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Abi Adams-Prassl, Kristiina Huttunen, Emily Nix, and Ning Zhang

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THE DYNAMICS OF ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIPS*

Abi Adams-Prassl,[†] Kristiina Huttunen,[‡] Emily Nix,[§] and Ning Zhang[¶]

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Abstract

Domestic abuse encompasses a range of damaging behaviours beyond physical violence, including economic and emotional abuse. This paper provides the first evidence of the impact of cohabiting with an abusive partner on victims' economic outcomes. In so doing, we highlight the systematic role played by economic suppression in such relationships. Using administrative data and a matched control event study design, along with a within-individual comparison of outcomes across relationships, we document three new facts. First, women who begin relationships with (eventually) physically abusive men suffer large and significant earnings and employment falls immediately upon cohabiting with the abusive partner. Second, abusive men impose economic costs on all their female partners, even those who do not report physical violence. Third, this decline in economic outcomes is non-monotonic in women's pre-cohabitation outside options. To rationalize these findings, we develop a new dynamic model of abusive relationships where women do not perfectly observe their partner's type, and abusive men have an incentive to use economic suppression to sabotage women's outside options and their ability to later exit the relationship. We show that this model is consistent with all three empirical facts. We harness the model's predictions to revisit some classic results on domestic violence and show that the relationship between domestic violence and women's outside options is crucially linked to breakup dynamics.

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[†]University of Oxford, abi.adams-prassl@economics.ox.ac.uk

[‡]Aalto University, kristiina.huttunen@aalto.fi

[§]University of Southern California, enix@usc.edu

[¶]The Chinese University of Hong Kong, ning.zhang@cuhk.edu.hk

1 Introduction

Domestic abuse is a common yet complex phenomenon. Policymakers and advocates increasingly argue that domestic abuse is not restricted to physical violence but encompasses a range of damaging and coercive behaviors including economic and emotional abuse. Qualitative studies document economic control, sabotage, and exploitation as tactics employed by abusers (Postmus *et al.*, 2020; Stylianou, 2018; Sanders, 2015). Small surveys of victims consistently find that the majority of those who experience physical violence also had their economic empowerment undermined (Postmus *et al.*, 2012; Outlaw, 2009). Some survivors have described how physical violence began once they were economically dependent: "The first feature of control was financial. As soon as I had less economic independence that's when the [violence] started."¹

The growing realization that economic control and sabotage might be important components of abusive relationships has led a number of countries to introduce "economic abuse" into their legal definition of domestic violence. For example, the United States Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2022 includes behaviour that is "coercive, deceptive, or unreasonably controls or restrains a person's ability to acquire, use, or maintain economic resources" in its statutory definition.² Economic abuse is one dimension of a cluster of behaviours often referred to as "coercive control"³, and a loss of economic independence may both proceed and coincide with physical violence. Charities and survivor groups are currently advocating for targeted economic support for survivors as well as reforms to the design of social support systems to reflect the risks that come with financial dependence on abusive spouses.⁴

Yet despite victims' testimonies and this increased policy importance, it is an open question whether a loss of economic independence characterizes abusive relationships in general and what this means for our understanding of domestic abuse and optimal policy. Indeed, the economics

¹Survivor testimony as told to Surviving Economic Abuse (Abuse, 2018).

²See the United States Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2021, 117th Congress. See also the UK's Domestic Abuse Bill 2021 in which economic abuse is included in the statutory definition of domestic violence as "any behaviour that has a substantial adverse effect on B's ability to: (a) acquire, use or maintain money or other property, or (b) obtain goods or services."

³See, for example, the UK Government's guidance on coercive control and financial abuse.

⁴See evidence submitted to the UK's House of Lords on the key working age benefit, Universal Credit (Committee, 2019).

literature to date has largely focused on the causal channel running in the opposite direction, i.e. on the impact of exogenous changes in economic conditions on the prevalence of physical domestic violence.⁵ For example, improvements in market-level wages and unemployment conditions for women relative to men have been found to lower the incidence of physical domestic violence in the US and UK (Aizer, 2010; Anderberg *et al.*, 2016; Bhalotra *et al.*, 2021b). While this is vitally important research, it does not shed light on the role of economic abuse nor capture the economic cost of cohabiting with an abusive spouse. Furthermore, changes in women’s economic outside options can change women’s incentives to form and dissolve relationships. If physically abusive relationships are accompanied by economic suppression, to what extent does an improvement in a woman’s outside option make her more likely to leave an abusive partner versus reducing her exposure to violence within the existing relationship? Disentangling these channels is necessary to assess the relative importance of policy focused on within-relationship mediation versus support for women exiting abusive matches.

In this paper, we fill this important gap in the literature. We use rich Finnish administrative data to provide the first empirical and theoretical analysis of the dynamic economic impacts of cohabiting with abusive men. We link every police report in Finland to administrative records on employment, cohabitation status, and demographic characteristics. Our police data contains unique identifiers for both perpetrator and victim. This allows us to use the linked tax data to identify reports in which the victim and perpetrator were cohabiting at or before the time of an offense. Rather than treat reported physical violence as the event of interest, we consider women’s outcomes for a long time series around the point of cohabitation with a partner who is later reported to be violent in that relationship. This innovation allows us to trace out the dynamic economic impacts of cohabiting with a partner who will later become physically abusive. In so doing, we identify the economic shadow of abusive partners.

We first estimate the impact of cohabiting with an abusive partner on women’s labor market outcomes. In the five years before starting an abusive relationship, women’s employment rates

⁵The literature has also explored wider determinants of domestic violence including educational attainment (Erten and Keskin, 2018), culture (Tur-Prats, 2019, 2021), the tax and transfer system (Bobonis *et al.*, 2013), and lockdowns (Leslie and Wilson, 2020; Bullinger *et al.*, 2021; Hsu and Henke, 2021; Bhalotra *et al.*, 2021a).

and annual earnings increase by 21% and 34% respectively. However, upon starting an abusive relationship, women's economic outcomes immediately deteriorate. Descriptively, women's employment rates do not continue to grow, and instead *fall* in absolute terms by 4% and earnings by 6% in the two years following cohabitation with an abusive partner. There are two main threats to a causal interpretation of this decrease in economic outcomes. First, a reverse causality argument: negative economic shocks may cause women to enter into "bad" matches rather than the relationship itself causing the decline in women's economic outcomes. Second, a "relationship effect" argument: women may reduce their labor force attachment in all relationships they form, even with partners who are not abusive.

To address reverse causality concerns, we use a matched difference-in-differences (DiD) design to analyze whether negative economic shocks at the market or firm level, or pre-cohabitation trends, are responsible for the deterioration of victims' labor market outcomes upon cohabiting with an abuser. With this strategy, we compare victims' outcomes to those of observationally identical women who begin cohabitation spells with observationally identical partners at the same time. We find that women in abusive relationships have 6.4 percentage points (p.p.) lower employment rates compared to their matched control in the five years following cohabitation. This represents a 12% decline relative to victims' baseline employment rates. As with our descriptive results, this drop in employment appears immediately after cohabitation. Relative to their matched controls, victims' earnings fall by 26% compared to their average earnings in the three years before starting the relationship. Importantly, we find no statistically significant difference in local labor demand, nor firm and co-worker outcomes, between victims and their matched controls, suggesting adverse shocks at the market and firm levels are not responsible for the declines we estimate. We additionally rule out fertility as an explanation for our results.

To analyze whether these results are due to a "relationship effect", with victims reducing their labor market attachment in any relationship they form, we introduce a within-person across-relationship research design. Half of victims form other relationships in which no violence is reported over the time period we analyze. We use victims' outcomes in their non-abusive relationships as an alternative counterfactual in a triple difference-in-differences design. If victims

reduce their employment upon cohabitation in general, large differences in outcomes would also appear relative to their matched controls in their non-abusive relationships. We find, however, that victims' economic outcomes are much worse in their abusive relationships. In the two years post-cohabitation, victims' earnings are 20.2% lower in their abusive compared to non-abusive relationships relative to pre-cohabitation outcomes and compared to their matched controls.

In our second set of results, we ask if men who are reported for physical abuse suppress the economic outcomes of all of their partners, not just for those partners in relationships characterized by reported physical violence. To do so, we identify women who form relationships with known perpetrators but where no physical violence is reported. We compare the economic outcomes of these women to their own matched control counterfactuals in a matched DiD design. We find significant declines in female labor market outcomes upon cohabiting with a domestic abuser even though these women do not report physical violence to the police at any point during or after the relationship. Women who do not report physical violence are, on average, more educated and have better outside options than women who report domestic violence to the police. These results are consistent with an abusive "type" of man who persistently suppresses his partners' outcomes, as opposed to just one bad match bringing out the worst in such men.

Finally, we analyze heterogeneity in the decline of victims' economic outcomes and the timing of reports of physical violence. We find that women who report physical violence closer to the start of the relationship have the lowest economic outside options; victims with a first police report within three years of cohabitation are 9 p.p. less likely to have a college degree and their pre-cohabitation employment rates are 7.9 p.p. lower than women who first report violence later into a relationship. Importantly, we recover that the decline in women's economic outcomes upon cohabiting with an abusive spouse is non-monotonic in their outside option. Women with "intermediate" levels of education and pre-cohabitation earnings suffer greater falls in employment rates and earnings than the least and most economically empowered women. This finding is hard to reconcile with a static model of within-household bargaining or exposure to physical violence in which the likelihood of economic suppression should decrease consistently in a woman's outside option. It is also inconsistent with a backlash model which would predict a

monotonic increase in physical violence with women's outside options.

These three empirical results motivate a novel dynamic model of abusive relationships. Based on our second set of empirical results, our model assumes that there are two types of men: abusive types, who gain utility from violence, and non-abusers. At the point of cohabitation, women have imperfect information about the man's type. In the first period, abusive men make a decision about whether to suppress an urge to be physically violent in favor of coercive control or non-abusive behaviour. Both violence and coercive control generate additional "household taxes" on female labor supply, which can cause women to reduce their labor market attachment, consistent with our first set of empirical results. Women update their belief about whether their partner is an abusive type on the basis of realized violence and the level of labor supply suppression. At the beginning of the second period, women and men compare the expected utility of remaining in the relationship to what they could achieve if single. If either party expects to gain more when single, the relationship ends. Otherwise, the relationship continues into a second period and abusive men again make a decision about whether to suppress urges to be violent or controlling, and women make their labor supply decision.

We show that the model can generate a non-monotonic relationship between a woman's pre-cohabitation outside option and the prevalence of economic suppression, consistent with our third set of empirical results. The inter-temporal linkages in the model create this non-monotonicity. Abusers have a dynamic incentive to suppress their urge for physical violence to conceal their type from women who would leave such men if they knew they were abusive but may stay if coercive control leads to sufficient financial dependence in the second period before the abuser's type is fully revealed. As a result, the probability of economic suppression and abuse in the first period can be non-monotonic in a woman's outside option: women with very low outside options are unlikely to leave an abusive relationship even if an abuser's type is revealed making costly economic suppression less necessary; women with high outside options would require a great deal of economic suppression to force them to stay, but this would substantially lower total household income and also increase the probability these women discover the abuser's type and leave, making economic suppression less likely. For intermediate outside

option women, the dynamic incentives in the model are operative creating the potential for a high degree of coercive control. While coercive control is unobserved by researchers, our empirical analysis indicates a significant labor market cost associated with cohabiting with an abuser, even if there is no police report of physical violence. This finding, along with the heterogeneity in economic losses by women's outside options, aligns with our model's predictions regarding coercive control.

In the final part of the paper, we develop the implications of our model and empirical results for the existing literature and policy. In a consequential paper, Aizer (2010) shows that as women's outside options increase, reported physical domestic violence decreases. This groundbreaking result has been widely replicated, and we also replicate it in our context. Our model generates two channels through which higher outside options decrease exposure to violence. First, the resource cost of abusing high outside option women is larger because any reduction in their labor supply results in a larger loss of income. While we do not allow for endogenous changes in bargaining power (as this would simply reinforce our central mechanism while generating additional modeling complications), this is a similar type of "within-relationship" exposure argument that has been used to explain these canonical empirical results. However, in our model, a second "breakup" channel is also operative. With higher outside options, women are more likely to leave an abusive partner and in so doing reduce their exposure to violence. This possible channel has received relatively less attention in the empirical literature to date.

