The new spirit of Islamism: The diffusion of strategies for success among Brothers

Yelin Ezgi Karlı (aka Ezgi Başaran)

Student number: 1113332

Candidate number: 1026937

St Antony's College

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of DPhil in Asian and Middle Eastern Studies

Word Count: 93,100

Supervisor: Dr Michael J. Willis

Abstract

The main aim of this research is to explain the aspirations and concerns of Islamist actors in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings by looking at two sets of relationships: the relationship between Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, the AKP) with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (*al-Ikhwan al-muslimin fi Misr*, the MB) and the relationship between the AKP and Tunisia's Ennahda ('Renaissance' in English). These two relationships, details of which were not made public, were assumed to revolve around an Islamist agenda, especially because they involved the Egyptian MB, the oldest Islamist movement, whose transnational financial and operational ties, and offshoots were constantly investigated by governments around the world. However, this research demonstrates a more complex and nuanced situation, in which the main driving force was neither the MB nor Ennahda but the AKP, a non-Arab political party whose Islamist credentials are questioned within the realm of political Islam and, more importantly, by the actors involved in this interplay.[1]

In the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings, Turkey was in the unique position of having an Islamist-leaning ruling party that had enjoyed successive electoral victories and appeared competent in running a market economy (hence the promotion of the so-called 'Turkish model'[2]). The aspiring Islamist parties in Tunisia and Egypt emerged from authoritarian *de*

[1] See interviews in Istanbul with Talip Küçükcan on 12 July 2018, Tariq Al-Zomor on 6 August 2018, Yehia Hamed on 30 July 2018 and in Tunis with Ajmi Lourimi on 18 November 2019 and Noureddine Arboui on 20 December 2019.

[2] At the beginning of the 2000s, the AKP's founders signalled that the party embraced a democracy framework despite its Islamist background. This framework was immediately endorsed by Western powers –

facto single-party regimes based on crony capitalism with no background at all in government (indeed, many politicians had just been released from jail). Turkey seized this geopolitical moment to conceive a Middle East and North Africa (MENA) dominated by governments to which it could act as 'Big Brother'. Just as in the case of legislative and prescriptive packages designed by the EU to assist the former Soviet countries, and later Turkey, towards democratic and market-based transitions, the assumption was that certain key skills and strategies of governance were transferable, and that training could be offered to achieve particular key objectives. It was in this context that the abovementioned interrelationships were forged. This focus departs from the more common approach of examining each Islamist party in its national setting. Instead, this thesis presents the first scholarly study of the interplay between the AKP, Ennahda and the MB between 2011 and 2013, characterising the actors, the structure and the main features of the interaction and thereby illuminating a political confluence among these three critical Islamist entities in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings.

The empirical section of the thesis is based on in-depth elite interviews conducted in Tunisia, Istanbul, and Ankara since the summer of 2018. The secondary sources used are news articles, party, and movement documents in Arabic, Turkish, English, and French. Drawing upon diffusion literature and using process tracing, the study first outlines the structure, actors, interlocutors, and brokers of the process and then analyses the tactics diffused from the AKP to Ennahda and the MB.

the US, the UK, and the EU. Since the AKP's rise to power in 2002, global powers have held the AKP up as a successful model associating Islam with democracy and the free market, which they assert should be spread throughout Muslim Arab world. See Cihan Tuğal, *The fall of the Turkish model: how the Arab uprisings brought down Islamic liberalism* (Brooklyn, NY: Verso, 2016), 6–11.

Acknowledgements

I am indebted to my supervisor, Dr Michael J. Willis, who taught me how to organise my thoughts and questions academically. He has tolerated my journalistic aspirations, demeanour, and occasional hastiness, and has guided me not only as a supervisor but also as a kind friend. Thank you very much, Michael.

I also would like to thank my husband, Mehmet, and my son, Deniz, for being who they are and making me smile.

I cannot thank 'my girls' in Oxford enough for being there for me through my highs and lows. They made me feel safe and joyous in ways that only sisters can. I could not have completed this research without their support.

This thesis is dedicated to my late father, Prof Müjdat Başaran, and my beautiful mother, Prof Yelda Başaran, for shaping me into the person I am today. I was able to embark on this academic journey, beginning with an MPhil and continuing with this DPhil in my late 30s at the University of Oxford, simply because life around them taught me to be resilient and hopeful. So, *canım babam ve canım annem* – thank you for illuminating my path – always.

Table of Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS **5**

1 INTRODUCTION: AN INDIRECT LINE OF ENQUIRY **8**

THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 8
THE RESEARCH DESIGN 19
KEY FINDINGS 26
CHAPTER ORGANISATION 30

2 THE EVOLUTION OF ISLAMISM **33**

2.1 FROM BANNA TO MORSI 37
2.2 FROM ZAYTOUNA TO THE PARLIAMENT 44
2.3 FROM MILLI GÖRÜŞ TO THE AKP 53

3 THE HISTORY OF THE INTERACTION **59**

3.1 ERBAKAN, GHANNOUCHI AND THE MB 60
3.2 THE SPREAD OF FRAMES FOR LEGITIMACY 68
3.3 CONSERVATIVE/MUSLIM DEMOCRACY AND THE TURKISH MODEL 72
3.3.1 The origins of Conservative/Muslim democracy *74*
3.3.2 The origins of the Turkish model *81*
3.3.3 The EU and the Turkish model *89*

4 THE CONTEXT, MILESTONES AND ACTORS OF THE INTERPLAY **94**

4.1 THE AKP IN CAIRO, THE MB IN ANKARA AND ISTANBUL 100
4.2 THE AKP IN TUNIS, ENNAHDA IN ANKARA AND ISTANBUL 109
4.3 THE ACTORS AND INTERLOCUTORS 120
4.3.1 The elite actors *121*
4.3.2 The interlocutors and structure *124*
4.3.3 Brokers: Al Jazeera and Yusuf Al-Qaradawi *130*

5 THE TACTICS OF SUCCESS FOR ISLAMISTS **137**

5.1 WINNING THE SYSTEM 147
5.2 SERVICE TO PEOPLE IS LIKE A PRAYER 156
5.3 PROTECTIVE ALLIANCES AGAINST THE OLD REGIME 167
5.3.1 Threats and alliances for the MB *169*
5.3.2 Threats and alliances for Ennahda *183*

6 BROTHERS IN SEARCH OF THEIR BOURGEOISIE **188**

6.1 ROAD TO NEOLIBERALISM 193
6.2 THE ECONOMIC VISION OF ENNAHDA AND THE MB 200
6.3 CULTIVATING AN ISLAMIC BOURGEOISIE 213

7 THE NEW SPIRIT OF ISLAMISM **227**

7.1 ISLAMIST LONGING FOR SUCCESS 227
7.2 POST-ISLAMISM AND MANAGERIALISM 232
7.2.1 What do Muslim youth want? *236*
7.2.2 Managerial awakening *241*
7.2.3 Cheap Islamisation *249*

8 CHANGING DYNAMICS OF THE INTERPLAY **254**

8.1 POST-2013 PERIOD: FEAR, ISOLATION, AND ACTIVISM 257
8.1.1 The MB – the AKP *257*
8.1.2 Ennahda – the AKP *265*
8.2 ERDOGAN'S U-TURNS VIS-A-VIS THE MB 271
8.3 THE CURRENT CRISIS, DEMOCRACY, AND ISLAMISM 280

9 CONCLUSION: THE SINK, THE COOKER, AND ISLAMISM **294**

APPENDIX **309**

1. FIGURE 309
2. FIGURE 310
3. FIGURE 311
4. FIGURE 312
5. FIGURE 313
6. FIGURE 314
7. FIGURE 315
8. FIGURE 316
9. FIGURE 318

BIBLIOGRAPHY 320

NOTES ON TRANSLITERATIONS

This thesis employs the IJMES transliteration system, but familiar Arabic expressions such as *sharia* whose meaning is known in English are spelled without diacritics. All Arabic and Turkish terms are italicised. Names already widely used in their English forms are used in their common spelling. All Arabic and Turkish texts have been translated into English by the author. However, on several occasions, a native Arabic speaker's assistance has been sought to avoid any misconceptions. Arabic names containing articles are shortened from their second appearance onwards (e.g. Yusuf Al-Qaradawi to Qaradawi).

1 Introduction: An indirect line of enquiry

The research objective

This thesis examines two sets of relationships: that of Turkey's Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, the AKP) with The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (*al-Ikhwan al-muslimin fi Misr*, the MB) and that of the AKP with the Tunisian Renaissance Party (*Ennahda*) between 2011 and 2013. The main contention of the thesis is that there was a diffusion of tactics for success among three major, but distinct Islamist entities and that this diffusion provides hints regarding the aspirations and aims of contemporary Islamist movements.

From the fall of former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and President Ben Ali in Tunisia, the AKP maintained an intensive dialogue with the Egyptian MB and Tunisian Ennahda until 2013. While teams from the AKP – including parliamentarians, ministers, and successful mayors of big cities – travelled to Cairo and Tunis, delegations from the MB, especially members of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP – *hizb al-hurriya wa'l adala*) and Ennahda, came to Istanbul and Ankara, where they visited municipalities and police stations, attended workshops and conferences, and met with government ministers. What was the primary goal of these meetings, which were not made public at the time? What was discussed among these Islamists in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings? What does this political confluence mean for the spirit of Islamism?

I consider the occurrence of this interplay as evidence in and of itself that Ennahda and the MB sought something that their own decades-long organisational and political repertoire could not provide. I did not select Ennahda, the Egyptian MB and the AKP as case studies to compare their strategy, discourse, or praxis. An implicit dialogue took place between the

AKP and Ennahda, as well as between the AKP and the MB, the intricate details of which are still unknown today. Thus, the first aim was to expose the details of this political confluence which provided an opportunity for analysis because it involved two Islamist entities – the Egyptian MB and Ennahda – that, for the first time in their history, had run for free elections, founded political parties, and then assumed power.

My approach to Islamism is conceptual; in other words, I consider political actors, intellectuals, and political organisations as the main agents of Islamism. Rather than seeking answers to normative questions, I believe, tracking the transformation of the aspirations of Islamist actors and parties since the 1980s may yield a more comprehensive explanation of 'so fascinating a chameleon as political Islam.'[3]

Typically, Islamist political behaviour and action are construed by comparing Islamist movements to one another or examining their position *vis-à-vis* the state in the national context. This is not the gate through which this research enters the debate. In this sense, I agree with Talal Assad, when he claims that 'understanding any dominant concept of modern life is […] perhaps best approached indirectly. A straight line isn't always the most useful way to explore things because it assumes not only that the endpoint is known but also that the shortest way to it from the starting point is always the best.'[4] In a similar vein, Spiegel, who elucidated the competition between Moroccan Islamist movements to attract young people, contends that Islamist ideas and actions are shaped and re-shaped precisely in this way – through their interactions with one another, rather than their interaction with the state or Islamic ideology.[5] Scholars of social movements also argue that a review on the interaction between actors is crucial for gaining a 'deeper insight into

[3] James Piscatori, *Islam in a world of nation-states* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 131.
[4] Talal Asad, *Secular Translations: Nation-State, Modern Self, and Calculative Reason*, Ruth Benedict Book Series, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2019), 2.
[5] Avi Spiegel, *Young Islam: the new politics of religion in Morocco and the Arab world*, Princeton studies in Muslim politics, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015).

the complexities and agency involved in [any] process.'[6] The central question of this thesis arose from this line of thinking which led me to focus on an indirect line, -a political confluence- to determine Islamist actors' aspirations and goals.

Examining the transformation of the aspirations of key Islamist actors through their interaction with one another and using analytical tools such as diffusion framework, process tracing and morphology of ideology, I attempt to de-exceptionalise the lines of enquiry regarding Islamist entities. This approach is one way of distancing the research from both Orientalism and a 'postmodern/poststructuralist eulogisation of Islamism'.[7] De-exceptionalisation, in this sense, does not imply that the goals and ideological evolution of Islamist actors in MENA are indistinguishable from those of their Western or Latin American counterparts. Rather, it allows me to avoid the neo-Orientalist trap of treating the actors and polities of MENA 'as largely homogeneous, closed, parochial, and resistant to change'.[8] In effect, I consider the group interests of the MB, the AKP and Ennahda as internal forces of change and examine them as embedded in global political upheavals.

Two considerations justify my research topic and outline the puzzle I seek to unravel. First and foremost is the claim that the persistence of the ties between Islamist entities is fully explained by ideology. A simplistic and limiting assumption about transnational ties between Islamist actors is that they sought to create or join a utopian *umma*. Thus, it is commonly asserted that these three Islamist actors with a shared ideological background –

[6] Sean Chabot, 'Dialogue Matters: Beyond the Transmission Model of Transnational Diffusion between Social Movements' in *The diffusion of social movements: actors, mechanisms, and political effects*, ed. Rebecca Kolins Givan, Kenneth M. Roberts and Sarah Anne Soule (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 100.
[7] Maidul Islam, *Limits of Islamism: Jamaat-e-Islami in contemporary India and Bangladesh*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 70.
[8] Asef Bayat and Linda Herrera, *Global Middle East into the twenty-first century*, (California: University of California Press, 2021), 4.

the AKP, the MB and Ennahda – have attempted to form an *Ikhwani* bloc in the Middle East. News outlets raised this belief, postulating that the transnational dialogue between the AKP, Ennahda and the Egyptian MB concerned 'their mutual interest in restoring the era of Islamic rule'.[9] Turkey's President Erdoğan had been accused by Turkey's opposition as being 'an offshoot of Ikhwan and Al-Qaeda whose main aim is to revive *ummah*' and 'a supporter of Ikhwani groups who diluted Turkishness within the *ummah*'[10] but was at the same time praised by Islamist and pro-government news outlets[11] as being '*ümmetçi* (promoter of the *ummah*)' due to AKP's close relations with the MB and Ennahda. Renowned scholars of Islamism, including Bassam Tibi and Gilles Kepel, saw the interplay in a similar vein. 'Well-informed observers know of the growing connections between the Muslim Brothers and the AKP, as Turkish Islamists claim a neo-Ottoman leadership of the Middle East. The Muslim Brothers are also growing outside of Egypt, including in the US and Europe, thus becoming a transnational movement',[12] claims Tibi. Gilles Kepel's approach is akin to that of Tibi: 'The MB, Salafists of varied stripes and former Islamic fighters convened after April 2011, then once more in Istanbul in October under the auspices of Erdoğan's AKP and Qatar. The thought was to have Libya serve as the geopolitical hyphen between Ennahda's Tunisia and Morsi's Egypt, and thereby make one Brotherhood empire of eastern coastal North Africa. However, even within this movement, intertribal and regional conflicts prevailed over allegiance to a shared

[9] Mohammad Abdel Kader, 'Turkey's relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood', *Al Arabiya*, 14 October 2013.
[10] See examples of the discussion within opposition circles: Musa Özuğurlu, 'AKP'nin dış politikası, Suriye ve İhvan', *Sol Haber*, 26 March 2022; 'AKP sözcüsü Ömer Çelik Erdoğan ümmetçilik yapıyor eleştirilerine yanıt verdi', *Cumhuriyet*, 14 May 2021; Sabahattin Önkibar, 'Tayyip'in büyük paniği', *Aydınlık*, 02 December 2013; Erdal Atabek, 'Milletten ümmete geçerken', *Cumhuriyet*, 15 July 2019.
[11] See examples from within Islamist and pro-AKP outlets: Murat Zelan, 'Erdoğan artık bizim değil', *Yeni Şafak*, 04 January 2018; 'Erdoğan ümmetin lideri, *Yeni Akit*, 12 August 2014; 'Ümmetin duası Erdoğan'la birlikte', *Yeni Şafak*, 23 June 2018.
[12] Bassam Tibi, *Islamism and Islam* (New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press, 2012), 103.

ideology.'[13] Kepel fails to explain what this 'one Brotherhood empire' would entail or aim to achieve. Although he acknowledges that allegiance to a shared ideology was frustrated by conflict and most probably national interests, his approach implies the existence of a pan-Islamist agenda.

It is true that with its second term, starting in 2007, the AKP began to position itself as the voice of the Muslim world, particularly on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, where it aligned itself more with Hamas than with the Palestinian Liberation Organization's Fatah faction. This shift coincided with the appointment as Foreign Minister of the then foreign adviser Ahmet Davutoğlu, who was 'an unashamed Ottoman nostalgist and made no secret of his ambition to reassert Turkey as the preeminent power not only in the region but in the Muslim world'.[14] As a result, the AKP's attempts to reinforce relations with Muslim-majority countries led to a second assumption that Erdoğan 'dream[ed] of transforming Turkey in ways Suleiman the Magnificent would have admired. His ambition, it seems clear, is to return to the pre-Atatürk era, when Turkey was not only militantly Muslim but also a regional superpower,'[15] and that the 'secret agenda was not aimed at creating a theocracy with a hat rather than a turban'[16] but Neo-Ottomanism.[17]

A major study conducted by Davutoğlu's former student, Behlül Özkan of Istanbul Marmara University, examined around 300 of Davutoğlu's writings between 1990 and 2001. According to Özkan, Davutoğlu's foreign policy was not neo-Ottoman, as it had

[13] Gilles Kepel, *Away from Chaos: The Middle East and the Challenge to the West* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020), 161.
[14] Gareth Jenkins, 'Islamism in Turkey', in *Routledge Handbook of Political Islam*, ed. Shahram Akbarzadeh, (London: Routledge, 2012), 138.
[15] Niall Ferguson, 'The Middle East's Next Dilemma', *Newsweek*, 19 June 2011.
[16] Amir Taheri, 'Turkey and the neo-Ottoman dream', *Middle East Spectator*, 05 August 2011.
[17] See for more examples of such articles in Burcu Kaya Erdem, 'Adjustment of the secular Islamist role model (Turkey) to the 'Arab Spring': the relationship between the Arab uprisings and Turkey in the Turkish and world press', *Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations*, 23:4 (2012), 446–449.

been described in the Western media, but pan-Islamist. Davutoğlu believed in and promoted a Sunni Muslim order in the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia, led by Turkey.[18] Ümit Kıvanç concurs with Özkan, contending that Davutoğlu's discourse expressed the notion of a global resurgence of Islamism that would extend far beyond Ottomanism.[19] These arguments fail to account for the state of play in the transnational dialogue formed by the AKP with the Egyptian MB and Tunisian Ennahda and, therefore, miss the opportunity to examine the transformation of the goals and strategies of contemporary Islamists. They also cloud our understanding of the spirit of Islamism in the 21st century.

There is no denying the transnational aspect of 'Muslim politics'; however, 'this does not imply that one Muslim cultural unit has coalesced or that a transnational Islamic space has acquired dominance. There is a way to think about politics and policy that goes beyond simply replicating the structure of political wisdom that dominated the Cold War years.'[20] My research demonstrates that the interplay contained no global Islamist political project, as imagined in the 1980s, influenced by Jamal al-Afghani's conceptualisation of *ummah* or *dar al-Islam* – a territorial concept in which *sharia* is applied.[21] Contemporary Islamists, unlike their predecessors, have a symbolic understanding of a global Muslim solidarity mobilised whenever Muslims are in distress anywhere around the world. What Kepel described as the aim of building a Brotherhood empire could simply be explained by realist international relations theory as an interest-based relationship. For example,

[18] Behlül Özkan, 'Turkey, Davutoğlu and the idea of pan-Islamism', *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* 56, no. 4 (2014).
[19] Ümit Kıvanç, *Panislamcının Macera Kılavuzu,* (İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 2015).
[20] Dale F. Eickelman and James P. Piscatori, *Muslim politics*, First ed., Princeton studies in Muslim politics, (Princeton, NJ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1996), 163.
[21] James P. Piscatori and Amin Saikal, *Islam beyond borders: the umma in world politics* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 27, 34.

between 2011 and 2013, the interchange between the AKP and the North African parties seemed to benefit all involved. The North African parties gained the technocratic information they needed from an Islamist party deemed by powerful international actors to be a success and bolstered their position in government with the AKP's economic and geostrategic support. Similarly, these North African parties' rise to positions of power and decision-making in their respective countries would enable the AKP to exert its soft power in the region and open wider avenues for economic investment.

The prospect of Islamist interconnectedness has been exaggerated as pan-Islamic solidarity and is perceived as a threat, especially in the West.[22] The dynamics of the Islamist movements, actors and parties are, however, complex, and their goals follow divergent trajectories. An accurate problematisation of these trajectories within Islamism requires the use of different perspectives to re-examine the Islamist actors' ways and means of conducting politics, the shifts in their theological teachings and discourses and their relationships with one another.

The Islamist movements 'disagree about and clash over a wide range of issues, such as the role of women within their movement and in society as a whole, the importance that should be granted to ethnic and tribal affiliations; the proper allocation of rights, duties, and privileges across generations, the appropriate ways to share scarce local and national economic resources, the type of international and transnational relations that ought to be developed, and with whom.'[23] Islamists are also strongly tied to their local contexts, and nationalism is often perceived as adjacent to their core ideology. In contemporary Islamist

[22] Piscatori and Saikal, *Islam beyond borders*, 1.
[23] Aurélie Campana and Cédric Jourde, 'Islamism and social movements in North Africa, the Sahel and Beyond: transregional and local perspectives', *Mediterranean Politics* 22, no. 1 (2017): 3–5.

thinking, being a member of the global Muslim community – *ummah* – entails nothing more than facing and responding to similar challenges as Muslims in different countries. While S. Sayyid sees Islam as a master signifier in the polity of MENA countries,[24] Roy argues that Islam has never been a dominant factor but, rather, one with a legitimising effect[25] on ethnic and national factors and that Islamists have, since the 1980s, 'largely abandoned transnational militant solidarity and are centred on national politics, with an agenda based on three main points: a call to replace corrupt ruling elites, a conservative socio-cultural agenda, and robust nationalism'.[26] Put simply, 'Islamo-nationalism triumphs over pan-Islamism.'[27]

A second motivation for this research is to provide empirical evidence for an understudied aspect of the Arab Uprising era, that is, the relations between Islamist political parties. An overview of the literature on the Arab Uprisings of 2011 reveals a wide range of monographs, edited volumes and journal articles on the causes and prospects of the revolutions, employing various methodologies and theoretical frameworks.
While some examine how the revolution impacted different countries of the Middle East through paradigms of democratic transition, agency to democratisation, contentious politics and democracy promotion,[28] others provide accounts of the role of civil resistance since 2011[29] in countries from Tunisia to Yemen, questioning the relationship between

[24] S. Sayyid, *A fundamental fear: eurocentrism and the emergence of Islamism* (London: Zed Books, 2015), 31–51.
[25] Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam: the search for a new Ummah* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 70.
[26] Roy, *Globalized Islam*, 58.
[27] Olivier Roy, *The failure of political Islam* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994), 201.
[28] Larbi Sadiki, *Routledge handbook of the Arab Spring: rethinking democratization* (London: Routledge, 2016).
[29] See Fawaz A. Gerges, *Contentious politics in the Middle East: popular resistance and marginalised activism beyond the Arab uprisings* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Lina Khatib and Ellen Lust, *Taking to the streets: the transformation of Arab activism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014).

historical agency and structure investigating internal and external factors.[30] Some attempt to answer broader questions, such as what the revolutions of 2011 mean for the Middle East[31] and North Africa,[32] and to 'reveal the multi-causal explanations for the suddenness and velocity of the revolts'[33] while others juxtapose the revolutions with colonialism and argue that they are 'post-ideological, meaning they [Arabs] are no longer fighting according to terms dictated by their condition of coloniality, codenamed "post-colonial"'.[34] Asef Bayat attempts to make sense of the Arab revolutions by focusing on everyday contentions, the routines of ordinary people and the agency of the subalterns on the streets.[35] There is an uneven focus on the Egyptian revolution,[36] which is unpacked using the tools of various disciplines, ranging from ethnographic methodologies[37] to those of quantitative political science.[38] While some works trace the historical continuity in Egypt's revolutionary moments and contextualise the historic and contemporary issues that led to the 'unravelling' of the 2011 revolution,[39] others analyse the 891 days that the MB stayed

[30] Adam Roberts et al., *Civil resistance in the Arab Spring: triumphs and disasters* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
[31] Nayef R. F. Al-Rodhan, Graeme P. Herd and Lisa Watanabe, *Critical turning points in the Middle East: 1915–2015* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
[32] Frédéric Volpi, *Revolution and Authoritarianism in North Africa* (Oxford University Press, 2017).
[33] Ricardo René Laremont, 'Moving past revolution and revolt: Transitions to democracy in North Africa', in *Revolution, revolt and reform in North Africa: the Arab Spring and beyond*, ed. Ricardo René Laremont (Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge studies in Middle Eastern democratization and government, 2014), 4.
[34] Hamid Dabashi, *The Arab spring: the end of postcolonialism* (London: Zed Books, 2012), 10.
[35] See Asef Bayat, *Life as politics: how ordinary people change the Middle East*, Second ed. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2013); Asef Bayat, *Revolution without revolutionaries: making sense of the Arab Spring*, Stanford studies in Middle Eastern and Islamic societies and cultures, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2017); Asef Bayat, *Revolutionary life: the everyday of the Arab Spring* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2021).
[36] See Tarek Osman, *Egypt on the brink: from Nasser to the Muslim Brotherhood*, updated ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013); Bernard and Lacroix Stephane Rougier, *Egypt's Revolutions: Politics, Religion, and Social Movements* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); Lloyd C. Gardner, *The road to Tahrir Square: Egypt and the United States from the rise of Nasser to the fall of Mubarak* (London: Saqi, 2011); David D. Kirkpatrick, *Into the hands of the soldiers: freedom and chaos in Egypt and the Middle East* (London: Bloomsbury Circus, 2018); Maha M. Abdelrahman, *Egypt's long revolution: protest movements and uprisings* (London: Routledge, 2014).
[37] Walter Armbrust, *Martyrs and Tricksters: An Ethnography of the Egyptian Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019).
[38] Neil Ketchley, *Egypt in Time of Revolution: Contentious Politics and the Arab Spring* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
[39] M. Cherif Bassiouni, *Chronicles of the Egyptian Revolution and its Aftermath: 2011–2016* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

in power[40] or focus on the evolution and transformation of the MB's discourse and strategies from its foundation to its overthrow by the Egyptian military in 2013.[41] There is also a significant attempt to ascertain how Islamist movements or Islamism influenced the revolts and the impact of the revolts on Islamism.[42] There are certainly also comprehensive contemporary works that examine Ennahda[43] and the Tunisian revolution,[44] and a number of journal and newspaper articles on different aspects of the Turkish model which will be explained in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, very few examples focus on the interplay between the AKP, Ennahda and the MB from 2011 to 2013. One is Cihan Tuğal's seminal work explaining what the Turkish model entails for Islamist movements such as Ennahda and the MB through a Gramscian political sociology lens.[45] The second is Pargeter's book which explores how the Egyptian and Libyan MB and Tunisian Ennahda 'tried to transform themselves into mainstream political actors' after the revolutions.[46] However, neither of these books presents the details, structure and actors of the symbolic and tactical diffusion between the AKP-Ennahda and the AKP-MB. Although the works mentioned above contain fundamental truths and aspects of the Arab Uprisings and Islamism, they do

[40] Eric Trager, *The Arab Fall: How the Muslim Brotherhood Won and Lost Egypt in 891 days* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016).
[41] See Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood: evolution of an Islamist movement* (Princeton: Princeton University, 2013); Hazem Kandil, *Inside the Brotherhood* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015); Noha Mellor, *Voice of the Muslim Brotherhood: Da'wa, Discourse, and Political Communication* (Routledge, 2017).
[42] See John L. Esposito et al., *Islam and Democracy after the Arab Spring* (Oxford University Press, 2016); Usaama al-Azami, 'Locating ḥākimiyya in global history: the concept of sovereignty in premodern Islam and its reception after Mawdūdī and Quṭb', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (2021); Ferran Izquierdo, John Etherington and Laura Feliu, *Political Islam in a time of revolt*, Islam and nationalism, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017); Eid Mohamed and Dalia Fahmy, *Arab Spring: modernity, identity and change*, Critical political theory and radical practice (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019); Robin B. Wright, *The Islamists are coming: who they really are*, (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2012).
[43] See Rory McCarthy, *Inside Tunisia's al-Nahda: between politics and preaching* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018); Anne Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia: the history of Ennahda* (London: Hurst & Company, 2017).
[44] Nouri Gana, *The making of the Tunisian Revolution: contexts, architects, prospects* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013).
[45] Cihan Tuğal, *The fall of the Turkish model: how the Arab uprisings brought down Islamic liberalism*, (Brooklyn NY: Verso, 2016).
[46] Alison Pargeter, *Return to the shadows: the Muslim Brotherhood and An-Nahda since the Arab spring* (London: Saqi, 2016), 8.

not present the full story. Additional dimensions, such as the focus on transnational and trans-party dialogues during and after the revolutions provided by this research would contribute to a more nuanced understanding.

Owing to the absence of truly democratic processes, and to co-opting tendencies within the Arab dictatorial regimes, the role of political parties, especially Islamist parties, is also overlooked by the literature.[47] Political parties in the Arab world were viewed as a 'far cry from traditional Western-style political parties [that] seek to win elections and assume executive power [because] they were rarely given the opportunity to govern – [or even consider governing] – at local or national levels.'[48] The period after the Arab Uprisings, however, unlocked a new avenue for studying party politics in the Arab world. Ennahda won 40 per cent of the seats and formed the first government in Tunisia in 2011, while the MB in Egypt, via its political party FJP, won 46 per cent of the seats; in 2012 its candidate, Mohammed Morsi, became the first democratically elected president of Egypt. Sadiki believes that 'one of the best ways of rethinking the conundrum of Islamism and democracy'[49] is to study cases of Islamist parties. In effect, the victories of Ennahda and the MB at the ballot box offer us a rare entry point for investigating Islamist party practices.

Although political parties cannot provide all the answers or a panoptic account to explain the malleability and transformation of an ideology, they can 'offer an illuminating sub-set

[47] Francesco Cavatorta and Lise Storm, *Political parties in the Arab world [electronic resource]: continuity and change* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018), 1–2.
[48] Shadi Hamid, 'Political party development before and after the Arab Spring' in *Beyond the Arab Spring: The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East*, ed. Mehran Kamrava (Oxford University Press, 2014), 132.
[49] Larbi Sadiki, 'Tunisia's Ennahda: Islamists Turning the Learning Curve of Democracy and Civic Habituation' in *The politics of Islamism: diverging visions and trajectories*, ed. J. L. Esposito, Lily Zubaidah Rahim, Nasir Qubadzadah (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 87–88.

of ideological discourse production and implementation'.[50] They should be seen as agents capable of rendering ideologies palatable as well as contributing to the 'increase or decrease of ideological polarisation through what has been termed value cleavages.[51] They 'can change the salience of interest and pressure groups and the sub-ideologies they carry within a broad ideological family, and can encourage ideological elasticity by refocusing on different electoral demands or presumed preferences in the process of negotiating policy.' By focusing on the relationship between the AKP and Ennahda and the MB/FJP, this research also reveals the Islamists' attempts to become political parties able to compete in free elections.

The research design

Although I employed a grounded theory approach, it is important to note that I, too, made assumptions regarding this interplay. Based on the vast amount of literature on transnational Islamism and Turkey's foreign policy shift towards the Middle East since 2009, as briefly mentioned above, it seemed reasonable to assume that the interplay between these three Islamist entities might be related to building a transnational Sunni Islamist bloc and that it might be guided by Islamist ideology. This assumption has not obscured the grounded theory approach. On the contrary, it has enabled me to juxtapose a rival explanation with my findings.

[50] Michael Freeden, 'The Morphological Analysis of Ideology' in *The Oxford handbook of political ideologies*, ed. Michael Freeden, Lyman Tower Sargent and Marc Stears (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 130.
[51] Freeden, 'The Morphological Analysis of Ideology', 131.

The course of this research is the following. First, I seek to uncover the details of the interplay that started with the Arab Uprisings of 2011. As mentioned above, despite numerous studies that focus on the promotion of a Turkish model for the Arab world and cite the relationship between the AKP and North African countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya as the exemplar of this promotion, the details and goals of such interplay are overlooked in the literature. Therefore, the first and foremost aim of this research is to fill this gap with tangible evidence. The second aim is to explain the interplay by using diffusion framework and process tracing methods.

Before going any further, we need to define the concept of diffusion and how it applies in this context. The diffusion framework is usually used to investigate protest tactics, repertoires, innovations, or collective actions that spread from one group or actor to another.[52] However, 'interpretive frames that actors construct to define issues, codify problems and solutions, target responsible parties, and mobilise political claims'[53] also diffuse. What distinguishes diffusion from the broader dissemination of information or economic and diplomatic linkage is the involvement of both active senders and, crucially, active recipients and that the message should concern a new idea.[54]

What is the new idea here? The AKP provided the parties reviewed here with tactics that would help them gain and retain power. Such tactics may not, at first glance, seem a 'strategic innovation' since all political parties aim to rule. However, this general precept hardly applies to the Islamist parties confounded by authoritarian post-colonial regimes. For example, although Ennahda had sought, since its founding in 1981, legality and

[52] Givan, Roberts and Soule, *The diffusion of social movements: actors, mechanisms, and political effects*, 2.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Everett M. Rogers, *Diffusion of innovations*, 5th ed. (New York; London: Free Press, 2003).

inclusion in the Tunisian parliamentary system, it had no means to govern at its disposal. The Egyptian MB was in the same position, as was, for example, the Moroccan Justice and Development Party (PJD – *Parti de la Justice et du Développement*), which had to downplay its successes in local elections for fear of agitating the king.[55] Therefore, in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings, it was a novel experience for these Islamist parties to seek methods to win elections and, more importantly, to stay in power.

Why would this particular toolbox of tactics that the AKP concocted help these Islamist parties? To answer this question, I first divided into categories the tactics that the AKP provided to the MB and Ennahda. Then I used the process tracing method to determine whether these tactics correlated with the AKP's history in power and had values congruent with its success and crisis management. Process tracing employs descriptive inferences to explain 'the evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case for the purposes of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms.'[56] This method requires the use of 'histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process hypothesized or implied by a theory is, in fact, evident in the sequence'.[57] Accordingly, in Chapter 5 and 6, I move back and forth between explaining the tactics used in the AKP's rule in Turkey since 2002 and those given to the MB and Ennahda to illustrate how these tactics were formed by AKP's experience and stem from its tried-and-tested methods. This type of 'correlation mapping' is used to find *prima facie* evidence of other diffusion processes – whether material or

[55] Michael J. Willis, 'Morocco's Islamists and the legislative elections of 2002: the strange case of the party that did not want to win' *Mediterranean Politics* 9, no. 1 (2004).
[56] Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, *Process tracing : from metaphor to analytic tool*, Strategies for social inquiry, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 7.
[57] Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case studies and theory development in the social sciences*, BCSIA studies in international security, (Cambridge, MA; London: MIT Press, 2005), 6.

ideational (diffusion through normative power).[58] As a result, I explain the material diffusion by introducing four categories of tactics - crisis evasion, legitimisation, winning elections and maintaining power- from the AKP that aimed to assist Ennahda and the MB between 2011 and 2013. The symbolic diffusion which precedes the Arab Uprisings is explained by certain frames such as Muslim/conservative democracy and the Turkish model used by the AKP, the MB and Ennahda to become legitimate political actors. I consider these tactics and frames as evidence contributing to a better understanding of Islamist aspirations and strategies.

For this research, I talked to numerous elite actors from different socio-economic, cultural, and national backgrounds to reveal the relationship between the AKP, Ennahda and the MB in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings. As the process tracing method prescribes, the interviews, conducted in English, Turkish and Arabic from 2018 to 2021 in Istanbul, Ankara, Tunis, and London, were not selected randomly but based on a thorough inquiry into who was involved in the confluence or had relevant knowledge. The interviews were, then, designed as semi-structured and were conducted in different settings, in different countries and at different times, without any interviewee knowing in advance what the others had said, or indeed who the other interviewees were.

Although exposing the thinking of elite actors and how this changes over time cannot answer all our questions about Islamism, elite interviews enable us to determine 'what is paramount, what is negotiable, and what might be left to the essentially uncertain arena'.[59] As Bermeo contends, documenting elite thinking and the political learning processes of elites is crucial

[58] T. M. J. Lenz, 'EU normative power and regionalism: Ideational diffusion and its limits' *Cooperation and conflict* 48, no. 2 (2013): 222.
[59] Nancy Bermeo, 'Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship,' *Comparative Politics* 24, no. 3 (1992): 277.

to understanding the trajectory of any political action. Although political learning occurs at all levels of society, the learning experience of political leaders is particularly important for the reconstruction of democracies and 'discrediting old beliefs is what political learning is all about'.[60] In the context of Islamism, elite interviews are especially important because Islamism is more or less organised around elite agents rather than ideas,[61] an aspect that will be seen more clearly in the following chapter.

My position as a researcher had an effect on data collection. Before I embarked on my MPhil and DPhil studies at Oxford, I was an established journalist and the editor-in-chief of a liberal-left newspaper in Turkey. The newspaper was shut down as a result of the government crackdown, and I had to halt my professional activities for the safety and well-being of my family. I was, therefore, a known figure – and an unpopular one in the eyes of the many AKP members. Accordingly, some of my interviewees were reluctant to meet me since they did not want to be seen 'talking' to a journalist from 'the other side'. In the contemporary Turkish context, 'the other side' includes any individual who does not pledge allegiance to Erdoğan. However, in the course of my research, the key people who knew about the interplay or took an active part in it gradually parted ways with the AKP; some even moved to the opposition benches. Fortunately, despite temporary setbacks, I managed to interview almost all the relevant individuals from the AKP. The senior members of the MB and certain other Egyptian Islamist elites had taken refuge in either Istanbul or Ankara and were willing to be interviewed. Very few refused to meet me or requested anonymity or pseudonyms for this research. I was fortunate to have met and interviewed all the Ennahda members who were crucial to the interplay before the de facto

[60] Bermeo, 'Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship', 281.
[61] Çınar, *Siyasal Bir Sorun Olarak İslamcılık: AKP'nin 20 Yılı*, 101.

coup of Tunisian President Kais Saeid. Unfortunately, I was not allowed by the central university research ethics committee (CUREC) of the University of Oxford to travel to Egypt to conduct interviews, for safety reasons. A key potential interviewee there would be the deputy Supreme Guide of the MB, Khariat al-Shater. His insights would deepen this research but, since he was already imprisoned, it would have been impossible to meet him even if CUREC had allowed me to travel to Egypt.

Generalisation is a common trap in case studies, and I may be criticised for focusing on an exceptional political confluence following consecutive revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011. Surely, it may be argued, this interplay cannot illustrate or explain all aspects of Islamist aspirations and objectives and it is also true that one study cannot portray the 'multifarious forms of Islamism that surged since the 90s'.[62] Notwithstanding these points, I am still convinced that the interplay at the heart of this research does not stand as an outlier in the story of Islamism but rather an outcome of the transformation of Islamists' goals. The two-decade-long rule of Turkey's Islamist-based AKP, the rise and fall of the Egyptian MB's fledgling party FJP, and Tunisia's Ennahda – once seen as a beacon of reconciliation and consensus – make these three entities and their unprecedented interplay between 2011 and 2013 worthy examples for the study of change within political Islam. These three entities wielded – and continue to wield – significant intellectual and organisational clout within Islamist movements. Egypt's MB is considered the mother of Islamist politics, inspiring the establishment of other Islamist movements in the Middle East, particularly in Syria, Jordan, and Palestine. Ennahda's founder and president, Rachid Ghannouchi, is widely regarded as one of the most prominent contemporary Islamist

[62] Aurélie Campana and Cédric Jourde, *Islamism and social movements in North Africa, the Sahel and beyond: transregional and local perspectives*, Routledge studies in Mediterranean politics 7 (London; New York: Routledge, 2018).

politicians and thinkers. Ennahda's journey to government in Tunisia since 2011 has demonstrated its 'alliance-building, consensus-based and power-sharing approaches',[63] indicative of 'significant trends within political Islam and its party expressions'.[64] Finally, the AKP has, since its foundation, been promoted by the West as the best example of the fusion of Islamism, democracy, and the market economy. These three entities and the diffusion process among them allow us, therefore, to examine contemporary Islamist aspirations and provide clues to their transformation.

A sense of inevitability should not be projected onto this diffusion process in hindsight, as if it was natural for the MB and Ennahda to forge a close relationship with the AKP in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings. The AKP is a non-Arab political party whose Islamist credentials are questioned within the realm of Islamism especially by the followers of the MB and Ennahda. As for receiving tactics on winning elections and governance, the MB and Ennahda could have forged a dialogue with older political parties around the world or relied on their decades-old political repertoires. They did not. In this sense, the non-existence of a similar diffusion process between the AKP and the Moroccan PJD can be viewed as a test case. Although the PJD's leaders have praised the AKP's reforms and electoral victories in the media, and once claimed to be observing 'Turkey as an example to see how a faith-based, or an identity based, political party could develop pragmatic policies to deal with the challenges',[65] no meetings, personal connections or tactic diffusion have taken place between the two parties. A former foreign policy adviser to the AKP who was active in meetings between the AKP, and the MB claimed, 'I remember that

[63] John L. Esposito, Lily Zubaidah Rahim and Nāṣir Qubādzādah, *The politics of Islamism: diverging visions and trajectories*, Middle East today, (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 15.
[64] Francesco Cavatorta and Fabio Merone, 'Moderation through exclusion? The journey of the Tunisian Ennahda from fundamentalist to conservative party,' *Democratization* 20, no. 5 (2013): 859.
[65] Feriha Perekli, 'The applicability of the "Turkish model" to Morocco: the case of the Parti de la justice et du developpement (PJD),' *Insight Turkey* 14, no. 3 (2012): 95, 98.

we [the AKP] tried to contact the PJD after the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia, but they were not interested. They are in another dimension.'[66] In that 'other dimension', King Mohammed VI of Morocco, known as the Commander of the Faithful, is the ultimate regulator of legitimacy. The PJD was co-opted by the regime into the political system in 2011, transforming it from the main opposition party to part of the executive branch through ministries. However, the PJD's inclusion was designed in such a way that those it was 'obliged to sit with in the new coalition government were veterans of previous governments and thus stalwarts of the existing political order' and 'the co-option of the PJD into government represented the conclusion of the successful containment of the effects of the Arab Spring.'[67] Because the PJD's aspirations and legitimacy were formed within the boundaries set by the Moroccan monarchy, there was little need for the AKP's tactics or symbols.

Key findings

The interview process of this research was initially designed to disclose the details of the diffusion process among these parties, but the theme of success was mentioned in every interview and, thus, emerged at the centre of this research without guidance or manipulation. The Egyptian MB and Ennahda, like Turkey's AKP, prioritised *success* which, in this context, meant winning elections, overcoming military autocracy, and consolidating power in the state. They wanted to learn the specifics of a 'success model' – dubbed the Turkish model in this context - that was constructed by a diverse cast of actors

[66] Interview with a former foreign policy advisor to the AKP, Oxford, 19 February 2020.
[67] Michael J. Willis, 'Evolution not Revolution? Morocco and the Arab Spring,' in *Routledge handbook of the Arab Spring: rethinking democratization*, ed. Larbi Sadiki (London: Routledge, 2016), 444.

including Western policymakers, think tanks, Turkish soft power actors, Arab intellectuals, Islamist entities and academics.

What is this model and why is it considered successful? While some scholars opted to use the term 'post-Islamist' to define this model, others have invented or adopted various other definitions, such as Islamic liberalism or, occasionally, an Islamo-democracy, a Muslimhood model, conservative populism, institutional Islamism, conservative democracy or a neo-Islamist model.[68] Olivier Roy called the adherents of this model simply 'new Islamists'.[69] Even though I agree with the scholarship that reviews the AKP's model as post-Islamist, I also emphasize that it is 'a product of the geopolitical reconfigurations of the post-Cold War era'.[70] In keeping with this historical context, this research conceptualizes the pursuit of success as attempts to embed Islamist praxis into the neoliberal rationality by Islamists themselves. As defined by Foucault, neoliberal rationality is any conduct that can systematically be adapted and modified in response to changing circumstances.[71] The diffusion process sought to equip Ennahda and the MB with tactics and frames capable of delivering the most adaptable conduct to achieve

[68] See Asef Bayat, *Post-Islamism: the changing faces of political Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Robin B. Wright, *The Islamists are coming: who they really are* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2012); Paola Rivetti, 'Political Islam in the age of democratization, by Kamran Bokhari and Farid Senzai' (2015); Yüksel Taşkın, 'Arap Baharı ve Türkiye'deki İslamcı çevrelere etkileri: Baharımızı kışa çevirtmeyeceğiz' *Birikim Dergisi* July–August, no. 303–304 (2014); John L. Esposito, Tamara Sonn and John Obert Voll, *Islam and democracy after the Arab Spring* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); Ali Bulaç, *Din ve Siyaset* (İstanbul: İnkilap Yayınevi, 2014); Jenny B. White, *Muslim nationalism and the new Turks*, Princeton studies in Muslim politics, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013); Peter G. Mandaville, 'Post-Islamism as Neoliberalisation: New Social Movements in the Muslim World' in *Islam after liberalism*, ed. Faisal and Kazmi Devji, Zaheer (London: Hurst & Company, 2017); Tarek Chamkhi, 'Neo-Islamism in the post-Arab Spring', *Contemporary Politics* 20, no. 4 (2014); Bassam Tibi, *Islamism and Islam* (New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press, 2012); Tuğal, *The fall of the Turkish model: how the Arab uprisings brought down Islamic liberalism*.

[69] See Olivier Roy, 'The myth of the Islamist winter', *New Statesman* 141, no. 5136 (2012).

[70] Yohanan Benhaim and Kerem Öktem, 'The rise and fall of Turkey's soft power discourse', *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, 21 (2015): 9.

[71] Michel Foucault, Michel Senellart and Graham Burchell, *The birth of biopolitics: lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–79* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 269.

success. This adaptation, I argue, prompts Islamist movements in question to shift their agenda and modus operandi, 'evolving towards reformism and negotiation […] to gain a place within the system'.[72] This is not surprising given that neoliberal rationality does not only implicate economic policy but rather leads 'market principles becom[ing] governing principles applied by and to the state, circulating through institutions and entities across society.'[73]

Following the Arab Uprisings, there would be inevitable crises on the path to power for Ennahda and the MB, as well as while in power. First, Egypt and Tunisia had just experienced a revolution that had toppled the dictators, ushering in a period of transition. However, elements of the former regime remained and posed a threat that both Ennahda and the MB had grown accustomed to facing even before the Uprisings, due to the regimes' oppressive and at times co-opting stance to these Islamist movements. For members of the MB and Ennahda, whose careers had evolved in exile or under imprisonment, achieving power 'would reverse this image and make them a legitimate part of [… local and international] society'.[74] Despite the removal of the dictators, the MB's and Ennahda's 'political preferences and trajectories [were still] mediated by organisational constraints and opportunities that regulate[d] their strategic choices over time'.[75] Thus, winning the election, coming to power and staying in power were three major challenges facing the MB and Ennahda and would require perennial crisis

[72] Ferran Izquierdo and John Etherington, 'From Revolution to Moderation: The Long Road of Political Islam' in *Political Islam in a time of revolt (Islam and nationalism*, ed. Ferran Izquierdo, John,Etherington and Laura Feliu (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 18.
[73] Wendy Brown, *In the Ruins of Neoliberalism: The Rise of Antidemocratic Politics in the West*, The Wellek Library Lectures, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2019), 19.
[74] Kasper Ly Netterstrøm, 'The Islamists' Compromise in Tunisia', *Journal of Democracy* 26, no. 4 (2015): 121.
[75] Jerome Drevon, 'The Constrained Institutionalization of Diverging Islamist Strategies: The Jihadis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Salafis between Two Aborted Egyptian Revolutions', *Mediterranean Politics: Islamism and social movements in North Africa, the Sahel and Beyond: transregional and local perspectives* 22, no. 1 (2017): 19.

management skills and the institutionalisation of their movements. Conveniently, the AKP was eager to 'export its model for governance to North Africa, especially to post-Arab Uprisings Egypt and Tunisia'.[76] The AKP officials believed they were providing these North African parties with the blueprint for a successful model that had enabled them, as Islamists, to rule Turkey with a military that regarded itself as the guardian of a secular republic. The MB officials in Egypt admitted that, despite being one of the world's oldest Islamist movements, they lacked the necessary experience of government. The same was true of Ennahda. As the former director of the Al Jazeera Media Network, Wadah Khanfar, put it, they [Ennahda and the MB in Egypt] were 'looking for the rules of the game. They were after a model in terms of government structure'.[77]

Actors or states 'embrace internationally sanctioned policy models or institutional forms because of their normative appeal […] – or feel compelled to conform as a condition for'[78] international legitimacy. In 2011, Turkey was still seen as the Muslim power preferred by the West, with NATO membership, an ongoing EU accession process and a high level of integration with European markets. Put another way, the AKP was regarded as a European actor with an Islamist background that had successfully implemented a market-friendly economic programme delivering economic prosperity.

From this perspective, the AKP's model was normatively appealing to both the Egyptian MB and Ennahda. In other words, it paved the way for such parties to be recognised as viable political actors on both domestic and international levels. In this sense, there is nothing unique about the attempts to emulate transnational movements on the part of these

[76] Emmanuel Karagiannis, *The new political Islam: human rights, democracy, and justice* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018).
[77] Interview with Wadah Khanfar, London, 6 December 2018.
[78] Rebecca Kolins Givan, Kenneth M. Roberts and Sarah Anne Soule, *The diffusion of social movements: actors, mechanisms, and political effects* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 9.

Islamist groups or other ideological entities suppressed by national or international actors.[79]

S. Sayyid, in the second edition of *Fundamental Fear* (published in 2003) summarises the conundrum of Islamists as if he had access to the interviews I conducted: 'The major difficulty faced by Islamists, despite all their rhetoric of Islam as a total system, a complete way of life, is that when it comes down to it, far too many of them have a very limited idea of what 'a way of life' is. […Hence] it is not surprising that so many Islamists are considered unequal to the task of managing the complexities of contemporary governance. Their capacity to make the trains run on time or make sure the garbage is collected is often put into question.'[80] Remarkably, the chapters in which I lay out the structure and details of the diffusion process between the AKP, Ennahda and the MB, bear witness to how garbage collection had become a symbolic as well as a practical issue among these actors. 'There is great need for Islamists to demonstrate great skill in dealing with the banality of governing'[81] continues Sayyid. This thesis, to some degree, features this endeavour of the Islamists and sheds light on their goals.

Chapter organisation

The following chapter outlines the evolution of the MB, Ennahda and the AKP. It serves as a second introduction to the thesis while situating the interplay already within the broader context of Islamism. Chapter 3 then describes the historical background of the relationship

[79] Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, 'Introduction: Religion, States, and Transnational Civil Society' in *Transnational religion and fading states*, ed. Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and James P. Piscatori, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 36.
[80] S. Sayyid, *A fundamental fear: eurocentrism and the emergence of Islamism* (London: Zed Books, 2015), xxix.
[81] Sayyid, *A fundamental fear: eurocentrism and the emergence of Islamism*, xxx.

between the AKP's predecessor movement, *Milli Görüş* and the MB in Egypt; and Ennahda in Tunisia since the 1980s. The purpose of Chapter 3 is to demonstrate the extent of the relationship prior to the 2011 uprisings by explaining the use and diffusion of two frames as signposts towards legitimacy and success: The 'Turkish model' and the 'Muslim democracy/Conservative democrat' model.

As Collier contends, process tracing requires good snapshots to be taken at a series of specific moments to adequately describe an event or situation over time, and this is what Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 aim to do: to take snapshots of events or dialogues at specific points between 2011 and 2013 'to characterize key steps in the process which in turn permits good analysis of change and sequence'.[82] Chapter 4 chronicles pivotal events and meetings from 2011 to 2013 between the parties. It sets out the structure of the diffusion, as well as identifying the key actors, institutions and brokers who helped craft this relationship. The fifth chapter categorises and explains the tactics shared by the AKP with Ennahda and the MB, all of which the AKP believed to be principal components in its success.

Chapter 6 begins exploring Islamists' encounters with neoliberalism and continues explaining economic vision of the MB and Ennahda and why the AKP's economic strategy appealed to them. It demonstrates the crux of the AKP's economic strategy – the cultivation of an Islamic bourgeoisie – and how this was diffused and translated to Ennahda and the MB. This chapter also provides the most tangible causal inference of the diffusion process. Chapter 7 attempts to expound on the meaning of 'success' for these actors. In the broadest sense, the pursuit of success at all costs and the formation of an

[82] David Collier, 'Understanding Process Tracing', *PS, Political Science & Politics* 44, no. 4 (2011): 824.

entrepreneurial self are key social tenets of the neoliberal system.[83] The first part of the chapter discusses Islamists' longing for success, and their managerial spirit in attaining this success by engaging with *The New Spirit of Capitalism* by Boltsanki et al.[84] The second part of the chapter attempts to incorporate the discussion into a post-Islamist[85] framework. Finally, Chapter 8 presents a summary of how the relationship between the AKP, the MB and Ennahda evolved from the 2013 Egyptian coup to 2022, highlighting Erdoğan's remarkable U-turns regarding the MB and Ennahda. This last section adds to the evidence that the primary motivation in the interplay of these parties was neither Islamic activism nor the establishment of a Sunni bloc.

[83] Glenn Adams et al., 'The Psychology of Neoliberalism and the Neoliberalism of Psychology', *Journal of Social Issues* 75, no. 1 (2019): 191.
[84] Luc Boltanski, Eve Chiapello and Gregory Elliott, *The new spirit of capitalism*, New updated ed. (London: Verso, 2018).
[85] Bayat, *Post-Islamism: the changing faces of political Islam*.

2 The evolution of Islamism

If the ambition is contributing to the deliberation of a 'new spirit of Islamism' by demonstrating the changing goals and aspirations of the Islamists in the post-Arab Uprising, unpacking Islamism's emergence and evolution are imperative. Despite a plethora of literature and a wealth of sources, Islamism remains an enigmatic socio-political phenomenon, and scholars struggle to explain the changing faces of its followers.[86] The Orientalist or culturalist approach to studying Islamism, in which Islam and Muslim culture are treated as constant variables, results in a reductionist and rigid understanding of political Islam. Insufficient and prejudiced views on the politics of Islam also stem from the use of modernisation theory as a primary analytical paradigm. Modernisation theory assumes that political institutionalisation and economic expertise lead to 'the emergence of centralised commercial, bureaucratic and educational structures and [consequently] superstition wanes and religion recedes from a role in public life'.[87] With its secular bias and sharp demarcation between the traditional and the modern, modernisation theorists are bound to regard political Islam as inherently backward, static, and totalitarian. Modernisation theory also overestimates the notion that Islam dictates every sphere of Islamist politics.

Seen through a postmodernist lens, Islamism emerged as a result of the quest of Muslim societies for 'cultural autonomy, alternative polity and morality versus the universalizing secular modernity'.[88] Hence, the argument goes, Islamism is a reaction to postmodernity.

[86] Khalil Al-Anani, 'Upended Path: The Rise and Fall of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood', *The Middle East Journal* 69, no. 4 (2015): 528.
[87] Dale F. Eickelman and James P. Piscatori, *Muslim politics*, First ed., Princeton studies in Muslim politics, (Princeton, NJ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1996), 23.
[88] Asef Bayat, 'Islamism and Social Movement Theory', *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 6 (2005): 894.

Postmodernity can, in this context, be defined as the plurality of truths and the dissolution of certainties. While Muslims felt besieged by the cultural encroachment of modernism, postmodernism compelled them to seek certainty and coherence in the form of tangible moral codes and stable cultural authenticities to which they could attach themselves.

A distinction should be made between reacting to Western dominance and reacting to modernism or postmodernism. Islamism concerns a political agenda, but the contents of that agenda – the ideas and projects of early Islamists – arose in response to Western encroachment. They began to take shape at the end of the nineteenth century, during the colonial presence in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Islamism, like any other ideology, borrowed concepts and strategies from other contemporaneous, action-oriented movements, in particular nationalism, with the goal of 'creating cultural identities in which national and Islamic belongings become intertwined'.[89] True, Islam lies at the core of Islamist ideology, and Islamists argue to varying degrees for the union of religion and politics – *din wa dawla.* In practice, however, Islamists are rational and motivated by interest-based calculations, like all other political actors.[90] Therefore, 'the emphasis on *din wa dawla* inadvertently perpetuates Orientalist assumptions [about] Muslim politics.'[91]

There is also a tendency within academia and the media to see the struggle of Islamist actors with secular states – colonial or local – as the main approach to understanding Islamism. The claim is that Islamist actors' resistance to secularism forms part of their resistance to European modernity. There is, in this line of thinking, didactic reductionism to spare. When we reduce Islamism's struggle to one with secularism, we have to devise a rivalry of models

[89] Jocelyne Cesari, 'Political Islam: More than Islamism', *Religions* 12, no. 5 (2021): 2.
[90] Eickelman and Piscatori, *Muslim politics*, 23, 56.
[91] Eickelman and Piscatori, *Muslim politics*, 56.

that will determine the prospects of Islamism – as Owen does: 'In the prolonged contest between Muslim secularism and Islamism, will one ideology and regime type eventually win?'[92] 'Today, Iran exemplifies Islamism, while Turkey exemplifies a new Islamist–secularist hybrid; gauging the relative success of each country can help us predict which regime will eventually come to predominate.'[93] I do not find this approach helpful, because it often does not seem to correlate with the objectives of today's Islamists and constructs an incomplete narrative. It can only provide hints as to their relationship with state institutions.

Positioning Islamism against modernism, secularism or postmodernism does not help us elaborate the nature of Islamism – its goals, strategy and agenda – but represents a Western attempt to 'elaborat[e] on the efforts to capture the particularities of Islam'.[94] Islamism is entwined with 'twentieth-century Western ideas of both liberal and totalitarian variety [and thus] Islamism as an ideology cannot be simply regarded as a matter of cultural authenticity that the postmodernists eulogize, but rather a question of political agenda and choice'. [95]

Islamist movements emerged not because their societies failed to adapt to modernity but because they saw the 'failures of world systems and worldviews hostile to Islam, such as Western democracies, socialism, communism, and secularism, albeit in ambiguous or merely rhetorical terms [and claimed that] Islam is the answer'.[96] In a similar vein Islamist movements drew 'strength from the widespread deficiencies of the post-colonial states in

[92] John M. Owen, *Confronting political Islam: six lessons from the West's past* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015), 111.
[93] Owen, *Confronting political Islam, 14.*
[94] Frederic Volpi, *Political Islam: a critical reader* (London: Routledge, 2011), 21-22.
[95] Maidul Islam, *Limitism: Jamaat-e-Islami in contemporary India and Bangladesh's of Islam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 71.
[96] Richard C. Martin and Abbas Barzegar, *Islamism: contested perspectives on political Islam* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 11.

the Middle East: massive corruption, overreliance on coercion, and the failure of Arab Socialism in Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Algeria – and a comparable form of state-led development in Turkey – to produce sustained economic development. These failures have coincided with the collapse of various secularist, nationalist, and leftist political projects, leaving the field of opposition politics more or less to Islamists.'[97]

The evolution of Islamism depended on a concatenation of major events in the Middle East, especially after the departure of the colonial powers. The nation-building processes in the Middle East and North Africa following independence are critical in the evolution of Islamist movements and the place of religion vis-à-vis the state. Although the majority of states emerged with a European model of secular apparatuses, the elites – especially in Iraq, Turkey, and Tunisia – believed that a nation forged almost overnight needed the glue of a homogenised religion and language. This homogenisation of religion and reorganisation of the religious community and its interaction with political power led to the deeper politicisation of Islamist movements.[98] Islamists held that the ruling regimes that rose to power after the colonial powers had left their countries were still dependent on them, and thus inherently illegitimate. Therefore, Islamism contains a sentiment of revanchism; it does not, however, promise 'a primitivist utopia, although this is the manner in which it presents itself'[99] but, rather, an unveiling of authenticity in Muslim-majority countries, especially those that suffered under colonial rule. Subsequently, despite seeming conservative in its rhetoric because it is attached to the period of the Prophet, it also requires revolutionary action to perturb the existing system.[100]

[97] Beinin, 'On the Modernity, Historical Specifity, and International Context of Political Islam,' 8.
[98] Jocelyne Cesari, 'Political Islam: More than Islamism', *Religions* 12, no. 5 (2021): 2–4.
[99] Aziz Azmah, *Islams and modernities*, 3rd ed. (London: Verso, 2009), 82.
[100] Volpi, *Political Islam: a critical reader*, 2.

Certain broader regional and international developments that followed the nationalist rivalries of the post-colonial era in the Arab world also affected the standing of Islamist movements: the defeat of Arab states led by Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser against Israel and the failure to recapture Palestine in 1967. The prominent contemporary Islamist scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi, for example, connects the Palestinians' displacement from their land and the foundation of the Israeli state in 1948 (*an-nakbah* – catastrophe) and the Arab defeat of 1967 (*an-naksah* – setback) with the awakening of Islamism.[101] This defeat further depreciated what was left of the credibility of nationalist–populist Arab regimes. Following the death of Nasser, a few years after the 1967 trauma, discourses revolving around liberation, Marxism and socialism lost their rigour and, 'although other populist regimes thrived in the region (in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Algeria), with similar structures and discourses, the tide was permanently reversed. A new force was maturing rapidly, namely, Islamism'[102] to fill the ideological vacuum.

2.1 From Banna to Morsi

The Muslim Brotherhood built on an intellectual heritage that sought answers to the existential question of what Muslims should do to foil and resist Western presence and pressure.[103] As the first Islamist movement, it initially aligned itself with the Egyptian nationalists. Its ideological project reached 'its fullest articulation only after the failure of earlier secular ideologies, such as Arab nationalism and socialism, with which they

[101] Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, *Islamic Awakening Between Rejection and Extremism* (International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2007).
[102] Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, *Islamic fundamentalism*, Twentieth century religious thought, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 21.
[103] Volpi, *Political Islam: a critical reader*, 31.

aim[ed] to compete.'[104] Islamists assumed that Muslim societies, their authenticity, culture and identity were under attack and Islam has something important to say about how politics and society should be ordered.[105] According to Kepel, the MB 'wanted to re-ignite the same torch that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had just extinguished in abolishing the Ottoman caliphate in 1924'.[106] Therefore, action was required to return to the Golden Age when Islamic civilisations led the way in social and scientific innovations and afforded social justice and human rights.

The founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan Al-Banna, worked at the time in Ismailiyya, Egypt, where he witnessed the most visible effects of European colonialism through the establishment of the Suez Canal Company, and was influenced by the thinking of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–97), Afghani's student Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) and Abduh's follower Rashid Rida (1865–1935). It was here that Banna initiated his advocacy that Islam had the solutions to fight against what he saw as the degeneration caused by colonial domination. What started as conversations in coffeehouses in Ismailiyya became, in 1928, the organisation called the Society of Muslim Brothers (*Jam'iyyat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin*). Through its prominent leaders, Banna and later Sayyid Qutb, the Society influenced Islamist movements worldwide. Banna advocated an Islamic order (*nizam islami*), of which the most important component was an Islamic state. The solution to the problem, he argued, was the Islamisation of society and then the state via the implementation of *sharia* (Islamic law). Only then would Muslims find their authentic selves.

[104] Browers, 'The secular bias in ideology studies and the case of Islamism', 80.
[105] Ayoob, 'Political Islam: Image and Reality', 1.
[106] Gilles Kepel, *Away from Chaos*, 12.

Considered as one of the primary ideologues of Islamism, Sayyid Qutb was not initially a member of the Brotherhood and even criticised several MB leaders in the aftermath of the 1952 Free Officers revolution led by Gamal Abdel Nasser. Qutb later joined the MB and was arrested by the Nasser government. He was then released on the grounds of ill health but rearrested and, in 1965, executed. Nasser's repression of the MB during the 1950s and 1960s, jailing and torturing its members and denying them access to the legal political arena, had been paradigmatic for the MB.[107] The MB's persecution and Qutb's execution caused rising frustration and anger within the organisation and led to radical ideas gaining prominence.[108]

President Anwar Sadat, Nasser's successor in Egypt, provided the Brotherhood with a fluid arena in which to manoeuvre in the 1970s. He released imprisoned Brotherhood leaders to counterbalance the leftists.[109] It was also during this time that the second Supreme Guide of the MB, Hasan al-Hudaibi, indirectly criticised the approaches of Qutb. For example, in his famous work 'Preachers not Judges (*du'at la qudat*)', Hudaibi argued that *jihad* against a manmade state solely because the latter is not based on *sharia* was illegitimate.[110] He also advocated for non-violent means to further the MB's goals.

Although the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran boosted the Brotherhood, the group experienced 'conflicting currents'[111] during the Hosni Mubarak era of the 1980s. For example, while the MB participated in parliamentary elections by forming alliances with the centrist-nationalist Al Wafd Party in 1984, 1987 and 1995, this partnership drew

[107] François Burgat, 'From national struggle to the disillusionments of 'recolonization': The triple temporality of Islamism' in *Political Islam: A Critical Reader*, ed. Frederic Volpi (London: Routledge, 2011), 34.
[108] Ayubi, *Political Islam: religion and politics in the Arab world*, 130, 39.
[109] Pargeter, *Return to the shadows*, 17–19.
[110] Annette Ranko and Justyna Nedza, 'Crossing the Ideological Divide? Egypt's Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood after the Arab Spring', *Studies in conflict and terrorism* 39, no. 6 (2016): 528.
[111] Alison Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood: from opposition to power*, New edition, Paperback ed. (London: Saqi, 2013), 45.

criticism from hardliners[112] who believed that these moves would corrupt the movement. However, by participating in these elections, the MB had 'plunged into formal politics, expanded its social network, and reached out to liberal and secular forces'.[113]

Until the 1990s, the MB had maintained its goal of establishing *sharia* and an Islamic state in Egypt and continued to be committed to its *tawheed* (unity of God) ideology which held that Islam should be involved in every aspect of life and politics. However, like many Islamist movements around the world, including the Turkish one, by the early 1990s, the MB 'publicly asserted a belief in the civic and religious value of democracy and demanded its full implementation into the Egyptian political system'.[114] The MB's involvement in electoral politics meant coexistence with the Mubarak regime through appeasement, concessions, and alliances. It had not, however, abandoned its early commitments regarding *sharia* and, from the mid-1990s, a dual call for democracy and *sharia* could be seen in the MB rhetoric.[115]

The movement proposed establishing 'a civil state' in which, theoretically, all citizens regardless of religion or gender would be equal and started 'actively using the language of personal freedom'.[116] However, there is little evidence that the MB translated this theory and rhetoric into real-life practice. For example, it should be recognised that the MB deputies almost always opposed the liberalisation of laws regarding non-Muslims' and

[112] Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood: from opposition to power*, 47.
[113] Khalil al-Anani, *Inside the Muslim Brotherhood: Religion, Identity, and Politics* (Oxford University Press, 2016), 7.
[114] Harnisch and Mecham, 'Democratic Ideology in Islamist Opposition? The Muslim Brotherhood's "Civil State"', 191.
[115] Harnisch and Mecham, 'Democratic Ideology in Islamist Opposition?', 193.
[116] Harnisch and Mecham, 'Democratic Ideology in Islamist Opposition?', 202.

women's rights by claiming they ran contrary to *sharia*. This should be considered proof of the MB's uncompromising approach to gender issues and deep conservatism.[117]

However, it was also during this period that a difference of opinion regarding strategy, practice and ideology emerged within the MB, with the younger generation advocating for a civil state with an Islamic reference rather than the full application of *sharia* into the state apparatus.[118] The divide within the MB has been formulated either as the younger generation versus the old guard or as reformists versus conservatives, where the young/reformists were critical of the MB's rigid and authoritarian inner structure and the old guard were considered as 'more zealous, conservative and committed primarily to long-term religious missionary work (*dawa*) and to preserving the movement's unity.'[119]

The events of 9/11 caused the MB, like almost all mainstream Islamist movements, to rephrase its message to the West. For the 2005 presidential election campaign, the MB revised its discourse to position the movement as 'open, moderate and democratic'. However, its credibility as an opposition party was tarnished due to its hesitant support – or lack of support at times – to the Kifaya (Enough) movement which started at the end of 2004 and protested against corruption and authoritarianism in the Mubarak regime. Although its younger members were more supportive of the Kifaya protests, writing commentaries on Islam Online and Al Jazeera.net, this was not enough in the eyes of the Kifaya's political supporters, comprising Nasserists, liberals, secularists and leftists.[120]

[117] Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood: evolution of an Islamist movement*, 275.
[118] Adel Abdel Ghafar Ghafar, Bill Hess *Islamist Parties in North Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt*, Brookings Institution (June 2018), 7.
[119] Maria Claret-Campana and Athina Lampridi-Kemou, 'Islamist forces in contemporary Egypt: The end of conventional dualities' in *Political Islam in a time of revolt*, ed. Ferran Izquierdo, John Etherington and Laura Feliu (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 131.
[120] Noha Mellor, *Voice of the Muslim Brotherhood: Da'wa, Discourse, and Political Communication* (Routledge, 2017), 183–87.

Meanwhile, the MB's parliamentary experience in 2005, in which it had to present a more or less civil programme with general references to Islam, 'directly impacted the Brotherhood's political discourse and its propaganda, generating a new Brotherhood approach entirely distinct from the organization's direction under the monarchy, Nasser, and Sadat'.[121] In 2006, some of its leaders embarked on an initiative to reintroduce the organisation to the West and fight misconceptions in an attempt to portray the Brotherhood 'as the representative of an emerging modern Islamism worthy of popular support'.[122] As Al-Ghobashy argues, although once a society of Muslim Brothers that set out to win Egyptian hearts and minds to establish an Islamic state, by the mid-2000s the Brotherhood had 'transformed into a flexible political entity […] highly responsive to the unforgiving calculus of electoral politics'.[123]

By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, 'most of the Brotherhood's leaders were savvy enough to realize that their objective of turning Egypt into an Islamic state was not realizable in the short term'.[124] Although, in the second half of the 2000s, the MB refined its 'core political beliefs, [stating that] the people are the source of all power and that the transfer of power must occur through free, clear elections and [that] the people should be fairly represented through parliamentary elections, and no citizen – male or female – should be excluded from participation',[125] the main problem persisted until the 2011 Uprisings – that is, the need for a demarcation between 'a political movement or an evangelizing society, […] the separation between the religious and political'.[126] As

[121] Amr Elshobaki, 'The Muslim Brotherhood - Between Evangelizing and Politics', in *Islamist politics in the Middle East: movements and change*, ed. Samer S. Shehata (Routledge, 2011), 113.
[122] Osman, *Egypt on the brink*, 110.
[123] El-Ghobashy, 'The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers', 390.
[124] Tarek Osman, *Egypt on the brink: from Nasser to the Muslim Brotherhood*, Updated ed. (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2013), 118.
[125] Kamal Helbawy, 'The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: Historical Evolution and Future Prospects' in *Political Islam: context versus ideology*, ed. Khalid Haruub, SOAS Middle East issues (London, England: Saqi, 2010), 85.
[126] Elshobaki, 'The Muslim Brotherhood – Between Evangelizing and Politics', 114.

Pargeter observes, just before the revolution, around 2010, the conservatives were dominant;[127] however, this did not mean that the reformist wing had been sidelined altogether.

The path that the Brotherhood should take has continued to divide reformists and hardliners, as well as the younger and older generation, during and after the 2011 Uprisings. With the formation of a political party, the FJP, another source of conflict – between the *hizb* (party) and the *haraka* (social movement) – emerged within the context of political contestations. By the time the revolution erupted 'the Brotherhood encompassed a broader range of viewpoints, orientations, and interests than ever before.'[128] Both the literature and the findings of the present thesis indicate that, in the post-Mubarak era, a younger generation of Brothers, in particular members of the FJP, sought to adopt the Turkish model, while the older generation within the movement were sceptical of some of its aspects, such as conforming to the expectations of a secular state. As Bayat contends, 'in Egypt, the old guard continued to pursue an Islamizing agenda, while the youth leaned toward a post-Islamist perspective'[129] and 'view the AKP as their model of Islamic governance […] which is certainly a considerable departure from the group's early 1990s adherence to the Quranic concept of 'shura.'[130]

A broader range of opinions and interests can lead to deeper fragmentation in movements like the MB even when in a position to acquire state power. The fragmented nature of the group explains why the party and the movement could not be separated during the FJP's rule, and why no coherent governance or survival strategy could be produced. The

[127] Elshobaki, 'The Muslim Brotherhood – Between Evangelizing and Politics', 23.
[128] Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood*, 132.
[129] Asef Bayat, *Post-Islamism: the changing faces of political Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 25.
[130] Asef Bayat, 'Arab revolts: Islamists aren't coming!' *Insight Turkey* 13, no. 2 (2011): 9–14.

supreme guidance bureau was formed of leaders who had endured the persecution of the Nasser era, respected for their decades of service. The second group comprised 'pragmatic conservatives [with] more flexible views and wider political experience – Mohammed Morsi and Khairat al-Shater belonged to this group.'[131] The young, tech-savvy, social-media-literate members in their 20s were disillusioned by both these groups, some even freezing their membership by the end of the Mubarak era because their reformist demands and ideas fell on deaf ears.[132] What brought all these factions within the MB together was the opportunity for power and a consensus on the acceptance of 'the procedural aspects of democracy noting that shura consultation is mandated by Islam and was practised by the Prophet Muhammad himself'.[133]

2.2 From Zaytouna to the parliament

It is essential to look back at the main actors of the post-independence period and the state-building process in Tunisia to form a picture of the emergence and evolution of Ennahda. The first coherent nationalist movement in Tunisia emerged with the Destour Party, founded in 1920 and short-lived because it was challenged by an internal, younger, and more radical group, the Neo-Destour party, which became the leading actor in Tunisia's nationalist movement. Soon after Tunisia had wrested independence from France, a divide emerged within the Neo-Destour party too. Neo-Destour's secretary-general, Salah Ben Youssef, was less Westernised than its leader, Habib Bourguiba. Ben Youssef brought with him more traditional and conservative Tunisians, such as students and scholars of the

[131] Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood*, 133.
[132] Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood*, 141–42.
[133] Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood*, 280.

Zaytouna Faculty at the Zaytouna Mosque. Although the antagonism between Bourguiba and Youssef was based on their rivalry for power, it also reflected an important reality about Tunisian society and the position of Islam during the post-independence period. Bourguiba and Youssef symbolised two different Tunisian publics and divergent views on the kind of country Tunisia should become.[134] Whereas Bourguiba represented a modern, secular, Westernised, French-speaking outlook, Ben Youssef spoke for the Arab-Islamic identity and a state built on this identity. However, between these opposing views stood millions of Tunisians 'who admire[d] aspects of the West and modernisation but also insist[ed] on the Arab-Islamic identity that [lay] at the core of their being'.[135] This context is key to understanding why Ennahda tried, from its very foundation, to play a part in mainstream politics.

When Bourguiba emerged triumphant from the power struggle with Ben Youssef and became the first president of independent Tunisia, he not only pursued his top-down modernisation agenda but also attacked those sectors of society that had supported Youssef. One of his early missions was to subordinate the *ulama* and religious institutions. He employed the *ulama* in newly established ministries and made them issue fatwas whenever necessary to legitimise his policies. This co-opting of the *ulama* served both to control Islamism and take revenge for the support that the religious sector had given Youssef.[136] A string of Jacobin reforms followed, which irritated devout Tunisians.

[134] Kenneth Perkins, 'Playing the Islamic Card: The Use and Abuse of Religion in Tunisian Politics' in *The Making of the Tunisian Revolution*, ed. Nouri Gana (Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 61.
[135] Perkins, 'Playing the Islamic Card', 61.
[136] Michael J. Willis, *Politics and power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from independence to the Arab Spring* (London: Hurst, 2012), 156.

