



DEMONISATION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: THE CASE OF ISRAEL-PALESTINE

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyses demonisation as a phenomenon in international politics. Introducing the notion of a so-called 'politics of demonisation', it argues that while the origins of demonisation are religious (a literal belief in satanic possession), the reasons for its continued presence in international relations are fundamentally political. Drawing upon illustrative examples from historical as well as modern conflicts, the thesis identifies two domains where demonisation might come to inform political practice, when 'waging war' and 'waging peace'. It identifies four objectives why leaders may demonise their enemies in conflict, including (1) unity through fear, (2) legitimacy through protection, (3) self-righteousness and moral heroism, and (4) political and military mobilisation. When it comes to peace efforts, the thesis suggest that there are three dimensions of so-called 'demonisation deadlock' that may come to impede successful progress as there are certain moral and pragmatic challenges that emerge when framing negotiations as 'shaking hands with the devil'. The conflict in Israel-Palestine is the thesis' central case study where mutual demonisation and diplomatic deadlock have been characteristic features for over six decades. While there are many contributing factors to the complex process of war and peace making, this thesis focuses on one particular psychological dimension of the conflict. Emphasis is placed on how the demonisation is one relational barrier among many other factors that have stalled progress in the peace talks.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIPAC – The American Israel Public Affairs Committee

IDF – Israel Defense Forces

MEMRI – The Middle East Media Research Institute

MFA – Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs

PASSIA – Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs

PA – Palestinian Authority

PLO – Palestinian Liberation Organisation

PMW – Palestinian Media Watch

UN – United Nations

US – United States of America

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In April 1998 three artists – an Israeli Jew, an Israeli Arab and a Palestinian – came together to paint a mural. The project was entitled ‘The World Wall: A Vision of the Future without Fear.’ Inspired by a Mexican-American muralist, Judith Baca, and financially supported by the Canada Fund for Dialogue and Development, the mural was supposed to stand as a symbol of coexistence in a disputed land. It was a project with noble intentions. It ended, however, badly. Covering the story in an article for the New York Times, Ethan Bronner dubbed the artistic discord ‘the devil incident’. The incident had occurred, he explained, when the Jewish artist had painted an angelic figure to represent his people. The Palestinian artist, furious at the depiction of the Israelis as the heroes of the story, announced to the audience at the unveiling of the artwork that his colleague’s creation ‘was a devil, posing in angel’s dress...like the Israelis themselves’. The Palestinian further explained:

For Palestinians, what Israel is doing is bad...Yet we Palestinians are seen as the bad guys and they are the good guys, the angels. So this is what it reflects. This thing that looks like an angel is not an angel but evil.¹

‘The devil incident’ between the Israeli and Palestinian artists exemplifies an instance of *demonisation*. This thesis investigates the phenomenon of demonisation in international politics.² Demonisation is one particular narrative-based and psychological dimension of conflict. It frames a polarising identity of ‘us’ as good and

¹ Ethan Bronner, ‘Jews and Arabs, painting a mural together, find a mosaic of mistrust’, *The New York Times* (Lexis Nexis), 28 April 1998. Accessed: 4 November 2010.

² The use of the term ‘phenomenon’ is not incidental: a ‘phenomenon’ denotes a concept that is visible. Using the term, then, implies that demonisation is an observable feature in international politics.

'them' as evil. The thesis documents demonisation in order to lay the foundations for an inquiry into why the phenomenon exists and what implications it has for the actors engaged in it. More specifically, it questions whether this very discursive framing can play a role in shaping attitudes and influencing behaviours between actors. The thesis asks: why does demonisation appear in modern political discourse? Where does this narrative come from? What, if any, are demonisation's implications as one of the factors amongst many for conflict and cooperation? How significant is the demonisation phenomenon in questions of war and peace? In light of these questions, the thesis has three main objectives: to introduce 'demonisation' as a phenomenon in international politics; to understand its origins and purpose; and to assess demonisation's potential implications. It explores the effects of demonisation in two different contexts - 'waging war' (the discursive legitimisation of violence) and 'waging peace' (the discursive legitimisation of negotiating with the enemy). These questions will be explored in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

1. DEMONISATION DEFINED

Demonisation is a speech act used to create an image of the enemy as evil or in league with the Devil. 'Demonisation', 'demonised' and 'demonising' are recognisable catchwords in contemporary politics. Politicians, journalists and academics are familiar with the terms and employ them in their analyses of conflicts. Examples of recent journal articles that have included demonisation in their titles

are geographically diverse, with topics ranging from Cambodia under Pol Pot³, China under Mao Zedong⁴, Germany during the Third Reich⁵, African Americans in the US⁶, Pan-Arabism in the Middle East⁷, Chechens in relation to Russia⁸ and US-China relations.⁹ There are other examples of scholars who employ demonisation in their analyses of conflicts.¹⁰ Interestingly, however, very few actually define the term. Like

³ David Chandler, 'Cambodia deals with its past: collective memory, demonisation, and induced amnesia', *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, vol. 9, no. 2, June 2008.

⁴ Daniel Leese, 'The pitfalls of demonisation - Mao: the unknown story and its medial repercussions', *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, vol. 8, no. 3, September 2007.

⁵ Peter Lambert, 'Heroisation and demonisation in the Third Reich: the consensus-building value of a Nazi pantheon of heroes', *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, vol. 8, no. 3, September 2007.

⁶ Michael Dawson, 'Black power in 1996 and the demonization of African Americans', *PS?: Political Science and Politics*, vol. 29, no. 3, 1996.

⁷ Ralph M. Coury, 'The demonisation of pan-Arab nationalism', *Race and Class*, vol. 46, no. 4, Apr-June 2005. See also Jonathan Scott, 'The demonization of pan-American nationalism', *Socialism and Democracy*, vol. 21, no. 2, July 2007.

⁸ John Russell, 'Terrorists, bandits, spooks and thieves: Russian demonisation of the Chechens before and since 9/11', *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 26, no. 1, 2005.

⁹ Stanley Lubman, 'The dragon as demon: images of China on Capital Hill', *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol. 13, no. 40, August 2004.

¹⁰ Writing on the domestic identity conflict with Turkey, for example, Gregory A. Burris noted that 'while pan-Turkists represented morality, freedom, and genuine Turkness, leftists and Communists were demonized as immoral and degenerate slaves of a foreign enemy...' See Gregory A. Burris, 'The other from within: pan-turkish mythmaking and the expulsion of the turkish left', *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 43, no. 4, July 2007. In the context of the India-Pakistan border dispute Ishtiaq Ahmed wrote that: 'The partition of India in 1947 was, on the one hand, a gory consummation of a long process of mutual demonizing and dehumanizing by Hindu and Muslim extremists.' See Ishtiaq Ahmed, 'The 1947 partition of India: a paradigm for pathological politics in India and Pakistan', *Asian Ethnicity*, vol. 3, no. 1, March 2002. Writing on pan-Arabism, Adeed Dawisha explained how 'Arabist ideas profited from an imperialist foe throughout the 1950s demonizing of Westerners as alien and unjust [sic].' See Adeed Dawisha, 'Requiem for Arab nationalism', *Middle East Quarterly*, vol. 10, no. 1, Winter 2003. Barry identified demonisation also in US-Arab relations: in his opinion 'demonizing the US and arguing that it - and not domestic misrule - is the main problem faced by the Arabs subverts efforts by moderate forces to encourage change and democracy'. See Barry Rubin, 'Arab liberals argue about America', *Middle East Quarterly*, vol. 13, no. 1, Winter 2006. In an article on anti-Semitism, Nonna Mayer highlighted '...the demonization of Israel and Zionism by both radical Islamism and the pro-Third World extreme left.' See Nonna Mayer, 'Nouvelle judéophobie ou vieil antisémitisme?' (A new judeophobia or old anti-semitism?), *Raisons Politiques*, vol. 16, Nov. 2004. See also Ofra Ayalon, 'Dealing with demonization of the "other" in the Middle East by metaphoric tools to transform foe to friend', in Judith Kuriansky, ed., *Terror in the holy land: Inside the anguish of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict*, Westport: Praeger, 2006; Norman Cohn, *Europe's inner demons: the demonization of Christians in medieval Christendom*, London: Pimlico, 1993; Tom DeLuca et al., *Liars! Cheaters! Evildoers!: Demonization and the end of civil debate in American politics*, New York: New York University Press, 2005; Rosalind Hackett, 'Discourses of demonization in Africa and beyond', *Diogenes*, vol. 50, no. 3, 2003; Elie Podeh, 'Demonizing the other: Israeli perceptions of Nasser and Nasserism', in , Elie Podeh, Onn Winckler and Mohamad Riad El Ghonemy, eds., *Rethinking Nasserism: Revolution and Historical Memory in Modern Egypt*, Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004.

many other terms and phenomena, the definition and meaning of demonisation are often taken for granted.

In its literal sense 'demonisation' denotes the personification of the devil. Related to 'dehumanisation', 'demonisation' occurs when an actor portrays his enemy as being a devil or in league with the Devil.¹¹ Once rooted in the religious belief of literal diabolic possession, the demonic charge today retains a figurative force: it is a metaphor, a figure of speech, an externally-imposed and symbolic characterisation of one's adversary. Demonisation, then, can be understood as an 'accusative' *process*, involving the *demonisers* – those who accuse – and the *demonised* – those being accused. 'Demonising' signifies the *act* of making someone or something into a devil or demon or their evil collaborators.

The meaning behind the demonic charge is hidden in the word itself. The word-decryption G(o)od - (D)evil illustrates the theological ancestry of the categorical imperatives of morality. 'Good' is by definition what God intends and 'evil' is the work of the Devil. Thus in politics today the cosmic battle between God and the Devil disguises itself in the rhetoric of good and evil. The use of the term 'evil' is therefore implicitly demonising. Robert Ivie has written extensively on 'the rhetoric of evil' and argues that by using the term 'evil', or other words associated with it, the 'unconscious projection of this devil figure is rhetorically triggered'.¹²

¹¹ Examples of dehumanisation include characterising the enemy as parasites, vermin or primates.

¹² Robert Ivie and Oscar Giner, 'Hunting the Devil: democracy's rhetorical impulse to war', *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, vol. 37, no. 4, 2007, p. 580.

Demonising involves imposing a moral judgement on one's adversary and does not necessarily have to include literal characterisations of devils and demons. This broader and less literal interpretation of demonisation opens up the scope of what is considered to be demonic and takes it beyond religious symbolism. For instance, equating one's adversary with Adolf Hitler also becomes a form of demonising. The leader of the Third Reich has become the ultimate symbol of evil in the 20th century and attributing Nazi/Hitlerian features to enemies therefore becomes another demonising strategy. Other non-human beings have also been used to depict the adversary: apocalyptic multi-headed beasts, mythical fire-spewing dragons, and venomous snakes with fangs effectively evoke evil and although some might argue 'animalising' the enemy is distinct from demonising him, evil is still a common denominator. With frightful appearances and wilful intent to harm, these characterisations provoke similar emotional responses of fear and repulsion. Indeed intent – and even desire – to harm is an important criteria of diabolical evil. In *Bargaining with the Devil*, Robert Mnookin explained that the 'Devil' signified 'an enemy who has intentionally harmed you in the past or appears willing to harm you in the future'.¹³

Literature on enemy representations focuses traditionally on 'dehumanisation'.¹⁴

Conceptually dehumanisation and demonisation are often used interchangeably. As

¹³ Robert H. Mnookin, *Bargaining with the Devil: when to negotiate, when to fight*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010, p. 1.


¹⁴ For more on dehumanisation see A. Bandura, B. Underwood and M. E. Fromson, 'Disinhibition of aggression through diffusion of responsibility and dehumanization of victims', *Journal of Research in Personality*, vol. 9, no. 4, 1975; Viola Bernard, Perry Ottenberg, and Fritz Redl, 'Chapter 8: Dehumanization', in Robert Nevitt Sanford and Craig Comstock, eds., *Sanctions for evil: sources of social destructiveness*, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1971; Nick Haslam, 'Dehumanization: an integrative review', *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, vol. 10, no. 3, 2006; S. Loughnan, N. Haslam, and Y. Kashima, 'Understanding the relationship between attribute-based and metaphor-based dehumanization', *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, vol. 12, no. 6, 2009.

Robert Nevitt Sanford and Craig Comstock wrote: 'Dehumanization of others...[involves] the process of defining someone as subhuman (lacking will or feeling)....Whether people are seen as *devils* or monsters, germs or vermin, pigs or apes, as robots, or as abstract menaces, they are thus removed from the company of men and exposed to the defences we employ against those threats'.¹⁵ Arguably the two are associated (demonisation is itself a form of dehumanisation), but there are distinct differences between the two: for instance, while demonising (e)vilifies, dehumanising representations are also used to humiliate the adversary (e.g. the enemy as donkey).

'Demonisation' is included in Daniel Bar-Tal's broader conceptual framework of 'delegitimation' under the sub-category 'dehumanisation' (see the figure below). 'Dehumanisation' as he describes it, is a categorisation of an enemy that is portrayed as possessing inhuman traits. These features, he explains, can be either *sub*-human or *supra*-human. It is within this latter sub-category that demonisation falls. In the thesis definition of 'demonisation', trait characterisation of the enemy as 'evil' and dehumanisation of the enemy in the form of literal devils or any other being that symbolises 'evil' are grouped together. The thesis does not make a distinction between them.

¹⁵ Robert Nevitt Sanford et al., *Sanctions for evil: sources of social destructiveness*, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1971, p. 8. Emphasis added.

Figure 1: Bar-Tal's five sub-categories of delegitimisation¹⁶



Despite the range of enemy representations, demonisation appears distinct from other types of adversarial images in terms of intensity: it evokes an extreme evil akin to that of diabolic spirits and exists at the top of the pyramid of possible negative representations of the adversary. Demonisation is the ripest testament of the good and evil dichotomy. Rodney Barker pointedly calls demonisation ‘the nuclear powered version of enmity’.¹⁷ In Barker’s scale of ‘the narratives of contention’, this phenomenon expresses the highest state of enmity – as illustrated in the table below.

¹⁶ Bar-Tal identifies five subcategories to delegitimisation: (1) *Dehumanization* (Possessing inhuman traits different from the human race – either by subhuman or suprahuman characterisations e.g. the enemy as ‘rat’, ‘bug’, ‘donkey’, ‘demon’, ‘monster’, ‘dragon’); (2) *Trait Characterization* (Possessing negative and socially unacceptable traits e.g. the enemy as ‘aggressor’, ‘idiot’, ‘parasite’); (3) *Outcasting* (Violators of pivotal social norms e.g. the enemy as ‘murderers’, ‘thieves’, ‘psychopaths’, or ‘maniacs’); (4) *Political labels* (Possessing dangerous political views that threaten the basic value of society e.g. the enemy as ‘Nazi’, ‘fascist’, ‘imperialist’, ‘communist’); (5) *Group comparison* (Compared to another negative group which symbolises malice, evil and wickedness e.g. enemy as ‘huns’, ‘vandals’).

¹⁷ Rodney S. Barker, *Making enemies*, New York: Palgrave, 2007, p. 127.

Table 1: Rodney Barker's 'scale of narratives of contention'

SCALE	Competition	Antagonism	Enmity	<i>Demonisation</i>
<i>Description</i>	<i>'an attack on the policies or competence of the opponent'</i>	<i>'a description of an opponent as wicked or morally flawed'</i>	<i>'presented as so threatening and hostile that they must be countered by force'</i>	<i>'so evil and subversive that their existence is a threat to one's own existence'</i>

Demonisation is an extreme form of negative stereotyping and a radical type of 'othering'. According to Tom DeLuca and John Buell demonisation is 'a sustained and illicit effort...to thoroughly stigmatize individuals, types of peoples or groups'.¹⁸ To demonise, they say, 'is to use language or other symbols in ways that meet two requirements. First, to strongly imply or directly suggest that others have very bad, immoral, or evil qualities, and often that they are capable of quite immoral deeds; or to directly suggest that they have done reprehensible deeds. Second, to do so without sufficient evidence, inquiry, justification or consideration of the consequences'.¹⁹ Ralph White defined 'demonizing' more broadly as the act of 'exaggerating the evil of the enemy'. White identified 'demonizing the enemy' as the first of the three major components that lead to misperceptions in war. 'Demonizing is practically universal', he argues in his study of instances of war from the past century and concludes: 'I discovered how many of the wars fought over the last 100 years have been significantly influenced by demonizing...one's enemy'.²⁰

¹⁸ Tom DeLuca and John Buell, *Liars! Cheaters! Evildoers!: Demonization and the end of civil debate in American politics*, New York: New York University Press, 2005, p. 5.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

²⁰ Ralph White, 'Misperception and war', *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, vol. 10, no. 4, 2004, p. 408.

2. DEMONISATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS - A CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE

Notwithstanding Ralph White's discovery, the role of demonisation in world politics is rarely considered and while enemy images have been analysed in other academic disciplines, they have received less scholarly attention in IR.²¹ A reason is that mainstream realist IR theory considers ideational factors in international politics epiphenomenal – meaning that they are a bi-product of deeper structural causes. It is the relative balance of power between states in an anarchical international system that gives rise to competition and conflict.²² Thus structural realities such as military prowess and economic might determine threat perceptions in the first place. Enemy discourses, images and perceptions of the enemy, as such, are merely symptomatic of these structural realities. As Alexander Wendt, one of the fathers of constructivist IR theory, pointed out:

²¹ The majority of scholarship on enemy perceptions exists outside the field of IR or is outdated. For more on enemy perceptions see Arthur Gladstone, 'The conception of the enemy', *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 3, no. 2, 1959; Ole Rudolph Holsti, 'Cognitive dynamics and images of the enemy', in John C. Farrell et al., eds., *Image and reality in world politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1967; Heikki Luostarinen, 'Finnish russophobia: the story of an enemy image', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 26, no. 2, May 1989; Robert Holt et al., 'On the psychology of enemy images: introduction and overview', *Journal of Social Issues*, vol. 45, no. 2, 1989; Robert Holt et al., 'The image of the enemy: U.S. views of the Soviet Union', *Journal of Social Issues*, vol. 45, no. 2, 1989; Gustav Jahoda, *Images of savages: ancient roots of modern prejudice in western culture*, London: Routledge, 1999; Louis Oppenheimer, 'The development of enemy images: a theoretical contribution', *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, vol. 12, no. 3, 2006; Rune Ottosen, 'Enemy images and the journalistic process', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 32, no. 1, 1995; Robert Rieber, *The psychology of war and peace: the image of the enemy*, New York: Plenum, 1991; Brett Silverstein, 'Enemy images: the psychology of U.S. attitudes and cognitions regarding the Soviet Union', *American Psychologist*, vol. 44, 1989; Brett Silverstein et al., 'Research on enemy images: present status and future prospects', *Journal of Social Issues*, vol. 45, no. 2, 1989; Kurt Spillmann and Kari Spillmann, 'On enemy images and conflict escalation', *International Social Science Journal*, vol. 43, no. 1, 1991; Ralph K. White, 'Images in the context of international conflict: Soviet perceptions of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.', in Herbert C Kelman, ed., *International behavior: a social-psychological analysis*, New York: Rinehart, 1965.

²² For the most renowned structural theories in IR see Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of international politics*, New York: Random House, 1979.

A feature of Neorealist structuralism is its materialism. The structure of the international system is defined as the distribution of material capabilities under anarchy. The kinds of ideational attributes or relationships that might constitute a social structure, *like patterns of friendship or enmity...*are specifically excluded from the definition.²³

This thesis's research focus on demonisation falls in line with the constructivist theory of IR, which contends that identities and perceptions matter in international politics. Constructivism can help remedy some of the shortcomings of realist IR theories with regards to their conceptual understanding of enmity.²⁴ It is insightful in that it introduces the idea of enmity as a *social construct*. Enemies in international politics are real, but perceptions of them are *constructed*. Moreover, these constructions are necessarily *social* because there are always at least two actors involved as far as enmity is concerned. Indeed a pre-requisite for demonisation is to have someone *to* demonise. This someone is the 'enemy'.²⁵ An 'enemy image' is a representation of the adversary. It is a psychological construct as it signifies the actor's *perception* of the enemy.²⁶ While the enemy is real (i.e. material), his enemy

²³ Wendt, *Social theory of international politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 16. Emphasis added.

²⁴ The constructivist school in IR emerged in the 1980s. It stressed the importance of ideational forces, perceptions, identity politics, inter-subjective meaning, and the constitutive/normative approach to relations between states.

²⁵ An 'enemy' is defined as 'one that cherishes hatred, that wishes or seeks to do ill to another; also in the weaker sense, an adversary, antagonist or opponent'. *Oxford English Dictionary Online* (<http://dictionary.oed.com/>).

²⁶ An 'image', as defined in the *Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*, is 'a psychological construct that is an amalgam of cognitive and affective processes. For this reason there will always be a sense in which the image can be distinguished from reality'. According to Vilho Harle, 'the "enemy image" tells what our adversary, opponent or military enemy *looks like* in a subject's perception or war propaganda'. See Vilho Harle, 'On the concepts of the 'other' and the 'enemy'', *History of European Ideas*, vol. 19, no. 1-3, 1994, p. 12. Robert Jervis pioneered the study of the use of images in IR theory. Noting how system-based IR theory ignored the influence of images on basic policies, Jervis proceeded to demonstrate how images could play a crucial role in shaping attitudes and determining behaviours between states. See Robert Jervis, *The logic of images in international relations*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970 and *Perception and misperception in international politics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. For more on enemy images see also Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase and Ursula Lehmkuhl, *Enemy images in American history*, Providence: Berghahn Books, 1996; Robert Holt and Brett Silverstein, 'On the psychology of enemy images'; Shoon Kathleen Murray and Jonathan A Cowden, 'The role of "enemy images" and ideology in elite belief systems', *International*

image is constructed (i.e. ideational). State actors *acquire* identities that are inherently relational and enmity is driven by the identity politics of 'us' vs. 'them'.²⁷ Demonisation is a discourse that further fuels this bi-polar 'us' versus 'them' environment where 'good' is associated with 'us' and 'evil' with 'them'.

Constructivist perspectives, particularly in the field of international security studies, can also help shed light on how discourse may come to affect political practice. More specifically, the concept of *securitisation* developed by the constructivist-inspired Copenhagen school lends itself particularly well to theorising the impact of 'demonisation' in international politics. According to the Copenhagen school, 'securitisation' is a type of threat construction through speech acts.²⁸ Elites

Studies Quarterly, vol. 43, no. 3, 1999; Louis Oppenheimer, 'The development of enemy images'; Brett Silverstein, 'Enemy images'; Brett Silverstein, 'The psychology of enemy images', in Sylvia Staub and Paula Green, eds., *Psychology and social responsibility: facing global challenges*, New York: New York University Press, 1992; Brett Silverstein et al, 'Research on enemy images'; Spillmann and Spillmann, 'On enemy images and conflict escalation'.

²⁷ A number of post-modernist IR scholars have addressed the concept of socially constructed or exaggerated enemies in their theories of state behaviour. For example David Campbell highlighted the role of 'difference, danger, and otherness' in his assessment of United States foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. He argued that the United States needed to articulate threats and accentuate 'otherness' in order to construct their own identity (see David Campbell, *Politics without principle: sovereignty, ethics, and the narratives of the Gulf War*, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993. Similarly Michael Connelly in *Identity\Difference* attempted to decipher the 'enigma of Otherness'. Constructing 'Otherness', Connelly argued, was a necessary step towards the shaping of one's own state identity, a process that he entitles 'the self-reassurance of identity through the construction of Otherness' (see William E. Connolly, *Identity\Difference: democratic negotiations of political paradox*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). States, according to Connelly, construct 'a range of differences as intrinsically evil, irrational, abnormal, mad, sick, primitive, monstrous, dangerous, or anarchical – as other'. Rob Walker also incorporated identity politics into his analytical framework, maintaining that IR evolves around a conceptual distinction between Inside and Outside (see Rob Walker, *Inside/outside: international relations as political theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Finally Der Derian builds upon the Marxist notion of 'alienation' to argue that states too, not just individuals, suffer from estrangement and identity-driven antagonisms. Diplomacy, for Der Derian, is a means of mediating the estrangement between the 'self' and the 'other' in international politics. He concludes by noting that 'until we learn how to recognize ourselves as the Other, we shall be in danger and we shall be in need of diplomacy' (see James Der Derian, *On diplomacy: a genealogy of Western estrangement*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987).

²⁸ See also Bezen Balamir Coskun, 'History writing and securitization of the other: the construction and reconstruction of Palestinian and Israeli security discourses', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, vol. 23, no. 2, June 2010. For more on 'securitisation' see Ole Waever 'Securitization and desecuritization' in *On Security*, edited by R. Lipschutz, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, and Barry Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 1998.

articulate a 'security speech act', which, if accepted by the general public, generates a perception of existential threat and a state of emergency subject to extraordinary measures. Issues become securitised through speech acts that come to affect political practice. As Ole Waever explained:

With the help of language theory, we can regard 'security' as a *speech act*. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance *itself* is the act...By uttering 'security' a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.²⁹

For constructivists, then, discursive labels matter in that they can legitimise and facilitate particular political practices. As Wendt pointed out: 'there is a strong case for the proposition that social kinds often are constituted in important part by external, discursive structures...“war” by a discourse that legitimates state violence, “terrorism” by a discourse that delegitimizes non-state violence'.³⁰ Demonisation, like securitisation, is a speech act that helps legitimate a particular course of action, while delegitimising others. By uttering the word 'evil' or 'devil', the parties bring in a moral dimension to the conflict.

3. WAGING WAR AND WAGING PEACE

The thesis identifies two different domains where demonisation might come to inform political practice - both when 'waging war' and 'waging peace'. In exploring the 'politics of demonisation' the thesis argues that 'demonising the other' today can be instrumental.

²⁹ Ole Waever (1995) cited in Michael C. Williams, 'Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 47, no. 4, 2003, p. 513.

³⁰ Wendt, *Social theory of international politics*, p. 84

In the context of conflict, demonisation is a discourse that may help to unite citizens, legitimise political authority, morally justify violence, and mobilise the military and the population at large. It highlights how chasing demons can serve politically expedient functions in that it helps promote:

1) Unity through fear: Chasing demons can prompt unity as people tend to unite behind a common enemy. As research in social psychology has shown, a hostile image of the out-group will tend to increase in-group solidarity. Fear of the (d)evil enemy has cohesive properties because it establishes a negative foundation upon which people can overcome differences: even those who may otherwise be divided find that they share an ambition to remove the source of threat and restore security. For the status-quo authority, this unity helps safeguard political stability. For the revisionist force, it helps unite the opposition.

2) Legitimacy through protection: Security is the very foundation upon which the state's legitimacy is built. Because threat inspires a need for protection, a state or church authority might use a hostile enemy image to enhance its public legitimacy. As political scientist Ole Holsti explained: 'When people feel threatened they are more likely to turn to leaders or authority for guidance, assurance and protection...The organisational structure may change, usually towards greater centralisation...tendencies towards rigidity, inflexibility, or even

despotism may develop...' ³¹ The advantages of such political outcomes – for the governing authority – are self-evident.

3) Self-righteousness and moral heroism: Demonising the enemy can justify reprehensible acts towards others. When a conflict is presented in absolute terms of go(o)d-and-(d)evil, it indicates a clear division between right and wrong. Any act of violence associated with the 'evil' opponent is branded as immoral, while one's own acts are perceived as necessary and legitimate. From this logic comes the crucial legitimising principle of 'self-righteousness' and moral heroism, meaning that, in our own perception, we consider ourselves and our actions to be just, upright, guiltless and sinless. Our acts of violence become dissociated from morality: we are not 'good', 'bad', 'right' or 'wrong' because of *what* we do, but because of *who* we are and what we stand for. Thus in the fight against the (d)evil enemy, otherwise immoral deeds become morally legitimate.

4) Political and military mobilisation: The more frightful the enemy, the more important the cause and the more committed the soldier, and the public supporting them. The demonised foe can therefore help secure both popular and military mobilisation and legitimacy. Intentions appear genuine if the aim is to deter or eliminate a (d)evil enemy. If dehumanising the enemy is a strategy that enables soldiers to remove their sense of guilt on the battlefield, demonisation is the strategy that fuels them with a sense of virtue in the act of killing. For these reasons demonisation and conflict share an intimate relationship.

³¹ Holsti, 'Cognitive dynamics and images of the enemy', p.10.

In the context of peace-making, demonisation may create an environment that additionally contributes to diplomatic deadlock by preventing the parties from coming together in the first place, by delegitimising the peace partners if they do decide to negotiate, and by polarising the parties even further apart. In coining the phrase 'demonisation deadlock', the thesis explores the relationship between demonisation and diplomatic deadlock. 'Demonisation deadlock' consists of three dimensions:

- 1) **'Nip in the bud'**: Demonising the enemy might prevent any dialogue from taking place as the prospects of negotiating with an 'evil' enemy appear as probable as striking a deal with the devil himself. There is often a strong moral principle *not* to negotiate with an evil foe: this is not just because the prospect of a successful outcome is considered minimal but also because it is perceived as wrong or compromising to do so. Evil must be vanquished, not negotiated. Exaggerating the evil of the enemy, then, tends to nip the diplomatic option in the bud.

- 2) **'No partner for peace'**: If negotiations do occur between demonised parties, demonisation may risk hampering a successful outcome in the process as it fosters an image of the peace-partner as a dishonest broker. The major problem with branding the enemy as 'evil' is that it delegitimises the adversary sitting across the negotiation table. The demonic charge, then, may render unrealistic any worthy and long-lasting negotiations with the opponent because it prevents the bargaining parties from generating mutual trust.

2) **'With us or against us'**: Demonisation may make the prospect of neutral third party involvement difficult because coating the conflict in terms of 'good' and 'evil' tends to forge a 'with us or against us' mentality. The assumption is that one cannot be neutral in a conflict that involves an 'evil' party. Hence demonisation also delegitimises the role of the 'honest broker'. It either increases the prospects of third-party partisanship or prevents the facilitating tool of third-party mediation altogether.

4. DEMONISATION IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT - AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE

The thesis explores the phenomenon of demonisation in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Three of the thesis's chapters are dedicated to this conflict: the first chapter provides a historical background and introduces conflicting narratives. The second chapter examines demonising discourses among Palestinian and Israeli elites, specifically asking 'who demonises whom, when and how'. The third chapter investigates some of the potential implications demonisation may have had on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

There are both conceptual and empirical reasons for choosing this conflict. Conceptually, focusing on one case allows for an in-depth analysis of the conflict. A single-case study enables researchers to investigate phenomena in greater detail and can therefore provide rich description and understanding. An added dimension to a single-case study design is the opportunity to study the case over a longer period of time, which allows for the longitudinal study of multiple instances of a phenomenon. Multiple observations from a single-case study can be useful in theory

development.³² Empirically, the Israeli-Palestinian case study was selected on the basis that it remains one of the most intractable conflicts of the 20th and 21st century. An intractable conflict is one that is perceived as *irresolvable*. It is *protracted* in that it has lasted over a long period of time, at least one generation, meaning that during a person's lifespan he/she has known nothing else but the reality of the conflict.³³ The conflict is of a violent nature that may vary in frequency and intensity over time. For the parties involved, an intractable conflict is considered existential, and usually takes on a *total* and *central* nature affecting the various spheres of everyday life such as territory, economy, religion, culture, and self-determination.³⁴ A zero-sum perception is another characteristic feature of an intractable conflict, with both parties seeing no possible means of compromise. Given all these intractable conflict characteristics, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict satisfied three conditions for this particular study of demonisation: Firstly, the contentious and bloody conflict between Israelis and Palestinians over the ownership of disputed land is ridden with longstanding hostility and hatred, and so provides fertile ground for the study of demonisation. Secondly, the protracted and violent nature of the conflict allows for the investigation of demonising narratives over a longer period of time. Thirdly, the Israeli-Palestinian case study was purposefully selected by virtue of being a conflict that has gone through several peace attempts, yet remains in diplomatic deadlock. This is a crucial context for exploring demonisation's potential impact on diplomatic deadlock. Many practitioners and scholars have attempted to decipher the reasons for the failed

³² Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case study and theory development in the social sciences*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005, p.32-33.

³³ Daniel Bar-Tal, 'Sociopsychological foundations of intractable conflicts', *American Behavioral Scientist*, vol. 50, no. 11, 2007, p. 1432.

³⁴ Daniel Bar-Tal, 'Societal beliefs in times of intractable conflict: The Israeli case', *International Journal of Conflict Management*, vol. 9, no. 1, 1998, p. 22

peace process and so the case study is information-rich in this respect. Indeed, on an empirical level, the Israeli-Palestinian case study has been widely researched and documented. However, little has been written on the narratives of deception and obstruction and their impact on the evolution of the conflict. By focusing on the demonising narratives on both sides of the conflict, the thesis attempts to offer a fresh perspective.

The focus on demonisation in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict suggests that the study is bound to remain *sui generis* to some extent. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is perceivably a unique case, much like every international conflict is somehow unique: it has its own particular origins, its own bitter rivalries, its own divisive issues and its own course of history. At the same time, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not entirely unique. It is an international conflict that has many features in common with other international conflicts: a clash of material interests, a conventional geopolitical conflict over territory and a clash of two national ideologies/movements. It involves nationalism, a clash of religious identities, and a perceived zero-sum nature. On the one hand, the uniqueness of the Israeli-Palestinian case study makes it an interesting and complex international conflict that is well worth exploring in its own right to see what insights one can get. On the other hand, given its common features with other international conflicts, one might be able to learn something from this conflict that can later be examined in other conflict contexts (or one may not).

5. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

5.1 AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH

The thesis takes an interdisciplinary approach to the study of demonisation. As there is no one 'theory' of demonisation, the thesis relies upon a mosaic of concepts from various academic fields. Secondary sources include existing and relevant concepts in IR theory (on 'threat perceptions', 'images' and 'representations' in international politics, and 'identity politics'), in political theory (on 'enmity', 'evil' and 'fear'), in philosophy (on notions of 'the other' and the dichotomies of 'good and evil'), in theology (on demonology, the meaning behind the 'devil' and the demonic charge), in social and political psychology (on 'stereotyping', 'perceptions', 'social identity theory', 'mirror imaging' and 'enemy images') and in history (on past cases of demonisation). Secondary literature on diplomatic deadlock and negotiation theory is also drawn upon. This rich panoply of concepts and examples will help provide the conceptual building blocks for investigating demonisation.

5.2 THE ANATOMY METHOD

This thesis uses an 'anatomical' method to investigate the contemporary and historical presence of demonisation in international politics. The aim is to do to the phenomenon of demonisation – in theory – what the anatomist does to the body in practice: to dissect, disentangle and scrutinise its parts in order to understand the underlying system by which it functions. The assumption behind this methodological approach is that by identifying where and how the phenomenon

functions we can better understand why it exists in the first place and what its main implications may be. There are many contributing factors to the complex process of war and peace making. The thesis focuses on one psychological dimension of the conflict. In particular, it will show how enmity and negative images of the other work to exacerbate, embitter and prolong conflict. It will attempt to give a qualitative assessment of the impact of demonisation on the conflict, as one of many factors.

This thesis's anatomy approach has three components:

1. **Documenting demonisation** (i.e. looking for and highlighting historical and contemporary examples of the phenomenon).
2. **Analysing its content** (i.e. looking at 'who demonises whom, when and how').
3. **Assessing causes and consequences** (i.e. looking at some of the contexts, reasons and effects of demonisation).

5.3 EMPIRICAL RESEARCH METHODS

Two different qualitative research methods are used to identify demonisation: image analysis and discourse analysis.

1) Image analysis was used for the historical part of the thesis (Chapter 2). It involved screening the content of visual images during conflict periods for evil representations of the enemy. The spectrum of graphic images included anything from propaganda war posters, caricatures and political cartoons to traditional artwork and ancient woodcuts. As Chapter 2 will demonstrate, the technique of

demonising the enemy through grotesque visual depictions is a common phenomenon in conflicts throughout history. Either by portraying the enemy as the Devil himself or by depicting his acts as demonic, artists have managed to effectively portray the opponent as insatiably evil and untrustworthy. Sam Keen made a similar observation in his 'phenomenology of hostile images', which examined the graphic representation of the enemy in global conflicts and found that all nations essentially used 'the same visual metaphors' and 'the same hostile clichés' to portray their enemy.³⁵ As he explained: 'The enemy is always a *demon*, a barbarian, the aggressor, a liar, a madman, or some vile animal that can be exterminated without regret'.³⁶ Keen's work therefore illustrates the temporal and geographic breadth of the standard repertoire of enemy image stereotypes.

There are several advantages to using visual images to document demonisation: firstly, the thesis traces graphic representations of the (D)evil enemy because it is an effective way of capturing perceptions and images historically. The crafting of graphic images is a tradition almost as ancient as man himself and precedes any other form of written documentation. Secondly the analysis of visual images as a research tool allows for broader geographic documentation because it helps cut across language barriers. Using visual sources therefore facilitates the task of the researcher who seeks to better understand demonisation's occurrence across time, language and geography. Thirdly, illustrations – like other primary documents – help capture the political environment of their time. Although designed by artists,

³⁵ Keen organised the many enemy images into several categories. His categories include the enemy as 'stranger', 'aggressor', 'faceless', 'enemy of God', 'barbarian', 'greedy', 'criminal', 'torturer', 'rapist', 'beast', 'reptile', 'insect', 'germ', 'death', 'worthy opponent' and 'abstraction'. See Sam Keen, *Faces of the enemy: reflections of the hostile imagination*, San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1986.

³⁶ Quote taken from Sam Keen and Bill Jersey, *Faces of the enemy*, PBS Documentary, 1986. Emphasis added.

they often embody the expression of the public mood, revealing complex attitudes, contradictions, public fears, political values and common beliefs. Visual portrayals can therefore be studied as historical 'artefacts' – as physical manifestations of societal myths and realities. Finally, visual images are also a powerful communication medium, a fruitful source of propaganda and a mobilising force in their own right. All visual images carry encoded messages: some attempt to entice, to sell, to moralise or to flatter while others seek to repulse, to shock, to breed fear and hatred. Images are therefore designed to create a certain emotional response in those who see them, and often they prove very effective. Addressing the role of images in shaping public opinion, political commentator Walter Lippman explained that 'whether right or wrong...imagination is shaped by the pictures seen...[and] ...consequently they can lead to stereotypes that are hard to shake'.³⁷ Similarly, Paul Martin Lester admits that 'when pictorial stereotypes are repeated enough times, they become part of a society's culture'.³⁸ Visual images, then, not only reveal political messages, they also create them. It is precisely for this reason that graphic work is often commissioned for a purpose. Visual images from conflict settings therefore provide fertile grounds for studying perceptions and images of the enemy.

There are several sophisticated online image-browsing search engines through which to access these graphic resources, but among those used the Harvard University's Visual Information Access, the Oxford Digital Library and the British Museum's collection database provided the broadest geographic and temporal range of sources. The search terms 'evil' and 'Devil' were used to retrieve images, and the

³⁷ Lippman quoted in Paul Martin Lester, *Visual communication: images with messages*, London: Wadsworth, 2003, p. 88.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

content was then selected if it presented a visual representation of the enemy in a conflict setting. The aim of this data collection was to capture both state-sponsored and popular depictions of the enemy.

2) Discourse analysis was used to document demonisation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This involved screening language during conflict periods for evil representations of the enemy. The range of sources consulted for the historical chapter included propaganda war pamphlets, government declarations and popular media. In the Israel-Palestine case study primary sources included elite statements pertaining to the enemy in official government papers, elite interviews and public policy documents.

Discourse is a crucial component in the construction of the demonic narrative. Admittedly, conflicts in international politics are not simply 'wars of words' but are frequently underscored by violence and bloodshed. Yet discourse plays an important role in perception-building, in signalling future policies, in framing the source of dispute and in presenting justifications for actions taken. Language is the dominant mode of communication and, as such, remains a primary source of influence in international politics. Discourse-analysis scholars are right, however, to point out that because language often operates as 'a background capacity' for people, providing them with the vocabulary tools to differentiate and identify things, people or situations, language can often foster 'taken-for-granted' qualities and attributes.³⁹ Language is not simply the slave of communication or an empty vessel

³⁹ Jennifer Milliken, 'The study of discourse in international relations: a critique of research and methods', *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 5, no. 2, 1999, p. 231.

of transmitted words. Instead, as Nicholas O'Shaughnessy points out, 'words direct thinking, they are sensitising concepts, in that a word or phrase is seldom value-neutral but embodies a picture, an image, or an ethical judgement'.⁴⁰

The thesis identifies two types of demonising vocabulary: direct and indirect. Direct vocabulary employs literal demonic characters (e.g. 'Devil', 'Satan', 'Satanic', 'demon', 'diabolic' and 'evil'). Indirect demonising vocabulary alludes to diabolic attributes/trait characterisations without explicitly using cosmic terminology (e.g. 'immoral', 'murderous', 'sinful', 'sinister' and 'treacherous'). Both indirect and direct discourses play a key role in the creation of the demonised enemy image.

In the Israeli-Palestinian case study, pre-selected search terms were used as baits to 'catch' the larger demonising content in documents. The following five search terms were used as primary indicators of demonisation: 'evil', 'devil', 'Satan', 'hate speech', and 'incitement'. Each search term was combined with the geographical terms 'Israel', 'Palestine' and 'Israeli-Palestinian conflict' to ensure relevance. This selective search term method was chosen in order to gain access to a range of demonising language. These terms acted as anchor points in the search engines, which screened large amounts of text for these key terms. Not all the quotes collected included these exact search terms (e.g. some refer to the other side as a 'cancer', a 'crocodile', or a 'beast'). These statements were, however, taken from websites that were found using the original five primary search terms. Such terms were included in the study because they were affiliated with incitement and hate

⁴⁰ Nicholas J. O'Shaughnessy, *Politics and propaganda: weapons of mass seduction*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004, p. 139.

speech. For example, one of the Palestinian quotes collected insisted that his enemy was 'Shylock', a reference to the vilified Jewish moneylender in Shakespeare's *The Merchant of Venice*.⁴¹ Thus while the statement does not directly include the demonising vocabulary of evil and devil, it shares a similar meaning, and was therefore selected as an illustration of hate speech and incitement.

Three selection criteria were used to separate relevant from irrelevant statements:

1. Statements had to be by elites (this meant excluding demonising statements by popular opinion as expressed in blogs, social network sites, twitter and newspaper editorials).
2. Statements had to be by official *Palestinian* and *Israeli* elites (this meant excluding statements by other government officials as, for example, Iran, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq and Syria).
3. Statements had to be directed towards either Israelis or Palestinians (this meant excluding for example anti-Jordanian, anti-Iraqi or anti-Iranian comments).

5.4 PRIMARY SOURCES

The Israeli and Palestinian elite demonising statements gathered in the thesis came from three broad source categories. The first category was ***governmental sources***. These primary sources included policymakers' speeches, their press statements to the public, as well as their transcripts from public interviews. In addition to open-

⁴¹ Israel's War against Terror. Source: Voice of Palestine, 15 March 1997. Accessed: 4 November 2010.

ended searches on Lexis Nexis and Google, several official government websites were consulted, including Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), The Palestinian National Authority's Ministry of Information and the PLO Negotiations Affairs Department. Each of these websites has an internal search engine option, so it is possible to screen the documents in their respective archives for the specific search terms. Digitalised Israeli and Palestinian government documents were also made available by the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs' (PASSIA) 'Documents of Palestine'. This is an eight-volume compendium of official Israeli, Palestinian and other related international organisation documents. A PDF search engine in the CD-ROM edition of this compendium allows for rapid identification of search terms in these volumes as well. The confidential documents from the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, known as the *Palestine Papers*, were also consulted.⁴² These documents, which were disclosed by Al-Jazeera in January 2011, include confidential memos, e-mails, maps, minutes from private meetings, accounts of high level exchanges, strategy papers and power point presentations – dated from 1999 to 2010.

The second category was *media sources*. The media sources were used to extract demonising statements as cited by elites in broadcasts or written press.⁴³ In some cases elites submit their views in the form of op-eds directly to newspapers. The Lexis Nexis database gives access to over a thousand different newspapers. Similarly

⁴² For access to the *Palestine Papers* online go to <http://www.aljazeera.com/palestinepapers/>

⁴³ The study includes examples of both direct and indirect elite statements: direct citations are those made by Israeli and Palestinian elites in person, for example in a speech or an interview with a journalist. Indirect citation is when the political official is cited in a newspaper article, an academic article or other secondary literature. For example if a newspaper article cites a statement by an official as he spoke to the Knesset or addressed a mass rally, these are indirect. Both direct and indirect citations qualify as primary sources as long as the citation can be attributed to its original source.

many Google search-term hits would come from mainstream newspapers and national broadcast websites. The most frequently cited media sources in the search included among others: *the BBC Worldwide Monitoring*, which supplies '*BBC Monitoring Middle East*' (that has a large Arabic translated database), written press such as *the New York Times*, *Jerusalem Post*, *Ha'aretz*, *Al-Jazeera* as well as TV/radio broadcasts such as *The Voice of Palestine*, *Palestinian Authority TV (PA TV)*, and *Voice of Israel*.

The third broad category was ***non-governmental sources***. Media watchdogs and non-profit organisations that track incitement made up the biggest group within this category. Those appearing most frequently in the Google search hits included articles from among others: *The Jewish Virtual Library*, *Palestinian Media Watch*, *Palestine Media Watch*, and *Israel's War against Terror*. Again, as in the case of the second category, these sources were only used to trace official elite statements. Independent searches were also conducted within the individual websites – for example the *Palestinian Media Watch* has a whole web-archive entitled 'the demonization of Jews/Israelis'.⁴⁴

In addition, **personal interviews** with both Israeli and Palestinian negotiators, scholars and practitioners were conducted in Israel and the Palestinian territories from 29 March to 12 April 2010.⁴⁵ The aim of the interviews was to obtain first-hand

⁴⁴ The *Palestinian Media Watch Center* is an Israeli-based media watchdog organisation established in 1996 with the aim to monitor Palestinian incitement against Israel. The PMW identifies six subset categories under the 'demonization of Jews/Israelis': (1) Animalisation and dehumanisation (2) The case study: portraying Jews as 'monkeys and pigs' (3) Jews/Israelis as evil (4) Jews/Israelis as cancer and other diseases (5) Jews/Israelis endanger all humanity (6) Terminology: Zionist Gangs. See <http://www.palwatch.org/>.

⁴⁵ See Appendix C for a list of interviewees and their biographies.

accounts of the perceptions of those who had either closely observed or directly participated in negotiations; to better understand the commonly held perceptions of the other side, their views on the issue of 'trust' or 'mistrust', the attribution of 'blame' and their perceived challenges of negotiating with the 'enemy'. The interviews were conducted in the form of a semi-structured personal conversation with a basic set of questions forming the core of the interview. Questions were asked about the role that negative images and attitudes had on the progress of the talks. The interviews therefore brought value in terms of understanding the perceptions and narratives that existed between the parties in the peace talks. All interviews were recorded electronically and transcribed. The table of interviewees and their biographies can be found in Appendix C.

6. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS

In order to capture mutual demonisation in the single-case study both Israeli and Palestinian elite narratives were included. However, given language restrictions, neither Hebrew nor Arabic sources were consulted. The reliance on purely English translated sources has certain research limitations; the meaning of certain terms and phrases may be 'lost in the translation'; and translators may deliberately change the text to tone down the content for their English speaking audience. However, there was sufficient material available in English translation to gather evidence of mutual demonisation.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ There are research methods that can help control for translation biases. One way would be to take the same speech/quote/article and compare several translated editions of it online. For example, the BBC Summary of the World has a Middle East edition with a large amount of translated texts. One would expect these to be less biased than say an explicitly pro-Israeli watchdog's website on 'Palestinian demonising quotes'. However, it was often difficult to find the exact same text in the

Online media watchdogs also help overcome the language barrier in that they translate the Palestinian and Israeli elite statements from Arabic and Hebrew into English. However, relying on watchdog sources can be problematic and one must be cautious in the attribution of quotes that come from 'the other side' (i.e a 'watchdog' caveat). These watchdogs have their own political agenda – to actively expose the language of incitement – and one therefore has to be aware of this when citing their quotations, particularly with reference to source reliability, context and translations. As a precaution each quote that was taken from a watchdog site was cited as the main source in Appendix A along with the original source (e.g. in the appendix the source would be referred to as 'Israeli's War against Terror. Source: Yediot Aharonot, 4 March 1994'). Another noteworthy imbalance was the limited number of Palestinian watchdogs monitoring Israeli incitement as compared to the Israeli watchdogs. A possible reason for this is that few of the monitoring groups that exist on the Palestinian side focus on tracking Israeli incitement. Instead, they tend to highlight violations of international law by Israel in the territories; such as the number of increased checkpoints, military incursions, fatality figures and settlement constructions.⁴⁷ Because a number of Palestinian quotes rely on Israeli watchdog sources, there is a risk of translation errors, omissions or even false attributions. Again this made it especially important to attribute not only watchdog references, but also the original source.

different translated versions online. Another way to go about it would be to trace the translation back to its original source and have independent translators compare them. The problem with these control methods, however, is that they are costly and time-consuming.

⁴⁷ Compare for example the Itamar Marcus's pro-Israeli watchdog *Palestinian Media Watch* (<http://www.palwatch.org/>) with Ahmed Bouzid's pro-Palestinian watchdog *Palestine Media Watch* (<http://web.archive.org/web/20080119203448/http://www.pmwatch.org/pmw/index.asp>.) See also Mark Glaser, 'Palestinians find their voice online', *Ausc Annenerg Online Journalism Review*, 22 October 2003, www.ojr.org/ojr/glaser/1066177054.php. Accessed: 21 October 2010.

An online 'snow-balling' research method was used in the study where one site would lead to another, which would lead to another etc. In this respect open-ended online search-engine research also has its potential pitfalls. There is always a danger that one comes across a large variety of unofficial, false or even plagiarised sources. One must therefore be aware of the online source's origins in order to determine whether it is a credible and official website.

Another research limitation was the temporality of online sources: websites can be removed or expire and so it is important to be aware of the risk that the source might disappear. In the course of the empirical research, several official Palestinian government websites as well as the official Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs website would function properly one day, but fail to open on the next. As a measure of precaution, all the citations from websites were printed in order to facilitate reference in case they were to expire.

7. OUTLINE

The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 ('Demonisation in historical context') illustrates the historic and religious roots of the devil metaphor in contemporary political discourse. It includes examples of the various manifestations of the (D)evil enemy in conflicts between states to show that demonisation is not a new phenomenon. Chapter 3 ('Demonisation in war and peace') conceptualises the different role of demonising discourses in the context of war and peace. The first section ('Waging war: the politics of demonisation in conflict') examines demonising

discourse in the context of war. It introduces the notion of a so-called 'politics of demonisation' in warfare and explores possible reasons for demonising the enemy. The second section ('Waging peace: can one bargain with the Devil?') examines demonising discourse in the context of peace negotiations and diplomatic engagements. It introduces the notion of 'demonisation deadlock' and addresses some of the moral and pragmatic challenges that emerge when framing peace-efforts with the enemy as 'shaking hands with the Devil'. Chapter 4 ('The Israeli-Palestinian conflict: an introduction') gives an introductory overview of the historical background of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It also presents the conflicting narratives surrounding the conflict. Chapter 5 ('Documenting demonisation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict') presents the research findings of a study of demonisation in Israeli-Palestinian elite narratives. It provides a qualitative analysis of the examples gathered – asking 'who demonises whom, when and how'. Chapter 6 ('Demonisation deadlock in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict') focuses on the diplomatic efforts made between Israelis and Palestinians to make peace. Drawing upon the thesis's three dimensions of 'demonisation deadlock', it points to an interaction between demonising elite narratives and stalemate in peace-negotiations in the conflict. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the thesis and proposes new avenues for future research.

CHAPTER 2

DEMONISATION IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

On 20 September 2006, the late Venezuelan President, Hugo Chavez, denounced the smell of sulphur in the United Nations General Assembly. ‘The devil, the devil himself, is right in the house’, Chavez exclaimed, directing his wrath towards the United States of America (US).¹ Almost three decades earlier, after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the Iranian Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini similarly branded the US ‘the Great Satan’ and Israel, its ‘little Satan’ companion. Equating one’s adversary with the devil is not a new phenomenon. Just as Christians in early Roman times evoked the figure of Satan to describe ‘pagans’, ‘heretics’ and ‘non-believers’, Adolf Hitler dismissed the Jew as ‘the handicraft of another God’, segregating this ‘human devil’ from the ‘human divinity’ of the Aryan race.² Charles Baudelaire once suggested that ‘it is the loveliest trick of the devil to convince you that he does not exist’, but history reveals that, on the contrary, man frequently choses to evoke the devil and his evil doings.³

As this chapter will demonstrate, the historical track record of demonising one’s adversary goes far back. It has evolved over time, mutating from a once literal belief in demonic possession to a now figurative – and more politically charged – accusation against one’s adversary. The chapter’s main objective is to highlight the

¹ Transcript, ‘President Hugo Chavez delivers remarks at the U.N. General Assembly’, *Washington Post*, 20 September 2006. Accessed: 30 September 2007.

