

Valentina Infante Batiste, Jesus College 2022

*The 'Other' Side of Memory: The Survival of Pro-regime Memorialisation in Democratic Chile (1990 – 2020)*



*The 'Other' Side of Memory:*

**The Survival of Pro-regime Memorialisation in Democratic Chile (1990 – 2020)**

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Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
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## **ABSTRACT**

### *THE 'OTHER' SIDE OF MEMORY:*

#### THE SURVIVAL OF PRO-REGIME MEMORIALISATION IN DEMOCRATIC CHILE

(1990 – 2020)

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DPhil in Sociology

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The thesis investigates the conditions that explain the survival of pro-regime memorialisation in democratic Chile (1990 – 2020). A pro-regime memory site is a monument, memorial or symbolic marker (e.g., street name) built to celebrate a past authoritarian government. In Chile, these sites either praise the military coup of 11<sup>th</sup> of September 1973, glorify General Augusto Pinochet's 17-year dictatorship (1973 – 1990), or celebrate Military Junta members and civil collaborators. Their survival – that is, their maintenance by authorities (city councils, judicial actors) – is a striking phenomenon in a context in which victims' human rights memorials dominate the public space. To enhance the internal validity of the thesis, the elimination of pro-regime memorials is also investigated. The thesis elaborates a theoretical framework to explain the survival and elimination outcome, with four and five conditions, respectively. Using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), the research minimised the presence and absence of these conditions in a sample of 17 cases of pro-regime memorials. It obtained a parsimonious solution for both outcomes (survival and elimination). The QCA

procedure uncovered that the survival of pro-regime memorialisation is explained by the presence of “Walls” (veto players), and a combination of “Silence” (absence of external intervention by NGOs and victims’ associations) and “Local and/or Institutional Support” (support towards the site’s survival by local communities and State institutions). Likewise, the elimination of pro-regime memorialisation is explained by the rejection of the site by the local community, or by a combination of civil society pressure and the presence of “Windows of Opportunity” (centre-left or left-wing city councils, or judges receptive to human rights). The results highlight the continued relevance of veto players in the survival of pro-regime memorialisation. The findings also emphasise the prominence of civil society, particularly local communities, in advancing both the survival and elimination of pro-regime memory sites in Chile.

## **DECLARATION**

I hereby certify that this doctoral thesis is the result of my own work except where otherwise indicated and due acknowledgment is given.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Valentina', with a horizontal line underneath it.

VALENTINA INFANTE BATISTE

Student number 1150433

7 October 2022

## ABBREVIATIONS

INDH	National Institute of Human Rights
UP	Popular Unity (1970 – 1973)
SDC	State Defence Council
CGR	Comptroller General of the Republic
SC	Supreme Court
COSOC	Neighbourhood Council
UDI	Democratic Union Party
RN	National Renovation Party
AFEP	Association of Executed Prisoners (Chile)
HML	Historical Memory Law (Spain, 2007)
PP	Partido Popular
PSOE	Partido Socialista Obrero Español
AMRO	Asociación Memorialista Ranz Orosas
FNFF	Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco
QCA	Qualitative Comparative Analysis
QCM	Quine-McCluskey Algorithm
AHD	Authorised Heritage Discourse
AMS	Authorised Memory Space
PL	Protective Location
S	Silence
LIS	Local and/or Institutional Support
W	Walls

UL	Unprotective Location
SN	Social Noise
LIR	Local and/or Institutional Rejection
WO	Window of Opportunity
DCY	Denunciation During the Critical Years

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*To Mora Batiste*

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## **CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION**

### **Objective and Research Question**

In 2019, a human rights lawyer filed a protection appeal against the Ministry of Defence and the commander-in-chief of the Navy, demanding the elimination of the statue of José Toribio Merino placed outside the National Maritime Museum in Valparaíso, Chile (see Appendix, picture #10, p. 455). Before the coup, Almirante José Toribio Merino was responsible for the *Cochayuyo* Plan, which organised the repressive activities against left-wing militants that would take place after the coup of 11 September 1973 (Cabrera et al., 2019, p. 3). During the dictatorship (1973 – 1990), the Navy – under Merino’s command – actively took part in the systematic policy of human rights violations against political opponents. Torture was conducted in several locations belonging to the Navy, such as the Buque Escuela Esmeralda, Naval War Academy, and Cuartel Silva Palma (Cabrera et al., 2019, p. 2; Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación, 2004, p. 356; A. Lira, 2020, p. 6). Moreover, as a member of the Military Junta headed by General Augusto Pinochet, Merino became an enthusiastic advocate of the neoliberal system; by the mid-1970s, he participated in the application of the neoliberal measures paving the way for the deepening of privatisations and reduced state expenditure (M. Salazar, 2020; Ugarte, 2014). Yet, since 2013 – when the denunciations against the statue began – the Navy still considered the statue a proper commemoration of Merino’s naval career regardless of his political participation during the dictatorship.

On 22 January 2020, the Santiago Court of Appeals rejected the human rights lawyer’s protection appeal. Echoing the Navy, the Court argued that the statute was entirely legal and

that there was no proof of the victims' harm caused by the figure. In 2021, the same human rights lawyer filed a new protection appeal, and the Navy defended Merino's statue with similar arguments. However, the request was now accepted by another chamber of the Court, which used international human rights law to defend the right of victims of human rights violations for an integral reparation. Thus, the Court ordered the statue's removal within five days, after which the Navy had to comply by replacing it with the figure of a transversally admired naval officer of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Arturo Prat. The human rights lawyer praised the Court's decision and criticised the passiveness of the new left-wing government: "Although we have a president [...] and ministers [...], [who are] cowards and submissive to militarism, who disregarded us, we have obtained a remarkable victory against the nostalgia for the coup [...]" (CHV Noticias, 2022). He then added that civil society would continue fighting against the maintenance of other pro-regime commemorations in military institutions in Chile.

The case of the Merino statue is striking for several reasons. It shows the Navy's persistent opposition to removing the statue, the passiveness of the government(s) (even left-winged), and the different approaches the Courts have had in their rulings regarding dictatorship symbols. A fundamental question we should ask here is: How was the statue of Merino able to survive for such a long time, from 2013 (when it was first denounced by victims), until 2022? How could Chile, a progressive country in terms of human rights, maintain (until June 2022) such an iconic symbol of regime glorification? In other words, "why do such pro-regime memorialisations persist even in countries that have seemingly broken with that past?" (Payne, 2022).

This thesis explores the factors that explain the survival of pro-regime memorialisation in democratic Chile (1990 – 2020). A pro-regime memory site is a monument, memorial or symbolic marker (e.g., street name) built to celebrate a past authoritarian regime<sup>1</sup>. In Chile, these sites either praise the military coup of 11<sup>th</sup> of September 1973, glorify General Augusto Pinochet's 17-year dictatorship (1973 – 1990), or celebrate Military Junta members and regime civil collaborators. Thus, pro-regime memorialisation is the phenomenon in which former military regime icons or dates materialise in celebratory symbolic markers, that is, become heritage. Some of these pro-regime memory sites were created during the dictatorship (1973 – 1990), while others were inaugurated in democracy (after 1990) by regime supporters and *Pinochetistas* (General Augusto Pinochet admirers).

The focus of this thesis is the survival of pro-regime memorialisation. "Survival" is the situation in which authorities refuse to eliminate the pro-regime symbol regardless of a public rebuke against the site (by victims or human rights activists). In this case, the site "survives." The moment of denunciation of a pro-regime site is a crucial aspect of the memorial's 'life span.' Denunciation sparks a process of public debate and controversy which may lead to the survival or elimination of the pro-regime site.

Although the survival of pro-regime memorialisation is the thesis's primary dependent variable, a complete picture of the phenomenon also requires the analysis of elimination (e.g., removal) and the factors intervening in such process. To this end, the thesis investigates the combinations of conditions explaining both survival *and* elimination of pro-regime

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<sup>1</sup> Hereafter, 'pro-regime memory site' and 'pro-regime memorial' are used interchangeably.

memory sites. The thesis understands 'elimination' as the legal removal of the pro-regime memorial carried out by an authority (city council, judge, etc.) after a public denunciation by an anti-regime agent<sup>2</sup>.

In Chile, the survival or elimination of memory sites in public spaces usually depends on the local administrations (municipalities, or which is the same, city councils) (Article N°20) (Ley 17.288 de Monumentos Nacionales y Normas Relacionadas, 2019). For instance, a neighbour might denounce the existence of a pro-regime site. Then, the city council takes up this concern and decides to discuss the issue and vote on whether to remove or maintain the site. In other cases, the site's maintenance could also depend on other institutions, such as the Armed Forces. In this case, whenever these sites are denounced, their fate is usually taken to the Courts, where it is finally decided whether to maintain or erase the pro-regime memorial.

The thesis argues that the explanation for the survival of pro-regime memorialisation in Chile consists of different paths leading to the outcome. Thus, the survival of pro-regime memorialisation is an equifinal social phenomenon. Equifinality – the situation in which there are different paths to one outcome – will depend on how the previously identified independent variables or explanatory factors/conditions combine to achieve the outcome. To this end, the thesis presents a framework with four explanatory factors for the survival of pro-regime memorials: "Protective Location", "Silence", "Local and/or Institutional Support", and "Walls." These four factors were extracted inductively in extensive data

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<sup>2</sup> It is worth noting that some pro-regime memorials in democratic Chile have been eliminated for other reasons disconnected to social demands. For instance, the Augusto Pinochet Museum in Vitacura closed its doors in 2017 because the Augusto Pinochet Foundation moved to another location (Palma, 2017).

analysis and literature review. The factors are expected to combine and produce ‘paths’ towards the outcome (survival). Correspondingly, five explanatory factors – obtained similarly – are expected to combine and generate the elimination outcome: “Unprotective Location”, “Social Noise”, “Local and/or Institutional Rejection”, “Window of Opportunity”, and “Denunciation During the Critical Years.”

Pro-regime memorialisation is currently an understudied phenomenon in the sociology of cultural memory. By explaining the survival (and elimination) of pro-regime memorials, the thesis will contribute theoretically and empirically to this field. Theoretically, it offers a set of explanatory factors to examine memorialisation in general and pro-regime memorialisation in particular. This framework also presents a helpful typology of paths to explain the survival (and elimination) of pro-regime memorialisation in Chile. As long as the scope conditions are met, other countries with pro-regime memory sites in democracy can also be studied using this typology.

Methodologically, the thesis aims to broaden the horizons of memorialisation research by showing novel ways of approaching the phenomenon. The thesis uses a multi-methods approach combining several qualitative methodologies. Specifically, it employs Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to uncover the combination of conditions leading to the outcomes of interest. This strategy demonstrates that memorialisation – a field where aesthetic analysis and single case studies have prevailed – can also be subjected to systematic comparisons. However, this approach aims to enrich existing methodologies, not replace them. It hopes to encourage the field to creatively experiment with new topics and

sociological methods that shed light on aspects of memorialisation that are out of the reach of single case studies. Hence, this research may be helpful for scholars wanting to expand the notion of memorialisation (and, for instance, analyse the 'pro-regime' side), and for researchers striving to employ innovative methodological strategies, particularly methods that incorporate comparisons across several cases.

Thus, the research expects to expand the cultural memory field in Chile and abroad. Indeed, the research generates broad lessons and findings:

- a. It discusses the dismantling of the memory pact or memory "bargain" (Collins & Hite, 2013b, p. 148) since 2013, and the consequences of this collapse on the democratic debate;
- b. It shows the existence of a 'thankful' memory towards the regime and Pinochet, which should be distinguished from "salvational memory" (Payne, 2008; Stern, 2006);
- c. It demonstrates that denunciations against and eliminations of pro-regime memorialisation have surged since 2005, which is consistent with the beginning of the "Unfavourable Period" for regime supporters (2005 – 2020);
- d. It points out the continued relevance of (generally right-wing) veto players in the survival of pro-regime memorialisation (despite over 30 years of democracy);
- e. It warns about the fact that Chileans have been living in an illusion of a 'human rights paradigm' (believing that a human rights culture has been achieved, when in fact, it has not);

- f. It shows that the defence of pro-regime memorialisation by specific communities or actors is not necessarily equal to regime support or fascist inclinations (a lesson directed to human rights and memory activists who usually think otherwise);
- g. And highlights the relevance of civil society, particularly local communities, in maintaining *and* eliminating pro-regime memory sites.

The general conclusion of the thesis is that the survival of pro-regime memorialisation reflects how the dictatorship (1973 – 1990) still haunts Chilean society, and how it will undoubtedly remain tainted by this period in the near future. In this context, memory sites could be used – as stated already by several authors – as platforms for democratic debate, critical discussions (Hite, 2003, 2012), and “contentious coexistence” (Payne, 2008).

Before continuing, it is essential to note that this thesis focuses primarily on pro-regime memorials that have survived in democracy. Thus, the study does not investigate in detail pro-regime memorials in dictatorship (1973 – 1990), and therefore only delves superficially into their history, creation, symbolism, and so forth. The focus is on *the factors that explain the survival of pro-regime memorialisation in democratic Chile until 2020*. This phenomenon requires urgent attention if we want to begin to understand pro-regime memorialisation in democracy.

It should also be clarified that this thesis names these sites ‘pro-regime’ because they positively remember aspects of the military regime (1973 – 1990). Thus, they belong to the ‘other’ side of memory (as opposed to victims’ memories). These sites pay homage to an

aspect (individual, date) linked to the regime. However, it should be noted that sometimes their maintenance is not necessarily related to pro-regime sentiments or *Pinochetismo* (admiration of Pinochet). Likewise, regarding terminology, it is relevant to point out that when referring to the period 1973 – 1990 in Chile, the terms “military regime”, “regime”, and “dictatorship” are used interchangeably throughout the thesis<sup>3</sup>.

## **The Puzzle**

It is a striking contradiction that, after 30 years of democracy, various pro-regime memory sites are still populating the public space in Chile. At this stage of advanced democracy in the country, we are tempted to think there should be no pro-regime memory sites left. However, some pro-regime memory sites still survive to this day. Specifically, this thesis’s Qualitative Comparative Analysis dataset accounts for at least six prominent pro-regime memory sites that, until 2020, were still maintained, including avenues, statues and monuments honouring Pinochet, the coup, or regime collaborators. Some of the most prominent examples are the statue of Almirante José Toribio Merino outside the National Maritime Museum<sup>4</sup> and the Augusto Pinochet Ugarte Monument and Square in Linares (see Appendix, picture #9, p. 454) which honours the military coup leader and later self-designated President of the Republic (1973 – 1990).

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<sup>3</sup> Also, the thesis does not focus on sites drastically removed or toppled by protesters in the context of social turmoil.

<sup>4</sup> Although Merino’s statue was eliminated in June 2022, this thesis considers it a “survival” case since, up until 2020, it had not yet been eliminated. Most significantly, this thesis’s paths to explain the elimination of pro-regime memorialisation are applicable in the statue of Merino as an “eliminated” case in 2022. The statue was eliminated this year through a combination of a “Window of Opportunity” in the Judiciary and the presence of “Social Noise.”

Of the 36 cases of pro-regime memory sites included in the dataset (see Appendix, pp. 444–445 ), 39% have survived, while 61% have been eliminated throughout democracy (from 1990 until 2020) (see Table 1.1). Although the elimination percentage is high, cases of survival still account for more than a third of the dataset, an outcome that this thesis is set to investigate.

<b>Table 1.1. Percentage of survival and elimination in the dataset</b>	
S/E	General dataset (36 cases)
Pro-regime memory sites that have survived (1990 – 2020)	39% (14 cases)
Pro-regime memory sites that have been eliminated (1990 – 2020)	61% (22 cases)

Most cases in the dataset have been eliminated throughout democracy (1990 – 2020). As noted by several authors (Benton, 1999, 2010; Harrison, 2013; Macdonald, 2009; Nadkarni, 2003), the shift from one regime to another – in this case, from dictatorship to democracy in 1990 – often brings with it the removal, destruction, or transformation of memory sites associated with the former regime<sup>5</sup>. Their erasure symbolises a new beginning and instils a feeling of radical change. However, this assertion requires nuance in the case of Chile. The democratic period between 1990 and 2004 favoured regime supporters and *Pinochetistas* (see next chapter). Reasonably, few pro-regime memory sites were eliminated in this historical context. Indeed, most of the eliminated memory sites were erased *long after regime change* and only when social demands and mobilisations to eradicate dictatorship legacies emerged, particularly after 2005 (see Chart 2.3 in Chapter Two).

If we now focus on survival, it should be noted that the maintenance of memory sites is an exceptional and compelling phenomenon in the sociology of cultural memory. As pointed

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<sup>5</sup> Including cases created during the regime or afterwards.

out by Thompson (2020), throughout history, “destruction [of memorials] is the norm and preservation [survival] is the rare exception.” Secondly, survival (39%) is relevant as these cases are maintained even when they could potentially be eliminated<sup>6</sup>. Since 2005, regime support has waned significantly and the human rights movement has become much more potent (see Chapter Two). Hence, it is surprising that so many pro-regime memory sites survive even in an unfavourable context (particularly after 2005, and even more so after 2013).

The three most common arguments to explain the survival of pro-regime memorialisation – the permanence of *Pinochetismo*, the lack of a legal framework to regulate these memorials, and the type of transition (“consensus transition”) – do not adequately address its complexity. Thus, the survival of pro-regime memorialisation in democratic Chile (1990 – 2020) is a compelling puzzle that deserves an in-depth examination.

Several anti-regime agents have said that the survival of pro-regime memorialisation in Chile is explained by the persistence of salvational memory – pro-regime memory associated with *Pinochetismo* – and how it still permeates certain societal spheres (A. Lira, personal communication, 28 September 2021). This position argues that the maintenance of pro-regime memorials is deeply linked to the “continuation” of support for the regime in democracy (Hite & Cesarini, 2004b, p. 3). Indeed, various pro-regime memory sites explored in this thesis, such as the statue of José Toribio Merino, or streets honouring Jaime Guzmán<sup>7</sup>,

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<sup>6</sup> “Possibility principle” by Mahoney and Goertz (2004).

<sup>7</sup> Civil collaborator of the regime (1973 – 1990) and main contributor to the 1980 constitution.

did not originate in dictatorship but were created in democracy, reflecting the degree to which pro-regime sentiments have flooded Chilean society since 1990.

Referring to the case of the plaques and photographs of Manuel Contreras<sup>8</sup> – maintained and protected by the Army in two military educational buildings and discovered in 2018 – a victim of the dictatorship taking part in the judicial process against them said that their survival reflected that “they [the Army] have not changed at all”, and thus, continue to possess pro-Pinochet sentiments and remain loyal to the glorification of the military coup and the regime (El Mostrador, 2020a; L. M. Rendón Escobar, personal communication, 27 September 2021).

Likewise, it is commonly argued that the main reason behind the survival of pro-regime memorialisation is the absence of legislation banning these kinds of memorials. Indeed, in 2019 the Navy justified the existence of their pro-regime statue of José Toribio Merino, arguing that the absence of a ‘removal of pro-regime memorialisation law’ implies that the figure is absolutely legal: “In effect, for there to be an illegal omission by a public authority, it is necessary that *there must be, previously, a legal obligation* that must be fulfilled within the competence of that public authority” (Armada de Chile, 2019, p. 4, emphasis added). Currently, this “legal obligation” to eliminate pro-regime memorialisation in Chile does not exist (Centro de DD.HH. UDP, 2019, p. 124).

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<sup>8</sup> Contreras is deemed one of the cruelest human rights criminals during the dictatorship period (1973 – 1990). Until his death in 2015, he had accumulated over 500 years in prison for directing and carrying out systematic tortures, executions, and disappearances of political opponents, particularly between 1974 and 1976.

The third plausible explanation for the survival of pro-regime memorialisation considers the type of transition from an authoritarian or repressive regime to a democracy. Chile and Spain underwent similar transitions characterised by pacts between the outgoing and upcoming political forces. This may help explain why pro-regime/Francoist memory sites have been relatively tolerated in both countries. Contrarily, the Argentinian transition is characterised by a discredited Military that left power with little political and social support after the economic crisis and the Malvinas/Falklands War catastrophe. Thus, the Military's lack of legitimacy is reflected in the absence of public spaces to commemorate their heroic memory (See Salvi, 2011, 2012). Furthermore, pro-regime memorialisation efforts were almost eradicated in 2004 when the portraits of two prominent Argentinian commanders of the Army and leaders of the dictatorship – Generals Videla and Bignone – were removed from a central gallery in the Military School by commander Bendini under the orders of the then President Néstor Kirchner. This was the President's clear sign of banning public pro-regime memorialisation of military heroes, and reflected a broader hostile sensitivity towards human rights abuses and ample support for human rights trials. Relatives' strong human rights movement (particularly the *Madres* and *Abuelas de la plaza de Mayo*) propelled these trials' public support and legitimacy. Contrarily, in Chile, the negotiated transition allowed the Military and pro-regime agents to possess much power in democracy, at least for the first ten years. Thus, historian Sergio Grez notes that the transactional nature of the democratic transition may help explain the maintenance of pro-regime legacies in Chile:

There are many signs of glorification of the dictatorship in Chile [...]. The type of transition explains this [...]. It was a negotiated transition [...] on the condition that the structures were maintained [...]. The political class has an entire network of complicities (Grez, 2019).

Although these explanations – *Pinochetismo*, lack of legislation against pro-regime memorialisation, negotiated transition – do play a key role as ‘scope’ conditions, they do not solve the puzzle of the persistence of pro-regime memorialisation in democratic Chile. The current weakness and lack of political power of *Pinochetismo* – especially after 2005 – is contradictory to the fact several pro-regime memorials survive today. Likewise, the absence of legislation does not explain why some pro-regime memory sites survive while others have been eliminated. Finally, the transactional nature of the Chilean transition is too broad as a historical category and lacks agency (capacity to produce actions). Moreover, the *consensus* transition may help explain the survival of pro-regime memorialisation in the first decade of democracy (1990 – 2000), but today, after more than 30 years and in a post-transitional context, it is no longer useful to help understand the phenomenon. In this context, the thesis asks: What explains the survival of pro-regime memorialisation in democratic Chile?

The thesis argues that a more elaborate explanation is required, one that considers various explanatory factors regarding location, the presence or absence of condemnations against the site, the protection granted to the site by its local community and/or by state institutions, and the presence or absence of veto players. By considering these varied structural and agentic elements, the thesis will provide a more comprehensive answer to the puzzling question of the survival of pro-regime memorialisation in democratic Chile.

## **Why Chile**

So far, most academic debates regarding the sociology of memory have centred on Europe and the United States. Latin America has, for its part, been “mostly side-lined [...] as a site

of conceptualisation of, and struggle over, cultural memory” (Andermann, 2015, p. 4). Yet, due to repressive regimes in the 1970s and 1980s in the Southern Cone, Latin American countries have recently become the scenarios of passionate scholarly debates regarding the relevance of memory sites for symbolic reparation.

In this context, Chile – which suffered a 17-year-long military dictatorship (1973 – 1990) in the hands of Augusto Pinochet Ugarte – is a compelling setting to develop research on pro-regime memorialisation. Firstly, it presents a solid human rights movement that, since the early 1990s, has fought for more justice and truth regarding human rights violations during Pinochet’s dictatorship (Aguilar, 2019, p. 432; Hite, 2012; Jelin, 2003). Secondly, the memorialisation of victims – through memory sites, memorials, statues, memory museums, and the transformation of former torture centres into places of remembrance – has flourished since the mid-1990s (Collins & Hite, 2013b, 2013a; Stern, 2006; Wilde, 2013). Thirdly, although the Supreme Court remains quite unpredictable and the Amnesty Law of 1978 pardoning perpetrators is still in place, the country has nevertheless achieved a high degree of justice in human rights cases, particularly concerning the disappearance of political prisoners (Collins & Hau, 2016). Indeed, because of its progress in transitional justice, Chile has become an “icon” of the human rights movement (Bianchini, 2014, p. 2; Stern, 2013a, p. viii). Thus, at first glance, the existence of pro-regime memorialisation in this context becomes a striking phenomenon. How can pro-regime memory sites be maintained in a country with such human rights improvements?

Chile also offers the possibility of a study of pro-regime memorialisation because of its “fragmented” memory scape (Aguilera, 2015, p. 102; Bianchini, 2014, p. 4; Hite & Collins, 2009, p. 379). A fragmented memory landscape has “different temporal and spatial commemorations speaking to divergent publics” (Conway, 2009, p. 398), which is typical of a “conflictual political culture” (Vinitzky-Seroussi, 2002, p. 32). Victims’ memorials coexist with perpetrators’ and pro-regime memory sites in Chile. The state has supported victims in their memorial efforts, but it has also allowed the existence of pro-regime memory sites (Bianchini, 2014, p. 5; Collins & Hite, 2013b, pp. 152–156). To respect different perspectives, allow freedom of expression, promote reconciliation, or conveniently leave the traumatic past behind, Chilean authorities have “turned a blind eye” to the erection and maintenance of pro-regime memorials, and have tried to avoid condemnations in this regard. Rojas (2017, pp. 246–247) noted that despite all its progress, “being indifferent to human rights is socially accepted in Chile.” Furthermore, landscape fragmentation means that victims’ memorials concentrate on specific areas linked to the left, the middle-low social classes, and the periphery. In contrast, pro-regime monuments/streets tend to be inaugurated and maintained in more affluent areas related to the right (Aguilera, 2015). In view of this fragmented memory scape, Chile is an ideal setting to observe victims’ monuments and pro-regime memorialisation.

Furthermore, Chile is a striking setting to study the survival and elimination of pro-regime memorials as there is no legislation banning this kind of memorialisation. Throughout democracy, but mainly since 2010, there have been some efforts by left-wing Deputies in Congress to pass legislation against pro-regime symbols—but to no avail. Currently, no law

prohibits or punishes the erection of pro-regime memorials. Therefore, how are some pro-regime monuments still being eliminated in Chile despite the absence of anti-regime-memorial legislation?

In this sense, Chile contrasts with other countries that have developed active measures against pro-regime memorialisation. Germany, for instance, inherited a large amount of monumental heritage from the Nazis. In the 1950s and 1960s, both on the West and the East side, most of the Nazi symbolic markers were destroyed. The 1980s, however, saw a paradigm change in which fascist heritage was repurposed in line with human rights and victims' memories. There was extensive recognition of the importance of 'working through' the past through these sites (Hepworth, 2019; Macdonald, 2009; Malone, 2017, p. 452; Olick, 2007). This perspective was accompanied by legislation banning pro-Nazi public sites that neo-fascists could potentially use to reinvigorate their nostalgic racist claims.

Similarly, Argentina's pro-regime legacy is not tolerated and has no public presence. No public monuments or streets praise the regime or former Military Junta members. Salvi (2011, 2012) noted that pro-regime movements in Argentina have been relatively unsuccessful – as compared to Chile – in their struggle for legitimacy and public recognition<sup>9</sup>. Indeed, Aguilar (2008, p. 434) noted that "as far as Argentina is concerned, it does not seem that there are many symbolic legacies [of the dictatorship], beyond some street

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<sup>9</sup> However, in March 2014, photographs honouring General Jorge Rafael Videla (dictator of Argentina between 1976 and 1981), with the words '*GRACIAS COMANDANTE*' (Thank you Commander) were placed in the Monument for Truth, Justice and Memory in Argentina (El Sol, 2014).

names in small cities or plaques in few barracks to those «fallen in the fight against subversion».”<sup>10</sup>

Today, the maintenance of pro-regime memorialisation in democracies has become a much-discussed topic in Chile due to victims’ desire to end their presence. Victims’ associations and anti-regime lawyers and activists have, at least since 2013, consistently rallied for their elimination. However, memory sites are usually erected to have a long life. Monuments, for instance, are made of materials resistant to sun, water, and the most erosive element: Time. They project a desire for eternity. Thus, their permanence may symbolise the status quo’s permanence, while elimination promises change (Marschall, 2009, p. 140). Thus, in transitional justice contexts, the survival of pro-regime memorialisation may symbolise for victims the permanence of impunity. Alija Fernández (2016, pp. 103/111), for instance, argues that Franco’s permanence at the Valley of the Fallen until 2019 made Spanish society perceive that “impunity persists”, reflecting “the negative impact that the treatment of his corpse has had in the fight against impunity in Spain.”

In Chile and Spain, victims also view pro-regime memorials as a clear symptom of the lack of symbolic reparations. They now feel it is not enough to just create victims’ memorials and argue that the state-led elimination of pro-regime memory sites should also take place, or what Collins and Ordóñez (2021, p. 88) call, the *despinochetización* (unpinochetisation) of public space. Eduardo Ranz – a prominent Spanish human rights lawyer who has headed the fight against pro-Francoist memorialisation in Spain since 2015 – has argued that the

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<sup>10</sup> Hite and Collins (2009, p. 395) argue that “higher levels of social repudiation in Argentina would make it inconceivable that, as in Chile”, elements of the dictatorship be praised.

survival of pro-Francoist commemorations feels like a “humiliation” which negatively impacts victims’ reparations demands. Their presence is experienced as a terrible reminder of the traumatic past. The lack of progress in the exhumation of the disappeared, he says, reinforces such feelings (Ranz, 2017, p. 282).

A case in point regarding the feeling of absence of symbolic reparations is the José Toribio Merino statue at the entrance of the National Maritime Museum in Chile. For victims of human rights violations, the figure represents the institutional support of the Navy towards the systematic policy of torture, the neoliberal transformations, and the lack of justice regarding civilian participation in the repression (Bohoslavsky, 2019, p. 25; E. Lira, 2019, p. 21). Merino had a close relationship with the Chicago Boys and those who were part of the regime’s economic committees<sup>11</sup>. His statue was financed and erected thanks to donations from businesspeople who became enormously wealthy from the privatisations promoted by Merino. By denouncing Merino’s statue, victims aim to disclose civilian participation in the dictatorship’s success, and also the *Concertación* governments’ collaboration in maintaining the neoliberal model. They condemn civilian actors’ “silence in the face of the crimes against humanity that were being committed”, and the “relationship between repression and concentration of wealth” (Bohoslavsky, 2019, p. 28). Thus, the denunciation of Merino’s statue reflects the “renewed attention to private actors” (Roht-Arriaza, 2019, p. 58) and the increased intensity of trials regarding civil justice (Payne & Pereira, 2019, p. 123). It also shows that victims are not satisfied with the symbolic reparation policies in Chile, which are

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<sup>11</sup> Group of Pontifical Catholic University economy students who, in the 1950s and 1960s, participated in an exchange programme with the University of Chicago.

based on erecting victims' memorials, *but not in actively removing pro-regime memorialisation.*

For this reason, the elimination of pro-regime memorials is currently being proposed in the Chilean public debate as part of the much-needed integral reparations policy towards victims (Centro de DD.HH. UDP, 2019, 2021; Collins, 2018; Collins & Colaboradores, 2020). This demand is part of a trend in which transitional justice societies have realised it is not enough to 'just' build pro-victims memorials. Victims' memorialisation is increasingly seen as an incomplete reparation policy. Likewise, scholars are becoming aware that *something else* must be done with pro-regime memorials coexisting next to victims' memory sites (Zavatti, 2021). To understand this phenomenon, this thesis addresses questions regarding the survival and elimination of pro-regime memorialisation.

In brief, the thesis focuses on pro-regime memorialisation in Chile because the country meets the conditions for a puzzling research question. Still, the thesis expects that its findings are helpful in other contexts. In this line, and using four case studies, the concluding part of this thesis (Chapter Seven) analyses the recipes for the survival (and elimination) of pro-Francoist memorialisation in Spain.

## **Memorial Background**

### *Memorialisation and Transitional Justice*

This research belongs to the field of transitional justice, which investigates “how to deal with the violations of human rights and humanitarian law perpetrated by previous regimes”

(González Ocantos, 2016, p. 15). Specifically, transitional justice explores the judicial, truth-telling and reparations initiatives by democratic governments to provide truth, justice and guarantees of non-repetition to victims who have suffered different forms of inhumane treatment and violations under periods of unrest, dictatorships or civil wars (Barahona de Brito, 2001, p. 4).

A relevant subfield of transitional justice mechanisms and scholarly research is memorialisation, that is, how victims are symbolically repaired and commemorated through remembering the past (Sferrazza & Bustos, 2021, p. 348). In the transitional justice framework, memorialisation of victims' suffering in post-conflict societies is a pivotal aspect of victims' right to truth, symbolic reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence (K. Brown, 2013; Druliolle, 2015; Druliolle & Brett, 2018; Jelin, 2003; Sodaro, 2018). In this sense, “the demands – voiced usually by human rights movements – regarding truth and justice are, from the very beginning, also demands for memory” (Jelin, 2007, p. 5). Salvioli (2020, p. 5) agrees that memorialisation is crucial for victims but also emphasises its importance to societies as a “tool” to stop the “cycle of hatred and conflict” in the future. Thus, the author argues that memorialisation is one of the most important aspects of transitional justice as it helps “to build a democratic, pluralistic, inclusive and peaceful society” (p. 4).

Following this premise, German scholars have, since the 1980s, studied the memorial strategies to remember the Holocaust and how symbolic markers help societies to “work through the past” or “come to terms with the [traumatic] past” (Macdonald, 2009, p. 9). Since the 1990s, and looking mainly at the German experience, academics and governments have

widely believed that memorialisation will promote peace in the future and assure the 'never again' of human rights violations (Brown, 2013, p. 273). Sodaro asserts that the current academic and public focus on memorialisation

Rests on the notion that memory of past violence and human rights abuses is necessary for coming to terms with and righting the wrongs of the past and thus preventing future violence; there is an ethical duty to remember, especially past violence (Sodaro, 2018, p. 116).

Following the idea that symbolic reminders of the past will help repair victims and prevent future violations, hundreds of memory sites have been erected in the past twenty years in the Southern Cone. Memorial efforts in Chile, Argentina and Brazil include transforming former detention centres into memory sites, the erection of statues or monuments, the creation of 'peace parks', or developing prominent memorials and memory museums. So far, these memorial efforts in Latin America have received intense scholarly attention (Sevcenko et al., 2010, p. 398). As Brown (2013, p. 274) states, the field of victims' memory sites is "drawing scholarship of transitional justice and human rights further from a legal base."

Indeed, victims' efforts and increased scholarly interest are pushing the field of memorialisation to be considered the fifth pillar of transitional justice – along with (1) truth, (2) justice, (3) reparations and (4) guarantees of non-repetition (Collins & Ordóñez, 2021, p. 87). Fabián Salvioli, United Nations Special Rapporteur on transitional justice, argued in 2020 that memory "is an obligation and not an option for states in which violations of human rights and international humanitarian law have been committed" (Salvioli, 2020). This assertion goes hand in hand with Jelin's (2003; 2007, p. 140) lucid statement that transitional justice is inseparable from the study of memory, and that memorialisation is an integral part

of the whole transitional justice process and not just a “secondary” aspect (Jelin, 2007, p. 156). In this view, memorialisation is not only a relevant issue in transitional justice but also in the sociology of memory.

### *The Sociology of Memory*

In the past decades, the study of collective memory, commemorations and memory sites have become relevant topics in the sociology of memory (Marschall, 2009, p. 4). According to Misztal (2003, p. 154), “researching collective memory is an important part of sociological investigation into the ways we give meaning to the world.”

The thesis belongs to the sociology of memory field, which seeks to understand cultural memory as a “process” of remembering the past (Olick & Robbins, 1998, p. 122). When societies remember their past, sociologists focus on the “power” dynamics and the “contestation” and “persistence” of certain memory narratives (p. 122). They study how these memory narratives are performed and materialised through memory sites, and how commemorations are performed in these places. Indeed, as noted by Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz (1991, p. 376), “the problem of commemoration is an important aspect of the sociology of culture because it bears on the way society conceives its past.”

By the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, cultural sociologists were already aware of the crucial role memory plays in society. In this context, sociologist Maurice Halbwachs set forth the study of cultural memory (Traverso, 2021, p. 54). He argued that memory about the past is a social phenomenon originating in the “social milieus” or social environments (groups) (Halbwachs, 1980 [1950]). Thus, the group determines the way individuals contemplate and

remember the past. This assertion about the social and cultural nature of memory drew on Durkheim, who had previously studied the relevance of commemorative rituals in maintaining the group's cohesion and "solidarity" (Evans, 2021, p. 1047, citing Durkheim, 1965). These ideas meant a different way of understanding memory as not only a "biological" or psychological phenomenon but also as a social and cultural issue (Olick & Robbins, 1998, p. 109; Assmann, 1996, p. 126).

Based on the sociological tradition of memory established by Halbwachs, collective memory is understood in this study as a subjective narrative framework about the past with which individuals identify and give meaning to their actions (Aguilar, 2019 [2008], pp. 57–61). This narrative framework guides feelings, thoughts, practices and relationships with others (Connerton, 1989, p. 36). It also provides a sense of belonging to a larger abstract community (p. 37). Misztal (2003, p. 25) describes "collective memory as the representation of the past, both the past shared by a group and the past that is collectively commemorated, that enacts and gives substance to the group's identity, its present conditions and its vision of the future." In this line, Jelin (2003, p. 16) has described collective memory as an "active and socially constructed dialogue and interaction with others." This "dialogue" and "interaction" occurs in 'mnemonic communities.' According to Mizstal (2003, p. 15), a mnemonic community is a "social formation" that actively socialises "what should be remembered and what should be forgotten."

Among the critical topics in the sociology of memory is the study of the conditions or factors enabling an outcome. Yet, this sociological approach has remained relatively unexplored.

Exceptionally, Jordan (2006) carried out a sociological study to uncover the factors that enable victims' memorial projects to be created, as well as the factors explaining their failure (and the fact they remain only as "plans"). For a project's success, she finds that "land use, land ownership, the resonance of the site's meaning with a broader (often) international public, and the presence or absence of what I call a «memorial entrepreneur»" are crucial elements (p. 2). Her study "yields a basis from which to understand and analyse the social pattern of memorialisation" (p. 15) and produces "a new theory of the production of urban memorial space" (p. 17).

Sociologists of memory also study the agents of memory and their actions. Vinitzky-Seroussi (2002, p. 37) noted that "behind the commemorative practices are the agents of memory who organize them." One of the most relevant memory agents is the "memory entrepreneurs", individuals who lead and encourage memorial projects (Jelin, 2003, p. 39). Memory entrepreneurs actively work towards creating memory sites where victims can mourn their loved ones and where the state openly acknowledges the wrongdoing (Hite, 2012, p. 75; Vaulasvirta, 2018, p. 35). Memory entrepreneurs "frame" and "stage" memory through the creation of memory sites (Zavatti, 2012, p. 952). They also gather the resources to carry out the projects. Indeed, citing Fine (2001), Conway (2010, p. 446) asserts that "commemoration does not just happen by chance but requires the active work of people to propagate and disseminate the past", that is, the presence of memory entrepreneurs.

Another decisive element in collective memory and memory sites is the 'denunciators' who 'denounce' a memorial case. Denunciators are individuals deeply involved in the fight for

human rights, such as victims, human rights lawyers, or ordinary citizens with a strong interest in human rights issues. These denunciators activate a memorial case and place it in the focus of public and political attention. They may initiate the creation of a memorial and thus demand financial and logistical support from the authorities, or they may also trigger a process to eliminate a pro-regime memory site. This thesis focuses on the latter action in which a denunciator publicly and formally denounces/condemns a pro-regime site (after which a process of elimination begins)<sup>12</sup>. Thus, the denunciation of a pro-regime memory site by a ‘denunciator’ initiates a process of “contentious coexistence” (Payne, 2008). According to Payne (2008, p. 4), “contentious coexistence” is how regime supporters, anti-regime agents, and victims engage in an “open and democratic” discussion regarding human rights issues. In the case of this thesis, pro-regime memory sites that have been denounced become “contentious” and their existence is debated in the public arena. This thesis is particularly interested in the pro-regime memory sites that survive the process of contentiousness and the combinations of factors explain this outcome.

### *Memory Sites*

With the rise of the cultural memory field, memory sites – monuments, memorials, statues, and symbolic markers (e.g., street names) – have attracted increased scholarly attention due to their theoretical and methodological usefulness. According to Assmann (2008, p. 110), memory sites reflect how we try to “objectify” memory, providing a more concrete form to our identity. In the words of Nora (1989, p. 19), memory sites “materialize the immaterial.”

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<sup>12</sup> The destruction, removal or toppling of sites in the context of social turmoil is not considered in the concept of denunciation.

Scholars in the field have focused mostly on victims' memorialisation processes, on the usefulness of memory sites as instruments for political elites (invention of traditions approach, Misztal, 2003, p. 56), and on memory sites' narratives, aesthetics, practices, and performative experiences (Young, 1993; Piper-Shafir et al., 2018; Taylor, 2010). Indeed, cultural memory researchers have become increasingly interested in memory sites associated with difficult pasts. This has occurred in a context characterised by the "obsession with memory" (Huysen, 2003, p. 3). According to Huysen (2003), Western societies no longer look to the future for answers, but increasingly look at the past for comfort and stability. We live in a world where the obsolescence of objects forces us to cling to the stories and images of the past. This feeling creates great interest in memory sites, memorials and commemorations (Huysen, 1995, 2001, 2003). Such focus is accompanied by a greater academic, political and public recognition of those who have suffered in wars, genocides and politicides throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Thus, "as a result of the memory boom of the mid-1980s and 1990s, a new genre of memorials [associated with traumatic pasts] emerged": Victims' memorialisation (Hepworth, 2015, p. 287).

In the context of the "commemorative fever" (Misztal, 2003, p. 2) of the 1980s and 1990s, memorialisation initiatives for victims boomed (e.g., Holocaust Washington Memorial Museum, Daniel Libeskind's Jewish Museum in Berlin, Yad Vashem World Holocaust Remembrance Centre in Jerusalem) (Ana Souto, 2018; Andermann, 2015; Connerton, 2006, p. 317; Hodgkin & Radstone, 2003; Huysen, 1995, p. 199; Misztal, 2005, p. 1321; Reynolds, 2018; Sodaro, 2018; Wagner-Pacifici & Schwartz, 1991; P. H. Williams, 2007;

Winter, 1995). As mentioned by Traverso (2021, p. 15), this meant that victims “dominate the memorial space of the West.” Olick (2007, p. 139) has called this phenomenon the “politics of regret”, that is, the “general willingness to acknowledge collective historical misdeeds.” Thus, since the 1990s, there has been a wave of acknowledgements of human rights violations, commemorations, and apologies for past wrongdoings that have marked the political agenda of several Western countries (Olick, 2007; Connerton, 2008). This “regret” took shape in museums of memory and in memorials, statues, monuments, and even “counter-memorials” (memorials that defy the fascist monumental aesthetic) (Young, 1993).

In transitional justice contexts, sociologists of memory have tried to study victims’ memory sites from a multidimensional approach. Studies have focused on their objectives, *who* creates them, *how* visitors use them, their symbolic meanings, representations and narratives, *what* conflicts and controversies permeate their construction, their impact on citizens, and their degree of success (Benton, 1999; Collins & Hite, 2013b; Hite, 2003, 2008, 2015; Jelin, 2003, 2007; Vaulasvirta, 2018; Wagner-Pacifici, 1996; Winter, 1995; Young, 1993).

Researchers of memory sites have also studied how they have become spaces for political “activism” (Hite, 2018, p. 214) and the scenario where the memory camps fight for their legitimacy (Stern, 2010, p. xxiii; Young, 1993, p. x). The focus is also on how they have become spaces for “mnemonic socialization” (Misztal, 2003, p. 15) of the ‘Never Again’ message and the need for truth and justice (Andermann, 2012, 2015; K. Brown, 2013; Da Silva Catela, 2015; A. E. Espinoza et al., 2014; Piper-Shafir et al., 2018).

The interest in victims' memory sites reflects a change of focus. The focus has shifted from memorial sites associated with glorious nation-building, characteristic of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, to memory sites representing traumatic pasts (Arnold-de Simine, 2013; A. Assmann, 2016). Since the 19<sup>th</sup> century, countries have used memory sites – monuments, statues, sculptures – to represent the “unity and stability of the nation” (Collins & Hite, 2013a, p. 164; Hite, 2003, p. 20; Rowlands & Tilley, 2006, p. 501) and bolster the “civic pride” (Misztal, 2005, p. 40) of belonging to an “imagined community” (Anderson, 2006 [1983]). In contrast, now, the political and academic focus is on memory sites paying homage to victims of human rights violations, thus exposing the darkest aspects of the nation. As Harrison (2013, p. 194) noted, heritage's meaning has expanded and “is seen no longer simply as a celebration of national identity, but also as a space for the remembrance of atrocity and disaster.”

Young's (1993, p. x) view of memorials as scenarios to observe the different memory camps is an influential perspective in studying memory sites. Meanwhile, Merewether (1999, p. 148) states that “the way society thinks about monuments reflects the way it deals with its own history”, directing attention to how they operate as cultural tools to understand broader phenomena. Indeed, Assmann (1995, p. 133) asserts that memory sites are windows to understanding society: “Which past becomes evident in [...] heritage [...] tell us much about the constitution and tendencies of that society.” Similarly, Hite (2012, p. 21) views memory sites as “lenses” through which to study political contentiousness and debate. Thus, the idea of memory sites as “windows” through which to investigate societies has been prevalent in academia (A. Assmann J., 1995, p. 133; Bianchini, 2014, p. 2; Erll, 2011, p. 5; Forest & Johnson, 2002, p. 525; Jelin & Langland, 2003, p. 1; Marschall, 2009, p. 1; Wagner-Pacifici

& Schwartz, 1991, p. 376). These approaches have expanded the cultural memory field in unprecedented ways and have transformed it into an area of undeniable academic “legitimacy” (Crenzel, 2011, p. 6).

The sociology of memory views memory sites as crucial elements for the survival of collective memory. They symbolise the “permanence” of a collective and provide the space in which the group performs its commemorative rituals (Rowlands & Tilley, 2006, p. 500). A memory site’s goal is to create a fiction of, as noted by Halbwachs (1950 [1980], p. 130), a certain “continuity” and “stability” of a group’s identity. For Halbwachs (1950 [1980], pp. 128–157), there is a close relationship between the group and its memory sites. The more collective memory is attached to its symbolic markers, the more it survives.

Memory sites possess a substantial emotional component (Doss, 2008; Sather-Wagstaff, 2011; Smith, 2014). They are deeply connected to the feeling of loss and threat (Nora, 1989, p. 7). They reflect how the collective memory of a group could be lost and how it is therefore preserved through objects and sites (Huysen, 2001, p. 23; Nora, 1989, p. 7). As mentioned by Doss (2008, p. 28), memory sites are spaces of “emotional catharsis” where there is permission to release emotions contained by various social contracts. Nora (1989, p. 7) would argue that, since we no longer live in memory environments, we need to create contact with the past through memory sites and thus we create *lieux de mémoire*. This approach helps understand the need to develop memory sites, but there is more to it. The existence of memory sites not only responds to the emotional threat of a specific collective memory’s disappearance, but also reflects how *alive* that memory actually is in society (A. Assmann J.,

1995, p. 128). For instance, Zavatti (2021, p. 964) argues that today's far-right sites of memory are current "signs of warning" that these movements are still alive and might flourish even more in the future.

In the Southern Cone, memory sites have proved crucial for victims' symbolic reparation (Wagner-Pacifici Robin & Schwartz, 1991, p. 417). In this line, academics have studied places of memory and commemorative practices as efficacious cultural devices for victims' sense of identity and healing (Andermann, 2012; Andermann & Arnold-de Simine, 2012; Jelin, 2003, 2003; Sodaro, 2018; Taylor, 2010; Whigham, 2014). According to Druliolle (2015), victimhood is a social construction consisting of legal and social legitimacy, and memorial sites have been fundamental in constructing such identity (Sevcenko et al., 2010, p. 497). The act of "territorialising memory" (of creating a memory site) reinforces victimhood and keeps the community alive through the practices that take place in this process (Jelin & Langland, 2003, p. 1; Till, 2005, p. 10).

Thus, memory sites have been widely accepted as a fundamental aspect of victims' political and moral demands for dignity and healing (Etxeberria, 2013, p. 24; Sodaro, 2018, p. 116; Vaulasvirta, 2018, p. 31). But memory sites are also the focus of "contentious coexistence" (Payne, 2008) as they act as "entrance points" to understand "memory struggles" (Jelin & Langland, 2003, p. 1). They are also part of a "difficult heritage" with no straightforward way to deal with it (Logan & Reeves, 2009; Macdonald, 2009). According to Collins and Hite (2013b, p. 135), victims' memory sites are never truly finished in the sense that, due to

the traumatic nature of the past, there is never a clear consensus on *who* and *how* victims should be remembered, the *purpose* of the site, and *where* it should be located.

Two critical aspects of victims' memorialisation are human rights organisations' role and proactiveness. Human rights and victims' organisations have been the most relevant actors in constructing victims' memorials in the Southern Cone. They have acted as memory entrepreneurs and have pushed the state to establish memorials or transform former detention centres into places to recover historical memory. Jelin (2003, p. 333) argued that "what is peculiar in the Southern Cone countries is the strong and visible presence of the human rights movement as a political actor and as an «administrator of memory»." These 'administrators' have been proactive in proposing and carrying out projects. In general, they plan memory initiatives and present them to the state seeking its support. They believe in memorialising the past to prevent future human rights violations. Thus, their proactiveness reflects how they rarely wait for the right conditions for their projects to occur but rather produce those conditions.

Within the sociology of memory, it is also helpful to distinguish four types of memory sites: conventional, unconventional, developed and undeveloped. Conventional memory sites are the most typical and traditional forms of memory sites. Here we see statues, monuments, and memorials. Street names can also be considered conventional memory sites. Although they are not an 'object' *per se*, they 'occupy' a specific spot in space and provide meaning to it. As noted by Capdepón (2020, p. 102) in her study of Francoist street names in Madrid, toponymy (street naming) is "a form of public commemoration that constitutes places of

memory, a medium through which struggles for social justice are materialized [...].” Thus, conventional memory sites – monuments, statues, memorials, and street names – serve a “commemorative function” (Williams, 2007, p. 8). They remember individuals or special historical events and can be used to develop memory performances, commemorations and memorial activities. Contrarily, unconventional memory sites are either too small or too large to be treated as mere conventional memory sites. They range from little commemorative objects handed from person to person (e.g., a badge) to large structures such as museums (e.g., a memorial museum).

We can also distinguish between developed and undeveloped memory sites. The ‘developed’ sites are the proposed, planned, and later built-up memory sites. In other words, they were not just planned but were also concretised. On the contrary, undeveloped memory sites were designed but never became concrete places. These sites remain in the imagination like memorial “ghosts” (Gordon, 2008). For sociologists of memory, they are still relevant as they shed light on the factors obstructing their development. Thus, the distinction between developed and undeveloped is appropriate as not all memorial projects succeed in becoming concrete memory sites. As Jordan (2006) noted, throughout the development process, several factors intervene that may aid the memorial project or halt its development (e.g., funding, public appeal, controversies, etc.). These distinctions – conventional and unconventional, developed and undeveloped – were used in the thesis to determine the sample for Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). Thus, the QCA sample only includes *conventional and developed* pro-regime memory sites.

### *Pro-regime Memory and Pro-regime Sites*

This thesis's significant contribution is to look at what could be called pro-regime, rather than pro-victim, sites of memory. By understanding pro-regime memorialisation, the thesis seeks to fill a gap on what these pro-regime sites are and how they survive in democracy.

First, it should be noted that, from a sociological perspective, pro-regime memory sites belong to the category of “difficult heritage.” Macdonald (2009) argues that a difficult heritage is a “troublesome”, “unsettling and awkward” (p. 1) site or material legacy of a traumatic past that many “might prefer to forget” (p. 80). However, it is not always possible to obliterate and erase these places because they either have a solid physical presence, some groups want to keep these sites, or because, as evidence of that past, they are seen in some cases as pedagogical tools to prevent future atrocities (*never again*) (p. 2).

Although few studies in the Southern Cone have focused on pro-regime memorialisation (Hershberg & Agüero, 2005, p. 6), there have been notable exceptions. In Perú, Milton (2015, 2018) found that, despite being accused by the Truth Commission of having committed a significant percentage of human rights violations, the Military still positively commemorates the war against Shining Path (1983 – 2000). For instance, they have created museum exhibitions in two locations in Lima – the National Police Terrorism Unit (DINCOTE) museum, and the Armed Forces Monument to the Heroes of Chavín de Huántar – to reinforce their memory and salvational discourse. Milton argues that pro-military memories are “not necessarily false or fabricated, but contorted” (Milton, 2015, p. 362). She

argues that the Military performs a biased selection of the past and presents it in a way that most favours their legitimisation interests.

In Argentina, Salvi (2011, 2012) has studied the groups that still positively praise the Military who fought in the 'war against subversion' (1976 – 1983). She argues that despite their lack of legitimacy and support, these groups still strive to gain recognition and put forward memorial projects. One of these groups, *Memoria Completa*, has tried to install some monuments and plaques to their 'victims' and 'heroes' in military facilities. However, these public initiatives have been rejected and relegated to the private sphere (Salvi, 2012, p. 73). She also noted that they have tried to imitate the human rights language by talking about *their* human rights violations at the hands of terrorism (Salvi, 2011, p. 56).

These examples show that regime supporters also take part in the politics of memory by creating their own memory sites. Indeed, in Chile, there is a non-official memorialisation culture in which regime supporters have created pro-regime memorials. Bianchini (2014, p. 5) noted that "the existence of memory related to the dictatorship's victims does not prevent the installation of *other memorials* in public spaces that positively commemorate the dictatorship" (emphasis added). Hite and Collins (2013b, p. 136) agree with this assertion, arguing that a more extreme right in Chile "openly opposes commemorative demands to acknowledge human rights victims [and] has begun to organise commemorations of leaders of the repressive past, including Pinochet himself." Thus, by paying homage to perpetrators or collaborators of the regime, or by honouring events that signify death and repression for thousands of people, pro-regime memory sites in Chile defy expectations of what a

“memorial” means. As such, because they are “unsettling and awkward” (Macdonald, 2009, p. 1) to most of society, these memorials “depart negatively from the particular expectations at issue” (Goffman, 1986 [1963], p. 5).

Why are pro-regime sites created? Pro-regime sites respond to commemorative needs, the need for legitimacy, and they may also be a reaction to a threat. Regarding their commemorative use, and similar to victims’ memorials, pro-regime sites are created to commemorate what regime supporters consider *their* truth, *their* honourable events, and *their* martyrs in the recent past. As commemorative elements, pro-regime memory sites serve as places for gatherings and performative rites by regime supporters. Young (1993, p. 7) noted that “memorials provide the sites where groups of people gather to create a common past.” Thus, similarly to the case of victims’ memorials (Taylor 2010), these sites can become spaces of pro-regime glorification and performance (Connerton, 1989; Sather-Wagstaff, 2011; Young, 1993, Hite, 2012).

In Chile, some pro-regime sites have become spaces in which certain aspects of history are remembered and enacted. For instance, the Pinochet Square and Monument in Linares have served since the 1990s as a gathering point for regime supporters. Since 1991, every 11<sup>th</sup> of September they gather there to sing the national anthem, deliver speeches, eat *empanadas* (pastries), drink red wine, and pay homage to Pinochet, the Junta, and their “military-political prisoners” – a name they use to refer to human rights violators in jail (Thesis fieldwork notes #1, 2019).

Thus, memory sites are spaces of ritualisation that help reaffirm, reinforce and materialise a group's identity. Durkheim (2001 [1912], p. 287) noted that "rites are, above all, the means by which the social group periodically reaffirms itself." Indeed, in democracy, one of the most worrying aspects for governments is that pro-regime sites could potentially serve as places for extending pro-regime sentiments across communities and generations (Garibian, 2016, p. 32). Zavatti (2021) noted that they could become sites to reaffirm pro-regime or far-right memories in the present, publicise them to a larger audience, and perpetuate them in the future. In his study of far-right memory sites in Romania, Zavatti (2021, p. 949) argues that far-right sites of memory "allows the far-right veterans to pass the torch to younger generations by establishing continuity with their commemorated fallen and by voicing their self-exculpating revisionist historical accounts."

In the 1980s, the Nazi Rally Grounds in Nuremberg posed a similar problem of continuity and reinforcement of a particular memory through commemoration. The site comprised buildings and open spaces created by Hitler to perform commemorations and political rallies in the 1930s and before the end of the Second World War. After the war, German authorities feared the place could become a "pilgrimage" site for neo-Nazis (Macdonald, 2009, p. 188). Although memory sites can always be changed or contextualised, in some cases, their linkage to the 'dark' side of history is so clear that they could become dangerous. As noted by Jordan (2006, p. 190), "some authentic sites [...] possess a different kind of aura, one that threatens to attract neo-Nazi pilgrimages." In a similar vein, the bodies and tombs of dictators also pose the problem of becoming places of pilgrimage after the tyrant's death (Alija et al., 2016).

Pro-regime memory sites may also reflect the need for legitimacy of certain counter groups. Because of their capacity to install a narrative in the public space, memory sites help achieve legitimacy and “shift public perception” (Milton, 2018, p. 29; Assmann, 1995, p. 133). Here, the construction and maintenance of memory sites becomes “a strategy of identity politics, a compelling means of establishing recognition” (Marschall, 2004, p. 81). They are a means by which regime supporters “normalise” their pro-regime narrative “in the present” (Zavatti, 2021, p. 950). One way this positive image of the past is “sold” is by appropriating the human rights discourse (Bilbija & Payne, 2011, p. 11; Milton, 2015, 2018; Payne, 2008, p. 34; Salvi, 2011, p. 47). Thus, regime supporters may defend their right to commemorate the past in their memory sites as a human right to freedom of speech while imitating the aesthetics of victims’ memorialisation (Collins & Hite, 2013b, 2013a; Payne, 2008; Salvi, 2011, 2012).

Likewise, pro-regime memory sites can be understood as reactions to a threat or an unfavourable political context. In Peru, for instance, memorial sites and cultural objects belonging to the Military are “a reaction to the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission” and the trials against military officers (Milton, 2018, p. 35). Indeed, Levi and Rothberg (2018, p. 359) see right-wing memories as “a reaction against the previous hegemonic politics of memory.” In recent years, and following Traverso’s (2019) studies on the right-wing, Levi & Rothberg (2018, p. 357) have identified a “reactionary transnational memory” and “reactionary nativism” (Rodríguez-Temiño & Almansa-Sánchez, 2021, p. 1066) related to the need of far-right groups to legitimise their memory and their symbols in

an unfavourable public scene. However, counterreaction is not a new phenomenon. For instance, the construction of Confederate monuments in the US by the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century has been analysed as a symbolic reaction to the loss of political power by the white elites. Likewise, the newer monuments of the 1950s and 60s demonstrate a response and “opposition to the civil rights movement” (Balko, 2017). Thus, Confederate monuments were created “decades after the war as part of the reassertion of white supremacy” and as a reaction to the relative loss of power (Block, 2020)<sup>13</sup>.

In this line, pro-regime sites of memory may also be spaces of resistance towards the imposition of victims’ memory. Scott (1990, p. xii) called for social scientists “to examine the social sites where this resistance can germinate.” Pro-regime memory sites undoubtedly constitute such “social sites.” For Zavatti (2021, p. 950), pro-regime sites “resemble the sites of counter-memory of the subaltern”, a concept used by Foucault in his study of power dynamics. Counter-memories are “the residual or resistant strains that withstand official versions of historical continuity” (Zemon Davies & Starn, 1989, p. 2) and strive to maintain their presence and legitimacy in a very unfavourable context.

Finally, it is interesting to note that pro-regime memorials’ origins, at least in Chile, are usually unclear regarding the paperwork certifying their creation (and also who authorised the memorial and why). For instance, when a city councillor asked in 2017 about the documents certifying the creation of the Pinochet Square and Monument in Linares (inaugurated in 1991), he was told that there were no such documents and that he must

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<sup>13</sup> Interviewing Michael Jeffries.

search for local newspapers' archives if he wanted to know more about its inauguration: "This documentation, which is from the 1980s, was lost in the earthquake as the archive's warehouse fell with it. If you require the information, you should read the newspapers of the time" (Municipalidad de Linares, 2017, p. 15). Similarly, in 2018, the Army admitted there are no "resolutions, minutes or document[s]" authorising the commemorations of Manuel Contreras (Griffiths Spielman, 2018). Likewise, in 2002, the Navy skipped the regular legislative procedure to honour public servants by erecting a statue of José Toribio Merino without Congress's authorisation. Thus, in the case of pro-regime memory sites in Chile, "the creators of these monuments do not wait for permission to commemorate certain persons and occurrences. Instead, they present a version of events that runs counter to the established political and historical narrative" (El-Mecky, 2019, p. 177)<sup>14</sup>.

### *The Afterlife of Dictatorial Heritage*

As noted before, memory sites are "windows" to observe the unfolding of democracies and transitional justice policies. Indeed, Misztal (2003, pp. 154–157) argues there is a profound link between memory and democracy. Thus, the more we study and understand victims' memorialisation, the more we understand transitional justice processes. A country that has memorialised its victims and dignified them with memorial museums and memory initiatives certainly speaks of a healthy democracy (Misztal, 2007). Bearing this in mind, Misztal's argument could be expanded to include pro-regime memorialisation: The more we

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<sup>14</sup> These aspects do not usually apply to the naming of streets that go through a standard approval process in the city council and for which documentation is much easier to find.

understand this phenomenon, the more we can grasp the limitations and opportunities of transitional justice democracies.

Indeed, a good deal of scholarly attention has been given to the afterlife – once democracy is restored – of buildings and monuments built by dictatorial regimes (Forest & Johnson, 2002; Hepworth, 2015; Macdonald, 2009; Marschall, 2009; Nadkarni, 2003). This research agenda has endeavoured to answer the following questions: Once democracy is established, what happens to the heritage created by former dictatorships? What strategies have societies used to deal with this “difficult past” (Macdonald, 2009)? The literature shows five key strategies for coping with pro-regime/dictatorial heritage: *destruction*, *vandalisation*, *neglect*, *relocation*, and *reuse*. The latter strategy distinguishes two types of reuse: “critical” and “uncritical” (Malone, 2017).

Regarding the first fate or strategy, *destruction*, we should note that a monument or site is ‘destroyed’ when it is violently removed. Much scholarly attention has focused on the iconoclasm of memory sites (Bevan, 2006; Latour & Weibel, 2002). According to this literature, iconoclasm usually takes place in the wake of regime change, “clear[ing] the way for the creation of a new collective memory” (Harrison, 2013, p. 171). The destruction of cultural elements and symbols belonging to the former administration represents a symbolic change necessary to mark the beginning of a new “era” (Merewether, 1999, p. 183). The act of destruction reveals not only negative feelings towards the monument, but also its ability to symbolise specific values. In the eyes of many, monuments are attributed with the ‘power’ not only to represent but also to ‘be.’ To remove a memorial is to eliminate “the symbolic

power of the image being removed” (Harrison, 2013, p. 171). In this sense, destruction (and vandalism) reflects the desire to erase the monuments’ “aura” (Merewether, 1999, p. 183; Macdonald, 2009, p. 1; Harrison, 2013, p. 171). For instance, after 1945, several Nazi symbols were actively (and performatively) destroyed by the allies to mark the fall of the fascist regime (Macdonald, 2009). Eastern Europe also saw waves of iconoclasm of monuments associated with communism after the fall of the Soviet Union (Harrison, 2013, p. 184).

With *vandalisation*, the site is not entirely removed but is severely damaged. Parts of its structure are torn off, painted, toppled, or burnt (Hite, 2008, p. 119; Milton, 2011, p. 193). Acts of vandalism may be politically motivated or not, but mutilation always sends a message (Marschall, 2009, p. 15; Milton, 2011, p. 202). Harrison (2013, p. 173) speaks of “symbolic humiliation” and Benton (2010, p. 156) of “castration.” The latter concept refers to defacing statues or monuments to downplay or oppose their glorifying symbolism.

*Neglect* refers to the abandonment of fascist or former-regime monuments (Malone, 2017, p. 449). This may happen because of disinterest, the need to forget the recent past, or the lack of financial resources to restore or reuse them (p. 449). In this state of affairs, the memorial becomes a sort of “zombie memorial” that is not totally dead (as it has not been eliminated) yet is not fully alive either. As no one uses or cares about it, it remains abandoned, waiting for an owner and a purpose. Malone (2017, p. 449) refers to the case of post-fascist Italy, where the government “lacked the funds to maintain the [Mussolini] regime’s costly flagship projects” and therefore, several fascist constructions remained in a state of neglect.

The *relocation* strategy is primarily seen in Eastern European countries. Soon after the fall of the Soviet Union, many Marxist and Leninist statues had their celebratory meaning erased by relocation: They were placed in a space where they could be valued only as evidence of the failure of communism (Harrison, 2013, p. 194). Thus, in 1993, the “Memento Park” in Hungary was inaugurated as a place to gather all these statues and display them ironically, discrediting and desacralising their power as Soviet symbols. The park also fulfils a touristic function (but without glorifying the past) (Marschall, 2009, p. 148; Nadkarni, 2003, p. 202). This strategy was also in line with how Hungarians wanted to present themselves internationally —as a nonviolent and democratic society (Nadkarni, 2003, p. 198).

Finally, through *reuse*, societies preserve these fascist (or pro-regime) monuments for present uses (Malone, 2017, p. 449; Benton, 2010, p. 129). By maintaining their original functions (e.g., sports, administrative) or by transforming their objectives, these monuments undergo a “new life” in democracy (Malone, 2017, p. 449). Reuse can be carried out “critically” or “uncritically” (p. 452). The “uncritical” response preserves the memory site without referring to its past. The place is valued mainly for its touristic, aesthetic or architectural values or its ‘age’ (antiquity), thus obscuring its fascist or dictatorial past (Benton, 2010, p. 131; Malone, 2017, p. 459). On the contrary, with a critical response, the site is preserved in a contextualised manner, referring to its past without extolling the former regime (Macdonald, 2009).

A clear example of a critical use of dictatorial heritage is the Nazi Party Rally Grounds in Nuremberg. Macdonald (2009, p. 4) considers the Nazi Grounds as a site with the capacity “to trouble collective identities and open up social differences.” She refers to this place as a site of “perpetration at a distance” (p. 3) —a site that belonged to the perpetrator apparatus during the regime and had an administrative function. Because of this, since the 1950s, German Governments feared it could be used as a point of reference for far-right movements. Thus, in the 1980s, two options for dealing with the Nazi Rally Grounds were considered: Restoring the site exactly as it was when it belonged to the Nazis, or applying what the author calls “profanation.” Profanation implied using the site for other purposes than that of the perpetrators’: It is a “way of working through the past and trying to counter the potential ‘enchanting’ or ‘fascinating’ effects of the heritage site” with “more ‘trivial’ or ‘banal’ means” (p. 88). It is the active and conscious transformation of the site’s uses, symbols and meanings to subvert its original purpose. Thus, in the 1980s, the Nazi Grounds in Nuremberg were ‘profaned’ and critically transformed into a place for concerts, recreational activities, and a space to encourage democratic values (p. 181).

Pro-regime or pro-fascist memory sites could also be maintained with no contextualisation (uncritically) and thus potentially with their original praising power. This is what the thesis calls the “survival” of pro-regime memorialisation. An example of an uncritical afterlife is the case of the Valley of the Fallen in Spain. Dictator Francisco Franco inaugurated the site in 1959 to serve as a mausoleum aimed at glorifying and perpetuating his positive image and celebrating the “victorious national side” of the civil war (1936 – 1939). In October 2019, Spain’s Supreme Court ordered the removal of Franco’s remains from the crypt, a decision

that has to do with how the place had become a pilgrimage site of “Spanish Falangists, and German and Italian Fascists” that pay homage to the dictator (Hite, 2008, p. 118). Removing Franco’s tomb is hoped to reduce its potential to positively commemorate the civil war (1936 – 1939) and the dictatorship (1939 – 1975). Nevertheless, even in the absence of his corpse, the site continues to offend victims’ memory (Aguilar, 2019 [2008], p. 430). Human rights organisations perceive that the site, as a whole, “commemorate[s] the nationalist victory” (Fuentes Vega, 2017, p. 78) and have therefore constantly demanded its erasure, re-purposing, or proper contextualisation in line with the recognition of human rights violations. So far, and despite the removal of Franco’s corpse, this contextualisation has not taken place.

The uncritical afterlife of the Valley of the Fallen is deeply linked to the type of transition experienced in Spain in the 1970s. The fact that only as recent as 2019 the state could finally remove Franco’s tomb from the Valley of the Fallen reflects how the trauma of the civil war (1936 – 1939) and the dictatorship (1939 – 1975) is still a taboo (Aguilar, 2019 [2008]). Perhaps, in fear of creating social discomfort or opening the wounds of the past, no government has dared to fully address this traumatic period in Spanish history. Thus, the timid treatment of pro-regime memorialisation in Spain reflects a society whose transition has been dominated by impunity, a fear of speaking out, and silence pacts (Payne & Aguilar, 2018)<sup>15</sup>.

South Africa has also had to deal with heritage belonging to the former Apartheid regime. Marschall (2009) argues that although post-Apartheid South Africa has seen cases of

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<sup>15</sup> Wildeboer and Dujisin (2022, p. 19) argue that the Spanish “silence pact” is no longer in place.

destruction and relocation of pro-Apartheid monuments, the primary strategy has been to maintain these monuments uncritically and create new ones honouring democratic ideals and victims. This may be linked to the fact that, although the Apartheid regime was dismantled, South Africa continued to experience an invisible regime of racism and discrimination. It is not by chance that in 2015 South African students mobilised to condemn the perpetuation of racial discrimination against the Black population —many viewed the maintenance of the statue of Rhodes at the University of Cape Town as a reflection of this state of affairs. The issue of racial discrimination is still haunting South African society. Thus, the author argues that “the process of removal [of pro-Apartheid monuments] is acknowledged as being contentious and divisive, whereas the installation of new [pro-democracy/pro-victim] monuments is presented as an inclusive, unifying act, conducive to nation-building and reconciliation” (Marschall, 2009, p. 144).

This logic of “conscious juxtaposition” explains the creation of museums dedicated to victims, such as the Robben Island Museum, while simultaneously preserving pro-Apartheid monuments (Grundlingh, 2001, pp. 105–106; Marschall, 2009, p. 17). Within the latter, one of the best known is the Voortrekker Monument in Pretoria. This monumental structure was inaugurated in 1949 to celebrate Afrikaner nationalism. Interestingly, Grundlingh (2001, p. 107) has argued that the end of the Apartheid regime and the decline of white political power has led some monuments to a “loss of symbolic status.” The Voortrekker Monument has been “sanitised” and transformed into a tourist and heritage object (p. 108). The site is accepted equally by both Black and white people since its “*raison d’être* has become less than clear, [and] it has been able to shift into heritage” (p. 109). This example shows that

some pro-regime sites that survive the democratic transition lose their celebratory power, while others – such as the Valley of the Fallen – maintain it.

Furthermore, this literature shows that the stronger the break with the previous fascist/authoritarian regime, the easier it is to deal with its symbolic legacies. In other words, in cases of transitions characterised by a “rupture” with the former regime, these legacies can be dealt with more directly and critically (as did Hungary and Germany with the communist and Nazi legacy, respectively) (Barahona de Brito et al., 2001, p. 12). Barahona de Brito, González and Aguilar (2001, p. 12, emphasis added) noted that “the more a transition entails the defeat of the old authoritarian elite and repressors, *the wider is the scope for truth and justice policies.*” On the other hand, when the transition takes place in an intensely transactional manner – and where the former representatives of the regime maintain high quotas of power until well into democracy – then the treatment of the regime’s symbolic legacy becomes more complicated, full of silences and packed with taboos (this is the case of Spain, South Africa and Chile) (pp. 14–15). In these cases, it will be no surprise that pro-regime or pro-fascist legacies will be uncritically maintained and preserved (they will “survive”).

These conclusions are in line with what the literature on transitional justice point out. Indeed, Misztal (2003, p. 151) argues that “the “type of transition” is linked to the way the country memorializes”, and inversely, whether and how pro-regime memory sites survive today reflects the country’s transitional justice process (Garibian, 2019, p. 30). For instance, the “relocation” fate is usually linked to relatively peaceful transitions, in which the society is

not too divided, and where there is a general backlash towards the former regime. As mentioned earlier, after the fall of the Soviet rule, the way Hungarians treated their Lenin and Stalin statues reflected their “pride in the peacefulness and legality” of their relatively nonviolent independence process, which made them “unwilling to ally themselves with the radicalism represented by the destruction of monuments” (Nadkarni, 2003, p. 197). They opted to create a “statue park” in which they would stock up the statues ironically following their ideals of democracy (p. 197). Thus, the treatment of pro-regime memorialisation can certainly be used as windows to learn about the political and cultural agendas of transitioning societies (p. 198). As summarised by Barahona De Brito, González and Aguilar (2001, p. 14), the way the transition is carried out (rupture or transaction) will affect subsequent memorialisation policies:

The politics of memory, such as the symbolic and economic rehabilitation of the victims, the building of monuments and ceremonies, and public recognition of the suffering of victims, will also depend on this equilibrium [of outgoing/upcoming forces, and the form of the transition].

However, as noted in the “puzzle” section of this thesis, the transactional nature of Chile’s transition – which implied the maintenance of high levels of support for Pinochet – does not fully explain the survival of pro-regime memorialisation in democratic Chile. The “transition” and the “maintenance of pro-regime memory” factors (*Pinochetismo* and salvational memory) in Chile act more like scope conditions but are too vague and far away in time to explain the survival of pro-regime memorialisation *today*. We need more productive and/or agentic factors pertaining to the less explored dimensions of location, the Judiciary, civil society mobilisation, local communities’ actions, and veto players.

## **Contributions of the Thesis**

This research provides a substantial contribution to the fields of cultural memory, the sociology of memory, and memorialisation in transitional justice societies. Firstly, it should be noted that this study adheres to the idea that, as indicated by Atencio (2014, p. 23), the cultural and symbolic spheres – to which, in this case, memory sites belong – are much “more than just background detail.” As argued in her study (p. 21), a “cultural approach could potentially yield a more rounded picture” of how transitional justice develops in countries that have suffered from repressive regimes. Looking at the symbolic as a relevant aspect of society, Atencio argues that such an approach creates more “dialogue” between transitional justice and cultural memory studies (p. 22). Bearing this in mind, this research goes one step further from Atencio’s combination of transitional justice and the cultural realm. Thus, it combines both fields (transitional justice and cultural memory) *with sociology*. This research incorporates methodological and theoretical aspects of sociology to explain pro-regime memorialisation’s survival. Sociology offers methodological and theoretical tools to examine the conditions under which pro-regime memory sites are maintained in democracy. Thus, the thesis provides a novel combination of transitional justice, cultural memory studies, and sociology to answer the research question.

The sociological component of this thesis certainly implies a methodological contribution to the field of cultural memory. Most of the studies in this field only focus on single case studies and cultural analysis. In particular, most cultural memory research ignores the need for systematic comparative perspectives and hence lack a thorough empirical grounding (for exceptions, see Collins & Hite, 2013b; Jordan, 2006; Marschall, 2009). Conway (2010, p.

446) has raised concerns about the excessive emphasis on “design” and cultural controversy by arguing that the most common form of research on memorialisation has so far been the “cultural analysis of symbolic representation”, leaving behind other approaches such as comparative analysis and, in particular, the study of successful and unsuccessful memory sites (p. 449). Likewise, in a recent publication in *Memory Studies Journal*, and referring to scholars’ emphasis on single case studies, Brown (2019, p. 113) called to surpass “the specificity of the majority of the work” and explore comparative perspectives. In 2003, Misztal (2003, p. 6) was already calling for a sociological perspective on memory to “explore the conditions and factors that make remembering” possible. Hence, following the demand for a more systematic approach, the thesis uses Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to compare 17 cases with positive (survival) and negative (eliminated) outcomes. This strategy provides the much-needed comparability in the sociology of cultural memory (Conway, 2010; Jordan, 2006; Vinitzky-Seroussi, 2002). As far as the author is concerned, QCA has never been used in the sociology of cultural memory. Thus, one of the most important contributions of the thesis is to go beyond the single-case analysis by systematically comparing different (yet comparable) cases to extract a parsimonious explanation for pro-regime memorialisation in Chile. This explanation could potentially be extended geographically (e.g., to understand other regions) and academically (e.g., in a post-doctoral research). Thus, following Vinitzky-Seroussi’s (2002, p. 49) words regarding the sociology of memory, “I view this exercise as an opportunity to open doors for future systematic comparative research of other cases.”

Secondly, by incorporating the study of pro-regime memory, this research expands the notion of memorialisation. So far, most studies in the area of cultural memory have either: a) focused on pro-victim memorialisation but not on pro-regime memorialisation (see Andermann, 2012; Da Silva Catela, 2015; Hite, 2003, 2012, 2018; Hite & Collins, 2009; Jelin, 2003, 2007), or b) focused on how democracies deal with a heritage built by former regimes (Benton, 2010; Grundlingh, 2001; Malone, 2017; Nadkarni, 2003), but not on *how* such symbolic legacies survive this context.

Academia has uncritically praised memorialisation as always reparative and positive for transitional justice aims, assuming it always works *for* and *with* victims (Milton, 2018, p. 3). Milton (2018, p. 3) notes that it has been accepted for a long time that “memory implicitly connotes human rights” and that it always has “positive connotations.” For instance, in the transitional justice field, some argue “memorialisation – the various processes and forms of collective remembrance – is a process fundamental to recovering from trauma and atrocity” (Sevcenko et al., 2010, p. 398). Under the vision of transitional justice, memorials should always aspire to generate conditions for a culture of human rights (Salvioli, 2020; Jelin, 2003). As mentioned earlier, it is assumed that memory sites should be bastions of symbolic reparation for victims of human rights violations (Brown, 2013). However, the permanence (in transitional democracies) of memorials, symbols and memory sites that honour human rights violators unsettle the meanings, significance and role of memorials of the recent past. Also, it makes us wonder how it is possible that pro-regime memorials survive (are maintained) precisely in societies that try to repair their victims and generate guarantees of non-repetition, such as Chile.

Having this in mind, this research aims at expanding the study of transitional justice and memorialisation by looking at the ‘other’ side of memory. With this approach, we understand that memorialisation might not always be reparative for victims. Indeed, pro-regime memorialisation is the least close to the idea of reparations for victims of human rights violations. In this context, Milton (2018, p. 3) asks: “[But] what about memories that do not necessarily promote human rights narrative[s] or may contort the meaning of the «never again»?” Such a question becomes even more prescient in a context in which, as asserted by Levi and Rothberg (2018, p. 356, emphasis added), “the memory of the right constitutes a distinct field of struggle that *has not yet received adequate attention* from scholars of either memory or fascism.”

By focusing on the ‘other’ side, this research contributes to scholarly debate in memorialisation by raising the uncomfortable idea that victims and the state have not been the only actors shaping Chile’s politics of memory. When Pinochet died in 2006, many believed it was the “end” of pro-regime memorialisation and “that Chile’s long transition had finally come to a close” (Hite et al., 2013, p. 22). However, almost 24 years later, and just like victims’ “memory irruptions” in the public space (Aguilar, 2019 [2008], p. 476; Wilde, 2013, p. 33), pro-regime memory sites and commemorations have continued to “irrupt” from time to time. For instance, on 11 September 2016, a prominent newspaper in Chile – La Tercera – published two externally paid pages in honour of the “heroes” of the coup *d’état* that ousted the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende (1970 – 1973). The newspaper used the following title: “43 years after the liberating deed, grateful Chileans of

their Armed Forces and Order do not forget and recognise the sacrifices they made for the homeland” (El Desconcierto, 2016b; The Clinic, 2016). Equally, in January 2019, those waiting for their flights in the VIP lounge room of the Punta Arenas airport in the South of Chile were surprised when the television showed videos praising Pinochet (CNN Chile, 2019; Cooperativa, 2019; Gajardo, 2019). The situation caused a stir, but it was unclear why this happened. However, what is clear is that these pro-regime “irruptions” or outbursts will continue to take place. For instance, one of the most recent outpourings of pro-regime salvational memory occurred in the Iquique’s Naval Combat commemorations on 20 May 2022 in Valparaíso. Here, the former commander-in-chief of the Navy (2001 – 2005), Almirante Vergara, publicly declared that the Navy should be prepared to fight against the “internal enemy” destroying Chile’s values. Almirante Vergara’s comments hinted at the need to reinstall the Internal Security Doctrine used by the dictatorship in the 1970s and 1980s. Civil society, especially victims and human rights organisations, widely criticised his sayings. The commander-in-chief of the Navy immediately apologised to the President of the Republic and the Minister of Defence for such comments (Pérez & Caro, 2022). These events are just a few examples showing how nostalgic memories of the regime are still pervasive in Chilean society.

Thirdly, in uncovering the factors that enable the survival of pro-regime memorialisation, the thesis will contribute to the overlooked area of ‘right-wing’ dimensions in democratic societies. In their study of Latin American politics, Luna and Rovira (2014) point out the exclusive focus on left-wing politics that social scientists have had in the past years. Their work tackles this bias and, drawing on their observations, it could be said that even though

regime supporters' public relevance is not as prominent as other actors' (e.g., victims and the state), they also shape contemporary politics by celebrating the dictatorial past. The creation, promotion and maintenance of memory sites reinforcing a positive view of the dictatorship is a fundamental aspect of such celebration. Although they have become a secondary and increasingly discredited actor after the return to democracy, *Pinochetistas* still play an essential role in shaping the politics of memory. The mechanisms by which their memorial sites survive have mainly remained unobserved. As noted by Bilbija and Payne (2011, p. 11),

Little research exists [...] to show how supporters of the authoritarian regime have attempted to sell a positive image of the past in the post-dictatorship era. Instead, the assumption prevails that those promoting memory are the same ones who reject the authoritarian regime [e.g., victims].

Indeed, pro-regime and far-right memories as a research agenda are gaining momentum. In the 2019 Latin American Studies Association's (LASA) annual report on cultural memory studies, Katherine Hite and Eugenia Allier called for 2020s LASA Congress in Guadalajara to host a panel exclusively dedicated to "Counter-memories – negacionismo (denialism) and authoritarian manipulations of the past." Likewise, a recent publication in the *Memory Studies Journal* addressed far-right politics and memorialisation in an article named "Memory Studies in a Moment of Danger: Fascism, Post-fascism, and the Contemporary Political Imaginary" (Levi & Rothberg, 2018). In this regard, Sturken (2022, p. 21) contends that the new international context has seen the emergence of actors from the most extreme right who, in a "predictably extreme" reaction to the identity politics of the left, also use memory as a weapon for their narratives of self-aggrandisement and victimhood. Likewise, Salvioli (2020, p. 4) asserts that "multilateralism and the human rights system are being

called into question and populist and xenophobic ideologies are on the rise.” These quotes witness the increased scholarly attention towards pro-regime, far-right, and counter-memories. Thus, this new agenda encourages further studies of pro-regime memorialisation in Chile and elsewhere. Indeed, such studies could be undertaken in Spain or Italy. In Italy, for instance, Bartolini (2019, p. 240) has argued that

In light of the rise of far-right movements in Italy and beyond, [and] considering the symbolic power these [pro-fascist] monuments exercise and how easily they could be instrumentalised, it is crucial to find ways to disempower memories of dark times.

In brief, and as mentioned earlier in the chapter, the study proposes methodological and theoretical contributions. Methodologically, it offers a novel mixture of cultural memory, transitional justice and sociology using a comparative strategy based on Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Theoretically, and in a context of increased focus on victims’ memorialisation in the transitional justice field, this project contributes to a new research agenda that centres on the ‘opposite side’ of memory, particularly on memory sites that praise the Pinochet military dictatorship (1973 – 1990) in Chile. These sites are part of an ongoing social struggle in determining the meaning of the recent past. Thus, this thesis investigates the following question: What explains the survival (and demise) of pro-regime memorialisation in democratic Chile (1990 – 2020)?

## **Memory Sites Matter**

Along with being “windows” into understanding democracies and their transitional justice processes, memory sites also matter because they have recently become the focus of “memory activists” and cultural struggles regarding the public narratives of the past (Sturken, 2022, p. 4). Hite (2008, p. 119) notes that “societies periodically confront public

monuments as they seek to reveal state injustices.” Likewise, Milton (2018, p. 28) argues that memory sites have become the centre of “culture battles” and societal and political confrontations.

For instance, one of the first actions of the social movement that erupted in Chile on 18 October 2019, in what today is known as the *Estallido Social* (Social Outbreak), was the transformation and destruction of monuments throughout the entire country. The toppling of monuments was a spontaneous but surgical action. Monuments representing the *Ancien Régime* of neoliberalism, social inequality, or colonialism against indigenous peoples were inclemently destroyed. Thus, protesters took days and nights to dismantle the monuments associated with oppression, such as the statues of Spanish conquerors García Hurtado de Mendoza or Pedro de Valdivia.

Interestingly (although it was not entirely surprising), the rage was also directed against the symbols of Pinochet’s military dictatorship (1973 – 1990). Among them, the memorial to Jaime Guzmán in Vitacura (see Appendix, picture #11, p. 455), Santiago, and the monolith in honour of Pinochet in Linares, Maule, were virtually destroyed. Although Jaime Guzmán was not directly involved in the torture or execution of dissidents during the dictatorship, he was a close collaborator to General Augusto Pinochet and is considered the mastermind of the 1980 Constitution that to this day governs all Chileans. Furthermore, as the founding father of the main political party of the dictatorship, the Independent Democratic Union (UDI), Guzmán has become a hated icon by a large sector of the population that rejects the legacies of the dictatorship. Several Guzmán and pro-regime monuments were attacked in

this context, while others were threatened. For instance, the emblematic Pinochet restaurant Lili Marleen, in the district of Ñuñoa, Santiago, had to close its doors in November 2019 due to threats of burning and destruction. The site was a museum-like restaurant honouring Pinochet through pictures, emblems, decorative objects, and a small-scale model of Pinochet's funeral (ADN, 2015; Herrera, 2015; Ricucci, 2011). In a statement on its Facebook web page, its owner lamented that the violence had become unsustainable. They denounced they were forced to close due to the unprecedented threats (Lili Marleen Administration, 2019). Thus, the social movement not only claimed to take to the streets but also to appropriate (and destroy) the monuments representing "dissonant" and uncomfortable heritage (Tunbridge & Ashworth, 1996) linked to colonialism and the dictatorship.

A similar situation was observed in the United States following the murder of a Black man, George Floyd, by a police officer, in late May 2020. The brutal killing became an icon of a long-standing fight against racism and oppression of the Afro-descendant community in the United States. In this context, several statues associated with the "Lost Cause" of the Confederates, the maintenance or defence of slavery, or the oppression against indigenous peoples – such as Robert E. Lee, Jefferson Davis or Christopher Columbus monuments – were destroyed or thrown into rivers. Usually, certain groups concerted and encouraged these actions, such as the "Take 'Em Down" movement. However, in many other cases, the monuments were toppled in spontaneous actions arising from the need for direct democracy on the part of mobs tired of demanding dignity and justice from indifferent authorities (Block, 2020)<sup>16</sup>.