Bourguiba, who stated on several occasions his admiration for Turkey's founder, Atatürk, integrated the *sharia* court into the state judicial system, introduced a Personal Status Code, which prohibited polygyny, gave women the right to divorce, set a minimum age for marriage and ended male repudiation. Bourguiba clothed these reforms in Islamic garb and claimed that he was not anti-Islam but using *ijtihad* to reinterpret the commands of the Quran. Although Bourguiba was Western-educated and secular in outlook, the Tunisian state was never secular, and Bourguiba made references to Islam and joined Friday prayers whenever he felt it was required. Therefore, when the Islamic Tendency Group (*Mouvement de tendance islamique* – MTI), Ennahda's predecessor, emerged in the 1980s, 'it was not as a notional return to Islam in direct opposition to a secular regime, but as a reaction against a state that had sought to monopolise the definition of Islam'.[137]

The Islamist movement in Tunisia started as a discussion group called *Jamaa Islamiyya* in and around Zaytouna University, the oldest Islamic teaching institution in the Middle East, prompted primarily by a feeling of alienation. Rachid Ghannouchi, the co-founder of MTI and later Ennahda, articulated this sentiment: 'The attack on religious institutions was one of the first decisions taken after independence. My generation thus felt excluded and ostracised. We constituted an Arab-Islamic base, and the country was in the process of Westernization. […] People wondered if they were really living in their own country.'[138] With the wave of books printed by The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Tunisian Islamists became exposed to the ideas of Banna and Qutb. Although Tunisian Islamists were not part of the Egyptian MB organisation, they were undoubtedly ideologically linked. Like the MB, they advocated for the social justice that Islam would bring. However, as former

[137] Rory McCarthy, 'Re-thinking secularism in post-independence Tunisia', *The Journal of North African Studies* 19, no. 5 (2014): 735.
[138] François Burgat, *Face to face with political Islam* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003), 29.

Ennahda MP Sayida Ounissa claims, the creation of the movement in the 1970s was not a case of Ghannouchi merely importing MB ideology into Tunisia but of adapting it to meet Tunisia's changing needs and modern tendencies.[139]

In 1979, the Islamic discussion group held its first conference and elected Ghannouchi as its leader. In 1981, it held a press conference at which it announced its new name, MTI, to highlight its progressive stance and ability to adapt to changing societal and political situations.[140] It was a critical episode in Tunisian Islamism, since it signalled the group's desire for legality and inclusion in the political and public spheres. The MTI manifesto also rejected violence and called for a multi-party system. Tunisian Islamism thus sought to position itself as a mainstream entity from the outset. However, its demand for recognition was met with greater repression: Bourguiba's response to the emergence of the MTI in 1981 was brutal. Threatened by its very existence, Bourguiba was later to announce: 'the eradication of the Islamicist poison will be the last service I'll render Tunisia.'[141] Shortly after its foundation, the MTI leaders were imprisoned for having formed an illegal organisation, only to be released in 1984.

During that time, the MTI agenda expanded, calling for respect for human rights, further reforms, democratisation, and social justice. Another important aspect of this era was MTI's decision to strengthen its base by encouraging its supporters to accept positions in the government, the military, the police force, and the trade unions. The main student union (UGET) was quickly filled with MTI sympathisers. Although the government's refusal to include MTI in the Tunisian polity did not result in a violent resurgence, it certainly led MTI to infiltrate the system informally. The MTI's recruitment process and

[139] Sayida Ounissi, 'Ennahda from Within: Islamists or "Muslim Democrats"?' in *Rethinking political Islam*, ed. Shadi Hamid and William F. McCants (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 231.
[140] Anne Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia: the history of Ennahda* (London: Hurst & Company, 2017), 50.
[141] Willis, *Politics and power in the Maghreb*, 166.

initiatives to take over syndicates, unions and certain government positions very much resemble MB operations in Egypt. With Ben Ali in power, the MTI, whose leaders were immediately released from prison, thought it opportune to initiate a rapprochement with the regime. It seemed like a new era, with a chance for MTI to run in the 1989 elections.

While Ben Ali changed his party's name from Neo-Destour to the Democratic Constitutional Rally (*Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique* – RCD) to demonstrate the end of the Bourguiba era, the MTI renamed itself Ennahda to avoid any Islamic reference in its title. It also toned down its Islamic rhetoric in public and claimed that it did not seek to undo Bourguiba's secular reforms or oppose the Personal Staturs Code. However, because its application for recognition as a political party had been left in limbo, it had to participate in the 1989 election by fielding independent candidates across the country. The election results proved alarming for the Ben Ali regime. The Ennahda candidates received 30 per cent of the votes, while the other opposition parties polled less than 5 per cent combined. In the official records, Ennahda's vote was reduced to 14.5 per cent and Ben Ali claimed to have received a 99 per cent endorsement as president. He refused to give Ennahda official recognition as a political party and depicted Islamists as a threat to Tunisia's social order due to their 'dangerous dogmatism' in contrast to the 'tolerance' of the regime.[142] The Ben Ali regime's portrayal of Islamists as 'outsiders, ideologically intolerant, terrorists, and subversives'[143] was highly exaggerated and part of the government's smear campaign against any potential opposition. Declaring the election results were rigged, an infuriated Ghannouchi left for Algeria and then for self-imposed exile in London. Ennahda was officially banned, and many members of the movement

[142] McCarthy, 'Re-thinking secularism in post-independence Tunisia', 741.
[143] Rory McCarthy, 'The Tunisian Uprising, Ennahdha and the Revival of an Arab-Islamic Identity' in S. Holliday and P. Leech (eds.) *Political Identities and Popular Uprisings in the Middle East*. (London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2016), p. 162.

were imprisoned by 1992. Ghannouchi's period in exile in London shifted his angle on politics and changed his mind about how to position Islam in a modern state structure.

Ennahda had, from the outset, showed its desire to be recognised as a political party, an ambition not seen in its ideological brother, the MB, which opted to maintain its opaque structure. Despite this continued aspiration, Ennahda had the chance to contest an election only once, in 1989, and as mentioned above then its candidates had to stand as independents, illustrating the repression it has endured, alongside the constant threat of arrests. However, unlike FIS in Algeria, this threat did not lead Ennahda to resort to violence. Although its Islamic rhetoric became at times radicalised, due to internal rifts in the movement and the crackdown by government, the prevailing approach has always been one of conciliation and even compromise. Ghannouchi had endorsed democracy and spoken of the importance of gaining power through parliament since the mid-1980s.
In 1995, the Ennahda congress, held in Switzerland, officially declared the movement's revised approach. According to this new approach, which Ghannouchi called Islamic democracy, *sharia* law would serve as the basis of the state, to be implemented by councils whose members would be elected by the people. This system, he argued, was compatible with democracy and a multi-party system.[144]

The imprisonment or exile of Ennahda's leaders, which lasted almost two decades, has been interpreted both as either a break for reformation or as the end of its story.[145] The truth lay somewhere in between: Ennahda was not dead but had been dealt a blow so great that reforming the movement or keeping it alive was an endeavour that required substantial

[144] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia: the history of Ennahda*, 97.
[145] Salwa Ismail, *Rethinking Islamist Politics: Culture, the State and Islamism* (London New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 138.

effort even after the Uprising. However, this prison-exile period, because it stripped the Nahdawis (followers of Ennahda) of the meaning and means for their political project,[146] led to self-criticism and internal debate regarding their strategy during the Ben Ali period. One of those debates, recorded in a secret document circulated in 2004 among the elites of the movement, assessed that Ennahda 'had overreached itself in its confrontation with Ben Ali' and proposed a strategy and discourse that favoured compromise, pragmatism and inclusion.[147] According to this document, the leaders also seemed to be embracing a market economy.[148] What these snapshots demonstrate is that '[Ennahda's] intellectual revision came well before the strategic behavioural change of the post-2011 period. It was not simply the pressure of contingent political competition that produced ideological change.'[149]

During the election campaign in 2011, Ennahda advocated for women's rights and economic stability and strived to present itself as the 'antithesis' of the dangerous, retrograde group depicted by Ben Ali's government,[150] even running an unveiled female activist, Souad Abderrahim, as a candidate on the Tunis 2 electoral list.[151] Referring to Ennahda's concessions regarding *sharia*, women's status and blasphemy, Monica Marks argues that the passing of the constitution in 2014 exemplifies the party's willingness to 'dilute' its religious ideological goals when faced with public resistance.[152] It was true that internal divisions had arisen during the writing of the constitution in 2014 over the explicit identification of *sharia* is a source of legislation but 'Ghannouchi and other leaders'

[146] Rory McCarthy, *Inside Tunisia's al-Nahda: between politics and preaching* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 102.
[147] Rory McCarthy, *Inside Tunisia's al-Nahda*, 120.
[148] McCarthy, *Inside Tunisia's al-Nahda*, 104.
[149] McCarthy, *Inside Tunisia's al-Nahda*, 120.
[150] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia: the history of Ennahda*, 2.
[151] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia: the history of Ennahda*, 133.
[152] Monica L. Marks, *Convince, Coerce, or Compromise? Ennahda's Approach to Tunisia's Constitution*, Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper (February 2014), 2.

interpretation of *sharia* as being more of a philosophy and way of life than a legal code won out. The movement decided not to push for a reference to it in the constitution.'[153]

One of the founders of the AKP, Beşir Atalay, (former deputy prime minister 2011–14) states that he went to Tunisia in 2018 and met with Ghannouchi:

> During our long chat, I asked Ghannouchi how he managed to persuade Ennahda's base in not including *sharia* in the new Tunisian constitution. He replied that he employed *ijtihad* [interpretation of Quranic legal codes by a qualified Islamic scholar]. I congratulated him and said, 'Please continue to produce such *ijtihad*s!'[154] The majority of Ennahda's leadership either spent years in the West in exile or were educated there. They knew that attempting to Islamize Tunisia would cause a nuisance to the public. They knew that the only solution is more democracy.[155]

A group of academics and journalists close to the AKP travelled to Tunisia to meet with Ennahda members in 2012. Among them was Mümtazer Türköne, who claimed that they went to share their opinions and compare the experiences of Turkey and Tunisia:

> I said to them [Nahdawis], let's collectively, lift the burden of establishing an Islamic state from the shoulders of Ennahda. I realized that day that Ghannouchi who once advocated for God's sovereignty, intends to relieve Ennahda of that burden as well. This exemplified the distinction between Islamism in opposition and Islamism in power.[156]

---

[153] Ghafar and Hess, *Islamist parties in North Africa*, 15.
[154] The role that ijtihads play in the malleability of Islamism as an ideology can be explained like this: 'the distinction between the core and dependent variables, the stable and the flexible constituents of Islam in which […] duties towards God are classified as part of the immutable core of Islam, while duties towards men – with the exception of a limited number of issues definitively laid down in the Koran Sunna – are subject to change and re-definition through *ijtihad*', in Gudrun Kramer, *Visions of an Islamic Republic: Good Governance According to the Islamists*, ed. Frederic Volpi, Political Islam: a critical reader, (London: Routledge, 2011), 88–89.
[155] Interview with Beşir Atalay, Ankara, 2 August 2019.
[156] Mümtazer Türköne, *Doğum ile Ölüm arasında İslamcılık* (İstanbul: Kapı Yayınları, 2012), 171.

In the 2014 elections, without the wave of popularity they had experienced in 2011, Ennahda allied with Nidaa Tounes – Tunisia's then main opposition party whose membership can be characterised by a general 'fear of Islamism'.[157] By adopting a more centrist position – conceding on religious matters and allying itself with secular parties – Ennahda showed that it was not the dogmatic Islamist party its opponents feared it to be. The decision to drop the demands that *sharia* form the source of legislation and the inclusion of the secular Nida Touness party in the cabinet were not just for show. As McCarthy argues, these steps constituted 'a formal organisational break with [Ennahda's] religious, cultural, and social activities.'[158]

In a 2016 congress, aware of the increasingly negative connotations of the term 'Islamism' with the rise of ISIS (also known as ISIL or Daesh), Ghannouchi proclaimed that Ennahda was no longer a party of 'Islamists' but one of 'Muslim democrats'.[159] As shown above, this process of rebranding and relabelling has recurred throughout the party's history as the Islamist movement has continually tried to present itself as moderate and progressive. Marks interprets this relabelling less as a change in how party members see themselves but, rather, how they want to be seen.[160] It is undeniable, however, that Ennahda has undergone substantial change since the days of MTI in 1981.

[157] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 4.
[158] Rory McCarthy, 'When Islamists lose: the politicization of Tunisia's al-Nahda Movement', *Middle East Journal* 72 (2018): 19.
[159] Sayida Ounissi and Monica Marks, 'Ennahda from Within: Islamists or "Muslim Democrats"?' in *Rethinking political Islam*, ed. Shadi Hamid and William F. McCants (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017) 238.
[160] Ounissi and Marks, 'Ennahda from Within', 242.

2.3 From Milli Görüş to the AKP

Milli Görüş (National Outlook), the mother movement of the AKP, is a Turkish Islamist movement of the 1970s led by Necmettin Erbakan. Its main positions can be summarised as anti-Western and anti-finance capital and its initial goal was to establish an Islamic order. Erbakan's parties, born out of *Milli Görüş* – the National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi* 1970–1971) and the National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi* 1973–1980) – were shut down by the secular establishment for alleged anti-secular activities.
By the 1990s, Turkish Islamists had undergone a transformation. A new vocabulary emerged, including concepts such as coexistence, interfaith dialogue, and the Charter of Madina – the constitution promulgated by Prophet Muhammad in Madina that stipulates a multi-religious Islamic state – and Turkey's Islamists became interested in issues such as minority rights and human rights. They shifted their oppositional rhetoric towards the regime as a result of a dual impetus to both safeguard themselves from the state and become part of it.

Ghannouchi sees similarities between the evolution of the Turkish and Tunisian Islamist movements:

> At first, both Tunisian and Turkish Islamists rejected and fought the visions imposed by Atatürk and Bourguiba. They later realized, however, that they could not completely eradicate the legacy, so they decided to engage in dialogue with it. They recognized the importance of finding common ground with this legacy. This is the central idea behind these two Islamic projects [in Turkey and Tunisia].[161]

[161] Interview with Rachid Ghannouchi, Tunis, 20 December 2019.

Divergent from the cases of Ennahda and the MB, understanding the evolution of 'the Islamic project in Turkey' as Ghannouchi referred to and its culmination in the foundation of the AKP compels adopting a political economy lens. Since the early days of the Turkish Republic, 'secularism was not only a political posture; it was also seen as a prerequisite to national economic development, which would only be possible if the model of the advanced industrial West could be emulated without interference from (putatively backward) Islamic values.'[162] Thus, pious or Islamic businesses were structurally excluded because the value they added to the Turkish economy was deemed insignificant. The dominance of the republican elites over the economy, 'as well as regional disparities were sources of political grievance which were articulated by emerging Islamist parties as early as the 1970s'[163] in Turkey. However, with the rise of the centre-right Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi* – ANAP) and its leader Turgut Özal in the mid-1980s, devout Anatolian businesspeople began to become partially integrated into the core of the economic realm.

Turgut Özal's ascent to the Turkish premiership, following the 1980 coup when the leaders of the Left were either imprisoned or fled the country, helped to reconstruct a society in which success was valued and the accumulation of wealth added status. 'Opening one's own business, getting married, owning a house, a car and home appliances, travelling on holidays and being financially comfortable were marked out as the mode of contemporary being and aspiration. Television ads paraded families who had made it. Happiness was

[162] Fikret Adaman, Murat Arsel and Bengi Akbulut, 'Neoliberal developmentalism, authoritarian populism, and extractivism in the countryside: the Soma mining disaster in Turkey', *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 46, no. 3 (2019): 520.
[163] Izak Atiyas, Ozan Bakış, Esra Çeviker Gürakar, 'Anatolian Tigers and the Emergence of the Devout Bourgeoisie in the Turkish Manufacturing Industry' in *Crony capitalism in the Middle East: business and politics from liberalization to the Arab Spring*, ed. Ishac Diwan, Malik, M. Adeel and Atiyas, Izak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 94.

measured on a scale of buying and easily consuming.'[164] Meanwhile, encouraged by Özal's policies, which intended to revitalise the market by bringing Muslim businessmen and traders into competition with the secular bourgeoisie, an Islamic business class began to flourish.[165] There were structural economic reasons for the rise of this Islamic capital over the years following Özal's initial reforms, including 'a shift away from the country's traditional economic policy of import substitution industrialization [ISI], the state's changing policy on religion, and the emergence of Islamic financial institutions'.[166] Erbakan and his *Refah Partisi* (RP- Welfare Party), founded in 1983, rose to prominence in the 1994 local elections by winning the mayorships of 28 cities, including Istanbul and Ankara. The year after, following the 1995 general elections, Erbakan became prime minister by forming a coalition government with Tansu Çiller's centre-right *Doğru Yol Partisi* (DYP- True Path Party).

The 1990s marked a decade of political and economic instability in Turkey, with increased control of the political realm by the military and heightened violence between the state and the outlawed Kurdish group, the PKK, which resulted in the state's extrajudicial killings of prominent Kurdish figures. These ominous elements culminated in a military intervention – or 'postmodern coup' in Turkey's political parlance – on 28 February 1997, which compelled the coalition government to resign. Erbakan's RP was shut down due to its perceived Islamist agenda, and *Fazilet Partisi* (The Virtue Party), founded ten months after

[164] Yael Navaro-Yashin, 'The Market for Identities: Secularism, Islamism, Commodities', in *Fragments of culture: the everyday of modern Turkey*, ed. Deniz Kandiyoti and Ayşe Saktanber (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002), 223.
[165] Yael Navaro-Yashin, *Faces of the state: secularism and public life in Turkey* (Princeton, NJ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002), 223–24.
[166] Ozlem Madi, 'From Islamic Radicalism to Islamic Capitalism: The Promises and Predicaments of Turkish-Islamic Entrepreneurship in a Capitalist System,' *Middle Eastern Studies* 50, no. 1 (2014): 146.

the coup[167] soon became defunct. The process that led to the formation of the AKP began in the aftermath of this 'postmodern coup' and accompanying economic crisis.
Not only did the Turkish economy collapse in 2001 but so did the political establishment that had ruled the country since the coup of 12 September 1980. This upheaval generated an opportunity for Islamist actors and business owners who 'tended to come from outside the ranks of Istanbul's traditional "secular" industrialists and were thus frequently referred to as the Anatolian Tigers or as Calvinist Muslims'.[168]

The activities of this new class shaped the trajectories of the Islamist movements of Turkey[169] where, in the aftermath of the 2001 economic crisis, strands such as Erbakan's lagged, while pro-business strands united under the umbrella of the AKP. Another crucial point raised by Navaro-Yashin is that when the AKP came to power, the secularists and Islamist bourgeoisie were already 'implicated in the same capitalist consumption market [which influenced how they construct their identities] and now Islamists [were] as active as secularists in the making and shaping of this market.'[170]

The AKP emerged victorious from the 2002 elections, presenting itself as a clean slate ready to right the wrongs of the country – to end corruption, stagnant services, state over-expansion and the unfair political representation of the Republican elite. In a commentary, Tunisian politician Noureddine Achour, an advocate for secular democracy and open market policies, argued that the AKP was elected in 2002 because it was perceived as 'a liberal economic option rather than an ideological one. The only criterion for success in

[167] In Turkey the incidents that led to the fall of Erbakan's government are referred to as a postmodern coup because although there was no military takeover, Erbakan was removed due to his clash with the military.
[168] Ahmet Insel, 'The AKP and normalizing democracy in Turkey', *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 102, no. 2 3 (2003): 296.
[169] Navaro-Yashin, *Faces of the state*, 249.
[170] Navaro-Yashin, *Faces of the state*, 249.

Turkey is the preservation of Turkish lands and economic success, which ensures the immunity of the Turkish nation so that it does not once again become the sick man of Europe.'[171] The making of the Turkish model, which had started with the military junta of 1980, followed by the Özal reforms that led to the flourishing of the religious strata, was finalised with the ascent to power of Turkish Islamism in 2002.[172] This rise was the embodiment of how to contain and tame the mobilisation of hopes and fears instigated by the 1968 leftist movements and the 1979 Iranian revolution.[173]

One of the founders of the AKP and former deputy prime minister, Beşir Atalay, recalled the sentiment at the time of the break from Erbakan:

> There were no major disagreements or schisms among the parties about how we should build the strategy and discourse because we all understood the conditions required for the AKP to take power in a country like Turkey. We had a strong grasp of national and international conjunctures of the time. Of course, as devout Muslims, we were aware of our identity and never discussed that. We knew that promoting democracy and individual liberties, would benefit our base the most – the religious Muslim strata. [174]

It is worth noting how İbrahim Kalın, an academic and chief adviser to President Erdoğan from the start, described the AKP for the Oxford Handbook of Political Islam. According to Kalın, when Erdoğan and Gül split from Erbakan, 'they [adopted] a radically different perspective and redefined their political ideology and […] identity based on cosmopolitan

[171] Achour, Noureddine, 'alaintikhabat albaladiat fi turkia: mae al'atrak takhtalif almueadalat hayth yusbih alshear 'turkiya awla' qabl altafkir min muntalaqat siyasiyat wa hizbia', *Assabah*, 7 April 2014.
[172] Cihan Tuğal, *The fall of the Turkish model: how the Arab uprisings brought down Islamic liberalism* (Brooklyn, NY: Verso, 2016), 25.
[173] Tuğal, *The fall of the Turkish model*, 25–27.
[174] Interview with Beşir Atalay, Ankara.

values, conservative politics, liberal economic policies, and a globalist and pro-active foreign policy, […] in contrast to Islamist movements that aim to establish a *sharia* state.'[175]

According to Ali Bulaç, a Turkish Islamist intellectual, the AKP came to power vowing that it had taken its '*Milli Görüş* shirt off' and would not adopt Islamism or follow a religious political path. Bulaç argues that the AKP's abolition of the death penalty and decriminalisation of *zina* (extramarital sex) during the EU accession process demonstrated the party's ability to adopt policies that were 'either against or outside of Islam' and that its economic, cultural and social policies were inspired by Western reform programmes.[176] Because the AKP's mother movement *Milli Görüş* had 'a fervent anti-EU stance and a somewhat ambiguous approach to a market economy, [the AKP's] policies [and its self-identification as Muslim/conservative democrat] were described as "path-breaking" for both the Islamist movement and in relation to Turkish democratisation'.[177]

[175] İbrahim Kalın, 'The AK Party in Turkey' in *The Oxford handbook of Islam and politics*, ed. John L. Esposito and Emad Eldin Shahin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 426.
[176] Ali Bulaç, *Din ve Siyaset* (İstanbul: İnkilap Yayınevi, 2014), 172.
[177] Ceren Lord, *Religious politics in Turkey: from the birth of the Republic to the AKP* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 243.

3 The history of the interaction

This chapter has two objectives. The first is to present the interaction between the AKP's mother movement, *Milli Görüş*, and Ennahda and the MB from in the 1980s, demonstrating that the MB and Ennahda had a long history of reciprocity with Turkish Islamism decades pre-dating the Arab Uprisings.

Political sociologists conceptualise the transfer and adoption of new ideas, policies, and strategies through diffusion mechanisms. Diffusion does not signify political contagion but, rather, is a strategic process in which the character, positionality and intentions of the various actors play a major role.[178] The actors in a diffusion process are dependent on the heuristics within a bounded rationality[179] which affect the applicability of the policies and tactics diffused and, thus, the implications of the overall process. Put in another way, the actors' history of interpersonal relations and the diffusion context produce intuitive decisions – cognitive shortcuts – that may or may not benefit their parties.[180]

It is, therefore, essential to familiarise ourselves with the relevant actors to understand the scope of the diffusion or how they interact and relate to one another – 'to gain deeper insight into the complexities and agency involved in the [diffusion] process'.[181] The second aim of the chapter is to depict the ideational component of the diffusion, namely

[178] Rebecca Kolins Givan, Kenneth M. Roberts and Sarah Anne Soule, *The diffusion of social movements: actors, mechanisms, and political effects* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 3.
[179] I employ Herbert A. Simmons' definition of bounded rationality which takes into account the limitations of the decision-making actor both in terms of knowledge and computational capacity. See H. A. Simon 'Bounded Rationality' in *Utility and Probability*, ed. M. Milgate, J. Eatwell, P. Newman (Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), 15.
[180] Daniel Kahneman and Shane Frederick, 'Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment' in Thomas Gilovich and Dale W. Griffin, *Heuristics and biases: the psychology of intuitive judgment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 53.
[181] Sean Chabot, 'Dialogue Matters: Beyond the Transmission Model of Transnational Diffusion between Social Movements', in Givan, Roberts and Soule, *The diffusion of social movements: actors, mechanisms, and political effects*, 100.

the journey of Muslim/conservative democracy and the Turkish model towards the legitimisation of their users.

3.1 Erbakan, Ghannouchi and the MB

Turkish Islamists were introduced to the MB corpus in the late 1960s and early 1970s. According to Nureddin Şirin, a Turkish Islamist who was imprisoned on charges of belonging to the Turkish *Hizbullah* and *Selam ve Tevhid*,[182] Muslims in Turkey had access to the works of Banna and Qutb through the translations of the International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations (IIFSO) based in Kuwait.

Mehmet Fuat Doğu, the then head of Turkey's intelligence service – *Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı* (MİT) (1961–1964/1966–1971) was personally involved in translating Qutb's 'Social Justice in Islam *(al-adala al-ijtima'iyyah fi l-islam*)' into Turkish (*İslam'da Sosyal Adalet*),[183] with the motivation of mobilising Islamic sentiment as a counterforce to communism. However, when Qutb's most radical book, 'Signposts along the Road (*ma'alim fi'l-tariq*)' was translated into Turkish by an Islamist publisher (*Hilal Yayınları*) four months after Qutb's execution by the Nasser regime, it was the same intelligence organisation – MİT – that moved to ban the book in 1966.[184] This time, it was a fear of Islamism rather than communism that would pose a threat to the Kemalist establishment. However, this intervention did not deter Turkish Islamists from studying and discussing Ikhwan literature. In 1968, an Islamist train conductor working for the Turkish State Railways (*TC Devlet Demiryolları*) translated and distributed Qutb's commentary on the

[182] Both are considered terrorist organizations by the Turkish government.
[183] Hamza Türkmen, *İslami Mücadelenin Yeni Dili* (İstanbul: Ekin Yayınları, 2013), 145.
[184] Türkmen, *İslami Mücadelenin Yeni Dili*, 140.

Quran, 'In the Shade of the Qur'an (*fi zilal al-Qur'an*)' to major cities.[185] By the end of the 1960s, a group of prominent Islamists in Turkey saw Qutb's works and his criticisms of the nation-state system as problematic and started to promote 'national piety' and 'Turkish Islam', in opposition to Ikhwani discourse.[186] Nonetheless, the *Milli Görüş* movement continued to endorse and distribute these Turkish translations.[187]

Although the ideas of Banna and Qutb initially enthralled a significant number of young Muslims in Turkey, by the 1980s their inclination towards the MB's ideology had waned. Interestingly, a similar dissociation occurred within Tunisian Islamism: 'Qutb and al-Banna's writings proved to be out of touch with Tunisian reality [and] were replaced by Islamist writers such as Baqir al-Sadr and Ali Shariati who were the most read authors in the 1980s.'[188] Turkish Islamists began to position the MB ideology as a historical source rather than a manifesto responding to everyday challenges.[189]

There were other reasons for this disengagement, according to Turkish theologian İsmail Kara. The first was that, in the 1980s, the MB appeared to be stagnating, unable to generate new ideas and attempting to survive on its extant oeuvre. The second was the Iranian revolution, which had repercussions for all Islamist movements worldwide. Efforts to translate Qutb's and Banna's works were replaced by a push to render the works of Rouhallah Khomeini, Morteza Motaharri, Musa Sadre and Ali Shariati accessible to Turkish Islamists. Last but not least, following the 1980 coup in Turkey, a new trend

[185] Türkmen, *İslami Mücadelenin Yeni Dili*, 148.
[186] Türkmen, *İslami Mücadelenin Yeni Dili*, 149.
[187] Nureddin Şirin, 'Erbakan adı altında Erbakan Hocayı Bitirme Operasyonu', *Tevhid Haber*, 19 July 2010.
[188] Maryam Ben Salem, 'God loves the rich: The Economic Policy of Ennahda: Liberalism in the Service of Social Solidarity', *Politics & Religion* 13, no. 4 (2020): 701.
[189] İsmail Kara, *Cumhuriyet Türkiye'sinde Bir Mesele Olarak İslam 2* (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2019), 508.

emerged among Islamists, advocating a critique of Islamism based on the MB and the Iranian revolution, as epitomised in the work of İsmet Özel, which called for a reassessment of contemporary Islamic thought and its reductionist approach to tradition.[190] Devout Turks rejected Qutb's proposed forms of resistance, viewing these as exclusivist and rigid, given that Turkish Islam is a synthesis of Sufi Islam, the traditions and practices of mysticism and Turkish nationalism.[191] For example, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, an icon for Turkish Islamists and nationalists, particularly Erdoğan, once described Qutb's works as 'deviant branches of the right path'.[192]

Nonetheless, communication between the MB in Egypt and the Islamists in Turkey was not limited to the translations of a few books. According to *Ikhvanwiki*, an archive of the MB news, articles and dossiers, the Egyptian MB had contact with two Islamist movements in Turkey: *Milli Görüş* and the Sufi tariqa *Nurcu*s (followers of the Bediuzaman Said-i Nursi are described as '*Nurcu(lar)*' in Turkish). It is worth noting that Erbakan's *Milli Görüş* has never maintained good relations with *Nurcular* or its offshoot *Gülen* movement, owing to pronounced differences in rhetoric, approach to the state and methods of mobilisation. Consequently, while Erbakan had always maintained cordial relations with the MB, the *Nur* movement was opposed to this alliance. Mehmet Kırkıncı, a *murshid* (teacher) of the *Nur* movement, claims he met Mustafa Mashhur, the fifth Supreme Guide of the MB (1996–2002), in Istanbul in 1996 and was disappointed when Mashhur requested that *Nur* members support Erbakan's *Milli Görüş*. Kırkıncı attempted to explain to Mashhur how the *Nur* path differed from those of both *Milli Görüş* and the MB. 'Thousands of Egyptians died because of MB activities, including Al-Banna and

[190] Kara, *Cumhuriyet Türkiye'sinde Bir Mesele Olarak İslam 2*, 503–07.
[191] Kara, *Cumhuriyet Türkiye'sinde Bir Mesele Olarak İslam 2*, 534–535.
[192] Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, *Türkiye'nin Manzarası* (İstanbul: Büyük Doğu Yayınları, 1985), 134–35.

Qutb. Many are imprisoned. On the other hand, not a single *Risale-i Nur* student has ever suffered a nosebleed, but they are all enlightened in their Islamic faith', he told Mashhur.[193]

According to İhsan Süreyya Sırma, a Turkish Islamist with personal ties with MB leaders, Erbakan had advised the MB on politics, stating that 'because Ikhwan was a movement of *tabligh* (propagator of faith and cause – *dawa*), not of politics, they [the MB members] would listen to Erbakan and take notes'.[194]Another *Milli Görüş* disciple, Necip Yavuzer, claims that Erbakan advised the MB leaders who visited him and complained about the repression of the Mubarak regime that they should form alliances with other political parties and enter parliament; 'otherwise Mubarak will shut you down completely'.[195] It was then, Yavuzer claims, that the MB allied with the nationalist Al Wafd Party. It is unclear whether Erbakan's advice was influential, but in the 1984 elections, the MB-Wafd coalition received 13 per cent of the votes and won 58 seats, with eight going to the MB.[196] It was MB's first strategic alliance in order to enter parliament.

Ennahda's founder, Rachid Ghannouchi, has been well-known to Turkish Islamists since the late 1980s. The first book published under his name discussed the Palestinian conflict and the PLO in 1988 (*Filistin Sorunu ve FKÖ*). Ghannouchi's views on Islamist movements around the world were published in a second book in 1994, formatted as interviews with him (*Raşid Gannuşi ile İslami Hareket Üzerine Söyleşiler*). His best-

[193] Mehmed Kırkıncı, *Hayatım-Hatıralarım* (İstanbul: Zafer Yayınları, 2004), 328–29.
[194] Emeti Saruhan, Interview with İhsan Süreyya Sırma, 'İhvan siyaseti Erbakan Hoca'dan öğrendi', *Yeni Şafak*, 1 September 2013.
[195] Necip Yavuzer, 'Siyasi Arenada Müslümanlar Erbakan'ı Ne Kadar Tanıdı', *İslami Analiz*, 28 February 2017.
[196] Dina Shehata, *Islamists and Secularist in Egypt: Opposition, Conflict, and Cooperation* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 87.

known book, *Public Liberties in the Islamic State* (*al-hurriyat al-'ammah fid-dawlah al-islamiyya / İslam Toplumunda Vatandaşlık Hakları*)[197] was translated into Turkish in 1996, three years after its original publication in Arabic. Advocates of *Milli Görüş* dominated Turkish Islamist movements during this period. Ghannouchi's later works on secularism and the role of women were published under AKP's rule, predominantly after 2010.[198] Ghannouchi proudly admits that his ideas influenced the AKP's founders as well as a broader Islamist constituency in Turkey.

> Seven of my books have been translated into Turkish and are very well known. I was walking down the street in Istanbul's Fatih district one day when a group of young people approached me and paid their respects. My friend Loutfi was with me at the time, and he joked that if you run for office in Turkey, you'd have a good chance of winning. I was in exile in Britain back then.[199]

According to a 2004 book written by former AKP MP Mehmet Metiner (2011–18), Ghannouchi was invited to Istanbul in 1989 by Erbakan for the 536th anniversary of Istanbul's conquest. Erdoğan, who was the head of the *Refah Partisi*'s Istanbul branch at the time, hosted Ghannouchi on this trip and 'never left his side'.[200] This event may be the first time Erdoğan and Ghannouchi spent a significant amount of time together.

---

[197] Raşid El Gannuşi, *İslam Devletinde Kamusal Vatandaşlık Hakları* (İstanbul: Birleşik Yayıncılık, 1996). A later publication has a slightly different name: Raşid El Gannuşi, *İslam Devletinde Kamusal Özgürlükler* (İstanbul: Mana Yayınları, 2012).
[198] Raşid El Gannuşi, *Laiklik ve Sivil Toplum* (Mana Yayınları, 2010); Raşid Gannuşi, *Kur'an ve Yaşam Arasında Kadın* (Mana Yayınları, 2011).
[199] Interview with Rachid Ghannouchi op. cit.
[200] Mehmet Metiner, *Yemyeşil Şeriat Bembeyaz Demokrasi* (Doğan Kitap, 2004). Cited in Müyesser Yıldız, 'Erdoğan aslına mı rücu etti', *Oda TV*, 13 July 2020.

Ghannouchi distinguishes *Milli Görüş* from the AKP and regards Erbakan as one of the founders of Islamism:

> Necmettin Erbakan came from a different generation of Islamists. I consider him as a professor, as a sheikh and a role model for me much like Maududi and Hasan Al-Banna. He was descended from this lineage. I met him many times during conferences and conventions in Turkey and elsewhere. For example, during the first Gulf War in 1990, Islamic leaders gathered in Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq and Iran to oppose the war. Hasan Al-Turabi, Erbakan, Ghabi Hussein of Pakistan, Algerian leaders … I represented the Tunisian Islamic movement. I also met Erbakan after he became Turkey's prime minister. He hosted me many times. I admired his personality, his oratory, his vision, and courage.[201]

Recai Kutan, Erbakan's long-time comrade, claimed that Ghannouchi saw Erbakan as a mentor and that Mahdi Akef (2004–2010), the MB's seventh Supreme Guide, referred to Erbakan as 'a Godsend *mujaddid* (reformist)' and praised his *taqwa* (piety, fear of God, following of the truth), ideas and projects.[202]

The relationship between Erbakan, the MB leaders and Ghannouchi had become more visible following the success of Erbakan's *Refah Partisi* in Turkey's municipal elections in 1994, in which Tayyip Erdoğan was elected mayor of Istanbul. Following the 1995 Turkish general elections, Erbakan formed a coalition government with the centre-right *Doğru Yol Partisi* (True Path Party). That same year, Egypt's Supreme Court had sentenced 54 MB members to hard labour in prison on charges of belonging to an illegal

[201] Interview with Rachid Ghannouchi, Tunis, 20 December 2019.
[202] Recai Kutan, 'Necmettin Erbakan'ı ve 28 Şubat'ı iyi anlamak-1', *Milli Gazete*, 27 February 2020.

organisation, a ruling that marked the nadir of the MB's deteriorating relationship with the Mubarak regime.[203] According to Fethullah Erbaş, a member of the *Refah Partisi* at the time, the party's leader, Erbakan, asked him to go to Egypt along with two others – Mehmet Elkatmış and Ahmet Dönmez – and observe the trials. 'We went to the airport and saw that Erbakan had arranged a private jet for us so that we wouldn't waste time,' he recalls. 'In Cairo, we were greeted by Banna's son, Saif al-Islam al-Banna, observed the trials, and even spoke with the judges.'[204]

During Mubarak's visit to Ankara in 1996, then prime minister Erbakan and he had a heated exchange, in which Erbakan told Mubarak to 'tolerate the MB'.[205] According to *Kitabiyat,* the two-volume memoir of the former leader of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, Erbakan went so far as to request the release of the imprisoned MB members, to which Mubarak responded, 'We do not want them: if you want them you can have them.'[206] Erbakan's affinity with the MB was publicly reciprocated during his short rule as prime minister. The MB's then leader, Mahdi Akef, who would later become the 7th Supreme Guide, told the Turkish secular newspaper *Cumhuriyet* on 28 November 1996 that Erbakan was the MB's representative in Turkey, causing such outrage within the secular establishment that Akef later issued a statement on the MB website claiming that his words had been misconstrued. [207] However, on the same page as the statement are several photos of Erbakan and Akef holding hands triumphantly for the *Milli Görüş* crowds.[208]

[203] Joel Campagna, 'From accomodation to confrontation: the Muslim Brotherhood in the Mubarak years' *Journal of International Affairs* 50, no. 1 (1996): 278–304.
[204] 'Dünyanın lideri', *Milli Gazete*, 11 April 2014.
[205] William M. Hale, *Turkish foreign policy, 1774–2000* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 304.
[206] Muhammed Nabil Helmy, 'Amr Musa'nın Hatıralarında Arap Siyaseti', *Şarkul Avsat*, 21 September 2017.
[207] 'a'laqat al-ikhwan al-muslimin bi'turkiya', Ikhwanwiki.
[208] 'a'laqat al-ikhwan al-muslimin bi'turkiya', Ikhwanwiki.

When Abdullah Gül and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan split from Erbakan's movement and founded the AKP in 2002, Ghannouchi attempted to mediate:

> I tried to bring Erdoğan, Gül, and Erbakan together. I tried to persuade Erbakan that these people are your students, and you should be proud of them because your dream of ruling Turkey, your Islamist vision, has won. So, you must be pleased because your students rule the country. He considered what I said before responding, then said: 'they are the students who left my class before completing their education under me, so I am not happy.[209]

Erbakan accused the founders of the AKP of 'changing Islam'.[210] He felt that the AKP had been established by those whose Islamist aspirations had been shattered by the 28 February coup and whose main goal became immediate power.[211] Erbakan was dissatisfied with the pragmatic break made by his disciples and saw it as a rupture with the core tenets of Islamism. A Tunisian media figure, Mehdi Ben Hamida, who visited Turkey in 1997 when Erbakan was prime minister, sees Erbakan and Ghannouchi as belonging to the same school of thought and politics. He compares them with Erdoğan: 'Erbakan and Ghannouchi tried to persuade voters through sermons, books and slogans, while Erdoğan managed to put food on people's tables, build roads, canals, subways and transportation networks.'[212]

---

[209] Interview with Rachid Ghannouchi op. cit.
[210] Ezgi Başaran, Interview with Necmettin Erbakan, 'Zekamı ölçmeye makina dayanmaz', *Radikal*, 2 January 2011.
[211] Ezgi Başaran, *Frontline Turkey: the conflict at the heart of the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2017), 58.
[212] Mehdi Ben Hamida, 'al-islam al-siyasi: al-tajribat al-turkyiat wa'ltajribat al-tunisiyat?', *Al Hiwar*, 06 April 2014.

As these incidents demonstrate, the interaction between Turkish Islamism, the Egyptian MB and Ghannouchi revolved around Erbakan and resulted from his personal efforts. The list of attendees at Erbakan's funeral demonstrates that he had forged good relations not only with the Egyptian MB but with Islamist groups from all over the world, including Malaysia, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Pakistan, Sudan, Indonesia, and Kuwait.[213]

Despite their longstanding relations with Erdoğan's mentor, Necmettin Erbakan, and their claims to be ideologically closer to *Milli Görüş* than the AKP, the leaders of the MB and Ennahda chose to learn from the AKP in the aftermath of the revolutions. According to the Nahdawis whom I interviewed, the AKP was the organization that managed to implement Ghannouchi's ideas about embedding Islamist entities in secular and democratic settings and created the first major success story for an Islamist party. The MB in Egypt, for its part, had initially preferred to remain allied with Erbakan's *Milli Görüş* when Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül –the former president of Turkey 2007–2014 – broke away and founded the AKP. Although the MB did not consider the AKP to be sufficiently Islamist, it nevertheless forged an extensive dialogue with it because the AKP was successful while Erbakan's movement faded into obscurity. Thus, for the MB, similar to Ennahda, success was more important than ideological proximity.

3.2 The spread of frames for legitimacy

Ideas, frames, innovations, and tactics spread in both domestic and transnational contexts – across nations, social movements, and organisations, as well as political parties. What actually spread are the stories or, more precisely, stories of success. Although the diffusion

[213] 'Erbakan'ın cenazesine kimler katılacak', *Takvim*, 28 February 2011.

literature typically focuses on contentious politics or governments and agencies to illustrate policy transfers from one national context to another, there is nothing new in political parties learning from foreign regimes in seeking to assume office.[214] Party-to-party diffusion is also not unique to Islamist entities in the greater Middle East. For example, in the mid-1990s, Britain's Tony Blair was influenced by Bill Clinton's 1992 'New Democrat' campaign, while the German party Linke claimed to have learned tactics from the Syriza's election victory in Greece in 2015.[215]

As shown by experiences of exiting authoritarian regimes in southern Europe, Latin America and Eastern Europe, social movements, and parties find themselves in a position of strong agency during transitional periods but are frequently unprepared following the collapse of an authoritarian regime.[216] Hence, they turn to foreign success stories for guidance or inspiration. Success can have different meanings for political parties depending on the opportunity structure of the time. While niche parties may consider themselves successful if they can form part of a coalition government, the mainstream parties aspire to office.[217] The strategy to retaining success sometimes relies on the emulation of foreign parties' policies and tactics deemed to be successful.[218]
Models, policies, and strategies that are deemed successful are curated by networks of actors 'in discursive frames and rhetorical tools but in a loose and broadly generative fashion surrounded by narratives and social fictions.'[219]

[214] Tobias Böhmelt et al., 'Party Policy Diffusion', *American Political Science Review* 110, no. 2 (2016): 399.
[215] Böhmelt et al., 'Party Policy Diffusion', 398–99.
[216] Pietro Marzo, 'Critical junctures, path dependence and Al-Nahda's contribution to the Tunisian transition to democracy', *The Journal of North African Studies* 24, no. 6 (2019): 917.
[217] Böhmelt et al., 'Party Policy Diffusion', 400.
[218] Böhmelt et al., 'Party Policy Diffusion', 401.
[219] Daniel Rodgers, 'Bearing tales: networks and narratives in social policy transfer', *Journal of Global History* 9, no. 2 (2014): 308.

What distinguishes Islamist entities – particularly the MB and Ennahda – is that they have had to spend their careers underground or semi-underground due to the constant repression, confrontation, and co-optation cycles of their repressive regimes. In this regard, the trajectory of Turkish Islamism diverges critically from that of Ennahda and the MB. As seen above, the Turkish Islamist movement established a political party as early as the 1970s. Despite setbacks and pressure from Turkey's secular establishment, backed by the military, the ability of Turkey's Islamists 'to transform themselves to answer the challenges that they have faced'[220] – whether survival or staying in power improved and even become formulaic over the decades since the 1970s.

The MB, however, 'remained an integral organization with low levels of professionalization and also failed to unify the Islamic field once it ultimately established its party'[221] due to the Salafist presence in Egypt. Although it fielded candidates during parliamentary elections, the MB was always forced to maintain a low profile and adapt to the regime's rules to 'fend off repression and maintain their organizational existence'.[222] The MB's quest for legitimacy was realised through its charity work and overwhelming presence within the unions. When the MB attempted to exploit its social legitimacy and use it to politically mobilise lower-class beneficiaries of its charity structure, the Mubarak regime ratcheted up its repression and closed down the spaces it had opened up to the MB in the 1980s, undermining both its own legitimacy and that of the MB.

[220] Ihsan Dağı, 'Post-Islamism a la Turca' in *(2013), Post-Islamism: the changing faces of political Islam*, ed. Asef Bayat (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 71–72.
[221] Cihan Tuğal, 'Religious Politics, Hegemony, and the Market Economy: Parties in the Making of Turkey's Liberal-Conservative Bloc and Egypt's Diffuse Islamization' in *Building Blocs: How Parties Organize Society*, ed. Cedric De Leon, Desai Manali, and Cihan Tuğal (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2015), 88.
[222] Mona El-Ghobashy, 'The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers', *Int. J. Middle East Stud.* 37, no. 3 (2005): 391.

Similarly, Ennahda was banned as a movement in Tunisia from 1992 and only gained legal status after the fall of the Ben Ali regime in 2011. Therefore, elections offered the opportunity to gain not only political power but also legitimacy for the MB and Ennahda, and this distinguishes the diffusion process among the Islamists from non-Islamist entities.

For Islamist entities such as the MB, Ennahda or the AKP, it was critical to construct a new 'commodity' of Muslim politics that both international and domestic audiences would buy. In some ways, the essence of this diffusion process was using the 'political opportunity' structure opened by the Arab Uprisings to demonstrate that Islamists were legitimate political actors capable of governing. The elites of these three parties aligned, setting in motion a diffusion process that created political learning foci.

The diffusion mechanisms can be summarised as emulation, coercion, learning and competition, all of which 'can be differentiated further as to whether they provide direct or indirect channels of influence'.[223] In other words, diffusion could be coerced through military power via threats such as military impositions. It could be incentivised by civilian power through rewards such as trade agreements, financial and technical assistance. These two processes are considered forms of material diffusion.

Ideational diffusion involves socialisation and emulation, involving the travel of frames, narratives, and symbolic representations. As will be seen through the evidence provided in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, the diffusion process in the context of this research includes both material incentives – such as technical and financial assistance from Turkey to Tunisia and

[223] Aron Buzogány, 'Illiberal democracy in Hungary: authoritarian diffusion or domestic causation?' *Democratization: Clusters of Authoritarian Diffusion and Cooperation: The Role of Interests vs. Ideology?* 24, no. 7 (2017): 1310.

Egypt between 2011 and 2013 – and ideational incentives in the form of discursive and symbolic aspects which will be discussed in the below section. [224]

3.3 Conservative/Muslim Democracy and the Turkish Model

The frames, Muslim Democracy (or conservative democracy) and the Turkish model, as well as the concept of legitimacy are, I believe, critical in understanding the political convergence that occurred in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings. Scholars of social movements define framing as 'the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action'.[225] These frames tell us about the nature of diffusion between 2011 and 2013 because they are interpretative meanings strategically attached to events, actions, plans and actors to legitimate them 'through appeal to values and appropriateness'.[226] They also act as 'compelling and effective [tools] to bring the movement's message to the people'.[227] Following the Uprisings, 'adopting frames which were distinctly Islamist (i.e., advocating a fully-fledged Islamic state), or secularly democratic (no mention of Islamic principles as a political framework) would have alienated important segments of Egyptian and Tunisian society from the outset'. [228] Invoking a tried-and-tested, internationally acknowledged model, on the other hand, would serve the purpose of gaining legitimacy and reinforcing the political standing of Ennahda and the MB in 2011.

[224] See Table 1 in T. M. J. Lenz, 'EU normative power and regionalism: Ideational diffusion and its limits', *Cooperation and conflict* 48, no. 2 (2013): 213.
[225] Doug McAdam, J. McCarthy & M. Zald, 'Introduction: Opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes – toward a synthetic, comparative perspective on social movements' in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framing*, ed. Doug McAdam, J. McCarthy and M. Zald (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6.
[226] Vivien A. Schmidt, 'Taking ideas and discourse seriously: explaining change through discursive institutionalism as the fourth "new institutionalism"' *Eur. Pol. Sci. Rev.* 2, no. 1 (2010): 3.
[227] McAdam et al., 'Introduction: Opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes' 16.
[228] Justin A. Hoyle, 'A Matter of Framing: Explaining the Failure of Post-Islamist Social Movements in the Arab Spring', *Digest of Middle East Studies* 25, no.2, 2016, 204.

According to Tarrow, framing starts with a domestic claim and becomes international through convergence and communication.[229] Muslim/conservative democracy and the Turkish model are prognostic or orientational frames. Snow, who first coined the term 'frame', argues that framing is regularly achieved by social movement leaders;[230] prognostic frames provide answers to 'what needs to be done', 'stipulating specific remedies or solutions and the general means or tactics for achieving these objectives'[231] while orientational frames 'relate to people's basic beliefs and attitudes; they offer direction since they are inherently action- focused.'[232] Orientational and prognostic frames do not necessarily stem from the core of the political actor's ideology. It is an error to assume that 'frames are merely and simply ideologically derived';[233] rather, they offer 'a mid-range concept with which it becomes possible to identify the development of the political ideas that motivate movement action yet remain firmly embedded in the praxis of the grassroots.'[234] As in the case of the Muslim/conservative democracy frame, frames are 'not identical to, or isomorphic with, existing ideologies, but are novel blends of the old and the new, the past and the present'.[235] However, it is not implausible to expect an interplay and transitivity between the ideology and the frame.[236] For example, Esposito et

[229] Sidney G. Tarrow, *The new transnational activism*, Cambridge studies in contentious politics, (New York; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 63.
[230] David A. Snow and Scott C. Byrd, 'Ideology, framing processes, and islamic terrorist movements' *Mobilization (San Diego, Calif.)* 12, no. 2 (2007): 124.
[231] Snow and Byrd, 'Ideology, framing processes, and islamic terrorist movements' 126.
[232] Kevin Gillan, 'Understanding Meaning in Movements: A Hermeneutic Approach to Frames and Ideologies,' *Social movement studies* 7, no. 3 (2008): 248.
[233] David A. Snow, 'Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields' in *Blackwell companion to social movements*, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah Anne Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), 399.
[234] Gillan, 'Understanding Meaning in Movements', 257.
[235] Snow and Byrd, 'Ideology, framing processes, and islamic terrorist movements', 130.
[236] Gillan, 'Understanding Meaning in Movements,' 258.

al. see the frame of Muslim democracy as signifying 'a dynamic political and intellectual wave shifting across the Muslim world'.[237]

The use of these orientational and prognostic frames by the AKP, Ennahda and the MB and the diffusion of particular tactics (elaborated in Chapters 5 and 6) distinguish this political confluence. European and American embassies, policymakers, organisations promoting democracy – such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung – had rushed to fill the vacuum in the transitional period in Tunisia and Egypt and met with groups active in the revolution. While Ennahda met with several representatives of French and German parties and the MB claimed that they attended several meetings at embassies, none of these meetings became regular or went beyond casual talk.[238]

3.3.1 The origins of Conservative/Muslim democracy

The AKP's founders first used the 'Conservative/Muslim democracy' frame in their rift with the *Refah Partisi* and after the AKP's inception in 2001. They defined the AKP as 'Conservative Democrat' – akin to Christian Democrat parties in Europe – and avoided Islamic vocabulary.

Numerous attempts have been made by AKP elites to describe the AKP's version of conservative democracy. Yalçın Akdoğan, a long-time adviser to Erdoğan, former deputy

[237] J. L. Esposito, Lily Zubaidah Rahim and Naser Ghobazadeh (eds), 'Transformations,' in *The politics of Islamism: diverging visions and trajectories*, (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 270.
[238] Interview with Yehia Hamed, Istanbul, 30 July 2018 and interview with Fethi Ayadi, Tunis, 18 November 2019.

prime minister (2014–16) and AKP MP (2011–18) even wrote a book entitled 'The AKP and Conservative Democracy' in 2004.[239] However, the term retained its ambiguity until it was abandoned by Erdoğan in 2013 and there was never a consensus among Turkey's Muslim intellectuals on the definition and content of conservative democracy.[240] In its 2023 vision document, however, the AKP still claims to have developed and institutionalised the political identity of the conservative democrat which later 'became a source of inspiration that will set an example for other countries in the region'.[241] Esposito sees AKP as a conservative democratic party whose government policies were not influenced by Islam and which emerged as a 'pragmatic, democratic and pluralistic party that emphasized the goal of a prosperous future for all Turkish citizens'.[242] As Taşkın contends, we can argue that 'conservative democracy is an ideological construct that has been strongly inspired by the legacy of [Turkey's] centre-right politics'.[243]

According to prominent Turkish Islamist Ali Bulaç, 'they [the founders of the AKP] wanted to take power' and to accomplish this, they devised a reconciliation doctrine.

> They began to define three domestic and global forces that wield power over Turkey and the Islamic world. International forces included the US, the EU and Israel, while domestic forces were established as the military, the bureaucracy, and the big capital. They resolved to make amends with these forces. They also realized that their demographic base – Anatolian religious strata – grew and filled urban spaces. Hence, if they could somehow

[239] Yalçın Akdoğan, *AK Parti ve Muhafazakar Demokrasi* (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2004).
[240] Yüksel Taşkın, 'Hegemonizing Conservative Democracy and the Problems of Democratization in Turkey: Conservatism Without Democrats?' *Turkish studies* 14, no. 2 (2013): 294.
[241] '2023 Siyasi Vizyon: Muhafazakâr Demokrat Siyasi Kimlik', AK Parti.
[242] John L. Esposito, Tamara Sonn and John O. Voll (2016), *Islam and Democracy*, 37.
[243] Taşkın, 'Hegemonizing Conservative Democracy and the Problems of Democratization in Turkey: Conservatism Without Democrats?' 294.

> mitigate these forces, they would win the elections and retain power. That is why they adopted the label 'conservative democrats' and put Islamism aside.[244]

We should consider the origin of Muslim/conservative democracy is linked to a broader debate on the strategic shifts within Islamism, that is post-Islamism. Two prominent scholars, Olivier Roy and Asef Bayat, have argued that the initial goals and projects of Islamist politicians have transformed since the mid-1990s. The term 'post-Islamism' was coined in Bayat's 1996 essay,[245] which discussed reformist trends in post-Khomeini Iran and referred to the transformation of Islamist ideas, approaches, and practices. For Bayat, the post-Islamist trend began in 1988 with the end of the Iran–Iraq war. Bayat argued that Islamists recognised the insufficiencies of their strategies as a result of internal contradictions or societal pressure, and took a pragmatic break, during which they reinvented themselves and abandoned certain underlying principles of Islamism. They then started shaping their project and discourse by 'marrying Islam with individual choice, freedom, democracy and modernity'.[246] Another point made by Bayat, strongly related to the arguments of this research, is that the advent of post-Islamism was prompted by Islamism's legitimacy deficit.[247]

As Benhabib states, 'the Arab Middle East was in the throes of a new legitimation crisis.'[248] One reason for this crisis was that, since 9/11, prevailing Western accounts of counterterrorism had decisively subsumed all Islamist groups, and the stability and

[244] Interview with Ali Bulaç, İstanbul, 20 December 2021.
[245] Asef Bayat, 'The Coming of a Post-Islamist Society' *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies*, no. 9 (1996): 281.
[246] Bayat, *Post-Islamism: the changing faces of political Islam*, 9.
[247] Bayat, 'Arab revolts: Islamists aren't coming!' 13.
[248] Seyla Benhabib, 'The new legitimation crises of Arab states and Turkey', *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 40, no. 4–5 (2014): 351.

security of Western democracy appeared linked to the ability of 'Muslims to tamp down on violence in the name of religion'.[249]

Following 9/11, Ghannouchi strongly reiterated to the international audience that Ennahda was committed to non-violence and had no ties to al-Qaeda. He also admitted that Ennahda had moved too fast during the 1989 election, unnecessarily confronting the regime.[250] One of the primary motivations for this was to undo 'Arab dictators' cynical appeals' to the West in which 'we find Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak and Tunisia's President Ben Ali telling their Western interlocutors, in effect, "It is either us or Bin Laden." If that is the choice, of course, Westerners—whatever their love for democracy—will opt for the autocrats over the theocrats.'[251]

Ghannouchi's thoughts on the compatibility of Islamic and democratic governance are elaborated in his book *Public Liberties in the Islamic State*,[252] completed during his exile in London. In this book, which has become 'one of the influential tracts in contemporary Islamic political thought that advocates democracy and pluralism',[253] Ghannouchi argues that the idea of sovereignty has been misinterpreted as belonging solely to God due to Qutb's initial conceptualisation of the term.[254] In Ghannouchi's formula, God's sovereignty (*hakimiyya Allah)* operates to impede despots from 'monopoliz[ing] wealth, power, and law-making, [as well as] against clerics who monopolize the right to interpret God's will and who claim to speak in His name'.[255] While *hakimiyya Allah* established parameters for fair and just rule, the *sharia* – broad guidelines in Ghannouchi's thinking

[249] Faisal Devji and Zaheer Kazmi, *Islam after liberalism* (London: Hurst & Company, 2017), 9.
[250] Willis, *Politics and power in the Maghreb*, 199.
[251] Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 'Toward Muslim Democracies', *Journal of democracy* 18, no. 2 (2007): 9.
[252] Rachid Ghannouchi, *al-huriyyat al- 'ammah fi al-dawla al-islamiyya* (Beirut: Markaz Dirasat Al-Arabiyya, 1993).
[253] Nazek Jawad, 'Democracy in Modern Islamic Thought', *British journal of Middle Eastern studies* 40, no. 3 (2013): 327.
[254] Tamimi, *Rachid Ghannouchi: a democrat within Islamism*, 198.
[255] Tamimi, *Rachid Ghannouchi: a democrat within Islamism*, 198.

rather than strict legal codes – would provide the framework for the democratic rule of the people (*hakimiyya as-shaab*) or their representatives.[256] This means that, in the 1990s, Ghannouchi's ideal democratic governance '[was still] conditional on the existence of an Islamic state [similar to] the first Islamic state in Medina that lasted 14 centuries and comprised all the required criteria, that is, people, territory, a government and law'.[257] Thus, Ghannouchi's formulation of Islamic/Muslim democracy differs from the proposals of the founders of the AKP for 'conservative democracy' when they first came to power.

Nevertheless, the former prime minister of Tunisia (2013–14) and a key Nahdawi, Ali Larayedh, claims that it was Ghannouchi who paved the way for Islamists to accept Muslim democracy because 'he has the credibility of an Islamist thinker' but that 'it was Erdoğan's party that realized Ghannouchi's thoughts by founding the AKP and winning successive elections.'[258] Rafik Abdessalem, the former Tunisian Minister of Foreign Affairs (2011–13) and son-in-law to Ghannouchi, describes the exchange of ideas between Ghannouchi and the AKP in a similar vein: 'Ghannouchi is the founder of Muslim Democracy concept whereas Erdoğan is a man of power, a pragmatic politician. He is not a thinker. Mr Ghannouchi produces ideas as well as politics.'[259]

The opinions of Abdessalem and Larayedh on this matter are shared by other Nahdawis. For example, according to Maha Somrani, who worked at Ennahda's youth HQ and was once dispatched to Istanbul to observe the AKP's election, 'everyone knows, especially young people, that Erdoğan is a student of Sheikh Rachid [Ghannouchi].'[260]

[256] Tamimi, *Rachid Ghannouchi: a democrat within Islamism*, 198.
[257] Jawad, 'Democracy in Modern Islamic Thought', 328.
[258] Interview with Ali Larayedh, Tunis, 18 November 2019.
[259] Interview with Rafek Abdesselam, Tunis, 20 December 2019.
[260] Interview with Maha Somrani, telephone, 8 May 2020.

Khalil Amiri, former Secretary of State for Scientific Research (2016–2020) and coordinator of Ennahda's 2019 electoral manifesto argues that it is not a question of giving intellectual credit to either Ghannouchi or the AKP's founders for adopting frames that revolved around democracy:

> However, to be frank, the concept was most visible in Ghannouchi's books at the end of 1980s. It extends all the way back to [Moroccan thinker] Taha Abdurrahman. He came up with ideas about the compatibility of Islam and modernity even in the 1970s. The AKP admits to being influenced by Sheikh Ghannouchi's writings and his progressive views. Sheikh Ghannouchi has had very innovative ideas about the Muslim project since the beginning. He believes that the Muslim project should be oriented toward democracy, liberty, and modern governance. It is important for an Islam scholar like Ghannouchi to say that there is no contradiction between Islam and democracy and modernity because it persuades Muslims, especially the youth. Politicians do not have that kind of authority.[261]

It could be argued that the AKP was influenced by Ghannouchi's ideas and reformulated them to fit the Turkish context. It could also be claimed that Ghannouchi himself transformed his ideal democratic governance, abandoning the prerequisite of *sharia*, because Ennahda did not push for it to be included in the new Tunisian constitution in the plenary sessions from December 2013 to January 2014.[262] However, more importantly, the movement of the Muslim/conservative democracy frame between the AKP and Ennahda shows that the ideational diffusion had started years before the material diffusion that began in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings.

[261] Interview with Khalil Amiri, telephone, 23 December 2019.
[262] More explanations on this period and how the AKP advised Ennahda on this issue are inclued in Chapter 5.

The AKP's self-identification as conservative democrat initially 'lured many in the Arab Spring countries, the first of which is Tunisia [as nobody wanted] to fall into the grip of extremism [or] returning to another type of dictatorship hidden behind the curtain of religion.'[263] In the aftermath of the 2011 revolution, one of the main aims of Ennahda and the AKP was to emphasise that not all Islamists – or 'Muslim politicians' as they prefer to be called – are the same. Ennahda MP Oussama Sagheir explained:

> The idea of [adopting the term] Muslim democrats is founded on two premises: First, Ennahda must be transformed from being seen as threat to a political party capable of working within the state. Second, we want to set Ennahda apart from other Islamist parties and movements. Many European countries put everyone under the same banner of political Islam. Salafists, Al-Qaeda, Daesh, Nahda, Ikhwan, the AKP. Muslim democrat as a concept was a different way of presenting ourselves.[264]

Many of the interviewees from Ennahda, the MB and the AKP shared the concerns and goals defined by Sagheir. This was a critical driver of the diffusion process between the AKP, Egyptian MB and Ennahda in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings: the desire to change the image of Ennahda and the MB from a threat to a competent political party.

It should be noted that the MB never adopted or used the Muslim/conservative democracy frame in its rhetoric. According to Kandil, the difference in how MB and Turkish Islamists interpret their successes and failures is a critical determinant in their transformation journey. While, for the MB, success and failure are resolutions of a divine nature, 'Turkish Islamists thought strategically in terms of durable alliances, rather than relying on religious dogma combined with the sporadic provision of welfare to the poor (especially before

[263] Assia Atrous, 'Erdogan... lam taeud al-namudhaj al-matlub', *Assabah*, 6 October 2012.
[264] Interview with Oussama Sagheir, telephone, 12 November 2019.

elections). [They] also saw the need to substitute Islamism as an ideology with conservative democracy – a catch-all label meant to present the party as a unique synthesis between everything that Turks cherished.'[265] For the MB, the Turkish model was a more fluid and useful frame for gaining legitimacy than the Muslim/conservative frame, even before the revolution, as the following section will explain.

3.3.2 The origins of the Turkish model

After it assumed power in 2002, the AKP was lauded by the global powers as a successful model for combining Islam with democracy and the free market that should be replicated throughout the Muslim Arab world. Among the Turkish Islamists were sceptics who saw the promotion of the Turkish model and 'moderate Islam (*Ilımlı İslam* in Turkish)' as part of a plan to accommodate Western values within Islamic principles and thus control Islam. This plot, allegedly began at the end of the 1990s, before the rise of the AKP, but then the AKP became the primary actor. In February 2002, at the invitation of Ismail Cem, the former Foreign Minister of Turkey (1997–2002), a joint forum was held in Istanbul between the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of member countries of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and those of EU member/candidate countries. The aim of the forum was 'to share their assessments of the world's present political situation and to promote understanding and harmony among civilizations',[266] as the UN described it.[267] According to Turkish Islamists, this forum, in which Turkey and Tunisia were cited

[265] Hazem Kandil, *Inside the Brotherhood* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015), 169, 70.
[266] 'OIC-EU Joint Forum on Civilization and Harmony/Two-state solution – Statement by Qatar, Spain, Turkey – Letter from Turkey', *United Nations*, 7 March 2002.
[267] 'AB – İKÖ Ortak Forumu', *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Avrupa Birliği Başkanlığı*, 07 February 2002.

as good examples in terms of women's rights and education levels, was evidence – among others – of the Western plot to manipulate Islamism.[268]

In 2004, US President George W. Bush and British foreign secretary Jack Straw praised the AKP for putting Turkey on a path to democracy. International media outlets including the *New York Times* and *The Economist,* as well as think tanks such as the Brookings Institute and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace consistently hailed the AKP as the bridge between political Islam and democracy. Academia contributed to this trend by demonstrating how the AKP integrated Islam into the global system and made it work. While 'the Bush administration and its US democracy promotion toolkit highlighted the AKP as a case study of "good Islamists", the model narrative became a source of symbolic capital in domestic, regional and international politics to validate the party's policies, approaches, and modes of governance.'[269] Turkey's experience with the AKP also reinforced a common liberal argument that secular authoritarian regimes in MENA were coming to an end and, if reformist Islamist actors were to assume power through elections, they could create a democratic experience. Vali Nasr who 'has risen to such prominence in US government circles as a preeminent explainer of the complex phenomena that define the modern Middle East'[270] was just one figure who promoted the idea that 'Turkey's progress toward capitalist growth and increasing political pluralism over the past decade should serve as the model for the ways in which the United States and Western powers can most effectively encourage positive change.'[271]

[268] Hamza Türkmen, *Türkiye'de İslamcılık ve Özeleştiri* (İstanbul: Ekin Yayınları, 2008), 139–40.
[269] Derya Göçer and Marc Herzog, 'Turkey and the Arab Uprisings' in *Routledge handbook of the Arab Spring: rethinking democratization*, ed. Larbi Sadiki (London: Routledge, 2016), 509.
[270] Jon B. Alterman, 'Free Markets, Free Muslims', *Foreign Affairs;* 88, no. 6 (2009).
[271] Vali Nasr, *The Rise of Islamic Capitalism (previously published as Forces of Fortune)* (New York: Free Press, 2009), 233.

Cihan Tuğal describes the Turkish model 'in two words: Islamic liberalism'.[272] According to Tuğal, who examined 'the rise and fall of the Turkish model' through a political economy lens in his 2017 book of the same title, the Turkish model was promoted by global business elites and embraced by international media outlets because it managed to bolster the free market economy and incorporate political Islam within the international financial system, rather than repressing it, as the Kemalist regime that had ruled Turkey for decades had done.[273] A study of the academic discourse on the Turkish model from 2002 to 2014 found that the concept of a Turkish model originated in the West, with each scholar highlighting a different aspect.[274] Such characteristics would include the AKP's accommodation of global markets, its economic policies, or its democratic reforms, all of which were implemented as a result of Turkey's EU accession process. Similarly, depictions of the Turkish model diverge depending on the period referenced in the AKP's extended rule. From 2002 to 2007, for example, the Turkish model was deemed to represent a pro-Western, secular, democratic, capitalist, moderate Muslim state.[275] However, in the period that included the events of the Arab Uprisings – 2008–2011 – the dominant Western academic narrative on AKP Turkey shifted, with views ranging from 'a radical Islamist state' to 'a benign Islamist state' and a model for post-revolutionary Arab states.[276]

Ennahda leaders frequently said they hoped to imitate the model of Turkey's AKP, in particular 'its early shift from its Islamist origins toward a vote-seeking centre-right platform', [277] to fend off 'potential discrediting from many Westerners and secular

[272] Tuğal, *The fall of the Turkish model,* 4.
[273] Tuğal, *The fall of the Turkish model,* 4.
[274] Fatima Sajjad and Umbreen Javaid, 'The Civilizational Rift and the Idea of the Turkish Model: A Case Study (2002-2014)', *Journal of Political Studies* 23, no.1, 2016, 138.
[275] Sajjad and Javaid, 'The Civilizational Rift and the Idea of the Turkish Model, 141.
[276] Sajjad and Javaid, 'The Civilizational Rift and the Idea of the Turkish Model, 143.
[277] McCarthy, 'When Islamists lose', *Middle East Journal* 72 (2018): 370.

Tunisians who viewed Ennahda as a direct contradiction and essential threat to the country's modernist legacy'. [278] When asked what kind of Islamist party or model Ennahda aspired to be, 'not a single respondent listed the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as an inspiring example, [but] the vast majority of respondents said Turkey's AK Party, which they perceived at the time as representing a winning combination of piety, prosperity, and democratic credibility.'[279] While Abdelkarem Harouni, president of the Ennahdha's *shura*, describes the AKP as a 'party that combined Islam, democracy and economic boom',[280] Naofel Jamali claims that the 'AKP is like us, they are Muslim democrats.'[281] According to Meherzia Labidi, 'AKP people are good Muslims, closer to Islam than many in the Gulf countries. I do not know if this means they are Islamist. I am very suspicious of that term.'[282]

In the 2005 parliamentary elections in Egypt, the MB secured a historic success, winning 88 seats and becoming the biggest opposition bloc. This development fuelled debate within the movement about how much effort should be devoted to political participation. As a result, the old guard, fearing complete destruction by the regime, withdrew from the municipal elections of 2008. However, simultaneously, a younger and more pragmatic strand of the movement was in search of ideas that would help them gain greater influence in Egyptian politics. Turkey's foreign policy shift towards the Middle East and the international promotion of the Turkish model coincided with the aspirations of younger MB members for political participation and the exploration of relevant strategies. Accordingly, a close, but primarily intellectual connection between the MB and the AKP

[278] Anne Wolf, 'An Islamist 'renaissance'? Religion and politics in post-revolutionary Tunisia', *The Journal of North African Studies* 18, no. 4 (2013): 560.
[279] Monica Marks, 'Tunisia's Islamists and the "Turkish Model"', *Journal of Democracy* 28, no. 1 (2017): 2.
[280] Interview with Abdelkarim Harouni, Tunis, 19 December 2019.
[281] Interview with Naofel Jamali, Tunis, 12 November 2019.
[282] Interview with Meherzia Labidi, Tunis, 16 November 2019.

developed at that time. For example, the AKP's then political ally, the Gülen movement, which served as its international lobbying machine, hosted a panel entitled 'Is Turkey's AKP a model for the Arab world' at Washington's Century Foundation in 2008.[283] Ibrahim Al-Hudaibi, then an MB member, 'editor of the MB's official web page,[284] and great-grandson of Hassan Al-Hudaibi, the MB's second Supreme Guide after Banna's death, was one of the panellists. He emphasised how the AKP had acted wisely and responsibly by not antagonising any segment of Turkish society.[285] This was the earliest public endorsement of the Turkish model by a key MB figure. According to Amr Darrag, a senior MB member and the former Minister of Planning and International Cooperation of the Morsi government, 'in and around 2007 a Turkish model began to be marketed to us by the West'.[286]

Almost all interviewees on both sides agreed that the AKP and the MB are very different entities. Former AKP MP Talip Küçükcan recalls his days as a theology student and member of young Islamist circles, claiming that 'even though we had read Ikhwan stuff, especially Qutb, we had never thought of transferring MB ideology or its political demands to Turkey. We were different and, as someone who is part of it, I can state unequivocally that the AKP is not an Islamist party in the sense that the MB recognizes.'[287] He was correct. Not one Egyptian participant described the AKP as Islamist. For example, for Salah Abdelmaqsoud, the former minister of information under Mohammed Morsi, 'the AKP was a Muslim party which was not against religion, a party

[283] 'Kapatma kararı Washington'da tartışıldı', *Habertürk*, 16 May 2008.
[284] Chris Harnisch and Quinn Mecham, 'Democratic Ideology in Islamist Opposition? The Muslim Brotherhood's "Civil State"' *Middle Eastern Studies* 45, no. 2 (2009): 195.
[285] 'Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood and the AKP in Turkey', Ikhwanweb, 29 August 2008.
[286] Interview with Amr Darrag, İstanbul, 18 July 2018.
[287] Interview with Talip Küçükcan, İstanbul, 12 July 2018.

that was committed to religious freedoms.' Salafi leader Tariq Al-Zomor, who has 'followed the AKP since 2002, visited its headquarters several times and even written a chapter praising Erdoğan's policies in his PhD thesis in 2003', believes that what was important for Egyptian Islamist movements was that the AKP was not anti-Islam and could survive in a secular system.[288] The investment minister of the Morsi government, Yehia Hamed, argues that the AKP and the MB shared common goals, such as improving people's welfare, and that Islamic ideology was not one of the commonalities.[289]
The AKP distinguishes itself from the MB not only in terms of structure – the former being a political party and the latter a movement – but also in terms of ideology and political demands. The AKP considered the MB to be too Islamist for a country like Turkey, while the MB did not consider the AKP to be an Islamist entity at all.

This state of affairs raises obvious questions. Why did MB members want to learn from the AKP rather than any other political party? A former AKP MP, who acted as an interlocutor and helped arrange meetings in Istanbul and Ankara, claims that he directed the same question to an MB member who had come to Istanbul and received the response, 'Because the AKP is successful.' 'Yes, but there are other very accomplished parties in Europe. Why not go to Germany rather than come to us?' the MP insisted. 'They said that they wanted to learn from the experience of a Muslim country where the government has Islamic roots. And we trust Turkey more than we trust Europeans. You can call it emotional, but it was the truth. For the MB people, Erdoğan was their brother.'[290]

[288] Interview with Tariq Al-Zomor, İstanbul, 06 August 2018.
[289] Interview with Yehia Hamed, İstanbul, 30 July 2018.
[290] Interview with Talip Küçükcan, op. cit.

According to a former AKP MP, the MB and Ennahda had been interested in the AKP's policies since its inception in 2002 but this interest increased in tandem with the AKP's electoral victories. Although the MB saw itself as the mother movement of Islamism and an exporter rather than an importer of ideas and expertise, it kept a close eye on developments in Tunisia and Turkey.[291] The confidence of MB members was evident in the interviews conducted for this research. However, the same interviews also demonstrated that the MB had done more than simply observe the AKP's model and had become actively involved to learn from it, for simple reasons.[292] The MB had previously been free to adopt radical postures, but these then posed a significant challenge following the revolution. When faced with the first free elections in 2012, the MB needed to prove 'its accountability to a wider global audience'.[293] As Sallam contends, 'for the Brothers, the success of a fellow Islamist party [the AKP] was a useful example'.[294]

While 'the FJP's functionaries privately scoffed at the idea that the Brotherhood was to "emulate" the experience of the Islamist activists in Turkey',[295] in public they praised the policies of the AKP and Erdoğan. The MB's Freedom and Justice Party published its official party newspaper *Freedom and Justice* (*al-hurriya wal 'adala*) on 22 October 2011, with chairman Mohamed Morsi and editor-in-chief Adel Al-Ansari. The first issue featured an exclusive interview with Jehan Sadat, the wife of the former Egyptian

[291] Nathan J. Brown, *When Victory Becomes an Option: Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood Confronts Success*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2012), 14.
[292] Hesham Al-Awadi, *The Muslim Brothers in Pursuit of Legitimacy: Power and Political Islam in Egypt under Mubarak* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014), 164.
[293] Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood*, 281.
[294] Hesham Sallam, 'Obsessed with Turkish models in Egypt', *Jadaliyya*, 30 June 2013.
[295] Victor J. Willi, *The fourth ordeal: a history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, 1968–2018* (Cambridge University Press, 2021), 259.

