

**Questioning neutrality:
Sino-Portuguese relations during
the war and the post-war periods,
1937-1949**

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is a study of neutrality and collaboration during the Second World War in East Asia. It analyses the relations between China and Portugal during the conflict and the immediate post-war period, with a particular focus on the enclave of Macau, the only foreign-administered territory in China not to be occupied by Japan. It argues that the practice of Portuguese neutrality in East Asia was marked by great ambivalence and used by different actors for their own, often conflicting, ends. In social history terms, Macau was part of the war, with comparable experiences to other cities in China, including a massive refugee influx, as well as everyday experiences of hunger, popular mobilisation for relief, and urban crime. Wartime Macau was marked by multiple layers of collaboration involving Chinese, Portuguese, British, Japanese, and others. This thesis also argues that wartime issues left unsolved had an impact on Sino-Portuguese relations after the war. Its dealings with a small European imperial power reveal China's attempts and difficulties to exercise its regained sovereignty and new international status.

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LONG THESIS ABSTRACT

‘Questioning neutrality’ analyses the relations between China and Portugal during the Second World War and the immediate post-war period, from the outbreak of an all-out war between China and Japan in 1937 until the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. It focuses on the intersection of international dimensions of China’s World War Two diplomacy and local wartime experiences centred on the enclave of Macau. The first and last European settlement in China, Macau was the only foreign-administered territory in the country not to be occupied by Japan during the war. This thesis argues that neutrality was not strictly practiced in Macau, resulting in the interplay of multiple forms of collaboration.

Across six chapters that follow a combination of thematic and chronological order, this study interrogates how Portuguese neutrality in wartime China was utilised by a variety of actors and how this neutrality was questioned at different moments. It demonstrates that the practice of Portuguese neutrality in East Asia was marked by great ambivalence and used by multiple actors – including Chinese of different factions, Japanese military forces, and British – for their own, often conflicting, ends. Instead of equidistant and impartial refrainment from involvement in war-related activities, Macau was a site used for intelligence gathering, smuggling, trade of various materials, fundraising for resistance, and relief to victims of the conflict. Official neutrality may have been maintained until the war ended but its practice on the ground was marked by many forms of engagement with and among the belligerents and different layers of collaboration.

Sino-Portuguese relations during the war comprised a variety of interactions. Official diplomatic relations were maintained between Portugal and the Chinese central government that relocated to the wartime capital of Chongqing. Nevertheless, the small

European country kept its top diplomat in China in occupied Shanghai, complicating communication between the two countries and contributing to a critical perception of the practice of Portuguese neutrality by Chinese representatives. In Macau, Portuguese authorities engaged in unofficial relations with authorities in Guangdong province of the collaborator Reorganised National Government (RNG) of Wang Jingwei in order to guarantee food supplies into the territory. The way in which the central government and the RNG interacted with the Portuguese reveal how regime competition for legitimacy was played out during the war, together with the ambiguities of the collaborator government, which kept contact with Chongqing through places such as Macau and whose relations with the Japanese authorities were far from smooth.

In social history terms, Portuguese neutrality in Macau did not signify the enclave's isolation. On the contrary, this thesis argues it was part of the war being fought outside its contested borders. Social conditions in Macau reveal comparable dynamics to other cities in China, including a massive refugee influx, as well as everyday experiences of hunger, popular mobilisation for relief, and urban crime. With a population that trebled to around half a million people, the enclave was marked by contradictory everyday realities: prosperity and destitution, safety and danger, displacement and mobility.

The ambiguous status of Macau as an in-between space in wartime China at the crossroads of different empires is also demonstrated through the presence of different intermediaries. Some of these were local business elites who connected the Portuguese administration, the majority Chinese population, Japanese and RNG authorities, British agents, and others. Some of these figures began to assume a prominent position during the conflict and consolidated it in the following decades. The enclave itself may be regarded as an intermediary between the Allies and the Axis, resistance and collaboration, war and peace. It was also a bridge between an old world of European colonial domination being eroded by the war, and a post-war China emerging almost fully sovereign and recognised

as a major world power. Portuguese neutrality ultimately allowed for the maintenance of two remnants of imperialism on China's doorstep. Not only Portuguese-administered Macau but also British-ruled Hong Kong, from where thousands relocated to the neighbouring enclave during the Japanese occupation. In or via Macau, they assisted Britain in maintaining a foothold in China and paved the way to a post-war British return to Hong Kong.

Finally, this thesis also argues that wartime issues left unsolved had an impact on Sino-Portuguese relations in the years that followed the conflict. Its dealings with a small and relatively weak European imperial power covering areas such as post-war justice and territorial sovereignty, demonstrate China's attempts to exercise its heightened international status. They also reveal its difficulties and limitations, which partially sprung from developments of the Chinese civil war and ultimately confirmed the regional dependency towards Guangdong that Macau experienced throughout its history. This dictated a number of compromises and accommodations to whoever controlled the province.

Based on a variety of primary sources mostly in Portuguese, Chinese, and English collected in archives and libraries in different countries and territories, this thesis aims to contribute to the on-going reappraisal of China's World War Two experience as a complex and diverse major event with global ramifications, as well as the practice of competing imperialisms in the region.

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This thesis is predominantly based in primary sources collected in different countries. Besides the FCT, I would like to thank St Antony's College for a Student Travel and Research Grant from the Carr and Stahl Fund that helped fund a research trip to Geneva in September 2014, the AHRC for a Research Training Support Grant that helped fund a research trip to Australia in January 2015, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the Center for Chinese Studies at the National Central Library for a Taiwan Fellowship that allowed me to conduct archival research in Taiwan between March and July 2015. A huge thank you is also owed to Natacha and her family for hosting me during my stay in Macau.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AH – Academia Historica (Guoshiguan), Taipei and Xindian

AHCGD – Arquivo Histórico da Caixa Geral de Depósitos (Caixa Geral de Depósitos Historical Archives), Lisbon

AHCVP – Arquivo Histórico da Cruz Vermelha Portuguesa (Portuguese Red Cross Society Historical Archives), Lisbon

AHD – Arquivo Histórico-Diplomático do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros (Historical Archives of the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Lisbon

AHU – Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (Overseas Historical Archives), Lisbon

AM – Arquivo de Macau (Archives of Macau), Macau

ANTT – Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo (Portuguese National Archives), Lisbon

AOS – Arquivo Oliveira Salazar (Oliveira Salazar Archives at the ANTT)

AS-IMH – Academia Sinica, Institute of Modern History Archives, Nangang

BAAG – British Army Aid Group

BNU – Banco Nacional Ultramarino (National Overseas Bank)

CCP – Chinese Communist Party

CMC – Chinese Maritime Customs

CRB – Central Bank of Reserves (of the RNG)

EIC – East India Company

FO – Foreign Office, United Kingdom

HKPRO – Hong Kong Public Records Office, Hong Kong

HKU – Hong Kong University Library, Hong Kong

ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross Archives, Geneva

IWM – Imperial War Museum, London

KMT – Kuomintang (Nationalist Party)

MC – Ministério das Colónias (Ministry of Colonies, Portugal)

MELCO – Macao Electric Lighting Company

MNE – Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Portugal)

MOFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China

NHW – Netherlands Harbour Works Company

NLA – National Library of Australia, Canberra

OSS – Office of Strategic Studies

PPC – People’s Political Council

PRC – People’s Republic of China

RNG – Reorganised National Government

ROC – Republic of China

SOE – Special Operations Executive

TNA – The National Archives, Kew

UK – United Kingdom

UN – United Nations

USA – United States of America

USSR – Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics

WATCO – Macau Waterworks

NOTE ON NAMES

Chinese names are spelled according to the *Hanyu Pinyin* romanisation system. Exceptions to this are names of major figures commonly known in Europe with other spelling (e.g. Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, T.V. Soong), in their English version (e.g. Robert Ho Tung), or names whose *Pinyin* equivalent could not be traced from the sources (e.g. a few Cantonese names mentioned in English and Portuguese sources).

Likewise, an exception is made to names of Chinese institutions that still exist today and whose official name romanisation does not follow *Hanyu Pinyin* (e.g. Kuomintang, Kiang Wu Hospital, Tung Sin Tong).

Regarding Chinese place names, except for a few these usually follow *Hanyu Pinyin* (e.g. Chongqing; Guangzhou). However, other spellings might be used when quoting from primary sources (e.g. Chungking; Canton). Macau is used to refer to the territory known in *Pinyin* as Aomen (it is only spelled 'Macao' when citing certain sources).

The struggle for survival was gradually stripped of mask and ornament to reveal a primitive brutality. A reasonable sense of shame was not cheap at all; many could not afford it.

Qian Zhongshu, *Fortress Besieged* (1947)¹

¹ Z. Qian, *Fortress Besieged*, trans. J. Kelly and N. K. Mao (London, 2004), p. 350.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

This thesis focuses on relations between China and Portugal during the Second World War – here considered as having started with the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 –, with particular reference to the territory of Macau during that period, as well as the immediate post-war, until the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Macau will be analysed as a case study of neutrality and collaboration in the broader context of the war in East Asia. It will also be integrated in the history of foreign imperialism in twentieth century China, as its wartime experience had connections with at least three imperial powers operating in the region: Portugal, Great Britain, and Japan. This work combines aspects of political, diplomatic, imperial, war, intelligence, and social history.

The experience of Macau, a Portuguese-administered enclave in South China, is one of the great-untold stories of the Second World War. Having remained neutral throughout the conflict, the small territory saw its population rise almost three-fold to around half a million people. Chinese, Portuguese, and British refugees filled its streets, intelligence agents for several powers operated in the territory, and activities of resistance, humanitarian relief, and smuggling were conducted under the protective shadows of Portuguese neutrality.

1.1. Arguments, literature review and sources

This thesis will address this complex period following two interlinked lines of enquiry. First, it will interrogate the notion of Portuguese neutrality during the Second World War in East Asia by exposing the ambiguities of its practice. At the same time, it

will show how wartime Macau was a site of many layers of collaboration, involving Chinese, Portuguese, Japanese, and British. These were often overlapping and even contradictory but ultimately contributed to keep the territory under Portuguese administration after the war.

The present study argues that Portugal's policy of neutrality was not strictly enforced in Macau; that the enclave's nominal neutrality created a space of freedom for actors with antagonistic interests that coexisted and interacted in the territory; and that collaboration was at the heart of the Macau wartime experience. There were various and sometimes competing layers of collaboration. Ultimately, on the part of the Portuguese authorities, collaboration with the British prevailed in a clear example of how the Anglo-Portuguese alliance worked on the ground. This thesis will also demonstrate that Macau's society suffered the impacts of the conflict in ways similar to other areas of China. In social history terms, the enclave was not sealed off but was very much part of the war.

Due to its geographical position and the relative weakness of the colonial power administering it, Macau was at the crossroads of different forces, becoming a nexus for competition for legitimacy between the Chinese central government of Chiang Kai-shek – with which Portugal maintained diplomatic relations – and Wang Jingwei's Reorganised National Government (RNG). During the war, Macau also regained a crucial importance for the British, unprecedented since the founding of Hong Kong. This study argues that Portugal's wartime conduct in relation to China and Japan left unsolved issues that had an impact on Sino-Portuguese relations in the immediate post-war period. These also provide a solid case for assessing China's efforts and difficulties in assuming the new international status it had gained with the war.

Literature review and sources

The history of Sino-Portuguese relations during the war has not been studied in detail and historiography on Macau during the war has been rather limited when compared with the plethora of literature on wartime China and Hong Kong.

The war period in Macau began to be probed into by scholars in Mainland China and Taiwan in the 1990s and early 2000s.¹ This scholarship has emphasised the contribution of the ‘Macau compatriots’ to China’s resistance efforts. The Portuguese authorities’ role is assessed briefly, usually in critical terms for its ceding to Japanese pressure. Scholars in Taiwan have also researched Kuomintang (KMT) activities in Macau and the post-war negotiations for extraditing alleged war criminals.² With few exceptions, Chinese historians base their works on Chinese sources and make little or no use of Portuguese (not to mention English) language sources. Over the past years, paralleling a renewed interest in the war in both China and the English-speaking world, there has been a revival of studies of Macau in the War of Resistance, manifested in new journal articles, theses and published sources, notably oral histories and collections of

¹ C. Fei, *Aomen sibai nian* [Macau 400 Years] (Shanghai, 1988), pp. 414-29; W. Huang and L. Chen (eds), *Haojiang fengyun er’nu: Aomen sijie jiuzaihui kangri jiuguo shiji* [Children of Haojiang: Macau’s Four Circles Assistance Association Activities of Resistance Against the Japanese and for National Salvation] (Macau, 1990); Z. Tan, *Aomen zhuquan wenti shimo: 1553~1993* [Disputes Concerning Macau’s Sovereignty Between China and Portugal (1553-1993)] (Taipei, 1994), pp. 221-36; K. S. Deng, *Aomen lishi (1840-1949 nian)* [History of Macau (1840-1949)] (Macau, 1995), pp. 85-110; L. Guo, ‘Shilun Aomen zai Guangdong kangzhan zhong de diwei he zuoyong’ [On Macau’s Position and Function in the War of Resistance in Guangdong], *Zhanjiang shifan xueyuan xuebao* [Journal of Zhanjiang Teachers College], 20/4 (1999), pp. 99-104; L. Zhang, ‘Aomen tongbao zhiyuan zuguo kangzhan chutan’ [The Support of Compatriots in Macau to the Homeland’s Resistance War], *Kangri zhanzheng yanjiu* [The Journal of Studies of China’s Resistance War against Japan], 1 (2003), pp. 101-14; X. Zhang, ‘Kangzhan qianqi Aomen de jingji shehui’ [Macau’s Economy and Society During the Early Phase of the War of Resistance], *Mingguo dang’an* [Republican Archives], 3 (2005): 82-9; Q. Huang, *ZhongPu guanxi shi (1513-1999)* [History of Sino-Portuguese Relations, 1513-1999] (Hefei, 2006), iii, pp. 1029-54.

² Y. H. Li, ‘Lunxian qian guomin zhengfu zai Xianggang de wenjiao huodong’ [Culture and Education Activities by the National Government in Hong Kong Before the Occupation], in *Gang’Ao yu jindai Zhongguo xueshu yanjiuhui lunwen ji* [A Summary of the Symposium on Hong Kong, Macao and Modern China] (Taipei, 2000), pp. 440-76; Y. H. Li, ‘Wu Tiecheng yu zhanshi Guomindang zai Gang’Ao de dangwu huodong’ [Wu Tiecheng and Kuomintang Party Activities in Hong Kong and Macau during the War], in H. Y. Chen (ed), *Wu Tiecheng yu jindai Zhongguo* [Wu Tiecheng and Modern Chinese History] (Taipei, 2012), pp. 66-88 ; S. F. Wu, ‘Shenzhang zhengyi? Zhanhou yindu taoni Aomen hanjian (1945-1948)’ [Justice Served? – Postwar Extradition of Traitors from Macao by the Nationalist Government, 1945-1948], *Guoshiguan xueshu jikan* [Bulletin of Academia Historica], 1 (2001), pp. 128-60.

visual materials.³ This recent scholarship maintains the former matrix of emphasising the role of the Chinese community in Macau in supporting Chinese resistance, and in local mobilisation for humanitarian relief.

In Portuguese, the publishing landscape on wartime Macau has not been as much the result of scholarly endeavours as the initiative of journalists with connections to the enclave. The key works on the period are a volume on Macau's old hotels – including their development during the war, an award-winning article on wartime Macau, and a more recent tome on the same topic.⁴ These journalistic works provide a Portuguese-centred narrative of events and privilege figures such as the governor or the head of the Macau Economic Services, Pedro José Lobo. Some are based on Portuguese archival documents, but these are not duly referenced in standard academic practice. The only academic works in Portuguese to the deal with the war period were concerned with specific subtopics, such as physical education,⁵ or concentrated on the immediate post-war as a starting point

³ J. Zou, 'Qianxi kangzhan zhong de Aomen sijie jiuzaihui' [On Macau's Four Circles Relief Association], *Xiandai qiye jiaoyu* [Modern Enterprise Education], 16 (2012), p. 146; X. Liu, and H. Huang, 'Aomen zhongwen baozhi zai kangzhan moqi de xinwen bianji kuangjia yanjiu' [The Frame of Macau Chinese Newspaper at the End of the Anti-Japanese War], *Guoji xinwen jie* [International Press], 1 (2013), pp. 134-42; C. Feng and Q. Xia, 'Bentu zhi wai: Aomen kangri zhanzheng yanjiu shuping' [Outside the Territory: Studies on the War of Resistance Against Japan in Macau], *Mingguo dang'an* [Republican Archives], 3 (2013), pp. 125-33; S. Mo, 'Kangzhan qijian PuRi heliu kuitan' [A Probe into Portugal-Japan Collusion during the War of Resistance against Japan], *Aomen ligong xuebao / Revista do Instituto Politécnico de Macau* [Macau Polytechnic Institute Journal], 16/2 (2013), pp. 42-52; Z. Chen, 'The Rise of Macao Chinese Cultural Nationalism during the Anti-Japanese War' (MA Thesis, University of Macau, 2013); Z. Li, 'Approaches of Chinese newspapers in Macau and their roles in four fields under the influence of nationalism during the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945)' (MA Thesis, University of Macau, 2013); P. Cai (ed), *Koushu lishi: Kangri zhanzheng shiqi de Aomen* [Oral History: Macau during the War of Resistance] (Macau, 2005); F. Lin and C. Jiang (eds), *Pingmin shengyin: Aomen yu kangri zhanzheng koushu lishi* [Civillian Voices: Oral History of Macau in the War of Resistance] (Guangzhou, 2015). Numerous photographs and images of memorabilia of the war period were reproduced in a trilingual exhibition catalogue and a pictorial history: I. L. F. Barreto (ed), *Macau During the Sino-Japanese War / Kangzhan shiqi de Aomen / Macau Durante a Guerra Sino-Japonesa* (Macau, 2002); F. Lin and X. Wang (eds), *Gudao yingxiang: Aomen yu kangri zhanzheng tuzhi* [Lonely Island Images: Pictorial History of Macau and the War of Resistance against Japan] (Guangzhou, 2015).

⁴ L. A. Sá, *A História na Bagagem. Crónicas dos Velhos Hotéis de Macau* [History in the Luggage. Chronicle of Macau's Old Hotels] (Macau, 1989), pp. 84-129; R. Pinto, 'Guerra em Paz' [War in Peace], *Macau*, 43 (1995), pp. 54-89; J. F. O. Botas, *Macau 1937-1945 – Os Anos da Guerra* [Macau 1937-1945 – The War Years] (Macau, 2012).

⁵ I. M. P. Braga, *Macau Durante a II Guerra Mundial: Sociedade, Educação Física e Desporto* [Macau during the II World War: Society, Physical Education and Sport] (Macau, 2003)

for works centred on Portugal's relations with the PRC,⁶ not treating the relationship with the Nationalists as significant in its own right. The publication of primary sources relevant to Macau during the war has also been modest when compared with the plethora of accounts on wartime Shanghai or Hong Kong.⁷

Portuguese historiography on the country's role in Second World War, however, has been relatively vibrant with monographs and articles covering general and specific aspects of the country's neutrality during the conflict. However, they overwhelmingly concentrate on the European theatre of war and the country's links to a few European countries and the United States.⁸ The Asian dimension of Portuguese neutrality has been focused in Timor, on which primary and secondary sources were published.⁹ Macau has

⁶ M. S. Fernandes, *Sinopse de Macau nas Relações Luso-Chinesas – 1945-1995: Cronologia e Documentos* [Synopsis of Portuguese-Chinese Relations – 1945-1995: Chronology and Documents] (Lisbon, 2000), pp. 27-70; M. S. Fernandes, *Confluência de Interesses: Macau nas Relações Luso-Chinesas Contemporâneas 1945-2005* [Confluence of Interests: Macau in Contemporary Portuguese-Chinese Relations 1945-2005] (Lisbon, 2008), pp. 23-111; F. G. Pereira, *Accommodating Diversity: The People's Republic of China and the 'Question of Macau' [1949-1999]* (Lisbon, 2013), pp. 31-49.

⁷ M. Teixeira, 'Macau durante a Guerra: Doce Visão de Paz!' [Macau During the War: Sweet Vision of Peace!] *Boletim Eclesiástico da Diocese de Macau* [Macau Diocese Ecclesiastic Bulletin], 885 (1978), pp. 497-518; A. A. Silva, *Eu estive em Macau durante a Guerra* [I Was in Macau During the War] (Macau, 1991); *A Guerra vista de Cantão: Os relatórios de Vasco Martins Morgado, Cônsul-Geral de Portugal em Cantão, sobre a Guerra Sino-Japonesa* [The War Seen from Canton: The Reports of Vasco Martins Morgado, Portugal's Consul-General in Canton, About the Sino-Japanese War], ed. A. V. Saldanha (Macau, 1998).

⁸ A. J. Telo, *Portugal na Segunda Guerra* [Portugal in the Second World War] (Lisbon, 1987); A. J. Telo, *Portugal na Segunda Guerra: 1941-1945* [Portugal in the Second World War: 1941-1945], 2 Volumes (Lisbon, 1991); F. Rosas, *Portugal entre a Paz e a Guerra 1939-1945* [Portugal between Peace and War 1939-1945] (Lisbon, 1995); J. M. Ferreira, 'Neutralidade' [Neutrality], in F. Rosas and J. M. B. Brito (eds), *Dicionário de História do Estado Novo* [Estado Novo History Dictionary] (Lisbon, 1996), ii, pp. 666-7; A. J. Telo, 'Segunda Guerra Mundial' [Second World War], in *Dicionário de História do Estado Novo*, ii, pp. 898-900; H. P. Janeiro, *Salazar e Pétain: Relações Luso-Francesas durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial (1940-44)* [Salazar and Pétain: Portuguese-French Relations during the Second World War (1940-44)] (Lisbon, 1998); A. J. Telo, *A Neutralidade Portuguesa e o Ouro Nazi* [Portuguese Neutrality and Nazi Gold] (Lisbon, 2000); A. J. Telo, 'A Neutralidade Portuguesa na Segunda Guerra Mundial' [Portuguese Neutrality in the Second World War], *JANUS* (1999-2000) http://www.janusonline.pt/arquivo/1999_2000_1_36.html (5 Oct. 2014); F. Rosas, 'Portuguese neutrality in the Second World War', in N. Wylie (ed), *European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents during the Second World War* (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 268-83; B. F. Pereira, *A Diplomacia de Salazar (1932-1949)* [Salazar's Diplomacy (1932-1949)] (Lisbon, 2012); I. F. Pimentel and C. Ninhos, *Salazar, Portugal e o Holocausto* [Salazar, Portugal and the Holocaust] (Lisbon, 2013); I. F. Pimentel, *Espiões em Portugal durante a II Guerra Mundial* [Spies in Portugal during the II World War] (Lisbon, 2013).

⁹ C. C. Brandão, *Funo: Guerra em Timor* [Funô: War in Timor] (Oporto, 1953); L. Cunha, 'Timor: A Guerra Esquecida' [Timor: The Forgotten War], *Macau*, 45 (1996), pp. 32-46; C. T. Motta, *O Caso de Timor na II Guerra Mundial: Documentos Britânicos* [The Case of Timor in the Second World War: British Documents] (Lisbon, 1997); J. D. Santa, *Australianos e Japoneses em Timor na II Guerra Mundial, 1941-1945* [Australians and Japanese in Timor in the Second World War, 1941-1945] (Lisbon, 1997); A. M.

been largely overlooked and one struggles to find any mention of China in one of the classic works on the topic.¹⁰

Finally, in English, references to wartime Macau were for years circumscribed to short mentions in works on wartime Hong Kong, which place the enclave as a secondary location in the drama unfolding elsewhere.¹¹ The few exceptions included articles on the Portuguese community in the British colony,¹² and unpublished theses. The latter include a Masters based on oral interviews with Macanese,¹³ and a four-volume PhD on Sino-Portuguese relations in the early Republican period with some references to their echoes during the war.¹⁴ Both of these stated that archival sources on the Second World War were limited, a claim the present work refutes.

However, when this thesis was being written, two books were published in English solely dedicated to the war period. The first was the memoir of the British consul in Macau, John Pownall Reeves, written in 1946 and unpublished until 2014,¹⁵ with the exception of a few excerpts published in a Macau journal.¹⁶ Reeves' memoir is one of the most important published sources on wartime Macau although the events it covers are similar to Reeves' telegrams and despatches found in the National Archives (TNA) in Kew. The second, admittedly springing from the publication of Reeves' memoir, is an

Cardoso, *Timor na 2ª Guerra Mundial: O Diário do Tenente Pires* [Timor in the Second World War: Lieutenant Pires' Diary] (Lisbon, 2007).

¹⁰ Telo, *Portugal na Segunda Guerra*.

¹¹ E.g. E. Ride, *BAAG Hong Kong Resistance 1942-1945* (Hong Kong, 1981); P. Snow, *The Fall of Hong Kong: Britain, China and the Japanese Occupation* (Hong Kong, 2003); F. D. Macri, *Clash of Empires in South China: The Allied Nations' Proxy War with Japan, 1935-1941* (Lawrence, 2012).

¹² J. Wordie, 'The Hong Kong Portuguese Community and its Connections with Hong Kong University 1914-1941', in K. C. Chan Lau and P. Cunich (eds), *An Impossible Dream: Hong Kong University from Foundation to Re-establishment, 1910-1950* (Hong Kong, 2002), pp. 163-73; F. Yap, 'Portuguese Communities in East and Southeast Asia During the Japanese Occupation', in L. Jarnagin, *The Making of the Luso-Asian World: Intricacies of Engagement* (Singapore, 2011), pp. 205-28.

¹³ M. D. Cannon, 'Experience, Memory and the Construction of the Past: Remembering Macau 1941-1945' (MA Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2001).

¹⁴ P. B. Spooner, *Macau: The Port for Two Republics* (PhD Thesis, University of Hong Kong, 2009).

¹⁵ J. P. Reeves, *The Lone Flag*, ed. C. Day and R. Garrett (Hong Kong, 2014).

¹⁶ W. Snyman, 'The John Reeves Memoir, "The Lone Flag": Lifting the Veil on Wartime Macao', *Revista de Cultura / Review of Culture*, 23 (2007), pp. 40-55.

edited volume that came out in late 2015.¹⁷ With a title similar to a book on wartime Shanghai¹⁸ but without making a specific comparison with that city, *Wartime Macau* is a collection of articles by an academic and three non-academics, including a Portuguese journalist who wrote one of the books mentioned earlier. Ambitious in its stated intentions, the book does not escape the limitations of its predecessors in Portuguese. Despite claiming the contrary, there is no evidence of exhaustive primary source work with Portuguese or Japanese archives, nor even with the TNA's rich holdings. Most importantly, despite two articles making a solid contribution to the study of the Eurasian Portuguese community,¹⁹ the book overall underplays a Chinese dimension in both narrative and sources – which given the non-negligible fact that the great majority of the population in Macau was Chinese is a reasonable critique. In sum, despite its presentation, *Wartime Macau* is certainly not the multi-centred study on Macau's wartime experience that the territory has long deserved.

By bringing together its key communities – privileging the Chinese and the Portuguese but acknowledging their many regional and international connections, this thesis aims to contribute to a more nuanced and complex understanding of wartime and post-war Macau. It draws on the pioneering work of many authors but is mostly based on primary sources in Portuguese, English, and Chinese collected at different archives and libraries in seven countries and territories. Japanese sources are also used, but mostly via translated materials (e.g. intercepted communications in British archives).

Primary sources for this thesis include government archives (Portuguese, Chinese, and British), documents by international organisations (Red Cross), and private papers (notably the Braga Collection). Published oral history anthologies, memoirs, and

¹⁷ G. C. Gunn (ed), *Wartime Macau: Under the Japanese Shadow* (Hong Kong, 2016).

¹⁸ C. Henriot and W. H. Yeh (eds), *In the Shadow of the Rising Sun: Shanghai under Japanese Occupation* (Cambridge, 2004).

¹⁹ R. E. Xavier, 'The Macanese at War: Survival and Identity among Portuguese Eurasians during World War II', in *Wartime Macau*, pp. 94-115; S. Braga, 'Nossa Gente (Our People): The Portuguese Refugee Community in Wartime Macau,' in *Wartime Macau*, pp. 116-40.

newspapers were also used as relevant source material. In Europe, research for this thesis was conducted in Portugal (National Archives, Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Historical Overseas Archives – for documents by the former Ministry of Colonies –, archives of the former National Overseas Bank, Portuguese Red Cross Archives, the Scientific and Cultural Centre of Macau Library, and the Portuguese National Library), in Britain (files from the Foreign Office, Colonial Office, Special Operations Executive, and others in Kew, files from the India Office in the British Library, the Imperial War Museum, and published primary and secondary sources in Oxford University Libraries, SOAS Library, and the British Library), and Switzerland (International Committee of the Red Cross Archives). In Asia, primary and secondary literature was researched in Taiwan (Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Academia Historica and the Academia Sinica, libraries in the Academia Sinica, and the National Central Library), in Hong Kong (Public Records Office and Hong Kong University Library), and in Macau (Archives of Macau). Research was also undertaken with papers of the Braga Collection held at the National Library of Australia. This underused collection, holding personal papers, printed materials, and photographs from José Maria Braga – a key figure in wartime Macau who liaised with the British, the Portuguese, and the Chinese – is one of the most important private collections about Macau in the world.

1.2. Chapter outline

The introductory chapter will analyse two key concepts framing this thesis, neutrality and collaboration, and provide an overview of the history of Sino-Portuguese relations from the 16th century until 1937. Understanding how relations between the two countries, which mostly revolved around Macau, evolved across time permits identifying

a number of continuities and changes that had echoes in the war period, such as local autonomy or parallel diplomatic channels.

The second chapter will address political and diplomatic developments that occurred from the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War until the start of the war in Hong Kong in December 1941. It will demonstrate that Macau had to face an ever-increasing Japanese pressure on the territory and show how the Portuguese authorities dealt with that pressure, in a precarious balance of stalling demands and trying to keep close relations to Portugal's old ally, Great Britain, which controlled the neighbouring colony of Hong Kong. Furthermore, this chapter will explore how Macau was used by the Chinese resistance and Chinese collaborators with Japan for their own activities, with or without knowledge or consent of the local Portuguese administration. It will also address one of the most flagrant episodes of problematic practice of neutrality in the territory: the Portuguese occupation of disputed islands.

The social dimension of the war in Macau will be addressed in Chapter Three, arguing that albeit neutral, the territory was socially part of the conflict. By drawing attention to the similarities between Macau and other places in wartime China, this chapter will address the massive refugee influx that poured into the enclave by covering two key communities of refugees: Chinese refugees from Shanghai and Guangdong province, and Portuguese refugees from Shanghai and Guangzhou. It will demonstrate that the arrival of a great number of refugees was both a crisis and an opportunity for the territory's administration, local population, and for the refugees themselves. It will detail the intersecting role of state(s) and society in refugee relief, demonstrate the importance of civic mobilisation in tackling the refugee crisis, and conclude that allowing the unrestrained entrance of refugees was determinant to the wartime experience of Macau and to shelter its administration against allegations of collaboration.

The following chapter will centre on Macau's 'lonely island' period, from the occupation of Hong Kong until the end of the war. It will detail the ambiguous practice of neutrality in Macau during the period of its utmost isolation, which was marked by the interplay of different forces competing for political legitimacy, economic control, and social influence. It argues that collaboration through compliance was a way of avoiding occupation.

The fifth chapter will focus on the second wave of refugees to Macau, those from Hong Kong. In particular, it will explore the experience of colonial transplantation that allowed the British to keep a foothold in South China from where the reoccupation of Hong Kong was prepared. It will pay particular attention to the role played by the British consulate in Macau in refugee management and intelligence networks. A clear example of pro-British collaborative neutrality will be given through the case study of the operations of the Macau Delegation of the Portuguese Red Cross.

The last chapter before the conclusion will address post-war developments of wartime issues until the establishment of the PRC in 1949, which opened a new cycle in the relationship between China and Portugal. This chapter will demonstrate how wartime issues left unsolved influenced post-war Sino-Portuguese relations. In particular it will focus on the complex processes of dealing with Japanese property in Portugal and Macau, the extradition of suspects of war crimes, the negotiations for abolishing extraterritoriality, and calls to return Macau to Chinese sovereignty. It argues that in its relation with a small and relatively weak European colonial power, China sought to affirm its new international status although this process was hampered by changing circumstances linked to the Chinese civil war.

1.3. Key concepts: Neutrality and collaboration

Two key concepts provide the backbone for this thesis, linking the topics covered in all chapters: neutrality and collaboration. Pervading throughout this study is also the theme of European imperialism in China.

Neutrality

The concept of neutrality lies at the heart of this thesis. Neutrality is a legal status and it exists only if there is a war. A neutral state ‘is required not only to abstain from all warlike action, but also to treat the belligerents impartially.’²⁰ If the former is a rather straightforward condition, the latter, however, is more difficult to respect in practice than in theory.

Questionable practices of neutrality during World War Two are often alluded to in works on the war’s neutrals.²¹ These may have remained as such for a variety of reasons but their survival required concessions that might not have been compatible with their neutral status. Case studies of European neutrals have merited some degree of attention in historiography but these have mostly adopted a Eurocentric perspective, downplaying relevant connections with belligerents in the Asia-Pacific.²²

²⁰ W. Hofer, *Neutrality as the Principle of Swiss Foreign Policy* (Zurich, 1957), p. 5.

²¹ R. Ogley, *The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century* (London, 1970); D. J. Fodor, *The Neutrals* (Alexandria, VA, 1983); H. R. Reginbogin, *Faces of Neutrality: A Comparative Analysis of the Neutrality of Switzerland and other Neutral Nations during WWII* (Bern, 2006).

²² E.g. C. Leitz, *Nazi Germany and Neutral Europe during the Second World War* (Manchester, 2000); N. Wylie (ed), *European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents during the Second World War* (Cambridge, 2001); M. af Malmborg, *Neutrality and State-Building in Sweden* (Hampshire, 2001); N. Wylie, *Britain, Switzerland, and the Second World War* (Oxford, 2003); R. Cole, *Propaganda, Censorship and Irish Neutrality in the Second World War* (Oxford, 2006); E. O’Halpin, *Spying on Ireland: British intelligence and Irish Neutrality During the Second World War* (Oxford, 2008); B. Evans, *Ireland During the Second World War: Farewell to Plato’s Cave* (Manchester, 2014). An exception is F. Rodao, *Franco y el Emperio Japonés: Imágenes y Propaganda en Tiempos de Guerra* [Franco and the Japanese Empire: Images and Propaganda in Wartime] (Barcelona, 2002).

Ogley distinguished four kinds of neutral states: neutralised, traditional neutrals, *ad hoc* neutrals, and non-aligned. Portugal would fit into the third category, a small power which sought ‘to keep out of a particular war.’²³ Portugal’s neutrality during the Second World War was never formally declared,²⁴ but it was often presented as framed and conditioned by the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance.²⁵ Portugal neither had a tradition of neutrality, nor was strong enough militarily to deter a foreign invasion. Indeed, in continental Europe it escaped such a fate because Germany was unable to mount a naval strategy against Great Britain and so abandoned plans for entering the Iberian peninsula, which would have led to a German-backed Spanish invasion of Portugal. In 1943 and 1944 Portugal agreed to British and American requests for basing rights in the Azores and even proposed entering the war in the Pacific to participate in the ‘liberation’ of Timor from the occupying Japanese forces. The Joint Planning Staff studied the possible consequences of a Portuguese declaration of war on Japan but these were not believed to be favourable.²⁶ It would be a burden to train and equip the Portuguese forces and Macau would be occupied, something that the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill deemed particularly undesirable. But the offer alone ended up being enough to guarantee British and American support for the reestablishment of Portuguese administration over Timor and to spare it a military occupation by Australia.²⁷ The leading Portuguese historian of the war thus concluded that the country remained neutral because both Germans and Allies got what they wanted from Portugal without it becoming a belligerent.²⁸ One could certainly add Japan as a prominent actor in this consideration, for it too, attained what it wanted from Portuguese colonial territories in Asia without Portugal entering the war.

²³ Ogley, *The Theory and Practice of Neutrality*, p. 3.

²⁴ Telo, *A Neutralidade Portuguesa*, p. 19, p. 38.

²⁵ The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, established in 1373 and ratified by the Treaty of Windsor in 1386, is considered the oldest alliance in the world still in place.

²⁶ TNA, CAB 121/508.

²⁷ A. J. Telo, *Portugal na Segunda Guerra*, ii, pp. 209-18; *A Neutralidade Portuguesa*, pp. 74-5.

²⁸ Telo, *A Neutralidade Portuguesa*, p. 360.

Portugal's neutrality was neither static nor strict. It was 'a pragmatic process of adaptation to the different phases of the war,' that 'leaned more to one side or the other depending on the circumstances'²⁹ but which has been analysed by different historians as overall pro-Allied, or most correctly perhaps, pro-British. In fact, the Portuguese dictator, António de Oliveira Salazar,³⁰ had a deep suspicion of the liberal, democratic and anti-colonial United States and the Estado Novo (New State) regime he led was ferociously anti-communist, not having diplomatic relations with Moscow. This is certainly a key difference between Salazar's Portugal and Chiang Kai-shek's China. For Chiang the Soviets and the Americans were crucial allies, even before 1941.³¹ What Salazar most admired in Britain – its status as a 'civilising' imperial power – was precisely what appealed less to the Chinese Nationalists and Communists, striving to overcome China's encroachment by imperialist powers that had begun in the nineteenth century – of which Britain was seen as a leading power – and reached the apex in the War Against Japan.

The study of Portuguese neutrality in Asia is of particular importance because Portugal was the only colonial power with territorial interests in China to remain neutral for the duration of the war with Japan. Furthermore, it was precisely in Asia that the most serious violation of Portugal's neutrality occurred: the Japanese occupation of the, then, Portuguese colony of Timor, that followed an unauthorised Allied landing in the territory and lasted from early 1942 until the end of the war in 1945. Therefore, Portugal remained neutral even after flagrant disrespects of its neutrality in Asia, including invasion and occupation – acts that usually dictate a change from neutrality to belligerence. The reasons for that are inextricably linked with the Portuguese regime's conception of its colonial empire.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 78, p. 359, my translation.

³⁰ The Portuguese dictator António de Oliveira Salazar was president of the council of ministers (prime minister) from 1932 to 1968, minister of foreign affairs and minister of war from 1936 to 1944, and minister of finance from 1928 to 1944.

³¹ J. W. Garver, 'China's Wartime Diplomacy', in J. C. Hsiung and S. I. Levine *China's Bitter Victory: The War with Japan 1937-1945* (Armonk, 1992), pp. 3-32.

As seen in the literature review, Macau has been largely overlooked by the historiography on Portugal in the Second World War. And yet, the uses of Portuguese neutrality in Macau reveal a multitude of connections, not only to Timor and Japan, but also, and most particularly, to China – and different Chinese forces at that – as well as to the country’s oldest ally, Britain, notably to its colony of Hong Kong. Ultimately, the history of neutral Macau reveals a multi-layered web of collaboration whose reach and relevance goes far beyond the small country that lent its neutral status to the South China enclave.

Collaboration

Collaboration is another key idea framing this study. Although the term has largely kept the negative connotation associated with occupied France during the Second World War, it has also been object of path-breaking enquiries applied to China’s War with Japan and Japanese imperialism in Asia more generally. The historiography of collaboration in China has explored, amongst others, cases of ‘collaborationist nationalism,’ local adaptation to occupation in Manchuria, attitudes of Shanghai capitalists and intellectuals, revisionist accounts of the Wang Jingwei regime, and contacts between pro-Chiang and pro-Wang factions.³² In particular, Brook’s book on different experiences of collaboration in China and how local elites and intermediaries were forced to deal with the exceptional circumstances of war and occupation – notably

³² J. H. Boyle, *China and Japan at War, 1937-1945: The Politics of Collaboration* (Stanford, 1972); G. E. Bunker, *The Peace Conspiracy: Wang Ching-wei and the China War, 1937-1941* (Cambridge, MA, 1972); P. Fu, *Passivity, Resistance, and Collaboration: Intellectual Choices in Occupied Shanghai, 1937-1945* (Stanford, 1993); T. Brook, ‘Collaborationist Nationalism in Occupied Wartime China’, in T. Brook and A. Schmid (eds), *Nation Work: Asian Elites and National Identities* (Ann Arbor, 2000), pp. 159-90; R. Mitter, *The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance, and Collaboration in Modern China* (Berkeley, 2000); D. P. Barret and L. N. Shyu (eds), *Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932-1945: The Limits of Accommodation* (Stanford, 2001); P. M. Coble, *Chinese Capitalists in Japan’s New Order: The Occupied Lower Yangzi, 1937-1945* (Berkeley, 2003); B. G. Martin, ‘Collaboration within Collaboration: Zhou Fohai’s Relations with the Chongqing Government, 1942-1945’, *Twentieth-Century China*, 34/2 (2008), pp. 55-88.

how ‘collaboration dealt with more mundane problems’ such as food provision³³ – provide useful parallels to understand wartime Macau.

Keeping in mind the concept of ‘collaboration’ even when discussing a formally unoccupied territory such as Macau is feasible, because Chinese perceptions of Portuguese and Chinese collaboration with Japan in Macau existed throughout the conflict and these suspicions were often a topic in diplomatic correspondence. Similarly, comparing events and actions in neutral Macau with areas in occupied China lends itself to recognising the similarities and differences of this case study. A narrow dictionary definition of collaboration links it to ‘traitorous cooperation with the enemy.’³⁴ However, for a country that, considering the literal translation of the Chinese term for ‘neutral’ (*zhongli*), was ‘standing in the middle,’ the enemy was one of the opposing sides – not necessarily the vanquished one. Japanese complaints that pro-British and pro-Chongqing activities were taking place in wartime Macau is a case in point. Therefore, this thesis argues that instances of collaboration with Japan in Macau need to be taken into account together with other, often stronger, cases of cooperation with Chinese forces or, stronger still, with the British, which can be seen as forms of collaboration that do not involve an occupying power.

The British link also relates to forms of inter-imperial collaboration that have been overlooked for the Macau case. This thesis also draws on to the applicability of the notion of collaboration in colonial contexts. Indeed, as Bickers noted, ‘empire was also rooted in collaboration.’³⁵ If ‘collaboration remained a necessity for imperialism throughout the

³³ T. Brook, *Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China* (Cambridge, MA, 2005), p. 7.

³⁴ B. Wasserstein, ‘Ambiguities of Occupation: Foreign Resisters and Collaborators in Wartime Shanghai’, in W. H. Yeh (ed), *Wartime Shanghai* (London, 1998), p. 24.

³⁵ R. Bickers, *Empire Made Me: An Englishman Adrift in Shanghai* (London, 2004), p. 59.

history of China,³⁶ in Macau that was the very condition for its survival as a foreign-ruled enclave throughout four centuries. Robinson's theory emphasising the role of mediating elites is also applicable to Macau during the war period, for 'they had to recognise mutual interests and interdependence,' not just with the Portuguese colonial authorities but also with the Japanese military and Chinese collaborator authorities' pressuring the enclave.³⁷ Wartime Macau hosted a plurality of often overlapping intermediaries: Chinese intermediaries who linked the majority of the enclave's population with the Portuguese colonial authorities; local elites who served as intermediaries between the Portuguese rulers and the Japanese and collaborationist authorities in the region; Chinese, Portuguese, and British intermediaries who linked those in Hong Kong and other occupied territories with Allied authorities in unoccupied areas in China and beyond; and, naturally, the charitable institutions and philanthropists who were key intermediaries between the colonial authorities and the many refugees and urban poor which the former would have been incapable of managing on their own. Ultimately, Macau itself may be regarded as an intermediary between the Allies and the Axis, those engaged in resistance and collaboration, and occupied and unoccupied areas. Although under exceptional circumstances, it is important to note that wartime Macau was not unique and its condition as node for different agents and interests was akin to other territories in China – for example, Shanghai and Hong Kong before December 1941 and Guangzhouwan until 1943 – and in Europe, notably Portugal's capital, Lisbon.

³⁶ J. Osterhammel, 'Semi-Colonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth-Century China: Towards a Framework of Analysis', in W. J. Mommsen (ed), *Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities* (London, 1986), p. 306.

³⁷ R. Robinson, 'Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration', in R. Owen and B. Sutcliffe (eds), *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism* (London, 1972), pp. 120-4.

China and Portuguese imperialism

By analysing relations between China and a European imperial power during a world war, this thesis aims to contribute to the fields of the history of China's foreign relations and of imperialism in China in the twentieth century. In recent decades, historians in and out of China have sought to demonstrate the significance of 'China's World War Two experience, and particularly the role of the Nationalist [...] government in that conflict' by interpreting it as 'a complex and contradictory set of processes between various Chinese actors.'³⁸ It has also been duly noted that 'the European experience in China, as much as the experience of the Chinese themselves, was complex and contradictory.'³⁹ The present work aims to contribute to this on-going historiographic reassessment by looking at the ambiguities of Chinese and international interconnections in a neutral territory during the war, one that, in many ways, does not fit the paradigm of modern colonialism.

Debates around the nature and development of Portuguese imperialism are not a main concern of the present study but a brief mention to them is useful to introduce the Macau case. Whilst the notion of Portuguese imperial exceptionalism in its lusotropicalist interpretation⁴⁰ has rightly been questioned by several recent studies,⁴¹ certain aspects of theoretical formulations of Portuguese imperialism are worthy of some attention for the Macau case in the period under analysis here. Although the idea of the Portuguese empire

³⁸ R. Mitter, 'Changed by War: The Changing Historiography of Wartime China and New Interpretations of Modern Chinese History', *The Chinese Historical Review*, 17/1 (2010), p. 85, p. 91.

³⁹ R. Mitter, 'Modernity, Internationalization, and War in the History of Modern China', *The Historical Journal*, 48/2 (2005), p. 530.

⁴⁰ The concept of 'Lusotropicalism' was developed by Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre. It argued that the Portuguese practiced a more humane form of colonialism manifested in widespread miscegenation. This idea was later used by the Estado Novo authoritarian regime to justify its colonial policy and resistance to decolonisation.

⁴¹ E.g. C. Castelo, "*O Modo Português de Estar no Mundo*": *O Luso-Tropicalismo e a Ideologia Colonial Portuguesa (1933-1961)* ['The Portuguese Way of Being in the World': Luso-Tropicalism and the Portuguese Colonial Ideology (1933-1961)] (Oporto, 1998).

as a ‘weak state’ has been rejected by some historians,⁴² recognising colonial weakness is inescapable when concentrating exclusively on post-Opium War Macau and the Portuguese position in Asia *vis-a-vis* Great Britain.⁴³ Indeed Portugal itself has been regarded by some authors as a British semi-colony, or part of British informal empire. The notion of ‘subaltern colonialism’ explored by Sousa Santos⁴⁴ –, allied to the concept of ‘semi-colonialism’ as it has been applied to Western imperialism in China – is illuminating when exploring the case of Macau, whose status as a colony was problematic throughout its history.

Macau is a relevant example if we are to recognise the plurality of foreign imperialism in China. The enclave may be regarded as a semi-colony in practice given the issue of disputed sovereignties. The Chinese state – be it the Ming, the Qing, the Republican government or that of the PRC – never incontestably acknowledged that what the Portuguese considered as Macau was not supposed to be Chinese territory. Despite the attempts to confirm Macau’s status as a colony ceded in perpetuity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the difficulty in defining Macau’s borders, the morose and contested negotiations reveal a strong degree of Chinese disapproval of such an idea.

From the beginning of the twentieth century, if not before, the Portuguese were not the key economic players in the territory. As will become clear in the following chapters, colonial authorities were often dependent on the role of Chinese intermediaries.

⁴² F. Bethencourt and D. R. Curto, ‘Introduction’, in F. Bethencourt and D. R. Curto (eds), *Portuguese Oceanic Expansion, 1400-1800* (Cambridge, 2007), p. 12; E. Morier-Genoud and M. Cahen, ‘Introduction: Portugal, Empire, and Migrations – Was There Ever an Autonomous Social Imperial Space?’, in E. Morier-Genoud and M. Cahen (eds), *Imperial Migrations: Colonial Communities and Diaspora in the Portuguese World* (Basingstoke, 2012), pp. 3-7.

⁴³ These ideas have also been applied to Goa. E.g. P. D. Parobo, ‘Tristão Bragança Cunha and Nationalism in Colonial Goa: Mediating Difference and Essentialising Nationhood’, *Economic & Political Weekly* 1/31 (2015), pp. 64-5. It is worth noting that Tristão Bragança Cunha, considered the ‘father of Goan [Indian] Nationalism,’ who criticised Portugal for being a ‘weak’ and ‘primitive coloniser’ responsible for a form of double (Anglo-Portuguese) colonialism, interacted in inter-war Europe with anti-imperial KMT activists (M. Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World Nationalism* [Cambridge, 2015]), p. 161).

⁴⁴ B. S. Santos, ‘Between Prospero and Caliban: Colonialism, Postcolonialism, and Inter-identity’, *Luso-Brazilian Review*, 39/2 (2002), pp. 9-43.

If Macau were attacked, Portugal would not have been able to defend it militarily. Socially, perhaps even more than politically, the life of the enclave was connected to the British imperial presence in China – not to mention to the political and social history of China itself, with which it had always been intertwined. Even the official status of ‘colony’ has been open to debate when analysing Macau. Portuguese colonialism in the enclave has been analysed precisely for the ambiguities and contradictions it embodied. Clayton called Portugal the ‘hapless imperialist,’⁴⁵ while Cheng entitled a chapter of her book on Macau ‘an anomaly in colonization and decolonization.’⁴⁶ Portuguese consciousness of its weakness in relation to China was always uncontested in practice. The Portuguese never attempted, much less succeeded at the degree of intervention that other European powers – and, of course, Japan – had in China in the modern period. This does not mean that, during the conflict under analysis here, Portugal regarded itself as different from the other colonial powers in Asia. Quite the contrary, the notion of Portugal as belonging to a ‘civilized Europe’ whose model was imperialist Great Britain was a guiding principle for the way Salazar orchestrated Portugal’s neutrality in the war. Discriminatory language against China, the Chinese, and Asians in general can be found in several passages of Portuguese diplomatic correspondence. But Portugal’s capacity to impose its will in Asia was limited. Awareness of its own inability for a successful military defence against any of the belligerents in World War Two led the country to rely fully on its capacity to negotiate through diplomatic (and often commercial) means with all sides to guarantee not only its national independence but also the maintenance of its colonies, even if actual control over them was effectively terminated (as in the Japanese occupation of Timor) or greatly constrained (as in the case of Macau).

⁴⁵ C. Clayton, ‘The Hapless Imperialist? Portuguese Rule in 1960s Macau’, in B. Goodman and D. S. G. Goodman (eds), *Twentieth-century Colonialism and China: Localities, the Everyday and the World* (Abingdon, 2012), p. 212.

⁴⁶ C. M. B. Cheng, *Macau: A Cultural Janus* (Hong Kong, 1999), p. 9.

When taking into account the domestic developments of both countries one sees that as the ‘age of empires’ was consolidated, Portugal began to reimagine itself more strongly as an imperial power belonging to a group of other European colonialists whereas, in contrast, Chinese intellectuals and statesmen developed an ever increasing anti-imperialist rhetoric.⁴⁷ Safeguarding its empire for the post-war and the Estado Novo regime – for which the existence of colonies was a precondition to its own survival – was a key motivation for Portugal’s neutrality in the war. Contrastingly, Nationalist China resisted Japanese imperialism by fighting it openly from 1937 and revoking the unequal treaties was a core goal of its wartime diplomacy. Therefore, Sino-Portuguese relations in this period were complicated also because the countries’ leaders had opposite attitudes towards imperialism as key motivations for their stances in the war: Portuguese neutrality was a way of guaranteeing the maintenance of its colonial possessions, Chinese belligerence was a struggle to keep the country independent from an imperial aggressor. Macau was a complex intersection point between these two opposite attitudes towards war, imperialism, and change.

1.4. Sino-Portuguese relations before 1937

Portugal was the first European country to have a permanent settlement in Chinese territory. It is also credited with being the last European colonial power to leave China, with the handover of Macau occurring in 1999, two years after the British colony of Hong Kong reverted to Chinese sovereignty. Despite the impressively long history of Sino-Portuguese contacts, Portugal is quite often ignored in accounts of Western relations with China in the modern period (i.e. after the first Opium War). Although there is a growing

⁴⁷ On the complexities of Chinese attitudes towards foreign imperialism in the twentieth-century see R. Bickers, *Out of China: How the Chinese Ended the Era of Western Domination* (London, 2017).

interdisciplinary literature on Macau, the territory is quite often analysed as a unique case and historians frequently overlook it in comparative analyses of foreign presence in China. The reasons for this are likely to be connected with the ambiguous colonial status of Macau, much less unequivocally defined than other territories in China, with the Portuguese presence weaker and more prone to be diluted into other identities (not all of them ‘Western’), and the bulk of the literature suffering from linguistic lacunae that only in recent years have begun to be overcome: notably, albeit with a few exceptions, the lack of researchers able to use both Portuguese and Chinese sources.⁴⁸

To understand a number of features of Sino-Portuguese relations during the Second World War it is important to go back to the origins and development of the Portuguese presence in China. Unlike Hong Kong and the treaty ports, the European presence in Macau dates back to a different imperial age, notably that of the Iberian maritime expansion inaugurated by the Portuguese conquest of Ceuta in 1415. In Asia, ‘the Portuguese empire functioned as an interconnected network of port cities that took on diverse institutional and diplomatic features determined by particular economic, political, and cultural interests.’⁴⁹ Portuguese imperial borders were fluid and in constant flux. East Asia, at the other extreme of the imperial metropolis, Lisbon, is an illustrative case. The Portuguese activities in Macau managed for decades to be outside of effective control by the Portuguese Estado da Índia⁵⁰ and even to remain outside of Castilian control after the union of the Iberian Crowns from 1580 to 1640. The territory was marked by a certain degree of local autonomy and this precedent would have a degree of utility during the 1937-1945 conflict.

⁴⁸ H. Lopes, ‘Historiografia Portuguesa sobre as Relações Luso-Chinesas nos Últimos Vinte Anos (1992-2012)’ [Portuguese Historiography on Sino-Portuguese Relations in the Last Twenty Years (1992-2012)], *Oriente*, 22 (2013), p. 7.

⁴⁹ Bethencourt and Curto, ‘Introduction’, p. 3.

⁵⁰ The Estado da Índia (State of India) was the official name of the Portuguese imperial project in Asia. It had its political and administrative centre in Goa.

Another important factor in Macau's history is the determinant role played by regional networks. Knowledge of China was first taken seriously by Portuguese explorers after their arrival in Malacca, which they conquered in 1511. It was in Southeast Asia that Portuguese sailors first came into contact with Chinese maritime traders and realised the market potential of China. Ming prohibitions against private trade meant that local demands in coastal areas were not being satisfied, leading to 'unprecedented levels of smuggling activities and banditry, sometimes even coastal warfare'⁵¹ involving Chinese and foreigners, particularly Japanese. It was in these networks that the Portuguese penetrated and ultimately succeeded. But it was a process of trial and error. Missions led by Jorge Álvares in 1513 and Rafael Perestrelo in 1515 departed from Malacca towards the China coast but the first attempt to send an embassy to the Ming court in Beijing, in 1516, ended in disaster. The envoy, botanist and geographer Tomé Pires, was incarcerated in a Guangzhou prison for reasons largely beyond his control and was never rescued.⁵² In the 1530s and 1540s, the Portuguese operated as 'contraband traders and pirates in the China Sea', establishing 'a number of semi-permanent but wholly unofficial settlements on the Chinese coast.'⁵³ They were first centred near Ningbo and Quanzhou, but were expelled in the 1540s, moving from the coasts of Zhejiang and Fujian to Guangdong province where they operated from Shangchuan and Langbaiao islands.⁵⁴ It has been noted that, by this time, Cantonese officials 'had begun to assess the advantages of cooperation with the Portuguese' from whom they could derive a number of commercial

⁵¹ R. Ptak, *China, the Portuguese, and the Nanyang: Oceans and Routes, Regions and Trade* (c. 1000-1600) (Aldershot, 2004), p. 50.

⁵² B. V. Pires, 'Origins and Early History of Macau', in R. D. Cremer (ed), *Macau: City of Commerce and Culture* (Hong Kong, 1987), p. 9; Ptak, *China, the Portuguese, and the Nanyang*, pp. 22-23.

⁵³ M. Newitt, *A History of Portuguese Overseas Expansion, 1400-1668* (London, 2005), p. 123.

⁵⁴ R. D. Cremer, 'From Portugal to Japan: Macau's Place in the History of World Trade', in *Macau: City of Commerce and Culture*, p. 31.

benefits, reduce their dependence on the Fujianese who controlled some of the external trade, and use them as an armed deterrent to piracy which was ravaging coastal areas.⁵⁵

Macau⁵⁶ was not the first settlement of the Portuguese in China, but it became their first (and last) permanent base, occupied from 1555 or 1557 with the permission of local authorities, to whom they paid an annual land rent payment. No written record has been found of such an agreement. As Clayton observed: ‘To many historians, the haziness of this origin story is the origin of Macau’s sovereignty problem. To others, this haziness was the condition of possibility for the very existence of Macau.’⁵⁷ Fok identified a ‘Macau formula,’ an informal Ming strategy that allowed for Portuguese trade activities in order to reconcile the need for coastal defences without giving up on the profits of international trade.⁵⁸ Ptak saw Cantonese decisions towards the Portuguese as an expression of ‘de facto independence of the southern periphery.’⁵⁹ Souza concluded that ‘the Portuguese maritime traders’ experience was unique in that their establishment was permanent,’ that being achieved because a ‘*modus operandi* between Ming officials and the Portuguese developed on account of Macao’s dependence upon Chinese foodstuffs for its survival, and produce and commerce for its prosperity.’⁶⁰ Sino-Portuguese interactions in the in-between space of Macau ‘took the form of on-going and often personal negotiations in total disregard of the instructions issued by central authorities.’⁶¹ Undoubtedly, skills at regional level dialogue and the fostering of private connections

⁵⁵ Ptak, *China, the Portuguese, and the Nanyang*, p. 31.

⁵⁶ The Macau peninsula was known by a variety of names in Chinese. Its upper half was known as Mengjia (Mong Ha), the name of its largest village, and the lower half was known as Haojing’ao or Xiangshan’ao. Nowadays Aomen (Ou Mun in Cantonese) is the officially recognised name (C. Clayton, *Sovereignty at the Edge: Macau & the Question of Chineseness* [Harvard, 2009], p. 44).

⁵⁷ Clayton, *Sovereignty at the Edge*, pp. 40-1.

⁵⁸ F. C. Fok, *Estudos sobre a Instalação dos Portugueses em Macau* [Studies on the Portuguese Settlement in Macau] (Lisbon, 1996).

⁵⁹ Ptak, *China, the Portuguese, and the Nanyang*, p. 33

⁶⁰ G. B. Souza, *The Survival of Empire: Portuguese Trade and Society in China and the South China Sea, 1630-1754* (Cambridge, 1986), p. 46.

⁶¹ T. Sena, ‘Macau’s Autonomy in Portuguese Historiography (19th and early 20th centuries)’, *Bulletin of Portuguese-Japanese Studies*, 17 (2008), p. 91.

played a vital role throughout the history of Macau – and the War of Resistance was no exception.

Key to the development of Macau was private enterprise, in particular the role of merchants. Commerce was the enclave's 'raison d'être.'⁶² Managing to escape the regional authority of the Portuguese Estado da Índia until the seventeenth century (when the governor at Goa started to appoint a permanent captain there), Macau was largely a self-governed merchant community (a 'merchant republic' according to one historian⁶³), structured around the Senate (municipal council) that was established in 1583. Chinese authorities tried to intervene on the affairs of the enclave on various occasions and its influence over the population grew as the Chinese became more numerous in Macau. The enclave's population was ethnically diverse, comprising not only Portuguese and Chinese but also other Europeans (notably missionaries), Eurasians, Japanese, Indians, Malays, Africans and many others. It was mostly a floating and mixed population. One author has argued that its cosmopolitanism was 'due in large part to its position as a city of liminality, of transience and of drift,' being 'neither fully Portuguese nor fully Chinese.'⁶⁴ Although certain aspects of the administration pointed to a strong level of Portuguese control, such as the military defences⁶⁵ or the fact that the Senate was dominated by Portuguese *casados*,⁶⁶ the exercise of Portuguese power 'was only possible through constant negotiation with the Chinese authorities in Canton' and the existence of Macau 'was the result not of central political action but of local negotiation and convergent

⁶² A. J. R. Russell-Wood, 'Patterns of Settlement in the Portuguese Empire, 1400-1800', in *Portuguese Oceanic Expansion*, p. 182.

⁶³ Newitt, *A History of Portuguese Overseas Expansion*, p. 145.

⁶⁴ I. Man-Cheong, 'Macao: An Early Modern Cosmopolis', in G. Wei (ed), *Macao: The Formation of a Global City* (Abingdon, 2014), p. 144.

⁶⁵ Ptak, *China, the Portuguese, and the Nanyang*, p. 63.

⁶⁶ Souza, *The Survival of Empire*, p. 31. The term *casados* ('married' in Portuguese) referred to Portuguese men who married local women overseas and their descendants. 'According to Sanjay Subrahmanyam, generally the *casados* can be described as the Asian Portuguese equivalent of the middle class: urban merchants' (A. Doré, 'Casados', in *E-Cyclopaedia of Portuguese Expansion* [Lisbon, 2005], <http://www.fcsh.unl.pt/cham/eve/index.php?lang=en> [5 Nov. 2016]).

interests.⁶⁷ This framework has been applied to the enclave even in analysis of its history in the second half of the twentieth century.⁶⁸

Macau's position was developed and consolidated through the highly lucrative trade between China and Japan that was assured by the Portuguese on the turn of the sixteenth century. Because the Ming officially forbade Chinese or Japanese ships to trade with Japan, the Portuguese – both the Macau merchants and the Jesuit missionaries⁶⁹ – ‘were able to secure a more or less official monopoly of the trade between the two countries,’ which mostly revolved around the exchange of Chinese silk for Japanese silver. The trade was so profitable that it has been regarded as the key cause for the prosperity then enjoyed by Macau and Nagasaki, which ‘rose from being obscure fishing villages to flourishing seaports by the end of the sixteenth century.’⁷⁰ One author considers that Macau was ‘the frontier between China and Japan *par excellence*’ during the late Ming.⁷¹

It was via the first Portuguese contacts with China that ‘the first European specialised and global information about Ming China’⁷² emerged. Interlocked with trade and missionary practices, Macau became a centre for service providers, notably interpreters and translators. It was from Macau that the Jesuits launched their mission in Japan, and it also became a base for Jesuit missionaries en route to China. The now famous efforts of Matteo Ricci, Michele Ruggieri, Alessandro Valignano, and others, that are considered pioneers of Western Christianity in China and Japan – and also the start of Western Sinology – began under Portuguese protection in the tiny Southern enclave. The

⁶⁷ F. Bethencourt, ‘Political Configurations and Local Powers’, in *Portuguese Oceanic Expansion*, p. 209, p. 210.

⁶⁸ Fernandes, *Confluência de Interesses*; Pereira, *Accommodating Diversity*.

⁶⁹ The Society of Jesus was a religious order founded in 1540 in the context of the Counter-Reformation. It operated in Portugal and its empire in the context of the Padroado – by which the Pope granted the Portuguese Crown the right to act as patron of the Roman Catholic missions in its empire.

⁷⁰ C. R. Boxer, *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 1415-1825* (London, 1969, repr. 1977), pp. 63-4.

⁷¹ L. F. Barreto, *Macau: Poder e Saber – Séculos XVI e XVII* [Macau: Power and Knowledge – 16th and 17th centuries] (Lisbon, 2006), p. 99, my translation.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 225, my translation.

Diocese of China and Japan, founded in 1576, was based in Macau. In the nineteenth century, Macau again played a relevant role as a stepping-stone for Protestant missionaries entering China.

Attempts to send Portuguese embassies to the Ming and Qing courts were not always successful. In 1552, 1562 and 1634 they did not go beyond Guangzhou, but a Macau envoy reached Beijing in 1630 and participated in the city's defence against the Manchus. During the Ming-Qing transition, Macau sent military help (in artillery and soldiers) to the Ming,⁷³ but when the Qing took Guangzhou, the Senate sought to keep channels of communication open with the new rulers. In 1667 the first state-to-state diplomatic mission, headed by Manuel Saldanha reached the Chinese capital. In 1678 Macau sent an embassy to Beijing to declare their local support for the Qing in the midst of the Three Feudatories Rebellion. Other embassies were sent in 1726 and 1753. As has been observed, there were two parallel diplomatic channels: the one of the Portuguese Crown, that sent missions to the Chinese emperor operating by initiative of Lisbon or Goa; and the private one, operated by Portuguese or Eurasians usually from Macau. The latter was a 'regional diplomacy' whose objective was the maintenance of Macanese interests. Common to both channels was the participation of Jesuit priests as interpreters and liaison agents.⁷⁴ The existence of official and unofficial forms of diplomacy would also be a clear feature of Macau during the Second World War.

Portuguese administration in Macau survived a number of regional realignments. From 1739 onwards, the Portuguese found themselves barred from Japan, following the country's unification by Toyotomi Hideyoshi and, particularly, the expulsion of Christian missionaries by Tokugawa Ieyasu. Macau's merchants found alternatives to their businesses, notably in trade with Southeast Asian ports. The Qing authorities also

⁷³ J. M. S. Alves, *Macau: O Primeiro Século de um Porto Internacional* [Macau: The First Century of an International Port] (Lisbon, 2007), p. 73.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

consolidated their presence in Macau by establishing two custom houses and having one representative operating from inside the city's borders. Chinese criminals were sent to be judged by Chinese authorities. At the end of the eighteenth century, 'political power in and over Macau was largely in Chinese hands.'⁷⁵

Before the First Opium War, Macau also played a key role in Anglo-Chinese relations. With trade only being allowed in Guangzhou for part of the year, and East India Company (EIC) men, theoretically, not being permitted to keep families in the city, Macau functioned as a rear base to their activities. Indeed, the Portuguese at Macau maintained trade relations with the EIC and British country traders in Indian markets, as well as with other European companies and European and Asian country traders in China. This was done 'on the basis of generating profitable trade and commercial advantage for their position at Macao' regardless of the fact that Portugal 'had long ceased being a serious imperial contender.'⁷⁶

Macau was a major nexus of the Canton trade, and some of its key Chinese merchants were based there. These men 'were central to the rise and advancement of international trade and commerce in the eighteenth century.'⁷⁷ The trade also involved Portuguese-speaking compradors, fisherman, and a group of licensed Chinese pilots known as the 'Macau pilots' who lived in the city and 'were the only persons allowed to guide ships up and down the Pearl River.'⁷⁸ Macau was also a key link in contraband trade. Other complex international contacts were also developed in the nineteenth century, including those to Hawaii and North America.

By the end of the eighteenth century the Portuguese empire was in decline. After the Portuguese monarch had left the country fleeing from Napoleon's troops and moved

⁷⁵ Pires, 'Origins and Early History of Macau', p. 13.

⁷⁶ Souza, *The Survival of Empire*, pp. 224-5.

⁷⁷ P. A. Van Dyke, *Merchants of Canton and Macao: Politics and Strategies in Eighteenth-Century Chinese Trade* (Hong Kong, 2012), p. 213.

⁷⁸ P. A. Van Dyke, 'Macao, Hawaii and Sino-American Trade: Some Historical Observations, Interactions, and Consequences', in Y. Hao and J. Wang (eds), *Macao and Sino-US Relations* (Lanham, 2011), p. 72.

to Brazil, the South American colony, Portugal's most important one, became independent initiating what is known as the 'Third Portuguese Empire.' The first Portuguese empire was a 'seaborne empire,' where 'the norm was enclave settlement.'⁷⁹ Macau fitted the pattern, but as imperial models shifted in the nineteenth century, the Portuguese did try to extend their domain over neighbouring islands, although without lasting success. At the end of the nineteenth century the Portuguese crown sought to affirm Portuguese sovereignty over Macau, extending the powers of the governor, establishing a Portuguese customs house and extending the military presence and defensive infrastructures. Two British landings on the enclave during the Napoleonic Wars served to remind the Portuguese of the dangers of Western competition in the area (Dutch attacks on Macau had been repelled in the early 1600s). However, it was not Portugal but the Qing authorities who ordered the British to leave, with the Jiaqing Emperor identifying their threat to Macau 'with an assault on the territorial sovereignty of China.'⁸⁰

The bold moves by governor João Maria Ferreira do Amaral (1844-1849), who, amongst other actions to curb Chinese power in Macau, refused to pay the land lease, demolished the Chinese customs houses, expelled the customs superintendents, and destroyed Chinese tombs when clearing land for building roads, were met with ferocious resistance from the Cantonese authorities.⁸¹ Guangzhou's streets 'were hung with posters offering a reward for his head,'⁸² and eventually Amaral was brutally murdered. In retaliation, his would-be successor, Vicente Nicolau de Mesquita, attacked the Chinese Baishaling fort near the border, defeating 400 men with a force of just 32. Even after this,

⁷⁹ Russell-Wood, 'Patterns of Settlement in the Portuguese Empire', p. 169.

⁸⁰ F. Wakeman Jr., 'Drury's Occupation of Macau and China's Response to Early Modern Imperialism', *East Asian History*, 28 (2004), p. 34.

⁸¹ On Amaral's governorship see: M. T. L. Silva, *Transição de Macau para a Modernidade – 1841-1853: Ferreira do Amaral e a Construção da Soberania Portuguesa* [Macau's Transition to Modernity – 1841-1853: Ferreira do Amaral and the Construction of Portuguese Sovereignty] (Lisbon, 2002).

⁸² C. G. Nuñez, *Macau* (Hong Kong, 1984), p. 45.

Amaral's remains were returned by the Chinese in a pig basket, in 'a gesture of utter contempt.'⁸³ In 1940, the Portuguese erected two monumental statues to these two men, celebrating, in practice, 'the expulsion of the Chinese dominance' and 'the Portuguese colonial conquest of Macau.' For the Chinese, the statues were a reminder of 'national disgrace.'⁸⁴

In the nineteenth century, Sino-Portuguese interactions via Macau began to be anchored in two controversial trades: narcotics, and human trafficking. A short lived opium trade boom occurred in the 1820s, based in the Portuguese Indian enclaves of Damão and Diu, near the Malwa production region, and, at the other end, in Macau. One historian sees this as having an important indirect link to the Anglo-Qing Opium War of 1840-1842, although admitting that the Portuguese themselves 'derived only modest benefits from this infamous commerce,' that was controlled by private traders of various nationalities, several of which eventually acquired 'Portuguese colours' for their ships.⁸⁵ Similar nationalisation strategies were used for ships during the Second Sino-Japanese War, as will be addressed in Chapter Two. In the nineteenth century, opium was the first source of revenue for Macau,⁸⁶ and it continued to be important in the period covered in this thesis.

In the mid-nineteenth century another infamous activity became associated with Macau, the so-called coolie trade, 'which was in effect a Chinese slave trade.'⁸⁷ Slaves had lived in Macau since its establishment and these included children and women known as the 'mui-tsai.' Boxer observed that these 'Chinese slaves and domestic servants were for the most part kidnapped from their villages when they were young, and sold to the

⁸³ Cheng, *Macau: A Cultural Janus*, p. 23.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29. The monument of Mesquita was destroyed during the so-called '123 Incident' in 1966. The statue of Amaral was removed in the aftermath of the handover and shipped back to Portugal in 1992.

⁸⁵ G. Clarence-Smith, *The Third Portuguese Empire 1825-1975: A study in Economic Imperialism* (Manchester, 1985), p. 26, p. 28.

⁸⁶ A. G. Dias, *Portugal, Macau e a Internacionalização da Questão do Ópio (1909-1925)* [Portugal, Macau and the Internationalization of the Opium Question (1909-1925)] (Macau, 2004), p. 41.

⁸⁷ Clarence-Smith, *The Third Portuguese Empire*, p. 71.

Portuguese by native pimps.’⁸⁸ The Chinese had complained about the practice, particularly worrisome as the Portuguese would take some of these people away from China, into India and even Europe.⁸⁹ Jesuit pressure and royal decrees to abolish it were not successfully enforced until 1758.⁹⁰ About a century later, a different slave trade thrived. In 1873 there were three hundred ‘coolie-slave recruiting offices’ operating in Macau.⁹¹ Most of the Chinese indentured labourers sent to Cuba and Peru from the 1840s to the 1870s were shipped from Macau until the trade was banned in 1874. Portuguese participation was but a part of this global trade, but because it was legal, the ‘government derived a great deal of revenue from it, in the form of licences, capitation taxes and so forth.’⁹² From the second half of the nineteenth century, Chinese also migrated to the Portuguese colonies in Africa, notably to Mozambique and, in a smaller scale, São Tomé and Príncipe.⁹³ Particularly interesting, albeit unresearched and largely outside the scope of this thesis, are the interactions between Portuguese and Chinese in spaces outside of the Portuguese empire, such as Hawaii, where the Portuguese, like in the treaty ports, ‘were always considered an ethnic group distinct from the whites and Europeans’⁹⁴ and, in a shared subalternity, had several interactions with Chinese migrants.

The practice of neutrality that was to mark Macau during the Second World War emerged very clearly in the nineteenth century. The territory was neutral during the Opium Wars (1839-1842, 1856-1860) and the Taiping rebellion/civil war (1850-1864).⁹⁵

⁸⁸ C. R. Boxer, *Fidalgos in the Far East 1550-1770* (Oxford, 1948, repr. 1968), p. 223.

⁸⁹ One author found evidence of the existence of several Chinese domestic slaves in Portugal until the 18th century (A. M. Caldeira, *Escravos em Portugal: Das Origens ao Século XIX* [Slaves in Portugal: From the Origins to the 19th Century] (Lisbon, 2017).

⁹⁰ Boxer, *Fidalgos in the Far East*, p. 240.

⁹¹ Cheng, *Macau: A Cultural Janus*, p. 32.

⁹² Clarence-Smith, *The Third Portuguese Empire*, p. 72.

⁹³ A. Nascimento, ‘A Passagem de Coolies por S. Tomé e Príncipe’ [The Passage of Coolies by S. Tomé and Príncipe], *Arquipélago – História*, VIII (2004), pp. 77-112; E. Medeiros, ‘Os Sino-moçambicanos da Beira. Mestiçagens Várias’ [The Sino-Mozambicans of Beira. Cross-cultural Encounters], *Cadernos de Estudos Africanos*, 13/14 (2007), pp. 157-187.

⁹⁴ Santos, ‘Between Prospero and Caliban’, p. 28.

⁹⁵ Ptak, *China, the Portuguese, and the Nanyang*, p. 69.

Portugal was also neutral during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, and fear of Japanese reprisals on Macau has been listed as one of the reasons for neutrality.⁹⁶

After the cession of Hong Kong island to the British, and the opening of a number of treaty ports in China, Macau's relevance greatly diminished. Foreign traders, their Chinese partners, and a significant number of Portuguese from Macau left the enclave for better opportunities in the new British colony or the largely British-dominated colonial world of the treaty ports. Not even having been declared a free port in 1845 helped Macau to regain the importance it had once had in Sino-European trade.

In the mid-nineteenth century, as several countries regulated their relations with China through bilateral treaties – known to this day as the ‘unequal treaties’⁹⁷ – Portugal attempted to follow suit. A lengthy negotiation of a treaty with the Qing authorities, that would recognise Portuguese sovereignty over Macau in perpetuity, was marred by a number of problems, mostly linked with the delimitation of the territory.⁹⁸ A Sino-Portuguese Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, signed in Lisbon in 1887, following negotiations that had begun for another treaty in Tianjin in 1862, was never ratified by the Chinese authorities but it is considered to be the document that confirmed Macau as a Portuguese colony.

Macau played a role akin to other foreign-dominated enclaves in China in the last years of the Qing, sheltering reformers and revolutionaries. The reformer Kang Youwei, a native of Guangdong province, was active in Guangzhou and Macau. In the latter he founded the newspaper *China Reformer* (*Zhixin bao*) with the financial support from a local merchant. The newspaper circulated widely in Chinese cities and abroad, including

⁹⁶ J. Milhazes, *Rússia e Europa: Uma parte do todo* [Russia and Europe: part of the whole] (Lisbon, 2016), p. 96.

⁹⁷ On the history of the term ‘unequal treaties’ see D. Wang, *China's Unequal Treaties: Narrating National History* (Lanham, 2005)

⁹⁸ A. V. Saldanha, *O Tratado Impossível: Um Exercício de Diplomacia Luso-Chinesa num Contexto Internacional em Mudança, 1842-1887* [The Impossible Treaty: An Exercise in Portuguese-Chinese Diplomacy in a Changing International Context, 1842-1887] (Lisbon, 2007).

in the USA and Japan.⁹⁹ After the failure of the Hundred Days' Reform in 1898 many other reformers sought refuge in Macau.¹⁰⁰ Macau was also an important stopover for revolutionaries. Notably, Sun Yat-sen lived in Macau where he worked for the Kiang Wu Hospital and contributed to the first bilingual newspaper in Macau, the *Echo Macaense* (*Jinghai congbao*).¹⁰¹

Macau was also the target of Chinese ire, with anti-Portuguese protests preceding the implementation of the Chinese republic in 1911. One case was motivated by the death of a Chinese passenger on a British steamer that according to Chinese witnesses 'had been kicked to death by the ship's Portuguese ticket collector.'¹⁰² Another was the Macau delimitation dispute, brought to the fore by Chinese complaints of repeated Portuguese interference with Chinese boats in waters around Macau. When a joint Sino-Portuguese commission was established in 1909 to settle the borders of Macau, boundary delimitation auxiliary societies were formed by popular initiative in Qianshan and Guangzhou. They advocated that the Portuguese rights were restricted to the Macau peninsula leased during the Ming dynasty and did not include any nearby islands, including Taipa and Coloane. The delimitation question, 'the last big nationalist controversy' in Guangdong before the 1911 Revolution¹⁰³ remained unsolved for many years to come, despite the signing of another Treaty of Friendship and Commerce with the Chinese central government in Nanjing in 1928. As will be seen at the end of Chapter Two, Portuguese claims over neighbouring islands served to justify their partial occupation during the Second Sino-Japanese War.

⁹⁹ P. Hao, *Peking University and the Origins of Higher Education in China* (Beijing, 2013), pp. 114-115.

¹⁰⁰ E. J. M. Rhoads, *China's Republican Revolution: The Case of Kwangtung, 1895-1913* (Harvard, 1975), p. 34, p. 36.

¹⁰¹ M. K. Chan, *The Luso-Macau Connections in Sun Yatsen's Modern Chinese Revolution* (Macau, 2011); K. C. Fok, *O Dr. Sun Yat-sen e a sua Profissão Médica em Macau* [Dr Sun Yat-sen and his Medical Profession in Macau] (Macau, 2014).

¹⁰² Rhoads, *China's Republican Revolution*, p. 142.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 148.

Despite the coincidence in dates in implementing a republican regime – 1910 in Portugal and 1911 in China – Sino-Portuguese relations in the republican period were not smooth. It is relevant to note how attitudes towards colonialism were important in the matter. Anti-imperialism had been part of the nationalist discourse in China since before the end of the Qing dynasty. From their base in Guangzhou in the 1920s, the Kuomintang (KMT) with their, then, CCP allies, sought to reorganise the city government in a testing ground for what would be their national government after the success of the Northern expedition in 1927.¹⁰⁴ The KMT had a crucial supporting role to the strikers that in 1922 protested the shooting of 70 Chinese to death by Portuguese soldiers¹⁰⁵ and that announced the largest strike and boycott that paralysed Hong Kong in 1925,¹⁰⁶ which also had a significant impact on Macau. Anti-imperialism against Japan was also a key feature of the second united front between the KMT and the CCP during China's War of Resistance from 1937 to 1945, a conflict that has been labelled by one historian 'the most atrocious war for colonial subjugation fought in modern history.'¹⁰⁷

In China's long march for sovereignty and respect, Macau became a topic of criticism at international *fora* already in the late Qing period and Chinese complaints were even more vocal during the Republican era. The auctioning of opium and gambling monopolies became the main source of revenue for Macau in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Opium trade and smuggling were denounced and China was successful in harnessing international support from both the United States and Great Britain, leaving the Portuguese largely isolated. Initial attempts of achieving compensation from China for the economic losses of suppressing opium trade in Macau – such as agreement on the contentious borders or the construction of a Guangzhou-Macau railway – failed. Portuguese colonial authorities attempted to find alternative solutions to

¹⁰⁴ M. Tsin, *Nation, Governance, and Modernity in China: Canton 1900-1927* (Stanford, 1999).

¹⁰⁵ Z. Hao, *Macau: History and Society* (Hong Kong, 2011), pp. 42-3.

¹⁰⁶ S. Tsang, *A Modern History of Hong Kong* (London, 2004), pp. 92-101.

¹⁰⁷ Osterhammel, 'Semi-Colonialism', p. 291.

Macau's decline.¹⁰⁸ The favoured solution was redeveloping the harbour to try to regain part of the enclave's former status as commercial centre. Ambitious plans for making Macau into a world hub for Portuguese colonial products never materialised, but it is important to note how those dreams were revived in Japanese offers for cooperation in the early stages of the Second Sino-Japanese War, as will be addressed in Chapter Two.

Without territorial or major commercial interests in North China, the Portuguese had, nevertheless, been indirectly involved in previous events that announced the Sino-Japanese conflict to come. In 1908 the Japanese ship *Tatsu Maru* was captured by the Chinese navy near islands around Macau, accused of illicit arms trade. The Japanese argued they were in Portuguese waters, and Portuguese authorities used the case to affirm their maritime rights' claims. Eventually the Qing authorities released the ship and apologised to Japan, which in turn generated protests and a boycott of Japanese products in Guangzhou.¹⁰⁹ In 1931, authorities in Macau acted to prevent the Chinese Commercial Association (the local chamber of commerce) from requesting local merchants to participate in a boycott of Japanese products as this could be damaging to the city's commerce.¹¹⁰ In March 1932 rumours that Japan was using Macau for military activities with Portuguese agreement arose in Chinese newspapers, yet were denied by the Portuguese authorities.¹¹¹ And in that year Portuguese residents in Shanghai suffered human and material damages during the Sino-Japanese armed conflict, a harbinger of the total war to come in a few years' time.

In conclusion, centuries of Sino-Portuguese contacts centred in Macau developed features that were quite significant in the 1937-1945 war period: a marked degree of autonomy, capacity for coping with a changing and diverse population, openness to

¹⁰⁸ Dias, *Portugal, Macau e a Internacionalização da Questão do Ópio*.

¹⁰⁹ Rhoads, *China's Republican Revolution*, pp. 135-41; Dias, *Portugal, Macau e a Internacionalização da Questão do Ópio*, p. 153.

¹¹⁰ Council Administrator and Police Commissioner to Director of the Civil Administration Services, 17 Oct. 1931, AM, MO/AH/AC/SA/01/13673.

¹¹¹ AM, MO/AH/AC/SA/01/25240.

engage in economic activities of questionable legality, flexibility in dealing with different authorities and regional powers, neutrality precedents, and experience of being caught in the middle of Sino-Japanese tensions.

CHAPTER 2

Tension and collaboration: Macau before the fall of Hong Kong, 1937-1941

Introduction

This chapter shows that from the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 until the fall of Hong Kong in December 1941 Macau was a centre for human, commercial, and intelligence exchange between Portugal, Japan, Great Britain, the Chinese central government, and Chinese collaborators. It argues that Macau functioned as a nexus for multiple layers of collaboration by different actors. These were dictated and conditioned by the weakness of the Portuguese authorities in Macau, Portugal's historical alliance to Great Britain, connections to Chinese local authorities in South China, and Japanese threats.

The first part of this chapter addresses the dilemma of the Macau Portuguese administration, caught between loyalty to an old ally, Great Britain, and accommodation to a new power in the region, Japan. The latter employed a mixed strategy towards the enclave, ranging from courtship to aggression. Whilst the Portuguese sought to stall demands, they eventually ceded to certain Japanese overtures for collaboration.

The second section deals with Macau as an intersection for competing Chinese forces during the war. The Portuguese-administered enclave was not only an important focal point for Chinese resistance activities in Guangdong – both Nationalist and Communist – but also for the collaborationist movement led by Wang Jingwei. Macau was also used as a meeting place for Japanese peace feelers towards Cantonese elites and Chiang Kai-shek's envoys.