² Hitler quoted in Arie Stav, *Peace: the Arabian caricature: a study of anti-semitic imagery* (Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House, 1999), p. 59.

³ Charles Pierre Baudelaire, ‘Le joueur genereux’ in *Le spleen de Paris*, 1869. See http://baudelaire.litteratura.com/le_spleen_de_paris.php. My translation. Accessed: 15 September 2011.

intimate historical relationship between religion and politics: how the Devil – an ancient religious character – is used in historic and modern political discourse in international conflict situations. Through historical illustrations and visual images of the (D)evil enemy, the chapter shows that there is a tradition for demonising one's enemy in conflicts. This historical and religious context is meant to provide a background for better understanding contemporary examples of demonisation, which are highlighted in the rest of the thesis.

The chapter is divided into three parts: the first part introduces the religious character of the Devil and shows how it crystallised into an embodiment of evil. It further explains how the link forged between the underworld and human protagonists was a crucial prerequisite for demonisation. The second part illustrates how the Satan myths spread into popular belief systems and became generators of religious demonisation campaigns. The third part shows the transition from demonisation in the context of religious wars to the more secularised demonisation in modern political conflicts.

1. SATAN & THE RELIGIOUS ORIGINS OF DEMONISATION

Who is the Devil? Where did he come from? And most importantly, what does he represent? According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the Devil is 'the supreme spirit of evil, the tempter and spiritual enemy of mankind, the foe of God and holiness, otherwise called Satan'.⁴ In Christianity, our central protagonist goes by

⁴ Oxford English Dictionary Online (www.oed.com). For other definitions of the Devil see S.G.F. Brandon, 'The Devil: in faith and history', *History Today*, vol. 13, no. 7, 1963, p. 473; Neil Forsyth, *The*

many names, but his two most common titles are 'Satan' and 'the Devil'.⁵ In Judaism, the Hebrew word to signify the forces of darkness is *Satan* or *Shedim* meaning demons – which also denotes an 'adversary'. *Iblis*, known otherwise as *Shaytan*, is the Islamic equivalent. He is the leader of the *Jinns* – demons with either good or evil forces. Hinduism also has its own demons, known as *Asuaras* – with several subclasses including the *Nagas* (serpent demons) and *Kamsa* (the arch-demon). The Hindu religious tradition also believes in the possession of human beings by evil spirits, referred to as *Raksasas*. Buddhist demons include *Mara* – the arch temptress – along with her daughters *Rati* (desire), *Raga* (pleasure), and *Tanha* (restlessness). Buddhism has also inspired the conceptions of demons and devils in Japan (*oni*) and China (*kuei-shen*). Thus devils and demons go by many different names and appear in many different cultural and religious contexts.⁶

In all three Abrahamic religions – Judaism, Christianity and Islam – rebellion against God is a common theme. In ancient Judaic texts, Azazel – the demon of the desert and king of the Se'irim (ancient goat-like spirits) – causes wrath in Yahweh when he discloses the secret of metallurgy to mankind, training men in the art of warfare and

old enemy: Satan and the combat myth, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987, p. 4; Elaine Pagels, *The origin of Satan*, London: Penguin Press, 1996, p. 39.

⁵ 'Satan' and 'the Devil' are used interchangeably in this chapter. However some scholars establish a distinct hierarchy between the two, with Satan being 'the vice president of Hell, second only to the Devil'. See for example Tom and Genevieve Morgan, *The Devil: a visual guide to the demonic, evil, scurrilous, and bad*, San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 1996, p. 99. Similarly 'Lucifer', the bearer of light, is considered synonymous with Satan and the Devil, although his relative rank in the kingdom of evil is disputed as well. The 'Anti-Christ', who is diametrically opposed (as epitomised by the term *anti*) to Christ, also appears in the demonic family tree. Other titles to refer to the Devil/Satan include the Prince of Darkness, the Angel of the Abyss, the Lord of the Underworld, Abaddon, Apollyon, Asmedai, Asmodeus, Baal, Belial, Beelzebub, Iblis, Leviathan, Masterma, Mephistopheles, Old Nick and Sammael. Devils and demons thus appear in various religious narratives throughout history under a panoply of different names, which nevertheless more often than not describe the same satanic essence. For a good overview of the different variants of the Devil and his servants in various religions see Morgan, *The Devil*, pp. 83-103.

⁶ Jacob E. Safra, ed., 'Demon', in *The new Encyclopaedia Britannica*, London: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc, 2005.

women in the art of vanity and betrayal.⁷ In the Quran, Satan appears in the account of Genesis where it is explained that Allah created him out of 'smokeless fire' and man out of clay. Satan refuses to bow to Adam and is subsequently cursed by Allah.⁸ In the New Testament Satan is banished from the holy kingdom and thrown into the fires of the underworld as a punishment for his misdeeds.⁹ His holy wings are removed and he falls 'like a lightning from Heaven'.¹⁰ After his fall Satan sets up a rival kingdom called 'Hell' where he becomes the leader of his own standing army of demons. From here his aim is to prevent the extension of God's kingdom by encouraging sinful behaviour in man and disobedience to God. Several episodes in the New Testament highlight this increased antagonism between Satan and God with Satan's temptation of Christ being perhaps the most climatic episode.¹¹

Satan's insurrection from the underworld sets the precedent for the dichotomy of G(o)od and (D)evil, where good becomes the will of God and evil the work of the Devil. Indeed, moral dualism of 'good' and 'evil' began as a theological belief and although the first references to it can be traced back to the ancient Persian religion of Zoroastrianism, Christianity has been one of the greatest sources of dualistic – 'good' and 'evil' – thought.¹² In particular, Manichean interpretations of Christianity

⁷ Pagels, *The origin of Satan*, pp. 52-54.

⁸ See Mustafa Ozturk, 'The tragic story of Iblis (Satan) in the Quran', *Journal of Islamic Research*, vol. 2, no. 2, 2009, p. 129.

⁹ Book of Revelation 12:7-9 (New Testament).

¹⁰ Gospel of Luke 10:18 (New Testament).

¹¹ For more on Satan's temptation of Christ and other apocalyptic battles in the New Testament see for instance the Gospel of Matthews 25:34-46, Gospel of Mark 16:5-7 and 3:23-27, Gospel of Luke 22:3. For useful secondary literature on diabolic encounters with God see Trevor Oswald Ling, *The significance of satan: new testament demonology and its contemporary relevance*, London: S.P.C.K, 1961, p. 4 and pp. 17-20.

¹² Zoroastrianism, under the teachings of Zoroaster, personified ethical good and evil into two separate characters, one representing the God of Light (Ormuzd) and the other the God of Darkness (Ahriman). According to Jeffrey Burt Russell, one of the leading experts on the biography of the Devil, Ahriman was the 'first real Devil in world religion' (see Russell, *The prince of darkness: radical evil and the power of good in history*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988, p. 19). For more on the

in 2nd-4th century AD gave rise to an inflamed and permanent distinction between good and evil.¹³ Satan became known as the embodiment of sin and greed; an emperor in the realm of misery; an agent provocateur leading mankind into wickedness and impurity; an obstructor of all good; a root of all evil; a supreme leader of rebellion with an insatiable appetite for power and self-aggrandisement.

While Satan was at first mainly relegated to the suprahuman domain, he soon became associated with human protagonists. This point is crucial to understanding demonisation because it was precisely the belief that evil spirits could inhabit the human body or corrupt the human mind that first gave rise to the devil enemy charge. Deception was the Devil's forte, and his master trick was to disguise himself and to appear where he was least expected. Within the Quran and the Christian and Jewish Bibles, Satan is displayed as able to disguise his physical appearance by taking refuge in animals and humans. In the Quran the djinns are described as spirits who intermediate between humans and angels. They are believed to have no body of their own, and so have to occupy that of a human.¹⁴ In the book of Genesis the Devil as serpent tempts Eve to commit the original sin in the Garden of Eden while the seven-headed beast of the apocalypse is another believed embodiment of Satan. In the New Testament's Book of Revelation the Devil appears in the form of a dragon that fights an apocalyptic battle with the archangel Michael, while in the Gospels the Devil disguises himself as an old man in the famous temptation scene of Christ in the desert.

influence of Zoroastrianism on modern conceptions of evil see, for example, Renee Jeffery, *Evil and international relations: human suffering in an age of terror*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp. 42-46 and John Edwards Le Bosquet, 'The Evil One: a development', *The Harvard Theological Review*, vol. 5, no. 3, July 1912, pp. 374-77.

¹³ Jeffery, *Evil and international relations*, Chapter 3.

¹⁴ See Carol K. Mack and Dinah Mack, *A field guide to demons, fairies, fallen angels, and other subversive spirits*, New York: Arcade Publishing, 1998, pp.147-50.

Several myths involving the merging of the demonic with the human world helped further foster the devil enemy image. In one myth, the Devil had human accomplices and this collaboration between humans and the underworld was forged through a 'pact' or 'deal' with the Devil. The diabolical pact initially involved an exchange of favours, in which the individual would render his services to the underworld in exchange for achieving personal goals such as wealth, power, knowledge or glory. Written and signed in blood or in the form of a more illicit oral accord, a contract was established and a Devil's mark was embossed in the human's flesh to formalise the deal. The human beings would then be responsible for carrying out evil deeds on earth: infanticide, for example, was an alleged common practice of the Devil's collaborators who worked to empower Satan's kingdom. The following illustration shows a pact with the Devil.



Devil and Man (Illuminated initial of a Latin Bible, artist unknown, 13th century)

¹⁵ Robert Muchembled, *Damned: an illustrated history of the Devil*, San Fransisco: Seuil Chronicle, 2004.

Another myth of the 'human' devil further connects the underworld with earthly protagonists. Unlike conscious collaborators, who actively engaged in a pact with Satan and exchanged services of mutual interest, 'human' devils were seen as directly possessed by the underworld. They were usually passive victims, unconscious of their fate. Demons would communicate with the world through them, and use their bodies as cunning guises in order to deceive and corrupt mankind. Although possessed individuals operated surreptitiously, there were supposed signs that could reveal their true identity. Left-handedness, blindness and the scent of sulphur were apparently the most obvious indications.¹⁶ Moreover, the demonic came to represent a way of life: if alcohol was the Devil's drink, gambling was the Devil's game and so anyone with a perceived 'religiously unorthodox lifestyle' could arouse suspicion. Some rituals, it was believed, could save the demonised soul. The following illustration shows Christ exorcising a man of evil spirits.



St. Francis Missal (Religious manuscript, artist unknown, France, mid-14th century)

¹⁶ Loss of vision, according to religious myth, was the Devil's doing and only faith in God could restore eyesight as God had the ability to 'open their eyes and turn them from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan to God' (Act 26:18).

¹⁷ Manuscript in repository of Bodleian Library, University of Oxford. Found using Oxford Digital Library (Accessed: 21 August 2009).

Visual images played a role in the dissemination of these myths into public belief systems. The earliest depictions of devils and demons appeared in religious artwork crafted by theologians.¹⁸ They were faithful to the religious narrative, only depicting the famous demonic encounters described in Holy Scripture.¹⁹ Although these religious artworks began to breathe life into the demonic image, the portrayals remained in religious seclusion and theologians were almost alone in visualising devils and demons.²⁰

During the late medieval period illustrated religious texts became more widely distributed and the demonic figures of the religious world were increasingly visible to the laity. In these, Satan is often represented as having a deformed bodily shape like that of a satyr with cloven hoofs, horns and a tail. His complexion is either dark red or pitch black (the colours of fire, blood, danger and darkness) and he is usually accessorised with a pitchfork. His eyes are often depicted as bulging, bloody or flaming. The illustrated manuscript on the following page represents an example of a depiction of Satan. The Devil's bestial horns and claws, along with his ogling eyes and gaping mouth were generally thought to represent the most appropriate form a demon might assume, according to the biographer of the Devil, Jeffrey Burton Russell.²¹

¹⁸ Scholars are not certain of the exact date when Satan first appeared on canvas: according to Tom Morgan there was no known depiction of the Devil before the sixth century, while Luther Link points to the hand-painted illustrations from Christian manuscripts in ninth century Europe as being among the first. Robert Muchembled argues that visual portrayals of devils and demons in Europe rarely appeared in art before the twelfth century.

¹⁹ Famous scenes included the damnation of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden; the fall of the archangel Lucifer; Satan's attempted conversion of Christ against God in the desert; and the apocalyptic battle of St. Michael against the Devil himself.

²⁰ See Muchembled, *Damned*, Chapter 1: 'Europe Invents the Devil'.

²¹ Jeffrey B. Russell, *Satan: the early Christian tradition*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981, p.223.



Devil's Bible (Religious manuscript, early 13th century)
Devil as portrayed in the Codex Gigas

As the public exposure to these fearful creatures grew, demonic illustrations became increasingly embellished. Tales of the underworld's mischief became more imaginative and the diabolical charges developed into frightening myths. Dante's *Divine Comedy*, for example, written in the early fourteenth century included horrifying scenes from the Devil's inferno.²³ These images revealed a growing obsession with the underworld. A common theme was the battle between good and evil forces over the human soul (as illustrated in the print on the following page). The image illustrates how the themes of temptation and struggle in religious texts were adapted to literature outside the traditional biblical narrative. This transition helped further propagate the Satan myths into society.

²² The devil's bible is a medieval manuscript stored at the Royal Library, Stockholm. It contains the image of the devil in Folio 290 recto. Legend has it a monk created the manuscript after having sold his soul to the devil.

²³ Three centuries later Milton's famous *Paradise Lost* would have the same effect. For more on literary references to the Devil see Wolfgang Seiferth, 'The concept of the Devil and the myth of the pact in literature prior to Goethe', *Monatshefte*, vol. 44, no. 6, 1952.



Dante's Divine Comedy (Manuscript, Italy, late 14th century)
The angels of God and the Devil fight for the soul of Buonconte.

In the medieval and early modern period the idea of demonic agents in human form was pervasive. These beliefs manifested themselves in the discourse and illustrations of the time: an entirely new vocabulary evolved to describe demonic servants, terms included *demoniac* (possessed by demon), *demonial* (of or relating to a demon), *demoniast* (one who was dealing with the Devil), *demonist* (a believer in or worshipper of demons), *demonian* (of the nature of a demon), *demonographer* (a writer on demons), *demonish* (of, belonging to, or of the nature of, a demon) and *demonomaniac* (a delusion of being possessed by an evil spirit).²⁵ Satan's polymorphism made it hard to tell where and when he was to be found, yet it was precisely through this ambiguity that demonic accusation campaigns flourished: for if the Devil was hard to identify, he was also easy to create.

²⁴ Manuscript in repository of Bodleian Library, University of Oxford. Found using ARTstor search engine. Accessed: 24 August 2009.

²⁵ Oxford English Dictionary online (www.oed.com).

2. RELIGIOUS DEMONISATION CAMPAIGNS

The widespread belief that Satan could manifest himself in human protagonists within the earthly domain manifested itself in inter- and intra-religious demonisation narratives. The figure of Satan came to define the religious enemy, from which the true righteous religion had to be demarcated. In early Christian writings, according to Elaine Pagels, the Jews became the defining “other” necessary for delineating a new Christian religion. She notes how followers of Jesus’ sects explained their fight against opposing Jewish sects competing for supremacy not only by arguing that ‘forces of evil act through certain people’ (in this case the opposing Jewish sects), but also by using the figure of Satan to ‘characteriz[e] one’s actual enemies as the embodiments of transcendent forces’.²⁶ By attributing Jews culpability for the death of Christ, early Christians often projected the figure of the Antichrist onto the Jews, who instead of worshiping God, served the Devil and assisted him in his evildoings.²⁷ This distinction was also turned against Roman pagans and later against heretics and dissidents within the Christian tradition.

The image of the Jew as a religious other, to be associated with ‘Satan’ and ‘evil’, was maintained throughout the medieval and early modern period. The Protestant reformist Martin Luther warned: ‘be on your guard against the Jews, knowing that wherever they have their synagogues, nothing is found but a den of devils in-which

²⁶ Pagels, *The origin of Satan*, p. 13.

²⁷ The demonisation of the Jews has been well-documented. See for example Joel Carmichael, *The satanizing of the Jews: origin and development of mystical anti-semitism*, New York: Fromm International, 1992; Joshua Trachtenberg, *The Devil and the Jews: the medieval conception of the Jew and its relation to modern antisemitism*, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1983; Robert S. Wistrich et al., *Demonizing the other: antisemitism, racism and xenophobia*, Amsterdam: Harwood Academic, 1999.

sheer self-glory, conceit, lies, blasphemy, and defaming of God and men are practiced most maliciously.²⁸ Below is one of many images from the period associating the Jew with the Devil.



Simon of Trent and the Judensau (Woodcut, Frankfurt-en-Main, 17th century)

During the Crusades similar rhetoric and images were also directed towards the followers of Islam.³⁰ The following print is taken from a French manuscript. The manuscript was compiled between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, beginning in the reign of Saint Louis, who wished to preserve the history of the Franks. This particular print shows Christian King Charlemagne's army fighting against the Muslim army (appearing here as dark devils) in Spain.

²⁸ Martin Luther, *On the Jews and their Lies*, 1543, translated by Martin H. Bertram. See <http://www.humanitas-international.org/showcase/chronography/documents/luther-jews.htm> Accessed: 24 September 2011. Devil is mentioned 100 times in the document.

²⁹ Heinz Schreckenberg, *The Jews in Christian Art: An Illustrated History*, transl. J. Bowden, NY: Continuum, 1996.

³⁰ For numerous examples of medieval and early modern demonisation of Islam see Nasir Khan, *Perceptions of Islam in the Christendoms: a historical survey*, Oslo: Solum, 2006 and Norman Daniel, *Islam and the West: the making of an image*, Oxford: Oneworld, 1993.



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Grandes Chroniques de France (Royal manuscript, Paris, 14th century)
Charlemagne leads his army against the Saracens

The image illustrates the graphic mutation occurring, in which humans were portrayed as collaborating with the demonic. Conflicts were coated with the rhetoric of good and evil, with the forces of good fighting on the side of God and the forces of evil fighting on the side of the Devil. This metamorphosis also reveals how Satan's image took on a more fearful and imaginative dimension in society as religious influence grew. The rise in literary and graphic references to demonic spirits during the medieval and early modern period points to an era of increased concern with and belief in them.

As with the well-poisoning conspiracy of 1321, criticisms of the Jews and Muslims were often conflated, and massacres of 'the devilish Jews' occurred on route to defending the Holy Lands from the religious threat posed by the Saracens.³² In *The*

³¹ Link, *The Devil*, p. 72.

³² For this conspiracy, see amongst others Malcolm Barber, 'Lepers, Jews and Moslems: the plot to overthrow Christendom in 1321,' *History*, vol. 66, 1981; Carlo Ginzburg, *Ecstasies: deciphering the witches' sabbath*, ed. Gregory Elliot, trans. Raymond Rosenthal, London: Hutchinson Radius, 1990,

Satanizing of the Jews, Joel Carmichael argued that the Crusaders exploited the ancient theme of Jews as demonic murderers of Christ. He explained how ‘the massacre of the Jews had nothing to do with the specific activities of individual Jews’ but that ‘the very existence of the entire people was taken to be a satanic activity’.³³ In the image below Ethiopians, Saracens and Jews are all portrayed as followers of the Antichrist.



Ethiopians, Saracens and Jews adore antichrist
(Manuscript, artist unknown, Austria, mid-15th century)

With the threat of an Ottoman invasion from the East, demonisation of the lascivious Turk and the threat of his false beliefs became a common occurrence. According to Palmira Brummett, in the rhetoric of early modern Christendom ‘the divide between Christendom and Islam was not so much a spatial one as a divide between those

Chapter 1; David Nirenberg, *Communities of violence: persecution of minorities in the Middle Ages*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996, esp. pp. 43-68 and pp. 91-124.

³³ Carmichael, *The satanizing of the Jews*, p. 82.

³⁴ Image found on ARTstore. Accessed: 29 August 2009.

chosen by heaven and those serving the interests of the devil³⁵. The first publication on Islam in English vernacular, *Treatyse of the Turkes Lawe called Alcoran* (1519) showed the picture of a Muslim preacher standing in front of the figure of a horned beast-like devil.³⁶



Image from *A Lytell Treatyse of the Turkes Lawe called Alcoran* (Manuscript, 1519)

Other sixteenth-century accounts of the life of Muhammad by authors such as Martin Luther and Theodore Bibliander described the prophet as succumbing to his evil lusts with Muhammad being ‘a tool of Satan’ and the Quran the work of the Devil.³⁸ Martin Luther’s *Preface* to the first translation of the Quran in Latin is filled with demonising rhetoric against the Muslims.

³⁵ Palmira Brummett, “‘Turks’ and ‘Christians’: The Iconography of Possession in the Depiction of the Ottoman-Venetian Hapsburg Frontiers, 1550–1689”, in Matthew Dimmock and Andrew Hadfield, eds, *The Devil Citing Scripture: Christian Perceptions of the Religions of the Book*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 112.

³⁶ Nabil I. Matar, ‘The question of Occidentalism in early modern Morocco’, Patricia Clare Ingham and Michelle R. Warren, eds, *Postcolonial moves: medieval through modern*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 164.

³⁷ Found on EEBO Early English Books Online. Accessed: 30 August 2009.

³⁸ Adam S. Francisco, *History of Christian-Muslim Relations, Volume 8: Martin Luther and Islam: A Study in Sixteenth-Century Polemics and Apologetics*, Boston: Brill Academic, 2007, pp. 55-56.

If the Christian tradition was particularly avid in the use of demonising rhetoric, the religious other as Devil was also present in Jewish and Muslim narratives of the medieval and early modern period. In his analysis of the Talevera dispute regarding the conversion of a Muslim woman to Judaism, David Nirenberg recounts the arguments put forward by the Jewish and Muslim counterparts and their Christian lawyers. The Jews argued that the Muslims would fight for the Antichrist and that the Muslim law was authored by Satan, while advocates for the Muslims claimed that the Jews had become a synagogue of Satan.³⁹ The prohibition of pictoriality in Islam, however, meant that there could be no visual demonised images of Europeans.⁴⁰

The interreligious rivalry between the Catholics and the Protestants during the Reformation (1517-1648) gave rise to evocative demonisation campaigns. This war-torn period also sparked off a great age of pamphleteering. The technical innovation of the printing press helped effectively spread the devil enemy image amongst the general public through 'poisonous pamphlets' filled with diabolic indictments against the opposition.⁴¹ Protestant pamphlets frequently included caricatures of the pope as demonic. In Germany, the most renowned Protestant reformist and the earliest, most effective pamphleteer, Martin Luther, spearheaded the 'Papist Devil' campaign.

³⁹ David Nirenberg, *Communities of violence: persecution of minorities in the Middle Ages*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996, pp. 192-94.

⁴⁰ Matar, 'The question of Occidentalism in early modern Morocco', p. 167.

⁴¹ See Jeffrey K. Sawyer, *Printed poison: pamphlet propaganda, faction politics, and the public sphere in early seventeenth-century France*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.



The Papist Devil (Woodcut, artist unknown, Germany, late 15th century)
 Depicts the Borgia Pope, Alexander VI, as Devil. Legend states: 'I am the Pope'

Conversely, the Catholic Church accused the Protestant attempt to reform Christianity of being diabolically subversive. Catholic theologians dismissed Martin Luther and his religious followers' heresy as the voice of the Devil.



The Devil's Bagpipe (Woodcut, artist Erhard Schoen, Germany, ca. 1520)
 Features Martin Luther as an instrument of demonic spirits.

⁴² Pope as Devil in Edward Lucie-Smith, *The art of caricature*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981, p. 35.

⁴³ Keen, *Faces of the enemy*, p. 27.

As the demonic pact and possession myths were disseminated through popular imagination, the targets of these demonic charges expanded and soon the religious myth took on a life of its own.⁴⁴ This is perhaps best observed in the range of polemical texts addressing the Devil's presence in the form of witchcraft.⁴⁵ The witch-hunts are a painful testament to the growing public conviction in demonic possession, with an estimated one million 'witches' being burned at the stake between 1575 and 1700 as a consequence. As early as 1274, however, Thomas Aquinas had already warned 'that there were among men other servants of the Devil, more subtle, more dangerous, than the heretics: the men and women devoted altogether to his service – the witches'.⁴⁶ The print below illustrates a ritual worship with a group of 'witches' and the Devil. Such prints were common during the period of the witch craze.



47

Witch giving a ritual kiss to Satan (Book print, artist R.P. Gaucius, Milan, 1626)

⁴⁴ For more on the social implications of the Satan myth see Pagels, *The origin of Satan*. She explains how analogies to Satan often became a justification for persecution.

⁴⁵ For an overview of the range of texts dealing with early modern demonology see Stuart Clark, *Thinking with demons: the idea of witchcraft in early modern Europe*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.

⁴⁶ Aquinas quoted in Cohn, *Europe's inner demons*, p. 112.

⁴⁷ Image originally appeared in the 1626 Italian edition of *Compendium Maleficarum*. Taken from www.pendlewitches.co.uk/. Accessed: 10 January 2010.

In *Europe's inner demons*, one of the leading scholars on witchcraft, Norman Cohn, argues that, 'the great witch-hunt...illustrates vividly both the power of the human imagination to build up a stereotype and its reluctance to question the validity of a stereotype once it is generally accepted. Until our own century, the operation and consequences of *demonization* have never been more horrifyingly displayed.'⁴⁸ The persecution campaigns against witches, Jews and heretics during the medieval and early modern period demonstrate the mobilising force of hostile belief systems. Demonisation became a weapon for persecution accompanying interreligious rivalry and provided ammunition for hatred, paranoia, fear and exclusion. The Devil's agents had to be eliminated in order to exorcise the forces of evil from the world. This task was a morally righteous one: the search for those who might be Devil collaborators or possessed and the quest to purge sinners of his influence became a sacred and God-given undertaking.

3. DEMONISATION IN MODERN POLITICS

While the propagation of Satanic myths had *religious* roots, their spreading also had *political* motivations. For example, the Religious Wars in Europe during the Reformation period illustrate the – at times explosive – relationship between politics and religion. It remains a prime example of how the Devil enemy came to life where and when someone stood to gain or lose religious and political primacy. The overlap between religious and political powers during the Religious Wars in early modern Europe was significant. Just as the fall of Constantinople and a possible Ottoman invasion had represented both a religious and a political threat, the Protestant-

⁴⁸ Cohn, *Europe's inner demons*, p. 233. Emphasis added.

Catholic clashes during the Thirty Years War were as much about religious rivalry as they were about political control. After the treaty of Westphalia (1648) and the formal cleavage of religious and political affairs, the battle of the churches in Europe gradually ceased to drive conflict as much as it had done in the past. One might assume therefore that this secularisation of political power would slowly suffocate demonic mythology. Interestingly, however, the devil enemy image persisted.

States came to employ the demonisation tactics that religious authorities had once mastered. During the American and French Revolutions, for instance, demonic imagery remained a common means of discrediting the adversary. Like the Protestant reformists who had sought to overturn the Catholic power-base, revolutionaries of the American and French Revolution used demonic imagery to illustrate the political vices and the insidious nature of those in power. Privilege, wealth and status were depicted as diabolical vices, which had come at the expense of poverty, exploitation, and popular servitude.

Demonisation tactics against the political elite became a critical mobilising force for the revolutionaries. In France, for instance, 'Le grand diable d'argent' (the great Devil of money) became a famous motif to characterise the rich aristocracy during the French Revolution and after. Many thematically similar prints circulated in France depicting the Devil as spreading moneybags among people of all trades. The association between the rich and the Devil, they believed, was obvious: wealth and greed came at a diabolic price. Their political motive was to delegitimise the existing power-base and mobilise the people against them.



49

Le Diable d'argent (Engraving, artist unknown, France, early 18th century)

In America, the famous patriot, revolutionary and engraver, Paul Revere employed images from the underworld in his depiction of British colonials. In his illustration the colonisers themselves are not directly depicted as demons, but are instead ushered into the fiery jaws of Hell. The accusation of evil remains similar. The colonisers are in league with the Devil in their sinful behaviour, and Revere clearly indicates that Hell is their appropriate destination. Robert Philippe argues the print could have 'stepped straight out of Reformation symbolism' given that 'it seems designed to revive ancient terrors'.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Manuscript is part of the Bleichroeder Print Collection, Kress Collection at the Baker Library, Harvard Business School, Historical Collections. Found using VIA through Harvard University Library. Accessed: 24 August 2009.

⁵⁰ Robert Philippe, *Political graphics: art as a weapon*, New York: Abbeville Press, 1982, p. 116.



A Warm Place – Hell (Print, artist Paul Revere, US, 1768)

It appears that those clinging onto political power would return the demonic accusations in order to safeguard their support base and to delegitimise the revolutionaries. The reactionary print below is an illustrative case in point. It portrays the revolutionary sans-culottes as entirely indigestible beings, even to the Devil.



Indigestion of the Devil (Print, artist unknown, France, ca. 1790)

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 136.

⁵² Originally printed in *Ami du Peuple*. In James Leith, 'Images of the sans-culotte', in Claudette and James Leith Hould, ed., *Iconographie et image de la Revolution Francaise*, Montreal: Université du Québec à Montreal, 1989, p. 158.

Alongside the intrastate demonisation campaigns between status quo and revolutionary forces in France there also existed a French-English rivalry. The apocalyptic nature of the French Revolution is captured in the following English print, which portrays the beheading of Louis XVI in 1793. France appears to have descended into Hell, with a sky of demons, satanic soldiers, and Satan himself presiding over the ceremony on his throne. In the print a direct personification of the revolutionaries as demonic is made. Admittedly artists could create their work outside the political authority of the state, but the state also purposefully commissioned and circulated demonising artworks with the aim to demonise their enemy.



Hell Broke Loose (Coloured engraving, artist W. Dent, Britain, mid-18th century)

For example the bitter English-French antagonism also becomes apparent in the French artist Jacques Louis David's work, which was commissioned at the behest of the Committee of Public Safety and distributed during the Revolution. In David's portrayal of the English Government, the monarchy is represented as a demon

⁵³ Muchembled, *Damned*, p. 153.

wearing a royal crown and emitting its excrement over the country and its aristocracy.



Gouvernement Anglais (Print, artist Jacques Louis David, Paris, 1793)

Napoleon would also become the target of demonisation campaigns. Images would depict Napoleon either as the Devil himself or in close alliance with him. In the case of this next print, the Devil is even nursing Napoleon to sleep. Another recurring graphic image of Napoleon at the time was that 'not even the Devil' wanted to deal with him (illustrated in the print on the following page).

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 130.



55

The Devil's darling (Print, artist Thomas Rowlandson, 1814)
Devil nursing Napoleon.



56

The Devil won't take him, what a pity (Print, artist unspecified, Curzon collection, early 1800s)

⁵⁵ Frank E. Huggett, *Cartoonists at war*, Leicester: Winward, 1981, p. 32. Colour print version taken from British Museum database

http://www.britishmuseum.org/research/search_the_collection_database/search_object_details.aspx?partid=1&objectid=1655732. Accessed: 13 September 2011.

⁵⁶ The print was taken from the Curzon collection, which is accessible through the Oxford Digital Library. The Curzon Project provides digital images of political cartoons from the period of the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars.

Across the Atlantic, a different demonisation campaign was taking place between unionists and secessionists during the American Civil War. The examples below represent a print that appeared on an official government envelope that was ‘entered according to an Act of Congress, in the year, 1861’.



57

The first secessionist (Envelope for the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the U.S. for the Southern District of Ohio, by Mumford & Co, 1861)

The political secularisation of religious myths surrounding Satan in the post-Westphalian order brought additional layers of meaning to the demonic charge: the effect of Satan's graphic appearance would continue to be subversive, yet it was now also an ironic metaphor for decadence, decay, corruption and rebellion in addition to a symbol of absolute evil. This metamorphosis of the Devil into a satirical figure was part of a more secular political strategy, although the imagery still retained its religious roots. States, like the religious authorities before them, would continue to

⁵⁷ Found in the archives of Harvard University's Rare Books Collection in the Houghton Library. Original contributor: Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C. publisher: Alexander Street Press (c) 2008. Also available online at <http://cpho.alexanderstreet.com/displayimage.php?pos=-1005>. Accessed: 26 March 2008.

maintain their powerbases by demonising their adversaries, just as those seeking to challenge them would.

The twentieth century saw a continuation of state-sponsored demonisation campaigns. The two World Wars in the first half of the twentieth century both witnessed extensive government-run atrocity propaganda campaigns. These total wars required conscript armies and the mobilisation of civil society at large. Consequently, state-sponsored propaganda agencies manufactured war posters and political cartoons to demonstrate the evilness of the enemy to increase recruitment. Harold Lasswell argued that the Allied propaganda during the First World War relied on 'simple satanism'.⁵⁸ The German leader, Kaiser Wilhelm, was often portrayed as an embodiment of Satan himself and the 'Hun-Devil' appeared in numerous propaganda campaigns.




Untitled (Allied poster during WWI, 1915)
German Kaiser Wilhelm II depicted as Devil

⁵⁸ Harold D. Lasswell, *Propaganda technique in the World War*, London: Paul Trench Trubner & co, 1927.

⁵⁹ Russell, *Mephistopheles - the Devil in the modern world*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986, p. 269.

Another illustration of demonised Germany can be found in the work of the renowned Dutch cartoonist Louis Raemaekers. In one of his cartoons, entitled 'Satan's Partner', Raemaekers portrays Germany as a green ogre-like demon with horns and a sadistic grin. Bearing the heading: 'War is as divine as eating and drinking', the print assumes an almost cannibalistic greed on the part of the Germans in the war, implying that the Germans found the death and gore of war just as pleasurable, necessary and natural as eating and drinking.




Satan's Partner (Cartoon, artist Louis Raemaekers, Netherlands, WWI)

The return of Reformist-style demonic propaganda during the early twentieth century becomes apparent when comparing the imagery of a Protestant pamphlet (1632) with that of a Russian propaganda poster (1915). The first print shows the Protestant city of Augsburg being consumed by the seven-headed 'Anti-Christ' beast of the apocalypse after the Catholic reforms of 1629. The text below the original print specifies that the beast represents the papacy. The Russian poster from the

⁶⁰ Louis Raemaekers and James Murray Allison, *Raemaekers' cartoon history of the war*, London: The Century Co, 1919, p. 147. Raemaekers' cartoon collection is also available online on 'Project Gutenberg' (<http://www.gutenberg.org/files/19126/19126-h/19126-h.htm>). Accessed: 12 September 2009.

First World War features a similar apocalyptic beast, a three-headed serpent, only this time the heads represent Russia's enemies: the Austrian head (which has been cut off), the German and the Turk. The poster's subtitle specifies: 'The great battle of the Russian Hero with the German Serpent'. Both the beast of the apocalypse and the serpent are common representations of Satan.



Untitled (Print, artist unknown, Germany, 1632)



The Great European War (War poster, artist unknown, Russia, 1915)

⁶¹ Elmer Adolph Beller, *Propaganda in Germany during the Thirty Years War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940, p. 12.

⁶² Peter Paret, Beth Irwin Lewis, and Paul Paret, *Persuasive images: posters of war and revolution from the Hoover Institution archives* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 13.

The Devil continued to feature in wartime posters, cartoons and caricatures during the Second World War. Adolf Hitler, like the German Kaiser before him, was frequently portrayed as either embodying or conspiring with Satan. The following cartoon featured Hitler scheming with the Devil on how to conquer the rest of Europe.



Where Next, Mein Fuhrer? (Political Cartoon, artist David Low, Britain, WWII)

The following British war poster is more direct in its characterisation of the German government as satanic. This government-sponsored propaganda poster depicts the German government as, what appears to be, a cross between an insect and a devil with horns and a tail-spear. It provides a prime example of how governments during the Second World War used the devil enemy image to mobilise their public in war.

⁶³ Keen, *Faces of the Enemy*, p.41.




Kill Him with War Savings (War poster, printed by Wiener Ltd, Britain, WWII)

German government propaganda was also guilty of inciting demonic accusations. Adolf Hitler drew upon the theologically rooted association between Jews and the Devil. He exemplified this most chillingly when he explained: 'two worlds confront each other! The God-man and the Satan-man! The Jew is the counter-human being, the anti-human being...the creation of another god...'⁶⁵ The German government also launched an effective propaganda campaign against the Russians during the War. The image on the following page is one of many grim depictions of the Soviet enemy:

⁶⁴ John D. Cantwell, *Images of war: British posters 1939-45*, London: H.M.S.O, 1989, p. 27.

⁶⁵ Hitler quoted in Carmichael, *The satanizing of the Jews*, p. 82.



66

The Russian Monster About to Escape: The Crime Against Europe
(War poster, Germany, WWII)

The characterisation of the Soviet Union as the beacon of evil would continue throughout the second half of the twentieth century as well. The Reagan Administration's 'Empire of Evil' slogan clearly exemplifies the government's perception of its rival as a red menace bent on world domination. During the Cold War demonic charges were exchanged between the 'dark forces' of capitalism and communism. The Iranian Ayatollah Khomeini once described the Cold War world as dominated by 'satanic' imperialist forces, spearheaded by the U.S. or 'Great Satan' and the USSR or 'Little Satan'.⁶⁷ During the Iran-Iraq war Khomeini and other Iranian Islamic revolutionaries also condemned Iraq as 'a puppet of Satan' because of its collaboration with the U.S.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Keen, *Faces of the enemy*, p. 45.

⁶⁷ Khomeini quoted in Raymond A. Hinnebusch, *The international politics of the Middle East*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003, p. 193. See also Abbas Amanat, 'Khomeini's Great Satan: Demonizing the American Other in the Islamic Revolution in Iran' in Abbas Amanat, *Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi'ism*, London: IB Tauris, 2009.

⁶⁸ Khomeini quoted in Sandra Mackey, *The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the soul of a nation*, New York: Dutton, 1996, p. 317.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the central case study in this thesis, has also displayed its fair share of diabolic indictments, with both sides evoking the demonic enemy image. The political cartoons of the 'Zionist Devil' and the Palestinian 'angel of death' are illustrative examples of the continuous demonisation campaign that existed in one of the most protracted conflicts of the 20th and 21st century.



The Zionist Devil (A-Dastur, Jordanian Newspaper, 30 September 1994)

⁶⁹ Stav, *Peace*, p. 203.



This is our 'Peace Partner' (Jerusalem Post, Israeli Newspaper, 15 December 2000)

Modern political demonisation campaigns have revamped the medieval and early modern Devil's 'evil' image. The image as we see it today is a peculiar hybrid: contemporary examples of demonisation, as illustrated by Hugo Chavez's outburst in the United Nations assembly, are neither meant to encourage laughter, nor expected to be taken literally.

4. CONCLUSION

Placing demonisation in historical context, the chapter has shown how it has evolved over time, mutating from an expression of literal belief in demonic possession to a figurative and more politically charged accusation as put forward by Ayatollah Khomeini and Hugo Chavez. The insurrection of Satan – a religious character – set the precedent for the dichotomy of G(o)od and (D)evil, which underlies the rhetoric of the modern demonic charge. The Devil became associated

⁷⁰ Accessed using Microfilm archives at Widener Library, Harvard University.

with human beings through myths involving the transformation of his physical appearance or the corruption of the human mind by evil spirits. This association helped fuel religious demonisation and persecution campaigns. Visual images of the Devil became increasingly less faithful to the religious narratives and demonisation became gradually more political. This mutation was fostered by the intimate historical relationship between religion and politics. Just as it was common for religious authorities to draw religious fault lines by demonising their religious adversaries, governments wishing to safeguard their position – or opponents wanting to challenge it – would also resort to demonising their political enemies. The secular ‘politicization’ of the demonic in the modern era has led to a so-called ‘politics of demonisation’. This politics implies that there is an underlying agenda behind the Devil enemy charge. This will be the subject of the following chapter.

CHAPTER 3

DEMONISATION IN WAR AND PEACE

'The enemy has got a face, he's called Satan, he's in Fallujah, and we're going to destroy him'.¹

Senior US Marine officer in Iraq, 2004

'One must talk to the devil, if it brings about a solution.'²

Muammar Gadhafi, 2009

As the two above quotes illustrate, elites employ demonisation both in the context of 'waging war' and 'waging peace'. The following chapter explores the role of demonisation in these two contexts. It specifically asks: Why does the phenomenon continue to appear in modern political discourse? What do leaders expect to gain from demonising their enemies in conflicts? What challenges might this discourse bring with it when attempts are made to make peace? The chapter is divided into two parts: the first section examines demonising discourse in the context of 'waging war'. It introduces the notion of a so-called 'politics of demonisation' and explores possible reasons for demonising the enemy in conflict. The second section examines demonising discourse in the context of peace negotiations and diplomatic engagements. It addresses some of the moral and pragmatic challenges that may emerge when framing peace-efforts with the enemy as 'shaking hands with the devil'. It also introduces the notion of 'demonisation deadlock'.

¹ Senior US Marine officer, Lt. Colonel Gareth Brandl in a US operation in Fallujah Iraq in November 2004. Quoted in Greg Moodie, 'The History of the Devil', APT Documentary: Siren Visual, 2008.

² The comment was made in a speech to Italian lawmakers, where the former Libyan leader Muammar Gadhafi urged the world to understand the reasons that motivated terrorists and to engage in dialogues with them. See Sabina Castelfranco, 'Libya's Gadhafi Lashes Out at US', *Voice of America*, 11 June 2009. www.51voa.com/VOA_Standard_English/VOA_Standard_English_30256.html. Accessed: 12 June 2009.

1. WAGING WAR: THE POLITICS OF DEMONISATION IN CONFLICT

The following section examines the strategies behind the so-called 'politics of demonisation' when waging war. It investigates the possible reasons for the use and abuse of the evil enemy image. More specifically, it suggests that demonising one's enemy may serve four politically expedient functions in that it can: (1) promotes unity (2) enhances legitimacy (3) reinforces self-righteousness and moral heroism and (4) secures military and political mobilisation.³

1.1 UNITY THROUGH FEAR

Demonising the enemy can be a consciously exploited tactic to create fear. Fear is an emotional response caused by the belief that someone or something is dangerous and likely to cause harm.⁴ Because fear is an emotive reaction to a *perception* of threat, it can be real, exaggerated or imagined. In tracing the history of 'fear' as a political idea, Corey Robin explained how fear is not just an emotion, but also 'a political tool, an instrument of elite rule or insurgent advance, created and sustained by political leaders or activists who stand to gain something from it'.⁵ Thus while

³ Theories on the political instrumentality of hostile images are extensive and well developed. For more on the functions of a hostile enemy images see Barker, *Making enemies*, pp. 6-24; Finlay, Fagen, and Holsti, *Enemies in politics*; Neil Forsyth, *The old enemy: Satan and the combat myth*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987; Arthur Gladstone, 'The conception of the enemy', *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 3, no. 2, 1959; Vilho Harle, *The enemy with a thousand faces: the tradition of the other in Western political thought and history*, Westport: Praeger, 2000; Robert Holt and Brett Silverstein, 'On the psychology of enemy images'; Keen, *Faces of the enemy*; Charles Krauthammer, 'Do we really need a new enemy?', *Time Magazine*, 23 March 1992; Pagels, *The origin of Satan*; Rieber, *The psychology of war and peace*.

⁴ In biological terms fear is an emotional reaction generated by a sense of danger. Fear is one of the six basic emotions identified by Charles Darwin, and it is the first sensation experienced by a character in the Bible. See Corey Robin, *Fear: the history of a political idea*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 1.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

fear itself may be a direct or indirect emotional response to a real enemy, 'the politics of fear' is a deliberate tactic of generating terror to serve instrumental ends.

In particular, fear from an evil outside enemy can be politically expedient in that it prompts unity. As research in social psychology has shown, a hostile image of the out-group will tend to increase in-group solidarity.⁶ People tend to unite behind a common scare. Political theorist Thomas Hobbes argued that fear established a negative moral foundation upon which men could live together in peace. The type of cohesion generated by fear does not necessarily grow from common values, aspirations or beliefs, but rather from the fact that people find themselves equally threatened and can all identify their fear.⁷ People who may otherwise be divided find they share a common ambition, which is to remove the source of threat and restore security. A common denominator can be generated through fear, and oddly a sense of strong allegiance might emerge in an otherwise diverse public.

Chasing demons is also a way of evading internal strife as demonisation can help remedy political instability. Through 'scapegoating', demonisation helps create cohesion by placing blame onto other sources. Targeting other groups can help create unity as it detracts attention away from other causes of domestic instability. Stability is at risk when a state is divided or overridden by internal ills such as economic deprivation, social inequality, political feud or ethnic conflict. One way to

⁶ See Henry Tajfel and John C. Turner, 'The social identity theory of inter-group behavior', in Stephen Worchel, ed., *Psychology of intergroup relations*, Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1986.

⁷ Fear was a primary driving force in Hobbes war-of-all-against-all where men in the state of nature were of existential threat to each another as they competed over limited resources in an anarchical self-help world. Realist scholars in IR base their theories on this very premise. According to their 'logic of anarchy' no state in the international system can ever be secure given the potential threat of competing states.

improve the situation is for politicians to address these issues and promote change. It might however be easier to focus on the 'evil' enemy in order to deflect attentions away from other issues. Central to William Connolly's thesis on 'Identity\Difference' is the argument that the construction of the evil 'other' tends to occur when states encounter problems in their own identity.⁸ Unity through fear and hatred, then, serves the political advantage of stability.

1.2 LEGITIMACY THROUGH PROTECTION

Demonisation can foster political legitimacy. In order to explain why this is the case, it is necessary to understand one of the foundational principles behind the very idea of state sovereignty and political legitimacy. Security is the very foundation upon which the state's legitimacy is built. According to Hobbes, it was people's fear of death that would lead them to accept the protective authority of the great Leviathan, Hobbes' metaphor for the state. The unwritten social contract between citizens and state leaders is protection in exchange for obedience, and freedom from fear was one of the corner-stone legitimating principles of the state. Max Weber's conception of the state as holding 'the monopoly of legitimate physical violence' is based on the premise that the government protects citizens against threats (whether external or internal). Similarly for political theorist Carl Schmitt, one of the most basic functions of the sovereign was to provide security at the most existential level. Security, then, is not just the yardstick by which good state leadership is measured, but it is considered the most basic and essential purpose of governance. Taken to an extreme,

⁸ Connolly, *Identity\Difference*, pp. 10-12.

then, one could argue that 'without enemies...government would not be necessary'.⁹ While this may appear an exaggerated claim given all the other functions states have today (distribution of goods, tax levying, public services etc.), it is nonetheless noteworthy that protection from threat plays a crucial role in a state's identity and purpose. Several scholars have addressed the 'need' for enemies in foreign policy.¹⁰ Among them political commentator Charles Krauthammer even went as far as suggesting that there is 'a law of conservation' that drives a state's 'need for enemies'. He noted how, 'just days after the demise of their enemy of the last half century [the USSR], Americans still seem desperate to conjure up a new one'.¹¹

According to Adam Curtis's BBC documentary 'The Power of Nightmares', the politics of fear seems to be a growing trend in politics today where 'instead of delivering dreams, politicians now promise to protect us from nightmares'.¹² Because threat inspires a need for protection, a state may use a hostile enemy image in order to exploit safety precautions to its own advantage. The threat of an outside or inside enemy helps generate fear, and legitimacy can be crafted through this fear. Prolonged preventative surveillance measures can be used opportunistically and one cannot fail to ignore the institutional advantages and the political leeway government authorities obtain from restricting civil liberties for the sake of protecting their people against the evil enemy.

⁹ Barker, *Making enemies*, p. 8.

¹⁰ See for example Ibid; Adam Curtis, 'The power of nightmares: the rise of the politics of fear', UK: BBC Documentary, 2005; and Tom DeLuca and John Buell, *Liars! Cheaters! Evildoers!*

¹¹ Krauthammer, 'Do we really need a new enemy?'

¹² Curtis, 'The power of nightmares'.

1.3 SELF-RIGHTEOUSNESS AND MORAL HEROISM

Demonising the enemy can justify reprehensible acts towards others. When a conflict is presented in absolute terms of go(o)d-and-(d)evil, it indicates a clear division between right and wrong. Any act of violence associated with the 'evil' opponent is branded as immoral, while one's own acts are perceived as necessary and legitimate. From this logic comes the crucial legitimising principle of self-righteousness and moral heroism, meaning that, in our own perception, we consider ourselves and our actions to be just, upright, guiltless and sinless. Our acts of violence become dissociated from morality: we are not 'good', 'bad', 'right' or 'wrong' because of *what* we do, but because of *who* we are and what we stand for. Thus in the fight against the (D)evil enemy, otherwise immoral deeds become morally legitimate.

The role of perceptions here is crucial for although objectively the violations on both sides of a conflict may have the same consequences, they are interpreted differently depending on who committed them. The notion of 'our *necessary* and *legitimate* violence' versus the other side's '*deliberate* and *illegitimate* violence' typically appears on both sides. Moreover, if a self-righteous actor commits an immoral act he or she will tend to regard it as a consequence provoked by an unlawful outsider, rather than an outcome of his own intention. When Golda Meir commented on the prospects for peace with Palestine during a press conference in 1969, for example, she contentiously noted: 'we will perhaps in time be able to forgive the Arabs for killing our sons, but it will be harder for us to forgive them for having forced us to

kill their sons'.¹³ For the Israeli Prime Minister, then, the casualties caused by Israel were a tragic, yet necessary response to Palestinian violence. Similarly, Tony Blair tried to disclaim moral responsibility for the casualties caused by the bombing of Serbia in 1999. Noting how 'war is an ugly affair', Blair tried to explain that the deaths caused by NATO forces were an unintended consequence of good intentions following the necessary response to the Serbian massacres.¹⁴ Both Golda Meir and Tony Blair's statements exemplify a self-righteous reasoning of violence within which they highlight the uncomfortable, yet moral imperative to face head-on the evil intentions and deliberately harmful actions of their opponents.

In some instances demonisation can achieve more than just legitimising violence; it can also help nurture a sense of moral heroism. Demonisation is an efficient mechanism for bolstering the national self-image and grants a sense of superiority. Evoking demonic attributes in the enemy makes the case for war not just necessary but morally imperative. As Robert Ivie argued: 'To kill the foreign devil-enemy is to reaffirm the nation's special virtue as a chosen people destined to overcome malevolence so that civilization may prevail'.¹⁵ Indeed, virtuous callings become even more pronounced in the presence of an evil threat. According to James Aho, 'evil' is one of the crucial components of what he calls 'the sociology of heroism'. Aho goes as far as arguing that individuals, communities and states partly create 'evil' for sensationalism and moral grandeur. In Aho's eyes there is an intimate relationship between 'the social construction of evil', heroism, and violence. This is because the

¹³ Statement made at a Press Conference in London, 1969. Cited on Jewish Virtual Library, see <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Quote/MeironPeace.html>. Accessed: 25 March 2012.

¹⁴ See David Runciman, *The politics of good intentions: history, fear and hypocrisy in the new world order*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.

¹⁵ Ivie and Giner, 'Hunting the Devil', p. 581.

notion of 'good', according to Aho, emerges from 'evil' and therefore 'the Fetishes of evil are socially assembled and then destroyed so that the world can be saved and the executioners might sense their greatness'.¹⁶

1.4 POLITICAL AND MILITARY MOBILISATION

Political theorist and the godfather of the American neo-conservatives, Leo Strauss, recognised the utility of endorsing 'noble lies' for the sake of mobilisation.¹⁷ Exaggerating the evil intentions of an enemy is a 'noble lie' that creates an imperative to act. The demonised foe can therefore help secure both political and military mobilisation.

Demonisation mobilises because referring to 'absolute evil' calls for urgency. If statesmen can convince their citizens and political opponents that a danger is imminent enough, they can override other diplomatic means, pleading the just war notion of 'last resort' for military action when other more peaceful options might still be available. One of the dangers of demonisation, however, is that people often lose sense of the real conflict, and combating the enemy becomes an end in itself, instead of a means to the ultimate goal of resolving the conflict. Nonetheless, by demonising, leaders increase the chances of getting public support for their political decisions. Colin Powell, for example, once openly admitted to the government's use of demonisation in American foreign policy, stating: 'When you demonise an enemy

¹⁶ James Alfred Aho, *This thing of darkness: a sociology of the enemy*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1994, p. 33.

¹⁷ See Leo Strauss, *The city and man*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978.

such as the President tended to do with Saddam Hussein you raised expectations that you would do something about him at the end of the day'.¹⁸ What remains questionable, however, is whether these 'raised expectations' are an undesired consequence or whether they are, in fact, consciously employed tactics to increase political and military mobilisation.