President Anwar Sadat, announced as the top headline, quoted as saying, 'I wish Ikhwan's party would be like Erdoğan's party.'[296]

However, the FJP never used the terms conservative/Muslim democracy or Turkish model when defining itself: 'We are the Freedom and Justice Party, a civil party with an Islamic frame of reference, founded by the Muslim Brotherhood for all Egyptians, of different creeds and races and social positions, without discrimination. The party undertakes its activities within the scope of constitutional legitimacy and works for the rejuvenation and development of the nation and seeks to fulfil the hopes and aspirations of the Egyptian people, including the objectives of the January 2011 revolution.'[297] However, it was no secret that 'in conceptualizing the FJP, its architects found inspiration in Turkey's AKP which had spearheaded a new model of Islamic democratic governance.'[298]

Bayat claims that 'the concrete model of Islamic governance that the Tunisian Ennahda, the Egyptian Young Brothers, Iran's reformists, and other religious groups want to emulate is the ruling AKP in Turkey [because] the AKP represents an Islamic party that has arguably pulled Turkey further toward democracy than it had experienced in the past three decades.' [299] It is questionable whether the democratic aspect of AKP's governance specifically attracted Ennahda and the MB as the Turkish model is a marriage of Islamist ideology with neoliberal praxis, rather than with individual choice, freedom, or democracy. This will be discussed further in Chapters 5 and 6 but, just as an example at this point, Ghannouchi's response to the author's question regarding his relationship with Erdoğan is revealing:

---

[296] 'Egypt: FJP Launches Official Party Newspaper', *Ikhwanweb*, 22 October 2011. Also see the first page of the newspaper in Apendix Figure 1.
[297] 'Frequently Asked Questions', FJP Online, cited in Marie Vannetzel, 'Confronting the Transition to Legality' in *Egypt's Revolutions: Politics, Religion, and Social Movements*, ed. Bernard Rougier and Stephane Lacroix (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 47.
[298] Willi, *The fourth ordeal: a history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, 1968–2018*, 256.
[299] Asef Bayat, 'Arab revolts: Islamists aren't coming!' *Insight Turkey* 13, no. 2 (2011): 13.

> We talk about mutual interests of our countries and also touch upon developments in the region. I am not an adviser to Erdoğan. Erdoğan is a friend, and I respect him, and I respect what he has done for Turkey, especially in the economic field. I have known Turkey for a long time and remember how the Turkish lira had no value before Erdoğan's time. Erdoğan made Turkey's economy the 21st biggest economy in the world. This is a great success.[300]

3.3.3 The EU and the Turkish model

The EU's role in framing AKP Turkey as a model for the Islamist parties/movements must be briefly examined here, in order to highlight the transposition of the EU model to Turkey and Turkey becoming a model for other Muslim-majority countries – or more accurately, Islamist movements/parties. One of the reasons behind this transposition was that 'the EU's democracy promotion efforts in the southern Mediterranean in the context of the Arab Uprisings'[301] were ineffectual 'because, especially in Tunisia, the EU was seen as hypocritical and unwelcomed as the young activists believed that the EU played a key role in maintaining the Ben Ali regime for decades'.[302] Therefore, the Turkish model discourse was 'connected to the interests of the United States, and […]the European Union, to influence parts of the world beyond their direct control via a more trusted regional leader, i.e. Turkey'.[303] In the aftermath of the Uprisings, the EU's engagement with actors central to the revolutions, especially in Egypt and Tunisia, greatly increased. It became 'actively involved in many projects in Tunisia and Egypt today, promoting a certain form of polity whereby democracy is procedural, the economy is neoliberal, and cultural actors are

[300] Interview with Rachid Ghannouchi, Tunis, 20 December 2019.
[301] Tobias Schumacher, 'The European Union and Democracy Promotion' in *Routledge handbook of the Arab Spring: rethinking democratization*, ed. Larbi Sadiki (London: Routledge, 2016), 560.
[302] Raoudha Ben Othman, 'European Union Democracy Promotion in Tunisia' in *Routledge handbook of the Arab Spring: rethinking democratization*, ed. Larbi Sadiki (London: Routledge, 2016), 603.
[303] Benhaim and Öktem, 'The rise and fall of Turkey's soft power discourse', 6.

encouraged to be entrepreneurial and competitive'.[304] When the EU was not actively involved, its most recent protégé – the AKP – filled the void with marked composure.

The EU's transformational capacity over Turkey was short-lived, peaking between 1999 and 2006–07. Turkey was officially declared an EU candidate country in 1999 at the Helsinki Summit. The resulting optimism, as well as the concrete goal of launching accession negotiations, created a powerful dynamic for democratic change. Consequently, Turkey embarked on a comprehensive reform process, first under a three-party coalition between 1999 and 2002 and then under the AKP between 2003 and 2007. Nine legislative packages were adopted to meet the so-called Copenhagen Criteria and, to further these reforms, significant parts of the 1982 constitution were rewritten in 2001 and 2004. The majority of fundamental rights were modelled following the provisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which takes precedence over Turkish laws and the Turkish constitution. Although the EU believed that these changes would ensure the preservation of liberal democracy, authoritarianism spiralled in Turkey under the AKP after 2013. Why should this have been the case? The short answer is that the EU accession process revolves around institutional and legal checklists. The EU-led reforms instigated in Turkey were legalistic, focusing on the means rather than the ends of the rule of law. While the EU pushed for reforms in law, and in the administrative and judicial institutions that protect individual rights, these reforms placed insufficient emphasis on confining and counter-balancing structures of power to ensure pluralism and prevent majoritarianism. In other words, the EU had not made structural issues a precondition to starting membership negotiations. This aspect of Turkey's accession process to the EU is crucial to any

[304] Halit Mustafa Tagma, Elif Kalaycioglu and Emel Akcali, ''Taming' Arab social movements: Exporting neoliberal governmentality' *Security Dialogue* 44, no. 5–6 (2013): 376.

understanding of the true nature of AKP's Turkish model and diffusion from the AKP to the MB and Ennahda.

Following the enlargement of the EU in 2004, debates began within the EU about 'whether or not the process of European integration has forever ended in the deadlock of a neoliberal zone, where liberalization of market forces has become the dominant principle behind all moves and policies of the EU, [and that EU accession processes] perpetuate neoliberal policies and strategies'.[305] A review of the Commission reports on candidate countries in 1998 and 1999 reveals no mention of social policy or social protection, with the exception of minority rights,[306] even though income and other inequalities were escalating in the majority of accession countries.[307] In almost all cases, the privatisation of pensions and healthcare was encouraged and 'the main concerns regarding social protection [seemed to be] financial stability, the (too high) level of expenditure, and the (slow) deregulation of prices.'[308] As a result, there was a 'not so hidden' neoliberal agenda from the start of the enlargement, supported by monetarist supranational organisations including the IMF and the World Bank.[309] The term 'EU as a model', according to Nicolaidis and Lenz, refers to an element of hierarchy and superior normative power over the candidate country. As a result, 'genuine mutuality' is hampered, and the model becomes 'disaggregatable.' Then, Lenz and Nicolaidis contend, the EU model can be reduced to 'a toolbox of governance, from which individual elements can be authentically drawn, while others are simply deemed inappropriate in a different context'.[310] This was

[305] Jörg Huffschmid, *Economic policy for a social Europe: a critique of neo-liberalism and proposals for alternatives* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 24.
[306] Zsuzsa Ferge, 'European Integration and the Reform of Social Security in the Accession Countries' *European journal of social quality* 3, no. 1/2 (2001): 14.
[307] Ferge, 'European Integration' 16.
[308] Ferge, 'European Integration' 19.
[309] Ferge, 'European Integration' 20.
[310] T. M. J. Lenz, Nicolaidis, Kalypso, 'EU-topia? A critique of the European Union as a model' *Culture, Practice & Europeanization* 4, no. 2 (2019): 92–95.

precisely the AKP's key takeaway from the EU accession process. This toolbox of governance – with different contents-, as will be seen in Chapters 5 and 6, was diffused to Ennahda and the MB.

The AKP's eager participation in the EU accession process helped it to create a façade of normalisation and democratisation. As Çınar argues, 'foreign policy has been used to offset the AKP's legitimacy deficit and [...] EU norms had provided the AKP with strategic resources'.[311]

While Erbakan's *Refah Partisi* did not and could not offer a 'strategic alternative to the pro-Europe, pro-US, pro-Israeli policy of the Kemalist state, simply because such an alternative does not exist',[312] the AKP used the EU accession process to thwart the military's interference in politics and provide a 'credible alternative to the obsolete and often corrupt political establishment' through its 'technocratic cadres and experience in urban management'.[313] Additionally, the AKP gained from the process a technocratic and strategic toolbox of governance embedded in an all-encompassing neoliberal agenda to meet the demands of globalised competition.[314] Although the contents of the toolbox provided by the EU for Turkey differ from those provided by the AKP for Ennahda and the MB, the managerial ethos of finding tried-and-tested solutions to potential crises, and sustaining competitiveness, advancement and survival are similar.

The AKP not only utilised its close relationship with the EU until 2007 to maintain its international image of 'Muslim but democratic/Muslim but pro-market' but also 'learned by doing' how to concoct a toolbox of tactics to gain domestic and international consent.

---

[311] Menderes Çınar, 'From Moderation to De-moderation: Democratic Backsliding of the AKP in Turkye' in *The politics of Islamism: diverging visions and trajectories*, ed. J. L. Esposito, Lily Zubaidah Rahim and Naser Ghobazadeh (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 148.
[312] Roy, *Globalized Islam*, 70.
[313] Roy, *Globalized Islam*, 75.
[314] Huffschmid, *Economic policy for a social Europe: a critique of neo-liberalism and proposals for alternatives*, 3.

As is well known, 'manufacturing the consent of the society to brutal privatization/ financialization' and 'crisis management and manipulation' are core tenets of neoliberalism.[315] The literature on the Arab Uprisings now agrees that 'what was being marketed to the Arab world [following the revolutions of 2011], not only by advanced capitals, Western governments, but also by countries such as Turkey and Qatar [was] the project of a mainstream neoliberal economic agenda'.[316]

The concerted efforts of the US, the EU and the AKP in creating the Turkish model played out as follows: the AKP privatised the majority of the luxury estates, resolved overemployment in bureaucracy, created urgent resources for the Treasury and improved public services,[317] all of which led to its second and more significant victory in the next election. The boom in the economy after the deep economic and political crises of 2001 'consolidated [the AKP's] position as a dominant party within a multi-party system'.[318] Therefore, the most conspicuous reason the AKP became a success to be emulated after the Arab Uprising was its economic policy, which appealed more widely than just to its Islamist base and led to its election victories. For the MB and Ennahda, whose intentions and ability to govern were in question, adopting and – more importantly – declaring to domestic and international actors that they would adopt the AKP model meant, in essence, the possibility of economic improvement [319] and was, therefore, a ticket to legitimacy.

[315] David Harvey, *A brief history of neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 163.
[316] Emel Akçali, 'Introduction: Neoliberal Governmentality and the Future of the State in the Middle East and North Africa' in *Neoliberal governmentality and the future of the state in the Middle East and North Africa*, ed. Emel Akçali (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 3.
[317] Aktas, 'The rise and the fall of the Turkish economic success story under AKP (JDP)' 176–77.
[318] Raymond A. Hinnebusch, 'Political parties in MENA: their functions and development', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies: Political parties in the Middle East: historical trajectories and future prospects* 44, no. 2 (2017): 172.
[319] Elisabeth Gidengil and Ekrem Karakoç, 'Which matters more in the electoral success of Islamist (successor) parties – religion or performance? The Turkish case', *Party Politics* 22, no. 3 (2016): 326, 35.

4 The context, milestones and actors of the interplay

In the years leading up to the Arab Uprisings, Turkey increasingly saw itself as 'a trading state'[320] and the dominant soft power in the region, hoping that its economic and cultural links would strengthen it as a regional power. The AKP's standing within the Muslim world and Islamist organisations also shifted dramatically in January 2009, at a World Economic Forum panel in Davos, when then Prime Minister Erdoğan attempted to respond to the Israeli president Shimon Peres's arguments regarding Israel's assault on Gaza, which had killed 1,200 Palestinians. The moderator, David Ignatius, tried to end the session. 'One minute! One minute! *Olmaz* [Not ok]!' interrupted a furious Erdoğan as he stormed off the podium – an event that transformed Erdoğan into a hero in the eyes of Muslims around the world.[321]

The former Tunisian Prime Minister Ali Larayedh believes 'Erdoğan became a global leader of the Muslim world'[322] while executive member of Ennahda's *shura* (consultative council) Ajmi Lourimi claims that 'Erdoğan and his AKP was the leader that the Arab Muslim world looked for since the Arab world was either run by monarchies or military dictatorships.'[323]

Following the 'one minute' incident, members of the MB, Ennahda and the AKP began to meet at conferences, workshops and panels hosted by pro-Palestinian Islamist NGOs in Turkey. For example, five months later, the influential MB figure Sheikh Yusuf al-

[320] Kemal Kirişçi, 'The transformation of Turkish foreign policy: The rise of the trading state', *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40 (2009).
[321] 'Recep Tayyip Erdoğan storms out of Davos after clash with Israeli president over Gaza', The Guardian, 30 January 2009.
[322] Interview with Ali Larayedh, Tunis, 18 November 2019.
[323] Interview with Ajmi Lourimi, Tunis, 18 November 2019.

Qaradawi attended a conference organised by FIDDER (*Filistin Dayanışma Derneği* – Palestinian Solidarity Association) in an Istanbul hotel, which commenced with a recitation from the Quran via a live connection to the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.[324] Bassem Khafagi, the former community relations director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), and a presidential candidate in Egypt in 2012 claims that in the rift between Erbakan and Erdoğan in 2001, the MB collectively stood with Erbakan rather than Erdoğan. 'However, following the [One minute!] incident, 'the Middle East awoke to an Erdoğan reality'.

> At the same panel in Davos with Erdoğan was the influential Egyptian intellectual Amr Moussa, who speaks fluent English but acted like a puppet. He first stood up and then sat down. Then a determined Erdoğan got up and spoke harshly about Israel. This was the moment when the MB decided that Erdoğan was a better partner than Erbakan's movement – not because Erdoğan was more Islamic than Erbakan – they knew he wasn't – but because they saw that Erdoğan had ways of pushing, leading, and progressing.[325]

The think tank TESEV (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation) conducted a survey after the 'One minute!' incident in July 2009 in seven countries (Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria) to determine how Turkey was perceived in the Middle East. According to this survey, '75 per cent of respondents had a positive opinion of Turkey, […] compared to 72 per cent having similar opinions of Egypt – often regarded as the political leader of the Arab world – and 77 per cent of respondents from across the region called on Turkey to play a larger role in the Arab world.'[326] The same survey also demonstrated that 'despite Turkey's secular political system, 61 per cent

[324] 'İstanbul'da Filistin konferansı', *Hürriyet*, 23 May 2009.
[325] Interview with Bassem Khafagi, İstanbul, 31 July 2018.
[326] Mensur Akgün, Sabiha Senyücel Gündoğar, Jonathan Levack, Gökçe Perçinoğlu, 'The perception of Turkey in the Middle East 2010', TESEV Foreign Policy Programme, February 2011, 8–9.

of respondents saw Turkey as a model for the Arab world'.[327] Therefore, 'following the Arab Spring, the AKP felt compelled to clarify its identity more strongly in Islamic terms to more effectively communicate with its Arab counterparts and continue assuming a regional leadership role.'[328]

This was consistent with the vision of the then Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, who advanced the idea of a new Islamic civilisation led by Turkey in his 2001 book *Stratejik Derinlik* (Strategic Depth). Davutoğlu boasted in a speech to the Turkish parliament in 2011 of having 'implemented what he had written in his book, *Strategic Depth*'.[329] While he was dubbed 'the Turkish Kissinger'[330] due to his assertive foreign policy, his book *Strategic Depth* was considered by the AKP elite to be a political manual to be followed step by step, rather than an academic treatise. Although Davutoğlu's policies were approved by the AKP base, they were criticised in Turkey's opposition circles as well as by Western and Arab media for having a neo-Ottoman and pan-Islamic agenda. However, it may also be argued that Turkey's support under Erdoğan and Davutoğlu for Islamist governments following the Arab Uprisings stemmed not from ideological connections with Islamism but from Turkey's economic aspirations in the Arab world, and that the AKP's vision was to create economic solidarity among Muslims.[331] The interviews conducted for this thesis, which will be presented extensively, appear to support this argument regarding the AKP's relations with Ennahda and the MB. Nationalistic in their own right, neither Ennahda nor the MB sought strategies or tactics from the AKP to realise the dreams of

[327] Akgün et. al, 'The perception of Turkey in the Middle East 2010', 7.
[328] Çınar, 'From Moderation to De-moderation: Democratic Backsliding of the AKP in Turkye' 149.
[329] TBMM 37th Assembly *minutes*, 14 December 2011.
[330] Richard Falk 'Turkey's Brilliant Statecraft: The Achievement of Ahmet Davutoğlu', Foreign Policy Journal, 19 November 2011.
[331] Kubilay Arin, 'Turkish think tanks, the AKP's policy network from neo- Gramscian and neo-Ottoman angles', *Center for Turkish Studies Occasional Paper Series*, Book 4, 2015.

Erdoğan or Davutoğlu. During our interview, Davutoğlu strongly denied that he had a neo-Ottoman or pan-Islamic vision. However, expecting him to acknowledge such an ambition would be unrealistic.

> We did want to be a strong actor in the Middle East, but who wouldn't? This cannot be considered a crime. We have never attempted to intervene in any country's domestic affairs or to change regimes. But I've always maintained that those establishments in the Middle East were Cold War era products and doomed to fail. Until the protests began in Syria, Egypt, Libya, or Tunisia we had stable diplomatic and economic relations with the existing regimes. We did not have any problem with Mubarak. If we had a regime change aspiration, say in Syria, 2005 was a better time because of the Hariri assassination.[332]

For the AKP, its alliance with the MB and Ennahda helped it to be considered an Islamist party with a mission to protect Muslim interests in the region. The aim was not to establish global or regional Islamic rule but to maintain economic and strategic alliances. The AKP had two parallel goals: the first was to 'strive to increase and legitimize the Muslim share' in the region's political economy,[333] and the second, in line with Davutoğlu's *Strategic Depth* philosophy explained above, was to broaden Turkey's bilateral relations with regional neighbours, especially developing countries.[334]

The Director of the Al Sharq Center for Regional and Strategic Studies in Cairo, Mustafa Al-Labbad, argued in an op-ed published in 2011 that 'Egypt could benefit from Turkish expertise and technological transfers and, politically, it could draw inspiration from the

[332] Interview with Ahmet Davutoğlu, Ankara, 20 August 2019.
[333] Joshua D. Hendricks 'Globalization, Islamic Activism, and Passive Revolution in Turkey: The Case of Fethullah Gülen' in eds. Balkan, Neşecan, Balkan, Erol and Öncü, Ahmet, *The Neoliberal Landscape and the Rise of Islamist Capital in Turkey*, (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2015), 263.
[334] Hendricks, 'Globalization', 246.

Turkish model in many respects. At another level, a strategic partnership with Turkey could serve to stabilize the balances of power in the Middle East and hence act as the key to sustainable security in the region.'[335] Although Erdoğan claimed that the 2008 global recession had 'passed us by',[336] it certainly placed limits on the AKP's neoliberal programme. Therefore, the AKP started to seek new opportunities, especially in the Middle East. According to Tuğal, in terms of new neoliberal gains, 'the AKP leaders saw an imperial possibility after 2011 [the Arab Uprisings] and further intensified the party's [reference] to Islamist themes' to appeal to the devout in the broader region.[337]

According to a high-level Turkish diplomat, economic relations between Egypt and Turkey had improved since the implementation of the trade agreement in 2007. In 2009, Turkey's trade with Egypt amounted to 2.9 billion dollars, and it established top-flight technology manufacturing plants in Cairo employing 60,000 Egyptians.[338] The Turkish Foreign Ministry also had a stable relationship with its Egyptian counterparts. While the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Ahmed Abu al-Gheit (2004–2011), had become friendly with Davutoğlu, the minister of trade and industry, Rachid Mohamed Rachid (2004–2011) would stay at President Erdoğan's house when he visited Turkey.[339] There was, thus, a cordial relationship with the Mubarak regime, as claimed by Davutoğlu above. Conversely, as Labbad stated, 'even though Cairo inaugurated two rounds of strategic dialogue with Ankara, these produced nothing tangible, owing to Cairo's lack of a clear vision as to what it hoped to gain from Turkey'.[340] Neither the volume of the trade nor the strategic cooperation was good enough for Turkey. However, with Morsi in power,

[335] Mustafa El-Labbad, 'Egypt and Turkey: future horizons', Ahram, 19 September 2011.
[336] 'Erdoğan ısrarlı: Kriz teğet geçecek', *Big Para Hürriyet*, 3 April 2009.
[337] Tuğal, 'Religious Politics', 119.
[338] Interview with high-level Turkish bureaucrat 2.
[339] Interview with Metin Turan, İstanbul, 25 July 2018.
[340] El-Labbad, *Ahram*, 2011.

economic cooperation was likely to go more smoothly. Turkey had given a 2-billion-dollar loan[341] to Egypt, while Egypt had promised 'an 8-billion-dollar investment opportunity to Turkish businessmen'.[342] This promise was further embellished with an assurance that the well-being of the Turkish business elite in Egypt would be looked after at the presidential level. For example, when President Morsi visited Erdoğan in September 2012 in Ankara, he acknowledged that 'there are one or two Turkish companies that experience difficulties, but we will fix those problems too'.[343] A former AKP MP claimed that 'during Morsi's brief rule, RO-RO [roll-on, roll-off ferries] expeditions increased significantly. For the first time, we could cross the Rafah Border as an AKP team and bring aid to Gaza. Do you realize what this means? There was a lot more to do in terms of electricity and tourism bids. We would rebuild Egypt and both of us would benefit from that.'[344]

As this MP's statement demonstrates, the AKP had a combination of goals, both economic and geostrategic. The AKP's conservative constituency, especially the small to medium-sized entrepreneurs from Anatolia, would invest in the 'new markets in the Middle East, Africa and Central Asia whose people were predominantly Muslims, [which would eventually] contribute to strengthening Turkey as a regional power'.[345] The emphasis on the Rafah Border is also critical. In November 2012, the then Foreign Minister, Davutoğlu, accompanied with his Arab counterparts and a team of AKP members, crossed Rafah, which is the only crossing point between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. It was a tour de force for Turkey that Arab ministers were able to step into Gaza, where the Arab–Israeli conflict

[341] 'İşte Türkiye'nin Mısır'a yaptığı yardım', *Vatan*, 5 July 2013.
[342] Doga Ulas Eralp, *Turkey as a Mediator: Stories of Failure and Success*, (Pennslyvania: Lexington Book, 2016), 45.
[343] 'Erdogan Mursi görüşmesi sona erdi', *Habertürk*, 30 September 2012.
[344] Interview with former AKP MP 2.
[345] Alper Y. Dede, 'The Arab uprisings: Debating the Turkish Model', *Insight Turkey*, Vo.13, Issue 2, (2011): 26.

is most visible and bitter and made the news as 'a historic visit'.[346] Coupled with Erdoğan's 'One minute!' episode, the AKP believed that the Gaza visit proved that, with the MB in power in Egypt, it would become one of the most influential powers in the region.

4.1 The AKP in Cairo, the MB in Ankara and Istanbul

'As Muslims, where we all go is a two-cubic-meter hole. Listen to the voices of the people […]. Without a doubt, the people desire change'[347] said Prime Minister Erdoğan to Hosni Mubarak on 1 February 2011. In the days that followed, Erdoğan continued to address Mubarak, calling on him to step down. Turkey's Islamist groups, led by NGOs such as Mazlum-DER and the IHH (*İnsan Hakları ve Hürriyetleri İnsani Yardım Vakfı* / The Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief) – the organisation that led the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident off Gaza in 2009 – took to the Turkish streets to show their support for the people protesting in Tahrir Square in Cairo. One of these protests[348] happened in front of the Egyptian Consulate in Istanbul and involved a senior MB leader, Ashraf Abdul Ghaffar, who later told the press that 'Turkey was one country that could set an example for Egypt'.[349]A week later, Egypt's ambassador to Ankara, Abdurrahman Selahaddin, met with the then Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, and gave him a letter written by Davutoğlu's Egyptian counterpart, detailing the events of Tahrir Square. More importantly, in diplomatic terms, the letter expressed the Egyptian government's dismay[350] at Erdoğan's comments, the latest of which had gone so far as to

[346] Uğur Ergan, 'Tarihi ziyaret için yoğun güvenlik', *Hürriyet*, 19 November 2012.
[347] 'Erdoğan'dan Mübarek'e: Halka kulak ver', *CNN Turk*, 2 February 2011.
[348] 'İstanbul Mısır Konsolosluğu önünde eylem', *CNN Turk*, 3 February 2011.
[349] 'Egyptian officials bristle at Turkey's interference', *National*, 11 February 2011.
[350] 'Mısır'dan bir kez daha 'Bize karışmayın!', *Oda TV*, 8 February 2011.

describe ‘the process of transfer of power’ and ‘a transitional government’. Both Erdoğan and senior echelons of the MB had already started planning for the post-Mubarak era before Mubarak’s resignation was announced on 11 February 2011.

The first official visit from a foreign country to Cairo in the aftermath of the revolution was, unsurprisingly, that paid by Turkey’s President Abdullah Gül on 2 March 2011. Gül’s visit, accompanied by Davutoğlu, was intended to show support for the Egyptian revolution without favouring any one element of it. During his day-long visit, Gül was greeted by Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi and met with the Wafd Party leader Siyad El-Badawy, the former Secretary-General of the Arab League Amr Moussa, the former director of the International Atomic Agency Mohammed El Baradei, a group of young people who actively participated in the revolution and the supreme leader of the MB Mohammed Badie, at the Turkish Embassy in the Giza district.[351]

Turkey’s stance of maintaining an equidistant relationship with all elements of the revolution changed after this trip. ‘Several advisers to Erdoğan began coming to Cairo and meeting with the executives of the MB, and this drew the attention of other sectors of Egyptian politics, especially from the *fuluul* – members of the old regime,’ recalls the then chief correspondent of Turkey’s national television *TRT*’s Cairo office, Mehmet Akif Ersoy. ‘Every day, someone from the AKP government was landing in Cairo. The aim was to forge a close economic and military relationship with the upcoming Egyptian regime. They did, however, put all of their eggs in one basket, the MB basket.’[352] According to Ersoy, the interaction between AKP officials and the MB had become so intense that they

[351] ‘Merhaba to Cairo Mr. Gul’, Egyptian Chronicles, 4 March 2011.
[352] Interview with Mehmet Akif Ersoy, Istanbul, 23 July 2018.

had no time to meet anyone outside MB circles. 'For example, Amr Moussa wanted to meet with our guys [the AKP]; they said no, not right now. Some of Erdoğan's advisers mistakenly assumed that the MB represented all of Egypt, and that simply talking to them was sufficient. Those advisers misled Erdoğan in that respect.'[353] It is hard to determine whether it was the advisers who 'misled' Erdoğan, or Erdoğan himself who decided to align with the MB and demanded that meetings focus solely on them.

Erdoğan's first visit to Cairo demonstrated the close relationship between the AKP and the MB at the highest level. He was accompanied by AKP deputies Ömer Çelik and Nurettin Canikli, deputy PM Bekir Bozdağ, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, finance minister Zafer Çağlayan, culture minister Ertuğrul Günay and defence minister İsmet Yılmaz, as well as his wife Emine, son Bilal and daughter Sümeyye. Two planes, one from Istanbul and the other from Ankara, carrying a hundred businesspeople, arrived in Cairo as part of Erdoğan's entourage. When Erdoğan landed in Cairo late at night on 12 September 2011, interim prime minister Essam Sharif and about a thousand people greeted him with banners reading 'Erdoğan the hero' and 'Erdoğan, a huge welcome from the Brothers'.[354] According to Reuters, the crowd consisted of 'Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, who approve of Erdoğan's bringing Islamists into mainstream Turkish politics'.[355] Turkey's national news agency, *Anadolu Ajansı*, reported that Erdoğan addressed the crowd in Arabic: 'Turkey and Egypt hand in hand. Greetings to Egyptian youth and people. May God's peace be upon you.'[356] This – 'Turkey and Egypt hand in hand' – was a slogan that had already appeared on several billboards in Cairo.[357] Chanting

[353] Interview with Mehmet Akif Ersoy, op. cit.
[354] Appendix, Figure 2.
[355] Tülay Karadeniz and Yasmin Saleh, 'Turkish PM throws weight behind Arab cause', *Reuters*, 13 September 2011.
[356] 'Erdoğan Mısır'da sevinç gösterileriyle karşılandı', *BBC Türkçe*, 13 September 2011.
[357] Appendix Figure 3.

for Erdoğan, sometimes in Turkish, continued in front of the Kempinski Hotel where he was staying.[358]

Erdoğan's visit had two faces: one public and one more discreet. For the public, two critical points were emphasised: one regarding secularism, the other on the treatment of non-Muslims. Erdoğan spoke first with a popular anchor-woman, Mona Shazly of Dreams TV – a satellite channel, and attempted to reassure Egyptians that secularism was not a threat.[359] 'I am a Muslim, and I am not a secular person. However, I am the president of a secular state. A secular state treats Muslims and non-Muslims the same. Secularism is not atheism. I recommend that Egypt adopt a secular constitution. After this speech, I hope that the sentiment of the Egyptian people towards secularism will change.'[360] It is important to note that this interview took place at the AKP headquarters in Ankara and was aired on Erdoğan's second night in Cairo. Therefore, when he met with a group of politicians at the Turkish ambassador's residence, no one had yet seen the interview.

Egyptian politician Ayman Nour, who describes himself as liberal, was one of the few people invited to that dinner organised in Erdoğan's honour. Nour began his career in politics as a member of the Wafd Party but left in 2001 to found *Hizb Al-Ghad* (Tomorrow's Party) in 2004. He stood in the presidential elections of 2005 as the first candidate ever to run against Mubarak in a presidential race. Having been pushed into second place, he was charged with forgery and sentenced to prison, from which he was released in 2009. He was a friend of Mohammad Morsi and even shared a prison cell with him. He tried his luck again in the first post-revolution presidential election but his

[358] Steven Cook, 'Egypt and Turkey: Nightmares', CFR Blog, 25 November 2013.
[359] 'Alʿashrt masaʾa', YouTube.
[360] 'Laiklik her dine eşit mesafede', *Hürriyet*, 15 September 2011.

nomination was withdrawn for legal reasons. When Nour entered the Turkish ambassador's house on 13 September 2011, Erdoğan had not yet arrived. However, the MB's current supreme leader Mohammad Badie, former leader Mahdi Akef, deputy chairmen Gomaa Amin and Khairat Al-Shater, and media spokesman Mahmoud Ghozlan had already taken their seats in the room. 'When the MB members saw me [Nour], they said teasingly, "Ayman, you are a liberal, why are you here? This place is for true Muslims, and Erdoğan is our man." I laughed but did not comment,' Nour recalled. 'It was a friendly meeting, but later we learned that Erdoğan was advocating for Egypt to embrace secularism! So now it was my turn to tease. I went back to the MB people and said, "I think your man may actually be my man. He talks about secularism! Maybe you people were out of place that night, not me!"'[361]

Erdoğan's secularist comments annoyed MB leaders and 'led some to question [Erdoğan's] Islamist credentials'.[362] While the movement's then spokesperson, Mahmoud Ghuzlan, commented that 'Atatürk's Turkey may be secular, but Egypt is different,' Essam El Erian, the deputy leader of the FJP, 'want[ed] to believe that there might have been a translation error'.[363] Erdoğan's interview was, however, well received among secular and liberal people such as Nour and also by the Coptic Christians. During the same visit, Erdoğan met with the Coptic Pope, Shenouda III. According to a high-level bureaucrat present at the meeting, the Pope, although very ill at the time, greeted Erdoğan at the front door of his compound, hugged him and thanked him for his comments on secularism. 'You managed to say things that the leaders of my country failed to deliver to my people,' the Pope said. 'I appreciate it very much.'[364]

[361] Interview with Ayman Nour, Istanbul, 16 July 2018.
[362] Brown, *When Victory Becomes an Option*, 15.
[363] 'Laiklik mesajı Müslüman Kardeşler'i çok kızdırdı' *Vatan*, 15 September 2011.
[364] Interview with high-level bureaucrat 1.

Despite the mixed reactions to Erdoğan's 'secularism interview', the relationship between the MB and the AKP continued both publicly and privately. It may have also helped that Erdoğan, before he left Egypt, paid a private visit to Seyfulislam Al-Banna, son of Hasan Al-Banna, at his house. Not wishing this visit to make the news, Erdoğan did not take his official car with the Turkish flag. Although I had confirmation of this visit from three different sources,[365] I was unable to determine the issues discussed during the meeting.

Following the revolution, the MB had initially declared that it would sit out the presidential race. It appeared that, according to its usual practice and key slogan, 'participation, not domination', the MB would act as kingmaker rather than candidate. Furthermore, with a caution like that of Ennahda, the MB did not want to foment trouble with other forces in Egypt or the West. Thus, it claimed that it would not fully enter the parliamentary race but only field candidates in 30 per cent of parliamentary seats. All this happened at the instruction of the *shura.* However, soon afterwards, the same *shura* reversed its decision, when 'the Brotherhood became emboldened and could not rein in its political ambitions'. [366] In the end, the MB contested 50 per cent of the seats and fielded a presidential candidate. Various factors contributed to this shift in attitude. To understand how and why the Brotherhood felt 'emboldened', we need to consider one heavyweight Brother, Khairat al-Shater, the then deputy general guide, who was also the *shura's* first choice for presidential candidate. He was disqualified from the race on legal grounds because he had been imprisoned in the six years preceding the elections. Thus,

[365]The first source is a person close to the Al Banna family, whom I had met in the winter of 2017 in the UK. The second source is the former Cairo correspondent of Turkey's news agency, Anadolu Ajansı (AA), Metin Turan. The third source is journalist Can Dündar's 6 July 2013 interview with Seyful Islam Al Banna, in which Banna mentions Erdoğan sitting in the exact place where Dündar was.
[366] Hazem Kandil, *Inside the Brotherhood* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015), 536.

Mohammad Morsi was designated as 'the spare tyre'.[367] Brown, who had the opportunity to meet with Khairat al-Shater several times during this period, claims to have witnessed the evolution of the MB's approach through him; for example, in June 2011, Shater appeared more assertive in his political stance and, in December, seemed to be predicting victory in the elections.[368]

In the period between the fall of Mubarak and the presidential election, a public schism developed within the MB. From 2001 until the revolution, the MB was under the sway of conservative figures who controlled and restructured decision-making bodies through two key actors: Mahmoud Izzat, who was until 2008 the secretary-general of the movement, and Shater.[369] According to Amr Darrag, a senior MB executive, the generational divide within the MB was imperceptible prior to 2011 because political participation was limited. Following the revolution, more MB members were willing to express opinions or criticism. 'It started with the youth wing, but other groups emerged over time,' Darrag explained. 'The major issue was participating in the elections. A group of Brothers was dissatisfied with the MB's concentration on elections. They believed that Mubarak's departure was insufficient. They argued that there should be a revolutionary route to changing the old regime altogether.'[370]

To fully grasp AKP's influence, it would be valuable to ascertain its role, if any, in the MB's vacillating attitudes towards participation in the first presidential election. However, it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions. First, both AKP and MB interviewees denied that the AKP was directly involved. The MB/FJP members I spoke with insisted that it

[367] Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood*, 256.
[368] Brown, *When Victory Becomes an Option*, 6.
[369] Khalil Al-Anani, 'Upended Path', 536.
[370] Interview with Amr Darrag, op. cit.

was solely the *shura*'s decision and that the AKP had no influence. According to Pargeter, it was Shater who had put pressure on the *shura* to contest the presidential elections and to nominate him,[371] rather than the *shura* taking the initiative. The fact that Shater's nomination was approved by the *shura* by a narrow margin supports Pargeter's point. Second, the AKP believed that shortening the transition period and holding elections was the best course of action and advised the MB accordingly. The former director of the Islamist NGO IHH (*İnsani Yardım Vakfi* – Humanitarian Relief Foundation) claimed that 'it was because of the AKP that the MB changed its mind on participating in the presidential elections. It was wrong because this led the MB to shoulder the whole burden of the revolution.'[372] A source who closely followed the AKP's relations with the MB claimed that 'the AKP pushed really hard for the MB to participate in the presidential elections to the point of pestering the Ikhwanis.'[373]

A phone call that the Al Jazeera general director Wadah Khanfar recalls having with Davutoğlu is also illuminating:

> The night that Mubarak was deposed, and the military took over the Egyptian government, everyone, including myself, was happy and satisfied with how the revolution turned out. Then my phone rang. It was Davutoğlu. He inquired about the situation. I assured him that everyone was joyous. He predicted that our happiness would be short-lived. And I asked why. He claimed that the army had taken control, which, based on his experience in Turkey, was not the most brilliant thing. It should not last long, and a civil government had to be formed, he added. And I said, what are you talking about? Let us rejoice.[374]

[371] Pargeter, *Return to the shadows*, 42.
[372] 'İHH Başkanı Fehmi Bülent Yıldırım, AKP'nin Mısır ve Suriye politikalarını eleştirdi', *Oda TV*, 23 January 2015.
[373] Interview, Istanbul, April 2022.
[374] Interview with Wadah Khanfar, London, 06 December 2018.

According to Khanfar, 'The Turks saw the dangers of military rule from the very beginning and did everything they could to warn any Egyptian official whom they met.'[375] All the interviewees agree that Shater was the most frequently encountered 'Egyptian official' by the AKP teams. A former AKP MP claims that Shater not only visited Turkey 'countless times' during and after the election campaign but that the AKP team usually held their meetings in Shater's office in Cairo.[376] Those meetings must have had some effect on Shater, because he used Erdoğan in his presidential campaign until he was disqualified. For example, a video was circulated in which Shater was referred to as 'Egypt's Erdoğan'.[377] As mentioned earlier, it is hard to determine the extent of the AKP's role in the uncharacteristically assertive political path pursued by the MB after the revolution. However, based on anecdotal evidence, it would be fair to claim that AKP representatives may have had some influence on Shater and, therefore, on the MB.
Since Shater was the main contact for the AKP, few people became acquainted with Mohammad Morsi, including Davutoğlu, who claimed that he met 'Morsi for the first time in my life after he was elected as president. We then supported him not because he was part of the MB, but because he won the election',[378] implying that AKP's sole motivation in Egypt after the revolution was establishing democratic practices and institutions.

The dialogue between the MB and the AKP resumed unabated after Morsi became president, but this time more publicly. The AKP's 4th General Assembly in September 2012 in Ankara was a spectacle that demonstrated Erdoğan's status in the Muslim world. The attendees included Khalid Meshal of Hamas, Rashid Ghannouichi of Ennahda, Ali Osman Muhammad of Sudan, Lutfi Hasan Ishaaq of Indonesia, Hasin Sowan Elmkrish of

[375] Interview with Wadah Khanfar, op. cit.
[376] Interview with former AKP MP 2, 03 August 2018.
[377] Eralp, *Turkey as a Mediator*, 45.
[378] Interview with Ahmet Davutoğlu, İstanbul, 20 August 2019.

Libya's Justice and Construction Party and, of course, President Morsi of Egypt.[379] Morsi was the only foreign leader allowed to address the AKP crowd. He commenced his nearly 50-minute address by stressing his intense interest in AKP's successes, stating that 'the AKP has accomplished all these while keeping its identity intact', and thanked the AKP, especially then President Gül and Prime Minister Erdoğan, 'for being the first people on the face of this earth to support the Egyptian revolution and my taking office'. It was also strategically important for Morsi to emphasise that Egypt and Turkey were on the same page when it came to the Palestinian issue and the Syrian crisis. 'The world is watching us,' he said, 'and the future expects more collaboration between Turkey and Egypt.'[380] Morsi was greeted by Erdoğan himself when he descended from the podium, not knowing that the speech he had just given would be broadcast to hundreds of thousands of AKP supporters at an election rally in Turkey in 2015 shortly after he was sentenced to death.[381]

4.2 The AKP in Tunis, Ennahda in Ankara, and Istanbul

A day after his Cairo visit, on 15 September 2011, Erdoğan landed at Tunis's Carthage Airport. He was greeted by a crowd resembling that in Cairo, with banners bearing slogans such as 'Jerusalem is our home' and 'Erdoğan, young people want freedom' and waving Tunisian, Turkish and Palestinian flags.[382] Erdoğan and his son Bilal shook hands and chatted with the jubilant crowd. Rachid Ghannouchi, who was present, greeted Erdoğan stating that Erdoğan had been 'working hard for Islam'.[383] The goal of Erdoğan's first visit to Tunisia after the revolution was the same as that in his Egyptian tour: to underscore that

[379] 'Kongrede ağır konuklar', *IHA*, 30 September 2012.
[380] 'Mısır Cumhurbaşkanı Muhammed Mursi Ak Parti 4. Kongresine katıldı', *YouTube*, 30 September 2012.
[381] 'Mursi AKP'nin mitinginde', *Cumhuriyet*, 17 May 2015.
[382] 'Erdoğan Tunus'ta sloganlarla karşılandı', *Al Jazeera Türk*, 20 September 2011.
[383] 'Turkey's Erdogan makes a case for Islam and Democracy in Tunisia', *France 24*, 15 September 2011.

Islam and democracy are compatible and that an Islamist party can 'successfully govern a secular state.'[384] This message was intended for both Western and Arab audiences.

During his press conference with caretaker prime minister Beji Caid Essebsi, Erdoğan reiterated his secularism comments in Tunisia: 'A secular state treats all faith groups equally, be they Muslims, Christians, Jews, or atheists. This is the crux of the matter. This may spark debate, but it is our opinion. As for what I think about Ennahda, we would respect the will of the Tunisian people. But, most important of all, Tunisia will prove that Islam and democracy can exist side by side. Turkey's population is 99 per cent Muslim. If we can do it, that means it is doable. No need to impede this.'[385]

The Ennahda leaders did not react to Erdoğan's preaching of secularism in the same way that the MB did. While Erdoğan's comments were deemed inappropriate by the MB, to say the least, they were viewed as convenient by the Nahdawis, as Ennahda had invested great effort into being perceived in the same category as the AKP, in order to reassure the Tunisians, especially secular Tunisians.

The Nahdawi Lourimi claims that 'Ennahda, since the beginning saw AKP's successes as its own and was genuinely thrilled with every electoral victory.'[386]

Lotfi Zitoun, the former Ennahda minister for local affairs and adviser to Ghannouchi, believes that 'in the beginning, there was an idea in the minds of both AKP's and Ennahda's leadership of cooperation between democratic Islam movements but there has never been an association called Ikhwani.'[387] For the Ennahda MP and former minister of employment and vocational training, Sayyida Ounnissi, the AKP's initial plan may have

[384] Ibid.
[385] 'Bir Müslüman laik ülke yönetebilir', *Hürriyet*, 16 September 2011.
[386] Interview with Ajmi Lourimi, op. cit.
[387] Interview with Lotfi Zitoun, telephone, 14 May 2020.

been to establish 'something similar to Socialist International, in which you have all the socialist parties from all the countries'.

> The AKP was willing to do the same for all the Islamist parties around the world. I participated in one of the AKP's meetings where I was representing the European wing of Ennahda. I saw this aspiration on the part of the AKP. They [the AKP people] were trying to integrate the Moroccan PJD, the MB in Egypt and parties from Sudan, Libya and Mauritania into an umbrella organization. The AKP was, at the time, looking into managing the whole Islamist party sphere and Ennahda was just one part of it.[388]

In this same period, prominent Ennahda executives stated that they had no intention of imposing *sharia* law; Hamadi Jebali confirmed that his daughter was not veiled and that Ennahda embraced pluralism in 'almost a copy and paste of the arguments made by the Turkish leaders of the AKP.'[389] Meanwhile, excessive emphasis on the AKP irritated certain Tunisians, particularly the Tunisian nationalists who, for example, stressed that 'Tunisia has a history that is much older than the history of Erdoğan. [If] the world does not know about Tunisia, this is not Tunisia's problem.'[390]

Nonetheless, as with Erdoğan's visit to Cairo, there was a delicate balance to his stand in Tunisia. While emphasising that secularism was not to be feared, he also boasted to the Islamists – especially to the Ennahda electorate – that he was one of them by bringing the Palestinian issue to the fore and harshly criticising Israel, which at the time had not apologised for its May 2010 raid on a Turkish flotilla bringing humanitarian aid to Gaza,

[388] Interview with Sayyida Ounnisi, telephone, 11 May 2020.
[389] Arienne Bonzon, 'Turquie- Tunisie, la filiation de l'AKP', *Slate*, 3 February 2011.
[390] 'An al-awan ki yagharaf al-al'amaghniyyun an li-tunis awladaan kathir', *Al Manar*, 26 October 2011.

which had killed nine Turks on board.[391] The second cue for the Islamists who might potentially be annoyed by his promotion of secularism was his last-minute visit to the Zaytouna Mosque, the symbolic birthplace of Ennahda's mother movement – the MTI. Erdoğan's prayers in Zaytouna just before he left Tunisia for Libya were intended to serve the same purpose as his visit to Seyful-Islam Al-Banna in Cairo: to prove his credentials as a man of Islam who was familiar with and respected the history of groups such as the MB in Egypt and Ennahda in Tunisia.

On 23 October 2011, almost a month after Erdoğan's visit, Tunisia was to hold its first free vote to elect the constituent assembly – the assembly that would pave the way for the post-revolution constitution. Ennahda, finally legalised as a political party in March 2011, fielded candidates in every constituency but 'limited its ambitions and insisted even before the vote that it would seek to govern in a coalition. Although the party sought to secure the position of prime minister for one of its own, it declined to seek the presidency.'[392]

Beşir Atalay, the then deputy prime minister of Turkey (2011–2014), claimed that he had been appointed by the AKP's higher echelons (in practice, Erdoğan himself) to represent the AKP in meetings with the MB and Ennahda delegations. Atalay received the Nahdawi delegation immediately before Tunisia's constituent assembly election.

> They [the MB and Ennahda teams] travelled to Turkey to learn why and how the AKP had achieved success. The main reason why I was chosen to meet these groups was that I was one of the AKP's founders and had coordinated the drafting of all the election manifestos, strategy documents and government programmes up to that point. Ennahda's first visit came shortly

[391] 'En Tunisie Erdogan concilie Islam et democratie', *Le Point*, 15 September 2011.
[392] Rory McCarthy, 'Al-Nahda: From preaching circles to politics', *The Middle East in London* 14, no. 1 (2018): 374.

> after the revolution and just before their first election. The head of the delegation was Ali Larayedh, and the second man in charge was Lotfi Zaitoun. Their second visit took place following the election.[393]

These meetings with Atalay never made the news and were kept quiet at the time, possibly to avoid lending credence to suggestions that an Ikhwani bloc was being formed with the help of the AKP, a claim made by Gulf countries and *ancien régime* elements in Egypt and secular groups in Tunisia and Turkey. Indeed, the fear of provoking Tunisian secular elements was not unfounded. The election campaigns of other political parties revolved around 'whether or not the Islamist Ennahda party intended to transform Tunisia into a new theocracy' 'and the secularists caricatured Ennahda in such a way, fuelling fears that if it came to power, it would enforce the wearing of the hijab, erode the rights accorded to women under the Personal Status Code and destroy the tourism industry by banning alcohol and beachwear.'[394]

When Erbakan's party had won the 1995 general elections and formed a government in coalition, the Turkish media overflowed with slogans such as 'Secularism is going, *sharia* is coming (*Laiklik elden gidiyor, şeriat geliyor*)' until Erbakan's government was ousted on 28 February 1997.[395] The AKP, having learned its lessons from 28 February, advised Ennahda to form alliances with different sectors of society. Beşir Atalay believes that the AKP's suggestions may have influenced Ennahda so that they managed to calm the waves of anxiety directed at them:

---

[393] Interview with Beşir Atalay, op. cit.
[394] Emma C. Murphy, 'The Tunisian elections of October 2011: a democratic consensus', *The Journal of North African Studies* 18, no. 2 (2013): 238.
[395] Beklan Kulaksızoğlu, 'Türkiye'nin postmodern darbesi: 28 Şubat', *Deutsche Welle Türkçe*, 28 February 2018.

> During my two meetings with the Ennahda delegation, I told them not to form a government alone. Even today, Ennahda gives us credit for this. Thanks to your guidance, they say, we formed a coalition and could move forward in 2011. Later, they [Ennahda] were also clever enough to appoint Moncef Marzouki as president and omit Ghannouchi from the [initial] picture. Of course, we did not dictate their government composition name by name, but we kept underlining that if they did not rule in a coalition, they would not be able to make any advances in a place like Tunisia.[396]

Ennahda received 37 per cent of the vote, taking 89 out of 217 seats in the National Constituent Assembly in October 2011, and formed a government in coalition with two other parties – Ettakol (Democratic Forum for Labour and Liberties – *at-Takattul ad-Dīmuqrāṭī min ajl il-ʻAmal wal-Ḥurriyyāt*) and the CPR (Congress for the Republic – *el-Mo'tamar min ajl el-Jomhūriya*) – which was later referred to as the Troika government. Ennahda's election victory was attributed to its door-to-door campaigning and its clear message of cultural renovation, 'which reflected traditional identities, and it compared itself with the Turkish AKP party, under whose leadership Turkey has enjoyed the kind of economic prosperity that Tunisians crave. It both distinguished itself from all aspects of the previous regime while also laying out a broad vision for the future.'[397] Tuğal agrees that one of the main reasons for Ennahda's election victory, despite two decades of scholarship emphasising its persecution and consequent disorganisation must 'be the mirage of the Turkish model – […] a Turkey style combination of religiosity, economic success and global acceptability'.[398]

[396] Interview with Beşir Atalay, op. cit.
[397] Murphy, The Tunisian elections of October 2011, 240.
[398] Tuğal, *The fall of the Turkish model*, 177.

One month after forming a government, and the day after the cabinet was unveiled by the new prime minister, Hamadi Jebali and Ennahda's leader – Rachid Ghannouchi – visited Istanbul and met with Erdoğan. According to Ghannouchi, he and Erdoğan discussed 'the main problems of the Muslim world' and looked for ways to strengthen cooperation between Turkey and Tunisia 'because we believe the closest experience to Tunisia's is the Turkish experience'.[399] A fortnight after Ghannouchi's visit, his son-in-law and the new minister of foreign affairs of Tunisia, Rafik Abdessalem, arrived in Ankara and he met with his counterpart, Ahmet Davutoğlu, Prime Minister Erdoğan and President Abdullah Gül.[400] Abdessalem spoke on a panel with Davutoğlu organised by SETA (*Strateji Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı* – the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research), entitled 'Arab Spring, Turkey and Tunisia', in which he stated that 'many people consider the Tunisian model as representing a peaceful political change and democratization process and I think the Turkish model very much influences the Tunisian model; it is a by-product of the Turkish model. We learned and continue to learn a lot from Turkey [...] Turkey demonstrated that Islam and democracy are compatible. Tunisia is about to prove that Islam, Arabism and democracy can coexist.'[401] The other panellist, Davutoğlu, began his speech by addressing Abdessalem as 'my colleague, my friend, my brother' and called Abdessalem's visit 'the most important visit made to Turkey', claiming it would be remembered as a symbolic visit because 'Dr Abdessalem was not only representing the Tunisian government but also the dignity and struggle of the Tunisian and Arab peoples.' Davutoğlu's enthusiastic speech underscored several times that 'Turkey's government would support every step and project of the Tunisian government because Tunisia's success is Turkey's success. We will not let Tunisia fail […] This is why our

[399] İpek Yezdani, No need for secularism in Tunisia: Ghannouchi, *Hurriyet Daily News*, 24 December 2011
[400] Dış politika kronolojisi, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı*, January 2012.
[401] SETA Panel: Arap Baharı, Tunus ve Türkiye, *SETA*, 11 January 2012.

institutions and experience will be at your service. Because your [Tunisia's] success will bring success to the region.'[402] It was not only Davutoğlu who linked the successes of Tunisia and Turkey. According to Ajmi Lourimi, an executive member of Ennahda and MP, who had been arrested in 1991, sentenced to life imprisonment and subjected to severe torture by the Ben Ali regime, 'Erdoğan [was] eager for the success of a moderate experience like Ennahda's [because] the success of Ennahda is the success of the model that Erdoğan defends.'[403]

As part of Ankara's willingness to share its practical knowledge with Tunisia, Tunisia's Nahdawi regional development and planning minister, Jamel Eddin Al-Gharbi, met with his counterpart, Cevdet Yılmaz, the tourism minister Ertuğrul Günay and the forestry and water management minister Veysel Eroğlu. Shortly after Al-Gharbi's visit, Turkey's then president, Abdullah Gül, accompanied by Beşir Atalay and Cevdet Yılmaz, travelled to Tunisia, becoming the first foreign president to visit post-revolution Tunisia – a distinction Gül also held for post-revolution Egypt. During this visit, three protocols were signed covering the two countries' cooperation on transport, tourism and technology. Gül also announced that Turkey's Exim Bank would lend 500 million dollars' worth of credit to Tunisian businesspeople.[404] After having lunch with Rachid Ghannouchi, Gül walked with him to the Zaytouna Mosque and prayed,[405] following in the footsteps of Erdoğan. Out of the public eye, the development ministers of the two countries, Yılmaz and Gharbi, continued to meet in the following months. During his second visit to Tunisia in less than six months, Cevdet Yılmaz announced that Turkey would endow Tunisia with 100 million

[402] SETA Panel: Arap Baharı, Tunus ve Türkiye.
[403] Interview with Ajmi Lourimi, op. cit.
[404] Fuad Ferhavi, 'Abdullah Gül'ün Tunus Ziyareti: Ekonomik Öncelik ve Bölgesel Eksen İhtiyacı,' *USAK Analiz* 19 (2012): 4.
[405] 'Cumhurbaşkanı Gül Tunus'ta', *Anadolu Ajansı*, 9 March 2012.

dollars and provide 400 million dollars' worth of loans.[406] This announcement came just a few days after Ennahda had held its first post-revolutionary congress – the ninth in total – at which Ghannouchi was elected president. The congress had triggered a debate about whether Ennahda would 'revise its founding text and ideological vision [which can sometimes be] close to Salafist thought. Then its aim to build a modern state will succeed. Otherwise, it will fail to establish the long-coveted Turkish model.'[407]

As Ali Larayedh, a senior Nahdawi and the Interior Minister at the time, confirmed, Turkey's financial and political support of Tunisia was apparent until the end of 2014:

> When we started determining the state's budget after the revolution, one of the funding resources we had was from Turkey. There were several Turkish banks that facilitated the loan process by following presidential orders. They also assisted us with the security systems, and we purchased logistics from them for the army.[408]

According to Meherzia Labidi, an executive member of Ennahda in charge of relationships with civil society and a former VP of the Parliament, the unconditional and prompt nature of Turkey's support proved to be its most salient aspect:

> When Tunisia needed genuine assistance, such as in its municipalities and in combatting terrorism, Turkey was the only country that sent military and municipal equipment without asking anything in return. They helped us immediately. I will never forget that, because I was part of the constitutional committee in the parliament back then. It was around 2013–14. When you ask for help from European countries, they say they will help but give you a list of conditions such as that we must buy this or that from them. Turkey did not do that. I personally

[406] 'Türkiye ile Tunus arasında yeni iş birliği anlaşması', *Haber 7*, 17 July 2012.
[407] 'Ennahda congress in Tunisia strives to define, unify the party', *Al-Monitor*, July 2012.
[408] Interview with Ali Larayedh, op. cit.

> witnessed how Turkey reacted to our request so fast. And Tunisians know that it was Erdoğan and Turkey that aided us.[409]

As Labidi mentions, Turkey helped Tunisia tackle the resurgence of terrorist attacks in addition to offering financial and political support. 'Terrorism was a fundamental issue for us,' according to Fethi Ayadi, Ennahda MP, 'and we talked about how to fight terrorism in most of our meetings with the AKP. And the Tunisian army received logistical and technical help from Turkey.'[410]

Indeed, terrorism was a fundamental threat to Tunisia's stability after the Arab Uprisings. The fall of Ben Ali's regime in 2011 suddenly enabled these radical groups to appear publicly. As McCarthy observes, the sharp rise in the wearing of the *niqab* following the Uprisings reveals not an increase in support for Ennahda but rather the 'pluralisation of Islamic identities flourishing in the new socio-political space'.[411] Those imprisoned during Ben Ali's regime used incarceration as a networking opportunity and, after 2011, membership of the prominent Salafist group Ansar al-Shariʿa increased dramatically, with varied branches reaching across Tunisia.[412] The outbreak of the Syrian Civil War attracted many Tunisians to travel eastwards and fight for ISIS, while the 2013 attack on Tunisian soldiers in the mountainous Chambi area and the 2015 mass shooting at a tourist resort in Sousse revealed that Tunisia itself had become a hotbed of religious violence.[413] As Wolf notes, the number of Tunisians fighting for ISIS and groups affiliated with al-Qaeda was

[409] Interview with Meherzia Labidi, Tunis, 12 November 2019.
[410] Interview with Fethi Ayadi, Tunis, 18 November 2019.
[411] McCarthy, 'The Tunisian Uprising, Ennahdha and the Revival of an Arab-Islamic Identity', 168.
[412] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 144.
[413] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 150.

remarkably high and can be explained by the growing tide of Salafi-jihadism in the country.[414]

Around the same time, Turkey experienced several ISIS attacks, one of which was the deadliest since the republic's foundation, killing over 100 civilians in Ankara. Tunisia also suffered from terrorist attacks, such as that in the Bardo National Museum in Tunis in 2015 and another in Sousse in 2015, each of which killed tens of civilians including tourists. In March 2016, Ben Gardane, a Tunisian city on the border with Libya, was attacked by an ISIS group that attempted to seize the town to establish a vassal ISIS entity. 'Many believe that without equipment and help from Turkey, ISIS would have invaded Ben Gardane.'[415] According to Abdel Jalil Tamimi's column, Turkey has provided millions of dollars of essential aid to Tunisia, in very delicate circumstances. However, he wrote, Turkey needed to form good relations with all political parties in Tunisia, rather than relying on one specific party, namely Ennahda.[416]

Turkey's help in curbing radical Islamist groups in Tunisia also had other motives. As evident in his speeches, Erdoğan was determined to make Ennahda's rule as smooth as possible, as proof of its 'Islamists can govern' motto. It was at this time critical to distinguish Ennahda from the Salafis and other radical groups, to substantiate Ennahda's project of reconciling Islam and democracy.[417]

[414] Wolf, *Political Islam in Tunisia*, 166.
[415] Interview with Fethi Ayadi, op. cit.
[416] Abd El Jalil Tamimi, 'ziyarat erdogan li Tounes wa al mawakef al baessa li bathi al kiadat al siyassiya', *Hakaek*, 20 December 2017.
[417] Wolf, 'An Islamist 'renaissance'?', 568.

4.3 The actors and interlocutors

When we talk about the emulation of 'a model', it is important to note that the narrative of the Turkish model concerns the AKP rather than Turkey itself. Needless to say, these are two different structural processes. Between 1890 and 1914, for example, Germany's efficient bureaucracy and administration served as an inspiration to progressive American social policy actors. When US institutions needed the best practical proposals to address the social disruption of intense industrial capitalism, stories of a successful imperial Germany flooded into the realm of policymaking through various channels. Ideas about social insurance policies or city designs diffused from German state institutions to the US.[418] In our case, even though the mobilisation of ideas seems to have emanated from Turkey, as the sender country, and landed in Egypt and Tunisia, the receiver countries, in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings, the interplay between 2011 and 2013 occurred among political parties, namely the AKP, Ennahda and the Egyptian MB's FJP. Turkey, Tunisia, and Egypt were neither structures nor inspirations in this interplay but, rather, backdrops against which limitations on Islamist political behaviour were cultivated in their respective *ancien régimes* or reminders of the hurdles that the AKP had overcome and that Ennahda and the FJP had to overcome. This is another reason why international relations models are not adequate for construing the interplay between the AKP, Ennahda and the Egyptian MB, even though the actors in question employed foreign policy tools and institutions. This was not merely state-to-state interaction, which would not be unusual given that the receiver states – Tunisia and Egypt – were in a turbulent transition period.

[418] Daniel Rodgers, 'Bearing tales: networks and narratives in social policy transfer', *Journal of Global History* 9, no. 2 (2014): 308.

4.3.1 The elite actors

Diffusion operates on three levels: relational, non-relational and mediated (brokerage). Relational diffusion refers to various direct and interpersonal networks, whereas non-relational diffusion usually means ideas, tactics and frames shared via mass media. Mediated diffusion usually signifies NGO involvement. For Solingen, the diffusion process usually starts with a triggering event or stimulus; a medium or a milieu is then formed in which the ideas travel[419] from the sender to the receiver. For the AKP, the triggering event was the start of the protests in Tunisia and Egypt.

In the process of diffusion, four types of actors exist: innovators, early adopters, late adopters, and non-adopters. Innovators are those who first adopt an innovation. Early adopters function as a legitimising force for the innovation, whereas late adopters embrace it only after careful deliberation. Finally, non-adopters are those who refrain from taking up such innovation. The literature on diffusion does not systematically explain 'why some actors adopt diffused policies, whereas others refrain'. [420] The innovators in this particular diffusion process were Ahmet Davutoğlu – the former Turkish FM and PM, Rachid Ghannouichi of Ennahda and Tayyip Erdoğan; while the early adopters were Beşir Atalay – the former Turkish Interior Minister and Abdullah Gül, the former Turkish PM and President. Early Nahdawi adopters may include the former Prime Minister of Tunisia Ali Larayedh, the former Foreign Minister Rafek Abdesselam, and executive member of Ennahda's *shura* Ajmi Lourimi.

[419] Etel Solingen, 'Of Dominoes and Firewalls: The Domestic, Regional, and Global Politics of International Diffusion1', *International Studies Quarterly* 56, no. 4 (2012).
[420] May Darwich, 'Creating the Enemy, Constructing the Threat: The Diffusion of Repression against the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East', *Democratization: Clusters of Authoritarian Diffusion and Cooperation: The Role of Interests vs. Ideology?* 24, no. 7 (2017):1392.

While it seemed to many ordinary Nahdawis that 'all parts of the Arabic world follow Erdoğan [as] a successful person who raised the standards of welfare of his people',[421] as explained in the previous chapter, Ghannouchi was not merely an adopter of a Turkish model, nor did he stand idly at the receiving end of the diffusion process. 'Indeed, all Islamist movements observe one another's experiences; many read and follow the work of Ennahda's founder/leader Rachid Ghannouchi, and, in turn, Ennahda has sought advice from Islamists outside Tunisia.'[422] Despite political factions such as the moderates and Salafists led by influential figures such as Abdelfattah Morou and Mohammed Khouja within Ennahda, it was primarily Ghannouchi's thoughts and writings that shaped the party's political trajectory.[423] In summary, 'Ghannouchi is one of the rare examples of Islamic leaders whose authoritative voice has influence in both the West and the Arab World.'[424]

An early adopter unit emerged within the MB immediately after the fall of Mubarak, led by influential figures Khairat El-Shater, deputy chair of the movement and the initial presidential candidate; Amr Darrag, former senior MB member and Development Minister; and Abd Al-Moneim Aboul Futuh, former leader of the MB's youth wing. 'Even before Morsi became president, delegations started to work with one another,' Darrag recalled. 'The Egyptian delegation had gone to Turkey and visited municipalities. After I became minister, I had two important meetings, one with prime minister Erdoğan and the other with President Abdullah Gül. Ali Babacan, the finance minister at the time, joined

[421] Interview with Takouo Lassoued, telephone, 7 May 2020.
[422] McCarthy, 'Al-Nahda: From preaching circles to politics' 371.
[423] Francesco Cavatorta and Fabio Merone, 'Moderation through exclusion? The journey of the Tunisian Ennahda from fundamentalist to conservative party', *Democratization* 20, no. 5 (2013): 860.
[424] Pietro Marzo, 'Critical junctures, path dependence and Al-Nahda's contribution to the Tunisian transition to democracy', *The Journal of North African Studies* 24, no. 6 (2019): 925.

our meeting with Erdoğan. During that meeting, we agreed on a two-million-dollar credit deal.'[425]

If Ghannouchi's and Erdoğan's positions in the diffusion process were crucial, so was that of Ahmet Davutoğlu. According to Bülent Aras, political scientist, and close associate of Davutoğlu, the latter has not only 'changed the rhetoric and practice of Turkish foreign policy [and provided] a new framework for pursuing it, thanks to the willingness of Erdoğan and Gül, [but also] he is known as the intellectual architect of the AKP.'[426] Davutoğlu served as Erdoğan's chief foreign policy adviser from the beginning, then as Foreign Minister and finally as prime minister. Davutoğlu devised a scheme in which specific NGOs and think tanks played a significant role in publicising the election of a pro-democracy and pro-market Islamist party.

This scheme, according to Aras, was part of a mechanism known as 'total performance', which entails the inclusion of 'NGOs, business communities and other civil organizations as part of the new foreign policy vision and mobilizing their support'. As a result, various groups increased their influence on the formulation of foreign policy: 'Business organizations, civil society, intellectuals, think tanks, and other actors now provide input into the foreign policymaking process […] in contrast to a past when regional policy and international relations were imagined in such a way that there was no room for these actors.'[427] This may appear to be a textbook example of establishing a lobbying machine. However, there was more to this scheme than mere lobbying. The directors and associates of these NGOs were handpicked by Davutoğlu and were involved in bureaucratic

[425] Interview with Amr Darrag, op. cit.
[426] Bülent Aras, 'The Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy', *Insight Turkey* 11, no. 3 (2009): 127.
[427] Aras, 'The Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy' 135.

operations. It was also these NGOs that later served as interlocutors in the diffusion process.

4.3.2 The interlocutors and structure

Ahmed Gaaloul, former Ennahda MP, secretary of state in the Ministry of Youth and Sports and member of Ennahda's *shura* has close ties to Ghannouchi from their time as refugees in the UK and claimed that 'there was the dissemination of ideas between Ennahda and the AKP, but the relationship was not structural, [meaning] it was not maintained through party institutions but interpersonal and spontaneous relations. AKP's help for Ennahda derives more from friendship. It is good, but it is not enough.'[428] Indeed, the relationship with the MB and Ennahda was not conducted through Turkey's state apparatus and usually bypassed the Turkish embassies in Cairo or Tunis. For example, meetings in Cairo of the AKP and the MB/FJP delegation almost always took place not on state premises but at the FJP's headquarters in central Cairo, Shater's office or the Kempinski Hotel, where AKP members almost always stayed when they visited the city.

Key non-state actors or interlocutors coordinated these meetings while also organising symposia, workshops, and conferences, which would provide opportunities for interaction between the teams of the AKP, Ennahda and the MB, as well as opportunities to meet prominent politicians and scholars in the wider Muslim world. Smith argues that conferences are a common trait of diffusion strategies and have a 'multiplier effect on

[428] Interview with Ahmed Gaaloul, Tunis, 18 December 2019.

strategic planning and discourse around a set of problems as well as structuring opportunities for transnational […] work'.[429]

The diffusion structure was a combination of interpersonal meetings, in which AKP-affiliated actors shared their experiences, and broader encounters such as conferences. Sayyida Ounissi claims that, after the revolution 'there were a lot of seminars organized in Turkey and a special interaction was managed between the AKP and Ennahda'.

> For example, the youth branch of the AKP met with Ennahda's youth branch on a regular basis. The same was true for the women's branches of both parties. The businessmen from both sides gathered in these seminars and conferences. Also, all the municipal departments of the AKP met with local representatives of Ennahda. The AKP also gave training about media management and online activism to Ennahda.[430]

Oussama Sagheir, Ennahda MP, recalls that he had 'been to Turkey and met with AKP people during our [Tunisia's] first municipal elections [after the Arab Uprisings] to see how they [the AKP] ran their municipal election campaigns, and later I organized a conference here [in Tunis] on the relationship between Turkey and Tunisia.'[431] According to Nidhal Gharbi, who 'was present in some meetings and youth exchange programmes between Ennahda and the AKP', representing Ennahda's youth bureau in Medjez El Bab, 'some meetings were like conferences. We met with the AKP people at conferences where there were many other delegates from other countries. The AKP also ran conferences for young people, and we, as Nahdawi young people, attended. We got information about the

[429] Jackie Smith, 'Transnational Processes and Movements' in *The Blackwell companion to social movements*, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah Anne Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), 323.
[430] Interview with Sayyida Ounnisi, op. cit.
[431] Interview with Oussama Sagheir, op. cit.

AKP's election campaigns. We are also invited by the AKP to Turkey at election times to observe.'[432] The AKP and Ennahda delegates also met regularly at each other's party congresses. [433]

The key AKP participants in the dialogue were advisers to Erdoğan and Davutoğlu, SETA academics with expertise in Islamic theology or Middle Eastern politics, and individual Turkish correspondents, who acted as fixers for meetings. According to one of these key players, 'the MB members who communicated with [the AKP] were all highly and usually Western-educated people. One of them was a Harvard University graduate and the other was from Durham University.'[434] Amr Darrag corroborates this information, claiming that, although members of the MB old guard were not opposed to the learning process, they did not attend meetings. 'I can say that it was mostly FJP members who took an active part in the process. Many of them were young people who spoke several languages. I was 53 at the time and the oldest person in this group,' he recalled. 'The rest were in their late 20s and 30s, with backgrounds in international relations or with work experience in multinational corporations.'[435]

Think tanks, legal associations and academic initiatives play pivotal roles in transition periods and diffusion processes around the world by forging relations among key actors.[436] The primary interlocutors in this diffusion process were Turkey's SETA, the governmental organisation TIKA (*Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı* – Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency) and the Yunus Emre Foundation (*Yunus Emre*

[432] Interview with Nidhal Gharbi, Tunis, 7 May 2020.
[433] Interview with Nejmeddine Felhi, Tunis, 19 December 2019.
[434] Interview with Talip Küçükcan, op. cit.
[435] Interview with Amr Darrag, op. cit.
[436] Nancy Bermeo, 'Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship', 286.

Enstitüsü). Talip Küçükcan, a former AKP MP and one of the co-founders of SETA claimed that 'the relationship between the AKP and the MB progressed through a couple of channels. The first was through special symposiums, workshops, and conferences, which enabled interaction between the two parties. Second, SETA played an essential part as a facilitator. When the MB or Ennahda people wanted to meet AKP people, we, as SETA, arranged the meetings.'[437]

SETA is often referred to as 'the AKP's think tank' because many of its fellows not only worked actively in Turkey's foreign policy as part of Davutoğlu's so-called 'total performance' but had also at some point become AKP members or MPs and wrote op-ed columns in pro-government newspapers such as *Star*, *Yeni Şafak*, *Sabah* and, recently, *Karar*.[438] As can be seen, the think tanks led by SETA that disseminated the 'Turkish model' discourse in Washington and the Arab world are not autonomous and have a tangled relationship with the AKP government.[439] As with the diffusion process, it is also important to stress that SETA opened a Cairo branch to be able to operate on-site with ease. Prime Minister Erdoğan, at a conference of trade attachés on 25 April 2011, acknowledged parts of this new foreign policy apparatus: 'In addition, we disseminate Turkey's soft power, Turkey's message of peace to the whole world through TIKA, the Yunus Emre Institutes, the TRT, and the Presidency of Turks Abroad and Related Communities.'[440]

[437] Interview with Talip Küçükcan, op. cit.
[438] Talip Küçükcan was a columnist for *Sabah Daily*, as was the former director of SETA, Fahrettin Altun. Another former director, Taha Özhan, was a columnist for the *Daily Star*.
[439] Benhaim and Öktem, 'The rise and fall of Turkey's soft power discourse', 13.
[440] Cited in Yohanan and Öktem, 'The rise and fall of Turkey's soft power discourse' 18.

Another soft power apparatus, established in January 2010 and led by Erdoğan's long-time senior adviser İbrahim Kalın, was the Office of Public Diplomacy (*Kamu Diplomasisi Koordinatörlüğü* – KDK). Cemallettin Haşimi, who succeeded Kalın at the end of 2012, claims that the KDK's main aim 'was to deliver the experience of new Turkey to other countries and regions.'[441] Haşimi was also among those who regularly met with Egyptian and Tunisian delegates. In 2014, when he met with 30 Tunisian government and civil society figures at the KDK headquarters, he highlighted the importance of a political strategy that would enable the Tunisian government to manage crises and prevent coups, violence and terrorism.[442]

Aside from KDK and SETA, Turkey opened its first TIKA branch in 2012 in Cairo, thanks to a protocol signed during the Morsi presidency. TIKA's Tunis office was also opened in February 2013 along with an industrial zone that would house 1,000 Turkish businesses, creating 25,000 jobs.[443] It had not been possible to open a TIKA branch in Cairo during the Mubarak era, owing to TIKA's reputation. Although TIKA claims to exist 'to provide aid, technical assistance, and information in developmental issues and preserve and promote Turkish and Ottoman culture', it is covertly linked to the Turkish intelligence agency, MIT (*Millî İstihbarat Teşkilatı*). For example, it is common practice for TIKA officials to join MIT at some point, or vice versa. The most prominent example of this flow is MIT's current director, Hakan Fidan, who was appointed to TIKA in 2003 before being transferred to MIT. It was this relationship with the intelligence that caused the Mubarak regime – and later Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel – to limit TIKA's presence in the

[441] 'Türkiye'nin hikayesini dünyaya anlatıyor', *Haber 7*, 31 January 2013.
[442] Ben Younes, Kamal, 'mustashar rayiys al-hukumat al-turkiat: hakdha nanzur 'iilaa mustaqbal ealaqatina mae tunis wasuria warusia', *Assabah*, 5 June 2014.
[443] 'Tunisie - La nouvelle zone industrielle pilote à Ennahli créera 25 mille emplois', Rekrute, *25 February 2013.*

region, since they saw 'the organization as trying to inject Turkey's influence into highly sensitive issues [such as the Palestinian issue, the status of Jerusalem and the Gaza blockade]'.[444]

However, since the AKP and the MB hold similar attitudes towards the Palestinian issue, TIKA's presence in Cairo – approved by President Morsi – would be beneficial to both parties in terms of exerting soft power. Similarly, it was during Morsi's period in office that the Yunus Emre Foundation, which in 2010 opened its Cairo office on the same street as TIKA in the Giza district with the aim of promoting the Turkish language and culture, expanded its activities significantly.[445] There is an intriguing story behind this foundation, which was established in 2009 to counter the influence of the Gülen movement's Turkish schools, especially in Africa. In the aftermath of the fallout between the AKP and the Gülen movement, the Yunus Emre Foundation in Cairo, according to a Turkish bureaucrat, took over almost all the cultural and educational activities that the Turkish Embassy in Egypt had previously coordinated.[446]

In summary, the AKP structured its relationship with the MB and Ennahda through foundations and NGOs in an unregulated, unrecorded fashion. For this reason, in part, while official visits at a presidential or ministerial level between Ankara, Cairo and Tunis made the news, little information about the nature of the dialogue has been made public.

