Civic Networks and Countering Violent Extremism in US and UK Cities

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of D.Phil. in Politics in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford.

July 2020

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Candidate Number: 645579 Word Count: 99,344

Abstract

Countering violent extremism (CVE) policies are an outgrowth of central government counter-terrorism efforts that aim to curb public support for terrorism and pre-emptively deter individuals from committing violence. The literature has heavily criticized CVE programs, yet central governments continue to expand them, tasking local governments and police with engaging predominately Muslim minority communities and establishing intervention efforts for individuals considered to be "at-risk" of becoming involved in terrorism.

Despite the same top-down pressures and widespread public opposition to these policies, local governments and city-level communities diverge in their approaches to counter-extremism programs, ranging from active collaboration around these agendas to evasion. The existing scholarship lacks a theory to explain this puzzling sub-national variation. I argue that the structure of local Muslim civil society networks, in particular, the pre-existing relationships between Muslim civil society leaders, state actors, and other co-religionists, shape how local actors navigate steep trade-offs associated with these programs and ultimately respond to CVE agendas. Muslim civil society leaders, in particular, act as the causal mechanism that translates network structures into local policy outcomes, determining both whether bureaucrats decide to invest in counter-extremism policies and how communities take part in the long term.

I test this theory in six cities over time, looking in-depth at CVE policy outcomes in four UK cities and two US cities, employing a mixed-methods approach that combines 139 interviews with local stakeholders and within-case social network analysis. The dissertation contributes to the literature on city governance and counter-terrorism, highlighting how sub-national community networks shape security policy outcomes, even amidst heavy top-down pressures and evolving terrorist threats.

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Chapter 1 Introduction

The post-September 11th security environment has ushered the world into a "See something, say something" era. Amidst growing fears of homegrown terrorism, governments have recruited ordinary citizens to assist with counter-terrorism efforts. New counter-terrorism policies adopted across Western states have placed Muslim communities[1] under intense government scrutiny.[2] These efforts have ranged from mosque monitoring and police partnerships with Muslim communities to government sponsorship of religious education programs.

In the UK, London's Metropolitan Police established a Muslim Contact Unit to engage with Muslim communities as part of broader efforts to prevent terrorism after 2001[3] and the Home Office funded the "Radical Middle Way" program, which aims to challenge extremism by sponsoring speaking engagements by Islamic scholars.[4] In the US, the Department of Homeland Security hosts roundtables with American Arab, Muslim, South Asian, and Middle Eastern communities to strengthen "channels of communication" between citizens and the federal government.[5] The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) also engages directly with local Muslim leaders[6] and has recruited informants to gather intelligence on Muslim community members.[7]

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[1] The notion of a "Muslim community" has been much criticized in the literature, for obscuring the important internal heterogeneity among Muslim publics. I use the term "Muslim community," as a shorthand in this dissertation, but I discuss the debates around the utility of the term in the chapters that follow. In the case study chapters, I look in depth at the internal diversity of local Muslim publics both cross-nationally and sub-nationally.

[2] See for instance: Cainkar, Louis A. *Homeland insecurity: The Arab American and Muslim American experience after 9/11*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2009; Apuzzo, Matt and Adam Goldman. "After Spying on Muslims, New York Police Agree to Greater Oversight." *New York Times*. 6 March 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/nyregion/nypd-spying-muslims-surveillance-lawsuit.html; Toor, Amar. "France's anti-terrorism laws leave Muslims in a state of fear." *The Verge*. 29 January 2016. https://www.theverge.com/2016/1/29/10860964/france-state-of-emergency-muslim-paris-attacks

[3] Dodd, Vikram. "Special Branch to track Muslims across UK." *The Guardian*. 20 July 2005. https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/jul/20/religion.july7

[4] Hellyer, H.A. *Engagement with the Muslim Community and Counter-Terrorism: British Lessons for The West*. The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World. 11(2007). https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/12_counterterrorism_hellyer.pdf

[5] U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. *Community Engagement Section*. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/community-engagement-dhs-crcl-poster.pdf

[6] Kundnani, Arun. "The FBI's 'Good' Muslims." T*he Nation*. 30 April 2011. https://www.thenation.com/article/fbis-good-muslims/

[7] Glionna, John. "U.S. Muslim leaders say FBI pressuring people to become informants." *Los Angeles Times*. 3 November 2014. http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-muslims-fbi-20141103-story.html

The growth of countering violent extremism (CVE) policies is part of this broader trend. CVE policies aim to mobilize local state actors[8] and predominately Muslim communities to assist central governments in preventing terrorism. CVE policies typically combine broad programming designed to create so-called "community resilience"[9] with more targeted interventions to dissuade specific individuals who are considered "at-risk" from becoming involved in terrorism. Although CVE efforts are a sub-set of broader counter-terrorism programs,[10] they differ from more traditional security policies because they aim to use non-coercive measures to influence the "hearts and minds" of citizens.

In recent years, CVE policies have rapidly expanded. The UK's counter-extremism strategy,[11] Prevent, has quickly grown in prominence, with the UK's National Coordinator for Counter-terrorism Policing calling Prevent, "the most important pillar" of the UK's counter-terrorism strategy in 2018.[12] Prevent has also served as a model for similar community-based counter-terrorism policies in the US, Canada, and Australia.[13] The United Nations and international NGOs[14] also actively promote the expansion of CVE programming around the world. Despite this surge in investment around counter-extremism programs, CVE programs have been consistently criticized for stigmatizing Muslim communities and for the underlying logic of radicalization that undergirds these programs.[15]

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[8] I use the term local state actors to refer to employees of government agencies in a given locality.
[9] Mirahmadi, Hedieh. "Building resilience against violent extremism: A community-based approach." The *ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 668.1 (2016): 129-144.
[10] In this dissertation, I use the term counter-extremism and counter-terrorism interchangeably because counter-extremism programs are a part of broader state counter-terrorism efforts.
[11] This dissertation focuses on the UK's Prevent strategy, which I also refer to as the UK's counter-extremism strategy. In 2015, the UK launched its Counter Extremism Strategy which deals with extremism that is not thought to be related to terrorism. I do not discuss the 2015 Counter Extremism Strategy, focusing only on Prevent programming. See: Commission for Countering Extremism. *Common Questions and their Answers from the Commission*. 16 August 2018. https://extremismcommission.blog.gov.uk/2018/08/16/questions-and-answers-from-the-commission/
[12] Pantucci, Raffaello. "A View from the CT Foxhole: Neil Basu, Senior National Coordinator for Counterterrorism Policing in the United Kingdom." *CTC Sentinel*. 11.2(2018): 10-14.
[13] Cottee, Simon. "The Pre-Terrorists Among Us." *The Atlantic*. 27 October 2015. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/counterterrorism-prevention-britain-isis/412603/
[14] Hedayah Countering Violent Extremism. *Guidelines and Good Practices Developing National P/CVE Strategies and Action Plans*. September 2016. http://www.hedayahcenter.org/Admin/Content/File- 1792016192156.pdf, 8. UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. *Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task-Force*. https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy; The Prevention Project. *Communities First A Blueprint for Organizing and Sustaining a Global Movement Against Violent Extremism*. December 2016. http://www.organizingagainstve.org/wp- content/uploads/2016/12 Communities_First_December_2016.pdf; Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. *OSCE Charter on Preventing and Combating Terrorism*. 7 December 2002. http://www.osce.org/de/mc/42538
[15] Patel, Faiza and Megan Koushik. *Countering Violent Extremism*. Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 2017; Brennan Center. *Countering Violent Extremism (CVE): A Resource Page*. https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/cve-programs-resource-page

On the ground, CVE policies have played out differently, not only between countries but sub-nationally,[16] even where local governments and police operate under the same central government policy frameworks and with similar threat-levels and resources. Some localities take on counter-extremism policies with enthusiasm, investing heavily in community engagement and intervention mechanisms. In other cases, cities opt out of delivering CVE policies, essentially avoiding policy delivery. The reactions of Muslim minority communities targeted by these strategies in different cities are equally mixed. In some instances, many community members actively engage with CVE policies, taking part in grassroots programs and sharing relevant information with police.[17] In many other cases, communities avoid engagement with CVE efforts or actively oppose these programs.[18] Why do some cities deliver counter-terrorism policies, while others choose not to? Why are some city-level communities willing to cooperate with these admittedly controversial efforts, while others avoid them entirely?

Both the policy[19] and academic literature[20] acknowledge the importance of citizens in preventing terrorism. For instance, Kurzman finds that tips from Muslim Americans represented "the largest single source of initial information"[21] used to disrupt domestic terror plots. Gill, Horgan, and Deckert examine a sub-sample of lone-actor terrorists and find that "in 64% of cases, family and friends were aware of the individual's intent to engage in a terrorism-related activity because the offender verbally told them."[22] Despite this recognition of the importance of citizen cooperation, there has been minimal research

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[16] Lowndes, Vivien, and Leila Thorp. "Preventing violent extremism—why local context matters." in *The New Extremism in 21st Century Britain*, ed. by Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin. Abingdon: Routledge, 2010, 123-141; O'Toole, Therese, et al. "Governing through Prevent? Regulation and Contested Practice in State–Muslim Engagement." *Sociology*. 50.1(2015), 1–18.
[17] Innes, Martin et al. *Assessing the Effects of Prevent Policing: A Report to the Association of Chief Police Officers*. University Police Science Institute: Cardiff University, March 2011, 4-5.
[18] See for instance:"Report: Muslims avoiding UK anti-radicalisation scheme." *Al Jazeera*. 26 December 2015. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/report-muslims-avoiding-uk-anti-terror-spy-programme-151226161427606.html
[19] Beutel, Alejandro J. *Community-led approaches to Countering Violent Extremism in the United States*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. 30 May 2015. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/05/30/community-led-approaches-to-countering-violent-extremism-in-the-united-states/; Rosand, Eric. "Investing in prevention: An ounce of CVE or a pound of counterterrorism?" *Lawfare*. 6 May 2016. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/05/06/investing-in-prevention-an-ounce-of-cve-or-a-pound-of-counterterrorism/
[20] Cronin, Audrey Kurth. *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009; Williams, Michael, John Horgan, and William Evans. "The critical role of friends in networks for countering violent extremism: toward a theory of vicarious help- seeking." *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 8.1(2016): 45-65.
[21] Kurzman, Charles. *Muslim-American Terrorism Since 9/11: An Accounting. Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security*. 2 February 2011. http://kurzman.unc.edu/files/2011/06/Kurzman_MuslimAmerican_Terrorism_Since_911_An_Accounting.pdf
[22] Gill, Paul, John Horgan, and Paige Deckert. "Bombing alone: Tracing the motivations and antecedent behaviors of lone-actor terrorists." *Journal of forensic sciences* 59.2 (2014), 433.

identifying the specific mechanisms that explain community involvement.[23] Existing research measures the expected willingness of individuals to report concerns to police via surveys[24] but does not explain sub-national differences in community cooperation in counter-terrorism over time. As I show, participation varies not only between individuals but systematically between communities bounded by locality—suggesting the presence of other mechanisms that shape how citizens choose to engage with the state on counter-terrorism.

Existing Explanations from the Literature

The counter-insurgency literature provides frameworks to understand the conditions under which communities will lend support to the state.[25] This dynamic is often characterized in terms of a competition between insurgent groups and the state, with communities loyal to the group that can best ensure their safety and provide public goods.[26] But radical groups like Al Muhajiroun (ALM) that have posed such concern to the UK government bear less resemblance to traditional insurgent groups. While some ALM members have become involved in terrorism, most do not, and the group's actions are not a routine threat to public safety.[27] Also, unlike traditional insurgent groups, many of the extremist groups whose messages CVE efforts are focused on challenging do not compete with the state by providing public goods. Their main contribution is the sense of meaning and belonging they provide to their

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[23] For examples of research in this area, see: Spalek, Basia. "Community Policing, Trust and Muslim Communities in Relation to 'New Terrorism.'" *Politics & Policy* 38.4(2010), 789–815; Huq, A., T. Tyler, and S. Schulhofer. "Mechanisms for Eliciting Cooperation in Counter Terrorism Policing: Evidence from the United Kingdom." *Journal of Empirical Legal Studies* 8.4 (2011): 728–61; Gillum, Rachel M. *Muslims in a Post-9/11 America: A Survey of Attitudes and Beliefs and Their Implications for U.S. National Security Policy*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2018.

[24] Huq, A., T. Tyler, and S. Schulhofer. "Mechanisms for Eliciting Cooperation in Counter Terrorism Policing: Evidence from the United Kingdom." *Journal of Empirical Legal Studies* 8.4 (2011): 728–61; Williams, Michael J., John G. Horgan, and William P. Evans. "The critical role of friends in networks for countering violent extremism: toward a theory of vicarious help- seeking." *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 8.1 (2016): 45-65.

[25] See literature review in: Berman, Eli, and Aila M. Matanock. "The empiricists' insurgency." *Annual Review of Political Science* 18 (2015): 443-464; O'Hanlon, Michael, and Bruce Riedel. "Plan A-Minus for Afghanistan." *The Washington Quarterly* 34.1 (2011): 123-132.

[26] Popkin, Samuel. *The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979; Berman, Eli, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Joseph H. Felter. "Can hearts and minds be bought? The economics of counterinsurgency in Iraq." *Journal of Political Economy* 119.4 (2011): 766-819; Kalyvas, Stathis N. *The logic of violence in civil war*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006; Berman, Eli, and Aila M. Matanock. "The empiricists' insurgency." *Annual Review of Political Science* 18 (2015): 443-464.

[27] Yeginsu, Ceylan. "One of U.K.'s Most Prolific Extremist Cells Is Regrouping." *The New York Times*. 18 May 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/18/world/europe/uk-extremist-cell-anjem-choudary.html; Kenney, Michael. *The Islamic State in Britain: Radicalization and Resilience in an Activist Network*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018, 25.

followers—intangibles governments are ill-equipped to provide their citizens. Thus, while I draw on this literature, the frameworks used to analyze civilian responses in counter-insurgency settings can only travel so far when it comes to explaining citizen participation in domestic counter-extremism efforts.

Another school of thought is that governments invest in counter-terrorism in line with the level of threats.[28] Areas with higher threat levels, the thinking goes, will invest more in delivering counter-terrorism programming, and we might extrapolate that they will manage higher levels of community participation in the long term. But local counter-extremism outcomes do not appear to vary in relation to local threat levels. In UK cities with the same level of central government threat designation, I find that local bureaucrats and communities responded differently to CVE agendas, ranging from mutual collaboration to policy evasion. In a number of cases, I also observe that community involvement in CVE programs appeared to be minimally impacted by the so-called Islamic State's efforts to recruit citizens from these same communities. If the outcomes of CVE policies are a reflection of threats, we would expect these developments to produce significant community mobilization.

Other scholars point to the role of trust in police and police fairness in dictating whether communities will ultimately feel comfortable to cooperate with their police around counter-terrorism.[29] While policing approaches are obviously important, I find less evidence of a linear relationship between trust in police and participation in CVE programs. For one, I observe that community participation in CVE programs is often low, even where civil society leaders describe a good rapport with local law enforcement. Community participation also changes over time in a number of cities, appearing to become more limited when local policing practices and views about the police are relatively similar over time.

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[28] Davis, Lois et al. Combating Terrorism: How Prepared Are State and Local Response Organizations? Santa Monica: RAND, 2006.

[29] Gillum, Rachel M. *Muslims in a Post-9/11 America: A Survey of Attitudes and Beliefs and Their Implications for US National Security Policy*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2018; Huq, Aziz., Tom Tyler, and Stephen Schulhofer. "Mechanisms for Eliciting Cooperation in Counter Terrorism Policing: Evidence from the United Kingdom." *Journal of Empirical Legal Studies* 8.4 (2011): 728–61.

A final approach centers around the socio-economic features of minority communities to explain how members of the public and law enforcement interact.[30] One might extrapolate from this scholarship that better integrated, more economically affluent minority communities will be more likely to lend voluntary cooperation to police on counter-terrorism. However, my findings also cast doubt on these types of claims. In cities where Muslim communities live in some of the most deprived neighborhoods in the UK, I find that CVE agendas play out differently—in some cases governments enthusiastically deliver these policies and maintain some level of community participation, in others, participation proves almost impossible for governments to sustain. In a number of cases, policy outcomes change over time—even when these socio-economic variables are held constant. In the US, where Muslim communities are, on the whole, more affluent than in the UK, policy responses also varied between cities and in individual locations over time, suggesting the presence of other mechanisms.

In short, we lack a ready-made theory to explain variation in the local outcomes of counter-extremism policies. The local dimensions of CVE agendas have received a lack of theoretical attention so far, despite the fact that the importance of community participation in counter-terrorism is frequently reiterated and these policies have rapidly expanded internationally. My dissertation aims to provide a new theory to explain how and why local actors respond in divergent ways to the imposition of CVE policies.

The Argument in Brief

I argue that the structure of local Muslim civic networks before the introduction of CVE programs shapes how local actors ultimately respond to CVE agendas. I start with the claim that CVE policies create steep trade-offs for Muslim civil society leaders and elected officials, whom I call *Muslim elites*,[31]

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[30] Soss, Joe, and Vesla Weaver. "Police are our government: Politics, political science, and the policing of race–class subjugated communities." *Annual Review of Political Science* 20 (2017): 565-591; Leiken, Robert S. "Europe's Angry Muslims." *Foreign Affairs*. July/August 2005. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2005-07-01/europes-angry-muslims; Pincus, Walter. "Don't Ignore Western Europe, Terrorism Expert Warns U.S." *Washington Post*. 8 September 2005. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2005/09/08/dont-ignore-western-europe-terrorism-expert-warns-us/b33da18c-19c3-4279-951e-8bb0a255b164/

[31] I use the term Muslim elites as a shorthand to refer to local elected leaders and civil society leaders who are themselves Muslims in a given locality, but I recognize that the actual nature of local leadership is highly diverse and often actively contested. I discuss these dynamics more thoroughly in later chapters.

often placing these individuals under pressure from both communities and local government. In deciding whether to support the local state's CVE efforts, I anticipate that many elites are likely to make a two-sided calculus about what benefits they can access from the state compared to the anticipated risks. In the story I tell, Muslim elites are likely to have distinct motivations from other co-religionists. On the one hand, Muslim leaders have many reasons to be skeptical about CVE programs, which are often perceived as a threat to civil liberties and an over-reach into private, religious affairs. At the same time, these leaders may be motivated to signal support for state security efforts, to maintain relationships with key government decisionmakers, and to access resources to fund their community work.

I make the argument that policy benefits associated with CVE agendas are likely to be especially compelling for leaders that have survived on state resources in the past and where leaders already maintain connections to key government decisionmakers before the introduction of these programs. These pre-existing connections should enable community leaders to more easily access policy incentives. By cooperating with CVE programs, elites may be able to access earmarked funding for their organizations and new advisory roles, bolstering their financial and political capital. However, I also anticipate that cooperating on contentious CVE agendas risks what I call *reputational damage* from other elites or public opposition movements. Reputational damage refers to public criticism and damage to a leader's public support. I anticipate that elites will formally cooperate with CVE programs by accepting program funding and partnering with the local state on these initiatives where policy benefits outweigh anticipated costs.

I argue that the impact of elite responses on local policy outcomes is determined by the position of Muslim elites within their wider social networks vis-à-vis the local state and co-religionists. CVE programs are contentious and involve new (often highly sensitive) responsibilities for local governments and police. I anticipate that local bureaucrats will be hesitant to embed counter-extremism programs without assistance from community leaders to facilitate community engagement and design local programming. Collaboration from well-known community leaders enables bureaucrats to more easily manage the delivery of CVE agendas, in effect relieving local government from the risks of going at CVE policy alone.

Where Muslim elites are willing to cooperate with CVE programs and maintain pre-existing connections to local government, via what I call *elite-state linkages*, I expect that police and local government will be more willing to invest in CVE strategies. By contrast, where well-connected elites withhold support or are disconnected from local government before the introduction of CVE policies, I anticipate that bureaucrats will be more reluctant to invest in these policies. Conceptually, this investment refers to the extent that state actors deliver community engagement efforts and establish individual-level intervention procedures. In these cases, local bureaucrats are likelier to assess the risks and challenges of delivering CVE without collaboration from grassroots leadership and adopt a cautious approach—barely delivering the strategy or steering clear of any connection to counter-terrorism objectives. These cities may eventually rollout the core components of CVE strategies if they face adoption pressure from the central government, but policy development is likely to trail behind their neighbors.

Muslim elites can also influence wider community members, but I argue that their impact is derived from their network position both in relation to other elites (what I call *inter-elite linkages*) and *elite-mass linkages*, which I define as the ties between elites and co-religionists. I claim that well-connected community leaders that maintain numerous connections across the network will be more able to influence other community members to participate in CVE, convening together local constituencies at counter-extremism programs or potentially serving as a strategically located point of contact to pass relevant concerns to the police. By *participation*, I refer to the extent that community members attend CVE programs and the degree to which they provide information to the police or express a willingness to do so in the future. Where Muslim elites back CVE but are not well embedded in local networks, I anticipate that they will have less traction when it comes to motivating members of the public to engage with counter-extremism strategies.

These local responses are not set in stone. Local actors may change their responses to CVE agendas when the risks of reputational damage increase or policy incentives diminish. This is especially likely when governments modify CVE policies, making CVE activities more punitive and harder to endorse. I argue that network dynamics also shape the types of risks Muslim elites face in the long term and, ultimately, whether they are able to cooperate with controversial CVE agendas over time. In networks with higher

levels of inter-elite competition or where elites are less connected to members of the public, leaders that cooperate with counter-extremism strategies are more likely to face growing reputational damage either from long-time rivals or from public opposition movements that can exploit gaps in the network to rally members of the public. In the face of these costs, elites are likelier to disengage from CVE programs. By contrast, in networks with lower levels of inter-elite competition and where leaders are highly connected to co-religionists, elites are likelier to face lower levels of reputational damage, which should enable many civil society leaders to remain cooperative with CVE agendas over time. In effect, I argue that highly connected networks serve a protective function that limits public opposition movements from emerging to challenge community leaders, while low levels of inter-elite competition mitigate against reputational damage from other leaders.

Why is this surprising? The power of local civic networks to shape how CVE policies operate on the ground challenges existing explanations that are thought to hold more salience in the literature, like the level of terror threats, local trust in police, or socio-economic factors. I now highlight how the theory I have constructed contributes to the existing literature.

Why Research Counter-Extremism Policies?

Theoretical Contribution

By developing a theory to explain local responses to state counter-extremism efforts, this dissertation speaks to the literature on local policing and counter-terrorism, two areas where scholars have acknowledged a lack of theoretical attention in the past.[32] As such, this dissertation sheds light on how controversial counter-extremism agendas impact the lives of citizens and the ways they engage with the local security apparatus.

[32] Byman, Daniel. "Counterterrorism Strategies." in *The Oxford Handbook of Terrorism,* ed. by Erica Chenoweth et al. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019; Soss, Joe, and Vesla Weaver. "Police are our government: Politics, political science, and the policing of race–class subjugated communities." *Annual Review of Political Science* 20 (2017): 565-591.

CVE programs represent a shift in the ways that governments manage the threat of terrorism, moving beyond traditional security measures to pre-emptive, ostensibly non-coercive strategies to dispel "terrorist ideologies specifically by tackling the causes of radicalization,"[33] in the words of the latest UK Counter-Terrorism strategy. Effectively, counter-extremism policies take counter-terrorism into the public domain, seeking out local community networks as allies.

A major contribution of this dissertation is to rigorously theorize these local community networks and understand the trade-offs CVE policies impose on local actors. I focus in particular on the role of Muslim elites, whom governments have sought out as intermediaries to guide policy development and facilitate community engagements. The public demand for "Muslim leaders" has expanded steadily with the growth of counter-terrorism efforts, yet these actors have received more minimal theoretical attention. This dissertation looks closely at the ways Muslim elites maintain positions of influence vis-a-vis the state and members of the public and ultimately how they experience CVE policies. This dissertation also enriches the often reductionist picture of "Muslim communities" presented in contemporary policy debates, by conceptualizing and measuring important structural differences in local Muslim civil society networks—in terms of the connections between co-religionists and the local state. I argue that these dynamics vary sub-nationally in measurable ways which help explain divergent local CVE policy outcomes.

Policy Insights

Community participation is definitional to the success of CVE programs, which are borne out of the acknowledgment that governments cannot prevent violent extremism alone.[34] As I have already explained, community tips are a vital intelligence source relied upon by government agencies to disrupt terror plots. Senior government officials repeatedly appeal directly to Muslim communities for

[33] HM Government. *CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism*. June 2018, 23. https://bit.ly/32OzsHY
[34] Thomas, Paul. "Changing experiences of responsibilities and contestation within counter-terrorism policies: the British Prevent experience." *Policy & Politics*. 45.3(2017), 305-321.

information.[35] Notably, Muslims in the US and the UK have tipped off law enforcement about individuals who later went on to commit acts of terrorism from New York bombing suspect Ahmad Khan Rahami[36] to the Manchester bomber Salman Abedi.[37]

Ultimately it is hard to know whether CVE programs "work" when it comes to dissuading individuals from committing acts of terrorism. There is much evidence to suggest that these policies have deleterious impacts and have worn down trust between Muslim communities and the state. Analyzing the policy effectiveness of these programs vis-à-vis broader counter-terrorism objectives is outside the scope of this project because I am limited from observing and evaluating government intervention efforts. Still, this dissertation identifies the conditions under which communities are likely to be more willing to cooperate with CVE agendas on the ground. As such, it presents important, suggestive insights about how nascent and controversial CVE policies can be improved.

I find suggestive evidence that communities will be more likely to participate in CVE agendas in lower competition networks, where elites are highly connected to co-religionists. Under these conditions, I expect that community leaders will be more willing to lend support to CVE agendas and actively help to facilitate community participation. By contrast, in cities with more inter-elite competition or where elites are loosely connected to members of the public, I anticipate that leaders will be more concerned about reputational damage, limiting their cooperation with CVE efforts over time. State actors are likely to then struggle to facilitate community participation without the support of civic partners.

But my goal is not to claim that governments are simply fated to accept policy outcomes based on longstanding network dynamics. Rather, my dissertation provides suggestive evidence about the ways that governments could improve counter-extremism strategies, specifically by addressing some of the most

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[35] Mulholland, Hélène. "Blears calls for local help to combat Muslim extremism." *The Guardian*. 31 October 2007. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2007/oct/31/uksecurity.terrorism; Fisher, William. "The Spies Who Came in from the Mosque." *Huffington Post*. 25 May 2011. https://bit.ly/2Z28b68

[36] Ackerman, Spencer, Paul Owen, and Amber Jamieson. "Ahmad Khan Rahami's father contacted FBI in 2014 over terrorism worry." *The Guardian*. 20 September 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/sep/20/ahmad-khan-rahami-father-fbi-terrorism-bombing

[37] Mendick, Robert et al. "Security services missed five opportunities to stop the Manchester bomber." *The Telegraph*. 6 June 2017. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/24/security-services-missed-five-opportunities-stop-manchester/

common policy concerns local actors surfaced throughout this research. These potential policy modifications are detailed further in the conclusion, but I summarize them here:

First, local actors should be able to pursue policy alternatives to CVE. My findings suggest that security priorities may be better served by giving local governments and communities the freedom to reject state CVE programs in order to identify other violence-prevention methods that maintain the support of key local stakeholders. Second, governments should provide less restrictive financial incentives as part of CVE programs. Rather than imposing narrow central government guidance about funding, it may be more useful for local governments and civil society leaders to designate funding in alignment with local priorities together, while also being transparent with service-users about the sources of financing.

Third, governments may be undermining policy objectives and key allies by insisting on promoting their counter-extremism activities. My aim is not to advocate that governments be secretive about CVE programs or the distribution of CVE funding. But rather that policymakers should recognize that the national spotlight may not always be conducive to the types of highly sensitive and inter-personal work involved in countering extremism by definition. These findings echo those of Krebs and Chowdhury who have examined the role of "moderates" in counter-terrorism.[38] Although they derive their conclusions in vastly different contexts from those examined here, they make similar claims that governments may be better able to mobilize "moderate" voices by operating at a distance from—or even criticizing—these individuals.

Finally, I argue that members of the public make decisions about whether they will participate in counter-extremism efforts based on networks of trust between citizens, civil society, and the state. But the research points to the fact that local CVE programs do not operate in a vacuum. Civil society organizations and leaders often sustain their ties to the state and members of the public through access to

[38] Chowdhury, Arjun, and Ronald R. Krebs. "Making and mobilizing moderates: Rhetorical strategy, political networks, and counterterrorism." *Security Studies* 18.3 (2009): 371-399.

government funding. Austerity measures can break down these networks and ultimately the avenues that made it possible for citizens to engage with counter-extremism programs.

Some readers may feel that focusing on Muslim communities and their involvement in counter-extremism agendas unfairly legitimizes state scrutiny on local Muslim minorities and somehow suggests that Muslim citizens are obligated to "do more" to support government counter-terrorism objectives. My intention is not to advocate for the current design of CVE programs or defend the targeting of Muslim citizens. There is much evidence to suggest that these tactics are counter-productive. Rather than arguing that Muslim citizens are further obligated to assist the state, one of the main conclusions of this dissertation is that counter-extremism policies impose trade-offs for Muslim civil society leaders and citizens that should be acknowledged by state actors.

I focus on Muslim communities in this dissertation because governments themselves have structured their CVE programming in this way.[39] Despite the problems associated with CVE agendas, I make the claim that understanding how CVE policies operate in practice is worthy of academic inquiry, especially as these strategies become an increasingly important part of government counter-terrorism efforts and are modified to more aggressively address the far-right. This dissertation points to a number of variables that have received less attention in existing policy debates, suggesting new ways to understand and potentially improve state security efforts in ways that prioritize local interests and give greater autonomy to local actors.

[39] Though I am interested in how governments will engage communities in order to prevent far-right inspired terrorism, these efforts are at such a nascent phase that I would be limited in the type of data I could gather on the ground. In fact, in the US, such engagements that address far-right violent extremism have been explicitly discouraged by senior American policymakers in the Trump Administration.

Empirical Approach

Studying the ways that CVE policies work in practice and interact with local citizens presents a number of challenges. For one, many basic details about CVE programs remain concealed from public view,[40] making it hard to map the evolution of state activities on the ground over time. Understanding the ways citizens actually relate to CVE agendas in practice and why this takes particular forms presents further complexities. By design, these policies impact only a fractional part of the wider population, and when they do, the nature of these engagements is often highly sensitive, making it impossible to ascertain why specific individuals provided particular information to the state or chose to attend CVE programs. To deal with these challenges, I use a range of approaches that together allow me to isolate causal mechanisms that I argue drive local, community-level responses.

I focus on counter-extremism policies in six locations across two countries, the United Kingdom and the United States. These comparative case studies allow me to hold constant several potentially confounding variables because cities operate under the same central government guidance with similar allocated funding from the central government, and they often experience similar terror threat levels. I ground my study in four highly similar UK cities, where CVE outcomes vary from one another and also change over time. The combination of within-case and cross-case variation provides multiple opportunities to identify and test the causal mechanisms. In each case, I use a combination of archival research, social network analysis, and interviews to establish a clear chain of events, understand the motivations behind key actors, and test alternative explanations. The core evidence I draw upon within the case studies is the 139 interviews I conducted with local actors, providing a rare, primary account of CVE programs in these locations over time.

I focus heavily on Prevent, the UK's counter-extremism strategy, as the policy was one of the earliest national CVE programs and is considered a model for other countries. The UK cases thus provide a

[40] Warrell, Helen. "Inside Prevent, the UK's controversial anti-terrorism programme." *Financial Times*. 24 January 2019. https://www.ft.com/content/a82e18b4-1ea3-11e9-b126-46fc3ad87c65; Ramesh, Randeep. "Anti-terror strategy is seen as intrusive and secretive by many Muslims." *The Guardian*. 9 March 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/mar/09/government-terrorism-strategy-criticised-spying-muslims

longer time span to test my theory in comparison to other countries, where counter-extremism policies are at a more nascent phase. This also provides the added advantage that my findings can more easily travel to other localities where similar policies are being rolled out, building from the framework developed in the UK.

The US cases provide additional external validity for the theory developed in the UK—showing how network dynamics drive policy outcomes in a significantly different context. By tracing the local trajectories of counter-extremism delivery in two country cases across six locations over time, I can be more confident that the theory I have developed can explain a wider range of cases. While I am interested in the highly local level causal mechanisms within the six US and UK cities, I expect that the theory should explain the dynamics of counter-extremism implementation in other democracies delivering similar policies.

Plan of Dissertation

This dissertation proceeds as follows. I begin in Chapter Two with a background on the evolution of CVE policies in the US and the UK and engage with the critical literature about counter-extremism programs. Chapter Three reviews the theoretical literature and lays out a framework to explain divergent responses from local actors to CVE programs, before highlighting several, key hypotheses and this dissertation's major theoretical contributions. In Chapter Four, I detail the methodologies I use to test the theory over time in six cases.

Chapter Five begins the case studies where I compare two highly similar cities in the East Midlands of England: Derby and Leicester. In both cities, elites with pre-existing ties to the state were well-positioned to access policy incentives associated with Prevent, initially without concerns about reputational damage in lower competition networks. Cooperation from elites in turn enabled state actors to invest more in the Prevent agenda in both cities. Despite concerns about the nascent counter-extremism agenda, Muslim elites in both cities used pre-existing connections to co-religionists to mobilize higher levels of community participation in the initial iteration of the Prevent strategy.

Over time in Derby, network gaps between elites and members of the public eased the ability of policy opponents to mobilize and inflict reputational damage against community leaders. These threats combined with new central government policy restrictions led a number of Muslim elites to limit their engagement with counter-extremism efforts moving forward. With more limited cooperation from civil society leadership, state actors then struggled to sustain community participation as they had done before. In Leicester, by contrast, Muslim elites were better protected from reputational damage by tighter elite-mass connections that limited the emergence of opposition groups, enabling many civil society leaders to remain cooperative with the state's security agenda. Drawing on support from these leaders, state actors continued to facilitate a degree of community participation in Prevent efforts over time.

In Chapter Six, I compare how Prevent programs play out in Slough and High Wycombe, another pair of English cities. In the initial iteration of Prevent in High Wycombe, Muslim elites with pre-existing connections to the state lent some support to the state's counter-extremism agenda, but there was a higher degree of caution about the new strategy among some civil society leaders in ways that appeared to reflect longstanding network competition. Limitations on elite cooperation led state actors to invest more minimally in local Prevent agendas, focusing narrowly on cohesion objectives. Despite concerns about Prevent I, a few Muslim civil society leaders used established network connections to co-religionists to mobilize some participation, though less than in the East Midlands cases. After the policy revision of Prevent in 2011, most Muslim civil society leaders limited their involvement with Prevent agendas moving forward, due to aggressive central government policy reforms. There were continued concerns about anticipated reputational damage in the city's more competitive network. State actors then struggled to facilitate community involvement, which effectively slowed to a halt in High Wycombe.

In Slough's more disconnected network, elite-state ties were the most underdeveloped of the four UK cases. Many Muslim elites lacked ties to state decisionmakers to capitalize on policy incentives associated with Prevent. There were also concerns about anticipated reputational damage from policy opposition groups that had maintained a longstanding network presence. These dynamics led much of the city's civic leadership to limit their involvement with Prevent. State actors recognized the political risks associated with Prevent agendas and invested less in counter-extremism programs, producing little in the

way of policy activity or community participation. Amidst growing top-down pressure on local governments, state actors built some ties directly with Muslim publics, navigating around the more disconnected network to facilitate some community participation over time, without relying heavily on community leaders as intermediaries.

In Chapter Seven, I test the theory developed in the United Kingdom in the United States, comparing two "pilot cities" of the US CVE strategy. I show how, despite the very different national and sub-national contexts, network dynamics over other factors drive how local actors respond to the CVE agendas in Boston and Los Angeles. Mobilized opposition groups in Boston with pre-existing connections to the most prominent civil society organizations in the city quickly dissuaded centrally positioned Muslim elites from taking part in CVE agendas, in turn discouraging state actors from investing heavily in CVE programs. In Los Angeles, a number of Muslim elites were more willing to take part in CVE agendas at the outset, based on longstanding elite-state ties and delays in the mobilization of local opposition, enabling state actors to plan for a more extensive CVE program. Only later, after the mobilization of local and national opposition after the Trump administration, did these aspirations for a city-wide CVE program break down. Having outlined CVE programs across six locations in two countries over time, I consider potential policy implications of the dissertation in the final chapter.

Chapter 2 Background

The purpose of this chapter is to situate countering violent extremism policies in the context of post 9/11 counter-terrorism and the evolution of community policing. My goal is not to exhaustively detail various policy developments, rather to show how CVE policies operate at the crux of different strands of governance that impose new pressures on British and American Muslim communities. I go on to highlight relevant similarities and differences between American and British Muslim communities before presenting key debates around CVE agendas by reviewing the extensive critical literature.

The Evolution of US and UK Counter-Terrorism

The UK has a more extensive history of domestic counter-terrorism efforts than the US. Of particular relevance to the development of CVE programs, counter-terrorism efforts in Northern Ireland relied on community cooperation and intelligence,[41] in ways that inspired later counter-extremism efforts.[42] In both countries, counter-terrorism efforts substantially expanded after September 2001 and the July 2005 bombings in London. I highlight major policy developments before discussing two key themes—the role of human intelligence and the concept of radicalization—that inform the development of CVE programs.

In the US, the post 9/11 focus on counter-terrorism catalyzed significant institutional and legal changes, from the creation of new, federal agencies to the expansion of policing powers[43] to prohibitions on the provision of "material support" to terrorist groups.[44] Similarly, in the UK, legislation from the early 2000s broadened the definition of terrorism and granted new powers to police, such as the power to stop and

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[41] McGovern, Mark and Angela Tobin. *Countering Terror or Counter-Productive?: Comparing Irish and British Muslim Experiences of Counter-insurgency Law and Policy*. Ormskirk: Edge Hill University, 2010; Kirk-Smith, Michael and James Dingley. "Countering terrorism in Northern Ireland: The role of intelligence." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 20.3-4 (2009): 551-573; Pantazis, Christina, and Simon Pemberton. "From the 'Old' to the 'New' Suspect Community: Examining the Impacts of Recent UK Counter-Terrorist Legislation." *The British Journal of Criminology* 49.5 (2009): 646-666.

[42] Jackson, Richard. "Counter-terrorism and communities: an interview with Robert Lambert." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 1.2(2008): 293–308.

[43] Rosenbach, Eric and Aki J. Peritz. *The USA-PATRIOT Act: Confrontation or Collaboration? Congress and the Intelligence Community*. July 2009. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/usa-patriot-act

[44] Rosenbach, Eric and Aki J. Peritz. *The USA-PATRIOT Act: Confrontation or Collaboration? Congress and the Intelligence Community*. July 2009. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/usa-patriot-act

search individuals suspected of terrorism[45] and detain suspected terrorists, through the use of so-called "control orders,"[46] or later "Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures."[47] To advance national anti-terrorism efforts, the UK introduced its first comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST,[48] in 2003 to coordinate national responses to the threat of terrorism. Like the US, terrorist attacks in the early 2000s motivated new resourcing and an influx of personnel into organizations like MI5 and GCHQ,[49] and later, the creation of the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism in the Home Office, out of which the Prevent strategy is now delivered.

Counter-terrorism approaches have evolved significantly over time, but the role of human intelligence and ideas around the role of radicalization in motivating terrorism have maintained salience in policy debates. These concepts have undergirded the logic of counter-extremism programs—not without controversy—and I unpack them in the section that follows.

Human Intelligence

Despite the growth of intelligence capacity in both countries, information provided by members of the public has continued to play a central role in government counter-terrorism efforts. [50] Tips from Muslim communities are among "the largest single source of initial information"[51] used to disrupt terror plots in the US. Governments have made sustained efforts to mobilize the public's cooperation with counter-terrorism efforts via campaigns such as the US Department of Homeland Security's "If You See Something, Say Something"[52] and the UK Home Office's "Communities defeat terrorism."[53] However,

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[45] Parliament of the United Kingdom. *Terrorism Act 2000*.
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/pdfs/ukpga_20000011_en.pdf Accessed 17 February 2020.
[46] Parliament of the United Kingdom. *Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005*.
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/2/pdfs/ukpga_20050002_en.pdf Accessed 17 February 2020.
[47] Parliament of the United Kingdom. *Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011*.
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/23/pdfs/ukpga_20110023_en.pdf Accessed 17 February 2020.
[48] CONTEST consists of four workstreams: Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and Prepare.
[49] Norton-Taylor, Richard and Nick Hopkins. "How the shock of 9/11 made MI5 stronger." *The Guardian*. 7 September 2011.
https:/www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/07/911-spy-agencies-expansion
[50] Rimington, Stella. "'Humint' Begins at Home." *Wall Street Journal*. 3 January 2005.
[51] Kurzman, Charles. *Muslim-American terrorism since 9/11: An Accounting*. Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland. 2 February 2011. http://kurzman.unc.edu/files/2011/06/Kurzman_Muslim-American_Terrorism_Since_911_An_Accounting.pdf
[52] Department of Homeland Security. *If You See Something, Say Something*. https://www.dhs.gov/see-something-say-something Accessed 17 February 2020.
[53] Gov.UK. *New Communities Defeat Terrorism campaign launched*. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-communities-defeat-terrorism-campaign-launched Accessed 17 February 2020.

citizens maintain understandable suspicions about sharing intelligence with law enforcement because of a history of government surveillance and punitive policing, particularly within Muslim communities, as I describe later in this chapter. As then FBI Director Robert Mueller explained, "Oftentimes, the communities from which we need the most help are those who trust us the least. But it is in these communities that we ... must redouble our efforts."[54] It is clear that despite enormous innovations and changes in the way that governments have fought terrorism, community cooperation remains central to evolving counter-terrorism policy.

Radicalization

Alongside the evolution of counter-terrorism policy, interest in the concept of radicalization has also grown. Peter Neumann defines radicalization as "the process whereby people become extremists."[55] The concept of radicalization has been heavily criticized in the literature for lacking conceptual clarity[56] and empirical rigor.[57] The factors that lead to radicalization are also much debated, though radicalization is often conceptualized as a process caused by multiple factors.[58] The notion of a "conveyer belt" that turns extremists into terrorists has been especially salient[59] and receives significant criticism.[60]

Many scholars have critiqued the idea that extreme ideas and terrorist violence are connected.[61] As John Horgan has explained, "The idea that radicalization causes terrorism is perhaps the greatest myth alive today in terrorism research… the overwhelming majority of people who hold radical beliefs do not engage in violence. And second, there is increasing evidence that people who engage in terrorism don't

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[54] Fisher, William. "The Spies Who Came in from the Mosque." *Huffington Post*. 25 May 2011. https://bit.ly/2Z28b68
[55] Neumann, Peter R. "The trouble with radicalization." *International affairs* 89.4 (2013): 873-893.
[56] Sedgwick, Mark. "The concept of radicalization as a source of confusion." *Terrorism and political violence* 22.4 (2010): 479-494.
[57] Githens-Mazer, Jonathan, and Robert Lambert. "Why conventional wisdom on radicalization fails: the persistence of a failed discourse." *International Affairs* 86.4 (2010), 889.
[58] Neumann, Peter R. "The trouble with radicalization." *International affairs* 89.4 (2013), 874.
[59] Baran, Zeyno. "Fighting the War of Ideas." *Foreign Affairs*. November/December 2005. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2005-10-01/fighting-war-ideas
[60] Hasan, Mehdi. "So, prime minister, are we to call you an extremist now?" *The Guardian*. 9 June 2011. https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2011/jun/09/cameron-counter-terror-muslims
[61] Richards, Anthony. "From terrorism to 'radicalization' to 'extremism': counterterrorism imperative or loss of focus?" *International Affairs* 91.2 (2015): 371-380.

necessarily hold radical beliefs."[62] However, Peter Neumann highlights the numerous documented instances where ideology was a significant factor in motivating individuals to carry out acts of terrorism.[63]

Despite its controversies, what is clear is that radicalization as a concept motivates how governments understand and deliver counter-terrorism. Radicalization is repeatedly cited in government documents, structuring the ways policymakers design policy interventions.[64] Indeed, existing understandings of radicalization appear to have motivated some of the most troubling counter-terrorism tactics, such as the FBI's use of entrapment techniques.[65] CVE efforts such as individual-level interventions with those deemed "at-risk" and the dissemination of counter-messages to broader audiences reflect the logic of radicalization discourses.

Local Policing

Countering violent extremism also builds on the controversial legacy of community policing. In this section, I highlight some of the most important community policing dynamics with relevance for counter-extremism programs: the role of partnerships and a shift toward interventionist policing, the history of police scrutiny of minority communities, and finally, the growing role of local police in counter-terrorism.

Community Policing

Community policing (CP) has been widely promoted by law enforcement in the US and the UK since the 1990s. As Brogden and Nijhar write, community policing has been "the buzzword in Anglo-American policing for the last two decades."[66] Community policing suffers a lack of conceptual clarity but the

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[62] Knefel, John. "Everything You've Been Told About Radicalization Is Wrong." *Rolling Stone*. 6 May 2013. https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/everything-youve-been-told-about-radicalization-is-wrong-80445/
[63] Neumann, Peter R. "The trouble with radicalization." *International affairs* 89.4 (2013), 880.
[64] Silber, Mitchell D. and Arvin Bhatt. *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat*. New York Police Department. https://seths.blog/wp-content/uploads/2007/09/NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf; HM Government. *Prevent Strategy*. 2011. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf
[65] Neumann, Peter R. "The trouble with radicalization." *International Affairs* 89.4 (2013): 873-893; Brill, Steven. "Is America Any Safer?" *The Atlantic*. September 2016. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/09/are-we-any-safer/492761/
[66] Brogden, Mike and Preeti Nijhar. *Community Policing*. New York: Routledge, 2013, 1.