We harness our unique data to directly test whether the breakup channel is a significant mechanism lying behind the Aizer (2010) result. We find that as women's outside options quasi-randomly increase, there is a substantial and significant increase in the rate of breakup amongst abusive couples, with no such impact on otherwise similar non-abusive couples (in fact, they are more likely to stay together if women's outside options increase). This result points to the importance of programs that facilitate women's economic independence and increase their ability to leave abusive relationships as key to reducing the prevalence of domestic violence.

This paper contributes to the existing economics literature on domestic violence by providing the first empirical evidence of the labor market consequences of cohabiting with an abusive

spouse. A number of papers analyze the impact of exogenous economic shocks to (market level) outside options on the prevalence of domestic violence (Aizer and Dal Bo, 2009; Heath, 2014; Anderberg *et al.*, 2016; Sanin, 2021b) and on the impact of realized labor market shocks (Bhalotra *et al.*, 2021b). We show that it is vitally important to consider the opposite causal direction, namely that these relationships are themselves characterized by economic suppression, making victims more vulnerable to abuse by reducing their ability to leave these relationships. Further, our results suggest that analyzing changes in women’s economic outcomes only around the point of a report of physical domestic violence will understate the full economic costs of abusive relationships, as such estimates will not capture the labor market costs of earlier suppression.⁶

Our empirical results also contribute to the applied literature on the impact of co-location with and physical exposure to abusive men. Stevenson and Wolfers (2006) find that the liberalization of U.S. divorce laws reduced spousal homicide and female suicide rates, partly through reducing the frictions to end abusive matches. A number of recent contributions have analyzed the impact of Covid-19 lockdown and social distancing restrictions on the prevalence and reporting of domestic violence (Leslie and Wilson, 2020; Arenas-Arroyo *et al.*, 2021; Berniell and Facchini, 2021; Hsu and Henke, 2021). In this paper, we show that abusive men consistently suppress female economic outcomes in the relationships that they form and that changes in women’s outside options partly reduce their exposure to violence by increasing the likelihood of leaving abusive partners.

We supplement our new empirical results with a novel theoretical model of abusive relationships. There are a number of models of domestic violence, which can be roughly characterized according to whether violence is modeled as: (i) arising from bargaining between an abuser with a preference for violence and a victim (Aizer, 2010; Lewbel and Pendakur, 2019), (ii) a signal of dissatisfaction of some aspect of the relationship that cannot be perfectly communicated (Bloch and Rao, 2002; Calvi and Keskar, 2021), or (iii) driven by emotional cues that behavioral agents cannot perfectly suppress (Card and Dahl, 2011).

The majority of this literature focuses only on physical violence, is static, and does not explic-

⁶Bindler and Ketel (2022) estimate negative labor impacts of reported physical domestic violence but find evidence of pre-trends for domestic violence, but not other crimes. These results are consistent with our analysis showing that the costs of cohabiting with an abusive partner materialize well before the reported physical violence.

itly consider the relationship dissolution margin. Our paper is the first to relax all three of these features in a single model. As such, we build on an innovative series of recent papers: Anderberg and Rainer (2013) develop a static model of economic abuse in which abusers engage in acts of economic sabotage to cause their spouse to specialize in home production. Anderberg *et al.* (2018) develops a dynamic model of women’s behavior in violent relationships, where they learn their partner’s type over time. Abuse is non-strategic in their framework and is modeled as arising probabilistically depending on an abusive man’s age and his spouse’s labor supply. Finally, Anderberg *et al.* (2016) develop a dynamic model where abusive men can expend effort suppressing the urge to be physically violent and women decide whether to stay in the relationship or not, but employment outcomes are exogenously determined by nature.⁷

2 Data and Descriptive Statistics

Domestic violence is all too common around the world, with the WHO reporting that 1 in 3 women experience intimate partner violence in their lifetimes (García-Moreno *et al.*, 2013). The World Bank estimates that over one billion women lack proper legal protection against domestic sexual violence and more than 1.4 billion women lack protection against economic domestic violence.⁸ Despite being one of the most advanced economies in the world with respect to women’s education and political representation, women in Finland still report high rates of domestic violence. In 2014, 53% of Finnish women reported having been subject to domestic physical, sexual, or psychological violence since the age of 15 (Union, 2014). Finland has also been criticized for being slow to develop women’s shelters and for its focus on mediation to resolve family issues involving intimate partner violence (Kotanen, 2018).⁹

⁷See also Bowlus and Seitz (2006) who utilize retrospective survey data to estimate a dynamic model exploring men’s choices related to abuse, as well as women’s divorce and employment responses, but do not focus on coercive control and do not allow women to endogenously learn about men’s types.

⁸See World Bank press release here.

⁹A 2010 United Nations report was particularly condemning, stating that: “The Committee is concerned: (a) That insufficient resources have been allocated to the implementation of the Action Plan to Reduce Violence against Women 2010 -2015 and that the incidence of violence against women remains high ... (f) That the number and services of shelters, many of which [are] non-governmental organizations, are insufficient to meet the needs of women victims of violence; (g) That other services available for victims of gender-based violence, including rape crisis centres, 24 -hour helpline services and walk-in centres, are lacking.”

To study the dynamics of abusive relationships and the impact of cohabitation with an abusive partner on victims' labor market outcomes, we construct unique administrative data from Finland. We observe all police reports filed between 2006-2019, which we merge with administrative data on labour market outcomes, cohabitation status, and demographics. A police report is the first step in an investigation and occurs before a suspect is formally charged with a crime or a court case.¹⁰ Importantly, the police data contains both perpetrator and victim unique national identifiers.

We perfectly link the police data with the Finnish Linked Employer-Employee Data (FLEED), i.e. population register data containing annual income, annual employment, and demographic characteristics, using the unique perpetrator and victim identification numbers. The FLEED data includes a unique national identifier for both an individual and their cohabiting spouse. This allows us to identify cohabiting couples. We define a report as a domestic violence incident following official reporting by Statistics Finland. First, the crime recorded in the report must belong to a set of specified offenses that includes crimes like assault, sexual offenses, menace, and stalking.¹¹ Second, the victim and suspect must be cohabiting at the time of the offense, or they must have been cohabiting at some point in the five years before the offense.

In contrast to much of the preceding literature, the police report is not the event of interest in this paper. Rather, we use the linked police and FLEED data to identify couples where physical violence will occur at some point in their relationship and then construct panel data on these couples' economic outcomes for a long time series around the point of first cohabitation. We are able to construct these couple-specific economic profiles because FLEED includes information on cohabitation status and economic outcomes for the universe of individuals living in Finland from the ages 15-70, allowing us to identify the first year in which a couple starts living together. Thus, a key innovation of this paper is constructing a data set on economic outcomes before and after cohabitation for partners in relationships with police reports for domestic violence.

¹⁰Reports can be filed online or in person at a police station. After an investigation, a suspect is charged only if the prosecutor considers that there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. We do not condition on whether a report results in a charge or conviction as evidence from criminology and sociology highlights significant case attrition between reporting and charging for gender-based violence that has little connection to the veracity of the case (Hester, 2006; Spohn and Tellis, 2012).

¹¹A full list of crime codes can be found in Appendix C.

We make three core sample restrictions to arrive at the final set of couples we study. First, we restrict attention to domestic violence occurring in couples that start cohabiting in 2006 or later. This is so we can correctly identify any abuse during a cohabitation spell, given that we only observe police reports from 2006 onward. Second, we restrict our analysis to couples who experience male-on-female violence. While the majority of reports involve male-on-female violence, in 17% of cases the victim is a man and the suspect is a woman.¹² However, in 53% of couples in which female-on-male violence occurs, there is also a simultaneous report of male-on-female violence. Finally, victims and suspects must be aged between 21 and 65 at the point of cohabitation given our interest in labor market outcomes.

As a way of assessing the population prevalence of police reports for domestic violence, we consider how many cohabitation spells that started in 2006 (the first year of our data and, therefore, unlikely to be subject to any censoring issue) have at least one police report for domestic violence in their history. We find that 2.9% of cohabitations starting in this year, or 1 out of every 35 couples, were abusive.

The primary limitation of our measure of domestic violence is that we only observe incidents reported to the police. However, reporting is far from universal. Victimization surveys suggest that approximately 10% of physical assaults are reported to the police in Finland, with lower reporting rates for crimes considered less serious by the victim (European Institute for Crime Prevention & Control, 2009; EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2015). This means our baseline estimates of the prevalence of domestic violence will undoubtedly understate the true prevalence. Further, the magnitude of post-cohabitation economic suppression experienced by female partners of abusive men where a police report is filed may not be externally valid for couples where there is unreported domestic violence. To address this concern, we will also analyze the economic outcomes of non-reporting partners of abusive men. Further, we note that past work by Bhalotra *et al.* (2021b) found a similar relationship between layoffs and the incidence of domestic violence when incidents were identified using court records or through hospitalization data, despite differences in the selection of cases being recorded in the justice and health systems.¹³

¹²Only a negligible proportion of reports involve same-sex violence.

¹³See also Kavanaugh *et al.* (2019), which examines the impact of all-women's justice centers in Peru on gender-

Figure 1 summarises key characteristics of our sample of police reports on domestic violence. Panel (a) gives the primary crime code associated with the offenses. 50% of reports are assaults, and a further 21% are petty assaults. The third most common crime category is "menace" (19%), which requires a perpetrator to intentionally cause fear of serious injury or death. Figure 1 Panel (b) gives the distribution of the number of police reports for domestic violence per abusive couple, i.e. per couple with at least one police report in their relationship history. 64% of couples have only a single police report in their history. However, the distribution of reports per couple is skewed; while the majority of couples file only a single report, there is a small number of couples with a very large number of domestic violence police reports. Figure 1 Panel (c) shows the number of years between when an abusive couple is first observed cohabiting and their first police report for domestic violence. 24% of couples experience their first police report in the first year that they are observed cohabiting, and 49% in the first two years. 51% of couples have their first report two years after the start of cohabitation or later. Thus, for many couples, there is a non-trivial gap between moving in together and a record of a violent incident.


2.1 Demographic Characteristics of Cohabiting Couples

Table 1 reports summary statistics for all cohabiting men and women during our time period in the year before they first start cohabiting with a new partner. We divide the sample into the groups that we will exploit for our primary analysis. Amongst women, this is: (1) women in abusive relationships (victims); (2) women who cohabit with known abusers but who do not report domestic violence in their own relationship with such men (other cohabitees); and (3) women who cohabit with men but who are not cohabiting with known abusers (non-abusive). Amongst men, this is: (1) men who are abusive (perpetrators); (2) men who cohabit with victims but are not themselves reported as abusive (other cohabitees) (3) men who do not cohabit with victims (non-abusive).

Table 1 shows that women and men who form relationships that are characterized by a police report for domestic violence are negatively selected on observables. They are less than half

based violence.

Figure 1: Domestic Violence Police Report Descriptive Statistics



Notes: Figure presents the histograms of (a) primary crime code; (b) police reports for domestic violence per couple; and (c) the number of years between when a couple is first observed cohabiting and the first police report for couples. All three panels restrict to couples with at least one police report for domestic violence (as defined in the text) in their relationship history. The sample is further restricted to couples that are first observed cohabiting after 2006, aged between 21-65 years old, and with police reports between a male perpetrator and female victim for domestic violence.

as likely to be college educated than those forming non-abusive relationships. The employment rates of both victims and perpetrators in the year before an abusive cohabitation starts are also substantially lower than those forming non-abusive relationships: 51% of victims and perpetrators are employed in the year before moving in with each other compared to 66% of those forming non-abusive relationships. Victims and perpetrators are both older and more likely to have children from prior relationships than those forming non-abusive relationships in the population at large.