[444] 'Israel mulls crackdown on Turkey's aid activity in Jerusalem: report', *I24 News*, 7 July 2018.
[445] Interview with Mehmet Akif Ersoy, op. cit.
[446] Interview with high-level Turkish bureaucrat 2, 01 August 2018.

4.3.3 Brokers: Al Jazeera and Yusuf Al-Qaradawi

As shown above, the diffusion mechanism between AKP, the MB and Ennahda is a relational and social enterprise, in which tactics, ideas and frames are conveyed through personal contacts and organisational connections. However, 'most scholars recognize that direct network ties and relational diffusion are only part of the story'[447] and that brokers may also be involved. The role of the broker is to bridge otherwise unconnected entities in a diffusion process. The other function of brokers such as mass media or international activist networks is to 'mobilize external support for local or national struggles in an attempt to enhance their political leverage when pressing claims on domestic governments'.[448] In addition to the interpersonal contact of elite actors and interlocutors within the AKP, Ennahda and Egyptian MB, brokers such as Al Jazeera TV and IUMS (*Al-Ittiḥād Al-'Ālamī li-'Ulāmā' al-Muslimīn* – International Union for Muslim Scholars) and its former president, Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, aided the diffusion process. These brokers, according to Piscatori, are vehicles of 'vertical transnationalism which [are] evolved, sponsored, and funded by state or non-state actors',[449] intending to connect local actors to the larger polity. Media outlets such as Al Jazeera 'often perform the function of [diffusing tactical repertoires] and thus play an important role as indirect channels of diffusion'.[450]

Qaradawi was considered one of the most influential Islamic scholars who died in September 2022. He was even 'characterised by some observers as something of a papal

[447] Givan, Roberts and Soule, *The diffusion of social movements*, 3.
[448] Givan, Roberts and Soule, *The diffusion of social movements*, 13.
[449] James Piscatori and Amin Saikal, *Islam beyond borders*, 163.
[450] Givan, Roberts and Soule, *The diffusion of social movements*, 12.

figure in Sunni Islam'.[451] Born in Egypt, he graduated from Al-Azhar University with a PhD in 1973 and was part of the MB until he went into exile in Qatar. He claimed that he declined an invitation from the MB to be its Supreme Guide. He is the author of 120 books, more than half of which have been translated into Turkish. Although some countries – including the Gulf countries and Egypt – believe he has ties with terrorist groups, his teachings on Islamic jurisprudence are regarded as being 'located between the fundamentalists who rely on ancient sources of the *sunna* and the Quran and the more moderate from the new stream. Ennahda's leaders also reflect this intellectual and theological trend called *wassatiyya*, which Qaradawi developed from a Quranic verse interpreted as justifying Islam's moderate nature.'[452] According to Ajmi Lourimi of Ennahda, 'Yes, this is the concept we adopt; it is more or less the same thing as the concept of Muslim democracy.'[453]

The actors involved in this diffusion process have close personal ties with Qaradawi. Ghannouchi, for example, had previously served as the vice president of IUMS. A recently published photograph of Erdoğan and Qaradawi demonstrates that their relationship dates back to 1998, before the foundation of AKP;[454] additionally, both the MB and the Palestinian Hamas regard him as a spiritual guide.[455] During and after the Arab Uprisings, Qaradawi's involvement in Islamist politics increased through his popular television show on Al Jazeera, his social media accounts, and visits to Istanbul. Similarly, statements issued by IUMS, which before the Uprisings referred primarily to the troubles of Muslims

[451] Usaama al-Azami, 'Abdullāh bin Bayyah and the Arab Revolutions: Counter-revolutionary Neo-traditionalism's Ideological Struggle against Islamism', *The Muslim world (Hartford)* 109, no. 3 (2019): 352.
[452] Fabio Merone, 'Politicians or Preachers? What Ennahda's Transformation Mean for Tunisia', Carnegie Endowment, January 2019, p. 4.
[453] Interview with Ajmi Lourimi, op. cit.
[454] 'Erdoğan ile Karadavi'nin fotoğrafı yayınlandı', *Yeni Akit*, 20 May 2015.
[455] Shaul Bartal, 'Sheikh Qaradawi and the Internal Palestinian Struggle Issues Preventing Reconciliation Between Fatah and Hamas and the Influence of the Qaradāwi Era over the Struggle Between the Organizations', *Middle Eastern Studies* 51, no. 4 (2015): 585.

around the world and thus were not seen as 'fundamentally threatening to the regional autocracies', changed into documents forcefully supporting the revolutions.[456] Qaradawi wrote a series of articles in the FJP's official newspaper, 'Freedom and Justice (*al-hurriya wal 'adala*) praising and 'encouraging the newspaper to profile itself as the voice of freedom and truth'.[457]

Qaradawi demanded that all Arab nations, but particularly the MB, cut their ties with Israel until the Gaza strip was liberated. Although Egypt did not sever ties with Tel Aviv, 'a long line of Arab nations expressed their support for Hamas, including Arab Foreign Affairs Ministers in the Gaza strip, thus [enabling] Hamas to [score] political achievements.' [458] Hence, although Qaradawi's influence has its limits, almost all the major Muslim political figures pay heed to him because he is popular in Muslim societies around the world. For example, he was one of the most quoted figures in Turkish newspapers in reports of the Arab Uprisings.[459] A 2018 public opinion survey[460] conducted by YouGov with 16,497 respondents in Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Lebanon, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates found that Qaradawi, along with Erdoğan and Ghannouchi, had one of the highest approval ratings among religious leaders.[461]

[456] al-Azami, 'Abdullāh bin Bayyah and the Arab Revolutions' 346.
[457] *al-hurriya wal 'adala*, p.11, 29 October 2011, cited in Noha Mellor, *Voice of the Muslim Brotherhood: Da'wa, Discourse, and Political Communication* (Routledge, 2017), 196.
[458] Bartal, 'Sheikh Qaradawi and the Internal Palestinian Struggle' 594.
[459] Da Ta Banu, 'Constructing the "Arab Spring": News Discourses in Turkish Newspapers', *Global Media Journal* 6, no. 2 (2013): 26.
[460] Kadir A. Yıldırım, 'The New Guardians of Religion: Islam and Authority in the Middle East', Baker Institute for Public Policy, March 2019, pp.18–20.
[461] The respondents were given a list of 82 individuals and asked 'Which of the religious leaders below do you approve of? Please select all that apply.'

Qaradawi's first public appearance in Istanbul after the Arab Uprisings was on 25 June 2010, when he hosted the annual meeting of IUMS in Istanbul's Grand Cevahir Kongre Merkezi – a meeting that Qaradawi called a turning point for the Islamic world. It brought together more than 500 Muslim clerics from around the world. At a press conference on the first day, Qaradawi stated that, given their leaders' reluctance to address the Palestinian issue, 'Arab countries need a couple of Erdoğans'.[462]

Qaradawi acted as a bridge between the AKP and other Islamist groups worldwide, especially the MB, and continued to play this role in the aftermath of the fall of Morsi. He convened almost all the annual meetings of IUMS in Istanbul, where senior MB members gathered with other Islamist groups and scholars of Islam. In these meetings, Erdoğan was praised by Qaradawi as the protector of and hope for Islam.[463] Qaradawi even called on the Turkish people to vote for Erdoğan in the presidential election of 2014, claiming that 'Turkey managed to progress both in many different areas and advanced democracy, which I hope will bring good fortune to Turkey and the Islamic *umma*, and I believe the most appropriate person for Turkey's presidency is Erdoğan.'[464] Unsurprisingly, Qaradawi's support was reciprocated by Erdoğan, who protested vociferously when Egypt's President Sisi asked Interpol to issue a red notice on Qaradawi in 2014[465] or the Gulf states put Qaradawi and several other Qatari organisations on a terror sanctions list.[466]

The meetings involving Qaradawi can be regarded as an avenue of mediated diffusion through missionaries. According to Tarrow, such individual missionaries bring together

[462] 'İslam dünyasına birkaç Erdoğan lazım', *Yeni Şafak*, 25 June 2010.
[463] See 'Dünya Müslüman Alimler Birliği'nin 5. Genel Kurulu İstanbul'da yapıldı', *TRT*, 4 November 2018 and 'Karadavi: Erdoğan İslam için bir umuttur', *Sabah*, 24 April 2016.
[464] 'Yusuf El-Karadavi'den Erdoğan'a destek çağrısı', *Star*, 9 August 2014.
[465] 'Karadavi kararına sert tepki', *Milli Gazete*, 8 December 2014.
[466] 'Qatar crisis grows as Arab nations draw up sanctions list', *Guardian*, 9 June 2017.

'people who might otherwise have remained ignorant of one another's claims. [For example] both the Protestant saints who smuggled Protestant tracts across Europe during the Reformation and the anarchists who brought their faith to southern Italy, Spain, and Latin America were brokers in the spread of revolutionary movements.'[467] Qaradawi legitimised Erdoğan and the AKP within the Muslim world and consequently precipitated the diffusion process. The key positions of brokers 'between otherwise unconnected sites can influence the content of the communicated information'.[468]

Following the Arab Uprisings, Istanbul and Doha emerged as destinations par excellence for those with an Islamic orientation, and for senior MB members to meet to decide on the movement's course.[469] Doha became a global power broker, thanks to the presence of Al Jazeera's headquarters in the city since 1996. The 'Al Jazeera effect', according to Cherribi, assists Arabs in overcoming government censorship and embracing notions of freedom and democracy in the face of authoritarian regimes. Al Jazeera supported the agendas of Ennahda and the MB and 'remain[ed] a staunch supporter of democratic political Islam, which sees the emancipation of [their] ideology as the only way for [them] to gain greater acceptance.' [470] Wadah Khanfar, the general director of the channel from 2003 to 2011, argued that an Islamist president would ensure a democratic transition during the Egyptian presidential election period.[471] He also acknowledged that 'there is and always has been an element of advocacy about Al Jazeera's role. Its reporting opened the minds of a generation of Arab young people [and] told them their voices mattered

[467] Sidney G. Tarrow, *The new transnational activism*, Cambridge studies in contentious politics, (New York; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 106.
[468] Tarrow, *The new transnational activism*, 105.
[469] Sam Cherribi, *Fridays of Rage: Al Jazeera, the Arab Spring, and Political Islam* (Oxford University Press, 2017), 244.
[470] Cherribi, *Fridays of Rage*, 245.
[471] Wadah Khanfar, 'These are crucial times in Egypt's transition to democracy', *Guardian*, 20 May 2012.

which gave them hope. For the first time, through Al Jazeera, that generation felt connected to the rest of the world.'[472]

Khanfar was instrumental in forging a close relationship between the Egyptian MB and the AKP. First and foremost, he had been a close friend of Ahmet Davutoğlu since the latter had been a faculty member at Malaysia's International Islam University, according to multiple sources, and had visited Turkey on many occasions before and after the Arab Uprisings.[473] A scholar at Georgetown University claims that a Turkish diplomat at the Doha embassy told him that this friendship encouraged Al Jazeera to devote more time to news related to Turkey.[474] Hakan Albayrak, a well-known Turkish Islamist, also elaborated on Khanfar's role, claiming that Turkey owed its popularity on the Arab streets to Khanfar. 'Al Jazeera was like an official Turkish channel for a while,' Albayrak wrote. 'It was Khanfar who made the "one minute incident"[475] legendary, and Erdoğan to be greeted like a new Selahaddin on Arab streets. We should thank Wadah for his efforts in bringing Arabs and Turks together.'[476] The Al Sharq Forum, a think tank founded by Khanfar after he left Al Jazeera, holds conferences and panels in Istanbul[477] nearly every year, gathering scholars of political Islam from the Western and Muslim worlds as well as youth groups from the Middle East and the Maghreb.

The Arab Uprisings triggered diffusion between the AKP, Ennahda and the MB in Egypt. Actors, interlocutors, and brokers aligned in this process, but what has diffused aside from the Turkish model or Muslim democracy frame? Were policies or tactics more important

[472] Wadah Khanfar, 'Al-Jazeera gave Arab youth a voice; Gulf regimes must not silence it', *Guardian*, 26 June 2017.
[473] Mahalli, Hüsnü, 'BOP', *Yurt*, 31 July 2013.
[474] Başkan, Birol (2016), *Turkey and Qatar*, 76.
[475] See Chapter 4, introduction.
[476] Albayrak, Hakan, 'Vaddah', *Yeni Şafak*, 24 September 2011.
[477] 'Al-Sharq Forum Konferansı İstanbul'da başladı', *Haberler*, 18 March 2017 and 'Ortadoğu ve güvenlik diyalogu: Gençlik Perspektifi Konferansı', *Milliyet*, 26 June 2018, and 'Breaking the Cycle of Crisis in the MENA', *Youtube – Al Sharq Strategic Research Channel*, 09 November 2016.

here? What were the aims of the AKP, Ennahda and the MB? I will turn to these questions in the next chapter.

5 The tactics of success for Islamists

The height of the diffusion process between the AKP, Ennahda and the MB in Egypt occurred in the transition period following the revolutions. To explain what happened at this point, we must first investigate the following questions: What exactly was diffused? Was the AKP, for example, laying out policy frameworks for Ennahda and the MB to adopt? Second, how should we conceptualise this diffusion process? Why was this specific toolbox chosen for diffusion? These are critical questions in determining the goals and aspirations of the Islamist actors. It is hoped that the answers to them, which are missing in the literature, will provide a contextual foundation for the following chapters, in which I will attempt to explain why this political confluence revolves around the concept of success, how Islamist entities act and what they aspire to when they are not in opposition or in resistance to Western colonisation – two common notions raised when defining Islamism.[478]

For Ennahda and the MB in Egypt, the AKP had become a reference point, serving as a benchmark of 'what works and what does not [in governance] because of geographic proximity, cultural similarity, shared history, or some combination of the three.'[479] 'What interested us was how the AKP had maintained itself in power for so long,' said Sayyida Ounnissi, a former Ennahda MP (2014–2020). 'The AKP is unquestionably a *wow machine* for elections. We were also impressed by AKP's rigour, discipline, and professionalism.'[480] According to Sadiki, Ennahda had invested heavily in the

[478] François Burgat, 'Islam and Islamist Politics in the Arab World: Old theories, new facts?' in *Islamist politics in the Middle East: movements and change*, ed. Samer S. Shehata (Routledge, 2011), 24.
[479] Nancy Bermeo, 'Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship', 283.
[480] Interview with Sayyida Ounnissi, op. cit.

professionalisation[481] and 'normalisation of Ennahda with the deep state, which has preserved the imprints of Bourguiba's political modelling of it in a Francophile fashion: secular in nature.'[482]

Ounnissi's description of the AKP as 'a wow machine' perfectly summarises the diffusion process. What was diffused from the AKP to Ennahda, and the MB was information on the components of a machine that had produced success for an Islamist party in a country where an Islamist–secular or Islamist–anti-Islamist tendency dominated the political culture. Therefore, we are witnessing not policy diffusion but, rather, piecemeal tactics representing the principal components of the AKP's success or on which the AKP believed its success depended. According to Ennahda and the MB, in the post-Uprisings context, success meant winning elections, assuming, remaining, and becoming entrenched in power. The interviews conducted for this thesis revealed that the tactics of the diffusion related to four areas: 1) winning elections; 2) the provision of efficient services through municipalities and market-friendly socio-economic policies, both of which helped the AKP to gain the loyalty of its voter base; 3) gradualism and building alliances, domestic and international, that would not only help maintain legitimacy but also undermine its opponents and the remnants of the *anciens régimes*, and 4) neoliberal economic tactics that would, in theory, enable Ennahda or the MB to cultivate the loyal bourgeoisie by using 'state power in its various guises – from planning to cronyism to outright corruption – to

[481] Sadiki, 'Tunisia's Ennahda: Islamists Turning the Learning Curve of Democracy and Civic Habituation', 108.
[482] Sadiki, 'Tunisia's Ennahda: Islamists Turning the Learning Curve of Democracy and Civic Habituation' 116.

achieve and sustain continued economic growth at all costs, including the sacrifice of ecological integrity, erosion of democratic norms, and oppression of societal resistance.'[483]

It is important to note that the AKP held notable misconceptions about both the Egyptian and the Tunisian social structures, as well as the inner workings of Ennahda and the MB, and this is perhaps why the theorisation of these tactics may not have operated so well for Ennahda and the MB. Once set in motion, transnational diffusion follows two paths, described as the attribution of similarity and theorisation. The attribution of similarity refers to the construction of social bonds and personal networks that allow people who identify with one another to receive information along established communication lines and adopt one another's modes of action. Theorisation is the process by which people in one country simplify or, more appropriately, 'nationalise' the idea of an actor from another country to adapt it to their own.[484] It is typical in the majority of diffusion processes around the world – for example, the diffusion of Bolivarianism from Venezuela under President Hugo Chávez to other Latin American countries, such as Ecuador, Nicaragua and Honduras – that the receiving parties adopt ideas selectively based on their domestic circumstances. [485] Amid an urgent crisis or uncertain conditions, the diffusion process may proceed in a 'lesson-drawing' fashion in which 'one should expect the selective rather than wholesale adoption of institutional solutions, since they need to be tailored to the problems

[483] Fikret Adaman, Murat Arsel and Bengi Akbulut, 'Neoliberal developmentalism, authoritarian populism, and extractivism in the countryside: the Soma mining disaster in Turkey' *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 46, no. 3 (2019): 519.
[484] Sean Chabot, 'Dialogue Matters: Beyond the Transmisson Model of Transnational Diffusion between Social Movements' in Rebecca Kolins Givan, Kenneth M. Roberts and Sarah Anne Soule, *The diffusion of social movements: actors, mechanisms, and political effects* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 102.
[485] André Bank, 'The study of authoritarian diffusion and cooperation: comparative lessons on interests versus ideology, nowadays and in history' *Democratization: Clusters of Authoritarian Diffusion and Cooperation: The Role of Interests vs. Ideology?* 24, no. 7 (2017): 1348.

at hand.'[486] Indeed, the tactics diffused from the AKP were not tailor-made for the Egyptian or Tunisian contexts.

I use process tracing to determine whether these tactics correlate with the AKP's history in power and have values congruent with its success and crisis management.
As mentioned above, the theorisation and applicability of these tactics in the Tunisian and Egyptian contexts may appear to be extraneous variables that could cloud our understanding of the answer to the question posed. This is where process tracing is useful, as it analyses 'the evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case for the purposes of either developing or testing hypotheses about mechanisms that *might* causally explain the case',[487] side-lining extraneous variables if necessary. I argue that what we witness in this diffusion process – similar to the diffusion of EU policies to candidate countries and its wider neighbours – is a social learning process with 'active engagement', not the passive 'downloading' of new rules and institutional 'software'.[488] This active engagement is an attempt by Ennahda and the MB to 'acquire and incorporate new norms and new understandings into one's belief systems'.[489]

Two postulations can be made regarding the toolbox that the AKP provided to Ennahda and the MB from 2011 to 2013. First, no specific policies were diffused; rather, partial tactics were shared that could be used at times of crisis to strengthen the entities' political standing. Second, the tactics diffused were stripped of ideological canon and never intended to invoke Islam as a means of gaining or retaining power. The essence of the

[486] Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, 'From Europeanisation to Diffusion: Introduction' *West European politics* 35, no. 1 (2012): 7.
[487] Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, *Process tracing: from metaphor to analytic tool*, Strategies for social inquiry, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 7.
[488] Börzel and Risse, 'From Europeanisation' 9.
[489] Börzel and Risse, 'From Europeanisation' 9.

diffusion process was normalisation, legitimisation and crisis evasion, and its style was managerial, providing quick solutions to problems. Complex issues such as ideological and social tendencies are reduced to practical complications that must be addressed step by step.

Managerialism is an under-theorised concept with different meanings, depending on the academic discipline applied – sociology, economics, or politics. In management studies, managerialism is the set of beliefs that enables an organisation to run smoothly and efficiently. When we think about managerialism outside the context of corporations, it is akin to Foucault's governmentality, which is defined as 'the techniques and procedures for directing human behaviour. Government of children, government of souls and consciences, government of a state.'[490] At the core of managerialism and governmentality lie the principles of rationality and organisational efficiency.[491]

The AKP accomplished the enterprises of 'normalisation', 'crisis management' and 'institutionalisation' in a similar way to how a corporation reacts to crises, with a managerial toolbox. As extensive research shows, crisis management includes a strong managerial dimension, such as critical decision-making during an emergency response, organisational coordination, and public communication. These characteristics apply to a wide range of crises, from 9/11 to NASA's Challenger space shuttle disaster.[492]
The managerial and prescriptive aspects of the formula diffused in these two sets of relations seem analogous to the legislative reform packages (the so-called Copenhagen

[490] S. K. Das, *Making the Poor Free?* (Oxford University Press, 2015), 1.
[491] Jonathan Joseph, *The social in the global: social theory, governmentality and global politics*, Cambridge studies in international relations 122 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 3–4.
[492] Arjen Boin, Allan McConnell and Paul Hart, *Governing after crisis: the politics of investigation, accountability and learning*, Cambridge core, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 25.

Criteria) that the AKP had to adopt to further its EU accession process between 2003 and 2007. Thus, the AKP provided the MB and Ennahda with strategies for success in a similar way to that in which it received strategies from the EU. The main difference was the conceptualisation of success, hence, the contents of the formula or the checklist. In a sense, the tactics diffused from the AKP were similar to the management performance of a firm's input-output maximisation and organisational optimisation[493] and the AKP acted as an outside actor with knowledge and expertise, or a business management consultant for the MB and Ennahda, a role recognised by large US corporations since the mid-1990s.[494]

In the context of Tunisia and Egypt, crisis refers to the clash of rival forces such as the military, civil society and Salafis, who were the main post-Uprising agents.[495] In his ethnography of the Egyptian revolution, Armbrust suggests that the revolution itself was a crisis in which no one could 'anticipate the future [but] sense the present acutely'.[496] Boin et al. define crises as 'bundles of real and present dangers, ills, or evils that defy widely held beliefs that such things must not and cannot happen here'.[497] In that sense, the rise to power of Ennahda and the MB following the first free elections can be seen as a second crisis. These entities had been persecuted by previous regimes for decades, and secular/liberal versus Islamist fault lines had become entrenched in society. How could

[493] Christopher J. O'Donnell, *Productivity and efficiency analysis: an economic approach to measuring and explaining managerial performance* (Singapore: Springer, 2018), 1–54.
[494] Christopher D. McKenna, *The world's newest profession: management consulting in the twentieth century*, Cambridge studies in the emergence of global enterprise, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 8–9.
[495] Raymond Hinnebusch, 'Introduction: understanding the consequences of the Arab uprisings – starting points and divergent trajectories' in *Democratization: From Arab Spring to Arab Winter: Explaining the limits of post-uprising democratisation - Guest Editor: Raymond Hinnebusch* 22, no. 2 (2015): 206.
[496] Walter Armbrust, *Martyrs and Tricksters: An Ethnography of the Egyptian Revolution*, Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics 75, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019), 10.
[497] Boin, McConnell and Hart, *Governing after crisis: the politics of investigation, accountability and learning*, 3.

two Islamist parties – Ennahda and the FJP – suddenly become pivotal in determining the trajectories of Tunisia and Egypt? For the secular-minded, this turn of events could be considered another crisis – a crisis that both the secularists and the remnants of the old regime had to manage, and one that Ennahda and the MB had to survive.

Beşir Atalay admitted the need to devise a careful strategy to avoid similar crises when forming the AKP:

> In 2002 [the year that the AKP emerged], we had several questions in mind: how could the AKP gain and maintain power? Back then, the AKP was viewed as an Islamist party. We realized we needed to expand our reach beyond the Islamist label. The formation of alliances with various segments of society was the most important component of our strategy. For example, allying with the liberals. To do so, we knew we needed to broaden the areas of freedom. The second alignment was with the EU. Thanks to the EU, we managed to widen our alliances to international levels. All these steps were carefully thought out. No coincidences, no spontaneous moves.[498]

The AKP's meticulously planned steps were also tools for normalisation. Normalisation is an ambiguous term, since what is considered normal depends on the agency making the claim. However, for the period between the regime collapse and the first elections in Tunisia and Egypt, it may be a useful concept. In this context, by normalisation, I mean a series of steps that would elevate Ennahda and the MB from the political fringes to the mainstream. The normalisation of the Turkish Islamists began in the 1990s and 'the AKP's willingness and ability to *"look and act normal"* in the perception of a wide range of

[498] Interview with Beşir Atalay, op. cit.

domestic and external actors explains many of its accomplishments'.[499] The former Nahdawi Prime Minister, Hamadi Jebali, offered his perspective on normalisation in an interview in 2006, claiming that Ennahda's aim was not to establish *sharia* but rather to show that Ennahda 'in the social and political world, [is] just *one party like the others*'.[500] Indeed, the findings of Mecham et al. on the goals of Islamist movements indicate that 'Islamist parties [especially in Morocco, Turkey, Indonesia, and Malaysia] are becoming increasingly *normalized* participants in their political systems […]. Their political behaviour has often become normalized (to look more like other political actors) in parallel with the shift in emphasis regarding their party platforms.'[501] Being perceived as a 'party like others' defines perfectly what normalisation meant for the MB and Ennahda after the Uprisings – 'genuine interest in being welcomed into the international community as responsible actors'.[502] Party institutionalisation is the first step in the normalisation process.

In the present case, party institutionalisation means the ability to mobilise and widen the base of the party and the construction of smooth internal operations. Weber explains that the emergence of politics as a profession (*Beruf*) occurs by transforming an amateur apparatus, which is 'very often manned by students who say to a man to whom they attribute leadership qualities, "we will do what needs to be done if you tell us what it

[499] Murat Somer, 'When Is Normalization Also Democratization? Islamist Political Parties, The Turkish Case and the Future of Muslim Polities' in *Islamist Parties and Political Normalization in the Muslim World*, ed. Julie Chernov and Hwang Quinn Mecham (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 42.
[500] US Embassy (Tunis) cable to State Department, 06TUNIS2298, 'An-Nahda Leader Jebali: Moderate Islamism Is the Future', Confidential//Noforn, 6 September 2006 cited in Anne Wolf, 'An Islamist 'renaissance'? Religion and politics in post-revolutionary Tunisia', *The Journal of North African Studies* 18, no. 4 (2013): 567.
[501] Quinn and Julie Chernow Hwag Mecham, 'The New Dynamism of Islamist Parties,' in *Islamist Parties and Political Normalization in the Muslim World*, ed. Quinn Mecham and Julie Chernov Hwang (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 180.
[502] Quinn Mecham, 'Islamist parties and foreign policy in North Africa: bridging ideology and pragmatism', *The Journal of North African Studies* 24, no. 4 (2019): 656.

is.”’[503] Of course, the internal structure and organisational operations of Ennahda and the MB cannot be described as amateur. Although both movements began in the manner described by Weber – with a group of students and a charismatic leader – they have, over decades, evolved into more complex and sophisticated enterprises with distinct hierarchies and functional bodies. However, as Weber observes, a political party is an enormous apparatus, similar to a machine. Operating this machinery requires full-time, paid, political entrepreneurs in and outside parliament who are held in tight bureaucratic control and equipped to canvass and win large numbers of voters.[504]

The machine that produced AKP’s success was a highly institutionalised party structure with over 13.5 million members,[505] offices in 81 cities,[506] youth and women’s organisations, specific training programmes for young people, and propaganda and lobbying bodies. According to Erdoğan, ‘the AKP has no parallel in Turkey in terms of membership and institutional bodies’.[507] The professionalism of the AKP partly explains why movements such as Ennahda and the MB – which are much older than the AKP and had experience participating in elections in Tunisia and Egypt when permitted – would want to learn from it.

Nahdawi Mohammed Ali Azaiez explains the takeaways Ennahda looked for in the AKP as a political party:

[503] Max Weber, *Political Writings*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 350.
[504] Weber, *Political Writings*, 341.
[505] ‘Cumhurbaşkanı: Türkiye’nin yeni ve sivil bir Anayasa’yı tartışması değişen şartların kaçınılmaz gereğidir’, *Anadolu Ajansı*, 24 March 2020.
[506] AK Parti Teşkilatları, AKP.
[507] ‘Cumhurbaşkanı: Türkiye’nin yeni ve sivil bir Anayasa’yı tartışması’, *Anadolu Ajansı*, 24 March 2020.

> We [Ennahda] attended their [the AKP's] big meetings and observed how they prepare for major events. We asked a lot of technical questions. We were particularly interested in how the AKP MPs manage their bureaus and so on. Because, here in Tunisia, MPs work alone, and most don't even have an office. We saw that Turkish MPs have a large team of assistants and experts. Yes, it has a lot to do with money, but we looked closely at how a successful party operated.[508]

The MB could not admit that it was inexperienced and knew little about governing, Wickham claims.[509] However, my research proves otherwise. The MB – at least its party, the FJP – was aware of its limitations, which was why it sought the AKP's advice on such matters. The transitional period following the Uprisings provided an opportunity for full engagement in political processes in Tunisia and Egypt, and this required different tools to tackle a broader range of challenges. As Brown contends, 'in Egypt in 2012, the Brotherhood's leaders [had] to answer questions that [had] never been asked before. They can refer to the epistles of their founder, Hassan al-Banna, for inspiration, but not for practical guidance on detailed questions.'[510]

According to former FJP minister Darrag, one practical outcome of meetings with the AKP team was to enable the FJP team to prepare President Morsi for foreign visits. 'For example, if Dr Morsi were about to meet with a minister from another country, we would prepare extensive briefings for him. He would talk to these people and impress them with his detailed knowledge. It was an entirely new thing for us. During Mubarak's time, we couldn't meet with foreigners like this because it was considered espionage. We learned

[508] Interview with Mohammed Ali Azaeiz, Tunis, 18 November 2019.
[509] Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood*, 296.
[510] Brown, 'When Victory Becomes an Option', 18.

this kind of stuff from the AKP.'[511] This example demonstrates the extent of inexperience on the part of the MB.

Similarly, before the Uprisings, Ennahda, like other Tunisian political parties, 'lacked clear policy goals, [was] highly personalistic and geared toward attaining office to receive benefits and access to patronage'.[512] Imed Khemeri, the head of public affairs at Ennahda in 2019, acknowledges the limits on the experience that movements active in civil society and charity work could acquire. 'No matter how strong your organizational structure is as a movement, you cannot change the realities of your country,' he says. 'You need to be part of the government to make your country a better place.'[513] Another Nahdawi, who wished to remain anonymous, argues that 'Ennahda was like a charity organization whose leadership had been in exile for the last decade. So, anyone with some expertise and experience would be welcomed. And it was the AKP who got in touch with us [Ennahda] first. What Ennahda looked for back then was success and power, and the AKP had both.'[514]

5.1 Winning the system

Although the elections were not free and the campaigning period was far from a level playing field, 'over the past 40 years, 89 parliamentary elections in 21 countries have included one or more Islamic parties, according to election reports from the Inter-

[511] Interview with Amr Darrag, Istanbul, 18 July 2018.
[512] McCarthy, 'When Islamists lose,' 369.
[513] Interview with Imed Khemeri, Tunis, 19 December 2019.
[514] Interview with a Nahdawi, London, 2019.

Parliamentary Union'.[515] However, the performance of these parties was not impressive, and 'in the 89 elections that Islamic parties have contested during the past generation, these parties have typically received only a small fraction of the vote'.[516] According to Kurzman and Naqvi, the main reason for this unimpressive performance may not have been unfair elections or fear of reprisal from authoritarian regimes. Until the 2000s, 'the more routine the elections become, the worse the Islamic parties do in them [and in] those Muslim-majority countries where elections were freest, Islamic parties performed worse.'[517] Therefore, many Islamist parties 'liberalized their stances significantly over the past several decades […] to strategically appeal to median swing voters'.[518] The AKP, with its liberal economic programmes and slick electoral campaign management, epitomised this transformation in Islamist parties.

In the autumn of 2011, the AKP mentored Ennahda and the MB's FJP in several elections. Tunisia's constituent assembly elections were scheduled for October 2011, and Egypt's first round of parliamentary elections would be held on 28 November 2011, followed by the second round in January 2012. The presidential election in Egypt was held in two rounds in May and June of 2012. Before the election for Tunisia's constituent assembly in October 2011, Ennahda 'observed and studied AKP's rich and advanced electoral experience'.[519] According to the Nahdawi Moussa Ben Ahmed, at the core of the relationship was a desire 'to learn the details of how to keep winning elections in Muslim-majority countries like Turkey and Tunisia'.[520]

[515] Charles Kurzman and Ijlal Naqvi, 'Do Muslims Vote Islamic?' *Journal of democracy* 21, no. 2 (2010): 50–51.
[516] Kurzman and Naqvi, 'Do Muslims Vote Islamic', 52.
[517] Kurzman and Naqvi, 'Do Muslims Vote Islamic', 54, 55.
[518] Kurzman and Naqvi, 'Do Muslims Vote Islamic', 57, 59.
[519] Interview with Abdelkarim Harouni, Tunis, 19 December 2019.
[520] Interview with Moussa Ben Ahmed op. cit.

Fethi Ayadi, a 2019 Ennahda MP, who had been in exile in France before the revolution, claims that Ennahda delegates visited Istanbul to meet with the AKP's 'election campaign management teams, and those teams also came to Tunisia [to hone] the AKP's election strategies and show us how to obtain good results'.[521] According to the adviser to the minister for investment, development and international cooperation, Mohammad Ali Azaiez of Ennahda, a Nahdawi delegation once met the Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, three AKP MPs and the mayors of Ankara [Melih Gökçek] and Üsküdar [Mustafa Kara] with the objective of learning 'electoral campaign skills'.[522] Furthermore, Nahdawi delegations were 'always invited to Turkey during general or mayoral elections to observe how they do their [AKP's] campaign'.[523]

As Ennahda emerged victorious from the parliamentary elections of October 2011, winning 89 seats out of 217, the MB's presidential election in the summer of 2012 was already on the horizon. The AKP's involvement developed significantly and its meetings with FJP members increased. Neither the liberal/secular forces in Egypt nor the MB were ready to contest the election, as 'six decades of military rule robbed them of the experience of open politics, [but] the Brotherhood had been waiting for such a historic moment for decades and seized its opportunity'.[524]

Since the MB had fielded independent candidates in elections numerous times from 1983 onwards (in the 1987, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010 elections), it may not initially be

[521] Interview with Fethi Ayadi, Tunis, op. cit.
[522] Interview with Mohammed Ali Azaiez, op. cit.
[523] Interview with Nidhal Gharbi, op. cit.
[524] Fouad Ajami, 'The Arab Spring at One: A Year of Living Dangerously', *Foreign Affairs* 91, no. 2 (2012): 63.

obvious why they would seek advice on elections from the AKP. However, a closer look shows that the conditions for participating in elections under Mubarak's authoritarian regime differed significantly from elections in the post-revolutionary context. Shehata argues that, under Mubarak, elections provided an opportunity for the MB to propagate its ideas and disseminate its ideology more widely in society. 'I call this political *da'wa* [the act of calling or inviting people to embrace Islam].'[525] Furthermore, Shehata claims that, during those elections, the MB's aim was not to seek office or maximise votes, since neither goal was possible under Mubarak;[526] simply participating in the elections and disseminating its message was considered a win. However, with Mubarak out of the picture, the MB faced its first free elections and sought advice from a party used to seeking both votes and office, that is, the AKP. Shehata ends his discussion with the prediction that with the founding of the FJP, the MB's electoral strategy may change and the FJP may 'function increasingly like an "ordinary" political party and participate in elections with the primary objective of winning seats, influencing policy and gaining power. Exploring such transformations, as well as their implications for the Muslim Brotherhood organization, is surely a worthy subject for future research.'[527] Indeed, this is precisely how the present research aims to contribute to the literature, by demonstrating as clearly as possible the strategic and aspirational transformations of the Islamist entities in question.

'When they [the MB] decided to run, they figured that they needed to examine how political parties prepare for elections,' a former AKP MP recalled. 'Where is the closest place that holds elections? Turkey, of course. Turkish Airlines back then had six flights a

[525] Samer S. Shehata, 'Political Da'wa: understanding the Muslim Brotherhood's participation in semi-authoritarian elections' in *Islamist politics in the Middle East: movements and change*, ed. Samer S. Shehata (Routledge, 2011), 121.
[526] Shehata, 'Political Da'wa,' 133.
[527] Shehata, 'Political Da'wa,' 133.

day between Turkey and Egypt. They used to come in the morning, find out what they wanted to know and leave again in the evening. They wanted to learn everything about elections. From A to Z.'[528] The AKP MP, who was in Cairo throughout the FJP's election campaign, claims that the biggest challenge proved to be conducting opinion polls. 'They had not done it before and told us that it wasn't possible. We explained how to conduct an opinion poll, but they still told us it was not feasible because they did not have the voter demographics to hand.'[529] There was a reason for the MB to see political polling as unfeasible, although it was not apparent to this AKP official. The Egyptian government agency CAPMAS (the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics) was the only entity authorised to conduct polling of any kind, including market or media research, both of which are also notoriously difficult to conduct in Egypt. For obvious reasons, CAPMAS had not approved political polling for any party other than Mubarek's ruling National Democratic Party. This incident can be seen as an example of the AKP's misconceptions and lack of expertise about the MB and Egypt's political structure, as mentioned above.

Unlike in Egypt, the AKP, and particularly Erdoğan, considered election polls an essential part of their political activity. Indeed, the AKP conducts opinion polls not only during election periods but whenever they introduce a new reform or launch a game-changing initiative.[530] For the AKP team it was inconceivable not to use polls in an election campaign 'because, in our experience, it is crucial to see the big picture and have a base level in terms of the MB votes'. Instead of conducting a robust opinion poll in Egypt, 'we

[528] Interview with former AKP MP 1, op. cit.
[529] Interview with former AKP MP 1, op. cit.
[530] For example, during the Kurdish peace process, which commenced in late 2012, the AKP conducted polls almost every month. In fact, the Kurdish party HDP's then leader, Selahattin Demirtaş, declared that it was primarily because the AKP polls revealed a rise in votes for the Kurdish HDP and a decrease in those for the AKP that Erdoğan decided to halt the peace process. See Ezgi Başaran, 'HDP co-chair Demirtaş reveals details of peace process', *Hürriyet Daily News*, 28 July 2015.

did some research using other methods, and we found evidence of serious popularity for the Salafists, especially around the Nour Party. The MB people said we were wrong, but the result of the election proved us right. The Salafists had a significant level of popularity.'[531]

The AKP influenced not only the FJP's campaign but also that of other presidential candidates in Egypt such as Abdul Moneim Aboul Fotouh, a former MB member who was forced to leave the MB when he declared his intention to run. Aboul Fotouh had been the leader of the MB youth wing in the late 1970s and continued to enjoy the support of the young Brothers when he became an influential medical doctor heading the Arab Medical Union. Fotouh's ideological views evolved from condoning violence to becoming the democratic liberal voice of the movement in the first decade of the 2000s. He met with the then prime minister Erdoğan and Ennahda leader Ghannouchi in the period leading up to the elections, although the exact date is unknown.[532] As an independent presidential candidate in 2012, Fotouh ran his campaign separately from the FJP but used the AKP in an unexpected way. 'We could not believe it when we saw Fotouh's banner on the streets of Cairo,' one former AKP MP remembered. The banner showed an image of Erdoğan's smiling face with a quotation allegedly from him, saying 'I can't recommend what the Egyptian people should choose, but if I were an Egyptian, I would choose Abd Al-Moneim Aboul Fotouh.'[533] 'We told [Aboul Futuh] that it was not a clever idea, but he went ahead with it anyway. His banner was a great example of how much influence and positivity the AKP's name sparked on the Egyptian streets back then.'[534] No interviewee from AKP could confirm that Erdoğan had uttered such a statement or consented to the banner.

[531] Interview with former AKP MP 1, op. cit.
[532] Nada Hefzy, 'abu futouh bi rafiqah erdogan wa al-ghannouchi', *Al Bawabh*, 23 December 2013.
[533] Appendix, Figure 4.
[534] Interview with former AKP MP 2, op. cit.

However, the flags remained in place, which may indicate that Erdoğan had no problem with them.

When it came to the elections, the AKP's then political marketing and publicity chief, Erol Olçak, was the key person appointed to assist both the MB and Ennahda with their campaigns. Olçak had a personal relationship with Erdoğan and managed all AKP campaigns from the party's foundation until his death during clashes between military officials and civilians in the attempted coup in Istanbul on 15 July 2016. Olçak had visited Cairo in November 2011, just before the first round of parliamentary elections and held meetings with FJP members. According to a TRT correspondent in Cairo at the time, the AKP did not want these meetings to be made public. 'I learned from my sources in the Kempinski Hotel Cairo that a team from the AKP held a meeting on the second floor. I thought I would go and say hello and never assumed that it would be a problem because I am from TRT, the state channel, you know, not from an anti-AKP news outlet.'[535] The correspondent claimed that he was immediately thrown out of the room, and his contract with TRT was terminated only to be renewed months later by a court order.[536] The meeting was never reported in Turkey. The reason for this secrecy could be that both parties wanted to keep their dialogue low profile to avoid any accusation of Turkish meddling in Egypt's internal affairs.

Other than Erol Olçak, the AKP team comprised of two scholars affiliated with SETA (*Strateji Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı* – the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research), two translators and two AKP ministers who joined on the second

[535] Interview with Metin Turan, op. cit.
[536] 'AKP'nin Mısır'daki gizli toplantısı TRT muhabirini işinden etti', *Aydınlık*, 30 January 2013.

day. Yehia Hamed, the senior adviser to President Morsi and the minister of investment, was among the MB members present at the meeting. 'We sat in on two sessions with the marketing director of AKP, Erol Olçak. He gave us a lot of tips on what a party should do in terms of political marketing. He had experience, some of which was very relevant, and some of which was not.'[537] During the two-day workshop, Olçak 'explained to the MB the methods and tricks for running a successful election campaign, including techniques of propaganda, publicity, and advertising.'[538]

Similar meetings were held under the radar with Ennahda 'in 2011, 2014, and 2019 [in which] we exchanged ideas and experiences about elections'.[539] 'Erol [Olçak] came to Tunis to help with the October 2014 parliamentary elections,' a former senior Nahdawi recalled.[540] Ajmi Lourimi, who was at the time in charge of Ennahda's communication, remembers meeting Erol Olçak and discussing the importance of having a unified discourse as a party:

> He [Olçak] asked me if there was one spokesperson or many. I said there were many. So, he said, the solution is to unify our discourse to avoid controversies. He also advised that it is best to involve experts on certain subjects rather than have politicians talk about them, because it offers more credibility. We never talked about ideology because what we needed to learn was the modern ways of winning elections and succeeding in governance. That is why our focus was on managing elections and the media.[541]

[537] Interview with Yehia Hamed, op. cit.
[538] Interview with Talip Küçükcan, op. cit.
[539] Interview with Noureddine Arboui, Tunis, 20 December 2019.
[540] Interview with a Nahdawi, London, October 2019.
[541] Interview with Ajmi Lourimi, op. cit.

Ennahda's main goal was to 'imitate the model of Turkey's AKP, in particular, its early shift from its Islamist origins toward a vote-seeking centre-right platform'.[542] Undoubtedly, the decision to retreat from its Islamist agenda during the 2011 elections caused heated internal debate. Over time, the party organised workshops to rationalise its concessions, such as abandoning its demand that *sharia* be the source of legislation for its activist cadres.[543] Ennahda's outlook as a vote-seeking, centre-right platform was underscored at its 2016 Congress, in which it announced the separation of the political party and *da'wa* (propagation). 'We do not deny our Islamic background,' claimed Bechir Yousifi, a member of Ennahda's youth wing from Medenine, 'but we left *da'wa* so the NGOs and charities can take care of it. We want to focus solely on politics and creating a strong party.' He defined a strong party as a 'party that can govern, able to reform, guide, and deliver political programmes. A party that is well institutionalized with transparent organizations and funding. That's why within Ennahda now there is no link between politics and the *da'wa*.'[544] The AKP may have had some influence as an example for the gradual expulsion of Islamic rhetoric and the separation between preaching and politics within Ennahda; at least, that is what several interviewees contended. 'Ennahda had various relations with foreign parties, but the relationship between Ennahda and the AKP is distinctive because we learned from the AKP how to separate religion and politics. Even after the revolution, old habits linked with being a *da'wa* movement continued to surface. So, the AKP for us was a successful model that separated Islam from daily political practice.'[545]

[542] McCarthy, 'Al-Nahda: From preaching circles to politics', 371.
[543] McCarthy, 'Al-Nahda: From preaching circles to politics', 377.
[544] Interview with Bechir Yousifi, Tunis, telephone, 7 May 2020.
[545] Interview with Mohammed Ali Azaiez, op. cit.

Rabeb ben Lotief, the 2019 Ennahda MP for Tunisians in the Americas and the rest of Europe (including Turkey), was among the Nahdawis who held meetings with an AKP delegation just before the 2019 Tunisian elections:

> The AKP team was specialized in elections and stayed with us for two days. They had suggestions about slogans, photos, and logos we use on Twitter and Facebook. All photos had to be taken professionally, they said. They advised us to use light, bright colours and devise short messages and hashtags. They also showed us how to promote the hashtags by sending to all Nahdawis.[546]

This diffusion of electoral tactics indicates that Ennahda and the MB's younger cadres, who filled most of the positions within the FJP, wanted to abandon their single-issue niche party status and 'framed success in terms of attaining office'[547] in the same way as other mainstream parties.

5.2 Service to people is like a prayer

Other than advice on how to mount an election campaign, conduct opinion polls or deliver a specific message effectively to the public, the second key topic discussed between the AKP and the MB and Ennahda teams was how to govern municipalities. Why was this such an important issue for diffusion? The answer is two-fold. First, Islamist movements in the Middle East had been providing direct social welfare – including healthcare, education, and financial aid – to the underprivileged, filling the void left by local entities such as those municipalities closely tied to authoritarian clientelist regimes. Bayat defines

[546] Interview with Rabeb ben Lotaief, Tunis, 18 November 2019.
[547] Tobias Böhmelt et al., 'Party Policy Diffusion', 400.

the charity work of Islamism as 'social Islam'.[548] The Islamist movements in Egypt, of which the MB was the most prominent, helped the poor not only by providing goods and healthcare but also by conducting informal study groups through mosques that were not run by the state. Second, therefore, socialising Islam was in this sense a mobilising tool for these movements. Similarly, Tuğal argues that the Middle Eastern Islamist movements, especially the Egyptian MB, prioritise 'feed[ing] the poor and elderly, not developmental and training activities'.[549] However, such sustained help consequently creates loyalty among the poor and underprivileged.[550]

Two aspects distinguish Islamic voluntary service providers from their secular counterparts. The first is the source of funding: businesses owned by Muslims donate 2.5 per cent of their income in the form of *zakat* (the compulsory giving of a set proportion of one's wealth to charity), on top of occasional external aid from Sunni or Shia state or non-state organisations. For example, 'in the early 1990s, the Nasser Bank, which supervises the *Zakat* Committees in Egypt, reported a $10 million zakat fund.'[551] The availability of funding through *zakat* undoubtedly constitutes an advantage for Islamic movements.
The second aspect is the tendency to interpret providing such services as part of *da'wa*. As Mahmood argues, 'Al-Banna's elaboration of *da'wa* was a key part of his larger program aimed at creating institutional structures and sensibilities capable of contesting Western cultural and political hegemony.'[552] The notion of *da'wa* turns efficient services into a

[548] Asef Bayat, 'Activism and Social Development in the Middle East', *Inter. J. Middle East Stud.* 34, no. 1 (2002): 11.
[549] Cihan Tuğal, 'Contesting Benevolence: Market Orientations among Muslim Aid Providers in Egypt', *Qualitative Sociology* 36, no. 2 (2013): 150.
[550] Tuğal, 'Contesting Benevolence' 154.
[551] Bayat, 'Activism and Social Development in the Middle East' 12.
[552] Saba Mahmood, *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 62.

religious duty and mobilises the Islamist base to participate in the process; this, in turn, enables the sustainability of the services.

Those who benefit from Islamist social welfare services may vote for the political party affiliated with that service provider out of gratitude or because they are happy with the efficiency and quality of the services. Thus, although providing social services through charities has an element of *da'wa* for Islamist entities, voting for these services does not have to be related to Islamism itself. What are the implications of this? Across the Middle East, Islamists have a reputation for delivering good local governance, which gives them the upper hand in political processes. However, as Cammett and Luong argue, 'ideology and reputation are not synonymous [and] ideology is not sufficient to win hearts and minds absent reputation.'[553] Thus, the reputations built over time under authoritarian regimes can potentially unravel in a post-authoritarian context. 'During regime transition, when Islamists no longer have to operate in a quasi-legal environment, their reputations can be easily undermined if they do not live up to their messages or appear to contradict their principles and ideologies.'[554]

Thus, at a time of transition when their reputations as good social welfare providers were not robust, such as in the aftermath of the Uprisings, both Ennahda and the MB believed it would be beneficial to listen to the AKP, whose leader had risen to power through his years as mayor of Istanbul. It is important to note that, unlike the MB, Ennahda had never had the opportunity to develop a base in local government or offer social services since it had been repressed since the early 1990s.

[553] Melani Cammett and Pauline Jones Luong, 'Is There an Islamist Political Advantage?' *Annual review of political science (Palo Alto, Calif.)* 17 (2014): 201.
[554] Cammett and Luong, 'Is There an Islamist Political Advantage?' 202.

The AKP is a service-oriented party and accommodates this trait within Islamist rhetoric, such as 'serving people is equal to serving God (*Halka hizmet Hakka hizmettir*)'. This slogan both served the AKP's secular approach to everyday politics and gave its Islamist base incentive to engage and participate in politics.

Controlling municipalities, or its grip on power, lies at the heart of the AKP's success, For example, Qaradawi, in a speech in which he reiterated his wish for 'Turkey to become the centre of the Islamic world', mentioned the AKP's municipalities as one of the benchmarks in Turkey's development as a country.[555] Since the 1990s, municipalities in Turkey have become 'the institutional vanguards of a socio-political project that attacks the established order and one of the chief mobilizers of people on the ground against this order',[556] because they sit on the boundary between state and politics and have a certain degree of autonomy. The AKP's mother movement, *Refah Partisi* (RP), reaped the seeds sown by the grassroots community services in the 1994 local elections, gaining 327 municipalities, including Istanbul and Ankara. Erdoğan, then a member of the party, was one of the beneficiaries of RP's powerful mayoral influence. For the AKP, this socio-political project was to extend and consolidate its base by 'merging ex-Islamists, the urban poor, intellectuals, business families, and professionals around a neoliberal "democratic" program.'[557] It utilised the autonomy and resources of the municipalities to achieve that goal.

According to Dağı, community experience is also crucial to understanding the AKP's transformation from Islamism to post-Islamism because Erdoğan's practice as the mayor

[555] Yusuf El-Karadavi: 'Türkiye'nin yeniden İslam dünyasının merkezi olması için dua ediyoruz', *Sabah*, 4 November 2018.
[556] Tuğal, 'Religious Politics', 91.
[557] Tuğal, 'Religious Politics', 100.

of Istanbul led him to 'abandon lofty ideas to build a new Islamic society and state'[558] and focus on mobilising the voter base through services.

As the interviews with the Egyptian MB members and Nahdawis demonstrate, they also see 'service to people' as an important component of Islamist success, and this was their main takeaway from the model propagated by the AKP. This is not surprising as all three entities had engaged in charity work in their respective local settings when political participation had not been possible. Put simply, 'service to people' is what they know best. However, this time, following the Arab Uprisings, service had to be operationalised to keep them in power.

Former Tunisian Prime Minister Ali Larayedh recognises the AKP's municipal strategy as one of the critical components of its success story.

> Turkey was not the only country we visited to learn about municipalities. We also visited France and heard about its experiences, but the Turkish experience is the closest to us, since it has similarities with the Tunisian case. That is why we focused on it.[559]

The first woman to run Tunisia's State Fund, Boutheina Ben Yaghlane, was appointed by Ennahda and believes that 'the success of the AKP began with its municipality work, which reinforced its relations with the people. This made people focus on their work.'[560]

[558] Ihsan Dağı, 'Post-Islamism a la Turca', 90.
[559] Interview with Ali Larayedh op. cit.
[560] Interview with Boutheina Ben Yaghlane, telephone, 21 May 2020.

Adel Ben Amor, a member of Ennahda's *shura* and adviser to the minister of state for transport and logistics, also sees that 'municipalities enabled the party to widen its base. Any new party, not only Ennahda, should learn about this aspect.'[561]

Ben Amor's and Yaghlane's perception is close to reality. The experience that the AKP elite had gained since 1994 (first within the RP's mayoral positions and then those of the AKP) was reconstructed as a social mobilisation mechanism. As White claims, the computerised lists and neighbourhood maps, with a neighbourhood management commission and a party-assigned head observer responsible 'for about 300 people in a voting district [… and] a perfected face-to-face personalized style of mobilizing'[562] were at the heart of the AKP's success. This was the most important aspect and one that interviewees from both the MB and Ennahda claimed their parties would like to learn about and emulate.

Here, it is important to emphasise one feature of AKP's style of local governance. A 2017 report on municipalities in Turkey disclosed that the AKP's commitment to welfare policies was not as strong as that of the RP which had built its programme on the notion of a 'Just Order (*Adil Düzen*)'. The AKP – via its municipalities – advocated pro-market and neoliberal policies promoting a massive expansion of social housing whose contracts 'awarded by the central government to local municipalities also fuelled distributive politics in the form of jobs, contracts, and subsidized housing, which, in turn, played a key role in consolidating and expanding the AKP's electoral base'.[563]

[561] Interview with Adel Ben Amor, telephone, 18 May 2020.
[562] Jenny B. White, 'Islamist social networks and social welfare services in Turkey' in *Islamist politics in the Middle East: movements and change*, ed. Samer S. Shehata (Routledge, 2011), 61.
[563] Melissa and Marwa Shalaby Marschall, Saadet Konak Unal, *Municipal Service Delivery, Identity Politics and Islamist Parties in Turkey*, POMEP Studies (September 2017), 32.

Bechir Yousifi of Ennahda professes that 'what works in Turkey will not necessarily be successful in Tunisia' but acknowledges that 'it was essential to understand Turkey's decentralization experience and the AKP's local governance.'[564]

The decentralisation of the Tunisian political landscape required several attempts. The adoption of the new constitution of 2014 involved the principle of the administrative autonomy of local authorities and the election of municipal councillors by the people. The first local elections after the revolution took place in May 2018. While the independent candidates' list received 33 per cent of the votes, Ennahda followed with 28.6 per cent of the seats, with 2,139 candidates elected. In contrast, the Nidaa Tounes party finished in third place, gaining 22.17 per cent of the seats.

The European Council, asked to observe the election, reported that although the election process went smoothly 'the Tunisian authorities should strive to further strengthen territorial democracy and decentralisation. Well-implemented, this constitutes an extraordinary opportunity for the country and could be a revolutionary process.'[565] Adnene Bouassida of Ennahda, the mayor of Raoeud, a town in Tunis's Arianna district, observes that the May 2018 municipal elections in Tunisia were the first elections following the passing of the decentralisation law. 'We are experiencing a new phase,' he says. 'We do not have much municipal experience, but we aspire to be successful like the AKP's municipalities, especially the Istanbul municipality. We try to form strong ties between the AKP municipalities and Tunisian municipalities to exchange information.'[566]

Marwen Ben Ameur, from Ennahda, who works for the Tunis municipality, claims that Ennahda was waiting for the new local governance legal framework to be implemented:

[564] Interview with Bechir Yousifi, op. cit.
[565] Information report on the municipal elections in Tunisia, Council of Europe, 35th session, 24 September 2018.
[566] Interview with Adnene Bouassida, telephone, 8 May 2020.

> Many of my Ennahda colleagues in the campaign travelled to Turkey to visit AKP municipalities as the first elections approached. The Tunisians showed us that they want concrete developments in their districts, which require structured municipal work. However, we are still very new to this, whereas the Turkish citizens saw that local governance experience benefited them, and they kept voting for Erdoğan.[567]

As mentioned above, delivering social welfare services is one of the areas in which the MB excels. Clark argues that the MB's social associations 'do not target the disenfranchised poor but the marginalized, educated middle-class, and they bring Islamists and non-Islamists together'.[568] Thus, the MB knew well how to utilise such services to mobilise and widen its base. However, this experience now had to be translated into a formal structure, even though there were no municipal elections on the horizon at the time in Egypt.

The cadres of the MB had never been allowed to be professional civil servants or bureaucrats because 'unlike their counterparts in Turkey's AKP, who gained significant governing experience during the 1990s, the MB leaders had no access to provincial and municipal administration in Egypt'.[569] Egypt's local administrative structure is divided into two levels: governorates and municipalities. Governorates are headed by governors who are appointed by the president of Egypt and report to the prime minister. Within the municipalities are bureaucrats appointed by the government and municipal workers who are elected by the people, presumably to supervise the appointed layer. The most recent

[567] Interview with Marwen Ben Amour, Tunis, 19 December 2019.
[568] Janine Clark, 'Social Movement Theory and Patron-Clientelism: Islamic Social Institutions and the Middle Class in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen', *Comparative Political Studies* 37, no. 8 (2004): 965.
[569] Khalil Al-Anani, 'The 'Anguish'', 233

municipal elections were held under Mubarak's rule in 2008, and almost all municipal workers were chosen by the state from the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) party. 'The municipalities are one of the main avenues of corruption and controlled by the regime even though certain layers seem to assume office via elections. When we were in government as the FJP in 2012, we aimed to change the local governance system during the drafting of the new constitution. It was one of the main topics we wanted to tackle, but we did not have time. So, we just issued an article in the constitution claiming that the local governance would be decentralized within a 10-year transitional period' claims Amr Darrag.[570] Even so, the MB focused in its dialogue with AKP members on the efficiency of services and of the municipal structure itself.

Khanfar recalls, 'The AKP people came to Egypt many times to show them [the MB] the techniques for delivering good services.'[571] Mesut Özcan, a former adviser to Davutoğlu and current Deputy Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Strategic Research Department, agrees: 'Our [the AKP's] delegations had underlined the importance of services time and time again. You should focus on dynamic communities, we said.'[572] Mohamed Hgazy, a former youth leader from Alexandria, claims that 'the MB sent teams to Istanbul that would focus on how the AKP operated municipalities. The teams included people from the movement whom they planned to allocate within the municipalities. For example, one of the attendants later became part of one of Alexandria's governance bodies.'[573]

[570] Interview with Amr Darrag, telephone, 31 March 2022.
[571] Interview with Wadah Khanfar, op. cit.
[572] Interview with Mesut Özcan, Ankara, 24 July 2018.
[573] Interview with Mohamed Hgazy, telephone, 09 May 2020.

President Morsi's presidential committee had visited Turkey and toured districts of Istanbul and Ankara. 'We wanted to learn how the municipalities work and about their independent operational structure,' says Yehia Hamed, Egypt's former minister of investment. 'We also were given a tour of the police departments. One time, we went to a very nice factory in Ankara that had a garbage recycling facility. We wanted to import that technology so as to create a full recycling facility of our own.'[574] According to a former AKP MP who was a crucial figure in the diffusion process, 'we [the AKP] also helped them restructure their municipal services. We have connected many municipalities to different places in Cairo to make services more efficient.'[575]

In May 2013, 150 refuse disposal trucks worth 25 million US dollars were loaded onto ships berthed in Mersin Port, to be sent to Egypt.[576] The refuse trucks were a gift, symbolic of the emphasis placed by the AKP on efficient services, made for two reasons. The first and most apparent was that Cairo had a serious refuse collection problem in the aftermath of the revolution. For decades, Cairo's solid waste was managed by local refuse collectors called *zabaleen,* mostly from poor Coptic Christian families. However, in the mid-2000s, the *zabaleen* began to be sidelined. The aim was to privatise waste management which, in a poorly planned neoliberal initiative, failed.[577] In the meantime, around 2009, the government, acting against the advice of WHO, ordered pigs to be slaughtered because of the threat of swine flu – an incident that proved highly traumatic for the *zabaleen* families.[578] As a result, Cairo's *zabaleen* had been waging protests since 2009, 'leaving

[574] Interview with Yehia Hamed, op. cit.
[575] Interview with a former AKP MP 1, Ankara, 24 July 2018.
[576] 'Türkiye'den Mısır'a 150 adet çöp kamyonu', *Hürriyet*, 28 May 2013.
[577] Petra Kuppinger, Najib B. Hourani and Ahmed Kanna, 'Crushed? Cairo's Garbage Collectors and Neoliberal Urban Politics', *Journal Of Urban Affairs* 36, no. 2 (2014): 630.
[578] Joseph Mayton, 'Pig slaughter lands Cairo in the mire', *Guardian*, 8 October 2009.

piles of trash in the streets and at homes, exposing the failure of the state to ensure a modicum of sanitary urban life.'[579] The refuse situation worsened in the aftermath of the revolution owing to the collapse of multiple state practices and, between 2011 and 2013, became a political issue.

The second reason was that the refuse and general sanitation problems on the streets had made a deep impression on the AKP team, who had to live in Cairo during and immediately after the election period. Memories of dirty streets appeared to be very vivid in their minds. 'Even the Kempinski Hotel was under a heavy layer of dust. I went to a mosque once and could not pray because of the filth inside,'[580] one AKP bureaucrat claimed. A former AKP MP recalled seeing the corpse of a horse on the street very close to the FJP offices in Cairo. 'On the third day, I went up to the FJP office and asked them if they could do something about the horse and told them the body had been lying there untouched for three days. They looked at me and asked, "What horse?" I couldn't believe my ears. It was impossible for them to miss it, but even when they see it, they don't see.'[581] These anecdotes may perhaps imply a feeling of Turkish superiority over Arabs on the part of the AKP officials, since uncleanliness is routinely associated with Arabs in Turkish discriminatory rhetoric. This Orientalist and essentialist approach portrays Arabs as backward and uncivilised, and the Turks as modern. Although these remarks may reflect that racist rhetoric, they also display a concern on the part of the AKP members for the MB's success.

[579] Asef Bayat, 'The Arab Spring and its Surprises', *Development and Change* 44, no. 3 (2013): 589.
[580] Interview with a Turkish bureacrat, Istanbul, 30 July 2018.
[581] Interview with former AKP MP 1, op. cit.

In the aftermath of the revolution, there had been 'remarkable social protests when basic urban services such as electricity, water or the sewage system faced disruption. […] In July 2012, residents of the poor Giza district of Saft al-Laban staged a sit-in at the governorate building holding signs that read "We Are Thirsty".'[582] For the AKP, the sanitation problems they witnessed first-hand in Cairo and the population's discontent were both alarming, since they knew that failing to meet the basic needs of the people can swiftly make or break a political actor. 'When [Turkey's main opposition party] CHP (Republican People's Party – *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*) was in power, people did not have access to clean water. The big cities were full of garbage mountains. CHP means corruption and garbage,'[583] Erdogan would say repeatedly. Another example can be found in the AKP's most recent local election campaign for the March 2019 elections, which opened with old pictures of Istanbul filled with refuse.[584]

5.3 Protective alliances against the old regime

The Arab Uprisings dismantled the extant 'ruling bargains' in Tunisia and Egypt as the transitional periods redefined 'the roles, functions, and the structures of institutions (political parties and organizations, the armed forces, the executive), personal actions and initiatives'.[585] The AKP sees itself as the founder of a 'new Turkey', in which the ruling bargains of the old secular elite and the military were broken up, and the power dynamics of the political landscape altered. The 'new Turkey' narrative, which entered the political jargon through Erdoğan's speeches in and around 2010, symbolised a counter-hegemony

[582] Asef Bayat, 'Plebeians of the Arab Spring', *Current anthropology* 56 (2015): 539.
[583] See Erdoğan's rally in İzmir to promote AKP's candidate before March 2019 local elections: 'CHP yolsuzluk ve çöp demek', *Hürriyet*, 6 January 2019.
[584] 'AK Parti'nin yeni reklam filmi: Gönül adamı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan', *Takvim*, 11 January 2019.
[585] Mehran Kamrava, 'The rise and fall of ruling bargains in the Middle East' in *Beyond the Arab Spring: The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East*, ed. Mehran Kamrava (Oxford University Press, 2014), 17.

to the old Kemalist establishment. As Davutoğlu once expressed it, 'new Turkey' was not only a slogan but a new design project.[586] The tactics deployed in forming alliances and managing threats were based on the AKP's experiences in constructing this so-called 'new Turkey'.

Both Ennahda and the MB are experienced in self-preservation against regime threats. However, the interviews for this research demonstrate that building alliances with various actors – both domestic and foreign – and taking precautions against the military were some of the topics that these three entities discussed in the aftermath of the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia. Why, though, would Ennahda and the MB need to heed the AKP's cautionary tales? The first reason was that the AKP practised a strategy of building alliances and curbing the military's role in politics while it was in power, not in opposition. Neither Ennahda nor the MB had had the opportunity to put their self-preservation methods to test while in power. As Roy explains, 'the Islamists [the MB and Ennahda are] obliged to search for allies as they control neither the army nor the religious sphere. And even if they are able to find allies among the Salafists – the religious conservatives – and the military, these two groups are nevertheless not prepared to allow them to become dominant. The Islamists [have] to negotiate.'[587] The second reason was that these tactics had, in the eyes of the MB and Ennahda, been effective in Turkey. 'One of the most important accomplishments of the AKP was to end the era of military coups in Turkey,' observed the president of Ennahda's *shura*, Abdelkarim Harouni. 'There is a consensus among the various parts of society in Turkey now, whether they are in power or opposition, that they do not want the military in politics.'[588]

[586] İbrahim Karagül, 'Başbakan Davutoğlu ve Yeni Türkiye Devrimi', *Yeni Şafak*, 22 August 2014.
[587] Olivier Roy, 'The myth of the Islamist winter,' *New Statesman* 141, no. 5136 (2012).
[588] Interview with Abdelkarim Harouni, Tunis, 19 December 2019.

It is difficult to pinpoint a causal inference[589] or the extent to which these tactics in building alliances have influenced the MB and Ennahda. AKP's impact on the actions of Ennahda and the MB is an exogenous variable that is 'too complex or unpredictable to be brought into theory'.[590] Therefore, using the process tracing method, I will outline the micro-correlating events – '[the] tracing of the explanatory narrative to the point where the events to be explained are microscopic and the covering laws correspondingly more certain[591] – between 2011 and 2013. In doing so, I hope to demonstrate that these tactics diffused by the AKP were congruous with the transitional period experienced by the MB and Ennahda.

5.3.1 Threats and alliances for the MB

After the revolution, the locus of major forces within society and the state unleashed in Egypt was more complicated than in Tunisia. The MB was confronted with three major and unfamiliar challenges: 'its newfound legality, its involvement in party politics, and its being thrust into the centre of the institutional political sphere'.[592] Secondly, a large proportion of Egyptian revolutionary groups and a faction within the MB as well believed that rushing into elections in November 2011 – 10 months after the fall of Mubarak – without fully eliminating elements of the old regime from state apparatuses would be contrary to people's demands and it would appear that the MB was hijacking the revolution and negotiating with the army. The Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF),

[589] Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, *Designing social inquiry: scientific inference in qualitative research*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 8–9.
[590] Bennett and Checkel, *Process tracing: from metaphor to analytic tool*, 7.
[591] Clayton Roberts, *The logic of historical explanation* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), 66.
[592] Marie Vannetzel, 'Confronting the Transition to Legality' in *Egypt's Revolutions: Politics, Religion, and Social Movements*, ed. Bernard Rougier and Stephane Lacroix (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 43.

which took power after Mubarak's fall, had soon come face-to-face with the MB. The standoff that ensued 'was not based on different views over democracy, achieving the Uprising's objectives, or meeting the people's demands; rather, it was about each side's share of power and political privileges.'[593]

The former Egyptian parliamentarian and author of several books on Islamism and the MB, Amr Al-Shobaki, argued at that time that Egypt could learn from Turkey's experience of establishing civil-military relations.[594] However, the AKP did not see themselves as on the same page as the MB on this matter: 'We were unable to persuade them of the danger that the old regime, with its remnants in the military and judiciary, posed. That was our biggest headache with the MB',[595] recalled a former AKP MP.

On 14 June 2012, two days before the presidential election, the Egyptian Supreme Court, comprised of judges appointed by former president Mubarak, ruled that the first democratically elected parliament should be shut down and the constitution suspended on the grounds of misapplication of election rules by independent candidates. The media reported that the court's ruling was 'condemned as a coup by Islamists, liberals, and scholars' in Egypt. However, the AKP team had a different story to tell regarding the reaction of the Islamists and the MB.[596] One AKP member telephoned the MB members with whom he was in contact when he learned of the parliamentary shutdown to find that the MB members were not as shocked or as enraged as he was. He telephoned Ankara to consult on the matter and, with Ankara's approval, went to the FJP election office.

[593] Al-Anani, 'Upended Path', 533.
[594] 'Ikhwan misr hal', *Al-Madina*, 8 April 2011.
[595] Interview with former AKP MP 1, op. cit.
[596] David D. Kirkpatrick, 'Blow to transition as court dissolves Egypt's Parliament', *New York Times*, 12 June 2012.

> When we entered the office, we noticed MB people eating *kunafa*. They greeted us joyfully and offered *kunafa*. Their complacency astounded me. I tried to urge them to take action such as organizing protests or sit-ins, to prevent the parliament from closing down. I told them that, if the parliament was suspended, you would have to make decisions about everything from the electricity administration to foreign policy. And in two months, you'll be labelled a dictator. The parliament is the most important insurance policy. They [the MB people] didn't seem to mind. Not because they were stupid but because they did not know how the system works. They were fixated on winning the presidential election. That day I realized that this show was going to end in a coup.[597]

There are several reasons for the difference of views between the MB and the AKP on how to respond to the *ancien régime*'s interventions. Both the 1980s junta in Turkey and the Mubarak regime had given some leeway to Islamist movements – *Milli Görüş* in Turkey and the MB in Egypt –to counterbalance leftist groups and more radical Islamists. However, this leeway had its limits. Both the MB and *Milli Görüş* abided by the rules, which meant they had minor and regulated representation in the parliament that prevented them from altering the status quo. As Bayat contends, 'the challenge faced by Turkish Islamism in its encounter with strong secular sensibilities and the Turkish military had brought about the emergence of a post-Islamist AKP.'[598] Put another way, the arrival of the AKP with a different strategy from its predecessor *Refah Partisi* marked the beginning of a solution for Turkey's Islamists to the threat of the army. In Egypt, however, the MB did not go through a similar transformational process.

[597] Interview with former AKP MP 1, op. cit.
[598] Bayat, 'The Arab Spring and its Surprises' 591.

Needless to say, however, neither the MB leadership nor the Morsi government was naive about the perils posed by the remnants of the Mubarak regime. In this situation, the MB implemented a parallel strategy. In August 2012, shortly after assuming office, President Morsi forced several powerful officials to retire, including the former head of the SCAF Hussein Tantawi, the defence minister, the army chief of staff and senior generals within the navy and air force. He also annulled a constitutional decree used by the military to oversee presidential processes. The Morsi government's moves were deemed provocative, as they appeared to be 'animated by an endless reservoir of distrust and dismissiveness toward their opponents'.[599] In theory, a Brother such as Morsi ruling Egypt could bring about a total disruption of the regime structure and the military's privileged position. What, however, happened in reality?

Although Morsi's steps appeared to be a bold reshuffling of the army, it later transpired that the changes were dictated by the military itself, which was embroiled in its own turf wars.[600] The Morsi government had enacted no legislation to limit the military's privileges, and the latter's position remained unchecked, autonomous, and opaque, as it had been during Mubarak's time. The Morsi government made no attempt to prosecute army officials for human rights violations or other wrongdoing. The constitution was drafted by a committee appointed by the SCAF in 2012. The military retained sole control over its budget, estimated to be 15 per cent of Egypt's GDP.[601] The MB seemed to have assumed that, if it did not antagonise the military, the two sides would eventually find a balance in sharing power.

[599] Shadi Hamid, *Temptations of Power: Islamists and illiberal democracy in a new Middle East*, (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 156.
[600] Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood*, 269.
[601] Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood*, 270.

Nevertheless, the previous tacit agreements would be superseded by new ones, with unprecedented consequences, as witnessed in the coup of the summer of 2013 and the subsequent crackdown on the MB. According to AKP members, the MB failed to foresee this outcome.

While its strategy to contain military threats was becoming counterproductive, the MB was also failing to follow the AKP's advice to forge protective alliances. In November 2012, President Morsi issued a decree that granted him and the Islamist-led assembly expansive power and exempted presidential decrees from constitutional scrutiny. With this move, he lost the support of the liberals, secularists, and leftists forever. Within one brief year, 'the Egyptians who had initially cheered him wanted him to go.'[602] At that point, 'many Egyptians (69 per cent) disapproved of the job performance of the country's leadership – a dramatic drop from the 63 per cent approval rating in November 2012. Nineteen per cent of Egyptians in June [2013] said they supported the FJP, a sharp decline from early 2012 when 67 per cent of Egyptians expressed support.'[603]

According to a high-level Turkish bureaucrat who was present in Cairo during Morsi's government, 'even though Ikhwan [the MB in Egypt] had promised that they would not interfere with individual lifestyles, just as the AKP had promised in its first two tenures, they could not persuade the technocratic cadres of the *ancien régime* who thought that Ikhwan's promises were just *taqiya* [a precautionary concealment of Islamic belief and practice].'[604] The perception of the MB's *taqiya* or fear of an Islamist takeover of the

[602] M. Cherif Bassiouni, *Chronicles of the Egyptian Revolution and its Aftermath: 2011–2016* (Cambridge, United Kingdom; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 124.
[603] Mohamed Younis, 'Egyptians' views of government crashed before the overthrow', *Gallup*, 01 August 2013.
[604] Interview with senior Turkish diplomat 2, telephone, 01 August 2018.

Egyptian state may have contributed to Morsi's unpopularity. However, these were not the primary reasons in the context of food and water shortages, rising prices for basic supplies and an increase in street crime. Although the MB blamed these problems on a military plot,[605] the responsibility laid on its shoulders.

The AKP is very familiar with this story, having experienced a similar situation. How did the AKP manage the Turkish military and give the impression that it had understood society's anti-military sentiment? First and foremost, it was a slow and gradual process. Unlike 'its predecessor [Erbakan's *Refah Partisi*], the AKP did not seek to depose all the ruling secularist elites (up until 2011, at least). Responding to its conciliatory tone, a vast number of non-Islamist politicians, intellectuals, and voters soon joined its ranks.'[606] A gradual approach to dismantling the status quo and adopting a conciliatory tone did not imply submission, however. In fact, resisting military and judicial intervention in politics became a sport for the AKP. The first significant challenge to the AKP's rule came in the presidential elections of 2007, following the end of the seven-year term of the tenth president, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, a staunch Kemalist. Although the president's role had been largely ceremonial, it retained a restraining function, with the power of veto over constitutional amendments. For example, Sezer had overturned 22 draft bills proposed by the AKP, on issues ranging from nuclear infrastructure to the facilitation of Imam Hatip schoolchildren attending university, from opening up 4.1 million acres of land formerly classified as forest for construction to electing the president by popular vote. Therefore, a figure such as Sezer provided a protective shield for the secular establishment against the perceived Islamist agenda of the AKP. When the AKP declared that it would nominate

[605] Bassiouni, *Chronicles of the Egyptian Revolution and its Aftermath: 2011–2016*, 125.
[606] Tuğal, 'Religious Politics' 97.