Enemy images are a crucial prerequisite for any military action not just because of public legitimacy, but also for the soldiers on the ground. All warriors need an enemy. As the famous war-scholar Carl von Clausewitz argued: 'War is inconceivable without a clearly defined image of the enemy'.¹⁹ 'Before the weapon comes the image', Sam Keen similarly pointed out.²⁰ The prominence of evil imagery in wartime propaganda campaigns suggests that demonising the enemy is an effective and common propaganda strategy for recruitment.

If dehumanising the enemy is a strategy that enables soldiers to remove their sense of guilt on the battlefield, demonisation is the strategy that fuels them with a sense of virtue in the act of killing. In *The Warrior: Reflections on Men in Battle*, Glenn Grey argues that the soldier like the crusader 'denies his [enemy's] humanity by making him into a devil...'²¹ Demonising the enemy can therefore also be instrumental for recruitment and military success in that it instigates violence itself as well as the moral legitimacy of violence.

¹⁸ BBC Frontline, 'Oral history: Colin Powell', (<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/powell/3.html>). Accessed: 29 April 2007.

¹⁹ Clausewitz quoted in Rieber, *The psychology of war and peace*, p. 4.

²⁰ Keen, *Faces of the enemy*, p. 10.

²¹ Glenn J. Gray, *The warriors: reflections on men in battle*, Lincoln Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1998, p. 147.

Indeed the relationship between negative images and violence has been well documented. Experimental research has shown that the phenomenon helps morally validate and actively promote aggression as well as helping to justify the act once committed.²² Dehumanisation, the literature explains, alters the subject's normal behavioural restraint and appears to affect his moral conscience.²³ Research done by psychologist and mediator Marshall Rosenberg shows that when ones labels someone as 'evil' it invokes the desire to punish or inflict pain. At a societal level, it also makes it easier for people to remove any feelings towards the person(s) they are harming.²⁴ The literature in social psychology also points to how dehumanisation and demonisation can elicit aggression of potential genocidal proportions in that it can sanction mass violence.²⁵ Herbert Kelman, for instance, included demonisation as one of three interrelated psychological processes that weaken moral restraint towards the authorisation and routinisation of violence and mass killings. Thus, the more frightful the enemy, the more important the cause and the more committed the soldier, and the public supporting them. For this reason, demonisation and conflict are intimately connected.

²² In the mid 1970s social psychologist Albert Bandura et al. conducted experiments to investigate the relationship between 'dehumanization' and aggression. Their experiments built on Milgram's famous studies, which tested the likelihood of subjects to administer electric shocks to other subjects. In these studies, subjects were under the fake impression that they were being tested on 'the effects of punishment on social learning patterns' when in reality they were being tested for the degree to which they were willing to administer electric shocks to subjects, ranging from intensity level of 1 (weak) to 10 (painful). Bandura's study revealed two very telling findings on the relationship between dehumanization and aggression: the first was that subjects were more likely to administer high intensity shocks to 'dehumanized' groups – they were treated twice as punitively as 'humanized' or 'neutral' groups. Secondly, post-evaluation forms revealed that the subjects were less likely to feel remorse about having administered the electric shocks against dehumanised groups while they strongly condemned punitive techniques, and rarely administered shocks to humanised groups. Subjects seemed to have morally disengaged from the victims. A. Bandura, B. Underwood, and M. E. Fromson, 'Disinhibition of aggression through diffusion of responsibility and dehumanization of victims', *Journal of Research in Personality*, vol. 9, no. 4, 1975.

²³ For a good overview on 'dehumanisation' in the field of social psychology see Nick Haslam, 'Dehumanization: an integrative review', *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, vol. 10, no. 3, 2006.

²⁴ See Marshall B. Rosenberg, *Speak peace in a world of conflict: what you say next will change your world*, Encinitas: Puddle Dancer, 2005.

²⁵ See Herbert C. Kelman, 'Violence without moral restraint - reflections on dehumanization of victims and victimizers', *Journal of Social Issues*, vol. 29, no. 4, 1973, pp. 25-61.

2. WAGING PEACE: CAN ONE BARGAIN WITH THE DEVIL?

Whilst the previous section focused on the instrumentality of demonisation in conflicts, this section is about demonisation's role in the context of negotiations and diplomatic engagement. In coining the phrase 'demonisation deadlock', the thesis examines demonisation in the context of diplomatic stalemate, arguing that demonising the enemy can be one factor that stalls negotiations. As Israeli peace activist Uri Avery pointed out: 'Describing the other side as monsters may be useful in waging war, but singularly unhelpful in waging peace.'²⁶

2.1 'BARGAINING WITH THE DEVIL': MORAL AND PRACTICAL DILEMMAS

In a conflict setting 'bargaining with the devil' involves reaching an agreement or making peace with a former enemy.²⁷ In negotiations, parties seek to reach a compromise. Entering into dialogue, the conflicting participants usually want to express their side of the story; hear the other side's story; attain a common understanding (if possible); resolve points of difference; and leave the table with a more optimal arrangement than before the dialogue. In conflicts, however, one of the main challenges is getting parties to the negotiating table.

'Diplomatic deadlock' occurs when neither of the conflicting parties are willing or able to reach a resolution through negotiated means. Conflict resolution scholars

²⁶ Uri Avnery, 'The Boycott Revisited', *Ma'an News Agency*, 7 September 2009. See <http://www.maanneews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=224008> Accessed: 2 June 2010.

²⁷ The thesis uses 'bargaining' and 'negotiating' interchangeably, with the common denominator being the attempt to resolve differences and to reach an agreement through dialogue. Mnookin also combines bargaining and negotiation, explaining: 'By bargain I mean attempt to make a deal – try to resolve the conflict through negotiation – rather than fight it out.' Robert H. Mnookin, *Bargaining with the Devil: when to negotiate, when to fight*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010, p. 1.

posit several reasons why this may occur: for instance, the uncompromising character of the various protagonists, the failure of the international actors to pay sufficient attention to them, or the irresolvable nature of the disputed matters themselves.²⁸ A zero-sum mentality of a conflict can also obstruct peaceful settlements because the disputing partners fear the negotiation process might give them the short straw in the draw. Inequality in relative power distribution between the conflicting parties is another cited obstacle to diplomatic resolution where 'the strong will feel no compulsion to negotiate while the weak will be fearful of the results of such negotiation.'²⁹ There are therefore several identified reasons for diplomatic deadlock in existing negotiation literature.

Scholars in the field of dispute resolution identify three negotiation domains:

- (1) **Substance** (i.e. what are you going to negotiate)
- (2) **Process** (i.e. how are you going to negotiate)
- (3) **Relationship** (i.e. the association between the negotiating parties).³⁰

All three domains have deadlock potential in the negotiations: for example, the parties may have a fundamental disagreement on the dispute matter and see no

²⁸ For more on literature on diplomatic deadlock see for example Guy Olivier Faure, 'Deadlocks in negotiation dynamics', in William Zartman and Guy Faure, eds., *Escalation and negotiation in international conflicts*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 28-32; Robert H. Mookin, 'Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to the Resolution of Conflict', *Ohio State Journal of Dispute Resolution*, vol. 8, 1993; Stefan Persson, 'Deadlocks in International Negotiations', *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 29, 1994; Paul R. Pillar, *Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993; Dean G Pruitt, Sung Hee Kim, and Jeffrey Rubin, *Social Conflict-Escalation, Stalemate and Settlement*, New York: McGraw- Hill, 2004; Arend Underdal, 'Causes of Negotiation "Failure"', *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 11, 1983.

²⁹ Lloyd Jensen, 'Negotiations and power asymmetries: the case of Bosnia, Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka', *International Negotiation*, vol. 2, no. 1, 1997, p. 23.

³⁰ David A. Lax and James K. Sebenius, *3D Negotiation: Powerful Tools to Change the Game in Your Most Important Deals*, Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2006.

resolvable compromise for example in the division of territory (i.e. a substance-related obstacle). The parties may disagree on where to hold the negotiations (i.e. a process-related obstacle) or they may refuse to meet altogether (i.e. a relationship-related obstacle). Thus there are various negotiation domains where deadlocks can arise. This thesis addresses one particular type of *relationship-based* source of diplomatic stalemate: 'demonisation deadlock'.

'Demonisation deadlock' implies that conflicts where parties are perceived as 'evil' can bring with them additional challenges to the negotiation table that are identity-based.³¹ In particular, the representation of the enemy as 'evil' is a qualitative factor that is likely to inform policymakers when deciding if and how to negotiate with their adversary. Representations of the enemy therefore matter in the negotiation process. As Guy Olivier Faure pointed out:

...negotiation also deals with images. The way a counterpart is represented conditions negotiation and is also a product of negotiation, contributing to its own construction, management, or destruction. This is a crucial factor in the negotiation process because people act on the basis not of reality, but of what they perceive reality to be. Perceptions and their associated evaluations relate to values and judgments that influence behavior, and also to strategic choices.³²

Thus, according to Olivier Faure, the negotiation partner's image and identity can influence negotiations. As Faure also noted: 'Escalation of images may elicit a deadlock. This is particularly true if the other party is demonised, which prevents a

³¹ For more on identity-based conflicts see for example Jay Rothman and Marie L. Olson, 'From Interests to Identities: Towards a New Emphasis in Interactive Conflict Resolution', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 38, May 2001.

³² Guy Olivier Faure, 'Demonization and Negotiation', *PIN - points: The Processes of International Negotiation Program*, vol. 28, 2007, p. 9.

negotiator from making any additional concessions so as not to be seen as compromising with the devil.’³³

‘Demonisation deadlock’ arises from the practical and moral dilemmas that surround the question: can or should one ‘shake hands with the devil’? This question rests on two separate considerations: the first – ‘can one’ – asks us to evaluate the *practical* possibility of a potential deal (i.e. can we really trust our negotiating party? Will the outcome of the bargain be successful and sustainable? Will he hold his end of the bargain?). The second consideration – ‘should one’ – addresses the *moral* challenges associated with a prospective agreement (i.e. is it ethically permissible or simply wrong? Is this a sacrifice of sacred values and principles? How will others morally judge the act?). In ‘Bargaining with the Devil: When to Negotiate, When to Fight’, Robert Mnookin suggests ways in which one *could* think about the decision to negotiate with a party that one considers evil. ‘Can we be pragmatic about it?’ Mnookin asks. His initial answer is affirmative: ‘Cutting deals entails giving the devil something he wants. But it can also lead to getting something you want. Hence, there is often a tension between the pragmatic course and the principled one.’³⁴

The categorical refusal of ‘bargaining with the devil’ rests on two separate rejection premises: the first is a moral/normative objection. As Mnookin put it: ‘no matter how seductive the possible benefits, negotiating with evil is simply wrong; it would

³³ Faure, ‘Deadlocks in negotiation dynamics’, p. 32.

³⁴ Robert H. Mnookin, ‘Bargaining with the devil’, *Foreign Policy*, 17 February 2010. See http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/17/bargaining_with_the_devil. Accessed: 10 September 2010.

violate your integrity and pollute your soul'.³⁵ The second is a pragmatic/practical objection about the futility of doing so because striking a deal with the devil will lead to an unsuccessful outcome: the devil enemy will cheat to maximise his own gains and you will ultimately lose. The Faustian legend suggests you should *never* negotiate with the devil. According to this popular fable, Faust strikes a deal with the devil in exchange for greater wisdom, but in doing so he unknowingly commits his soul to eternal damnation and becomes enslaved by the forces of evil. The myth gave rise to the notion of a 'Faustian bargain'. The lesson of the Faustian bargain was as simple as it was clear: never strike a deal with the devil because it will remain irrevocable and you will unknowingly get tricked along the way.

There are other moral challenges associated with shaking hands with the devil. In some cases, it might entail turning a blind eye to their evils, and this brings with it the ethical dilemma of whether or not one can live with it. 'Shake hands with the Devil' was the title of Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire's book on the Rwandan genocide, which detailed his experiences as Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in 1993-1994. Dallaire stressed the failure of UN to uphold peace and to prevent the genocide: instead he argued they merely 'watched as the devil took control of paradise on earth and fed on the blood of the people we were supposed to protect.' Leaving a meeting with the *génocidaires*, Dallaire described how he had 'shaken hands with the devil,' and felt guilty for having 'actually negotiated with him'.³⁶

³⁵ Mnookin, *Bargaining with the Devil*, p. 3.

³⁶ Romeo Dallaire and Brent Beardsley, *Shake hands with the devil: the failure of humanity in Rwanda*, London: Arrow, 2004, p.7.

Bargaining with the devil can also hurt a leader's public image. Indeed the reputation of those who choose to negotiate with the 'evil' other often risks being tarnished. As we will see in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, leaders on both sides were criticised for shaking hands with the devil and their public image tarnished as a consequence. Fear of the opposition and the public's angry reaction is no doubt a reason why secrecy and two-track diplomacy are common in cases where parties are perceived as 'bargaining with the devil'. Initial negotiations between, for example, Hitler and Stalin, Mandela and the South African regime, the PLO and the Israeli government, all took place in secret. The actors were knowingly aware of the fact that their engagement with the enemy 'across the table' could have serious repercussions 'behind the table' (i.e. in their own domestic constituency).³⁷ Therein lies one of the complications of having previously demonised one's enemy in a conflict: it becomes very difficult to justify any dialogue – to one's own constituency – let alone convince its members of the prospect of reaching a negotiated peace agreement.

The dilemma of whether or not to 'shake hands with the devil' is also one that several scholars have addressed. Johan Galtung, one of the founders of the field of peace research and conflict studies, speculated the risks of engaging with devils in the field and identified the following dilemma:

The right instinct is to pursue contact, with the hope of changing both the devil and his evil ways; of making oneself available to change, for instance of the perception of the devil as a devil; in order to change the whole

³⁷ Putnam distinguishes between 'across the table' (i.e. face-to-face interactions between the international parties) and 'behind the table' (i.e. the interaction between the party and its own domestic constituency). See Robert D. Putnam, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games', *International Organization*, vol. 42, Summer 1988.

relationship in a more peaceful direction. But then, on the other hand, there is also the risk that the devil uses the contact for his evil purposes as a part of his pursuit of direct and/or structural violence. He may be spying on the peace researcher; using his material to spy on others trying to legitimize himself by showing off his contacts with angels. Also he may try to convert the more naïve among peace researchers into instruments of his trade...³⁸

Initially Galtung encourages engagement, claiming it is by instinct morally 'right'. His reasoning for pursuing contact is that it may lead to a change in course in the conflict – in that either the devil changes his way or that we change our perception of him as evil. But Galtung then highlights practical and moral concerns at risk when dealing with someone who may in fact be evil and devious: the devil's intentions may appear genuine, but he might have ulterior motives, such as the pursuit of further violence, and therefore could be out to trick you. Moreover, Galtung suggests one might unknowingly become morally corrupted in the process – and instead of changing the course of the conflict, the naïve peace-researcher may in fact become an evil accomplice subject to the devil's trade. Bargaining with the devil therefore comes with risks and Galtung concludes his article by warning the peace researcher: 'when eating supper with the devil, bring a long spoon.'³⁹ In other words, there is no harm in attempting to make peace, but one should always be wary of the devil's intentions and take appropriate measures to guard oneself against them.

Father of modern conflict resolution theory and practice, Morton Deutsch, also provided advice on negotiating with the devil. He explained:

You have to make a decision, do you think the devil is corrigible or not? If the devil is not corrigible, then probably in a sense, negotiating really is a matter of amassing the power to contain the devil. However if the devil is corrigible,

³⁸ Johan Galtung, 'What if the Devil were interested in peace research?', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 25, no. 1, 1988, p.1.

³⁹ *Ibid*, p. 1.

there are ways to try to elicit those corrigible aspect of the devil into a negotiating situation.⁴⁰

Deutsch's dilemma of whether the devil is capable of being reformed appears to have the same solution: it is still better to take the risk of engaging with the devil than not. At worst the outcome of the negotiations will lead to containment, and at best they will lead to a change for the better. Negotiation with the devil, then, should always be an option.

Indeed the very premise of peace research and dispute resolution is to promote dialogue and cooperation between parties. It comes as no surprise, then, that both founding fathers of peace research consider options for how and when to deal with the evil parties. The field's foundations rest upon the core argument that one should *always* be willing to negotiate – to always favour words over wounds and dialogue over daggers as a means to resolve the conflict. Negotiating with the evil enemy does not necessarily mean one needs to concede to everything he wants. It simply requires that diplomats and negotiators are willing to sit down with the adversary to discuss whether there are common interests and to assess better alternatives to conflict. Any aspirations for a resolution of the conflict and the path to peace are futile, unless one is willing to sit down and negotiate with the enemy – even the devil enemy.⁴¹

History has revealed several instances where leaders have chosen to 'shake hands with the devil' in order to reach agreements. For example, although Winston

⁴⁰ Interview with Morton Deutsch on 'negotiating with the devil'
<http://www.thegovernancecommons.org/audioplay/deutsch-m-13-devil1> Accessed: 23 September 2010.

⁴¹ Point made in Mnookin, *Bargaining with the Devil*, p. 3.

Churchill refused to make a deal with Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin surprised the world with the signing of the Non-Aggression pact with Nazi Germany in August 1939. The famous cartoonist, Louis Raemakers satirised the deal as it was perceived at the time:



Mephisto to Faust: You Can Trust me (Cartoon, Louis Raemaekers, 1939)

Sixty years later, Ronald Reagan would also come to negotiate with the Soviet Union, whom he had previously denounced as the 'evil empire'. In the early 1990s, Nelson Mandela chose to enter into negotiations with the apartheid regime that was responsible for his twenty-seven year prison sentence.⁴³ He was elected President in 1994 after he negotiated reforms with the South African regime. The famous-handshake on the Whitehouse lawn between the Palestinian Liberation Organisation's (PLO) Chairman, Yasser Arafat, and the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, on 13 September 1993, was perceived by many as a landmark

⁴² Image taken from Guity Novin, 'Chapter 40: A history of caricatures, and political cartoons', *A history of graphic design* (Online blog). See <http://guity-novin.blogspot.com/2011/06/chapter-40-history-of-caricatures.html>. Accessed: 23 June 2011.

⁴³ For more on the Mandela's negotiations see Chapter 6 in Mnookin, *Bargaining with the Devil*.

achievement in the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians over their disputed territories. For others, the agreement was an unforgivable compromise of principles.

Great Britain's negotiations with Sinn Féin in December 1994 were also morally contentious. Prime Minister Tony Blair came under fire for initiating talks with Gerry Adams. In a later interview, Blair stressed the importance of treating members of Sinn Féin as human beings, for only then could the two parties reach a peace agreement. The cartoon below, which appeared in *The Times*, illustrates that not everyone shared the former prime minister's conviction.



Tony Blair shaking hands with the devil (Gerry Adams)
(Cartoon, Peter Brookes, *The Times*, 1997)

The question of whether to 'bargain with the devil' appears, among others, in the context of terrorism. The US State Department, for instance, publically states that it will 'make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals.'⁴⁴ Consequently, the US government has refused to engage in dialogue with actors - be it individuals,

⁴⁴ Cited in Deepak Malhotra, 'Without conditions: the case for negotiating with the enemy', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 88, no. 5, September/October 2009, p. 88

organisations, political parties or states - which it considers to be engaging in or supporting terrorism.⁴⁵ Asked, for example, whether the US administration should engage in dialogue with the Taliban, Condoleezza Rice once replied: 'These are people who whipped women in stadiums given to them by the international community to play soccer, who refused to let women learn to read. The Taliban made Afghanistan a failed state and a terrorist haven for al-Qaeda so that they could launch the Sept. 11 attack. What's to negotiate?'⁴⁶

Rice's argument for not negotiating with terrorists follows both the principled and pragmatic rejectionist logic. The former secretary of state presents the option of negotiating with the Taliban as futile because there would be no common value-basis from which to reach a consensus (i.e. a pragmatic challenge). She also seems to suggest it would be unethical to negotiate with those who promote evil because they only understand the language of violence (i.e. a principled challenge). Another underlying reason may be the more practical concern of signalling concessionary behaviour to the terrorists. Negotiations would confirm the terrorists' belief that their actions were effectively influencing policy. Negotiating with aggressors, then, could be seen as validating their aggression.⁴⁷ The danger with this is that it would set a precedent for further violence as it signals to other actors that they have something to gain. In an op-ed entitled 'Negotiating with the Devil', the former Director of Policy Analysis for Israel Policy Forum, MJ Rosenberg, who spent eighteen years working within US government, stressed this very point when asking:

⁴⁵ e.g. Al-Qaeda, Hamas, PKK and ETA.

⁴⁶ Condoleezza Rice cited in Jordan Timm, 'Book review: Negotiating with the Devil', *Canadian Business Magazine*, 15 March 2010.

⁴⁷ Point also made in Bertram I. Spector, 'Deciding to negotiate with villains', *Negotiation Journal*, vol. 14, no. 1, 2007.

'can someone explain what Israel is doing negotiating with Hezbollah, the most radical anti-Israeli and anti-American Middle East terror organization?' He went on to admit that 'the answer is simple and horrifying. By kidnapping Israelis, and by bargaining over their bodies, Hezbollah gained the ability to entice Israeli to deal with it.'⁴⁸ The condemnation was clear: if you bargain with the devil, you violate your own moral integrity.

There are those who encourage negotiating, or at the least talking, with terrorists.⁴⁹ Their reasoning is similar to Galtung and Deutsch's. Talking with terrorists will at least clarify their intentions, whether or not one chooses to concede to or negotiate any demands. Moreover, the alternatives of not doing so may prove more violent and bloody. In 2009 Muammar Gaddafi urged the international community that 'one must talk to the devil, if it brings about a solution'. The former Libyan ruler was referring to the need to engage in dialogue with terrorists. Gaddafi likened the 1986 U.S. Strikes on Libya after the Berlin discotheque bombings to Osama bin Laden's terror attacks on the United States in 2001. His point was to urge the world to understand the reasons that motivated terrorists and to attempt to resolve them

⁴⁸ MJ Rosenberg, 'Negotiating with the devil', *Israel Policy Forum*, no. 166, 30 December 2004. See <http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/commentary/negotiating-devil>. Accessed: 15 September 2010.

⁴⁹ Some scholars argue that a 'no-negotiation' policy is suboptimal unless terrorist groups are risk-seeking (e.g. Todd Sandler, John Tschirhart, and Jon Cauley, 'A theoretical analysis of transnational terrorism', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 77, March 1983). Others recommend that governments should 'never say never' because certain scenarios necessitate concessions and it is therefore better for the government to be open to negotiations (e.g. Richard L. Clutterbuck, *Terrorism in an unstable world*, London: Routledge, 1994). Sederberg, for instance, argues that a regime's decision to negotiate with a terrorist group (or not) should depend upon certain structural factors, such as the size of the terrorists' base of support and the nature of the terrorists' goals. Peter C. Sederberg, 'Conciliation as Counter-Terrorist Strategy', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 32, no. 3, 1995. For a more contemporary debate on the question of whether to bargain with terrorists see Guy Olivier Faure and I. William Zartman, eds., *Negotiating with terrorists: strategy, tactics, and politics*, New York: Routledge, 2010. See also Deepak Malhotra, 'Without conditions: the case for negotiating with the enemy', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 88, no. 5, September/October 2009.

through dialogue. Dialogue, however, was not the final technique that would remove Gaddafi from power only two years later.

2.2 THREE DIMENSIONS OF 'DEMONISATION DEADLOCK'

'Demonisation deadlock' stresses demonisation's potential impact on diplomatic stalemate. This part proceeds by presenting possible ways in which demonisation may stall a negotiation or a diplomatic engagement. Demonisation deadlock is comprised of three dimensions: Firstly, demonising the enemy might prevent any dialogue from taking place as the prospects of negotiating with an 'evil' enemy appear as probable as striking a deal with the devil himself. Secondly, if negotiations do occur, demonisation will risk hampering a successful outcome in the process as it fosters an image of the peace-partner as a dishonest broker. Finally, demonisation makes the prospect of neutral third party involvement difficult because coating the conflict in terms of 'good' and 'evil' tends to forge a 'with us or against us' mentality.

1. 'NIP IN THE BUD': The 'nip in the bud' dimension of demonisation deadlock precedes any specific issues that may arise around the negotiation table, because it prevents the parties from getting there in the first place. The factor preventing negotiations is the constitutive characteristic of the negotiation partner himself – the fact that he is evil. For how does one propose to negotiate with an inherently evil foe? As the normative rejectionist principle suggests, the answer is that one cannot, and above all, *should* not shake hands with the devil.

Negotiation theorist Bertram I. Spector similarly pointed out how 'villinization' can generate diplomatic deadlock and conflict escalation. He explained:

One of the major consequences of villinization is the closing off of the negotiation option and the peaceful settlement of disputes. The goal of all of these sanctions is to change the behavior of the villainous country. Sometimes they succeed over time, but often the immediate response of the villain is further rigidity in its position and an escalation of the conflict.⁵⁰

Evil must be vanquished, not negotiated – is the driving principle behind the 'nip in the bud' dimension. This is because those who perceive themselves to be in a conflict of good and evil have little or no incentive to negotiate with their demonised foe. Their rejectionist principle rests on the assumption that an evil enemy is morally depraved and therefore nothing other than pure vicious intent governs his actions. As Daniel Heradstveit pointed out, '...evil has no specific goal – except to produce evil – that is why all negotiations with evil are fruitless.'⁵¹ Exaggerating the evil of the enemy, then, tends to nip the diplomatic option in the bud because actors refuse to negotiate in the first place.

2. 'NO PARTNER FOR PEACE': In instances where the demonised parties choose to confront each other around the negotiation table, obstacles can arise as a consequence of their preconceived perceptions of the other party as evil. Thus while the first dimension explains why demonisation may prevent the parties from reaching the negotiation table in the first place, the second dimension of 'demonisation deadlock' can help explain why the diplomatic option may fail during the negotiation process itself.

⁵⁰ Spector, 'Deciding to negotiate with villains', p. 47.

⁵¹ Daniel Heradstveit and Matthew Bonham, 'What the 'axis of evil' metaphor did to Iran ', *Middle East Journal*, vol. 61, no. 3, 2007, p. 91.

The problem with branding the enemy as 'evil' is that it delegitimises the adversary sitting across the negotiation table.⁵² Demonisation creates the image of a dishonest peace partner and this 'no partner for peace' mentality generates its own practical barriers. It may render unrealistic any worthy and long-lasting negotiation with the opponent because demonisation prevents the bargaining parties from generating mutual trust.⁵³ A certain level of distrust may naturally exist between parties who are negotiating over their overlapping or conflicting interests, but with demonised adversaries mutual suspicion can paralyse any prospects of progress. In particular, distrust creates process-related problems in the negotiations: distrust fuels the suspicion that the partner is 'cheating'. In other words, the party is disingenuous about his intentions for peace, and is using the negotiation as a strategy to gain public legitimacy, to buy time or to lure the opponent – before attacking again. Essentially the deal is being made, only to be broken. Moreover, distrust leads to lack of information sharing because neither party wants to reveal any information that might jeopardise their bargaining power over the other side. Information sharing is a practical necessity for parties to reach agreements – if one of the negotiation parties finds out that their partner withheld important information that was revealed after an agreement was reached, then it will dampen any prospects of successfully implementing that agreement.

⁵² In his research on the causes for intractable conflicts Daniel Bar-Tal argues that 'delegitimization of the adversary...is one of the major detrimental forces of peaceful resolution of any conflict.' See Daniel Bar-Tal and Neta Oren, 'The detrimental dynamics of delegitimization in intractable conflicts: the Israeli-Palestinian case', *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, vol. 31, no. 1, 2007, pp. 111-12.

⁵³ For more on the role of mistrust in bargaining dynamic see Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, *The security dilemma: fear, cooperation, and trust in world politics*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

3. 'WITH OR AGAINST US': In 2000 the former American President Bill Clinton urged the international community to 'take risks for peace', but at the same time warned against the dangers of neutrality in a battle of 'good' and 'evil'. Speaking in the context of the Middle East stalemate, Clinton noted: 'There are times when the international community must take sides – not merely stand between the sides...For when good and evil collide, even-handedness can be an ally of evil'.⁵⁴ Clinton's point was that standing-by and witnessing evil without taking a stance against it, or doing anything to stop it, is akin to aligning oneself with the evil party. The battle of good and evil, in the eyes of Clinton, then, challenges the notion of neutrality.

The third dimension of demonisation deadlock explains how the phenomenon can problematise the facilitating negotiation tool of third-party intervention in the diplomatic process.⁵⁵ Mediation is a form of alternative dispute resolution whereby an actor – the so-called mediator – assists the parties in reaching their own settlement.⁵⁶ The mediator facilitates the process of negotiating, but does not partake in it. He acts as the third-party who oversees and guides the dialogue between the conflicting parties. The role of impartiality is often considered one of the defining factors in determining the success of third party intervention.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ Bill Clinton, 'Millennium Summit Speech', 6 September 2001. See

<http://www.un.org/millennium/webcast/statements/usa.htm> Accessed: 27 September 2010.

⁵⁵ According to Donald Rothchild, third party mediation was 'the missing variable' in traditional literature on ethnic bargaining. Donald Rothchild, 'Ethnic Bargaining and the Management of Intense Conflict', *International Negotiation Journal*, vol. 2, no. 1, 1997.

⁵⁶ For more on mediation see for example Lon Fuller, 'Mediation: Its Forms and Functions', *Southern California Law Review*, vol. 44, 1971; Janet Rifkin, Jonathan Millen, and Sara Cobb, 'Towards a New Discourse for Mediation: A Critique of Neutrality', *Mediation Quarterly*, vol. 9, no. 2, Winter 1991; Larry Susskind, 'Mediating Public Disputes: A Response to the Skeptics', *Negotiation Journal*, vol. 1, no. 2 April 1985.

⁵⁷ For example Kelman attributed part of the 'Oslo Breakthrough' in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the Norwegian facilitators/mediators (i.e. not setting the agenda, not pushing for any particular solution or forcing their opinions, but rather providing a venue, the resources and advice when asked. See Herbert C Kelman, 'Some determinants of the Oslo breakthrough', *International Negotiation*, vol. 2, no. 2, 1997.

Framing a conflict in terms of good and evil makes third party neutrality more difficult in that it tends to forge a bi-polar ‘with us or against us’ mentality. The assumption here is that one should not be neutral in a conflict that involves an evil party. Anyone who stands by and attempts to broker with an evil party loses his moral integrity in the process - for not fighting back on the side of the good. Hence demonisation also to some extent delegitimises the role of the ‘honest broker’ or neutral party in the process. It may even increase the prospects of third party partisanship. In either case the prospect of a successful resolution through mediation risks being reduced.

In summary, the three dimensions of ‘demonisation-deadlock’ are presented in the table below.

Table 2: Overview of the three dimensions of ‘demonisation deadlock’.

Dimensions	Issues	Consequence
‘Nip in the bud’	Principled objection: Evil as barrier to talks	No negotiation
‘No partner for peace’	Process-related challenge of distrust	Unsuccessful negotiation/Breakdown of talks
‘With us or against us’	Principled objection: Neutrality as problematic	Biased mediation/Delegitimised ‘honest broker’

3. CONCLUSION

This chapter has assessed some of the purposes and challenges of demonisation in the context of war and peace. In the context of 'waging war', the chapter discussed four reasons why elites might demonise the enemy in conflict: 'unity from fear', 'legitimacy through protection', 'self-righteousness and moral heroism', and 'political and military mobilisation'. It then suggested that when it comes to the phase when parties may be seeking a peaceful resolution to the conflict, demonisation might come to pose additional challenges. In the context of 'waging peace', the chapter highlighted moral and practical dilemmas associated with the framing of a conflict in terms of 'bargaining with the devil'. It presented three dimensions of 'demonisation deadlock' to help explain how demonisation may further complicate negotiation efforts. The first dimension posited why branding the enemy as 'evil' negated the possibility of any dialogue. The second dimension dealt with how demonisation de-legitimised the diplomatic process because it fostered an image of a dishonest interlocutor, leaving neither party able or willing to understand, sympathise with or trust their adversary. Finally, the third dimension illustrated how the fight against 'evil' made the notion of third party neutrality difficult as it presented the conflict in absolute, all-or-nothing, with-or-against-us terms. These conceptual considerations will now be examined in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

CHAPTER 4

THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT: AN INTRODUCTION

*We understand your narrative but we do not accept it and I know you won't change it and we have our narrative and we won't change it either. We can spend a meeting speaking of our narratives if we think it is important. But it is not an argument that we can use in negotiations because we won't accept your narrative and you won't accept ours.*¹

Udi Delek, Israeli negotiator, 28 May 2008

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the most intractable of the 20th and 21st century. Its intractability stems from the perceived *irresolvable* nature of the conflict.² As Israeli negotiator, Udi Delek, pointed out in a meeting with Palestinian negotiators on 28 May 2008, later revealed in the leaked *Palestine Papers*, the intractable conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is marred with divergent and seemingly irreconcilable narratives. For some the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains an ill-fated battle of two national movements claiming possession of the same land; for others it is a quest of one people's rightful reclamation of a once-lost land; while others contend it represents the righteous mission of one people's fight against foreign occupation.

According to Louis Kreisberg, intractable conflicts must be understood in a deeply contextual manner. That is, in order to understand its intractableness, one must understand the particular historical development of the conflict.³ The

¹ Meeting Minutes: 8th Meeting on Territory, Jerusalem, King David Hotel, 28 May 2008. *Palestine Papers*, <https://thepalestinepapers.com/files/2681.PDF>. Accessed: 17 March 2013.

² Intractable conflicts have been defined on pp. 16-17. For more see also Daniel Bar-Tal, 'Sociopsychological foundations of intractable conflicts', *American Behavioural Scientist*, vol. 50, no. 11, 2007.

³ Louis Kriesberg, ed. *Intractable conflicts and their transformation*, Syracuse: Syracuse , p.2.

following chapter introduces the thesis's central case study and presents Israeli and Palestinian narratives around the most important events that took place in the lead up to the present day conflict. The aim is not to present a detailed chronological history of the conflict, but rather a cursory overview that shows how the same events are perceived and interpreted differently. This chapter also serves to contextualise the demonising narratives, which will be examined in the subsequent chapter.

1. THE ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICT

The partitioning of Palestine into two separate states under the UN resolution of 29 November 1947 and the subsequent declaration of the state of Israel on 14 May 1948 are often cited as the origin of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.⁴ While these events instigated the first Arab-Israeli war, earlier clashes between Jews and Arabs in Palestine had occurred. As Benny Morris points out in *Righteous Victims*, longstanding tensions had existed between the Arab Palestinians and the Jewish settlers who had been buying land in the area since the 1880s in an effort to consolidate power in – what they felt was – their original homeland, albeit after two thousand years of exile.⁵

⁴ For a detailed and comprehensive overview of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its origins see, for example, Mark Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 2d ed. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009, Chapter 3. Alan Dowty, *Israel/Palestine*, 3rd ed., Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2012, Chapter 4. Neil Caplan, *The Israel-Palestine Conflict: Contested Histories*, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, Chapter 3. These books include the claims and counter-claims of both sides of the conflict.

⁵ See Benny Morris, *Righteous victims: A history of the Zionist-Arab conflict, 1881-1999*, New York: Vintage Books, 2001, Chapter 1.

The desire for a Jewish homeland that would reunite the dispersed and persecuted Jews was one of the main driving forces behind Zionist ideology, as set out most clearly by Theodore Herzl in *The Jewish State* (1896). Although Herzl did not specify the location of the homeland, later Zionists like Chaim Weizmann had their eyes set on Palestine. Their problem of course, later formulated as the 'Arab Question', was how to justify the expansion of one group of people at the expense of another, particularly given that the Palestinian community at the time was almost nine-fold that of the Jewish. The Palestinian scholar, Ghada Karmi, aptly highlighted this dilemma in her book *Married to another man*.⁶ The title was taken from an apocryphal story about a late 19th century report written by two rabbis who had travelled to Palestine to evaluate it as a prospective location for a Jewish state. Their report concluded: 'the bride is beautiful, but she is married to another man'.⁷ The bride's spouse represented in this case the already existing 'native' Palestinian community. Thus the central Zionist dilemma that unraveled was: how to keep the territories without negating the people?

On the other hand, Palestinian nationalism was growing alongside Zionism, with its main ambition being to unite behind a common identity and nation. In *Palestinian Identity: The construction of modern national consciousness*, Rashid Khalidi traces the ideological tenets of Palestinian nationalism and points to the 'fierce contrast' between Palestinian and Zionist narratives, arguing that Palestinian identity is poorly understood or misrepresented today. The inherent

⁶ See Ghada Karmi, *Married to another man: Israel's dilemma in Palestine*, London: Pluto Press, 2007.

⁷ Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab world*, New York: W.W. Norton, 2000, p. 3

tensions and irreconcilable goals of Zionism and Palestinian nationalism are in many ways at the heart of the conflict.⁸ As the Zionist leader and later Israel's first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion explained already in 1918: 'there is no solution to the question of relations between Arabs and Jews....And we must recognize this situation....We as a nation want this country to be ours; the Arabs, as a nation, want this country to be theirs.'⁹

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War only strengthened the desire and possibility for a return to Zion. Moreover, the subsequent British Mandate turned out to be sympathetic to the Jewish cause as demonstrated by the famous Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917 where Britain's Foreign Secretary Arthur J. Balfour indicated in a letter to Lord Rothschild that 'his Majesty's government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people'.¹⁰ The letter also stated that such a home should not 'prejudice the civil and religious right of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine', suggesting that Britain at the time believed a Jewish home could arise in peaceful coexistence with resident Palestinians. However, given Britain's earlier promise to Hussein the Sharif of Mecca in the Hussein-McMahon correspondence (that it would support the establishment of an independent Arab kingdom in return for the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans), it becomes clear that Britain's contradictory promises helped fuel different expectations that would later prove irreconcilable. Thus not only did the conflict

⁸ For more on the competing nationalist conceptions of the holy land in Zionism and Palestinian nationalism see Rashid Khalidi, *Palestinian identity: the construction of modern national consciousness*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, esp. chapter 5 and 6.

⁹ Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict*, 5th edn., Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p. 121.

¹⁰ Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, p. 6.

originate from the divergent ambitions of two different national movements claiming possession over the same land, it was also brought about and exacerbated by Britain's contradictory promises during the First World War.¹¹

The strong Zionist determination to establish their promised homeland and the Arab resistance to it caused several clashes in Palestine during the 1920s and 1930s. It became increasingly clear to the British that their promises had raised contradictory expectations, fostered increased resentment and reinforced incompatible ambitions. Zionists wanted international recognition of their national home after the Balfour Declaration, and grew increasingly ambitious, with Chaim Weizmann announcing at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 that he wanted: 'To make Palestine as Jewish as England is English.'¹² Hitler's rise to power in the early 1930s and the subsequent persecution of the Jews increased the flow of Jewish immigrants to Palestine and this influx was met with increased Arab resistance. The Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 was a clear testament to this growing tension. The British continued to give mixed promises as exemplified, on the one hand, by the 1937 Peel Commission that recommended partitioning (considered therefore as a betrayal of the Arabs) and, on the other hand, by the 1939 White Paper, which called for the reduction of Jewish immigration and their land purchasing ability (consequently a betrayal of the Jews).¹³

¹¹ For more on the British mandate in Palestine see for example Roza El-Eini, *Mandated Landscape: British Imperial Rule in Palestine, 1929-1948*, New York: Routledge, 2006. Wasserstein, Bernard, *The British in Palestine: The Mandatory Government and the Arab-Jewish Conflict, 1917-1929*, 2nd ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991.

¹² Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, p. 8.

¹³ Dowty, *Israel/Palestine*, pp. 83-85.

It was only after the Second World War, when the British eventually gave up their mandate of Palestine to the United Nations, that the Zionists were finally granted their Jewish state. The Palestinians refused to accept the UN resolution of 29 November 1947, which divided their homeland into two separate states. Nevertheless the Israelis announced their independence and the state of Israel was declared on 14 May 1948. Israel was met with great resistance in its infancy when Arab conventional armies from Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Transjordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and two unconventional Palestinian armies attacked it in 1948. Despite the often-used David and Goliath analogy, Israel proved its military superiority and succeeded in expanding the Jewish state by two-thousand square miles beyond the UN partition plan. The war resulted in a mass exodus of over 700,000 Palestinian Arabs, which was in turn matched with a great influx of Jewish immigrants doubling the Jewish population between 1949 and 1952.¹⁴ The Palestinians who remained within the territories of the 1948 war and their descendants today account for just under 1 million (17% of the total Israeli population).¹⁵ Political theorist Hannah Arendt, who herself was Jewish, duly noted one of the problematic consequences of the displacement and replacement of Arab Palestinians by Israeli Jews during this period. Arendt explained:

After [the Second World War] it turned out that the Jewish question, which was considered the only insoluble one, was indeed solved – namely, by means of a colonized and then conquered territory – but this solved neither the problem of minorities nor the stateless. On the

¹⁴ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict*, p. 226.

¹⁵ These figures exclude those Palestinians living in Occupied East Jerusalem, which make up approximately 170,000 Palestinians. Most of these are 'legal residents', but not citizens of Israel. See Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled, *Being Israeli: the dynamics of multiple citizenship*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 110.

contrary, of virtually all other events of our century, the solution of the Jewish question merely produced a new category of refugees, the Arabs, thereby increasing the number of the stateless by another 700,000-800,000 people.¹⁶

Great controversy has surrounded the origins of the refugee problem that was created in the 1948 war.¹⁷ The disagreement is centered on whether the Palestinians left at the behest of their own leaders and in the expectation of a triumphal return or because the Zionists forcefully removed them from their homes as part of a premeditated 'transfer solution' (to replace the native Arab population with Jewish settlers). The question of the ultimate responsibility of the Palestinian refugee problem matters because it has implications for their yet-unfulfilled 'right to return' as stated in UN General Assembly Resolution 194 of December 1948. If the Israeli government was ultimately responsible for the mass-exodus of Palestinians then it makes even more salient the claim for the 'right to return' and for material compensation, than if Arab leaders instructed Palestinians to flee. As Benny Morris points out, the moral questions surrounding the refugee problem ultimately affect the perception of whether Israel's entry into the world was the result of 'immaculate conception' or 'original sin'.¹⁸

¹⁶ Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973, see pp. 31-49.

¹⁷ For a good illustration of the conflicting perspectives on the origins of the refugee problem compare for example Samuel Katz, *Battleground: fact and fantasy in Palestine*, New York: W. H. Allen, 1973, chapter 2 (an Israeli 'pre-Morris' narrative) with the critique of Nur Masalha, *The politics of denial: Israel and the Palestinian refugee problem*, London: Pluto Press, 2003, chapter 2. For an Israeli new historian account see Benny Morris, *The birth of the Palestinian refugee problem revisited*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

¹⁸ Morris, *The birth of the Palestinian refugee problem revisited*.

Another Arab-Israeli war that continues to have implications for present day Israeli-Palestinian relations was the so-called Six-Day War.¹⁹ The June 1967 war resulted in substantial territorial gains including the Golan Heights, the Sinai Peninsula, East-Jerusalem and the West bank. On 22 November 1967, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 242, which called for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories in return for peace. Despite the UN's repeated 'land for peace' decrees, Israel still occupies the Golan Heights, East-Jerusalem and the West Bank.

Contending narratives give different reasons for Israel's continued occupation of the territories: in his book *The brink of peace*, the former Israeli ambassador to the US, Itamar Rabinovich, argued that Israel had kept the Arab land that it conquered in order to secure peace, while the Arabs have only wanted massive territorial concessions, not genuine peace.²⁰ The land, according to this line of argument, has not been returned because the conditions for peace have not yet been fulfilled. Many Israeli practitioners and scholars including Rabinovich endorse the view that the Arab communities' hostility and their governments' failure to recognise Israel as a legitimate state poses an existential threat, which cannot be ignored. In their eyes, therefore, Israel can only effectively be protected by military power and deterrence. Security, they argue, can only be ensured by military means because of the Arab community's persistent failure to acknowledge Israel's legitimacy. The image of little Israel surrounded by a sea of

¹⁹ For more on the Six Day war and its impact on the region see for example Michael B. Oren, *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East*, New York: Presidio Press, 2003.

²⁰ Itamar Rabinovich, *The brink of peace: the Israeli-Syrian negotiations*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998, p. 38.

enemies has long dominated international perceptions of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and is used to justify the American guarantee of Israeli's quantitative military capability.²¹ According to Avi Shlaim, Israel's military deterrence strategy has perpetuated the dictum that 'a state created by the sword would have to live by the sword.'²² Israel's offensive defense strategy, then, is reflected in a deeper 'siege-mentality' grounded in a perception of the conflict as an ultimately existential one.

The Palestinians, on the other hand, see the Israeli occupation as part of the larger Zionist agenda to achieve a 'Greater Israel' (Eretz Yisrael). According to this line of argument, the Israeli government never intended to give back the land that it occupied. This argument resonates with the fact that dominant Israeli discourse rarely mentioned the term 'occupied territories', instead the designation terms 'Judea and Samaria' are used to describe the land.²³ Thus, according to Palestinians, a hidden colonialist agenda was often pitted as the core reason for Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories. According to Said, after 1967:

Israel became an occupying power, and not simply a Jewish state... As colonial administrators have done everywhere in Asia and Africa, the Israelis believed it was possible to stamp out the slightest sign of "native" resistance to military rule. For the first time in its history, Israel literally produced, manufactured a new class of person, not so much "the Arab" as the "terrorist".²⁴

²¹ For more on the US-Israeli special relationship see Stephen M. Walt and John Mearsheimer, *The Israel lobby and U.S. foreign policy*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007.

²² Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, p. 23.

²³ Yoram Meital, *Peace in tatters: Israel, Palestine, and the Middle East*, Boulder Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2006, p. 99.

²⁴ Said, *The Question of Palestine*, New York: Vintage Books, 1992, p. 137.

Israeli scholars Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled also point out the 'colonialist' objectives of 1967. The purpose of the 1967 war, they explained, was 'to establish a permanent presence in the designated areas, alter their demographic constitution, and eventually annex them to Israel.'²⁵ This objective, they argue, is reflected in the continued expropriation of Palestinian land through settlement construction and the so-called 'Judaization' of the occupied territories.²⁶ The growing number of settlements and the absorption of Israeli immigration continued to influence the demographic distribution in the occupied territories. Roads, residential areas and shopping complexes, built exclusively for settlers, privilege the Israelis over Palestinians in the occupied territories.²⁷ This, Shafir argues, marks a stark contradiction inherent in the Israeli expropriation of Palestinian land in the occupied territories: while taking the land and distributing it to Israelis, the government has been unwilling to grant the occupied Palestinian residents citizenship of Israel.²⁸ Israeli new historians also argue that the quest for Jewish statehood severely marginalised Palestinians.²⁹

Additionally, there was, and still is, a power asymmetry between the Israelis and Palestinians in the conflict.³⁰ Israel's territorial aggrandisement in 1967 coupled with its strong ties with the United States has provided the state with the ability to maintain military control over the occupied territories. Israel therefore has a

²⁵ Shafir and Peled, *Being Israeli*, p. 159.

²⁶ Term used by Mike Berry and Greg Philo, *Israel and Palestine: competing histories*, London: Pluto Press, 2004, p. 37.

²⁷ See 'The frontier within: Palestinians as third class citizens', in Shafir and Peled, *Being Israeli*, pp. 110-37. For more on the impact of Israeli occupation in the territories see also Neve Gordon, *Israel's Occupation*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008.

²⁸ Shafir and Peled, *Being Israeli*, p. 184.

²⁹ For more on Israeli new historians see the works of Avi Shlaim, Benny Morris and Ilan Pappé.

³⁰ For more on the power asymmetry in the conflict see for example Giorgio Gallo and Arturo Marzano, 'The dynamics of asymmetric conflict: The Israeli-Palestinian case', *The Journal of Conflict Studies*, vol. 29, 2009, pp. 33-49.

strong economic and military advantage over its Palestinian counterpart. According to Said, this Israeli superiority occurred gradually over the years: 'In a generation [1948 to 1967] the Israelis had been transformed from underdogs into overlords.' The existing power asymmetry, he argues, is also reflected in the Palestinian terminology used to characterise the enemy in colonialist/imperialist terms (e.g. 'occupier vs. occupied', 'colonisers vs. colonised', 'apartheid regime', 'imperialists'.)³¹ These terms reflect that Palestinians living in the territories as well as those living outside them feel they are under occupation akin to apartheid. The quest for the Zionist dream, then, according to the Palestinians, became the Palestinians' worst nightmare.

2. THE ROAD TO RESISTANCE AND THE FIRST INTIFADA

Occupying and maintaining the land after 1967 meant that Israeli leadership came to govern over a sizable number of Palestinians residing in those territories. These Palestinians, as Shafir and Peled argue, remained 'almost completely rightless subjects of Israel's military regime' and were only integrated into the Israeli economy as workers, consumers and taxpayers. From 1967 to 1987 'Israel was able to maintain a low-cost, low-casualty occupation' alongside a gradual and 'creeping annexation' through settlement projects.³² 'To be Palestinian today', the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) official Afif Safieh explained in an interview in 1985, 'means helplessly witnessing the gradual Judaisation of one's homeland, and the removal of the Arab influence and

³¹ Said, *The Question of Palestine*, p.138.

³² Shafir and Peled, *Being Israeli*, p. 337.

presence from it.’³³ The increased marginalisation of the Palestinians and the perceived growing Zionist aspiration for the territories planted the seeds for political instability that would later manifest itself in two Intifadas (uprisings) in 1987 and 2000.

The First Intifada began on 9 December 1987 following the death of four Palestinian residents of Jabaliya, one of the refugee camps in Gaza, in a traffic accident caused by an Israeli truck driver. Rumours that the truck driver had wilfully killed the Palestinians began to circulate and sparked a spontaneous uprising in the refugee camp that soon spread to the rest of Gaza and to the West Bank. What would emerge as an uncoordinated, spontaneous and popular wave of demonstrations in the occupied territories was therefore neither premeditated nor organised. The traffic accident may have sparked the Intifada, but its causes ran much deeper.³⁴ The popular uprising of the tens of thousands of discontented Palestinian people was a reaction to the sustained occupation and increased settlement building. Palestinians in the occupied territories lived in what they considered to be a colonial regime that practiced deeply discriminatory policies akin to apartheid.³⁵ They felt that their basic human rights and freedom of movement were violated as they were subjected to daily checkpoints, security controls, curfews, forced evictions and house demolitions. As a Washington Report on Middle East Affairs noted: ‘...before the intifada, the

³³ Afif Safieh, *The Peace Process: From Breakthrough to Breakdown*, London: Saqi Books, 2010, p. 21.

³⁴ For more on the First Intifada see for example Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin, *Intifada: the Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation*, London: Tauris, 1990.

³⁵ The former US president Jimmy Carter also used ‘Apartheid’ to characterise Palestinian conditions in the occupied territory in Jimmy Carter, *Palestine: Peace not Apartheid*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006.

daily oppression, humiliation, land confiscations and arbitrariness of the Israeli regime were steadily increasing. This increase, duly recorded by the Hebrew press, was the chief reason for the outbreak of the intifada'.³⁶

Originally, however, the Intifada was not a nationalist revolt, according to Professor Avi Shlaim. Shlaim explained that 'the aims of the intifada were not stated at the outset, they emerged in the course of the struggle'.³⁷ As the revolt gained impetus, the political aims materialised, and gradually the ultimate aim became Palestinian self-determination and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. According to Said, 'the [first] intifada provided a blueprint for Palestinians' political and social life that is lasting, relatively nonviolent, inventive, brave and confoundingly intelligent...a model for movements of democratic protest...the intifada gave them [the Palestinians] new voices, authority and power.'³⁸ Palestinian politician and former negotiator Ghassan Khatib similarly argued in an interview that 'one of the main messages of the [first] intifada is that the PLO is the legitimate representative of the Palestinians, but also the Israelis realised that their previous approach is not bringing them nearer to their legitimate objectives of peace and safety, and legitimacy and acceptance in the region.'³⁹

With the political stability in the occupied territories shaken, the Israeli government was forced to re-evaluate whether the benefits of control might

³⁶ Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, March 1991, cited in Berry and Philo, *Israel and Palestine*, p. 84.

³⁷ Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, p. 451

³⁸ Said, *The question of Palestine*, p. xxxi.

³⁹ Interview with Ghassan Khatib, Ramallah, 29 March 2010.

outweigh its costs. The nationalist aspirations of a Palestinian state were received with mixed feelings in Israel: while some left-leaning Israelis began to question the economic, political and moral sustainability of the occupied territories, others – more right-leaning – were determined to crush the dissent. Either way the First Intifada precipitated a growing awareness of the Palestinian discontent with occupation and their aspirations for self-government that would prove crucial in the lead up to the Oslo Peace Accord.