Interestingly, abusive men are significantly more negatively selected on economic characteristics than other men with whom victims form relationships: the employment rates and earnings of men with whom victims cohabit but do not report any violence are much closer to those of the characteristics of men forming non-abusive relationships with women who are never victims. Further, the women who cohabit with men who are abusive in another relationship but who do not file police reports for domestic violence themselves, are more positively selected on economic outcomes than victims. The employment rates and earnings of such women are much closer to those who cohabit with men who never have a police report for domestic violence filed against them.

Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of New Cohabitees

	Women				Men	
	Victims (1)	Other Cohabitees (2)	Non-Abusive (3)	Perpetrator (4)	Other Cohabitees (5)	Non-Abusive (6)
Age	31.43 (10.70)	32.36 (10.93)	29.34 (10.61)	33.73 (10.57)	34.08 (10.71)	31.14 (10.91)
College	0.10 (0.295)	0.15 (0.354)	0.23 (0.421)	0.12 (0.320)	0.11 (0.313)	0.18 (0.382)
High School	0.53 (0.499)	0.58 (0.494)	0.60 (0.491)	0.47 (0.499)	0.57 (0.495)	0.60 (0.489)
Dropouts	0.38 (0.485)	0.28 (0.448)	0.17 (0.379)	0.42 (0.493)	0.32 (0.467)	0.22 (0.414)
Employed at t-1	0.51 (0.500)	0.64 (0.481)	0.66 (0.473)	0.51 (0.500)	0.62 (0.486)	0.65 (0.476)
Earnings at t-1	12137 (14520)	16316 (16767)	15952 (16352)	16549 (19906)	20438 (20481)	21661 (23270)
Number of Children	1.06 (1.382)	0.89 (1.267)	0.47 (0.989)	0.86 (1.252)	0.78 (1.213)	0.45 (0.976)
Speak Finnish	0.90 (0.304)	0.91 (0.286)	0.90 (0.300)	0.85 (0.355)	0.89 (0.317)	0.88 (0.330)
Prior Violent Crimes	0.09 (0.747)	0.05 (0.627)	0.01 (0.266)	0.77 (3.169)	0.31 (2.127)	0.07 (0.964)
Observations	13767	8088	609872	13767	9580	609872

Notes: Victims and perpetrators in columns (1) and (4) are members of all DV couples who appear in the police data for a domestic violence report, from 2006-2019. Columns (3) and (6) report statistics for women and men in non-DV couples, which consist of all other cohabiting couples in the same time period. Other cohabitees in columns (2) and (5) consist of other women (men) that perpetrators (victims) also cohabit with at some point in the sample period. College indicates the share with a bachelor's degree or higher. Note that the majority of those who go on to college in Finland also receive a master's degree. High school consists of those who graduate with either a vocational-secondary or academic-secondary degree as their highest educational degree. Prior violent crimes consist of all prior police reports for violent crimes and does not condition on arrests or convictions. Earnings are reported in Euros deflated to 2013 prices.

3 The Economic Impacts of Cohabiting with an Abusive Partner

3.1 Victims' Labour Market Outcomes Fall After Cohabiting with an Abusive Partner

We start by documenting the employment impacts on women from cohabiting with partners who later appear in the police data for one (or more) instances of physical abuse against them. Figure 2 Panels (a) and (c) show the average employment rate and earnings respectively for women who start an abusive cohabitation spell at time zero for the five years before and after moving in with an abusive partner. As was clear from Table 1, pre-cohabitation employment rates and earnings are low for victims, although their labor market outcomes are improving in the years leading up to the start of the new relationship. In the five years before starting an abusive relationship, women's employment rates and annual earnings *increased* by 21% and 34% respectively. However, upon cohabitation, victim's economic outcomes immediately deteriorate. Descriptively, women's employment rates *fall* in absolute terms by 4% and earnings by 6% in the two years following cohabitation with an abusive partner.

These descriptive results might not capture the causal effect of cohabiting with an abusive partner for a number of reasons. First, there is negative selection on observables for women who form abusive relationships. This selection suggests that cross-sectional comparisons could overstate the employment and earnings costs of forming abusive relationships if these women's labour market attachment is weak in general. Women who form abusive relationships, because they initially make a lower income and are less likely to be employed, may be more likely to drop out of employment in general, and not due to any action on the part of the abusive partner.

To address this concern, we estimate a matched difference-in-differences design which allows us to carefully compare the outcomes of individuals who cohabit with a partner at the same time and are otherwise observationally identical before the cohabitation event, but one cohabits with an eventually physically abusive partner while the other relationship never results in a police report for domestic violence.

Formally, we identify women who are observationally identical to victims according to their key economic and demographic characteristics before they both start a cohabitation spell. We


perfectly match on employment status in the year before cohabitation (year -1) and, for those women who are employed the year before cohabitation, whether their earnings are above or below median. Next, within these groups, we match on a wider set of covariates on the basis of an estimated propensity score. To do so, we estimate a probit regression, where the dependent variable is a dummy capturing whether an individual is a victim and with controls including a woman's age, education, violent crime reports, earnings, and employment status in the four years prior to cohabitation, and her male partner's employment, earnings, age, education and violent crime reports in the year before cohabitation. Using this estimated propensity score, we then identify a victim's five nearest neighbor matches. This exercise leaves us with five matches for the victim who also start a new relationship at the same time, appear identical on observables in the years prior to the year in which cohabitation occurs, and start a relationship with an observationally identical man, but who do not experience a police report for domestic violence at any point in their relationship.

With matched "control" and treatment observations in hand, we estimate the following regression model:

$$Y_{it} = \sum_{j=-5, j \neq -1}^5 (\delta_j D_{i,j} + \alpha_{m(i),j}) + \gamma_t + \epsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

where Y_{it} represents the outcome of interest for woman i in year t . $D_{i,j}$ is an indicator variable for the treatment (being in an abusive relationship) in year j since the start of cohabitation. $\alpha_{m(i),j}$ give the set of match-by-time from start of cohabitation fixed effects. δ_j are the coefficients of interest, identifying the effects of being in an abusive relationship relative to the matched counterfactual in a non-abusive relationship. Given the inclusion of $\alpha_{m(i),j}$, δ_j is identified by variation between victims and their matched controls in the time period of interest. We omit the year prior to the event ($j = -1$), which means that all estimates of δ_j are relative to the year before the incident. Additionally, we include year fixed effects, γ_t . Standard errors are clustered at the match level.

Figure 2: Employment Impact of Cohabiting with an Abusive Partner



Notes: Panels (a) and (b) report descriptive and estimated impacts of cohabiting with a partner where there will eventually be a police report on employment of the female victim. The estimates in Panel (b) use the matched control to identify effects 5 years before and 5 years after cohabitation, estimating equation 1 (see main text for additional details), and with all estimates relative to the year before cohabitation which is omitted. Year 0 denotes the year at which cohabitation began. Panel (c) and (d) report the descriptive and estimated impacts of cohabiting with a partner where there will eventually be a police report on the earnings of the female victim. Employment indicates whether an individual was employed during the last week of the year (the reference week). Earnings are the sum of all taxable labor earnings during the preceding calendar year. This includes both wage and salary income, but also self-employment income, and is deflated to 2013 Euros. Standard errors are clustered at the match level.

We report results in Figure 2 (b) and (d) for employment and annual earnings respectively. The figures depict flat pre-trends prior to cohabitation. Directly after starting a cohabitation spell with an abusive partner, women's employment drops relative to their matched controls. This drop in employment is persistent: by five years after cohabitation, these women are on

average 6.4 percentage points less likely to be employed compared with their matched controls who do not experience a police report for domestic violence within their relationships. This represents a 12% decline relative to their baseline employment rates. Turning to earnings, victims' annual earnings are €1750 lower per year in the five years after cohabitation with an abusive partner relative to their matched controls. Appendix Figure A.1 shows that, relative to average earnings in the three years before cohabitation, this fall represents a 26% decline. Thus, relative to observationally identical women who start relationships with observationally identical men, victims of domestic abuse suffer significant drops in their labor market attachment immediately upon cohabitation. These effects are especially large given victims' low employment rates and earnings pre-cohabitation.

While our focus in this paper is on victim outcomes, we also consider whether the decline in female labor supply is compensated for by an increase in the labor supply of her abusive partner, thereby keeping overall household income constant. To do so, we sum spousal annual incomes to form a measure of household earnings for victims and their matched controls. Appendix Figure A.2 shows that while the trend in total earnings is indistinguishable between abusive couples and their matched controls prior to cohabitation (despite us not matching on male economic outcomes before $t = -1$), directly after cohabitation the total incomes of abusive couples diverge significantly, with abusive households experiencing much lower total household income post cohabitation. Thus, the decline in female labor supply is not matched by an increase in labor market participation amongst abusive men.

Robustness: Reverse Causality Our matched DiD strategy allows us additionally to verify whether the declines in victims' economic outcomes are driven by market or firm-level shocks, rather than by the cohabitation event. For example, if there are mass layoffs in the women's industry or her firm, then she might be more likely to cohabit with an unobservably lower quality (and potentially abusive) partner, and also more likely to become unemployed. To establish robustness to such local labor market- or firm-level shocks as an alternative possible explanation for our results, we provide a number of robustness checks.

First, we construct a Bartik measure of (exogenous) female local labor demand. We do so by constructing an index for average employment for women in a region r with education e at time t as:

$$\bar{Y}_{ret} = \sum_j \gamma_{re0j} Y_{-r,etj} \quad (2)$$

where j denotes industries.¹⁴ If victims disproportionately start relationships in markets characterized by negative labor market shocks, we should see that their index of labor demand is consistently lower than that of their matched control.

We also test the possibility that women who enter abusive relationships do so as a result of negative shocks to their firms. For example, a woman's firm might downsize or significantly cut pay, driving her to move in with a potentially abusive partner while concurrently causing a deterioration in her labour market outcomes. To test this, we examine the average earnings, turnover, and total number of employees (firm size) for the women in abusive relationships who were employed prior to starting an abusive relationship and their matched controls before and after cohabitation as the outcome of interest in Equation 1. Further, in Table 3, we analyze employment outcomes relative to matched controls for the (selected) sample of victims who remain employed at $t = 0$ and, therefore, for whom we can eliminate job loss as a potential explanation for starting an abusive relationship.

Table 2 gives the stacked DiD results for these exercises. We find no evidence of differential labor market nor firm-level shocks for the women who begin a cohabitation spell with an abusive partner relative to their matched controls. We estimate precise zero effects on our Bartik index of labor demand, as well as average earnings, turnover, and firm size for those in employment pre-cohabitation relative to their matched control. We further find significant negative declines in employment and earnings for women who remain employed for the first year of cohabitation (Table 3 Column 3). Based on this evidence, we conclude that it is the start of the abusive relation-

¹⁴The region variable is the "sub-region" definition from Statistics Finland. It is similar to the definition of commuting zones. In total, there are around 70 sub-regions in Finland. The education variation has three levels: college and above, high school graduates, and less than high school. The industry variation is categorized by the two-digit level industry code.

ship itself that causes the stark and immediate declines in the woman’s labor market outcomes at cohabitation, rather than some other confounder at the market or firm level driving both the cohabitation choice and the deterioration in labor market outcomes.

Table 2: Robustness Checks for Reverse Causality

	(1) Bartik Index	(2) Earnings	(3) Firm Size	(4) Turnover
Abusive	0.0003 (0.0006)	-12.9972 (92.83)	-18.0727 (10.46)	0.0012 (0.0026)
Observations	709484	318812	318812	303348
Dependent Mean	.647	23228	469	.282
<i>Fixed effects</i>				
Year	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Since Cohabit \times Match	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: Table reports difference-in-differences estimates from Equation (1) collapsed into a pre- and post-period. Data is from police reports linked to FLEED register data. The counterfactual observations are given by victims’ matched controls. The sample is restricted to those employed at $t - 1$ in columns (2)-(4). The Bartik index in (1) is constructed as in equation 2. Average earnings are the mean year-end earnings of all employees in the firm. Firm size is given by the number of year-end employees in the firm. Turnover is the share of employees leaving each year as a fraction of total employees in the plant. Standard errors are clustered at the match level.