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<sup>16</sup> Interviewing Carol Anderson.

However, the movement against monuments and statues symbolising oppression dates back much earlier. In March 2015, students at the University of Cape Town in South Africa mobilised demanding the removal of the statue of Cecil J. Rhodes, a British 19<sup>th</sup> century politician and mining businessman. For them, the monument glorified a past marked by slavery and exploitation perpetrated by British colonialism (Chaudhuri, 2016). In 2020, inspired by the “Rhodes must fall” movement initiated in South Africa, a massive concentration of people in High Street, Oxford, demanded the removal of the Rhodes statue from Oriel College’s main façade. Although today the statue is contextualised with a plaque that speaks of its origin and the role of Rhodes in British colonialism, the controversy regarding what to do and how to interpret this “difficult heritage” continues to rage (BBC, 2022; Clayton, 2021; Gershon, 2021, 2021; Macdonald, 2009; Oriel College Oxford, 2020).

Demonstrations against monuments and statues have had a significant international impact not only because they are massive but also because of their meaning. Monuments and commemorative names matter greatly as they represent *how* and *what* society understands and values at a given moment (Von Tunzelmann, 2021). In this sense, monuments can be offensive, but this offensiveness is barely visible; it uses no words. For instance, Confederate statues are an offence to the Afro-descendant community. However, nothing in these statues explicitly says something against them, or something like “the Confederate side is the most glorious of all”, but the offence is still there, embodied and symbolised in the object itself. These monuments have always been an offence and were planned to remain as such (Williams, 2020). As the American Historical Association has put it, these statues emerged

long after the end of the Civil War, especially in the first two decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Their objective was to implicitly reaffirm white supremacy in a new context where they were no longer “owners” of Black people (American Historical Association, 2017).

In this sense, pro-regime memory sites matter because their meaning is not so easily changed. Pro-regime memorials’ meaning is firmly affixed to them. In Chile, for instance, it is hard to think that their identity as monuments praising the 11<sup>th</sup> of September coup, or General Pinochet, could be right-away transformed. Pro-regime memory sites are usually that: *Pro-regime*. Indeed, their association with the regime is so strong that victims and human rights activists see their survival as the survival of pro-regime memory and legacies. Alicia Lira, leader of the Association of Relatives of Executed Prisoners (AFEP), asserts that the survival of pro-regime memorialisation in the Military exemplifies that they “have not changed” regarding their positive memory of the regime (El Mostrador, 2020a).

Likewise, victims also feel that eliminating pro-regime memory sites would mean eliminating or weakening pro-regime memory. As mentioned by Luis Mariano Rendón, a human rights lawyer and activist who has fought against pro-regime symbols since 2012, the elimination of José Toribio Merino’s statue at the entrance of the National Maritime Museum would at last transform the Navy into an institution of “all Chileans”, where there is no space for salvational memory and the glorification of perpetrators (Ciudadanos por la Memoria, 2019).

It should be noted that this understanding of pro-regime memory sites as having a “fixed” pro-regime meaning in the eyes of victims contrasts with a dominant understanding in memory studies which regards memorials’ meaning as constantly changing depending on the historical and social context. This tradition of thought, which sees memory sites as “fluid”, began with Halbwachs (1950 [1980]) and Nora (1989, p. 20). Nora (1989, p. 20), for instance, argued that memory sites – or as he called them, *lieux de memoire* – are “*mise en abime*”, that is, they possess a changeable character and thus have the potential to experience different meanings and uses to the ones initially planned (Nora, 1989, p. 24). Halbwachs (1950 [1980], p. 131) said that although objects offer a sense of “stability” to the social milieu or group, space will also change whenever the group changes. In other words, changes in the social context immediately produce changes in memory sites. Likewise, drawing on victims’ memorialisation, Hite (2012, p. 41, emphasis added) has stated that the meanings and identities of memory sites are not stable but change depending on different groups and historical situations: “All monuments are open to interpretation, and their *meanings change* in relation to changing political moments and societal appropriations.”

Following Olick (2007, p. 56), I contend that when studying pro-regime memorialisation, scholars should problematise this ‘unstable meaning’ paradigm of memory sites. In some cases – such as pro-regime memorials – meanings might not change that easily and quickly. Schwartz (2010, p. 622) was one of the first sociologists to argue in this direction saying that “what is known about the past limits what can be done with it interpretively.” Likewise, Robbins and Olick (1998, p. 128) have said that memorial processes involve “malleability” but also “persistence.” In this same line, Mizstal (2003) has proposed the “dynamics of

memory” approach, which focuses on how the present influences cultural memory meanings, and how the past, as well, shapes and determines understandings of, for instance, memory sites. Overall, these scholars share the argument that memory sites’ meanings are not as mouldable as usually assumed.

In this line, this thesis argues that, *in the eyes of victims*, pro-regime memory sites’ meanings remain strongly associated with a glorification of the regime and its actors. Hence, pro-regime memory sites are crucial to our understanding of social reality as they question the idea that meanings (at least in memory sites) always change. People ascribe particular «essential» meanings that may be passed down from generation to generation. As noted in the case of Confederate monuments, their elimination has been supported because, for victims of discrimination, they exert a “suffocating weight. The outrage that many feel about having to share the streets with such hulking ghosts of oppression is deep and *crushingly real*” (Grovier, 2020, emphasis added). In Chile, too, victims see pro-regime sites as “crushingly real” in celebrating the regime. Likewise, regime supporters also see them as “crushingly real” in terms of their usefulness for enhancing their pro-regime memory.

Yet, the thesis does not advocate for an essentialist view of memory sites and does not perceive their meaning as static. I follow Harrison (2013, p. 197) in that “heritage values are ascribed rather than intrinsic”, and Young (1993, p. 3), in that “once created, memorials take on lives on their own.” The present and its constant changes certainly shape memory sites’ meanings. This ‘presentist’ approach to memory has produced the most extensive and profound research on victims’ memory sites. However, memory sites’ meanings are not

only affected by the present but are also “haunted” by the past (Till, 2005), which implies that their meaning does not mutate that quickly (Assmann, 2008, p. 113). This is because they possess an “aura” (Benjamin, 2008 [1935]) that links them inextricably to, in this case, the pro-regime context, the pro-regime people, and the pro-regime motivations under which they were created (McNabb, 2022).

In sum, memory sites matter today because we can use them as “windows” to explore “the larger forces” acting in society (Burawoy, 1998; Small, 2009, p. 20). They also reflect and affect transitional justice contexts and condition how societies and victims work through their trauma. As such, they are scenarios in which societies debate and decide the public narratives of the past. Indeed, they are currently becoming crucial platforms for ‘contentious coexistence’ and democratic debate (Payne, 2008). As argued by Mitter (2020) regarding Confederate monuments, they have become “a powerful and fertile hybrid civic space.” This debate occurs because of the power memory sites have in projecting a fixed meaning that cannot straightforwardly be modified, thus provoking strong tensions and discussions on what to do with them.

## **Outline of the Thesis**

In a nutshell, the primary goal of this thesis is to uncover the combinations of conditions that explain the survival of pro-regime memorialisation in democratic Chile. In the process, it also shows the combinations of conditions for the elimination of these sites. To this end, the thesis is divided into seven chapters following a progression from the theoretical to the empirical.

This first part of the thesis – Chapter One – has introduced the research aim and question, the puzzle, a justification of Chile as the main context to study pro-regime memorialisation, and has explained why memory sites matter today. It has also provided the conceptual tools for understanding the cultural memory field (e.g., memorialisation and transitional justice, the sociology of memory, memory sites, and the afterlife of dictatorial heritage). Moreover, it has exposed the existence of several ‘gaps’ in the literature regarding pro-regime memorialisation, namely, the absence of a focus on pro-regime memory and memorialisation, the lack of a framework with which to study its survival and elimination, and the need for a more comparative strategy when analysing memory sites (thus, this thesis offers an approach based on Qualitative Comparative Analysis).

The second chapter is named “The Struggle for Memorialisation.” It shows the different memory camps in Chile and focuses on the two main ones: The memory camp belonging to victims of human rights violations, and the memory camp belonging to the ‘other’ side, that is, to those who are on the opposite side and tend to be more associated with a pro-regime or salvational memory. Then, the chapter delves into the historical development of Chile between 1973 and 2020. It divides this period into two extensive durations: The first goes from 1973 to 2004 and is the most favourable period for pro-regime memory. Thus, it has been called the “Favourable Period” for regime supporters. Within this period, democracy spans between 1990 and 2004. The next period has been termed the “Unfavourable Period” for regime supporters and runs from 2005 to 2020. During this context, the conditions become highly adverse for those who have a salvational memory. The most challenging period for this memory, however, begins in 2013, and the reasons for this will be explained

in the chapter. This historical background intertwines political and social aspects, and discusses situations and events related to the memorials developed over time. After exposing the historical background, the chapter offers a descriptive analysis of the frequency of inaugurations, denunciations, and eliminations of pro-regime memorials, and how these events are reflected in the two periods (favourable and unfavourable for regime supporters). The main finding of this section is that most of the pro-regime memorials were inaugurated in the “Favourable Period” (1973 – 2004), while observing a greater frequency of denunciations and eliminations in the “Unfavourable Period” (2005 – 2020). These findings justify and support the notion that regime supporters have two critical periods: Favourable (1973 – 2004) and unfavourable (2005 – 2020). The chapter’s last section offers a historical overview of the main legislative initiatives presented in the Chilean Congress to eliminate pro-regime memorials. The impossibility of passing anti-regime legislation is symptomatic of the state’s ambivalence in dealing with and regulating pro-regime commemoration. Finally, the chapter also analyses and describes the main discourses justifying the survival of pro-regime memorialisation: *sanitising, splitting, Authorised Heritage Discourse (AHD), division and legalist discourses.*

Chapter Three – “Theoretical Framework for The Survival (and Elimination) of Pro-regime Memorials” – lays the theoretical foundations for understanding the survival and elimination of pro-regime memory sites. It first describes the factors that are relevant to explain the survival of pro-regime memorialisation: “Protective Location”, “Silence”, “Local and/or Institutional Support”, and “Walls.” It then exposes the factors that play a crucial role in the

elimination of pro-regime memorials: “Unprotective Location”, “Social Noise”, “Local and/or Institutional Rejection”, and “Window of Opportunity.”

Chapter Four – “Data and Methods” – describes the methodological approach to uncover the combinations of conditions for the survival and elimination of pro-regime memory sites. This approach is based on an intensive data collection strategy to identify the sample and the explanatory factors. The chapter also explains the use of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to uncover the combinations of conditions that explain the survival and elimination of pro-regime memorials in democratic Chile.

Chapter Five – “Explaining the Survival of Pro-regime Memorialisation” – uncovers the combinations of conditions to explain the survival of pro-regime memorialisation in democratic Chile using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). The chapter uses fsQCA software and corroborates the results using the QCA package in R. The findings show two main paths for the survival of pro-regime memorialisation: The “Wall” path and the “Support” path. The survival recipe indicates the continued relevance of veto players in maintaining regime legacies despite 30 years of democracy. It also shows the continued upholding of an implicit positive nostalgia towards the regime in state institutions, particularly in the Armed Forces. Secondly, these findings show that the defence of pro-regime memorialisation in local communities does not necessarily mean a pro-regime sentiment. The accusations of being pro-dictatorship, fascist, or ignorant may alienate these communities and distance them from building a human rights culture.

Chapter Six of this thesis – “Explaining the Elimination of Pro-regime Memorialisation” – is the next QCA chapter dealing now with the elimination outcome. The chapter also uses fsQCA software and corroborates the results with R. It uncovers the presence of two main paths: The “Rejection” path and the “Social Noise” path. The first path shows the power that local communities have, when organised, to pressure their municipalities (city councils) to eliminate pro-regime symbols. The second path shows the power of “Social Noise”, that is, the intervention of victims and human rights activists in creating “noise” against the site, which eventually leads to more pressure on the authorities. However, this “noise” must combine with a “Window of Opportunity.” Both elements (“Social Noise” and “Window of Opportunity”) provide a potent recipe for the elimination of pro-regime sites.

These elimination paths strengthen the claims regarding the survival paths. If the elimination of pro-regime memorialisation is in the hands of the community (“Rejection” path), it is not unreasonable to think that they would also have the power to assure their survival (“Support” path). Likewise, the fact that “Social Noise” is not enough to cause elimination but needs to combine with a “Window of Opportunity” (“Social Noise” path) speaks to the power veto players (“Wall” path) have in guaranteeing the survival of pro-regime memorialisation. Thus, the results obtained in this chapter regarding elimination corroborate the relevance of the pathways uncovered in the previous chapter concerning survival. Both chapters resemble each other and contribute to the thesis’s internal validity.

The conclusion (Chapter Seven) summarises the thesis’s main objectives, findings, and contributions, and reflects on its limitations. It offers a section for ‘final thoughts’ regarding

pro-regime memorialisation, which illuminates further inquiries and research topics. The chapter also shows how the paths could be applied to Spain, a country that has also dealt with pro-Francoist memorial sites in the past twenty years. This section strengthens the thesis's external validity by demonstrating that the paths uncovered in Chile help understand external independent cases (e.g., in Spain). Finally, the chapter presents valuable lessons that could be applied in policymaking. The final aim of these guidelines (and of the thesis) is to promote memory sites as instruments for democratic dialogue, debate, and respect for human rights.

## CHAPTER 2: THE STRUGGLE FOR MEMORIALISATION<sup>17</sup>

### Introduction

This chapter begins with a discussion of the main memory camps in Chile. It draws mainly from Stern's research (2006, 2010) regarding the different narratives about Chile's recent past (1973 – 1990): *memory as rupture*, *memory as persecution*, *memory as a closed box*, and *salvational memory*. Because this thesis focuses on pro-regime memorialisation, it mainly centres on salvational memory. This section also describes the group that would most likely hold this type of memory and who would most likely be behind the inauguration of pro-regime memorials, the *Pinochetistas*.

The following section – Two Broad Memory Camps – argues that Chile's memory field contains two main memories: Victims' memory and pro-regime memory. Victims' memory camp is linked to the human rights discourse, while the 'other' memory camp has a (relatively) positive view of the regime. Of course, there is immense heterogeneity within both 'camps.' In the case of the pro-regime memory camp, memories range from outright admiration of Pinochet and civil collaborators, such as Jaime Guzmán, to people who feel closer to this camp because they support the neoliberal and political reforms during the dictatorship (Bustos, 2021).

Despite the heterogeneity, the distinction between two broad camps – victims and pro-regime – is analytically valuable as it simplifies Chile's 'memory picture.' It allows us to realise that

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<sup>17</sup> The title of this chapter was suggested by Professor Leigh A. Payne (2022).

not all memorials in Chile regarding the recent past belong to victims; there is also another 'side' positively praising the regime.

Apart from discussing salvational memory and showing the presence of two broad memory camps in Chile, this chapter's main objective is to provide a general background to Chile's recent history (1973 – 2020). It shows that there have been two "memory cycles" regarding the public valorisation of the regime in Chile (Atencio, 2014). A 'memory cycle' is a period characterised by a particular political and social *ethos* or disposition towards the past (Capdepón, 2020, p. 103). Visualising these two cycles or periods is helpful to understand better how pro-regime memorialisation has behaved depending on the historical context. The first period spans from 1973 until 2004 and is titled the "Favourable Period" for regime supporters. Here is when Pinochet and his admirers enjoyed the highest degree of legitimacy, political power, and valorisation.

2004, however, marks a turning point. The disclosure of the Riggs Bank scandal severely affected Pinochet's reputation. Thus, 2005 started another period marked by Pinochet's discrediting and the increasing illegitimacy of salvational memory. This "Unfavourable Period" spans between 2005 and 2020. The period is divided into two sub-periods: 2005 – 2012, and 2013 – 2020. This subdivision highlights the more challenging conditions for regime supporters in terms of legitimacy and public acceptance since 2013. This year is marked by the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the military coup and the elimination of the street name Avenida 11 de Septiembre in Providencia, one of the most iconic pro-regime streets in Santiago (see Appendix, picture #4, p. 452).

After reviewing the historical background, the chapter's 'descriptive analysis' section performs descriptive statistics operations to show the main trends and patterns of pro-regime memorialisation in democratic Chile. It focuses on the timing of inauguration, denunciation, elimination, and the timing of undeveloped pro-regime memory sites. The findings draw on an original dataset containing 36 publicly known pro-regime memory sites (N= 36, see Appendix, pp. 444–445). This section shows that most pro-regime memorials were inaugurated during the “Favourable Period” for regime supporters (1973 – 2004), which is consistent with theory and literature. Furthermore, it shows that denunciations and eliminations intensified during the “critical years” period, between 2013 and 2020. These findings support the accuracy of the time frame developed earlier in the chapter (favourable and unfavourable).

The chapter then discusses the different legislation attempts against pro-regime memorialisation since 2010, showing how pro-regime memorialisation has become increasingly illegitimate over time. However, regime supporters can still say their memorialisation is ‘legal’ as no prohibiting legislation has yet been passed. This chapter also describes the discourses justifying the survival of pro-regime memorialisation, which allows us to better understand why pro-regime memory sites survive in democratic Chile.

## **Memory Camps in Chile**

Historian Steve Stern (2006) has proposed that the Chilean cultural landscape is characterised by the existence of a “memory box” in which four “emblematic memories”

coexist. An emblematic memory is a collective discursive framework – an idea that he borrows from Halbwachs (1980 [1950]) and Jelin (2003, 2007) – that circulates widely and with which individuals articulate and give meaning to the recent past (Stern, 2006, p. 28). The memory box is a helpful analogy that makes us think of memories as contained in a box, each “struggling” to gain prominence and adherents.

Stern (2006) identified four emblematic memories: *memory as rupture, memory as persecution, memory as a closed box, and salvational memory*. The first two relate to people directly or indirectly affected by the dictatorship and who vehemently reject Pinochet (pp. 40–87). These memory camps oppose the dictatorship’s legacies and align with the human rights struggle. Stern (2006, pp. 89–103) also recognised a curious phenomenon: Memory as a closed box, expressed in people who consciously do not want to remember and who have “closed” the memory box to avoid controversies. Several scholars have noted that the common slogan “let’s focus on the future; let’s leave the past behind” works as an example of self-imposed cultural silence, just like a “memory as a closed box” (see Jelin, 2003, pp. 17–19; Payne & Bilbija, 2011, p. 36)<sup>18</sup>.

### **Salvational Memory and *Pinochetismo***

Within the “memory box”, Stern (2006, pp. 7–38) also identified *salvational memory*, a framework that sees the Military as heroes who “saved” the country from communism and economic chaos. Members of this framework would call Pinochet ‘President’ instead of dictator, and would see the takeover on 11 September 1973 as a ‘military pronouncement’

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<sup>18</sup> Hugo Rojas (2017, 2022) has also studied the memory as a closed box, naming it “indifferent memory.”

rather than a coup. Fundamentally, they praise the imposition of a military regime in 1973 which overthrew Allende's socialist project (Stern et al., 2016, p. 262). For them, Allende and the Unidad Popular (1970 – 1973) symbolise a period of trauma and suffering. They feel “suffering is not the patrimony of only a part of Chileans” (FPAP, 2019), but believe that other sectors of society – besides victims of human rights violations during the dictatorship – also underwent great difficulties under Allende (e.g., landowners, business people, high social class groups, right-wing activists). They also celebrate the neoliberal economic system implemented by Pinochet in the 1970s (and which was perpetuated in democracy) (Gillis, 2015, p. 6). Regarding human rights violations, they “share, at least publicly, respect for human rights and condemn individual “bad apples” who committed crimes and tarnished the regime. They even appropriate the language of human rights” (Payne, 2008, p. 34).

Salvational memory runs across various actors, such as “passive and active, military and civilian, formal members of the dictatorial state, and non-state actors” (Payne, 2008, p. 33). A group that would usually possess and perform salvational memory is the *Pinochetistas*, who have a solid positive attachment to Pinochet's figure or the regime. Since the 1990s, several pro-regime memory sites were created and maintained by individuals closely identified with *Pinochetismo* (for instance, the Augusto Pinochet Monument and Square in Linares or the Augusto Pinochet Plaque at Walmart). Thus, the characteristics of this group should be explored in detail.

*Pinochetistas* originate from the unique political, cultural and economic features of General Augusto Pinochet's dictatorship and constitute a significant and influential mnemonic

community in democratic Chile (Angell, 2007, p. 5; Huneeus & Ibarra, 2013b, pp. 199–201). According to Stern (2006), *Pinochetistas*’ “heroic memory” (Payne, 2008) has a particular historical “root” that should be located in the pre-coup context. Latin America in the 60s, 70s, and 80s was riddled by what scholars have named the period of military dictatorships (Crenzel, 2011; Dinges, 2004; Lessa, 2013; Stern, 2006; Winn, 2016). In the context of the Cold War and the influence of the United States, countries such as Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile went through military regimes that promised ‘salvation’ against the internal enemy, communism. In Chile, a military coup took place on 11 September 1973, after which General Augusto Pinochet installed a dictatorship that lasted until 1990.

Pinochet’s strong approval throughout the dictatorship and well into democracy was based on the idea that the Armed Forces ‘saved’ the country from a Marxist-Leninist tyranny. People who were traumatised by the experience of the left-wing Popular Unity and socialist president Salvador Allende (1970 – 1973) celebrated the military coup and the establishment of a military “*dicta-dura*” (hard rule government)<sup>19</sup>.

As noted by Angell (2007), Huneeus & Ibarra (2013b, 2013a) and Amorós (2019), General Pinochet managed to create a government whose ideals would remain sustainable and attractive to a large section of the population. Indeed, despite losing the plebiscite of 1988 to determine the continuity of his presidency, he maintained popularity amongst Chileans — winning over 44% of the plebiscite vote (Angell, 2007, p. 4).

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<sup>19</sup> The situations that most impacted them were the long queues to get food, food rationing and shortages, and the takeover of agricultural land and production companies.

After 1990, Pinochet's support was mainly constituted by *Unión Demócrata Independiente* (UDI) and *Renovación Nacional* (RN), two powerful right-wing parties born under the dictatorship and favourable (yet with specific differences) to the management of the military government (Huneus, 2014, p. 280). Indeed, polls indicate that the crucial element *Pinochetistas* have in common is political affiliation: *Pinochetistas* are more likely to be found in Chilean right-wing parties such as RN or UDI (Huneus, 2014, p. 281; Hite et al., 2013, p. 8; Bustos, 2021, p. 73).

By the end of the 90s, the UDI party was close to reaching the presidency. In 1999, UDI presidential candidate and Pinochet admirer, Joaquín Lavín, was only 187,000 votes away from the *Concertación* (centre-left coalition) candidate, socialist Ricardo Lagos. Thus, the *Pinochetista* right continued, even after 1990, to have a strong presence in society and politics, particularly right-wing politics (Angell, 2007, p. 5; Pollack, 1999). A recent example of the incidence of *Pinochetismo* in the right-wing occurred in December 2018, when RN Deputy Camila Flores publicly announced: “You know me, I am a *Pinochetista*, and I say it without problems, I am grateful to the military government, and I will always say it [...]. I am a brave woman, and I expect that same courage from you” (The Clinic, 2018).

Pinochet's ideals of nationalism, neoliberalism, privatisation, security, stability, and fighting against subversion have remained, up to now, firmly attached to the right-wing sectors that support him. Beyond UDI and RN, these include the business people, the media (especially El Mercurio), the Opus Dei (an ultra-conservative branch of the Catholic church), landowners, sectors of the Armed Forces, former military officers, and even low-income

sectors of society (Angell, 2007, p. 5; M. J. Lazzara, 2018, p. xiv; Monckeberg, 2003; Thumala, 2005). Hard-line and soft-line *Pinochetistas* are likely to be found amongst these groups (Huneus & Ibarra, 2013b, p. 223). They have a favourable or *very* favourable opinion of Pinochet and his regime, and express a profound desire for order and stability (Bustos, 2021; Huneus & Ibarra, 2013b, p. 216). Indeed, it is common to hear from regime supporters that they yearn for the ‘old days’ of economic growth, peace, tranquillity, and low crime levels. A participant in the 11 September commemorations at the Pinochet Square in Linares (2014) noted that “we are already preparing ourselves, and they [communists] are forcing us, once again, to take forceful measures against an ineffective government.” This person was complaining about the ‘ineptitude’ of the government in tackling current waves of violence and uncertainty (Canal 5 Linares, 2014).

Although *Pinochetismo* remained constant throughout the 1990s, it suffered a pronounced decline in the early 2000s: While in 2004, *Pinochetistas* accounted for 13% of Chileans, in 2005, they only accounted for 10% (Huneus, 2014, p. 280). This decline occurred right after the Riggs Bank case of corruption charges against Pinochet. In 2011, support dropped to 5% (Huneus & Ibarra, 2013b, p. 225). By 2013, only 4% of Chileans could be considered *Pinochetistas*. On the contrary, nowadays, the “majority type within Chileans” is a hard-line anti-*Pinochetista*, people who strongly reject Pinochet and his regime (Huneus & Ibarra, 2013b, p. 223).

Indeed, today, *Pinochetistas* bear what Goffman would call the mark of “stigma”, which is “the situation of the individual who is disqualified from full social acceptance” (Goffman,

1986 [1963], p. 1). Individuals with stigma are regarded as having a particular physical, moral or mental “attribute that is deeply discrediting” (p. 3). This situates them in a subordinate “moral status” as compared to “normals” (p. 1). In Chile, individuals who identify with the regime or its aspects know their salvational memory is highly discredited and banned from the public sphere. However, after several recent events – the Social Outbreak in Chile (2019), the *Rechazo* movement against the drafting of a new constitution (2020 – 2022), and the presidential campaign of conservative right-wing José Antonio Kast (2021) – there has been a reappropriation of that stigma in which pro-regime sentiment is proudly displayed (C. Collins, personal communication, 27 September 2021; Thesis fieldwork notes #19, 2020). Yet, the tension between the demand to gain public recognition and the need to remain low-profile to survive the stigma is still there.

Consequently, *Pinochetismo* and pro-regime memories capitalise on a feeling of being silenced and marginal (Levi & Rothberg, 2018). Going further, Navia (2018) states that “politicians who identify with Pinochet and his legacy are *marginal* voices that do not represent the right in Chile today” (emphasis added). However, there is evidence that Pinochet and his regime, and its positive memory, are still a ‘guilty pleasure’ for large sectors of the right-wing spectrum. As a right-wing Deputy confessed in 2014, “it is one thing to say it publicly, and another thing is to remain silent and still be a *Pinochetista*, and there is a lot of silence” (Gallo, 2014). In this sense, perhaps, it would be more appropriate to say that what remains marginal – because of social condemnation and stigma – is the public applause for the regime. However, private nostalgia is still widespread.

Thus, in the current context, groups possessing ‘salvational memory’ constantly undergo a tension between victory and defeat (Levi & Rothberg, 2018, p. 357). They feel they are on the right side of history and that their fight will succeed, but they also feel they have been silenced and marginalised by society. For them, this is not like the struggle experienced in the 1970s and 1980s, but a “psychological war” which is being “waged in the scenario of memory” (Salvi, 2011, p. 57).

## **Two Broad Memory Camps**

Having described the four memory camps indicated by Stern (2006)<sup>20</sup>, and having analysed salvational memory and *Pinochetismo*, it should now be noted that several authors have stated that it is possible to divide the memory spectrum into two broad memory camps (Angell, 2007, p. 5; Huneus, 2014, p. 243; Huneus & Ibarra, 2013b, 2013a; Stern, 2010, p. 109). One of these memory camps favours victims and human rights, whilst the other one is less inclined towards these issues and feels more affinity to pro-regime sentiments (although they are not necessarily outright pro-regime). For Angell (2007, p. 4), the “dichotomy” in how the coup and the regime were experienced and seen – for some as a positive event, for others negative – “created a division which *split Chilean society* almost into two halves. The way the military regime ended helped to sustain that division” (emphasis added). We observe a similar situation in Peru’s armed conflict period (1980 – 2000). Milton (2018, p. 16) asserts that the country exhibits two main memory camps: On the one hand, victims’ and human rights memories, and on the other, the Armed Forces’ memories. However, these two

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<sup>20</sup> *Memory as rupture, memory as persecution, memory as a closed box, and salvational memory* (Stern, 2006).

memory camps are “not homogeneous” as they may be composed of different identities, narratives and sensibilities (p. 18).

The presence of two memory camps in Chile is consistent with a prevalent feeling of division in the country. For instance, in September 2018, Criteria survey stated that “a majority of citizens (77%) think that the political and social divisions of that time [the plebiscite in 1988] have increased or remain the same” (El Mostrador, 2018). That is, most people in Chile feel that the country is still divided into the “Yes” (which supported Pinochet with 44%) and the “No” (which supported the return of democracy with 55%). These two sides represent two different (but broad) memory camps. On 8 August 2018, a centre-left Deputy in the Chamber of Deputies delivered a speech asking the President to order the Minister of Culture, Arts and Heritage to eliminate the José Toribio Merino statue. In his speech, and pointing out at this division, the Deputy anticipated that a well-known far-right Deputy would most likely reject the draft agreement to remove the Merino statue. For him, this far-right Deputy represented the ‘other’ side of Chile: “It seems that we *represent different peoples* with Deputy Urrutia who will most likely speak against this project” (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional, 2018).

Accordingly, this thesis divides the memory camps into two major memories —victims’ memories and pro-regime memories. Yet, the thesis is aware of the existence of other memory camps (for instance, ‘indifferent memory’, see Hugo Rojas, 2017). Furthermore, there is certainly a vast heterogeneity within each narrative about the past (Olick, 2007, p. 95; Conway, 2010, p. 444).

The distinction between two broad memory camps is helpful to begin to understand the phenomenon of pro-regime memorialisation. Accordingly, we should distinguish the “dominant memory” from the “hegemonic memory” (Aguilar, 2019 [2008]). For Aguilar, the dominant memory controls the public and official political discourse, while the hegemonic memory is the memory held within the population (p. 24). For instance, during Franco’s dictatorship in Spain (1939 – 1975), the dominant memory was a salvational narrative that justified the massacre of republicans and celebrated his government’s restorative Catholic and nationalistic mission (p. 33). The generations who grew up during Franco’s dictatorship were “socialised” in this dominant memory and were forced to believe that Franco’s dictatorship was the only solution to the “extreme violence” of republicans (Aguilar & Ramírez-Barat, 2019, pp. 219–220). This memory framework governed the public sphere during the dictatorship (1939 – 1975). Other memories – republican families and people persecuted during the civil war and the dictatorship – existed but were largely suppressed from the public arena (Aguilar, 2019 [2008], p. 24). They could have been hegemonic but not dominant as it was the Francoist memory which controlled the public agenda.

In Chile’s case, salvational memory that praised the regime was dominant (and probably hegemonic) during the dictatorship (1973 – 1990). However, after the transition to democracy (1990), the balance shifted, and victims’ memory of the traumatic past became dominant *and* hegemonic. This tendency was reinforced after Pinochet’s scandal in 2004 (Stern & Winn, 2016, p. 263).

The thesis argues that analysing only victims' memory – that is, the dominant and hegemonic memory today – will prevent us from understanding transitional justice's complex development in Chile and its "fragmented" memorial landscape (Aguilera, 2015, p. 102). As noted by Scott (1990, p. 4), "any analysis based exclusively on the public transcript [the dominant memory] is likely to conclude that subordinate groups endorse the terms of their subordination and are willing, even enthusiastic, partners in that subordination." In other words, if we focus exclusively on victims' memorialisation, we will conclude that the 'memory battle' has been won by victims and that the only discourse participating in public space is victims' narratives. However, in Chile, regime supporters do not "endorse" the dominant discourse but instead use their pro-regime sites to establish their viewpoints. As argued by Scott (1990, p. 13), "eventually, we will want to know how the hidden transcripts of various actors are formed, [and] the conditions under which they do or do not find public expression." This implies that we focus on the underground phenomenon of pro-regime memorialisation and try to understand how it survives. This thesis, then, aims to uncover the combinations of conditions that enable the survival of pro-regime memory sites. The thesis seeks to find how the "hidden transcript" of pro-regime memory survives in a context in which it is neither the dominant nor hegemonic memory, but rather, using Foucault's (1977) term, it is a "counter-memory", a narrative that contests prevailing and powerful discourses.

## **Historical Background**

### *Favourable Period for Regime Supporters (1973 – 2004)*

The most favourable context for regime supporters and Pinochet spans from the military coup on 11 September 1973 until 2004, the moment in which Pinochet became highly

discredited after the Riggs Bank corruption scandal. During this period (1973 – 2004), regime supporters and Pinochet enjoyed high political power and social legitimacy. Much historical academic research has focused on the dictatorship period (1973 – 1990). Thus, this thesis is not reproducing the same knowledge in detail but provides a summary to orient the reader to Chile's recent history.

On 11 September 1973, the three branches of the Armed Forces and the Police (hereafter *Carabineros*), headed by Captain-General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, carried out a military coup to depose Salvador Allende's Socialist government (1970 – 1973). The most dramatic symbolism of the end of democracy was the siege of the Presidential Palace, La Moneda. The images of Dutch photographer Chas Gerretsen depicting the detention of Allende's supporters outside La Moneda prefigure the massive political persecution that unfolded immediately. In the following months after the coup, repression was particularly harsh and peaked again in the mid-1980s (Cárdenas, 2010, p. 30). Thousands of left-wing suspects were detained, tortured and disappeared in special concentration camps, and thousands, too, were exiled.

In this context of repression and social control, the symbolic sphere of monuments, commemorations, and street names also proved crucial to Pinochet's consolidation of power. Since the beginning of the dictatorship – and just like his predecessor Franco in Spain – Pinochet sought to set forth a “mnemonic offensive” (Wildeboer & Dujisin, 2022) to take over public space with militaristic and nationalistic symbols. Errázuriz and Leiva (2012) recount how, after the coup *d'état* of 11 September 1973, the Pinochet regime attempted to

radically transform public and private space. The Junta believed that the “cleaning” of the landscape would brainwash citizens and would force them to abandon the temptation of political involvement (p. 11). This was also aligned with the National Security Doctrine which, in a medical language, stated that the enemy – the communist ideology – was a bacteria or germ located inside the national body, infecting it and spreading uncontrollably, and thus requiring a fast and precise surgical action (p. 24). Thus, immediately after ousting Allende, the Military Junta ordered the renaming of several streets and schools, the “cleaning” of walls (the colourful and muralist propaganda of the Popular Unity was removed), the repainting of houses (in white), and men were required to wear short hair in military style (p. 24).

Indeed, between 1974 and 1982, over 54 streets throughout the country were changed to honour national military heroes (all men), or militaristic events that extolled *chilenidad* (chileanness). The new names were Bernardo O’Higgins (who fought against the Spanish crown in the Independence wars in the 1810s), Diego Portales (creator of the conservative Constitution of the 1830s), José de San Martín (Independence war hero by the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century), or the Concepción Battle (fought during the War of the Pacific by the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century) (pp. 135–136). Likewise, between 1977 and 1982, over 52 schools received a new name following nationalistic values. Not all former names of streets and schools were linked to the Popular Unity or the left. Still, some were connected to the communist or socialist parties and were targeted immediately. This is the case of Carlos Cortés Díaz Street (Minister of Housing and Urban planning during the UP who possessed a street in Linares, changed in 1977 to “Villa Oriente”); Marmaduque Grove Street (socialist

militant and military officer who participated in the Socialist Republic of the 1930s. His street in Caldera changed in 1978 to “Corneta Cabrales”); or the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia School 122 (a school in the San Miguel district which changed in 1977 to “Diego Portales Palazuelos School”) (pp. 135–138).

According to Joignant (2007, p. 53/42), by the late 1970s, Pinochet reinforced his “heroisation” and the commemoration of the 11<sup>th</sup> of September as a founding date for the new Chile. In a public ceremony in 1979, the Junta inaugurated the *Altar de la Patria* (Altar of the Fatherland), a grand monument in front of La Moneda Palace in the *Plaza de la Ciudadanía* (Citizenship Square). The monument protected a Flame representing Chile’s liberty and the “sacrifices” of the Military in saving the nation (p. 45). The Flame was inaugurated in 1975 at the site, but after being taken away, it was re-inaugurated in the *Altar de la Patria* in 1982 (Errázuriz & Leiva, 2012, pp. 113–116). In the inauguration speech in 1975, Pinochet made a call to young people to be vigilant and willing to keep salvational memory alive, to protect “freedom”, and fight communism: “Freedom is not a gift. It must be conquered day after day because its enemies work at all hours to destroy it or devalue it in our consciences” (DCHPress, 2009). By referring to “consciousness”, Pinochet was implying that the battle against the communist ideology was not only a physical and repressive endeavour, but also a cultural one. This is why the field of culture, symbols and monuments soon became a relevant aspect of the regime’s societal power and control (Errázuriz & Leiva, 2012, pp. 7–8).

By this time, Pinochet made sure the foundational myth of the 11<sup>th</sup> of September became associated with Chile's "second independence", and with him as the ultimate saviour of the country (Huneus & Ibarra, 2013b, p. 201; Joignant, 2007, p. 54)<sup>21</sup>. After the bombing, the La Moneda presidential palace was rendered unusable. Pinochet then decided to house the government in a building in downtown Santiago called the Gabriela Mistral Centre, which had been built in 1971 to host the Third United Nations World Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD III) (Bianchini, 2014, p. 12). This building was renamed Diego Portales, and what was previously an enjoyable cultural space for free movement and cultural meetings, became a fully fenced and secret space where "windows [were replaced] by walls" (Errázuriz & Leiva, 2012, p. 92). In the central part of the complex, a bust of Diego Portales was inaugurated, and "1810 – 1973" was inscribed (Bianchini, 2014, p. 12). This inscription was intended to show that, if in 1810 Chile legitimately initiated a process of freeing itself from the rule of the Spanish crown, now, in 1973, it was again legitimately beginning a new cycle of liberation from Marxism.

Bianchini (2014, p. 6) shows that when Pinochet left the Diego Portales building and returned to La Moneda in 1981, the back door through which presidents informally entered the palace, the so-called "Morandé 80 door", was removed and replaced with a wall. Allende's body had been taken from there on the day of the bombing on 11 September 1973 (p. 8). Thus, Pinochet wanted to conceal this association by covering any trace of the violent coup *d'état*. However, since the beginning of democracy, this "mute memorial" door has become a powerful symbol for the left (p. 8).

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<sup>21</sup> Chile gained independence from the Spanish monarchy in a process starting in 1810.

The Junta's "refoundation project" (Bianchini 2014, p. 4; Errázuriz & Leiva, 2012, p. 14) also implied the elimination of pro-Marxist monuments. For instance, the statue of Che Guevara in the left-wing district of San Miguel, which was inaugurated a few days before Allende's election (4 September 1970), was immediately removed after the coup (Lautaro, 2013; Osorio, 2021). The *El Mercurio* newspaper of 16 September 1973 reads: "[The monument] was torn from its pedestal yesterday by a military patrol that knocked it down with a steel cable, moving it to an unknown location" (Errázuriz & Leiva, 2012, p. 24).

These drastic changes in public space were destined to represent the arrival of 'order', 'stability', and 'technocracy.' Left-wing symbols were considered "dirtiness" that needed to be cleaned (Errázuriz & Leiva, 2012, p. 14). On the contrary, everything associated with the "truly" Chilean and national was revalued. In fact, from the first moment, the Junta placed all its efforts into revaluing national heritage and ordered the "preservation of country houses", the conservation of "churches", and dedicated itself to the construction of monuments and busts to "characters of the Armed Forces and the Police" (p. 34). Thus, the dictatorship had an evident "concept of national heritage" in which "many buildings in Santiago were declared *historical monuments*" (e.g., The Museum of Fine Arts, National Library, Municipal Theatre) (Bianchini, 2014, p. 4). This nationalistic heritage policy was inspired by the "patriotic commitment to restore Chilean identity", as enshrined in the constitutive act of the Governing Junta in September 1973 (Errázuriz & Leiva, 2012, pp. 34–35).

Pinochet's Military Junta eliminated Popular Unity symbols as "a tacit acknowledgement of the[ir] symbolic power" (Harrison, 2013, p. 171). Thus, for instance, the erasure of the murals painted by the Popular Unity artist brigades – which had thick black borders and intense colours encouraging people to rebel against the bourgeoisie and see a future of hope – was meant to signify the elimination of the people's political power. After the coup, *El Mercurio* celebrated how groups of youngsters took to the streets to clean up the UP's propaganda in what the Junta called the "cleaning operation" (Errázuriz & Leiva, 2012, p. 14). Thus, in this context, the elimination of former symbols had a profound political and social meaning beyond simply replacing what previously inhabited public space. It meant a new way of understanding national identity and viewing the 'other' (the political opponent) as a polluted element whose disappearance was justified.

Civilians and the political right immediately adopted this sanitising discourse, becoming essential to the regime's permanence (Rebolledo, 2015). The coup *d'état* was widely popular among Chileans, especially among right-wing groups such as the National Party, the *Gremialistas*<sup>22</sup>, and the business sector headed by the 'Chicago Boys' (Angell, 2007, p. 5). By 1977, after applying neoliberal reforms, the Chilean economy showed signs of recovery, a situation that strengthened Pinochet's right-wing civilian support (Pollack, 1999, p. 69).

Pinochet's new Constitution in 1980 provided further legitimacy among his followers. By the late 1970s, Pinochet suspected the need of a legal framework to prevent the "loss of regime

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<sup>22</sup> Political right-wing group that emerged in the late 1960s at the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile under the leadership of Jaime Guzmán.

stability” (Pollack, 1999, p. 73). Since 1974, when he proclaimed himself President, his dictatorship was subjected to heavy accusations of human rights violations from the United Nations (Angell, 2007, p. 7). By the late 1970s, human rights advocates – such as human rights lawyers, the Catholic Church, and relatives of the disappeared – became more empowered and started pressuring the regime to admit the crimes (Stern & Winn, 2016, p. 264). The 1980 Constitution, then, was installed as a safeguard to legitimise and strengthen the dictatorship. The Constitution was approved in a fraudulent referendum with over 67% votes. The new foundational document proposed a ‘transitory’ period between 1981 and 1990 in which Pinochet would remain President, after which he would stay in power for another term until 1997. This timetable satisfied his right-wing supporters’ will to impose an authoritarian model without “democratic interference” (Pollack, 1999, p. 79). A referendum would take place in 1988, through which the plan would be secured. The referendum would present two options, the “Yes” in favour of Pinochet and his mandate until 1997, and the “No” for democratic elections in 1989 and a return to democracy in 1990. At the time of the 1980 Constitution’s approval, the “No” scenario seemed unthinkable to Pinochet and his government. He had already “won” his previous plebiscite (in 1978), and this one would certainly not be different. But it was.

In the 1980s, Pinochet’s power became increasingly challenged. By 1982, the context of global economic weakness and the country’s unhealthy financial speculation and deregulation provoked a deep financial crisis. Hundreds of companies were bankrupted and needed state intervention (Pollack, 1999, p. 83). The financial crisis created a wave of repercussions in other areas: unemployment, poverty, and political and social unrest. In May 1983, the first social

mobilisations broke out. Its achievements in drawing national and international attention forced Pinochet to show signs of “openness.” Still, the repression persisted, and despite the calls for an immediate democratic transition (Pollack, 1999, p. 85), the 1988 plebiscite remained the only available option. One of the most important political consequences of the 1982 financial crisis was that Pinochet became even more isolated while the opposition grew more robust.

After the victory of the “No” option in the 1988 plebiscite – which supported democracy – presidential elections took place in 1989. The winning candidate was centre-left Patricio Aylwin, a Christian Democrat and leader of the *Coalition of Parties for the No* (the *Concertación*). As expected, the electoral transition was not the end of the support for the dictatorship. Chile was a case of “*continuous transition*”, where regime supporters “retain[ed] substantial power [...] often dominating the political agenda” (Martins, 1986; O’Donnell, 1992; Power, 2000, p. 11). Pinochet not only received ample support in the plebiscite but, through his Constitution and its “authoritarian enclaves”, the political right and the Military maintained high quotas of power.

Although the Constitution was substantially reformed in 1989, bringing it closer to a more democratic model – for instance, article 8, which prohibited Marxist ideological parties, was eliminated – Chile returned to a somewhat ‘protected’ democracy according to Pinochet’s plans. In this sense, the ‘negotiated transition’ determined, for instance, that state officials who had worked for the dictatorship could not be removed; the National Security Council – a military organism that had veto power against the President – was also kept; the President

could not remove the commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces; the Senate would have undemocratically appointed Senators; the Amnesty Law of 1978 was left untouched; the binominal system of elections was maintained (designed in such a way to ensure the presence of the right in the legislative power); and Pinochet himself would remain as head of the Armed Forces until March 1998.

Upon taking office in 1990, Aylwin offered state apologies to the victims. He also said there would be 'justice as far as possible.' The phrase resembled Chile's 'protected' democracy: There could be some truth and reparation, but not yet *full* justice. Justice would come much later. As Collins and Hau (2016) note, Chile is a case of "incremental truth, [but] late justice."

The main reason for this "late justice" was the "Pinochet factor." The 'protected democracy' of the first years demanded extreme caution. There were reasons for that. The Rettig report was received with some scepticism by the victims (who feared a 'final point' to their demands) but, above all, with open hostility by the political right and the Military (Stern & Winn, 2016, p. 276; Angell, 2007, p. 4). In fact, after its publication, Pinochet publicly affirmed that "there is no reason to ask for forgiveness" (Cooperativa, 2018a)<sup>23</sup>. The position of Pinochet and his adherents was further sharpened when UDI Senator Jaime Guzmán was assassinated by the Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front<sup>24</sup> just one month after the publication of the report. Guzman's murder tarnished the results of the Rettig Report and offered the

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<sup>23</sup> A similar situation occurred in Perú after the publication of the *Comisión Nacional de la Verdad y Reconciliación* (see Milton, 2015, p. 362).

<sup>24</sup> The armed wing of the Communist Party.

right-wing parties a civil “martyr” to articulate their memory, one in which they also figured as victims of left-wing extremism (Crenzel, 2011, p. 5; Stern & Winn, 2016, p. 279; Hite & Collins, 2009, p. 394). It was clear, then, that Pinochet and his adherents would not admit the systematic violation of human rights during the dictatorship.

Indeed, after 1990, victims were hardly listened to when fighting against the erasure of clandestine torture centres, and often had great difficulties creating their memory sites (Stern, 2010). Within this atmosphere, their memory was deeply silenced and only ‘broke in’ and “irrupted” from time to time, demonstrating its invisible power (Wilde, 1999, 2013).

However, the state still granted some degree of symbolic reparation to the victims. For instance, in 1990, the government organised a state funeral for Allende’s remains and then buried his body in the General Cemetery; on March 4, 1991, Aylwin apologised to the victims of human rights violations; and in 1994, the Memorial to the Detained, Disappeared and Politically Executed of the General Cemetery was inaugurated, becoming the first national and state-led memorial.

In this context, civil society and victims’ groups were fundamental in promoting symbolic reparations. In 1997, the Villa Grimaldi Park for Peace was inaugurated. This was the first former detention centre in Latin America to be recovered by the victims and inaugurated as a site of memory. Although there was some state support, the recovery of this place was mainly due to the mobilisation of the groups that prevented the area from being demolished and transformed into a real estate project (Hite & Collins, 2009, pp. 385–387; Klep, 2012, p. 262). Along the same lines, in 2008, the former torture and detention centre Londres 38 was

also inaugurated, becoming “a site of memory recovered and open to the community” (M. Lazzara, 2011; Londres 38, n.d.).

On the ‘other’ side of memory, between 1990 and 2004, pro-regime groups enjoyed beneficial conditions to inaugurate their own memorials. In this context, regime support was still relatively legitimate, Pinochet had significant public support, and the political legacies of the regime were robust (though not to the same degree as in the previous period of 1973 – 1990).

According to Wilde (1999, p. 481), this context was characterised by a “broader conspiracy of consensus that ties the country to its authoritarian past.” This consensus politics tainted the “Favourable Period” and had memorial implications, providing pro-regime memory entrepreneurs with enough power to carry out their projects. David (2017, p. 303) noted that “every memorialisation is fundamentally shaped by the availability or absence of resources, with this being a straightforward outcome of the existing power relations in the society.” For instance, on 11 September 1991, in Linares, a group of regime supporters inaugurated a monument and a square to honour Pinochet’s regime and the military coup. The square became known as the *Plazoleta Capitán General Presidente de la República Augusto Pinochet Ugarte*, and the monolith was dedicated “to the government of the Armed Forces and Order.” Although the documents allowing its erection are lost (Municipalidad de Linares, 2017, p. 15), more than 20 years later, Linares’s mayor expressed that the memory site was part of an implicit negotiation of the transition in which each ‘side’ – victims and regime supporters – were allowed to have their own spaces to develop and perform their

memorial projects. None of the sides would be bothered as long as they remained in their specific space and as long as they complied with certain implicit ideas, such as the fact that the most prominent areas would be for victims' memorialisation. This is how the 'memory bargain' – as referred to by Hite and Collins (2013b, p. 148) – looked until at least 2013.

Thus, in 2017, Linares's mayor stated that the democratic authorities

Decided [in 1991] that there should be two public memorials in Linares. In the first place, the Augusto Pinochet Square and, in second place, the Memorial of the Detained-Disappeared. This democratic discussion must be valued, and I, as mayor, must respect this type of decision adopted altruistically (Cooperativa, 2017a).

During the first years of democracy – particularly between 1990 and 1993 – newly-inaugurated pro-regime streets were mostly in honour of Jaime Guzmán, a former regime collaborator and the first murdered Senator in Chile's history. After his assassination in 1991, Guzmán became a potent right-wing symbol embodying the renewed spirit reconciling the right's love for the regime and democracy (C. Collins, personal communication, 27 September 2021; Collins & Hite, 2013a, p. 180; Hite, 2003; Hite & Collins, 2009; Joignant, 2007). Hence, the frequent inaugurations of pro-regime sites between 1990 and 1993 are explained by the right-wing's need – with the centre-left's acquiescence – to honour Jaime Guzmán after his assassination (see Appendix, p. 490).

Indeed, just one year after the erection of the Pinochet Monument in Linares, in 1992, the Chamber of Deputies discussed the creation of a memorial to Senator Jaime Guzmán. Hite & Collins (2013b, pp. 148–151) note that the discussion regarding this memorial was imbued with a sense of reconciliation and the need to achieve political and social consensus regarding the past. For instance, in the debate on Guzmán's monument, a centre-left Deputy

mentioned that ‘both sides’ should be appropriately remembered, and that he would disagree with having just one version of the past memorialised. In particular, he said that “I don’t think that the Republic wants, after what we have experienced, to honour, culturally value, and highlight, only a fraction of us. It seems to me that this is the wrong path” (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional, 1991, p. 24)<sup>25</sup>. Thus, although he did not share Guzmán’s political vision, he supported the construction of his memorial. Correspondingly, in the Mixed Commission Report on 4 November 1992, a centre-right Deputy “stressed that erecting these monuments is not only a tribute to the memory of former Senator Guzmán, but also a true gesture of reconciliation” (p. 51). Likewise, with that same spirit and around the same years (in 1994), former President Sebastián Piñera (then Senator) approved Allende’s monument arguing “that it constitutes a legitimate recognition of a trajectory and a contribution to reconciliation, [thus] I vote favourably for the project” (Senator Sebastián Piñera). Hence, not only Guzmán’s but also Allende’s monuments were born out of this reconciliatory spirit of the transition (Collins & Hite, 2013b, 2013a; Hite, 2003).

Besides the dictatorship period (1973 – 1990) and the period right after Guzmán’s death, another wave of inaugurations of pro-regime memorials occurred between 1999 and 2003 (see Appendix, p. 490). This may represent a reaction to the “proliferation of memorials that, in their view, commemorate the left” (Hite & Collins, 2009, p. 294), and also due to an incipient decrease in regime support. It was also a reaction to Pinochet’s deteriorating image after his detention in London on 16 October 1998 on charges of crimes against humanity. In Spain, Judge Baltazar Garzón had instructed an extradition order following the concept of

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<sup>25</sup> Discussion of the Chamber of Deputies, 2<sup>nd</sup> Constitutional Procedure, 5 August 1992, session 25, legislature 324. The project was approved in general.

universal jurisdiction through which “anyone can be held accountable” for human rights crimes (Cárdenas, 2010, p. 173).

This situation stimulated regime adherents to defend Pinochet and fervently denounce his “political persecution” (Joignant, 2013). Said’s (2001) documentary, *I love Pinochet*, shows that, in this context, *Pinochetistas* actively organised a counter-offensive with demonstrations, memorial efforts, and public gatherings. They expressed their duty to protect Pinochet’s legacy and react against “resentful” individuals who could not forget the past and instead “keep on crying out for truth and justice.” A well-known *Pinochetista* and TV presenter lamented that

This story [Pinochet’s prosecution] does not end, and it will never end, never, because they [victims] do not want this to end. They will instil [it] in their children, their grandchildren, their great-grandchildren [...] and it will continue [forever], and that is what we have to do [as well], defend the principles and deeds of General Pinochet (Said, 2001).

Indeed, in 2000, La Junta town (in the extreme south of Chile) unveiled a monument honouring Pinochet and his development of the Austral Highway (AFP Santiago, 2000; Orbe, 2000). The town’s right-wing mayor and city council supported the initiative (AFP Santiago, 2000; La Red 21, 2000; Orbe, 2000). It is noteworthy that the town celebrated Pinochet’s legacy in a context where regime support was still strong but was being challenged for the first time (by the beginning of the 2000s). These challenges began with Pinochet’s detention in London in 1998, but continued long after with the increasingly powerful human rights and victims’ movement.

In this context, two other pro-regime memory sites were inaugurated: The José Toribio Merino Exhibition (2000) and the José Toribio Merino statue (2002) at the National Maritime Museum in Valparaíso. These inaugurations also occurred in a reactionary atmosphere in which regime adherents felt threatened. They also reveal how regime supporters accommodated their permanent glorification of the regime by choosing a figure other than Pinochet, who was becoming entirely discredited. Furthermore, Moulián (2002, p. 11) noted that, in this period, the entrepreneurial and business community needed to assert democratic credentials while maintaining their support for the regime (Bohoslavsky, 2019, p. 43). The solution to this contradiction was to redeem the regime's role in imposing a new "triumphant" economic model (Stern, 2010, pp. 142/184). Thus, the decision to inaugurate a statue of Merino rather than Pinochet reflected the desire of supporters to demonstrate their regime adherence in a context of economic growth (for which, in their view, the regime was responsible) while also responding to the increased questioning of the Military's human rights violations record. In their opinion, the defence of the regime's economic model was compatible with promoting democracy. Indeed, at the base of Merino's statue, a plaque shows that a group of wealthy businesspeople – who took on the opportunity to thank Merino for what he had done – financed and supported the sculpture.

Pinochet's detention unleashed a strong memorialisation wave that favoured victims of the dictatorship (Stern, 2006, 2010, 2013a, 2013b; Wilde, 1999, p. 199, 2013). For Wilde (1999, p. 489), this episode was "the most evocative of all the irruptions of memory", and it helped to awaken "the start of a major unravelling of memory impasse" (Stern, 2010, p. 211). The

events in London also helped give a greater impetus to the investigation against Pinochet in Chile.

Indeed, by then, the balance began to tilt in favour of victims' memory (Stern & Winn, 2016). For instance, the removal of 9/11 as a holiday in 1998 is often cited as a precursor to the more prominent position victims' memories were beginning to enjoy. In the early 1980s, Pinochet created the "National Liberation Day", a holiday to pay tribute to the coup *d'état* of 11 September 1973. On every 11 September, this date would commemorate and celebrate the "liberation" of Chile from Marxism. In a bid to reconcile Chileans, in 1998, the holiday was eliminated and replaced by every first Monday of September, which was renamed "National Unity Day"<sup>26</sup> (Joignant, 2007). In 2012, the *Desmonumentar la Dictadura* initiative sent a letter to the right-wing mayor of Providencia requesting to change the name of Av. 11 de Septiembre. In point 11 of the letter, they mention that eliminating the 11 September bank holiday in 1998 was an important precedent for the symbolic reparation of victims, as it was recognised that this day caused pain and should not be a holiday (Desmonumentar el Golpe, 2012). A year later, in 2013, Providencia's new progressive mayor addressed the community, saying that Pinochet proposed in 1998 to eliminate this holiday (Municipalidad de Providencia, 2013a, p. 5), an action that reflected how, by then, pro-regime memory was beginning to crumble.

Thus, the period after Pinochet's detention is seen by Wilde (2013) as the "season of memory." According to the author, after 1998, the human rights movement and victims'

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<sup>26</sup> This holiday was eliminated in 2002.

memories “became a significant public issue” (p. 32) which came accompanied by a “remarkable flowering of official memorialisation” (p. 47). Eventually, the once subaltern memory of the trauma and the human rights violations (Stern’s *memory as rupture* and *memory as persecution*) appeared as the most legitimate and dominant discourse that framed the meaning of the past (Stern, 2010, p. 212). According to Cárdenas (2010, p. 177), “the Pinochet case broke societal silence about past violations and legitimised the notion of human rights.”

Changes also took place in the political arena. Parties such as *Unión Demócrata Independiente* (UDI) and *Renovación Nacional* (RN) – historical allies of Pinochet during the dictatorship – remained faithful to their commander. Still, some gestures accounted for a certain distance, at least a strategic one (Angell, 2007, p. 157). For example, the UDI presidential candidate in 2000, Joaquín Lavín, tried to keep Pinochet away from his campaign. Despite his efforts, the socialist Ricardo Lagos won the presidency in 2000.

Several authors have noted how Lagos (2000 – 2006), as well as his successor’s government (Bachelet, 2006 – 2010), initiated a strong memorialisation wave in favour of victims (Collins & Hite, 2013b, 2013a; Hite, 2003; Hite & Collins, 2009; Wilde, 2013). Lagos was the first socialist to reach La Moneda after Salvador Allende. Upon taking office, he tried to “rehabilitate” Allende’s figure by inaugurating a statue in his honour outside the presidential palace (Collins & Hite, 2013b, p. 148). Over the years, the monument has become a “magnet for present day progressive activism” (Hite & Collins, 2009, p. 392). During his presidency, Lagos also decided to open the Morandé 80 door. Yet, to maintain the conciliatory mood of

the transition, the reopening of the door did not make any reference to the coup or to the fact Allende's corpse was taken away from La Moneda through those doors in 1973 (Bianchini, 2014, p. 7).

In this context, public denunciations against pro-regime memorials reveal how Pinochet's image and salvational memory were beginning to decline. For instance, the Augusto Pinochet Monument in La Junta was denounced by *Concertación* Deputies on 7 September 2000. These Deputies presented Resolution Agreement N° 464 to oversee the monument's legality and apply sanctions if necessary (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional - Cámara de Diputados, 2000). They argued that the monument "contravenes" the "constitutional and legal norm" which established that monuments to public servants must be first approved in Congress and then passed as a law (Article N° 60, N° 5, Constitution) (Cámara de Diputadas y Diputados, 2000, p. 32). Furthermore, they noted that, "according to Law 17.288 of the National Monuments Council, all public monuments must be under its supervision" (p. 32). This was not the case with the La Junta monument which had been installed avoiding legislative approval. Thus, the Chamber of Deputies approved the Resolution Agreement against the monument on 12 September 2000. However, no further relevant actions took place<sup>27</sup>. This inertia is undoubtedly connected to a context where anti-regime actions and eliminations of pro-regime memorials were still relatively rare. Furthermore, it is striking that the denunciation against the Pinochet Monument in La Junta did not mention victims' need for

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<sup>27</sup> In document N° E96071/2021, the *Contraloría* certified that after the issuing of Resolution Agreement N° 464, on 21 September 2000, it requested a report regarding this issue (*oficios* N° 1,978 and 1,979) to the *Dirección de Vialidad de la Región de Aysén del General Carlos Ibáñez del Campo* and the *Juzgado de Policía Local de Puerto Aysén*. It was not possible to have access to these reports, either because they were eliminated or because they are physically stored in the remote location of Villa Ortega (Contraloría General de la República - Contraloría General de Aysén, 2021; Contraloría General de la República, 2021; Dirección de Vialidad, Gobierno de Chile, 2021).

reparations, much less the concept of “integral reparations”<sup>28</sup>, which appeared later (in 2008) (INDH, 2020a, p. 12). Instead, Deputies highlighted the monuments’ lack of legality. This reveals an absence of a *moral urgency* – something only offered by victims’ imminent involvement in the cases – which could help explain this denunciation’s failure.

A similar situation occurred with the statue of José Toribio Merino. In 2002, a Deputy in Congress raised a red flag regarding its inauguration in May that year. In project N° 46, centre-left Deputies rejected the statue’s erection and argued it was not appropriately regulated (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional - Cámara de Diputados, 2002). However, the project was vetoed as the statue was located on private land belonging exclusively to the Military (G. Flores, 2002). Again, in this case, the main argument against the statue’s existence was its lack of legality rather than how it could impact victims’ reparations. The condemnation was primarily legal, not moral. Looking back, in 2021, the President of the Association of Executed Prisoners (AFEP) noted that the statue should have been regarded as “immoral” rather than “illegal” (A. Lira, personal communication, 28 September 2021).

Thus, the case of the La Junta monument and the statue of José Toribio Merino reflect how denunciations in this context (“Favourable Period”) lacked the ethical weight of later condemnations that would bring pro-regime memorials down. Other elements contributing to denunciators’ reduced efficacy during this period include the blockage generated by the right-wing in Congress, and the defensive measures carried out by the “administrators” of

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<sup>28</sup> A reparation policy that involves not just economic compensation but also guarantees of non-repetition and symbolic reparation (C. Collins, personal communication, 27 September 2021; F. Bustos, personal communication, 27 September 2021).

these monuments. For instance, in the case of the Pinochet Monument in La Junta, the right-wing mayor of Cisnes publicly defended and justified the memory site saying that the people who constructed it “live very isolated [...] and are unaware of the legal norms” (Orbe, 2000; AFP Santiago, 2000).

It should be noted that, although the influence of victims’ memory was becoming more apparent, support for Pinochet and the regime remained significantly strong during this period (1990 – 2004). For instance, in September 2002, 31% considered Pinochet “one of the best rulers” in Chile’s history (Huneus & Ibarra, 2013b, p. 219). As mentioned earlier, unlike Argentina or Uruguay, where the support for the former dictatorships waned soon after their regimes ended (Angell, 2007, p. 5), Chile experienced a “highly controlled transition and still-popular outgoing authoritarians” (Hite et al., 2013, p. 15).

Drawing on what has been mentioned above, the period between 1990 and 2004 is dominated by two salient features: The politics of consensus and a “compulsion to forget” (Moulián, 2002, p. 37). These aspects of democracy benefited regime supporters and Pinochet as the memory question regarding human rights violations was relegated to a minor position.

The politics of consensus refers to a spirit dominating political elites. They opted to subject themselves to certain concessions to the right-wing linked to Pinochet to maintain political stability. Thus, it was agreed, for instance, that Pinochet held specific quotas of power, that the Senate became populated by undemocratically designated Senators, or that prosecutions

against perpetrators should remain utopias. Moulián (2002, p. 44) noted that “consensus became a command to silence.”

Regarding forgetfulness, several scholars have argued that the 1990s were characterised by silence regarding the past and by a generalised willingness to obscure its most traumatic elements (Rojas, 2017, 2022; Stern, 2006, 2010). As Stern (2010, p. 130) pointed out, regime supporters successfully closed the “memory box” during this period, silencing and denying human rights violations. They acquired a “*misión cumplida*” (mission accomplished) memory: They were convinced that Pinochet had achieved his goal of making Chile an effective democracy without the threat of Marxism (Stern, 2010, p. 55). This meant that there was nothing else to discuss. Thus, around 2000, and despite Pinochet’s detention in London in 1998, there was a generalised feeling of “indifference” towards the past (Rojas, 2017, 2022).

Said’s (2001) documentary *I love Pinochet*, for instance, shows a group of Pinochet supporters in Santiago’s streets by the beginning of the 2000s with a poster that reads “No to Senator Pinochet’s impeachment [*desafuero*]”, and singing “thank you, thank you Pinochet, you were a great president!” to the tune of Lili Marleen<sup>29</sup>. They are in the middle of the sidewalk, and nobody cares. People pass by, and not a single person says anything to them. Only one foreigner is bothered and accuses “it’s a German fascist song!” Despite this brief interruption, it is striking that pro-regime groups could publicly and openly campaign for Pinochet without being disturbed, reflecting a different kind of society from today’s Chile.

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<sup>29</sup> Second World War German song associated to Nazi fascism.

The lack of public rebuke against regime supporters shown in the documentary demonstrates how, during the period 1990 – 2004, “having been part of the dictatorship hardly carried any stigma or shame” (Collins, 2020, p. 25). Indeed, Said’s documentary shows regime supporters’ self-perception of being a majority and enjoying high degrees of legitimacy. Regarding Pinochet’s trial, a person featured in the documentary said, “50% of us support General Pinochet. We will not allow them to take him away, to do something to him” (Said, 2001).

The reconciliatory politics of consensus that dominated the political sphere in Chile in the 1990s and early 2000s may explain, in part, why only a few pro-regime memorials were eliminated in this context. For instance, the Av. 11 de Septiembre (now Av. República de Chile) in Coltauco was eliminated on 29 December 1992 after the city council organised the school contest “A name for my street” (30 November 1992) (Municipalidad de Coltauco, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c). In this case, what might have favoured the elimination of this street was the composition of the city council, dominated by the centre-left and left-wing, with only one right-wing and one independent councillor (Serval, 1992). Still, this case represents a rare exception in which the elimination of pro-regime sites was not yet part of any political agenda. This is, indeed, the only name change of a pro-regime street that this thesis could identify in the context of the 1990s, which, as we know, was a very favourable period for Pinochet and his supporters.

Another case is Santiago’s *Llama de la Libertad* (Liberty Flame), which, as mentioned before, was inaugurated in 1975 to represent Chile’s ‘second’ independence against the

forces of Marxism (Stern, 2010, p. 269). According to Stern (2010, p. 269), by 2000, the Flame still represented the military coup and “remained a sacred symbol of salvation.” In October 2003, the government (*Concertación*) announced that it could no longer bear the financial costs of the Flame (F. Estévez, personal communication, 6 September 2021; *Nación*, 2003). Shortly after, Providencia’s mayor (a fervent regime supporter and right-wing militant) announced that his city council would take over the expenses to keep Pinochet’s Flame alive (F. Estévez, personal communication, 6 September 2021; *La Segunda*, 2003; *Nación*, 2003). Faced with this controversy, the Defence Minister decided to suspend the elimination, arguing that “it must be remembered that O’Higgins is buried there, who is practically the father and founder of the Army, and *this is very important to the Armed Forces*” (*Nación*, 2003, emphasis added). Nevertheless, the site was eliminated the following year (in 2004) in the context of the *Bicentenario* infrastructure developments (Bicentennial celebrations) (Ansa, 2004). Thus, the removal of the Flame of Liberty resulted from an administrative decision to remodel the area. Francisco Estévez (2021) – who participated in removal actions against the Flame – termed this situation a “*solución a la chilena*” (the Chilean way), as compared to the more robust and aggressive manner in which Argentina has dealt with pro-regime symbols and legacies in which they do not use excuses to eliminate pro-regime memorialisation. This silent or sanitised removal is consistent with the favourable context to regime supporters (1990 – 2004) in Chile. By then, the government knew that a low-profile, ‘administrative’ elimination would not hurt any sensibilities.

Considering the strong political power regime supporters still had in this period, the lack of eliminations and denunciations against pro-regime memorials is not surprising. This context

also made pro-regime groups more successful and confident in their memorial plans. Indeed, the inaugurations of pro-regime memorials met almost no social backlash during this period. For instance, virtually no one noticed the José Toribio Merino statue's inauguration in 2002 (except for the centre-left Deputy who denounced it in Congress), and there was no social condemnation against it (Gallo, 2012). Indeed, the statue was unveiled while Michelle Bachelet (Socialist Party leader and victim of the dictatorship) was Defence Minister under President Ricardo Lagos's Presidency (centre-left *Concertación*). Thus, a 'turn a blind eye' attitude dominated the political scene at this time (Marín, 2014a, 2014b; Menares, 2018). Likewise, there is no evidence of any significant social backlash against the creation/inauguration of the Linares Pinochet Square and Monument in Linares on 11 September 1991, the Av. Jaime Guzmán in Renca in 1993, the José Toribio Merino Auditorium in 1993, the Buque Madre de Submarinos BMS-42 Almirante Merino in 1997, the commander-in-chief of the Army C. G. Augusto Pinochet U. Medal in 1997, the Augusto Pinochet Monument in La Junta in 2000, the José Toribio Merino exhibition in 2000, and the pro-Pinochet Lili Marleen Restaurant in 2003.

However, by the end of this period (around 2004), the favourable conditions for pro-regime memorialisation – although still present – were diluting. A transformation in societal mood towards pro-regime sites was evidenced in the attempt to build a memorial to Jaime Guzmán in Plaza Italia, Providencia. The Guzmán memorial was approved by Congress on 29 January 1993 (Ley N°19.205 - Autoriza La Erección de Monumentos En Memoria de Don Jaime Guzmán Errázuriz, 1993). By the end of the 1990s, the Jaime Guzmán Foundation initiated conversations with the Providencia city council to install the memorial in Plaza Italia, a

central area in the capital and a gathering point for massive demonstrations, celebrations, and protests (Collins & Hite, 2013b, pp. 150–151; Retamal & Retamal, 2019; Thesis fieldwork notes #25, 2019). On 28 May 2002, Providencia's city council finally approved the development of the memorial in this area (Municipalidad de Providencia, 2002). By then, the city council was led by a former regime collaborator; it was no surprise the memorial had his ardent support.

Local neighbours disapproved of the memorial's location. Guzmán's association with the dictatorship and fears that his memorial might host acts of violence pushed them to reject the monument (Municipalidad de Providencia, 2004). Hence, fearing a backlash, the memorial was not placed in the Plaza Italia area but in the wealthy Las Condes district, next to the United States Embassy. This affluent, upper-class district offered better survival guarantees to the Guzmán memorial (Aguilera, 2015; Collins & Hite, 2013b). This was one of the first signs in Chile of the local communities' increasing awareness of the symbols surrounding them and their urge to erase those associated with the regime.

### *Unfavourable Period for Regime Supporters (2005 – 2020)*

#### 2005 – 2012

After being detained in London and processed in Chile for Human Rights violations, Pinochet's image received another blow in 2004 – though this time a more determinant one. That year, a US investigation discovered he had stolen over 20 million dollars from the Chilean treasury, concealing state assets in several illicit Riggs Bank accounts with false names. This situation – known as the “Riggs Bank case” – clearly disappointed many of his

followers, especially the right-wing parties UDI and RN. His image as a genuine, virtuous and honourable defender of the homeland disintegrated (Huneus & Ibarra, 2013b, p. 204; Stern & Winn, 2016). Now, Pinochet was being questioned not only for human rights crimes but also for corruption and theft. He eased his legal burden in 2001 when the human rights investigation was suspended after his lawyers skilfully filed an appeal for senile dementia that the Chilean Courts accepted. Pinochet died on 10 December 2006 having escaped prosecution but subjected to “high-profile degradation” of his “public status” (Joignant, 2013, p. 169). In this context, a curious “trinity” emerges: The “eleventh [of September], Pinochet and shame” (Joignant 2007, p. 123).

The publication of the Valech report in 2004 initiated consistent progress for victims’ historical recognition and contributed to Pinochet’s “gradual degradation” (Joignant, 2013, p. 168). The report, also known as the Truth Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture, determined the existence of 1,132 detention centres during the dictatorship and over 38,000 victims of torture. The traumatic memory of torture was finally acknowledged, and victims’ narratives were decisively accepted as a “national tragedy” (Stern, 2010). After the report’s release, General Juan Emilio Cheyre, commander-in-chief of the Army between 2002 and 2006, admitted on behalf of the Military community that “never, and for anyone, can there be ethical justification” for the abuses. This statement marked a milestone in the official Army discourse and the opening of a “new stage” of recognition of the “never again” in the Military (Stern & Winn, 2016, p. 298). Yet, it was also noted that support for these statements by the military ranks was relatively weak (Rohter, 2004). Moreover, the Navy

accepted the Valech report reluctantly, and actions by the Military thereafter were not along the same 'never again' lines (see footnote 95) (Collins, 2020, p. 26).

After 2004, Pinochet's "marginalization as a public figure" became clearer (Stern, 2010, p. 261; Angell, 2007, p. 153). As early as 2002, Moulián (p. 10) noted that Pinochet "is almost a spectre, a faded figure, whose footsteps cast a dim light." This marginalisation was undoubtedly related to how his closest political allies distanced themselves from his image to convey a more democratic and modern discourse tuned in the new times (Angell, 2007, p. 157). Joignant (2007, p. 22) mentions that after 2004, the right-wing in Chile – composed primarily of UDI and RN parties – put into motion their active "*despinochetización*", which meant trying to avoid and diminish as much as possible their historical and political contacts with him (also see Collins & Ordóñez, 2021, p. 88). This situation led Jorge Martínez Busch – former Navy Almirante and designated Senator (1998 – 2006) – to say in January 2005 that "Chile has abandoned Pinochet" (Stern, 2010, p. 301).

Pinochet's death exposed a divided Chile (Joignant, 2013, pp. 175–177). Regardless of his political decay, Joignant (2013) demonstrated how his death still powerfully resonated with those who admired him. Days before he died, Pinochet supporters formed a "moral" community that could be seen "keeping vigils outside the Military Hospital while he was dying" (pp. 175–176). On the day of his funeral, violent clashes occurred between people who supported and rejected his legacy. Thousands of supporters participated in his vigil at the Military School to pay their respects —demonstrating they "still cared deeply about Pinochet" (Stern, 2010, p. 349). Those who admired him raised banners of "*Pinochet, thank*

*you for existing*” and “*You were a great President*”, while those who rejected him celebrated with champagne and danced on the streets. Bachelet’s government denied Pinochet a state funeral but allowed military honours. His supporters viewed the lack of state honours as the ultimate degradation (Alija, 2016, p. 115).

After Pinochet’s death, it was evident that the coup and the dictatorship had become “unspeakable” pieces of history that could negatively impact one’s reputation in the public sphere (Joignant, 2007, p. 22). Stern (2010, p. 127) noted that “if one was indifferent to human rights, one had better express it privately.” Indeed, polls show that support for the regime and Pinochet were severely affected after 2004 by the Riggs Bank scandal (Huneus & Ibarra, 2013b, pp. 223–224). For instance, in 2003, when asked, “In your opinion, when you consider the regime run by General Augusto Pinochet, do you think it was...” 29% of the respondents answered it was “completely good.” Contrarily, in 2005, that same question was answered with a “completely good” answer only by 17% (CERC-MORI, 2015; Huneus, 2014; Huneus & Ibarra, 2013b, p. 218). Regarding the opinion towards Pinochet, in 2003, 19% believed Pinochet to be “one of the best rulers” in Chile’s history. In 2005, however, that positive opinion had dropped to 14% (CERC-MORI, 2015; Huneus & Ibarra, 2013b, p. 220). Likewise, in 2002, hard-line *Pinochetismo* accounted for 17%, but in 2005, it had significantly dropped to just 10% (Huneus & Ibarra, 2013b, pp. 223–224).

Two memory sites honouring Pinochet were planned in 2006 and two more in 2007 but were unsuccessful (see Appendix, p. 493). These four memorial attempts demonstrate the existence of a ‘core’ segment of *Pinochetistas* who remained loyal despite the Riggs Bank

scandal in 2004. Three main reasons explain these memorial attempts in 2006 and 2007: Firstly, the passing of Augusto Pinochet (10 December 2006); secondly, the need to push back the nascent signs of an unfavourable context to regime supporters; and thirdly, the desire of the right-wing to counterbalance the inauguration of Salvador Allende's commemorations, notably the monument unveiled right in front of La Moneda Presidential Palace on 26 June 2000. Indeed, since 1998, Allende's image had increasingly replaced that of Pinochet as a figure of honour and exceptionality (Joignant, 2007, p. 95; Hite, 2012, p. 82).

A few days after Pinochet's death, the Las Condes mayor proposed inaugurating a "Presidente Augusto Pinochet" Street (Municipalidad de Las Condes, 2006). During the municipal discussion, a UDI councillor mentioned that

He hopes that the [other centre-left] councillors have a sufficient level of openness [*altura de miras*], similar to that of dozens of mayors throughout the country, in terms of naming many streets with the name, for instance, of Salvador Allende, former President of the Republic (Municipalidad de Las Condes, 2006, p. 13).

A Christian Democrat councillor disagreed with the measure and denounced that the initiative was aimed "at the Right, at the leadership of the UDI and, ultimately, at *Pinochetismo*" and argued that he "would like to ask the thousands of voters of Las Condes, who have certainly suffered the persecution and damage done to them by the military dictatorship, if they agree with the street's name change" (p. 16). Although the city council meeting of 18 December 2006 approved the idea of naming a street, avenue or square as "Presidente Augusto Pinochet" (Agreement N° 130), the project did not prosper and, ultimately, came to nothing.

Likewise, in December 2006, in Congress, right-wing Deputies drafted a law project to inaugurate various Pinochet monuments in different cities across Chile (Álvarez-Salamanca et al., 2006): “[It] authorizes the construction of a monument in the city of Santiago, Iquique and Valparaíso, in memory of the former President of the Republic and former commander-in-chief of the Army, Captain-General Don Augusto Pinochet Ugarte” (Cámara de Diputadas y Diputados, 2006) (Law Draft N° 4744-24, legislation period 354, session 110). A UDI Deputy argued that “if Salvador Allende has a monument, it is rightful that Pinochet has one as well” (AP, 2006). The Law Project mentioned that “on the death of former President of the Republic Captain General Don Augusto Pinochet U”, three monuments in Santiago, Iquique and Valparaíso were a “moral duty.” The document mentioned that recently some groups had been trying to “ignore real history, [but] everyone knows the country’s situation on 11 September 1973 Salvador Allende’s Marxist government had not only accentuated poverty and economic instability, but had also systematically violated current legislation” (Boletín 4744-24) (Cámara de Diputadas y Diputados, 2006, p. 77).

The document added that *Pinochetistas* would continue to honour Pinochet “regardless of the petty attitudes that, for political reasons, some governments may take” (Cámara de Diputadas y Diputados, 2006, p. 77). These assertions refer to President Bachelet’s refusal of state honours and national mourning after Pinochet’s passing, and her declaration that “Pinochet is a benchmark of division, hatred and violence” (El País, 2006). Although the project had its first constitutional step in the Chamber of Deputies on 20 December 2006, on 20 April 2010 the Commission of Culture and Arts archived the project.

Some of the same right-wing Deputies who proposed this monumental project for Pinochet also planned two pro-regime projects in January 2007: That Pinochet's residence – the house he lived in during much of his regime – should be declared a historical monument, and that the "Austral Highway" be officially named "Carretera Austral Presidente Augusto Pinochet Ugarte" (agreement project N° 272, 23 January 2007) (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional - Cámara de Diputados, 2007a). In the former, a UDI Deputy complained against the declaration of Salvador Allende's house in the Tomás Moro area as a National Monument, saying, "I do not like this decision, but I know it is a Government attribution" (p. 73). Thus, he proposed the declaration of Pinochet's house as a National Monument to compensate for Allende's state-led glorification.

Likewise, in the latter project, RN Deputies argued that the name "Carretera Austral Presidente Augusto Pinochet Ugarte" would serve as a tribute to Pinochet's infrastructure and development achievements, and that "the proposal also responds to the request of many people in the region who saw their dreams come true" (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional - Cámara de Diputados, 2007b, pp. 20–21). Yet, a socialist Deputy immediately condemned this project and asked, "how is it possible that today we discuss naming the highway after the dictator when the country is convulsed by the direct participation of murderer Pinochet in former President Frei's death?" (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional, 2007, p. 61). The socialist Deputy added, "it is *shameful* for the country to discuss this initiative [that Carretera Austral be named Presidente Augusto Pinochet Ugarte]. [...] because that name represents extermination, persecution, murder, [and] *everything related to the Riggs bank*" (p. 61, emphasis added).

The cases above show the motivations of regime supporters to inaugurate memorial sites and how confident, by 2006 and 2007, they felt in their success. However, they also show how the atmosphere was becoming progressively hostile to regime supporters. Support for Pinochet was seen as reprehensible (because of human rights violations and the Riggs Bank scandal), and being a *Pinochetista* was increasingly becoming a shameful “defect” (Goffman, 1986 [1963]).

For instance, Pinochet would have loved to be buried in a Franco-style mausoleum, but by 2006, he knew such a desire was unreasonable (Alija, 2016, pp. 111–112; Joignant, 2007). By then, “it was no longer politically possible to contemplate a public memorial” for him (Stern & Winn, 2016, p. 360). He was aware of his discredit and had previously ordered his body to be cremated and placed in a private tomb inside a secluded family property in Los Boldos (Valparaíso Region) (Alija, 2016, p. 115). Stern (2010, pp. 335/355) said that this indicated “solitude”; he knew his remains had to “be protected from public access.” As a fervent regime supporter mentioned, “if Pinochet’s tomb were in a public cemetery... They would have profaned it. For the 11<sup>th</sup>, they don’t even respect Don Jaime Guzmán’s [tomb]” (Tobar, 2017).

For Stern and Winn (2016), Michelle Bachelet’s first government (Socialist/*Concertación*) (2006 – 2010) strengthened the tendency favouring victims’ memory and the human rights discourse. As a political prisoner and the daughter of a general who died in prison due to torture, Bachelet strove to reinforce the *never again* culture. One of her main government

milestones was the inauguration in 2010 of the Museum of Memory and Human Rights (MMHR). The museum entrance reads: “*We cannot change the past; we can only learn from what we have lived through. That is our responsibility and challenge.*” Indeed, the museum was a symptom of an invigorated human rights culture. The inauguration of the first human rights museum in the country has helped promote awareness of human rights and reinforced victims’ legitimacy in the face of the still-influential Pinochet supporters. After its inauguration, *Pinochetistas* criticised the museum for its “biased” narrative, focusing on the absence of context before the coup *d’état* (1970 – 1973). They attacked the lack of references to the economic crisis, ideological violence, and confiscations during the Allende government (1970 – 1973). Indeed, to counter this narrative, some regime supporters voiced the need for a “Museum of Truth” that would tell their version of the recent past (Batarce, 2018).

Still, two prominent pro-regime memorials were inaugurated in 2008, the Jaime Guzmán memorial in Las Condes and the Pinochet Museum in Vitacura. Notably, they were inaugurated in the “Unfavourable Period” (2005 – 2020) and in honour of two individuals directly associated with the regime, making these sites quite outstanding accomplishments for regime supporters in such an unfavourable context. Interestingly, the inauguration of a museum for Pinochet in 2008 demonstrates that, although “the stain of corruption was in some ways tougher” (Stern, 2010, p. 300) than any other discrediting situation, the Riggs bank scandal did not weaken *Pinochetismo* entirely and a core of unaffected supporters remained loyal. As noted by a *Pinochetista* interviewee, regardless of the Riggs Bank corruption scandal, “I will always be a *Pinochetista*, whatever they say about General

Pinochet. Regarding the millions [he stole], I don't care. He changed this country for the better, politically, economically and socially" (J. Medel, personal communication, 28 February 2020).

But these memorial projects were exceptions; victims now dominated the commemorative landscape. Indeed, during this period (2005 – 2012), Chile saw a massive increase in victims' memory sites (Hite, 2018, p. 214). Such progress was based on a "reparations approach" that dominated Chile's public policies, which stated that victims were to play a prominent role in memorialisation (Bianchini, 2014, p. 9). Some of the factors that spurred this new era were the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the military coup (2003), the creation of specialised government offices for memorial projects, the Valech report on political imprisonment and torture (2004), and Pinochet's death in 2006 (Stern, 2010, pp. 273–312). Stern (2010, p. 298) contends that the Valech Report signified a massive blow against pro-regime memory which increasingly "fell apart." By 2010, victims' memorial narratives – embodied in the iconic sites of Villa Grimaldi, Londres 38, and the MMHR – had become the most prominent elements in the Chilean politics of memory and a clear manifestation of the privileged status of human rights (Stern & Winn, 2016, p. 321; Winn, 2016, p. 415).

Indeed, support for the regime "drops considerably from 2010" (Huneus, 2014, p. 428). Simultaneously, 2010 initiated a positive period for victims' demands regarding the recent past, while the pro-regime memories were downgraded to an insignificant role in the public discussion. This is the period of the inauguration of the National Institute of Human Rights (INDH) (2010) and the outbreak of national student protests to end the dictatorial legacies in

education (2011). In this context, polls show how regime support decreases. For instance, while in 2009, 18% considered Pinochet as one of the best rulers, in 2011, that percentage had dropped to just 13% (Huneus & Ibarra, 2013b, p. 220). Likewise, in 2005, while 17% considered Pinochet's regime "completely good", in 2011, the percentage had fallen to 14% (p. 218). Similarly, hard-line *Pinochetismo* was 9% in 2009 but dropped to 5% in 2011 (Huneus, 2014, p. 280; Huneus & Ibarra, 2013b, p. 225). Thus, it is evident that after 2010 there was a significant decrease in support for the regime and consistent corrosion of Pinochet's image.

The period between 2005 and 2012 was felt by regime supporters as a period of "Silence", a time in which they were humiliated and only allowed to express their views in private. In 2011, a plaque honouring Pinochet was found in the company headquarters of Walmart. The plaque had been placed there in 1999 by the previous owner of the place, a pro-Pinochet businessman who owned the D&S company. When interviewed, Pinochet's daughter said this plaque represented the fact there were many *Pinochetistas* out there who feared speaking out favouring the regime because of social condemnation (Cooperativa, 2011a). Nonetheless, a UDI Deputy praised the person who installed the plaque, saying he was an honest individual "with trousers and courage that dared in these times, when everyone has forgotten about General Pinochet and left him alone, to remember the true story" (Foncea, 2011). However, a socialist Deputy reacted saying that defending Pinochet was the same as defending a "criminal and thief" (Cooperativa, 2011b). These comments made pro-regime groups feel oppressed, marginalised, frustrated and annoyed for being minimised and almost ridiculed by public opinion.

