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Cooperation and Competition in Organizations: A Dynamic Perspective.

Abstract:

In static principal-agent relationships, cooperation and competition among agents both yield higher welfare than independent compensation - both modes of job design improve the tradeoff between risk and explicit incentives. In dynamic settings, welfare is also affected by implicit incentives, in particular, the ratchet effect. I characterize the effects of job design decisions on implicit incentives, showing that they differ in nature from explicit incentive effects and may be the dominant on...

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Authors


Margaret A. Meyer More by this author
Journal:
European Economic Review
Volume:
39
Issue:
3
Publication date:
1995
DOI:
URN:
uuid:d8843531-e9dc-4532-8da8-ca474e04dbd6
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:12626
Language:
English

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