Robustness: Relationship Effect Women who cohabit with abusive partners might always experience a deterioration in their labor market outcomes upon moving in with a partner, even if their partner is never abusive. This concern might not be addressed by our matched difference-in-differences design if this relationship effect is an unobservable personality trait. To test this possibility, we leverage the fact that we can observe other cohabitation spells for victims where no domestic violence is reported in our data. This richness in the data allows us to compare a victim’s outcomes in her abusive relationship to those in her non-abusive relationships. If we find an employment impact of a similar magnitude using this alternative counterfactual, such a result would confirm that the employment drop upon cohabitation we documented above is an abusive relationship effect as opposed to something that characterizes the victim’s behavior upon starting relationships in general.


As victims are, by definition, different ages and have different relationship histories in their non-abusive relationships compared with their abusive relationships, we consider a triple difference-in-differences design. That is, we compare the difference in employment outcomes for victims relative to their matched controls in their abusive and non-abusive relationships. Formally, we estimate the following event study specification:

$$Y_{it} = \sum_{j=-5, j \neq -1}^5 (\delta_j (V_{i,j} \times A_{i,j}) + \omega_j V_{i,j} + \mu_j A_{i,j} + \alpha_{m(i),j}) + \gamma_t + \epsilon_{it} \quad (3)$$

where $V_{i,j}$ is an indicator for whether an individual is a victim or a matched control to the victim in her abusive relationship and $A_{i,j}$ is an indicator for whether an individual is a victim in at least one of her relationships. Note that $(V_{i,j} \times A_{i,j})$ is equivalent to $D_{i,j}$ in Equation 1.

We report results from this exercise in Figure 3. This confirms an immediate decline in victims' economic outcomes upon starting an abusive relationship relative to outcomes in her non-abusive relationships. If victims always reduced their labor market attachment when forming relationships relative to observationally identical women, the coefficients reported in Figure 3 would be zero. This result suggests that it is cohabiting with a partner that will eventually result in a police report for physical abuse that leads to the deterioration in her economic outcomes, and not relationships *in general* that lead her to cut back on her labor supply.

Figure 3: Employment and Earnings Impacts of Cohabiting with an Abusive Partner: Triple Difference Design



Notes: Panel A (B) reports estimates of equation 3 comparing the employment (earnings) outcomes of women in abusive relationships to their non-abusive relationships, relative to their matched controls in a triple difference-in-differences design. Employment is a dummy indicating if the woman was employed before the relationship started. Earnings consist of all taxable labor market income each year and are measured in 2013 Euros. Standard errors are clustered at the match level.

Robustness: Fertility Women who enter abusive relationships may be more likely to have children after cohabitation. If pregnancy causes these women to move in with their partners, and then the birth of the child causes both the physical abuse (due to the additional stress on the partnership) and the drops in employment (due to a child penalty effect (Angelov *et al.*, 2016;

Kleven *et al.*, 2019; Andresen and Nix, 2022)), then the economic declines we document above could be entirely due to children and not driven by abusive behavior by one's partner.

To test this possibility, Table 3 reports stacked DiD results for victims relative to their matched controls for the sub-sample of women who have no change in their completed fertility between $t = -1$ and $t = 2$. While this is a selected sample, it allows us to confirm whether childbirth is driving our primary result. We find that our main results remain. There is almost no difference in the point estimates of our primary outcomes: we estimate treatment effects of -0.0637 and -0.2295 on employment and relative earnings respectively in the five years following cohabitation for the group of women with no change in completed fertility, compared to -0.0638 and -0.2566 in our primary specification. Based on these results we conclude that while fertility is likely an important component of abusive relationships (and indeed all relationships), and may also be an important dimension through which abusive partners are able to exert control over victims,¹⁵ changes in fertility alone do not explain the impacts on women's labor supply from cohabiting with an abusive partner.

¹⁵Indeed, existing literature suggests that the presence of children may play an important role in the impacts of policies (Brassiolo, 2016).

Table 3: Robustness Checks for Fertility and Employment

	(1) Main	(2) Ex. Δ Fertility	(3) Employed $t = 0$
Panel A: Employment			
Abusive	-0.0638*** (0.0029)	-0.0637*** (0.0039)	-0.0463*** (0.0032)
Observations	814364	594022	461099
Panel B: Relative Earnings			
Abusive	-0.2566*** (0.0152)	-0.2295*** (0.0169)	-0.1581***
Observations	647417	468856	429360
<i>Fixed effects</i>			
Year	✓	✓	✓
Time since cohabit \times Match	✓	✓	✓


Notes: Table reports difference-in-differences estimates from Equation (1) collapsed into a pre- and post-period. Data is from police reports linked to FLEED register data. The counterfactual observations are given by victims' matched controls in columns (1)-(3). The sample is restricted to those with no change in completed fertility between $t = -1$ and $t = 2$ in column (2) and those who were employed at $t = 0$ in column (3). Column (1) gives our primary specification. Standard errors are clustered at the match level.

Robustness: Violent Types A last concern is that these results might capture the impact of cohabiting with a partner who is a difficult personality, and not the impact of cohabiting with an individual who is engaging in domestic abuse. To test this possibility, we introduce a placebo check. We identify all couples in the police data where the man commits one of the same crimes we use to identify our domestic violence couples (see Section 2 and Appendix Section C.3). However, in contrast to our DV sample, we restrict to men who commit one of these crimes, but where the victim is not his female partner. This provides us with a subset of couples where the man is similarly violent toward another person at some point after cohabitation, but unlike the men in our domestic violence couples sample, he is violent against someone who is not his partner.

With this group of couples in hand, we then take the exact same approach as our main estimation strategy, estimating a matched DiD design (i.e. estimating equation 1 with this new estimation sample) to identify the economic impacts on the female partners of cohabiting with these violent, but not domestically violent, men relative to their matched counterfactuals.

We report results for employment and earnings in Figure 4 below. We find almost no impact of cohabiting with these men who also appear with a police report for violence, but where their partner is never the victim. This result shows that it is indeed cohabiting with an abusive partner that drives our main results.

Figure 4: Employment and Earnings Impacts of Cohabiting with a Partner with a Police Report for Violent Crime Against a Non-Partner



Notes: Panel A (B) reports estimates of equation 1 comparing the employment (earnings) outcomes of women who cohabit with a partner who is violent at some point after cohabitation but does not commit violence against her (i.e. this is not a domestic abuse couple) relative to her matched control to identify effects 5 years before and 5 years after cohabitation. All estimates are relative to the year before cohabitation which is omitted. Year 0 denotes the year at which cohabitation began. Employment is a dummy indicating if the woman was employed before the relationship started. Earnings consist of all taxable labor market income each year and are measured in 2013 Euros. Standard errors are clustered at the match level.

3.2 Labor Market Outcomes Deteriorate for All Female Partners of Abusive Men


The previous section showed that women who enter a relationship where there will be a police report for domestic abuse experience a significant deterioration in their labor market outcomes immediately following cohabitation, which persists for at least five years. However, this drop in labor supply is not present in the victims' other relationships. Do abusive men impose labor market costs on their partners in their other relationships?

To test this possibility, we identify the other relationships that perpetrators of domestic violence form but in which no police report is filed. Specifically, we identify relationships starting since 2006 that do not result in police reports for domestic violence but for whom the male partner has at least one police report for domestic violence in some other relationship. A lack of decline

in labor market outcomes for women in an abusive man's other relationships could be consistent with our findings in the previous section resulting from a negative "match shock", i.e. that this particular match was problematic. In contrast, if abusive men suppress women's economic outcomes consistently, this would suggest that some men are systematically abusive, i.e. there are "abusive" types and "non-abusive" types of men.

Formally, we estimate Equation 1 for the labor market outcomes of other women who cohabit with abusive men relative to their matched controls (identified using the same procedure as described in Section 3.1). We report results in Figure 5. We find that in his other relationships where no police report is filed, an abusive man's partners still experience substantial declines in their employment outcomes directly after cohabitation, although somewhat smaller in size compared with the women in relationships where a police report is filed. These results show that the subset of men who appear in police reports for physical domestic abuse impose labor market costs across all of their relationships. This result supports existing models of domestic violence in economics that rely on dividing partners into abusive and non-abusive types.

Figure 5: Impact of Cohabiting with an Abusive Man When No Police Report is Filed



Notes: Figure reports the impact on employment of cohabiting with a partner who in another relationship was the perpetrator in a police report of domestic violence. The estimated impact is from a matched difference-in-difference design as described in the text. Employment is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is employed at the end of the year. Standard errors are clustered at the match level.

3.3 Victims' Labor Market Deterioration is Non-Monotonic in Pre-Cohabitation Outside Options


Having established a robust negative impact of cohabiting with an abusive spouse on women's labor market outcomes, we now examine heterogeneity in the magnitude of this decline. We re-estimate Equation 1 separately by education groups and earnings terciles (defined over the three years preceding cohabitation) for victims and their matched controls. Figure 6 gives the stacked DiD estimate of the employment decline experienced by these different groups relative to their matched control observations who enter into non-abusive relationships. Appendix Figure A.3 reports the results of the same exercise for earnings.

We find that those who have "intermediate" levels of education and pre-cohabitation earnings experience the largest declines in their employment rates upon starting an abusive relationship. Those with high school degrees have the largest drops in labor market outcomes, while those who are high-school dropouts and college graduates have smaller labour market suppression. This non-monotonicity across pre-cohabitation education levels is statistically significant. Similarly, we find that those in the middle earnings tercile prior to cohabitation experience the largest drop in their labour supply, with statistically significantly larger labour market suppression following cohabitation when compared with those with high earnings, and marginally significantly larger suppression compared with women who have low earnings prior to cohabitation.

This non-monotonic relationship between the decline in labor market outcomes and women's pre-cohabitation outside options is difficult to reconcile with a traditional physical violence and collective bargaining power story. Such models typically generate a monotonic relationship between a woman's outside option and her exposure to violence (Aizer, 2010). Thus, we would expect a similar monotonic relationship in the magnitude of her employment decline following cohabitation with such models, but this is not what we find, suggesting that a new framework is needed to understand these relationships.

We also consider heterogeneity in the time between cohabitation and the first police report

Figure 6: Non-Monotonic Dynamic Decrease in Outside Options



Notes: Figure reports the stacked DiD estimates for the impact of cohabiting with an abuser on female employment rates in the two years following cohabitation for victims relative to their matched controls. For Panel A, low refers to women whose pre-cohabitation earnings put them in the bottom tercile of the earnings distribution of all women who are in abusive relationships (including those with zero incomes). Medium (high) is defined similarly, but for women whose pre-cohabitation earnings put them in the middle (top) third of the earnings distribution. For Panel B, college consists of all individuals with any post-secondary school degree, excluding those who went to vocational tertiary schools. Note that the majority of Finnish college graduates also obtain a master's degree. Dropout consists of all individuals without a secondary degree (including vocational secondary degrees). High school consists of individuals whose highest degree is an academic secondary or vocational secondary degree. Standard errors are clustered at the match level.


for domestic violence. We estimate the following linear probability model:

$$Y_i = \beta X_i + \epsilon_i \quad (4)$$

where Y_i is a binary variable equal to one if a police report for domestic violence is filed in the first two years of a woman i 's relationship. X_i is the explanatory variable of interest, namely one of the following three options: education, pre-cohabitation employment, or pre-cohabitation earnings.

Figure 7 shows that women in abusive relationships in which the first police report is filed within the first two years of a relationship are significantly less likely to be college educated and have significantly lower pre-cohabitation earnings and employment rates than those for whom police reports occur later in the relationship.

Figure 7: Time Until Physical Violence



Notes: Figure reports the coefficients and 95% confidence interval from equation 4 amongst the sample of victims who file police reports in their relationships with abusive men. The dependent variable is a binary variable that equals one if a police report for domestic violence is filed in the first two years of woman i 's relationship. College is a dummy of whether the woman has a tertiary degree or not. Employment is a dummy indicating if the woman was employed before the relationship started. Above average earnings is a dummy indicating if a woman's earnings in the three years before cohabitation were below or above the median.