3. THE PATH TO PEACE: FROM MADRID TO CAMP DAVID

The 1990s witnessed unprecedented reconciliation efforts between the Israeli and Palestinian elites. Several peace-processes took place during the decade including the Madrid Peace Conference (October 1991); the bilateral negotiations in Washington DC that followed (from December 1991 onwards); the Oslo Accord (September 1993); the Stockholm talks (1994-1995); the Oslo II Accord (September 1995), the Hebron Agreement (January 1997); the Wye Memorandum (October 1998) as well as dozens of other parallel two-track negotiations.⁴⁰ From the outset of the 1991 Madrid Conference, however, the dialogue between Palestinians and Israelis was not particularly productive. The

⁴⁰ For secondary literature on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process (in both official and unofficial channels) see for example Hussein Agha and Shai Feldman, *Track-II diplomacy: lessons from the Middle East*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003; Jane Corbin, *Gaza first: the secret Norway channel to peace between Israel and the PLO*, London: Bloomsbury, 1994; Herbert C. Kelman, 'The Israeli-Palestinian peace process and its vicissitudes: insights from attitude theory', *American Psychologist*, vol. 62, no. 4, May-Jun 2007; Meital, *Peace in tatters*; Robert L. Rothstein, Moshe Ma'oz, and Khalil Shikaki, *The Israeli-Palestinian peace process: Oslo and the lessons of failure: perspectives, predicaments and prospects*, Brighton: Sussex Academic, 2002; Shimon Shamir and Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, *The Camp David summit - what went wrong? Americans, Israelis, and Palestinians analyze the failure of the boldest attempt ever to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict*, Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2005; Clayton E. Swisher, *The truth about Camp David: the untold story about the collapse of the Middle East peace process*, New York: Nation Books, 2004.

Israeli government under the Likud party refused to deal directly with the PLO and wanted the non-PLO Palestinian representatives to be part of the Jordanian delegation. The then Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, was not ready to accept an independent Palestinian sovereignty and was only willing to discuss Palestinian matters with the Jordanian delegation. The Palestinians were not happy with this arrangement and wanted to have their own delegation to engage in bilateral negotiations with Israel. The Palestinian delegation kept close contact with the PLO and so in effect the Washington talks involved indirect negotiations with the PLO, although Israel refused to acknowledge them.⁴¹ The Washington talks that followed Oslo did not move forward, they were mired with complications and disagreements. As new historian Avi Shlaim noted: 'little was expected and nothing was achieved'.⁴² Instead, hidden track-two negotiations held in Norway, which had been running parallel to the Washington peace talks, were what would in the end pave the way to an agreement. Direct and open dialogue between the PLO and the Israeli government, something that had been previously prohibited by the Israeli government, had taken place during the secret negotiations in Oslo.

Dialogue and reason had replaced bullets and bombs, it seemed, and there was a sense of genuine optimism around the potential resolution of the conflict. The famous handshake of PLO Chairman Yassir Arafat and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on the White House lawn with the signing of the Peace Accord on 13 September 1993 was considered a milestone in Israeli-Palestinian relations. The

⁴¹ Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, p. 508.

⁴² *Ibid*, p. 510.

clash between the two national movements had moved from mutual denial to mutual recognition.

Optimism that the Oslo Accord would normalise relations and put an end to the century-old conflict between Arabs and Jews in the Holy Land, however, would fade as the decade came to a close. Both parties accused the other side of having failed to uphold its commitments as spelled out in the 1993 Oslo Accord. For Israelis, Palestinian terrorism had hijacked efforts at reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians, and the Palestinian government's failure to curb this violence – and at times even funding and encouraging it – had been the main cause of deadlock in the conflict. Israeli officials pointed an accusing finger at the PLO's chairman and held him personally accountable for instilling violence in his own people.⁴³ For Palestinians, the main impetus for mobilisation was continued Israeli occupation of the territories and the doubling of settlement building since the Oslo Accord in 1993, which contradicted promises of self-government.⁴⁴ Israeli occupation and colonialist ambitions, according to the Palestinians, then, was the main source of conflict. As Palestinian negotiator and former Palestinian Authority (PA) foreign minister, Nabil Sha'ath pointed out:

The settlement issue reflected the real greed for land that never really evaporated with our signing of the [Oslo] agreement. Even during Rabin's time, settlements continued. You could not explain it, I mean what the hell! You are negotiating land for peace and land is vanishing as you're talking....and so if you look at the determination of every time of conflict and confrontation...there was a settlement announced before it.....So in

⁴³ For more on the disputed role of Arafat in the breakdown of Camp David see Robert Malley and Hussein Agha, 'Camp David: the tragedy of errors', *New York Review of Books*, 9 August 2001.

⁴⁴ For more on the settlement construction, see for example Robert H. Mnookin and Ehud Eiran, 'Discord 'Behind the Table': The Internal Conflict Among Israeli Jews Concerning the Future of Settlements in the West Bank and Gaza', *Journal of Dispute Resolution*, May 2005. See also B'tselem figures <http://www.btselem.org/settlements>.

effect those who did not believe or did not want the peace process tried to explode it by settlements and by supporting settlements....On the Palestinians side, Hamas tried to destroy the peace process by suicide bombers...Hamas would explode a suicide bomb, the Israelis would close the borders, the settlement policy would grow, and so the vicious circle would go on. Settlements exploded bombs and bombs exploded settlements, and the result was every time, every round after that we were set back in terms of political commitments, psychological feelings, [and] public support for the peace process.⁴⁵

Every consequence of the conflict became a cause for more conflict.⁴⁶ Moreover, failure to agree on the implementation of the right to return and the question of the division of Jerusalem were two substantive issues that further drove a wedge through the peace process. When the Israeli and Palestinian delegations met again in Camp David in July 2000 (this time under the leadership of the Israeli labour party Prime Minister Ehud Barak), the parties were unable to reach any comprehensive agreements. The promises made to either side during the Oslo accord, both sides felt, had been broken. The path to peace was therefore abandoned.

4. A VIOLENT DECADE: FROM THE SECOND INTIFADA TO THE GAZA OFFENSIVE

The Second Intifada (also known as the al-Aqsa Intifada) began in late September 2000 following the failure of Israeli and Palestinian leaders to come to agreement in Camp David in July 2000. Ariel Sharon's famous walk on the Temple Mount sparked the outbreak, but the reasons for the Palestinian uprising

⁴⁵ Interview with Nabil Sha'ath, Ramallah, 29 March 2010.

⁴⁶ Interview with Mark Heller, Tel Aviv, 22 March 2010.

– as in the First Intifada – were far more deep-rooted.⁴⁷ The Second Intifada marked the ultimate downfall of the Oslo agreement and proved to be one of the most deadly periods of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.⁴⁸ Violence, resistance and bloodshed became the common currency following the Second Intifada – and the optimism from the 1990s faded as the body count on both sides increased. Palestinian suicide bombings in Israel and Israeli retaliation created a spiral of violence that was unprecedented in the conflict. Famous violent incidents include among other the lynching of the two Israeli reservists in October 2000 by a Palestinian mob in Ramallah and the retaliatory air strikes by the Israeli army that followed;⁴⁹ the bombing of the Tel Aviv coastline Dolphinarium dance club by an Islamic Jihad suicide bomber in June 2001; the Passover Massacre in Natanya in March 2002; and the April 2002 Operation Defensive Shield incursion by the Israeli army into the Palestinian territories. This was the largest military incursion into the territories since the Six-Day War in 1967. It is perhaps not surprising then that amid this intense tit-for-tat violence, the subsequent peace efforts like the 2002 Saudi-initiated Arab Peace Plan and the 2003 Road Map for Peace initiated by the Quartet failed. Another casualty of the Second Intifada was the belief that Yasser Arafat was a credible peace partner. The Sharon government, along with the Bush Administration, refused to have dealings with

⁴⁷ For more on the origins and background of the Second Intifada see for example Jeremy Pressman, 'The Second Intifada: background and causes of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict', *Journal of Conflict Studies*, vol. 23, no. 2, 2006.

⁴⁸ For comprehensive data on fatality figures in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict see <http://www.btselem.org/statistics>.

⁴⁹ The footage from the lynching deeply disturbed the Israel public and the international community. In response, the Israeli government launched a series of retaliatory airstrikes against Palestinian Authority targets in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. For more see 'Lynch mob's brutal attack', *BBC News*, 13 October 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/969778.stm, Accessed: 13 January 2012.

the PLO Chairman, who they claimed was responsible for the Palestinian terrorism.

Palestinians, on the other hand, blamed the downfall of the peace process on Israel. For them, Israel's excessive militarism, continuous land grabbing schemes and occupation of Palestinian territories escalated the conflict and prevented peace. In a letter to President George W. Bush on 14 April 2004, for example, Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei explained that occupation was the cornerstone obstacle to peace in the conflict:

The fundamental issue is not terrorism, as the Israelis assert, but occupation. If the Palestinian people believe that Israeli occupation will end, that the confiscation of their land will cease and that Israeli settlements will be dismantled, I can assure you that peace will prevail.⁵⁰

Israeli settlement construction under the Sharon government had continued to expand; with Ariel Sharon nicknamed the 'godfather of the settlements'.⁵¹ Under Sharon, the Israeli government adopted a unilateral policy, which further ostracised the Palestinian leadership. Plans for the construction of the security barrier, which were formulated in July 2001 following increased Palestinian attacks in Israel, further segregated the parties. Sharon's unilateral disengagement from Gaza in 2005 also marked a clear departure from bi-lateral peace talks. The Palestinian leadership considered the removal of Israeli settlers' communities in Gaza with some skepticism. According to a Palestinian Negotiation Support Unit report:

⁵⁰ Letter from Qurei to President Bush Re: Reaction to Bush-Sharon Press Conference, 14 April 2004. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/185.PDF>. Accessed: 3 March 2013.

⁵¹ Dowty, *Israel/Palestine*, p.180.

Israel may have “left” Gaza, but it didn’t leave Gaza alone....It got up and took the keys, leaving an embattled and embittered population to fend for itself in the world’s largest prison...Israel ultimately controls every person, every good, and every drop of water to enter or leave the Gaza Strip.⁵²

Meanwhile, Hamas was gaining political grounds over Fatah in the Palestinian territories. In January 2006, the Islamic party won the Palestinian legislative elections. The political tension between Fatah and Hamas peaked with the Hamas military takeover of Gaza and the dissolution of the unity government in June 2007, which led to the de facto division of the Palestinian territories with Hamas in control of Gaza and Fatah in control of the West Bank. Palestinian negotiator and Fatah-member Saeb Erekat pointed to one of the differences between the two Palestinian parties in a meeting with his Israeli counterpart, Tzipi Livni, on 4 February 2008, noting:

The battle with Hamas is unending. We’ve two schools: one says that the establishment of a state can be achieved through negotiations, and the other says that we’ve tried negotiations and they’re an illusion; only resistance can lead to the establishment of a state.⁵³

The rise of Hamas in Gaza and its hardline approach to Israel put the Israeli government further on alert. Rocket attacks from Gaza, while having been a factor since the beginning of the Second Intifada, increased sharply after the 2007 Hamas takeover.⁵⁴ In return Israeli incursions and airstrikes on the Israel-Gaza border increased. Negotiations did not appear to be an option for either side: Like the PLO during the Madrid conference in 1991, Hamas was not invited

⁵² Key Palestinian Messages on the Current Crisis in Gaza, 18 July 2006. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/656.PDF>. Accessed: 3 March 2009.

⁵³ Meeting Minutes: Ahmed Qurei and Tzipi Livni, Jerusalem, Sheraton Plaza Hotel, 4 February 2008. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/2312.PDF>. Accessed: 4 April 2013.

⁵⁴ Dowty, *Israel/Palestine*, p. 202.

to participate in the Middle East Peace Conference in Annapolis in November 2007. In return, Hamas organised massive demonstrations in Gaza, denouncing the Annapolis conference as a sham. With Fatah loosing political grounds in the territories, the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government attempted to come to a political settlement. However, the facts on the ground made it difficult for the parties to come to any agreement. As Israeli negotiator, Udi Delek, pointed out in a meeting with Palestinians on 28 May 2008:

Since 2000, something happened in those eight years so we are not at the same starting point. You started a terror war on us, and we created facts on the ground. This is the reality that we live in today, so we can't go back to Camp David. Circumstances have changed considerably since then. Facts have changed. So we can't freeze time and consider that we are in 2000 reality. The Middle East has changed.⁵⁵

Relations between Israelis and Palestinians have not recovered since the breakdown of Camp David and the outbreak of the Second Intifada. As Mark Heller noted in an interview: 'since the second intifada – there isn't really much of a peace camp left in Israel – except on the fringes'.⁵⁶ The overall lack of trust and the continued frustration between elites on both side of the conflict meant that there was little scope for genuine progress. The almost one thousand and seven hundred documents from 1999 to 2010, known as the *Palestine Papers*, that were leaked to Al-Jazeera show a complicated and stagnant negotiations process. Very little progress was made during these years. The same topics kept

⁵⁵ Meeting Minutes: 8th Meeting on Territory, Jerusalem, King David Hotel, 28 May 2008. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/2681.PDF>. Accessed: 4 April 2013.

⁵⁶ Interview with Mark Heller, Tel Aviv, 22 March 2010. For more on the decline of the Israeli peace movement see Tamar Hermann, *The Israeli peace movement: a shattered dream*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

appearing in the minutes of meeting, and no agreements were made on the core issues of the conflict.

The growing violence between Hamas-run Gaza and the Israeli government only further underscored the stagnation of the peace process. Amid tit for tat violence on the Israel-Gaza border, Hamas and Israel accepted an Egyptian brokered six-month ceasefire in July 2008. When the ceasefire ended in December 2008, however, Hamas rocket fires resumed and Israel retaliated with Operation Cast Lead, a three-week long air and ground offensive in Gaza from 27 December 2008 to 18 January 2009 that resulted in almost 1,400 fatalities.⁵⁷ The Gaza offensive was a violent testament to the failure of the peace process.

5. BONES OF CONTENTION, HISTORICAL TRAUMAS AND HATE NARRATIVES

Several bones of contention continue to exist at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: whether and how to divide the land, whether or not the Palestinian refugees have the right to return, who should reign over the holy places of Jerusalem and whether or not to halt the continued settlement construction in the occupied territories.⁵⁸ These issues continue to strain relations between Palestinians and Israelis.

⁵⁷ For more on the fatality figures from Operation Cast Lead see http://www.btselem.org/download/20090909_cast_lead_fatalities_eng.pdf. Accessed: 2 June 2013.

⁵⁸ For an overview of the substantive disputes between Israelis and Palestinians see 'Matrix of Palestinian and Israeli positions', *Palestine Papers*, 15 July 2008. <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/2914.PDF>. Accessed: 12 April 2013.

Both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict suffer from historical traumas and carry scars from the past. For the Jews, their own history is filled with discrimination, persecution, anti-Semitism and expulsion, culminating in the horrendous tragedy of the Holocaust. Their flight to Palestine during and after the Second World War was existential. Stressing the deep psychological dimensions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Professor Alon Ben-Meir noted: 'The Jews have carried the scars of this past with them to Palestine and still hold to the view that it can happen again unless they remain relentless in protecting themselves at any cost.'⁵⁹ For the Palestinians, the injustices of an imposed UN partition, the experience of the Nakba, precipitated by the 1948 war, the refugee problem that followed, and life under occupation have also left deep scars. The need to be liberated from the chains of occupation resonates in both political elite and popular discourses. As Ghassan Khatib noted in an interview in Ramallah: 'the main determining factor in [the] Palestinian way of thinking, because this is the main constant in our thinking, [is] ending the occupation. So if we are convinced that this process is going to end the occupation then it becomes popular. If resistance, for example, is giving the impression that it is successful in bringing the end of occupation, then it becomes popular and so on...'⁶⁰

While both peoples therefore cling on to a deeply entrenched sense of victimhood and injustice, the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is further complicated by deep internal divisions within each respective community: on the

⁵⁹ Alon Ben-Meir, 'The psychological dimension of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict'. See <http://www.alonben-meir.com/article/the-psychological-dimension-of-the-israeli-palestinian-conflict/>. Accessed: 10 March 2012.

⁶⁰ Interview with Ghassan Khatib, Ramallah, 29 March 2010.

Palestinian side divergent opinions exists, among others, between Fatah and Hamas, between secular and religious factions, between those Palestinians who live inside the territories, those who live inside Israeli proper and those who live abroad; and between those Palestinians who live in refugee camps and those who do not.⁶¹ While resistance movements such as Hamas oppose Israel's existence and continue to adhere to the ideological ethos of Palestinian control over all of mandated Palestine, other more moderate parties push for coexistence and self-determination within a two-state solution.

On the Israeli side gaps exist, among other, between secular and orthodox, between the various denominations within Judaism, between left and right, between doves and hawks.⁶² While political parties such as the Likud wish to maintain the vision of 'the land of Israel' in its entirety, parties like Labour, Kadima, and Meretz are willing to compromise territorially as long as Israel does not compromise its security.⁶³ Among the most extreme, religious Orthodox Jews in the Charedi community view Zionism and the state of Israel as 'demonic enterprises' and refuse to have anything to do with them. Deep divisions within both the Israeli and Palestinian camps, then, further complicate the conflict as there is no one singular and consistent opinion on either side.

⁶¹ For more on the political divergence in Palestinian domestic politics see Asad Ghanem, *Palestinian Politics after Arafat: A Failed National Movement*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2010.

⁶² For more on the political divergence in Israeli domestic politics see Myron J. Aronoff, *Israeli Visions and Divisions: Cultural Change and Political Conflict*, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1989.

⁶³ For more on the rise and the political visions of the Likud party see Colin Shindler, *Israel, Likud and the Zionist Dream: Power, Politics and Ideology from Begin to Netanyahu*, London: I. B. Tauris, 1995.

Hostile attitudes towards the 'other' side have been well documented in research on Israeli and Palestinian public attitudes.⁶⁴ Extensive studies have been done on the institutionalised nature of the mutual delegitimisation and negative stereotyping of Palestinians and Israelis. Daniel Bar-Tal, for instance, explores how societal prejudices are deeply embedded in schoolbooks, meaning that from a young age Palestinian and Israeli children are aware of their 'evil' other. In the Israeli case, Bar-Tal notes how Arabs in general are portrayed as 'primitive, dirty, stupid, easily agitated and violent'.⁶⁵ They are perceived in the Israeli literature as 'killers, a bloodthirsty mob, rioters, treacherous, untrustworthy, cowards, cruel and wicked' with the ultimate aim of annihilating the State of Israel and driving the Jewish population into the sea.⁶⁶ A study by Nurit Peled-Elhanan found that demonisation of Palestinians – including the comparisons of Nazis and the Devil – were present in Israeli schoolbooks that were published even after the mutual recognition of Israelis and Palestinians in 1993.⁶⁷ The Palestinian side and the governments sympathetic to the Palestinian cause have also matched these demonising characteristics.⁶⁸ For example, a PA sponsored schoolbook warned Palestinian children that 'one must beware of the Jews for

⁶⁴ See for example Daniel Bar-tal, 'The rocky road towards peace: beliefs on conflict in Israeli textbooks', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 35, no. 6, 1998, pp. 723-742.

⁶⁵ See for example Daniel Bar-Tal and Neta Oren, 'The detrimental dynamics of delegitimization in intractable conflicts: the Israeli-Palestinian case', *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, vol. 31, no. 1, 2007.

⁶⁶ See *ibid.*

⁶⁷ Nurit Peled-Elhanan, *Palestine in Israeli School Books: Ideology and Propaganda in Education*, London: I.B. Tauris, 2012, p. 69.

⁶⁸ See for example in 2007 Itamar Marcus, under the Palestinian Media Watch, released a report on hate narratives in PA Schoolbooks with Senator Hilary Clinton. For the video recording of his presentation see <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=niBajpLSEPA> Accessed: 5 May 2012.

they are treacherous and disloyal.⁶⁹ Thus Israeli and Palestinian hate narratives have perpetuated hostile stereotypes in the conflict.⁷⁰

6. CONCLUSION

The Israeli-Palestinian case study thus involves a deeply entrenched territorial conflict between two national movements. It is mired with its own unique narratives, historical events and traumas. While Palestinian and Israeli nationalisms continue to fuel divergent interests, internal divisions within each constituency further complicated the conflict. There have been attempts at waging peace, but ultimately the underlying issues are unresolved and violence continues to haunt their relationship. Consequently warring parties remain unable to overcome the diplomatic deadlock that characterises their relationship. It is with this background in mind that the thesis will now examine the particular narratives of demonisation in this conflict.

⁶⁹ Palestine Media Watch, 'Kill a Jew – and go to heaven', Special Report, 2005. Accessed: 30 October 2010.

⁷⁰ See for example 'Israeli and Palestinian textbooks: Teaching children to hate each other', *The economist*, 8 February 2013. Accessed: 4 May 2013.

CHAPTER 5

DOCUMENTING DEMONISATION IN THE ISRAEL-PALESTINE CONFLICT

Have Israeli and Palestinian elites demonised each other over time, and if so, who demonised whom, when and how?¹ The chapter presents the findings of a qualitative study aimed at documenting demonisation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Gathering evidence of Israeli and Palestinian demonisation is instructive because it helps provide an empirical basis from which to analyse the demonising narratives and place them into the context of Israeli and Palestinian ideologies and historical experiences. It also provides a framework for understanding the reasons and intents behind each party's demonisation narratives, and recognises themes of mobilisation, unity, self-righteousness, and legitimacy identified in chapter 3. The chapter also shows how each side's demonising discourse appears in different contexts of perceived evils: while Palestinian demonisation of Israelis must be understood in the context of their own colonial experiences, Israeli demonisation of Palestinians must be understood in the context of their own experiences of security concerns and terrorism.

The question 'who demonises whom, when and how' drove the analysis of the quotes collected. Four principal categories were therefore used to examine the statements:

1. '*Who?*' required identifying the demoniser – i.e. the person who demonises

¹ This question is a variation of political scientist Harold Laswell's communications model. Writing in 1948 Laswell posed the question, 'Who says what in which channel with what effect?'

2. *'Whom?'* required identifying the demonised – i.e. the target of the demonisation
3. *'When?'* required identifying the context within which the comment was made
4. *'How?'* required identifying the type of accusation being made

In total, one hundred and seven quotes illustrating demonising discourse were collected in this study. Of these, fifty-five illustrate Palestinian elites demonising Israelis and fifty-two illustrate Israeli elites demonising Palestinians. All quotes are listed in Appendix A, which is organised in chronological order and lists the date, the quote, its narrator and the document source.

The chapter is divided into four parts: the first part addresses 'the demonisers' (who), the second part the 'the demonised' (whom), the third part 'the context of demonisation' (when) and the final section 'the demonising message' (how). Each section presents a description and deeper discussion/interpretation of the statements collected according to the four categories. Tables and graphic representations are used to synthesise the information gathered.


1. THE DEMONISERS

Asking ‘who demonised’ helps identify the source behind the demonising statement – the so-called narrator. Within the category of elites, three subsets were identified: (1) government (2) religious and (3) non-government figures.² Government figures are those elites who hold or compete for political power (e.g. elected party representatives, rival political party representatives, past and current government ministers, diplomats, ambassadors, official negotiators, city mayors etc.). Religious figures are those who provide spiritual guidance to the people and command authority and recognition in their respective religious communities (e.g. a Jewish rabbi, Muslim imam, Christian priest). Non-government figures are those who do not hold a formal post in government, but who nevertheless are public figures (e.g. a community leader, official representatives/spokespeople for a non-governmental organisation, a renowned university professor, or a high-profile media spokesperson).

² These categories are not mutually exclusive and a few quotes were therefore difficult to categorise given the at times overlapping distinctions: for example Palestinian quote #19 in Appendix A appeared on a TV broadcast (i.e. a non-government source), but the channel was sponsored by the PA (i.e. a government source) and it was a religious broadcast (i.e. a religious source). The quote was categorised as a religious source because it best reflected the elite’s official role.

The chart below illustrates the categorisation of Israeli elite narrators in the quotes collected in this study.³

Figure 2: Categories of Israeli narrators




Forty-three Israeli statements came from government officials (including among others high ranking ministers such as Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Shamir, Benjamin Netanyahu, Shimon Peres, Ehud Barak, Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert). The 'religious' category included five statements. All five came from one leader, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, who is the spiritual leader of the Shas party, Israel's religious orthodox party. The remaining statements came from four non-government figures: the first was the spokesman for the Committee of the Jewish Settlers Community of Hebron; the second was a veteran Peace Now activist who worked in the Israeli land-for-peace group; the third was an analyst from an Israeli-American think tank and the fourth was a journalist who worked as an assistant policy adviser to the Prime Minister in Israel's negotiations with the Palestinians in 1994.

³ See Table 1 (Appendix B) for the breakdown of the statements into categories.

The chart below illustrates the categorisation of Palestinian elite narrators in the quotes collected in this study.⁴

Figure 3: Categories of Palestinian narrators



Forty-six statements came from official Palestinian government figures. These included comments made by, among others, Yasser Arafat, other spokespeople from the PLO, PA, Fatah, Hamas, the Islamic Jihad Movement and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, government ministers and press officers. The five Palestinian statements that were labelled 'religious' came from Sheik Ibrahim Mudayris, who is a Palestinian imam. His sermons are broadcast on Palestinian Authority TV. The remaining four statements came from non-government figures, which included a university lecturer from Gaza and two columnists from a Fatah party newspaper (*Al-Hayat Al-Jadida*).

⁴ See Table 2 (Appendix B) for the breakdown of the statements into categories.

The quotes collected suggest that demonising narrators exist across the political spectrum for both Israeli and Palestinian elites. However, among the examples collected on the Israeli side, there were more demonising statements from right-wing affiliated parties (including the Likud party, the Yamin Israel party and the former Tehiya party) than from the Labour party.⁵ This finding is consistent with research regarding the effect of party affiliations on attitudes towards the conflict and the peace process: right-wing leaders are typically more hostile towards their Palestinian adversaries than left-wing leaders. An empirical survey conducted at Haifa University examining 'Arab-phobia' among moderate and extreme right-wing parties in Israel, for example, found that the degree of exclusionary attitudes towards Arabs differed significantly between the two: 'Arab-phobia', the study argued, was more deeply entrenched within the extreme right, regardless of the actual behaviour or attitudes of Israeli and Palestinian Arabs.⁶

Additionally, Israeli right-leaning leaders tended to target specific individuals and party members in their demonising narrative, while labour party elites' comments were directed more towards actions (e.g. terrorism, terrorist acts or terrorists in general and less 'all Palestinians' specific). In Likud Prime Minister Begin's own words, for example, Arafat was the 'mass murderer' and the PLO was engaging in 'beastly acts'.⁷ His statement was made in the context of the Coastal Road Massacre, a Palestinian terrorist attack that claimed the lives of 45 people. Terrorism was also the subject of Prime Minister Peres's speech on 13 March 1996. The Prime Minister

⁵ See Table 1 (Appendix B).

⁶ Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler and Eran Halperin, 'Through the squalls of hate: Arab-phobic attitudes among extreme right and moderate right in Israel', *Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics*, vol. 12, no. 2, 2005, pp. 53-60.

⁷ Menachem Begin quoted in *The Globe and Mail*, Canada (Lexis Nexis), 14 March 1978. Accessed: 29 October 2010.

was making an address at the summit of peacemakers at Sharm El-Sheikh where he pointed to the tragic death of two twelve-year old Israeli boys ‘murdered by the ultimate evil’ nine days earlier, on the eve of the festival of Purim. However, Peres rejected ‘the evil of terrorism’ without specifying anyone in particular.⁸ The examples taken from Peres’ speeches tended to differentiate between ‘all Palestinians’ and those Palestinians who committed terrorism: for example in a statement following the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres condemns terrorists as ‘messengers of the Devil’ but he preambles, noting, ‘I don’t know if there is a lot of extremism, but the extremists are very extreme’.⁹ Peres thereby made a distinction between extreme and moderate factions. Contrast this, for instance, with the Likud appointed Israeli civilian governor of the Occupied West Bank and Gaza, Professor Menachem Milson, who in 1982 seemed unwilling to make a distinction between extreme and moderate factions of the PLO: ‘If people are pro-PLO’, he explained, ‘then they are terrorists, anti-Semites and bent on the destruction of Israel’.¹⁰ Milson’s statement appeared in the context of pending elections in the West Bank for the proposed autonomy council for Arab self-government. Milson explicitly rejected the eligibility of PLO supporters to participate in the elections. According to the Israeli governor, the PLO was an ‘evil organisation’ and eliminating pro-PLO influence in the region was therefore necessary because ‘this destructive position of the PLO and the evil doctrines behind it are illegitimate. They are immoral and therefore are illegitimate. They are illegitimate in the West Bank, illegitimate in Amman; they are illegitimate in Beirut,

⁸ Shimon Peres quoted in a speech at the Summit of Peacemakers Sharm el-Sheikh, *Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs website (MFA)*, 13 March 1996. Accessed: 2 August 2011.

⁹ CNN interview with Shimon Peres, *MFA*, 14 November 1995. Accessed: 4 November 2010.

¹⁰ Menacham Milson quoted in William Claiborne, ‘Israeli says West Bank election awaits end of PLO influence; Israeli rules out PLO voting role’, *The Washington Post (Lexis Nexis)*, 27 March 1982 Accessed: 2 November 2010.

or Paris or New York.’¹¹ Similarly on 16 October 1985, Likud party member Benjamin Netanyahu, then Israel’s permanent representative to the United Nations, wrote an op-ed editorial to the *New York Times* reflecting on ‘the true nature of the PLO’. Israel, Netanyahu argued, was ‘faced with absolute evil’ because the PLO was ‘not a political organisation that dabbles in terrorism but a terror organisation that dabbles in politics’.¹² His focus was therefore on the PLO as a terrorist entity rather than on the terrorist acts that they committed. Netanyahu’s statement was made in the context of the discussion about the PLO’s legitimacy as a participant in the United Nations – something Netanyahu believed would lead to the ‘moral collapse’ of the institution and the death of any prospective Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

A possible reason for the right’s non-distinction between those people who engage in terrorist activities and those who do not, is that it contributes to delegitimising the entire people and their cause as a whole. Traditionally, right-wing parties have been more hostile towards the Palestinian Arabs because they do not consider them legitimate inhabitants of the land of Israel. Ghassan Khatib, a former member of the Palestinian People’s Party, noted in an interview: ‘the Likud, ideologically, couldn’t accept the idea of Palestinian statehood, because they still believe in the historical and ideological rights of Israel, of the Israeli people, or the Jewish people in all historical Palestine.’¹³ What Khatib describes as the conviction of the Likud party, also falls in line with the old Zionist slogan: Palestine was ‘a land without a people for a people without a land’. The denial of the Palestinian national identity has continued to be reflected in the political discourse of the right-wing Likud party. In

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Benjamin Netanyahu, ‘Face Up to the P.L.O.’s True Nature’, *The New York Times (Lexis Nexis)*, 16 October 1985. Accessed: 29 October 2010.

¹³ Interview with Ghassan Khatib, Ramallah, 29 March 2010.

1991, for example, when asked about Palestinian aspirations for statehood, Likud member and later Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu replied: ‘They [the Palestinians] are trying to create an artificial state on the false assumption that there is a separate peoplehood.’¹⁴ Demonisation narratives on the part of the right-wing leadership, then, must be understood in the context of the delegitimisation of Palestinian statehood and peoplehood. On the contrary, singling out the problem (e.g. the acts of violence against Israel) and the possible reasons behind it (e.g. that some do not consider it terrorism but a legitimate fight against occupation) and separating the problem from the people (i.e. focusing only on those responsible) requires a legitimate reflection on the cause and consequences of the conflict.

Among Palestinian elite quotes collected, the demonisation of Israel or ‘the Zionist entity’ also occurred across the political spectrum. From the liberal Fatah movement to the more extreme Islamic parties ‘evil’ was a shared perception of ‘the Zionist enemy’. While Israel was considered an evil occupying force on all political fronts, there were apparent qualitative differences in the way political Islamic resistance movements like Hamas and their more secular-liberal Fatah party peers referred to their enemy – both in the terms used (e.g. whether they used alternative references to ‘Israel’ like ‘the Zionist entity’ as a sign of non-recognition) and the intensity of the statement (e.g. literal vs. non-literal demonisation). In particular, religious affiliated parties were more likely to use literal demonising references when characterising the adversary. For example Hamas officials coin the conflict in demonic terms and the party’s covenant is a fruitful source of good and evil

¹⁴ Press Conference with Dep. PM Netanyahu, Washington DC, *MFA*, 10 December 1991. Accessed: 29 October 2010.

narratives. The term 'evil' appears seven times in the Hamas covenant from 18 August 1988. According to one section of the charter:

The basic structure of the Islamic Resistance Movement consists of Moslems who have given their allegiance to Allah whom they truly worship...they fear Allah and raise the banner of Jihad in the face of the oppressors, so that they would rid the land and the people of their uncleanness, vileness and *evils*.¹⁵

The fact that the Hamas covenant uses demonisation narratives and calls for Jihad is an example of the use of demonisation as a mobilisation force. In this particular context, the demonising language was used to rally resistance in the name of Islam with Hamas making a clear appeal to Muslims to actively purify the territory of its 'uncleanliness, vileness and evils'. Hamas has continued to demonise their Zionist adversary. The following extract from an official Hamas statement was posted on the Palestinian Information Centre website in 2005 in the context of, what Hamas officials called, 'recent assassinations of mujahidin and fighters in the West Bank and Gaza strip':

The Zionist *hellish* machine continues to kill Palestinians without getting tired or bored, indifferent to the calm and to the appeals made by the Palestinian [National] Authority and others for a halt to the aggression and assassinations. It has thus proved for the one thousandth time that it is a *demonic* and criminal force whose only concern is to shed blood and kill innocent people....Let the occupation know that regardless of its cruelty and tyranny, it will eventually fade away, because wrong cannot defeat right and *evil* cannot defeat good. We are confident that victory is ours, God willing, against the *state of evil*, corruption, and tyranny.¹⁶

The Israeli attacks, the Hamas website explained, were 'not merely a response to martyrdom operations but a systematic policy deeply ingrained in the Zionist entity'

¹⁵ Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement of Palestine, Chapter 1, Article three, 18 August 1988, *PASSIA*, vol. 4, p.19. Emphasis added.

¹⁶ Hamas quoted in *BBC Monitoring Middle East* (Lexis Nexis), 10 December 2005. Source: Palestinian Information Centre website in Arabic 10 Dec 2005. Accessed: 3 November 2010.

and on ‘an ideology predicated on murder and treachery’.¹⁷ In addition to the mobilising aspect of the quote, the religious battle of g(o)od and (d)evil is prominent, with the Zionist entity presented as the agent of evil, pitted against the forces of good who will ultimately prevail. The narrative is strikingly similar to illustrative examples in Chapter 2 of the battle of the Protestant and Catholic churches in seventeenth-century Europe.¹⁸ Protestants and Catholics accused each other of corrupting the region, just like the former Hamas member Ismail Abu Shanab declared before his assassination: ‘The Israelis have brought the Devil into the Middle East’.¹⁹

The Palestinian Imam, Ibrahim Mudayris, is also well-known for demonising Israel. In one of his sermons broadcast on the Palestinian Authority TV in March 2004 Mudayris announced: ‘the Jews today...are extremists and terrorists who deserve death, while we deserve life, since we have a just cause’.²⁰ In a later sermon, Mudayris again called out for ‘waging this cruel war with the brothers of the monkeys and pigs, the Jews and the sons of Zion.’ He professed to his fellow listeners that: ‘The Jews will fight you and you will subjugate them.’²¹ These types of dehumanising statement by religious leaders are intended to mobilise followers to engage in violence and morally legitimise their actions. The dualism of good and evil, the legitimate fight against the evil enemy, and the notion of self-righteousness – as highlighted in Chapter 3 – are all crucial ingredients in the Imam’s call to arms.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ See Chapter 2, pp. 48-49.

¹⁹ Cited in Harvey Morris, ‘Violence has quashed signs of development in Palestinian Territories’, *Financial Times (Lexis Nexis)*, 18 October 2000. Accessed: 4 November 2010.

²⁰ Ibrahim Mudayris quote on *Jewish Virtual Library*. Source: sermon on *Gaza Palestine Satellite TV*, 12 March 2004. Accessed: 11 November 2010.

²¹ Ibrahim Mudayris quote on *Jewish Virtual Library*. Source: *PA TV*, 12 September 2004. Accessed: 4 November 2010.

Similarly Hamas's Foreign Minister and co-founder of the organisation, Mohamoud Al-Zahar, made a reference to the Jew's killing of the prophet as a justification for their 'historical fate' of destruction. On 15 March 2005, amid on-going talks between Palestinian factions that resulted in the Cairo Declaration, Al-Zahar declared at a National Conference: 'I direct a clear message to the Israeli enemy:...you, who killed your prophets, and whose fate throughout history has been destruction;...you were destined for destruction and you remain so'.²² Such statements incite hatred and help to both mobilise and legitimate acts of violence against an evil adversary in the spirit of self-righteousness.

On the Israeli side, the spiritual leader of the powerful ultra-orthodox political party Shas, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, also resorted to demonising vocabulary when referring to his opponents. In August 2000, one month preceding the second intifada, Ovadia pronounced in a sermon that 'Arabs are evil and that God regretted their creation.'²³ The spiritual leader also likened the Palestinians to vicious snakes and animals in previous sermons, even calling for the extermination of the 'evil and accursed' Arabs by missiles.²⁴ In a Sabbath sermon in August 2010, he announced: 'Let Abu Mazen [Mahmoud Abbas, president of the Palestinian Authority] and all these evil folk perish from this world. May God smite them with the plague, them and these

²² Mahmoud Al-Zahar quoted in *Palestinian Media Watch*. Source: the National Conference for Maintaining Principles on *Al-Aqsa TV* (Hamas), 15 March 2005. Accessed: 7 November 2010.

²³ Rabbi Ovadia quoted in *BBC Monitoring Middle East* (Lexis Nexis), 13 August 2000. Accessed: 3 November 2010.

²⁴ See for example text of report by Palestinian radio, 'Jerusalem mufti condemns Israeli rabbi's statements on Arabs', *BBC Worldwide Monitoring* (Lexis Nexis), 9 April 2001. Accessed: 29 October 2010. Rabbi Ovadia quoted in *Ha'aretz* (Lexis Nexis), 20 March 2000. Accessed: 18 November 2010.

Palestinians'.²⁵ The use of incitement by religious leaders to mobilise their followers is therefore apparent on both sides of the conflict.

There are several reasons why religiosity might elicit a more literal form of demonisation: firstly, the metaphor has religious origins and features in the texts that religious leaders draw upon. The term is therefore more likely to appear in their discourse. Secondly, leaders may feel that they can reach out to their religious constituencies more efficiently by connecting their struggle to a 'God-given' fight against evil. For religious leaders and their followers the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is more than a territorial dispute between two peoples, it is a religious conflict. The religious significance of Jerusalem is considerable given that it is home to important religious sites for Christians, Jews and Muslims alike. Furthermore the establishment of the State of Israel, for some religious Jews, is part of a biblical fulfilment of the return of the Jews to their ancient homeland as well as a perceived God-given right to inhabit the land. For some Muslim Palestinians, the sacredness of Islam and the call for Jihad propels them to fight against 'infidels' to secure their land. Transposing the struggle from their religious texts onto the modern political contexts helps to mobilise their followers. It also coats the conflict with moral righteousness.

The religious belief in the Holy Land might also be subject to political manipulation. As Ron Hassner highlights in *War on sacred grounds*, the belief in the indivisibility of sacred spaces like the temple mount allows for their manipulation by political elites

²⁵ Rabbi Ovadia quoted in *Financial Times* (Lexis Nexis), 30 August 2010. Accessed: 22 October 2010.

that seek power over religious groups.²⁶ More specifically, Hassner argues that sacred sites incite political mobilisation by providing ‘believers’ with concrete spaces that they believe provide access to the divine. At no time was the importance of religious sites more effectively illustrated than with the outbreak of the Second Intifada following Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount in September 2000. The sacredness of the Temple Mount has long been a contentious issue. On 25 July 1988, for example, the PLO Executive Chairman Yasir Arafat appealed to King Fahd Bin Abd al-Aziz in a letter calling for the Saudi Arabian king’s support against the ‘evil Zionist force’ of Israel.²⁷ His demonising statement was made in the context of recent Israeli events on the ground: on June 15th, 1988 Israeli troops had stormed Al-Aqsa Mosque, firing tear gas into groups of worshippers. A month later the discovery of new excavations adjacent to the Sanctuary led to more civil disorder. Arab riots occurred as a response to the archaeological digs.²⁸ More specifically, Arafat appealed to the Saudi King – and all Muslims around the world – to rescue Jerusalem from destruction. The third holiest mosque in Islam was at stake, for according to Arafat, it was only a matter of time ‘before the racist and terrorist Zionist succeed in destroying it to build their so-called Solomon’s temple in its place.’²⁹ Arafat drew on religious appeal and demonised the Israelis in order to mobilise Muslims proclaiming: ‘let us proceed together until we perform prayers in the liberated holy city of Jerusalem, God willing’. In his letter to the Saudi King, Arafat juxtaposes the ‘evil Zionist forces’ destruction of what is holy against his own

²⁶ See Ron Hassner, *War on sacred grounds*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009. For more on the notion of indivisibility of sacred spaces see also Stacie E. Goddard, *Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy: Jerusalem and Northern Ireland*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

²⁷ Arafat quoted in a letter to King Fahd bin Abdalaziz, *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (Lexis Nexis), 28 July 1988. Accessed: 29 October 2010.

²⁸ See Joel Brinkley, ‘Arabs Riot in Jerusalem Over Archaeological Dig’, *The New York Times* (Lexis Nexis), 4 July 1988. Accessed: 10 April 2013.

²⁹ Arafat quoted in a letter to King Fahd bin Abdalaziz, *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (Lexis Nexis), 28 July 1988. Accessed: 29 October 2010.

peoples 'heroic confrontation of the Israeli occupational forces and the herd of their armed settlers'. The Palestinian leader appealed for assistance to help check 'this blatant aggression against Islamic holy places in the occupied Palestine.' He further pledges that his people would continue their jihad and sacrifice martyrs until the end of the occupation when the Arab national flag would be hoisted over the holy city of Jerusalem. The labelling of the Israelis as 'evil' in this context, then, was used to mobilise support and to create unity through fear.

Thus the Israeli and Palestinian demonisers in the collection of statements gathered in this study spanned the political spectrum with certain qualitative differences existing in terms of party affiliation. On both sides religiosity appeared to have further fuelled the tendencies to resort to demonisation.

2. THE DEMONISED

The question of ‘whom’ is being demonised requires investigating the targets of demonisation. As an analytical category it matters because it helps identify who is perceived as the main threat – in other words, who are the individuals, groups or organisations that are considered responsible for the evils described. Whom do they blame? The statements collected shows that there is a broader set of targets than on the Israeli side.


Of the fifty-two Israeli statements collected six Palestinian ‘target’ categories were identified.

Table 3: Categories of Israeli targets

#	Category	Description	Example
1	PLO/PA	References to the Palestinian governing authority	‘I’m ready to speak with anyone even Satan himself – but not with the PLO’. (Yitzhak Shamir, 1989)
2	Arafat	References to the Chairman of the PLO and the President of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA)	Arafat ‘has brought nothing but terror and evil since his return to the territories’. (Silvan Shalom, Israel’s former Deputy Prime Minister, 2004)
3	Palestinians	References to the Palestinian people	‘The Palestinians are like crocodiles, the more you give them meat, they want more’. (Ehud Barak, 2000)
4	Arabs	References to specific ethnic/racial identities	‘Arabs don’t suffer from the problem of telling lies that exists in Judeo-Christian culture’. (Ehud Barak, 2002)
5	Terrorists	Reference to terrorists and their activities.	‘They [the killers] are...the sons of the Devil...and woe to this government that made a pact with Satan’. (Rabbi Elizer Waldmann, a former Knesset member, 1993)
6	Unspecific	References to the accused target are unclear and ambiguous.	‘Being the only true democracy in the Middle East, Israel stands at the forefront of the conflict between the civilized world and the forces of evil’. (Ariel Sharon, 2002)

The graph below illustrates the distribution of the statements collected into the six categories. The x-axis presents their frequency in absolute numbers. It is important to note that the numbers shown represent the total number of *accusations* made. The majority of statements singled out one target category but a few statements included several target groups (e.g. both Arafat and the terrorists are evil). For this reason the absolute number of overall Palestinian targets (fifty-nine) is greater than the absolute number of total Israeli statements (fifty-two).³⁰

Figure 4: Categories of Israeli targets



As the graph illustrates, the highest number of accusations condemns the evils of terrorists/terrorism (over one in every three statements). The ‘PLO’ appeared ten times in the statements. The ‘Palestinians’ and ‘Arabs’ categories shared a similar number of statements. ‘Arafat’ was targeted in nine of the statements. Three of the statements mentioned ‘evil’ but did not target any group in particular.

³⁰ See Table 3 (Appendix B) for the breakdown of the statements into categories.

In the Israeli statements, 'terrorists' were the most frequent target for demonisation. In a large majority of the statements, elites singled out 'terrorism' or 'terrorists' as the greatest source of evil. For example, in March 1978 Menachem Begin made a pledge to end terrorism and 'cut off the arm of evil' promising: 'we shall not allow under any conditions an evil hand to be lifted against the head of a Jewish child or woman'.³¹ He was referring to the Palestinian attack in Haifa where Palestinian gunmen hijacked a tourist bus and killed 45 people. Begin's analogy clearly illustrates the notion of legitimacy through protection. The image of cutting off the arm is graphic and illustrates the intent to incapacitate the limb responsible for the violence (ie. terrorism). Once the limb is gone it cannot strike back and so cutting the arm suggests an irreversible process. The use of the metaphor therefore signalled to the public the serious extent to which Begin was determined to fight back. Three days after the Haifa attack, the Israeli government launched Operation Litani against PLO bases in Southern Lebanon.³²

In 1996 Shimon Peres also equated terrorist extremists to 'messengers of the devil' and called for 'the civilized world's rejection of the evil of terrorism'.³³ Peres stressed the need for Israel to take aggressive measures to defend itself against terrorism. He made his statement at the Summit of the Peacemakers, held on 13 March 1996, which brought the Israelis together with the regional and international

³¹ Menachem Begin quoted in *The Globe and Mail*, Canada (Lexis Nexis), 14 March 1978. Accessed: 29 October 2010.

³² 'Israeli Defense Force statement on the operation in Lebanon', *MFA*, 15 March 1978. Accessed: 1 May 2013.

³³ Shimon Peres, Speech at the Summit of Peacemakers Sharm el-Sheikh, *MFA*, 13 March 1996. Accessed: 13 August 2011.

community to condemn terror and act against it.³⁴ Over a decade later, the theme of combatting the evils of terrorism persisted in elite narratives, especially after the US initiated the war on terrorism. At an AIPAC conference in 2003 Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Silvan Shalom, announced that problems of terrorism were endemic in the conflict that had cost the lives of many Israeli victims.

He explained:

Since September 2000, the State of Israel has gone through one of the most difficult periods ever. We are in the third year of yet another campaign of terror. Just today, the cold, deadly hand of this despicable, devil destroyed once again the lives of dozens of Israelis, innocent families, this time in the hearth of the peaceful city of Netanya.³⁵

The 'devil' Shalom is referring to is terrorism and those who commit it (terrorists). His statement accentuates the evilness of such acts. In particular, Shalom was referring to the bombing of the London Café in Netanya which injured 54 people. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the attack.

The former chairman of the PLO, Yasser Arafat, was another target among the Israeli examples collected. The demonisation of Arafat was also intimately connected with allegations of terrorism. For example writing an obituary on Yasser Arafat in the Washington Times, Caroline B. Glick, one of Israel's negotiators with the PLO from 1994-1996 called him the 'godfather of Islamic terrorism'.³⁶ Glick also wrote that Hitler was one of Arafat's guiding lights and claimed that the analogy between Arafat's death and Hitler's death was pertinent, because, like Hitler, Arafat had built

³⁴ For more on the summit see Dennis Ross, *The missing peace: the inside story of the fight for Middle East peace*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004, p. 248.

³⁵ Silvan Shalom, Address at the AIPAC Policy Conference, Washington, D.C., *MFA*, 30 March 2003. Accessed: 13 August 2011.

³⁶ Caroline Glick wrote the obituary on Arafat unsure whether he was 'dead or dying'. Arafat died on 11 November 2004, two days after the article was published.

the Palestinian power apparatus in his own murderous image. Glick held Arafat personally responsible for the Palestinian assaults on Israel. When reflecting upon the policy consequences of his death, she noted:

The death of an *evil* man is always a cause for hope...Arafat's death will provide an opportunity for building a better future if the Bush administration uses his disappearance as a catalyst for a true overhaul of Palestinian society. This requires more than just pressuring Israel to meet with and make concessions to a new PLO warlord, raised on Mr. Arafat's knee.³⁷

Ariel Sharon too blamed Arafat for the on-going violence in the conflict. Several times the former Israeli Prime Minister noted that he was an 'arch-murderer' who would obstruct peace for as long as he lived. Sharon's demonising remarks of Arafat appeared in 1989 amid growing debate over the government's policy toward the PLO and Israel's response to the Palestinian Intifada in the occupied territories. In an interview with Fox news in April 1989, Sharon reiterated the claim that no peace would be possible while Arafat stands at the centre of 'an empire of terror.'³⁸ Sharon's demonising statements may also have attempted to foster unity through fear and legitimacy through protection, with Arafat and Palestinian terrorism being his identified source of threat.

³⁷ Caroline Glick, *The Washington Times* (Lexis Nexis), 9 November 2004. Accessed: 15 November 2010. Emphasis added.

³⁸ Ariel Sharon quoted in John Moody 'Sharon: No peace while Arafat is around', *Fox News*, 11 April 2002. Accessed: 19 April 2013.


From the fifty-five Palestinian statements collected, nine Israeli target categories were identified.

Table 4: Categories of Palestinian targets

#	Category	Description	Example
1	Israel	References to the state, the government or the country of Israel	'Israeli governments were anxious to apply the most dangerous ethnic cleansing theory against the Palestinian people'. (PA Information Ministry press release of 29 March 1997)
2	Israeli leaders	References to official government figures	'Israeli leaders...plot evil designs against us in secret'. (Ibrahim Nimre Hussein, the mayor of the Arab town of Shafa Amre, 1998)
3	Israelis	References to the citizens of Israel	'The Israelis brought on themselves...in every society they lived, disasters and massacre'. (Khadar Abas lecturer at Gaza's Al-Aksa University broadcast on PA TV, 2002)
4	Jews	References to the ethnic and religious character	'The Jews are the seed of Satan and the devils'. (Excerpt from a religious broadcast on PA TV, 1998)
5	Jewish Nation	References to the Jewish character of the state	'The Jewish nation...lives by scheme and deceit'. (Imud Falouji, PA Communications Minister, 2002)
6	Settlers	References to the settled population in occupied territories	'Rabin has to remove all the settlers from the West Bank and Gaza and transfer them to hell'. (Jibril Rajoub, former head of the Preventive Security Force in the West Bank, 1994)
7	Zionism	References to the Zionist ideology	'World Zionism...since its inception has undertaken to spread evil and destruction in the world'. (Muhammad ash-Sha'ir, PLO representative in Moscow, 1979)
8	Occupation	References to occupation or colonialist ambitions	'...an evil and dehumanizing Israeli military occupation' (Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas' political leader, 2006)
9	Unspecific	References to the accused target are ambiguous	'We are fighting and struggling with an enemy who is Shylock'. (Othman Abu Gharbiya, Arafat's adviser on National Political Guidance, 1997)

The graph below illustrates the distribution of the nine categories in absolute numbers. Again, the absolute number of overall targets (sixty-two) is greater than the absolute number of total statements (fifty-five) because a few of the statements demonised several targets.³⁹

Figure 5: Categories of Palestinian targets



The greater number of targets among the selected quotes indicates that the spectrum of demonised targets is broader on the Palestinian side than on the Israeli side. The two categories ‘Israel’ and ‘Zionism’ were more frequently targeted (13 and 14 statements respectively). Together they constituted almost half of the Palestinian targets. Palestinians demonise Zionism because, for them, it is a nationalistic, political, and ideological movement that gave rise to the state of Israel,

³⁹ See Table 4 (Appendix B) for the breakdown of the statements into categories.

a state which they see as having dispossessed them of their land. It is identified as the *source* of Israel's evil, as the ideology that fuels Israel's quest for domination, colonialism and oppression. According to the former Hamas leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, for example, 'the evil Zionists destroyed all sources of a dignified living for that people and stole their wealth'.⁴⁰ 'Israeli leaders' were the third most targeted category, closely followed by occupation-related evils. Less common were the 'settlers', 'Israelis', 'unspecified' and 'the Jewish Nation' targeted groups.