In June 2012, a group of regime supporters – the ‘Corporación 11 de Septiembre’ and Álvaro Corbalán in Punta Peuco (in jail for human rights crimes) – organised a documentary premier of a “Pinochet” (Zegers, 2012) movie at the famous and centric Teatro Caupolicán. The premiere caused colossal outrage among human rights activists and victims’ associations who demanded the government to prohibit its exhibition. However, the authorities claimed the right to freedom of expression and authorised the debut. The event became known as the *Caupolicanazo*. The documentary illustrates the frustration regime supporters were experiencing by then. For instance, the movie begins by saying, “let’s get to know the recent past of Chile after decades of *silence*.” After being forcibly repressed and relegated to the private sphere, they were finally going to express what they thought about the recent past. This was one of regime supporters’ first major public appearances after Pinochet’s death in 2006. They wanted to demonstrate how tired they were of their marginalisation. In the documentary, a conversation between a grandfather and his grandson and granddaughter makes this point clear:

*Grandson: But Tata [grandfather], so much persecution against Pinochet, this seems like a horror movie.*

*Tata: Look, everything is evident in the press, textbooks, and the Museum of Memory.*

*Granddaughter: What a pity, Tata. Such resentment is chilling. You know what, Tata? I think that the Carretera Austral is what most represents the General, opening paths and leaving footprints where no one ever tried before (Zegers, 2012).*

This conversation is symptomatic of their frustration. When mentioning “so much persecution”, the grandson refers to Pinochet’s demise after his judicial prosecution for human rights violations and the Riggs Bank scandal. Then, the grandfather mentions how

this negative situation has been reinforced and promoted by the press (probably referring to the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the military coup in 2003), by education (history textbooks depicting Pinochet as dictator), and by the Museum of Memory, which was felt as a massive attack to pro-regime memory. For them, victims' need for reparation is pure resentment that could be avoided if we forgot about the past and remembered the 'positive' aspects of the regime, such as the infrastructure developments. Thus, the granddaughter proposes that Pinochet be remembered for the Carretera Austral project, which connected many areas in the southern sections of the country in the 1970s and 1980s.

Here, another element contributing to the marginalisation of pro-regime memory and Pinochet's image was the increased prominence of the *funas*. Human rights activists and victims carry out *funas* when they feel there is no justice against human rights violations. *Funas* are noisy public shamings of perpetrators so that the community learns about the past. The motto is "if there is no justice, there is *funa*." In 2000, Stern (2010, p. 232) noted that, in a slow but steady increase in awareness of past human rights violations, some organisations have started carrying out *funas*. Later, in 2010 and 2012, Collins and Hite (2013a, pp. 179–180) also note that *funas* have become more frequent. They argue that these increased *funas* respond to regime supporters' attempts at resurgence. One of these attempts was the previously mentioned exhibition of the "Pinochet" documentary at Teatro Caupolicán in 2012. Indeed, assistants to the premier were met with large crowds outside the theatre who shouted and condemned the perpetrators. Around the same period (2013), a regime supporter noted in The Clinic newspaper that it was difficult for him to admit his admiration to Pinochet in public as he could become *funado* (shouted against): "It is very

different to go out on the street protesting with a sign that says, “Where are they?<sup>30</sup>”, to go out with one saying: “I am a *Pinochetista*.” They silence us, they oppress us” (J. Rojas, 2013).

One of the best well-known *funas* occurred just a year earlier than the *Caupolicanazo*, in 2011. This *funa* occurred in Club Providencia in the Providencia district – governed by a right-wing mayor and former collaborator of Pinochet, Cristián Labbé. Here, a group of regime supporters tried to launch a book honouring the memories of Miguel Krassnoff, a human rights criminal during the dictatorship convicted to more than a hundred years in prison. Mayor Labbé explicitly supported the book launch and sponsored the invitations (Collins & Hite, 2013b, p. 152; El Mostrador, 2011). The local community and human rights organisations gathered outside the Club and protested furiously. This *funa* was widely publicised and was relatively successful in installing the need for a more robust and immediate condemnation towards positive commemorations of human rights violators.

Thus, the period between 2005 and 2012 was marked by a steep decrease in the legitimacy of pro-regime memory. After the Riggs Bank case (2004), supporters of Pinochet were silenced and marginalised and were relegated to the private sphere. In 2011 and 2012, they attempted to win back the public space (e.g., Krassnoff’s book launch and the *Caupolicanazo*), but these endeavours were met with fierce public reactions propelled by the *funas*.

### 2013 – 2020, the “Critical Years”

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<sup>30</sup> Women in the dictatorship used a picture of their disappeared relatives with this question.

An even more unfavourable period for regime supporters began in 2013 with the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the military coup and the change of name of the emblematic Av. 11 de Septiembre in Providencia to Av. Nueva Providencia (2013). Later, between 2019 and 2020, and despite their situation of illegitimacy and political marginality, regime supporters have tried to counterattack and become more defiant in displaying their positive memory of Pinochet.

In 2010, a right-wing government – of RN Sebastián Piñera (2010 – 2014) – was elected to the presidency for the first time after the return to democracy. Against the odds, this government continued the path of achievements in memory and human rights (Stern & Winn, 2016, p. 396; Bianchini, 2014, p. 3). For instance, in the commemorations of the 1988 plebiscite in 2013, he declared that “it was a wise decision to vote for the No” (Aburto, 2013). His statement surprised UDI members of his coalition who had voted for the continuation of Pinochet (“Yes”). That same year, he also criticised the Chilean justice for “not having lived up to” their role of defending human rights during the dictatorship (El Mostrador, 2013). Furthermore, referring to civil collaborators and the business community, Piñera denounced the existence of “passive accomplices” (*cómplices pasivos*) during the regime (Torrealba & Turner, 2013). Thus, in this context, condemnation against civilian participation in dictatorship increased (Collins & Colaboradores, 2020, p. 497).

A significant blow to the *Pinochetistas* came with Piñera’s order to close Penal Cordillera (2013), the luxurious prison for human rights violators. The inmates were transferred to a less comfortable prison, Punta Peuco. Naturally, *Pinochetistas* raged after realising that

Piñera was doing more harm than good to their cause. For Stern and Winn (2016), Piñera's acts aligned with victims' memories and represented, at least on the surface, a generalised degree of recognition of the memory of human rights violations. As Payne and Lessa (2012, p. 2) would argue, Chile started participating in the age of accountability "in which governments and international institutions are expected to hold perpetrators of atrocities legally responsible for their acts."

During Piñera's government, 2013 and the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the military coup became a milestone that deeply marked the country. Hundreds of television programs, symposiums and conferences, talks at universities, and artistic activities, plagued the public space with harrowing scenes and testimonies of the massive violations of human rights during the Pinochet dictatorship. If salvational memory and regime supporters had already been experiencing a progressive marginalisation since 2005, 2013 struck the *coup da grâce*.

Just a few months before the anniversary, another event significantly marked the memorialisation of the recent past. By the beginning of July 2013, a central avenue in Santiago – Av. 11 de Septiembre – was renamed to Av. Nueva Providencia (see Appendix, picture #4, p. 452). The change was promoted by the community and human rights activists and caused widespread social controversy. National and international media covered the situation. This was one of the first times the name of a significant avenue linked to the dictatorship was modified. Thus, the event was considered a milestone in the fight to "*despinochetizar*" the public space (Collins & Ordóñez, 2021, p. 88). From this moment

onwards, many other cities and towns in Chile would try to imitate Providencia by changing the name of their own 11 de Septiembre streets and avenues (Rojas, 2015)<sup>31</sup>.

Thus, after 2013, ‘memory reckonings’ regarding human rights violations intensified considerably (Rojas, 2017, 2022; Stern, 2010). 2013 significantly bolstered victims’ memories and awareness of human rights (C. E. Alegría, personal communication, 28 September 2021; F. Estévez, personal communication, 6 September 2021). As noted by one newspaper, the 2013 “commemoration, unlike the previous ones, was marked by the generalised condemnation by Chilean society and its press media, especially television, regarding the crimes committed during dictatorship” (Marín, 2014b). Here, ‘dignity’ of victims and ‘shame’ of regime civil collaborators were mobilised as never before. It became evident that victims deserved to be memorialised and recognised in their suffering as part of a demand for justice. For victims, ‘dignity’ would mean recognition beyond mere economic or judicial compensation. In September 2014, a group of people protested against the Pinochet Square and Monument in Linares, holding posters and banners of the disappeared with the following message: “Truth and Justice for the fallen in dictatorship!” (Canal 5 Linares, 2014). This showed that, unlike what happened in the “Favourable Period” (when victims were not mentioned and/or did not participate), after 2013, a moral urgency – embodied in the need for truth and justice – was present in denunciations and eliminations against pro-regime memorials.

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<sup>31</sup> For instance, the Av. 11 de Septiembre in Quillota was changed to Av. Francisco Silva in 2016, the Lorenzo Gotuzzo Street in Santiago was changed to Amanda Labarca Street in 2016, and the Lucía Hiriart Square in Iquique was changed to Arturo Godoy Square in 2018.

Society weaponised ‘shame’ to combat regime supporters and their positive memory of the regime. *Pinochetistas* were banned from public space because it was the victims’ turn and right to speak out the truth of their violations, and because it became extraordinarily shameful and degrading to defend Pinochet. Thus, from 2013 onwards, an even more powerful stigma was placed upon regime supporters. It was the stigma of defending the indefensible. Hence, during most of this period (2013 – 2020), pro-regime memory remained and acted as a hidden transcript: “A backstage discourse consisting of what cannot be spoken in the face of power” (Scott, 1990, p. xii).

During this period, regime supporters’ need to publicise their salvational memory clashed with their sense of degradation and ostracism. For instance, on 11 September 2014, a UDI Deputy in Congress tried to invigorate *Pinochetismo* by claiming that the true ‘patriots’ were the incarcerated human rights criminals: “Those who are in Punta Peuco, [are] the true patriots, those who saved Chile from the Marxist dictatorship, there they are, in Punta Peuco, most of them wrongly prosecuted” (The Clinic, 2015). Yet, that same year, a prominent *Pinochetista* confessed to The Clinic newspaper that ‘salvational memory’ was insignificant: “Today, the Pinochet youth does not exist. If I were to look for all the under-30s *Pinochetistas hueones* [dudes] in Santiago, we wouldn’t make more than 300”, adding that “if you go down the street and say you are a *Pinochetista*, you will surely get hit by a stone” (M. Espinoza, 2014). Although in 2014 Pinochet’s grandson declared he was forming a new *Pinochetista* party, “*Orden Republicano Mi Patria*” (El Mostrador, 2014), in 2016, however, regime supporters complained about Pinochet’s lack of political support. This was evident in the absence of prominent politicians commemorating his death on 10 December

2016. The Clinic newspaper is not wrong in identifying the lack of political support for the commemoration:

After 12 o'clock, two buses from the President Pinochet Foundation arrived with 30 people each, followed by a van with another twenty. Only older women came off. As soon as they stepped out of the vehicle, they chanted, "*Chi-chi-chi-le-le-le, long live Chile Pinochet!*" Nothing remains of the golden days when politicians flooded the place (Escobedo, 2016, emphasis added).

Thus, at least until 2017, regime supporters remained extremely marginal and in the back seat of politics. However, specific episodes that year showed that regime supporters were experiencing a "shift towards an offensive rather than a silent or defensive strategy" (Collins & Hite, 2013b, p. 152). For instance, in 2017, the conservative right-wing presidential candidate José Antonio Kast proposed, as one of his first measures in the presidency, the removal of Allende's statue from the Constitution Square in front of La Moneda Palace (Cooperativa, 2017b; Jara, 2017; Pezoa, 2017). Never before had a Presidential candidate made such proposal, showing that the patience of pro-regime groups was running out in terms of passively accepting their humiliated and secondary role.

Then, in 2018, this kind of statements by the extreme right – to eliminate victims' memory and claim their own memory and victimisation – significantly increased. This is consistent with Traverso's (2019, p. 3) assertion of "the rise of the radical right" in 2018. Indeed, Collins (2018) has named the period since 2018 as the "post-truth" period, similar to Traverso's (2019) "post-fascism" period. Collins (2018, pp. 47–48) noted that between 2017 and 2018, "the public expressions of what can be described as denialism have worsened and deepened." Thus, regime supporters have become more outspoken about praising the regime and Pinochet and

about denying human rights violations (see Appendix, picture #13, p. 456) (C. Collins, personal communication, 27 September 2021; Thesis fieldwork notes #20, 2020). They explicitly publicise their annoyance for being silenced, and are more outspoken against having “been pushed to the margins” (Traverso, 2019, p. 19).

The Human Rights Reports developed by Cath Collins and her team in the Universidad Diego Portales have recorded a significant increase in the “desecrations of memorials” in the past years by groups aiming at destabilising and eliminating victims’ memory (Collins, 2018, p. 50; Collins & Colaboradores, 2020, p. 560). Among many other attacks, on 17 April 2018, the Memorial of the 177 Disappeared Detainees in Valparaíso appeared scratched with the slogan “*Viva Pinochet!*” A shocked member of the Valparaíso Brigade of Memory and Human Rights said that “the memorial had never been vandalised in such a way before” (Radio Universidad de Chile, 2018). Moreover, in December 2018, a prominent figure from the centre-right *Renovación Nacional* party declared at a party rally that she admired the ‘military government’, after which she was applauded and cheered. Her statement marked a “before and after” moment in terms of leaving behind, once and for all, the shame of being a *Pinochetista*. As mentioned by an interviewee wearing a Pinochet T-shirt in one of the *Rechazo*<sup>32</sup> demonstrations in 2020, “I would not have dared to do this three years ago, but now I feel confident” (Thesis fieldwork notes #23, 2020). Thus, if Bilbija and Payne (2011, p. 17) once said that these groups’ motto was “silence” about the past (“silence is golden”), since 2017 – 2018, it has become clear that silence is no longer their preferred option.

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<sup>32</sup> Demonstrations against the Social Outbreak and the drafting of a new Constitution (2019 – 2020).

Thus, since 2018, Chilean society has experienced a “cultural *Pinochetismo*”, the renewed positive public valorisation of Pinochet’s legacies in young pro-regime groups (C. Collins, personal communication, 27 September 2021; Collins, 2018, p. 99). This “renaissance of revisionist tendencies” (Hite et al., 2013, p. 14) generated a powerful backlash by anti-regime agents, which clashed with the “cultural *Pinochetismo*” and the indolence and apathy of then-President Piñera’s right-wing government (2018 – 2022). The first years of his second presidential period were marked by his administration’s pardons of military prisoners condemned for massive human rights violations and the employment of former regime collaborators as Government Ministers (F. Bustos, personal communication, 27 September 2021; C. Collins, personal communication, 27 September 2021; Collins & Colaboradores, 2020, pp. 520–544). These situations encouraged anti-regime agents to denounce regime symbols and legacies fiercely, creating, in 2018, an environment of intense political and ideological confrontation between the two sides (victims and pro-regime)<sup>33</sup>.

The Social Outbreak (between 18 October 2019 and the beginning of March 2020) expanded the need to attack regime symbols and legacies (C. E. Alegría, personal communication, 28 September 2021; N. Cabrera, personal communication, 21 September 2021; A. Lira, personal communication, 28 September 2021). For instance, in the case of the elimination of Av. Jaime Guzmán in Renca (today Av. Dorsal), several interviewees identified the Outbreak as the catalyst that “woke up” the need to erase the Jaime Guzmán name (Anonymous Key Informant #14, Renca, personal communication, 17 March 2021; I. Calderón, personal

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<sup>33</sup> Indeed, this context evidenced a new phenomenon: the violent attack and desecration of victims’ memorials by pro-Pinochet groups.

communication, 22 September 2021; Thesis fieldwork notes #11, 2021) (see Appendix, picture #8, p. 454).

The political polarisation experienced in 2018, and the Social Outbreak in 2019, had an enormous impact on regime supporters. After these events, support for Pinochet probably radicalised. Collins (personal communication, 2021) has noted that, at least, regime support has become even “more vocal”<sup>34</sup>. As mentioned by a pro-regime interviewee, the Outbreak reinforced the *Pinochetista* conviction of certain groups for the need for order and stability *at any cost*<sup>35</sup> (J. Medel, personal communication, 2020). For instance, in the *Rechazo* marches – demonstrations against the Social Outbreak and the drafting of a new Constitution (2020) –, and without any glimpse of shame (as it used to be in the past), the pro-Pinochet nostalgia was proudly exposed and performed (also noted by Cath Collins, personal communication, 2021). Several people with Pinochet photographs and t-shirts with the slogan “*Por la fuerza entonces*” (by force then), and young men carrying flags and clothing of “*Patria y Libertad*” (nationalist anti-communist group of the early 1970s), participated in these marches. Although these *Pinochetistas* were a minority group, the entire anti-Social Outbreak movement of *Rechazo* (in 2020) shared their reactionary agenda against violence and the social transformations taking place after October 2019<sup>36</sup>.

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<sup>34</sup> No polls are available yet.

<sup>35</sup> This statement is based on several interviews with anonymous participants in the context of the 11<sup>th</sup> of September pro-regime commemorations at Escuela Militar (Santiago) in 2020 and 2021. Also, see Camila Bustos’s book about pro-regime memorialisation (Bustos, 2021). It should be noted that here I focus on the *Rechazo* demonstrations in 2019 and 2020. The *Rechazo* in 2022 is different and involved a transversal movement including political sectors from the right the centre-left.

<sup>36</sup> This idea was mentioned by several pro-regime interviewees.

Yet, the fact that regime supporters have become more vocal in the past years does not mean that the context is more favourable for them. The period between 2005 and 2020, particularly the critical years of 2013 – 2020, is deeply unfavourable for groups with a more or less positive view of the regime. The fact they have become vocal only adds more political and social polarisation to the equation, but does not make their position more auspicious. They are still highly discredited, and since 2005, it has become difficult for them to erect pro-regime memorialisation. Their increased difficulty to memorialise since 2013 makes them react aggressively. One of the ways they channel the lack of possibilities to manifest their salvational memory has been, in recent years, to desecrate victims' memorials.

It should be noted that the “memory bargain” (Collins & Hite, 2013b, p. 148) or “memory pact” has weakened since 2010, and even more so since 2013. As mentioned earlier, this pact allowed each side – victims and pro-regime – to memorialise their own milestones without being disturbed by the ‘other side.’ The contract dictated that both sides had the right to commemorate. Within this implicit agreement, the idea that victims and the left have Salvador Allende, and the ‘other’ side has Jaime Guzmán or the military coup, was very present. Thus, for instance, in trying to recall the pact, and regarding the need to maintain the Av. Jaime Guzmán in Antofagasta, a UDI militant said in 2018:

Indeed, a group of people may disagree on the name of the Avenida Jaime Guzmán, but you have to remember that cities belong to everyone. Here [in Antofagasta] some streets remember former president Salvador Allende (Antofagasta TV 30, 2018).

Similarly, the owner of the Pinochet restaurant Lili Marleen said in an interview in 2015 that the existence of his restaurant was due, precisely, to the persistence of a reconciling pact between both memories:

Something extraordinary has been achieved. People from all sectors come here, they get together, or I place them at the bar knowing that one is DC [centre-left], the other is from RN [centre-right], and I see that, ultimately, they always have something in common. Here, we are all equal (Herrera, 2015).

By 2010, however, this pact had cracked considerably. This is connected with the emergence of a new generation not born into the dictatorship and unwilling to be satisfied with the idea of “each memory with its own space.” This new generation proposed itself to eradicate all vestiges of the dictatorship. In 2013, the memory pact was almost inexistent. During the process of eliminating the name Av. 11 de Septiembre in Providencia, a regime supporter rebukes one of the young city councillors who carried out the measure in the following dialogue:

*Pro-regime lady: Look at the two faces of the coin, does the name of a street bother you that much? Does it hurt that much?!*

*Councillor: Yes, it [Av. 11 de Septiembre] offends us.*

*Pro-regime lady: Many things also offend us! (Mentiras Verdaderas La Red, 2013).*

She is saying that regime supporters are offended by Allende’s statue and for having to commemorate Pinochet in private. Still, they do not complain about it and silently accept the game’s rules —they do not even complain about victims’ memorials. However, this new generation denouncing pro-regime memorials – such as this councillor, who was in his 30s – is no longer accepting the pact rules. This new cohort not only wants to privatise salvational memory but goes one step further eliminating every vestige, every trace of that memory.

In 2015, a violent clash occurred between those attending the commemoration of 11 September at the Plaza Augusto Pinochet in Linares and young left-wing associations and victims. Although pro-regime commemorations had been taking place there since 1991, this was the first time a fierce fighting occurred between the two groups. One of the pro-regime attendees complained that “they [protesters] are children who do not know reality” (Chilevisión Noticias, 2015).

The collapse of the bargain has had vast consequences on the democratic debate regarding the recent past in Chile. Both sides – victims and pro-regime – have radicalised. On the one hand, victims and human rights associations have raised the volume and tone of their demands and accusations against the ‘other’ side. The word *facho* (fascist), used during the pre-coup period of political polarisation (1970 – 1973), started being widely used again, and the *funas* increased in number, intensity, loudness, and notoriety. Regime supporters, seeing that now their memorial spaces – no matter how marginal or private – were not being respected as it used to be, also began raising their voices. Thus, in one commemoration of 11 September at the Plaza Augusto Pinochet in Linares (2016), a woman exclaimed: “Half of Chile celebrates 11 September in *silence* out of fear, and that has to end!” (Canal 5 Linares, 2016). In the same line, in recent years, the new conservative right-wing party “Republican Party” has declared that they are going to fight “to continue saying *out loud* what many say in a low voice” (candidate to Metropolitan Region Deputy, Republican Party). Thus, the political debate on memory and the recent past has become increasingly aggressive and boisterous, fuelled by both memory camps. As argued by a *funas* protester outside the

National Maritime Museum on 11 October 2019, “recently, the *Pinochetista* right-wing is carrying out a fierce communication campaign for denialism, and we, with our active presence, are fighting against it!” (G. Correa, 2019).

Two recent unsuccessful plannings of pro-regime memorialisations – the “Museo de la Verdad” in 2018, and the Academia de Ciencias Policiales de Carabineros de Chile General Rodolfo Stange Oelckers (Police Science Academy of *Carabineros*, ACIPOL) in 2020 – demonstrate that, despite regime supporters’ growing social backlash, these groups still enjoy vast amounts of resilience. Salvational memory is still present in current Chile, particularly among the Military and the *Carabineros*.

In August 2018, a group of regime supporters – among them, the pro-dictatorship association 11<sup>th</sup> of September Corporation and relatives of imprisoned military officers – announced they would create a “Museum of Truth” (*Museo de la Verdad*) where they would present their version of the past and pay homage to the victims who died in “terrorist attacks by subversive organisations” (Batarce, 2018a). Although the initiative triggered a massive response by prominent public figures who denounced it as nonsense and offensive, regime supporters still feel they have the ‘same right’ to publicise their memory and commemorate their heroes.

Likewise, in 2020, the *Carabineros* (Police) named their primary police academy in Chile (ACIPOL) with an unmistakable regime symbol: “Rodolfo Stange Oelckers.” It is striking that after the Social Outbreak (2019) – and the condemnation of police brutality in this

context (resembling the dictatorship's worst repressive period) – the *Carabineros* still dared to name ACIPOL with a pro-regime symbol. Stange was a member of the Military Junta between 1985 and 1990. In 1994, President Eduardo Frei demanded Stange's resignation for his cover-up of the *Degollados* case – the murder of three communist activists by police officers in 1985.

On 19 August 2020, a socialist Deputy disclosed the *Carabineros* decree establishing the new ACIPOL name as “Rodolfo Stange Oelckers.” The document mentioned that Stange had been “a prominent individual in the institutional history” and, thus, deserved to have his name honoured (Carabineros de Chile, 2020a). The inauguration of this new pro-regime name for ACIPOL generated intense controversy. The plan was rejected by prominent political figures and various organisations, including the National Institute of Human Rights (INDH) (Cooperativa, 2020b, 2020a, 2020d, 2020c). The former *Intendente* of Santiago pointed out the contradiction of inaugurating a symbol of the authoritarian regime in a context of social unrest where the main objective was, precisely, the elimination of pro-regime legacies: “*We are resignifying our statues and commemorations [...], [but] the Carabineros General Director honours a former member of the dictatorship's Military Junta*” (Vera, 2020) (emphasis added).

The *Carabineros*, nevertheless, ardently defended their decision. They argued that Stange had positively contributed to the institution's development, and assured he had never been convicted of any crime (a similar argument used by the Navy to defend the José Toribio Merino statue) (Catena, 2020; Catena, Jara, et al., 2020; Catena, Muñoz, et al., 2020, 2020;

Catena & Reyes, 2020; Dammert, 2020). Unsurprisingly, various right-wing politicians from UDI and RN supported the *Carabineros*. They regretted that *Carabineros* would give in to a “left-wing tantrum if the measure was reversed” (El Mostrador, 2020c). Finally, and although the Interior Minister – a former civilian collaborator of Pinochet – had not considered the new name as something to be worried about (Catena, Muñoz, et al., 2020), *Carabineros* decided to back down and eventually suspended the decree on 20 August 2020 (Carabineros de Chile, 2020b; Catena & Reyes, 2020; Cooperativa, 2020c; El Baquedano, 2020).

The commemoration of General Stange was not an accident nor a “mistake” (C. Cruz, personal communication, 22 September 2021; Dammert, 2020). Quite the contrary, it speaks of how the Social Outbreak (October – December 2019) intensified the pro-regime nostalgia for order and stability. For the *Carabineros*, Stange embodied the values of discipline and *mano dura* (iron fist) that regime supporters and military institutions currently yearn for. And although this was an undeveloped memorialisation, activists in the human rights camp realised this was not an isolated or accidental expression of regime support, but evidence of the maintenance of pro-regime sentiments in the Military beyond their discursive support for human rights. As mentioned by a centre-left Senator, “the condemnation of the dictatorship cannot and should not be only discursive. A genuine commitment to human rights and democracy involves stopping honouring people who were accomplices [of the dictatorship]” (El Mostrador, 2020b).

## **Descriptive Analysis**


This section looks at the behaviour of inaugurations, denunciations, and eliminations of pro-regime memory sites (and undeveloped sites) over time. It observes these events across the two *longue durées* (Braudel, 2009) or cycles: The “Favourable” (1973 – 2004) and the “Unfavourable Period” (2005 – 2020) for regime supporters.

As seen in Chart 2.1, most pro-regime memory sites were inaugurated<sup>37</sup> during the “Favourable Period” (1973 – 2004) (91%, 32 cases), while the “Unfavourable Period” (2005 – 2020) presents a reduced percentage of inaugurations (9%, just three cases) (see Appendix, pp. 490–491). Indeed, when looking at the “Unfavourable Period” for regime supporters (2005 – 2020), the frequency of inaugurations (3 cases) is concentrated in 2008, with just two cases. This lack of inaugurations is because of a more “Unfavourable Period” for regime supporters (2005 – 2020) in which their capacity to inspire support and enjoy “cultural legitimacy” (Tarrow, 2011, p. 145) was reduced. This is certainly linked to a “thicker” (Klep, 2012, p. 260) human rights movement and a society more conscious of the need to erase regime legacies. Joignant (2007, p. 118) noted that around 2003, commemorations of Pinochet and the regime were already “so tiny that they almost escape the trained eye.” On an 11<sup>th</sup> of September commemoration in 2020 at Escuela Militar (Santiago), when asked why *Pinochetistas* lacked a memorial site to pay homage to the military coup and Pinochet in Santiago, a regime supporter immediately answered: “Because human rights movements won’t let us!” (Thesis fieldwork notes #7, 2020). Thus, most sites were inaugurated during the dictatorship between 1973 and 1989 (19 cases). This outcome is consistent with how

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<sup>37</sup> In the following subsections, the analysis of inaugurations focuses on the period 1973 to 2020. However, given that the focus of the thesis is *survival in democracy*, the discussion of denunciations, eliminations and undeveloped sites, concentrates only on the democratic period between 1990 and 2020.

regime support has behaved in the past 50 years, and how the most suitable conditions for the inauguration of pro-regime memory sites were present during the military regime (1973 – 1990) in which the Military Junta had total control of how and what to commemorate (Bianchini, 2014; Errázuriz & Leiva, 2012; Joignant, 2007). Indeed, Table 2.1 shows that the mean of inaugurations of pro-regime memory sites in the “Favourable Period” is significantly greater (1 memory site per year) than in the unfavourable context (0.2 memory sites per year, almost inexistent).



Context	Inaugurations		Denunciations		Eliminations	
	Mean per year	Mode	Mean per year	Mode	Mean per year	Mode
Favourable period (1973 – 2004)	1.0	Regime and 1993, 1997 and 2000	0.1	n/a	0.1	n/a
Unfavourable period (2005 – 2020)	0.2	2008	1.7	2013	1.3	2019

Chart 2.2 below shows that most pro-regime memory sites were denounced during the “Unfavourable Period” (2005 – 2020) (91%, 29 cases), while the “Favourable Period” (1990 – 2004) presents a minimal percentage of denunciations (9%, three cases) (see Appendix, pp. 491–492). Only three cases were denounced in the favourable context, specifically in 1992,

2000, and 2003. Thus, most denunciations occurred during the “Unfavourable Period” (2005 – 2020). This is an expected outcome, as this context presents the most harmful conditions for regime supporters and more incentives for anti-regime agents (e.g., victims and human rights lawyers) to denounce pro-regime sites. Chart 2.2 reveals a high frequency of denunciations in 2013 and 2018 (eight denunciations in 2013, and five denunciations in 2018). This coincides with 2013 being the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the military coup, the elimination of Av. 11 de Septiembre in Providencia that year, and 2018 marking the resurgence of a “cultural *Pinochetismo*” (Collins, 2018, p. 99).





Table 2.1 shows that 0.1 memory sites per year were denounced in the “Favourable Period”, while the “Unfavourable Period” sees a much greater frequency: 1.7 cases denounced per year since 2005. In democracy, most cases were denounced in 2013 marking the beginning of a highly hostile period for pro-regime commemorations (the critical years, 2013 – 2020).

Chart 2.3 shows that most pro-regime memory sites were eliminated during the “Unfavourable Period” (2005 – 2020) (91%, 20 cases). Contrarily, the “Favourable Period” (1990 – 2004) presents a reduced percentage of eliminations (9%, only 2 cases) (see


Appendix, p. 492). Likewise, Table 2.1 reveals that the “Favourable Period” sees almost inexistent elimination cases (0.1 cases eliminated per year), while the “Unfavourable Period” presents a mean of 1.3 cases eliminated yearly since 2005. The fact that most eliminations occurred during the “Unfavourable Period” (2005 – 2020) is coherent with how regime support has unfolded in the last twenty years, and how this period presents the most harmful conditions for pro-regime memorialisation.



Finally, it is worth noting that when examining Chart 2.4 below (denunciations and eliminations together), the great majority of denunciations and eliminations are concentrated on the right-hand side of the charts: In the “Unfavourable Period” (2005 – 2020), particularly between 2013 and 2020. This indicates that within the “Unfavourable Period” (2005 – 2020), there is a considerably more unfavourable and hostile sub-period for regime commemorations: 2013 – 2020. In the historical section above, this period has been termed the “critical period” for regime supporters, which contains the most aggressive and frequent denunciations and eliminations against pro-regime memorials. Accordingly, Collins and Ordóñez (2021, p. 88) state that the “*despinochetización*” of public space, that is, the

elimination of pro-regime symbols, has accentuated in this subperiod (and especially since 2018):

As we have commented in previous reports (2018, 2019 and 2020), new demands are constantly emerging from sectors of society for the removal of images and tributes to figures associated with the dictatorship and/or directly linked to the perpetration of serious human rights violations.



It is also worth exploring the behaviour of pro-regime memory sites that have neither the ‘survival’ or the ‘elimination’ outcome. These sites are the undeveloped memory sites that, throughout democracy, were planned and discussed but did not materialise. The reasons to abort these memorial plans vary from having no local or ‘popular’ support, fear of social backlash and massive condemnations, and no political support in Congress or the city councils. These cases are not included in the QCA dataset, but the timing of their planning sheds intriguing findings into the dynamics of pro-regime memorialisation. They show – regardless of the fact they were unsuccessful – the continued strength and manifestation of regime support in democracy.

As seen in Chart 2.5 below, there are almost no undeveloped memory sites during the “Favourable Period” for regime supporters (1990 – 2004), with just one case that could not develop in 2004. This is the case of the Jaime Guzmán Memorial in Plaza Italia, Providencia (Metropolitan Region), in 2004. This case is worth exploring as the first time in democracy in which the “survival factors” for pro-regime memorialisation begin to fade away. It also shows how a local community – and eventually a social movement – actively fought against a pro-regime commemorative symbol. The memorial was not developed because of the local rejection and social mobilisation against it.

It is no coincidence that there were no undeveloped pro-regime sites in the “Favourable Period” (1973 – 2004); it would have been unthinkable for pro-regime memory entrepreneurs not to be able to carry out their memorial projects in such a favourable context. However, as the political scenario changed (by the end of the “Favourable Period”, in 2004), developing pro-regime commemorative projects became more difficult. As shown in this chapter, this is demonstrated by the fact several memorial sites planned in 2006 and 2007 were proposed but not developed. Some other memorial plans were proposed in 2018 and 2020, and it is no surprise that they were unsuccessful in such an unfavourable context.




Chart 2.5 also shows that most undeveloped pro-regime memory sites were planned in the first years of the “Unfavourable Period”, between 2006 and 2007. Another peak of undeveloped pro-regime memory sites is seen in 2018 and 2020, revealing the continuity, up until today, of a nostalgic memory associated with the regime (Bustos, 2021). The fact these commemorative plans could not develop highlights the difficulties pro-regime memory entrepreneurs have had since 2005 to materialise their own memorial projects in public space.

Timing is relevant to this research for several reasons. First, it shows that most inaugurations of pro-regime memorials occurred in the “Favourable Period” for regime supporters (1973 – 2005). Second, it demonstrates that most denunciations and eliminations occurred during the “Unfavourable Period” (2005 – 2020). Within this period, a highly unfavourable context for *Pinochetismo* spans between 2013 and 2020 (the “critical years”), which sees the highest frequency of denunciations and eliminations of pro-regime memorials. These findings are consistent with the literature on Chile’s transition and memory politics.

The thesis uses these results to sharpen the research question. We want to solve a puzzle: How and why have these memorials survived in a very unfavourable context (2005 – 2020)? We know one of the reasons for survival is the lack of prohibitive/regulatory laws against pro-regime symbols. However, as discussed in the introduction, this is not enough to explain survival.

## **Legislation Against Pro-regime Memorialisation**

Since 1990, Chilean democracy has seen two explicit legislative attempts to eliminate pro-regime memorialisation: 2010 and 2014. On 27 July 2010, a group of centre-left Deputies in the Chamber of Deputies proposed Law Project 7080-17 which “Prohibits all symbols and monuments that honour the members of the Military Junta who ruled Chile between 1973 and 1990.” The project demanded the elimination of images, plaques, statues, and shields that honoured Pinochet or any other member of the Junta in public spaces, educational spaces, or military institutions and buildings. The exception was private space in which commemorations would be allowed, but public space would now officially belong only to victims (Traverso, 2021, p. 57). By determining the private/public separation, this piece of legislation reinforced the stigmatisation of pro-regime commemoration which was now seen as “ritually polluted, to be avoided, especially in public spaces” (Goffman, 1986 [1963], p. 1).

At the outset, the legislative draft refers to the Supreme Court’s ruling regarding commander Prat’s assassination by the DINA in 1974. The legislative project established that Pinochet had governed with the help of an “illicit association”, the DINA (Cámara de Diputadas y Diputados, 2010, p. 1). The draft mentions that “this ruling [by the Supreme Court against the DINA] ratifies the position that those who reject the military regime have had for years” (p. 1). It also says that the commander-in-chief of the Army, General Fuente-Alba, has condemned Prats’s assassination, showing how the Armed Forces have changed (p. 1). For these Deputies, society had finally accepted the discourse against the regime, legitimising the need to regulate pro-regime memorialisation. The document also mentions that Chile should

follow Argentina (Kirchners' government) and Spain (the Historical Memory Law of 2007) in their fight against pro-regime memorialisation. Thus, the Law Project reflected how foreign progress in human rights affected Chilean internal affairs.

One of the most striking aspects of this legislative project is that it hints at the need for a concordance between discourse and practice. It argues it is not enough for the Military to “say” they respect human rights or condemn Pinochet’s secret police (DINA). These speeches should be accompanied by symbolic gestures and actions to eliminate pro-Pinochet commemorations from military institutions. Point five of the document mentions that

However, we believe that concrete acts must accompany this attitude [of discursive condemnation]. It is unacceptable, for instance, that this institution [the Military] maintains in its military precincts the figure of the person in charge of this illicit association, General Augusto Pinochet (Cámara de Diputados y Diputados, 2010, p. 1).

The second attempt to eliminate pro-regime memorialisation came on 25 November 2014 – not coincidentally, on the anniversary of Pinochet’s birthday – with the Law Project that “Prohibits the homage and/or exaltation of the civic-military dictatorship” (Cariola, 2014)<sup>38</sup>. Again, the project was proposed by left and centre-left Deputies<sup>39</sup>, but, unlike the previous attempt, it was more ambitious and aggressive. This ambitiousness is connected to a context of heightened sensibility after the condemnation of Miguel Krassnoff’s book launch in 2011, the *Caupolicanazo* in 2012; the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the military coup (11 September 2013); and after a new generation of left-wing politicians rose to power and were elected Deputies for the period 2014 – 2018 (among them, current president Gabriel Boric). Indeed, the

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<sup>38</sup> Law Draft 9746-17, legislation period 362, merged with project 11949-17.

<sup>39</sup> Communist Party, Socialist Party, Party for Democracy, and Christian Democrats.

project was actively promoted by Karol Cariola, a communist Deputy and 2011 student leader. She named the project “No street will have your name” (*Ninguna calle llevará tu nombre*), alluding directly to Augusto Pinochet or anyone who participated in the coup or the dictatorship.

The project had much stronger wording than the one used in the 2010 project. It regarded the 1973 – 1990 period as a “civic-military dictatorship” or “totalitarian regime” instead of just a “military regime”, and tackled commemorations of members of the Military Junta and also “authors, accomplices and abettors” (Cariola, 2014, p. 2). Thus, it expanded the idea of perpetrators to civilian participation. Moreover, the project broadened the meaning of commemorations to include not only objects or sites but also commemorative “activities” or “acts of honour, apology or praise”, as well as names of institutions, ships, aeroplanes, and public spaces (e.g., streets). The draft argued that society has “evolved”; thus, pro-regime commemorations in public places have become unbearable. Finally, in contrast with the previous project – which did not introduce any punishments – this one establishes “minor prison in its maximum degree” for publicly exposing or publicising pro-regime commemorations (pp. 2–5). Thus, the project impelled society to condemn the state’s and the Armed Forces’ ambiguous commitment to human rights.

Both law projects were fruitless: The first one (2010) was archived<sup>40</sup>, and the second one (2014), although it was merged with a second project (Law Draft N° 11949-17), is still in the

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<sup>40</sup> The project had its first constitutional step on 27 June 2010. It was immediately transferred to the Human Rights, Nationality and Citizenship commission, and then to the Culture and Arts Commission. In June 2013, the Culture and Arts Commission finally archived the project (Cámara de Diputadas y Diputados, 2010).

initial stage (first constitutional step) of a long process. Thus, currently, Chile has no legislation to eliminate pro-regime memorialisation.

Despite their failure, these attempts at erasing pro-regime commemorations are relevant for several reasons. First, the impossibility of passing a law to regulate pro-regime memorialisation reflects the “ambiguous” and “reactive” stance of the Chilean state in memorialising the past (Bianchini, 2014; Collins & Hite, 2013a, pp. 162–187). The state has tried to avoid the memorial “issue” as much as possible. This also explains why most of the memorialisation efforts for victims have come from civil society and private actors (Collins & Hite, 2013a, p. 162). This reticence may explain why, up to now, there is no systematic and consistent legislation to fund victims’ memorial projects, or why there is still no protection for victims’ sites against increasing acts of vandalism (Collins & Ordóñez, 2021, p. 31). Indeed, Collins and Hite (2013b, p. 138) argue that such weak state policy regarding memorialisation is a breeding ground to “assign equal validity to other versions of, and explanations for, recent political violence”, such as pro-regime memorialisation.

Secondly, these two legislative attempts (2010, 2014) show how, since 2010, and particularly after 2013, a greater social condemnation against the regime and its icons has taken root. As noted in the historical background section, after 2013 being a regime supporter became a dreadful stigma. In 2018, a right-wing Deputy complained to the Chamber of Deputies about the growing wave of demands to eliminate pro-regime memorials. For him, this attitude deviates from the ‘memory pact’ agreed upon since the transition. The Deputy argued that

Lately, we have seen Resolution Projects that oppose what has historically been approved in the Chamber of Deputies. This is inconceivable. It does not correspond and is far from what our

parliamentary activity has been doing during these years (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional - Cámara de Diputados, 2018, p. 17).

As mentioned in the historical background section, the memory pact consisted of “pragmatic politics” (Wilde, 2013, p. 82) based on an implicit agreement in which both ‘sides’ were allowed to commemorate, having each side their own memorial space. Thus, each memory had its own monuments, narratives, and areas of performance and memorialisation. As argued by the Chilean sculptor of Merino and Allende’s commemorations, “everyone has the right to have a statue” (Escobedo, 2018). However, in 2018, and as noted by the right-wing Deputy mentioned above, this negotiation/memory pact had crumbled. According to him, the pact’s breakdown debilitated the democratic traditions of Chilean society. Yet, to this Deputy’s relief, none of the anti-pro-regime memorialisation laws progressed beyond initial discussions.

These two unsuccessful legislative projects (2010 and 2014) demonstrate how pro-regime memorialisation is a thorny issue that politicians may sometimes be open to discuss but will generally not want to tackle with concrete and direct actions. Pro-regime memorialisation remains taboo: It exists, but it is hard to address and talk about. It generates political controversies and enemies, and may annoy everyday citizens indifferent to these issues and who would prefer “more urgent” legislation to be passed.

Thus, in the absence of these regulatory laws, in the past 30 years in Chile there has been an implicit policy of adding new victims’ memorials without removing perpetrators’ memory sites. Such a strategy is similar to South Africa’s policy towards the traumatic past. Here,

“the process of removal [of pro-apartheid monuments] is acknowledged as being contentious and divisive, whereas the installation of new [victims’] monuments is presented as inclusive, unifying act, conducing to nation-building and reconciliation” (Marschall, 2009, p. 144). Thus, in South Africa, several pro-apartheid monuments have not been removed but rather have gradually suffered a “loss of symbolic status” (Grundlingh, 2001, p. 107). Such an indirect strategy – also employed in Chile – is more manageable, less controversial and less problematic. Yet, especially since 2005, this solution has become unbearable for victims and those who fight in the human rights camp. They say there is an immense contradiction that must be resolved. Such contradiction emanates from the type of transition and democracy Chile has had, aiming at reconciliation, coexistence, silence, and “formula” (Stern 2013, 2010, 2006).

At this point, it could be argued that the absence of a law prohibiting pro-regime commemorations explains why these sites that still survive in democratic Chile. In other words, pro-regime memory sites could perhaps survive because there is no law demanding their elimination. However, the absence of a prohibitive law does not explain the current survival of pro-regime memorialisation for two reasons<sup>41</sup>. First, there have been eliminations of pro-regime memorials in the past years in Chile without the need for any law (see Appendix, p. 492). Secondly, even if there were a law prohibiting pro-regime memorialisations, this would not guarantee their elimination. In other words, many pro-

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<sup>41</sup> In some cases, laws can be very effective in maintaining pro-regime memorialisation, like in the US. For instance, “laws in some states make removing Confederate symbols extremely difficult, including in South Carolina, where a law written in 2000 requires two-thirds of legislators to approve any removal” (Berkowitz & Blanco, 2020). Thus, in the US, removing pro-Confederate statues is an “uphill battle” because legislation guarantees their survival (Schrader et al., 2021). However, the findings offered by this thesis may still help explain other cases in which there are no laws (Chile), or where memory laws are weak (Spain).

regime memorials would still survive even with a law. This is the case in Spain. Since issuing the Historical Memory Law<sup>42</sup> in 2007, over 1,000 pro-Francoist commemorations are still in the same sites where Franco placed them<sup>43</sup> (Aguilar, 2019 [2008], p. 432; Rivas, 2021), and fascists and falangists still unashamedly gather around Franco's tomb (now in Mingorrubio cemetery) to celebrate his deeds and leave flowers (Alija, 2016, p. 107; Hite, 2008, p. 118; Ranz, 2020, p. 23). Some of the most iconic pro-Francoist commemorations have taken more than 13 years to be eliminated since the issuing of the law, as is the case of Franco's statue in Melilla (removed as recent as 2021). Similarly, in the case of Romania, despite an anti-far-right memorial law in 2002, "the legal constrictions have not stopped the public glorification of the legionaries [...] to the present day" (Zavatti, 2021, p. 954).

Thus, survival may depend more on other factors than just the absence of regulatory law. Furthermore, it also depends on the quality of the law as there might be several loopholes that regime supporters could identify and exploit to guarantee the survival of their commemorations (Ranz, 2017, p. 280).

This is not to argue that laws are unnecessary. They are, of course, relevant factors. The 2019 Human Rights Report of Universidad Diego Portales denounced that expressions of denialism in Chile have grown in some sectors of society, suggesting this may be because

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<sup>42</sup> As noted by Aguilar (2019 [2008], p. 86), the law's correct name is: "Law that recognises and expands rights and establishes measures in favour of those who suffered persecution or violence during the Civil War or the Dictatorship."

<sup>43</sup> Articles 15 and 16 of Law 52/2007, of 26 December 2007, state that public administrations should remove "shields, insignias, plaques and other objects or commemorative mentions of exaltation, personal or collective, of the military uprising, the Civil War and the repression of the Dictatorship", and that no commemorative celebrations of "the Civil War, its protagonists, or the Franco regime" are allowed at the Valley of the Fallen (Ley de Memoria Histórica, 2007).

“the regulation of expressions that pay homage to people associated with the dictatorship and its crimes has not seen major progress” (Centro de DD.HH. UDP, 2019, p. 12). This quote hints at the importance of such regulations. When appropriately written and when containing few loopholes, legislation can effectively regulate pro-regime memorialisation. Still, this thesis asserts that to explain the survival of pro-regime memorials it is necessary to consider more than just a *legalist* viewpoint. Thus, the phenomenon’s political, geographical, social, judicial, and cultural dimensions should also be investigated to understand why pro-regime memorialisation survives.

At an international level, no concrete instrument demands that states eliminate pro-regime memorialisation. This is probably because it would affect freedom of expression. Yet, in judicial proceedings – against the statue of Merino and the commemorations to Manuel Contreras – victims in Chile usually mention the obligation of states to promote and safeguard “guarantees of non-repetition” of human rights violations. Specifically, they refer to Resolution 60/147 of the United Nations General Assembly (General Assembly, 2006)<sup>44</sup> as the main instrument to justify the elimination of pro-regime memorials. This Resolution determines victims’ right to have access to justice and their right to physical and mental wellbeing beyond mere legal and economic compensations. It also urges states to continue with their public memorialisation policies and to avoid processes that would re-traumatise victims.

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<sup>44</sup> “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law” (Resolution 60/147, 2006).

Thus, in judicial proceedings against pro-regime symbols, victims usually focus on subsection N° 23 of section IX of the Resolution, which elaborates on “Reparation for harm suffered” and guarantees of non-repetition. This section requires states to guarantee “strengthening the independence of the Judiciary”, to facilitate “human rights and international humanitarian law education to all sectors of society”, and to advance “the observance of codes of conduct and ethical norms, in particular international standards, by public servants” (General Assembly, 2006, p. 8). When citing this Resolution, victims specifically mention sections (a) and (e) of point N° 23, which demand states to (a) decrease the Military’s autonomy and (e) boost human rights education, especially in the Armed Forces. All these measures aim to reduce the degree of military autonomy and the power of veto players, as well as increase the capacity of anti-regime memory entrepreneurs and civil society to exert pressure to achieve transitional justice goals. These measures also aim to improve education and awareness of human rights (especially at the state level) and generate an effective social control increasing the political and social costs of violating human rights. Moreover, article VII of this Resolution, which is also frequently used by victims in Courts, states that “remedies for gross violations” include “(b) adequate, effective and prompt reparation for harm suffered”, by which the states should do everything possible to comprehensively repair the victims (p. 6). This would, indirectly, include the elimination of pro-regime memorialisation that damages victims’ emotional wellbeing and society’s guarantees for non-repetition.

The active use of Resolution 60/147 in judicial cases by victims of the dictatorship demonstrates the deepening knowledge they have of international instruments to counter pro-

regime memorials, and the “creative” and “innovative” ways in which they present these instruments for their purposes of reparations and guarantees of non-repetition (C. Collins, personal communication, 27 September 2021; Payne et al., 2019, pp. 1–18, 2022). In the case of Merino, victims demanded the statue’s elimination as it showed Merino as an example to follow and thus violated the guarantees of non-repetition:

[It is] in a place intended precisely for education, such as the Maritime Museum in Valparaíso, [and] conspires directly against the education of all sectors of society regarding human rights, especially against the Armed Forces’ education. Education as a medium that offers guarantees of non-repetition is contemplated in letter e) [of Resolution 60/147] (Rendón, 2019a, pp. 9–10).

Likewise, Resolution 60/147 was used against the commemorations of Manuel Contreras inside Army facilities: “[Contrera’s commemorations] fulfil a nefarious role: to show him to the new generations of Army officers and troops as a normal and decent officer, [that is], a meritorious officer who fulfilled his duty” (Rendón, 2019b, p. 5). Although victims used similar arguments in both cases, in 2019 the Court of Appeals ruled to eliminate Contreras’s commemorations, but it ordered the maintenance of the José Toribio Merino statue (in 2020). The survival of Merino’s statue (until 2022) is explained in Chapter Five.

### **Discourses Justifying the Survival of Pro-regime Memory Sites**

Having analysed Chile’s historical background and memory struggles, and having unpacked the different legislative attempts to regulate pro-regime memorialisation, it is now necessary to explore how the groups who advocate for the survival of pro-regime monuments employ discursive strategies to justify and legitimise their position. Due to the stigmatisation associated with pro-regime memory, it is unlikely that support for these sites will be framed

in terms of salvational memory or outright defence of the regime. Thus, supporters usually employ five strategies to defend pro-regime memorials: *sanitisation*, *splitting*, *Authorised Heritage Discourse (AHD)*, *division* and *legalist* discourses.

*Sanitisation* is the strategy in which the pro-regime memorial is stripped away of any political connotation. Without political meanings, the pro-regime memorial's potential stigmatisation is reduced and it can appear in public space without being condemned. This is achieved in two ways.

First, *sanitisation* creates a drastic separation between history and memory. History is associated with objective and undeniable facts which must be learnt “whether you like it or not.” If history is ‘objective’ and cannot be denied, then memory sites representing history should not be eliminated and must be protected. Pulling them out would signify a denial of history, something considered unacceptable. Accordingly, people linked to pro-regime memory tend to use the word “history” much frequently than “memory” when referring to the recent past. For them, memory belongs to victims, but they belong to history as history represents, in their eyes, the objective “truth” (Milton, 2018, p. 38)<sup>45</sup>. Milton (2018, p. 38, emphasis added) noted that “what they want is that the past be remembered *correctly*.”

Examples of the separation between memory and history, and the association of the pro-regime sites with the latter, abound. For instance, a right-wing city councillor who defended

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<sup>45</sup> In her study of military memory in Perú, Milton (2018, p. 137) also noted that the Military is more inclined to a “traditional” way of understanding the opposition between memory and history, which also relates to their “traditional” understanding of heritage.

the maintenance of Av. 11 de Septiembre in Providencia (Santiago, Chile) in 2013 argued that “there is a street in Providencia called the Republic of Cuba, and it has not been changed. [Cuba] is no longer a Republic, *but we cannot erase history.*” Her argument emphasised that, since the street name “Republic of Cuba” has not been changed (because *it is part of history*), the same logic should be applied to the pro-regime name 11 de Septiembre, which, in her view, is part of history too (CNN Chile, 2013b, emphasis added). Similarly, when Almirante Lorenzo Gotuzzo Street was changed to Teacher Amanda Labarca<sup>46</sup> in 2016, a right-wing city councillor complaint that “I’m against the city council’s decision, [...] one cannot *erase Chile’s history at the stroke of a pen*” (Mediabanco, 2016, emphasis added). Likewise, in Spain, the “history” argument has been extensively used by the *Partido Popular* (centre-right) and Vox (far-right) to defend the maintenance of pro-Francoist commemorations. For instance, Vox voted against the measure of removing Franco’s statue in Melilla “because it’s history” that must be maintained and respected (Bartolomé, 2021a).

Secondly, in addition to placing pro-regime sites in the realm of history, *sanitisation* is also achieved by removing the ‘pro-regime’ elements from the commemoration. In this strategy, the memory site no longer bears the weight of pro-regime symbols; thus, it should no longer be considered a candidate for elimination. For instance, it has become evident that to protect the tomb of Gonzalo Queipo de Llano i Sierra at the Basilica de la Macarena (Spain), the priesthood in charge of its maintenance changed the text on the tombstone over time. Queipo – a prominent military man who fought for the Nationalist side in the Spanish Civil War –

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<sup>46</sup> Amanda Crispina del Carmen Pinto Sepúlveda was a prominent teacher and feminist of the 20<sup>th</sup> century in Chile.

went from being “Lieutenant General” to just “Honorary Big Brother”, distancing him from Franco’s regime and presenting him less pro-Francoist (Castillo, 2017). Likewise, the iconic Monument to Franco in Santa Cruz de Tenerife has changed its name over time to decrease its association with Francoism. The monument passed from being “Monument to Franco” and “Monument to Victory”, to “Monument of the Fallen Angel” (Antequera, 2018).

Aside from *sanitisation*, a second discursive strategy to defend pro-regime memorialisation is the *splitting* of the commemorated object. Here, the object has two identities: A political identity associated with the regime, and an apolitical or neutral identity, for instance, related to their profession or with another period in history. Those who use the *splitting* strategy argue that what is being commemorated in the object is *not* the political identity but its “other” neutral identity. This approach sanitises the object and presents it as a harmless and objective truth.

For instance, to defend the maintenance of the statue of Admiral Merino outside the National Maritime Museum in Valparaíso (Chile), one of the arguments outlined by the Navy in 2019 was that the statue paid tribute to Merino in his capacity as the commander-in-chief of the Navy, and *not* as a political leader and member of the Military Junta during the dictatorship (1973 – 1990). This argument divided Merino into two identities: The first Merino was a neutral Almirante or Navy commander, whilst the second Merino was a political actor who led a dictatorship. According to the Navy, the statue only pays homage to the first identity (the “neutral military man”). Thus, the existence of the figure is presented as rational and legitimate. However, the plaintiff questioned this argument. Throughout the legal process, he

found that there were only two statues of Navy commanders in the Navy: of General Cochrane (an English general who served in the Chilean Navy in the 19<sup>th</sup> century), and of José Toribio Merino. The complainant argued that if the Navy had a tradition of paying homage to its commanders in chief of the Navy, there would certainly be many more statues. This meant that the tribute to Merino was more than an innocent homage to a commander of the Army, and that it had political connotations due to his role as a member of the Military Junta and leader of the neoliberal reforms during dictatorship (Rendón, 2019a, p. 12). Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals agreed with the Navy saying that Merino's commemoration was not honouring him as a Junta leader. The Court argued that there were two different interpretations which had to be respected: the Navy interpreted Merino simply as a military man, while victims saw him as a political figure member of the Junta. According to the Court, this double identity was absolutely reasonable. Thus, the Court accepted that Merino's political elements were absent in his statue and endorsed a sanitised version which transformed him into a simple commander-in-chief of the Navy and nothing else. Victims received this reasoning as a bucket of cold water.

A similar situation occurred with the statue of Franco in Melilla, Spain. The statue was approved in 1977 by Melilla's city council. The city council referred to the need for "a monument to the memory of Francisco Franco, alluding to his years spent in Africa" (Bartolomé, 2021b). According to its defenders – amongst them, the Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco, Plataforma Millán Astray, Vox and the PP – the city council's archival records explicitly show that the statue is a tribute to Franco in his capacity as commander of the Spanish Legion and for his role in repelling the Rif Tribes (Morocco) from invading

Melilla in 1921. In their view, this was totally unrelated with the posterior coup and dictatorship; thus, the statue does not violate the Historical Memory Law (HML). Indeed, during the city council discussions in 1977, the purpose of the statue changed from being dedicated to “*Generalísimo* Franco” – a title directly associated with his dictatorship – to “commander Francisco Franco, a hero in the African [military] campaigns and Melilla’s liberator” (Guzmán & Rivas, 2017). The statue’s defenders used this change in meaning to promote the idea that the figure had no connection to paying tribute to Franco as leader of the coup and the dictatorship. Thus, they resorted to a *splitting* of Franco in which only his non-political identity – his military identity as “saviour” of Melilla – was being honoured.

Despite these arguments, in December 2020, the *Asociación Memorialista Ranz Orosas* (AMRO) filed an appeal against the Melilla Government demanding the elimination of Franco’s statue. In January 2021, the Government approved the removal of the figure, but *Partido Popular* (PP) and VOX (right-wing parties) disapproved of the initiative. In February 2021, the Assembly voted to eliminate the statue; PP abstained and VOX rejected the idea (Estaire, 2021). The statue was finally removed on 23 February 2021.

The third discourse used to defend pro-regime memorialisation is the *Authorised Heritage Discourse* (AHD). The concept was coined by cultural heritage scholar Laurajane Smith (2006), and refers to how we accept certain things as “heritage” as long as they abide by specific canons established by the Western world. Thus, we usually understand heritage as linked to official history, and that it must be monumental, architectural, and tangible. Before the AHD lens, heritage is not a cultural construction, but a given, and as such, it cannot be eliminated nor transformed because it has “essential” values (p. 44). These allegedly intrinsic

values are considered superior even in the face of ethical demands for eliminating pro-regime memorials by victims. Under the AHD, heritage is deemed irreplaceable and essential.

Whenever the site is valued as heritage because of its monumental architecture, antiquity, or its linkage to relevant historical events, the AHD states that such sites should be preserved and maintained. Thus, the memory site is stripped of its political values which are replaced by more neutral and 'universal', uncontested Western values.

It is no surprise that those who defend pro-regime memorials – whatever their real motivations and feelings towards the regime – generally use the AHD to assure the survival of these sites. This discourse strongly legitimises memory sites and makes it more difficult to argue for their removal. The discourse focuses on values that will make the pro-regime site worth keeping. The site becomes not a memorial site but a heritage site that should be preserved as a testimony of human genius or human history. In Spain, groups and individuals defending pro-Francoist symbols have used the AHD profusely to justify their maintenance. They draw on article 15.2 of the Historical Memory Law which maintains that symbols with artistic or historical value should be preserved (even if they are pro-Francoist). Thus, for instance, in Salamanca (Spain) in 2017, the PP rejected the removal of Franco's bust from a mural in the plenary hall for considering it part of the city's artistic heritage (La Crónica de Salamanca, 2017).

The touristic potential of memory sites is closely associated with the AHD. A pro-regime memorial can become a touristic site and gain 'touristic' value whenever the site is considered heritage. For instance, one of the arguments used to defend the maintenance and

use of the Valley of the Fallen in Spain is the systematic touristification it has experienced since its creation. Indeed, the Valley of the Fallen has become part of a touristic network benefiting the surrounding communities (Fuentes Vega, 2017). Vegas Fuentes (2017, p. 78) notes that the “touristification process was made possible through a renegotiation of the monument’s meaning, from a scenography of victory and power to a heritage site.” Thus, the site’s political values were downplayed and neutralised (p. 86). A similar situation occurs with the Voortrekker monument in South Africa. The monument “has been negotiated” as “heritage”; that is, it was stripped off from its political meanings, thus becoming more neutral and more capable of surviving (Grundlingh, 2001, p. 109). Grundlingh (2001, p. 108) asserts that “its status as a tourist site sanitises the monument and places it outside the arena of contested history.”

The *division* discourse is also used to justify the survival of pro-regime memorialisation. This discourse states that eliminating pro-regime memorials would produce division in society. This division translates into confrontations, heated debates, and open wounds that had already been closed. The obvious conclusion of this reasoning is that, as the elimination of pro-regime memorials brings about hatred and social animosities, they should be maintained. This discourse is based on the premise that society is in a state of social harmony. Elimination reverses and interrupts such a state of unity and cohesion. Thus, on the part of those who defend the maintenance of the pro-regime memorials, they raise the idea that elimination “generates hatred”, “generates division”, and “opens wounds.” For instance, Wildeboer and Dujisin (2022, pp. 13–16) note that, in Spain, the division discourse raised by conservative and right-wing sectors is associated with the “desecrated democracy” narrative.

This narrative states that the elimination of pro-Francoist symbols damages democracy, and it is seen as an “opportunistic reopening of old wounds in an already healed society” (p. 16). In this right-wing view, pro-regime symbols should be maintained to ward off a civil war temptation (Aguilar, 2019 [2008], p. 77). Thus, for this group, divisions would come *after* elimination. Contrarily, those who advocate for eliminating pro-regime memorials believe that society is currently divided and stress that its division is caused precisely by the survival of dictatorial symbols. The solution is, therefore, the removal of pro-regime sites. Only then will peace and social cohesion be achieved. Hence, while defenders of pro-regime symbols argue that elimination produces “no progress and revives old wounds” (Ahumada, 2013), anti-regime agents say that pro-regime symbols should be eliminated as they “divide society and create anxieties” (Municipalidad de Providencia, 2013b, p. 9).

The *legalist* discourse is another strategy used by groups defending pro-regime memorials. The discourse supposes a formal and reduced interpretation of the law that leaves no room for ethics. Here, it is argued that maintaining pro-regime symbols is palatable, legitimate, valid and reasonable since no legal mechanism requires their elimination. Therefore, even though the existence of these pro-regime symbols could, in some cases, cause serious psychological harm to victims, this situation collides with the *legalist* discourse that considers their maintenance as decidedly legal and valid. A clear example of the use of a *legalist* discourse is found in the case of the plaques and photographs of Manuel Contreras. The Army defended their maintenance by saying that “the institution with its actions has not violated any rule” (Comandancia en Jefe del Ejército de Chile, 2019, p. 11). It was indeed

legal to maintain these commemorations as no legislation prohibited their existence. However, ethically, such legalism concealed that Manuel Contreras died in prison serving a 400-year sentence for directing Pinochet's repressive police (DINA) and for having commanded and carried out tortures, executions, and disappearances in Chile and abroad. Thus, when used uncritically, the *legalist* discourse jeopardises comprehensive reparations for victims of human rights violations.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter first described Chile's different memory camps focusing on salvational memory and *Pinochetismo*. The chapter then asserted that it is possible to divide the memory scenario in Chile into two prominent memories: Victims and pro-regime. This thesis focuses on pro-regime memorials, which are linked to the latter.

As detailed in the historical background section of this chapter, Chile's recent history is divided into two memory cycles: The "Favourable Period" for regime supporters (1973 – 2004) and the "Unfavourable Period" (2005 – 2020). The chapter also shows that the frequency of inaugurations, denunciations, eliminations, and undeveloped pro-regime sites, depends on the historical context. For instance, it showed that the highest frequency of inaugurations occurred in the "Favourable Period" (1973 – 2004) —precisely because this context favoured regime supporters. Contrarily, most denunciations and eliminations occurred in the "Unfavourable Period" (2005 – 2020). This context placed regime supporters in a disadvantaged political position. Likewise, the highest frequency of undeveloped pro-regime memory sites occurred by the end of the "Favourable" and the beginning of the

“Unfavourable Period”, marking a moment of transition for salvational memory. In this context (around 2004 – 2007), regime supporters still felt legitimate but were not as successful as they used to be in having public recognition.

Although between 2005 and around 2010 *Pinochetistas* remained relatively marginal and silent, this began to change in 2018. Today, they have strengthened their reactionary sentiments and authoritarian nostalgia. This was evident in the *Rechazo* against a new constitution demonstrations by the end of 2019 and 2020.

The chapter also discussed Congress’s initiatives to ban pro-regime memorialisation. Thus far, none of these projects has been passed. The absence of legislation has had several implications, among them, the lack of state action and the fact victims’ judicial claims have had to use international instruments to justify the elimination of pro-regime memorials (e.g., Resolution 60/147).

Finally, the chapter analyses the main discourses justifying the survival of pro-regime memorialisation: the *sanitisation, splitting, Authorised Heritage Discourse* (AHD), *division* and *legalist* discourses. This section shows that pro-regime memorials are legitimated through specific narratives justifying their survival.

## **CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE SURVIVAL (AND ELIMINATION) OF PRO-REGIME MEMORIALS**

### **Introduction**

This chapter elaborates on the theoretical frameworks used in the thesis to explain the survival and elimination of pro-regime memorials. The explanatory factors for survival are four and refer to different structural and agentic aspects: “Protective Location”, “Silence”, “Local and/or Institutional Support”, and “Walls.” This section also presents the factors that explain the elimination of pro-regime memorialisation: “Unprotective Location”, “Social Noise”, “Local and/or Institutional Rejection”, “Windows of Opportunity”, and “Denunciation During the Critical Years.” Because of the topic’s novelty, these nine explanatory factors draw on previous theoretical knowledge stemming from the fields of the sociology of memory, transitional justice, and cultural heritage studies. Each explanatory factor is illustrated using different case studies of pro-regime memorials in Chile (and Spain).

This chapter also unpacks the survival explanatory factors in survival and eliminated cases. It uncovered that “Local and/or Institutional Support” and “Walls” act as necessary and sufficient factors, respectively. At the same time, both “Protective Location” and “Silence” would need to combine to create a sufficient condition for survival. These findings set the stage for the development of QCA in the following chapters.

Before delving into the chapter, it is relevant to note that there is a void regarding the factors that explain the survival and elimination of pro-regime memorials; there is no solid and clear

initial theoretical framework. As described in previous chapters, the analysis of memory sites has mostly been cultural or semiotic, excluding a more sociological approach focusing on the factors that allow their (non) existence. Regarding Confederate monuments, there have been attempts to explain the conditions under which they are eliminated or under which they survive. Still, these attempts constitute hypotheses that exclude systematic and empirical comparisons between cases. For instance, it has been stated that pro-Confederate monuments survive thanks to strict legislation preventing their removal, or are eliminated in contexts of extreme social turmoil (Evans, 2021). These theories are helpful but cannot fully explain the phenomenon.

In Spain, for instance, historians and human rights lawyers have said that the survival of pro-Francoist memorialisation is due to “impunity”: “Like limpets, Franco’s symbols survive clinging, in part, thanks to the prevailing impunity” (Baquero, 2017). In Chile, in addition to the arguments regarding the absence of legislation or the permanence of pro-regime memory, it has also been suggested that the survival of pro-regime memorialisation responds to a lack of political will and a compulsion to “turn a blind” eye to these kinds of issues. Thus, it is easier to turn a blind eye and promote victims’ memorials instead of erasing these pro-regime symbols.

Such a “blind-eye” culture certainly exists. When speaking against the plaques and photographs of Manuel Contreras in 2019, Deputy Brito demanded the attention of his “parliamentarian colleagues”, who were looking at their cell phones and not paying attention while he was speaking about the need to regulate pro-regime memorialisation (Biblioteca del

Congreso Nacional, 2019, p. 10). Likewise, the Presidents of Chile have never been interested in how the Armed Forces commemorate their military personnel (providing space for the commemoration of human rights violators), and they have shown little interest in responding to the letters of human rights organisations demanding the elimination of pro-regime memorials such as Merino's statue. On 11 August 2014, a member of Cine Forum complained that "the President...[behaves] as if it were raining, there is not the slightest response [to our letter sent in June 2014]" (Cine Forum Cine Otro, 2014b). Also, there has been no solid political condemnation against pro-regime memorialisations. For instance, the documentary premiere in honour of Pinochet in 2012 (the *Caupolicanazo*) was defended by authorities based on freedom of expression, saying that "there are no reasons to suspend or prohibit the exhibition of the Pinochet documentary" (T13, 2012). Also, although the right-wing has tried to distance itself from pro-regime memory since Pinochet's demise in 2004, they still have a hard time condemning pro-regime memorialisation. In 2014, for instance, a right-wing Deputy performed a "minute of silence" at the Chamber of Deputies to honour Pinochet's death anniversary. In an interview with *The Clinic*, he said that his peers tolerated his commemoration: "They [right-wing Deputies] knew and did not object. I warned everyone through the chat" (Gallo, 2014).

Still, impunity or the "turn a blind eye" culture are vague concepts that should be operationalised into more concrete elements or actions. Therefore, this section offers a comprehensive exposition of explanatory factors to fill the void and provide a theoretical framework to explain the phenomenon of pro-regime memorialisation survival (and elimination).

The variables were elaborated drawing on previous theory and literature from cultural memory, cultural heritage studies, and cultural sociology. Also, the model's specification was done in parallel to data collection. Empirical findings in the data collection process, particularly secondary sources, were instrumental in shaping these factors (Hicks et al., 1995; Rihoux & Lobe, 2009, p. 232; Schneider & Wagemann, 2010, p. 403). Schneider and Wagemann (2010, p. 401) note that “familiarity with cases makes it easier to identify analytically relevant conditions.” Accordingly, the factors were adjusted, “updated”, and reformed in an iterative manner in which I constantly went back to the cases (Wagemann & Schneider, 2010, p. 379). Throughout this iteration, I also ensured there were no omitted conditions or non-essential factors. Finally, I used my “sociological imagination” to ensure the factors were plausible in Chile and abroad (Mills, 2000 [1959]).

The thesis considers that the explanatory factors – four for survival and five for elimination – are all equally relevant. In research that employs QCA, “conditions do not compete against each other in a race for explaining more of the variation in an outcome” (Ragin, 2014, p. xxvii). Instead, it is expected that these conditions will each play a role in the outcome by combining in different ways to create equifinal paths (Wagemann & Schneider, 2010, pp. 382–383). This is because, as the most suitable “candidate” explanations (Beach, 2018, p. 67), each explanatory factor is potentially meaningful for all the cases (Ragin, 2014, p. 137). In other words, the explanatory factors used in QCA are not trivial conditions. Thus, in the subsequent chapters, I will test how these explanatory factors combine to explain the survival and elimination of pro-regime sites. Ragin (2014, p. 123) summarises this idea succinctly: “In the

Boolean approach this competition between theories [explanatory factors] is transcended. [...] The typical end product of Boolean analysis is a statement of the limits of causal variables identified with different theories, not their mechanical rejection or acceptance.”

In QCA, an appropriate framework should consider conditions – or explanatory factors – from different fields and perspectives. Hite and Cesarini (2004b, p. 7) mentioned that “institutionalist and culturalist analyses are currently required to achieve a richer understanding of authoritarian legacies.” Thus, the factors range from the more structural to the more agentic (see Table 3.3). Likewise, the conditions are not specific to a country (Chile); they can be potentially used in other contexts (Slater & Ziblatt, 2013, p. 1311).

## **Explanatory Factors for the Survival of Pro-regime Memorialisation**

### *Protective Location (PL)*

This first explanatory factor for survival – “Protective Location” – shows that pro-regime memorials would most likely survive if they are located in areas where they could be protected. Specifically, they would survive in areas with little public attention or prominence, or in low-profile areas where most of the access would be restricted to regime supporters or a few people.

A memory site’s geographical, social and political location in space is not a random fact (Forest & Johnson, 2002, p. 536; Fuentes Vega, 2017; Harvey, 1979, p. 19; Macdonald, 2009, p. 15; Szpunar, 2010, p. 384). Sites of memory are “topographical” in that they are intimately connected to the space in which they are located (Nora, 1989, p. 22). Pro-regime

memory sites are no exception in this regard. Pro-regime memorial leaders may want to place/erect their memorials in spaces that offer protection from vandalism and public debates, providing an atmosphere for harmonious coexistence.

The literature on Chilean politics has recognised that there are defined geographical areas in which regime supporters and *Pinochetistas* would feel more 'comfortable' expressing themselves. Likewise, there is an *Authorised Memory Space* (AMS) for pro-regime memorials, that is, spaces in which they would be allowed to create and develop pro-regime memory sites. In the same logic, other areas might be socially forbidden. Memory sites that abide by these rules are more likely to survive. The most obvious AMS for a pro-regime memorial is the private space in which each person is free to commemorate whoever s/he wants. Bilbija and Payne (2011, p. 19) have said that perpetrators celebrate privately while victims commemorate publicly. This thesis does not focus on private memorials, but they certainly exist. Regime supporters usually like to have a little shrine (*altarcito*) at the entrance of their homes with the picture of Pinochet, and enjoy displaying souvenirs positively remembering the period of the 'military government', as they call it (keychains, t-shirts, mugs, medals, etc.) (see Gillis, 2015). In South Africa, for instance, the Voortrekker monument was privatised after the Apartheid so it could be protected. As noted by Grundlingh (2001, p. 100), "whereas earlier the monument was volkbesit (literally "the property of the nation"), it was now privatised and controlled by those with specific and dedicated cultural interests."

Aguilera (2015) has identified wealthy areas among the *Authorised Memory Spaces* for pro-regime memorialisation<sup>47</sup>. She asserts that almost no pro-regime memorialisation is located in poor neighbourhoods; most of them are in high-income areas. Likewise, few pro-victims and human rights memorials have been established in wealthy neighbourhoods. She argues that the “high socio-economic segregation in residential areas [in Chile] shapes the politics of memory”, and denounces that “the country’s elite” has obliterated the memory of human rights violations (pp. 102–103). Thus, memory sites are also intermingled with social class divisions and geographical segregation. Bianchini (2014, p. 5) noted a “socio-economic difference in memorialisation”, where pro-regime memory would feel more comfortable in wealthy areas, while victims’ memorialisation would be more prevalent in the middle to low-income neighbourhoods. Indeed, when demanding the name change of Av. 11 de Septiembre in 2012, a group of human rights activists accused that there was no pro-victim memory site in the well-off district of Providencia, and that this had to do with socio-economic segregation (NGO Desmonumentar el Golpe, 2013). Indeed, since the return to democracy (and even before that), the upper classes have had a more benevolent view of the dictatorship (Stern, 2010, pp. 90/109). Rojas (2017, p. 194) has asserted that “the hostile group [towards human rights] is more prevalent in the upper and middle classes, while the pro-human rights and ambivalent groups are more prevalent in the lower classes.”

Other *Authorised Memory Spaces* for pro-regime memorials are marginal areas such as isolated and/or peripheral regions, places in the countryside, or small-sized cities, and non-prominent streets. The less public opinion the memorial is exposed to, the more it will

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<sup>47</sup> Aguilera (2015) does not use the term “Authorised Memory Space” (AMS).

survive. Thus, location is fundamental for memorials and determines their public exposure. As noted by Williams (2007, p. 79), “[...] the prominence and accessibility of its location [memory site], and the proximity of other city features [...] determines the «geographical reach» of the” memorials. He explains that well-connected memorials located in central areas are much more exposed socially and politically. By contrast, memory sites “situated in rural or remote locations or hidden in obscure urban hooks are more likely to be overlooked” (p. 79). Due to their stigmatisation, pro-regime memorials’ survival chances increase when located in distant and invisible areas. In South Africa, for instance, some pro-Apartheid monuments managed to survive in democracy through changes in their location, from prominent spaces to more marginal areas where they did not cause any controversy or did not draw attention. Thus, authorities arranged “the physical repositioning of statues”, which were put “away from highly official, prestigious places (e.g., in front of the city hall) [and transferred] to less prominent locations and community spaces” (Marschall, 2009, p. 146).

Military areas (buildings, institutions, campuses) are also protective locations for pro-regime memorialisation. In Chile (and in several other Southern Cone countries), the Military was responsible for the massive human rights violations during the military regimes, and their pro-regime tendencies have continued to this day. The secrecy and inaccessibility of their buildings, and the political autonomy they still enjoy, facilitate the maintenance and hiding of pro-regime memorialisation. Milton (2018) was struck by the protective and secretive nature of military exhibitions when she visited the DIRCOTE museum and the Chavín de Huantar displays in Perú, presenting the heroic military memory regarding the ‘saving’ of the country by the Armed Forces in the context of the fight against Shining Path. She recalls that

“these museums are not quite engaging to the public. The difficulty of gaining entry suggests a reluctance to be fully accessible. Thus, they are only partially open spaces” (Milton, 2018, p. 152).

Finally, pro-regime memory sites can also ‘disappear’ in the eyes of the public. For instance, a pro-regime site may be able to ‘vanish’ throughout the year and be revived by pro-regime memory entrepreneurs on specific commemorative dates and performances. Throughout the year, it may seem as if the memorial barely exists, has been destroyed, or remains in a state of abandonment and decay. Thus, “if we look carefully, we can also find that” certain monuments are “intended to hide” (White, 2020). Intentional or not, this state of disrepair or invisibility is strategic for their survival. This would prevent vandalism by anti-regime agents and allow regime supporters to conveniently use the sites on specific dates. This situation is similar to the strategy certain animals employ to survive – thanatosis – in which they play dead to seem harmless and unattractive in front of a predator. Once the danger passes, they revive.

This is what occurs, for instance, with the Augusto Pinochet Monument and Square in Linares. The place usually looks as if it was abandoned and in disrepair as if nothing happened there and as if it had no symbolic meaning or relevance. In September 2017, Channel 5 Linares noted that “meanwhile, the square installed on the west side of the Artillery School is still abandoned without more activity than for every 11 September”, adding that “the square looks practically *abandoned* over time” (Canal 5 Linares, 2017a, 2017b, emphasis added). After the “I approve a new constitution” option won on the 25

October plebiscite in 2020, the site was vandalised and painted with a pen representing the ‘Approve’ option (J. Flores, 2020). This sparked the feeling that the site had finally been erased, and anti-regime agents celebrated fervently. However, on 11 September 2021 – as they do on every anniversary of the military coup – supporters cleaned up the square, decorated it, repainted the monolith, and placed a new signpost with the square’s name. The site was “revived.” The place looked brand new as if nothing had occurred (Thesis fieldwork notes #18, 2021).

Regime memory entrepreneurs feel comfortable with this invisibility because they are “niche oriented” (Milton, 2018, p. 59; Bilbija & Payne, 2011, p. 24). Due to social condemnation, they tend to feel more secure in secluded areas and surrounded by people who think like themselves. Thus, they would usually not attempt to surpass or go beyond certain geographical and socio-political limits. In this line, pro-regime memory does act as a “hidden transcript”: “Each hidden transcript, then, is elaborated among a restricted “public” that excludes that is hidden from certain specified others” (Scott, 1990, p. 14). Regime supporters know they have been excluded from the “politics of regret” (victims’ memorialisation) now dominating the public space (Olick, 2007), and realise they must only perform their pro-regime memory in their *Authorised Memory Spaces*.

When examining the examples of pro-regime memory sites in Chile, what stands out is their location and how this factor plays a significant role in their inauguration and fate. For instance, the Jaime Guzmán memorial had been initially planned in Plaza Italia in Providencia (Santiago, Chile). However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the

neighbourhood mobilised against it between 2002 and 2004 and the plan was aborted (Collins & Hite, 2013, pp. 150–151). The memorial was finally unveiled in 2008 in the protective area of Las Condes, an affluent sector dominated by the right-wing and far away from any dispute with the political left or with victims (Aguilera, 2015; Collins & Hite, 2013b, p. 151). The documentary *La Batalla de Plaza Italia* (The Battle of Plaza Italia) (Villegas, 2008) shows a group of construction workers developing the Jaime Guzmán memorial in Las Condes in 2006 – 2007. When asked about the memorial, one of them said, “I imagine that in this district [Las Condes], they will want it here, that’s why they put it [in this place]”, adding that in Plaza Italia “they [neighbours and civil society] would have destroyed it, not many people want it [there]. It has nothing to do with my lifestyle; he is a rich person.” Likewise, the Augusto Pinochet Museum was inaugurated in 2008 in Vitacura, a traditionally right-wing and affluent, high-class area with little connection to victims’ memories (Aguilera, 2015). It is no coincidence that, although these sites were inaugurated in 2008 – during the unfavourable context – the fact they were unveiled in such protective areas highly contributed to their chances of inauguration and survival.

In Spain, the “Protective Location” factor has also helped pro-Francoist memory sites survive in democracy. For instance, at least until 2015, the Monument to General Mola in La Bureba survived thanks to its relative lack of public notoriety:

[It is] a monument, like so many others, that resists the Historical Memory Law, [...] its isolation from population centres and the abruptness of the road that leads to it makes it almost unknown to people who do not live in the region (BurgosConecta.es, 2015).

Similarly, the monument to Romanian soldiers in the Majadahonda Cemetery in Madrid, which represents individuals who died in the Civil War fighting for the national side, survives “almost hidden, without making a sound” (Rodríguez, 2015).

In brief, pro-regime sites in protective areas – private, wealthy, low-profile, or military buildings – will most likely survive. These locations garner less press/media attention, produce fewer contradictions or tensions within the community, and provide regime supporters the freedom to develop and maintain their memorial projects. Memory sites can also create their own invisibility by appearing abandoned, wrecked and shattered, thus reducing their symbolic power in the eyes of their adversaries (thanatosis). The more invisible the pro-regime memorial, the lower the chances it becomes denounced and mobilised against.

### *Silence (S)*

The second explanatory factor for survival – “Silence” – which refers to the absence of “noise” regarding the site’s existence. Specifically, it relates to the fact that no relevant external agents such as NGOs, human rights associations, or prominent public figures pressure authorities to eliminate the memory site. Thus, the pro-regime site is not noticed beyond the immediate community.

As will be explored below (in the “Social Noise” section), the literature on transitional justice has extensively studied the prominent role human rights and victims’ organisations have in pushing forward demands and generating public awareness of the need for truth and

reparation. Thus, “Silence” occurs whenever a case becomes denounced, but no human rights organisations intervene making “noise” regarding the importance of the site’s elimination. This “Silence” will likely help the pro-regime memory site to remain where it is. As there is little controversy, authorities have fewer incentives to eliminate the pro-regime memory site. In brief, the more “silent” the case is, the more likely it is to survive.

Resonance (the degree of public “Noise” or “Silence” regarding a situation, event, person or case) is a relevant factor when considering the successfulness of memory sites. For instance, Jordan (2006) has argued that successful pro-victims’ memory sites in Berlin usually resonate strongly in society. In these cases, memory entrepreneurs have been able to publicise and highlight their memory projects, creating resonance concerning their importance. Thus, with pro-regime sites, cases that resonate push authorities to start elimination processes, while sites that remain “silent” are simply not considered.

Conway (2009, p. 408) noted that “the success, or not, of memorialization turns on whether it resonates with a larger audience.” Likewise, Hite and Collins (2013b, p. 170) argue that to survive and be successful, victims’ memorials need a high degree of “public visibility”, which is similar to the idea of “resonance.” For instance, Villa Grimaldi in Chile – a former torture centre transformed into a peace park – was relatively successful because its memory entrepreneurs were able to create public interest and awareness, drawing national and international attention to the project (Collins & Hite, 2013b, pp. 139–146). Yet, pro-regime memorials use an inverted logic: The more silent society remains regarding their maintenance, the more they can survive. What most complicates a pro-regime memorial is

precisely its public visibility. “Noise” regarding its existence provokes condemnation and may eventually lead to its elimination. “Silence”, then, is what pro-regime memorials need to survive. The creator of the documentary *La Batalla de Plaza Italia* argued that one of the reasons pro-regime memorials succeeded was the silence regarding their existence: “I realised that we are a little lazy in facing civic life. Many people were against it [Jaime Guzmán’s memorial] but did not give their opinion so as not to oppose the authorities. [This silence] is a legacy of the dictatorship” (El Mostrador, 2008). Hite (2003, p. 22) has argued that, at least until 2003, this distance between a passive and silent community and a privileged political elite – who negotiated behind closed doors – reflected the considerable divide in Chilean society and lack of civic participation, which were, certainly, dictatorship legacies. Bartolini (2019, p. 239) has argued that, in the case of Italy, “for most Italians, these [pro-fascist] monuments do not represent a threat”, hinting at the absence of active and organised condemnation, which helps these sites to survive. As noted by the author, the erection of monuments to Rodolfo Graziani in democratic Italy “shows how part of society still views fascism as positive” (p. 233) and, thus, remains relatively *silent* regarding the existence of pro-fascist memorialisation.

Therefore, the ideal scenario for the survival of pro-regime memorialisation is the absence of victims and human rights organisations’ “noise” of condemnation and denunciation.

However, once these organisations intervene and actively demand the elimination of the pro-regime site, the situation changes drastically and the fate of the pro-regime memorial is most likely to be elimination. Thus, a site possesses “Silence” when there are no external victims’,

NGOs, or human rights organisations actively intervening against the site and promoting its elimination.

### *Local and/or Institutional Support (LIS)*

The third factor in explaining the survival of pro-regime memorialisation is “Local and/or Institutional Support.” The factor is present when pro-regime memory sites are actively supported and protected by their local communities (neighbours) and/or state institutions. This support may obstruct or slow down elimination processes and thus enhance the site’s capacity to survive. However, LIS actors’ decisions can sometimes be overturned as they usually cannot control the final decision regarding the site’s fate (which depends on local city councils or the Judiciary).

#### Local Support

In Chile, local communities have been crucial in developing victims’ memorialisation (Aguilera, 2015, p. 107). In most cases, victims’ memory sites are born out of grassroots groups’ initiatives to mobilise resources and advance opportunity structures to develop their memorial projects (Druliolle, 2011). Similarly, local communities may also organise to prevent a pro-regime site from being removed. Small-scale neighbourhood or community support towards a pro-regime site can effectively hamper elimination processes and guarantee the site’s survival.

Local support expresses through various actions. Neighbours may organise polls showing the community’s support for the site, or carry out a plebiscite vote showing that most of the

community favours the site's survival. It could also happen that most of the local neighbour's council (in Chile, the COSOC) votes to maintain the site. Finally, neighbours may actively take care of the site and protect it from deterioration or vandalism.

Tarrow (2011, p. 168) has argued that whenever there is a movement, the possibility it “can trigger a counter-movement” is relatively high. Thus, in a campaign against a pro-regime memory site, the local community may also organise itself and develop a ‘counter-reaction’ to protect it. For McCarthy and Zald (1977, p. 1218), a counter-movement “is a set of opinions and beliefs in a population opposed to a social movement.” With pro-regime sites, the local community living adjacent or close to the site may organise a set of ‘opinions and beliefs’ to keep the site where it is. In this sense, local communities produce outstanding leadership when they see their interests in danger. In the case of memorials, there is evidence they mobilise in their defence when they feel specific sites should be protected and defended against vandalism or attempts at removal.