Robustness: Non-Reporting Partners of Abusive Men In Appendix Figure A.4 we show that the non-monotonicity documented above is also apparent when we look at other women who cohabit with abusive men but who do not have a police report for physical violence. To do so, we use the same sample and the same matched controls as in Subsection 3.2, and estimate a matched DiD collapsing to the post- versus pre-period as in Figure 6. We note that these women are different on observables relative to victims from police reports (see Table 1), so we do not expect the effect sizes to be the same. However, if the non-monotonicity in the amount of estimated economic suppression remains amongst this non-reporting sample, such a result would suggest that the results from Figure 6 are unlikely to be explained by heterogeneity in reporting across victims based on pre-cohabitation outside options, i.e. this serves as a robustness check to address under-reporting concerns. Reassuringly, we find a similar non-monotonicity in the amount of economic suppression for these non-reporting other cohabitantes.

4 A Dynamic Model of Coercive Control and Physical Violence

To rationalize our stylized facts, we develop a two-period model of abusive households that incorporates both physical violence and coercive control. We use the model to provide a better understanding of the mechanisms underlying the declines in women’s economic outcomes upon cohabiting with an abusive man, with implications for both the existing economics literature on domestic violence and the optimal policy response.

Motivated by our second set of empirical results, the model features two types of men: abusive and non-abusive. Abusive men decide whether to act on violent urges, and can engage in either physical violence (P) or coercive control (S), or choose to be non-abusive (N). While these men derive some positive utility from violence, abuse suppresses female labor supply lowering total household income. Women imperfectly observe their partner’s type before cohabitation. Over time, women learn about whether their partner is abusive from his behavior. At the beginning of the second period, women decide whether to remain in the relationship or not. Women will leave the relationship if the expected value of being single exceeds that of cohabitation given their belief about their partner’s type.

An abusive man's violence choice is thereby shaped by static and dynamic incentives. The static incentives involve a within-period trade-off of the utility benefits of acting on violent urges with the immediate resource cost of suppressing female labour supply. These static incentives interact with dynamic "learning" and "suppression" mechanisms. If abusive men do not suppress their urges, women will learn their type with implications for whether she will choose to remain in the relationship in future periods. Balanced against this, violence and coercive control suppress female labour supply and with it a woman's incentive to leave the relationship in later periods given the fall in her potential income when single. These dynamic channels can create an incentive for abusive men to suppress their violent urges in favor of coercive control in the early periods of the relationship as this can conceal their type while undermining her incentive to leave the relationship as violence escalates in later periods.

4.1 Set-Up

Preferences Abusive men receive utility from consumption and violent behavior.¹⁶ We assume that a man's consumption is some fixed fraction, $1 - \lambda$, of total household income, where $0 \leq \lambda \leq 1$. Household income is comprised of a woman's earnings and some lump sum household benefit, B . B is a reduced form way of capturing (unmodelled) male income in addition to economies of scale from cohabitation and other direct benefits of being in a relationship compared to being single. Formally, the flow utility for abusive men (m) when cohabiting (C) is:¹⁷

$$u_t^{Cm} = (1 - \lambda) \underbrace{(B + wL_t)}_{\text{Total resources}} + \underbrace{\alpha_{Pt}P_t}_{\text{Violence utility}} + \underbrace{\alpha_{St}S_t}_{\text{Suppression utility}} \quad (5)$$

Women receive utility from consumption derived from their share, λ , of household income

¹⁶Specifically, the utility from physical violence (denoted P , when men do not suppress their violent urges), is higher than the utility from coercive control (S , when men partially suppress their violent urges). The utility from non-abuse (N , when men fully suppress their violent urges) is normalized to zero.

¹⁷The period utility for non-abusive men (n) in a relationship is:

$$u_t^{Cn} = (1 - \lambda) \underbrace{(B + wL_t)}_{\text{Total resources}}$$

Since the focus of the paper is women and abusive men's choices and behaviour, in the model we abstract from the optimization problem for non-abusive men.

and get disutility from physical violence and labor supply. The flow utility for women (f) in a relationship is:

$$u_t^{Cf} = \lambda \underbrace{(B + wL_t)}_{\text{Total resources}} - \underbrace{e_t^C L_t}_{\text{Effort cost}} - \underbrace{\omega A_t}_{\text{Violence disutility}} \quad (6)$$

When single, individuals consume the value of their labor income. For single men, the flow utility is normalized to zero. The flow utility for single (S) women is:

$$u_t^{Sf} = (w - e_t^S)L_t \quad (7)$$

The Household Tax & Learning We assume a woman's disutility from work is drawn from different distributions according to her relationship status and the abuse choice of her partner. In particular, we assume first-order stochastic dominance in the distribution of labor disutility conditional on physical violence, coercive control, non-abuse, and being single respectively i.e.,

$$\mathbb{E}(e^C|P) \geq \mathbb{E}(e^C|S) > \mathbb{E}(e^C|N) > \mathbb{E}(e^S)$$

This assumption reflects that physical violence and coercive control impose additional taxes on female labor supply as a result of economic sabotage, suppression, and economic costs of victimization. We can interpret the gap $(\mathbb{E}(e^C|N) - \mathbb{E}(e^S)) > 0$ as a gender norm in non-abusive relationships, i.e., men in general dislike women working more in the labour market and would like women to do more household production. To demonstrate that this "tax" is relevant even in non-abusive relationships, in Appendix B we use a child-penalty style empirical strategy to estimate a decrease in female employment of 2 p.p. after cohabitation, compared with women who are of a similar age but are not yet cohabiting with a partner.

A woman conditions her subjective belief over whether her partner is abusive, $\tilde{\pi}$, on the basis of the realization of e^C and any occurrence of physical violence. Physical abuse ($P_t = 1$) fully reveals that the man is an abusive type. We assume there is overlap in the distribution of e^C for men engaging in non-abusive behaviour and men engaging in coercive control. This overlap means that coercive control does not perfectly reveal a man's type because only the associated tax on economic activity rather than coercive control itself is directly observed by women. We

assume that higher realizations of e^C increase a woman's belief that her partner is abusive (as would occur if she was Bayesian):

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{\pi}_t(P_t = 1) &= 1 \\ \frac{\partial \tilde{\pi}_t(P_t = 0)}{\partial e_t^C} &\geq 0\end{aligned}\tag{8}$$

Wage Dynamics A woman's labor market opportunities in the second period depend on her first-period labor supply.¹⁸ As a simple version of such a process, we assume that women who do not work in the first period cannot work (i.e. face a zero wage) in the second period.

4.2 Timing

Each period is characterized by the following four stages of the game:

1. A match shock, θ_t , is realized and women decide whether to remain cohabiting or break up with their partner given their belief about whether he is abusive, $\tilde{\pi}_{t-1}$.
2. Male preferences for physical violence and coercive control are realized and abusive men choose the degree to suppress their violent urges, $v_t \in \{P_t, S_t, N_t\}$.
3. Conditional on a man's violence choice, v_t , women's effort shocks, e_t^C , are realized and women update their belief about their partner's type.
4. Women make their labor supply decision.

We focus on a two-period version of the model as this is able to capture the primary dynamics present in the multi-period model. Individuals are cohabiting at the start of the first period; we do not model the matching process. In the first period, individuals maximize their expected utility over the two periods, taking into account the dynamic impact of their choices on future payoffs. In the second (and final) period, individuals maximize their final-stage payoff based on the static benefits and costs of their choices.

¹⁸This dependency could arise through a human capital accumulation channel.

4.3 Final period

We solve the two-period problem by backward induction as behavior in the last period is determined only by static incentives. We start with the final decision in the second period for those in a relationship: the woman's labor supply decision. The probability that she works is given by:

$$\mathbb{P}(L_2(1)|w, L_1) = \begin{cases} \mathbb{P}(\lambda w > e_2^C) & \text{if } L_1 = 1 \\ 0 & \text{if } L_1 = 0 \end{cases}$$

where $L_2(j)$ is shorthand notation for $L_2 = j$ for $j = \{0, 1\}$

Abusive men make their violence choice taking into account that their actions will affect their partner's labor supply and thus their own consumption through the household budget constraint. Formally, an abusive man chooses physical violence over non-abuse and coercive control if and only if:

$$\alpha_{P2} > (1 - \lambda)w [\mathbb{P}(L_2(1)|w, L_1, N_2) - \mathbb{P}(L_2(1)|w, L_1, P_2)] \quad (9)$$

$$\underbrace{(\alpha_{P2} - \alpha_{S2})}_{\text{Static benefits}} > \underbrace{(1 - \lambda)w [\mathbb{P}(L_2(1)|w, L_1, S_2) - \mathbb{P}(L_2(1)|w, L_1, P_2)]}_{\text{Static costs}} \quad (10)$$

where

$$\mathbb{P}(L_2(1)|w, 1, v) = \int f(e|v) \mathbf{1}[\lambda w > e] \, de \quad (11)$$

i.e., the probability of a woman working given the distribution of labor disutility dictated by the abuse decision, $f(e|v)$. Given assumptions on the distribution of violent urges, α_v , Equations 9 and 10 determine the probability of an abusive man choosing violence level v .

At the beginning of the final period, women decide whether to remain cohabiting ($\kappa = 1$) or not. They compare their expected payoff from staying in the relationship compared to being single given their belief about whether their partner is abusive, $\tilde{\pi}$, and their second-period outside option, $o = w \cdot \mathbf{1}(L_1 = 1)$, i.e. w if they worked in the first period and zero otherwise. In Appendix

D, we derive the following comparative statics:

$$\frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(\kappa)}{\partial o} \leq 0, \quad \frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(\kappa)}{\partial \tilde{\pi}} < 0. \quad (12)$$

If a woman has a higher outside option, she will have a higher value of being single relative to being in a relationship because being in a relationship imposes a tax on her labour supply and by remaining single she can personally retain more of the benefits from an increase in her economic opportunities. If a woman has a higher belief that the man is abusive, her expected payoff from the relationship will be lower because of a higher probability of being exposed to violence and a higher expected tax on her labour supply, both of which lower the value of cohabitation.

These results allow us to derive Theorem 1, providing a formal relationship between a woman's outside option and her exposure to physical violence in the later period. There are two channels creating a negative relationship between a woman's outside option and the probability of physical violence: a breakup channel and a within-relationship channel. Higher outside options increase women's probability of breaking up with abusive men. They also increase the static costs of violence, reducing its prevalence within a relationship.

Theorem 1. The probability of physical violence in the final period, $\mathbb{P}(P_2)$, decreases as a woman's outside option (o) increases. This result follows from the following decomposition exercise from the formal model:

$$\frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(P_2)}{\partial o} = \underbrace{\frac{\partial P(\kappa)}{\partial o} \mathbb{P}(P_2|\kappa)}_{\text{Breakup}} + \underbrace{\mathbb{P}(\kappa) \frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(P_2|\kappa)}{\partial o}}_{\text{Within-Relationship}} < 0$$

Proof. See Appendix D.

4.4 First period

In the first period, abusive men consider the dynamic effects of their violence choice. The expected value of the first-period violence choice v is given by:

$$V_1^v = \underbrace{\mathbb{E}(\alpha_{v1})}_{\textcircled{1}} + \underbrace{(1 - \lambda)(B + w\mathbb{P}(L_1(1)|w))}_{\textcircled{2}} + \sum_{j=0}^1 \underbrace{\mathbb{P}(L_1(j)|v)}_{\textcircled{3}} \underbrace{\mathbb{P}(\kappa|v, L_1(j))}_{\textcircled{4}} \underbrace{V_2^{Cm}(L_1(j))}_{\textcircled{5}} \quad (13)$$

where: ① gives the expected utility of the violence choice; ② is the expected static resource cost; ③ is the probability of $L_1 = j$ given v ; ④ is the probability of remaining cohabiting in the second period given the violence choice v and first-period labor supply j ; and ⑤ is the expected value of cohabitation in period two given $L_1 = j$.