The Palestinian elites used multiple terms to characterise the Israeli state, referring to it as the 'Jewish Nation', the 'Zionist entity' or 'Israel'. At times, Zionist-related terms were used instead of 'Israel' in order to capitalise on the non-recognition of the Jewish state. In particular, there was a noteworthy absence of the 'Israel' term in Hamas and other non-Fatah representative statements where they included alternative titles such as 'the evil Zionist occupation forces' and 'the Zionist hellish machine' instead of Israel. Prior to the Algiers declaration of 1988, the PLO refused to recognise Israel in its covenant and in their statements PLO representatives would often refrain from using the term⁴¹ or would use it to illustrate the fact that Zionism was the main driving force behind the creation of Israel. Among the examples collected, however, elites mentioning Israel-related terminology were mainly from the post-1988 Fatah constituency.⁴² For example, reflecting on the humanitarian situation in Gaza following the freeze in Western aid after Hamas

⁴⁰ Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Letter to the Arab summit meeting in Tunis, March 2004, *PASSIA*, vol. 7, p.206.

⁴¹ Article 19 of the original Palestinian National Covenant stated: 'The establishment of the State of Israel is null and void, regardless of the passage of time'.

⁴² One might expect the mutual recognition of the PLO and Israel in 1993 to have had a positive effect on the terminology transformation from 'Zionist entity' to 'Israel'. Among the statements collected, however, there was not enough evidence to draw such a conclusion. 'Israel' was cited both before and after 1993. The translations-variable might also play a role in this.

victory in the PA legislative elections, Islamic Jihad Movement's Secretary General Dr Ramadan Abdallah referred to Israel as 'a Zionist entity' when stating in a rally speech in Gaza in October 2006:

We realize that the Palestinian situation is facing an impasse and acute crises. These are hard days indeed in which *the camp of evil* and falsity led by the USA and the Zionist entity as well as their agents and lackeys in the region are practicing the vilest and basest forms of blockade and aggression against the Palestinian people.⁴³

It is noteworthy that Palestinians also used the terminology of terrorism to describe their enemies. A difference, however, was that while Israelis referred to either the act of terrorism in general or groups of terrorists or terrorist individuals in particular, Palestinian statements referred to the systemic terrorism exercised by the state of Israel. For example according to a 2001 statement by Ahmad Hillis, the Fatah secretary in the Gaza strip, 'the only thing worthy of being called terrorism is the Israeli occupation. The Israeli occupation is the peak of official and systematic state-sponsored terrorism.'⁴⁴ This accusation falls in line with Arafat's statement in 1989 that Israel was exposing the Palestinians to 'evil doings and sins, including its daily official, systematised terrorism against our kinfolk in the occupied territories'.⁴⁵ The language of terrorism, then, was also present on the Palestinian side.

It is important not just to evaluate the 'target' terminology that was present, but also that which was absent. For example among the Israeli elite statements there was no

⁴³ Ramadan Abdallah quoted in *BBC Monitoring Middle East* (Lexis Nexis), 22 October 2006. Source: addresses at Gaza rally via telephone speech. Accessed: 29 October 2010. Emphasis added.

⁴⁴ Ahmad Hillis quoted in *BBC Monitoring Middle East* (Lexis Nexis), 6 December 2001. Source: *Palestine TV*, Gaza, in Arabic 0920 GMT 6 Dec 2001. Accessed: 29 October 2010.

⁴⁵ Transcripts from PLO radio broadcast on *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (Lexis Nexis), 13 May 1989. Accessed: 29 October 2010.

expressed notion of a Palestinian state or homeland in the accusations. A term that did not appear once in the Israeli target narratives collected was 'Palestine', which denotes the territorial recognition and autonomy of the state of the Palestinian people. Thus while over a quarter of the Palestinian statements collected made references to 'Israel', not one reference was made on the Israeli side to the state of Palestine. The absence of the term 'Palestine' likely reflects the Israeli elite's reluctance to acknowledge the notion of an independent Palestinian nation state. This finding is consistent with studies done on Israeli schoolbooks that similarly note the absence of the terms Palestine and Palestinians (even in schoolbooks produced after the 1993 peace accords which included the mutual recognition of Israel and Palestine).⁴⁶

3. THE CONTEXT OF DEMONISATION

The question of 'when' demonisation occurs requires examining the context within which the statements were made. What events on the ground set the scene for the narrative? Two particular contexts appeared to dominate: terrorism and settler-colonialism. While Palestinian elite quotes focused on the settler-colonialism and occupation as a reason for resistance, Israeli elites focused on terrorism and insecurity as leading to self-defensive measures. For example in a meeting held by the Knesset on 3 May 1950 to discuss the annexation of the West Bank by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Israeli government justified the conquering of Arab territory as a pre-emptive measure of self-defence – more specifically, the Knesset document noted: 'We could not prevent any Arab country giving bases to

⁴⁶ See Peled-Elhanan, *Palestine in Israeli School Books*, p. 52.

the Devil himself unless we conquered those areas'.⁴⁷ Conquest was necessary in the eyes of the Israeli government, then, because failure to do so would bring evil to the region. A similar reasoning was given to legitimise Israeli retaliation against Palestinian terrorist almost half a century later. The Israeli statement on the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal consequences of the construction of the wall in the Palestinian territories stated:

This Palestinian terrorism has taken the lives of nearly 1,000 Israelis in over 20,000 attacks over the last three and a half years, wounding thousands more, leaving broken families, widows, and orphans. No other country would act differently in the face of such an *evil* campaign'.⁴⁸

Both Israeli quotes illustrate the legitimisation of their own actions towards the adversary: It was *the other sides'* evil acts that cause retaliatory actions. On the Palestinian side, Hamas, for example, affirmed the right of the Palestinian people 'to resist against occupation using all available means, thus expressing their rejection of the occupation and repulsing it and its evils.'⁴⁹ It was Israeli ills that both fuelled and justified Palestinian resistance, seen through Hamas's eyes.

Violence has haunted the Israel-Palestine conflict be it through Palestinian suicide bombings, Israeli military incursions, mutual firefights, Palestinian-launched rockets or Israeli target killings. A high number of the demonising statements collected appeared in the context of such violent events. A likely reason for this is that in times of murder and mourning, leaders are expected to respond to the violence; to

⁴⁷ Government of Israel, 135th sitting of the First Knesset, 3 May 1950, *PASSIA*, vol. 2, p. 154.

⁴⁸ Israeli statement on the advisory opinion of the ICJ on legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territory, 9 July 2004, *PASSIA*, vol. 7, p. 276. Emphasis added.

⁴⁹ Hamas quoted in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (Lexis Nexis), 20 March 1998. Source: Hamas, website in Arabic 17 March 1998. Accessed: 24 November 2010.

condemn the attacks; to support the victims and their family; and to promise to avenge the people suffering the violence. These sentiments typically manifest themselves in the form of condemning language.

On the Israeli side, many of the elite's comments tended to address specific terrorist attacks. For example when Menachem Begin directed his wrath against 'Arafat, the master murderer' it was in direct response to the Fatah terrorist attacks in Haifa in 1978. His statement appeared in a report to Israeli parliament on 13 March 1978 condemning the attack, later known as the coastal road massacre that claimed the lives of forty-five Israelis and wounded at least seventy-four people. The attack was carried out by the PLO faction, Fatah, and masterminded by Abu Jihad. According to Fatah, the attack was launched to avenge the death of their PLO chief of operations, Kamal Adwan, who was killed in an Israeli attack in Beirut five years earlier. The attack was also aimed at derailing the peace talks between Menachem Begin and Egypt's President Anwar Sadat. Begin described the event as 'one of the most terrible and beastly acts of infamy of all times'.⁵⁰

When Rabbi Waldman, a former Knesset member, called upon 'the sons of the devil' as deserving of death it was in a speech to several thousand mourners following the assassination attempt of an Israeli rabbi in the occupied west-bank in November 1993.⁵¹ The rabbi's car had been targeted, killing the driver and injuring the rabbi. The attack sparked several riots among the settler community in Hebron. The guerilla group that claimed responsibility for the attack had killed eleven Israelis

⁵⁰ Menachem Begin quoted in *The Globe and Mail*, Canada (Lexis Nexis), 14 March 1978. Accessed: 29 October 2010.

⁵¹ Rabbi Waldman quoted in *The Herald*, Glasgow (Lexis Nexis), 8 November 1993. Accessed: 4 November 2010.

after the signing of the Oslo peace agreement in an attempt to derail the peace process. Similarly, the former Environment Minister, Yossi Sarid, warned against 'depositing our future in the hands of these evil people' following an attack by Hamas on a school bus in April 1994. A suicide car bomber killed eight people and wounded over fifty in the attack that was meant to avenge the Palestinian victims killed in the Hebron massacre in February that year. Palestinian violence continued to be a source of demonising condemnations especially after the outbreak of the Second Intifada in September 2000. Deputy Minister and Foreign Minister, Silvan Shalom, for example, pointed his finger squarely at Yasser Arafat after two explosions on Beersheba city buses in August 2004 killed sixteen people and wounded over one hundred. Arafat 'has brought nothing but terror and evil since his return to the territories' Shalom announced in a speech in which he expressed his condolences to the afflicted families.⁵² Hamas later claimed responsibility for the two suicide bombers who carried out the attack. Terrorist attacks, then, call for the Israeli political leadership – whether left or right leaning, religious or non-religious as the above examples illustrate – to respond to its people to show that they will ultimately take action in order to protect them and high profile officials were thus more likely to make demonising statements in times of violence. The statements collected suggest that terrorism and security concerns are the central themes within Israeli demonising discourse. Israeli demonisation of Palestinians, then, must be understood in the context of their own experiences of terrorism.

On the Palestinian side, leaders also referred to the evil enemy in the context of violence. For example on 17 July 1981, Yasser Arafat condemned the 'terrorist

⁵² Silvan Shalom, *MFA*, 31 August 2004. Accessed: 7 November 2010.

murderers' of 'the US-Zionist oppressors and all its evil, terrorism, crimes and unequalled ferocity.'⁵³ The PLO Chairman was specifically referring to the destruction of the PLO headquarters in Beirut by Israeli airstrikes. The attacks, which caused more than 300 civilians deaths and wounded 800 were retaliation for Russian-made rockets launched by the PLO against Israel from Southern Lebanon. Israel's response led to worldwide condemnation, as well as a temporary embargo on the export of US aircraft to Israel. Two decades later, in May 2002, the Secretary General of the Palestinian Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Ahmad Jibril, called out against the 'triangle of evil' when jointly accusing Israeli, US and Jordanian intelligence efforts as leading to the assassination of his son, who was killed by a car bomb in Beirut.⁵⁴ Similarly the assassination of the Hamas-founder Sheikh Ahmad Yassin in March 2004, the assassination of Abul Azziz al Rantissi in April 2004, and two military incursions into Gaza known as 'Operation Rainbow' and 'Operation Days of Penitence' in May and September-October 2004 respectively where crucial contexts within which Hamas promised on 26 September 2004 to pursue the path of Jihad and resistance against 'the evil Zionist occupation forces' whom they saw as 'responsible for this heinous crime'.⁵⁵ Their statement emphasised the split between 'us' and 'them', between the martyrs and the evil occupation forces and provided a justification for pursuing the path of Jihad and resistance. It followed the Beersheba bus bombings of 31 August 2004, but precedes several other suicide bombings and could be considered as an enticement to them.

⁵³ Yasser Arafat quoted in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (Lexis Nexis), 20 July 1981. Source: Excerpts from recorded message on 'Voice of Palestine' 1616 GMT 17 July 1981. Accessed: 3 November 2010.

⁵⁴ Ahmad Jibril quoted in *Al-Jazeera* (Lexis Nexis), 20 May 2002. Accessed: 2 November 2010.

⁵⁵ Hamas quoted in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (Lexis Nexis), 26 September 2004. Accessed: 2 November 2010.

When Mahmoud Abbas denounced Israel as being ‘an evil aggressor’ it was, in his own words, a response to ‘the blatant aggression carried out by the Israeli military machine upgraded with the latest technology to bombard a defenceless people...’⁵⁶ Abbas’s statement was made in the context of the Israeli government’s extensive military incursion in Gaza, which started on 27 December 2008. The violence and bloodshed caused by the Israeli military in the occupied territories, then, are essential contexts for Palestinian demonisation.

Palestinian demonisation of Israelis must also be understood in the context of what they conceive of as a settler-colonialism. The statements collected suggest that Palestinian demonising narratives are often an expression of anti-colonial, anti-Zionist and anti-occupation sentiments. In particular, settlement activities in the occupied territories were an important context within which several demonising statements appeared. For example, when Arafat urged on the 7 August 1996 that ‘the most important thing is to confront this demon that swallows up everything’,⁵⁷ he was referring to Israel’s dramatic increase in settlement constructions in the occupied territories which had expanded at an exponential rate even after the Oslo Peace Accord.⁵⁸ More specifically, his statement was made in the context of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s announcement of the Israeli Government’s decision to permit the expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. Arafat condemned the announcement as a ‘flagrant violation’ of the Oslo Peace Accords.

⁵⁶ Mahmoud Abbas quoted in *BBC Monitoring Middle East* (Lexis Nexis), 2 February 2009. Source: Text of report by Palestinian presidency-controlled news agency Wafa website. Accessed: 2 April 2011.

⁵⁷ Yasser Arafat quoted in *The New York Times* (Lexis Nexis), 7 August 1996. Accessed: 22 October 2010.

⁵⁸ Robert H. Mnookin and Ehud Eiran, ‘Discord “Behind the Table”: The Internal Conflict Among Israeli Jews Concerning the Future of Settlements in the West Bank and Gaza’, *Journal of Dispute Resolution*, no. 1, 2005.

The continued construction of Israeli settlements after the signing of the Oslo Accord was also the context in which Jibril Rajoub, the former head of the Preventative Security Force in the West Bank, argued on 4 March 1994 that 'Rabin has to remove all the settlers from the West Bank and Gaza and transfer them to hell.'⁵⁹ Rajoub's statement is strikingly similar to Paul Revere's anti-colonialist attack on the British during the American War of Independence, with his artwork depicting the colonials being ushered into the fiery jaws of Hell.⁶⁰ Such parallels illustrate the occurrence of demonisation in the context of occupation and resistance to it. In these occupation contexts, demonisation serves as an important unifying and mobilising tool. For example, on 3 November 2000 the columnist in the PA official newspaper *Al Hayat Al-Jedida*, Fuad Abu Hijleh, denounced settlers as 'rats' and called for the mobilisation against them, noting: 'The settlers are a dirty stain on our land...It is time to begin expelling them by besieging them, cutting off their electricity and contaminating their water....They will become groups of rats gathering in their sewer before they are driven away into Israel'.⁶¹ Considering that the statement appeared in an official PA newspaper intended for an Arab audience, it may indicate an attempt to mobilise the people. Abu Hijleh's statement was made shortly after the failure of Camp David and the outbreak of the Second Intifada. 2000 was also the year that experienced the sharpest increase of settlement construction in the territories. Under Ehud Barak's government, the construction of almost 4,800 new housing units was commenced that year. At the end of 1993, the population of the West Bank settlements (excluding East Jerusalem) totaled 100,500. By the end of

⁵⁹ Jibril Rajoub quoted in *Israel's War against Terror*. Source: *Yediot Ahronot*, 4 March 1994. Accessed: 4 November 2010.

⁶⁰ See Chapter 2, p. 54.

⁶¹ Fuad Abu Hijleh quoted in *Al-Hayat Al-Jedida*, 3 November 2000. Source: *MEMRI*, Special Dispatch No. 153, 17 November 2000. Accessed: 22 October 2010.

2000, this figure had increased to 191,600, representing a growth rate of some ninety percent.⁶² These settlement constructions, for the Palestinians, were a testament of the growing permanency of Israeli occupation and represented an act of violence in its own right. As General Amin al-Hindi, the head of the Palestinian secret police, explained in a meeting with Israeli and American delegates leaked in the *Palestine Papers*: 'Our concept of violence is different from yours...You can see that shooting is violence. I agree with you. But settlement activity, blockade and entering into area (a) is violence as well.'⁶³ In the case of Palestinian demonisation, events that highlight the continued Israeli occupation called for the Palestinian leadership to respond to their people to *protect* their people, *unite* them behind the cause of anti-occupation, and *mobilise* them against it. Consequently increased settlement constructions and military incursions in the occupied territories is an important context for understanding Palestinian demonisation of Israelis.

4. THE DEMONISING MESSAGE

The demonising message refers to the actual content of the accusation being made. This analytical category matters because it focuses on the actual transaction between the 'demoniser' and the 'demonised'. Five reoccurring themes were identified as appearing regularly in the one hundred and seven statements. The examples include both Israeli and Palestinian sources:

⁶² For more on the settlement figures see *B'stelem*
http://www.btselem.org/download/200205_land_grab_eng.pdf. Accessed: 13 May 2013.

⁶³ General Amin in Meeting Minutes: U.S., Israel and Palestine Generals. *Palestine Papers*,
<http://transparency.aljazeera.net/files/69.PDF>. Accessed: 22 February 2013.


Table 5: Categories of demonising messages

#	Category	Description	Examples
1	Destruction	References to the enemy's intentions to injure, terrorise or destroy.	'The brazen espousal of terror and national annihilation in the PLO charter is what distinguishes the PLO even from such terrorist states as Syria'. (Benjamin Netanyahu, 1988)
2	Domination	References to the enemy's intentions to dominate or to occupy.	'International Zionism and colonialism conspired and worked to displace it [the Palestinian Arab people], dispossess it from its homeland and property...' (National Covenant of the PLO, First Palestinian Congress, 1964)
3	Deception	References to the enemy's dishonesty or intentions to consciously deceive	'In Arafat, you're dealing with a man who has been consistent in only one thing - he has consistently broken his word in everything'. (Benjamin Netanyahu, 1995)
4	Sinful	References to the enemy's wicked/morally corrupt character or behaviour	'[Zionist] organisations...aim at undermining society, destroying values, corrupting consciences, deteriorating character...' (Hamas Covenant, 1988)
5	Literal embodiment of evil	References to the enemy as a literal embodiment of evil in the form of an analogy or a metaphor.	'Killers invoking the name of God...are really the Devil's emissaries'. (Shimon Peres, 1995)

These categories are not mutually exclusive and at times statements include more than one type of evil accusation. For this reason the total absolute number of overall accusations (one hundred and forty one) is greater than the total absolute number of statements (one hundred and seven).⁶⁴ A total count yields the following comparative results for the distribution across the five categories. The y-axis represents the total number of accusations.

⁶⁴ See Tables 7 & 8 (Appendix B) for the breakdown of the statements into categories.

Figure 6: Categories of evil message content



In both Israeli and Palestinian narratives, the ‘destruction’ and ‘literal evil’ categories were the two most frequent types of accusations made. Yet the figures also suggest several points of divergence between the two sides: firstly, there was less diversity in the accusations made by Israeli elites. The two most dominant categories were ‘destruction’ and ‘literal evil’ related. Conversely for the Palestinian elites, the statements fell more evenly into the five categories. ‘Deception’ and ‘sinful’ related accusations, for instance, together constitute approximately one-third of the accusations. Secondly, the ‘domination’ charge was absent from the Israeli statements collected in this study. Among the Palestinian examples, however, the category appeared in eleven of fifty-five statements.

The most common theme in both the Israeli and Palestinian elite narratives was the enemy's destructiveness. The adversary's 'evilness' was attributed to his intention to harm, which was often described as deliberate and systematic: for example a PLO broadcast on 13 May 1989 heavily criticised the US for shielding Israel of 'its evil doings and sins, including the daily official systematized terrorism against our kinfolk in the occupied territories.'⁶⁵ The context of the quote was the Israel government's crack down during the First Intifada, which resulted in high numbers of Palestinian fatalities.⁶⁶ A Palestinian Authority's Information Ministry press release published in March 1997 went as far as accusing the Israeli government of 'ethnic cleansing' noting that 'since the very beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israeli governments were anxious to apply the most dangerous ethnic cleansing theory against the Palestinian people'.⁶⁷ The quote referred to the Palestinian Nakba and the violence directed against Palestinians since 1948. Commenting on the events of the Nakba, Ahmed Hanoun, the PLO director of refugees in Ramallah, noted at the marking of its 62nd anniversary, 'which befell our Palestinian people when the Zionist gangs carried out dozens of acts of massacre, destroyed hundreds of Palestinian villages, and carried out the most extensive campaign of collective expulsion against our Palestinian people'.⁶⁸ In an interview on Palestinian Authority TV on 6 February 2004, Ahmad Nasser, the former Secretary of the Palestinian Legislative Council, explained how Israel's foundations were laid on violent grounds making it a 'Satanic offspring':

⁶⁵ PLO radio broadcast, *BBC summary of World Broadcast* (Lexis Nexis), 13 May 1989. Accessed: 29 October 2010.

⁶⁶ For figures of Palestinian fatalities during the first intifada see *B'stelem* http://www.btselem.org/statistics/first_intifada_tables. Accessed: 20 May 2013.

⁶⁷ PA Information Ministry Press release, *Israel's War against Terror*. Source: a 'PA source' from 29 March 1997. Accessed: 6 November 2010.

⁶⁸ Ahmed Hanoun quoted in *Palestinian Media Watch*. Source: *PA TV*, 17 May 2010. Accessed: 19 December 2011.

Israel, the State of Israel, is the Satan's offspring, a Satanic offspring. Israel was founded on theft from the first moment. It was founded on the basis of robbery, terror, killing, torture, assassination, death, stealing land and killing people. On this basis, Israel was founded and will continue this way, never able to exist because its [Israel's] birth was unnatural, a Satanic offspring, and cannot exist among human beings... Israel is an aggressive country, a racist country, an ideologically hostile country, which hates all the *goyim*, all the foreigners. Israel is a Satanic offspring.⁶⁹

Descriptions of the enemy's destructiveness also often lacked any notion of remorse or regret on the enemy's part. The enemy was portrayed as either being indifferent to or taking pleasure in causing devastation. According to a Hamas statement on 10 December 2005, for example, the Israeli enemy 'continues to kill Palestinians without getting tired or bored, *indifferent* to the calm and to the appeals made by the Palestinian [National] Authority and others for a halt to the aggression and assassinations'.⁷⁰ The statement referred in part to the Sharon government's target killings of Hamas officials. Similarly the Israeli Peace Now activist, Yaacov Lozowick, noted how his country was faced with 'an enemy who gloats in murder and dances over Jewish blood'.⁷¹ Lozowick was attempting to explain the 'night and day' difference between Israeli's willingness to kill when 'necessary' and the Palestinians 'enthusiasm' for murdering the innocent. His reflections were made in the context of the Second Intifada. Lozowick's statement suggests explicit enjoyment and pleasure of the enemy's evildoing.

⁶⁹ Ahmad Nasser quote in *Palestinian Media Watch*. Source: *PA TV*, 6 February 2004. Accessed: 29 October 2010.

⁷⁰ Hamas quoted in *BBC Monitoring Middle East* (Lexis Nexis), 10 December 2005. Source: *Palestinian Information Centre* website in Arabic 10 Dec 2005. Accessed: 10 December 2011.

⁷¹ Yaacov Lozowick, *The Philadelphia Inquirer* (Lexis Nexis), 21 December 2003. Accessed: 29 October 2010.

The enemy's targeting of society's weakest members was another common feature in the Israeli and Palestinian evil destructiveness. Several demonising statements included examples from both sides accusing their adversary of deliberately targeting the more vulnerable citizens: just as Menachem Begin argued in 1978 that Palestinian's 'evil hand' of terrorism was being lifted against the head of a Jewish child or women', the PLO representative to Moscow, Muhammad Ash-Sha'ir in 1979 accused the Israeli government of killing 'children, women and old people'.⁷² Palestinian examples also included accusations of the Israeli government infecting Palestinian children with HIV and chasing after them using American Apache helicopters.⁷³ According to Arafat in a speech on 28 January 1981, for instance, Menachem Begin, (or as he referred to him 'the Prime Minister of the enemy') had committed himself to fighting the PLO and the Palestinian revolution 'with methods which even the Devil has not thought of'.⁷⁴ Both sides of the conflict therefore emphasised the destruction caused by the other side, not just to highlight their capacity to engage in evil deeds, but also to stress the injustices and victimhood their side had been exposed to. 'We [the Palestinians] are like a pen of sheep', Fatah member of PA Parliament, Najat Abu Bakr, explained in March 2008, 'from which a wolf grabs a sheep every day'.⁷⁵

⁷² Muhammad Ash-Sha'ir quoted in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (Lexis Nexis), 14 July 1979. Source: *Moscow radio* in Arabic 1700 GMT 12 Jul 1979. Accessed: 3 November 2011. Menachem Begin quoted in *The Washington Post* (Lexis Nexis) 14 March 1978. Accessed: 29 October 2010.

⁷³ Nabil Ramlawi quoted in a session of the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, *Israel's War against Terror*. Source: *Jerusalem Post*, 17 March 1997. Accessed: 29 November 2010. Ahmad Hillis quoted in *BBC Monitoring Middle East* (Lexis Nexis), 6 December 2001. Source: *Palestine TV*, Gaza, in Arabic 0920 GMT 6 Dec 2001. Accessed: 29 October 2010.

⁷⁴ Yasser Arafat quoted in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (Lexis Nexis) 30 January 1981. Source: Excerpts from Arafat's speech on 'Voice of Palestine' 1137 GMT 28 January 1981.

⁷⁵ Najat Abu-Bakr quoted in *Palestinian Media Watch*. Source: *PA TV* (Fatah), 3 March 2008 (includes video). Accessed: 14 April 2011.

The enemy's evilness was at times presented as an 'innate' characteristic: for example in a radio broadcast on 14 July 1979, the PLO representative to Moscow, Muhammad Ash-Sha'ir, presented his adversary's 'evilness' as inherent from birth, noting that 'Israel ... is an executive instrument and a criminal tool in the hands of world Zionism, which since its inception has undertaken to spread evil and destruction in the world'. Evil was portrayed as an inherent character trait – a product of 'its grave designs and sinister aggressive spirit'.⁷⁶ Ash-Sha'ir's statement appeared in the context of Arafat's visit to Austria where he had met with the Austria's Jewish Chancellor Bruno Kreisky. Austria was the first western government to receive Arafat since his famous speech at the United Nations in 1974. Arafat's official visit to Vienna sparked a diplomatic crisis between Israel and Austria, with Israel officially condemning the visit of this 'evil' terrorist. Almost three decades later, a statement by Hamas representative of the Palestinian Legislative Council, Yussuf Al-Sharafi, in April 2007, similarly painted the Jews in Israel as intrinsically murderous, noting that they 'longed to drink the blood of our massacred people.' Al-Sharafi attributed the enemy's destructiveness to its ideology, noting 'Jewish faith does not wish for peace nor stability, since it is a faith that is based on murder: "I kill, therefore I am..."'. He further noted the logic of destruction that guided Israeli policy and that would, in the end, seal its own fate: 'Israel is based only on blood and murder in order to exist, and it will disappear, with Allah's will, through blood and Shahids (Martyrs)'.⁷⁷ The demonising statement not only served to legitimate and mobilise violence against Israel, but also presented it as a God-given and righteous quest. Also on the Israeli side, certain Palestinian character

⁷⁶ Muhammed Ash-Sha'ir quoted in *BBC Summary of the World Broadcasts* (Lexis Nexis) 14 July 1979. Source: *Moscow radio* in Arabic 1700 GMT 12 July 1979. Accessed: 3 November 2011.

⁷⁷ Yussuf Al-Sharafi quoted in *Palestinian Media Watch*. Source: *Al-Rissala* (Hamas Weekly), 12 April 2007. Accessed: 12 May 2011.

traits were expressed as innate to their culture. For example former Prime Minister Ehud Barak maintained in an interview with *the New York Review of Books* on 13 June 2002: 'they are the product of a culture in which to tell a lie...creates no dissonance. They don't suffer from the problem of telling lies that exists in Judeo-Christian culture'.⁷⁸ Barak's statement was made in the context of what he perceived as the failure to adhere to the promises of the peace process.

That the enemy's evil acts make him deserving of punishment was an argument that also appeared in both the Israeli and Palestinian statements. Among the statements collected, two – one Israeli and one Palestinian – went so far as to justify the death of the other side. According to Palestinian Imam, Ibrahim Mudayris, during the Second Intifada in March 2004 the Jews were 'extremists and terrorists who deserve death, while we deserve life, since we have a just cause'.⁷⁹ Similarly Rabbi Eliezer Waldman professed in November 1993 in reaction to an assassination attempt of an Israeli rabbi in the occupied West Bank that the Palestinians were 'the sons of the devil, they deserve to die'.⁸⁰ Both religious leaders illustrate how their demonising statements aim to mobilise and legitimise violence. Also the notion of the other sides 'sinfulness' as a justification for violence is obvious in the following demonising statement made on a PA TV religious broadcast on 3 November 1998:

The Jews are the seed of Satan and the devils....To their Prophets they attribute the greatest of crimes: murder, prostitution, and

⁷⁸ Interview with Ehud Barak by *the New York Review of Books* (Lexis Nexis), 13 June 2002. Accessed: 4 November 2010.

⁷⁹ Ibrahim Mudayris quoted in *Jewish Virtual Library*. Source: sermon on *Gaza Palestine Satellite TV*, 12 March 2004. Accessed: 3 November 2010.

⁸⁰ Rabbi Waldman quoted in *The Herald*, Glasgow (Lexis Nexis), 8 November 1993. Accessed: 4 November 2010.

drunkenness....They have distorted the faith and exchanged the gift of God for heresy, rebellion and prostitution, and distorted the Torah.⁸¹

A common accusation on the Palestinian side that did not appear on the Israeli side was the notion of 'domination', 'occupation' and 'land-grabbing'. More specifically, there was an expressed feeling of *loss* and identity attached to this land that was not present in the Israeli elite narrative. In several of the statements, some Palestinian elites emphasised the taking over or usurping of the land and the displacement and dispossession of the people. For example, in a meeting on 18 July 1934 with Ben Gurion (the Chairman of the executive of the Jewish Agency – later to become Israel's first Prime Minister), the President of the Palestinian Istiqlal Party (also known as the Palestinian Independence Party), Awni Abd al-Hadi accused his counterpart as 'active in tempting the fellahin, taking over their lands by means of the greatest calamity and *horrible evil* with which we are afflicted'.⁸² The meeting between them had taken place because Ben Gurion was exploring the possibility of negotiations with Arab leaders 'to find a way to an understanding with the Arab national movement on the basis of what we and they want'.⁸³ Ben Gurion did not succeed in diminishing Arab alarm towards the influx of Jewish immigration in the period. On the contrary, Abd al-Hadi characterised the irreconcilable nature of the conflict, noting: 'there was no point whatever in negotiations or attempts to reach mutual understating. The goal of the Jews was to rule the country, and the aim of the

⁸¹ PA TV Religious Broadcast, *Israel's War against Terror*, 3 November 1998. Source: 'a PA religious broadcast'. Accessed: 30 October 2010.

⁸² Awni Abd Al-Hadi, Meeting between David Ben-Gurion and President of the Palestinian Istiqlal Party, 18 July 1934, *PASSIA*, vol.1, p. 306. Emphasis added.

⁸³ Ben Gurion cited in Philip Mattar, *Encyclopedia of the Palestinians*, revised edition, Facts On File, Incorporated, 2005, p.555.

Arabs was to fight against this rule.’⁸⁴ The statement clearly attempts to unite and mobilise the Arabs against the Jewish invaders. The manifestation of these fights later materialised in the Arab Revolts from 1936-1939, which marked the resistance to accept Zionist aspirations of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. The partitioning in 1948 and the Palestinian refugee problem that followed Israel’s War of Independence in 1948 continued to fuel a sense of loss on the part of the Palestinians.⁸⁵ Israel’s appropriation of land from Syria, Jordan and Egypt after the six-day war in 1967 gave it the international status of an occupying state, with PLO representative to Moscow Muhammad Ash-Sha’ir warning in 1979 that Israel was continuing its ‘frightful plan to impose occupation and domination, to usurp land’.⁸⁶ The events of 1948 and 1967, then, help explain the historical context for the Palestinian ‘land-grabbing’ narrative.

The theme of domination and occupation was absent from the Israeli side. ‘Dispossession’/‘land-grabbing’ goes hand in hand with ‘domination’/‘occupation’. According to the Palestinian statements that refer to these notions, it was the fact that the Israeli government occupied the land that led to the dispossession of the Palestinians: the Israeli government’s gains came at the Palestinian people’s expense. There also exists an implicit power asymmetry of the strong over the weak in the Palestinian narrative that is different from the Israeli one. Palestinian negotiator and former cabinet minister Nabil Sha’ath’s insights into the conflict, which appears in line with the dominant Palestinian discourse of Israeli-Palestinian

⁸⁴ Quote taken from Neil Caplan and Laura Zittrain Eisenberg, *Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: Patterns, Problems, Possibilities*, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, Second Edition, 2010, p.13.

⁸⁵ For more on the Palestinian refugee situation in 1948 see Morris, *The birth of the Palestinian refugee problem revisited*.

⁸⁶ Muhammad Ash-Sha’ir in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (Lexis Nexis), 14 July 1979. Source: *Moscow radio* in Arabic 1700 GMT 12 Jul 1979. Accessed: 3 November 2011.

relations, can help explain the reason for this. In an interview Sha'ath noted: 'There is a difference in positions [between Israelis and Palestinians]. The real difference is they are the occupiers and we are the occupied.'⁸⁷ The fact that Israel continues to control the borders and Palestinian movements between the territories, as well as being far more economically and militarily advanced, has inverted the traditional Israeli David and Arab Goliath image of the conflict. This power-asymmetry is reflected in the demonising discourse, with Palestinian statements often describing the enemy as the 'oppressor' who, according to for example former Hamas leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin's statement in March 2004, 'destroyed all sources of a dignified living...and stole our wealth'.⁸⁸ Ambassador Nasser Al-Qudwa, Permanent Representative of Palestine to the UN, also noted in 2004 following the Israeli clamp down after the Second Intifada that:

The Palestinian people have been dehumanized and demonized, humiliated and demeaned, dispossessed and dispersed, and brutally punished by their occupier.⁸⁹

According to the Palestinian narrative, Israelis are like colonisers who suppress and exploit the native population through the use of force. For example on 13 April 2006, shortly after his appointment as Prime Minister, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh called out against 'an evil and dehumanizing Israeli military occupation'.⁹⁰ Also the following statement by PA columnist Yihya Rabah in June 2009 vividly illustrates

⁸⁷ Interview with Nabil Sha'ath, Ramallah, 29 March 2010.

⁸⁸ Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Letter to the Arab Summit Meeting in Tunis, March 2004, *PASSIA*, vol. 7, p. 206.

⁸⁹ Ambassador Nasser Al-Qudwa, Permanent Representative of Palestine to the UN, Introductory statement to the International Court of Justice, 23 February 2004, *PASSIA*, vol. 7, p. 196.

⁹⁰ Ismail Haniyeh quoted in *BBC Monitoring Middle East* (Lexis Nexis) 15 April 2006. Source: Text of commentary by Haniyeh entitled 'Peace can only be the fruit of justice', published in English by Egyptian newspaper *Al Ahram Weekly* website on 13 April 2006. Accessed: 16 November 2010.

this sense of occupation by equating Israel to a demon taking over another person's body:

The state of Israel...lives like a demon that takes possession of another body. The state of Israel lives within the Palestinian body in Palestinian land and Palestinian cities....and despite all the aggression, and despite the whole ugly deception, Israel...looks like a demon that enters a person's body, causing him suffering and depriving him of sleep and torturing him.⁹¹

The statement presents Israel as a literal embodiment of evil and a foreign agent imposing itself on an innocent victim. This framing needs to be understood in the context of Palestinian feelings of dispossession and occupation. The framing of Israel as a demon in this context enhances the illegitimacy of Israel and implicitly calls for Palestinians to mobilise in order to reclaim possession of their own rightful body. The element of contagion and dispossession is again illustrated in the Palestinian imam, Ibrahim Mudayris's use of the metaphor of a spreading cancer. His metaphor carries the same message: that the enemy's overpowering and destructive nature is 'spreading in the body of the [otherwise healthy] Arab and Islamic nation'.⁹² It was 'a cancer that has spread and reached the Arab institutions, the villages and the refugee camps'.⁹³ The need to 'fight back' and 'resist' the corrosive disease is an implicit motivation.

An evaluation of the demonising message in the Palestinian and Israeli quotes collected reinforce the observation that the context of settler-colonialism and terrorism is important to understand demonisation in the Israeli-Palestinian

⁹¹ Yihya Rabah quoted in *Palestinian Media Watch*. Source: *Al-Hayat Al-Jadida* (Fatah), 24 June 2009. Accessed: 29 April 2011.

⁹² Ibrahim Mudayris quoted in *Palestinian Media Watch*. Source: *Palestinian TV* (Fatah) 13 May 2005 (includes video) and *Jewish Virtual Library*. Accessed: 2 November 2010.

⁹³ Ibrahim Mudayris quoted in *Jewish Virtual Library*. Source: sermon on *PA TV*, 7 January 2005. Accessed: 3 November 2010.

conflict. The correlation between occupation and terrorism (or 'resistance to occupation' as Palestinians might refer to it) was noted by Israeli negotiator Shlomo Brom who was in charge of the strategic planning division of the IDF from 1993 (after the signing of the Oslo Peace Accord) until 1998. In an interview he explained:

There is always an emotional baggage [in the conflict], which is the result of the fact that the Palestinians are looking at us [Israelis] as ruthless occupiers – the ones that denied them the rights and cause them much disasters. And we had the tendency to look at the Palestinians for many years as a bunch of murderers – that all they wanted to do is murder Jews...⁹⁴

5. CONCLUSION

Based on a collection of illustrative examples, this chapter has documented instances of demonisation between Israeli and Palestinian elites using four probing questions: (1) who demonises (2) whom (3) when and (4) how. While the findings are limited to the one hundred and seven quotes collected, they help give us a prima facie sense of the demonising narratives that exist between elites in the conflict. The 'demonising narrators' appeared across the political spectrum in the Israel-Palestine conflict. However, on the Israeli side, there were more demonising statements from right-wing affiliated parties. Among the Palestinian examples, Hamas member statements were more extreme and literal than Fatah. The statements indicated that religious leaders on both sides were more likely to use literal demonising statements. Underlying themes of mobilisation, legitimacy, unity and self-righteousness - identified in the 'waging war' section of chapter 3 - also appeared in the demonising narratives. The statements showed that the 'demonised targets' in

⁹⁴ Interview with Shlomo Brom. Tel Aviv, 23 March, 2010.

the Israeli and Palestinian conflict spanned across multiple levels of analysis (e.g. the state, the leaders, the people, an ideology etc). Israel and Zionism were the two most frequent targets of the Palestinian demonisation narrative as they represent both the state, which they see as having dispossessed them of their land, and the nationalistic, political, and ideological movement that gave rise to it. In the case of Hamas, alternative titles such as 'the evil Zionist occupation forces' and 'the Zionist hellish machine' were used instead of Israel in order to capitalise on the non-recognition of the Jewish state. Also the absence of the term 'Palestine' in the Israeli statements likely reflects the Israeli elite's reluctance to acknowledge the notion of an independent Palestinian nation state.

Demonisation seems to be related to specific events on the ground. Many of the statements appeared in the context of the other side's provocations, be it through the form of suicide bombings, military incursions or settlement building. The 'destructive' nature of the adversary was the most common accusation of 'evil'. The enemy's intent to harm was often portrayed as deliberate and followed by no remorse. Certain quotes even suggested that the other side took pleasure in the act of killing. Two contexts were particularly important: terrorism and settler-colonialism. While accusations of coldblooded and murderous terrorism dominated the Israeli context of demonisation, 'land-grabbing', 'occupation' and 'domination' narratives were distinctly Palestinian accusations. This reflects an underlying power-asymmetry in Israeli-Palestinian relations, with Israel characterised as the occupier/colonisers and Palestinians as the occupied/colonised. Thus while demonisation was documented on both Israeli and Palestinian narratives in the conflict, the context within which these discourses appeared to be different: more

specifically, Palestinian demonisation of Israelis must be understood in the context of their own colonial experiences. Their demonisation was an expression of anti-colonial, anti-Zionist and anti-occupation sentiments. Israeli demonisation of Palestinians must be understood in the context of their own experiences of terrorism. Terrorism and security concerns were the central themes behind Israeli demonising discourse. The same speech act was therefore used to express different evil experiences of the same conflict.

CHAPTER 6

DEMONISATION DEADLOCK IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

Reflecting in 1988 on ‘the hope for peace’ between the Palestinians and Israelis, the African-American civil rights activist and minister, Jesse Jackson, summarised the challenges of the conflict as follows: ‘The core problem is the psychological one of fear. Forty years of conflict have charred not only the land but the spirit. *Each side has made the other a demon; no pact can be made with the devil.* Conflict has become an accustomed visitor, peace a stranger.’¹

Jackson’s statement sets the tone for this chapter, which argues that demonisation is one factor among many that have complicated the negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. Structural factors, asymmetry of power, clash of interests and positional differences regarding territory, settlements, refugee rights, security needs, distribution of resources and the division of Jerusalem lie at the heart of the deadlock between Israelis and Palestinians.² As the Palestine Papers that were leaked and subsequently published by Al-Jazeera in January 2011 revealed, the Israeli and Palestinian negotiation efforts have been marred with thorny issues including the failure to agree on the 1967 borders³, Israeli security concerns⁴,

¹ Jesse Jackson, ‘In Bethlehem, Hope for Peace’, *The New York Times* (Lexis Nexis), 22 December 1988. Accessed: 4 November 2011. Emphasis added.

² For a Palestinian interpretation of the positional disagreements see Matrix of Israeli and Palestinian Positions, 15 July 2008. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/2914.PDF>. Accessed: 29 April 2013.

³ See for example the dialogue on the disagreement over 1967 borders between Tzipi Livni and Saeb Erekat in Meeting Summary: 5th Meeting on Territory, Jerusalem, King David Hotel, 6 April 2008. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/2461.PDF>. Accessed: 27 April 2013.

⁴ See for example Tzipi Livni’s concern of terrorism emerging from the Palestinian territories in Meeting Minutes: Plenary Meeting - Post Annapolis, Jerusalem, Inbal Hotel, 6 April 2008. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/2470.PDF>. Accessed: 27 April 2013.

disputes over settlements⁵, the right of return of Palestinian refugees,⁶ prisoner releases⁷, the division of Jerusalem⁸, and the distribution of water and resources.⁹ While there is much literature on the *substantive* issues of deadlock, relatively little emphasis has been placed on demonisation as a *relational* barrier in peace talks.

The chapter applies the framework of 'demonisation deadlock' onto the case study. It uses materials from the leaked *Palestine Papers*, the demonisation quotes from appendix A, interviews and first-hand biographical accounts from both Israeli and Palestinian negotiators, scholars and practitioners, who have either closely observed or directly participated in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Focus was placed on the role that negative images and attitudes had on the progress of the talks with a view to understanding the perceptions and narratives that existed between the parties during negotiations.

The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section examines the pre-Oslo Accord years when the Israelis and Palestinians refused to negotiate ('nip in the bud'). The second phase addresses the ground-breaking Oslo Accord, highlighting both the positive change in narratives and the negative reactions it fostered in terms of the accusation of 'shaking hands with the devil'. The third section focuses on the

⁵ See for example the dialogue between Abu Ala and Tzipi Livni in Meeting Minutes: Borders - Ahmed Qurei, Saeb Erekat and Tzipi Livni Jerusalem, Inbal Hotel, 7 April 2008. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/2484.PDF>. Accessed: 27 April 2013.

⁶ See for example Palestinian Talking Points Re: Refugees since Nakba, 7 May 2008. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/2530.PDF>. Accessed: 28 April 2013.

⁷ See for example Negotiations over prisoners release in Meeting Minutes: Saeb Erekat and Dov Weisglass, Tel Aviv, 3 February 2005. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/281.PDF>. Accessed: 20 April 2013.

⁸ See for example Minutes Meeting: Taba, Egypt, 22 January 2001. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/112.PDF>. Accessed: 23 March 2013.

⁹ See for example Talking Points for Process Meeting on Water, 11 August 2008. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/3085.PDF>. Accessed: 28 April 2013.

gradual return of the 'no partner for peace' framing that emerged following the Camp David Summit of July 2000. The final section tackles the final breakdown of the peace process, which culminated with the Gaza incursion in the winter of 2008-2009.

1. PRE-OSLO: NIP IN THE BUD AND NARRATIVES OF DECEPTION

The following section addresses the lack of willingness from both sides to negotiate prior to the Oslo Accord of 1993. It highlights that Israeli and Palestinian elites exemplified at different times the 'nip in the bud' rejectionist principle by refusing to sit down and talk to the adversary. According to this interaction, the moral and pragmatic dilemmas of 'shaking hands with the devil' was a relational barrier that influenced the parties' readiness to negotiate.

Palestinians and Israelis have had different reasons for non-reconciliation: for the Palestinians, negotiating with the Israelis would have involved accepting their legitimate presence, not only as a peace partner, but also as a geographical neighbour. Since the United Nation's partition plan of 1947, Palestinians and their Arab neighbours had refused to recognise the establishment of the state of Israel. When the PLO was created in 1964, its charter similarly emphasised that it did not recognise Israel's right to exist as stipulated in the United Nation's partition plan. According to the National Covenant of the PLO, which was adopted at the First Arab Palestinian Congress on 28 May 1964, the injustices against the Palestinians were a source of resistance. The document stated:

We, the Palestinian Arab people, who faced the forces of *evil*, injustice and aggression, against whom the forces of international Zionism and colonialism conspired and worked to displace it, dispossess it from its homeland and property, abused what is holy in it and who in spite of all this refused to weaken and submit.¹⁰

Because the PLO took issue with the creation of the state of Israel and its very existence, negotiating with the Israeli government was not considered an option. For a long time the PLO's covenant remained an impediment to peace talks. Yitzhak Rabin, like other Israeli leaders before him, saw the covenant as leaving no room for cooperation with the PLO and 'its terrorist gangs and border marauders'. With its failure to recognise the state of Israel, the PLO had 'made rejectionism into its political dogma', Rabin pointed out in his memoir *Battling for peace*.¹¹ According to Rabin, the charter also denied any possibility of change within the PLO because any acceptance of Israel would undermine its whole *raison d'être*.¹²

An additional argument against making peace with Israel was based on the notion of its illegitimacy as an occupying power post-1967. Violence was presented as a justified and legitimate way to resist occupation, and so the use of force, not the use of dialogue, was chosen as the PLO's means of communicating with Israel. Article 13 of the Hamas charter of 18 August 1988 also clearly spelled out the futility of dialogue, noting that 'there is no solution for the Palestinian question except through

¹⁰ National Covenant of the Palestinian Organization, First Arab Palestinian Congress, Jerusalem, 28 May 1964, *PASSIA*, vol. 2, p. 231. Emphasis added.

¹¹ Shimon Peres, *Battling for peace: a memoir*, New York: Random House, 1995, p. 262.

¹² Efraim Inbar, *Rabin and Israel's national security*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999, p. 26.

Jihad. Initiatives, proposals and international conferences are all a waste of time and vain endeavors.¹³

The Palestinian leadership pursued the same policy as their Arab neighbours which had been declared in the Arab League meeting in Khartoum in 1967 as the infamous three no's: 'no to negotiations, no to recognition, no to peace'. Negotiations would not occur because Israel was an illegitimate entity, a source of evil, in the Middle East. In his speech to the Knesset in March 1982, Menachem Begin quoted Ali Hassan, an assistant of Arafat, as exemplifying Palestinian intransigence to peace talks: 'Zionism is *the devil*, we do not negotiate with it; anyway, it will not survive for long...If that state [of Israel] is based on the Zionist idea, then it has no right to exist and we have no intention of negotiating with it.'¹⁴ The statement was an obstruction to peace on two levels: on one hand, the quote clearly sets the Palestinians' rejectionist position by equating the enemy with the Devil (the nip in the bud principle that we do not negotiate with the Devil). The rationale here was that Israel had to be destroyed and so any negotiations with the government would not only be practically pointless, but also morally reprehensible. On the other hand, the statement was used by the 'enemy' to illustrate the other sides' intransigence and provide a justification for not negotiating. As such, both adversaries use the same statement to achieve the same goal.

Ali Hassan's rejectionist attitude towards the Israeli government was mirrored by how certain Israeli officials felt about the prospect of negotiating with the PLO at the

¹³ Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement of Palestine (Hamas), 18 August 1988, *PASSIA*, vol. 4, p. 18.

¹⁴ Ali Hassan quoted in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (Lexis Nexis), 5 March 1982. Source: *Israel television service* 1000 GMT 4 Mar 1982. Accessed: 29 October 2010. Emphasis added.

time. 1982 was an eventful year in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with the invasion of Lebanon, the massacre of Sabra and Shatila and the forced expulsion of Yasser Arafat and the PLO leadership from Lebanon, all taking place that year. According to a statement by Menachem Milson, the Israeli civilian governor of the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, on 27 March 1982, eliminating pro-PLO influence from the West Bank was essential because:

...this destructive position of the PLO and the *evil* doctrines behind it are illegitimate. They are immoral and therefore are illegitimate. They are illegitimate in the West Bank, illegitimate in Amman; they are illegitimate in Beirut, or Paris or New York. We...failed to see that the population was intimidated very seriously, intimidated in some cases, bribed in other cases by that evil organization. Therefore, the end result was not democratic elections in the true sense.¹⁵

For Israelis, two main arguments worked against taking a seat at the negotiating table: the first was based on an existential principle. As the former Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir put it in 1974, shortly after the Yom Kippur war: 'you can compromise on territory, you can compromise on a line, you cannot compromise on the question to live or die. Either you live or you're dead. And between us and Arafat...there's no room for negotiations and there's no room for compromise.'¹⁶ According to Golda Meir there were substantive grounds impeding a successful negotiation, namely, that one cannot negotiate about one's right to exist. Yitzhak Rabin used this same reasoning in 1976 when encouraged by the Carter administration to approach the PLO in talks. Rabin responded that he did not want to delve into hypothetical questions of what the Israeli government would do if the

¹⁵ Menacham Milson quoted in William Claiborne, 'Israeli says West Bank election awaits end of PLO influence; Israeli rules out PLO voting role', *The Washington Post* (Lexis Nexis), 27 March 1982. Accessed: 2 November 2010. Emphasis added.

¹⁶ 'Prime Minister rejects Palestinian state', *Daily Report*, 15 March 1974. Jerusalem International Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Middle East & Africa. Accessed: 4 November 2010.

PLO were to change its philosophy and policy as this seemed to him entirely unlikely.¹⁷

While Israel's first argument for not negotiating was based on existential grounds, the second argument had a deeper ideological origin. Accepting formal talks with those who claimed to be political representatives of the Palestinian people would involve accepting them as legitimate territorial partners. Such a recognition would challenge the Zionist aspirations of Eretz Israel, the land promised by God to the descendants of Abraham through his son Isaac and to the Israelites, descendants of Jacob. According to Shlomo Brom, this view is mainly associated with more religious and right-leaning parties. As he noted in an interview, 'the traditional policy of the state of Israel that "we are not negotiating with the PLO" ... was basically the right-wing position in Israel that first of all they didn't want to negotiate with the Palestinians because they don't want to establish a Palestinian state – that's not the kind of solution that they were thinking about.'¹⁸

An interesting illustration of this can be found in Likud Prime Minister Menachem Begin's speech to the Knesset on 4 March 1982 in the presence of the French President, François Mitterrand. This was the first official visit of any French President since Israel's independence. In his speech, Begin attacked France's support of a Palestinian state. The Israeli Prime Minister pointed out that the Charter of the so-called 'sole legitimate representative of the Arabs of Eretz Yisrael' was equal to 'the Arab edition of "Mein Kampf" concerning the Jewish people.' The

¹⁷ Yitzhak Rabin, *The Rabin Memoires*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996, p. 297.

¹⁸ Interview with Shlomo Brom, Tel Aviv, 23 March 2010. Arguably, this was also the position of the labour party before the Oslo Accord.

Likud Prime Minister rhetorically questioned the moral conscience of the French:

Can France, peace-seeking France, support the horrendous idea of creating such a menace to the very existence of our people...I have heard an opinion which says it would be symmetrically just if, along the Jewish state, a Palestinian state were also established. No, sir, there is neither symmetry nor justice here. Symmetry? The large Arab nation today has 21 sovereign states stretching along an area of 12,000,000 square kilometres, from the Persian Gulf to the shores of the Atlantic Ocean. The Jewish people, who were not only persecuted but also destroyed, have a minute and single state in its ancient motherland. Is it necessary to establish a 22nd Arab state which will strive to annihilate the Jewish state, which will shed the blood of its citizens day and night?¹⁹

This reasoning was also forwarded by the Labour Party as Golda Meir illustrated in her argument for not negotiating with the PLO already back in 1973: 'We shall not negotiate with the organizations of murderers and their leaders who endeavour to destroy the State of Israel and to establish instead a Palestinian state on the "plundered earth." All the more so since the murder and terror organizations' claims of representing the Arabs of Judea and Samaria, and Arabs of Palestinian origin in other countries, lack all foundation.'²⁰ Thus while the title of 'evil occupier' barred negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis, Israelis labelled Palestinians 'evil terrorists' and likewise refused to negotiate with them.