For instance, in the context of massive removals of Confederate statues in 2020, a journalist noted that defenders of these sites were “regrouping in response to events: Appearing armed at monument sites, filing lawsuits, or taking out newspaper ads” (Mitter, 2020). In late June 2020, a group of protesters approached the statue of King St. Louis IX in Missouri to remove it, but members of the Archdiocese of St. Louis immediately came to defend the monument. They surrounded it to prevent the protesters from approaching, and they prayed asking God to forgive those who wanted to attack the monument (Blair, 2020). Thus, by actively

protecting it, they blocked the statue's elimination. Here, "Local Support" became the essential condition for the monument's survival.

Local neighbourhoods have political power. They can dictate what mayors or local authorities must or must not do regarding their public space. They shape or re-orientate public policies with their formal and informal contentiousness. Forest and Johnson (2002, p. 539) noted that politicians gauge the "popular sentiment" within the immediate community when deciding what and how to commemorate.

In Chile, an illustrative example is the Pinochet Monument in Pumanque (a semi-rural town in the General Bernardo O'Higgins region). When asked about the possibility of removing the monument, the mayor said it all depended on the local community's desire. He argued that, so far, there had been no demands for elimination. Indeed, he asserted that the community supported the site as it attracted tourists. Thus, he had no intention of removing the monument: "I know that for many people it must be shocking. However, the *only thing that matters to me is that it is not shocking to anyone in my community*. I owe myself to my people" (Massai, 2017).

A similar "Local Support" situation towards a pro-fascist memorial is observed in Affile, Italy. In 2012, the local mayor erected a pro-fascist site in honour of war criminal Marshal Rodolfo Graziani using taxpayers' money. Graziani led the massacre of Ethiopian and Libyan people in the 1930s and was nicknamed the "butcher of Fezzan." Until today, the local community supports the monument's maintenance. According to Bartolini (2019, p.

236), “what emerges from my interviews is that the local population in Affile support their mayor’s decision [to erect the memorial], and that they also advocate for a general “revision” of history.”

There are several explanations why a local community may support a pro-regime (or pro-fascist) site. It is worth exploring these reasons to better understand the “Local Support” factor for survival. Firstly, it cannot be denied that some local support could certainly be related to a degree of “commemorative vigilance” (that is, active protection) (Nora, 1989, p. 19) towards the site fuelled by pro-regime or pro-fascist sentiments. This is difficult to measure or uncover because of the stigmatisation associated with pro-regime memory across many contexts. However, this motivation cannot be dismissed as it is evident that positive nostalgic sentiments towards the recent past still prevail in some memory groups. For instance, Pol Pot’s tomb in Anlong Veng, Cambodia, is maintained partly thanks to the commemorative vigilance and protection of local support groups nostalgic for the regime (Guillou, 2016, p. 73).

However, this research found that pro-regime sentiment is much more complex than salvational memory. In Chile, some communities defending pro-regime sites do not protect the site because Pinochet ‘saved them’ from communism. Instead, they say that, beyond any political connotations, they are thankful to Pinochet for having provided connectivity, infrastructure or housing during the regime. By the end of his dictatorship, Pinochet said he wanted a country of “proprietaries, not proletaries” (Sandoval, 2006). This idea seems to have profoundly shaped lower-class peoples’ view of the regime, some of whom had their

lives changed with new housing or new access to critical infrastructure (highways, hospitals, schools) during the dictatorship. Thus, in many cases, instead of having an outright salvational memory, some communities defending pro-regime sites draw on their 'thankful memory' towards the regime. This expands the idea that pro-regime memory is only based on a feeling of being 'saved' from communism (salvational memory). 'Thankful memory' is much more complex and includes the sense of being saved from poverty and isolation. Such memory creates strong feelings and attachments towards the site. As contradictory as it may sound due to its link to the dictatorship, some pro-regime memory sites may represent the moment in which specific communities regained their dignity and self-worth; these neighbours are thus very thankful to Pinochet.

Two cases in Chile exemplify how communities mobilised their 'thankful memory' to resist elimination demands of pro-regime memorials: The Pinochet Monument in La Junta (Cisnes, Aysén Region) and the Villa Presidente Augusto Pinochet Ugarte (El Bosque, Metropolitan Region) (see Appendix, picture #7, p. 453).

In May 2000, the town of La Junta in the extreme south of Chile constructed a four mt. high monument in homage to Pinochet (AFP Santiago, 2000; Orbe, 2000). The monument was placed on the "fiscal zone of the Austral Highway" at the town's entrance (Cámara de Diputadas y Diputados, 2000, p. 32). Immediately, accusations arose against the monument as some politicians considered it illegal (AFP Santiago, 2000). Right-wing Deputies defended the site arguing these people were thankful to Pinochet for having constructed the

Austral Highway which provided them with necessary connectivity. Emol Newspaper reported that

With this [inaugural] ceremony, it was sought to recognise the actions of the military government by emphasising the construction of the Southern Highway [Carretera Austral], as they consider it took them out of their state of abandonment and changed the lives of those who inhabit the 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> regions (Orbe, 2000).

As right-wing Deputy Pablo Galilea argued, “it was the community itself who decided to create this monument, with which they want to thank the one who brought them out of isolation, the visionary patriot [Pinochet], as the plaque says” (La Red 21, 2000). Indeed, as noted by the city council meeting minutes, the monument was actively supported by the community:

*[It] is endorsed by many residents of the sector. The point is analysed and discussed by the [city] councillors, finally approving the [monument's] installation and giving freedom to the majority thoughts of the community. Such ideas should be respected in democracy (Municipalidad de Cisnes, 2000).*

Some La Junta town residents still possessed this ‘thankful memory’ around 2012, when the “Pinochet” documentary was presented at the Teatro Caupolicán in Santiago. The documentary shows a group of people praising the monument and Pinochet by saying: “[This monument in La Junta represents] a great achievement, hundreds of kilometres of road that before Pinochet [’s government] were uncrossable.” The documentary interviewed several neighbours of the Carretera Austral who feel deeply thankful to Pinochet and how he connected these isolated places to the rest of the country. An interviewee in the documentary said that

This region will remember him for these great deeds because he has been the only Chilean President who has remembered us; he is the only one who made us a Carretera Austral, who gave us

light, telephones, and who gave us the comforts we have today (Zegers, 2012).

Another interviewee thankfully mentioned that Pinochet and the Army

Brought us out of isolation. Formerly, Chile ended in Puerto Montt, but we knew we were Chileans when [...] the Army arrived to disembark on a barge, and [we] saw military men who told us they would take us out of isolation (Zegers, 2012).

It is striking how this memory is presented as less political than salvational memory, which explicitly refers to salvation from communism. At the time of the inauguration of the La Junta monument, *Emol* Newspaper reported that the neighbours “did not intend to have a political connotation” but rather demonstrate their thankfulness to Pinochet and his infrastructure developments (Orbe, 2000).

Another case that illuminates the idea of a ‘thankful memory’ is the Villa Augusto Pinochet in El Bosque (Metropolitan Region). Pinochet inaugurated the Villa in 1988 to provide a home to the Zanjón de la Aguada and Las Turbinas camps. The houses were between 25 and 30 square meters (Figueroa, 2018). According to historian Sergio Grez (2019), it was part of Pinochet’s plan to offer these houses to obtain votes for the 1988 plebiscite and the 1989 presidential elections.

When visiting the Villa, several interviewees said that they have always called it “La Pinocho [Pinochet’s nickname]” and that, for them, it will always be the “La Pinocho” Villa, despite any change. They also mentioned they did not feel the Villa had a negative

connotation because of its name<sup>48</sup>. An interviewee said he fondly remembered when Pinochet gave them the houses and the soccer fields, and how Pinochet had managed to “clean up” the place and offer a pleasant neighbourhood. For him, the admiration for Pinochet and the name of the Villa had nothing to do with a “political issue” (Anonymous Key Informant #13, El Bosque, personal communication, 16 March 2021). Indeed, his attitude was that of a sincerely thankful person for the opportunity of having an excellent place to live in. Similarly, the owner of a Pinochet-museum liquor store told me he admired Pinochet because he had saved him from poverty by providing a house to live in. He told me he would be forever thankful for having been allowed to have a land and a place to own. He said,

The other day, I was talking to a 20-year-old kid. He said hello to me, and I asked: Do you know who gave the house to your mother? And I immediately answered, My general Pinochet, yes, thanks to my general Pinochet! (J. Medel, personal communication, 28 February 2020).

According to him, this feeling of thankfulness was widespread within the community: “In my neighbourhood, there are a lot of *Pinochetistas*. It is because of that [thankfulness], precisely” (J. Medel, personal communication, 28 February 2020).

In 2018, in a routine legal proceeding, a judge ‘discovered’ the “Villa Augusto Pinochet” and drew the attention of the local authorities to determine what to do in this case. After this denunciation, and by the beginning of 2019, a civil society initiative called *Ciudadanos por*

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<sup>48</sup> Anonymous Key Informant #10, El Bosque, personal communication, 16 March 2021; Anonymous Key Informant #11, El Bosque, personal communication, 16 March 2021a, personal communication, 16 March 2021b; Anonymous Key Informant #13, El Bosque, personal communication, 16 March 2021; Thesis fieldwork notes #10, 2021.

*la Memoria* (Citizens for Memory) – which campaigns against pro-regime legacies and public symbols – launched a movement to change the Villa’s name through a plebiscite. However, they soon realised they had to convince the community. Indeed, the organisation planned to carry out a local referendum in September 2019, but it had to be postponed. One of the reasons for the delay was that it was still necessary to carry out more citizen education on the need for the change. One of the anti-regime activists noted that, so far, the process “has not ended up convincing the majority of the importance of the modification” (Andrade, 2019). A local activist explicitly mentioned the community still had a deep-seated ‘thankful memory’:

Many people have defended the issue [the ‘Pinochet’ name of the Villa], not everyone agrees [with the change]. They say that in 1989 Pinochet gave them housing. Many people came from camps and had nowhere to live. They are *grateful* for owning a house thanks to Pinochet (Andrade, 2019).

In a somewhat patronising attitude, the human rights organisations decided they would try to convince the neighbourhood of their own victimhood, showing them how Pinochet had fooled them and how ignorant they were about their lack of dignity for having had the name “imposed” upon them. One of the organisers of this campaign noted that “it is expected that the neighbours know that they were victims of political exploitation.” At the same time, another one highlighted the “importance that, based on the name, the inhabitants recover the dignity they lost when they were almost bribed to vote “Yes” in 1988” (Andrade, 2019). The La Junta monument and the Villa Augusto Pinochet case demonstrate that, in some cases, communities defend pro-regime memorials because of a ‘thankful’ memory —which is not exactly the same as ‘salvational memory.’

Hence, community support towards a pro-regime site or street/neighbourhood name does not necessarily indicate pro-regime or pro-fascist tendencies. In addition to the presence of a 'thankful memory', support may also be linked to several other reasons, such as the need to defend a sense of identity; defend the economic or touristic potential of the site; the fear that the expenses incurred in eliminating the site are too high (financial costs or waste of time); a negative feeling that the elimination of pro-regime sites is an electoral machination; or a genuine perception that there are other issues that need to be addressed by the authorities to improve the quality of life. Regarding the latter, in 2017, for instance, a group of neighbours in Rengo sent a letter to the mayor saying that although they did not oppose changing the name of Av. Jaime Guzmán, they would prefer that the authorities focused on more urgent issues for the community: "For us, the most important thing is that, before worrying about a [street] name, it would be better to think about fixing the avenues full of holes, which would improve citizens' wellbeing" (Municipalidad de Rengo, 2017a).

Sometimes, a sense of identity is profoundly and inevitably attached to the memory sites irrespective of who created the site or what it means. This is not surprising; the main objective of a memory site is to concretise a specific identity in the public space.

Furthermore, the way communities relate to these sites daily (e.g., when walking down the road or going to work, or as a point of reference), or the site's myths, may reinforce that identity, attachment, and 'love' towards it. Bevan (2006) has studied why historical and heritage sites are the first objects to be attacked in a war. The sense of disorientation and demoralisation of the enemy increases if their public icons are eliminated. Thus, when a community defends a pro-regime site, it may well be because they are protecting their sense

of belonging to a particular culture or identity, and not because they are 'pro-regime.' Bevan (2006, p. 13) mentioned that social identity is "located in time and space." Likewise, Marschall argues for South Africa that eliminating pro-Apartheid monuments has not been easy. The author says there is a certain degree of local support towards pro-Apartheid memory sites (monuments, sculptures, memorials) not because communities are pro-Apartheid, but because their sense of identity is attached to these places:

The fact remains that the majority of the white community in South Africa, including liberal and progressive-minded individuals, tend to be defensive about and emotionally attached to the symbolic markers of their past. This is not necessarily because they identify (or even have identified) with the role model, values, and intended 'message' each of these monuments convey, but because they have an increasing sense of alienation [...] and perceived threats to their sense of cultural identity (Marschall, 2009, p. 142).

Similarly, in Hungary, many pro-communist statues were not eliminated, not only because of the need for a more 'democratic' solution that avoided destruction, but also because of the emotional attachment to these objects beyond any political affiliation. Thus, Nadkarni (2003, p. 199, emphasis added) recounts that "communist monuments had inspired not only anger but also indifference, irony and *affection*." Similarly, despite having recently elected a socialist mayor, a town in Spain is still dedicated to Juan Yagüe, a falangist military who played a crucial role during the military coup of 1936 in Spain. The residents of "San Leonardo de Yagüe" have, since 2016, strongly resisted any name change. They argue they are happy with the name, which they feel is part of their identity (Ayala, 2017; La Sexta, 2017). In 2018, in a document supported by 850 neighbours, the human rights lawyer who initiated an elimination campaign against the town's pro-regime name was declared *persona non grata* (R. Fernández, 2018; Ranz, 2020, p. 80).

Indeed, as with San Leonardo de Yagüe, some localities in Spain have fervently opposed any elimination attempts and have protected pro-regime sites. Drawing on their identity and perhaps a hint of 'thankful memory' towards Franco, they defend the towns' pro-regime names. A resident from Llanos del Caudillo said in 2016 that "I have been here since the 1950s, and I want it [the village] to be called what it has always been called. We came here starving, and now we live as God wants and commands" (La Información, 2016).

Such support has its roots in how certain Spanish towns originated. In the 1950s, dictator Francisco Franco needed to boost Spain's agricultural economy, for which he created rural settlements in isolated areas. Within this "Colonisation Program", these "colonies" grew thanks to families that emigrated to these localities to start crops. Today, many of these families who live in these small towns are grateful to Franco for giving them a piece of land to farm (Andrés & Kastenholz, 2017). Thus, Aguilar (2019 [2008], p. 476) notes that "the inhabitants of rural areas" continue to display "a great resistance to stirring up the past", as any attempt at eliminating pro-Francoist legacies contradicts their foundational myths and identities.

Finally, another reason a community might defend the survival of a pro-regime site is related to more "pragmatic reasons" (Benton, 2010, p. 126) regarding the economic costs, the time costs, and the touristic potential of the site. Eliminating a pro-regime site can imply a heavy expense in terms of the machinery for removing the site and the personnel involved. Also,

Changing a street name may create inconveniences for those who live there, such as having to print out new receipts or develop new paperwork to reconfigure the address, which costs time and money. It might be the case that there are “limited financial resources” to remove memory sites or eliminate pro-regime street names (Malone, 2017, p. 454). In such a scenario, the community may support their maintenance as they feel it is a waste of money, while those resources could be used for more urgent needs. For instance, in the discussion regarding the Av. 11 de Septiembre in Providencia (Santiago, Chile) in 2013, several neighbours disagreed with the name change as it “All has a cost, but also [we have] to change the address of Chilectra [electricity company], telephone, water, etc., and in addition to the cost of certificates, you have to spend time [doing this], which is also costly (Municipalidad de Providencia, 2013a, p. 7). Indeed, these were the main reasons why several neighbours rejected the name change of this emblematic pro-regime avenue in 2013.

The site’s touristic potential is another reason communities might defend pro-regime memorials. This is connected with the growing interest in tourism associated with traumatic pasts, or “dark tourism” (Lennon & Foley, 2010). Tourism certainly brings about economic growth and public prominence. Thus, communities may want to touristify these sites in contexts of economic weakness. For instance, the Valley of the Fallen in Spain survives because of legislation and its touristic potential, which benefits the surrounding community (Barros García, 2020, p. 255). Hundreds of tourists visit the Valley and its surrounding areas each year, such as El Escorial. In Chile, the Pinochet Monument in Pumanque survives supported by its community, which sees it as a source of income for an isolated town. According to the mayor, the monument created certain benefits: “We are an isolated district,

and this [pro-regime memory site] allows us to be known. Even some *gringos* have come [here] to take pictures with the only Pinochet monolith in Chile” (Piensa Chile, 2013). In 2017, he argued that

It’s not an issue here; quite the opposite. The people who own restaurants tell me they hope it’s never removed because, due to the media coverage, people come to take pictures and then have lunch. It has allowed us to do tourism (Massai, 2017).

Furthermore, communities may dislike changes in their environment as they may view them as foreign impositions. For instance, regarding the Ebro monument in Tortosa (Spain), some residents rejected the fact “that Barcelona and other areas of Catalonia have pushed to remove the monument without waiting to see what neighbours decide” (Rovira, 2016). Thus, communities’ motivations to defend their pro-regime symbols are varied and go far beyond a mere ‘salvational memory.’

### Institutional Support

State agents can also favour a pro-regime site’s survival and promote its maintenance. In memory issues, “agents of the state have a central role and special weight because of their power in relation to establishing and developing an «official history/memory»” (Jelin, 2003, p. 27). Jordan (2006, p. 177) has noted state agents’ relevant role in promoting or obstructing the development of memory sites by arguing that “states shape landscapes of memory.” For instance, they can actively provide legal support to ensure the site is maintained, or offer other sorts of physical or administrative protection, arguing in favour of the site’s survival. However, state institutions’ level of authority is ‘medium’ as their decisions could be appealed or overturned, and they cannot guarantee the site’s survival completely. At least in

Chile, it is usually mayors/city councils and judges who have the 'last say' regarding the site's survival or elimination (see the following section of "Walls").

The most evident "Institutional Support" for pro-regime memorialisation in Chile comes from the Armed Forces. This is primarily because of their history linked to the military regime. As noted by González Ocantos (2016, p. 65), in Latin America, the Military usually belongs to the "pro-impunity groups." The Armed Forces provide support through several strategies, such as turning a blind eye towards elimination demands, defending the pro-regime site in legal proceedings, or defending the site by physically protecting it. For instance, video footage from 2013 shows how the Museo Marítimo Nacional closes the doors of one of its main entrances every time a group of protesters gather outside the Museum to demand the elimination of the José Toribio Merino statue (Cine Forum Cine Otro, 2013b). In a speech in 2018, a protester said that "today they have closed the doors of the Museum because they knew we could come" (Rendón Escobar, 2018).

In Chile, the Armed Forces provide this support because they enjoy a high degree of autonomy, which is embedded in "a culture of secrecy and self-sufficiency that still permeates the security forces, behaving and conceiving themselves as a state within a state" (Collins & Colaboradores, 2020, p. 518). Thus, they know there are no grave legal consequences when promoting/defending pro-regime commemorations, and they also know they will be supported and backed up by civil authorities who have not dared to bolster the Military's subjugation to civil and political power (Agüero, 2004, p. 242; Hite & Aguilar, 2004, p. 213). Such autonomy gives ground for "the Military's patterns of authoritarian

domination” (Hite & Cesarini, 2004a, p. 342), including the defence of pro-regime memorialisation. For instance, as recalled by the UDP Human Rights Report, the Armed Forces still employ individuals who celebrate the regime and Pinochet (Collins, 2018, p. 19), and have had, since the return to democracy (but more so recently), a “bold and defiant stance” towards human rights (Collins & Ordóñez, 2021, p. 89). Although the Military in Chile has indeed made significant progress in terms of condemnation of the dictatorship (Stern & Winn, 2016, p. 298; Huneus, 2014, p. 287; Angell, 2007, p. 148), ‘pockets’ of *Pinochetistas* still inhabit the military institution. Thus, “people linked to the military regime continue to hold positions of power” inside the Military (Centro de DD.HH. UDP, 2009, p. 21). Collins (2018, p. 45) has linked this issue to the “cultural *Pinochetismo*,” reflected, for instance, in the fact that the Chilean Armed Forces still employ many former DINA agents. She mentions that the Military has not yet “cleared of their ranks all perpetrators of crimes of repression” (Collins, 2018, p. 45).

It is not only the Armed Forces that provide “Institutional Support” to maintain pro-regime memorialisation. This support may also come from other state institutions that use administrative and bureaucratic instruments that fit legality to defend the site’s existence. With the plaques and photographs of Manuel Contreras, for instance, it was not only the Army who defended this commemoration but also the Ministry of Defence, who, in 2018 and 2019, promoted the site’s maintenance. Likewise, in 2019, the appeal for protection against Merino’s statue was filed against both the Minister of Defence and the commander-in-chief of the Army “for omitting the removal of a statue located in the Maritime Museum of Valparaíso, an establishment dependent on the Navy” (Rendón, 2019a, p. 1).

In the case of the statue of Merino, the 2020 UDP Human Rights Report noted the recurrent actions of specific state agents, such as the State Defence Council (SDC), in favour of maintaining pro-regime commemorations. According to the report, this institution has been determined to obstruct demands for reparation in which the state must symbolically and financially compensate victims. For instance, in 2019, the SDC legally defended the Navy in the judicial case of Merino's statue and supported the thesis that the figure was legal and legitimate. The report argues that "with this, the CDE, and therefore the state, ignores [...] obligations that weigh on the state as a whole" (Collins & Colaboradores, 2020, p. 588). According to the report, this case shows how the SDC has been ignoring "compliance by the state of which it is a part, of its duties of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-repetition" (p. 517). Thus, by defending pro-regime memorials that honour human rights violators, some state institutions in Chile have not fully incorporated the idea of comprehensive reparations. As noted by the report, "the CDE, on behalf of the state, appears in almost all known civil lawsuits, inevitably advocating the non-recognition or non-satisfaction of the right to judicial remedy [for victims]" (p. 567). The report warned that this kind of institutional support for maintaining pro-regime symbols and legacies "is doubly worrying and striking" (p. 589). The 2021 report insisted on calling attention to the institutional obstruction towards reparations by saying that "the State Defence Council must stop opposing the demands for judicial reparation from relatives and survivors" (Collins & Ordóñez, 2021, p. 99).

The José Toribio Merino statue case at the National Maritime Museum in Valparaíso clearly illustrates the “Institutional Support” factor in almost all dimensions. Here, institutional support was pivotal in blocking the elimination process (guaranteeing the statue’s survival) and generating adequate conditions for the “Wall” factor to act (see next section “Walls”). Three main institutional agents actively contributed to the statue’s survival (until 2022): The Navy and former military officials, the Comptroller General of the Republic (CGR), and the State Defence Council (SDC).

When the statue was denounced in 2012<sup>49</sup>, a group of UNOFAR members (retired military officers) immediately defended Merino’s figure. They argued he had been an honourable and impeccable Navy commander who helped save the country from communism. For them, he deserved a commemorative statue: “I remind you that Admiral Merino [...] liberated this country from the worst and most criminal [Marxist] repression seen in history” (Maldonado, 2012; Navajas, 2012; Russell, 2012).

The Navy also actively defended the statue through several actions. For instance, they have permanently closed the museum doors that are right next to the site where the *funas* (public denunciations) take place<sup>50</sup> (see Appendix, picture #15, p. 456). The victims and human rights activists who protest at the site have noted this subtle but evident reaction. On 11 October 2015, one individual lamented, “they don’t tell the people why they are closing the [museum] doors! uh?” (Cine Forum Cine Otro, 2015). Furthermore, the Navy has also

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<sup>49</sup> It was first denounced in 2002 by a centre-left Deputy in Congress.

<sup>50</sup> That museum door is now permanently closed (Fieldwork to Valparaíso, August 2021).

prepared extensive legal documents defending the statue, and has requested the expert legal support of specialised state agencies, such as the State Defence Council (N. Romero, 2019).

Furthermore, and in line with these institutional protections, in 2015, the Comptroller General of the Republic (CGR) stated that the monument was located inside a military territory and, therefore, it should not be subjected to the Public Monuments Statute (decree N° 032951N15) (Contraloría General de la República, 2015). Thus, the CGR certified the statue's "legality" and legitimised its existence.

Another form of "Institutional Support" was an agreement by the State Defence Council (SDC) (on 8 October 2019) to defend the Ministry of Defence and the Navy in the judicial battle against the statue (Consejo de Defensa del Estado, 2019a, 2019b). Upon learning about this agreement, a human rights lawyer involved in the process said that this "Institutional Support" towards the maintenance of Merino's commemoration "reflects, once again, how the state of Chile continues to turn a blind eye [on victims' needs]" (Romero, 2019). As noted before, the UDP Human Rights Observatory warns on how the SDC tends to defend the state in human rights cases and frequently undermines victims' interests in reparations, acting as a barrier to a comprehensive transitional justice process (Centro de DD.HH. UDP, 2019, p. 118).

Thus, institutional support is a crucial factor in the survival of pro-regime memorialisation. It implies the defence and protection by state institutions of pro-regime symbols. It should be noted that a specific institution is not 'essentially' a defender of pro-regime legacies; state

agencies may take a pro or anti regime position depending on the circumstances and on various factors. Still, as seen in several cases (e.g., the statue of José Toribio Merino and plaques and photographs of Manuel Contreras), Chile's Armed Forces (and the *Carabineros*) have consistently acted as defenders of regime symbols throughout democracy.

### *Walls (W)*

The fourth factor in explaining the survival of pro-regime memorialisation is “Walls.” The factor is a high-level authority that can guarantee the site's elimination or survival. “Walls” refer to authorities (city councils or judicial actors) not inclined to support human rights issues. For instance, at the local level, it is expected that city councils dominated by the centre-right or right-wing will more likely maintain pro-regime memorialisation. Likewise, in the context of a judicial process, Courts that are unreceptive to the international law of human rights constitute “Walls” that will obstruct the elimination process and guarantee the site's survival. These “Walls” are the “barricades” (Stern 2010, p. 215) that impede or slow down progress in transitional justice.

“Walls” exert more pressure than “Local and/or Institutional Support” because they are the “veto power.” Following George Tsebelis's (2002), Payne et al. (2019, p. 114) have asserted that, in transitional justice contexts, veto power is “actors' ability to stop a change from the status quo.” Specifically, whenever these actors are political agents, Tsebellis (2002, p. 2) calls them “partisan” veto players. In Tarrow's (2011, p. 32) vocabulary, “Walls” could be seen as the “threats” and factors that discourage or block contentious action—in this case, the elimination of pro-regime memorialisation. An opposite situation is a “Window of

Opportunity” (WO), in which chances of removal are higher (see “Window of Opportunity” in the next section). Compared to actors who perform LIS (state agents, neighbours), decisions belonging to the “Wall” dimension are more difficult to appeal (judicial actors or municipalities/city councils).

In deciding the fate of pro-regime memorialisation, the veto power is located either in the municipalities (city councils), where local decisions occur, or in the Judiciary (Courts). The idea of city councils acting as “Walls” and obstructing elimination processes of pro-regime memorialisation demonstrates the central role of political elites in deciding the fate of memory sites according to their political needs (Forest & Johnson, 2002). However, city councils and the Judiciary are not “veto players” *per se*. The idea of veto players should be understood dynamically and not through an essentialist view. Thus, in some cases, city councils may be very receptive to elimination demands, whilst in other cases, they may act as veto players, obstructing these demands and protecting pro-regime memorialisation. The same logic applies to judicial actors. Sometimes they may act as veto players, while in other cases, they may enable reparations and justice for victims of human rights violations. These actors’ actions depend on whether they are right-wing or left-wing (in the case of city councils), and whether they are familiarised with international human rights law (in the case of judicial actors).

City councils have the potential to act as “Walls” because political ideology is deeply connected to attitudes towards human rights issues (Huneus & Ibarra, 2013a, pp. 254–257; H. Rojas, 2017, p. 193). Thus, it is expected that city councils dominated by the centre-right

or right-wing – such as the UDI or RN – will be more likely to defend the existence of a pro-regime site or act as a “Wall” obstructing an elimination process. As shown by Rojas (2017, p. 193) in his analysis of indifference towards human rights in Chile, “the left-wing shows prevalence with positions that favour human rights, while people from the right-wing are more likely to be hostile to human rights issues.” Regarding accountability of civil perpetrators, Payne et al. (2019, pp. 23–24) have also stated that veto players linked to the right and the Military have consistently “blocked corporate accountability.”

The linkage between the centre-right or right-wing and acquiescence towards the survival of regime legacies (or even the promotion of it) is no surprise in Chile. This has to do with the origins of the right-wing parties (UDI and RN), which are deeply connected to the dictatorship, and how their values resemble, to a greater or lesser extent, Pinochet’s values in the economic, social and political dimensions. Thus, after the transition, the right was “willing to defend and promote” Pinochet’s “legacy” (Agüero, 2004, p. 248). It was as if they implicitly vowed to act as “Walls” to obstruct any change or deviation from what Pinochet devised for Chile (Rojas, 2017, p. 31). Throughout democracy, the right-wing has been a veto player and has had significant power to “counter civil society demand” (Payne et al., 2015, p. 747). In a recent Human Rights Report, Collins and Ordóñez (2021, p. 88) stressed how the right-wing continues to act as a “Wall” by thwarting progress on human rights issues. With frustration, they mention that in January 2021, “a bill that would have created the subject of memory and human rights in elementary and secondary education [Bulletin 12167-17], was rejected in the legislature by votes of the ruling [right-wing] party.”

Hence, the survival of pro-regime memorialisation in Chile may well “depend on the political will of the [city] council” (Municipalidad de La Serena, 2013, p. 19). The pro-regime memorial will tend to survive when the council is dominated by the centre-right or right-wing —such as UDI or RN<sup>51</sup>.

In Chile, human rights groups and activists are very much aware of this political factor. In the documentary *La Batalla de Plaza Italia* regarding the failed Jaime Guzmán memorial (around 2004), one of the neighbours stressed that “we have to be aware of something, the [Providencia] mayor is from the right, this is clear and I see that he has an interest in having a monument to Jaime Guzmán in this district” (Villegas, 2008). In 2012, the same right-wing mayor still governed Providencia and stubbornly ignored the demands for the name change of Av. 11 de Septiembre. Owing to his refusal, he was celebrated by regime supporters, one of them saying that he admired “the consistency that he [the mayor] has had for always manifesting himself as a person who does not deny his past as part of the military government” (Mentiras Verdaderas La Red & Verdad Histórica Chile, 2012). Similarly, in 2013, one of Providencia’s right-wing city councillors defended the avenue’s name, arguing that “I’m going to vote against the Avenue’s name change, because it is a historic date [11 September 1973] when Chile was freed from chaos” (Reyne, 2013).

At this point, it should be noted that the linkage between right-wing political affiliation and pro-regime memorialisation is a trend. Still, it does not mean that city councils dominated by the right-wing will *always*, without exception, support the survival of pro-regime

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<sup>51</sup> Also, far-right *Partido Republicano*.

memorialisation or ignore elimination demands. In some cases, right-wing city councils have supported eliminations. It may also be the case that a left-wing city council acts as a “Wall” supporting the maintenance of a pro-regime symbol. For instance, in 2013 and 2014, Vigo (Spain), led by a socialist mayor from the PSOE party (centre-left), refused to eliminate the pro-Francoist *Cruz de los Caídos* at the Monte do Castro in Vigo because, according to the mayor, its Francoist elements had already been eliminated (Paniagua & Lamas, 2014). Thus, although victims viewed the cross as “a sword in the heart of Vigo”, the centre-left pro-PSOE city council still decided to maintain it (López, 2014). This case indicates the importance of examining the explanatory factors and how they unfold (or not) in each case – theory must always be contrasted with empirical evidence.

In Chile, the fate of pro-regime memorials is not only decided by city councils but also by judicial actors. Victims and human rights groups sometimes prosecute a case by filing a *recurso de protección* (protection appeal) to eliminate a pro-regime memorial. Indeed, in the past years, there has been a clear tendency in the “judicialisation” of cases for symbolic reparation (Collins & Colaboradores, 2020, p. 585; Collins & Ordóñez, 2021, p. 32; Sferrazza & Bustos, 2021). In these cases, Courts must decide whether the pro-regime site is maintained or eliminated. Here, judicial actors have the potential to become “Walls” by rejecting victims’ claims and by supporting the maintenance of pro-regime sites.

Indeed, González Ocantos (2016, p. 9) noted that there are “important blockages inside the Judiciary in transitional justice contexts.” Some judicial actors may use narrow interpretations of victims’ right to redress or even ignore international human rights law

altogether. According to González Ocantos (2016, p. 5) such judicial actors hold a “formalistic legal orthodoxy strongly influenced by positivism.” Contrarily, other judicial actors may “embrace a new legal worldview grounded in the values of human rights law” (p. 5), thus helping victims achieve their goals. However, this is less about politics and ideology and more about the constraints posed by the judicial culture embedded in the Judiciary (González Ocantos, 2016, p. 6; Hilbink, 2007). Thus, González Ocantos (2016, pp. 6–7) argues that it is not about “individual judges’ opportunistic calculations”, but rather a matter of a “thick cultural lens” and “deeply ingrained institutional inertias” (also noted by C. Collins, personal communication, 27 September 2021).

González Ocantos (2016) identifies three types of judicial actors in transitional justice contexts: responsive, unresponsive (recalcitrant), and indifferent. In the case of pro-regime memory sites, “Walls” in the Judiciary are represented by recalcitrant judicial actors that block elimination demands because of their lack of connection with human rights law. This type of Judiciary has a “deeply ingrained positivist legal worldview” and does not “think outside the box” in terms of incorporating human rights norms (González Ocantos, 2016, p. 59). This type of judicial actor will privilege an objective, formalistic, and narrow view of the interpretation of the law that will not give space for victims of human rights violations’ demands for reparation and truth (González Ocantos, 2016, p. 8; Gonzalez-Ocantos, 2020, p. 49; Payne et al., 2019, p. 46). Thus, because they have not learnt about human rights or are not interested in them, recalcitrant judges will develop “rulings that do not incorporate international law” (González Ocantos, 2016, p. 23).

“Walls” have also been part of the transitional justice landscape in Spain. As noted by Traverso (2019, p. 43), “nostalgia for Francoism [in Spain] is very much a presence among the most conservative elements of society, who vote for the *Partido Popular*.” Capdepón (2020, p. 120) noted that “Francoist culture and ideology are deeply rooted in certain sectors of Spanish society”, including the Military, the Judiciary, public administration, and the right-wing political parties. Indeed, in Spain, the centre-right-wing party *Partido Popular* and the far-right party Vox have tended to block elimination processes of pro-Francoist memorialisation since the issuing of the Historical Memory Law in 2007, explicitly arguing in favour of their survival. The PP, for instance, actively opposed the HML in 2007 and opposed having the 18<sup>th</sup> of July as the day for the condemnation of Francoism (Mora, 2015). More recently, Capdepón (2020) notes that the impulse given to the change of Francoist street names in Madrid in 2015 – with the progressive left-wing government – came to a halt with the new right-wing government elected in 2019. The current slowdown in the processes of change is explained by the fact that this new right-wing coalition included the far-right Vox Party, which advocates maintaining the Francoist symbols and views any change as a meaningless and revengeful attitude (p. 119).

Thus, since the transition, the Judiciary in Spain has also been inclined to oversee international human rights law when analysing cases regarding victims’ reparations.

According to former members of the Judiciary, a Francoist “trace” linked to a “profound conservatism” and formalism “remains alive and present in the current reality of the Spanish magistrature” (C. Jiménez & Doñate, 2012, pp. 17–18). This recalcitrance towards human rights and victims’ reparations is evident in several Court favouring the maintenance of pro-

regime memorialisation. Thus, in 2021, the Madrid Court stated, against the municipal agreement of 2017, that General Millán Astray Street in Madrid must be maintained since, according to the Court, Millán Astray had nothing to do with the Civil War and the repression of the dictatorship (although he did participate as a key promoter of the Nationalist cause) (Viejo, 2021). Likewise, in 2018, a Court ordered the Madrid government to put back the street name *Caídos de la División Azul* – a group of Spanish volunteers who, during the Second World War, fought with Nazi Germany – using a *sanitising* discourse: “[The street name] was created in the period of the dictatorship, but its actions take place outside our borders, and they were not an exaltation of the dictatorship” (Caballero, 2018). The Courts maintained the name as it was not explicitly connected to the regime (even if the *División Azul* was deeply linked to Franco’s dictatorship). Thus, the process of street name change in Madrid has also met “Walls” from the Judiciary. For Spanish historian Julián Casanova, the survival of pro-Francoist memorialisations in Spain has been aided not only by “Walls” but also by a lack of political will from the centre-left: “The right has not yet broken with Francoism, and the left is very timid, incapable of confronting politically the prejudices of a part of public opinion” (Junquera, 2011).

### **Explanatory Factors for the Elimination of Pro-regime Memorialisation**

This section explores the factors that explain the elimination of pro-regime memorialisation. Removing memory sites has been integral to human history (Platt, 2020). As noted by Fortin (2017), the elimination of monuments and memory sites “were recorded in the Bible. Medieval Christians smashed sculptures of ancient Rome. Spanish conquerors destroyed temples of the Aztecs and the Incas.”

In recent years, the removal of memory sites has become recurrent in social protests in the United States, Europe and Latin America (Murphy, 2021, p. 1143). Some authors have tried to uncover “through a sociological lens, the current conditions in society in which many monuments are being removed or torn down” (Evans, 2021, p. 1045). Social scientists, therefore, are trying to understand what leads a society to remove sites that are an essential part of its identity, and what patterns explain this behaviour. Today, this is undoubtedly a crucial issue as there has been a “growing support for [the] removal of monuments” (p. 1049).

The research, however, does not focus on memory sites that have been destroyed or toppled in the context of protests or vandalism. Instead, it centres on administrative or legal removals by authorities once a process of elimination initiates. According to Connerton (2008), who developed a typology of forgetfulness, this would be “prescriptive forgetting”, a highly political elimination in which authorities agree to erase a section of the past (also see Forest & Johnson, 2002, p. 504).

In any case, the elimination of symbols is always felt as “clear[ing] the way for the creation of a new collective memory” (Harrison, 2013, p. 171), and “symbolizing the end of an era” (Merewether, 1999, p. 183). When transformations in political regimes occur, demolitions and transformations of the public space represent and reinforce the idea of change. This often happens in contexts of transition from an authoritarian regime to one in which citizens have pinned their hopes for a better quality of life. A classic example is shown in Sergéi

Eisenstein's "October 1917" (1928), which recreates a mob pulling down the gigantic statue of Tsar Alexander III of Russia.

### *Unprotective Location (UL)*

This first explanatory factor for elimination – "Unprotective Location" – shows that pro-regime memorials would most likely be eliminated if they are located in areas where they are unprotected, that is, in areas with significant public attention or prominence. Thus, pro-regime memorials are eliminated when they are located in high-profile areas where widespread public access and notoriety are higher.

Specifically, "Unprotective Locations" are areas such as touristic or busy areas, avenues in prominent cities, or areas strongly associated with dictatorship victims. Pro-regime memorials will likely be denounced, campaigned against, and eventually eliminated in all these locations. These spaces grant visibility. The greater the visibility, the more serious is the possibility that these memorials will be attacked and denounced. The stigmatisation of pro-regime memory means that these memorials must retreat to more or less invisible areas (or with less public access) to survive.

Areas deeply connected to victims will certainly not accept the existence of a pro-regime memorial. Here, the community will most likely prevent the inauguration of the pro-regime site, or will campaign for its elimination. The contradiction of having a pro-regime memorial located in a community with strong links with the suffering of victims – either because many of their neighbours were tortured or murdered, or because human rights violations occurred

in the area – would be too strong to bear. This assertion is connected to the previously developed idea (in the “Protective Location” section) regarding Chile’s geographical and socio-economic segregation of memory (Aguilera, 2015). This segregation is observed in how victims’ memorials are usually located in neighbourhoods that suffered most from repression. Few pro-victim memorials are found in the well-off areas more linked to the right-wing and the regime (Aguilera, 2015). Under the same logic, pro-regime memorials will not inhabit spaces in which the memory of victims predominates, but instead, will inhabit less visible and marginal areas, or high socio-economic areas in which it will generate fewer tensions.

There are various examples of pro-regime memorials whose “Unprotective Location” played a crucial role in their elimination. For instance, in the case of Av. General Francisco Franco in La Pintana (now Av. Violeta Parra), anti-regime agents argued in 2010 that this name was in stark contrast “with the community of this *popular, working-class neighbourhood*, where many workers [live].” Thus, it was argued, the “Francisco Franco” name should be eliminated from the area (Agencia de Noticias Medio a Medio, 2013, emphasis added) (see Appendix, picture #1, p. 452).

Likewise, in the Av. 11 de Septiembre in Providencia (now Av. Nueva Providencia), it was widely recognised that the site’s prominent location aided elimination efforts. According to one newspaper, the street’s name attracted high levels of “public controversy”, and “this is because it takes place in an *emblematic district* of the capital city” (Bahamondes, 2013, emphasis added).

The case of the failed Jaime Guzmán memorial in Plaza Italia (Santiago, Chile) also exemplifies the relevance of the site's (unprotective) location for its elimination. Around 2004, a prominent UDI leader and promoter of this initiative held a press conference to explain the memorial's construction. A journalist asked: "The fact it is located there [in Plaza Italia], would it place it at any risk of damages or controversy?" and added: "[I say this because] it's a place that belongs to all Chileans (regardless of their political colour)." The journalist asked why an "Unprotective Location" – a prominent space linked to protests – was chosen for a pro-regime memorial. Perhaps somewhat naively, the UDI representative downplayed the issue and answered that Jaime Guzmán also deserved a memory site regardless of location: "The city belongs to all Chileans, and just as we have Salvador Allende in the Constitution Square, Jaime Guzmán was a man who was loved by his supporters and respected by his opponents" (Villegas, 2008). This perception contrasted with popular opinion; many people considered its location inappropriate. Citizens in the area thought that Jaime Guzmán's ideals regarding neoliberalism, individualism, extreme Catholicism and authoritarianism, clashed with the square as a symbol of social protest, demonstrations and freedom of speech. The Coordinator of the *Comisión FUNA* said, "for us, it is extremely serious not that the monument is built, but the *place* they chose. This is certainly the most complicated [issue] as it is an open provocation to the people." Ultimately, the "Unprotective Location" factor was essential in suspending the project, and the memorial was later built in another area providing more protection.

It must be noted that public exposure to the media may turn a “Protective Location” into an ‘unprotective’ one. An interesting case is the Augusto Pinochet Plaque in Walmart, which was located inside a private area belonging to the company. The plaque had been placed in 1999 when the area was owned by a well-known *Pinochetista* businessman<sup>52</sup> (The Clinic, 2011). In 2011, the plaque was made public in a photo sent to The Clinic newspaper: “An outraged reader sent us this photograph” (The Clinic, 2011). The situation immediately generated a “huge controversy” (Foncea, 2011). Several centre-left Deputies publicly condemned the plaque, saying such commemoration was “sombre” (Foncea, 2011). By contrast, a well-known right-wing Deputy (UDI) defended the Pinochet Plaque and praised the pro-regime memory entrepreneur who had unveiled it. According to him, s/he “seems a person consistent with his/her principles.” He argued that the plaque was on private property, a fact that should have forestalled condemnation: “Why do they [public opinion] have to get involved?” (Foncea, 2011). However, it was precisely the fact (and the way) the plaque had been exposed that made the “private location” factor irrelevant, although it was *still* in a “Protective Location.” Irrespective of where it was located (in this case, inside a private company building), the plaque was now, inevitably, a very *public issue*. Curiously, Walmart anticipated this situation and, by the end of 2010, pre-emptively removed the plaque to avoid “various interpretations” (Cooperativa, 2011a, 2011b). However, their preventive measure did not stop its subsequent public disclosure – someone had managed to take a picture of the plaque before it was removed and then sent it to the newspaper. Thus, although the plaque was placed in a “Protective Location” (private space), media exposure made this factor irrelevant.

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<sup>52</sup> He owned D&S which Walmart bought in 2009.

In brief, the “Unprotective Location” factor indicates that pro-regime memorials would be most likely eliminated when located in unprotected areas. Such areas include spaces with significant public attention or prominence, busy areas, avenues in prominent cities, or areas strongly associated with victims of the dictatorship.

### *Social Noise (SN)*

The second explanatory factor for the elimination of pro-regime memorials is “Social Noise.” The factor refers to the “involvement” of actors from “outside” (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, p. 1216), going beyond the local community in which the pro-regime site is inserted. These actors from “outside” have “some degree of formal organization” (Tarrow, 2011, p. 183), such as victims’ associations, human rights NGOs, or civil organisations linked to the fight against the dictatorship. Thus, these groups belong to “civil society”, defined by Payne et al. (2019, p. 42) as “an overlapping set of actors primarily comprised of victims of abuse, their families, allies and advocates. All are non-state, non-institutionalized actors.” By intervening in an elimination process, these organisations create “noise” concerning the need to remove the pro-regime memory site. Their “noise” draws the attention of the press, politicians, and civil society, generating more “Social Noise.” This “Social Noise” increases the chances that the memory site is removed as the pressure on the authorities also increases—the more exposure and “noise” on the case, the more pressure for its removal.

The idea of “Social Noise” is connected to the concept of “public resonance” used by Jordan (2006). In her study of Holocaust victims’ memorialisation in Berlin, she examined how the

“increasing visibility” gained by a memorial helped the project succeed and finally be inaugurated (p. 12). This resonance implied that national and international actors took up the memory site’s case, discussed it in the press, and politicians debated the issue. Such resonance increases pressure and the need to approve the memorial project. Thus, the author maintains that with public resonance, “the campaign seems to reach a point of no return, a moment at which any alternative use of the land becomes unthinkable, and it becomes politically difficult not to support a given memorial project” (p. 12).

Bearing this theory in mind, “public resonance” could also be used as a factor for the elimination of the commemorative projects of the ‘opposite side.’ Drawing from this idea, in the case of pro-regime memorials, it seems more appropriate to name the concept “Social Noise”, as it is “noise” the primary tool being mobilised by human rights organisations in their fight against pro-regime memorialisation. This “Social Noise” becomes ‘social’ as it resonates among larger groups and activists, having further reverberations in society (and not only within a single community).

The concept of “Social Noise” also draws on the broad literature on social movements in dictatorships and transitional justice. Payne et al. (2019, p. 229) noted that “Latin America has a uniquely strong and mobilized human rights and victims’ community.” Thus, transitional justice literature has identified social movements against the dictatorship – particularly victims’ and relatives’ associations – as one of the most critical factors behind the fall of dictatorial regimes and the progress in memory, justice and human rights in democracy (Jelin, 2003, p. 333). Regarding the demise of authoritarian regimes and the

capacity of the state to provide justice after transition, Sikkink and Joon Kim (2013) argued that human rights NGOs have been fundamental in promoting the human rights cause and pressuring states to abide by their human rights obligations. These local NGOs create networks with international advocacy groups, thus generating immense pressure on the political elite and veto powers (Sikkink, 1998). This pressure is also crucial considering the lack of interest or involvement of states in providing swift and integral transitional justice policies. In this context, civil society organisations have thus taken the lead in pressuring state officials and creating awareness of the importance of human rights (Stern & Winn, 2016, p. 286).

Indeed, the countries with more accountability in Latin America are characterised by a strong human rights movement (e.g., Argentina, Chile), while “weaker human rights movements characterise cases with a poor record of criminal accountability” (e.g., Brazil and Mexico) (Gonzalez-Ocantos, 2020, p. 26). Regarding justice, for Payne and Pereira (2019, p. 121), one of the most relevant factors in overcoming impunity is “the demand of civil society.” They argue that “without human rights victims claiming their right to reparation, the Judiciary would hardly have challenged the amnesty laws *motu proprio* and promoted accountability.” Thus, civil society organisations have arduously pushed the processes in favour of transitional justice. Regarding corporate accountability – which targets civil perpetration linked to the business sector – Payne et al. (2019, pp. 18–19) have also examined the relevance of civil society mobilisation in pushing forward justice in contexts in which the Judiciary is still very much affiliated with the regime. Here, “civil society demand remains critical to the process [...]. Without that demand, corporate accountability processes

would not begin” (Payne et al., 2019, pp. 18–19). The authors stress the importance of their capacity to generate “noise” by saying that, to succeed in pressuring for justice, they must carry out “visible and *audible* mobilisations” (Payne et al., 2019, p. 45, emphasis added).

For example, in 2012, in an open letter to *The Clinic* newspaper, a right-wing Deputy publicly condemned the statue of José Toribio Merino at the Chilean National Maritime Museum. Regime supporters swiftly reacted by writing letters against this action. In one of these letters, they argued that, unfortunately for them, this Deputy would not dare to defend criminals against humanity or the legacy of the military regime because “the *vociferous* masses of the DD.HH NGOs will come” (Navajas, 2012, p. 543, emphasis added). The adjective “vociferous” is purposeful. It indicates the central resource human rights groups have: Raising their voices and imposing their agenda.

Similarly, in 2014, in the context of a *funa* against a Navy officer in Valparaíso, the officer told the human rights activist, “keep *yelling* [at me] because you’re doing it just fine” (Cine Forum Cine Otro, 2014a). The word “yelling” refers not only to the physical act of shouting, but also to human rights groups’ “Social Noise” against perpetrators. By 2017, human rights organisations complained that their “noise” against Merino’s statue, no matter how loud, was not being listened to by authorities. Thus, ‘Cine Forum Valpo’ and *Ciudadanos por la Memoria* criticised that “government authorities have turned a *deaf ear* to the complaint [against pro-regime memorialisation] that this group of *porteños* and *porteñas* tirelessly carries forward” (G. Correa, 2017, emphasis added). The ‘deaf ears’ metaphor is not accidental; it indicates the authorities’ prevalent attitude of letting time pass and trying to

silence the uncomfortable “noise” of human rights organisations demanding symbolic reparations and justice.

Although the involvement of social movements in transitional justice contexts has not been conceptualised as “Social Noise”, most authors in the field use words and concepts associated with “noise.” Thus, for instance, Hite and Cesarini (Hite & Cesarini, 2004a, p. 327, emphasis added) mention that “a key factor is also the willingness of the citizenry to organize and *voice* dissent.” Likewise, Sikkink (1998, p. 13, emphasis added) frequently uses the metaphors of deaf/noise/voice when talking about how, when “governments are inaccessible or *deaf*”, these human rights networks “*amplify* the demands of domestic groups” and thus make the mobilisations much more effective and impactful.

Resource mobilisation theory states that social movements mobilise resources “to work toward goal achievement” (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, p. 1220). The kind of resources mobilised range from “legitimacy”, “money”, “facilities”, “labor”, and indeed, “adherents” who will promote the cause (p. 1220). Adherents have a particular role in expanding and consolidating the movement by “mobilizing supporters”, changing public opinion on the issue (p. 1217), and consolidating linkages with other movements (Tarrow, 2011, p. 30). As long as these resources are used efficiently, the movement will benefit by acquiring more visibility and, eventually, political viability (Ganz, 2009).

Other crucial resources for social movements include “repertoires of contention” and performances (Tarrow, 2011, p. 29). Repertoires of contention refer to the critical discourses

a movement uses in the political and symbolic space to present its demands to citizens and political actors (pp. 31–32). These frames appropriate historical elements from other demands and movements to “*resonate* with a population’s cultural predispositions” (p. 144, emphasis added).

Likewise, social movements use performances as a powerful resource to set the agenda and draw attention. Performances are actions that escape the normal course of quotidian and ordinary acts. They “disrupt” the flow of everyday life (Tarrow, 2011, p. 99). To generate disruption, they incorporate previous cultural elements citizens already know. Still, performances also “innovate” by including new actions or speeches to give the movement a certain air of renewal and authenticity (p. 99). As more people feel identified with these performances and understand their meaning, they “help solidarity grow” (p. 100). Thus, according to Tarrow (2011, p. 104), performance “is the strongest weapon of social movements.”

Bearing this in mind, the central resource mobilised by human rights groups to contest pro-regime memorialisation is their capacity to generate “noise” against the pro-regime site. The more “noise” they mobilise through widespread social condemnation, and media and political attention, the more likely authorities will feel pressured to eliminate the site. Their “noise” will imply that they will “argue, persuade, strategize, document, lobby, pressure and complain” (Sikkink & Keck, 1998, p. x). Adherents to the cause will add “noise” to their repertoires of contention and their performances to attract civil society’s attention. Thus, they will campaign and promote the need to eliminate the pro-regime memorial through

“organized efforts to inform the public” (Payne et al., 2019, p. 203). They will strive to achieve “frame resonance” (Snow & Benford, 1988) by making sense to a broader public and thus increasing the costs of maintaining the site.

Indeed, human rights issues have “reputational costs for authorities and politicians (Payne et al., 2019, p. 277). As noted by Payne et al. (2019, p. 161), “those potential costs result from efforts from below”, in this case, from social movement’s involvement and their “Social Noise.” Ultimately, once they impact public opinion, human rights organisations know they can become “agenda setters” and have “significant control over the policies that replace the status quo” (Tsebellis, 2002, p. 2).

The media has a relevant role in promoting human rights organisations’ “Social Noise” against the pro-regime sites. Francisco Estévez, an interviewee who participated in several campaigns against pro-regime memorials in Chile, stated that cases need “*mediatización*” (media exposure) to be successful. Thus, Sikkink (1998, p. 22) has argued that “to reach a broader audience, networks strive to attract press attention.” The media “diffuses” and “frames” the contentiousness (Tarrow, 2011, p. 133) around the pro-regime site. It may cause a local case to jump to the national arena or a national case to be discussed internationally. For instance, the case of the name change of Av. 11 de Septiembre in Providencia (Chile) drew the attention of Spanish newspaper El País (Montes, 2013) and the BBC (2013). The media was also responsible for framing the case (“media framing”) (Tarrow, 2011, p. 148) by characterising the change of Av. 11 de Septiembre’s name as “emblematic” and “controversial.” Likewise, a prominent journalist from CNN framed the case of the plaques

and photographs of Manuel Contreras as totally unacceptable, increasing the notoriety of the case by saying in prime time that: “The only acceptable way for him to be in the galleries of the Military would be to remember his crimes” (CNN Chile, 2020). Similarly, in Spain, Human rights lawyers fighting against pro-regime memorialisation know that media coverage is fundamental to increase “Social Noise”, and thus increase the political costs of maintaining pro-Francoist symbols: “And all of them would reach the ears of [city] councillors, civil servants, magistrates...even some other politician who would not know what to answer at a press conference so as not to anger his electorate” (Ranz, 2020, p. 199). In this context, as noted by Jesús de Andrés<sup>53</sup>, the attack on pro-Francoist memorialisation “reopens the debate on the memory of Francoism” (Olaya & León, 2015).

“Social Noise” through the media persuades politicians and the Judiciary. In recent years, victims in Chile have frequently used the judicial Courts to carry out civil lawsuits in favour of their symbolic reparation (C. Collins, personal communication, 27 September 2021; Sferrazza & Bustos, 2021). Thus, “Social Noise” through the media has been crucial in expanding awareness of the cases and convincing Courts of the importance of eliminating pro-regime memorials (Payne et al. 2019, p. 121).

As “Social Noise” around the issue of pro-regime memorialisation escalates, the contentiousness around these sites is framed differently. In the early 2000s in Chile, pro-regime memorials were branded by left-wing politicians as “illegal.” This argument stated that these sites should be eliminated because they were inaugurated without legal or

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legislative permission —as a law passed in Congress or without the certification of the National Monuments Council. For instance, and as mentioned earlier, shortly after being inaugurated in 2002, the José Toribio Merino statue was condemned in Congress by a centre-left Deputy who said that its inauguration represented the autonomy of the Armed Forces, and that it should have been approved in Congress like any other monument to a public official. By then, victims and human rights organisations were not making the “Social Noise” that would later characterise them.

After this episode, the “Social Noise” against pro-regime memorials mutated and incorporated certain ideas linked to the suffering of victims. Thus, in 2013, the main arguments against pro-regime memorials encompassed concepts such as generating division, representing backwardness and lack of modernity, affecting the national and international image, and ultimately, affecting victims. For instance, it is noteworthy that one of the main arguments in favour of the name change of Av. 11 de Septiembre in Providencia in 2013 was that this pro-regime name affected the district’s ‘image’: “[The avenue’s pro-regime name] divides and offends people and tarnishes the image of the district” (J. Errázuriz, 2012). In Spain, a similar argument regarding international ‘image’ was used to defend the elimination of Franco’s statue in Melilla by saying that, since it was located in a place that welcomed visitors and tourists, it could potentially provide a negative ‘first impression’ (Jiménez, 2019).

By then (2012 – 2013), “Social Noise” also incorporated an ethical problem beyond the legalist perspective or ‘image’ issue. As a human rights lawyer mentioned in an interview

regarding the Merino statue, “whether it is legal or not for the statue to be there is not the issue. There is an ethical problem here” (Gallo, 2012<sup>54</sup>). In this context, “Social Noise” acquired an ethical dimension that made it much more powerful and audible. The idea that these memorials represent impunity was fully incorporated into the “noise.” Victims, human rights lawyers, and organisations started framing the survival of pro-regime memorialisation as an ethical problem of justice and symbolic reparation. Thus, victims argued that it is not enough to have memorials for the victims; the state must also strive to eliminate the monuments linked to the ‘other’ side. For victims, these eliminations would also symbolise symbolic reparation and the end of impunity.

Since 2018, “Social Noise” has incorporated other elements into its discourse, making it even more audible. Organisations and victims no longer speak simply of impunity or reparation but have fully introduced the idea of comprehensive reparation (*reparación integral*), guarantees of non-repetition, and *negacionismo* (denialism). These three concepts figure prominently in appeals for protection against pro-regime memorials in Chile.

For instance, civil society and victims view pro-regime memorials as examples of the denialism of human rights violations during the dictatorship. This denialism has recently become more “vocal” (C. Collins, personal communication, 27 September 2021). Certain groups have publicly cast aside their stigmatisation and openly deny, justify, and celebrate human rights violations. Thus, victims’ “Social Noise” currently assert that denialism must be urgently regulated. They argue that denialism – embodied in pro-regime memorialisation

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<sup>54</sup> Interviewing Jorge Contesse.

– would affect two crucial elements of transitional justice: Comprehensive reparations and guarantees of non-repetition. Recent protection appeals against pro-regime memorials argue that the existence of these commemorations is an obstacle to victims' reparations since they damage their psychological wellbeing. The mere fact of knowing that these commemorations exist disturbs their peace of mind. This approach derives from expanding the idea of reparations, understanding it not only as financial compensation but also as victims' psychological and mental wellbeing (C. Collins, personal communication, 27 September 2021).

Furthermore, victims argue that this comprehensive reparation cannot be achieved without guarantees of non-repetition. The survival of pro-regime memorials is the best example of this lack of guarantees; they symbolise how pro-regime sentiments continue to swarm within the armed institutions. With the Military defending pro-regime memorialisation, they argue, there cannot be a guarantee that the atrocious events of the recent past will not happen again. “Social Noise” has been progressively nourished by discourses that emphasise that pro-regime memorials are not only a legal problem but also an ethical one seriously affecting victims and society.

Chile presents several cases in which “Social Noise” played a relevant role in eliminating pro-regime memorials. In the case of Av. 11 de Septiembre in 2013, the media emphasised that the organisations promoting its change “want to make *noise*, because [...] mayor Cristián Labbé rejects the petition” (La Segunda, 2012, emphasis added). This “noise” was reflected in their “*call* on neighbours, social networks and student and cultural organisations

to carry out citizen pressure after this important objective” (NGO Desmonumentar el Golpe, 2013, emphasis added).

A paradigmatic case is that of the failed memorial to Jaime Guzmán in Plaza Italia. The documentary “The Battle of Plaza Italia” shows how the square residents decided to campaign to prevent the memorial from being built in their area (around 2000 – 2004). Yet, they were not listened to by the authorities, who continued with the plans without asking the community. The documentary shows how, in desperation, neighbours contacted the *Comisión FUNA*, an expert group in public *funas* (denunciations) of human rights violators (Collins & Hite, 2013b, p. 147)<sup>55</sup>. The neighbours asked *Comisión FUNA* to “make noise” and draw the attention of the authorities, forcing them to desist from the plan. In one of the meetings, a neighbour asked if residents knew what a *funa* was, and most had no idea. This shows how, by then, “Social Noise” against pro-regime memorials was still uncommon. At the meeting, the neighbours agreed on using *Comisión FUNA*’S “Social Noise” to stop the plans to create the Jaime Guzmán memorial. As one of the residents mentioned, “I think it is time to start making *noise*, make a sitting, park all the cars!” (Villegas, 2008, emphasis added). In the protest, *Comisión FUNA* and other human rights and victims’ organisations indeed made significant “noise.” There were speeches using megaphones, there was a saxophonist, and they did a ritual performance shouting at a Jaime Guzmán doll. The doll was dressed like a businessman, had no head, and was tied to a stick. People from the public entered the circle surrounding the figurine and yelling at him. The documentary shows how a

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<sup>55</sup> As noted by Hite and Collins (2009, p. 391), “the ‘FUNA’ is a direct action group, mainly composed of young people, that has mobilised as many as several hundred people at a time for public denunciations of former perpetrators at their homes or workplaces.”

woman shouted: “Answer back! Here we are, waiting for your answer!” and “Jaime Guzmán, I declare you *funado!*” The documentary shows how everyone in the *funera* shouts and spins around the doll in a cathartic “Social Noise” performance of condemnation.

The protest appeared in the media and created even more “Social Noise.” Indeed, on 3 August 2004, right-wing mayor Cristián Labbé asked the city council to lower the ‘volume’ of the case by reducing its media exposure: “Everything must be weighed very well, de-dramatize and de-mediatize” (Municipalidad de Providencia, 2004, p. 22). In the meeting, the city councillors commented that, in the context of “the latest events that are shaking the country” (referring to the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the military coup in 2003), the “neighbours’ apprehensions” are justified (p. 18). As mentioned by the councillors, the memorial would be placed in “a very neuralgic point in Santiago” where it could be destroyed (p. 21).

Neighbours’ and civil society’s “Social Noise” made them re-think “it could be complicated for the integrity of the monument itself *if it were located in a sector with these [prominent and unprotective] characteristics*” of Plaza Italia (p. 21, emphasis added).

Thus, shortly after, the authorities decided to abort the plans and move the memorial away to another place. The neighbours celebrated their triumph, thanks to their “Social Noise.” As noted by a neighbour, “it is worth organising because, even if you make little *noise*, it works!” (Villegas, 2008, emphasis added).

The case of Av. Jaime Guzmán in Renca also offers a clear example of the role played by “Social Noise” in the name change of this road (see Appendix, picture #8, p. 454). In 2020,

the district's mayor publicly defended the name change to Av. Dorsal alluding to the community organisations' "Social Noise": "No matter how legitimate the personal esteem some may have for him [Jaime Guzmán], it is not a sufficient reason to ignore the *voice* of millions of Chileans" (Castro, 2020, emphasis added). Similarly, in 2014 in the context of a *funa* against the statue of Merino, one of the organisers of the event mentioned the importance of "Social Noise" in increasing the condemnation against the statue: "We want to thank the presence of organised human rights groups, young students, party members, who have supported this activity, which started a year ago with [only] four or five people", but which has grown now to include various sectors of civil society (e.g., human rights organisations, students, communities, etc.) (Cine Forum Cine Otro, 2014c).

"Social Noise", then, is a decisive factor that advances the elimination of pro-regime symbols. It is an agentic condition involving civil society's "noise" and actions, particularly human rights organisations and victims fighting against the permanence of regime legacies in democracy.

### *Local and/or Institutional Rejection (LIR)*

The third factor in explaining the elimination of pro-regime memorialisation is "Local and/or Institutional Rejection." The factor is present when local communities (neighbours) and/or state institutions actively reject the pro-regime memorial and thus support an elimination process. Pro-regime sites subjected to this opposition are more likely to be eliminated.

A pro-regime memory site possesses the LIR factor when a section of the local community actively rejects the site<sup>56</sup>. Evidence of this rejection is reflected in several situations, such as in polls demonstrating the community's rejection; in a plebiscite vote, where the majority of the community opposes the maintenance of the site; or when in neighbourhood council meetings, the majority of the residents approve its elimination. Capdepón (2020) studied this phenomenon in Madrid when in 2015, the local government – headed by the progressive left – initiated a process of eliminating pro-Francoist names of certain streets. The author notes how the rising of a new left-wing city council encouraged local communities to push forward the changing of several street names that honoured Franco and his closest collaborators. She calls this process a “toponymic activism”, a mobilisation “from below” advancing “informal resignification and reappropriation of urban space” and advancing actions pressuring authorities to implement the changes (Capdepón, 2020, p. 114).

State agencies can also reject the survival of pro-regime memorials by providing legal and/or administrative arguments to eliminate the site. In Chile, this rejection is observed, for instance, in Congress Resolutions condemning the existence of pro-regime sites, or when the National Institute for Human Rights sends *amicus curiae* to remind the Courts about the obligations of states in defending human rights.

It is important to note that “Local and/or Institutional Support” (LIS) and “Local and/or Institutional Rejection” (LIR) focus more on the actions carried out by agents rather than on

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<sup>56</sup> Although vandalism and destruction of the memory site may be considered part of a local rejection effort, it is not included as an indicator of “Local Rejection.” This factor refers to formal actions in negotiations with authorities.

specific agents *per se*. Thus, in some cases, certain institutions' efforts regarding a pro-regime site may be catalogued as LIS. In other cases, the same institution could perform actions that fit into the LIR description. Moreover, it should be noted that LIS and LIR may coexist in the same case. Thus, it may happen that while a section of the community actively supports the maintenance of a pro-regime site, another section opposes it and advocates for its elimination. For instance, in Tortosa (Spain), the community is divided on what to do with the “Commemorative Monument of the Battle of the Ebro”, a monument installed by Franco’s government in the 1960s. Today, a group of neighbours considers that the monument should be maintained and re-interpreted to learn from history (*Col·lectiu per a la Reinterpretació del Monument a la Batalla de l’Ebre*, Corembre). Indeed, in 2016, the community voted to maintain the monument, with 68% supporting its survival. A member of the collective defending it mentioned that “the commemorative monument of the battle of the Ebro is no longer a Francoist monument. It is an artistic and architectural work of all *Tortosinos*” (Sellart, 2016). This group also views the monument as an opportunity to make a pedagogy of memory, that is, an “opportunity not to forget the scars of the past” (Collective for the reinterpretation of the monument of the battle of the Ebro) (ACN Tortosa, 2020). However, simultaneously, another section of the same community rejects the monument and advocates for its removal (*Comisión per la Retirada dels Símbols Franquistas de Tortosa*). In this case, both “Local and/or Institutional Support” and “Local and/or Institutional Rejection” coexist.

Since the return to democracy in Chile, communities have had a relevant role in rejecting the existence of pro-regime memorialisation. Faced with clear political costs, mayors and city

councils have usually abided by what the community desires. An illustrative case is the name change of Almirante Gotuzzo Street in Santiago, changed to Teacher Amanda Labarca Street in 2016 (see Appendix, picture #5, p. 453). In January 2016, the Citizen Participation Subdirectorate surveyed nearby residents, asking: “Would you agree with changing the name of Almirante Lorenzo Gotuzzo Street<sup>57</sup> to that of Teacher Amanda Labarca?” 79% said yes, while 21% rejected the idea<sup>58</sup> (Municipalidad de Santiago, 2016b, pp. 25–26). When the renaming of the street was proposed to the neighbourhood council (COSOC), 14 neighbourhood representatives approved, two abstained, and only three rejected the motion (Municipalidad de Santiago, 2016a). In the meeting, two neighbours congratulated the change. One of them said, “[I would] just [want to] thank the initiative [that] has taken place among other name changes, and it is good that we rename streets with the true representatives of our country’s history [...]. We appreciate it” (Municipalidad de Santiago, 2016a, p. 26).

The rejection of the Almirante Lorenzo Gotuzzo name within the community, particularly in the COSOC and in the poll, was instrumental for the mayor to legitimise and put forward the street’s name change. Thus, communities and citizens “have a key and autonomous role to play in the eradication of authoritarian legacies” (Hite & Cesarini, 2004a, p. 327).

Another case is that of Av. 11 de Septiembre in Providencia. In the neighbourhood council meeting in June 2013, and although most neighbours voted against changing the avenue’s name, a group of residents supported the name change, arguing that the election of the new

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<sup>57</sup> Almirante Lorenzo Gotuzzo was the first Minister of Finance of the dictatorship (1973 – 1974).

<sup>58</sup> 29 participants.

progressive mayor reflected that most of the community supported this elimination. A neighbour claimed that the elimination of the 11 de Septiembre name from the avenue “was on Mrs Josefa Errázuriz’s program, she was elected, *the neighbours supported that program*, they knew about it, it was widely publicized” (Municipalidad de Providencia, 2013a, p. 10, emphasis added).

In Renca, too, the mayor justified the elimination of Av. Jaime Guzmán (which was changed to Av. Dorsal) in 2020 saying that “the replacement of the traditional name of this Avenue is not born of my will as democratically elected mayor, but of *the desire of various organisations of residents* of Renca” who rejected the Jaime Guzmán name (Castro, 2020, emphasis added). The mayor thus highlighted that the street’s name elimination was pushed forward by local rejection.

Similarly, in the case of the failed memorial to Jaime Guzmán in Plaza Italia, after the Senate and the city council approved its construction, the residents of the area carried out protest actions and hung a large canvas on the building’s façade that said: “The neighbours don’t want the monument here.” In the documentary, one resident argued he hoped this local rejection would grow and eventually develop into “Social Noise”: “The ideal thing is that this would grow like a snowball, you know, that we [local neighbours] set this off and that later there would be a civic platform [“Social Noise”] that would oppose this monstrosity” (Villegas, 2008).

Local communities and institutions may have various reasons for rejecting a pro-regime memorial. These vary from the damage to the public image of the community or the institution; the need to eliminate it due to the fear of violence and controversy; the economic and political punishment associated with its maintenance; or also, the need to offer comprehensive reparations to victims and ensure guarantees of non-repetition.

### *Window of Opportunity (WO)*

The fourth factor in explaining the elimination of pro-regime memorialisation is the presence of a “Window of Opportunity.” A “Window of Opportunity” is a higher-level authority inclined to support human rights issues. For instance, it is expected that city councils dominated by the centre-left or left-wing will be more likely to remove pro-regime memorialisation. Likewise, in the context of a judicial process, Courts that prioritise victims’ “integral reparations” and are more receptive to the international human rights law are also a “Window of Opportunity” that may aid an elimination process.

The “Window of Opportunity” factor is connected to the “political opportunities” (Tarrow, 2011, p. 28) that movements or anti-regime agents have in promoting their agendas, in this case, the elimination of pro-regime memorials. According to Tarrow (2011, p. 32), political opportunities are “consistent [...] sets of clues that encourage people to engage in contentious politics.” In the case of pro-regime memorials, the presence of a predominantly centre-left or left-wing city council, or Courts and judicial actors inclined to human rights issues, “expands opportunities” (p. 167) for the elimination of pro-regime sites. These opportunities are “external to the group” (p. 33) and, in this case, depend on the inclinations

of these powerful agents (city councils or judicial Courts). If these agents are centre-left or left-wing or, in the case of judicial actors, have demonstrated awareness of victims' integral reparations and human rights issues, then it is more likely they will be predisposed to eliminate pro-regime sites. However, as Tarrow (2011, p. 169) notes, these "openings for reform quickly close" and, in some cases, become fragile. Thus, a city council in which the centre-left or left-wing dominated can, after an election, become right-wing. Similarly, Courts can be unpredictable and become less inclined to human rights issues at any time, a common situation in Chile (Collins & Hau, 2016).

Several authors have investigated how political inclinations condition how human rights issues are treated. Thus, "political orientation/beliefs, including political party identification, is a strong predictor of attitudes towards human rights and civil liberties" (Rojas 2017, p. 113). Hence, people linked to the centre-left or left-wing are more likely to support human rights issues and condemn the dictatorship. Consequently, city councils dominated by the centre-left or left-wing will likely become scenarios where elimination processes against pro-regime memorialisation are initiated and are successful. This left-wing 'dominance' might be observed in the composition of the city council at the moment of denunciation, and when the elimination process unfolds. If the majority of the city council (including city councillors and the mayor) belong to the centre-left or left-wing political parties – such as Socialist Party, Communist Party, the Party for Democracy, or *Frente Amplio*<sup>59</sup> –, then it is likely that, after anti-regime activists present a petition, they will vote in favour of eliminating the pro-regime site.

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<sup>59</sup> Left-wing coalition.

Similarly, in Spain, PSOE (centre-left) city councils are more inclined to eliminate pro-Francoist memorialisation than councils controlled by the centre-right *Partido Popular* (PP) or far-right Vox. For instance, as noted by journalist Manuel Viejo, during the period that the PP governed Madrid between 2007 and 2015, the Historical Memory Law – which demanded the elimination of pro-Francoist memory sites and street names – was ignored. Only with the election of the centre-left government of Manuela Carmena in 2015, the HML was applied. Soon after, in 2017, the city council agreed to eliminate more than 50 pro-Francoist names. The PP was the only party that rejected these changes, highlighting the importance of political orientation for this type of decision (Viejo, 2021). In 2019, a newspaper noted that in Spain, “the arrival of the governments of change [linked to centre-left PSOE] in several cities [in 2019] [...] has accelerated the elimination of the Francoist plaques” (Escudero & Rodríguez, 2020).

In Chile, a case in point is the Av. Jaime Guzmán in Renca. The avenue’s name was changed to Dorsal in 2020, but the demand had been present for a long time. A key interviewee mentioned that the avenue’s name change was “long overdue” because previous right-wing mayors had no political will to change it (Anonymous Key Informant #17, Renca, personal communication, 17 March 2021). Indeed, a former right-wing mayor of Renca, who governed the city between 1987 and 1992 angrily reacted against the name change:

The decision promoted by the [new centre-left] mayor of Renca [to change the street’s name] constitutes an unfair action, generates divisions. It is hateful [...]. May this letter serve as a last recognition and reparation to the memory of a great man [Jaime Guzmán] (Baraona González, 2020).

In addition to local rejection, this site was eliminated due to the election of a new centre-left mayor and the predominance of centre-left parties in Renca's city council, which allowed for the Av. Jaime Guzmán to be changed to Av. Dorsal (2020).

It is important to note that centre-left or left-wing mayors or city councils will usually not act on their own initiative but would need to be pushed by "Social Noise" or by local neighbours' rejection to carry out an elimination. This is because memorial issues carry severe political costs. For instance, one of the reasons the right-wing mayor of Providencia (since 1996) was not elected as mayor for the period 2012 – 2016 was his support for human rights criminal Miguel Krassnoff and his book launch of the 4<sup>th</sup> edition of "Miguel Krassnoff. Prisoner for serving Chile" at Club Providencia in 2011. As mayor of Providencia, he invited people to attend this commemorative event. However, he did not expect the media outrage and spontaneous massive *funa* of hundreds of protesters, which had a tremendous cost on his political appeal. Thus, to avoid disgrace, politicians generally tend to be careful when removing or defending pro-regime sites; they know this controversial topic should be disregarded to maintain power. Authorities usually resort to a "blind eye" approach, a typical attitude in Chile's transition concerning dictatorship's legacies and symbols. Thus, if no one pushes forward an elimination process, "Windows of Opportunity" will not usually act on their own initiative. There have been some cases where, without having a movement demanding an elimination, certain centre-left or left-wing politicians have put in motion elimination processes (probably after making sure there is no cost in this type of decision), but this is rare. No matter how far left the city council is, eliminations will usually require the

presence of anti-regime agents (e.g., neighbours, human rights associations, NGOs) behind the scenes pushing forward the process.

For instance, the right-wing mayor of Linares said in 2018 that during the entire period in which the centre-left governed the city since the return to democracy (1992 – 2000, 2002 – 2008), there was *never* any attempt to eliminate the Square and Monument in honour of Augusto Pinochet. One of those left-wing mayors responded to these allegations admitting he bears some responsibility for the survival of this pro-regime site, but assured this was because no one ever requested such removal: “I don’t have any problem to assume the responsibility that fell to me during the time I was mayor [2004 – 2008], *but the issue is installed today*, maintaining it today is hateful” (Canal 5 Linares, 2018b).

Likewise, the fact that “Windows of Opportunity” are linked to centre-left or left-wing city councils and mayors does not prevent the right-wing from approving eliminations in some rare cases. Although this is uncommon, right-wing politicians may also promote or, at least not obstruct, elimination demands. Thus, each case should be examined in detail, and it should be determined whether the elimination carried out by a city council was due to the existence of a “Window of Opportunity” (centre-left or left-wing city council) or to the fact a right-winged city council, despite its ideological inclinations, still supported an elimination demand. The thesis has come across cases where the right-wing voted in favour of eliminating pro-regime sites, such as the 11 de Septiembre Street in La Serena. Here, curiously, all RN and UDI city councillors voted to eliminate the 11 de Septiembre Street (2013) (Municipalidad de La Serena, 2013, p. 19). Likewise, in Renca, none of the UDI city

councillors opposed the measure of eliminating Av. Jaime Guzmán (2020). Finally, in Peralillo and Rengo, their pro-regime streets were eliminated unanimously with the support of right-wing councillors (in 2007 and 2017, respectively).

Sometimes, the fate of the pro-regime memorial is not decided at the local level through the city council but, instead, is judicialised. Here, the anti-regime agent that triggers the case and starts a removal process usually presents a protection appeal demanding the removal of the site. The Judiciary must then decide whether the pro-regime site is maintained or removed.

Judicial actors constitute “Windows of Opportunity” when they are open and receptive to international human rights law. Only in these cases they are more likely to rule to eliminate pro-regime memorials. As mentioned previously, Gonzalez-Ocantos (2016, p. 7) differentiates a Judiciary receptive to human rights issues from one reluctant or indifferent. A receptive Judiciary is “committed to the values of international human rights law” (p. 7). These judicial actors have undergone an “ideational transformation” in which they have appropriated a “new paradigm of rights-based jurisprudence” (pp. 7–8). This transformation makes the Judiciary “more predisposed to make creative readings of the legal framework that afford citizens greater protection vis-à-vis the state” (p. 4). These more “responsive” judicial actors are prone to displaying knowledge about comprehensive reparations and guarantees of non-repetition in their Court rulings, and explicitly cite and recognise the relevance of international human rights legal instruments in national jurisprudence. As noted by González Ocantos (2016) and Payne et al. (2019, p. 55), these judges are much more predisposed to taking bold stances, such as prosecuting civilian collaboration of the dictatorship. However,

it is essential to note that in some cases, judicial actors do not employ arguments from international human rights law and still rule in favour of eliminating a pro-regime site. Their “receptiveness” could be connected to administrative-legal issues. Thus, similar to “Windows of Opportunity” (WO) at the local level (municipalities/city councils), when cases are judicialised, Court rulings must be examined in detail to determine whether the WO factor was present or not.

A way of examining the WO explanatory factor in the Judiciary is by exploring Court rulings. The case of the plaques and photographs of Manuel Contreras exemplifies a “Window of Opportunity” in the Judiciary. An examination of the Court ruling by the 5<sup>th</sup> Chamber of the Court of Appeals of Santiago on 26 December 2019 shows that the judges actively employed human rights law to support the elimination of these pro-regime honours. For instance, the Court said that, for victims of human rights violations, the *recurso de protección* was an appropriate tool, rejecting the Army’s arguments that this was an invalid instrument for such a request (C.A, 2019).

Secondly, the ruling argued against the idea, revered by the Army, that they had the autonomy to do what they wanted in their buildings and institutions. The Court ruling clarified that there could be no closed spaces in military precincts that were outside a judicial intervention: “There cannot be forbidden reserves or spaces laying outside the adoption of measures [...] of judicial protection” (C.A, 2019, p. 4).

Thirdly, the ruling also made clear that integral reparations surpass mere economic compensation, as “it happens that for that purpose [reparation] the payment of compensation in money is simply not adequate” (C.A, 2019, p. 6). The ruling also demonstrated ample knowledge of human rights law by citing article 19 N°1 of the Constitution<sup>60</sup> and Article Five of the American Convention on Human Rights (p. 6)<sup>61</sup>.

Fourthly, the ruling also demonstrated a deep knowledge of the links between memory, reparations, and guarantees of non-repetition. For instance, it indicated that memory and human rights education is fundamental to preventing future violations (Bustos & Sferrazza 2021, p. 349). It argued that human rights education must be incorporated into the Military’s core beyond simple “instruction”. Thus, it asserted that the Army should “orient” their education towards a “comprehensive education in the matter —not mere instruction or simple delivery of content” (C.A, 2019, p. 6).

Finally, the ruling also took an essential step forward in recognising the relevance of symbolic and integral reparations regarding victims’ mental wellbeing. It argued that “the mere fact of knowing” about the existence of these commemorations was enough to assume

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<sup>60</sup> “Article 19. The Constitution ensures all people: 1°. The right to life and the physical and mental integrity of the person. The law protects the life of the unborn. The death penalty may only be established for a crime contemplated in a law approved with a qualified quorum. The application of all illegitimate pressure is prohibited” (*Constitución Política de La República de Chile*, 2010, p. 11).

<sup>61</sup> “Article 5. Right to Humane Treatment. 1. Every person has the right to have his physical, mental, and moral integrity respected. 2. No one shall be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person. 3. Punishment shall not be extended to any person other than the criminal. 4. Accused persons shall, save in exceptional circumstances, be segregated from convicted persons, and shall be subject to separate treatment appropriate to their status as unconvicted persons. 5. Minors while subject to criminal proceedings, shall be separated from adults and brought before specialised tribunals, as speedily as possible, so that they may be treated in accordance with their status as minors. 6. Punishments consisting of deprivation of liberty shall have as an essential aim the reform and social readaptation of the prisoners” (Inter American Commission on Human Rights, 1969).

victims had been damaged. The Army rejected this argument saying that victims had never visited the site; thus, it was absurd to think they could be hurt by the existence of the plaques and photographs of Manuel Contreras (Comandancia en Jefe del Ejército de Chile, 2019, pp. 7–13). As noted by Bustos and Sferrazza (2021, p. 348), the ruling reflected a deep commitment to human rights by stating that reparations are a duty that states cannot evade, which goes beyond financial reparations. For instance, the Court argued that measures that “promote the formation of a true human rights culture are presented as the most suitable mechanisms to achieve such ends” (C.A, 2019, p. 6). Bustos and Sferrazza (2021, 348) have argued that this ruling in favour of the elimination of Contrera’s commemoration is a judicial “milestone”, demonstrating the legal receptivity to human rights issues from these judicial actors. It also proves how cultural memory is being assimilated in the judicial field and is increasingly seen as part of the victims’ right to comprehensive reparation (pp. 348–349).

In sum, this section has examined the role of “Windows of Opportunity” as a factor to explain the survival of pro-regime memorialisation. This factor is present when the city council where the site’s fate is being decided is dominated by the left or the centre-left. Likewise, the WO factor is also present in judicial cases whenever judicial actors are receptive to human rights issues.

### *Denunciation During the Critical Years (DCY)*

The denunciation of the pro-regime site in the context of the critical years (2013 – 2020) may also help explain its elimination. For regime supporters, the most critical years span from 2013 (included) to 2020. This is the most challenging period, a context in which they

experienced the elimination of the emblematic case of Av. 11 de Septiembre in Providencia (2013), the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the military coup (2013), and the Social Outbreak in 2019.

The idea of “critical years” draws on the importance of timing to transitional justice outcomes.

Payne et al. (2019, p. 244) have said that timing is crucial for corporate accountability. For instance, positive justice outcomes for victims are more likely when the government is centre-left or left-wing. González Ocantos (2016, p. 65) has also linked successful outcomes for victims to a more favourable political timing for human rights. As mentioned by him, “the political environment play[s] an important role” because, with more favourable political conditions, human rights activists’ fight for transitional justice goals becomes much more accessible (p. 22). Still, these authors note that, although relevant, timing is not a determinant and sufficient factor for positive outcomes. Timing is a scope condition that can benefit the outcome, but does not have productive power as it relates to a more structural dimension. In this sense, González Ocantos (2016, p. 21) argues that transitional justice outcomes also occur in unfavourable contexts. In contrast, veto players might also inhibit any progress in favourable contexts. In brief, elimination may be affected by the socio-political and historical context, but it is not a determinant factor.

Like “Windows of Opportunity”, timing also offers the “opportunity structure” (Sikkink & Keck, 1998, p. 7) in which agents of transitional justice act and develop their agendas. The context between 2013 and 2020 is a relatively positive period for anti-regime agents and victims in terms of their enormous capacity to generate “Social Noise” and condemn pro-

regime memorialisation. Contrarily, this period is highly unfavourable to supporters of pro-regime memorialisation. In other words, 2013 – 2020 offers plenty of opportunities for anti-regime agents to eliminate pro-regime memorialisation.

A similar situation of opportunity structure occurred after the murder of George Floyd and the massive demonstrations against racial injustice in 2020, in which an opportunity was “opened” for protesters to tear down statues or initiate elimination campaigns. As one of these protesters mentioned, “you don’t get *opportunities* like this in history more than once in a lifetime to take action that can result in a change” (Ortiz & Diaz, 2020, emphasis added). Thus, specific periods of history have a “spirit” that imbues the demand with a particular legitimacy and strength to create a positive outcome (A12, n.d.). Moreover, this spirit can generate a “cascade” effect (Sikkink & Joon Kim, 2013; Sikkink & Keck, 1998) that may push other monuments to be removed or torn down. For instance, the exhumation of Franco’s body from the Valley of the Fallen in 2019 produced a domino effect after which a strong impetus was given to removing other pro-Francoist memorials still standing. Thus, after this episode, Franco’s statue in Melilla was seen as Franco’s only remaining standing statue in all of Spain and pressure to remove it increased. As noted by a news article, “the exhumation of Franco from the Valley of the Fallen has brought back to the forefront of the political debate in Melilla a controversy that remained silent but latent” (Soto, 2019).

As noted previously, 2013 originated a hard time for defenders of pro-regime memorialisation, and pro-regime memory became more discredited and stigmatised than ever. Such a situation is linked to how society began to *funar* (create public rebuke against)

*Pinochetismo* more strongly, and how discussions about pro-regime legacies became more frequent and “noisier” in a cascade of condemnations.