In Appendix D, we show that we can decompose changes in the expected value of violence level i relative to j , $\Delta_{ij} \equiv V_1^i - V_1^j$, with respect to the wage into three components:

$$\frac{\partial \Delta_{ij}}{\partial w} = RC_{ij} + SC_{ij} + LC_{ij} \quad (14)$$

where RC represents the resource cost channel, SC gives the suppression channel, and LC gives the learning channel.

Comparing more extreme to less extreme forms of violence, the resource channel is negative, $RC_{ij} \leq 0$, i.e. the relative surplus of more extreme to less extreme violence falls as women's wages increase because the cost of her not working rises. Again comparing more extreme to less extreme forms of violence, the suppression channel is positive, $SC_{ij} \geq 0$, i.e. as women's wages rise, more extreme forms of violence become more valuable over less extreme forms of violence. By increasing the probability of a woman not working, and therefore lowering her outside option, more extreme violence makes a woman's decision of whether to break up less sensitive to the wage.

The final learning channel is ambiguously signed. Formally this term is:

$$LC_{ij} = \frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(L_1(1)|i)}{\partial w} \delta(i) - \frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(L_1(1)|j)}{\partial w} \delta(j) \quad (15)$$

where $\delta(i)$ gives the cohabitation probability weighted surplus differential between when a woman works in period one and when she does not:

$$\delta(i) = \mathbb{P}(\kappa|i, L_1(1))V_2^{Cm}(L_1(1)) - \mathbb{P}(\kappa|i, L_1(0))V_2^{Cm}(L_1(0)) \quad (16)$$

The sign of the learning channel will depend on the relative strength of differences in the wage elasticity of women's labor supply across violence levels and of differences in the sensitivity of the cohabitation decision to outside options across violence levels. For example, imagine the extreme case where cohabitation probabilities do not vary with women's outside options. In this case, $LC_{ij} \leq 0$ for cases where i is a more extreme level of violence than j .¹⁹ If, however, cohabitation probabilities are especially sensitive to outside options, the expected value of a woman working can be smaller than when she does not work because of the heightened break-up risk. In such cases, the sign of LC_{ij} can also be positive.

Based on the man's optimal choice of violence in the first period, we obtain the following theorem regarding the possibility of a non-monotonic relationship between the probability of coercive control, physical violence, and non-abuse and women's wages at $t = 1$, i.e. her outside option at the start of cohabitation. As physical violence and coercive control impose larger household taxes on female labour supply than non-abuse, Theorem 2 also implies that there can be a non-monotonic relationship between the fall in women's labour supply and her outside options, consistent with our empirical result demonstrating such non-monotonicity in the data from the previous section.

¹⁹This is because $V_2^{Cm}(L_1(1)) \geq V_2^{Cm}(L_1(0))$ and $\frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(L_1(1)|i)}{\partial w} \leq \frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(L_1(1)|j)}{\partial w}$ for i giving a more extreme level of violence.

Theorem 2. The probability of physical violence and coercive control in the first period can exhibit non-monotonicity in women’s outside options at the start of a relationship (w). Specifically, both physical violence and coercive control can be higher in the first period among women with median outside options and lower among women with low or high outside options.

Proof. See Appendix D.

5 Discussion and Implications

A large literature shows that when women’s outside options increase, the amount of domestic violence observed in cross-sectional data decreases (Aizer, 2010; Anderberg *et al.*, 2016). This is often interpreted as the result of a change in women’s bargaining power within these relationships. An important implication of our model is that increasing women’s outside options may reduce observed domestic violence in cross-sectional data for another reason: women may be more likely to exit abusive relationships when their outside options increase, as they are no longer locked into a bad relationship. This "breakup" channel could occur in addition to a reduction in physical violence within existing relationships due to increased bargaining power but has been difficult to separately examine using prior data. In this section, we replicate the main results from Aizer (2010) and then explicitly test for this alternative breakup channel as a potentially important mechanism explaining this canonical result in the domestic violence literature.

Formally, we replicate Aizer (2010) by showing that when women’s outside options exogenously increase, the prevalence of domestic violence decreases. We construct an index for labor demand for workers of gender g in region r with education e at time t as:

$$\bar{Y}_{rget} = \sum_j \gamma_{reg0j} Y_{-r,egtj} \quad (17)$$

where j denotes industries. We consider two measures of demand: average earnings and employment rates. We consider employment rates as a measure of demand as wages and earnings are relatively rigid in Finland and so there is much greater variation in an index based on quantities

compared with an index based on prices.


With our Bartik instrument in hand, we estimate the following regression:

$$\log DV_{ret} = \beta^f \bar{Y}_{rfe} + \beta^m \bar{Y}_{rme} + \alpha_t + \gamma_e + \phi_r + \epsilon_{ret}$$

where $\log DV_{ret}$ refers to the natural log of domestic violence reports in region r in education group e at year t .²⁰ We report results in Figure 8. The blue bar is the original estimated effects from Aizer (2010). The red bar shows that, in our context, as the earnings outside option for women goes up, there is a significant decrease in the number of police reports of domestic violence. Last, the green bar shows that as a women’s employment outside options increases there is also a significant decrease in domestic abuse reported to the police. This is reassuring from a replicability standpoint, suggesting that this core result is robust across contexts and time periods. When it comes to changes in men’s labor demand, the index based on earnings shows very little variation within markets over time and we estimate a zero effect on domestic violence rates. However, the index based on employment rates, which shows much greater variability, demonstrates the expected behavior: increases in men’s outside options are associated with a higher prevalence of domestic violence.

²⁰The region variable is the “sub-region” definition from Statistics Finland. It is similar to the definition of commuting zones. In total, there are around 70 sub-regions in Finland. The education variation has three levels: college and above, high school graduates, and less than high school. The industry variation is categorized by the two-digit level industry code.

Figure 8: Replication: Domestic Violence Decreases as Women's Outside Options Increase



Notes: Figure reports the regression coefficients and 95% confidence intervals of the impacts of outside options on domestic violence, where outside options are defined using earnings ("Replication") and employment rates ("Replication-Emp"). The three estimates on the left use women's outside options, while the three estimates on the right use men's outside options. The "Aizer" coefficients are those reported in Table 4 of Aizer (2010).

We now harness our unique panel data to test the role of break-up in explaining this relationship in the data. To do so, we harness within-couple variation in the (employment) outside option of women and men over time. For our sample of abusive couples and their matched control observations, we estimate the following linear probability model:

$$BreakUp_{ijt} = \beta^f \bar{Y}_{it}^f + \alpha^f \bar{Y}_{it}^f \times DV_i + \beta^m \bar{Y}_{it}^m + \alpha^m \bar{Y}_{it}^m \times DV_i + \omega_i + \psi_t + \gamma_j + \epsilon_{ijt} \quad (18)$$

where DV_i is an indicator for whether a couple is abusive, ω_i is a couple fixed effect, ψ_t is a time fixed effect, γ_j is a time since cohabitation fixed effects, and $BreakUp_{ijt}$ is an indicator variable that equals one if a couple is not cohabiting at t and is zero otherwise.

Figure 9 gives the overall impact of a change in outside options on breakup probabilities for non-abusive women, non-abusive men, victims, and perpetrators. We find that the breakup of abusive relationships is a key outcome when women's outside options increase. While improvements in outside options *decrease* the probability of breakup in non-abusive couples, increases in

women's outside options in abusive couples lead to a statistically significant 5 percentage point increase in the probability the couple breaks up in a period. This demonstrates that the breakup channel is a relevant driver of observed reductions in reported physical domestic violence with improvements in women's economic outcomes.


This result adds to a closely related discussion from the literature that estimates the impacts of changing divorce laws on domestic violence. Most of these papers are unable to disentangle impacts mediated through break-up versus within-marriage reductions in violence. For example, in their influential paper on this topic Stevenson and Wolfers (2006) state: "Because the survey universe consists only of couples living in a conjugal unit, we are limited to analyzing rates of domestic violence within intact marriages. Thus, we cannot directly disentangle whether the estimated effects reflect a decreasing propensity toward spousal violence or an increasing propensity for abused spouses to exit their marriages." One notable exception is Sanin (2021a) who finds that a new divorce law that allowed women to divorce their husbands for domestic abuse increased the rate of divorce in areas where marriages tended to be more violent.

6 Conclusion

In this paper, we provide the first estimates of the labor market impact of cohabiting with an abusive spouse. Women who form relationships with men who eventually become physically violent experience immediate, large, and persistent reductions in their labor supply after beginning their relationships with these men. These women do not experience these reductions in their labour supply in their other relationships. In contrast, on average all women who form relationships with a man who has been reported to the police for abuse experience large declines in their labor supply, even if a given woman does not formally report abuse herself.

Heterogeneity in the magnitude of the decline of victims' economic outcomes cannot be rationalized by a standard household bargaining model of violence. We find that the decline in women's economic outcomes upon cohabiting with an abusive spouse is non-monotonic in their outside option. Women with "intermediate" levels of education and pre-cohabitation earnings suffer greater falls in employment rates and earnings than the least and most economically em-

Figure 9: The Relationships Between Women’s Outside Options and Relationship Breakup



Notes: Figure reports the regression coefficients and 95% confidence interval of the impacts of outside options on relationship breakup, estimating Equation 18 where outside options are instrumented using the Bartik approach described in the text. "Emp F" is the impact of an increase in women’s employment outside options and whether women in non-abusive relationships breakup. "Emp F x DV" reports estimates of the impact of improved employment outside options for women in abusive relationships on breakup. Similarly for "Emp M" and "Emp M x DV" for men. DV is an indicator equal to one if the women (or man) is in a relationship with one or more police reports for domestic violence.

powered women. This finding is hard to reconcile with a static model of exposure to physical violence. Further, women who report physical violence closer to the start of the relationship have the lowest economic outside options; victims with a first police report within two years of cohabitation are significantly less likely to have a college degree and their pre-cohabitation employment rates are 5.2 p.p and lower than women who first report violence later into a relationship.

We introduced a new dynamic model of abuse to rationalize our main empirical findings. A combination of three features makes our framework novel. First, we allow for abusers to engage in acts of coercive control as well as physical violence for both strategic and expressive motivations. Second, our model is dynamic and the abuser's incentive to suppress an urge for violence can vary across the lifetime of the relationship. Third, we go beyond a within-relationship analysis to directly include the decision to break up or not in the model. While there are a small number of contributions that include a subset of these mechanisms, there is no work that encompasses all of these channels. Our model is able to generate non-monotonicity in the relationship between a woman's outside options and her labor supply decline as well as differences in the timing of physical violence by a woman's economic empowerment, consistent with our empirical results.

Our model highlights that dynamic incentives relating to breakup risk play a key role in understanding the dynamics of abusive households. Higher outside option women experience a lower prevalence of violence because they are less exposed within a relationship (given the high resource cost of abusing these women) and because they are more likely to break up with abusive men. We explore the significance of the breakup channel directly with our unique panel data. Increases in women's outside options are associated with lower domestic violence and much greater rates of breakup amongst abusive couples.

These results have several policy implications. First, our finding that men who appear in the police data for domestic violence in at least one relationship also suppress the economic outcomes for women in their other relationships suggests that these men are persistently abusive. This motivates policy intended to dissuade men from these behaviors earlier in life, before such behavior becomes persistent. Indeed, research suggests that interventions in adolescence may be

effective (Goldstein *et al.*, 2022). Second, the fact that women's economic outcomes are severely damaged by abusive relationships raises the importance of economic support and active labor market programs to encourage reattachment to employment that are tailored to the needs of domestic abuse victims. Moreover, the fact that increased outside options facilitate women's ability to exit abusive relationships suggests that improving these women's outside options is a productive way to reduce domestic violence by empowering them to leave. However, in contexts where breakup is not an option for women, including many lower and middle income countries, the impacts of increased outside options could be quite different, with high potential for backlash (Bhalotra *et al.*, 2021c; Erten and Keskin, 2018). This implies that economic opportunities should be paired with an option to divorce to give these women the best chance at escaping abuse at the hands of their intimate partners.