The premise of mutual non-recognition between Israeli and Palestinian elites prior to the Oslo Accord created fertile grounds for mutual demonisation. This demonisation, in turn, became one factor adding to the challenges of dialogue. In 1986, for instance, the Knesset passed a law that barred government officials from

¹⁹ Menachem Begin quoted in *BBC Summary of World Broadcast* (Lexis Nexis), 5 March 1982. Source: *Israel television service* 1000GMT 4 March 1982. Accessed: 29 October 2010.

²⁰ Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, Address to the secretariat of the Israel Labour Party, Statement on the Palestinian Issue, 12 April 1973, *PASSIA*, vol. 2, p. 397.

having contact with terrorist groups, a category that included the PLO. This had obvious and severe repercussions for those who had been having informal talks with people affiliated with the PLO, even in academic settings. As the former deputy foreign minister Yossi Beilin confirmed in an interview:

It [was] not that beforehand we had any negotiations with the PLO, but it was possible to talk with people from time to time in seminars or whatever. So that even [the law] prevented this kind of contacts, which made it artificial...once...I went to a conference in Egypt and I could not even shake the hand of Nabil Sha'ath. And I mean that was shameful because I know that he was a man of peace...²¹

The PLO had been branded a terrorist organisation and so no contact could be established with its leadership. According to Benjamin Netanyahu's op-ed in *The New York Times* on 7 March 1988, for example, it was 'the brazen espousal of terror and national annihilation in the PLO charter' that 'distinguish[ed] the PLO even from such terrorist states as Syria'. Netanyahu chastised the United Nations for interacting with the PLO, noting that, 'in embracing an organization whose avowed principles are diametrically opposed to its own, the U.N. not only undermined itself but also helped legitimize the illegitimate...Not only is *evil* done, but those who do it and proclaim it are honored'.²² The statement's intent was clearly to attempt to influence the members of the UN to reject the PLO. But 93 states had recognised the PLO by February 1989 and the US agreed to start a dialogue with the organisation.

The Israeli government was not ready to engage in dialogue with the PLO. Yitzhak Shamir illustrated this most succinctly when stating in a meeting with the Knesset

²¹ Interview with Yossi Beilin, Herzliya, 22 March 2010.

²² Benjamin Netanyahu's op-ed in *The New York Times* (Lexis Nexis), 7 March 1988. Accessed: 29 October 2010. Emphasis added.

Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee in early December 1989: 'I'm ready to speak with anyone, *even Satan himself* – but not with the PLO'.²³ This statement is clearly representative of the rejectionist 'nip in the bud' interaction: Shamir even goes beyond the classic 'bargaining with the devil' analogy, implying that the PLO is worse than the Devil himself. Shamir's statement was made in the context of the US's move towards dialogue with the PLO after it recognised Israel's right to exist and renounced its path of 'armed struggle' in the Algiers declaration of 1988.²⁴ According to Shlomo Ben-Ami, a former Israeli negotiator, 'America's recognition of the PLO...gave legitimacy to an organization that the Israelis perceived to be their arch-enemy, their demon, Satan incarnate.'²⁵ For Shamir, the PLO had not abandoned the path of terror at Algiers, it had always been and would forever remain a terrorist organisation. In his autobiography, *Summing Up*, Shamir confessed that in his eyes, 'the only peace the PLO could produce in terms of Israel was the peace of the cemetery'.²⁶ The governing Likud party at the time regarded the PLO's move towards negotiations as 'a deceptive propaganda exercise, intended to create an impression of moderation'.²⁷ Shamir insisted that his political counterparts were still 'diametrically opposed to peace' and warned: 'We are witnessing a monumental act of deception. In Algiers, Stockholm, Strasbourg and now Geneva, a mirage was created to deceive the international community by an

²³ Yitzhak Shamir quoted in the *Jerusalem Post* (Lexis Nexis), 2 February 1990. Accessed: 3 November 2010.

²⁴ For more on Shamir's deep reservations of the US move towards the PLO and the Bush administration's attempts to close Israeli-PLO ties see Yitzhak Shamir, *Summing up: an autobiography*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1994, p. 187, 200, 206, 212, 227-229, and 237.

²⁵ Shlomo Ben-Ami, *Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy*, London: Phoenix, 2006, p. 194.

²⁶ Shamir, *Summing up*, p. 198.

²⁷ Yitzhak Shamir, 'Statement on the PNC decisions', Jerusalem, 15 November 1988, *PASSIA*, vol. 4, p. 48.

illusion of moderation.’²⁸ As the Israeli Ambassador to the United Nation at the time, Benjamin Netanyahu echoed his party’s concerns, branding the PLO as ‘a Pan-Arab Trojan horse’.²⁹ In the Likud party’s eyes the PLO’s signalling of peace was merely a tactical ploy to attack Israel when it least expected it.

Shamir’s peace initiative of 14 May 1989 therefore did not involve the PLO.³⁰ US Secretary of State James Baker was encouraging Israeli-Palestinian dialogue in his five point plan drafted on 1 November 1989. By a nine to three vote of its senior members, the Israeli Cabinet agreed to ask Mr. Baker to assure the Israelis that they would not in any way have to negotiate with the PLO. The condition was approved at the insistence of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and his Likud party.³¹ The refusal to negotiate with the PLO continued to inform Israeli government policy. Yasser Arafat, the PLO chairman, came to symbolise the antithesis of peace, with Ariel Sharon stating in July 1989 that ‘there will be no peace as long as Arafat lives.’³² PLO members associated with Arafat were similarly tarnished. In a public demonstration in the Hague in November 1989, for example, PLO member Afif Safieh remembers right-wing Likud supporters shouting anti-PLO slogans at him including ‘Safieh – Satan’. He confronted the protestors, noting: ‘Please do not compare me to Satan, you risk making Hell look less unattractive than it was intended to be.’³³

²⁸ Yitzhak Shamir, ‘Reaction to Chairman Arafat’s Speech at Geneva’, Jerusalem, 13 December 1988, *PASSIA*, vol. 4, p. 58.

²⁹ Netanyahu quoted in the Berry and Philo, *Israel and Palestine*, p. 73.

³⁰ See Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 2000, pp. 468-469.

³¹ Joel Brinkley, ‘Israeli Cabinet Approves Baker Plan, With Conditions’, *The New York Times* (Lexis Nexis), 6 November 1989. Accessed: 13 May 2013.

³² Ariel Sharon quoted in the *Los Angeles Times* (Lexis Nexis), 18 July 1989. Accessed: 5 November 2010.

³³ Afif Safieh, *The Peace Process: From Breakthrough to Breakdown*, London: Saqi Books, 2010, p. 200.

In the early 1990s, Yasser Arafat, from his headquarters in Tunis, signalled a willingness to engage in dialogue with the Israeli government. Already in Geneva in 1988 Arafat had pronounced: 'I will extend my hand in peace, hoping that an Israeli de Gaulle would seize it.'³⁴ He later urged the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, to sit with him in 'a meeting of the brave to forge a brave peace.'³⁵ Rabin's response echoed the Arab rejection in Khartoum in 1967: 'no'.

Adhering to their 1986 ban, the Israeli government under Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir refused to talk with the PLO in the 1991 Madrid peace conference, and instead insisted that non-PLO affiliated Palestinians be part of the Jordanian delegation. Palestinian and Jordanian issues were therefore discussed jointly. Consequently, the PLO was not present in Madrid or in any of the official bi-lateral talks that followed. Another crucial context for Israel's rejection of the PLO was the organisation's support of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait on 18 January 1991, which tarnished its image even more and magnified the perceived battle of good and evil in the conflict. Paul Eidelberg, then member and now president of the Yamin Israeli party, for example, connected the 'evil' dots between Saddam and the PLO, urging US President George Bush Senior to continue pursuing his 'commitment to moral principle' and 'to fight against unmitigated *evil*', noting then that 'the PLO is an agent of that *evil*'. According to Eidelberg, the PLO was 'nothing but an Arab code word for Israeli's destruction' and 'the time ha[d] come for the PLO to be expelled from the UN, and for President Bush to lead the endeavor'.³⁶ By 1992 this position, at

³⁴ Arafat quoted in Safieh, *The Peace Process*, p. 155.

³⁵ Quote by Arafat in Clyde Haberman, 'Chatting with the enemy: Israelis nod the PLO and talk with the Palestinians', *The New York Times* (Lexis Nexis), 24 January 1993. Accessed: 4 November 2010.

³⁶ Paul Eidelberg, 'Throw the PLO out of the UN', *The Jerusalem Post* (Lexis Nexis), 29 January 1991. Accessed: 29 October 2010. Emphasis added.

least in official Israeli discourse, had not changed and narratives continued to involve the demonising theme of destruction. As Benjamin Netanyahu pointed out:

The PLO is an outlaw organization in Israel. And any member of the PLO would not participate in the negotiations, just as no formal member of the PLO...participates in these [Washington] talks as well....The PLO is committed to the destruction of Israel. Not to peace with Israel...So from Israel's point of view, it is simply not an acceptable negotiating partner.³⁷

Certain Palestinian elites matched the Israeli government's language of distrust. In a 1989 memorandum to US Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs, for example, several Palestinian personalities warned:

The so-called Israeli "peace initiative" is an attempt to simultaneously negate Palestinian national rights and identity, circumventing legitimate representation and leadership, and sidestepping the central issues of the conflict. As a tactical ploy to distract and deceive public opinion, it has introduced tangential issues and mis-directions, thus confusing the means with the end and confusing the procedure with the substance.³⁸

In a talk in Washington DC ten days after the Madrid Conference, PLO official Afif Safieh highlighted how the Palestinian's desire to reach a resolution was not matched by the Israelis because Mr Shamir's 'appetite for territory' was greater than his 'hunger for peace.'³⁹ The Israeli government's willingness to negotiate, then, was also considered by some as a tactical ploy to delay peace by postponing the resolution of any substantive issues that would end the conflict.

In summary, mutual demonisation, distrust and consequent diplomatic deadlock characterised Israeli-Palestinian relations prior to the Oslo Accord. Their refusal to

³⁷ News conference by the Israeli Delegation to the Middle East Peace Process Conference, Washington, *MFA*, 28 April 1992. Accessed: 2 February 2011.

³⁸ Palestinian Personalities, Memorandum to US Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs John Kelly, Jerusalem, 3 August 1989, *PASSIA*, vol. 4, p. 74.

³⁹ Safieh, *The Peace Process*, p. 161.

negotiate lay rooted not only in the non-recognition of the adversary as a legitimate partner, but also in the political and territorial ramifications the negotiations would have for the future. The other side was conceived of as evil and illegitimate: an enemy who had to be expelled from the land and not negotiated with. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, attitudes were gradually changing and new avenues of diplomacy were being considered, but these remained hidden at first – until the news broke about the Oslo Accord.

2. THE OSLO ACCORD: THE HONEYMOON YEARS OF ‘SHAKING HANDS WITH THE DEVIL’

The signing in Washington on 13 September 1993 of the Oslo Accord marked a watershed moment in Israeli-Palestinian relations. It symbolised a leap of faith on the Palestinian and Israeli leaderships’ part. This trust-building exercise influenced the governing elite narratives at the time. A notable shift in discourse towards the Palestinians was reflected in the language of the Israeli leadership. In 1995, for example, the acting foreign minister, Ehud Barak noted: ‘We perceive the Palestinians as partners, and expect them...to live up to all the other commitments agreed upon in our agreements.’⁴⁰ The later foreign minister, David Levy, also commented on the remarkable change in atmosphere by 1997 in negotiations with his Palestinian counterparts. He explained:

On the Palestinian side, from the first meetings, we discerned a strong desire to engage in dialogue. I was the first Israeli minister of this government to meet with Yasser Arafat, and the first conversation which began with a certain tension not of words, but of feelings, soon thawed, and we had a serious talk, placing

⁴⁰ Remarks by Foreign Minister Ehud Barak to the Diplomatic Corps, Jerusalem, *MFA*, 13 December 1995. Accessed: 8 February 2011.

matters on the table....We agreed that any future disagreements would be resolved in face-to-face negotiations.⁴¹

A certain familiarity and a more friendly tone had, at least publicly, come to characterise the Israeli and Palestinian leadership after the signing of the Oslo Accord. Yitzhak Rabin illustrated this when admitting: 'We have begun to get used to each other. We're like old acquaintances. I can tell you all about Arafat's quirks, and his friend can tell you all about ours.'⁴²

In a speech before the Knesset on 30 August 1993 Shimon Peres commented on the prospect of a potential peace agreement with the PLO and stressed the importance of humanising the enemy: 'This is a genuine proposal,' Peres noted:

We did not try to deceive either the Jews or the Palestinians. We want to live with them in peace. They are human beings just like us. We do not want to rule over them, scorn them or humiliate them. They are not four-legged creatures. They are not *demons* or animals. They are human beings just like us - Israel's faith is based upon such precepts - and we will live with them in peace.⁴³

The ideological shift from Likud to Labour undoubtedly played a role in facilitating the willingness to negotiate the idea of Palestinian statehood and to move forward with the peace process. As one of the Palestinian members of the negotiation team in the Washington negotiations, Ghassan Khatib, pointed out:

The Likud government wouldn't accept – in principle – that this is an occupation...to be ended. For them there are rights for Israel in controlling

⁴¹ Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy, Statement in the Knesset on the peace process, Jerusalem, *MFA*, 12 March 1997. Accessed: 8 February 2011.

⁴² Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's address at Israeli-Palestinian interim agreement signing ceremony, Washington, *MFA*, 28 September 1995. Accessed: 2 February 2011.

⁴³ Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, Speech before the Knesset, Jerusalem, 30 August 1993, *PASSIA*, vol. 4, p. 276.

this area...so there is an ideological difference which changed with the Labour under Rabin took office but unfortunately not for long, but for long enough to sign the Oslo agreement...⁴⁴

The description of the atmosphere during the Oslo peace talks by Yossi Beilin, one of the principal Israeli architects behind the talks, would seem to further confirm this.

In an interview Beilin noted:

It seems that on both sides [i.e. the Israeli and Palestinian delegations in Oslo] there were people who wanted very much to have peace, and they did not have any wrong images of the other side. They didn't believe that the other side were beasts. So they didn't have to go through this process of school-kids who understand that the other side is human. Which made it easier. It does happen to the right. When the right is negotiating with the Palestinians they are always surprised that on the other side they find human beings. We did not need this stage.⁴⁵

One could therefore argue that this linguistic and attitudinal shift corresponded with a change in Israeli leadership from right to left, but a noticeable transition was also apparent in the right-wing Likud party. By 1998, for example, Netanyahu's attitude towards negotiating with the Palestinian Authority leader Yasser Arafat had altered. Now Prime Minister, Netanyahu regarded Arafat's negotiating efforts as a move towards peace, noting that 'whatever the disagreements may be, they must be settled around the negotiating table only'.⁴⁶ Within a decade, then, Netanyahu had moved from characterising the PLO as a deceptive 'Trojan horse' to a peace partner with whom one should engage in dialogue around a negotiating table.

⁴⁴ Interview with Ghassan Khatib, Ramallah, 29 March 2010.

⁴⁵ Interview with Yossi Beilin, Herzliya, 22 March 2010. Similarly in an interview with Mark Heller, he noted: 'the right is always more suspicious of outside mediation or involvement, and more suspicious of the Palestinians'. Interview with Mark Heller, Tel Aviv, 22 March 2010.

⁴⁶ Prime Minister Netanyahu, Arafat Remarks Positive, *MFA*, 17 November 1998. Accessed: 8 February 2011.

The atmosphere of dialogue and optimism was also apparent on the Palestinian elite front. Attempts at 'waging peace' were duly noted by Palestinian negotiator, Hanan Ashrawi, who explained that 'from Prague to London, from Paris to New York, from Stockholm to Jerusalem, from Milan to Helsinki, we met, debated, agreed, and argued about how to untie and resolve the Gordian knot of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.'⁴⁷ On 7 April 1994, Yossi Sarid, an Israeli negotiator, urged the continuation of the final settlement agreement noting that 'the peace process is intended to decrease the level of terrorism, and if we end the peace process we are in essence depositing our futures in the hands of these evil people'.⁴⁸ Sarid's statement was made following an attack by Hamas on a school bus in April 1994 when a suicide car bomber killed eight people and wounded over fifty in the attack. While the peace process was a way to eschew evil, it was also a way to create new bonds where there had previously been none. For example, Nabil Sha'ath, one of the chief Palestinian negotiators discussed with nostalgia what he called 'the honeymoon' that followed the signature of the Oslo Accord. He explained:

I mean literally I tell you, my first exit from Gaza out of Ben-Gurion airport, was just about two weeks or so after we entered, and I had a chauffeured limousine to take me to the plane directly...I didn't go through customs, I didn't go through passport checks, I didn't go through the whole building...I went to the plane. I went up to that TWA plane, and all the passengers who were in first class and in tourist class, came to take my signature, my autograph...I would take a taxi-ride in Tel Aviv and the taxi-cab would not charge me money. I went to Jaffa, my hometown, before leaving Palestine and the Israelis insisted that I be accompanied by military cars and police cars to protect me. They said if you refuse we will not allow you into Jaffa. Jaffa has many extremist Jews and we are afraid for your safety – so I accepted finally.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Hanan Ashrawi, *This side of peace: a personal account*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995, p. 62.

⁴⁸ Yossi Sarid quoted in *The Independent* (Lexis Nexis), 7 April 1994. Accessed: 6 April 2011.

⁴⁹ Interview with the Nabil Sha'ath, Ramallah, 29 March 2010.

The Israeli government's concern for high-ranking PLO officials was not unfounded.⁵⁰ While the Oslo Accord demonstrated that there were elites on both sides of the conflict who were willing to negotiate with the enemy, their efforts were not free from condemnation. Elites who negotiated became victims of demonisation. They were seen as traitors. They were loathed and threatened for what was considered, by some, treacherous compromise with evil. Indeed an interesting phrase that appeared on both the Israeli and Palestinian side following the Oslo Peace Accord was that of 'shaking hands with the Devil'. As discussed in Chapter 3, this analogy represents a double instance of demonisation: firstly it suggests that the 'enemy' is akin to the Devil and secondly it coats the negotiators with the same evil brush because they are compromising their moral integrity and values by fraternising with the Devil.⁵¹

Journalists covering the peace process also noted the presence of the 'shaking hands with the devil' analogy. In the lead up to the 1993 Oslo Accord, the possibility of attempted peace between Israel and the PLO was captured by a *New York Times* journalist who commented how: 'Israelis sidled closer last week towards what many of them consider to be shaking hands with the devil.'⁵² Another journalist noted how 'the deal has rather Faustian overtones for both sides. That's why only the

⁵⁰ Arafat received death threats from his Palestinian political opponents. He also received death threats from the Israeli government. Mark Fineman, 'Radical Palestinians Issue Death Threats in Denouncing Accord: Amid vows of more violence, Arafat's assassination is predicted', *Los Angeles Times*, 11 September 1993. Chris McGreal 'Sharon hints that Arafat may be killed', *BBC News* (Lexis Nexis), 14 September 2004. Accessed: 25 May 2012.

⁵¹ For examples on intra-demonising statements see Judy Dempsey, 'Netanyahu and Arafat head for midnight pact', *Financial Times* (Lexis Nexis), 15 January 1997. Accessed: 4 November 2010; Eitan Haber, 'The party that loves to hate', *The Jerusalem Post* (Lexis Nexis), 21 January 2001. Accessed: 11 November 2010; David Hirst, 'Crisis as Israel bulldoze peace process', *The Irish Times* (Lexis Nexis), 24 March 1997. Accessed: 11 November 2010. Amir Taheri, ' Hamas-land and Fatah-land at war', *The Times* (Lexis Nexis), 16 June 2007. Accessed: 3 November 2010.

⁵² Clyde Haberman, 'Chatting with the enemy: Israelis nod the PLO and talk with the Palestinians', *The New York Times* (Lexis Nexis), 24 January 1993. Accessed: 4 November 2010.

opposition is saying much about what might have been paid to the devil in return for peace.⁵³ Analogies were drawn to the pact between Germany and the Soviet Union during the Second World War, with one journalist explaining: 'the analogy to the Hitler-Stalin pact is simply that Arafat, like Hitler, is not to be trusted, and this deal with the devil will backfire.'⁵⁴

One of the most powerful intra-Israeli demonisation campaigns was against Yitzhak Rabin after he concluded the Oslo II Accord in September 1995. In certain circles Rabin was criticised for corrupting his values and betraying his fellow countrymen by going over to the 'dark' side. Yitzhak Shamir chastised the accord 'between Israel and that murderous organization', arguing in his autobiography that it contained 'the seeds of disaster for the Jewish state.'⁵⁵ During public demonstrations against the Oslo Peace Accord in Israel, Rabin was in some cases even depicted as a Nazi officer – the historical arch-symbol of evil for the Jewish community. Two weeks before Rabin's assassination, the novelist Moshe Shamir said on a radio program, 'Yitzkah Rabin is not a Nazi officer as he was presented in that picture. But Rabin does collaborate with the thousands of Nazi officers whom he brings to the heart of Israel, and he hands it over to them, under the command of their leader, Adolf Arafat, to carry forward the plan of the destruction of the Jewish people.'⁵⁶

⁵³ David Evans, 'Israeli, Palestinian peacemakers must spread hope to succeed', *The Ottawa Citizen* (Lexis Nexis), 17 September 1993. Accessed: 4 November 2010.

⁵⁴ Michael Kinsley, 'Checking the mirror when doing a u-turn: What does America's change of heart over Yasser Arafat say about its foreign policy?', *The Guardian* (Lexis Nexis), 28 September 1993. Accessed: 4 November 2011.

⁵⁵ Shamir, *Summing up*, p.258.

⁵⁶ Moshe Shamir cited in Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, p. 551.

The demonisation of Rabin also occurred within political elite discourse. Referring to Rabin's involvement in the Oslo Accord, Mr Elyakim Ha-Etzni, a former right-wing Knesset member, denounced 'this peace deal Satan made with the Devil'.⁵⁷ The comments were made during the organising of a resistance rally to block Arafat's first official visit to the West Bank in 1994. Ha-Etzni's statement illustrates two-dimensional demonisation (intra- and inter-): he demonises his own government (Satan) for making a deal with the Devil (in this context Arafat). Similarly the religious figure, Rabbi Eliezer Waldman, also a former rightist member of the Knesset, announced in his sermon: 'They (the killers) are the sons of death, they are the sons of the Devil, they deserve to die – and woe to this government that made a pact with Satan'.⁵⁸ His strong condemnation of the Oslo Accord followed after the car of a former Israeli right-wing member of the Knesset, Rabbi Haim Druckman, was riddled with bullets in the West Bank in November 1993. In his reaction to the attack, Waldman's demonising narrative was used to mobilise the mourners to react to the killings. In a rebuttal against Jewish fundamentalism, Shimon Peres employed demonising language when addressing the public in a special memorial session of Parliament following the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, declaring: 'We have to prevent having verbal gallows in Israel, or killers invoking the name of God while they are really the devil's emissaries'.⁵⁹ Peres therefore pointed a finger of blame at the role of religion for creating the ugly climate that incited radical fringe elements towards assassination. In an interview with CNN ten days after the assassination of Rabin, Peres further warned against the evils of religious fundamentalism, noting:

⁵⁷ Judith Colp Rubin, 'Israelis to welcome Arafat with protests', *The Washington Times* (Lexis Nexis), 30 June 1994. Accessed: 4 November 2010.

⁵⁸ See Bassam Schweiki, 'Ambush on rabbi ignites protests by Jewish settlers', *The Herald* (Lexis Nexis), 8 November 1993. Accessed: 4 November 2010.

⁵⁹ Shimon Peres quoted in *The New York Times* (Lexis Nexis), 14 November 1995. Accessed: 29 October 2010.

‘The problem is not in the number, but in their fanaticism, in their lack of restraint and understanding, the claim that they represent heaven, where in fact they are messengers of the devil’.⁶⁰ An interesting aspect put forward by Peres linked to religiosity and the duality of G(o)od and (D)evil is that terrorists on both sides claim that they are representing heaven whilst they are perceived as messengers of evil.

Likud opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu also demonised Rabin for initiating the peace process with the Palestinians.⁶¹ Ironically, Netanyahu later fell victim to his own charge following the Prime Minister’s signing of the Hebron Accord in 1997. Under the terms of the agreement Israel committed to leaving a majority of Hebron and gradually pulling its military forces out of the rural parts of the occupied West Bank. Settlers who lived in the area were strongly opposed to the accord. David Wilder, a spokesman for the Hebron Jews, for example, denounced his leader, arguing: ‘Netanyahu has made a pact with the Devil...the Israeli Government has left the Jewish residents of Hebron vulnerable to attack by Palestinian terrorists’.⁶² Thus the charge was used across the political spectrum to criticise those who made moves towards talking with the (D)evil enemy.

Palestinian elites who had attempted to make peace with their Israeli counterparts fell victim to similar charges and threats. In July 1987, in the pre-Oslo ban era, for example, Sari Nusseibeh and Faisal Husseini met with Moshe Amriav, a member of Israel’s Likud Party. While testing the waters of whether a pact between PLO, Fatah

⁶⁰ CNN interview with Shimon Peres, *MFA*, 14 November 1995. Accessed: 29 October 2010.

⁶¹ See Clyde Haberman, ‘Arafat set to leave Tunis to live in Jericho and Gaza’, *The New York Times* (Lexis Nexis), 5 July 1994. Accessed: 3 November 2011.

⁶² Christopher Walker, ‘Settler rage as US envoy wins Hebron accord’, *The Times* (Lexis Nexis), 15 January 1997. Accessed: 4 November 2010.

and the Likud party could be made, Amriav pulled out of the talks at the last minute. As the talks were exposed, Sari Nusseibeh (a Fatah member and later Palestinian National Authority representative) paid the price and was beaten up by – what he thinks – were his own Fatah party members. ‘I paid the price for this’, he explained, ‘because everyone was surprised. You know “The Likud Party – What! Are you crazy?” – at that time it was like talking to the devil’s advocate.’⁶³

Similar intra-demonisation charges continued in the post-Oslo era. On 6 May 1994, for example, Imad al-Alami, a member of the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas, announced that the Arafat leadership had sold itself to the Devil by making peace with the enemy.⁶⁴ His comment was made in the context of a meeting of the Alliance of Palestinian Forces to study the Gaza-Jericho agreement that Arafat signed with Rabin in Cairo that day in the presence of Egyptian President Husni Mubarak, the US Secretary of State and the Russian foreign minister. The agreement set out to establish the Palestinian Authority, an interim organisation created to administer a limited form of Palestinian self-governance in the Palestinian territories for a period of five years during which final-status negotiations would take place.⁶⁵ In the eyes of Hamas, the agreement was a ‘capitulatory deal’ because it failed to mention Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian state, repatriation and self-determination.

⁶³ Interview with Sari Nusseibeh, East Jerusalem, 27 March 2010.

⁶⁴ Text of report from Al-Quds Palestinian Arab Radio in Arabic, ‘Alliance of Palestinian forces meets; PFLP-GC leader Jibril denounces accord’, *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (Lexis Nexis), 6 May 1994. Accessed: 4 November 2010. See also Judy Dempsey, ‘Netanyahu and Arafat head for midnight pact’. Accessed: 4 November 2010.

⁶⁵ For more on the Gaza-Jericho interim agreement see Dennis Ross, *The missing peace*, pp. 133-136

Hamas-member Imad Al-Alami described the signing as ‘a poisoned dagger directed at the heart of the Arab and Islamic nation’.⁶⁶

Hamas continued to denounce the Oslo Accord, maintaining in 1998: ‘We emphasize that our acceptance to this [Oslo] meeting is not in any way linked with consultations on the composition of the governmental council, which is part of the *evil* Oslo Agreements, which have been rejected by our people as well as by our movement.’⁶⁷ While Arafat’s involvement in the peace efforts with Israel won him the peace prize, it also led him to be condemned for ‘treason’ by some of his counterparts. ‘He is the Devil’, said Mr Abdul Rahman, who despite being a close political ally of Arafat confessed that ‘he is ready to do almost anything to preserve his position and what he has achieved so far’.⁶⁸

To summarise, the Oslo Accord represented, on the one hand, a great leap of faith on the part of Israeli and Palestinian leadership in the direction of peace. On the other hand, sceptics framed the peace process as an evil concession akin to ‘shaking hands with the Devil’. Critics seeking to discredit the peace process demonised both within and between the communities – even during the ‘honeymoon years’ after Oslo. It is with this context in mind that the chapter turns to the third section.

⁶⁶ Text of report from AI-Quds Palestinian Arab Radio in Arabic, ‘Alliance of Palestinian forces meets; PFLP-GC leader Jibril denounces accord’, *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (Lexis Nexis), 6 May 1994. Accessed: 4 November 2010.

⁶⁷ Statement to President Yasser Arafat regarding the negotiations with the PA, 18 June 1998, *PASSIA*, vol. 5, p. 356. Emphasis added.

⁶⁸ Rahman cited in David Hirst, ‘Crisis as Israel bulldoze peace process’, *The Irish Times* (Lexis Nexis), 24 March 1997. Accessed: 4 November 2010.

3. POST-OSLO: NO PARTNER FOR PEACE

By the end of the decade the optimism ushered in by the Oslo peace process had evaporated.⁶⁹ The parties were unable to agree on a permanent settlement and both sides blamed the other for backtracking from their commitments under the Oslo Accord. Mutual distrust and delegitimisation resurfaced in elite narratives on both sides. Two decisive factors are traditionally identified as having contributed to the downfall of the peace process: Palestinian suicide bombings and Israeli settlement construction.⁷⁰ As the Israeli negotiator of the strategic planning division of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) from 1993-1998, Shlomo Brom, noted about the downfall of the peace process:

Parties refused to understand what they were doing [was] having the most negative effect on the other party and continued to do it. In the case of the Israelis it was the settlements: that we continued broadening the settlements during the process – in the case of Palestinians it was terrorism....so because of these two reasons, then, the Oslo process that was supposed to be a confidence-building process, became in my opinion, a confidence-destroying process.⁷¹

Escalating violence was one of the factors that drove Benjamin Netanyahu's charge against Arafat for being consistently deceitful in a speech at a Heritage Foundation gathering in February 1995. Netanyahu noted that: 'In Arafat, you're dealing with a man who has been consistent in only one thing – he has consistently broken his

⁶⁹ For more on the fall of the Oslo peace process see Avi Shlaim, 'The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process', in Louise Fawcett ed., *International Relations of the Middle East*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 241-261.

⁷⁰ Palestinian terrorism and Israeli settlement construction were also cited as two major impediments to the peace process in the *Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report* (released in April 2001 after the Intifada) under US Senator George Mitchell (see http://eeas.europa.eu/mepp/docs/mitchell_report_2001_en.pdf.) Accessed: 29 March 2012.

⁷¹ Interview with Shlomo Brom, Tel Aviv, 23 March 2010.

word in everything...We (Israelis) made a big mistake in believing that Arafat would do the job of fighting terrorism for us'.⁷² Netanyahu's condemnation of Arafat came amid growing suspicion of the efficacy of the peace process. In the four months preceding his statement fifty Israelis had been killed in terrorist attacks, twenty-one of these in suicide car bombings only two weeks before. Netanyahu held Arafat personally responsible for the violence. At the time, Netanyahu was the opposition leader for the then coalition government led by Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres. Netanyahu was outspoken in his opposition to the Oslo Peace accord. Combined with four bombings in nine days prior to the May 29 election the following year, this portrayal of the lack of trust in their Palestinian partner contributed to the election of Netanyahu. After winning the election in May 1996, the Likud leader continued to voice his opposition to the accords, with Ahmed Qurei dubbing him 'the arch-enemy of Oslo'.⁷³ Following the Hebron marketplace attack on 1 January 1997 where an Israeli wounded seven Palestinians in a shoot out, Netanyahu criticised the former Israeli Prime Ministers of previously 'subcontracting Israeli's security' to 'thugs' and 'terrorists' like Jibril Rajoub, a former Palestinian guerrilla commander and former head of the Preventive Security Force in the West Bank. Rajoub was apparently 'a regular devil figure in Netanyahu's campaign rhetoric.'⁷⁴

In his reflections on the failure of the Oslo peace process, the chief Israeli negotiator of the accords, Uri Savir, identified the 'mutual demonisation' as one of the core failures of the process because it contributed to a culture of hostility rather than

⁷² Benjamin Netanyahu quoted in *St. Petersburg Times*, Florida (Lexis Nexis), 9 February 1995. Accessed: 29 October 2010.

⁷³ Ahmed Qurei, *Beyond Oslo, The Struggle for Palestine, Inside the Middle East Peace Process from Rabin's Death to Camp David*, London: I.B. Tauris, 2008, p.19.

⁷⁴ Benjamin Netanyahu quoted in *The Washington Post* (Lexis Nexis), 3 January 1997. Accessed: 3 November 2010.

cultivating a culture of peace.⁷⁵ The coming to power of the Likud Party in 1996 was both a product of and contributed to this climate of hate. Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu ran a campaign by stoking the public's fear about security, stressing the need for a leader who could protect them, thus promoting unity through fear.⁷⁶ Never hiding his objection to the Oslo accords, Netanyahu's election victory was a 'declaration of war on the peace process.'⁷⁷

In a statement where Arafat called the settlement building 'a demon that swallows up everything, including the peace process' in August 1996, the Palestinian Authority highlighted how Netanyahu was attempting to derail the signed agreement and delay talks on a final peace settlement.⁷⁸ Arafat noted that the Israeli government's lie on curbing expanding settlements was 'the most dangerous' threat facing Palestinians and the peace process.⁷⁹ While Arafat did meet with the new Israeli Minister, David Levy, formal negotiations between Israeli and Palestinian officials over the carrying out of the self-rule accord or a permanent agreement had not resumed. Netanyahu had declined to meet with Arafat.

Diplomatic relations between Israelis and Palestinians continued to deteriorate in the late 1990s. Not only did the parties accuse each other of backtracking on their

⁷⁵ Uri Savir, *Peace First: A new model to end war*, San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2008, p. 36.

⁷⁶ Point made in Ross, *The missing peace*, p.256. Also Yithak Rabin criticised Netanyahu for using fear as a campaign tactic – see 'Rabin's widow tells Israelis: Vote for Peres', *CNN*, 29 May 1996. Accessed: 2 May 2013.

⁷⁷ Phrase used in Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 2000, p. 568.

⁷⁸ Yasser Arafat quoted in Joel Greenberg, 'Arafat says plan for settlements violates accord', *The New York Times* (Lexis Nexis), 7 August 1996. Accessed: 14 November 2010.

⁷⁹ For more on the development of settlements in this period see <http://www.fmep.org/reports/archive/vol.-6/no.-5/PDF>. Statistics of settlement constructions across the various Israeli presidencies is also available in NSU Draft Paper on Settlement Freeze, 06 February 2007. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/1474.PDF>. Accessed: 4 April 2013.

commitments, but experiences from the past were brought forward to question the moral integrity of their peace partners. For example in a statement made in Geneva on 11 March 1997, Ambassador Nabil Ramlawi, Permanent Observer of Palestine to the UN Commission on Human Rights, reviewed Israel policies during the First Intifada. At the opening session of the commission's annual meeting the Palestinian Ambassador claimed that 'Israeli authorities...infected 300 Palestinian children with the HIV virus during the years of the intifada.'⁸⁰ Ramlawi argued that the Israeli daily newspaper *Yediot Achronot* had confirmed the report. In response, Israel's ambassador to the U.N. commission, Yosef Lamdan, wrote to the body's president that in fact the Egyptian newspaper *al-Ahram* printed a full retraction on its front page of the same charges, 'admitting that the story was completely false and that nothing of the kind had appeared in *Yediot Achronot*'.⁸¹ Also the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations, Dore Gold, denounced Ramwali's statement in a letter addressed to the UN Secretary-General dated 8 January 1998. Gold called Ramwali's accusation a 'modern version of anti-Semitic blood libels that were once rampant in medieval Europe'.⁸² His letter included other examples to illustrate the 'increasing evidence of anti-Semitism emerging as an integral part of the rhetoric of Palestinian Authority officials' despite their commitment to refrain from incitement as stated in the interim agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip of 28 September 1995 (article XXII). Ramwali's statement, then, illustrates how a false claim made to an international audience by an official ambassador contributed

⁸⁰ Nabil Ramlawi, Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. Cited in *Israel's War against Terror*. Source: *Jerusalem Post*, 17 March 1997. Accessed: 13 November 2011.

⁸¹ Mark Lorell, 'Israel blasts Palestinian charge that it infected children with HIV', *The Global News Service of the Jewish People*, 5 June 1997. Accessed: 15 March 2013.

⁸² 'The situation in the Middle East Elimination of Racism and Racial Discrimination', Letter dated 8 January 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. See <http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/CF13A75F44DD1F55052565910051E152>. Accessed: 13 May 2013.

to further poisoning the relationship between the two sides, and had a negative impact on the peace process.

During this same time period of diplomatic decline, demonising rumors were also circulating about Israeli attempts at deliberate food contamination. In a speech at the Chamber of Commerce in July 1997, PA deputy minister of supplies, Abdel Hamid al-Qudsi, maintained that 'there is an Israeli mafia which is distributing spoiled food products under the aegis of Israeli generals in the territories of the Palestinian Authority...they are distributors of death'.⁸³ In another statement issued the previous month, Hamid al-Qudsi, again accused the Israelis government of 'distributing food containing materials that cause cancer and hormones that harm male virility'. The government's aim, according to Hamid al-Qudsi was to launch 'an organized plan and conspiracy' in order 'to harm and poison the Palestinian population'.⁸⁴ These demonising rumours further contributed to poisoning relations between the parties.

During this early part of 1998, the Palestinian Authority and the Israelis were negotiating the first phase of the FRD (further redeployment).⁸⁵ There was pressure on the PA to meet its obligations under Oslo, such as perform immediately on arrests and confront Hamas infrastructure. Alongside these efforts the PA was met with resistance from Hamas. In March 1998, for example, Hamas called on the foreign ministers of the Organisation of the Islamic conference to support the right of the

⁸³ Abdel Hamid al-Qudsi quoted in *Israel's War against Terror*. Source: *Itim news agency*, 9 July 1997. Accessed: 11 November 2010.

⁸⁴ Abdel Hamid al-Qudsi quoted in *Israel's War against Terror*. Source: *Yediot Ahronot*, 25 June 1997. Accessed: 11 November 2010.

⁸⁵ For more on these negotiations see Ross, *The Missing Peace*, pp. 3-74.

Palestinian people 'to resist against occupation using all available means in order to repulse it and its evils.'⁸⁶ Their statement on resistance to occupational evil and mobilisation in this context was no doubt politically motivated to gain influence over the public and to mobilise other Arab states.

Relations continued to deteriorate between Israelis and Palestinians as the decade came to a close with distrust and delegitimisation on the rise. In August 1998, for example, Ibrahim Nimre Hussein, mayor of the Arab town of Shafa Amre in Galilee noted the 'Israeli leaders speak about equality and co-existence in public and plot evil designs against us in secret'.⁸⁷ The statement appeared in the context of the Likud government's report issued on 17 August 1998 recommending that 'the Arabs in Israel be viewed as a potential strategic threat to state' and warning against 'growing ideological separatism' among the Arab minority. In reaction to the document, Sheikh Ra'ed Salah, mayor of the Arab town of Um Al-Fahem, argued that 'the report reflects the diabolical thinking of those who prepared it and subscribe to its sinister recommendations.'⁸⁸

The failure of the parties to agree on a permanent settlement and Israel's continued occupation of the Palestinian territories was a source of continued frustration for the Palestinians also during the government of Ehud Barak (1999-2001).⁸⁹ 'We are free only in our cages' explained Minister Yasser Abd Rabbo in a meeting with the

⁸⁶ Hamas statement, *BBC Summary of the World Broadcasts* (Lexis Nexis,) 20 March 1998. Source: Hamas, website in Arabic, 17 March 1998. Accessed: 29 October 2010.

⁸⁷ Ibrahim Nimre Hussein quoted in article by Khalid Amayreh, 'Israeli report proof of rampant racism', *Middle East Newsfile* (Lexis Nexis), 18 August 1998. Accessed: 25 October 2010.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ For a good overview of the challenges of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process during the Barak government see 'Chapter 3: Building Mistrust' in Charles Enderlin, *Shattered Dreams: the failure of the peace process in the Middle East 1995-2002*, New York: Other Press, 2002, pp. 111-176.

international committee of inquiry in New York on 27 November 2000, following the failure of the Camp David Summit and the outbreak of the Second Intifada.⁹⁰ The Palestinian frustration with the occupation manifested itself in violence within the occupied territories. As the Second Intifada gained momentum, two Israeli reserve soldiers were lynched in a Palestinian police station in Ramallah on 12 October 2000. In retaliation the IDF destroyed security offices adjacent to Arafat's compound in Gaza and several other police stations in Gaza and the West Bank. A summit was arranged with Arafat, Barak, Clinton, King Abdullah of Jordan and Kofi Annan to agree on a cease-fire and security arrangements. There was also a summit of the Arab League, the first in four years, on 21-22 October. At a time when the Intifada was playing day and night on Arab satellite TV, with anger swelling up on the Arab streets, Arafat saw it as a vehicle to reestablish his leverage with Arab leaders for the first time in a decade.⁹¹

On the Israeli side, portraying the Palestinians as 'no partners' was particularly prevalent after the failure of the Camp David Summit. Yasser Arafat was personally blamed for having prevented a successful settlement at Camp David.⁹² As Yoram Meital notes: 'by the summer 2000, both right-wing and left-wing media portrayed Arafat as an enemy and Israel as the victim of his evil design.'⁹³ From the outbreak of the Second Intifada until his death in 2004, Arafat's evil image appeared to revert

⁹⁰ Minister Yasser Adb Rabbo in 'introductory meeting: international committee of inquiry' (summary report), 27 November 2000, New York City, USA. *Palestine Papers*, <http://transparency.aljazeera.net/files/46.PDF>. Accessed: 29 April 2013.

⁹¹ Point made in Ross, *The Missing Peace*, pp. 741-742.

⁹² For accounts blaming Arafat for the breakdown of Camp David see for example Danny Yatom, 'Background, process and failure' in Shimon Shamir and Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, (ed.) *The Camp David Summit – What went wrong?* Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2005, p. 40, Ehud Barak, 'The myths spread about Camp David are baseless', in Shamir and Maddy-Weitzman, (ed.) *The Camp David Summit*, p.117, and Ross, *The Missing Peace*, p.84

⁹³ Yoram Meital, *Peace in Tatters*, p. 119.

back to the pre-Oslo days. Or as later-day accounts suggest, perhaps it never really went away: as former deputy foreign minister, Yossi Beilin, said about Yitzhak Rabin when he was in office with him:

Rabin was very sceptical. Very sceptical. About Arafat. About the Palestinians. About the PLO – but eventually...he changed his mind and when he changed his mind, he was ready to negotiate – it was not with trust, I mean retroactively Arafat used to say ‘you are my friend’ – nonsense – I mean he never was his friend – he hated Arafat – he never trusted a word, but he said ‘okay I don’t trust him’ but you know – maybe he’s the dictator that we need on the other side.⁹⁴

Later accounts have challenged this version of Arafat as peace-breaker. These accounts point out how in retrospect part of the problem in the negotiation process was the Israeli government’s reluctance to regard the Palestinian Authority as a legitimate peace-partner in the first place.⁹⁵ One of the most prominent spokespersons of this counter view was Robert Malley, President Bill Clinton’s special assistant for Arab-Israeli affairs at the National Security Council, who participated in the Camp David summit. Malley argued that Arafat was a ‘convenient culprit’ for a complex peace process that had many reasons for falling through. Also Colin Powell privately confessed in a one-on-one meeting with Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat in June 2004 his concerns about President Clinton’s book blaming Arafat for the collapse of the peace process.⁹⁶ The diplomatic deadlock was more complex and could not be narrowed down to one particular person alone.

⁹⁴ Interview with Yossi Belin, Herzliya, 22 March 2010.

⁹⁵ For a detailed first hand account of Camp David see Akram Hanieh, ‘The Camp David Papers’, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 30, no.2 (Winter 2001), pp. 75-97. For an Israeli perspective, see Ehud Barak on Camp David: “I did not give away a thing”, in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 33, no.1 (Autumn 2003), pp. 84-87. For a critical revision of the view that Arafat gave up the ‘generous offer’ at Camp David see Robert Malley and Hussein Agha, ‘Palestinian-Israeli Camp David Negotiation and Beyond’ in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 31, no.1 (Autumn, 2001), pp. 62-85.

⁹⁶ Colin Powell in one-on-one with Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat in Meeting Summaries: Erekat with U.S., Egypt and Shimon Peres, 26 June 2004. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/209.PDF>. Accessed: 29 March 2013.

Nonetheless journalist Akiva Eldar from *Ha'aretz* pointed out the effective scapegoating of the Palestinian Chairman, noting how 'the demonization of Arafat by the politicians and the media was very successful, like the attitude toward an incurable disease about which nothing can be done.'⁹⁷

Mainstream discourse in the United States and Israel maintained that the Palestinians were once again seizing the opportunity to miss an opportunity. Ehud Barak claimed to have offered all he had to offer, but still a settlement had not been reached. A month after the failure of the Camp David summit, Barak argued that 'the Palestinians are like crocodiles, the more you give them meat, they want more'.⁹⁸ His statement appeared in the context of what Barak considered to be a historical compromise on the part of the Israeli government that the Palestinians had turned down, dissatisfied that they could not get more. Israeli negotiator, Shlomo Ben Ami, shared Barak's opinion. He considered the Clinton parameters so good that he noted in a negotiation at Taba that 'they will throw us out of the window of history if we don't make a deal'.⁹⁹

Palestinian officials, however, felt that what was offered at Camp David and Taba was not sufficient.¹⁰⁰ In a leaked memorandum from the Palestinian Negotiation Support Unit to Mahmoud Abbas, the delegation expressed their reservations against the Clinton Parameters, which the US government proposed on 23 December

⁹⁷ Akiva Eldar, 'Behind Arafat's mask', *Ha'aretz* (Lexis Nexis), 1 November 2004. Accessed: 22 May 2012.

⁹⁸ Ehud Barak quoted in *The Jerusalem Post* (Lexis Nexis), 30 August 2000. Accessed: 3 March 2013.

⁹⁹ Shlomo Ben Ami in 'Meeting Minutes: Taba Borders', Taba, Egypt, 22 January 2001. *Palestine Papers*, <http://transparency.aljazeera.net/files/112.PDF>. Accessed: 29 February 2013.

¹⁰⁰ For more on the Palestinian leadership's perspective of what was offered at Camp David and Taba see Ahmed Qurei, *Beyond Oslo*, Chapter 7-8.

2000 after the failure of Camp David. Core issues of concern included the continued ambiguity of the territorial boundaries between Israeli and Palestine, the division of Jerusalem, the right of return of the Palestinian refugees, the withdrawal period of the occupational forces and settlers, water distribution and the compensation of damages due to the occupation.¹⁰¹ According to another leaked memorandum of Palestinian talking points in 2007, Palestinians elites still believed that the negotiations of 2000 would not have lead to a viable permanent settlement:

Camp David offered a Swiss cheese state with no real sovereignty in occupied East Jerusalem, no control over its borders or airspace, and no real resolution to the plight of Palestinian refugees. We were, and are, looking to achieve freedom—not to renegotiate the terms of our imprisonment.¹⁰²

Israeli settler populations in the Palestinian Occupied Territories and the right of return of Palestinians to the region were two especially thorny issues during the negotiations. In one encounter between the parties at Taba, settlers and refugees became a source of bartering with one of the Israeli negotiators requesting that they need 80% of settlers, to which Palestinian negotiator Yasser Adb Rabbo answered: 'then I want 80% refugees to return'.¹⁰³

Amid attempted peace talks, Palestinian minister and negotiator Yasser Abd Rabbo expressed the Palestinian desire to restart talks with Israel, but observed that his people had 'lost faith in the peace process due to broken commitments and missed deadlines'. In a meeting with US, EU, Turkish and Norwegian delegates, the

¹⁰¹ For more on the Palestinian delegation's concern of the Clinton parameters see NSU Memo Re: President Clinton's Proposals, 2 January 2001. *Palestine Papers*, <http://transparency.aljazeera.net/files/120.PDF>. Accessed: 29 February 2013.

¹⁰² Talking Points: US Benchmarks and General Political Situation, 6 May 2007. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/1655.PDF>. Accessed: 13 March 2013.

¹⁰³ Meeting Minutes: Taba Handwritten Notes, Taba, Egypt, 21 January 2001. *Palestine Papers*, <http://transparency.aljazeera.net/files/111.PDF>. Accessed: 29 February 2013.

Palestinian negotiators called for confidence building measures such as a freeze on settlement activity and broader international participation in order to restart negotiations.¹⁰⁴ Abd Rabbo was acutely aware of the decline in faith of a Palestinian peace camp: 'Our international image is so negative that we cannot afford to harm it further', he admitted to the Israeli minister Yossi Beilin, according to the minutes of meeting leaked in the *Palestine Papers*.¹⁰⁵ Beilin confirmed Abd Rabbo's concern, confessing that the Israeli peace camp was angry: 'They felt that Barak went a long way in his proposals, and that the Palestinians started the Intifada and introduced the right of return. Now they feel that there is no distinction between good guys and bad guys on the Palestinian side.'¹⁰⁶ With this climate of mutual distrust and violence, the path to peace was abandoned and the image of the enemy as untrustworthy, deceptive and evil resurfaced. As one scholar pointed out: 'observing the years since the Oslo Accord of 1993...one could not fail to notice the contradiction between official recognition of the Other and the constant delegitimisation of that Other as a real partner'.¹⁰⁷

Deep mistrust existed not only among political elites, but also among the wider Israeli and Palestinian public. As illustrated in the table below, public opinion polls taken before and after the failure of the Camp David summit and the outbreak of the

¹⁰⁴ Minister Yasser Abd Rabbo in 'Introductory meeting: international committee of inquiry' (summary report) 27 November 2000, New York City, USA. *Palestine Papers*, <http://transparency.aljazeera.net/files/46.PDF>. Accessed: 20 February 2013.

¹⁰⁵ Minister Yasser Abd Rabbo quoted in 'Meeting Minutes: Yasser Abd Rabbo and Yossi Beilin', 30 November 2000. *Palestine Papers*, <http://transparency.aljazeera.net/files/55.PDF>. Accessed: 20 February 2013.

¹⁰⁶ Yossi Beilin quoted in 'Meeting Minutes: Yasser Abd Rabbo and Yossi Beilin', 30 November 2000. *Palestine Papers*, <http://transparency.aljazeera.net/files/55.PDF>. Accessed: 20 February 2013.

¹⁰⁷ John Bunzl and Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, *Psychoanalysis, identity, and ideology: critical essays on the Israel/Palestine case*, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 2002, p. xii.

Second Intifada, for instance, showed a noticeable change in perceptions of the dishonesty and violence of the other side.

Table 6: Research conducted on the images of the Palestinians and the Israelis towards each other.¹⁰⁸

<i>The images of the Palestinian in Israeli eyes</i>			
	1997	1999	2000
<i>Violent</i>	39	37	68
<i>Dishonest</i>	42	35	51
<i>The images of the Israelis in Palestinian eyes</i>			
<i>Violent</i>	77	75	94
<i>Dishonest</i>	62	67	81

Figures are given as percentages.

Other public opinion polls showed that almost 80% of Israeli Jews reported that they did not trust Palestinians, responding that even if they were to sign a peace agreement, the other side would not honour it. This distrust was matched by Palestinian opinion polls: according, for instance, to a poll carried out by the Development Studies Programme at Birzeit University in October 2001, 91% of the Palestinian respondents felt that the current Israeli government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, was not serious about reaching an agreement to end the conflict with Palestine.¹⁰⁹ Both elite discourse and public opinion suggested that neither party regarded their opponent as trustworthy. The

¹⁰⁸ Daniel Bar-Tal, Neta Oren, and Ohad David, 'Conflict, identity, and ethos: the Israeli-Palestinian case' in Yueh-Ting Lee, ed., *The Psychology of Ethnic and Cultural Conflict*, Westport: Praeger, 2004, p. 145.

¹⁰⁹ Bar-Tal and Oren, 'The detrimental dynamics of delegitimization', p. 119.

peace party on the other side of the negotiating table had been delegitimised, and the image of the dishonest peace opponent was mutual. The 'no partner for peace' framework of demonisation deadlock was therefore apparent in the relations between Israelis and Palestinians during their attempted peace efforts, with mutual distrust and delegitimation corroding relations.