United States Department of Justice defines it as: "a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies which support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques, to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime."[67] On the ground, community policing is often delivered with varied implementation quality and minimal institutional commitment,[68] though the idea remains salient.

There is evidence that community policing increases public satisfaction with police,[69] though there is a persistent debate about the extent to which community policing reduces crime. Community policing has also faced sustained criticism for scrutinizing disadvantaged communities, with some arguing that public resources dedicated to policing would be better spent on public infrastructure development.[70] The literature has also shown that partnerships within community policing can prove problematic in practice with law enforcement at times unwilling to treat citizens as equal partners or exchange information with citizens.[71] In the UK, in particular, concerns about policing have grown amidst aggressive austerity cuts both to policing and other social services, resulting in reductions in policing capacity and the types of engagement and partnership building activities associated with community policing.[72]

Parallel to the evolution of community policing, the focus of policing activities has also shifted toward a wider range of prevention-oriented activities,[73] which has resulted in police taking on roles outside the

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[67] Office of Community Oriented Policing Services US Department of Justice. *Community Policing Defined.* 2009. https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=248881

[68] Cordner, Gary. "Community Policing" in *The Oxford Handbook of Police and Policing,* ed. by Michael D. Reisig and Robert J. Kane. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 149.

[69] Gill, Charlotte, et al. "Community-oriented policing to reduce crime, disorder and fear and increase satisfaction and legitimacy among citizens: A systematic review." *Journal of experimental criminology* 10.4 (2014): 399-428; Weine, Stevan. "How Local Law Enforcement Uses Community Policing to Combat Terrorism." *Lawfare.* 19 February 2017. https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-local-law-enforcement-uses-community-policing-combat-terrorism

[70] Purnell, Derecka and Marbre Stahly-Butts. "The Police Can't Solve the Problem. They Are the Problem." *New York Times.* 26 September 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/26/opinion/the-police-cant-solve-the-problem-they-are-the-problem.html

[71] Andy Myhill, *Community Engagement in Policing: Lessons from the Literature.* National Policing Improvement Agency, 2012, 69-70.

[72] Mueller, Benjamin. "Fewer Officers, More Calls: U.K. Police Are Stretched by Austerity." *New York Times.* 1 February 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/01/world/europe/uk-police-crime-austerity.html; Dearden, Lizzie. "'Bobbies on the beat' being eradicated by police cuts, government warned." *The Independent.* 13 February 2019. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/police-cuts-uk-budget-crime-rise-neighbourhood-austerity-federation-survey-a8775826.html

[73] Crawford, Adam. "Networked governance and the post-regulatory state? Steering, rowing and anchoring the provision of policing and security." *Theoretical Criminology* 10.4 (2006): 449-479; Soss, Joe and Vesla Weaver. "Police are our government: Politics, political science, and the policing of race–class subjugated communities." *Annual Review of Political Science* 20 (2017), 573.

scope of traditional policing,[74] at times overlapping with social service providers to emerge as "urban problem solvers."[75] This mission creep has been acknowledged by law enforcement authorities themselves.[76] The criminologist Lucia Zedner writes about this shift to what she calls "pre-crime," noting:

> "We are on the cusp of a shift from a post- to a pre-crime society, a society in which the possibility of forestalling risks competes with and even takes precedence over responding to wrongs done…the impact of 9/11, of the London bombings and the continuing threat of catastrophic risk has significantly increased the pressure on governments to think and act pre-emptively."[77]

Policing Minority Communities

Controversial CVE agendas build from the logic of partnerships that are central to community policing and the shift toward risk prevention. These policies also emerge out of a longer history of policing that has historically targeted minority communities. Police discrimination and the concentration of police powers within minority communities is well documented.[78] The literature has outlined how police over-scrutinize minority communities[79]—in the US, the highly salient "broken windows"[80] theory has energized greater focus on small offenses concentrated in minority communities.[81] Examples of police

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[74] Millie, Andrew. "The Policing Task and the Expansion (and Contraction) of British Policing." *Criminology & Criminal Justice* 13.2 (2013): 143-160; Soss, Joe, and Vesla Weaver. "Police are our government: Politics, political science, and the policing of race–class subjugated communities." *Annual Review of Political Science* 20 (2017).

[75] Soss, Joe, and Vesla Weaver. "Police are our government: Politics, political science, and the policing of race–class subjugated communities." *Annual Review of Political Science* 20 (2017), 572.

[76] Rowley, Mark. "Extremism and Terrorism: The need for a whole society response." *The Colin Cramphorn Memorial Lecture.* London, UK. 26 February 2018. https://policyexchange.org.uk/pxevents/the-colin-cramphorn-memorial-lecture-by-mark-rowley/

[77] Zedner, Lucia. "Pre-crime and post-criminology?" *Theoretical criminology* 11.2 (2007): 261-281.

[78] Dearden, Lizzie. "Metropolitan Police use force disproportionately against black people in London, new statistics reveal" *The Independent.* 1 August 2017. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/metropolitan-police-force-statistics-brutality-guns-tasers-black-people-disproportionate-ethnic-a7871811.html; Townsend, Mark. "Racial bias in police stop and search getting worse, report reveals." *The Guardian.* 13 October 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/law/2018/oct/13/racial-bias-police-stop-and-search-policy-black-people-report; Bui, Quoctrung and Amanda Cox "Surprising New Evidence Shows Bias in Police Use of Force but Not in Shootings." *New York Times.*11 July 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/12/upshot/surprising-new-evidence-shows-bias-in-police-use-of-force-but-not-in-shootings.html

[79] Soss, Joe, and Vesla Weaver. "Police are our government: Politics, political science, and the policing of race–class subjugated communities." *Annual Review of Political Science* 20 (2017), 573.

[80] Wilson, James Q., and George L. Kelling. "Broken Windows: The police and neighbourhood safety." *The Atlantic.* March 1982.

[81] Soss, Joe, and Vesla Weaver. "Police are our government: Politics, political science, and the policing of race–class subjugated communities." *Annual Review of Political Science* 20 (2017), 573.

abuses are too many to name from the beating of Rodney King[82] to policing in Ferguson[83] and the killing of Eric Garner by a New York city police officer in 2014.[84] England has its own history of police abuses against minorities,[85] which became a national focus during the Macpherson report and the acknowledgment of institutional racism in the Metropolitan Police.[86]

Muslim communities in both the US and the UK have been the focus of aggressive policing tactics. American Muslims have been victims of surveillance[87] and entrapment techniques,[88] while British Muslims have been targets of state scrutiny from police stop and searches to CCTV surveillance[89] in heavily Muslim neighborhoods. It is important to highlight that CVE agendas operate within this wider context of policing strategies that have targeted minority and particularly Muslim communities.

Community Policing and Counter-Terrorism

Another dynamic to draw out is the growing role of local police in counter-terrorism. In recent years, law enforcement have expanded their capacity to respond to terrorism, dedicating more personnel and investing further in training.[90] Much energy has been dedicated to expanding intelligence-sharing and improving coordination with central government via structures like Fusion centers and Joint Terrorism

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[82] Lasley, James R. "The impact of the Rodney King incident on citizen attitudes toward police." *Policing and Society: An International Journal* 3.4 (1994): 245-255.
[83] Lopez, German. "Read the full, shocking Department of Justice report on racism in the Ferguson PD." *Vox*. 4 March 2015. https://www.vox.com/2015/3/4/8148915/ferguson-police-racism-doj-report
[84] "Eric Garner: No federal charges in US 'I can't breathe' death." *BBC*. 17 July 2019. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-49008746
[85] Siddique, Haroon. "Black people more likely to have force used against them by police." *The Guardian*. 13 December 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/dec/13/black-people-more-likely-to-have-force-used-against-them-by-police-data-shows
[86] Macpherson, William. *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: Report of an Inquiry*. February 1999. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/277111/4262.pdf
[87] Apuzzo, Matt and Adam Goldman "After Spying on Muslims, New York Police Agree to Greater Oversight." *The New York Times*. 6 March 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/nyregion/nypd-spying-muslims-surveillance-lawsuit.html
[88] Harris, Paul. "Fake terror plots, paid informants: the tactics of FBI 'entrapment' questioned." *The Guardian*. 16 November 2011. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/16/fbi-entrapment-fake-terror-plots
[89] Choudhury, Tuyfal and Helen Fenwick. *The Impact of Counterterrorism Measures on Muslim Communities*. Manchester: Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2011, 34, 41.
[90] Brill, Steven. "Is America Any Safer?" *The Atlantic*. September 2016. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/09/are-we-any-safer/492761/

Task Forces[91] or the UK's "richer picture."[92] At the same time, community policing has been operationalized in relation to engaging and partnering with communities to prevent terrorism.[93] For instance in his comprehensive 2016 study, Schanzer finds that nearly half of surveyed American law enforcement agencies engage with communities around countering violent extremism.[94]

Some scholars argue that local police are well-positioned to advance counter-terrorism objectives,[95] building from partnerships developed from community policing.[96] On the other hand, scholars have drawn attention to the problems inherent to transporting community policing into the counter-terrorism domain,[97] which introduces new fears of increasing state surveillance and infiltration into everyday community policing activities.[98] In short, local law enforcement have become increasingly involved in the counter-terrorism domain, both in terms of more traditional security measures and through ostensibly "softer" community partnerships. These policy reforms have implications for all citizens, but engagements have often concentrated on local Muslim communities in practice.

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[91] Bipartisan Policy Center. *Defeating Terrorists, Not Terrorism: Assessing U.S. Counterterrorism Policy from 9/11 to ISIS*. September 2017. https://bipartisanpolicy.org/report/counterterrorism-policy-from-911-to-isis/

[92] Innes, Martin et al. Assessing the Effects of Prevent Policing: A Report to the Association of Chief Police Officers. University Police Science Institute: Cardiff University, 2011, 72.

[93] Lamb, John Bahadur. "Preventing violent extremism; A policing case study of the west midlands." *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice* 7.1 (2012): 88-95; Forst, Brian. "Local Police and the 'War' on Terrorism." in *The Oxford Handbook of Police and Policing,* ed. by Michael D. Reisig and Robert J. Kane. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014; Weine, Stevan. "How Local Law Enforcement Uses Community Policing to Combat Terrorism" *Lawfare*. 19 February 2017. https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-local-law-enforcement-uses-community-policing-combat-terrorism

[94] Schanzer, David H., et al. The Challenge and Promise of Using Community Policing Strategies to Prevent Violent Extremism: A Call for Community Partnerships with Law Enforcement to Enhance Public Safety. Durham: Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security, 2016, 14.

[95] Friedmann, Robert R., and William J. Cannon. "Homeland security and community policing: Competing or complementing public safety policies." *Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management* 4.4 (2007); Innes, Martin. "Policing uncertainty: Countering terror through community intelligence and democratic policing." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 605.1 (2006): 222-241.

[96] Rascoff, Samuel J. "The Law of Homegrown (Counter) Terrorism." *Texas Law Review*. 88 (2009), 1734.

[97] Klausen, Jytte. "British counter-terrorism after 7/7: Adapting community policing to the fight against domestic terrorism." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 35.3 (2009): 403-420; McCants, Will, and Clinton Watts. *US Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism: An Assessment*. Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2012.

[98] Schanzer, David H., et al. The Challenge and Promise of Using Community Policing Strategies to Prevent Violent Extremism: A Call for Community Partnerships with Law Enforcement to Enhance Public Safety. Durham: Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security, 2016.

Muslim Communities in the US and UK

CVE policies do not operate with a blank slate, as I go on to describe, the history of state engagement with Muslim communities is critical to understand the context within which these policies emerge. The concept of "Muslim communities" itself has been actively contested in the literature for ignoring internal diversity.[99] Other scholars have noted how the term "meshes with conceptualizations of certain populations as 'suspect.'"[100] On the ground, the notion of a common, community identity that links together Muslims bounded by geography often lacks salience in the lives of citizens, though both policy and academic discourses have utilized this terminology.

Islamophobia and State Scrutiny

Despite this, many Muslims living in the US and the UK share common concerns about state surveillance and discrimination in the years following 9/11, which has coincided with surges in anti-Muslim hate crimes,[101] discriminatory media coverage,[102] anti-Muslim political speech,[103] and scrutiny at border crossings.[104] Islamophobia is a lived reality for many British and American Muslims, worsening in recent years amidst far-right terrorism that has targeted Muslims, such as the Christchurch mosque shootings in 2019 and the 2017 Finsbury Park attack. HA Hellyer notes that hate crimes against Muslims account for "almost half of all hate crimes against religious groups in the UK" and warns of the "increasing

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[99] Chakraborti, Neil. "Policing Muslim Communities" in *Policing beyond Macpherson: Issues in Policing, Race and Ethnicity*, ed. by Michael Rowe. Cullompton: Willan, 2007, 109.
[100] Hickman, Mary J., et al. "Social cohesion and the notion of 'suspect communities': a study of the experiences and impacts of being 'suspect' for Irish communities and Muslim communities in Britain." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 5.1 (2012): 89-106.
[101] Arab American Institute. *Hate Crimes Continue to Surge in America.* 13 November 2018. https://www.aaiusa.org/hate_crimes_continue_to_surge_in_america; Marsh, Sarah. "Record number of anti-Muslim attacks reported in UK last year." 20 July 2018. *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/jul/20/record-number-anti-muslim-attacks-reported-uk-2017
[102] Schanzer, David H., et al. The Challenge and Promise of Using Community Policing Strategies to Prevent Violent Extremism: A Call for Community Partnerships with Law Enforcement to Enhance Public Safety. Durham: Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security, 2016.
[103] Zurcher, Anthony. "What Trump team has said about Islam." *BBC News*. 7 February 2017 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-38886496; Alsaafin, Linah and Anealla Safdar. "'The rot of Tory Islamophobia goes all the way to top.'" *Al Jazeera.* 10 Dec 2019.https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/rot-tory-islamophobia-top-191210113333660.html
[104] Schanzer, David H., et al. The Challenge and Promise of Using Community Policing Strategies to Prevent Violent Extremism: A Call for Community Partnerships with Law Enforcement to Enhance Public Safety. Durham: Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security. Durham: Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security, 2016.

prevalence and acceptability of Islamophobia."[105] Hate crimes targeting Muslim Americans have also risen in recent years,[106] "easily surpassing the modern peak reached in 2001" according to a study by Pew.[107]

Muslim communities have also been the target of state surveillance and profiling, for example, the NYPD's Demographics Unit,[108] the FBI's use of entrapment techniques,[109] the controversial "hold until cleared" policy following the September 11th attacks[110], and the placement of video cameras in heavily Muslim areas of Birmingham, England. At the same time, Muslim communities (and community leaders in particular) have been sought out as state allies in partnership-oriented initiatives, which include programs like the Metropolitan Police's Muslim Contact Unit in London, the Los Angeles Police Department's engagements with Muslim communities, and the BRIDGES initiative in Boston to connect law enforcement with minority leaders. The UK government has also intervened in theological debates, for example, funding the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB), a body that regulates and promotes best practices among British mosques.

Mistrust between Muslim communities and the police has been widely documented.[111] But national survey data in both countries paints a more mixed picture from the one commonly depicted in policy debates. In a 2011 report, Innes et al. find using the British Crime Survey data that "Muslims express higher levels of trust and confidence in the police than do the general population… Muslim community

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[105] Hellyer, H.A. "Islamophobia Is Boris Johnson's Problem Now." *Foreign Policy*. 16 December 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/16/britain-election-conservative-party-islamophobia/

[106] Potok, Mark. "Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes Surged Last Year, Fueled by Hateful Campaign." *Southern Poverty Law Center*. 14 November 2016. https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2016/11/14/anti-muslim-hate-crimes-surged-last-year-fueled-hateful-campaign; Lopez, German. "The number of anti-Muslim hate groups in America increased by 197 percent in 2016." *Vox*. 16 February 2017. https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/2/16/14636418/hate-groups-map-splc-2016

[107] Katayoun, Kishi. "Assaults against Muslims in U.S. surpass 2001 level." *Pew Research Center*. 15 November 2017. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/15/assaults-against-muslims-in-u-s-surpass-2001-level/

[108] Apuzzo, Matt and Adam Goldman "After Spying on Muslims, New York Police Agree to Greater Oversight" *The New York Times*. 6 March 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/nyregion/nypd-spying-muslims-surveillance-lawsuit.html

[109] Harris, Paul. "Fake terror plots, paid informants: the tactics of FBI 'entrapment' questioned." *The Guardian*. 16 November 2011. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/16/fbi-entrapment-fake-terror-plots

[110] Lichtblau, Eric. "Supreme Court Weighs Whether Bush Officials Can Be Sued Over Post-9/11 Abuse." *New York Times*. 18 January 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/us/politics/supreme-court-bush-detainee-case.html

[111] See for instance: Spalek, Basia. "Community policing, trust, and Muslim communities in relation to "New Terrorism"." *Politics & Policy* 38.4 (2010), 798-99; Schanzer, David H., et al. *The challenge and promise of using community policing strategies to prevent violent extremism: A call for community partnerships with law enforcement to enhance public safety*. Durham: Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security, 2016.

perceptions of the police have been remarkably stable, and largely positive," though they note lower levels of trust among young Muslim men[112] and that "compared with the general population Muslims are much less likely to report crime victimisations to police."[113] A 2010 report on 11 EU cities (two of which were in the UK) from the Open Society Institute did not identify significant differences in levels of trust in the police between Muslims and non-Muslim survey respondents.[114] Finally, a 2020 report from the British think tank Crest finds that "British Muslims and Great Britain adults show relatively high levels of trust in the police and this extends to views about the police's role in counter-extremism, as well as more routine police tasks…British Muslims would be more likely to refer someone to Prevent if they suspected they were being radicalised than the general population" at 66% of British Muslims compared to 63% of the wider public.[115] Gillum's national survey of American Muslims surfaces a nuanced picture, showing that foreign-born Muslims and noncitizens are more trusting of law enforcement than US-born Muslim Americans, who expect worse treatment of Muslim suspects than non-Muslims.[116]

Having outlined some key similarities in the ways that American and British Muslims have historically experienced the state and recent experiences of Islamaphobia, I now discuss some important national differences. My intention is not to exhaustively detail the history of British and American Muslims, instead to present relevant differences that will prove important for the discussion of CVE implementation in the US and UK that follows.

Muslims in Britain

First, the Muslim population in the UK is proportionally larger than in the US, with over 2.7 million adherents in England and Wales that make up 5% of the population. Nearly 70% of the Muslim

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112 Innes, Martin et al. Assessing the Effects of Prevent Policing: A Report to the Association of Chief Police Officers. University Police Science Institute, 2011, 7.
113 Innes, Martin et al. Assessing the Effects of Prevent Policing: A Report to the Association of Chief Police Officers. University Police Science Institute, 2011, 9.
114 Open Society Institute. *Muslims in Europe–A report on 11 EU cities*. London: Open Society Foundation, 2010, 170.
115 Clements, Jon, Manon Roberts, and Dan Forman. *Listening to British Muslims: Policing, Extremism and Prevent*. London: Crest Advisory. March 2020. https://b9cf6cd4-6aad-4419-a368724e7d1352b9.usrfiles.com/ugd/b9cf6c_d12a4911772d4e04a683b69561c86501.pdf, 10-11
116 Gillum, Rachel M. Muslims in a Post-9/11 America: A Survey of Attitudes and Beliefs and Their Implications for U.S. National Security Policy Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2018, Kindle Locations 2655-2658.

population is of Asian descent, largely from Pakistani and Bangladeshi backgrounds.[117] The *British Muslim in Numbers* report showed using 2011 census data that "46% of the Muslim population resides in the 10% most deprived local authority districts in England,"[118] with Muslims reporting higher levels of unemployment than the population on the whole.[119]

The British Muslim community also features significant diversity along sectarian, ethnic, and kinship lines that will prove important in the discussion that follows. One important schism is the divide between two Sunni "sub-sects," the Deobandis and Barelvis,[120] which together reflect the sectarian orientation of most British mosques.[121] Though both emerge from the Sunni Muslim tradition in South Asia and ascribe to the same Islamic legal school,[122] their religious practice expresses itself differently.[123] Barelvis are thought to be comparably less conservative than their Deobandi counterparts, who are often more disengaged from politics.[124] In the case studies that follow, I discuss how these and other sectarian groups have interfaced with Prevent agendas.

Kinship networks or *biraderis* also play an important role in some sections of British Muslim communities, particularly within Pakistani diasporas. Biraderis operate along lines of extended family and clan that reflect a caste-based social hierarchy.[125] These structures have shaped how Muslim communities have settled in Britain[126] and sought out political representation.[127] Marriage along biraderi lines persists at high rates among Pakistanis in Britain.[128] In many cases, biraderis have retained a degree of salience at the local level over time. As Dancygier writes, "the migration and settlement patterns that characterize the

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117 Ali, Sundas. *British Muslims in Numbers*. London: Muslim Council of Britain, 2015, 24.
118 Ali, Sundas. *British Muslims in Numbers*. London: Muslim Council of Britain, 2015, 18.
119 Ali, Sundas. *British Muslims in Numbers*. London: Muslim Council of Britain, 2015, 19.
120 Behuria, Ashok K. "Sects within Sect: The Case of Deobandi–Barelvi Encounter in Pakistan." *Strategic Analysis* 32.1 (2008): 57–80.
121 Bowen, Innes. *Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in Brent: Inside British Islam*. London: Hurst & Co., 2014, 3-4.
122 Bowen, Innes. *Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in Brent: Inside British Islam* Inside British Islam. London: Hurst & Co., 2014, 4.
123 Shaw, Alison. "Why might young British Muslims support the Taliban?." *Anthropology Today* 18.1 (2002), 7.
124 Fergusson, James. *Al-Britannia, My Country: A Journey Through Muslim Britain*. London: Random House, 2017, 137-140; Bowen, Innes. *Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in Brent: Inside British Islam*. London: Hurst & Co., 2014, 12, 25.
125 Baston, Lewis. *The Bradford Earthquake*. https://democraticaudituk.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/bradford-earthquake-full-report-web.pdf Accessed 18 February 2020, 17-18.
126 Peace, Timothy, and Parveen Akhtar. "Biraderi, Bloc Votes and Bradford: Investigating the Respect Party's Campaign Strategy." *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 17.2 (2015), 226.
127 Dancygier, Rafaela M. *Dilemmas of inclusion: Muslims in European politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017, 148-9.
128 Dancygier, Rafaela M. *Dilemmas of inclusion: Muslims in European politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017, 56.

Muslim presence in Western Europe have led to the replication of village and kin networks in European cities."[129]

Of particular relevance to the discussion that follows, biraderis play an important role in the maintenance of community leadership.[130] Scholars have described the role of biraderis in mobilizing local voting and propelling Muslims to local elected office.[131] But the role of local Muslim leaders (both elected and un-elected) remains a source of debate. While these leaders provide important social services and are thought to have enhanced community representation,[132] community leaders have also faced criticism for lacking legitimacy.[133] Others have noted how Muslim leaders have posed obstacles for integration[134] and limited the political participation of women.[135]

A final issue worth highlighting because of its relevance for the case studies that follow is the role of radical, but non-violent groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and Al Muhajiroun.[136] The role of these groups in influencing terrorism is a source of much debate.[137] These groups have often established a local presence in many locations in the UK (and further abroad), influencing largely young people and, at times, posing a challenge to more established civic and religious leadership.[138] In the case study chapters that follow, I

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[129] Dancygier, Rafaela M. *Dilemmas of inclusion: Muslims in European politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017, 63.
[130] Akhtar, Parveen. *British Muslim Politics: Examining Pakistani Biraderi Networks*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, 21-23.
[131] Peace, Timothy, and Parveen Akhtar. "Biraderi, Bloc Votes and Bradford: Investigating the Respect Party's Campaign Strategy." *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 17.2 (2015), 224-225; Dancygier, Rafaela M. *Dilemmas of inclusion: Muslims in European politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017, 122, 136-7.
[132] Chapman, Rachael, and Vivien Lowndes. "Accountable, authorized or authentic? What do 'faith representatives' offer urban governance?" *Public Money & Management* 29.6 (2009): 371-378; Jones, Stephen H., et al. "A 'System of Self-Appointed Leaders'? Examining Modes of Muslim Representation in Governance in Britain." *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 17.2 (2015): 207-223.
[133] Rodger, James. "Former police chief: 'Government must do more to reach young Muslim women to tackle extremism.'" *Birmingham Live*. 4 June 2017. https://www.birminghammail.co.uk/news/midlands-news/former-police-chief-government-must-13136144
[134] See literature cited in: Dancygier, Rafaela M. *Dilemmas of inclusion: Muslims in European politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017, 23.
[135] Dancygier, Rafaela M. *Dilemmas of inclusion: Muslims in European politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017, 177.
[136] Pew Research Center Religion & Public Life. "Radical Islamist Movements: Jihadi Networks and Hizb ut-Tahrir." *Muslim Networks and Movements in Western Europe*. 15 September 2010. https://www.pewforum.org/2010/09/15/muslim-networks-and-movements-in-western-europe-radical-islamist-movements-jihadi-networks-and-hizb-ut-tahrir/
[137] Raymond, Catherine Zara. Al Muhajiroun and Islam4UK: The group behind the ban." London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation. May 2010. https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/ICSR-Feature-Al-Muhajiroun-and-Islam4UK-The-group-behind-the-ban.pdf
[138] Lewis, Philip. "Imams, ulema and Sufis: providers of bridging social capital for British Pakistanis?." *Contemporary South Asia* 15.3 (2006), 280; Pnina Werbner, Pnina. "Theorising complex diasporas: purity and hybridity in the South Asian public sphere in Britain." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 30.5 (2004), 904.

show how these groups at times opposed local counter-extremism efforts, in some cases appearing to heighten risks of reputational damage for elites cooperating with CVE efforts.

American Muslims

American Muslims share many experiences with their British counterparts, as I have described. But there are a number of ways in which their experiences differ which will become important for the discussion that follows. The US Census does not gather information about religion, but the Pew Research Center estimates that Muslims number around 3.45 million in the US as of 2017,[139] at just over 1% of the population. There are larger Muslim populations in some US cities, like New York, Dearborn, and Los Angeles, though Muslim Americans are less spatially concentrated than their British counterparts. There is wide-ranging ethnic diversity within American Muslim communities. While much research and discussion has focused on Arab Muslims,[140] African American Muslims are the single largest ethnic group, with estimates suggesting that American Muslims make up one-fifth or more of all American Muslims.[141] Survey data has shown that American Muslims are more socio-economically affluent than their European counterparts[142] and by many measures better integrated into American life.

Gillum's extensive study of Muslim Americans shows that American Muslims (who lean Democrat) vote at the same levels as their non-Muslim peers and marry outside their faith at similar levels to non-Muslim Americans.[143] She writes, "Muslims are performing well when compared with both foreign-born and

[139] Mohamed, Besheer. "New estimates show U.S. Muslim population continues to grow." *Pew Research Center*. 3 January 2018. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/03/new-estimates-show-u-s-muslim-population-continues-to-grow/
[140] Gillum, Rachel M. Muslims in a Post-9/11 America: A Survey of Attitudes and Beliefs and Their Implications for US National Security Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2018.
[141] Gillum, Rachel M. Muslims in a Post-9/11 America: A Survey of Attitudes and Beliefs and Their Implications for US National Security Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2018, Kindle Locations 433-435.
[142] Pew Research Center. Muslim Americans: Middle class and mostly mainstream. Pew Research Center, 2007.
[143] Gillum, Rachel M. Muslims in a Post-9/11 America: A Survey of Attitudes and Beliefs and Their Implications for US National Security Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2018.

native-born Americans in terms of their educational attainment and ability to earn income"[144] and noting that "Muslims appear to become more integrated sooner than some other groups."[145]

Contextualizing CVE

As I have explained, CVE programs build on an earlier history of counter-terrorism and community policing. In the section that follows, I review CVE policies in greater detail, outlining how they operate in practice and developed in the UK and US. I then outline the major academic and policy debates around these policies.

CVE and its associated terminology are much debated; academics[146] and governments have provided many definitions.[147] Some have argued that CVE programs are characterized by a lack of conceptual clarity[148] with a wide array of programmatic activities included under its umbrella.[149] Humera Khan usefully defines CVE as "the use of noncoercive means to dissuade individuals or groups from mobilizing towards violence and to mitigate recruitment, support, facilitation, or engagement in ideologically motivated terrorism by nonstate actors."[150] What is clear is that CVE programs are largely preventative in nature, conceptually distinct from traditional counter-terrorism measures like pursuing and disrupting terrorist networks. On the ground, CVE strategies involve broader efforts aimed to promote "resilience"

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[144] Gillum, Rachel M. Muslims in a Post-9/11 America: A Survey of Attitudes and Beliefs and Their Implications for US National Security Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2018, Kindle Locations 1230-1233.
[145] Gillum, Rachel M. Muslims in a Post-9/11 America: A Survey of Attitudes and Beliefs and Their Implications for U.S. National Security Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, Kindle Location 1378.
[146] Harris-Hogan, Shandon, Kate Barrelle, and Andrew Zammit. "What is countering violent extremism? Exploring CVE policy and practice in Australia." *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 8.1 (2016): 6-24.
[147] The US government defines CVE as "efforts focused on preventing all forms of ideologically based extremist violence, to include prevention of successful recruitment into terrorist groups. It is distinct from disruptive actions which focus on stopping acts of terrorism by those who have already subscribed to violence." See: Department of Homeland Security. *Factsheet: A Comprehensive U.S. Government Approach to Countering Violent Extremism.* https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/US%20Government%20Approach%20to%20CVE-Fact%20Sheet_0.pdf, 1; The UK's Prevent strategy aims to "stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism." HM Government. *Prevent Strategy*. 2011, 6.
[148] Rosand, Eric. "The global CVE agenda: Can we move from talk to walk?" *The Brookings Institution*. 20 April 2016 https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2016/04/20/the-global-cve-agenda-can-we-move-from-talk-to-walk/
[149] Heydemann, Steven. "Countering Violent Extremism as a Field of Practice." *United States Institute of Peace Insights*. 1(2014). https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Insights-Spring-2014.pdf
[150] Khan, Humera. "Why countering extremism fails: Washington's top-down approach to prevention is flawed." *Foreign Affairs*. 8 February 2015. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2015-02-18/why-countering-extremism-fails

against extremism, by addressing so-called "root causes."[151] Prevention activities are accompanied by intervention efforts that work with individuals deemed "at-risk" of becoming involved in violent extremism, often through a combination of mentoring and counter-messaging, though these concepts of risk and vulnerability have also been criticized at length, as I will go on to describe.

How do CVE agendas work in practice and what do they ask of citizens? Despite the diversity of CVE policies around the world, they consistently focus on seeking out partnerships from communities, rendering community engagement a central policy objective.[152] On the ground, the responsibility to deliver these engagements has often fallen to local police. Engagements have focused predominately on Muslim communities,[153] which was at times made explicit in the US and the UK.[154] The policy seeks out (largely Muslim) citizens in a number of ways. Most controversially, CVE programs ask citizens to report so-called "vulnerable individuals" as candidates for CVE programs as well as to attend CVE-funded programs. These programs often focus on women, young people, and religious leaders and are designed to provide skills to promote cohesion and counter-narratives that challenge violent extremism. Beyond this, local bureaucrats often rely on civil society leaders to design CVE strategies, dispense public resources, and access participants for CVE programs.

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[151] United Nations Development Programme. *Preventing Violent Extremism Through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance, and Respect for Diversity*, 2016, 4; Holmer, Georgia. "Countering violent extremism: A peacebuilding perspective." *US Institute of Peace: Special Report 336*. September 2013.

[152] Briggs, Rachel. "Community engagement for counterterrorism: lessons from the United Kingdom." *International affairs* 86.4 (2010), 976.

[153] Rabia Chaudry, "Countering Violent Extremism Still an Uphill Battle." *Observer*. 14 April 2015. https://observer.com/2015/04/countering-violent-extremism-still-an-uphill-battle/

[154] The Prevent I strategy focused exclusively on Muslim communities, distributing funding based on the size of a locality's Muslim population, though the policy's scope was later expanded to include all forms of extremism. See: House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee. *Preventing Violent Extremism Sixth Report of Session.* London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2010, 50; In the US, the congressional bill designating funding for CVE activities defines the scope of its activities around "violent Islamist extremism" alone. The Trump Administration has made this further explicit by cutting funds designated to prevent far-right extremism. See: Congress.gov. *H.R.1022 - CVE Grants Act*. 24 February 2015. https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1022/text; In practice, this means that the majority of government outreach, funded projects, and tip-offs focus on Islamist inspired extremism.

The UK's Prevent Strategy

The UK's countering violent extremism strategy, Prevent, has undergone a number of policy revisions during its short history. In its original iteration, the policy reflected a bottom-up orientation, with a broad mandate to promote community cohesion and prevent extremism in partnership with Muslim civil society organizations. Over time, it has evolved into a narrower agenda with heightened top-down pressure on local actors and minimized resources for civil society partners.

The current iteration of Prevent focuses heavily on public agencies and compels them to cooperate with central government Prevent guidance. The most recent iterations of Prevent have reduced the range of avenues for communities to engage with the strategy—a function both of wider austerity cuts to local government and the narrowing scope of Prevent activities. However, the strategy continues to emphasize the role of communities, seeking out civilians to attend Prevent-funded programs and as candidates for intervention, as well as at more ad hoc consultations and meetings. I walk through the various iterations of Prevent which is important for the case study chapters that follow, where I show how local responses to the Prevent agenda evolve amidst various central government policy reforms.

Prevent I

Prevent was a part of the UK's broader counter-terrorism strategy from 2003, but the policy rose to public attention after the 2005 London bombings. These events prompted the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG) to release the *Preventing Violent Extremism—Winning Hearts and Minds* strategy in 2007. The policy laid out responsibilities for public agencies and communities who were tasked with promoting cohesion and preventing violent extremism[155] in order to promote "shared values" and build civic capacity within British Muslim communities,[156] part of the government's effort to

[155] Department of Communities and Local Government. *Preventing violent extremism –Winning hearts and minds*. April 2007. Department for Communities and Local Government: London.
[156] Department of Communities and Local Government. *Preventing violent extremism –Winning hearts and minds*. April 2007. Department for Communities and Local Government: London, 5.

build a "British version of Islam."[157] Policy activity centered around what were referred to as "Pathfinder" areas, that were controversially identified based on the size of the city's Muslim population.[158]

Prevent domestic spending from 2008-11 totaled £150.7 million.[159] DCLG provided funds for local authorities and community organizations to deliver Prevent, which were used on a variety of projects, including community mapping, developing Muslim consultation bodies, and funding community organizations to challenge violence and promote cohesion through a range of programs. Alongside this, the UK's intervention procedure, Channel, which aims to engage individuals deemed "at-risk" of becoming involved in terrorism, was being developed locally and nationally. Channel-style interventions involve a process of one-to-one counseling for individuals that are considered vulnerable to becoming involved in violent extremism facilitated by a panel of local, multi-agency staff.

Prevent II

The scope of Prevent narrowed after the policy revision in 2011. Of particular relevance for the discussion that follows is that Prevent II reduced discretion for both local level state actors and civil society partners, pushing the strategy in a more financially restrictive and punitive direction, increasingly regulating policy implementation from the top down. Prevent II specifically acknowledged perceived shortcomings of the earlier strategy[160] and removed the emphasis on community cohesion and civil society partnerships. Other important developments included new expectations that public sector organizations would establish procedures to address violent extremism. Prevent II also expanded to include extremism in all forms, including the extreme right-wing and non-violent extremism, defined as

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[157] Kelly, Ruth. "Time for a British Version of Islam." *New Statesman*. 9 April 2007. http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2007/04/deep-faith-british-government

[158] House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee. *Preventing Violent Extremism Sixth Report of Session.* London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2010, 50.

[159] "Between 2008 and 2011, the DCLG budget for Prevent was £66.760 million according to a detailed response by the DCLG to a Freedom of Information request in 2011… Between 2009 and 2011, Home Office funding came to £84 million." See: O'Toole, Therese, et al. "Governing through prevent? Regulation and contested practice in State–Muslim engagement." *Sociology* 50.1 (2015), 16; Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government. *FOI Release: Prevent Funding*. 7 July 2011.https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-funding

[160] HM Government. *Prevent Strategy*. 2011. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf, 1.

the "extremist (and non-violent) ideas that are also part of a terrorist ideology."[161] The earlier strategy for selecting Pathfinder areas was set aside. Under the revised Prevent, so-called "priority areas" would be determined based on threats of terrorism.[162]

Prevent II also designated the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) with responsibility for the Prevent strategy, removing DCLG's leadership role, and introduced Home-Office funded "Prevent coordinators" in order to further facilitate policy standardization. Finally, Prevent II significantly restricted local access to central government funding, requiring funded projects to receive Home Office approval. On the ground, police were often tasked with delivering the majority of Prevent engagements, although Prevent II outlined new responsibilities for many local agencies. Despite efforts to centralize policy implementation, a 2013 report highlighted growing concerns within government around the local implementation of Prevent with the Task Force on Tackling Radicalization and Extremism noting the challenge of "local authorities … not taking the problem seriously."[163]

The "Prevent Duty" and Beyond

In the face of new terror threats posed by the Islamic State, the 2015 Counter-Terrorism Security Act (CTSA) introduced a "Prevent duty" on statutory agencies to have "due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism."[164] The duty legally obliged public bodies to cooperate with Prevent and Channel programs locally, significantly curtailing flexibility for local policymakers and further centralizing national Prevent efforts. The UK has released some national Channel data, which shows that between 2015-18 the majority of cases focused on "concerns related to Islamist extremism."[165] The most recent data from April 2018 to March 2019 shows that there was parity between what the Home Office refers to as right-wing and Islamist related referrals, with the majority of cases from the most recent year

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[161] HM Government. *Prevent Strategy*. 2011, 6.
[162] HM Government. *Prevent Strategy*. 2011, 34.
[163] HM Government. *Report from the Prime Minister's Task Force on Tackling Radicalisation and Extremism*. London: Cabinet Office, 2013. www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263181/ETF_FINAL.pdf, 4.
[164] HM Government. *Prevent duty guidance*. 2015.
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2015/9780111133309/pdfs/ukdsiod_9780111133309_en.pdf, 3.
[165] Home Office. Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme, April 2017 to March 2018. 13 December 2018, 13.

categorized as "mixed, unstable or unclear ideology."[166] The most recent data shows that referrals from members of the community, family, and friends comprise just 4% of the total referrals nationally.[167] Also of note is the fact that only 10% of referrals were deemed eligible to proceed as Channel cases.[168] The significant gap between referrals and cases deemed appropriate for Channel would seem to confirm critics' fears about securitization under the Prevent program, as I detail in the section that follows.

Recent years have seen further efforts to limit the role of law enforcement in Channel—with some local authorities exercising greater control over local interventions, via a pilot program known as Project Dovetail.[169] While Prevent budgets are not publicly available, the total annual spend is estimated to be around £40m a year.[170] Despite a range of policy amendments over the years, the focus on communities remains a common theme reiterated in the 2018 national counter-terrorism review.[171]

To sum up, the Prevent strategy has evolved significantly since its public rollout in 2007. What began as a grassroots-oriented agenda at the cross-section of community cohesion and counter-extremism that gave significant autonomy to local actors has evolved into a top-down central government agenda centering around local interventions. While community engagement and consultation remain important parts of Prevent agenda, the shift in the nature and scope of Prevent has led Peter Neumann to call Prevent I "almost the direct opposite of the government's strategy today."[172]

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166 Home Office. Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent programme, England and Wales, April 2018 to March 2019. 19 December 2019, 10.
167 Home Office. Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent programme, England and Wales, April 2018 to March 2019. 19 December 2019, 6.
168 Home Office. Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent programme, England and Wales, April 2018 to March 2019. 19 December 2019, 7.
169 Home Office. *Channel: Dovetail pilot evaluation findings.* August 2017. http://www.hampshirepreventboard.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Dovetail-evaluation-high-level-findings-and-next-steps.pdf Accessed 18 February 2020.
170 "Reality Check: What is the Prevent strategy?" *BBC.* 4 June 2017. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2017-40151991
171 HM Government. *CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism.* June 2018, 33. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/716907/140618_CCS207_CCS0218929798-1_CONTEST_3.0_WEB.pdf
172 Khaleeli, Homa. "'You worry they could take your kids': is the Prevent strategy demonising Muslim schoolchildren?" *The Guardian.* 23 September 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/sep/23/prevent-counter-terrorism-strategy-schools-demonising-muslim-children

Countering Violent Extremism in the US

The evolution of CVE in the US has been more circuitous than in the UK with a number of stops and starts over its brief history. At the time of writing, counter-extremism policies are receiving little investment from the US government. The US CVE strategy entitled *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* was first launched in 2011 under the Obama administration with guidance provided to a range of partner agencies under the "Strategic Implementation Plan." Like Prevent, the strategy stressed the importance of a "community-based approach"[173] and was oriented around three core goals: engaging with local communities, enhancing expertise around counter-extremism, and challenging extremist propaganda.[174] Much of the 2011 strategy outlines research and training activities that do not interface with citizens, a notable exception being the Community Awareness Briefing which aimed to create public awareness around terrorism and outline how communities can support broader counter-extremism efforts.[175] Central government level CVE activities were coordinated by several agencies: the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigations, and National Counter-terrorism Center.[176] Locally, US Attorney's Offices around the country were tasked with leading community engagement for the CVE agenda.[177] In practice, however, CVE efforts remained under-resourced. As Morton and Silber write, "CVE was hardly mentioned after the 2011 announcement and received no funding of any consequence from the federal government."[178]

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[173] The President of the United States. *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*. August 2011. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/empowering_local_partners.pdf, 2.
[174] The President of the United States. *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*. August 2011. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/empowering_local_partners.pdf
[175] The Office of the President. *Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*. December 2011. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/sip-final.pdf, 19.
[176] Vidino, Lorenzo and Seamus Hughes. *Countering Violent Extremism in America*. George Washington University: Program on Extremism. June 2015.https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/downloads/CVE%20in%20America.pdf
[177] Vidino, Lorenzo and Seamus Hughes. *Countering Violent Extremism in America*. George Washington University: Program on Extremism. June 2015.
https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/downloads/CVE%20in%20America.pdf
[178] Morton, Jesse and Mitchell D. Silber. "Lessons From a Year in the CVE Trenches." *Lawfare*. 23 June 2019. https://www.lawfareblog.com/lessons-year-cve-trenches

CVE became a focus again after the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing and later the rise of the Islamic State. In 2014, the US Attorney General announced that CVE activities would center around three so-called "pilot" cities: Boston, Los Angeles, Minneapolis-St. Paul.[179] Under the pilot program, government agencies[180] and civil society organizations in these three cities were expected to develop CVE frameworks that were then presented at the White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism in February 2015. The federal government provided each of the three cities a small amount of funding to deliver CVE programming[181] and generate best practices. The intention of the pilot program was to generate best practices that could inform the expansion of CVE agendas around the country in coming years.

In 2016, the federal government issued revised strategic guidance that reiterated the government's commitment to countering violent extremism programs and the importance of "resilient communities,"[182] with an additional emphasis on local individual-level interventions.[183] After the completion of the pilot program, the Obama administration designated ten million dollars of grants[184] to civil society organizations around the country to deliver CVE programming, the aspiration being that these grants would initiate a new, nation-wide, counter-extremism effort beyond the earlier small-scale pilots.

This momentum was swiftly curtailed by the Trump administration, which rapidly reorganized CVE funding as envisioned by the previous administration,[185] canceling several grants, including a project that

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[179] Department of Justice Archives. *Pilot Programs are Key to Our Countering Violent Extremism Efforts*. 18 February 2015. https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/pilot-programs-are-key-our-countering-violent-extremism-efforts; Vidino, Lorenzo and Seamus Hughes. *Countering Violent Extremism in America*. George Washington University: Program on Extremism. June 2015. https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/downloads/CVE%20in%20America.pdf, 7.
[180] In each of these cities, a range of agencies and organizations took part in developing CVE frameworks and subsequent programmatic activities, but U.S Attorney's Offices were coordinating and leading activity at the local level.
[181] Koumpilova, Mila. "In Boston, Los Angeles and Minneapolis, Federal Anti-Terror Programs Stoke Community Interest and Criticism." *Star Tribune*. 9 February 2016. http://www.startribune.com/in-boston-los-angeles-and-minneapolis-federal-anti-terror-pilots-stoke-community-interest-and-criticism/368091441/
[182] The Office of the President. *Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*. October 2016. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2016_strategic_implementation_plan_empowering_local_partners_prev.pdf, 1.
[183] The Office of the President. *Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*. October 2016. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2016_strategic_implementation_plan_empowering_local_partners_prev.pdf, 11-12.
[184] Department Homeland Security. *The Department of Homeland Security Announces the Countering Violent Extremism Grant Program*. 6 July 2016. https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/07/06/dhs-announces-countering-violent-extremism-grant-program
[185] Morton, Jesse and Mitchell D. Silber. "Lessons From a Year in the CVE Trenches." *Lawfare*. 23 June 2019. https://www.lawfareblog.com/lessons-year-cve-trenches

addressed far-right extremism.[186] The Trump administration released a revised list of grantees with most federal funding going to law enforcement and Muslim civil society organizations. At the same time, Trump officials pushed for a more punitive CVE approach that would explicitly scrutinize Muslim communities. Efforts to re-name countering violent extremism "Countering Radical Islamic Extremism"[187] were discussed. These policy changes were followed by reductions to the DHS office charged with leading CVE efforts[188] and later cuts to all federal funding for CVE.[189]

US and UK CVE: Similarities and Differences

The US CVE strategy was clearly inspired by the UK's Prevent strategy. Both national policies share similar goals and a range of common strategic approaches. Interestingly, observers have noted that US policymakers have problematically adopted the UK's early approach to Prevent without learning from its own admissions of failure and learning.[190] However, there are a number of important procedural and policy differences. For one, while both national CVE strategies have focused heavily on Islamist-inspired extremism, the UK's Prevent strategy has grown to include other forms of extremism, notably the far-right. The US CVE agenda, by contrast, limits its focus to Islamist inspired violent extremism,[191] though calls for CVE efforts that can address the far-right have grown in recent years.[192]

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[186] Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany. "DHS Strips Funding From Group That Counters Neo-Nazi Violence Trump's approach to fighting extremism puts law enforcement front and center. Critics say that's dangerous." *Foreign Policy*. 26 June 2017. https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/26/dhs-strips-funding-from-group-that-counters-neo-nazi-violence/

[187] Southers, Erroll. "The U.S. government's program to counter violent extremism needs an overhaul." *LA Times*. 21 March 2017. https://www.latimes.com/opinion/la-fg-global-erroll-southers-oped-20170321-story.html

[188] Tracy, Abigail. "'We Are at a Turning Point': Counterterrorism Experts Say Trump is Inspiring A Terrifying New Era of Right-Wing Violence." *Vanity Fair*. 2 November 2018. https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/11/trump-administration-tree-of-life-shooting-domestic-terrorism

[189] Ainsley, Julia. "White House budget slashes 'countering violent extremism' grants." *Reuters*. 23 May 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-budget-extremism/white-house-budget-slashes-countering-violent-extremism-grants-idUSKBN18J2HJ; Greer, Ryan and George Selim. "Reframing Prevention: If Government Won't Lead, Civil Society Must Step Up to Curb Extremism." *Just Security*. 10 December 2018. https://www.justsecurity.org/61755/reframing-prevention-government-lead-civil-society-step-curb-extremism/

[190] McCants, Will and Clinton Watts. *US strategy for countering violent extremism: An assessment*. Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2012.