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
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Online Appendix


A Additional Exhibits

Figure A.1: Impact of Cohabitation with an Abusive Partner on Earnings Relative to Pre-Cohabitation Outcomes




Notes: Figure reports estimated impacts of cohabiting with a partner where there will eventually be a police report on the earnings of the female victim. Earnings are the sum of all taxable labor earnings during the preceding calendar year. This includes both wage and salary income, but also self-employment income, and is deflated to 2013 Euros. We then take these earnings and divide them by the average earnings in the pre-cohabitation period. The estimates use the matched control to identify effects 5 years before and 5 years after cohabitation, estimating equation 1, and with all estimates relative to the year before cohabitation which is omitted. Year 0 denotes the year at which cohabitation began. Standard errors are clustered at the match level.

Figure A.2: Household Income Impact of Cohabiting with an Abusive Partner




Notes: Figure reports estimated impacts of cohabiting with a partner where there will eventually be a police report on total income in the households where female victims reside. The estimates use the matched control couple to identify effects 5 years before and 5 years after cohabitation, estimating equation 1, and with all estimates relative to the year before cohabitation which is omitted. Year 0 denotes the year at which cohabitation began. Combined earnings on the y-axis are the sum of both partner's total taxable labor earnings during the preceding calendar year. This includes both wage and salary income, but also self-employment income, and is deflated to 2013 Euros. Standard errors are clustered at the couple level.

Figure A.3: Non-Monotonic Decrease in Outside Options: Earnings



Notes: Figure reports the stacked DiD estimates for the impact of cohabiting with an abuser on female total labor market earnings in the two years following cohabitation for victims relative to their matched controls. Standard errors clustered at the match level.

Figure A.4: Non-Monotonic Decrease in Outside Options: Non-Reporting Partners of Abusive Men



Notes: Figure reports the stacked DiD estimates for the impact of cohabiting with a known abuser on female employment rates in the two years following cohabitation for non-reporting female partners relative to their matched controls. Standard errors clustered at the individual level.

B General Cohabitation Tax

We show in the main text that cohabitation with an abusive partner imposes large labor market costs on female victims. Is there a "cohabitation tax" in general for women where their incomes and employment slow down or even decline at the start of a relationship? To explore this possibility, we do two things. First, we graph the raw means of employment and earnings outcomes for women who begin cohabitation with non-abusive partners. These results are shown in Figure B.5 panels (a) and (b) for employment and earnings, respectively. We see that unlike in abusive couples, earnings and employment do not fall after cohabitation, but rather continue to increase. However, there does appear to be a kink, with earnings and employment increasing at a slower rate post-cohabitation compared to before cohabitation for these women. This already suggests stark differences in abusive versus non-abusive relationships in terms of total economic suppression.

Next, we compare the outcomes of women in non-abusive relationships after versus before cohabitation, using a research design equivalent to the "child penalty" literature. Formally we estimate the following equation:

$$Y_{its} = \sum_{j=-5, j \neq -1}^5 \delta_j \mathbf{I}[j = t] + \beta_k + \gamma_s + \epsilon_{its} \quad (19)$$


Where Y_{it} is the outcome variable (annual earnings or end-of-year employment status) for individual i in event time t , and in calendar year s . The vector $\mathbf{I}[j = t]$ includes indicators for the time since event (where the event here is the first year of cohabitation). We leave out the indicator for event time -1, so the coefficients δ_j capture how outcomes evolve in different time periods $j = t = -5, -4, \dots, 4, 5$ relative to the year prior to cohabitation ($t = -1$). β_k is a fixed effect for age, and γ_s is fixed effect for calendar year s . By including fixed effects for time and year we control for life-cycle trends and year shocks.

We report results in Figure B.5 panels (c) and (d), with the calendar year and age fixed effects used to control for earnings and employment changes over time and by age. We find that cohab-

itation results in a 2 percentage point employment drop for women *in general* by five years after cohabitation. The pre-trends indicate that earnings and employment were growing quite quickly prior to cohabitation. Given the presence of these pre-trends we do not interpret this causally, but rather as an illustrative example of the possibility of a general cohabitation tax, a feature of our model. After cohabitation, there is a decrease in earnings and employment growth, compared with women who are of a similar age but are not yet cohabiting with a partner.

These results are consistent with an employment "cohabitation tax" for women in general of around 2 percentage points. Since our main estimates compare women who cohabit with abusive men versus those who cohabit with non-abusive men, this general cohabitation tax is differenced out, meaning that Figure 2 shows the negative impact of cohabitation on female employment is 6.4 p.p. *larger* for women in abusive relationships.

Figure B.5: General Cohabitation Tax: Employment and Earnings



Notes: Panel I reports the raw means for employment and earnings of women 5 years prior and 5 years after cohabitation, excluding couples with a police report for domestic violence, i.e. excluding our "DV" couples. Panel II reports the impact of cohabiting with a partner on employment (c) and earnings (d) of women in general, estimating equation 19. The estimates compare women's outcomes after versus before cohabitation with the year before cohabitation omitted (the reference year) and include year and age fixed effects. Employment is measured at the end of the year. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

C Data Appendix

C.1 Details on Main Data Sets Used

Police Data To identify which couples are "domestic violence" couples amongst all cohabiting couples, we leverage administrative data which includes every single recorded offense in the police information system (PATJA) from 2006-2019. These data contain unique national identifying numbers for both the victim and the perpetrator. We use these identifiers to perfectly link the police reports with administrative data containing labor market and demographic information as we describe below and identify perpetrators and victims who are also cohabiting couples.

Additionally, the police data indicates the type of offense (6-digit classification), whether the case has been reported to the prosecutor, whether the case is solved, and the age, gender, and location of the perpetrator and victim.

Labor Market and Demographics Data We obtain data on labor market outcomes and demographic details from the Finnish Employer-Employee linked data. For earlier years this data is known by the moniker "FLEED" and for later years (2017-2020), we use the FOLK modules which are identical, but formatted slightly differently. These data include every person living in Finland from the ages 15 to 70, including those who are outside the labor force. This data contains many of our key outcomes of interest. Importantly, these data have unique national identifiers for all individuals. In addition, it has unique identifiers for cohabiting partners (married and unmarried) at the end of the calendar year. This allows us to identify cohabiting couples and merge information about their criminal behavior from police records.

Employment is an indicator taking value 1 if the individual was observed as employed in a reference week in December. Earnings are the sum of all taxable labor market earnings, including salary, wages, and self-employment earnings.

C.2 Linking the Data Sets

To construct the panel data used in this paper, we link the above data sets together to obtain rich information on both DV and non-DV couples. For both the victim and perpetrator, in the

police data we observe unique national identifying numbers. We use these numbers to link each individual in the police data to the FLEED and FOLK data. Because these numbers are unique, the linking is perfect, i.e. we never have to worry about "false" links unlike fuzzier matching techniques in other settings that rely on names and ages. The links are also almost 100% complete since the only way we would fail to link an individual aged 15-70 in the tax data to the FLEED and FOLK data is if the individual died or moved out of Finland.

C.3 Identifying Domestic Violence

As described in Section 2, we identify cohabiting couples who experience domestic violence by using the same standards Statistics Finland applies when calculating the national statistics on domestic violence prevalence in Finland.

This entails two main restrictions. First, we restrict to police reports where the victim and perpetrators are both known and either currently cohabit or were cohabiting at some point in the past 5 years. In the police data, among all police reports 75% include the identification of the perpetrators, i.e., the personal IDs of perpetrators. Cases involving an unknown perpetrator (or unknown victim) will not be included.

Second, we restrict to the same crime codes Statistics Finland uses to identify domestic violence cases. These consist of the following crime codes: 200101 (Rape), 2001A3 (Rape, only after 2014), 200104 (Attempted rape), 2001A4 (Attempted rape, only after 2014), 200201 (Aggravated rape), 200202 (Attempted aggravated rape), 200401 (Coercion into a sexual act), 200402 (Attempted coercion into a sexual act), 200501 (Sexual abuse), 200503 (Attempted sexual abuse), 2005A1 (Sexual harassment- note, only after 2014), 200601 (Sexual abuse of a child), 200603 (Attempted sexual abuse of a child), 200701 (Aggravated sexual abuse of a child), 200702 (Attempted aggravated sexual abuse of a child), 200801 (Abuse of a victim of prostitution), 200804 (Attempted abuse of a victim of prostitution), 2008A1 (Purchase of sexual services from a young person), 2008A3 (Attempted purchase of sexual services from a young person), 2008B1 (Solicitation of a child for sexual purpose), 2008B3 (Attempted solicitation of a child for sexual purposes), 2008C1 (Following of a sexually offensive performance of a child), 2008C2 (Attempted following of a sex-

ually offensive performance of a child), 2507A1 (Persecution), 250801 (Coercion), 250301 (Trafficking in human beings), 2503A3 (Attempted aggravated trafficking in human beings), 250101 (Deprivation of personal liberty), 250201 (Aggravated deprivation of personal liberty), 250303 (Attempted trafficking in human beings), 2503A1 (Aggravated trafficking in human beings), 250701 (Menace), 310101 (Robbery), 310102 (Attempted robbery, 310301 (Extortion) 310302 (Attempted extortion) , 210101 (Manslaughter), 210102 (Attempted manslaughter), 210201 (Murder), 210202 (Attempted murder), 210301 (Killing), 210302 (Attempted killing), 210401 (Infanticide), 210402 (Attempted infanticide), 210501 (Assault), 210502 (Attempted assault), 210601 (Aggravated assault), 210602 (Attempted aggravated assault), 2106A1 (Preparation of aggravated homicide and bodily injury), 210701 (Petty assault), 210801 (Negligent homicide), 210901 (Grossly negligent homicide), 211001 (Negligent bodily injury), 211101 (Grossly negligent bodily injury), 211201 (Brawling), 211301 (Imperilment), 211401 (Abandonment), 211501 (Neglect of rescue), 2503B1 (Unlawful obtaining of consent to adoption), 2503B2 (Attempted unlawful obtaining of consent to adoption), 2503C1 (Unlawful arrangement of adoption), 470301 (Work discrimination), 4703A1 (Extortionate work discrimination), 111101 (Discrimination).

D Math Appendix

D.1 Assumptions and Propositions

Propositions Given the assumptions made on the distribution of effort costs with the level of violence and cohabitation, it is straightforward to show that:

1. Labor supply is falling in the violence level

$$\mathbb{P}(L_2(1)|P_2) \leq \mathbb{P}(L_2(1)|S_2) \leq \mathbb{P}(L_2(1)|N_2) \leq \mathbb{P}(L_2(1)|\kappa = 0)$$

This follows from the assumption of first-order stochastic dominance in the distribution of labor disutility conditional on physical violence, coercive control, non-abuse, and being single.

2. Cohabitation probabilities are falling in the violence level conditional on labor supply

$$\mathbb{P}(\kappa|L_1(i), P_2) \leq \mathbb{P}(\kappa|L_1(i), S_2) \leq \mathbb{P}(\kappa|L_1(i), N_2)$$

for $i \in \{0, 1\}$. This follows from the assumption that physical violence causes women to update their belief that they are cohabiting with an abusive type to one, and that higher violence choices are associated with a greater probability that one cohabits with an abusive type.

Assumptions We assume that the distribution of effort costs and structural parameters are such that the following hold:

1. The sensitivity of labor supply to changes in the wage is falling in the level of violence:

$$\frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(L_1(1)|P_1)}{\partial w} \leq \frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(L_1(1)|S_1)}{\partial w} \leq \frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(L_1(1)|N_1)}{\partial w}$$

2. The sensitivity of cohabitation to the wage is falling in the level of violence:

$$\frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(\kappa|L_1(1), P_1)}{\partial w} \leq \frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(\kappa|L_1(1), S_1)}{\partial w} \leq \frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(\kappa|L_1(1), N_1)}{\partial w}$$

D.2 Proof of Theorem 1

Theorem 1. The probability of physical violence in the final period, $\mathbb{P}(P_2)$, decreases as a woman's outside option (o) increases. This result follows from the following decomposition exercise from the formal model:

$$\frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(P_2)}{\partial o} = \underbrace{\frac{\partial P(\kappa)}{\partial o} \mathbb{P}(P_2|\kappa)}_{\text{Breakup}} + \underbrace{\mathbb{P}(\kappa) \frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(P_2|\kappa)}{\partial o}}_{\text{Within-Relationship}} < 0$$

As $\mathbb{P}(P_2|\kappa) \geq 0$ and $P(\kappa) \geq 0$, we simply need to show that $\frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(P_2|\kappa)}{\partial o} \leq 0$ and $\frac{\partial P(\kappa)}{\partial o} \leq 0$.