Abdullah Gül for the presidency, this had three likely outcomes. First, since the AKP had a majority in the parliament, Gül would almost certainly win, which he did. Second, Gül, as president, would give free rein to the AKP to pass any bill it saw fit. And third, the presidential mansion in Ankara would be inhabited by a First Lady who wore a head covering, a first since the foundation of modern Turkey.

To avoid this scenario, nationwide rallies known as *Cumhuriyet Mitingleri* (Republican Rallies) were organised. The AKP ignored them and nominated Gül. The main opposition party, the CHP, boycotted the first round of parliamentary elections. On the same night, the chief of general staff of the Turkish army posted a threatening memorandum on the army's website, declaring that he would do whatever it took to guard the secular republic, an event that was dubbed the '*e-muhtıra*' (e-ultimatum) in Turkish political jargon. The AKP did not back down and repeal Gül's nomination but adhered to its original plan. The crisis culminated, in 2007, in an early general election, in which the AKP received 46 per cent of the votes and Gül became the 11th president of Turkey. The second challenge came in 2008, when the AKP, with the help of nationalist party MHP (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*), was able to pass a constitutional amendment that liberalised restrictions on wearing head coverings at universities and in civil service. As a result, the chief public prosecutor issued an indictment against the AKP for violating the separation of religion and state. In July 2008, the Constitutional Court voted six to five not to ban the party.

These two incidents provided the AKP and its base with invaluable learning experiences, the principal among which was that if it did not cave in to threats, it would eventually triumph. 'We stand our ground; we never bow down except when we pray'[607] had become

[607] 'Erdoğan: Rüku ve secde dışında eğilmedik', *Haber 7*, 28 February 2012.

Erdoğan's motto.[608] In the AKP's thinking, it would be a fatal mistake to yield to groundless threats from the *ancien régime*, such as the Egyptian Supreme Court's decision to close down parliament two days before the presidential election. Hence, at that time, the AKP delegation tried to push the FJP to 'stand its ground', though to no avail.

The then deputy prime minister of Turkey, Beşir Atalay, states that he was frank with delegates from both the MB and Ennahda whom he had met a couple of times in the aftermath of the regime's collapse.

> I went through step by step what kind of obstacles and challenges the AKP had encountered in its first years in power. I emphasized the need to form alliances with different segments of society. I said to them, do not envy the Iranian model. Its governance is a bad example for Muslims. Please, I said to the Egyptians, please be cautious when it comes to the military. I told them that their guardianship is worse than what we had in Turkey.[609]

In its first years in office, the AKP was 'nearly obsessed with garnering support from a diverse group of voters because of their fear of the military elite and another possible coup d'état'.[610] When it faced perceived existential threats, the AKP set about diligently forming critical alliances that would help it to consolidate certain blocs that stood on the fracture lines of Turkish society. One such alliance was with the liberal intellectuals, who provided significant intellectual and media support during the aforementioned 2007–2008 crises, the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials and the 2011 constitutional amendment referendum, all of which sealed the deal for the AKP's consolidation of power. Another alliance that

[608] 'Diklenmeden… Dik durduk, sonucu aldık', *Star*, 23 March 2013.
[609] Interview with Beşir Atalay, Ankara, 02 August 2019.
[610] Elvan Aktas, 'The rise and the fall of the Turkish economic success story under AKP (JDP)', *Dynamics of Muslim Life* 11, no. 2 (2017): 176.

enabled the AKP to push back was that with the Gülen movement, which staged the high-profile trials mentioned above with fabricated evidence, thanks to its members in the police and the judiciary, and acted as the AKP's international lobbying agent until 2014. When the AKP fell out violently with its former partner Gülen, it allied itself with the ultra-nationalist bloc led by MHP (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* – Nationalist Movement Party). In short, it took the AKP nearly a decade to take a stand and another decade to fully control the state. It formed alliances according to its needs while discarding old partners. The media and scholars often fail to note that 'the transition that produced the Turkish model was much slower and more precarious than the pace of change unleashed in Egypt, Tunisia and beyond'.[611]

According to the interviewees, the AKP tried to explain precisely this to the MB team. 'I have seen more than once that "our guys (*bizimkiler*)" told Morsi to go slowly and be flexible on specific issues',[612] claims a former AKP MP. The former adviser to then Foreign Minister Davutoğlu, Mesut Özcan, had met with Yasser Ali, an adviser to President Morsi, and asked him about the MB's vision for Egypt.

> Yasser Ali told me that the AKP is very successful in economic policies and overcoming the military's challenges. But, he said, we'd do the same in less time. I could sense his pride. In the back of his mind, he was thinking, 'We are Ikhwan. We are Egyptian civilization. Who are you, Turks? You were in Central Asia yesterday.' Of course, he was not as blunt about it as I just was, but you get that feeling. So, I told him that Islamist parties in Turkey, starting with Erbakan's party, have always been part of the Turkish state since the multi-party system was adopted in 1946. Added to that, since 1999, there has been an active EU accession process in Turkey. This was instrumental

[611] Aslı Ü. Bali, 'A Turkish model for the Arab Spring?', *Middle East Law and Governance*, Vol.3, Issue 1-2, (2011), 30.
[612] Interview with Talip Küçükcan, op. cit.

> in attracting foreign investors and reviving the economy. In Egypt, you have neither of these conditions, and you tell me that you are going to act fast. I told him it was a mistake, but he was too cocksure to listen.[613]

According to Wickham, the MB's soft underbelly was not its ideological rigidity but its hubris, which stood in the way of forming alliances with other sectors of society – such as the revolutionary camp, the leftists and the secular–liberals – to confront elements of the deep state.[614] The MB discarded the gradualism of the past after achieving victory in the elections following the revolution and moved hurriedly, Hamid claims.[615] A further factor contributing to the MB's complacency was its inexperience. As all the Egyptian interviewees confirmed, none of their previous interactions with the regime could have provided them with the knowledge they would need when in power. Another problem was the movement's *shura*, which consisted of the old guard, and 'placed its political party on a very short leash – appointing the FJP's leaders, approving its platforms, and even deciding which movement members should move over to the party'.[616]

The then Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu highlights the same problem, emphasising the importance of alliances for survival.

> Ikhwan endured the same challenges that any movement transitioning from a *da'wa* entity to a political party would endure. I've warned them several times that they cannot manage a political party under the auspices of a religious movement. A political party should treat each citizen equally and respect all identities. Because Ikhwan was unable to separate the FJP from

[613] Interview with Mesut Özcan, op. cit.
[614] Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood: evolution of an Islamist movement*, 296.
[615] Hamid, *Temptations of power*, 144, 83.
[616] Brown, *When Victory Becomes an Option*, 18.

> the movement, the Copts felt ill at ease. We always stressed that the Copts should feel comfortable. Make Christians part of the party, if possible, we suggested. When I became the prime minister, I appointed an Armenian intellectual as my senior adviser. It was an example to follow. I wanted to show that merit, not religious identity, is important.[617]

According to the AKP actors involved in the diffusion process, the MB had implemented some of the AKP's suggestions:

> We repeatedly asked the MB delegation, 'You have a considerable Christian population. Also, most elites in Egypt are Christians. So, they are critical. How do you plan to govern and coexist with them?' We advised them to be brave and avoid the Salafist path. Morsi listened to us and went on TV and said, 'Christians are my brothers.' This was not a simple or easy statement for an MB leader to make in an election atmosphere. Salafists attempted to pit the MB against the Coptic Pope, but the MB did not fall into that trap. Our insistence and suggestions on this issue influenced Morsi's decision to publicly extend a hand to the Christians.[618]

It is important to note that, in Egypt, the elite intelligentsia is composed mainly of Sunni Muslims. However, a certain degree of pluralism and coexistence with non-Muslims holds some symbolic value and, more importantly, may be considered – in the eyes of Egypt's 'secularized intelligentsia'[619] – as a sign of democratic maturity.

While the approach of the former AKP MP cited above demonstrates the importance attributed by the AKP to forming alliances with, or at the very least not antagonising other social groups, Davutoğlu's words highlight the practicality of symbolic gestures such as –

[617] Interview with Ahmet Davutoğlu, op. cit.
[618] Interview with former AKP MP 1, op. cit.
[619] Khaled Abou El Fadl, 'Egypt's Secularized Intelligentsia and the Guardians of Truth' in *Egypt and the contradictions of liberalism: illiberal intelligentsia and the future of Egyptian democracy*, ed. Dalia and Faruqi Fahmy, Daanish (OneWorld, 2017).

in his case – appointing an Armenian scholar as a senior adviser. As he implied, the significance of winning the hearts of the Coptic Christians was critical not merely because they hegemonised the elite intelligentsia, but because an alliance with the Copts – symbolical or structural – could open up avenues of elite consolidation for the MB. Although the Copts and seculars constitute a small proportion of Egyptian society, their exclusion from the early stages of the transition 'created an atmosphere of distrust at the outset that was worsened overtime'[620] and hampered any possibility of elite coherence, which is one of the main factors determining the success or failure of a transitional period.[621]

It was not only the AKP that warned the FJP and the Morsi government of the military's encroachment. The leader of the Salafist Building and Development Party, Tariq Al-Zomor, who was imprisoned for 25 years on charges of being part of the Islamist group that assassinated former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, also attempted to advise President Morsi on the same issue. 'Following the closure of the parliament and the election, I met with Dr Morsi and told him that the Supreme Court had ruled the way it did at the military's request and that it was unacceptable,' Zomor recalled. 'Dr Morsi asked me what my recommendation was, and I said that, as Islamist groups, we were behind him; we should get five million people out on the street and protest: that way, we could stop a possible coup.'[622] According to Zomor, President Morsi was not convinced that a coup was likely because he believed that the US would not allow it to happen. Another reason may have been that the MB was attempting to strike a deal with the military in a bid to

[620] Ricardo René Laremont, 'Moving past revolution and revolt: Transitions to democracy in North Africa' in *Revolution, revolt and reform in North Africa: the Arab Spring and beyond*, ed. Ricardo René Laremont (Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge 2014), 151.
[621] Laremont, 'Moving past revolution and revolt', 149.
[622] Interview with Tariq Al-Zomor, Istanbul, 6 August 2018.

acquire more freedom to manoeuvre when the crowds began their sit-in at Tahrir Square to force Mubarak to resign in 2011. Young Egyptians saw the MB's negotiations with the military as a betrayal of the revolution.[623] This episode at the height of the revolution may have led the MB leadership to assume that the initial accord between them and the military was still in effect.

Salah Abdel Maqsoud admitted that the MB was mistaken about the military's actions. 'We made two critical errors. First, we assumed that, after the 25 January revolution, the Egyptian military would not attempt a coup. Second, we anticipated a strong international reaction to the junta.'[624] This miscalculation was based partly on the belief that President Morsi had maintained a cordial relationship with high-ranking military officers. This was not a delusion created by MB members. 'One month before the coup, I had met with a high-ranking officer who was close to Sisi. He told me that the military loved Dr Morsi because he called army officials every time he made a foreign visit and asked them what they wanted and then structured his visits to fulfil the army's requests,' Zomor claimed.

Why, then, did this seemingly amicable relationship end with a bloody coup? The goal of the amicability was reverse co-option, incorporating the military into the MB's own processes so that the army did not pose a threat and would also – potentially – legitimise the MB government. This approach was similar to the decades-long strategy of the Mubarak regime vis-à-vis Islamist groups. According to Springborg, 'the Brothers have wavered between cozying up to authoritarians and rashly lashing out against them, never reaching a stable midpoint in which they could cooperate with other political forces to

[623] Pargeter, *Return to the shadows*, 28.
[624] Interview with Salah Abdel Maqsoud, Istanbul, 1 August 2018.

form a coherent, unified civilian opposition.'[625] Kandil, similarly, contends that Morsi and the MB, 'even at the height of power, [they] mistrusted other political factions and deferred to their past tormentors in the military and security.'[626]

The AKP seemed to have noticed the strengthening of an anti-Morsi bloc, not necessarily because they could read the tensions or trends in Egyptian society but because of the work of the Turkish Intelligence Agency (MIT). Davutoğlu, in a television interview in August 2013, disclosed for the first time that the head of MIT, Hakan Fidan, had been sent to Cairo fifteen days before the coup to warn President Morsi, since 'the MIT had collected information regarding a probable coup'.[627] According to pro-AKP news outlets, Fidan had presented President Morsi with a list of suggestions.

> 1) To strengthen your presidency's legitimacy, reach out to all sectors of Egyptian society, and organize consultation meetings with members of other political parties. 2) We understand how much you value our close relationship. Turkey appreciates this; however, you should arrange foreign visits to countries like the USA and Iran. 3) Focus on tourism to revitalize the economy. 4) Clean the streets of Cairo. Use the garbage trucks we provided. 5) Send us government bureaucrats for training.[628]

Fidan's suggestions corroborate the general themes of the diffusion process between the AKP and the MB after the fall of Mubarak and stand as an official account of this process, which emphasised plurality and reaching accommodations with global and regional powers.

---

[625] Robert Springborg, *Egypt*, (Cambridge: Polity, 2018), 135.
[626] Hazem Kandil, *The power triangle: Military, Security, and Politics in Regime Change*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 17.
[627] 'MİT Müsteşarı Hakan Fidan'a özel görev*', Milli Gazete*, 30 September 2013.
[628] 'MİT Müsteşarı Mursi'yi uyarmış', *Sabah*, 23 August 2013.

5.3.2 Threats and alliances for Ennahda

According to the interviews conducted for this research, the AKP recommended that Ennahda form coalitions with secular and left-wing parties in the Tunisian Parliament, especially during the transition and constitution-writing period. The discussions on the new constitution began after the parliamentary elections in November 2011 and lasted for two years, with the draft ready to be put to a vote in late January 2014. The coalitions and alliances formed during that period would enable Ennahda to stay in power, just as alliances with the liberal intelligentsia and the EU had helped the AKP to gain legitimacy in its first two terms and had provided protection against the secular establishment and military in Turkey. The tacit and cross-class coalition had enabled the AKP to garner votes from other parties, from 'housewives to public employees to pro-EU, mostly urban, educated voters'.[629] Similarly, Ennahda also had a history of reaching out to other opposition parties from the early 1980s in a way that the MB did not.
The alliance with the Mustapha Ben Jaffar's Ettakatol Party linked Ennahda to the old Tunis opposition elites while the alliance with Moncef Marzouki's Congress for the Republic (CPR) linked them to the newer revolutionary elites, - both important constituencies.

Zeinab Brahmi of Ennahda acknowledges that 'diversity management was the most important task' facing Ennahda after the revolution and that Turkey and Tunisia showed similarities 'in terms of the political and intellectual differences within society'. For this

[629] Elisabeth Gidengil and Ekrem Karakoç, 'Which matters more in the electoral success of Islamist (successor) parties – religion or performance? The Turkish case', *Party Politics* 22, no. 3 (2016): 334.

reason, she said, ‘we are focusing on how the AKP managed disagreements and differences in Turkey, because, in the end, that is the reality of a country everyone must deal with’.[630] The interviewees from Ennahda’s side uphold the view that the party’s decision to form a coalition following the first free elections was part of a diversity management strategy within Tunisian polity.

Ridha Driss, one of the key actors who advocated Ennahda’s announcement of a ‘Muslim democracy’ at the 10th Congress in 2016, claims that Ennahda did not and does not rule alone, for three reasons:

> First, the electoral law in Tunisia does not allow one party a majority of votes. Second, we are still in a transition from an unjust state to a democratic one. During this transition period, we need the coalition of all parts because we are all trying to learn about democratic political work in power. Third, Tunisia sits in a volatile region, with Libya and Algeria in constant flux next door. We need to fortify the Tunisian national core in the face of these challenges.[631]

To protect Ennahda, the existing fault lines in society needed not to be permitted to solidify. Ennahda was confronted with ‘an anti-Islamist backlash from large sectors of the secular and modernist sectors of society [following the first elections, owing to its initial ambiguous stance] with respect to its commitment to liberal democracy, [which] contributed to the fear of Islamism’.[632] For this reason, claims Lourimi, ‘We worked with moderate secularists [after the first election] rather than Muslim extremists, because we

[630] Interview with Zeinab Brahmi, Tunis, 19 December 2019.
[631] Interview with Ridha Driss, Tunis, 18 November 2019.
[632] Marzo, ‘Critical junctures’, 921.

believed that the country should be led by a strong centre composed of moderate Muslims and secularists. We did not wish to build a large Islamic front against a secular front.'[633]

Between crisis and consolidation come moments of 'anchoring' for political parties and actors. The anchors in the political sense are strategic decisions made in times of crisis that define the path of the political actor/party and the country's transitional period.[634] Although the Nahdawis claim they did not fear a similar end to that of the MB, the Egyptian coup impacted Ennahda's political path and precipitated Ennahda's decision of 2016 to split the practices of politics and preaching. Certain segments within Ennahda rationalise this decision by alluding to the first amendment of the constitution, which states that 'Tunisia is a free, independent, sovereign state; its religion is Islam, its language Arabic, and its system is republican.' Through this amendment, the Nahdawis claim that Islamic values and principles are automatically applied to society and that Ennahda's initial self-relegated task of preaching Islamic values to the people is thus redundant. As a result:

> Now we [Ennahda] want to focus on politics. If people want to focus on religion, they can do it through religious organizations. We, as a party, need to deal with administration, economics and foreign relations. We decided to separate *da'wa* and politics after discussing the issue for 18 months with Tunisian figures who do not belong to Ennahda and scrutinizing the experiences of Morocco, Algeria, and Turkey.[635]

[633] Interview with Ajmi Lourimi, op. cit.
[634] Leonardo Morlino, *Democracy between consolidation and crisis: parties, groups, and citizens in Southern Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 339.
[635] Interview with Moussa Ben Ahmed, op. cit.

Others believe that the separation of *da'wa* and politics resulted from Ennahda's evolution since its foundation in the 1980s, and that, 'if Ennahda had not wanted its fortunes to wane and become a nostalgic entity, it would have had to reinvent itself. Of course, an impulse for self-preservation might have been behind the decision to split *da'wa* from politics, after seeing what happened in Egypt in 2013.'[636] Lotfi Ziotun claims there had also been pressure from the Tunisian public:

> Ennahda felt the need to announce that it was no longer an Islamist party because there was pressure from society. The first election that made Ennahda the leading party was right after the revolution. People's minds were still not set. However, in the next elections, it was apparent that the Tunisian mood rejected the prospect of having an ideological party in power. The Tunisian elite, the intelligentsia, academics, and artists made that clear.[637]

As seen, Ennahda was more reactive to and conscious of threats, and it proposed solutions that would appease the prominent forces in Tunisian politics. For example, during Tunisia's constitution-writing period, a video of Ghannouchi was leaked to Facebook, showing a speech made in a meeting with Islamist leaders on 10 October 2012, in which Ghannouchi stated that while Ennahda had polled higher than expected in the elections, the secular elites retained hegemony over the national discourse due to their control over the media and economy, so Islamists had to tread very carefully.[638]

As shown in this chapter, the tactics diffused from the AKP can be summarised as two-tier formulae that would bring about the success that Ennahda and the MB saw in the AKP rule. The first tier offered checklists to legitimise the MB's party – the FJP, and Ennahda

[636] Interview with Sayyida Ounnisi, op. cit.
[637] Interview with Lotfi Ziotun, op. cit.
[638] Bülent Karaatlı, *Arap Baharı'nda Farklı Bir Ülke: Tunus* (Ankara: Nobel Yayınları, 2018), 213–14.

as competent political parties and help them to survive the first few years of a transitional period shaped by unavoidable crises. The second tier consisted of prescriptions regarding state, party, and elite consolidation. This is analogous to the Gramscian power structure, in which the state equals political society plus civil society.[639] In this sense, while forming alliances was a formula that would aid elite consolidation, curbing the military's role was a formula for state consolidation. Managing the municipalities and the elections can be considered part of party consolidation. The final strategy diffused from the AKP concerned economic management. In the next chapter, I will set out the economic strategies that helped to solidify the AKP's status vis-à-vis the state and society.

[639] Antonio Gramsci, Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, *Selections from the prison notebooks of Antonio Gramsci* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971).

6 Brothers in search of their bourgeoisie

It is easy enough to chant a slogan such as 'Islam is the solution' – a slogan adopted by Islamist movements from the end of the 1980s across the MENA region[640] – when oppressed and excluded from the political game. It is even easier for movements to propose nebulous solutions to economic grievances that primarily draw attention to the corruption of the ruling establishment when they are not in a position to deliver a comprehensive economic vision. However, when they ascend to power in the aftermath of a crisis – in this case, a crisis that has shaken the status quo – it is unwise to reiterate ideological slogans while failing to develop practicable action plans. This was the challenge facing both the Tunisian Ennahda and the MB/FJP when they emerged victorious from the first free elections held after the Arab Uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt respectively.

Although certain parts of the era are still understudied, the literature on the Arab Uprisings of 2011 has accurately outlined the political, cultural, and economic reasons for the regimes' collapse in Egypt and Tunisia. The Uprisings crossed ideologies and classes,[641] railing against a system that the protesters saw as illegitimate. Roughly construed, the peoples of Tunisia and Egypt revolted against decades of oppression and the neoliberal policies, ostentatious corruption, and cronyism of the ruling elite at a time when almost 40 per cent of the population was living below the poverty line. Just before the Uprisings, the

[640] Anoushiravan Ehteshami, 'Islam as a political force in international politics' in *Islam in world politics*, ed. Nelly Lahoud and Anthony H. Johns (Routledge, 2005), 32.
[641] M. Abdelrahman, 'A hierarchy of struggles? The 'economic' and the 'political' in Egypt's revolution,' *Review of African political economy* 39, no. 134 (2012).

gulf in living standards between the rich and poor had become wider, to the extent that, for example, the majority of Egyptians had to rely solely on Islamic charities to make ends meet and receive essential social services.[642] The privatisation, deregulation and globalisation of many sectors had resulted in an uneven distribution of benefits and significant external debt, amounting, in the case of Tunisia, to 48 per cent of annual GDP.[643] Given the sheer number of studies on the adverse effects of neoliberal policies introduced during the 1990s and 2000s in Arab economies and the socio-economic plight of the people, the Uprisings should not have surprised anyone.[644] However, they did, because, in Hayekian terms, the economic and social functioning of a society is far too complex for any economic model to accommodate and analyse.

When asked about the outlook for Arab Uprising countries in 2011, the French scholar Bertrand Badie suggested that it would be delusional to anticipate swift democratisation, since the former autocracies had eviscerated the social strata and were now incapable of triggering the dynamics of democracy and modernisation. 'The only route to hope,' he claimed, 'is to emulate the emerging powers, like Turkey, Brazil, and India, who have gradually succeeded in forging a democracy for themselves, thanks to their economic performance and to the birth of a true middle-class that identifies with the virtues of such a regime.'[645] Olivier Roy offered thoughts along the same lines: 'To get through the period of austerity and the economic difficulties that go with it, they [Egypt and Tunisia] should have done more to secure a "historic compromise" with the liberals. […] A coalition that is

[642] Mona Atia, 'A Way to Paradise: Pious Neoliberalism, Islam, and Faith-Based Development', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 102, no. 4 (2012): 814, www.jstor.org/stable/23275509.
[643] Nader Habibi, *The Economic Agendas and Expected Economic Policies of Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia*, Crown Center for Middle East Studies (2012), 2–3.
[644] Francesco Cavatorta and Samir Amghar, 'Symposium—Islamism, Islamist Parties, and Economic Policy-Making in the Neo-Liberal Age', *Politics & Religion* 13, no. 4 (2020): 686.
[645] 'La revanche des arabes', *Le Monde*, 24 February 2011.

conservative in politics and morals but neoliberal in economics, and thus open to the West. In this respect, the model is the AKP in Turkey.'[646]

The common – and Western – assumption was that the policies of the Washington Consensus had been poorly implemented in the economic systems of Egypt and Tunisia, resulting in societal grievances that led to the overthrow of the existing regimes.
This is, as Armbrust contends, interpreting the anger on the streets of Egypt and Tunisia in 2011 as purely directed at the corrupted state elites – *haramiyya* (thieves) –, which is akin to pointing at a tree but missing the forest.[647] Egypt and Tunisia had already experienced three decades of neoliberal transformation and the regimes of Mubarak and Ben Ali 'were considered to be at the forefront of instituting neoliberal policies in the Middle East'.[648]
It is fair to claim that the cause of the Arab Uprisings was not that the countries in question had applied neoliberal policies less effectively than the Western economies but that neoliberal policies were so well applied that they created uneven development, social and economic disparities, and cronyism.[649]

The international financial institutions, for their part, assumed the grievances of the Egyptians and Tunisians as a 'response to the absence of capitalism.'[650] The words of the then president of the World Bank, Robert Zoellick, reveal the simulated economic paradigm pushed at Egypt and Tunisia: 'The key point I emphasized in this speech is that

[646] Olivier Roy, 'The myth of the Islamist winter', 25.
[647] Walter Armbrust, 'The Revolution against Neoliberalism' in *The dawn of the Arab uprisings: end of an old order?*, ed. Haddad Bassam, Rosie Bsheer, Ziad Abu-Rish, Roger Owen, (London: Pluto Press, 2012), 114.
[648] Armbrust, 'The Revolution against Neoliberalism' 115.
[649] Emel Akçali, 'Introduction: Neoliberal Governmentality and the Future of the State in the Middle East and North Africa' in *Neoliberal governmentality and the future of the state in the Middle East and North Africa*, ed. Emel Akçali (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 2.
[650] Adam Hanieh, *Egypt's 'Orderly Economic Transition': Accelerated Structural Adjustment under a Democratic Veneer?* Centre for Development Policy and Research (SOAS, University of London, July 2011).

it is not just a question of money. It is a question of policy. […] Keep in mind [that], the late Mr Bouazizi was basically driven to burn himself alive because he was harassed with red tape [for] locating a poor fruit vendor stand. Given that you have 40 million people who are going to need to find jobs, and you have an informal economy. One starting point is to quit harassing those people and let them have a chance to start some small businesses.'[651] This was exactly the approach that the AKP would, step by step, teach Ennahda and the MB to foster.

The Islamist movements, especially the MB in Egypt, had been filling the gap in social provision with their charities, as a result of the government's retreat from welfare. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the MB's charity work may have contributed to the belief that it would fight corruption and deliver services to the have-nots and have played a role in its victory in the first elections. In other words, 'the Islamic machine' – a term Masoud uses to describe the MB's charity structure – helped the MB to win the election; however, the voters soon realised that the MB had over-promised and withheld their initial support.[652] Thus the Islamists' initial and perceived advantage over other political parties waned quickly after Ennahda and the MB/FJP assumed power. Slogans such as 'Islam is the solution', tacit and utopian promises of a 'return to Islam's Golden Age', previous charity work: none of this proved enough. The population, and especially the young, needed to believe that their needs would be met, and their material lives improve. As the son of an Egyptian Islamist put it, '[T]he last thing youth are thinking about is religion. […] They

[651] 'Remarks at the Opening Press Conference World Bank Group President Robert B. Zoellick', World Bank, 11 April 2011.
[652] Tarek E. Masoud, *Counting Islam: religion, class, and elections in Egypt*, Problems of international politics, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 208.

need money, they need to get married, a car, and they don't have anything to do with anything else.'[653]

As Wickham observes, 'Without a doubt, one of the Brotherhood's highest priorities since Morsi's election as president [was] to demonstrate its capacity for effective governance, most notably in the domain of the economy.'[654] While Ennahda offered 'Turkish-style economic development',[655] the MB's senior entrepreneurs exerted themselves to refute long-held views about the MB's economic vision by appealing to and engaging with foreign investors, 'much like their counterparts in the Arab world or in Turkey'.[656] The co-founder of Egypt's centre-right party, al-Wasat's Essam Sultan, describes the MB's vision as a fine example of how the non-Ikhwani polity saw the MB: 'The political culture of the Muslim Brotherhood is based on hatred of the system, any system. They always see themselves as something and the system as something else. They have their own outlook on life, their own way of cooperating, and their own economic path. And, gradually, they isolated themselves from society.'[657]

It was not easy for the MB to overcome prejudices or opinions such as this or, for example, that of the former Minister for Family and Population of Egypt (2009–11), Moushira Khattab. Khattab, emphasising a lack of vision in the MB leadership, argued that Egypt's acute economic crisis could benefit from the neoliberal economic policies of the Turkish model, 'which offers a unique insight into one of the most successful

[653] Antony Shadid, 'In one slice of Egypt, daily woes top religion', *New York Times*, 15 February 2011.
[654] Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood: evolution of an Islamist movement* (Princeton: Princeton University, 2013), 273.
[655] Cavatorta and Amghar, 'Symposium—Islamism, Islamist Parties, and Economic Policy-Making in the Neo-Liberal Age' 686.
[656] Khalil al-Anani, 'Devout Neoliberalism?! Explaining Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood's Socio-economic Perspective and Policies', *Politics and Religion* 13, no. 4 (2020): 762.
[657] Haenni Patrick and Tammam Husam, 'Penser dans l'au-delà de l'islamisme', *Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée* 123, no. 123 (2008).

transformations of an Islamic movement in the Muslim world. 'But,' she continued, 'the Egyptian Islamists [were] talking solely about *shariah* […], displaying Islamic beards, praying for the ruler in mosques.'[658] According to the Lebanese economist Louis Hobeika, Turkey's economic model was more suited to the Egyptian context because of the country's 'geographical, demographic, cultural, and economic proximity, as well as the long, positive and negative historical relations that characterized our association for centuries.'[71]

In summary, the neoliberal vision implemented by the AKP should be adopted by Ennahda and the MB; after the Uprisings, the majority of the general public concurred.

6.1 Road to Neoliberalism

This research is neither about globalisation nor the trajectories of capitalism or original moorings of neoliberalism. However, it is impossible to escape these socio-economic systems if we are to conceptualise success and discuss the Islamists' economic vision. This section will, therefore, first explain the Islamists' relationship with capitalism and neoliberalism and then juxtapose these accounts with the diffusion process.

The West has usually defined Muslim-majority countries in terms of what they are not, as it did with post-communist societies: 'They are not proper capitalist societies because they do not have a recognizable capitalist class, [their] institutions cannot work, or they have the wrong characterizations.'[659] However, as historian Maxime Rodinson asserted in 1974, 'The alleged fundamental opposition of Islam to capitalism is a myth, whether this view is

[658] Moushira Khattab, 'Turkey and Egypt: Where is the Model?' *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 11, no.4 (2013): 33–43.
[659] Gil Eyal, I. Szelényi and E. Townsley, 'The theory of post-communist managerialism', *New Left Review*, no. 222 (1997): 70.

put forward with good intentions or bad.'[660] Many Islamists indeed started their careers in the 1970s and early 1980s as socialists with Marxist tendencies. While Mustafa Al-Siba'i, the author of *Socialism of Islam*,[661] argued in 1960 that socialism would be an appropriate remedy for the economic, social, and political ailments of Muslim countries,[662] other prominent Islamic thinkers, such as 'Sayyed Abol-Ala Maududi, Sayyid Qutb and Mohammad Baqir Al-Sadr, tried to present an Islamic alternative to capitalism and communism based on the moral teachings of Islam.'[663]

During the 1970s and 1980s, Islamist thinkers envisioned an economic system based on the Islamic values of equal prosperity, protection of property rights and social justice – a system 'situated between the two major economic systems of the time, capitalism and communism'.[664] Qutb had contended that an economic system developed around Islam's values would serve social justice which, in his thinking, was inconceivable in either capitalism or communism. The teachings of Iranian thinker Ali Shariati, who argued against the Western capitalist system because of its materialistic treatment of society, also had significant influence. In these writings, the authors all endeavoured to propose a forum in which Islamic moral considerations could coexist with threads of both capitalism and socialism.[665]

Qutb's *The Battle between Islam and Capitalism* was written in a historical context in which authoritarian nationalism emerged, modelled on European fascist movements.

---

[660] Maxime Rodinson, *Islam and capitalism* (London: Allen Lane, 1974), 155.
[661] Mustafa Al-Siba'i, *ishtirakiyat al-islam*, 2nd ed. (Damascus: Mu'assasat al-Matba'at Al-'Arabiyah, 1960).
[662] Khalil al-Anani, 'Devout Neoliberalism?!', 752.
[663] Habibi, *The Economic Agendas and Expected Economic Policies of Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia*, 3.
[664] Lena Rethel, 'Corporate Islam, Global Capitalism and the Performance of Economic Moralities', *New Political Economy* 24, no. 3 (2019): 351.
[665] Ibrahim Saif and Mohammed Abu Rumman, *'The Economic Agenda of the Islamist Parties'*, Carnegie Endowment Middle East Center (2012), 5.

Communism was propagated, at the time, by 'intellectuals of European descent and/or Western-educated Egyptians, [and] turned into a real mass movement during World War II'.[666] These ideologies rivalled for domination. Qutb, as the main proponent of the idea that Islam, as a complete system, provides the best economic and ideological framework, 'not only guaranteeing the salvation of the individual soul but the realisation of social justice on earth for the whole of humanity',[667] proposed that Islam's taxation solutions – *zakat* and limits on excessive wealth accumulation – were the solution to unequal wealth distribution.[668] However, intellectual and practical attempts to Islamise economies failed in Iran, Pakistan and Sudan; thus, 'the ideals of an Islamic economy fell short of the economic and political realities on the ground'.[669]

The penetration of neoliberal policies in the Middle East dates to the early 1970s following the 1967 Arab defeat and the 1973 oil crisis, 'through the aid conditionality or debt-relief programmes of the IMF and the World Bank' primarily instigated by the US and the UK.[670] In the late 1970s, the Open Door (*Infitah*) policy of Egypt's then President Anwar Sadat (1970–81) promoted foreign investment and a market-oriented economy, signalling a break with the USSR. Coupled with the oil boom of the Gulf countries, to which many workers flocked and from which they sent remittances home, and the emergence of the Islamic Republic in Iran, the Islamists in Egypt found themselves in a burgeoning environment for business.

[666] Margherita Picchi, 'Islam as the Third Way: Sayyid Quṭb's Socio-Economic Thought and Nasserism' *Oriente Moderno* 97, no. 1 (2017): 186.
[667] Picchi, 'Islam as the Third Way' 188.
[668] Picchi, 'Islam as the Third Way' 189.
[669] Rethel, 'Corporate Islam, Global Capitalism and the Performance of Economic Moralities' 351.
[670] Tagma, Kalaycioglu and Akcali, '"Taming" Arab social movements' 379.

During this period, the Islamist intelligentsia moved away from socialism, claiming that it was essentially opposed to Islamist principles such as trust in the market rather than the state and the importance of private property. The global discrediting of the left and the demise of the Soviet Union were additional factors driving this shift. It was not difficult for Islamists to accept capitalism and its mode of production in the end, because Islamism has always emphasised the centrality of private property.[671] 'With governments' adoption of the World Bank and the IMF's economic reforms, Islamists' businesses and economics flourished, and a new Islamic elite emerged. Free trade in global markets attracted this growing Islamist elite and they invested heavily in the banking and financial sectors.'[672] Amir argues that Islamism aligns itself with capitalism and is in the service of imperialism, despite its claims to the contrary. According to Amin the MB, for example, had supported the passing of the laws in parliament that would reinforce private property to the detriment of tenant farmers' rights. He contends that Islamism is reactionary and contrary to the rights of women and anti-Muslims, but its base – 'the nouveaux riches, the comprador bourgeoisie' – support and benefit from 'current imperialist globalization' while the agenda of the elite Islamists is 'lined up behind the dominant powers in the world scale'.[673]

Neoliberalism, a combination of *globalisation* and *financialisation* 'generates the fact that *no place*, or almost no place in the world [where] human activities, production forces, relations of distribution of material and cultural goods among the classes, relations of power, alliances or antagonisms among nations and peoples, everyday habits and modes of life, travel, and settlement [are defined], remains "outside" the global constraints or is

[671] Francesco Cavatorta and Samir Amghar, 'Symposium—Islamism, Islamist Parties, and Economic Policy-Making in the Neo-Liberal Age', *Politics & Religion* 13, no. 4 (2020): 689.
[672] Al-Anani, 'Devout Neoliberalism?!' 753.
[673] Samir Amin, 'Political islam in the service of imperialism', *Monthly Review* 59, no. 7 (2007): 2–3.

immune to the effects of financialization.'[674] In the context of global neoliberal convergence, 'the requirements of globalization leave very little room for manoeuvre for national policymakers to try out alternative economic policies to deal with the increased vulnerability of citizens exposed to the full force of globalization'.[675] It seems that the Islamists who were inclined towards a neoliberal vision since the late 1980s 'have [too] arrived at common technical solutions, based on a common set of problems'.[676] The implicit narrative of progress and success encoded in neoliberalism is impervious to counter-evidence. It is true that neoliberalism as a coherent theory has been hammered by a storm of criticism, but the process of policy implementation has been a success from Latin America to Central and Eastern Europe.[677]

Mona Atia calls the convergence of Islamism and neoliberalism 'pious neoliberalism' but also contends that 'the patterns and processes involved in Islamic neoliberalism are not unique to Islam but are indicative of a particular combination of religion and economic rationality […] in the contemporary moment'.[678] By process and patterns, Atia means the neoliberal economic reforms in Egypt starting in the 1990s, such as the privatisation of state industries, retreat of the welfare state, currency devaluation and subsidy elimination, all of which led to the creation of a 'pro-business, consumption-driven economy focused on drawing in international investment, promoting unregulated markets and unfettered competition, and extending market logic into all components of social life'.[679] A new,

[674] Étienne Balibar, 'Absolute Capitalism' in *Mutant Neoliberalism: Market Rule and Political Rupture*, ed. William Callison and Zachary Manfredi (New York: Fordham University Press, 2019), 260.
[675] Francesco Cavatorta, 'The Convergence of Governance: Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World and Downgrading Democracy Elsewhere?' *Middle East Critique: The Future of Middle Eastern Political Rule through Lenses of the Past: Revisiting the (first) Era of Post-Democratization* 19, no. 3 (2010): 228.
[676] Sarah Babb, *Managing Mexico: Economists from Nationalism to Neoliberalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018), 2.
[677] Harvey, *A brief history of neoliberalism*, 156.
[678] Mona Atia, '"A Way to Paradise": Pious Neoliberalism, Islam, and Faith-Based Development', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 102, no. 4 (2012): 81.
[679] Atia, 'A Way to Paradise' 814.

'more virtuous economic actor dubbed *homo Islamicus* [emerged], who will be disciplined enough to refrain from corrupt practices and who will inspire workers to greater productivity by engaging them in culturally appropriate ways'.[680] Unlike the ideal Muslim in the minds of Qutb and Maududi, *homo Islamicus* strives for material success and individual excellence;[681] he is a translation and operationalisation of 'the Hayekian prescription of free political order'[682] into contemporary Islamist politics.

Homo Islamicus, a close cousin of *homo economicus*, 'may well represent the contemporary equivalent in the Muslim world of the Protestant Reformation', claims Beinin. '*Homo Islamicus* is a modern incarnation of the Protestant ethic: an entrepreneur who works hard for material gain and his spiritual purity will be rewarded here on earth in the form of shared profits and social recognition.'[683]

The Protestant work ethic of the Enlightenment era, which 'emphasizes economic freedom to acquire private property, to exchange goods and services, and to succeed or fail according to a person's merits'[684] is, in the 20th century, an extension of prosperity theology. This cannot be seen as a fringe movement, as it is preached today by Pentecostalists and three of the four largest US churches.[685] The Protestant ethic is also redefined by the Universal Church 'with enterprise and urbanity, fulsomely embracing the

[680] Edward Webb, 'Changing the Player, Not the Game. Ennahda's Homo islamicus', *ASPJ Africa & Francophonie* 5, no. 1 (2014): 4.
[681] Cavatorta and Amghar, 'Symposium—Islamism, Islamist Parties, and Economic Policy-Making in the Neo-Liberal Age' 691.
[682] Aihwa Ong, *Neoliberalism as exception [electronic resource]: mutations in citizenship and sovereignty* (Durham N.C.: Duke University Press, 2006), 13.
[683] Joel Beinin, 'Political Islam and the New Global Economy: The Political Economy of an Egyptian Social Movement', *The New Centennial Review* 5, no. 1 (2005): 163.
[684] Glenn Adams et al., 'The Psychology of Neoliberalism and the Neoliberalism of Psychology', *Journal of Social Issues* 75, no. 1 (2019): 194.
[685] Jason Hackworth, 'Religious Neoliberalism(s)' in *Faith Based, Religious Neoliberalism and the Politics of Welfare in the United States* (University of Georgia Press, 2012), 40.

material world where we see here Pentecostalism meets neoliberal enterprise'.[686] Prosperity theology, while making the crass capitalistic pursuit of wealth palatable to the conscience of the religious, 'reinforces the Calvinist tenet of individual responsibility for material success, and its darker corollary, individual responsibility for one's failures – a key justification for dissolving the welfare state'.[687]

Tayyip Erdoğan is a great practitioner of the neoliberal mindset: for example, in his thinking, 'if the conditions of the lower classes deteriorated, this was because they failed in their quest for good education, submission to work or the acquisition of a Protestant work ethic, discipline and flexibility, [they are not fit enough to survive] in a Darwinian new liberal world.'[688] Nasr, who interviewed religious businessmen in Kayseri – the heartland of Anatolian entrepreneurs – describes them as 'pro-Europe, pro-democracy, and above all pro-capitalism combining religion, hard work, and economic innovation in much the same way as did Calvinist Burghers of Northern Europe in the sixteenth century when capitalism was just starting out'.[689] Erdoğan is known to berate citizens who complain about their economic hardships, telling 'the poor to pull themselves together and do something for themselves, instead of expecting the government to do it for them'.[690] 'Rise and start doing business' would be his slogan.

[686] Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, *Millennial capitalism and the culture of neoliberalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 23.
[687] Hackworth, 'Religious Neoliberalism(s)' 45.
[688] David Harvey, *A brief history of neoliberalism*, 157.
[689] Vali Nasr, *The Rise of Islamic Capitalism (previously published as Forces of Fortune)* (New York: Free Press, 2009), 247.
[690] Tuğal, *The fall of the Turkish model*, 41.

6.2 The economic vision of Ennahda and the MB

Thematically, the economic pledges of Ennahda and the MB had sounded similar for the two decades preceding the Uprisings: to wipe out corruption, end cronyism, create more jobs for young people and end poverty via 'market-driven growth coupled with protections for the poor and social justice for all'.[691] Nevertheless, neither organisation had devised a practical, policy-driven economic programme until the elections of 2011, as they had been forced to linger in opposition with no prospect of gaining power. Neither Ennahda nor the MB had opposed the respective *ancien régime* neoliberal policies in their country; instead, both saw corruption as the biggest problem. Moreover, the MB, comprising a considerable number of small to medium-sized businesses, had benefited both from President Sadat's Infitah (Open Door) policies in the mid-1970s and Mubarak's neoliberal reforms in the 1990s. Such benefits were denied to Ennahda, as many of its members were forced to live outside Tunisia. It is important to note that, compared to the privileges enjoyed in Egypt by crony allies of Mubarak and his son Gamal,[692] the gains of businessmen affiliated with the MB were small, since they were always seen as part of the opposition rather than the ruling coalition whose needs were met by generating rents.[693]

With the 2011 Uprisings and the fall of the dictators, the economic complexities of Tunisia and Egypt became more pressing than ever for the MB and Ennahda, as the elections approached, and they were ill-prepared to address the issues. A top Egyptian banker in

[691] Shadi Hamid, 'Political party development before and after the Arab Spring' in *Beyond the Arab Spring: The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East*, ed. Mehran Kamrava (Oxford University Press, 2014), 146.
[692] Ishac Diwan, Philip Keefer and Marc Schiffbauer, 'Crony Capitalism in Egypt' in *Crony capitalism in the Middle East: business and politics from liberalization to the Arab Spring*, ed. Ishac Diwan, M. Adeel Malik and Izak Atiyas, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 68.
[693] Diwan et al., 'Crony Capitalism in Egypt' 85.

Islamic finance who had 'dealt frequently with Brothers after they came to power' claimed that the MB had a very poor grasp of Islamic finance and sought advice from Islamist bankers abroad, who were 'market-oriented technicians, with limited economic imagination'.[694]

In a 2004 document entitled 'The Muslim Brotherhood's Initiative on the Principles of Reform in Egypt (*mubadarat al-ikhwan al-muslimin hawl mabadi' al-islah fi misr*),'[695] the MB offered several economic prescriptions based on ideas derived from Banna's 'Economic Order (*al-nizam al-iktisadi*)'. This was no comprehensive economic vision but it did include the 'prohibition of usury and gambling, which are considered as sinful, promoting social solidarity to reduce income gaps, restricting luxuries and upholding the right to private property as long as it does not harm the public interest'.[696] A year later, in 2005, the MB published another document called 'The Muslim Brotherhood's Initiative for Domestic Reforms in Egypt (*mubadara jamaa'a al-ikhwan al-muslimin lil-islaah al-dahili fi misr*)' on what it believed to be the reforms necessary. This included the MB's observations and suggestions in 13 areas: political reform, social reform, economic reform, electoral reform, judicial reform, Al-Azhar reform, the cultural field, women, Coptic brothers and sisters, education, scientific research, fighting poverty and foreign policy. The section on the economy, after reiterating opposition to usury and extravagant expenditure, especially at the state level, and vowing to increase punishments for fraud and corruption, emphasised the freedom of economic activity and the right to ownership, as Islam dictates. The part that closely resembled the AKP's economic strategy concerned privatisation: 'We

[694] Interview with Walid by Hazem Kandil, Cairo, 27 March 2013, cited in Kandil, *Inside the Brotherhood*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015) 114.
[695] Unpublished document cited in Kandil, *Inside the Brotherhood*, 112.
[696] Kandil, *Inside the Brotherhood*, 112.

are working to encourage the private sector to participate in major public projects that are subject to privatization.'[697]

Needless to say, the MB's vision did not propose an economic plan that was structurally different from the Mubarak era neoliberal policies which dictated 'a pro-business, consumption-driven economy focused on drawing in international investment, promoting unregulated markets and unfettered competition and extending market logics into all components of social life [which entailed decreased] funding for nationalized health care, education, subsidies and pensions'.[698] In terms of the economy, inconsistency was the only constant for the MB from 2005 until the revolution in 2011. While, in parliament, MPs close to the MB argued for higher wages and supported strikes against further privatisation initiatives, the leadership offered no anti-market rhetoric;[699] on the contrary, pro-business approaches were lauded.

Similarly, although Ennahda and its base had clear ideas about identity-related issues, such as recognising Islam as the religious and cultural base for the essential workings of Tunisian society, they lacked a comprehensive understanding of the global and Tunisian economies and required advice on technical policy.[700]

Ennahda's economic programme was prepared hastily for the election by inexperienced activists and adopted the Keynesian model in which the private sector plays a more significant role.[701] Similar to the policies of the MB and Mubarak era, Ennahda's

---

[697] 'mubadara jamaa'a al-Ikhwan al-muslimin lil-ıslaah al-dahili fi misr', *Al Jazeera*, 16 May 2005.
[698] Atia, 'A 'Way to Paradise' 813.
[699] Tuğal, 'Religious Politics', 11.
[700] Mathieu Rousselin, 'In the Name of Allah and of the Market: The Capitalist Leanings of Tunisian Islamists', *Science & Society* 80, no. 2 (2016): 211.
[701] Maryam Ben Salem, '"God loves the rich." The Economic Policy of Ennahda: Liberalism in the Service of Social Solidarity', *Politics & Religion* 13, no. 4 (2020): 706.

proposals differed little from Ben Ali's neoliberal programme. The key divergence may be that Ennahda's programme claimed to 'emulate Turkey in its attempt to re-moralize the economy by promoting individual virtue'.[702] How, though, did the AKP promote individual virtue, and how would that 're-moralize' the economy? An examination of Ennahda's programme does not supply satisfactory answers, but we know that the AKP promoted a Protestant version of the individual work ethic with the dictum 'service to people is a prayer to God', and this dictum together with 'an unambiguous embrace of the market'[703] seemed to be adopted by Ennahda to construct its model of '*homo Islamicus*'.

A document written by Ennahda's president, Rachid Ghannouchi, was published in April 2011 under the title 'On the Problematique of the Islamists' Economic Programme (*huwl ishkaliya al-barnamaj al-iqtisadi lida al-islamiyyin*)'. The document had seven parts – representing seven observations – on how Ennahda saw problems in and solutions to the economy. It argued that the Islamic economy integrates the political, social, and cultural spheres and brings its leaders closer to their citizens. While claiming that both capitalism and socialism had failed, it argued that a 'Third Way' – an Islamic developmental path – would be successful in Tunisia.[704] The AKP, when it first assumed power, also 'reframed an Islamic moral stance to fit a Third Way party image that partly emulate[d] the former political approaches of Tony Blair, Bill Clinton, and Gerhard Schröder, which were crucial for the neoliberal restructuring of the economy and transformation of the state along liberal–democratic lines.'[705] The Third Way was not the only reference to embracing an

[702] Ben Salem, 'God loves the rich' 712.
[703] Sadiki, 'Tunisia's Ennahda: Islamists Turning the Learning Curve of Democracy and Civic Habituation', 109.
[704] Rousselin, 'In the Name of Allah and of the Market' 208–09.
[705] Yıldız Atasoy, *Islam's Marriage with Neoliberalism: State Transformation in Turkey* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 109.

AKP approach: the fifth section of Ennahda's document was devoted to praising Turkey's economy and its efficient services, especially in the municipality of Istanbul.

'They [the AKP] reduced Turkey's debts by a third within three years, brought inflation and unemployment down to the rates of developed countries, and their economy escaped the 2008 crisis that hit the capitalist economies,' asserted Ghannouchi. 'There is no apparent reason for these successes other than Islam, as the Islamists, like their secular colleagues, have studied at the same universities, mastering the same sciences, technologies, and modern knowledge. However, they are superior to them because they are also competent in [the tenets of] Islam.'[706] Ghannouchi fails to explain how Islam protected the Turkish economy from the 2008 crisis; his allusion to the Turkish example can be seen as simply an attempt to bolster the idea that Islamists can govern successfully. Conspicuous throughout the document is the reduction of Islamism to a moral identity that helps only if its actors are trained in the same way as their secular counterparts. In general, Ghannouchi's article and 'Ennahda Movement Programme for Freedom, Justice and Development in Tunisia',[707] a document published in October 2011, display a 'strong commitment to free enterprise capitalism, with an active role envisioned for small and medium-sized enterprises',[708] a commitment that lay at the heart of the AKP's economic vision from very early on. According to Ben Salem, Ennahda's economic vision, which became evident after 2011, '[was] not drawn from or inspired by Islamist writers'[709] and

[706] Ghannouchi, Rachid, 'huwl ishkaliya al-barnamaj al-iqtisadi lida al-islamiyyin', Al Jazeera, 29 April 2011.
[707] 'Ennahda Movement Programme for Freedom, Justice, and Development in Tunisia', Issuu – Ennahda Electoral Programme (English), 2 October 2011.
[708] Habibi, *The Economic Agendas and Expected Economic Policies of Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia*, 5.
[709] Ben Salem, 'God loves the rich' 702.

had a heavy liberal ethos and neo-managerial logic in 'insisting on the responsibility and autonomy of the members of the group'.[710]

The MB in Egypt embraced the existing economic system. Far from questioning the Mubarak regime's policies or offering an alternative, it adopted a similar neoliberal orientation: no tax increases but a decrease in state funding of public expenditure so that the private sector would take over the state's duties.[711] Similar to Ghannouchi's argument above, the MB contended that 'if honest and competent people are put in high state positions, Egypt can harness its people's talents, and pockets of wealth, which would allow for healthy economic development'.[712] Therefore, like Ennahda, the MB offers virtuousness as an economic policy. Inside this virtuous outer wrapping – of pledges to promote social justice and end corruption – would be found 'all sorts of pro-market reforms and structural adjustment programs with the (secular) blessing of foreign investors and international organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank'.[713] For the MB, Ennahda and the AKP limiting the state's role and establishing good governance were good enough precepts for moralising the economy.[714]

'Both the Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda [had] expressed full support for attracting foreign investment and promoting trade and tourism',[715] promising not to impose restrictions on foreign tourists who wanted to wear, drink and eat whatever they chose. In

[710] Ben Salem, 'God loves the rich' 704.
[711] Amr Adly, 'Between Social Populism and Pragmatic Conservatism' in *Egypt's Revolutions: Politics, Religion, and Social Movements*, ed. Bernard Rougier and Stephane Lacroix (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 63.
[712] Brown, *When Victory Becomes an Option*, 15–16.
[713] Rousselin, 'In the Name of Allah and of the Market: The Capitalist Leanings of Tunisian Islamists' 204.
[714] Dilek Yankaya, 'Du cadre d'action collective au programme partisan: ancrages patronaux des islamismes en Turquie et en Tunisie' in *L'année du Maghreb* (2020).
[715] Habibi, *The Economic Agendas and Expected Economic Policies of Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia*, 6.

this regard, a shift in the MB's attitude should be noted: while the Brotherhood's 2007 programme underscored the need for tourism 'accordant with our Islamic values and laws' within a state 'at one with its Islamic values', the 2011 programme made no mention of religious values in the functioning of this key sector. Similarly, the FJP's economic vision which 'back[ed] the principles of economic freedom […] while encouraging foreign and domestic investment [was] in sharp contrast with the MB's ideological positions in 2007 that [had been] based on an Islamic economic system'.[716]

According to former FJP minister Amr Darrag, the MB team was looking for answers to this question: 'How did Turkey raise its GDP from 2,500 dollars to 10,000 dollars during the AKP's time in power? This was the important thing to us. We were not going to learn Islamic ideology from Turkey! They [the AKP team] were not interested in learning anything about Islam from us either.'[717] Ennahda was on the same page as the MB in this regard. 'How Turkey managed to attract international and domestic investments was a good model for us. We thought that the Turkish export policy was one of the best policies,' says Ridha Driss, executive member of Ennahda. 'The AKP succeeded in promoting Turkish products worldwide. In Tunisia, we are also focusing on what we call the export of added value. We want to export services and technology.'[718] Both Ennahda and the MB, therefore, sought actionable and specific economic tactics. The Nahdawi leadership whom I interviewed in 2019–21 believed they had managed the first stage of the challenge, namely proving the legitimacy of an Islamist party, and that 'Ennahda [had] succeeded in promoting a good image to the world of a civil moderate democratic party that managed the balance between Islam and democracy and was open to the world,'[719] but that 'our

[716] Al-Anani, 'The 'Anguish', 230.
[717] Interview with Amr Darrag, Istanbul, 18 July 2018.
[718] Interview with Ridha Driss, Tunis, 18 November 2019.
[719] Interview with Abdelkarim Hourini, Tunis, 19 December 2019.

economic progress did not catch up with our political success.'[720] This was a significant problem.

Therefore, the most important topic in the dialogue between the MB and the AKP – and between the AKP and Ennahda – was improving the economy. However, the methods of accomplishing that goal have become a point of contention within the MB's old guard. For example, according to Darrag, the MB believed that 'whenever it is possible, institutions should be built in compatibility with Islamic principles. For us, for example, loans and interest are not advisable. We do not want to lower inflation or raise interest rates for the sake of a healthy economy.'[721] The literature on the MB's economic stance demonstrates that Darrag's words do not represent general attitudes within the movement but perhaps resonate with the rhetoric of the old guard.

The dialogue between the MB's eighth and last Supreme Guide, Mohammad Badie, and the then-Turkish ambassador to Egypt shows another example of this rhetoric. Although, as explained in Chapter 4, the Turkish Embassy was not involved in the dialogue, the then-Turkish ambassador, at the Turkish Foreign Ministry's request, visited Badie at the MB's headquarters in Cairo's Al-Moqattam suburb on one occasion in 2011. According to a high-level bureaucrat who had first-hand knowledge of the meeting, the Turkish ambassador told Badie that 'the keys to maintaining a stable country are, first, the smooth operation of services for health, education, and keeping the city clean; second, Egypt's financial credibility [which] needs a boost in international financial circles, and, to do that, an IMF negotiation would be a good option. Turkey went that route from 2000 onwards,

[720] Interview with Rafik Abdessalem, Tunis, 20 December 2019.
[721] Interview with Amr Darrag op. cit.

and Egypt should not be suspicious about doing the same. The more Egypt is at peace with the international economic system, the more she will gain.'[722] Why had the Turkish ambassador been sent to the headquarters of the MB to appeal to the IMF for assistance? The answer lies in the 'success guidelines' of the AKP. As mentioned in Chapter 3, in its first year of rule, the AKP's 'broad commitment to the IMF program [had] helped the economic recovery survive the deep economic crisis that Turkey experienced in 2000 and 2001, with inflation rates falling to their lowest level since the early 1970s'.[723] Badie listened to the Turkish ambassador without interrupting, then turned to his aide, who was taking notes and asked him not to record what he was about to say. 'I understand very well, but not everyone in our movement does,' Badie told the Turkish ambassador. He continued half-jokingly, 'It would be nice of you to drop in on my predecessor, whose office is downstairs, and tell him what you just told me. See if you can convince him.'[724]

Was Badie's playful remark an indication of a rift within the *shura* regarding how to approach the economy? Hardly. Even if a consensus had been lacking in the *shura*, it did not affect the MB's path, which was pro-foreign investment and well-disposed to the IMF. In fact, it was not the MB but the Salafists within the parliament calling themselves the Al Nour Party – which was later shut down – who had protested against an IMF loan while the Morsi government was in negotiations. The Salafists claimed that foreign loans amounted to usury, which is against Islamic law. The MB, for its part, was seeking ways to present the IMF loan as a palatable option for the Islamist electorate. When the meetings between the Morsi government and the IMF regarding a $4.8 billion loan were terminated,

[722] Interview with senior Turkish bureaucrat 1.
[723] Ziya Öniş, 'The political economy of Turkey's Justice and Development Party' in *The Emergence of a New Turkey: Islam, Democracy, and the Emergence of the AK Parti*, ed. Hakan Yavuz (University of Utah Press, 2006), 208.
[724] Öniş, 'The political economy of Turkey's Justice and Development, 208.

‘Abdel Khaleq al-Sherif, head of the Muslim Brotherhood’s advocacy and guidance department, asked Al-Azhar, the Ministry of Endowments and Scholars to issue a collective fatwa on the permissibility of the IMF loan to aid President Morsi.’[725]

As President Morsi took his place in the front seat, the MB *shura* tried to preserve its hegemony over the movement and the newly founded FJP. The FJP’s leadership cadres, however, were filled with young, Western-educated, ambitious technocrats who would soon recognise their limited room for manoeuvre. This limitation started with one critical MB strategist, mentioned in Chapter 4 – Khairat Al-Shater. As soon as he was released from prison in 2011, Shater became known as a key figure in building a new Egypt and started meeting with foreign ambassadors, ‘the executives of multinational corporations and Wall Street firms, and a parade of United States senators and other officials to explain the Brotherhood’s vision’,[726] namely pro-democracy, pro-free market and tolerant of other religions. It was an ironic image, since Shater had led the conservative wing of the MB, strengthening his influence by placing allies in critical positions in the movement since the beginning of the 2000s. He drove away a group of influential MB leaders known as reformists including Abdel Moneim Aboul Foutuh, and maintained the MB’s links with the Salafi movements.[727] When it came to the economy and business, however, Shater could be as supple as Erdoğan. Inspired by Qutb’s ‘emphasis on a strong organization’, Shater developed ‘his managerial mind’ and ‘developed training and research manuals for private sector clients, [and] lectured aspiring management consultants on doing business’[728] from the mid-1980s. With this mindset, he tried to shape the FJP’s economic

[725] ‘Brotherhood asks Al-Azhar to issue a fatwa on IMF loan’, *Egypt Independent*, 29 August 2012.
[726] David Kirkpatrick, ‘Keeper of Islamic Flame Rises as Egypt's New Decisive Voice’, *New York Times*, 12 March 2012.
[727] Bernard Rougier and Stéphane Lacroix, *Egypt's Revolutions* (Place of publication not identified: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2016), 266.
[728] Willi, *The fourth ordeal*, 145.

policies along with – or sometimes against – a small clique of young technocrats. As Roy put it, 'Morsi's economic model was neoliberal: he is surrounded by "Chicago Boys", who swear by the free market. He is in favour of deregulation, the end of subsidies and an opening to the global market.'[729] By 'Chicago Boys', Roy alluded to the young cadres of the FJP who had been educated in the West and returned to Egypt after the Uprisings, rather like the Chilean or Mexican students who studied economics in the US – especially at Harvard, Yale, MIT and the University of Chicago[730] – and promoted anti-socialist and neoliberal policies when they returned to their countries in the 1980s. The 'Chicago Boys' of the MB, however, were not as influential or, more accurately, did not have the opportunity to be influential, because heavyweight businessmen already controlled the economic direction that the MB should follow. That direction was 'not at all dissimilar to the neoliberal project of Mubarak's NDP'.[731]

As an engineer, businessman and Deputy General of the MB (2011–13), Al-Shater had business relations with Turkey, pre-dating the 2011 revolution. In 2003, he and his business partner, Hassan Malek, also an MB member, opened two branches of a Turkish furniture superstore, İstikbal, in Cairo.[732] In 2005, Malek and Shater brought the Turkish menswear brand Sarar to City Stars mall in Cairo. Turkey's trade attaché and leading businesspeople attended the opening.[733] Malek and Shater had spent four years in prison together on charges of illegally funding the MB and were released in 2011 when the Mubarak regime fell.

[729] Roy, 'The myth of the Islamist winter' 24.
[730] Babb, *Managing Mexico*, 1.
[731] Abdelrahman, 'A hierarchy of struggles? The 'economic' and the 'political' in Egypt's revolution,' 623.
[732] 'İstikbal mobilya Kahire'de', *Yeni Şafak* 05 May 2003.
[733] 'Sarar Mısır'da mağaza açtı', *Hürriyet*, 03 December 2005.

'Before doing anything, especially involving economic steps, Morsi used to consult Shater. Shater decided everything, from the gas pipeline that would pass through Israel to the distribution of billboards on Cairo streets,'[734] claims a former AKP MP. Former Brother and presidential nominee Aboul Foutuh corroborated this information in an interview with Alison Pargeter. According to Foutuh, Shater was 'running everything like a puppet show from behind … Egypt had two presidents, a real one, Shater, and an official one, Morsi.'[735] What, though, was Shater's show about? In an interview with the *Wall Street Journal*, Shater claimed that 'the economics file is the most important' and explained that 'our Islamic vision is close to a modified capitalism . . . to [have a mixed] open market and take care of social welfare'.[736] Malek and Shater – who came to have great influence over the MB's *shura* council – had made their fortune through the Mubarak era's free market policies. The FJP government, therefore, wanted to preserve the system as it was, and even continued to follow policies initiated by SCAF 'such as anti-labour legislation to discourage strike action by workers and plans to cut subsidies'.[737] The problem partly stemmed from the MB's view of the Egyptian economy and the root causes of the Arab Uprisings. 'The Brotherhood and the FJP interpreted the revolution as a reaction not to neoliberalism, but rather to years of corruption and political monopoly by Mubarak and his cronies',[738] which was only part of this multi-layered and complex story.

In response to expectations from its base, the MB reintroduced its Nahda Project, conceived by Shater 15 years earlier, in the aftermath of the revolution. Hamid describes the project as 'the blueprint for Islamist would be technocrats [… with] impressive ideas

[734] Interview with former AKP MP 2.
[735] Pargeter, *Return*, 65.
[736] Matthew Kaminski, 'Khairat al-Shater: The Brother Who Would Run Egypt', WSJ, 22 June 2012.
[737] Angela Joya, 'Neoliberalism, the State and Economic Policy Outcomes in the Post-Arab Uprisings: The Case of Egypt' *Mediterranean politics* 22, no. 3 (2017): 346.
[738] Joya, 'Neoliberalism, the State and Economic Policy Outcomes in the Post-Arab Uprisings' 348.

on institutional reform, economic development, and urban renewal'.[739] However, although it was the result of years of deliberation, the project seemed to lack a comprehensive view of politics and governance.[740] Designating Shater to lead it, the MB's economic programme demonstrated that, within the movement, 'the pro-market faction had more clout than the government-oriented faction'.[741]

In an April 2011 lecture entitled 'Features of Nahda: Gains of the Revolution and the Horizons for Development', Shater tried to explain what the Nahda Project entailed, revealing his worldview. 'Some [people] do not realize how deep the issue of Islamic reference is; they imagine that it is an emotional word or that I can take the experience of Japan, of Britain, of Malaysia, of Turkey, or any other experience and dress it up in Islamic garb or Islamic guise,' he said. 'The issue is that the Islamic method is a substantial method that deeply impacts the organization of [all] aspects of life. This needs to be laid out before us; it is not a matter of an emotional or a formalistic slogan, but rather a substantial and fundamental issue.' As he intimated in the first part of his lecture, Shater wanted to emphasise that the MB had not abandoned Islamism altogether and would not adopt a Turkish model in its entirety. He then continued with a vague description of how to implement the Nahda Project, acknowledging the lack of experience among the general public: 'This "Nahda" is a fine word, but, in the end, we must identify several paths to take in social, economic, health, education and moral development in a variety of fields. […] It is incumbent on us to inform people about how to operate: those who want to start an association, those who want to form a company, those who want to start a school, those

[739] Hamid, *Temptations of power*, 177.
[740] Ibid., 51.
[741] Habibi, *The Economic Agendas and Expected Economic Policies of Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia*, 5.

who want to start an institution. All these issues require major efforts because the people don't have experience.'[742]

6.3 Cultivating an Islamic bourgeoisie

The founding of two business associations – Namaa in Tunis and Egyptian Business Development Association (EBDA) in Cairo – is a material outcome, a verifiable impact of the AKP-Ennahda and the AKP-MB diffusion. Namaa ('growth or development' in Arabic) was founded on 15 March 2011, 14 days after Ennahda was legalised, as a non-profit association to help connect and advise small to medium-sized businesses and attract foreign and domestic investors.[743] Three months before Morsi assumed the presidency in March 2012, Hassan Malek, Shater's business partner, founded the EBDA ('start' in Arabic). The key actor in both foundations was Turkey's MÜSIAD (*Müslüman İşadamları Derneği*), an organisation founded as an alternative to Turkey's biggest secular business association, TÜSİAD (*Türkiye Sanayicileri ve İş İnsanları Derneği*).

Malek claimed publicly that he modelled EBDA on MÜSİAD.[744] In Turkey, while TÜSIAD was close to the established state elites and committed to preserving secular principles, MÜSIAD represented the Anatolian small to medium-sized enterprises and had a close affinity with Islamist movements, especially the AKP's mother movement, *Milli Görüş*.[745] MÜSİAD was formed in 1990, according to Madi, to create a new 'economic man - *homo Islamicus*'. The role of MÜSİAD in the AKP's development should be clarified in order to appreciate the significance of the founding of EBDA in Egypt and

[742] 'Khairat al-Shater', Hudson Institute, 10 April 2012.
[743] 'jama'a namaa tunisie', *Assiyasi Net*, 15 March 2011.
[744] Marroushi, Nadine, 'Brotherhood businessman urges business to play role in development, Egypt Independent, 15 April 2012.
[745] Öniş, 'The political economy of Turkey's Justice and Development Party' 221.

Namaa in Tunisia. Following the postmodern coup of 28 February 1997, which toppled Erbakan's government and his *Refah Partisi*, the military attempted to limit Islamist business activities and their influence on the economy. While MÜSIAD was threatened with closure, its then chairman, Erol Yarar (1990–99) was tried in semi-military courts for inciting hatred.[746] At that time, therefore, 'the Islamic business elite found themselves at a crossroads: they could choose to support either closed-minded [conservative] Islamist political movements or open-minded modernist groups. Most chose the second option, providing financial and human resources for the establishment of the AKP',[747] which conveniently did not identify itself as an Islamist party but rather as a 'conservative democratic' one. The preference and support of 'Islamist capital' for the AKP over '*Milli Görüş's* newly founded party *Saadet Partisi* (Felicity Party) was the most important component in the AKP's birth'.[748] 'With the emergence of the AKP, the ideological common ground between this conservative bourgeoisie and the new party led to a new partnership of mutual support and benefit.'[749]

This was because the AKP and the Islamist businessmen represented by MÜSIAD shared a desire for a greater slice of the economic and political pie. As Habibi argues, this kind of relationship is not unique to Turkish Islamism, and 'the business wing of an Islamist movement, […] typically dominated by small and medium-sized business owners, […] calls for the removal of anticompetitive considerations such as corrupt, government-supported monopolies of the sort that dominated the economies of Tunisia and Egypt

[746] '28 Şubat siyasi değildi', Anadolu Ajansı, 20 April 2012.
[747] Filiz Başkan, 'The rising Islamic business elite and democratization in Turkey', *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 12, no. 4 (2010): 416.
[748] A. Ekber Doğan and Yasin Durak, 'İslami Burjuvazinin Yükselişi ve Neoliberalizmin Toplumsallaştırılması: İki dindar şehrin başarı hikayesinin perde arkası' in *'Yeni Türkiye'ye Varan Yol*, ed. İsmet Akça, Bekmen Ahmet, Özden Barış Alp (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2018), 304.
[749] Gamze Çavdar, 'Islamist New Thinking in Turkey: A Model for Political Learning?' *Political Science Quarterly* 121, no. 3 (2006): 484.

under Ben Ali and Mubarak. This group of business owners is usually a relatively large one within Islamist movements, and it is likely to play an important role in the formulation of Islamist economic policies in both countries. In Egypt, moreover, religious businessmen have been very influential in the Muslim Brotherhood.'[750]

The common quest of MÜSIAD and the AKP required a gradual but crucial process: the reorganisation of Turkey's political power structure. For this daunting task, the AKP relied on the social class that MÜSİAD represented, along with other tactics mentioned in Chapter 5. It is revealing how Ajami contextualised Turkey's neo-Islamic bourgeoisie when unpacking the challenges faced by the Egyptian economy: 'The plain truth of it is that Egypt lacks the economic wherewithal to build a successful modern Islamic order, whatever that might mean. The Islamic Republic of Iran rests on oil, and even the moderate ascendancy of the AKP in Turkey is secured by prosperity stemming from the "devout bourgeoisie" in the Anatolian hill towns. Egypt lies at the crossroads of the world, living off tourism, the Suez Canal, infusions of foreign aid, and remittances from Egyptians abroad.'[751] In this formulation, for the AKP, the Islamic bourgeoisie and its associations are as vital as oil is to the maintenance of Iran's regime. As a result, the main strategy that spread from the AKP to the MB and Ennahda was that of bringing together a loyal business class neglected by previous regimes.

Although MÜSİAD was established thanks to the neoliberal policies of the 1980s, and its member businesses flourished without state sponsorship, its members had always claimed that wealth was distributed according to closeness to the secular state rather than the

[750] Habibi, *The Economic Agendas and Expected Economic Policies of Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia*, 4.
[751] Fouad Ajami, 'The Arab Spring at One: A Year of Living Dangerously'. *Foreign Affairs* 91, no. 2 (2012): 63.

potential or quality of the business. As a result of globalisation and Prime Minister Turgut Özal's liberalisation policies, MÜSİAD companies were able to operate outside the government's reach. With the emergence of the AKP, the aspiration of the blending 'of Islam, capitalism, and democracy […] reached its logical conclusion [and gave birth to] a new neo-Islamic bourgeoisie in Turkey'.[752] Cristofis calls this a 'bourgeois revolution, a radical redistribution of political power, economic capital, and symbolic resources carried out by using the mechanisms of democracy. Here, the bourgeoisie fought against the old regime, with the political support of the disadvantaged classes of Anatolia and the inhabitants of the poorer areas in the outskirts of the big cities.'[753] The AKP's strategy of cultivating an Islamic bourgeoisie generated a climate in Turkey in which religious rituals such as praying five times a day and veiling became more relaxed and less puritan and were replaced by a 'business-oriented spirituality'.[754] In this climate, Islamist elites, groups and parties adjusted their goals and aspirations, adopting what Bayat refers to as post-Islamist tendencies such as dropping their 'comprehensive vision of Islam (including the goal of an Islamic state)'.[755]

It is no surprise that MÜSİAD and the AKP have similar views of economic development. Both are proponents of a free market economy, foreign trade investment, export-oriented growth and limited state intervention.[756] Tuğal, however, argues that the AKP's relationship with MÜSİAD in fact 'reinforced business–state interdependence, financialization, and speculative growth',[757] contrary to MÜSİAD's goals. What we see in

[752] Madi, 'From Islamic Radicalism to Islamic Capitalism' 148.
[753] Nikos Christofis, 'The AKP's "Yeni Turkiye": Challenging the Kemalist Narrative?' *Mediterranean Quarterly: a Journal of Global Issues* 29, no. 3 (2018): 14.
[754] Tuğal, 'Religious Politics,' 99.
[755] Tuğal, 'Religious Politics,' 100.
[756] Başkan, 'The rising Islamic business elite and democratization in Turkey' 412.
[757] Tuğal, *The fall of the Turkish model*, 204.

this space is a common neoliberal agenda, not specific to Turkish polity, but applicable anywhere. Congruous with Foucault's governmentality framework, the state is not in retreat, but the government is expanded in such a way that it is restructured 'with techniques, shifting the regulatory competence of the state to "responsible" and "rational" individuals'.[758] In our case, these responsible and rational individuals are devout businessmen closely affiliated with the ruling elite, that is, the AKP.

Ayşe Buğra claims, in a similar vein, that a new conservative class has emerged thanks to significant capital accumulation. However, Buğra contends that this class's potential was not unleashed by the market-friendly policies of the AKP but, rather, 'with the help of a regulatory framework that has been continuously modified [by the AKP] to open more spaces for arbitrary government intervention in support of politically privileged entrepreneurs'.[759] There is indeed ample evidence that the AKP had channelled more resources into small and medium-sized businesses through state banks to correct the imbalance that it saw between small MÜSIAD enterprises and large TÜSIAD companies.[760] Side by side with this strategy went increasing numbers of Muslim businessmen and the growth of the AKP's support base.

For MB business circles, MÜSİAD, by helping small and medium-sized enterprises throughout Turkey, helped the AKP to break the monopoly of TÜSİAD, representing the old elites, and to decentralise the country's economic development.[761] When describing MÜSIAD's activities in post-Uprising Tunisia and Egypt, Vannetzel and Yankaya use the word 'intervene', rather than 'help': 'MÜSIAD seized strong opportunities to intervene in

[758] S. K. Das, *Making the Poor Free?* (Oxford University Press, 2015), 6.
[759] Ayşe Buğra 'The truth', Open Democracy, 25 August 2014.
[760] Öniş, 'The political economy of Turkey's Justice and Development Party' 217.
[761] 'Brotherhood businessman urges business to play role in development', *Egypt Today*, 15 August 2012.

the restructuring of Egyptian and Tunisian business communities, in line with its transnational community-building project.'[762] The founding of EBDA in Egypt, and Namaa in Tunisia, offering a novel business model for these countries,[763] was not an autonomous act or decision on the part of MÜSİAD but an element of the diffusion from the AKP to the MB and Ennahda. According to a senior Turkish diplomat who was present in Cairo at the time, 'When the collaboration agreement with MÜSİAD was signed, Morsi was present because EBDA was intended to be the smiling face of Ikhwan that would assure the international system of their adherence to the liberal economy. Ikhwan members who had established businesses in the West were called to be members, and so they did.'[764]

The composition of EBDA and the meetings of Malek and Shater with economic entities indicated a Machiavellian approach and an unwillingness to cut ties with the former regime. Before EBDA's foundation, Shater had liaised with 14 investment managers from Europe, the US and Africa in meetings arranged by 'the Egyptian bank EFG-Hermes, in which Mubarak's son Gamal had been a partner'.[765] Furthermore, EBDA organised 'reconciliation negotiations' with businessmen who had fled the country after facing corruption charges. These included Rachid Mohammed Rachid, former trade and industry minister under Nazif, (2004–11), and Hussein Salem, Mubarak's friend and a major player in a natural gas export deal with Israel.[766]

[762] Marie Vannetzel and Dilek Yankaya, 'Crafting a business Umma? transnational networks of "Islamic businessmen" after the Arab Spring', *Mediterranean Politics* 24, no. 3 (2019): 297.
[763] Ibid.
[764] Interview with senior Turkish diplomat 1, Skype, 31 July 2018.