[191] Congress.gov. *H.R.1022 - CVE Grants Act*. 24 February 2015. https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1022/text ; Chaudry, Rabia. "Countering Violent Extremism Still an Uphill Battle." *The Observer*. 14 April 2015. https://observer.com/2015/04/countering-violent-extremism-still-an-uphill-battle/

[192] Friedman, Uri. "How Many Attacks Will It Take Until the White-Supremacist Threat Is Taken Seriously?" *The Atlantic*. 4 August 2019. https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/08/how-can-fbi-fight-far-right-extremism-ideology/595435/

Another area of difference is the scope of CVE programs in both countries. US counter-extremism efforts focus squarely on violence prevention,[193] while the aspiration of the UK's Prevent strategy is much broader in scope, addressing violent and non-violent extremism. Unlike Prevent, the US federal government is far less involved in the delivery and oversight of CVE programs—describing itself as a "convener"[194] disseminating best practices and funding research, rather than guiding policy practice. Adding further complexity is the wide range of agencies involved in US counter-extremism efforts and persistent disputes about how CVE activities are defined[195] and the division of responsibilities across these agencies is organized.[196] This is in contrast to the UK's highly centralized Prevent policy directed by the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism in the Home Office, with central government funded personnel charged with leading policy implementation locally.

Finally, the central government has also invested far less in CVE activities than in the UK. Even at the peak of enthusiasm around CVE, US counter-extremism work was not even half as resourced as the UK's Prevent agenda.[197] The DHS office charged with leading CVE programs was operating with a budget of around $20 million per year. Under the Trump administration, CVE budgets have been slashed and policy personnel dedicated to CVE have dropped off rapidly.[198] While a few funded CVE programs are running in the United States, any notion of a top-down counter-extremism program has faded under the Trump administration and with it the aspiration to engage local communities. To sum up, despite a number of similarities, US CVE policy has a different policy trajectory than in the UK—with vastly less resources and institutional commitment. The Trump administration's disinterest in the CVE agenda and policy changes have led to further de-prioritization and inflammation of public opposition, rendering CVE policy more of an aspiration than a reality in the lives of citizens. Before I look at how these policies

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[193] Rascoff, Samuel J. "Establishing Official Islam-The Law and Strategy of Counter-Radicalization." *Stanford Law Review.* 64 (2012), 125.
[194] The Office of the President. *Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*. 8 December 2011. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/sip-final.pdf, 3.
[195] Challgren, Jonathan, et al. "Countering Violent Extremism: Applying the Public Health Model." *Georgetown Security Studies Review*. Washington, DC., 2016.
[196] Challgren, Jonathan, et al. "Countering Violent Extremism: Applying the Public Health Model." *Georgetown Security Studies Review*. Washington, DC., 2016.
[197] "Reality Check: What is the Prevent strategy?" *BBC*. 4 June 2017. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2017-40151991
[198] Beinart, Peter. "Trump Shut Programs to Counter Violent Extremism." *The Atlantic*. 29 October 2018.

play out sub-nationally, I turn to the extensive critical literature around CVE programs to contextualize the discussion that follows.

Critiques of Countering Violent Extremism Programs

CVE policies have been highly controversial both in policy debates and in the academic literature, with groups from civil liberties organizations[199] to government agencies[200] voicing opposition. My aim in this section is to give the reader a broad overview of these policy critiques to contextualize the discussion that follows. A number of concerns about the Prevent strategy were detailed in the 2009 *Spooked!* Report, among them that the strategy alienates Muslims, operates without transparency, is used for intelligence-gathering, involves government interference in religious affairs, and censors debate.[201]

Other literature looks at the counter-productive nature of CVE programs, enflaming inter-communal divisions, despite its aspiration to promote integration and prevent extremism.[202] Some scholars have challenged the gendered assumptions within CVE programs by relying on Muslim women as reformist influences and family informants,[203] while others have criticized the lack of attention dedicated to foreign policy within the UK's Prevent strategy.[204] The problematic involvement of the police in many aspects of CVE agendas has also been a focus of critical attention,[205] with scholars noting how a growing role for

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[199] American Civil Liberties Union. The Problem with 'Countering Violent Extremism' Programs. https://www.aclu.org/other/problem-countering-violent-extremism-programs; Accessed 18 February 2020; Ross, Alice. "Academics criticise anti-radicalisation strategy in open letter." *The Guardian.* 29 September 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/sep/29/academics-criticise-prevent-anti-radicalisation-strategy-open-letter; Versi, Miqdaad. *Concerns on Prevent.* Muslim Council of Britain. 2015. https://www.mcb.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/20150803-Case-studies-about-Prevent.pdf

[200] US Government Accountability Office. *Countering Violent Extremism: Actions Needed to Define Strategy and Assess Progress of Federal Efforts.* 6 April 2017. https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-300

[201] Kundnani, Arun. *Spooked! How not to prevent violent extremism.* London, UK: Institute of Race Relations, 2009, 6.

[202] Birt, Yahya. "Promoting Virulent Envy? Reconsidering the UK's Terrorist Prevention Strategy." *The RUSI Journal* 154.4 (2009), 55-66.

[203] Brown, Katherine. "The promise and perils of women's participation in UK mosques: The impact of securitisation agendas on identity, gender and community." *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 10.3 (2008): 472-491; Winterbotham, Emily. *Do Mothers Know Best? How Assumptions Harm CVE.* Tony Blair Institute for Global Change. 17 September 2018. https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/do-mothers-know-best-how-assumptions-harm-cve

[204] Hasan, Mehdi. "So, prime minister, are we to call you an extremist now?" *The Guardian.* 9 June 2011. https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2011/jun/09/cameron-counter-terror-muslims

[205] Birt, Yahya. "Promoting Virulent Envy? Reconsidering the UK's terrorist Prevention Strategy." *The RUSI Journal* 154.4 (2009), 56.

police in counter-extremism risks securitizing interactions between Muslims and the state.[206] I outline some of the key policy critiques in the section that follows.

CVE Policies Target Muslim Communities

Perhaps the most notorious critique of government counter-extremism policies is that they alienate Muslim communities,[207] who are treated by the state as a "suspect community."[208] Scholars have noted how CVE programs problematically transport the logic of counter-insurgency into the domestic arena, exaggerating the nature of the threat.[209] A consistent critique has focused on the problematic conflation of community cohesion efforts with counter-terrorism which is thought to securitize state engagement with Muslim communities[210] and generate concerns about intelligence gathering.[211] Others have noted the so-called "chilling effect" of counter-extremism policies which have created fears that individuals will have their views designated as extremist.[212] As Jamie Bartlett describes,

> "(Prevent) has in some respects exacerbated the problem that it was designed to solve: to ensure Muslims were not isolated or segregated from British society. It has spearheaded a decade-long

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[206] "Prevent directly promoted the increasing securitisation of community relations by the overt involvement of the Police in day to day contact with Muslim communities through the lens of counter-terrorism, creating a reality of 'policed multiculturalism.'" See: Thomas, Paul. "Changing experiences of responsibilisation and contestation within counter-terrorism policies: the British Prevent experience." *Policy & Politics* 45.3 (2017): 305-321.

[207] Grierson, Jamie. "'My son was terrified': how Prevent alienates UK Muslims." *The Guardian*. 27 January 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/jan/27/prevent-muslim-community-discrimination

[208] Pantazis, Christina, and Simon Pemberton. "From the 'Old' to the 'New' Suspect Community Examining the Impacts of Recent UK Counter-Terrorist Legislation." *The British Journal of Criminology* 49.5 (2009): 646-666.

[209] McCants, Will, and Clinton Watts. *US strategy for countering violent extremism: An assessment*. Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2012, 4.

[210] Khan, Khalida. *Prevent: A Response from the Muslim Community*. 2009. https://www.sacc.org.uk/sites/default/files/e28_pve_and_prevent_-_a_muslim_response-1.pdf, 11.

[211] See literature cited in Lakhani, Suraj. "Preventing violent extremism: perceptions of policy from grassroots and communities." *The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice* 51.2 (2012): 198-99; House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee. *Preventing Violent Extremism Sixth Report of Session 2009–10*. London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2010, 11-14; Hirsi, Ibrahim. "Government's anti-extremism initiative divides Twin Cities' Somali community." *MinnPost*. 17 February 2015. https://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2015/02/governments-anti-extremism-initiative-divides-twin-cities-somali-community/

[212] Parliament.Uk. *Factors inhibiting freedom of speech*. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201719/jtselect/jtrights/589/58907.html; Adams, Richard. "UK's Prevent strategy 'biggest threat to free speech on campus'" *The Guardian*. 27 June 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/jun/27/uks-prevent-strategy-biggest-threat-to-free-speech-on-campus

laser focus on British Muslims, creating a self-perpetuating obsession with Britishness, identity, Islam and terror that did not exist before 2005."[213]

Radicalization as a Problematic Concept

Other critics interrogate the concept of radicalization embedded within CVE programs and the ways these ideas are operationalized, some of which I already detailed in an earlier section of this chapter. Scholars argue that the notion of radicalization has been used to legitimize counter-extremism efforts, despite persistent gaps in our understanding about the relationship between radicalization and violence.[214] Heath-Kelly writes that the notion of radicalization has been used to create "a linear narrative around the production of terrorism, making it accessible to problem-solving approaches."[215] Githens-Mazer and Lambert critique understandings of radicalization, highlighting how the Brixton Salafi community, a group the authors designate as "culturally and socially different from other sections of both Muslim and non-Muslim British society" have been crucial allies in counter-terrorism efforts.[216]

The notion of individual-level "vulnerability" to radicalization and terrorism has also been challenged at length in the literature. Richards argues that this conceptualization of vulnerability "implies a diminished capacity for rational behaviour," which clashes with a traditional understanding of terrorism as a rational act.[217] The operationalization of vulnerability with seemingly innocuous details[218] has also proved problematic. These issues are apparent in the UK's Channel program where up to 90% of referrals are

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[213] Bartlett, Jamie. *Radicals: Outsiders Changing the World*. London: Random House, 141.
[214] Apuzzo, Matt. "Who Will Become a Terrorist? Research Yields Few Clues." *The New York Times*. 27 March 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/28/world/europe/mystery-about-who-will-become-a-terrorist-defies-clear-answers.html; Sageman, Marc. "The stagnation in terrorism research." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26.4 (2014): 565-580; Richards, Anthony. "The problem with 'radicalization': the remit of 'Prevent' and the need to refocus on terrorism in the UK." *International Affairs* 87.1 (2011), 143.
[215] Heath-Kelly, Charlotte. "Counter-Terrorism and the Counterfactual: Producing the 'Radicalisation' Discourse and the UK PREVENT Strategy." *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 15.3 (2013), 396.
[216] Githens-Mazer, Jonathan, and Robert Lambert. "Why conventional wisdom on radicalization fails: the persistence of a failed discourse." *International Affairs* 86.4 (2010): 891-892.
[217] Richards, Anthony. "Characterising the UK Terrorist Threat: The Problem with Non- Violent Ideology as a Focus for Counter-Terrorism and Terrorism as the product of 'Vulnerability.'" *Journal of Terrorism Research*. 3.1(2012), 17.
[218] Thomas, Paul. *Changing but still controversial: Britain's Prevent Counter-Terrorism Strategy*. November 2017. Chapter Published on Author's website in English translation. https://pure.hud.ac.uk/en/publications/changing-but-still-controversial-britains-prevent-counter-terrori Accessed 7 July 2020.

not deemed actionable.[219] Reflecting broader conceptualization of radicalization, Crenshaw and Lafree also note how governments have used punitive "material support laws" in the context of counter-extremism initiatives in the US, writing, "preventive counterterrorism policy has been characterized by large numbers of arrests for many different criminal offenses, most based on charges of some form of "material support" of terrorism... Sentences are generally severe."[220]

The critical literature draws attention to important debates around various aspects of CVE agendas. However, much of this scholarship focuses on normative debates, giving less attention to how CVE programs are implemented on the ground or responded to by local publics.[221] In fact, the limited literature on the local dimensions of CVE reveals the gap between policy frameworks devised by central governments and policy activity on the ground, highlighting a diversity of responses from local actors to these agendas.[222] The aim of this dissertation is to better understand local responses to CVE and ultimately explain divergent responses to these programs on the ground.

Conclusion

This chapter has covered much ground, contextualizing CVE agendas that build from recent developments in counter-terrorism and community policing. I broadly outlined important similarities and differences between American and British Muslim communities. I also reviewed how CVE agendas were developed and revised over time in the US and UK. I closed this chapter by highlighting some of the

[219] Thomas, Paul. *Changing but still controversial: Britain's Prevent Counter-Terrorism Strategy*. November 2017. Chapter Published on Author's website in English translation. https://pure.hud.ac.uk/en/publications/changing-but-still-controversial-britains-prevent-counter-terrori Accessed 7 July 2020.
[220] Crenshaw, Martha, and Gary LaFree. *Countering terrorism*. Washington, D.C.,: Brookings Institution Press, 2017, 97.
[221] Scholars have noted the lack of rigorous research that interrogates how CVE policies are implemented and the adaptive approaches of local bureaucrats and citizens. See: O'Toole, Therese, et al. "Governing through prevent? Regulation and contested practice in State–Muslim engagement." *Sociology* 50.1 (2015): 1-18.
[222] Lowndes, Vivien, and Leila Thorp. "Preventing violent extremism—why local context matters." in *The New Extremism in 21st Century Britain,* eds. by Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin. Abingdon: Routledge, 2010, 123-141; Bokhari, Kamran. *Countering Violent Extremism and American Muslims*. George Washington University Program on Extremism. October 2015; Ambrozik, Caitlin. "Community stakeholder responses to countering violent extremism locally." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* (2018): 1-25; Innes, Martin et al. *Assessing the Effects of Prevent Policing: A Report to the Association of Chief Police Officers*. University Police Science Institute, 2011, 39; Busher, Joel, et al. *What the Prevent duty means for schools and colleges in England: An analysis of educationalists' experiences*. Research Report: Aziz Foundation, 2017.

main critiques of CVE agendas. In the chapter that follows, I present the core theory I developed to explain variation in local responses to CVE policies.

Chapter 3 Theory

The importance of community support for the success of counter-terrorism efforts has been widely acknowledged,[223] but the existing literature lacks a theory to explain the conditions under which this cooperation will emerge. The scholarship on counter-insurgency provides some potential explanations,[224] but CVE agendas operate in a very different context, requiring a more specific theoretical framework to explain local responses to domestic counter-extremism efforts. In this chapter, I present a theory to explain this policy variation. I first highlight the core puzzle and review the literature, before presenting a framework to understand the local actors involved in counter-extremism programs, exploring the trade-offs CVE introduces for these constituencies. Having laid out this logic, I turn to a discussion of the core theory.

The main argument of this chapter is that the pre-existing structure of local Muslim civic networks drives how local actors engage in CVE programs—over more traditional explanations presented in the literature. Counter-extremism policies are controversial and carry risks for local actors, especially for Muslim communities targeted by these policies. Different network structures, I suggest, create specific trade-offs that shape how bureaucrats, Muslim elites, and wider Muslim communities estimate the feasibility of participating in CVE. I argue that this assessment relies heavily on a small set of neighbors in their local network, with whom they already share social ties.

I pay particular attention to what I call *Muslim elites*, who lead local civil society organizations or hold elected office. In the theory I develop, these elites act as a causal mechanism that translates network structures into local policy outcomes, determining both whether bureaucrats choose to invest in these policies and whether wider communities are willing to take part. After explicating the broader framework

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[223] There is a large literature on the importance of community participation in counter-terrorism cited later in this chapter. See for instance: Cronin, Audrey Kurth. *How terrorism ends: Understanding the decline and demise of terrorist campaigns*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009; Williams, Michael, John Horgan, and William Evans. "The Critical Role of Friends in Networks for Countering Violent Extremism: Toward a Theory of Vicarious Help-Seeking." *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*. 8.1 (2016): 45–65.

[224] Berman, Eli, and Aila M. Matanock. "The empiricists' insurgency." *Annual Review of Political Science* 18 (2015): 443-464; Kalyvas, Stathis N. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

and core theory, I introduce several hypothetical network types and outline how these network structures allow me to make specific predictions about how CVE programs will play out locally. I then discuss the scope conditions and the major theoretical implications for the broader literature.

The goal of this chapter is to provide a parsimonious theory that can explain counter-extremism policy outcomes in the US and UK, and ultimately other democracies delivering similar policies. I try to provide a theory that can explain dynamics across different national, sub-national, and community contexts, while acknowledging the diversity of variables across countries and localities. In the case chapters that follow, I then examine these dynamics up close.

The Puzzle

Governments have dedicated enormous resources to counter-terrorism, with estimates of US spending alone reaching nearly three trillion dollars.[225] Despite the significant expansion of traditional counter-terrorism measures, governments continue to seek out information from members of the public, as I described in Chapter 2. Governments also face a persistent challenge where they are alerted about individuals who sympathize with terrorism but fail to divert these individuals from committing acts of violence, despite receiving advance tip-offs, often from their own family and friends.[226] Recognizing this, states have established countering violent extremism (CVE) programs to mobilize members of the public to challenge extremist messages and, most controversially, to identify individuals who are considered "at-risk" of becoming involved in terrorism. Concerns about if governments can or should engage in counter-extremism activities have raged since the introduction of these policies. Civil liberty advocates argue that CVE amounts to aggressive state surveillance.[227] Policy proponents claim that community

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[225] Sampathkumar, Mythil. "US spent $2.8tn on counterterrorism but not all of it may have been necessary, report finds." *The Independent*. 17 May 2018. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/donald-trump-counterterrorism-homeland-security-spending-war-afghanistan-iraq-syria-stimson-center-a8356946.html

[226] Chelsea bombing suspect Ahmad Khan Rahami was known to the FBI, having been tipped by his own father, as were Omar Mateen the Pulse nightclub attacker, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the Boston marathon bomber, and Major Nidal Hasan the Fort Hood shooter. In the UK, the Manchester Bomber Salman Abedi was supposedly also tipped off to the relevant authorities.

[227] See literature cited in Chapter Two. See also: Cottee, Simon. "The Pre-Terrorists Among US: Is it possible to stop terrorism before it happens?" *The Atlantic*. 27 October 2015. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/counterterrorism-prevention-britain-isis/412603/

engagement and intervention programs can help governments sway individuals away from turning to violence.[228]

What is clear is that controversial CVE policies place local governments in a bind. Governments cannot coerce communities to voluntarily assist with state security agendas, but these programs rely on human intelligence about individuals thought to be "at-risk." State actors also seek out members of the public to attend CVE programs which aim to promote "resilience" against violent extremism. State actors also often rely on members of the public to guide the delivery of CVE programs, by identifying and delivering relevant initiatives. CVE efforts that lack community participation are by definition not effective at securing the public's cooperation in counter-terrorism, the express purpose for which CVE programs have been designed.

Efforts to use surveillance tactics within Muslim communities—such as the NYPD's spying on mosques or the installation of video cameras in heavily Muslim neighborhoods in Birmingham, England—have only created further obstacles to collaboration between communities and the state. Equally, government efforts to disseminate counter-narratives have at times proved counter-productive. The US State Department's "Think Again Turn Away" campaign that aimed to counter ISIS online faltered badly and, critics argued, ultimately created openings for ISIS supporters to amplify their messages online.[229] Indeed, embedded into the logic of CVE programs is a concession about the limitations of the state to prevent terrorism independently.[230]

To market government counter-extremism efforts, CVE programs around the world are presented with narratives of partnership and shared-decision-making between governments and (largely Muslim)

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[228] Zelin, Aaron. "The Importance of CVE in Light of the Changing Nature of the Threat." *Lawfare*. 27 April 2017. https://www.lawfareblog.com/importance-cve-light-changing-nature-threat

[229] Katz, Rita. "The State Department's Twitter War With ISIS Is Embarrassing." *Time*. 16 September 2014. https://time.com/3387065/isis-twitter-war-state-department/

[230] As Paul Thomas explains, CVE programs pursue partnerships with communities recognizing "both the state's lack of understanding of the complex dynamics of Islamist violent extremism and its own limited ability to make progress in preventing it." See: Thomas, Paul. "Changing experiences of responsibilisation and contestation within counter-terrorism policies: the British Prevent experience." *Policy & Politics* 45.3 (2017): 305-321.

communities.[231] The motto "communities defeat terrorism"[232] has become an oft-repeated theme. But despite the fact that central governments require collaboration from local bureaucrats and citizens, responses on the ground have taken varied forms, ranging from mutual evasion or hostility to some degree of sustained partnership. These sub-national differences pose important questions about the conditions under which both communities and local governments will choose to collaborate on contentious state security policies.

In some cases, local governments have rapidly rolled out CVE programs, embedding intervention procedures, training public sector staff about CVE efforts, and establishing mechanisms to interface with community members about counter-extremism efforts. But in other cases, local governments have taken more evasive policy responses—delaying the creation of intervention programs and avoiding engagement with community members, effectively maintaining little involvement from public agencies outside law enforcement. Counter-extremism strategies are politically costly and poorly defined in nearly every city—tasking local bureaucrats to wade into contentious ideological territory and potentially alienate minority constituencies.[233] Local governments experience the burdens of CVE programs equally, yet they respond to these policies in highly different ways from going public with these programs to attempting to avoid them altogether.

Muslim communities repeatedly targeted by CVE programs also differ in their responses to these policies, in some cities sections of the public demonstrate some willingness to collaborate on counter-extremism agendas, willingly providing relevant tip-offs, attending consultation and CVE programs, and proactively working with government to develop strategies to address extremism. In other areas, communities have avoided working with law enforcement on these policies or actively blocked them from taking root locally.

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[231] Klausen, Jytte. "British Counter Terrorism after 7/7: Adapting Community Policing to the Fight Against Domestic Terrorism." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 35.3 (2005), 407.
[232] Home Office. *New Communities Defeat Terrorism campaign launched.* 23 January 2019. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-communities-defeat-terrorism-campaign-launched
[233] Klausen, Jytte. "British Counter Terrorism after 7/7: Adapting Community Policing to the Fight Against Domestic Terrorism." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 35.3 (2005): 403–420.

These responses are equally puzzling—CVE programs task community members to provide sensitive intelligence to law enforcement in a context where Muslim citizens have been historically targeted by state surveillance. While there may be some abstract payoffs for participating in counter-terrorism efforts, such as the desire to reduce the threat of terrorism or to demonstrate commitment to the state, it would seem that these intangible and long-term benefits are largely outweighed by immediate and significant risks posed by CVE programs, such as exposure to law enforcement who have in the past used engagements with Muslim communities as a cover for surveillance[234] or potentially inviting aggressive sentencing onto loved ones.[235] In light of the hefty risks associated with CVE programs, why would communities participate in CVE—the latest in a long line of counter-terrorism policies that have targeted them?

Out of this emerges two questions: why do some local bureaucrats invest in central government counter-extremism policies, in terms of delivering community engagement efforts and establishing functioning intervention procedures, while these types of programs are de-prioritized elsewhere? After these policies have been rolled out locally, why do (largely Muslim) communities that are targeted by government CVE policies participate in counter-extremism efforts differently in different localities?

Existing Explanations

The scholarship provides several answers that partially explain sub-national variation in counter-extremism policy outcomes, but these theories leave us wanting when it comes to explaining evolving local responses on the ground. I review explanations from across several bodies of literature before laying out the core theory.

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[234] Hirsi, Ibrahim. "Government's Anti-Extremism Initiative Divides Twin Cities' Somali Community." *MinnPost*. 17 February 2015. https://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2015/02/governments-anti-extremism-initiative-divides-twin-cities-somali-community/; House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee. *Preventing Violent Extremism: Sixth Report of Session 2009–10*. London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2010. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmcomloc/65/65.pdf

[235] Crenshaw, Martha, and Gary LaFree. *Countering terrorism*. Washington, D.C.,: Brookings Institution Press, 2017, 97.

Counter-Terrorism Literature

The literature on CVE programs[236] has been largely critical of central government counter-extremism strategies highlighting key normative debates, that I reviewed in Chapter Two. However, less attention has been given to exploring why local actors approach these policies differently at the sub-national level.[237] The counter-terrorism literature has also focused largely on the central government level, examining how differences in threat perceptions and security capacity,[238] or so-called "strategic cultures" dictate state responses to terrorism.[239] Abrahms examines the role of regime type, noting that "democracies prevail in counterterrorist campaigns,"[240] while Foley highlights the role of pre-existing organizational routines.[241] But these explanations leave us wanting when it comes to explaining sub-national variation in counter-terrorism policy outcomes. If local counter-terrorism approaches are dictated by local threats,[242] cities with higher threat levels should outpace their neighbors in investment in counter-extremism efforts. However, I show in the following chapters how local responses do not align neatly with these predictions.

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[236] There is some literature that outlines the benefits of so-called "delegitimization" approaches. See literature review in: Pate, Amy. "Surveying the Literature on Counter-Terrorism, Counter-Insurgency, and Countering Violent Extremism: A Summary Report with a Focus on Africa." *Report to the Strategic Multilayer Assessment Office, Department of Defense, and the Office of University Programs*. Department of Homeland Security. College Park, MD: START, 2015, 8-9.

[237] There is a small literature that assesses the local implementation of CVE strategies and divergence in local response: Innes, Martin et al. *Assessing the Effects of Prevent Policing: A Report to the Association of the Chief Police Officers*. London: The Association of Chief Police Officers, 2011; Vivien, and Leila Thorp. "Preventing violent extremism—why local context matters." in *The New Extremism in 21st Century Britain*, eds. by Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin. Abingdon: Routledge, 2010, 123-141; O'Toole, Therese et al. "Governing through Prevent? Regulation and Contested Practice in State–Muslim Engagement." *Sociology* 50.1 (2015): 1–18; Ambrozik, Caitlin. "Community stakeholder responses to countering violent extremism locally." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* (2018): 1-25; Bokhari, Kamran. *Countering Violent Extremism and American Muslims*. George Washington University: Program on Extremism. October 2015.
https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/downloads/CVE%20Bokhari.pdf

[238] Shapiro, Jeremy, and Daniel Byman. "Bridging the transatlantic counterterrorism gap." *Washington Quarterly* 29.4 (2006): 33-50; Omelicheva, Mariya. "Combating terrorism in central Asia: Explaining differences in states' responses to terror." *Terrorism and Political violence* 19.3 (2007): 369-393; Davis, Lois et al, *Combating Terrorism: How Prepared Are State and Local Response Organizations?* Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2006.

[239] Rees, Wyn, and Richard Aldrich. "Contending cultures of counterterrorism: transatlantic divergence or convergence?." *International affairs* 81.5 (2005), 906.

[240] Abrahms, Max. "Why Democracies Make Superior Counterterrorists." *Security Studies* 16.2 (2007), 226.

[241] Foley Frank. "Reforming Counterterrorism: Institutions and Organizational Routines in Britain and France." *Security Studies* 18.3 (2009): 435–78.

[242] Davis, Lois et al, Combating Terrorism: How Prepared Are State and Local Response Organizations? Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2006.

The broader security scholarship has discussed the importance of civilian support for the success of counter-insurgency operations and the survival of terrorist groups.[243] Intelligence from members of the public in particular is considered a critical component of counter-terrorism.[244] The counter-insurgency literature casts civilians as making a calculus in deciding whether to support and share information with governments or insurgent groups, which is often thought to be based on the provision of public goods and protection from violence.[245] In looking at gangs in American cities, scholars make similar observations, highlighting how gangs work to retain community loyalty,[246] both through threats of violence against tipsters and by providing protection to community members.

But these frameworks have limitations when it comes to explaining local responses to counter-extremism. For one, many of the extremist groups of such concern to governments are not violent, such as the banned, radical group Al Muhajiroun.[247] Dan Byman cites a British study showing that, "two-thirds of the British foreign fighters (to the Islamic State) had ties to only six preachers or recruiters in the United Kingdom, while almost 80% has some sort of connection to an extreme, but non-violent, Islamist group."[248] Still, the role of such groups in motivating acts of terrorism remains unclear, with a leaked UK government report dismissing such a connection.[249] Also unlike insurgent groups, these organizations usually do not offer state-like services and often operate within relatively generous welfare states. It is

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[243] Berman, Eli, and Aila M. Matanock. "The empiricists' insurgency." *Annual Review of Political Science* 18 (2015): 443-464; Kalyvas, Stathis N. *The logic of violence in civil war*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006; Cronin, Audrey Kurth. *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009; See discussion of "civilian-centric camp" in Mir, Asfandyar. "What explains counterterrorism effectiveness? Evidence from the US drone war in Pakistan." *International security* 43.2 (2018): 45-83.

[244] Williams, Michael, John Horgan, and William Evans. "The critical role of friends in networks for countering violent extremism: toward a theory of vicarious help- seeking." *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 8.1(2016): 45-65; Kurzman, Charles. *Muslim-American Terrorism Since 9/11: An Accounting*. Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security. 2 February 2011; Hoffman, Bruce. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, 169.

[245] Berman, Eli, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Joseph H. Felter. "Can hearts and minds be bought? The economics of counterinsurgency in Iraq." *Journal of Political Economy* 119.4 (2011): 766-819; Berman, Eli, and Aila M. Matanock. "The empiricists' insurgency." *Annual Review of Political Science* 18 (2015), 447; See discussion of "civilian-centric camp" in Mir, Asfandyar. "What explains counterterrorism effectiveness? Evidence from the US drone war in Pakistan." *International security* 43.2 (2018): 45-83.

[246] Akerlof, George and Janet Yellen. *Gang Behavior, Law Enforcement, and Community Values*. Washington, DC: Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, 1994.

[247] Yeginsu, Ceylan. "One of U.K.'s Most Prolific Extremist Cells Is Regrouping." *New York Times*. 18 May 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/18/world/europe/uk-extremist-cell-anjem-choudary.html

[248] Byman, Daniel. *Road Warriors: Foreign Fighters in the Armies of Jihad*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, 218.

[249]Gilligan, Andrew "Hizb ut Tahrir is not a gateway to terrorism, claims Whitehall report." *The Telegraph*. 25 July 2010. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/journalists/andrew-gilligan/7908262/Hizb-ut-Tahrir-is-not-a-gateway-to-terrorism-claims-Whitehall-report.html

clear that the calculus for citizens to take part in government CVE programs is distinct in a number of ways from the trade-offs described in the counter-insurgency literature and thus demands separate theorization.

The small literature on civilian participation in counter-terrorism elevates the role of trust in local law enforcement for eliciting cooperation with counter-terrorism, arguing that expectations of fair police treatment produces greater willingness to share information with police.[250] Conversely, mistrust is thought to be one of the greatest obstacles to community cooperation with law enforcement around counter-terrorism.[251] Police treatment is undoubtedly important when it comes to shaping how communities interface with CVE agendas. However, in the case studies that follow, I show how community participation varies across cities where law enforcement utilize highly similar policing approaches. Community participation also changes over time in individual localities, despite the fact that policing approaches remain the same. This suggests the presence of additional mechanisms that are also important to explain how local actors will collaborate with state counter-terrorism efforts.

Other scholars have stressed the role of credible individuals in shaping the effectiveness of counter-extremism efforts. Chowdhury and Krebs note the importance of what they call "mobilizing moderates" in counter-terrorism, arguing that the legitimacy of political moderates is partly a function of the ways these individuals are positioned vis-à-vis the state and community members.[252] Looking at domestic counter-extremism efforts, Spalek emphasizes what she calls "connectors" who are "positioned at the intersections of sometimes overlapping communities"[253] that can help facilitate participation in counter-terrorism. Braddock and Horgan, similarly, emphasize that counter-narratives that attempt to dissuade

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[250] Spalek, Basia. "Community Policing, Trust, and Muslim Communities in Relation to 'New Terrorism.'" *Politics & Policy* 38.4(2010), 789–815; Huq, Aziz Z., Tom R. Tyler, and Stephen J. Schulhofer. "Mechanisms for eliciting cooperation in counterterrorism policing: Evidence from the United Kingdom." *Journal of empirical legal studies* 8.4 (2011): 728-761; Innes, Martin. "Policing Uncertainty: Countering Terror through Community Intelligence and Democratic Policing," *Annals of American Political Social Sciences* 605 (2006), 3; Gillum, Rachel. *Muslims in a Post-9/11 America: A Survey of Attitudes and Beliefs and Their Implications for U.S. National Security Policy*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2018.

[251] Weitzer, Ronald. "Police Race Relations" in *The Oxford Handbook of Police and Policing*, ed. by Michael D. Reisig and Robert J. Kane. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 18.

[252] Chowdhury, Arjun, and Ronald R. Krebs. "Making and mobilizing moderates: Rhetorical strategy, political networks, and counterterrorism." *Security Studies* 18.3 (2009), 379.

[253] Spalek, Basia. "Community engagement for counterterrorism in Britain: An exploration of the role of "connectors" in countering Takfiri jihadist terrorism." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 37.10 (2014), 826.

individuals from supporting terrorism should rely on "identifiable, respected sources."[254] I build on these insights in the theory that follows, arguing that network factors drive how local civil society leaders respond to counter-extremism agendas and under what conditions they can influence both bureaucrats and co-religionists.

Local Bureaucracy Literature

The literature on bureaucratic capacity provides additional frameworks through which to understand the local implementation of counter-extremism programs. Of particular relevance is the scholarship on "street-level bureaucrats" that examines how local bureaucrats manage various top-down and bottom-up constraints using personal discretion to shape local policy outcomes.[255] Other scholars observe how differences in local government capacity impact the ways that localities respond to the threat of terrorism.[256] In the case studies that follow, I describe how bureaucrats use discretion in important ways, influencing how communities interfaced with CVE policies. But neither individual-level discretion nor bureaucratic capacity seem able to explain patterns of sub-national variation on their own. I show how policy outcomes differ on the ground, both between cities and in individual locations over time, where bureaucrats maintain similar training, bureaucratic routines, multi-agency partnerships, and managers. This divergence points toward the relevance of variables outside local government alone.

The literature on social regulatory policy provides additional insights. CVE programs, like social regulatory policies "involve multiple political actors and tend to be highly salient,"[257] where local actors have discretion about how they will invest in these policy areas. Sharp outlines a number of responses

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[254] Braddock, Kurt, and John Horgan. "Towards a guide for constructing and disseminating counternarratives to reduce support for terrorism." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 39.5 (2016), 393.
[255] Lipsky, Michael. *Street-level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in Public Service*. London: Russell Sage Foundation, 2010; Gilson, Lucy. "Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Service." in *The Oxford Handbook of Classics in Public Policy and Administration*, ed. by Martin Lodge, Edward C. Page, and Steven J. Balla. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015; Durose, Catherine. "Front-line workers and 'local knowledge': Neighbourhood stories in contemporary UK local governance." *Public administration* 87.1 (2009): 35-49.
[256] Chenoweth, Erica and Susan Clarke. "All terrorism is local: Resources, nested institutions, and governance for urban homeland security in the American federal system." *Political Research Quarterly* 63.3 (2010): 495-507.
[257] Haider-Markel, Donald P. "The politics of social regulatory policy: State and federal hate crime policy and implementation effort." *Political Research Quarterly* 51.1 (1998), 72.

which range from evading, responding, or repressing local interests.[258] Scholars in the field of social regulatory policy specify a number of factors that shape these responses from institutional features of local government, such as the existence of a local mayor,[259] to the role of local governing coalitions,[260] highlighting how interest groups shape policy outcomes when they have connections to key local government decisionmakers.[261] I draw on the concept of the governing coalition in the theory that follows, focusing on pre-existing connections between minority civil society leaders and the state, which I argue is an important part of understanding the ways that bureaucrats choose to invest in CVE agendas.

Local Politics and Voting

Debates around local politics have often focused on what Oliver et al. call "propertied elites preoccupied with economic development."[262] Peterson has described how local governments have unique constraints on their autonomy which is inherently "limited" in comparison to national governments,[263] arguing that these limitations in turn disincentivize political participation.[264] What then are the conditions under which communities are more likely to participate politically and make their demands known at the local level?

The literature on local voting tells us that citizens typically vote in local elections at lower levels than in national ones;[265] those that do tend be highly informed.[266] Many have observed that minorities and

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[258] Sharp, Elaine, ed. *Culture Wars and Local Politics*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999; Sharp, Elaine B. and Michael Brown. "Cultural Conflicts, Religion, and Urban Politics." in *The Oxford Handbook of Urban Politics*, ed. by Peter John, Karen Mossberger, and Susan E. Clarke. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 396.

[259] Sharp, Elaine B., Dorothy M. Daley, and Michael S. Lynch. "Understanding local adoption and implementation of climate change mitigation policy." *Urban Affairs Review* 47.3 (2011): 433-457.

[260] Sharp, Elaine, ed. *Culture Wars and Local Politics*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999, 16.

[261] Sharp, Elaine B., and Michael Brown. "Cultural Conflicts, Religion, and Urban Politics" in *The Oxford Handbook of Urban Politics*, eds. by Peter John, Karen Mossberger, and Susan E. Clarke. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 398-399.

[262] Oliver, J. Eric, Shang E. Ha, and Zachary Callen. *Local elections and the politics of small-scale democracy*. Princeton University Press, 2012, 9; See also discussion of the "power elite" in Peterson, Paul. *City Limits*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1981, 5.

[263] Peterson, Paul. *City Limits*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1981, 4.

[264] Peterson, Paul. *City Limits*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1981, 128.

[265] See discussion on "Local Elections in the Context of Declining Voter Participation" in Hajnal, Zoltan, Paul G. Lewis, and Hugh Louch. Municipal Elections in California: Turnout, Timing, and Competition. San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California, 2002, 1-4.

[266] See discussion of "homevoters": Oliver, Eric, Shang Ha, and Zachary Callen. *Local Elections and the Politics of Small-Scale Democracy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012, 8.

economically disadvantaged groups vote at lower levels.[267] However, scholars have specified conditions that are more conducive to the political participation of minority communities. For instance, Garbaye stresses the importance of institutional variables, such as electoral systems and the openness of political parties.[268]

The role of religious civic society organizations in mobilizing the political participation of minority communities has been well-documented.[269] In looking at the political participation of minority ethnic groups in Amsterdam, Fennema and Tillie stress the importance of linkages between ethnic civil society organizations for producing what they call "civic community," which they argue correlates with political participation.[270] Dancygier argues that political parties will make a greater effort to include Muslim minority candidates where minority communities can significantly impact electoral outcomes, highlighting the role of community leaders as an important factor in community mobilization.[271] I draw on the notion that civic networks and civil society leaders in particular help explain community responses to CVE agendas in the theoretical argument that follows.

Thatcher explores the role of local public opinion in shaping local counter-terrorism, suggesting that sub-national units (and police, specifically) often face political disincentives to invest in terrorism prevention because the public perception costs are high, while benefits are experienced by other cities.[272] Local policymakers are of course influenced by public opinion, however, public sentiment alone seems less able to explain policy outcomes. CVE agendas are controversial and unpopular in nearly every case, and yet local actors cooperate on CVE agendas in some localities and not others.

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[267] Weeks, Daniel. "Why Are the Poor and Minorities Less Likely to Vote?" *The Atlantic*. 10 January 2014. https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/01/why-are-the-poor-and-minorities-less-likely-to-vote/282896/; See description of socioeconomic status and voting: Jones-Correa, Michael A., and David L. Leal. "Political participation: Does religion matter?." *Political Research Quarterly* 54.4 (2001): 751-2.

[268] Garbaye, Romain. "Ethnic minority participation in British and French cities: a historical–institutionalist perspective." *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 26.3 (2002): 567-568.

[269] Jones-Correa, Michael A., and David L. Leal. "Political participation: Does religion matter?." *Political Research Quarterly* 54.4 (2001), 766; Jamal, Amaney. "The political participation and engagement of Muslim Americans: Mosque involvement and group consciousness." *American Politics Research* 33.4 (2005): 521-544.

[270] Fennema, Meindert and Jean Tillie. "Political participation and political trust in Amsterdam: civic communities and ethnic networks." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 25.4 (1999): 703-726.

[271] Dancygier, Rafaela M. *Dilemmas of Inclusion: Muslims in European Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017, 44.

[272] Thacher, David. "The Local Role in Homeland Security." *Law & Society Review*. 39.3 (2005): 635-76.

Policing and Immigration Literature

The policing literature also provides a number of theories to explain how minorities and local law enforcement interact with one another, with relevance for police-community relations around counter-extremism. Discriminatory treatment by police within minority communities has been extensively noted in the literature.[273] Scholars have explored how "neighborhood racial and class composition"[274] produces more aggressive and discriminatory modes of local policing. For instance, Sampson and Bartusch find that "neighborhoods of concentrated disadvantage display elevated levels of legal cynicism, dissatisfaction with police."[275] I earlier cited literature from Tyler et al. which outlined how members of the public are more likely to cooperate with police on counter-terrorism efforts when citizens perceive that law enforcement carry out their duties with procedural justice.[276] Other scholars have looked at how identity interacts with expectations of law enforcement. For instance, in Gillum's extensive survey of American Muslims, she finds that foreign-born Muslims and noncitizens are more trusting of law enforcement than US-born Muslim Americans, who are by comparison more aware of discriminatory treatment by police and expect that Muslim suspects will receive worse treatment than their non-Muslim counterparts.[277]

A number of scholars have focused on national integration regimes, debating their role in shaping the experiences of migrants and their ability to integrate into various host countries.[278] My aim is not to dismiss the relevance of these policies. However, I find significant differences in the ways that local bureaucrats and Muslim publics choose to relate to CVE programs at the sub-national level, despite

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[273] See literature cited in Soss, Joe, and Vesla Weaver. "Police are our government: Politics, political science, and the policing of race–class subjugated communities." *Annual Review of Political Science* 20 (2017): 565-591.
[274] Weitzer, Ronald. "Police Race Relations" in *The Oxford Handbook of Police and Policing*, eds. by Michael D. Reisig and Robert J. Kane. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 345-347.
[275] Sampson, Robert and Dawn Bartusch. "Legal Cynicism and (Subcultural) Tolerance of Deviance: The Neighborhood Context of Racial Differences." *Law & Society Review*. 32.4 (1998): 777-804.
[276] Huq, Aziz Z., Tom R. Tyler, and Stephen J. Schulhofer. "Mechanisms for eliciting cooperation in counterterrorism policing: Evidence from the United Kingdom." *Journal of empirical legal studies* 8.4 (2011): 728-761; Tyler, Tom R., Stephen Schulhofer, and Aziz Z. Huq. "Legitimacy and deterrence effects in counterterrorism policing: A study of Muslim Americans." *Law & society Review* 44.2 (2010): 365-402.
[277] Gillum, Rachel M. Muslims in a Post-9/11 America: A Survey of Attitudes and Beliefs and Their Implications for US National Security Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2018
[278] Ersanilli, Evelyn, and Ruud Koopmans. "Do immigrant integration policies matter? A three-country comparison among Turkish immigrants." *West European Politics* 34.2 (2011): 208-234; Joppke, Christian. "How immigration is changing citizenship: a comparative view." *Ethnic and racial studies* 22.4 (1999): 629-652.

operating under the same national integration frameworks. This highlights the need to look more closely at sub-national factors that might explain variation in policy outcomes. Dancygier's study of immigration and conflict in Europe looks at how the electoral power of immigrants interacts with economic scarcity to produce different patterns of conflict between immigrants, native populations, and the state at the local level.[279] Others have focused on the role of local socio-economic factors and the perceived lack of integration of Muslim communities in Europe as a driver of radicalization.[280] One might infer from these insights that better integrated communities will be more cooperative with state security objectives or resistant to extremist messaging.

In brief, the literature on immigration and policing both highlight the relevance of socio-economic factors. This literature leads us to expect that police will either avoid CVE policies altogether or deliver these programs in a punitive way in areas where Muslim minorities are less affluent, producing minimal willingness from members of the public to cooperate on counter-terrorism. Where Muslim minority communities are more affluent and better integrated into political life, they may be able to push for more collaborative policy approaches, which, the thinking goes, would be more conducive to community participation. My aim is not to dismiss the salience of these factors, but I find that community participation changes over time in cities, even when socio-economic factors are held constant. I also observe that CVE agendas are more swiftly rejected in the US, although American Muslim communities are more affluent and better integrated according to many indicators than their European counterparts. This points to the fact that socio-economic factors cannot on their own explain how CVE policies play out sub-nationally.