Showing $\frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(P_2|\kappa)}{\partial o} \leq 0$. This is only relevant for women who worked in the first period. In this case $o = w$. Women who do not work in the first period are excluded from the labor market in the second period. In this case, violence choices are dictated purely by male preferences for violence. For couples in which women worked in the first period, the male surplus of violence choice i compared to violence choice j in period 2, ρ_{ij}^{V2} , and its derivative are defined as:

$$\rho_{ij}^{V2} = \alpha_{i2} - \alpha_{j2} + (1 - \lambda)w (\mathbb{P}(L_2(1)|w, i) - \mathbb{P}(L_2(1)|w, j)) \quad (20)$$

$$\frac{\partial \rho_{ij}^{V2}}{\partial w} = (1 - \lambda) (\mathbb{P}(L_2(1)|w, i) - \mathbb{P}(L_2(1)|w, j)) + (1 - \lambda)w \left(\frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(L_2(1)|w, i)}{\partial w} - \frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(L_2(1)|w, j)}{\partial w} \right) \quad (21)$$

By Proposition 1 and Assumption 1, we have that:

$$\frac{\partial \rho_{PS}^{V2}}{\partial w} < 0 \text{ and } \frac{\partial \rho_{PN}^{V2}}{\partial w} < 0$$

Thus, $\frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(P_2|\kappa)}{\partial o} \leq 0$.

Showing $\frac{\partial P(\kappa)}{\partial o} \leq 0$. This is again only non-zero for women who worked in the first period in which case $o = w$. We first define the value function associated with remaining in a relationship,

V_2^{Cf} :

$$V_2^{Cf} = \tilde{\pi}V_2^{Af} + (1 - \tilde{\pi})V_2^{Nf} \quad (22)$$

where V_2^{Af} , the value of an abusive relationship, and V_2^{Nf} , the value of a non-abusive relationship are defined as:

$$V_2^{Nf} = \lambda B + \mathbb{P}(L_2(1)|N) (\lambda w - \mathbb{E}[e^C|L_2(1), N]) \quad (23)$$

$$V_2^{Af} = \lambda B - \mathbb{P}(P_2)\omega + \sum_v \mathbb{P}(v)\mathbb{P}(L_2(1)|v) (\lambda w - \mathbb{E}[e^C|L_2(1), v]) \quad (24)$$

The value of being single is given by:

$$V_2^{Sf} = \mathbb{P}(L_2(1)|\kappa = 0) (w - \mathbb{E}[e^S|L_2(1)]) \quad (25)$$

A woman's surplus of cohabitation over being single at the beginning of period 2 is given as:

$$\rho^\kappa = V_2^{Cf} + \theta - V_2^{Sf} \quad (26)$$

We have that:

$$\frac{\partial V_2^{Sf}}{\partial w} = \frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(L_2(1)|\kappa = 0)}{\partial w} (w - \mathbb{E}[e^S|L_2(1)]) + \mathbb{P}(L_2(1)|\kappa = 0) \left[1 - \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}(e^S|L_2(1))}{\partial w} \right] \quad (27)$$

$$\frac{\partial V_2^{Nf}}{\partial w} = \frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(L_2(1)|N)}{\partial w} (\lambda w - \mathbb{E}[e^C|L_2(1), N]) + \mathbb{P}(L_2(1)|N) \left[\lambda - \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}(e^C|L_2(1), N)}{\partial w} \right] \quad (28)$$

$\frac{\partial V_2^{Af}}{\partial w_2}$ takes a similar form to $\frac{\partial V_2^{Nf}}{\partial w}$ but with more notation due to the need to integrate over the choice of violence levels when defining the expected labor supply disutility.

Given Proposition 1 and Assumption 1, that $\lambda < 1$, and with the natural assumption on the distribution of effort costs that changes in the expected disutility of labor supply with changes in

the wage are not greater when single than when in a relationship,²¹ we have that

$$\frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(L_2(1)|\kappa=0)}{\partial w} (w - \mathbb{E}[e^S|L_2(1)]) \geq \frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(L_2(1)|v)}{\partial w} (\lambda w - \mathbb{E}[e^C|L_2(1), v]) \quad (30)$$

$$\mathbb{P}(L_2(1)|\kappa=0) \left[1 - \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}(e^S|L_2(1))}{\partial w} \right] \geq \mathbb{P}(L_2(1)|v) \left[\lambda - \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}(e^C|L_2(1), v)}{\partial w} \right] \quad (31)$$

for $v \in \{A, S, N\}$. In this case, the expected surplus of cohabitation relative to being single is falling in the wage:

$$\frac{\partial \rho^\kappa}{\partial w} = \frac{\partial V_2^{Cf}}{\partial w} - \frac{\partial V_2^{Sf}}{\partial w} < 0 \quad (32)$$

In which case, $\frac{\partial P(\kappa)}{\partial o} \leq 0$.

D.3 Proof of Theorem 2

Theorem 2. *The probability of physical violence and coercive control in the first period can exhibit non-monotonicity in women's outside options at the start of a relationship (w). Specifically, both physical violence and coercive control can be higher in the first period among women with median outside options and lower among women with low or high outside options.*

We have that the expected value of the first-period violence choice v is given by:

$$V_1^v = \mathbb{E}(\alpha_{v1}) + (1 - \lambda) (B + w\mathbb{P}(L_1(1)|w)) + \sum_{j=0}^1 \mathbb{P}(L_1(j)|v) \mathbb{P}(\kappa|v, L_1(j)) V_2^{Cm}(L_1(j)) \quad (33)$$

We can decompose changes in the expected value of violence level i relative to j , $\Delta_{ij} \equiv V_1^i - V_1^j$, with respect to the wage into three components:

$$\frac{\partial \Delta_{ij}}{\partial w} = RC_{ij} + SC_{ij} + LC_{ij} \quad (34)$$

²¹i.e.

$$\frac{\partial \mathbb{E}(e^S|L_2(1))}{\partial w} \leq \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}(e^C|L_2(1), v)}{\partial w} \quad (29)$$

for $v \in \{A, S, N\}$.

where RC represents the resource cost channel, SC gives the suppression channel, and LC gives the learning channel. These are formally given as:

$$RC_{ij} = (1 - \lambda) [\mathbb{P}(L_1(1)|i) - \mathbb{P}(L_1(1)|j)] + (1 - \lambda) w \left[\frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(L_1(1)|i)}{\partial w} - \frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(L_1(1)|j)}{\partial w} \right] + \frac{\partial V_2^{Cm}(L_1(1))}{\partial w} [\mathbb{P}(L_1(1)|i)\mathbb{P}(\kappa|i, L_1(1)) - \mathbb{P}(L_1(1)|j)\mathbb{P}(\kappa|j, L_1(1))] \quad (35)$$

$$SC_{ij} = \left[\frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(\kappa|i, L_1(1))}{\partial w} \mathbb{P}(L_1(1)|i) - \frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(\kappa|j, L_1(1))}{\partial w} \mathbb{P}(L_1(1)|j) \right] V_2^{Cm}(L_1(1)) \quad (36)$$

$$LC_{ij} = \frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(L_1(1)|i)}{\partial w} \delta(i) - \frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(L_1(1)|j)}{\partial w} \delta(j) \quad (37)$$

with $\delta(i) = \mathbb{P}(\kappa|i, L_1(1))V_2^{Cm}(L_1(1)) - \mathbb{P}(\kappa|i, L_1(0))V_2^{Cm}(L_1(0))$. Given Propositions 1 and 2 and Assumptions 1 and 2, $RC_{ij} \leq 0$ and $SC_{ij} \geq 0$ for violence levels i that are more extreme than j . The sign of LC_{ij} is ambiguous.

Now consider the variation of prevalence of violence over the distribution of wages. That the derivative of violence choices can vary in sign with the wage, gives the proof of Theorem 1.

Low Outside Options. At low outside options, we have that $\mathbb{P}(\kappa|v, L_1(1)) \approx 1$ for all violence choices. In this case, $SC_{ij} = 0$ for all violence comparisons and we have that:

$$RC_{ij} = (1 - \lambda) [\mathbb{P}(L_1(1)|i) - \mathbb{P}(L_1(1)|j)] + (1 - \lambda) w \left[\frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(L_1(1)|i)}{\partial w} - \frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(L_1(1)|j)}{\partial w} \right] \quad (38)$$

$$LC_{ij} = \left(\frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(L_1(1)|i)}{\partial w} - \frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(L_1(1)|j)}{\partial w} \right) [V_2^{Cm}(L_1(1)) - V_2^{Cm}(L_1(0))] \quad (39)$$

Given Proposition 1 and Assumption 1, $RC_{ij} < 0$ and $LC_{ij} < 0$ for violence choice i more extreme than j . Thus, the surplus of more extreme forms of violence are declining in the wage, and with it the probability of violence.

High Outside Options. At high outside options, we have that $\mathbb{P}(\kappa|v, L_1(1)) \approx 0$ for all violence choices. In this case, $SC_{ij} = 0$ and $LC_{ij} = 0$ for all violence comparisons and we have

that:

$$RC_{ij} = (1 - \lambda) [\mathbb{P}(L_1(1)|i) - \mathbb{P}(L_1(1)|j)] + (1 - \lambda) w \left[\frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(L_1(1)|i)}{\partial w} - \frac{\partial \mathbb{P}(L_1(1)|j)}{\partial w} \right] \quad (40)$$

Given Proposition 1 and Assumption 1, $RC_{ij} < 0$. Thus, the surplus of more extreme forms of violence are declining in the wage, and with it the probability of violence.

Intermediate Outside Options. At intermediate outside options, we have $0 < \mathbb{P}(\kappa|v, L_1(1)) < 1$ for all violence choices. Given Assumptions 1 and 2 and Propositions 1 and 2, we have that $RC_{ij} < 0$ and $SC_{ij} > 0$ over this range when comparing more extreme to less extreme forms of violence. Recall that for LC_{ij} we have that

$$\mathbb{P}(\kappa|i, L_1(1)) < \mathbb{P}(\kappa|i, L_1(0)) \quad (41)$$

$$V_2^{Cm}(L_1(1)) > V_2^{Cm}(L_1(0)) \quad (42)$$

The sign of the effect then depends on the relative strength of the suppression effect versus the learning effect. On one hand, a higher violence level suppresses women's labor supply and limits their outside options, leading to a reduced likelihood of leaving abusive partners. On the other hand, a higher violence level is more likely to reveal the man's type, making women more inclined to leave abusive relationships and diminishing the value of abusive partners through the potential loss in cohabitation surplus. Where the suppression effect is particularly high, we can have $LC_{PN} > 0$ and $LC_{SN} > 0$. In this case, the surplus of some choice of violence will be rising in women's wages and with it the suppression effect on female labor supply.

It can also be that coercive control rises more quickly in the wage than physical violence in this interval. In cases where both physical violence and coercive control have similar suppression effects on female labor supply (i.e. the distributions of effort costs conditional on both violence choices is similar), we have that $RC_{PS} \approx 0$. However, physical violence can exhibit a significantly larger learning effect compared to coercive control because physical violence perfectly reveals the abusive man's type. In this case, we can have that:

$$\mathbb{P}(\kappa|P, L_1(1))V_2^{Cm}(L_1(1)) - \mathbb{P}(\kappa|P, L_1(0))V_2^{Cm}(L_1(0)) < \mathbb{P}(\kappa|S, L_1(1))V_2^{Cm}(L_1(1)) - \mathbb{P}(\kappa|S, L_1(0))V_2^{Cm}(L_1(0)) \quad (43)$$

As a result, we can therefore have $LC_{PS} < 0$ giving rise to coercive control being increasingly favoured over physical violence.