In 2013, a Providencia neighbour pointed out the specificity of the context of heated debates by showing “her satisfaction at being able to discuss a topic that is not usually in the forefront, that is not discussed openly” (Municipalidad de Providencia, 2013a, p. 10). Indeed, after 2013, it has become more frequent to hear in the press, on social media, and in public discussions in general that the pro-regime legacies and memorials are “aberrant”, “inconceivable”, “unacceptable”, “a shame”, an “affront”, or a “grievance.” As noted by an anti-regime activist in 2013, “it seems *inconceivable* to us that 40 years after the coup *d'état* there are still symbols of the dictatorship installed in our country [...], and there is even a statue of this individual [José Toribio Merino]!” (El Ciudadano TV, 2013, emphasis added). These adjectives show how public opinion became increasingly outspoken against pro-regime memory after 2013. Similarly, anti-regime activists, journalists and politicians started saying that “the time has come” to eliminate these pro-regime sites once and for all. Since 2013, phrases such as “it’s time” or “the moment has arrived” have become pervasive. A media article noted regarding Merino’s statue that “the *time has come* to eliminate these symbols of hatred that unfortunately were maintained due to the tolerance of previous governments” (Wari, 2013).

In this context, the idea that Chile had changed and that pro-regime memorials are no longer tolerated begins to take root. Such a situation is linked to the growing stigmatisation of pro-regime memory after the images of torture and repression seen on TV on the anniversary of

the coup in 2013. Thus, when proposing the elimination of Av. 11 de Septiembre to Av. Nueva Providencia, Providencia's mayor said, "today, in June 2013, we are facing a *different* Chile" (Municipalidad de Providencia, 2013a, p. 5, emphasis added). The "different Chile" is reflected in the fact that the change of 11 de Septiembre Avenue in Providencia promoted and stimulated the elimination of other 11 de Septiembre avenues or streets in different regions. For instance, one of the activists against Merino's statue argued that the idea of *funar* the figure came in 2013 after they saw the elimination of Providencia's 11 de Septiembre (Marín, 2014a). In La Serena, the councillor who proposed the elimination of their 11 de Septiembre Street argued that this "has to do with reconciliation and overcoming those dates that divide us. It is a situation similar to what was done in the district of Providencia" (Municipalidad de La Serena, 2013, p. 19). Likewise, in La Calera, it was said that "more than four city councils in the country followed the example of Providencia and, after a citizen consultation, they changed the name of their respective 11 de Septiembre streets" (Rojas, 2015) (see Appendix, picture #3, p. 452).

The feeling of living in a "different" Chile was strengthened after the Social Outbreak on the 18<sup>th</sup> of October 2019. Since the beginning of the massive demonstrations, pro-regime symbols were seen as absolutely intolerable. People condemned the excruciating maintenance of regime symbols, especially Jaime Guzmán's 1980 Constitution. For instance, by the end of 2019, a plaque of Jaime Guzmán appeared in a garbage dump in the La Chimba neighbourhood (Antofagasta). The person who found it placed the plaque on a rubbish hill and took a photo. An Instagram post note said that

In the context of a Chile hit by neoliberalism, this guy [Guzmán] has nothing to teach [us] today, [...] his significance in the La Chimba clandestine dump transforms him into a work of art that

reflects on the reproduction of an outdated ideology  
(Antofagasta TV 30, 2019).

According to this person, the Constitution was felt as “outdated” and thus Guzmán’s plaque deserved to be thrown into the rubbish bin.

Spain’s critical years for pro-Francoist supporters began in 2015 when human rights lawyer Eduardo Ranz initiated a landslide of judicial cases against the maintenance of pro-Francoist memorialisations and pro-Francoist town names. Moreover, 2015 coincided with the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Franco’s death, a moment in which “the debate on historical memory reignites” (Martínez, 2015). By the end of 2015, a newspaper noted that “in the last year, there seems to have been a greater impulse in the sense of erasing the Francoist past” (Ramos, 2015). Likewise, in 2019, the critical moment initiated in 2015 was intensified with the departure of Franco’s tomb from the Valley of the fallen. This event sparked a new interest in pro-Francoist vestiges, notably Franco’s statue in Melilla and Franco’s monument in Santa Cruz de Tenerife.

In sum, the explanatory factor “Denunciation During the Critical Years” refers to a highly “Unfavourable Period” for pro-regime memorialisation since 2013 (and since 2015 in the case of Spain). This context created favourable conditions for anti-regime agents to condemn pro-regime memorialisation. Thus, pro-regime memory sites denounced in or after 2013 are certainly more likely to be eliminated.

## **Unpacking the Survival Factors**

This section unpacks the survival explanatory factors and explores their presence in survival and elimination cases. It is important to note that the conclusions obtained in this section are based on observing the presence and absence of the explanatory factors in 17 (positive and negative) cases. The Appendix (see pp. 462– 474) shows how I justified the presence and absence of the explanatory factors using varied empirical evidence.

As seen in Table 3.1, in 83% of the survival cases, the “Protective Location” factor was fundamental for their survival; in 67% of the survival cases, “Silence” played a crucial role in maintaining the pro-regime memory sites; in *all* the cases (100%) “Local and/or Institutional Support” contributed to the site’s survival; and in 67% of the cases, “Walls” advanced the site’s survival. This observation reveals that the survival explanatory factors developed in this chapter are present in more than half of the survival cases, suggesting their relevance to explaining the survival of pro-regime memorialisation. However, the observation of Table 3.2 regarding eliminated cases reveals that only “Local and/or Institutional Support” and “Walls” have a presence below 50% of the cases, which might indicate their superior relevance in explaining the survival of pro-regime memorialisation in contrast with the other two factors (“Protective Location” and “Silence”).

Explanatory factors in survival cases	Relative frequency
Cases in which a “Protective Location” was fundamental for the site’s survival	83%
Cases in which “Silence” was pivotal for the capacity to survive	67%
Cases in which “Local and/or Institutional Support” played a crucial role in the survival of pro-regime memorialisation	100%
Cases in which “Walls” played a crucial role and enhanced the site’s survival	67%

<sup>62</sup> These percentages were calculated based on the values shown for survival cases in the data matrix (see Appendix, p. 494. See values marked in yellow). PL = 5/6 = 83.3; S = 4/6 = 66.7; LIS = 6/6 = 1; W = 4/6 = 66.7.

Based on Table 3.1, the assertions presented above must be further unpacked. Firstly, Table 3.1 reveals that the factor “Local and/or Institutional Support” may well be necessary for the survival of pro-regime memorialisation. This is because it is present in all the survival cases (100%), and theory and process tracing reveal the prominent role this factor plays in the survival of pro-regime memory sites (see Appendix, pp. 475–489). However, a “necessary” condition does not mean the factor can produce the outcome (survival) *per se*. It only indicates that it is present in all survival cases and whenever the outcome is present (Schneider & Wagemann, 2006, p. 753). Furthermore, Table 3.1 shows that some eliminated cases present this factor (27%), which indicates that the condition’s explanatory power was neutralised or reduced in those cases. This suggests that “Local and/or Institutional Support” is not sufficient; thus, it must combine with other factors to have explanatory power. Wickham-Crowley (1991, p. 87) notes that this kind of factor may “have the effect only in the context of other, supporting conditions.”

Another interesting finding of Tables 3.1 and 3.2 is that the “Wall” factor is most likely to be a sufficient condition for the survival of pro-regime memorialisation. A “sufficient” condition implies that the outcome is always present whenever it is present (Schneider & Wagemann, 2006, p. 753). Here, we could ask: When “Walls” are present, is the survival outcome always present? The answer is yes. As seen in Table 3.2, there are no cases with “Wall” that have been eliminated (see the “0”); thus, all of them have survived. How else can we say it is a sufficient factor? If we observe Table 3.1, from the survival cases, only a part of them (67%), but not all, possess a “Wall.” This means there must be other paths for the

outcome (apart from “Wall”). As noted by Whickham-Crowley (1991, p. 87), a sufficient condition “does not preclude the existence of other conditions [and paths].”

<b>Table 3.2. General trends and patterns of survival factors in eliminated cases<sup>63</sup></b>	
Explanatory factor in survival cases	Relative frequency
Cases in which a “Protective Location” was present even though the site was eliminated	55%
Cases in which “Silence” was present even though the site was eliminated	55%
Cases in which “Local and/or Institutional Support” was present even though the site was eliminated	27%
Cases in which “Walls” were present even though the site was eliminated	0

Considering the relevance of “Local and/or Institutional Support” and “Walls” for the survival of pro-regime memorialisation, the other two factors must also be explored. The “Protective Location” factor is present in over 83% of the survival cases. Still, it is also present in 55% of the eliminated cases, which might put some nuance in considering its relevance (as it is present in more than half of the eliminated cases). Thus, this factor is present in survival and elimination cases (83% and 55%, respectively). This implies that the factor is insufficient for the outcome.

Finally, the factor “Silence” is similar to the previous factor. “Silence” is present in 67% of the survival cases and 55% of the eliminated cases. It has a presence in more than half of the survival cases, but like “Protective Location”, it is also quite prevalent in eliminated cases (55%), so we should be cautious when considering its relevance for the outcome of interest (survival). Like “Protective Location”, this factor is present in survival and elimination cases (67% and 55%, respectively). Thus, the factor is insufficient and would need to combine

<sup>63</sup> These percentages were calculated based on the values shown for eliminated cases in the data matrix (see Appendix, p. 494. See values marked in orange). PL = 6/11 = 55; S = 6/11 = 55; LIS = 3/11 = 27; W = 0/11 = 0.

with other factors to create a sufficient explanatory condition for the outcome. In the QCA solution, it is expected that this factor will not appear on its own as a unique path for survival (as is the case of the “Wall” factor), but, contrarily, it will combine with other factors to create a sufficient path for survival.

In brief, a first approach to the explanatory factors for survival shows that “Local and/or Institutional Support” and “Walls” are highly relevant to the outcome (survival). The analysis also indicated that “Protective Location” and “Silence” are by themselves insufficient for the survival outcome and would necessarily need to combine with other factors. Mackie (1974, p. 60) has termed these factors “INUS.” The acronym refers to “an insufficient but non-redundant part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result.”

## **Conclusion**

The chapter has developed the four explanatory factors for the survival outcome, and the five factors for elimination (see Table 3.3). A profound study of these theories has allowed the thesis to adequately measure and operationalise the variables (see Appendix, pp. 459–461). Based on these insights, the next chapter describes the data and methods used to uncover the combinations of conditions for pro-regime memorialisation’s outcome (survival and elimination).

Explanatory factors		Description
Explanatory factors for survival	Structural (location)	Protective Location Pro-regime sites in protective locations will likely survive as these areas do not generate significant public attention.
	Agentic (actions)	Silence Pro-regime sites with “Silence” will likely survive. In a “Silent” context, no relevant external agents (e.g., NGOs, human rights associations, prominent public figures) pressure authorities to eliminate the memory site
		Local and/or Institutional Support Pro-regime memory sites actively supported and protected by their local communities (neighbours) and/or by state institutions are more likely to survive. This support may obstruct or slow down elimination processes and enhance the site’s capacity to survive.
		Walls A “Wall” (W) is a higher-level authority that can guarantee the site’s elimination or survival and is less inclined to support human rights issues.
Explanatory factors for elimination	Structural (location)	Unprotective Location Pro-regime sites in unprotective locations will most likely be eliminated as these areas generate significant public attention.
	Agentic (actors’ actions)	Social Noise Pro-regime sites with “Social Noise” will most likely be eliminated. In a “Social Noise” context, external agents (e.g., NGOs, human rights associations, prominent public figures) pressure authorities and generate “noise”, demanding the elimination of the memory site.
		Local and/or Institutional Support Pro-regime memory sites actively rejected by their local communities (neighbours) and/or by state institutions are more likely to be eliminated. This rejection may facilitate elimination processes and block the site’s survival capacity.
	Structural (scope conditions)	Window of Opportunity A “Window of Opportunity” (WO) is a higher-level authority that can guarantee the site’s elimination or survival and is inclined to support human rights issues.
		Denunciation During the Critical Years The denunciation of the site is likely to be more robust and lead to elimination when it occurs during the “Critical Years”, that is, in or after 2013. This year marks the beginning of a very unfavourable period for pro-regime commemorations. The period 2013 – 2020 experiences the elimination of the emblematic case of Av. 11 de Septiembre in Providencia (2013), the 40 <sup>th</sup> anniversary of the military coup (2013), and the Social Outbreak in 2019.

Regarding the explanatory factors, the chapter provides evidence that “Protective Location”, “Silence”, “Local and/or Institutional Support”, and “Walls” apply to the main outcome (survival), which is consistent with theory and empirical data. However, these factors play different roles: “Local and/or Institutional Support” act most likely as a necessary factor, whilst “Wall” is a sufficient factor. Moreover, both “Protective Location” and “Silence” will need to combine with other elements to have explanatory power (INUS).

These findings show a “non-linear” explanation for the outcome (Mahoney, 2012, p. 338). Some explanatory factors will need to combine with others to have real explanatory power (conjuncture), while there are also several paths to survival (multiple conjunctures) (Wagemann & Schneider, 2010, p. 386). This situation is compatible with an understanding of reality and social phenomena as essentially complex, reinforcing the decision to use Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) in the following chapters (Lambach et al., 2020, p. 103). Thus, the primary focus of the next chapter (Five) is the striking phenomenon of the survival of pro-regime memorialisation in the unfavourable context of regime supporters (2005 – 2020).

## **CHAPTER 4: DATA AND METHODS**

### **Introduction**

This chapter describes the research design and methods used to uncover the main paths for the survival (and elimination) of pro-regime memorialisation in Chile. The thesis uses a multi-methods research strategy employing several data collection and analysis techniques: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), analysis of presence/absence of conditions, corroboration using another software (R), process tracing, and testing the paths in external cases.

Triangulation was achieved through data collection (“data triangulation”) and an extensive literature review (“theory triangulation”) (Flick, 2018, p. 446). I also developed “software triangulation”, in which I subjected the QCA results obtained in Ragin’s fsQCA software to the QCA package in R. Thus, I ensured that the QCA procedure and results were accurate. This also allowed me to observe whether any other paths were uncovered.

The chapter first presents the sample of pro-regime memorials in Chile. It then looks into the different data collection strategies: literature review, secondary sources, videos and films, primary sources, fieldwork, and expert interviews. Then, the chapter describes QCA and how it was used to uncover the combinations of conditions for the survival (and elimination) of pro-regime memory sites.

The last part of the chapter describes the different techniques employed to enhance the robustness of the results —QCA for the elimination outcome, analysis of presence/absence

of conditions, corroboration with R, process tracing, and the application of the results in external cases (Spain). The conclusion summarises the chapter's main points, emphasising the importance of a multi-methods approach to this theoretically and empirically informed research.

This research belongs to the category of “sensitive”, as described by Lee (1993, p. 2). For Lee, “sensitive research” relates to controversial or sensitive topics in which the researcher or its participants deal with significant ethical issues as compared with other kinds of studies. Here, I deal with memorials that celebrate the military coup or collaborators of the regime. In doing so, I also investigate people who still support the Chilean military regime and Pinochet. They constitute memory's ‘other’ side. As noted by Traverso (2019, p. 97) in his study of fascism in contemporary politics, it is not the same to study “feudalism” as to study post-fascism today: “It is an intellectual engagement deeply interwoven with political languages and conflicts.” These conflicts stem from the fact their pro-regime narratives are not socially accepted in society, and academic research on them is scarce.

I had to overcome two research obstacles: On the one hand, my own prejudices and aversions, and on the other, regime supporters' mistrust and suspicion towards researchers. Many researchers regard the far-right or pro-regime individuals as “inexplicable and repugnant” (Blee, 2007, p. 121) and avoid studying them. As noted by Blee (2007, p. 121), these subjects “are sufficiently distant from the political orientations of most academics”, who regard pro-regime groups as “mysterious, frightening and irrational.” In her study of

pro-military memories in Perú, Milton (2018, p. 138) said she had “to undo some of my preconceived expectations”, something I also did to study pro-regime memorialisation.

I also encountered regime supporters' bias against a young female student. As mentioned by Blee (2007, p. 125) regarding extreme-right groups, these groups have “a pervasive suspicion towards outsiders, including scholars.” Most of the regime supporters I interviewed turned uneasy when I told them I was a Sociology student, perhaps because of the left-wing association the career has in Chile. During the dictatorship, Sociology schools, departments and other social sciences (e.g., Social Work) were regarded as Marxist and were immediately intervened. Many sociologist students were imprisoned, tortured or disappeared. Thus, it was no surprise they would consider me a left-wing activist. For instance, in the context of a rally supporting conservative right-wing presidential candidate José Antonio Kast in December 2021, I asked a young man what he thought about the political situation in Chile. Another man I had talked with before joined the conversation and warned him, “don't talk to her. She's a sociologist and will make you look like a moron.” They both contemptuously laughed at me. I assured them I did not intend to portray them as stupid, but they continued laughing at me, and I had no choice but to leave the scene with a bitter taste. This example illustrates the difficulties of building trust in sensitive research. As noted by Davies (2008, p. 94), at some point, “all fieldworkers report experiencing emotional extremes, from great exhilaration to serious feelings of inadequacy and self-doubt.” To avoid such uncomfortable situations, I tried to build rapport and keep myself as open-minded as possible, avoiding judgements and comments in the conversations. I wanted to make them feel more than just mere objects of study. While doing this, I always kept in mind my own perspectives and

principles regarding the unacceptability of human rights violations during the dictatorship. As mentioned by Stern in his study of salvational memory in Chile, it is certainly necessary to learn about pro-regime memory. However, it is also essential to remember that this memory is “offensive and intolerable” for victims (Stern, 2009, p. 70). In her research on Perú’s military memories, Milton (2018, p. 9) noted that “there is something to be taken seriously in their call for a more nuanced analysis of the Military’s role in recent history”, but she adds that “my purpose is in no way meant to suggest that we lessen our condemnation.”

Three aspects of my own life proved beneficial in procuring my openness and willingness to understand the ‘other’ side of memory. Firstly, having been born in 1989 – one year before the election of the first democratic president – I did not experience the dictatorship period. I do not have what Halbwachs ([1950]) calls a “lived historical memory” that would have conditioned the way I perceive the past and its actors<sup>64</sup>. Secondly, none of my close relatives is a dictatorship victim. Thirdly, having close relatives from the political right and the left, I grew up hearing the narratives of ‘both sides’ of the memory camp. These three aspects enhanced my curiosity and reduced my phobia in understanding the different perspectives regarding the obscure elements of the past.

In brief, sensitive research is crucial because “it illuminates the darker corners of society” (Lee, 1993, p. 2). As such, it allows the academic community and society to have a “fuller”

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<sup>64</sup> I have more of a “historical memory”, that is, a memory of events that were not experienced first-hand but that have been transmitted in conversations with relatives and friends, images, historical textbooks and the like (Aguilar 2019 [2008], p. 43, citing Halbwachs 1980 [1950]).

picture of reality and not just the more “illuminated” side. This approach enables more informed judgements and decisions in daily life and policymaking.

### **Selection of Pro-regime Sites**

The cases analysed in this thesis belong to the universe of ‘pro-regime memorials’, that is, memory sites that pay homage to the military regime (1973 – 1990) (e.g., the 11<sup>th</sup> of September military coup), to one of its protagonists (e.g., Augusto Pinochet, Almirante José Toribio Merino, etc.), or prominent collaborators (e.g., Jaime Guzmán, Almirante Lorenzo Gotuzzo, Lucía Hiriart<sup>65</sup>, etc.). The sample includes both positive *and* negative cases, that is, pro-regime memory sites that have survived elimination attempts, and sites that have been eliminated throughout democracy (1990 – 2020). Thus, I followed Small’s (2004, 2009) approach and chose cases purposively based on specific criteria relevant to the research.

Through extensive online research, the thesis identified 36 sites that fit the definition of a ‘pro-regime memory site’ (see Appendix, pp. 444–445). The publicity of these sites was a relevant characteristic I considered when selecting the cases for the QCA dataset. The thesis aims to present findings regarding pro-regime sites that are (or have been) notorious; research on undisclosed pro-regime memory sites is ethically problematic. The thesis does not aim to trigger elimination processes against pro-regime memorials but to understand the conditions that favour their survival.

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<sup>65</sup> General Augusto Pinochet’s wife.

The Appendix (see pp. 444–445) shows the original dataset containing 36 public and notorious pro-regime memory sites. It also includes their date of creation/inauguration, denunciation date, and elimination date (if applicable).

## **Data Collection**

This section describes the thesis's data collection strategy, which unfolded in two phases: The first phase occurred between 2018 and 2020, and the second phase occurred in 2021.

The first phase (2018 – 2020) included a literature review, collection of secondary sources, and videos/films. The primary objective of this phase was to uncover the conditions that explain the survival and elimination of pro-regime memorialisation. Of course, this set of conditions was open to modifications throughout the entire data collection process, but it permitted the elaboration of an initial framework of explanatory factors.

The second phase occurred in 2021 and consisted of collecting primary sources, fieldwork in different locations, and expert interviews. The main objective of this phase was to continue gathering information about the cases and fill in the gaps. I had conversations with expert individuals who participated in the sites' elimination or survival processes, or with expert scholars who had relevant information regarding the sites' maintenance or removal. Thus, in this phase, I gained thorough knowledge regarding the presence or absence of the conditions that would allow survival or elimination<sup>66</sup>.

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<sup>66</sup> It is worth noting that although varied, these strategies belong to the tradition of qualitative research. The few pro-regime memorials available for this thesis prevented a “multivariate analysis which reach statistically significant results” (Wickham-Crowley, 1991, p. 84). Furthermore, research designs focusing on “what” or “how”

## *Phase One (2018 – 2020)*

### Literature Review

The first step in the data collection strategy was the thorough review of the literature on cultural memory and pro-regime memorialisation. As noted by Thomann (2017), a researcher using QCA “first screens the literature and field to identify potentially relevant explanatory factors.” Thus, this step was crucial not only to know more about memorialisation, but also to realise the lack of theoretical insights into the survival and elimination of pro-regime sites. Thus, I learned early on in the study that I had to delve into several sources and empirical data to uncover the explanatory factors. In this first step, I began to grasp the basic notions that would later configure the potential explanatory factors, such as location or veto players’ role in the survival of regime legacies. The explanatory factors shown in Chapter Three (for the survival and elimination outcome) are “theoretically informed” by the literature, as well as empirically grounded in the data collection process (Rihoux, 2006, p. 684)<sup>67</sup>.

### Secondary Sources

The second step of phase one was identifying relevant secondary sources, particularly online newspaper articles. In this, I followed Wildeboer and Dujisin (2022), who, in their study of mass media narratives regarding Franco’s exhumation from the Valley of the Fallen in Spain (2019), encourage scholars to be more confident in using journalism to study cultural

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questions – in this case, what explains the survival of pro-regime memorialisation – are far better suited for qualitative research (Ragin, 2014, p. xix).

<sup>67</sup> For Thomann and Maggetti (2020, p. 374), “an iterative, in-depth approach is a crucial strength when exploring unresearched or undertheorized phenomena, illuminating causal mechanisms, suggesting alternative theoretical explanations, and extending or refining existing knowledge.”

memory. Thus, between September and December 2019, I collected and assembled all the online news and articles regarding the 36 pro-regime memory sites. This compendium was created using Google searcher. I scanned the first six result pages for each pro-regime memory site, thus surveying over 216 Google pages with links.

Because most printed and online newspapers in Chile tend to be relatively biased – the media is controlled by a few companies linked to the right-wing (M. J. Lazzara, 2018, p. 4) – I made sure I collected articles from a wide variety of online media outlets linked to the left (e.g., *The Clinic*, *El Ciudadano*, *Interferencia*), the centre-left (*El Mostrador*), the centre-right (*La Tercera*), the right (*El Mercurio*) and the far-right (*El Baquedano*). With this strategy, I corroborated and triangulated the evidence.

During my period in Chile (September 2019 – December 2021), the National Archive remained closed or with access restrictions due to the Social Outbreak (2019 – 2020) and the Covid-19 pandemic (2020 – 2021). Thus, an online search of newspaper articles was the fastest and safest way to gather the first chunks of information regarding the pro-regime memory sites.

I compiled a database with 733 online news articles, which I then read and analysed to build up the cases' "temporal processes and long-run analysis" (Mahoney, 2007, p. 126). I carried out this task from January 2020 to April 2020. In this process, I looked at the monument's "public life" and biography (Young, 1993, p. 13) to achieve construct validity. Thus, I tried to piece together the story of each case, identifying relevant events such as

planning/inauguration/creation dates, denunciation by anti-regime agents, and elimination (if applicable).

In addition to learning more about the cases, I read the database to identify and highlight the conditions that enabled their survival or elimination. This exercise was inductive and grounded. When I first approached the database, I still had a vague idea about the conditions that might enable the survival of pro-regime memorialisation. Thus, I began seeking the conditions that most frequently emerged. I also replicated Whickham-Crowley's (1991) method of agreement in his study of the success and failure of revolutions in Latin America. Accordingly, I focused on the positive cases (memory sites that have survived) and the conditions they shared in common and which allowed their survival (I did the same with eliminated cases). In this step, I also employed an initial "exploratory process tracing" of the cases to "discern the [...] unknown determinants of an outcome" (Beach & Rohlfing, 2018, pp. 12–17). This intensive process of theory building through the analysis of empirical data allowed me to make sure there were no omitted explanatory factors and to discard rival explanatory theories.

Once I had identified the explanatory factors (for survival and elimination), I had a clearer idea of what to scrutinise in the following data collection steps. I had achieved a high degree of theoretical sampling in which the categories (the conditions) had become "saturated" (Charmaz, 2014, p. 26; Small, 2009, p. 24). Yet, following Charmaz (2014, p. 26), I remained flexible enough to allow new conditions to crop up, or remained open to adjusting the ones I had already uncovered. Due to the lack of previous academic theorisation

regarding the survival (and elimination) of pro-regime memorialisation, this open-source step was fundamental to “update the level of confidence” in the theoretical framework (Bennett, 2008, p. 2). I then improved the framework with more data collection strategies, such as the observation of videos and films.

### Videos and films

In this research, I also carried out ethnography digitally by viewing hundreds of YouTube videos connected to pro-regime memory sites in Chile. This exercise constituted the third step in the first phase of data collection between 2018 and 2020. During this period of time, I viewed 258 videos related to 25 pro-regime memory sites, and also watched videos regarding pro-Francoist memorialisation in Spain. The videos were created between 2007 and 2020. Most of them belong to media news outlets, but I also observed amateur videos filmed by people denouncing the pro-regime sites. For instance, the video archive created by Cine Forum Valpo was essential to study the case of the José Toribio Merino statue in the Maritime Museum in Valparaíso. Each 11<sup>th</sup> of September since 2013, this organisation has recorded and uploaded YouTube videos showing their *funas* in front of the statue. Although I was not there physically (except for 2021, when I directly observed a *funa*), these videos provided a “fieldwork” experience which I observed thoroughly trying to identify clues regarding the site’s survival.

This strategy also included the analysis of documentaries. Four documentaries proved crucial to understanding the conditions for pro-regime sites’ survival in democracy: *I Love Pinochet*

(Said, 2001), *La Batalla de Plaza Italia* (Villegas, 2008), *Pinochet* (Zegers, 2012), and *Haydee y el Pez Volador* (Bustos, 2019).

*I love Pinochet* exemplifies *Pinochetismo* in the early 2000s: Where and how *Pinochetistas* lived, how they showed their affection towards Pinochet, and what they thought about his detention in London in 1998. The film illustrates how, by early 2000, *Pinochetistas* still felt politically strong and socially legitimate.

The *Batalla de Plaza Italia* film shows how a group of neighbours from the Turri Towers in Plaza Italia organised themselves to stop the construction of the Jaime Guzmán memorial right in front of them. The documentary shows how, by the beginning of the 2000s, local communities were not consulted on decisions regarding their public space.

The *Pinochet* film was released in 2012 in the Caupolicán Theatre in Santiago. The film depicts Pinochet as a saviour against Marxism and a state leader who brought progress and development to Chile. It also justifies his government by saying that people in the extreme south of Chile are thankful to him for creating the Carretera Austral (the Pinochet Monument in La Junta is featured). The documentary's premiere in 2012 summoned several dozens of *Pinochetistas* and became known as the *Caupolicanazo*.

Finally, *Haydee y el Pez Volador* is narrated by Haydee Oberreuter, a torture survivor of the Navy. The movie shows her judicial ordeal against the Navy officers who tortured her and

her fight against the José Toribio Merino statue. She and other victims see the statue as a symbol of impunity.

Regardless of their unique perspectives, these four documentaries were indispensable to acquiring a broader view on pro-regime memorialisation that could be triangulated with other data sources.

In brief, as the third step in phase one (2018 – 2020), the observation and analysis of videos and films was crucial to becoming confident about the explanatory factors for survival and elimination of pro-regime memorials. At this stage, I had built a framework for both outcomes (Survival: “Protective Location”, “Silence”, “Local and/or Institutional Support” and “Walls”, Elimination: “Unprotective Location”, “Social Noise”, “Local and/or Institutional Rejection”, “Window of Opportunity” and “Denunciation During the Critical Years”). This strategy was fundamental in the Covid-19 pandemic; throughout most of 2020, I could not travel outside the Metropolitan Region because of Covid-19 restrictions. Such a situation encouraged me to find alternative ‘online’ ways to observe and ‘take fieldnotes’ of locations, objects and individuals without physically being there.

### *Phase Two (2021)*

#### Primary Sources

The goal in phase two was to gather extra details and information to generate a “big picture” of each of the cases used for the QCA. To this end, after collecting and analysing the

literature, secondary sources, and the observation/analysis of videos and films, I gathered primary sources, collecting 235 primary documents.

The main primary sources used in this thesis were official documents provided by state institutions in Chile under the Transparency and Access to Public Information Law (Law 20.285). These documents are publicly available for anyone upon request. Because most of the pro-regime sites I studied are administered locally, I requested most documents from the *municipalidades* (city councils). I also asked for information from the Comptroller General of the Republic, the National Monuments Council, the *Carabineros*, the Navy, and the National Congress Library's online archive (Senate and Chamber of Deputies). The data requested was informational (facts): The sites' date of creation and inaugural decrees, date of elimination and elimination decrees, information about the dates in which the sites became denounced, information regarding their locations, or information regarding how the sites' planning and creation were discussed.

Through the Transparency and Access to Public Information Law (Law 20.285), I was also able to collect the memos and agreement drafts of the city council meetings and the neighbours' council meetings (COSOC). These are the two local instances in which the survival or elimination of memory sites (in this case, pro-regime memory sites) are usually discussed. These documents proved crucial to understanding the negotiations and motivations behind these processes. I was also given access to the campaign documents created by local communities against pro-regime memorialisation. These documents included PowerPoint slides, letters, and lists of signatures.

These documents are not necessarily transparent nor show all the information. They are part of a political context and, as such, follow political rules of what should and should not be said. Furthermore, transcriptions of city council meetings might be filtered by the transcriber's own motivations, and it is also impossible to transcribe every detail. Still, because these documents are a more or less literal transcript of the conversations and agreements, they provide relatively strong evidence of the presence or absence of conditions for survival. Moreover, I could corroborate the information in these documents with other means such as the literature, secondary sources, expert interviews and fieldwork.

### Fieldwork

In phase two of the data collection process (2021), the second step was fieldwork in Chile (see Appendix, pp. 447–456). By investigating pro-regime memorialisation in “space and time” (Burawoy, 1998, p. 25), I could corroborate data and have a first-hand experience of pro-regime sites and commemorations. This allowed me to understand how the survival (and elimination) factors play out in “real world cases” (Álamos-Concha et al., 2021, p. 2).

Fieldwork broadened my perspective on the meanings and motivations behind survival. In this context, I spoke to residents, casual passers-by, key informants, and took pictures of the pro-regime sites. Back in the office, I would revisit these pictures to extract more information, such as the quality of the memorial (in bad shape or brand new), the environment (prominent, peripheral), and the relationship with its community.

I carried out fieldwork in Chile in September 2019; October 2019 – March 2020; September 2020 – October 2020; March 2021; and August 2021 – December 2021. During these periods, I visited 12 memory sites<sup>68</sup>, travelled through four regions in Chile (Antofagasta, Valparaíso, Metropolitan, and Maule Regions), and visited 12 districts (Santiago, Providencia, El Bosque, Pedro Aguirre Cerda, Renca, La Pintana, Las Condes, Antofagasta, La Calera, Valparaíso, Macul, and Linares).

I also attended the massive demonstrations in Chile from the 18<sup>th</sup> of October 2019 until March 2020, known as the Social Outbreak. Protesters wanted to erase all regime symbols surviving in democracy, the most notorious one being the 1980 Constitution drafted by regime collaborator Jaime Guzmán. Social Outbreak demonstrations became “memory sites” (Hepworth, 2019, p. 156) in which memories of the dictatorship and victims’ suffering were performed and displayed (Infante Batiste, 2020). Likewise, between December 2019 and March 2020, and then again from September 2020 until October 2020, I also observed the *Rechazo* demonstrations against the Social Outbreak and the drafting of the new constitution, in which vast sectors of the right-wing and some *Pinochetistas* and pro-regime groups, participated.

The *Rechazo* demonstrations in 2020, and the rallies in favour of the ultra-conservative right-wing candidate José Antonio Kast in 2021 (which I also attended), were privileged spaces to

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<sup>68</sup> Av. General Francisco Franco [now Av. Violeta Parra]; 11 de Septiembre Street [now Aquilina Rojas Street]; Av. 11 de Septiembre in La Calera; Av. 11 de Septiembre [now Av. Nueva Providencia]; Lorenzo Gotuzzo Street [now Teacher Amanda Labarca]; Augusto Pinochet Villa; Av. Jaime Guzmán [now Av. Dorsal]; Augusto Pinochet Monument and Square in Linares; José Toribio Merino statue. Not included in the final QCA dataset: Memorial Jaime Guzmán; Av. Fabriciano González Urzúa and Av. Ramón Toro; Teatro Municipal Antofagasta (where a Pinochet plaque was placed).

observe the use of pro-regime commemorative symbols. Although the people who wore, used and performed these symbols – Pinochet T-shirts, flags with the 'Freedom Angel'<sup>69</sup>, pictures of José Toribio Merino – were a minority, they participated in most of these rallies. Their presence was tolerated and even celebrated, and became a "speech act" declaring the survival of salvational memory (Cortés, 2021; Murphy, 2021; Thesis fieldwork notes #19, 2020) (see Appendix, picture #14, p. 456).

Two other activities were crucial to fieldwork: Semi-structured anonymous interviews and fieldnotes. At each site or event, I tried to immerse myself in the local community and performed 'participant observation.' I spoke to people who lived near the pro-regime memory sites and individuals participating in commemorative activities or social demonstrations. These individuals remained anonymous. Spontaneous interviews provided information about the pro-regime memory sites, their inauguration, denunciation, and elimination (if applicable), and why they survived until today (if applicable). This information was instrumental for corroboration and for gaining expert knowledge on the cases. Likewise, fieldwork notes were also necessary to record relevant data collected *in situ*. This data comprised dates, names, contact details of potential elite interviews, sketches, and research findings and reflections (memos) (Charmaz, 2014). During my time in Chile (September 2019 – December 2021), I conducted 40 semi-structured anonymous interviews and wrote 45 fieldnote documents. The Appendix (see pp. 447–456) contains detailed

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<sup>69</sup> The 'Angel of Liberty' – a female angel with outstretched wings breaking the chains tied to her wrists – was a symbol of 'liberation' from Marxism. The figure was used in the 10-peso coin minted after the coup (Errázuriz & Leiva, 2012).

information on the sites/events visited and their dates. It also displays information concerning the activities carried out during fieldwork and their relevance to the thesis.

While carrying out fieldwork, I learned some aspects crucial to ethnographers. For instance, I realised the importance of dressing up appropriately to the context. As a researcher, I did not want to draw attention or bother the people surrounding me. When I approached a potential participant, I realised the best was to introduce myself with a *very* brief statement of the research and say at the outset that the answers were anonymous. I also started the conversations with indirect topics (e.g., why is this place so important, what do you think about this site) and just one or two questions. Contrarily, “direct questions” as well as “too many questions” were “perceived as threatening” by respondents (Hamill, 2001, p. 8). I also discovered that the long informed consent and information sheets felt somewhat intimidating. Thus, consent was taken orally. I was surprised by the wide variety of reactions to my questions and had to be prepared for that. Some people simply did not want to speak to me or did not trust me in any sense. However, I also encountered enthusiastic people who talked about the issue of interest (pro-regime memorialisation), but who were also willing to talk about their lives, making it sometimes hard to re-channel the conversation.

One of the most important aspects I learned about fieldwork is its double-edged nature. On the one hand, it provides a first-hand experience of the object of study, thus illuminating and enriching the researcher’s view of social reality. It also legitimates knowledge giving authority to the claim: “*I was there*, so I can authoritatively talk about this or that issue.” However, I also learned that fieldwork could distort reality. While immersed in fieldwork,

the researcher observes her immediate surroundings without accessing the “broader” picture. Moreover, fieldwork has a strong emotional component as the researcher also participates in other people’s actions, stories and performances. This experience can exaggerate, distort, enlarge, or reduce the perception of the object of study. Therefore, fieldwork remains a crucial – if not the *most* critical – component of this research. However, for these reasons, data obtained via this strategy was also triangulated with other sources of information, such as expert interviews.

### Expert Interviews

After obtaining Ethical approval (CUREC 1A)<sup>70</sup>, the final step of phase two (2021) was interviewing expert individuals who had in-depth knowledge of the cases (or of memorialisation in Chile) (see Appendix, p. 457). In this stage, the purpose was to continue gathering insights about the memory sites. Elite interviewees belonged to “both sides” of the topic (e.g., human rights lawyers or pro-regime memory entrepreneurs). I also interviewed scholars actively engaged in memory issues in Chile. Between September 2021 and November 2021, I contacted 10 interviewees via email<sup>71</sup>. The conversations unfolded virtually using Zoom meetings that lasted around an hour. Interviews with scholars helped improve my knowledge of specific pro-regime sites and contrast and corroborate my perspective on pro-regime memorialisation. With these ‘expert’ interviews, I was not looking at ‘themes’ to code but rather at information that could help explain the survival of pro-regime memorialisation.

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<sup>70</sup> Approval Reference: SOC\_R2\_001\_C1A\_19\_32.

<sup>71</sup> One interview was carried out solely via phone, and the other one was carried out in person in February 2020, before the pandemic.

Because of the Covid-19 situation where I could not meet people personally, Zoom became a valuable tool for conducting expert interviews. I carefully approached my interviewees via email with a brief and concise message regarding what my research was about and what I wanted from them. I avoided attaching the informed consent and information sheet immediately, which would most likely put them off. These documents were sent later when my first email was responded to and when a certain degree of trust had been established (Burns, 2010). Once the participant agreed to have the Zoom interview, an appropriate date and time for them were set. I also used this second email to send the questions I would like to ask. I learned that it is fundamental that, in the interviews, I maintained the same questions or topics mentioned in the previous emails. Elite interviewees are always concerned about their reputation; thus, they do not feel comfortable answering something they do not control or do not know about. I also learned that elite interviewees prefer to be identified by their names. This is not surprising as most of them are used to public exposure and want their status to be recognised<sup>72</sup>.

In brief, this section has shown the different data collection strategies of the thesis, with which I gained extensive knowledge on the topic. This detailed knowledge helped me determine the QCA sample, adjust the explanatory factors (see Chapter Three), and reduce the possibility of coding and measurement errors (Mahoney, 2007, p. 130; Thomann &

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<sup>72</sup> One of the elite interviewees, Joaquín Medel, emphasised he did not want anonymity as he said he had “nothing to hide” and felt proud of what he thought and believed (J. Medel, personal communication, 28 February 2020). This attitude was common among regime supporters who said they were “not afraid” of public opinion.

Maggetti, 2020, p. 369). Table 4.1 illustrates the data collection process in phases one and two.

Table 4.1. Data collection strategy and relevance to the research					
Phase	#	Data collection strategy	Data collected	Relevance to the research	
Phase one (2018 – 2020)	1	Literature review ↓	Previous research on memorialisation and pro-regime memorialisation	triangulation	Exploratory process. Elaborate on a robust set of explanatory factors for survival and elimination.
	2	Secondary sources ↓	Online newspaper articles, webpages, blogs		
	3	Videos and films ↓	Videos on YouTube regarding pro-regime sites Documentaries		
Phase two (2021)	4	Primary sources ↓	Public official documents	Data	Fill in the gaps/collect missing information. Develop a broad picture of each of the cases.
	5	Fieldwork ↓	Fieldnotes: Memos and reflections; Conversations with anonymous participants Pictures		
	6	Expert interviews	Interview notes of conversations with anti-regime leaders, pro-regime leaders, and experts		

## Qualitative Comparative Analysis

This section describes Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), a strategy used in chapters Five and Six. By using QCA, I aim to improve the empirical groundings of the sociology of memory and offer an alternative systematic approach other than the single case study.

### *Description*

QCA is a “comparative nature” methodology designed to uncover the combinations of sufficient conditions that lead to an outcome (Rihoux & Lobe, 2009, p. 223). The goal of QCA is to aid the researcher in seeing what conditions, “present or absent”, produce the outcome, and how these combine (Rihoux & De Meur, 2009). Here, cases are “best viewed as configurations or attributes of causal conditions” (Greckhamer et al., 2013, p. 51; Ragin,

2014, p. xxi). Through the use of Boolean algebra and the Quine-McCluskey algorithm (QCM), QCA brings out the “empirical patterns” in the cases (Wagemann & Schneider, 2010, p. 380). Thus, its main advantage is that it allows the researcher to accomplish both “in-depth insight in the different cases” while producing “some form of ‘short’ (parsimonious) explanation” (Rihoux & Lobe, 2009, pp. 223–228).

QCA understands causality through the concepts of equifinality and multiple conjunctural causation. Equifinality indicates various paths to the “same outcome” (Rihoux & Lobe, 2009, p. 224), while multiple conjunctural causation implies that several factors combine in different ways (paths) to arrive at an “outcome” (p. 224).

According to Rihoux and Lobe (2009, p. 223), QCA can be seen “both as an approach and a technique.” As a case-oriented approach, QCA is the process by which the researcher defines the research question, selects the cases, generates the model (the conditions observed in the cases), and specifies the outcome. It is also how the researcher becomes very familiar with her cases and defines the thresholds for the conditions and outcomes. As a technique, QCA “refers to the so-called «analytical moment»” (Ragin, 2000) in which the researcher creates a truth table and then performs the algebraic Boolean procedure. If done with software (recommended by experts), the Boolean minimisation step is fast and delivers accurate results. The results are shown in a final solution containing the relevant conditions and combinations for the outcome.

The deep familiarity with the cases has rendered QCA a very “case-sensitive approach” (Rihoux & Lobe, 2009, p. 223). The researcher must be able of recognising when a condition is present in the case (“1”) or absent (“0”). The outcome undergoes a similar situation. The researcher must know precisely when she can speak of a positive outcome (“1”) or an absent or negative outcome (“0”). To achieve this, the investigator draws on various sources and becomes an expert on her cases. Rihoux and Lobe (2009, p. 239) have pointed out that this “very good knowledge of each particular micro-level case” shows that “a bridge could possibly be built between QCA and ‘ethnographic case studies’.” Through phases one and two of the data collection strategy, I gained deep knowledge of the 17 QCA cases of pro-regime memorialisation.

In addition to empirical knowledge, diversity of sources, and ethnography, the QCA process also requires “quite a lot of theoretical qualification” (Rihoux & Lobe, 2009, p. 226). The researcher must have read significant literature and carefully observed the cases to construct the model (the explanatory factors). As described in the previous section, I developed such a process between 2018 and 2021 (phase one and phase two of the data collection strategy).

This research uses crisp-set QCA instead of fuzzy-set QCA. While investigating different methodologies, crisp-set emerged as a suitable technique because both the outcome and the explanatory factors can be adequately dichotomised and calibrated without risking information loss. Also, the thresholds have been clearly defined (see Appendix, pp. 459–461), and the nature of the outcome and factors allow for dichotomisation: They are either present or absent. Although fuzzy-set QCA allows for fine-grained explanations, this is also

true for crisp-set QCA when there is deep knowledge of a small to intermediate sample (Rihoux, 2006, p. 686). This is the case of my research, with 17 cases for the QCA analysis.

### *Advantages of QCA*

QCA is a suitable technique that focuses on *relationships between conditions*, not “correlations between variables” (Schneider & Wagemann, 2013, p. 276). The outcome investigated in the thesis (survival or elimination of pro-regime memory sites) is expected to be the product of various conditions that ‘relate’ and combine in multiple ways.

Secondly, QCA allows replication and transparency (De Meur et al., 2009, p. 6). As noted by Rihoux and Lobe (2009, p. 236), “it is possible for other researchers [...] to revisit this analysis.” For instance, another scholar could employ the same data matrix of this research and perform the Boolean operations (p. 224). Thus, QCA offers high transparency by providing the raw data matrix and the truth tables, and urging the researcher to show how she selected the cases, generated the model, and interpreted the results<sup>73</sup>. The Appendix (see pp. 494–495/497–498) displays the entire QCA procedure for survival and elimination: data matrix, truth tables, and solutions. It also shows the commands employed in the replication using R (see Appendix, pp. 496/499). Other researchers are encouraged to scrutinise all these elements to corroborate the procedure.

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<sup>73</sup> Indeed, the first data matrix used in this thesis was replicated and corroborated by Professor Michael Baumgartner (Department of Philosophy, University of Bergen) using the QCA package in R. Baumgartner is an expert scholar in QCA (crisp-set and fuzzy-set), and has developed an alternative procedure based on this technique called Coincidence Analysis. These first QCA findings coincided with Baumgartner’s conclusions. He supported my decision of interpreting the parsimonious solution (instead of the complex or intermediate solutions). He also suggested the model should be interpreted disjunctively (M. Baumgartner, personal communication, 6 October 2021).

Thirdly, QCA is an adequate research method to “summarize data”, develop novel theories, explore cases in-depth, and test theories (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010, pp. 399–400). Pro-regime memory sites are a relatively unexplored topic in the sociology of memory. Thus, QCA has been instrumental in developing and testing a conditions model. Furthermore, QCA produces parsimonious solutions that aspire to be generalisable. The parsimonious solutions shown in Chapters Five (survival) and Six (elimination) may contribute to strengthening the theories regarding the conditions that facilitate the survival (and elimination) of dictatorial legacies in democracy.

Fourthly, other strategies – such as Mill’s method of comparison – help compare two cases and extract the missing variable, or illuminate the variable the cases have in common.

However, they are inadequate when working with more than two or four cases (Ragin, 2014, p. ix; Rihoux & Lobe, 2009, p. 223). Furthermore, Mill’s method of comparison understands conditions as factors acting separately. In contrast, QCA considers explanatory factors not as working alone but “in combination with other” conditions (Wagemann & Schneider, 2010, p. 386). According to Ragin (2017, p. 31), “in Boolean-based qualitative comparison, causes are not viewed in isolation but always within the context of the presence and absence of other causally relevant conditions.”

Finally, one of the most significant advantages of QCA is that it illuminates the necessary and sufficient conditions for an outcome. The necessary conditions are the conditions that need to be present (previously) in all the paths for the outcome to be positive (Wagemann &

Schneider, 2010, p. 384). Conversely, a sufficient condition is the “causal alternatives for an outcome” (p. 384). If they are present, the outcome will take place. However, the outcome may well occur through *other* sufficient conditions as well.

### *Software*

I performed the QCA process using the fsQCA software by Charles Ragin. Several scholars recommend using software to avoid “mistakes” in the minimisation process (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010, p. 406). The software asks you to insert the data matrix, from which it generates a truth table. It then develops a “Standard Analyses”, after which it displays three solutions for the outcome: the most complex, parsimonious and intermediate solutions (Ragin, 2017).

The most complex solution contains more factors and combinations, some of which may not be relevant to the outcome. In the intermediate solution, the researcher decides which logical remainders to use based on theory and case knowledge. Finally, the parsimonious solution allows the software to use the logical remainders (provide a “1” or “0” in the outcome). By including all the possible logical combinations, the parsimonious solution is the most compact, reduced and straightforward solution, and the one that achieves the highest degree of abstraction. This makes it the most appropriate solution for the outcome as, unlike the other two solutions, it “identifies causally relevant” and “core conditions” (Greckhamer et al., 2013; Haesebrouck & Thomann, 2021, p. 2; Wagemann & Schneider, 2010, pp. 391–408). Furthermore, according to Ragin (2014, p. 122), the parsimonious solution offers the

“logically minimal statements” needed to explain the outcome<sup>74</sup>; thus, it does not contain false positives (Baumgartner, 2021, p. 2). Considering these antecedents, the thesis focuses on the parsimonious solution<sup>75</sup>.

### *The QCA Sample*

This section describes the sample used for the QCA procedure. QCA requires a homogeneous and unbiased set of cases sharing standard “background features” with variability in factors and outcomes (Mahoney, 2007, p. 130; Rihoux, 2006, p. 688; Rihoux & Lobe, 2009, pp. 230–231). The inclusion of too much diversity could hamper the results, generate descriptive paths (Ragin, 2014, p. 168), and produce excessive “conceptual stretching” (Bennett, 2008, p. 32). Thus, for the QCA analysis, I considered 17 cases that were sufficiently “unique” but “at the same time” had “enough background characteristics” so they could be compared (Berg-Schlosser & De Meur, 2009, p. 3; Ragin, 2014, p. 45; Rihoux & Lobe, 2009, p. 229). The “background characteristics” are: streets and monuments (conventional memory sites) that were denounced during the “Unfavourable Period” (2005 – 2020), and in which the decision of whether the site survives or is eliminated falls to an authority (e.g., the city council where local decisions are taken, or Judicial Court). Cases with these characteristics are considered “good instances of the qualitative outcome in question” (Ragin, 2014, p. xxvi) (see Appendix, p. 446).

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<sup>74</sup> Baumgartner suggests not to interpret the intermediate and the complex solutions, as there is robust evidence that “Walls” are sufficient for the outcome: “I would, however, STRONGLY recommend not to causally interpret (4) [intermediate and conservative solutions]. There is no evidence in your data whatsoever that W has to be complemented by PL\*SP or PL\*LIS in order to yield outcome” (M. Baumgartner, personal communication, 29 September 2021).

<sup>75</sup> The complex solutions are shown in the Appendix (see pp. 495/498). In this case, the complex solution is the same as the intermediate solution.

These criteria help answer the research question and are appropriate for the current socio-political context and academic debates. As seen in the recent developments regarding the toppling of statues and renaming of streets worldwide, most scholarly and social interest is now placed on conventional memory sites such as street names and monuments.

Furthermore, the puzzle is located in the survival of pro-regime memorialisation during the “Unfavourable Period” for regime supporters (2005 – 2020). As demonstrated in Chapter Two, the percentage of denunciations and eliminations of pro-regime sites is higher in this period. Thus, chapters Five and Six explain the survival and elimination of pro-regime memorialisation between 2005 and 2020.

As Rihoux and Lobe (2009, pp. 223–224) have asserted, QCA operates very well with an intermediate number of cases. Here, 17 cases provide enough leverage for encompassing each case’s complexity while simultaneously delivering a parsimonious explanation. This QCA dataset (17 cases) considers positive cases (1 to 6, Table 4.2) and negative cases (7 to 17, Table 4.2). Negative outcomes function as “control” cases. They also participate in the “possibility principle”: They could have survived, but for some reason, they did not (Mahoney & Goertz, 2004).

#	s/e	Pro-regime memory site	Town, region (Chile)	Date of creation	Date of denunciation	Date of elimination
1	Survived	José Toribio Merino statue, National Maritime Museum	Valparaíso, Valparaíso Region	2002	2013	n/a
2		11 de Septiembre Street	La Serena, Coquimbo Region	R	2013	n/a
3		Av. 11 de Septiembre	La Calera, Valparaíso Region	R	2013	n/a
4		Augusto Pinochet monolith and square	Linares, Maule Region	1991	2013	n/a
5		Augusto Pinochet monolith	Pumanque, LBO Region	1977	2017	n/a
6		Av. Jaime Guzmán	Antofagasta, Antof. Region	D	2018	n/a
7	Eliminated	Av. General Francisco Franco [Av. Violeta Parra]	La Pintana, MR	R	2010	2013
8		Augusto Pinochet Plaque at Walmart (former D&S)	Quilicura, MR	1999	2011	2010
9		Av. 11 de Septiembre [Av. Nueva Providencia]	Providencia, MR	1980	2012	2013
10		11 de Septiembre Street [Aquilina Rojas Street]	Pedro Aguirre Cerda, MR	R	2012	2013
11		Augusto Pinochet Plaque, Gimnasio Luis Bisquert, UCN	Antofagasta, Antofagasta Region	1976	2015	2016
12		Lorenzo Gotuzzo Street [Amanda Labarca Street]	Santiago, RM	1980	2016	2016
13		11 de Septiembre Street [Francisco Silva Street]	Quillota, Valparaíso Region	R	2016	2016
14		Av. Jaime Guzmán [Av. José Ramírez Allende]	Rengo, LBO Region	D	2016	2017
15		Manuel Contreras plaques and photographs	La Reina (MR) and San Antonio (Valparaíso Region)	R	2018	2020
16		Lucía Hiriart Square [Arturo Godoy square]	Iquique, Tarapacá Region	R	2018	2018
17		Av. Jaime Guzmán [Av. Dorsal]	Renca, MR	1992	2020	2020
LBO = Libertador Bernardo O'Higgins MR = Metropolitan Region			R = Regime D = Democracy			
Source: Author's original dataset of pro-regime memorialisation in democratic Chile (1990 – 2020)						

### *Calibration and Coding Rules*

Once I had a deep understanding of each of the 17 cases, I created a “raw data matrix” (see Appendix, pp. 494/497) where I displayed all the cases, conditions, and outcomes, and their binary values (1 or 0). This “process of using empirical information on cases for assigning set membership to them is” often referred to as “calibration” (Schneider & Wagemann, 2013,

p. 32). Ragin mentions that “there are two conditions or states in Boolean algebra: True (or present) and false (or absent)” (Ragin, 2017, p. 27). In the calibration process, the researcher must put a “1” value if the condition is present in the case. In contrast, she puts a “0” value if it is absent. The researcher decides when a condition is present or absent based on her “theoretical knowledge and empirical evidence” (Schneider & Wagemann, 2013, p. 32; also see Rihoux & Lobe, 2009, p. 233). Thus, calibration required extensive theoretical and “case expertise” to create good coding rules and avoid information loss (Krook, 2010, p. 891)<sup>76</sup>.

### Coding Rules for the Outcome

As seen in Table 4.3, I dichotomised the outcome by clearly defining what is understood by survival (positive outcome) and elimination (negative outcome) of pro-regime memorialisation. A threshold was created to determine whether the case belonged to “1” or “0.” A case is assigned a “1” value when the site (street name, monument) is still in place and has not been removed by competent authorities (it has survived). On the other hand, a case is assigned a “0” outcome value when it was physically and/or legally removed by an authority, such as a city council or judicial actor<sup>77</sup>.

<b>Outcome</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Coding rules/threshold</b>
Positive (survival)	A pro-regime site that has survived (positive case) is still “there”, occupying space. Competent authorities have not removed it.	Survival pro-regime memory sites receive a “1” in the outcome.
Negative (elimination)	Eliminated pro-regime sites (negative case) have been physically and/or legally removed by competent authorities.	Eliminated pro-regime memory sites receive a “0” in the outcome.

<sup>76</sup> For a detailed demonstration of the coding rules and the presence and absence of the conditions in each case (see Appendix, pp. 459–561/462–474).

<sup>77</sup> When examining the combinations of conditions for elimination, the “1” outcome value was assigned to eliminated cases, while the “0” value was given to survival cases.

### Coding Rules for the Explanatory Factors

As seen in Chapter Three, the thesis considers four potential explanatory factors for the survival of pro-regime memorialisation: “Protective Location” (PL), “Silence” (S), “Local and/or Institutional Support” (LIS), and “Walls” (W), and five for elimination: “Unprotective Location” (UL), “Social Noise” (SN), “Local and/or Institutional Rejection” (LIR), “Window of Opportunity” (WO), and “Denunciation During the Critical Years” (DCY). As demonstrated in the previous section (data collection), I carried out a thorough investigation of the cases to extract the four “core” conditions and avoid omitted variables (Beach & Rohlfing, 2018; Berg-Schlosser & De Meur, 2009, p. 7). Although a ‘memory site’ is not an “operational concept” (Olick, 2007, p. 85), the conditions under which it could survive or be eliminated were operationalised (to see the full operationalisation, see Appendix, pp. 459–461).

These explanatory factors vary throughout the cases, and no more than four to five conditions have been considered for the survival/elimination factors<sup>78</sup>. To develop exogenous explanatory factors (no overlapping), they have been clearly defined and delimited, and their thresholds of set membership have been sharply identified. Despite being defined in “isolation” and following the QCA understanding of reality, they are expected to work in combination with one another (Beach, 2018, p. 68). The Appendix (see pp. 459–461) shows

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<sup>78</sup> More explanatory factors ( $\geq 5$ ) could negatively affect the results by uncovering excessively complex and descriptive solutions and by generating limited diversity (too many logical combinations without cases). The ratio between conditions and cases in QCA has been established at a maximum of 0.33 (Marx, 2006). The research has an appropriate ratio of 0,24 (4/17). However, for elimination, I had to add another condition related to timing (5 conditions in total), producing a ratio of 0,29.

the operationalisation of each of the explanatory factors, with its description and coding rules/threshold.

The thesis also employs a “high-order” or “master” explanatory factor that has been aggregated to encompass a broader set of cases (Slater & Ziblatt, 2013, p. 1322). This is the “Local and/or Institutional Support” (LIS). It refers to two aspects: The support towards the memory site’s survival by the local community (neighbours) and/or by relevant state institutions that might want to protect the memory site (e.g., the Armed Forces). Thus, instead of creating two factors – one for the support of the local community and the other for the support of state institutions – I merged both situations into just one factor, thus facilitating the QCA procedure (the same logic was applied to the elimination factor “Local and/or Institutional Rejection”).

### *Truth Table*

After creating the data matrix, I developed a truth table that serves as a valuable tool to visualise all possible combinations of conditions and their outcome (Schneider & Wagemann, 2013, p. 94). The combination formula is  $2^k$  being  $k$  the number of conditions (Schneider & Wagemann, 2006, p. 757). The survival outcome considers four conditions and thus 16 combinations, while the elimination outcome considers five conditions and 32 combinations (see Appendix, pp. 495/498). After developing the truth tables, I then proceeded with the Boolean minimisation.

*Boolean Minimisation*

Minimisation is the step “for reducing primitive expressions and formulating more succinct Boolean statements” (Ragin, 2014, p. 93). Here, the researcher “take[s] two Boolean expressions that differ on only one term” yet have the same outcome, and then eliminates that term. Ragin offers the example with the configurations *Abc* and *ABc*. If they have the same outcome, logically, *B* – the differing variable – has to be eliminated as it is not producing the outcome. This process is carried out until all the simpler expressions are obtained. Once all the simpler configurations are found, the researcher creates a “Boolean expression” that summarises all possible combinations.

The next step involves “prime implicants” and requires further minimisation of configurations through which the researcher grasps the sufficient basic combinations of conditions. Here, the researcher eliminates the conditions already implied in the “Boolean expression” obtained in the previous step (Ragin, 2014, p. 97). In the case of Boolean expressions, the + sign means “OR”, and the \* sign means “AND.” These signs are “not arithmetic” but signal the presence of paths (+) and combinations (\*) of conditions (p. 30). This process was carried out in the thesis using Ragin’s fsQCA software.

*Overcoming QCA imitations*

It is essential to tackle some restrictions of QCA. Firstly, QCA is a time-consuming, “labour intensive” methodology (Rihoux & Lobe, 2009, p. 237). The investigator must be exceptionally familiar with each one of her cases and know precisely whether the conditions apply or not. Rihoux and Lobe (2009, p. 231) noted that “it is certainly a challenge to gain

enough ‘intimacy’ with each case if one works on, say, twenty or thirty cases.” The thesis examined 17 cases exhaustively, which took three and a half years of research. Nevertheless, in-depth knowledge of each case is a strength as it allows the study to reach valid conclusions. Following several scholars, Schneider and Wagemann (2012, p. 305) assert that “much emphasis is put on the importance of intimate case knowledge for a successful QCA (Ragin, 1987, 2000, 2008; Rihoux & Ragin, 2009).”

The other aspect to consider is the number of conditions. This number should be kept low, hopefully between three and five conditions. If the study considers more than five conditions, the number of combinations without cases in real-life increases considerably (limited diversity) and, in addition, the solutions obtained at the end of the process become long and complex (Ragin, 2014, p. xiii; Schneider & Wagemann, 2010, p. 402). The researcher strives for simple and compact formulas that cover a wide range of cases, not idiosyncratic or “individualizing” solutions that cover certain cases in isolation (Berg-Schlosser & De Meur, 2009, p. 13; Gerring, 2017, p. 46). In this study, I chose to have four conditions to explain survival and five conditions to explain elimination. To avoid going beyond five, some conditions are “master or macro variables” that combine and assemble different elements (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010, p. 402; also see Rihoux & Lobe, 2009, p. 232). As mentioned before, the “Local and/or Institutional Support” (for survival) and “Local and/or Institutional Rejection” (for elimination) are aggregated conditions that merge the ‘local’ and the ‘institutional’ components.

Finally, QCA does not contemplate temporal processes; it is essentially “static in nature” (De Meur et al., 2009, p. 14; Schneider & Wagemann, 2013, p. 80). As in many other sociological methodologies, the final QCA solutions are synchronous (Griffin, 1993, p. 1099). However, there are several ways in which this limitation can be addressed<sup>79</sup>. For instance, researchers have introduced temporality as one of the conditions of the model (De Meur et al., 2009, p. 14; Rihoux, 2006, p. 694). Thus, I included a temporal condition to explain the elimination of pro-regime memorials. As years go by, it becomes more difficult for the pro-regime sites to survive. After 2013, the start of the critical years for pro-regime memorialisation, timing seems pivotal in elimination. Hence, I included the condition “Denunciation During the Critical Years” (DCY), which spans 2013 and 2020. This is an exceptionally unfavourable period for regime supporters in which social backlash and condemnations against the dictatorship increased considerably. Therefore, it is expected that sites denounced in or after 2013 are more likely to be eliminated. Within the “Unfavourable Period”, some cases possess this condition (denounced in or after 2013), while other cases do not (were denounced between 2005 and 2012). This variation allows for the inclusion of a “temporal” condition.

## **Enhancing Validity**

### *Analysis of Presence/Absence of Explanatory Factors*

To enhance the validity of the findings, I performed a thorough historical analysis of each of the cases included in the QCA dataset (17 cases) (see Appendix, pp. 462–474). This analysis

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<sup>79</sup> For instance, some researchers have developed a temporal QCA, where the time factor becomes part of the Boolean minimisation (Caren & Panofsky, 2005).

consisted of observing whether the conditions for survival and elimination were present or not, and justifying this with relevant historical details. Such an exercise entailed a great deal of “thick” historical knowledge about the cases, for which primary and secondary sources, and video ethnography, proved crucial (Rihoux & Lobe, 2009, p. 230). This analysis also allowed for greater transparency of how I attributed “0” and “1” values in the data matrix for each of the cases. Thus, this thesis also draws on the tradition of historical sociology, which “involves data over time” and which “theorizes about social processes” when investigating social phenomena (Abbott, 1991, pp. 204–205).

### *Process Tracing*

Process tracing proved fundamental in this thesis as a research technique to account for the “causal mechanism” between the explanatory factors and the outcome (Gerring, 2008; Mahoney, 2012). Post-QCA process tracing was a necessary ingredient that enhanced the validity of the results by first “testing” and then confirming or disconfirming the “plausible causal pathways” for the outcome and assuring the non-spuriousness of the results (Gonzalez-Ocantos & LaPorte, 2019, p. 2; Haesebrouck & Thomann, 2021, p. 17). Process tracing can potentially find the smoking gun evidence for the production of the outcome. Through process tracing, I became confident that the paths delivered in the parsimonious solutions for survival and elimination were indeed “causally relevant” (Haesebrouck & Thomann, 2021, p. 17; Mahoney, 2007, p. 132) (see Appendix, pp. 475–489). Bennett calls this a “deductive theory testing”, in which the paths are tested in the cases (Bennett, 2008, pp. 3–4). Furthermore, process tracing helped me recognise which paths were more relevant (Álamos-Concha et al., 2021; Beach, 2018; Beach & Rohlfing, 2018; Bennett, 2008;

Gonzalez-Ocantos & LaPorte, 2019; Rohlfing & Schneider, 2013; Schneider & Rohlfing, 2011). This was particularly useful in the case of R software which delivered disjunctive models for the elimination outcome. Thus, I had to choose the most relevant model based on the process tracing of the cases.

QCA's solutions do not explain the outcome; the investigator must "unpack" the paths and "creatively" see how they "play out" dynamically in the cases (Rihoux, 2006, p. 683; Ragin, 2014, p. 120; Beach, 2018, pp. 74–75; Alamos Concha et al., 2021, p. 2). Therefore, after developing the analysis of the presence/and absence of explanatory factors, and after obtaining the parsimonious solutions for the survival and elimination of pro-regime memorialisation, I "interrogated" each of the cases identifying *how* the paths uncovered in the parsimonious solutions became "difference makers" for the outcome (Rihoux, 2006, p. 683; Beach & Rohlfing, 2018, p. 5; Baumgartner, 2021, p. 12). Can the paths shown by fsQCA and R software explain the survival (and elimination) of pro-regime memorialisation? The Appendix (see pp. 475–489) shows how I answered this question elaborating a "causal narrative" (Mahoney, 2012) for each of the 17 cases, from denunciation until the outcome.

Moreover, Mahoney (2012) and Rihoux & Lobe (2009, p. 236) have suggested that QCA results should be analysed as a narrative. In this sense, "the QCA minimal formula acts as a flashlight," demonstrating how factors interact to produce an outcome (Rihoux & Lobe, 2009, p. 236). I used case narratives in Chapters Five and Six to illustrate each path in practice (Beach & Rohlfing, 2018; Thomann & Maggetti, 2020, p. 374).

### *QCA for the Elimination Outcome*

According to Schneider and Wagemann (2010, p. 385), good practice in QCA also includes the study of the negative outcome. Therefore, although the thesis's main objective is to uncover the combinations of sufficient conditions for the survival of pro-regime memorialisation (Chapter Five), I have also included an analysis of the combinations of conditions for the elimination outcome (Chapter Six) (see Appendix, pp. 497–499). This step is done separately, with the same 17 positive and negative cases, but with a new data matrix and truth table (Wagemann & Schneider, 2010, p. 385).

An analysis of the negative outcome is helpful to corroborate the findings in the positive outcome procedure. It can also “generate substantively interesting insights in their own right” (Wagemann & Schneider, 2007, p. 26). Thus, Chapter Six of this thesis develops QCA for the elimination of pro-regime memorials<sup>80</sup>.

### *Corroboration with R Software*

To confirm that the procedures developed with the fsQCA software were correct, I replicated them using R. After downloading the QCA package in R, I imported the data matrix (.csv) and applied the commands for the truth table (`tt <- truthTable(data, outcome = "Outcome", incl.cut = 0.8, sort.by = "OUT")`). Then, I applied the commands for the parsimonious (`minimize(tt, include = "?", all.sol = T, details=T)`), intermediate (`minimize(tt, include="?", dir.exp = c(PL,SP,LIS,W), all.sol = T)`) and complex solutions (`minimize(tt, all.sol = T)`) (M. Baumgartner, personal communication, 29 September 2021, personal communication, 6

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<sup>80</sup> The Appendix (see pp. 497–499) shows the data matrix, truth table, and complex solution for the elimination outcome.

October 2021)<sup>81</sup>. As shown in chapters Five and Six, the replications demonstrated that the initial procedures with fsQCA were accurate. Regarding the elimination outcome, and due to its “fine-grained algorithm” (M. Baumgartner, personal communication, 29 September 2021, personal communication, 6 October 2021), R provided two models in the parsimonious solution. Based on background knowledge about the cases and process tracing, I confirmed that model 2 ( $\sim SN * LIR + SN * WO$ ) best explained the elimination of pro-regime memorials<sup>82</sup>.

### *External Cases: Spain*

QCA allows for a certain degree of generalisability, which has been termed “historical”, “contingent”, or “middle-range” (Ragin, 1987, p. 31; Thomann & Maggetti, 2020, p. 361). Thus, this research contemplated testing the explanatory paths in external cases “sufficiently close” to the QCA sample (Rihoux & Lobe, 2009, p. 236). Spain fits the cases’ characteristics and provides a relevant context “to explore the scope and plausibility of the outcome” (González Ocantos, 2016, p. 20). Like Chile, Spain also went through a dictatorship (1939 – 1975), had a similarly styled dictator with relatively similar support and “legitimacy” (Hite & Aguilar, 2004, p. 194), and had a similar transition in the 1970s as to that experienced in Chile in 1990 —reflecting “features of continuity” with the past regime (Hite & Morlino, 2004, p. 43). Furthermore, its right-wing parties *Partido Popular* and *Vox* are still deeply connected to (and implicitly nostalgic for) the regime, as are the *UDI* and *RN* in Chile (and recently, the *Partido Republicano*). Moreover, its military and Judiciary still bear the shadow of dictatorial legacies (Ranz, 2020, p. 166; Jiménez & Doñate, 2012) and

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<sup>81</sup> These commands were provided by Professor Michael Baumgartner (M. Baumgartner, personal communication, 29 September 2021, personal communication, 6 October 2021).

<sup>82</sup> For more details, see Chapter Six and the Appendix (pp. 475–489).

currently, both countries present a variety of pro-regime monuments, statues, and names that have survived (or have been eliminated) in the past twenty years<sup>83</sup>. As noted by Hite and Aguilar (2004, p. 192), the similar dimensions between the Spanish and Chilean dictatorships and transitions to democracy make “the two cases useful for examining historical memory [...] in comparative terms.”

Moreover, Spain offers ‘least-likely’ cases where the survival outcome *should not happen*, yet it still takes place. In 2007, Spain passed a law prohibiting pro-Francoist memorialisation in the public space, demanding the elimination of monuments and street names that paid homage to the military uprising (1936), the civil war (1936 – 1939), and the dictatorship (1939 – 1975). Nevertheless, up until today, hundreds of pro-regime symbols survive and continue to celebrate Franco and his regime. The solutions offered in this thesis help explain why, despite a prohibitive law, pro-Francoist memorialisation continues to thrive (survive) (though it should not). Thus, Spain provides a striking context in which to test the results of this thesis.

There are two ways to test the results in external cases. On the one hand, the explanatory factors (PL, S, LIS, W; UL, SN, LIR, WO, ACY) can be used to perform QCA with a new (but similar) sample belonging to another country. Here, it is expected that the parsimonious

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<sup>83</sup> It should be noted, however, that the frequency of the survival of pro-regime memorialisation in Spain is higher than in Chile. For instance, according to Capdepón (2020, p. 103), over 1,000 streets in Spain still honour Franco and elements of his regime. We should also bear in mind that the Spanish transition was based on a “pact of oblivion” in which symbolic reparations to victims was not part of the agenda (Aguilar, 2019; Payne & Aguilar, 2018 [2008]). Contrarily, in Chile, victims participated in a much stronger policy of symbolic reparations in which human rights organisations were crucial protagonists (Aguilar, 2019 [2008], p. 27).

solutions obtained with this new sample and the new QCA procedure (for survival and elimination) are relatively similar to the ones shown in this thesis.

On the other hand, and without performing a new QCA, the researcher can “pick up” the recipes offered by the thesis (the parsimonious solutions for survival and elimination) and use them to understand other cases. In this scenario, the researcher would have to process trace the external cases and test whether the combinations of explanatory factors operate to produce the outcome. Likewise, the researcher should be open and flexible enough to acknowledge that the recipes for one country, in this case, Chile, do not necessarily need to fit perfectly well into other countries, regardless of how similar they are. There will always be political, social and economic factors that will sometimes produce unique results (Charmaz, 2014, p. 18). However, “middle-range” generalisations of one country can still be used “with appropriate caution” to understand the basics of pro-regime memorialisation survival (and elimination) in other countries (Haesenbrouck & Thomann, 2021, p. 9).

The first option (developing a new QCA with a new set of cases) would require deep knowledge of at least 17 cases in Spain, a task that exceeds the capacity of this thesis, but this could be considered for postdoctoral research. Thus, I have chosen the second option: Test the external validity of the results of this thesis with independent evidence. To this end, I selected two positive and two negative cases of pro-regime memorialisation in Spain. These are four of the most emblematic, mediatic and controversial cases of survival and elimination of pro-regime memorialisation in Spain in recent years. The general public, scholars, and policymakers will likely be interested in understanding these cases better. Also, I ensured

variations in the type of site (monuments and names of towns), and also, that they belonged to different geographical areas in Spain. The two positive cases are the Monument to Franco in Santa Cruz de Tenerife (a monument in the Canary Islands), and Llanos del Caudillo (a town in Ciudad Real), which have survived an elimination process dating back to 2016. The negative cases are Guadiana del Caudillo (a village in Badajoz), and Franco's tomb at the Valley of the Fallen (Madrid). Chapter Seven demonstrates the causal mechanisms unfolding in these four sites, showing how the results of this thesis help explain external cases.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter showed that the thesis design is a “multi-methods” qualitative research firmly grounded in theory and empirical data. The study used several methods to collect data concerning the survival and elimination of pro-regime memorials. This allowed for triangulation: In phase one (2018 – 2020), I collected data from the literature, secondary sources, and videos and films; in phase two (2021), I collected data through primary sources, fieldwork, and expert interviews. This data collection process also allowed me to narrow down the sample for the QCA procedure (17 cases) and helped me identify the explanatory factors for the survival of pro-regime memorials (as well as for their elimination). In the next step, I developed QCA to uncover the combinations of conditions explaining the survival and elimination of pro-regime memorialisation (see Chapters Five and Six).

To enhance the validity of the results, I employed various complementary strategies. First, to make sure the calibration process in the data matrix was correct (the assignation of “1” or “0” values), I investigated each of the 17 cases in detail and elaborated an “analysis of the

presence/absence of explanatory factors” (see Appendix, pp. 462–474). Furthermore, I carried out process tracing on each case to corroborate the causal mechanism and test the paths for survival and elimination (see Appendix, pp. 475–489). I also developed a separate analysis of the elimination outcome and verified the technical procedure by transferring the data matrix to another software (QCA package in R) (see Appendix, pp. 496/499). Finally, I used external cases (in Spain) to test the paths for the survival and elimination of pro-regime memorialisation (see Chapter Seven).

Following Conway (2010, p. 451), it is hoped that this multi-methods strategy will be replicated in future sociological approaches to the study of memorialisation. The thesis demonstrates that even the most ‘cultural’ topics, such as memory sites, may be subjected to a systematic approach using numerous cross-case comparisons.

## **CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE SURVIVAL OF PRO-REGIME MEMORIALISATION**

### **Introduction**

This chapter examines the combinations of conditions leading to the survival of pro-regime memorialisation in democratic Chile. It focuses on conventional memory sites (monuments and streets) that have survived the “Unfavourable Period” (2005 – 2020). The chapter answers the research question: *What explains the survival of pro-regime memorialisation in democratic Chile?* To answer this problem, it performs Qualitative Comparative Analysis as described in Chapter Four. Accordingly, the chapter argues that the explanation for the survival of pro-regime memorialisation in Chile comprises different paths. This assertion is based on an understanding of reality as complex, where there is no isolated explanation for the outcome (Ragin, 2014, p. xxvii).

There are two main paths for the survival of pro-regime memorialisation in democratic Chile. The first path is labelled the “Wall” path and stresses the importance of veto players for the survival of these memorials. This finding is consistent with the literature on transitional justice, which has highlighted the role veto players have had in preventing the advancement of reparations, justice, and the establishment of a culture of human rights (Payne et al., 2019; Payne & Pereira, 2019; Payne et al., 2022).

The second path is labelled the “Support” path and highlights the role played by “Local and/or Institutional Support” in the survival of pro-regime memorialisation. Thus, in

democratic Chile, pro-regime memorials seem to survive thanks to the support provided by local communities and the protection given by some state institutions.

The relevance of “Walls” (W) and “Support” (S\*LIS) paths for the survival of pro-regime memorialisation confirms the expectations of the existing scholarship. As showed in Chapter Three, veto powers, notably the right-wing and the Judiciary (in some cases), have been crucial factors inhibiting advances in human rights judicial processes in post-authoritarian countries in the Southern Cone (Collins, personal communication, 27 September 2021; Payne et al., 2015, 2019; Payne & Pereira, 2019). Likewise, it has also been noted that local communities and state institutions have a crucial role in defending memorialisation in transitional justice contexts (Collins & Hite, 2013b; Druliolle, 2011).

These findings expand theory by providing a more profound explanation beyond the usual traditional frameworks —such as the existence of *Pinochetismo*, the type of transition, or the lack of prohibitive legislation. Moreover, these paths emphasise the crucial role “Social Noise”, “Local and/or Institutional Rejection”, and “Windows of Opportunity” have in the elimination of pro-regime memorials (see next chapter).

In this chapter, the “Wall” (W) path and the “Support” path (S\*LIS) were uncovered using Charles Ragin’s fsQCA software. A replication exercise with the QCA package in R demonstrated that the procedure used in fsQCA is correct and that both results are equivalent.

The chapter is organised as follows: It first shows the procedure regarding the data matrix and the truth table, which are fundamental steps in developing QCA. It then discusses the QCA solutions, particularly the parsimonious solution with its two paths for the survival of pro-regime memorialisation (W+S\*LIS): The “Wall” path and the “Support” path. The discussion includes the analysis of case studies from the QCA dataset. The conclusion summarises the chapter’s main points and highlights the importance of the findings in explaining the survival of pro-regime memorialisation in democratic Chile.

## **Tables**

### *Data Matrix*

The data matrix presents the set membership of the cases. Each case is assigned a “1” or a “0” for each explanatory factor (“Protective Location”, “Silence”, “Local and/or Institutional Support”, and “Walls”) and outcome (“1” for survival, “0” for elimination) depending on whether it is present (1) or absent (0). The data matrix shows the primitive combinations of conditions that will later be transformed into a truth table and minimised in the Boolean minimisation (see Appendix, pp. 494).

### *Truth Table*

As discussed in Chapter Four, a truth table is a valuable tool to visualise all possible combinations of conditions and their outcome (Schneider & Wagemann, 2013, p. 94). The

four explanatory factors (or conditions) for survival produce 16 possible logical combinations (see Appendix, pp. 495)<sup>84</sup>.

An examination of the truth table in the Appendix (pp. 495) reveals that four combinations lead to a positive outcome (survival, “1”). These combinations contain six cases in total.

Likewise, six combinations lead to a negative outcome (elimination, “0”), with 11 cases. No contradictions – two cases with the same combination and different outcomes – were found among the combinations.

## Results

This section shows the recipes for the survival of pro-regime memorialisation in democratic Chile. For Ragin (2014, p. xxvii), recipes are “how [...] conditions combine to generate outcomes.” The chapter focuses on the recipes offered by the parsimonious solution. As mentioned earlier, this solution shows the “fewest possible conditions within the whole set of conditions” and, thus, is more appropriate for the goal of this research (Rihoux & Lobe, 2009, p. 224). Table 5.2 (p. 293) shows the paths to survival contained in the parsimonious solution. The entire parsimonious solution uncovered by the fsQCA software is the following:

$$W + S * LIS,$$

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<sup>84</sup> For the sake of clarity, I decided to leave the logical remainders (combinations that have no cases) out of the table. However, the software did include them in the minimisation procedure for the parsimonious solution (Rihoux & Lobe, 2009, p. 225).

where + is logical “OR” (disjunction) and \* is logical “AND” (conjunction). In narrative terms, the solution reads as follows:

*The survival of pro-regime memorialisation in democratic Chile is explained by the presence of “Walls” (W) OR by the presence of a combination of “Silence” AND “Local and/or Institutional Support” (S\*LIS).*

Therefore, the solution contains two paths for the survival of pro-regime memorialisation

Path 1: W

Path 2: S\*LIS

This reveals the presence of equifinality, as there are two different sufficient recipes for a positive outcome:

“Walls” OR “Silence” AND “Local and/or Institutional Support.”

Conjunctions are also present in the solution. The explanatory factor “Silence” (S) combines with “Local and/or Institutional Support” (LIS):

S\*LIS

A preliminary observation of the parsimonious solution also reveals that there might be no necessary explanatory factor for the survival of pro-regime memorialisation. As noted by Wagemann and Schneider (2012, p. 383), “if any condition were necessary, then it would have to be contained in all “paths” leading to the outcome.” Yet, in this case, only sufficient

(W) and INUS<sup>85</sup> (S, LIS) explanatory factors are present, and no condition is present in *all* paths.

However, this scenario changes when we consider the data matrix and the complex solution offered by the fsQCA software (see Appendix, pp. 494–495). Here, we can identify a factor present *in all survival cases*. This is the “Local and/or Institutional Support” factor. This necessary factor (LIS) was not included in *all* the parsimonious solution paths because this solution focuses on the *most reduced sufficient paths*. However, LIS is still implied in the entire solution.

What makes the “Local and/or Institutional Support” (LIS) a “necessary” factor is the fact it is present in *all* survival cases (see Appendix, p. 494). However, it is not enough to explain the outcome as it is also present in eliminated (negative) cases. Thus, LIS is a “necessary” factor as it works as an antecedent condition. It should be present as a previous condition for the outcome to occur, but its presence will not guarantee the occurrence of the outcome (Schneider & Wagemann, 2006, p. 753). Chapter Four had already pointed out that the LIS factor may be necessary for the outcome as its descriptive analysis showed that it was present in all survival cases.

The analysis of necessity performed by the fsQCA software confirms these assertions. Two parameters shown in this analysis should be understood first: “Consistency of the explanatory factor” and “coverage of the explanatory factor.” The former refers to the degree

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<sup>85</sup> “Insufficient but necessary part of a causal condition that is itself unnecessary but sufficient” (Freese & Kevern, 2013).

to which the factor will be an antecedent for the outcome. The higher the number – for instance, 1 – the higher the degree to which it is a precondition for the outcome to occur. The latter (“coverage”) looks at all the cases and points out how many of these cases possess the explanatory factor. The higher the number, the more likely the factor is essential for the outcome. Contrarily, if the coverage is low, it may be a trivial necessary factor, that is, a non-essential or irrelevant necessary factor (a kind of false-positive). Rohlfing and Schneider (2013, p. 221) have established a parameter for trivial necessary conditions: Above 0.66 in coverage is a non-trivial (that is, a relevant) necessary condition, whilst below 0.66 is a trivial (irrelevant) necessary condition.

Table 5.1 below shows the analysis of necessity performed for each of the explanatory factors for survival. It demonstrates that “Local and/or Institutional Support” (LIS) has a consistency of 1, confirming it is a necessary explanatory factor for the survival of pro-regime memorialisation. In other words, the factor is present in all the survival cases (6/6 = 1). However, the consistency of this factor is 67%. Thus, only six out of nine cases with this factor survive, that is, only 67%. Still, considering Rohlfing and Schneider’s (2013, p. 221) parameter of fit, it can be argued that “LIS” is a relevant and non-trivial necessary condition as it is above the threshold (0.66). This analysis reveals that “Local and/or Institutional Support” is a necessary explanatory factor for the outcome.

<b>Table 5.1. Analysis of necessity of the explanatory factors for survival</b>		
<b>Explanatory factors</b>	<b>Consistency</b>	<b>Coverage</b>
Protective Location (PL)	0.83	0.45
Silence (S)	0.67	0.40
Local and Institutional Support (LIS)	1	0.67
Wall (W)	0.67	1
Source: Author’s original dataset of pro-regime memorialisation in democratic Chile (1990 – 2020). Using fsQCA software 3.0 (Ragin, 2008), available at: <a href="http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml">http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml</a>		

Likewise, it is noteworthy that the “Wall” factor has a consistency of 67% (when observing the positive cases, not all of them present this factor) and coverage of 1. Coverage 1 means that every time the factor is present, the outcome will also be present, and there are no negative cases with this factor. This indicates that the “Wall” factor may be a sufficient condition *per se* for the positive outcome (survival), though there might be other paths for the outcome too. This also coincides with the analysis in Chapter Three, which showed that “Walls” were sufficient for the outcome. Thus, this section demonstrates that “Local and/or Institutional Support” is a non-trivial necessary condition, and “Wall” is a sufficient factor.

Apart from analysing the necessity of the explanatory factors contained in the parsimonious solution, the coverage and consistency of the solution terms (paths) and the entire solution should also be analysed. Table 5.2 shows that solution term W explains four cases: José Toribio Merino statue at the National Maritime Museum, Pinochet Square and Monument in Linares, Pinochet’s monolith in Pumanque, Av. Jaime Guzmán in Antofagasta. These four cases constitute 67% of the survival cases (raw coverage). Two survival cases are uniquely explained by this solution term (the statue of José Toribio Merino and the Pinochet Square and Monument in Linares), thus showing 33% of unique coverage. The consistency of this term is 1, indicating that all the cases with W have a positive outcome (survival).

Table 5.2. Paths to survival (csQCA, parsimonious solution) <sup>86</sup>						
#	Configurations (terms/recipes)	# of cases explained	Cases	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Consistency
1	W	4	<i>JTM</i> <i>Linares</i> Pumanque JGAntofagasta	0.67	0.33	1
2	S*LIS	4	<i>11SeptLasComp</i> <i>11SeptLaCal</i> Pumanque JGAntofagasta	0.67	0.33	1
Solution coverage: 1 Solution consistency: 1						
PL = Protective Location S = Silence LIS = Local and/or Institutional Support W = Wall(s)						
Source: Author's original dataset of pro-regime memorialisation in democratic Chile (1990 – 2020). Using fsQCA software 3.0 (Ragin, 2008), available at: <a href="http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml">http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml</a>						
Cases that are unique to a particular term are written in <i>italics</i> .						

The solution term S\*LIS (“Silence” AND “Local and/or Institutional Support”) explain four cases as well: 11 de Septiembre Street in Las Compañías, 11 de Septiembre Street in La Calera, Pinochet Monument in Pumanque, and Av. Jaime Guzmán in Antofagasta. These four cases constitute 67% of the survival cases (raw coverage). Two of these cases are uniquely explained by this solution term (11 de Septiembre Street in Las Compañías and 11 de Septiembre Street in La Calera), showing 33% of unique coverage. The consistency of this term is 1, indicating that all the cases with S\*LIS have a positive outcome (survival).