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[279] Dancygier, Rafaela. *Immigration and Conflict in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
[280] Leiken, Robert S. "Europe's Angry Muslims." *Foreign Affairs*. July/August 2005. Pincus, Walter. "Don't Ignore Western Europe, Terrorism Expert Warns U.S." *Washington Post*. 8 September 2005. https://wapo.st/2VSPuiN

Networks Literature

Finally, the literature on networks provides additional theories to explain the puzzle of interest. Scholars have argued that networks perform a wide range of functions from facilitating transnational advocacy[281] to mitigating against polarization and ethnic conflict.[282] Networks are also important within the terrorism literature,[283] they are thought to facilitate radicalization and enable the survival of radical groups.[284] Counter-terrorism scholars have also highlighted the importance of networks.[285] Many scholars have examined how civic networks promote social capital[286] and political participation, particularly within migrant communities.[287] Dancygier stresses how, what she calls, "embeddedness in traditional ethnoreligious communities" facilitates the mobilization of Muslim minority voters and ultimately access to local political representation.[288]

Much attention has also been dedicated to the role of network positioning and the kinds of connections individuals maintain in a given network. Granovetter famously stressed the importance of "weak ties,"[289] while Chapman and Lowndes explore how the "horizontal connections" between faith leaders and grassroots organizations and members of the public can enable leaders to more authentically represent community interests.[290] David Siegel has also explored how elite preferences combine with network

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[281] Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. "Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics." *International Social Science Journal* 51.159 (1999): 89–101.
[282] Varshney, Ashtosh. "Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond." *World Politics* 53.3 (2001): 362–98.
[283] Krebs, Valdis E. "Mapping networks of terrorist cells." *Connections* 24.3 (2002): 43-52.
[284] Sterman, David, and Nate Rosenblatt. "All Jihad is Local Volume II: ISIS in North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula." *New America*, 2018, 5; Neumann, Peter, and Shiraz Maher. "London Attack: How Are UK Extremists Radicalised?" *BBC News*. 5 June 2017. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-40161333; Kenney, Michael. *The Islamic State in Britain: Radicalization and Resilience in an Activist Network*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
[285] See discussion of "weak ties": Innes, Martin. "Policing uncertainty: Countering terror through community intelligence and democratic policing." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 605.1 (2006): 234-235; Chowdhury, Arjun, and Ronald R. Krebs. "Making and mobilizing moderates: Rhetorical strategy, political networks, and counterterrorism." *Security Studies* 18.3 (2009): 371-399.
[286] Putnam, Robert D., Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Y. Nanetti. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994; Woolcock, Michael. "Civil Society and Social Capital" in *The Oxford Handbook of Civil Society*, ed. by Michael Edwards. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
[287] Fennema, Meindert, and Jean Tillie. "Political participation and political trust in Amsterdam: civic communities and ethnic networks." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 25.4 (1999): 703-726; Morales, Laura, and Luis Ramiro. "Gaining political capital through social capital: Policy-making inclusion and network embeddedness of migrants' associations in Spain." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 16.2 (2011), 148.
[288] Dancygier, Rafaela M. *Dilemmas of Inclusion: Muslims in European Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017, 11.
[289] Granovetter, Mark S. "The Strength of Weak Ties." *American Journal of Sociology*. 78.6 (1973):1360-1380.
[290] Chapman, Rachael and Vivien Lowndes. "Searching for Authenticity? Understanding Representation in Network Governance: The Case of Faith Engagement." *Public Administration* 92.2 (2014), 284-286.

structures to produce divergent social outcomes, arguing that elites can mobilize networks where elites "have uniformly high internal motivations and a unique position within the network."[291]

In the discussion that follows, I build on many of the themes within the networks literature. I argue first that the structural properties of Muslim civil society networks differ sub-nationally, using some of the earlier cited scholarship to conceptualize these differences. I then show how these network properties shape how civil society leaders respond to CVE agendas and are able to influence both local bureaucrats and co-religionists.

I have reviewed several bodies of literature that draw attention to a number of important variables that ultimately inform the theoretical argument. But on their own, existing theories are unable to explain local policy outcomes, in terms of divergent responses to CVE agendas from local bureaucrats and members of the public. Explaining these policy outcomes requires a new theory that reflects the unique dynamics around CVE agendas. Before I discuss the theory in-depth, I outline my broader intellectual approach and core assumptions that frame the discussion that follows.

Bringing Rational Choice Approaches to Local Counter-Terrorism

This dissertation uses a rational choice framework[292] to theorize local actors and understand the logic behind their responses to central government policy. Rational choice approaches have already been used to illuminate the behavior of terrorists and terrorist organizations,[293] and to understand counter-terrorism approaches.[294] I bring a rational choice approach into the domain of local counter-terrorism,[295] which

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[291] Siegel, David A. "Social Networks and Collective Action." *American Journal of Political Science* 53.1 (2009), 135; See also: Siegel, David A. "When Does Repression Work? Collective Action in Social Networks." *The Journal of Politics* 73.4 (2011), 994.
[292] For a discussion on rational choice approaches see: Varshney, Ashutosh. "Nationalism, ethnic conflict, and rationality." *Perspectives on Politics* 1.1 (2003): 85-99; Becker, Gary S. *The Economic Approach to Human Behavior*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013.
[293] Berrebi, Claude. "The Economics of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: What Matters and Is Rational-Choice Theory Helpful?" in *Social Science for Counterterrorism Putting the Pieces Together*, ed. by Paul K. Davis and Kim Cragin. Santa Monica: RAND, 2009.
[294] Zegart, Amy B. *Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.
[295] While I rely heavily on rationalist frameworks, I acknowledge their limitations, in that they may leave out other motivations that lay behind individual decision-making. See: Varshney, Ashutosh. "Nationalism, ethnic conflict, and rationality." *Perspectives on Politics* 1.1 (2003): 85-99.

grounds a number of the assumptions I make about the ways local actors experience the unique pressures imposed by state security agendas.

This allows me to better understand the sub-national dimensions of countering violent extremism policies that have thus far received minimal theoretical attention. My work takes much inspiration from the scholarship of Rafaela Dancygier,[296] which I draw from to understand many of the same actors (in some cases even in the same locations) whom local states have sought out as allies in developing counter-extremism agendas. In the sections that follow, I introduce the core actors at the heart of the theory and lay out the specific assumptions I make about these groups that underlie the main theoretical argument.

Understanding Local Actors

Local Bureaucrats

It has already been acknowledged that local policymakers are often at the forefront of managing immigration policy,[297] despite the fact that the policy discourse around these issues focuses squarely at the central government level. Reflecting these broader trends, central governments design and promote CVE agendas, while the burden of implementation falls squarely on the shoulders of local bureaucrats who are tasked with implementing CVE strategies, from identifying community organizations to fund to establishing intervention efforts that can deter so-called "vulnerable individuals" away from violent extremism. In different national contexts, central governments grant local actors varying degrees of freedom in relation to CVE programs. On the whole, however, these policies aim to compel local actors to deliver at least some aspects of CVE initiatives (like distributing funding) but often allow significant

[296] Dancygier, Rafaela M. *Dilemmas of Inclusion: Muslims in European Politics.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017; Dancygier, Rafaela M. *Immigration and conflict in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
[297] Garbaye, Romain. "Ethnic Minority Participation in British and French Cities: A Historical–institutionalist Perspective." *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 26.3 (2002): 555–570; Vertovec, Steven et al. *Citizenship in European Cities: Immigrants, Local politics and Integration Policies*. New York: Routledge, 2016.

discretion around the specifics of policy implementation, for instance the degree to which local actors invest in intervention programming.[298]

Local bureaucrats are often presented by both critics and proponents of CVE as extensions of the state, unquestioningly rolling out CVE programs as envisioned by central governments. However, the small literature on the implementation of counter-extremism programs reveals that local bureaucrats are highly aware of the controversies associated with these strategies.[299] These policies place local governments in a tenuous position. On the one hand, CVE agendas make new resources available to local governments and introduce avenues to collaborate with central governments on high profile national security issues. For local government actors, collaboration on CVE can be a path to professional advancement. On the other hand, these policies pose new risks, asking local government personnel to navigate around divisive religious and political issues, in order to identify local partners with whom to deliver counter-extremism programming, risking a backlash from local minorities.[300] Misapplication of these policies—especially inappropriate referrals—may be seized upon in the local and national press, setting back relations between Muslim minority communities and the state.

I operate under the assumption that local bureaucrats are interested in maximizing access to state resources to fund community development priorities and showing support for government security objectives, particularly when they are under pressure by central government. But bureaucrats should also be highly reluctant to invite a political backlash over sensitive counter-extremism strategies. In deciding how to invest in these policies, I expect that bureaucrats weigh the potential costs and risks—the uncertainty around how to implement these agendas and the potential backlash bureaucrats may face from local constituencies—with the desire to access funding from the state and support government

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[298] In the UK, the central government has narrowed the range of discretion for local actors over time—now closely supervising nearly every aspect of counter-extremism activities on the ground. However, particularly at the outset of these policies, local bureaucrats had wider discretion over the ways they choose to invest in counter-extremism efforts.

[299] Thomas, Paul. "Changing experiences of responsibilisation and contestation within counter-terrorism policies: the British Prevent experience." *Policy & Politics* 45.3 (2017): 305-321; Lowndes, Vivien, and Leila Thorp. "Preventing violent extremism—why local context matters." in *The New Extremism in 21st Century Britain*, eds. by Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin. Abingdon: Routledge, 2010, 123-141.

[300] Klausen, Jytte. "British counter-terrorism after 7/7: Adapting community policing to the fight against domestic terrorism." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 35.3 (2009): 403-420.

security priorities. While bureaucrats are undoubtedly under some pressure from central government to prioritize CVE efforts, I operate under the assumption that state actors can make strategic choices outside central government dictates, specifically that they can choose how much and in what ways they will invest in CVE programs.

Conceptually, investment refers to the extent that cities deliver the core components of CVE programs on the ground, which I distill to a few core indicators involving the presence of a formal engagement strategy and the scope of intervention efforts, detailed in a subsequent methodology chapter. In practice, local governments can invest minimally in these programs, with little policy activity beyond distributing funds to community-based programs, while largely avoiding intervention activities. In other cases, local bureaucrats may choose to prioritize CVE programs, developing a wide-ranging engagement strategy and intervention efforts. Theoretically, local governments can deliver CVE programs without significant community participation. But community participation is definitional to the success of CVE. These policies are designed to mobilize communities to engage with state-funded programming and provide information about individuals deemed "at-risk," who may then take part in intervention programming.

Muslim Elites

In practice, state actors have relied heavily on (largely Muslim) community intermediaries to mobilize members of the public around CVE agendas. Bureaucrats repeatedly partner with these individuals—often religious and civil society leaders—to navigate around the complexity inherent to CVE programs and to access members of the public. Thus, understanding these intermediaries—their motives and actions—is a crucial part of theorizing local CVE programs. Because these policies have focused almost exclusively on engaging Muslim communities—the role of Muslim community leaders is particularly critical.

While Muslim leaders have been newly politicized around counter-terrorism, these individuals have often served in an informal political capacity partnering both with local and national governments around a

range of policy issues in years prior,[301] consulting with the state around community cohesion, race equality, and disparities in education and housing. Many of these elites also provided much-needed services, helping young people access job training or navigate the complexities of local bureaucracy to win grant funding or public housing,[302] though others have argued that these leaders lack meaningful connections to local constituencies.

I use the term Muslim elites as a shorthand to refer to local elected leaders and civil society leaders who are themselves Muslims in a given locality, but I recognize that the actual nature of local leadership is highly diverse and often actively contested,[303] reflecting differences across secular civil society and religious institutions from wide-ranging sectarian and ethnic backgrounds. I choose to distinguish Muslim leaders conceptually because government policies actively seek out and attempt to incentivize interlocutors to assist governments with engaging Muslim populations. I also acknowledge that elected leaders face different pressures and maintain different relationships to the state than unelected civil society leaders, though both maintain important representative functions on the ground.[304] Both elected politicians and unelected civil society leaders are sought after by the state to assist with CVE agendas, and I make the claim that both share similar concerns about the implications of CVE agendas. For the sake of parsimony, I categorize these leaders together, but in the case chapters that follow I provide more texture about how specific types of leaders navigate around CVE agendas on the ground.

I make a number of assumptions about Muslim elites. The first is that civil society leaders are eager to maintain their constituencies upon which they base their representational claims. This applies equally to elected leaders who require public mobilizations to win elected office and to civil society leaders who make more informal (but also significant) claims to representation. The second assumption I make is that civil society leaders are often actively seeking resources from the state to support their civil society efforts

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301 O'Toole, Therese, et al. *Taking Part: Muslim Participation in Contemporary Governance Report*. Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship: University of Bristol, 2013.
302 Dancygier, Rafaela M. *Dilemmas of Inclusion: Muslims in European Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017.
303 O'Toole, Therese, et al. *Taking Part: Muslim Participation in Contemporary Governance Report*. Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship: University of Bristol, 2013, 17-27.
304 Chapman, Rachael, and Vivien Lowndes. "Accountable, authorized or authentic? What do 'faith representatives' offer urban governance?" *Public Money & Management* 29.6 (2009): 371-378.

and provide services to fellow citizens, which can, at times, involve a degree of competition with other community leaders.[305] To maintain their position as intermediaries working between the local government and members of the public, I operate under the assumption that Muslim elites need to protect their network position, maintaining key contacts with the local state and a local, public following. I expect that elites may risk jeopardizing their claims to community representation should this (albeit often highly informal) public following substantially diminish.

In their role as representatives, these individuals may maintain civil society organizations that further entrench their positions of community leadership and provide much-needed services to community members. Through their relationships with local government, I expect that community leaders may be able to maintain a competitive advantage in accessing public funding used to deliver local services. In short, I claim that Muslim elites are operating a careful balance, working to protect their connections to local government, while also maintaining their community following.

Local bureaucrats have repeatedly recognized their inability to deliver nascent and sensitive CVE programs within predominately Muslim communities without local partners, in turn seeking out Muslim civil society leaders both for their community development work and connections to Muslim publics. At the local level, many of these leaders were the same individuals that had been serving in representative functions around a range of other policy priorities in years prior. To mobilize cooperation from these civic leaders, state actors have provided a number of incentives, notably through the provision of funding to grassroots organizations as well as political capital, such as memberships on local boards and consultation with key local and central government decisionmakers. For instance, Muslim leaders that assist with CVE programs have been invited to private receptions such as the White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism or consultation bodies like the UK's National Muslim Women's Advisory Group. I operate under the assumption that policy incentives will be particularly valuable to civil society

[305] Werbner, Pnina. "Theorising complex diasporas: purity and hybridity in the South Asian public sphere in Britain." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 30.5 (2004), 898.

organizations operating in a resource-scarce environment or that have depended on state resourcing in the past.

But CVE does not represent a conventional area of state policy; these are relatively new, controversial government-led programs designed to identify "at-risk" individuals and provide counter-messages predominately within local Muslim communities. Cooperation with these initiatives poses a number of unique risks that are likely to disincentivize local involvement. If community leaders engage with these programs—even in a highly critical or limited way—they may become vulnerable to criticism from policy opponents. Rival leaders or members of the public might easily cast Muslim elites as betraying their local community for funding and supporting state intelligence gathering. These claims may then dissuade members of the public from making donations to particular organizations or utilizing their services, for fear that their information may be shared with law enforcement. I call this kind of criticism and public challenge that threatens the ability of Muslim elites to maintain public support and credibility, *reputational damage*. Thus, I anticipate that many Muslim elites are simultaneously balancing the desire to maintain relationships with key government decisionmakers and access resources to provide community services, while minimizing potential reputational damage should they cooperate with Prevent agendas.[306]

There are several ways that elites could respond to the introduction of CVE policies in the face of these trade-offs. Elites might actively cooperate with CVE programs, collaborating with local government and police to deliver engagement programs and to share information with policy practitioners. Equally, elites might take a non-cooperative stance, simply avoiding these programs altogether or they might be partially involved, accessing government funding and consulting with local bureaucrats, while minimizing involvement around the more securitized components of CVE.

[306] See similar dynamics outlined in Bokhari, Kamran. *Countering Violent Extremism and American Muslims*. George Washington University: Program on Extremism, October 2015. https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/downloads/CVE%20Bokhari.pdf, 5.

Muslim Communities

While CVE programs often seek out Muslim elites as allies, these policies focus squarely on engaging (predominately Muslim) citizens. In this dissertation, I refer to Muslim communities as adherents of Islam in a particular locality, but I acknowledge that the term does little to characterize significant diversity across genders, sects, and ethnicities, as well as important cross-national differences between American and British Muslims. As Chakraborti has written,

> "greater attention should be paid to acknowledging the heterogeneity and diverse characteristics of the British Muslim population, as it is both difficult and dangerous to generalize about the policing of Muslim communities without affording suitable recognition to the very real differences in background, belief, experience and need among British Muslims."[307]

Though I recognize the limitations of this term, I choose to define Muslim communities in this way because central government policy has tended to treat Muslim communities as a single group without regard for diversity within these communities. In the case studies, I look in-depth at different group identities within the Muslim community, along the lines of ethnicity, kinship, and religious sect.

In practice, CVE policies make repeated requests of citizens, and Muslim citizens particularly, asking that they attend CVE programs to develop "resilience"[308] against violent extremism and identify individuals who may then take part in intervention activities. Research indicates that Muslim communities are concerned about extremism and highly sympathetic to the goals of counter-terrorism.[309] But when it

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[307] Chakraborti, Neil. "Policing Muslim Communities" in *Policing beyond Macpherson: Issues in Policing, Race and Ethnicity*, ed. by Michael Rowe. Cullompton: Willan, 2007, 109.
[308] Mirahmadi, Hedieh. "Building resilience against violent extremism: A community-based approach." *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 668.1 (2016): 129-144.
[309] Pew Research Center. *U.S. Muslims Concerned About Their Place in Society, but Continue to Believe in the American Dream.* Pew Research Center, 2017. http://www.pewforum.org/2017/07/26/terrorism-and-concerns-about-extremism/, 8-9; Gillum, Rachel M. *Muslims in a Post-9/11 America: A Survey of Attitudes and Beliefs and Their Implications for US National Security Policy*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2018, Kindle Locations 2701-2702; Clements, Jon, Manon Roberts, and Dan Forman. *Listening to British Muslims: policing, extremism and Prevent*. London: Crest Advisory, March 2020.

comes to participating in CVE programs, community members may fear discriminatory treatment and punitive action by the state.[310]

Despite these legitimate and well-documented concerns, I observe that local Muslim communities targeted by CVE programs participate in these agendas differently at the sub-national level, in some cases with more active cooperation (at least among sections of local publics), while these efforts are largely resisted or ignored elsewhere. I conceptualize participation in CVE programs as the extent that members of the public are involved in supporting and engaging with CVE programs and policy objectives, in terms of attendance at CVE programming and willingness to share relevant information or referrals with state actors. Specific indicators are further detailed in the methodology chapter.

Before I progress with the core theory, a few caveats are in order. My goal is to understand how and why communities voluntarily cooperate with government CVE agendas, which I try to assess to the best of my ability in light of various constraints. While I operate under the assumption that participation in terms of attendance at CVE programs and information-sharing are voluntary, state actors have been repeatedly accused of gathering intelligence from community members in ways that are covert and non-consensual. Though I was not able to identify such tactics in the course of my research, this must be acknowledged.

It is also important to highlight debates around referrals and information sharing with police in the context of CVE. I consider a greater number of referrals from members of the public as an indication of higher community participation, but it must be said that these referrals have consistently proved problematic and controversial. The fact that CVE referrals have placed individuals on law enforcement radar for baseless reasons is well documented.[311] Referrals may also be made deliberately to inflict harm or embarrassment on others. Indeed, the UK government has acknowledged the potential for abuse

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[310] Gillum, Rachel M. *Muslims in a Post-9/11 America: A Survey of Attitudes and Beliefs and Their Implications for US National Security Policy*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2018; Lakhani, Suraj. "Preventing Violent Extremism: Perceptions of Policy from Grassroots and Communities." *The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice*. 51.2 (2012): 190-206.
[311] Dodd, Vikram. "School questioned Muslim pupil about Isis after discussion on eco-activism." *The Guardian*. 22 September 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/education/2015/sep/22/school-questioned-muslim-pupil-about-isis-after-discussion-on-eco-activism; Khaleeli, Homa. "'You worry they could take your kids': is the Prevent strategy demonising Muslim schoolchildren?" *The Guardian*. 23 September 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/sep/23/prevent-counter-terrorism-strategy-schools-demonising-muslim-children

inherent to these referrals, noting a screening process whereby "malicious, misinformed, or misguided"[312] referrals are identified and removed. Information about referrals is of course highly restricted, so I am not able to make additional inferences about the nature of the information that communities provide to the state. Equally, my ability to discern what level of referrals from members of the public we ought to expect is also limited—especially in light of the controversy around the logic that underlies CVE programs and the notion of radicalization that I outlined in Chapter Two. As I detail in the Methodology chapter that follows, I deal with these challenges by measuring participation through many, different qualitative indicators, that together provide a picture of how members of the public are willing to interface with CVE agendas.

In brief, I make the claim that controversial CVE programs create specific risks for local bureaucrats, Muslim elites, and wider Muslim communities. Yet, on the ground I observe that these actors choose to invest differently in CVE programs, producing important policy divergence in terms of policy delivery and community participation. I argue that these differences can be explained by the structure of local Muslim community networks which shape how local actors ultimately respond to CVE programs.

Core Theory

For many local bureaucrats who often have little prior involvement in counter-terrorism, CVE agendas represent a novel and controversial policy domain. In responding to nascent CVE agendas, I anticipate that local bureaucrats will want to access government funding associated with counter-extremism and position themselves as allies within national counter-terrorism efforts. State actors will also be concerned about how to go about implementing these strategies without actively alienating minority constituencies. Bureaucrats likely recognize that they cannot sustain sensitive partnerships with Muslim communities and implement programs to disseminate counter-narratives on their own. There are clear administrative

[312] Department for Education. *Advice note: Safeguarding vulnerable individuals in Higher Education from terrorist groups*. https://www.safecampuscommunities.ac.uk/uploads/files/2017/05/advice_note_safeguarding_in_he_050517.pdf Accessed 11 February 2020.

challenges around how to design and deliver CVE programs and interventions, as well as how to go about engaging members of the public.

Forcing these agendas from the top-down is not conducive to mobilizing community networks around CVE programs or creating receptivity to ideological messaging. The political and administrative demands of CVE policies effectively require cooperation from civil society. To manage these challenges, I argue that state actors are likely to draw from pre-existing Muslim civic networks, defined as the relationships between Muslim communities, Muslim elites, and the local state. Differences in the structure of Muslim networks then refers to variation in the strength and number of ties between elites, co-religionists, and the state.

To inform their responses to CVE agendas, I argue that state actors are likely to rely in particular on Muslim elites with whom they already share network connections (what I call *elite-state linkages*). This insight builds from the scholarship on urban politics, which highlights the importance of interest groups inside the "governing coalition"[313] that determine government responses to social regulatory policies.[314] The connections between local government and Muslim elites are important for several reasons. I start with the assumption that local bureaucrats are more likely to rely on Muslim leaders with whom they have historically consulted to estimate the preferences of wider Muslim communities.[315] Bureaucrats should also be motivated to maintain the support of key community leaders (both religious leaders across various sectarian groups, elected officials, and secular civil society groups) that they have historically partnered with around other policy domains. Community leaders might also assist state actors by designing and implementing some counter-extremism programming, effectively minimizing political risks and complexities associated with the policy area.

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[313] Sharp, Elaine B. *Culture Wars and Local Politics*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999, 6.
[314] Sharp, Elaine B., and Michael Brown. "Cultural Conflicts, Religion, and Urban Politics" in *The Oxford Handbook of Urban Politics Oxford*, eds. Peter John, Karen Mossberger, and Susan E. Clarke. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. DeLeon, Richard. "San Francisco and Domestic Partners: New Fields of Battle" in *Culture Wars & Local Politics*, ed. by Elaine Sharp. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999; Rosenthal, Donald B. "Regime Change and Gay and Lesbian Politics in Four New York Cities." in *Culture Wars & Local Politics*, ed. by Elaine Sharp. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999.
[315] DeHanas, Daniel Nilsson et al. *Muslim Participation in Contemporary Governance: Literature Review Summary*. University of Bristol. September 2010, 4.

When Muslim community leaders choose to cooperate on CVE agendas, I expect that bureaucrats will be able to rely on their knowledge and social connections, partnering with civic elites around various aspects of CVE programming. Without support from these individuals, local governments are likely left to implement poorly defined and controversial CVE programs alone—an administratively challenging and politically risky feat. Where Muslim elites that are well connected to local government before CVE choose to cooperate with CVE programs, bureaucrats can more easily manage the trade-offs associated with CVE policies, relying on partnerships with community leaders. These partnerships should then ease the ability of bureaucrats to invest in CVE programs.

Effectively, I argue that support from well-known elites acts as a signal that local governments should be able to deliver CVE programs without alienating key political allies and wider local constituencies. By contrast, where well-connected elites oppose CVE initiatives, I expect that local governments will be more likely to avoid delivering these programs, wary of "going at it alone." Where there are few elite-state connections at the outset of CVE policies, bureaucrats are likely to be less motivated to deliver these policies and might attempt to distance themselves from CVE programs, particularly around the more securitized aspects of the policy.

But what shapes elite responses to counter-extremism agendas, to choose to collaborate or not? For Muslim elites, I argue that CVE policies present steep trade-offs. Cooperation with counter-extremism efforts might provide Muslim elites with government funding to buttress community organizations and provide services to community members. CVE programs also offer access to key government decisionmakers and other potential political opportunities that might easily bolster positions of civil society leadership. However, affiliation with this state security program could also make individuals vulnerable to reputational damage from co-religionists, in the form of public criticism that might curtail the willingness of community members to use an organization's services or make donations, harming an organization's public credibility.

I argue that the position of Muslim elites within civic networks vis-a-vis local government and co-religionists shapes the balance of risks and incentives, ultimately dictating how Muslim elites will respond

to CVE programs. Elites that are connected to local government are likely to be better positioned to extract benefits from participation and thus more motivated to cooperate with CVE programs. In the contest for funding, elites linked to government should be able to use pre-existing relationships with key decisionmakers to out-maneuver new organizations and secure financial incentives to resource their community organizations and further buttress their community leadership positions. In some cases, supporting CVE programs may be a mechanism for Muslim elites to limit the entrée of other organizations from securing positions of community leadership and liaising with the state on the community's behalf. I expect that organizations without pre-existing connections to the local state are less likely to access CVE funding, and they may use disengagement to demonstrate their commitment to Muslim community interests.

While I anticipate that Muslim elites will be interested in maximizing access to policy incentives, these leaders are also likely estimating the reputational damage they may face for publicly collaborating with the state on counter-terrorism. CVE programs are broadly contentious, but I argue that local network structures also shape the risks elites face for collaborating on state counter-extremism policy, specifically the pre-existing connections between Muslim elites, what I call *inter-elite linkages*. Empirically, inter-elite dynamics can take a variety of forms, but I delineate two types. The first is where elites are disconnected from each other and have an internally competitive dynamic. The second is where elites are internally linked together, without competition. I expect that where Muslim elites are highly connected together and inter-elite competition is low, community leaders will be less concerned about the reputational damage they will face for cooperating with CVE agendas. In these instances, elites are likely to be more confident to cooperate with CVE programs. In practice, this could take the form of actively facilitating community participation, assisting local government in expanding their network of contacts, and sharing relevant information with law enforcement. By contrast, where inter-elite competition is higher, elites are at greater risk of reputational damage,[316] jeopardizing their public following or access to public donations;

[316] Bokahri describes how inter-organizational competition impacts how American Muslim groups have responded to CVE agendas. See: Bokhari, Kamran. *Countering Violent Extremism and American Muslims*. George Washington University: Program on Extremism, October 2015. https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/downloads/CVE%20Bokhari.pdf, 5

they should then be more tentative about backing CVE programs, either avoiding these agendas entirely or lending partial support to the state.

The connections between Muslim elites and community members, what I call *elite-mass linkages*, are also important for shaping the nature of reputational damage. Where there is organized public opposition to CVE programs, I expect that elites will take note and curb their support for counter-extremism initiatives for fear of damaging their connections to local publics. But in the absence of public mobilization, where inter-elite connections are strong, I anticipate that elites will be more willing to support CVE policies, since they are not likely to expect to face reputational damage for doing so. In short, I make the claim that network structures shape the way elites navigate trade-offs associated with CVE programs and ultimately determine how to respond to CVE programs. I have also argued that network structures will determine how bureaucrats choose to invest in counter-extremism agendas on the ground. But even after these policies are rolled out, CVE agendas sometimes elicit wider community participation, but they are often met with little community involvement.

To clarify, CVE programs are not designed to stimulate mobilization around government counter-terrorism efforts en-masse. Participation is often deliberately limited to smaller groups who are sought after to take part in CVE programs, consultations, or interventions. While CVE policies impact the daily lives of only a fractional part of the civilian population, variation in community involvement can still be observed at the local level. In some cases, there is genuine civil society involvement—though it may be narrow and episodic. Members of the public are more likely to interface with CVE programs and share relevant information with state actors—even though they may remain highly critical about the policy. Elsewhere, these kinds of consultations or exchanges about risks almost never occur. Countering violent extremism efforts essentially remain the aspiration of the state, and participation is limited to a select few civic allies. I argue that these differences in participation can also be explained by local networks, specifically the connections between Muslim elites and other co-religionists.

As should now be clear, Muslim elites often make representational claims, though in many cases they are not elected. These claims to community representation can be highly contested and evolve over time,

with leaders positioned in relation to different parts of what are often highly heterogeneous Muslim communities. I am not suggesting that leaders control local constituencies and the nature of these ties can be highly fluid and ill-defined. However, elites can be situated in relation to co-religionists through elite-mass ties in very different and meaningful ways. In some cases, these leaders lack routine connections to members of the public and do not appear to be widely relied on or trusted. In other instances, these leaders provide services that members of the public repeatedly rely on or draw on family networks to maintain a more regular presence in the lives of co-religionists.

Differences in elite-mass connections, I claim, shape how elites can translate their policy preferences across the wider network and thus the nature of community participation. Where elites back CVE efforts and are highly connected to members of the public, they can use their network position to mobilize higher levels of community involvement in these agendas. Leaders might also utilize inter-elite connections to access a wider range of community members, in effect pooling broader community support around CVE programming. Where elites support CVE efforts but lack strong ties to co-religionists, community participation in CVE initiatives should be relatively low. Elites may be able to mobilize some community involvement, but they are likely to struggle to influence wider cross-sections of the network and produce higher levels of participation. Finally, where elites do not collaborate with the state on CVE and are highly connected to other elites and members of the public, they could use their network connections to discourage engagement with CVE, producing minimal public involvement in counter-terrorism efforts. In the sensitive and contentious domain of counter-extremism, I argue that well-connected Muslim elites are an important influencing factor that shapes the way some citizens choose to engage with CVE programs.

In the theory I developed, Muslim elites act as the causal mechanism translating network structures into different local policy outcomes. In brief, I argue that Muslim elites should be more willing to cooperate with CVE agendas when they can leverage pre-existing ties to the state in the context of low inter-elite competition and the lack of a mobilized opposition. Local bureaucrats, in turn, are likely to be more willing to invest in nascent CVE agendas when they can rely on elites with established connections to the state to manage the political and administrative trade-offs associated with these programs. Where Muslim

elites back CVE programs and maintain links to co-religionists via inter-elite and elite-mass ties, they will be able to mobilize higher levels of participation, effectively leveraging earlier networks of trust.

Elite responses to CVE programs are not "locked-in" over time—rather they are subject to change. I expect that elites are likelier to remain collaborative on counter-extremism policy when they can continue to access some incentives from the state, while minimizing reputational damage. When CVE policies change, for instance where government approaches become more punitive, it becomes less feasible for elites to cooperate with state agendas, unless they are insulated from reputational damage. Wherever Muslim elites face higher risks for cooperating with state security efforts, I assume that they will limit their ongoing support for CVE programming.

I argue that network structures also explain the kinds of reputational damage elites are likely to face over time. In networks with higher inter-elite competition and weaker elite-mass ties, elites should experience increasing reputational damage for cooperating with CVE initiatives, especially if governments modify CVE programming to make these agendas more punitive. Public opposition movements may be able to exploit gaps between Muslim elites and members of the public to mobilize citizens against CVE policies and individuals collaborating with the state. Reflecting pre-existing network competition, rival elites could also accuse other community leaders of supporting state surveillance policy. Facing growing reputational damage, I assume that elites will limit cooperation with CVE programs moving forward, which could pose obstacles for bureaucrats attempting to mobilize community participation in the future.

If CVE programs become more restrictive or punitive, I anticipate that elites will only be able to maintain a cooperative stance where networks are highly connected and can serve a *protective function*. In networks with developed inter-elite and elite-mass connections, elites may be able to lend some assistance to the state without damaging connections to members of the public. Strong ties between elites and community members are likely to leave less room for opposition movements to organize and threaten local elites. Networks with tighter inter-elite ties should also mitigate against opposition from rival elites. In effect, I argue that more connected networks can shield Muslim elites from reputational damage, allowing

community leaders to continue facilitating some degree of public participation in counter-extremism strategies over time.

CVE Policies Over Time

Having spelled out the theoretical argument, it is important to address the temporal dimension of CVE agendas as an additional variable. As CVE programs have evolved, so too have narratives around these programs, with increasing public awareness and opposition to these approaches locally and nationally. The simultaneous growth of social media amplifies these broader trends, heightening public awareness about CVE programs and policy opposition. Although the UK's Prevent policy faced criticism from its public rollout in 2007, there was some degree of initial optimism among civil society around cooperating with the then-nascent CVE agenda, as evidenced by the willingness of a wide range of stakeholders to engage with the government's counter-extremism effort. But as the policy evolved, the public discourse around these policies darkened. Concerns that Prevent (and other national CVE strategies) stigmatize Muslim communities, censor dissent, and involve government surveillance have become ubiquitous and surfaced in nearly every interview I conducted. On the ground, much of the initial willingness to engage with the state's counter-extremism efforts within civil society has faded.

The evolution of these narratives also has transnational effects. American CVE efforts faced public opposition from their inception, often drawing on policy narratives and civil liberties concerns taken directly from UK policy debates. The fact that critiques of Prevent influenced the policy trajectory of US CVE efforts highlights how the evolution of policy narratives shapes future policy efforts. Effectively, this means that the history of CVE programs creates a degree of path dependency, where early policy experiences impact later policy outcomes.

Concurrent with these developments, social media has also become more embedded in the daily lives of citizens. It is hard to identify a single impact of social media on policy outcomes alongside a range of other local and national variables. However, a crucial effect of growing social media connectivity is the amplification of policy opposition, in some cases heightening reputational damage for individual civil society organizations taking part in CVE activities. These developments together—the evolution of policy

narratives over time and the growth of social media— mean that future iterations of CVE agendas are to a degree always shaped by earlier policy legacies, rendering the initial iteration of UK Prevent unique to the extent that it operates before the eventual hardening of public opinion.

My theoretical expectations build from these insights. I anticipate that-risks of reputational damage will rise in the face of growing public opposition. In the face of growing costs, civil society leaders are then likely to limit their cooperation with counter-extremism efforts, which should then lead to a decline in public participation. My findings, however, challenge the notion that the shift in the public discourse around CVE programs is the main driver of local policy outcomes. Instead, I argue that local network dynamics continue to shape patterns of policy adoption, even as policy narratives change over time. Highlighting this, I show how patterns of participation diverge over time both between and within-cases, although policy opposition increases over time in nearly every case. In many instances, evolving policy narratives around counter-extremism raise risks of reputational damage and lead civil society leaders to back away from CVE agendas, mainly where public mobilization occurs or where there are higher levels of inter-elite competition. But elsewhere, I observe continued participation from at least some members of the public, even after concerns about the policy have become mainstream. For instance, in Chapter 5, I show how several civil society leaders in Leicester remain collaborative with the Prevent agenda over time, partnering with policy practitioners and utilizing their network connections to help facilitate some level of sustained participation. To explain these local reactions, I point to specific features of local civic networks that have reduced network costs over time.

While the evolution of CVE policy narratives over time must be acknowledged, I continue to observe policy divergence on the ground, even after growing policy opposition and the hardening of public opinion locally and nationally. I take this as further evidence that local network dynamics are a critical factor explaining local responses to central government counter-extremism policy, interacting with these broader policy shifts to shape outcomes on the ground. Where civil society leaders and members of the public reject CVE programs in the context of these developments, it may not be possible for policymakers to rebuild a meaningful consensus around counter-extremism initiatives. Still, there may be some conditions around which governments can encourage more sustainable policy cooperation around

the main objectives of counter-extremism programs, by addressing some major policy concerns and giving autonomy to local actors. I discuss these potential policy reforms in the conclusion.

Explaining Local Network Structures

I have argued in this chapter that pre-existing network structures shape how CVE policies play out on the ground. In the following section, hypothetical networks are presented that then map onto different CVE outcomes at the city-level in line with the theory. But first, what causes variation in these network structures to begin with? I look in detail at the many factors that produce Muslim civic network structures in the case studies that follow. In short, these network dynamics reflect a range of factors such as ethnic diversity, sectarian distinctions, kinship groups, as well as the history of state engagement—that together shape how Muslim communities relate to each other and to the local state before the introduction of CVE agendas. While these various factors produce important differences in the structure of local community networks, they operate independently of counter-extremism policy, which was introduced after local network structures had already long been in place.

Main Hypotheses

Drawing from the theory, I now outline how different network structures lead me to make specific predictions about how CVE agendas will play out locally. In the section that follows, I highlight different hypothetical network configurations that reflect my earlier characterization of the conceptual features of civic networks.

To be clear, these are idealized networks that deliberately minimize complexity to illuminate the theory. In practice, network shapes often take on more complex forms or middling values in the real world, as I

detail in later chapters. However, to explicate the logic of the theory I reduce complex network dynamics to the following prototypical network structures.[317]

Highly Connected Network



Figure 3.1 Highly Connected Network

In this *highly connected network*, there are well established elite-state linkages, and Muslim elites are very inter-connected, in what I will assume is an absence of inter-elite competition. Community leaders also have a high degree of connectivity to members of the public. I claim that in deciding how to respond to nascent and controversial CVE programs, elites will be making a cost-benefit analysis that reflects trade-offs that are specific to local networks.

Key Predictions

I predict that elites will be more willing to cooperate with CVE agendas because elites have a number of ties to local government and to co-religionists, without significant inter-elite competition. Elites should be able to use pre-existing ties to key decisionmakers to access policy incentives. I also expect that elites are

[317] I leave out networks where Muslim communities are highly internally linked (in terms of either inter-elite or elite-mass linkages) but lack connections to the local government. These network structures are less likely to emerge in the real world; they defy the logic of earlier scholarship which argues that strong inter-communal ties will produce higher levels of political participation and connections to local government more broadly. See: Dancygier, Rafaela M. *Dilemmas of Inclusion: Muslims in European Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017. I assume that communities who can build ties to the state will choose to do, so I treat this network type as an empty cell, following the logic of what Ellman calls "logical compression... deleting cells that are the product of impossible or highly improbable combinations of variables." See: Elman, Colin. "Explanatory Typologies in Qualitative Studies of International Politics." *International Organization* 59.2 (2005), 200.

less likely to face reputational damage from co-religionists because of the lack of network competition. For instance, Elite A can use their connections to local government to access CVE resources without fear that Elite B will damage their connections to members of the public. Elite cooperation can take many forms including assisting state actors in devising and delivering counter-extremism efforts, as well as engaging wider communities.

I hypothesize that local state actors also recognize the trade-offs associated with CVE efforts and that they will be wary of the potential political costs and administrative obstacles associated with the policy area. State actors are likely to manage these challenges vis-à-vis community leaders with whom they already share network connections, in effect relying on these leaders to estimate the feasibility of rolling out CVE programs. I predict that bureaucrats will invest more in CVE programs where Muslim elites have pre-existing elite-state ties and are willing to cooperate with CVE agendas. Government investment in CVE often takes the form of more routine public engagement and the maintenance of intervention procedures with public agencies as partners. I anticipate that bureaucrats will proceed more cautiously, only partially delivering these policies or avoiding them altogether, where elites that are well connected to the state oppose CVE agendas.

In this highly connected network, elites have a higher degree of ties to members of the public. I predict that elites can use their network position to mobilize higher levels of participation around CVE agendas, even in the face of public apprehensions about these agendas. For instance, Elite A can mobilize community members around CVE programs. Elite A can also use network connections to Elite B to stimulate wider participation across the network. This can take the form of attendance at consultations, programs, and in rare cases, members of the public voluntarily sharing information with the state. I predict that the network's high levels of connectivity should serve a protective function against reputational damage, both from other elites and from the mobilization of public opposition, enabling leaders to continue cooperating with CVE agendas and leveraging their network ties to mobilize some level of community participation over time.

Inter-Elite Connected Network



Figure 3.2 Inter-Elite Connected Network

In *inter-elite connected networks*, there are many elite-state and inter-elite linkages, in what I will interpret as an absence of inter-elite competition. Community leaders lack dense ties to members of the public.

Key Predictions

I predict that elites are likelier to cooperate with CVE agendas because elites can use pre-existing ties to state decisionmakers to access policy incentives, without the risk of reputational damage from rivals. However, the lack of elite-mass connections is likely to create openings for opposition movements to emerge and mobilize the public, heightening reputational damage. This leads me to predict that, in the absence of public mobilization, more community leaders will cooperate with CVE programs, which can take the form of assisting state actors in devising and delivering counter-extremism efforts, as well as engaging wider communities. Where public opposition is already mobilized, I anticipate that Muslim elites will limit their cooperation with CVE agendas.

I predict that bureaucrats will invest more in CVE programs where Muslim elites with pre-existing ties to the state cooperate with CVE agendas. By contrast, where elites oppose CVE agendas, I anticipate that bureaucrats will proceed more cautiously, only partially delivering these policies or avoiding them altogether. Inter-elite connected networks feature fewer elite-mass ties than highly connected networks. Thus, I predict that leaders in inter-elite connected networks can leverage ties to other Muslim elites to mobilize some participation around CVE, but less so than in other networks with more elite-mass ties. I

expect this participation will take the form of lower levels of attendance at CVE programming and comparably less willingness to share information with the state.

Over time, I anticipate that weaker ties between elites and members of the public will leave gaps for opposition movements to exploit, leaving community leaders more vulnerable to reputational damage. In the face of growing reputational damage, I anticipate that elites will disengage from CVE programs. Local bureaucrats are then likely to struggle to sustain earlier levels of community participation without cooperation from intermediaries.

Elite-Mass Connected Network



Figure 3.3 Elite-Mass Connected Network

In *elite-mass connected networks*, there are well established elite-state linkages and elite-mass connections, but a lack of inter-elite ties, in what I will assume is a higher competition network.

Key Claims

I predict that elites will be warier of reputational damage in this more competitive network, despite incentives associated with the policy area. These dynamics are likely to dissuade community leaders from cooperating with CVE programs altogether or produce more limited forms of cooperation. Where elites that are well connected to the state oppose or constrain their involvement with CVE agendas, I anticipate that bureaucrats will proceed more cautiously, only partially delivering these policies or avoiding them

entirely. In practice, bureaucrats might deliver CVE policies in a way that emphasizes community development and avoids investment in the securitized aspects of the policy.

While a weak coalition of elites and local government actors might hold together for a time, producing some form of community participation that builds on pre-existing elite-mass connections, I anticipate that elites will disengage from CVE efforts over time if they face growing reputational damage, either from rivals or from local opposition movements. If elites disengage from CVE efforts, I predict that local governments will be unable to sustain community participation, producing further diminished rates of community involvement in CVE efforts.

Disconnected Network



Figure 3.4 Disconnected Network

In *disconnected networks*, there are a dearth of connections between the state and Muslim elites, as well as few inter-elite connections, in what I will assume is a more competitive network. The network also lacks elite-mass ties.

Key Claims

I expect that elites in disconnected networks will anticipate more significant reputational damage from rival elites or opposition movements that can exploit network openings to mobilize public opposition. Elites in the network also lack pre-existing connections to local government which should limit their ability to access policy incentives. Facing greater risks of reputational damage and obstacles to accessing

policy incentives, I predict that most elites will choose to minimize their cooperation with CVE programs, either avoiding the policy area altogether or providing limited support to state actors.

Bureaucrats are less likely to invest in CVE agendas without support from Muslim elites. Policy efforts, if any, are likely to minimize investment in the securitized aspects of the policy. Without cooperation from civic elites, I expect that CVE programs will progress with more minimal community participation. Even if state actors identify some community leaders to assist with programming, I anticipate that these efforts will struggle to stimulate community participation across the more diffuse network.

If local bureaucrats face significant top-down pressure to invest in CVE, they may be able to navigate around the disconnected network to build some direct ties with members of the public without relying on intermediaries. However, I predict that rates of community participation will remain lower than in highly connected networks where elites actively cooperate with CVE efforts and leverage network connections to other elites and members of the public.

The Predicted Causal Chain

Figure 3.5 illuminates the broader causal chain, looking at how different structural properties of civic networks explain policy responses by local actors, highlighting the theoretical relationships described throughout this chapter.