4. MUTUAL BLAME AND THE BREAKDOWN OF THE PEACE PROCESS

Ehud Barak's inability to curb the violence associated with the Al-Aqsa Intifada gravely damaged his reputation in Israel and contributed to the lurch to the right.¹¹⁰ The Likud party won the election in February 2001 and Ariel Sharon, who succeeded Ehud Barak as Prime Minister, continued to condemn the Palestinian leadership, noting: 'Arafat is not a partner. He is a brutal enemy'.¹¹¹ The terminology of the Israeli leader had returned to that of the pre-Oslo period, with Sharon maintaining in a speech to the Knesset during the Second Intifada:

The murderous [Palestinian] gangs have a leader, a purpose, and a directing hand. They have one mission: to chase us out of here from everywhere...And there is one dispatcher: Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat...Arafat has established a regime of terror, which nationally and officially trains terrorists and incites, finances, arms and sends them to perpetuate murderous operations across Israel...the horror, malice, brutality and deception revealed here are alarming.¹¹²

¹¹⁰ Argument made in Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, second edition, Chapter 17: 'Peace in Tatters' (forthcoming, 2014). I am grateful to the author for letting me see the updates for the second edition of his book.

¹¹¹ Ariel Sharon quoted in *Gulf News*, 23 November 2000. Accessed: 30 October 2010.

¹¹² Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's Political address to the Knesset, *MFA*, 8 April 2002. Accessed: 10 November 2010.

In Sharon's eyes, Arafat had not lifted a finger to stop the Intifada and had allowed violence to erupt as a tactical move to achieve what he wanted: Palestinian independence. His foreign minister, Silvan Shalom, made a statement following the two Hamas-inspired suicide bombings in Beersheba in August 2004 claiming that Arafat had 'brought nothing but terror and evil since his return to the territories'.¹¹³

On the Palestinian side, elites also delegitimised and mistrusted their Israeli counterparts. Ariel Sharon was not considered a man of peace and his walking on the Temple Mount, which sparked the Second Intifada, undermined his credibility.

In the lead up to the Israeli elections for Prime Minister in February 2001, Palestinian officials Dr. Saeb Erekat and Yasser Abed Rabbo spoke out against Likud candidate Ariel Sharon. They warned Israelis of the detrimental effects Sharon would have on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and encouraged them not to vote for him. According to Yasser Abed Rabbo: 'The victory of Ariel Sharon' would 'lead to disaster and war.' He continued by arguing that electing Sharon would be 'an evil act' because the Likud leader was a 'blood-thirsty racist who has no sense of responsibility toward his own people.'¹¹⁴

After his election, great suspicion continued to be cast on Ariel Sharon's peace agenda, particularly in light of his policies in the territories. For example, Sharon was chastised as 'a butcher' in the following statement by the Fatah Secretary of the Gaza strip, Ahmad Hillis. Hillis's announced in a speech at a Gaza march in support of

¹¹³ Silvan Shalom, *MFA*, 31 August 2004. Accessed: 13 November 2010.

¹¹⁴ Yasser Abed Rabbo quoted in *Ha'aretz* (Lexis Nexis), 25 January 2001. Accessed: 4 November 2010.

Arafat on 6 December 2001 after the Israeli army had confined Arafat to his compound in Ramallah:

No doubt, the escalating pace of the ugly Israeli aggression and the widening circle of Israeli attacks are part of a carefully-studied programme prepared by the government of terrorism in Israel against our Palestinian people, their National Authority, institutions and factions...We hold the government of *the butcher Sharon* and the entire international community fully responsible for this hostile aggression and for all the repercussions that will come forth from this aggression... We want to stress that the only thing worthy of being called terrorism is the Israeli occupation. The Israeli occupation is the peak of official and systematic state-sponsored terrorism. Israel is devoting the most powerful military force in the region to slaughter an unarmed people and to chase after children using American Apaches.¹¹⁵

This is another statement whereby the accusation of 'terrorism' – usually the hallmark of the Israeli accusations – is used by the Palestinians to mobilise their followers. It corresponded to a time when Sharon sent troops into Ramallah, shelling and surrounding the Palestinian government's West Bank headquarters. This statement is placed in the context of Palestinians considering Israelis as terrorists and provides evidence of their 'no partner for peace' mentality. The Israeli side matched this mind frame as the statement was made in the context of Arafat's gradual decline in Israeli government standing. A statement released by the Israeli government one week later, on 12 December 2001, said Arafat is 'directly responsible for the series of attacks and therefore is no longer relevant to Israel, and Israel will no longer have any connection with him.'¹¹⁶ Consequently the Israeli security cabinet cut all contact with Arafat.

¹¹⁵ Ahmad Hillis quoted in *BBC Monitoring Middle East* (Lexis Nexis), 6 December 2001. Source: *Palestine TV*, Gaza, in Arabic 0920 GMT 6 Dec 2001. Accessed: 29 October 2010. Emphasis added.

¹¹⁶ 'Israeli cabinet cuts ties contact with Arafat', *PBS news*, 12 December 2001. Accessed: 4 April 2013.

With both sides accusing each other of terrorism, the prospect of any successful peace talks was becoming increasingly unlikely. The lack of trust between parties due to the incremental violence on both sides was noted in a Palestinian Negotiation Support Units' draft proposal for a prospective meeting between Yasser Arafat and Shimon Peres dated 27 August 2001. It stated that 'in light of the assassinations by the Israeli government of Palestinian political and community leaders and attacks by Palestinian opposition groups on Israeli civilians, trust between the parties is not possible at the time.'¹¹⁷

The 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 added an additional 'with or against us' dimension to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. More specifically, Israeli elites began to directly adopt President George W. Bush's post-9/11 rhetoric of 'the axis of evil', 'with or against us', and 'the forces of evil'. Israel's Prime Minister Ariel Sharon for example was quick to place his Palestinian opponents at the forefront of the terrorist campaigns during the Second Intifada, noting on 21 June 2002:

We are in the middle of a war, a hard war, a cruel war, a war that the Palestinian terrorists are carrying out against women, children and old people...We are facing a coalition of terror led by the Palestinian Authority and backed *by an axis of evil* – Tehran, Baghdad, Damascus and [Osama bin Laden]'.¹¹⁸

Sharon's statement was made in a meeting with his top advisers in response to a Palestinian attack on a Jewish settlement in the West Bank. The attack ended in a fierce shootout with Israeli border police where five Israelis and one Palestinian were killed. Three of the six victims were children. With such events in mind, the

¹¹⁷ NSU Memo Re: New Palestinian Proposal for Yasser Arafat and Shimon Peres Meeting, 27 August 2001. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/104.PDF>. Accessed: 24 February 2013.

¹¹⁸ Ariel Sharon quoted in *the Washington Post* (Lexis Nexis), 21 June 2002.

Israeli government continued to draw parallels between local Palestinian attacks in the occupied territories and global terrorism. The US and Israel's now shared understanding would make them partners in the fight against terrorism because, according to Sharon, 'being the only true democracy in the Middle East, Israel stands at the forefront of the conflict between the civilized world and the forces of evil'.¹¹⁹ His statement was issued at the AIPAC conference of 2002 where the theme was 'America and Israel Standing against terror'.¹²⁰

Even the more dovish Israeli leaders like Shimon Peres contributed to some of the most divisive descriptions of the world after 9/11. In an interview on PBS television on 4 February 2002, Peres was asked how the terrorist attack on the twin towers had impacted the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. He replied:

It changed the world politics and the relations between us and the Palestinians. Until September 11th, the world was divided East and West. The East supported the Palestinians; the West supported Israel, by and large...All of a sudden, this disappeared completely. Today there is just one division – devil and anti-devil...¹²¹

The ties between Israel and the US in their 'with or against us' fight against terrorism further problematised the US' third-party role in the diplomatic process.¹²² While it did not prevent mediation altogether (since the US had an interest in seeing this conflict resolved), the notion of standing firm against the 'evils

¹¹⁹ Ariel Sharon, Message to the AIPAC Policy conference, 23 April 2002 in PASSIA, vol. 6, p. 333.

¹²⁰ For more on this AIPAC conference see Dana Hearn, 'AIPAC Policy Conference, 21-23 April 2002', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 31, no. 4, Summer 2002, pp. 66-70.

¹²¹ Shimon Peres, Interview on PBS Television, *MFA*, 4 February 2002.

¹²² For more on the third party partisanship of the US in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict see Rashid Khalidi, *Brokers of Deceit: How the U.S. Has Undermined Peace in the Middle East*, Boston: Beacon Press, 2013 and Nasser Aruri, *Dishonest Broker: The Role of the United States in Palestine and Israel*, Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2003.

of terrorism' appeared to influence the mediator in terms of third party partisanship. In June 2002, for example, when Israel began the construction of the separation barrier, President George W. Bush made his historical speech in which he outlined a new US policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict later known as the road map for peace. The US administration made it clear that it would no longer deal with Arafat and would work to replace him with a new Palestinian leadership.¹²³ There could be no neutrality in a conflict run by a terrorist leader and Bush called upon 'Palestinian people to elect new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror'.¹²⁴ It was a change in the strategy of this US administration, which had earlier been relatively disengaged from the peace process. The Israeli government's likening of US and Israeli democratic values, the association of terror perpetrated against the two countries and the notion of a fight against a common evil appeared to close the ties between the two. Palestinian government officials argued that Israel was consciously conflating the global war on terror with their local Palestinian conflict in order to delegitimise the legitimate struggle of the Palestinian people for freedom and independence.¹²⁵

Following US and Israeli government's refusal to negotiate with Arafat, Mahmoud Abbas began to emerge as an attractive new candidate for the Palestinian leadership. Arafat appointed him as Prime Minister on 19 March 2003. An Israeli-American think tank published a policy paper in 2003 aimed at Israeli government

¹²³ For more on the exclusion of Arafat see, for example, 'Anyone but Arafat' and 'Bush's break with Arafat' in Daniel C. Kurtzer et al., *The peace puzzle: America's quest for Arab-Israeli peace, 1989-2011*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013, pp. 156-167.

¹²⁴ Ross, *The Missing Peace*, p. 787.

¹²⁵ Point made in Jericho Security Paper, a white paper draft of discussions about security sector reform held November 15-17, 2005 in Jericho. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/376.PDF>

elites, which raised concerns at the rising legitimate image of Mahmoud Abbas compared to the evil image of his predecessor, noting:

Under the Arafat regime it's not difficult to convince the American public of the corruption of the current Palestinian leadership. While many sympathize with the plight of the Palestinian people, there is no love lost for Yassir Arafat. *Arafat is a terrorist; they [the Americans] know that. Better still, he looks the part.* The emergence of Mahmoud Abbas as the new Palestinian Prime Minister comes exactly at the wrong time. His ascent to power seems legitimate. He is a fresh face, and a clean-shaven one at that. He speaks well and dresses in Western garb. He may even genuinely want peace.¹²⁶

Despite the rise of a new prospective Palestinian peace partner, relations between the Israelis and Palestinians remained tense. The unilateralism of Ariel Sharon's disengagement plan, which he announced for the first time on 19 December 2003, was a testament to the continued lack of trust between the parties. The plan called for the removal of Israeli settlements in the Gaza strip and four Israeli settlements in the northern West Bank. In a letter to George W. Bush on 14 April 2004, Sharon explained that he had developed the plan of unilateral disengagement because Israel had come to the conclusion that there was 'no reliable Palestinian partner' with which it could make progress in a bilateral peace process.¹²⁷ The Palestinian Authority's discourse at the time, however, seemed to contradict Sharon's 'no partner for peace' argument. That same day, for example, the Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei wrote in a letter to UN General Secretary Kofi Annan that the Palestinian leadership was committed to working towards a negotiated solution with Israel. 'We are prepared to immediately commence fast track negotiations on

¹²⁶ Wexner Analysis - Israel Communication Manual - 2003. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/142.PDF>. Accessed: 13 March 2013. Emphasis added.

¹²⁷ Ariel Sharon's Letter to President George W. Bush, 14 April 2004. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/181.PDF>. For more specifics on the disengagement plan see Ariel Sharon's Israeli Disengagement Plan, 14 April 2004, *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/182.PDF>. Accessed: 13 March 2013.

permanent status starting where we left off in Taba, 2001', Qurei noted.¹²⁸ For the Israeli government, however, there would be no return to the track of negotiations and dialogue until the Palestinians demonstrated their full and proactive commitment to combatting terrorism.¹²⁹

Palestinians also remained suspicious about the Israeli government's intentions for peace. This was illustrated when the PLO executive committee stated on 30 May 2004 that: 'the consecutive plans announced by Sharon confirm he is not serious and continues *deceiving* and maneuvering.'¹³⁰ In the eyes of the Palestinian leadership, Sharon's disengagement plan was a strategic ploy to further consolidate the occupation. While presenting the withdrawal of settlements in the Gaza strip as an act of peace, the Israeli government was continuing the encirclement of East Jerusalem, the further fragmentation and strategic settlement construction in the West Bank and the entrenchment of the separation wall.¹³¹ According to a draft memo by the Palestinian Negotiation Support Unit on the settlement evacuations, 'the logic behind current Israeli thinking is simple and undeniable: why should Israel seek to negotiate, and therefore compromise, when it can simply take what it wants unilaterally'.¹³²

¹²⁸ Letter from Qurei to President Bush Re: Reaction to Bush-Sharon Press Conference, 14 April 2004. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/185.PDF>. Accessed: 13 March 2013.

¹²⁹ Point made in Revised Disengagement Plan - Approved by Cabinet, 5 June 2004. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/198.PDF>. Accessed: 13 March 2013.

¹³⁰ Political statement after meeting with representatives of the Palestinian factions, Ramallah, 30 May 2004, *PASSIA*, vol. 7, p.241.

¹³¹ For more on the Palestinian leadership's suspicion of the unilateral disengagement plan see NSU Discussion Paper - Road Map Language Re: Militants, 30 September 2005. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/1949.PDF>. Accessed: 17 March 2013.

¹³² NSU Draft Memo Re: Pre-Permanent Status Settlement Evacuations, 29 April 2006. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/532.PDF>. Accessed: 18 March 2013.

The former head of the Palestinian Preventative Security Forces in the West Bank, Jibril Rajoub, argued that Israel has managed to obliterate the Palestinian peace partner by destroying the image and relevance of the president. They had discredited Fatah, the PLO and the PA, destroyed their security apparatus and led their party into an existential battle in a fight for their own survival.¹³³ Earlier that year, in March 2004, the Hamas leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin had made an appeal to the Arab Summit Meeting in Tunis. In a letter, Yassin urged his fellow Arab leaders to boycott Israeli by chastising Zionists as 'evil' and not worthy of negotiating with: 'Our people need economic support to boost their steadfastness after the evil Zionists destroyed all sources of a dignified living for that people and stole their wealth.... We urge you to activate boycott of that enemy and to end all contacts and cooperation with it'.¹³⁴ The Tunis declaration of the 16th Arab Summit requested support from the international community to provide the necessary protection for the Palestinian people against the continuous acts of killing and deportation they were enduring, but did not call for a specific boycott as requested by Yassin.

Even at times when Israelis appeared to cooperate with demands, such as with the announcement by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of the release of 400 prisoners in the occupation prisons on 25 May 2005, the Palestinian Minister of Prisoners and senior Fatah official, Sufyan Abu-Zayidah, denounced it as 'mere propaganda' to soothe US pressure to comply with the Sharm El-Sheikh agreements. In an interview with the BBC, Abu-Zayidah argued Sharon's announcement 'reflects evil intentions' especially given that Israel had arrested more than 500 Palestinians since the Sharm El-Sheikh

¹³³ Meeting Minutes: LPU with Palestinian Leadership, 30 May 2004. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/195.PDF>. Accessed: 14 March 2013.

¹³⁴ Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Letter to the Arab Summit Meeting in Tunis, March 2004, *PASSIA*, vol. 7, p. 206.

summit.¹³⁵ The Prisoners Affairs Minister reiterated the Palestinian National Authority's refusal to participate in any meetings of the joint committee should Israel continue imposing its criteria for releasing prisoners.¹³⁶

In a summit meeting between Mahmoud Abbas and Ariel Sharon in Jerusalem, on 21 June 2005, both parties continued to blame their counterpart for obstructing the peace process. According to Ariel Sharon, the Palestinian government had not done enough to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure in the territories. According to Mahmoud Abbas, the Israeli government had suffocated the prospects of peace with their persistent attacks, incursions and home demolitions.¹³⁷ 'You have no solution with the Israelis', Palestinian negotiator Mahmoud Dahlan confessed to Condoleezza Rice in a meeting in Ramallah on 22 July 2005 about Israel's unilateral disengagement plan.¹³⁸ Afif Safieh, the former Palestinian General Delegate of London and now Fatah Deputy Commissioner for International Relations, argued in 2010 that since the Arab Peace plan initiative came on the table in 2002, the deadlock between the Israelis and Palestinians was 'not due to an Arab rejection of Israeli existence but due to an Israeli rejection of Arab acceptance.'¹³⁹

¹³⁵ Sufi Abu-Zayidah quoted in *BBC Monitoring Middle East* (Lexis Nexis,) 25 May 2005. Accessed: 29 October 2010.

¹³⁶ Issues such as that of prisoner releases continued to remain a sensitive bone of contention between Israelis and Palestinians. See for example Negotiations over prisoners release in Meeting Minutes: Saeb Erekat and Dov Weisglass, Tel Aviv, 3 February 2005. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/281.PDF>. Accessed: 13 March 2013.

¹³⁷ Meeting Minutes: Mahmoud Abbas and Ariel Sharon Summit Meeting, Jerusalem, Sharon's Residence, 21 June 2005. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/5116.PDF>. Accessed: 17 March 2013.

¹³⁸ Meeting Minutes: Condoleezza Rice and Mohammed Dahlan, Ramallah, 22 July 2005. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/5126.PDF>. Accessed: 17 March 2013.

¹³⁹ Safieh, *The Peace Process*, p. 10.

Growing divisions between the Palestinian political leadership was proving to be an additional challenge. The Palestinian's Fatah party, who had lost to Hamas in the Palestinian legislative election on 25 January 2006, were raising concerns about their role in prospective peace talks with the Israelis. In a meeting with the American diplomat, David Welch, on 25 February 2006, Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat, noted the diplomatic stalemate whereby 'Hamas doesn't want to negotiate and neither does Israel'. Erekat confessed that if the Israeli government continued its unilateral disengagement, rather than working together on permanent status negotiations, it would be perceived as a victory on the part of the Hamas government, and 'that would be the end of it'.¹⁴⁰ In light of the decline of Fatah's political power, Mahmoud Abbas was eager to push forward the peace process. In a meeting with the European Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, on 15 May 2006, Abbas urged that 'we would like the Israeli government to accept that we are partners. Saeb [Erekat] is ready to immediately enter final negotiations, and he has the experience and the cadres to do so. The Israeli side must be convinced that we are their partners.'¹⁴¹

The split between Hamas and Fatah continued to widen with their attitudes towards Israel as a prospective peace partner being a serious source of division. In September 2006, violence erupted between Fatah and Hamas in the Gaza strip. President Mahmoud Abbas and his moderate party advocated a Palestinian state alongside Israel, while Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh and his Islamist party rejected Israel's right to exist. A UN study declared the humanitarian situation in the Gaza

¹⁴⁰ Meeting Minutes: Saeb Erekat and David Welch, Ramallah, NAD, 25 February 2006. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/5130.PDF>. Accessed: 18 March 2013.

¹⁴¹ Meeting Minutes: Mahmoud Abbas and Benita Ferrero-Waldner, 15 May 2006. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/5156.PDF>. Accessed: 21 March 2013.

strip 'intolerable' with 75% of the population dependent on food aid and 80% of the population living below the poverty line. The Palestinian economy had largely relied on Western aid and revenues, which had been frozen since Hamas's victory. In this context, Ramadam Abdallah, the Islamic Jihad Movement Secretary-General, chastised the Zionist entity and the US as 'the camp of evil', noting:

We realize that the Palestinian situation is facing an impasse and acute crises. These are hard days indeed in which *the camp of evil* and falsity led by the USA and the Zionist entity as well as their agents and lackeys in the region are practicing the vilest and basest forms of blockade and aggression against the Palestinian people.¹⁴²

Meanwhile the Bush administration continued to refuse negotiating with Hamas unless it accepted the three benchmarks of agreeing to Israel's right to exist, respecting prior agreements, and renouncing terrorism.¹⁴³ The administration was instead attempting to bolster the Fatah constituency that supported the two-state solution. This difference between how the US mediated the conflict depending on *who* the Palestinian negotiating party was, is an illustration of the 'with us or against us' dimension of diplomatic deadlock in that the 'evils of terrorism', in this case, impeded the process. The Bush administration's final attempt to mediate the conflict at the Annapolis Conference on 27 November 2007 proved unsuccessful. Moreover, the situation in Hamas-controlled Gaza was becoming a challenge for both Israel and the Fatah-controlled West Bank. The situation in Gaza was deteriorating with the Israeli blockade. According to a leaked minutes of meeting, Tzipi Livni admitted that in Israel the common cursing expression 'go to Hell' had now been replaced with 'go

¹⁴² Ramadam Abdallah quoted in *BBC Monitoring Middle East* (Lexis Nexis), 22 October 2006. Source: addresses at Gaza rally via telephone speech. Accessed: 29 October 2010. Emphasis added.

¹⁴³ Alon Ben-Meir, *Lost Perspectives*, Bloomington, IN: Authorhouse, 2009, p. 214.

to Gaza'.¹⁴⁴ In the months following the Annapolis conference, Israeli incursions in Gaza escalated, with the Palestinian Authority pointing to 467 casualties and 1706 injuries in over 2000 Israeli attacks in the territories.¹⁴⁵ According to Palestinian negotiators, Israel's participation at Annapolis marked the end of its failed unilateralism, but the government's insistence on Palestinian demilitarisation along with their continued presence in the territories was evidence of their continued desire to perpetuate the regime of occupation.¹⁴⁶ The Israeli government, however, claimed that the failure of achieving peace was due to the lack of a credible peace partner. 'Negotiating with "Hamastan" will harm both of us', the Israeli negotiator General Amos Gilad admitted to Palestinian negotiators Ahmed Qurei and Saeb Erekat in a post-Annapolis meeting on 28 February 2008. ' Hamas is not only a terror organization....they want to establish Hamastan and extend it to the West Bank', General Gilad continued.¹⁴⁷ The common resistance against Hamas was not enough, however, to unite the Israeli negotiator with his Fatah-affiliated counterparts, who confessed that 'right now we don't consider you a partner.'¹⁴⁸

The Israeli incursion into Gaza, known as Operation Cast Lead (27 December 2008 - 18 January 2009), was a violent testament to the failure of the peace process. The attack, according to Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas, had taken the life of 1300 martyrs, wounded 5000, destroyed thousands of homes and displaced thousands of individuals. Abbas directed his wrath against the Israeli government in a mass rally

¹⁴⁴ Meeting Minutes: Ahmed Qurei and Tzipi Livni, Jerusalem, Sheraton Plaza Hotel, 4 February 2008. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/2312.PDF>. Accessed: 27 March 2013.

¹⁴⁵ Draft Letter Re: Israeli Escalation in Occupied Palestinian Territory, 14 July 2008. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/2928.PDF>. Accessed: 27 March 2013.

¹⁴⁶ Point raised in Speaking Notes - PA Security Presentation, 20 October 2008. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/3440.PDF>. Accessed: 28 March 2013.

¹⁴⁷ Meeting Minutes: Post-Annapolis Security Session, Tel Aviv, Office of Livni, 28 February 2008. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/2289.PDF>. Accessed: 27 March 2013.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

held at Palestine Hospital in the Egyptian capital Cairo on 1 February 2009, noting: 'This is Israel, which continues to attack our people every day. We know that Israel is *an evil aggressor* and that it has committed many crimes against the Palestinian people'.¹⁴⁹ Abbas reiterated that there would be no dialogue with their counterparts who rejected the PLO. In the eyes of the Palestinian Negotiation Support Unit, Israel's invasion of Gaza was yet 'another example of Israel's consistent attempt to undermine the side that calls for negotiations: Destroy a Palestinian partner for peace and thereby legitimate continued theft of Palestinian lands and refusal to achieve viable, negotiated solution.'¹⁵⁰ The Palestinian Authority pronounced the Annapolis process dead, blaming Israel's Gaza incursion for having pulled the trigger.¹⁵¹

The post-Oslo years thus saw the breakdown of the peace process and the eruption of violence in the Second Intifada. Relations between Israelis and Palestinians continued to deteriorate as the promise of peace became ever more distant. Mutual distrust and delegitimation resurfaced in elite narrative on both sides. For the Israelis, the Palestinians were not credible peace partners as they failed to abandon terrorism. For the Palestinians, Israel's occupational desires had trumped its ambitions for peace.

¹⁴⁹ Mahmoud Abbas quoted in *BBC Monitoring Middle East* (Lexis Nexis), 2 February 2009. Source: Text of report by Palestinian presidency-controlled news agency Wafa website. Accessed: 4 November 2010. Emphasis added.

¹⁵⁰ NSU: Gaza Offensive Questions & Answers, 11 January 2009. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/3689.PDF>. Accessed: 28 March 2013.

¹⁵¹ For the Palestinian Authority's refusal to negotiate on the basis of the Gaza incursion see Palestinian Draft Response to French Non-Paper on Gaza, 13 January 2009. <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/3696.PDF> and NSU Draft: Key Actions PLO Can Take in Wake of Gaza Disaster, Ramallah, 19 January 2009. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/3706.PDF>. Accessed: 27 March 2013.

Both Israeli and Palestinian elites have recognised that demonisation and, more generally, the use of language in the form of ‘incitement’ have been obstacles to the peace process and have committed to ‘abstain from incitement, including hostile propaganda, against each other.’¹⁵² A joint Israeli-Palestinian committee on incitement was set up following the October 1998 Wye River interim peace agreement.¹⁵³ The committee aimed to monitor incitement between the parties in order ‘to break down the barriers of mistrust and change the images they hold of each other.’¹⁵⁴ Following the outbreak of the Second Intifada, however, the Sharm El-Sheikh fact-finding committee report (issued on 30 April 2001), headed by George Mitchell, again identified incitement as an obstacle to peace. The report noted that: ‘In their submission and briefings to the committee, both sides expressed concern about hateful language and images emanating from the other, citing numerous examples of hostile sectarian and ethnic rhetoric in the Palestinian and Israeli media, in school curricula and in statements by religious leaders, politicians, and others.’¹⁵⁵ An official PLO response to the final report on 15 May 2001 found ‘statements by highly placed GOI [Government of Israel] officials or political leaders *demonizing* the Palestinian people as a whole or arguing that Palestinians are collectively guilty for any act of violence directed at Israel or its occupation.’¹⁵⁶ The committee report urged both sides of the conflict ‘to abstain from incitement and

¹⁵² The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, Washington D.C., *MFA*, 28 September 1995. Accessed: 25 May 2010.

¹⁵³ Saeb Erekat to Dov Weisglass in Meeting Minutes: Dov Weisglass and Saeb Erekat, Jerusalem, Dan Panorama Hotel, 14 June 2005. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/5116.PDF>. Accessed: 14 March 2013.

¹⁵⁴ ‘Washington meeting of the trilateral anti-incitement committee’, 26 February 1999. See <http://usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/press/state/archive/1999/february/sd3301.htm>. Accessed: 4 April 2013.

¹⁵⁵ George Mitchell, *Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report*.

¹⁵⁶ PLO Official response to the final report of the Sharm El-Sheikh fact-finding committee, 15 May 2001, *PASSIA*, vol. 6, p. 222. Emphasis added.

hostile propaganda'.¹⁵⁷ Both parties therefore acknowledged the relationship between the language of incitement, violence and diplomatic deadlock.

Amid continued tit-for-tat violence and diplomatic deadlock, Palestinian and Israeli leaders again began to focus on the issue of incitement. In June 2005, Mahmoud Abbas called for the revival of the joint anti-incitement committee. In reality little had become of the anti-incitement committee over the years, with Israeli negotiator Dov Weisglass admitting in a meeting with Saeb Erekat on 14 June 2005 that 'we had no idea what it did in the past'.¹⁵⁸ In the first meeting between Israelis and Palestinians on the Culture of Peace in Jerusalem in March 2008, the Israeli participant Daniel Taub confessed that the committee did not work since inception because it was not a priority at the time.¹⁵⁹ Renewed efforts led to the creation of a new committee set to promote a culture of peace and a mutual agreement between the parties in order to prevent further incitement.¹⁶⁰ Yet the Israeli and Palestinian leadership's charges of incitement have continued. On 30 August 2010, for example, the Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erakat denounced Israeli government for taking insufficient measures to curb 'incitement to genocide' by public figures in Israel. He was referring in particular to incitement by the spiritual leader of the Shas', Ovadia Yosef pronounced that day. Only days before peace talks were about to begin between parties in Washington, Ovadia Yosef had called for Abu Mazen and 'his evil

¹⁵⁷ George Mitchell, *Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report*.

¹⁵⁸ Dov Weisglass to Saeb Erekat in Meeting Minutes: Dov Weisglass and Saeb Erekat, Jerusalem, Dan Panorama Hotel, 14 June 2005. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/5116.PDF>. Accessed: 13 March 2013.

¹⁵⁹ Meeting Minutes: 1st Meeting on Culture of Peace, Jerusalem, King David Hotel, 17 March 2008. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/2352.PDF>. Accessed: 19 March 2013.

¹⁶⁰ See Draft Agreement on Culture of Peace (#5), 29 June 2008. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/2814.PDF>. Accessed: 20 March 2013.

folk' to 'perish from this world', wishing upon them the plague and God's smite.¹⁶¹ Erakat pronounced that 'this type of incitement is part of Israel's larger policy against a Palestinian state, which also includes its illegal settlements activities, forced removals and evictions, home demolitions, water theft and separating occupied Jerusalem from its Palestinian residents. They all have the same destructive goal.'¹⁶² On the Israeli side, the current Netanyahu government is in the process of implementing an 'incitement index' to monitor and quantify Palestinian incitement on a regular basis.¹⁶³ 'Demonisation' was identified as one of the four criteria highlighted as 'incitement' by the Israeli security cabinet.¹⁶⁴ According to Netanyahu, the continued Palestinian incitement is proof of their refusal to recognise the legitimacy of Israel's right to exist.¹⁶⁵ It is the Israeli government's belief that curbing demonisation is a necessary step in order to prevent violence, which will in turn lay the groundwork for a dialogue for peace. For the Palestinians, freedom from occupation will have to proceed this. As the Negotiation Support Unit reflected on 'The Prospects of Peace in the Middle East during President Obama's Administration':

Resolving this conflict [does not] hinge on the concept of reconciliation. In South Africa, reconciliation began only after apartheid was dismantled. In Palestine, the long and difficult process of reconciliation will begin only after

¹⁶¹ Ovadia Yosef quoted in *Financial Times* (Lexis Nexis), 30 August 2010. Accessed: 29 October 2010.

¹⁶² 'Erakat condemns Shas' spiritual leader's incitement towards genocide', *the PLO's Negotiations Affairs Department*, <http://www.intertech.ps/nad/etemplate.php?id=251>, 30 August 2010. Accessed: 5 November 2010.

¹⁶³ Herb Keinon, 'Cabinet to discuss incitement monitoring', *The Jerusalem Post* (Lexis Nexis), 5 May 2010. Accessed: 7 November 2010.

¹⁶⁴ See Israeli Prime Minister's Office, 'Security Cabinet discusses education for peace and incitement index', www.pmo.gov.il, 3 November 2010. Accessed: 18 November 2010.

¹⁶⁵ PM Netanyahu responds to the 'index of incitement' and the culture of peace in the Palestinian Authority. 12 August 2012. See <http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/MediaCenter/Spokesman/Pages/spokehasata120812.aspx>. Accessed: 20 September 2012.

Israel's occupation is dismantled. To talk of reconciliation before this is to ask Palestinians to reconcile themselves to their own occupation.¹⁶⁶

4. CONCLUSION

In a statement by the permanent observer of Palestine to the UN before the 56th session of the UN General Assembly in New York on 1 October 2001, Ambassador Nasser Al-Qudwa cited the Palestinian Poet Mahmoud Darwish saying: 'Nothing, nothing can justify...polarizing the world into two camps that can never meet: one of absolute good, the other of absolute evil.'¹⁶⁷ It appears, however, that both Israeli and Palestinian leaders have been guilty of demonising their counterparts throughout the peace process.

This chapter has investigated the interaction between demonisation and diplomatic deadlock in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Using the framework of 'demonisation deadlock', it analysed the causes and effects of demonising statements in four historical periods surrounding the Oslo Accord. In the period preceding the Oslo Accord the 'nip in the bud' interaction prevailed. For the Palestinians, Israel was an illegitimate entity, a source of evil in the Middle East, an evil occupier. For the Israelis, terrorism and challenges to the existence of Israel and to the Zionist aspirations of Eretz Yisrael were the main causes of their rejectionist rhetoric. The Oslo Accord of 1993 marked a watershed in Israeli-Palestinian relations, leading to a leap of faith between the two parties. This was reflected in a

¹⁶⁶ NSU draft paper entitled 'The Prospects of Peace in the Middle East during President Obama's Administration - a Palestinians Perspective', 26 April 2010. *Palestine Papers*, <http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/5071.PDF>. Accessed: 3 May 2013.

¹⁶⁷ Ambassador Nasser Al-Qudwa, Statement before the 56th session of the UN General Assembly, New York, 1 October 2001, *PASSIA*, vol. 6, p. 252.

friendlier tone in elite narratives and a strong desire to engage in dialogue. Demonisation, however, became an instrument for sceptics and critics seeking to discredit the Accord and the peace process. The post-Oslo years saw the breakdown of the peace process and the eruption of violence in the Second Intifada. Both sides blamed the other for backtracking from their commitment under the Oslo Accord. The 'no partner for peace' interaction became prevalent and mutual distrust and delegitimisation resurfaced in elite narratives on both sides. Israeli and US's 'with or against us' efforts to combat the evils of terrorism in the post 9/11 world strengthened their ties and further problematized the role of the US's third party mediation efforts. The Gaza incursion in the winter 2008-2009 sealed the fate of the peace process, and no serious attempts at peace have taken place since.

While *substantive* issues, such as territory, Jerusalem, the right of return, security needs and water resources, remain at the core of unresolved conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, demonisation has posed an additional *relational* barrier in the peace talks. Just as asymmetry of power is a structural barrier to the resolution of the conflict, demonisation is a relationship barrier. The analysis showed that demonisation as a form of narrative was present throughout the period. It appeared both as an outcome of events on the ground or at the negotiation table and as a contributor to stalling progress in the peace talks. On the one hand, for example, the creation of Israel, the Israeli annexation of new territories in 1967, the Palestinian resistance to the occupation that persistent thereafter all created fertile grounds for demonisation. On the other hand, for example, Yitzak Shamir's statement 'I am ready to speak with Satan, but not with the PLO' for example led directly to the exclusion of the PLO from the Madrid conference and the branding of PLO as a terrorist

organisation severed all contacts between the Israeli and PLO leadership. Both had negative effects on the peace process because in either case demonisation contributed to preventing the parties from engaging with the other side.

‘Over the years we have engineered a process of mutual demonization’, Avraham Burg, a Labour Party leader and former speaker of the Knesset, once admitted in an interview on the prospects of negotiating with the PLO in the early 1990s. ‘If we are to deal with the problem realistically, we must start by de-demonizing our enemies. They have a similar barrier to overcome. They see us as devils too.’¹⁶⁸ In other words the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians is as much about creating a culture of peace, as it is about establishing a consensual contract on paper.¹⁶⁹ De-demonising the enemy is a step in the direction of peacemaking because it forces the adversaries to take each other seriously and to humanise the other. It enables them to sit down with each other in the first place, to at least ‘talk about talks’. De-demonising would be the beginning of the end of demonisation deadlock.

¹⁶⁸ Avraham Burg quoted in David Krivine, ‘Talking about talking to the PLO’, *The Jerusalem Post* (Lexis Nexis), 2 February 1990. Accessed: 4 November 2010.

¹⁶⁹ Radwan Abu Ayyash quoted in David Evans, ‘Israeli, Palestinian peacemakers must spread hope to succeed’, *The Ottawa Citizen* (Lexis Nexis), 17 September 1993. Accessed: 4 November 2010.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This thesis set out to study 'demonisation' in international politics. Questioning why contemporary political and religious leaders portray their antagonists as the devil or equate their actions with his evil doings, the thesis examined the origins of demonisation, considered the underlying reasons for its appearance and examined two different domains in international politics where demonisation might come to inform political practice, when 'waging war' and 'waging peace'. While there are many contributing factors to the complex process of war and peace-making, this thesis has focused on one particular narrative-based and psychological dimension of conflict.

As stated in the introduction, the research design applied an 'anatomy' approach to the study of demonisation: the theoretical assumption behind this approach was that by identifying where and how the phenomenon appears one can better understand why it exists in the first place and what its implications may be. Image analysis and discourse analysis were used to gather evidence of demonisation. For the historical context section (Chapter 2), online image-browsing search engines such as the Harvard University's Visual Information Access, the Oxford Digital Library and the British Museum's collection database were used to retrieve demonising images from past conflicts. By placing demonisation in historical context, the aim was to show a recurring theme of how parties hold polarising

identities of 'us' as good and 'them' as evil that add a moral dimension to conflict. Moreover, the thesis argued that demonisation might help legitimate particular courses of action, while delegitimising others. More specifically, in the context of conflict, demonisation may help to unite citizens, legitimise political authority, morally justify violence, and mobilise the military and the population at large. In the context of peace making, demonisation damages the image of a worthy peace partner and may therefore pose an additional relationship barrier to conflict resolution (Chapter 3).

Demonising narratives were explored in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While this intractable conflict has been well-documented, relatively little has been written about demonising narratives in the conflict. Three chapters were dedicated to the case study, which included an introduction to the conflict (Chapter 4), a documentation of demonisation statements (Chapter 5) and an analysis of demonising narratives in periods of diplomatic stalemate (Chapter 6). For the case study, online search engines including Lexis Nexis were used to retrieve and screen elite statements, interviews, speeches, and other government documents, and media sources for demonising narratives. Primary sources were also gathered from political memoirs, government websites, the Al-Jazeera leaked *Palestine Papers*, and personal interviews with negotiators, scholars and practitioners in Israel and the Palestinian territories. The examples of demonisation were qualitatively analysed in light of the question 'who demonises whom, when and how', which involved probing deeper into the meaning and context of the demonising statements. These also helped provide a basis for an analysis into some of the

obstacles in overcoming diplomatic deadlock in the conflict. The remainder of this chapter will discuss the thesis's scholarly contributions to the field, the key insights from its empirical findings and further avenues for research.

1. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE FIELD

Equating one's adversary with the devil or evil is not a new phenomenon, but its consequences for war and conflict resolution remain largely unexplored. Although enmity is considered endemic to the international system, IR theories pay little attention to the *constitutive* characteristics of the enemy (e.g. the enemy as 'devil' or 'evil'). Rather than focusing on the structural and interest-based sources of conflict that mainstream IR theories often prioritise, this thesis has addressed a particular discursive and psychological dimension of conflict. Along constructivist lines, the thesis presented the notion of enmity as a *social construct*, arguing that while enemies in politics are real, *perceptions* of them are constructed. Demonisation, like the Copenhagen's school concept of 'securitisation', is one particular type of threat construction through speech acts. It emphasises the bi-polar identity politics of 'us' as 'good' and 'them' as 'evil'. These discursive labels matter in that they may come to legitimise and facilitate particular political practices. The thesis considered two different contexts where this may occur, when 'waging war' and 'waging peace'. In particular, demonisation, the thesis argued, may come to further increase enmity and can provide additional relational barriers in situations of conflict and

cooperation. In doing so, it contributes to our understanding of the presence and impact of destructive discourses in international politics.

The thesis has also placed demonisation in historical context, showing how a visible demonic thread weaves itself through the centuries. The theoretical approach of looking back into the past to understand contemporary demonisation helped expose the roots of the phenomenon: that the tradition of demonising the enemy grew out of a religious character who became associated through various myths with human protagonists. Yet, while the belief that human spirits could inhabit the human body or corrupt the human mind helped give rise to the devil enemy charge, the reasons for its continued presence today are fundamentally political. The thesis therefore underscored the intimate relationship between religion and politics. In particular, it illustrated how the dichotomous notions of God and Devil are inextricably linked with secular moral notions of good and evil. This secular politicisation of the demonic in the modern era has led to a so-called 'politics of demonisation', which implies that there is an underlying agenda behind the Devil enemy charge.

The thesis further highlighted the instrumentality of demonisation in conflict, classifying four different reasons for demonisation ('unity from fear', 'legitimacy through protection', 'self-righteousness and moral heroism', and 'political and military mobilisation'). Firstly, demonisation breeds fear and this emotion can help fortify societal cohesion, where citizens unite against a common evil enemy. Secondly, a leader can more easily legitimate his actions in the light of a perceived

'evil' enemy. He will most likely also receive support for his protective efforts. Moreover the leader can gain greater political leeway by exploiting the fear of his citizens. Thirdly, demonisation helps create a biased sense of morality prone to self-righteousness. It can also bolster a sense of moral heroism. Finally, demonisation mobilises, both politically and militarily. All these factors can help nurture domestic political stability. They are also all beneficial ingredients in times of conflict. For this reason, chasing demons abroad can be expedient when 'waging wars'.

The thesis also contributes to broadening our understanding of how demonising one's enemy may come to inform political practice in the context of 'waging peace'. According to Vamik Volkan 'the view of the enemy as a dehumanized and demonic monster persists when negotiations fail'.¹ This thesis, however, has suggested considering also the converse: that negotiations may partially fail also because the view of the enemy as inhuman and demonic persists. It has argued that the very framing of the ongoing political tension in morally absolute terms of 'good' and 'evil' may itself cause problems for diplomatic engagement. This is not to say that other structural factors like the clash of material interest and the asymmetry of power are insignificant, but rather that the practice of demonisation adds complications to overcoming *substantive and material* sources of diplomatic deadlock. In particular, the qualitative characteristics of the negotiating party as 'evil' may create additional *relational* barriers. Choosing whether or not to 'shake hands with the devil' brings with it moral and pragmatic dilemmas. The thesis developed a three-dimensional framework for better understanding how demonising the enemy contributes to so-

¹ Vamik D. Volkan, *The need to have enemies and allies: from clinical practice to international relationships*, Northvale: J. Aronson, 1994, p. 124.

called 'demonisation deadlock'. The first dimension ('nip in the bud') posited why branding the enemy as 'evil' negated the possibility of any dialogue because it was considered either morally reprehensible or practically infeasible. The second dimension ('no partner for peace') dealt with how demonisation de-legitimised the diplomatic process because it fostered an image of a dishonest interlocutor, where neither party was able or willing to understand, sympathise with or trust their adversary. Finally, the third dimension ('with or against us') illustrated how the fight against 'evil' made the prospect of third-party neutrality unlikely as it presented the conflict in absolute, all-or-nothing, with-or-against-us terms. These dimensions present a useful framework for understanding the different ways in which demonisation may come to interfere with an ongoing diplomatic process.

In light of the conceptual-framework development of demonisation in the context of 'waging war' and 'waging peace', a final contribution of the thesis was to apply this framework to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Little had been written on the narratives of demonisation on both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and their impact on the evolution of the conflict. The particular insights gained from the case study will be highlighted in the following section.

2. KEY INSIGHTS FROM THE CASE STUDY

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict was the thesis's central case study. As stated in the introduction, there were both conceptual and empirical reasons for choosing this particular conflict as an illustrative example. Firstly, the conflict remains one of the most intractable conflicts of the 20th and 21st century, and so it provided fertile grounds for analysing the role of demonisation in international politics. Secondly, the conflict's violent and protracted nature allowed for the study of demonising narratives over a longer period of time. Finally, the diplomatic deadlock that has ensued between the parties despite the many peace efforts provided a crucial context for exploring the link between demonisation and diplomatic deadlock. The problem of diplomatic deadlock in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is hardly an understudied one. Even so, this thesis has explored a psychological dimension that has received relatively little attention in the academic literature on the subject.

The Israeli-Palestinian case study formed the basis for an in-depth analysis aimed at documenting demonisation in *elite* narratives. 'Who demonises whom, when and how' was the analytical enquiry that drove the study. Evidence was found on both sides of the conflict showing that Israeli and Palestinian elites demonise each other. The findings were, however, limited to the one hundred and seven quotes collected, and so they can only give us a *prima facie* sense of the demonising narratives that exist between elites in the conflict. Moreover, the focus on demonisation in the context of one illustrative case study meant that some of the thesis's findings are *sui*

generis to some extent. As showed in Chapter 5, the examples of Israeli and Palestinian demonising narratives were deeply connected to the unique history and experiences of the conflict. Particular subject matters were often raised in conjunction with demonising narratives such as the division of Jerusalem, the right of return of the refugees, the construction of settlements in the Occupied Territories, the death of Palestinian civilians in Israeli incursions or the death of Israeli civilians in Palestinian terrorist attacks. One of the key insights from the study of elite demonisation was that there were often *different* causes behind each side's demonising narratives: more specifically, Palestinian demonisation of Israelis was often an expression of anti-colonial, anti-Zionist and anti-occupation sentiments which arose in the context of their own colonised experience. Terrorism and security concerns were the central themes behind Israeli demonising discourse, which arose in the context of their own experiences of terrorism. Thus anatomising the different types of demonising discourses revealed how the same speech act could be used to express different experiences and realities of the same conflict.

While the origins of Israeli and Palestinian demonisation are unique, there did appear to be some generalisable patterns across the examples. A common cause of demonisation on both sides, for example, was the 'destructive' nature of the adversary. Many of the statements appeared in the context of the other side's violent provocations, be it through the form of suicide bombings, rocket launching, military incursions or settlement building. Moreover, the enemy's intent to harm was portrayed as deliberate and followed by no remorse. In certain quotes, the enemy was portrayed as taking pleasure in the act of killing. Demonising narratives existed

across the political spectrum. On the Israeli side, there appeared to be a relationship between party affiliation and levels of demonisation with more demonising statements from right-wing affiliated parties. On the Palestinian side, Hamas member statements were more extreme and literal than Fatah. Religious leaders on both sides used more literal demonising statements to help mobilise their followers. These patterns suggest that there may be a prima facie case pointing towards higher degrees of demonisation within particular groups of a society with more conservative and religious origins. Examining the targets of the demonising narratives also gave insights into those blamed for the evils in the conflict. The thesis's empirical findings showed that Israel and Zionism were the two most frequent targets of the Palestinian demonisation narrative as they represent both the state, which is seen as responsible for the dispossession of their land, and the nationalistic, political, and ideological movement that gave rise to it. In the case of Hamas, alternative titles such as 'the evil Zionist occupation forces' and 'the Zionist hellish machine' were often used instead of 'Israel' to capitalise on their non-recognition of the state. Israeli narratives pointed primarily to the 'terrorists'. The absence of the term 'Palestine' in the statements likely reflected the Israeli elite's reluctance to acknowledge the notion of an independent Palestinian nation state. Non-recognition of the 'other' and demonisation, then, appeared to go hand in hand. This finding suggests that there may likely be a case for arguing that parties who are less likely to recognise each other politically are more likely to use demonisation as a delegitimising tool. Also underlying motivational themes of mobilisation, legitimacy, unity and self-righteousness - identified in the 'waging war' section of Chapter 3 - appeared in the demonising narratives between Israelis and Palestinians. In some cases elites demonised their opponents to mobilise support

from their followers, to legitimise violence against the other, to unify their society against a common enemy or to portray their side as righteous or virtuous or as possessing moral rectitude. The notion that the other sides 'evilness' was deserving of punishment and that the cause of 'good' would prevail in the light of 'evil' appeared on both sides as well.

In Chapter 6, Israeli-Palestinian demonisation was evaluated in the context of 'waging peace'. Focus was placed on the relationship between demonisation and diplomatic deadlock in the conflict – the so-called 'demonisation deadlock'. The aim was to show how demonisation is one factor among many that have complicated the negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. The unresolved *structural* issues that prevent a peace agreement include among others: (1) the border dispute over the 1967 occupied territories; (2) settlement constructions and potential land-swaps; (3) the right to return; and (4) the division of Jerusalem. These issues lie at the heart of the conflict and create conditions for demonisation narratives to grow. However, while there is much literature on the *substantive* issues of deadlock, relatively little emphasis has been placed on demonisation as a *relational* barrier in peace talks. In particular, emphasis was placed on how narratives of evil and deception contributed to worsening relations between the negotiating parties and therefore further problematised a final settlement of the conflict. This is because moral and pragmatic dilemmas emerge from the framing of the peace-process as 'shaking hands with the devil' (i.e. whether it is (a) ethically permissible and (b) practically possible).

The focus on demonisation narratives showed that the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians was conducted under conditions of mistrust. Both parties had other underlying reasons for non-reconciliation that went hand in hand with the demonising rhetoric: for the Palestinians, negotiating with the Israelis would have meant accepting their legitimacy not only as a peace partner, but also as a territorial neighbour. For Israelis, two main arguments prevented them from sitting at the table with Palestinians: the first is based on the existential principle, namely that one cannot negotiate about one's right to exist. Secondly, accepting formal talks with representatives of the Palestinian people would challenge those with an ideological commitment to the Whole Land of Israel.

Four historical periods surrounding the Oslo Accord were used to illustrate the change in elite narratives. In the pre-Oslo phase, the premise of mutual non-recognition between Israeli and Palestinian elites created fertile grounds for reciprocal demonisation. This mutual demonisation generated a lack of willingness on either side to negotiate and therefore contributed to nipping any diplomatic process in the bud. The Oslo Peace Accord of September 1993, however, was a watershed moment in Israeli-Palestinian relations, symbolising a leap of trust on both sides. Both parties expressed willingness to negotiate and there was a noticeable discursive shift away from demonisation, which corresponded to this new attitude. However a counter-current of critics to the Oslo Peace Accord continued to employ demonising vocabulary through the use of the metaphor of 'shaking hands with the devil'. Demonisation emerged from those who were either critical to the moral credentials and trustworthiness of their negotiating party or who wished to sabotage the peace process altogether because they found it morally

reprehensible to negotiate with the (D)evil enemy. Intra-demonisation campaigns also followed between those who were against and those who were in favour of the peace talks. Mutual distrust and demonisation therefore resurfaced in elite narratives in the post-Oslo era's 'no partner for peace' rhetoric with both sides blaming the other for backtracking from their commitments. For the Israelis, the Palestinians were not credible peace partners because of their return to terrorism. For the Palestinians, Israel's creeping annexation of their land had trumped its ambitions for peace.

With this climate of mutual distrust and violence, the path to peace was abandoned and the image of the enemy as untrustworthy, deceptive and evil came back. Yet again Israeli-Palestinian peace talks were overwhelmed by a spiral of violence and incitement, with the second intifada marking the definitive end of the optimistic Oslo-era. The first decade of the 21st century witnessed a renewed tension between the parties. The 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 added an additional 'with or against us' dimension to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with the Israelis placing themselves together with the Americans as the mantle holders of democratic good in the evil war on terror. Ariel Sharon's unilateral government policies and the construction of the Israeli security barrier further deteriorated relations between the parties. The rise in popularity of Hamas in the Palestinian territories and its hardline approach towards Israel also contributed to rising tensions. Tit-for-tat violence between Hamas and the Israeli government climaxed with Israel's 'Operation Cast Lead' assault on Gaza, which totally destroyed what was left of the peace process.

The study of demonisation in the rise and fall of the Oslo Accord illustrates the problematic role that hate narratives like demonisation can play alongside efforts to negotiate with the adversary. This is not to say that demonisation is the root cause of deadlock in the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, but rather that it is one factor among many, more specifically a *relational* barrier, that hinders – perhaps consciously so – the *substantive* issues from being resolved.

3. AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This study of demonisation has opened up avenues for future research. The thesis has focused mainly on the single case study of Israel-Palestine for insights into demonisation narratives in an acute conflict over several decades. But the same method can be applied to analyse other historic and contemporary conflicts. In particular, one could compare demonisation across cases with similar conflict dynamics to Israel and Palestine. The notion of ‘occupation’ and ‘settler-colonialism’, for example, which was a particular feature of Palestinian demonising narratives, also appears in other contexts. For example, anti-occupation sentiments exist in the China-Tibet conflict where there is a tradition of self-immolation amongst Tibetan monks who protest against what they perceive as the Chinese occupation of their homeland. Interestingly, demonising discourses have appeared also in this context: when eighteen-year old Nangdrol, for instance, set himself on fire near the Zamthang Monastery in the northeast Tibetan town of Barma, he left a suicide note affirming: ‘I am going to set myself on fire for the benefit of all Tibetans.’ Referring to China’s ethnic Han majority as ‘devils,’ the monk added, ‘It is impossible to live

under their *evil* law, impossible to bear this torture that leaves no scars.’² In turn, Chinese government officials have returned the demonising charge. In 2012, for example, China strongly objected to the UN’s critique that its government should better address grievances in Tibetan areas where there had been frequent self-immolations. The Chinese government maintained that the protests were instigated by Tibetan exiles in an ‘ugly and *evil*’ attempt to promote separatism.³ Also the Dalai Lama, the exiled spiritual leader of the Tibetans, has been the target of Chinese demonisation. According to Wikileaks documents, for instance, the former Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi reported to US Ambassador Clark T. Randt in a cable following the award of the Congressional Gold Medal to the Dalai Lama in 2007 that he was the ‘personification of *evil* and deception’.⁴ Despite these examples of mutual-demonisation in the China-Tibet case, there does not appear to be much academic writing on the subject.⁵ The China-Tibetan case also includes the non-monotheist religion of Buddhism and the secular Communist tradition and a possible research question would be to compare whether these different ideologies have influenced the demonisation narratives on either side of the conflict. For example would the fact that the two conflicts (Israel-Palestine/China-Tibet) differ in terms of religious demographics – despite being similar in the occupation-aspect - affect their comparative demonising discourses?