Finally, the last part addresses a key manifestation of the questionable practice of Portuguese neutrality in China. By taking advantage of the chaotic situation in the region, the Portuguese temporarily occupied part of some Chinese islands they considered to be under dispute and sought to legitimise that situation in secret negotiations with Japan.

Before the Second Sino-Japanese War entered its global phase towards the end of 1941, Macau's position was one of uncertainty and its administrators sought to cultivate good relations with all the opposing forces in the region. As Japan's control over South China became stronger, Portugal's capacity to avoid yielding to Japanese demands diminished. This led to a growing pressure over Chinese resistance activities in Macau. Anti-Japanese actions also became more violent as the collaborators gained some political recognition. By late 1941 it was in a climate of increasing fear and shrinking options that Macau faced the biggest challenge to its official neutrality: the occupation of neighbouring Hong Kong. An initial phase of tense neutrality was over. The following years would test Macau's capacity to remain unoccupied to the limit, this time without any possibility of eventual assistance from the British.

2.1. Old allies and new friends: Portugal between Great Britain and Japan

Although this thesis is primarily concerned with Sino-Portuguese relations, during the war period these were framed by a wider range of international links, given Macau's position at the crossroads of different empires.

The Portuguese authorities in the enclave found themselves the constant centre of Japanese attention during the early stages of the Sino-Japanese War in South China. Conscious that the enclave could not be defended in case of an attack, and sensing Britain to be uncommitted to facing Japan, the Macau authorities adopted a pragmatic stance: They dealt with the invading forces with continuous assurances of friendship, while

stalling their demands. Modest cooperation was, thus, a self-defence mechanism to avoid formal occupation.

Caught between two opposing Asian powers, the Portuguese turned to their oldest ally. British authorities initially downplayed the threat of a Japanese occupation of Macau. However, they had been on the alert for Japanese attempts at getting a foothold in the enclave since before 1937. Knowing that to offer the Portuguese concrete compromises for help in defending Macau would be unfeasible, the British nevertheless kept official and unofficial channels of communication open for intelligence sharing and tried to diffuse any temptation the Portuguese might have of taking a more pro-Japanese line.

Portugal's relations with Japan and Britain were guided by the uncertainty of the moment but also the certainty of a historical alliance. The Portuguese could imagine a defeated China but never, in a future that included them administering Macau, a defeated Britain.

2.1.1. Carrots and sticks: Portuguese-Japanese relations and Macau before the occupation of Zhongshan

From the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on 7 July 1937 to the period of stalemate between late 1938 and 1941, Japanese military advances in China were fast and brutal. Japanese forces moved southward through railway lines, targeting industrial and commercial urban areas along the coast. With its most important diplomats and communities based at Shanghai and Guangzhou and with its colonial enclave situated on the Pearl River delta, the Portuguese presence in China was very much in the line of fire from the beginning of the conflict.

By late 1937 Japanese military activities around Macau were an everyday reality. Aerial bombings over ships and land targets were often reported, the sound of which was

sometimes heard in the enclave. For the Portuguese authorities it was clear that defending the territory against an eventual Japanese attack was a task deemed impossible to achieve. However, even though the minister of colonies, Francisco José Vieira Machado, assured the governor of Macau, Artur Tamagnini de Sousa Barbosa,¹ that the territory would be able to guarantee its neutrality,² the latter insisted on strengthening the enclave's defence capability. His argument was not that Portugal could win over 'the invincible Japanese' but that making a show of protecting its interests would have an important 'moral' effect.³ Subsequently, Macau's defences were modestly boosted.⁴

Similarly to the way in which Germany was attempting to woo Salazar's regime in Portugal away from its traditional ally, Britain, Japan kept trying to entice the Portuguese authorities in Asia into believing it could be a reliable alternative partner. Vague suggestions or more concrete proposals began to be offered more vigorously from 1938, the year that Japanese military forces started to occupy parts of Guangdong province. Although acting treacherously towards the old ally was not an acceptable option for the authorities in Macau, gaining economic benefits out of the Japanese apparent preference for the Portuguese was sometimes considered. In October 1938, after the fall of Guangzhou, the Macau government received a Japanese request to station an attaché in

¹ Barbosa was governor of Macau three times, in 1918-1919, in 1926-1930, and in 1937-1940.

² Minister of Colonies to Governor of Macau, 30 Oct. 1937, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767, my translation.

³ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 2 Nov. 1937, *ibid.*

⁴ By the late 1930s Macau had benefited from military build-up efforts but its defences were still too weak to resist an eventual Japanese attack. A garrison of 497 men in 1936-7 had been increased to 794 in 1940 (one battalion of Mozambican soldiers divided into 2 infantry companies, one machine-gun company and one artillery company). The police force was mostly constituted by Sikh policemen and Chinese. Defences amounted to a battery of five field guns, six hydroplanes, and a sloop (*aviso*) – a type of warship sent from Lisbon on commission. The first, Gonçalo Velho, stayed in Macau for fifteen months from September 1937, the second, Gonçalves Zarco, stayed in Macau from September 1938 to April 1939, followed by the João de Lisboa between April and November of the same year, a second commission by the Gonçalo Velho, from June 1940 to March 1941, and then the João de Lisboa from May 1941 to May 1942, after which the ships returned to Lisbon as sign of neutrality. After the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War, the Centre of Naval Aviation of Macau, extinct since 1933, was reactivated in December 1937. Two Osprey seaplanes sent from Lisbon were joined by another four in 1938 and in 1939 a School of Naval Aviation was established. The Centre closed in 1942 after one of the Ospreys had an accident crashing in the middle of Macau killing the two pilots on board. An aircraft hangar built in 1941 was destroyed by American bombings in 1945 (R. J. Garret, *The Defences of Macao: Forts, Ships and Weapons over 450 Years* [Hong Kong, 2010], pp. 114-5 and pp. 134-8; Macri, *Clash of Empires*, p. 128.).

the enclave. The governor informed Lisbon he believed the ‘answer should be compliance in principle’ but ‘with reciprocity.’ The temptation to gather some advantages from Japanese offers was not absent. According to the governor, the British were ‘making all efforts for the Japanese to allow entrance of a British steamship in Canton, what they will find hard to get; however the Japanese invited us to make them a similar request for boats with Portuguese flag [under the] condition [it will be] a Canton-Macau route and not Canton-Hong Kong.’ If such was the case, maybe Macau could even be ‘useful to Hong Kong.’⁵

The Japanese strategy of offering concessions to the Portuguese while being hard on the British put Macau in a complicated position, particularly as Japanese offers became more daring. A set of proposals that the Japanese military and naval forces aimed to submit to the Portuguese government reached Barbosa in November. Amongst other things, they planned to make Macau a transit hub for passenger and cargo shipping to Guangzhou. Military transport would come close to Coloane (one of the islands under Macau’s administration); its cargo would pass through Macau in Portuguese boats and from there on to Guangzhou via the Pearl River or overland. Concession of this traffic would not be given to Japanese people or firms and the Japanese would only nominate an agent to help establish a Portuguese company. Japanese pressure was obvious to a worried governor, who was already concerned with gambling and opium, Macau’s financial lifeblood, having become available in Guangzhou ‘with acquiescence from the Japanese authorities.’⁶ If Portugal refused to collaborate the Japanese could simply block any trade to and from Macau. He was adamant that, should such plans be presented to the Portuguese government, the proposal on military transport should not be accepted but the others could be carefully discussed. However, Japanese offers to develop Macau were

⁵ Governor of Macau [to Minister of Colonies], received 27 Oct. 1938, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767, my translation.

⁶ Governor of Macau [to Minister of Colonies], received 16 Nov. 1938, *ibid.*

received with more scepticism by others. Vasco Martins Morgado, the consul general at Guangzhou, doubted the Japanese capability to do as they had promised. He argued that Macau's development should only be planned according to Portuguese ideas in order to keep its independence.⁷

In December the Japanese presented an updated round of thirteen proposals for a cooperation project between Japan and Portugal focused on Macau. Excluding the point on military transport, it added the plan to build a railway line and a road between Macau and Guangzhou, a commercial air service connecting Taiwan, Macau, and Guangzhou, develop shipping between Japan, Taiwan, Timor and Portuguese colonies in Africa, build sugar, cotton, and gas factories, establish schools in Macau, and others. The governor considered that 'some of proposals are inadmissible' but feared that a negative response could 'damage our good relations.'⁸ Unsurprisingly, rumours of such collaboration provoked outrage amongst many Chinese, who criticised them in the Hong Kong press. American information that the Japanese had promised to 'develop Macau as a commercial port at the expense of Hong Kong' was also received with alarm by the British who contemplated the possibility of Macau becoming 'a Japanese Headquarters in South China for the smuggling of goods and other kinds of economic exploitation.'⁹ This pattern of enticing offers, alarming news, and international concern was to mark Macau's war years.

The conciliatory approach was not the only one used. The Portuguese were becoming familiar with the destruction Japanese bombings could cause, testified in person by the Portuguese consuls at Shanghai and Guangzhou and by everyone in Macau that came into contact with the thousands of refugees arriving from China. But in December 1938 they experienced it first hand in buildings guarded by neutral Portuguese

⁷ Portuguese Consul at Guangzhou to Governor of Macau, 17 Nov. 1938, AHD, 2P, A48, M217.

⁸ Governor of Macau [to Minister of Colonies], received 16 Dec. 1938, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767, my translation.

⁹ Home Office (Drugs Branch) to FO, 18 Jan. 1939, TNA, FO 371/23501.

flags when Japanese planes bombed the Portuguese Catholic mission at Zhaoqing,¹⁰ causing damage to the property and killing a watchman. In January 1939 Japanese planes bombed it again, causing further damage. Portuguese flags were hoisted at flagpoles and painted on roofs but still one bomb fell near the flagpole where the Portuguese flag was flying. In a letter protesting to the Japanese consul general at Guangzhou, Okazaki Katsuo, Morgado highlighted the contradiction between the rhetoric and the actions: ‘[...] it is not understandable for our friendship toward the Japanese Empire that such attacks to Portuguese properties could be made.’¹¹ Complaints and requests for compensation were lodged in Tokyo, but to no avail.

A string of visits from Japanese military officers to Macau and Portuguese officers representing the governor to Guangzhou or other neighbouring occupied areas intensified from late 1938. A Japanese military attaché arrived in Macau in December 1938,¹² and that same month a major, representing the commanding officer of the South China Area Army, lieutenant general Ando Rikichi, came to visit the governor. Barbosa reported to Lisbon on the usefulness of these contacts: ‘I maintain my impression that we will get nothing without a prior understanding [with the] military and naval authorities [and] only later taking the subject [to the] diplomatic field.’¹³ At Japanese invitation, the governor sent the police commander, captain Carlos de Sousa Gorgulho,¹⁴ to Guangzhou to meet with Japanese military authorities. Gorgulho was accompanied by Wada Shinzo, a Japanese secret services agent who posed as a dentist,¹⁵ much to the displeasure of the

¹⁰ The Zhaoqing Mission was the first Jesuit residence in Chinese territory. It was opened in 1583 by Michele Ruggieri and Matteo Ricci. It was abandoned in the 18th century due to persecution from Qing authorities and reopened in the beginning of the 20th century under the jurisdiction of the Macau Diocese (A. F. Netto, *Breve Notícia Histórica da Missão de Shiu-Hing na Província de Cantão* [Brief Historical Account of the Shiu-Hing Mission in Canton Province] [Macau, 1924], p. 12, p. 16).

¹¹ Portuguese Consul at Guangzhou to Japanese Consul at Guangzhou, 4 Feb. 1939, AHD, 2P, A48, M176.

¹² Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 16 Dec. 1938, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767.

¹³ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 23 Dec. 1938, *ibid.*, my translation.

¹⁴ Gorgulho was appointed governor of São Tomé and Príncipe in April 1945, a West African archipelago where he became associated with an infamous massacre of the local population.

¹⁵ A long-term resident of Macau, he was believed to be a retired or reserve naval officer and working for the Navy secret services. The dentist cover was apparently common amongst Japanese spies in China

Portuguese and the Japanese consuls in the city, who disapproved of serious issues regarding Macau being discussed by someone without an official position.¹⁶ But this unofficial parallel diplomacy centred on Macau continued. Several officers (at least one rear admiral, four colonels and two majors) visited Macau between January and May 1939.¹⁷

The most significant initiative of parallel diplomacy was the visit of Gorgulho to Japan. He left for Tokyo in the beginning of February,¹⁸ accompanied by Wada who, according to British sources, was being paid a monthly fee of \$1000 to assist the easy passage of a scheme for the disputed Lappa island.¹⁹ The pretext for Gorgulho's visit was to hand in a cypher book to the Portuguese legation in Tokyo. He had been instructed by Macau to approach the Japanese authorities about the release of some Portuguese boats detained at Guangzhou, compensation for the bombing of the Zhaoqing mission and the closing of 'two or three Chinese Customs posts established in Portuguese waters.'²⁰ The key unofficial motive was, however, to negotiate with Japan the recognition of Macau's outlying islands boundary claims,²¹ which will be discussed further in the last part of this chapter. During his 'special mission' to Japan, Gorgulho met a number of senior government officials, toured ministerial buildings, military academies, factories, a warship, and other places, following an organised itinerary. He visited the Portuguese chargé d'affaires at Tokyo, Antero Carreira de Freitas, where the difficult process of negotiating Timor matters came up in conversation. Gorgulho was contacted by officers at the Ministry of War who wanted to discuss in private, the possibility of the Portuguese

(Portuguese Chargé d'Affaires in Tokyo to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 4 Mar.1939, AHD, 2P, A48, M217).

¹⁶ Portuguese Consul at Guangzhou to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 26 and 31 Dec. 1938, *ibid.*

¹⁷ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 5, 11 and 19 Jan. and 6 and 18 May 1939, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767. Also in AHD, 3P, A9, M128-129.

¹⁸ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 7 Feb. 1939, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767.

¹⁹ British Consul at Guangzhou to British Ambassador at Shanghai, 30 Sept. 1939, TNA FO 371/23501. Another source puts this figure at \$500 (British Consul at Macau to Foreign Office, 29 Apr. 1940, TNA, FO 371/24700).

²⁰ Portuguese Chargé d'Affaires in Tokyo to MNE, 4 Mar. 1939, AHD, 2P, A48, M217.

²¹ *Ibid.* Also: G.O.C. Hong Kong to War Office, 8 Feb. 1939. TNA, FO 371/23501.

government allowing the establishment of a Japanese military base in Timor, to which he promptly replied that he did not have authority to negotiate. But he did attend a meeting at the Ministry of War where, having treated the matters at a personal level and thus bypassing the Portuguese legation, Gorgulho presented Macau's requests regarding the disputed islands and clarified some of Japan's proposals to Macau (the railway and the Coloane harbour ideas had been abandoned but trade deals were still desired).²² Gorgulho's visit to Tokyo was used as a propaganda coup, with an article in the *Asahi Shinbun* claiming that Portugal would recognise Manchukuo, sign new trade agreements with Japan, and grant facilities to Japanese troops.²³ This was vehemently denied by the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and by Gorgulho himself,²⁴ who according to the chargé d'affaires at Tokyo had not talked to the press. The report had apparently not even been well received by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as it suggested Macau wanted to deal with the Japanese military authorities excluding the Ministry.²⁵ Freitas blamed Wada for the whole affair but Gorgulho might not have been completely against the attention bestowed upon him. For example, he requested permission from the Macau authorities to wear the Order of the Rising Sun – 5th Class that he had been awarded by the Japanese emperor.²⁶

²² Copy of confidential and secret report by Captain Carlos de Sousa Gorgulho to the Governor of Macau, 20 Mar. 1939. The report was sent by MC to MNE in September 1939 (AHD, 2P, A48, M217).

²³ British Ambassador to Tokyo to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 2 Mar. 1939, TNA, FO 371/23501. A clipping of the original article in the *Asahi Shinbun* (1 Mar. 1939) and the English translation of the article ('The Portuguese Government at Macau will Co-Operate with Japan Bringing about Better Political and Economic Understandings') can be found in AHD, 2P, A48, M217. The article was mentioned in several other reports, such as 'Japan and Macao – Understanding Reached in Tokyo', *The South China Morning Post* (2 Mar. 1939); 'Co-Operation of Japan and Portugal Seen', *The Shanghai Times* (2 Mar. 1939); 'Un journal japonais annonce la conclusion d'un accord nippon-portugais' [A Japanese Newspaper Announces the Conclusion of a Japanese-Portuguese Agreement], *Le Journal de Shanghai* (2 Mar. 1939), AHD, 2P, A48, M217. A piece to be published by the Lisbon newspapers *O Século* and *Novidades* ('Parece estar em via de conclusão um acôrdo luso-nipónico que comporta o reconhecimento da Mandchuria por Portugal' [The Conclusion of a Portuguese-Japanese Agreement that Includes Portugal's Recognition of Manchuria Seems to Be Under Way]) was cut by the Portuguese censorship services.

²⁴ The letter the Portuguese chargé d'affaires in Tokyo to the editor of the paper ended by stating that 'such important matters [...] can only be discussed and settled between the two Governments and never between the Government of a country and the colonial Government of the other' (AHD, 2P, A48, M217).

²⁵ Chargé d'Affaires in Tokyo to MNE, 3 Mar. 1939, *ibid.*.

²⁶ AM, MO/AH/AC/SA/01/17164.

Japan's wooing of Portugal was a transnational affair. In Brussels, the Japanese ambassador Kuruso Saburō²⁷ visited the Portuguese legation more than once to discuss the situation in Asia. He mentioned the 'necessity of making a deal about Macau,' placing Portugal's position in China with other small powers 'such as Holland or Belgium' with whom Japan wanted to keep good relations.²⁸ The following month, he mentioned the possibility of developing the enclave's harbour. Everything would be 'confined to private interests, simple businesses between legally constituted companies, to ease the response to any complaint by other powers.'²⁹ From Lisbon, Salazar wrote back recommending the chargé d'affaires not to show interest in such conversations.³⁰

These early efforts for Portuguese-Japanese cooperation did not bring tangible results but they did bring about bad publicity. With an unwanted spotlight being cast on Portuguese-Japanese relations due to Gorgulho's trip, governor Barbosa was recalled to Lisbon to attend a colonial conference.³¹ The commander of the sloop Gonçalves Zarco filled in as acting governor, despite rumours that Gorgulho had been promised the post.³² The Japanese personnel in Macau also changed. Wada did not return from his trip to Japan. His place was filled by major Watanabe Giichi, an infantry officer attached to the headquarters staff of the South China Expeditionary Force. The British saw the move as due to Wada's failure to assure the peaceful surrender of Zhongshan district,³³ which bordered Macau.

Japanese attempts to get something out of Macau were undeterred by the governor's absence. In April, rear admiral Sukigara, the navy chief of staff at Guangzhou,

²⁷ Kuruso Saburō was later appointed ambassador to Germany (1939-1941), where he signed the Tripartite Pact, and special envoy to Washington, where he was when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor.

²⁸ Portuguese Chargé d'Affaires in Brussels to MNE, 18 Feb. 1939, AHD, 2P, A48, M217, my translation.

²⁹ Portuguese Chargé d'Affaires in Brussels to MNE, 4 Mar. 1939, *ibid.*

³⁰ Minister of Foreign Affairs to Portuguese Legation at Brussels, 11 Mar. 1939, *ibid.*, my translation.

³¹ A British intelligence report suggested he had been recalled to consult with the central government regarding Japanese proposals for concessions in Timor (Hong Kong Intelligence Report No. 7/39, sent from War Office to Far Eastern Department, FO, 23 May 1939, TNA FO 371/23501).

³² British Consul General at Guangzhou to British Ambassador at Shanghai, 30 Sept. 1939, *ibid.*

³³ Hong Kong Intelligence Report No. 9/39, sent from War Office to Far Eastern Department, FO, 3 July 1939, *ibid.*

came to the enclave to request the cooperation of the Macau government.³⁴ Two motorboats were being used for contraband and the admiral believed them to be the property of Pedro José Lobo, the head of the Economic Services and one of the most powerful figures in Macau. The admiral wanted the boats detained and to establish a temporary radio station for exclusive use of the Japanese navy. The acting governor rejected the accusation (but ordered Lobo to put a stop to the use of those boats) and declined authorisation for the request. But the Japanese were not finished. They threatened to detain custom launches in the waters between Macau and Lappa, an area the Portuguese considered as under dispute with China.³⁵ The minister of colonies recommended the usual blend of stalling and flattering. Such requests had to be made to the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not to an acting governor. But he argued that it was ‘useful to remind our excellent relations [with the] Japanese [and the] advantage of not changing the status quo for the moment.’³⁶

The idea of exchanging visits as shadow diplomacy continued to be considered. After the governor’s return to Macau, the Japanese consul at Guangzhou brought an invitation from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Barbosa to visit Japan as ‘public proof of their consideration.’³⁷ He replied he would accept in due course and held a dinner for Japanese officers where Timor and Wang Jingwei were topics of conversation. A few months later the Japanese consul returned, accompanied by two officers. They asked for Portuguese ‘cooperation’ in order to prevent a campaign of some Macau Chinese newspapers against Wang Jingwei and violent actions of pro-Chiang Kai-shek Chinese. The governor replied by showing a ‘great number of newspaper articles [that the] censorship commission had not permitted to be published because it deemed

³⁴ Acting Governor [to Minister of Colonies], 22 Apr. 1939, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767.

³⁵ Acting Governor to Minister of Colonies, 24 Feb. 1939, *ibid.*

³⁶ Minister of Colonies to Acting Governor, 27 Feb. 1939, *ibid.*, my translation.

³⁷ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 23 Aug. 1939, *ibid.*. Also in AHD, 3P, A9, M128-129, and in AHD, 3P, A9, M135.

them damaging [to our] good friendship with Japan.’ The neighbouring regions did indeed receive anti-Wang pamphlets but the ‘Macau police had been preventing their circulation.’ The movement of alleged ‘terrorists’ from Hong Kong to the interior via Macau was being monitored and some had been repatriated to Guangzhou at the request of the Hong Kong governor. He assured efforts were being made to prevent anti-Japanese activities and punish those who did them.³⁸ But reports did not stop immediately. Shortly after the visit a piece in a pro-Japanese newspaper in Guangzhou declared that Macau authorities had permitted the presence of pro-Chongqing ‘enemies of Japan,’ including members of the Blue Shirts, a secret paramilitary movement loyal to Chiang Kai-shek.³⁹ A few days later, Amaro Sacramento Monteiro, the new consul at Guangzhou discussed the accusations with Japan’s consul general. Monteiro argued that even though the Portuguese wished to maintain a strict neutrality in Macau and keep ‘the best and most friendly relations’ with its Chinese and Japanese neighbours, ‘it would be difficult, if not impossible, to avoid each and every kind of manifestation by anti-Japanese elements infiltrated in Macau, a territory that was open to the Chinese.’⁴⁰ The consul was, thus, implicitly admitting that the Portuguese were unable to guarantee complete neutrality in Macau.

³⁸ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 13 Sept. 1939, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767, my translation. Also in AHD, 3P, A9, M128-129.

³⁹ ‘Aomen dangju sang xinbinkuang bi rang kangRi fenzi Rifang yanzhong kangyi fenkai yichang’ [Macau Authorities Have Gone Mad Sheltering Anti-Japanese Terrorists Japan Protests Energetically and with Exceptional Indignation], *Guangdong xunbao* (13 Sept. 1939), AHD, 3P, A9, M128-129. On the Lixingshe (Society for Vigorous Practice) and the Blue Shirts see F. Wakeman Jr., ‘A Revisionist View of the Nanjing Decade: Confucian Fascism’, *The China Quarterly*, 150 (1997), pp. 395-432; and F. Wakeman Jr., *Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service* (Berkeley, 2003).

⁴⁰ Portuguese Consul at Guangzhou to Governor of Macau, 30 Sept. 1939, AHD, 3P, A9, M128-129, my translation.

2.1.2. Growing isolation: Japanese pressure on Macau after 1940

From 1940 Japanese pressure over Macau became less suave and more threatening. This was primarily linked to events in another Portuguese colony in Asia, the island of Timor. This connection, which will be further explored in Chapter Four, is useful to understand Portuguese neutrality in a broader international framework.

The Portuguese ceded to British lobbying to grant an Australian company rights to explore for oil in a part of the island coveted by Japan.⁴¹ In February the former Japanese chargé d'affaires at Lisbon stopped at Macau on his way to Japan. He hinted that a more cooperative stance regarding Timor could only be in the interest of Macau.⁴² In Tokyo, he conveyed the same to the newly arrived Portuguese minister, Luís Esteves Fernandes, in a private conversation. He told Fernandes that the 'Japanese government decided to exert pressure over Macau to obtain oil concessions in Timor,' something the navy and military authorities were desperate to guarantee. Fernandes noted that such intimidation was undesirable and the Japanese government had had no reason for complaint since the 'Portuguese Government [had been] always willing [to] acquiesce [to] Portuguese-Japanese collaboration.'⁴³ Soon after the governor of Macau commented that he believed the aim of Japan's invasion of Zhongshan had been retaliation for the oil concession in Timor not having been given to them.⁴⁴

Pressure over Macau took on a variety of forms, as noted before, and the Portuguese resorted to informal diplomacy to deal with it. In March 1940 the Japanese military authorities in Guangzhou started to demand visas issued by a representative of the Japanese police for Chinese passengers travelling from Macau, an illegal situation

⁴¹ Negotiation of this concession was a lengthy affair that preceded the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. For details see G. Stone, *The Oldest Ally: Britain and the Portuguese Connection, 1936-1941* (Suffolk, 1994), pp. 183-7.

⁴² Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 3 Feb. 1940, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767.

⁴³ Portuguese Minister to Japan to MNE, 9 Mar. 1940, AHD, 2P, A48, M217, my translation.

⁴⁴ British Consul at Macau to British Ambassador at Shanghai, 24 Mar. 1940, TNA, FO 371/24700.

against which the Portuguese could do little. The governor lamented it as a ‘very embarrassing situation’ and again linked Japanese actions in Macau to pressure over Timor.⁴⁵ He then sent two envoys to meet the Japanese as his ‘ambassadors.’⁴⁶ The Portuguese consul general at Guangzhou caustically condemned this initiative. He complained about the governor’s shadow diplomacy, sending its own emissaries to directly negotiate, in a ‘disastrous’ manner, with the Japanese military authorities bypassing his authority.⁴⁷ The Japanese vice-consul at Guangzhou also visited Macau, demanding Portuguese cooperation to suppress anti-Japanese activities and the use of the enclave’s inner harbour for Japanese vessels in transit as well as for a number of guards en-route to Qianshan, near the border with Macau. As usual, the governor’s reply was a mixture of assurance and buying time by insisting that everything ought to be conducted according to the existing legislation.⁴⁸ This succession of begrudged understandings can be seen as incipient forms of collaboration.

On 30 March 1940, the same day that Wang Jingwei formed a central government in Nanjing, the Japanese occupied Qianshan. Chinese sources were quoted in the press listing the demands Japanese were making to the Macau government, including the retreat from disputed islands, stopping supplies to Chongqing, and recognising the Zhongshan puppet administration.⁴⁹ News about Japanese pressure over Macau was reported as far

⁴⁵ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 15 Mar. 1940, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767, my translation.

⁴⁶ Lieutenant Júlio de Montalvão e Silva and Lieutenant Botelho de Sousa.

⁴⁷ Portuguese Consul at Guangzhou to Portuguese Minister to China, 19 Mar. 1940. AHD, 3P, A9, M135. He insisted on denouncing this to Lisbon on other occasions, stressing that Macau’s envoys had not even briefed him about what they had come to discuss with the Japanese when he could probably do it better – or at least in better English – than them (Portuguese Consul at Guangzhou to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 30 Apr. 1940, AHD, 2P, A48, M217).

⁴⁸ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 20 Mar. 1940, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767.

⁴⁹ E.g. ‘Colony Menaced – Japanese demands to Portuguese’, *Daily Express* (30 Mar. 1940). Pressure on Macau was widely reported in the British press in late March-early April, with news appearing in the *Times*, the *Daily Telegraph*, the *Evening News*, the *Sunday Dispatch*, the *Sunday Express*, the *Star*, the *Scotsman*, and the *News Chronicle* (clippings in AHD, 2P, A48, M217).

away as Brazil, Chile, and South Africa, countries that had important Chinese communities. Once again, the Portuguese denied these reports.⁵⁰

Visits of Japanese military figures to Macau continued to take place, and not only to meet with the Portuguese.⁵¹ News that Japanese officers had met with ‘supporters of the new [Chinese] regime’ in a hotel in Macau, toasting ‘Asia for the Asians’ alarmed the governor, who was becoming convinced that ‘the Japanese objective is to provoke disorder and anarchy in Macau,’ damaging the profits of the opium and gambling monopolies and diverting wealthy Chinese residents from Macau.⁵²

After gaining control of Zhongshan in March 1940 the Japanese hardened their attitude towards Macau. Relations began to turn sour, to a point that the consul at Guangzhou remarked that ‘Macau is a colony but it is not the first time the invader considers it a concession.’⁵³ Japanese blockade of food supplies to the enclave accompanied pressure over the Portuguese occupation of the disputed Lappa island. Relaxation of the strict Japanese blockade was ensured by bribing Chinese puppet authorities in Lappa, who acted against the Japanese. The British consul alluded to a secret financial agreement between them and the concessionary of the gambling monopoly in Macau Fu Deyin (Fu Tak Iam), the chairman of the Commercial Association, and Pedro Lobo. For the consul, Japanese policy towards Macau was taking shape: blackmail.⁵⁴

Shortly after being called to Lisbon to explain a controversial issue of opium smuggling that had been presented to the League of Nations,⁵⁵ governor Barbosa died of illness in Macau in July 1940. Administrative uncertainty could not have come at a worse

⁵⁰ Portuguese Minister to China to Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1 Apr. 1940, AHD, 2P, A48, M217.

⁵¹ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 4, 12, and 23 Apr., 1940, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767.

⁵² Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 30 Apr. 1940, *ibid.*, my translation.

⁵³ Portuguese Consul at Guangzhou to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 30 Apr. 1940, AHD, 2P, A48, M217, my translation.

⁵⁴ British Consul at Macau to FO, 20 May 1940, TNA, FO 371/24700.

⁵⁵ Pinto, ‘Guerra em Paz’, pp. 68-9.

time as Japanese démarches proceeded. In early August, the acting governor received a request from the Japanese lieutenant general Nemoto Hiroshi to station Japanese liaison officers in Macau ‘in order to strengthen relations’ between the Zhongshan military detachment and the Macau government. The acting governor replied he was not authorised to answer the request, which he interpreted as reflecting ‘the will to establish [in] Macau an authentic headquarters [...] linked to probable attack [of] Hong Kong.’⁵⁶ In early September a Japanese liaison officer, colonel Okubo Hiroshi, came to Macau,⁵⁷ and the Japanese consul at Hong Kong announced that a Japanese consulate would be installed in the enclave the following month.⁵⁸ This came a few months after the British sent their consul to the city. The Japanese consulate was established in the beginning of October, the first consul being Fukui Yasumitsu who remained in the post until his assassination in February 1945.⁵⁹ In the meantime, Japan tried to get the Macau acting governor to convince the Chinese Maritime Customs (CMC) authorities at Lappa to accept a Japanese director. Requests were made via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, the minister in Lisbon and the consul at Hong Kong. Initially the acting governor refused.⁶⁰ Later, instructed by Lisbon, he assured them that he would employ his services to attain the desired outcome.⁶¹ Little by little, the Portuguese authorities began to cede more and more to the Japanese. Censorship over the local press became more severe. From August to October alone the censorship commission forbade the publication of 102 articles in the local Chinese press for containing passages ‘offensive to Japan and the

⁵⁶ Acting Governor to Minister of Colonies, 9 Aug. 1940, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767, my translation.

⁵⁷ Acting Governor to Minister of Colonies, 9 Sept. 1940, *ibid.*

⁵⁸ MC to MNE, 17 Sept. 1940, AHD, 2P, A48, M217. Also in AHD, 2P, A48, M212.

⁵⁹ G. P. Jin and Z. Wu, ‘Teria Havido Acordos Secretos entre Portugal e o Japão Durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial?’ [Were There Secret Agreements Between Portugal and Japan during the Second World War?], *Administração* 14/51 (2001), p. 244. A news report at the time of his death stated that Fukui had arrived in Macau in January 1939, as a staff member of the Japanese chancery (‘Consul do Japão’ [Japan’s Consul], *A Voz de Macau* [3 Feb. 1945], p. 4).

⁶⁰ Acting Governor of Macau to MC, 2 Oct. 1940, AHD, 2P, A48, M217.

⁶¹ MNE to Portuguese Minister in Tokyo, 19 Dec. 1940; MNE to Japanese Minister in Lisbon, 16 Oct. 1940, *ibid.*

Japanese army.⁶² Signs that something bad was brewing for the British in South China began to mount as the Japanese began to transfer some of their assets from Hong Kong to Macau.⁶³

Japanese actions towards Macau were not altered by changes in the local Portuguese administration. The new governor of Macau, naval commander Gabriel Maurício Teixeira, who arrived in October 1940, continued to be visited by Japanese military figures.⁶⁴ An offer to exchange intelligence was made in February 1941, with the governor answering vaguely, believing it would be inconvenient to give a clear refusal.⁶⁵

As the war dragged on, the conduct of the Japanese in Macau worsened with several minor clashes. For example, one night in April 1941, a Portuguese soldier was attacked in the street by the consul's drunken secretary, Sakurai Hirochi.⁶⁶ Other attacks that followed were more serious. In early May, Japanese planes returned to Zhaoqing bombing civilian targets in the city and dropping two bombs on the Portuguese mission, again near the flagpole hoisting the neutral Portuguese flag. A four page long dispatch from the Portuguese consul at Guangzhou to his Japanese counterpart listed the damages and protested vigorously about the five times the mission had been hit since 1938. Following the Macau bishop's reasoning that the attack might have been intentional, he stated: 'Some one [sic.], in bad faith, would even say that the bombardments would have

⁶² It also forbade 85 articles for 'alarming the population or damaging neutrality,' and 38 for 'other reasons' (MC to MNE, 17 Jan. 1941, *ibid.*, my translation).

⁶³ In August, a representative of the Japanese firm Mitsui Bussan Kaisha enquired in Macau about storage space for 3,000 tons of miscellaneous cargo from Hong Kong (General Officer Commanding Hong Kong to War Office, 9 Aug. 1940, TNA, FO 371/24688). In October the manager of the BNU Macau informed the acting governor that several Hong Kong companies had asked to open accounts there, including Mitsui, which, he added, also financed a Timor society. He warned Lisbon that 'these precautions make suppose the Japanese expect something abnormal [in the] future [of] Hong Kong.' (Acting Governor to Minister of Colonies, 26 Oct. 1939, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767, my translation). In February 1941 Mitsui deposited 10,000 patacas at the bank (Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 11 Feb. 1941, *ibid.*).

⁶⁴ Governor of Macau quoted in despatch from MC to MNE, 10 Dec. 1940, AHD, 2P, A48, M212.

⁶⁵ Governor of Macau quoted in despatch from MC to MNE, 4 Feb. 1941, AHD, 2P, A48, M217.

⁶⁶ While the fight was taking place, a second Japanese man – later identified as the vice-consul Asahina Taiki – pleaded for him not to be arrested. The soldier later declared that he had not defended himself with the pistol and sabre he carried as they 'could produce wounds that would take the matter to serious consequences.' (AM, MO/AH/AC/SA/01/18210).

been purposely done.⁶⁷ Apart from bombing Zhaoqing, Japanese soldiers pillaged and looted churches and residences of Portuguese missions in Kaiping and Chikan.⁶⁸ The Portuguese kept protesting, mainly via the consulate at Guangzhou, but their pleas for compensation went unanswered till as late as 1948.⁶⁹

Japanese interactions with European colonial authorities in South China became more confrontational in the 1940s. As the Japanese advanced towards French Indochina, pressure also grew on Macau. In mid July 1941 a new Japanese liaison officer, lieutenant colonel Sawa Eisaku, who had been sub-chief of Japanese intelligence in Manchuria, arrived in the enclave.⁷⁰ At the end of the following month, consul Fukui presented the governor with a note listing pro-Chongqing activities taking place in Macau, notably smuggling of military supplies and commodities to the territory under Chiang's regime, secret activities of its organisations, and anti-Japanese propaganda. He submitted a long set of proposals that Portugal should 'find a way to accept [...] at the earliest possible date in order that the Government of Macau may offer sincere cooperation in the pursuance of Japan's policy towards the Chungking regime.' The proposals included 'prohibiting the smuggling of military supplies and transportation of commodities' to Chongqing through the enclave and allowing Japan to inspect 'all boats in the harbour of Macau [...] at any time to prevent smuggling;' extending facilities to Japanese authorities' vessels and persons and grant them protection in Macau; closing Chiang's intelligence and espionage

⁶⁷ Portuguese Consul General at Guangzhou to Japanese Consul General at Guangzhou, 21 Aug. 1941, AHD, 2P, A48, M176. Also in AM, MO/AH/AC/SA/01/17228.

⁶⁸ Portuguese Consul General at Guangzhou to Acting Consul for Japan at Guangzhou, 27 Oct. 1941; Portuguese Acting Consul at Guangzhou to Japanese Consul General at Guangzhou, 18 Nov. 1941, *ibid.*

⁶⁹ In October the Japanese military authorities claimed clouds had been thick and low when they had flown over Zhaoqing in May and were not aware of damages done to Third Nationals' interests. They stated that an investigation could not be carried out because the area was unoccupied (Japanese Consul General at Guangzhou to Portuguese Consul General at Guangzhou, 31 Oct. 1941, AHD, 2P, A48, M176). In November they stated they could not receive claims for compensation over Kaiping since the dates of the alleged looting were unknown and it was not an occupied area (Japanese Consul General at Guangzhou to Portuguese Consul General at Guangzhou, 13 Nov. 1941, AM, MO/AH/AC/SA/01/17228). In January 1942 Japanese military authorities replied via the Japanese consulate that no evidence was found of looting by Japanese soldiers suggesting it might have been done 'either by the Chinese Army [...] or by the bandits.' They refused to take any responsibility (Japanese Acting Consul-General at Guangzhou to Portuguese Vice-Consul at Guangzhou, 20 Jan. 1942, *ibid.*).

⁷⁰ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 16 July 1941, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767.

organisations in Macau ‘and deportation of hostile characters designed [sic.] by the Japanese Authorities;’ ‘complete suppression of anti-Japanese propaganda rumour, press and organisation[s];’ and ‘suppression of terrorist acts and prevention of persons of this character from entering Macau.’⁷¹ The governor replied on 3 September. He did not object to the ‘doctrine’ of the requests as it was integrated with neutrality duties but certain aspects of the ‘modus faciendi’ were ‘offensive’ to Portuguese sovereignty.⁷²

Two days later, the Japanese consul insisted on the proposals, clarifying them in a memorandum on their execution.⁷³ The governor accepted⁷⁴ only to receive an even more comprehensive list of demands handed out by liaison officers. These included stopping ‘all trades [sic.] by junks,’ delivery to the Japanese authorities of a list of ships registered at the Harbour Authority, a copy of the manifestos of ships and ferries travelling between Macau and Guangzhouwan, Indochina, and Hong Kong, prohibition of night time navigation within Macau’s harbour of all ships except the government’s and Hong Kong boats, and not only allowing men and boats of Japanese authorities to operate on land and water at any time but also furnishing them with arms for their self-protection.⁷⁵ This was unacceptable for the governor who, in discussion with Japanese liaison officers refused to provide copies of the ships’ manifests and grant freedom for the Japanese authorities to circulate in Macau and its waters, as it was unthinkable to dare presume ‘the government of Macau would undertake economic espionage for Japan.’ Eventually, the governor consented in suspending trade via junks for a short period, constituting a special brigade to suppress contraband, granting gun licenses to six Japanese informants to be used in smuggling suppression, handing in a copy of the names of registered boats, forbidding navigation for boats with combustion engines, and permitting the liaison officer to have

⁷¹ Japanese Consul at Macau to Governor of Macau dated 27 Aug. 1941, sent with despatch from the Governor of Macau to the Minister of Colonies, 3 Sept. 1941, AHD, 2P, A48, M212.

⁷² Governor of Macau to Japanese Consul at Macau, 3 Sept. 1941, *ibid.*, my translation.

⁷³ Memorandum from the Japanese Consul at Macau to the Governor of Macau, 5 Sept. 1941, *ibid.*.

⁷⁴ Governor of Macau to Japanese Consul at Macau, 5 Sept. 1941, *ibid.*.

⁷⁵ ‘Main Points of the Execution of the Proposals (A Plan)’, *ibid.*.

two private boats, which were not allowed to use the flag of the Imperial Japanese Navy nor do any act of inspection or policing.⁷⁶

To Lisbon the governor completely downplayed what he had consented to. In his interpretation such demands were only aimed at readjusting the ‘mechanics of contraband’ in the region. With China’s southern coast occupied by the Japanese, smuggling ‘was only possible with the complicity and profit of the pro-Japan Chinese authorities and the Japanese themselves.’ The governor’s conclusion of the whole affair was that there were ‘some more Japanese “partners” in contraband that needed to be paid off.’ The Macau government was able to cash in on its compliance. Teixeira wrote to Lisbon that exports had increased and the revenue of the taxes over tobacco had gone up from the usual \$25,000 [patacas] to \$60,000 in September and \$70,000 in October. The anti-smuggling brigade consisted of five Chinese appointed by the Japanese that were integrated in the Portuguese police and employed by the Harbour Authority. His despatch to Lisbon ended by subtly upholding the advantages of Macau’s own style of diplomacy. Considering that the Japanese commands in China were ‘practically independent’ from the Japanese government, the governor would seek to solve any future incidents on the spot with them when possible, only telegraphing Lisbon about the most important cases and writing about the others via despatch.⁷⁷ When analysing these documents, two scholars have concluded that ‘there was no agreement as such’ but only a ‘*modus vivendi*’ between Portugal and Japan.⁷⁸ But *modi vivendi* in other cases have been seen as forms of collaboration.⁷⁹ It is clear that the terms agreed by the governor amount to a degree of acquiescence to Japanese demands. However, at the time there was little opportunity for

⁷⁶ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 27 Oct. 1941, sent by MC to MNE, 17 Jan. 1942, *ibid.*, my translation.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ Jin and Wu, ‘Teria havido’, p. 266, my translation.

⁷⁹ Wasserstein, ‘Ambiguities of Occupation’, p. 25.

any major moral questioning. Two months later the British capitulated in Hong Kong and Macau had to cede even more to the Japanese in order to remain nominally unoccupied.

2.1.3. Allies of a kind: Macau and Hong Kong

The beginnings of British presence in China were tightly linked with Macau⁸⁰ but, by 1937, the Portuguese enclave's importance for Britain had long become negligible. When the war erupted, British interests in Macau were small. They were confined to the Macau Electric Lighting Company (MELCO) and Waterworks (WATCO), both managed by Frederick Johnson Gellion, a long-term resident who was also the British vice-consul in the city.⁸¹ The post had been revived in 1936,⁸² which shows that indications of Japanese penetration – in other words, competition – in the enclave were not completely ignored. From 1937 to late 1941 British attitudes towards Macau were marked by cautious cooperation through information exchange but with the avoidance of concrete commitments.

A key link between Hong Kong and Macau before 1942 was Captain (later Major⁸³) Charles Ralph Boxer, a naval intelligence officer stationed at the British colony. Boxer was fluent in Japanese and Portuguese and is now best remembered as one of the most eminent historians of the Portuguese empire. He shared official documents and intelligence with the Portuguese consul in Hong Kong and the Macau authorities.⁸⁴ He also had links of personal friendship with the governor of Macau, A.T. Barbosa, and figures of the Macanese elite such as Jack (José Maria) Braga. Braga was a member of an

⁸⁰ A. Coates, *Macao and the British 1637-1842: Prelude to Hong Kong* (Oxford, 1988); R. M. Puga, *The British Presence in Macau, 1635-1793* (Hong Kong, 2013).

⁸¹ British Consul General at Guangzhou to British Ambassador at Beijing, 13 Aug. 1937, TNA, FO 371/20988.

⁸² 'Macau H.B.M. Vice-Consul Mr. Gellion Sets to Work', *The Canton Truth* (27 June 1936), p. 23, NLA, MS 4300, Box 84, 14.2/14.

⁸³ Boxer was promoted to Major in June 1940 ('Major C.R. Boxer', *A Voz de Macau* [17 May 1940], p. 5).

⁸⁴ E.g. Portuguese Consul at Hong Kong to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 15 July 1938, AHD, 3P, A9, M128-129. Also D. Alden, *Charles R. Boxer: An Uncommon Life* (Lisbon, 2001), p. 93.

important Hong Kong Portuguese family who lived in Macau from the late 1920s to 1946, as a Reuters and Associated Press correspondent, and as a teacher. As will be detailed in Chapter Five, he worked for British, Chinese and possibly American intelligence during the war.⁸⁵

After talking to the governor about ‘Japanese penetration in Macau,’ Boxer concluded that whilst Barbosa ‘appears to be genuinely pro-British,’ it was nevertheless possible for him to be ‘tempted to fall in with some of the Japanese proposals’ if he could not ‘obtain elsewhere the necessary support for his schemes for improving Macau’s economic conditions.’⁸⁶ To discourage any Portuguese perceptions of neglect by the British, A.P. Blunt, consul general in Guangzhou, visited Macau in early August 1937. One of the main goals of his trip was ‘to counteract an alleged tendency towards closer relations with the Japanese.’ He confirmed that attempts at Japanese penetration had been occurring since the late 1920s, but they had mostly been rejected. The governor’s pro-British stance was also apparent to him.⁸⁷

Anglo-Portuguese contacts about Macau were similarly made in Europe. The Portuguese ambassador to London, the anglophile Armindo Monteiro, discussed the situation in the Foreign Office (FO) with deputy under-secretary Alexander Cadogan⁸⁸ in September, who told him Macau was not in the same danger as Hong Kong. ‘If Japan wanted a footing on the Chinese coast there were a hundred other places they could

⁸⁵ The Braga Papers held at the National Library of Australia hold numerous letters and work drafts attesting to a long-term friendship between Boxer and Braga, both sharing an interest in the history of the Portuguese presence in East Asia in the pre-modern period as well as sharing intelligence on the situation in South China. E.g. NLA, MS 4300, Box 9, 3.2./2. Another of Boxer’s informants was Lieutenant P. da Costa, the governor’s private secretary with ‘pro-British tendencies.’ It was him that told Boxer in March 1937 that the Japanese had not made any attempts to secure control in Macau after a failed scheme to establish a sugar refinery at Coloane (Minute of conversation between Gibbs and Boxer to the British Consulate-General at Guangzhou, 20 Mar. 1937, TNA, FO 371/20988).

⁸⁶ Boxer to Chaplin (War Office), 22 July 1937, *ibid*.

⁸⁷ British Consul General at Guangzhou to British Ambassador at Beijing, 13 Aug. 1937, *ibid*.

⁸⁸ Cadogan had been Britain’s minister plenipotentiary and later ambassador to China between 1933 and 1936.

choose without antagonising Portugal,' was his prescient assessment.⁸⁹ Monteiro left the conversation with the impression that British foreign policy towards Japan was marked by 'extreme caution.'⁹⁰ The ambassador also visited the foreign secretary Anthony Eden a few days later, to discuss the situation in East Asia. Monteiro stressed Portuguese reinforcement of its army and navy presence in Macau, but he desired closer contacts between the governors of Macau and Hong Kong.⁹¹ A visit by the acting governor of Hong Kong, Norman Lockhart Smith, to Macau was prepared before governor Geoffry Northcote's arrival. Monteiro had asked for defence issues to be discussed. In a meeting in London, British officials decided that the acting governor could discuss local defence, 'but not to appear to commit the Colony or His Majesty's Government in any way.' The Colonial Office assistant under-secretary Henry Moore argued that 'if the whole thing were kept vague then any further approach and request for a definite commitment could be more easily refused.'⁹² The British were not yet prepared to take a clear stance in East Asia. Their vague commitment towards their Portuguese allies was somewhat similar to their stance towards the Chinese central government.

The acting governor's visit took place in late October and nothing much came of it but a simple recommendation for enhancing commercial relations between Hong Kong and Macau. Barbosa did not raise the key question of local defences. Instead Smith gathered a number of impressions on the governor's attitude towards China and Japan that highlight the ambiguity of Portuguese stances towards the conflict. Barbosa was more preoccupied with 'Chinese irredentism' than with Japanese penetration in Macau, being more favourable to the British than to the Japanese where foreign capital was

⁸⁹ Record of conversation between Cadogan and the Portuguese Ambassador, 21 Sept. 1937, *ibid.*

⁹⁰ Portuguese Ambassador to Britain to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 17 Sept. 1937, AHD, 2P, A48, M176, my translation.

⁹¹ Draft of conversation between Eden and the Portuguese Ambassador sent to the British Embassy in Lisbon. 23 Sept. 1937, TNA, FO 371/20988.

⁹² Note on meeting (Colonial Office), 27 Sept. 1937, *ibid.*

needed.⁹³ The following year, in November, governor Northcote also made an official visit to Macau.⁹⁴ These visits gave the impression of a close relationship and a coordinated strategy although they fell quite short of a united front.

Nevertheless, the British had begun to pay more attention to Macau. Evidence of this was the dispatch of a consul to replace Gellion while he was temporarily absent from the territory. Hermann Derek Bryan arrived in Macau in February, in the midst of a tense period of Japanese demands, and one day after a complaint from the governor to Gellion that he was being ignored by the British authorities.⁹⁵ The following year Bryan took up a permanent consular post in Macau.⁹⁶

Boxer had been assured in a meeting with Gorgulho that the governor, although having come to ‘some sort of modus-vivendi’ with Japan, still prioritised ‘closer and more friendly relations’ with Hong Kong.⁹⁷ Nevertheless, Gorgulho’s visit to Tokyo discussed in the previous section sounded some alarms amongst the British.⁹⁸ Following up the *Asahi* report, there was fear that on Gorgulho’s return the governor would leave for Lisbon ‘to undertake the final negotiations,’ which would include the recognition of Manchukuo. Anxieties about Portugal’s stance in East Asia were very much linked to what was happening in Europe, where war broke out a few months later. The fact that Franco’s Spain had recognised Japan’s puppet state was seen as possible influence over Salazar’s Portugal. A report in the *South China Morning Post* reminded the desirability of Portugal not venturing too far from its traditional ally: ‘Portugal’s best insurance policy is

⁹³ Acting Governor of Hong Kong to Colonial Secretary, 26 Oct. 1937, *ibid.*

⁹⁴ ‘O Governador de Hongkong visita oficialmente Macau’ [The Governor of Hong Kong Officially Visits Macau], *A Voz de Macau* (7 Nov. 1938), p. 2, p. 4.

⁹⁵ British Consul General at Guangzhou to British Ambassador at Shanghai, 14 Mar. 1939, TNA, FO 371/23501.

⁹⁶ He presented credentials in July 1940 (Acting Governor to Minister of Colonies, 18 July 1940, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767).

⁹⁷ Record of conversation between Captain Gorgulho and the G.S.O.3 (Intelligence), Hong Kong, 1 Feb. 1939, TNA, FO 371/23501.

⁹⁸ France was equally concerned. The French ambassador visited the Portuguese chargé d’affaires in Tokyo to enquire about the veracity of the report and to complain about concessions to the Japanese by the Macau authorities (MNE to Portuguese Legation in London, 13 Mar. 1939, AHD, 2P, A48, M217).

still her alliance with Britain – especially for her colonial possessions and for her trade. No other protector can offer better terms for Portugal’s co-operation.’⁹⁹ The advice seems to have been followed.

Sino-British cooperation was particularly promoted by a few key figures. As seen before, one of them was Boxer. In a 1939 report he noted that there had been complaints over the absence of a British representative in a national holiday celebration at Macau. He stressed such occasions should not be wasted, particularly because the German and Italian consuls at Guangzhou attended them, and given British attempts to ensure Portugal’s support in Europe. He painted a perceptive picture of the Portuguese and of Macau’s potential importance:

The Portuguese are accurately described as our oldest allies, and they have also (and with equal justice) been described as our worst; but in either case it is better to treat them as friends than as potential enemies, for if they eventually do line up with the Axis Powers, Macau may well become something more than a mere nuisance to Hong Kong.¹⁰⁰

The situation in Macau was often reported in the Hong Kong press, and even the British press in Europe picked up on reports about the enclave. This was a source of tension for the Portuguese authorities who believed a campaign had been mounted against them. Nonetheless, relations between the two colonies remained sound. Barbosa went on an official visit to Hong Kong in March 1938,¹⁰¹ his successor returning in May 1941. And whilst the press in Macau refrained from reporting anything concerning the effects of the war in China on the territory apart from the arrival of refugees and the rising cost of living, there was something far from neutral coming out in the pages of the main

⁹⁹ ‘Portugal’s Position’, *The South China Morning Post* (3 Mar. 1939), *ibid.*.

¹⁰⁰ Report by C. Boxer, August 4, 1939, sent by the War Office to the FO, 2 Nov. 1939, TNA, FO 371/23501.

¹⁰¹ ‘Visita oficial de S. Exa. o Governador a Hongkong’ [Official Visit of H.E. the Governor to Hongkong], *A Voz de Macau* (21 Mar. 1938), p. 4.

Portuguese local daily. Particularly during 1940, pro-British articles and cartoons, as well as propaganda photos of the British war effort in Europe, were often published.¹⁰²

In the beginning of December 1941, as the Japanese attack on Hong Kong unfolded, communications between the British colony and Macau were completely interrupted. In the latter, businesses began to reject Hong Kong dollars. The government worked out an agreement with the local moneychangers to continue accepting that currency. The new governor, G.M. Teixeira, justified his pro-British decision by linking the future of the Portuguese in Macau to Hong Kong, stating that ‘if England loses the war I don’t believe we will stay in Macau, if it wins, our gesture would be presented as [an act of] trust [and] friendship.’¹⁰³ Veiled assistance to the British would continue during the remaining war years, when Macau became more isolated – and more precious to the British – than ever before.

2.2. War and peace: Macau between Chinese resistance and collaboration

Macau was used by both Chinese resistance and collaborators in their activities to maintain China’s war effort against Japan or convince others to file for peace with the occupiers. The enclave had a strategic position during the Sino-Japanese War. Located in the Pearl River Delta, connected by land and water routes to the most important city in South China, Guangzhou (occupied in 1938), it bordered a county, Zhongshan, that was not firmly occupied until 1940, and was relatively near the British colony of Hong Kong, which until 1941 was an important lifeline for Chinese resistance.

¹⁰² The pro-British tone was so overwhelming that sometimes it could almost be read as a veiled criticism of Portugal’s authoritarian regime. See for example the last paragraph of an article that read: ‘England is rich – because England is, above all, a country of freedom’ (‘A Inglaterra capitalista’ [Capitalist England], *A Voz de Macau* [9 July 1940], p. 1, my translation).

¹⁰³ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 10 Dec. 1941, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767, my translation.

2.2.1. Macau and Chinese resistance

Communication between the Chinese Nationalist government resisting the Japanese invasion and the Portuguese authorities in Lisbon and Macau was made through diplomatic channels, personal intermediaries, and contacts between provincial and county authorities and the Macau administration. These links had varying degrees of efficiency but they were constant during the war.

Sino-Portuguese diplomatic relations suffered a period of crisis during the war. Although China's diplomatic representation to Portugal was marked by stability, such was not the case with the Portuguese diplomatic presence in China. The Chinese minister to Portugal throughout the period covered in this chapter was Li Jinlun, a New York native who served at Lisbon for a record period, from 1934 to 1943.¹⁰⁴




Figure 1. Li Jinlun, China's minister to Portugal

When the war erupted, Portugal's highest-ranking diplomat to China was minister plenipotentiary Armando Navarro, based at the Portuguese legation at Beijing since 1930. As the Portuguese minister to Tokyo who had worked in Beijing in the 1920s noted,

¹⁰⁴ *Zhonghua minguo shi waijiao zhi (chugao)* [Diplomatic History of the Republic of China] (Taipei, 2002), p. 832.

‘Macau justified the existence of the legation,’¹⁰⁵ since Portuguese trade and other relations with China were practically nil. An extensive Portuguese community, mostly comprised by Eurasian families with ancestral links to Macau, lived in some treaty ports where Portuguese consuls and/or vice-consuls were either posted from Portugal (at Shanghai and Guangzhou) or requested to look after Portuguese interests locally. At the suggestion of Li Jinlun, the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs ordered Navarro to move from Beijing to Shanghai in October 1937 to better communicate with the government in Nanjing.¹⁰⁶ But he died in February the next year,¹⁰⁷ depriving Portugal of an experienced diplomat in China. His successor, chosen in April, was João Maria da Silva de Lebre e Lima, who had served in London and at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Lisbon.

All was set in August 1938 for Lima to travel from the Portuguese legation in Shanghai to the Chinese wartime capital of Chongqing to present his credentials. Then suddenly his departure was suspended as the war progressed and bombings between Hong Kong and Chongqing made travelling dangerous.¹⁰⁸ Lima ended up staying in Shanghai until his return to Lisbon in 1945, a permanent point of contention mentioned by the Chinese side throughout the war.¹⁰⁹ Although technically accredited to Chiang’s government, Portugal’s minister lived in an occupied city, mingling in the same diplomatic circles as the pro-Wang Jingwei German and Italian ambassadors. This fact is particularly illustrative of the complexities of Portuguese neutrality in China.

¹⁰⁵ L.E. Fernandes, *De Pequim a Washington: Memórias de um Diplomata Português* [From Beijing to Washington: Memories of a Portuguese Diplomat] (Lisbon, 2007), p. 47.

¹⁰⁶ Minister of Foreign Affairs to Portuguese Embassy in London, 3 Oct. 1937, AHD, 2P, A48, M176.

¹⁰⁷ ‘Ministro de Portugal na China’ [Portugal’s Minister to China], *A Voz de Macau* (7 Feb. 1938), p. 4.

¹⁰⁸ E.g. Minister of Foreign Affairs to Portuguese Legation in Shanghai, 23 Aug., 1 and 5 Sept. 1938; Portuguese Legation in Shanghai to MNE, 23 Aug., and 5 Sept. 1938, ANTT, AOS, NE-2A2, cx. 422.

¹⁰⁹ E.g. AH, Waijiaobu [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], 020000023906A; Conversation notes by Franco Nogueira, 13 Aug. 1945, ANTT, AOS, NE-2A2, cx. 422, Pt. 8.

A useful and troublesome enclave

Macau assumed a privileged position as a base for communication with both Japanese and Chinese of different factions, sometimes at odds with the Portuguese diplomatic representatives.¹¹⁰ This was also due to the abnormal situation in China, where all Portuguese consular officials were, from 1937-8 onwards, living in occupied cities (Shanghai, Guangzhou, Xiamen, Hankou, Harbin¹¹¹), and the fact that the transferred Portuguese consul at Hong Kong was not replaced by a career diplomat.¹¹² Chinese contacts with Macau requesting assistance from the Portuguese authorities began in the first year of the war.¹¹³ They gained momentum as the Chinese Nationalists began to suffer serious attacks in South China from 1938.

Having attempted and failed to instigate a local coup, the Japanese started to bomb Guangzhou in February 1938.¹¹⁴ As the first city to be under a KMT government in the

¹¹⁰ Mutual complaints between the governor of Macau and the Portuguese consul at Guangzhou can be found in some of the existing correspondence to Lisbon. E.g. Acting Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 23 June 1939, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767; Portuguese Consul at Guangzhou to Portuguese Minister to China, 26 Mar. 1940, AHD, 2P, A48, M217; J. da Costa Carneiro (MNE) to the Portuguese Minister at Shanghai, 21 May 1940, *ibid.*

¹¹¹ In some cities consular representation seemed to have been an honorific post with little to do with actual diplomacy. Illustrative of this was the employment of several ‘White Russians’ as Portuguese consuls, perhaps a remnant of the 19th century, when tsarist diplomats had played a role as intermediaries between Portugal and the Qing. Solomon L. Skidelsky, a Jewish merchant, was consul at Harbin since the early 1920s,¹¹¹ disappearing from official listings in 1941 and being reported to have been executed by the Soviets after the war (F. Patrikeeff, *Russian Politics in Exile: The Northeast Asian Balance for Power, 1924-1931* [Oxford, 2012], p. 118, p. 199; *The Chinese Year Book 1940-1941* [Chongqing, 1941], pp. 800-2). From 1923 to 1947 the Portuguese consul in Hankou was Andrei Terentevich Belchenko, a former Russian diplomat. The Portuguese vice-consul at Xiamen was the French consul in the city. The consulate in Fuzhou closed in 1938.

¹¹² The well-connected consul at Hong Kong, Álvaro Brillhante Laborinho, was moved to South Africa in June 1939 (Acting Governor to Minister of Colonies, 5 June 1939, AHD, 3P, A9, M128-129). Francisco Paulo de Vasconcellos Soares, an aged member of the Hong Kong Portuguese community, stayed as acting consul (B. H. M. Koo, *The Portuguese Community in Hongkong and China*, Volume 2 [Macau, 2013], p. 124). The Governor of Macau complained to Lisbon that although he was ‘a good and honest man,’ he was ‘very old’ and his ‘action as consul very deficient.’ (Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 8 Apr. 1940, AHD, 2P, A48, M217, my translation).

¹¹³ For example, in October 1937 a delegate of the Guangdong government visited the Macau governor to request his assistance in trade and supply flows (Governor of Macau to MC, 12 Oct. 1937, transcribed in note from MC to Salazar, 16 Oct., 1937, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767).

¹¹⁴ The Portuguese consul in the city witnessed the attacks and wrote to Lisbon: ‘The Japanese say the targets are military but until today in these raids over the city almost no soldier has been killed. Students, women, children are the ones that have suffered in these violent and continuous daily attacks on the city. I personally went to see the result of the bombings [...] The spectacle is profoundly horrible and desolating.’

1920s, Guangzhou was of great symbolic importance for the Nationalists.¹¹⁵ The Portuguese authorities in Macau assisted Chinese in neighbouring areas during the Japanese bombings. In April the Japanese bombed the CMC post at Qianshan, three miles from Macau. The crews of the nearby boats fled in panic to Wanzai, in the eastern part of Lappa island, with a few being treated for their wounds in Macau.¹¹⁶ Following a request for help from Chinese authorities, an ambulance went from Macau into Chinese territory to collect two people seriously injured after a Japanese bombing.¹¹⁷ After a similar request, several wounded in a bombing over Zhongshan's capital, Shiqi, were also assisted in Macau.¹¹⁸ The Portuguese minister to China was thanked in writing by the Chinese minister of foreign affairs, Wang Chonghui, in December, and was asked to convey his regards to the governor, the police commander and the staff who had assisted the victims in another attack on Shiqi.¹¹⁹

Macau had been for centuries a source of arms' supplies for China¹²⁰ and the war with Japan revived the practice. Whilst the role of Hong Kong as a base for military supplies into unoccupied China is well known,¹²¹ Macau's is less so, despite the connections between the two foreign-ruled territories. For example, in May 1939 agents of the Chinese military informally approached the Hong Kong government requesting it to allow the export of war material to Macau for re-export to inland China to be used by

(Portuguese Consul General at Guangzhou to MNE, 9 June 1938, AHD, 3P, A9, M128-129, my translation).

¹¹⁵ In a speech to Nationalist party delegates in April Chiang Kai-shek declared that 'Guangdong province is our revolutionary base area,' and stressed the importance of China holding Guangzhou, with its key 'sea links to the outside world' (R. Mitter, *China's War with Japan, 1937-1945: The Struggle for Survival* [London, 2013]), p. 147). The city's population also mobilised for resistance. It was reported that thousands of middle school and university students demonstrated against Japan shouting 'fight until the end!' and 'down with Japanese imperialism in China' ('Manifestação de estudantes chineses contra os japonezes' [Demonstration of Chinese Students Against the Japanese], *A Voz de Macau* [15 Jan. 1938], p. 1).

¹¹⁶ 'O bombardeamento de ontem ao Posto Marítimo da Alfandega Chinesa de Chinsan' [Yesterday's Bombing of the Chinese Maritime Customs Post at Qianshan], *A Voz de Macau* (18 Apr. 1938), p. 3.

¹¹⁷ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 18 Apr. 1938, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767.

¹¹⁸ 'Os efeitos do último bombardeamento japonês sobre Seaki' [The effects of the latest Japanese bombing over Shiqi], *A Voz de Macau* (5 Nov., 1938), p. 4.

¹¹⁹ Portuguese Minister to China to Governor of Macau, 7 Jan. 1939, AM, MO/AH/AC/SA/01/16831.

¹²⁰ D. Faure, *Emperor and Ancestor: State and Lineage in South China* (Stanford, 2007), p. 314.

¹²¹ E.g. K. C. Chan Lau, *China, Britain and Hong Kong, 1895-1945* (Hong Kong, 1990), pp. 265-92.

Chinese forces in South Guangdong. This was to be done without insisting on a formal authorisation by the Macau government.¹²² The Macau chief of police, lieutenant colonel Alberto Arez, wrote a personal letter to his Hong Kong counterpart stating that ‘we are prepared to help these people.’¹²³ This source, hinting that at least some amongst the Macau authorities were favourable to cooperating with the Chinese contradicts the governor’s assurances to Lisbon that no military assistance was dispensed. However, the plan did not secure British approval.¹²⁴ The reason for the denial was that such proposition posed a ‘grave risk of a clash with the local Japanese naval authorities.’¹²⁵

Sino-Portuguese contacts were also established for matters concerning Portuguese interests in the enclave. In May 1938, the governor sent colonel Arez to speak to the provincial governor Wu Tiecheng via the Portuguese consulate at Guangzhou. He was to discuss the presence in Macau of Japanese elements spreading anti-Portuguese propaganda and causing problems between Portugal and China. He suggested that should the Guangzhou authorities know who the troublemakers were and request it, the governor would be willing to hand them in, unless they were long term residents. The consul considered this offer extremely problematic but helped Arez to write a more general note that ended up being received by Diao Zuoqian, special delegate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Guangdong and Guangxi. Being equally vague in his response, Diao guaranteed that ‘Macau’s tranquillity was very important to China and to Guangzhou, given the high number of Chinese who lived there.’¹²⁶ Attempts to get supplies into Macau were also made via personal channels.¹²⁷

¹²² Governor of Hong Kong to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 5 May 1939, TNA, FO 371/23427.

¹²³ Macau Chief of Police to Hong Kong Deputy High Commissioner of Police, 12 Apr. 1939, *ibid.*

¹²⁴ The Hong Kong governor, following the suggestion of the commander-in-chief of the China Station, forbade it, and the Colonial and Foreign offices later concurred.

¹²⁵ Governor of Hong Kong to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 5 May 1939, *ibid.*

¹²⁶ Portuguese Consul General at Guangzhou to Portuguese Chargé d’Affaires in China, 21 May 1938, AHD, 2P, A48, M176.

¹²⁷ For example, Jack Braga wrote to general Zhang Huichang asking him to intervene in order to allow ships to travel between Shiqi and Macau (Braga to Boxer, 21 Oct. 1938, NLA, MS 4300, Box 9, 3.2./2).

Sometimes Chinese actions around Macau prompted protests by the Portuguese, such as in May 1938, when several Chinese planes flew over Macau on their way to bomb Japanese positions outside of Portuguese waters,¹²⁸ or in October when Chinese troops patrolling a so-called ‘neutral zone’ wounded a Portuguese lieutenant from the Barrier Gate (*Portas do Cerco*) garrison.¹²⁹ Protests were sent from the Portuguese consul at Guangzhou to the provincial authorities and assurances were usually given in writing or in person, by Diao Zuoqian or his secretary Lin Shifen.

Diplomatic correspondence between Portugal and China during the war can be described as a litany of complaints and rebuttals, with the Chinese government insisting on official clarifications to any information it received on possible breaches of Portuguese neutrality in Macau. The Chinese minister in Lisbon, Li Jinlun, went to the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs several times to get a reaction to news on events in Macau or rumours on Portugal’s stance towards Japan. Similarly, the despatches of the Portuguese minister to China to the Chinese minister of foreign affairs in Chongqing usually contained denials of such rumours. For example, in May 1938 Lima wrote to Wang Chonghui, via the Portuguese consulate in Hong Kong, to deny the news that Portugal would recognize Manchukuo. In his rebuttal, he admitted the *de facto* existence of parallel diplomacy between Macau and Japanese forces:

It is possible that between the Government of Macao and the Japanese authorities there exists some kind of understanding or local agreement in connection with shipping facilities. However, I have the honour and pleasure to assure Your Excellency that the news regarding the existence, for the above purposes, of any treaty or negotiations between the Portuguese and the Japanese Governments have no foundation whatsoever.¹³⁰

The Japanese occupation of Guangzhou added a layer of distance between the Portuguese diplomats and the Chinese central government. The city fell in October 1938

¹²⁸ Governor of Macau to Portuguese Consul at Guangzhou, 12 May 1938; Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Special Delegate for Guangdong and Guangxi to Portuguese Consul General at Guangzhou, 26 May 1938, AHD, 2P, A48, M176.

¹²⁹ Portuguese Consul at Guangzhou to Governor of Guangdong Province, 14 Oct. 1938; Portuguese Consul at Guangzhou to Portuguese Minister to China, 18 Oct. 1938, AHD, 3P, A9, M128-129.

¹³⁰ Portuguese Minister to China to Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 10 May 1938. AS-IMH, Waijiaobu, 312.8/0001. Also in AHD, 2P, A48, M217.

with little military resistance, almost at the same time as the Nationalists lost the temporary wartime capital of Wuhan. The city's occupation may be regarded as the transition between a first phase of the Sino-Japanese war and 'second, defensive stage' that ensued.¹³¹

As the Nationalists lost ground in South China, Macau made its riskiest move in shadow diplomacy. The visit of Gorgulho to Japan discussed earlier caused a stir in Sino-Portuguese relations. Li Jinlun came to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Lisbon to enquire if news of a treaty between Portugal and Japan recognising Manchukuo and granting privileges was true. He was told it was not.¹³² Li later delivered a note on the matter, noting that there was information that 'some members of the Macau government favour the pro-Japanese policy' advocated by Gorgulho.¹³³ A document from the Chinese Military Affairs Commission informing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Gorgulho's trip and the proposals he had discussed shows how these caused high-level concern. The Chinese feared Japan was attempting to use Macau as a base and influence Portugal to join the Anti-Comintern Pact.¹³⁴ A few days later Li Jinlun presented the Ministry in Lisbon this new set of allegations of Portuguese collaboration with Japan that he wished to see confirmed.¹³⁵ These were denied, but Japanese increasing pressure in the vicinity of Macau was a reality.

¹³¹ Mitter, *China's War with Japan*, p. 200.

¹³² Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Portuguese Legation in Shanghai, 6 Mar. 1939, AHD, 2P, A48, M217.

¹³³ Note handed by the Chinese Minister to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, sent with despatch from MNE to MC, 12 May 1939, *ibid.*.

¹³⁴ Military Affairs Commission to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 June 1939. AS-IMH, Waijiaobu, 312.8/0001.

¹³⁵ Note delivered by the Chinese Minister to the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 June 1939, AHD, 2P, A48, M217.

The 'Portuguese' ships

An illustrative way in which the war affected Sino-Portuguese relations at a non-official level – but that often spilled out into consular *démarches* – was the registration of Chinese ships under Portuguese nationality, several of which were used for smuggling war material to both Chiang's China and Japanese troops. As a Portuguese consul wrote at the time, the 'Portuguese merchant fleet' in China was 'the illegitimate daughter of the Sino-Japanese conflict.'¹³⁶ Correspondence about detained ships, many of which were involved in the lucrative, albeit risky, trade of transporting weapons, ammunitions or goods destined to both of the belligerents, is one of the sources that attest to the flexibility of Portuguese neutrality in the Sino-Japanese War. The Japanese accused the Macau authorities of protecting Chinese boats that attacked Japanese warships.¹³⁷ Sometimes it was Macau's arrest of Chinese and their boats that motivated protests by China.¹³⁸

The Japanese had informed foreign powers that the transfer of Chinese ships to foreign ownership since August 1937 would only be recognised with proof of the transfer being *bona fide*. A consequence of this was the registration of Chinese boats under foreign flags, of which Portugal's was perhaps an easy choice given that the limited financial capacity of the country's community in China would make them more likely to agree on such a scheme. Throughout 1937 and 1938 'Portuguese' merchants ships such as the *Wing Wah* and the *Anjou*, Chinese junks with permits from the Macau Harbour Authority, and Chinese junks travelling between Hong Kong and Macau were often stopped and searched by Japanese navy patrols. Some had their cargo seized, others were

¹³⁶ Portuguese Consul at Guangzhou to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 9 Aug. 1941, AHD, 3P, A9, M135, my translation.

¹³⁷ The governor of Macau denied this but admitted that wounded Chinese had come to be treated in Macau, an 'humanitarian act' that could not be considered as 'help to the Chinese forces.' (Minister of Foreign Affairs to Portuguese Legation in Tokyo, 25 Apr. 1938, AHD, 2P, A48, M176, my translation).

¹³⁸ For example, a case occurred in 1940 (and still unsettled in 1948) resulted in the seizure of the vessel and in the arrest, trial, and deportation to Timor of members of the crew. AH, Waijiaobu, 020000003313A.

attacked, the crew left to die. A public accusation that Chinese junks and speedboats were using Portuguese territorial waters in South China to launch raids on Japanese warships was made by a Japanese Navy spokesman in Shanghai in April 1938, which was amply reported in the Hong Kong press.¹³⁹ This was denied by the Macau government and the Chinese military authorities.¹⁴⁰ In July 1938 the minister of colonies wrote to the governor of Macau that it was ‘not convenient to facilitate the matriculation of Chinese junks as Portuguese boats [as] it will be source [of] conflicts without any advantage.’¹⁴¹ Barbosa replied that such measures were taking place only ‘as long as the conflict lasted’ but that most of such cases were due to ‘the abuse of Chinese boats [that] even use [the] Portuguese flag.’¹⁴² Sometimes that was not even the only flag they used. One of the vessels detained by the Japanese in 1940, the *Fu An* (*Fuk On* in Cantonese), ‘flew the Portuguese flag’ while having ‘a painted flag of the Chiang Kai Shek regime on her stern.’¹⁴³ However, not all the ships were stopped by the Japanese. In 1940 the Chinese authorities in Fujian detained the boats *Tito*¹⁴⁴ and *Santa Rosa*, including the Portuguese captain and crew, accused of collaborating with the enemy.

The registration of former Chinese ships as Portuguese was an open secret and was employed as a strategy for mutual benefit given that Macau needed supplies from inland China and the Portuguese needed Chinese capital for the ships and could also

¹³⁹ E.g. ‘Claims Junks Attack War Vessel’, *The Hongkong Telegraph* (19 Apr. 1938); ‘Macao Accused of Sheltering Chinese Ships’, *Hong Kong Daily Press* (20 Apr. 1938), AHD, 3P, A9, M135.

¹⁴⁰ ‘Colony Has Not Deviated From Strict Neutrality’, *The South China Morning Post* (22 Apr. 1938); ‘Japanese Allegations Refuted’, *The China Mail* (22 Apr. 1938). The Cantonese authorities stated that ‘such allegations are made to cover the Japanese navy’s nefarious plans to destroy the Chinese fishing industry and as an excuse to fire on fishing boats at will’ (‘Real Motive Behind Japanese Charge’, *The South China Morning Post* [23 Apr. 1938]). Clippings in AHD, 3P, A9, M135.

¹⁴¹ Minister of Colonies to Governor of Macau, 8 July 1938, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767, my translation.

¹⁴² Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 9 July 1938, *ibid.*. Also in AHD, 3P, A9, M135.

¹⁴³ Japanese Consul General at Guangzhou to Portuguese Consul at Guangzhou, 28 Aug. 1940, AHD, 3P, A9, M135.

¹⁴⁴ The boat had belonged to a shipping company owned by Wang Qingpo, a Chinese who was a ‘Portuguese protégé’ and was sold to Victor Carvalho, a Portuguese from Xiamen in 1937 (Responsible for Portuguese Interests in Xiamen to Portuguese Consul General at Guangzhou, 4 Apr. 1939, *ibid.*). A later document mentioned that Carvalho’s partner was a Chinese man from Taiwan who was an ‘intimate friend of the Japanese’ in Xiamen (Report by the captain of the ship *Tito*, 7 Dec. 1940, *ibid.*)

profit from their trade.¹⁴⁵ Even Portuguese representatives were involved: one prominent case involved the *Luso*, a ship that had been bought by the vice-consul at Shanghai, Antonio Augusto Alves Lico. Attempts to tackle the situation were half-hearted. In the summer of 1939 instructions were given to Portuguese consulates in China and to the Macau Harbour Authority not to nationalise Chinese or Japanese ships as Portuguese. Temporary boat passports were to be replaced for definite ones, and in cases where there were legal impediments solutions were to be found to guarantee that nothing changed so as not to cause trouble to the Portuguese involved in the traffic. Nevertheless, by 1941 most of the ‘Portuguese’ ships had been apprehended by Japanese or Chinese authorities. Portuguese consuls at Shanghai and Guangzhou repeatedly pleaded with authorities to solve the issue, but release of the boats and sometimes their crews, was a lengthy and not always successful process. The Portuguese consul at Guangzhou concluded that: ‘The “Portuguese fleet” is not respected by any of the two contenders, because both know the way in which it was acquired.’¹⁴⁶ The important role Macau played in smuggling weapons and other supplies into Free China is attested by several sources, including a report by the manager of the Banco Nacional Ultramarino (BNU)¹⁴⁷ and an American report noting that ‘a considerable amount of railway material’ and small quantities of munitions entered China via Macau.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁵ C.T. da Costa (Merchant Navy Department), 3 July 1939, sent by the Navy Ministry to MNE, 8 July 1939, *ibid.*

¹⁴⁶ Portuguese Consul at Guangzhou to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 8 July 1941, *ibid.*, my translation.

¹⁴⁷ C. Vasconcelos, ‘Relatório de Exercício de 1938 a 1945 da Filial de Macau’ [Macau Branch Activity Report from 1938 to 1945], pp. 6-7, CGD, AG-012-22-117.

¹⁴⁸ Acting Secretary of War to Secretary of State, 15 June, 1938, NARA, Collection FDR-FDRPSF, Diplomatic Correspondence, 1933-1945, China, 1938 <https://catalog.archives.gov/id/16618367> (25 July 2017).

The attack on Zhongshan

The Japanese Expeditionary Forces in South China had long held positions encircling Zhongshan county but had not moved into the capital, Shiqi. They tried to convince local elites to settle for peace and Macau was one of the chosen meeting places. According to a British account (based on a pro-Chinese source), at least five meetings took place in Macau between Japanese officers and representatives of the Zhongshan authorities between December 1938 and February 1939 to guarantee a smooth occupation without violence. The Japanese promised the return of foreign concessions and colonies and abolition of extraterritoriality but ‘the Chinese representatives retorted that it was impossible to reconcile the Japanese protestations of friendliness, with the indiscriminate attacks on the local civilian populace as exemplified in the burning of junks, raping of women [...] or the shooting down of the C.N.A.C. [China National Aviation Corporation] plane “Kweilin.”’¹⁴⁹

Armed resistance to the Japanese was made not by regular troops but by militia,¹⁵⁰ which, a newspaper claimed, ‘imported arms and ammunitions through third parties at the border,’¹⁵¹ that is, via Macau. Fighting around Shiqi occurred from the spring of 1939 and intensified during the summer and fall when the county was heavily bombed, disrupting food production and supplies, including to Hong Kong and Macau. As one historian

¹⁴⁹ Hong Kong Intelligence Report No.3/39, sent by War Office to Far Eastern Department, FO, 15 Apr. 1939, TNA FO 371/23501. Occurred in August 1938 and known as the ‘Kweilin Incident,’ it is considered the first time a civilian airliner was shot down in the world. At the time, it was speculated that the intended target had been Sun Fo, then president of the Executive Yuan, who cancelled his journey at the last minute (‘Descida forçada dum avião pertencente à “China National Aviation Corporation”’ [Forced descent of a plane belonging to the ‘China National Aviation Corporation’], *A Voz de Macau* [25 Aug., 1938], p. 4). In a letter to Boxer, Braga informed him he had gone to photograph the site and sent a long report to the *SCMP*, ‘but it was crowded out by news of affairs in Europe’ (Letter from Braga to Boxer, 31 Aug. 1938, NLA, MS 4300, Box 9, 3.2./2).

¹⁵⁰ Up to 200,000 guerrillas were reported to be operating in Guangdong in 1939 (Macri, *Clash of Empires*, p. 130).

¹⁵¹ ‘Japanese Disclose Why Chungshan Taken’, *The Canton Daily Sun* (9 Oct. 1939). Clipping attached to copy of despatch from the Portuguese Consul at Guangzhou to the Portuguese Minister to China, where he noted that: ‘[...] during my short stay in that colony of ours, a trusted person had told me armament had been passed through Macau’ (AHD, 3P, A9, M128-129, my translation).

observed: ‘The Chinese defended the birthplace of Sun Yat Sen with great determination, and although the fight for Shekki [Shiqi] was small in scale compared with other significant battles, its political impact helped prolong the war.’¹⁵² Three assaults on the city failed in September, but on October 8 the Japanese occupied it. However, they had to withdraw after two days and the local magistrate, General Zhang Huichang, returned.¹⁵³ Worried that combat might spread to what was considered a ‘neutral zone’ between Qianshan and Macau, or that some Chinese troops might seek refuge in the enclave, the governor tried to reinforce defences near the border. He was also involved in contacting the local authorities via intermediaries to convince them to avoid a bloodbath by giving up what he considered to be a ‘pointless opposition’.¹⁵⁴ Chinese resistance in and around Macau was tolerated, but Barbosa would prefer that it did not pose too many problems for the Portuguese. Others were more understanding. Anti-Japanese activities in Macau were a consequence of the brutal invasion, and the Portuguese consul at Guangzhou knew it would be ‘almost impossible to completely prevent them in a land where around 200,000 Chinese live who cordially hate the invader and victorious oppressor.’¹⁵⁵

In early March 1940, Japanese naval units advanced again into Shiqi following the same route as the previous year. An army of around 25,000 men under Wu Fei,¹⁵⁶ who had been the county leader since 1939, resisted the invasion but was overpowered. Japanese naval and land forces blockaded coastal areas while naval air units bombed the

¹⁵² Macri, *Clash of Empires*, p. 137.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 143. Zhang Huichang grew up in the US, graduating from a flight school in New York and becoming an American citizen. He returned to China in 1917, was Sun Yat-sen’s aid-de-camp and the leader of his first squadron of aviation corps, later bureau chief of the Canton Aviation Bureau and director of the Nationalist government Aviation Office in Nanjing. An aviation celebrity, he fell from grace after joining the Fujian’s People Government, destroyed by Chiang Kai-shek in 1933. He served as a diplomat in Cuba before returning to be the head of Zhongshan county (A. O’Keefe, ‘Stars in the Nation’s Skies: The Ascent and Trajectory of the Chinese Aviation Celebrity in the Prewar Decade’, in Paul Pickowicz [ed], *Liangyou: Kaleidoscopic Modernity, and the Shanghai Global Metropolis, 1926-1945* [Leiden, 2013], pp. 138-46).

¹⁵⁴ Governor of Macau quoted in despatch from MC to MNE, 12 Oct. 1939, AHD, 3P, A9, M128-129.

¹⁵⁵ Portuguese Consul at Guangzhou to Portuguese Minister to China, 26 Mar. 1940, AHD, 2P, A48, M217, my translation.

¹⁵⁶ According to the Governor of Macau, he was ‘not unfavourable’ to the Portuguese (Acting Governor to Minister of Colonies, 5 June 1938, AHD, 3P, A9, M128-129, my translation).

retreating Chinese. The city was taken in three days.¹⁵⁷ From Chongqing, a Chinese military spokesman deemed the operation of ‘no military significance,’ and probably carried out ‘for certain political reasons connected with the Japanese attempt at an early establishment of a new regime in China.’¹⁵⁸ News in pro-Japanese Chinese newspapers in Guangzhou claimed the pro-Chiang guerrillas, who had provoked the Japanese advance on Shiqi, had been operating from and were aided by Macau. The governor of Macau believed Wu Fei to be a collaborator with the Japanese. The Portuguese consul at Guangzhou disagreed, confirming the rumours that he was acting under orders of the Nationalist government, fooling both the Japanese and the governor.¹⁵⁹ These contradictory views demonstrate how volatile the South China front was, with those engaged in resistance and collaboration not always unequivocally differentiated.