Figure 3.5 Explaining Counter-Extremism Policy Outcomes Sub-nationally

Scope Conditions

I recognize that the precise reasons individuals choose to participate in counter-extremism programs and share sensitive information with police are many and varied. My goal is not to explain the drivers behind individual instances of cooperation around countering violent extremism programs. Rather, I have identified an important causal mechanism that helps to explain city-level differences in responses to counter-extremism efforts over time, with important implications for policymakers. Despite the

limitations of the theory, the insights I draw out are important because CVE agendas have been historically under-researched, although these agendas are rapidly being expanded by central governments and have already directly influenced the lives of citizens.

I expect my argument to hold in democratic settings where central governments have introduced CVE policies, which prioritize community participation and where this participation remains voluntary. I acknowledge, however, that CVE policies in democratic settings have targeted Muslim communities unfairly, at times using non-security related engagements as a front for information gathering,[318] posing questions about the degree to which community members ultimately choose to interface with security programs.

The theory also rides on a very specific understanding of countering violent extremism policies, where counter-extremism efforts are ostensibly non-coercive and separated from more traditional counter-terrorism efforts, though the relationships between these policy areas have been debated in practice.[319] If CVE programs prosecute individuals simply on the basis of their views, I anticipate that citizens will be wary of participating in counter-extremism agendas, regardless of local network structures. Having outlined the core theory and scope conditions, I now turn to a discussion of this study's theoretical implications.

Theoretical Implications

To explain variation in local policy outcomes, this dissertation looks beyond explanations found in the literature, like terror threat levels and state capacity, focusing instead on the role of civic networks. By paying attention to variation in network dynamics and how these structures shape individual actions in

[318] See the discussion around community surveillance and CVE programs in Chapter Two.
[319] There is a debate about the actual separation between counter-extremism and more traditional counter-terrorism measures. See: House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee. *Preventing Violent Extremism Sixth Report of Session*. London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2010, 52-55. There are also concerns about the extent to which intervention programs criminalize citizens despite these programs remaining ostensibly voluntary. See: Grierson, Jamie. "Database 'reinforces worst fears' about Prevent, says Labour." *The Guardian*. 7 October 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/oct/07/secret-prevent-index-reinforces-worst-fears-about-programme

the domain of counter-terrorism, this dissertation makes important contributions to the literature on security, urban politics, and immigration.

The literature on terrorism has long emphasized networks in explaining how terrorists mobilize and organize acts of violence.[320] I argue that networks are also important in shaping how civilians choose to collaborate with counter-terrorism agendas. Rather than broader security dynamics, the theory emphasizes how local actors look to their immediate social connections to determine the feasibility of engaging with state security policies. The counter-terrorism literature has often assumed that security threats overshadow local political dynamics, but the theoretical framework developed here highlights that both community members and state actors remain highly concerned about the political risks and incentives they face locally.

I argue that these risks and incentives emerge from local network structures, allowing us to make specific predictions about how counter-extremism policy will play out locally. This insight builds off a tradition in urban politics which emphasizes the importance of alliances between governments and special interests in explaining the behavior of local governments. This dissertation thus echoes older insights in the field of urban policy—that cities are motivated differently than central governments and prioritize the policy preferences of groups well-connected to key decisionmakers.[321] Even in the domain of counter-terrorism—where we might expect other factors to take precedent—networks guide how local actors choose to navigate around contentious state policies.

The theory also highlights that local Muslim diaspora networks vary in important ways with significant implications for policies that attempt to engage these communities. Much research on immigration has preferred to take a national lens, lacking bottom-up perspectives, a gap that has been noted in the literature.[322] This dissertation looks at how Muslim civic networks differ at the city level in terms of the

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[320] Zech, Steven and Michael Gabbay. "Social Network Analysis in the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence." *International Studies Review* 18.2(2016): 1–30; Krebs, Valdis E. "Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells." *Connections* 24. 3(2002): 43–5.
[321] Peterson, Paul. *City Limits*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1981.
[322] Ireland, Partick. "Reaping What They Sow: Institutions and Immigrant Political Participation in Western Europe." in *Challenging Immigration and Ethnic Relations Politics: Comparative European Perspectives*, eds. by Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

ways Muslim communities relate internally and to the state and ultimately, I argue, to CVE programs. As such, this dissertation enriches existing policy debates that have focused on the impact of national security programs on Muslim communities.

As Muslim communities have established a more public presence in Western countries, so too have Muslim leaders. A final theoretical contribution of the dissertation is to look closely at the concept of Muslim leadership at the sub-national level. While the literature involves a small discussion of Muslims in electoral politics[323] the role of unelected Muslim "representatives" has received less attention,[324] although these individuals have become increasingly politicized amidst state security policies that target Muslim communities. I look beyond Muslim leadership in the electoral domain alone and show how community leaders build off religious and familial networks at times yielding significant influence over social and political life.

Muslim elites thus occupy a unique domain that has received minimal attention so far—at times relied on by local government to guide state engagement and by other co-religionists. While these individuals draw their representative claims from their affiliation with "the community," their political reality can differ from other co-religionists. Drawing from the literature on networks, the theory highlights that elites have different political opportunities and exposure to risk that can be explained by their unique network position vis-a-vis coreligionists and the state.[325]

These theoretical insights allow me to make more specific predictions about how elites situated in particular networks will respond to state security policies, with implications for policy outcomes over time. The theoretical framework I have developed to understand Muslim civil society networks could potentially inform a wider range of scholarship, particularly around migrant communities and local civil

[323] Dancygier, Rafaela M. *Dilemmas of Inclusion: Muslims in European Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017.
[324] There is a small literature on Muslim civil society leaders. See for instance: O'Toole, Therese, et al. *Taking Part: Muslim Participation in Contemporary Governance Report*. Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship: University of Bristol, 2013.
[325] Siegel, David A. "When Does Repression Work? Collective Action in Social Networks." *The Journal of Politics*. 73.4 (2011): 993-1010.

society. Having explicated the theoretical logic, I now turn to a discussion of the research methodology I use to test the theory.

Chapter 4 Methodology

In the previous chapter, I argued that local civil society network dynamics—rather than other variables that come to mind when we think about counter-terrorism—shape how local actors decide to take part in controversial counter-extremism efforts. Muslim elites, in particular, act as the causal mechanism that translates network structures into local policy outcomes, determining both whether bureaucrats decide to invest in counter-extremism policies and how communities take part in the long term. I argue that elites are likelier to cooperate with state security policies when they have existing connections to the state and where inter-elite competition is low. Where elites support CVE policies and maintain connections to co-religionists, they can use their ties across the network to mobilize more participation in CVE programming. I expect that elites will be less willing to cooperate with CVE programs, where networks are more diffuse or feature higher levels of competition or a mobilized opposition. This should, in turn, produce minimal investment from bureaucrats and few avenues for community members to take part in counter-extremism agendas.

The crux of my argument is that responses to counter-extremism programs are a product of local community dynamics closer to home, rather than variables like counter-terrorism capacity or terror threat levels. I test this theory using a multi-pronged approach that combines case selection, within-case social network analysis, and process tracing techniques. I first outline the broad research design, before discussing the component parts in turn. Having spelled this out, I outline the major methodological contributions.

Research Design

I pursue a research strategy that allows me to develop and test a new theory to explain local responses to CVE agendas. Specifically, my goal is to test if different network structures shape CVE outcomes on the ground, as well as testing a range of alternative hypotheses. To do this, I use several methodological approaches (case selection, social network analysis, and process tracing) that mutually reinforce each other and together provide a strong test of the core theory.



Figure 4.1 Research Design

Building on the logic of Mill's Method of Difference, I selected four UK and two US cities as the main testing ground for the theory, where I observe CVE policies play out differently over time. To do this, I need to establish substantive differences in terms of the ways that local actors responded to CVE agendas, by conceptualizing what I mean in terms of investment by bureaucrats and participation by communities, using a range of indicators to show policy variation between the cases. The cities I selected share a number of similarities across many potentially confounding variables, but they differ in terms of local responses to CVE agendas. By selecting highly similar cases that share many variables thought to explain policy outcomes, I can test alternative hypotheses and zero in on the causal mechanisms of interests. I then discuss the cases in highly similar pairs, which allows me to establish more controls on potentially confounding variables.

Within each case, my task is to show how network structures produce different responses by local actors on the ground. To do this, I first use social network analysis as a preliminary measure of the independent variable for each of the selected UK local authorities. I make a number of predictions about the relationship between civic networks and CVE policy outcomes, and I need to show that network structures and policy outcomes vary in line with those predictions. For instance, my theory would be ruled out if I observed very little state investment in CVE agendas and minimal community participation in a network where elites were historically highly connected to the state and co-religionists, in the absence of inter-elite competition or mobilized public opposition. Equally, in a network with high levels of inter-

elite competition and where elites lack pre-existing connections to the state, I would not expect significant investment by bureaucrats nor high levels of community participation.

But I need to do more than merely show covariation between network structures and outcomes, rather I must establish that network dynamics specifically structure the way that local actors respond to CVE programs. To do this, I use within-case process tracing, to test both the main hypotheses as well as alternative hypotheses, using evidence from 139 interviews as well as archival sources. Interviews were of particular importance because they allowed me to speak with primary sources and probe the motivations behind their actions, testing both my core hypotheses and alternative explanations. I describe the logic of process tracing in greater detail later in this chapter, but in brief, I look for statements from multiple interviewees from different perspectives that confirm each prediction in the causal chain. Together, these research strategies help me to isolate the causal mechanisms of interest, test alternative mechanisms, measure variation in local social networks, and map how these differences produce distinct policy outcomes on the ground. I break apart the various components of the research design in the sections that follow.

Case Selection[326]

I ground my study in the United Kingdom, which provides a rich opportunity to test my theory. The UK's counter-extremism strategy, Prevent, is seen as the model for CVE policy in other countries—for instance, the US, Canada, and Australia draw heavily from the UK's experience in the development of their counter-extremism strategies. I also test the theory in two US cities which provides an additional opportunity to see how the argument holds up in a very different institutional context.

My goal is to approximate a "most similar systems" research design by selecting cases that vary on the dependent variable but are relatively similar across other potentially confounding independent variables. There is a debate about selecting cases on the dependent variable. King, Keohane, and Verba describe

[326] In each of the case studies, I examine CVE activities for a particular set of time. In the UK, I focus on Prevent policy developments from 2007 to 2019. In the US, I look at how counter extremism strategies play out from 2014 to 2019.

how selection on the dependent variable may lead researchers to unintentionally "underestimate the causal effect" if the range of selected cases is more limited than in the real world,[327] while other scholars have argued that selection on the dependent variable is a useful way to test necessary conditions.[328] Recognizing this, I work to correct for any potential bias by selecting from the full range of the outcome variable, specifically the entire list of UK Prevent Priority areas and from the three DHS CVE pilot cities. I detail the particular case study selection strategy in the section below.

UK Cases

To select the UK cases, I use a two-step process, first selecting four cases using UK government indicators from a database of all UK priority areas. This ensures that I am capturing the full range of variation. Because central government indicators have significant limitations, I use more in-depth qualitative metrics to measure outcome variables and confirm the case selection.

I first use central government indicators that evaluated local Prevent implementation between 2008 and 2010, known as National Indicator 35 (NI 35) which captured "resilience to violent extremism."[329] The indicator measured local authority Prevent performance[330] according to four criteria: local engagement with Muslim communities, local understanding of the causes of violent extremism, development of a Prevent action plan, and effective oversight of Prevent projects on a scale from 1 to 5 (with 5 being the highest) and then averaged into a single value.[331] Using these indicators, I classified the 46 local authorities designated as priority areas in 2015, designating areas with lower scores as localities where bureaucrats

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[327] King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. *Designing social inquiry: Scientific inference in qualitative research*. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1994, 130.

[328] Goertz, Gary, and James Mahoney. *A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012, 139-140;George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004, 23.

[329] Department of Communities and Local Government. *NI 35: Building Resilience to Violent Extremism.* https://data.gov.uk/dataset/ni-035-building-resilience-to-violent-extremism 3 December 2010. Accessed 28 February 2020.

[330] Although NI 35 scores are self-reported by local authorities, the central government framework mandates a peer review process that aims to ensure that scores are relatively standardized and can give a snapshot of how local delivery functioned in the first years of the strategy.

[331] HM Government. *Self-assessing Local Performance Against NI 35: Building resilience to violent extremism.* https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/18244/response/59705/attach/7/NI%2035%20Self%20Assessment.pdf Accessed 28 February 2020; The NI 35 framework was used to measure local performance during Prevent I. Subsequent policy evaluations have not been made public to the best of my knowledge, meaning that I can only access standardized measures of local performance during Prevent I.

invested less in Prevent and those with higher scores as areas where state actors were investing more heavily in counter-extremism efforts, using a scoring metric I devised.[332] I provide a list of the 46 areas designated as priority areas in 2015 in an appendix.

I then selected four areas, two higher-scoring areas and two lower-scoring localities. While the NI 35 provides a preliminary indication of sub-national Prevent variation, these indicators are self-reported, reflect central government priorities for Prevent, and provide minimal assessment of community participation.

To address these limitations, I used additional qualitative metrics I developed to verify the classification of cases in terms of both policy delivery and community participation, which are detailed more thoroughly in the process tracing section. I aim to understand the degree to which a locality has a formal engagement strategy and the scope of intervention efforts. I also want to capture the ways that communities participate in broad programs and consultation and their willingness to share relevant information about extremism with the state.

As I detail at length in later case study chapters, the four selected cases share many similarities across a range of other variables, with similar threat priority designations and levels of central government funding. The cities are home to relatively large Muslim populations that are in many cases spatially concentrated in more deprived wards. There are a number of other similarities in terms of reported levels of community cohesion, crime, deprivation, and satisfaction with police. Finally, the four cases fall within two regions, where local police are managed by the same regional Counter Terrorism Units working to standardize counter-terrorism policing efforts.

[332] Local authorities with subcomponent scores of 1, 2, or 3, without a score of 4 in the first year, I classify as areas that invested less in policy delivery. Local authorities with all scores greater than 2 and with at least one score of 4 in the first year and more than one score of 4 in the second year, I classify as areas that invested more heavily in Prevent policy delivery.

US Cases

In addition to the four UK cases, I also selected two US cities—Boston and Los Angeles—where CVE outcomes differ on the ground. Both cities were part of the Department of Homeland Security's Countering Violent Extremism "three city pilot program." In selecting the US cases, I used data from policy reports and on-background conversations with researchers to understand policy outcomes within the three pilot cities. I selected Boston because there was more minimal policy investment in CVE initiatives at the outset, while bureaucrats and civil society leaders in Los Angeles appeared to have more initial interest in investing in CVE agendas at the time of conducting this research.

The cities share some important areas of commonality. Both are politically progressive cities, with similar allocations of federal funding to deliver CVE, and common investment in police reform in the years leading up to the introduction of CVE agendas. However, I find important differences on the ground. CVE programs were swiftly rejected in Boston, while I observe more initial enthusiasm for CVE activities in Los Angeles, later subsiding after policy reforms under the Trump administration.

The US context also differs from the UK in a number of respects, allowing me to test the salience of alternative explanations and examine the limits of the theory in a different social and political environment. Unlike in the UK, there is very little top-down pressure or guidance for local bureaucrats as to how to deliver CVE programs. The US also has a more punitive policing culture than the UK on the whole.[333] As I described in the earlier background chapter, the American Muslim community is better integrated than their European counterparts according to a number of indicators. The US cases thus serve as "least likely" test, where if the theory holds up to scrutiny, I can have greater confidence in its explanatory power.[334]

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[333] Witte, Griff. "What can US trigger-happy cops learn from Britain's gunless police?" *The Independent*. 12 June 2015. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/what-can-us-trigger-happy-cops-learn-from-britains-gunless-police-10316119.html

[334] Bennett, Andrew. "Process Tracing: A Bayesian Perspective." in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, eds. by Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady, and David Collier. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, 713.

Social Network Analysis

Having selected relatively similar cases that vary in terms of local policy outcomes, I need to establish that networks co-vary with outcomes on the ground as predicted by the theory. To do this, I use social network analysis[335] to visualize and measure connections between Muslim civil society organizations and between these organizations and local government. In the discussion that follows, I lay out how I assembled these social networks and the kinds of measures I use to capture both network-level properties and the centrality of individual nodes. I provide more granular detail about the social network analysis methodology I developed in the methodological appendix. Due to data constraints, I only assemble SNAs for the UK cases, using qualitative metrics to measure network dynamics in the US cases.

I use UK Charity Commission data to assemble a list of Muslim civil society organizations in a given locality and to map connections between organizations, their board members, and local government from 2014-17.[336] To assemble a database of Muslim charities in each of the four UK local authorities, I gathered a complete list of registered charities in a given locality. From this database, I individually coded thousands of registered charities to make a sub-sample of designated "Muslim charities" in each of the four UK cities, using a multi-part coding criteria. For more detail about the specific coding criteria I developed to identify the selected list of charities, see the methodological appendix.

To map connections between Muslim civil society organizations what I call inter-elite linkages, I follow from the work of Fennemma and Tillie, who focus on "interlocking directorates."[337] In line with their criteria, I measure a connection between two Muslim civil society organizations where an individual is a board member on both Muslim civil society organizations within the selected dates. This individuals'

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[335] Ward, Michael D., Katherine Stovel, and Audrey Sacks. "Network analysis and political science." *Annual Review of Political Science* 14 (2011): 245-264.

[336] I attempted to build SNAs for the UK cases in the years prior to the rollout of Prevent, which required issuing Freedom of Information Requests to the UK Charity Commission, but many of these requests were refused. Because of these challenges, I assemble SNAs for 2014-17. See methodological appendix for further discussion.

[337] This follows from the work of Fennemma and Tillie who focus on what they call "interlocking directorates," defined as, "those linkages between ethnic organisation that come into being when one person serves simultaneously on the governing board of two or more ethnic organisations." See: Fennema, Meindert, and Jean Tillie. "Political participation and political trust in Amsterdam: civic communities and ethnic networks." *Journal of ethnic and migration studies* 25.4 (1999), 713.

shared board membership thus serves as a path of length two between the civil society organizations.[338] To identify shared board memberships, I use Annual Returns (ARs) that registered charities submit to the UK Charity Commission, which list budgetary information and board-members for each Charity annually.

I establish elite-state ties in several ways: where a charity board member is a city councilor, a city council candidate, or selected as an official community representative on a city-level minority consultation forum. I also consider an elite-state tie when a charity receives local or central government funding. To do this, I use budgetary information that charities report in their Annual Returns and data about local elections and consultations.

To measure the connectivity of the network and the centrality of individual nodes I calculate:

- the *number of nodes* (both organizations and connecting board members)
- the *number of links* between Muslim civil society organizations via shared board memberships
- The *average degree*, which is the average number of connections of each node in the network
- I also calculate the *node of highest betweenness centrality*. Betweenness centrality measures how often a node falls along the shortest path between two other nodes.[339]

I calculate network measures with and without local government, recognizing that the local state is unlike other civil society organizations. While the social network analysis provides a standardized coding of the independent variable, I face the challenge of incomplete data because much civic activity is not reflected in Charity Commission reports. I provide more detail about these limitations and why the SNA remains a useful way to approximate network structures, particularly when combined with qualitative indicators in the methodological appendix. While the data limitations I faced are not insignificant, they were held

[338] I exclude board members from the social network analysis that are not paths between at least two nodes in the network.
[339] Disney, Andrew. "Social network analysis 101: centrality measures explained." *Cambridge Intelligence.* 2 January 2020. https://cambridge-intelligence.com/keylines-faqs-social-network-analysis; Hanneman and Riddle define betweenness centrality as the "extent that (nodes) fall on the shortest (geodesic) pathway between other pairs of actors. The idea is that actors who are "between" other actors, and on whom other actors must depend to conduct exchanges, will be able to translate this broker role into power." See: Hanneman, Robert A. and Mark Riddle. *Introduction to Social Network Methods*. Riverside: University of California, Riverside, 2005. https://faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/nettext/ Accessed 28 February 2020.

constant across all cities. As I show in the case studies that follow, I find important differences in the structural properties of local civic networks based on UK Charity Commission data alone, which gives added confidence about the validity of identified network structures.

Having outlined the case selection and social network analysis techniques, I now turn to discuss how I use process tracing in the selected cases, both to better understand network dynamics and to probe the specific reasons that explain local responses to CVE agendas.

Within-Case Process Tracing

Much of the work of testing the theory centers around within-case process tracing. I use this method to test the causal mechanisms that connect different network structures to local responses to CVE policies. To do this, I identify different "causal process observations" (CPOs)—that together help me test each step in the causal chain and rule out alternative explanations.[340] I gather CPOs from a range of archival sources such as local government action plans and reports, internal emails that have been released to the public, and local newspapers to establish the history of local policy activity, community dynamics, and the priorities of local actors over time. These documents provide a sense of how bureaucrats were carrying out counter-extremism policies in real time, as well as offering details about the public attendance and reception of these events, helping me to triangulate statements made in interviews, which often occurred many years after the policy activity in question.

I rely heavily on evidence from the 139 semi-structured interviews I conducted across the six cases with a range of local stakeholders, including local government officials, police, city councilors, civil society leaders, academics, and members of the public between 2015-2019. The breakdown of interviews is detailed in the figure below.[341]

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[340] Collier, David. "Understanding process tracing." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 44.4 (2011): 823-830.

[341] For the purposes of this figure, I treat "local government" officials as both local government employees and local elected officials. Admittedly the different role categories can overlap in practice. More details about individual interviewees is listed in the appendix.

Table 4.1 Breakdown of Interviews

	UK	*US*
Academic	3	6
Community Member	12	10
Law Enforcement	11	9
Civil Society Leader	37	29
Local Government	18	2
Central Government	0	2
Total Interviews	139	

I also conducted two off-the-record interviews with central government officials in the UK. Because these were off-the-record interviews, I do not count them as part of the 139 interviews detailed above.

Interviews focused on confirming basic facts around local network dynamics, policy delivery, and the nature of community participation in CVE. I also used interviews to understand why actors responded in particular ways to CVE agendas, asking them to trace their thought process over time, as well as to test alternative explanations.

Recruiting Interview Participants

To recruit interview participants, I used both a snowball sampling technique and a purposive sampling technique. These techniques ensured I captured the range of actors that were central to local counter-extremism policy and other perspectives less directly implicated in these programs. In each case, I recruited and interviewed obvious stakeholders such as local government officials, police officers, and civil society groups that were central to local policy development. I then asked these individuals to recommend other potential interviewees—both inside government and from wider civil society. But

snowball sampling can pose the problem of over-sampling in particular parts of the network, potentially biasing insights from interviews.[342]

To remedy the limitations of snowball sampling, I also used purposive sampling to deliberately recruit a wider range of stakeholders. For instance, I identified groups that publicly opposed CVE programs and civil society organizations that were never involved in CVE policy. I also sought out observers such as civil society leaders from a range of ethnic and religious groups as well as academics that observed the roll-out and reception of CVE programs. These interviews help me test and confirm the chain of events and the main causal mechanisms.

I recognize that there are limitations to using interviews as a data source because I am asking both about sensitive political dynamics and about events in the past. Individuals may suffer from lapses of memory or the desire to retell events in a politically advantageous way. An additional challenge is that state actors often maintain a more detailed recollection of policy developments than civil society leaders because CVE programming was often a sole focus for state actors who were required to document their activities over time. By contrast, for many civil society leaders, their involvement with counter-extremism efforts was part-time or voluntary, often occurring several years prior. Recognizing this, I was especially diligent about sampling a large number of civil society leaders and third-party perspectives to ensure non-government perspectives were well represented in the sample of interviewees.

Testing the Theory with Process Tracing

Across the interviews, I tried to establish basic facts about CVE policy delivery and community dynamics as well as to test the main causal mechanisms. To do this, I utilize metrics initially developed by Van Evera and adapted by other qualitative scholars to discern the impact of a particular piece of evidence, using necessary and sufficient conditions to confirm or disconfirm hypotheses.[343] For example, to test

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[342] Tansey, Oisín. "Process tracing and elite interviewing: a case for non-probability sampling." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 40.4 (2007), 770.

[343] Van Evera, Stephen. *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997; Collier, David. "Understanding process tracing." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 44.4 (2011): 823-830.

that well-connected elites who cooperate with CVE efforts can mobilize higher rates of community participation, I use a range of CPOs. When elites make this claim, I consider this a necessary but not a sufficient condition, since I expect that these individuals will hold their activism and personal influence in high esteem. By contrast when bureaucrats claim that community participation in Prevent could not have been achieved without the help of well-connected civil society leaders or explain how they tried and failed to achieve participation without well-connected elites, this has higher inferential leverage. It is unlikely that bureaucrats would specifically claim to be unable to achieve a policy outcome if this were not true. In short, the logic of process tracing helps me triangulate various statements to more clearly establish the policy's evolution and test specific causal mechanisms that drive policy outcomes on the ground. I now lay out the specific ways I use qualitative evidence to measure variables and test causal mechanisms.

Measuring Policy Outcomes

I use a range of qualitative indicators to measure policy outcomes in each case. I measure what I call *policy delivery*[344] as the degree to which a locality has a formal engagement strategy and the scope of intervention efforts. To do this, I capture whether a locality attempts to engage the community by establishing community-based programs that address violent extremism and via regular public consultation. I also assess whether an intervention effort is in operation and how soon these types of programs were implemented locally after the introduction of CVE programs. Finally, I examine whether local government leads intervention efforts and if they are supported by other local agencies, who are aware of and contribute to CVE efforts locally. I classify cases where local bureaucrats invest in engagement and local government-led intervention processes exist with involvement from public agencies, as areas where CVE agendas are being delivered. I categorize areas as partially delivering CVE policies, where local governments establish some community engagement and community-based programming, but intervention efforts are delayed and public agencies do not participate in these efforts. In a final set of cases, cities lag in delivering any CVE programming beyond distributing public funding,

[344] While CVE programs have been criticized for lacking definitional clarity, these agendas often involve these two broad components.

with little effort to engage communities or embed intervention efforts–essentially, avoiding CVE programs.

The nature of policy delivery to a degree shapes the kind of community participation that is possible on the ground. I define *community participation* as the extent that community members in a particular locality are involved in engaging and supporting CVE programs and objectives. When I measure participation, I am not referring to mass enthusiasm for CVE agendas nor widespread civic participation. CVE agendas are highly sensitive, and many CVE efforts are intentionally designed to focus on smaller groups rather than the population writ large. Even when community members cooperate with these agendas, they often maintain legitimate criticisms of government security approaches. Recognizing this, participation often looks limited and episodic.

Because the vast majority of CVE programming and engagements focuses on Muslim communities, nearly all of the community participation I measure takes place within these communities. My goal, of course, is not to advocate for the current design of CVE programming, rather to acknowledge that because of the lack of counter-extremism activities focusing on non-Muslim communities (which at times has been explicitly stated by central governments), it would be disingenuous to claim to be measuring community involvement outside Muslim communities.

To do this, I use a range of indicators to capture community participation: the average number of attendees at CVE programs, attendance at countering violent extremism consultation, if attendance at CVE programming aligns with the expectations of local bureaucrats, and the diversity of participants at CVE programs. I also try to gauge the extent of referrals from members of the public, if any, whether these referrals are increasing or decreasing over time, estimated community willingness to make referrals, and examples of community-based referrals.

As I have described, US CVE efforts operate on a different policy trajectory than the UK, with less investment in intervention efforts nationally and significantly fewer opportunities for members of the public to participate in counter-extremism programs. Recognizing this, I use similar, but slightly modified indicators to capture the extent that localities invested in delivering CVE policies. To measure policy

delivery in the US cases, I identify whether state actors publicized CVE efforts and the extent that they formally engaged communities around counter-extremism efforts. I also work to determine whether state actors intended to and actively designed plans for government-led intervention efforts. Though US CVE programs have interfaced with members of the public far less than in the UK, I still attempt to measure how members of the public responded to counter-extremism efforts in Los Angeles and Boston, using indicators such as the level of attendance at CVE programs and its alignment with programmatic expectations, where possible.[345]

Measuring Network Dynamics

I also use qualitative indicators to capture network dynamics. To measure *elite-state linkages* I identify informal connections, for instance, where state actors and civil society organizations consulted routinely or cooperated on policy areas in the past or where state actors and civil society organizations both refer to levels of interpersonal trust after working together in years prior. Where I am told by multiple interviews that little or no consultation between state actors and Muslim civil society organizations occurs, where state actors express confusion about how to identify civil society partners, or where I find documentary evidence suggesting that the state lacks civil society partners, I take this as evidence of weaker elite-state linkages.

I also use qualitative data to measure *inter-elite connections* and estimate the level of competition. To do this, I identify incidents of elite coordination, such as mobilizing together around one-off political or religious events or shared membership in umbrella bodies. I take this kind of intra-elite coordination as an indication of stronger inter-elite linkages. I also gauge the extent of historic inter-elite competition in a number of ways. I categorize areas as low competition where multiple interviewees from different perspectives describe a lack of network rivalry and where I find evidence that community leadership is organized with minimal contestation. Where elites are unable to coordinate together around common

[345] Because government managed CVE interventions are pre-operational in the US, I was not able to gather meaningful data about the frequency of referrals from members of the public, nor expected willingness to share such referrals between the two cities.

policy priorities, when I can find documentary evidence of inter-communal disputes, requiring third party arbitration, where elections for representative positions are highly contentious, or when state actors describe that competition hinders their ability to engage communities, I take this as evidence of higher levels of competition.

To measure the way that elites are connected to Muslim citizens, what I call *elite-mass connections*, I speak directly to community members to understand if elites influence the political behavior of co-religionists, how frequently elites interface with members of the public, and to what extent if at all, community members rely on elites for problem-solving. I also use evidence from interviews to identify whether Muslim leaders have faced public challenges in the past, which I take as evidence of weaker elite-mass linkages. I also use interview evidence to understand the extent to which young people are readily interacting with religious leadership. Where religious education networks are highly established and routinized, I take this as an indication of stronger connections between civil society leaders and members of the public, in comparison to areas where these types of networks are comparably weak or non-existent. I use this evidence alongside interview evidence from academics, interfaith leaders, and state actors who observe these dynamics from a distance, which can serve as an additional way to verify network dynamics.

Using Process Tracing to Test Causal Mechanisms

Having outlined how I measure social network dynamics; I now lay out how I test the causal mechanisms that connect network structures to specific responses by local actors. I make the claim that elites will be more willing to cooperate with CVE programs when they have relationships with state actors and do not expect to face reputational damage for cooperating with these policies. To test this, I look to establish from interviewees with different perspectives (civil society actors, state actors, third party observers) that interpersonal relationships between Muslim elites and state actors motivated collaboration around the CVE agenda. In cases where elites were less willing to cooperate with CVE agendas, I look for evidence that the state struggled to identify civic partners because of the lack of pre-existing civic partnerships or where civil society leaders explain that they were less involved in CVE efforts because they lacked

connections to key decisionmakers. I also look for specific evidence that elites that are better connected to key decisionmakers were advantaged in taking on leadership roles associated with the policy. One example would be if a number of interviewees tell me that local government partnered with civic organizations it had been working with in the past. I also use interviews to establish if elites without pre-existing connections to the state were disadvantaged in accessing CVE funding.

To test the claim that elites are dissuaded from cooperating on CVE agendas because of fears of reputational damage, I use several indicators. If a number of different civil society groups and state actors both refer to the reputational damage elites would face for cooperating on CVE agendas, in the form of a loss of followers or public support, I take this as evidence of higher risks of reputational damage. I also look for evidence of public challenges against elites, such as personalized threats, opposition campaigns, or newspaper articles that specifically name organizations cooperating with CVE efforts. By contrast, in cities where state actors and civil society leaders agree that they are relatively insulated from public opposition, where I cannot find examples of public challenge, and where community leaders readily admit that cooperation on counter-extremism efforts has not been personally damaging, I take this as evidence of lower levels of reputational damage.

I also use interview evidence to test the claim that elite responses shape the willingness of state actors to invest in CVE strategies. In cases where Muslim elites were more cooperative with CVE agendas, I look for evidence from state actors that they relied on elites to meet policy objectives that would not have otherwise been achieved and that elites guided local bureaucrats about how to deliver counter-extremism agendas. Another important indicator is whether state actors explain that they required partnerships from Muslim elites in order to invest in CVE agendas. In the absence of elite cooperation, I look for state actors to explain that they chose not to invest in CVE agendas because of the lack of partnership from civil society organizations or anticipation of other political costs, or other references to challenges posed by the lack of support from community leaders.

Finally, to test the argument that elites shape community participation, I use a number of indicators. For one, I look for statements from different civil society leaders, state actors, and third-party observers that

elites were able to mobilize some degree of participation in CVE programming, in terms of attendance at programs or sharing information with law enforcement. I also look for specific examples where community members brought relevant referrals to community leaders who then passed them on to state actors, where elites leveraged connections to other elites to mobilize higher levels of participation, or where observers describe how pre-existing trust of particular civil society leaders produced higher levels of willingness to interface with counter-extremism programming. Finally, where interviewees from different perspectives describe that discouragement from community leaders dissuaded participation in counter-extremism efforts or where state actors describe how they struggled to access members of the public due to opposition from community leadership, I take this as an indication that Muslim elites can use network connections to limit participation.

I also use the logic of process tracing to test alternative hypotheses. To test that community responses to CVE agendas are a reflection of public trust in the police, I specifically ask interviewees about the nature of community-police relations. Where interviewees cite relatively positive relationships with police but rates of community participation in CVE are extremely low, I take this as evidence that responses to counter-terrorism programs are not solely a function of community sentiment about the police. It is also important if community participation changes over time (either significantly decreasing or increasing), while policing approaches and public views about policing are held relatively constant. To test that local responses can be explained by the level of threats, I compare cities with similar levels of threat according to central government designations. I also use interviews to understand if local actors change their responses to counter-extremism programs in response to changes in the local threat, for instance in the aftermath of terrorist attacks or after ISIS-related arrests in a particular locality. If state actors and civil society leaders describe that these events do not change local policy responses, I take this as evidence that threats alone cannot explain policy outcomes. Finally, I test the salience of socio-economic factors by selecting cases with similar levels of deprivation, which allows me to hold the level of affluence relatively constant. The US cases serve as an additional opportunity to test the role of socio-economic factors, since Muslim Americans are notably more affluent than their European counterparts, yet I continue to observe sub-national differences in terms of the ways that local actors responded to CVE agendas.

Despite my efforts to use process tracing rigorously to test the core theory, process tracing faces criticism on the grounds that "competing explanations may be equally consistent with the process-tracing evidence" creating challenges for the researcher to isolate the true causal explanation.[346] To manage the shortcomings of process tracing, I take a number of precautions. I first work to establish a clear chain of events by triangulating interviews alongside archival sources. I also identify potential variables laid out in the literature, testing these alternative variables via the case selection technique and in each case. Finally, there is a small case study literature on CVE delivery. Although this work typically focuses on a snapshot in time, it helps me to clarify the chain of events and ensure that I have not ignored other potentially important variables.

In short, I use a combination of in-depth, within-case and cross-case analysis of highly similar cases, what George and Bennett call the "strongest means of drawing inferences from case studies."[347] The combination of process tracing and social network analysis in a small group of cases, extended to two "least likely cases" in the US addresses the potential shortfalls of my research design and gives me a higher level of confidence. Having described the various, qualitative strategies I employ to test the theory in this dissertation, I now turn to a discussion of research ethics.

Research Ethics

CVE as a policy area is sensitive and highly controversial, which introduces several, unique ethical challenges that I worked to address throughout the research process. Interviewees face various risks in speaking to me. One significant risk is if readers can identify interviewees and attribute particular comments back to them. Specifically, if civil society leaders can be identified, they may face the kinds of reputational risks and criticism that I discuss in the dissertation. Comments about network dynamics where the speaker is identifiable might also heighten existing local tensions or potentially cause interpersonal conflicts. Government and police personnel I interviewed also face risks. If comments can

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346 Collier, David. "Letter from the President Comparative Method in the 1990s." *Newsletter of the APSA Organized Section in Comparative Politics,* 1998, 8.

347 George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. *Case studies and theory development in the social sciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004, 18.

be attributed back to particular government employees, these individuals might invite negative scrutiny for the ways they have delivered controversial CVE policies. Members of the public face, arguably, the highest risk by taking part in this study. Rank and file citizens have comparably more minimal experience speaking to journalists and academics than civil society leaders and local government officials who are more frequently asked by observers to explain their activities. One particular issue I anticipated is if citizens make comments that challenge civil society leaders. If other readers can identify the source of these statements, citizens might potentially face negative consequences locally.

I used several strategies to address these challenges. First, I anonymized all names and institutions associated with interviewees. As an added step, I worked carefully to remove specific descriptions that might be used by highly knowledgeable readers to identify interviewees. Second, I asked general questions about patterns of political behavior and responses to CVE over time. I avoided asking for highly specific details about CVE intervention efforts or individual attendees at CVE programs that might place interviewees in an uncomfortable position or put other members of the public at-risk. Third, I tried as much as possible to conduct interviews in relatively private spaces where risks of being overheard were minimal, such as people's places of work, though it was not always possible. At times, individuals asked to meet in public places.

Finally, I recognized that members of the public were more vulnerable than other types of interviewees. Because of this, I only asked members of the public about civil society dynamics. I avoided asking any questions relating to terrorism or extremism in these interviews. However, when I recruited participants, I made clear that the project was part of a larger research effort to understand local counter-extremism efforts. While the research remains sensitive, I am confident that these multiple strategies together helped to address some of the major ethical challenges posed by this study.

Theoretical Expectations in the US and UK

The UK's Prevent Strategy

I ground four of the six case studies in the UK, looking at how the controversial counter-extremism strategy, Prevent, plays out on the ground. The evolution of the policy (becoming more punitive and restrictive of financial incentives over time) provides additional opportunities to test the theory. I walk through my specific expectations about how local actors will respond to Prevent over time in light of the policy's evolution.

Theoretical Expectations for Prevent I

Under Prevent I, funding criteria were broad, and recipients were able to shift the focus of Prevent-funded activities toward a wider range of community development priorities, while operating inside the bounds of the government's strategy. The policy was notably less punitive than its later iteration in part because intervention processes had not yet been streamlined. While there were obligations on local government to distribute funding, local bureaucrats were given more freedom around which aspects of Prevent to emphasize and which to under-emphasize or ignore. Notably, there was less top-down pressure on local governments to identify and manage "at-risk" individuals through intervention processes.

In light of the greater flexibility around the administration of Prevent and policy funding, I expect that more Muslim civil society leaders will be willing to cooperate with Prevent efforts. Muslim elites will likely be able to minimize reputational damage because Prevent I is broader and less punitive, giving elites flexibility to avoid the more controversial policy components. I expect that bureaucrats will invest in Prevent efforts when they maintain the support of Muslim civil society leaders with elite-state ties. By contrast, bureaucrats are likely to de-prioritize Prevent programs where there are more constraints on civil society support, since local state actors are under less top-down pressure to invest in these agendas. Where civil society leaders cooperate with Prevent and maintain dense ties to co-religionists, I expect that they will be able to facilitate more significant community participation. In contrast, I expect lower levels

of community participation where local governments rely on Muslim elites that lack established networks ties to co-religionists.

Theoretical Expectations for Prevent II

In 2011, Prevent was revised. While engaging communities remained a clear focus, central government pressure on public sector workers increased[348] amidst a greater focus on working with "at-risk" individuals and standardizing the UK's local intervention program, known as Channel. Under Prevent II, local funding bids were subjected to greater central government oversight. Projects that lacked a clearer focus on countering violent extremism were cast aside.[349] On the ground, this involved diverting funding away from many grassroots projects that had earlier received central government funding, reducing the earlier avenues that facilitated community engagement. As Prevent evolved, central government pressure on local governments increased further, culminating in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (CTSA) in 2015 that effectively compelled local authorities and other public sector staff to deliver Prevent and Channel procedures in line with central guidance.

The reform of Prevent provides useful within case variation, allowing me to test how policy outcomes change as counter-extremism policies become increasingly centralized and punitive. Over time, I expect that there will be less involvement from civil society leaders and members of the public across the board because central government Prevent efforts have shifted from a broader agenda that prioritized civic partnerships to a narrower security program heavily targeting local agencies, such as the education sector and health services. Still, policy practitioners have continually sought out community participation over time.

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[348] HM Government. *Prevent Strategy*. 2011. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent- strategy-review.pdf

[349] The Prevent Catalogue listed a select number of specific projects the Home Office would fund, in effect removing the flexibility and discretion that had characterized the earlier period. See: Office of Security and Counter Terrorism. Home Office. *Local Delivery Best Practice Catalogue Prevent Strategy*. March 2015. http://powerbase.info/images/8/8c/OSCT-Prevent_catalogue-March_2015-OCR.pdf

I expect that cooperating with Prevent II will become more costly for Muslim civil society leaders and that many are likely to disengage from the policy area, in the face of growing reputational damage. I assume that elites will only continue collaborating on counter-extremism efforts if they are insulated from reputational damage, in the absence of inter-elite competition and denser elite-mass ties. If Muslim elites remain cooperative with Prevent strategies and maintain a central network position, they should be able to assist state actors in mobilizing at least some community participation over time. By contrast, if Muslim elites cease cooperation with counter-extremism efforts, community participation is likely to decline over time, especially if governments are unable to identify new allies with established network connections.

The US Countering Violent Extremism Strategy

While most of the empirical work in this dissertation draws from local case studies of Prevent in UK cities, I also devote significant attention to CVE policy in the United States, looking closely at CVE efforts in Boston and Los Angeles. In the US, CVE policies are at a more nascent phase, first introduced in 2011 taking inspiration from the UK's Prevent program.[350] Counter-extremism efforts have faced numerous setbacks due in part to the Trump Administration's apprehensions about these programs. In brief, policy development in the US aligns more closely with the first iteration of the UK's Prevent strategy, with relatively little top-down pressure and fewer restrictions on government funding. Because the policy operates not unlike the first phase of Prevent, I do not make separate predictions for policy outcomes. I anticipate that network structures will explain how policies play out on the ground.

Studying CVE Policies: Opportunities and Challenges

CVE policies are relatively new and there is a dearth of research that looks at how these agendas play out on the ground, let alone that identifies the mechanisms that explain divergent responses. While I draw on the small literature on community participation in counter-terrorism, much of this work relies on survey data that measures how respondents anticipate cooperating with law enforcement around counter-

[350] McCants, Will & Clinton Watts. *US Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism: An Assessment*. Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2012.

terrorism.[351] This study builds on this work by examining how communities have interfaced with counter-extremism agendas over time across six locations. The policy stakes are high. Governments have been seeking out community support to assist them in counter-terrorism for some time, and there is ample data showing that governments rely on tip-offs as one of the most valued sources of intelligence used to disrupt terror plots.[352] Government strategies used to gather intelligence within Muslim communities have repeatedly failed and worn down the public's trust in law enforcement.[353] In fact, as other scholars have noted, baked into the logic of CVE is a concession that governments cannot fight terrorism on their own.[354]

Despite the need for academic inquiry into CVE agendas, I faced a number of obstacles in conducting this research. CVE agendas remain to a degree secretive policies and scholars have criticized the refusal of central government to "allow independent scrutiny."[355] This has required that I work harder to identify basic details about the implementation of CVE agendas, with information about funding, grant recipients, engagement routines, and referral figures often intentionally kept out of public view. For instance, I made dozens of Freedom of Information (FOI) requests, but most of my requests for even the most basic and innocuous of details were rejected. Still, I managed to gather a large number of archival materials from other academics and local bureaucrats who often went out of their way to provide documentation I was looking for. Because of the sensitivity of the subject matter both government employees and community members were often wary of speaking with researchers, so I worked over several years to build relationships with a range of stakeholders across these six cities.

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[351] Huq, Aziz, Tom Tyler, and Stephen Schulhofer. "Mechanisms for Eliciting Cooperation in Counter Terrorism Policing: Evidence from the United Kingdom." *Journal of Empirical Legal Studies* 8.4 (2011): 728–61; Gillum, Rachel M. *Muslims in a Post-9/11 America: A Survey of Attitudes and Beliefs and Their Implications for US National Security Policy*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2018.

[352] Kurzman, Charles. *Muslim-American terrorism since 9/11: An accounting*. Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security. 2 February 2011. http://kurzman.unc.edu/files/2011/06/Kurzman_MuslimAmerican_Terrorism_Since_911_An_Accounting.pdf

[353] Lewis, Paul. "Birmingham stops camera surveillance in Muslim areas." *The Guardian*. 17 June 2010. https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/jun/17/birmingham-stops-spy-cameras-project; Goldman, Adam and Matt Apuzzo. "NYPD: Muslim spying led to no leads, terror cases." *AP*. 21 Aug 2012. https://www.ap.org/ap-in-the-news/2012/nypd-muslim-spying-led-to-no-leads-terror-cases

[354] Thomas, Paul. "Changing experiences of responsibilisation and contestation within counter-terrorism policies: the British Prevent experience." *Policy & Politics* 45.3 (2017): 305-321.

[355] Khaleeli, Homa. "'You worry they could take your kids': is the Prevent strategy demonising Muslim schoolchildren?" *The Guardian*. 23 September 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/sep/23/prevent-counter-terrorism-strategy-schools-demonising-muslim-children

Understanding how communities interface with CVE programs and the rationale behind these responses also presented a number of challenges. Scholars have noted concerns within Muslim communities about academic scrutiny as well as "research fatigue" due to the large number of projects that seek out community members as research participants.[356] Beyond this, governments also intentionally—and justifiably—protect information about the fraction of the population that participates in CVE programs. Due to the secrecy around these policies, I was unable (nor would it have been appropriate) to approach individual members of the public to ask why they provided information to the state or attended controversial CVE programming. Instead, I used a range of qualitative strategies to assess and explain differences in community participation at the city-level. However, I recognize that in light of the sensitivity associated with CVE agendas there remain limits to what is knowable, despite my best efforts to explain local policy outcomes.

