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Cooperation as a volunteer's dilemma and the strategy of conflict in public goods games.

Abstract:

Conflict and cooperation for the exploitation of public goods are usually modelled as an N-person prisoner's dilemma. Many social dilemmas, however, would be described more properly as a volunteer's dilemma, in which a certain number of individuals are necessary to produce a public good. If volunteering is costly, but so is failure to produce the public good, cheaters can invade and form a stable mixed equilibrium with cooperators. The dilemma is that the benefit for the group decreases with ...

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Publication status:
Published

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS
Department:
Zoology
Role:
Author
Journal:
Journal of evolutionary biology
Volume:
22
Issue:
11
Pages:
2192-2200
Publication date:
2009-11-01
DOI:
EISSN:
1420-9101
ISSN:
1010-061X
Source identifiers:
209512
Language:
English
Keywords:
Pubs id:
pubs:209512
UUID:
uuid:d7fd119a-4813-4962-940b-8929acb68ba2
Local pid:
pubs:209512
Deposit date:
2012-12-19

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