### *Corroboration with R Software*

The chapter corroborated the procedure using the QCA package in R (see Appendix, p. 496). This exercise is helpful in confirming whether the procedure using fsQCA software was

<sup>86</sup> The complex solution is shown in the Appendix, p. 495.

correct, and whether there is more than one model for the survival outcome ( $W + S*LIS$ ). R software can identify one or two models explaining the outcomes. Here, however, it only yielded one model ( $W + S*LIS$ ), which coincides with the solution offered by fsQCA software.


Model 1 (M1):  $W + S*LIS$

This reveals that the procedure using Ragin's fsQCA software was correct. It also shows that – given they are included in the M1 model – both the “Wall” path and the “Support” path are relevant to the outcome. Thus, the thesis can be confident in the results pointing to the survival of pro-regime memorialisation as a product of  $W + S*LIS$ .

### **Discussion of the Main Findings: Identifying the Recipes for the Survival of Pro-regime Memorialisation**

After analysing necessity and showing the relevance of each path and the entire solution ( $W+S*LIS$ ), the chapter now analyses the types of paths contained in the solution. Indeed, QCA is helpful for the creation of typologies. According to Ragin (2014, p. 168), a typology “establishes the necessary bridge between the diversity that exists [...] and social scientists' attempts to produce theoretically relevant generalisations.” Thus, as seen in Figure 5.1, there are two types of paths for the survival of pro-regime memorialisation: The “Wall” (W) path and the “Support” path ( $S*LIS$ ).

**Figure 5.1. Summary of the survival paths**



### *The “Wall” Path*

The “Wall” (W) path emphasises the importance of actors with veto capacity to block elimination processes and thus guarantee the survival of pro-regime memorials. It is striking that this path does not need to combine with any other explanatory factor. Therefore, when there are W, even with the presence of external mobilisations – in other words, even with the presence of “Social Noise” (SN) – it is likely that the pro-regime memorial will survive. Chapter Three of this thesis states that “Walls” refer to mayors and city councils belonging to centre-right or right-wing parties who tend to stop or ignore elimination demands against pro-regime memorials. Their political affiliation with the right and their certainty that their actions will not garner political costs lead them to be indifferent or block elimination processes (examples of the right acting as “Walls”, see Appendix, p. 458). “Walls” also refer to Courts that do not prioritise victims’ integral reparations in their rulings and thus decide to maintain pro-regime memorialisation.

From a broader point of view, the idea of “Walls” can also be applied to the democratic process Chile has undergone since 1990. Although Chilean democracy has been applauded as a thriving economic, political and social development case, an essential characteristic has also been the existence of “Walls” in the form of barriers and authoritarian “moorings” that have not allowed a fully representative, transverse and equitable democracy. The Universidad Diego Portales Human Rights Report in 2019 argued that Chile is accustomed to “the habit of erecting, and jealously defending, a *wall* between the state and the citizens” (Centro de DD.HH. UDP, 2019, p. 28). This is evident in the “Walls” that, for instance, indigenous peoples have had to face in their struggle for social recognition or the acceptance of sexual minorities and immigrants—they have faced “Walls” such as discrimination and police violence. A large part of these “Walls” have been built, directly or indirectly, by a political sector striving to maintain the structures inherited from the military regime. As noted by the literature, this political sector has been associated with the centre-right and right-wing parties (UDI and RN) (Huneus, 2014; Huneus & Ibarra, 2013b, 2013a).

Over the past two years, these “Walls” have begun to fall. The most visible evidence of this crackdown was the Social Outbreak of October 2019, followed by the overwhelming vote in favour of “I approve a new Constitution” in the referendum on 25 October 2020. Likewise, in the election of the constituents (15 and 16 May 2021), the right-wing achieved a squalid representation (only 21% of the votes) with which it cannot perform its veto power (something they were hoping to do) in the Constitutional Assembly that drafted a proposal for a new Constitution (Montes, 2021). However, it is striking that this right-wing sector (which generally constitutes these barriers) clings to its “Walls” without fully

comprehending the changes that are taking place. On a symbolic level, the fact that Piñera's right-wing government (2018 – 2022) built a physical *wall* in 2020 to prevent protesters from climbing the iconic monument of the Social Outbreak – the statue of General Baquedano, used as a meeting point and which was constantly intervened and modified – sends the message that, in the face of transgression and change, “Walls” will continue to exist (see Appendix, picture #12, p. 455).

The survival recipe “W” indicates the continued relevance of right-wing veto players in maintaining regime legacies despite more than 30 years of democracy. In particular, city councils dominated by the right-wing<sup>87</sup> have been relevant actors blocking elimination processes of pro-regime memorialisation since 2005. As seen in the Appendix in the section “Right-wing acting as “Walls” for the survival of pro-regime memorialisation” (p. 458), at least in seven cases the right-wing has blocked (or tried to block) elimination processes.

How does the “Wall” (W) path work? The case of José Toribio Merino's statue in Valparaíso illustrates this path for the survival of pro-regime memorialisation. Until 2022, the statue was located at the entrance of the Maritime Museum in Valparaíso (Valparaíso Region), which the Navy administers (see Appendix, picture #10, p. 455).

The survival of the statue of José Toribio Merino in democratic Chile (between 2013 and 2020) can be explained by the existence of a “Wall” in the Judiciary. In 2013, the same year of the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the military coup and the change of Av. 11 de Septiembre in

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<sup>87</sup> And also, right-wing councillors in centre-left-dominated city councils.

Providencia to Av. Nueva Providencia (an emblematic case), human rights NGOs and victims' groups started demanding the elimination of the statue. According to one of the organisers of the protests,

The idea arose from what was carried out in Providencia by the mayor [...], who changed the name of Av. 11 de Septiembre to Nueva Providencia. [...] After this event, a group of former prisoners, artists and left-wing militants began to realise «what it meant to honour a murderer, torturer and main promoter of the military coup» (Marín, 2014a).

Victims and human rights activists started gathering at the entrance of the National Maritime Museum, shouting, “*Fuera la Estatua de Merino!*” (Remove Merino’s Statue!). In 2014, NGO *Ciudadanos por la Memoria* organised a public campaign on [avaaz.org](http://avaaz.org) to gather signatures for a letter to President Michelle Bachelet. By 13 March 2014, they had gathered over 5,956 signatures in favour of the statue’s removal (*Ciudadanos por la Memoria*, 2014). By the end of that year, the movement had grown in intensity and popularity; former political prisoners, regular citizens, lawyers, constitutionalist Navy associations, and academics, all participated in the monthly protests against the statue (on the 11<sup>th</sup> of each month).

Nonetheless, these protests did not produce the expected outcome: Throughout the years, Government Presidents and the Navy would not listen. Thus, in September 2019, a human rights lawyer decided to file a protections appeal to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was accepted, and a judicial process against Merino’s statue began (Judicial case N° 79183-2019).

Since then, the Navy passionately defended the existence of the statue. They argued that a tribute to commander Merino was reasonable and legitimate and that victims have not

provided sufficient evidence of the alleged psychological harm produced by this pro-regime commemoration (Armada de Chile, 2019, pp. 4–5). In response, on 24 September 2019, eight victims joined the case and alleged the statue damaged their need for integral reparations and the guarantees of non-repetition (Cabrera et al., 2019, pp. 2–8).

By November 2019, evidence of the “Wall” factor began to emerge. First, the Court of Appeals determined that victims – who had previously attempted to join the process – could not be part of the case (C.A Santiago, 2019b). This barrier was reaffirmed when the victims’ reconsideration request (filed on 5 December 2019) was rejected (C.A Santiago, 2019c). The lawyer representing these victims said she was “surprised” that such an obstacle was placed on them. She argued that victims had been widely recognised by international law and the Valech Report; thus, the ruling violated their “right to be heard” (Fernández, 2019).

On 3 January 2020, the judicial hearings took place (Arriagada, 2020), and on 22 January, the 8<sup>th</sup> Court of Appeals of Santiago rejected the protection appeal. The document argued that the statue was entirely legal and depended exclusively on the Navy. It said that Merino was never judged or condemned for human rights violations; thus, the statue was legitimate. It also mentioned that, considering the Navy’s autonomy, the Minister did not have the power to intervene (Organic Statute of the Ministry of Defence, in Law N° 20.424, Art. Three and Five), and said that the Navy did not commit any illegal activity. Finally, it used the *splitting* argument by arguing there were simply two different interpretations at stake: 1) Merino as a member of the Military Junta, and 2) as commander-in-chief of the Navy. The

Court argued that the latter interpretation – belonging to the Navy – was entirely reasonable and should be respected (C.A Santiago, 2020).


By supporting the autonomy of the Armed Forces to commemorate whomever they deem appropriate, and by arguing that the statue was entirely legitimate, legal and reasonable, this Court presented a very restricted and formalistic legal viewpoint. This vision neglected the priority that victims have of having their suffering and right to reparations after massive human rights violations considered. This interpretation is based on a *legalistic* discourse that also sanitises the figure of Merino by simply presenting him as a neutral commander-in-chief of the Navy and not as what he was: a Navy commander *and* one of the foremost political leaders of the military dictatorship.

On 19 February 2020, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Chamber of the Supreme Court maintained the 8<sup>th</sup> Court of Appeals' original ruling (Corte Suprema de Chile, 2020a). It is noteworthy that the judge who chaired the 8<sup>th</sup> Court of Appeals in this ruling was well-known for not being inclined to apply human rights law (Bustos, personal communication, 27 September 2021; Collins, personal communication, 27 September 2021; Rendón, personal communication, 27 September 2021). For instance, on a human rights case on 8 April 2020, this judge ignored International Human Rights Law and reduced the convictions of 17 former DINA agents. The ruling was seen as a massive setback for Chile's human rights and transitional justice (Massai & Ortiz, 2020), and victims' relatives considered the Court ruling "aberrant" (El Clarín, 2020). Thus, in the case of the statue of José Toribio Merino, the 8<sup>th</sup> Court of

Appeals' ruling constituted a "Wall" that ignored victims' demands on integral reparations and guarantees of non-repetition (see Figure 5.2).

In this case, however, several actors and situations favouring the elimination of the statue intervened. Indeed, the case showed clear signs of "Social Noise" against the site (absence of "Silence"). Yet, in the presence of "Walls" in the Judiciary, eliminating the pro-regime memory site became a much more challenging endeavour for these groups. Until 2020, their "noise" was not heard, no matter how loud. In her judicial process against naval officers for tortures suffered during the dictatorship, Haydee Oberreuter reflects on how, in some cases, the Courts act as barriers to obtaining reparation and truth, and refers to this lack of judicial action against perpetrators as a "poetic justice" (Bustos, 2019).

**Figure 5.2. José Toribio Merino statue**



Another case that illustrates the "Wall" path is the Augusto Pinochet Monument and Square in Linares. Here, the right-wing mayor has been pivotal in guaranteeing the site's survival since the beginning of its condemnation in 2013.

Since 2013, neighbours and cultural organisations have actively denounced the site's existence (C. E. Alegría, personal communication, 28 September 2021). They argue that "it [is] inconceivable that a homage is made to a murderer on 11 September, when many of our

colleagues were killed” (Canal 5 Linares, 2015). In 2016, these groups initiated a campaign on change.org to eliminate the square and the monument in honour of Pinochet, collecting over 2,731 signatures (Centro Cultural La Cigarra, 2017). In 2017, a prominent UDI Deputy defended the Pinochet Monument and Square accusing that the new generations who attacked it were being manipulated by the left and brainwashed to think that the “military government” had been regrettable (Canal 5 Linares, 2017a).

In this context, Linares’ right-wing mayor (RN) repeatedly refused to eliminate Linares’ pro-regime commemoration by defending its existence and blocking any negotiations (C. E. Alegría, personal communication, 28 September 2021). In August 2017, he said he would not discuss the issue: “I will never put this matter on the table, under discussion” (Canal 5 Linares, 2017b). He argued that we have to live together with our political differences (Casas, 2017), and that he would respect the “memory bargain” (Collins & Hite, 2013b, p. 148) installed during transition:


This small [Pinochet] square and the memorial of the disappeared detainees in *Plaza de Armas* resulted from decisions made in democracy in the 1990s and 2000s. Therefore, these decisions must be valued and respected [...]. We must know how to live with legitimate differences. People who forget their history are condemned to repeat it (Casas, 2017).

In 2018, an RN councillor supported the mayor’s decision by saying that this pact – allowing the existence of memorials from both sides – also reflected the city’s friendly and warm social atmosphere:

It recognises two stories; there is not just one story [...] I think it’s good we live together. Because, for instance, people who go to the *Plaza de Armas* event [to honour victims], I meet them daily, I greet them, we are friends! (Canal 5 Linares, 2018d).

In 2020, the mayor reiterated his stance by saying he has “established a position on this matter, and I will not change my position” (Canal 5 Linares, 2020). Thus, today (2020), the memorial still survives (see Figure 5.3).

**Figure 5.3. Pinochet Square and Monument in Linares**



### *The “Support” Path*

The “Support” path (S\*LIS) highlights two aspects. First, it features how human rights organisations’ lack of external intervention aids pro-regime memorial survival (“Silence”). Secondly, it focuses on how the local community or state institutions’ support contributes to the survival or pro-regime memorialisation. Thus, the name “Support” comes precisely from the active defence the community and certain state institutions may provide to a pro-regime memory site.

It is worth noting there is a close interaction between “Silence” (S) and “Local and/or Institutional Support” (S\*LIS). QCA combinations comprise either “scope”, “passive”, or “remote” factors on the one hand, and/or “triggering”, “agentic”, or “proximate” factors on the other (Álamos-Concha et al., 2021, p. 7; Beach, 2018, p. 93; Lambach et al., 2020, p. 106; Schneider & Wagemann, 2006, p. 760). The former are conditions that usually need to be present for the outcome to occur as “they play a key role in the integrity and functioning

of the mechanism”, but they do not “trigger” the outcome (Álamos-Concha et al., 2021, p. 7). The latter – the “triggering” conditions – are performed by actors and are more determinant for the outcome. They “have a productive relationship with the outcome (Beach & Pedersen, 2016, p. 89)” (Álamos-Concha et al., 2021, p. 7). Here, “Silence” is a “scope” condition more associated with structure than agency and, thus, it must be accompanied by other “agentic” or “triggering” factors to become an adequate explanatory condition (Álamos-Concha et al., 2021, p. 7; Beach, 2018, p. 93). This issue was also noted in Chapter Three, which showed that “Silence” is a weak factor that would need to combine with another one to have explanatory power (INUS). In this case, it is accompanied by “Local and/or Institutional Support.” On the contrary, “Wall” in itself can produce a positive outcome as it is entirely agentic and performed by specific actors.

The leading institution providing state support towards pro-regime memorialisation in Chile is the Armed Forces, reflecting the permanence of an implicit nostalgic feeling towards the regime. Indeed, the Armed Forces’ defence of pro-regime memorialisation reveals a tension between discourse and practice. Some surviving cases – particularly the plaques and photographs of Manuel Contreras, or the statue of Merino – show that the Armed Forces and the *Carabineros* have not been able to establish a genuine commitment towards a human rights culture. On the one hand, they continue to affirm their condemnation of human rights violations, but, on the other, they still defend and justify the commemoration of regime icons such as Manuel Contreras; of military leaders who masterminded the coup and led the repression, such as Almirante José Toribio Merino; or members of the *Carabineros* who acted as accomplices to murder during the dictatorship, such as General Rodolfo Stange.

Thus, the Military and *Carabineros* (Police) continue to operate on two levels (or two identities): One superficial (their public image) and the other internal (their institutional ethos). Goffman (Goffman, 1990 [1959], pp. 14–15) would have read this as the difference between what they “give” (discourse) and what they “give off” (non-verbal signs). What they “give” is the primary strategy to maintain “acceptability” and “hide incongruences” (p. 53). Furthermore, because of their past human rights violations, their support and allegiance to Pinochet, and their passiveness and obstruction towards transitional justice, they know they are “discreditable”, that is, they have the potential to become “discredited” (Goffman, 1986 [1963], pp. 4–5) at any point. The tension between these two identities pushes them to perform an “information control” regarding what makes them discreditable (p. 138). It is striking to note that, in 2002, Moulián (2002, p. 57) already noted this contradiction: “Today’s Chile lives a discursive tension, in a kind of contradiction that affects self-expression.”

Thus, within the Military, human rights courses are taught, state guidelines on human rights are applied, and the violation of human rights is utterly condemned (what they “give” in Goffman terms). The public life of these institutions is strongly focused on “stigma management”, in which they try to control public perception by showing themselves as utter defenders of human rights (Goffman, 1986 [1963], p. 64). However, internally, homage continues to be paid to perpetrators, ultimately showing that there is still, at least, a dangerous affinity for the dictatorship’s leaders and what this period represents (what they “give off”). Therefore, up to date, these institutions’ condemnation of the dictatorship has not

been total. In 2010, Stern (2010, p. 277) wrote that, by the beginning of the 2000s, “the Army [had] joined in the sensibility of shared national tragedy.” According to the author, this was demonstrated by its participation in the Dialogue Table (1999 – 2000), its generational renovation, and its conduction by General Juan Emilio Cheyre, who declared a “never again” of human rights violations perpetrated by the Armed Forces (p. 277). Today, however, the Armed Forces show signs in a different direction by defending the permanence of pro-regime commemorations. Collins et al. (2020, p. 517) noted these negative signs in the UDP Human Rights Report of 2020: Their rejection of symbolic reparations for victims reflects how “secrecy and obstructionism persist inside the Armed Forces.”

Two of the most notorious cases of institutional defence of pro-regime memorialisation by the Armed Forces in Chile have been the protection of the Merino statue by the Navy since 2012, and the plaques and photographs of Manuel Contreras in two Army institutions (War Academy in La Reina, Santiago, and School of Engineers Tejas Verdes in San Antonio) between 2018 and 2020. In these two cases, the Armed Forces have continuously defended the need to keep these sites to honour individuals directly linked with human rights violations. In 2020, Collins et al. (2020, p. 543) stated that “It is striking that the Armed Forces persist in adopting positions of defence, vindication and glorification of perpetrators.”

Regarding “Local Support”, the case of the 11 de Septiembre Street in Las Compañías (La Serena) (11SeptLasComp), clearly exemplifies the “Support” path to survival. In this case, the local community actively supported maintaining the 11 de Septiembre Street’s name in their community in La Serena (Coquimbo Region).

In September 2013, a centre-left city councillor in La Serena proposed eliminating the street's 11 de Septiembre name (denunciation). The councillor argued that such a move was necessary for the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the military coup. All councillors approved the measure, one of them claiming that he “absolutely agrees with the proposal”, while another one said that “[these issues] have to be seen with a spirit of dialogue [*altura de miras*], he agrees with trying to change the street's name” (Municipalidad de La Serena, 2013, p. 19). Consequently, the city council unanimously accepted the proposal: “The street's name change is approved, and they would define the new name later. Agreement N° 9: The council unanimously agrees to approve the name change of 11 de Septiembre Street in Las Compañías” (p. 20).

This denunciation, however, was not followed by any neighbourhood or victims' movement against the site. In other words, there was no mobilisation (pushing forward the elimination demand) that could have supported and reinforced the initial denunciation.

“Local Support” for the site appeared soon after. Upon learning about this measure, the community immediately rejected the plan and organised a meeting with two local city councillors. On 5 April 2014, neighbours said they did not want changes in their local area. They convincingly argued that “they did not want to get complicated” with a name change, and that the name should remain since “the street [had] never had another name.” Moreover, they argued that “there have never been any protests for 40 years” and that “they are used to it” (Leyre, 2014). Furthermore, they made clear that “they were annoyed at not being consulted about the change” and stated that this name change would affect their sense of

identity because “they went with *Carabineros* [police] to put the name 11 de Septiembre” (Municipalidad de La Serena, 2014, p. 5). In the meeting, they also carried out a vote asking whether they would like to change the street’s name or not, and only one out of 40 attendees voted in favour of the name change (Municipalidad de La Serena, 2014, p. 5). As noted by 24 Horas,

The vast majority are older adults who do not want to complicate their lives with cumbersome procedures, and they assure the street has never had another name [...]. They understand that historical sensitivities are involved, but they are used to it now and don’t think it’s such an important issue (Leyre, 2014).

Interestingly, in a session five days later, the city council – which, as seen earlier, had already approved the name change – decided to keep the street’s 11 de Septiembre name. The mayor asserted he would revoke the name change until the community presented a formal petition to change it. He said the community explicitly needed to demonstrate they wanted to change the street’s name (e.g., through an explicit demand), something that had not happened so far (Municipalidad de La Serena, 2014, pp. 5–8). The mayor referred to the political costs of carrying out a measure disliked by the community:

If you act independently [without consulting the neighbours], you will create a conflict that you will later be unable to solve, and this worries us [...]. The neighbours will be asked because we are in a democracy (p. 7).

Thus, strikingly, the original agreement by the city council was ignored as if it had never occurred: “[So far] no formal request has been issued” (p. 7) (see Figure 5.4).

What is most remarkable about cases of “Local Support” for pro-regime memorialisation is that communities are not necessarily linked to pro-regime nostalgia. They may have

legitimate reasons for defending such sites. In the case of La Serena, the community wanted to keep the 11 de Septiembre name because of a mixture of a sense of identity and discontent with decisions taken from outside and without their consent. This pushed them to halt the elimination process.

**Figure 5.4. 11 de Septiembre Street in Las Compañías, La Serena**



What about the underrepresented factor? Indeed, “Protective Location” does not appear to be a prominent factor in explaining the survival of pro-regime memorialisation. However, the fact it is not shown in the solution ( $W + S^*LIS$ ) does not mean it is unimportant. The parsimonious solution extracts the core combinations of factors to explain the outcome, usually the most agentic ones, but that does not mean the underrepresented factors are totally irrelevant. It is still an essential factor that should be considered when analysing the survival of pro-regime memorialisation. Due to the stigma and condemnation associated with pro-regime memory, it is hard to think of a pro-regime memorial or street name that, after 2005, would survive in a prominent, public location. Still, its absence from the final parsimonious solution indicates it is a relatively weak factor. “Protective Location” is a fragile factor because no matter how “protective” a location is, in the current context of widespread social media usage and *funas*, the mere knowledge about the memory site – regardless of whether it is in a “Protective” or “Unprotective” location – can spark a massive backlash that may eventually end up with the site’s elimination. This is what happened in 2011 with the

Pinochet Plaque inside a private company discussed in Chapter Three. Thus, a memory site could be placed inside a private and/or “Protective Location”, but this is no guarantee it will be able to survive as it could still be publicly disclosed and condemned.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter helps answer the research question – what explains pro-regime memorialisation’s survival in democratic Chile? – by offering two primary explanatory paths: The “Wall” path and the “Support” path. The “Wall” path highlights the role veto players (right-wing city councils and recalcitrant judicial actors) have in maintaining pro-regime memorialisation. It is worth noting that these actors’ discourses to defend pro-regime symbols vary. As seen in Chapter Two, they might use *sanitising*, *splitting*, *Authorised Heritage Discourse (AHD)*, *division* and *legalist* discourses to defend the maintenance of these symbols. On the other hand, the “Support path” indicates the relevance of state institutions or local communities in protecting pro-regime memorialisation. This chapter highlights the Armed Forces’ and the local neighbours’ role in defending these legacies. As noted in Chapter Three, local protection granted to the pro-regime site is not necessarily linked to a salvational memory.

Hitherto, the phenomenon of pro-regime memorialisation, much less its survival (and elimination) in democracy, had not been theorised in the academic literature. Furthermore, the finding of these two paths (W + S\*LIS) supports the initial statement that explaining this phenomenon is complex and equifinal, containing several paths to the outcome. As noted in previous chapters, these paths are consistent with theory. Still, they also set the stage for

future investigations, for instance, on the combination of conditions explaining elimination (see next chapter).

Indeed, by indicating the importance of “Walls” and “Support” for the survival of pro-regime memorialisation, these findings inversely highlight the importance of “Windows of Opportunity” (WO), “Social Noise”, and “Local and/or Institutional Rejection” (LIR) in the elimination of pro-regime sites. As noted in Chapter Three, a “Window of Opportunity” is embodied by centre-left or left-wing city councils who are usually more predisposed to listening to and encouraging elimination demands. Likewise, the presence of judges inclined to recognising victims’ need for integral reparations also constitutes a “Window of Opportunity.” Moreover, “Local and/or Institutional Rejection” reflects some degree of local mobilisation pressuring authorities to listen to their demands and denunciations against pro-regime memorialisation. It also demonstrates state institutions’ power in eliminating pro-regime memorials whenever they have political will.

The next chapter (Six) will address the “opposite” side of the research question by uncovering the conditions for the elimination of pro-regime sites in democratic Chile. Following Mikkelsen (2017), the analysis of negative cases is helpful to make sure the survival paths only work in positive cases. The results are expected to reinforce the relevance of “Walls” (W) and “Support” paths (W + S\*LIS) for the survival of pro-regime memorialisation.

## **CHAPTER 6: EXPLAINING THE ELIMINATION OF PRO-REGIME MEMORIALISATION**

### **Introduction**

After uncovering the paths for the survival of pro-regime memorialisation in democratic Chile, it is now necessary to uncover the paths for the opposite outcome: elimination. Thus, the chapter examines the combinations of conditions leading to the elimination of pro-regime memory sites. Like the previous chapter, this chapter focuses on conventional memory sites (monuments and street names) eliminated since 2005 – that is, during the “Unfavourable Period” for regime supporters (2005 – 2020). Its goal is to answer the following question: What explains, since 2005, the elimination of pro-regime memorials in Chile? To what extent can these results help validate the paths for survival obtained in the previous chapter? To answer these problems, the chapter uncovers the sufficient combinations of explanatory factors that lead to the outcome of interest (elimination).

This chapter also supports the idea that the explanation for the elimination of pro-regime memorials is complex and conjunctural. Specifically, it argues that the elimination of pro-regime memorials in democratic Chile takes place through two main paths: The “Rejection” path ( $\sim$ SN\*LIR) and the “Social Noise” path (SN\*WO).

In the first path of “Rejection” ( $\sim$ SN\*LIR), the local community or state institutions reject the pro-regime memorial. Local community rejection is observed when neighbours actively organise to rebuff the existence of a pro-regime memory site in their local area. This could happen, for instance, via the organisation of polls, or the collection of signatures showing

their refusal to have a pro-regime site nearby. They can also send letters to the authorities and even organise protests. In brief, any action intended to reject the pro-regime site and generate pressure upon authorities is understood as an active rejection. However, rejection can also come from state institutions. Congress or state-led human rights institutions are potent actors that can pressure authorities who have in their hands the fate of the pro-regime memorial. As with the case of neighbours, this rejection increases the costs of keeping the pro-regime memorial. The likelihood of elimination becomes higher whenever the price of maintenance is high.

We should note that the “Rejection” path includes the absence of “Social Noise.” This means that the lack of “Social Noise” and the presence of “Local and/or Institutional Rejection” matters for eliminating pro-regime memorials. This does not mean that “Social Noise” is not essential. “Social Noise” – the intervention of human rights organisations – will always intensify the elimination demand. Yet, it does not need to be present for an elimination outcome since “Local and/or Institutional Rejection”, by itself, may produce elimination. This is because of the power of local communities and state institutions in pushing forward elimination demands, regardless of whether there is “Social Noise” or not.

The second path, the “Social Noise” path, combines two factors: “Social Noise” AND (\*) “Window of Opportunity.” This means that “Windows of Opportunities” need to combine with “Social Noise” to be productive. “Windows of Opportunity” alone will not eliminate pro-regime memorials. Again, this is because the issue of pro-regime memorialisation is politically controversial. Thus, even if there is a centre-left or left-wing mayor (“Window of

Opportunity”), or even in the presence of pro-victim judicial actors, they will not act on their own initiative. They need to be pushed and encouraged by human rights activists and victims (“Social Noise”) to carry out the elimination process. Thus, here we are in front of a scope condition (WO) which requires the presence of another more productive condition, “Social Noise”, to carry out an elimination. For instance, an anti-regime agent involved in several judicial processes against pro-regime sites noted that the removal of these commemorations had taken place primarily thanks to the pressure and “Social Noise” (SN) of human rights NGOs and victims’ groups which have fought against the political unwillingness to eliminate pro-regime commemorations:

Unfortunately, we have lacked leaders with the moral courage willing to cleanse the Armed Forces and the *Carabineros* [police] of dictatorial symbols.” Thus, “it must be the Courts, *at the request of civil society*, who order the elimination of these tributes (Fundación Memoria Histórica Celebra Éxito de Recurso contra Homenajes a Contreras, 2020; Villa, 2019, emphasis added).

Examining the negative outcome yields two benefits: First, it can help corroborate the results for survival. If the paths for elimination match the paths for survival in opposite terms, this will signify that the survival paths are accurate. We already know that the survival paths are “Walls” (W) and “Support” (S\*LIS). If the paths for elimination include their opposing situations – “Windows of Opportunity”, “Social Noise”, and “Local and/or Institutional Support” – this provides confidence in the accuracy and internal validity of the survival paths.

Moreover, examining the negative outcome can produce interesting results that could be analysed using specific case studies (Mahoney & Goertz, 2004; Mikkelsen, 2017). In this

sense, the “elimination” of pro-regime memory sites is not just the “absence” of survival; instead, it should be considered a relevant qualitative outcome that deserves a separate analysis (Mahoney & Goertz, 2004; Mikkelsen, 2017).

As noted in previous sections, the elimination of monuments has become a prominent headline discussed in various political debates in the past years. In this context, studying the “elimination” outcome seems necessary to understand this phenomenon more deeply: What factors most influence an elimination? How do these factors combine to eliminate monuments associated with former regimes, or that have negative historical connotations to large sectors of society? This chapter helps find an answer to these pressing questions while at the same time corroborating the findings regarding the survival of pro-regime memorialisation.

The chapter first shows the procedure with the data matrix and truth table, but with the “elimination” outcome. Thus, this chapter considers “1” for elimination and “0” for survival. Then, the chapter corroborates the solution by replicating the data matrix in R software. The chapter then discusses the QCA solutions for elimination (the “Rejection” path and the “Social Noise” path) and brings to the fore case studies illuminating such paths. The conclusion summarises the chapter’s main points focusing on the role of the local communities and “Social Noise” in eliminating pro-regime memorials.

## **Tables**

### *Data Matrix*

First, the data matrix shows the set membership of the cases. Each case is assigned a “1” or a “0” for each explanatory factor (“Unprotective Location”, “Social Noise”, “Local and/or Institutional Rejection”, “Window of Opportunity”, “Denunciation During the Critical Years”) and outcome (“1” for eliminated, “0” for survival) depending on whether it is present (1) or absent (0). The Appendix (p. 497) shows the primitive combinations that will be minimised by the software and transformed into a truth table.

### *Truth Table*

In the truth table (see Appendix, p. 498), the five explanatory factors produce 32 logically possible combinations. Seven combinations lead to a positive outcome (elimination, “1”), with 11 cases in total, and four combinations lead to a negative outcome (survival, “0”), with six cases in total. Like the survival outcome, no contradictions were found among the cases with the eliminated outcome<sup>88</sup>.

## **Results**

This section shows the recipes for the elimination of pro-regime memorialisation in democratic Chile. It focuses on the parsimonious solution offered by Ragin’s fsQCA software, and it then corroborates it using the QCA package in R. This section also shows the

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<sup>88</sup> For the sake of clarity, I decided to leave the logical remainders (combinations that have no cases) out of the table. However, the software did include them in the minimisation procedure for the parsimonious solution (Rihoux & Lobe, 2009, p. 225).

process through which I finally chose the best solution to explain the elimination outcome.

First, fsQCA software uncovered the following solution for elimination:

LIR\*WO

Where \* should be read as “AND” (conjunction). In narrative terms, the solution can be described as follows:

*The elimination of pro-regime memorials in democratic Chile occurs by a combination of “Local and/or Institutional Rejection” AND a “Window of Opportunity.”*

Therefore, the entire solution:

LIR\*WO

contains one path made up of two explanatory factors (conjunction) that explain the elimination of pro-regime memorialisation.

A preliminary observation of the path LIR\*WO reveals that both explanatory factors, in conjunction, may be necessary for the outcome to occur. This is because they are a conjunction and the only path to the outcome.

In fact, an observation of the data matrix and the complex solution offered by the fsQCA software (see Appendix, pp. 497–498) reveals that the path is comprised of two necessary conditions, “LIR” and “WO”, since both are present in all eliminated cases. Although by themselves “LIR” and “WO” cannot explain the elimination of pro-regime memorialisation,

the parsimonious solution still indicates that, in combination, they are indeed producing the outcome.

The analysis of necessity performed by the QCA software confirms these assertions (see Table 6.1). Both “Local and/or Institutional Rejection” and “Window of Opportunity” have 1 in consistency, which means that the degree to which they act as preconditions or antecedents to the outcome is very high. In other words, whenever the outcome of interest appears, it will likely be preceded by LIR and WO (LIR and WO are supersets of the outcome). Both explanatory factors have a high degree of coverage too (85% each), making them essential (non-trivial) explanatory factors for the outcome because of their high empirical relevance in the outcome of interest.

<b>Explanatory factors</b>	<b>Consistency</b>	<b>Coverage</b>
Unprotective Location (UL)	0.45	0.83
Social Noise (SN)	0.45	0.71
Local and/or Institutional Rejection (LIR)	1	0.85
Window of Opportunity (WO)	1	0.85
Denunciation During the Critical Years (DCY)	0.63	0.54

Source: Author’s original dataset of pro-regime memorialisation in democratic Chile (1990 – 2020). Using fsQCA software 3.0 (Ragin 2008), available at: <http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml>

Apart from analysing the necessity of the explanatory factors in the parsimonious solution, the coverage and consistency of the solution term (path) and the entire solution should also be analysed<sup>89</sup>.

<sup>89</sup> Yet, because the software obtained just one path, which constitutes at the same time, the solution, only the raw coverage and consistency will be examined.

As seen in Table 6.2, the solution term “LIR\*WO” should be able to explain all the eliminated cases: Av. General Francisco Franco in La Pintana [now Av. Violeta Parra], Augusto Pinochet Plaque at Walmart, Av. 11 de Septiembre in Providencia [now Av. Nueva Providencia], 11 de Septiembre Street in Pedro Aguirre Cerda [now Aquilina Rojas], Augusto Pinochet Plaque at UCN in Antofagasta, Almirante Lorenzo Gotuzzo Street in Santiago [now Amanda Labarca Street], 11 de Septiembre Street in Quillota [now Francisco Silva Street], Av. Jaime Guzmán in Rengo [now Av. José Ramírez Allende], Manuel Contreras plaques and photographs in Military buildings, Lucía Hiriart Square [now Arturo Godoy Square], and the Av. Jaime Guzmán in Renca [now Av. Dorsal]. These cases constitute 100% of the eliminated cases (raw coverage of 1). The unique coverage is also 1 since all the cases are explained by this path. Moreover, the consistency of the term is 1, showing that all the cases with LIR\*WO have the outcome of interest (elimination). In brief, this analysis points out that the cases that have been eliminated are properly explained by the solution LIR\*WO.

<b>Table 6.2. Paths to elimination (csQCA, parsimonious solution)<sup>90</sup></b>						
#	Configurations (terms/recipes)	# of cases explained	Cases	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Consistency
1	LIR*WO	11	Franco, APplaqueW, 11SeptProviden, 11SeptPAC, UCN, Gotuzzo, 11SeptQuill, JGRengo, ManuelContreras, Iquique, JGRenca	1	1	1
Solution coverage: 1 Solution consistency: 1						
LIR = Local and/or Institutional Rejection WO = Windows of Opportunity						
Source: Author's original dataset of pro-regime memorialisation in democratic Chile (1990 – 2020). Using fsQCA software 3.0 (Ragin, 2008), available at: <a href="http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml">http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml</a>						

<sup>90</sup> The complex solution is shown in the Appendix, p. 498.

### *Corroboration with R Software*

I corroborated the fsQCA procedure using the QCA package in R to check whether the process using fsQCA software was correct and whether there is more than just one model as uncovered so far for the elimination outcome (see Appendix, pp. 499).

Due to its “fine-grained algorithm” (M. Baumgartner, personal communication, 29 September 2021, personal communication, 6 October 2021), the QCA package in R software uncovered two models explaining the elimination outcome:

Model 1 (M1): LIR\*WO

Model 2 (M2): ~SN\*LIR + SN\*WO

Solution LIR\*WO is equal to model 1; thus, the fsQCA software procedure is correct.

However, R obtained two disjunctive models. Both models are expressed as follows:

*M1: The elimination of pro-regime memorials is the outcome of a combination of “Local and/or Institutional Rejection” AND a “Window of Opportunity.”*

*[this model is the same as the one obtained using fsQCA software]*

*OR*

*M2: The elimination of pro-regime memorials is the outcome of two paths. On the one hand, it is produced by “Local and/or Institutional Support” in the absence of Social Noise (that is, there is “Silence”). On the other, the elimination outcome is produced through the combination of “Social Noise” AND a “Window of Opportunity.”*

To choose the best model, I have used post-QCA process tracing to check which one can better explain the elimination outcome (see Appendix, pp. 475–489). In the process tracing

exercise, I uncovered two types of eliminated cases: A group that had been eliminated in the presence of “Silence”, and another group that had been eliminated with “Social Noise.”

Thus, the cases eliminated with “Silence” – in which there was no external intervention of human rights NGOs or victims’ associations – are:

<b>Table 6.3. Cases eliminated with “Silence” (~SN)</b>
11 de Septiembre Street [Aquilina Rojas Street]
Augusto Pinochet Plaque, Gimnasio Luis Bisquert, UCN
Lorenzo Gotuzzo Street [Amanda Labarca Street]
11 de Septiembre Street [Francisco Silva Street]
Av. Jaime Guzmán [Av. José Ramírez Allende]
Lucía Hiriart Square [Arturo Godoy Square]

and the cases eliminated with “Social Noise” – in which there was an external intervention of human rights NGOs or victims’ associations – are:

<b>Table 6.4. Cases eliminated with “Social Noise” (SN)</b>
Av. General Francisco Franco [Av. Violeta Parra]
Augusto Pinochet Plaque at Walmart (former D&S)
Av. 11 de Septiembre [Av. Nueva Providencia]
Manuel Contreras plaques and photographs
Av. Jaime Guzmán [Av. Dorsal]

Because there is a clear distinction between these two different groups of eliminated cases (with “Silence” and with “Social Noise”), I used model 2 provided by R. I have discarded the solution offered by fsQCA software (LIR\*WO), and model one yielded by R (LIR\*WO), because they do not distinguish between these two groups. Contrarily, model two allows for the creation of a typology. Moreover, the solution in fsQCA and model 1 in R does not include “Social Noise”, which the literature and an examination of the cases in this thesis

demonstrate is highly relevant for the elimination outcome. Thus, model 2 yielded by R is the most appropriate:

$$\sim\text{SN}*\text{LIR} + \text{SN}*\text{WO}$$

Put in narrative terms, then, the elimination of pro-regime memory sites in democratic Chile:

*Occurs whenever there is “Local and/or Institutional Rejection” in the absence of “Social Noise”, OR when there is “Social Noise” combined with “Window of Opportunity.”*

## **Discussion of the Main Findings: Identifying the Recipes for the Elimination of Pro-regime Memorialisation**

### The “Rejection” Path

The “Rejection” path ( $\sim\text{SN}*\text{LIR}$ ) reads as follows: In the absence of “Social Noise”, the elimination of pro-regime memorialisation is the product of “Local and/or Institutional Rejection.” Here, the “Local and/or Institutional Rejection” factor does all the “work” to eliminate pro-regime memorials. Cases in this group have not experienced the intervention of external anti-regime agents (e.g., human rights activists) to help boost the elimination process. Thus, it is alone the local communities (or state institutions) who advance the pro-regime site’s elimination.

The relevance of this path is twofold. First, it highlights the idea that even in the absence of “Social Noise”, pro-regime sites can still be eliminated thanks to other actors’ actions (e.g., neighbours or state institutions). Secondly, it emphasises local communities’ power in eliminating pro-regime memory sites. However, it should be remembered that Table 6.1. above shows that “Local and/or Institutional Rejection” and “Window of Opportunity” have

1 in consistency, which indicates they act as preconditions or antecedents to the outcome. In other words, they are necessary. Thus, although the “WO” factor does not appear in this path ( $\sim$ SN\*LIR), it is expected to be implicitly present as a necessary condition providing the context in which the LIR factor is most successful. This means that “Local and/or Institutional Rejection” is the productive factor pushing forward the elimination of pro-regime memorialisation. Still, this factor needs the existence of a “Window of Opportunity” (centre-left authorities or receptive judicial actors) that will hear and eventually materialise the rejection demands.

An examination shows that the “Local Rejection” aspect plays a pivotal role and is much more prominent than the “Institutional Rejection” element. Local communities that mobilise can exert significant pressure on authorities and force them to eliminate pro-regime memorials even without “Social Noise.” Because they are internal actors and electoral power lies in them, they have the legitimacy of making demands regarding changes in their communities. They do not need “Social Noise” because their demands, if voiced forcefully and if resource mobilisation is successful, may be capable of pushing mayors in the desired direction. Indeed, of the eight eliminated cases explained by the “Rejection” path ( $\sim$ SN\*LIR), seven are explained by neighbours’ active rejection of the site (11 de Septiembre Street [Aquilina Rojas Street]; Augusto Pinochet Plaque, Gimnasio Luis Bisquert, UCN; 11 de Septiembre Street [Francisco Silva Street]; Av. Jaime Guzmán [Av. José Ramírez Allende]; Lucía Hiriart Square [Arturo Godoy Square]). In only one case – Lorenzo Gotuzzo Street [now Amanda Labarca Street] – it was both “local” rejection and “institutional” rejection that were equally relevant to its elimination. Here, the Ministry of Education asked

the Santiago city council to find a street to honour Amanda Labarca (“institutional” rejection). Still, the community also had a prominent role in rejecting the Lorenzo Gotuzzo name by providing ample support to the initiative in the neighbours’ council meeting (COSOC) (“local” rejection).

How do communities intervene to have their local pro-regime memorials eliminated? There are several ways in which they act towards their elimination goal: They may send letters to the authorities, organise polls, attend city council meetings to denounce the presence of pro-regime sites, organise protests and *funas*, condemn the site via social media, or even vandalise or destroy it.

Their arguments for rejecting a site are also varied. However, the most crucial ones are connected to their sense of political identity and how the pro-regime site might clash with their empathy towards human rights violations or their left-wing political identity. Local rejection could also be related to a new generational cohort that has grown up in democracy exposed to the images and narratives of human rights violations during the regime and who, for that reason, feel more identified with victims while also less tolerant and more intransigent with Chile’s memory pact allowing the existence of pro-regime sites alongside victims’ memorials.

Locals may also demand an elimination whenever they feel the site is damaging their national/international reputation and touristic potential. For instance, a section of the Linares local community demanded in 2016 the elimination of the Pinochet Monument and Square in

Linares because, among other reasons, it is urgent to “change this *bad postcard* that our city delivers” (La Cigarra, 2017) (emphasis added). Finally, local demands for elimination could be part of a “pedagogy of memory” carried out previously by human rights activists to create awareness of the importance of eliminating pro-regime legacies.

The fact that “Local Rejection” is a crucial element for the elimination of pro-regime memorialisation is a finding that exceeds previous expectations. Initially, and based on the literature on transitional justice, it was expected that “Social Noise” would occupy a prominent and exclusive role in the elimination of pro-regime memorials. However, this thesis points out that, if organised, local communities *can also* push elimination demands forward and succeed (inversely, as seen in the previous chapter, they can also effectively block elimination demands). Human rights organisations and victims’ associations have a relevant role, *but they are not the only* actors whose actions are pivotal for elimination.

Indeed, some human rights organisations are beginning to realise local communities’ importance in deciding and shaping their memorial landscape. For instance, if human rights organisations push forward an elimination demand but the local community is not interested or even opposes it, they know it would be difficult to eliminate the pro-regime memorial. Some human rights movements have learnt that they have to win the hearts and minds of the local communities if they want to achieve elimination. This happened, for instance, in the case of the Villa Augusto Pinochet in El Bosque (Santiago, Chile), in which victims’ associations and the *Ciudadanos por la Memoria* realised that, before holding a referendum, they had to carry out an educational plan regarding the memory of the recent past and teach

residents why this name change was so important. Without a previous educational process, it would have been very likely that the local community would still support the name “Villa Augusto Pinochet.”<sup>91</sup>

These ideas do not imply that the “Local and/or Institutional Rejection” factor always successfully eliminates pro-regime memorials. As noted previously, a “Window of Opportunity” is present in all eliminated cases, showing that the LIR factor acts within a highly beneficial scope, which is the openness and receptivity to human rights issues of the authorities in charge of the pro-regime site. If “Walls” are present, the site will most likely survive, as demonstrated by the Av. 11 de Septiembre case in Providencia. Here, the avenue’s name was changed *only after the right-wing mayor left office* in 2012 and was replaced by a progressive centre-left mayor. Thus, there needs to be a “Window of Opportunity” as a scope condition for the “Local and/or Institutional Rejection” factor to succeed.


The cases of the Lucía Hiriart Square in Iquique, and the Av. 11 de Septiembre in Quillota, illustrate the “Rejection” path (~SN\*LIR) very clearly. In both cases, there was no intervention of external human rights groups or activists (~SN). Instead, it was exclusively the local communities who mobilised to change the names of their pro-regime sites (LIR).

In the case of Iquique, by the beginning of 2018 the neighbourhood council Dagoberto Godoy initiated a campaign to change the name of their Lucía Hiriart Square (CNN Chile,


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<sup>91</sup> The Villa Augusto Pinochet was not included in the QCA dataset because the elimination process was suspended by the Social Outbreak and the Covid-19 pandemic.

2018). In March 2018, they organised a local poll with 67 signatures favouring the name of Arturo Godoy – a Chilean boxing champion who lived in the area – and the document was presented to the city council (CNN Chile, 2018; Junta de Vecinos Dagoberto Godoy, 2018a). According to a local city councillor, “it’s a square that has kept its name [Lucía Hiriart] since the dictatorship. The residents did not agree [with it] and also wanted to highlight Arturo Godoy, a prominent neighbour who was also part of the community” (CNN Chile, 2018). Thus, the neighbourhood council sent a letter to Iquique’s mayor requesting to change the name of Lucía Hiriart Square to Arturo Godoy Square. In the letter, they say that “after consultation with our neighbours, the name chosen was unanimously accepted, making a recognition of our neighbour and great boxer from Iquique, who thus far only had an alley with his name, where the square is currently being rebuilt” (Junta de Vecinos Dagoberto Godoy, 2018b). The local rejection of the name was reinforced in the neighbours’ council meeting (COSIQ) on 9 April 2018, which unanimously approved the motion (Municipalidad de Iquique, 2018a). By 12 April 2018, Iquique’s mayor (independent) presented the project to the council. It was approved with seven votes in favour and two against (Agreement N° 254/2018) (Municipalidad de Iquique, 2018b). The two opposing votes belonged to right-wing city councillors —UDI and RN (Municipalidad de Iquique, 2018b), who, as a minority, could not block the elimination process. Thus, Lucía Hiriart Square was changed to Arturo Godoy Square thanks, primarily, to a local demand which was positively received by the majority of the city council, that was, by then, more inclined to the centre-left (“Window of Opportunity”) (see Figure 6.1) (Serval, 2016a, 2016d).



In another case, in June 2016 some neighbours in Quillota suggested on the city council's Facebook webpage that a street should be named after footballer Francisco Silva who scored a goal in the Copa América Centenario Cup, giving Chile the victory over Argentina (Soy Chile, 2016a, 2016b; Soy Quillota, 2016). According to RLV News (R. Salazar, 2016), "it was the neighbours who led the initiative to change the name of this road." Soon after, the city council surveyed 44 families, of which 40 favoured the name change of 11 de Septiembre Street to Francisco Silva Street (Municipalidad de Quillota, 2016, p. 77). Local rejection of the 11 de Septiembre name, and support for the new name, reinforced the city council's legitimacy to carry out the change. The name change was proposed in the city council by the mayor (DC) (Soy Chile, 2016a), where the centre-left was a majority ("Window of Opportunity"). "Local Rejection" against the old name was also evident in the inaugural ceremony of the new name, in which a large crowd of neighbours could be seen applauding and cheering. The centre-left mayor (DC) delivered a speech in honour of Francisco Silva (Soy Quillota, 2016) and implicitly criticised the old name saying this new name would allow to "unite us forever" (Ovalle, 2016). Thus, 11 de Septiembre Street in Quillota was changed due to a local demand (LIR) (see Figure 6.2), which was listened to by a receptive city council dominated by the centre-left (WO).

**Figure 6.2. 11 de Septiembre Street [now Francisco Silva Street], Quillota**

In brief, the “Rejection” path highlights civil society’s role in eliminating pro-regime memory sites<sup>92</sup>, particularly local communities’ incidence in the process. Whenever they feel these sites are not beneficial to their identity and are negatively affecting their social, cultural and economic wellbeing, there will be the potential for them to mobilise to modify their environment.

### The “Social Noise” Path

The “Social Noise” path (SN\*WO) reads as follows: The elimination of pro-regime memorials results from a combination of two factors, “Social Noise” and “Window of

<sup>92</sup> Another interesting case of local rejection occurred in June 2013, when neighbours of the Pedro Aguirre Cerda district (Santiago, Chile) sent a letter to their mayor requesting the elimination of the name 11 de Septiembre from a local street. They wanted their street to be named after Aquilina Rojas, the mother of two prominent left-wing politicians who had helped residents in the area to acquire lands and housing during the left-wing Popular Unity government (1970 – 1973). After the military coup of 11 September 1973, the new military authorities immediately erased the Aquilina Rojas name and replaced it with 11 de Septiembre to celebrate the coup. For the residents of the area, the latter represented a period that caused the community “a lot of pain” (Anonymous Key Informant #8, Pedro Aguirre Cerda, personal communication, 16 March 2021). Thus, in August 2013, the centre-left dominated city council approved the change (Municipalidad de Pedro Aguirre Cerda, 2013) (see Appendix, picture #2, p. 452). In the session, the mayor invited all city councillors to vote in favour of the initiative: “[...] then, I would ask you to the vote for the approval [...] of the street to be called Aquilina Rojas” (Municipalidad de Pedro Aguirre Cerda, 2013, p. 30). This case is striking for several reasons – among others, the erasure of a name by the Military after the coup, and the strong left-wing identity of residents whose memories were linked to the dictatorship. It is also notable that the community organised itself to reject what they felt was a pro-regime legacy.

Opportunity.” This path stresses the importance of civil society activists and human rights organisations in eliminating regime legacies in democracy. As seen in Chapter Three, “Social Noise” reflects the active intervention of human rights activists who mobilise resources – most notably their “noise” – to achieve elimination.

Since 2005, Chilean society has experienced an explosive rise of a “Social Noise” culture regarding human rights issues. “Silence”, so typical of the 1990s, is no longer the primary trend of the current socio-political context. This is evident in the strengthening of human rights organisations (e.g., the INDH), the installation of a culture of *funa* (public rebuke), and the growth of social media as a platform for political commentary and condemnation (C. E. Alegría, personal communication, 28 September 2021; N. Cabrera, personal communication, 21 September 2021).

The fact the “Social Noise” factor combines with “Window of Opportunity” (WO) shows that, by itself, the former may not be capable of producing the outcome (elimination).

Although “Social Noise” is a crucial factor as “cases will not be initiated in the absence of civil society demand” (Payne et al., 2019, p. 241), it still needs to combine with a scope condition; in this case, WO. This is consistent with the previous theory of transitional justice. Payne and Pereira (2019, p. 121) have stated that “the demand of civil society is insufficient by itself, but progress in truth and justice would hardly take place without it.” Likewise, Payne et al. (2019, p. 241) argue that, in cases regarding corporate accountability, “civil society mobilization and institutional innovation can only go so far.” Human rights and victims’ groups are usually met with strong resistance by veto players (e.g., businesses,

judicial actors) or may come across an unfavourable political context inclined to the right-wing, which might block the elimination process no matter how strong “Social Noise” is. In the case of José Toribio Merino’s statue, a member of Ciudadanos de la Memoria argued that regardless of their “noise”, their efforts to eliminate the figure have been hopeless:

We have carried out all kinds of activities, including parliamentary lobbying, and met with the President of the Chamber of Deputies and the entire staff of advisers to the then minister. In the second Bachelet government, we have collected six thousand signatures, made demonstrations, and sent letters to the President of the Republic [...], and there has been no response. This is a tough nut to crack (Grez, 2019).

In other words, “Social Noise” – the active intervention of human rights organisations and groups – is fundamental but insufficient in itself. Thus, only in the presence of “Windows of Opportunity”, “Social Noise” will most likely succeed. The combination SN\*WO is certainly powerful: it is a combination of “noise” demanding the elimination, and receptive authorities.

How does the “Social Noise” path (SN\*WO) unfold? Several scenarios are possible. First, it could be the case that a local community mobilises against a pro-regime memorial, and upon learning of this, external human rights activists join the fight and help make the elimination process successful. It could also occur that the “noise” precedes the local mobilisation, but once this “noise” is installed, the neighbours begin to mobilise forcing the authorities to eliminate the site. On the other hand, it can also happen that the local community does not join the struggle and remains indifferent. Finally, it could also be the case that there is no need to deal with the local community as the pro-regime site is located in a different environment, such as military buildings or private spaces. In the latter, “Social Noise” would undoubtedly be the leading actor fighting for the elimination of the pro-regime site.

Elimination will take place, however, whenever there are authorities receptive to this “noise” and who will listen to the demands and accept them. In other words, elimination will take place when there is a “Window of Opportunity” —centre-left or left-wing city councillors and mayors, or receptive judicial actors inclined to human rights issues.

Two cases that exemplify the “Social Noise” path (SN\*WO) in democratic Chile are the Av. 11 de Septiembre in Providencia and the commemorations of Manuel Contreras by the Army. Both cases show the power of “Social Noise” in eliminating pro-regime memorials. They also show how this factor requires a “Window of Opportunity” to be productive.

On 29 September 1980, the Military Junta honoured the coup by naming “11 de Septiembre” a central avenue in Providencia. The decree mentioned, “that the deed of the 11<sup>th</sup> of September 1973, which freed the country from Marxist oppression, must be remembered by present and future generations in a construction of great urban importance” (Municipalidad de Providencia, 1980).

The first objections against this name appeared right after Chile transitioned to democracy. In 1991, for instance, a Providencia neighbour demanded that the street’s pro-regime name be changed. He argued that “if we are all looking for a path of peace, how could there be a street that justifies and glorifies a date in which human rights were violated [?]” (Vecino de Providencia/Municipalidad de Providencia, 1991).

However, until 2012, the city council was governed by right-wing mayors who repeatedly rejected and ignored citizens' demands to eliminate the 11 de Septiembre name (Estévez, 2013; Estévez et al., 2012). In 1991, the then Providencia mayor used a *sanitising* discourse saying that “such denomination [11 de Septiembre] derives from a historical fact”, and, thus, it should not be questioned nor removed (Estévez et al., 2012; Municipalidad de Providencia, 1991, p. 33).

In 2012, a civil society initiative called *Desmonumentar la Dictadura*<sup>93</sup> announced a public campaign to eliminate the avenue's name. They requested the mayor – who during the dictatorship was a former DINA agent and close collaborator to Pinochet – to remove the name and replace it with Nueva Providencia, its original name. Unsurprisingly, the mayor flatly rejected the demand. In April 2012, the group sent him a letter, but the mayor vetoed the request (Estévez, 2013). A well-known *Pinochetista* praised him for rejecting the demand and the “consistency he has had in always manifesting himself as a person who does not give up his past as part of the military government” (Mentiras Verdaderas La Red & Verdad Histórica Chile, 2012).

However, by the end of 2012, a “Window of Opportunity” appeared. For the first time in 16 years, Providencia elected a progressive centre-left mayor (Serval, 2012b, 2012f). As mentioned by a key agent in the process, Francisco Estévez (personal communication, 6 September 2021): “*Fue una ventana, si tu quieres*” (it was a window, if you like).

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<sup>93</sup> This initiative's webpage shows *Desmonumentar el Golpe*, but a former member of this group insisted it was called *Desmonumentar la Dictadura*, so this latter name is used here.


With this election, the centre-left now dominated the city council (five centre-left vs four centre-right city councillors). Providencia's new centre-left mayor rapidly announced she would pursue a democratic and participatory agenda and that the avenue's name change was her priority (CNN Chile, 2013c; J. Errázuriz, 2012).

However, once she took office, she delayed fulfilling her promise and the citizens' movement, particularly an anti-regime memorialisation group called *Ciudadanos por la Memoria*, began to remobilise. In fact, by June 2013, civil society organisations accused the mayor of not respecting the agreement regarding the street's name change (Correa, 2013). They blamed "she did not want to comment. There are journalists who have asked her for interviews on this subject, she has rejected them, so it gave us the impression *there was a reluctance to deal with the issue*" (Vega & Ciudadanos por la Memoria, 2013, emphasis added). Indeed, they "asked for a meeting several days ago, and last night we received a ridiculous response from a minor official, saying her chief of staff was going to receive us" (Correa, 2013). Worried about the delay, these groups became increasingly restless and bothered.

Civil society intensified the pressure, and the *Ciudadanos por la Memoria* group decided to send her a letter "since we could not have a meeting with the mayor" (Vega & Ciudadanos por la Memoria, 2013). About 600 people signed the letter, including neighbours, artists, academics, national academic awards, and political and social leaders. At this point, several newspapers noted that the initiative had "broad citizen support" (Hora 20 La Red, 2013c, 2013e).

This “Social Noise” eventually forced the mayor to announce that the city council would start assessing the name change. By the end of June 2013, the mayor declared that “the time has come” and that she would analyse the issue in the neighbours’ council meeting (COSOC) taking place in the coming weeks (Correa, 2013; La Segunda, 2013).

Ultimately, the city council approved the proposal on 2 July 2013 (see Figure 6.3). In this case, it is evident that “Social Noise” was fundamental in pushing forward the elimination demand. If it had not been for this pressure, even in the presence of a “Window of Opportunity” (a new centre-left mayor elected by the end of 2012), the change would have taken place later or, as the citizen initiative feared, it would have simply not happened (L. M. Rendón Escobar, personal communication, 27 September 2021).



Another striking case presenting the combination of SN\*WO is that of Manuel Contreras’s plaques and photographs. After denunciation (in 2018) and throughout the entire process (before its elimination), this case was riddled with “Walls” (W). However, it also presented a last-minute “Window of Opportunity”, which finally led to the elimination of Manuel

Contrera's honours inside two military buildings (in 2020). This case demonstrates how the presence of "Social Noise" and "Windows of Opportunity" contributed to its elimination.

On 25 May 2018, a human rights lawyer used the Transparency Law to request information about the existence and whereabouts of commemorative elements to Manuel Contreras in two military institutions: The War Academy in La Reina (Santiago) and the School of Engineers Tejas Verdes in San Antonio (Valparaíso) (Radio Biobio, 2018). This action constituted the moment of denunciation of the case. In response, the Chilean Army issued an official document certifying that several commemorations to Contreras existed in the two military precincts: Three photographs and two plaques in the War Academy in La Reina and three plaques in the School of Engineers Tejas Verdes in San Antonio, all referring to Manuel Contreras (Griffiths Spielman, 2018)<sup>94</sup>.

After denunciation, on 7 September 2019, another human rights lawyer initiated a judicial battle to eliminate these commemorations (Rendón, 2019b). Four days later, on 11 September 2019, his appeal was rejected by the First Chamber of the Court of Appeals. The Court argued that maintaining these commemorations "exceeds the matters this Court oversees" (C.A Santiago, 2019a). It said that the military precincts are "owned by the Army" and "are not freely accessible to the public." A *Pinochetista* lawyer involved in the process celebrated this "Wall", saying that this Court was "based on a *healthy doctrine* on the scopes,

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<sup>94</sup> The latter had been the home of the DINA, which was Pinochet's first repressive secret police commanded by Contreras (Rebolledo, 2015). In the judicial process, the Army insisted that these were not commemorations/honours but simple historical records (Comandancia en Jefe del Ejército de Chile, 2019, p. 12).

objectives and purview” of the Judiciary as it respected the Military’s autonomy (Meza, 2020, p. 5).

However, the case was brought to the Supreme Court (SC), and on 2 October 2019, the SC declared the initial protection appeal against Contrera’s commemorations admissible. It asserted that “the appeal should have been accepted for processing” by the Court of Appeals since it could “constitute the violation of guarantees” (Corte Suprema de Chile, 2019).

The Army defended these commemorations from the beginning. They insisted that the plaques and photographs of Manuel Contreras were part of a “historical record” and that honouring a former officer would not contradict their commitment to human rights (Comandancia en Jefe del Ejército de Chile, 2019, p. 12). For them, these plaques and photographs were “the Institution’s registry of its members, which dates back to 1810” (p. 12). Furthermore, they argued these commemorations were acceptable and functional as they “meet the goal of maintaining a chronological record of the Military” (p. 12). They even affirmed that removing Contreras’s plaques and photographs would start an undesirable landslide of eliminations of commemorative objects of other military leaders. For instance, they suggested that the descendants of those who died in the battles of José Miguel Carrera – a Chilean independence hero who fought against the Spanish Army by the beginning of the 1800s – could feel strongly displeased and could also request the removal of Carrera’s commemorations inside military institutions (pp. 11–12).

By October 2019, and after the Supreme Court's order, the case was revised by another Chamber of the Court of Appeals (Fifth). On 26 December 2019, this new chamber ruled in favour of the initial denunciation. This more recent ruling – drafted by a different judge who was certainly more acquainted with human rights law – argued that “there cannot be forbidden reserves or spaces laying outside the adoption of measures [...] of judicial protection.” Notably, this statement rejected the initial thesis of military autonomy (C.A, 2019, p. 4). The ruling used human rights notions of victims' reparations by referring to “Article 63.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights, [which] establishes the duty of the states to repair the consequences derived from the violation of fundamental rights” (p. 6). Consequently, and based on these arguments, the chamber gave the Army three days to comply and eliminate Contrera's commemorations.

However, this was not the end of the case. On 31 December 2019, Contrera's son appealed the ruling. He argued that, although Chile's Human Rights Plan required memorialising victims of human rights violations, no current legislation ordered the “removal of photographs and plaques of former officials of the Chilean Army or the Armed Forces who have the status of convicted for crimes against humanity” (Meza, 2020, p. 9). Moreover, he said, under this “removal logic”, the Army would have to eliminate “all photos of retired generals, living and deceased, from all the respective military fairground units they commanded [...] alive or deceased since 1973, who have been convicted or prosecuted for human rights reasons” (Meza, 2020, p. 6).

Against this backdrop, the Chilean President ignored the elimination demands, and the Defence Minister explicitly supported the Army. For instance, on 15 January 2020, in a meeting in Congress with several Deputies, the Minister reinforced the Army's thesis arguing there was no contradiction whatsoever in admitting Contreras's criminality while at the same time maintaining his commemorative plaques and photographs in educational military units (Comisión de Derechos Humanos y Pueblos Originarios, 2020, p. 3). In the meeting, a frustrated Socialist Deputy denounced "this reflect[ed] an Army that has not changed" (p. 3).

Throughout the entire elimination process, "Social Noise" grew increasingly louder. Right after the first request for information regarding the plaques (25 May 2018), and "one day before the 45<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the coup *d'état*", Radio Biobio released an article – which had over 38,000 visits – showing that the Army maintained photographs and plaques of Manuel Contreras (Radio Biobio, 2018). On 4 January 2020, Fundación Memoria Histórica – an NGO that fights against pro-regime symbols – publicly expressed its disappointment at the Army's defence of these commemorations and regretted it evaded an "institutional admission of its responsibility regarding the severe and systematic human rights violations during the dictatorship." They also mentioned that "it's evident that a self-perception persists, according to which the Army owes to itself, as an institution separated from society, which has created it [...]. We believe that the notion of autonomy in the Armed Forces persists" (Zúñiga, 2020). Furthermore, on 28 January 2020, Sofía Prats Cuthbert, daughter of General Carlos Prats – murdered in 1974 under the orders of Manuel Contreras – became part of the


litigation and filed a protection appeal expressing that this situation deeply “hurts us as victims of Mr Manuel Contreras” (Prats Cuthbert, 2020, p. 3).

In this context of heated debate, the National Institute of Human Rights (INDH) intensified the atmosphere of “Social Noise” by sending the Supreme Court an *amicus curiae* reminding the state of its obligations to victims’ reparations (26 February 2020) (INDH, 2020a). The document states that reparations must be “comprehensive” and that the survival of these commemorations to Contreras risked “violating victims’ dignity and offending the memory of relatives and society as a whole” (INDH, 2020a, 2020b).

Finally, on 5 March 2020, the Supreme Court ratified the ruling (Corte Suprema de Chile, 2020b; Salgado & Forero-Ortiz, 2020), and the Army had no other choice but to unenthusiastically remove the commemorative plaques and photographs of Manuel Contreras (Comandancia en Jefe del Ejército de Chile, 2020b).

This case reveals a situation in which “Walls” and “Windows of Opportunity” coexisted almost simultaneously (in the Judiciary). The first judicial attempt was blocked on 11 September 2019 by the First Chamber of the Court of Appeals, which did not accept the lawsuit (judicial “Wall”). However, almost four months later, the Fifth Chamber of the Court of Appeals – integrated by another leading judge inclined to human rights and who wrote the ruling – ruled to eliminate these symbols and repair victims (26 December 2019). This sudden “Window of Opportunity” (WO), combined with activists’, victims, and human rights organisations’ “Social Noise” against the case, finally led to the elimination of Manuel

Contrera's commemorations inside the Army (see Figure 6.4). This case visibly demonstrates the importance of the "Window of Opportunity" factor combined with "Social Noise" in advancing elimination processes against pro-regime memorialisation.



It should be noted that "Unprotective Location" and "Denunciation During the Critical Years" (2013 – 2020) do not appear in the parsimonious solution for elimination ( $\sim$ SN\*LIR + SN\*WO). These absences indicate they are not the most prominent factors in explaining the survival of pro-regime memorials. As mentioned in previous sections, because of pro-regime memory's stigma and negative social connotations, pro-regime memory sites would be eliminated quite quickly if located in an "Unprotective location" (public or prominent space, or an area associated with victims). However, we also know that pro-regime memorials can 'disappear' and "present" themselves (Goffman, 1990 [1959]) as harmless and abandoned, thus helping them to survive regardless of where they are located (thanatosis, see Chapter Three). Therefore, the pro-regime site's location is not as relevant as initially thought: In many cases, sites in a "Protected" area can still be easily condemned, while

memory sites in an “Unprotected” area can still survive if they look abandoned or in disrepair (thanatosis).


Regarding “Denunciation During the Critical Years” (2013 – 2020), it should be noted that although it did not show up in the parsimonious solution for elimination, it cannot be denied that the historical context is a crucial element in explaining the elimination of pro-regime memorialisation. As described in earlier chapters, since 2013, the socio-political context has become increasingly difficult for pro-regime memory. This context implies a growing condemnation against the regime, increasing pro-regime stigma, and the deepening of polarisation. Meanwhile, victims’ narratives have become both “dominant” and “hegemonic” (Aguilar, 2019 [2008]). Thus, it was expected that sites denounced in or after 2013 would have had more chances of being eliminated as they would bear the weight of the wave of condemnations that started that year. Bearing this in mind, two reasons explain why the “Denunciation During the Critical Years” factor is not as essential for eliminating pro-regime memorialisation as initially thought. The first reason is that this is a scope condition but not a triggering one because it provides the appropriate ambience for the outcome, but is not “productive” enough. It is a condition in which actors develop their actions, but it does not constitute an agentic actor *motu proprio*. Thus, the factor should be considered in analysing the elimination of pro-regime memorials as it acts as the “fulcrum” (Payne et al., 2022) in which political dynamics occur. Yet, to explain the mechanisms, we need to look at other more agentic conditions such as “Window of Opportunity”, “Social Noise”, and “Local and/or Institutional Rejection” in which actors (neighbours, civil society, mayors, city councillors, etc.) directly act. The other reason is that, as shown in Chart 2.3 (Chapter Two),

eliminations did occur before 2013. Although they spiked after this date, some cases were still eliminated before this crucial year. For instance, the Augusto Pinochet Plaque was removed in 2010 from former D&S premises at Walmart, indicating that the “Denunciation During the Critical Years” factor is certainly important but not critical or agentic enough.

## Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the elimination of pro-regime memorials. It uncovered two main paths for this outcome: The “Rejection” path ( $\sim\text{SN}*\text{LIR}$ ) and the “Social Noise” path ( $\text{SN}*\text{WO}$ ) (see Figure 6.5). In both paths, community mobilisations (“Local and/or Institutional Support”) and civil society actions (“Social Noise”) feature prominently as the main factors in eliminating pro-regime memorialisation. Still, a “scope” condition needs to be present for these factors to deploy their causal power, which is the “Window of Opportunity.” Thus, only authorities receptive to human rights issues will listen to community rejection or “Social Noise.” In those cases, the pro-regime memorial will most likely be eliminated.

**Figure 6.5. Summary of the elimination paths**



By giving prominence to these two factors (“Local and/or Institutional Support” and “Social Noise”), this section also demonstrates the validity of the results obtained in the previous chapter regarding survival. Chapter Five showed that the paths that explain the survival of the pro-regime memorials are, on the one hand, “Walls” and, on the other hand, the “Support” path, which combines “Silence” with “Local and/or Institutional Support.”

Elimination occurs precisely when the opposite factors to those that produce survival come together. If survival is explained by the existence of “Walls”, once these “Walls” become “Windows of Opportunity”, then, the pro-regime memorial can be eliminated (see Table 6.5. below). However, authorities (e.g., mayors) are not particularly proactive on the issue of human rights (because of the political costs and the controversy), and, thus, they certainly need a drive. To this end, the “Window of Opportunity” factor combines with “Social Noise.” On the other hand, if survival is explained by “Silence (that is, there are no human rights organisations making noise to eliminate the pro-regime memorial) and the support of the local community (LIS), then, conversely, the pro-regime site is eliminated in the presence of local rejection (LIR).


<b>Table 6.5. Survival and elimination factors</b>	
<b>Explanatory factors contained in the survival paths</b>	<b>Explanatory factors contained in the elimination paths</b>
Walls	Windows of Opportunity
Silence	Social Noise
Local and/or Institutional Support	Local and/or Institutional Rejection

## CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

### Overview and Contributions

The thesis examined the combinations of conditions that explain the survival and elimination of pro-regime memorials in democratic Chile (see Figure 7.1). Chapters One and Two first explored the main memorialisation concepts (pro-regime memory sites, memory entrepreneurs, conventional and developed memory sites, pro-regime memories); it examined salvational memory and *Pinochetismo*; and it studied two main historical periods (the favourable (1973 – 2004) and unfavourable (2005 – 2020) contexts for regime supporters). This part of the thesis highlights and discusses the undoing of the memory pact or “memory bargain” (Collins & Hite, 2013b, p. 148) since 2013, and the consequences of this collapse on radicalised democratic debate.

**Figure 7.1. Summary of survival and elimination paths**



Chapter Two – The struggle for memorialisation – demonstrates that most pro-regime memorials were built during the “Favourable Period” (1973 – 2004) for regime supporters and *Pinochetistas*, while most of the denunciations and eliminations have occurred during the “Unfavourable Period” (2005 – 2020). In other words, condemnations and eliminations against pro-regime memorialisation have surged since 2005, which is consistent with regime supporters’ beginning of the “Unfavourable Period” (2005 – 2020). This shows that we should analyse survival during this latter period, as survival is less expected since 2005. Thus, the QCA sample contained conventional and developed pro-regime memorials that have survived this context (2005 – 2020) or that have been eliminated since 2005.

In Chapter Two, the thesis also analysed the legislation against pro-regime memorialisation and the discourses justifying its memorialisation. These elements provided the necessary backdrop to understand the survival of pro-regime memorialisation, which is the thesis’s primary goal.

In Chapter Three, the thesis developed a theoretical framework by presenting the key factors that help explain the survival and elimination of pro-regime memorials. In this section, a relevant contribution of the thesis is the discussion of the existence of a ‘thankful’ memory within specific communities. This ‘thankful memory’ should be distinguished from ‘salvational memory.’

The thesis then delved into describing the methodologies employed to uncover the combinations of survival and elimination factors. As shown in Chapter Four, the primary

method of the thesis is Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), constituting a novel approach to the sociology of memory.

Chapter Five contains the thesis's core results: The combinations of conditions that explain the survival of pro-regime memorialisation. Through a procedure carried out using fsQCA software (and corroborated with R), the chapter uncovered that the survival solution is  $W+S* LIS$ , containing two paths: The "Wall" path (W) and the "Support" path ( $S* LIS$ ).

In the  $W+S* LIS$  solution, what most matters for the survival of pro-regime memorialisation is either the presence of "Walls" (e.g., right-wing mayors and city councils, recalcitrant judicial actors), or the presence of active support towards the pro-regime memorial by certain actors, particularly local communities who live nearby the site. "Walls" have the power to block elimination processes. At the same time, local communities may also increase the political cost of elimination and thus force their authorities to maintain the pro-regime site.

As mentioned in Chapter Three, communities' support towards pro-regime sites located in their local areas does not necessarily respond to pro-regime sentiments or the fact they might be *Pinochetistas*. In other words, "Local Support" of pro-regime memorialisation is not necessarily equal to regime support or fascist inclinations. The explanation for such support is much more complex. It might be connected to a 'thankful memory' towards Pinochet (which is different from salvational memory), the need to preserve their sense of identity, or fears of the economic costs of removal, among others. This is one of the most relevant

contributions of the thesis. Human rights activists should critically reflect on this phenomenon to avoid alienating communities by calling them “pro-regime” immediately.

Chapter Five also highlighted the Armed Forces’ role as institutional guarantors of pro-regime memorialisation in democratic Chile. These results question the general idea in academia that the Chilean state has reached a ‘human rights paradigm’ in which the goal of installing a human rights culture within institutions has been successfully achieved, and that “the battle of memory has been won in the twenty-first century” (Bianchini, 2014, p. 3). As argued by Hite and Collins (2009, p. 397), the Chilean state and governments have shown a consistent “reluctance to take strong positions of repudiation and blame” for the survival of pro-regime memorialisation in the Armed Forces.

The second solution ( $\sim\text{SN}*\text{LIR} + \text{SN}*\text{WO}$ ) shown in Chapter Six regards the elimination of pro-regime memorialisation. On the one hand, elimination is explained by the “Rejection” of the pro-regime site by local communities (and, to a lesser degree, the rejection of state institutions). On the other, the combination between “Social Noise” (SN) and a “Window of Opportunity” (WO) also produces the elimination outcome. In the first path, it is demonstrated that when mobilised against a pro-regime memory site, local communities successfully push their authorities to eliminate the memory site. In the second path, we see how “Social Noise” can also successfully force authorities to eliminate pro-regime memorials. However, “Social Noise” is successful only in the presence of a scope condition: WO. Although centre-left or left-wing mayors, or receptive judicial actors (WO), are more

likely to *listen to* human rights and victims' "noise", they will usually still need to be pushed by civil society ("Social Noise") to act and eliminate the pro-regime site.

The two paths for elimination (~SN\*LIR and SN\*WO) highlight the relevance of civil society (local communities and human rights organisations) in eliminating pro-regime legacies. This finding is consistent with previous literature on transitional justice regarding the importance of pro-human rights actors in pushing forward justice, truth and symbolic reparations in the Southern Cone (Barahona de Brito et al., 2001; Barrientos, 2015; Crenzel, 2011; Payne et al., 2019, 2022; H. Rojas, 2017, 2022; Sikkink & Joon Kim, 2013; Sikkink & Keck, 1998).

However, these paths also highlight the importance that – in the processes of elimination of pro-regime legacies – the authorities are open to listening to communities and civil society, and are receptive to human rights issues and the demands for symbolic reparation of victims. The findings of other scholars studying the survival of pro-Francoist memorialisation in Spain support this conclusion. In her study of the elimination of Francoist street names in Madrid, Capdepón (2020, p. 120) notes that receptive authorities ("Window of Opportunity") are crucial to have these legacies eliminated: "Toponymic activism "from below" needs to meet with institutional support from above to successfully apply" the transformations in urban heritage.

While most of the literature has focused on victims' memorials, this thesis centres on pro-regime memorialisation. It has introduced a new framework to explain the survival of pro-

regime memory sites beyond the most frequent explanations of the ‘absence of legislation’ or the presence of *Pinochetismo*. The thesis has uncovered that survival is explained by the support of specific vital actors (“Walls” and local communities), while elimination is explained mostly by the pressure of civil society (human rights organisations, victims, and neighbours). These results highlight the critical role played by *agency* in contrast to more *structural* factors such as “Protective Location” and “Silence” in the case of survival, and “Unprotective Location” or “Denunciation During the Critical Years” in the case of elimination. Thus, the key to survival and elimination are actors/individuals. However, although these underrepresented factors may not be the “triggering” or “productive” factors needed for the outcome to occur (Álamos-Concha et al., 2021, p. 7; Beach, 2018, p. 93; Lambach et al., 2020, p. 106; Schneider & Wagemann, 2006, p. 760), they still offer the scope conditions in which actors will most likely succeed in their goals of helping pro-regime memorials to survive or be eliminated. Thus, we should not discard *location* and *timing* in future analyses of the survival/elimination of pro-regime memorialisation.

The thesis advances theory in transitional justice and memorialisation in several aspects. As noted before, *it highlights local communities’ role in the permanence or elimination of pro-regime legacies*. This indicates that human rights activists and victims are not the only actors at play but also local neighbours who, when organised, exert tremendous power over their local authorities. Such local mobilisation was present, for instance, in the cases of La Serena, Linares, La Pintana, Providencia, Pedro Aguirre Cerda, Quillota, Rengo, Iquique, and Renca, in which communities actively organised to reject the pro-regime legacies (monuments or street names) in their neighbourhoods, in many cases succeeding.

Another striking finding of this thesis is that, contrary to what has been set out in the literature on cultural memory (see Introduction), *the human rights culture has not touched the core of the military ethos in Chile* (C. Cruz, personal communication, 22 September 2021; S. Grez, personal communication, 24 September 2021; A. Lira, personal communication, 28 September 2021; L. M. Rendón Escobar, personal communication, 27 September 2021). Since the beginning of the 2000s, several scholars have foregrounded the Military's significant progress in distancing themselves from Pinochet, and for condemning the dictatorship (Huneus, 2014, p. 287; E. Lira et al., 2013; Stern et al., 2016, p. 298). However, recent events in which the Military and the *Carabineros* have exhibited fervent support for pro-regime memorialisation – the José Toribio Merino statue (since 2012), the commemorations to Manuel Contreras (2018 – 2020), or the naming of ACIPOL as 'General Rodolfo Stange Oelckers' (2020), among others<sup>95</sup> – reflect how they *still* care for regime symbols and how they might *still* be haunted by pro-regime/salvational memory (Collins, 2018, p. 19; Collins & Colaboradores, 2020, pp. 498–517; Hite & Morlino, 2004). This finding must encourage academics to reassess their, until now, overly optimistic view of the Military in terms of their allegedly distant symbolic link to the regime (as recently noted by Agüero, 2018; Agüero et al., 2017; Radio Universidad de Chile, 2019). These findings

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<sup>95</sup> In September 2015, army officials damaged the memorial to the disappeared in Iquique (Núñez, 2015); On 9 July 2017, in the Pledge of Allegiance (*Juramento a la Bandera*) public discourse, General Humberto Oviedo said that the context of the coup in 1973 should be considered and argued that the Military was only receiving orders. Moreover, he did not condemn human rights violations (9 July 2017) (Radio Universidad de Chile, 2017); On 14 October 2018, an unauthorised tribute to Miguel Krassnoff (human rights criminal) at the Military School took place. The tribute was leaked on social media, and Miguel Krassnoff Bassa (son) and the Military School director, Germán Villarroel Opazo, were called to retirement (Asencio, 2018; Batarce, 2018b; Cooperativa, 2018b); On 8 September 2019, a group of soldiers carried out a tribute to honour the bodyguards killed in the attack on Pinochet in 1986. The honour was leaked, and the Army announced an investigation (8 September 2019) (Díaz Montero, 2019).

question the idea that the 'human rights paradigm' has been successfully achieved in state institutions. It should also inspire politicians, state agencies, and civil society to reflect on the social/political/ethical impact of these memory sites and the remarkable capacity (and interest) specific agents display in keeping them alive: Why does this happen? How do these sites affect democracy?

This thesis is confident about the empirical findings because of the novel methodological strategy employed, particularly QCA. Moreover, I corroborated the solutions for survival and elimination through their application to external cases. Thus, the following section tests the external validity of the thesis by using the QCA solutions to understand cases of survival and elimination of pro-Francoist memorialisation in democratic Spain.

### **External Validity**

The scope of the study includes countries that have gone through repressive regimes in their recent history and in which pro-regime memory sites still survive in democracy. Thus, the findings of this thesis are transferrable to "different and independent evidence" (Bennett, 2008, p. 4) collected from other countries with similar characteristics. One such country is Spain, which experienced a military dictatorship from 1939 until 1975 under the command of General Francisco Franco. Today thousands of monuments, statues, street names, and memorial sites still honour Franco's regime, although many others have also been eliminated since the beginning of the transition to democracy in 1975.

Although Spain does have a law prohibiting the existence of pro-Francoist commemorations (Historical Memory Law, HML) (Ley de Memoria Histórica, 2007), a preliminary analysis of survival cases in this country reveals that many of these sites survive for reasons linked to the ones highlighted in this thesis. The Historical Memory Law (HML) is relatively weak as it does not generate any punishment for not abiding; it is not clear on what constitutes heritage and should be preserved; or precisely what kind of symbols should be removed. Also, considering removal is sometimes expensive and requires plenty of logistics and human resources, it is unclear how the different state institutions should cooperate towards this goal (Ranz, 2020, p. 51). Consequently, the maintenance or removal of pro-Francoist memorialisation depends much more on the mayors' political affiliation or the degree of local support residents garner towards the pro-Francoist symbol, than on the application of the HML (p. 50). As noted by a human rights activist in Spain, in the case of the Monument to Franco in Santa Cruz de Tenerife (which still survives), “the Historical Memory Law, [...] is applied or not depending on the colour of the political party that governs the place” (Antequera, 2018).

Before delving into the Spanish cases, two main differences should be noted regarding Chile's and Spain's pro-regime and pro-Francoist memorialisation. Firstly, they have different degrees regarding the quantity of these legacies. Pro-Francoist symbols in Spain are massive, going into the thousands. Franco had a much more systematic and explicit policy of leaving his 'mark' in every corner of the country in line with fascist regimes. Although it is true that “fearing reprisals from the Allies, Franco considerably watered down the use of fascist symbols after the end of the second world war” (Aguilar, 2001, p. 112), he still

maintained an active policy of heritage making which is best expressed in the construction of the Valley of the Fallen as the epitome of the fascist, nationalistic and overly catholic overtones of his regime (Hite, 2008). In Chile, in contrast, the quantity of pro-regime memorialisation is minimal, perhaps due to the somewhat less ‘totalitarian’ tone of the dictatorship. Curiously, in Chile – and contrary to what occurs in Spain – many pro-regime sites have been created in democracy, which is partly explained by the presence of a strong *Pinochetista* right-wing after the transition. Secondly, Spain’s “heritage” debate regarding pro-Francoist symbols is much more vigorous than in Chile. This is because Franco’s *heritagisation* of the regime was widespread, and because the Historical Memory Law states that pro-Francoist symbols should be eliminated *unless they have heritage value* (artistic, architectonic, historical, etc.). In Chile, in contrast, such heritagisation was not as predominant as in the Spanish case – except for the fact many streets during the dictatorship were named 11 de Septiembre – and because there is no law indicating the heritage value of pro-regime sites. Nonetheless, the two cases are still comparable as they share several characteristics (e.g., a similar type of regime and transition, and the survival of pro-regime memorialisation in democracy) that fit the scope conditions.

Recently, Spanish Francoist symbols have gained crucial relevance because of the lack of justice and reparations for the victims of Franco’s regime. When the beheaded statue of Franco was exhibited in 2016 in El Born (Barcelona) – to denounce the survival of pro-Francoist symbols in public space – it was seen by the public as an offence, as if the institution intended to honour and retrieve a symbol praising Franco (which was not, in fact, the museum’s intention). Indeed, right after the statue was unveiled, an enraged pedestrian

walked up to it and threw eggs. He could not understand how a place that pays homage to victims of the dictatorship was now “honouring” Franco. When interviewed, he said that Franco’s statue had caused him deep indignation: “I was outraged, I went down to buy half a dozen eggs, and I expressed it like this [throwing eggs]” (Martí, 2016). In analysing these events, a Barcelona government official mentioned these attacks reflect “there is an open wound, the impunity of the Franco regime persists and therefore the reactions of rejection that have occurred these days are perfectly understandable” (Blanchar, 2016). Thus, the feeling of impunity in Spain is widespread, and this lack of justice usually taints the interpretation of the survival and elimination of Francoist heritage.

In recent decades, Pro-Francoist symbols have also become relevant due to the emergence of a new generation that questions the transition’s pacts of silence and consensus, and that emphasises the search for truth, justice, and reparations for the victims (Payne & Aguilar, 2018; Ranz, 2017, p. 15). In Spain, “in the last 15 years [...], different voices have challenged” the idea that the transition allowed citizens to cure the wounds of the past, turn the page, and forget what happened (Aguilar & Ramírez-Barat, 2019, p. 213). For instance, one of the leading activists against pro-Francoist symbols and who has brought legal proceedings against the permanence of Franco’s plaques, monuments, and town names since 2015, is Eduardo Ranz, great-grandson of a victim of Franco’s repression. He has proposed to bring this issue to the fore to, once and for all, produce some reparation for victims. In 2015 and 2016, he began requesting several *ayuntamientos* (city councils) to eliminate their Francoist symbols (especially the names of towns). Many of these *ayuntamientos* refused to do so, and thus he went further down and filed legal actions. He argued that “there are two

options: either comply with the [HML] law immediately, or become an accomplice in the 1936 coup against the legality of the Second Republic” (InfoLibre, 2016).

Can this thesis’s solution for survival (W+S\*LIS) be applied to Spain? The answer is yes, and two cases – the Monument to Franco in Santa Cruz de Tenerife and Llanos *del Caudillo*<sup>96</sup> – exemplify how the “Wall” (W) and the “Support” (S\*LIS) path explain the survival of pro-Francoist memorialisation. Likewise, the solution for elimination (~SN\*LIR + SN\*WO), with its two paths, the “Rejection” path (~SN\*LIR) and the “Social Noise” path (SN\*WO), can also be applied in two other prominent eliminated cases: Guadiana *del Caudillo*<sup>97</sup>, and Franco’s tomb at the Valley of the Fallen.