Limitations of the Research Design and Methodological Contributions

I pursue a multi-pronged research design that attempts to rigorously test the theory and alternative explanations, but it is important to state the limitations of the design before presenting the cases. For one, while I use a range of indicators from programmatic attendance to the frequency of community-based referrals, these indicators struggle to capture the true willingness of community members to cooperate with state security activities. The sensitivity and rarity of the phenomenon of violent extremism makes it extremely hard to ever really understand community willingness to cooperate with state security efforts. It is also a challenge to know what level of participation and specifically referrals from the public we ought to expect, especially because referrals are often made for baseless reasons and the logic of radicalization and vulnerability around which CVE programs operate has also been called into question.

It should be clear from the discussion in Chapter 2 that members of the public have many good reasons to avoid sharing information or making tip-offs to CVE programs. I try to acknowledge these challenges

[356] Githens-Mazer, Jonathan, et al. *Muslim Communities Perspectives on Radicalisation in Leicester, UK.* Aarhus, Denmark: Centre for Studies in Islamism and Radicalisation, 2010, 18.

and measure participation in a number of ways, recognizing the limitations of using any individual indicator to capture the nature of local participation. Despite these limitations, the range of data I have collected is an important first step to understanding how members of the public interact with controversial CVE programs, as most studies to date have focused more on central government intentions rather than local realities.

Relatedly, I face limitations on the scale of the research. I test the theory in six locations over time, conducting 139 interviews and assembling social network analyses that represent thousands of individual data points. This is a massive undertaking that allows me to go in-depth to see how causal mechanisms play out over time. However, the work of testing hypotheses qualitatively means that I am unable to test the theory across a wider range of localities. I deal with this by using the logic of process tracing to identify causal mechanisms that explain policy outcomes in individual cases and by testing these mechanisms in other locations where they appear less likely to hold up to scrutiny. These research strategies give me confidence that other variables cannot explain the observed variation and provide suggestive evidence that network structures lie behind the range of local responses I am attempting to explain.

Finally, this study focuses on an important dimension of CVE agendas—the degree to which local state actors and communities cooperate with central government security agendas. While participation is definitional to the effectiveness of CVE policies, this study cannot definitively show whether or not CVE programs "work." As a researcher, I am limited from seeing what governments do with the information that communities provide them, and whether the investment in community programming and intervention substantively lowers the risk of terrorism. However, I am able to gather important evidence about the conditions under which communities provide the assistance that governments (by their own admission) require. In short, the study generates important insights for academics and policymakers seeking to understand and potentially improve the delivery of CVE agendas. However, connecting CVE programs to counter-terrorism objectives is a leap I am unable to make, due to the restrictions I have faced as a researcher.

Despite these obstacles, my dissertation makes a number of methodological contributions. First, the data I have gathered is unique. There is a dearth of studies that trace how CVE policies have played out in different locations over time and gather basic qualitative data about policy developments. This dissertation thus helps to enrich accounts of CVE programs and our understanding of how local actors interface with these policies in different locations over time, specifically in regard to the ways that communities participate in CVE programs. Existing work on the subject of community involvement in counter-terrorism has relied on statements made by individuals about their hypothetical willingness to cooperate on counter-terrorism in a survey setting.[357] My study carries this work forward by looking at how communities bounded by locality have participated in counter-terrorism efforts over time.

Second, this dissertation devises a new methodology to measure civil society networks using documentary data that can be replicated by other researchers. The use of social network analysis has allowed me to present a more multi-dimensional picture of Muslim civil society networks, capturing how local Muslim community networks vary sub-nationally. This has relevance not only for studying counter-extremism policies but for understanding civil society dynamics at the local level more broadly.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this dissertation sets out to understand why CVE policies have played out differently between cities, both in terms of investment by bureaucrats and involvement from communities. I use several methodologies that together allow me to test the core theory and rule out alternative explanations. The research design I have developed uses both within-case and cross-case comparison among pairs of similar cities that vary over time in the ways bureaucrats and communities are involved in CVE programs. I leverage a range of sources—from documentary evidence, 139 interviews, and social network analysis to

[357] See for instance: Gillum, Rachel M. *Muslims in a Post-9/11 America: A Survey of Attitudes and Beliefs and Their Implications for US National Security Policy*. University of Michigan Press, 2018; Huq, Aziz Z., Tom R. Tyler, and Stephen J. Schulhofer. "Mechanisms for eliciting cooperation in counterterrorism policing: Evidence from the United Kingdom." *Journal of Empirical Legal Studies* 8.4 (2011): 728-761.

trace the causal chain across these cases. The next chapter employs this research design to examine the evolution of Prevent in two East Midlands cities.

Chapter 5 Prevent in Two Midlands Cities

This chapter looks at how the Prevent agenda played out in Derby and Leicester, two broadly similar cities in the East Midlands of England, from 2007 to 2019. I make the case that the dynamics of local Muslim civic networks produce distinct trade-offs around the Prevent agenda in the two cities, leading to critical differences in the ways that local actors respond to counter-extremism programs over time.

Civic Networks in Derby and Leicester

In Chapter 3, I presented several hypothetical network types, which I draw on to characterize network dynamics in these two cities, though I recognize that these conceptual networks at best can only partially approximate real-world dynamics. Muslim civic networks in Leicester resemble a *highly connected network* structure in a number of ways, with many established elite-state linkages and strong inter-elite ties, without significant competition. Community leaders also have dense links to members of the public across much of the network. Derby's network approximates some features of both a *highly connected network* and an *inter-elite connected network*.[1] In Derby, several elites maintain connections to the state as well as inter-elite connections. The main axis of difference is that Muslim elites have some but fewer links to members of the public in Derby than in Leicester.

Theoretical Expectations

These different network dynamics lead me to make specific predictions about how I expect that local actors will respond to Prevent agendas over time. Building from the theory, elites should find it costlier to endorse Prevent in Derby, facing higher risks of reputational damage from policy opponents. In contrast, elites should be able to maintain more cooperation with the Prevent agenda in Leicester over time

[1] As I describe in greater detail in the case chapter that follows, there are a number of actors and groups in Derby that are relatively detached from co-religionists, with comparably few network ties. However, the majority of the network can be summarized in this way.

because of the network's denser elite-mass connections which should serve as a protection against reputational damage.

In Leicester's *highly connected network*, it should be feasible for Muslim elites to cooperate with the state on counter-extremism efforts at the introduction of Prevent. I anticipate that elites can utilize pre-existing connections to the state to access policy incentives, without concerns of reputational damage in the lower competition network. State actors, in turn, should be more willing to invest in counter-extremism agendas with assistance from community leaders with longstanding ties to the state. I expect that elites can then use their connections to co-religionists to mobilize higher levels of participation around Prevent initiatives, even in the face of public suspicion about counter-extremism agendas. I expect that at least some elites should be able to maintain cooperation with Prevent efforts over time because they are likelier to be protected from reputational damage, even amidst policy reforms that limit financial incentives and further securitized policy routines. Tighter elite-mass connections should limit the ability of opposition movements to organize and inflict reputational damage on elites cooperating with the state. With continued elite cooperation, state actors should be able to rely on community leaders to continue facilitating community engagement, even in the face of public suspicion around the Prevent agenda.

Derby's network has features of both a *highly connected network* and an *inter-elite connected network,* with many elite-state and inter-elite linkages but fewer elite-mass ties. I expect that at the start of the Prevent agenda, policy efforts should progress in Derby, much as they did in Leicester. Muslim elites should be able to cooperate with Prevent efforts, leveraging their ties to local government decisionmakers to access policy incentives, without concerns about reputational damage in a lower competition network. As in Leicester, state actors should find it more feasible to invest in counter-extremism agendas with cooperation from community leaders with longstanding ties to the state. Elites can, in turn, use connections to co-religionists to mobilize higher levels of participation, even in the face of public suspicion about counter-extremism agendas. I expect the trade-offs around cooperating with Prevent to be steeper in Derby over time, especially as the policy is revised to become more punitive and restrictive of financial incentives. Elites will likely be more vulnerable to public opposition movements because elites lack dense connections to members of the public to limit these movements from organizing. In

short, I anticipate that network gaps between elites and members of the public will ultimately render cooperation around counter-extremism costlier for elites in Derby than in Leicester, leading many community leaders to disengage from counter-extremism efforts over time. With more limited involvement from elites around Prevent, I expect that state actors will then struggle to sustain community participation over time.

Tracing the evolution of Prevent over time in these two cities provides a meaningful test of the theory. The case of Leicester allows me to test how counter-extremism efforts play out in a highly connected network where I expect that elites will be relatively insulated from the costs associated with the policy area. My theory would be ruled out if Muslim elites or state actors largely avoid counter-extremism strategies or if they are unable to sustain community participation despite network conditions that make it less costly to do so. In Derby, I expect that network gaps will render the Prevent agenda more costly for elites over time, limiting the potential for sustained cooperation from elites and ultimately broader community participation over time. If I observe sustained community participation without elite involvement, or if elites continue to stay engaged amidst rising reputational damage, my theory would face a serious challenge.

Within-Case Testing

I begin the chapter by laying out the social network analyses (SNAs) I built to estimate Muslim civil society network dynamics in both cities using UK charity commission data. SNAs provide a standardized snapshot of network dynamics, but they cannot on their own explain the causal mechanisms that drive policy differences on the ground. To test the theory, I use in-depth process tracing to identify the causal mechanisms that explain local responses at each step in the causal chain.

Chapter Four outlines the logic of the methodology in greater detail, but I also summarize it here. In each case, I first try to gauge the structure of local networks using a wide range of qualitative metrics. To capture elite-state connections, I identify informal relationships between Muslim elites and state actors and instances where state actors and civil society organizations cooperated in the past. Finally, I look for evidence where state actors and civil society actors refer to interpersonal trust before the rollout of

Prevent. To capture inter-elite connections and the level of network competition, I identify prior incidents of inter-elite coordination, such as mobilizing together around common goals or shared membership in representative organizations. I also use interviews to estimate the level of network competition. When multiple interviewees from different factions in the community, as well as third party observers, and state actors refer to the absence of competition, I take this as evidence of a low competition network. By contrast, when multiple interviewees from different perspectives refer to inter-elite competition or when I can find evidence of inter-communal disputes and other obstacles to civic coordination, I would take this as evidence of higher levels of competition.

I also measure connections between elites and Muslim citizens. I use interviews with community members to estimate the degree that elites influence the political behavior of co-religionists, how frequently elites interface with members of the public, and to what extent, if at all, community members rely on elites for problem-solving. I also identify whether leaders have faced a public challenge in the past. I consider a prior history of organized public opposition to community leaders as one indicator of weaker elite-mass linkages. By contrast, when many interviewees from varied perspectives describe the ways that community leaders are insulated from personal, public attacks and have been able to limit the emergence of opposition movements locally, I take this as an indication of tighter elite-mass linkages. Finally, I try to gather evidence about the extent that civil society organizations influence the lives of young people, specifically in terms of how regularly young people interact with religious leadership. I use this evidence alongside interview evidence from academics, interfaith leaders, and state actors who observe these dynamics from a distance.

Having captured network dynamics using both social network analysis and qualitative metrics, I test how networks shape local responses from Muslim elites, the local state, and members of the public to the Prevent agenda. I first look at how elites initially responded to the Prevent agenda. To test the theory, I look for statements both from a range of civil society leaders from different parts of the network and state actors to establish that elites used prior connections to the state to access policy incentives, without concerns about reputational damage. To test that local government actors were more willing to invest in counter-extremism strategies because of support from civic elites with whom they shared network

connections, I rely on statements from a range of state actors from across local government and law enforcement. I also look for concrete examples where civil society groups helped local bureaucrats meet their policy goals, for instance where civil society leaders helped design and deliver Prevent programs. To test that civil society leaders with connections to co-religionists helped mobilize community participation, I rely on statements from civil society leaders, state actors, and third-party observers that describe how members of the public were more willing to engage with Prevent efforts because of support from trusted civic elites, as well as evidence that Muslim elites drew on pre-existing connections across organizations to recruit participants to Prevent programs.

I test these mechanisms again after the policy revision of Prevent, when the program becomes more punitive and restrictive of financial incentives. Since central government essentially forced local governments to deliver Prevent after 2015, I do not test local state reactions after the policy revision. To verify the claim that network factors shape elite responses to the Prevent agenda after the policy revision, either to remain cooperative or to disengage from the agenda, I look for evidence from multiple elites that they avoided cooperating with Prevent because of concerns about potential reputational damage. I then confirm these statements with interviews from state actors and other third-party observers who I expect would have little incentive to exaggerate these threats. I also look for documented evidence, for instance, in local newspapers, that elites faced threats and other public challenges for their affiliation with Prevent. By contrast, to test that network factors enabled elites to remain cooperative around the Prevent agenda, I look for interview evidence from multiple civic elites, third-party observers, and state actors that elites were not concerned about reputational damage and could cooperate with counter-extremism efforts without significant costs. Finally, to explain the evolution of community participation over time, I look for statements from different interviewees from varied perspectives suggesting that the lack of elite involvement created obstacles to sustaining community participation. In cases of higher community participation, I look for evidence that elites helped state actors mobilize participation in terms of referrals or programmatic attendance, and where multiple interviewees point to the role of elites in facilitating community involvement.

These process tracing tests rely heavily on 41 interviews I conducted in Derby and Leicester from 2015 to 2019, with a wide range of state actors—from elected officials, local government bureaucrats, and law enforcement. I also spoke with many civil society leaders from varying backgrounds and local community members. I deliberately sampled third-party perspectives, such as academics and interfaith leaders, to enrich the views represented in the study and triangulate statements made by other interviewees. Archival data from both cases helped to confirm basic facts about how counter-extremism policies played over time and to verify statements made in interviews. Having laid out the theoretical expectations and the logic of the within-case process tracing, I lay out the similarities between the two cases and then present the social network analyses, which provides a snapshot of civic networks in the two cities.

Approximating a Most Similar Systems Design

A mere thirty miles apart, Derby and Leicester are both cities in the East Midlands of England, though Leicester is larger with nearly 330,000 residents[2] while Derby has a population of nearly 250,000.[3] As manufacturing hubs, Derby and Leicester became destinations for migrants that arrived from the 1950s and 1960s. Both cities are home to sizeable Muslim populations, though the Muslim community is much larger in Leicester than in Derby, with over 60,000 Muslims in Leicester and 19,000 in Derby.[4] Many Muslims in Derby originate from the Mirpur district of Pakistan,[5] while Leicester was a destination for Indian migrants, many of whom arrived via East Africa.[6] Parts of Derby and Leicester face higher rates deprivation in comparison to other parts of England, though national rankings place the levels of deprivation higher in Leicester than in Derby.[7] In both cities, the wards with the highest concentration of Muslim residents are also highly deprived, containing neighborhoods that rank among the most deprived

[2] Office of National Statistics. *2011 Census: Key Statistics for Local Authorities in England and Wales*. London: Office of National Statistics, 2012. https://bit.ly/2JKcd9e
[3] Office of National Statistics. *2011 Census: Key Statistics for Local Authorities in England and Wales*. London: Office of National Statistics, 2012. https://bit.ly/2JKcd9e
[4] Ali, Sundas. *British Muslims in Numbers*. London: Muslim Council of Britain, 2015.
[5] The Change Institute. *The Pakistani Muslim Community in England: Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities*. London: Department for Communities and Local Government, 2009.
[6] Panesar, Jeevan. "A history of Leicester." *BBC*. 24 September 2014.
.http://www.bbc.co.uk/leicester/content/articles/2005/10/10/al_leicester_backgrounder_feature.shtml.
[7] Department of Communities and Local Government. *English Indices of Deprivation 2015*. London: Department of Communities and Local Government, 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/english-indices-of-deprivation-2015

in the country.[8] Despite these commonalities in socio-economic dynamics, scholars have acknowledged that many Muslims in Leicester (particularly East African Asians) arrived in the UK having lived in multicultural settings, with higher levels of education and professional training than many of their co-religionists from other backgrounds.[9]

In terms of crime and policing, rates of crime between the two areas are broadly similar[10] as are overall approval ratings of the police.[11] Both areas are traditionally Labour strongholds, and Muslim councilors have been historically represented as councilors in both city governments. While there have been tensions around community cohesion in both areas, the cities share similar levels of community cohesion according to national indicators.[12] Local governments had invested in both areas in engaging minority communities and attempting to bolster community cohesion, which often took the form of consultations with minority representatives and financial support for community-based programming. However, Leicester had a longer standing and more established cohesion agenda[13] with more investment in civic partnerships than neighboring Derby. Before the introduction of Prevent, both cities had prior

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[8] Info4Derby Derby City Council. *Overview Report: Normanton*. Derby: Derby City Council. https://info4derby.derby.gov.uk/overview/?geographyId=0a42dec4872d405987672b545c41083c&featureId=E05001780; Info4Derby Derby City Council. *Overview Report: Arboretum*. Derby: Derby City Council. https://info4derby.derby.gov.uk/overview/?geographyId=0a42dec4872d405987672b545c41083c&featureId=E05001770; Hussain, Dilwar. *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Leicester*. London: Open Society Foundation, 2010, 22.

[9] Klausen, Jytte. "British counter-terrorism after 7/7: Adapting community policing to the fight against domestic terrorism." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 35.3 (2009), 413; Hussain, Dilwar. *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Leicester*. London: Open Society Foundation, 2010, 32-33, 125.

[10] Home Office. *Crime and policing in England, Wales and Northern Ireland*. www.police.uk. For 2019, there were 121.76 crimes per thousand residents in Leicester and 85.73 in Derby. For reference, both areas have lower rates of crime than other major cities like Nottingham and Manchester.

[11] Nicholas, Sian, Chris Kershaw, and Alison Walker. *Home Office Statistical Bulletin: Crime in England and Wales 2007/08*. London: Home Office, 2008. See Table 6.04: Confidence in the criminal justice system by police force area: 49% of respondents believe police do an excellent/good job in Derbyshire, compared to 55% in Leicestershire; Office of National Statistics. *Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) perception and ASB data by Police Force Area, year ending March 2016*. London: Office of National Statistics, 2016. https://bit.ly/2x9YHJx See Table 2: Ratings of the local police and public confidence in the police and local council: 62% of respondents say that "police are doing an excellent or good job" in Derbyshire, compared to 69% in Leicestershire.

[12] Data.gov.uk. *Data Interchange Hub—Data Download: October 2010*. https://data.gov.uk/dataset/ni-035-building-resilience-to-violent-extremism According to National Indicator 1 in 2008, 77% of respondents in Derby and 76% of respondents in Leicester "believe people from different backgrounds get on well together."

[13] Leicester City Council. *Evidence to the Commission on Integration and Cohesion*. Leicester City Council: January 2007.

experiences with terrorism.[14] In Derby the now banned, radical group Al Muhajiroun had a more established presence and was a particular concern to community members.[15]

From the public rollout of Prevent, Leicester and Derby were both selected as priority areas by the central government, meaning that they were areas of focus and funding in the government's broader counter-extremism agenda. Both areas were later designated by the Home Office as so-called "Tier 2 priority areas." Throughout the evolution of Prevent, both cities navigated a common institutional landscape with relatively similar levels of counter-extremism funding.[16] Local Prevent efforts were facilitated by local police and local authorities, initially with coordination by regional government and later regional Counter-Terrorism Units (CTUs) that placed a common supervisory structure over counter-terrorism policing in both cities.

Network Analysis in Leicester and Derby

Social Network Analysis provides a standardized measure of network dynamics and allows me to triangulate the qualitative evidence I present in the case studies. The network analyses for Leicester and Derby illustrate numerous elite-state and inter-elite linkages, highlighting that elites are positioned in relation to each other and the state in broadly similar ways. A key difference is that there are more civil society organizations in Leicester and some nodes hold a more central network position in comparison to Derby. Due to data limitations, the social network analyses cannot capture variation along the dimension of elite-mass connections which is the primary way in which the two networks differ. I first outline the

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[14] "Algerians remanded on terror charges in Britain." *The Irish Times*. 18 January 2002. https://www.irishtimes.com/news/algerians-remanded-on-terror-charges-in-britain-1.1047059; Lyall, Sarah. "What Drove 2 Britons to Bomb a Club in Tel Aviv?" *The New York Times*. 12 May 2003. https://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/12/world/what-drove-2-britons-to-bomb-a-club-in-tel-aviv.html

[15] Lyall, Sarah. "What Drove 2 Britons to Bomb a Club in Tel Aviv?" *The New York Times*. 12 May 2003 https://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/12/world/what-drove-2-britons-to-bomb-a-club-in-tel-aviv.html

[16] Gov.UK. *FOI Release: Prevent Funding.* 7 July 2011. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-funding I calculated total payments to Derby and Leicester from 2007-11 using FOI requests that listed organizations who received Prevent funding between those years. Both organizations were provided less than a million pounds to deliver Prevent over a five-year period, totalling £610,033 in Derby and £999,209 in Leicester. After 2011, the Home Office stopped providing data about the local distribution of Prevent funding.

strategies I used to assemble network data before discussing similarities in the structural properties of the networks.

Data Collection

I use a range of approaches to assemble these networks, which I detail in the methodology chapter and more thoroughly in the methodological appendix. To summarize, I use the UK Charity Commission database to construct a list of Muslim civil society organizations in a given locality. Having assembled this list of registered Muslim charities, I use Annual Returns (ARs) from 2014-17 provided by these charities to enumerate board memberships of the selected charities. To estimate inter-elite connections, I identify shared board memberships where two organizations are connected by one or more shared board members. This individuals' shared board membership thus serves as a path of length two between the civil society organizations. I exclude board members from the social network analysis that are not paths between at least two nodes in the network. I use these board memberships as links in the social network connecting individuals and organizations. To estimate elite-state ties, I use annual returns and other government sources to identify charities that have been funded by local government or where a board member is also a city councilor, a city council candidate, or serves as a representative on a city-level consultation forum.

I use a range of measures to estimate the connectedness of the network on the whole and the centrality of specific nodes. To measure the connectivity of the whole network, I calculate the *total number of nodes* and the *total number of links*. I also calculate the *average degree*, the average number of links each node has to other nodes across the network. To capture the centrality of specific nodes, I calculate the *betweenness centrality* of each node in the network, which measures how often a node falls on the shortest path between two nodes in the network, and I report the node of *highest betweenness centrality*. I calculate these network measures with and without the local government because I recognize that the local state is unlike other civil society organizations.



Data Source - UK Charity Commission 2014-2017

Figure 5.1 Network of Registered Muslim Charities in Derby



Data Source - UK Charity Commission 2014-2017

Figure 5.2 Network of Registered Muslim Charities in Leicester

Finding and Discussion

Table 5.1 Network Measures for Leicester

Leicester	*With Local Government*	*Without Local Government*
Total Nodes	216	205
Total Links	146	118
Average Degree	0.67	0.57
Node of Highest Betweenness		0.047

Table 5.2 Network Measures for Derby

Derby	*With Local Government*	*Without Local Government*
Total Nodes	40	39
Total Links	25	20
Average Degree	0.62	0.51
Node of Highest Betweenness		0.009

As expected, the Leicester social network analysis has more nodes than the Derby network analysis. In the network analysis without local government, I identify 205 unique nodes in Leicester compared to just 39 in Derby. Despite these differences in network size, the networks share a number of broadly similar structural properties. They both have a number of linkages without local government which I take as an indication of inter-elite linkages with 118 in Leicester and 20 in Derby. While the specific count of linkages differs, the average degree of each node in both networks is fairly similar around 0.5 in the networks without local government. For comparison, this measure of average degree is twice as high as the social network analyses I calculate in the South East cases.

In both network analyses, several nodes have connections to local government, as indicated by the fact that both networks have more total linkages and higher average degree with the inclusion of local government as a node. Specifically, I count 28 unique ties between nodes and the local government in the Leicester social network analysis and 5 unique linkages in the Derby network analysis.

While both of these networks maintain a number of inter-elite and elite-state linkages, an interesting difference between the two networks centers around betweenness centrality. I calculate that the node of highest betweenness in the Leicester network without local government is around 0.04, whereas in Derby the node of highest betweenness centrality is 0.009. In practice, this means that several nodes in the Leicester network hold a more central network position (almost 4.5 times more central) than the most central node in Derby. The higher value of betweenness centrality is an indicator of more inter-elite connectedness in Leicester. It also indicates that Leicester has some approximation of a civic center with specific nodes acting as bridges for more network nodes. By contrast, the lower value of betweenness centrality in Derby indicates that there is not an equivalent node at the center of the network in the same way.

The most important dimension in which these two networks differ is the way that elites are positioned in relation to members of the public. But I cannot quantitatively measure elite-mass connections in the social network analysis due to data constraints. To remedy this, I use qualitative evidence in the discussion that follows to show the more numerous and better developed elite-mass ties in Leicester in comparison to Derby. Having laid out the similarities between the two cases and presented the network analyses, I now turn to a discussion of Prevent in Leicester.

Leicester

Leicester is larger in terms of population than Derby, but both are classed as mid-sized cities.[17] The city was a destination for migrants, notably from India. One of the UK's most diverse cities, Leicester is one

[17] Bolton, Tom and Paul Hildreth. *Mid-Sized Cities: Their Role in England's Economy*. Centre for Cities: June 2013. https://www.centreforcities.org/publication/mid-sized-cities/

of a few urban centers in the UK where White Britons are a minority.[18] Leicester has a national reputation for cohesion programming and state partnerships with faith organizations. The city is home to a rich faith-based civil society reflecting local Christian, Hindu, and Muslim communities, what O'Toole et al. call "the most well developed faith sector in the whole of the UK."[19] According to the 2011 UK Census, there are over 61,000 Muslim residents that make up just under one-fifth of the population.[20] Much of the Muslim community is of Gujarati Indian descent, many of whom arrived via East Africa after the imposition of Africanization policies.[21] Indian Muslims live alongside smaller Pakistani, Somali, Bangladeshi, and Turkish communities.[22] Unlike Derby where the Barelvi sub-sect dominates, Leicester is

[18] Philipson, Alice. "White Britons a minority in Leicester, Luton and Slough." *The Telegraph*. 10 January 2013. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/9792392/White-Britons-a-minority-in-Leicester-Luton-and-Slough.html

[19] O'Toole, Therese et al. *Taking Part: Muslim Participation in Contemporary Governance.* Bristol: Centre for the Study of Ethnicity & Citizenship, 2013, 43.

[20] Ali, Sundas. *British Muslims in Numbers*. London: Muslim Council of Britain, 2015.

[21] Hussain, Dilwar. *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Leicester*. London: Open Society Foundation, 2010, 32; Dancygier, Rafaela M. *Immigration and Conflict in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 199.

[22] Hussain, Dilwar. *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Leicester*. London: Open Society Foundation, 2010, 17.

a stronghold for Deobandi Muslims,[23] though there is a diversity of sectarian groups represented in the city.



Figure 5.3 Leicester Ward Map

Muslims in Leicester have wide-ranging socio-economic backgrounds, though many Muslims in Leicester live in some of the city's poorest neighborhoods,[24] with higher rates of deprivation relative to average values for England and Wales.[25]

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[23] Bowen, Innes. Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in Brent: Inside British Islam. Hurst & Co: London, 2014, 30.
[24] Vertovec, Steven. "Multiculturalism, Culturalism and Public Incorporation." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 19.1(1996), 63; Hussain, Dilwar. *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Leicester*. London: Open Society Foundation, 2010, 37.
[25] According to 2011 census data, Muslim communities are concentrated in four wards in Leicester: Charnwood, Coleman, Spinney Hills, and Stoneygate. Two of these wards (Charnwood and Spinney Hills) have higher rates of deprivation than the average in Leicester. See: Leicester City Council. *Leicester Ward Health Profile: Charnwood*. Leicester: Leicester City Council, 2013. https://www.leicester.gov.uk/media/179068/charnwood.pdf; Leicester City Council. *Leicester Ward Health Profile: Spinney Hills*. Leicester: Leicester City Council, 2013. https://www.leicester.gov.uk/media/179066/spinney-hills.pdf; Coleman and Stoneygate

Muslim Civic Networks in Leicester

Contemporary Leicester features a wide range of Muslim civic activity that reflects wider ethnic and sectarian diversity in the city, with around 200 organizations working with women, young people, ethnic groups, and specific sectarian groups. Most of these organizations are affiliated with the city's Muslim umbrella organization that aims to represent Muslim communities in the city.[26] Muslim civil society networks in Leicester are characterized by relatively dense connections, linking elites, state actors, and members of the public together. I discuss the various dimensions of civil society networks in the city before turning to discuss how local actors responded to the Prevent agenda in Leicester.

Elite-State Ties

Many Muslims in Leicester arrived in the 1970s, building on bonds of kinship from common Gujarati and East African backgrounds to settle within the same areas of the city.[27] Dancygier describes how in the early 1970s Indian community representatives began establishing community organizations and liaising with the state, noting that by the end of the decade there were 3 Asian councilors on the city council.[28] By 2010, there were 7 Muslim councilors in Leicester.[29] Minority politicians and civil society leaders historically engaged with the state via a plethora of forums and representative bodies, such as the Leicester Multi-Cultural Advisory Group, the Faith Leaders Forum, and Leicester Council of Faiths. These connections deepened further when the city initiated a formal cohesion strategy in 2001—outpacing most of its neighbors in its significant investment in this policy area. Muslim leaders used these consultation spaces to secure concessions from the state, such as the provision of halal food and

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have less deprivation than average in the city, though a number of Lower Super Output Areas in these wards are among the most deprived in the nation. See: Leicester City Council. *Leicester Ward Health Profile: Coleman*. Leicester: Leicester City Council, 2013. https://www.leicester.gov.uk/media/179057/coleman.pdf; Leicester City Council. *Leicester Ward Health Profile: Stoneygate*. Leicester: Leicester City Council, 2013. https://www.leicester.gov.uk/media/179070/stoneygate.pdf; See also description of Leicester wards: Nomis: Official Labour Market Statistics. *2011 Ward Profile: Leicester*. London: Office for National Statistics, 2011. https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/reports/lmp/ward2011/1946157130/report.aspx

[26] *Leicester Council of Faiths*. April 2013. http://www.lcof.org.uk/faith/muslims/Accessed 8 January 2019.

[27] Dancygier, Rafaela M. *Immigration and Conflict in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 202.

[28] Dancygier, Rafaela M. *Immigration and Conflict in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 203.

[29] As of 2010, there were 7 Muslim background councilors in Leicester. See: Hussain, Dilwar. *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Leicester*. London: Open Society Foundation, 2010, 113.

accommodations for Muslim burials.[30] State actors also relied on many of these same leaders and organizations to help manage community tensions around international events and local disturbances.[31] Over time, these exchanges enhanced the control of a small set of key interlocutors relied on by the state to facilitate engagement with Muslim communities in the city. Innes Bowen describes this phenomenon in heavily Deobandi Leicester, writing, "Outsiders' attempts to speak to anyone else about Deobandi community business will often be thwarted—ordinary followers will feel too inhibited to talk and all roads will lead back to the local (community leader)."[32]

Inter-Elite Ties

Building on common ethnic, sectarian, and linguistic ties, Muslims in the city developed dense inter-elite connections, both inside and outside the Deobandi community. Muslim community leaders from nearly all the city's mosques and civil society groups are members of a large umbrella body.[33] I was told by a religious leader about the efforts to maintain this collaboration over time, who explained to me, "We will never ever touch any theological issue that's the key for us, so we say we will talk about the issues which are commonly effecting everybody, so education everybody's problem, youth issues everybody's problem, sister's niqabs, scarf issues, everybody's problem, halal food everybody's issue, employment, discrimination, hatred, housing…the issues which are common to everybody that is what our focus is on. We have done that very successfully… it's very, very delicate I must say it's not an easy thing. I wouldn't say it's 100 percent perfect, but at least we hold on to each other."[34] Despite these efforts, Deobandis have been seen to dominate local civil society institutions,[35] with other Muslim minority sectarian and ethnic groups maintaining comparably less influence within these organizations. Still, I find little evidence of overt rivalries that limit political and social coordination that I describe elsewhere. I take this extensive, sustained civic coordination around a single organization, the ease with which Muslim civil society leaders

[30] Bowen, Innes. Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in Brent: Inside British Islam. Hurst & Co: London, 2014, 24.
[31] Hussain, Dilwar. *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Leicester*. London: Open Society Foundation, 2010, 111.
[32] Bowen, Innes. Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in Brent: Inside British Islam. Hurst & Co: London, 2014, 25.
[33] Interview 22. 28 February 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.
[34] Interview 22. 28 February 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.
[35] Bowen, Innes. Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in Brent: Inside British Islam. Hurst & Co: London, 2014, 30.

interfaced together with state actors, and the absence of overt inter-elite rivalries as evidence of strong ties between community leaders and low levels of competition.

Elite-Mass Ties

Reflecting highly established Deobandi networks, Leicester features denser elite-mass ties than I observe in other cities. Much of this can be credited to the network of Islamic schools or madrassas in the city, deepening ties between religious leadership and families at the grassroots level. As Jonathan Birt writes, "Muslim Leicester today is a Deobandi center of learning, a node for the dissemination of the movement's message in which the ulama are now able to determine the scope and direction of further Islamization. …The key to this centrality is attaining the control of Islamic educational institutions… The movement is able to capture young Muslims though the supplementary schools."[36] In 2010, a Muslim civil society organization delivered safeguarding training in over 60 madrassas in Leicester,[37] further indicating the levels of civic coordination in the network. In Bowen's description of Deobandis in Leicester she similarly observes the level of influence of religious leadership noting that "Many among the Deobandi population in Leicester will voluntarily submit themselves to the authority of the Deobandi ulema. A local sharia council helps to settle disputes between adherents…There are now areas of Britain where a high proportion of the population is Deobandi—such as…the Highfields district of Leicester—where the '100 per cent lifestyle' is more easy to achieve."[38] Interviews with community members highlighted the connections between imams and young people[39] via madrassa networks. A community member described how members of the public were generally aware of Muslim civil society leaders in the city and would be comfortable to approach these individuals for relevant assistance.[40] Muslim elites in Leicester were certainly not exempt from critique, but I found evidence from interviews that they were better protected from organized, public challenge than in other cities.[41] In fact, scholars have argued that

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[36] Birt, Jonathan. "Locating the British Imam: The Deobandi Ulama Between Contested Authority and Public Policy Post-9/11." *European Muslims and the Secular State*, edited by Joyceline Cesari and Sean McLoughlin. Abingdon: Ashgate Publishing, 2005,185.
[37] Hussain, Dilwar. *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Leicester*. London: Open Society Foundation, 2010, 63.
[38] Bowen, Innes. Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in Brent: Inside British Islam. Hurst & Co: London, 2014, 27-28.
[39] Interview 130. 20 February 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, UK; Interview 131. 20 February 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, UK.
[40] Interview 130. 20 February 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, UK.
[41] Interview 132. 20 February 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.

groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir and Al Muhajiroun struggle to build a local following in Leicester because religious leaders are highly connected to young people, limiting the ability of these groups to disseminate their messages or actively recruit new members.[42] The absence of overt challenges to community leadership, the dense ties between young people and religious leadership, and the familiarity described between civic leadership and members of the public, together lead me to characterize denser elite-mass ties in Leicester.

Both the social network analysis and qualitative evidence just outlined reflect a network that is highly connected with a number of links connecting Muslim elites, co-religionists, and the state. I now discuss how these dynamics shape how local actors respond to Prevent when counter-extremism efforts were first introduced in the city.

Prevent I in Leicester

Prevent efforts in Leicester were met with a degree of public concern and suspicion from the introduction of these policies in 2007.[43] Local bureaucrats were also wary about the potential of the Prevent agenda to jeopardize the city's earlier investment in community cohesion.[44] To guide the development of local policy approaches, Muslim civil society leadership were consulted on the new and controversial Prevent agenda from the outset. I show how their responses were shaped by pre-existing elite-state and inter-elite linkages, which eased the ability of community leaders to access policy incentives, without concerns about reputational damage.

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[42] Birt, Jonathan and Philip Lewis. "The Pattern of Islamic Reform in Britain: The Deobandis Between Intra-Muslim Sectarianism and Engagement with Wider Society." *Producing Islamic Knowledge: Transmission and Dissemination in Western Europe*, edited by Martin Van Bruinessen and Stefano Allievi. Abingdon: Routledge, 2013, 111.
[43] Interview 22. February 28, 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom; Hussain, Dilwar. *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Leicester*. London: Open Society Foundation, 2010, 39.
[44] House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee. *Preventing Violent Extremism Sixth Report of Session 2009–10 Report*. London: The Stationery Office, 2010, 58.

Muslim Elites and Prevent I

Despite acknowledging the shortcomings of the government's approach, a number of Muslim community leaders formally cooperated with counter-extremism efforts during Prevent I, delivering funded programming, sitting on Prevent-deliberative bodies, and providing counsel to local bureaucrats around local community dynamics. I show how elites with pre-existing ties to the state were able to more easily access policy incentives, without reputational damage because of strong inter-elite ties and the absence of network competition.

There is clear evidence that local bureaucrats sought out civil society leaders to guide policy development that they had funded and consulted with in the past. These civil society leaders were then well placed to shape local Prevent approaches and access policy incentives associated with the strategy. A civil society leader involved in Prevent efforts described how pre-existing connections between Muslim civil society leaders and the state eased the ability for partnerships to form around the counter-extremism agenda, explaining: "We were sitting in a comfort zone already so we just added (another policy area) to it."[45] Consultation with communities and programmatic activities centered around the city's largest Muslim community organization and a small group of community leaders, most of whom the local government had closely partnered with in years prior.[46]

There were a number of reasons for Muslim elites to cooperate with state security efforts. Muslim leaders in Leicester were motivated to promote cohesion and security priorities, but I also found evidence that accessing incentives associated with these new programs was an important factor.[47] The Prevent agenda became a platform for a small number of community leaders to shape national debates around counter-extremism by consulting directly with national policymakers.[48] A council employee that managed Prevent during this period described how one civil society leader recognized the political significance of the

[45] Interview 30. 13 March 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.
[46] The city council also established a "Mainstreaming Moderation" board that helped set the strategic direction and funding priorities for the local Prevent agenda. The membership of this group pulled heavily from individuals that were already well connected to the state before the introduction of Prevent and had previously consulted with the state around other policy issues.
[47] Interview 31. 20 March 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.
[48] Interview 31. 20 March 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.

counter-extremism agenda and was motivated to maintain cooperation with the state, saying, "He knows that if (his organization) had simply stepped right out of the ring and distanced itself from everything that would not be not good for (his organization) or Muslim communities in the city… he's interested in government he wanted to be influencing policy."[49]

Muslim elites were also cooperative with Prevent agendas because they operated in a civic network with significant coordination among civil society leaders and low levels of inter-elite competition. This meant that elites were less concerned about reputational damage at the hands of other civil society leaders. I spoke with a number of community leaders that were heavily involved in Prevent activities during Prevent I, and I found little evidence that they faced significant costs for doing so. As I describe in the sections that follow, civil society leaders that were publicly cooperative with counter-extremism efforts conceded that their involvement had not been personally damaging, even after the Prevent agenda was reformed to become more punitive. Another interviewee heavily involved in local civil society detailed that community leaders were unlikely to face public challenge from co-religionists for their involvement with Prevent. By contrast, I show how elites in other cities were more cautious about the Prevent agenda from the start—limiting or altogether avoiding counter-extremism efforts because they anticipated criticism from co-religionists.

Local Bureaucrats and Prevent I

Though they recognized the contentiousness of the Prevent agenda, I argue that state actors in Leicester invested more heavily in counter-extremism efforts because they could rely on support from well-connected community leaders to manage the policy's administrative complexity and political sensitivity. Bureaucrats were highly motivated to maintain cooperation from Muslim civil society leaders and wider communities. The council staff person tasked with leading on counter-extremism during Prevent I

[49] Interview 31. 20 March 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.

described how policy efforts needed to be initiated by the community and not imposed by the local government.[50]

This recognition by state actors of the need to maintain civic partnerships in order to progress with delivering the policy was not merely theoretical. Bureaucrats took pains to frame Prevent delivery around the city's cohesion discourse in ways that would be more palatable to civil society leaders, ultimately re-titling Prevent "Mainstreaming Moderation" and working to limit the overt focus on Muslim communities.[51] After the Prevent revision in 2011, local policymakers again made further policy modifications to appeal to well-connected civil society organizations as I go on to describe. This indicates the extent to which state actors were working to develop Prevent agendas in a way that would appeal to Muslim civil society leaders and ultimately the wider community.

Despite these policy modifications, Prevent efforts operated in Leicester much as they did in Derby during Prevent I. State actors consulted with Muslim community leaders via various forums and a "Mainstreaming Moderation" consultation body, that drew together a number of prominent Muslim leaders in the city. Police worked with the local authority to establish a local intervention procedure in partnership with other agencies. State actors were able to quickly deliver Prevent programs and meet demands imposed by central government because they could rely on support from Muslim elites. Civil society leaders assisted bureaucrats in designing and delivering community engagement programming, using the policy's initial flexibility to resource broader cohesion priorities. Programmatic activities focused heavily on youth and centered around the city's largest Muslim civil society organization and its network of affiliated organizations[52] that had been collaborating with the state for years prior. State actors readily admitted their reliance on civil society partners to facilitate community engagement. A council staff person responsible for delivering Prevent described how cooperation from one of Leicester's major

[50] Interview 31. 20 March 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.
[51] O'Toole, Therese, et al. "Governing through prevent? Regulation and contested practice in State–Muslim engagement." *Sociology* 50.1 (2015): 1-18.
[52] Lowndes, Vivien and Leila Thorp. *PVE Pathfinder in the East Midlands Action Research, 2007-08*. Leicester: De Montfort University, 2008, 4

Muslim civil society organizations was a "huge advantage because we already had a respected organization that could act as the conduit for engaging with Muslim communities."[53]

Civil society leaders also assisted around local intervention programming, the early iteration of the Channel program. A council employee described specific instances where community leaders informed state actors about groups believed to be "at-risk" and identified programs of activities to respond to these concerns,[54] explaining, "we would sit back and listen to them because they knew much better than we did" and noting "I had a good working relationship with say ten really key community leaders from different parts of the community… they would come forward with genuine concerns and issues and equally they would understand the government agenda as well, so they were sort of key players."[55] She credited one community leader for motivating a major Muslim civil society organization in the city to become involved in Prevent efforts, as well as serving as the local government's "ear on the ground."[56]

The fact that state actors sought out long-term allies to guide their initial Prevent efforts, that bureaucrats viewed cooperation from Muslim elites as a requirement for investing in the counter-extremism agenda, and that these leaders shaped how bureaucrats delivered policy programming both in terms of broad engagement and more targeted interventions is a strong confirmation that state actors were relying on well-connected civic elites to guide their responses to Prevent.

Muslim Communities and Prevent I

Although Prevent efforts remained controversial and interfaced with only a fraction of the wider population, I observe comparatively higher levels of community participation and fewer obstacles to mobilizing members of the public in Leicester than in other cities. Available data from policy documentation and interviews suggest that participation during Prevent I in general aligned with the

[53] Interview 31. 20 March 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.
[54] Interview 31. 20 March 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.
[55] Interview 31. 20 March 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.
[56] Interview 31. 20 March 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.

expectations of bureaucrats, with small groups of under 20 to over 200 attending varied Prevent events,[57] as well as larger events drawing as many as 400 people.[58] I argue that Muslim elites used pre-existing network connections to co-religionists to mobilize higher levels of community participation in the Prevent agenda, both in terms of attendance at various engagement programs and in terms of sharing relevant information with the local state. Documents from this period detail how a Muslim community organization spearheaded a youth event that was attended by over 400 people, bringing together Muslim youth with local leadership. Academic observers noted how civil society leaders promoted these programs utilizing pre-existing connections to mosques, madrassahs, and other civil society organizations resulting in sizeable community involvement.[59] I also find evidence that civil society leaders with connections to co-religionists motivated some members of the public to share information with the state about individuals thought to be "at-risk" in rare cases.[60] A civil society leader explained this to me saying: "(Some people) would ring and say that these are the concerns we have…can you take it forward and….and I'll pass it to the necessary people to look at. And that gives that brief that gives that little barrier between the community and the police because they may not have the same confidence in the police that I do."[61]

Of course, there are a myriad of factors that may motivate community members to share sensitive information with police, of which encouragement by local elites is only one. However, it is significant that state actors credit civil society leaders for helping them understand extremism in the city and access referrals. In the cases that follow, I show how state actors in other cities struggled to access community

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[57] To estimate the level of attendance at Prevent programs, I rely on documents that were provided to me by Leicester City Council. See: Leicester City Council. *Mainstreaming Moderation Programme Fund Current Projects*. January 2011. Provided to the author by Leicester City Council; Leicester City Council. *AIM: Building Resilient Communities: Programmes of Action in Leicester*. 12 March 2009. Provided to the author by Leicester City Council.

[58] Lowndes, Vivien and Leila Thorp. PVE Pathfinder in the East Midlands Action Research 2007-08: Case Studies Report. Leicester: De Montfort University, 2008.

[59] Lowndes, Vivien and Leila Thorp. *PVE Pathfinder in the East Midlands Action Research 2007-08: Case Studies Report*. Leicester: De Montfort University, 2008, 8.

[60] I am unable specify the exact number of community referrals in Leicester, but a law enforcement officer involved in the Channel process in both Derby and Leicester described community members providing referrals for intervention in both cities and did not identify significant differences in community involvement between Derby and Leicester. See: Interview 26. 5 March 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom; While referrals came from many sources, state actors and Muslim elites both cited examples where community leaders passed referrals to local police from community members, which were then included in the Channel process. See: Interview 30. 13 March 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom; Interview 31. 20 March 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.

[61] Interview 30. 13 March 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.

participation or referrals from members of the public without assistance from civil society leaders. Together, I take this as suggestive evidence that network dynamics are an important factor that helps explain local community responses to state security policy.