The KMT in Macau

The presence of two neutral foreign colonies bordering Guangdong province¹⁶⁰ was of great importance to harness support for Chinese resistance. At an early stage, Hong Kong and Macau were regarded as one entity and Kuomintang party cadres usually operated in both, often being based in Hong Kong, which was deemed more important.¹⁶¹ As China suffered a series of defeats and saw more of its territory occupied, the importance of those territories grew and there was a significant rise in the number party

¹⁵⁷ ‘Japanese Spokesman Reviews Chungshan Operation’, *The Canton Daily Sun* (9 Mar. 1940), AHD, 2P, A48, M127.

¹⁵⁸ ‘Chinese Comment on Chungshan Operation,’ *The Canton Daily Sun*, 9 Mar. 1940, *ibid.*.

¹⁵⁹ Portuguese Consul at Guangzhou to Portuguese Minister to China, 26 Mar. 1940, *ibid.*.

¹⁶⁰ To Macau and Hong Kong should be added the French concession of Guangzhouwan. Its wartime experience had many similarities with Macau’s as can be ascertained by one of the few English-language studies on that territory (C. Xie, ‘China’s Casablanca: Refugees, Outlaws, and Smugglers in France’s Guangzhouwan Enclave’, in J. S. Esherick and M. T. Combs [eds], *1943: China at the Crossroads* [Ithaca, 2015], pp. 391-425).

¹⁶¹ Y. H. Li, ‘Lunxian qian’, pp. 445-6.

members in Hong Kong, Kowloon and Macau.¹⁶² Wu Tiecheng, the former mayor of Shanghai and governor of Guangdong province,¹⁶³ headed the Hong Kong-Macau branch, which had been reorganised and became independent from the tutelage of the Guangzhou one it had formerly belonged to.¹⁶⁴ In 1939 he entrusted the responsibility over the Macau section to Zhou Yongneng, whom Wu had also asked the KMT Central Committee to make head of the Guangdong Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs.¹⁶⁵ In May 1939 a mass rally supporting the resistance was held on Lappa island, with the participation of Macau patriotic associations.¹⁶⁶

Chinese resistance activities had to deal with increasing interference from the Portuguese authorities. In September 1939 they sent the police to search offices, houses, and schools of Chinese representatives in Macau. Chinese sources state that after the Japanese consul had protested to the governor against the Chongqing government having many people engaged in anti-Japanese activities in the enclave, and requested the Portuguese to stop them, Barbosa had agreed to send the Macau police to search for propaganda materials. Zhou's house and the Zhong De Middle School were searched, materials apprehended and some people arrested.¹⁶⁷ The Portuguese police had also asked to be given the money collected from donations for refugee relief.¹⁶⁸ These actions seemed to indicate that Portugal was breaching its neutral status and favouring Japan. The Chinese legation in Lisbon was instructed to protest to the Portuguese government and

¹⁶² Ibid., p. 449; Y.H. Li, 'Wu Tiecheng', pp. 75-6.

¹⁶³ Wu Tiecheng was regarded favourably by Ashley Clarke, a senior British diplomat who later served as ambassador to Lisbon from 1944 to 1946. He cited information by the Officer Administering Government in the Straits Settlements that there was no suggestion in China that he was blamed for the loss of Guangzhou, and that he still enjoyed Chiang Kai-shek's confidence.¹⁶³ (FO to Colonial Office, 20 Oct. 1940, TNA, FO 371/24704).

¹⁶⁴ R. Hei and H. Chen, '1927-1949 nian Guomindang Aomen zhibu de dangwu kaocha' [The Party Affairs of the KMT Macau Branch in 1927-1949], *Aomen yanjiu* [Journal of Macau Studies], 54/10 (2009), pp. 131-2.

¹⁶⁵ Li, 'Lunxian qian', p. 450; Li, 'Wu Tiecheng', p. 74.

¹⁶⁶ Guo, 'Shilun Aomen', p. 100.

¹⁶⁷ Military Affairs Commission to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 20 Sept. 1939, AS-IMH, Waijiaobu, 312.8/0001.

¹⁶⁸ Military Affairs Commission to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 23 Sept. 1939, *ibid.*

urge it to enquire about the matter with the Macau authorities. Further information that the Macau police had raided offices, schools, and residences searching for anti-Japanese materials reached the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in October. This was based on a Chinese intelligence report (*qingbao*) informing on Portuguese-Japanese collaboration that had included the acceptance of payments from the Japanese in exchange for help to arrest Chinese officials and spies engaged in anti-Japanese activities in Macau.¹⁶⁹ Li Jinlun delivered a small note to the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating that the Chinese government had been informed on a decision to crack down on Chinese relief institutions in Macau, including the seizure of over 10,000 Chinese dollars the Commercial Association had collected for refugees. They had been ordered to dissolve because if the Japanese captured Zhongshan and demanded a list of Chinese involved in anti-Japanese activities the Macau government could not be responsible for their safety.¹⁷⁰ In a follow-up meeting at the Ministry, Li insisted on clarifying the rumours, particularly the threat of handing Chinese refugees in the enclave over to the Japanese military authorities if they advanced close to Macau. He wanted guarantees from the Portuguese that the Macau authorities would not do such a thing.¹⁷¹ Barbosa reported to Lisbon that all of the rumours were false. Chinese merchants who raised funds for refugees were just asked to present their balance sheets to prove funds were not being sent to the resistance, as the Japanese suspected.¹⁷² Once again, the Chinese central government was quick to use diplomatic channels to hold the Portuguese accountable for what was happening in Macau.

Despite the Japanese military forces using KMT activities in Macau to pressure the Portuguese, these activities continued to take place. A Domei report published in occupied Guangzhou claimed that a KMT meeting had taken place in Macau in January

¹⁶⁹ Military Affairs Commission to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 14 Oct. 1939, *ibid.*

¹⁷⁰ Note from the Chinese Minister to Portugal, delivered on 27 Sept. 1939, AHD, 3P, A9, M128-129.

¹⁷¹ Record of conversation with the Minister of China, 14 Oct. 1939, *ibid.*

¹⁷² Governor of Macau quoted in despatch from MC to MNE, 18 Oct. 1939, *ibid.*

1940,¹⁷³ which the governor denied. Later Zhou Yongneng confirmed that the meeting had taken place on Lappa island.¹⁷⁴ This is also attested by a letter from Braga assuring the report was erroneous but confirming that KMT meetings did occasionally take place in Wanzai, on the Eastern part of Lappa. The majority of those attending were Macau residents and the branch was known as the ‘Macau Kuomintang.’ Braga believed the branch was not engaged in anti-Japanese propaganda ‘but concentrate their attention in getting subscriptions for Chinese war charities, and keep an eye on any of their own nationals who happen to be pro-Japanese.’¹⁷⁵ The line between relief and resistance was often a thin one.

Crackdown on KMT activities seemed to have grown in the later stages of Barbosa’s governorship and from 1940 onwards they were mostly forced underground.¹⁷⁶ In June 1940 Chiang Kai-shek was informed that the Macau governor had reached a tacit agreement with Japan. He would suppress the activities of Chinese patriotic groups and in exchange Japan would not allow a blockade of Macau. The generalissimo lamented in his diary that Macau was now completely under Japanese control.¹⁷⁷ Zhou Yongneng recalled in his memoirs how his presence in Macau was cut short when he was arrested. When his identity was revealed in a newspaper, the governor of Macau ceded to Japanese pressure and sent the police to arrest him. Wu Tiecheng, with the help of some influential Chinese personalities from Macau, managed to prevent Zhou’s extradition to the Japanese. Instead he was simply expelled from Macau and forbidden to exercise activities there.¹⁷⁸ He went to Hong Kong where he remained until the death of governor Barbosa and his

¹⁷³ ‘Kuomintang Party Holds Conference in Macao’, *The Canton Daily Sun* (17 Jan. 1940), AHD, 2P, A48, M217.

¹⁷⁴ Governor of Macau to Portuguese Consul in Guangzhou, 29 Jan. 1940, *ibid.*

¹⁷⁵ J. M. Braga to S. S. Moosa, 30 Jan. 1940, NLA, MS 4300, Box 14, 4.1./15.

¹⁷⁶ Guo, ‘Shilun Aomen’, p. 100.

¹⁷⁷ S. F. Wu, ‘Zhongguo kangzhan xia de Aomen juese’ [Macau’s Role in China’s War of Resistance], in *Jiang Jieshi yu kangzhan shiqi de Zhongguo* [Chiang Kai-shek and China during the War of Resistance] (Taiwan, 2013), p. 45, <http://ccfd.org.tw/ccef001/filesys/files/dl/CKS-manual.pdf> (5 July 2017).

¹⁷⁸ Y. Zhou, *Zhou Yongneng xiansheng fangwen jilu* [The Reminiscences of Mr. Chou Yung-neng] (Taipei, 1984), p. 150.

replacement by G.M. Teixeira, whom Zhou described as anti-German and not sympathetic towards the Japanese. Zhou managed to resume work in Macau through Catholic networks, and he cultivated good relations with the new governor and others in the administration.¹⁷⁹ Although he lived in Kowloon, Zhou often stayed in Macau. He was there for a party meeting the night the Pacific War started and remained stranded in Macau for the following weeks, fleeing to Chongqing after learning that traitors were planning to kill him.¹⁸⁰

Official and shadow diplomacy were occasionally intertwined. At the end of 1940 and in April 1941 the former Chinese chargé d'affaires in Portugal came to visit the Macau governor, saying he was an envoy of Chiang Kai-shek who wanted him to be his delegate in the enclave.¹⁸¹ The governor replied he could only consider him privately as an official appointment had to be granted by Lisbon. Assistance could be requested through these semi-informal channels. The Chongqing envoy asked the governor to allow gasoline to be supplied to China. Teixeira told him that Portugal's 'honest [and] loyal neutrality policy could not allow' an approval. When he suggested that perhaps contraband could be permitted, the governor's answer was ambiguous: 'if smugglers were caught, they would suffer the legal penalties.'¹⁸² This implied that they would be free to continue their activities if they kept a low profile.

As these contacts attest, Chiang Kai-shek had not given up on Macau as an entrepôt for Chinese war supplies. In February 1941 the governor informed Lisbon that Chiang had sent a special delegate, Wang Zhengting,¹⁸³ to Hong Kong and Macau. However, he had not been able to visit the latter, arguably because Japanese were

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 151.

¹⁸⁰ Li, 'Wu Tiecheng', p. 83.

¹⁸¹ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 30 Dec. 1940, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767.

¹⁸² Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 10 Apr. 1941, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767, my translation.

¹⁸³ Wang Zhengting was a former Chinese minister of foreign affairs and had been China's ambassador to the United States between 1936 and 1938.

searching boats travelling between the two colonies. Since Wang had asked to exchange views with the Macau government, the governor sent Pedro Lobo to the British colony to meet him. He was instructed to listen to whatever Wang had to say but only talk about assistance to refugees:

[...] within [its] impartial neutrality, the Macau government will continue to assist Chinese refugees not only because [of] the never-interrupted friendship between our two countries but also by compliance with the Christian spirit [which is the] base of the New State [Estado Novo authoritarian regime] doctrine.¹⁸⁴

Mentioning Christianity may have been an attempt to stress a common ground, given the Christian influence over Chiang's New Life Movement¹⁸⁵ implemented, like the New State in Portugal, in the 1930s. The reference to the Chinese refugees in Macau – by then already numbering tens of thousands – attests to the links between humanitarian assistance and political expediency in the enclave, an issue that will be analysed in the following chapter. During his meeting with Lobo, Wang transmitted official thanks from Chiang Kai-shek for Portugal's 'correctness [and] friendship with China and assistance [to] refugees,' having sent a jade stone ring to the governor as a 'symbol of friendship.' Before leaving for Chongqing, Wang said he would return within a few months and that 'he would come [to] Macau if there was no danger of Japanese arresting him.' Teixeira later notified Lisbon that he had information of 'secret negotiations' taking place in Hong Kong between delegates of Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei. Wang, he said, had been showing some resistance towards the Japanese and refused to nominate a pro-Japanese candidate to govern Shiqi. Japanese agents were working in Guangzhou distributing donations for propaganda purposes and advocating peace. However, according to the governor, Chiang, remained the 'main figure' and 'if Chiang does not make peace, even if the Japanese keep Wang Jingwei, his authority will be more and more fictitious.' The

¹⁸⁴ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 10 Feb. 1941, *ibid.*, my translation.

¹⁸⁵ On the Christian elements of the New Life Movement see F. Ferlanti, 'The New Life Movement in Jiangxi Province, 1934-1938', *Modern Asian Studies*, 44/5 (2010), pp. 961-1000.

governor then clearly stated his position in the matter: ‘[...] our policy is not altered: honest neutrality but, within it, friendship with Chiang.’¹⁸⁶

CCP mobilisation

Chiang’s men were not the only ones operating in Macau and neighbouring areas. Communist guerrillas had been recruited in Macau since the early stages of the war. There had been a CCP presence in Macau before the conflict. Between 1935 and 1936, Chen Shaoling, a CCP member from Taishan who had fled the KMT to Malaya in 1927 came to the enclave where he opened a ‘progressive’ bookshop and sought to mobilise teachers, students, and workers.¹⁸⁷ But the United Front during the war provided a golden opportunity for the CCP to expand their activities in places like Macau.

One of the city’s newly founded charities, the Four Circles Disaster Relief Association (*Sijie jiuzaihui*),¹⁸⁸ was linked to armed resistance. It provided training to youth teams dispatched to engage in popular mobilisation and guerrilla fighting in inland China. The ‘Macao Chinese Youth Countryside Service Group’ (*Lü Ao Zhongguo qingnian xiangcun fuwutuan*) was the first to send members to the interior.¹⁸⁹ After the fall of Guangzhou, the Four Circles Disaster Relief Association Return to the County

¹⁸⁶ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, received 27 Feb. 1941. ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767, my translation.

¹⁸⁷ Guo, ‘Shilun Aomen...’, p. 100. Chen was expelled from the party in 1939, wrongly accused of being a Trotskyist, and died in a Japanese bombing that year. ‘Chen Shaoling’, in *Baidu baike*, <http://www.baidu.com/wiki/陈少陵> (24 Aug. 2017).

¹⁸⁸ The Four Circles Disaster Relief Association seems to have been the main resistance association in Macau. The ‘circles’ were academic, musical, theatrical, and sports. It included more than 50 smaller associations (schools, sports teams, media, musical and theatre groups, etc.) and more than 100 people. Founded in August 1937, it organised a variety of fundraising activities (such as entertainment events, sports matches and collection of donations on the street). The teams’ work included propaganda activities to mobilise the rural communities and provision of medical treatment, for example, to victims of Japanese bombings, as well as actual fighting (Deng, *Aomen lishi*, pp. 90-9). Several of its young members lost their lives in the conflict (Barreto, *Macau During the Sino-Japanese War*, pp. 157-9). On this association see Huang and Chen, *Haojiang fengyun er’nu*, and Zou ‘Qianxi kangzhan’, p. 146.

¹⁸⁹ Fei, *Macau 400 Years*, p. 343.

Service Group (*Sijie jiuzaihui huiguo fuwutuan*) was set up, with Liao Jintao as leader.¹⁹⁰ Liao was a clerk in a motor company in Macau and was responsible for the propaganda department of the Four Circles Association, travelling to Guangzhou and other places near Macau mobilising people to support the resistance. An underground CCP member, in 1941, he was arrested by the Nationalists, and ended up dying in jail at just 27.¹⁹¹ That year general Ye Ting, commander of the New Fourth Army, is mentioned as having come to reside in the enclave. Ye had been arrested and tried in the New Fourth Army Incident and is reported to have been imprisoned until the end of the war.¹⁹² On the other hand, according to a telegram from the governor of Macau, after being arrested by the Nationalists, Ye returned to Macau, where he had sought refuge in 1935.¹⁹³ The governor notified Lisbon that he would summon Ye to tell him that ‘he would let him stay in Macau as long as he observed utter correctedness [in his behaviour] but at the minimum communist activity he would be arrested and deported.’¹⁹⁴ It is unclear if Ye’s return to Macau did indeed take place, and if so, how long it had lasted and what its purpose was.

The CCP presence in Macau became stronger in the 1940s when some future key figures started to operate in the Portuguese enclave. The party is now credited by Chinese historians with the bulk of anti-Japanese resistance activities in and around Macau.¹⁹⁵ The Nationalists’ contribution has been, as in many other cases in China, considerably overlooked.

¹⁹⁰ Deng, *Aomen lishi*, pp. 96-7.

¹⁹¹ ‘Liao Jintao’, in *Gang’Ao dabaiké quanshu* [Encyclopedia of Hong Kong & Macao] (Guangzhou, 1993), p. 800.

¹⁹² G. Benton, *New Fourth Army: Communist Resistance along the Yangtze and the Huai, 1938-1941* (Berkeley, 1999), p. 571.

¹⁹³ Ye Ting’s family home in Macau is now opened to the public as a museum (author’s visit in February 2015).

¹⁹⁴ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 13 Mar. 1941, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767, my translation.

¹⁹⁵ A good example of this is the section dedicated to ‘Heroes of the Sino-Japanese War’ in Barreto, *Macau During the Sino-Japanese War*, pp. 139-65.

2.2.2. Macau and Chinese collaborators

Macau was also a link in the efforts of Chinese collaborators, particularly the supporters of Wang Jingwei. As will become clear in this section and in Chapter Four, the enclave was a peculiar participant observer in the rise and fall of Wang's RNG.

Unable to convince Chiang Kai-shek to accept peace, the Japanese turned their attention to Wang Jingwei, an important KMT figure who regarded Chiang as a rival who had usurped his 'rightful place as leader of the National revolution.' Together with a group of close associates, he left Chongqing in December 1938, bound for Hanoi in French Indochina, and Hong Kong. Believing that 'the negotiating of a just peace' was 'the only realistic solution to the crisis of war,' they were responding to Japanese covert overtures for peace that had been happening for some time and would continue for the remaining of the conflict.¹⁹⁶

After leaving Chongqing, Wang began to contact a number of figures in areas where he and his wife, Chen Bijun, were well connected. Chen played a key role in Wang's shift towards Japan and actively liaised for his 'Peace Movement.' One of her stopovers was Macau. In January, the governor noted Chen had 'come to reside in Macau where she trusts she is in greater safety.'¹⁹⁷ Guangdong province had for long been a key area of support for Wang, a native Cantonese who had been a close associate of Sun Yat-sen. It is not surprising that the Wangs' first efforts of developing an alternative government to that of Chiang involved meetings with Cantonese elites, certainly facilitated by the official neutrality of the foreign administered territories in South China.

¹⁹⁶ Mitter, *China's War with Japan*, p. 202 and p. 206.

¹⁹⁷ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 5 Jan. 1939, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767, my translation. Also in AHD, 3P, A9, M128-129.

It was via Macau that Wang Jingwei arrived at Guangzhou in July, on the Japanese ship *Shirogane Maru*.¹⁹⁸ He broadcast a key speech in the city, calling for peace with Japan and condemning Chiang and guerrilla actions in Guangdong, and the suffering they inflicted on the local population.¹⁹⁹ His pleas were not unanimously well-received and his attempts to convince key KMT military figures, such as general Zhang Fakui, to defect failed. Although Wang ended up relocating to Shanghai, a pro-Wang Guangdong Political Affairs Committee was established later in 1939. By then Cantonese collaborationists were divided into factions, one of them Chen Bijun's, fighting for power. In a bid against Chen's faction, Peng Dongyuan, one of the collaborationists the Japanese had put in charge of Guangzhou, made himself mayor of the new Guangzhou Municipal Administrative office but eventually Chen's faction succeeded in dominating Guangdong province, where a new provincial government was established in May 1940.²⁰⁰

If Wang Jingwei used Macau as a stopover for his démarches in South China, so did Chiang Kai-shek's envoys, who were determined to make Wang's efforts collapse. Wang's rival government had been officially inaugurated on 30 March 1940 without formal recognition by Japan, which 'still hoped for a peace settlement with the real power in China, the National Government.'²⁰¹ In June high level contacts that had begun in Hong Kong between Nationalist agents and Japanese military figures were resumed in Macau. The talks revolved around 'Chinese recognition of Manchuria and Japanese stationing of troops in North China' and went as far as the signing of a memorandum agreeing that Chiang would meet Itagaki Seishirō, Chief of Staff of the China

¹⁹⁸ British Consul General in Guangzhou to British Minister to China, 31 July 1939, TNA, FO 676/410.

¹⁹⁹ British Minister to China to Foreign Office, 15 Aug. 1939. An English translation of the speech was published in *The Canton Daily Sun* (11 Aug. 1939), TNA, FO 676/410.

²⁰⁰ J. K. S. Yick, "'Pre-Collaboration': The Political Activity and Influence of Chen Bijun in Wartime China", *Southeast Review of Asian Studies*, 36 (2014), p. 68.

²⁰¹ M. Huang and H. Yang, 'Nationalist China's Negotiating Position During the Stalemate, 1938-1945', in *Chinese Collaboration with Japan*, p. 63.

Expeditionary Army, in Chongqing in August but were then abruptly cancelled by Chiang.²⁰² In early November a more informal meeting took place in Macau between Du Shishan, one of the Nationalists' 'unofficial representatives,' and Toyama Shuzo, son of a friend of Sun Yat-sen, who warned of the imminent recognition of the Wang Jingwei regime. This was one of the last efforts of the Nationalists to obstruct it,²⁰³ but they did not stop trying to discredit it. For example, news from Chongqing, that the Chinese apostolic vicar of Nanjing, Yu Bin, called for opposing the Wang government, was published in the main Macau daily.²⁰⁴ The impact of such words amongst a considerable local Chinese Catholic population is unknown but is easily imaginable, particularly taking into account the Japanese bombing of Catholic missions in the province.

Meanwhile the local collaborator authorities found Macau useful for other purposes. In May 1940 the new Zhongshan county magistrate appointed by the Wang regime began contacts with the Macau authorities. He was organising an export regime to neighbouring territories and promised to make the enclave's harbour a distribution hub, as well as replacing the Lappa island garrison with one more in line with Portuguese interests. In exchange he wished to obtain 20,000 patacas to cover the district's organisational expenses. In a top-secret telegram to Lisbon, the governor of Macau expressed his approval fearing economic reprisals if he did not comply. Everything would be taken care of confidentially, involving only the governor and two other associates, one of them Lobo. Including the occasional bout of racial prejudice, he explained that 'all Chinamen are venal,' it was not such a high amount, 'and the general has volunteered to issue a receipt which is a valuable document for us and places him, in a way, in our dependency.' Ever mindful of colonial comparisons, he added that 'it is like this that other foreign countries have managed their tranquillity and the maintenance of their

²⁰² Ibid., pp. 65-6. Also Mitter, *China's War with Japan*, pp. 220-1.

²⁰³ Huang and Yang, 'Nationalist China's Negotiating', pp. 63-4.

²⁰⁴ 'Um apelo do bispo católico chinês Yi Pin' [An appeal by the Chinese Catholic Bishop Yu Bin], *A Voz de Macau* (8 Apr. 1940), p. 3.

interests in the Far East.’²⁰⁵ The minister of Colonies was less enthusiastic. Such things ‘are perhaps very common [in the] East but they contradict our principles [and] shock our sensibility,’ he telegraphed. The whole affair was likely to lead to more demands and would look very much like blackmail. But, if the Lappa settlement meant a Portuguese reoccupation, he added, using ‘these means would not be repugnant.’ The minister approved the operation hoping for the ‘moral sacrifice’ to be justified by ‘advantageous results.’²⁰⁶ For the governor, compromise was imperative because the ‘maintenance [of] gambling, opium and commerce profits depend[ed] [on the] sympathy [of the] high authority [of the] Zhongshan district.’ The money would be considered a loan and the replacement of the Lappa garrison by one less hostile to Portugal would allow the Macau authorities to scale down maritime security measures. In sum, collaboration with the collaborators would be ‘very useful at least economically,’ especially given the unrelenting Japanese pressure.²⁰⁷

Protecting one's interests

A policy of accommodating all sides was kept in practice. When governor Barbosa died, the situation of good relations with everyone (pro-Chiang, pro-Wang, and Japanese) was considered secured by the acting governor, who assured that it was being kept ‘without breaking our strict neutrality.’²⁰⁸ This flexible understanding of neutrality was one of the features of Portuguese actions during the war. Apart from Japanese pressure, the Portuguese authorities in the enclave now had to deal with demands from their collaborator neighbours. In November a tax of 2 patacas was imposed on everyone

²⁰⁵ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 2 May 1940, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767, my translation.

²⁰⁶ Minister of Colonies to Governor of Macau, 4 May 1940, *ibid.*

²⁰⁷ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 4 May 1940, *ibid.*, my translation.

²⁰⁸ Acting Governor to Minister of Colonies, 3 Aug., 1940, *ibid.*, cx. 767.

who went to Macau. The new governor informed Lisbon he would try to negotiate a reduction. An opportunity came up when the newly appointed magistrate of Zhongshan remained in Macau, hiding from the supporters of his predecessor 'who wanted to assassinate him' and waiting for the Japanese to 'clean up Zhongshan.' The Macau governor granted him protection.²⁰⁹ In May the magistrate came to visit Teixeira with customary 'wishes of collaboration.' Confirming those to be his wishes as well, the governor suggested that a practical way of doing so would be to lower the taxes over people and goods travelling between Macau and Zhongshan, as well as to facilitate the return of refugees in Macau. The magistrate requested to station a representative to deal with Macau-Zhongshan issues, a refugee from Zhongshan who had been living in Macau for four years. He was a graduate of an American university and a 'friend' of the Portuguese. The governor accepted.²¹⁰ But personal links were volatile insurance in a region ravaged by factions and war. In mid June the magistrate was assassinated in Macau, shot dead by three Chinese who escaped. The governor expected a protest from Wang Jingwei's RNG. To Lisbon he argued that the Portuguese could not possibly be blamed, particularly because 'to the murdered man we had given everything he had asked for his personal security,' including authorisation for gun licence for his two bodyguards. His death was also inconvenient because 'it meant reinitiating negotiations with a new magistrate for Macau supplies.'²¹¹

Macau's unofficial relations with representatives of the Wang regime became unavoidable. Complaints and demands were opportunities for the RNG to affirm its claims as legitimate Chinese government. The awaited protest about the magistrate's assassination took several days, but it eventually arrived, brought by the commissioner for foreign affairs of the Guangdong provincial government, Zhou Bingsan, accompanied by

²⁰⁹ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 24 Apr. 1941, *ibid.*, my translation.

²¹⁰ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 8 May 1941, *ibid.*, my translation.

²¹¹ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 18 June 1941, *ibid.*, my translation.

a Japanese adviser. The demands were harsh: a written apology by the Macau government; immediate handing over of the criminals; punishment of the responsible Macau government staff; financial compensation for the family of the deceased; and guarantees that similar incidents would never again take place. The governor refused to accept, claiming he had granted all requests for the deceased's protection and had kept good relations with him. The Japanese sided with the governor, and their agent told him that their investigations in Shiqi pointed towards the assassination having been requested by the Nanjing government itself.²¹² This case highlights the divisions amongst collaborators and how unstable informal relations between the Macau administration and these figures could become. As will be seen in Chapter Four, these clashes became more common after 1941.

Political assassinations continued with frequency, sometimes perpetrated in Macau. One of the victims was the Guangzhou police sub-chief.²¹³ He was the fifth man working for the puppet Cantonese provincial government to be killed in Macau between June 1940 and September 1941.²¹⁴ A new protest ensued. The Guangzhou authorities wanted to send their staff to cooperate with the Portuguese authorities in 'exterminating dangerous Chongqing elements in Macau.' Licenses for carrying guns would be issued to them and their bodyguards. After some negotiating, the governor granted 20 licenses but objected to the 150 demanded and tried to get the Japanese to support him. Then he called the Chongqing representative in Hong Kong urging him of the 'imperative need to impose on his supporters respect [for] Macau's hospitality [and] neutrality. The agent denied Chongqing's involvement in the assassinations.²¹⁵ In fact, Nationalist underground

²¹² Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 8 July 1941, *ibid.*

²¹³ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 11 Sept. 1941, *ibid.*

²¹⁴ MNE note based on information transmitted from the Governor of Macau to MC, March 1942, AHD, 2P, 48, M212. Of the five men assassinated, one of was shot and stabbed to death while in hospital.

²¹⁵ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 1 Oct.1941, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767, my translation.

actions against collaborators were common during the war.²¹⁶ This reveals that although pressured by the RNG authorities, the Portuguese maintained contacts with Chiang's men.

The Nationalists were paying close attention to what was happening in Macau and regularly sent representatives to ensure the Portuguese authorities had not changed sides. In early May 1941, Lin Shifen visited the governor. He wanted to ascertain whether the Macau government had recognised Wang's, and if the Japanese had espionage services in the enclave and were pressuring Chinese schools and associations to support Wang. Teixeira confirmed that not only had the Macau government not recognised Wang's regime, but that such a decision rested with the metropolitan government. On the other issues, he had no knowledge of Japanese spying in Macau and did not think it necessary given that Japan occupied all the neighbouring territories. As for co-opting the Macau Chinese, he only knew that the local Japanese agent, colonel Okubo had invited the president of the Commercial Association to support Wang Jingwei. The governor forbade that association of having any political activity.²¹⁷ At least until 1941 the core of the Macau Chinese elite remained with the Nationalists, and this permitted useful communications to be made. For example, in early July the British intercepted a message from Macau to the Chinese embassy at Berlin, to evacuate the embassy.²¹⁸ The warning came shortly after Chongqing's severed relations with the Axis powers. In July 1941, two years after his defection, Wang Jingwei's Nanjing government was recognised by Japan. It was also recognised by Germany, Italy and a number of pro-Axis countries, including

²¹⁶ E.g. P. F. Lo, *It is Dark Underground* (New York, 1946).

²¹⁷ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 6 May 1941, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767; MOFA Commissioner for Guangdong and Guangxi to MOFA, 18 May 1941, AH, Waijiaobu, 02000003319A.

²¹⁸ Wong Yun Une [Liang Houyuan?] to Wong Hsioh Li [possibly Lin Qiusheng], FO 371/27635. On Lin Qiusheng: N. F. Glang, 'Back-Channel Diplomacy and the Sino-German relationship, 1939-1945' (PhD thesis, University of Sheffield, 2014), pp. 103-4.

Spain.²¹⁹ Efforts were made, by Wang and by Japan, for Portugal to follow suit. Despite many rumours in that direction, such an official recognition never occurred. In fact, Portugal was asked by the Chinese government to protect Chinese interests and citizens in Spain and its territories after Chongqing broke relations with Madrid,²²⁰ and the request was accepted.

In sum, between 1937 and 1941 there were many official and unofficial contacts between the Chinese government and Portuguese authorities in Lisbon and in Macau. Macau assumed a privileged position for assisting Chinese resistance, with or without the Portuguese authorities consent. It was also an important location for the collaborators who used Macau and nearby areas to co-opt adherents to their cause. As Japanese moved on to occupy the neighbouring county of Zhongshan and Wang's RNG gained a higher domestic and international status, neutral Macau became more isolated and dangerous. This dictated the pursuit of compromises with all the players in the region in order to save Macau from a military occupation.

²¹⁹ W. C. So, 'Race, Culture, and the Anglo-American Powers: The Views of Chinese Collaborators', *Modern China*, 37/1 (2011), p. 77. On Spain's close relations with the Wang's government see F. Rodao, 'Franco's Spain and the Japanese Empire, 1937-45', *Bulletin of Portuguese-Japanese Studies*, 10-11 (2005), pp. 243-62; F. Rodao, 'Japan and the Axis, 1937-8: Recognition of the Franco Regime and Manchukuo', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 44/3 (2009), pp. 431-47.

²²⁰ Chinese Minister to Portugal to Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 19 Sept. 1940, AHD, 2P, A48, M212. The Chinese legation in Spain had been moved to the South of France during the Spanish civil war and was closed in 1940. Shortly afterwards there were attempts to re-establish diplomatic relations, which were not accepted by the Spanish government.

2.3. Colonial chimera: Portuguese occupation of disputed islands




Figure 2. Map of Macau and neighbouring territories, 1912

Apart from the Macau peninsula, Portugal administered the islands of Taipa and Coloane as part of their ‘colony of Macau.’ However, the country had tried to extend its sovereignty over part of three other islands (Lappa, D. João, and Montanha)²²¹ in negotiations with China at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth.²²² The Sino-Japanese war provided an excuse for some maverick actions in this regard. Under the pretext of asserting their claims over the territories, the Macau

²²¹ None of these islands remains today in the territorial form they had during the war. Lappa (Duimianshan, sometimes also referred to as Wanzai, name of one of its villages), is no longer an island. It was connected to the China mainland by reclamation and integrates the Xiangzhou district of the city of Zhuhai. Dom João (Xiao Hengqin) and Montanha (Da Hengqin) are now a single island, Hengqin. A road links it to the Macau Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China. Taipa and Coloane are part of the Macau SAR but the two have been connected by land reclamation, the artificial isthmus being known as Cotai.

²²² For a history of these negotiations see A. V. Saldanha, *Negociações e Acordos Luso-Chineses sobre os Limites de Macau no Século XX* [Sino-Portuguese Negotiations and Agreements on Macau’s Borders in the 19th Century] (Lisbon, 2010).

authorities sent Portuguese forces to occupy part of the islands. The most serious cases involved Montanha and Lappa.

As the Japanese advances in China gained momentum, the Portuguese legation in Tokyo suggested clarification of Portugal's claims over disputed islands near Macau. To an initial cold reply from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Lisbon ('it is preferable to do nothing for now regarding islands'²²³), A.C. Freitas, the chargé d'affaires at Tokyo, insisted on his suggestion. His reasoning was that the Japanese general staff was using a map of China made by the Chinese, which described the territories under dispute as belonging to China. Therefore, Japanese military authorities could use that as an excuse if they came to occupy those islands.²²⁴ A report by a Portuguese naval commander in October 1937 advocated Portugal's occupation of the parts it claimed if the Chinese forces retreated from these islands. He argued that 'not occupying them in the current circumstances would be giving up our rights [over them] forever.'²²⁵

The war had already reached the islands in 1937. By October Chinese had started to open trenches in Lappa and moved on to the part of the island claimed by Portugal. Protests were made to Guangzhou and Nanjing.²²⁶ The Portuguese embassy at London was also informed.²²⁷ The Chinese minister in Portugal, Li Jinlun, came to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to ascertain that China wished to keep the status quo and that the trenches in Lappa were for defence purposes against attacks by Japanese planes, and had been made on the Chinese side of the island near the customs posts. That territory 'had nothing to do with Macau' and was 'purely Chinese.'²²⁸ Despite Chinese assertions, on 11 November 1937, Salazar, in his capacity as president of the council (premier), sent a

²²³ Minister of Foreign Affairs to Portuguese Legation in Tokyo, 22 Sept. 1937, AHD, 2P, A48, M175, my translation.

²²⁴ Portuguese Chargé d'Affaires in Tokyo to MNE, 23 Sept. 1937, *ibid.*

²²⁵ Excerpt of report by the commander of the sloop Gonçalo Velho, 14 Oct. 1937. AHD, 2P, A48, M176, my translation.

²²⁶ Portuguese Minister to China to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1 Oct. 1937, *ibid.*

²²⁷ Minister of Foreign Affairs to Portuguese Embassy in London, 3 Oct. 1937, *ibid.*

²²⁸ Record of conversation between F. Calheiros (MNE) and the Chinese Minister to Portugal, October 13, 1937, *ibid.*, my translation.

dispatch approving a suggestion from the Ministry of the Colonies recommending the Portuguese occupation of the disputed islands after the withdrawal of Chinese forces and before the arrival of the Japanese.²²⁹

At the end of November, the Japanese consul general at Hong Kong, Midzusawa Kosaku, came to the Portuguese consulate to discuss which islands were under dispute.²³⁰ Correspondence on how to proceed involved the Portuguese legation in Tokyo from where the chargé d'affaires wrote to Lisbon that the threat of Japanese occupation of the islands provided an opportunity to 'liquidate once and for all the old question of [border] limits between Portugal and China in conditions favourable to Portugal.' Japan would not mind the islands being occupied by a neutral country. His machiavellian suggestion, tantamount to an appeal for covert collaboration, was that:

Under the pretext of the threat of a Japanese occupation, and with previous establishment of a verbal and secret agreement with the Japanese Government, Portugal could occupy those islands without protests from the world and without reason for protests from the Chinese Government. In virtue of that agreement and in exchange for a well observed neutrality of the Portuguese government during the blockade, the Japanese Government would employ its influence next to the new [Chinese] Government, which will be as malleable as the Manchurian one in the hands of Japan, so that the Portuguese occupation is considered and accepted as *un fait accompli*.²³¹

Negotiations between Portuguese and Japanese authorities took place at regional level. Midzusawa returned to the Portuguese consulate where he met Gorgulho, sent by the governor of Macau with a map of the disputed territories. After the meeting, the consul delivered a copy of a memorial he had written to Tokyo addressing the question of the islands, to the Portuguese consul at Hong Kong, Álvaro Brilhante Laborinho. Given the sensitive nature of the matter, Laborinho travelled to Macau where he met with the governor and several high officials of the colony's administration. Some changes to the memorial were proposed by the governor and the consul insisted that when communicating this to Midzusawa he should stress the mere informative character of such

²²⁹ Minister of Colonies, 6 Nov. 1937, and despatch by Salazar, 11 Nov. 1937, *ibid.*, my translation.

²³⁰ Portuguese Consul at Hong Kong to the Governor of Macau, 27 Nov. 1937, AHD, 2P, A48, M175.

²³¹ Portuguese Chargé d'Affaires in Tokyo to MNE, 10 Dec. 10, 1937, *ibid.*, my translation.

a mission, which would ‘not involve obligations of any kind.’ It stated the disputed nature of the islands and Portuguese rights to occupy the Eastern part of each of them (which faced Macau) if China, or any nation, sent troops to the islands. Japanese troops that landed on the islands should respect the limits described, but were warned not to try it ‘because Chinese troops are nearby and Portugal is likely to be drawn into the conflict.’ If that happened, Portugal would protest ‘but it will be a rather diplomatic procedure’ to make sure China understood Portugal kept its territorial claims. Japan should notify the Portuguese consul at Hong Kong if any action was to be taken on those islands.²³² Salazar wrote to the Portuguese chargé d’affaires at Tokyo to make verbal démarches to guarantee the acceptance of the memorial’s content.²³³ However, solid guarantees were not given. The Japanese government had told Midzusawa it could not assure Portugal of prior notice should Japanese forces land on the islands because ‘operations were only known by the government after they were carried out.’²³⁴ As instructed, Freitas also took the matter to the minister of foreign affairs, Hirota Kōki, who seemed not to have heard of the Laborinho-Midzusawa memorial. In a second interview with Freitas, and after speaking to military authorities, Hirota showed some agreement with the Portuguese proposals, although also stressing the difficulties in giving prior notification of military operations, which were often secret.²³⁵

Indeed, the Portuguese had not been notified when, in the early morning of December 28, Japanese troops landed on Montanha island, shots being heard in Macau.²³⁶ Portugal protested in Tokyo but a local paper guaranteed that these events did not involve

²³² Portuguese Consul at Hong Kong to Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 11 Dec. 1937, *ibid.*, my translation.

²³³ Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs to Portuguese Legation in Tokyo, 11 Dec. 1937, *ibid.*

²³⁴ Portuguese Consul General at Hong Kong to Governor of Macau, 11 Dec. 1937, *ibid.*, my translation.

²³⁵ Portuguese Chargé d’Affaires in Tokyo to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 18 Dec. 1937, *ibid.*

²³⁶ The Hong Kong press reported the affair in critical terms. The *SCMP* wrote: ‘About 200 marines landed, but it is not known why the landing should have taken place, unless it was for taking the few miserable belongings, pigs and poultry of the fisherfolk on the island’ (‘Firing heard at Macao – Attack on Island’, *The South China Morning Post* [29 Dec. 1937], *ibid.*).

the country in the conflict in any way.²³⁷ Words guaranteeing strict neutrality were often accompanied by actions indicating a murkier reality. Following the Japanese landing, the governor sent a police officer with some men to occupy Maliaohe (Maniό in Portuguese), the main village in the disputed Eastern part of the island, and contacted a Japanese officer. He also sent a local administrator to inform the Chinese authorities in Zhongshan and urged for protests to be made via diplomatic channels.²³⁸ These were delivered, in the innocuous terms previously agreed. In Hong Kong, Laborinho met Midzusawa's replacement, Nakamura Toyoichi, to express hopes that the memorial indications would be respected.²³⁹ When meeting the vice-minister (Hirota was on holiday) in Tokyo, Freitas assured him that 'the protest did not represent any act of hostility from the Portuguese Government but instead an affirmation of [sovereignty] rights.' He presented a verbal memorandum of the Portuguese position regarding Montanha, which was well received.²⁴⁰ Portugal's protest to Japan and the landing of Portuguese forces on the island had international coverage, with news clippings being sent over to Lisbon from diplomats in Paris, Rome, and Havana.²⁴¹

In the meantime, Chinese forces had gathered in the western part of Lappa. Fearing they would attack the Japanese in Montanha, the Portuguese sent an officer to meet colonel Kusumoto Sanetaka in Shanghai to suggest to the Japanese not to land on Lappa and respect Portuguese border claims. He reserved Portugal's right to protest if that was not done. These terms were accepted, and it was stressed that understandings with the

²³⁷ 'A Ocupação da Ilha de Tai Von Cam pelo Japão' [The Occupation of Tai Von Cam Island by Japan], *A Voz de Macau* (3 Jan., 1938), p. 3.

²³⁸ Governor of Macau to MC, 28 Dec. 1937, transcribed by MC to MNE, 30 Dec. 1937, AHD, 2P, A48, M175.

²³⁹ Portuguese Consul at Hong Kong to Governor of Macau, 29 Dec. 1937, *ibid.*.

²⁴⁰ Portuguese Chargé d'Affaires in Tokyo to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 30 Dec. 1937, *ibid.*, my translation.

²⁴¹ Despatches and clippings in AHD, 2P, A48, M175.

Japanese military command should be prioritised over diplomatic channels.²⁴² As seen in the previous sections, diplomacy was practiced via multiple means.

The Japanese forces withdrew from Montanha one month after invading it.²⁴³ The reason for their retreat seems less due to Portuguese protests than to the fact that Japanese soldiers posted there contracted malaria,²⁴⁴ a disease known to be prevalent in the island. The Portuguese remained on the island, contrary to anything acceptable to the Chinese government. The latter made sure protests on the matter were made via proper diplomatic channels. In September 1938 Diao Zuoqian protested to the Portuguese consulate general at Guangzhou about the Portuguese occupation of Montanha. The protest followed complaints by several citizens of Maliaohe to the Zhongshan county government. The villagers reported that Portuguese soldiers had beaten up three Chinese villagers, interfered in local practices by not allowing maintenance of boats, chopping down wood, and not paying for wood bought from the villagers. To guarantee the respect for Chinese sovereignty the Macau authorities were asked to withdraw their forces. Such had been guaranteed in a personal verbal note by the former chargé d'affaires at the Guangzhou consulate but had not yet taken place.²⁴⁵ In fact, a *South China Morning Post* report indicated precisely the opposite. Portuguese policemen from Macau had resumed patrol of Montanha under the pretext of protecting the local population from Japanese sailors who had come to the island, robbed some residents and taken 'all available fresh water [...] to cater for the Japanese warships off Chungshan [Zhongshan] county.'²⁴⁶ Several months later a vague response from Lisbon stated that the affair's resolution 'should be

²⁴² Governor of Macau to MC, 14 Jan. 1938, *ibid.*.

²⁴³ 'Retirada dos japonezes de Tai Vong Cam' [Retreat of the Japanese from Tai Vong Cam], *A Voz de Macau* (27 Jan. 1938), p. 4; 'Wongcam Abandoned', *The South China Morning Post* (28 Jan. 1938), *ibid.*.

²⁴⁴ 'Back to Wangcum,' *The South China Morning Post*, 15 Jan. 1938, *ibid.*.

²⁴⁵ Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Special Delegate for Guangdong and Guangxi to the Portuguese Consul General at Guangzhou, 5 Sept. 1938, *ibid.*. The former chargé was Albano Rodrigues de Oliveira, who would be governor of Macau from 1947 to 1951.

²⁴⁶ 'Wang Cum Island – Portuguese Police From Macao Return There', *The South China Morning Post* (15 Sept. 1938), *ibid.*.

influenced by local conditions of the moment and largely left to the Governor's will.²⁴⁷ The Portuguese occupation was, therefore, maintained despite Chinese criticism.²⁴⁸

Of the three disputed islands Lappa was the largest and closest to Macau. Portuguese interests in controlling at least part of the island were linked to security and water provision.²⁴⁹ In the absence of governor Barbosa, the Macau acting governor pointedly observed in May 1939 that the Portuguese occupation of Lappa 'should only be done and will have any chance of present and future success if the Chinese central government authorises it.' Private negotiations with the Chinese government had begun in Macau some time before via Lin Shifen and Diao Zuoqian of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, their reported absence from South China, as well as of any other representatives of the central government, made it 'impossible to renew negotiations.'²⁵⁰ The acting governor insisted on the subject of Chinese agreement in a telegram a few days later, noting that the Chinese would 'never accept our occupation of Lappa around which revolve interests of various sorts.'²⁵¹

The situation was left idle for a while, although Japanese threats to occupy the disputed islands were used to pressure Portugal on other matters.²⁵² Finally, in the midst of an attack on Zhongshan, Japanese forces entered Lappa on 20 March 1940,

²⁴⁷ MNE to MC, 21 Nov. 1938, *ibid.*.

²⁴⁸ In March 1939 the Governor wrote to Lisbon that a Portuguese police force still occupied Montanha. He complained about the matter being reported by the Portuguese press, deeming it a 'very delicate subject that offends the Chinese some of whom are helping us in that objective' (Governor of Macau, 23 Mar. 1939, AHD, 2P, A48, M176, my translation).

²⁴⁹ Saldanha, *Negociações*, p. 26, The idea for a project of water supply from Lappa to Macau preceded the beginning of hostilities in July 1937 and it was maintained even as they progressed. Drafts in the Braga Papers dating from January to April 1939 attest to plans for the establishment of a Sino-British company for the development of water supply from Lappa to Macau. These were to be negotiated by Zhang Huichang with the authorisation of the Chinese government (NLA, MS 4300, Box 16, 4.2./2). The plans were most likely abandoned by the subsequent occupation(s) of Lappa.

²⁵⁰ Acting Governor to Minister of Colonies, 18 May 1939, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767, my translation.

²⁵¹ Acting Governor [to Minister of Colonies], 7 June 1939, *ibid.*.

²⁵² In September 1939 the Japanese consul at Guangzhou, Okazki Katsuo, came to the Portuguese consulate where, after complaining about pro-Chiang Kai-shek activities in Macau, he stated that in the army and navy milieus in Tokyo there was an 'unfavourable environment towards Macau,' the occupation of Lappa even being considered, not because it would bring Japan any added advantage but 'as a reprisal against Macau.' (Portuguese Acting Consul to Governor of Macau, 11 Sept. 1939, AHD, 2P, A48, M175. Also in AHD, 3P, A9, M218-219 and AHD, 2P, A48, M212).

disembarking in the North, and reaching Wanzai, in the Eastern part that Portugal claimed. Chinese authorities did not resist and the population fled to Macau. Barbosa sent two emissaries to Qianshan to request the retreat of Japanese military from the disputed areas. They conceded and the governor sent a police force to occupy part of the island, raising the Portuguese flag.²⁵³ They used the Chinese customs station as barracks.²⁵⁴ In a second informal meeting the envoys were told that the commander of the Japanese forces had heard from the military authorities in Guangzhou that they had no information on disputed territories in Lappa. Portuguese forces were requested to leave Wanzai. The Portuguese envoys insisted the matter should be taken to the Japanese government, invoking the confidential memorandum.²⁵⁵ Attempts at getting the Japanese to acknowledge the Portuguese occupation in this kind of back-and-forth negotiations often failed, hostage to vague commitments.

The Portuguese occupation of Lappa was done without prior notice to the Chinese government at Chongqing or even the Portuguese minister in Shanghai. Boxer was told confidentially that Portuguese advances into Lappa were made ‘with the consent and approval of the local Chinese community,’ and the governor believed ‘the matter could be settled to the mutual satisfaction of both Portuguese and Japanese by negotiation between the Foreign Office in Lisbon and Tokyo, and that the standpoint of the Chinese authorities could be safely ignored.’²⁵⁶ The British consul at Macau, H.D. Bryan, could certainly see Portuguese actions in Lappa for what they were, an unlawful territorial occupation accomplished by taking advantage of Japan’s war on China. He wrote to the British embassy in Shanghai that the Chinese had ‘been very suspicious of the policies [sic.] of Macau, accusing them of intriguing with the Japanese in the hope of furthering their

²⁵³ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 20 Mar. 1940, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767.

²⁵⁴ British Consul at Macau to British Ambassador at Shanghai, 24 Mar. 1940, TNA, FO 371/24700.

²⁵⁵ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 22 Mar. 1940, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767.

²⁵⁶ Report by Boxer, 26 Mar. 1940, sent from War Office to Far Eastern Department, FO, TNA, FO 371/24700.

ambitions in regard to Lappa,' accusations that although 'vigorously denied' had 'some foundation in fact.'²⁵⁷

The governor had assured the British consul that Portuguese maneuvers in Lappa had been taken to safeguard Portuguese territorial waters and to 'prevent any possibility of disorder arising on Macao's doorstep.'²⁵⁸ Occupying Wanzai would allow him to have a better control over Macau's inner harbour. But in one of his telegrams to Lisbon the case started to take more delusional dimensions. For the governor a possible solution for the Portuguese predicament would be stepping up colonisation efforts in the disputed island, installing 'religious, medical assistance, education and other services that would make the population respect the benefits they derive from our sovereignty.'²⁵⁹ He asked for a credit of 1,000 patacas to do so. In Lisbon, the minister of colonies disagreed, fearing such initiatives would be seen as a provocation to the Japanese (but not to the Chinese central government). 'If we have to abandon Lappa the less we have there the less undignified it will be,'²⁶⁰ he warned.

A curious position in the Lappa issue was that of H.W. Bradley, CMC commissioner for the Lappa district. In April 1940 the Japanese controlled 'all the territory between the sea on one side, Shekki [Shiqi] on the upper end, the West River and the Macao frontier.' All organs of the Chinese government had withdrawn from the area but no one had yet approached the customs authorities and they were 'formally functioning' although 'various members of the staff have been under fire from both parties.' In reality, only the Maliuzhou (Malowchow) station could make 'any pretence at

²⁵⁷ British Consul at Macau to British Ambassador at Shanghai, 24 Mar. 1940, *ibid.*.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁹ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 29 Mar. 1940. ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767, my translation.

²⁶⁰ Minister of Colonies to Governor of Macau, 1 Apr. 1940, *ibid.*.

actually functioning.²⁶¹ Bryan observed that Bradley could protest over the Portuguese occupation of the customs station in Wanzai. However, timing was favourable to Macau, because the only station still operating did so ‘entirely at the pleasure of the Macao authorities.’²⁶² Bradley eventually reinstated caretakers in the Wanzai station without objecting to the presence of the Portuguese police,²⁶³ another act of accommodation to the exceptional circumstances in the area.

The Portuguese occupation of Lappa, however, was short-lived as Wang Jingwei supporters took over the island. In early April 1940 a Chinese soldier posted a notice in Wanzai advising the Chinese people to follow Wang’s policy and unite with Japan. The Portuguese did not allow it and told the soldier to leave, which he did,²⁶⁴ but it was a brief success. Soon after, Chinese men, initially with Japanese flags, took control of the north of the island and the flow of goods into Macau, demanding ever-higher amounts for supplies. The Portuguese tolerated the ‘abuse’ in order to ‘avoid misunderstandings that may compromise the friendship relations between Portuguese and Japanese.’²⁶⁵

To the Minister of Colonies the Japanese strategy seemed to be one of forcing the Portuguese to leave Lappa without taking the blame, by using Chinese forces. To Barbosa he demanded prudence: ‘even if we were attacked we should retreat avoiding any combat that is not convenient to us. If by any chance we were attacked [in] Macau we should defend [it] to the last cartridge [and the] last man but by no means Lapa.’ A symbolic resistance would suffice.²⁶⁶ Making a show of colonial power for prestige purposes while

²⁶¹ ‘Notes on the situation in Macao,’ based on memorandum by the Commissioner of Customs at Lappa sent by the Inspector-General of the Chinese Maritime Customs to the Portuguese Minister to China, 5 Apr. 1940, AHD, 2P, A48, M217.

²⁶² British Consul at Macau to the British Ambassador at Shanghai, 24 Mar. 1940, TNA, FO 371/24700.

²⁶³ Despatch from the British Consul at Macau to Foreign Office, 10 Apr. 1940, *ibid.*.

²⁶⁴ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 12 Apr. 1940, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767.

²⁶⁵ Governor of Macau to Portuguese Consul at Guangzhou, 24 Apr. 1940, AHD, 2P, A48, M217, my translation.

²⁶⁶ Minister of Colonies to Governor of Macau, 15 Apr. 1940, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767, my translation.

being conscious of its limitations was something the Portuguese attempted more than once.

The governor persisted in trying to contact the Japanese military authorities, although noting that ‘the frequent and intentional substitution of officers in the forces operating around Macau does not permit efficiency [in] conversations and compromises.’ He argued that if the Lappa situation was not regularised, the blame was to be found with the Japanese, the failure of his efforts being consequence of the ‘disloyalty [and] bad faith [of the] Japanese who are consummated masters in subtleties and tricks against which the best world diplomacy has bogged down and broken.’²⁶⁷ Reaction to the invading forces had gone from opportunism to frustration. Barbosa reinforced the garrison at Lappa with thirty men, and was ready to send in twenty more. But he would not overcommit, given a rumour that ‘a group of around a thousand pirates are thinking of launching a major assault [on] Macau.’²⁶⁸ The tiny peninsula was his priority, not the larger island.

By late April the governor had been contacted by a Chinese ‘pseudo-officer’ surnamed Li,²⁶⁹ claiming he had received orders from his superiors to send in troops ‘to occupy and take back their territory.’ Given the ‘usurpation of sovereignty rights,’ Portuguese soldiers were told to retreat from the island in order to avoid a clash. The governor did not answer him, convinced that ‘what Li wanted was money.’²⁷⁰ The situation escalated. Chinese forces in Lappa were reported to have risen to 200 men. Chinese soldiers and armed civilians carrying Japanese flags opened fire on the Portuguese. At the same time, local villagers raised Chinese flags. An attack was also launched on Wanzai, which the Portuguese police commander in charge of the Lappa forces and Macau future police commissioner, lieutenant Carlos Alberto Ribeiro da

²⁶⁷ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 17 Apr. 1940, *ibid.*.

²⁶⁸ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 22 Apr. 1940, *ibid.*.

²⁶⁹ He is referred to in Portuguese sources as Lei Katchi (probably Li Jiaqi in Mandarin).

²⁷⁰ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 22 Apr. 1940, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767, my translation.

Cunha, described as so well mounted that it was clear that ‘the aggression had been carefully studied and prepared.’ An informant would later tell the Portuguese the civilians and soldiers were from Taiwan, Xiamen, and Korea,²⁷¹ hinting that they were not locals but controlled by Japan. In a later report, the BNU manager also stated that the Japanese had covertly helped Wang’s supporters to attack the Portuguese position.²⁷² After meeting a council of senior staff, the governor sent the order to retreat.²⁷³ The Portuguese forces returned to Macau having lost three men in Lappa, all of them British Indian guards.

Any possibility of an understanding with the Japanese military, whom the Portuguese blamed for the Lappa attack, had failed. Who to protest to? In Lisbon, the colonial minister was adamant: never to the ‘Chinese government protected by Japan,’²⁷⁴ as this might amount to an informal recognition of its legitimacy. A protest was then submitted by the Portuguese consul at Guangzhou to his Japanese counterpart.²⁷⁵ Portuguese legations in Tokyo and in Washington received similar instructions to inform the Japanese and American governments of the Portuguese perspective on the incident.²⁷⁶ From Shanghai the Portuguese minister wrote to Wang Chonghui in Chongqing. He justified that Portuguese occupation of part of Lappa was ‘without any character of annexation’ but served the purpose of sparing ‘from the consequences of the actual hostilities a territory over which Portugal believes she has rights which had been friendly discussed [sic.] with the Chinese government.’ Now that they had been ousted by ‘Chinese civil [sic.] and military forces, apparently directed or instigated by the Japanese,’ Portuguese wished to reiterate those rights, hoping to ‘resume the discussion in future date.’²⁷⁷ In Tokyo the newly arrived Portuguese minister, L.E. Fernandes, spoke

²⁷¹ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 26 Apr. 1940, *ibid.*.

²⁷² Vasconcelos, ‘Relatório,’ p. 25, CGD, AG-012-22-117.

²⁷³ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 24 Apr. 1940, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767.

²⁷⁴ Minister of Colonies to Governor of Macau, 25 Apr. 1940, *ibid.*, my translation.

²⁷⁵ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 26 Apr. 1940, *ibid.*. Also in AHD, 2P, A48, M217.

²⁷⁶ MNE to Portuguese Legation in Washington and in Tokyo, 1 May 1940, *ibid.*.

²⁷⁷ Portuguese Minister to China to Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 4 May 1940, *ibid.*.

with the vice-minister of Foreign Affairs. Unaware of the particulars about Lappa and not knowing of the 1937 memorial, he was keener to refer to Japan's disappointment at Portugal over Timor. Fernandes left 'with bad impression and convinced this Ministry will never do anything useful for us.' They wanted concessions in Timor but had 'no interest or means to solve the Macau situation.'²⁷⁸

Portuguese retreat from Lappa and diplomatic shunning was not the end of their troubles. The victorious Li demanded that those of his men who had been detained be set free, otherwise he would attack Macau. His request was fulfilled and the governor asked Lisbon to get Japan to deal with this since, he feared, the 'Japanese are instigating this man.'²⁷⁹ In May the governor sent two officers to Qianshan after a Japanese request for talks. The Japanese officer whom they met hinted Japan was not happy about the Chinese troops under Li occupying Lappa. If the Portuguese requested, the Japanese would force them to leave and let the Portuguese reoccupy the islands. He gave them until the following morning to ask. The governor deemed it impossible and believed that the Japanese forces would retreat from near Macau, handing control to Chinese troops faithful to Nanjing. Their approach would be to force the Portuguese to deal with those.²⁸⁰ In Tokyo, the Japanese minister of foreign affairs, Nomura Kishisaburō,²⁸¹ replied to a note sent by the Portuguese minister. Japanese troops were 'in no way concerned' with the incident at Lappa. Violent actions had been taken by local residents who, feeling 'extreme aversion to being under the control of the Moors' (Indian policemen), had attacked them and driven them away.²⁸² In July, lieutenant colonel Oka visited the Portuguese consul at Guangzhou and hinted that the Lappa situation would be solved

²⁷⁸ Portuguese Minister to Tokyo to Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 Apr. 1940, *ibid.*, my translation.

²⁷⁹ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 26 Apr. 1940, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767, my translation.

²⁸⁰ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 18 May 1940, *ibid.*.

²⁸¹ Nomura Kishisaburō's next post would be ambassador to the United States, which he held when the Imperial Japanese Navy attacked Pearl Harbor.

²⁸² Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to Portuguese Minister to Japan, 20 May 1940, AHD, 2P, A48, M217.

through diplomatic means, which the consul understood to mean the new Wang Jingwei government. To Lisbon he reported that a definitive return of Lappa to Chinese sovereignty would give Wang a powerful political weapon by claiming that he had recovered territories Chiang's government had not taken proper care of.²⁸³ Soon after, Li was transferred from Wanzai. After staying near Shiqi he came to Macau, where he was arrested for trying to instigate 'disorderly elements against the man who substituted him in Lappa.'²⁸⁴

The Lappa case highlights the often-ignored friction that occurred between Japanese military forces and Chinese collaborators. At the end of August the Japanese began to bomb the east of Lappa, notably customs posts at Wanzai and Samei villages.²⁸⁵ The pretext was to 'drive out the Chinese puppet troops,' who had been breaching the Japanese imposed blockade to Macau by supplying foodstuffs, and even petrol into unoccupied China, with fantastic profits.²⁸⁶ A Chatham House news bulletin also stated that the reason for the Japanese shelling of Lappa was a rebellion by the puppet administrator.²⁸⁷ A few days later, their occupation was secured. Reporting to Lisbon, the acting governor noted that such action would facilitate charging transit fees to Macau, that in the occupied areas there were several artillery pieces, 'some even directed towards Macau,' and that general Ando ordered the military occupation of areas of Lappa he knew were under dispute. Protesting to him would bear 'little or no result,' and so he appealed to Lisbon to use diplomatic channels.²⁸⁸ Lisbon telegraphed Tokyo to reaffirm its rights over that part of the island, 'asking for the status quo to be maintained.'²⁸⁹ In September 1940 Japanese flags disappeared from Lappa and the acting governor was informed they

²⁸³ Portuguese Consul at Guangzhou to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 4 June 1940, *ibid.*

²⁸⁴ Acting Governor to Minister of Colonies, 18 July 1940, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767, my translation.

²⁸⁵ Acting Governor to Minister of Colonies, 31 Aug. 1940, *ibid.*

²⁸⁶ British Consul at Macau to British Ambassador at Shanghai, 22 Sept. 1940, TNA, FO 371/24700.

²⁸⁷ 'Chronology', *Bulletin of International News*, 17/19 (1940), p. 1242.

²⁸⁸ Acting Governor to Minister of Colonies, 4 Sept. 1940, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767, my translation.

²⁸⁹ Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs to Portuguese Legation in Tokyo, 12 Sept. 1940, AHD, 2P, A48, M217, my translation.

had withdrawn.²⁹⁰ A complete withdrawal would only occur in early November, when Japanese troops left to occupy neighbouring areas.²⁹¹

Ultimately, Portuguese occupation of the islands was not even recognised by the Japanese forces they had tried to collude with. Almost a year after the retreat from Lappa, the Japanese consul at Macau told Pedro Lobo that the Japanese military authorities did not recognise Portuguese sovereignty over Montanha, where they had had a police force since 1938. The new governor wrote to Lisbon that, although he had been verbally informed that ‘there had been an agreement with the Japanese’, he had found nothing about it in the archive. He then clarified his position on the disputed islands, which was slightly different from his predecessor: ‘We have to respect the border limits question with China but we cannot use the present confusion to obtain any territorial advantage.’²⁹² He considered the border question suspended until ‘normalcy’ returned to the area.

Having tried to take advantage of the confusing situation in South China, the Portuguese ended up losing their ground, caught between the fast-changing power struggles happening around Macau and involving different collaborators and the Japanese military forces. Attempts at breaching Chinese sovereignty over the islands ended with the war. The way in which Portugal had sought to exploit China’s weakness to occupy disputed territory through secret dealings with its aggressor are a particularly evident example of the unneutral actions occurring in wartime Macau.

Conclusion

This chapter placed Macau within a framework of international diplomacy. It argued that from the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in mid-1937, the enclave

²⁹⁰ Acting Governor to Minister of Colonies, 24 Sept. 1940, *ibid.*.

²⁹¹ Acting Governor to Minister of Colonies, 7 Nov. 1940, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, ex. 767.

²⁹² Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 23 Aug. 1941, *ibid.*, my translation.

experienced increasing local and transnational tensions. In the period considered in this chapter, neutrality was a policy that all foreign powers with interests in China adopted. Through the analysis of the Portuguese case, this chapter demonstrated that complete neutrality was, from the start of the conflict, impossible to ensure. The interplay of colonial interests, prestige aspirations and structural weaknesses dictated a course of variable degrees of accommodation. To face the dangers of the spiralling conflict, the Macau Portuguese administration and key actors in the region – Japanese forces, Chinese resistance, Chinese collaborators, and the British in Hong Kong – resorted to different forms of collaboration.

The progressively higher pressure exerted by Japan towards Macau was marked by contradictory actions. On the one hand, there were promises of help for developing the enclave as a competitor to Hong Kong. On the other hand, there were threats over disputed territories, supply blockades, and actual bombings of Portuguese missionary properties in South China. Sharing with them an old alliance and the common trait of being European colonialists in China, the British were regarded by the Portuguese in Macau as natural partners and protectors. Even though it soon became apparent that they could not be relied upon for significant assistance, the Portuguese refrained from actions that would antagonise the neighbouring British and cooperation was attempted whenever possible. Portuguese actions towards the two major imperial powers in China – Japan and Britain – are illustrative of the interconnectedness of foreign actors in China. Colonial powers did not exist in isolation but responded to each other, and those reactions were monitored and sometimes exploited by the Chinese authorities.

If Portuguese neutrality in Macau was often questioned by the Chinese government, it was also pragmatically utilised by its agents. Smuggling, propaganda, and meetings were conducted in and through Macau by Chinese in opposing camps. As this chapter demonstrated, Chinese wartime diplomacy was an active endeavour which did not

overlook small powers like Portugal. The opportunities offered by neutrality, from Macau's entrepôt features to the protection the Portuguese flag could offer renationalised ships, were used by the Nationalists from the start of the war.

Portuguese foreign policy towards China was actually nothing more than colonial policy, where every action was taken with the single objective of securing Portugal's outposts in Asia. While Chinese diplomats at Lisbon had a stable presence and acted with ordinary professionalism, the Portuguese in China were a diverse mix of characters that further stressed the country's abnormal relations with the country during the conflict. In this context, Macau's authorities often engineered shadow diplomacy initiatives on their own, bypassing official diplomatic channels although without a lasting success. Decisions in Macau were sometimes taken without the prior knowledge and approval of the Portuguese central government in Lisbon, even though it was the latter who had to respond to Chinese enquiries and complaints over malpractices of neutrality.

The crisis in South China gave way to different opportunistic experiments around Macau, some far from the supposed inactivity suggested by its neutral status. The final part of this chapter addressed how the Portuguese authorities sought to take advantage of China's weakness during the war to occupy, with Japanese consent, parts of islands they considered under dispute. The move, the last attempt to extend control over those territories, failed. The Portuguese were caught between power struggles that revealed the instability of Japanese relations with Chinese collaborators and the divisions amongst the latter. Collaboration was often as murky as neutrality.

Macau was part of a network of foreign-ruled territories on China's doorstep, also including Hong Kong and Guangzhouwan, which, due to their ambiguous neutrality, were used by both resistance activists and collaborators with Japan. Macau was a liminal place, with water and overland links to mainland China, through which people, goods, and information could transit. Increasing Japanese pressure to limit Chinese uses of Macau

had some degree of success. However, these never completely ceased and the smuggling opportunities on offer served both belligerents.

Three milestones marked a hardening of the Japanese position: the occupation of the provincial capital, Guangzhou, in 1938; the take-over of Shiqi, the capital of the Chinese county adjacent to Macau, in 1940, and the appointment of a pro-Wang Jingwei provincial government to Guangdong in that same year. By the end of 1941, despite its neutrality, the enclave was quite isolated and under informal Japanese control, a situation that would be aggravated after the occupation of Hong Kong.

This chapter stressed the interactions of multiple international actors in South China in the first four years of the war and how neutrality created opportunities that led to forms of collaboration with different sides. Having addressed the key political and diplomatic manoeuvres around Macau, the following chapter will focus on the social impact on the territory, notably the experience of refugees who arrived from Shanghai and Guangdong province.

CHAPTER 3

Crisis and opportunity: Refugees in wartime Macau, 1937-1941

Introduction

During the Second World War the population of Macau rose from slightly more than 150,000 to around half a million people thanks to the arrival of hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing war-ridden China and Hong Kong. This chapter will focus on the first wave of refugees that reached the enclave between 1937 and the fall of the British colony in December 1941. This was mostly comprised of Portuguese and Chinese hailing from Shanghai and Guangdong province, and differs from the second wave of refugees, coming predominantly from Hong Kong.

This chapter argues that the arrival of so many refugees in Macau was both a crisis and an opportunity for the enclave's colonial authorities, local elites, and for the refugees themselves. It provided the Portuguese administration with an opportunity to project ideas of prestige through charity, and gave it a powerful political argument to be used in their favour when the Chinese government questioned Portugal's stances towards Japan and the Chinese collaborationist authorities. The refugee crisis also enhanced the position of the enclave's Chinese elites through philanthropic practices. Finally, for many of those seeking a safe haven in Macau, the enclave guaranteed enough freedom from Japanese harassment, and a space to continue their pre-war activities, such as teaching. The refugee influx had a markedly positive impact in the territory, enriching its financial, cultural, and educational sectors.

The history of Sino-Portuguese relations during the Second World War is inseparable from that of the massive refugee influx into Macau. This chapter will

demonstrate how, in social history terms, Macau should be understood as part of the war in China through a number of comparable cases drawn from recent scholarship on the conflict. Then, it will address the problematic issues of numbers and identities of those coming to Macau. Finally, the role of state(s) and society in refugee relief will be explored through the study of the two main communities of refugees in Macau. The chapter will reveal how the enclave was affected by the war, with experiences that were similar to other colonial spaces in China during the first years of the conflict.

3.1. Placing the wartime social history of Macau within the historiography of refugees in China

Refugees have deserved a renewed interest in the historiography of the Second World War in East Asia, being an important topic of the recent scholarship that puts ‘the war at the centre of social change’¹ in modern China. This literature provides important contextual information at the national level and comparable cases at the local one that help to understand Macau within the history of the conflict in China.

China’s war with Japan affected a massive number of people, the total number of refugees still being debated, with figures ranging from 20 to nearly 100 million.² Research on how refugees were dealt with by the Chinese central government, local authorities (which were sometimes foreign), civic and religious organisations and others is important because it ‘allows reconstruction of a history that goes beyond the trauma and chaos caused by the Japanese invasion, and illustrates how societies actually deal with catastrophe.’³ Recent studies on refugees have focused on different geographic areas in China and have highlighted different actors, strategies, and goals. Some authors have

¹ D. Lary, *The Chinese People at War: Human Suffering and Social Transformation, 1937-1945* (Cambridge, 2010), p. 195.

² *Ibid.*, p. 28.

³ T. Lincoln, ‘Fleeing from Firestorms: Government, Cities, Native Place Associations and Refugees in the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance’, *Urban History*, 38/3 (2011), p. 238.

privileged the wartime capitals of Wuhan and Chongqing and the role of the Chinese central government under the Nationalists, linking refugee management to state-building efforts and popular mobilisation. MacKinnon described Wuhan in 1938 as marked by ‘an unprecedented level of community volunteerism and state intervention in relief and health work.’⁴ He explored the relation between the refugees in the tri-city and the development of a national-level mobilisation that involved different actors. Focusing on the other, and main, wartime capital of China, Mitter explored how the Kuomintang attempted to create ‘a sense of citizen identity through mobilization.’⁵ The central government was a key player in relief provision, laying the foundations for a post-war welfare state. According to Mitter, ‘the total scale of Nationalist government refugee assistance was well beyond anything previously seen in China.’⁶ This was also observable in South China. The China Information Committee stated in 1945 that ‘by the end of June, 1943, 994,893 overseas Chinese had registered with the Urgent Relief Commission For Overseas Chinese in Hong Kong and Macao.’⁷

These and other authors have also drawn attention to case studies where the role of the state in refugee management was articulated with other networks and institutions, such as religious missions, native place associations (*tongxianghui*) or foreign administrations, the latter notably in Shanghai.⁸ As Chen demonstrated in her work on the urban poor – from whom many refugees became indistinguishable during the war years – how ‘to count refugees, control their mobility, and make them accountable [...] developed

⁴ S. R. MacKinnon, *Wuhan, 1938. War, Refugees and the Making of Modern China* (Berkeley 2008), p. 61.

⁵ R. Mitter, ‘Classifying Citizens in Nationalist China during World War II, 1937-1941’, *Modern Asian Studies*, 45/2 (2011), p. 251

⁶ Mitter, *China’s War with Japan*, p. 178

⁷ *China Information Committee Daily Bulletin*, 1142, 13 Aug., 1945, TNA, FO 371/46224.

⁸ E.g. Lincoln, ‘Fleeing from Firestorms’, p. 429; N. Dillon, ‘The Politics of Philanthropy: Social Networks and Refugee Relief in Shanghai, 1932-1949’, in N. Dillon and J. C. Oi (eds), *At the Crossroads of Empires: Middlemen, Social Networks, and State-Building in Republican Shanghai* (Stanford, 2008), pp. 179-205.

into persistent preoccupations.⁹ The Macau case shares a number of these interactions and concerns.

Recent scholarship has also analysed the refugees in China's War of Resistance from new perspectives, focusing on issues such as the environmental impact¹⁰ or women's mobilisation,¹¹ and granting new importance to the voices and actions of refugees themselves. Sometimes this was done by downplaying the nationalist feeling of those affected by the conflict. For example, Schoppa, who focused his study on refugees from Zhejiang province, argued that they were mostly concerned with 'saving themselves, their families, and their native places,' and did not show 'a special appeal to patriotic nationalism.'¹² In Macau, the situation was arguably more akin those of other international cities such as Shanghai, and the sources show how many not only had national concerns, but also, such as amongst the refugees from Hong Kong, imperial ones.

Indeed, the best comparative cases to understand the social experience of Macau during the war are those of urban spaces framed by overlapping transnational interests and actors, cities where the desirable display of colonial order and prestige faced the challenge of an unprecedented refugee influx that profoundly shaped their wartime existence and reconfigured the power of Chinese relief providers. Places like the British colony of Hong Kong, the French enclave of Guangzhouwan or, and most particularly, the French Concession in Shanghai and the International Settlement. In the latter, the colonial authorities sought to limit the impact of the human crisis as 'the arrival of

⁹ J. C. Chen, *Guilty of Indigence: The Urban Poor in China, 1900-1953* (Princeton, 2012), p. 130.

¹⁰ M. S. Muscolino, 'Violence Against People and the Land: The Environment and Refugee Migration from China's Henan Province, 1938-1945', *Environmental History*, 17 (2011), pp. 291-311; M. S. Muscolino, *The Ecology of War in China: Henan Province, the Yellow River, and Beyond, 1938-1950* (Cambridge, 2015).

¹¹ E.g. H. M. Schneider, 'Mobilising Women: The Women's Advisory Council, Resistance and Reconstruction during China's War with Japan', *European Journal of East Asian Studies*, 11 (2012), pp. 213-36.

¹² K. R. Schoppa, *In a Sea of Bitterness. Refugees during the Sino-Japanese War* (Cambridge, MA, 2011), pp. 309-10.

refugees, and the disease that they brought with them, threatened to upset Shanghai's sense of itself as orderly, rational, and modern.' The Shanghai Municipal Council, which ran the International Settlement, regarded 'the provision of space and facilities for the refugees [...] a highly unwelcome task.'¹³ Similarly, the French Concession authorities sought to 'block the influx of population into their territory,' finding themselves 'caught between humanitarian considerations and the fear of welcoming more refugees into their already resource-strained territory.'¹⁴ The massive refugee influx was considered to 'present obvious risks for social order and health conditions' and since an early stage, 'the settlements' authorities and above all the various native-place associations worked towards sending as many people as possible back to their villages.'¹⁵ In 1938 the Shanghai Municipal Council assumed a tighter control over the refugee camps in the city, classifying them into groups, asking 'relief organizations to repatriate the remaining residents and prepare to shutter all of the sites,' with the remaining refugees being classified as 'beggars.' The persistence of a 'beggar problem' led to the 'unprecedented step of creating a camp to incarcerate beggars.'¹⁶ If similar worries of imposing colonial control, particularly in the field of hygiene, can be identified in wartime Macau, there was a marked difference in the Portuguese authorities' attitude towards refugees. As shall be detailed later in the chapter, guaranteeing their protection was often seen as potentially advantageous.

However, even if British and French reluctance to accept refugees in Shanghai contrasted with Portuguese willingness to take them in Macau, the practice of relief was remarkably similar in both locales. In Shanghai, government institutions, civic

¹³ Mitter, *China's War with Japan*, p. 185.

¹⁴ C. Henriot, 'Shanghai and the Experience of War. The Fate of Refugees', *European Journal of East Asian Studies*, 5/2 (2006), p. 220.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 224.

¹⁶ Chen, *Guilty of Indigence*, p. 157, p. 161.

associations and prominent individuals joined efforts to tackle the refugee crisis.¹⁷ A prominent role was played by Chinese voluntary associations who succeeded due to the ‘strength of the elite networks that helped coordinate their activities.’¹⁸ As Dillon and Martin showed, prominent businessmen such as Yu Xiaqing and the Green Gang boss Du Yuesheng assumed leading roles in philanthropic endeavours during the war, and thus enhanced their influence in local and national circles.¹⁹ The same occurred in Macau. Solutions to tackle refugee management were also emulated. In Shanghai, around 200 refugee camps were established.²⁰ The largest was the Jacquinet Safety Zone, devised by a French Jesuit priest.²¹ This inspired the establishment of the Nanjing Safety Zone, where several foreign missionaries also played important roles in refugee management and in recording events for posterity.²² In Macau, a refugee safety zone was also envisioned at one point, camps were established for the poorest refugees, and religious groups, both Christian and Buddhist, were important in relief activities.

Despite the contribution of the existing literature to place the Macau case within the social history of the war in China, the Portuguese enclave had its own particularities. Unlike most of the abovementioned places, it remained under foreign administration for the duration of the war. It was not ruled by the Chinese government, and so its state-building efforts through refugee management did not directly affect Macau. Also, it was never under formal Japanese occupation, although control over the enclave was tightly exerted in various ways. The key role played by civil society in Macau was determinant

¹⁷ Henriot, ‘Shanghai and the Experience of War’, p. 227; P. Stranahan, ‘Radicalization of Refugees: Communist Party Activity in Wartime Shanghai’s Displaced Persons Camps’, *Modern China*, 26/2 (2000), p. 169.

¹⁸ Dillon, ‘The Politics of Philanthropy’, p. 183.

¹⁹ Ibid., B. G. Martin, ‘Du Yuesheng, the French Concession, and Social Networks in Shanghai’, in *At the Crossroads of Empires*, pp. 65-84.

²⁰ Henriot, ‘Shanghai and the Experience of War’, p. 236.

²¹ M. R. Ristaino, *The Jacquinet Safety Zone: Wartime Refugees in Shanghai* (Stanford, 2008).

²² K. Zhang (ed), *Eyewitnesses to the Massacre: American Missionaries Bear Witness to Japanese Atrocities in Nanjing* (New York, 2001). Other accounts of the role of missionaries can be read in D. Lary, ‘A Ravaged Place: The Devastation of the Xuzhou Region, 1938’, in D. Lary and S. Mackinnon (eds), *Scars of War: The Impact of Warfare on Modern China* (Vancouver, 2001), pp. 98-1116; E. J. Christensen, *In War and Famine: Missionaries in China’s Honan Province in the 1940s* (Montréal, 2005).

to guarantee management and relief, even if the Portuguese administration reaped the symbolic benefits of being seen as the protector of refugees. In reality, a myriad of actors often worked together, or at least cooperated frequently, even if harbouring different political goals. These included the Macau Portuguese authorities, local charities, Chinese elite figures, representatives of other states (e.g. the British consulate), and transnational institutions (such as the Catholic Church or the Red Cross).

3.2. Growing numbers and conflicting identities

The most striking feature of the refugee influx in Macau was its number, although exact figures are impossible to ascertain. This is by no means unique to this case but it confirms similar difficulties in calculating the total number of refugees in China during the conflict. As MacKinnon noted, ‘anecdotal evidence is abundant but the statistical evidence of refugee flight on a massive scale is skimpy and conflicting.’²³ The reason for this, as Mitter observed, was that ‘so many people fled in so many directions, and the governments under which they lived were so consumed by the struggle for survival, that keeping meaningful records became a secondary task.’²⁴ In Macau no authority compiled systematic data on the number of refugees entering or leaving the territory during the war years. Available statistical records do not provide accurate figures since the flow of people and goods entering and exiting Macau was often hard to control. However, from the available census, several archival documents and memoirs it can be concluded that the population in Macau rose dramatically during the war, having reached around half a million people. In 1927, the population of Macau was 157,175, having increased to

²³ MacKinnon, *Wuhan, 1938*, p. 47

²⁴ Mitter, *China's War with Japan*, p. 117

254,194 in 1939. After the war, in 1950, it was only 188,896.²⁵ These numbers fail to give a full picture of the refugee influx during all the war years. However, by analysing passenger numbers who arrived in Macau in the 1940s (table below) approximate figures may be reached. Between 1940 and 1945 there was an increase of more than 200,000 people that if added to the total population in 1939 confirm that around half a million people were in Macau during the war. The peak of foreign arrivals in 1942 coincides with the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong and the peak of departures in 1945 matches the end of the war.

| Year | Chinese | Foreigners | Total |
|------|---------|------------|-------------------------|
| 1940 | +30,757 | +132 | +30,889 |
| 1941 | +85,855 | -356 | +85,499 |
| 1942 | -36,977 | +1,137 | -35,840 |
| 1943 | +65,478 | +813 | +66,291 |
| 1944 | +80,620 | +1,527 | +82,147 |
| 1945 | -18,240 | -1,770 | -20,010 |
| | | | TOTAL: + 208,976 |

Number of entries and departures to/from Macau by land and by water.

Data from the 1949 Macau Statistical Yearbook.²⁶ Author's calculations.

Other sources provide similar figures. In a press conference in 1946, the then governor of Macau stated that during the war the enclave's population had been between 450,000 and 500,000.²⁷ Monsignor Manuel Teixeira, a Portuguese missionary and local historian who lived through the war years in Macau, later wrote that the enclave's population swelled from 200,000 to half a million during the war.²⁸ In April 1942 the British consul listed the population at 407,300 people,²⁹ and in his memoirs he stated that from 'some 150,000, the population grew during this period to 450,000,' of which around

²⁵ Quoted in Barreto, *Macau During the Sino-Japanese War*, p. 31.

²⁶ Repartição Central dos Serviços de Administração Civil – Secção de Estatística, *Anuário Estatístico de Macau. Ano de 1949* [Macau Statistical Yearbook. Year of 1949] (Macau, 1950), pp. 32-3.

²⁷ 'Declarações do Sr. Governador de Macau à Imprensa' [The Words of the Governor of Macau to the Press], *Boletim Geral das Colónias* [General Bulletin of the Colonies], XXII/254-255 (1946), pp. 7.

²⁸ Teixeira, 'Macau Durante a Guerra', p. 498.

²⁹ British Consul at Macau, 25 Apr., 1942, quoted in telegram from Embassy in Lisbon to FO, 26 Apr., 1942, TNA, FO 371/31630.

10,000 refugees (mostly citizens from Hong Kong) were under his care.³⁰ A report penned by a businessman who escaped from Macau described ‘a population of over 400,000 Chinese’, a figure that had ‘increased steadily since the Japanese occupation of Hongkong.’³¹ A telegram from the Macau Red Cross to the Lisbon headquarters reported a total population of ‘approximately four hundred thousand people of whom half Chinese refugees.’³² Some authors suggest the number of people was even higher, around 600,000 people³³ or even more than one million during the war years.³⁴ An article about the housing crisis in a local newspaper illustrated the situation well when the author expressed the conviction that he ‘live[d] in the city with the highest population density in the world.’³⁵ Macau, which at the time had an area of just 15 Km², experienced a population increase of almost three fold, an exceptional case even by today’s standards. It became a temporary city for hundreds of thousands of people fleeing the brutality of the Japanese invasion. The number of refugees who passed through Macau during the Second World War largely dwarfs those who transited via Portugal, and who have merited more attention by historians.³⁶

The absence of clear data on the number of refugees in Macau brings to the fore another problem, one of definition of what a refugee was. Considering all of those who came to Macau during the war as refugees is contestable. Many of those who came were not receiving any kind of assistance, in fact some, like the Hong Kong tycoon Sir Robert

³⁰ Reeves, *The Lone Flag*, p. 14, p. 121.

³¹ E. Heenan, Memorandum written in Chongqing, 27 May, 1942, pp. 1-2, sent by the British Embassy in Chongqing to the FO, 3 June, 1942, TNA, FO 371/31630. Also in TNA, CO 825/30/12.

³² President of the Macau Delegation of the Portuguese Red Cross to Portuguese Red Cross in Lisbon, May 19 1943, AHCVP, CV/3513-3514, my translation.

³³ C. N. P. S. Cónim and M. F. B. Teixeira, *Macau e a sua População, 1500-2000: Aspectos Demográficos, Sociais e Económicos* [Macau and its Population, 1500-2000: Demographic, Social, and Economic Aspects] (Macau, 1998), p. 188.