The Monument to Franco is located in one of Santa Cruz de Tenerife’s main avenues (Canary Islands). It is a large structure symbolising Franco’s departure from the Canary Islands to command the uprising of the National side in 1936. Its main symbolic element is a giant angel. Thus far, the monument still survives thanks to the existence of “Walls” that have prevented its removal.

The site was denounced in August 2010, when *Alternativa Sí Se Puede por Tenerife* (political party) requested the local government to eliminate the monument.

The *ayuntamiento* (city council) refused to remove it saying it was no longer a pro-Francoist commemoration because its name had been changed that year to *Ángel Caído* (Fallen Angel) (Campello, 2010). Since then, two perspectives were born: a) the monument is Francoist and

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<sup>96</sup> Name of a town honouring Franco.

<sup>97</sup> Name of a town honouring Franco.

should be eliminated, or b) the monument is no longer Francoist and has become part of the city's cultural heritage and identity. In November 2017, human rights lawyer Eduardo Ranz requested the *ayuntamiento* to eliminate the monument. The *ayuntamiento* did not answer the request; thus, in February 2018, Ranz filed a lawsuit (J. Jiménez, 2018).


In 2019, after 26 years of centre-right government of *Coalición Canaria*, the city was now governed by PSOE with the left-wing. This created high expectations for victims and human rights organisations, which had “faith that a socialist government would finally find a solution to this monument” (Jiménez, 2019). Association Ranz Orosas considered, by then, that the monument had not been eliminated “due to a lack of political will” in the previous conservative governments (Jiménez, 2019).

In 2021, however, the newly elected centre-right government of *Coalición Canaria* and PP explicitly announced that the monument and its discussion over its elimination “will not be a priority” (Diario de Avisos, 2021a). In response, the *Historical Memory Secretariat* of the Socialist Party in the area denounced “the passive, indifferent and illegal attitude of the current Santa Cruz government team” (Diario de Avisos, 2021b), and accused the right-wing government of acting as a “Wall” preventing the monument's elimination. Although the monument was never declared an “Asset of Cultural Interest”, two reports in 2018 argued it should be maintained as it had cultural and artistic values (*Centro Internacional para la Conservación del Patrimonio* and *Academia de Bellas Artes*). Contrarily, a report delivered by Universidad de La Laguna (2019) argued the monument violated the Historical Memory Law.

In February 2022, a PP city councillor argued that the monument should be maintained as it had “no political meaning.” He added that

No resolution obliges us to demolish the monument. If tomorrow we receive a judicial or administrative resolution forcing us to demolish the fountain, we will see what should be done, but I should [first] know how much it would cost us to fix it (Canarias Ahora, 2022).

In this case, then, what explains the survival of the Monument to Franco in Santa Cruz de Tenerife is the obstinate rejection and indifferent attitude of the *ayuntamiento* (city council) – controlled by the right-wing (“Wall”) – to eliminate the pro-Francoist memorial (see Figure 7.2).




The town *Llanos del Caudillo* is another example of the survival of pro-Francoist memorialisation, though this case exemplifies the “Support” path (S\*LIS). The town – of around 750 inhabitants – was denounced in February 2016 when human rights lawyer Eduardo Ranz accused the *ayuntamiento* of not changing the town’s surname (celebrating Franco) and thus violating the Historical Memory Law. Immediately after this denunciation, several newspapers showed that the residents strongly supported the name’s survival. For instance, according to *La Tribuna*, a neighbour said, “I have been here since the 1950s, and I

want it to be what it has always been called” (Pobes, 2016). According to *El Confidencial*, in a piece titled “The most loyal town to Franco”, the neighbours “promise[d] to go out with banners and tractors” if someone tried to change the name. A neighbour said: “They can change the square’s plaque or the sign at the entrance, but for us, it will always be Llanos del Caudillo” (Brunat, 2016). Likewise, *El País* newspaper reported that “five generations later, the inhabitants of the town boast of a powerful sense of belonging, which perhaps explains their strong defence of the town’s surname” (Espinosa, 2020). Indeed, in 2004, a local referendum voted to keep the town’s “*del Caudillo*” surname. In 2007, the socialist mayor who had organised the referendum “indicated that he has been elected by his neighbours, not by the government and that; therefore, he has to defend the interests of those who overwhelmingly voted “no” to the name change” (Muñoz, 2007). In 2020, this former mayor said that the support for the town’s name was connected with how residents regarded the name change attempt “as an attack on the town’s identity” (Espinosa, 2020).

After a Court ruling favouring the maintenance of the name (May 2018), in October 2020, the PP mayor of Llanos del Caudillo informed the Senate that they would not change the town’s name (EFE, 2020). Thus, Llanos would maintain its “*del Caudillo*” surname based on community support. We should note that this local support is more likely linked to the town’s sense of identity than the presence of pro-regime sentiments. As pointed out by *El País* newspaper, local support is not linked to a pro-Francoist or right-wing inclination: “[Here] Spanish flags do not hang in the houses. In the bar, a few neighbours discuss politics. They vote for *PSOE* [centre-left] in the regional and general elections. And for 28 years, a socialist held the command [of the community]” (Espinosa, 2020, emphasis added). Thus, in this case,


the local town's support for their name is not related to pro-Francoist sentiments. In the absence of human rights organisations' intervention (S\*LIS), it was the local community's support what determined the survival outcome (see Figure 7.3).



Guadiana del Caudillo town is another illustrative example, but now for the “Rejection” path of elimination (~SN\*LIR). The village of Guadiana del Caudillo in Badajoz Province, Extremadura, was denounced on 11 February 2016 – the 143 anniversary of the First Spanish Republic – when human rights lawyer Eduardo Ranz filed a petition to the Federation of Spanish Municipalities and Provinces for Guadiana del Caudillo (among other towns) to eliminate its Francoist surname “*del Caudillo*” (Cadena Ser, 2016). Since 2007 and until 2019, a right-wing mayor of the Popular Party governed Guadiana del Caudillo. Since 2016, he did not only reject the name change but also actively defended it (Marcos, 2016). In 2012, the mayor organised a local referendum in which more than half of the residents expressed they wanted to keep the (*del Caudillo*) surname. In 2016, after Ranz’s denunciations, he protected Franco’s plaque in the *ayuntamiento* with armoured glass. In October that year, the President of the Badajoz Council announced he would withdraw financial support to Guadiana if it did not eliminate its “*del Caudillo*” surname. Still, the mayor – who was a fervent Francoist – continued to support the name. In November 2016, the Badajoz

Contentious Administrative Court ordered the mayor to change the town's name and remove any Francoist symbols. The mayor appealed the ruling, and a long judicial battle ensued. In December 2016, the Francisco Franco National Foundation (FNFF) awarded him the *Caballero de Honor* (Lord of Honour) medal for his relentless defence of Francoist memorialisation (Marcos, 2016). In the meeting at the FNFF, he said he would become a "Wall" against any changes: "As long as the one who speaks to you breathes and is a mayor, no one will erase the history of the town" (Viejo, 2019). In October 2018, local rejection emerged; neighbours created the *Guadiana Despierta* (Wake Up Guadiana) group, starting a public campaign to change the town's Francoist name. On 24 November, the group organised protests in which over 300 residents participated. One participant said: "It is a shame to live in a town that extols Francoism" (Brunat & Campo, 2018). Surprisingly, in May 2019, a PSOE candidate won the elections for mayor of Guadiana del Caudillo. He promised to immediately initiate a process to change the town's name "to restore dignity and political decency to Guadiana" (Conde, 2019). On 23 July, the city council approved eliminating Guadiana's "Caudillo" surname. Although far-right party Vox opposed the name change, on 28 January 2020, the Extremadura Council approved the change, and in December 2020, the Superior Justice Court of Extremadura ratified the measure. Once he took office, the new mayor said this was thanks to the community's rejection: "[The] name change was endorsed by the [local] people on 26 May when I won the elections" (Rua, 2019). It should be noted that human rights groups or associations did not have a prominent role here; instead, it was primarily the local community who rejected the site (~SN\*LIR). Also, the presence of a "Window of Opportunity" – with the centre-left PSOE mayor – was necessary for this local rejection to succeed (see Figure 7.4).


**Figure 7.4. Guadiana del Caudillo, Badajoz, Spain**



Finally, Franco's tomb at the Valley of the Fallen is also illustrative of an elimination path: The "Social Noise" path (SN\*WO). The presence of Franco's tomb in a prominent area inside the Valley of the Fallen (San Lorenzo del Escorial, Madrid) was denounced in 2011. That year, a group of public figures and academics – gathered in the Commission for the Application of the Historical Memory Law – suggested to the PSOE government that Franco's tomb at the Valley of the Fallen should be removed and taken to another cemetery. They argued this would help alter the site's negative symbolism as a place that celebrates Francoism. The report sparked a heated debate on the fate of Franco's remains. Although the discussions around the issue slowed down during the conservative PP government (2011 – 2018), it was re-activated with the election of a PSOE government in 2019. As *La Vanguardia* newspaper (A. Fernández, 2021) noted, "the new government of the PSOE-Podemos has proposed to recover the historical memory policies." However, this new impetus given to the Historical Memory Law was also due to human rights and victims' organisations' "Social Noise." For instance, the *Asociación para la Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica*, the *Asociación Memorialista Ranz Orosas*, the *Foro por la Memoria de la Comunidad de Madrid*, the *Foro Social de la Sierra*, and the *Plataforma contra la*

*Impunidad del Franquismo*, as well as prominent academics and experts, all demanded government action regarding Franco's tomb at the Valley of the Fallen. Responding to this "Social Noise", on 24 August 2018, the Council of Ministers of the Government approved Franco's exhumation decree. In September that year, the Congress of Deputies approved the necessary legislation. Concomitantly, as part of its institutional efforts to eliminate Francoist symbols, the Ministry of Justice sent a letter in February 2019 to 656 towns and cities demanding the elimination of their Francoist vestiges. On 30 September 2019, the fourth section of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court (N° 1279/2019, Rec 75/2019) announced its verdict authorising Franco's exhumation from the Valley of the Fallen. The Court ruling shows a certain degree of "Window of Opportunity" (WO) as it suggests the need to comply with the Historical Memory Law: "The SC [TS] considers that the exhumation does not affect religious freedom but rather abides by law 52 /2007, of 26 December [Historical Memory Law]" (Iberley, 2019). Thus, this case shows how the presence of "Social Noise" embodied by human rights activists and victims' associations, and the presence of receptive authorities (WO) – both in government and in the Judiciary – led to the removal of Franco's corpse from the Valley of the Fallen.

**Figure 7.5. Franco's tomb at the Valley of the Fallen, Madrid, Spain**



These four cases in Spain (two positives and two negatives) demonstrate that the paths uncovered in this thesis shed light on the survival and elimination of pro-Francoist memorialisation. In Spain, while survival occurs due to the presence of “Walls” and the “Support” path, elimination is explained by the “Rejection” path and the “Social Noise” path (see Figure 7.5).

### **Future Challenges**

Cultural memory and memory sites are not stable phenomena. Instead, they are a moving target and mutate considerably over time. Jelin (2017, p. 32) has asserted that “[memory processes] are open processes, not finished or finished issues.” Similarly, Erll (2011, p. 14) has argued that the “stability of memory may thus be actors’ (and scholars’) desire, but it is not necessarily the logic of memory.” Thus, this thesis’s “survival” cases may be eliminated at any time, while sites that have been eliminated can be ‘resurrected’ and re-concretised in the public space. Indeed, it is likely that some memory sites that are in the dataset as survivors will soon become ‘eliminated.’ Hence, “any simple survey of these memorial sites would soon become obsolete” (Young, 1993, p. x). The instability of these processes,

however, is not a significant limitation. Despite their mutability, today's results can be used to understand tomorrow's changes.

In addition, future research should address the overrepresentation of cases from Chile by developing QCA with cases from abroad. This will entail adapting the explanatory factors to fit the country's particular characteristics. As expected, however, the core meaning of the explanatory factors for survival (PL, S, LIS, W) and elimination (UL, SN, LIR, WO, ACY), and the final recipes offered in this thesis for survival ( $W + S * LIS$ ) and elimination ( $\sim SN * LIR + SN * WO$ ), should not change dramatically.

## **Policy Implications and Lessons**

In terms of policymaking, we can extract some significant lessons from the thesis. First, the thesis invites us to think why, if there is a Historical Memory Law in Spain, it has not been entirely successful and many pro-Francoist memory sites still survive. Ranz has argued this law is highly imprecise; it does not define deadlines, methodologies, or forms of collaboration or financing (Ranz, 2020). According to this lawyer, these aspects generate little incentives for removal (Ranz, 2017, pp. 280–281). Thus, a robust historical memory law should undoubtedly contain the following elements: It should respect the private space and allow private commemorations; it should be accompanied by memory and human rights education; it should not depend on the political party in power; it should establish a time frame for its application; it should be appropriately financed; and it should indicate what to do with the monuments that are eliminated, where must they be taken, how, who is in charge,

and how the removal is financed. Finally, it should explicitly and clearly define what is understood by the concept of “pro-regime memorialisation.”

The fact the HML does not tackle “Walls” nor address “Local and/or Institutional Support” also explains its lack of efficacy. For instance, elimination or survival is still very much dependent on the political inclination of the local authorities, who will have the ‘last say’ regarding the site’s fate. Their political will to eliminate or maintain a pro-Francoist memorial depends on these authorities’ political affiliation. This is also aggravated by the fact it is not a punitive law. Thus, right-wing mayors belonging to the PP or Vox will usually maintain these symbols. Regarding “Local Support”, the HML has not been paired with a consistent educational programme on human rights and memory. Before applying the law, the community must be educated regarding the relevance for victims to eliminate these pro-Francoist symbols. Likewise, the law must offer solutions to the community’s legitimate concerns regarding changes affecting their local identities. In some cases, the HML is viewed as an attack on the community. One of the major problems here is the straightforward application of the law with no consideration, previous analysis, or dialogue with communities on how they feel about these changes.

In this line, another lesson extracted from this thesis is that authorities should *listen* to local communities. In the past twenty years, there has been a progressive appropriation by citizens of their spaces and heritage. Cultural heritage has become a collective grassroots construction, and empowered communities increasingly reject heritage and symbols imposed by the political and economic elites (Beier-de Haan, 2006). For at least twenty years,

communities have demanded more participation in building their local heritage and identity. Thus, the rejection of pro-regime symbols is not only a rejection of the vestiges of the past but also a dismissal of the construction of public space by elites. By rejecting these monuments and street names, communities reject the dictatorship *and* a style of politics that excludes citizen participation. Regarding the construction of the Jaime Guzmán Memorial in Plaza Italia, one person claimed that they were rejecting the memorial because the city “belongs to us, and we don’t even know what is happening in it” (Villegas, 2008). Likewise, in Spain, it was argued that “we want to share a transformation of the symbolic environment that surrounds the city, and that in some way describes the citizens who live in it” (Campelo, 2010). Recognising this relationship with public space opens new possibilities to consider naming and connecting streets and heritage to more subaltern identities. Thus, women, minorities, individuals belonging to the cultural sphere, or even individuals contributing to the community could be possible candidates for renaming streets. In 2017, in the process of eliminating several pro-Francoist street names in Madrid, the historical memory commission leader said that “the commissioner considers that illustrious women, educational institutions, or cultural figures who contributed to enhancing the intangible heritage, should be honoured” (Europa Press, 2017).

However, in the same way as communities may demand the elimination of pro-Francoist or pro-regime symbols based on a new connection with heritage, this new connection can also make communities feel fond and deeply attached to these pro-regime symbols. These feelings may lead them to reject any attempts at elimination (we know that, in many cases, this is far from having to do with fascist or far-right sentiments). The point here is that

whatever communities want – to maintain or to eliminate pro-regime memorialisation – we should remember that their decisions are based on a participative and “affective” relationship with heritage (Smith, 2014).

NGOs, victims’ associations and human rights groups should also listen to the communities and critically analyse what is behind their support of pro-regime memorialisation. Far from simply being outright fascist or far-right, there are complex reasons why a community might support a pro-regime site. Human rights organisations tend to stigmatise communities as Francoists, *Pinochetistas*, or simply as ‘ignorant’ or ‘manipulated’ when they choose to defend and support a pro-regime site. However, the imposition from outside of an idea of how memory should be or what a culture of human rights should look like might alienate the community and make them even more reluctant to collaborate with reparation policies and historical memory. This is particularly true if these organisations, as noted by Aguilar (2019 [2008], p. 91), sometimes “do not seem willing to negotiate” the “contents” of public policies of memory and assume a rigid path at how to deal with the past. Human rights organisations and victims may feel the right and legitimacy to eliminate pro-regime memory sites from specific communities immediately. Still, as long as this is experienced as an imposition, and as long as they do not leave behind preconceptions, prejudices or patronising attitudes, street name changing or the removal of monuments might create animosity and resistance within the communities. Thus, it may be more fruitful to develop an open-minded and prejudice-free plan of human rights education and then allow the community to decide. An educational process is crucial before any law is imposed on the community (no matter how ‘legal’ the action is). Locals must understand *why* changing a pro-regime name or eliminating a pro-

regime site is essential. Conversely, promoters of these changes and eliminations should also understand *why* this heritage – despite being pro-regime – is relevant to the local communities.

In this sense, the thesis expands the discussion on memorialisation by showing that the defence of pro-regime legacies within communities *is not necessarily linked to pro-regime tendencies connected to salvational memory*. For instance, in Llanos del Caudillo and Alberche del Caudillo – two towns in Spain that bear the surname “*del Caudillo*” referring to Franco – the human rights lawyer carrying out the judicial actions against these towns publicly said that the maintenance of these pro-Francoist names was a “hate speech.” This was a shocking accusation for the mayors and these towns who thus deployed a defensive rather than collaborating stance in the process (Pobes, 2016).

A similar situation occurred with Villafranco F.C., the football team of Isla Mayor (Spain). The town – which in the 1940s was named Villafranco in honour of the dictator – changed its name to Isla Mayor in 2000. However, the football team somewhat inertially continued to be called “Villafranco.” A human rights lawyer accused them of “hate speech” for honouring Franco with their football team name. The perplexed team answered they had inherited the name from the town, saying that football clubs get their names from their locations (Espina, 2015). They said they felt extremely annoyed and upset after being accused of such a crime when it was never their intention. Thus, NGOs or human rights activists should avoid labelling communities as Francoist or pro-regime immediately. Instead, they should try to understand *what is behind* their support or maintenance of pro-regime memorialisation.

Such a lesson has implications for what is taking place in Chile regarding the heated debates around the drafting a new constitution. This process began in July 2021, after the Social Outbreak. Everyone opposing the draft or the constitutional process (2021 – 2022) is immediately labelled as *facho* (fascist) or *Pinochetista*, epithets that do not help conversations and debate. *Facho* (or its feminine, *facha*) is a Chilean slang defining people with pro-fascist or pro-regime feelings and political inclinations (in Spain, it would be just *facha*). By immediately calling the other as *facho* or *facha*, the conversation is blocked as it is socially forbidden to talk to someone with the stigma of having fascist political tendencies. The famous saying goes, “you do not dialogue with fascism. You fight it.” Political bullying in the form of “shut up *facho*” or “what a *facho* you are!” has become socially authorised. In contrast, the other person (not necessarily a *facho*, but simply someone who thinks differently) is left humiliated, frustrated and silenced. As a matter of fact, there may be profound reasons for rejection or disappointment in the new constitutional process that has nothing to do with loving Pinochet or having fascist tendencies—cataloguing the other as *facho* sets barricades to a democratic debate where everyone should be able to freely expose the underlying reasons that lead someone to go *against the tide*. This is not to say that Chile has no pro-fascist or pro-regime groups. Of course, there are, but there are also people who disagree with accepted narratives and do not necessarily belong to those groups (*Pinochetistas*, fascists, pro-regime, etc.). The same analysis applies to using the words *zurdo* or *comunacho* (leftist, communist) to identify left-wing individuals, which denigrates and dehumanises the political opponent and harms the essential trust needed for two people to

start a debate. This same logic, then, should be applied to the case of “Local Support” for pro-regime symbols. This support is much more complex than just being a *facho(a)*.

What is more, NGOs and human rights associations should remember that elimination processes take time. When graduality is requested, it may be because time is needed and not because communities seek excuses to halt elimination processes because they are “pro-regime.” Elimination of pro-regime memorialisation is complex, and it is not a matter of straightforwardly applying a particular law. Authorities must convince the communities, prepare the legal and juridical apparatus to defend the decision, and determine the patrimonial value of the site if applicable. All these steps take time (and money).

Notably, memory sites can have an “afterlife”; whenever they are removed, they may still exist (Marschall, 2009, p. 142). For instance, Hendrik F. Verwoerd’s statue – a pro-apartheid symbol in South Africa – was removed in 1994. Still, his widow’s house “was turned into a museum” in 2000, and the site became a pocket for the survival of pro-apartheid symbols (p. 142). In the same way as the survival of pro-regime memorials does not necessarily imply the survival of pro-regime memories, the elimination of pro-regime sites does not necessarily mean the elimination of pro-regime tendencies.

Indeed, although it has been said that elimination is “a symbolic act that implies ending an apology that lives through a sculpture” (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional, 2019, p. 34), it is likely that pro-regime sentiments will continue to exist after the site has been eliminated. Pro-regime memories may become even more robust and alienated with the presence of a

prohibitive law. As noted by Benton 2010, the elimination of memory sites can create resentment. Furthermore, elimination does not imply we are destroying a specific identity (Benton, 2010, p. 127; Fortin, 2017). Likewise, White (2020) argues that “it is far easier to topple a monument or change a name than eradicate racism or counter its long legacy.” This means that, after elimination, pro-regime sentiments can become radicalised. For instance, in Spain, the PP mayor of Guadiana del Caudillo affiliated with VOX because he felt that the reaction of the PP against the Historical Memory Law was too soft. Vox emerged, then, as an alternative giving ‘voice’ (vox means voice in Latin) to individuals who feel betrayed and attacked by victims and human rights groups’ “Social Noise” and elimination attempts. Thus, censorship is tricky. It could bolster pro-regime groups’ “revenge memory” (Aguilar 2008, p. 68) and hamper debate, which is essential in a free and healthy democracy.

It is clear that pro-regime memorialisation in the Military requires urgent debate. Unlike any other actor in society, the Armed Forces are the guarantors of the non-repetition of human rights violations (Collins & Colaboradores, 2020). Their defence of pro-regime memorialisation inevitably makes us think that the military *ethos* is still imbued with dictatorial values, which might indeed affect the quality of democracy (Barahona de Brito et al., 2001, p. 31). Every time they praise and commemorate human rights criminals (e.g., Manuel Contreras), they teach the next generations to adore the inhumane practices these individuals carried out during their regimes (Rendón, 2019a, p. 9). The autonomy they feel to commemorate whomever they want is linked to the feeling that they are “self-administered spaces and beyond all civil control” (Fuentes, 2018). In defending their pro-regime commemorations, they also communicate they continue to feel like the “fifth state power”

(Moulián, 2002, p. 54), which should not be accepted in a democracy. We should orient policies to push the Military into a genuine, comprehensive, and authentic human rights culture, not just the discursive acceptance of human rights that has been the tonic so far (Centro de DD.HH. UDP, 2021, p. 96; Sagredo, 2020, p. 45). Thus, the Armed Forces must act not only based on the legalism of ‘complying’ with human rights, but also based on ethics, empathy and an authentic sense of humanity. Indeed, Collins and Ordóñez (2021, p. 93) note that greater compassion and knowledge are needed by state institutions regarding human rights and victims. They draw attention to the “low level of knowledge that different institutions, offices and public bodies claim to have about their own state obligations in terms of human rights.” Indeed, this became a much more pressing issue after the *Estallido Social*, which showed that “the legacies of authoritarianism and impunity are still very much in force and entrenched within the command culture and daily practices of our public forces” (Collins & Colaboradores, 2020, p. 502). In the Military, these legacies are evident not only in the fact perpetrators continue to work within administrative ranks (Collins, 2018, p. 45), or the fact they have not disclosed archives regarding human rights violations (Centro de DD.HH. UDP, 2012, p. 35), but also, in the scarce application of the National Program of Human Rights for the period 2018 – 2021 (Collins & Ordóñez, 2021, p. 89). The programme ordered the “Installation of commemorative plaques in military compounds” (Subsecretaría de Derechos Humanos, Gobierno de Chile, 2018). However, cycle seven (May 2021) of the programme showed this task had “not started”, and cycle eight (December 2021) said it was “Completed, no implementation” (Centro de DD.HH. UDP, 2021, p. 89; Subsecretaría de Derechos Humanos, Gobierno de Chile, 2018).

In this line of action, it would have been interesting if the Court of Appeals that ruled in favour of eliminating Manuel Contrera's plaques and photographs from military precincts (2019) had accepted the plaintiff's request regarding what to do with the empty spaces of the commemorations. The plaintiff requested that these commemorative plaques and photographs be replaced by frames showing the Court's ruling certifying the removal of Contreras's plaques and photographs. Specifically, the plaintiff requested "to place in the same vacant space an excerpt from the final ruling [...], as a specific form of reparation, which grants a guarantee of non-repetition through a pertinent education of the Armed Forces" (Rendón, 2019b, pp. 7–8). However, the Court argued that this measure was unnecessary given that the ruling could be straightforwardly incorporated into the Army's educational programmes. It mentioned that: "The need to also incorporate an extract from this ruling is not noticed, because its socialization can be included into the educational work that the institution has to carry out" (C.A, 2019, p. 8). Such a decision reflects how pro-regime commemorations continue to be treated with utmost care and delicacy. The ruling ordered the elimination of these elements. Still, by refusing the plaintiff's symbolic request, the implicit message is "do not ask for too much" or "justice as far as possible."

## **Final Thoughts**

The maintenance of pro-regime memorials and the struggles against them tell a story about how Chilean society wants to define itself. Is this a society of continuity still linked to regime legacies but tolerant of different political viewpoints (even extreme ones) and their public manifestations? Or will we become a progressive society with new foundational values but intolerant to specific counter memories about the past? Pro-regime memorials are the perfect scenario to observe and analyse the dialectic development and tensions between these two

paradigms. The survival of pro-regime memorials until today reveals that although the latter paradigm has become predominant – something particularly evident in the recent political events in Chile, with the drafting of a new democratic constitution – dictatorship continuities are still throbbing from the shadows.

Indeed, pro-regime memorialisation puts us in a profound contradiction: They hurt but also promote debate. The survival of pro-regime memorialisation in the public space is capable of “opening dialogue, encouraging citizen participation, [...] and igniting cultural reckoning with racist, brutally violent pasts and their lived afterlives” (Murphy, 2021, p. 1049). In other words, just as victims’ memorials contribute to a “lively debate” (Whigham, 2014, pp. 98–99) and are “cathartic” (Hite, 2012, p. 3), or like perpetrators’ confessions about their crimes that spark debate, pro-regime memorialisation can also detonate “contentious coexistence” (Payne, 2008). For Payne, contentious coexistence is the presence of debates and discussions that, eventually, create the fabric of democracy. Thus, “through participation and debate, citizens exercise democratic rights. Expressing views contrary to those prevailing in society puts free speech into practice” (Payne, 2008, p. 36). For instance, during the civic discussion of Av. 11 de Septiembre in Providencia in 2013, a neighbour thanked the controversy as it allowed the community to exercise democratic debate: “Despite having differences, they are all together discussing the issue. She appreciates being able to express her opinion with total freedom” (Municipalidad de Providencia, 2013a, p. 10). Hite and Cesarini (2004, p. 330) noted that “often, in fact, the best answer to authoritarian cultural practices is not censorship but the shaping of effective democratic countercultures.” Indeed, I spoke with one of the

protesters who gathered every 11 of September outside the National Maritime Museum to condemn Merino's statue, and asked him what would happen once the figure was eliminated:

*Is there a tension in wanting them to be eliminated, but simultaneously, knowing that their existence sparks a larger fight for human rights?*

*Protester: This is unending. If it's eliminated, we'll go against the next one. This is part of a ritual for our symbolic reparation (N. Cabrera, personal communication, 21 September 2021)<sup>98</sup>.*

Thus, the unending practice of denunciation is also part of victims' symbolic reparation.

Symbolic reparation has become increasingly important over time. More than ever, young generations are progressively committed to the need for comprehensive reparations. There is a crucial generational component in this struggle for survival and elimination of pro-regime memorials: Younger generations actively participate in these processes. A young Spanish human rights lawyer said that he hoped “that this work [fighting against pro-Francoist memorialisation] will serve to generate reparation and, with it, close wounds” (Escribano, 2015). Thus, this new generation is unwilling to abide by the “memory bargain” (Collins & Hite, 2013b, p. 148) in which both memories (victims' and pro-regime), are tolerated in the public space. However, although this new generation is increasing the possibilities of transitional justice in contexts marked by deep traumatic histories, it is also becoming exceedingly intolerant and “noisy.” Too much “noise” leaves us incapable of communicating and, eventually, produces a deaf society in which aggression becomes the only way out. As noted by a Pinochet admirer and owner of a Pinochet museum inside his liquor store, whom I

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<sup>98</sup> This interview was made via phone call in 2021, and it was not recorded. The conversation was recreated based on my notes.

interviewed in 2020, it is the “young generations who insult and threaten me; those of the old school [old socialists], with them you can talk, they do not attack.”

But beyond the benefits of debate, the struggles around the permanence of pro-regime memorialisation also reveal a profound fracture in society. Indeed, the survival of pro-regime memorialisation confirms that Chile has a fragmented memory landscape. According to Vinitzky-Seroussi (2002, p. 48), this kind of memory landscape “does not enhance social solidarity. And more than representing social conflicts, it may sharpen them.” Indeed, one of the significant differences between those who advocate survival and those who want the elimination of pro-regime memorials is *where* they place this social fracture. Both visions are irreconcilable. For those who prefer to maintain these symbols, division comes *after* discussing these issues and *after* eliminating the monuments. For them, elimination generates hatred and resentment and “reopens wounds.” Instead, those who want to remove these monuments regard society as already divided, and such division is caused precisely by the existence of pro-regime memorials. To heal the division, it is necessary to eliminate these monuments, thus contributing to social peace. This explains victims’ proactiveness: The need to “fix” society, as compared to regime supporters’ reactivity, who see society as “fixed” and try to conserve it as it is. However, this political and social division exists irrespective of the presence or not of pro-regime memorialisation. All things considered, the study of pro-regime memorialisation is still required. A focus on pro-regime memorials can change or expand how we understand memory. It invites us to see that memorialisation is used in multiple ways and may survive or be eliminated depending on various factors. Thus, by

doing this research, the goal is to understand the phenomenon better and offer more material for future democratic debate.

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## APPENDIX

### Sample

General dataset of pro-regime memory sites in Chile					
				 Eliminated (1990 – 2020)  Has survived (1990 – 2020)	
#	Pro-regime memory site	Town, region	Date of creation/ inauguration	Date of denunciation	Date elimination
1	Av. 11 de Septiembre [now Av. República de Chile]	Coltauco, L. Bernardo O'Higgins Region	Regime	1992	1992
2	Av. General Francisco Franco [now Av. Violeta Parra]	La Pintana, Metropolitan Region	Regime	2010	2013
3	11 de Septiembre Street [now Aquilina Rojas Street]	Pedro Aguirre Cerda, Metropolitan Region	Regime	2012	2013
4	11 de Septiembre, Las Compañías	La Serena, Coquimbo Region	Regime	2013	n/a
5	Av. 11 de Septiembre, La Calera	La Calera, Valparaíso Region	Regime	2013 <sup>99</sup>	n/a
6	Av. 11 de Septiembre [now Av. Francisco Silva]	Quillota, Valparaíso Region	Regime	2016	2016
7	Manuel Contreras plaques and photographs	La Reina and Tejas Verdes	Regime	2018	2020
8	Lucía Hiriart de Pinochet Square [now Arturo Godoy Square]	Iquique, Tarapacá Region	Regime	2018	2018
9	Av. 11 de Septiembre [now Av. Hermanos Carrera]	Peralillo, L. Bernardo O'Higgins Region	Regime	n/a	2007
10	Llama de la Libertad	Santiago, Metropolitan Region	1975	2003	2004
11	Av. Fabriciano González Urzúa and Av. Ramón Toro Ibáñez	Macul, Metropolitan Region	1975	2017	n/a
12	Augusto Pinochet Plaque, UCN, Gimnasio Luis Bisquert	Antofagasta, Antofagasta Region	1976	2015	2016
13	Augusto Pinochet monolith	Pumanque, L. Bernardo O'Higgins Region	1977	2017	n/a
14	Escuela de Suboficiales de Carabineros Fabriciano González Urzúa	Macul, Metropolitan Region	1977	2018	n/a
15	Av. 11 de Septiembre [now Av. Nueva Providencia]	Providencia, Metropolitan Region	1980	2012	2013
16	Almirante Lorenzo Gotuzzo Street [now Amanda Labarca Street]	Santiago, Metropolitan Region	1980	2016	2016

<sup>99</sup> Although the plebiscite took place in 2015, it is highly likely the site was denounced in 2013. A source related to the city council says that the name change attempt came after seeing what happened in Av. 11 de Septiembre in Providencia (changed to Av. Nueva Providencia) (Rojas, 2015).

17	Augusto Pinochet Plaque	Teatro Municipal Antofagasta, Antofagasta Region (see picture #6, p. 386)	1981	2019	2019
18	Augusto Pinochet Villa (“La Pinocho”)	El Bosque, Metropolitan Region	1988	2018	n/a
19	Presidente Augusto Pinochet Library [now War Academy Library]	War Academy, La Reina, Metropolitan Region	1989	2013	2014
20	Av. Jaime Guzmán [now Av. José Ramírez Allende]	Rengo, L. Bernardo O’Higgins Region	Democracy	2016	2017
21	Av. Jaime Guzmán	Antofagasta, Antofagasta Region	Democracy	2018	n/a
22	Jaime Guzmán Plaque	Viña del Mar, Valparaíso Region	Democracy	2019	2019
23	Costanera Peatonal Almirante José Toribio Merino	Algarrobo, Viña del Mar	? <sup>100</sup>	2020	n/a
24	Augusto Pinochet monolith and square	Linares, Maule Region	1991	2013	n/a
25	Av. Jaime Guzmán [now Av. Dorsal]	Renca, Metropolitan Region	1993	2020	2020
26	José Toribio Merino auditorium	Former Naval War Academy, Valparaíso Region	1993	2013	n/a
27	Buque Madre de Submarinos BMS-42 Almirante Merino	Valparaíso, Valparaíso Region	1997	2013	2015
28	Commander-in-chief of the Army C. G. Augusto Pinochet U. Medal	n/a	1997	2006	2014
29	Augusto Pinochet Plaque at Walmart (former D&S)	Quilicura, Metropolitan Region	1999	2011	2010
30	Augusto Pinochet Monument	La Junta, Coyhaique, Aysén Region	2000	2000	n/a
31	José Toribio Merino exhibition	Naval Museum, Valparaíso Region	2000	2013	n/a
32	José Toribio Merino statue, National Maritime Museum	Valparaíso, Valparaíso Region	2002	2013	n/a
33	Lili Marleen Restaurant	Ñuñoa, Metropolitan Region	2003	2019	2019
34	Jaime Guzmán Memorial	Las Condes, Metropolitan Region	2008	n/a	n/a
35	Presidente Augusto Pinochet Museum	Vitacura, Metropolitan Region	2008	n/a	2017
36	Jaime Guzmán bust	Los Ángeles, Biobío Region	2016	n/a	2019

<sup>100</sup> The name was most likely placed after the death of José Toribio Merino in 1996.

## Selection Parameters for the QCA Sample

Selection parameters for the QCA sample	
Total number of cases	17
Time frame	Denounced between 2005 and 2020 (“Unfavourable Period” for regime supporters)
Number of positive cases (survival)	6
Number of control cases (eliminated)	11
Criteria for included cases	<p><b>Pro-regime memorials presenting the following characteristics are included in the QCA analysis:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Streets and monuments (conventional memory sites)</li> <li>• Denounced during the “Unfavourable Period” (2005 – 2020)</li> <li>• The decision on whether the site survives or is eliminated falls to an authority</li> </ul>
Criteria for not included cases	<p><b>Pro-regime memorials presenting at least one of these characteristics were not included:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unconventional memory site</li> <li>• Denounced in the “Favourable Period” (1973 – 2004)</li> <li>• Sites that were toppled or destroyed by protesters</li> <li>• Development of the case was interrupted by the Social Outbreak and/or by the Covid-19 pandemic</li> <li>• Cases that were planned but not developed (undeveloped memory sites)</li> </ul>
Source: Author’s original dataset of pro-regime memorialisation in democratic Chile (1990 – 2020).	

## Fieldwork

### **Augusto Pinochet Monument and Square, Linares/Memorial to the Disappeared Detainees and Politically Executed Prisoners of Linares**

- Fieldwork dates: September 2019 and September 2021.
- Location: Av. Presidente Ibáñez, Linares, Maule Region/*Plaza de Armas* de Linares, Linares, Maule Region.
- Activities: Observations, field notes, pictures, and semi-structured anonymous interviews with attendees.
- Relevance: I observed a pro-regime memorial and a pro-regime ceremony for the military coup. I gained a deeper insight into pro-regime motivations and conditions for survival and collected contact details for future interviews/The victims' memorial occupies a privileged public space in the city (*Plaza de Armas* of Linares). At the same time, the Pinochet memory site is located in a more peripheral area. The 11<sup>th</sup> of September commemorations in Linares are quite tense as both ceremonies (victims' and pro-regime) occur on the same day and almost at the same time (afternoon).
- Anonymous semi-structured interviews: (Anonymous Key Informant #1, Linares, personal communication, 11 September 2019; Anonymous Key Informant #2, Linares, personal communication, 11 September 2019; Anonymous Key Informant #3, Linares, personal communication, 11 September 2019; Anonymous Key Informant #38, Linares, personal communication, 11 September 2021)
- Fieldnotes: (Thesis fieldwork notes #1, 2019; Thesis fieldwork notes #2, 2019; Thesis fieldwork notes #18, 2021)

### **Social demonstrations in Plaza Italia in the context of the Social Outbreak:**

- Fieldwork date: October 2019 – March 2020.
- Location: Plaza Italia, Providencia/Santiago, Metropolitan Region.
- Activities: Participant observation, fieldnotes, pictures, and semi-structured anonymous interviews with attendees.
- Relevance: These historic demonstrations allowed me to gain a profound perspective on the generalised rejection by society, especially by middle-low class youth, of pro-regime symbols.
- Fieldnotes: (Thesis fieldwork notes #25, 2019; Thesis fieldwork notes #26, 2019; Thesis fieldwork notes #27, 2019; Thesis fieldwork notes #28, 2020; Thesis fieldwork notes #29, 2020, 2020; Thesis fieldwork notes #30, 2020; Thesis fieldwork notes #31, 2020; Thesis fieldwork notes #32, 2020; Thesis fieldwork notes #33, 2020; Thesis fieldwork notes #34, 2020; Thesis fieldwork notes #35, 2020; Thesis fieldwork notes #36, 2020; Thesis fieldwork notes #37, 2020, 2021, 2021; Thesis fieldwork notes #38, 2020; Thesis fieldwork notes #39, 2021; Thesis fieldwork notes #41, 2019)

### **Social demonstrations against the Social Outbreak and the drafting of a new Constitution (*Rechazo*):**

- Fieldwork date: December 2019 – March 2020.
- Location: El Golf and Escuela Militar neighbourhoods, Las Condes, Metropolitan Region.

- **Activities:** Observations, field notes, pictures, and semi-structured anonymous interviews with attendees.
- **Relevance:** These demonstrations signalled the first time the right-wing publicly rallied for a cause since Pinochet's detention in 1998. Although the context had turned very unfavourable, regime supporters had gained enough courage to defend their most revered symbols publicly (e.g., Pinochet's 1980 Constitution) and values such as order and stability.
- **Fieldnotes:** (Thesis fieldwork notes #19, 2020, 2020; Thesis fieldwork notes #20, 2020; Thesis fieldwork notes #21, 2020, 2020; Thesis fieldwork notes #22, 2020; Thesis fieldwork notes #23, 2020, 2020; Thesis fieldwork notes #24, 2020)

**Almirante Lorenzo Gotuzzo Street [now Amanda Labarca Street]:**

- **Fieldwork date:** March 2021.
- **Location:** In Santiago's Civic Neighbourhood, Santiago, Metropolitan Region.
- **Activities:** Observations, field notes, pictures, and semi-structured anonymous interviews with passers-by.
- **Relevance:** I observed the significance of the site's location, right next to the La Moneda Presidential Palace ("Unprotective Location"). I also talked with people who witnessed the street's inauguration.
- **Anonymous semi-structured interviews:** (Anonymous Key Informant #5, Santiago, personal communication, 4 March 2021)
- **Fieldnotes:** (Thesis fieldwork notes #3, 2021)

**Av. 11 de Septiembre [now Av. Nueva Providencia]:**

- **Fieldwork date:** March 2021.
- **Location:** Providencia, Metropolitan Region.
- **Activities:** Observations, field notes, pictures, and semi-structured anonymous interviews with passers-by and owners of *kiosks* (vendor stands).
- **Relevance:** It was evident that the name change had affected the vendors in the area ("Local Support"). An interviewee who worked in the area said that, although he was in favour of the change, he knew it had affected some people, as they had to change their receipts, and there was a lot of bureaucracy involved. S/He knew that until today (2021), some shop owners still had some problems in this regard (Anonymous Key Informant #21, Providencia, personal communication, 18 March 2021)
- **Anonymous semi-structured interviews:** (Anonymous Key Informant #20, Providencia, personal communication, 18 March 2021; Anonymous Key Informant #21, Providencia, personal communication, 18 March 2021; Anonymous Key Informant #22, Providencia, personal communication, 18 March 2021; Anonymous Key Informant #23, Providencia, personal communication, 18 March 2021)
- **Fieldnotes:** (Thesis fieldwork notes #12, 2021)

**Villa Augusto Pinochet ("La Pinocho"), El Bosque, Metropolitan Region:**

- **Fieldwork date:** March 2021.
- **Location:** El Bosque, Metropolitan Region.

- Activities: Observations, field notes, pictures, and semi-structured anonymous interviews with passers-by and residents.
- Relevance: There is evidence of a profound identity connection with the name (“Local Support”). Several interviewees in the Villa said that they have always called it “La Pinocho” and *will always be* the “La Pinocho” Villa, despite any change. They also noted that the Villa does not have a negative connotation for them or other people nearby.
- Anonymous semi-structured interviews: (Anonymous Key Informant #10, El Bosque, personal communication, 16 March 2021; Anonymous Key Informant #11, El Bosque, personal communication, 16 March 2021a, personal communication, 16 March 2021b; Anonymous Key Informant #13, El Bosque, personal communication, 16 March 2021)
- Fieldnotes: (Thesis fieldwork notes #10, 2021)

### **11 de Septiembre Street [now Aquilina Rojas Street]:**

- Fieldwork date: March 2021.
- Location: Pedro Aguirre Cerda, Metropolitan Region.
- Activities: Observations, field notes, pictures, and semi-structured anonymous interviews with passers-by and residents.
- Relevance: I had the opportunity to speak to some street residents. They reflected on the importance of changing the street’s name (“Local Rejection”).
- Anonymous semi-structured interviews: (Anonymous Key Informant #6, Pedro Aguirre Cerda, personal communication, 16 March 2021; Anonymous Key Informant #7, Pedro Aguirre Cerda, personal communication, 16 March 2021; Anonymous Key Informant #8, Pedro Aguirre Cerda, personal communication, 16 March 2021; Anonymous Key Informant #9, Pedro Aguirre Cerda, personal communication, 16 March 2021)
- Fieldnotes: (Thesis fieldwork notes #9, 2021)

### **Av. Jaime Guzmán [now Av. Dorsal]:**

- Fieldwork date: March 2021.
- Location: Renca, Metropolitan Region.
- Activities: Observations, field notes, pictures, and semi-structured anonymous interviews with passers-by.
- Relevance: I spoke directly with people involved in the process. I also corroborated that the name change was impossible before due to the right-wing administration (“Wall”).
- Anonymous semi-structured interviews: (Anonymous Key Informant #14, Renca, personal communication, 17 March 2021; Anonymous Key Informant #15, Renca, personal communication, 17 March 2021; Anonymous Key Informant #16, Renca, personal communication, 17 March 2020; Anonymous Key Informant #17, Renca, personal communication, 17 March 2021; Anonymous Key Informant #18, Renca, personal communication, 17 March 2021)
- Fieldnotes: (Thesis fieldwork notes #11, 2021)

### **Av. General Francisco Franco [now Av. Violeta Parra]:**

- Fieldwork date: March 2021.
- Location: La Pintana, Metropolitan Region.

- **Activities:** Observations, field notes, pictures, and semi-structured anonymous interviews with passers-by and residents.
- **Relevance:** I had the opportunity to meet one of the social movement leaders who organised to change the street's name to Violeta Parra. She told me that from 2010 until 2013, the process was plagued with obstacles, obstructions, bureaucracy, postponements, and difficulties. According to her, the centre-left authorities did not have the political will to change the name, and they had to fight on their own, with great impetus and perseverance (Anonymous Key Informant #24, La Pintana, personal communication, 23 March 2021). This reflects how the fact there is a "Window of Opportunity" does not necessarily mean the authorities are going to be proactive and change the street's name (or remove the monument) unless they see strong local pressure.
- **Anonymous semi-structured interviews:** (Anonymous Key Informant #24, La Pintana, personal communication, 23 March 2021; Anonymous Key Informant #25, La Pintana, personal communication, 23 March 2021)
- **Fieldnotes:** (Thesis fieldwork notes #13, 2021)

#### **Jaime Guzmán Memorial:**

- **Fieldwork dates:** February 2020 and March 2021.
- **Location:** Las Condes, Metropolitan Region.
- **Activities:** Observations, fieldnotes, pictures.
- **Relevance:** I verified that the memorial was still significantly deteriorated since the Social Outbreak due to vandalism. It was clear that Jaime Guzmán was no longer tolerated in public space, not even in upper-class areas linked to the right.
- **Fieldnotes:** (Thesis fieldwork notes #4, 2019; Thesis fieldwork notes #5, 2020; Thesis fieldwork notes #6, 2020; Thesis fieldwork notes #8, 2021)

#### **Av. Fabriciano González Urzúa and Av. Ramón Toro Ibáñez:**

- **Fieldwork date:** March 2021.
- **Location:** Macul, Metropolitan Region.
- **Activities:** Observations, field notes, pictures, and semi-structured anonymous interviews with residents.
- **Relevance:** I noticed that some signs on these streets had been modified during the Social Outbreak to express rejection of the dictatorship legacies. However, residents did not seem very concerned or interested in these streets' names.
- **Anonymous semi-structured interviews:** (Anonymous Key Informant #26, Macul, personal communication, 23 March 2021; Anonymous Key Informant #27, personal communication, 23 March 2021; Anonymous Key Informant #28, Macul, personal communication, 23 March 2021; Anonymous Key Informant #29, Macul, personal communication, 23 March 2021)
- **Fieldnotes:** (Thesis fieldwork notes #14, 2021)

#### **Av. Jaime Guzmán and Pinochet Plaque at the Teatro Municipal Antofagasta:**

- **Fieldwork date:** August 2021.
- **Location:** Antofagasta, Antofagasta Region.

- Activities: Observations, field notes, pictures, and semi-structured anonymous interviews with key informants.
- Relevance: I had the opportunity to visit both sites. In the case of the Augusto Pinochet Plaque, I learned that the plaque was denounced in 2019 in the context of the Social Outbreak by a newspaper that criticised this plaque's presence and location. The theatre removed the plaque pre-emptively to avoid the destruction of the whole site by angry mobs outraged by the presence of regime symbols.
- Fieldnotes: (Thesis Fieldwork Notes #42, 2021).

#### **Statue and exhibition of José Toribio Merino:**

- Fieldwork date: August 2021.
- Location: National Maritime Museum, Valparaíso, Metropolitan Region.
- Activities: Observations, field notes, pictures, and semi-structured anonymous interviews with passers-by and participants in the monthly *funa*.
- Relevance: I had the opportunity to visit the Museum, observe José Toribio Merino's statue, and attend a *funa* outside the Museum carried out by victims of the dictatorship. I spoke with those who carried out the *funa*. They believe the main reason for the statue's survival is the Navy's protection and defence actions.
- Anonymous semi-structured interviews: (Anonymous Key Informant #30 - Valparaíso, personal communication, 11 August 2021; Anonymous Key Informant #31, Valparaíso, personal communication, 11 August 2021; Anonymous Key Informant #32, personal communication, 10 December 2021)
- Fieldnotes: (Thesis fieldwork notes #15, 2021; Thesis fieldwork notes #16, 2021)

#### **Av. 11 de Septiembre, La Calera:**

- Fieldwork date: August 2021.
- Location: La Calera, Valparaíso Region.
- Activities: Observations, field notes, pictures, and semi-structured anonymous interviews with residents and municipal officers.
- Relevance: I spoke with a municipal officer who told me this initiative never went through the city council since it came from the Communal Development Directorate. They carried out the referendum in 2015.
- Anonymous semi-structured interviews: (Anonymous Key Informant #32, personal communication, 10 December 2021)
- Fieldnotes: (Thesis fieldwork notes #17, 2021)

#### **Rallies supporting an ultra-conservative candidate for the Chilean Presidency (José Antonio Kast):**

- Fieldwork date: November 2021 – December 2021.
- Location: Av. Presidente Errázuriz (Las Condes, Metropolitan Region) and Parque Araucano (Las Condes, Metropolitan Region).
- Activities: Observations, field notes, pictures, and semi-structured anonymous interviews with attendees.
- Relevance: The far-right candidate won the first presidential round in November 2021, an astonishing result that raised the rights' spirits, especially the most *Pinochetistas*. I

attended these demonstrations to observe their performances and symbols, such as 'El Ángel de la Libertad' or images of Pinochet and Lucía Hiriart (she died in the middle of the campaign).

- Fieldnotes: (Fieldwork Notes #43, 2021a, 2021b; Fieldwork Notes #45, 2021).

## Fieldwork Pictures



**Picture #1:** Av. General Francisco Franco [now Av. Violeta Parra], La Pintana, Metropolitan Region. Author's source, 2021.



**Picture #2:** 11 de Septiembre Street [now Aquilina Rojas Street], Pedro Aguirre Cerda, Metropolitan Region. Author's source, 2021.



**Picture #3:** Av. 11 de Septiembre, La Calera, Valparaíso Region. Author's source, 2021.



**Picture #4:** Av. 11 de Septiembre [now Av. Nueva Providencia], Providencia, Metropolitan Region. Author's source, 2021.



**Picture #5:** Almirante Lorenzo Gotuzzo Street [now Amanda Labarca], Santiago, Metropolitan Region. Author's source, 2021.



**Picture #6:** Place where the Augusto Pinochet Plaque was located, Teatro Municipal Antofagasta, Antofagasta, Antofagasta Region. Author's source, 2021.



**Picture #7:** Augusto Pinochet Villa ("La Pinocho"), El Bosque, Metropolitan Region. Author's source, 2021.



**Picture #8:** Av. Jaime Guzmán [now Av. Dorsal], Renca, Metropolitan Region.  
Author's source, 2021.



**Picture #9:** Augusto Pinochet monolith and square, Linares, Maule Region.  
Author's source, 2021.



**Picture #10:** José Toribio Merino statue, National Maritime Museum, Valparaíso, Valparaíso Region. Author's source, 2021.



**Picture #11:** Jaime Guzmán Memorial, Las Condes, Metropolitan Region. Author's source, 2021.



**Picture #12:** 'Plaza Dignidad' or 'Plaza Baquedano', Providencia, Metropolitan Region. Author's source, 2021.



**Picture #13:** 11 September commemoration in 2020 by regime supporters, Escuela Militar, Las Condes, Metropolitan Region. Author's source, 2020.



**Picture #14:** Regime supporter in a *Rechazo* demonstration, El Golf, Las Condes, Metropolitan Region. Author's source, 2020.



**Picture #15:** *Funa* against the statue of José Toribio Merino outside the National Maritime Museum, Valparaíso, Valparaíso Region, Author's source, 2021.

## Expert Interviews

- **Ishkra Calderón**, city councillor in Renca (Metropolitan Region). Interviewed on 22 September 2021 [Av. Jaime Guzmán, now Av. Dorsal]. (I. Calderón, personal communication, 22 September 2021)
- **Juan Carlos Arellano**, author. Interviewed on 22 September 2021 [Costanera Peatonal Almirante José Toribio Merino in Algarrobo]. (J. C. Arellano, personal communication, 22 September 2021)
- **Nelson Cabrera**, leader of Cine Forum Valparaíso. Interviewed on 21 September 2021 [José Toribio Merino statue in Valparaíso]. (N. Cabrera, personal communication, 21 September 2021)
- **Cristián Cruz**, human rights lawyer. Interviewed on 22 September 2021 [Plaques and photographs of Manuel Contreras]. (C. Cruz, personal communication, 22 September 2021)
- **Professor Sergio Grez**, historian and member of *Ciudadanos por la Memoria*. Interviewed on 24 September 2021 [various cases]. (S. Grez, personal communication, 24 September 2021)
- **Professor Cath Collins**, Transitional Justice scholar. Interviewed on 27 September 2021 [various cases]. (C. Collins, personal communication, 27 September 2021)
- **Francisco Bustos**, human rights lawyer. Interviewed on 27 September 2021 [various cases]. (F. Bustos, personal communication, 27 September 2021)
- **Luis Mariano Rendón**, human rights lawyer. Interviewed on 27 September 2021 [José Toribio Merino statue in Valparaíso and plaques and photographs of Manuel Contreras]. (L. M. Rendón Escobar, personal communication, 27 September 2021)
- **Alicia Lira**, leader of the Association of Relatives of Executed Prisoners in the Dictatorship (AFEP). Interviewed on 28 September 2021. (A. Lira, personal communication, 28 September 2021)
- **Eloy Alegría**, teacher and leader of the movement against the Augusto Pinochet Monument and Square in Linares in 2013 – 2017. Interviewed on 28 September 2021 [Augusto Pinochet Monument and Square, Linares, Maule Region]. (C. E. Alegría, personal communication, 28 September 2021)
- **Francisco Estévez**, director of the Museum of Memory and Human Rights. Interviewed on 6 October 2021 [Av. 11 de Septiembre, now Av. Nueva Providencia, Providencia, Metropolitan Region]. (F. Estévez, personal communication, 6 September 2021)
- **Joaquín Medel**, owner of a Pinochet-themed liquor store in Santiago. Interviewed on 27 February 2020. (J. Medel, personal communication, 2020, personal communication, 28 February 2020)

**Right-wing as “Walls” for the Survival of Pro-regime Memorialisation**

<b>Right-wing as “Walls” in pro-regime memorialisation</b>		
<b>Pro-regime memory site</b>	<b>Description</b>	
Survived	Augusto Pinochet monolith and square, Linares	Since taking office in 2016, the RN mayor of Linares has refused countless times to remove the monument and the plaza in honour of Augusto Pinochet (C. E. Alegría, personal communication, 28 September 2021; Canal 5 Linares, 2020; Casas, 2017; El Amaule, 2017; El Desconcierto, 2017; MQL TV, 2019; Prensa Ruil, 2017; Radio Buena Nueva, 2018).
	Augusto Pinochet monolith, Pumanque	RN mayor between 2016 and 2021 said that he would not remove the Pinochet Monument in his district if the community did not ask him to do so (Massai, 2017; Piensa Chile, 2013).
	Av. Jaime Guzmán in Antofagasta	Between 2012 and 2020, Antofagasta’s mayor was linked to the right-wing party UDI and showed herself predisposed to help and protect other Guzmán memorials in the area (Castro, 2018; Soy Chile, 2019). In 2018, UDI leaders defended the avenue’s name. That same year, Congress rejected the motion to eliminate Guzmán’s commemorations with 67 votes against and 32 in favour (there were 15 abstentions). All UDI Deputies opposed the project (Hoffmann et al., 2018).
Eliminated	Av. 11 de Septiembre [Av. Nueva Providencia]	Between 1996 and 2012, UDI mayor and former collaborator of Pinochet’s dictatorship rejected any name change to Av. 11 de Septiembre (Desmonumentar el Golpe, 2012; La Segunda, 2012; NGO Desmonumentar el Golpe, 2013). On 25 June 2013, Providencia’s right-wing councillors - (two RN, one UDI and one Independent linked to the right) - decided to boycott the change of name and did not attend the city council meeting that was going to approve the street’s new name. The meeting was postponed. The mayor said, “I believe the council members are defending the maintenance of the name 11 de Septiembre” (CNN Chile, 2013a).
	Lorenzo Gotuzzo Street [Amanda Labarca Street]	In changing the street’s name to Teacher Amanda Labarca, the right-wing city councillors (UDI and RN) rejected the project and declared that it meant “erasing history”(Adriasola, 2016; El Mostrador, 2016b; La Tercera, 2016; Mediabanco, 2016; Municipalidad de Santiago, 2016b; Radio Universidad de Chile, 2016).
	Lucía Hiriart Square [Arturo Godoy Square]	In the city council vote to change the name of Lucía Hiriart Square to Arturo Godoy, the two right-wing city councillors (from UDI and RN) voted against the idea (Municipalidad de Iquique, 2018b).
	Av. Jaime Guzmán [Av. Dorsal]	The former mayor between 1989 and 1992, who named the Avenue Jaime Guzmán, reacted angrily to the name change and sent a public letter to the centre-left mayor accusing him of having run over the memory and dignity of Jaime Guzmán (Baraona González, 2020).

## Coding Rules for the Explanatory Factors

Coding rules for survival factors		
EF	Description	Coding rules
Protective Location (PL)	Pro-regime sites in protective locations will most likely survive as these areas <b>do not generate significant public attention and/or benefit from (generally pro-regime) protection</b>	<p>The case gets “1” in this factor when:</p> <p>It does not generate significant public attention:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Wealthy areas</li> <li>Private, isolated, and/or peripheral areas</li> <li>In the countryside or in small-sized cities (outside the most prominent cities)</li> <li>Non-prominent street/object</li> <li>Benefits from (generally pro-regime) protection</li> <li>In or close to military precincts belonging to the Armed Forces or Police</li> </ul> <p><i>Thanatosis</i>: The monument “disappears” throughout most of the year, and it is “revived” only in the context of commemorations by regime supporters</p>
Silence (S)	Pro-regime sites are “silent” when <b>no relevant external agents</b> (e.g., NGOs, human rights associations, prominent public figures) pressure authorities to eliminate the memory site. The case is <i>not</i> noticed beyond the immediate community.	<p>The case gets “1” in this factor when:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No external victims’, NGOs, or human rights organisations actively intervene against the site</li> <li>No high-profile external agents actively intervene in the case and promote its elimination</li> </ul>
Local and/or Institutional Support (LIS)	Pro-regime memory sites <b>actively supported and protected by their local communities (neighbours) and/or by state institutions</b> are more likely to survive. This support may obstruct or slow down elimination processes and enhance the site’s capacity to survive	<p>The case gets “1” in this factor when:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A section of the local community actively supports the site’s survival, for instance: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>They organise polls demonstrating the community supports the site (or vehemently rejects the erasure/changing of the site)</li> <li>In a plebiscite vote, the majority of the community votes in favour of the site’s survival</li> <li>The majority of the neighbourhood council (e.g., COSOC) votes in favour of the site’s survival</li> <li>Neighbours actively take care of the site (commemorative vigilance)</li> </ul> </li> <li>State agencies actively support the site’s survival. Their level of authority is “medium” as their decisions could be appealed or overturned, and they cannot guarantee the site’s survival. These “medium level” authorities might grant “Institutional Support” by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Providing legal support</li> <li>Providing physical and institutional protection</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>Local political parties support the site’s survival</p>

Wall (W)	A “Wall” (W) is a higher-level authority that can guarantee the site’s elimination or survival and is <b>less inclined to support human rights issues.</b>	The case gets “1” in this factor when: During the development of the case, the city council has a centre-right or right-wing majority In the context of a judicial process, the Court is <i>not</i> favourable to victims’ integral reparations During the development of the case, the owner or authority in charge of the site is unreceptive to human rights issues (e.g., pro-regime)
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Coding rules for elimination factors		
EF	Description	Coding rules
Unprotective Location (UL)	Pro-regime sites in unprotective locations will most likely be eliminated as these areas <b>generate significant public attention and/or lack (generally pro-regime) protection.</b>	The case gets “1” in this factor when: It generates significant public attention: Located in a prominent/touristic general area It is an avenue in a large city It is located in an area strongly associated with victims of the dictatorship
Social Noise (SN)	Pro-regime sites that are “noisy” will most likely be eliminated. <b>External agents</b> (e.g., NGOs, human rights associations, prominent public figures) pressure authorities and generate “noise” beyond the site’s local boundaries, demanding its elimination. The case is noticed beyond the community.	The case gets “1” in this factor when: External political parties, NGOs, or human rights or victims’ organisations intervene against the case High-profile politicians (e.g., Former mayors, Deputies, Senators) or public figures individually intervene in the case High-profile newspapers release reports regarding the pro-regime memory site. There is widespread media coverage of the case.
Local and/or Institutional Rejection (LIR)	Pro-regime memory sites <b>actively rejected by their local communities (neighbours) and/or by state institutions</b> are more likely to be eliminated. This rejection may facilitate elimination processes and block the site’s survival capacity.	The case gets “1” in this factor when: A section of the local community actively rejects the site, for instance: They organise polls demonstrating the community rejects the site In a plebiscite vote, the majority of the community rejects the site The majority of the neighbourhood council (e.g., COSOC) rejects the site <sup>101</sup> State agencies actively reject the site. Their level of authority is “medium” as their decisions could be appealed or overturned, and/or they cannot guarantee the site’s elimination (e.g., Congress Resolutions, National Institute of Human Rights, State Defence Council, etc.). These “medium level” authorities might grant “Institutional Rejection” by: Providing legal arguments against the site

<sup>101</sup> Although vandalism and destruction of the memory site may be considered as part of a local rejection effort, it is not included as an indicator of “Local Rejection.” This factor refers to formal actions in the context of negotiations with authorities.

<p>Window of Opportunity (WO)</p>	<p>A “Window of Opportunity” (WO) is a higher-level authority that can guarantee the site’s elimination or survival and is <b>inclined to support human rights issues</b>.</p>	<p>The case gets “1” in this factor when:                  During the development of the case, the city council has a centre-left or left-wing majority                  In the context of a judicial process, the Court is favourable to victims’ “integral reparations”                  During the development of the case, the owner or authority in charge of the site is receptive to human rights issues</p>
<p>Denunciation During the critical years (DCY)</p>	<p>The denunciation of the site is more likely to lead to elimination during the “Critical Years”, that is, in or after 2013. This year marks the beginning of a critically unfavourable period for pro-regime commemorations. This period also experienced the elimination of the emblematic case of Av. 11 de Septiembre in Providencia (2013), the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the military coup, and the Social Outbreak in 2019.</p>	<p>The case gets “1” in this factor when denounced in or after 2013 (2013 – 2020).</p>

## Enhancing Validity

### *Analysis of Presence/Absence of Explanatory Factors*

#### Survival Cases

#### José Toribio Merino statue, National Maritime Museum

	EF	1/0	Justification
Conditions for survival	PL	1	The statue presents a “Protective Location”: It is inside the National Maritime Museum in Valparaíso, an area that belongs to the Navy (it benefits from military protection).
	S	0	The case does not present “Silence” (contrarily, it presents “Social Noise”, see below).
	LIS	1	The case presents “Local and/or Institutional Support”: Since its denunciation in 2013, the statue has received clear institutional support from the Navy, the SDC, the CGR, and the Defence Ministry.
	W	1	The case presents a “Wall”: The Courts have continuously ruled against victims’ demands. On 28 November 2019, the Court of Appeals determined victims (who had joined the process on 24 September 2019) could not be part of the original protections appeal. On 5 December 2019, the Court rejected the victims’ reconsideration request. On 22 January 2020, Santiago’s 8 <sup>th</sup> Court of Appeals denied the protection appeal. It argued the statute was legal and said the Court did not have the power to intervene in military matters. On 19 February 2020, the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Chamber of the Supreme Court maintained the original ruling.
Conditions for elimination	UL	0	The case does not present an “Unprotective Location” (contrarily, it has a “Protective Location”, see above).
	SN	1	The case is “noisy”: Since 2013, various external actors have intervened to push forward the elimination demand. The first <i>funas</i> was on 11 September 2013, and they continue until today. Several anti-regime actors have joined the <i>funas</i> : Former Navy personnel, lawyers, academics, other victims’ and human rights associations, and left-wing political parties. The organisation <i>Ciudadanos por la Memoria</i> also got involved in the struggle against the statue. By the beginning of 2014, they organised a campaign to gather signatures on <i>avaaz.org</i> and sent letters to the President of the Republic.
	LIR	1	The case presents “Local Rejection”: The local cultural organisation “Cine Forum Valparaíso” began the struggle against the statue in 2013.
	WO	0	At least between 2013 and 2020, the case does not present a “Window of Opportunity” (contrarily, it presents a “Wall”, see above).
	DCY	1	The case presents the “Denunciation During the Critical Years” factor: The statue was denounced in the critical year of 2013. Here, the elimination of Av. 11 de Septiembre in Providencia encouraged anti-regime memory agents.

#### 11 de Septiembre Street, Las Compañías

	EF	1/0	Justification
Conditions for survival	PL	1	The street presents a “Protective Location”: It is located in a peripheral residential area (Las Compañías) in La Serena (Coquimbo Region).
	S	1	The case presents “Silence”: No relevant external agents pressured authorities to eliminate the memory site.
	LIS	1	The case presents “Local Support”: Neighbours actively supported and protected the pro-regime name. On 5 April 2014, they met with two councillors and expressed their frustration and annoyance regarding the name change. They did not want changes in their neighbourhood and disliked the idea of more bureaucracy. Voting took place in the meeting, in which 39 out of 40 supported maintaining the name. The neighbours then delivered a letter with signatures to La Serena city council demanding to keep the 11 de Septiembre name.

	W	0	The case does not present a “Wall” (contrarily, it presents a “Window of Opportunity”, see below).
Conditions for elimination	UL	0	The street does not present the “Unprotective Location” factor (contrarily, it has a “Protective Location”, see above).
	SN	0	The case is not “noisy” (contrarily, it presents “Silence”, see above).
	LIR	0	The case does not present “Local and/or Institutional Rejection”: there was no group within the community mobilising against the street’s name, and no state institution intervened against it.
	WO	1	The case presents a “Window of Opportunity”: While the case unfolded, the city council of La Serena was governed by a centre-left majority (2012 – 2016).
	DCY	1	The case presents the “Denunciation During the Critical Years” factor: The street’s name was denounced in 2013. On 5 September 2013, a centre-left councillor proposed to the city council to change the name of 11 de Septiembre street. The councillor argued that the change was necessary for the context of the 40 <sup>th</sup> anniversary of the military coup. The idea was approved unanimously (Municipal Agreement N° 9).

## Av. 11 de Septiembre, La Calera

	EF	1/0	Justification
Conditions for survival	PL	1	The street presents a “Protective Location”: It is located in a small-sized city (La Calera) in the Valparaíso Region.
	S	1	The case presents “Silence”: No relevant external agents pressured authorities to eliminate the memory site.
	LIS	1	The case presents “Local Support”: Neighbours supported maintaining the avenue’s name. In 2013, the city council of La Calera carried out a survey asking the community whether they would like to change the street’s name (11 de Septiembre) or not. 52% of the surveyed preferred to keep the name. According to the city council, this decision surprised them (Rojas, 2015).
	W	0	The case does not present a “Wall” (contrarily, it presents a “Window of Opportunity”, see below).
Conditions for elimination	UL	0	The avenue does not present an “Unprotective Location” (contrarily, it has a “Protective Location”, see above).
	SN	0	The case does not present “Social Noise” (contrarily, it presents “Silence”, see above).
	LIR	0	The case does not present “Local and/or Institutional Rejection”: There is no group within the community mobilising against the street’s name, and no external state institution intervened against it.
	WO	1	The case presents a “Window of Opportunity”: While the case unfolded, La Calera was governed by the centre-left. The mayor belonged to the <i>Concertación</i> (centre-left), and in 2012 he won 61.17% of the votes. Only two city councillors were centre-right.
	DCY	1	The case presents the “Denunciation During the Critical Years” factor: The case was denounced in 2013. The official statement from La Calera mentioned the importance of the change in Providencia as a precedent to the plebiscite carried out in the district of La Calera: “More than four districts in the country followed the example of Providencia, and after a citizen consultation, they changed the name of their respective 11 de Septiembre streets since they considered them alienating and evoking a dark period in Chile’s history” (Rojas, 2015).

## Augusto Pinochet monolith and square, Linares

	EF	1/0	Justification
Condit	PL	1	The case presents a “Protective Location”: The Monument and Square are located in a military, residential area on Av. Presidente Ibáñez (military man) in Linares. The site is very close to the Linares Artillery School ( <i>Escuela de Artillería</i> ) and Colonia Dignidad, an area used as a torture centre during the regime. Also, the monument seems abandoned

			throughout most of the year, and it is “revived” by regime supporters in the context of the anniversary of the military coup (thanatosis).
	S	0	The case does not present “Silence” (contrarily, it presents “Social Noise”, see below).
	LIS	1	The case presents “Local Support”: The community seems divided regarding the existence of this Monument and Square and receives active local support from certain pro-regime groups. Many of those who attend the commemorative ceremony of 11 September live in Linares. They keep the memory site “alive” by repainting the monument and the square’s signposts every 11 September (these are erased the night before by anti-regime activists). That day, they pay tribute to the military coup and Pinochet; remember the “military orders” delivered by the Junta; deliver speeches; and sing the national anthem and other pro-regime anthems (e.g., Alborada).
	W	1	The case presents a “Wall”: Linares has usually leaned to the centre-right. The right-wing mayor of Linares (RN) has, since 2016, continuously blocked the demands for elimination. In 2017, he said he would not discuss the issue: “We must learn how to live with legitimate differences” (Casas, 2017). In September 2018, he reiterated he would not remove the monolith or the square’s name: “I will never put the topic on the table for discussion” (Canal 5 Linares, 2018b, 2018d). By the beginning of 2020, he mentioned he would not discuss eliminating the Square and Monument.
<b>Conditions for elimination</b>	UL	0	The site does not present an “Unprotective Location” (contrarily, it has a “Protective Location”, see above).
	SN	1	The case presents “Social Noise”: Since 2013, Centro Cultural La Cigarra has received the external support of other organisations such as left-wing political parties and victims’ associations. They began regularly carrying out <i>funas</i> every 11 September (2014, 2015). In 2016, they initiated a campaign on change.org to collect signatures for the removal of the memory site (2.700 signatures). In August 2017, a member of the communist youth met with the Intendencia Regional del Maule at the Table for Human Rights and delivered a letter signed by more than 30 NGOs. As noted by several newspapers, in 2017, the La Cigarra Cultural Centre created tremendous controversy over this memory site. In 2018, former mayors and left-wing political representatives condemned the existence of the Square and Monument. In 2019, Memoria Histórica Foundation said they would also pursue eliminating this memory site after eliminating the Manuel Contreras plaques and photographs.
	LIR	1	The case presents “Local Rejection”: The movement against the monument was initiated by a local organisation called Centro Cultural La Cigarra. They received the support of the local Communist Party Youth and local anti-regime associations connected to victims.
	WO	0	The case does not present a “Window of Opportunity” (contrarily, it presents a “Wall”, see above).
	DCY	1	The case presents the “Denunciation During the Critical Years” factor: The first <i>funa</i> took place on 11 September 2013.

## Augusto Pinochet monolith, Pumanque

	<b>EF</b>	<b>1/0</b>	<b>Justification</b>
<b>Conditions for survival</b>	PL	1	The case presents a “Protective Location”: The monolith is located in a small-sized town (Pumanque) in the Libertador Bernardo O’Higgins Region.
	S	1	The case presents “Silence”: After the rebuke, there is no evidence of the intervention of an external human rights/victims’ movement (or external prominent public figures) pushing forward the elimination process.
	LIS	1	The case presents “Local Support”: The community may be inclined to protect the monument for identity and touristic reasons. In 2013, a newspaper noted that “it’s not an issue for the <i>pumanquinos</i> ” (PienSA Chile, 2013), as there is “a majority that observes it without giving it much importance” (Massai, 2017). According to Pumanque’s mayor, the monument is an “issue” only for people outside the community: “[But] It does not generate

			any noise for us. That happens, first, because, in Pumanque, people are used to it. Secondly, [we do not want to remove it] because there are many more important issues or situations. We pay little attention to it either; it's not an issue here; it's quite the opposite. The people who have restaurants tell me they hope it's never removed because people come to take pictures and then have lunch because of the media coverage. It has allowed us to do tourism" (Massai, 2017).
	W	1	The case presents a "Wall": Between 2012 – 2016 and 2016 – 2020, the centre-right governed the city council. In 2013, Pumanque's mayor (RN) said he "does not think it's necessary to remove the monolith." In 2017, he said: "If a citizen movement is formed asking [for the monolith] to be removed, he will listen", adding that "the people of Pumanque decide what they want to have and what they don't want to have [...]. But on the initiative of the city council to remove it, there will be none" (Massai, 2017).
Conditions for elimination	UL	0	The monument does not present an "Unprotective Location" (contrarily, it has a "Protective Location", see above).
	SN	0	The case does not present "Social Noise" (contrarily, it presents "Silence", see above).
	LIR	0	The case does not present "Local and/or Institutional Rejection": There is no group within the community mobilising against the street's name, and no external state institution intervened against it.
	WO	0	The case does not present a "Window of Opportunity" (contrarily, it presents a "Wall", see above).
	DCY	1	The case presents the "Denunciation During the Critical Years" factor: It was denounced in 2017 when a human rights lawyer emailed the National Monuments Council (CMN) requesting information about the legal status of the Pumanque monument (Massai, 2017).

## Av. Jaime Guzmán, Antofagasta

#	EF	1/0	Justification
Conditions for survival	PL	0	The monument does not present a "Protective Location" (contrarily, it has an "Unprotective Location", see below).
	S	1	The case presents "Silence": After denunciation, there is no evidence of the intervention of an external human rights/victims' movement (or external prominent public figures) pushing forward the elimination process.
	LIS	1	The case presents "Local Support": This support is provided by UDI's Antofagasta office. After the case was denounced, the UDI regional leaders defended the name's importance, saying: "The city must have a street with the name of Guzmán, pointing out its existence is synonymous with a city with a spirit of integration." A UDI militant said: "Now there is indeed a group of people who can disagree on the name of the street or Jaime Guzmán's avenue, but we must remember, cities belong to everyone, there are also streets remembering former President Salvador Allende" (Antofagasta TV 30, 2018).
	W	1	The case presents a "Wall": while the case unfolded, Antofagasta's mayor was linked to the right-wing party UDI and showed herself predisposed to help and protect pro-regime memorialisation. Also, the city council had a centre-right majority (2016 – 2020). In session N° 16 of the city council, the elimination was discussed in the point "various": "Through the ordinary 0048: [We should] Respond to [name] on the request made by the transparency law N° MU009T0002689, which has not yet been given a response" (Municipalidad de Antofagasta, 2018, p. 19). The issue was not discussed in the following session. On 12 June 2018, the Transparency request was cancelled since it could only respond to information requests.
Conditions	UL	1	The case presents an "Unprotective Location": The avenue is located in a prominent coastal area in one of the largest cities in Chile (Antofagasta, Antofagasta Region).
	SN	0	The case does not present "Social Noise" (contrarily, it presents "Silence", see above).
	LIR	0	The case does not present "Local and/or Institutional Rejection": Although the case was denounced in 2018 by an anti-regime agent who used Twitter to demand the elimination of

			the avenue's name (Regionalista, 2018), there is no evidence of a group within the community mobilising against it, neither the intervention of a state institution rejecting the name. The Twitter post has only one retweet and no "like" or comments.
	WO	0	The case does not present a "Window of Opportunity" (contrarily, it presents a "Wall", see above).
	DCY	1	The case presents the "Denunciation During the Critical Years" factor: It was denounced in 2018. The person who initiated the demand used arguments regarding the feminist movement: "Mayor #Antofagasta, may history remember you as the woman who defended your fellow's dignity, change the name of Av. Jaime Guzman to that of a prominent woman in the city. Jaime Guzmán humiliated women by describing them as "weak female brains." Courage!" (Gutierrez, 2018).

### Eliminated Cases

#### Av. General Francisco Franco [Av. Violeta Parra]

	EF	1/0	Justification
<b>Conditions for</b>	PL	0	The avenue does not present a "Protective Location" (contrarily, it has an "Unprotective Location", see below).
	S	0	The case does not present "Silence" (contrarily, it presents "Social Noise", see below).
	LIS	1	The case presents "Local Support": A group of local neighbours actively supported the maintenance of the "Franco" name, sending the city council a letter with 168 signatures (21 January 2013). Several neighbourhood representatives showed themselves against the measure at the neighbourhood council meeting (26 April 2013).
	W	0	The case does not present a "Wall" (contrarily, it presents a "Window of Opportunity", see below).
<b>Conditions for elimination</b>	UL	1	The case presents an "Unprotective Location": The avenue is located in a prominent area in La Pintana (Metropolitan Region), crossing several neighbourhoods.
	SN	1	The case presents "Social Noise": External agents intervened to push forward the elimination demand, such as the music band "Chico Trujillo" (2012 - 2013). This external aid created further "social noise", enhancing the local initiative.
	LIR	1	The case presents "Local Rejection": The demand for changing the street's name was born out of a local initiative by a group of young activists belonging to "Centro Cultural el Arca de la Pintana." Their campaign included posters and canvases, radio programmes, workshops, protests, and community education. On 20 January 2013, they organised a non-binding citizen consultation to ask whether the community wanted to change the name to Violeta Parra or not. The Violeta Parra option won.
	WO	1	The case presents a "Window of Opportunity": While the case unfolded, the city council was governed by a centre-left majority (2008 – 2012, 2012 – 2016).
	DCY	0	The case does not present the "Denunciation During the Critical Years" factor: it was denounced in 2010.

#### Augusto Pinochet Plaque at Walmart (former D&S)

	EF	1/0	Justification
<b>Conditions for survival</b>	PL	1	The case presents a "Protective Location": The plaque was located in a private area (at the entrance of Walmart Holding – former D&S – in Quilicura).
	S	0	The case does not present "Silence" (contrarily, it presents "Social Noise", see below).
	LIS	0	The case does not present "Local and/or Institutional Support": There is no group within the community (in this case, the company) mobilising to maintain the plaque, and no state institution intervened to defend it.
	W	0	The case does not present a "Wall" (contrarily, it presents a "Window of Opportunity", see below).

<b>Conditions for elimination</b>	UL	0	The case does not present an “Unprotective Location” (contrarily, it has a “Protective Location”, see above).
	SN	1	The case presents “Social Noise”: External agents intervened to condemn the plaque. The plaque came to light on 3 January 2011 thanks to a photo sent to The Clinic newspaper: “An outraged reader sent us this photograph” (The Clinic, 2011). La Cuarta Newspaper mentioned this situation generated a “huge controversy” (Foncea, 2011). On 5 January 2011, several centre-left MPs publicly condemned the plaque. For instance, Deputy Tucapel Jiménez (PPD) said that considering the recent Court ruling in the murder of General Prats and his wife, such commemoration was very sombre (Foncea, 2011). He also added this was a “tremendous provocation” and said, “it’s a provocation to all Chileans” (Foncea, 2011). Socialist Deputy Sergio Aguiló said a monument to a “criminal and thief” was unacceptable. He added, “there are almost no reminders, or statues left, in favour of Pinochet,” signalling the decline of Pinochet’s image (Cooperativa, 2011).
	LIR	1	The case presents “Local and/or Institutional Rejection”: The company rejected the plaque. By the end of 2010, and anticipating social outrage, Walmart had already decided to remove it from its premises to prevent “various interpretations” in the future (Cooperativa, 2011a, 2011b).
	WO	1	The case presents a “Window of Opportunity”: A regime supporter no longer owned the company, which helped explain its elimination in 2010. The area had previously belonged to D&S of Nicolás Ibáñez, a well-known millionaire businessman and <i>Pinochetista</i> (El Mostrador, 2019; Saavedra Morales, 2019; The Clinic, 2011). He openly supports the military regime and expresses “enormous gratitude” towards Pinochet (El Desconcierto, 2016a).
	DCY	0	The case does not present the “Denunciation During the Critical Years” factor: The plaque was denounced in 2011.

## Av. 11 de Septiembre [Av. Nueva Providencia]

	<b>EF</b>	<b>1/0</b>	<b>Justification</b>
<b>Conditions for survival</b>	PL	0	The avenue does not present a “Protective Location” (contrarily, it has an “Unprotective Location, see below).
	S	0	The case does not present “Silence” (contrarily, it presents “Social Noise”, see below).
	LIS	1	The case presents “Local Support”: In June 2013, a group of neighbours of Providencia sent a letter supporting the maintenance of the name 11 de Septiembre. Also, in the COSOC (neighbourhood council) meeting on 17 June 2013, most neighbourhood representatives voted against the change (6/10). The representatives who rejected the measure argued that the change would bring unnecessary economic costs, time loss, extra bureaucracy, and confusion. They also said they disliked its “political use” and argued the change created even more divisions (instead of healing them). Finally, they said that there were more urgent needs. On 21 June 2013, a group of regime supporters sent a letter to the mayor demanding to keep the 11 de Septiembre name. On 25 June 2013, right-wing councillors decided not to attend the session in which the name change would be approved. This move precluded the change as there was no quorum. On 27 June 2013, they sent a letter to the mayor requesting that the decision be postponed and a referendum be carried out. Two right-wing councillors assured they had received thousands of signatures and emails supporting the 11 de Septiembre name.
	W	0	The case does not present a “Wall” (contrarily, it presents a “Window of Opportunity”, see below).

<b>Conditions for elimination</b>	UL	1	The case presents an “Unprotective Location”: Providencia is an emblematic, central, and affluent district in the city of Santiago. Likewise, the naming decree refers to the avenue as “a construction of great urban importance” (Municipalidad de Providencia, 1980).
	SN	1	The case presents “Social Noise”: In 2012, the initiative <i>Desmonumentar la Dictadura</i> was created. It comprised prominent civil society individuals who campaigned to gather support to eliminate the 11 de Septiembre name. They encouraged citizen pressure for the demand to succeed. The request created colossal controversy and broad citizen support. It appeared on TV, in newspapers, and in political debates and was part of everyday conversation. By June 2013, <i>Ciudadanos por la Memoria</i> accused the new mayor that, despite her campaign promise, she had not carried out the name change. They requested a meeting with her and sent a letter to the city council.
	LIR	1	The case presents “Local Rejection”: a large percentage of the community rejected the site. In the municipal elections of 2012, they voted against the right-wing mayor and for the centre-left mayor, Josefa Errázuriz. She promised she would change the avenue’s name as soon as she took office in 2012.
	WO	1	The case presents a “Window of Opportunity”: Since the return to democracy, right-wing mayors and city councils have dominated Providencia. While the case unfolded, the right-wing mayor – a former DINA agent – had constantly ignored and refused elimination demands. However, by the end of 2012, a “Window of Opportunity” (WO) appeared and changed the situation. In the 2012 municipal elections, a progressive centre-left mayor was elected. The centre-left now dominated the city council (5/4). Providencia’s new mayor announced she would pursue a democratic and participatory agenda and that the avenue’s name change was her priority. The change was finally approved on 2 July 2013. None of the right-wing councillors attended the session except one RN councillor, who provided the quorum.
	DCY	0	The case does not present the “Denunciation During the Critical Years” factor: It was denounced in 2012.

## 11 de Septiembre Street [Aquilina Rojas Street]

	EF	I/O	Justification
<b>Conditions for survival</b>	PL	0	The street does not present a “Protective Location” (contrarily, it has an “Unprotective Location”, see below).
	S	1	The case presents “Silence”: After denunciation, there is no evidence of the intervention of an external human rights/victims’ movement (or external prominent public figures) pushing forward the elimination process.
	LIS	0	The case does not present “Local and/or Institutional Support”: There is no group within the case mobilising in favour of maintaining the street’s name, and no state institution intervened to defend it.
	W	0	The case does not present a “Wall” (contrarily, it presents a “Window of Opportunity”, see below).
<b>Conditions for elimination</b>	UL	1	The street presents an “Unprotective Location”: The area is strongly connected with victims of the dictatorship. As one interviewee said: “There were many “people of struggle” who had fought to have a house, and later they had also opposed the military regime, a period that caused the community “a lot of pain” (Anonymous Key Informant #8, Pedro Aguirre Cerda, personal communication, 16 March 2021). The land used to be a <i>toma</i> (land occupation). In the early 70s, they began constructing their houses with the help of left-wing Deputies, such as Mario Palestro.
	SN	0	The case does not present “Social Noise” (contrarily, it presents “Silence”, see above).
	LIR	1	The case presents “Local Rejection”: In 2012, Unit N° 14 Los Maitenes requested the city council to change the name of 11 de Septiembre to Aquilina Rojas. They organised themselves to achieve their goal and asked the community whether they wanted to change the street’s name or not. They presented a document with supporting signatures. On 24

			June 2013, Unit N° 14 Los Maitenes sent a letter to Pedro Aguirre Cerda mayor, requesting to change the street's name. In July 2013, they sent a second letter. On 31 July 2013, the neighbourhood council (COSOC) unanimously approved the name change to Aquilina Rojas. No opposition or dissenting voices were recorded.
	WO	1	The case presents a "Window of Opportunity": In 2013, the centre-left dominated the city council. The mayor was Communist, and most of the city councillors were centre-left. On 6 August 2013, the city council unanimously approved changing the name of 11 de Septiembre alley to Aquilina Rojas. The neighbourhood president of Unit N° 14 Los Maitenes thanked the city council: "First of all, thanks to the mayor and the entire council, this is significant for this directive because it was the longing of the founders of our sector. It was the first toma that was made. Thanks a lot" (Municipalidad de Pedro Aguirre Cerda, 2013, p. 30).
	DCY	0	The case does not present the "Denunciation During the Critical Years" factor: it was denounced in 2012.