I have shown how network dynamics eased the ability of Muslim elites with pre-existing ties to the state to cooperate with new counter-extremism efforts, accessing policy incentives, without facing reputational damage due to the lower levels of inter-elite competition. State actors were able to invest more heavily in counter-extremism efforts and meet targets imposed by central government with cooperation from trusted civil society leaders. A number of these leaders then utilized their connections to co-religionists to mobilize community participation around the Prevent agenda. I now discuss how policy outcomes evolved over time after the central government's policy revision in 2011, highlighting how a number of elites could remain cooperative with the Prevent agenda because they remained relatively insulated from reputational damage.

Prevent II in Leicester

In 2011, the Home Office revised Prevent, substantively narrowing the policy's scope and centralizing local policy delivery around the government's counter-terrorism objectives. In the same year, the city's mayor placed the Home Office funded Prevent Coordinator within a local, multi-faith civil society organization, rather than within the local government council, a reflection of the city's longstanding community cohesion orientation.[62] Though Prevent activities in Leicester remain based out of this center, local bureaucrats in Leicester have also been impacted by growing top-down pressure, which has resulted in policy delivery that increasingly mirrors central government designs for Prevent, notably through expanded training efforts and further standardization of Channel processes. State actors have also continued engagement efforts such as routine community consultation and grassroots projects centering around youth and women.

[62] O'Toole, Therese, et al. "Governing through prevent? Regulation and contested practice in State–Muslim engagement." *Sociology* 50.1 (2015),11-12.

Elite Responses to Prevent II

In Leicester a number of community leaders remained cooperative with the Prevent agenda primarily because they were protected from reputational damage by tighter inter-elite and elite-mass connections. The lack of network competition meant that Muslim elites were relatively insulated from challenges from other community leaders. A councilor explained that members of the public in the city would be reluctant to publicly criticize or organize opposition against Muslim elites, preferring to express criticism privately, noting of the city's largest Muslim civic organization: "there is nobody else to challenge its role."[63]

Elites were also protected from organized public opposition due to denser elite-mass connections that historically helped limited the growth of Hizb ut-Tahrir and Al Muhajiroun, which powered opposition against Prevent, and at times targeted Muslim elites directly in other localities. Birt and Lewis have noted how Leicester's highly developed madrassah networks (particularly within the Deobandi community) constrained the expansion of these movements in the city, writing, "The core institutions have already been established, and there is little discernible religious radicalism among younger Indian Muslims in Leicester; groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir struggle to make inroads into the Deobandi community. The youth are captured while young in the madrasahs (mosque supplementary schools), which are large, streamed by age, and well-supported."[64] These observations were reiterated to me by a local councilor who explained: "(Hizb ut-Tahrir's narrative) was wrong and it was challenged because we have a strong community to challenge it… (the imams) are in the position to challenge because of their relationship with the children."[65] It is highly significant that local politicians and academics stress that groups which powered Prevent opposition in other cities were unable to mobilize in Leicester because of denser connections between elites and co-religionists. I show later in this chapter how Muslim elites in Derby faced heftier reputational damage because network dynamics did not provide the same protective function.

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[63] Interview 132. 20 February 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.
[64] Birt, Jonathan and Philip Lewis. "The Pattern of Islamic Reform in Britain: The Deobandis Between Intra-Muslim Sectarianism and Engagement with Wider Society." *Producing Islamic Knowledge: Transmission and Dissemination in Western Europe*, edited by Martin Van Bruinessen and Stefano Allievi. Abingdon: Routledge, 2013, 111.
[65] Interview 132. 20 February 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.

I argue that tighter elite-mass connections and the lack of inter-elite competition combined to limit reputational damage, making it more feasible for some Muslim elites to continue lending assistance to the state's counter-extremism efforts over time. A civil society leader that had been involved in the Prevent agenda over time conceded that his cooperation with counter-extremism efforts had "not been detrimental," citing his repeated re-election to a prominent leadership position.[66] In addition to the fact that interviewees described the absence of reputational damage, I could not find evidence of public attacks like those I observed elsewhere, where Muslim elites anticipated threats to their safety or destruction to their personal credibility for cooperating with state security efforts. In the sections that follow, I show how a number of community leaders remained cooperative with the state's security efforts, actively partnering with Prevent practicioners to facilitate some degree of community engagement over time and continuing to share relevant information with the state.

To be clear, my aim is not to paint a rosy picture or claim that elites in Leicester were exempt from criticism. I was told by community leaders that they had faced critique both from non-Muslims as well as co-religionists.[67] But on the whole, a number of Muslim elites I interviewed did not appear so concerned with reputational damage from public opposition movements or other civic elites that they limited their cooperation with state actors around Prevent. Because of their involvement, these leaders could continue to access some degree of leadership on policy development locally, for instance assisting the state with Prevent training, hosting national policy leaders, and interfacing with key local decisionmakers.

Community Responses to Prevent II

Cooperation from elites with ties to co-religionists helped state actors sustain higher levels of community participation than I observe elsewhere, though there remains widespread suspicion about counter-extremism efforts. In practice, this has meant that various Prevent programs and consultations are relatively well attended[68] and that state actors face fewer obstacles in facilitating participation around the

[66] Interview 30. 13 March 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.
[67] Interview 24. 22 March 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom; Interview 30. 13 March 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.
[68] Bureaucrats described a range of well-attended consultation and programs, though exact data on attendance is hard to identify.

Prevent agenda. As a police officer involved in Prevent in Leicester explained to me, "We could easily tomorrow make a telephone call and fill an auditorium full of 50+ for a Prevent conference. We could do that tomorrow."[69] Civil society leaders and local state actors also described how communities made referrals and shared security information with state actors at multiple points in time.[70] Despite the rarity of these types of exchanges, I was told that referrals from community members were increasing in frequency over time, both from Muslim community leaders and community members.[71]

As under the early iteration of Prevent, a number of Muslim elites used their network connections to co-religionists to mobilize continued involvement from some members of the public around Prevent. A local imam described how he convened a series of meetings between religious leaders who had concerns about Prevent to meet directly with local police about the strategy.[72] Another civil society leader described the role of a community organization in facilitating these types of exchanges, saying, "unless you have somebody like (a local Muslim organization) facilitating some of that, I think it doesn't work, you need that broker."[73] On another occasion, a Muslim civil society organization hosted the former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism to meet with around 60 community members, where a local imam chaired the meeting and publicly defended local Prevent activities, later organizing an event about counter-extremism in schools to address concerns among members of the public.[74] Although community members brought referrals directly to state actors, there were also examples of community members sharing concerns about extremism with community leaders they trusted, rather than the state. For instance, a civil society leader explained how a local school contacted a Muslim civil society organization with a concern about radicalization.[75]

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[69] Interview 26. 5 March 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.
[70] Interview 27. 20 March 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom; Interview 26. 5 March 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom; Interview 30. 13 March 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.
[71] Interview 27. 20 March 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.
[72] Interview 22. 28 February 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.
[73] Interview 24. 22 March 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.
[74] Interview 22. February 28, 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.
[75] Interview 24. 22 March 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.

My aim is not to claim that Leicester's highly connected Muslim civic network is the only reason that community members participated in Prevent efforts over time. However, it is significant that community leaders repeatedly helped state actors facilitate interfaces with skeptical members of the public, effectively giving state actors platforms through which to conduct community engagement. Further highlighting the importance of civic networks, a civil society leader detailed how some community members questioned the local authority about a Prevent event that did not include a major Muslim civil society organization in the city. He explained that these public questions in turn compelled the local government to formally include this organization as an event sponsor.[76] That some residents spoke up about Prevent programs which excluded a particular civil society organization is important evidence that the presence of trusted grassroots organizations shapes community participation among at least some sections of the public. Another civil society leader described to me how she was more willing to engage with Prevent practitioners despite earlier apprehensions because of encouragement from another board member that was involved in counter-extremism efforts.[77] Again, this highlights that local actors were making decisions about how they would interface with the Prevent agenda on the basis of interpersonal networks of trust, despite concerns about counter-extremism agendas.

I observe more sustained community participation in Leicester than other areas, with willingness among some members of the public to interface with state actors around counter-extremism and in rare cases to share referrals with the state. However, it was suggested that existing Prevent activities limited their engagement to members of the public that were linked to particular civil society organizations,[78] effectively bypassing other constituencies in the city. But these policy critiques ultimately reiterate my core claim that the nature of community participation reflects pre-existing civic networks, in particular connections between elites and the state and between elites and co-religionists.

[76] Interview 22. 28 February 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.
[77] Interview 134. 21 February 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.
[78] Interview 132. 20 February 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.

Somali Communities in Leicester

As an additional test of the theory, I explored how Somali communities in Leicester have interfaced with the Prevent agenda over time. In comparison to wider Muslim civil society networks in the city, Somali civic networks are more decentralized, with greater competition between elites, comparatively weaker connections between civic leaders and Somalis, and degree of institutional separation from Deobandi civil society organizations in the city.[79] Some Somalis in Leicester participated in Prevent programs during the initial iteration of the strategy, but state actors appeared to face greater obstacles at certain points facilitating involvement from community leaders and later in mobilizing wider community participation. I argue that this was a function of greater inter-elite competition and the weaker connections between Somali civil society organizations and other civil society organizations in the city.

In the first iteration of the policy, state actors described the obstacles they faced engaging Somali leaders, which appeared to be in part because of longstanding inter-elite competition. A council employee explained the failure of a consultative body that aimed to engage different Somali leaders, saying, "That fell flat on its face, it was an exercise in how the local authority can't do this stuff."[80] State efforts to engage Muslim communities via Deobandi-controlled organizations often appeared to bypass Somali communities who were comparably less connected to these institutions. A Somali leader described a number of Prevent engagements where Somalis were barely in attendance relative to other Muslim constituencies.[81]

It is significant that Somali communities were on the receiving end of the same Prevent program in Leicester, yet community engagement efforts appeared to have played out differently within the Somali community—with some evidence that state actors faced greater obstacles to establish partnerships with Somali leaders and mobilize members of the public over time. This provides further evidence that

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[79] Interview 81. 1 March 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in London, United Kingdom.
As an academic with deep knowledge of Somalis in Leicester explained: "The Somali community is very decentralized… that's to do with the traditional ways of social cohesion so the clan factor is a big one which is already a decentralized form of existence where there's no particular hierarchy…and so because of that decentralized way of existence it's difficult for an outsider to engage with them because there is not a common central focal point."
[80] Interview 31. 20 March 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.
[81] Interview 23. 28 March 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.

network dynamics are a critical factor that helps to explain the ways that members of the public interface with counter-extremism agendas—even when other factors like state capacity and threat levels are held constant.

Conclusion

In brief, I have argued that network dynamics shape the way that local actors respond to controversial Prevent programs in Leicester. Pre-existing elite-state ties and the lack of network competition eased the ability of many elites to cooperate with Prevent at the outset, accessing policy incentives, without facing reputational damage in the process. Support from trusted elites in turn enabled local bureaucrats to invest more in sensitive and administratively complex, counter-extremism programming. Finally, elites used their established network ties to mobilize higher levels of participation, both in terms of sharing sensitive information and attendance at Prevent programs.

A number of community leaders remained cooperative with counter-extremism efforts, even after the controversial policy revision in 2011. I argued that this was a function of denser elite-mass ties and the lack of network competition, which shielded community leaders from reputational damage at the hands of other leaders or organized public opposition. With continued support from elites, state actors were able to maintain some degree of community participation in Prevent over time, even in the face of widespread public suspicion about the strategy.

It is important to emphasize that bureaucrats in Leicester shaped local policy outcomes, by making specific policy reforms and amendments in line with community preferences, notably by re-branding the initial Prevent strategy to focus on all forms of extremism and placing the Home Office funded Prevent coordinator out of a local civil society organization. Local bureaucrats also built wider community networks. A Prevent practitioner described what he called going "beyond" community leaders to "speak with the youngsters, speak with the women, speak with some of these groups that don't get the ear of the politicians and engage them on the strategy and give them a voice as well… I go that extra mile and look for those other networks that exist and other youth groups or passionate personalities that really want to

do good, but no one is giving them the oxygen or the time to do that."[82] These policy amendments and inter-personal relationships were clearly significant for the way that members of the public perceived Prevent efforts. However, I still find evidence that network structures are important in explaining how these efforts translate into policy outcomes on the ground, and bureaucrats repeatedly told me how community leaders contributed to their work and were valuable allies facilitating engagement with local publics.

Though I observe comparatively higher levels of community participation in Prevent in Leicester, it must be said that these engagements impact only a fractional part of the wider population. Much of the public remains highly suspicious about government counter-extremism efforts,[83] and a number of interviewees told me that opportunities for members of the public to engage with Prevent practitioners were lacking. One civil society leader characterized Prevent engagements in the city as "very ad hoc,"[84] with government engagement at certain points in time, which then appeared to dissipate later. Some of this is a function of reforms to the UK's Prevent strategy which have reduced funding and emphasis on community development programs that were a mainstay of the earlier policy approach, re-orienting energy and resources toward public agencies and the Channel intervention program.

Critically, these policy modifications operate in a context of broader cuts to policing and other public agencies,[85] where the state's ability to engage with citizens (in particular in relation to policing)[86] has been significantly cut back. Academics have noted how austerity cuts have impacted civil society activities in Leicester, limiting opportunities for citizens to engage with the state and breaking down civic networks.[87]

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[82] Interview 27. 20 March 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.
[83] Interview 30. 13 March 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom;
Interview 24. 22 March 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom; Interview 134. 21 February 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.
[84] Interview 134. 21 February 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.
[85] Regional Equality and Diversity Partnership. *Report on the Impact of the Government Cuts on Voluntary and Community sector in the East Midlands Region.* 2012. http://www.theraceequalitycentre.org.uk/pdf/redp-impact-of-the-cuts-to-voluntary-sector.pdf
[86] "Police on the frontline bear the brunt of cuts to their service and others." *The Guardian.* 28 June 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/28/police-on-the-frontline-bear-the-brunt-of-cuts-to-their-service-and-others; "Leicestershire Police cuts: Hundreds of officers face axe, says union" *BBC.* 21 August 2013. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-leicestershire-23777236
[87] Davies, Jonathan. *Austerity Leicester: Between Revitalisation, Retrenchment and Resistance*. Leicester: Centre for Urban Research on Austerity, 2017. https://www.urbantransformations.ox.ac.uk/blog/2017/austerity-leicester-between-revitalisation-retrenchment-and-resistance/Davies writes of Austerity in Leicester that "the state is reorganising itself under austerity and, in the process, disorganising elements of local civil society."

I argued that these networks eased the ability of the state to mobilize cooperation from Muslim elites and some members of the public around Prevent objectives. In the face of funding cuts, civil society organizations are providing fewer services[88] and avenues of engagement with citizens that were more numerous and better-resourced before have generally diminished. These developments highlight that cuts to government funding are likely to change network dynamics over time, potentially impacting state security efforts in unexpected ways. Having traced the development of Prevent in Leicester, I now turn to the case of Derby.

Derby

Derby is a mid-size city, smaller than its neighbors, Nottingham to the East and Leicester to the South. As a manufacturing hub, the city became a destination for migrants from around the world, hosting an increasingly diverse population, including a sizeable Muslim community. I discuss the dynamics of the city's Muslim civil society networks before turning to discuss the evolution of Prevent in Derby.

Much of the Muslim community in Derby has Pakistani roots, with links to the Mirpur District in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan. Along with the city's Pakistani population of around 15,000, the city is also home to smaller populations of Bangladeshis, Kurds, and Somalis.[89]

[88] Interview 81. 1 March 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.
[89] Derby City Council. *Census 2011 Report: Ethnicity, Language and Religion*. Derby: Derby City Council, 2014. https://www.derby.gov.uk/council-and-democracy/statistics-and-census-information/census-information/



Figure 5.4 Derby Ward Map

Data from the 2011 census shows that two wards, Arboretum and Normanton, have the highest concentration of Muslim residents. Both of these wards have higher rates of deprivation, with several neighborhoods among the most deprived in the country,[90] with higher unemployment rates and lower levels of education than elsewhere in the city.[91] Most Muslims in the city are affiliated with the Sunni Barelvi tradition and its network of four mosques; there are also smaller Deobandi, Salafi, and Shia communities.[92] Within the Pakistani community, there are also divisions along kinship lines, known as

[90] Info4Derby Derby City Council. *Overview Report: Normanton*. Derby: Derby City Council. https://bit.ly/2UPjyL9; Info4Derby Derby City Council. *Overview Report: Arboretum*. Derby: Derby City Council. https://bit.ly/2xUxvi0

[91] Nomis: Official Labour Market Statistics. *2011 Ward Labour Market Profile: Normanton*. London: Office for National Statistics, 2011. https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/reports/lmp/ward2011/1140851004/report.aspx; Nomis: Official Labour Market Statistics. *2011 Ward Labour Market Profile: Arboretum*. London: Office for National Statistics, 2011. https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/reports/lmp/ward2011/1140850994/report.aspx

[92] Lowndes, Vivien and Leila Thorp. *PVE Pathfinder in the East Midlands Action Research, 2007-08*. Leicester: De Montfort University, 2008.

biraderis,[93] and these kinship structures have maintained a degree of salience over time. While community leaders are not insulated from criticism, Muslim elites in Derby have maintained a unique network position vis-à-vis the state and other Muslims. I break down the structural properties of Muslim civic networks in Derby before turning to a discussion of Prevent.

Muslim Civic Networks in Derby

Muslim civic networks in Derby feature a number of inter-elite and elite-state ties. While some elites are better connected to members of the public (notably within sections of the Pakistani Barelvi community), ties between civil society leaders and co-religionists are less developed, particularly in comparison to Leicester.

Inter-Elite Ties

Building on ethnic, biraderi, and sectarian networks, there were a number of inter-elite ties between Muslim leaders in Derby before the introduction of Prevent, with little evidence of inter-elite competition. A number of community leaders sat on boards of the city's Muslim civil society organizations, linking these institutions together via overlapping board memberships. There was a willingness among Muslim civic leaders in Derby (mostly within the Barelvi Pakistani community) to coordinate around common priorities when they emerged.[94] For instance, council documents from 2004 highlight how a number of Muslim civil society organizations collaborated together with the city council to address academic under-achievement among young Pakistanis in Derby, engaging with over four thousand young people in the city.[95] Many of these same leaders consulted with the state together at ward meetings and local authority consultations. This is in contrast to other cities where internal disputes

[93] Peace and Akhtar define biraderis as "networks of individuals and families that share a common ancestry. They function as hierarchical systems of social organisation and support…Biraderi broadly translates as patrilineage or descendants of the same bloodline. In practice however, biraderis do include non-blood relatives through relatively porous boundaries of inclusion." See: Peace, Timothy, and Parveen Akhtar. "Biraderi, Bloc Votes and Bradford: Investigating the Respect Party's Campaign Strategy." *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 17.2 (2015), 226.
[94] Interview 18. 15 February 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.
[95] Derby City Council. *Minority Ethnic Communities Advisory Committee: Pakistani Youth Development Project*. 18 November 2004. https://bit.ly/2PKmxR8

repeatedly prevented coordination amongst community leaders or stood as an obstacle to consultation with the state. While I observe tighter inter-elite connections within the Pakistani community which represents the majority of Muslims in the city, there were weaker connections between different minority ethnic communities[96] and sectarian groups in the city.[97]

Elite-State Ties

Ties between Muslim elites and the state were relatively well developed before the introduction of Prevent. A small core of leaders served as elected councilors or as community representatives that liaised with the state at various consultation forums where they voiced community demands[98] and delineated small grants to local civil society organizations. Many of these same community leaders were then relied on by state actors to help manage community tensions, deliver voluntary services, and consult on local policy delivery. In short, at the start of Prevent there were already built-up ties between a handful of community leaders and key local government decisionmakers, though these linkages were less established than in Leicester where state actors had invested more energy in cohesion and community engagement in years prior.

Elite-Mass Ties

Many Muslims in Derby clearly relied on local civil society organizations to access much-needed services.[99] Interviews with community members highlighted the various levels of connectivity between Muslim elites and members of the public (which is to be expected), with some individuals directly interfacing with community leaders, while others would be more hesitant to do so or prefer to utilize a local imam to facilitate these connections.[100] On the whole, however, I identify wider gaps between

[96] Interview 137. 22 February 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.
[97] Interview 11. 24 February 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.
[98] Interview 7. 27 February 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Rotherham, United Kingdom.
[99] Interview 18. 15 February 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.
[100] I interviewed a community member in Derby who described that they were primarily connected to a local imam, who would then facilitate connections to other civic leadership in the city, rather than approaching them directly, though there appeared to be

Muslim civil society leaders and members of the public. In comparison to Leicester, Muslim community leaders were less connected to young people and more vulnerable to public challenge. After-school religious education programs that were so prominent in Leicester were less developed in Derby.[101] Community leaders in Derby also faced public challenge from followers of Al Muhajiroun in the city. A report from the *New York Times* in 2003 quoted a member of Derby City Council describing how Al Muhajiroun's messaging was "embarrassing for mature members of the community," while another civil society leader described fears about the ability of these groups to influence young people in the city.[102] An academic observer described how sympathizers of the group had attempted to intimidate and undermine mosque leadership in the past, citing their disruption during a visitation by the Archbishop of Canterbury.[103] This is in contrast to Leicester where I find evidence that Muslim elites generally commanded public deference over time—even among those with contrasting views. A final indication of weaker elite-mass linkages is the fact that police operating in both Leicester and Derby described the wider gaps between community leadership and members of the public in Derby.[104] The fact that state actors observe less developed elite-mass connections, that young people maintained fewer ties to religious leadership in the absence of religious education programs, and that civil society leaders faced public challenge before the introduction of Prevent, confirm a picture of wider gaps between elites and members of the public in Derby.

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a general trust for community leaders. Interview 128. 19 February 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom; Another interviewee stressed a local mosque as a central organization but described that members of the public might approach various civic leaders in the city depending on the issue at hand. It was suggested, however, that members of the public might be more trusting of community leaders from their same biraderi. Interview 129. 19 February 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.

[101] Interview 19. 18 March 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.

[102] Lyall, Sarah. "What Drove 2 Britons to Bomb a Club in Tel Aviv?" *The New York Times*. 12 May 2003. https://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/12/world/what-drove-2-britons-to-bomb-a-club-in-tel-aviv.html

[103] Interview 16. 7 February 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.

[104] Interview 26. 5 March 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom. A law enforcement officer described to me: "In Derby you've still got that issue. You've got the old school, non-English speaking figure head leader who was disconnected with his youth with everybody else in that community and that figurehead Imam leader was not there to lead the people."

Prevent I in Derby

The nascent Prevent agenda was met with a degree of public opposition in Derby from its introduction in 2007.[105] At the same time, there were also concerns about the history of terrorism in the city, which included Britain's first suicide bomber, Omar Sharif.[106] Muslim leaders I interviewed described their fears about radicalization in the city.[107] In the sections that follow, I show how network dynamics shaped the way that Muslim elites, state actors, and wider communities responded to the first iteration of Prevent.

Muslim Elites and Prevent I

Despite the controversies surrounding the Prevent agenda, a number of community leaders actively cooperated with the state's counter-extremism efforts, motivated to support government security objectives. A councilor detailed his initial response to the Prevent agenda, saying, "We took the view that something needs to happen, if there are elements within our communities who have the potential to cause us all an embarrassment and loss of life, we recognize that it needed to be dealt with."[108] A civil society leader acknowledged the shortcomings associated with the strategy but described his willingness to work with state actors around state counter-extremism efforts, saying, "Even though we didn't agree with the way the government were approaching this, we thought, look, it's better to be inside working with them rather than to be outside just moaning and complaining."[109] Many of these leaders utilized pre-existing connections to the state to access policy incentives associated with the Prevent agenda. In the historically lower competition network, elites were able to back Prevent efforts, without significant concerns about reputational damage.

Muslim civil society leaders that were already close to the state before the introduction of Prevent were able to position themselves at the center of developing counter-extremism programs in the city. For

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[105] Interview 11. 24 February 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.
[106] Crowson, Isaac. "Derby's history of terrorism and extremism from Omar to Munir." *The Derby Telegraph*. 13 January 2018. https://www.derbytelegraph.co.uk/news/derby-news/derbys-history-terrorism-extremism-omar-1048504
[107] Interview 7. 27 February 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Rotherham, United Kingdom; Interview 15. 7 February 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.
[108] Interview 15. 7 February 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.
[109] Interview 7. 27 February 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Rotherham, United Kingdom.

instance, the consultation forum created as part of Prevent that was designed to represent Muslim communities in the city and advise on counter-extremism programming—what became known as Derby's "Muslim Forum"—drew heavily from civil society leaders that were already known to the local government and had received state funding in the past. Prevent consultations were held at the same ethnic community organization where earlier ward meetings had taken place. A local bureaucrat called this group of civil society leaders the "old guard"[110] who had historically represented the city's Pakistani Barelvi community and served in leadership positions across various local Muslim civil society organizations.

Further highlighting the role of pre-existing elite-state ties, community groups that lacked relationships with key decisionmakers appeared to struggle to access Prevent funds and criticized the lack of representativeness of state engagement efforts. As one civil society leader described, "When it came to translating that funding… there was never a level playing field…It was only the old usual suspects who shouted the loudest would get it…they would be in a prime position to coordinate initiatives and be the spokes-organization for the community."[111] Similarly, I was told by a police officer that had delivered Prevent in Derby that organizations that struggled to navigate bureaucratic requirements were less able to access Prevent funding.[112]

There was little evidence I could find that leaders were wary of reputational damage during the initial rollout of counter-extremism efforts in the city, in fact some interviewees conveyed a degree of optimism about supporting state counter-extremism efforts in the city. Only later, after the policy revision and organized opposition in the city did many leaders limit their involvement with Prevent in Derby going forward, recognizing the hefty costs associated with the strategy and new policy constraints imposed by the central government. This is in contrast to other areas where community leaders were immediately

[110] Interview 11. 24 February 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.
[111] Interview 21. 22 February 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.
[112] Interview 26. 5 March 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.

aware of the potential risks associated with counter-extremism efforts, avoiding the policy area altogether fearing a loss of organizational credibility.

Leaders that cooperated with the state's Prevent agenda were able to capitalize on new financial and political capital associated with the policy area.[113] Specific funding numbers are hard to ascertain, but existing documentation suggests that initial grants ranged from £40,000 used to create new job posts in a local grassroots organization to a few thousand pounds.[114] The policy also brought new political capital, by identifying and formalizing positions of community leadership that gave a small number of community leaders opportunities to interface with key local leaders. At times, community representatives used their roles on the city's local authority supported Muslim Forum to commission work in their own organizations and resource their ongoing community efforts. Many of these organizations operated in a resource scarce environment and used Prevent funding to deliver much-needed services to members of the public, though others expressed more skeptical views, particularly around the connection between funded programming and Prevent objectives. For instance, a council staff person described how counter-extremism funds were utilized in the service of organizations' earlier community development priorities, summarized as, "taking the money and doing what they had always done, that sustained their roles and their organizations."[115]

In brief, both civil society leaders and state actors conceded that Prevent I relied on community leaders with pre-existing ties to the state, while civil society organizations that lacked ties to key decisionmakers struggled to access policy incentives. While Prevent efforts remained controversial, community leaders were willing to cooperate around these agendas at the outset because they did not anticipate significant reputational damage. In the sections that follow, I show how elites helped state actors meet demands

[113] Interview 5. 15 March 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom. A civil society leader that was involved with Prevent at this time explained to me how Prevent was seen by some as "a career opportunity, a self-promotional opportunity."
[114] The Tax Payer's Alliance. *Council Spending: The Prevent Strategy*. London: The TaxPayers' Alliance, 2009. https://www.taxpayersalliance.com/council_spending_uncovered_the_prevent_strategy
[115] Interview 17. 13 February 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.

imposed by the central government, actively co-designing and implementing Prevent programs, as well as facilitating community involvement.

Local Bureaucrats and Prevent I

Local bureaucrats were more willing to invest in Prevent efforts because they could rely on cooperation from community leaders with whom they shared pre-existing connections. A council staff person in Derby that led on policy development during Prevent I described to me how counter-extremism represented an unprecedented policy domain and a source confusion,[116] whereby local governments were compelled into the counter-terrorism domain in an unprecedented way. Recognizing the novelty and sensitivity associated with the Prevent agenda, state actors were insistent that they deliver Prevent in a way that was palatable to Muslim civil society leaders, actively seeking out these individuals to guide and sanction local Prevent approaches. Initial policy consultations with community leaders culminated in what became known as the "Derby Muslim Forum," which brought together a small group of community leaders that were already well-known to the state.[117]

Not only did this body satisfy central government demands for consultation with Muslim leaders under Prevent I, the Muslim Forum also served as a conduit for state actors to partner with civic elites around developing and delivering Prevent programming. Like local bureaucrats in Leicester, council staff I interviewed were wary of forcing their strategic preferences on Muslim publics and stressed that counter-extremism efforts were developed in partnership with local leaders,[118] with a council leader saying, "There was a sort of shared aspiration... I think we took the strategic view that it had to be."[119] In effect, local government personnel described to me that they viewed cooperation from Muslim civil society leaders as a pre-requisite for investing in Prevent agendas. Community leaders also assisted the state in meeting objectives imposed by central government, relating to community engagement and consultation. In Derby, state actors relied heavily on civil society leaders to identify partnerships with other community

[116] Interview 17. 13 February 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.
[117] Interview 7. 27 February 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Rotherham, United Kingdom.
[118] Interview 12. 20 October 2015. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.
[119] Interview 17. 13 February 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.

organizations to diversify the range of voices consulting with local government via the "Muslim Forum." Muslim elites also assisted the state in designing and delivering local Prevent programming that engaged with Muslim publics using government funding.

Alongside these developments, state actors quickly established functioning intervention programs with some cooperation from local agencies,[120] as well as from some civil society leaders and community members, as I describe later. Unlike other areas where the lack of support from Muslim leaders dissuaded state actors from investing heavily in counter-extremism efforts, there was an initial willingness to support counter-extremism efforts among some local leaders. For instance, a councilor explained to me how he valued the actions taken by local police, which he credited with disrupting the public presence of Al Muhajiroun locally.[121]

Putting the evidence together in Derby, state actors were highly cautious to maintain the support of Muslim civil society leaders. Multiple local government personnel detailed to me their sustained efforts to consult and partner with well-established community leaders around Prevent, which was seen as a requirement in order to deliver these programs. Muslim elites also provided concrete assistance in the administration of Prevent agendas. This took the form of designing and delivering programs that enabled local state actors to meet policy requirements imposed by central government. This is in sharp contrast to other localities where state actors avoided investing in counter-extremism efforts because they lacked cooperation from civil society leaders that were highly connected to the state.

Muslim Communities and Prevent I

Although there was significant public suspicion about the Prevent agenda[122] and admittedly only limited sections of the population ever engaged with the strategy, I show how a number of Muslim elites used inter-elite and elite-mass connections to mobilize community participation during Prevent I. Interviews

[120] Interview 17. 13 February 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.
[121] Interview 15. 7 February 2018 Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.
[122] Baksh, Nadeem et al. *Understanding and Appreciating Muslim Diversity in the City of Derby*. Nottingham: Institute of Community Cohesion, 2009. Provided to the Author by Council Staff at Derby City Council, 13.

with multiple state actors delivering Prevent during this period indicate that attendance at Prevent programs aligned with their expectations, what a council leader described to me as "big levels of participation"[123] that reached a number of constituencies from young people and women to religious leaders.[124] For instance, programming included a women's multicultural day event and workshops for youth, focusing on cohesion issues.

For comparison, a law enforcement officer delivering Prevent in both Derby and Leicester did not observe significant differences in the nature of public participation between the two cities, noting how in both locations "people engaged quite quickly."[125] Unlike other areas where I find essentially no evidence that community members shared information of any kind with law enforcement, I found evidence that a small number of Muslim civil society leaders and members of the public did assist the state in understanding local risks and providing referrals about individuals who might then take part in intervention programs,[126] though most referrals appeared to originate from other public agencies, notably from schools.[127]

I make the case that this participation was a function of Muslim elites who cooperated with the Prevent agenda at the outset of the strategy and leveraged their pre-existing network connections to facilitate community participation. A number of the Muslim elites that assisted with state counter-extremism efforts were board members of prominent community associations. These leaders then built on wide-ranging networks to facilitate community engagement at a range of well-attended Prevent-funded programs, much of which focused on broader cohesion and community development objectives. For instance, a Muslim civil society leader that had observed Prevent in Derby described how community leaders used connections to co-religionists to encourage public participation during Prevent I, explaining the importance of one community leader's encouragement in particular, saying, "because people see him

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[123] Interview 17. 13 February 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.
[124] It is hard to identify exact numbers but documentation I was able to access highlighted youth programs with around 50 in attendance and women's events with nearly five hundred people in attendance. See: Lowndes, Vivien and Leila Thorp. *PVE Pathfinder in the East Midlands Action Research, 2007-08: Case Studies Report*. Leicester: De Montfort University, 2008.
[125] Interview 26. 5 March 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.
[126] Interview 26. 5 March 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.
[127] Interview 17. 13 February 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.

as somebody who is coming from an informed position they are more likely to sort of support (him) in his endeavors, if (he) then asks them to attend a meeting on the basis of that trust, they will go along and do that and where there is a lack of knowledge, they will speak to (him) and say well, we don't understand this, can you explain this… that's how it normally works."[128] A councilor similarly attributed initial community participation to consensus across established elites advocating for collaboration around Prevent, explaining, "The message from people who are prominent in the community was probably unanimously in favor of us working with the police. If people are not getting conflicting messages it becomes more doable, if people are confused, one group is saying participate, one group is saying don't participate then people often get confused with the information which is presented to them."[129]

Academic observers that researched Prevent in Derby during this period also described how Muslim elites utilized pre-existing civic networks to increase community involvement in Prevent, pooling contacts between Muslim charities, local mosques, and other affiliated civil society to promote attendance at Prevent-funded workshops.[130] As Lowndes and Thorp note about Prevent I: "There is a general distrust of the government agenda and its Muslim focus at the current time that was encountered in the work. This barrier was largely overcome however, by the use of a respected and well-known locally embedded organisation in the facilitation of the workshops."[131] The role of community leaders in mobilizing community involvement during Prevent I was also highlighted to me by another academic observer[132] as well as a local bureaucrat.[133] To be clear, my aim is not to claim that local civil society leaders controlled local communities, rather that long-term networks of trust motivated greater public engagement with the Prevent agenda in some sections of the community, despite concerns about the government's counter-terrorism agenda.

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[128] Interview 18. 15 February 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.
[129] Interview 15. 7 February 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.
[130] Lowndes, Vivien and Leila Thorp. *PVE Pathfinder in the East Midlands Action Research, 2007-08: Case Studies Report*. Leicester: De Montfort University, 2008, 23: A youth initiative "builds on the knowledge and experience gained by this organisation in its previous work and on the locally embedded character of the volunteers."
[131] Lowndes, Vivien and Leila Thorp. *PVE Pathfinder in the East Midlands Action Research, 2007-08: Case Studies Report*. Leicester: De Montfort University, 2008, 25.
[132] Interview 16. 7 February 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.
[133] Interview 12. 20 October 2015. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.

Despite the controversy around intervention programs and their underlying logic, it was clear that state actors in Derby relied on a small number of civil society leaders with grassroots connections to identify individuals thought to be "at-risk" who might be suited to take part in intervention programming. A police officer heavily involved in the roll-out of Channel in the East Midlands explained to me how a grassroots project based out of a local Muslim community organization was relied on to identify the majority of referrals in the city, saying, "That was one of their biggest areas of engagement where they got the most of their referrals from and also they utilized as an intervention."[134] A civil society leader explained to me how he identified individuals thought to be "vulnerable" to violent extremism, noting, "Some of the projects that I was directly leading on…I saw vulnerabilities in terms of what gets people into a certain place, my aim was always to get young people involved who were vulnerable, call it a knack, call it a hunch, it wasn't done in a systematic way, we were able to get those people involved, some of those young people that worked with me, I see them now and they're in a different place, simply through that work that we did."[135]

While I find evidence that Muslim elites used pre-existing elite-mass and inter-elite ties to mobilize participation in certain sections of local civic networks, the majority of Prevent activities I identified centered around the local Pakistani (predominately Barelvi) communities,[136] with comparably less involvement from other ethnic and sectarian groups.[137] Effectively, Prevent engagements appeared to bypass groups within the Muslim community that lacked connections to the state and to Pakistani civil society leaders. Muslim diasporas outside the Pakistani community were less influenced by Pakistani civil society leaders with whom they shared comparably fewer network linkages. For instance, a Bosnian civil society leader I interviewed noted to me how his co-ethnics were consistently uninvolved in Prevent over time, viewing activities within the local Pakistani population as removed from their experience.[138] Smaller Muslim diasporas(such as the local Kurdish community) that were more internally disconnected without a

[134] Interview 26. 5 March 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.
[135] Interview 5. 15 March 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.
[136] Interview 17. 13 February 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.
[137] Baksh, Nadeem et al. *Understanding and Appreciating Muslim Diversity in the City of Derby*. Nottingham: Institute of Community Cohesion, 2009. Provided to the Author by Council Staff at Derby City Council.
[138] Interview 137. 22 February 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.

clear civic center[139] posed challenges for law enforcement to identify key points of contact through which to facilitate engagement. Equally, law enforcement described how engaging with Salafis in the city proved difficult because these groups were on the whole more reluctant to engage with the state. In general, Salafis in Derby were less influenced by Barelvi lay leadership, which then required state actors to identify other interlocutors to engage these communities.[140] It is significant that I find a range of evidence that different Muslim constituencies with fewer elite-state connections and inter-elite ties participated more minimally in Prevent agendas. These groups were on the receiving end of the same policy, with most potentially confounding variables held constant. Yet, I observe that state actors faced greater obstacles facilitating the engagement of these groups around Prevent efforts over time.

While I find evidence that Muslim elites drew on pre-existing network linkages to mobilize higher levels of community participation among certain sections of Muslim publics, it is important to note that most Prevent funded programs focused on broader cohesion objectives rather than violent extremism during this period. Many interviewees cast doubt on the effectiveness of these engagements. For instance, a councilor questioned whether Prevent meaningfully engaged those who were not "already keen on the cohesion agenda,"[141] while another leader suggested that Prevent activities had not impacted individuals that were sympathetic to the views of Al Muhajiroun.[142] Despite this, I have shown how Prevent efforts mobilized some degree of public involvement, building on pre-existing network ties between elites and the state and between Muslim civil society leaders and co-religionists. In the sections that follow, I show how this coalition around nascent Prevent agendas breaks down over time, as elites face growing reputational damage and the central government imposes increasing top-down constraints on policy activity.

[139] Interview 137. 22 February 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.
[140] Interview 26. 5 March 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.
[141] Interview 15. 7 February 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.
[142] Interview 19. 18 March 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.

Growing Reputational Damage

In neighboring Leicester, I showed how denser elite-mass linkages protected a number of Muslim elites from significant reputational damage, easing their ability to remain cooperative with Prevent over time. By contrast in Derby, Muslim elites faced growing reputational damage from organized public opposition that appeared to have historically exploited network gaps between elites and members of the public to mobilize a small public following. In Derby, I find suggestive evidence that followers of Al Muhajiroun and Hizb ut-Tahrir that maintained an established presence in the city were a key part of powering public opposition against Prevent and its collaborators locally.[143] It is a challenge to identify precisely why these groups managed to establish a foothold locally, but I find suggestive evidence that these groups were able to develop a local following because of longstanding network gaps between Muslim elites and members of the public, specifically young people. I was told by a civil society leader that the city historically lacked religious education programs that would have connected young people to imams, suggesting that without some degree of religious competency young people are more vulnerable to the messages of radical groups.[144] By contrast, these same groups were more swiftly rejected in Leicester, where Muslim religious leaders maintain expansive religious education networks and more established ties to young people. These elite-mass ties appeared to be factor that has limited the ability of groups like Al Muhajiroun from organizing locally and threatening established Muslim leadership. It is significant that Muslim leaders in Derby point to the lack of Islamic education and connections between young people and religious leadership as a factor that has eased the ability of radical groups to reach young people in the city. The case of Leicester, by contrast, highlights how denser elite-mass connections limit the ability for these groups to maintain an established presence.

Al Muhajiroun sympathizers in Derby seemed to fuel public opposition to Prevent and Muslim elites that were cooperating with state security efforts. Some of this opposition took the form of rumors and

[143] It is hard to identify where exactly targeted opposition originates from, though a number of interviewees pointed to groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) and Al Muhajiroun, who some argued played an important role in heightening opposition against the policy. As one interviewee described, "Prevent was a threat for HT anyway from the beginning so they would definitely attack… it to protect their own political party…but general public got the wrong message." Interview 19. 18 March 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.

[144] Interview 19. 18 March 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.

suspicion, casting leaders involved in Prevent as informants or spies. In another instance, public posters were hung with the names and faces of Muslim leaders associated with Prevent, accusing them of "crimes against Islam."[145] It is hard to identify the exact source of this opposition because of course many groups and individuals were critical of the Prevent strategy, but many pointed to groups such as Al Muhajiroun. This opposition clearly rattled some elites that had backed Prevent, who shared concerns about their safety.[146] A Muslim civil society leader that was involved in Prevent explained to me how groups of "radicals" rallied public opposition against Prevent and those cooperating with the agenda, saying, "We were kind of left a little bit high and dry, without any backup or support … When you live within that community it can be quite brutal when you see those people every day and the way they turned a lot of people against you... there was all this poison being sown… (community leaders) you're spies you work for MI5. It got really, really toxic for us."[147] A civil society leader explained to me, "Al Muhajiroun and others when they started to basically label people, they targeted (leaders on the Muslim Forum) first as well and they said, they are sold out and this is what they are doing, and they are getting money from government …So they lost their credibility in that sense."[148]

It should now be clear that Muslim elites in Derby faced greater risks of reputational damage for cooperating with Prevent than their counterparts in Leicester. Groups like Al Muhajiroun appear to have powered some of this opposition, having mobilized a small group of followers in the past by appearing to exploit network gaps between Muslim leaders and young people in particular. This is in contrast to Leicester where denser network connections limited these groups from emerging and levying threats against community leaders in the long term. In the sections that follow, I show how these differences in reputational risks that reflect different network dynamics critically shape Prevent policy outcomes in the city over time.

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[145] Interview 7. 27 February 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Rotherham, United Kingdom.
[146] Interview 7. 27 February 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Rotherham, United Kingdom; Interview 5. 15 March 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.
[147] Interview 7. 27 February 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Rotherham, United Kingdom.
[148] Interview 19. 18 March 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.

Prevent II in Derby

After the central government modified its Prevent agenda in 2011, local government and police in Derby continued to invest in the Prevent agenda, meeting new obligations imposed by central government, refining Channel procedures and training local agencies to cooperate with Prevent efforts. But the revision of Prevent represented an important shift in the ways that Muslim elites and members of the public participated in counter-extremism efforts in Derby.

Elite Responses to Prevent II

As elites faced heightened reputational damage, the central government also revised the Prevent strategy, adding significant restrictions to the use of Prevent funding and pushing Prevent programming more clearly into the domain of counter-terrorism. Effectively, the Prevent revision forced civil society leaders in Derby closer to the more punitive aspects of the policy, for which they were already facing heightened public opposition. In the face of these developments, many community leaders that had lent support to the state under Prevent I limited their involvement with counter-extremism efforts after the end of their earlier funding commitments.

On the ground, the Muslim Forum became defunct. Meetings and exchanges between Muslim elites and the local authority also dwindled, despite evidence of efforts by the local government to salvage relationships with civil society leaders.[149] In addition to broader concerns about Prevent, many civil society leaders remained highly cautious about cooperating with the state because they anticipated reputational damage for affiliating with counter-extremism efforts. As one interviewee explained about the lack of religious leaders involved in Prevent, "I didn't see anybody else having that confidence to come forward because of many reasons because of that backlash because of those negative things that people would spread."[150]

[149] Interview 5. 15 March 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.
[150] Interview 19. 18 March 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.

Community Responses to Prevent II

With more limited cooperation from civil society leaders, bureaucrats were less able to rely on elite networks that had before helped mobilize community participation. State actors then struggled to mobilize community participation around Prevent. While local government and law enforcement worked to identify new civil society partners, many leaders remained concerned about the potential reputational damage they might face for publicly affiliating with Prevent efforts. A law enforcement officer that delivered Prevent in Derby and Leicester explained the challenges that resulted from the disengagement of grassroots leaders involved in a particular project that facilitated referrals and was used as an intervention, saying:

> "The people involved disengaged and the kids had nowhere else to go. We lost our 'in' within the community in Derby… To be fair Derby then struggled to find another way of engagement … once we lost that opportunity there in Derby there was very limited other people that were willing to put their head above the parapet because they would lose their credibility."[151]

Another Prevent practitioner stressed how Prevent efforts in Derby relied heavily on a very limited number of civil society leaders who remained concerned about the potential backlash they might face for participating in Prevent.[152] In the face of these concerns, these leaders then limited the assistance they provided to the state and local bureaucrats struggled to find additional avenues to facilitate engagement.

The fact that state actors concede that they struggled to identify referrals without cooperation from civil society leaders is highly significant, as well as the fact that state actors and civil society leaders both describe how elites were reluctant to cooperate with counter-extremism efforts because they anticipated reputational damage. By contrast, in Leicester, where local governments were delivering the same revised Prevent agenda, a number of Muslim elites were better insulated from reputational damage and continued to help state actors mobilize at least some degree of community participation.

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[151] Interview 26. 5 March 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.
[152] Interview 27. 20 March 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.