³⁴ Cannon, ‘Experience, Memory’, p. 7.

³⁵ ‘A crise de habitações [The housing crisis]’, *Renascimento* (2 Mar. 1945), p. 2, my translation.

³⁶ It is estimated that around 100,000 European refugees passed through Portugal during the war (I. F. Pimentel, ‘Refugiados’ [Refugees], in *Dicionário de História do Estado Novo*, ii, pp. 823; F. R. Meneses, *Salazar: A Political Biography* [New York, 2009], pp. 236-7. The most comprehensive study to date of the passage of Jewish refugees through Portugal during the war is Pimentel and Ninhos, *Salazar, Portugal e o Holocausto*.

Hotung (He Dong), were so affluent that they provided funds to help others. An internationally recognised definition of refugee such as that codified in the United Nations Convention in 1951 did not exist during the Second World War, and the term remains prone to debate to this day.³⁷ Therefore, this chapter uses a broad definition, considering as refugees those who sought refuge elsewhere after leaving their place of origin or domicile to flee war, external aggression or occupation. This is also in line with primary and secondary sources, which refer to those seeking refuge in Macau as refugees (*refugiados* in Portuguese, *nanmin* in Chinese), regardless of their socio-economic status, nationality or access to state assistance. As soon as the war ended, an exodus out of Macau ensued. Macau had been a mere temporary haven and the rate of refugee return was striking. This further confirms that those who moved there from the late 1930s did so because of the war.

There were precedents in Macau's role as a refugee destination. As a foreign administered enclave it had long been a refuge for Chinese escaping conflict, persecution or natural disasters. However, the scale of the influx during the Second World War was unprecedented. Moreover, it was marked by the arrival not only of Chinese but also of large numbers of the Portuguese community in China and of refugees from Hong Kong of various nationalities. A person's identity was often more fluid and plural than one's citizenship. This adds to the complex reality of interactions between communities and blurs the line of national interests at stake in Macau during the war.

The present chapter focuses specifically on Chinese and Portuguese, who constituted the first main wave of refugees arriving in Macau, fleeing the Japanese occupation of Shanghai in 1937 and of parts of Southern China, particularly in Guangdong province, from 1938. Although these might seem to constitute two clearly

³⁷ A. T. Fragomen Jr., 'The Refugee: A Problem of Definition', *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law*, 3/1 (1970), pp. 45-69; A. E. Shacknove, 'Who Is a Refugee?', *Ethics* 95/2 (1985), pp. 274-84; W. T. Worster, 'The Evolving Definition of the Refugee in Contemporary International Law', *Berkeley Journal of International Law*, 30/1 (2012), pp. 94-160.

demarcated groups, ‘Chinese’ and ‘Portuguese’ could be quite polysemic terms during this period.

‘Portuguese’ in 1930s China did not primarily refer to a European-born citizen of the Republic of Portugal. Most Portuguese in China were Eurasians, had never set foot in Portugal, often did not even speak Portuguese, and were sometimes citizens of other countries. Their origins were predominantly linked to Macau, although many had not been born there, and marriage patterns reveal links to numerous other communities (Chinese, Indian, British, Japanese, Filipino, Russian, etc.), although their specific ethnic origins have been the focus of some debate.³⁸ Nowadays, the former Portuguese community in China is often referred to as Macanese, including by the members themselves,³⁹ although in this thesis’ primary sources they are always named as ‘Portuguese.’ For the Portuguese colonial authorities in Macau the Macanese were not regarded as a separate Eurasian group with a particular identity but as essentially Portuguese, recognisable by family relations, their mostly Portuguese surnames and their practice of the Roman Catholic faith. For the authoritarian Estado Novo regime governing Portugal, unlike most people in the Portuguese African colonies, whom it considered ‘indigenous’ or ‘uncivilised natives’ and subject to a discriminatory legal regime, the Macanese had a ‘special status,’ together with the people of Cape Verde and of the Portuguese State of India, being considered ‘full citizens.’⁴⁰ A review of the scholarship on the Portuguese diaspora in Asia and race relations in the Portuguese colonial world

³⁸ E.g. A. M. Amaro, ‘Sons and Daughters of the Soil’, *Review of Culture* 20 (1994), pp. 16-67; J. P. Cabral, ‘The “Ethnic” Composition of Macao’, *ibid.*, pp. 229-38; M. Teixeira, ‘The Origin of the Macanese’, *ibid.*, pp. 157-67.

³⁹ This is clearly observable in the community associations and projects established around the world such as the Macanese American Union (*União Macaense Americana*) or the Macanese Association (*Associação dos Macaenses*) in Macau, not to mention the several Macau Houses (*Casas de Macau*) in various countries.

⁴⁰ Clarence-Smith, *The Third Portuguese Empire*, p. 138; P. F. Matos, *As Côres do Império: Representações Raciais no Império Português* [Title of the English-language edition: *The Colours of the Empire: Racialized Representations during Portuguese Colonialism*] (Lisbon, 2012), p. 63, p. 66.

falls outside the scope of this thesis.⁴¹ However, it should be noted that different perceptions towards the Portuguese in China help to explain how so many of them found refuge in Macau during the war. Outside of Macau, they lived and worked mostly in the British-dominated colonial spaces of the treaty ports and Hong Kong, where ‘racial or ethnic segregation and discrimination’ were ‘both tolerated and encouraged.’⁴² Even though it was argued that the British discriminated less against the Portuguese than other Eurasians,⁴³ the Portuguese were often a target, and did not even escape the portrayal British popular culture reserved for Eurasians as misfits or criminals.⁴⁴ But, as Cabral bluntly put it: if an ‘English *mestiço* was called half-cast,’ a ‘Portuguese *mestiço* was called Portuguese.’⁴⁵ The Portuguese refugees who came to Macau during the war received privileged treatment by the local authorities, which prioritised them over the Chinese in evacuation efforts and housing allocation. But if the Portuguese left Macau, they could easily assume other identities, including Chinese, without arising suspicion given their fluency in local dialects and physical appearance. An extreme example of this will be addressed in Chapter Six, when discussing the case of a Portuguese man accused of being a Chinese traitor.

Their treatment of the Macanese might point to a particular racial tolerance amongst Portuguese authorities. That, however, was not necessarily the case. The legal protection offered by extraterritoriality led many Chinese, even long before the war

⁴¹ There is a growing number of scholarship on this in Portuguese and English languages. E.g. Castelo, “*O Modo Português de Estar no Mundo*”; F. Bethencourt and A. J. Pearce (eds), *Racism and Ethnic Relations in the Portuguese-Speaking World* (Oxford, 2012).

⁴² J. M. Carroll, ‘Chinese Collaboration in the Making of British Hong Kong’, in T. W. Ngo (ed), *Hong Kong’s History: State and Society Under Colonial Rule* (London, 1999), p. 14.

⁴³ Yap, ‘Portuguese Communities’, p. 208.

⁴⁴ R. Bickers, *Britain in China: Community, Culture and Colonialism, 1900-1949* (Manchester, 1999), pp. 46-9. An example of this sort of literature is G. Collins, *Chinese Red* (London, 1932).

⁴⁵ J. P. Cabral, ‘A Composição Social de Macau’ [Macau’s Social Composition], in F. Bethencourt and K. Chaudhuri (eds), *História da Expansão Portuguesa, Volume V: O Último Império e Recentramento (1930-1998)* [History of the Portuguese Expansion, Volume V: The Last Empire and Recentring (1930-1998)] (Lisbon, 1999), p. 278.

started, to obtain foreign nationalities, sometimes more than one,⁴⁶ as ways of minimising business risks and enjoying new opportunities or freedoms. Portuguese nationality was a popular choice, even for famous Chinese figures never associated with Portugal or even Macau, such as Du Yuesheng.⁴⁷ Although legally these Portuguese citizens were entitled to the same treatment as others, in practice they were sometimes seen as aliens. For example, Portuguese authorities commented negatively on the claims of a Portuguese national called John Tong who complained about the damage caused by Japanese soldiers to his residence in Guangzhou in 1938. His English name and Chinese surname were seen as proof of his un-Portugueseness.⁴⁸ Similarly, members of the Club Lusitano in Fuzhou (*Fuzhou Puqiao gonghui*) asked for Portuguese consular protection in 1939. However, their nationality claims were contested in diplomatic correspondence and, one year later, their ballots confirming them as Portuguese citizens were not renewed because ‘the photographs attached to the ballots, with some garments and the typical Chinese cap and the names of the applicants attest that these are 100% Chinese.’⁴⁹ Discrimination, positive or negative, was, as these examples show, highly arbitrary and in a conflict situation could have serious consequences.

The constant intersection and difficult disentanglement of national, ethnic, linguistic, and other identities will be even more apparent when analysing the second wave of refugees, that from Hong Kong, in Chapter Five.

⁴⁶ M. H. Lin, ‘Overseas Chinese Merchants and Multiple Nationality: A Means for Reducing Commercial Risk (1895-1935)’, *Modern Asian Studies*, 35/4 (2001), p. 993.

⁴⁷ B. G. Martin, ‘“The Pact with the Devil”: The Relationship between the Green Gang and the Shanghai French Concession Authorities, 1925-1935’, in F. Wakeman Jr. and W. H. Yeh (eds), *Shanghai Sojourners* (Berkeley, 1992), p. 270

⁴⁸ Portuguese Chargé d’Affaires in Tokyo to Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 22 Mar., 1939, AHD, 2P, A48, M176.

⁴⁹ Portuguese Consul in Guangzhou to Portuguese Minister to China, 1 Aug. 1940, AHD, Arquivo do Consulado de Portugal em Cantão, No. 199-203, my translation. The decision appears to have been reversed in 1941.

3.3. The role of state(s) and society in refugee relief

3.3.1. Portuguese refugees from Shanghai and Guangzhou

Writings on refugees during the first years of China's War of Resistance usually focus on Chinese citizens. Foreigners in China are assumed to be uniformly in a position of privilege and not directly affected by the conflict. During the war, at least until Pearl Harbor, they are cast as relief providers and not beneficiaries of charity. The case of the Portuguese in China can be regarded as an exception. It demonstrates how the effects of the war were international from the onset and highlights similar relief practices across communities. As will be made clear in the following pages, refugees' escape to Macau and maintenance in the territory was guaranteed by different entities. These included not only state representatives (such as the Portuguese authorities in Macau), but also local associations and charities – that is, representatives of civil society – at the point of departure and in Macau, both Chinese and Portuguese. Although their target audience for relief differed, these associations provided a crucial intermediary link between the refugees and the local authorities. Without this grassroots, often translocal, mobilisation for assistance, the local colonial authorities would have had a much harder task of managing the refugee influx alone. They testify both the colonial authorities' permissiveness and their weakness and limitations. Some of the relief providers are listed in the table below.

| In Shanghai and Hong Kong | In Macau |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • [Shanghai] Club Lusitano • 廣東旅滬同鄉會 [Shanghai] Guangdong Native Place Association • [Hong Kong] Club Lusitano • [Hong Kong Portuguese Community] Relief Commission (<i>Comissão de Socorros</i>) • [Hong Kong Portuguese Community] Executive Commission for Refugees (<i>Comissão Executiva de Refugiados</i>) • Portuguese Consulates (Shanghai and Hong Kong) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 慈善救濟委員會 Charity and Relief Commission (<i>Comissão de Assistência e Beneficência</i>) • 鏡湖醫院 Kiang Wu Hospital • 同善堂 Tung Sin Tong Charitable Society • 難民救濟委員會 Refugee Relief Commission (<i>Comissão de Assistência aos Refugiados</i>) • 澳門四界救災會 Macau Four Circles Disaster Relief Association • 澳門各界救災會 Macau All Circles Disaster Relief Association • 澳門中國婦女會 Macau Chinese Women Association • 澳僑協助難民回鄉會 Macau Overseas Chinese Association for Assisting Refugees to Return Home • Catholic Diocese of Macau • British Consulate |

Selected list of relief providers

The Portuguese were one of the most numerous foreign communities in Shanghai.⁵⁰ According to the consul general in the city, the community counted 1,938 people in 1937.⁵¹ Their socio-economic standing was relatively low and because they do not easily fit into the narratives of Euro-American white privilege and prejudice in China, they have been largely overlooked by historians.⁵²

Like their Chinese neighbours, the Portuguese in Shanghai had an illustrative taste of how a Sino-Japanese conflict could affect their lives in 1932. Portugal's Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives hold lists of their material losses and complaint letters on the

⁵⁰ A Portuguese scholar lists the Portuguese as the second largest foreign community in Shanghai's International Settlement after the British in 1900, the third after the British and the Japanese in 1905, 1910 and 1915, the fourth after the Japanese the British, and the Russian in 1920, and the fifth after those and the Americans in 1925 and 1930 (A. G. Dias, *Diáspora Macaense: Macau, Hong Kong, Xangai (1850-1952)* [Macanese Diaspora: Macau, Hong Kong, Shanghai (1850-1952)] [Lisbon, 2014], p. 170).

⁵¹ Portuguese Consul in Shanghai to French Consul in Shanghai, 16 Aug. 1937, AHD, 2 P, A 48, M175.

⁵² Amongst the exceptions: Dias, *Diáspora Macaense*; A. G. Dias, 'The Origins of the Macao Community in Shanghai: Hong Kong's Emigration (1850-1909)', *Bulletin of Portuguese-Japanese Studies*, 17 (2008), pp. 197-224; A. M. P. J. Silva, *The Portuguese Community in Shanghai: A Pictorial History* (Macau, 2012).

damage caused by the so-called Shanghai War of 1932.⁵³ Some of the strategies to deal with a humanitarian crisis linking Macau to Shanghai employed from 1937 onwards were tested five years before. For example, a public subscription was started by Macau's municipal council, the 'Loyal Senate' (*Leal Senado*) to gather donations for relief of compatriots in Shanghai.⁵⁴

In 1937, with the beginning of an all-out war between China and Japan, foreigners in Shanghai faced their fate with apprehension and the Portuguese were no exception. Diplomatic correspondence reveals the dilemmas faced by a small imperial power concerned with saving its own while not showing its weakness in relation to the great colonial giants in the region. Plans for taking some of the Portuguese out of Shanghai began in the summer of 1937. In August, the Portuguese consul general in the city, António Alves, telegraphed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reporting that 'a great number of Portuguese had abandoned the threatened district [Hongkou]' and that he had 'nominated a commission responsible for transportation, housing [and] relief of refugees.'⁵⁵ Two days later, a 'Portuguese relief group managed to evacuate under fire 70 people [in] zone [of] hostilities' and the consul informed Lisbon he had 'protested [the] bombing reserving right to ask compensation.'⁵⁶ The Portuguese consulate in Shanghai published (in English, for the local Portuguese had become predominantly English-speaking) notices in the local press asking for Portuguese nationals to register their address, and those who had had properties destroyed to 'collect immediately all the available evidence of such destruction, damage or looting, whenever possible with the aid

⁵³ AHD, 3P, A9, M125. The Shanghai War of 1932 is now regarded as a key event leading up to the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War (D. A. Jordan, *China's Trial by Fire: The Shanghai War of 1932* [Ann Arbor, 2001]).

⁵⁴ Appeal from the President of the Loyal Senate, 16 Mar. 1932, AM, MO/AH/AC/SA/01/13827.

⁵⁵ Consul in Shanghai to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 Aug. 1937, AHD, 3P, A9, M132-133, my translation.

⁵⁶ Consul in Shanghai to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 Aug. 1937, *ibid.*. Also in AHD, 2P, A48, M175.

of the Police authorities.⁵⁷ Without means to transport them – a fact that pointedly illustrates the limitations of Portugal's projections of power –, the consul requested the American and British governments to guarantee the evacuation of the Portuguese. He also asked for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to support his request so that the Macau authorities 'make arrangements to receive two thousand refugees.'⁵⁸ The Portuguese consulate in Shanghai, and Portuguese embassies abroad, contacted British, American and French representatives to request assistance in a potential withdrawal of the 'Portuguese colony' in Shanghai but such appeals were usually met with a lukewarm response as those countries seemed to have been unsure of the necessity and their capacity for evacuating the totality of their own citizens.⁵⁹ The Portuguese ambassador in London, who had also made enquiries on the subject, warned about the bad image such requests could have on Portugal and wrote to the minister of Foreign Affairs, the dictator Salazar, that 'to maintain our prestige in the Pacific it would be advantageous not to place ourselves in a situation of strict dependence on other countries.'⁶⁰ The problem of lack of official means could only be overcome through a concerted effort of local associations and consular representatives on the ground.

In war, as in peace, the experience of the Portuguese community in China was marked by triangular links between Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Macau. Therefore, in 1937, preparations started to be made in the last two to receive the refugees from Shanghai. As Portuguese authorities and diplomats debated whether or not to completely evacuate the Portuguese in the city, members of the Portuguese community in Hong Kong established a Relief Commission (*Comissão de Socorros*) in August 1937 to deal with the refugees coming from Shanghai. The idea for such a commission came from Leonardo

⁵⁷ Newspaper clippings in appendix no. 6 to the report on Sino-Japanese hostilities in Shanghai, 15 Oct. 1937, *ibid.*.

⁵⁸ Consul in Shanghai to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 Aug. 1937, *ibid.*.

⁵⁹ Several telegrams and despatches in AHD, 2P, A48, M175.

⁶⁰ Ambassador in London to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 Aug. 1937, *ibid.*, my translation. Also in AHD, 3 P, A 9, M 132-133.

d'Almada e Castro, a distinguished figure of the Hong Kong Portuguese community who was a member of the Legislative Council and the president of the Club Lusitano, a Portuguese club that still exists to this day. On 17 August a meeting in that club between members of the Portuguese community and the Portuguese consul in Hong Kong, Álvaro Brilhante Laborinho, finalised the establishment of the Relief Commission, in which the consul would act as president. The remaining members of the commission were all male and, with one exception, were all presidents of associations that catered to the Portuguese community in Hong Kong. Compatriots residing in Hong Kong were requested to offer housing to the refugees, and 'in case of absolute necessity, they would be housed in premises of Portuguese associations.' Money subsidies, however, were likely to be needed and concerning that the consul did not know 'what could be demanded of the community who, in its great majority, is poor.'⁶¹ He noted how the British organised 'their commissions' and prepared housing in hotels, associations and even hospitals. The Portuguese were paying close attention to how relief was being taken care of by other nations. Indeed, efforts in refugee relief had many translocal and transnational similarities.

Fleeing for safety was sometimes arranged between state agents and civil society, sometimes an individual choice, which bypassed government-backed schemes. The consul in Shanghai noted that apart from the refugees sent via his consulate, 'others depart, of unknown number, who buy tickets directly to the Messageries Maritimes company, mostly 1st class passages.'⁶² As in other places in China, the wealthy were usually the first to leave. As for those Portuguese without the means to seek refuge on their own, the Portuguese authorities – from consular representatives in China to the Macau government – strove to guarantee their safe departure. Taking care of the

⁶¹ Consul in Hong Kong to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 20 Aug. 1937, AHD, 2P, A48, M175, my translation.

⁶² Consul in Shanghai to Consul in Hong Kong, 21 Aug. 1937, *ibid.*, my translation.

Portuguese refugees was perceived as a useful way of fostering their reconnection with their Macau family origins and their attachment to Portugal – a country many had never been to but whose state reach was more present in Macau than in the treaty ports. Many of the Portuguese in China were native English-speakers and worked for foreign companies, so fears of ‘denationalisation’ were sometimes voiced. The war provided a temporary reversal of their detachment from a Portuguese identity, which for many became a ticket for survival.

The arrival of refugees in Macau from Shanghai was usually preceded by an important stopover: Hong Kong. The first contingent of Portuguese refugees from Shanghai arrived in the British colony on 24 August 1937: 199 people in the French ship *Aramis*. The second batch departed from Shanghai on the following day aboard the British ship *Empress of Canada*. The evacuation proceeded as the weeks passed. In September, the consul in Shanghai noted: ‘Situation very serious [...] Evacuation of Portuguese continues as circumstances allow.’⁶³ From August to October 1937 several groups of Portuguese refugees were evacuated from Shanghai in foreign boats,⁶⁴ a subtle reminder of the Portuguese relative weakness in the region. According to a report compiled by the Portuguese consul in Hong Kong, from August to November 603 refugees had arrived in Hong Kong from Shanghai, of whom 335 went straight to Macau and 268 remained in Hong Kong. Of these 27 later left for Macau fully funded by the consulate.⁶⁵ Thus, the majority of the Portuguese refugees ended up in Macau and, as the correspondence between the Shanghai consulate and the Macau government indicates, many were ‘without any resources.’⁶⁶

⁶³ Consul in Shanghai to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 Sept. 1937, AHD, 3P, A9, M132-133, my translation.

⁶⁴ Apart from the abovementioned two ships, they arrived in the ‘Conte Verde’ (Italian), the ‘Tjinegara’ (Dutch), the ‘Tjisondari’ (Dutch), the ‘Tjasalak’ (Dutch), and the ‘Chenonceaux’ (French).

⁶⁵ Report on the Portuguese refugees from Shanghai written by the Portuguese consul in Hong Kong, Álvaro Brilhante Laborinho, Nov. 1937, p. 21, AHD, 2P, A48, M175, my translation.

⁶⁶ Consul in Shanghai to Governor of Macau, 8 Sept. 1937, *ibid.*.

Communal efforts to deal with the Shanghai refugees were not just taking place in Shanghai and Macau but also in Hong Kong. The Relief Commission there worked with the consulate in order to receive the newly arrived.⁶⁷ A group of volunteers accompanied the commission's representatives to take care of the sorting and transport of luggage and to assist elders, women and children.⁶⁸ Lists were made of those who were to stay with their families in Hong Kong and those who would follow by boat to Macau. To deal with the refugee influx from Shanghai, the Macau government transferred HK\$1,500 to the Portuguese consulate in Hong Kong.⁶⁹ It also sent the consul a list of instructions concerning assistance to refugees. These were to be examined by a doctor when arriving in Macau and had to be vaccinated against cholera. To those without means the government would distribute \$1.50 daily in food, housing to those 'without family or friends in Macau who wish to receive them' and a subsidy for personal expenses, to be given to all refugees. Initial expenses would be paid \$25 for one person, \$40 for two, \$50 for three, \$60 to four or more. Daily expenses would be paid \$0,50 per person.⁷⁰ However, the refugees did not just represent an object of charity. For some of the locals they were an opportunity for profit, for example through overpriced housing rentals.⁷¹

One of the reasons why many Portuguese were sent to Macau was because it was deemed cheaper to assist them there than in Shanghai. In September 1937 the consul noted the growing number of destitute and unemployed in Shanghai, suggesting that it would be preferable to send them to Macau, 'where their maintenance is much cheaper and accommodation easier, more so as fare costs will be lower than the expenses if they stay here for fifteen days.' All should be done to guarantee that 'the destitute who can not earn their living in Shanghai should not return to this city [underlined in the original]'.⁷¹

⁶⁷ Consul in Hong Kong to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Aug. 27 1937, *ibid.*

⁶⁸ Report, Nov. 1937, p. 17, *ibid.*, my translation.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 34-5.

⁷¹ 'Noticias de Hongkong' [Hong Kong news], *A Voz de Macau* (8 July 1940), p. 4.

Solutions for those deemed undesirable did not stop there. ‘The old, handicapped, blind, etc., could perhaps be lodged in the hospices or charitable institutions that exist in that colony; the young men of military age could eventually be admitted to the police or other garrison forces, instead of coming back to Shanghai where they risk becoming vagrants or criminals [...].’⁷² The consul then volunteered to provide the names of those already sent to Macau who, in his view, should not return to Shanghai. Refugee management was also a process of delegating troublesome tasks and costly decisions to others.

Financial constraints could also mix with patriotic concerns to ensure the British paid their share because some of the Portuguese refugees were in fact British citizens. The Portuguese consul in Shanghai wrote to the governor of Macau, A.T. Barbosa, in September 1937 considering it acceptable for Portuguese who held British nationality to be helped by the consulate. However, he believed ‘a certain distinction should be made between the people who became British subjects for reasons other than their own, continuing always to maintain contact with the Portuguese, and those who, having acquired British nationality spontaneously and voluntarily, have ostentatiously drifted apart from their race brethren [*irmãos de raça*].’⁷³ Those should be taken care of by the British authorities. The Relief Commission in Hong Kong, however, was more open-minded. It stated that whilst the attitude of the British government was not made clear, it decided to make no distinction between Portuguese refugees who were British subjects seeking the help of the commission and those who were Portuguese.⁷⁴

As mentioned before, plans to evacuate members of the Portuguese community in China were drawn by taking into account what other countries were doing and, sometimes seeking foreign assistance. As Cooper observed, ‘imperialisms existed in relation to one

⁷² Consul in Shanghai to Governor of Macau, Sept. 8 1937, AHD, 2P, A48, M175, my translation.

⁷³ Consul in Shanghai to Governor of Macau, Sept. 9 1937, *ibid.*

⁷⁴ Report, Nov. 1937, p. 68, *ibid.*

another,⁷⁵ and in the case of a small player like Portugal there was a constant anxiety to keep up with bigger powers, particularly those which drew many Portuguese to their spheres. If strengthening its military defence capability outside of Macau lay beyond Portugal's means, the country's representatives sought to protect their citizens by encouraging them to move to the enclave. Preparations in Guangzhou started the year before the city was occupied.⁷⁶ In one of his wartime reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the consul V.M. Morgado informed that he had warned the 'Portuguese colony' in the city to prepare for the evacuation of women and children and that he had 'sought (and succeeded) to guarantee the evacuation of the Portuguese in our own transportation, since it would not be possible to count on British help.'⁷⁷ He would remain in the city with his wife hoping for peace. By October he had evacuated most of the women and children. Their destinations were Macau and Hong Kong. Like his counterpart in Shanghai, he was taking note of the attitudes of the British, French and American consuls, although he was unable to count on British assistance, whose ships were either defending Shamian or evacuating its own citizens.⁷⁸ In fact, after the Japanese attack on Guangzhou, the consul informed Lisbon that 'many Portuguese remained and given the events and forced by the circumstances, it was necessary to take measures and prepare elements for a probable and needed evacuation,' similar to those taken by the other consulates in Shamian. Without foreign assistance, he tried to make do with the limited means available. He requested the services of a small motorboat, 'half abandoned' but 'of Portuguese property,'⁷⁹ and guaranteed that it was repaired and made fit for the evacuation to Macau, arranged with the governor. As in Shanghai, the evacuation from

⁷⁵ F. Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley, 2005), p. 53.

⁷⁶ AHD, 3P, A9, M132-133.

⁷⁷ Consul in Guangzhou to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sept. 30 1938 in *A Guerra vista de Cantão*, p. 191, my translation.

⁷⁸ Consul in Guangzhou to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nov. 30 1938, AHD, 2 P, A 48, M175. Shamian is a small island where the British and French concessions in Guangzhou were located. Foreign consulates in the city, including the Portuguese, were also based there.

⁷⁹ Consul in Guangzhou to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nov. 2 1938 in *A Guerra vista de Cantão*, p. 234, my translation.

Guangzhou to Macau was a collaborative endeavour that involved Portuguese diplomats, the Macau administration, and civilian efforts.

How to manage housing, healthcare and food provision became prime concerns for the Portuguese colonial authorities in Macau. The commission set up in Hong Kong sought to mobilise family members and friends the refugees might have in Macau to receive them. The Macau government published appeals in a local newspaper for those who could take some into their houses or provide them with food to sign up at the Civil Administration bureau.⁸⁰ The Portuguese refugees, first from Shanghai and Guangzhou, and later from Hong Kong, were the top priorities. Whilst Chinese refugees were left to fend for themselves, to count on family members or Chinese charities or, if destitute, moved to camps and asylums, the Portuguese were offered accommodation in several locations, including hotels, clubs, schools, a theatre and even the Canidrome.⁸¹ Documents produced in 1942 by the Senate list 12 locations,⁸² the most iconic of which was perhaps the Bela Vista Hotel.⁸³

However, willingness to accept refugees had to be weighed against financial capacity to manage them, and this had never been great. The contours of a refugee crisis became apparent already in 1937, with the governor of Macau labelling it a potential ‘problem without solution.’⁸⁴ Telegraphing the Ministry of Colonies in October, Barbosa requested that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs inform the Portuguese consul in Shanghai ‘not to send more refugees while funding is not solved,’ considering that this should come

⁸⁰ ‘Repartição Central de Administração Civil – Aviso’ [Central Division of the Civil Administration – Notice], *A Voz de Macau* (21 Jan. 1942), p. 2, my translation.

⁸¹ Teixeira, ‘Macau Durante a Guerra’, p. 501.

⁸² Club de Macau, 3 Praia Grande, Caixa Escolar, Clube Recreativo 1º de Junho, 7 Rua do Barão, 54 Rua de S. Paulo, 56 Rua de S. Paulo, Escola Municipal Luso Chinesa, Hotel Bela Vista, Vila Leitão, Estrada Ferreira do Amaral (AM, AH/LS/181).

⁸³ M. Teixeira, *Bela Vista Hotel* (Macau, 1978), p. 9. Recollections of one of the refugees housed in the hotel can be read in A. P. Silva, ‘Life and Learning in Wartime Macau,’ *UMA NEWS BULLETIN* (2009), http://www.uma-casademacau.com/files/9212/9669/0353/UMA_News_Bulletin__All_Summer_2009.pdf (23 Nov. 2012)

⁸⁴ Governor of Macau, telegram transmitted by the Minister of Colonies to MNE, 29 Oct. 1937, AHD, 2 P, A 48, M175, my translation.

out of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' budget.⁸⁵ Even with some help from the Portuguese state, the prospects for refugees' livelihood in Macau were complicated.

Lack of employment opportunities had motivated many Macanese to leave for the treaty ports since their opening in the mid-nineteenth century. Now the same livelihood problem led several refugees to cut their Macau exile short and go back to their homes in Shanghai. In April 1940 the governor wrote to Lisbon informing that some of the Shanghai refugees funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wished to return to the city and asked for it to pay for their travel fare.⁸⁶ However, the situation was not immediately solved. In October the Portuguese consul noted the precarious situation of many of the Shanghai Portuguese who were refugees in Macau, where the Charity and Relief Commission had not been able to help them since May. The consul informed that 'family members of these indigents are ready to receive them in their houses and to arrange them a placement in this city. However, they cannot afford to pay for travel expenses.'⁸⁷ In January 1941 several Portuguese refugees appealed individually to the Macau government to be provided with funds to return to Shanghai. Their stories highlight the difficulties many refugees faced in finding a job in Macau during the war.⁸⁸ Their will to return to Shanghai plainly reveals the limitations of Macau's assistance.

The 'lonely island' period in Shanghai (1937-1941) still afforded some guarantee of survival for the local Portuguese community, as intensive associative endeavours suggest.⁸⁹ But those who returned soon faced an even worse situation. Because they mainly worked for British firms, after Japan declared war on the Allies and took over the

⁸⁵ Governor of Macau to MNE, 7 Oct. 1937, *ibid.*.

⁸⁶ Governor of Macau to MC, 29 Apr. 1940, *ibid.*.

⁸⁷ Portuguese Consul in Shanghai to MNE, 14 Oct. 1940, *ibid.*, my translation.

⁸⁸ E.g. Humberto Vasco Colaço to Governor of Macau, 19 Jan. 1941; Roberto Jesús Xavier to Governor of Macau, 22 Jan. 1941, AM, MO/AH/AC/SA/01/18103.

⁸⁹ The Organisation of the Portuguese Community (*Organização da Colónia Portuguesa*), a branch of the youth organisation Mocidade Portuguesa and a food-retail cooperative were founded in 1940, and new buildings were opened by the Club Lusitano and the Association of Portuguese Ladies (*Associação das Senhoras Portuguesas*) in 1941 (Silva, *The Portuguese Community*, pp. 61-74). A radio station, 'Radio Portugal,' was also set up in 1940 ('Pela Patria' [For the Homeland], *A Voz de Macau* [29 July 1940], p. 4).

still neutral patches in Shanghai the livelihood of the Portuguese became severely threatened. The Portuguese minister to China, who remained in the occupied city throughout the war, called for the creation of a ‘central association in which all the local associations would be represented and which would in turn officially represent the Community and care of its interests.’ The Association and the consulate were the main funders of ‘the Camp’, a slum in the French Concession where those completely destitute lingered.⁹⁰ Those who could leave returned to Macau again or went there for the first time. A Macau newspaper reported on February 1942 that ‘many Portuguese, without jobs or means of subsistence’ would be ‘arriving shortly’ from Shanghai.⁹¹ Others remained in the city and their situation deteriorated significantly in the mid-1940s as the war approached its end. At the time, appeals to assist the Portuguese community in Shanghai, notably through public subscriptions, were a constant presence in newspapers published in Macau. The issue was considered ‘a case of national consciousness.’⁹² The translocal efforts of the Portuguese community in China played a crucial role in assisting their members in need, regardless of where they were, and often seeking to work concertedly with the Portuguese – and sometimes other – state representatives.

Strategies attempted in 1937 to tackle the difficult situation of the Portuguese community in Shanghai continued to take place throughout the war. However, responsibility for relief endeavours often fell upon the civil society due to the lack of official means.

⁹⁰ Silva, *The Portuguese Community*, p. 92, pp. 94-95.

⁹¹ ‘Refugiados portugueses de Hongkong e Shanghai’ [Portuguese Refugees from Hong Kong and Shanghai], *A Voz de Macau* (10 Feb. 1942), p. 3.

⁹² ‘Os portugueses em Shanghai’ [The Portuguese in Shanghai], *Jornal de Notícias* (8 July 1945), p. 2, my translation.

3.3.2. Chinese refugees from Shanghai and Guangdong Province

Although the Portuguese authorities were primarily concerned with assisting Portuguese refugees, many Chinese also took refuge in Macau. Unlike their Portuguese counterparts, most of whom were economically vulnerable, the Chinese who fled to safety in the enclave came from all socio-economic standings. Many gave Macau a newfound prosperity in the fields of finance, education or the arts. They also brought along their politics, much to the concern of the Portuguese authorities. As the governor recognised: ‘Macau is full of refugees of all sides to whom the Macau Government does not ask the side they belong to but only demands that they leave their party hatreds outside.’⁹³

Chinese refugees in Macau came mostly from the Cantonese community in Shanghai and from Guangdong province. The Guangdong Native Place Association Council for Refugee Relief, which successfully coordinated the evacuation of thousands of members of the Cantonese community in Shanghai in 1937, was studied by Lincoln, who noted that ‘some 10,000 people were taken by boat to Hong Kong, Guangzhou and Macao in 16 groups.’⁹⁴ In August 1937 the Portuguese consul in Hong Kong observed the arrival of ‘numerous refugees, coming particularly from Canton, of Chinese nationality, and from Shanghai.’⁹⁵ Their number was perceived as problematic by the governor: ‘Macau population calm for now the only worry being the entrance of many Chinese refugees [...] that are making life expensive already.’⁹⁶ Fears for the economic impact of Chinese refugees were soon joined by concerns for their impact on public health. Facing a cholera epidemic in the territory in 1938, the governor blamed it on the arrival of

⁹³ Governor of Macau to MC, 8 July 1941, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767, my translation.

⁹⁴ Lincoln, ‘Fleeing from Firestorms’, p. 453.

⁹⁵ Consul in Hong Kong to MNE, 20 Aug. 1937, AHD, 2 P, A 48, M175, my translation.

⁹⁶ Governor of Macau to Minister of the Colonies transcribed in letter from that ministry to MNE, 20 Aug. 1937, *ibid.*, my translation.

‘thousands of Chinese refugees.’⁹⁷ This hygienic scare usually targeted the poorest Chinese. In a newspaper article reporting positively about the official efforts to ensure street cleanliness – an obvious praise for the colonial state’s ‘civilising’ actions –, the authors describe how they visited ‘the shadiest neighbourhood where the most dense and miserable population lives, in its largest majority constituted by the thousands of poor Chinese refugees that have come to take shelter here due to the circumstances.’⁹⁸ Although this thesis is not primarily interested in the intersection between the exercise of colonial power through the control of health and hygienic practices, there is enough evidence in primary sources to suggest the war period in Macau was one when this issue was acutely considered given the perception that a constant threat loomed over the enclave.

Destitute Chinese refugees come up in Portuguese sources usually described in collective and vague terms, an embodiment of extreme misery and, sometimes, a symbol for China’s weakness. The short stories of the Macanese writer Deolinda da Conceição, who lived in Macau during the war, are often gendered accounts of its social impact. In one, titled ‘Hunger’ (*Fome*), the writer contrasted the violence in China with the situation in Macau through the story of a nameless Chinese mother who succumbs to disease when she gets to the enclave, portrayed as ‘an oasis of peace.’⁹⁹ Although this story focused on Chinese victimhood with an emphasis on hopelessness and not on resistance or survival, the decision of many refugees to move to Macau was one of endurance and instead of expecting to find paradise on earth, they were aware of the ambiguities surrounding life there.

As the Japanese advanced through South China, the number of Chinese refugees in the territory increased. In one of his lengthy reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

⁹⁷ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 21 Oct. 1938, AHU, 157, 1A, MU, MÇ, 1938, my translation.

⁹⁸ ‘A limpeza de Macau’ [Macau’s cleanliness], *A Voz de Macau* (11 May 1942), p. 3, my translation.

⁹⁹ D. Conceição, *Cheong-Sam – A Cabaia* [Cheongsam] (Macau, n.d.), p. 129, my translation.

the Portuguese consul in Guangzhou expressed his belief that ‘the conviction that Portugal does not impose neutrality and that Japan favours us [Portugal] is being used by the Chinese from here to go to Macau to seek refuge before the Japanese invasion of the south takes place.’¹⁰⁰ In a later report he estimated that ‘everyday 10.000 people, preferably women and children, leave Canton.’¹⁰¹ Shortly after, the Macau newspaper *Huaqiao ribao* (*Jornal Va Kio*) – which had been founded in November 1937 – wrote that the number of refugees who had fled to Macau had reached more than 40,000 and that a Refugee Relief Commission (*Nanmin jiuji weiyuanhui*)¹⁰² had been organised to provide assistance to them.¹⁰³ The occupation of Guangzhou in October 1938 brought about an exodus of refugees. It was estimated that 13,76% of those who had to leave their homes between 1937 and 1945 were from Guangdong Province.¹⁰⁴ MacKinnon stated that as many as ‘a million people migrated into Hong Kong and Macau.’¹⁰⁵

From the beginning of the conflict, the Portuguese authorities coordinated with local Chinese personalities and associations in order to provide assistance to many of those coming to the enclave. Although that was not something unheard of, its enhancement during the War of Resistance period has been recognised as particularly significant in the history of twentieth century Chinese associations in Macau.¹⁰⁶ These acted as mediators between the colonial administration and the majority of the population. The Chinese central government was also directly informed of some of the endeavours taking place in Macau to deal with the refugee crisis. For example, in September 1937

¹⁰⁰ *A Guerra vista de Cantão*, p. 36, my translation.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 108, my translation.

¹⁰² *Comissão de Assistência aos Refugiados* in Portuguese.

¹⁰³ Guangdong Provincial Archives, *Guangdong Aomen dang'an shiliao xuanbian* [Selected Historical Materials about Macau from Guangdong] (Beijing, 1999), p. 380.

¹⁰⁴ H. S. Ch'i, ‘The Military Dimension, 1942-1945,’ in *China's Bitter Victory*, p. 180. Data based on a 1946 KMT survey.

¹⁰⁵ S. MacKinnon, ‘Refugee Flight at the Outset of the Anti-Japanese War’, in D. Lary and S. Mackinnon (eds), *Scars of War: The Impact of Warfare on Modern China* (Vancouver, 2001), p. 124.

¹⁰⁶ S. Lou, ‘Acerca das Características do Corporativismo de Macau’ [On the Characteristics of Macau's Corporatism], *Administração*, 65 (2004), p. 818.

Cui Nouzhi,¹⁰⁷ an influential figure of the Chinese community in Macau, wrote to the central government in Nanjing to report that to tackle the growing number of refugees 15 people, including himself, had decided to form a committee and were hoping to establish a long term fundraising service to help the refugees, the Macau All Circles Relief Organization (*Aomen gejie jiuzaihui*).¹⁰⁸ This institution comprised the Macau Chinese Commercial Association, the Kiang Wu Hospital (*Jinghu yiyuan*), the Tung Sin Tong Charitable Society (*Tongshantang*), and the Macau Chinese Education Association (*Aomen Zhonghua jiaoyuhui*).¹⁰⁹ These were influential Chinese elite institutions, some of which dating back to the late Qing.¹¹⁰ Amongst the names in the committee is that of Gao Kening, a local tycoon who was one of the most important Chinese figures in Macau during the war and whose activities will be addressed in Chapter Four.

In May 1938 the Macau government established a Charity and Relief Commission (*Comissão de Assistência e Beneficência*).¹¹¹ Amongst others, the commission subsidized Chinese institutions, particularly the Kiang Wu Hospital and the Tung Sin Tong. Starting from 1938 and continuing after the end of the war, the government subsidised these institutions with both regular and extraordinary donations.¹¹² By delegating to these charities a significant share of responsibility for caring for vulnerable members of society

¹⁰⁷ Often identified in Western sources by his Portuguese name Joel José Choi Anok. A Catholic with Portuguese nationality, he had served in the Portuguese navy in his youth and was president of the Tung Sin Tong and the Kiang Wu Hospital for several stints (C. Jorge, and R. B. Coelho, *Roque Choi: Um Homem Dois Sistemas* [Roque Choi: A Man Two Systems] [Macau, 2015], pp. 108-15). His son, Cui Leqi (Roque Choi) was an important intermediary figure after the war.

¹⁰⁸ AH, Guomin zhengfu [National Government], 001000004794A. This association was still running in August 1939, when it reported to Chongqing that it had collected 4,000 yuan to help the local refugees in a fundraising drive on the anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (AH, Guomin zhengfu, 001000004795A).

¹⁰⁹ Lou, 'Acerca', p. 800.

¹¹⁰ The King Wu Hospital was founded in 1871, the Tung Sin Tong in 1892, and the Commercial Association in 1911.

¹¹¹ 'Comissão de Assistência e Beneficência' [Charity and Relief Commission], *A Voz de Macau* (28 May, 1938), p. 4. The president was the *provedor* of the Holy House of Mercy, a centuries-old Portuguese charity that operates in Macau since 1569. Of the commission's governing body, only one member was a representative of the Chinese community, Liu Yulin (Lew Yuk Lin), who died in 1942. Liu had been one of the first Chinese students in the United States and had a distinguished diplomatic career under the Qing and the Republic, having been minister in London and in Washington.

¹¹² Lou, 'Acerca', p. 789.

in general, and refugees in particular, the government indirectly recognised its inability to manage refugee relief on its own. Institutions such as these, as well as other civic and religious charities provided shelter, meals and medical care to many Chinese refugees.¹¹³



Figure 3. Tung Sin Tong (同善堂), Macau

Assistance to refugees was sometimes linked to a general grassroots mobilisation to support China resistance efforts. This involved, for example, the participation of women in patriotic social work. It was the case of the Macau Chinese Women's Support Association (*Aomen Zhongguo funü weiliaohui*), which was visited by Shi Liang, one of the leaders of the National Salvation Movement.¹¹⁴ It was also the case of the Macau Four Circles Assistance Association, referred in the previous chapter.¹¹⁵ This association's

¹¹³ For example, in 1945 the Tung Sin Tong was giving around 600 free medical appointments per day ('Um apelo' [An Appeal], *Jornal de Notícias* [21 June 1945], p. 4).

¹¹⁴ On Shi Liang: MacKinnon, *Wuhan, 1938*, pp. 55-59; on Shi Liang's visit to Macau: 'Shi Liang zai Aomen' [Shi Liang in Macau], *Funü shenghuo* (20 Jan. 1938); Guo, 'Shilun Aomen', p. 100; Zhang, 'Aomen tongbao', p. 107. On the mobilisation of women in China see Y. Pan, 'Feminism and Nationalism in China's War of Resistance against Japan', *The International History Review*, 19/1 (1997), pp. 115-30; R. Cheung, 'Wartime Feminists in the City of Ram: Women's Movement in the City of Guangzhou during the Second World War,' UCLA Center for the Study of Women (2009), <http://eprints.cdlib.org/uc/item/77k5j421> (30 Aug. 2016)

¹¹⁵ *Macau During the Sino-Japanese War*, pp. 147-153.

activities in Macau included fundraising, propaganda mobilisation, and relief.¹¹⁶ From 1937 to 1940 more than 100 fundraising activities took place by Chinese patriotic associations in Macau, including one of sex workers.¹¹⁷ Fundraising events continued to be organised by the enclave's Chinese civil society until the end of the war.¹¹⁸ The magnitude of the social effects of the war allied to the relative weakness of the colonial state capacity led to an outburst of grassroots civic mobilisation in Macau, with many similarities with what happened in pre-1941 Hong Kong.¹¹⁹

Unlike with the Portuguese, the Macau government had a more indirect contact with Chinese refugees, with the exception of the poorest. Similarly to steps taken by colonial authorities elsewhere in China, in Macau the poor were sent to designated areas, where they could be contained and controlled. The Chinese government, however, was not overly keen on Portuguese managing Chinese refugees in Macau's outlying islands. Diao Zuoqian, the foreign affairs special commissioner for Guangdong and Guangxi was informed by the consul in Guangzhou of the Portuguese plan to set up shelters (*binansuo*) in Taipa and Coloane. Reporting to MOFA after investigating the matter, he noted that Portuguese control over those islands was not recognised by the Chinese government. Therefore, he had replied to the consul that management of a Chinese refugee shelter should be ensured by Chinese authorities ('ying you Zhongguo dangju zi wei chuli'), although he thanked the governor for his generosity. He also stressed to MOFA that the matter should not be reported in the press.¹²⁰ Even though the Chinese central government

¹¹⁶ Zou, 'Qianxi kangzhan', p. 146. On the fundraising activities undertaken by sports teams associated with this association see K. J. Tang, 'Os Desportos Modernos de Macau no Período Republicano: Formação e Desenvolvimento' [Macau Modern Sports during the Republican Period: Formation and Development], *Administração*, 68 (2005), pp. 800-3.

¹¹⁷ Guo, 'Shilun Aomen', p. 100; Zhang, 'Aomen tongbao', p. 109; Zhang, 'Kangzhan qianqi', p. 89.

¹¹⁸ For example, in 1945 the Tung Sin Tong organised theatrical performances and the Chinese Women Association organised a flower sale ('Em prol dos necessitados' [For Those in Need], *Jornal de Notícias* [4 May 1945], p. 4; 'Venda de flores' [Flower Sale], *Jornal de Notícias* [16 June 1945], p. 4).

¹¹⁹ Y. Lu, 'Together with the Homeland: Civic Activism for National Salvation in British Hong Kong', *Modern China*, 40/6 (2014), pp. 639-74; Chan Lau, *China, Britain and Hong Kong*, pp. 267.

¹²⁰ MOFA Special Commissioner in Guangdong and Guangxi to MOFA, 28 June 1938, AH-IMH, Waijiaobu, 312.8/0001.

was anxious to safeguard its position and interested in being a prime actor in refugee relief for state-building purposes, the extent of its authority in the two islands governed as part of the ‘Macau colony’ was limited. Therefore, a refugee camp was in fact set up by the colonial government in Coloane. The camp was run by the local authorities in coordination with the Refugee Relief Commission. In December, a first batch of 600 Chinese refugees was moved to what a local paper called the Coloane ‘concentration camp’ in order to ‘decongest’ the city of Macau.¹²¹ Conditions were dire. In April 1939 concerns were raised about the quantity and quality of the food provided.¹²² After visiting the camp, the administrator of the Islands Council reported in shock to the head of the Civil Administration Services in the Macau government:

The shack where the kitchen is located can be said to be little less than filthy. The shack that hosts the refugees is a constant threat to their lives, if a cigarette tip starts a fire that will rapidly make that container a brazier [...] It has around 600 refugees amongst men, women and children, and the sick aspect of most, without any medical assistance, with shortage of quinine that has been lacking for some time, and with the frightening number of hospitalised sick and deceased, with orphaned children, has wounded my humanitarian feelings.¹²³

Despite this description, which vividly illustrates the extreme misery faced by poor refugees, some medical assistance was provided by the authorities as other documents in the Macau Archives reveal. Refugees were taken to the Hospital Conde São Januário when sick and were vaccinated against smallpox.¹²⁴ However, the island continued to be treated as a dumping ground for undesirables. In December 1941 the local government decided to intern the beggars ‘in an appropriate place in Coloane Island where they will be provided with housing and food.’¹²⁵ Shortly afterwards, a local paper reported that the Macau government’s ‘kindness’ in designating an unused factory

¹²¹ ‘Refugiados Chineses’ [Chinese Refugees], *A Voz de Macau* (30 Dec. 1938), p. 4, my translation.

¹²² Islands District Administrator to President of the Refugee Relief Commission, 28 Apr. 1939, AM, MO/AH/AC/AC1/35/13.

¹²³ Administrator of the Islands Council to Head of the Civil Administration Services, 8 Sept. 1939, *ibid.*, my translation

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*.

¹²⁵ ‘Nota Oficiosa’ [Unofficial Note], *A Voz de Macau* (26 Dec. 1941), p. 3, my translation.

building in Green Island (Ilha Verde) to harbour Chinese homeless refugees was repaid with ‘the theft of all the factory’s equipment: taps, pipes, bulbs, lampshades, lamps and cleaning material.’¹²⁶ This small report points out the agency of refugees in the wartime struggle for survival. By using materials that did not belong to them to presumably sell or exchange, possibly for food or money, they were not so far removed from the wartime reality in the enclave, where similar practices were made by the authorities on quite a different scale, as will be addressed in the following chapter.

The safety zone project

Similarly to what happened in Shanghai and Nanjing, some in Macau also tried to establish a refugee safety zone outside the enclave’s borders, in Qianshan, in cooperation with the local Chinese authorities. However, the project did not go ahead. Writing two decades after the events he had witnessed, news correspondent and liaison figure Jack Braga stated that:

Macao was crowded to such an extent that the Macao authorities asked the Chinese government to set aside the neighbouring village of Tsinshan [Qianshan], a couple of miles from the Macao border, and the intervening space, for use as a refugee area, for the stretch of land on both sides of the Macao-Shekki [Shiqi] Highway was built over with shacks, obviously in need of some control. The Japanese did not disagree with the suggestion but in the absence of a reply from the Chinese Government nothing came of the idea.¹²⁷

Documents held among the Braga papers at the National Library of Australia and at the Portuguese National Archives tell a slightly different story and reveal the ambiguities surrounding the politics of refugee relief in Macau. Initially, the governor seemed to have had doubts about such a project, particularly if it involved other foreign powers. A refugee zone under international jurisdiction with British, American, and French intervention near Qianshan ‘will in no way be convenient to us’ he wrote in November

¹²⁶ ‘Por bem fazer’ [By doing good], *A Voz de Macau* (19 Jan. 1942), p. 3, my translation.

¹²⁷ J. M. Braga, *Hong Kong and Macao* (Hong Kong, 1960), p. 119.

1938, showing how imperial competition and the desire to preserve domestic order could trump humanitarian concerns. According to him ‘with a refugee zone it would be almost impossible to expurgate existing communist elements near Macau’ and so it would be ‘preferable [for] Japanese forces to clean[?] out all the region and in case of necessity to attend to refugees ourselves [in?] Coloane island while we are unable to occupy Lappa.’¹²⁸ Eventually, the project for a Qianshan refugee zone took shape and the political advantage of providing help to the Chinese refugees won over the governor’s mind. ‘When the conflict is finished we cannot consider Chinsan [Qianshan] as a territory attached to Macau’ but ‘the services we provide’ will bring ‘recognition from both parts and prestige to Portugal,’ having the potential ‘to make disappear custom posts near Macau and forces that disturb us so much with their nearness.’¹²⁹ He was ‘just waiting for the central government of China [and] the governor of Seaki [Zhongshan county magistrate] to approve the request he had made’ to establish the zone.¹³⁰ The planned refugee camp, however, did not materialise. In December 1938 the governor sent a police force to occupy the area previously designated by local Chinese authorities for the refugee zone. The men were greeted with bombs. The Zhongshan magistrate tried to convince the Portuguese to enter unarmed as civilians but the governor of Macau gave up the project all together. He thanked the Japanese ‘for their good will’ and ‘protested energetically’ to the magistrate for having ‘subjected us to such great risks when we were only going for humanitarian motives and to his and the Chinese population’s request.’¹³¹ Refugee relief was seen as potentially useful to extend the Portuguese sphere of influence beyond the borders of Macau but Chinese authorities resisted this.

¹²⁸ Governor of Macau [to MC?], 15 Nov. 1938. ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767, my translation.

¹²⁹ Governor of Macau [to MC?], 22 Nov. 1938, *ibid.*

¹³⁰ Governor of Macau to MC, 29 Nov. 29 1938, AHU, 157, 1A, MU, MÇ, 1938, my translation. Also in ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767

¹³¹ Governor of Macau to MC, 12 Dec. 1938. ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767, my translation.

More interesting was perhaps the transnational nature of the efforts involved in the creation of a Qianshan Refugee Relief Committee. Formed in Macau, it included figures from the Macau administration, Chinese elites, and the Catholic Church, amongst others. Minutes of a meeting held in January 1939 at the Episcopal House and chaired by the bishop of Macau, José da Costa Nunes, also list as present Dai Ensai (brother-in-law of Sun Yat-sen who lived in Macau), T.H. Bannister, Pedro Lobo, Liang Houyuan (representative of the Macau Chinese community), Jack Braga and Father Serafim Brum Amaral (superior of the Catholic mission in Zhongshan). Help for the project of a refugee camp in Qianshan had been asked of the British and German consuls in Guangzhou (with little result) and of the governor of Macau. The latter had told the bishop that he ‘could not provide protection for an unlimited number of refugees, because of financial considerations, and principally because of the fact that a very large number of refugees were already being maintained by the Government of Macao.’ He eventually stated that ‘the Macao Government was prepared to receive about 10,000 refugees, provided that they are from Tsinsan [Qianshan] District.’¹³² At the Committee’s third meeting, held the following month,¹³³ Father Amaral reported on his talks with the Japanese consul general in Guangzhou¹³⁴ to get his authorisation for the refugee zone, which was denied, although some vague concessions were outlined: ‘Missions may receive refugees within their properties, but they must prevent the admission [of] any form of anti-Japanese elements, individual or associations, and in case the Japanese are informed by spies that there are anti-Japanese elements within such property, the Japanese forces will take such steps as they consider necessary to clear out such elements, without consideration for

¹³² Minutes of meeting of the Tsinsan [Qianshan] Refugee Relief Committee, 9 Jan. 1939. NLA, MS 300, Box 52, 8.1./14.

¹³³ Minutes of the third meeting of the Tsinsan Refugee Relief Association[sic.], 14 Feb. 1939, *ibid.*

¹³⁴ The meeting was arranged via the Portuguese consulate (Portuguese Consul in Guangzhou to Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 13 Feb. 1939, AHD, Arquivo do Consulado de Portugal em Cantão, No. 199-2013).

anybody.¹³⁵ Members were divided on how to proceed. The Bishop wanted to know that if the Japanese invaded Zhongshan whether or not ‘the [Refugee Relief] Committee could count on the financial help from the Chinese Government, through the organisations established for the purpose.’¹³⁶ Dai explained how he was still in touch with Chinese officials and how he had been ‘instrumental in securing two contributions’ for the Macau Government-controlled Refugee Centre in Coloane. He stated that ‘\$10,000 had been handed only a few days ago, through Ambassador Hsu [Xu Shiyong],’ China’s representative in Tokyo until the start of the war.¹³⁷ He would try to approach ‘the same people again, asking them to reserve a sufficient sum of money, to be available in case the Committee should require the money at any time.’¹³⁸ An idea for the establishment of a refugee centre in the disputed Lappa island was put forward by Father Amaral but the committee agreed that ‘it would have to get the authorisation of the Chinese as well as the Portuguese authorities.’ During the meeting it was also decided that Lobo would try to obtain the Macau government’s consent to transfer the Coloane refugee centre to the committee. An undated document on a meeting of the Macau Refugee Relief Committee stated that it had been decided to round up the Coloane refugee camp and transfer their ‘inmates’ to a new camp to be established at Lappa. Confrontations in that disputed island (as detailed in Chapter Two) put such plans to rest. The aborted plan for a safety zone near Macau highlights some of the difficulties in managing conflicting interests in wartime Macau. These included the goal of gaining prestige through humanitarian assistance and attempts of territorial control around the enclave.

Despite the failure of the safety zone project, people kept pouring into Macau throughout the war years. In 1939 the number of entries in the enclave reached a record,

¹³⁵ Summary of the reply of the Japanese Consul General in Canton [to Father Amaral], NLA, MS 300, Box 52, 8.1./14.

¹³⁶ Minutes of the third meeting of the Tsinshan Refugee Relief Association, 14 Feb. 1939, *ibid.*

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

¹³⁸ Governor of Macau [to the MC?], 5 Dec. 1938, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767, my translation.

more than a million by maritime route and more than two million by land. The Portuguese consul in Guangzhou left accounts describing not only the flight from that city to Macau but the efforts by Japanese authorities in guaranteeing the return of some of the refugees, with little success, because ‘even if they don’t live well [in Macau], at least [there] they do not see their homes in ruin.’¹³⁹ In 1940 the governor of Macau estimated that 9,000 refugees were kept by the Chinese population with a minimum of state support since the majority were said to have relatives in town.¹⁴⁰ Many of the Chinese who came to Macau did not travel from very far. In one of the occasional news reports dedicated to the Chinese community in the local Portuguese press, it was stated that most Chinese residents in Macau came from Zhongshan, ‘due to the proximity of the two territories.’¹⁴¹ They formed a native place association whose statutes were approved by the local government in April 1945.¹⁴²

The continuous flow of people, many of them destitute further strained an administration that was unprepared to deal with such a challenge on its own. After the occupation of Hong Kong and the arrival of more refugees, efforts to contain urban poor were heightened through a combination of public and private initiatives to relocate people to spaces that were reinvented during the war but where the goal of state control was openly evident by the involvement of police officers. The Beggars’ Refuge (*Refúgio dos Mendigos*), for example, was an institution funded by government funds, subscriptions, and charity events that the numerous philanthropic institutions of Macau organised, as well as donations from private individuals, particularly Chinese. Initially located in terrible conditions in Macau’s Green Island, the Refuge was moved to an old firecracker

¹³⁹ Portuguese Consul in Guangzhou to MNE, 31 Jan. 1939 in *A Guerra vista de Cantão*, pp. 278-9, my translation.

¹⁴⁰ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 17 Mar. 1940, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767.

¹⁴¹ ‘Vida Social Chinesa’ [Chinese Social Life], *A Voz de Macau* (22 Jan. 1943), p. 3, my translation.

¹⁴² ‘Estatutos da Associação dos Naturais de Chong-Sân em Macau’ [Statutes of the Association of Zhongshan Natives in Macau], *Boletim Oficial da Colónia de Macau* [Official Bulletin of the Macau Colony], no. 14 (7 Apr. 1945), p. 123.

factory, described by a local newspaper reporter as a proper, clean place where ‘everybody worked, except the elderly and children,’ and where there was no lack of food. The Beggars’ Refuge was run by a lieutenant and two guards from the Public Security Police, and one male nurse. It housed 840 people, including criminals (155 men, 283 women, 213 children and 189 detainees ‘to serve various sentences’). Located in the same place where racing dogs used to live before the war, the Poorhouse (*Casa dos Pobres*) housed 200 people who, according to the same reporter, benefited from ‘clean cubicles, schools for the children, an admirably kept little garden, chicken, ducks, goose and pork raising, etc.’¹⁴³ The institution was run by the police commissioner, a sergeant, three guards and a male nurse. It was funded by the Macau government and by private donations. An asylum ‘for the internment of 150 poor children’ was founded in October 1942 and named after the governor. This included a children’s infirmary.¹⁴⁴ Congratulatory reports were not matched by some other sources, which painted a bleak picture of those places. Willingness to provide relief clashed with financial constraints to do so, and ability to manage it. As late as May 1944 the Macau government nominated a commission of four Chinese figures (which included Gao Kening and the president of the Kiang Wu Hospital Liu Xutang) to investigate the conditions of the Chinese refugees in Macau,¹⁴⁵ which implies the local authorities were unable to do so themselves.

Trade and art

The massive refugee influx into Macau was a crisis, but it was also an opportunity. Some of those who sought refuge in Macau had a considerable impact on the economic,

¹⁴³ ‘Uma extraordinária Obra de Assistência’ [An Extraordinary Work of Assistance], *A Voz de Macau* (24 Apr. 1943), p. 2, my translation.

¹⁴⁴ ‘Asilo Governador Gabriel Teixeira’ [Governor Gabriel Teixeira Asylum], *A Voz de Macau* (6 Apr. 1943), p. 3, my translation.

¹⁴⁵ ‘Refugiados chineses’ [Chinese Refugees], *A Voz de Macau* (27 May, 1944), p. 2.

artistic and educational sectors in the enclave. Several financial institutions and companies moved to Macau, causing some Chinese scholars to speak of an era of newfound economic prosperity. Fei mentioned that: ‘Some of those who swarmed into Macau from Canton, Hong Kong and other cities brought huge amounts of gold, silver and foreign currency with them, and many banks moved to Macau from Hong Kong and the interior. The financial market in Macau boomed as the number of banks of various kinds, big and small, shot up to about 300.’¹⁴⁶ The financial prosperity of Macau in the early stages of the war derived from being an exchange station between the interior and Hong Kong, a situation that ended with the occupation of the British colony in 1941.¹⁴⁷ A Chinese scholar called it Macau’s financial ‘golden era.’¹⁴⁸ Throughout the war, money exchange brokers were some of the main private philanthropists to donate to refugee relief. Amongst the newcomers was a man who would become the most powerful Chinese figure in Macau after the war, He Xian (Ho Yin). In 1938, he left Guangzhou for Hong Kong, and then moved to Macau where he excelled in financial activities, later branching out to other sectors. In the post-war, he consolidated his position as one of the gold trade magnates (together with Pedro Lobo and Y.C. Liang, who will be addressed in the following chapters). He also became the key intermediary between the Portuguese administration and the communist authorities across the border.¹⁴⁹

Macau’s trade boomed before 1941, and the enclave became a key transfer station between the Chinese interior, Hong Kong, and occupied areas, with many transport companies moving to the enclave.¹⁵⁰ Several Chinese companies also opened branches or relocated activities to Macau. One of them was the herbal tea brand Wong Lo Kat (Wang

¹⁴⁶ Fei, *Macau 400 Years*, p. 345.

¹⁴⁷ K. Deng, and X. Lu (eds), *Yue Gang Ao jindai guanxi shi* [Modern history of Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macau relations] (Guangzhou, 1996), pp. 291-2.

¹⁴⁸ Zhang, ‘Kangzhan qianqi’, p. 86.

¹⁴⁹ ‘He Xian’, in *Gang’Ao dabaike quanshu*, p. 804; Jorge and Coelho, *Roque Choi*, pp. 38-41.

¹⁵⁰ Zhang, ‘Kangzhan qianqi’, pp. 83-4.

lao ji), which still exists today.¹⁵¹ Another was the China Travel Service, a commercial agency founded by Chen Guangfu, which ‘relied on its Macao branch to serve international travellers’.¹⁵² The refugee influx created new opportunities, embraced by Chinese medicine businesses from Guangdong or clothes and furniture shops.¹⁵³

The impact of newcomers in the enclave’s artistic scene was also significant. One of the most prominent figures to seek refuge in Macau during the war was the painting master Gao Jianfu,¹⁵⁴ a leading figure of the Lingnan School of Painting. Gao, like the other artists of the Lingnan School, had a close relationship with the KMT. In 1936 he had been appointed professor of Fine Arts at the National Central University in Nanjing, having left the capital for Guangzhou when the Japanese invaded it. When the city fell, he left again, this time for Macau where he stayed in the Puji Buddhist Temple and re-established the art studio he had in Guangzhou, the Chun Shui Studio.¹⁵⁵ In Macau, Gao did his bit to support the Chinese war effort. In July 1939 he and his students exhibited over two hundred works at the Commercial Association, drawing the attention of the public: ‘Large crowds, reportedly over ten thousand people in five days, flocked to what must have been one of the biggest cultural events in the history of the tiny Portuguese colony.’ Many of Gao’s disciples ‘were concentrating on an art of national resistance by producing paintings that used the distinctive Lingnan style to show the horrors of war and lives of the common people.’¹⁵⁶ That such an exhibition could have been held in Macau highlights the relative freedom of expression that still graced Chinese opponents to Japan in the territory. Until 1941 Gao moved between Macau and Hong Kong, and then relocated with his family and several of his students to the Portuguese-administered

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p. 86.

¹⁵² P. M. Coble, *China’s War Reporters: The Legacy of Resistance against Japan* (Cambridge, MA, 2015), p. 92.

¹⁵³ Zhang, ‘Kangzhan qianqi’, p. 84, pp. 86-7.

¹⁵⁴ Barreto, *Macau During the Sino-Japanese War*, p. 87.

¹⁵⁵ *The Art of Kao Chien-Fu* (Hong Kong 1978), p. 12, p. 14.

¹⁵⁶ R. Croizier, *Art and Revolution in Modern China: The Lingnan (Cantonese) School of Painting, 1906-1951* (Berkeley 1988), p. 153.

enclave for the remainder of the war. He refused to have any association with the collaborationist government in Nanjing, despite the harsh living conditions in wartime Macau and the fact that he had been close to the left KMT faction of Wang Jingwei.¹⁵⁷

The path of Gao Jianfu is also significant because it illustrates how certain aspects of the Macau wartime experience were replicated in later periods, notably that of the Chinese civil war that followed the conflict with Japan, when many refugees also came to the Portuguese-administered territory. Indeed, Gao returned to Macau in 1949 and remained there to the end of his life, painting what were deemed minor works until he died in 1951. He became one of the many forgotten faces of that land of exile until, decades later, his profile became marketable enough to become a topic of one of the local tourist maps.¹⁵⁸

The cases of financiers and artists that came to Macau during the war attest to the relative openness enjoyed in the territory. It also shows how, instead of passive receivers or spectators, some of those seeking refuge took the initiative to help other refugees through philanthropy or fundraising activities. Similarly to those observed in other colonial spaces in China in earlier time periods, these offered many Chinese ‘considerable freedom, choice, agency and economic prosperity, without denying the hierarchical power relations of imperialism.’¹⁵⁹ The irony of this was that Macau’s importance had declined with the rise of the treaty ports and when their cosmopolitanism was succumbing under Japanese military might, the enclave benefitted from the transfer of people, activities, and funds.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 144-5.

¹⁵⁸ Bilingual map in Portuguese and Chinese *Traços Legadaos[sic.] pelo Pintor Gao Jianfu / Huajia Gao Jianfu de zuji*, edited by the Instituto para os Assuntos Cívicos e Municipais / Minzhong zongshu, collected during fieldwork in Macau, February 2015.

¹⁵⁹ B. Goodman, and D. S. G. Goodman, ‘Introduction: Colonialism in China’, in *Twentieth-century Colonialism and China*, p. 11.

Relocation of schools

One of the aspects that best demonstrate the impact Chinese refugees had on Macau pertains to the relocation of Chinese schools from Guangdong province. Macau was far from being a renowned education centre in China but the war created an opportunity for a significant enhancement of its education sector. Many schools and tens of thousands of Chinese students moved to Macau during the war. The local authorities understood that interacting with educated Chinese and being seen as guaranteeing their protection could be beneficial for them. Apart from granting authorisation for the running of the schools and inspecting their premises, the Portuguese authorities do not appear to have had any influence over the Chinese schools' curriculum. For the many Chinese teachers and students who moved to Macau, the enclave guaranteed them enough freedom to continue their activities, including the fostering of nationalist ideas.

The relocation of schools is a clear example of one of this thesis' overall arguments, that instead of being sealed off from it, Macau was very much part of the social experience of the War of Resistance. Numerous schools were relocated from occupied areas. According to MacKinnon, of 'China's 108 institutions of higher learning, 94 closed or relocated during the war; some moved as many as five times' and 'although 'comprehensive statistics on secondary schools are not available [...] the situation was undoubtedly just as severe.'¹⁶⁰ Lary observed that this 'exodus was funded by the government, on the grounds that China had to make sure that she had an educated elite to run the country after the war was over.'¹⁶¹ Liu has concluded that with the retreat of schools to China's interior, the KMT 'successfully regulated and managed middle

¹⁶⁰ MacKinnon, *Wuhan, 1938*, p. 83.

¹⁶¹ Lary, *The Chinese People at War*, p. 39.

schools, expanded the state's hand in secondary education, and provided a form of stability for students despite the war's disruption.'¹⁶²

Several Chinese schools were transferred from Guangdong to Macau. In August 1938 the governor noted that 'the number of Chinese schools transferred here from Canton is growing.'¹⁶³ The number was placed at 15 in a study about the history of teaching in Macau¹⁶⁴ but Chinese scholars estimated that more than 30 middle schools were transferred.¹⁶⁵ Based on sources from the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, Tan stated that in 1939 there were 36 middle and technical secondary schools in Macau with more than 30,000 students, more than 140 primary schools with a student population of around 30,000 or 40,000 students.¹⁶⁶ Many education professionals also came to Macau and this benefited not only the student-refugees but also the children of the Chinese already established in Macau. School advertisements in the enclave's Chinese press attest to the new educational opportunities created by the war in Macau.¹⁶⁷ Li, Tan and Deng all argue that this was the period of the biggest flourishing of Chinese education in Macau.¹⁶⁸

Documents held at the Macau Archives list numerous authorisation requests for the establishment of Chinese schools in Macau during the war years. For example, the Jue Min Primary School had around 80 students in Jiangmen. Due to the war, its director moved to Macau and wanted to re-establish the school in December 1937, bringing along teachers, students, and school material. The request was approved although a permanent

¹⁶² J. Liu, 'Defiant Retreat: The Relocation of Middle Schools to China's Interior, 1937-1945', *Frontiers of History in China*, 8:4 (2013), p. 559.

¹⁶³ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 9 Aug. 1938, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767.

¹⁶⁴ A. Barata, *O Ensino em Macau 1572-1979. Contributos para a sua História* [Education in Macau 1572-1979. Contributions to its History] (Macau 1999).

¹⁶⁵ Zhang, 'Aomen tongbao', p. 111; Li, 'Lunxian qian', p. 455

¹⁶⁶ Tan, *Aomen zhuquan wenti*, p. 223. Similar data is stated in Deng, *Aomen lishi*, pp. 412-3, where an extensive list of most of the relocated schools is mentioned. The British consul estimated the number of Chinese students relocated to Macau was only 20,000 (Reeves, *The Lonely Flag*, p. 44) but the Portuguese missionary and local historian Manuel Teixeira put the number at 30,000 (Teixeira, 'Macau Durante a Guerra', p. 515).

¹⁶⁷ *Huaqiao ribao* (26 Aug. 1942) reproduced in Lin and Wang, *Gudao yingxiang*, p. 14.

¹⁶⁸ Li, 'Lunxian qian', p. 455; Tan, *Aomen zhuquan wenti*, p. 223; Deng, *Aomen lishi*, p. 413.

licence was only issued in 1939, after the number of the school's students had increased. Another school that retreated, this time from Guangzhou, was the Zhixin School, a women's school that had been founded by Sun Yat-sen. It came to Macau in 1938 and in 1940 teachers and students opposed the director's wishes to move the school's property back to Guangzhou, something that seemed to have been settled in 1942.¹⁶⁹ The Lianghe Middle School relocated from Zhongshan. In August 1940 it had more than 300 students that had classes in other schools' rooms after their regular schedule. Permission was required to move to a new building. In November of that same year the school started to run free night classes for poor Chinese children.¹⁷⁰ Another school which relocated to Macau during the war was the Pui Ching [Pei Zheng] Middle School, which remains one of the most important schools in the territory to this day. The directors of the latter undertook a fundraising campaign for 'poor and needy children of both sexes' attending the school, with the support of the governor.¹⁷¹ The abovementioned examples show that many Chinese schools moved to Macau in order to seek a refuge from occupied areas. They also reveal how the number of Chinese students in Macau kept rising during the war.

The presence of so many Chinese students led to new joint initiatives. In April 1940 a local paper reported on the activities on the Chinese Student-Refugees in Macau Relief Association (*Associação de Socorros aos Estudantes Chinese Refugiados em Macau*). It provided the students with lodging (including in boats), food, and medical care. Like similar institutions set up during the war in the enclave, it was a transnational endeavour, counting on the support on Chinese and Portuguese benefactors, including the governor.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁹ AM, AH/EDU/3174.

¹⁷⁰ AM, AH/EDU/3187.

¹⁷¹ 'Campaign to raise funds for free education', *Macau Tribune* (26 Mar. 1944), p. 6.

¹⁷² 'Socorros aos estudantes chineses refugiados' [Relief to Chinese Student-Refugees], *A Voz de Macau* (24 Apr., 1940), p. 5; 'Festa de Caridade' [Charity Fête], *A Voz de Macau* (7 Aug., 1944), p. 4.

Schools have been linked to the nurture and spread of nationalistic and revolutionary ideas in modern China. The same happened in many of the relocated schools in Macau. Some of them ‘advocated enthusiastically anti-Japanese patriotic education’, teaching the students ‘to sing anti-aggression songs’ and printing ‘patriotic slogans [...] on students’ stationery.’¹⁷³ Some oral history records support this,¹⁷⁴ and in his memoirs, the British consul also alluded to the political mobilisation of the Chinese students.¹⁷⁵ Chinese sources show that the KMT was certainly linked to some of the relocated schools and two of its main figures met a tragic fate in Macau. Liang Yanming, the principal of Chongshi Middle School and head of the Macau Chinese Education Association was assassinated on December 1942 and Lin Zhuofu, who was a member of the board of the Sun Yat-Memorial Middle School and principal of Zhongshan County Middle School was also killed in February 1943.¹⁷⁶

For the Portuguese authorities, granting refuge to Chinese schools provided an opportunity to foster good relations with influential Chinese intellectual circles. In July 1939 a request was made by Dai Ensai to establish a university in Macau. He had informed the Macau inspector of Chinese schools that he ‘could get great monetary support from sponsors of education in China in North America as long as he could prove to the North-American sponsors that he had the protection of the Macau government.’¹⁷⁷ It is probably this project the governor was referring to when he informed Lisbon in December the following year, saying that he had been sought by ‘a group of influential Chinese educated in America, accompanied by the delegate of the Chongqing government in Hong Kong, to enquire about the possibilities of ceding them land on the islands to

¹⁷³ Barreto, *Macau During the Sino-Japanese War*, p. 75.

¹⁷⁴ E.g. Kuang Bingren’s testimony in Cai, *Koushu lishi*, pp. 12-23.

¹⁷⁵ Reeves, *The Lone Flag*, p. 44.

¹⁷⁶ Li, ‘Lunxian qian’, p. 461, Deng, *Aomen lishi*, p. 88; Kuomintang Hong Kong-Macau General Branch, *Gang’Ao kangzhan xunguo lieshi jiniance* [Album of Martyrs from Hong Kong and Macau during the War of Resistance] (Hong Kong, 1946), pp. 1-2.

¹⁷⁷ Head of Technical Bureau of Chinese Affairs and Inspector of Chinese Schools to Director of Public Works, 28 June 1939, AM, AH/EDU/3181.

build a university campus.’ He asked the Ministry of Colonies for further instructions but thought favourably of the idea ‘because of the political advantages of having a direct contact with Chinese university elements.’¹⁷⁸ A few months later he insisted on the ‘convenience [of a] University [in] creating [a] centre [of] educated Chinese like there is [in] Hong Kong who have contributed greatly [to the] prosperity [of] that colony.’¹⁷⁹ The plan, just like the one for a safety zone in which Dai had also been involved, came to naught. But its existence attests to the array of transnational networks and constructive possibilities put forth in wartime Macau. The enclave’s first modern university would only be established in the 1980s.

With the occupation of Hong Kong by the Japanese in late 1941, many Chinese students found themselves in a precarious situation in Macau. Guaranteeing the maintenance of some form of support was seen as politically advantageous by the local authorities. In 1942, the governor informed Lisbon that ‘directors of Chinese schools sheltered in Macau [which] have more than 28,000 students explained to me [that] more than one third of these are children of Chinese residents abroad who send their allowances to Hong Kong, [which is] now without communications [so] they are left without resources creating a serious problem.’ He stressed the ‘political aspect to consider’ since ‘a great number belongs to overseas associations [which] have great influence.’¹⁸⁰ He recommended notifying the Chinese ambassadors in England, the US, Canada and Australia so that the students’ parents would be instructed to transfer their funds to the BNU in Lisbon who would then send them to Macau.¹⁸¹

The presence of Chinese schools in Macau allows us to understand how some of the regional and transnational networks operated in wartime Macau to guarantee refugee

¹⁷⁸ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 13 Dec. 1940, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767, my translation.

¹⁷⁹ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 17 Mar. 1941, *ibid.*.

¹⁸⁰ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 23 Jan. 1942, *ibid.*.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*

relief. For the Chinese, Macau's neutrality was convenient as it provided them with a space to continue their teaching activities and, along with them, the fostering of a politically conscious youth that could be used for patriotic mobilisation. For the Portuguese authorities, the influx of educated and potentially influential Chinese figures added prestige to the enclave and provided favourable connections that were considered useful for the future.

Conclusion

To understand the political and diplomatic history of Sino-Portuguese relations during the Second World War, the social impact of the conflict on Macau needs to be taken into consideration. The arrival of around 300,000 refugees was the most striking feature of the territory's wartime experience. This chapter argued that this was both a challenge and an opportunity to the enclave's Portuguese administration, local elites, population, and the refugees themselves. Responses to the refugee crisis sprang from interconnected top-down and bottom-up efforts. Without popular mobilisation for assisting refugees, it would have been impossible for the Portuguese authorities to manage the influx on their own.

The first wave of refugees that reached Macau was mostly comprised of Chinese and Portuguese from Shanghai and Guangdong province. Neutrality made Macau a feasible option for many fleeing the war in the mainland. Contrary to other foreign authorities elsewhere in China, the Portuguese did not limit the number of those allowed to enter. Welcoming refugees was used as a strategy to enhance colonial prestige even though, in practice, Portuguese authorities had limited means for relief provision. Evacuation plans often included requesting assistance from other countries and were only put into practice with significant involvement from local associations. Chinese elite

figures and charities acted as indispensable intermediaries between the majority of the population and the Macau government. As will be detailed in Chapter Four, they also played a key role in liaising with occupation authorities beyond Macau to provide livelihood supplies to a significantly swollen population. For the Macau authorities being perceived as putting their best efforts into helping refugees was seen as key to enhance Portugal's prestige in the eyes of its diaspora in treaty port China and of influential Chinese. The following chapters will demonstrate how assistance to refugees was cited by Portuguese authorities as an argument to defend their conduct during the war. Although not the only reason, it helped to prevent serious enquiries on wartime collaboration and guaranteed the continuity of the Portuguese administration in Macau after the conflict.

Responses to the refugee influx were marked by various forms of collaboration involving different state and civil society representatives. The unrealised project to establish a refugee safety zone outside of Macau's borders is particularly illustrative of different national, political, and religious entities interacting to face up to the arrival of refugees.

The ambiguity of Macau's neutrality can also be discerned in the unintended opportunities the war created in the enclave by the newcomers. Refugees brought financial and human capital that revitalised the socio-economic and cultural life of the territory. For the hundreds of thousands of people that came to Macau during the war, the enclave guaranteed enough freedom from Japanese harassment and opportunities to pursue their activities. They could still trade, paint, teach... and mobilise for resistance against Japan, although this became more difficult from 1942 onwards. This resulted from the relative powerlessness of the Portuguese authorities that would not have been able to enforce a more thorough control without risking to be overpowered by the Chinese (either by forces of the central government or the collaborationist authorities in Guangdong) or the Japanese.

However, Macau's neutrality did not isolate it from the effects of the war felt in other areas of China, with which those in Macau had many connections. Many refugees faced unemployment, poverty and a growing problem of food scarcity, which will be further detailed in the following chapter. The challenge of a swollen and deprived population created further needs for collaboration.

The Japanese occupation of Hong Kong in late 1941 prompted a second wave of refugees to seek shelter in Macau. The know-how acquired during the first wave was determinant, and similar actions were deployed, although with some important differences, such as the emergence of the British consulate in the enclave as a major player in refugee management. This will be the focus of Chapter Five.

CHAPTER 4

The limits of control: Macau's 'lonely island' period, 1941-1945

Introduction

The ambiguity of neutrality and collaboration in Macau reached a peak between the occupation of Hong Kong in late 1941 and the end of the war. This chapter analyses the uses of Portuguese neutrality by different actors (e.g. the Chinese central government, the RNG, Japanese forces, local elites) with either opposing or collaborative interests. It argues that wartime Macau was at the crossroads of competing forces struggling for political, economic and social leverage. A British report compiled in 1944 noted:

With the outbreak of the war between Japan and Great Britain and the United States, Macau became a lonely island of neutrality in the Far Eastern war-zone. Whilst the Japanese desisted from overt occupation, they were able to exert immediate pressure on the colony by their complete control of its economy. Puppet-Chinese agents were said to be much in evidence, and to coerce the Chinese inhabitants by means of gunmen. [...] Meanwhile an ever-increasing stream of refugees poured into the Colony, and the population rose to perhaps three times its peace-time level. The problems of housing and feeding became acute.¹

The quote summarises some of the key features of 'lonely island' Macau: the maintenance of foreign administration in the absence of a formal occupation, Japanese economic control, presence of collaborators, urban crime, a swollen population, and hunger. The term 'lonely island', also rendered in its Chinese version 'gudao' (孤島), has been used to refer to Shanghai from the outbreak of the war in China in July 1937 until the occupation of the British-dominated International Settlement in 1941.² Its application to Macau is also pertinent, as the Portuguese-administered enclave shared with Shanghai

¹ Research Department, FO, 'Portuguese Possessions in Asia and Oceania', 5 June 1944, p. 7, TNA, FO 371/46199.

² E.g. W. H. Yeh, 'Prologue: Shanghai besieged, 1937-45', in *Wartime Shanghai*, pp. 1-15; C. Henriot and W.H. Yeh, 'Introduction', in *In the Shadow of the Rising Sun*, pp. 1-14; M. Blair, *Gudao, Lone Islet: The War Years in Shanghai* (Victoria, 2007).

a number of characteristics. These were not the only ‘lonely islands’ however. French-ruled territories in China remained grey areas of neutrality until they were taken over by Japanese forces in 1943. The French concessions in Shanghai and Hankou and the enclave of Guangzhouwan have all merited historiographical attention in recent years.³ These foreign-administered territories are treated as exceptional but I contend that they are better understood comparatively. While this work concentrates on Sino-Portuguese relations and Macau, it will become apparent how these have many parallels to other interactions between European countries and China during the war.

The current chapter explores the experience of a number of actors in Macau’s ‘lonely island’ period. First, it addresses the relations between the Chinese central government and Portugal. It argues that channels of communication to Chongqing were kept open in Lisbon and Macau. The activities in the enclave were closely monitored by the Nationalists. Portuguese attitudes towards Japan and the RNG, and the situation of the Chinese population in Macau, Timor and Portugal were probed into.

This chapter also addresses the relations between the Macau authorities and the Wang Jingwei’s RNG, notably the provincial government in Guangdong. It concludes that unofficial relations were maintained until the end of the war, in a clear example of the centuries-old parallel diplomacy conducted from Macau mentioned in Chapter One. Additionally, it covers the sometimes tense interplay between the RNG authorities and Japanese forces towards Macau.

The struggle for control over the relatively isolated enclave is further explored through the analysis of the social impact of the war in Macau. Developing the argument introduced in Chapter Three, that this was severe and comparable to other occupied areas in China, the third section will show how lack of food supplies led to starvation and to the

³ C. Cornet, ‘The Bumpy End of the French Concession and French Influence in Shanghai, 1937-1946’, in *In the Shadow of the Rising Sun*, pp. 257-76; D. Rihal, ‘The French Concession in Hankou 1938-43: The Life and Death of a Solitary Enclave in an Occupied City’, in R. Bickers and I. Jackson (eds), *Treaty Ports in Modern China* (Milton Park, 2016), pp. 220-42; Xie, ‘China’s Casablanca’.

rise of powerful local economic elites who acted as intermediaries between the Portuguese administration and Japanese forces and other actors.