## Augusto Pinochet Plaque, UCN

	EF	1/0	Justification
Conditions for survival	PL	1	The plaque presents a "Protective Location": The plaque was located inside a private property (Luis Bisquert Gym, North Catholic University).
	S	1	The case presents "Silence": After denunciation, there is no evidence of the intervention of an external human rights/victims' movement (or external prominent public figures) pushing forward the elimination process.
	LIS	0	The case does not present "Local and/or Institutional Support": There is no group within the case mobilising in favour of maintaining the plaque, and no state institution intervened to defend it.
	W	0	The case does not present a "Wall" (contrarily, it presents a "Window of Opportunity", see below).
Conditions for elimination	UL	0	The plaque does not present an "Unprotective Location" (contrarily, it has a "Protective Location", see above).
	S	0	The case does not present "Social Noise" (contrarily, it presents "Silence", see above).
	LIR	1	The case presents "Local Rejection": The site was denounced by the end of 2015, when a group of students, professors and alumni sent a letter to the University authorities requesting the plaque's elimination. Several groups sent the letter revealing a degree of internal organisation and mobilisation towards rejecting the plaque.
	WO	1	The case presents a "Window of Opportunity": The University's director seemed receptive to human rights issues. In August 2016, he accepted the request and proceeded to remove the plaque. On 11 September 2018, the university authorities and the student federation organised a commemorative ceremony in honour of the North Catholic University members who were murdered during the regime.
	DCY	1	The case presents the "Denunciation During the Critical Years" factor: It was denounced by the end of 2015.

## Lorenzo Gotuzzo Street [Amanda Labarca Street]

	EF	1/0	Justification
Conditions for	PL	0	The street does not present a "Protective Location" (contrarily, it has an "Unprotective Location", see below).
	S	1	The case presents "Silence": After denunciation, there is no evidence of the intervention of an external human rights/victims' movement (or external prominent public figures) pushing forward the elimination process.
	LIS	0	The case does not present "Local and/or Institutional Support": There is no group within the case mobilising in favour of maintaining the street's name, and no state institution intervened to defend it.

	W	0	The case does not present a “Wall” (contrarily, it presents a “Window of Opportunity”, see below).
Conditions for elimination	UL	1	The street presents an “Unprotective Location”: It is located in a strategic area in the district of Santiago, at the heart of the Civic District. It is very close to the Palacio de La Moneda, behind the Ministry of Finance (one of the most important ministries of political power). Many other ministries and government offices are located in this area. There are almost no residences on the street; most are offices. In February 2016, the mayor of Santiago said: “It’s not a good thing that just a few meters from La Moneda we pay tribute to someone who was the Minister of Finance of a dictatorship” (Mediabanco, 2016). A councillor said: “Undoubtedly, in Chile, a street that pays tribute to the Prime Minister of Finance of the dictatorship in the civic neighbourhood is a reason for discord” (Municipalidad de Santiago, 2016b, p. 57).
	SN	0	The case does not present “Social Noise” (contrarily, it presents “Silence”, see above).
	LIR	1	The case presents “Local and/or Institutional Rejection”: In January 2016, the city council surveyed the local area asking whether they would like to change the street’s name to Amanda Labarca. 79% of participants voted in favour of the idea (total number of participants: 29). On 28 January 2020, the neighbourhood council (COSOC) voted to eliminate the Almirante Lorenzo Gotuzzo name. 14 councillors approved, two abstained, and three rejected. President Bachelet attended the inauguration of the new name on 7 March 2016.
	WO	1	The case presents a “Window of Opportunity”: In 2012, a centre-left mayor took office in Santiago city council. Five centre-left councillors were elected. The name change was approved in the city council meeting on 29 February 2016. The mayor and all the centre-left councillors voted in favour of the change, but all right-wing councillors rejected it.
	DCY	1	The case presents the “Denunciation During the Critical Years” factor: It was denounced in 2016. The mayor presented arguments related to the feminist movement: Amanda Labarca’s “work was mainly aimed at improving the situation of women in Latin America and women’s suffrage in Chile. Her legacy remains in force in multiple publications favouring women’s rights, especially in education issues” (Municipalidad de Santiago, 2016b, p. 25).

## 13. 11 de Septiembre Street [Francisco Silva Street]

	EF	1/0	Justification
Conditions for survival	PL	1	The street presents a “Protective Location”: It is located in a small-sized town (Quillota) in the Valparaíso Region.
	S	1	The case presents “Silence”: After denunciation, there is no evidence of the intervention of an external human rights/victims’ movement (or external prominent public figures) pushing forward the elimination process.
	LIS	0	The case does not present “Local and/or Institutional Support”: There is no group within the case mobilising in favour of maintaining the street’s name, and no state institution intervened to defend it.
	W	0	The case does not present a “Wall” (contrarily, it presents a “Window of Opportunity”, see below).
Conditions for	UL	0	The street does not present an “Unprotective Location” (contrarily, it has a “Protective Location”, see above).
	SN	0	The case does not present “Social Noise” (contrarily, it presents “Silence”, see above).
	LIR	1	The case presents “Local Rejection”: The street was denounced in June 2016 after neighbours requested on Facebook that the street’s 11 de Septiembre name be changed to Francisco Silva, a beloved footballer. He was raised in the town of Quillota. According to RLV Newspaper, “it was the neighbours who led the initiative to change the name of this road” (R. Salazar, 2016). In June/July 2016, the city council of Quillota organised a poll in which they interviewed 44 families, of which 40 favoured changing the name

			(Municipalidad de Quillota, 2016, p. 77). A sizeable crowd of neighbours attended the opening ceremony of the new street's name. Everyone applauded and looked joyful. The mayor delivered a speech in honour of Francisco Silva.
	WO	1	The case presents a "Window of Opportunity": According to the RVL Newspaper, the mayor said, "it was not the first time an attempt was made to withdraw this denomination, but now the agreement was reached to do so" (Salazar, 2016). While the case unfolded, Quillota's mayor was centre-left (DC), and the centre-left also dominated the city council. On 4 July 2016, the mayor (DC, centre-left) presented the name change proposal. Five out of six councillors approved the project.
	DCY	1	The case presents the "Denunciation During the Critical Years" factor: it was denounced in 2016.

## 14. Av. Jaime Guzmán [Av. José Ramírez Allende]

	EF	1/0	Justification
Conditions for survival	PL	1	The street presents a "Protective Location": The road is located in a small-sized town (Rengo) in the LBO Region.
	S	1	The case presents "Silence": After denunciation, there is no evidence of the intervention of an external human rights/victims' movement (or external prominent public figures) pushing forward the elimination process.
	LIS	0	The case does not present "Local and/or Institutional Support": There is no group within the case mobilising in favour of maintaining the street's name, and no state institution intervened to defend it.
	W	0	The case does not present a "Wall" (contrarily, it presents a "Window of Opportunity", see below).
Conditions for elimination	UL	0	The street does not present an "Unprotective Location" (contrarily, it has a "Protective Location", see above).
	SN	0	The case does not present "Social Noise" (contrarily, it presents a "Silence", see above).
	LIR	1	The case presents "Local Rejection": By the end of 2016 and the beginning of 2017, neighbours (Rinconada de Malambo, El Villorrio, Los Conquistadores, Villa San Benito) favoured the new name. They sent letters to the city council in approval. One letter says: "Having made the inquiries to our neighbours; we communicate our support for the name change" (Junta de Vecinos de Villa San Benito, n/d).
	WO	1	The case presents a "Window of Opportunity": The centre-left has predominated in this district. While the case unfolded, a centre-left (PPD) mayor was in office. The city council was composed mainly of centre-left councillors, with only one centre-right councillor (RN). On 8 March 2017, Rengo's mayor proposed the city council to change the Jaime Guzmán avenue's name to José Ramírez Allende. The change was approved unanimously.
	DCY	1	The case presents the "Denunciation During the Critical Years" factor: It was denounced by the end of 2016.

## 15. Plaques and photographs of Manuel Contreras

	EF	1/0	Justification
Conditions for survival	PL	1	The plaques and photographs present a "Protective Location": The Manuel Contreras plaques and photos were located inside two educational buildings belonging to the Army: The War Academy in La Reina (Metropolitan Region) and the School of Engineers Tejas Verdes in San Antonio (Valparaíso Region).
	S	0	The case does not present "Silence" (contrarily, it presents "Social Noise", see below).
	LIS	1	The case presents "Institutional Support" by the Army and the Defence Ministry. On 10 April 2019, the Chamber of Deputies approved Draft Resolution N° 375 (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional - Cámara de Diputados, 2019), demanding President Sebastián Piñera order the Ministry of Defence to eliminate the Manuel Contreras commemorations. However, there is no evidence the President ordered the Ministry of Defence to eliminate

			these commemorations. On 30 October 2019, the Army delivered a report to the Court of Appeals where it justified and approved the existence of these commemorations. On 31 December 2019, Manuel Contrera's son filed an appeal against the unfavourable Court ruling (26 December 2019). On 2 January 2020, the Army filed an appeal against the adverse Court ruling (26 December 2019). The Army continued to defend the thesis of military autonomy, that victims must prove their harm, and that the tributes are entirely legal (Comandancia en Jefe del Ejército de Chile, 2020a, pp. 6–7). For Alicia Lira, President of the Association of Relatives of Executed Politicians (AFEP), “the Army’s appeal shows their logic of continuing to protect criminals until after their death, [and this] speaks that they have not changed” (El Mostrador, 2020a, 2020a). On 15 January 2020, The Chamber of Deputies’ Human Rights Commission (session N° 81) met with the Army commander-in-chief (Deputy), the Minister of Defence, and the Subsecretary for the Armed Forces, to discuss the situation (Comisión de Derechos Humanos y Pueblos Originarios, 2020). The Army reinforced the thesis that it is not a commemoration but a simple historical record. The Defence Minister defended the Army’s thesis saying that there is no contradiction in recognising Contreras’s criminality and at the same time keeping those plaques and photographs (p. 3).
	W	0	The case does not present a “Wall” (contrarily, it presents a “Window of Opportunity”, see below).
<b>Conditions for elimination</b>	UL	0	The case does not present an “Unprotective Location” (contrarily, it has a “Protective Location”, see above).
	SN	1	The case presents “Social Noise” with the intervention of external Human Rights organisations and prominent figures. Indeed, the case was denounced on 25 May 2018, when a human rights lawyer requested information about commemorations of Manuel Contreras in Army buildings. The Army certified the existence of several plaques and photographs in his honour. On 10 September 2018, Biobio newspaper issued a report on the case. On 27 July 2019, a second human rights lawyer requested the Army eliminate these commemorations. The Army refused to eradicate the commemorations, and on 7 September 2019, the second lawyer filed a protection appeal against the Army. On 4 January 2020, Fundación Memoria Histórica lamented the Army’s appeal against the Court’s ruling (on 26 December 2019) and said, “we believe the notion of autonomy in the armed forces persists” (Zúñiga, 2020). On 28 January 2020, the daughter of General Carlos Prats, who the DINA murdered under Manuel Contreras’s command, became part of the litigation and filed a protection appeal.
	LIR	1	The case presents “Institutional Rejection”: On 26 February 2020, the National Institute of Human Rights (INDH) sent an Amicus Curiae to the Supreme Court.
	WO	1	The case presents a “Window of Opportunity” where the Judiciary had a prominent role. On 2 October 2019, the Supreme Court’s Third Chamber declared the lawyer’s protection appeal admissible. It said, “the appeal should have been accepted for processing” since it could “constitute the violation of guarantees of those indicated in Article 20 of the Political Constitution” (Corte Suprema de Chile, 2019). On 15 October 2019, the Court of Appeals (another chamber) declared the protection appeal admissible. On 26 December 2019, the Fifth Chamber of the Court of Appeals ruled in favour of HRL2’s protection appeal and ordered the Army to eliminate the photographs and plaques, giving three days to comply. On 5 March 2020, the Supreme Court rejected the Army’s appeal. The Court of Appeals’ ruling was ratified.
	DCY	1	The “Denunciation During the Critical Years” factor affected the case: It was denounced in 2018.

**Lucía Hiriart Square [Arturo Godoy Square]**

	<b>EF</b>	<b>1/0</b>	<b>Justification</b>
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Conditions for survival	PL	1	The square presents a “Protective Location”: The square is located in a peripheral area of Iquique (Tarapacá Region).
	S	1	The case presents “Silence”: after denunciation, there is no evidence of the intervention of an external human rights/victims’ movement (or external prominent public figures) pushing forward the elimination process.
	LIS	0	The case does not present “Local and/or Institutional Rejection”: There is no group within the case mobilising in favour of maintaining the street’s name, and no state institution intervened to defend it.
	W	0	The case does not present a “Wall” (contrarily, it presents a “Window of Opportunity”, see below).
Conditions for elimination	UL	0	The case does not present an “Unprotective Location” (contrarily, it has a “Protective Location”, see above).
	SN	0	The case does not present “Social Noise” (contrarily, it presents “Silence”, see above).
	LIR	1	The case presents “Local Rejection”: By the beginning of 2018, a group of neighbours of the Junta de Vecinos Dagoberto Godoy mobilised against the square’s name (Lucía Hiriart). They wanted to rename Arturo Godoy, a well-known boxer star from the area. In March 2018, they organised a local poll with 67 signatures favouring the name change. They sent a letter to Iquique’s mayor requesting to change the name. In the letter, they said that “after consultation with our neighbours, the name chosen was unanimously accepted, making a recognition of our neighbour and great boxer from Iquique [...]” (Junta de Vecinos Dagoberto Godoy, 2018b). On 9 April 2018, the neighbourhood council (COSOC) unanimously approved eliminating the square’s name.
	WO	1	The case presents a “Window of Opportunity”: In the municipal elections of 2016, an independent candidate for mayor won over the right-wing UDI candidate. Thus, there was an independent mayor (more connected to the centre-left), and the city council had five centre-left councillors and five right-wing councillors (centre-left majority). On 12 April 2018, the mayor presented the motion to the city council. It was approved with seven votes and two against (Agreement N° 254/2018). Two right-wing councillors (UDI and RN) opposed the measure.
	DCY	1	The case presents the “Denunciation During the Critical Years” factor: It was denounced in 2018.

## Av. Jaime Guzmán [Av. Dorsal]

	EF	1/0	Justification
Conditions for survival	PL	0	The avenue does not present a “Protective Location” (contrarily, it has an “Unprotective Location”, see below).
	S	0	The case does not present “Silence” (contrarily, it presents “Social Noise”, see below).
	LIS	0	The case does not present “Local and/or Institutional Support”: There is no group within the case mobilising in favour of maintaining the street’s name, and no state institution intervened to defend it.
	W	0	The case does not present a “Wall” (contrarily, it presents a “Window of Opportunity”, see below).
Conditions for elimination	UL	1	The avenue presents an “Unprotective Location”: It is a central avenue in Renca (Metropolitan Region) connecting the Costanera Norte, Autopista Central, Av. Apóstol Santiago and Av. General Velázquez. Also, it is located at the heart of the district’s “Civic Neighbourhood” (Colectivo Poesía y Territorio, personal communication, 5 October 2020).
	SN	1	The case presents “Social Noise”: Between 17 and 30 September 2020, they surveyed 1,022 people, of which 97.2% approved the change. A percentage of these voters belonged to districts outside Renca. Other social organisations also conducted surveys supporting the name change.
	LIR	1	The case presents “Local Rejection” evidence: It was denounced on 10 September 2020, when Colectivo Poesía y Territorio (a local organisation) created a Facebook post with a

		<p>photograph demanding Av's removal. Jaime Guzmán: "Never again a Jaime Guzmán Avenue in Renca!" On that date, they organised several activities and marches to request the elimination of the avenue's name. On 5 October 2020, several councillors and cultural/political organisations delivered a letter to the mayor (77 signatures). On 7 October 2020, the name change was discussed in COSOC (neighbourhood council) and unanimously approved by all neighbourhood councillors (Municipalidad de Renca, 2021).</p>
WO	1	<p>The case presents a "Window of Opportunity": In 2016, a centre-left mayor (DC) was elected with 64.62% of the votes, far ahead of the UDI candidate, 26.87% (Serval, 2016b, 2016f). While the case unfolded, the council was composed of five <i>Nueva Mayoría</i> (centre-left) councillors and three <i>Chile Vamos</i> (right) councillors. A key interviewee said that the demand to change the street's name was "long overdue", but it was impossible because previous city councils had no political will to do so. He said it was thanks to the new city council (elected in 2016) that the change had been possible (Anonymous Key Informant #17, Renca, personal communication, 17 March 2021). On 14 October 2020, Renca's city council, headed by a centre-left mayor, approved changing the name of Av. Jaime Guzmán to its original name: Dorsal. There were seven votes in favour, one abstention and one absent ballot.</p>
DCY	1	<p>The "Denunciation During the Critical Years" factor affected the case: It was denounced in 2020, after the Social Outbreak.</p>

## Process Tracing

### Survival Cases

#### José Toribio Merino statue, National Maritime Museum

Process tracing	
Causal mechanism	Within-case evidence
Denunciation ↓	In 2013, the first <i>funa</i> (public condemnation) took place outside the Museum, led by a group of former political prisoners. Some of them are Cine Forum members, a cultural civil organisation in Valparaíso (Cine Forum Cine Otro, 2013a).
WALL ↓	On 26 August 2019, the head of the Defence Ministry cabinet sent the human rights lawyer the same letter they had sent on 12 November 2018, rejecting the statue's elimination. This letter is sent in document N° 4778/4911/1 (Consejo de Defensa del Estado, 2019b, p. 3).
	On 13 September 2019, commander-in-chief Julio Leiva said the protection appeal by Rendón should be rejected, and he used the same arguments used previously. They argued the statue is legitimate (no Courts have ever condemned Merino) and legal (using the same ideas provided by the Comptroller General of the Republic). They added the statue is "fair and reasonable" since it was erected to pay homage to a commander-in-chief, entirely independent of any political actions he might have taken in the past. They also argued that Rendón did not provide evidence of the alleged psychological damage (Armada de Chile, 2019, pp. 4–5).
	On 22 January 2020, the Eighth Court of Appeals of Santiago rejected the protection appeal filed by Rendón against the Navy and the Ministry of Defence. Its arguments coincided with the SDC and CGR. The document mentioned the statue was entirely legal and depended exclusively on the Navy. Merino was never judged or condemned for human rights violations; therefore, the statue is legitimate. It is also mentioned that Rendón delivered the protection appeal after the deadline (since he would have known of the fact in November 2018); hence, his <i>recurso de protección</i> cannot be accepted. Also, it mentioned that considering the Navy's autonomy; the Minister does not have the power to intervene (Organic Statute of the Ministry of Defence, in Law N° 20,424, Art. Three and Five) and that the Navy did not commit any illegal activity. Finally, it said there are simply two different interpretations at stake, on the one hand, Merino as a member of the Military Junta and, on the other, as commander-in-chief of the Navy, alluding to the fact that this latter interpretation – belonging to the Navy – is entirely reasonable and should be respected (C.A Santiago, 2020).
Outcome: SURVIVAL (2020)	The 3 <sup>rd</sup> Chamber of the Supreme Court maintained the Court of Appeal's original ruling (Corte Suprema de Chile, 2020a).

#### 11 de Septiembre street, Las Compañías

Process tracing	
Causal mechanism	Within-case evidence
Denunciation ↓	On 5 September 2013, councillor Margarita Riveros (Independent, pro Concertación) proposed the street 11 de Septiembre in Las Compañías, La Serena, to be changed. All councillors approved the motion (even right-winged/UDI councillors). UDI councillor Mauricio Ibacache "absolutely agrees with the proposal of councillor Riveros; he shares her opinion." RN councillor Jorge Hurtado said, "[these issues] have to be seen with a spirit of dialogue [altura de miras], he agrees with trying to change that street's name (...)" (Municipalidad de La Serena, 2013, p. 19). Margarita Riveros argued for the need to eliminate memorials that created "divisions," especially on the 40 <sup>th</sup> anniversary of the military coup (Municipalidad de La Serena, 2013, p. 19). She also

	<p>mentioned the importance of making this change after Av. 11 de Septiembre in Providencia (in Santiago), named Nueva Providencia. The councillor suggested the new street should be named after Jorge Peña Hen, a musician assassinated by the dictatorship (Municipalidad de La Serena, 2013, p. 19). The city council minutes recorded the approval of the street's name change: "The mayor says that before changing the subject, regarding the request of Mrs Margarita Riveros, he proposes the agreement be made and that the Commission presents it in a future session, that is, the name change of the street is approved, and they would define the new name later. Agreement N° 9: The council unanimously agrees to approve the name change of 11 de Septiembre Street in Las Compañías area" (Municipalidad de La Serena, 2013, p. 20). The road has no physical signpost (Municipalidad de La Serena, 2014, p. 8).</p>
<p>S* ↓ LIS</p>	<p>On 5 April 2014, the community met with the councillors to express their annoyance regarding the change of 11 de Septiembre Street in their area. They said they fear bureaucracy and do not want changes in their neighbourhood. They also feel annoyed at being excluded from such a decision (Leyre, 2014). As noted by 24 Horas, "The vast majority are elderly people who do not want to complicate their lives with cumbersome procedures, and they also assure the street has never had another name. They say the authorities gave them that name from the beginning, and there have never been any protests [against the name] for 40 years. They understand historical sensitivities are involved, but they are used to it by now and do not think it's such an important issue" (Leyre, 2014).</p> <p>In the meeting, they cast a vote, and just one out of 40 assistants favoured changing the name (Municipalidad de La Serena, 2014, p. 5).</p> <p>Then, the community delivered a letter to the city council requesting the street name change be suspended. The letter contains signatures of neighbours of the area (Municipalidad de La Serena, 2014, p. 5). According to councillor Juan Carlos Thenoux [PRSD], the community is "upset at not being consulted about the change of the street's name; they also refer to those who say the street is called Cuba, they [say they] are very wrong [...], they also say that when the land was handed over, they went personally with <i>Carabineros</i> to put the name 11 de Septiembre and the street that bears the name of Cuba is another one" (Municipalidad de La Serena, 2014, p. 5).</p>
<p>Outcome: SURVIVAL</p>	<p>On 9 April 2014, the city council decided to omit the original decision. The mayor said that the community or an individual must formally request it for any changes to occur. Then a local consulta (referendum) should take place (Municipalidad de La Serena, 2014, p. 5). councillor Pablo Yáñez (independent – Concertación) said: "Taking advantage of the fact that El Día Newspaper is present, he hopes they can communicate this issue. In one way or another, people had misinterpreted [the situation] and were very scared because they thought the street had already been renamed; it's good to make this situation clear because the city council and the mayor have always respected what neighbours think. For them, it was now clear there had been no formal request, and the neighbours would be consulted if such a request existed. The neighbours stated that, for better or for worse, the date had to be remembered as it was a way of paying homage to the fallen. It was a way to ensure this situation would never happen again (Municipalidad de La Serena, 2014, p. 5).</p>

Av. 11 de Septiembre, La Calera

Process tracing	
Causal mechanism	Within-case evidence
<p>Denunciation ↓</p>	<p>2013 is the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the military coup. Memory struggles intensified. "This commemoration, unlike the previous ones, was marked by the generalised condemnation by Chilean society and its press media, especially television, regarding the crimes committed during the dictatorship" (Marín, 2014a, 2014b). The official statement from the city council of La Calera mentioned the importance of the change in Providencia as a precedent to the plebiscite carried out in La Calera: "More than four districts in the country followed the example of Providencia, and after a citizen consultation, they changed the name of their respective 11 de Septiembre</p>

	streets since they considered them alienating and evoking a dark period in Chile's history" (Rojas, 2015).
S*LIS ↓	In 2015, the city council of La Calera (DIDECO) carried out a survey asking the community whether they would like to change the street's name (11 de Septiembre) or not (Rojas, 2015). 52% of the surveyed inhabitants wanted to keep the name (Rojas, 2015).
Outcome: SURVIVAL	The name is maintained (Rojas, 2015). According to the city council, this decision surprised them (Rojas, 2015).

Augusto Pinochet Monument and Square, Linares

Process tracing	
Causal mechanism	Within-case evidence
Denunciation ↓	Pro-regime commemoration of 11 September 1973 took place in the square on 11 September 2013. The people who come to this commemoration make sure the monument's stone looks brand new. The monument always appears painted or scratched; therefore, regime supporters repaint it (in white) and re-write the monolith's letters (Anonymous Key Informant #1, Linares, personal communication, 11 September 2019). The video of Channel 5 Linares shows how the event was <i>funado</i> by a group of young people with the communist flag, who shouted, "Allende, [our] friend, the people is with you!" (Canal 5 Linares, 2013). This is the first video recording of this commemoration. In fact, for someone who participates in this commemoration, it is the new generations who are the ones who are attacking them, not the previous generations who lived through the period (Anonymous Key Informant #1, Linares, personal communication, 11 September 2019). Elements in the commemoration: A profusion of national and patriotic symbols, such as men dressed as <i>huasos</i> [Chilean peasants], Chilean flags, and floral offerings. They sing the national anthem and are moved by the "brave soldiers." Most of the attendees are senior men, civilians and retired military personnel. According to the video, the attendees feel that "there is a convulsed climate in the country," and they are worried about it. One of the attendees, in his 60s, said: "General Pinochet is always going to be celebrated in Linares, and every year, every September, we will be standing with a raised flag saying thank you, President Pinochet." An adult woman said: "Obviously, it's quite special for me since I'm the daughter of a military man, a wife of a military man, and I'm feeling proud and joyful that my father participated on 11 September 1973 as a policeman, in the recovery of democracy, of the freedom of this country" (Canal 5 Linares, 2013).
WALL ↓	In 2016, a Campaign began on change.org to eliminate the square and the monument in honour of Pinochet. The campaign collected 2.731 signatures (La Cigarra, 2017). According to La Cigarra leaders, "they knew it was difficult and almost impossible to materialise the movement started by La Cigarra, [but] they did manage to install the issue through extensive community coverage" (G. Bustos, 2018). For Félix Villalobos, "this type of [pro-regime] plaques, commemorative stones or squares are unacceptable in Argentina or Germany. A country without memory is a country without history. This small square divides the people of Linares" (Casas, 2017). In August 2017, mayor Mario Meza said he would not discuss the issue: "I will never put this matter on the table, under discussion" (Canal 5 Linares, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c). He said we must live with our political differences (Casas, 2017). Mayor Mario Meza: "This small square and the memorial of the disappeared detainees in Plaza de Armas resulted from decisions made in democracy in the 1990s and 2000s. Therefore, these decisions must be valued and respected. I have the deep conviction that <i>linarenses</i> and Chileans with less than 40 years of age want their authorities to act with high-mindedness. We must know how to live with legitimate differences. People who forget their history are condemned to repeat it" (Casas, 2017). He added: "We must live with legitimate differences" (El Desconcierto, 2017). "They decided there would be two public monuments in Linares. Firstly, the Augusto Pinochet square, the Memorial of the

	Disappeared Detainees. This democratic discussion must be valued, and as mayor, I must respect those decisions adopted altruistically” (Cooperativa, 2017a).
	In September 2018, mayor Mario Meza reiterated: “Do not ask mayor Mario Meza to discuss an issue when mayors of the <i>Nueva Mayoría</i> , with clear political colours, Christian Democrats, socialists, former mayors such as Sergio Sepúlveda [...], Rodrigo Hermosilla Gatica, and Carlos Villalobos, they never had the initiative, nor were they driven by these same movements which today are requesting the change. Third, I will never put the topic on the table for discussion” (Canal 5 Linares, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2018d, 2018e).
Outcome: SURVIVAL	In January 2020, mayor Mario Meza reiterated he would not change his position regarding the survival of Pinochet’s Monument and Square in Linares (Canal 5 Linares, 2020).

## Augusto Pinochet monolith, Pumanque

Process tracing	
Causal mechanism	Within-case evidence
Denunciation ↓	In 2017, Luis Mariano Rendón sent an email to the National Monuments Council (CMN) requesting information about the legal status of the Pumanque monument (Massai, 2017). According to Pumanque’s mayor, the monument is an “issue” only for people outside the community: “[But] it does not generate any noise for us. That happens, first, because, in Pumanque, people are used to it. Secondly, [we do not want to remove it] because there are much more important issues or situations. We don’t pay much attention to it either; it’s not an issue here; In fact, it’s quite the opposite. The people who have restaurants tell me they hope it’s never removed because people come to take pictures and then have lunch due to the media coverage. It has allowed us to do tourism” (Massai, 2017).
WALL ↓	That same year, the mayor of Pumanque said, “the people of Pumanque decide what they want to have and what they don’t want to have [...]. But on the initiative of the city council to remove it, there will be none” (Massai, 2017). He added, “I imagine it [the monument] must be shocking for many people. But the only thing that interests me is that it’s not shocking to anyone in my district. I’m accountable to my people. I’m governed by the city council’s law and the legal regulations for the administration. The council is autonomous. And if someone orders me to take it out, [you have to] put the lucas [money] on. We are not going to spend any money on it either.”
Outcome: SURVIVAL	He said he agreed with condemning human rights violations. Still, he thinks that “if we start erasing all the monuments, then we won’t even remember [these human rights violations]” (Massai, 2017). In the meantime, “the monument has lived with a handful of people who scratch it with graffiti from time to time, others who feel bypassed and go clean it, and a majority who observe it without caring too much” (Massai, 2017).

## Av. Jaime Guzmán, Antofagasta

Process tracing	
Causal mechanism	Within-case evidence
Denunciation ↓	On 30 May 2018, Twitter user Manuel Gutiérrez demanded eliminating the street name (Regionalista, 2018). “Mayor #Antofagasta, may history remember you as the woman who defended your fellow’s dignity, change the name of Av. Jaime Guzman to that of a prominent woman in the city. Jaime Guzmán humiliated women by describing them as “weak female brains.” Courage!” (Gutierrez, 2018). The post has only one retweet and no “like” or comments. In an interview with Antofagasta TV, he said: “It’s not possible to continue honouring the one who has humiliated so many women in the country and for so long. There is plenty of background, his biography, the background his nephew provided, the biography of Cristián Gazmuri, and I think, with all this background. What people know

	<p>today it's reason enough to demand the mayor and councillors that there can be no half measures [...] —not doing it, not changing the name of Av. Jaime Guzmán means maintaining a symbol that expresses the opposite of what the feminist movement strives for [...]. Keeping the name and the monolith of Jaime Guzmán implies the continuation of the symbol of machismo and misogyny in Chile's history" (Antofagasta TV 30, 2018).</p> <p>On 5 June 2018, a formal request was issued to the city council of Antofagasta's Transparency Website. Four local councillors were open to discussing the proposal (Periodista ATV, 2018). Councillor Camilo Kong said: "At Antofagasta's local level, Jaime Guzmán is not a figure that bears the importance of having an avenue in his name" (Antofagasta TV 30, 2018).</p>
<p>WALL ↓ Outcome: SURVIVAL</p>	<p>On 12 June 2018, the Transparency request was cancelled since it could only respond to information requests (Portal de Transparencia, 2018). Antofagasta's mayor is linked to the right-wing party UDI and has shown herself predisposed to help and protect pro-regime memorialisation.</p>

Eliminated Cases

Av. General Francisco Franco [Av. Violeta Parra]

<b>Process tracing</b>	
<b>Causal mechanism</b>	<b>Within-case evidence</b>
<p>Denunciation ↓</p>	<p>In an interview in 2010 with the Agencia de Noticias (by the end of 2012), Charly Vargas, an anti-regime memory agent, talked about how the demand to change the name of Av. General Francisco Franco was developed. The initiative "has always existed," but added that "for two years we have been participating in the initiative to change the name of Av. Francisco Franco [since 2010]." During this time, he and Cultural Centre El Arca de la Pintana began a campaign to raise awareness by installing canvases and posters in the neighbourhood (Centro Alerta, 2013). Centro Alerta added this initiative "was never born from institutions" but rather from below (Centro Alerta, 2013). He added General Francisco Franco street was out of place in La Pintana, a centre-left district with a high percentage of socioeconomically vulnerable population: "It's the symbol of dictatorships, fascism, the ultra-right, the ultra-Catholic and [this] contrasts with the community of this popular, working-class neighbourhood, where there are many workers" (Agencia de Noticias Medio a Medio, 2013). Finally, he said their mobilisation is intended to force authorities to open up: "We are linked to social organisations and not political parties." Their objective is to generate social noise to force political institutions to make changes: "Ultimately, we want the communities to empower themselves and make decisions and [we want] the institutions to obey popular decisions" (Agencia de Noticias Medio a Medio, 2013). In this sense, the Cultural Centre distrusts political parties, and it prefers to promote "self-governed" and "self-organised communities" (Agencia de Noticias Medio a Medio, 2013). This feeling of empowerment is part of a cultural change, a new generation that wants to erase Pinochet's legacies: "We believe our role in El Arca Cultural Centre is to build a new culture within our community, culture involves building identity, rescuing values, organising ourselves, fighting for things and for the things the neighbourhood wants" (Agencia de Noticias Medio a Medio, 2013). According to a key informant, the movement started with a small group of friends who mobilised intensely and for a long time, to achieve this change. Their work included radio programs (Radio Libre y Comunitaria 107.1), workshops, talks, leaving flyers at homes, community education, <i>cacerolazos</i>, protests (which were repressed by the police), and they even organised a carnival that continues to this day ("El Carnaval del 30"). The group received help from other community organisations and the "Chico Trujillo" musical band, which</p>

	participated in the carnivals. It helped raise funds (Anonymous Key Informant #24, La Pintana, personal communication, 23 March 2021).
WO ↓	In 2012, the city council will be composed of mayor PPD Jaime Pavez and councillors PPD, PPD, PC, PDC, PS, UDI and RN, giving a majority to the centre-left (Servel, 2012a, 2012e).
LIR/SN ↓	<p>A non-binding citizen consultation took place on 20 January 2013, asking the community whether they wanted to change the street's name to Violeta Parra or not. Two hundred forty homes voted (out of 436), and the Violeta Parra option won with 59% (149 votes) (Cancioneros.com, 2013). According to Charly Vargas, the name Violeta Parra resonated with the community much more than "General Francisco Franco." Francisco Franco's fascism was associated with Jaime Guzmán, his Constitution, and "death and extermination" (Centro Alerta, 2013).</p> <p>However, according to Cancioneros media, "many of the citizens of La Pintana who voted did not know who Franco was and only knew "he was Spanish," [still] Violeta has won another battle against fascism" (Cancioneros.com, 2013). Charly Vargas said: "We discussed rescuing a symbol that was very present in the community, that people could locate, associate, and that it was not something harsh, but instead a cultural symbol that would help us rescue La Pintana's identity. Violeta Parra represents all we are fighting for. She sang for all our struggles for the Mapuche, the students, the shanty towns, and dignified life. She represents everything we fight for and for what we want as a new society" (Agencia de Noticias Medio Medio, 2013). One of my interviewees told me that s/he did not know who Franco was. S/He also said that s/he remembered this entire period as something "very nice", in which the carnival passed outside their house and in which the young people mobilised to change the name of the street. However, s/he also told me that the movement was gone, that it had turned off" (Anonymous Informant #25, La Pintana, personal communication, 23 March 2021).</p> <p>For the consultation, the "City council cooperated with casting the votes and the loan of the ballot boxes to carry out the consultation process, which was organised by the Centro Cultural el Arca" (Municipalidad de La Pintana, 2013, p. 2).</p>
LIR ↓	On 26 April 2013, the council's majority gave a favourable opinion to the change of name, "but all the neighbours involved should be informed about the costs that this modification has in a particular way." One of the assistants abstained (Municipalidad de La Pinata, 2013, pp. 4-6).
Outcome: ELIMINATION	On 14 May 2013, the city council (with a centre-left majority) (Servel, 2016e) approved the street's change. The decision was unanimous (Centro Alerta, 2013). In the session, the mayor said that "generally he has been cautious in proposing this type of matters in inhabited places, due to the problems that the change of name streets where people live entails, therefore, the consultation has looked for the way to diminish the effects that this Resolution will imply for the neighbours." He adds that the city council will bear the costs. There will only be costs if the owners decide to sell their houses. He also said that "he has been reluctant to change the name of the streets due to the problems it implies, but in recent times this situation has been repeated in several districts [in the context of the 40 <sup>th</sup> anniversary of the coup] (Municipalidad de La Pintana, 2013, p. 2). Councillor Manuel Pavez (PS) said, "there is a historical, social and political argument in the district that supports the proposed change of name." He added that "it is striking that councillor Navarrete [PPD] has presented antecedents for not respecting the result of the vote in the democratic exercise that took place [...]" (Municipalidad de La Pintana, 2013, p. 3). Councillor Marcelo Sandoval (PPD) approved the motion saying that "the most important thing is to change the name of that street, to end the footprint of the dictator Francisco Franco in the district. He believes that it would be convenient to regulate the procedure for changing the name of streets in La Pintana and for the citizen consultation to be incorporated into this type of initiative [...] so that the inactive community that opposes everything does not worry about objecting to the work what others do" (Municipalidad de La Pintana, 2013, p. 3). Councillor Luis Huneeus (RN) said that "he has been working in the district for twenty-eight years and respects the changes that have been incorporated in this

	<p>territory, recognises that he supports the name of Violeta Parra who has won, and which does not exist in the district, which is supported by the work done by young people in the sector in charge of this process” (Municipalidad de La Pintana, 2013, p. 4). Councillor Abigail Acosta (UDI) said she agreed with the change since the community supported it. However, she is still worried about the “problems affecting neighbours” when the change takes place and the fact that the name of the “Padre [Antonio Ghyselen]” would have also been appropriate. She said that she “expresses her agreement with the result of the vote, even though her position is that the street's name is kept due to the problems that involve the neighbours who live there” (Municipalidad de La Pintana, 2013, p. 5).</p> <p>The motion was approved unanimously by all the councillors and the mayor.</p>
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#### Augusto Pinochet Plaque at Walmart [former D&S]

Within-case evidence	
Causal mechanism	Description
WO	By the end of 2010, and anticipating social outrage, Walmart had already decided to remove the plaque from its premises to prevent “various interpretations” (Cooperativa, 2011a, 2011b).
Denunciation ↓	The plaque came to light thanks to a photo sent to The Clinic newspaper on 3 January 2011. According to the newspaper, “an outraged reader sent us this photograph” (The Clinic, 2011). According to La Cuarta Newspaper, this situation generated a “huge controversy” (Foncea, 2011).
SN ↓	That same month, several centre-left MPs publicly condemned the plaque. Deputy Tucapel Jiménez (PPD) said that considering the recent conviction in the murder of General Prats and his wife, such commemoration was very sombre (Foncea, 2011). He also added this was a “tremendous provocation” and said, “it’s a provocation to all Chileans” (Foncea, 2011). Socialist Deputy Sergio Aguiló said a monument to a “criminal and thief” was unacceptable. He added, “there are almost no reminders, or statues left, in favour of Pinochet,” signalling the decline of Pinochet’s image (Cooperativa, 2011).
Outcome: ELIMINATION	As noted before, Walmart had already decided to remove the plaque from its premises in 2010.

#### Av. 11 de Septiembre [Av. Nueva Providencia]

Process tracing	
Causal mechanism	Within-case evidence
Denunciation ↓	In 2012, civil society individuals (academics, students, neighbours, NGO members, and human rights activists) gathered in the <i>Desmonumentar la Dictadura</i> movement. They launched a public campaign to collect support and signatures to remove the name of Av. 11 de Septiembre. They invited interested citizens to send their name, RUT (national identification number), and occupation to their email. They said Chile should follow the example of eliminating Francoist symbols in Spain and the <i>Desmonumentar a Roca</i> movement in Argentina (Desmonumentar el Golpe, 2012; NGO Desmonumentar el Golpe, 2013).
WO ↓	By the end of 2012, the city council will be composed of mayor Josefa Errázuriz (Independent – centre-left), and councillors PRO, PPD, PDC, PS from the centre-left, and UDI, RN, RN and ILH (centre-right Coalición por el Cambio), giving a majority to the centre-left (5 over 4). Cristián Labbé (UDI) had remained in office for over 16 years (Serval, 2012b, 2012f). On 6 December 2012, Errázuriz took office as the new Providencia mayor. Errázuriz’s victory implied a re-definition of the relationship between the city council and the community, as she promised she would significantly support local participation. “We understand the idea of participation as a cornerstone in designing and implementing a democratic political model for

	the district, which means redefining the relations between the neighbours and the city council” (J. Errázuriz, 2012, p. 16).
SN ↓	In June 2013, these organisations continued pressuring her and decided to send her a letter “since we could not have a meeting with the mayor,” said Luis Mariano Rendón (Vega & Ciudadanos por la Memoria, 2013). About 600 people, including neighbours, artists, academics, national academic awards, and political and social leaders, signed the letter (note: There are no victims’ associations). The initiative has “had broad citizen support” (Hora 20 La Red, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d, 2013e), and is Errázuriz’s proposal with the most “citizen adhesion” (M. Romero, 2013a, 2013b). In the letter, they say that the street’s name relevance “far transcends the reality of Providencia.” For them, the name symbolises human rights violations. They also said the word “harshly offends all santiaguinos” and “several of us have witnessed the perplexity of foreign visitors when they learn that one of the main streets of the capital continues to have this name, more than 20 years after the end of the Pinochet dictatorship” (El Periodista, 2013).
Outcome: ELIMINATION	On 2 July 2013, The city council approved the name change of Av. 11 de Septiembre. All centre-left councillors approved the motion together with the mayor. Right-wing councillors did not attend the meeting except for RN councillor José Manuel Monckeberg, who decided to participate, thus generating the necessary quorum (5 against 1: PRO, PPD, PS, DC, against one RN). In her speech, mayor Errázuriz referred to the previous administration, saying, “the community was already tired of it” (Municipalidad de Providencia, 2013b, p. 9). Councillor Monckeberg noted that “in his email inbox, he had a hundred emails from neighbours who have wanted to be heard and letters with lists of up to a thousand neighbours who opposed [the measure]” (p. 12). Councillor David Silva said that even an Army General (Juan Emilio Cheyre) admitted the Army’s institutional responsibilities in human rights violations; therefore, the street name was no longer acceptable (p. 14). “When [the city council] approved the change, some participants burst into applause and others in boos. While some women shouted in support of General Augusto Pinochet’s memory, a larger group celebrated with signs reading Nueva Providencia” (Hora 20 La Red, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d, 2013e; Soy Chile, 2013b, 2013a). Maya Fernández Allende, Salvador Allende’s niece, attended the session and said she was “excited to see many neighbours hugging” (CNN Chile, 2013c, 2013d, 2013d).

## 11 de Septiembre Street [Aquilina Rojas Street]

Within-case evidence	
Causal mechanism	Description
Denunciation ↓	In 2013, neighbours of the neighbourhood unit N° 14 asked the Pedro Aguirre Cerda city councillors to change the 11 de Septiembre Street to Aquilina Rojas (Municipalidad de Pedro Aguirre Cerda, 2013b, p. 29).
LIR ↓	On 24 June 2013, Neighbourhood Unit N° 14 Los Maitenes residents sent a letter to the mayor of Pedro Aguirre Cerda (Claudina Núñez, PC) requesting the elimination of the name 11 de Septiembre Alley and a new name: Aquilina Rojas Alley. According to one of my interviewees, being able to live in the 11 de Septiembre Street area was thanks to one of the Palestro brothers, who arranged for them to have access to houses in that area. S/He said there were many “people of struggle” in that area, just like her. They had fought to have a home, and later they had also opposed the military regime. This period caused the community “much pain” (Anonymous Key Informant #8, Pedro Aguirre Cerda, personal communication, 16 March 2021).
LIR ↓	On 31 July 2013, the neighbourhood council (COSOC) unanimously approved to change the name (Municipalidad de Pedro Aguirre Cerda, 2013a). The meeting’s minutes say: “For this purpose, it’s proposed the name of Aquilina Rojas González be recovered. Doña Aquilina was the mother of Mario [PS] and Tito Palestro [PS], mayor of San Miguel, between 1956 and

	1973. Likewise, it's proposed the adjacent square be named after Mario Palestro. The attendees approve both changes unanimously" (Municipalidad de Pedro Aguirre Cerda, 2013a).
WO ↓	On 6 August 2013, a centre-left-dominated city council approved the change (Serval, 2012h). In the session, the mayor invited councillors to vote in favour of the initiative: "[...] Then, I would ask you to vote for approval, in a vote, gentlemen councillors, for the street to be called Aquilina Rojas and the square and the multi-court, Don Mario Palestro Rojas. In voting. Any opinion [?]. The neighbourhood council president is here with us; does the president have something to say [?]" (Municipalidad de Pedro Aguirre Cerda, 2013b, p. 30). The neighbourhood council's president appreciates the mayor and the council's disposition. They unanimously approved the change: "First of all, thanks to the mayor and the entire council, this is very important for this directive because it was the longing of the founders of our sector; it was the first toma [land takeover] that was made. Thanks a lot" (Municipalidad de Pedro Aguirre Cerda, 2013b, p. 30).
Outcome: ELIMINATION	The city council issued an official decree on 14 August 2013, authorising the name change (Municipalidad de Pedro Aguirre Cerda, 2013c).

## Augusto Pinochet Plaque, UCN

Process tracing	
Causal mechanism	Within-case evidence
Denunciation LIR ↓	By the end of 2015, students, former students, professors and members of the educational community of the Universidad Católica del Norte sent a letter to the authorities requesting the removal of this "controversial" plaque (258 signatures) (D. González, 2016). According to the letter, "the permanence of this plaque is an affront to the pain of those who suffered physical and psychological repression by state agents, in addition to representing the opposite to reconciliation which, as we know, is based on truth and effective justice concerning the guilty and reparations to the victims" (D. González, 2016).
WO ↓ Outcome: ELIMINATION	The university authorities accepted the request and removed the plaque (D. González, 2016). On 11 September 2018, the Federation of Students of the Catholic University of the North, together with the University, organised a commemorative ceremony in memory of the students and teachers, members of the educational community, who were arrested, disappeared and executed during the dictatorship. The University's director, Jorge Tabilo, "thanked the invitation to take part in this ceremony and stressed the importance of continuing to build the identity of the UCN through dialogue" (Universidad Católica del Norte (UCN), 2018).

## Lorenzo Gotuzzo Street [Amanda Labarca Street]

Process tracing	
Causal mechanism	Within-case evidence
Denunciation ↓	In January 2016, the Ministry of Education proposed the city council of Santiago to rename a nearby street in honour of Amanda Labarca (Adriasola, 2016; Municipalidad de Santiago, 2016a, p. 24). According to the council, "Her work was mainly aimed at improving the situation of women in Latin America and women's suffrage in Chile. Her legacy remains in force in multiple publications favouring women's rights, especially in education issues" (Municipalidad de Santiago, 2016a, p. 25). In the COSOC meeting (with civil society), mayor Carolina Tohá proposed that the renamed street be Almirante Lorenzo Gotuzzo. She commented that "it was appropriate to make this change and that it was appropriate for the ministry to have a teacher's name with this background in a neighbouring street." She also mentions that the change must be done before 8 March, when commemorating international women's day (Municipalidad de Santiago, 2016a, p. 25). The measure created controversy:

	<p>“A large mural, cafes and the Ministry of Finance are part of Almirante Lorenzo Gotuzzo street, in the capital’s heart, and now also in the centre of controversy, since the idea of its name change generates divisions” (Mediabanco, 2016).</p>
<p>WO ↓</p>	<p>On 6 December 2012, mayor Carolina Tohá (PPD, centre-left) took office in the Mayorality of Santiago (Serval, 2012d, 2012h). Between 2000 and 2012, the city council of Santiago was dominated by the right. However, from 2012 to 2016, a space was opened for the centre-left with a PPD mayor and five centre-left councillors.</p>
<p>LIR ↓</p>	<p>Next, the Citizen Participation Subdirectorate conducted a survey (29 participants). It asked: “Would you agree with changing the name of Almirante Lorenzo Gotuzzo street to that of Teacher Amanda Labarca?” 79% said yes, and 21% rejected the idea (Municipalidad de Santiago, 2016a, pp. 25–29).</p>
<p>LIR ↓</p>	<p>On 28 January 2020, the idea was proposed in the neighbourhood council (COSOC), where neighbours gave their support. 14 neighbourhood councillors approved, two abstained, and three rejected the motion (Municipalidad de Santiago, 2016a, p. 27). After the issue was exposed, two participants congratulated the change. One of them said that “[I would] just [want to] congratulate the initiative, [which] it has taken place among other name changes, and it is good that we begin to change the faces of the true representatives of our country’s history, who contributed, not those who represent the saddest episodes [...]. It is appreciated.” However, one of the councillors opposed the measure (Municipalidad de Santiago, 2016a, p. 27).</p>
<p>Outcome: ELIMINATION</p>	<p>During the city council, the reasons for the name change are presented. It is emphasised that this would not be a political issue but only a vindication of the women’s struggle: “In this context, and beyond the opinions that my opposition colleagues, who got entangled with the issue that this was political and that the other was an Admiral, and it was an Admiral who was put there, I don’t know” (Municipalidad de Santiago, 2016b, p. 46). The city council approved changing the name with six votes in favour and four against. The councillors who supported the measure are close to the <i>Nueva Mayoría</i> (former <i>Concertación</i>). “Meanwhile, it was rejected by councillors Leonel Herrera, Carlos Kubick, Felipe Alessandri and Carolina Lavín, all related to the parties of the <i>Chile Vamos</i> conglomerate” (El Mostrador, 2016a). Felipe Alessandri defended Almirante Lorenzo Gotuzzo by saying: “He has never been tarnished with the issue of Human Rights” and “there is also an ideological issue of politics [involved in this change]” (Municipalidad de Santiago, 2016b, pp. 48–49). He also said, “I am going to express my vote against, not for political reasons, but rather for practical reasons. I believe that certainly, an Admiral deserves the greatest of respect” (p. 49). Councillor Kubick argued, “they talk trash against General Pinochet” (p. 51) and that there are more relevant issues to worry about. He also said that this change, even if the mayor tried to deny it, was undoubtedly driven by political motivations: “I regret that we are working on this, dedicating time and resources to issues that are certainly not a priority for the population [...], any other street in the sector could have been chosen or some other street adjacent to the Ministry of Education, and for this reason, is that I am going to reject [the motion]” (p. 51). Councillor Calderón said that this initiative was aimed at ending the dictatorship’s legacies: “It is already a good way to end the vestiges of the dictatorship in this country, as the Germans have ended the traces of Nazism” (p. 54). The mayor said that it was a mainly practical decision since it is the most straightforward street to change and that is closer to the Ministry of Education, but in which the ideological issue could also have influenced: “Undoubtedly, in Chile, a street that pays tribute to the Prime Minister of Finance of the dictatorship in the civic neighbourhood is a reason for discord” (p. 57). She added that “if someone has an objection or has a problem, it activates, if they have no objection, in general, they participate little, even so, most of those who spoke did so favourably and, rather, this has been very well received because it has already begun to appear on the social networks [...]”, and that “had to fight a lot against that dictatorship, and for the same reason, I lost a father as a result of that dictatorship; therefore, my political behaviour has always made clear my limits with that dictatorship” (p. 60).</p>

## 11 de Septiembre Street [Francisco Silva Street]

<b>Process tracing</b>	
<b>Causal mechanism</b>	<b>Within-case evidence</b>
WO	In the 2012 municipal elections, the city council of Quillota was comprised of a centre-left majority (Serval, 2012c, 2012g).
Denunciation/LIR ↓	On 26 June 2016, footballer Francisco Silva scored a goal in the Copa América Centenario Cup, which gave Chile the victory over Argentina. Some neighbours suggested that the street 11 de Septiembre be renamed Francisco Silva. According to Soy Quillota Newspaper, the mayor congratulated Francisco Silva on Facebook. Some neighbours began to leave comments suggesting the change (Soy Chile, 2016a, 2016b). According to RLV Newspaper, “it was the neighbours who led the initiative to change the name of this road” (RLV, 2016).
LIR ↓	In June/July 2016, a survey interviewed 44 families, of which 40 favoured changing the name (Municipalidad de Quillota, 2016, p. 77).
Outcome: ELIMINATION	The name change proposal was presented to the city council by mayor Luis Mella (DC) (Soy Chile, 2016a, 2016b). All councillors approved the proposal except Fernando Puentes (DC), who opposed it, arguing this is too “emotional” a decision and other athletes in the district who have not yet received a tribute must be honoured too (Municipalidad de Quillota, 2016, p. 78).

## Av. Jaime Guzmán [Av. José Ramírez Allende], Rengo

<b>Process tracing</b>	
<b>Causal mechanism</b>	<b>Within-case evidence</b>
WO	In the 2016 municipal elections, mayor Carlos Soto (independent linked to PPD) was elected. The city council was composed mainly of centre-left councillors, with only one centre-right councillor (RN) (Serval, 2016c, 2016g).
Denunciation ↓	In 2016, following the death of athlete José Ramírez Allende (31 October 2016), who was born in the district, mayor Carlos Soto proposed changing the Av’s name and renaming it honouring the athlete (Municipalidad de Rengo, 2017b, p. 7).
LIR ↓	In 2016/2017, neighbours in the district (Rinconada de Malambo, El Villorrio, Los Conquistadores, Villa San Benito) favoured the new name and sent letters to the city council (Municipalidad de Rengo, 2017b, p. 8). Four letters were sent. In the first letter of 2 March 2017, a neighbour says that “it is something that we as neighbours do not care [much], since for us the most important thing is that before worrying about a [street] name, I would better think about fixing the avenues that are full of holes [...] here we have many old adults with difficulty to walk and fall easily” (Municipalidad de Rengo, 2017a). The second letter mentions that the Neighbourhood Unit “supports mayor Carlos Soto’s initiative to change the name of Avenida Jaime Guzmán” (Junta de Vecinos de Los Conquistadores de Rengo, 2016). The third letter also approved the name change. It said that “We take the opportunity to thank you [the mayor] for your visit to our Villa to give us only good news” (Villa el Villorrio de Rengo, 2017). The fourth letter mentions that “having made the inquiries to our neighbours, we communicate our support for the name change” (Junta de Vecinos de Villa San Benito, n/d).
Outcome: ELIMINATION	On 8 March 2017, mayor Carlos Soto proposed to change the name of Av. Jaime Guzmán to José Ramírez Allende. He said: “Such an important street” should bear the name of someone close to the community” (Municipalidad de Rengo, 2017b, p. 7). The change was approved unanimously. One of the councillors said: “It seems a significant act [...] also in the future, there should be names of prominent women” (p. 9).

## Manuel Contreras plaques and photographs

<b>Process tracing</b>	
<b>Causal mechanism</b>	<b>Within-case evidence</b>
Denunciation ↓	<p>On 25 May 2018, through the Transparency Law (document N° AD 006T-0002785), lawyer Cristián Cruz asked the Army to inform him about the presence of plaques, photographs, pictures and paintings in honour of Manuel Contreras in two military precincts: the War Academy (La Reina, Metropolitan Region), and School of Engineers Tejas Verdes (San Antonio, Valparaíso Region) (Cruz, 2018). After this, On 7 September 2019, lawyer Luis Mariano Rendón filed a protection appeal (<i>recurso de protección</i>) before the Court of Appeals against the commander-in-chief of the Army (Ricardo Martínez Menanteau) “for omitting the removal of the plaques and photographs installed in Army premises commemorating Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda” (Rendón, 2019b, p. 1).</p> <p>Rendón argued these commemorations damaged his right to mental integrity [Article 19, N° One of the Constitution] and violated the guarantees of non-repetition (pp. 3–4). “In other words, the Army, like any state institution, must respect and actively promote human rights. Instead, it commemorates the passing through its premises of the one who has been the main violator of such rights in Chile’s history” (p. 2).</p> <p>He talked about the danger these commemorations represent: “When presenting Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda in educational establishments of the Army as a normal officer who fulfilled his duty, without any mention of his crimes, it conveys the implicit message that military duty may include re-committing such crimes if circumstances warrant. This message is transmitted to new generations of officers and troops” (p. 3).</p> <p>He also said this perpetuates salvational memory: “We cannot rest assured that the Chilean Armed Forces have changed and whatever the circumstances, they will never again commit crimes against Chileans, they will never again be a threat to a part of Chile. Furthermore, there is a more than a sufficient record that some young Army officers continue to support the criminal acts of the military dictatorship and despise its victims” (p. 6). “In this case, as has already been said, the Army wrongly educates by not presenting the true story of Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda in the institutional precincts, omitting all information about his crimes and, instead, normalising his figure among those of the honourable military” (p. 7).</p> <p>For Rendón, these tributes violate the guarantees of non-repetition established in Resolution 60/147, adopted in the 64<sup>th</sup> plenary session of the United Nations, regarding proper reparations to victims of human rights violations (specifically section N° 23) (p. 4).</p>
SN ↓	<p>On 10 September 2019, Radio Biobio revealed the Army maintained photographs and plaques of Manuel Contreras. The report states, “this is exposed one day before the 45<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the coup <i>d’état</i>” (Radio Biobio, 2018).</p> <p>Later, lawyer Luis Mariano Rendón used this piece of news as part of the documents that supported his appeal for protection against Contreras’s photographs and plaques (Rendón, 2019b). He said this news “gives an account of the existence of the commemorations to Manuel Contreras inside the Military precincts” (p. 8). On 3 January 2020, Mónica Rincón, a well-known journalist for CNN Chile, commented on the case, saying the plaques and images should be kept in the institution “but only so that Manuel Contreras is an explicit example of what the Army should never, never do [...]” (CNN Chile, 2020). On 4 January, Fundación Memoria Histórica, Luis Mariano Rendón is a member, publicly expressed its disappointment at the Army’s appeal and regretted the Army evaded an “institutional admission of its responsibility regarding the severe and systematic human rights violations during the dictatorship.” They also mention, “it’s evident that a self-perception persists, according to which the Army owes to itself, as an institution separated from society, which has created it [...]. We believe the notion of autonomy in the armed forces persists” (Zúñiga, 2020). On 28 January 2020, Sofía Prats Cuthbert, daughter of General Carlos Prats, who the DINA murdered under Manuel Contreras’s command, became part of the</p>

	litigation and filed a protection appeal. She appealed, representing her sisters María Angélica Prats Cuthbert and Hilda Cecilia Prats Cuthbert. She expressed this: “Hurts us as victims of Mr Manuel Contreras” (Prats Cuthbert, 2020, p. 3).
WO ↓	<p>The Fifth Chamber of the Court of Appeals ruled in favour of Luis Mariano Rendón and ordered the Army to eliminate the photographs and plaques. It gave the Army three days to comply.</p> <p>The ruling of the Court of Appeals rejected the thesis of military autonomy by saying, “there cannot be forbidden reserves or spaces laying outside the adoption of measures [...] of judicial protection” (C.A, 2019, p. 4).</p> <p>Also, this is an “arbitrary” tribute (p. 7). “It is a fact of public knowledge that Brigadier General Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda was convicted in multiple criminal proceedings as the author of serious attacks and human rights violations, constituting crimes against humanity, including the crimes of qualified homicide and kidnapping or forced disappearance of people” (p. 5). The ruling refers to “Article 63.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights, [which] establishes the duty of the states to repair the consequences derived from the violation of fundamental rights” (p. 6). The ruling also said Resolution 60/147, “whatever the binding force,” refers to a duty states could not evade for the comprehensive reparation of victims, which goes beyond financial reparations. For instance, measures that “promote the formation of a true human rights culture are presented as the most suitable mechanisms to achieve such ends” (p. 6).</p> <p>It argues these plaques and photographs do not deserve a visible commemoration, but rather, a historical record in history books or similar elements: “If historical records are involved, then, annotations in books, cards or documents are enough for this [purpose] [...]. Therefore, keeping other kinds of testimonies [such as plaques and images] - aside from being counterproductive with the existence of a “National Human Rights Plan” - is totally unnecessary for that purpose” (p. 6).</p> <p>Finally, it said victims do not need to prove their physical and psychological harm. Rendón is a victim of human rights violations (as shown in Valech II). Therefore, it is evident that the mere fact of knowing about the existence of these commemorative plaques and photographs is sufficient enough to cause mental disturbance (p. 8).</p> <p>Nonetheless, they believe the Army doesn’t need to display – in the space of Contreras’s commemorations – the Court’s final ruling (p. 8). The Court of Appeals gave the Army three days to remove the commemorations.</p> <p>According to Rendón, this situation demonstrates that “it must be the Courts, at the request of civil society, who order the elimination of these tributes” and “it must be the civil organisations who must fight against denialism” (Villa, 2019).</p>
Outcome: ELIMINATION	On 7 April 2020, the Supreme Court dictated the fulfilment of the ruling (Corte Suprema de Chile, 2020b).

Lucía Hiriart Square [Arturo Godoy Square]

<b>Process tracing</b>	
<b>Causal mechanism</b>	<b>Within-case evidence</b>
WO	By 2018, the city council was not dominated by the centre-right (Serval, 2016a, 2016d).
Denunciation ↓	By the beginning of 2018, neighbours of Iquique, organised in the Junta de Vecinos Dagoberto Godoy, campaigned against the square’s name and for the need to change it to Arturo Godoy, a well-known boxer star from the area (CNN Chile, 2018).
LIR ↓	On 12 March 2018, Neighbours of Iquique, organised in the Junta de Vecinos Dagoberto Godoy, sent a letter to Iquique’s mayor requesting to change the name of Lucía Hiriart Square to Arturo Godoy Square. In the letter, they say that “after consultation with our neighbours, the name chosen was unanimously accepted, making a recognition of our neighbour and great boxer from Iquique, who thus far only had a passage with his name

	in the city, place where the square is currently being rebuilt” (Junta de Vecinos Dagoberto Godoy, 2018a, 2018b).
LIR ↓	On 9 April 2018, Iquique’s neighbourhood council (COSIQ) unanimously approved the motion (Municipalidad de Iquique, 2018a).
Outcome: ELIMINATION	On 12 April 2018, the mayor of Iquique (independent) presented the motion in the city council’s discussion. It was approved with seven votes in favour and two against (Agreement N° 254/2018). Two right-wing councillors opposed the measure (Municipalidad de Iquique, 2018b).

## Av. Jaime Guzmán [Av. Dorsal]

<b>Process tracing</b>	
<b>Causal mechanism</b>	<b>Within-case evidence</b>
WO	Renca’s city council had traditionally been right-winged, but in 2016 a new city council was elected in which the <i>Nueva Mayoría</i> coalition was elected. This opened up the opportunity to hear demands regarding eliminating authoritarian legacies. Mayor Claudio Castro (DC, centre-left) was elected with 64.62% of the votes, far ahead of the UDI candidate, 26.87%. Now the council is composed of five <i>Nueva Mayoría</i> (centre-left) councillors and three <i>Chile Vamos</i> (right) councillors (Servel, 2016b, 2016f).
Denunciation ↓	On 10 September 2020, Colectivo Poesía y Territorio presented a Facebook post with a photograph demanding the removal Av. Jaime Guzmán: “Never again a Jaime Guzmán Avenue in Renca!”
SN ↓	That same month Colectivo Poesía y Territorio surveyed 1,022 people, of which 97.2% approved the change. The survey was conducted online, and people outside the district also participated (114 people) (Colectivo Poesía y Territorio, 2020, personal communication, 5 October 2020). Other social organisations also conducted surveys supporting the name change (Anonymous Key Informant #18, Renca, personal communication, 17 March 2021). According to one of my interviewees, during this process, some people put up “posters”, slogans and canvases on Jaime Guzmán Avenue to promote the initiative and raise awareness among citizens (Anonymous Key Informant #14, Renca, personal communication, 17 March 2021).
LIR ↓	On 5 October 2020, Colectivo Poesía y Territorio sent its survey “Never again a Jaime Guzmán Avenue in Renca” to the city council of Renca. According to Claudio Castro, civil organisations sent the council a letter with “thousands of signatures” supporting the initiative (The Clinic, 2020). According to several news reports, the mayor had argued the name Jaime Guzmán “has no direct relationship with the district, nor with its history and identity, in addition to being a person linked to a civic-military dictatorship and whose memory causes division among the district’s inhabitants” (Agencia UNO, 2020b, 2020a). In addition to a survey, the Colectivo Poesía y Territorio delivered a letter to the mayor detailing their motivations for requesting the name change. They say: “This idea was born out of our concern for our history and human rights since the importance of the use of language is also a way to repair the damage, the brutal historical events that we already know took place in our country since 1973 until the return of democracy. As you know, in the district, people were also tortured, and there were disappeared detainees, and even if one wanted to erase the injustice from our lives, it is still written, so reparation is what we still have to do. In this sense, we ask you to change the name so that there will never again be a Jaime Guzmán Avenue in Renca, [that] is what mobilises us. With this, [we] also reaffirm our commitment to our territory, with the people, the neighbourhoods [ <i>poblaciones</i> ], and next to them. We hope you can take action promptly and our voice is heard.” (Colectivo Poesía y Territorio, personal communication, 5 October 2020). Several councillors also delivered a letter to the mayor on the same date. They mention that in the current context of the Social Outbreak and the null legitimacy of the 1980 Constitution, “we cannot afford to

	<p>“pay homage” to a close collaborator of a dictatorship that generated and continues to generate deep wounds in our country.” The name change “would mean an act of reparation for hundreds of renquinos y renquinas.” The letter was signed by councillors Teresa Cordero, María Luisa Irazoqui, Jorge Lozano, Cristián Sandoval, Ishkra Calderón, a Colectivo Poesía y Territorio leader, and by Socialist Party Representative in Renca. It was supported by 77 signatures (supported by other 86 signatures): four neighbourhood councils, Casa de la Mujer de Huamachuco, Chile Diverso, Club Deportivo Social y Cultural la Pobra Insurgente, Grupo de Memoria Renca de Pie, Grupo Folclórico Cuencas y Tormentos, Grupo Recreativo Esperanza. Political Parties: PS, PPD, DC, PC, Convergencia Social (Colectivo Poesía y Territorio, personal communication, 5 October 2020; Municipalidad de Renca, 2020a). The reasons presented for the name change are the following: “The current name corresponds to an individual of the country’s recent history, who has no direct relationship with the district, its history and its identity; the current name corresponds to a person linked to the military dictatorship, and the memory of him generates division among the district’s inhabitants; public spaces and geographical landmarks must represent the communal identity, its inhabitants, and not become a point of contention between them” (Municipalidad de Renca, 2020b).</p>
LIR ↓	The project was discussed in COSOC (neighbourhood council) and was unanimously approved by all neighbourhood councillors (Municipalidad de Renca, 2021).
Outcome: ELIMINATION	On 14 October 2020, Renca’s city council, headed by mayor Claudio Castro, approved changing the name of Av. Jaime Guzmán to its original name: Dorsal. There were seven votes in favour, one abstention and one absent (24 Horas, 2020; Henríquez, 2020; Palacios, 2020; Puranoticia, 2020; Salgado, 2020; The Clinic, 2020).

## General Trends and Patterns Regarding Timing

### *Timing of Inauguration*

#### Favourable Period (1973 – 2004)<sup>102</sup>

Inauguration of pro-regime memory sites, “Favourable Period” (1973 – 2004)			
#	Pro-regime memory site	Date of inauguration	Frequency and %
1	Av. 11 de Septiembre [now Av. República de Chile]	Regime	32 (91%)
2	Av. General Francisco Franco [now Av. Violeta Parra]	Regime	
3	11 de Septiembre Street [now Aquilina Rojas Street]	Regime	
4	11 de Septiembre, Las Compañías	Regime	
5	Av. 11 de Septiembre, La Calera	Regime	
6	Av. 11 de Septiembre [now Av. Francisco Silva]	Regime	
7	Manuel Contreras plaques and photographs	Regime	
8	Lucía Hiriart de Pinochet Square [now Arturo Godoy Square]	Regime	
9	Av. 11 de Septiembre [now Av. Hermanos Carrera]	Regime	
10	Llama de la Libertad	1975	
11	Av. Fabriciano González Urzúa and Av. Ramón Toro Ibáñez	1975	
12	Augusto Pinochet Plaque, UCN, Gimnasio Luis Bisquert	1976	
13	Augusto Pinochet monolith, Pumanque	1977	
14	Escuela de Suboficiales de Carabineros Fabriciano González Urzúa	1977	
15	Av. 11 de Septiembre [now Av. Nueva Providencia]	1980	
16	Almirante Lorenzo Gotuzzo Street [now Amanda Labarca Street]	1980	
17	Augusto Pinochet Plaque, Teatro Municipal Antofagasta	1981	
18	Augusto Pinochet Villa (“La Pinocho”)	1988	
19	Presidente Augusto Pinochet Library [now War Academy Library]	1989	
20	Av. Jaime Guzmán [now Av. José Ramírez Allende]	Democracy	
21	Av. Jaime Guzmán, Antofagasta	Democracy	
22	Jaime Guzmán Plaque, Viña del Mar	Democracy	
23	Augusto Pinochet monolith and square, Linares	1991	
24	Av. Jaime Guzmán [now Av. Dorsal]	1993	
25	José Toribio Merino auditorium	1993	
26	Buque Madre de Submarinos BMS-42 Almirante Merino	1997	
27	Commander-in-chief of the Army C. G. Augusto Pinochet U. Medal	1997	
28	Augusto Pinochet Plaque at Walmart (former D&S)	1999	
29	Augusto Pinochet Monument, La Junta	2000	
30	José Toribio Merino exhibition	2000	
31	José Toribio Merino statue, National Maritime Museum	2002	
32	Lili Marleen Restaurant	2003	

<sup>102</sup> Does not include the case of Costanera Peatonal Almirante José Toribio Merino.

Unfavourable Period (2005 – 2020)

<b>Inauguration of pro-regime memory sites, “Unfavourable Period” (2005 - 2020)</b>			
#	Pro-regime memory site	Date of inauguration	Frequency and %
1	Jaime Guzmán Memorial	2008	3 (9%)
2	Presidente Augusto Pinochet Museum	2008	
3	Jaime Guzmán bust, Los Ángeles	2016	

*Timing of Denunciation*Favourable Period (1990 – 2004)

<b>Denunciation of pro-regime memory sites, “Favourable Period” (1990 - 2004)</b>			
#	Pro-regime memory site	Date of denunciation	Frequency and %
1	Av. 11 de Septiembre [now Av. República de Chile]	1992	3 (9%)
2	Augusto Pinochet Monument, La Junta	2000	
3	Llama de la Libertad	2003	

Unfavourable Period (2005 – 2020)

<b>Denunciation of pro-regime memory sites, “Unfavourable Period” (2005 - 2020)</b>			
#	Pro-regime memory site	Date of denunciation	Frequency and %
1	Commander-in-chief of the Army C. G. Augusto Pinochet U. Medal	2006	29 (91%)
2	Av. General Francisco Franco [now Av. Violeta Parra]	2010	
3	Augusto Pinochet Plaque at Walmart (former D&S)	2011	
4	11 de Septiembre Street [now Aquilina Rojas Street]	2012	
5	Av. 11 de Septiembre [now Av. Nueva Providencia]	2012	
6	11 de Septiembre, Las Compañías	2013	
7	Av. 11 de Septiembre, La Calera	2013	
8	Presidente Augusto Pinochet Library [now War Academy Library]	2013	
9	José Toribio Merino auditorium	2013	
10	Buque Madre de Submarinos BMS-42 Almirante Merino	2013	
11	José Toribio Merino exhibition	2013	
12	José Toribio Merino statue, National Maritime Museum	2013	
13	Augusto Pinochet monolith and square, Linares	2013	
14	Augusto Pinochet Plaque, UCN, Gimnasio Luis Bisquert	2015	
15	Av. 11 de Septiembre [now Av. Francisco Silva]	2016	
16	Almirante Lorenzo Gotuzzo Street [now Amanda Labarca Street]	2016	
17	Av. Jaime Guzmán [now Av. José Ramírez Allende]	2016	
18	Augusto Pinochet monolith, Pumanque	2017	
19	Av. Fabriciano González Urzúa and Av. Ramón Toro Ibáñez	2017	
20	Manuel Contreras plaques and photographs	2018	
21	Lucía Hiriart de Pinochet Square [now Arturo Godoy Square]	2018	
22	Augusto Pinochet Villa (“La Pinocho”)	2018	
23	Av. Jaime Guzmán, Antofagasta	2018	
24	Escuela de Suboficiales de Carabineros Fabriciano González Urzúa	2018	

25	Augusto Pinochet Plaque, Teatro Municipal Antofagasta	2019	
26	Jaime Guzmán Plaque, Viña del Mar	2019	
27	Lili Marleen Restaurant	2019	
28	Costanera Peatonal Almirante José Toribio Merino, Algarrobo	2020	
29	Av. Jaime Guzmán [now Av. Dorsal]	2020	

### *Timing of Elimination*

#### Favourable period (1990 – 2004)

<b>Elimination of pro-regime memory sites, “Favourable Period” (1990 - 2004)</b>			
#	Pro-regime memory site	Date of elimination	Frequency and %
1	Av. 11 de Septiembre [now Av. República de Chile]	1992	2 (9%)
2	Llama de la Libertad	2004	

#### Unfavourable Period (2005 – 2020)

<b>Elimination of pro-regime memory sites, “Unfavourable Period” (2005 - 2020)</b>			
#	Pro-regime memory site	Date of elimination	Frequency and %
1	Av. 11 de Septiembre [now Av. Hermanos Carrera]	2007	20 (91%)
2	Augusto Pinochet Plaque at Walmart (former D&S)	2010	
3	Av. General Francisco Franco [now Av. Violeta Parra]	2013	
4	11 de Septiembre Street [now Aquilina Rojas Street]	2013	
5	Av. 11 de Septiembre [now Av. Nueva Providencia]	2013	
6	Presidente Augusto Pinochet Library [now War Academy Library]	2014	
7	Commander-in-chief of the Army C. G. Augusto Pinochet U. Medal	2014	
8	Buque Madre de Submarinos BMS-42 Almirante Merino	2015	
9	Almirante Lorenzo Gotuzzo street [now Amanda Labarca Street]	2016	
10	Augusto Pinochet Plaque, UCN, Gimnasio Luis Bisquert	2016	
11	Av. 11 de Septiembre [now Av. Francisco Silva]	2016	
12	Av. Jaime Guzmán [now Av. José Ramírez Allende]	2017	
13	Presidente Augusto Pinochet Museum	2017	
14	Lucía Hiriart de Pinochet Square [now Arturo Godoy Square]	2018	
15	Augusto Pinochet Plaque, Teatro Municipal Antofagasta	2019	
16	Jaime Guzmán Plaque, Viña del Mar	2019	
17	Lili Marleen Restaurant	2019	
18	Jaime Guzmán bust, Los Ángeles	2019	
19	Manuel Contreras plaques and photographs	2020	
20	Av. Jaime Guzmán [now Av. Dorsal]	2020	

*Timing of Undeveloped Memory Sites*

<b>Dataset of pro-regime memorials that were planned but never developed</b>			
<b>#</b>	<b>Pro-regime memory site</b>	<b>Town, region</b>	<b>Date of planning</b>
1	Jaime Guzmán Memorial at Plaza Italia	Providencia, MR	2004 <sup>103</sup>
2	Augusto Pinochet Monuments after his death	Santiago, Valparaíso, Iquique	2006
3	Presidente Augusto Pinochet Street	Las Condes, MR	2006
4	Augusto Pinochet's residence (as national monument)	Las Condes, MR	2007
5	Carretera Austral "Presidente Augusto Pinochet Ugarte"	Los Lagos and Aysén Region	2007
6	Nazi Art School President Augusto Pinochet	Ancud, Chiloé, Los Lagos Region	2014
7	Museo de la Verdad ("The Museum of Truth")	n/a	2018
8	Police Science Academy Rodolfo Stange (ACIPOL)	Las Condes, Metropolitan Region	2020

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<sup>103</sup> Approximate date.

**Survival***Data Matrix*

Data matrix of pro-regime memory sites (survival)							
#	Case	Case ID	Explanatory factors				Outcome S = 1 E = 0
			PL	S	LIS	W	
1	José Toribio Merino statue, National Maritime Museum	JTM	1	0	1	1	1
2	11 de Septiembre Street, Las Compañías	11SeptLasComp	1	1	1	0	1
3	Av. 11 de Septiembre, La Calera	11SeptLaCal	1	1	1	0	1
4	Augusto Pinochet monolith and square	Linares	1	0	1	1	1
5	Augusto Pinochet monolith, Pumanque	Pumanque	1	1	1	1	1
6	Av. Jaime Guzmán, Antofagasta	JGAntofagasta	0	1	1	1	1
7	Av. General Francisco Franco [Av. Violeta Parra]	Franco	0	0	1	0	0
8	Augusto Pinochet Plaque at Walmart (former D&S)	APplaqueW	1	0	0	0	0
9	Av. 11 de Septiembre [Av. Nueva Providencia]	11SeptProviden	0	0	1	0	0
10	11 de Septiembre Street [Aquilina Rojas Street]	11SeptPAC	0	1	0	0	0
11	Augusto Pinochet Plaque, Gimnasio Luis Bisquert, UCN	UCN	1	1	0	0	0
12	Lorenzo Gotuzzo Street [Amanda Labarca Street]	Gotuzzo	0	1	0	0	0
13	11 de Septiembre Street [Francisco Silva Street]	11SeptQuill	1	1	0	0	0
14	Av. Jaime Guzmán [Av. José Ramírez Allende]	JGRengo	1	1	0	0	0
15	Manuel Contreras plaques and photographs	ManuelContreras	1	0	1	0	0
16	Lucía Hiriart Square [Arturo Godoy Square]	Iquique	1	1	0	0	0
17	Av. Jaime Guzmán [Av. Dorsal]	JGRenca	0	0	0	0	0
PL = Protective Location S = Silence LIS = Local and/or Institutional Support W = Wall(s)							
Source: Author's original dataset of pro-regime memorialisation in democratic Chile (1990 – 2020).							

*Truth Table*

Truth table of pro-regime memory sites						
Explanatory factors				Outcome	Cases	# of cases
PL	S	LIS	W			
1	1	1	0	1	11SeptLasComp, 11SeptLaCal	2
1	0	1	1	1	JTM, Linares	2
0	1	1	1	1	JGAntofagasta	1
1	1	1	1	1	Pumanque	1
1	1	0	0	0	UCN, 11SeptQuill, JGRengo, Iquique	4
0	1	0	0	0	11SeptPAC, Gotuzzo	2
0	0	1	0	0	Franco, 11SeptProviden	2
0	0	0	0	0	JGRenca	1
1	0	0	0	0	APplaqueW	1
1	0	1	0	0	ManuelContreras	1
PL = Protective Location S = Silence LIS = Local and/or Institutional Support W = Wall(s)						
Source: Author's original dataset of pro-regime memorialisation in democratic Chile (1990 – 2020). Using fsQCA software 3.0 (Ragin, 2008), available at: <a href="http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml">http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml</a>						

*Complex Solution*

Paths to survival (csQCA, complex solution)						
#	Configurations (terms/recipes)	# of cases explained	Cases	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Consistency
1	PL*S*LIS	3	11SeptLasComp 11SeptLaCal Pumanque	0.5	0.33	1
2	PL*LIS*W	3	JTM Linares Pumanque	0.5	0.33	1
3	S*LIS*W	2	Pumanque JGAntofagasta	0.33	0.16	1
Solution coverage: 1 Solution consistency: 1						
PL = Protective Location S = Silence LIS = Local and/or Institutional Support W = Wall(s)						
Source: Author's original dataset of pro-regime memorialisation in democratic Chile (1990 – 2020). Using fsQCA software 3.0 (Ragin, 2008), available at: <a href="http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml">http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml</a>						
Cases that are unique to a particular term are written in <i>italics</i> .						

## Corroboration with R<sup>104</sup>

### Truth Table

Console	Terminal x	Jobs x
R 4.1.3 · ~/ ↗		
	PL SP LIS W	OUT n incl PRI
8	0 1 1 1	1 1 1.000 1.000
12	1 0 1 1	1 2 1.000 1.000
15	1 1 1 0	1 2 1.000 1.000
16	1 1 1 1	1 1 1.000 1.000
1	0 0 0 0	0 1 0.000 0.000
3	0 0 1 0	0 2 0.000 0.000
5	0 1 0 0	0 2 0.000 0.000
9	1 0 0 0	0 1 0.000 0.000
11	1 0 1 0	0 1 0.000 0.000
13	1 1 0 0	0 4 0.000 0.000

### Parsimonious solution

```
> minimize(tt, include = "?", all.sol = T, details=T)

M1: W + SP*LIS <-> Outcome

          inclS  PRI  covS  covU
-----
1         W  1.000  1.000  0.667  0.333
2    SP*LIS  1.000  1.000  0.667  0.333
-----
M1  1.000  1.000  1.000
```

### Intermediate and conservative (complex) solutions

```
> minimize(tt, include="?", dir.exp = c(PL,SP,LIS,W), all.sol = T)

From C1P1:

M1:    PL*SP*LIS + PL*LIS*W + SP*LIS*W <-> Outcome

> minimize(tt, all.sol = T)

M1: PL*SP*LIS + PL*LIS*W + SP*LIS*W <-> Outcome
```

<sup>104</sup> The factor “SP” refers to factor “S” (silence).

**Elimination***Data Matrix*

Data matrix of pro-regime memory sites (elimination)								
#	Case	Case ID	Explanatory factors					Outcome S = 0 E = 1
			UL	SN	LIR	WO	DCY	
1	José Toribio Merino statue, National Maritime Museum	JTM	0	1	1	0	1	0
2	11 de Septiembre Street, Las Compañías	11SeptLasComp	0	0	0	1	1	0
3	Av. 11 de Septiembre, La Calera	11SeptLaCal	0	0	0	1	1	0
4	Augusto Pinochet monolith and square	Linares	0	1	1	0	1	0
5	Augusto Pinochet monolith, Pumanque	Pumanque	0	0	0	0	1	0
6	Av. Jaime Guzmán, Antofagasta	JGAntofagasta	1	0	0	0	1	0
7	Av. General Francisco Franco [Av. Violeta Parra]	Franco	1	1	1	1	0	1
8	Augusto Pinochet Plaque at Walmart (former D&S)	APplaqueW	0	1	1	1	0	1
9	Av. 11 de Septiembre [Av. Nueva Providencia]	11SeptProviden	1	1	1	1	0	1
10	11 de Septiembre Street [Aquilina Rojas Street]	11SeptPAC	1	0	1	1	0	1
11	Augusto Pinochet Plaque, Gimnasio Luis Bisquert, UCN	UCN	0	0	1	1	1	1
12	Lorenzo Gotuzzo Street [Amanda Labarca Street]	Gotuzzo	1	0	1	1	1	1
13	11 de Septiembre street [Francisco Silva street]	11SeptQuill	0	0	1	1	1	1
14	Av. Jaime Guzmán [Av. José Ramírez Allende]	JGRengo	0	0	1	1	1	1
15	Manuel Contreras plaques and photographs	ManuelContreras	0	1	1	1	1	1
16	Lucía Hiriart Square [Arturo Godoy Square]	Iquique	0	0	1	1	1	1
17	Av. Jaime Guzmán [Av. Dorsal]	JGRenca	1	1	1	1	1	1
UL = Unprotective Location SN = Social Noise LIR = Local and/or Institutional Rejection WO = Window of Opportunity DCY = Denunciation During the Critical Years (2013 onwards).								
Source: Author's original dataset of pro-regime memorialisation in democratic Chile (1990 – 2020).								

*Truth Table*

Truth table of pro-regime memory sites							
Explanatory factors					Outcome	Cases	# of cases
UL	SN	LIR	WO	DCY			
0	0	1	1	1	1	UCN, 11SeptQuill, JGRengo, Iquique	4
1	1	1	1	0	1	Franco, 11SeptProviden	2
1	0	1	1	0	1	11SeptPAC	1
0	1	1	1	0	1	APplaqueW	1
1	0	1	1	1	1	Gotuzzo	1
0	1	1	1	1	1	ManuelContreras	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	JGRenca	1
0	1	1	0	1	0	JTM, Linares	2
0	0	0	1	1	0	11SeptLasComp, 11SeptLaCal	2
0	0	0	0	1	0	Pumanque	1
1	0	0	0	1	0	JGAntofagasta	1
UL = Unprotective Location SN = Social Noise LIR = Local and/or Institutional Rejection WO = Window of Opportunity DCY = Denunciation During the Critical Years							
Source: Author's original dataset of pro-regime memorialisation in democratic Chile (1990 – 2020). Using fsQCA software 3.0 (Ragin, 2008), available at: <a href="http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml">http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml</a>							

*Complex Solution*

Paths to elimination (csQCA, complex solution)						
#	Configurations (terms/recipes)	# of cases explained	Cases	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Consistency
1	UL*LIR*WO	5	Franco, 11SeptProviden, 11SeptPAC, Gotuzzo, JGRenca	0.45	0.09	1
2	SN*LIR*WO	5	Franco, APplaqueW, 11SeptProviden, ManuelContreras, JGRenca	0.45	0.09	1
3	LIR*WODCY	7	UCN, Gotuzzo, 11SeptQuill, JGRengo, ManuelContreras, Iquique, JGRenca	0.64	0.36	1
Solution coverage: 1 Solution consistency: 1						
UL = Unprotective Location SN = Social Noise LIR = Local and/or Institutional Rejection				WO = Window of Opportunity DCY = Denunciation During the Critical Years		
Source: Author's original dataset of pro-regime memorialisation in democratic Chile (1990 – 2020). Using fsQCA software 3.0 (Ragin, 2008), available at: <a href="http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml">http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml</a>						
Cases that are unique to a particular term are written in <i>italics</i> .						

## Corroboration with R

### Truth table

Console	Terminal x	Jobs x
R 4.1.3 · ~/		
	UL SN LIR WO ACY	OUT n incl PRI
8	0 0 1 1 1	1 4 1.000 1.000
15	0 1 1 1 0	1 1 1.000 1.000
16	0 1 1 1 1	1 1 1.000 1.000
23	1 0 1 1 0	1 1 1.000 1.000
24	1 0 1 1 1	1 1 1.000 1.000
31	1 1 1 1 0	1 2 1.000 1.000
32	1 1 1 1 1	1 1 1.000 1.000
2	0 0 0 0 1	0 1 0.000 0.000
4	0 0 0 1 1	0 2 0.000 0.000
14	0 1 1 0 1	0 2 0.000 0.000
18	1 0 0 0 1	0 1 0.000 0.000

### Parsimonious solution

```
> minimize(tt_eliminated, include = "?", all.sol = T, details=T)
```

M1: LIR\*WO <-> Outcome  
M2: ~SN\*LIR + SN\*WO <-> Outcome

	inclS	PRI	covS	covU	(M1)	(M2)
1 ~SN*LIR	1.000	1.000	0.545	0.000		0.545
2 SN*WO	1.000	1.000	0.455	0.000		0.455
3 LIR*WO	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.000	-	
M1	1.000	1.000	1.000			
M2	1.000	1.000	1.000			

### Intermediate and conservative (complex) solution

```
> minimize(tt_eliminated, include="?", dir.exp = c(UL,SN,LIR,WO, ACY), all.sol = T)
```

From C1P1, C1P2:

M1: UL\*LIR\*WO + SN\*LIR\*WO + LIR\*WO\*ACY <-> Outcome

```
> minimize(tt_eliminated, all.sol = T)
```

M1: UL\*LIR\*WO + SN\*LIR\*WO + LIR\*WO\*ACY <-> Outcome