² Xu Zhiyong, ‘Tibet is burning’, *The New York Times*, 12 December 2012 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/13/opinion/tibet-is-burning.html?_r=0. Accessed: 12 September 2013. Emphasis added.

³ Human Rights Watch, *China: Tibetan Immolations, Security Measures Escalate*, 29 November 2012, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/50b8a5a12.html>. Accessed: 12 September 2013. Emphasis added.

⁴ Confidential cable leaked by wikileaks entitled ‘07Beijing6733’, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/10/07BEIJING6733.html>. Accessed: 11 September 2013. Emphasis added.

⁵ While there are articles on the demonising tradition of the early Communist regime under Mao Zedong (see for example Michael Schoenhals, ‘Demonising Discourse in Mao Zedong’s China: People vs Non-People’ in *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, vol. 8, no. 3-4, September-December 2007, pp. 465-482), there does not appear to be much academic literature of Chinese demonisation of Tibetans or vice versa.

The Northern Ireland conflict would be another interesting case study given that the occupied/occupier dynamic existed also there. Anti-occupation sentiment amongst Irish Catholics against the 'evil' British, at times, manifested themselves in violent terrorist attacks and bombings, often executed by the Irish Republican Army.⁶ These in turn gave rise to anti-terrorism condemnations on the loyalist and British side. Tony Blair, for instance, condemned the Omagh bombing in Northern Ireland carried out by the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) four months after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 as 'an appalling act of savagery and *evil*.'⁷ His condemnation echoes that of Israeli leaders following Palestinian attacks. Northern Ireland would also be a fruitful case to explore the notion of 'de-demonisation' in a so-far successful outcome of the peace process. It would be interesting to investigate whether the parties overcame their differences purely through finding common interests or whether they also changed the narratives surrounding the conflict in the process. A comparison of demonisation across several cases would help further determine whether the analytical insights offered by the thesis can be extrapolated to other conflicts.

Other ethnic and nationalist-based conflicts such as the Rwandan genocide or the breakdown of the former Yugoslavia could be investigated in order to see whether the patterns found in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict apply to their demonising

⁶ For more on demonisation and hate speeches in the Northern Ireland conflict see for example, Paul Dixon, 'Political Skills or Lying and Manipulation? The Choreography of the Northern Ireland Peace Process' in *Political Studies*, vol. 50, no. 4, September 2002, p. 727 and Roger Macginty, 'Hate Crimes in Deeply Divided Societies: The Case of Northern Ireland', *New Political Science*, vol. 22, no. 1, 2000, p. 58.

⁷ Tony Blair quoted on the *BBC*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/events/northern_ireland/latest_news/152156.stm, 16 August 1998. Accessed: 12 September 2013. Emphasis added.

discourses. Do the parties hold polarising identities of 'us' as 'good' and 'them' as 'evil' and, if so, do they differ according to degrees of religiosity and political orientation? Is the destructive nature of the adversary the most crucial context for the demonising narrative? Can the four reasons for demonising when 'waging war' or the three scenarios of demonisation deadlock be applied to these cases? The need to contextualise and to understand the historical issues that feed their narratives will remain important for understanding the particularities of each conflict, but a cross-comparison might also help reveal similarities. Moreover, future comparative analyses between several case studies might lend themselves to new and different sets of questions regarding demonisation. For example, does the level of demonisation vary according to the different religions, cultures or races? Is cross-racial demonisation (like that which took place between the Americans and the Japanese during the Second World War) more severe than inter-racial demonisation? Is the demonisation within constituents of the same umbrella faith, for example between Sunni and Shia Muslims different from demonisation across religions? These research questions could open up avenues for investigating different kinds and different levels of demonisation and for exploring the factors that may affect them.

Placing more emphasis on the 'audience' is another avenue for the future research on demonisation: in other words, asking who are the expected recipients of the demonising narratives? One could ask whether the demonisation charge and its intensity might change according to the various audiences. One would be able to investigate the audience aspect empirically by looking at the presence of

demonisation in different types of documents or statements, and to see when and to whom they were directed. Another interesting study would be to compare degrees of demonisation in private and public government sources to see whether the discourses matched. The assumption here being that if there was a discord between private and public discourse of the enemy's degree of 'evilness', then demonisation could be demonstrated as tactical. The audience question matters, then, because it can help provide further explanation about why actors demonise in the first place. It shifts the focus away from the demonised party's evil actions to the demoniser's intentions. In other words, do state leaders use the demonising language for purely instrumental reasons, or is their discourse also a reflection of their genuine beliefs and deeper normative values of right and wrong?

Finally, there are important aspects underlying the very validity of demonisation that remain open to question as the thesis comes to a close. These include questions about the very nature of 'evil', whether it exists, what objective criteria qualify for it, whether it should be stopped or whether demonising at times may be a necessarily mobilising force to stop other societal evils. Can evil means be used to combat other evil ends? Is using the term 'devil' or 'evil' in the context of genocide really demonising? Conceptually, the thesis excluded moral evaluations of the demonic charge because its primary focus was on the occurrence of the evil accusation itself. The thesis therefore explicitly did not question whether the demonising charge was accurate or justified. In an op-ed entitled 'demons and demonization', the economist Paul Krugman once argued that 'saying that people do terrible things isn't

demonization if they do, in fact, do terrible things'.⁸ After all, the diabolic enemy image is not created in a vacuum and demonisation is often a consequence of real, violent and acute antagonisms. As one scholar noted: 'A victim of demonisation may indeed be a demon'.⁹

⁸ Paul Krugman, 'Demons and Demonization', *NYT*, <http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/17/demons-and-demonization/>, 17 March 2010. Accessed: 14 January 2010.

⁹ Wistrich, *Demonizing the other*, p. 301.

APPENDIX A: THE STATEMENTS
STATEMENTS OF PALESTINIANS DEMONISING ISRAELIS

#	Date	Elite	Statement	Reference
1	18 Jul 1934	Awni Abd Al-Hadi, President of the Palestinian Istiqlal Party	Ben-Gurion as inflicting 'horrible evil' upon Palestinians: 'You [Ben-Gurion] are active in tempting the fellahin, taking over their lands by means of the greatest calamity and horrible evil with which we are afflicted'.	Meeting between David Ben-Gurion and President of the Palestinian Istiqlal Party, PASSIA, vol. 1, p. 306.
2	28 May 1964	PLO document	Forces of international Zionism and colonialism as 'evil': 'We, the Palestinian Arab people, who faced the forces of evil, injustice and aggression, against whom the forces of international Zionism and colonialism conspired and worked to displace it, dispossess it from its homeland and property, abused what is holy in it and who in spite of all this refused to weaken or submit'.	National Covenant of the Palestine Liberation Organization, First Arab Palestine Congress, Jerusalem, PASSIA, vol. 2, p.231.
3	14 Jul 1979	Muhammad Ash-Sha'ir, PLO rep. in Moscow	Character description of Israel as brutal, criminal, evil, destructive and with calculated intent to harm: 'Israel...is an executive instrument and a criminal tool in the hands of world Zionism, which since its inception has undertaken to spread evil and destruction in the world. It pursues a policy of domination and trickery, creates sedition and attacks any liberation movement or progressive tendency. Worst of all it persists with the connivance of the USA, with the implementation of its frightful plan to impose occupation and domination, to usurp land and kill children, women and old people – as Israel is most brutally doing in southern Lebanon. Israel exposed its grave designs and sinister aggressive spirit when it declared through its Cabinet that it will destroy the Palestinians wherever they may be'.	BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Lexis Nexis). Source: Moscow radio in Arabic 1700 GMT 12 Jul 1979.
4	17 Jul 1981	Yasser Arafat	US-Zionist oppressor and its 'evils, terrorism, crime and unequalled ferocity': 'Brothers, beloved ones, sons of our heroic Lebanese, Palestinian people, every man, woman and child; my beloved steadfast ones against the terrorist murderers, beloved faithful, patient ones stationed in the most important arena of the struggle in our Arab nation and in the strongest fortress of Arab steadfastness against the US-Zionist oppressor and all its evils, terrorism, crimes and unequalled ferocity'.	BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Lexis Nexis) 20 Jul 1981. Source: Excerpts from recorded message on 'Voice of Palestine'.

5	28 Jan 1981	Yasser Arafat	Begin's methods as worse than the Devil: 'The whole world also heard the Prime Minister of the enemy, Menachem Begin, declaring that he will fight the PLO and the strugglers in the Palestinian revolution with methods which even the Devil has not thought of.'	BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Lexis Nexis) 30 January 1981. Source: Excerpts from Arafat's speech on 'Voice of Palestine'.
6	4 Mar 1982	Ali Hasan, Arafat's assistant	Zionism as the Devil: 'Zionism is the Devil, we do not negotiate with it; anyway, it will not survive for long'.	BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Lexis Nexis) 5 March 1982. Source: Israel television service.
7	28 Jul 1988	Yasser Arafat	Zionist force as evil: '...these evil Zionist force have as their objective the destruction of the Al-Aqsa mosque and the Dome of the Rock'.	Letter to King Fahd bin Abdalaziz, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Lexis Nexis).
8	18 Aug 1988	Hamas Covenant	Zionist invasion as 'evil', devious and sinful: 'The Zionist invasion is a vicious invasion. It does not refrain from resorting to all methods, using all evil and contemptible ways to achieve its end. It relies greatly in its infiltration and espionage operations on the secret organizations it gave rise to...All these organizations, whether secret or open, work in the interest of Zionism and according to its instructions. They aim at undermining societies, destroying values, corrupting consciences, deteriorating character and annihilating Islam. It is behind the drug trade and alcoholism in all its kinds so as to facilitate its control and expansion'.	Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement of Palestine (Hamas), PASSIA, vol. 4, p.18.
9	18 Aug 1988	Hamas Covenant	Oppressors as 'unclean, vile and evil': 'calls upon Muslims to raise the banner of Jihad in the face of the oppressors, so that they will rid the land and the people of their uncleanness, vileness and evils'.	Ibid.
10	13 May 1989	PLO radio broadcast	Israel's 'evil doings and sins': '...the existence, meaning and destiny of Israel are linked to the wish of the US administration and to the US military, political and economic umbrella that shields Israel from the consequences of its evil doings and sins, including its daily official, systematized terrorism against our kinfolk in the occupied territories'.	BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Lexis Nexis).
11	4 Mar 1994	Jibril Rajoub, former head of Preventive Security Force in the West Bank	Settlers to hell: 'Rabin has to remove all the settlers from the West Bank and Gaza and transfer them to hell'.	Israel's War against Terror. Source: Yediot Ahronot.

12	4 May 1994	Imad al-Alami, Hamas	Selling the soul to the Devil: He added that Palestine was not owned by those who sold themselves to the devil, including the Arafatist leadership, which disowned our people's revolution, struggle, and all Islamic and Arab values.	BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Lexis Nexis) 6 May 1994. Source: Al-Quds Palestinian Arab Radio in Arabic.
13	7 Aug 1996	Yasser Arafat	Settlements as 'demon': 'The most important thing is to confront this demon that swallows up everything, including the peace process'.	New York Times (Lexis Nexis).
14	17 Mar 1997	Nabil Ramlawi, Palestinian representative	Accusation of deliberate harm: 'Israeli authorities... infected by injection 300 Palestinian children with the HIV virus during the years of the intifada'.	Quote from a session of the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. Cited in Israel's War against Terror. Source: Jerusalem Post.
15	15 Mar 1997	Othman Abu Gharbieh, Arafat's Advisor on National Political Guidance	Character trait: 'We are fighting and struggling with an enemy who is Shylock. We must know that he is Shylock'.	Israel's War against Terror. Source: Voice of Palestine.
16	29 Mar 1997	PA Information Ministry Press release	Israeli governments' deliberate harm: 'Since the very beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israeli governments were anxious to apply the most dangerous ethnic cleansing theory against the Palestinian people'.	Israel's War against Terror. Source: a 'PA source'.
17	9 Jul 1997	Abdel Hamid al-Qudsi, PA Deputy Minister of Supplies	Israeli mafia and generals' deliberate harm: 'There is an Israeli mafia which is distributing spoiled food products under the aegis of Israeli generals in the territories of the Palestinian Authority... they are distributors of death'.	Speech at the Chamber of Commerce. Cited in Israel's War against Terror. Source: Itim news agency.
18	25 Jun 1997	Abdel Hamid al-Qudsi, PA Deputy Minister of Supplies	Accusation of deliberate harm: 'Israel is distributing food containing material that causes cancer and hormones that harm male virility and other spoiled food products in the Palestinian Authority's territories in order to poison and harm the Palestinian population. We absolutely feel that it is an organized plan and conspiracy which is under the auspices of the Israel Defense Forces... this is a planned and initiated war against the Palestinian people'.	Israel's War against Terror. Source: Yediot Ahronot.
19	3 Nov 1998	PA TV Religious Broadcast	Jews as seeds of Satan: 'The Jews are the seed of Satan and the devils....To their Prophets they attribute the greatest of crimes: murder, prostitution, and drunkenness....They have distorted the faith and exchanged the gift of God for heresy, rebellion and prostitution, and distorted the Torah'.	Israel's War against Terror. Source: 'a PA religious broadcast'.

20	17 Mar 1998	Hamas website	Occupation as 'evil': ' Hamas called on the foreign ministers of the Organization of the Islamic Conference [OIC] to affirm the right of the Palestinian people to resist against occupation using all available means, thus expressing their rejection of the occupation and repulsing it and its evils'.	BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Lexis Nexis). Source: Hamas, website in Arabic.
21	18 Aug 1998	Ibrahim Nimre Hussein, former mayor of the Arab town of Shafa Amre in the Galilee	Israeli leaders' secret 'evil designs': 'Israeli leaders speak about equality and co-existence in public and plot evil designs against us in secret'.	'Israeli report proof of rampant racism' by Khalid Amayreh in Middle East Newsfile (Lexis Nexis).
22	18 Jun 1998	Hamas	The Oslo agreements as evil: 'We emphasize that our acceptance to this meeting is not in any way linked with consultations on the composition of the governmental council, which is part of the <i>evil</i> Oslo Agreements, which have been rejected by our people as well as by our movement'.	Statement to President Yasser Arafat regarding the negotiations with the PA, PASSIA, vol. 5, p.356.
23	12 Sep 1999	Yasser Arafat	Sinful and vicious attempts: 'Sinful and vicious attempts are now being made to cast despair and frustration in the hearts of the Palestinian refugees, to undermine their splendid patriotic steadfastness, which has protected the Palestinian cause from being wasted and forgotten. This is the outcome of a tremendous colonialist conspiracy against our people'.	Remarks on the Sharm el-Sheikh memorandum to the Arab foreign ministers council, Cairo, PASSIA, vol. 6, p. 21.
24	17 Nov 2000	Fuad Abu Hijleh, Columnist in PA official newspaper	Settlers as 'rats': 'The settlers are a dirty stain on our land....It is time to begin expelling them by besieging them, cutting off their electricity, and contaminating their water....They will become groups of rats gathering in their sewers before they are driven away into Israel'.	Al-Hayat Al-Jedida, November 3, 2000, MEMRI, Special Dispatch No. 153.
25	18 Oct 2000	Former Hamas member Ismail Abu Shanab	Bringing the devil into the Middle East: 'The Israelis have brought the Devil into the Middle East'.	Cited in Harvey Morris, 'Violence has quashed signs of development in Palestinian Territories', <i>Financial Times</i> (Lexis Nexis).
26	2001	PA sponsored schoolbook	Jewish 'treacherous' character traits: 'One must beware of the Jews for they are treacherous and disloyal'.	Palestinian Media Watch 'Kill a Jew – and go to heaven', Special report, 2005.

27	6 Dec 2001	Ahmad Hillis, the Fatah secretary in the Gaza strip	Israeli government and 'butcher' Sharon's deliberate intention to harm: 'No doubt, the escalating pace of the ugly Israeli aggression and the widening circle of Israeli attacks are part of a carefully-studied programme prepared by the government of terrorism in Israel against our Palestinian people, their National Authority, institutions and factions....We hold the government of the butcher Sharon and the entire international community fully responsible for this hostile aggression and for all the repercussions that will come forth from this aggression... We want to stress that the only thing worthy of being called terrorism is the Israeli occupation. The Israeli occupation is the peak of official and systematic state-sponsored terrorism. Israel is devoting the most powerful military force in the region to slaughter an unarmed people and to chase after children using American Apaches'.	BBC Monitoring Middle East (Lexis Nexis) 6 December 2001. Source: Palestine TV, Gaza, in Arabic.
28	25 Jan 2001	Yasser Abed Rabbo, PA Information Minister	Sharon as 'a blood-thirsty racist' thus electing him is 'an evil act': 'The victory of Ariel Sharon will lead to disaster and war.' He said electing Sharon would be 'an evil act' because he is a 'blood-thirsty racist who has no sense of responsibility toward his own people.'	Ha'aretz (Lexis Nexis).
29	16 Dec 2001	Yasser Arafat	Israelis launching an immoral and malicious war: 'From the depth of this agony and this epic endurance of our people and institutions, I declare that this immoral and malicious war will not break the resolve of this great people, nor will it taint the will and pride of a people that stands firm in the face of indignity, as history has stood witness'.	Address to the Palestinian People, PASSIA, vol. 6, p.277.
30	14 Apr 2002	Khader Abas, lecturer in psychology at Gaza's Al-Aksa University on PA TV	Character description of Israelis: 'The Israelis brought on themselves...in every society they lived, disasters and massacres: first, they concentrated money in their hands, denying it to others. Second, they spied against the nations where they lived. And the third, important and basic aspect they [behaved as though they] were superior. These three elements created hatred [of Jews]'.	'Anti-semitism in arab-muslim media' on Discoverthenetwork.org Source: PA TV.
31	27 Mar 2002	Yasser Arafat	Occupying forces as treacherous: 'While our people are still burying their martyrs and healing the wounds of their children, their youth, their elderly and their women; while facing the winter of this year under the ruins of their homes which were destroyed and in the midst of the debris of all that we have built during the last few years, in terms of infrastructures that were also repeatedly destroyed by the treacherous occupying forces'.	Speech to the 14th Arab Summit, Beirut, PASSIA, vol. 6, p. 306.

32	8 Aug 2002	Imud Falouji, PA Communications Minister	The Jewish nation as deceitful: 'The Jewish nation, it is known, from the dawn of history, from the time Allah created them, lives by scheme and deceit'.	Jewish Virtual Library. Source: PA TV.
33	20 May 2002	Ahmad Jibril, Secretary General of the PLFP	A triangle of evil: 'We know they – that triangle of evil are capable of getting us, and they did this time. But that doesn't mean they will succeed – be able to get us every time'.	Al-Jazeera (Lexis Nexis).
34	6 Feb 2004	Ahmad Nasser, Secretary of the PLC	Israel as a 'satanic offspring': 'Israel, the State of Israel, is the Satan's offspring, a Satanic offspring. Israel was founded on theft from the first moment. It was founded on the basis of robbery, terror, killing, torture, assassination, death, stealing land and killing people. On this basis, Israel was founded and will continue this way, never able to exist because its [Israel's] birth was unnatural, a Satanic offspring, and cannot exist among human beings...Israel is an aggressive country, a racist country, an ideologically hostile country, which hates all the <i>goyim</i> , all the foreigners. Israel is a Satanic offspring'.	Palestinian Media Watch. Source: PA TV.
35	12 Mar 2004	Ibrahim Mudayris	Jews as 'apes and pigs' deserving death: 'Here are the Jews today taking revenge for their grandfathers and ancestors, the sons of apes and pigs...They are extremists and terrorists who deserve death, while we deserve life, since we have a just cause'.	Jewish Virtual Library. Source: sermon on Gaza Palestine Satellite TV.
36	12 Sep 2004	Ibrahim Mudayris	Jews and the sons of Zion as 'monkeys and pigs': 'We are waging this cruel war with the brothers of the monkeys and pigs, the Jews and the sons of Zion. The Jews will fight you and you will subjugate them'.	Jewish Virtual Library. Source: PA TV.
37	26 Sept 2004	Hamas	The 'evil' Zionist occupation': 'While praying to God to accept one of its distinguished cadres as martyr, the Hamas movement holds the evil Zionist occupation forces responsible for this heinous crime and stresses that such crimes, which unite the Palestinian blood inside and outside Palestine, will not intimidate us and will not deter us from pursuing the path of jihad and resistance'.	BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Lexis Nexis).
38	22 Mar 2004	Izzedin Al-Qassam Brigades	Zionists as murderous: 'O Murderous Zionists, you have bestowed martyrdom upon our Sheikh, and we will bestow violent death upon you on every city and every street'.	Statement following the assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, PASSIA, vol. 7, p. 207.
39	25 Mar 2004	Statement by the Palestinians from Political, Intellectual and social institutions	Sharon's coldblooded murder: 'The cold-blooded murder of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and his faithful companions by Sharon and his right-wing extremist government two days ago epitomizes Israel's criminal and insidious behavior'.	'Enough assassination, enough of the occupation, stop the bloodshed', PASSIA, vol. 7, p. 208.

40	Mar 2004	Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Hamas Leader	Zionists as 'evil' and not worthy of negotiating with: 'Our people need economic support to boost their steadfastness after the evil Zionists destroyed all sources of a dignified living for that people and stole their wealth.... We urge you to activate boycott of that enemy and to end all contacts and cooperation with it'.	Letter to the Arab Summit Meeting in Tunis, PASSIA, vol. 7, p. 206.
41	30 May 2004	PLO executive committee	Sharon as deceiving and maneuvering: 'The consecutive plans announced by Sharon confirm he is not serious and continues deceiving and maneuvering'.	Political statement after meeting with representatives of the Palestinian factions, Ramallah, PASSIA, vol. 7, p.241.
42	22 Jun 2005	Islamic Jihad Movement	Zionist enemy killing in cold blood: 'The Zionist enemy is committing crimes against the free mujahidin. It has killed in cold blood...'	Statement to the Palestinian People, PASSIA, vol. 7, p. 395.
43	15 Mar 2005	Mahmoud Al-Zahar, Hamas Foreign Minister and co-founder	Israeli enemy killing prophets: 'I direct a clear message to the Israeli enemy:...you, who killed your prophets, and whose fate throughout history has been destruction;...you were destined for destruction and you remain so'.	Palestinian Media Watch. Source: the National Conference for Maintaining Principles on Al-Aqsa TV (Hamas).
44	13 May 2005	Ibrahim Mudayris	Israel as a cancer: 'Israel is a cancer spreading in the body of the Islamic nation'.	Palestinian Media Watch. Source: Palestinian TV (Fatah) (includes video).
45	7 Jan 2005	Ibrahim Mudayris	Jews as a cancer: 'The Jews are a cancer spreading in the body of the Arab nation and the Islamic nation, a cancer that has spread and reached the Arab institutions, the villages and the refugee camps'.	Jewish Virtual Library. Source: sermon on PA TV.
46	25 May 2005	Sufian Abu-Zaideh, head of Israeli desk at PA	Evil intentions of Israeli government: 'In statements to our radio this morning, Abu-Zayidah added that Sharon's announcement on the eve of President Mahmud Abbas's arrival to Washington reflects evil intentions, especially since Israel has arrested more than 500 citizens since the Sharm al-Shaykh summit'.	BBC Monitoring Middle East (Lexis Nexis).
47	10 Dec 2005	Hamas	Zionist hellish machines as 'demonic and criminal force': 'The Zionist hellish machine continues to kill Palestinians without getting tired or bored, indifferent to the calm and to the appeals made by the Palestinian [National] Authority and others for a halt to the aggression and assassinations. It has thus proved for the one thousandth time that it is a demonic and criminal force whose only concern is to shed blood and kill innocent people....Let the occupation know that regardless of its cruelty and tyranny, it will eventually fade away, because wrong cannot defeat right	BBC Monitoring Middle East (Lexis Nexis). Source: Palestinian Information Centre website in Arabic.

			and evil cannot defeat good. We are confident that victory is ours, God willing, against the state of evil, corruption, and tyranny’.	
48	15 Apr 2006	Isma'il Haniyah, Hamas	Israeli military occupation as ‘evil and dehumanizing’: ‘As the Palestinian people continue their long and painful journey for freedom and independence, we look to the future with hope and optimism. Indeed, it is this hope, this strong faith in the justice of our cause, that kept us going all these years and made us withstand the suffering and brutality meted out to us by an evil and dehumanizing Israeli military occupation’.	BBC Monitoring Middle East (Lexis Nexis). Source: Text of commentary by Haniyeh entitled ‘Peace can only be the fruit of justice’, published in English by Egyptian newspaper Al Ahram Weekly website on 13 April 2006.
49	22 Oct 2006	Ramadan Abdallah, Islamic Jihad Movement Secretary-General	Zionist entity and US as ‘the camp of evil’: ‘We realize that the Palestinian situation is facing an impasse and acute crises. These are hard days indeed in which the camp of evil and falsity led by the USA and the Zionist entity as well as their agents and lackeys in the region are practicing the vilest and basest forms of blockade and aggression against the Palestinian people.’	BBC Monitoring Middle East (Lexis Nexis). Source: addresses at Gaza rally via telephone speech.
50	12 Apr 2007	Yussuf Al-Sharafi, Hamas rep. of the PLC	Jews/Israel as intrinsically murderous: ‘The representative of the Legislative Council, Dr. Yussuf Al-Sharafi, of the ‘Change and Reform’ faction [Hamas], emphasized the option of Jihad and resistance to banish the thieves of the occupation, who longed to drink the blood of our massacred people...because the Jewish faith does not wish for peace nor stability, since it is a faith that is based on murder: ‘I kill, therefore I am...’. Israel is based only on blood and murder in order to exist, and it will disappear, with Allah’s will, through blood and Shahids (Martyrs)’	Palestinian Media Watch. Source: Al-Rissala (Hamas Weekly).
51	3 Mar 2008	Najat Abu-Bakr, Member of PA parliament (Fatah)	Enemy as a ‘wolf’: ‘This enemy was born of massacres, a segregation mentality, marginalizing, killing and destroying. Due to this Zionist mentality, we [the Palestinians] are like a pen of sheep from which a wolf grabs a sheep every day’.	Palestinian Media Watch. Source: PA TV (Fatah) (includes video).
52	2 Feb 2009	Mahmoud Abbas	Israel as ‘evil aggressor’: ‘This is Israel, which continues to attack our people every day. We know that Israel is an evil aggressor and that it has committed many crimes against the Palestinian people’.	BBC Monitoring Middle East (Lexis Nexis). Source: Text of report by Palestinian presidency-controlled news agency Wafa website.

53	24 Jun 2009	Yahya Rabah, daily PA columnist	Israel as a 'possessed demon': 'The state of Israel cannot bear the contradiction, being a country that lives like a demon that takes possession of another body. The state of Israel lives within the Palestinian body in Palestinian land and Palestinian cities....and despite all the aggression, and despite the whole ugly deception, Israel...looks like a demon that enters a person's body, causing him suffering and depriving him of sleep and torturing him'.	Palestinian Media Watch. Source: Al-Hayat Al-Jadida (Fatah).
54	29 Jul 2009	Bassam Khoury, PA economy minister	The occupation as the cause of all evil: 'The occupation and its associated policies was, is and will remain the cause of all evil.'	Draft of Bader Khoury Speech at University of Tel Aviv, http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/4738.PDF .
55	17 May 2010	Ahmed Hanoun, PLO director of refugees in Ramallah	Murderous 'Zionist gangs': '...we are marking the 62nd anniversary of Nakba, which befell our Palestinian people when the Zionist gangs carried out dozens of acts of massacre, destroyed hundreds of Palestinian villages, and carried out the most extensive campaign of collective expulsion against our Palestinian people'.	Palestinian Media Watch. Source: PA TV (Fatah).

STATEMENTS OF ISRAELIS DEMONISING PALESTINIANS

#	Date	Elite	Statement	Reference
1	3 May 1950	Knesset document	Arab country as 'devil': 'One does not choose one's enemies, or even the regimes in hostile countries, nor does one sign armistice agreements with allies...We could not prevent any Arab country giving bases to the devil himself unless we conquered those areas'.	Government of Israel, 135 th sitting of the First Knesset, PASSIA, vol. 2, p. 154.
2	14 Mar 1978	Menachem Begin	The 'evil hand' of terrorism: 'We shall defend our citizens, our women and children. We shall cut off the arm of evil and we shall not allow under any conditions an evil hand to be lifted against the head of a Jewish child or women'.	The Washington Post (Lexis Nexis).
3	14 Mar 1978	Menachem Begin	Arafat as 'master murderer' and 'beastly' PLO terrorism: 'Mr. Begin described the attack as "one of the most terrible and beastly acts of infamy of all time". The Israeli leader went on: "Only three days ago (PLO chief Yasser) Arafat, the master murderer, was in Moscow being received with great honor."'	The Globe and Mail, Canada (Lexis Nexis).
4	27 Mar 1982	Menachem Milson, Israeli civilian governor of the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip	PLO's 'evil doctrine' and 'evil organization': 'Eliminating pro-PLO influence from the West Bank is necessary, Milson said, because "this destructive position of the PLO and the evil doctrines behind it are illegitimate. They are immoral and therefore are illegitimate. They are illegitimate in the West Bank, illegitimate in Amman; they are illegitimate in Beirut, or Paris or New York. We...failed to see that the population was intimidated very seriously, intimidated in some cases, bribed in other cases by that evil organization. Therefore, the end result was not democratic elections in the true sense"'.	The Washington Post (Lexis Nexis).
5	8 Jun 1982	Menachem Begin	Terrorists as 'two footed animals': 'The children of Israel will happily go to school and joyfully return home, just like the children in Washington, in Moscow, and in Peking, in Paris and in Rome, in Oslo, in Stockholm and in Copenhagen. The fate of... Jewish children has been different from all the children of the world throughout the generations. No more. We will defend our children. If the hand of any two-footed animal is raised against them, that hand will be cut off, and our children will grow up in joy in the homes of their parents'.	Statement in the Knesset by Prime Minister Begin. <i>MFA</i> .

6	16 Oct 1985	Benjamin Netanyahu	Evil nature of the PLO: Israel was 'faced with absolute evil' because the PLO was 'not a political organisation that dabbles in terrorism but a terror organisation that dabbles in politics'.	Netanyahu's op-ed in the New York Times (Lexis Nexis).
7	7 Mar 1988	Benjamin Netanyahu	PLO engages with evil: 'The brazen espousal of terror and national annihilation in the PLO charter is what distinguishes the PLO even from such terrorist states as Syria....The United Nations opted for the PLO. In embracing an organization whose avowed principles are diametrically opposed to its own, the U.N. not only undermined itself but also helped legitimize the illegitimate...Not only is evil done, but those who do it and proclaim it are honored'.	Netanyahu's op-ed in the New York Times (Lexis Nexis).
8	1 Apr 1988	Yitzhak Shamir	Palestinians as 'grasshoppers': '[The Palestinians] would be crushed like grasshoppers...heads smashed against the boulders and walls'.	New York Times (Lexis Nexis).
9	4 Jan 1988	Israeli Army Statement	Palestinian prisoners' 'evil ways': 'the [Israeli] Army said it was releasing without charge about 100 of the 1,000 or so Palestinians arrested in last month's....An Army statement said those released had pledged "they would not return to their evil ways," and it promised that others would also be freed soon if calm is maintained.'	The Washington Post (Lexis Nexis).
10	18 Jul 1989	Ariel Sharon	Calls for the 'liquidation' of 'arch-murderer' Arafat: 'There will be no peace as long as Arafat lives'.	The Los Angeles Times (Lexis Nexis).
11	2 Feb 1990	Yitzhak Shamir	PLO worse than Satan: 'I'm ready to speak with anyone, even Satan himself - but not with the PLO'.	The Jerusalem Post (Lexis Nexis).
12	29 Jan 1991	Paul Eidelberg, now President of the Yamin Israel Party	PLO as an 'agent of evil': 'The time has come for the PLO to be expelled from the UN, and for President Bush to lead the endeavor. The time has come to test the solidity of his commitment to moral principle. He has sent 500,000 Americans to fight against unmitigated evil. The PLO is an agent of that evil'.	The Jerusalem Post (Lexis Nexis).
13	31 Oct 1991	Yitzhak Shamir	Coldblooded Palestinian terrorists: 'Just two days ago, we were reminded that Palestinian terrorism is still rampant, when a mother of seven children and a father of four were slaughtered in cold blood'.	Madrid Peace Conference - Opening speech, PASSIA, vol. 4, p.150.
14	20 Dec 1992	Yitzhak Rabin	Coldblooded Palestinian terrorists: 'they killed Toledano in cold blood...'	Statement on the expulsion of Hamas activists, Netanya, PASSIA, vol. 4, p.250.

15	8 Nov 1993	Rabbi Eliezer Waldman, a former Knesset member	[Terrorists] as sons of the devil: 'They (the killers) are the sons of death, they are the sons of the devil, they deserve to die – and woe to this government that made a pact with Satan'.	The Herald (Glasgow) (Lexis Nexis).
16	7 Apr 1994	Yossi Sarid, former Environment Minister and negotiator	Terrorists as evil people: 'The peace process is intended to decrease the level of terrorism, and if we end the peace process we are in essence depositing our futures in the hands of these evil people'.	The Independent (Lexis Nexis).
17	30 Jun 1994	Elyakim Ha-Etzni, a former Knesset member	Satan [Peres] makes peace deal with the devil [Arafat]: 'We're hoping it will be very massive and express the utter revulsion people have of this peace deal Satan made with the devil'.	The Washington Times (Lexis Nexis).
18	10 Dec 1994	Yitzhak Rabin	Combating murderous terrorism: 'And so we are determined to do the job well - despite the toll of murderous terrorism, despite the fanatic and cruel enemies of peace'.	Remarks on receiving the Nobel prize for peace, Oslo, PASSIA, vol. 4, p. 441.
19	9 Feb 1995	Benjamin Netanyahu	Arafat as consistently deceitful: 'In Arafat, you're dealing with a man who has been consistent in only one thing – he has consistently broken his word in everything...We (Israelis) made a big mistake in believing that Arafat would do the job of fighting terrorism for us'.	St. Petersburg Times (Florida) (Lexis Nexis).
20	28 Sep 1995	Yitzhak Rabin	Fighting against the evil angels of death: I want to say to you, Chairman Arafat: Do not let the land flowing with milk and honey become a land flowing with blood and tears. Don't let it happen. If all the partners to peace-making do not unite against the evil angels of death by terrorism, all that will remain of this ceremony are color snapshots, empty mementos.	Address at signing ceremony of 'Oslo II', Washington DC, PASSIA, vol. 5, p.119.
21	14 Nov 1995	Shimon Peres	Killers as 'devil's emissaries': 'We have to prevent having verbal gallows in Israel, or killers invoking the name of God while they are really the devil's emissaries'.	The New York Times (Lexis Nexis).
22	14 Nov 1995	Shimon Peres	Terrorists as 'messengers of the devil': 'I don't know if there is a lot of extremism, but the extremists are very extreme. That is our problem. The problem is not in the number, but in their fanaticism, in their lack of restraint and understanding, the claim that they represent heaven, where in fact they are messengers of the devil'.	CNN interview with Shimon Peres, MFA.
23	13 Mar 1996	Shimon Peres	Evils of terrorism: 'This gathering signifies the civilized world's rejection of the evil of terrorism and its support for the peace process'.	Speech at the Summit of Peacemakers Sharm el-Sheikh, MFA.
24	3 Jan 1997	Benjamin Netanyahu	Palestinians Security Service as 'thugs' and 'terrorists': 'Rajoub, a former Palestinian guerrilla commander long imprisoned in and then expelled from	The Washington Post (Lexis Nexis).

			Israel, was a regular devil figure in Netanyahu's campaign rhetoric. Netanyahu accused former prime ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres of "subcontracting Israel's security" to "thugs" and "terrorists" like Rajoub, who runs the Palestinian Preventive Security Service in the West Bank'.	
25	15 Jan 1997	David Wilder, a spokesman for the settlers in Hebron	Pact with the devil: 'Netanyahu has made a pact with the devil ... the Israeli Government has left the Jewish residents of Hebron vulnerable to attack by Palestinian terrorists'.	The Times (Lexis Nexis).
26	20 Mar 2000	Rabbi Ovadia Yosef	Arabs as 'animals': 'Arabs are the same as animals. There is no animal worse than them'.	Ha'aretz (Lexis Nexis).
27	10 Jul 2000	Ehud Barak	A cold blooded terrorist act: 'I feel the acute pain...of Smadar Haran who lost Yael, Einat and Danny in a cold blooded terrorist act...'	Address to the Knesset regarding the Camp David Summit, Jerusalem, PASSIA, vol. 6, p. 60.
28	30 Aug 2000	Ehud Barak	Palestinians as 'crocodiles': 'The Palestinians are like crocodiles, the more you give them meat, they want more'.	The Jerusalem Post (Lexis Nexis).
29	23 Nov 2000	Ariel Sharon	Arafat as 'brutal enemy': 'Arafat is not a partner. He is a brutal enemy'.	Gulf News.
30	13 Aug 2000	Rabbi Ovadia Yosef	Palestinians as 'snakes' and 'evil' people: 'Yosef earlier said that the Palestinians are snakes and filthy people, adding that Arabs are evil and that God regretted their creation!'	BBC Monitoring Middle East (Lexis Nexis).
31	9 Apr 2001	Rabbi Ovadia Yosef	Arabs as evil: 'In a Sabbath sermon, Yosef called for exterminating the Arabs by missiles and showing no tolerance towards them. He also described them as evil and accursed. Yosef had earlier insulted the Arabs by describing them as snakes. He, however, did not face any charges.'	BBC Monitoring Middle East (Lexis Nexis).
32	15 May 2001	Rabbi Ovadia Yosef	Palestinians as evil and damnable: 'it is forbidden to be merciful to [Palestinians]. You must give them missiles, with relish - annihilate them. Evil ones, damnable ones.'	Cited in PLO's official response to the final report of the Sharm el-Sheikh fact-finding committee, PASSIA, vol. 6, p. 222.
33	11 Sep 2001	Shimon Peres	Fighting evil with evil measures: 'Are you surprised by the sophistication that must have been at play to carry out these attacks? FM PERES: It's a solid indication of the most evil kind. Only evil people can arrive at such sophistication. And the measures must be radical as the evil itself'.	Interview with Foreign Minister Shimon Peres on CNN, MFA.

34	18 Oct 2001	Rehavam Zeevi, former Tourism Minister	Arabs as 'lice', 'cancer' and 'liars': There were moments, however, when Zeevi's rationalist mask slipped, as when he condemned Arabs working illegally in Israel this year as "lice" and "cancer". On various occasions he called George Bush senior an "anti-Semite and a liar"; Yasser Arafat a "viper" and "war criminal".	The Guardian (Lexis Nexis).
35	4 Feb 2002	Shimon Peres	Devil and anti-devil: 'Today there is just one division – devil and anti-devil. And the United States is today leading an unprecedented coalition comprising the United States, a united Europe, Russia, China, India, Japan, Pakistan, Latin America to fight terrorism'.	Interview on PBS Television, MFA.
36	23 April 2002	Ariel Sharon	Israel's fight against the 'forces of evil': 'Being the only true democracy in the Middle East, Israel stands at the forefront of the conflict between the civilized world and the forces of evil'.	Message to the AIPAC Policy conference, PASSIA, vol. 6, p. 333.
37	13 Jun 2002	Ehud Barak	Arabs as 'liars': 'They [Arabs] are products of a culture in which to tell a lie...creates no dissonance. They don't suffer from the problem of telling lies that exists in Judeo-Christian culture'.	Interview with Barak by the New York Review of Books (Lexis Nexis).
38	21 Jun 2002	Ariel Sharon	PA backed by 'axis of evil': 'We are in the middle of a war, a hard war, a cruel war, a war that the Palestinian terrorists are carrying out against women and children and old people...We are facing a coalition of terror led by the Palestinian Authority and backed by an axis of evil -- Tehran, Baghdad, Damascus and [Osama] bin Laden'.	The Washington Post (Lexis Nexis).
39	30 Mar 2003	Silvan Shalom, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs	Terrorism as despicable devil: 'Since September 2000, the State of Israel has gone through one of the most difficult periods ever. We are in the third year of yet another campaign of terror. Just today, the cold, deadly hand of this despicable devil destroyed once again the lives of dozens of Israelis, innocent families, this time in the heart of the peaceful city of Netanya'.	Address at the AIPAC Policy Conference, Washington, D.C., MFA.
40	1 Sep 2003	Israeli Cabinet	Muderous attacks by Hamas: 'the murderous Hamas attack of August 19, 2003 in Jerusalem.'	Communiqué on security matters, Jerusalem, PASSIA, vol. 7, p. 117.
41	21 Dec 2003	Yaacov Lozowick, Peace Now	Enemy as evil: 'Faced with generation upon generation of warfare against an enemy who gloats in murder and dances over Jewish blood...we have mostly done our best not to return evil for evil'.	The Philadelphia Inquirer (Lexis Nexis).
42	2003	Israeli-American think tank	Arafat as a terrorist: 'To some extent, your job as proponents of Israel has been easy. Under the Arafat regime it's not difficult to convince the American public of the corruption of the current	Wexner Analysis - Israel Communication Manual – 2003, Palestine Papers.

			Palestinian leadership. While many sympathize with the plight of the Palestinian people, there is no love lost for Yassir Arafat. Arafat is a terrorist; they [the Americans] know that. Better still, he looks the part. The emergence of Mahmoud Abbas as the new Palestinian Prime Minister comes exactly at the wrong time. His ascent to power seems legitimate. He is a fresh face, and a clean-shaven one at that. He speaks well and dresses in Western garb. He may even genuinely want peace.'	
43	9 Jul 2004	Official Israeli government statement	Evil campaign of Palestinian terrorism: 'This Palestinian terrorism has taken the lives of nearly 1,000 Israelis in over 20,000 attacks over the last three and a half years, wounding thousands more, leaving broken families, widows, and orphans. No other country would act differently in the face of such an evil campaign'.	Israeli statement on the advisory opinion of the ICJ on legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territory, PASSIA, vol. 7, p. 276.
44	31 Aug 2004	Silvan Shalom, Deputy PM and Minister of Foreign Affairs	Arafat as the bringer of evil: 'Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom placed the blame squarely at PA Chairman Yasser Arafat, who "has brought nothing but terror and evil since his return to the territories"'.	MFA.
45	26 Oct 2004	Ariel Sharon	Murderous terror as a source of diplomatic deadlock: 'future agreement...will hopefully be achieved when this murderous terror ends, and our neighbors will realize that they cannot triumph over us in this land'.	Speech to the Knesset, Jerusalem, PASSIA, vol.7, p. 292.
46	9 Nov 2004	Caroline B. Glick, journalist and former negotiator	Arafat as evil: 'On a basic level, the death of an evil man is always a cause for hope. Yet Mr. Arafat's death will provide an opportunity for building a better future if the Bush administration uses his disappearance as a catalyst for a true overhaul of Palestinian society. This requires more than just pressuring Israel to meet with and make concessions to a new PLO warlord, raised on Mr. Arafat's knee'.	The Washington Times (Lexis Nexis).
47	20 Jun 2006	Ehud Olmert	Connecting (indirectly) PA with 'axis of evil': 'The Palestinian Authority never upheld their commitment to stop terror attacks and dismantle terrorist organizations....The terrorist organizations would not be able to continue to act if they did not receive encouragement, funding, training and guidance from regimes and organizations which support terror on the axis of evil which runs through Tehran, Damascus, Al Qaeda, global Jihad and Hizbollah'.	Speech at the 35th Zionist Congress, Jerusalem, PASSIA, vol. 8, p. 154.

48	2006	Shlomo Ben-Ami, former Israeli negotiator	Israeli perception of PLO as a 'demon, Satan incarnate' : 'America's recognition of the PLO...gave legitimacy to an organization that the Israelis perceived to be their arch-enemy, their demon, Satan incarnate'.	In his book <i>Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy</i> , p. 194.
49	20 Jun 2006	Ehud Olmert	Terrorist organizations as murderous : Terrorist organizations gain inspiration from fundamentalist, anti-Semitic and murderous ideologies, which call for the blood of all Jews and Israelis.	Speech at the 35th Zionist Congress, Jerusalem, PASSIA, vol. 8, p.151.
50	27 Nov 2007	Ehud Olmert	Murderous organizations : the ongoing activity of murderous organizations throughout all the territories of the Palestinian Authority.	Speech at the Annapolis Conference, Annapolis, Maryland, PASSIA, vol. 8, p.351.
51	25 Aug 2010	Shimon Peres	Endorsing concept of good/evil : 'Since you have taken office as Director General of the IAEA we feel a sense of professionalism, objectivity, and fairness. Your position requires someone that all sides rely upon, someone who differentiates between good and evil, between those who try to deceive the international community and those who don't'.	Joint press statement after President Peres meets with IAEA Director General Amano, MFA.
52	30 Aug 2010	Rabbi Ovadia Yosef	Palestinians as 'evil' deserving to 'perish' : 'The spiritual leader of Israel's ultra-orthodox Shas party...has called for the Palestinian leader to "perish from this world" and suffer the "plague". Only days before peace talks are due to begin in Washington, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, one of Israel's most revered clerics, said during a sermon on Saturday: "Let Abu Mazen and all these evil folk perish from this world. May God smite them with plague, them and these Palestinians"'.	The Financial Times (London) (Lexis Nexis).

APPENDIX B
OVERVIEW OF TABLES USED IN DATA ANALYSIS

PART 1. The demonising narrators

Table 1: Breakdown of Israeli elite narrators

Government officials			Religious	Non-government	Total
Gov doc	Left-Party	Right-Party			
#1	#14	#2	#26	#25	
#9	#16	#3	#30	#41	
#40	#18	#4	#31	#42	
#43	#20	#5	#32	#46	
	#21	#6	#52		
	#22	#7			
	#23	#8			
	#27	#10			
	#28	#11			
	#33	#12			
	#35	#13			
	#37	#15			
	#48	#17			
	#51	#19			
		#24			
		#29			
		#34			
		#36			
		#38			
		#39			
		#44			
		#45			
		#47			
		#49			
		#50			
4	14	25	5	4	52

PART 2. Israeli-Palestinian targets

Table 3: Breakdown of Israeli targets

PLO/PA	Arafat	Palestinians	Arabs	Terrorists	Unspecific	Total
#4	#3	#5	#1	#2	#36	
#6	#10	#8	#26	#3	#41	
#7	#17	#9	#31	#5	#51	
#11	#19	#28	#34	#13		
#12	#29	#30	#37	#14		
#24	#34	#32	#38	#15		
#38	#42	#52	#47	#16		
#47	#44			#18		
#48	#46			#20		
#50				#21		
				#22		
				#23		
				#25		
				#27		
				#33		
				#35		
				#38		
				#39		
				#40		
				#43		
				#45		
				#47		
				#49		
10	9	7	7	23	3	59

Table 4: Breakdown of Palestinian targets

Israel	Israeli leaders	Israelis	Jews	The Jewish Nation	Settlers	Zionism	Occupation	Unspecific	Total
#3	#1	#25	#19	#32	#11	#2	#2	#12	
#10	#5	#30	#26		#13	#3	#9	#15	
#18	#14		#35		#24	#4	#20	#29	
#22	#16		#36			#6	#23		
#27	#17		#45			#7	#27		
#33	#21		#50			#8	#31		
#34	#27					#37	#48		
#43	#28					#38	#50		
#44	#39					#40	#54		
#48	#41					#42			
#50	#46					#47			
#52						#49			
#53						#51			
						#55			
13	11	2	6	1	3	14	9	3	62

PART 3. Timing

Table 5: Palestinian demonisation over time

Year	#
1934	1
1964	1
1979	1
1981	2
1982	1
1988	3
1989	1
1994	2
1996	1
1997	5
1998	4
1999	1
2000	2
2001	4
2002	4
2004	8
2005	6
2006	2
2007	1
2008	1
2009	3
2010	1
TOTAL	55

Table 6: Israeli demonisation over time

Year	#
1950	1
1978	2
1982	2
1985	1
1988	3
1989	1
1990	1
1991	2
1992	1
1993	1
1994	3
1995	4
1996	1
1997	2
2000	5
2001	4
2002	4
2003	4
2004	4
2006	3
2007	1
2010	2
TOTAL	52

PART 4. The demonising message

Table 7: Breakdown of coding of Palestinian demonising messages

#	1.Destruction	2.Domination	3.Deception	4. Sinful	5.Literal Evil
1	1	1		1	
2		1	1	1	
3	1	1	1		
4	1				
5					1
6					1
7	1				
8	1		1	1	
9				1	
10	1			1	
11				1	
12					1
13	1				1
14	1				
15					1
16	1	1	1		
17	1				
18	1		1		
19				1	1
20		1			
21			1		
22					1
23					
24				1	1
25					1
26			1		
27	1				
28	1				
29	1			1	
30			1	1	
31	1	1		1	
32			1		
33		1			
34				1	1
35	1				1
36					1
37		1			
38	1				
39	1				
40	1				
41			1		
42	1				
43				1	
44					1
45		1			1
46			1		
47	1				1
48	1				
49	1		1		
50	1				
51	1				1
52	1				

53	1				1
54		1			
55	1				
Total	28	11	12	14	17

Table 8: Breakdown of coding of Israeli demonising messages

#	1. Destruction	2. Domination	3. Deception	4. Sinful	5. Literal Evil
1					1
2	1				
3	1				
4	1			1	
5					1
6	1				
7					1
8	1				
9	1			1	
10	1				
11					1
12					1
13	1				
14	1				
15					1
16					1
17					1
18	1				
19			1		
20	1				
21	1				1
22					1
23	1				
24	1				
25	1				1
26					1
27	1				
28	1				1
29	1				
30					1
31				1	
32	1				
33	1				
34			1		1
35					1
36					1
37			1		
38	1				
39	1				1
40	1				
41	1				
42	1				
43	1				

44	1				
45	1				
46					1
47	1				
48					1
49	1				
50	1				
51			1		
52					1
Total	31	0	4	3	21

APPENDIX C

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES AND THEIR BIOGRAPHY

Name	Biography
Yossi Beilin	Former Knesset member, deputy Foreign Minister and Justice Minister for the Israeli Labour party. One of the principal architects behind the Oslo Accord under Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin.
Shlomo Brom	Research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University (INSS). Worked in the strategic planning division of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) General Staff. Responsible for dealing with security aspects in the peace negotiations with the Palestinians during the 1990s.
Shlomo Gazit	Retired Major General and former head of Israeli military intelligence. First military governor of the West Bank. Involved in some dozen two-track diplomacy talks with the Palestinians and served as the Israeli emissary to Yassir Arafat in 1995 to 1996.
Mark Heller	Principal Research Associate at INSS. Writes and researches on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, but has not himself been involved in any two-track or official negotiations with the Palestinians.
Nabil Sha'ath	Senior Palestinian government official. Served as Palestinian chief negotiator, Cabinet Minister, international co-operation minister, planning minister, foreign minister and prime minister of the PNA. Closely involved in the peace talks with the Israelis both before, during and after the Oslo Accord.
Ghassan Khatib	Palestinian politician in the Palestinian People's Party. Was a member of the Palestinian negotiation delegation in the 1991 Madrid peace talks. Also involved in the subsequent Washington negotiations.
Sari Nusseibeh	Former representative for the Palestinian National Authority in Jerusalem and President of Al-Quds University. Was involved in initiating peace talks with Moshe Amirav (a member of Israel's right-wing Likud party) in 1985. Along with Faisal Husseini, Nusseibeh was also involved in negotiations with US Secretary James Baker.

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III. Search Engines/Databases

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Bridgeman Education, www.bridgemaneducation.com

British Museum database, www.britishmuseum.org/collection

B'tselem, www.btselem.org

EEBO Early English Books Online, eebo.chadwyck.com/home

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via.lib.harvard.edu/via/deliver/advancedsearch?_collection=via

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Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs' (PASSIA) 8-
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