Finally, this chapter deals with the phenomenon of urban crime in wartime Macau, an aspect that illustrates the relative powerlessness of the Portuguese rulers. It also reveals how the enclave's wartime experience was comparable to that of cities like Shanghai.

4.1. An international affair: The Nationalists and the Portuguese in Lisbon, Macau, Timor, and Chongqing

A recently edited volume claims that the Nationalists had no official contact with Macau from January 1941 until the end of the war.⁴ However, archival sources contradict that statement, revealing contacts and the flow of information between Chongqing, Macau and Lisbon.

As Macau started to face serious food shortages in early 1942, a representative of the central government hidden in Hong Kong sent a delegate to the governor of Macau offering to smuggle wolfram, tin and other minerals that could even be sold to the Japanese to buy rice. He was doing that 'in recognition [of the] protection [given to the] Chinese population [by the] Macau government.'⁵ Contacts were also made via the Portuguese consulate in Guangzhou to keep the Portuguese actions towards Chinese in check. For example, in November 1942 the MOFA special commissioner for Guangdong and Guangxi telegraphed the Portuguese consul in order to ask the Macau authorities to hand back to China a man who had been arrested in 1940 and sentenced to exile.⁶

Hong Kong's occupation made life more difficult for KMT agents in Macau. Zhou Yongneng, the head to the local party branch covered in Chapter Two, escaped to

⁴ G. C. Gunn, 'Introduction', in *Wartime Macau*, p. 15.

⁵ Governor of Macau to MC, 23 Feb. 1942, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767, my translation.

⁶ MOFA Delegate of Guangdong and Guangxi to Portuguese Consul in Guangzhou, 18 Nov. 1942, AHD, 2P, A48, M221.

Chongqing in early 1942 and some of those who carried on his work paid with their lives.⁷ As mentioned in the previous chapter, Liang Yanming, the head of the Macau Chinese Education Association, was killed on Christmas Eve of 1942, shot dead in the street by a hidden assassin. Since the start of the war, he had set up a variety of initiatives for ‘national salvation’ (*jiuguo*) and refugee relief activities, including free classes for refugee children. A post-war KMT source celebrated Liang as a martyr for the motherland.⁸ The blame for his murder would be pinned on a notorious Chinese *hanjian*, Huang Gongjie, who will be addressed in Chapter Six. A similar fate was met by Lin Zhuofu, another KMT figure linked to educational circles who was assassinated in 1943. Lin was from Zhongshan, had worked for the Guangdong province educational department and served as secretary for the Zhongshan county KMT branch. Since the beginning of the Pacific War, he had been a committee member of the Macau KMT branch. In February 1943, Lin fell victim to five bullets from a sniper, on his way home.⁹ Both Liang and Lin attest to the links between the relocation of schools from occupied China – a massive effort that was by no means circumscribed to Macau¹⁰ – and resistance by the Nationalists from their places of temporary exile.

While in Macau the Nationalists operated under constraints, in Lisbon the Chinese central government kept its legation fully functioning. It played a role much beyond Portuguese borders. After German pressure to expel Chinese diplomats from Vichy France, Lisbon received the staff of the Chinese legation and the KMT branch in Paris.¹¹

⁷ Zhou, *Zhou Yongneng*, p. 155.

⁸ Kuomintang, *Gang’Ao kangzhan*, p. 2.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 1

¹⁰ Liu, ‘Defiant Retreat’; B. H. K. Luk, ‘War, Schools, China, Hong Kong: 1937-49’, in J. Flath and N. Smith (eds), *Beyond Suffering: Recounting War in Modern China* (Vancouver, 2001), pp. 36-58.

¹¹ Kuomintang Central Committee, *Zhongguo Guomindang zai haiwai* [The KMT Overseas] (Taipei, 1961), p. 148; M. Bastid-Bruguière, ‘Les Relations entre l’Indochine de Decoux et le Gouvernement de Wang Jingwei Pendant la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale’ [Relations between Decoux’s Indochina and the Wang Jingwei Government during the Second World War], in L. Cesari and D. Varaschin (eds), *Les Relations Franco-Chinoises au Vingtième Siècle et leurs Antécédents* [Franco-Chinese Relations in the Twentieth Century and their Antecedents] (Arras, 2003), p. 233, p. 239. Likewise, when the French embassy in Chongqing was closed in March 1943, its staff was moved to Lisbon (‘A embaixada de França em

The legation in Lisbon was also contacted to obtain Spanish transit visas for Chinese diplomats in Switzerland.¹² Like Macau, Lisbon was an important stopover and haven for many people, and Chinese diplomats participated in the wartime cosmopolitanism of the Portuguese capital.

The normal running of the Chinese legation in Lisbon contrasted with the shambolic Portuguese diplomatic presence in China that, as noted in Chapter Two, was concentrated in occupied areas. A particular point of contention was the presence of the Portuguese minister to China accredited to Chiang's government, J.M.L. Lima, in occupied Shanghai. This led to a number of misunderstandings. For example, in April 1942, the Brazilian ambassador in Lisbon and the Brazilian minister in Beijing requested Portugal to represent their interests in occupied China. From Lisbon, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reaffirmed that Portugal recognised the government in Chongqing so Lima could not take care of it. He remained in Shanghai, it was stated, because to move him to Chongqing would create difficulties with Japan.¹³ In January 1943, the Chinese minister to Portugal, Li Jinlun, wrote to Chongqing on Lima's geographical problem. The Portuguese justified not moving him there because of difficulties in transportation, something that sounded akin to an excuse. Li informed that the Portuguese authorities had written to Lima urging him to leave Shanghai for Chongqing but it had not been possible until then because Portugal did not have diplomatic relations with Russia and so Lima could not travel via that country.¹⁴ In fact, several foreign diplomats facing arguable harder challenges got to Chongqing during the war. The Norwegian minister came after being interned by the Japanese in Bangkok and the Belgium ambassador had been in

Chungking foi fechada' [The French embassy in Chongqing was closed down], *A Voz de Macau* [9 Mar. 1943], p. 1).

¹² Victor Hoo, Washington to Chinese Minister in Lisbon, 17 Apr. 1942, TNA, HW 12/275.

¹³ MNE to Ambassador in Rio de Janeiro, 9 Apr. 1942, TNA, HW 12/275.

¹⁴ Chinese Minister in Lisbon to MOFA, Jan. 7 1943, AH, Waijiaobu, 020000023906A.

Hong Kong and in Shanghai and got to Chongqing through an exchange.¹⁵ After some attempts to clarify the situation with the Portuguese government, it was concluded in June 1943 that it was impossible for Lima to go to Chongqing. Someone else would be sent to the Nationalists' wartime capital, although Lima would continue to be minister to China.¹⁶ The problem dragged on for the duration of the war, with one diplomat being appointed to replace Lima and then not leaving Portugal, which cost him his career in the diplomatic corps.¹⁷ A Portuguese envoy only reached Chongqing at the end of the war, as will be discussed in Chapter Six.

As noted before, the Nationalists had their own men in Macau. Relations with them were assured by figures close to the Portuguese administration, notably Jack Braga, whose links to British intelligence will be covered in the next chapter. On good terms with a variety of local elites, Braga and one of his associates, the American-educated Chinese Warren Wong, were involved in intelligence, trading with the interior, contacts with Hong Kong, escapes and, not of small importance, in running a Chinese transmitting station connected to Chongqing.¹⁸ The Nationalists in Macau were a composite sample of people, many connected to pre-war Cantonese revolutionary circles with ambivalent postures towards Chiang Kai-shek. An example of this is Tang Liu who would become the first MOFA commissioner in Macau after the war. He was the eldest son of Tang Shaoyi,¹⁹ a Zhongshan native who had been the first prime minister of the Chinese Republic. In 1936 his father sided with Chiang against Chen Jitang, but later retired from politics and moved to the Shanghai's French Concession where he was killed by Chiang's

¹⁵ British Embassy in Chongqing to FO, 7 Dec. 1942. TNA, FO 371/31679.

¹⁶ Chinese Minister in Lisbon to MOFA, 17 June 1943. AH, Waijiaobu, 020000023906A.

¹⁷ Chinese Minister in Lisbon to MOFA, 22 Dec. 1945. AH, Waijiaobu, 020000006303A. Alberto da Veiga Simões, a former Portuguese ambassador to Berlin recalled in 1940 for being too critical of the Third Reich, considered the China post a demotion and tried to escape his appointment by invoking health reasons (Fernandes, *Confluência de Interesses*, p. 42; L. A. Madeira, 'Introdução' [Introduction], in *Correspondência de um Diplomata no III Reich* [A Diplomat's Correspondence in the Third Reich] [Coimbra, 2005], p. 30).

¹⁸ Charles M. Knaggs, 'Information about Macau and the Macau area,' 11 June 1942, TNA, FO 371/31630.

¹⁹ 'Tang Liu', in *Baidu baike*, <https://baike.baidu.com/item/唐榴> (16 Aug. 2017).

military intelligence agents in 1938 at a time when Tang was being approached by the Japanese to become president of the Nanjing puppet government.²⁰ Tang Liu served as consul in Surabaya, Nagasaki, Singapore and Calcutta and during the war ended up in Macau, claiming to have been the first Chinese to escape by junk from Hong Kong in early January 1942.²¹ By 1943 he was acting as representative to the central government, fostering good relations with the governor, and guaranteeing him that ‘Chongqing repudiates any action against Macau,’ the only territory it did not claim given the ‘antiquity’ of Portuguese occupation.²² Similar assurances were given by the Chinese minister to Lisbon to Luís Teixeira de Sampaio, secretary general at Portugal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He stated that despite rumours on the contrary the Nationalist government did not claim Macau and ‘completely recognised Macau as a Portuguese colony.’²³

In Macau, the governor was well aware that many Nationalist secret agents operated in the enclave. He believed them to be working in connection with those of the British consul in a parallel collaboration to those of the Wang Jingwei RNG agents with the Japanese. Although the governor ensured Lisbon he had his own agents amongst each of the factions,²⁴ various sources attest to multiple intelligence penetrations, making it hard to clarify who was infiltrating whom.

Macau’s ambiguous situation made it an easy target for propaganda. In October 1943 Radio Chongqing announced that the governor of Macau had been assassinated by the Japanese,²⁵ one of the several pieces of exaggerated news released during the war,

²⁰ F. Wakeman Jr., *The Shanghai Badlands: Wartime Terrorism and Urban Crime, 1937-1941* (Cambridge, 1996), p. 48. Tang Shaoyi, who had chaired the Zhongshan County Administrative Committee from 1929 to 1934, was acquainted with Jack Braga, as attested by several photos in the Braga collection (NLA, J.M. Braga collection, Photographs, Box 7).

²¹ Tang Liu, Macau, quoted in telegram from the Chinese Legation in Lisbon to MOFA, 18 Aug. 1945. AH, Waijiaobu, 020000023906A.

²² Governor of Macau to MC, 27 Feb. 1943, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768, my translation.

²³ Note on conversation with the Chinese minister, 27 May 1943, AHD, 2P, A48, M212.

²⁴ Governor of Macau to MC, 22 Apr. 1943, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768.

²⁵ Governor of Macau to MC, 14 Oct. 1943, *ibid.*

which the Japanese decried as attempts to harm Portugal's relations with Japan. Later that month, the Nationalists sent word to (a very much alive) Teixeira offering the help of guerrillas to fight the Japanese if they attempted anything against Macau and proposing to send an officer to devise a plan. The governor declined, arguing to Lisbon that even if Macau could benefit should they expel the Japanese from neighbouring areas, the Japanese would exert reprisals against innocent Chinese villages and he could not bear the thought of it. However, they would keep in touch and exchange information.²⁶

With the highest-ranking Portuguese diplomat in China living in occupied Shanghai, the only official channel of communication between the Portuguese and the Chinese governments during the war was via the Chinese legation in Lisbon. The Chinese minister there informed his government on the status of Portuguese attitudes towards China, on Portugal's foreign relations (notably with Japan), on the domestic situation in Portugal and on matters of overseas Chinese in the Portuguese empire. The presence of a myriad of foreign dignitaries in Lisbon also allowed for formal and informal exchanges of information between them. For example, Li was informed of the Azores agreement (by which Portugal ceded basing rights to Britain in the Atlantic archipelago) by the British ambassador who had come to see him.²⁷ He told Chongqing of the 'increasingly bitter antagonism against Japan' but that it would be unlikely for Portugal to declare war. Amongst other reasons, Portugal had 'no effective means for offensive war' and a 'declaration of war against Japan would probably cause immediate seizure of Macao and internment of Portuguese in Japanese occupied areas.'²⁸ The Chinese minister also monitored the heavily censored Portuguese press and reported back to Chongqing on

²⁶ Governor of Macau to MC, 20 Oct. 1943, *ibid.*

²⁷ Chinese Minister in Lisbon to MOFA, 13 and 16 Oct. 1943. AH, Waijiaobu, 020000023906A.

²⁸ Chinese Minister in Lisbon to MOFA, 13 Oct. 1943, *ibid.*. Also in AH, Waijiaobu, 020000039817A.

what he read. In January 1945 he reported on the American bombing of Macau based on the morning paper.²⁹ News about Timor was of particular interest.³⁰

Occupied Timor

The Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia³¹ did not spare the neutral Portuguese nor the Chinese community in Timor (now East Timor). The Portuguese colony was occupied by Japan in February 1942 after an unauthorised Allied landing.³² Whereas Australian and Dutch troops were received by the population with open arms,³³ the Japanese arrival marked the start of years of brutality. The Japanese kept Timor's governor under virtual house arrest and cut off direct communications with Portugal. It was noted that, from October 1942, 'the Portuguese administration ceased to exist.'³⁴ Around 500 Portuguese went to Australia and gave a grim account of the invasion to the Portuguese consul in Sydney. They referred to the Japanese campaign of turning the native population against the whites as a form of instituting a 'reign of terror' and shifting responsibility from themselves. They spoke of villages being 'bombed and machine-gunned by Japanese aeroplanes' for no reason and of the slaughter of a military company in Aileu, which was attacked by a column of Timorese under Japanese instigation, who only intervened after the killing to demonstrate they were not responsible. Reports of

²⁹ Chinese Minister in Lisbon to MOFA, 11 Jan. 1945. AH, Waijiaobu, 020000023906A.

³⁰ E.g. Chinese Minister in Lisbon to MOFA, 21 Jan. 1944, *ibid.*.

³¹ There is a considerable amount of scholarly literature on the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia. For the impact on the British colonies see C. A. Bayly, and T. N. Harper, *Forgotten Armies: Britain's Asian Empire and the War with Japan* (London, 2005).

³² On Timor during the Second World War see the Portuguese scholarship mentioned in p. 5, footnote no. 14, and the following memoirs, articles, and monographs: B. J. Callinan, *Independent Company: The 2/2 and 2/4 Australian Independent Companies in Portuguese Timor, 1941-1943* (London, 1953); G. C. Gunn, *Wartime Portuguese Timor: The Azores Connection* (Clayton, 1988); A. Campbell, *The Double Reds of Timor* (Swanbourne, 1995); K. Goto, *Tensions of Empire: Japan and Southeast Asia in the Colonial and Postcolonial World* (Athens, Ohio, 2003), pp. 24-38; F.B. d'Água, *Le Timor Oriental face à la Seconde Guerre Mondiale (1941-1945)* [East Timor in the Second World War (1941-1945)] (Lisbon, 2007); P. Cleary, *The Men Who Came Out of the Ground* (Sydney, 2010).

³³ Timor was a penal colony and amongst its European settler community were people convicted for political crimes, including leftists who opposed the Estado Novo regime.

³⁴ Telo, *Portugal na Segunda Guerra*, i, p. 60.

‘butchery, pillage, rape and incendiarism’ created panic amongst the population who fled to the mountains and hid in the jungle, and then appealed for protection to the leaders of Australian guerrillas in order to be evacuated.³⁵ Only in March 1944 did the Japanese allow a Portuguese envoy to visit Timor. Captain Silva e Costa, the private secretary to Macau’s governor, reached Timor after stops in Hong Kong, Guangzhou and Taiwan and then left via Manila, Taiwan and Tokyo. His assessment of the situation in Timor was far from rosy, noting that the general mood of the Portuguese there towards the Japanese was ‘hate’ and towards the governor ‘indifference’, ‘antipathy’ and in a few cases ‘some enmity.’³⁶ He was critical of Japanese actions but did not spare his countrymen for disobeying the governor’s orders and having ‘banded together with the Australians.’³⁷

The Chinese minister in Lisbon was aware of the situation in Timor and worried about the Chinese population there.³⁸ At the beginning of the war Timor counted the largest number of Chinese residents in the Portuguese empire after Macau, 3,500 people.³⁹ A KMT branch in the territory was established in the first year of the Republic of China, in 1934 it was involved in founding a Chinese Chamber of Commerce and its members made contributions towards anti-Japanese resistance since the early 1930s. There were more than 800 party members on the island when hostilities began, and in 1941 they still surpassed 300. The Japanese occupation left a trail of destruction to the Chinese in Timor, including the KMT headquarters.⁴⁰ This can be assessed by post-war requests for compensation.⁴¹ To avoid similar vulnerabilities, the Chinese government

³⁵ Portuguese Consul in Sydney to MNE, 8 and 9 Oct. 1943, TNA, HW 12/293.

³⁶ Governor of Macau to MC, 4 June 1944, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768, my translation.

³⁷ Governor of Macau to MC, 28 June 1944, *ibid.*

³⁸ Chinese Minister in Lisbon to MOFA, 27 Nov. 1943. AH, Waijiaobu, 020000023906A.

³⁹ *The Chinese Year Book 1936-37* (Shanghai, 1936), p. 199. Data collected by the National Overseas Affairs Commission based on reports from Chinese consulates abroad.

⁴⁰ Kuomintang, *Zhongguo Guomindang zai haiwai*, pp. 304-6.

⁴¹ AS-IMH, Waijiaobu, 063.1/001.

cemented its presence in post-war Timor by despatching a consul general to Dili in 1947.⁴²

Probing Portuguese actions in Lisbon and Macau

The argument that Portuguese authorities underreacted over the Japanese occupation of Timor because of fear of reprisals in Macau can be found in several accounts, including some pre-dating the occupation.⁴³ But Lisbon was also a point of pressure. In May 1943, Li Jinlun informed Chongqing that the Japanese minister to Portugal had attempted to pressure the government into relinquishing municipal rights in Shanghai. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had replied that Portugal could not take any ambivalent action towards the RNG, which it did not recognise ('Putaoya buneng caiqu renhe you sheji chengren Nanjing weizuzhi xianyi zhi xingdong').⁴⁴ Li warned that if Portugal signed any such agreement with Japan the Chinese government would not recognise it and would protest. A few days later, the American minister to Portugal stated his government's support for Chiang's through a note expressing the hope that 'no action tend to give recognition support to the Puppet regime at Nanking [Nanjing] and against the interest of China will be taken by the Portuguese Government.'⁴⁵ If there were any doubts, actions such as these served to remind the Portuguese government that the central government in Chongqing had powerful allies and to discourage any temptation to switch sides.

⁴² AH, Waijiaobu, 020000003310A.

⁴³ Research Department, FO, 'Portuguese Possessions in Asia and Oceania' 5 June 1944, p. 12, TNA, FO 371/46199; Governor of Macau to MC, 7 June 1944, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768; J. M. Ferreira, 'Timor,' in *Dicionário de História do Estado Novo*, ii p. 974; Meneses, *Salazar*, p. 273; N. Tarling, 'Britain, Portugal and East Timor in 1941', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 27/1 (Mar. 1996), p. 132; Telo, *Portugal na Segunda Guerra*, i, p. 61, and ii, p. 209.

⁴⁴ Chinese Minister in Lisbon to MOFA, 14 May 1943. AH, Waijiaobu, 020000023906A.

⁴⁵ Chinese Minister in Lisbon to MOFA, 15 May 1943, *ibid.*.

An arena where Sino-Portuguese cooperation was particularly relevant pertained to humanitarian relief. Assistance provided by the Portuguese authorities to a largely Chinese refugee population in Macau became an asset to be cited when doubts arose on Portugal's conduct towards the RNG and the Japanese. In March 1944 the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a memorandum to the Chinese legation in Lisbon listing Portuguese actions in favour of the Chinese in Macau. Somewhat ironically, some of the achievements were not led by the colonial authorities but organised by local charities or resulting from ambiguous endeavours with links to collaboration, such as the policy of a controlled rice market. Other accomplishments listed included the establishment of economic soup kitchens, the setting up of public works employing as workforce Chinese refugees, the free distribution of land for cultivation, and special protection offered for the disabled, abandoned and poor children cared for in asylums and refuges, and to whom food was handed out. Continuing to take credit from local initiatives, the memorandum also mentioned that the Macau government had helped the Kiang Wu Hospital and the Tung Sin Tong, which distributed free meals and supplied rice at minimum prices to the schools run by the charity attended by refugee children. The document ended by affirming that in all the relief work done the Portuguese authorities had sought the 'collaboration and suggestions of the most qualified representatives of the Chinese community.'⁴⁶ The following year, a letter to the then Chinese minister of foreign affairs T.V. Soong (Song Ziwen), Tang Liu – signing as 'consul general' (*zonglingshi*) – informed on the difficulties that had arisen in Macau due to population influx. He credited the governor for letting the Chinese live a peaceful life in Macau, including establishing asylums for the young, old and poor. Amongst the initiatives he mentioned was a system of meal distribution twice a day, although such initiatives were at risk as funds were

⁴⁶ MNE to Chinese Legation in Lisbon, 13 Mar 1944, *ibid.*

drying out. A Sino-Portuguese juvenile association (*ZhongPu lianhe qingnianhui*)⁴⁷ had been created as well. Tang also mentioned the important role of the Tung Sin Tong in poverty relief. The charity would ask some of those destitute but in good health to do certain jobs like work on road pavements in exchange for better meals. He also reported he intended to invite Captain Silva Costa to be the secretary-general of a Refugee Survey Committee (*Nanmin diaocha weiyuanhui*), showing how enacting close relations with the local colonial authorities was a strategy pursued by both sides. In the meantime, some local businessmen had been asked to contribute.⁴⁸ Amongst them was Gao Kening, who will be focused on later in the chapter.

Communist guerrillas

From 1944 the situation around Macau became even more complicated. The Japanese reinforced their forces in Zhongshan but resistance guerrillas hardened their positions too. Some were communist, some were under Chongqing's orders and some were, in the governor's words, 'half independent, that is half pirates half guerrillas.'⁴⁹

The CCP presence in Macau became stronger in the 1940s when some future key figures started to operate in the Portuguese enclave. Groups such as the famous Chinese Communist's East River Column (*Dongjiang zongdui*) operated in Guangdong province and recruited some of its members in Macau.⁵⁰ Ke Zhengping was one of them. Brother

⁴⁷ This is referred in Portuguese sources as the Macau Youth Association (Associação dos Jovens de Macau). Its establishment involved several figures, including a Hong Kong Portuguese, the honorary president of the Pui Ching and Pui To schools and the governor ('As comemorações do 28 de Maio' [The 28th of May commemorations], *A Voz de Macau* [31 May 1944] p. 3; 'Sino-Portuguese Juvenile Association,' *A Voz de Macau* [26 June 1944], p. 2).

⁴⁸ Tang Liu to Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 24 Aug. 1944. AH, Waijiaobu, 020000023906A. Also in: AH, Waijiaobu, 020000003315A.

⁴⁹ Governor of Macau to MC, 12 Apr. 1944. ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768, my translation.

⁵⁰ G. Y. M. Chan, *The Chinese Communists' East River Column, Guangdong, 1937-1945* (Leeds, 1998), p. 41; G. Y. M. Chan, 'Hong Kong and Communist Guerrilla Resistance in South China, 1937-1945', *Twentieth-Century China*, 29/1 (2003), p. 47; S. J. Chan, *East River Column. Hong Kong Guerrillas in the Second World War and After* (Hong Kong, 2009), p. 10.

to Ke Lin, the first secretary of the Macau branch of the CCP, he was sent from Hong Kong to Macau to undertake underground activities to help the Column.⁵¹ He remained in Macau for the rest of his life, becoming a key CCP operative in Macau after 1949.

In late 1943 Father Amaral, a Portuguese missionary based in Shiqi, came to Macau after reportedly being kidnapped by communists nearby, and then freed by other guerrillas.⁵² A Chinese author stated that Amaral, referred to as Father An (his Chinese name was An Puling), was used as an intermediary by the Zhongshan guerrillas to get in touch with the Macau government.⁵³ A few months later, in the spring of 1944 the Zhongshan Volunteer Brigade (*Zhongshan yiyong dadui*) did contact the enclave's authorities. It intended to send agents to operate in Macau (e.g. for fundraising), to send wounded for treatment, buy cartridges and medicine and set up a transmitting station (to Yan'an). In exchange it would attack the collaborationists who menaced the safety and public order in Macau. The Portuguese are said to have agreed.⁵⁴ In October the governor reported to Lisbon that he had struck up good relations with the leader of the communist guerrillas in Zhongshan.⁵⁵ He was also strengthening relations with the 'Chongqing people,' considering the situation around Macau as an 'anarchy,' with Nationalist and Communist guerrillas fighting against Japan but independently from one another. At the same time, pro-Japanese Chinese groups connected to the navy or to the army fought each other with the support of elements in the Japanese navy or army and were considering turning to Chiang's side. Then there were competing 'groups of pirates.' But Macau was the place where all chose to rest and, Teixeira noted, 'rare is the group chief that does not

⁵¹ M. S. Fernandes, 'How to Relate to a Colonial Power on its Shore: Macau in the Chinese Foreign Policy, 1949-1965', *Bulletin of Portuguese-Japanese Studies*, 17 (2008), p. 229; Barreto, *Macau During the Sino-Japanese War*, p. 163.

⁵² Governor of Macau to MC, 30 Oct. and 20 Nov. 1943, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768.

⁵³ Guo, 'Shilun Aomen', p. 103.

⁵⁴ K. S. Deng, J. M. Lu and R. F. Yang, *Aomen shihua* [A Brief History of Macau] (Beijing, 2011), p. 293. Jin and Wu, and Mo attribute an identical account to the memoirs of Ou Chu, who directed the Chinese resistance at the No. 9 zone in Zhongshan (Jin and Wu, 'Teria havido', p. 274; Z. Wu, *Segredos da Sobrevivência – História Política de Macau* [Secrets of Survival – Political History of Macau] [Macau, 1999], p. 304; Mo, 'Kangzhan qijian', p. 53).

⁵⁵ Governor of Macau to MC, 18 Oct. 1944, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768.

have a house in Macau as a refuge in case of a setback.’ The governor ‘trusted no one’ but ‘depended on all of them for supplies.’ His approach was to try to reach a balance between different forces to guarantee that goods reached Macau, and ensure the fighting took place outside the enclave.⁵⁶

Towards the end of the war

At the same time as Portuguese authorities in Macau cultivated a pragmatic stance of getting along with everybody, potential post-war claims over the enclave by a victorious Nationalist government were considered with apprehension. In mid-1943 the governor wrote to Lisbon that ‘Japan would be defeated’ and if Macau were occupied, it would be the Chinese who would retake it and then, he mused, ‘we will never see Macau again.’ If, however, the Portuguese were still in Macau by the time the war ended, the question would surely be raised by China in the peace conference. He would not give it three months between the end of the war and the beginning of an open civil war in China and he noted, with peculiar foresight, that ‘under those circumstances Macau might hang on.’⁵⁷ Post-war issues were also being considered on the Chinese side. Tian Fangcheng, a diplomat at the legation in Lisbon reported to Chongqing on remarks by a former member of the Macau Senate who even quoted Chiang’s *China’s Destiny* to defend the Portuguese position.⁵⁸ Sovereignty issues would resurface in full in the post-war, as will be seen in Chapter Six.

⁵⁶ Governor of Macau to MC, 19 Sept 1944, *ibid.*, my translation.

⁵⁷ Governor of Macau to MC, 20 June 1943, *ibid.*

⁵⁸ Tian Fangcheng to MOFA, 29 Apr. 1944. AH, Waijiaobu, 020000023906A. The passage quoted was: ‘The knowledge of honour makes the Chinese people never to covet what belongs to others.’ Tian is listed as third secretary at the Chinese legation in Lisbon in 1947 (Chinese Ministry of Information, *China Handbook 1937-1945 – A Comprehensive Survey of Major Developments in China in Eight Years of War* [New York, 1947], p. 587). Before coming to Portugal, he worked in the Chinese embassy in London. After the war he served in the Chinese delegation to the UN and as consul general in Wellington, amongst other positions.

In May and June 1945 suspicion against the Macau authorities and their problematic practice of neutrality arose again.⁵⁹ The first secretary of the Chinese legation came to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Lisbon to enquire on information that the Guangzhou military authorities had sent to Chongqing: The Macau government had handed over guns and ammunitions to the ‘traitor’ Huang Gongjie, materials that had come from Chinese soldiers previously disarmed and interned in Macau. The information was certainly incorrect but the Portuguese government should deny it so the legation could inform Chongqing.⁶⁰ The governor of Macau later explained to Lisbon that he had indeed lent 60 Mauser rifles and 5,000 cartridges to 93 Chinese under deposit of 30,000 patacas guaranteed by a commission which included an unofficial representative of the Chongqing Ministry of Information. The representative of the Allied command in China had been told of the arrangement and approved it and then lent 12 Mauser pistols to the Macau police. The governor attributed the confusion to factionalism amongst the Nationalists and recommended that ‘relations with other Chinese official departments’ should not be mentioned to the Chinese minister in Lisbon as they did not get along. He suggested the reply should be that only a few rifles without military value had been lent for protection service of food supplies in Macau.⁶¹ These assurances were transmitted to Chongqing by the minister Zhang Qian, who had replaced Li Jinlun in November 1943.⁶² The Portuguese denied another accusation of the presence of Japanese advisors, and

⁵⁹ Yu Hanmou to MOFA, 15 May 1945, AH, Waijiaobu, 020000023906A.

⁶⁰ Note on conversation with the First Secretary of the Chinese Legation, 1 June 1945, AHD, 2P, A48, M212.

⁶¹ Governor of Macau to MC, 5 June 1945, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768. British intelligence intercepted the message, which can be found translated in TNA, HW 12/319.

⁶² Li Jinlun and Zhang Qian to MOFA, 15 Nov. 1943, AH, Waijiaobu, 020000023906A. Zhang Qian, also known as Henry Kunghui Chang, presented credentials in December and remained in Lisbon until January 1947. A native of Guangdong, he studied in Pennsylvania and before coming to Portugal was consul-general in New York, minister to Chile and director of the MOFA American Affairs Department.⁶² After his post in Lisbon he served in the Netherlands and, in August 1948, was assigned to the Xiangxiang county court in Hunan province as judge and president (Chinese Ministry of Information, *China Handbook 1937-1945*, p. 633; *Zhongguo zhu wai ge gong/dashiguan liren guanzhang xian mingbiao* [Chronological List of Chinese Embassies/Legations Abroad] [Taipei, 1989], p. 132; G. Liu (ed), *Zhongguo Guomindang bai nian renwu quanshu* [Book of 100 Years of KMT Figures] [Beijing, 2005], p. 1149).

explained that the weapons had been given in short amounts to a group of overseas Chinese (*huaqiao tuanti*) in order to protect the transportation of food. Their leader was a supporter of the central government and the guns provided were so old they could not be used for aggressive goals.⁶³ Incidents such as this one demonstrate the difficulties in communication between China and Portugal during the war and how these led to misunderstandings.

The war not only affected Chinese in Macau and Timor but also those in Portugal itself where, at the beginning of the conflict, there were around 1,200 residents.⁶⁴ The Chinese in Lisbon fundraised for the resistance and participated in events such as the anniversary of the Marco Polo bridge incident or the obsequies for president Lin Sen.⁶⁵ After the war ended, in December 1945, Zhang Qian, together with the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, organised the repatriation of a number of Chinese from Qingtian, in Zhejiang province, who were in Portugal and had become destitute due to wartime privations. Sick, malnourished and unemployed, the group requested the help of the Chinese government to take measures to alleviate their plight.⁶⁶

The unexpected end of the war in 1945 revealed the extent of its social impact and the enormous task of rehabilitation that lay ahead. The Lisbon Chinese poor were a drop in the ocean. Chapter Six will detail how issues left by the conflict influenced Sino-Portuguese relations in the post-war.

⁶³ Chinese Minister in Lisbon to MOFA, 12 June 1945. AH, Waijiaobu, 020000023906A.

⁶⁴ Chinese Ministry of Information, *The Chinese Year Book 1936-37*, p. 199.

⁶⁵ Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 Ago. 1943, ANTT, AOS, NE-2A2, cx. 422, Pt. 5; Yang Xianceng, Lisbon to MOFA, 7 July, 1944, AH, Waijiaobu, 020000023906A; Kuomintang Central Committee, *Zhongguo Guomindang zai haiwai*, p. 147.

⁶⁶ Refugees to MOFA, 26 Nov. 1945; Chinese Legation in Lisbon to Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, 6 Dec. 1945, AH, Waijiaobu, 020000023906A.

4.2. Avoiding occupation: Macau's relations with the Reorganised National Government and Japanese authorities

Macau's geographical position and neutral status made it an obvious area of interest for the collaborationist RNG that controlled Macau's neighbouring areas. The enclave's dependency on imports, particularly of rice, led the local Portuguese authorities to constantly engage, not only with Japanese occupation forces, but also in unofficial relations with the RNG authorities in Guangdong province, taking the shadow diplomacy moves discussed in Chapter Two to a whole new level. Furthermore, Macau continued to provide a relatively safe space for them to communicate with Chongqing representatives.

After months of growing food scarcity, in April 1942, Pedro Lobo, the head of the Economic Services in Macau, was sent to Guangzhou where he met the RNG provincial governor, Chen Yaozu, and Japanese economic advisors. He negotiated the regularisation of rice supply to Macau, the possibility of importing minerals from Free China and assistance in repatriating Chinese refugees.⁶⁷ The Portuguese authorities intended to send back 200-300,000 Chinese refugees in Macau, which was seen, in the words of the consul in Guangzhou, as 'a great relief' for Macau.⁶⁸ In 1942 an organisation was set up to help Chinese return to their homes in the countryside, the Macau Overseas Chinese Association for Assisting Refugees to Return Home (*Aoqiao xiezhu nanmin huixiang hui*).⁶⁹ By the end of that year it had repatriated 12,000 people.⁷⁰ It is noteworthy that the only refugees the Macau authorities sought to send away were Chinese.

The level of contacts was considerably raised when in June 1942 the RNG Guangdong provincial government requested the Portuguese to post a liaison officer in Macau. The governor considered this potentially useful despite not looking favourably at

⁶⁷ Governor of Macau to MC, 24 Apr. 1942, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767.

⁶⁸ Portuguese Vice-Cosul in Guangzhou to Portuguese Minister to China, 16 Apr. 1942, AHD, 2P, A48, M221, my translation.

⁶⁹ Guangdong Provincial Archives, *Guangdong Aomen*, p. 383.

⁷⁰ 'Vida Social Chinesa' [Chinese Social Life], *A Voz de Macau* (29 Dec. 1942), p. 3.

the possibility of the agent exerting pro-Wang political activity. Under the circumstances, he thought it ‘impolitic to refuse’ and if the minister of colonies approved he would agree to the ‘private arrangement’ (*combinação particular*) between the Macau and the Guangzhou governments.⁷¹ The proposed deal was announced in the Cantonese press. The provincial government was to set up an office (*shengzhengfu banshichu*) in Macau. The commissioner of foreign affairs of Guangdong, Zhou Bingsan, would concomitantly be the special representative (*tepai jiaosheyuan*) and Geng Tingzhen, the head of the second section of the foreign affairs special commission, would double up as secretary. The latter would reside in Macau.⁷² The office began operating in early July. Amongst the guests at the welcome banquet in the Hotel Riviera were the governor and a number of Japanese figures, including the consul.⁷³

Although relations were not given an official character by the Portuguese, they appear to have been treated as such by the RNG authorities, for whom displays of legitimacy were paramount. However, throughout the 1940s, relations in Macau remained tense. On the one hand there were attempts to forge trade agreements, on the other there were repeated rumours that pro-Wang groups were preparing an occupation of the enclave.

In August 1942 the governor received information on the latter. The goal would be to provoke fires to distract the police and then take over the government by terror. The Japanese had been approached for assistance but refused.⁷⁴ The governor made enquiries with colonel Sawa Eisaku, the Japanese liaison officer mentioned in Chapter Two, who suggested that there might be accomplices inside the police. Teixeira concluded the Japanese were not involved and that it was probably the work of Chinese and Formosan

⁷¹ Governor of Macau to MC, 11 June 1942, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767, my translation.

⁷² ‘Guangdong shen zhengfu zai Aomen sheli banshichu’ [Guangdong Provincial Government Sets Up an Office in Macau], *Guangdong xunbao* (4 June 1942), AHD, 2P, A48, M221.

⁷³ Portuguese Vice-Consul in Guangzhou to Portuguese Minister to China, 15 July, 1942, *ibid.*.

⁷⁴ Governor of Macau to MC, 22 Aug. 1942. ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767.

agents, who had already caused incidents with British subjects.⁷⁵ Lobo believed this was just an intimidation manoeuvre to get the money of rich Chinese. But the plot to enter Macau was confirmed by Father Amaral, who informed the plan was put on hold until Portuguese vigilance in Macau was reduced. Similar assurances were given by colonel Sawa.⁷⁶ Macau authorities had a note published in a local paper denying rumours of 'external danger' and guaranteed having the means to clamp down any attempt of creating 'internal disorder.' Should the latter occur, the population was advised to stay indoors to facilitate the government's 'repressive actions, which will be immediate and exerted with the utmost violence.'⁷⁷ But confident words in public masked great private uncertainty.

Tension between Japanese and collaborators over Macau continued until the end of the war and the Portuguese authorities sought to exploit it to their advantage. In September, Chen Yaozu visited the enclave for two days before heading to Zhongshan. He came with a number of other provincial government officials⁷⁸ but, again, the visit was not of an official character. The governor hosted an 'intimate dinner' where Lobo, the harbour master, the chief of staff, and the police commissioner were present. Cracks between the Japanese and the RNG were evident as consul Fukui and Sawa, who had been invited, did not show up due to an unexpected illness. The governor believed the visit had been useful and henceforth relations with Guangzhou were to be treated 'personally between us two', when possible without Japanese interference.⁷⁹ Before he left the enclave a group of 'influential Chinese who before the war were all [for] Chongqing,' which included Gao Kening and Liang Houyuan, offered him lunch. The governor declined the invitation but later took Chen for a car ride alone where he asked

⁷⁵ Governor of Macau to MC, 28 Aug. 1942, *ibid.*.

⁷⁶ Governor of Macau to MC, 29 and 31 Aug. 1942, *ibid.*.

⁷⁷ 'Nota Oficiosa' [Unofficial Note], *A Voz de Macau* (9 Sept. 1942), p. 1, my translation.

⁷⁸ Portuguese Vice-Consul in Guangzhou to Governor of Macau, 25 Sept. 1942, AHD, 2P, A48, M221.

⁷⁹ Governor of Macau to MC, 20 Sept. 1942, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767, my translation.

for assistance in obtaining rice, wood and cement supplies.⁸⁰ This kind of elite rapprochement, making use of local notables, continued throughout the conflict, but did not provide solid assurances of a smooth relationship.

In March 1943 the rumour that neighbouring Chinese authorities were planning to take over Macau surfaced again. Tension with the collaborators was not directly linked to relations with Japan, for only one month before the pro-Japanese *Hongkong News* had published a report based on an interview with Teixeira asserting that ‘Macao’s policy towards Japan was one of the fullest co-operation and friendship.’⁸¹ The British consul, John Reeves, reported that the previous month a meeting had taken place in Macau between Japanese and Wang Jingwei representatives where Wang’s men exhorted Japan, with no success, to take over Macau in accordance with their ‘Asia for the Asians’ policy.⁸² Similar information, probably passed by Reeves, reached the governor. The Japanese consul assured Teixeira that his government had not altered his promise of respecting Macau. The governor was not convinced of the Japanese lack of responsibility but believed that if he obtained a Japanese denial of connection to any activities to disturb Macau, the Chinese would feel unsupported and give up.⁸³ So he made sure representatives of both sides distanced themselves from the affair. He invited Zhou Bingsan and engendered to have him dissociate the RNG from such ‘adventurous speculators.’ Zhou reassured Teixeira that Wang Jingwei did ‘not hold any intentions against Macau’ and that General Yazaki Kanju, an intelligence chief in Guangzhou, would never allow it.⁸⁴ Assurances of Guangzhou-Macau friendship and good relations

⁸⁰ Governor of Macau to MC, 22 Sept. 1942, *ibid.*, my translation. See also ‘Visita de Sua Exa. O Governador da Provincia de Kwantung [sic.]’ [Visit of His Excellency the Governor of Guangdong Province], *A Voz de Macau* (23 Sept. 1942), p. 3.

⁸¹ ‘Governor of Macao Voices Friendship’, *The Hongkong News* (21 Feb. 1943), AHD, 2P, A48, M221.

⁸² Ride, *BAAG*, p. 214.

⁸³ Governor of Macau to MC, 27 Feb., 4 and 14 Mar. 1943, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768.

⁸⁴ Governor of Macau to MC, 20 Mar. 1943, *ibid.*, my translation.

were given at a tea and dinner party, where the omnipresent Gao Kening made a speech.⁸⁵ The governor believed to have ‘liquidated’ what he regarded as the biggest offensive against Macau. He also informed Lisbon that he believed there was ‘convenience in keeping good relations with these people,’ particularly the provincial governor who was a relative of Wang Jingwei.⁸⁶ The governor’s strategy was not just to get along with everybody but to use to his advantage the frictions between the Japanese and the RNG.

A high point in Macau’s parallel diplomacy with the RNG occurred in late April 1943, when Teixeira visited Chen Yaozu in Guangzhou; another informal visit that was treated very much like an official one. He travelled with his chief of cabinet, captain Silva e Costa, his aide-de-camp, and Sawa, staying at the Portuguese consulate in Shamian as the hotel initially proposed by the Cantonese authorities was without working lifts or satisfactory water supply.⁸⁷ Nevertheless, it was evident who was really in charge and the visit also included encounters with Japanese representatives. The governor informed Lisbon that the Chinese and Japanese had showered him with attention and accounts of the visit list a succession of lunches, cocktail parties and dinners organised by the Japanese, Chinese and the Portuguese consulate.⁸⁸ Commander-in-chief Tanaka Hisakazu⁸⁹ offered a lunch in his honour in the presence of several Japanese officials and the consul, and toasted to Portugal-Japan friendship, guaranteeing he would assist in supplies to Macau. General Yazaki welcomed him to a Japanese-style lunch and the Japanese consul Minoru Ishikawa offered a cocktail party inviting all Portuguese in Guangzhou. Chen Yaozu took him to sightsee and organised a dinner for him with Cantonese officials. Teixeira was also visited by the German and Italian consuls. He left

⁸⁵ ‘Cativante homenagem’ [Captivating Tribute], *A Voz de Macau* (25 Mar. 1943), p. 3.

⁸⁶ Governor of Macau to MC, 20 and 22 Mar. 1943, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768.

⁸⁷ Portuguese Vice-Consul in Guangzhou to Portuguese Minister to China, 16 Apr. 1943, AHD, 2P, A48, M212.

⁸⁸ Portuguese Vice-Consul in Guangzhou to Portuguese Minister to China, 20 Apr. 1943, *ibid.*; ‘Cativantes homenagens a Sua Exa. o Governador da Colónia em Cantão’ [Captivating Tributes to H.E. the Governor of the Colony in Guangzhou], *A Voz de Macau* (22 Apr. 1943), p. 3.

⁸⁹ After the war he was sentenced by an American military tribunal for war crimes and was later handed to the Nationalists, who also tried him. He was executed in 1947.

with good impressions, describing Yazaki as a ‘good element we have on our side’ and Chen as a ‘person of superior culture’ and a ‘man of good will.’⁹⁰ The visit made for great propaganda and was reported in several newspapers in Guangzhou and Hong Kong.⁹¹

Fraternisation over meals was also happening in Shanghai, where the Portuguese minister mingled in Axis circles. For example, in early May Lima informed Lisbon he and his wife had hosted a dinner at the Portuguese legation. Amongst the guests were the Italian ambassador, the Spanish minister, the German consul general and two Imperial Japanese Army officers. Also present was Xu Jiaping (Jabin Hsu), an American-educated Chinese journalist who had worked closely with H. H. Kung (Kong Xiangxi) and was then director of the Central Bank of Reserves (CRB) and vice-president of the Shanghai Municipal Council.⁹²

In Macau, the governor was aware that Nationalist agents operated there but he refused to take action against them when that was possible. In June 1943 Zhou Bingsan came to Macau to present to the governor a long protest about an attack on the Zhongshan magistrate. He accused the Macau police of having pro-Chongqing elements and demanded that their agents replaced them and that all ‘Chongqing terrorists’ were expelled or arrested. Teixeira skirted responsibility, noting his side also had assassins so the best option would be for them to agree on a truce and since Zhongshan had more political crimes than Macau it would certainly not be able to spare policemen.⁹³

RNG attempts to exert economic control over Macau became evident from 1943. Their proposals revealed the wish to dominate food supplies to the enclave and curb pro-Chiang activities there. In June the Guangdong government sent a commissioner for

⁹⁰ Governor of Macau to MC, 22 Apr. 1943, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768, my translation.

⁹¹ Clippings in AHD, 2P, A48, M212.

⁹² Portuguese Minister to China to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 4 May 1943, AHD, 2P, A48, M212. After the war, Xu said he had been coerced to collaborate after being incarcerated in a cell at the infamous 76 Jessfield Road from where he watched daily executions, and after being despoiled of his family fortune (J. W. Powell, *My Twenty-Five Years in China* [New York, 1945], p. 335).

⁹³ Governor of Macau to MC, 18 June 1943, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768.

supplies to Macau to propose an agreement: it would supply 10 to 12,000 bags of rice to a syndicate of merchants they considered financially sound. The supply would have to be done through the syndicate because the Cantonese authorities feared their emissaries would be killed by guerrillas, as had occurred in the past. In exchange, rice imports by smugglers would be forbidden and their merchandise would be handed to the Cantonese government. Pro-Chiang elements and writings would not be allowed in Macau. The political consequences of this were high on the governor's mind, as such a deal could give the impression the government was freeing itself from the responsibility of feeding the population. Economically, however, he was not worried as he calculated 'the Japanese Navy will be the first to break the monopoly.'⁹⁴ Anonymous information in English amongst the governor's papers details that the plan to monopolise rice supply in Macau also had Japanese involvement, as well as from the former Zhongshan magistrate and some of his relatives. Zhou Bingsan had also brought from Guangzhou 25 special workers, including agents 'trained for anti-British work'.⁹⁵ Although a Macau Import-Export Traders Syndicate was set up in June,⁹⁶ the ambitious plan never materialised as envisioned due to the 'passive resistance' of traders in Macau, whose capital was necessary to finance the venture. Alternatively, the governor proposed the Cantonese authorities to organise a non-profit cooperative to supply the population with rice. Representatives of the Macau Chinese community of different political affinities agreed. The former syndicate would cede its share and join the cooperative and to guarantee approval Zhou was made a member of the board.⁹⁷ In August a Public Association for the Purchase of Foodstuffs was set up, its provisional headquarters located in the Commercial Association. The Guangdong government supply department deputy chief came to Macau

⁹⁴ Governor of Macau to MC, 26 and 29 June 1943, *ibid.*, my translation.

⁹⁵ Unsigned typed information, 9 July 1943, AHU, Espólio Gabriel Maurício Teixeira.

⁹⁶ 'Comerciantes de importação e exportação' [Import-export merchants], *A Voz de Macau* (8 June 1943), p. 3.

⁹⁷ Governor of Macau to MC, 10 Aug. 1943, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768.

to discuss its affairs and the representatives of the Macau Chinese community and charities managed to get him to cancel rice import tariffs.⁹⁸ This case confirms how control attempts were manipulated by local business elites but also how functional relations existed between the Macau and the Guangdong authorities for livelihood supplies to the enclave. These, this work argues, were always precarious.

In August 1943 new rumours of collaborators' plans to take over Macau emerged. A missionary from Zhongshan (likely Amaral) came to Macau with a message he had received from the magistrate warning that as soon as a study on the matter was concluded in Nanjing, the Japanese would occupy Macau as it was 'inadmissible that insignificant Macau was the only spot in the Far East out of the new order [in] Asia where the British flag was still flying.'⁹⁹ Various other informants warned the governor that there were people in Macau ready to execute a large-scale plan to take over the enclave. Information on their associates, location of armament and of hotel rooms was provided. When asked, Sawa told the governor some of the names involved pointed towards the 'Nanjing people,' that is, they were pro-Wang Jingwei agents. Teixeira concluded it might be a group of pirates helped and possibly armed by the RNG with the ultimate goal of occupying Macau, of whom the Japanese would wash their hands. The governor used the gambling concessionaire (he does not specify who but it is likely to have been Fu Deyin) to get information. He brought him a list of 13 groups in Macau with connections to Nanjing and Japan, and proposed to infiltrate spies in these groups in order to be warned

⁹⁸ 'Governor and Merchants discuss rice problem', *Macau Tribune* (15 Aug. 1943), p. 1; 'Associação Publica para Aquisição de Géneros Alimentícios' [Public Association for the Purchase of Foodstuffs], *A Voz de Macau* (17 Aug. 1943), p.3; 'Associação Publica de Auxilio Mutuo para Aquisição de Generos Alimentícios' [Public Association of Mutual Assistance for the Purchase of Foodstuffs], *A Voz de Macau* (20, 21 and 27 Aug. 1943), p. 3; 'Cantão atendeu o pedido de cancelamento dos direitos sobre o arroz' [Guangzhou accepted the request for canceling tariffs over rice], *A Voz de Macau* (11 Sept. 1943), p. 3.

⁹⁹ Governor of Macau to MC, 22 Aug. 1943, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768, my translation.

if a coup was being planned and of their internal dissensions.¹⁰⁰ Different layers of cooperation were activated in times of crises to avoid even worse problems.

Macau was at the intersection of multiple forces engaged in a global war. The ambiguous practice of its neutrality made for great news scoops, true or not. In Hong Kong, the *Hongkong News* printed a Domei report from Guangzhou blaming the news of disturbances in Macau on ‘false propaganda’ by the US and Britain.¹⁰¹ The news was promptly denied but other reports on Macau generated international concern. In September a telegram from Chongqing reporting the invasion of Macau reached as far as Brazil. There, Portuguese commander Sarmiento de Beires commented on the (false) news defending that ‘Portugal should risk it all and act in accordance with race firmness’ by sending troops to Australia and India to participate in the campaign ‘that will expel the Japanese from China and Oceania’ as such was ‘the will of the Portuguese people.’¹⁰² In fact, as seen in Chapter One, the Portuguese government did consider entering the war against Japan to safeguard the reestablishment of its post-war rule over Timor, but this was never implemented.

Portugal was not the only side wanting to capitalise its limited bargaining power for self-preservation. Throughout the war, Macau was a site of attempts to reach peace between Chiang’s side and the Japanese either directly or through mediation from Wang’s side. In September 1943 Chu Minyi, the RNG minister of foreign affairs, and Chen Bijun, passed through Macau incognito. The governor sent a message saying he would not greet them to respect their anonymity but should they need anything he would be glad to be of

¹⁰⁰ Governor of Macau to MC, 4 and 9 Sept. 1943, *ibid.*

¹⁰¹ ‘Peace & Order Reining in Macao’, *The Hongkong News* (10 Sept. 1943), AHD, 2P, A48, M221.

¹⁰² ‘Repercute na imprensa carioca a ocupação de Macau pelos niponicos’ [Macau’s occupation by the Japanese repercutated in the Rio press], *Correio do Povo* (11 Sept. 1943), *ibid.* Major J.M. Sarmiento de Beires was a pioneer of Portuguese aviation. He completed the first flight between Lisbon and Macau in 1924 and the first nighttime flight over the South Atlantic in 1927. A staunch critic of Salazar, after organising failed coups in the 1930s and 1940s he was stripped of his military posts and condemned to exile.

service. Before they left Chu sent Teixeira a card and he reciprocated.¹⁰³ According to the governor, Chen's visit to Macau had been to co-opt Sun Yat-sen's widow (his first wife Lu Muzhen) and eldest daughter (Sun Wan) but her efforts were unsuccessful.¹⁰⁴ Other reports on negotiations between Wang and Chiang's men reached the governor in October. The talks, which had led to nothing, had included the president of the rice cooperative in Macau, who had been a former finance minister in Sun Yat-sen's government, Chu Minyi, Chongqing's 'minister of publicity' (it is unclear who this referred to), and the Hong Kong chief of staff.¹⁰⁵ The encounter was confirmed by the Japanese minister in Lisbon, who received a telegram from Macau stating Chen Bijun had visited Macau and mentioned her meeting with Feng Zhuwan and rumours of a Japanese occupation of Macau.¹⁰⁶ The French military mission in Chongqing also wrote to the Fighting French in Algiers that Chen met Chongqing emissaries in Macau, with Japan supposedly accepting that they would evacuate Manchuria and hand over Indochina to China.¹⁰⁷ For the Nationalists, these overtures served 'as a major bargaining counter to prompt the United States and Britain into offering aid.'¹⁰⁸ The consequences of a China willing to give up its resistance were not in the interest of the Allies.

Secret encounters and espionage intrigues were something Macau shared with Lisbon. Weekly reports by the Portuguese secret police PVDE¹⁰⁹ reveal that from the summer of 1943 there was comprehensive surveillance on Japanese moves in the Portuguese capital. The key informer was a woman identified under the pseudonym 'Frau

¹⁰³ Governor of Macau to MC, 17 and 20 Sept. 1943, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768.

¹⁰⁴ Governor of Macau to MC, 30 Sept. 1943, *ibid.*.

¹⁰⁵ Governor of Macau to MC, 11 and 20 Oct. 1943, *ibid.*.

¹⁰⁶ Japanese Minister in Lisbon to Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1 Oct. 1943, TNA, HW 12/293. Feng was an associate of Li Jishen, a military commander who had been governor of Guangdong and was a rival of Zhang Fakui, having an uneasy relationship with Chiang Kai-shek. Feng himself had been part of the Liangguang Incident in 1936, a confrontation between Cantonese military warlords and the central government to fight Japan, after the failure of which he had moved to Macau.

¹⁰⁷ French Military Mission in Chongqing to Fighting French in Algiers, 19 Oct. 1943, TNA, HW 12/293.

¹⁰⁸ Huang and Yang, 'Nationalist China's Negotiating', p. 73.

¹⁰⁹ Acronym for *Policia de Vigilancia e Defesa do Estado* (Surveillance and State Defence Police). It is more commonly known by the acronym PIDE that resulted from a name change in 1945.

W.’ with whom Morishima Morito, the Japanese minister, had a relationship.¹¹⁰ How the Portuguese managed to infiltrate the high echelons of Japanese officials in Lisbon is a plot worthy of a Hollywood film. The information received from Frau W., often extracted from private conversations with a drunk Morishima, revealed the tensions amongst the Japanese representatives and the complex relations between them and other Axis figures in Portugal. Morishima, who had been consul in New York at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, was reported as manifesting ‘certain sympathy for the Americans and none for the Germans.’ Both he and the third secretary spoke highly of Russia, while the naval attaché was close to the Italians.¹¹¹ Morishima was also described as a personal friend of Tojo Hideki, with whom he had been in Manchuria, where he had been posted at the time of the Mukden Incident in 1931.¹¹²



Figure 4. The Japanese minister Morishima Morito with the German ambassador Oswald von Hoyningen-Huene in Portugal, 1943

¹¹⁰ This set of documents was first (briefly) referenced in Meneses, *Salazar*, p. 329.

¹¹¹ 28th report, 19 Aug., 1943, ANTT, AOS, IN-8D, cx. 334, my translation.

¹¹² 34th report, 7 Oct., 1943, *ibid.*

The turning point

Portuguese neutrality is considered to have leaned decisively to the side of the Allies from 1943, with the ceding of basing rights in Azores.¹¹³ Churchill announced the agreement in the House of Commons on 12 October, 1943. Shortly after, the minister of foreign affairs in Tokyo informed the ambassador in Berlin that Japan wished to ‘act in close concert with Germany in handling the Portuguese question.’¹¹⁴ Japanese policy was to prevent a rupture of diplomatic relations or a state of war, and avoid exaggeration in announcements on the matter.¹¹⁵ Morishima was instructed to present the Japanese government’s protest on the violation of neutral obligations, and he submitted a memorandum to the effect on 16 October. The tone of threat of the protest was not well-received by Salazar, who told the minister that Japan had no juridical or moral right to question an agreement made on the terms of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance given what had been going on in Timor. He, however, also expressed interest in preventing the deterioration of Japan-Portugal relations.¹¹⁶ After protesting to Salazar against the Azores agreement, Morishima got carried away in his private conversations with Frau W. after downing a bottle of whisky. He believed Macau would be bought from Portugal and handed back to China.¹¹⁷ By November he more cautiously suggested that the government in Tokyo was interested in maintaining contacts with the West via Lisbon, where the legation was considered ‘the most important diplomatic post in Europe after the embassy in Berlin.’¹¹⁸ The following month, an intoxicated Morishima ‘dreamed aloud’

¹¹³ Telo, ‘Segunda Guerra Mundial’, p. 900.

¹¹⁴ Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, 13 Oct. 1943, TNA, HW 12/293.

¹¹⁵ Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, 18 Oct. 1943, *ibid.*.

¹¹⁶ Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to Japanese Minister in Lisbon, 15 Oct., 1943; Japanese Minister in Lisbon to Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 16 Oct. 1943; Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Portuguese Minister in Tokyo, 17 Oct. 1943, *ibid.*.

¹¹⁷ 35th report, 25 Oct. 1943, ANTT, IN-8D, cx. 334.

¹¹⁸ 40th report, 17 Dec. 1943, *ibid.*, my translation.

of Japanese pilots bombing Lisbon if Portugal and Japan broke off relations.¹¹⁹ But in public, threats were not usually voiced, despite complaints about different issues, including those regarding the exhibition of American war movies deemed offensive to Japan.¹²⁰ In any case, they had a less chilling effect than in Macau, where daily livelihood depended on Japanese goodwill. Furthermore, Lisbon was very important for Japan to collect and transmit intelligence on the Allies, a direct radiotelegraphic link to Tokyo having been set up in early 1942.¹²¹

By 1944 the RNG began to disintegrate from within. American bombings over Guangzhou and increased guerrilla activity with the support of regular troops loyal to Chiang were hitting Japan hard. Wang Jingwei died in November in 1944 but rumours of his death began to circulate in South China in April. The governor of Macau informed Lisbon that Guangzhou was in turmoil, with everyone trying to get rid of the RNG's CRB currency.¹²² Wang's centrality in the RNG has been noted by authors such as Barrett, who stressed how Wang was 'essential to the survival of his government.'¹²³ The idea of his departure was enough for the RNG apparatus in Guangdong to stumble. From Macau the governor noted more Wang supporters were turning to Chongqing and the situation was 'very confusing.' He expected a new influx of refugees from Guangzhou as the 'situation there is that of a volcano that everyone feels can erupt at any moment.'¹²⁴ Indeed, by 1944 many high-profile figures of the Wang government switched sides in secret. Some had had channels opened with Chongqing for years, the most notable case being perhaps Zhou Fohai, who was in contact with Chiang's spymaster Dai Li.¹²⁵

¹¹⁹ 41st report, 31 Dec. 1943, *ibid.*

¹²⁰ Japanese Legation in Lisbon to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 May and June 1944, AHD, 2P, A48, M212.

¹²¹ 'Ligação radio-telegrafica directa entre Tóquio e Lisboa' [Direct radiotelegraphic link between Tokyo and Lisbon, *A Voz de Macau* (31 Jan. 1942), p. 3.

¹²² Governor of Macau to MC, 20 and 25 Mar. 1944, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768.

¹²³ D. P. Barrett, 'The Wang Jingwei Regime, 1940-1945: Continuities and Disjunctures with Nationalist China' in *Chinese Collaboration with Japan*, p. 104.

¹²⁴ Governor of Macau to MC, 12 and 27 July 1944, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768, my translation.

¹²⁵ Martin, 'Collaboration within Collaboration'.

In May, the RNG governor of Guangdong, Chen Yaozu was murdered in Guangzhou. The governor of Macau wrote to Lisbon that he did not know who the perpetrators were for he had heard that Chen had started conversations with Chongqing to prepare to change sides.¹²⁶ Shortly after, he reported to Lisbon that Wang's people blamed his death on the Japanese.¹²⁷ A few months later a summary of intelligence handed to Teixeira claimed an informer had said Chen Yaozu had not been killed due to politics or by Nationalists' agents but because he had tried to control rice matters, together with Madame Wang and her faction who were 'making a lot of money, harming the growers.'¹²⁸ Some of the charges brought against Chen Bijun in her post-war trial included using 'her authority to cut off the supply of goods and assistance from "friendly nations" to Chongqing from Hong Kong and Macau.'¹²⁹

Family politics continued, however, and Yaozu's replacement was another of Chen's relatives, Russian-educated Chen Chunpu. Interactions with Macau also proceeded. Even as Guangzhou experienced shortages of coal and water, Chen Chunpu agreed to supply Macau with rice.¹³⁰ Between 13 and 26 July 1944, captain Silva e Costa, the new president of the Macau Imports Regulation Commission, came to Guangzhou to negotiate an agreement for the rice supply from Zhongshan. The Guangdong government wanted to buy some rails and locomotives in the possession of the Netherlands Harbour Works (NHW) in the enclave. Costa argued the Macau government could cede the small amount of rails it possessed in the public works but as for the Dutch company property, he could only try. But the Cantonese authorities, represented by the director of public works Zhang Youyun, made the amount of rice supplied dependent on acquiring what they wanted. As negotiations stalled, the Portuguese approached General Yazaki, a man

¹²⁶ Governor of Macau to MC, 6 Apr. 1944, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768.

¹²⁷ Governor of Macau to MC, 12 Apr., 1944, *ibid.*.

¹²⁸ 'Notícias soltas' [Loose reports], 19 July 1944, AHU, Espólio Gabriel Mauricio Teixeira, my translation.

¹²⁹ C. D. Musgrove, 'Cheering the Traitor: The Post-War Trial of Chen Bijun, April 1946', *Twentieth-Century China*, 30/2 (2005), p. 9.

¹³⁰ Governor of Macau to MC, 27 July 1944, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768.

who the vice-consul in Guangzhou described as a good friend of the Portuguese, to help them guarantee Macau would not be left without rice. The intervention worked. The Guangzhou authorities agreed to provide 15,000 cattes of rice to Macau (a previous agreement had been 30,000 but they argued it was impossible to maintain given the supplies required by the Japanese navy). In exchange the Macau government would provide 'some rails' they owned, as soon as they stopped being used by the entity to which they had been lent, 20 to 30 tonnes of stakes, a launch, and would try to guarantee that rails and locomotives of the NHW stored in Macau would be sold to Chinese traders there.¹³¹ For the RNG, this agreement was justified in legitimising terms, arguing that they were supplying rice to Macau in order to provide for the Chinese resident there facing difficult subsistence conditions. But they reserved themselves the right to reduce or suspend the amount agreed if Guangdong experienced scarcity or production decreased due to a calamity.¹³² Moreover, they wanted the Macau government to prevent individuals or news articles that 'disturbed peace' in the enclave. By expressing their concern over the Chinese population in Macau they were competing directly with Chiang's government as the legitimate political representative overseeing their livelihood.

It was not solely the Wang Jingwei regime that began to turn on itself but also the Japanese in Macau. In September 1944 the governor noted how he had the consul and the navy against Sawa. Teixeira bought time by arguing if Japan lost the war it would only have 'one friendly port to distribute their merchandise which is Macau' and should strive 'not to alienate that friendship.'¹³³ Japanese women and children were sent to Macau from

¹³¹ Portuguese Vice-Consul in Guangzhou to Portuguese Minister to China, 29 July 1944, AHD, 2P, A48, M221, my translation.

¹³² Point 8 and 9 of the agreement signed in 22 July 1944. A copy of the Portuguese version can be found in AHD, 2P, A48, M221.

¹³³ Governor of Macau to MC, 6 Sept. 1944, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768, my translation.

Guangzhou and Hong Kong, themselves a peculiar sort of refugee.¹³⁴ By then it was clear to Teixeira which side would lose the war, and the governor was trying to prevent major disturbances while keeping up good relations with the Japanese and collaborators on whom he depended to feed Macau. As the war entered its final year, some of those with links to the Japanese or the RNG began to switch sides. In early December 1944 Xu Chongzhi, former head of the opium syndicate in Hong Kong arrived in Macau to reside there with his family.¹³⁵ He reconciled with the Nationalists at the end of the war.

Divisions amongst the Japanese in Macau were again brought to the fore when the Japanese consul in Macau was shot twice on February 2, 1945, dying in hospital the following day. This was arguably the highest-profile murder to occur in the enclave during the war. Fukui had been a well-regarded presence in Macau, an example of how some Japanese diplomats sought to mitigate the abuses of the military. The governor noted how he ‘enjoyed respect from everyone.’¹³⁶ The British consul reported his death saying he was a ‘man of highest integrity’ who had ‘always done his best’ for relatives of POWs in Hong Kong.¹³⁷ He believed Fukui had been killed by an assassin hired by the Japanese gendarmerie.¹³⁸ So did Pedro Lobo’s son who recalled years later that Fukui ‘was shot by his own people because he was too friendly with the Allies.’¹³⁹ BAAG documents state that Fukui was assassinated by a Formosan for personal revenge.¹⁴⁰ Publicly, the Japanese blamed Chinese resistance. Domei reported the assassination as

¹³⁴ They started to come in 1942 but the move intensified in later stages of the war (Knaggs, ‘Information’, and MacKaskie, ‘Report on conditions in Macau’, TNA, FO 371/31630; Ride, *BAAG*, p. 171; Governor of Macau to MC, 15 Sept. 1943, and 27 July 1944, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768).

¹³⁵ Governor of Macau to MC, 5 Dec. 1944, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768. Teixeira called him ‘Haison Chi’ but the description he gave clearly matches Xu’s. He had been commander-in-chief of Guangdong troops in Sun Yat-sen’s government in 1923, holding a number of other posts, including minister of war in 1925 but was dismissed after the assassination of Liao Zhongkai. His brother Xu Chongqing was the president of Sun Yat-sen University and his sister Xu Guangping had been Lu Xun’s partner. On Xu Chongxi see: T. Saich, *The Origins of the First United Front in China: The Role of Sneevliet (alias Maring)* (Leiden, 1991), p. 549, Snow, *The Fall of Hong Kong*, p. 162; Faure, *Emperor and Ancestor*, p. 324.

¹³⁶ Governor of Macau to MC, 2 Feb. 1945, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768, my translation.

¹³⁷ British Consul at Macau to Foreign Office, 3 Feb. 1945, TNA, FO 371/46199.

¹³⁸ Reeves, *The Lone Flag*, p. 22.

¹³⁹ Roger Lobo quoted in J. McGivering, *Macao Remembers* (Oxford, 1999), p. 76.

¹⁴⁰ Kweilin Intelligence Summary No. 87, 28 Feb. 1945, HKU, MF 2530701, Roll 19.

having been perpetrated by ‘enemy terrorists.’¹⁴¹ However, other sources claim the assassination had been orchestrated by Sawa because Fukui was too close to the British consul or to the Portuguese.¹⁴² A reward of 20,000 patacas was offered by the Macau authorities for information that could lead to the arrest of the perpetrators,¹⁴³ but it appears not to have been claimed.

The assassination led to international concern. In London, the possible reasons for the attack were also discussed. Perhaps the goal could have been to ‘murder the Consul for his un-Japanese humanitarianism & then use the incident as an excuse for either murdering H.M. Consul or occupying Macao.’¹⁴⁴ The FO asked the Portuguese government to guarantee Reeves’s protection and Ashley Clarke, who went from the FO Far Eastern Department to ambassador to Portugal, conveyed the message in Lisbon.¹⁴⁵ Assurances were given at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Portuguese authorities did not suspect that ‘Japanese authorities intended to exploit [the] assassination for political purposes’ but they were ‘fully alive to the possibility of violent action by Japanese extremists,’ and discreetly warned that Reeves should avoid giving pretexts to ‘ill-disposed’ people who could ‘use violence against him.’¹⁴⁶ In Lisbon, Morishima demanded a formal apology from the Portuguese government. He requested that all means were employed to find, arrest and punish the authors and instigators of such an attack, that the person or people responsible in the Macau government staff were fired and that the authorities did everything possible to monitor and control harmful elements and guarantee security in the territory and the protection of Japanese officials and subjects

¹⁴¹ Domei, 4 Feb. 1945, TNA, FO 371/46199.

¹⁴² Teixeira, ‘Macau Durante a Guerra’, p. 533.

¹⁴³ ‘Alviçaras’ [Reward], *A Voz de Macau* (3 Feb. 1943), p. 3.

¹⁴⁴ F 546/104/10 minutes, TNA, FO 371/46199.

¹⁴⁵ ANTT, AOS, NE-2E1, cx. 431, Pt. 25.

¹⁴⁶ British Embassy in Lisbon to Foreign Office, 6 Feb. 1945, TNA, FO 371/46199.

there.¹⁴⁷ The minister had to repeat the protest two months later, when Mr Shibayama, a Japanese naval officer believed to be of the naval special branch, was assassinated together with his bodyguard in Macau.¹⁴⁸

A few days later, a Japanese blockade was again imposed on Macau and the governor believed Sawa to be the main figure responsible. Teixeira noted that the Japanese resented the atmosphere of hatred towards them by the Chinese but they were ‘unable to understand that that was the result of their actions [in] China.’¹⁴⁹ He observed that in Macau no assistance was given when the police investigated attacks against Japanese. The blockade finished some days later after Lobo got a Chinese commission to ask Sawa to end it. For the governor, the goal had been to demonstrate how Macau was still dependent on Japanese forces.¹⁵⁰ Once again, decisive action was taken by Chinese intermediaries.

Understanding that the Japanese in the enclave were not always acting in unison, Lobo also approached Fukui’s replacement, Iwai Eiichi, who belonged to the Greater East Asia office in Guangzhou. Iwai had been reluctant to move to Macau believing that his anti-Chongqing activities would put him at risk.¹⁵¹ Lobo told him the governor had asked the Portuguese government to set up a criminal investigation bureau led by the chief of police. The plan would involve Japanese cooperation through a mixed commission which would ‘exchange reports and views relevant to the maintenance of peace and order.’ The consul did not respond favourably, arguing that such measures had come too late and should have been proposed after Fukui’s death.¹⁵² In Tokyo the proposal was deemed ‘inadvisable,’ as they could end up burdening the Japanese with ‘a share in the formal

¹⁴⁷ Japanese Minister in Lisbon to Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 23 Mar. 1945, ANTT, AOS, NE-7B, Pt. 40, my translation.

¹⁴⁸ British Consul at Macau to Foreign Office, 9 Apr. 1945, TNA, FO 371/46199; Japanese Minister to Portugal to Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 25 Apr. 1945, ANTT, AOS, NE-2F1, cx. 450, p. 41.

¹⁴⁹ Governor of Macau to MC, 9 Apr. 1945, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768, my translation.

¹⁵⁰ Governor of Macau to MC, 12 Apr. 1945, *ibid.*

¹⁵¹ G. C. Gunn, ‘Wartime Macau in the Wider Diplomatic Sphere’, in *Wartime Macau*, p. 51.

¹⁵² Japanese Foreign Minister to Japanese Minister in Lisbon quoting Iwai’s telegram from Macau, 26 Apr. 1945, TNA, HW 12/315.

responsibility for keeping order.’ The Greater East Asia minister instructed Iwai to abstain from demanding their implementation.¹⁵³ For the Portuguese, inviting Japanese involvement was also a way of testing their connection to the incidents. In early May the Japanese consul in Macau reported to Tokyo that the governor told him four people linked to the Shibayama affair had been arrested.¹⁵⁴ He explained later that Portuguese authorities had arrested them on circumstantial evidence but had no material proof to convict them. The four suspects had been connected to the Guangzhou coastal defence forces under the Japanese navy and Japanese naval authorities ‘wanted them for other reasons.’ The Portuguese handed them over ‘by friendly agreement’ without specifying they were the Shibayama murder culprits. Iwai believed the Macau authorities were thus avoiding responsibility for settlement of the case.¹⁵⁵ Acts such as these reveal the perilous balancing act undertaken by the local authorities when dealing with criminality, with several cases implicitly recognising the relative powerlessness of the local authorities in relation to the invading forces surrounding the enclave. The frontier between sovereign control and collaboration was very thin indeed.

In May, Yodogawa Masaki replaced Iwai, who was transferred to Guangzhou. Teixeira had urged Lisbon to convince Morishima to keep him and prevent his replacement by the Portuguese-speaking former Japanese consul in Timor.¹⁵⁶ The request was not attended but the new consul’s first moves were conciliatory. In July he reported to Tokyo that he had been trying to improve relations with the Portuguese and had

¹⁵³ Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to Japanese Minister in Lisbon, 29 Apr. 1945, *ibid.*.

¹⁵⁴ Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to Japanese Minister in Lisbon quoting Iwai’s telegram from Macau, 7 May. 1945, TNA, HW 12/316.

¹⁵⁵ Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to Japanese Minister in Lisbon, 21 May. 1945, TNA, HW 12/317.

¹⁵⁶ Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to Japanese Minister in Lisbon, 2 May 1945, TNA, HW 12/315; Governor of Macau to MC, 8 and 21 May 1945, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768.

‘disbanded the Chinese guard and the band of agents’ employed by his predecessor, who were a costly source of misunderstandings.¹⁵⁷

Similarly to other neutrals, Portugal’s relations with Japan deteriorated in 1945. In March, the Japanese minister in Lisbon was informed that Portugal’s consul in Mexico, who represented Japanese interests, was returning and a consul without diplomatic standing was staying until a replacement was possible.¹⁵⁸ Protection was officially withdrawn in June although the Portuguese consul would guarantee it temporarily until another power was nominated to take it on.¹⁵⁹ Sweden accepted the task in July.¹⁶⁰ In April, Spain broke off relations with Japan. The Japanese minister in Madrid proposed an exchange whereby Spanish diplomats in Tokyo would be sent to Macau and the Japanese in Spain would move to Lisbon, Berne or Stockholm.¹⁶¹ The Macau suggestion was later abandoned as it would mean ‘crossing extensive combat lines’ and because it was ‘inundated with Chinese refugees without means.’¹⁶² This seems to indicate that Macau was no longer considered safe by the Japanese.

In Japan too, the Portuguese minister, L.E. Fernandes, complained of almost unbearable difficulties. Together with other diplomats, he was kept away from Tokyo, in Karuizawa, for weeks, prevented from returning to the legation and the chancery’s staff unable to visit him.¹⁶³ In late May the Portuguese legation in Tokyo was burned to the ground, as were several others, including the Chinese.¹⁶⁴ Some wondered why Portugal did not break off relations. The Portuguese ambassador to the Vatican reflected to Lisbon

¹⁵⁷ Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to Japanese Minister in Lisbon, quoting the Japanese consul in Macau, 31 July 1945, TNA, HW 12/327.

¹⁵⁸ Note on conversation with the Japanese minister, 23 Mar. 1945, ANTT, AOS, NE-7B, Pt. 40.

¹⁵⁹ Portuguese Legation in Mexico to MNE, 13 June 1945, ANTT, AOS, NE-2I, cx. 439, Pt. 29.

¹⁶⁰ Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs to Portuguese Minister in Mexico City, 9 July 1945, TNA, HW 12/323.

¹⁶¹ Japanese Minister in Madrid to Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 16 Apr. 1945, TNA, HW 12/314.

¹⁶² Spanish Minister in Tokyo to Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Madrid, 24 Apr. 1945, TNA, HW 12/315.

¹⁶³ Portuguese Legation in Tokyo to MNE, 4 and 12 Apr. 1945, AHD, 2P, A48, M212.

¹⁶⁴ Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to Japanese Minister in Stockholm, 29 May 1945, TNA, HW 12/318.

that ‘although the sacrifice of Macao would be a great grief’ it would be ‘a passing one’ and breaking off relations with Japan would ‘put an end to the moral and political risk’ of the war ending with Portugal having relations with a defeated power that had occupied one of its colonies. From Lisbon the reply was to stand by Macau as the ‘interest in avoiding any grave incident there’ was ‘recognised by others as well as ourselves.’¹⁶⁵ So, Portuguese moves towards Japan were timid. Shortly after communicating Brazil’s declaration of war, Portugal decided to withdraw their protection of Japanese interests in the South American country,¹⁶⁶ but diplomatic relations were maintained.

In Macau, Portuguese interactions with both Japanese and RNG authorities remained functional until the end of the war, as the governor kept trying to negotiate rice supplies. As late as July 1945 an envoy was sent to Guangzhou to negotiate a contract with the Cantonese government, while the Japanese military, on whom the imports were dependent, was also approached. It was believed that a food crisis could be averted if they kept their promises; otherwise rice for the public would only be enough for four days.¹⁶⁷ The following month, the governor informed Lisbon that the living costs in Macau were so high ‘that officials and even high-ranking officers’ were ‘suffering from hunger.’¹⁶⁸ The only rice arriving was through smuggling. This food dependency, which will be further analysed in the following section, was the key factor in the collaborative attitude the Portuguese authorities in Macau had towards the Japanese forces and the RNG in Guangdong. But collaboration, even if under duress, was a dangerous game.

The end of the war on 2 September, 1945 caught several people connected to the Japanese and the RNG in Macau. Several figured in lists of war criminals and traitors sought after by both the Nationalists and the British. Their presence in the Portuguese-

¹⁶⁵ Portuguese Ambassador to the Vatican to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 Apr. 1945; Minister of Foreign Affairs to Portuguese Ambassador to the Vatican, 29 Apr. 1945, TNA, HW 12/315.

¹⁶⁶ ANTT, AOS, NE-2A, cx. 419, Pt. 32; Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs to Portuguese Minister in Tokyo, 15 June, 1945, TNA, HW 12/320.

¹⁶⁷ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 20 July 1945, TNA, HW 12/325.

¹⁶⁸ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 3 Aug. 1945, TNA, HW 12/327.

administered enclave created a new set of problems for the local authorities, whose vulnerability to supply blockades did not end with the war. This will be addressed in Chapter Six.

4.3. Land of contradictions: Starvation, profits, and philanthropy

The social impact of the war in Macau was comparable to occupied areas in China. Studies on wartime food scarcity in Shanghai, for example, reveal identical dynamics: growing destitution, ineffective policies, smuggling dependency, and the use of food as ‘an economic weapon for political purposes.’¹⁶⁹ And similarly, the misery of many was contrasted with the opulence of a few. Resentment towards unnamed profiteers transpired in newspapers at the time and in memoirs written later.¹⁷⁰

The enclave had always been dependent on food imports and with sea and land travels often disrupted, everyday life became marked by shortages and inflation. In August 1937 the Macau government fixed the prices of rice sales.¹⁷¹ However, the measure did not hamper a spiralling rise. From 1939 to 1945 the price of rice in Macau rose more than 33 times.¹⁷² In December 1941, the local government started rationing some products, including bread, olive oil, and coal.¹⁷³ Rice was the key commodity, and the government continually sought to control it. In early 1942 it announced that all people who had more than two bags of rice for their own consumption needed to register with the

¹⁶⁹ C. Henriot, ‘Rice, Power and People: The Politics of Food Supply in Wartime Shanghai (1937-1945)’, *Twentieth-Century China*, 26/1 (2000), p. 69.

¹⁷⁰ ‘Macau e a Guerra’ [Macau and the War] *Renascimento* (23 Mar. 1945), p. 4; F.T.O. Li and T. Harrison, *Much Beloved Daughter* (London, 1985), p. 35.

¹⁷¹ ‘Portaria nº 2:359’, *Boletim Oficial da Colónia de Macau* [Official Bulletin of the Macau Colony], no. 33, 17 Aug., 1937, p. 1.

¹⁷² The price rose every year. In 1939 it was 0,08 patacas per catty and in 1945 it was 2,70 patacas per catty (*Anuário Estatístico de Macau*, p. 154).

¹⁷³ *Boletim Oficial da Colónia de Macau* [Official Bulletin of the Macau Colony], no. 50, 13 Dec., 1941, p. 868.

police.¹⁷⁴ Milk was also rationed, which was to be sold only to sick children and the elderly and with a medical prescription. Lists of the places where ration coupons could be exchanged were constantly published in the local papers. These coupons were also distributed to the ‘floating population’, those who lived in boats.¹⁷⁵ The Macau authorities also took steps to regulate the use of rationing coupons, hinting that misuses were happening.¹⁷⁶ From April onwards exiting Macau without handing in rationing coupons was forbidden.¹⁷⁷ Queues for rice, bread and sugar were sizable and methods and amounts of distribution reported as unclear.¹⁷⁸ Complaints about the lines to exchange ration coupons, the cheaters who sold fake ones or empty bags to naïve people, and the hoarders were voiced in the press.¹⁷⁹

After the occupation of Hong Kong, a precarious situation quickly deteriorated. In February 1942 people in Macau went through Chinese New Year cold and hungry. The governor ordered bakeries to operate non-stop but their production only covered one tenth of the population. He praised the ‘admirable resistance’ of the population who did not blame the local government but the Japanese for the scarcity of rice. In February alone 1,007 died of starvation.¹⁸⁰ The British consul stated in his memoirs that 27,000 people did so that year.¹⁸¹

By April the situation in Macau was reaching dramatic levels. Reeves reported that deaths from starvation were numbering 55 a day. There had been no rice for three weeks, with prices much higher than before the war, and robberies were increasing. He

¹⁷⁴ ‘Comissão Reguladora das Importações – Anuncio’ [Imports Regulation Commission – Announcement], *A Voz de Macau* (3 Mar. 1943), p. 2.

¹⁷⁵ E.g. ‘Administração do Conselho de Macau – Aviso’ [Macau Council Administration – Notice], *ibid.* (30 Jan. 1942), p. 3.

¹⁷⁶ ‘Administração do Conselho de Macau – Edital’ [Macau Council Administration – Proclamation], *ibid.* (27 Feb. 1942), p. 3; ‘Abutres’ [Vultures], *Renascimento* (18 May 1945), p. 1.

¹⁷⁷ ‘Administração do Conselho de Macau – Edital,’ *A Voz de Macau* (27 Mar. 1942), p. 3, my translation.

¹⁷⁸ MacKaskie, ‘Report’.

¹⁷⁹ ‘Mais uma exploração’ [One More Exploitation], *A Voz de Macau* (27 Feb. 1942), p. 3.

¹⁸⁰ Governor of Macau to MC, 23 Feb. 1942, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767, my translation.

¹⁸¹ Reeves, *The Lone Flag*, p. 14.

also blamed the prices and scarcity on the Japanese who controlled supplies.¹⁸² That month Teixeira informed Lisbon there had been three cases of cannibalism amongst Chinese refugees. A group of seven people involved in the incident, that had included sale of human flesh, was caught but the governor decided not to put them on trial. Instead he sent them away in a smuggling junk and spread the rumour that they had been executed to discourage others.¹⁸³ By the end of the month the average of death by starvation per day was sixty, with another two anthropophagic cases reported.¹⁸⁴ A censored letter sent by a lady in Macau to her fiancé in the navy in Lisbon vividly described cannibalism cases in Macau, including references to the cooking and selling of human flesh at the Hotel Central, one of Macau's main hotels.¹⁸⁵ Other accounts mention cannibalism and go as far as to indicate that premeditated killings were perpetrated to harvest human flesh.¹⁸⁶ Although references to cannibalism did not usually pertain to cases witnessed directly, their frequency in accounts of the period points towards a probable veracity.

In February 1943 Japanese forces took over the French enclave of Guangzhouwan, which had been the major line of supplies into Macau.¹⁸⁷ The effects were immediately felt, with rising prices and diminishing products. To try to find a solution for the supply problem, the governor convoked a meeting with rice merchants and charity representatives, including Gao Kening as president of the Commercial Association, the president of the Kiang Wu Hospital Liu Xutang, and Liang Houyuan as representative of the Chinese community.¹⁸⁸ Similar meetings were held several times, but the problem persisted. As the year went on, the governor informed that the number of

¹⁸² British Consul at Macau, 25 Apr., 1942, quoted in telegram from Embassy in Lisbon to Foreign Office, 26 Apr. 1942, TNA, FO 371/31630. Also in TNA, CO 825/30/12.

¹⁸³ Governor of Macau to MC, 1 Apr. 1942, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767.