[765] Wael Gamal, *Lost Capital: The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's Neoliberal Transformation*, Carnegie Endowment Middle East Center (2019), 3.
[766] Gamal, *Lost Capital*, 4.

The foundation of the Tunisian business association Namaa was announced 'to a business assembly of more than five hundred Turkish, Tunisian, and Libyan businessmen. […] Having signed an agreement with MÜSIAD, Namaa has become its regional partner, [and] joined the IBF [International Business Forum] board of directors, where it is responsible for setting up regional meetings in the Maghreb.'[767] According to Yankaya, the founding of Namaa was the materialisation of the illusory Turkish model, in which the tenets of business action and social capital were diffused from the AKP to Tunisian business.[768]

The Namaa members also acknowledged their role in redefining Ennahda's economic approach, claiming that 'Tunisia can only follow a market economy path, not a socialist path. We want to apply the model of the Prophet when he settled in Madinah. There were Jews and Christians. We want a free market without corruption. This is Islam.'[769] Interestingly, the Market of Madinah is an example frequently used by MÜSİAD as a symbol that purportedly sheds light on the economic vision of the Prophet Mohammad. The Prophet is said to have established a bazaar in Bakh Zubair, a town in Madinah, in which he stipulated that no tradesmen should pay taxes or have a fixed place but that all would open up their stalls every morning on a first-come-first-served basis.[770] More importantly, every tradesman would be allowed to do business regardless of his tribe. The Market of Madinah is considered to be a place where market rules operate freely.[771] This city-state had become a utopic reference for Muslim entrepreneurs, owing to its alleged

[767] Yankaya, 'Du cadre d'action collective au programme partisan: ancrages patronaux des islamismes en Turquie et en Tunisie', L'année du Maghreb, (2020).
[768] Ibid.
[769] Interview with a Tunisian businessman by Dilek Yankaya in April 2018 in 'Du cadre d'action collective au programme partisan'.
[770] M. J. Kister, 'Peygamberi'in Pazarı,' *Cumhuriyet Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, vol. 6, no. 2 (2002): 26.
[771] 'The Prophetic Economy – How an Islamic Economy was born', Islamic Finance Guru, 6 April 2020.

'communal solidarity, mutual compassion, toleration, and protection of difference'.[772] The founding president of MÜSİAD, Erol Yarar, stated in 2019 that MÜSİAD had been established 30 years previously to change the system and, 'if we do not regain the spirit of the Market of Madinah, then we are all prisoners of this system where the lines between halal and haram are blurred'.[773]

In Ben Ali's Tunisia, the government used arbitrary rules to keep businesses from becoming involved in social or political movements. This was especially true for businesses outside the regime's clientelist network, such as those that did not join the UTICA (Union Tunisienne de l'Industrie, du Commerce et de l'Artisanat).[774] In this context, it is not surprising that businesspeople with ties to Ennahda had a weak presence in the private sector, while those with ties to the MB were able to keep their footing.[775] In June 2012, a MÜSIAD team went to Tunis and organised several meetings for Namaa. They introduced Namaa to the commerce section of the Turkish Embassy, and a dinner was organised, at which Ennahda leader Rachid Ghannouchi, the head of Namaa Mohammed Kochlaf, and the former deputy president of MÜSIAD discussed ways to strengthen collaboration between the two bodies.[776] Interestingly, on the same trip, MÜSIAD paid a visit to UTICA, where – according to the MÜSIAD report – Ali Nakai (UTICA's director of foreign relations 2011–18) asserted that UTICA was the most established and oldest business association and that it had been collaborating with Turkey's Union and Chambers of Commodity – TOBB (*Türkiye Odalar ve Borsacılar*

[772] Sadiki, 'Tunisia's Ennahda: Islamists Turning the Learning Curve of Democracy and Civic Habituation' 94. Also see prominent Turkish Islamist Ali Bulaç's recent work: Ali Bulaç, *Medine Sözleşmesi* (İstanbul: Çıra Yayınları, 2020).
[773] 'Ekonomik güç bilgiye sahip olanın elinde toplanıyor', MÜSİAD, 08 November 2019.
[774] Vannetzel and Yankaya, 'Crafting a business Umma?', 298.
[775] Vannetzel and Yankaya, 'Crafting a business Umma?', 299.
[776] MÜSIAD Fuar Tanıtım Raporu: Tunus ve Fas, 24–28 June 2012, p.4.

Derneği).[777] TOBB may not be considered an autonomous organisation and has been known to have ties to government. However, it cannot be seen as organically linked to the AKP, as MÜSİAD is. TOBB is more centrist–right than Islamic. Therefore, it was important for UTICA, as the most prominent business association, to underline its existing collaboration with Turkish businesspeople through TOBB rather than MÜSIAD.

The economic advocacy network that MÜSİAD, Namaa and EBDA sought to construct after 2011 was a crucial part of the diffusion process. The main aim was not purely economic but also political and was, again, part of the AKP's prescription for success. Namaa and EBDA – had they thrived like MÜSİAD and cultivated an Islamic bourgeoisie – would have been the cornerstones of the survival of Ennahda and the MB. According to Cammett and Diwan, 'in the 1950s leaders such as Bourguiba and Nasser adopted an Atatürkian model of modernization in which the middle-class played a legitimizing role. Thus, for the Arab autocrats, losing their middle-class anchors was tantamount to becoming naked dictatorships with no operational narrative.'[778] In this sense, the strategy to create a bourgeoisie loyal to and dependent upon these Islamist actors was reverse mimicry of the founders of modern Turkey, Tunisia and Egypt.

It is impossible to deny the interdependence between the AKP and conservative businesses. The AKP 'rapidly became a party of careerists who benefited from the vast selective incentives emanating from the party's control over government and municipalities'.[779] Not only did the number of MÜSIAD branches in Turkey increase

[777] MÜSIAD Fuar Tanıtım Raporu: Tunus ve Fas, 24–28 June 2012, 9.
[778] Melani and Ishac Diwan Cammett, *The Political Economy of the Arab Uprisings* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2014), 19.
[779] Güneş Murat Tezcür, *Muslim reformers in Iran and Turkey: the paradox of moderation*, 1st ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010), 46.

significantly during the AKP era, but the AKP also gradually and consistently increased its votes in 29 cities with a significant number of MÜSIAD members. In the same cities, the AKP scored 50 times more votes than its mother movement, *Milli Görüş*, represented by the Felicity Party – *Saadet Partisi*.[780] Independent of the EU accession process, its symbiotic partnership with MÜSIAD led the AKP to adopt democratic reforms until 2010 to maintain 'their advantageous place in Turkey's changing economic system. As with other late-developing countries, Turkey's Islamic business elite have become contingent democrats to protect their material interests.'[781] Consistent with a post-Islamist framework, 'the AKP has absorbed Islamism into a neoliberal governance and one that is marked by national conservatism, free market globalization, limited pluralism, and the instrumentalization of religion'.[782]

Should MÜSIAD's undertakings in helping to establish Namaa in Tunisia and EBDA in Egypt be considered as activism in a bid to build an *umma*? Vannetzel and Yankaya believe not, as the results in Tunisia and Egypt were divergent and reduced the expectation of a business *umma*. In other words, even if the AKP and MÜSIAD leaders had intended to build a business *umma*, this aspiration vanished as soon as it became apparent that it was not possible. However, as the empirical evidence provided by this research demonstrates, there is no question that MÜSIAD's model and its function for the AKP were diffused via training workshops for 'the importation process of MÜSİAD'.[783] Therefore, the initiation of Namaa and EBDA under MÜSIAD's mentorship can be interpreted as part of 'an economic advocacy network that seeks to densely exchange

[780] See Table 2 in Başkan, 'The rising Islamic business elite and democratization in Turkey' 411.
[781] Başkan, 'The rising Islamic business elite and democratization in Turkey' 409.
[782] Asef Bayat, *Post-Islamism: the changing faces of political Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 11.
[783] Vannetzel and Yankaya, 'Crafting a business Umma?' 304.

goods and capital as well as information and services and to bind actors with the sense of sharing common Islamic values. Rather than being part of the dominant "transnational capitalist class", its goal is to establish an alternative one with Islamic references.'[784]

According to the AKP's thinking, EBDA would, like MÜSİAD, help keep the MB in line with the neoliberal order and, at the same time, consolidate a new Islamist middle-class. After EBDA's establishment, 'small enterprises […] rushed to join EBDA, which now [had] over 400 members, and 1,000 companies […] waiting to join'.[785] Following Erdoğan's style of structuring overseas visits, Morsi took a delegation of 80 businesspeople from EBDA to China in August 2012.[786] It is highly probable that, if the Morsi government had remained in power as long as the AKP, a similar clientelist relationship would have been formed between the FJP and EBDA. Although EBDA quickly became a significant business community 'with globalized political cadres often trained in management techniques', it underestimated the existing political class and its party politics and expressed 'a hostile religious discourse to any form of protest'.[787] According to Haenni, 'Egypt [was] not an enterprise, [thus] governance [and pure pragmatism were] not enough.'[788] Following the coup of 2013, EBDA's founders were imprisoned, along with many MB members, and EBDA effectively shut down.

[784] Vannetzel and Yankaya, 'Crafting a business Umma?' 291, 94.
[785] Marwa Awad, 'Islamist businessman', ***Reuters***, 17 October 2012.
[786] Ibid.
[787] Patrick Haenni, 'The Reasons for the Muslim Brotherhood's Failure in Power' in *Egypt's Revolutions*, ed. Bernard Rougier, Stéphane Lacroix (USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 28.s
[788] Haenni, 'The Reasons for the Muslim Brotherhood's Failure in Power' 35.

Namaa, continued to function with a formal public presence and adhered to the existing business structure albeit overshadowed by UTICA until 2022. Ennahda's executive member, Driss, claimed that 'Namaa was not as successful as the MÜSIAD because of UTICA's dominance of the private sector. [So] Namaa remained a fine effort, but it did not thrive to the level of MÜSIAD in Turkey.' [789] Namaa participates in MÜSIAD's business expo organisations[790] and MÜSIAD has continued to collaborate with Namaa and strive to strengthen its presence in the African economy up to the end of 2022 – the period in which this thesis is written.

According to the French journalist Bonzon, UTICA's hegemony over the private sector is not the sole reason behind Namaa's underperformance. Bonzon claims that Ennahda's base is heterogeneous, comprising workers, the petty bourgeoisie and students, while the AKP cultivates its support primarily from central Anatolian businessmen. 'In other words,' says Bonzon, 'for Ennahda, 1 May [International Workers' Day] has a meaning; for the AKP, it does not.'[791] While this may be true, the hearts and minds of the Ennahda leadership are not ruled by socialist tendencies. When the scholar Sami Zemni asked the first Tunisian president, Moncef Marzouki (2011–13), after the Uprisings why it had not been possible to legislate for or implement any economic reform between 2011 and 2014, Marzouki replied that it was mainly due to Ennahda's resistance. Marzouki told Zemni that Ennahda blocked social-democratic reform packages, believing that they would deter international financial institutions and investors. Zemni claimed that 'Ennahda was an excellent student of Washington Consensus'.[792] Moreover, this approach was backed by the US and the EU, both

[789] Interview with Ridha Driss op. cit.
[790] See Namaa's Facebook page.
[791] Arienne Bonzon, 'Turquie–Tunisie, la filiation de l'AKP', *Slate*, 3 February 2011.
[792] Sami Zemni's talk entitled 'The Trajectory of the Tunisian Revolution: Between Continuities and Disjunctures', *The Middle East Centre, St Antony's College*, 18 November 2020.

of which argued that Tunisia should be as open to world markets as possible. The result was what Tunisia's political commentators called a 'nisf–nisf (half–half)' policy and the lack of any robust economic reform programme.

If we consider the principal economic tactic that the AKP offered to the MB and Ennahda – that of founding MÜSIAD-like organisations – another clue emerges. MÜSIAD not only consolidated the Anatolian entrepreneur vote for the AKP but, thanks to its symbiotic relationship with the party, was instrumental in transferring money and power from the *ancien régime* to the AKP's base. Thus, the crux of the economic tactic was not only to preserve the neoliberal system but to change the actors that would benefit from it: the base of Ennahda and the MB. However, it is one thing to fathom the rationale behind this strategy and quite another to apply it to achieve a similar outcome by cultivating an Islamic bourgeoisie loyal to the party in question and transferring wealth from the present elite.

There are two principal reasons why neither EBDA nor Namaa achieved or looked set to achieve what MÜSİAD had. One, as Tuğal posits, was the divergence in the political structure and evolution of Islamism(s) in Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey, as explained in Chapters 2 and 3. The second was the divergence of economic transformations that occurred in these three countries from the 1980s onwards. While 'Turkish neoliberalization came to be a hegemonic ideology only through bottom-up Islamization', Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia had a top-down relationship with their countries' corporatism and neoliberal opportunities.[793] Madi agrees with Tuğal, contending that

[793] Tuğal, *The fall of the Turkish model* 50, 51, 55.

'capitalism and Islam have transformed and even invigorated each other within the Turkish context. Wealthy Turkish Muslims have striven hard to arrive at this point. […] Contrary to "Muslim Lutheran" or "Muslim Protestant" arguments, rather than choosing an ascetic life in the Weberian sense, the new Muslim bourgeoisie have internalised the surrounding capitalist culture.'[794] Even though both the Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes had implemented neoliberal policies, there had been no period of embourgeoisement of Islamist segments of society either in Tunisia or in Egypt. Nevertheless, rather than examining the applicability of the tactics that the AKP proposed or the factors specific to Tunisia's and Egypt's economic and political realms, I want to stress the political actors' intentions in this diffusion process: the intention to widen their base by cross-class alliances; the intention to make their Islamic base wealthier and keep them loyal by pursuing neoliberal policies; the intention to show 'allegiance to the free market in line with the interests of their own bourgeoisifying base';[795] the intention to become successful one way or the other.

[794] Madi, 'From Islamic Radicalism to Islamic Capitalism' 158.
[795] Tuğal, 'Religious Politics' 97.

7 The new spirit of Islamism

Success rearranges the morphology of an ideology; it yields legitimacy and shapes identity. The pursuit of success alters our broad vision of value, and the illusion that success may be within reach and the myth of self-realisation create tensions between our environment and our goals. These are neoliberal ways,[796] seen in the habits and minds of many who are influenced and constrained by the hegemonic practices of governments and transnational markets. It can also be argued that neoliberalism is not only a set of economic ideas and formulae reinforcing the market but also an ideology overarching all other political ideologies and shaping all social and political arrangements.[797]

In the realm of neoliberalism, the vacuum left to be filled by the market after the retreat of government is not the only effect. As Stephenson argues, 'the most pervasive effect of neoliberal governmentality is to occupy and to proliferate in the realm of everyday life. Now life starts to be imagined in new ways.'[798] How did these new ways of conceiving the world and its affairs affect Muslim and Islamist actors?

7.1 Islamist longing for success

What Islamist politicians in positions of power aspired to was success, for three reasons. First, young Muslims, as social agents, wish to be successful, and some of those young people constitute the Islamist political electorate. The second reason was elaborated by

[796] Glenn Adams et al., 'The Psychology of Neoliberalism and the Neoliberalism of Psychology', *Journal of Social Issues* 75, no. 1 (2019): 197.
[797] See Stephanie Lee Mudge, 'What is neo-liberalism?' *Socio-economic review* 6, no. 4 (2008); Rachel S. Turner, 'Neo-Liberal Constitutionalism: Ideology, Government and the Rule of Law', *Journal of politics and law (Toronto)* 1, no. 2 (2008); David Harvey, *A brief history of neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
[798] Niamh Stephenson and Dimitris Papadopoulos, 'Exit from the Regime of Life Control: Biopolitics, Anticipatory Risk and the Excess of Experience', *Somatechnics* 1, no. 2 (2011): 418.

Foucault in a lecture from the 1980s: 'There will be either success or failure; success or failure, rather than legitimacy or illegitimacy, has now become the criterion of governmental action. So, success replaces legitimacy. […] Success or failure, then, will replace the division between legitimacy and illegitimacy.'[799] Third, the debate in academia and the media on how Islamism failed contributed to the pursuit of success.

Olivier Roy's 1994 book *The Failure of Political Islam* has led, in the decades since, to a flurry of academic writing and polemic on the future of Islamism. In what he calls the sequel to *The Failure of Political Islam*, *Globalised Islam*, Roy continues his argument that Islamist movements had lost their revolutionary rigour and 'could not provide a blueprint for an Islamic state'.[800] The portrayal of Islamism by media pundits and scholars as 'fluctuating between cycles of success and failure, intertwined with hope and despair',[801] deepened the Islamists' hunger for success. According to Ali Bulaç, one of the most prominent Islamist scholars in Turkey, Erbakan saw the aspiration to success as a trap:

> In the aftermath of his ousting from government in 1997, Erbakan gave a speech to his cadres in Bolu [a city in northern Turkey], claiming that a dangerous doctrine had emerged that he called the Islamization of success. In his line of thinking, Islamists would be enabled to assume power by the domestic and international forces and then, when and if they failed, they would never see the light of day in any kind of power circle. This was Erbakan's fear and he decided to keep a measured distance from the state for a while. This

[799] Foucault, Senellart and Burchell, *The birth of biopolitics: lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–79*, 16.
[800] Roy, *Globalized Islam*, 1.
[801] Esposito et al. 'Introduction: Theological Contestations and Political Coalition-Building,' 2.

> is when the founders of the AKP understood that neither with Erbakan's nor with Al-Banna's perspective was it possible to assume power.[802]

In hindsight, what Erbakan defined at the end of the 1990s as 'the success trap' finally devoured the MB in power. Bassiouni agrees: 'Having allowed Morsi to win the 2012 presidential election, the SCAF tested the Muslim Brotherhood's skills at the helm of the nation, with the relative certainty that it would be only a matter of time before it would fail to address the needs of the nation and become unpopular.'[803]

In contrast to Erbakan, the AKP's founders saw achieving success as a service to Islamism. Former deputy minister and AKP founder, Beşir Atalay, explains:

> There are very few success stories involving Islamists in power. The Islamists who took power were unable to provide a robust economic vision. In this sense, we [the AKP] were the most successful Islamist party. Our accomplishments became a symbol for the Muslim world. We wanted this notion of success to spread to other Islamist parties that are close to our tradition. We believed that, if only this notion of success were to spread to others, Islam's image would improve. Otherwise, young people will lose interest in Islam and break away. That is evident in Iran. However, we wanted the rest of the world to say, 'Look at these Muslims! They have built this model, their economy is thriving, their people are free, and they are open to the world. The recent authoritarian turn of Turkey, of course, does not bode well.[804]

In a similar vein, Ahmed Gaaloul, a member of the *shura* of Ennahda, sees the AKP's success as beneficial to all Islamist movements:

---

[802] Interview with Ali Bulaç, 20 December 2021, Istanbul.
[803] M. Cherif Bassiouni, 'Egypt's Unfinished Revolution' in *Civil resistance in the Arab Spring: triumphs and disasters*, ed. Adam Roberts et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 64.
[804] Interview with Beşir Atalay, op. cit.

> Turkey is more developed and stronger than it was 25 years ago. That is the success story. And it is achieved by people who are inspired by the idea of Islam. This is beneficial to all Islamic-inspired parties and groups. The Turkish model has nothing to do with ideology. Ideology is important only if it contributes to your country's success. Otherwise, it is a failure, whether it is inspired by Islam, Marxism, or liberalism. As a member of Nahda, I am inspired by Islam, but this inspiration does not guarantee that we will be able to put bread on people's tables. If my inspiration from Islam helps me fight corruption and poverty, then it is good. An Islamic party is successful not because it is an Islamic party but because it provides people with good economic solutions. So, Islam in this context is helpful because fighting corruption and service to the people are both part of worship.[805]

The words of Atalay and Gaaloul offer two clues to what success means for Islamists, and especially for the actors involved in the diffusion process. The main task, it seems, is first to prove that the Islamist party in question is a legitimate actor capable of governing, and then to assume power. The second task is staying in power. If they are achieved, these two tasks will bring what Islamists believe to be a success. Success also means clearing the name of Islam(ism). Ajmi Lourimi, a senior member of Ennahda, claimed that Islamist movements in Sudan or Afghanistan were 'failures because they displayed a negative image of Islam' but 'Turkey's AKP is a success story because it proved that there can be Islamic movements that do not scare or threaten'.[806]

The head of Ennahda's political bureau, Noureddine Arbaoui, claimed, 'We deem ourselves successful if we manage to bring good service to the Tunisian people; that is our main goal. People can learn about their religion everywhere, from the internet, even from their phones. They do not need us for that anymore.'[807] This was Ennahda's official

[805] Interview with Ahmed Gaaloul, op. cit.
[806] Interview with Ajmi Lourimi, op. cit.
[807] Interview with Noureddine Arbaoui, Tunis, 20 December 2019.

reasoning for abandoning the *dawa* after 2016, outsourcing it to other entities, most of which had no formal Islamic training. Roy defines this process as 'post-Islamist Islamisation', which has 'nothing to do with the project of reconstructing society [through] state [power] and an all-encompassing Islamic ideology [but consists of] a cluster of individual practices that are used as a means of finding jobs, money, respect and self-esteem – the reference to Islam is everywhere and nowhere.'[808]

For Islamist leaders, success is also a tool of retribution. Although they frame it as God's will, being successful and living a good life avenges, in their thinking, years of repression and humiliation by the West. Erdoğan's 2017 speech, made as part of his referendum campaign in Eskisehir [a city in northwestern Turkey] and addressed to Turkey's immigrants living in Europe, is a good example: 'They [Europeans] are OK with Turks being plant workers, but they can't stand Turks owning a plant or having a good career. I ask that you send your children to the best schools possible. Drive the best cars. Live in the best houses. Have five children rather than three. This is the best answer to the hostilities you face there [in Europe].'[809]

In November 2021, an AKP MP, Mücahit Birinci, was criticised for being photographed next to President Erdoğan wearing a Louis Vuitton scarf, at a time when Turkey was experiencing 'a full-blown currency meltdown and rocketing inflation'.[810] The scarf cost 330 GBP, more than the monthly minimum wage in Turkey. His response to the criticism was indicative of the sentiment among AKP cadres and perhaps the electorate as well. 'I know the main issue here!' he wrote on his Twitter account, 'Who are we to wear such

[808] Roy, *Globalized Islam*, 98.
[809] 'Erdoğan'dan Avrupa'daki Türklere: 3 değil 5 çocuk yapın', *Al Jazeera*, 17 March 2017.
[810] Tommy Wilkes and Marc Jones, 'Turkey's lira dives back into crisis territory', *Reuters*, 19 November 2021.

scarves … The devout … Who are we? Only a crazed minority who used to be soldiers of the hegemonic mindset[811] have the right [to wear fancy clothes]. According to this crazed minority, we [the pious and the religious] are the doormen (*kapıcılar* in Turkish) [of this country].'[812] Islamists desired to be transformed from 'nobodies' to 'somebodies'. As Zadie Smith puts it, 'the forces of capital are pragmatic: capital does not bother itself with essentialisms. It transforms nobodies into somebodies – and vice versa – depending on where the labor is needed, and the profit can be made.'[813]

Another important development is that Islamists – even those who assumed power through elections – 'see an erosion of their popular support, as the situations in Turkey, Tunisia and Egypt show. The academic consensus is that popular support for Islamism is currently at its peak and is unlikely to increase any further, according to opinion surveys that express a significant decline in support for religious parties and leaders, most of them conducted in Arab countries.'[814] Islamists face the challenge of satisfying the ever-changing needs of their base when the legitimising effect of the Islamist discourse dissipates. The Islamists in question tacitly acknowledged, after decades of trial and error, that the benchmark for success was economic growth and the creation of electorally strong and loyal networks.

7.2 Post-Islamism and managerialism

The end of the Cold War made obsolete the transactional alliance between the Western powers and Islamist movements in the Middle East that had been based on the assumption that Islamism would impede the spread of communism. There was an intellectual

[811] By 'crazed minority' with a 'hegemonic mindset', Binici crudely refers to Turkey's secular strata.
[812] 'AKP'li Mücahit Birinci: Hay atkı kadar başınıza taş düşsün', *Cumhuriyet*, 22 November 2021.
[813] Zadie Smith, 'Introduction' in *Recitatif*, ed. Toni Morrison (London: Vintage, 2022), xxxvi.
[814] Cesari, 'Political Islam: More than Islamism', 1.

consensus – most famously described by Fukuyama's 'The End of History' essay in 1989 – that fundamental ideological debate was over and 'liberal democracy in the form of a market or capitalist economy and an open, competitive system would reign'.[815] 'One difficulty with Fukuyama's the end of history thesis is that no sooner had it been proclaimed than new ideological forces rose to the surface,'[816] Islamism being the most prominent. Unsurprisingly, the West's perception of the threat from communism has shifted to Islamism.

By the end of the 20th century, a new order led by American interests emerged that triggered another struggle for all ideological entities, including the Islamists: 'the progress of a sort of rampant "recolonisation" [by] the global superpower'.[817] Undoubtedly, Al-Qaeda's attacks on New York and Washington DC in September 2001 and America's subsequent invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq were critical in how Islamist movements transformed their strategy and discourse over time and space – shifting 'between phases of confrontation and reconciliation and rejection and accommodation'.[818]

It is important to stress that, although the new world order constructed by the US's soft and hard power in the Middle East informed Islamists' mobilisation practices, the shifting phases of confrontation and accommodation were usually shaped by the stance of national governments towards the Islamist movements. Piscatori and Eickelman use the market metaphor to explain the political praxis of Islamist groups. The price of the survival and authority of Islamist groups had to be negotiated with numerous actors: international

[815] Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History?' *The National Interest* 16 (1989).
[816] Andrew Heywood, *Political ideologies: an introduction* (London: Palgrave, 2017), 326.
[817] Volpi, *Political Islam*, 30.
[818] Sadiki, 'Tunisia's Ennahda: Islamists Turning the Learning Curve of Democracy and Civic Habituation', 118.

actors, the national government, 'external patrons such as Saudi Arabia or Iran, other Islamist groups, and the masses or the target audiences from which they wish[ed] to attract sympathisers […], masses whose religious and political formation they hope[d] to control'.[819] At critical junctures when international interest in and tension towards Islamist movements soared, such as after the attacks of 11 September, 'the artery of international relations hardened and the circle of conflict widened'.[820]

As a result of the changing dynamics in the Western powers' views of Islamists, the latter were obliged to change their strategy, goals, and discourse, an imperative that other ideological movements escaped. However, the ideological reformation from the Cold War era to the post-Cold War era is not unique to Islamists.[821] Charles Tripp, in his seminal work on the evolution of the Islamic economy, explains how the changing human transactions around the globe influence Islamic imaginations and thoughts. He suggests that prudence is now measured by the success of individuals and institutions in their relations with the outside world, which, he claims, 'led to critical engagement with forms such as the violent rejectionism of *Al-Jama'at al-Islamiya* in Egypt or the acceptance of the free market and parliamentary republic in Turkey by the AKP'.[822]

To examine this change in strategy and goal, I choose to adopt the framework of post-Islamism. The post-Islamist worldview indicates that certain underlying principles of

[819] Dale F. Eickelman and James P. Piscatori, *Muslim politics*, 2nd ed., Princeton studies in Muslim politics, (Princeton, NJ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004), 132.
[820] Anoushiravan Ehteshami, 'Islam as a political force in international politics' in *Islam in world politics*, ed. Nelly Lahoud and Anthony H. Johns (London: Routledge, 2005), 34.
[821] For example, at the beginning of the 2000s, the Italian left, despite reluctant attempts to depart from the Cold War paradigm[821] and 'flirt[ing] more than others with the "end of ideology" argument', realised the need to adapt their discourse to shifting public opinion. See Elisabetta Brighi and Lilia Giugni, 'Foreign Policy and the Ideology of Post-ideology: The Case of Matteo Renzi's Partito Democratico', *The International Spectator* 51, no. 1 (2016): 19-20.
[822] Charles Tripp, *Islam and the moral economy: the challenge of capitalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 11, 9.

Islamism, such as the establishment of an Islamic state, the negation of Western modernity and liberal institutions and a critical approach towards capitalism were abandoned. However, this does not mean that post-Islamist parties dropped all the values of Islamism; indeed, the AKP, Ennahda and the MB did not. Neither does it signify a historical end to Islamism but 'should be seen as the birth, out of a critical departure from Islamist experience, of a qualitatively different discourse and politics'.[823] Thus, it differs from other 'finalist prophecies', such as Daniel Bell's 'end of ideology'[824] or Fukuyama's 'end of history' theses 'to designate an ideological moment in the Cold War waged against the communist bloc, which in this perspective was the only ideological formation'.[825]

Post-Islamism does not denote the end of a historical or political period; rather, it describes a condition or project that the Islamists devised through trial-and-error processes. Similarly, 'a post-Islamist project is neither anti-Islamic, un-Islamic or secular.'[826]
For the purposes of the present chapter, I wish to underline the main contention of Bayat when referring to the historical significance of a new period in Islamist politics: 'While Islamism had its roots in Cold War politics, post-Islamist politics is shaped by the prevailing idioms of the post-Cold War period – the free market, civil society, non-violence and reform.'[827] The re-emergence of nationalism, combined with populism and the spread of Islamism in the aftermath of the Cold War, proved that ideologies multiply, wander into and interact in the worlds of other ideologies, and are persistent. Again, such persistence does not imply that the features of ideologies are fixed; on the contrary, they are 'constantly being rewritten, not just reread, because [their] producers inherit that

[823] Bayat, *Post-Islamism*, 28.
[824] Daniel Bell, *The end of ideology: on the exhaustion of political ideas in the fifties* (Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1960).
[825] Aziz Azmah, *Islams and modernities*, 22.
[826] Bayat, *Post-Islamism*, 8.
[827] Bayat, 'The Arab Spring and its Surprises', 599.

creative task from generation to generation, even from month to month, as the life span of ideology-formulating groups extends beyond that of their individual members'.[828]

Nilüfer Göle argues that 'Islamism is concomitant with the formation of new middle classes [and creates] its own intellectual, political, and entrepreneurial elites, drawing on their increasing public visibility and commercial success.'[829] Thus she claims that, by the end of the 1990s, 'we can speak of a post-Islamist stage in which Islamism is losing its political and revolutionary fervour but steadily infiltrating social and cultural everyday life practices. And now Islamists are using the latest model of Macintosh computers, writing bestselling books, becoming part of the political and cultural elite, winning elections, and establishing private universities, but they are also carving out new public spaces, affirming new public visibilities, and inventing new Muslim lifestyles and subjectivities.'[830]

7.2.1 What do Muslim youth want?

By the 1990s, Islamist movements in Egypt, especially the MB, found themselves in a contradictory position. Thanks to Nasser's educational policies, the number of high school and university graduates in Egypt had risen; however, they were jobless. The grievances of this unemployed but educated lumpen intelligentsia[831] were heard and mobilised by moderate Islamists and the MB. According to Wickham, it was self-interest that drew young people to Islamist organisations, which offered them support networks, an avenue for activism and a sense of purpose in life.[832]

[828] Michael Freeden, 'Confronting the chimera of a 'post-ideological' age', *Critical review of international social and political philosophy* 8, no. 2 (2005): 255.
[829] Nilüfer Göle, 'Snapshots of Islamic Modernities', *Daedalus* 129, no. 1 (2000): 93.
[830] Göle, 'Snapshots of Islamic Modernities' 94.
[831] Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam: religion, activism, and political change in Egypt* (New York; Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2003), 36–62.
[832] Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam: religion, activism, and political change in Egypt*, 151.

Thus, on the one hand, the MB had to appeal to the workers and the lumpen intelligentsia, while also promoting 'the business interests of bankers, financiers, and entrepreneurs closer to the leadership of the Muslim Brothers. Yuppies of the "young generation"– some of them connected to Egypt's new small high-tech and telecommunications sectors – have embraced a new form [of doing politics and mobilization] of Islamism.'[833] In the mid-1990s, Qaradawi's television appearances demonstrated that he acknowledged 'that, in order to respond to young people's will, "a spirit shaped by realism" should be injected.'[834] When I met with Ghannouchi in December 2019, he articulated a similar conclusion, saying that 'both Turkish and Tunisian Islamism have begun to seek conciliation with reality rather than aiming to destroy reality […] The reality I am talking about is Western realities.'[835] Both believed that only by accepting 'the realities' could they give young people 'confidence that they can build a better future'.[836] What, though, are those realities?

Reflecting almost every country's experience of a neoliberal transition, resentments and grievances started to appear, especially among Middle Eastern youth. Youth unemployment in the MENA region has surged since the 1990s, reaching 25.7 per cent[837] – nearly double the global average of 14 per cent. In Egypt, for example, 95 per cent of these unemployed youth are educated, with either secondary school diplomas or university degrees.[838] What do these young people aspire to? What do they rely on? How do they

[833] Joel Beinin, 'Political Islam and the New Global Economy: The Political Economy of an Egyptian Social Movement' *CR: The New Centennial Review* 5, no. 1 (2005): 135.
[834] Raymond William Baker, *Islam without fear: Egypt and the new Islamists* (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press, 2003), 216.
[835] Interview with Rachid Ghannouchi, 20 December 2019, Tunis.
[836] Baker, *Islam without fear: Egypt and the new Islamists*, 216.
[837] 'Unemployment, youth total, Middle East and North Africa', World Bank.
[838] Linda Herrera, 'Young Egyptians' Quest for Jobs and Justice' in *Being young and Muslim: new cultural politics in the global south and north*, ed. Asef Bayat and Lisa Herrera (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 128.

cope? The answers to these questions, unsurprisingly, are vital for researchers as well as policymakers. However, it is hard to identify a collective objective on the part of the young. It is more helpful, therefore, to trace the transformation in their everyday lives to better understand what influences their goals and choices.

'Youth' is not a monolithic entity but, rather, an urban and modern phenomenon.[839] Although 'the simultaneous processes of urbanization, Islamization and globalization had fragmented the young generation in Egypt, mass education, commercialisation, the emergence of coffee shops, college campuses, shopping malls, concert venues, *mulid* (the celebration of a saint's birth) festivals and street corners provided spaces for social interaction and active and passive networks, which led to the construction of youth identities and turned young people into social agents in both Egypt and Iran during the late 1990s.'[840] According to Olivier Roy, during that period, a new generation of bourgeois Islamists emerged who, owing to the diversification of the religious sphere and shifting geostrategic context, did not automatically locate themselves in the anti-Western camp with their more traditional elders.[841]

This is where post-Islamist praxis begins. Mahdawi argues that a new metaphor/discourse/ paradigm of post-Islamism has been introduced by ordinary people: 'as the younger generations demonstrated their commitment to a post-Islamist polity, the old guards were often trapped in their exclusivist and patriarchal Islamist discourse.'[842]

[839] Asef Bayat and Linda Herrera, *Being young and Muslim: new cultural politics in the global south and north* (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 31.
[840] Bayat and Herrera, *Being young and Muslim: new cultural politics in the global south and north*, 41.
[841] Roy, 'The myth of the Islamist winter', 25.
[842] Mojtaba Mahdavi, 'Whither Post-Islamism: Revisiting the Discourse/Movement After the Arab Spring' in *Arab Spring: modernity, identity and change*, ed. Eid Mohamed and Dalia Fahmy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 16, 26.

Post-Islamism includes 'the pursuit of the Islamic good life […via] finding jobs, money, respect, and self-esteem […which] thrives within the global free markets, consumption, and neoliberal circulation of capital'.[843] In this post-Islamist realm, the state's key position is replaced by 'an individualised piety, sense of private responsibility',[844] and 'the rising influence of conservative business figures' is indisputable, as demonstrated in Chapter 6. In other words, as Roy observes in citing Turkey's MÜSİAD[845], 'post-Islamism means the privatisation of re-Islamisation, [which includes] the development of religious-minded middle-class entrepreneurs [who are] conservative in faith and beliefs, but modern in terms of business, […] with a Weberian work ethic'.[846]

It is hardly surprising, then, that the advent of a new breed of self-trained Islamic preachers, such as Amr Khaled in Egypt and Abdullah Gymnastiar (Aa Gym) in Indonesia, coincided with the rise of neoliberalism in Muslim-majority countries. The prevalence of Khaled-like preachers over the traditional *ulama* is also part of the post-Islamist trend. While Egypt's orthodox Islamic *ulama* dismissed Khaled as unqualified to speak about Islam and accused him of diluting Islam's principles, he became extremely popular among the young in the 1990s. Khaled studied accounting at Cairo University before beginning to preach in private gatherings, where he gained notoriety. When he appeared on a television show in 2001 on Dream TV, an Egyptian satellite network, his broadcasting career and popularity skyrocketed, and his books, CDs and audio tapes sold in the millions.[847] Similar popular tele-preachers who followed in the footsteps of Amr Khaled are Khaled al-Gendy,

[843] Peter Mandaville, 'Post-Islamism as Neoliberalisation: New Social Movements in the Muslim World' in *Islam after liberalism*, ed. Faisal Devji and Zaheer Kazmi (London: Hurst & Company, 2017), 288.
[844] Robbert A. F. L. Woltering, 'Post-Islamism in Distress? A Critical Evaluation of the Theory in Islamist-Dominated Egypt' *Die Welt des Islams* 54, no. 1 (2014): 109.
[845] Roy, *Globalized Islam*, 97.
[846] Roy, *Globalized Islam*, 97.
[847] Shaimaa El Naggar, 'The Discursive Construction of Muslim Identities by Contemporary Muslim Televangelists in the West' (ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2016), 15.

Mustafa Hosni and Moez Masoud in Egypt,[848] Arifin Ilham, Jefri al-Bukhari and Yusuf Mansur (as well as Aa Gym) in Indonesia,[849] Cherif Haidara in Mali, and the bestselling author of *Don't Be Sad* (*la tahzen*), Aaidh al-Qarni, in Saudi Arabia.[850]

What Khaled offered to devout middle-class Muslims via his television show *Lifemakers* (*suna'a al-hayat*) was a 'religious discourse carrying the values of the new spirit of capitalism: ambition, wealth, success, imagination, efficiency and concern for self'.[851] Wearing luxury fashion brands such as Hugo Boss, he commended his followers for pursuing the admirable values of modernity, such as hard work and efficiency.[852]

It is noteworthy that Khaled does not propose reformist ideas or create a new form of Islamic liberalism that diverges from Sunni orthodoxy[853] but, instead, encourages his followers to proactively seek personal success with a strong work ethic, to become a 'pious winner'.[854] According to Peter Mandaville, 'the vision contained in the work of Khaled, as well as the pro-West, pro-business orientation of new Islam epitomised in the AKP in Turkey, was decidedly friendly towards globalization, at least in its economic dimension'.[855]

[848] Al-Sayed Zaied, 'Da'wa for dollars: A new way of Muslim Televangelist' *Arab Insight* 1, no. 3 (2008): 23–24.
[849] Ahmad Najib Burhani, 'Muslim Televangelists in the Making: Conversion Narratives and the Construction of Religious Authority', *The Muslim World: A Quarterly Review Of History, Culture, Religions & The Christian Mission In Islamdom* 110, no. 2 (2020): 154.
[850] James Bourk Hoesterey, *Rebranding Islam: piety, prosperity, and a self-help guru*, Studies of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2016), 11.
[851] Husam Tammam and Patrick Haenni, 'Au diable les loosers ! Le succès et l'achievement, nouvelles valeurs islamiques en Égypte', *Mouvements (Paris, France: 1998)* no 36, no. 6 (2004): 44.
[852] Sebnem Gumuscu, 'Class, Status, and Party: The Changing Face of Political Islam in Turkey and Egypt', *Comparative Political Studies* 43, no. 7 (2010): 851.
[853] Peter G. Mandaville, *Islam and politics*, Third ed. (London: Routledge, 2020), 291.
[854] Haenni and Tammam, 'Penser dans l'au-delà de l'islamisme', *Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée* 123, (2008).
[855] Mandaville, *Islam and politics*, 292.

Islamists of our age, 'even as they seek to synthesise, adapt to or critique Western liberalism [and its institutions], […] cannot exit its language and categories'.[856] The neoliberal hunger for success is a factor that Islamists could not escape. While Islam's role is overemphasised in Muslim societies, that of globalisation is underestimated. Due to globalisation and Westernisation, the relationship between the Muslim and Islam has changed and the social authority of religion has faded.[857] In other words, it could be argued that politics has become less dependent on or subordinated to religion, although more empirical research is needed to validate this claim. Suffice it to say that neoliberal rationality views the state as a machine and believes that 'all governing is *for* markets and oriented by market principles'[858] which fundamentally alters values, moral codes, and ideological goals.

7.2.2 Managerial awakening

Boltanski et al.'s *The New Spirit of Capitalism* aims to explain the evolution of capitalism from the end of the 1960s to the second half of the 1990s. Its principal argument is that capitalism 'is an absurd system: in it, wage-earners have lost ownership of the fruits of their labour and the possibility of pursuing a working life free of subordination', making it a process 'singularly lacking in justifications'[859] and explaining the loud and clear protests of May 1968. Throughout the 1980s, protests were suppressed until capitalism discovered a new means to be seen as a viable economic system in the eyes of the people. The

[856] Devji and Kazmi, *Islam after liberalism*, 9.
[857] Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam*, 14, 22.
[858] Wendy Brown, *In the Ruins of Neoliberalism: The Rise of Antidemocratic Politics in the West*, The Wellek Library Lectures, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2019), 20.
[859] Luc Boltanski, Eve Chiapello and Gregory Elliott, *The new spirit of capitalism*, New updated ed. (London: Verso, 2018), 7.

ideology that justifies engagement with capitalism, according to Boltanski et al., is referred to as the spirit of capitalism. For Weber, the spirit of capitalism was the recognition of work (and, as previously stated, politics) as a religious duty, a vocation that provided workers, merchants, and entrepreneurs with a normative drive. In essence, Protestantism had steered the spirit of capitalism. When Boltanski et al. compared the French management literature – the formulae offered to firms and organisations for their smooth operation – between 1959–69 and 1989–94, they discovered that the latter period had a distinct goal of 'creating meaning for shared goals where anyone can simultaneously develop their personal autonomy and contribute to the collective project', namely the survival of the capitalist system, as making profit was recognised as an insufficiently inspiring goal.[860] Managerialism was, thus, inserted into capitalist narratives, giving it a 'new spirit' and quelling opposition by providing workers with meaning and incentive.

Eyal et al. argue that managerialism, as a mentality, loomed over the transition of post-communist countries in the 1990s and that 'this mentality [where ideology and reality meet painfully] is not the exclusive property of CEOs; it is shared equally by all fractions [including] intellectuals and technocrats'.[861] They also argue that managerial mentality has the impetus to transform ideology.[862] Managerialism is designed to be a compilation of practical methods to 'improve the productivity of organisations as one improves the performance of a machine', but it also has a moral tone, 'taking into account not only personal aspirations to security and autonomy, but also the way these aspirations can be attached to a more general orientation to the common good'.[863] As Chakravartty explains, the Global South was not immune to the cultural, political and social transformations of

[860] Boltanski, Chiapello and Elliott, *The new spirit of capitalism*, 63.
[861] Eyal et al., 'The theory of post-communist managerialism' 86.
[862] Eyal et al., 'The theory of post-communist managerialism' 87.
[863] Boltanski, Chiapello and Elliott, *The new spirit of capitalism*, 55.

this wave: 'The new management thinking in Europe and North America in the 1980s and 1990s travelled to places such as India, where neoliberal economic reforms led to economic growth alongside unprecedented suffering.'[864] The MENA region was similarly affected.

The end of the 1990s also saw a surge of management books written by Islamist thinkers who, a decade earlier, had come to the US from Iraq, Kuwait and Palestine for their studies and, 'conquered by the managerial thought provided in the faculties of economics of the New Continent', produced 'pioneering works bridging the gap between Islamic commitment and the development of management literature'.[865] In this so-called period of 'managerial awakening (*sahwa idâriyya*)', there occurred 'the frequent reconciliation or integration of values specific to Islam with […] the vision of management'.[866] It is no coincidence that this 'managerial awakening' happened at a time when Islamism's attractiveness, vitality and sources of legitimacy had become depleted, 'even among its once-ardent supporters'.[867]

Qaradawi's book, *Religious Practices in Islam*, and the books and pamphlets of former MB member Mohamed Abdel Gawad, Shaykh Mohamed al-Ghazali, Shaykh Mohamed Ahmed al-Râshid and Hisham Talib demonstrate how the self-management and self-realisation style of the American Dale Carnegie converged with Islamic concepts.[868] These writings, which Islamised the US management discourse, provided daily living recipes for

[864] Paula Chakravartty and Sreela Sarkar, 'Entrepreneurial Justice: The New Spirit of Capitalism in Emergent India', *Popular communication* 11, no. 1 (2013): 60.
[865] Tammam and Haenni, 'Au diable les loosers' 45.
[866] Bernard Pras, 'Management et islam: Vers une convergence de valeurs', *Revue Française de Gestion* 33, no. 171 (2007): 92–93.
[867] Asef Bayat, 'The Coming of a Post-Islamist Society', *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies*, no. 9 (1996): 45.
[868] Tammam and Haenni, 'Au diable les loosers' 45–46.

Muslims and validated the quest for success and happiness as a goal. Islamic spiritual movements in Southeast Asia, particularly in Indonesia, melded business management practices and capitalist principles from popular life-coaching seminars with Muslim practice.[869]

These books 'merge classical Quranic ideals with newly acquired capitalist concepts, which they picked up in management science textbooks [used] in MBA programmes at Western universities and business schools'.[870] Consequently, 'the Islamic discourse embraced the modern business corporation as a model through which one could articulate specifically Islamic policies and objectives [and], in a quasi-Weberian twist, the spirit of Western corporate capitalism was absorbed into a system of Islamic ethics enriched by US-style managerialism and entrepreneurialism.'[871]

The Indonesian tele-preacher and entrepreneur Aa Gymnastair (aka Aa Gym) created a brand called Management of the Heart (*Manajemen Qolbu* - MQ), in which Sufi ethics are combined with Western self-help slogans, and prosperity and piety are positioned hand in hand. Aa Gym not only broadcast a Sunday television show and a morning radio show but also provided MQ training programmes aimed at middle-class Muslims who worked in corporate firms.[872] According to Hoesterey, who interviewed Gym at his home, which was filled with the translated books of American self-help gurus such as Daniel Coleman, Steve Covey and Dale Carnegie, the MQ programme 'was not just about managing hearts but also about achieving success. Following decades of corruption and nepotism,

[869] Florence Bergeaud-Blackler, Johan Fischer and John Lever, 'Introduction: Studying the politics of global halal markets' in *Halal matters: Islam, politics and markets in global perspective*, ed. Florence Bergeaud-Blackler, John Lever and Johan Fischer (London: Routledge, 2015), 8.
[870] Willi, *The fourth ordeal*, 157.
[871] Willi, *The fourth ordeal*, 158.
[872] Hoesterey, *Rebranding Islam*, 1, 3, 10.

Indonesians had renewed their faith in the possibilities of entrepreneurship and social mobility, of piety and prosperity. Aa Gym's self-help formulae for success gave a religious foundation and economic direction to these hopes, desires, and anxieties.'[873]

Jeffrey Kenney views the prevalence of the self-help and management discourse, as well as the celebrity of the tele-preachers idolised by Muslim youth, as a 'cultural by-product of one of the many ruptures [that] have often been driven by the challenge of capitalism and contributed to a variety of social and cultural transformations – a pattern of modernization familiar around the world'.[874] In that sense, for example, the retreat of the state in Egypt due to the imposition of economic liberalisation policies correlates with the emergence of Amr Khaled and the self-help phenomenon in Egypt that started in the 1990s.[875]

Bayat and Herrera juxtapose the popularity of Amr Khaled and those like him with the flight of Muslim youth from what they see as patronising moral authority. Devout young Muslims were unsure where they belonged because they 'were religious believers, but […] they swung back and forth from [the pop star] Amr Diab to Amr Khaled, from partying to prayers; and yet they felt the burden of a strong social control of their elders, teachers, and neighbours'.[876] A similar trend could be seen in Iran among the young following the Iran–Iraq war, but Islamist leaders were blind to the clues; owing to their 'constructed image and […] their doctrinal animosity toward joy', they characterised these changes simply as the 'strange behaviour of Iranian youth'.[877] That 'strange behaviour', however, was an

[873] Hoesterey, *Rebranding Islam*, 12.
[874] Jeffrey T. Kenney, 'Selling Success, Nurturing the Self: Self-Help Literature, Capitalist Valuees, and the Sacralization of Subjective Life in Egypt', *Int. J. Middle East Stud.* 47, no. 4 (2015): 664.
[875] Kenney, 'Selling Success, Nurturing the Self' 672.
[876] Bayat and Herrera, *Being young and Muslim*, 46.
[877] Bayat and Herrera, *Being young and Muslim*, 33.

attempt to integrate Islamic normative codes with their interests and desires as part of the global neoliberalisation process.[878]

Ehteshami argues that Western models of organisation, management, and progress, all of which are designed to measure success, have a scientific character and leave no room for culture. As a result, he claims, the governments of the Muslim world have been attempting to find an indigenous solution to respond to globalisation; otherwise, a popular backlash may result.[879] Under colonial rule, nationalists and Islamists in the Middle East struggled to find ways to resist the cultural dominance of Western models while integrating their economic systems. Thus, Islamists are accustomed to this type of predicament. However, the methods they devised could differ greatly. The Islamist parties repositioned themselves in response to 'new patterns of consumption and new forms of observing Islam, which have been justified by the new tele-preachers'[880] in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia and the *maddah*s in Iran.

It is, therefore, neither strange nor shocking that contemporary Islamist parties which genuinely want to succeed will follow where society goes, particularly the young, whom they believe have lost their enthusiasm for Islamist politics. Bayat claims that change in the youth base of Ennahda and the MB continued after the Arab Uprisings: 'The trends of Muslim women taking off the hijab, or unmarried women leaving home to live on their own, did not appear to diminish. If anything, the desire for self-assertion and autonomy, albeit with associated tensions, seemed to amplify.'[881]

[878] Bayat and Herrera, *Being young and Muslim*, 20.
[879] Ehteshami, 'Islam as a political force in international politics' 43–45.
[880] Gumuscu, 'Class, Status, and Party: The Changing Face of Political Islam in Turkey and Egypt' 851.
[881] Asef Bayat, *Revolutionary life: the everyday of the Arab Spring* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2021), 241.

Listening to a self-help podcast while running is not only more attractive for young people who are turning away from the traditional *ulama* and their guilt-inducing sermons but also serves as a form of activism in which they invalidate those Western and/or secular 'discourses that stigmatise Islam or present it as an archaic religion'.[882] Malek Chennoufi, who works for Ennahda's youth wing, enumerates the demands of her peers:

> Tunisian youth have the same demands as any young members in any other country. They want development, economic stability, a decent lifestyle. Young people want to be open to the world but also want the government to protect [Tunisia's] traditions. Now the real work starts for Ennahda! Young entrepreneurs need more encouragement and financial support.[883]

The Islamist leaders seemed to realise the disenchantment of the young with traditional religious authorities and attempted to connect with them through ad hoc, corporation-style solutions, such as organising leadership workshops – as achieved by both the AKP and Ennahda. Nahdawi Nejmeddin Felhi elaborates:

> Parents now send their children to Ennahda because we provide them with assistance and training. We provide them with training in leadership skills, management, and teamwork. They dream of a better future, they are diverse in their thoughts, clothes, and ways of thinking. They aspire to be successful in their studies and to become future leaders. The dream is to achieve social and economic success and improve their country, as happens all over the world.[884]

[882] Amel Boubekeur, 'Post-Islamist Culture: A New Form of Mobilization?' *History of Religions* 47, no. 1 (2007): 77–79.
[883] Interview with Malek Chennoufi, telephone, 6 May 2020.
[884] Interview with Nejmeddine Felhi, Tunis, 19 December 2019.

It is important to note that micro-finance, token vocational training and entrepreneurship training are favourite solutions of neoliberal development practitioners as a 'series of non-structural poverty alleviation interventions.'[885] In a similar vein, Cavatorta believes that Islamist parties not only adopt economic liberalism but also adapt their religious adherence according to a new global value system with a renewed spirit of capitalism. That value system, which prioritises success and self-improvement, 'ultimately affects the way in which Islamists conceive the world'.[886] From the 2000s onwards, owing to the inevitable influence of global flows of money, people and ideas, Islamic economies engaged with secular, broader, economic governance methods and organisations.[887] A lax and laissez-faire attitude to the tourism sector, a liberal approach to economic policies and a pragmatic and malleable understanding of the morality of economic measures have become common among Islamist political parties.

Islamists were now the disciples of neoliberalism because it 'could deliver economic success. […] From the Turkish AKP to the PJD in Morocco and from Tajik Islamists to Egyptian Islamist telly-preachers, Islamists began to promote a type of economic thinking and policies that went beyond mere recognition of private property as a fundamental right that was religiously sanctioned.'[888] The AKP, as the successful practitioner of neoliberal policies, or the 'mobiliz[er] of state power in the contradictory extension and reproduction of market(-like) rule, which requires the development of new forms of statecraft',[889] went on to share its strategy with Ennahda and the MB.

---

[885] Colin Powers, 'Run the country like a business? The economics of Jordan's Islamic action front', *Critical research on religion* 7, no. 1 (2019), 45.
[886] Cavatorta and Amghar, 'Symposium—Islamism, Islamist Parties, and Economic Policy-Making in the Neo-Liberal Age' 691.
[887] Rethel, 'Corporate Islam, Global Capitalism and the Performance of Economic Moralities' 352–54.
[888] Cavatorta and Amghar, 'Symposium—Islamism, Islamist Parties, and Economic Policy-Making in the Neo-Liberal Age' 689.
[889] A. Tickell, & J. Peck, 'Making global rules: Globalization or neoliberalisation' in *Remaking the global economy: economic-geographical perspectives*, ed. Jamie Peck and Henry Yeung (SAGE, 2003), 166.

7.2.3 Cheap Islamisation

The AKP did not explicitly enforce an Islamisation agenda until around 2010, instead promising economic growth and stability and passing democratic reforms as required by Turkey's EU accession process. These reforms 'heralded the undoing of the sclerotic and stagnant system that had been in place since the early 1990s, which enabled the military and judiciary elites to wield considerable influence'.[890] Following the referendum-based passage of the 2010 constitutional reform package, which gave the AKP greater power over the judiciary, the party's policies took on an authoritarian tone, and a concomitant 'Islamisation agenda' emerged.

It is crucial to understand exactly what the AKP's version of Islamisation entails. For example, it 'engaged in morality politics, by advocating the construction of a pious generation'.[891] In 2013, it banned alcohol advertising and alcohol sales after 22.00 and assigned the authority to license the sale of alcohol to government officials rather than elected mayors.[892] In the meantime, the budget and personnel of the *Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı* (The Presidency of Religious Affairs), the official state institution which propagates Sunni Islam and also constrains the religious rights and freedoms of the Alevis, the second largest faith group in Turkey,[893] were increased every year by almost 30 per cent. By 2021, the *Diyanet'*s budget had grown to double the combined budgets of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Economy and Culture and Tourism.[894] As Somer contends, 'the AKP seemed to have embraced Turkey's state-controlled secularism for its own

[890] 'Turkey Transformed', October 2015, 42.
[891] Esen Kirdiş and Amina Drhimeur, The rise of populism? Comparing incumbent pro-Islamic parties in Turkey and Morocco, *Turkish Studies*, Vol.17, Issue 4, (2016), 604.
[892] T.C. Resmi Gazete, *Sayı 28674*, 11 June 2013.
[893] See Chapter 2 and 3 in Lord, *Religious politics in Turkey: from the birth of the Republic to the AKP*.
[894] Mustafa, Çakır, 'Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı'nın bütçesi çok sayıda bakanlığı ve idareyi geride bıraktı', *Cumhuriyet*, 15 September 2021.

goals'.[895] The official role of the *Diyanet* is to promote Islam by producing religious materials and building mosques. However, the AKP instrumentalises the *Diyanet* to mobilise and direct its electorate both domestically and in countries such as Germany and Austria, where a sizeable Turkish diaspora exists. However, according to Mandaville, 'the increased power of Diyanet does not necessarily signify Islamization of the Turkish state but its deployment globally serves as an instrument of Turkish religious soft power.'[896] A watershed moment came when, in the summer of 2020, Erdoğan declared Hagia Sophia, the UNESCO-listed Byzantine church, to be once again a mosque. The site had originally been declared a mosque following the Ottoman conquest of Istanbul in 1453 by the Ottoman Sultan Mehmet II but was designated a museum in 1924 by Atatürk after the foundation of modern Turkey, in a symbolic break with the past. Amid the international condemnation that followed the conversion of Hagia Sophia to a mosque by presidential order and Greece's reaction by declaring a day of mourning, Erdoğan led the first prayers, saying, 'This is Hagia Sophia breaking away from its chains of captivity. It was the greatest dream of our youth.'[897]

I consider these moves by the AKP to be 'piecemeal Islamization',[898] the 'banalization of Islamic referents'[899] or a 'cheap Islamisation' strategy, all trademarks of post-Islamist Islamisation. By cheap Islamisation, Bayat means one 'resorting to the language of moral and cultural purity (e.g. calling for the banning of alcohol or "immoral" literature, or raising the issue of women's public appearance), appealing to identity politics', rather than

[895] Somer, 'When Is Normalization Also Democratization?' 55.
[896] Mandaville, *Islam and politics*, 178.
[897] Bethan McKernan, 'Erdoğan leads first prayers at Hagia Sophia museum reverted to a mosque', *Guardian*, 24 July 2020.
[898] Volpi, *Political Islam: a critical reader*, 4.
[899] Salwa Ismail, *Rethinking Islamist Politics: Culture, the State and Islamism* (London New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 172.

aiming for the more 'costly projects' of establishing an Islamic state or economy, areas in which, as Islamists realised by the mid-1990s, 'they could not go very far'.[900] In a similar vein, Roy believes that, because 'the AKP could not fulfil the Islamists' biggest promise about being against corruption, [Erdoğan] uses symbols as tools for consolidating the electorate. In that sense, what better symbol than converting the Hagia Sophia to a mosque? Erdoğan could not Islamize minds, so he is trying to Islamize stones. That is the punchline of the Hagia Sophia conversion.'[901]

According to Mümtazer Türköken, a scholar of Turkish nationalism and Islamism, the AKP's 'piecemeal Islamisation' and attempts to 'creat[e] a pious generation' backfired:

> Imam Hatip Schools are now more reactionary to Islamist politics than the students at regular schools. Many identify as deists because they witnessed corruption and authoritarianism flourishing under the guise of Islamist politics. Many of the mosques built by the AKP government have no actual community; some mosques house homeless people and drug addicts.[902]

Even though Islamizing the society had backfired, could the AKP capture the state and subtly Islamize it? The answer to this question is complex. First, we need to ascertain what state capture means in the context of Turkey and the AKP. It is the gradual infiltration of 'pious cadres' into state institutions such as the police, the judiciary, ministries, and public education[903] and the 'purge of secular cadres from the state.'[904] Since Turkey undertook a

[900] Asef Bayat, *Making Islam democratic: social movements and the post-Islamist turn*, Stanford studies in Middle Eastern and Islamic societies and cultures, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 9.
[901] Ezgi Başaran 'Erdoğan could not Islamize minds, so he is Islamizing the stones', *Duvar English*, 21 July 2020.
[902] Interview with Mümtazer Türköne, 17 December 2021, Istanbul.
[903] Tuğal, 'Religious Politics', 99.
[904] Tuğal, 'Religious Politics', 99.

pro-secular nation-building process, the state capture in this sense may, Somer argues, 'be called an "Islamist project", that is, a revolutionary takeover of the state in the name of Islamization'.[905]

Tuğal agrees that this process 'can be taken as an instance of Islamic coercion'[906] since the secular cadres were replaced by devout cadres. However, I believe the 'Islamic' or devout qualities of the new cadres were of less importance to the AKP than their allegiance and loyalty to the party itself. Islamist parties are often accused of being wolves in sheep's clothing: if given the chance, they will Islamise the state and the rule of law. The AKP's authoritarian clientelist networks, mostly consisting of Muslim conservatives – and, more recently, nationalists – have been cited lately as a prime example of the Islamists' true intentions. However, the AKP's state capture and actions to stack institutions with loyalists do not necessarily relate to Islamic ideology or an Islamist project. As Kandil argues, 'What AKP's detractors complain about is hardly unique to Islamist movements: after all, few successful politicians could remain immune to the arrogance of power.'[907]

Rather than calling it Islamisation, I prefer to refer to the AKP's transformation of human capital within state apparatuses as 'state capture' and its policies with Islamist referents as 'conservatism' similar to other groups in today's Europe. In this respect, it is noteworthy that, since 2011, the AKP has, through its control of the media and state resources, also marginalised and at times persecuted Islamist or initially pro-AKP intellectuals and politicians who became critical.[908]

[905] Murat Somer, 'Conquering versus democratizing the state' 1028.
[906] Tuğal, 'Religious Politics', 99.
[907] Kandil, *Inside the Brotherhood*, 171.
[908] Talha Köseoğlu, 'Islamists and the state: changing discourses on the state, civil society and democracy in Turkey', *Turkish Studies* 20, no. 3 (2019/05/27 2019): 342.

It is important here to make a distinction between the AKP's steps toward state capture in Turkey and the diffusion process of 2011–13. The AKP's undemocratic swerve, which was consolidated following the Gezi protests in 2013 and the attempted coup in 2016 in Turkey, should not obscure our analysis of the diffusion process. The findings of this research do not support the argument that there was a transnational Islamist project. Moreover, the diffusion process did not involve specific tactics for refashioning the judiciary, military, or security apparatuses. The steps taken by the AKP to capture the state were vastly different from those suggested to Ennahda and the MB.

The AKP believed its tactics would help Ennahda and the MB to enhance the ability of Islamist parties to 'look and act normal', which would assist them in overcoming crises at critical junctures. In this sense, it is noteworthy that, for the AKP, Ennahda and the MB, the formula for 'looking and acting normal' or, to put it another way, for being seen as a legitimate political entity, had nothing to do with Islamist ideology.

8 Changing dynamics of the interplay

In retrospect, 2013 was a turning point for all involved in the diffusion process – the AKP, the MB and Ennahda. On 28 May, a small group of environmentalists staged a sit-in in Gezi Park in Taksim Square, Istanbul, in protest against plans to demolish the park and rebuild an Ottoman era military barracks as part of the AKP's urban development policy. The plan to bulldoze the park was simply the last straw for the protesters, fuelling discontent that had been building over the AKP's increasing authoritarianism and the crackdown on press freedom and development projects which disregarded environmental concerns but allowed a small pro-AKP elite to prosper. The Gezi protests continued at full strength for two weeks until they were quashed, leaving 12 young people dead and around 8,000 injured.

On 30 June, just as the Gezi protests were dying down in Turkey, the Morsi government was deposed, and the Egyptian military took over. The MB organised large crowds to stage a sit-in in Rabaa al-Adawiyya Square in Cairo. One of my interviewees, who was in Cairo at the time, claimed that Erdoğan, via an adviser, had encouraged the MB to hold street protests in retaliation for the military's intervention. The same source noted that the AKP sent food aid to the protesters in Rabaa Square via Turkish Islamist NGOs[909] although I was unable to find corroborating evidence of this. At the same time, mass prayers for the Morsi supporters who camped for six weeks[910] in Cairo's Rabaa Square were organised by Turkish Islamist associations in Istanbul's Saraçhane district.[911] Rabaa

[909] Interview with a Turkish journalist, Istanbul, 7 August 2018.
[910] Patrick Kingsley and Martin Chulov, 'Morsi supporters prepare to defend themselves as tide turns in Egypt', *Guardian*, 4 July 2013.
[911] 'Saraçhane'de Mısır nöbeti sürüyor', *Genç Dergi*, 29 July 2013.

Square was subjected to a violent raid by the Egyptian police on 14 August, which left around 1,400 people dead. In the following days, hundreds of MB leaders were arrested.[912]

In the meantime, a Turkish graphic designer, Saliha Eren, who worked for a social media company that produced campaigns for the Arab Uprisings, especially in Egypt and Syria, was closely watching the violent suppression of the Rabaa protesters from Istanbul. As a devout Muslim close to Islamist circles, she decided to show her support for the protesters by creating a graphic symbol for the massacre. While on a bus, she saw on her smartphone the four-finger gesture of Egyptians who were protesting in Rabaa Square. This gave her an idea. 'I used the four-finger gesture in black on a bright yellow background, the yellow symbolizing Qubbat al-Shakhra and the black symbolising Mecca.[913] In 24 hours, the symbol had reached 90 million people, according to Facebook and Twitter numbers. I did not do it for money or fame. Very few people knew it was I who did it,'[914] Eren told me. She and her friends launched a Twitter campaign with the same symbol and the hashtag 'What is Rabaa' in Arabic, Turkish and English. The tweets included slogans such as 'Rabaa is where the so-called values of the West collapsed', 'Rabaa is the return of Muslims to the world stage', 'Rabaa is the birth of a new movement' or 'Rabaa is a symbol of freedom'.[915] Although neither Eren nor her colleagues were contacted by the AKP at any stage of this campaign, Erdoğan had seen the popularity of the four-finger gesture and started using it himself at every gathering he attended.[916] The yellow and black sign also started to be used by pro-Morsi protesters in Egypt.[917] In the following weeks and months, occasional protests were held in Turkey's largest cities against the Egyptian coup

[912] 'Rabaa: The massacre that ended the Arab Spring', *Middle East Eye*, 14 August 2018.
[913] Appendix, Figure 5.
[914] Interview with Saliha Eren, Istanbul, 12 July 2018.
[915] Appendix, Figure 6.
[916] 'Rabia işaretiyle Arap dünyasına umut oldu', *Sabah*, 19 August 2013.
[917] Appendix, Figure 7.

and the arrest of the MB leaders.[918] Reports surfaced that Erdoğan had broken down in tears on hearing of the death of Esma Baltaggi, the daughter of one of the MB leaders, Mohammad Baltaggi,[919] and on 23 August 2013 Erdoğan publicly wept while reading Mohammad Baltaggi's letter to his deceased daughter, saying that 'he saw his own children in this letter'.[920]

Erdoğan's tears and the connection he made with a young MB follower who died while taking part in protests with his children demonstrated how personally he took Morsi's ousting. His supporters shared his sentiments. For example, in 2015, a headline in *Hürriyet* daily newspaper reporting the death sentence for Morsi sparked a furore in AKP circles. The headline read, 'Death sentence for the president who assumed office with 52 per cent of the votes'.[921] Erdoğan believed that *Hürriyet*'s headline about Morsi implied that a similar fate might await him too. A couple of days later, at an AKP rally, Erdoğan criticised *Hürriyet*'s parent company, Doğan Holding, saying, 'Have you seen how the Doğan Group reported Morsi's death sentence? Hey, Doğan Group, I don't care about you! If I come to the same end, *inshallah*, grant me martyrdom.'[922] Erdoğan's oversensitivity to the fall of the Morsi government was due to his belief in a grand plan to destroy his government and its allies. In his mind, both the Gezi protests and the Egyptian coup were part of this so-called grand plan, which was orchestrated by Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the US. Thus, the Gezi protests and the Egyptian military's crackdown on the MB only heightened Erdoğan's perception of a threat to himself.[923]

[918] 'İdam kararları Mısır Konsolosluğu önünde protesto edildi', İHH, 29 April 2013.
[919] 'Başbakan şehit Esma için ağladı', *Milliyet*, 21 August 2013.
[920] 'Erdoğan'ı ağlatan mektup', *Hürriyet*, 23 August 2013.
[921] 'İşte o utanç manşetleri', *Sabah*, 04 October 2015.
[922] 'Erdoğan: Ben Mursi'nin akıbetine uğrarsam…', *T24*, 17 May 2015.
[923] Interview with Behlül Özkan, Istanbul, 17 July 2018.

'The Egyptian coup showed us that the West does not care about democracy and keeps silent in the face of a military dictatorship,'[924] said a former AKP official. Following the Gezi protests and the fall of the MB in Egypt, three years later the Turkish military attempted a coup on 15 July 2016, allegedly masterminded by Erdoğan's former ally, the Gülen movement. 'The resistance that we showed against the military coup on the night of 15 July was due to the lessons we had learned during Morsi's ousting,' Eren said.[925] Following the botched coup, the crackdown in Turkey on the media, individual rights, the rule of law and academia, which had started in and around 2010, intensified. As a result, as of 2022, Turkey has the largest number of imprisoned journalists in the world[926] and its democracy ranking is steadily declining.[927] While this environment caused a significant intellectual exodus from Turkey,[928] Turkey in turn had become a safe haven for Egyptian Islamists fleeing the Sisi government. The MB had successfully 'capitalized on Turkish Islamists' historically contentious relations with the army as a source of sympathy'.[929]

8.1 Post-2013 period: Fear, isolation, and activism

8.1.1 The MB – the AKP

Istanbul played a major role in preserving the spirit of the MB in the aftermath of the military coup in Egypt by hosting international conferences and meetings. For this reason, according to Saudi-funded think tanks and news outlets, it has become a meeting point for

[924] Interview with former AKP MP 2.
[925] Interview with Saliha Eren, op. cit.
[926] See Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) report on Turkey.
[927] '2018 Democracy index', *Bianet*, 9 January 2019.
[928] Mark Lowen, 'Turkey brain drain: Crackdown pushes intellectuals out', *BBC*, 28 December 2017.
[929] Shaimaa Magued, 'The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's transnational advocacy in Turkey: a new means of political participation', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.45, Issue.3 (2018), 488.

the Egyptian MB with many MB-affiliated organisations.[930] Arab Scholarship and Expertise for Peace and Stability in the Middle East (MESBAR) claims that 'Islamists' friendly relationships in Turkey have enabled them to find and rent conference and commercial facilities there, making the Islamist presence in Turkey beneficial to both the extremists and the Turks', and that 'many new Muslim Brotherhood institutions' headquarters are located in Istanbul'.[931] The historical animosity between the Saudi Kingdom and the MB, stemming from their rival claims to represent Sunni Islam in the region, may be a factor in these depictions of the relationship between the Turkish government and the MB, but they are not wholly unfounded.

Istanbul was the venue for two major MB-related conferences: the first, held shortly after the Morsi government was deposed, on 10 July 2013, was attended by several Egyptian MB members and Ennahda's leader, Ghannouchi; the second was from 25 to 26 September 2013, when Egyptian MB leaders participated as representatives of the Parliamentary Union of Islamic Countries (PUIC).[932] In August 2014, the representatives of Egypt's opposition groups, including former ministers of the Morsi government, declared that they had established the 'Egyptian Revolutionary Council (ERC)' in Istanbul.[933] A few months later, the MB's news site, Ikhwanweb, announced that 'the elected representatives of the Egyptian people, Egypt's legitimate parliamentarians, are holding parliamentary sessions in Istanbul's Bayrampaşa district.[934] Another conference, held in August 2015 in Istanbul and entitled The Conference for Countering Despotism

[930] Abdel Kader, Mohammad, 'Turkey's relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood', *Al Arabiya*, 14 October 2013.
[931] 'The Muslim Brotherhood', MESBAR, 13 December 2018.
[932] Ibid.
[933] İpek Yezdani, 'Egyptian opposition establishes Revolutionary Council in Istanbul', *Hurriyet Daily News*, 09 August 2014.
[934] 'Egyptian Parliament', *Ikhwanweb*, 19 December 2014.

and Bloodshed, irritated Egyptian religious bodies affiliated with the government. While Egypt's Fatwa Monitoring Observatory *Dar al-Iftaa* claimed that the conference demonstrated 'Turkey's hostility towards Egypt [and] the role it is trying to play in the region', Al-Azhar's deputy head was angry at the participants who portrayed themselves as respected Sunni scholars. 'Who gave them the right to say that? Was there one single scholar there who wasn't tied to the Brotherhood?' he raged.[935]

Meanwhile, gatherings in Istanbul continued without pause. In January 2016, former FJP lawmakers living in Turkey and elsewhere gathered in Istanbul to form 'The Exiled Egyptian Parliament'. This group was led by Gamal Heshmat, a senior MB leader.[936] The MB also celebrated its 90th birthday in Istanbul in April 2018, attended 'by dozens of Muslim Brotherhood leaders from around the world, including Ibrahim Mounir, the movement's deputy leader and the former head of the Hamas political bureau, Khaled Meshaal'.[937]

Yusuf al-Qaradawi continued to play his brokerage role after the fall of Morsi. While he became more vocal in his support of the MB, especially after the Rabaa massacre, 'pressure from other Gulf states forced him off the air and, for all intents and purposes, ended his 17-year run on Al Jazeera Arabic's prime-time religious program, al-Sharia wa-l-Ḥayah'.[938] However, he maintained, until his death in 2022, his activism through his close relationship with Erdoğan. He convened the annual meetings of the International

[935] Sonia Farid, 'The Brotherhood's Istanbul conference: Turkey's message to Egypt', *Al Arabiya*, 18 August 2015.
[936] 'Aynı gün toplandılar', *Hürriyet*, 10 January 2016.
[937] 'Muslim Brotherhood celebrates 90 years of giving', *Middle East Monitor*, 2 April 2018.
[938] Usaama al-Azami, 'Abdullah bin Bayyah and the Arab Revolutions: Counter-revolutionary Neo-traditionalism's Ideological Struggle against Islamism', *The Muslim world (Hartford)* 109, no. 3 (2019): 352–53.

Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) in Istanbul, at which significant MB members met with other Islamist groups and scholars of Islam. In these meetings, Erdoğan was praised as the protector of Islam by Qaradawi himself.[939] It is important to note that, although Erdoğan announced his support for the Morsi government and its followers, and condemned the Sisi regime numerous times, he never publicly acknowledged that Turkey was providing a haven for exiled MB followers. It is equally interesting that he also never commented on the MB presence or MB events that Istanbul had hosted.

Besides hosting conferences and meetings that enabled exiled MB members to connect with other Islamist groups around the world, Turkey helped the MB to remain internationally visible by enabling it to bypass the repression of Egyptian President Sisi. As Trager states, 'From its primary base in Istanbul, [the MB] broadcasts its message through sympathetic satellite networks.'[940] One of these networks was Al Sharq TV, owned by a former Egyptian parliamentarian (mentioned in Chapter 4), Ayman Nour. In the aftermath of the 2013 military coup, Nour fled first to Lebanon and then to Turkey, where he established this news channel in Istanbul's Tekstilkent, a conservative business centre on the periphery of the city. According to Nour, Al Sharq was the news channel most hated by President Sisi, 'because it provides Egyptians with the truth and brings together all dissident opinions.' Nour claimed that nine months before our meeting in his office, 'a group of Sisi's men came to the Al Sharq office and tried to hijack the live broadcast, but their attempt was averted by the channel's employees'.[941] Nour insisted that his channel does not propagate MB ideology but that his team collaborates on specific issues with Al Watan, the MB channel in Istanbul. By 2018, 13 Arab-language television

[939] 'Karadavi: Erdoğan İslam için umuttur', *Sabah*, 24 April 2016.
[940] Eric Trager *Arab fall*, 233.
[941] Interview with Ayman Nour, 16 July 2018, Istanbul.

channels had head offices in Istanbul, the most popular of which were Al Sharq, Al Watan and Mekameleen. Mekameleen was founded in 2014 and its anchor, Hamza Zawba, was a former spokesperson of the FJP. Mekameleen's Facebook page had 4.5 million followers and Al Watan's video interaction rate was larger than Al Jazeera's.[942]

According to Shaimaa Magued, who interviewed anchors working in the MB's four television channels in Turkey – Rabʿa, Mekammelyn, Al Sharq and Misr Alan – the channels adopted 'a confrontational anti-regime approach, a radical Islamic rhetoric and self-victimizing narrative […] by using transnational advocacy tools such as information politics to construct material and moral leverage and rally wider support among national public opinion'.[943] Similarly, they often used incendiary rhetoric against the Egyptian military, calling on behalf of Islam for popular resistance and boycotts of Sisi's followers.[944] Meanwhile, Erdoğan maintained his tacit support for the exiled Brothers in Turkey while also turning the overthrow of Morsi's government and, eventually, Morsi's death into a global campaign.