¹⁸⁴ Governor of Macau to MC, 29 Apr. 1942, *ibid.*

¹⁸⁵ Censorship transcript dated 18 Dec. 1942 of letter from D. M. Sousa Afonso to Augusto Souto Silva Cruz, 23 July 1942, *ibid.*, my translation.

¹⁸⁶ E.g. Pinto, 'Guerra em Paz', pp. 80-2; Ana Maria Amaro's testimony in F. Lima and E. C. Torres, *Macau entre Dois Mundos* [Macau in Between Two Worlds] (Lisbon, 2004), p. 141.

¹⁸⁷ Governor of Macau to MC, 23 Feb. 1943, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768.

¹⁸⁸ 'Uma reunião no Palácio do Governo' [A meeting at the Government's Palace], *A Voz de Macau* (24 Feb. 1943), p. 3; 'O problema do arrôz' [The rice problem], *A Voz de Macau* (2 Mar. 1943), p. 3.

those who starved to death had increased. The famished robbed people with food parcels on the street and deliberately let themselves get caught pleading to be taken to jail where they would have something to eat.¹⁸⁹ In his post-war report to Lisbon, Carlos Vasconcelos, the BNU manager in Macau described the moral breakdown in the enclave in vivid terms, with ‘streets infested with cadaveric beggars,’ and the city’s cemetery with no more space for the dead, who were sent to Taipa island piled on a boat, ‘a macabre spectacle’ to which people got used to due its frequency. He also mentioned the ‘not few’ cases of cannibalism, the mutilated corpses of children with missing limbs found in a beggars’ asylum in the morning, and the ‘almost weekly’ murders on the street.¹⁹⁰ António de Andrade e Silva, who was harbour master in Macau from 1941 to 1945, also described in his unfinished memoirs shocking scenes of famine and inequality witnessed during the war, such as the sight of two famished boys rushing to devour the vomit left by drunken Japanese on the street.¹⁹¹ A case in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives also demonstrate the dire situation reached in wartime Macau at the same time as it reveals the challenges of information flow between those in Macau and their family members overseas. In 1944 a Chinese Canadian requested news about his family in Macau. After making enquiries it was concluded that his relatives had died of hunger.¹⁹² One historian estimated the numbers of death due to starvation and disease in Macau during the war surpassed 50,000.¹⁹³ The everyday visibility of starvation left a strong imprint in those who lived through it. Macanese lawyer and writer Henrique de Senna

¹⁸⁹ Governor of Macau to MC, 29 June 1943, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768.

¹⁹⁰ Vasconcelos, ‘Relatório’, p. 66, my translation.

¹⁹¹ Silva, *Eu estive em Macau*, p. 142.

¹⁹² Chinese Consul in Winnipeg to MOFA, 21 Aug. 1944; Chinese Legation in Lisbon to MOFA, 14 Oct. 1944, AH, Waijiaobu, 020000023906A.

¹⁹³ Tan, *Aomen zhuquan wenti*, p. 228.

Fernandes said when he saw news footage of the survivors of concentration camps in Europe at the end of the war it reminded him of what he had seen in Macau.¹⁹⁴

The rise of the intermediaries

Economic opportunities created by the war were closely linked to its social impact. Japanese supply blockades generated additional needs for food – and for compromise. Portuguese authorities gave in to demands to cede vessels and other materials in exchange for foodstuffs or access to food markets. The occupation of Hong Kong precipitated extraordinary measures that reinforced the power and influence of local elites who acted as intermediaries for the local government. Some, like the gambling concessionaries Gao Kening and Fu Deyin, were already prominent figures in Macau's business circles. Others, like Stanley Ho (He Hongshen), were newcomers from Hong Kong. And others still were part of the Portuguese administration, most notably Pedro José Lobo who would go on to have an important role in post-war gold trade in Macau and, it is said, even inspired Ian Fleming's *Goldfinger*.¹⁹⁵

The start of the war in Hong Kong precipitated events in Macau. Communications were temporarily suspended and the enclave's situation became, in the words of the BNU manager, one of 'complete isolation.'¹⁹⁶ With the local government's funds in Hong Kong inaccessible, and limited resources, a decision was made to take over contraband goods in the enclave. Vasconcelos explained that when Macau was cut out from the surrounding areas, there was a great quantity of stocks destined to be smuggled by boat to the Nationalists. The local authorities 'requisitioned from the stockists gasoline, oil,

¹⁹⁴ McGivering, *Macao Remembers*, p. 95. Similar comparisons were made by Cannon's interviewees (Cannon, 'Experience, Memory and the Construction of the Past', p. 15).

¹⁹⁵ P. Pons, *Macao*, trans. S. Adams (London, 2002), p. 121. For Ian Fleming's account of 1960s Macau see *Thrilling Cities* (London, 2013), pp. 25-49.

¹⁹⁶ Vasconcelos, 'Relatório', p. 52, my translation.

combustible oils, cotton yarn, raw materials and others, shut down grocery stores and bought basic necessities.¹⁹⁷ Lobo negotiated with a representative of the Japanese navy to guarantee supplies of rice. From then on, supplies were paid to the Japanese in silver and HK dollars. The Imports Regulation Commission, created in November 1941 took on a new role, concentrating the existing stocks in Macau to distribute them to different sectors and create reserves for an uncertain future. Initially, the BNU manager was also the commission's president, and began a process of manipulating prices by selling rice faster to those who paid in the currency needed at a particular time.¹⁹⁸ However, the local government was largely powerless to the actions of money exchangers, who speculated in everything, particularly silver.¹⁹⁹ Reeves reported to London on 'speculation on a vast scale' in several currencies, with a black market possibly involving Hong Kong, Indochina, Shanghai and unoccupied China, and profits being made by starting rumours.²⁰⁰ British and Portuguese sources decry the action of the men involved in wild currency trading, who, Vasconcelos stated, 'exploited everything to get rich, despoiling the population.'²⁰¹ However, the bank manager also believed that, all things considered, their action could be seen as 'beneficial,' stating that: 'if the Colony was able to survive, it owed it to them, to their connections with the Japanese and to their influence in the neighbouring regions, [as well as] to the cooperation they provided the Government regarding supplies.'²⁰²

Smuggling became a lifeline for the enclave. Macau was an entrepôt where petrol, petrol tins, rubber, scrap metal, leather, cloth and toilet articles could be smuggled into China in exchange for rice and, sometimes wolfram ore. Wolfram was also a key trading

¹⁹⁷ Ibid. p. 54.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid. p. 60.

¹⁹⁹ Heenan, Memorandum, p. 2; British Consul at Macau, 21 June 1943, quoted in telegram from Embassy in Lisbon to FO, 22 June 1943, TNA, FO 371/35733.

²⁰⁰ British Consul at Macau, 21 June 1943, quoted in telegram from Embassy in Lisbon to FO, 22 June 1943, TNA, FO 371/35733.

²⁰¹ Vasconcelos, 'Relatório', p. 63, my translation.

²⁰² Ibid., p. 78, my translation. Also quoted in Braga, *Macau Durante a II Guerra Mundial*, p. 79, and Botas, *Macau 1937-1945*, p. 255.

commodity in Portugal, where its supply to Germany was significant and controversial.²⁰³ The Japanese were involved in smuggling, with a British escapee noting the amounts were controlled by Japanese patrol boats and troops stationed along the West and Pearl Rivers in places like Shiqi, Tangjia, Sangchuan island or Doumen.²⁰⁴ Smuggling did not have to involve food, energy or military products. Reeves noted that looted American films were also being shown by Japanese.²⁰⁵

From early 1942, Japanese demands to Macau authorities began to mount. Démarches were made to acquire vessels, including some that were foreign property such as Dutch dredgers or the Panamanian ship *Masbate*. Incidents were reported to Lisbon, London and Chongqing but if protestations and excuses were able to stall some of the sales, they were not all successful.²⁰⁶ Vasconcelos noted that the Japanese asked for concessions in exchange for rice and other supplies to Macau, while the Portuguese felt ‘diminished and vexed’ in relation to the Chinese population who, he sensed, regarded them ‘with an expression of contempt and mockery.’²⁰⁷ The loss of colonial prestige was a major worry for the Portuguese authorities. But the war also provided opportunities to try to disentangle the bonds of subaltern colonialism. The case of MELCO is a good example of the ambiguities of the Anglo-Portuguese relationship in Macau.

British interests in Macau were limited to two companies, as seen in Chapter Two. One was the MELCO, the majority of its shares owned by the General Electric Company of China, a subsidiary of the General Electric Company. It had the monopoly of the

²⁰³ Reginbogin, *Faces of Neutrality*, pp. 128-29.

²⁰⁴ Knaggs, ‘Information’, TNA, FO 371/31630. A Macau resident during the war recalled later that ‘we could get things from Hong Kong (...) as long as we had a good contact amongst the Japanese’ (Lima Torres, *Macau entre Dois Mundos*, pp. 34-5, my translation).

²⁰⁵ British Consul at Macau, 19 Jan. 1943, quoted in telegram from Embassy in Lisbon to FO, 28 Jan. 1943, TNA, FO 371/35731.

²⁰⁶ ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768; TNA, FO 371/31630; TNA, FO 371/35731; TNA, FO 371/35732; TNA, FO 371/35733; TNA, FO 371/35734; TNA, FO 371/35736; AH, Waijiaobu, 020000023906A; Fernandes, *Confluência de Interesses*, pp. 39-40.

²⁰⁷ Vasconcelos, ‘Relatório’, p. 65, my translation.

supply of electric energy to Macau.²⁰⁸ The other was WATCO, a holding company for Macao Water Supply Company concessionary, whose functioning was closely linked to the electricity company. In late 1941, the chief of staff of the Japanese navy in Hong Kong visited the Macau governor and informed him no more coal would be supplied as it was intended for use by a British company.²⁰⁹ At the start of 1943 the Senate, Macau's municipal council, unilaterally took over MELCO's concession, causing a barrage of alarmed correspondence in British circles. In Lisbon, the secretary general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the British ambassador discussed the possibility of the requisition of MELCO being 'provisional for the period of the war, at the end of which the concession holders would regain their rights.' If such was agreed, 'it would be necessary to keep their agreement secret in order to avoid difficulties with the Japanese and to keep it secret from everyone in Macao itself.'²¹⁰ In Portugal the 'secret agreement' was not unequivocally settled until July 1945, when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a memorandum to the British embassy reporting that the Portuguese government had agreed to the solution proposed in February 1943. An agreement was regarded as embodied in letters and a memorandum previously exchanged.²¹¹ The provision of electric services was returned to the original company in December 1945.²¹² The MELCO case, which has been completely overlooked by the historiography on Anglo-Portuguese relations, is a clear example of how Britain sought to guarantee the post-war recovery of its commercial sphere in China and how Portuguese authorities demonstrated a certain opportunism to better their bargaining position by taking advantage of Britain's predicaments. In his memoirs, Reeves labelled it 'perhaps the worst moment of Anglo-

²⁰⁸ The exclusive of the electric supply to Macau was granted for 30 years to Marius Bert, based in Indochina, in 1904. After running into difficulties, it was trespassed to MELCO (Cónim and Teixeira, *Macau e a sua População*, p. 439).

²⁰⁹ Governor of Macau to MC, 4 Dec. 1942, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767.

²¹⁰ British Embassy in Lisbon to FO, 13 Feb. 1943, TNA, FO 371/35731.

²¹¹ Translation of MNE memorandum sent by the British Embassy in Lisbon to the FO, 19 July 1945, FO 371/46199.

²¹² 'Diploma legislativo n° 899', *Boletim Oficial da Colónia de Macau*, no. 50, 15 Dec. 1945, p. 467.

Portuguese relations throughout the war.²¹³ However, the agreement in Europe was also a clear example of Portuguese loyalty to the alliance with Britain.

Without being able to count on the British for help, the local authorities sought to tackle the economic and social crisis by engaging with the Japanese and local Chinese elites. The Macau Cooperative Company was founded by the initiative of Pedro Lobo. Officially, it would be dedicated to ‘commerce, industry and shipping (cargo and passengers) between Macau and other ports.’²¹⁴ The BNU manager explained how Japanese and Chinese were involved in it to guarantee supplies for Macau. The Imports Regulation Commission gave them metal bars and coins in exchange for foodstuffs.²¹⁵ The company’s secretary was a young refugee from Hong Kong who was to have a major role in post-war Macau: Stanley Ho. He was a great-nephew of Robert Ho Tung, who also lived in Macau during the occupation of Hong Kong. In an anthology of Macau-related recollections, he noted that the company’s main purpose was ‘to provide food’ for the enclave, and to achieve it the government supplied the company ‘with all the surplus they could afford to give away.’ He also gave English lessons to Sawa.²¹⁶ He remembered Macau as a site of opportunity during the conflict (‘Macau was paradise during the war’), a place where one could lead an enjoyable life and ‘excellent food’ if one ‘had the money.’²¹⁷ Other figures who became prominent in the post-war, such as He Xian, also became noted as intermediaries during the war.²¹⁸

The following year the BNU found another way of imposing some control on the economic crisis and getting a comfortable surplus in the process. After a talk with the manager of the Deutsche-Asiatische Bank in Guangzhou who had come to visit Macau,

²¹³ Reeves, *The Lone Flag*, p. 117.

²¹⁴ ‘Nova companhia’ [New Company], *A Voz de Macau* (11 May 1942), p. 3, my translation.

²¹⁵ Vasconcelos, ‘Relatório’, p. 70.

²¹⁶ McGivering, *Macao Remembers*, pp. 107-8; J. Studwell, *Asian Godfathers: Money and Power in Hong Kong and South-East Asia* (London, 2007), p. 19. Studwell listed as source for his section on Stanley Ho the notes of an interview Ho had given to Philip Snow in 1995.

²¹⁷ McGivering, *Macao Remembers*, p. 108

²¹⁸ Jorge and Coelho, *Roque Choi*, pp. 66-7.

Vasconcelos discovered they were interested in Swiss francs. In exchange they sold the BNU in Macau military yen and CRB dollars, both of which could be used to buy rice. The profits for the Portuguese bank were considerable.²¹⁹ The economic opportunities of the war in Macau were a distorted mirror image of what was going on in Portugal, where the conflict is regarded as having ‘allowed the accumulation of public and private capital, via fabulous “war businesses”.’²²⁰

The economic elite of Macau was also linked to the impoverished population by philanthropic practices. If the tightly censored press kept their potentially controversial business activities out of the limelight, it often reported the charitable donations of the ‘generous capitalists’ in town, a who’s who of pre-war and post-war tycoons in the region: Gao Kening, Fu Deyin, Robert Ho Tung, He Xian and even the Tiger Balm boss Aw Boon-hwa (Hu Wenhua) and his son, amongst several others, were often mentioned in a local daily as contributing to charitable relief of the poor in Macau.²²¹

While a detailed biographical study of Macau’s twentieth-century prominent businessmen remains to be written and falls outside the scope of this work, a few figures require a more extensive mention. First, Pedro Lobo, who is credited by Portuguese accounts as the key liaising element with Japanese and Chinese and one of those responsible for guaranteeing the respect for Portuguese nominal neutrality. Portuguese sources highly praise his negotiation capacity and ingenuity, often remarking on this ‘profound knowledge’ of the ‘Oriental soul,’ which can also be read as a veiled discriminatory remark on Lobo’s Eurasian origins.²²² Also, Cui Nouzi’s son, Cui Leqi,

²¹⁹ Vasconcelos, ‘Relatório’, p. 80.

²²⁰ Rosas, ‘Portuguese Neutrality’, p. 281.

²²¹ E.g. ‘Sir Robert Ho Tung,’ *A Voz de Macau* (17 Aug. 1942), p. 3. ‘Mais uma benemerencia do sr. Kou Hó Neng’ [One More Charitable Act by Mr Gao Kening], *ibid.* (28 Sept. 1942), p. 3; ‘Donativos á Beneficencia’ [Charitable Donations], *ibid.* (23 Dec. 1942), p. 3; ‘Donativo aos Pobres’ [Donation for the Poor], *ibid.* (13 Feb. 1943), p. 3; ‘Corações Generosos’ [Generous Hearts], *ibid.* (17 Feb. 1943), p. 3; ‘Bem Fazer’ [Doing Good], *ibid.* (11 Oct. 1944), p. 4; ‘Gestos Filantropicos’ [Philanthropic Gestures], *Renascimento* (8 May 1945), p. 2; ‘Beneficência’ [Charity], *Jornal de Notícias* (29 June 1945), p. 4.

²²² E.g. BNU Macau Manager to BNU Lisbon Manager, 15 Oct. 1941, ANTT, AOS, UL-5A, cx. 750, pt. 7, my translation; Governor of Macau to MC, 6 Feb. 1945, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768; M. Teixeira, “A

who would become a key intermediary figure in his own right in the post-war (as secretary to Lobo and He Xian), remembered Lobo's role during the conflict as being 'a sort of minister of foreign affairs' for the Macau's government.²²³ As will become clear in Chapter Five, Lobo was also in close contact with British and American intelligence. His son Roger, who had a remarkable career in Hong Kong after the war, was, by his own admission, 'involved with British intelligence' through his father.²²⁴ After the war the elder Lobo was invited to join a commission for Hong Kong's economic reconstruction as well as to be T.V. Soong's agent in the British colony, which demonstrated how he had the trust of both the British and the Nationalists.²²⁵

Amongst the Chinese elite in Macau two names figure prominently in sources of the period: Gao Kening and Fu Deyin, whose company Tai Heng (Tai Xing) had been granted the lucrative gambling monopoly and owned one of the main hotels in the territory, the Hotel Central. Gao had been previously connected to an opium processing business in Macau, and had founded a currency exchanging house that later expanded into a bank. During the war he was president of the Macau Commercial Association, the local chamber of commerce. He was also connected to two of the key Chinese charities in the city, the Kiang Wu Hospital and the Tung Sin Tong. In 1942 Gao was decorated by the Portuguese government with the title of 'comendador.'²²⁶ His dealings with the Japanese were well known but the governor was willing to vouch for him politically, asking Reeves to convey that to the Nationalists in 1943.²²⁷ Indeed, as will be seen in Chapter Six, the Chinese government had Gao on a list of traitors, although, like his business partner, he was never sentenced to anything. After the war, the governor tried to clean up

Alfandega Roubada" e "O Barco Roubado" [‘The Stolen Customs Station’ and ‘The Stolen Boat’], *Boletim Eclesiástico da Diocese de Macau* [Macau Diocese Ecclesiastic Bulletin], 885 (1978), p. 526; Alberto Barros Lopes testimony in Lima and Torres, *Macau entre Dois Mundos*, p. 35.

²²³ Lima and Torres, *Macau entre Dois Mundos*, p. 97, my translation.

²²⁴ McGivering, *Macao Remembers*, p. 75.

²²⁵ BNU Macau Manager to Lisbon, 30 Ago. 1945, CGD, AG-011-7-185.

²²⁶ 'Ordem de Benemerencia' [Charitable Order], *A Voz de Macau* (10 Dec. 1942), p. 3.

²²⁷ Reeves quoted in despatch from the British Consulate General in Guilin to Chancery, 28 Jan. 1943, TNA, FO 371/35731.

the image of some alleged collaborators. He wrote to the British consul, and copies reached the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that to be able to crack a Japanese blockade during the war, he had the names of several Chinese citizens in Macau falsely announced as traitors on radio Chongqing, in order to convince the Japanese to allow them to get some food supplies into Macau. The names were transmitted by Reeves to Guilin and amongst them were Gao and Fu.²²⁸

How much money and goods were transacted in Macau during the war in impossible to ascertain but Allied actions against the enclave demonstrate that wartime profiteering raised some alarm. Vessels from Macau had been a target since 1937, as seen in Chapter Two, but as naval warfare in the Pacific went on into full swing in the 1940s, the enclave's shipping capability became increasingly depleted. In late May 1943 the cargo ship *Wing Wah* (also known by the Japanese name *Eika Maru*) travelling under Portuguese flag but with a Japanese charter, was torpedoed and sunk near Haiphong by an American submarine. The steamer had been allowed by the Japanese to make occasional voyages, for example to Guangzhouwan and Xiamen, for supplies.²²⁹ When it was sunk it was bringing rice and coal (required for water supply) from Indochina, both of which were in desperate need in Macau.²³⁰ In a long letter to the British consul-general at Guilin reporting on his intelligence-related activities, Reeves provided additional information on the *Wing Wah* case. Of the more than 300 people on board only 15 were saved and amongst the dead were 11 Japanese officials who were coming to take up military positions in Haiphong. The material losses were also considerable, and included millions worth of wolfram, copper, iron bars, and gold bars.²³¹ With the loss of its last supply ship, Portuguese authorities in Macau asked for authorisation for the Panamanian steamship

²²⁸ Teixeira to Reeves, 27 June, 1946, MOFA delegate in Macau copy, 7 Ago. 1946. AH, Waijiaobu, 020000003314A.

²²⁹ Heenan, Memorandum, p. 3.

²³⁰ Governor of Macau to MC, 12 June 1943, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx.768.

²³¹ Extract from Macau letter to Guilin, 14 June 1943, sent with despatch from the British Embassy in Chongqing to FO, 8 Sept. 1943, TNA, FO 371/35736.

Masbate to sail under a Red Cross flag which the governor thought preferable than to requisition the ship as it would exempt Portugal from the costs if it was also torpedoed.²³² Through Lobo's mediation, the Portuguese authorities contacted the head of the Allied intelligence services in South China to guarantee the safe passage of the ship. He agreed to help but, in another revealing passage of the little tensions that existed on each side, recommended that Reeves was not contacted because he was a 'drunkard' and not trustworthy.²³³ In the end the *Masbate* did not sail under a Red Cross flag but under the Portuguese one,²³⁴ with a safe-conduct issued by the British consul that would be revoked if the ship transported contraband or stopped at other ports apart from Haiphong and Saigon.²³⁵ When the ship returned to Macau, accusations of having transported enemy cargo were indeed made, but denied by the governor.²³⁶ The complex web of people involved in Macau's wartime shipping also reveals how supplies for refugee relief and contraband for the belligerents were often difficult to separate.

American bombing

Appearing to confirm that some suspicious businesses were going on in the enclave, Macau was bombed by American aircraft on five occasions in 1945.²³⁷ In mid January Macau was attacked four times. The former Pan-American Airways hanger, where 250 50-gallon drums of petrol belonging to the local government were stored was destroyed and the radio and power stations were 'slightly damaged.' Two people on a

²³² Governor of Macau to MC, 8 June 1943. ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768.

²³³ Governor of Macau to MC, 5 Feb. 1943, *ibid.*.

²³⁴ Governor of Macau to MC, 8 Feb. 1943, *ibid.*.

²³⁵ Governor of Macau to MC, 22 Mar. 1944, *ibid.*.

²³⁶ Governor of Macau to MC, 2 May 1944; Translation of letter from Jack Nicholls at the British Embassy in Lisbon to MNE, undated; Governor of Macau to MC, 5 May 1944, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768; MOFA to British Embassy, 31 Mar. 1944; British Embassy in Chongqing to MOFA, 3 June 1944; MOFA to Bureau of Statistics, 20 June 1944, AH, Waijiaobu, 020000023906A.

²³⁷ Fernandes, *Sinopse de Macau*, pp. 27-32.

vessel in the harbour were killed.²³⁸ Portuguese sources give a full account of the attack that had also aimed at a small fort and military barracks. Given the targeted locations and the fact that it had been sunny that day, the attack appeared deliberate.²³⁹ The governor noted how some refugees in Macau could ‘barely hide their satisfaction’ as they believed it to be the ‘the prelude to an Allied landing.’²⁴⁰ The English-language paper *Macau Tribune* was suppressed by the governor (without Lisbon’s prior approval) for failing ‘to express sufficient disgust’ when reporting the event.²⁴¹

Censorship, however, did not prevent attacks. In February 1945 a Japanese military plane with a slight malfunction landed in Macau. The pilot asked to have it repaired and leave but the governor refused and parked the plane.²⁴² A few days later, an American plane bombed the place where the Japanese one was parked, but did not hit it, and also fired shots at the *Masbate*, the Tamagnini de Barbosa neighbourhood for the poor, and barracks near the Barrier Gate. Four people were killed and a few were wounded. Again, the visibility had been good and the governor considered it a deliberate attack.²⁴³ In early April an American bomber sank a tugboat in the canal at the entrance of the outer harbour, killing 19 people.²⁴⁴ In June three bombs were dropped near the 28 de Maio social housing neighbourhood by an unidentified aircraft. Houses were damaged and ‘people were machine-gunned’ resulting in one dead and two injured.²⁴⁵ The British denied responsibility and analysis made to bomb fragments proved they were similar to

²³⁸ Kweilin Intelligence Summary No. 83, 26 Jan. 1945, HKU, MF 2530701, Roll 18.

²³⁹ Minister of Foreign Affairs to Portuguese Embassy in Washington, 16 Jan. 1945, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768.

²⁴⁰ Governor of Macau to MC, 15 Jan. 1944, *ibid.*.

²⁴¹ British Embassy in Lisbon to Foreign Office, 14 Mar. 1945, TNA, FO 371/46199.

²⁴² Governor of Macau to MC, 19 Feb. 1945. ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768.

²⁴³ Governor of Macau to MC, 25 Feb. 1945, *ibid.*.

²⁴⁴ Governor of Macau to MC, 7 Apr. 1945, *ibid.*; ‘Nota oficiosa’ [Unofficial note]. ANTT, AOS, PC-2D, cx. 587, pt. 25.

²⁴⁵ Governor of Macau to MC, 12 June 1945, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768; Portuguese Embassy in London to FO, 15 June 1945, FO 371/46199.

the former so it was concluded they had been dropped by an American plane.²⁴⁶ In late July another Allied aircraft dropped two or four bombs over Coloane island, causing no victims or damages.²⁴⁷ After the war, the American government apologised for the ‘mistake’ and paid compensation in 1950.²⁴⁸

At the time of the second bombing, a note from Salazar in the Lisbon newspaper *Diário da Manhã* lamented the event and stated that neutrality had been perfectly maintained despite the presence of Japanese forces in Chinese territories contiguous to Macau. That was evident since none of the Allied nations had made diplomatic protests over the conduct of the local Portuguese authorities.²⁴⁹ Such an immaculate image is not corroborated if one reads the diplomatic correspondence of the period, where suspicions and complaints over the practice of Portuguese neutrality in Macau were made by different sides. In fact, some authors considered the bombings a premeditated action against the Macau Portuguese authorities’ ‘pro-Japanese neutrality’.²⁵⁰ While this work argues that the situation on the ground was a lot more complex and involved multiple layers of cooperation, the bombings do indicate that abuses of Macau’s neutrality were not without consequences.

²⁴⁶ Air Ministry to FO, 14 July 1945, FO 371/46199; Governor of Macau to MC, 14 June 1945, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768.

²⁴⁷ Governor of Macau to MC, 26 July 1945, *ibid.*; British Embassy in Lisbon to FO, 29 July 1945, FO 371/46199.

²⁴⁸ Garret, *The Defences of Macao*, p. 116.

²⁴⁹ ‘Macau foi de novo bombardeada por um avião americano’ [Macau was Bombed Again by an American Plane], *Diário da Manhã* (26 Feb. 1945), ANTT, AOS, PC-2D, cx. 587, pt. 25.

²⁵⁰ Fernandes, *Sinopse de Macau*, p. 27; Braga, *Macau Durante a II Guerra Mundial*, p. 58.

4.4. Badlands: Urban crime in 1940s Macau

Similarly to other wartime cities, notably the better studied case of Shanghai,²⁵¹ Macau was a stage for multiple acts of political and economically motivated urban crime. In Portuguese sources, these acts were often attributed to ‘pirates’ and ‘bandits.’ The unavailability of Macau police records hampers a more in-depth knowledge of those involved, their motivations, and the colonial state’s response to their acts. But references in other sources provide colourful descriptions of criminality revealing it as part of the everyday normal in wartime Macau.²⁵²

Episodes of urban crime connected to the war began in 1937. In November, a Chinese small trader was killed in the middle of the one of Macau’s busiest streets, the incident being linked to the fact that he sold Japanese goods.²⁵³ In the 1940s, these episodes continued. In April 1942 the governor reported that a group of armed ‘pirates’ from Lappa and Zhongshan came to Macau. After a few days, shooting incidents had left several policemen and assailants dead.²⁵⁴ In December, two bombs went off simultaneously in two *fantan* houses²⁵⁵ causing several dead and injured. Teixeira considered it possible that it had been a political act against some partners of the gambling company that were considered pro-Japanese.²⁵⁶ Indeed, information intercepted by the British suggested that Chinese ‘patriotic youths’ were attempting to ‘clean up’

²⁵¹ E.g. Wakeman Jr., *The Shanghai Badlands*; B. G. Martin, *The Shanghai Green Gang: Politics and Organized Crime, 1919-1937* (Berkeley, 1996); B. Wasserstein, *Secret War in Shanghai: Treachery, Subversion and Collaboration in the Second World War* (London, 1998); W. H. Yeh, ‘Urban Warfare and Underground Resistance: Heroism in the Chinese Secret Service During the War of Resistance’, in *Wartime Shanghai*, pp. 111-32.

²⁵² This has been noted by Cannon, who heard several crime stories in her oral history work with ‘resident Macanese.’ She interpreted these as evidence of ‘a strong fear that pervaded day-to-day life’ for this community (Cannon, ‘Experience, Memory and the Construction of the Past’, p. 27).

²⁵³ ‘Respeitem-se as leis’ [Respect the Law], *A Voz de Macau* (29 Nov. 1937), p. 2.

²⁵⁴ Governor of Macau to MC, 29 Apr. 1942, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767.

²⁵⁵ On this game see: X. Paulès, ‘Gambling in China Reconsidered: *Fantán* in South China during the Early Twentieth Century’, *International Journal of Asian Studies*, 7/2 (2010), pp. 179-200.

²⁵⁶ Governor of Macau to MC, 19 Dec. 1942, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767.

alleged traitors in the enclave.²⁵⁷ In October a Chinese man linked to the Japanese secret service was shot (but not killed) in Macau,²⁵⁸ and the following year a bomb went off in a film theatre showing a Japanese film.²⁵⁹

If some of the crimes were committed for political reasons, economic blackmail was also common. In January 1943 an attack was committed by a man the governor described as a ‘bandit’ who commanded 2,000 ‘pirates’ active in the northeast of Zhongshan. He delivered a bomb wrapped around a child who had been paid a pittance to wait in a fan-tan house until it went off. The goal had been to demand from the concessionaries a tax of 1,000 patacas per month. To solve the problem Teixeira got the gambling concessionaries to speak to the criminal’s emissaries.²⁶⁰ Local bosses were regarded by the authorities as intermediaries to deal with troublemakers of all sorts. Incidents against money exchangers, traders or even the police occurred several times. For example, in 2 January 1945, three violent acts (a grenade throwing, a shooting, and an attempted murder) were committed in succession.²⁶¹ At the end of that month three bombs went off by the offices of the main Portuguese-language daily in Macau.²⁶²

Sometimes confrontations escalated, involving the Macau police directly, which was likely infiltrated by all sides. Once again, this was not unique to Macau and similar situations were noted for ‘lonely island’ Shanghai.²⁶³ In August 1944 the police arrested a Chinese collaborator, but two others intervened, taking him to a hotel that was later surrounded. Japanese armed with pistols and swords, covered by men with machine-guns, then joined them to contest the arrest. The governor ordered the police commander to withdraw, fearing an escalation that would lead to a bloodbath. Sawa and Fukui spoke to

²⁵⁷ ‘The Portuguese Colony of Macao,’ 5 Mar., 1942, TNA, HS 1/176.

²⁵⁸ Governor of Macau to MC, 10 Oct. 1943, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768.

²⁵⁹ Governor of Macau to MC, 17 Sept. 1944, *ibid.*

²⁶⁰ Governor of Macau, 19 Dec. 1942 quoted in letter from MC to MNE, 13 Jan. 1943, AHD, 2P, A48, M221.

²⁶¹ ‘Incidentes tragicos’ [Tragic Incidents], *A Voz de Macau* (5 Jan. 1945), p. 4.

²⁶² ‘Um acto de malvadez’ [A Mean Act], *A Voz de Macau* (30 Jan. 1945), p. 1.

²⁶³ Bickers, *Empire Made Me*, p. 313.

the governor and to Lobo on separate occasions and attributed such incidents to mental pressure. Japanese defeats were causing everyone in Macau except the authorities to show them how much they were hated. To Lisbon the governor admitted such concerns had grounds. He had heard people say out loud that the day for payback to the Japanese was near and that the police was with them. Teixeira then gave 'severe instructions' to refugee centres that any attitude against neutrality would be punished.²⁶⁴ If doubts existed on the political mobilisation of refugees in Macau, documents such as these dispel it.

Confrontations involving Japanese, Taiwanese, and pro-Japanese against pro-Chiang Chinese were common. In February 1945 an agent of the pro-KMT paramilitary group Blue Shirts was shot in the Chinese bazaar by a member of a pro-Japanese group. The governor, fearing another string of urban crime like that of 1939, contacted Chongqing to urge the Nationalists not to exert reprisals.²⁶⁵ Sawa denied knowledge of events and blamed the Macau police. He claimed it had had many members recruited amongst refugees from Hong Kong and Guangzhou who were connected to British and Chongqing interests and, therefore, not interested in protecting Japanese lives. Later, the police commander, captain Alberto Carlos Ribeiro da Cunha, was singled out as having connections to the Nationalists. The governor defended him saying he had contacts with all sides in order to gather information and do his job properly. Sawa then assured the governor he had superior instructions to respect Macau's neutrality and proposed a list of names to be hired as guards. According to the governor, all of them were implicated in the incidents so he refused.²⁶⁶ In Lisbon, Morishima also told the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Macau government employed, particularly in the police, 'many Chinese of which part are simple Chinese or Anglo-American agents.' He suggested the governor should be requested to accept a list of names of those 'suspect or undesirable,' but this

²⁶⁴ Governor of Macau to MC, 4 Aug 1944, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768.

²⁶⁵ Governor of Macau to MC, 6 Feb. 1945, *ibid.*.

²⁶⁶ Governor of Macau to MC, 14, 15 and 20 Mar. and 5 Apr. 1945, *ibid.*.

was not accepted.²⁶⁷ With their loyalty questioned, agents became targets. In January 1945 a Chinese policeman from Singapore in the Macau special branch was murdered in front of a film theatre.²⁶⁸ The police's connections to the KMT were to surface in the post-war, as will be covered in Chapter Six.

Some of the primary sources on urban crime mention an important element connected to the Japanese in Macau: the Taiwanese. Along with Koreans, their presence in Macau is noted in different documents.²⁶⁹ Some were engaged in businesses, others seem to have been also linked to other activities. In 1944 it was estimated that there were around 150 Taiwanese in Macau. They were portrayed as a paradigm of wartime anything-goes attitudes: heavy drinkers, nighttime dancers, with their own gangs planning future looting; ultimately, also with agency, not obedient puppets to the Japanese. As an anonymous report amongst the governor's papers noted: 'these Formosans are out to engage upon irregularities, without the knowledge of the Japanese.'²⁷⁰ The Taiwanese testify to Macau's interlocking with the imperial Japanese sphere in South China, where many Formosans found opportunities for themselves.

The Sai-On case

No act of urban crime in Macau, possibly not even the assassination of the Japanese consul mentioned before, received the same amount of international attention as the takeover of the British ship *S.S. Sai-On* (Xi'An). Around 2 a.m. on 19 August, 1943, a group of people, initially described as being pro-Wang Jingwei, landed in Macau and

²⁶⁷ Note on conversation with the Japanese minister, 23 Mar. 1945, ANTT, AOS, NE-7B, Pt. 40, my translation.

²⁶⁸ 'Assassinato' [Murder], *A Voz de Macau* (9 Jan. 1945), p. 4.

²⁶⁹ E.g. British Consul at Macau, 25 Apr, 1942, quoted in telegram from Embassy in Lisbon to FO, 26 Apr. 1942, TNA, FO 371/31630; Tomio Fukasako [to Head of Macau Civil Administration Services?], 21 Mar., 1944, AM, MO/AH/AC/SA/01/25736. After the war, some Taiwanese in Macau were accused of helping the Japanese, as can be seen by the case of Chen Qingtu, who had served as a translator and cook (AS-IMH, Waijiaobu, 074/0001).

²⁷⁰ Unsigned typed information, 6, Sept. 1944. AHU, Espólio Gabriel Maurício Teixeira.

towed away the *Sai-On* with all of its passengers, including many Filipinos, Portuguese-British and also three British adults and three British children. In his memoirs, Reeves stated seventy refugees were on board the ship the night ‘all hell was let loose in the Colony.’²⁷¹ To guarantee the success of the mission, the consul reported at the time, the perpetrators ‘mounted four machine guns near the wharf and had bodies of men with guns at many points of the city to create diversions.’²⁷² The intensity of the firing was such that a riot police van five minutes from the scene did not dare approach it for twenty. Three tugs removed the ship from the wharf, an operation that took about one hour without the police having tried to sink a single tug. Troops were ordered to remain inside the barracks as the ‘pirates’ left in junks. Although the tugs used were identified as having re-entered Macau, no action was taken against them. The governor was informed that ‘pirates’ from Zhongshan had been paid 150,000 military yen to do the job.²⁷³ He later learned that it had been planned by a Japanese navy sector but their commanders and the army had disapproved and the latter would hand back the refugees.²⁷⁴ The incident made for great propaganda by the Nationalists. The Central News Agency reported, inflating the numbers, that ‘more than 20 Portuguese armed guards and policemen’ had been killed when ‘Japanese naval authorities (...) forcibly commandeered the British river boat’ out of Macau with ‘more than 100 refugees’ and large quantities of merchandise on board.²⁷⁵

For Reeves, evidence was clear of Japanese involvement, confirmed by their ships having switched off the lights ‘simultaneously with the cutting of the public lighting in the wharves area’ while ‘parties of armed men were seen leaving on the Japanese ships to assist.’ Reeves believed the Portuguese authorities had not attempted to stop the ship

²⁷¹ Reeves, *The Lone Flag*, p. 98.

²⁷² British Consul at Macau, 19 Aug. 1943, quoted in telegram from Embassy in Lisbon to FO, 21 Aug. 1943, TNA, FO 371/35735.

²⁷³ Governor of Macau to MC, 20 Aug. 1943, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768.

²⁷⁴ Governor of Macau to MC, 23 Aug. 1943, *ibid.*.

²⁷⁵ AH, Waijiaobu, 020000023906A.

because they ‘were afraid of [the] occupation of Macau.’²⁷⁶ The FO also considered this ‘act of banditry’ to be ‘clearly the work of the Japanese.’ By using Wang Jingwei’s agents they were discarding responsibility in case of a Portuguese protest, which they would redirect to the Nanjing government unrecognised by Portugal. The police’s slow response and the inability to prevent the seizure of the ship was not to be the focus of British protests, which would instead only press Portugal into protesting to Japan and demanding the return of the ship and the people on board.²⁷⁷ In Lisbon, Salazar told the British ambassador, Reginald Hugh Campbell, that the Portuguese government had ‘no doubt that the raid had been organised by the Japanese’ and had protested immediately.²⁷⁸ He read Campbell the telegrams sent from Teixeira to the minister of colonies who showed ‘the police were genuinely baffled by numerous diversions created in the town by accomplices of raiders’ and he had decided not to open fire on the ship because of the refugees on board.²⁷⁹ Satisfied with the explanations, the FO decided not to pursue its protest but hoped the US would.²⁸⁰ The State Department confirmed that its chargé d’affaires in Lisbon was instructed to demand the return of the Filipinos on board and to coordinate his actions with the British ambassador.²⁸¹ But Washington was more concerned that events in Macau did not lead to the breaking off of Portuguese-Japanese relations, as this would interrupt the American-Japanese exchange under preparation.²⁸²

Breaches of neutrality could be ignored when that neutrality also granted advantages.

²⁷⁶ British Consul at Macau, 21 Aug. 1943, quoted in telegram from Embassy in Lisbon to FO, 24 Aug. 1943, TNA, FO 371/35735.

²⁷⁷ FO to Embassy in Lisbon, 24 Aug. 1943, *ibid.*.

²⁷⁸ British Embassy in Lisbon to FO, 25 Aug. 1943, *ibid.*.

²⁷⁹ British Embassy in Lisbon to FO, 28 Aug. 1943, *ibid.*. In a later telegram to Lisbon Teixeira stated he had given the order to sink the ship but later reversed it due to the refugees on board (Governor of Macau to MC, 29 Sept. 1943, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768).

²⁸⁰ FO to British Embassy in Washington, 1 Sept. 1943, TNA, FO 371/35735.

²⁸¹ Department of State to FO, 8 Sept. 1943, *ibid.*.

²⁸² Department of State to FO, 10 Oct. 1943, TNA, FO 371/35736. Two American-Japanese exchanges took place in Portuguese-controlled territories during the war, one in Lourenço Marques (now Maputo) in Mozambique, in July 1942 and one in Mormugão, Goa, in September 1943 (P. S. Corbett, *Quiet Passages: The Exchange of Civilians between the United States and Japan during the Second World War* [Kent, Ohio, 1987], pp. 56-95).



Figure 5. Model of the *Sai-On* (after being renamed as *Tung-Shan* [Dong Shan]), Macau Maritime Museum

The following month, the Japanese naval attaché in Lisbon received a telegram informing that the governor of Macau had told Fukui he agreed the *Sai-On* incident had been the ‘work of pirates’ and apologised for ‘having made a fuss without good reasons.’²⁸³ In Macau, the governor’s enquiries were unable to confirm Japanese complicity in the event because ‘no Chinese dares to incriminate Japanese while they have not withdrawn from South China as they know they would pay for the testimony with their life or that of their families living in occupied areas.’²⁸⁴ He had information that machine-guns lent to the assailants had been provided by the Japanese navy at Maliuzhou but proof would only be possible to obtain after the Japanese left the region.

In Lisbon and Macau, Portuguese authorities made endeavours for the ship and its passengers to be returned. The Japanese minister blamed the seizure on pirates and told Salazar that ‘in accordance with the principles of international law,’ it would not be possible to return the ship. The matter was left unsettled until Japan captured the ‘pirates.’²⁸⁵ Morishima’s moves were reported by the Chinese minister to Chongqing.²⁸⁶ In Macau, the consul showed Teixeira a list of passengers to confirm who was

²⁸³ Japanese Minister in Lisbon to Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 21 Sept. 1943, TNA, HW 12/293.

²⁸⁴ Governor of Macau to MC, 29 Sept. 1943, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768, my translation.

²⁸⁵ Japanese Minister in Lisbon to Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 6 Oct. 1943, TNA, HW 12/293.

²⁸⁶ Chinese Minister in Lisbon to MOFA, Oct. 27 1943. AH, Waijiaobu, 020000023906A.

Portuguese. The governor confirmed all and insisted he wanted the return of everyone irrespective of their nationality. Fukui said he would do his best but no answer had come from Tokyo. Teixeira was moved by his honesty and wrote to Lisbon that he was ‘the best’ Japanese but the others did not like him saying he was ‘more Portuguese than Japanese.’²⁸⁷ A few days later, 15 people who had been on the ship returned to Macau, including women and children.²⁸⁸ In early December the Japanese legation in Lisbon issued a statement declaring that all Portuguese who had been taken by the pirates had returned and all British subjects had been released.²⁸⁹ This was not true and in January the British legation in Lisbon left an aide-memoire with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs urging the Portuguese government to press for the release of two British engineers who had not returned to Macau.²⁹⁰ The case was not properly settled and in April 1945 the governor reported that a Chinese man who had perpetrated the *Sai-On* robbery was arrested with others. He worked for the Japanese navy who requested to have him handed over to them. The Portuguese complied.²⁹¹ In 1947, a letter published in the *China Weekly Review* noted that an ‘admiral’ who had participated in the capture of the *Sai-On* was working for the KMT in Taipei. This was likely to refer to Gan Zhiyuan, a naval commander in South China who collaborated with the Japanese.²⁹²

The web of communications surrounding the ship’s misadventures highlights the international dimensions of the uses and abuses of Portuguese neutrality in Asia. When the war ended, the *Sai-On* returned to passenger service between Macau and Hong Kong

²⁸⁷ Governor of Macau to MC, 3 Oct. 1943, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768, my translation.

²⁸⁸ British Embassy in Lisbon to FO, 30 June 1945, TNA, FO 371/35736; Governor of Macau to MC, 19 Oct., 1943, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768.

²⁸⁹ British Embassy in Lisbon to FO, 7 Dec. 1943, TNA, FO 371/35736.

²⁹⁰ British Embassy in Lisbon to MNE, 17 Jan. 1944, TNA, FO 371/41620.

²⁹¹ Governor of Macau to MC, 30 Apr. 1945, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768.

²⁹² ‘Mandated Taiwan’, *The China Weekly Review* (20 Dec. 1947), p. 65; ‘Protecting Puppets’, *The China Weekly Review* (14 Dec. 1946), p. 32; ‘Macao’s Sins’, *The China Weekly Review* (7 June 1947), p. 4.

but was destroyed in a fire in 1947. Decades later, after being rebuilt and renamed, it was sent to be dismantled... in Japan.²⁹³

The *Sai-On* incident exposed to the world how vulnerable Macau was to attacks by pro-Japanese agents. Together with the other cases of urban crime described in this section, it showed the weakness of local Portuguese authorities in keeping Macau safe during the war. Despite their efforts to control confrontations in the street, which may have avoided even more breakdown of public security, episodes kept occurring. Attempts made for their resolution indicate the importance of contacts with and concessions to Japanese forces.

Conclusion

The flexible uses of Portuguese neutrality in Macau and the different layers of collaboration which marked them reached a critical point during Macau's 'lonely island' period, from December 1941 to September 1945. This chapter detailed how, in those years, Macau became an arena where different actors competed for political legitimacy, economic control, and social influence.

Perceived breaches of Portuguese neutrality were attentively followed by the Nationalists. The Chinese central government remained interested in Macau's situation and kept contacts with Portuguese authorities there through its agents in the territory and in Lisbon via its legation. Its concern for the impact of the war on the Chinese population was not only directed towards Macau and Lisbon but also towards the, then, Portuguese colony of Timor, which remained under Japanese occupation from 1942 until the end of the war.

²⁹³ Reeves, *The Lone Flag*, p. 99, p. 193; author's visit to the Macau Maritime Museum, February 2015.

The so-called Pacific War phase marked the culmination of the pressures imposed on Macau by Japanese and collaborator authorities addressed in Chapter Two. The enclave also experienced a social crisis. The constraints on food supplies led to hunger and disease affecting a growing number of refugees, as thousands fleeing Hong Kong joined those who had arrived in previous years. Neutrality turned Macau into a haven for many but it also fuelled the rampant inequality that made some victims of the war objects of charity while some of their benefactors were enriched by the conflict.

Showing care for the Chinese in Macau was an arena for legitimacy competition and the RNG authorities in Guangdong tried to use it to their advantage. Their partial control over rice supplies to Macau meant that the enclave's authorities had to engage with them in what, in practice, ended up being unofficial relations, attested by visits and attempts to forge local supply agreements. The Macau authorities also tried to exploit divisions between the collaborators and the Japanese forces as well as within the Japanese to get some breathing space and much needed supplies. In times of great need, multiple forms of collaboration were attempted or redesigned. They kept (some) food on the table, bought safety and time, and kept Portuguese colonialism in place since the belligerents had more pressing worries than overthrowing an accommodating small power.

Building up on the links between politics, diplomacy, and society addressed in the previous chapters, this chapter demonstrated how the lack of foodstuffs was a crucial feature of Macau's wartime experience in the 1940s. It had devastating effects on the increased population and was used to justify concessions to Japanese and collaborators. Local businessmen and moneychangers enhanced their economic power and political influence, being co-opted by the government as key supply providers. Some of these wartime economic elites assumed an even greater importance in post-war Macau.

Profiteering and collaboration did attract attention however. Not only was Macau's shipping highly disrupted by Allied attacks in the Pacific, the territory itself was

bombed several times in 1945. Criminal acts, politically or economically motivated also left a trail of blood on Macau's streets, with the colonial authorities unable to secure them effectively despite their best efforts. These complicate the picture of a neutral Macau, showing how its experience had many similarities with occupied cities in China, notably with Shanghai. The Macau case demonstrates that collaboration did not require a formal occupation.

An important element in the international chess played in wartime Macau, with its own links to shadow activities and a pool of intermediaries, was the British consulate. Its activities will be analysed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5

Colonial transplantation: Hong Kong in Macau, 1942-1946

Introduction

The Japanese occupation of Hong Kong had a profound impact on neighbouring Macau. This chapter argues that from 1942 to 1945 Macau resumed the important role in British activities in South China it had lost after the first Opium War in the nineteenth century. The British element is of key importance. Anglo-Portuguese imperial solidarity and occasional rivalry conditioned both Sino-Portuguese and Sino-British relations. As seen in Chapter Two, Macau and Hong Kong were united by geographical proximity, colonial status, and an international alliance. They were also connected through an important human dimension embodied in the Portuguese, Chinese, and many others who moved between Macau and Hong Kong, with personal and professional engagements in both territories. These connections became of great importance when the temporary loss of Hong Kong led to a colonial transplantation to Macau, with echoes of the old British presence there during the Canton system. This lasted until 1946, when most of the Hong Kong refugees returned or left for other places.

From early 1942 to 1945, the Portuguese-administered enclave became the nearest possible point of refuge for thousands of people who fled Hong Kong through open or underground means. In Macau, the British consulate not only guaranteed relief to multinational refugee communities, it also became a node in intelligence and escape networks that used Macau to get people, goods and information in and out of Hong Kong, Guangzhouwan, and unoccupied China. In Macau, assistance to the British was effected

by a number of people and institutions, of which the Macau Delegation of the Portuguese Red Cross is a prime example.

This chapter also demonstrates how Macau was important in preparing the British reoccupation of Hong Kong in 1945. It reveals how the existence of neutral Macau contributed to the post-war maintenance of two major remnants of colonialism in Chinese territory even after China emerged victorious and (almost) fully sovereign at the end of the Second World War.

5.1. Escapes from Hong Kong

People left Hong Kong to Macau at different times and by different means but one thing was common to all: the international interactions before and during the escape. Many reached Macau through evacuation drives set up at the moment. These were not formally planned in Lisbon but had a certain official capacity since they were organised by the Macau government through contacts with the Portuguese consulate and the Japanese authorities. In Hong Kong, matters were coordinated by the Portuguese vice-consul, F.P.V. Soares, who opened his house in Kowloon to some four hundred refugees who he fed with the help of a Chinese merchant.¹ Soares was, himself, a Hong Kong Portuguese affected by the war, having two sons taken as POW by the Japanese.² In 1942 he registered more than 1,100 people as Portuguese, possibly illegally, so they could flee to Macau with third national passes issued by the Japanese authorities. An author, who stated that more than 90 per cent of the Hong Kong Portuguese went to Macau during the war, described Soares as ‘Hong Kong’s Schindler.’³ His actions were not unanimously

¹ B. H. M. Ko, *The Portuguese in Hongkong and China: The Beginning, Settlement and Progress to 1949* (Macau, 2013), ii, p. 127; Braga, ‘Nossa Gente’, p. 118.

² A. G. Dias, ‘Os Refugiados de Hong Kong (1942)’ [The Hong Kong Refugees (1942)], *Revista de Cultura*, 34 (2010), p. 125.

³ Braga, ‘Nossa Gente’ in *Wartime Macau*, pp. 119-20.

received, being criticised by both the governor, G.M. Teixeira, and Leo D'Almada e Castro, who represented the Hong Kong Portuguese refugees in Macau and whose involvement in refugee relief has already been alluded to in Chapter Three.⁴

For the Macau authorities, the Portuguese community in the neighbouring colony was its main priority. At the end of January, the local government opened applications for those who could provide housing, food or furniture for Portuguese affected by the war.⁵ Having initially put forward 50,000 patacas for a relief fund to assist destitute Portuguese in Hong Kong and Guangzhou,⁶ the governor requested the Japanese consul, Fukui Yasumitsu, to back him up in sending a ship to bring those who wanted to come to Macau, where assistance was cheaper.⁷ After a few weeks of being cut off from Hong Kong, towards the end of January ships started to arrive in Macau, but the governor noted they were full of Chinese and not many Portuguese were coming,⁸ so he stepped up efforts to ensure their arrival. Those who came told of 'acts of altruism of Japanese soldiers in favour of the Portuguese,' praise the governor conveyed to military authorities in the hope that they would ease the pressure on him.⁹ Other accounts by non-Portuguese also refer to individual acts of kindness by Japanese in Hong Kong that suggest the importance of forms of transnational solidarity, such as Christianity. Patrick Yu, a University of Hong Kong (HKU) student who went on to work for British naval intelligence and for the Chinese Nationalist army during the war, mentioned in his recollections that a Japanese Christian, a former school headmaster who had known his father when he was senior inspector of schools, escorted his family on their departure to

⁴ L. A. Sá, *The Boys from Macau: Portugueses em Hong Kong* [The Boys from Macau: Portuguese in Hong Kong] (Macau, 1999), p. 141.

⁵ 'Repartição Central de Administração Civil – Aviso' [Civil Administration Bureau – Notice], *A Voz de Macau* (21 Jan. 1942), p. 2.

⁶ Governor of Macau to MC, 13 Jan. 1942, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767.

⁷ Governor of Macau to MC, 9 Jan. 1942, *ibid.*

⁸ Governor of Macau to MC, 25 Jan. 1942, *ibid.*

⁹ Governor of Macau to MC, 26 Jan. 1942, *ibid.* See also: 'Os Portugueses de Hongkong são afavelmente tratados pelas autoridades japonesas' [The Hong Kong Portuguese are Warmly Treated by the Japanese Authorities], *A Voz de Macau* (7 Feb. 1942), p. 4.

Macau after providing them with rice in Hong Kong.¹⁰ Ellen Field, an Englishwoman who pretended to be Irish and moved to Macau in June 1945, was helped by a Japanese army interpreter who was a Lutheran minister.¹¹ These and other examples throughout this thesis reveal how the practice of humanitarian relief in the Second World War in South China often implied engagement with the occupation forces. However, their control over who left was far from absolute.

Of the several accounts of escapes from Hong Kong published, a few pertain to heading to Macau undetected by Japanese forces. These provide details of the routes taken to Free China through Macau as well as some common features in different escapes. The key one was the role played by Chinese agents and intermediaries in arranging the logistics of the escape. Their names were often left out of the published accounts but it is clear that several networks were mobilised for the undertaking, including communist, nationalist, and secret societies. On the latter, an OSS (Office of Strategic Studies) report on Chinese leaders in South China mentioned Lin Qinghun, leader of the triad society Hong Bang, who was said to be able to arrange safe passages from Hong Kong, Macau, and Guangzhou, having personally escorted Sun Yat-sen's relatives safely out of Macau at the request of the governor.¹²

Escapes from Macau were made by land or by boat. The first, via Shiqi, was easier for Chinese. The latter is the most commonly referred to in Western accounts. The quickest way was to sail from Macau via Taishan and Sanbu, using the same route as that of boats which smuggled goods into Free China.¹³ There were also other routes, including via the enclave of Guangzhouwan, which was French-controlled until 1943. The latter was the one chosen by Phyllis Harrop, an Englishwoman who had been the assistant

¹⁰ P. Yu, 'Wartime Experiences in Hong Kong and China (Part 2)', in C. Matthews and O. Cheung (eds), *Dispersal and Renewal: Hong Kong University During the War Years* (Hong Kong, 1998), p. 316.

¹¹ E. Field, *Twilight in Hong Kong* (London, 1960), p. 75, pp. 135-8, pp. 217-25.

¹² OSS Report 'Kwangsi-Kwangtung Leaders', 26 Feb. 1944, p. 15, sent from the British Embassy in Washington to FO, 25 Mar. 1944, TNA, FO 371/41662.

¹³ MacKaskie, 'Report'; Knaggs, 'Information', TNA, FO 371/31630.

secretary to the Secretary of Chinese Affairs in Hong Kong, and claimed to have been the first person to escape from the British colony. Through the advice and contacts of a Chinese acquaintance in Hong Kong, Harrop used in her favour the German passport she had acquired when she married her ex-husband. She prepared her escape to Macau through a network of friends and acquaintances of different nationalities. On arrival she was met by a Portuguese naval officer who took her ashore without security checks and registered her as a Portuguese subject. In Macau she met the British consul, the governor and a number of other personalities. She also got a 'spare neutral passport.' After being given letters to the governor at Fort Bayard by a Chinese government official with connections in Guangzhouwan, she left Macau with a friend with a French passport on a steamer chartered by the Portuguese authorities to bring supplies to Macau. From Guangzhouwan she went by land to Chongqing.¹⁴ Harrop's case, told in her 1943 memoirs, clearly exemplifies the web of personal and international connections that made the trips possible, the fluidity of one's nationality and, as Bickers observed, the 'strangeness of the South China front',¹⁵ marked as it was by a geography of colonial remnants offering peculiar opportunities.

Surprisingly, given the relative obscurity in which wartime Macau remains, many well-known figures escaped from Hong Kong via the enclave, including the playwright Xia Yan, the film director Cai Chusheng,¹⁶ and the journalist Israel Epstein. The latter's account reveals how a range of figures were involved in the escapes, including communists, local bosses, and missionaries. After failed attempts to be removed from Hong Kong with the assistance of Liao Chengzhi, the CCP representative in Hong Kong, Epstein evaded the Stanley Internment camp in a multinational group that included two

¹⁴ P. Harrop, *Hong Kong Incident* (London, 1943), pp. 130-52.

¹⁵ R. Bickers, *Out of China*, p. 227

¹⁶ Guo, 'Shilun Aomen', p. 104.

seamen, a former CMC staff, F.W. Wright,¹⁷ and Elsie Fairfax-Chomeley, whom Epstein would later marry in 1944. Using an abandoned boat prepared with great improvisation, the group left Stanley in March 1942, were helped by a group of poor fisherman in Lantau Island and taken to Macau.¹⁸ On arrival, they were welcomed by Father Paulus, an American member of the Maryknoll mission who took them to the British consulate, where they were met by the consul.¹⁹ Later, Epstein contacted a physician named Tang, who had been recommended by Sa Kongliao, a Chinese journalist associated with the Democratic League and sympathetic towards the CCP. Tang's 'brother' Chen arranged for their escape in the same smuggling boat that would take the former Dutch consul at Guangzhou and his wife into Free China at the request of Reeves.²⁰ The fee for the undertaking was provided by Father Paulus and his colleagues.²¹ To evade Macau safely, an arrangement was made with puppet guards outside Macau. From there they 'disappeared into the darkness of the West River,' eventually reaching Guilin.²² Epstein would discover many years later that the leader of the organisation who had put together his escape, Zhao Qixiu, was a merchant turned smuggler and organiser of a local anti-Japanese militia. The contact between Chen and Zhao had been made through the latter's secretary, Zhong Hua, who was an underground communist.²³ During the war, Zhao was involved in smuggling from Macau to Nationalist-controlled areas in Northwestern

¹⁷ Wright appeared on a list of BAAG agents and runners dated 23 July 1942 as being 'in charge of Macao if required' (Ride, *BAAG*, p. 312).

¹⁸ The escape is also briefly described in another memoir, which does not mention Epstein (G. Wright-Nooth and M. Adkin, *Prisoner of the Turnip Heads: Horror, Hunger and Humour in Hong Kong, 1941-1945* [London, 1994], p. 112).

¹⁹ Epstein did not remember him as the consul but as simply a consulate 'functionary' that he had met in Wuhan. This is feasible, for Reeves had been posted in Hankou before arriving in Macau. Reeves did not recognise Epstein at all, perhaps because he was travelling under the name of Alec Stevenson

²⁰ In one of his telegrams to Lisbon the governor of Macau mentioned hearing about the Dutch consul in Guangzhou coming to Macau and then leaving. At the time he had sent Lobo to meet him and enquire on his views on the possibility of selling the Dutch dredger Hankow to the Japanese (Governor of Macau to MC, 13 May 1942, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767).

²¹ I. Epstein, *My China Eye: Memoirs of a Jew and a Journalist* (San Francisco, 2005), pp. 152-3.

²² Heenan, Memorandum.

²³ Epstein, *My China Eye*, p. 156.

Guangdong, as well as in escapes. He was given the title of adviser by both Zhang Fakui, who commanded the Fourth War Zone, and Yu Hanmou, commander of the Seventh.²⁴

By cross-referencing different records, one concludes that key Chinese facilitators were involved in several escapes. Zhao Qixiu's name comes up more than once, and so does that of Patrick Wong, a *Dagongbao* reporter from Hong Kong who had left for Guilin. He assisted Ernest Heenan, the Far Eastern Representative of the Royal Insurance Company in Liverpool who escaped to Chongqing in April 1942 after being left stranded in Macau in early December 1941.²⁵ Wong was also acknowledged as a key intermediary by G.A. MacKaskie and C.M. Knaggs, two Malayan service cadets who departed from Macau, where they had been studying Cantonese, in May 1942.²⁶ Wong put them in touch with Zhao. But the Nationalist military were also involved. The commissioner of the Guangdong first division had informed the British he would 'give all possible help to those who wish[ed] to leave the colony and enter China,'²⁷ and sent two of his men to effect the escape. The cadets' party included 12 other foreigners. Amongst them were, once again, customs staff and missionaries: the American former commissioner in Jiangmen and two fathers of the Maryknoll mission, who were on friendly terms with Zhao. They left Macau in May,²⁸ after bribing an Indian policeman, and travelled via a small junk, a sampan and a heavily armed motor junk sailing under a Japanese flag. They were taken to Sanbu, from there to Guilin and finally to Chongqing by plane in early

²⁴ After an uneasy relationship with the Nationalists for being involved in forming a peasant association, Zhao fled to Indonesia in the late 1920s before returning to Macau. After the war he got into trouble with the Nationalists again and provided escort for a pro-communist shipping company operating between Macau and Kaiping after 1949, ending up in Hong Kong where he was decorated by the British for helping refugees (H. F. Siu, *Agents and Victims in South China: Accomplices in Rural Revolution* [New Haven, 1989], pp. 96-7).

²⁵ Heenan, Memorandum, p. 5.

²⁶ Already in February 1942 the FO had told Reeves that if they had the chance to make their way to a place where their services would be more effectively employed they should do so (FO to British Embassy in Lisbon, 20 Feb. 1942, TNA, CO 825/30/12).

²⁷ Knaggs, 'Information'.

²⁸ British Consul at Macau, 25 May 1942, quoted in message from the British Ambassador in Lisbon to Foreign Office, 27 May 1942, TNA, CO 825/30/12.

June.²⁹ While travelling in Guangdong, their expenses were paid by the provincial government in unoccupied China, which also provided official escorts.³⁰ Despite the role of Nationalist authorities in guaranteeing the safe passage of people to Chongqing, the contribution of intermediaries like Zhao Qixiu was paramount because although the provincial government could aid escapees when they reached their territory it was unable to guarantee passages from Macau.

Even without government backing, organising escapes into Free China from Macau was a service offered by several figures and involved both a patriotic and an economic dimension. Costs differed, from free to 6,000 patacas per party. Portuguese middlemen were also involved in establishing contacts for those who wanted to escape with local merchants and others involved in this 'trade.' Amongst them was Jack Braga, who will be addressed later in the chapter.³¹

Many escapes were organised by the British Army Aid Group (BAAG) whose activities will be covered in more detail further ahead. These were likewise international affairs not only in the groups of escapees but also regarding those arranging the passage. The account written by Marjorie Fletcher, who was married to the MELCO accountant, is illustrative. When the company was taken over by the Macau Senate, the Fletchers decided to leave. They first 'obtained the name of the organizing man for the escape party' and then met him at the British consulate.³² In early April 1943, the Fletchers, Joy Wilson (head of the Macau BAAG branch), and several others left via a smuggling 'snake boat'. Their party was composed of 37 escapees from Macau including British, American, Russian, Chinese, an Irish-British and Filipinos.³³ They were let through by Chinese boatmen of a Portuguese harbour patrol near Maliuzhou island, bribed their way out of a

²⁹ MacKaskie, 'Report'.

³⁰ Knaggs, 'Information'.

³¹ Ibid.

³² IWM, Private Papers of Mrs Fletcher, 97/40/1.

³³ F.W. Wright to Ride, 12 Apr. 1943, HKU, MF 2530701, Roll 6.

half-collaborator, half-guerrilla group, and arrived in a village after six days of travel where they were expected by a Chinese Canadian who organised their escape to Sanbu.³⁴ Before reaching Guilin, her husband had telegraphed his employers via consular channels asking for assistance to go to England or Canada.³⁵ BAAG documents reveal some clues on the Chinese side of this escape. Its success was celebrated in two Chinese newspapers in Taishan, which praised a unit commander named Leung Wai Cheung.³⁶ F.W. Wright from the BAAG also reported having thanked general Yuan Dai for the ‘gallant work and services rendered by the men of his division.’³⁷ Once again, the successful escape resulted from the coordination between local guerrillas, Nationalist forces, and British resistance networks working with the connivance of people in Macau.

Not all of those who escaped were necessarily pro-Allied and the option to move to Macau reveals the ambiguities of wartime decisions and how that intersected with the British establishment. Amongst those who left to Macau were people who had worked for the occupation authorities in Hong Kong. One of them was Li Jingkang (Li King-hong), a former head-teacher in government service since 1924 who became cultural representative on the Cooperative Council formed by Japan in March 1942. That fact placed him on a Chongqing blacklist and because he was deemed ‘to have collaborated willingly with the Japanese’ his allowances were withheld by British authorities. When pleading to unfreeze them, he justified his actions in Hong Kong as acts of self-preservation for himself and his family. He escaped alone to Macau in the summer of 1942, his family joining him later. From there, they left on a cargo-steamboat to unoccupied China with the help of a secret agent of the Free Guangdong government.

³⁴ IWM, 97/40/1, Private Papers of Mrs Fletcher.

³⁵ Message from Fletcher transmitted by the British Consul General and quoted in telegram from the General Electric Company to FO, 22 Apr. 1943. TNA, FO 371/35733.

³⁶ It is possible that this was Liang Yongyuan (Leung Wingyuen), a guerrilla leader mentioned in T. Luard, *Escape from Hong Kong: Admiral Chan Chak's Christmas Day Dash, 1941* (Hong Kong, 2012), p. 129, p. 212.

³⁷ Ride to Military Attaché in Chongqing, 25 Apr. 1945, with translation of extracts from *Xinzhongbao* and *Huohai*, 12 Apr. 1943, HKU, MF 2530701, Roll 6.

When he petitioned the British for relief funds in 1944, Li was head of the first section of the political department of the Military Training Academy of the Seventh War Zone in Guangdong.³⁸ This case shows how the crossover between occupied and unoccupied areas and service to different authorities was more flexible than is often recognised.

Many of those who escaped Hong Kong to Free China via Macau found themselves in Guilin,³⁹ whose wartime experience was marked by a certain degree of autonomy from Nationalist control.⁴⁰ But the majority of people who went to Macau remained there throughout the war. How they were managed by the British consulate will be addressed next.

5.2. The British consulate in Macau and different refugee communities

Once they got to Macau, the usual first stop for all Hong Kong escapees was the British consulate. The consulate, headed by John Reeves, a diplomat who had lived in China since 1933,⁴¹ was central to the management of the refugees who came from Hong Kong.

In December 1945, after the war had ended, there were still 5,650 people drawing relief from the British consulate in Macau.⁴² Lists of thousands of names waiting to return in late 1945 and early 1946 stored at the Hong Kong Public Records Office provide individual portraits of the refugee communities in wartime Macau. British, Portuguese,

³⁸ Li King-hong to British Ambassador in Chongqing, 2 Apr. 1944, TNA, FO 371/41564.

³⁹ P. C. M. Sedgwick, 'Report on Refugee Relief Department organisation in South China', 2 Nov. 1943, p. 10, sent with despatch from Embassy at Chongqing to Foreign Office, 17 Dec. 1943, TNA, FO 371/41562.

⁴⁰ P. Zhu, *Wartime Culture in Guilin, 1938-1944: A City at War* (Lanham, 2015); G. Hutchings, 'A Province at War: Guangxi During the Sino-Japanese Conflict, 1937-45', *The China Quarterly*, 108 (1986), pp. 652-79.

⁴¹ Reeves began his diplomatic career in 1933 as a student interpreter in the British Foreign Service at the legation in Beijing. He later served as acting consul general in Hankou and in Shenyang (D. Calthorpe, 'About *The Lone Flag* and John Pownall Reeves', in *The Lone Flag*, p. 169 and p. 173). Although Reeves belonged to the China Consular Service, the consulate in Macau reported to the British embassy in Lisbon, not the one in Chongqing even though, during the war, Reeves occasionally wrote directly to the latter.

⁴² Hong Kong Civil Affairs Administration, Refugee Relief in Macao, Summary of Discussions with H.B.M. Consul, 19 Dec. 1945, HK-PRO, HKRS 170-1-333. A report from January 1946 estimated that of amongst those there were about 2,000 Chinese, 700 Indians, and between 500 and 1,000 Europeans.

Chinese, and Indians⁴³ of all walks of life came to Macau in an extraordinary case of temporary colonial transplantation. The consulate also took care of individuals of other nationalities, such as of about 940 Americans, mostly from the Philippines or Hawaii, including many Chinese Americans.⁴⁴ Clerks, workers, civil servants, policemen, musicians, teachers, housewives, and countless others registered at the consulate. Their names, age, arrival date, and conduct during the war were methodically registered. The lists also show how a time believed to be of isolation was actually marked by considerable mobility.⁴⁵ People came and went, from Hong Kong to Macau, from Macau to occupied and unoccupied China. The British consulate was informed of their movements and of their misdemeanours, from cheating the system to receive more allowance to working for the enemy. A few illustrative examples are transcribed below:

LEE CHEE LEUNG: Crown Sergeant in H. K. Police Reserve. After hostilities worked as clerk in Fook Tai Co. (Japanese concern) until July 1944. Later did brokerage with Taiwanese purchasing agents for the Japanese Navy. Wife worked as nurse in Japanese Mining Co. in Hainan Island. Repeated requests for subsidy. No support.⁴⁶

Nariman Fakirji Jokhi: - Age 25. Born in Amalsad, Bombay, India. Indian. Employed in Messrs. Jokhi Parekh & Co. Monthly income: \$1,400. – War Service: Food Control. After the hostilities sold what stock he had left in order to maintain a living. He was working with his brother and other loyal Indians helping British nationals. His brother was arrested by the Japanese. Arrived in Macau on the 19th August, 1945.⁴⁷

Cheng Tak Yim:- Age 44. Born in Haiphong, Indo China. Pre-war: Employed in the Hongkong Government Rice Monopoly from Jan 1941 to 25th Dec. 1941. Left H.K. and arrived in Macao Sept. 1942. Drew one month's Rice Monopoly Pay from B.C. Macao. and travelled between Sanfau and Macao doing business (unknown). On applying for 2nd

⁴³ The links between Portuguese and British imperial spheres in China are evident in the case of Indian men from villages in Punjab employed as police officers in Macau (TNA, FO 371/41620; BL, IOR/L/PJ/8/334). During the war a branch of the Indian Independence League was established in Macau under the title 'Japanese Independence League India (Macao branch).' The consul asked 'loyal Indians' to join and report back to him (TNA, FO 371/31630). On Indians in Shanghai and Hong Kong see I. Jackson, 'The Raj on Nanjing Road: Sikh Policemen in Treaty-Port Shanghai', *Modern Asian Studies*, 46/6 (2012), pp. 1672-1704; Y. Cao, 'Red Turbans on the Bund: Sikh Migrants, Policemen, and Revolutionaries in Shanghai, 1885-1945' (PhD Thesis, National University of Singapore, 2016).

⁴⁴ Reeves, *The Lone Flag*, p. 71.

⁴⁵ This is also revealed by a number of requests made to the Macau Civil Administration showing how several refugees travelled to Guangzhou as late as 1944, for example to take care of personal businesses (AM, MO/AH/AC/SA/01/25738).

⁴⁶ HK-PRO, HKRS 170-1-334.

⁴⁷ HK-PRO, HKRS 170-1-359.

month's pay for Food Control services rendered was declined on ground of having travelled to enemy occupied territory in the course of his business.⁴⁸

Julia Joan Agon Demee: Born in Cuba – 27.5.1912. Age 33. Censor's Office, G.P.O. Censoring Spanish letters. Salary: \$170.00 1 year's service. After the hostilities worked as salesgirl in the Yokohama Silk Store (an Indian firm). Worked for one month and then worked for the Tkachenko Bakery (Russian) for six months. Arrived in Macao, 24th April, 1944. (wife of above A.[Alfred] A.[Adolf] Demee).⁴⁹

These cases attest to the multiple networks that framed the experience of those coming to Macau, revealing how the war was marked by the movement of people and goods and the agency of different individuals in a struggle for survival. They also show the extent to which the British consulate was able to monitor even the private lives of those in Macau. Reeves even set up a team of 'gambling inspectors' who reported on any refugees caught playing.⁵⁰ These acts of surveillance were likely to have been the genesis of Reeves local intelligence networks, addressed later in the chapter.

How the British consulate in Macau came to support a large number of Hong Kong refugees was not the result of a pre-devised plan but an ad-hoc response decided locally and then approved by authorities in Europe.

In early February 1942, the first batch of Hong Kong refugees, 450 people, whose transport had been arranged by the Macau governor arrived in Macau. At the time it was expected that the number would rise to 2,800 but it greatly surpassed it.⁵¹ The Macau government requisitioned clubs and other buildings to house them and set up an 'economic kitchen.' The number of children was surveyed to guarantee they would all attend local schools, increasing the teaching staff with qualified refugees. Adults were

⁴⁸ Ibid..

⁴⁹ Ibid..

⁵⁰ Reeves, *The Lonely Flag*, p. 34.

⁵¹ Governor of Macau to MC, 6 Feb. 1942, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767.

offered night classes in Portuguese as many did not speak it well or at all.⁵² Later, new schools were set up to cater for English-speaking children.⁵³

By April the governor had realised many of the Hong Kong Portuguese were British subjects and discussions began with the British consul on who should shoulder the relief costs.⁵⁴ From Lisbon, Salazar, who also held the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, contacted the ambassador in London to enquire on the matter.⁵⁵ The FO agreed to cover expenses for Hong Kong refugees of Portuguese descent if their British nationality could be proven. The governor estimated that more than 75% of the refugee expenses would be passed on to Reeves.⁵⁶ The matter was not only of the interest of Portuguese authorities but of the refugees themselves. According to a report by a British escapee, the pecuniary relief the Portuguese refugees received was ‘extremely low’ and did not allow large families to face the soaring prices. This caused many to ‘reclaim and substantiate their British nationality’ in order to receive assistance from the consulate.⁵⁷

Regarding Portuguese refugees from Hong Kong, Reeves was instructed to ‘admit liability for relief of British subjects only’ and decline responsibility for those of dual nationality.⁵⁸ But the murky definition of one’s nationality, alluded to in Chapter Three, continued. As late as January 1944 Reeves was requesting to examine the records of the Portuguese consulate in Hong Kong, which had been transferred to Macau, in order to ascertain if some of the refugees receiving allowances from the consulate were

⁵² Governor of Macau to MC, 18 Feb. 1942, *ibid.*

⁵³ Reeves, *The Lonely Flag*, pp. 37-8; Sá, *The Boys from Macau*, pp. 161-2; Silva, ‘Life and Learning in Wartime Macau’, p. 9; Xavier, ‘The Macanese at War’, pp. 107-8; Braga, ‘Nossa Gente’, pp. 127-9.

⁵⁴ Governor of Macau to MC, 4 Apr. 1942, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767.

⁵⁵ Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs to Portuguese Ambassador in London, 2 Apr. 1942, TNA, HW 12/275.

⁵⁶ MC to Salazar, 18 Apr. 1942, TNA, FO 371/35734.

⁵⁷ Heenan, Memorandum, p. 2.

⁵⁸ FO to British Embassy in Lisbon, 22 May 1942, TNA, CO 825/30/12.

Portuguese citizens. Some did not know for sure and others ‘for reasons of their own, suppress[ed] their nationality.’⁵⁹

Despite discussions over who should be paid, who should pay and how much, British relief funds were allocated with a great degree of flexibility by Reeves, who comes across in the existing correspondence as willing to bend the rules if a person’s basic livelihood was at stake. Anglo-Portuguese cooperation on refugee relief went on as well.

In June 1942 the governor asked Lisbon for authorisation to open an extraordinary credit of 800,000 patacas for refugee relief in order to meet the payments for British subjects of Portuguese descent.⁶⁰ After smaller remittances in previous months, from June 1942 the British embassy in Lisbon committed to transferring the equivalent of 60,000 patacas per month in order to reimburse the Macau government of sums advanced to the British consulate. Reeves had insisted on the fact, arguing that the Macau government had ‘voluntarily undertaken military protection and maintenance’ of many British subjects. The amount was higher than had been calculated per person but the remaining would be left for the governor and Reeves to spend on the ‘hardest cases irrespective of nationality.’⁶¹ Cooperation was also demonstrated by locally made arrangements. In July 1942, for example, the governor asked Reeves’ wife to organise the allocation of special food for babies, a serious issue that was leading to a high infant mortality, and granted 2,000 Hong Kong dollars to kick off the work.⁶²

⁵⁹ British Consul at Macau to Head of the Civil Administration Services, 7 Jan. 1944, AM, MO/AH/AC/SA/01/25726.

⁶⁰ Governor of Macau to MC, 15 June 1942, ANTT, AOS, UL-10A1, cx. 767.

⁶¹ British Consul in Macau, 5 June 1942, quoted in message from the British Ambassador in Lisbon to FO, 8 June 1942; British Consul in Macau, 20 July 1942, quoted in message from the British Ambassador in Lisbon to FO, 29 July 1942; British Ambassador in Lisbon to FO, 4 Aug. 1942; British Ambassador in Lisbon to FO, 5 Dec. 1942, TNA, CO 825/30/12.

⁶² British Consul in Macau, 20 July 1942, quoted in message from the British Ambassador in Lisbon to FO, 29 July 1942, *ibid.*

In January 1943 Reeves enquired about the possibility of being put in charge of Allied interests in Macau by individual governments.⁶³ The FO replied that although it ‘had no objection to his taking charge of United States and Dutch interests,’ the smallness of Allied interests in Macau did not justify him taking care of all of them for the time being.⁶⁴ In practice, Reeves ended up looking after a small global community. Norwegians and Polish were reported to have arrived in Macau in 1942.⁶⁵ In March an American Citizens Committee was established to request relief for Americans nationals, many of whom were Filipinos⁶⁶ and Chinese-Hawaiians who wanted to leave for China ‘to join the fighting forces.’⁶⁷ From the New Year’s greetings to their country’s leaders transmitted via the British consulate, we also learn of a community of Fighting French and Russians.⁶⁸ Amongst the applications to return to Hong Kong after the war were men with Portuguese surnames who arrived in Macau in 1944 in charge of consular affairs for the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Panama, Mexico, Ecuador, Brazil and Argentina.⁶⁹ Several Chinese Mexicans fleeing exclusionary politics in North and South America had been residing in Macau since the 1930s.⁷⁰

An important element in this international refugee community was, unsurprisingly, Chinese from Hong Kong. In May 1942 Reeves enquired on how he should treat them and was instructed to assist those who were government pensioners, civil servants and their wives, and volunteers and others who took part in the defence of

⁶³ Consul at Macau, 19 Jan. 1943, quoted in telegram from Embassy in Lisbon to FO, 28 Jan. 1943, TNA, FO 371/35731.

⁶⁴ FO to Embassy in Lisbon, 14 Feb., 1943, *ibid.*.

⁶⁵ MacKaskie, ‘Report’.

⁶⁶ Draft to the Associated Press Correspondent in Chongqing, 18 Nov. 1942, NLA, MS 4300, Box 52, 8.1./10.

⁶⁷ British Consul at Macau, 29 July 1942, quoted in telegram from Embassy in Lisbon to Foreign Office, 8 Aug. 1942. TNA, FO 371/31630.

⁶⁸ British Consul at Macau, 28 Dec. 1942, quoted in telegram from Embassy in Lisbon to Foreign Office, 6 Jan. 1943, TNA, FO 371/35731.

⁶⁹ HKPRO, 170-1-359.

⁷⁰ J. M. S. Camacho, *Chinese Mexicans: Transpacific Migration and the Search for a Homeland, 1910-1960* (Chapel Hill, 2012), pp. 114-5; K. Lopez, *Chinese Cubans: A Transnational History* (Chapel Hill, 2013), p. 177.

Hong Kong.⁷¹ A later document on the matter indicated that Reeves was also giving small relief subsidies to Chinese from Malaya, New Zealand, Canada and other places.⁷²

Relief funds to those in Macau were not only remitted by the British state but also by the refugees' former employers and in good colonial fashion, Chinese were sometimes singled out as an unwanted financial burden. Correspondence between Guy C. Clarke from Shell Petroleum Company, the British subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell, and the FO is revealing of some of the discussions. When asked for permission to do so by Reeves, Clarke had decided that Chinese evacuees would receive the same rate of subsistence as the Portuguese because 'any rate of racial discrimination would be fatal' and could 'mean starvation or semi-starvation.' However, facing unpredicted high numbers of Chinese requesting assistance in Macau where they were unlikely to find work, he proposed some limits to the scheme. Chinese would be able to go to Macau only in transit and after four months would cease to receive relief there. He considered it preferable to get Chinese from Hong Kong directly into Free China where they could be paid in national dollars instead of sterling, as well as find work and 'assist to some extent at any rate in the war effort.'⁷³

Eventually, Reeves himself requested permission to refuse relief to Chinese who arrived in Macau after September 1943 as he believed these people had only chosen to leave Hong Kong then 'for purely selfish reasons.'⁷⁴ In early February the Colonial Office confirmed that there were no grounds 'on which such relief could be made a charge on Hong Kong funds.'⁷⁵ For British subjects with no record of anti-British activities, however, relief would not be withheld. Reeves' largesse was resented by other British officials in unoccupied China. Facing claims of discriminatory treatment by the chairman

⁷¹ FO to British Embassy in Lisbon, 23 May 1942, TNA, CO 825/30/12.

⁷² FO to British Embassy in Chongqing, 26 Sept. 1942, *ibid.*.

⁷³ G. C. Clarke to A. Clarke, FO, 7 June 1944, TNA, FO 371/41620.

⁷⁴ Consul at Macau, 17 Jan. 1944, quoted in telegram from Embassy in Lisbon to Foreign Office, 19 Jan. 1944, TNA, FO 371/41619.

⁷⁵ Colonial Office to FO, 7 Feb. 1944, TNA, *ibid.*.

of the Hong Kong Chinese Civil Servants Association in Shaoguan when compared to Macau, the acting consul general at Guilin lamented that Reeves had ‘undertaken to support completely large numbers of Hongkong refugees, who should rather, if of Chinese race, have been encouraged to come to Free China,’ accusing him of fostering a ‘dole mentality’ costly to the British government.⁷⁶

Fighting for a job

If Chinese leaving Macau to join the war effort was a welcome occurrence, the Portuguese who did so found themselves in a problematic position given their country’s official neutrality. Despite their willingness to assist, they were not particularly welcome by either the Chinese or British authorities.

In 1944 the Chinese legation in Lisbon notified the Portuguese government that 17 Portuguese soldiers from the Macau garrison had crossed into Chinese territory with the intention ‘of serving in the forces of the United Nations.’ The Chinese authorities did not accept their services and asked Lisbon what to do with the men who were stranded in Guilin. The Portuguese government replied that they should be repatriated to ‘Portuguese India’ and requested the assistance of authorities to assume responsibility for the men from the Chinese and then send them through British India.⁷⁷ The FO was not enthusiastic about the request. Although they could grant visas to enter British territory en route to Portuguese India, they did not think it was reasonable to ask their military authorities to take charge of the men and arrange for their journey. The ‘simplest solution’ would be to arrange for their return to Macau.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Lau Wing Shum to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 12 Apr. 1944; British consulate general in Guilin to Ambassador in Chongqing, 21 Apr. 1944, TNA, FO 371/41564.

⁷⁷ Portuguese Embassy in London to Foreign Office, 6 Mar. 1944, TNA, FO 371/41619.

⁷⁸ FO to Portuguese Embassy, 16 Mar. 1944, *ibid.*.

For British authorities in China, Portuguese deserters from Macau fell into two categories. The first was composed by Portuguese nationals who had left Hong Kong or had other British connections. They could claim minimum relief from British organisations in Shaoguan or Guilin although the FO advised that ‘everything possible should be done to discourage their arrival.’ The second group were Portuguese nationals who had deserted the armed forces in Macau and had no claims to British assistance. Although the BAAG leader, Lindsey Ride, employed them, responsibility for these men rested with the Chinese government and it should be made clear that they had ‘no claim on British relief organizations should they later become unemployed.’⁷⁹ The 1944 deserters were of the second category. Ride offered them a job as guards, as he needed trustworthy people on the premises of his headquarters. The Chinese authorities approved of their employment but the British military attaché in Chongqing did not concur. Not only ‘this action would condone their desertion from the Portuguese’ who were allies, but it might also encourage more men to defect to Guilin ‘in the hope of obtaining employment.’ Ride asked for the matter to be reconsidered. He informed Chongqing that when they were told the British would not employ them, they had applied to the Americans and the Fighting French and both had accepted them. Furthermore, according to Ride, as Macau was ‘to all intents and purposes under Japanese occupation these men are not deserters in the strict sense of the word since they have left rather than remain[ed] under Japanese rule.’⁸⁰ Their arrival was seen by the leader of the BAGG as contributing to the ‘Allies War Effort.’

To the embassy in Lisbon the FO stated that although it was in British interest to employ the deserters, there was no good reason to justify such action ‘in the eyes of the Portuguese Government’ and, therefore, the issue should not be raised ‘in the hope that

⁷⁹ British Embassy in Chongqing to FO, 29 Feb. 1944, *ibid.*

⁸⁰ Minute from Military Attaché’s Office, British Embassy in Chongqing, 17 Jan. 1944, *ibid.*

their attention will not be drawn to the matter by the authorities in Macau.’⁸¹ Months later, the Portuguese were still trying to get the men repatriated, without success. Most decided to enlist in the French Foreign Legion and left for North Africa. Six remained in China and the Portuguese government wanted them to be sent to Goa. The Chinese government expressed ‘willingness to grant the necessary transport facilities’ and the Portuguese embassy in London requested visas for the men to travel through British India.⁸² When Guilin was evacuated in September 1944, some of the Portuguese seemed to have dispersed.⁸³

As the deserters’ case suggests, one of the reasons to leave Macau was the possibility of finding employment in Free China. In the enclave that was particularly hard, but it was not impossible for those with particular skills. The British consulate employed several Hong Kong refugees and even organised a clinic for which it recruited doctors amongst them, even though medical practitioners in Macau needed a special Portuguese licence which they did not have. Such were the cases of António Guterres, Joseph Barnes, Eddie Gosano, Horacio P. Luis Ozorio or G.A.V. Ribeiro, whom Reeves highly praised.⁸⁴ Initially funded by the Portuguese authorities, in July 1942 the FO accepted to pay 100 HK dollars per month for each doctor given that the vital work they were performing was not being adequately paid.⁸⁵ Work conditions were far from ideal. Medicines were in short supply and Reeves admitted that sometimes they ‘had to buy from smugglers.’⁸⁶ The war blurred the line between legal and illegal channels.

⁸¹ FO to Embassy in Lisbon, 24 Mar. 1944, *ibid.*.

⁸² Portuguese Embassy in London to FO, 18 Oct. 1944, TNA, FO 371/41620.

⁸³ British Ambassador in Chongqing to British Consul General at Kunming, 21 Nov. 1944, *ibid.*

⁸⁴ British Consul at Macau, quoted in despatch from the British Consulate General at Guilin to Chancery, 28 Jan. 1943, TNA, FO 371/35731; ‘Anúncio’ [Announcement], *A Voz de Macau* (20 May 1944), p. 4; ‘M.S. Refugee Clinic’, *ibid.* (5 June 1944), p. 3; Reeves, *The Lonely Flag*, p. 36, p. 61; Wordie, ‘The Hong Kong Portuguese Community’, pp.169-70; IWM, *Hong Kong Farwell*, p. 25.

⁸⁵ FO to Colonial Office, 16 July 1942, TNA, CO 825/30/12.

⁸⁶ Reeves, *The Lonely Flag*, p. 65.

New cosmopolitanism

Stranded in Macau for the foreseeable future, the Hong Kong refugees, together with the British consul and often with the Portuguese authorities, organised a number of activities to get on with their lives with a degree of normality. Programmes and invitations for various charitable events can be found in the Braga Papers⁸⁷ and in the everyday news reported in the English-language supplement *Macau Herald*.⁸⁸ Some of those who lived through that time remember it as pretty joyful, with lots of sports and dancing.⁸⁹ The ‘cultural shock’ between the refugees from Hong Kong and their Macau hosts had an immediate social impact. Hong Kong refugees, notably the women, were perceived as more open-minded and less conservative.⁹⁰ With the refugees from Hong Kong, as indeed with those that had come before them from Shanghai and Guangzhou analysed in Chapter Three, Macau benefited from new cosmopolitan everyday experiences, in areas from education to sports, including a small boom in the entertainment sector.⁹¹ Some of the short stories of the Macanese lawyer and writer Henrique de Senna Fernandes, who lived through the period, capture the extremes and opportunities of wartime Macau as a city of international encounters and how these affected a variety of people, notably the young.⁹²

Accounts on the period also reveal how local resentment, built upon decades of rivalry between Macau and Hong Kong, was present alongside the most publicised solidarity. ‘Refugees’ became a term ‘of scorn rather than of pity’ and the Anglicised Portuguese were an easy target, with pieces in the local papers even pointing out that they

⁸⁷ E.g. NLA, MS 4300, Box 52, 8.1./15.

⁸⁸ E.g. ‘Refugee topics’, *Macau Herald* (21 Mar. 1943), p. 7.

⁸⁹ E.g. Sir Roger Lobo’s testimony in *Macau Remembers*, p. 74.

⁹⁰ E.g. José Silveira Machado’s testimony in *Macau entre Dois Mundos*, p. 42.

⁹¹ E.g. Henrique de Senna Fernandes’s recollections in *Macau Remembers*, p. 96; Sá, *A História na Bagagem*, p. 117; Braga, *Macau Durante a II Guerra Mundial*, p. 71.

⁹² A particularly good example of this is ‘Candy’ on the experience of a female Portuguese Eurasian refugee from Hong Kong (H. S. Fernandes, *Nam Van: Contos de Macau* [Nam Van: Macau Short Stories] [Macau, 1997], pp. 69-102).

were now learning what their ‘true’ nationality was.⁹³ In March 1943 a Refugee Club set up by Portuguese from Hong Kong was shut down about one month after having been founded. The pages of the local daily gave account of opposing views on this case, which reflect the conflicting attitudes towards the newcomers and hint at deeper issues such as pressure to curb expressions of support for the Allies.⁹⁴

Even so, part of Macau’s population mobilised itself to provide relief to refugees and the urban poor. These initiatives became more varied and frequent as the number of those needing assistance increased in the 1940s. Football matches, dance contests, concerts, exhibitions, bridge tournaments and lotteries, and others were used to fundraise for charities and associations operating in Macau.⁹⁵ A local paper reporting on one of the events hailed the enclave as the largest ‘centre of charity’ in South China.⁹⁶

The social impact of the Hong Kong refugees in Macau was a two-way process. Whilst the arrival of thousands of people further strained local services, some refugees also made a significant contribution to relief activities. This was the case of missionaries such as the Maryknoll Sisters, an American Catholic group. Of the twenty-eight Maryknoll Sisters in Hong Kong when the Japanese invaded, four came to Macau between 1942 and 1943.⁹⁷ In January 1944, the Lisbon daily *O Século* published a small first page article stating that more than 400 refugee children had been entrusted to their care by the authorities and more than 500 who could not be lodged in the improvised

⁹³ Reeves, *The Lone Flag*, p. 18; ‘Portugueses de Hongkong,’ *A Voz de Macau* (28 Feb. 1942), p. 2; Braga, ‘Nossa Gente’, p. 123.

⁹⁴ ‘Muito Sensato’ [Very Wise], *A Voz de Macau* (16 Mar. 1943), p. 3; ‘Refugee Club’, *ibid.* (19 Mar. 1943), p. 3; ‘Tribuna do Leitor’ [Reader’s Tribune], *ibid.* (27 Mar. 1943), p. 4.

⁹⁵ Articles in *A Voz de Macau* such as: ‘Encontro de Futebol Portugal-China’ [Portugal-China Football Match] (12 Feb. 1942), p. 3; ‘Exposição’ [Exhibition] (9 Dec. 1942), p. 3; ‘Recita de Beneficência’ [Charitable Performance] (18 Jan. 1943), p. 3; ‘Futebol’ [Football] (22 Jan. 1943), p. 3; ‘Concurso de Dança’ [Dance Contest] (27 Feb. 1943), p. 3; ‘Lotaria de Caridade’ [Charitable Lottery] (8 May 1943), p. 3; ‘Exposição de Pintura e Caligrafia’ [Painting and Calligraphy Exhibition] (2 Mar. 1944), p. 3. Braga provides a detailed description of some of the cultural activities organised in Macau during the war (Braga, *Macau Durante a II Guerra Mundial*, pp. 88-95).

⁹⁶ ‘Ainda o Torneio de Bridge’ [Still the Bridge Tournament], *A Voz de Macau* (23 Apr. 1943), p. 3, my translation.

⁹⁷ C. Y. Y. Chu, *The Maryknoll Sisters in Hong Kong, 1921-1969: In Love with the Chinese* (New York, 2004), pp. 51-9.

orphanage were provided with a daily meal. Four of the sisters had come to Macau with other refugees after their school in Hong Kong was occupied by the Japanese and another two were transferred to Macau from their Jiangmen mission in 1943, under Japanese escort.⁹⁸

Regarding the relocation of religious groups to Macau during the war and how the British presence in the enclave was particularly relevant, a case in point is the sizeable Anglican community under the care of Florence Tim Oi Li (Li Tian'ai), whose experience in wartime Macau is also revealing of the new opportunities the conflict opened up for women. Li was sent to Macau in 1940, after witnessing the devastating effects of the war in Guangzhou. After six months in charge of the Anglican parish, she went to Hong Kong to be ordained deacon, and then returned to Macau where she held services for the protestant community until the end of the war. Not only was she the first Chinese woman to be ordained deacon, later she was also the first woman to become an Anglican priest. Her community work went beyond religion, for example, vouching for Hong Kong refugees at the British consulate when they arrived in Macau, which led her to being watched by the Japanese. She smuggled herself into Hong Kong to get her father to Macau, paying for her passage with the help of the British consul. As Macau did not have a resident Anglican priest, deacon Li was allowed to baptise, marry and bury, but not to celebrate communion. As the war left Macau progressively more isolated, the visits from the priest in Shiqi became irregular and then stopped. She was first authorised to celebrate communion and then bishop Ronald Hall from Hong Kong wrote to the Archbishop of Canterbury from his refuge in Chongqing in order to ordain Li, something 'totally unprecedented in the Anglican Church.' They both made dangerous journeys to Xingxing,

⁹⁸ 'Centenas de crianças vítimas da guerra que se refugiaram em Macau estão a ser tratadas por irmãs de caridade' [Hundreds of Children Victims of the War Who Took Refuge in Macau are Being Looked After by Sisters of Charity], *O Século* (10 Jan. 1944), p. 1. A translation was sent from the British Embassy in Lisbon to the FO, 27 Jan. 1944, TNA, FO 371/41619. The 'Children's Asylum' ran by the Maryknoll Sisters had been reported in Macau the year before ('Uma Extraordinária Obra de Assistência' [An Extraordinary Assistance Work], *A Voz de Macau* [24 Apr. 1943], p. 2).

in unoccupied Guangdong to the effect. She travelled by boat, bicycle and sedan chair via Jiangmen and through two mountains. After being ordained priest in an Anglican church in nearby Zhaoqing in 1944, she returned to Macau via Guilin and Guangzhou.⁹⁹ The archbishop did not approve, but his reply to bishop Hall's request arrived after the ordination.¹⁰⁰

In sum, the Hong Kong refugees in Macau were not solely constituted by Portuguese but were a very heterogeneous group who were related to multiple national forces, including Chinese. Most interacted closely with the British consulate, which supported them but also monitored their activities. Their arrival, as that of the Shanghai and Guangdong refugees before, put extra pressure over the strained territory. However, it also revitalised its everyday experiences in various ways.

5.3. The Macau Delegation of the Portuguese Red Cross

The crossover between refugee relief in Macau and assistance to the British is particularly well illustrated in the case of the Macau Delegation of the Portuguese Red Cross Society. This institution was revived in Macau from 1943 to 1946¹⁰¹ and was sometimes officially referred to as a 'war delegation' (*delegação de guerra*) or 'POW service' (*serviço de prisioneiros de guerra*),¹⁰² curious titles for a branch in a neutral territory. Filling in an empty space left by the constraints imposed by Japan on Red Cross activities in East Asia and by the failures of negotiating a British-Japanese exchange that

⁹⁹ Li and Harrison, *Much Beloved Daughter*, pp. 28-48.

¹⁰⁰ In 1946 the Chinese House of Bishops decided that she could not continue to exercise priestly functions. She later refrained from using the title of priest to avoid creating problems for bishop Hall. She left Macau for a new post in China in early 1947 (Ibid., pp. 49-52, p. 58).

¹⁰¹ A branch of the Portuguese Red Cross Society had been established after the First World War but it was a short-lived experience, closing down in 1922 (Minutes of the Macau Delegation of the Portuguese Red Cross, 23 Apr. 1922, AHCVP, Delegação de Macau, 1ª Pasta [1915-1974]).

¹⁰² E.g. President of the Macau Delegation of the Portuguese Red Cross to the Head of the Macau Civil Administration Services, 28 Apr. 1944, AM, MO/AH/AC/SA/01/25736.

included those in Hong Kong,¹⁰³ the Red Cross in Macau enacted global connections at a time of disruption of communications, linked people in Macau to those in occupied Shanghai and Hong Kong, and was a very subtle way of aiding the British.

As noted in other works on the war, Japanese authorities refused to allow a regular functioning of Red Cross activities such as camp inspections and parcel deliveries.¹⁰⁴ The only International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) delegates authorised to operate in China were Edouard Egle in Shanghai and, later, Rudolf Zindel in Hong Kong.¹⁰⁵ Delegates were constantly under surveillance and subject to different forms of harassment, and some unofficial delegates elsewhere in Asia met tragic fates.¹⁰⁶ In this context, the completely overlooked case of the Macau Red Cross gains a new importance. The Macau delegation was sheltered by being under the umbrella of a national society of a neutral country, with which Japan maintained ambiguous relations throughout the war, as seen in previous chapters. Portugal's historical alliance with Britain, the intertwined nature of Macau's relations with Hong Kong, and the influential presence of well connected Chinese elites in the territory all contributed to allowing the local Red Cross delegation to operate along the blurred lines of Portuguese neutrality in East Asia. In practice, it can also be regarded as an unofficial supporting ICRC branch.

It was precisely in its articulation with the ICRC in Hong Kong that the first discussions for establishing a branch in Macau took place in 1942, its necessity being

¹⁰³ K. Fedorowich, 'Doomed from the Outset? Internment and Civilian Exchange in the Far East: The British Failure over Hong Kong, 1941-45', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 25/1 (1997), pp. 113-40; R. Ward, 'The Asia-Pacific War and the Failed Second Anglo-Japanese Civilian Exchange, 1942-45', *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, 13/12/4 (2015), pp. 1-17.

¹⁰⁴ E.g. J. Crossland, *Britain and the International Committee of the Red Cross, 1939-1945* (Basingstoke, 2014), pp. 90-7.

¹⁰⁵ ICRC Delegate in Shanghai to ICRC, 16 May 1942, ICRC, B G 017 07-012.

¹⁰⁶ The most extreme case was perhaps the execution of the couple of Swiss missionaries that acted as unofficial delegates in Borneo in 1943 ('60 Prison Camps Concealed', *The South China Morning Post* [23 Nov. 1945], sent with letter from ICRC Delegate in Hong Kong to ICRC, 30 Nov. 1945, ICRC, B G 017 07-071).

pushed by the Portuguese colonial authorities in Macau and the British consul.¹⁰⁷ In January 1943 the Macau Delegation of the Portuguese Red Cross initiated its activities under the presidency of Fernando de Senna Fernandes Rodrigues, a local merchant, with the approval of the Macau government. In a letter to Egle, Rodrigues informed that he had been appointed by the Portuguese Red Cross,¹⁰⁸ although it is highly likely that the creation of the Macau delegation was partly due to his own efforts. The exceptional circumstances of Red Cross activities in Japanese-occupied Asia led to the emergence of a sort of ‘humanitarian private contractor,’¹⁰⁹ of which Rodrigues can be seen as an example. He was head of a commercial house that sold a variety of products, being the agent of several foreign and Portuguese import-export and insurance firms, as can be attested by numerous advertisements in the annual directories of Macau.¹¹⁰ In 1940 his name appears in Portuguese archival sources as an agent of a Japanese shipping company in Macau, having denounced some problematic practices to the governor.¹¹¹ His local and international contacts,¹¹² financial means and, possibly, his storage facilities, were likely to have been advantageous for starting a Red Cross branch, given that its activities would need all of those to succeed.

The Red Cross in Macau was, therefore, simultaneously, a local entity (springing from the personal efforts of its president), a national and colonial body (belonging to the Portuguese Red Cross), an inter-imperial structure (due to its close links to the British authorities), an organisation with international connections (linking those in Macau to

¹⁰⁷ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 12 Aug. 1942, AHU, 236, 1E, MU, GM, MÇ, 1942, my translation.

¹⁰⁸ President of the Macau Delegation of the Portuguese Red Cross to ICRC Delegate in Shanghai, 27 Feb. 1943, ICRC, D AO CHINE1 01-086.

¹⁰⁹ Crossland uses the term to refer to the ICRC representative in Singapore (Crossland, *Britain and the International Committee*, p. 92).

¹¹⁰ E.g. *Directório de Macau* (Macau, 1937), p. 1, p. 3, p. 5; *Anuário de Macau* (Macau, 1938), p. 22, pp. 37-8; *Anuário de Macau* (Macau, 1939), p. 3, p. 5, p. 9, p. 10, pp. 12-19.

¹¹¹ Portuguese Consul at Guangzhou to Portuguese Minister to China, 19 Mar. 1940, AHD, 3P, A9, M135.

¹¹² In addition to his professional contacts, Rodrigues also had international connections of more personal nature. For example, his second wife, Neeltje Adriana van Woerkom, was Dutch (J. Forjaz, *Famílias Macaenses* [Macanese Families] [Macau, 1996], iii, p. 257).

their relatives, employers, and acquaintances all over the world), and given the Red Cross label, a transnational institution.

The Macau Red Cross case shows how private and public dimensions were interlocked in relief provision during the war. Its headquarters were established in the commercial house of its president. Having received so many information requests about POWs Rodrigues put his company staff to do some work for the Red Cross as well.¹¹³ Since the beginning, the Macau government sought to guarantee that it was informed of the relevant Red Cross correspondence, asking the president to remit copies of the replies to Red Cross enquiries forwarded by the government to stay in its archives.¹¹⁴ The key figures in the institution further stress the branch's colonial dimension: the president, the secretary, the treasurer, and the board members were all Portuguese and Macanese men living in the enclave, some of them serving officers.¹¹⁵ However, the public emphasis on the Macau delegation as part of the Portuguese Red Cross Society was somewhat paradoxical. Its nationalistic outward presentation (observable, for example, in announcements or small reports of its fundraising activities published in the daily newspaper *A Voz de Macau*¹¹⁶) contrasted with the fact that a significant part of its activities benefited citizens of other nations and that some of its key local donors were Chinese businessmen, such as Gao Kening.¹¹⁷ This had been a feature of the institution

¹¹³ President of the Macau Delegation to the Secretary General of the Portuguese Red Cross, 5 June 1943, AHCVP, CV/3513-3514.

¹¹⁴ Head of the Macau Civil Administration Services to President of the Macau Delegation, 12 Mar. 1943, AM, MO/AH/AC/SA/01/18566, my translation.

¹¹⁵ Respectively, Fernando de Senna Fernandes Rodrigues, Navy first lieutenant José Peixoto de Lima, infantry lieutenant Manuel Gedeão, captain José Joaquim da Silva e Costa, Alberto Pacheco Jorge, João Correia Pais Assunção, and retired lieutenant Augusto Teixeira (Cruz Vermelha Portuguesa, *Boletim Oficial 1943*, 1st semester [1943], p. 23; 'Delegação da Cruz Vermelha Portuguesa' [Portuguese Red Cross Delegation], *A Voz de Macau* [29 Feb. 1943], p. 3).

¹¹⁶ E.g. Add to a charitable billiards show in *A Voz de Macau* 14 June 1943, 3; small report on a flower sale fundraising event in 'Cruz Vermelha Portuguesa' [Portuguese Red Cross], *A Voz de Macau*, 24 Apr. 1944, 2. The latter event included the participation of several Chinese schools in the territory ('Festa da Flor' [Flower Fête], *ibid.* [28 June 1944], p. 4).

¹¹⁷ When Gao died in Hong Kong in 1955, the president of the Macau Delegation conveyed his condolences to the family in name of the Portuguese Red Cross, noting how he had been a 'distinguished member and benefactor' (Macau Delegation to Secretary General of the Portuguese Red Cross, 12 May 1955, AHCVP, Delegação de Macau, 1^a Pasta [1915-1974]).

since its earlier existence in the 1920s and it continued to mark it in its post-war reestablishment. This elite involvement was also similar to Red Cross activities in China.¹¹⁸

The activities of the Macau delegation dealt mainly with communications between Macau, Hong Kong and Shanghai by citizens of different nationalities who happened to be (or were thought to be) in these cities during the war. However, several messages, transmitted to Macau via the ICRC in Geneva or the Portuguese Red Cross headquarters in Lisbon, came from all corners of the world. The names of those who used the services of the Macau Red Cross also paint a picture of a diverse foreign community living in the Portuguese-administered territory during the 1940s, a newfound cosmopolitanism that had been an unintended consequence of the war. From Macau, messages were exchanged with Russians in Shanghai, North American and French missionaries, internees in Hong Kong,¹¹⁹ Chinese in the United States of America¹²⁰ and in South Africa,¹²¹ and many others. Correspondence came from various branches of the Red Cross, including India,¹²² Germany,¹²³ South Africa,¹²⁴ and Turkey.¹²⁵ Its postal services even ran via

¹¹⁸ In Republican China, those linked to Red Cross branches had often been involved in local philanthropic activities before (C. Reeves, 'The Red Cross Society of China: Past, Present, and Future', in J. Ryan, L. C. Chen and T. Saich [eds], *Philanthropy for Health in China* [Bloomington, IN, 2014], p. 217). When the Red Cross became a Chinese government agency in the 1930s, one of its vice-presidents was the Shanghai gangster Du Yuesheng (J. R. Watt, *Saving Lives in Wartime China: How Medical Reformers Built Modern Healthcare Systems Amid War and Epidemics, 1928-1945* [Leiden, 2014], p. 138).

¹¹⁹ ICRC Assistant Delegate in Shanghai to President of the Macau Delegation of the Portuguese Red Cross, 6 July, 29 Sept., 16 Oct., 14 Oct. and 15 Nov. 1943, ICRC, D AO CHINE1 01-086.

¹²⁰ Portuguese Red Cross to American Red Cross, 14 May 1945, AHCVP, Livro de Correspondência Expedida 1945, Vol. IV.

¹²¹ Correspondence in AM, MO/AH/AC/SA/01/18566.

¹²² Assistant Delegate of the ICRC in Shanghai to President of the Macau Delegation of the Portuguese Red Cross, 23 Mar. 1944, ICRC, D AO CHINE1 01-086.

¹²³ President of the Macau Delegation of Portuguese Red Cross to the Delegate of the ICRC in Shanghai, 2 May 1944, *ibid.*

¹²⁴ Secretary General of the Portuguese Red Cross to the Macau Government Secretary, 21 Nov. 1942, transmitted to the President of the Macau Delegation of the Portuguese Red Cross on 30 Aug. 1943, AM, AM, MO/AH/AC/SA/01/18566.

¹²⁵ Assistant Delegate of the ICRC in Shanghai to President of the Macau Delegation of the Portuguese Red Cross, 16 Nov. 1944, ICRC, D AO CHINE1 01-086.

Chongqing,¹²⁶ and Macau appears to have been the only part of unoccupied China to where POWs and internees in Hong Kong were allowed to send messages through the Red Cross channels.¹²⁷

One of the most important activities of the Macau Red Cross during the war was the transmission of correspondence and parcels to and from Japanese POW and civilian camps. In October 1944, the ICRC delegate in Hong Kong telegraphed the ICRC at Tokyo listing as the second largest source of remittances (35%) between January and September those received through the Portuguese Red Cross in Macau.¹²⁸ A few months earlier he summed up to Geneva the close links to the Red Cross in Macau:

Our intercourse with the Portuguese Red Cross in Macau is quite active and still expanding; we are receiving regular remittances from them, for transmission to Prisoners-of-War and Civilian Internees in Hongkong and Japan. Moreover, we are also handling, to the extent permitted by the Camp-Authorities, comfort-parcels to Civilian Internees.¹²⁹

The most comprehensive connection between the ICRC in Hong Kong and the Macau Delegation of the Portuguese Red Cross pertained the civilian centre Rosary Hill. In September 1943 Zindel set up a centre of POW and civilian internees' dependants, the Rosary Hill Red Cross Home, housed in a Dominican convent rented for the purpose. Initially it housed 670 people, most of them women and children. The residents had diverse origins: Eurasian, Portuguese, British by marriage, Chinese, Russian, Indian, Czechoslovak, Iranian, French, Estonian, Swiss, Irish, American Chinese, Latvian, Colombian, and stateless.¹³⁰ In the last two years of the war rising living costs and the suspension of rice rations forced Zindel to encourage the relocation of the inhabitants.

¹²⁶ An announcement in a local daily informed the readers that from then onwards the Macau Delegation of the Portuguese Red Cross was 'able to receive correspondence to be sent via plane to Europe, Australia, and the United States, via Chungking' (*A Voz de Macau* [1 Apr. 1944], p. 3, my translation).

¹²⁷ ICRC Delegate in Hong Kong to ICRC Delegate in Yokohama for ICRC in Geneva, 21 June 1943, ICRC, D AO CHINE1 01-024; also ICRC, B G 017 07-061.

¹²⁸ ICRC Delegate in Hong Kong to ICRC Tokyo Office for ICRC in Geneva, 19 Oct. 1944, ICRC, B G 017 07-068. However, later that same month he asked Geneva for assistance because the Hong Kong authorities had stipulated that 'future Macau remittances to us must pass via Geneva/Tokyo.' (ICRC Delegate in Hong Kong to ICRC Tokyo Office for ICRC in Geneva, 24 Oct. 1944. ICRC, B G 017 07-068).

¹²⁹ ICRC Delegate in Hong Kong to ICRC, 28 Apr. 1944. ICRC, B G 017 07-065.

¹³⁰ ICRC Delegate in Hong Kong to ICRC, Dec. 20 1943. ICRC, B G 017 07-063.

Hundreds of them came to Macau, where they were received by the Portuguese Red Cross.¹³¹ The British consulate funded most of the Rosary Hill evacuees,¹³² the money having been sent by British agents in Lisbon to the governor of Macau via the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹³³ Those who were not initially deemed ‘legitimate dependants of the British prisoners of war or internees’ were taken care of by the Macau delegation, to whom expenses were later reimbursed by the British authorities.¹³⁴

Apart from transmitting messages – more than 1,000 telegrams from refugees were relayed by Macau to the Lisbon headquarters¹³⁵ – and liaising with Hong Kong, the Macau Red Cross also handed money transfers and comfort parcels to those in civilian assembly centres (internment camps) in Shanghai when this was possible.¹³⁶ Fundraising appeals to those in Shanghai, particularly aimed at providing relief to the Portuguese community, were often present in the Macau press, notably in 1945.¹³⁷

The activities of the Macau Delegation of the Portuguese Red Cross were greatly undermined when its president was shot dead in a Macau street after returning from a funeral on July 10, 1945. The reasons for Rodrigues tragic death remain unclear. However, existing accounts point to his connections to and possible involvement in smuggling networks, notably with the boss a pro-Nanjing government group who had

¹³¹ For example, between January and November 1944, over 200 dependants left Rosary Hill, and in May 1945 281 dependants left for Macau (ICRC Delegate in Hong Kong, ‘Memorandum on Proposed Measures to ensure the future maintenance of the “Rosary Hill” Red Cross Home,’ 30 Apr. 1945; ICRC Delegate in Hong Kong to ICRC, 20 June 1945, ICRC, B G 017 07-063).

¹³² British Vice-Consul at Geneva to ICRC, May 28 1945, ICRC, B G 017 07-077.

¹³³ Note from FO to Colonial Office, 16 Aug. 1945, TNA, FO 369/3267.

¹³⁴ Jean Cellérier, London Delegation of the Central Agency for Prisoners of War of the International Committee of the Red Cross to Colonial Office, 5 July 1945, TNA, FO 369/3267.

¹³⁵ ‘Elementos estatísticos da acção da Cruz Vermelha Portuguesa durante a Guerra de 1939-1945’ [Statistical elements of the actions of the Portuguese Red Cross during the 1939-1945 War], AHCVP, CV/4742-4805.

¹³⁶ ICRC Delegate in Shanghai to President of the Macau Delegation, 24 Jan. 1944, ICRC, D AO CHINE1 01-086.

¹³⁷ E.g. ‘Cruz Vermelha Portuguesa’ [Portuguese Red Cross], *A Voz de Macau* (7 Dec. 1944), p. 4; ‘Como socorrer os portugueses de Shanghai, vítimas da guerra?’ [How to Help the Shanghai Portuguese, Victims of War?] *Renascimento* (23 Mar. 1945), p. 6; ‘Portugueses! Centenas de Famílias Portuguesas estão destruídas em Shanghai! Assinem, conforme a sua posse, a subscrição pública!’ [Portuguese! Hundreds of Portuguese Families are Destroyed in Shanghai! Sign the Public Subscription According to your Means!], *Renascimento* (29 Mar. 1945), p. 6; ‘Para os Portugueses de Xangai’ [To the Shanghai Portuguese], *Renascimento* (26 June 1945), p. 4.

secretly passed to Chiang's side a few months before and that had recently been assassinated in Zhongshan.¹³⁸ Two other Portuguese accounts state that Rodrigues was assassinated by an agent for Huang Gongjie, arguably the number one pro-Japanese Chinese criminal in Macau during the war, who will be addressed in Chapter Six.¹³⁹ The man caught for the crime corroborates this link.

The Macau Red Cross did not outlive its president for long, terminating its activities in 1946. With the end of the war, its 'POW service' had no further purpose. In Lisbon, the Portuguese Red Cross decorated several of its members, including a posthumous 'Praise' (*Louvor*) medal to Rodrigues.¹⁴⁰ A few years later, the Red Cross was revived in Macau. Another member of a prominent Macanese family, Alberto Pacheco Jorge, who had been involved in the wartime branch, was chosen as the new president, a position he would occupy until 1971. This third life of the Red Cross in Macau has lasted until the present, albeit now operating under the umbrella of a different national society, that of the Red Cross Society of China. The know-how acquired during the Second World War was a valuable precedent to its subsequent activities, dealing with new waves of refugees from China and Vietnam, including the exodus of the Shanghai Portuguese community in the early 1950s.¹⁴¹

¹³⁸ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 14 July 1945, NE-10A2, cx. 768

¹³⁹ M. Teixeira, 'Rescaldo da Guerra' [Aftermath of the War], *Boletim Eclesiástico da Diocese de Macau* [Macau Diocese Ecclesiastic Bulletin], 885 (1978), pp. 530-1; and M. Teixeira, 'The Bonnie and Clyde of Macao', in D. Pittis and S. J. Henders, *Macao: Mysterious Decay and Romance* (Hong Kong, 1997), pp. 5-7; Pinto, 'Guerra em Paz', p. 86.

¹⁴⁰ 'Elementos estatísticos', AHCVP, CV/4742-4805. Rodrigues had been awarded other two decorations by the Portuguese Red Cross Society: one for Dedication (*Dedicação*) in 1920 and one for Merit (*Mérito*) in 1943.

¹⁴¹ AHCVP, Delegação de Macau, 1ª Pasta (1915-1974).

5.4. Intelligence networks

The Macau Red Cross played an important role in the transmission of private messages. But other sorts of information circulated via Macau. Different intelligence groups used the enclave as an information collection post and, on the side of the Allies, as a place to organise escapes to unoccupied China. The BAAG and the Special Operations Executive (SOE) are the better known, although their activities in Macau often crossed with each other and with other groups, such as the American OSS. As will become clear in this section, the British consul in Macau ended up being a central figure for Allied intelligence in Macau, even setting up his own informal network without London's consent.

Created in 1942, the BAAG was led by lieutenant-colonel Lindsay Tasman Ride, an Australian veteran of the First World War who had taught at HKU and served in the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Force before the Japanese occupation. He escaped to Chongqing in early 1942, was appointed MI9 representative in China and worked under instructions of the military attaché at the British embassy. All BAAG activities had to be carried out with knowledge of Chinese authorities. In its area of operations in South China were 'several thousand British subjects' in Macau.¹⁴²

The consulate looking over them had a variety of secret contacts at its disposal. In May Reeves informed the FO that he was 'in direct touch' with agents of the Guangdong Political Affairs Committee with credentials. He proposed to 'use them exclusively' and send messages to Chongqing.¹⁴³ That same month, SOE agents were sent to enquire on the potential for activities in Macau and Guangzhouwan to try to establish contact with

¹⁴² War Office report 'British agencies in China', pp. 1-2, copy sent by War Cabinet Offices to FO, 27 Mar., 1945, TNA, FO 371/46196.

¹⁴³ British Consul at Macau, 7 May 1942, quoted in message from the British Ambassador in Lisbon to FO, 9 May 1942, TNA CO 825/30/12.

Hong Kong. The operation was named 'Vodka.' Macau's location and nationality made it an asset for intelligence gathering, although initially it was considered that it could also be used to interfere with enemy shipping in the region, to operate in Hong Kong or, if necessary, to create incidents which could bring Portugal to enter the war on the Allied side.¹⁴⁴ Eventually, plans for using Macau as a sabotage base were left dormant until a Japanese occupation of the enclave that never came about, and operation 'Vodka' seems to have been offered to the Secret Intelligence Service instead.¹⁴⁵

The following month Ride established contact with Reeves via William Chong, a Canadian Chinese who had lived in Hong Kong before the occupation. Joy Wilson, who worked for the consulate, was appointed the official BAAG representative in the enclave. Her husband, police superintendent Geoffrey Wilson, was in a POW camp in Hong Kong. She was put 'in charge of all codes and communications and was the main point of contact for the various agents in the colony.'¹⁴⁶ Joy Wilson was soon approached by the SOE as well. In August, F.A. Olsen, a Danish operative, reported unfavourably on Reeves' lack of discretion with a code he had given him and ended up entrusting a second code to Wilson.¹⁴⁷ Olsen also engaged K.P. Fletcher from MELCO and Jean Fay, a 'very Anti-Vichy' French of the CMC at Lappa, as well as two Chinese men, one of whom with contacts in Guangzhouwan and Hainan. According to Olsen, Reeves was 'very friendly' with the governor and 'apt to confide too much' with him. He was also described as giving out information which he should have kept to himself.¹⁴⁸ Arrangements were made by Olsen for carrying written messages via the crews of ships plying between Macau, Guangzhouwan and Hong Kong. In Macau, a 'compradore shop' was used as post office. Transfers of funds could be made through CMC, from the Norwegian commissioner in

¹⁴⁴ 'The Portuguese Colony of Macao', 5 Mar. 1942, TNA, HS 1/176.

¹⁴⁵ TNA, HS 1/176.

¹⁴⁶ Ride, *BAAG*, p. 211.

¹⁴⁷ P. Elphick, *Far Eastern File: The Intelligence War in the Far East, 1930-1945* (London, 1997), pp. 369-70.

¹⁴⁸ Report by F.A. Olsen, 4 Aug., 1942. TNA, HS 1/176.

Guangzhouwan to Fay.¹⁴⁹ After visiting Macau he managed to smuggle funds used to set up a wireless station to communicate directly with Chongqing.¹⁵⁰

British intelligence networks around Macau sprang from the many personal and professional connections to Hong Kong. Although these were multinational, the Portuguese Honkongers were a key element. According to a 1943 report from the ICRC delegate in Hong Kong, about 1,200 Portuguese remained there, by far the second largest number of ‘third nationals’ after Indians.¹⁵¹ As Snow observed, some of the Portuguese who remained ‘managed to recreate their traditional intermediary role by setting themselves up as “brokers” to traffic between the conquerors on the one hand and the Hong Kong Chinese population on the other.’¹⁵² Others however, kept supporting the British in various ways. Those caught suffered severe consequences. In June 1943 two Portuguese were sentenced for espionage in Hong Kong. An HSBC employee was condemned to 15 years imprisonment for listening to and reporting on broadcasts from London and other places. Another man was sentenced to death. He had been employed as a chauffeur and mechanic by the public health section of the governor’s general department after the occupation. He was accused of being recruited by a Chinese acquaintance in 1943, setting up a wireless post in his house, passing messages to and from a British organisation in Huizhou and establishing secret contacts with Stanley Internment Camp via an Englishman and a Chinese ‘coolie.’¹⁵³ In October around 70 Portuguese men were arrested in the Club Lusitano on suspicion of holding a pro-Allied

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.. Fay had arrived in Macau in October 1941 and retired from his post in July 1944. Before leaving his post he wrote a letter to the governor thanking him for his hospitality and expressed the will to remain an intermediary between the Macau authorities and the customs (Fay to Teixeira, 9 June, 1944, AHU, Espólio Gabriel Maurício Teixeira).

¹⁵⁰ Elphick, *Far Eastern File*, pp. 369-70.

¹⁵¹ ‘Rapport de Mr. Zindel sur l’activité de la Délégation du CICR à Hong Kong’ [Report by Mr Zindel on the Activities of the ICRC Delegation in Hong Kong], 28 Feb. 1943, ICRC, B G 017 07-060.

¹⁵² Snow, *The Fall of Hong Kong*, p. 121.

¹⁵³ ‘Extracts from weekly intelligence report no.4 from Staff Officer (Intelligence) Hongkong’, 24 Sept. 1945, pp. 9-16, sent by the Director of Naval Intelligence to the FO, TNA FO 371/46258.

meeting.¹⁵⁴ The following month the club was shut down and the president of the Portuguese Association was arrested on suspicion of planning a coup for retaking Hong Kong.¹⁵⁵

The exodus of Hongkongers to Macau provided a vast pool of informers to the British consulate. The scale of Reeves intelligence activities would only become evident in London in mid-1943, when a letter from the consul reached the British ambassador in Chongqing via Guilin. In it, Reeves alluded to the tight Japanese surveillance over his activities, with sentries posted at intervals outside the consulate and cars tailing him and his family. More intriguing for Seymour, Reeves provided intelligence he had received to be passed on to the BAAG about the situation in Hong Kong and information about specific people there. He also provided information on Japanese and collaborationist actions and men in South China and Macau, passed by one of his agents who was a student in the local Japanese school.¹⁵⁶ According to Reeves, he had three groups working in intelligence: one predominantly Portuguese and the others composed by Portuguese, Indian and Chinese, with the latter in majority. They only received ‘small amounts for expenses’ and the consul had promised that ‘their names will be reported to our people at the end of the war.’ He estimated that some one hundred people were reporting to him, including an agent whom Reeves did not trust completely covering Wang Jingwei and the peace movement. References to existing radio communications with Free China were also present.¹⁵⁷

Enquiries were made and it became apparent that Reeves’ intelligence activities had not been directed by London or Lisbon and were considered a potential liability that could compromise British organisations operating in China. SOE confirmed that Reeves

¹⁵⁴ Waichow Intelligence Summary No. 36, 23 Nov. 1943, HKU, MF 2530701, Roll 19.

¹⁵⁵ Governor of Macau, quoted in letter from MC to MNE, 6 Nov. 1943, AHD, 2P, A59, M263.

¹⁵⁶ Extract from Macau letter to Guilin, 14 June 1943 sent with despatch from the British Embassy in Chongqing to Foreign Office, 8 Sept. 1943, TNA, FO 371/35736.

¹⁵⁷ Extract from Macau letter to Guilin, 14 June 1943 sent with despatch from the British Embassy in Chongqing to Foreign Office, 8 Sept. 1943, *ibid.*.

occasionally used their ciphers but it had ‘no other interest in him.’¹⁵⁸ Replying to the FO, Reeves stated that he had asked some people receiving relief from the consulate to gather information in Macau, including on ‘enemy politics and trading activities’ in the enclave. He noted the potential usefulness of these reports for the post-war Hong Kong government and stated that the intelligence he had gathered had been thanked by different constituencies: he had served the Macau governor ‘in domestic affairs,’ it had served Chongqing ‘politically’ and ‘over smuggling’ and had been useful to BAAG when their means had not been sufficient to deal with Macau.¹⁵⁹ The FO ordered him to stop collecting such reports and acting as a channel of communication for the BAAG as the Japanese were fully aware of his activities.¹⁶⁰

BAAG and escapes

With or without Reeves, BAAG activities continued to be prepared via Macau. In October 1943, it organised the successful transfer of the HSBC records to Chongqing (from where they were dispatched to London), duplicates of which had been moved to the BNU in Macau before the Japanese invasion.¹⁶¹

The BAAG also set up an escape route from Hong Kong into Free China via Macau which was used by around 100 people during the war.¹⁶² As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, one of those who used it was Wilson herself. In 1943 she entrusted the leadership of the Macau branch to her physician Eddie Gosano. Born in Hong Kong in a Portuguese family, according to his memoirs, Gosano was legally

¹⁵⁸ Ministry of Economic Warfare to FO, 6 Nov. 1943, TNA, FO 371/35736.

¹⁵⁹ British Consul at Macau, 28 Oct. 1943, quoted in telegram from Embassy in Chongqing to FO, 10 Nov., 1943, *ibid.*

¹⁶⁰ FO to Embassy in Chongqing, 10 and 19 Nov. 1943, *ibid.*

¹⁶¹ F. H. H. King, *The History of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Volume III – The Hong Kong Bank between the Wars and the Bank Interned, 1919-1945: Return from Grandeur* (Cambridge, 1988), p. 615; Gunn, ‘The British Army Aid Group (BAAG) and the Anti-Japanese Resistance Movement in Macau’, in *Wartime Macau*, p. 153.

¹⁶² Ride, *BAAG*, p. 212.

classified as Chinese. Trained as a doctor, he had volunteered to serve in Argyle and Sham Shui Po POW camps before arriving in Macau in 1942, where he became Reeves' attending physician. Wilson also left three Chinese associates in Macau, including Y.C. Liang (Liang Runchang), whom Gosano described as 'a rice merchant with a small shop' in central Macau who 'became a rich and prominent financier after the war,'¹⁶³ notably one of the major figures in the city's gold trade. When Gosano stepped down from the leadership of the Macau BAAG he appointed Liang to the position.¹⁶⁴ The people involved in the BAAG activities in Macau reveal how personal trust was a key element in the establishment of intelligence operations during the war. They also confirm our argument that resistance in wartime Macau was often an international endeavour involving figures of different nationalities, socio-economic strata and interests.

Amongst the major escapes coordinated by the BAAG were those of the number two in the Macau administration, Luíz da Câmara Meneses Alves, and of a group of American airmen shot down near the enclave. The sort-of defection of the head of the civil administration services, Macau's equivalent of colonial secretary, in April 1944 remains a matter of some speculation, enhanced by his death after being interviewed about the affair in the 1990s. Described in British sources as a 'staunch supporter of the Allied Cause,'¹⁶⁵ Alves left Macau disguised as a peasant and was smuggled by Chinese agents into Free China. He arrived at the BAAG post in Sanbu en route to Guilin.¹⁶⁶ From Guilin he was transported by the United States Air Force to Kunming, and from there he travelled to Portugal via India, Egypt, and Gibraltar. In Lisbon, Alves called at the British Embassy to thank them for the assistance given by the RAF and the British Overseas

¹⁶³ IWM, *Hong Kong Farewell*, p. 27.

¹⁶⁴ They remained friends until Gosano migrated to the US in 1960. In his memoirs, he wrote that Liang named the first hydrofoil in Hong Kong, whose company he founded, 'Phoenix' after Gosano's BAAG codename (Ibid., p. 37). E. Ride stated that 'Phoenix' had been Liang's own codename (Ride, *BAAG*, p. 211) but Y.C. Liang papers in the HK PRO confirm he was not 'Phoenix', whom it replaced (HKPRO, HKRS 30-1-1).

¹⁶⁵ BAAG Guilin, quoted in telegram from British Embassy in Chongqing to FO, 27 Apr. 1944, TNA, FO 371/41620.

¹⁶⁶ BAAG Guilin, quoted in telegram from British Embassy in Chongqing to FO, 27 Apr. 1944, *ibid.*

Airways Corporation on his return to Europe. He also provided information about the circumstances in Macau. Japanese morale had been deteriorating and their shipping resources were being depleted. He believed that if Portugal toughened up its attitude regarding Timor the Japanese would seize Macau at once, 'probably not directly but by employing puppet Chinese and disclaiming all responsibility.' For Alves, one of the reasons why Japan had not seized Macau was to use it as propaganda 'to refute the charge that they were making war on the white race as such.' He praised Reeves as having done 'magnificent work for British interests.'¹⁶⁷ In a later conversation with a member of staff of the British Embassy, Alves offered more praise for the consul, stating that he was 'treated with respect by the bulk of the population, who are convinced of eventual allied victory.' He also provided further details about his escape and the local authorities. Alves' name had been on the Japanese black list and he had travelled as a private person to prevent a diplomatic incident if he were killed. Although criticising the governor, whose 'isolation from Portugal for three years had put him into a position of independent power which he is not completely qualified to occupy,' he believed him to be honest and trying his best, reserving a harsher judgement for other unnamed 'elements in the Government who have been assisting the Japanese to an unnecessary extent.'¹⁶⁸

A few months later, Alves' assessment of the governor's performance had hardened. In a conversation with the British embassy's third secretary, he 'stated that the Governor was definitely pro-Japanese and took the Japanese side in every question that arose to a greater extent than was necessitated by his admittedly difficult position.' He believed 'a little firmness on the part of the Governor would have avoided the infestation of Macau by numbers of Japanese gendarmerie in plain clothes, who were able to assassinate and kidnap prominent Chinese with impunity.' Alves considered that during

¹⁶⁷ British Ambassador in Lisbon to Anthony Eden, 28 July 1944, *ibid.*

¹⁶⁸ Memorandum from Embassy in Lisbon to Anthony Eden, 27 Oct. 1944, *ibid.*

the war, ‘the Portuguese in Macao have lost much face in Chinese eyes by their attitude.’¹⁶⁹ His representations, together with critical reports from the Chinese, were considered to have altered Salazar’s opinion of the governor.¹⁷⁰ Although the fact that Teixeira was kept in post contradicts the British perception of a loss of trust by the Portuguese dictator, the more critical tone Alves adopted towards the governor remained the same when he was interviewed decades later. There he stated that his opposition to the sale of vessels and materials to the Japanese had damaged his relations with the governor and co-workers to a point where he got anonymous death threats, and finally decided to leave.¹⁷¹ Despite Alves self-portrayal contrasting himself, as of a friend of Reeves and in good contacts with a clandestine network of pro-Chongqing Chinese refugees from Shanghai, with a pro-Japanese governor, other primary sources make clear that Teixeira was equally close to the British and not favourably disposed towards the Japanese, whose abuses he constantly decried in his telegrams to Lisbon, but with whom he had to interact to avoid an actual occupation.

In fact, the governor’s name appears linked to what is considered one of the highlights of Portuguese-Allied cooperation in Macau during the war, the escape of the American airmen George W. Clarke, Don E. Mize, and Charles Myers.¹⁷² The operation involved Y.C. Liang from the BAAG, the Nationalist guerrilla leader Wong Kau (Wang Jiu?), and counted with the cooperation of Pedro Lobo and the Macau chief of police, Captain Ribeiro da Cunha.¹⁷³ However, as with all escapes from Macau, Chinese

¹⁶⁹ Minute by Third Secretary Curl, 24 Nov. 1944, sent with despatch from British Ambassador in Lisbon to FO, 25 Nov. 1944, *ibid.*.

¹⁷⁰ Minute by Third Secretary Curl, 24 Nov. 1944 with despatch from British Ambassador in Lisbon to FO, 25 Nov., 1944, *ibid.*.

¹⁷¹ R. Pinto, ‘A Grande Evasão’ [The Great Escape], *Macau*, 43 (1995), p. 93.

¹⁷² Amongst others, Ride thanked the governor for his assistance after the war and he mentioned he would propose Ribeiro da Cunha for a decoration, Gosano mentioned it in his memoirs, and Jack Braga’s nephew recently celebrated it in a newsletter of a Macanese association in Australia (Ride to Teixeira, 22 Oct. 1946, AHU, Espólio Gabriel Maurício Teixeira; IWM, *Hong Kong Farewell*, p. 33; S. Braga, ‘Rescued from certain death,’ *Casa Down Under Newsletter*, 23/4 [2011], pp. 1-4, http://www.casamacau.org.au/newsletter/casanewsletters/11_4CasaOct2011.pdf [23 July 2017].

¹⁷³ Gunn, ‘The British Army Aid Group’, p. 153.

intermediaries were crucial. Their voices are often absent from sources but a rare exception can be found amongst the Braga Papers in the National Library of Australia. An English-language draft signed by Pang Meng and probably handwritten by Braga, details the heroic deed of a 'poor fisherman' and the post-war neglect many of those who had helped the Allies around Macau suffered in the post-war. In early 1945 Pang was on his junk when he saved the three American airmen as their plane was sinking. Although a passenger on his boat had suggested handing them over to the Japanese for a reward, he took them to Macau and asked for help at the British consulate. This set up a plan with Chinese guerrillas, and the airmen, disguised as Chinese fishermen, were taken into Free China on the same junk. Reeves paid Pang Meng for his services and the other junk's passengers to keep quiet. Later Pang was warned the Japanese had found out about his deed and he escaped with his family to Free China, having to borrow to survive. After the war he returned, and asked Reeves for help to find work. Reeves sent him to the American consulate in Hong Kong. The matter was referred to more people until he was notified he had already been 'sufficiently rewarded.' He sought Reeves' help again but he had been replaced and the new consul did not receive him. Pang did not want money, but work to be able to pay the debts he had incurred for saving the airmen. He was thus appealing to them to plea for him, if they were still living, via the United Press News Service.¹⁷⁴ It is unclear if they ever received the message.

Multiple connections

Several of those involved in intelligence in Macau had links to different powers. This becomes evident through the case of an OSS agent, whose information is likely to have triggered one of the American bombings over Macau discussed in the previous

¹⁷⁴ Undated handwritten draft by Pang Meng, NLA, MS 4300, Box 52, 8.1./11.

chapter. Bernard Felix Xavier had worked for the Shanghai Police before coming to Hong Kong, where he served in the Royal Navy as a signalman from 1940 to 1941. He left to Macau in 1942, and reached Guilin by junk. After being recruited by the OSS at the BAAG headquarters, he was sent back to Macau pretending to be a Japanese agent offering information. His contact in Macau was Jack Braga, whom Xavier recalled as ‘the man in charge of the British intelligence in Macau.’¹⁷⁵ Because Braga was aware the Japanese knew of his activities, he told Xavier his new contact would be Lobo (it is unclear from the oral history record if it was Pedro or his son Roger). ‘Mr Lobo’ paid him for his services and passed the information to Braga. At one time he was advised to ‘disappear’ or ‘hide’ and he hid for three months under the bed of his mother’s house – an interesting element revealing the importance of family relations in survival strategies in wartime Macau. Later, Braga arranged for him to join the Macau police force. All the Chinese agents knew him and tipped him off that the Japanese were ‘buying petrol from the Portuguese government in exchange for rice.’ He reported to Braga who then informed American intelligence and a few hours later the Americans came and ‘bombed it.’ Pedro Lobo was very angry, telling him he had not expected him to ‘tip the Americans so soon.’ He warned Xavier the Japanese would shoot him if they knew and recommended him to stay hidden in Coloane. Xavier remained on the island until the end of the war, never returning to the Macau peninsula. He was picked up by a British vessel, re-joined the navy, and eventually moved to Britain. He left behind his Chinese wife ‘from a very rich family’ whose father opposed her going with him, and who migrated to San Francisco instead. Without receiving thanks for the help he had given the Allies, he ended up as a restaurant owner in Britain.¹⁷⁶ Xavier’s account highlights the multiple layers of cooperation that existed in wartime Macau. He was a Shanghai Portuguese who

¹⁷⁵ IWM, Catalogue no. 19926, Interview with Bernard Felix Xavier (1999).

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*.

had served in the Royal Navy, an American intelligence agent who reported to a Hong Kong Portuguese who spied for the British, and to a Eurasian Portuguese who was a key intermediary between the Macau administration and both Japanese and Chinese of different factions. The fate of his Chinese family also reveals the intimate relations (and their difficulties) between members of different communities during the war.

Crossing over different intelligence agencies was Jack Braga, truly one unsung hero of the Allied war effort. As detailed in Chapter Two, Hong Kong-born Braga had been living in Macau since the 1920s and was a close friend of many Cantonese elite figures. During the war he liaised between the British consulate, Nationalist agents, the governor of Macau and several intelligence operatives. Most of his efforts appear to have sprung from his own initiative. The Braga Papers in Australia hold documents written in late 1945 and early 1946 to Chinese and others who had assisted the Allies, notably Nationalist and British agents in information gathering, propaganda, and escapes during the war so they could find work after the conflict.¹⁷⁷ These people had rendered service voluntarily to the Allies, but in the post-war, neither the British nor the Chinese government acknowledged them officially or were willing to assist them financially in case of need. A poignant letter shows Braga was helping some of these people out of his own pocket while he himself had to borrow money.¹⁷⁸ Before leaving his post in Macau, Reeves wrote him a reference acknowledging the services he had rendered to the Allies.¹⁷⁹ In June 1947, when articles in the Chinese press were criticising Macau, Braga wrote to Robert Ho Tung: ‘We know that the Macao authorities were not only sympathetic, they were actually helping the Allied agents.’¹⁸⁰ His efforts for British-Portuguese-Nationalist cooperation did not have lasting results, but in their collaborative

¹⁷⁷ NLA, MS 4300, Box 53, 8.1./18.

¹⁷⁸ [Unsigned] to Cheung Tsz-wai, 11 Dec. 1945, *ibid.*

¹⁷⁹ Reeves to J. M. Braga, 24 July, 1946, NLA, MS 4300, Box 52, 8.1./11.

¹⁸⁰ [Unsigned] to Sir Robert Hotung, 9 June 1947, NLA, MS 4300, Box 26, 4.7/1.

character they were certainly important in guaranteeing the nominal neutrality of the enclave during the war, through very unneutral ways.

The extent of these local, bottom-up efforts is confirmed by nervous diplomatic correspondence about Reeves' involvement in intelligence activities that erupted again in 1945. British documents retained until 2013 reveal the extent to which Reeves actions went beyond London's control. It began when the British consulate general at Kunming received telegrams from the consul at Macau containing messages for OSS representatives. These however believed 'the author of the messages is working for the Japanese' and Reeves had compromised himself by sending them. Despite initial opinions on the contrary, it was decided that Reeves should stop sending messages in the interest of his safety as he would be 'in serious danger if and when the Japanese take over Macao.'¹⁸¹ At the end of April the Supreme Allied Command in South East Asia telegraphed the British Embassy in Chongqing asking if messages regarding future operations had been sent to Reeves for transmission to the governor.¹⁸² A few days later the Portuguese ambassador in London also asked if the FO had seen the note Reeves had addressed the governor.¹⁸³ After making enquiries, the FO wrote to Chongqing that it had learnt 'from a most secret source which must on no account be quoted or compromised' that Reeves had communicated a message to Teixeira upon instructions from 'the Allied Command in the Interior of China.' The message reassured the governor that the Allies were aware of Japanese pressure on him but a landing was forthcoming in April near Macau, in French Indochina and at another point on the China coast so he should 'play for time.'¹⁸⁴ The governor did not think anything seemed odd and informed Lisbon he had been doing just that, as advised by Lobo.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸¹ British Ambassador in Chongqing to Government of India, 3 Apr. 1945, TNA, FO 371/46199.

¹⁸² Supreme Allied Command South East Asia to British Embassy in Chongqing, 20 Apr. 1945, *ibid.*

¹⁸³ Record of visit of Portuguese Ambassador to Sir Orme Sargent, 2 May 1945, *ibid.*

¹⁸⁴ FO to British Embassy in Chongqing, 27 Apr. 1945, *ibid.*

¹⁸⁵ Governor of Macau to Minister of Colonies, 16 Apr. 1945, TNA, HW 40/84.

Who had sent such a message to Reeves? The message was an item of strategic deception,¹⁸⁶ but British intelligence was keen on knowing who had sent it. Reeves could not be asked because there was no safe, confidential way of reaching him. The ambassador, Horace Seymour, and general Carton de Wiart, Churchill's representative in Chongqing, made enquiries and concluded that the message had not been sent to any British organisation in China and the Americans had not sent it either.¹⁸⁷ Possibility was raised that 'some Chinese organisation may have sent it without the knowledge of General Wedemeyer's headquarters.'¹⁸⁸ Seymour did not believe it likely that 'any official Chinese organisation with which British Organisations have contact would have sent the message' and suggested it could have been orchestrated by the Japanese.¹⁸⁹ His choice of words however, hinted that it could have been done by other Chinese agents. Eventually, Reeves reported back to London via the governor of Macau and then the Portuguese embassy in London. The message had been conveyed by 'an individual who was in possession of credentials from the Chungking Government.' Reeves had passed it to Teixeira as 'a duty of friendship' to him without 'accepting responsibility as to its authenticity.'¹⁹⁰ As this case shows, Reeves was engaged with multiple Allied agents, as well as in constant contact with the governor, appearing immune to rivalries between agencies and countries.¹⁹¹ It is known that Chinese agents of the OSS had been sent to Macau and other places to spread disinformation in order to damage Japanese morale.¹⁹² So it is possible that Reeves got caught up in the middle of this. The variety of his

¹⁸⁶ D Division Weekly Progress Report No. 5, Apr. 1945, *ibid.*.

¹⁸⁷ British Embassy in Chongqing to FO, 30 Apr. 1945. TNA, FO 371/46199.

¹⁸⁸ FO to British Embassy in Chongqing, 19 May 1945, *ibid.*.

¹⁸⁹ British Embassy in Chongqing to FO, 22 May 1945. TNA, *ibid.*.

¹⁹⁰ Portuguese Embassy in London to FO, 1 Aug. 1945, *ibid.*.

¹⁹¹ On Sino-American intelligence rivalry in see R. J. Aldrich, *Intelligence and the War Against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service* (Cambridge, 2000).

¹⁹² M. Yu, *The Dragon's War: Allied Operations and the Fate of China, 1937-1945* (Annapolis, 2006), p. 159.

connections¹⁹³ makes it difficult to demarcate specific allegiances beyond the vague ‘Allied cause.’

Even if Reeves was seen as a potential liability, British intelligence’s interest in Macau continued until the end of the war. In October and November 1944 enquiries were made in Lisbon, London and Macau on the possibility of ‘having a reliable Portuguese agent’ to provide funds in the enclave for ‘financing special work.’ Contacts in Lisbon were made by Mikhail Terestchenko.¹⁹⁴ Amongst the figures initially suggested were a Portuguese veterinary surgeon in Macau with friends in democratic circles, the manager of the BNU, and even the governor.¹⁹⁵ In late November Terestchenko provided more specific data on eight possible recruits including potential uses and ways of contacting them. Henrique Nolasco, the honorary Dutch consul in Macau, was the first. Other names put forward were recommended by the ‘Lisbon Freemasons.’ Amongst the suggested names was the former bishop of Macau, D. José da Costa Nunes, who would probably be able to indicate possible recruits in Macau.¹⁹⁶ This, allied to the fact that Reeves was a freemason,¹⁹⁷ points to other global networks linking wartime Macau.

Further enquiries were made in December and January 1945 on the Norwegian Reider Johannessen, one of the names proposed by Terestchenko. Johannessen had escaped to Macau via Hong Kong after being arrested by the Japanese in Shanghai. He then went to India in 1942, where he was appointed representative of the Norwegian Merchant Shipping Board.¹⁹⁸ MI5 had informed he was on friendly terms with Mahommed Namazee, an Iranian merchant with agencies in Shanghai and Macau, who

¹⁹³ Elphick stated that Reeves also worked for the SIS, considering as proof a denial that he did so (Elphick, *Far Eastern File*, p. 369).

¹⁹⁴ TNA, HS 1/176. Terestchenko was a Russian with a Nansen passport who had been minister of finance in Kerenski’s government. A businessmen and a banker, he had been spotted by the British in Mozambique. He had contacts in Eastern Europe and the Balkans and had been connected to British intelligence work in Lisbon (TNA, HS 9/1451/8).

¹⁹⁵ TNA, HS 1/176.

¹⁹⁶ ‘Summary of the Conference held in Lisbon between Mr. T and F/A in November, 1944’, 23 Nov. 1944, TNA, HS 1/176.

¹⁹⁷ Reeves, *The Lone Flag*, p. 118.

¹⁹⁸ TNA, HS 1/176.

was favourably regarded by the Japanese and suspicious to the British. It is inconclusive if further enquiries led to his recruitment, or of any of the other names listed.¹⁹⁹

It is feasible that enquiries on people and ways to send money into Macau were connected to the SOE's 'Operation Remorse' studied by Bickers. Currency trading was the main activity in the scheme for purchasing 'quinine, influence, safety and food for prisoners, to smooth the British path into Hong Kong,' and currency trading was indeed one of the key activities that kept neutral Macau appealing to different actors. Remorse's commercial network through occupied and unoccupied China had a number of international connections, including to Lisbon,²⁰⁰ which adds credibility to a possible Macau link. In sum, this variety of international contacts attest to the important supporting role played by neutral Macau in a global Second World War.

5.5. Preparing the reoccupation of Hong Kong

Macau was a place where the British reoccupation of Hong Kong was prepared, even though the preparations were not sanctioned by London and their actual implementation is unclear. Amongst the Braga Papers at the National Library of Australia and the Hong Kong PRO several pages of detailed plans for the post-war rehabilitation of Hong Kong made by refugees in Macau can be found.²⁰¹ Covering issues such as housing, repatriation, food supplies or transportation, the plans reflect the efforts to combine the expertise of those in Macau for the future prosperity of a British-ruled Hong Kong. A letter containing a list of personnel mentioned that those involved in the scheme included people receiving British consulate support and some who did not. Some names had been

¹⁹⁹ TNA, HS 9/799/1.

²⁰⁰ R. Bickers, 'The Business of a Secret War: Operation "Remorse" and SOE Salesmanship in Wartime China', *Intelligence and National Security*, 16/4 (2001), p. 12, pp. 25-6.

²⁰¹ E.g. Minutes of meetings in Macau and other papers, NLA, MS 4300, Box 52, 8.1./10, and Box 53, 8.1./20.

referred to Nationalist agents in Macau for their views. The list of those involved included several Portuguese and Chinese, amongst others.²⁰² Another letter from Jack Braga, explained that it was the author's idea to gather some friends to 'draw up a study.' Reeves was approached and 'gave his blessing to the suggestion.' Therefore, the committees sprung from local initiative and were unconnected to similar planning being done in London. The scheme was seen as a way for many Hong Kong people stranded in Macau to contribute to the war effort. Through it they also affirmed their capacity to play active roles in the future of Hong Kong, a home where many had been marginalised by racist colonial hierarchies. Braga wrote:

[...] if given a chance, the local fellows believe that they can contribute substantially in many ways to assist in the important phases of the rehabilitation of Hongkong, together with a contribution, if such should be needed, to the war effort, in case Hongkong should be utilized as a military base and use can be found for local people of ability, integrity and goodwill, whose loyalty is unquestioned. In other words, we feel we can show that we can, if given the opportunity, and assigned to those posts where our ability and qualifications can enable us to render good service, be of some help to the British Government.²⁰³

In May 1945 the FO was informed of the existence of two committees composed by Portuguese, Indian, Eurasian and Chinese refugees in Macau drawing plans for the future reoccupation and rehabilitation of Hong Kong. The information, provided by the BAAG representative in Macau and transmitted by Ride to the military attaché in Chongqing and from him to the Colonial Office, noted that both committees were 'fully chartered and authorized by the governing bodies in London' and there was a 'wild rumour' on how the two committees would function on a return to Hong Kong.²⁰⁴ The FO was beyond surprise. The committees were certainly not London's doing and the

²⁰² The list too extensive to reproduce here. The first names listed were Reeves as chairman, L. D'Almada e Castro, T.N. Chau, A. el Arculli and C.G. Anderson as Consultants, E.J. Figueiredo, C.Y. Kwan, W.C. Hung, and R. Nazarin as Executives and J.M. Braga, Dr S.N. Chau, J.S. Landolt, R.L. Noronha and M.U. Razack as co-coordinators (HKPRO, Book 940.53 SOM 1945, *Some Records of the Plans Made During the War Against Japan by British Residents in Macao*).

²⁰³ Braga to 'George,' 14 July 1945, *ibid.*. Although the letter is unsigned, a reference to 'my father, the late Mr. J.P. Braga, O.B.E.' and a copy of the letter amongst the Braga Papers confirm the authorship.

²⁰⁴ Ride to Military Attaché at the British Embassy in Chongqing, 25 Apr. 1945, TNA, FO 371/46251.

possibility of Reeves ‘being duped by an enemy agent’ and having to be replaced was raised.²⁰⁵ This was linked to the discovery made in 1943 that Reeves was, without superior order, ‘engaged in various unorthodox activities’ and there was information that he had disobeyed previous instructions to limit his activities to relief and consular duties and had been communicating with the OSS in China.²⁰⁶ To investigate further, the possibility to get Leo D’Almada e Castro, listed as one of the members of the ‘Hong Kong Rehabilitation Committee,’ out of Macau was discussed.²⁰⁷

In Macau, where he arrived in April 1942 after having been arrested by the Japanese,²⁰⁸ D’Almada had been the liaison officer between the British consulate and the Macau government. He agreed to come to London but insisted on bringing along his wife Clothilde, much to the nervousness of the extraction organisers who believed the passage from Yangping to Kunming from Macau was too difficult for a woman.²⁰⁹ In the meantime, it was decided in London that he was no longer required and the embassy in Chongqing was sent instructions for Reeves not to let D’Almada leave.²¹⁰ But in a clear example of how wartime miscommunications could have unintended consequences, he had already left when the message arrived.²¹¹ Given that fact, the Colonial Office accepted to employ him in the Hong Kong Planning Unit,²¹² after confirmation was given that he was in fact a British subject. Enquiries about the confusion were to be dealt delicately because of his ‘status as a leading Eurasian barrister’ and a member of the Hong Kong Legislative Council.²¹³ Smuggled by BAAG agents, D’Almada and his wife got to Kunming (via Yanping, Baise, Yulin, and Nanning) and from there to India – where they stayed with one of her uncles – before they were flown to London in

²⁰⁵ F 2868/1147/10 minutes, *ibid.*.

²⁰⁶ FO to Colonial Office, 23 May 1945, *ibid.*.

²⁰⁷ British Embassy in Chongqing to FO, 22 May 1945, *ibid.*.

²⁰⁸ Sá, *The Boys from Macau*, p. 164.

²⁰⁹ British Military Attaché in Chongqing to Colonial Office, 23 May 1945, TNA, FO 371/46251.

²¹⁰ FO to Embassy in Chongqing, 19 June 1945, *ibid.*.

²¹¹ British Embassy in Chongqing to FO, 28 June 1945, *ibid.*.

²¹² Colonial Office to FO, 7 July 1945, *ibid.*.

²¹³ BAAG Kunming to British Consul General in Kunming, 8 July 1945, HKU, MF 2530701, Roll 15.

August.²¹⁴ Writing to Reeves from Kunming via BAAG channels, D'Almada stated he had 'had quite an exciting, eventful and exhausting trip by motor-boat, sanpan, sedan chair (400 miles), pillion on bicycle, walking, "bluebottle", jeep and plane.'²¹⁵ When in London, he visited the Portuguese embassy where he praised Teixeira and Lobo stating that their skills in conducting difficult negotiations with the Japanese had spared the civilian population 'the horrors of an occupation.'²¹⁶ He also wrote to the FO commending Reeves and the governor of Macau for their assistance to refugees at a time of 'difficulties unparalleled in the history of any colonial administration.'²¹⁷ When the war ended, D'Almada was appointed president of the General Military Court in Hong Kong and he was made Commander of the Order of the British Empire in 1953.²¹⁸ It was, thus, by a series of misunderstandings that a Portuguese Hongkonger ended up playing an important role into the British retaking of Hong Kong. But he was not the only one.

Macau also played a key part in the actual reestablishment of British authority over Hong Kong at the end of the war. To ensure that the government policy 'to restore British sovereignty and administration immediately' was carried out, it was considered a 'matter of great importance' to transmit to Franklin Gimson, the colonial secretary before the occupation who was at the Stanley internment camp, a message that, if released when the Japanese capitulated in Hong Kong, he was to assume governing authority in the absence of a governor and before a British naval force arrived. The message was to be transmitted by the BAAG or 'any alternative reliable means.'²¹⁹ In Hong Kong Selwyn-Clarke also asked Arthur May, an electrician who assisted him and who had claimed Irish

²¹⁴ BAGG Yanping to Kunming, *ibid.*; BAAG War Diary, July 1945, HKU, MF 2530701, Roll 2; British Embassy in Chongqing to Foreign Office, 10 and 26 July 1945, TNA, FO 371/46251; Sá, *The Boys from Macau*, p. 166.

²¹⁵ George (likely pseudonym for D'Almada) to Reeves, 15 July 1945, HKU, MF 2530701, Roll 15.

²¹⁶ Portuguese Ambassador in London to Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 20 Aug. 1945, TNA, HW 12/330.

²¹⁷ D'Almada e Castro to FO, 22 Aug. 1945, TNA, FO 371/46253.

²¹⁸ A. M. P. J. Silva, *The Portuguese Community in Hong Kong* (Macau, 2011), p. 21; Sá, *The Boys from Macau*, p. 53. His wife, Clothilde Barreto, was one of the first female Justices of the Peace in Hong Kong.

²¹⁹ FO to Embassy in Chongqing, 11 and 13 Aug. 1945, TNA, FO 371/46251.

nationality to avoid internment, to go to Macau.²²⁰ The goal was to contact Reeves to get instructions from the secretary of state for the colonies via Lisbon so Gimson could assume civil administration before an Allied commander arrived.²²¹ His trip coincided with Y.C. Liang's in the opposite direction. Liang took the message to Gimson, travelling to Hong Kong with Roger Lobo and Eddie Gosano disguised as fishermen.²²² He received it on 23 August.²²³ Meanwhile in Macau Jack Braga introduced May to the governor and to Pedro Lobo, who arranged for his return to Hong Kong.²²⁴ The message carried by May reached the secretary of state who approved of his plans. The latter informed that rear admiral Harcourt was to establish a military administration by proclamation on arrival in Hong Kong, after which Gimson was to comply with his instructions.²²⁵ Macau was, therefore, a key stop in connecting London and Hong Kong at a crucial time when the British were rushing to reach the occupied colony before the Nationalists.

Immediately after the war had ended, Macau was also a resort to get some supplies into Hong Kong. The Red Cross delegation in the enclave was contacted regarding 'the most urgent requirements of Food, Fuel and Medicines.'²²⁶ Jack Braga was credited with guaranteeing the first cargo of rice to Hong Kong after the conflict.²²⁷ In a 1949 publication, Leo D'Almada made the connection between the Portuguese contribution to the post-war rehabilitation of Hong Kong and the role the community had played in the early years of the British colony.²²⁸ However, despite the important role played by Portuguese Hongkongers, the British return to Hong Kong resulted from a joint effort of different intermediaries of various origins.

²²⁰ R. Taylor, *The Arthur May Story: Hong Kong 1941-1945* (2015), p. 91

²²¹ S. Selwyn-Clarke, *Footprints: The Memoirs of Sir Selwyn Selwyn-Clarke* (Hong Kong, 1975), p. 99.

²²² S. J. Chan, *East River Column*, p. 92.

²²³ *Ibid.*, p. 93; Ride, *BAAG*, p. 299.

²²⁴ Taylor, *The Arthur May Story*, p. 94.

²²⁵ FO to Chongqing, 28 Aug. 1945, TNA, FO 371/46256.

²²⁶ ICRC Delegate in Hong Kong to ICRC, 29 Sept. 1945, ICRC, B G 017 07-063.

²²⁷ Koo, *The Portuguese in Hongkong*, p. 141.

²²⁸ L. D'Almada e Casto, *Some Notes on the Portuguese in Hongkong* (Macau, 1949), p. 15.

Conclusion

Of the multiple layers of collaboration that marked wartime Macau, none was stronger than the Anglo-Portuguese imperial connection. This chapter argued that Macau played an important supportive role to many in and from Hong Kong from late 1941 to the end of the war. It allowed for escapees to reach unoccupied China, for great numbers of refugees to receive assistance, for intelligence to be gathered, and for resistance activities to be coordinated. Without a neutral Macau, the British reoccupation of Hong Kong would have been more difficult.

Just as it had played a crucial role in the first Sino-British contacts, Macau was key to the British presence in South China during the Second World War through the functioning of its consulate in the enclave. Consul John Reeves managed a colony within a colony, coordinating humanitarian assistance, organising employment and leisure opportunities, monitoring the Hong Kong refugees, and setting up an ad-hoc intelligence network which both intersected with other Allied groups and was so independent that it exasperated authorities in London. Many of those who came to Macau supported the Allies in different ways. Also important was the setting up of a Macau branch of the Portuguese Red Cross Society in 1943, which assisted POW and civilian internees and their dependants in Hong Kong and Shanghai when the British were unable to reach them on the ground.

Neutral Macau was also a site of Sino-Portuguese interactions framed by British power. Amongst those drawing relief from the British consulate, assisting escapees from Hong Kong, and gathering intelligence for Reeves were many Chinese and Portuguese. Some of those involved in these efforts were also closely linked to the Chinese Nationalists and to the Americans. Macau was, therefore, a centre of inter-Allied

collaboration. Some of it was spearheaded by the actions of individuals who were transnational agents with contacts in different camps, such as Jack Braga.

The temporary colonial transplantation that took place from Hong Kong to Macau was anchored in a major root cause for Portugal's neutrality: the maintenance of its colonial empire, for which the alliance with Britain was regarded as vital. Anglo-Portuguese imperial collaboration is crucial to understand wartime Macau and a key element in the post-war continuity of two imperial remnants in China: Macau and Hong Kong. Chinese anti-imperialism raised alarm amongst Portuguese colonial elites, as it did amongst the British, but China and Britain were Allies in the war against Japan and that alliance was cherished by several in Macau. Collaboration could take many forms and ramifications and be forged by unlikely actors. In Macau, it also meant Anglo-Chinese cooperation.

This chapter has shown that, through collaboration with the British, Macau was an unacknowledged rear base that paved the way for post-war British rule in Hong Kong. However, as will be seen in the following chapter, the shadows of wartime Macau were not completely lifted when the conflict ended.

CHAPTER 6

Unsolved problems: Post-war developments of wartime issues, 1945-1949

Introduction

The sudden end to the war in East Asia with Japan's surrender a few days after the American dropping of atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki left China, as General Wedemeyer, Chiang Kai-shek's chief of staff, had anticipated, in 'widespread confusion and disorder.'¹ In Shanghai and Macau, the Portuguese were, once again, caught in the middle of the whirlwind of changes which, like many other foreigners, they were often unable to comprehend.

Four, interconnected, major issues unsolved in the war marked post-war Sino-Portuguese relations: the repatriation of Japanese and disposal of their property, the extradition of suspects of war crimes and collaboration, the abolition of extraterritoriality, and the status of sovereignty over Macau. This chapter argues that the Second World War left unsolved issues in Sino-Portuguese relations that gained a new momentum with China's enhanced international status in the post-war, a position that Portuguese representatives found difficult to accept. In their relations with a small and relatively weak European colonial power whose wartime record in Asia was ambivalent, China affirmed its position as a sovereign nation emerging victorious from an anti-imperialist war. This chapter demonstrates that there were attempts of establishing smoother Sino-Portuguese relations, often through personal connections with Nationalist figures, but both these and the solution of wartime issues – with the exception of extraterritoriality – were aborted by the evolution of the Chinese civil war.

¹ Quoted in J. Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (New York, 1990, repr. 1999), p. 459.

6.1. Resuming official contacts

After years without a senior diplomat in the Nationalists' capital, Portugal took steps to resume official contacts in China at the end of the war. Initially, the significance of the Allied victory seemed to have escaped the Portuguese minister in Shanghai, J.M.L. Lima, who had remained in the occupied city during the conflict. He declined an invitation from the French consul to celebrate victory arguing that since Portugal was neutral and kept a diplomatic representation in Japan, 'to celebrate the victory of one power could be interpreted as rejoicing in the defeat of another.'² The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Lisbon emphasised that he was authorised to participate in celebrations of victory, in which the government was 'directly interested.'³ A few days later Lima informed Lisbon of his wish to leave for the USA at the earliest opportunity due to the seriousness of his wife's health condition.⁴ In exchange, the Ministry sent José Rodrigues Simões Affra as chargé d'affaires to Chongqing. There, he was told that the Chinese government considered Lima's permanence in China undesirable and hoped for his replacement. This was because he 'had always refused to reside' in Chongqing, 'alleging difficulties of installation that all other colleagues had managed to overcome.'⁵ Complaints about Lima had been made several times. A few months before, on a visit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Lisbon the first secretary of the Chinese legation pressed Portugal on the suppression of opium in Macau and enquired on the delays in sending a chargé d'affaires to Chongqing who, months after being nominated, had not yet made the trip, alleging health reasons. According to the first secretary, during the war the

² Portuguese Minister to China to MNE, 14 Sept. 1945, AHD, 2P, A48, M212, my translation.

³ Minister of Foreign Affairs to Portuguese Legation in Shanghai, 15 Sept. 1945, *ibid.*.

⁴ Portuguese Minister to China to MNE, 6 Oct. 1945, *ibid.*. Later correspondence to Lisbon reveals the United States took almost one month to give Lima a visa on his diplomatic passport.

⁵ Portuguese Chargé d'Affaires in Chongqing to MNE, 17 Oct. 1945, *ibid.*, my translation.

Portuguese minister to China had stayed in Shanghai with no contact with the Chinese government. He had remained in occupied territory, generating ‘a confused and “regrettable” diplomatic situation’ that should be clarified with the end of hostilities.⁶

However, proximity to the base of the Nationalist government was not a guarantee of a better understanding. Affra spent six months in Chongqing from October 1945. He wrote a detailed report about the experience, which reveals how he adapted poorly to life in the wartime capital, which he described as the ‘dirtiest city’ of the ‘dirtiest province’ in the ‘dirtiest country.’ Revealing an incredible lack of sympathy for what the city had gone through, including repeated bombing,⁷ Affra concentrated on the failings of the Nationalists and the ordeal of the ‘foreigners born in civilised countries.’ He lived in a hotel owned by H. H. Kung, Chialing House (*Jialing binguan*), where many foreign diplomats resided in supposedly appalling conditions for which Affra blamed the Chinese government. The lack of privilege he was experiencing was doubly disconcerting: China was no longer treating all foreigners as above the Chinese, and Portugal’s diplomatic presence in China was insignificant. Having been the only country to have sent just one representative to Chongqing, Affra was mocked as the ‘one man legation.’⁸ He moved to Shanghai in 1946 and then to Nanjing but his description of the circumstances of this city was also extremely critical.⁹ Only in 1947 did Portugal send a minister plenipotentiary to China again, although his opinion of the Nationalists, as will be mentioned later, was probably worse than Affra’s.¹⁰

In contrast, the Portuguese authorities in Macau were relatively quick to adapt to victory and to seek a closer relation with the Nationalists, despite the difficulties due to

⁶ Note of conversation with the First Secretary of the Chinese Legation with Franco Nogueira, MNE, 13 Ago. 1945, ANTT, AOS, NE-2A2, cx. 422, my translation (the word ‘regrettable’ is not translated in the original but the rest of the document suggests the term might have been said in French, not English).

⁷ On the bombing of Chongqing see E. Tow, ‘The Great Bombing of Chongqing and the Anti-Japanese War, 1937-1945’ in M. Peattie, E. Drea and H. van de Ven (eds), *The Battle for China: Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945* (Stanford, 2011), pp. 256-82.

⁸ AHD, J.R.S. Affra, ‘Chunking’, June 1946, p. 2, p. 6, p. 29, p. 33, pp. 38-39.

⁹ AHD, J.R.S. Affra, ‘O Pôsto de Nanking’ [The Nanjing Post], June 1948.

¹⁰ ‘New Portuguese Minister Arrives in Nanking’, *China Newsweek*, 230 (13 Mar. 1947), p. 9.

the volatile conditions in South China. In early September 1945 the situation around Macau reflected the confusion experienced in many other places when the war in Asia reached an abrupt end. The governor of Macau reported to Lisbon that some areas were occupied by Chongqing forces, others still by Japanese, and others were dominated by communist guerrillas, none of which initially affected Macau, where the Chinese community filled the streets commemorating peace. The Portuguese authorities joined in with the festivities.¹¹ In a public speech, the governor said ‘long live’ (*viva*) China and Chiang Kai-shek.¹² Representatives of the Chinese community in Macau, including the presidents of the Commercial Association, the Kiang Wu Hospital, the Tung Sin Tong, and the Chinese Educational Association thanked Portuguese authorities for the ‘benefits received’ under Portuguese neutrality.¹³ However, peaceful celebrations did not last for long. A few days later a Portuguese soldier disobeyed the prohibition of crossing the Barrier Gate and was caught by a group of Chinese collaborators and held for exchange by some of their members, including the assassin of the president of the Macau Delegation of the Portuguese Red Cross. The governor appealed to Chinese authorities, whose regular army forces were increasing in the vicinity, but still unable to ‘eliminate communists’ while Lappa and Maliuzhou islands continued to be under the control of ‘pirates’ and pro-Japanese Chinese.¹⁴ The governor recommended that Chongqing appointed a trusted delegate to Macau because he had no way of knowing with whom to discuss matters given that many came saying they were Nationalist high officials.¹⁵ If, on the one hand, China had the highest international status it had enjoyed since the Opium

¹¹ Governor of Macau to MC, 4 Sept. 1945, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768. See also: ‘A grandiosa homenagem da população chinesa a Sua Exa. o Governador da Colónia Comandante Gabriel Teixeira’ [The Grandiose Tribute of the Chinese Population to His Excellency the Governor, Commander Gabriel Teixeira], *Renascimento* (7 Sept. 1945), p. 1.

¹² ‘Palavras de S. Exa. o Governador’ [Words by His Excellency the Governor], *Renascimento* (5 Sept. 1945), p. 1.

¹³ Governor of Macau to MC, 5 Sept. 1945, ANTT, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768.

¹⁴ Governor of Macau to MC, 11 and 12 Sept. 1945, *ibid.*.

¹⁵ Governor of Macau to MC, 27 Sept. 1945, *ibid.*.

War, on the other old issues such as factionalism were far from solved, and were likely made worse by the unexpected end of the conflict.

6.2. Dealing with Japanese and their property in Portugal and Macau

China promptly embraced its role as a victorious nation. Of central concern to the Chinese representatives around Macau was the management of alleged war criminals and their property. Writing to Chongqing, the Chinese minister in Lisbon, Zhang Qian, noted that the news of Japan's surrender was received with joy by the people of Portugal. The Portuguese government had been in touch and informed him that it would recover Timor, and the situation of Macau, which had been through difficult times, could be later discussed with the Chinese government. Zhang understood Portugal was still harbouring colonial designs.¹⁶ Some days later the Chinese legation in Lisbon informed Chongqing of the contents of a note it had sent to the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It had requested that Portugal follow the same provisions it had applied to German assets to 'all public and private Japanese assets in Portugal and Portuguese territory as well as to the assets owned or controlled from all territories occupied by Japan and Japanese satellites'.¹⁷ It would soon become clear that to act as a sovereign power abroad could be easier than closer to home.