Turkey's harbouring of MB members prompted the Egyptian regime to undertake a public relations campaign against Turkey, worsening already strained relations with regional powers such as Saudi Arabia. While Saudi Arabia designated the MB a terrorist organisation and banned all MB books,[945] the United Arab Emirates (UAE) froze its relations with Tunisia after Ennahda formed a government following the first election after the revolution in 2011, despite being Tunisia's second most important trading partner.

[942] Murat Sofuoğlu, 'Istanbul: a haven for Egyptian journalists in exile', *TRT World*, 31 March 2018.
[943] Magued (2018), 489–490.
[944] Mokhtar Awad and Nathan Brown, 'Mutual escalation in Egypt', *Washington Post*, 9 February 2015.
[945] Stephane Lacroix, 'Saudi Arabia's Muslim Brotherhood Predicament', *Washington Post*, 20 March 2014.

Saudi Arabia's stance regarding an MB government in power was no secret; indeed, according to a former AKP MP, the AKP had warned President Morsi about this. 'We said, make your first official visit to the Saudis, don't come to us [Turkey] first. Secure good relations with them to secure your place. He listened to us and made his first foreign visit to the Kingdom.'[946] However, as Tariq Al-Zomor observed, President Morsi's Saudi visits were far from fruitful:

> Dr Morsi told me that he aimed to mend ties with Saudi Arabia. I told him it is not that simple. But he didn't pay attention. However, the last time I spoke to him before the coup, his reaction was different. Saudis are not Muslims; they are Jews, he told me. It was around March 2013, and he realized that Saudis were, along with Israel, plotting against him.[947]

According to Abou Al Fadl, 'no country did more to undermine Morsi's regime and no government more openly celebrated his overthrow' than Saudi Arabia; adding 'the trail of money provides the best evidence.'[948] While the Saudi intelligence chief Prince Bandar bin Sultan went to Western capitals and campaigned for a military takeover in Egypt, 'the UAE, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia pledged money that far exceeds the aid Egypt receives from the US and the EU combined, in the event that the US and EU might attempt to punish the Egyptian army by cutting off aid.'[949] Meanwhile, the MB's attempts during their time in office to secure trade agreements with Turkey, China and India angered wealthy generals within the Egyptian military 'to the point that [they] showed up on numerous television channels denouncing […] deals as disastrous' and reminded President

[946] Interview with former AKP MP 1.
[947] Interview with Tariq Al-Zomor op. cit.
[948] Khaled Abou El Fadl, 'Failure of a Revolution: The Military, Secular Intelligentsia and Religion in Egypt's Pseudo-Secular State' in *Routledge handbook of the Arab Spring: rethinking democratization*, ed. Larbi Sadiki (London: Routledge, 2016), 265.
[949] El Fadl, 'Failure of a Revolution' 265.

Morsi of 'the military's strategic outlook, which incidentally focused heavily on maintaining the ongoing commercial ties with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait, while steering away from Turkey and Iran and approaching China only after getting the US's consent to any substantial investment.'[950]

The intransigent positioning that placed Turkey and Qatar on one side and Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries on the other, started when the MB won the Egyptian elections in 2012, not after Morsi's fall. The implications of this alignment, however, loomed over every major development in the Middle East, including the Syrian civil war, the Arab–Israeli conflict and the Libyan conflict. It can be argued that, post-2013, the diffusion process between the AKP, the Egyptian MB and Ennahda indicated a form of 'transnational activism' and that the frames and dynamics of the diffusion diverged from those of the period 2011–13. Although the aspiration to success remained, the survival imperative once again took over for the Islamists. However, activism in this context should be clarified. The general assumption is that Islamic activism emerges in a crisis or amid mounting socio-economic grievances. However, recent scholarship argues that Islamic activism is not 'contingent upon Islamic ideology' and that 'Islamic activism is not sui generis'.[951] As Çavdar argues, 'Islamist activism is a rationally calculated pursuit of individual interests, not an outcome of religious indoctrination'[952] and Islamism is a means rather than a goal. She also observes that

[950] El Fadl, 'Failure of a Revolution' 266.
[951] Quintan Wiktorowicz, 'Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory', in ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz, *Islamic activism: a social movement theory approach*, Indiana series in Middle East studies, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), 3.
[952] Gamze Çavdar, 'Islamist Rationality: An Assessment of the Rational Choice Approach', *Politics & Religion* 5, no. 3 (2012): 585.

'Islamists use ideology selectively, strategically, and instrumentally and […] that […] engage in cost-benefit analysis and strategic calculation.'[953]

According to rational choice theory, which assumes that an individual's behaviour is determined according to his or her self-interest and maximum utility, we might expect Erdoğan to cease supporting the Egyptian MB, since this support is counterproductive on multiple levels. However, although Erdoğan's political career has been archetypically that of a pragmatist, some of his actions cannot be explained by rational choice theory, because 'what Erdoğan thinks is rational and what is in his interest might be completely different'.[954] This apparent irrationality from Erdoğan has been manifested on numerous occasions, including the prolongation of the imprisonment of foreigners, such as the German journalist Deniz Yücel and the American pastor Andrew Brunson, which threw Turkey's international relations into disarray. One rational explanation may be Erdoğan's recourse to seemingly irrational actions in the international arena for domestic gains. For example, the portrayal of Western leaders' condemnation of these imprisonments as Western interference in Turkey's internal affairs is a common theme in his rhetoric.

Moreover, Erdoğan may have believed that providing a haven for exiled MB members would preserve his position as 'the protector of Muslims', as Qaradawi suggested, or as 'the hope of Islamic world', as he was characterised in a pro-AKP daily by the influential MB leader Youssef Nada, who lives in Turkey.[955] It also appealed to both his nationalist and conservative base. Last but not least, Erdoğan, by hosting MB dissidents, 'maintain[ed] a lever against Egypt and Gulf Cooperation Council-bloc countries [Bahrain,

[953] Çavdar, 'Islamist Rationality', 585.
[954] Gökhan Bacik, 'Misreading Turkey: the false promise of rational choice theory', *Ahval News*, 15 August 2018.
[955] 'Müslüman Kardeşler: Türkiye İslam dünyasının umudu', *Sabah*, 12 May 2018.

Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, excluding Qatar].'[956] As the following section will demonstrate, Erdogan's seemingly irrational behaviour of supporting the MB and provoking the Gulf countries after 2013 was transient and will have changed dramatically several years later.

8.1.2 Ennahda – the AKP

Regarding the coup in Egypt in 2013, Bedreddine Abdelkafi, a member of the executive bureau of Ennahda, stated, 'We have different realities in Tunisia than in Egypt, thank God, our military respects the will of the people.'[957] Unlike Egypt or neighbouring Algeria, where the state and the army were intricately entwined, Habib Bourguiba, the first president and founder of the Tunisian state, deliberately excluded the military from politics. The vice president of Ennahda, Noureddine Bhiri, claimed that the army meddling in politics is a red line for Tunisia. 'Bourguiba tried hard to build a military that does not interfere in politics. Even during the Ben Ali dictatorship, the military was not allowed to take hold.'[958] On the other hand, many of those within the Ennahda leadership believed that, in 2013 'there were exterior forces that tried to mess with Tunisian society and all revolutions in the region at the time'.[959] According to one Nahdawi, Ahmed Gaaloul, who spent years in exile in the UK along with Ghannouchi and, after the revolution, became the secretary of state in the Ministry of Youth, 'The old demons crawled back into our minds after the Egyptian coup.'[960]

[956] Krishnadev Calamur, 'The irony of Turkey's Crusade for a missing journalist', *Atlantic*, 15 October 2018.
[957] Interview with Bedreddine Abdelkefi, telephone, 13 May 2020.
[958] Interview with Noureddinne Bhiri, telephone, 18 May 2020.
[959] Interview with Bedreddine Abdelkefi, op. cit.
[960] Interview with Ahmed Gaaoul, Tunis, 18 December 2019.

The Nahdawis' apprehension was not baseless. In 2013, two prominent leftist politicians, Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi, were assassinated in Tunisia. Brahmi's killing in July 2013 followed that of Belaid in February of the same year. The then minister of the interior Lofti Ben Jeddou had warned that 'the same gun' had killed both MPs, forcing Al-Nahda to cut all ties with Jihadi-Salafism and ban its most prominent group, Ansar al-Sharia.[961] Large anti-Ennahda demonstrations followed, which compelled Ennahda to resign in favour of a technocratic government in January 2014. Ennahda MP Sahbi Atig believes that the assassinations were masterminded to create instability in Tunisia and 'mobilize a rebellious rank within the revolution'.

> We were not afraid that our military would do something similar to what happened in Egypt. However, we were afraid that the hands – inside Tunisia and outside Tunisia – that plotted the assassinations would impede a democratic transition. Following discussions with leading social and political groups, we decided to step down so that a technocratic government could take over and continue with elections. It was a wise decision on our part.[962]

The period that started with the assassinations and ended with Ennahda's withdrawal was one of bargaining. Marzo contends that this was a critical juncture where the country could follow one of two paths. If the bargaining fails to reach major agreements and one party does not relinquish power, there is a risk of regression to authoritarianism.[963] According to Boubekeur, Ennahda and the secular elites were in a 'bargained competition' from the onset of the first elections after the Uprisings, 'seek[ing] a bargain on their mutual

[961] Marzo, 'Critical junctures' 923.
[962] Interview with Sahbi Atig, op. cit.
[963] Marzo, 'Critical junctures' 919.

reintegration into the political order.'[964] Thus, Ennahda, by choosing to relinquish power, did indeed make a 'wise decision', and thereby set Tunisia on a favourable path. At a similar critical juncture, the MB's inability to reach a national pact led the Sisi regime to take over. However, although Ennahda's bargaining competition with elements of the old regime prevented Tunisia from falling into disarray, it caused 'the revolutionaries' demands for change participation [to be diluted] into a reductive form of pluralism that ostensibly pits Islamists against representatives of the old regime'.[965] There is anecdotal evidence that, as with the MB, the AKP warned of the consequences – via Turkey's chief spy, Hakan Fidan – of not appeasing certain blocs in society and reaching a consensus. However, the interviews for this research did not enable me to be sure whether the AKP advised Ennahda to step down during the bargaining period of 2013–2014.

From 2013 onwards, the Tunisian media began vociferously to highlight Erdoğan's authoritarianism and crackdowns on freedom, claiming that Erdoğan and his party were under investigation for corruption, that the myths of democratic rule and economic success associated with his name had faded and that his failures would be added to those of other Islamists in the Middle East.[966] Nevertheless, Ghannouchi maintained his close relations with Erdoğan, attending the latter's milestone events in Turkey in 2019[967] and participating in SETA symposiums, claiming that 'democracy and Islam are twins'[968] despite continued criticism from the leftist and secular media in Tunisia.[969]

[964] Amel Boubekeur, 'Islamists, Secularists and Old Regime Elites in Tunisia: bargained Competition' *Mediterranean Politics* 21, no. 1 (2016): 108.
[965] Boubekeur, 'Islamists, Secularists and Old Regime Elites' 109.
[966] Aroua Kooli, 'usturat Erdogan ..antht?! allaenat alsuwriat tutariduh', *Assbah*, 31 March 2014.
[967] 'Büyük Çamlıca Camii'ne Görkemli Açılış', *Hürriyet*, 3 May 2019.
[968] 'Tunus Nahda Lideri Gannuşi: İslam ile demokrasinin ikiz olduğuna inanıyoruz', SETA, 26 February 2019.
[969] 'liqaa' al Ghannouchi Erdogan bitathir jadlan wa as'an fi tunis', *Bawabaa*, 22 October 2019.

Erdoğan's character also became a point of contention in Tunisian political circles. Erdoğan's Rabaa sign (symbolising his support for the MB) next to the Tunisian president, Beji Caid Essebsi (2014–19), in Tunisia in 2017 and the attitude of his numerous entourage at the Tunisian Parliament were seen as arrogant and cavalier.[970] Ghannouchi was accused of being manipulated by Erdoğan when he, accompanied by his son-in-law Rafek Abdessalem, paid an unannounced visit to the latter at the start of the government-forming period in Tunisia in 2019.[971] One commentator claimed that Ghannouchi, 'who had long theorised the compatibility of political Islam and democracy, took Erdoğan and his style as his compass but failed to apply the experience of Turkey to Tunisia.[972]

Ennahda was the largest party in the Tunisian Parliament when the Tunisian president, Kais Saied, who was elected in 2019, sacked the government and suspended parliament in July 2021. Ghannouchi's strategy faced with President Saied's power grab had also been described as a mixture of the styles of Erbakan and Erdoğan: Ghannouchi shied away from direct confrontation with Saied, just as Erbakan – Erdoğan's mentor- had conceded to the military intervention of 28 February 1997[973] in Turkey but also stated several times that Saied's actions were illegitimate and described them as a coup d'etat.[974]

Since then, fractures have appeared within Ennahda, with bitter recriminations aired between members of the movement and the party. Some 100 senior members accused the leadership and Ghannouchi of mistakes that may have contributed to Saied's power grab. Those senior members, including former ministers, resigned from Ennahda in September

[970] Zied Krichan, 'min alqayimat alswda' 'iilaa nsf tabrir alqarar al'iimaratii 'iilaa al'iishkalat albrutukuliat fi ziarat ardughan: fi daef al'ada' altuwnisii alrasmi', *Le Maghreb*, 28 December 2017. Also see Hassen Ayadi, 'recep tayyip erdogan isatadif maktab majlis al-nuwwab fi qasr qartajan: min aldayf wa min al-madif?', *Le Maghreb*, 28 December 2017.
[971] 'Al Ghannouchi yabhath 'an al-d'am min rafiq al-fikr Erdogan', *Al Marjie*, 22 October 2019.
[972] Hamza Alyan, 'ayn al-ghannouchi wa ikhwan tunis min tajribat erdogan?' *Al Jarida*, 08 February 2021.
[973] Ahmed Al-Sharif, 'al-ghannouchi 'alaa kuhtaa erbakan', *Al Omah*, 01 August 2021.
[974] Majed Azzam, 'al-ghannouchi beyn namudhaji erbakan wa erdogan', *Arabi 21*, 26 August 2021.

2021.[975] Ennahda, like the MB in Egypt, has experienced its most acute internal crisis since its founding in the 1980s, while Saied's popularity has hovered at around 72 per cent.[976] The deterioration of the Tunisian economy in the last decade and the mismanagement of the COVID-19 pandemic reinforced the popularity of Saied – a constitutional law professor and an outsider in the political establishment – while strengthening distrust of Ennahda and its leader, Ghannouchi.

In November 2022, Ghannouchi appeared before a court in Sousse and was heard for 14 hours as part of a 'money-laundering' and 'incitement to violence' investigation. The investigation began in June 2022, and the bank accounts of Ghannouchi and a dozen of his family members, including his son Moaz Ghannouchi and son-in-law, former Tunisian Foreign Minister Rafek Abdeselam, were frozen. Moaz Ghannouchi and Abdesselam had left Tunisia. Since then, Rachid Ghannouchi has been barred from leaving the country as part of another investigation into the assassinations of two leftist leaders, Mohamed Brahmi and Chokri Belaid, in 2013.

The November 2022 episode was one of several ongoing investigations into Ghannouchi and Ennahda members. The so-called Instalingo case, which began in October 2021, investigates a company called Instalingo and contends that Ennahda leaders are suspected of organising an armed uprising against the current president, Kais Saied, through this company. The Instalingo case, has now been linked to another financial organisation called Namaa, an association of Tunisian businessmen. As explained at length in Chapter 6, Namaa was AKP's brainchild, founded on the model of Turkey's MÜSİAD, with the

[975] Tarek Amara, 'More than 100 officials from Tunisia's Islamist Ennahda Party resigned amid crisis', *Reuters*, 25 September 2021.
[976] 'tunisiyun ya'tabirun d'awha al-ghannouchi li intihabat mabkura munawrah lil harub', *Al-Ghad*, 4 December 2021.

assistance of Turkish businessmen close to the AKP. Namaa was outlawed in Tunisia in early 2022.

Abdel Karim Suleimani, a former Ennahda member and businessman, was detained after being questioned about his ties to Instalingo and Namaa in December 2022.[977] According to the prosecutor, Suleimani and others within Ennahda conspired in a money-laundering scheme, received foreign financial support, amassed illicit wealth, and allegedly used some of that money to send jihadists to Syria and Iraq. Tunisia's Ministry of Interior provided little information, let alone a summary of proceedings. Indictments in these cases have also been pending.

According to sources at Tunisian radio news station Mosaique FM, the Namaa Assosication case, which involves not only Ghannouchi and his family members but also the former Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali, investigates "suspicious money flow after the January 2011 revolution, totaling 30-35 million dollars through front companies.[978] Other sources[979] claimed a Qatari charity affiliated with the Emir of Qatar is also involved in this scheme. The Tunisian Defense Authority's head, Reda Al-Radaoui, stated that ‘while the Namaa Association was founded to encourage foreign investment, it was also involved in the crimes of sending terrorists to conflict zones, particularly Syria. Foreign investment was merely a ruse for Namaa.’[980]

[977] ‘Tunisia: Authorities arrest Ennahda leaders on charges of money laundering’, *Middle East Monitor*, 6 January 2023.
[978] ‘tunis… tawqif qiadiun sabiq fi haraka Ennahda bi tuhmat ghasil al'amwal’, *Al Watan News*, 31 December 2022.
[979] Mohamed Yassine Jelasi, ‘Financement illicite d’Ennahda: Namaa Tunisie, Ooredoo et le Qatar’, *Nawaat*, 14 February 2022.
[980] ‘Abdel Karim Suleiman…al fasad yafuku shafra "lighaz" ikhwan tunis’, *Al Ain*, 11 January 2023.

It's intriguing that the link between the Namaa and the AKP has gone unnoticed by Tunisian news outlets. Aside from a passing mention of the cases against Ennahda without explanation, the Namaa case was almost non-existent in Turkish sources.

Financial corruption investigations are difficult to assess unless the prosecutor's reports and indictments are first reviewed. Therefore, it is not possible to draw any conclusions about whether the businessmen who are members of the Namaa and Ennahda committed crimes. However, it is fair to say that the charges of "inciting violence" and "sending jihadists to foreign countries" are inconsistent with Ennahda's character and history as an organisation. Furthermore, Namaa had, since its founding, irritated Tunisia's established business elite by adopting a strategy similar to that of the MÜSİAD, which was to conduct its own business diplomacy in order to gradually access resources from the transnational network and impose itself as a trade broker in the international arena.[981]

Tunisia's president Kais Saied has been persecuting the opposition in ways that are straight out of the playbook of any authoritarian. Since sacking the government and suspending the parliament in June 2021, Saied has been targeting his opponents, particularly Ennahda. While Ennahda's relations with the AKP has been one of the reasons for this persecution, neither the AKP leaders nor its media outlets have shown any support for Ennahda.

8.2 Erdogan's U-turns vis-a-vis the MB

[981] Dilek Yankaya, 'Le Commerce Exterieur Comme Strategie d'Integration a l'etat. Le Parcours d'Obstacles d'une Assosication Patonale Issue du Mouvemant Islamiste en Tunisie', *Mondes en Développement*, vol.50-2022/2, issue 198, 99.

Erdoğan's stance on the MB began to change around 2016, which saw a period of U-turns in Turkey's Middle Eastern policies. For example, Erdoğan, who 'felt personally betrayed'[982] by Israel's attack on a Turkish flotilla that was, under the auspices of Islamist aid group İHH (*İnsani Yardım Vakfi* – Humanitarian Relief Foundation) bringing aid to Gaza in 2010, changed his tone regarding the incident following a rapprochement with Israel. 'Did you ask me before going to Gaza?'[983] he asked rhetorically in the summer of 2016, six years after the incident, accusing the Islamist aid group of acting recklessly.

Another interesting change centred on the four-fingered symbol: according to Hecker, who traced Erdoğan's changing views of the Rabaa icon between 2013 to 2016, the icon was initially used to portray the AKP as a defender of 'freedom, justice, legitimacy, and humanity as imagined under the umbrella of Islam and embedded into a bipartite worldview, with 'the West' in the role of antagonist'. It also implied that Erdoğan and the AKP had the 'moral superiority and pride that stood in opposition to the oppression of Muslims around the world and the rejection of Western values.'[984] Therefore, the Rabaa icon, which immediately became Erdoğan's 'corporate identity', [985] aimed to mobilise both domestic and international Muslim sentiment. However, in the aftermath of the attempted coup in Turkey in July 2016 and just before the 2017 constitutional referendum, in which Turkey would become a presidential republic, Erdoğan nationalised the Rabaa icon, claiming that it symbolised AKP's worldview: one nation, one motherland, one flag, one state. A brand-new meaning was given to the sign, separating it from its origins.

[982] Ian Traynor, 'Gaza flotilla raid draws furious response from Turkey's prime minister', *Guardian*, 01 June 2010.
[983] 'Erdoğan'dan Mavi Marmara fırçası: Giderken bana mı sordunuz?', *Sözcü*, 30 June 2016.
[984] Pierre Hecker, 'The 'Arab Spring' and the End of Turkish Democracy,' in *Arab Spring: modernity, identity and change*, ed. Eid Mohamed and Dalia Fahmy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 69.
[985] Hecker, 'The 'Arab Spring' and the End of Turkish Democracy' 71.

In 2016, a bronze statue was made of Erdoğan's hand making the Rabaa sign, with the slogan '*Tek Millet, Tek Bayrak, Tek Vatan, Tek Devlet* (one nation, one motherland, one flag, one state)' written on it and distributed to everyone working in the parliament including visitors.[986] Erdoğan first ideologically abused the Rabaa massacre by inventing a modern-day myth, and then 'divorced [the] gesture from its original anchorage in the Egyptian context and denied connection with the Rabaa massacre' to consolidate his base at home and 'resume diplomatic relations with the Sisi government in Egypt'.[987]

In another example, Abdul Moneim Foutuh, an MB defector who was well known to AKP members, including Erdoğan, and who came fourth in Egypt's 2012 presidential elections with 17 per cent of the votes, took part in the protests against the coup in 2013 and was arrested in 2018. The MB spokesperson and Foutuh's family members[988] raised the subject of Foutuh's arrest with Erdoğan, hoping that he would condemn it, but were met with silence.[989]

Apart from Turkey's support for the MB and Saudi Arabia's support for Egypt's coup, relations between the two countries had grounded to a halt, both economically and diplomatically, following the murder of Saudi dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Saudi Arabia's consulate in Istanbul in 2018. According to both Turkish and US intelligence, the brutal killing had been ordered by the crown prince and de facto ruler, Muhammad Bin Salman (MBS), and carried out by a team including one of his close aides. Erdoğan piled international pressure on MBS while revealing audio recordings of

[986] 'Milletvekillerine Erdoğan'ın masasında da bulunan 'Rabia heykeli' dağıtıldı', *T24*, 04 May 2016.
[987] Hecker, 'The 'Arab Spring' and the End of Turkish Democracy', 75.
[988] 'Abu Al-Futuh rahin ala'etqal… misr aydan', *Al Jazeera*, 07 July 2018.
[989] François Burgat and Bjorn Olaj Otvik, 'an 'abd al-moneim al-futh', *Al Jadid al-Araby*, 04 July 2018.

the killing.[990] As a result, relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia further deteriorated, leading to an unofficial Saudi boycott of Turkish exports. Whereas the two countries' foreign trade volume had been 5.2 billion USD in 2015, it was reduced to 3.3 billion by 2019.[991]

Following media outrage over Khashoggi's murder, MBS withdrew from the limelight and did not travel outside Saudi Arabia or give interviews to non-Saudi media networks until March 2022. In an interview published in the American journal *The Atlantic*, MBS claimed that 'the Khashoggi incident was the worst thing ever to happen to [him], because it could have ruined all of [his] plans to reform the country'.[992] He also stated[993] that he had been 'hurt a lot'. A month after this interview, Turkey abruptly handed over the Khashoggi trial to Saudi Arabia, claiming that as the Saudis had refused to extradite the suspects, the Turkish courts could do little in the absence of defendants.[994] However, in 2018, at a conference organised by an NGO called the 'League of Parliamentarians for Al-Quds' in Istanbul, Erdoğan claimed that the voice recordings pertaining to the Khashoggi murder proved that it was premeditated and had warned that, if Saudi Arabia did not prosecute the case properly, the Istanbul courts would do so in accordance with international law because the incident had occurred on Turkish soil. 'They [the Saudis] think we are stupid, they think the world is stupid,' Erdoğan continued.[995] However, the Erdoğan of 2022 thought differently than the Erdoğan of 2018. What was behind this volte-face was clear to many: a month following his visit to Jeddah, Erdoğan invited MBS

[990] Bethan McKernan, 'Appalling Khashoggi shocked Saudi intelligence- Erdoğan', *Guardian*, 13 November 2018.
[991] Zafer Çağrı, 'Türkiye-Suudi Arabistan ticari ilişkileri ne durumda?', *Kronos35*, 19 October 2020.
[992] Graeme Wood, 'Absolute Power', *Atlantic*, 03 March 2022.
[993] Ibid.
[994] 'Khashoggi: Anger as Turkish court halts murder trial', *BBC*, 07 April 2022.
[995] 'Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, kan donduran o cümleyi ilk kez paylaştı', *Hürriyet*, 14 December 2018.

to Turkey, hoping these visits would lead to a 'major boost to bilateral ties as well as Turkey's deteriorating economy'.[996]

A similar conciliation process was initiated with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Between November 2021 and May 2022, UAE President Mohammad bin Zayed (MBZ) and Erdoğan visited each other's nations on several occasions. Those visits occurred after a nine-year period of tense relations, which began with Turkey's support of the MB – a period in which numerous AKP officials and ministers, including the minister of foreign affairs and minister of the interior, accused MBZ of having financed the attempted coup in Turkey on 15 July 2016.[997]

Turkey, unsurprisingly, also sought to improve relations with Egypt; the deputy foreign ministers met several times and Turkey's Foreign Minister, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, indicated repeatedly that Turkey was determined to improve relations.[998] However, a rapprochement with President Sisi of Egypt seemed harder than one with MBS or MBZ, as Sisi in his rhetoric still portrayed the MB as the villain and himself as having saved the country from that malicious organisation. The media, also controlled by the Egyptian state, seemed to be following the same rhetoric. The third season of a popular television series in Egypt called *Al- Ikhtiar* (The Choice), which depicted the MB's short rule and ousting, became one of the most-watched series in Egypt. In a trailer, 'the show promised to take viewers behind the scenes of Egypt's most dangerous 96 hours, further claiming that the series will demonstrate Sisi's determination to save Egypt from the Muslim Brotherhood's dark

[996] Kozok, Fırat and Selcan Hacaoglu, 'Erdogan invites Saudi Crown Prince as Turkey seeks investment, *Bloomberg*, 23 May 2022.
[997] '15 Temmuz'u BAE finanse etti iddiası', *Gazete Duvar*, 12 June 2017; 'BAE'yi FETÖ'nün finansörü olarak gösteriyorlardı: Erdoğan'ın BAE için dikkat çeken mesajı', *Cumhuriyet*, 16 February 2022.
[998] 'Dışişleri Bakanı Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu: Mısır'la ilişkiler düzelir, düzelmesi de gerekir', *Anadolu Ajansı*, 14 April 2022.

path.'[999] AKP's conspicuous attempts to repair the damage caused by its support for the Islamist movements after the Uprisings raise the obvious question: Would the AKP government extradite MB members who live in Turkey? A senior but former MB member to whom I put this question told me that 'Erdoğan is pragmatic and does whatever he thinks is necessary for his country, such as making peace with Saudi Arabia, but he will not extradite the MB members because many of them are now Turkish citizens.'[1000]

Hard on the heels of these interviews, at the end of April 2022, one of the primary MB television channels, Mekameleen, ceased broadcasting. Al Sharq TV, owned by Ayman Nour, followed suit and stopped broadcasting in Turkey.[1001] In a written statement, the management of Mekameleen stated that 'it has decided to move the broadcast, studios, and all activities of the channel outside of Turkey, owing to the conditions that are not hidden from anyone and with the concern of continuing the mission of the channel to convey the whole truth. Our broadcasts from different parts of the world will be restarted.'[1002]

On 21 November 2022, at the World Cup in Qatar, a photograph of Erdogan shaking hands with his Egyptian counterpart Abdel Fatah Al-Sisi was circulated. While Erdogan had repeatedly referred to Sisi as 'a murderer' and 'a putschist'[1003] in reference to the Rabaa massacre and Mohamed Morsi's death in prison, Sisi had accused Erdogan of attempting to destabilise his country by supporting a terrorist organization that is the

[999] Mounir, Ghufrane, 'Al-Iktiyar 3: Why an Egyptian Ramadan drama is provoking anger', *Middle East Eye*, 08 April 2022.
[1000] Interview with a senior former MB member, 07 April 2022.
[1001] 'li madha kharaj al'amir bin salman alrrabh al'akbar wal' islam alsiyasi alkhasir al'abraz min ziyarat 'Erdogan lil Saudia? Wa madha yani tazamun al-ziyarat mae 'iighlaq qanaa 'mekameleen' al'ikhwani?', *Rai Al-Youm*, 30 April 2022.
[1002] 'Müslüman Kardeşler'in yayın organından Türkiye kararı: Yayınlarını durdu', *Cumhuriyet*, 30 April 2022.
[1003] 'Türkiye-Mısır yakınlaşması: Dokuz yılda 'Katil Sisi'den 'Sayın Sisi'ye nasıl gelindi?', *BBC Türkçe*, 12 December 2022.

Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Yet, both leaders were shaking hands with a smile on a platform of international focus, such as the World Cup, for all to see. Following the photograph, Erdogan stated that he intends to meet with al-Sisi as soon as the foreign ministers reach agreement on specific issues.[1004]

Two weeks prior to this handshake, the security teams of both countries met and agreed not to take any actions that would jeopardise their respective countries' security. This should be interpreted as Egypt asking Turkey to reconsider its Libyan policy and Turkey asking Egypt to reconsider its position vis a vis Mediterranean. According to Egyptian sources, Turkey's sole request[1005] was that Egypt change its position on Turkey's status in the eastern Mediterranean. In 2019, Turkey signed a preliminary deal with Libya's government in Tripoli that granted it access to a contested economic zone for exploration of hydrocarbon reserves in Libya's offshore waters ignoring the existence of several Greek islands, including Crete. The agreement caused friction between Turkey and Greece, as well as a geopolitical realignment in which Turkey is one side and Greece, Egypt, France, and the UAE are on the other. Egypt and Greece accuse Turkey of expanding its influence in the Mediterranean. [1006]

It is not hard to guess that the handshake between Sisi and Erdogan was pre-planned. The Amir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad al Thani, served as the mediator. Prior to the World Cup, Thani's team had been travelling back and forth between Turkey and Egypt to

[1004] 'Erdogan says Turkish, Egyptian ministers to meet in process of building ties', *Reuters*, 27 November 2022.
[1005] 'baed musafahat al-sisi.. al-rais al-turki yuelin "talabah al wahida" min misr', *Al Hurra*, 21 November 2022.
[1006] Galip Dalay, 'Turkey, Europe, and the Eastern Mediterrannean: Charting the way of the current deadlock', Brookings Institute, 28 January 2021.

arrange for this meeting.[1007] Another episode, according to a pro-AKP columnist, indicates that the reconciliation process began months before the World Cup: For some time, Erdogan had been serving mango juice to his visitors at the presidential palace, Beştepe.[1008] When asked about why, Erdogan claimed that mangoes were sent by the Egyptian president Sisi through Turkey's spy chief Hakan Fidan and foreign minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, both of whom had been working on to mend relations.

Even though Egyptian presidency spokesperson Bassam Essam Rady stated on presidency's Facebook account that the handshake would be the beginning of developing bilateral relations[1009], Tariq Fahmy, a political scientist at the Cairo University, argues that 'there is still a long way to go and that Turkey needs to regain Egypt's trust and that there is no agreement between two countries on thorny issues, particularly Libya and the Mediterranean.'[1010] Because, as explained in this Chapter, the eastern Mediterranean maritime dispute and the Libyan quagmire are not the only issues causing friction between Turkey and Egypt. Interestingly, the Turkish and Egyptian presidencies appear to have a tacit agreement not to bring up the 'other issue' that is the AKP's close ties to the MB.

Erdoğan's U-turn was perceived by the Arab media as a capitulation to Saudi Arabia and President Sisi of Egypt:

> Islamic principles and values rank low on the Turkish president's list of priorities. If Khashoggi had been alive, he might have handed him up to the Saudi authorities. What

[1007] 'tafasil jadidat tatakashaf khalf musafahat al-sisi wa erdogan', *Al Arabiyya*, 22 November 2022.
[1008] Abdülkadir Selvi, 'Erdoğan'la Esed 2023 seçimlerinden önce görüşebilir', *Hürriyet*, 23 November 2022.
[1009] Spokesman of the Egyptian Presidency, Facebook, 21 November 2022.
[1010] 'baed musafahat al-sisi wa erdogan ma mustaqbal alaqat misr wa turkia?', *Al Sharq al-Awsat*, 22 November 2022.

> matters to him is to remain in the presidential palace and – to facilitate that – for the lira to recover and the Turkish economy to overcome the difficulties it currently faces owing to the failure of his policies. Erdoğan was a talented actor who managed to enlist "political Islam" in the service of the US and its schemes against several Arab and Islamic states such as Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Egypt. It is regrettable that some leaders of the Islamist movement still see him as the Caliph of the Muslims and Commander of the Faithful and continue to defend him fiercely. Erdoğan only understands the language of power.[1011]

Meanwhile, Turkish Islamists expressed their disappointment, - albeit *sotto voce.* One of them stated that he 'cannot acquiesce Erdogan's handshake with the murderer Sisi. No and never! I despise Sisi and everything he stands for. I fully identify with Morsi and the values he represents. I feel very sad and wounded.'[1012] Another confessed that he 'was devastated on behalf of the Muslim world'[1013] after seeing the photo of the handshake.

Erdogan's shift in attitude towards the Egyptian president Sisi and his rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, cannot be explained other than by him being a man of pragmatism and by the fact that Erdoğan's actions are contingent on their utilitarian value for his grip on power. With the 2023 parliamentary and presidential elections looming in Turkey, the annual inflation rate has reached its highest levels in decades, devaluing salaries and the currency.[1014] The bleak economic situation that threatens Erdogan's re-election compelled him to break Turkey's regional isolation in the hope of re-establishing economic ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Therefore,

[1011] Atwan, Abdel Bari, 'Erdogan capitulates to MBS', *Rai Al-Youm*, 02 April 2022.
[1012] İsmail Kılıçaslan, 'İki meselenin peşinde', *Yeni Şafak*, 22 November 2022.
[1013] Ali Karahasanoğlu, 'Yazıklar olsun bize! Keşke o fotoyu görmeseydim', *Yeni Akit*, 21 November 2022.
[1014] Ben Hubbard, 'Skyrocetting prices in Turkey hurt families and tarnish Erdogan', *New York Times*, 05 December 2022.

Erdogan's reconciliation with Sisi, MBZ, and MBS can only be explained in *real politik* terms, as Steven A Cook, a Turkey expert did: 'The Turkish government discovered that there are limits to its ability to impose its will on other regional powers, whether in the Eastern Mediterranean or in its support for Islamist movements around the Middle East. Turkey's geopolitical isolation exacerbated its economic troubles when Saudi Arabia undertook a boycott of Turkish goods amid tensions over the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi and Ankara's support for Doha after the imposition of the Saudi-led blockade on Qatar in 2017. Now that Erdogan has reconciled with Saudi leaders, Turkish goods are likely to flow into the kingdom unimpeded, there is the potential for new Saudi investment in Turkey, and Riyadh could join other Gulf governments in currency swaps with Ankara.'[1015]

8.3 The current crisis, democracy, and Islamism

The changing geopolitical dynamics which encompass the grounds that the AKP, the MB and Ennahda operate may lead us to conclude that we have on our hands three failures for various reasons. Two of the parties studied in this research have been ousted by coups: the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt and Ennahda in Tunisia. Meanwhile, the AKP in Turkey, once hailed as an example of Muslim democracy, has become a pillar of illiberalism and the vehicle of a strongman spewing staunch anti-Western rhetoric. This is the convolution that this section must navigate through.

[1015] Steven A. Cook, 'Why Turkey is resetting relations with Saudi Arabia', Council on Foreign Relations, 04 May 2022.

It is true that neither the research design nor the method employed in this research can explain why Ennahda and the MB were deposed or why the AKP became authoritarian. Exogenous factors such as the historical and domestic realities in each country regarding competing societal and political forces, as well as international trends, all contributed to current crisis some of which are not germane to the explanations I seek. Nonetheless consideration of these issues is unavoidable. First and foremost, the above-described trajectory of events, including failure in democracy and Erdogan's withdrawal of support from the MB and Ennahda when he realised they did not serve his purpose of remaining in power at any cost, support my main argument that the diffusion process between these actors was neither about democracy nor ideology.

Can we, however, draw any conclusions about Islamists' stance toward democracy from this crisis-ridden picture? The first part of this penultimate section, then, will assess the nature of failures and then briefly apply the discussion of democracy and Islamism to the focus of this research.

The MB fell into disarray after the 2013 coup, suffering its greatest challenge since its founding in Cairo in 1928. Not only are the majority of the leaders now imprisoned in Egypt, but those members in exile members are separated by geography and political standing. Ennahda members have been persecuted since Tunisia president Kais Saeid took office in 2019 and suspended the parliament in 2021. The ousting of the MB in Egypt and Ennahda in Tunisia, as well as the rejection of their policies while in power – whether because they were authoritarian, too Islamist and therefore unappealing to secular and non-Muslim constituencies or incompetent in meeting the needs of their societies – will undeniably have repercussions within these movements and other Islamist entities in the Muslim world. Similarly, the AKP's authoritarianism, and recent turmoil in the Turkish

economy caused by Erdoğan's insistence on keeping interest rates low to boost economic growth –which resulted in the Turkish lira falling by an unprecedented 45 per cent against the US dollar – will have detracted from the success story that many around the world accepted after the AKP came to power. Then, it can be denoted that we have three Islamist entities that managed to ascend to power but failed to govern, failed to integrate into existing domestic and international systems – however flawed they may be normatively – and failed to comply with democratic norms. Hence, the Islamist parties were tested in power and normatively vanquished. In other words, the Islamist movements that are the focus of this research attempted to follow in the AKP's footsteps to achieve success but failed to maintain power. This would be a hasty and superficial analysis - a masked *non sequitur*-, of any political situation, let alone these complex developments.

I also do not consider crises as 'definitive and irrevocable' spaces in which only binary alternatives are permitted: 'success or failure, right or wrong, life or death, and finally, salvation or damnation'.[1016] I prefer Koselleck's suggestion that crisis is 'an iterative periodizing concept'[1017] whose guiding principle does not have to be progress,[1018] as defined by modernisation theory.

Mohammad Morsi's attempts to bestow 'himself and the Islamist-dominated assembly writing Egypt's new constitution, extraordinary new powers'[1019] in 2012 were attributed to the despotic and totalitarian core of Islamism. Put another way, the argument went that any Islamist in power would put Islam's dogmas into practice; hence, an appropriation of state apparatus was inevitable.[1020] However, retrospective analyses of Morsi's brief rule

[1016] Reinhart Koselleck, *The practice of conceptual history: timing history, spacing concepts* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 237.
[1017] Koselleck, *The practice of conceptual history*, 240.
[1018] Koselleck, *The practice of conceptual history*, 243.
[1019] Peter Beaumont, 'Morsi power grab angers Egypt opposition groups', *Guardian*, 23 November 2012.
[1020] Joel Beinin and Joe Stork, *Political Islam: essays from Middle East report* (London: Tauris, 1997), 35.

concluded that 'Morsi was no Mandela, but he was no autocrat either […] and that Egypt under Morsi was undergoing a remarkably ordinary transition, neither wholly autocratic nor wholly democratic, falling almost exactly at the mean value of political transitions globally'.[1021]

At this point, we should pause and remember the erroneous transitology framework sometimes applied to the Arab Uprisings. The post-Cold War transition paradigm assumes that, if certain conditions are met, such as 'higher levels of economic well-being; the absence of extreme inequalities in wealth and income; greater social pluralism, including particularly a strong and autonomous bourgeoisie; a more market-oriented economy; [and] a culture that is less monistic and more tolerant of diversity and compromise',[1022] then a democratisation process is set in motion. The democracy promotion community – mainly led by US policy advisers – usually takes the transition paradigm as the ultimate form of democratisation and nation-building. However, as Carothers argues, 'a whole generation of democracy aid is based on this paradigm'[1023] and on these institutional checklists, but unfortunately, there are few examples globally – whether in Latin America, the Balkans or Africa – in which it was successful. Similarly, as Hinnebusch contends, both democratisation and post-democratisation theories are limiting when it comes to explaining the aftermath of the Uprisings, which 'have set different states on a great variety of different trajectories […] rather than a uniform authoritarian restoration or democratization'.[1024]

[1021] Shadi Hamid and Meredeth Wheeler, 'Was Mohammed Morsi an autocrat?' *Atlantic*, 31 March 2014.
[1022] Samuel P. Huntington, 'Will More Countries Become Democratic?' *Political Science Quarterly* 131, no. 2 (2016): 261.
[1023] Thomas Carothers, 'The End of the Transition Paradigm', *Journal of democracy* 13, no. 1 (2002): 18.
[1024] Hinnebusch, 'Introduction: understanding the consequences of the Arab uprisings – starting points and divergent trajectories' 205–06.

Other contextual and structural reasons can be presented to explain 'the bewildering behaviour of the MB after taking power'.[1025] First, the MB was unable to meet the rapidly changing economic and political realities of Egypt; second, it was inexperienced; third, it continued to act like a party in opposition that knows how to protest [but] not how to rule; and, finally, it was 'unable to restructure itself as a normal political party'.[1026] It would be misleading to conclude it was Islamism that led to the MB's 'odd behaviours in power', because the MB has a loose, elastic ideology 'that fits with different contexts and circumstances'; its 'pragmatism in many instances superseded its ideology.'[1027] Al-Anani admits that the MB could not 'modify its ideology to adapt to Egypt's new environment after the January Uprisings' but this was partly 'because ideologies don't change overnight [but rather] take years, if not decades to be internalized within a movement's structure.'[1028]

In terms of consolidating the Islamist base, the AKP never had to compete with the Salafi whereas both Ennahda and the MB had to adapt their discourse and strategy in response to Salafi elements in their respective societies. Another example can be found in the sectarian tension in Egypt where decades of contention between Copts and Muslims were exacerbated after the regime's fall, due to the power vacuum and apprehension on the part of the Copts after Islamist actors such as the MB assumed power. Neither in Tunisia nor in Turkey did sectarian conflict extend to violence. Finally, the MB's tenure was too short to determine whether the symbols and tactics passed from the AKP to the MB could or would have been successful.

[1025] Al-Anani, 'The 'Anguish', 235.
[1026] Al-Anani, 'The 'Anguish', 235.
[1027] Al-Anani, 'The 'Anguish', 235.
[1028] Al-Anani, 'The 'Anguish', 235.

Two former Egyptian ministers, Yehia Hamed and Salah Abdel Maqsoud, deny that the Morsi government acted fast or recklessly. Wickham's interviews revealed a similar consensus within the MB: 'To be fair, all the Brotherhood and FJP leaders I interviewed stressed Morsi did invite several prominent secular and progressive Islamic leaders to join the government in various capacities, whether as vice presidents, as members of the President's Advisory Team, or as cabinet ministers but virtually all of these overtures were rebuffed.'[1029]

For Maqsoud, Morsi's presidency was too short to disrupt the regime in a way that would justify the secular and liberal fears:

> What did we do in eight months? Did we bring in *sharia* law? Did we force all women to wear the hijab? Did we cut off the hands of criminals? No, we did none of these. As the FJP, we opened our doors to everyone in Egypt. The FJP's deputy secretary-general was a Christian. There is a misunderstanding about the MB. We do not want to impose *sharia* by force. We would listen to the people to see if they want *sharia*. But secularists and the regime realized that if elections were to be free, they would never stand a chance against the Islamists. So, they collaborated with the army.[1030]

In a similar vein, 'I want someone to cite one incident where Dr Morsi or his government has enacted any legislation that showed that the government is pro-religious people and against secular people. Please don't talk to me about fears of the future. They are imaginary,'[1031] said former minister Hamed.

Hamed's view of the attitudes of the intelligentsia chimes with some of the academic writing on Egypt. For example, El Fadl asserts that 'Egypt's intelligentsia betrayed the

[1029] Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood*, 305.
[1030] Interview with Salah Abdel Maqsoud, op. cit.
[1031] Interview with Yehia Hamed, op. cit.

revolution that they claimed to celebrate and support'[1032] contending that 'the secularized intellectuals whether on the right or left adopted and promoted the claim that the Islamists were brought into power by the United States to implement an American agenda in the region'[1033] and calling the Morsi government's legitimacy into question. Thus, the intelligentsia remained silent in the face of a military takeover in 2013.

Conversely, there is a valid argument that whatever the strategy adopted, the Morsi government was doomed to fail from the start: the *ancien régime* would never have let the MB rule the country. This is a view with which almost all Egyptian interviewees retrospectively agree. As to what triggered the military intervention, some pointed to closing the parliament, some to the denial of Shater's presidential nomination and some to the media furore that erupted following an Islamist attack in August 2012 on the Egyptian military's compound in the Sinai Peninsula, killing 16 soldiers.

A similar conclusion can be drawn regarding Ennahda's fall from government. First, President Saied's power grab affected not only Ennahda but also Tunisian democratic institutions. It should also be noted that during its tenure, Ennahda resigned from government in 2014 to appease the public furore following the assassinations of the leftist politicians and announced in 2016 that it is no longer an Islamist party but a Muslim democratic one, as explained in the final section of Chapter 5. However, as also acknowledged by its leaders, Ennahda was unable to govern effectively and solve Tunisia's decades-long economic problems. Nevertheless, economic, and governmental

[1032] Khaled Abou El Fadl, 'Egypt's Secularized Intelligentsia and the Guardians of Truth', The Search For Beauty, 15 January 2017.
[1033] Ibid.

failures cannot solely be attributed to Ennahda's incompetence or, in the context of this study, its Islamist character.

The case of the AKP is more complicated to be labelled as a failure, since it continued to win elections and hold power while defying everything that made it an example to be followed by other Islamist entities in the eyes of Western actors, including the US and the EU, who once saw it as a model that merged Islamism, democracy, and a market economy.[1034]

The constitutional changes of 2011 and 2017 in Turkey centralised power in the hands of one individual, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, undermining institutional checks and balances. A series of decree–laws and presidential decrees adopted immediately before and after Erdoğan took office as president in July 2018 have dramatically changed the structure of the Turkish government and represent a rupture in Turkey's 200-year-old constitutional history. While Turkey had become more authoritarian under Erdoğan, rifts within the AKP had led to the fragmentation of political actors rooted in Islamism. Erdoğan first declared Fethullah Gülen and his followers - a partner in his endeavour to curb republican elements within the state apparatus - to be part of the terrorist organisation *FETÖ* that masterminded the attempted coup on 15 July 2016.[1035]

Erdoğan then parted ways with senior members of the AKP who were intrinsic to its foundational ethos. Among them was the former president, Abdullah Gül, former prime minister and the brain behind Turkey's foreign policy during the Arab Uprisings, Ahmet Davutoğlu, and Ali Babacan, the former Minister of Economy who was trusted by the

[1034] See Tuğal, *The fall of the Turkish model*.
[1035] 'Turkey's coup attempt: What you need to know', *BBC*, 17 July 2016.

West and seen as implementing an appropriate financial regime in compliance with supranational financial institutions. Both Davutoğlu and Babacan have founded political parties – *Gelecek Partisi* (The Future Party) and *Deva Partisi* (The Democracy and Progress Party) respectively – and criticise Erdoğan's authoritarian and economic policies while highlighting corruption and injustice. The AKP has thus become an oligarchic party under Erdoğan, heedless of what constitutes and what violates legitimate political conduct. It also formed a transactional coalition with the ultra-nationalist party *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* (the MHP – The Nationalist Movement Party) and is filled with individuals who bind their political and economic well-being to that of Erdoğan. The current rhetoric of Erdoğan and the AKP has both Islamist and hard-line nationalist undertones. Progress reports from the European Parliament and Commission cite the deterioration of press freedom and failure to fully meet the Copenhagen Criteria. In effect, we have witnessed the rise and fall of the Turkish model through the AKP's transformation in power since 2002.

In 2009, Vali Nasr made the following prediction: 'If Turkey stays on its current course, it will become a Muslim capitalist democracy, and the face of Turkish modernity today will become the face of the wider Muslim world tomorrow if the rising business leadership and its attendant new middle-class get their way […] The reconciliation of Islam and capitalism that the critical middle is voting decisively for is the only way forward toward a wider reconciliation of Islam and democracy.'[1036] Turkey stayed on its capitalist course and constantly pushed for neoliberal policies but AKP's leader Erdoğan became authoritarian. As of 2023, democracy, which should be the soul of Turkey and the wider

[1036] Nasr, *The Rise of Islamic Capitalism* ,251, 53.

Muslim world, as presumed by Nasr and his like, cannot be attained.[1037] First, this outcome demonstrates that 'linking capitalist development with democratisation and bourgeoisification and assuming that capitalist development results in democratisation' is problematic and needs further explanation.[1038] Second, since Western observers had seen the AKP as forging a new democratic path and serving as a democratic model with Ennahda and, to a lesser extent, the MB, a discussion on Islamists' stance regarding democracy is needed.

It may seem that the AKP's authoritarian practices cast doubt on the initial argument that post-Islamism was 'associated with democratic values.'[1039] Roy and Bayat's conceptualisations of post-Islamism have been criticised for being based on modernisation theory and displaying what the West wants to see rather than what actually occurs within Islamism. I disagree with these assertions because neither Roy nor Bayat contend that Islamists fully embrace democracy, free speech and equal rights for women and minorities. Rather, they indicate a shift in the strategy and goals of Islamist politicians. Bayat also acknowledges that post-Islamism as a project is incoherent and that 'the post-Islamist extension of democratic space comes into conflict with its ambivalence toward the value of individual rights and liberties'.[1040] I see the post-Islamist paradigm as constantly evolving and contingent upon globalisation and neoliberal governance; its features are, therefore, not fixed but subject to change and redefinition.

Furthermore, AKP's turn to authoritarianism is not necessarily related to its religious sensibilities, because 'secular governments may also indulge in such undemocratic

[1037] Ceren Lord, *Religious politics in Turkey: from the birth of the Republic to the AKP* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 243.
[1038] Lord, *Religious politics in Turkey*, 243.
[1039] Bayat, 'The Coming of a Post-Islamist Society' 45.
[1040] Bayat, 'The Coming of a Post-Islamist Society' 45.

conduct, particularly when their self-confidence is boosted, as is the case with AKP, by economic success, regional power, and a feeble opposition'.[1041] The AKP's authoritarianism does not, therefore, preclude post-Islamism but rather highlights the troubled relationship between post-Islamist parties and democracy.

Bayat believes that compatibility between Islam and democracy is not a matter of philosophy but of politics. 'The pertinent question is not whether Islam and democracy are compatible (least of all because of the contested meanings attached to both Islam and democracy) but rather how and under what conditions Muslims can make their religion compatible with desired notions of democracy, how they can legitimise and popularise an inclusive reading of their doctrine in the same way that democrats have been struggling to broaden the narrow (white, male, propertied and merely liberal) notion of democracy.'[1042] For Islamists democracy is a matter of debate and circumstance. However, the main factor here is not Islam. As Brumberg writes, 'For democracy to have any hope in the Arab world, it is not Islam that must be fixed, but politics itself.'[1043] On this matter, neither Islamists nor their secular but authoritarian counterparts have been able to demonstrate convincingly their democratic credentials.[1044]

Beyond the pervasive tendency to approach Islamist entities through analytical frameworks inspired by 'democracy-spotting and exceptionalism, [… we can see that] the region [MENA] displays a form of governance that has become quite widespread across the globe, with a number of different political systems and regimes displaying similar

[1041] Asef Bayat, *Post-Islamism*, 12.
[1042] Bayat, *Making Islam democratic*, 5.
[1043] Daniel Brumberg, 'Authoritarian legacies and reform strategies in the Arab world' in *Political liberalization & democratization in the Arab world*, ed. Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany and Paul Noble (Boulder, CO; London: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 98.
[1044] Joel Beinin and Joe Stork, *Political Islam: essays from Middle East report* (London: Tauris, 1997), 22.

dynamics. In the last decade and a half, with the rise of illiberal populist parties and rhetoric across Europe, India, Russia and Latin America, the debate has centred on whether we have entered an epoch of post-democracy.[1045] Illiberal–authoritarian forms of rule are part of a general trend.'[1046] For example, the state-capturing process followed by the AKP and Erdoğan is very similar to that of Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban's party, Fidesz, or PiS – the party of Polish deputy prime minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski.[1047] Similarly, Erdoğan's authoritarian conduct is not 'evidence of his Islamism [but it] seems to be lifted from the script of other leaders in autocracies such as Russia's Vladimir Putin, seeking to minimise political opposition and maintain positions of power'.[1048]

The emergence of the AKP, its rise to become an example for other Islamist movements, and its trajectory in power are all outcomes of the internal contradictions and predicaments in Islamism since the 1990s. The AKP model was not bankrupt; rather, the AKP was modelled in such a way as to circumvent the impasse of the Islamist project. In other words, as the Islamist project was not achieving success, a different course of action was needed. The AKP, with its determination to assume power, demonstrated that course. As White argues, 'Islamist success in Turkey is less a triumph of Islamic ideology or religious affiliation than a result of strategies of mobilization [and] a mutual accommodation

[1045] See Colin Crouch, *Post-democracy*, Themes for the 21st century (Cambridge: Polity, 2004); Colin Crouch, 'Post-democracy and populism', *The Political quarterly* (London, 1930) 90 (2019); Timothy Snyder, *The road to unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America* (London: The Bodley Head, 2018); Ivan Krastev, *Democracy Disrupted: The Politics of Global Protest* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014); Jan-Werner Müller, *What is populism?* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016); Anne Applebaum, *Twilight of democracy: the failure of politics and the parting of friends* (London: Allen Lane, 2020).
[1046] Cavatorta, 'The Convergence of Governance: Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World and Downgrading Democracy Elsewhere?' 217.
[1047] See Applebaum, *Twilight of democracy: the failure of politics and the parting of friends*.
[1048] Mandaville, *Islam and politics*, 177.

between Islamic conservatives and the state, in part through shared agendas with other sectors of the population, in part through an intensified civil society.'[1049]

We cannot reduce Islamism to the AKP, although there is no doubt that the AKP is a product of Islamism's 150-year-old journey. The secular front in Turkey sees in the AKP 'the real face of Islamism', now openly declared, which hegemonises the state and society in religious terms; in contrast, the Islamists see the consolidation of neoliberal conservatism and 'wretched degeneration' of Islamism. In this sense, the AKP's experience in power can be interpreted in two ways. It could be seen as a success story if Islamism's main ethos was assuming and solidifying state power. However, it also represents a profound disappointment for those who are concerned about how Islamists in power – in this case, the AKP – have adopted authoritarian tools to use against their opponents, and neoliberal tactics to integrate into the global system while ignoring justice and equality in society – core pledges of Islamist politics. [1050] Furthermore, as Islamist theologian Kırbaşoğlu argues, the AKP's main feature became the preservation of the capitalist system so that Erdoğan and his entourage could unfairly accumulate wealth. 'This is against the core of Islam', he states, 'so, what is left of Islam or Islamism in the AKP?' he asks. 'Only ablution and prayer five times a day. Those are not enough even to qualify as Muslims.'[1051] As Türköne sees it, 'The AKP squandered a historical opportunity by becoming a dictatorial regime. This is a loss not only for Turkey's Islamist tradition in Turkey but also for other Islamist movements around the world, especially those inspired

[1049] White, 'Islamist social networks,' 61.
[1050] Tanıl Bora and Kerem Ünüvar, 'İslamcılık ve AKP: Mazeret ve kibir', *Birikim Dergisi,* July–August, no. 303–304 (2014): 16.
[1051] Bayram Koca, 'M. Hayri Kırbaşoğlu ile söyleşi: İslam, sol ve AKP', *Birikim Dergisi* July–August, no. 303–304 (2014): 184–85.

by the AKP model.'[1052] The same could be said of the MB's experience in power although the MB was never held up as a model for other Islamist movements.

In conclusion, I do not presuppose that Islamist actors are, in essence, democratic or undemocratic. I also do not claim Islam is or is not compatible with democracy production. What I have aimed at was to demonstrate the ideological malleability of Islamism through a political confluence that occurred after the Arab Uprisings. Islamism borrowed political forms derived from the values of Enlightenment. Hence, 'theoretically, there is no reason why this borrowing should not be extended to democracy; [but] such a synthesis is possible only if democracy becomes the dominant tradition to which the Islamist movements are forced to adapt themselves and their ideology, [which has not been] the present political scene in the Middle East and North Africa.' [1053]

[1052] Interview with Mümtazer Türköne, op. cit.
[1053] Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, *Islamic fundamentalism*, Twentieth century religious thought, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 26.

9 Conclusion: The sink, the cooker, and Islamism

I have, in this research, told a story of two sets of relations between major Islamist movements/parties – the AKP – MB/FJP and the AKP – Ennahda - during and after the Arab Uprisings, and provided a snapshot of Islamist aspirations and ways of defining and overcoming crises.

As structuralist Barrington Moore suggests, it is a utopian ideal of the social sciences to explain all questions arising from a topic. It is fruitless and 'dodges the main issue: what is worth knowing'[1054] and what is possible to know. Thus, 'change is what requires explanation.[1055] This research has attempted to demonstrate the change in Islamist goals by focusing on the connections between the AKP-Ennahda and the AKP-MB relationship.

I reviewed the nature of success as a strategic end for Islamists, how the pursuit of success affects the core tenets of Islamism as an ideology, and the broader context of incorporating neoliberal governance models into Islamist politics. I have also offered novel empirical evidence on the aspirations and goals of Islamist actors who came to power after decades of repression.

Islamism emerged with claims that it would find solutions to the crises encountered by Muslim societies: the crisis of colonialism, the crisis of identity, the crisis of being left behind, and the crisis of post-colonial nation-building. It argued that 'Islam, as a complete divine system with a superior political model, cultural code, legal structure, and economic arrangement'[1056] could respond to these problems. However, the exploration for purely

[1054] Barrington Moore, *Social origins of dictatorship and democracy [electronic resource]: lord and peasant in the making of the modern world*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993), 489.
[1055] Moore, *Social origins of dictatorship and democracy*, 486.
[1056] Asef Bayat, *Making Islam democratic*, 7.

Islamic solutions to the political, economic, and cultural requirements of contemporary life[1057] proved insufficient or incomplete. This insufficiency stemmed from both a lack of innovative intellectual production from Islamist politicians and thinkers and the international dynamics and repressive governments that constantly intervened in the natural flow of social and political life in the MENA region.

The domestic and international affairs of Islamist movements and the reasons behind their success or failure are highly contentious and often politicised.[1058] In the aftermath of the regime collapses in Tunisia and Egypt, 'Turkey put itself forward […] as the natural leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and similar Sunni Islamist movements in the Arab world, [demonstrating] that a populist Sunni Islamist party could dominate free elections, implement successful (at least for a while) economic policies, and govern a major regional state, [and] the Muslim Brotherhood, following Erdoğan's playbook and positioning itself as a moderate, democratic, populist Islamist political party, did very well in elections in Egypt and Tunisia.'[1059] Erdoğan's shifting of foreign policy towards the MENA region and Turkey's economic and developmental assistance of these countries were driven by 'economic and military motives'.[1060] These geopolitical motives 'were connected to Turkey's energy dependency'[1061] and economic aspirations rather than establishing an order based on ideology or led by Islamic activism. As Erdoğan's later efforts to disentangle his party from the problems that stemmed from its support of the MB and Ennahda prove, the supposed ideological common ground between the AKP, Ennahda and

[1057] Martin and Barzegar, 'Introduction: The debate about Islamism in the public sphere', 2.
[1058] Shehata, 'Introduction', in *Islamist politics in the Middle East: movements and change*, 1.
[1059] Gregory Gause, 'The Price of Order: Settling for Less in the Middle East', *Foreign Affairs* 101, no. 2 (2022).
[1060] Huda Hadi and Al-Suwaidani Hamid Mohammed Taha Ahmed, 'al-siyasa al-turkia tujah afriqia fi 'ahd hizb al-'adala wa al-tanmiya' *College of Education for Women* 30, 4 (2019): 162.
[1061] Helen Thompson, *Disorder: hard times in the 21st century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), 270.

the MB was contingent on its functional value. Therefore, the Islamists – especially Ennahda and the AKP – conceded their Islamist vision of an *umma* employing foreign policy tools that are similar to those of other national secular political parties and movements.[1062]

Contrary to the common assumption, contemporary Islamists view *umma* through what could be termed a realist lens,[1063] in which Muslim solidarity becomes an emotional concept rather than a determinant of foreign policy interests.[1064] In other words, it evolves into a 'loose universal Muslim consciousness'.[1065] It is true that emotions motivate activism, and Muslims can be mobilised even by Islamist movements that 'are more expressly committed to attaining power within specific national contexts' on issues affecting Muslims in other countries.[1066] However, this activism is also fragmented along sectarian lines and limited to national economic and political interests, as evidenced by, among others, 'the inaction of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Malaysia and Indonesia, [in response to] China's suppression of its Muslim Uyghur population'.[1067]

Hence, *umma* is redefined as a symbolic Muslim community, offering the possibility of establishing a confederation or union of nation-states with a Muslim majority.[1068] Eickelman and Piscatori describe it as the localisation of Muslim transnationalism, which does not result in 'denationalization as one might assume from a reading of at least a part

[1062] Al Kadi, 'Between Foreign Policy and the Umma' 241.
[1063] Al Kadi, 'Between Foreign Policy and the Umma' 260.
[1064] James Piscatori, *Islam in a world of nation-states* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 149.
[1065] Sadiki, 'Tunisia's Ennahda: Islamists Turning the Learning Curve of Democracy and Civic Habituation', 95.
[1066] Andrew F. March, 'Political Islam: Theory', *Annual Review of Political Science* 18, no. 1 (2015): 105.
[1067] Piscatori and Saikal, *Islam beyond borders*, 9.
[1068] Abdelwahab Al-Affendi, 'Umma, State and Movement: Events that Shaped the Modern Debate' in *Political Islam: context versus ideology*, ed. Khālid Ḥarūb (SOAS Middle East issues; London: Saqi, 2010), 35.

of the transnational literature'.[1069] On the contrary, within Muslim transnationalism, 'states and local identities may be reinforced, not undermined, by transnational interactions'.[1070] This sentiment is supported by the present research. Both Ennahda and the MB members who had interacted with the AKP repeatedly emphasised their national and Islamist credentials, claiming that they sought practical knowledge and experience from the AKP. They also stated that the close relationship after the 2011 Uprising was possible only because the AKP respected the sovereignty of Tunisia and Egypt and did not attempt to interfere in their domestic politics. Although ideological proximity initiated the diffusion process between the sending and receiving parties, the process was driven by utilitarian calculations and the convergence of interests (writing a success story for and by Islamists) rather than by ideology or grand visions.[1071]

I argue that from the 1990s until after the Arab Uprisings, a new spirit of Islamism emerged as a result of the dual pressures of neoliberalism and internal crises within Islamism. The Arab Uprisings crystallised the disenchantment of youth with established ideologies such as secular liberalism, Marxism, or Islamism. As the youth of the MB and Ennahda could not relate to their leaders, they looked for 'some form of post-Islamist third way – a more critical, open, and inclusive polity'.[1072]

In the 1990s, through management discourse, capitalism could respond to critiques and be perceived as an egalitarian project. It almost functioned as a legitimisation tool for a system in crisis. Conjointly, management discourse has a prescriptive nature and is able to

[1069] Eickelman and Piscatori, *Muslim politics*, 150.
[1070] André Bank and Roy Karadag, 'The 'Ankara Moment': the politics of Turkey's regional power in the Middle East, 2007–11', *Third World Quarterly* 34, no. 2 (2013): 155.
[1071] Buzogany, 'Illiberal democracy in Hungary: authoritarian diffusion or domestic causation?' 1309- 17.
[1072] Bayat, *Revolutionary life*, 103.

justify profit-making as desirable and innovative.[1073] Juxtaposing these two aspects of managerialism with the diffusion process, I have attempted to show that this interplay, with its aim of legitimising Islamist actors via a prescriptive formula, indicates a new spirit in Islamist politics. The pursuit of success – defined in this study as 'winning elections', 'assuming power', 'staying in power', 'service to the people' and 'economic growth' – was portrayed as a 'manageable' goal. This is my small contribution to the literature on changing dynamics of Islamist politics.

Within the new spirit of Islamism, two interlinked objectives have become prevalent: success and *sharriya* (legitimacy). In his final speech before the military coup in 2013, the late Egyptian president, Mohammad Morsi, used the word '*shariyya* (legitimacy in Arabic)' 59 times within 45 minutes, emphasising that the people are the source of authority according to the constitution; thus, he and not the military was the legitimate holder of state power.[1074] The concept of legitimacy was used during the pro-Morsi demonstrations in June 2013 with banners reading 'Legitimacy is a red line'[1075] and 'There is no alternative to legitimacy'.[1076] Erdoğan also contextualises all the major setbacks and challenges to his party, his power – and even to AKP's mother movement, *Milli Görüş* – within the legitimacy frame. He notes that 'those [in Turkey] who told the legitimate [Erbakan-led] government to resign [on 28 February 1997] saw that the will of the people triumphed one way or the other'.[1077]

[1073] Husam Tammam and Patrick Haenni, 'Au diable les loosers ! Le succès et l'achievement, nouvelles valeurs islamiques en Égypte', *Mouvements (Paris, France: 1998)* no 36, no. 6 (2004).
[1074] 'al-rais mursi astakhdim mustalah 'shariyatan' 59 maratan', *Al Arabiya*, 03 July 2013.
[1075] Appendix Figure 8.
[1076] Appendix Figure 9.
[1077] 'Bu millet 28 Şubatların değil, kendi iradesinin bin yıl süreceğini eline geçen her fırsatta göstermiştir', Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı, 28 February 2015.

In July 2008, before the AKP 'narrowly escaped – just one vote short of – the necessary consensus [within Turkey's highest court] that would have seen the AKP closed, and its leading figures banned from politics',[1078] Erdoğan reiterated on several occasions that 'our strength comes from the people.'[1079] As one pro-AKP columnist put it, 'since Erdoğan is well aware that the concept of legitimacy is a significant component of the Western definition of democracy, he frequently emphasized the "legitimate" government that derives its legitimacy from the "democratic" elections, i.e., from the people – when discussing Gezi [protests] or corruption investigations [against Erdoğan's family and cabinet on December 17, 2013,[1080]]. Erdoğan also urged the West to defend democracy and Egypt's Morsi government, which he described as an 'elected and legitimate one.'[1081]

After the Tunisian president, Kais Saied, seized power and dissolved parliament, he and Ghannouchi went head-to-head, exchanging arguments about 'political legitimacy'.[1082] For instance, Ghannouchi called Saied's actions 'a coup against legitimacy'.[1083] Riad Al-Shuaibi, political adviser to Ennahda, declared that Ennahda was committed to peaceful protests to restore 'constitutional legitimacy'.[1084] In response to President Saied's decision to prosecute members of the dissolved parliament, including Ghannouchi, for their 'illegal'

[1078] Robert Tait, 'Turkey's governing party avoids being shut down for anti-secularism', *Guardian*, 31 July 2008.
[1079] 'Kapatma davası bitmeden meclis tatile çıkmayacak', *Dünya Gazetesi*, 11 June 2008.
[1080] Nick Tatterstall and Daren Butler, 'Turkey dismisses corruption case that has dogged PM Erdogan', *Reuters*, 2 May 2014.
[1081] Yusuf Selman İnanç, 'Avrupa Erdoğan'ı anladı mı?' *Sabah*, 24 January 2014.
[1082] 'al-shariyya al-siyasati tusheil siraean bayn kais saeid wa rachid al-ghannouchi', *Attounisiyoun*, 29 April 2022.
[1083] 'saeid yumaris aldughuta… al-ghannouchi: nihayat al-inqilab a'laa al-shariyya batat wa shikatan', *Al Araby*, 05 June 2022.
[1084] 'mustashar al-ghannouchci:mutamasikun bi'leawdat 'iilaa al-shariyya al-dusturiya', *Afrigate News*, 10 January 2022.

meetings and 'conspiracy against the state', Ennahda condemned the decision in a written statement and 'stressed the legitimacy of the parliament'.[1085]

Legitimacy had always been a critical component of Islamist discourse, but the context in which it is applied has evolved. For Islamists at the turn of the twentieth century, Western dominance and colonisation were seen as illegitimate. The struggle continued after the Western powers left because the newly formed nation-states were based on the European model and led by secular authoritarian regimes backed by the West. Islamists saw the ruling regimes as dependent still on the colonial powers and, thus, inherently illegitimate. The illegitimacy also stemmed from their adoption of a Western-style, 'manmade' governance following nationalist, socialist or capitalist principles.[1086] Qutb and Maududi advocated for '*hakimiyya Allah* – God's sovereignty' partially because they saw it as a remedy for 'Western materialism, which [they] saw as the chief contaminant, [enslaving] men to their passions, and to consumerism, and [pitting] individual against individual in a system of competition'.[1087] In this regard, God's sovereignty would shield society from the 'side effects' of capitalism. Qutb's Islamism rested on three pillars: 'divine *sharia* versus human law, social justice versus materialism, and revolutionary Muslim societies versus *jahili* (ignorant, pre-Islamic) societies.'[1088]

By the beginning of the 21st century, however, the Islamists' grasp of sovereignty for God started 'to being interpreted in the newly dominant terms of neoliberalism, as a form of

[1085] 'ennahda tarfud muhakamat zaeimiha rachid al-ghannouchi wa tawkid 'alaa shariyya', *Business News Arabi*, 04 April 2022.
[1086] Shahram Akbarzadeh, 'The paradox of political Islam' in *Routledge handbook of political Islam*, ed. Shahram Akbarzadeh (London: Routledge, 2012), 5–7.
[1087] Michaelle L. Browers, 'Islamic Political Ideologies' in *The Oxford handbook of political ideologies*, ed. Michael Freeden, Lyman Tower Sargent and Marc Stears (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 632.
[1088] S. Qutb, *Al-Mustaqbal li Hadha al-Din* (Cairo: Maktabat Wahda, 1965), 32–35. cited in Moussalli, 'Sayyid Qutb: founder of radical Islamic political ideology', 15.

economic or social management devoid of old-fashioned politics.[1089] What had been reserved for the divine was now given to the ballot box. Being part of a 'manmade government' in a capitalist realm or employing the concept of legitimacy within the framework of a majoritarian interpretation of democracy, that is, treating the ballot box as the main provider of legitimacy, is no longer even questioned. As the FJP's official newspaper showed at the end of 2011, the MB's age-old slogan of 'Islam is the solution' was transformed into 'Elections are the solutions (*al-intikhabat hiyya al-hal!)*'.[1090]

To achieve the goals of crisis evasion and legitimacy, the Islamists in question – the MB, Ennahda and the AKP - utilised the frames of 'the Turkish model, Muslim/conservative democracy'. We should think of these concepts as 'picture frames [that] focus attention by punctuating or specifying what in our sensual field is relevant and what is irrelevant, what is "in frame" and what is "out of frame" in relation to the object of orientation'.[1091] In the frame are success through neoliberal policies and economic growth at all costs; out of the frame are Islamist codes. The Islamists' repertoire of metaphors, symbols, narratives and rituals from which they draw from to define themselves, to represent their rivals and their allies, and to identify the problems and the solutions they propose[1092] were seemingly inadequate to tackle the crises ahead – hence the attempt to learn from the experience of the AKP. I argue that the absence of Islamist concepts to find pre-emptive solutions to the challenges ahead is structural, rather than an attempt to conceal a covert intention to Islamise the state. The endeavours of the MB and Ennahda to be perceived as legitimate,

[1089] Devji and Kazmi, *Islam after liberalism*, 7.
[1090] In 'al-hurriyya wa-l- 'adala', 22 November 2011, cited in Neil Ketchley, *Egypt in Time of Revolution: Contentious Politics and the Arab Spring* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 78.
[1091] David A. Snow, 'Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields' in *Blackwell companion to social movements*, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah Anne Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), 384.
[1092] Aurélie Campana and Cédric Jourde, *Islamism and social movements in North Africa, the Sahel and beyond: transregional and local perspectives*, Routledge studies in Mediterranean politics; 7, (London; New York: Routledge, 2018), 4.

'normal' actors resulted in them becoming political parties in a neoliberal mould, with the state viewed as a mere machine in a Hobbesian sense. The principle of parsimony drives my argument here: Islamist entities react to opportunities for power and success in the same way as any other contemporary political party on the ideological spectrum. There is nothing exceptional about their aspirations or methods when opportunities for power arise.

As this research demonstrates, the main driver of transformation within today's Islamist parties is their goal of retaining economic and political power. When we consider French historian Fernand Braudel's definition of the components of capitalism – 'a striving for power, economic and political, and a suppression of competition, as well as wealth',[1093] Islamists became standard capitalist agents. In a similar vein, one feature shared by neoliberal systems around the world is that the government becomes the business itself, with governance reduced to 'an exercise in the technical management of capital [thus ideologically founded politics appear dead], replaced by the politics of interest, entitlement, and identity – three counterpoints of a single triangle'.[1094] In this triangle, political leaders serve as the CEOs of a holding company that governs the conduct of entrepreneurs, whose consumption is also considered as production.[1095] The Islamist leaders took the path most travelled and attempted to act in the same way as any political leader in a neoliberal zone. In other words, their political interests – and the opportunity structures that surrounded those interests – compelled them to become 'CEOs of Islam'. For example, Jordanian Islamic Action Front's (IAF) executive member, Ibrahim Mansi, referred to the famously neoliberal AKP as the IAF's star model, [while] the party's

[1093] Martin Hellwig, ''Capitalism: what has gone wrong?': Who went wrong? Capitalism? The market economy? Governments? 'Neoliberal' economics?' *Oxford review of economic policy* 37, no. 4 (2021): 665.
[1094] John Comaroff, 'The End of Neoliberalism?: What Is Left of the Left', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 637, no. 1 (2011): 146.
[1095] Foucault, Senellart and Burchell, *The birth of biopolitics: lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–79*, 226.