In Portugal, disposal of Japanese property was coordinated between China, Britain and the United States. According to a report written in April 1947 by the American, British and Chinese members of a quadripartite committee for Japanese Affairs (a representative of the USSR was absent because Portugal had no diplomatic relations with Moscow) to the chiefs of diplomatic missions of those countries, 'plans for taking in

¹⁶ Chinese Minister to Portugal to MNE, 6 Aug. 1945, AH, Waijiaobu, 020000023906A.

¹⁷ Chinese Minister to Portugal to MNE, 15 Aug. 1945, *ibid*.

custody the official Japanese property in Portugal were made in August 1945.¹⁸ In October Zhang wrote to Chongqing that the British and the Americans had informed the Portuguese government that Japanese property had to be audited and prevented from being occupied by other countries. After discussing the matter with the British ambassador, a joint action was agreed and China, the UK and the USA jointly requested a list of Japanese property and funds in Portuguese territories from the Portuguese government.¹⁹ The following month, guards from the US army were posted in the Japanese minister's residence, the chancery, the military attaché's and the naval attaché's offices. The latter contained 'only office furniture and items without [any] particular value or confidential character, other items having been either destroyed or consolidated in the Legation.' Analysis of the documents in the Japanese legation revealed 'nothing of any interest whatsoever.' After being questioned on this, the Japanese minister informed that everything of a confidential nature had been destroyed, on instructions, 'immediately after the Potsdam declaration.'²⁰ This matches communications intercepted in 1945, revealing how the Japanese legation in Lisbon destroyed correspondence and ciphers before the end of the war.²¹

If Japanese assets in Portugal were negligible, in Macau they were considerable and a joint action was harder to coordinate. Power sharing with the other key ally represented in the territory, Britain, does not appear to have been a priority for the Chinese government. In September 1945 the legation in Lisbon wrote to the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Japanese assets of 'considerable amount and quantity' accumulated in Macau. It proposed that a 'thorough investigation and inspection of these

¹⁸ 'Report of the Quadripartite Committee for Japanese Affairs to the Chiefs of the Diplomatic Missions of the United States, the United Kingdom and China at Lisbon, Portugal', 29 Apr. 1947, pp. 1, AS-IMH, Waijiaobu, 078.3/0004.

¹⁹ Chinese Minister to Portugal to MNE, 15 Oct. 1945, AH, Waijiaobu, 020000023906A.

²⁰ Report of the Quadripartite Committee', pp. 1-2, AS-IMH, Waijiaobu, 078.3/0004.

²¹ Japanese Minister in Lisbon to Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 13 and 16 Aug. 1945, TNA, HW 12/329.

assets be conducted jointly by the representatives of the Chinese and Portuguese Government[s].²² The MOFA special commissioner appointed in 1945, Tang Liu, proceeded to transfer some of these to China, which motivated the British to try to guarantee that enemy property was dealt with in Macau as in any neutral territory. In September, the British ambassador in Chongqing, Horace Seymour, wrote to the vice-minister for foreign affairs, Gan Naiguang, to ascertain if the British consul at Macau could be associated to the investigations on Japanese assets in Macau.²³ Half a year later, British involvement in the process was still problematic. Seymour wrote to the Chinese minister of foreign affairs, Wang Shijie, in January 1946 to guarantee that the procedures in Macau followed those applied in Portugal. Given that the British consul also represented US interests in Macau, the British government considered that ‘the appropriate procedure would likewise be for the control of Japanese property to be shared’ between the consul and Tang Liu, and ‘for any Japanese funds to be held in a joint account until final instructions for their disposal are received from the respective Governments.’²⁴ The following March the issue was still unresolved and the British embassy in Chongqing insisted that it would be ‘incorrect for any one Government to decide unilaterally on the disposal of Japanese assets in any territory, however such assets may have been acquired.’²⁵ The Chinese MOFA argued that although official Japanese property could be dealt with as required, ‘the liquidation of private Japanese property assets was complicated by the fact that many of these assets were being administered under false names’ and so ‘the Chinese representative should in the first instance take these over before compiling the proposed list.’ In October, the British proposed instead, that ‘such property must remain under Portuguese control until an agreement regarding

²² Chinese Legation in Lisbon to MNE, 7 Sept. 1945, AHD, 2P, A48, M211. Also in ANTT, AOS, NE-2A2, cx. 422.

²³ British Ambassador in Chongqing to Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, 20 Sept. 1945, AS-IMH, Waijiaobu, 078.3/0003.

²⁴ British Ambassador in Chongqing to Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 24 Jan. 1946, *ibid.*.

²⁵ British Ambassador in Chongqing to Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 21 Mar. 1946, *ibid.*.

Japanese unofficial assets has been reached between the Allies and the Portuguese Government.²⁶

Taking over Japanese property was regarded by the Chinese government as a reasonable request to face the massive destruction caused by Japan in eight years of war. But Chinese demands and the processes of dealing with Japanese assets were not always smooth. In London, the Chinese ambassador, Wellington Koo (Gu Weijun), sent a memorandum to the FO in 1946 on China's desiderata relating to Japanese reparations. It proposed that the 'full title of property rights, interests and assets of whatever nature belonging to the Japanese Empire and Japanese nationals in the territory of the Chinese Republic [...] be considered as having passed to the Chinese Government.'²⁷ But the British were cautious in their reply, revealing a strange unawareness of the devastation China had experienced. The head of the FO Far Eastern Department, J.C. Sterndale Bennett, wrote to the Treasury that while China 'has suffered much from looting, pillage and destruction by the Japanese armed forces' it had 'suffered nothing like the bomb damage which we in Britain have suffered' and destruction in the British colonies had to be taken into account. Similarly, it was important to clarify if 'the Chinese are thinking only of assets which are really Japanese and not those which have been seized by the Japanese from British or other owners.'²⁸ One month later, foreign secretary Ernest Bevin replied to Koo that he was not 'in a position at present to express the views of His Majesty's Government.'²⁹ The existence of places where both Chinese and British had claims on Japanese property complicated matters. In May the British embassy in Chongqing enquired on the veracity of a report received from the consul at Macau that a

²⁶ British Ambassador in Chongqing to Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 29 Oct. 1946, *ibid.*.

²⁷ Memorandum 'China's Desiderata relating to Japanese Reparations' sent by W. Koo to Foreign Secretary E. Bevin, 20 Sept. 1945, TNA, FO 371/46214.

²⁸ FO to Treasury, 27 Sept. 1945, *ibid.*.

²⁹ Bevin to Koo, 24 Oct. 1945, *ibid.*.

sum in Chinese national dollars in notes, property of the Yokohama Specie Bank,³⁰ had been sent by the MOFA special commissioner in the enclave to the Bank of China in Guangzhou. If confirmed, the British requested the funds to be returned as it had been assured that ‘no unilateral decision would be taken regarding the disposal of Japanese assets in Macao.’³¹ The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that the notes would be ‘deposited in a special account and not touched pending discussions between the governments concerned regarding their disposition.’³² As the maintenance of Hong Kong and Macau under foreign administration indicated, European colonialism in Chinese soil had not been completely overcome.

Even when the British did not claim what the Chinese wanted, another element had to be taken into account: the Portuguese. In June 1946 the British consul at Macau asked permission from the FO to hand over to China one Japanese fighter aircraft in Macau.³³ The British consul-general at Shanghai was unsure ‘whether neutral Macao may technically be considered as in China theatre for the purposes of receiving war material’.³⁴ Macau’s small dimension and interrelation with occupied areas complicated procedures in the post-war.

Apart from their property, another element of Japan’s presence in Macau also required a solution: several Japanese residing in the enclave. By the end of the war there were more than 60 Japanese residing in Macau eligible for repatriation. A list compiled in January 1946 listed 48 men, 8 women, and 5 children wanting to leave. Some expressed the desire to be repatriated at a later date, either to accompany family members (two women whose husbands were detained in Macau and Guangzhou) or to be able to

³⁰ A branch of the Yokohama Specie Bank was established in Macau in 1944 (Kweilin Intelligence Summary No. 68, 29 Sept. 1944, HKU, MF 2530701, Roll 18).

³¹ British Embassy in Chongqing to MOFA, 22 May 1946, TNA, 371/53617.

³² MOFA to British Embassy in Nanjing, 4 June 1946, *ibid.*

³³ Quoted in telegram from British Embassy in Lisbon to FO, 18 June 1946, *ibid.*

³⁴ British Consul General at Shanghai to FO, 22 June 1946, *ibid.*

liquidate their frozen businesses.³⁵ Three Japanese subjects wanted to be repatriated to Formosa, a hint that they were in fact Taiwanese with Japanese names and nationality. Other Japanese were not registered at the consulate and the Americans believed some 10 to 15 might be hiding in Macau. Of these, some were deemed of potential intelligence interest also to the British in Hong Kong. In particular, the vice-consul, Asahina Taiki, considered to be a Kempeitai captain. They also wanted to further investigate two non-official civilians believed to be spies. One, Kubota Yasuyoshi, was reported to have been a member of the Naval Special Affairs Department in Macau and possible member of the Matsu Kikan, a secret intelligence organisation. Another, Nakajima Takayoshi, was recorded as having been a member of the Renraku or Sawa Kikan in Macau, an army secret intelligence organisation. If this was confirmed, the British authorities wanted to take them in to be interrogated in Hong Kong.³⁶ The Chinese General Headquarters of the National Military Council in Guangzhou were also interested in Japanese men in Macau, notably Fukasako Tomio, ex-manager of the Nan Hing Tobacco Company in Macau, which 'was the property of the ex-Puppet-Governor of Korea,' and Omachi Rinzo, ex-manager of the Sun Hing Hong in Macau whose main job had been collecting 'food-stuffs, metals, and army needs for the enemy' and using his commercial dealings as a cover to spy on the movements of Allied troops.³⁷ General Zhang Fakui asked for the cooperation of the governor of Hong Kong to have the wanted men arrested and sent to Guangzhou for trial. The extradition of alleged Japanese war criminals from Macau was linked to another major issue in post-war Sino-Portuguese relations: the extradition of Chinese traitors (*hanjian*).

³⁵ Japanese Consul at Macau[?] to Macau Civil Administration Services[?], 21 Jan. 1946, AM, MO/AH/AC/SA/01/19213.

³⁶ Lt. Col. A.S. Roger, Hong Kong, to Secretariat C.A., 16 Jan. 1946, HK-PRO, HKRS, 169-2-152.

³⁷ Zhang Fakui to Governor of Hong Kong, 3 June 1946, *ibid.*.

6.3. Dealing with *hanjian*

To the Portuguese authorities, handing suspected *hanjian* to Chinese authorities was more problematic than extraditing Japanese subjects. In November 1945 an editorial in the *Jianguo ribao* urged ‘the early repossession of Macau by the Chinese’ and the *Dagongbao* reported that Zhongshan authorities were blockading Macau because of the ‘misbehaviour of the Macao authorities for harbouring traitors, conniving smugglers, gamblers, and opium-smokers.’ According to the latter a ‘large number of traitors’ who had been ‘naturalized as Portuguese only by paying several tens of Macao currency dollars as fees’ planned to escape to Lisbon on a repatriation ship.³⁸ The *S.S. Colonial* left Macau in September 1945 and arrived in the Portuguese capital in March 1946. The Chinese legation in Lisbon asked the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs if among those repatriated were any ‘enemies and traitors’ or their property. The Portuguese secret police guaranteed that no Chinese or Japanese subjects had arrived in Lisbon on the repatriation ship.³⁹ Even if that was the case, the ship’s passengers had something to say on wartime collaboration, including criticisms of the governor’s conduct. Americans in Lisbon got a ‘reliable source’ to interview some of them. The information was compiled by the US naval attaché in Lisbon in a report which painted a grim picture of Macau as a site of quasi-occupation and collaboration:

The Japanese Army completely controlled Macau. The Portuguese officials, the Chinese resident [sic.] there and even the Japanese Consul were entirely subservient to them. Receiving orders only from Canton headquarters and acting independently of other Japanese armies in China, the war lords had their General Staff headquarters in Macau, and used it as a pleasure resort where officers spent their leave. Macau was run by brute force during this period, and famine, starvation, disregard of law and order, murder, etc. were rampant. Hundreds of Chinese died on the streets every day, and for a time it is said that their flesh was sold in restaurants as “smuggled pork from the Japanese zone”. Many

³⁸ Extracts from Guangzhou press on 27 Nov. 1945 sent by British Consul General at Guangzhou to Commander-in-Chief in Hong Kong, 29 Nov. 1945, TNA, 371/53617.

³⁹ Chinese Legation in Lisbon to MNE, 23 Mar. 1946; MNE to PIDE Director, 24 Apr. 1946; PIDE to MNE, 30 Apr. 1946, AHD, 2P, A48, M212.

Chinese got rich in the service of the Japanese, carrying murder, gambling and the opium trade.⁴⁰

Those who stayed in Macau were of as much concern to the Chinese authorities as the potential escapees but Portuguese authorities posed some conditions to assist with extradition matters. A memorandum from the Portuguese legation in Chongqing in December 1945 stated that: ‘The Portuguese Government had committed [sic.] itself to refuse asylum to war criminals and to surrender those who eventually took refuge in Portuguese territory at the request of an allied nation, present to it through regular diplomatic channels.’ But to ‘avoid any arbitrary action’ it would surrender only ‘those individuals whose names were included on lists of war criminals approved by a responsible government and containing the indication of the tribunal by which their trials would be conducted,’ excluding ‘members of the Japanese armed forces and common law criminals’ who ‘would be surrendered without those formalities.’ The memorandum further stated that until then the Portuguese government had not received from the Chinese one ‘any request of such kind’ despite ‘arbitrary action of some Chinese army officers’ who sought to interfere with the Portuguese administration.⁴¹ Indeed, from October 1945, the Portuguese authorities in Macau were visited by different figures that claimed to be representing the Nationalist government. Delegates of the Chinese War Crimes Commission came to the governor of Macau asking for names of Japanese collaborators, some of whom were given.⁴² But the situation soon became confusing, with representatives of that commission, the Guangdong provincial government secretary for reconstruction, the Guangdong Provincial government ‘president,’ and what the governor considered as members of the Blue Shirts competing to take over *hanjian* and their assets. The Macau governor was also worried that Chinese authorities might come to ask for

⁴⁰ Report by US Naval Attaché in Lisbon, 26 Apr. 1946, TNA, 371/53617. There were 259 passengers, and about 100 Portuguese army personnel stationed in Macau repatriated on the ship.

⁴¹ Memorandum from the Portuguese Legation in Chongqing, 13 Dec. 1945, AH, Waijiaobu, 02000003315A.

⁴² Governor of Macau to MC, 2 Oct. 1945, AHD, AOS, NE-10A2, cx. 768.

‘some of the Macau Chinese [who] cooperated with us although they are not trustworthy (*não sejam boas rezes*).’⁴³

Indeed, lists with hundreds of pages of the alleged *hanjian* from Macau were compiled containing information on a variety of people, mainly Chinese but also some Japanese (possibly Taiwanese). Their suspicious activities were mostly of an economic nature.⁴⁴ One high profile case was that of Gao Kening, who was accused of being an economic traitor (*jingji hanjian*). Gao was a prominent businessman and a major philanthropist who had contributed greatly to a number of relief initiatives in wartime Macau, both Chinese and Portuguese, which earned him decorations by the Portuguese authorities. Between 1946 and 1947 China attempted to have Gao extradited but the Portuguese authorities constantly refused, arguing accusations against him were inconsistent, that his conduct was well known, that he had purchased food provisions for the people, not to aid the enemy. Other major personalities in the charity sector in Macau also supported Gao, such as the representative of the Chinese community Lu Rongxi, the vice-chairman of the Kiang Wu Hospital He Xian, the chairman of the Tung Sin Tong Huang Weilin, and the chairman of the Macau Chinese Commercial Association Liu Baiying.⁴⁵ Gao’s partner in the gambling business, Fu Deyin, suffered a worse fate. He was accused of being a traitor and was tried in Guangzhou, but was acquitted. However, he became a victim of a 50-day kidnapping that left him without an ear. The incident is said to have involved Chinese triads and Portuguese members of the Macau police, notably the chief of Cunha’s special brigade, Sebastião Voltaire Pinto de Morais.⁴⁶ This shows that the pursuit of post-war justice was undertaken by official and unofficial, legal and extrajudicial channels.

⁴³ Governor of Macau to MC, 4 Oct. 1945, *ibid.*

⁴⁴ AS-IMH, Waijiaobu, 078.4/0007.

⁴⁵ Y. Huang, *Tong Shan Tang yu Aomen huaren shehui* [The Tung Sin Tong and Macau’s Society] (Beijing, 2012), pp. 301-2.

⁴⁶ Sá, *A História na Bagagem*, pp. 134-8; Pinto, ‘Guerra em Paz,’ pp. 88-9; Jorge and Coelho, *Roque Choi*, p. 47.

The Chinese minister to Portugal had requested that property of the former Nanjing government in Macau should be handed to the Chinese authorities. The Portuguese agreed, as long as there were no doubts that they had belonged to it and that the request was presented in Lisbon through diplomatic channels.⁴⁷ Following up on previous conversations on the subject, the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote to the Chinese legation to begin negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty of extradition between Portugal and China,⁴⁸ although this was not undertaken.

6.3.1. Two case studies: Huang Gongjie, and Lourenço Oswaldo de Senna

The following case studies illustrate with more detail the difficulties of Sino-Portuguese relations related to dealing with *hanjian* in the post-war. These sprang from the ambiguity of the Portuguese presence in China and the multiple layers of collaboration that marked the Macau wartime experience.

Huang Gongjie

No traitor in Macau seems to have been more sought after than Huang Gongjie (Wong Kong Kit). A Portuguese missionary who lived in Macau for decades (including during the war), wrote that Huang and his wife ‘were the greatest criminals in Macao. The terror they inspired and the protection of the Japanese military they enjoyed made them untouchable.’⁴⁹ Huang, who was in his late thirties-early forties during the war, worked for the Japanese special services in Macau. He headed a group of armed men who were deemed responsible for assassinating many Chinese ‘patriots,’ and also linked to the

⁴⁷ Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs to Portuguese Legation in Shanghai, 27 July 1946, AHD, 2P, A48, M211.

⁴⁸ MNE to Chinese Legation in Lisbon, 9 Jan. 1946, AH, Waijiaobu, 020000023906A.

⁴⁹ Teixeira, ‘The Bonnie and Clyde of Macao’, p. 8.

murder of the president of the Macau Red Cross covered in the previous chapter. The attempts by the Chinese government to have Huang handed over for trial in China proved unfruitful and his death was revealing of the unsolved problems left by the conflict that plagued Sino-Portuguese relations in the post-war. Chinese sources show that the Chinese government requested the Portuguese authorities to arrest and extradite Huang. But the Portuguese were also interested in keeping him as he threatened to provide sensitive information on Portuguese dealings with Japan during the war if he was handed over to Nationalist authorities.

The East River Column issued a manifesto on December 1946 concerning ‘the war criminal’ Huang Gongjie. It stated that Huang and his subordinates had been captured by them and that ‘after long and careful trials’ they were to be ‘sentenced to death according to the law of punishment for War Criminals.’ However, because Huang had been active in Macau causing suffering not only to Chinese but also to Portuguese, the Column had accepted the request to hand them over to the Macau authorities ‘for public trial.’⁵⁰ Portuguese accounts stated that, after escaping from Macau at the end of the war, Huang was caught on an island west of Hong Kong by a Portuguese police commissioner, S.V.P. Morais, in an operation that involved Macau policemen (both Portuguese and Chinese), British intelligence agents, and the co-opting of a communist guerrilla general with whom Huang was planning to link up.⁵¹ According to Nationalist sources Portugal paid one million in Portuguese currency – other documents mention slightly larger sums – in exchange for the prisoner.⁵² After being caught, Huang was brought back to Macau

⁵⁰ ‘Handed to Macau – Alleged War Criminal Arrested by Guerrillas’, *The South China Morning Post* (10 Dec. 1945), AHD, 2P, A48, M212.

⁵¹ Teixeira, ‘The Bonnie and Clyde of Macao’, p. 11.

⁵² AS-IMH, Waijiaobu, 074/0001.

from Hong Kong, where according to some Portuguese accounts Morais managed to bypass the British, whose intelligence services were also interested in capturing Huang.⁵³

Once arrested, Huang wrote to the governor of Macau to plea for mercy. He stressed his affection for the city and the role he had played to *defend* it, using his favour with the Japanese to guarantee that the territory did not suffer major aggression. He also recalled that he had once been a Chinese patriot, who had worked for the resistance as an undercover agent, before divisions in his group forced him to seek alternative work in Macau. This rather self-serving confession seems to be corroborated with earlier Portuguese intelligence that stated Huang had for a while worked for Zhou Yongneng before he left Macau in 1942. After the KMT branch leader departed to Chongqing, and facing destitution, Huang began to work for the Japanese.⁵⁴ He and his gang operated in and around Macau, controlling rice supplies to the enclave, blackmailing and allegedly torturing and killing local traders and going after those deemed enemies of Japan (there was a hit list!).⁵⁵

In his letter to the governor, Huang defended his actions, cleverly implying that he had not been the only one to, in his words, ‘pursue the path of friendship with [the] Japs’ and, therefore, it was terribly unfair that he was now labelled such a great criminal when ‘the real sinners in society are allowed to remain’. Addressing Portuguese neutrality with a mixture of praise and threat, he suggested the real danger to Portuguese rule in Macau was coming from the Nationalists who were now committed to ‘cleaning up [...] bandits and taking over [...] enemy property.’⁵⁶ By exploiting Portuguese colonial anxieties, Huang’s words reference an often overlooked feature of post-war China: the

⁵³ E.g. Teixeira, ‘The Bonnie and Clyde of Macao’; J.C. Rêgo (Filho), *Os Feitos do Capitão Ribeiro da Cunha Durante o Período da Guerra do Pacífico em Macau* [The Feats of Captain Ribeiro da Cunha during the Pacific War Period in Macau] (Macau[?], 1996), pp. 83-4.

⁵⁴ Wong Kong Kit [Huang Gongjie] to Governor of Macau, 19 Dec. 1945, AHU, Espólio Gabriel Maurício Teixeira.

⁵⁵ See several intelligence-related documents amongst the governor’s papers in AHU, Espólio Gabriel Maurício Teixeira.

⁵⁶ Wong Kong Kit [Huang Gongjie] to Governor of Macau, 19 Dec. 1945, *ibid.*.

consolidation of the Nationalists as an anti-imperialist force whose new international status made authorities from a small, weak, but obsessively imperialist country like Portugal somewhat nervous.

One of the dimensions used by the Nationalists to assert China's new role in the international community was organising war crimes trials.⁵⁷ Thus, the insistence for people like Huang to be handed over for trial. Under Chiang Kai-shek's instructions, the MOFA delegate in Macau, Tang Liu, wrote to the governor in late December 1945 asking for Huang to be extradited to Guangzhou to be tried according to martial law. After failed attempts, the Portuguese finally agreed to hand him over.⁵⁸

However, in early January 1946, as Huang was being moved from one detention centre to another under very suspicious circumstances, he was shot dead after allegedly trying to escape. The local newspapers reported that he had attempted to flee and was pursued by the police who shot him several times. He was then sent to a hospital where he died. The Chinese authorities sought to investigate Huang's suspicious death. Tang presented a series of demands to the governor of Macau to ensure this would not happen again. Dai Li, the head of the Nationalist intelligence agency, the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics (also known by its Chinese abbreviation Juntong), had investigated the case and concluded in February that the Macau government had collaborated with the Japanese and, worried that Huang Gongjie might reveal secrets to the Chinese, had spent money to get him back to Macau to be killed. The explanation that he had tried to flee was false. Later Portuguese accounts of the case take for granted that Huang was deliberately shot by the Portuguese.⁵⁹ The strange death of Huang in Portuguese custody contrasts with the efforts of the Nationalists to give him a proper trial and highlights the different parties competing for the application of justice in the post-war.

⁵⁷ B. Kushner, *Men to Devils, Devils to Men: Japanese War Crimes and Chinese Justice* (Cambridge, MA, 2015).

⁵⁸ AS-IMH, Waijiaobu, 074/0001.

⁵⁹ Rego, *Os Feitos*, p. 84; Pinto, 'Guerra em Paz', p. 87

Huang Gongjie was the most notorious, but he was certainly not the only alleged *hanjian* to be at the centre of difficult negotiations between the Nationalist government and the Portuguese authorities. Unresolved debates on the nature of Portuguese sovereignty in Macau, as well as over the classification of *hanjian* as war criminals also marred a process that was marked not only by Portuguese reluctance, if not refusal, in handing in suspects to the Chinese authorities, but also by internal conflicts with those in charge of dealing with extradition issues on the Chinese side. As Wu observed, bribery, obstruction, and confusion accompanied the attempts of extraditing alleged *hanjian* hiding in Macau in an ‘absurd’ and ‘paradoxical’ process that was also linked to the Nationalists’ failure in recovering sovereignty over Macau in the post-war.⁶⁰

Lourenço Oswaldo de Senna

If Huang Gongjie’s case exposed the different links between Chinese figures, and the failure to apply justice, that of Lourenço Oswaldo de Senna is revealing of the problems of the conduction of legal procedures, as well as of the plural dimensions of Portuguese identity in China. Senna, a Portuguese citizen born in Shanghai of a Portuguese father and Chinese mother,⁶¹ was detained in Chongqing from 1944 until 1950. A Eurasian, he assumed a Chinese identity on certain occasions and wrote to the Portuguese consulate in English only. When the Sino-Japanese hostilities began in 1937, he left for Macau where he served in the police force. In October 1943 he resigned and went to mainland China in search of a better salary. He adopted a Chinese name and lived first in Guilin and then in Kunming, where he worked for the American Red Cross. In December 1944 Senna was arrested for espionage while he was with his Chinese wife and

⁶⁰ Wu, ‘Shenzhang zhengyi’, p. 129, p. 157, my translation.

⁶¹ ‘Portuguese to Face Trial on Espionage Count’, *China Daily Tribune* (8 Oct. 1946), AHD, 2P, A59, M263.

son, and was brought to Chongqing. Chinese authorities accused him of having raided a clandestine radio station in the house of a Chinese man in Macau who was arrested, to have had repeated contacts with Japanese in Macau, including with the consulate, to have handed to the Japanese two Chinese patriots, and to have spied for the Japanese special service in Macau while in China. Senna claimed he was tortured and forced to sign a confession in Chinese he could not read, and that during the trial he was not given an interpreter and had to use Mandarin, a language he did not master (he was fluent in spoken Shanghainese and Cantonese).⁶²

The Portuguese chargé d'affaires in China suggested, and the Ministry in Lisbon approved, that the Portuguese consulate at Shanghai should argue on the incompetence of the court because, as a Portuguese citizen, Senna was still protected under Portuguese extraterritoriality (which was only abolished in 1947), and, in any case, he could not be tried in Chinese courts for acts he did in Macau while on police duty.⁶³ The Macau authorities confirmed Senna's defence, including that he had even been given a reference by the British consul in Macau before leaving for mainland China.⁶⁴ Some of the accusations seemed to have been based on information Senna had given Major Hall-Caine of the BAAG when he arrived in Guilin,⁶⁵ which was later distorted.

In August 1946 Senna was reported to have been freed⁶⁶ but that was not so. Instead, in October he was sentenced to life imprisonment and to have his property confiscated by the Sichuan Higher Court for having collaborated with the enemy 'in gathering for it military, political and economical information.'⁶⁷ He decided to appeal to the Highest Court in Nanjing and insisted that the verdict was 'a most terrible miscarriage

⁶² Senna to Acting Consul General for Portugal in Shanghai, 9 Oct. 1946, *ibid.*.

⁶³ Portuguese Chargé d'Affaires in China to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 June 1946, *ibid.*.

⁶⁴ A. Telles de Vasconcellos, Macau Civil Administration Services to Portuguese Chargé d'Affaires in China, 23 July 1946, *ibid.*.

⁶⁵ Senna to Acting Consul General for Portugal in Shanghai, 17 Oct. 1946, *ibid.*.

⁶⁶ Portuguese Legation in China to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 Ago. 1946, *ibid.*.

⁶⁷ Copy in English of the Sichuan High Court No. 1 Sub-Court Criminal Case Decision, 15 Oct. 1946, *ibid.*.

of justice' and that he was 'innocent of any crime or intention against the Chinese Government or any government.'⁶⁸ Senna had been charged 'not as a spy, but as a traitor' and he wondered how he could have been one if he was not Chinese.⁶⁹ His appeal noted that he had inclusively helped the Allies, using his connection with the Macau police to 'furnish the British consulate with information obtained by him from the Japanese' and after the latter became suspicious, he had decided to leave for Free China. He stated that in Macau, only the British consul knew where he was going.⁷⁰ However, in his memoirs, Reeves did not seem to be entirely in the know or sure of Senna's innocence.⁷¹

Portuguese diplomats in China and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Lisbon tried to clarify Senna's situation with Chinese authorities on several occasions without any results.⁷² In September 1948 the Chinese minister in Lisbon said the case would be retried but with courts being independent there was a limit to what the government could do. The minister stressed that Senna had confessed to the acts of treason he was being accused of, for which the sentence was usually the death penalty, and only because of his confession had it been commuted to life.⁷³ However, in November 1949 Senna was condemned again.⁷⁴ A letter to the Chinese minister to Portugal, Wang Huazheng, pleaded that the Portuguese Government expected from the Chinese one an 'attitude of generosity' similar to that shown by the British government which had freed and deported Rogério de Menezes, a Portuguese citizen who had been sentenced to death for espionage.⁷⁵ It is interesting that this example is given, for Menezes was indeed guilty of spying for the

⁶⁸ Senna to Acting Consul General for Portugal in Shanghai, 15 Oct. 1946, *ibid.*.

⁶⁹ Senna to Acting Consul General for Portugal in Shanghai, undated. Copy attached to despatch from the Portuguese Legation in China to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 Dec. 1946, *ibid.*.

⁷⁰ Copy of 'Petition incorporating additional grounds for appeal against decision of High Court at Chungking, submitted to the Highest Court at Nanking' sent with letter from Tsai Kuo Han, Attorney-at-law, to the Portuguese Consul General in Shanghai, 1 Feb. 1947, *ibid.*.

⁷¹ Reeves, *The Lone Flag*, p. 103.

⁷² Portuguese Chargé d'Affaires in Shanghai to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 28 Jan. 1948, AHD, 2P, A59, M263.

⁷³ A. da Faria, MNE, note of conversation with the Chinese Minister to Portugal, 23 Sept. 1948, *ibid.*.

⁷⁴ Portuguese Chargé d'Affaires in China to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 Nov. 1949, *ibid.*.

⁷⁵ V. Cunha, MNE to Chinese Minister to Portugal, 14 Nov. 1949, *ibid.*.

Germans while working for the Portuguese legation in London.⁷⁶ But that same month Senna's sentence was upheld.⁷⁷ From Macau the governor, the former British consul and J.M. Braga,⁷⁸ all wrote statements backing his defence but in court these were deemed too vague.

At the end of November, Senna was finally freed as the warden of Chongqing prison received orders to release all prisoners. His escape is revealing of the networks to which foreigners in China could resort in troubled times – and also how these were still standing in the 1949 transition to communist rule. Senna left Chongqing with the help of the Paris Foreign Catholic Mission, travelling by boat to Hankou where he reported to the British consulate, which was in charge of Portuguese interests. In Hankou he asked for help at the Colombian Catholic Mission and stayed with Portuguese friends but was arrested by the police before he could present himself at the Portuguese consulate in Shanghai. The communists treated him quite nicely but asked him for information on British and missionary contacts as well as on Braga and the American-Chinese Warren Wong. After being offered a book of Mao's writings he ended up being expelled to Hong Kong via Guangzhou. At the Hong Kong border, as he had no passport, Senna once again assumed a Chinese identity to enter the British colony and from there he went to Macau.⁷⁹

Senna's case highlights how issues of collaboration in post-war China could be marred by a number of misunderstandings. For the Portuguese authorities this was a prime example of the shortcomings of Chinese justice with the Kafkaesque delays and refusals to accept the arguments provided to justify the innocence of a foreign citizen. But from a Chinese perspective, the suspicion about Senna was perhaps also justifiable. He was seen as Chinese and the Nationalist government did not treat collaboration lightly.

⁷⁶ On the case of the London spy see J. A. Barreiros, *O Homem das Cartas de Londres* [The Man of the London Letters] (Lisbon, 2003), and Pimentel, *Espiões em Portugal*, pp. 281-7.

⁷⁷ Senna to Portuguese Minister to China, 3 Nov. 1949, AHD, 2P, A59, M263.

⁷⁸ Statutory declaration by J.M. Braga, 14 July 1949, *ibid.*

⁷⁹ Report by Senna sent by the Portuguese Minister to China, in Macau, to MNE, 7 Feb. 1950, *ibid.*

While in China Senna took on a Chinese name, spoke Chinese, had a Chinese wife and being himself the son of a Chinese woman, presumably looked Chinese. The fact that he had worked for the police in Macau and then appeared in cities in unoccupied China with a strong presence of Allied intelligence without, it seems, assuming his Portuguese origin, might have seemed odd. Besides, it was well known that Portuguese nationality had been granted to people with spurious claims on it during the war⁸⁰ so brandishing it might have not been given too much credit.

Like other allegations of Portuguese misconduct in Macau, Senna's case was dropped at the end of the civil war and was left lying hidden in the archives as one more forgotten example of the communication problems between the Portuguese and the Nationalists in the changing post-war order in East Asia.

6.4. Abolition of extraterritoriality

As Senna's trials and tribulations indicate, a key element of tension in solving wartime issues and exercising Chinese sovereignty pertained to the remnants of extraterritoriality. Contrary to what is often mentioned, the system did not cease when Britain and the US relinquished their rights in 1943. In fact, Portugal was the last country in the world to renounce extraterritoriality in China, in 1947. Extraterritoriality had long been one of the most contentious issues in the ROC's relations with foreign powers. Although the 'system of extraterritoriality in China originally involved only the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign nationals by their consuls and by special courts set up by the

⁸⁰ Writing to Lisbon on the cold reception given by the new mayor of Shanghai, K.C. Wu (Wu Guozhen), to a courtesy visit by the Portuguese consul on his appointment, the Portuguese chargé d'affaires to China, who had met Wu several times in Chongqing, noted that Portugal's Consulate General in Shanghai enjoyed 'a very sad reputation' in the city. The former consul, Ribeiro de Mello, was rumoured to have practiced irregularities that brought scandal to the consulate, notably registering as Portuguese citizens people of various nationalities,' particularly Chinese (Chargé d'Affaires in Shanghai to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 6 June 1946, AHD, 2P, A48, M211. Also in AHD, 2P, A48, M212).

major Powers for that purpose', over the one hundred years when it was in place, it 'became an important support for the various special privileges enjoyed by foreigners in China, including leased areas, concessions, settlements, navigation rights, their own military and naval protection, certain customs privileges, and other immunities not generally enjoyed by foreigners residing abroad.'⁸¹ Strongly opposed by China, particularly after the end of the First World War, its abolition began to be seriously negotiated from the end of the 1920s, although the start of the Second Sino-Japanese conflict halted the process. In a first phase, discussions for its abolition were postponed, as, in practice, foreign concessions ended up being useful to the Chinese central government and many Chinese who sought refuge in areas under foreign jurisdiction, notably in Shanghai. In a later phase, the Second World War precipitated the end of the extraterritorial rights when the US and the United Kingdom both took steps to abolish them on paper facing the fact that they had already been abolished in practice after the beginning of the Pacific War and, particularly, their coerced abolition by the RNG. Despite this, negotiations for the end of extraterritorial rights went on during the post-war period, with countries such as Italy only settling the issue at a very late stage. Portugal managed to stall the process until 1947, although the main reason for doing so was not resistance to give up rights in mainland China but refusal to include Macau in the negotiations.

Chinese diplomats in Lisbon had tried several times to deal with Portuguese extraterritoriality during the war, but the matter was constantly postponed. In 1944, the first secretary in Lisbon was told that Portugal would make a decision when the act of abolishing extraterritoriality would not be seen as an action against one of the belligerents.⁸² Portugal was closely following the developments of other countries'

⁸¹ W. R. Fishel, *The End of Extraterritoriality in China* (New York, 1974), p. 216.

⁸² Notes on talk between F. Nogueira, MNE and the First Secretary of the Chinese Legation, 16 June 1944, AHD, 2P, A48, M211.

negotiations with China, asking its diplomats in the Netherlands, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Belgium, France, Spain, and Brazil for information on their cases. The French case was an important reference. The Chinese government had unilaterally denounced all French privileges at the time of the Vichy regime but such was not immediately accepted by the post-war French government. Eventually France reached an agreement on the return to Chinese sovereignty of the leased territory of Guangzhouwan and the return of Chinese troops in Indochina before negotiating the end of extraterritoriality, in late February 1946.⁸³

Soon after the war ended the Chinese legation in Lisbon insisted with the Portuguese government to begin negotiations for abolishing extraterritoriality. In September, Zhang Qian went to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to press Portugal to relinquish its rights in China.⁸⁴ The Sino-Portuguese Treaty signed in Nanjing in December 1928 had scheduled the abolition of extraterritoriality to 1930, provided that the Chinese government signed agreements with the signatory powers of the 1921-1922 Washington Treaties and made detailed agreements with Portugal for the matter. That having happened, the Portuguese government was pressured to initiate negotiations.⁸⁵ In 1945, on the ROC national day, 10 October, a note was delivered to the Chinese minister in Lisbon where the Portuguese government declared its decision to renounce extraterritoriality and that that should come into effect after the signing of a Sino-Portuguese convention to be negotiated.⁸⁶ The note was relayed to Chongqing at the end of the month.⁸⁷

⁸³ Portuguese Legation in Paris to MNE, 12 Sept. 1945; Portuguese Legation at Chongqing to MNE, 1 Mar. 1946, *ibid.*.

⁸⁴ Chinese Minister to Portugal to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 Sept. 1945. AH, Waijiaobu, 02000006303A.

⁸⁵ Project of note, Sep. 1945, AHD, 2P, A48, M211.

⁸⁶ Minister to Foreign Affairs to Portuguese Legation in Shanghai, 10 Oct. 1945, *ibid.*.

⁸⁷ Chinese Minister to Portugal to MOFA, 28 Oct. 1945, AH, Waijiaobu, 020000023906A.

Before such an agreement was sealed, however, a number of contentious issues hampered the negotiations. In December 1945 the Chinese legation in Lisbon informed that the consular courts of all powers had ceased to operate and Portugal was to be no exception.⁸⁸ Portugal refused.⁸⁹ The issue was particularly thorny given the detention of some Portuguese citizens in China accused of different crimes, including collaboration. This, as in Senna's case, was connected to fluid perceptions of nationality. For example, one of the only two foreign staff members of the CMC to be refused re-employment following investigations on wartime collaboration was 'a British citizen who, after the Japanese takeover, had changed her nationality to Portuguese to avoid dismissal.'⁹⁰

Then there was the ever-thorny question of Macau. The Chinese minister in Lisbon informed the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Chinese government would reserve its position on Macau, which was deemed unacceptable by the Portuguese, a position later reiterated in a meeting between the Portuguese chargé d'affaires and the Chinese vice-minister of foreign affairs in Nanjing.⁹¹ The only reservation the Portuguese government could consider was on the limits of Macau, not on Portuguese sovereignty over the enclave.⁹²

The governor at Macau saw the extraterritoriality negotiations as a good opportunity to fix the disputed borders of the territory. He wrote to the minister of colonies that although difficult, Portugal should try to obtain Montanha island in exchange for clearly renouncing Lappa and D. João⁹³ – none of which Portugal *de facto* controlled. However, the Portuguese central government might have had a different

⁸⁸ Chinese Legation in Lisbon to MNE, 18 Dec. 1945, *ibid.*.

⁸⁹ Portuguese Minister at Chongqing to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 Feb. 1945, *ibid.*.

⁹⁰ B. G. White, "'A Question of Principle with Political Implications' – Investigating Collaboration in the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, 1945-1946', *Modern Asian Studies*, 44/3 (2010), p. 526.

⁹¹ Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs to Portuguese Legations in Chongqing, London, and Washington, 16[?] Mar. 1946; Portuguese Legation in China (Nanjing) to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 July 1946, AHD, 2P, A48, M211.

⁹² Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs to Portuguese Legation in Shanghai, 2 Sept. 1946, *ibid.*.

⁹³ MC to MNE, 21 Jan. 1946, *ibid.*.

position, as a 1946 official map excludes the islands from Portuguese domain.⁹⁴ In November 1946, without Lisbon's knowledge, the Macau government censorship banned the distribution of an edition of the *South China Morning Post* due to a news report on Sino-Portuguese negotiations for the abolition of extraterritoriality because it was deemed that it could be inferred from the news that Macau was equivalent to other pre-war foreign concessions in China.⁹⁵

The Chinese National government had prepared a draft for a Sino-Portuguese treaty with fourteen articles to be celebrated possibly in Lisbon and that would include the transfer of the administration and control of Macau to the ROC.⁹⁶ Predictably the Portuguese government did everything in their power to avoid the issue of Macau from being linked to its renouncing of extraterritorial rights. It is important to note that the Portuguese Estado Novo regime's intransigence regarding its colonial possessions was not a matter open to discussion in Portuguese civil society. The majority of people in Portugal were kept in the dark about the foreign policy decisions made by the country's leaders. Indeed, there was no news in the Portuguese press about the exchange of notes with China when it eventually occurred.⁹⁷

After a lengthy period of impasse an agreement was reached between Portugal and the ROC to postpone indefinitely the discussion of the 'Macau problem' and thus withdraw the major impediment to the negotiations for the abolition of Portuguese extraterritorial rights in China. Fernandes argued that with the civil war looming, retaking Macau became an issue of minor importance for the Nationalist government. It became more pressing for Chiang Kai-shek's regime to secure a diplomatic victory in order to appease sectors of the Chinese public who were becoming increasingly hostile to the

⁹⁴ Fernandes, *Confluência de Interesses*, p. 68.

⁹⁵ 'Hongkong Paper Banned by Macau', *The North China Daily News* (24 Nov. 1946); Macau Acting Governor to MC, Dec. 1946, AHD, 2P, A48, M211.

⁹⁶ AH (Xindian), Xingzheng yuan [Executive Yuan], 01400000186A.

⁹⁷ Fernandes, *Confluência de Interesses*, p. 82.

KMT.⁹⁸ The advantages to Portugal are also not to be overlooked, as this agreement restored Sino-Portuguese relations to normalcy after years of ambivalent practice.

Notes ‘for the relinquishment by Portugal of its rights relating to the consular jurisdiction in China and the adjustment of certain other matters’ were finally exchanged between the Portuguese minister, João de Barros Ferreira da Fonseca, and the Chinese minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Shijie, in Nanjing on 1 April 1947.⁹⁹ The notes abrogated all the ‘provisions of treaties or agreements in force [the wording ‘in force’ allowed for the exclusion of Macau, the jurisdiction of which had never been unequivocally clarified] between both countries which authorize the Government of Portugal or its representatives to exercise consular jurisdiction over nationals or companies of the Republic of Portugal in the territory of the Republic of China.’ Portugal also relinquished rights ‘in regard to the Diplomatic Quarter in Peiping [Beijing] and the International Settlements at Shanghai and Amoy [Xiamen], in regard to the system of treaty ports in China and the employment of foreign pilots in the ports of the territory of China, and in regard to the coasting trade and inland navigation.’¹⁰⁰

Excluding a financial agreement between China and Macau and an arrangement between the Macau authorities and the CMC concerning smuggling between Macau and South China signed in 1948,¹⁰¹ the notes relinquishing consular jurisdiction were the last diplomatic agreement between Portugal and the ROC to be signed until the official breaking of diplomatic ties between the two countries in 1975.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 73.

⁹⁹ AH, Waijiaobu, 020000023907A. Also in AH, Guomin zhengfu, 001000005349A and AH, Xingzheng yuan, 01400000186A.

¹⁰⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Treaties Between the Republic of China and Foreign States (1927-1957)* (Taipei, 1958), pp. 412-5.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., pp. 415-21.

6.5. Calls for Macau's return to Chinese sovereignty

Calls for the return of Macau to Chinese sovereignty began to emerge with the end of the war, often linked to criticism of the Portuguese authorities' conduct during the conflict.

Pressure over Macau came from different sectors of Chinese society. A military blockade of Macau, in effect until December 1945, was only lifted when Portugal accepted to undertake measures to extradite criminal suspects, hand in Japanese property in Macau and allow the nomination of a MOFA special commissioner to Macau.¹⁰² In a private conversation with the minister of Colonies, Marcello Caetano,¹⁰³ in Lisbon, Américo Pacheco Jorge, a Macanese lawyer who had been in the USA giving talks on China, stated that the Nationalist government's attitude towards Portugal was more favourable than in Guangzhou, where 'extremely nationalist' university students saw Macau as 'a stain in the history of China that is necessary to clean up.' He believed the situation in Macau was dependent on Hong Kong's.¹⁰⁴

Criticism of Macau was not exclusive of young Cantonese patriots, however. After several minor incidents, a brief incursion took place in February 1946. Liu Shaowu, a KMT officer in Zhongshan, led his troops into Macau, reportedly receiving the support of over 10,000 Chinese in the city.¹⁰⁵ Liu had blockaded Macau since November, controlling water and land transport and preventing food and energy supplies from entering the enclave. He believed he was strengthening the government's negotiating hand, but the minister of foreign affairs Wang Shijie considered the time was not yet right to recover Macau. The government asked Zhang Fakui to put his subordinate in order and

¹⁰² Fernandes, *Confluência de Interesses*, pp. 44-6.

¹⁰³ Caetano would replace Salazar as president of the council (premier) in 1968, governing Portugal until the end of the Estado Novo regime in 1974.

¹⁰⁴ Record of conversation between the Minister of Colonies and Américo Pacheco Jorge, 21 Feb. 1946, ANTT, AOS, UL-1D, Cx. 743, Pt. 19.

¹⁰⁵ Hao, *Macau*, p. 43.

end the blockade.¹⁰⁶ Liu's action had also been seen as a way to distract attention from the mop-up campaigns against CCP guerrillas in South China.¹⁰⁷ In September 1946 a newsletter of the Chinese Ministry of Information in London, *China Newsweek*, published an article by a professor of economics at the National Central University in Nanjing advocating Macau's 'return to the motherland in order to clear away the last vestige of the unequal treaties.' One of the reasons given to support this was that Macau had 'served as a perfect refuge for fugitives, gangsters and criminals.'¹⁰⁸

For the Portuguese authorities there were no grounds to understanding Chinese nationalist aspirations towards Macau. Indeed, they were unable, for decades to come and at a great cost, to engage with other forms of anti-imperial nationalism. In an illustrative example, the British ambassador to Lisbon noted how the director general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had told him in conversation that 'the attitude of the Chinese towards Macau was much the same as that of the Indian nationalists towards Goa.'¹⁰⁹ Portuguese diplomats in China were also unimpressed by the Nationalists' new international position. In 1946, the wartime consul at Guangzhou, Amaro Sacramento Monteiro, speculated that was due 'to the susceptibility originating from the fact that a small power maintains a colony in Chinese territory when the great ones make concessions and court their good will' together with a heightened nationalism fuelled by 'the Americans' attitude who convinced them they also won the war.'¹¹⁰ He further expressed disregard for China's contribution to the war in another despatch where he referred to the Chinese people as 'drunk with a victory for which they contributed little.'¹¹¹ In a 14-page long despatch to Lisbon the Portuguese chargé d'affaires in Shanghai also exposed his very negative view

¹⁰⁶ Wu, 'Zhongguo kangzhan', p. 48.

¹⁰⁷ 'Liu Shaowu', in *Baidu baike*, <https://baike.baidu.com/item/刘绍武/12634359> (15 Feb. 2017)

¹⁰⁸ C. Chu, 'Macao's Return to China', *China Newsweek*, 199 (1 Aug. 1946), p. 4. Also in TNA, 371/53617.

¹⁰⁹ British Embassy in Lisbon to Foreign Secretary, 29 Ago. 1946, TNA, 371/53617.

¹¹⁰ Portuguese Consul at Guangzhou to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 9 Jan. 1946, AHD, 2P, A48, M212, my translation.

¹¹¹ Portuguese Consul at Guangzhou to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 23 Sept. 1946, *ibid.*, my translation.

of the Nationalists stating that the KMT was ‘discredited’ and its administration was ‘inefficient and arch-dishonest.’¹¹² His words became stronger when lieutenant-general Takashi Sakai, former commander of the Japanese third army in South China who had interacted with Portuguese representatives in Guangzhou, was publically executed in Nanjing, an act which he saw, in a highly orientalist and discriminatory appraisal, as defining of ‘this sordid and barbaric people, in which a pseudo-millenarian civilisation had not managed to infuse a single attribute of moral decency.’¹¹³

The contempt for China’s post-war position as a major power in the international stage was also expressed a few years later by the Portuguese minister to China, J.B. Ferreira da Fonseca. He believed the new Chinese status had made Sino-Portuguese relations difficult because of the ‘natural arrogance’ of a country emerging victorious ‘over the progressive Japanese empire,’ although he did admit that the anomalous wartime circumstances when Portugal ‘lost contact with the central government’ were also to blame.¹¹⁴ In an unintendedly ironic statement – for Portugal itself was an authoritarian regime – Fonseca described the KMT as ‘a form of national dictatorship, supported on a single party [...] that everyone knows has as little of “democratic” as of “national” or “serious”.’¹¹⁵ Another despatch followed a similar logic, stating that some said that Chiang Kai-shek’s government ‘is little different from a modality of fascism, which the war had destined to be removed,’ a regime ‘where individual freedoms and non-official expressions of thought are severely suppressed.’¹¹⁶ Once again, this observation could also be applicable to the Estado Novo dictatorship in Portugal.

¹¹² Portuguese Chargé d’Affaires to China to Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 22 July 1946. AHD, 2P, A47, M151, my translation.

¹¹³ Portuguese Chargé d’Affaires to China to Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 15 Sept. 1946, *ibid.*, my translation.

¹¹⁴ Portuguese Minister to China to Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 29 Jan. 1949, AHD, 2P, A48, M211, my translation.

¹¹⁵ Portuguese Minister to China to Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 29 Mar. 1947, AHD, 2P, A47, M151, my translation.

¹¹⁶ Portuguese Minister to China to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 23 May 1947, *ibid.*, my translation.

After the successful exchange of notes for the abolition of extraterritoriality in April 1947, a press campaign calling for the retrocession of Macau intensified. The non-democratic nature of the Portuguese regime, and the existence of ‘immoral activities’ in Macau (gambling, opium, and prostitution), was pointed out. It was also noted that the enclave ‘had been the centre of Japanese espionage and refuge for “collaborationists” during the war,’ that neutrality had not been maintained, and that Portugal had ‘helped the enemy.’¹¹⁷ A letter to the editor of the *China Weekly Review* went as far as to portray the governor during the war as ‘a warm-hearted collaborator with the “Imperial Army”.’¹¹⁸ This was accompanied by a resolution passed by members of the People’s Political Council (PPC) asking the government for Macau’s return as the issue had not been included in the treaty that abolished extraterritoriality.¹¹⁹ The following month, 21 PPC members presented recommendations to the president of the Executive Yuan, Zhang Qun, advocating ‘the immediate recovery of Macau’ arguing that ‘during the war, Portugal violated her neutrality to the detriment of China’s war efforts.’¹²⁰ In July, the Legislative Yuan decided that steps should be made for the ‘recovery’ (*shouhui*) of Macau ‘at the earliest possibility’ (‘zui duan shi nei’). The government ordered the Executive Yuan to start negotiations with the relevant authorities.¹²¹

As the pressure against Macau in the press mounted, the Portuguese consul in Hong Kong sought to make the British authorities sympathetic to Portugal’s difficulties. Inter-imperial solidarity was again called to the fore, but the response was lukewarm. In a meeting with the colonial secretary in April, he noted that ‘if one day we have to abandon our possession [Macau], it would certainly not be auspicious, nor long, the future of Hong

¹¹⁷ Portuguese Minister to China to Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 29 Jan. 1949, AHD, 2P, A48, M211, my translation.

¹¹⁸ ‘Return Of Macao’, *The China Weekly Review* (17 May 1947), p. 305.

¹¹⁹ ‘China Wants Return of Macao’, *China Mail* (12 Apr. 1947), AHD, 2P, A48, M212.

¹²⁰ ‘Return of Macau’, *The South China Morning Post* (22 May 1947), ANTT, AOS, UL-10A3, cx. 769, Pt. 1.

¹²¹ Chiang Kai-shek, Chinese Government to Executive Yuan, 8 July 1947, AH, Xingzheng yuan, 01400000186A, my translation.

Kong.’¹²² The question on how far to connect Macau to Hong Kong in a ‘united front’ was debated in Portuguese correspondence but, as had happened during the Second World War, the ministry’s choice was to attempt to keep good relations with everyone: the Chinese authorities in Guangdong, and the British in Hong Kong.¹²³ The consul at Guangzhou, for one, went as far as to argue that a joint action with Britain would not be advantageous to Portugal and the country should act independently.¹²⁴ Sino-British interactions had been experiencing a number of clashes linked to the Kowloon Walled City question, including the burning of the British consulate in Guangzhou in January 1948. In contrast, relations with Portugal entered a more positive track.

Portuguese diplomats increased their efforts to restore good relations with the Nationalists. Personal connections played an important role. In August 1947 a branch of the Central News Agency was established in Macau¹²⁵ and, later that month, Sun Fo, Sun Yat-sen’s son and President of the Legislative Yuan since 1932, visited Macau where some of his family, including his mother, still lived. In the running-up to the visit the MOFA delegate in Hong Kong told the Portuguese Consul, E. Brazão, he was worried that the Macau government would exaggerate in the reception to Sun Fo, making it look like an official visit.¹²⁶ Indeed, Sun, who was accompanied by Brazão, was given a grand welcome, although later the consul complained to Lisbon that there was a certain ‘lack of preparation’ for this kind of events in Macau. Despite this, he concluded that Sun’s passage through Macau as a ‘guest of honour’ was of ‘great utility.’¹²⁷ Sun’s words on Sino-Portuguese friendship at a banquet made the news even in Lisbon.¹²⁸ At the end of

¹²² Portuguese Consul in Hong Kong to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 18 Apr. 1947, AHD, 2P, A48, M212.

¹²³ Vasco da Cunha, MNE, to Portuguese Consul in Hong Kong, 12 Feb. 1948, AHD, 2P, A47, M151.

¹²⁴ J. C. Magalhães, *Macau e a China no Após Guerra* [Macau and China in the Post-war] (Macau, 1992), p. 31.

¹²⁵ Fernandes, *Confluência de Interesses*, p. 96.

¹²⁶ Portuguese Consul in Hong Kong to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 Ago. 1947, AHD, 2P, A48, M212.

¹²⁷ Portuguese Consul in Hong Kong to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 Ago. 1947, *ibid.*

¹²⁸ ‘É Necessário que Não Haja Razões que Possam Destruir a Amizade que Existe entre Portugal e a China’ [‘It is Necessary That There Are No Reasons That Can Destroy the Friendship That Exists Between Portugal and China’], *O Século* (23 Ago. 1947), AHD, 2P, A48, M212.

the month it was reported that Chiang Kai-shek had ordered Chinese newspapers in Guangdong to stop their ‘propaganda’ for the handover of Macau.¹²⁹ Shortly after, a possible visit by General Zhang Fakui began to be discussed. It was thought that a visit by the general who was said to have previously attacked the Portuguese, would be a ‘great political triumph.’¹³⁰

In September 1947 a new governor arrived in Macau, Albano Rodrigues de Oliveira. He had lived in China before, being interim consul general at Guangzhou between 1937 and 1938, where he had befriended the then governor Wu Tiecheng. Oliveira went on an official visit to Guangzhou the same month he assumed the governorship.¹³¹ He was received by general Zhang Fakui, the provincial governor Luo Zhuoying, the mayor of Guangzhou Ouyang Ju, and general Chen Ce (Chan Chak).¹³² Bilateral relations also benefited from the appointment of T.V. Soong as governor of Guangdong in the same month.¹³³ Not even mentioning smuggling, Soong had told the Portuguese consul at Guangzhou, José Calvet de Magalhães, that he expected Portuguese cooperation so that asylum was not given in Macau to ‘political discontents’ of the region.¹³⁴ Chinese relations with Portugal and Macau improved in inverse proportion to relations with Britain, in part due to the very cordial relation that had developed between Soong and Calvet de Magalhães. In a 15-page despatch the consul exposed his appreciation for Soong, who he perceived as the most occidentalised politician in China who wanted to Westernise Chinese life, a positive description that matches similar

¹²⁹ ‘Ordem Sensacional de Chiang Kai Shek’ [Chiang Kai-shek’s Sensational Order], *Notícias de Macau* (27 Ago. 1947), p. 1. On Chiang’s intervention see also: Portuguese Minister to China to Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 4 Sept. 1947, AHD, 2P, A47, M151; Portuguese Minister to China to Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 29 Jan. 1949, AHD, 2P, A48, M211.

¹³⁰ Portuguese Consul in Hong Kong to MNE, 9 Sept. 1947, AHD, 2P, A48, M212.

¹³¹ ‘Visita a Cantão de S. Exa. o Governador de Macau’ [His Excellency the Governor of Macau’s Visit to Canton], *Notícias de Macau* (22 Sept. 1947), p. 1.

¹³² ‘A Viagem Triunfal de S. Exa. o Governador’ [His Excellency the Governor’s Triumphal Trip], *ibid.* (25 Sept. 1947), p. 2.

¹³³ T.V. Soong remained as provincial governor until 1949.

¹³⁴ Portuguese Consul at Guangzhou to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 Oct. 1947, AHD, 2P, A47, M151.

accounts of the period such as *Thunder Of out China*, which the consul quoted.¹³⁵ In December 1947 he reached an agreement on rice supplies, by which Cantonese authorities would supply Macau if the enclave forbade re-exports of the cereal.¹³⁶

Highlighting the new state of relations, the Chinese Double Ten national day was effusively celebrated in Macau in 1947, so much so that the consul in Hong Kong considered it an exaggeration.¹³⁷ The main Portuguese language newspaper went as far as to post on the front page portraits of Sun Yat-sen, Lei Peng Seak, President of the Macau Branch of the KMT, and of Guo Zefan, the MOFA delegate since 1946, accompanied by quotes on democracy¹³⁸ – a concept arguably controversial in Portugal itself at that time. The Nationalists also won a symbolic victory when Portuguese authorities finally agreed to ban opium in Macau. The trade was banned in late 1945, and opium houses were closed in mid 1947, after the implementation of rehabilitation plans for addicts.¹³⁹

Cordial relations did not mean abandoning sovereignty claims. In January 1948, T.V. Soong asked the consul at Guangzhou – who had come to see him about rice supplies – to intervene with the Macau government to recall the Portuguese policemen from Maliaohe, in the disputed Montanha island. The two men who had remained there since the war were subsequently told to leave.¹⁴⁰ Chinese control over the disputed island finally resumed in full. Also, amongst the proposals presented at the National Assembly in April 1948 was one for the retrocession of Hong Kong, and another for Kowloon and Macau.¹⁴¹ Despite this, there was a perception that ties with the Nationalists could soon

¹³⁵ T. H. White and A. Jacoby, *Thunder out of China* (New York, 1946, repr. 1975), pp. 263-66.

¹³⁶ Magalhães, *Macau e a China*, p. 35.

¹³⁷ Portuguese Consul in Hong Kong to Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 15 Oct. 1947, AHD, 2P, A47, M151.

¹³⁸ 'O Duplo Dez' [Double Tenth], *Notícias de Macau* (12 Oct. 1947), p. 1.

¹³⁹ On the abolition of the government's Opium Regie see *Boletim Oficial de Macau* [Macau's Official Bulletin], no. 52, 2nd supplement, 31 Dez. 1946, p. 1007. Opium suppression measures were regarded as a way of placating Chinese claims to retake Macau but their implementation in the enclave was seen as only partially effective ('Macao Hits the Doldrums,' *The China Weekly Review* [6 Sept. 1947], p. 12).

There is surprisingly little written about the abolition of opium in Macau.

¹⁴⁰ MNE to Minister of Colonies, 23 Jan. 1948, AHD, 2P, A47, M151.

¹⁴¹ Portuguese Minister to China to Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 20 Apr. 1948, *ibid.*

improve. Sun Fo was again chosen as president of the Legislative Yuan the following month, and he was perceived as possibly pleasant given his family connections to Macau.¹⁴²

In April 1948, on the occasion of the commemorations in Macau of the 20th anniversary of Salazar's assumption of government functions, figures of the Chinese community in Macau even praised Portugal's role in the war. Guo Zefan highlighted the ceding of basing rights in the Azores as a valuable act of Portuguese cooperation with the Allied nations. Then chairman of the board of directors of the Commercial Association Liu Baiying mentioned how many cultivated individuals, merchants and capitalists from all over China had sought refuge in Macau during the War of Resistance and contributed to the development of the enclave's commerce and industry,¹⁴³ an observation that can be prone to different readings.

In August 1948 the Macau governor wrote to Lisbon on the possibility of T.V. Soong becoming premier and Wu Tiecheng returning as governor of Guangdong. He informed that Wu had been 'an old friend' and that he had kept in touch with him since he had taken up the post in Macau. Soong was also seen as a friend of the Portuguese who 'had interests in Macau.' If the rumours about their future positions were true, it augured good things for the Portuguese.¹⁴⁴ In fact Sun Fo would be nominated premier and Wu was appointed minister of foreign affairs at the end of 1948. When meeting the Portuguese minister in Nanjing in the first audience given to members of the diplomatic corps, Wu also referred to the 'very good personal and official relations he had had with the governor of Macau in the past.'¹⁴⁵

In 1948 the Portuguese minister to China wrote several times to Lisbon recommending the upgrade of the Portuguese legation to embassy. Given that only a few

¹⁴² Portuguese Minister to China to Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 25 May 1948, *ibid.*.

¹⁴³ ANTT, AOS, UL-10A3, cx. 769, Pt. 2.

¹⁴⁴ Governor of Macau quoted in despatch from MC to MNE, 30 Ago. 1948, *ibid.*.

¹⁴⁵ Portuguese Minister to China to MNE, 30 Dez. 1948, *ibid.*.

countries still kept legations instead of embassies and ministers plenipotentiaries instead of ambassadors and given Portuguese interests in China this matter could affect the country's prestige.¹⁴⁶ Despite this suggestion, the legation was not elevated.

When Portuguese relations with the ROC were starting to improve, a fresh challenge was posed by the Communists' victories in the civil war. Just as they had done during the war with the collaborator rulers in Guangdong province, the Portuguese authorities in Macau dispatched a few envoys to forge links with the Communists to guarantee Macau's position. One of them was Pedro Lobo, who was sent as 'special emissary' to deal with the future authorities of neighbouring districts to guarantee the 'regular supply of goods' needed by the enclave.¹⁴⁷ Another envoy was captain Francisco da Costa Gomes, who would become the first president of the Portuguese Republic after the end of the Estado Novo dictatorship. He later stated that before the end of the civil war he went on a 'secret mission' to hand over two CCP members detained in Macau to prevent them from falling into the Nationalists' hands. He claimed he 'had always had good relations with the Chinese communists' knowing they 'did not intend to attack Macau.'¹⁴⁸ One can argue that, in the 1940s, the KMT was perceived as more anti-imperialist than the CCP by some Portuguese figures.

The Portuguese minister to China was unsure of the nature of Chinese communists' ideology and decided to follow other foreign diplomats by remaining in Nanjing. The minister anticipated that many KMT elements, including 'bankers and big capitalists,' could seek refuge in Macau, as they were already seeking in Hong Kong but the Portuguese authorities should be selective on whom to admit.¹⁴⁹ In September 1949 a

¹⁴⁶ Portuguese Minister to China to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 19 July 1948. AHD, 2P, A48, M212; Minister to China to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 13 Oct. 1948, AHD, 2P, A47, M151.

¹⁴⁷ Pereira, *Accommodating Diversity*, p. 39.

¹⁴⁸ A. Caeiro, *Peregrinação Vermelha: O Longo Caminho até Pequim* [Red Pilgrimage: The Long Path to Beijing] (Lisbon, 2016), pp. 16-17.

¹⁴⁹ Portuguese Minister to China to Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 29 Jan. 1949, AHD, 2P, A48, M211.

secret *pro memoria* from the British embassy in Lisbon asked the Portuguese government if they ‘would be prepared in principle to support their [British] policy of maintaining a foothold in China as long as possible’ as ‘His Majesty’s Government are not in favour of a premature abandonment of British interests in China.’¹⁵⁰ The Portuguese did manage to keep a foothold in China, even for longer than the British, but they didn’t follow their old ally when, the following month, the British embassy informed Portugal of its government’s intention of recognising the recently established PRC.¹⁵¹ Despite some in the diplomatic corps favouring it, the Portuguese government preferred to wait, as did the French,¹⁵² although it ended up waiting much longer than the latter to officially recognise ‘Red China.’ Relations with the ROC were broken only in 1975, although by then communist control over Macau was such that the enclave was already regarded as a ‘half-liberated area,’ even before Portugal established diplomatic relations with the PRC, in 1979.

Conclusion

This chapter argued that the ambivalent experience of neutrality in wartime Macau had an impact on Sino-Portuguese relations after the conflict. Combined with discussions over extraterritoriality and the problem of the Portuguese diplomatic representation in China, a number of wartime issues in Macau linked to collaboration affected the bilateral relationship and ultimately led to decades of estrangement between the ROC and Portugal.

Nationalist China emerged from the Second World War as a victorious, anti-imperialist world power recognised on the international stage, as proved by its permanent

¹⁵⁰ Pro memoria from the British Embassy in Lisbon, 1 Sept. 1949, ANTT, AOS, NE-2A2, cx. 422.

¹⁵¹ Aide memoire from the British Embassy in Lisbon, 5 Oct. 1949, *ibid.*.

¹⁵² Pereira, *Accommodating Diversity*, p. 49. France recognised the PRC in 1964.

seat on the Security Council of the newly founded UN. Post-war interactions with Portugal reveal the Nationalists' determination in assuming their heightened status. Tackling perceived unneutral actions occurred in Macau during the war, they sought to deal with enemy property and alleged criminals and collaborators as a sovereign state. However, their efforts were marred by internal factionalism and external prejudice. Sino-Portuguese relations reveal the problems and limitations in China's exercise of its new position, from difficulties in getting people extradited to their failure of taking over Macau, its return to Chinese sovereignty being advocated by some as a way of washing away the sins committed during the war. Grey zones are difficult targets to pin-down, however. Macau's flexible neutrality meant that collaboration had multiple beneficiaries, including on the side of the winners, which complicated performance assessments. The hazy identities of several of those who had operated in and around the shadow land of Macau during the war were a pointedly example of the difficulty of labelling people and exercising post-war justice: a collaborationist gang leader began as an agent for the resistance, a Portuguese Eurasian policeman found himself on trial as a Chinese traitor, a local tycoon was acquitted by a court but did not escape unharmed from popular justice at the hands of a group of kidnapers. The wartime record of individuals and institutions was far more complicated than a clear-cut binary of good and evil, and perhaps nowhere was this truer than in in-between neutral spaces like Macau.

Post-war Sino-Portuguese relations had a mixed record. Despite the abovementioned dissensions, negotiations for the abolition of extraterritoriality were concluded and the prohibition of the infamous opium trade in Macau was implemented. From 1947, more cordial relations with the Portuguese began to take shape through personal connections, some forged during the war. However, the Chinese civil war ultimately derailed Nationalist's efforts to tackle certain unsolved wartime issues.

Post-war Macau was also marked by continuities. Small, strategically located, and well connected, Macau remained for decades to come under Portuguese administration, resuming several features of its wartime period. It once again became a refugee destination, a smuggling hub, and ever more dependent on an elite of business intermediaries. In a curious echo of the war period, Portugal never posted a representative to Taiwan, although the ROC kept its legation in Lisbon. But distance from the Nationalists did not mean official relations with the PRC either. Macau and the interests of its local elites prevailed over regular diplomatic relations between Portugal and China.

CONCLUSION

Through the case study of Sino-Portuguese relations and Macau, this thesis explored the impossibility of strict neutrality in the Second World War in East Asia and how its practice was marked by multiple forms of collaboration. It analysed the international links that framed the relations between the republics of China and Portugal, as well as those involving Chinese and Portuguese individuals. Combining a chronological and thematic approach, this thesis delved into the 1937-1941 period, the one between the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong and the end of the war, and finally, how unsolved issues leftover from the war were dealt with in the immediate post-war until the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. These periods were marked by a flexible understanding of neutrality, with variable levels of pressure from the belligerents and multiple and evolving connections that kept Macau neutral through somewhat unneutral ways.

To an extent, Macau's wartime experience was not completely new. The introductory chapter provided an overview of Sino-Portuguese relations before 1937, demonstrating how cooperation for mutual interests and a relative autonomy were continuously reinvented, with practices at the margins of legality and collaboration featuring prominently in Macau's existence. Chapter Two focused on the growing levels of pressure the enclave was subject to since the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937. It highlighted the web of international contacts framing its experience since the early stages of the conflict: wooing and coercion from Japanese forces, hands-off Anglo-Portuguese solidarity, the Chinese government's active diplomacy to harness support for resistance, and the pragmatic use of the enclave's potential for co-opting supporters by Wang Jingwei and his followers. Different collaborative relations began to be forged in the late 1930s, being developed in subsequent years. The third Chapter showed how

Macau's neutrality turned it into a haven for hundreds of thousands of refugees coming from Shanghai and Guangdong province. Through the analysis of the interactive state-society response to the social crisis that ensued, it explored different forms of collaboration for relief. Chapter Four exposed how layers of collaboration were also at the centre of what were arguably the most dramatic years of Macau's twentieth-century. After the occupation of Hong Kong, pressure by the Japanese and the RNG authorities – which did not always act in tandem – reached a peak. The Portuguese administration in Macau resorted to multiple contacts to keep Macau nominally neutral and remain in power. In doing so, it ended up engaging in unneutral actions that underscored the limits to their colonial control. A crisis in food supplies and episodes of violent crime attest to this. In the meantime, the Chinese central government kept monitoring how Portuguese neutrality was being practiced and how Chinese citizens were affected not just in Macau but also in Lisbon and Timor. The following chapter detailed the process of colonial transplantation from Hong Kong to Macau in the years after the Japanese occupation of the British colony. A neutral Macau served British citizens and interests, allowing for escapes to be effected, assistance to be dispensed, intelligence to be collected and the reoccupation of Hong Kong to be prepared. Collaboration with the British is another dimension that brought several Portuguese and Chinese together. Finally, Chapter Six revealed how questionable practices of neutrality and ambiguous collaboration ties resurfaced in the post-war, affecting Sino-Portuguese relations. China's efforts to deal with what had taken place during the war were made difficult by the scepticism of those who denigrated its contribution to the war and its new international status. They were also weakened by internal division. Meanwhile, relations of collaboration were decried by some, but also forged anew.

Ambiguous circumstances springing from both Portugal's neutrality and imperialism made Macau a site of interactions for actors with various, and often

conflicting interests, who found enough freedom for their actions in this grey zone. This thesis argued that neutrality led to unneutral actions, with many layers of collaboration marking the enclave's wartime and post-war experience, involving Chinese, Portuguese, Japanese, British, among others. However, on the part of the Portuguese authorities, collaboration with the British prevailed in a clear example of how the centuries-old Anglo-Portuguese alliance could work on the ground.

This study sought to re-evaluate Macau's importance in the history of China's Second World War, in particular its links and similarities with better-studied semi-colonial territories such as Shanghai. It is centred on a neglected aspect of the historiography of Chinese diplomacy in the period, which has privileged relations with major powers,¹ and of neutrality, which has been dominated by Eurocentric accounts. By looking into China's interactions with a small European country, this thesis has presented a counter-current case study in which the Chinese, both authorities – those of the central government or of the collaborationist RNG –, and local elites were more often than not in a position of strength *vis-a-vis* a European imperial power and its representatives. This case study of the practice of Portuguese neutrality in East Asia also attests to the truly global character of the Second World War. Since its opening salvo in East Asia in 1937, the war involved a variety of international actors in official and unofficial contacts and actions that connected Europe and Asia.

¹ Notably the USA, Britain, Russia, Japan, Germany, and France (A. Iriye, 'Japanese Aggression and China's International Position 1931-1949', in J. K. Fairbank and A. Feuerwerker [eds], *The Cambridge History of China, Volume 13: Republican China 1912-1949, Part 2* [Cambridge, 1986], pp. 492-546; Garver, 'China's Wartime Diplomacy'; Kirby, W. C., 'The Internationalization of China: Foreign Relations at Home and Abroad in the Republican Era', *The China Quarterly*, 150 [1997], pp. 433-458; H. van de Ven, D. Lary and S. R. MacKinnon, *Negotiating China's Destiny in World War II* [Stanford, 2015]). Amongst the few studies on China's relations with other countries during the Second World War are articles focused on Italy and India (G. Samarani, 'The Evolution of Fascist Italian Diplomacy During the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1943', in D. P. Barrett and L. N. Shyu [eds], *China in the Anti-Japanese War, 1937-1945: Politics, Culture, and Society* [New York, 2001], pp. 65-87; G. Samarani, 'Italians in Nationalist China (1928-1945): Some Case Studies', in A. M. Brady and D. Brown (eds), *Foreigners and Foreign Institutions in Republican China* (London, 2013), pp. 234-250; T. Yang, 'Chiang Kai-shek and Jawaharlal Nehru', in *Negotiating China's Destiny in World War II*, pp. 127-40).

It is precisely the importance of these webs of connections linking different people and places that is emphasised throughout this thesis. Macau's isolation as a 'lonely island' did hamper some of these networks, but it also created new ones or enhanced declining ones, such as those linking it with British Hong Kong. The importance of connections is also explored through the figures of mediators. A link between the war and the post-war is discernible in the emergence of powerful economic magnates who became key intermediaries for the Portuguese administration for decades to come.

The maintenance of neutrality in Macau during the Second World War was also partly responsible for the continuation of Portuguese imperialism in China in stark divergence to what occurred with the British in Shanghai's International Settlement or the French with their concessions, including the neighbouring enclave of Guangzhouwan. However, British imperialism did remain in Hong Kong and for that some credit is owed to wartime Macau. In the case of Macau, the ambiguities and contradictions of neutrality ultimately made the Chinese Nationalists' post-war attempts to solve issues such as extradition of alleged war criminals and more concrete actions for Macau's retrocession, more difficult. After all, that neutrality had served many actors, including the Nationalists themselves and the British.

The war period is crucial to understand the future developments of Sino-Portuguese relations. The disruption caused by the war had a lasting effect on relations between the ROC and Portugal. Although these were maintained until 1975, the emergence of Chiang's China as an internationally recognised anti-imperialist power keen on retaking Macau was not particularly appealing for Portugal, even despite the shared anti-communism of both regimes. Smooth relations were prevented from developing during the war in part because the Portuguese chose not to send their minister in China to the wartime capital of Chongqing. Even though the ROC kept its diplomats in Lisbon, dialogue was not exactly conducted in equal parts.

Macau's position as a twilight zone at the confluence of different empires had contradictory effects. Initially it was a relevant channel for the Nationalists to acquire necessary materials for the interior, an intelligence collection station and a mobilisation centre targeting the local Chinese population and overseas Chinese. However, the Portuguese authorities in the enclave progressively ceded more and more to a number of Japanese demands, thus affecting Chinese resistance efforts in Macau. Furthermore, they remained close to the British due to a certain imperial solidarity at odds with China's anti-imperialist position during the war. In later stages of the war, contacts between the Macau government and communist guerrillas appear to have forged a relatively positive view of their actions, likely to have eased the future relationship with the PRC authorities. In the immediate post-war, pressures for certain Nationalist sectors to retake Macau and disagreements between figures on the ground fuelled a negative image of Chiang's rule which is likely to have further eroded chances of a stable relationship, despite the relative rapprochement during T.V. Soong's governorship of Guangdong from 1947 to 1949.

From 1949, ROC-Portugal relations experienced a peculiar *déjà vu*, in several ways echoing its wartime experience. Diplomatic relations between Salazar's and Chiang's governments were maintained, but the two countries were far from close. Although the ROC kept its legation in Lisbon open, staffed and functioning, Portugal never sent a diplomat to Taipei – a striking contrast to Franco's Spain, with which Chiang's China had not even had relations before the war but with which friendly links were forged afterwards.² In Macau, everyday life became more dependent on the Nationalists' adversaries, even if pro-KMT people remained in the enclave for years. It was not that different from the war period, when the Macau experience was marked by pressures, concessions and interactions to guarantee food supplies or, in the case of the

² Despite this, Spain broke off relations with the ROC in 1973 to establish relations with the PRC, two years before Portugal did the same.

Portuguese authorities, to ensure that their nominal colonial control was kept intact – even though time and time again their powerlessness became evident. Informal negotiations had to be made with the power governing across Macau’s borders, the newly founded PRC. New refugee waves arrived, some relocating from Shanghai and Guangdong province like many others during the war with Japan.³ Responses were, in many ways, fairly similar: accommodation, shadow diplomacy, and the dependence on increasingly powerful figures of local intermediaries. Several of the most prominent had emerged precisely during the Second World War.

The war period in Macau may also be regarded as a peak in its popular image of a ‘sin city,’ for arguably never were its contradictions as evident as during the conflict. It was a safe haven and a killing ground. It was a bustling ‘dancing world’ with a newfound cosmopolitanism borrowed from Shanghai and Hong Kong, and a hell of piled up cadavers and poor so famished they ate fellow human beings. It was a land for spies, traitors, and patriotic heroes, many as ambiguous as the enclave itself. It is this allure that has inspired popular culture in recent years after decades of neglect. Cold War Macau did merit a few unflattering allusions in Hollywood cinema,⁴ but, with the exception of the 1938 French novel *Macao, Enfer du Jeu* (Macau, Gambling Hell) and its 1942 adaptation to film,⁵ only recently has wartime Macau begun to inspire a number of relatively obscure

³ A recent exhibition in Macau and Lisbon focused on the relocation to Macau of the Portuguese community from Shanghai (A. G. Dias, *Refugiados de Xangai, Macau (1937-1964)* [Shanghai Refugees, Macau (1937-1964)] [Macau, 2015]).

⁴ R. Lopes, “‘A fabulous Speck on the Earth’s Surface’: Depictions of Colonial Macao in 1950s’ Hollywood’, *Portuguese Studies*, 32/1 (2016), pp. 72-87.

⁵ M. Dekobra, *Macao, Enfer du Jeu* [Macau: Gambling Hell] (Paris, 1938), adapted to film in 1942. It was directed by Jean Delannoy and starred Eric von Stroheim and Sessue Hayakawa. The tribulations of the film’s production and exhibition are illustrative of wartime constraints. When the novel was published, its truthfulness was passionately denied in the Portuguese press, although its plot involving smuggling, shady businesses, and gambling was not that far from wartime Macau’s reality (‘Em defesa de uma linda colónia’ [In Defence of a Beautiful Colony], *A Voz de Macau* [reproducing an article published in the Portuguese daily *Diário de Notícias*] [20 Sept. 1938], p. 2; ‘Macau Inferno do Jogo’ [Macau Gambling Hell], *A Voz de Macau* [19 Dec. 1938], p. 2).

works of written and visual fiction.⁶ The latter are a reminder of the enduring power of what cannot be known.

In 1938, the British poet W.H. Auden wrote a poem on Macau after visiting the enclave during his journey through wartime China. Auden described the territory as a city of contradictions, where ‘churches alongside brothels testify / That faith can pardon natural behaviour.’ Despite being surrounded by conflict, Macau’s apparently sheltered isolation led the poet to conclude that ‘nothing serious can happen here.’⁷ However, as this work has demonstrated, serious things did happen in Macau during the Second World War. In such a devastating conflict, neutrality was not completely attainable and led to multiple forms of collaboration. The history of this small enclave shows how, even in the unlikeliest of places, the war was global and those who lived through it were profoundly interconnected.

⁶ Books include R. L. Carvalho, *A Mãe* [The Mother] (Pedreiras, 2001); C. Petit, *Deep Night* (New York, 2008); J. Lees, *The Fan Tan Players* (Dingwall, 2009), inspired by the life story of the author’s mother, a Russian who lived in wartime Macau; B. Castro, *Shanghai Dancing* (New York, 2003), based on the Australian author’s Portuguese family in wartime Shanghai; F. Sobral, *O Segredo do Hidroavião* [The Seaplane Secret] (Lisbon, 2014), which is set in the late 1940s but with several references to the war; J. R. Santos, *As Flores de Lótus* [Lotus Flowers] (Lisbon, 2015), first volume of a trilogy narrated by a fictionalised Pedro Lobo; I. Valadão, *O Rio das Pérolas* [The Pearl River] (Lisbon, 2017). Films include *Hao qing suiyue* (international title: *Love in Macau*), directed by Chen Yifeng (2006), and references to escaping from Shanghai to Macau in James Ivory’s *The White Countess* (2005) and in Mikael Håfström’s *Shanghai* (2012). A 30-episode TV series set in wartime Macau, *Jing hai fengyun* (international title: *Nature Situation*), was produced by China Central Television in 2009 and aired in 2011.

⁷ W. H. Auden, and C. Isherwood, *Journey to a War* (London, 1939, repr. 1973), pp. 13-14.

GLOSSARY OF CHINESE NAMES

- An Puling [Father Serafim Brum Amaral] 安普靈
 Cai Chusheng 蔡楚生
 Chen Bijun 陳璧君
 Chen Ce [Chan Chak] 陳策
 Chen Chunpu 陳春圃
 Chen Guangfu [K. P. Chen] 陳光甫
 Chen Shaoling 陳少陵
 Chen Yaozu 陳耀祖
 Chu Minyi 褚民誼
 Cui Leqi [Roque Choi] 崔樂其
 Cui Nouzhi [Joel José Choi Anok] 崔諾枝
 Dai Ensai 戴恩賽
 Dai Li 戴笠
 Diao Zuoqian [Philip K.C. Tyau] 刁作謙
 Gan Naiguang 甘乃光
 Gan Zhiyuan 甘志遠
 Gao Kening [Ko Ho Neng] 高可寧
 Gao Jianfu 高劍父
 Geng Tingzhen 耿廷楨
 Gu Weijun [Wellington Koo] 顧維鈞
 Feng Zhuwan 馮祝萬
 Fu Deyin [Fu Tak Iam] 傅德蔭
 He Dong [Robert Ho Tung] 何東
 He Hongshen [Stanley Ho] 何鴻燊
 He Xian [Ho Yin] 何賢
 Huang Gongjie [Wong Kong Kit] 黃公傑
 Huang Weilin 黃渭霖
 Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] 蔣介石
 Ke Zhengping 柯正平
 Kong Xiangxi [H. H. Kung] 孔祥熙
 Li Jinlun [Frank W. Chinglun Lee] 李錦綸
 Li Tian'ai [Florence Tim Oi Li] 李添嫻
 Liang Houyuan [Leong Hau-Un] 梁後源
 Liang Runchang [Y.C. Liang] 梁潤昌
 Liang Yanming 梁彥明
 Liao Jintao 廖錦濤
 Lin Shifen [Andrew S.F. Lin] 凌士芬
 Lin Zhuofu 林卓夫
 Liu Baiying 劉柏盈
 Liu Shaowu 劉紹武
 Lu Muzhen 盧慕貞
 Lu Rongxi [Lo Wing Sik] 盧榮錫

Luo Zhuoying 羅卓英
Ou Chu 歐初
Ouyang Ju 歐陽駒
Sa Kongliao 薩空了
Shi Liang 史良
Song Ziwen [T.V. Soong] 宋子文
Sun Ke [Sun Fo] 孫科
Sun Zhongshan [Sun Yeat-sen] 孫中山
Tang Liu 唐榴
Tang Shaoyi 唐紹儀
Tian Fangcheng 田方城
Wang Chonghui 王寵惠
Wang Jingwei 汪精衛
Wang Shijie 王世杰
Wang Zhengting 王正廷
Wu Guozhen 吳國楨
Wu Tiecheng 吳鐵城
Xia Yan 夏衍
Xu Chongxi 許崇智
Xu Jiaping [Jabin Hsu] 許建屏
Xu Shiying 許世英
Ye Ting 葉挺
Yu Hanmou 余漢謀
Zhang Fakui 張發奎
Zhang Huichang [Chang Wai Cheung] 張惠長
Zhang Qian [Henry Kunghui Chang] 張謙
Zhang Qun 張群
Zhang Youyun 張幼雲
Zhou Bingsan 周秉三
Zhou Fohai 周佛海
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B G 017 07-063 – Prisonniers à Hong Kong [Prisoners in Hong Kong]

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