General Secretary, Muhammad Awad al-Zayyid, stated that the party's main slogan was a pledge to run the country like a business.[1096]

Prominent scholar of ideology Michael Freeden, in his morphological framework, urges us to depict a room when outlining an ideology. A room contains non-negotiable core elements that distinguish it from other rooms. A kitchen must have a cooker and a sink; however, it can borrow a table and a chair from the dining room or – if it is a contemporary open-plan kitchen that caters to the daily practicalities of its inhabitants – even a couch and television from the living room, and perhaps a bookcase from the study. These borrowed items are the adjacent elements of the kitchen. The non-negotiable sink and cooker remain but may be covered. The priorities in the design of the kitchen may change, in that the table may be the centrepiece rather than the cooker, and the permeability with other rooms may continue or increase.

Priority, Proximity, Proportionality and Permeability are the 4Ps used by Freeden to construe the internal layout of ideologies. The change of priorities within an ideology, the permeability of its nature – the continuous borrowing from other ideologies – and the proximity of new ideas to the core premise define the contextual transformation of any ideology. Similarly, 'proportionality refers to the relative weight that the conceptual components of an ideology possess, and the impact and centrality attributed to it within one ideology in contrast to its downplaying in another'[1097] This framework can duly be applied to the analysis of Islamism.

[1096] Powers, 'Run the country like a business?' The economics of Jordan's Islamic action front', *Critical research on religion* 7, no. 1 (2019).
[1097] Michael Freeden, 'The Morphological Analysis of Ideology', in *The Oxford handbook of political ideologies*, ed. Michael Freeden, Lyman Tower Sargent and Marc Stears (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 134.

Scholars of ideology since Marx have underscored the demarcation between religion and ideology and the belief that ideologies must be autonomous – free from religious doctrines – in forming a political project.[1098] This approach stems partly from the way ideologies emerged as a modern phenomenon and how Marx positioned religion with regard to ideologies. Browers argues that Islamism's relationship to the Quran as source material should not be considered very different from, say, liberalism's relationship to John Stuart Mills's corpus or socialism's interaction with Marx's teachings: 'Before one respond that words of God, unlike words of men and women, can be contested, consider the fact that the Quran provides very little in the way of specific political programs and maxims. The ideologisation of the Quran requires considerable effort (*ijtihad*, independent reasoning) on the part of its committed believers and has revealed multiple variants.'[1099] This is exactly why Islamism should be treated as a modern ideology similar to, for instance, nationalism. The faces, hues, strategies, and short-term goals of Islamism may transform as this thesis attempted to demonstrate, but so do those of all the other macro-, thick-centred ideologies.

According to Freeden's morphological framework, the core of Islamism is the Islamisation of the sovereign – the state – and society. The order of these objectives may differ between Islamists and, over time, so does the definition of what Islamisation entails. Islamist parties, especially after the Arab Spring, stopped clinging to 'the ideological absolutism of [slogans such as] Islam is the solution […] and started to work towards the discovery of a much more pragmatic manner of conducting politics.'[1100] Ennahda's ideological revision after 2011, which 'recast the role of Islam and asserted a cultural Islamic identity in its

[1098] Browers, 'The secular bias in ideology studies and the case of Islamism', 79.
[1099] Browers, 'The secular bias in ideology studies and the case of Islamism', 86.
[1100] Ibid.

discourse'[1101] is congruous with Bayat's post-Islamism concept and 'supports Roy's essential argument that the unification of the religious and the political was no more than an Islamic myth because the idealised Islamic State was never achieved, thereby leaving the religious and political spheres autonomous'.[1102]

Similarly, Roy contends that the Islamisation – of the state and/or society – should be contextualised according to the modernisation of the day. For example, during the Islamic revolution in Iran, modernisation meant ethnocentricity and advocated for a linear path from tradition to secular modernity. However, this path has become blurred by social and cultural change and no longer builds on the dichotomy between religion and secularism.[1103]

Ismail, on the other hand, claims that 'moderate Islamism's aim is to capture society, not just the state. In this respect, it has succeeded.'[1104] In my opinion, the Islamist movements to which Ismail refers – especially the AKP and Ennahda – delegated their goal of 'capturing society' to civil society. The emphasis on tactics for success among Islamist actors studied in this research proves that Islamism's repertoire of solutions (however ambiguous they may have been) were sidelined and that one of the core activities of Islamism – that is, preaching *dawa* – was outsourced and individualised to television programmes and smartphone applications.[1105]

Given the evolution of Islamist movements and the manifestations of their ideology in different national contexts over time, we should acknowledge that Islamism is a dynamic

[1101] McCarthy, *Inside Tunisia's al-Nahda*, 173.
[1102] McCarthy, *Inside Tunisia's al-Nahda*, 165.
[1103] Roy, *Globalized Islam*, 19.
[1104] Salwa Ismail, *Rethinking Islamist Politics: Culture, the State and Islamism* (London New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 169.
[1105] Interview with Noureddine Arbaoui, Tunis, 20 December 2019.

social phenomenon replete with contradictions.[1106] Coherence can be flexible within an ideology as well, and cores are 'quasi-contingent foundations: they constitute a structural necessity, but their contents are mutable'.[1107] There are certainly limits to the extent of the transformation of the core contents and the flexibility of coherence. As Heywood contends, 'there must be a point in which, by abandoning a particularly cherished principle or embracing a previously derided theory, an ideology loses its identity, or perhaps, is absorbed into a rival ideology. Could liberalism remain liberalism if it abandoned its commitment to liberty?'[1108] The answer is no. Therefore, it would be incongruous and an overstatement to argue that Islamism is detached from its foundational element, that is, Islam. However, the allegiance to the foundational element could, at times, be merely emotional; it has the ability to hold the centre of the ideology but may be eliminated when designing a political strategy of action.[1109] If we define Islamism as an ideology whose main objective is to build an Islamic order and a religious state that implements *sharia* law and organises its society through moral codes, then we have been witnessing a break with these goals as the post-Islamism framework has been displaying. Yet an Islamist party or movement can abandon these objectives while remaining Islamist. The appeal of Islamist parties in the post-Arab Uprising era demonstrated that Islamism did not collapse but, rather, as Bayat argues, underwent a metamorphosis. Islamists abandoned their goals of an Islamist state because that 'road was blocked'[1110], but they redeployed religious significations in other fields. However, such redeployment leads to 'a continual dilution of Islamism'.[1111]

[1106] Akbarzadeh, 'The paradox of political Islam', 1.
[1107] Michael Freeden, 'Editorial: Fundaments and foundations in ideologies', *Journal of political ideologies* 10, no. 1 (2005): 6.
[1108] Heywood, *Political ideologies*, 13.
[1109] Freeden, 'Editorial: Fundaments and foundations in ideologies' 7.
[1110] Salwa Ismail, *Rethinking Islamist Politics*, 161.
[1111] Ibid.

Ideological malleability is a decisive attribute that shapes the present political world, but it would also mould that certain ideology's future.[1112] Islamism's malleability, the goals and the strategies of the Islamists are 'contingent on opportunity structures […] and dynamics of their interaction with the state and other social and political actors',[1113] similar to any other social and political movement.

I do not claim that the core element of Islamism – Islamising state and society – has vanished but suggest that it has receded into the background at this historical juncture. As Skinner et al. argue, the role of conventions and the position of ideological actors in relation to power are key factors in transforming the inner concepts of ideologies.[1114] Therefore, it is not surprising that the morphology of Islamism has been rearranged – the core concepts such as Islamising the state, the legislature and, consequently, society – are partially or fully covered; the adjacent and peripheral concepts are redefined.
Using Freeden's kitchen analogy, I argue that the sink and the cooker are no longer the main attractions of 'the Islamist kitchen.' The inhabitants, for now, use the modern services of takeaway or deliveries. There is no cooking, no washing up. The dinner table, borrowed from the living or dining room, is now the centre of the action. The cooker and the sink are still there; if we look closely, we can make out their silhouettes and locations, but they are not in use as they were at the beginning of the 20th century. The dinner table, in my depiction, represents the neoliberal mindset that rules almost every room in every house in every country. In this context, Islamists are not unique or different. They do not

[1112] Michael Freeden, *Ideologies and political theory : a conceptual approach*, Ebook central, (Oxford : New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1996), 111.
[1113] Ismail, *Rethinking Islamist Politics*, 176.
[1114]Quentin Skinner, 'Some Problems in the Analysis of Political Thought and Action,' *Political theory* 2, no. 3 (1974): 292–300, cited in Jonathan Leader Maynard, 'A map of the field of ideological analysis,' *Journal of Political Ideologies* 18, no. 3 (2013): 303.

aim to rearrange their house, neither do they possess the repertoire of ideas, projects, or strategies to do that. Today's mainstream Islamists do not choose to position themselves in opposition to Western ideals or institutions, resisting the rhetoric of the clash of civilisations that earlier orthodox generations embraced 'but in fact constitute part of the West's ideological diversity'.[1115] They devote little effort to fighting the ideals of secularism, even though they do not embrace them; for them, the priority is to be perceived as successful. The gospel of success, even if it means diluting Islamism's main credos, seeks to silence the rumblings of decades that Islamists have failed in their strategy and their attempt to construct an intellectually consistent and credible project.

[1115] Sami Zubaida, *Beyond Islam: a new understanding of the Middle East*, Library of modern Middle East studies; 84, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 114.

APPENDIX

1. Figure



Caption: The MB's Freedom and Justice Party's official party newspaper 'Freedom and Justice (*al-hurriya wal 'adala*) on 22 October 2011, featuring an interview with Jehan Sadat, the wife of former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, announced as the top headline with her quote: 'I wish Ikhwan's party would be like Erdoğan's party.

2. Figure



Caption: Erdoğan was cheered by a crowd with banners when he arrived in Cairo on 12 September 2011.

Source: The Globe Post.

3. Figure



Caption: ‘Hand in hand for a common future, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’ is the slogan on the billboards in Cairo ahead of Erdoğan’s first visit after the fall of President Hosni Mubarak.

Source: Anadolu Ajansı.

4. Figure



Caption: I can't recommend what the Egyptian people should choose but if I were an Egyptian, I would choose Abd Al-Moneim Abu Al-Futuh – Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Source: Provided by an interviewee who was a former AKP MP.

5. Figure



Caption: The Rabaa sign designed by a Turkish graphic designer Saliha Eren.

Source: Hürriyet Newspaper

6. Figure



Caption: The picture used for the Twitter campaign that young Turkish Islamists used after the massacre in Rabia Square.

Source: Provided by one of the campaigners.


7. Figure



Caption: Pro-Morsi demonstrations in Cairo.

Source: Wikipedia page titled ‘Post-coup unrest in Egypt (2013-2014).’

8. Figure



Caption: Memorabilia from the pro-Morsi demonstrations in Cairo, 30 June 2013: ‘Legitimacy is a red line.’

Source: Willi, Victor J. 2016. “The Fourth Ordeal: A History of the Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, 1973-2013.” PhD thesis. University of Oxford: 26.

9. Figure



Caption: Memorabilia from the pro-Morsi demonstrations in Cairo, 30 June 2013: ‘There is no alternative to legitimacy.’

Source: Willi, Victor J. 2016. “The Fourth Ordeal: A History of the Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, 1973-2013.” PhD thesis, University of Oxford: 26.

Bibliography

Abdelrahman, Maha M. "A Hierarchy of Struggles? The 'Economic' and the 'Political' in Egypt's Revolution." *Review of African political economy* 39, no. 134 (2012): 614-28.

Abdelrahman, Maha M. *Egypt's Long Revolution: Protest Movements and Uprisings.* London: Routledge, 2014.

Abrahamian, Ervand *The Coup: 1953, the Cia, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations.* The New Press, 2015.

Adaman, Fikret, Murat Arsel, and Bengi Akbulut, "Neoliberal developmentalism, authoritarian populism, and extractivism in the countryside: the Soma mining disaster in Turkey," *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 46, no. 3 (2019).

Adams, Glenn, Sara Estrada-Villalta, Daniel Sullivan, and Hazel Rose Markus. "The Psychology of Neoliberalism and the Neoliberalism of Psychology." *Journal of Social Issues* 75, no. 1 (2019): 189-216.

Adas, Emin Baki. "The Making of Entrepreneurial Islam and the Islamic Spirit of Capitalism." *Journal for cultural research* 10, no. 2 (2006): 113-37.

Adly, Amr. "Between Social Populism and Pragmatic Conservatism." In *Egypt's Revolutions: Politics, Religion, and Social Movements*, edited by Bernard and Lacroix Stephane Rougier, 61-80. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

Ahmed, Huda Hadi and Al-Suwaidani Hamid Mohammed Taha "Al-Siyasa Al-Turkia Tujah Afriqia Fi 'Ahd Hizb Al-'Adala Wa Al-Tanmiya." *College of Education for Women* 30, 4 (2019).

Ajami, Fouad. "The Arab Spring at One: A Year of Living Dangerously." *Foreign Affairs* 91, no. 2 (2012): 56-65.

Akbarzadeh, Shahram. "The Paradox of Political Islam." In *Routledge Handbook of Political Islam*, edited by Shahram Akbarzadeh. London: Routledge, 2012.

Akdoğan, Yalçın. *AK Parti ve Muhafazakar Demokrasi*. İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2004.

Akçalı, Emel. "Introduction: Neoliberal Governmentality and the Future of the State in the Middle East and North Africa." In *Neoliberal Governmentality and the Future of the State in the Middle East and North Africa*, edited by Emel Akçali. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

Aktas, Elvan. "The Rise and the Fall of the Turkish Economic Success Story under Akp (JDP)." *Dynamics of Muslim Life* 11, no. 2 (2017): 171-83.

Altuntaş-Çakır, Ravza. "Umma: A Modern Turkish Approach." *The Muslim World* 109, no. 3. 2019.

Al-Affendi, Abdelwahab. "Umma, State and Movement: Events That Shaped the Modern Debate." In *Political Islam : Context Versus Ideology*, edited by Khalid Harub. SOAS Middle East issues; London, England: Saqi, 2010.

Al- Ghannouchi, Rachid. *al-huriyyat al- 'ammah fi al-dawla al-islamiyya* (Beirut: Markaz Dirasat Al-Arabiyya, 1993.

Al-Kadi, Alia. "Between Foreign Policy and the Umma: The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan," *The Muslim world (Hartford)* 109, no. 3 (2019).

Al-Anani, Khalil. "Devout Neoliberalism?! Explaining Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood's Socio-Economic Perspective and Policies." 13, no. 4 (2020): 748-67.

Al-Anani, Khalil. *Inside the Muslim Brotherhood: Religion, Identity, and Politics.* Oxford University Press, 2016.

Al-Anani, Khalil. "The ‘Anguish’ of the Muslim Brotherhood." In *Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring : Rethinking Democratization*, edited by Larbi Sadiki, 227 - 39. London: Routledge, 2016.
Al-Anani, Khalil. "Upended Path: The Rise and Fall of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood." *The Middle East Journal* 69, no. 4 (2015): 527-27.
Al-Awadi, Hesham. *The Muslim Brothers in Pursuit of Legitimacy: Power and Political Islam in Egypt under Mubarak.* London: I.B. Tauris, 2014).
Al-Azami, Usaama. "Locating Hakimiyya in Global History: The Concept of Sovereignty in Premodern Islam and Its Reception after Mawdūdī and Quṭb." *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (2021).
Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf. *Islamic Awakening between Rejection and Extremism.* International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2007.
Al-Siba’i, Mustafa. *Ishtirakiyat Al-Islam.* 2nd ed. Damascus: Mu’assasat al-Matba’at Al-‘Arabiyah, 1960.
Al-Azami, Usaama. "Abdullah Bin Bayyah and the Arab Revolutions: Counter-Revolutionary Neo-Traditionalism’s Ideological Struggle against Islamism." *The Muslim world (Hartford)* 109, no. 3 (2019): 343-61.
Al-Rodhan, Nayef R. F., Graeme P. Herd, and Lisa Watanabe. *Critical Turning Points in the Middle East : 1915 -2015.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
Alterman, Jon B. "Free Markets, Free Muslims," *Foreign Affairs;* 88, no. 6 (2009).
Amin, Samir. "Political Islam in the Service of Imperialism." *Monthly Review* 59, no. 7 (2007): 1-19.
Applebaum, Anne. *Twilight of Democracy : The Failure of Politics and the Parting of Friends.* London: Allen Lane, 2020.
Aras, Bülent. "The Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy." *Insight Turkey* 11, no. 3 (2009): 127-42.
Armbrust, Walter. *Martyrs and Tricksters : An Ethnography of the Egyptian Revolution.* Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics ; 75. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019.
Armbrust, Walter. "The Revolution against Neoliberalism." In *The Dawn of the Arab Uprisings: End of an Old Order?*, edited by Bassam Haddad, Bsheer, Rosie, Abu-Rish, Ziad, Owen, Roger. London: Pluto Press, 2012.
Asad, Talal. *Secular Translations : Nation-State, Modern Self, and Calculative Reason.* Ruth Benedict Book Series. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2019.
Atasoy, Yıldız. *Islam’s Marriage with Neoliberalism : State Transformation in Turkey.* London: Palgrave Macmillan UK : Imprint: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
Atia, Mona. ""A Way to Paradise": Pious Neoliberalism, Islam, and Faith-Based Development." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 102, no. 4 (2012): 808-27.
Atiyas, Izak, Ozan Bakış, Esra Çeviker Gürakar, "Anatolian Tigers and the Emergence of the Devout Bourgeoisie in the Turkish Manufacturing Industry," in *Crony capitalism in the Middle East : business and politics from liberalization to the Arab Spring*, ed. Ishac Diwan, Malik, M. Adeel, and Atiyas, Izak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 94.
Ayoob, Mohammed. "Political Islam: Image and Reality." *World Policy Journal* 21, no. 3 (2004): 1-14.
Ayubi, Nazih N. M. *Political Islam : Religion and Politics in the Arab World.* London: Routledge, 1991.
Azmah, Aziz. *Islams and Modernities.* 3rd ed. London: Verso, 2009
Babb, Sarah. *Managing Mexico : Economists from Nationalism to Neoliberalism.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018.

Baker, Raymond William. *Islam without Fear : Egypt and the New Islamists.* Cambridge, Mass. ; London: Harvard University Press, 2003.
Bali, Aslı Ü., 'A Turkish model for the Arab Spring?', *Middle East Law and Governance,* Vol.3, Issue 1-2 (2011).
Balibar, Étienne. "Absolute Capitalism." In *Mutant Neoliberalism: Market Rule and Political Rupture*, edited by William Callison and Zachary Manfredi. New York: Fordham University Press, 2019.
Balkan, Neşecan, Balkan, Erol and Öncü, Ahmet. *The Neoliberal Landscape and the Rise of Islamist Capital in Turkey*. New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2015.
Bank, Andre and Roy Karadag. "The 'Ankara Moment': the politics of Turkey's regional power in the Middle East, 2007-11." *Third World Quarterly* 34, no. 2 (2013).
Bank, Andre. "The Study of Authoritarian Diffusion and Cooperation: Comparative Lessons on Interests Versus Ideology, Nowadays and in History." *Democratization: Clusters of Authoritarian Diffusion and Cooperation: The Role of Interests vs. Ideology?* 24, no. 7 (2017): 1345-57.
Banu, Da Ta. "Constructing The "Arab Spring": News Discourses in Turkish Newspapers." *Global Media Journal* 6, no. 2 (2013): 19-33.
Bartal, Shaul. "Sheikh Qaradawi and the Internal Palestinian Struggle Issues Preventing Reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas and the Influence of the Qaradāwi Era over the Struggle between the Organizations." *Middle Eastern Studies* 51, no. 4 (2015): 585-99.
Başaran, Ezgi. *Frontline Turkey : the conflict at the heart of the Middle East*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2017.
Başkan, Filiz. "The Rising Islamic Business Elite and Democratization in Turkey." *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 12, no. 4 (2010): 399-416.
Bassiouni, M. Cherif. *Chronicles of the Egyptian Revolution and Its Aftermath : 2011-2016.* Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
Bassiouni, M. Cherif. "Egypt's Unfinished Revolution." In *Civil Resistance in the Arab Spring : Triumphs and Disasters*, edited by Adam Roberts, Michael J. Willis, Rory McCarthy and Timothy Garton Ash. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
Bayat, Asef, and Linda Herrera. *Being Young and Muslim : New Cultural Politics in the Global South and North.* New York ; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Bayat, Asef. "Activism and Social Development in the Middle East." *Inter. J. Middle East Stud.* 34, no. 1 (2002): 1-28.
Bayat, Asef. "Arab Revolts: Islamists Aren't Coming!" *Insight Turkey* 13, no. 2 (2011): 9-14.
Bayat, Asef. *Life as Politics : How Ordinary People Change the Middle East.* Second ed. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2013.
Bayat, Asef. "Islamism and Social Movement Theory." *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 6 (2005): 891-908.
Bayat, Asef. "The Coming of a Post-Islamist Society." *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies*, no. 9 (1996): 43-52.
Bayat, Asef. "The Arab Spring and Its Surprises." *Development and Change* 44, no. 3 (2013): 587-601Bayat, Asef. *Making Islam Democratic : Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn.* Stanford Studies in Middle Eastern and Islamic Societies and Cultures. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007.
Bayat, Asef. "Plebeians of the Arab Spring." *Current anthropology* 56 (2015).
Bayat, Asef. *Post-Islamism : The Changing Faces of Political Islam.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Bayat, Asef. *Revolution without Revolutionaries : Making Sense of the Arab Spring.* Stanford Studies in Middle Eastern and Islamic Societies and Cultures. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2017.
Bayat, Asef. *Revolutionary Life : The Everyday of the Arab Spring.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2021.
Beinin, Joel and Joe Stork. "On the Modernity, Historical Specifity, and International Context of Political Islam." In *Political Islam : Essays from Middle East Report*, edited by Joel Beinin and Joe Stork. London: Tauris, 1997.
Beinin, Joel, and Joe Stork. *Political Islam : Essays from Middle East Report.* London: Tauris, 1997.
Beinin, Joel. "Political Islam and the New Global Economy: The Political Economy of an Egyptian Social Movement." *The New Centennial Review* 5, no. 1 (2005): 111-39.
Bennett, Andrew, and Jeffrey T. Checkel. *Process Tracing : From Metaphor to Analytic Tool.* Strategies for Social Inquiry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Bell, Daniel. *The End of Ideology : On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties.* Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1960.
Benhabib, Seyla. "The new legitimation crises of Arab states and Turkey," *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 40, no. 4-5 (2014).
Benhaim, Yohanan, Kerem Öktem, "The rise and fall of Turkey's soft power discourse," *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, 21 (2015).
Ben Salem, Maryam. "“God Loves the Rich.” the Economic Policy of Ennahda: Liberalism in the Service of Social Solidarity." *Politics & Religion* 13, no. 4 (2020): 695-718.
Bergeaud-Blackler, Florence, Johan Fischer and John Lever. "Introduction: Studying the Politics of Global Halal Markets." In *Halal Matters : Islam, Politics and Markets in Global Perspective*, edited by Florence Bergeaud-Blackler, Lever, John, and Fischer, Johan London: Routledge, 2015.
Bermeo, Nancy. "Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship." Journal. *Comparative Politics* 24, no. 3 (1992): 273-91.
Bockman, Johanna, and Gil Eyal. "Eastern Europe as a Laboratory for Economic Knowledge: The Transnational Roots of Neoliberalism." *American Journal of Sociology* 108, no. 2 (2002): 310-52.
Bogaert, Koenraad. "Contextualizing the Arab Revolts: The Politics Behind Three Decades of Neoliberalism in the Arab World." *Middle East critique* 22, no. 3 (2013): 213-34.
Boin, Arjen, Allan McConnell, and Paul 't Hart. *Governing after Crisis : The Politics of Investigation, Accountability and Learning.* Cambridge Core. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Boltanski, Luc, Eve Chiapello, and Gregory Elliott. *The New Spirit of Capitalism.* New updated ed. London: Verso, 2018.
Bora, Tanıl and Kerem Ünüvar. "İslamcılık Ve Akp: Mazeret Ve Kibir." *Birikim Dergisi* July-August, no. 303-304 (2014).
Borg, Stefan. "The Arab Uprisings, the Liberal Civilizing Narrative and the Problem of Orientalism." *Middle East critique* 25, no. 3 (2016): 211-27.
Boubekeur, Amel. "Islamists, Secularists and Old Regime Elites in Tunisia: Bargained Competition." *Mediterranean Politics* 21, no. 1 (2016): pp107-27.
Boubekeur, Amel. "Post-Islamist Culture: A New Form of Mobilization?". *History of Religions* 47, no. 1 (2007): 75-94.

Böhmelt, Tobias, Lawrence Ezrow, Roni Lehrer, Hugh Ward. "Party Policy Diffusion." *American Political Science Review*,110, no. 2 (2016): 397-410.
Börzel, Tanja A., and Thomas Risse. "From Europeanisation to Diffusion: Introduction." *West European politics* 35, no. 1 (2012): 1-19.
Brenner, Neil, Jamie Peck, and N. I. K. Theodore. "Variegated Neoliberalization: Geographies, Modalities, Pathways." *Global networks* 10, no. 2 (2010): 182-222.
Brighi, Elisabetta, and Lilia Giugni. "Foreign Policy and the Ideology of Post-Ideology: The Case of Matteo Renzi's Partito Democratico." *The International Spectator* 51, no. 1 (2016): pp13-27.
Brooke, Steven, and Amr Darrag. *Politics or Piety? Why the Muslim Brotherhood Engages in Social Service Provision: A Conversation.* Brookings Institute (Washington: 2016).
Browers, Michaelle L. "Islamic Political Ideologies." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, edited by Michael Freeden, Lyman Tower Sargent and Marc Stears. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
Browers, Michaelle L. "The Secular Bias in Ideology Studies and the Case of Islamism." *Journal of political ideologies* 10, no. 1 (2005): 75-93.
Brown, Nathan J. *When Victory Becomes an Option:Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood Confronts Success.* Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2012).
Brown, Wendy. *In the Ruins of Neoliberalism : The Rise of Antidemocratic Politics in the West.* The Wellek Library Lectures. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2019.
Brumberg, Daniel. "Authoritarian Legacies and Reform Strategies in the Arab World." In *Political Liberalization & Democratization in the Arab World*, edited by Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany and Paul Noble. Boulder, Colo.; London: Lynne Rienner, 1995.
Bugari, Bojan. "Neoliberalism, Post-Communism, and the Law." *Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci.* 12, no. 1 (2016): 313-29.
Bulaç, Ali. *Din ve Siyaset.* İstanbul: İnkilap Yayınevi, 2014.
Bulaç, Ali. *Medine Sözleşmesi.* İstanbul: Çıra Yayınları, 2020.
Burke, Edmund Burke III, "Islam and Social Movements: Methodological Reflections." In *Islam, politics, and social movements*, edited by Edmund Burke III and Ira M. Lapidus. London: University of California Press, 1988.
Burgat, François. *Face to Face with Political Islam.* London: I. B. Tauris, 2003.
Burgat, François. "Islam and Islamist Politics in the Arab World : Old Theories, New Facts?". In *Islamist Politics in the Middle East : Movements and Change*, edited by Samer S. Shehata: Routledge, 2011.
Burgat, François, and Thomas Hill. *Understanding Political Islam.* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2019.
Burhani, Ahmad Najib. "Muslim Televangelists in the Making: Conversion Narratives and the Construction of Religious Authority." *The Muslim World: A Quarterly Review Of History, Culture, Religions & The Christian Mission In Islamdom* 110, no. 2 (2020): pp154-75.
Buzogany, Aron. "Illiberal democracy in Hungary: authoritarian diffusion or domestic causation?." *Democratization: Clusters of Authoritarian Diffusion and Cooperation: The Role of Interests vs. Ideology?* 24, no. 7 (2017).
Cammett, Melani and Ishac Diwan. *The Political Economy of the Arab Uprisings.* Boulder: Westview Press, 2014.
Cammett, Melani and Pauline Jones Luong. "Is There an Islamist Political Advantage?." *Annual review of political science (Palo Alto, Calif.)* 17 (2014): 187.

Campagna, Joel. "From accomodation to confrontation: the Muslim Brotherhood in the Mubarak years." *Journal of International Affairs* 50, no. 1 (1996): 278-304.
Campana, Aurélie, and Cédric Jourde. *Islamism and Social Movements in North Africa, the Sahel and Beyond : Transregional and Local Perspectives.* Routledge Studies in Mediterranean Politics ; 7. London ; New York: Routledge, 2018.
Carothers, Thomas. "The End of the Transition Paradigm." *Journal of democracy* 13, no. 1 (2002): 5-21.
Cavatorta, Francesco, and Fabio Merone. "Moderation through Exclusion? The Journey of the Tunisian Ennahda from Fundamentalist to Conservative Party." *Democratization* 20, no. 5 (2013): 857-75.
Cavatorta, Francesco. "Neither Participation nor Revolution: The Strategy of the Moroccan Jamiat Al-Adl Wal-Ihsan." *Mediterranean Politics* 12, no. 3 (2007): 381-97.
Cavatorta, Francesco, and Lise Storm. *Political Parties in the Arab World: Continuity and Change.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018.
Cavatorta, Francesco. "The Convergence of Governance: Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World and Downgrading Democracy Elsewhere?" *Middle East Critique: The Future of Middle Eastern Political Rule through Lenses of the Past: Revisiting the (first) Era of Post-Democratization* 19, no. 3 (2010): 217-32.
Cavatorta, Francesco, and Samir Amghar. "Symposium—Islamism, Islamist Parties, and Economic Policy-Making in the Neo-Liberal Age." *Politics & Religion* 13, no. 4 (2020): 685-94.
Cesari, Jocelyne. "Political Islam: More Than Islamism." *Religions* 12, no. 5 (2021): 299.
Chabot, Sean. "Dialogue Matters: Beyond the Transmission Model of Transnational Diffusion between Social Movements." In *The Diffusion of Social Movements : Actors, Mechanisms, and Political Effects*, edited by Rebecca Kolins Givan, Kenneth M. Roberts and Sarah Anne Soule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Chakravartty, Paula, and Sreela Sarkar. "Entrepreneurial Justice: The New Spirit of Capitalism in Emergent India." *Popular communication* 11, no. 1 (2013): 58-75.
Chamkhi, Tarek. "Neo-Islamism in the Post-Arab Spring." *Contemporary Politics* 20, no. 4 (2014): 453-68.
Cherribi, Sam, and S. Cherribi. *Fridays of Rage: Al Jazeera, the Arab Spring, and Political Islam.* Oxford University Press, 2017.
Christofis, Nikos. "The Akp's "Yeni Turkiye": Challenging the Kemalist Narrative?" *Mediterranean Quarterly : a Journal of Global Issues* 29, no. 3 (2018): 11.
Claret-Campana, Maria, Lampridi-Kemou, Athina "Islamist Forces in Contemporary Egypt: The End of Conventional Dualities." In *Political Islam in a Time of Revolt*, edited by Ferran Izquierdo, Etherington, John, and Feliu, Laura. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.
Clark, Janine. "Social Movement Theory and Patron-Clientelism:Islamic Social Institutions and the Middle Class in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen." *Comparative Political Studies* 37, no. 8 (2004): 941-68.
Collier, David. "Understanding Process Tracing." *PS, Political Science & Politics* 44, no. 4 (2011): 823-30.
Comaroff, Jean, and John L. Comaroff. *Millennial Capitalism and the Culture of Neoliberalism.* Durham: Duke University Press, 2001.
Comaroff, John. "The End of Neoliberalism?: What Is Left of the Left." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 637, no. 1 (2011): 141-47.

Cook, Steven. *Ruling but not governing : the military and political development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007.
Crouch, Colin. *Post-Democracy.* Themes for the 21st Century. Cambridge: Polity, 2004.
Crouch, Colin. "Post-Democracy and Populism." *The Political quarterly (London. 1930)* 90 (2019): 124-37.
Çavdar, Gamze. "Islamist New Thinking in Turkey: A Model for Political Learning?". *Political Science Quarterly* 121, no. 3 (2006): 477-97.
Çavdar, Gamze. "Islamist Rationality: An Assessment of the Rational Choice Approach." *Politics & Religion* 5, no. 3 (2012): 584-608.
Çınar, Menderes. "From Moderation to De-Moderation: Democratic Backsliding of the Akp in Turkye." In *The Politics of Islamism : Diverging Visions and Trajectories*, edited by J. L. Esposito, Rahim, Lily Zubaidah,Ghobazadeh, Naser. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.
Çınar, Menderes. *Siyasal Bir Sorun Olarak Islamcılık: Akp'nin 20 Yılı.* Ankara: Nika Yayınevi, 2021.
Dabashi, Hamid. *Being a Muslim in the World : Rethinking Islam for a Post-Western History.* Palgrave Pivot. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
Dabashi, Hamid. *The Arab Spring : The End of Postcolonialism.* London: Zed Books, 2012.
Dağı, İhsan. Post-Islamism a la Turca. In *Post-Islamism: the changing faces of political Islam* edited by Asef Bayat, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Darwich, May. "Creating the Enemy, Constructing the Threat: The Diffusion of Repression against the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East." *Democratization: Clusters of Authoritarian Diffusion and Cooperation: The Role of Interests vs. Ideology?* 24, no. 7 (2017): 1289-306.
Das, S. K. *Making the Poor Free?* : Oxford University Press, 2015.
Deeb, Lara, and Jessica Winegar. *Anthropology's Politics : Disciplining the Middle East.* Ebook Central. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2016.
De Leon Cedric, Desai Manali, and Tuğal Cihan. *Building Blocs : How Parties Organize Society.* Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2015.
Denoeux, Guilain. "The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam." [*Middle East policy* IX, no. 2 (2002): 56-81.
Devji, Faisal, and Zaheer Kazmi. *Islam after Liberalism.* London: Hurst & Company, 2017.
Diwan, Ishac, Philip Keefer, Marc Schiffbauer. "Crony Capitalism in Egypt." In *Crony Capitalism in the Middle East : Business and Politics from Liberalization to the Arab Spring*, edited by Ishac Diwan, Malik, M. Adeel, and Atiyas, Izak Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.
Doğan, A. Ekber, Yasin Durak. "Islami Burjuvazinin Yükselişi Ve Neoliberalizmin Toplumsallaştırılması: Iki Dindar Şehrin Başarı Hikayesinin Perde Arkası." In *'Yeni Türkiye'ye Varan Yol*, edited by İsmet Akça, Bekmen Ahmet, Özden Barış Alp. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2018.
Drevon, Jerome. "The Constrained Institutionalization of Diverging Islamist Strategies: The Jihadis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Salafis between Two Aborted Egyptian Revolutions." *Mediterranean Politics: Islamism and social movements in North Africa, the Sahel and Beyond: transregional and local perspectives* 22, no. 1 (2017): 16-34.
Ehteshami, Anoushiravan "Islam as a Political Force in International Politics." In *Islam in World Politics,* edited by Nelly and Anthony H. Johns. Lahoud. London: Routledge, 2005.

Eickelman, Dale F. "Trans-State Islam and Security." In *Transnational Religion and Fading States*, edited by Susanne Hoeber and James Piscatori. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997.
Eickelman, Dale F., and James Piscatori. *Muslim Politics.* Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics. First ed. Princeton, N.J. ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1996.
El Fadl, Khaled Abou "Egypt's Secularized Intelligentsia and the Guardians of Truth." In *Egypt and the Contradictions of Liberalism : Illiberal Intelligentsia and the Future of Egyptian Democracy*, edited by Dalia and Faruqi Fahmy, Daanish OneWorld, 2017.
El Fadl, Khaled Abou. "Failure of a Revolution: The Military, Secular Intelligentsia and Religion in Egypt's Pseudo-Secular State." In *Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring : Rethinking Democratization*, edited by Larbi Sadiki, 253-70. London: Routledge, 2016.
El Gannuşi, Raşid. *İslam Devletinde Kamusal Özgürlükler*. İstanbul: Mana Yayınları, 2012.
El Gannuşi, Raşid. *İslam Devletinde Kamusal Vatandaşlık Hakları.* İstanbul: Birleşik Yayıncılık, 1996.
El Gannuşi, Raşid. *Kur'an ve Yaşam Arasında Kadın.* Mana Yayınları, 2011.
El Gannuşi, Raşid. *Laiklik ve Sivil Toplum.* Mana Yayınları, 2010.
El Naggar, Shaimaa. "The Discursive Construction of Muslim Identities by Contemporary Muslim Televangelists in the West." ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2016.
El-Ghobashy, Mona. "The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers." *Int. J. Middle East Stud.* 37, no. 3 (2005): 373-95.
Elshobaki, Amr. "The Muslim Brotherhood - between Evangelizing and Politics." In *Islamist Politics in the Middle East : Movements and Change*, edited by Samer S. Shehata: Routledge, 2011.
Eralp, Doga Ulas, *Turkey as a Mediator: Stories of Failure and Success*, Pennslyvania: Lexington Book, 2016.
Erdem, Burcu Kaya, 'Adjustment of the secular Islamist role model (Turkey) to the 'Arab Spring': the relationship between the Arab uprisings and Turkey in the Turkish and world press,' *Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations*, 23:4 (2012), 435-452.

Esposito, J. L. "Moderate Muslims." In *Debating Moderate Islam: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West*, edited by M. A. Muqtedar Khan, 25-33: University of Utah Press, 2010.
Esposito, J. L., Lily Rahim, Naser Zubaidah Ghobazadeh. "Introduction: Theological Contestations and Political Coalition-Building." In *The Politics of Islamism : Diverging Visions and Trajectories*, ed. J. L. Esposito, Rahim, Lily Zubaidah, and Ghobazadeh, Naser, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
Esposito, John L., Sonn Tamara, John O. Voll. *Islam and Democracy After the Arab Spring*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.
Esposito, J. L., Lily Rahim, Naser Zubaidah Ghobazadeh. "Transformations." In *The politics of Islamism : diverging visions and trajectories*, ed. J. L. Esposito, Rahim, Lily Zubaidah,Ghobazadeh, Naser Basingstoke, Hampshire:: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.
Esposito, J. L., Lily Zubaidah Rahim, and Naser Ghobazadeh. *The Politics of Islamism : Diverging Visions and Trajectories.* Middle East Today. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.

Euben, Roxanne Leslie, and Muhammad Qasim Zaman. *Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought : Texts and Contexts from Al-Banna to Bin Laden.* Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics. Princeton, N.J. ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009.
Eyal, G., I. Szelényi, and E. Townsley. "The Theory of Post-Communist Managerialism." *New Left Review*, no. 222 (1997): 60-88.
Fawaz, Leila T. *An Occasion for War – Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860.* University of California Press., 1994.
Ferhavi, Fuad. "Abdullah Gül'ün Tunus Ziyareti: Ekonomik Öncelik Ve Bölgesel Eksen Ihtiyacı." *USAK Analiz* 19 (2012).
Foucault, Michel, Michel Senellart, and Graham Burchell. *The Birth of Biopolitics : Lectures at the Collège De France, 1978-79.* Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
Freeden, Michael. "Confronting the Chimera of a 'Post-Ideological' Age." *Critical review of international social and political philosophy* 8, no. 2 (2005): 247-62.
Freeden, Michael. "Editorial: Fundaments and Foundations in Ideologies." *Journal of political ideologies* 10, no. 1 (2005): 1-9.
Freeden, Michael. *Ideologies and Political Theory : A Conceptual Approach.* Oxford : New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1996.
Freeden, Michael. *Ideology : A Very Short Introduction.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Freeden, Michael. "The Morphological Analysis of Ideology." In *The Oxford Hanbook of Political Ideologies*, edited by Michael Freeden, Lyman Tower Sargent and Marc Stears. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
Fukuyama, Francis. "The End of History?". *The National Interest* 16 (1989).
Gana, Nouri. *The Making of the Tunisian Revolution : Contexts, Architects, Prospects.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013.
Gamal, Wael. *Lost Capital: The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's Neoliberal Transformation.* Carnegie Endowment Middle East Center (2019).
Gardner, Lloyd C. *The Road to Tahrir Square : Egypt and the United States from the Rise of Nasser to the Fall of Mubarak.* London: Saqi, 2011.
Gause, F. Gregory. "The Price of Order: Settling for Less in the Middle East." *Foreign Affairs* 101, no. 2 (Mar/Apr 2022).
George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences.* Bcsia Studies in International Security. Cambridge, Mass. ; London: MIT Press, 2005.
Gerges, Fawaz A. *Contentious Politics in the Middle East : Popular Resistance and Marginalised Activism Beyond the Arab Uprisings.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
Ghafar, Adel Abdel, Bill Hess *Islamist Parties in North Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt.* Brookings Institution (June 2018).
Gidengil, Elisabeth, and Ekrem Karakoç. "Which Matters More in the Electoral Success of Islamist (Successor) Parties – Religion or Performance? The Turkish Case." *Party Politics* 22, no. 3 (2016): 325-38.
Gill, Stephen. "The Constitution of Global Capitalism." The Capitalist World, Past and Present at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Los Angeles, 2000.
Gillan, Kevin. "Understanding Meaning in Movements: A Hermeneutic Approach to Frames and Ideologies," *Social movement studies* 7, no. 3 (2008).
Gilovich, Thomas, and Dale W. Griffin. *Heuristics and Biases : The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Givan, Rebecca Kolins, Kenneth M. Roberts, and Sarah Anne Soule. *The Diffusion of Social Movements : Actors, Mechanisms, and Political Effects.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Göçer, Derya and Marc Herzog, "Turkey and the Arab Uprisings," in *Routledge handbook of the Arab Spring : rethinking democratization*, ed. Larbi Sadiki (London: Routledge, 2016), 509.
Göle, Nilüfer. "Snapshots of Islamic Modernities." *Daedalus* 129, no. 1 (2000): 91.
Gramsci, Antonio, Quintin Hoare, and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci.* Selections from Prison Notebooks. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971.
Gümüşçü, Sebnem. "Class, Status, and Party: The Changing Face of Political Islam in Turkey and Egypt." *Comparative Political Studies* 43, no. 7 (2010): 835-61.
Simon, Herbert, A.. "Bounded Rationality." In *Utility and Probability*, edited by Milgate M. Eatwell J., Newman P.: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990.
Habibi, Nader. *The Economic Agendas and Expected Economic Policies of Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia.* Crown Center for Middle East Studies (2012).
Hackworth, Jason. "Religious Neoliberalism(S)." In *Faith Based*. Religious Neoliberalism and the Politics of Welfare in the United States, 30-47: University of Georgia Press, 2012.
Haenni, Patrick. "The Reasons for the Muslim Brotherhood's Failure in Power." In *Egypt's Revolutions*, edited by Bernard Rougier, Lacroix, Stéphane, and Rougier USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
Haenni, Patrick, and Tammam Husam. "Penser Dans L'au-Delà De L'islamisme." *Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée* 123, no. 123 (2008): 179-201.
Hale, William M. *Turkish foreign policy, 1774-2000.* London: Frank Cass, 2000.
Hamid, Shadi. "Political Party Development before and after the Arab Spring." In *Beyond the Arab Spring: The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East*, edited by Mehran Kamrava: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Hamid, Shadi. *Temptations of Power : Islamists and Illiberal Democracy in a New Middle East.* Ebook Central. Oxford, [England] ; New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Hanafi, Hassan. "Islamism: Whose Debate Is It?". In *Islamism : Contested Perspectives on Political Islam*, edited by Richard C. and Barzegar Martin, Abbas. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010.
Hanieh, Adam *Egypt's 'Orderly Economic Transition': Accelerated Structural Adjustment under a Democratic Veneer?* Centre for Development Policy and Research (SOAS, University of London: July 2011).
Harnisch, Chris, and Quinn Mecham. "Democratic Ideology in Islamist Opposition? The Muslim Brotherhood's 'Civil State'." *Middle Eastern Studies* 45, no. 2 (2009): 189-205.
Harvey, David. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Hecker, Pierre. "The 'Arab Spring' and the End of Turkish Democracy." In *Arab Spring : Modernity, Identity and Change*, edited by Eid Mohamed and Dalia Fahmy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.
Helbawy, Kamal "The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: Historical Evolution and Future Prospects." In *Political Islam : Context Versus Ideology*, edited by Khālid Ḥarūb. Soas Middle East Issues. London, England: Saqi, 2010.
Hellwig, Martin. "'Capitalism: What Has Gone Wrong?': Who Went Wrong? Capitalism? The Market Economy? Governments? 'Neoliberal' Economics?" *Oxford review of economic policy* 37, no. 4 (2021): 664-77.

Hendricks, Joshua D. ‘Globalization, Islamic Activism, and Passive Revolution in Turkey: The Case of Fethullah Gülen’ in eds. Balkan, Neşecan, Balkan, Erol and Öncü, Ahmet, *The Neoliberal Landscape and the Rise of Islamist Capital in Turkey*, New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2015.
Herrera, Linda. "Young Egyptians’ Quest for Jobs and Justice." In *Being Young and Muslim : New Cultural Politics in the Global South and North*, edited by Asef and Lisa Herrera Bayat. New York ; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Heywood, Andrew. *Political Ideologies : An Introduction.* London: Palgrave, 2017.
Hinnebusch, Raymond. "Introduction: Understanding the Consequences of the Arab Uprisings - Starting Points and Divergent Trajectories." *Democratization: From Arab Spring to Arab Winter: Explaining the limits of post-uprising democratisation - Guest Editor: Raymond Hinnebusch* 22, no. 2 (2015): 205-17.
Hinnebusch, Raymond A. "Political parties in MENA: their functions and development." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies: Political parties in the Middle East: historical trajectories and future prospects* 44, no. 2 (2017): 172.
Hoesterey, James Bourk. *Rebranding Islam : Piety, Prosperity, and a Self-Help Guru.* Studies of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2016.
Hoyle, Justin A. "A Matter of Framing: Explaining the Failure of Post-Islamist Social Movements in the Arab Spring." *Digest of Middle East Studies* 25, no. 2 (2016): 186-209.
Huffschmid, Jörg. *Economic policy for a social Europe : a critique of neo-liberalism and proposals for alternatives* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
Huntington, Samuel P. "Will More Countries Become Democratic?". *Political Science Quarterly* 131, no. 2 (2016): 237-66.
Ibrahim, Saad Eddin. "Toward Muslim Democracies," *Journal of democracy* 18, no. 2 (2007).

Iqtidar, Humeira. "Theorizing Popular Sovereignty in the Colony: Abul A'la Maududi's “Theodemocracy”." *The Review of politics* 82, no. 4 (2020): 595-617.
Islam, Maidul. *Limits of Islamism : Jamaat-E-Islami in Contemporary India and Bangladesh.* Cambridge Core. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Ismail, Salwa. *Rethinking Islamist Politics: Culture, the State and Islamism.* London New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006.
Izquierdo, Ferran, Etherington, John. "From Revolution to Moderation: The Long Road of Political Islam." In *Political Islam in a Time of Revolt (Islam and Nationalism*, edited by Ferran zquierdo, Etherington, John, and Feliu, Laura Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). 2017.
Izquierdo, Ferran, John Etherington, and Laura Feliu. *Political Islam in a Time of Revolt.* Islam and Nationalism. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.
İnsel, Ahmet. "The Akp and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey." *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 102, no. 2-3 (2003): 293-308.
Jawad, Nazek. "Democracy in Modern Islamic Thought," *British journal of Middle Eastern studies* 40, no. 3 (2013).
Joseph, Jonathan. *The Social in the Global : Social Theory, Governmentality and Global Politics.* Cambridge Studies in International Relations ; 122. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Joya, Angela. "Neoliberalism, the State and Economic Policy Outcomes in the Post-Arab Uprisings: The Case of Egypt." *Mediterranean politics (Frank Cass & Co.)* 22, no. 3 (2017): 339-61.

Kalın, İbrahim. "The AK Party in Turkey," in *The Oxford handbook of Islam and politics*, ed. John L. Esposito and Emad Eldin Shahin. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Kandil, Hazem. *Inside the Brotherhood.* Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015.
Kandil, Hazem. *The power triangle: Military, Security, and Politics in Regime Change*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.
Kandiyoti, Deniz. "The travails of the secular: puzzle and paradox in Turkey." *Economy and Society* 41, no. 4 2012.
Kamrava, Mehran. "The Rise and Fall of Ruling Bargains in the Middle East." In *Beyond the Arab Spring: The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East*, edited by Mehran Kamrava: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Karaatlı, Bülent. *Arap Baharı'nda Farklı Bir Ülke: Tunus.* Ankara: Nobel Yayınları, 2018.
Kara, İsmail. *Cumhuriyet Türkiye'sinde Bir Mesele Olarak Islam 1.* İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2019.
Kara, İsmail. *Cumhuriyet Türkiye'sinde Bir Mesele Olarak İslam 2.* İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2019.
Karagiannis, Emmanuel. *The New Political Islam : Human Rights, Democracy, and Justice*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018.
Kenney, Jeffrey T. "Selling Success, Nurturing the Self: Self-Help Literature, Capitalist Values, and the Sacralization of Subjective Life in Egypt." 47, no. 4 (2015): 663-80.
Kepel, Gilles. *Away from Chaos: The Middle East and the Challenge to the West.* New York: Columbia University Press, 2020.
Ketchley, Neil. *Egypty in Time of Revolution: Contentious Politics and the Arab Spring.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
Khan, M. A. Muqtedar. "Islamic Democracy and Moderate Muslims." In *Debating Moderate Islam: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West*, edited by M.A. Muqtedar Khan, 51-61.: University of Utah Press, 2010.
Khatib, Lina, and Ellen Lust. *Taking to the Streets : The Transformation of Arab Activism.* Baltimor: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014.
Kırkıncı, Mehmed. *Hayatım-Hatıralarım.* İstanbul: Zafer Yayınları.
Kısakürek, Necip, Fazıl. *Türkiye'nin Manzarası.* İstanbul: Büyük Doğu Yayınları, 1985.
King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. *Designing Social Inquiry : Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research.* Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994.
Kirişçi, Kemal. "The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State." *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40 (2009): 29-56.
Kirkpatrick, David D. *Into the Hands of the Soldiers : Freedom and Chaos in Egypt and the Middle East.* London: Bloomsbury Circus, 2018.
Kister, M. J. "Peygamberi'in Pazarı." *Cumhuriyet Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi dergisi* 6, no. 2 (2002): 25-30.
Koca, Bayram. "M. Hayri Kırbaşoğlu Ile Söyleşi: Islam, Sol Ve Akp." *Birikim Dergisi* July-August, no. 303-304 (2014).
Koselleck, Reinhart. *The practice of conceptual history: timing history, spacing concepts* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002).
Köseoğlu, Talha. "Islamists and the State: Changing Discourses on the State, Civil Society and Democracy in Turkey." *Turkish Studies* 20, no. 3 (2019/05/27 2019): 323-50.

Kramer, Gudrun. *Visions of an Islamic Republic: Good Governance According to the Islamists,* ed. Frederic Volpi, Political Islam : a critical reader, London: Routledge, 2011.
Krastev, Ivan. *Democracy Disrupted : The Politics of Global Protest.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014.
Kuppinger, Petra, Najib B. Hourani, and Ahmed Kanna. "Crushed? Cario's Garbage Collectors and Neoliberal Urban Politics." *Journal Of Urban Affairs* 36, no. 2 (2014): 621-33.
Kurzman, Charles, and Ijlal Naqvi. "Do Muslims Vote Islamic?". *Journal of democracy* 21, no. 2 (2010): 50-63.
Laremont, Ricardo René "Moving Past Revolution and Revolt: Transitions to Democracy in North Africa." In *Revolution, Revolt and Reform in North Africa : The Arab Spring and Beyond*, edited by Ricardo René Laremont. Abingdon, Oxon: New York: Routledge studies in Middle Eastern democratization and government, 2014.
Lenz, T. M. J. and Kalypso Nicolaidis, Kalypso. "EU-topia? A critique of the European Union as a model." *Culture, Practice & Europeanization* 4, no. 2 (2019): 92-95.
Lenz, T. M. J. "EU normative power and regionalism: Ideational diffusion and its limits." *Cooperation and conflict* 48, no. 2 (2013).
Lockman, Zachary. *Contending Visions of the Middle East : The History and Politics of Orientalism.* Contemporary Middle East ; 3. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Lord, Ceren. *Religious Politics in Turkey : From the Birth of the Republic to the Akp.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
Madi, Ozlem. "From Islamic Radicalism to Islamic Capitalism: The Promises and Predicaments of Turkish-Islamic Entrepreneurship in a Capitalist System." *Middle Eastern Studies* 50, no. 1 (2014): 144.
Mahdavi, Mojtaba. "Wither Post-Islamism: Revisiting the Discourse/Movement after the Arab Spring." In *Arab Spring : Modernity, Identity and Change*, edited by Eid Mohamed and Dalia Fahmy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.
Mahmood, Saba. *Politics of Piety : The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011.
Makdisi, Ussama *The Culture of Sectarianism – Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon.* University of California Press., 2000.
Mandaville, Peter. *Islam and Politics.* Third ed. London: Routledge, 2020.
Mandaville, Peter. "Post-Islamism as Neoliberalisation: New Social Movements in the Muslim World." In *Islam after Liberalism*, edited by Faisal and Kazmi Devji, London: Hurst & Company, 2017.
March, Andrew F. "Political Islam: Theory." *Annual Review of Political Science* 18, no. 1 (2015): 103-23.
Marks, Monica. *Convince, Coerce, or Compromise? Ennahda's Approach to Tunisia's Constitution.* Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper (February 2014).
Marks, Monica. "Tunisia's Islamists and the "Turkish Model"," *Journal of Democracy* 28, no. 1 (2017): 2.
Marschall, Melissa and Marwa Shalaby, Saadet Konak Unal. *Municipal Service Delivery, Identity Politics and Islamist Parties in Turkey.* POMEP Studies (September 2017).
Martin, Richard C., and Abbas Barzegar. *Islamism : Contested Perspectives on Political Islam.* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2010.
Martin, Richard C., and Abbas Barzegar. "Introduction: The Debate About Islamism in the Public Sphere." In *Islamism : Contested Perspectives on Political Islam*, edited by Richard C. and Barzegar Martin, Abbas Stanford: Stanford University Press), 2010.

Marzo, Pietro. "Critical Junctures, Path Dependence and Al-Nahda's Contribution to the Tunisian Transition to Democracy." *The Journal of North African Studies* 24, no. 6 (2019): 914-34.
Masoud, Tarek E. *Counting Islam : Religion, Class, and Elections in Egypt.* Problems of International Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
Maududi, Abul A'la. *Al Jihad Fil Islam.* Lahore: Idāra Tarjumān-ul-Qur'ān, 2007.
Maynard, Jonathan Leader. "A Map of the Field of Ideological Analysis." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 18, no. 3 (2013): 299-327.
McAdam, Douglas, John McCarthy, Mayer Zald. "Introduction: Opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes – toward a synthetic, comparative perspective on social movements," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framing*, ed. D. McAdam, J. McCarthy, and M. Zald, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
McCarthy, Rory. "The Tunisian Uprising, Ennahdha and the Revival of an Arab-Islamic Identity." In *Political Identities and Popular Uprisings in the Middle East*, edited by S. and Leech Holliday, P. . London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2016.
McCarthy, Rory. "Al-Nahda: From Preaching Circles to Politics." *The Middle East in London* 14, no. 1 (2018).
McCarthy, Rory. "When Islamists Lose: The Politicization of Tunisia's Al-Nahda Movement." *Middle East Journal* 72 (2018).
McCarthy, Rory. *Inside Tunisia's Al-Nahda : Between Politics and Preaching.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
McCarthy, Rory. "Re-Thinking Secularism in Post-Independence Tunisia." *The Journal of North African Studies* 19, no. 5 (2014/10/20 2014): 733-50.
McKenna, Christopher D. *The World's Newest Profession : Management Consulting in the Twentieth Century.* Cambridge Studies in the Emergence of Global Enterprise. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Mecham, Quinn. "Islamist Parties and Foreign Policy in North Africa: Bridging Ideology and Pragmatism." *The Journal of North African Studies* 24, no. 4 (2019/07/04 2019): 640-60.
Mecham, Quinn and Julie Chernow Hwag. "The New Dynamism of Islamist Parties." In *Islamist Parties and Political Normalization in the Muslim World*, edited by Quinn Mecham and Julie Chernov Hwang: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014.
Mellor, Noha. *Voice of the Muslim Brotherhood : Da'wa, Discourse, and Political Communication.* Routledge, 2017.
Metiner, Mehmet. *Yemyeşil Şeriat Bembeyaz Demokrasi.* Doğan Kitap, 2004.
Mohamed, Eid, and Dalia Fahmy. *Arab Spring : Modernity, Identity and Change.* Critical Political Theory and Radical Practice. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.
Moore, Barrington. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy [Electronic Resource] : Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World.* Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press, 1993.
Morlino, Leonardo. *Democracy between Consolidation and Crisis : Parties, Groups, and Citizens in Southern Europe.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Moussalli, Ahmad S. "Sayyid Qutb: Founder of Radical Islamic Political Ideology." In *Routledge Handbook of Political Islam*, edited by Shahram Akbarzadeh. London: Routledge, 2012.
Mudge, Stephanie Lee. "What Is Neoliberalism?" *Socio-economic review* 6, no. 4 (2008): 703-31.
Müller, Jan-Werner. *What Is Populism?* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016.

Mura, Andrea. "A Genealogical Inquiry into Early Islamism: The Discourse of Hasan Al-Banna." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 17, no. 1 (2012/02/01 2012): 61-85.
Murphy, Emma C. "The Tunisian Elections of October 2011: A Democratic Consensus." *The Journal of North African Studies* 18, no. 2 (2013): 231-47.
Navaro-Yashin, Yael. *Faces of the state : secularism and public life in Turkey* (Princeton, N.J. ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002), 223-24.
Navaro-Yashin, Yael. "The Market for Identities: Secularism, Islamism, Commodities," in *Fragments of culture : the everyday of modern Turkey*, ed. Deniz Kandiyoti and Ayşe Saktanber (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002).
Nasr, Vali. *The Rise of Islamic Capitalism (Previously Published as Forces of Fortune).* New York: Free Press, 2009.
Netterstrom, Kasper Ly. "The Islamists' Compromise in Tunisia." *Journal of Democracy* 26, no. 4 (2015): 110-24.
O'Donnell, Christopher J. *Productivity and Efficiency Analysis : An Economic Approach to Measuring and Explaining Managerial Performance*. Singapore: Springer, 2018.
Ong, Aihwa. *Neoliberalism as Exception [Electronic Resource] : Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty.* Durham N.C.: Duke University Press, 2006.
Öniş, Ziya. "The Political Economy of Turkey's Justice and Development Party." In *The Emergence Ofa New Turkey: Islam, Democracy, and the Emergence Oft He Ak Parti*, edited by Hakan Yavuz: University of Utah Press, 2006.
Osman, Tarek. *Egypt on the Brink : From Nasser to the Muslim Brotherhood.* Updated ed. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2013.
Ounissi, Sayida, and Monica Marks. "Ennahda from Within: Islamists or "Muslim Democrats"?". In *Rethinking Political Islam*, edited by Shadi Hamid and William F. McCants. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.
Owen, John M. *Confronting Political Islam : Six Lessons from the West's Past.* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2015.
Özbudun, Ergun. "From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy: The Case of the Jdp in Turkey." *South European Society and Politics* 11, no. 3/4 (2006): 543-57.
Özkan, Behlül. "'Turkey, DavutoğLu and the Idea of Pan-Islamism'." *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* 56, no. 4 (2014): 119-40.
Pargeter, Alison. "Localism and Radicalization in North Africa: Local Factors and the Development of Political Islam in Morocco, Tunisia and Libya." *International Affairs* 85, no. 5 (2009): 1031-44.
Pargeter, Alison. *Return to the Shadows : The Muslim Brotherhood and an-Nahda since the Arab Spring.* London: Saqi, 2016.
Pargeter, Alison. *The Muslim Brotherhood : From Opposition to Power.* New edition, Paperback ed. London: Saqi, 2013.
Perekli, Feriha. "The Applicability of the 'Turkish Model' to Morocco: The Case of the Parti De La Justice Et Du Developpement (Pjd)." *Insight Turkey* 14, no. 3 (2012): 85-108.
Perkins, Kenneth. "Playing the Islamic Card: The Use and Abuse of Religion in Tunisian Politics." In *The Making of the Tunisian Revolution*, edited by Nouri Gana: Edinburgh University Press, 2013.
Picchi, Margherita. "Islam as the Third Way: Sayyid Quṭb's Socio-Economic Thought and Nasserism." *Oriente Moderno* 97, no. 1 (2017): 177-200.
Piscatori, James. *Islam in a world of nation-states.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
Piscatori, James. *Islam, Islamists, and the Electoral Principle in the Middle East.* ISIM (Leiden, Netherlands: 2000).

Piscatori, James P., and Amin Saikal. *Islam Beyond Borders : The Umma in World Politics.* Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2019.
Powers, Colin. "Run the Country Like a Business? The Economics of Jordan's Islamic Action Front." *Critical research on religion* 7, no. 1 (2019): 38-57.
Pras, Bernard. "Management Et Islam: Vers Une Convergence De Valeurs." [In fre]. *Revue Française de Gestion* 33, no. 171 (2007): 91-95,12.
Qutb, S. *Al-Mustaqbal Li Hadha Al-Din.* Cairo: Maktabat Wahda, 1965.
Raoudha Ben Othman, "European Union Democracy Promotion in Tunisia," in *Routledge handbook of the Arab Spring : rethinking democratization*, ed. Larbi Sadiki (London: Routledge, 2016).
Rahman, Fazlur. "Islam and Social Justice." *Pakistani Forum 1* 1, no. 4-5 (1970).
Ranko, Annette, and Justyna Nedza. "Crossing the Ideological Divide? Egypt's Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood after the Arab Spring." *Studies in conflict and terrorism* 39, no. 6 (2016): 519-41.
Rethel, Lena. "Corporate Islam, Global Capitalism and the Performance of Economic Moralities." *New Political Economy* 24, no. 3 (2019): pp350-64.
Roberts, Clayton. *The Logic of Historical Explanation.* University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996.
Roberts, Adam, Michael J. Willis, Rory McCarthy, and Timothy Garton Ash. *Civil Resistance in the Arab Spring : Triumphs and Disasters.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
Rodgers, Daniel. "Bearing Tales: Networks and Narratives in Social Policy Transfer." *Journal of Global History* 9, no. 2 (2014): 301-13.
Rogers, Everett M. *Diffusion of Innovations.* 5th ed. New York ; London: Free Press, 2003.
Rodinson, Maxime. *Islam and Capitalism.* London: Allen Lane, 1974.
Rogan, Eugene L. "Sectarianism and Social Conflict in Damascus: The 1860 Events Reconsidered." *Arabica* T.51, no. Fasc.4 (2004): 493-511.
Rougier, Bernard and Stephane Lacroix. *Egypt's Revolutions: Politics, Religion, and Social Movements.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
Rousselin, Mathieu. "In the Name of Allah and of the Market: The Capitalist Leanings of Tunisian Islamists." *Science & Society* 80, no. 2 (2016): 196-220.
Roy, Olivier. *The failure of political Islam.* London: I.B. Tauris, 1994.
Roy, Olivier. "The Myth of the Islamist Winter." *New Statesman* 141, no. 5136 (2012): 23-25.
Roy, Olivier. *Globalized Islam : The Search for a New Ummah.* Ceri Series in Comparative Politics and International Studies. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.
Rivetti, Paola. "Political Islam in the Age of Democratization, by Kamran Bokhari and Farid Senzai." 579-80, 2015.
Rudolph, Susanne Hoeber "Introduction: Religion, States, and Transnational Civil Society." In *Transnational Religion and Fading States*, edited by Susanne Hoeber and Piscatori Rudolph, James P. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997.
Sadiki, Larbi. "Tunisia's Ennahda: Islamists Turning the Learning Curve of Democracy and Civic Habituation." In *The Politics of Islamism : Diverging Visions and Trajectories*, edited by J. L. Esposito, Rahim, Lily Zubaidah,Ghobazadeh, Naser. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.
Sadiki, Larbi. *Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring : Rethinking Democratization.* London: Routledge, 2016.
Said, Edward W. *Orientalism.* Penguin Classics. London: Penguin Books, 2003.

Said, Edward W. *Orientalism.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978.
Saif, Ibrahim, and Mohammed Abu Rumman. *'The Economic Agenda of the Islamist Parties'.* Carnegie Endowment Middle East Center (2012).
Sajjad, Fatima and Umbreen Javaid. "The Civilizational Rift and the Idea of the Turkish Model: A Case Study (2002-2014). " *Journal of Political Studies* 23, no.1, (2016).
Salwa Ismail, *Rethinking Islamist Politics: Culture, the State and Islamism* (London New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006).
Sargent, Lyman Tower. "Ideology and Utopia: Karl Mannheim and Paul Ricoeur." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 13, no. 3 (2008): 263-73.
Sayyid, S. *A Fundamental Fear : Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism.* London: Zed Books, 2015.
Schmidt, Vivien A. "Taking ideas and discourse seriously: explaining change through discursive institutionalism as the fourth 'new institutionalism'," *Eur. Pol. Sci. Rev.* 2, no. 1 (2010).
Schumacher, Tobias. "The European Union and Democracy Promotion," in *Routledge handbook of the Arab Spring : rethinking democratization*, ed. Larbi Sadiki (London: Routledge, 2016).
Schwedler, Jillian. "Islamists in Power? Inclusion, Moderation, and the Arab Uprisings." *Middle East Development Journal* 5, no. 1 (2013): 1350006-1-06-18.
Shehata, Samer S. . "Introduction." In *Islamist Politics in the Middle East : Movements and Change*, edited by Samer S. Shehata: Routledge, 2011.
Shehata, Samer S. "Political Da'wa : Understanding the Muslim Brotherhood's Participation in Semi-Authoritarian Elections." In *Islamist Politics in the Middle East : Movements and Change*, edited by Samer S. Shehata: Routledge, 2011.
Sidahmed, Abdel Salam, and Anoushiravan Ehteshami. *Islamic Fundamentalism.* Twentieth Century Religious Thought. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996.
Skinner, Quentin. "Some Problems in the Analysis of Political Thought and Action." *Political theory* 2, no. 3 (1974): 277-303.
Smith, Jackie. "Transnational Processes and Movements." In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, edited by David A. Snow, Sarah Anne Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004.
Smith, Zadie. "Introduction." In *Recitatif*, edited by Toni Morrison. London: Vintage, 2022.
Snow, David A. "Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields." In *Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, edited by David A. Snow, Sarah Anne Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004.
Snow, David A., Scott C. Byrd, "Ideology, framing processes, and islamic terrorist movements," *Mobilization (San Diego, Calif.)* 12, no. 2 (2007).
Snyder, Timothy. *The Road to Unfreedom : Russia, Europe, America.* London: The Bodley Head, 2018.
Solingen, Etel. "Of Dominoes and Firewalls: The Domestic, Regional, and Global Politics of International Diffusion1." *International Studies Quarterly* 56, no. 4 (2012): 631-44.
Somer, Murat. "Conquering Versus Democratizing the State: Political Islamists and Fourth Wave Democratization in Turkey and Tunisia." *Democratization* 24, no. 6 (2017): 1025-43.
Somer, Murat. "When Is Normalization Also Democratization? Islamist Political Parties, the Turkish Case and the Future of Muslim Polities." In *Islamist Parties and Political Normalization in the Muslim World*, edited by and Julie Chernov Hwang

Quinn Mecham. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014.
Spiegel, Avi. *Young Islam : The New Politics of Religion in Morocco and the Arab World.* Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015.
Springborg, Robert. *Egypt,* Cambridge: Polity, 2018.
Stampnitzky, Lisa. *Disciplining Terror : How Experts Invented "Terrorism".* Cambridge Core. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Stephenson, Niamh, and Dimitris Papadopoulos. "Exit from the Regime of Life Control: Biopolitics, Anticipatory Risk and the Excess of Experience." *Somatechnics* 1, no. 2 (2011): 412-33.
Svasand, Lars. *International Pary Assistance - What Do We Know About the Effects?* Expertgruppen för bistandsanalys (EBA) (2014).
Şengül, Serdar. "Kategorik Ret ile Kategorik Kabul Arasında Türkiye'de Islam'a ve Islamcılığa Yaklaşımlar." *Birikim Dergisi* July - August, no. 303-304 (2014).
Tagma, Halit Mustafa, Elif Kalaycioglu, and Emel Akcali. "'Taming' Arab Social Movements: Exporting Neoliberal Governmentality." *Security Dialogue* 44, no. 5-6 (2013): 375-92.
Tamimi, Azzam. *Rachid Ghannouchi : a democrat within Islamism* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001)
Tammam, Husam, and Patrick Haenni. "Au Diable Les Loosers ! Le Succès Et L'achievement, Nouvelles Valeurs Islamiques En Égypte." *Mouvements (Paris, France : 1998)* no 36, no. 6 (2004): 42-53.
Tarrow, Sidney G. *The New Transnational Activism.* Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics. New York ; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Taşkın, Yücel. "Arap Baharı ve Türkiye'deki İslamcı çevrelere etkileri: Baharımızı kışa çevirtmeyeceğiz." *Birikim Dergisi* July- August, no. 303-304 (2014).
Taşkın, Yüksel. "Hegemonizing Conservative Democracy and the Problems of Democratization in Turkey: Conservatism Without Democrats?," *Turkish studies* 14, no. 2 (2013).
Tezcür, Güneş Murat. *Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey : The Paradox of Moderation.* 1st ed. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010.
Thompson, Helen. *Disorder : Hard Times in the 21st Century.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022.
Tibi, Bassam. *Islamism and Islam.* New Haven, Conn. ; London: Yale University Press, 2012.
Tickell, A., & Peck, J. ("Making Global Rules: Globalization or Neoliberalisation.". In *Remaking the Global Economy : Economic-Geographical Perspectives*, edited by Jamie and Henry Yeung Peck, 163-82: SAGE, 2003.
Trager, Eric. *The Arab Fall: How the Muslim Brotherhood Won and Lost Egypt in 891 Days.* Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016.
Tripp, Charles. *Islam and the Moral Economy : The Challenge of Capitalism.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Tuğal, Cihan. "Contesting Benevolence: Market Orientations among Muslim Aid Providers in Egypt." *Qualitative Sociology* 36, no. 2 (2013): 141-59.
Tuğal, Cihan. *The Fall of the Turkish Model : How the Arab Uprisings Brought Down Islamic liberalism.* Brooklyn, NY: Verso, 2016.
Tuğal, Cihan. "Religious Politics, Hegemony, and the Market Economy: Parties in the Making of Turkey's Liberal-Conservative Bloc and Egypt's Diffuse Islamization," in *Building Blocs : How Parties Organize Society*, ed. De Leon Cedric, Cihan Tuğal, and Desai Manali, Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2015.

Turner, Bryan S. "Islam, Capitalism and the Weber Theses." *British Journal of Sociology* 61, no. Supp. 1 (2010): 147-60.
Turner, Rachel S. "Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Ideology, Government and the Rule of Law." *Journal of politics and law (Toronto)* 1, no. 2 (2008).
Türkmen, Hamza. *İslami Mücadelenin Yeni Dili.* İstanbul: Ekin Yayınları, 2013.
Türköne, Mümtazer. *Doğum ile Ölüm arasında İslamcılık.* İstanbul: Kapı Yayınları, 2012.
Varisco, Daniel, M.,. "Inventing Islamism: The Violence of Rhetoric." In *Islamism : Contested Perspectives on Political Islam*, edited by Richard C. and Barzegar Martin, Abbas. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010.
Vannetzel, Marie. "Confronting the Transition to Legality." In *Egypt's Revolutions: Politics, Religion, and Social Movements*, edited by Bernard and Lacroix Stephane Rougier, 41-60. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

Vannetzel, Marie, and Dilek Yankaya. "Crafting a Business Umma? Transnational Networks of 'Islamic Businessmen' after the Arab Spring." *Mediterranean Politics* 24, no. 3 (2019): 290-310.
Ventura, Lorella. "The "Arab Spring" And Orientalist Stereotypes: The Role of Orientalism in the Narration of the Revolts in the Arab World." *Interventions* 19, no. 2 (2017): 282-97.
Vicini, Fabio. "Post-Islamism or Veering toward Political Modernity?". *Sociology of Islam* 4, no. 3 (2016): 261-79.
Volpi, Frédéric. *Political Islam : A Critical Reader.* London: Routledge, 2011.
Volpi, Frederic. *Revolution and Authoritarianism in North Africa.* Oxford University Press, 2017.
Webb, Edward. "Changing the Player, Not the Game. Ennahda's Homo Islamicus." *ASPJ Africa & Francophonie* 5, no. 1 (2014): 4-18.
Weber, Max. *Political Writings.* Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought. Edited by Raymond and Quentin Skinner Geuss. 2010 ed. Edited by Peter and Ronald Speirs Lassman. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky. *Mobilizing Islam : Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt.* New York ; Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2003.
Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky. *The Muslim Brotherhood : Evolution of an Islamist Movement.* Princeton: Princeton University, 2013.
Wickham. Carrie Rosefsky. "The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt's Wasat Party." *Comparative Politics* 36, no. 2 (2004): 205-28.
Wiktorowicz, Quintan. *Islamic Activism : A Social Movement Theory Approach.* Indiana Series in Middle East Studies. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2004.
White, Jenny B. *Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks.* Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013.
White, Jenny B. "Islamist Social Networks and Social Welfare Services in Turkey." In *Islamist Politics in the Middle East : Movements and Change*, edited by Samer S. Shehata: Routledge, 2011.
Willi, Victor J. *The Fourth Ordeal: A History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, 1968-2018*. Cambridge University Press, 2021.
Willis, Michael J. "Evolution Not Revolution? Morocco and the Arab Spring." In *Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring : Rethinking Democratization*, edited by Larbi Sadiki, 435-50. London: Routledge, 2016.
Willis, Michael J. "Morocco's Islamists and the Legislative Elections of 2002: The Strange Case of the Party That Did Not Want to Win." *Mediterranean Politics* 9, no. 1 (2004): 53-81.

Willis, Michael J. *Politics and Power in the Maghreb : Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring.* London: Hurst, 2012.
Wolf, Anne. "An Islamist 'Renaissance'? Religion and Politics in Post-Revolutionary Tunisia." *The Journal of North African Studies* 18, no. 4 (2013): 560-73.
Wolf, Anne. *Political Islam in Tunisia : The History of Ennahda.* London: Hurst & Company, 2017.
Woltering, Robbert A. F. L. "Post-Islamism in Distress? A Critical Evaluation of the Theory in Islamist-Dominated Egypt (11 February 2011-3 July 2013)." *Die Welt des Islams* 54, no. 1 (2014): 107-18.
Wright, Robin B. *The Islamists Are Coming : Who They Really Are.* Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press : United States Institute of Peace Press, 2012
Yankaya, Dilek. "Du Cadre D'action Collective Au Programme Partisan : Ancrages Patronaux Des Islamismes En Turquie Et En Tunisie." *L'année du Maghreb* (2020): 203-22.
Yenigün, Halil Ibrahim. "The Political and Theological Boundaries of Islamist Moderation after the Arab Spring." *Third World Quarterly* 37, no. 12 (2016): 2304-21.
Yohanan, Benhaim, and Öktem Kerem. "The Rise and Fall of Turkey's Soft Power Discourse." *European journal of Turkish studies* (2016).
Zaied, Al-Sayed. "Da'wa for Dollars: A New Way of Muslim Televangelist." *Arab Insight* 1, no. 3 (2008): 21-27.
Zubaida, Sami. *Beyond Islam : A New Understanding of the Middle East.* Library of Modern Middle East Studies ; 84. London: I.B. Tauris, 2011.
Zsuzsa Ferge, "European Integration and the Reform of Social Security in the Accession Countries," *European journal of social quality* 3, no. 1/2 (2001).