I find much evidence that the rates of public involvement in Prevent diminished in Derby[153] amidst the revision of Prevent and these constraints on elite cooperation. I was told by a number of interviewees about the local government's struggles to convene community members at consultations around Prevent, with one council employee noting the need to cancel consultation meetings after only two individuals were in attendance.[154] Law enforcement I interviewed similarly explained how "no one turned up" to a Prevent consultation despite consistently publicizing Prevent events with key contacts.[155] This is in contrast to Leicester where state actors continued to organize these types of engagements without these obstacles over time.

There was also a consensus from interviews that community willingness to share information and referrals had diminished over time.[156] I was also told by a law enforcement officer how referral numbers in Derby had tapered off over time, while they remained sustained in Leicester.[157] One civil society leader explained in an interview, "Where (community members) would have perhaps come forward and raised their suspicions about a young person who they thought may be involved in some activity they probably wouldn't now... they've lost any sort of trust that they may have had in the authorities or in any process that takes place."[158] Highlighting this, law enforcement I interviewed in Derby emphasized the lack of community referrals, describing "the gap is lack of referrals from the community and lack of understanding of potential risk in the community."[159] These local reactions are not unique to Derby; communities nationally have shown reluctance to share information with the Prevent program across the UK.[160] What explains these shifts in community involvement? I suggest that the state struggled to engage local publics in the absence of partnerships from community leaders that could leverage network ties to

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[153] My goal is not to claim that counter-extremism activities in Derby in the first iteration of Prevent were widely accepted. Prevent was criticized by many sections in the community from the start and community involvement was (in some cases by design) limited to smaller groups. However, I find that the earlier levels of community involvement in Derby became further reduced over time.

[154] Interview 12. 20 October 2015. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.

[155] Interview 82. 18 March 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.

[156] Derby did see an increase in referrals from government agencies over time, notably from the education sector. See: Crowson, Isaac. "Shocking increase in number of feared extremists in Derbyshire revealed" *Derbyshire Live*. 28 November 2017. https://www.derbytelegraph.co.uk/news/derby-news/shocking-increase-number-feared-extremists-838237

[157] Interview 26. 5 March 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Leicester, United Kingdom.

[158] Interview 18. 15 February 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.

[159] Interview 82. 18 March 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Derby, United Kingdom.

[160] Press Association. "Prevent programme 'lacking referrals from Muslim community'" *The Guardian*. 25 December 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/dec/25/prevent-programme-lacking-referrals-from-muslim-community

facilitate community participation. To be clear, my goal is not to claim that the disengagement of key civil society leaders is the sole reason for the observed decline in community participation. At the same time as Prevent in Derby lost some key allies, the policy itself became more punitive, focusing on intervention programming associated with Channel, at the expense of resourcing broader community development and engagement priorities.[161] Parallel to these developments, austerity cuts limited interactions between members of the public, civil society leaders, and state actors, with broader implications for government efforts to engage members of the public. However, these developments also impacted communities in Leicester, where I do not observe the same changes in public willingness to engage with Prevent over time. This suggests that network dynamics are an important variable that structure the kinds of reputational damage elites face for cooperating with counter-extremism efforts and ultimately their ability to assist the state in facilitating community participation in the long term.

Conclusion

I have argued that network structures shape local responses to the Prevent agenda in Derby. At the policy's outset, a number of Muslim elites were motivated to cooperate with Prevent, in part out of a recognition of the history of extremism in the city. In the absence of obvious risks of reputational damage, many of these leaders used pre-existing connections to state actors to access policy incentives and deliver community development programs in the city. Muslim elites then used longstanding network ties to coreligionists to mobilize community participation around Prevent efforts.

I have argued that network gaps between Muslim elites and members of the public (and young people in particular) created openings that enabled followers of radical groups to establish a local presence before the introduction of Prevent, later inflicting reputational damage against elites cooperating with the state's security agenda. In the face of these risks and the more punitive iteration of Prevent, most community leaders curtailed their cooperation with Prevent moving forward, then limiting avenues for state actors to engage local publics. Effectively, Prevent practitioners could no longer rely on community leaders or

[161] Innes, Martin, Colin Roberts, and Trudy Lowe. "A Disruptive Influence? "Prevent-ing" Problems and Countering Violent Extremism Policy in Practice." *Law & Society Review* 51.2 (2017): 252-281.

draw upon their civic networks. State actors then struggled to engage members of the public around the CVE agenda, rendering community involvement in Prevent more of a state aspiration than a meaningful reality. Having tested the theory in the two cases, I now turn to discuss how alternative explanations stand up to scrutiny.

Alternative Explanations

I have now laid out the case that networks help explain how local actors respond to counter-extremism agendas in Derby and Leicester. But what about other factors that emerge from the literature? Much of the discussion about counter-extremism policies centers around normative debates about the controversial nature of these agendas, in particular for Muslim communities who have been targeted by central government security efforts.[162] We might extrapolate from this scholarship that local, public perception about controversial CVE agendas drives policy outcomes on the ground. In both Leicester and Derby concerns and suspicions about the Prevent agenda were widespread, and yet I find that both civil society leaders and members of the public engaged differently with these strategies over time, highlighting that policy perceptions alone are less likely to explain how local actors respond to CVE agendas.

Another common factor thought to explain how communities will cooperate with counter-terrorism initiatives is trust in police.[163] Both Leicester and Derby had invested in community policing and community engagement in the years before Prevent. However, Leicester had built a more prominent reputation for community cohesion both among the police and local government. The city's investments in this area were repeatedly nationally recognized and a source of pride in the city, what Hussain et al. summarize as "some of the strongest police–community relations in the country."[164] Despite this, public

[162] See extensive summary of these debates in Chapter 2.
[163] I interact with this literature in depth in Chapter 3.
[164] Hussain, Dilwar. *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Leicester*. London: Open Society Foundation, 2010, 103.

perceptions of police from national surveys look relatively similar, though slightly higher in Leicester.[165] Qualitative evidence from both cities indicates that public perceptions of police are mixed, with both mistrust in sections of the public, while some civil society leaders feel a greater sense of confidence approaching local police.

The relationships between members of the public and law enforcement are undoubtedly relevant for explaining policy outcomes, particularly shaping elite-state linkages that I argue drive how civil society leaders engage with state actors around counter-extremism. The ways bureaucrats positively used personal discretion in the delivery of CVE agendas was highlighted in many interviews. Yet, I find less evidence of a linear relationship between trust in police and local responses to Prevent. The ways that communities participate in Prevent diverges between the two cities, even though Prevent practitioners employed relatively similar approaches on the ground[166] and faced nearly identical top-down pressure via a number of the same regional coordination bodies.[167] In Derby, community participation in Prevent appears to diminish over time, though a number of Muslim civil society leaders in Derby described positive relations with law enforcement. Rather than the nature of policing, interviewees pointed to other variables—notably central government policy reform and growing reputational damage—for dissuading them from participating in counter-extremism efforts.

This chapter also casts doubt on threat-based explanations. For one, the Home Office designates both Leicester and Derby with the same level of terror threats, both as so-called "Tier 2" priority areas. However, Derby appears to have a more publicized history of terrorism and connections to the now banned radical group Al Muhajiroun. Yet, I observe more minimal community involvement in Derby

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[165] Nicholas, Sian, Chris Kershaw, and Alison Walker. *Home Office Statistical Bulletin: Crime in England and Wales 2007/08*. London: Home Office, 2008. See Table 6.04 Confidence in the criminal justice system by police force area: 49% of respondents believe police do an excellent/good job in Derbyshire, compared to 55% in Leicestershire; Office of National Statistics. *Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) perception and ASB data by Police Force Area, year ending March 2016*. London: Office of National Statistics, 2016. See Table 2: Ratings of the local police and public confidence in the police and local council: 62% of respondents believe police are doing an excellent or good job in Derbyshire, compared to 69% in Leicestershire.

[166] I spoke to multiple law enforcement officers that were responsible for Prevent in Derby and Leicester at different points in time, and they explain extremely similar policing approaches from what I could discern, though some of their work was obviously outside the scope of this research.

[167] Local policy implementation was overseen by the Government Office of the East Midlands during Prevent I and later from the Home Office, which now tightly controls local policy delivery. Beyond this, the same regional policing bodies, notably the East Midlands Community Contact Unit and the East Midlands Counter Terrorism Unit manage counter-terrorism policing in both cities.

over time, where the local threat of terrorism was similar, if not higher than neighboring Leicester. Threat-based explanations also suggest that members of the public might seek out engagement from the state as threats of terrorism rise, but I was not able to identify a significant shift in the ways that community members interfaced with Prevent amidst the emergence of ISIS and related connections in the city.

Other scholars have emphasized the importance of religious "moderation" or integration as a condition of counter-terrorism cooperation. But I find that these theories fall short in explaining policy outcomes in both cases. The Deobandi sect—which dominates in Leicester—is traditionally more conservative and cautious about state engagement than their Barelvi counterparts,[168] which make up the majority of Muslim adherents in Derby. Indeed, a US diplomat described the Muslim community in Leicester as among the most conservative she had observed in Europe.[169] The UK's index of dissimilarity ranks Leicester among the top ten most segregated areas in the UK, ranking above other areas compared in this study.[170] Yet I find more sustained rates of participation around counter-extremism efforts in Leicester than in Derby. This casts doubt on explanations that highlight the importance of integration as a pre-condition for cooperation with the state on security policy. An emphasis on political moderates would lead us to expect more community participation in cities where Barelvis dominate, but I ultimately observe lower levels of community involvement in these cases over time.

Finally, the case studies cast doubt on the ability of socio-economic factors to explain local policy responses on their own. Many Muslims in Leicester arrived in the UK with higher levels of education and professional training than co-religionists elsewhere in the country.[171] However, national rankings place Leicester on the whole as more deprived than Derby.[172] A large proportion of Muslim populations in

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[168] Bowen, Innes. *Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in Brent: Inside British Islam*. Hurst & Co: London, 2014; Fergusson, James. *Al-Britannia, My Country: A Journey Through Muslim Britain*. London: Random House, 2017, 139.
[169] Bowen, Innes. Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in Brent: Inside British Islam. Hurst & Co: London, 2014, 27.
[170] "The ten places where ethnic minorities are most segregated from the White British (as measured by the index of dissimilarity) within schools are: Blackburn with Darwen, Birmingham, Haringey, Bradford, Rochdale, Kirklees, Leicester, Oldham, Rotherham, and Manchester." See: Policy Exchange. *Integration Hub: Education.* http://www.integrationhub.net/module/education/
[171] Hussain, Dilwar. *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Leicester*. London: Open Society Foundation, 2010, 32-33.
[172] Department of Communities and Local Government. *English Indices of Deprivation 2015*. London: Department of Communities and Local Government, 2015. Web. 30 October 2019.

both cities live in wards with high rates of deprivation, as I described earlier in this chapter. My goal is not to dismiss the role of economic and social capital. It is clear, for instance, that Leicester's more extensive and better developed local civil society produced more potential partners for local government and police to draw upon as allies in the delivery of Prevent.

However, my findings still cast doubt on explanations that focus solely on socio-economics factors. Local actors respond similarly to Prevent agendas in Leicester and Derby at the start, with a degree of cooperation both from civil society leaders and members of the public. Over time, community participation becomes more limited in Derby, although socio-economic factors are held relatively constant. In Leicester, where rates of deprivation are similar if not higher, I observe more sustained willingness from some members of the public to take part in Prevent programming. The fact that community participation shifts over time where rates of deprivation do not change is a critical indication that affluence cannot on its own explain patterns of community engagement.

Conclusion

To sum up, I have argued that network dynamics help explain the trajectory of Prevent in two East Midlands cities. In this chapter, I emphasized differences in the ways that elites were positioned in relation to members of the public, arguing that less developed elite-mass connections in Derby eased the ability of members of the public to organize and levy challenges against community leaders. Organized public opposition, in turn, increased the risks of reputational damage for many elites cooperating with Prevent agendas, dissuading most community leaders from investing in these agendas. The absence of civil society partners then complicated state efforts to engage communities, leaving the local government with fewer avenues to facilitate participation. While Prevent has become more entrenched within public agencies, I observed minimal community involvement in the state's counter-extremism efforts.

In Leicester, by contrast, elites maintained more established connections to members of the public, which appeared to constrain the ability of opposition groups to organize and inflict reputational damage on elites in the long term. In the absence of these risks, a number of Muslim elites were more willing to partner with the state on counter-extremism efforts moving forward, continuing to leverage their network

connections to facilitate some degree of participation around the Prevent agenda. Cooperation from Muslim civil society leaders then enabled state actors to supplement these networks with new ties with a broader range of grassroots partners. I now turn to the case of Prevent in two cities in the South East of England.

Chapter 6 Prevent in Two South East Cities

This chapter compares how the Prevent agenda plays out in two cities in the South East of England, Slough and High Wycombe. The towns share a host of similarities, yet the two cases play out differently and evolve in surprising ways over time. I argue that this policy variation is a function of distinct network dynamics that map onto specific responses from local actors.

Civic Networks in Slough and Wycombe

Drawing on the ideal network types outlined in Chapter 3, I characterize Muslim civic networks in High Wycombe as approximating features of both an *elite-mass connected network* and a *disconnected network*. Two relatively siloed sectarian groups dominate the network, which features some elite-state linkages (though fewer than in the East Midlands cases) and inter-elite competition, particularly within the larger of the two factions. Community leaders maintain connections to members of the public via sectarian and kinship linkages, though Muslim elites appear to exert less influence in the daily lives of co-religionists than in Leicester.

Slough more clearly approximates a *disconnected network*, with comparably few connections between Muslim elites, the state, and co-religionists. The network features more self-contained clusters of elites and community members that are less connected to other co-religionists. While there is a degree of competition between various elites, these rivalries are less intense than those I observed in High Wycombe, where inter-communal disputes have repeatedly required third party arbitration. The main axis of difference is that Muslim civic networks in High Wycombe feature more elite-mass and elite-state connections but higher levels of competition, whereas networks in Slough are relatively disconnected and divided into distinct factions.

Theoretical Expectations

These different network dynamics lead me to make specific predictions about how local actors will respond to Prevent agendas over time. My core claim is that networks in High Wycombe and Slough should create steeper trade-offs for elites in both cities when it comes to cooperating with Prevent, with critical downstream

implications for broader policy outcomes. I described Wycombe's network as approximating features of an *elite-mass connected network* and a *disconnected network*. I expect that at the introduction of Prevent in High Wycombe, some community leaders with prior connections to the state will cooperate with counter-extremism efforts in the city. However, elites are likely to be more cautious about their cooperation with Prevent programs because of concerns about potential reputational damage in the higher competition network and may in some cases limit their involvement with counter-extremism efforts. These dynamics should, in turn, dissuade state actors from investing heavily in nascent Prevent agendas, recognizing the political risks associated with delivering counter-extremism programs without civic partnerships. Muslim elites may be able to stimulate some community participation around Prevent efforts drawing on their network ties, but I expect that communities will participate more minimally due to limitations on elite involvement in counter-extremism programs. The revision of Prevent in 2011 provides another opportunity to test the theory, where the policy becomes more punitive and financial incentives are further restricted. In a more competitive network, I expect that elites will expect to face more substantial reputational damage for cooperating with state security efforts and that most community leaders will disengage from counter-extremism efforts in the face of central government reforms. Effectively, longstanding network competition should render engaging with Prevent more costly for elites than in lower competition networks. I expect that state actors will then struggle to mobilize community participation with limitations on elite cooperation.

In Slough's more disconnected network, I expect that many Muslim elites will be more hesitant to cooperate with nascent Prevent agendas. Muslim civil society leaders lack a network position with pre-existing ties to the state to access policy incentives associated with counter-extremism agendas, while network competition heightens potential risks related to taking part in the strategy. With more limited cooperation from elites, I expect that bureaucrats will be warier about investing in Prevent efforts. With less cooperation from elites and more minimal state investment, I expect that there will be relatively low levels of community participation in Prevent efforts. Even if state actors identify interlocutors to deliver programs, they are likely to struggle to mobilize significant involvement across the more diffuse network. The revision of Prevent should have less of an impact in Slough than in other cities. While these reforms will compel state actors to invest more in counter-extremism efforts, I anticipate that elites will remain relatively disengaged, since the policy has only become more punitive and further

restrictive over time. Because Muslim elites in Slough lack a position of network centrality in the more disconnected network, local state actors may be able to mobilize some degree of community involvement without relying on intermediaries, in effect navigating around the more diffuse network to build direct ties with members of the public. However, I expect that community participation will operate at lower levels than in highly connected networks where civil society leaders actively cooperate with counter-extremism programs and leverage their network ties to coreligionists over time.

The case of High Wycombe allows me to test how counter-extremism efforts will play out in a more competitive network, where there are likely to be higher risks of reputational damage for cooperating with Prevent. My theory would be ruled out if Muslim elites actively cooperate with counter-extremism strategies over time and help sustain community participation, despite network conditions that should make it more costly to do so. In Slough, I expect that elites and state actors are likely to avoid Prevent efforts in large part, only until the central government actively compels state actors to invest more in the policy area. If I observe that elites cooperate extensively with Prevent efforts despite lacking pre-existing ties to the state and that they can mobilize significant participation without dense inter-elite or elite-mass ties, my theory will face a severe challenge.

Within-Case Testing

I test the theory in a number of ways. I first use social network analysis together with qualitative metrics to measure and triangulate network dynamics. The role of network competition is particularly important in this chapter. To review, I measure competition by looking for evidence from multiple interviewees, both state actors, Muslim elites, and other third-party observers confirming the presence of inter-elite competition. I also characterize instances of inter-communal disputes and obstacles to civic coordination around common policy priorities as indicators of higher network competition.

I also need to examine how network dynamics shape responses by local actors at each step in the causal chain. To do this, I use 40 interviews I conducted in these two cities between 2015-2019. I detailed how I use case selection and process tracing techniques in greater detail in Chapter 4. In brief, by selecting two similar cases that vary in terms of policy outcomes, I can test the main causal mechanisms, while holding relatively constant a number of potentially confounding variables. I use a number of process tracing tests to evaluate how networks drive the

specific responses of local actors over time. To confirm that Muslim elites cooperated more minimally with Prevent because of network factors, I look for evidence from state actors and civil society leaders that elites limited their involvement with Prevent either because they lacked connections to the state to capitalize on policy incentives or that they were concerned about reputational damage from other elites or members of the public. To test that the lack of elite cooperation dissuaded state actors from investing in these agendas, I rely on statements from multiple state actors, specifying that they avoided investing in Prevent agendas because of concerns about alienating local constituencies in the absence of support from civil society leadership. I also look for evidence that state actors struggled to meet policy demands imposed by central government with less support from local civil society leaders.

To confirm that network dynamics also shaped community involvement, I use interviews from multiple civil society leaders and state actors. I look for statements that civil society leaders with denser elite-mass connections were more able to facilitate community involvement or that members of the public were more willing to engage with these organizations because of pre-existing trust, whereas community participation lagged where elites did not cooperate with Prevent agendas or where they lacked pre-existing network connections. If there are instances where some Muslim community leaders used their network connections to discourage members of the public from taking part in Prevent programs, where community participation is also low, I take this as suggestive evidence that network dynamics are structuring the nature of community participation.

I test these mechanisms again after the policy revision of Prevent when these programs become more punitive and restrictive of financial incentives. To test that network dynamics continue to shape elite responses, I look for evidence from Muslim civil society leaders that they avoided cooperating with Prevent because of concerns about potential reputational damage. I then confirm the nature of reputational damage using interviews from state actors and other third-party observers who would have little incentive to exaggerate these threats. I also look for documented evidence, for instance, in local newspapers, that elites face threats and other public challenges for their affiliation with Prevent. To explain the evolution of community participation over time, I look for statements from different interviewees suggesting that the lack of elite support created obstacles to facilitating the public's involvement in more connected networks or that state actors were able to navigate around elites to facilitate some direct ties with members of the public across more disconnected networks.

Approximating a Most Similar Systems Design

Slough and Wycombe share a number of similarities, which allows me to place controls on potentially confounding variables. Both cities are of similar size with populations of around 150,000,[1] though the Muslim community in Slough is proportionally larger at 23% of the population, compared to 9% in High Wycombe.[2] The Thames Valley Police administers policing in both areas, and communities report similar overall levels of police approval[3] and community cohesion according to national indicators,[4] though it must be noted that both cities had invested comparably less than Leicester in terms of community cohesion in the lead-up to Prevent. Reported crime levels in Slough are relatively similar to Derby, while High Wycombe has the lowest rate of crime of all UK cities discussed in this dissertation.[5] Slough and High Wycombe are more affluent than Derby and Leicester, though Slough is more deprived than High Wycombe.[6]

In both cases, many Muslim residents live in wards with lower levels of employment and education compared to the national average.[7] Muslims in Slough are more diverse both in terms of sectarian affiliation and ethnic background than in neighboring Wycombe, where the majority of Muslims hail from Mirpur and Barelvis are dominant. In both cities, Muslim councilors were well represented on local councils much before the introduction of Prevent. However, civic links connecting minority community organizations and leaders to the local state

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[1] Wycombe's population is estimated to be 171,644 and the population in Slough is 140, 205. See: Office of National Statistics. *2011 Census: Key Statistics for Local Authorities in England and Wales*. London: Office of National Statistics, 2012. https://bit.ly/2JKcd9e

[2] Ali, Sundas. *British Muslims in Numbers*. London: Muslim Council of Britain, 2015. According to the 2011 Census, the Muslim population in Slough is 32,655, 23% of the population. In Wycombe, there are 15,022 Muslim residents, 9% Wycombe's total population.

[3] Nicholas, Sian, Chris Kershaw, and Alison Walker. *Home Office Statistical Bulletin: Crime in England and Wales 2007/08*. London: Home Office, 2008. See Table 6.04: Confidence in the criminal justice system by police force area: 57% of respondents believe Thames Valley Police do an excellent/good job, similar to Leicester; Office of National Statistics. *Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) perception and ASB data by Police Force Area, year ending March 2016*. London: Office of National Statistics, 2016. https://bit.ly/2x9YHJx See Table 2: Ratings of the local police and public confidence in the police and local council: 70% of respondents say that the Thames Valley Police are doing an excellent or good job.

[4] Data.gov.uk. *Data Interchange Hub—Data Download: October 2010*. https://data.gov.uk/dataset/ni-035-building-resilience-to-violent-extremism According to National Indicator 1 in 2008, 68% of respondents in Slough and 77% of respondents in Wycombe "believe people from different backgrounds get on well together," at similar levels to those reported in Derby and Leicester.

[5] For 2019, there were 102.58 crimes per thousand residents in Slough and 60.5 crimes per thousand residents in Wycombe. See: Home Office. *Crime and policing in England, Wales and Northern Ireland*. www.police.uk

[6] Department of Communities and Local Government. *English Indices of Deprivation 2015*. London: Department of Communities and Local Government, 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/english-indices-of-deprivation-2015

[7] According to the 2011 Census, 46% of the residents of Wycombe's Oakridge and Castlefield ward and 36% of Bowerdean ward are Muslim. These wards have higher rates of unemployment and residents with no qualifications than the city and national average; Four wards in Slough (Chalvey, Central, Baylis and Stoke, and Wexham and Lea) have Muslim populations that make up over 30% of the population. These wards have higher rates of unemployment and residents with no qualifications than city and national averages. See Nomis: Official Labour Market Statistics. *2011 Ward Labour Market Profile*. London: Office for National Statistics, 2011.

before the start of Prevent were less developed. In terms of the administration of the UK's counter-extremism agenda, both areas were designated as so-called "Pathfinder Areas" in 2007/8; both cities received similar central government Prevent funding[8] and were managed by the same police force and regional counter-terrorism unit. Wycombe received greater press attention due to historic terrorist links in the city.[9] By contrast in Slough, the now banned radical group Al Muhajiroun had a historic presence.[10] While very small in number, both areas later dealt with individuals attempting to leave to join the so-called Islamic State. Reflecting these dynamics, the Home Office designated both cities as a "Tier 2" Priority areas—with Wycombe receiving this designation in 2013 and Slough in 2015.[11] Both areas have received similar top-down pressure both from the Home Office and from regional South East counter-terrorism units. Having outlined broad similarities between Wycombe and Slough, I now turn to a discussion of the social network analyses.

Network Analysis in High Wycombe and Slough

Data Collection

I detail the methods I use to assemble social network analyses in the methodology chapter and more thoroughly in the methodological appendix. To summarize, I use the UK Charity Commission database to construct a list of Muslim civil society organizations in a given locality. Having assembled this list of registered Muslim charities, I use Annual Returns (ARs) from 2014-17 provided by these charities to enumerate board memberships of the selected charities. To estimate inter-elite connections, I identify shared board memberships where two organizations are connected by one or more shared board members. This individuals' shared board membership

[8] Gov.UK. *FOI Release: Prevent Funding*. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-funding I calculated total payments to Slough and High Wycombe from 2007 to 2011 using FOI requests that listed organizations who received Prevent funding between those years. I calculated a total of £603,153 in High Wycombe and £635,347 in Slough. After 2011, the Home Office ceased providing data about the local distribution of Prevent funding.

[9] Greenwood, Chris. "Extremists guilty of airline bomb plot." *The Independent*. 7 September 2009. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/extremists-guilty-of-airline-bomb- plot-1783211.html; In 2009, the Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism designated Wycombe as the most "high-risk in terms of producing violent jihadists" after Birmingham. See: Greer, Steven. "Anti-terrorist Laws and the United Kingdom's 'Suspect Muslim community': A Reply to Pantazis and Pemberton." *The British Journal of Criminology* 50.6 (2010), 1178; Reidy, Tess. "Why Do So Many Jihadi Terrorists Come From High Wycombe?" *Vice*. 11 November 2014. https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/exm7ge/high-wycombe-terrorist-tess-reidy-683

[10] Dearden, Lizzie. "UK's 'most dangerous extremist group' regenerating after terrorist prisoners released." *The Independent*. 15 February 2019. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/terror-islamists-uk-anjem-choudary-al-muhajiroun-prison-release-a8781826.html

[11] Wycombe was designated as a Tier 2 priority area in 2013; Slough was designated as a priority area in 2015.

thus serves as a path of length two between the civil society organizations. I exclude board members from the social network analysis that are not paths between at least two nodes in the network. I use these board memberships as links in the social network connecting individuals and organizations. To estimate elite-state ties, I use annual returns and other government sources to identify charities that have been funded by local government or where a board member is also a city councilor, a city council candidate, or serves as a representative on a city-level consultation forum.

I use a range of measures to estimate the connectedness of the network on the whole and the centrality of specific nodes. To measure the connectivity of the whole network, I calculate the *total number of nodes* and the *total number of links*. I also calculate the *average degree*, the average number of links each node has to other nodes across the network. To capture the centrality of specific nodes, I calculate the node with the highest value of *betweenness centrality*, which measures how often a node falls on the shortest path between two nodes in the network. I report the node of *highest betweenness centrality*. I calculate these network measures with and without the local government because I recognize that the local state is unlike other civil society organizations.[12]

[12] I only calculate the node of highest betweenness centrality for the network without local government, since the node with the highest betweenness is the local government, when it is included as a node.



Figure 6.1 Network of Registered Muslim Charities in High Wycombe



Figure 6.2 Network of Registered Muslim Charities in Slough

Finding and Discussion

Table 6.1 Network Measures for High Wycombe

	With Local Government	*Without Local Government*
Total Nodes	43	30
Total Links	30	0
Average Degree	0.69	0
Node of Highest Betweenness		0

Table 6.2 Network Measures for Slough

	With Local Government	*Without Local Government*
Total Nodes	48	47
Total Links	16	12
Average Degree	0.33	0.25
Node of Highest Betweenness		0.0009

The social network analysis shows that Muslim civic networks in High Wycombe and Slough are of similar size, comparable to Derby. The SNA reveals important structural properties of the networks, in terms of inter-elite state and elite-state connections. Social network measures for High Wycombe confirm a network with elite-state connections but an absence of inter-elite connections. There are 30 elite-state linkages, but no connections between civil society organizations via overlapping boardmemberships, which I take an indication of very low inter-elite linkages, the lowest of all cases. Reflecting this, the average degree for the Wycombe social network analysis which captures the number of connections each node has on average is measured at 0. In Slough, there are fewer elite-state ties than in High Wycombe, with only 4 unique elite-state linkages, compared to 30 in High Wycombe. There are inter-elite connections in Slough, specifically 12 linkages. But in comparison to the East

Midlands cases discussed earlier, there are still relatively few inter-elite connections. The average degree of the Slough network without local government is 0.25, half of the average degree values for the Leicester and Derby networks. The node in the Slough network with the highest betweenness centrality has a value of 0.0009, for comparison this is 44 times less than the highest betweenness centrality node in the Leicester network. Effectively, this means that no individual in the network has an informational advantage vis-à-vis other nodes in the network and gives a sense that the network lacks a civic center.

It is important to note that I cannot quantitatively measure elite-mass connections in the social network analysis due to data constraints. To remedy this, I use qualitative evidence in the discussion that follows. I will show that both networks have comparably less developed elite-mass connections, though these ties are more established in High Wycombe than in Slough. Having laid out the network analyses, I now turn to a discussion of Prevent in High Wycombe.

High Wycombe

High Wycombe is a relatively affluent town with easy transport links into central London, smaller in size than the East Midlands cities discussed in the prior chapter. The city features a "two-tier" system where local policy administration is divided between the Wycombe District Council, which is traditionally controlled by the Conservative party, and Buckinghamshire County Council.[13]

High Wycombe's population is less ethnically diverse than Slough and Leicester, with over 75% of the population identifying as White British.[14] Muslim residents in High Wycombe number just over 15,000 according to the 2011 census,[15] most are of Pakistani background with smaller populations of Arabs and Bangladeshis.[16] Many Muslims in High Wycombe originate from the Mirpur District in Azad Kashmir; migration to High Wycombe accelerated

[13] Wycombe District Council. Options for Local Governance in High Wycombe Consultation Document. August 2019. https://www.wycombe.gov.uk/uploads/public/documents/About-the-council/Have-your-say/Consultations/Community-Governance-Review-2019/High-Wycombe-community-governance-review-consultation-document-August-2019.pdf

[14] Office of National Statistics. *2011 Census: Ethnic group, local authorities in England and Wales*. London: Office of National Statistics,2012. https://bit.ly/2x3Jslu

[15] Ali, Sundas. *British Muslims in Numbers*. London: Muslim Council of Britain, 2015.

[16] According to the 2011 census, nearly 8% of High Wycombe residents identify as Pakistani with smaller Bangladeshi and Arab populations that make up less than 1% of the total population respectively. See: Office of National Statistics. *2011 Census: Ethnic group, local authorities in England and Wales*. London: Office of National Statistics, 2012. https://bit.ly/2x3Jslu

in particular after the construction of the Mangla Dam in the 1960s.[17] Decades later, networks that reflect biraderi and village affiliations from Mirpur continue to maintain relevance in High Wycombe, shaping numerous dimensions of local social and political life from consanguineous marriage and housing[18] to voting.[19]



Figure 6.3 High Wycombe Ward Map

Looking at the ward map of High Wycombe, more than 30% of residents in Bowerdean ward and Oakridge and Castlefield ward are Muslim, according to the 2011 census.[20] These wards have higher rates of deprivation according to a number of indicators, such as level of education and employment, in comparison to average values

[17] Shaw, Alison. "Drivers of cousin marriage among British Pakistanis." *Human heredity* 77.1-4 (2014), 33.
[18] Shaw, Alison. "Drivers of cousin marriage among British Pakistanis." *Human heredity* 77.1-4 (2014), 31-33.
[19] Interview 74. 30 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.
[20] Office of National Statistics. *2011 Census: Religion (Detailed), Wards in England and Wales*. London: Office of National Statistics, 2012. https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/datasets/2011censuskeystatisticsandquickstatisticsforwardsandoutputareasinenglandandwales

for England and Wales.[21] Estimates suggest that 80% of Muslims in the city are members of one of three affiliated Barelvi mosques in High Wycombe.[22] Other mosques in the city cater to smaller communities of Deobandis, Salafis, and Shias, who appear to be relatively insulated from the larger Barelvi community.

Muslim Civic Networks in High Wycombe

Inter-Elite Ties

Though many Muslim elites in High Wycombe share informal, interpersonal links that reflect sectarian and kinship ties, Muslim civic networks feature significant inter-elite competition. The predominately Barelvi Pakistani community in High Wycombe is internally divided along village lines, breaking down into two groups known as the Thara and Seva groups that have been described by an observer as "highly informal political parties."[23] This division has produced political partisanship[24] and fueled competition over mosque leadership,[25] appearing to encumber coordination between community leaders. A court case was brought to arbitrate between these two groups over the selection of mosque leadership in 2011 which culminated in recommending a police presence at mosque elections to prevent conflict.[26] A later dispute in 2016 that involved accusations of hate preaching culminated in an investigation by a retired judge.[27] The Pakistani Barelvi community appears to be relatively siloed from the significantly smaller Salafi population in the city,[28] with minimal evidence of formal collaboration between these groups of the kind that I observed in Leicester.

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[21] Oakridge and Castlefield and Bowerdean wards have unemployment rates and rates of no qualifications higher than the average for both Wycombe and England. See: Nomis: Official Labour Market Statistics. *2011 Ward Labour Market Profile: Oakridge And Castlefield*. London: Office for National Statistics, 2011. https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/reports/lmp/ward2011/1140852421/report.aspx; Nomis: Official Labour Market Statistics. *2011 Ward Labour Market Profile: Bowerdean*. London: Office for National Statistics, 2011. https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/reports/lmp/ward2011/1140852406/report.aspx; Buckinghamshire Business First. *Wycombe Councillor Update: Economic Profile of Oakridge and Castlefield Ward*. April 2014. https://go.aws/2x4n0IZ

[22] Colley, Andrew. "Wycombe Islamic Mission and Trust investigating claims of hate preaching by three Imams at mosques in High Wycombe." *Bucks Free Press*. 21 May 2016. https://www.bucksfreepress.co.uk/news/14505215.wycombe-islamic-mission-and-trust-investigating-claims-of-hate-preaching-by-three-imams-at-mosques-in-high-wycombe/

[23] Cooke, David. "Ghalib Hussain and Anr v Wycombe Islamic Mission and Ors." *Arbitration Law Reports and Review* 1(2011), 407.

[24] Interview 74. 30 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.

[25] Cooke, David. "Ghalib Hussain and Anr v Wycombe Islamic Mission and Ors." *Arbitration Law Reports and Review* 1(2011), 393–432.

[26] Cooke, David. "Ghalib Hussain and Anr v Wycombe Islamic Mission and Ors." *Arbitration Law Reports and Review* 1(2011), 407.

[27] Colley, Andrew. "Mosque Investigation: Three High Wycombe Imams accused of hate preaching to face retired judge." *Bucks Free Press*. 8 July 2016. https://www.bucksfreepress.co.uk/news/14607576.mosque-investigation-three-high-wycombe-imams-accused-of-hate-preaching-to-face-retired-judge/

[28] Interview 77. 7 December 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.

Elite-Mass Ties

Muslim elites maintained a number of ties to members of the public, particularly within the city's Pakistani community that reflected kinship and sectarian kinship networks, though there appeared to be wider gaps between leaders and members of the public than those I observed in Leicester. It is clear that community leaders provided important services and enhanced community representation in a number of ways, but there is also evidence that suggests that Muslim elites maintained more tenuous connections to co-religionists. As Cooke writes about Muslim communities in High Wycombe:

> "If a view is expressed by someone who is regarded as a leader or spokesman for the group, that may be influential in determining the view of the individual members or followers of the group. But it cannot, it seems to me, bind any of them to take any particular step…So far as the position of those who are regarded as leaders is concerned, that depends entirely on their continuing to command sufficient support from the other members of the group. They are not formally appointed, and having no formal position or authority they could not be formally removed, but no doubt if rivals for leadership emerge, either one or the other will emerge by consensus, or the group may fracture with each taking away a set of supporters."[29]

Reflecting these dynamics, there was some suspicion among interviewees about the degree to which certain individuals merited designation as "community leaders." While community members I interviewed were familiar with prominent Muslim civil society leaders, they highlighted a reluctance to approach these individuals personally, who were described by one individual as resource of last resort.[30] Other interviewees described the diminishing influence of the older generation of Muslim civic leadership, particularly with younger people. Relatively newer civil society organizations founded in the last two decades and led by younger Muslim professionals in the city have aimed to address what one interviewee described to me as "a gap between what was being provided locally by the mosque and what wasn't."[31] These groups appeared to command comparably more

[29] Cooke, David. "Ghalib Hussain and Anr v Wycombe Islamic Mission and Ors." *Arbitration Law Reports and Review* 1(2011), 407.
[30] Interview 117, Interview 118, Interview 119, Interview 120, Interview 121, and Interview 122. 5 February 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.
[31] Interview 64. 15 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.

public trust, delivering services relied upon by many young families in High Wycombe.[32] Despite the evolution of community leadership over time, I still find evidence from interviews that Muslim elites, particularly within the Pakistani Barelvi community, used reinforcing family, religious, and ethnic networks to maintain a degree of influence over social and political life and in a number of cases a durable, public following.[33]

Elite-State Ties

At the introduction of Prevent, the city featured some elite-state ties, though these were sparser than those observed in the East Midlands where consultations and civic partnerships were routine. Still, I found evidence that a small number of Muslim leaders in High Wycombe leveraged local networks to mobilize support for elected office.[34] The city's Race Equality Council also established ties between Muslim leadership and state actors.

However, much of the city's engagement with Muslim communities was catalyzed by terrorism arrests in High Wycombe in 2006, which highlighted gaps between state actors and Muslim community leadership. A civil society leader close to these efforts described how the local council lacked basic information or knowledge about how to engage faith communities at that time.[35] These post-arrest engagements resulted in what became known as the city's "Communication Forum" that brought together police and Muslim community leaders, effectively strengthening elite-state ties before the introduction of Prevent.

Summarizing Network Dynamics

High Wycombe is a network with two major siloed clusters. The larger of these two factions features significant inter-elite competition and some elite-state ties. Muslim elites maintain ties to members of the public often building from established sectarian and kinship networks, though there are significant gaps, as I have described. Of particular importance for the discussion that follows is that Muslim civic networks in High Wycombe feature

[32] Interview 77. 7 December 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom; Interview 40. 29 August 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.
[33] Interview 70. 26 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom; Interview 71. 26 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.
[34] Interview 74. 30 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom; Interview 40. 29 August 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.
[35] Interview 33. 20 August 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.

higher levels of competition. I argue that this pre-existing competition leaves Muslim elites in High Wycombe more vulnerable to reputational damage from co-religionists over time. This is also a network where family and kinship linkages have been preserved over time giving a small number of community leaders a significant level of influence and access to members of the public. Having outlined network dynamics in High Wycombe, I will now trace the evolution of Prevent in High Wycombe, showing how civic networks shaped local responses at each step in the causal chain.

Prevent I in High Wycombe

The central government's push for the public rollout of the Prevent agenda in 2007 followed shortly after prominent terror arrests in High Wycombe. These arrests created a public acknowledgment about the presence of extremism in the city and an openness among some civil society leaders to engage with the state around countering extremism. However, the Prevent agenda was also immediately controversial as in other cities.

Muslim Elites and Prevent I

Much like in the East Midlands cases, Muslim elites with pre-existing ties to the state were positioned to shape local Prevent agendas and more easily access policy incentives. There were a number of reasons given as to why civil society leaders cooperated with Prevent programming from providing assistance to local policymakers to maintaining positions of influence locally to delivering what was seen as much-needed community development programming. Some suggested a desire to limit other groups from leading on Prevent that were seen as ill-suited to represent community interests. What is clear is that leaders with ties to key decisionmakers before the introduction of Prevent were poised to become central players in the development of counter-extremism programs and access incentives associated with the policy. In High Wycombe, the consulting body developed by police in the aftermath of prominent arrests in High Wycombe became the consultative body local government relied on to guide Prevent delivery, a number of whom were Muslim professionals that had worked in local government in years prior or maintained other personal relationships with key decisionmakers. As one interviewee

put it "everyone knew everyone more or less."[36] State actors readily conceded that those without skills to navigate the local bureaucracy were less able to secure funding,[37] further highlighting the importance of elite-state linkages. A councilor also expressed criticism that council staff relied on individuals with whom they shared personal connections to devise local Prevent approaches.[38]

While Muslim elites with ties to the state were able to more easily access leadership opportunities associated with Prevent, many community leaders remained more cautious about counter-extremism efforts, preferring to focus cohesion priorities. As I was told by a civil society leader: "I don't necessarily feel like people thought they were doing the whole Prevent thing, they felt like they were doing the whole community cohesion thing… there were real challenges around the wording initially and where the parameters were and where the lines were drawn."[39] Despite these concerns, Muslim civil society leaders on the Communications Forum assisted in designing local policy approaches as well as delivering community development programming with Prevent funding. Reflecting this focus on cohesion, I found minimal evidence that community leaders worked with bureaucrats in terms of sharing information around individuals thought to be "at-risk," compared to my observations of the East Midlands cases.[40]

There are a number of reasons to explain this caution around Prevent, not least the widely held and legitimate concerns about the policy's approach, many of which I have cited in this dissertation. While there was some interest in cooperating with state efforts at the outset, Prevent agendas became increasingly politicized over time,[41] with interviewees pointing to growing concerns about the evolution of central government policy and the heightened focus on Muslim communities.[42] I also find evidence that cooperating with nascent Prevent initiatives imposed growing risks for community leaders, in ways that appear to reflect earlier network competition. A council staff person described High Wycombe as "a community where there was quite a lot of internal distrust so actually that then spilled into anything you do. So if you're the person who stands up and says I'm working with

[36] Interview 65. 17 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.
[37] Interview 39. 8 August 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Aylesbury, United Kingdom.
[38] Interview 67. 22 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in London, United Kingdom.
[39] Interview 64. 15 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.
[40] Interview 39. 8 August 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Aylesbury, United Kingdom.
[41] Interview 39. 8 August 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Aylesbury, United Kingdom.
[42] Interview 65. 17 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.

the council you'd immediately be thought of as well, you're getting paid by the council to do this. So getting people past that was quite difficult."[43] He also outlined how some community leaders were under so-called "mixed pressures," balancing partisan rivalries with engagement around the state's Prevent agenda.[44] Similarly, a councilor explained that local leaders would be reluctant to openly support Prevent for fear of being cast by the community as "a rat or a grass,"[45] while a local community campaigner suggested that members of the two major factions within the Barelvi community would be reluctant to invest in Prevent efforts, for fear of how this might impact their wider community standing amidst longstanding rivalries.[46] These fears of a potential backlash for taking part in Prevent were not merely theoretical. The local city newspaper ran an article in 2009 listing groups that had received Prevent funding alongside critiques of the policy from local stakeholders.[47] Public suspicion about community leaders and concerns about their financial motivations reached such heights that community members brought complaints to the local Member of Parliament.

It is significant that multiple interviewees highlighted that Muslim elites with pre-existing connections to the state were poised to become leaders in developing local policy approaches and that state actors conceded that those without these connections were disadvantaged from accessing policy incentives. At the same time, I find evidence that concerns about reputational damage that appear to reflect longstanding network competition were an important factor alongside general concerns about the policy that shaped more cautious approaches from elites toward the Prevent agenda. Whereas elites in Leicester's lower competition network described that they did not anticipate significant costs for affiliating with Prevent, state actors in High Wycombe acknowledged how competition shaped how civil society leaders approached the Prevent agenda and these risks to elites were demonstrated in the public backlash against those involved in Prevent.

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[43] Interview 39. 8 August 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Aylesbury, United Kingdom.
[44] Interview 39. 8 August 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Aylesbury, United Kingdom.
[45] Interview 67. 22 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in London, United Kingdom.
[46] Interview 74. 30 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.
[47] "Wycombe anti-terror cash 'not working"' *Bucks Free Press*. 12 March 2009.
http://www.bucksfreepress.co.uk/news/4196909.Wycombe_anti-terror_cash__not_working_/

Local Bureaucrats and Prevent I

As in Leicester and Derby, bureaucrats relied heavily on Muslim community leaders and organizations with pre-existing ties to the state to guide local policy approaches. I show that caution from elites about the Prevent agenda led state actors to invest more minimally in counter-extremism efforts, focusing on cohesion priorities, while largely evading an emphasis on extremism or intervention priorities.

I find much evidence that state actors were devising Prevent responses based on feedback from elites with pre-existing ties to the state. A council staff person leading Prevent activities explained this dynamic to me as, "you tell us what you want was the approach… you are there as the Communication Forum to advise us on what to do because we don't know what to do" and outlining how maintaining partnerships with the forum was used as an "answer" to policy demands for community engagement.[48] He described how the reluctance among some Muslim leaders to publicly cooperate with counter-extremism efforts limited the council's ability to invest in the Prevent strategy, noting a "real frustration" among council leaders:

> "If the Muslim councilors had been prepared to go to meetings and be clearly supportive with what the council was doing you would have had a much better chance of the community buying in more easily, but because they sat on the fence… that probably made it a lot harder for the administration of the council…to strongly support the agenda… if you haven't got your Muslim councilors strongly supporting you, how can you take this agenda to the Muslim community and say this this what we're going to do? So it kind of disempowered the whole thing."[49]

Reflecting the preferences of Muslim elites and the controversial nature of Prevent, bureaucrats adopted a policy approach that minimized a focus on security objectives, preferring to frame programming around community cohesion more broadly, which was seen as more palatable.[50]

[48] Interview 39. 8 August 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Aylesbury, United Kingdom.
[49] Interview 39. 8 August 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Aylesbury, United Kingdom.
[50] Interview 39. 8 August 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Aylesbury, United Kingdom.

It is significant that council personnel responsible for delivering Prevent describe the extent to which they relied on Muslim elites to guide Prevent programs and that limitations on elite cooperation shaped how local government delivered counter-extremism efforts. In practice, this meant that state actors pursued a cohesion-oriented policy approach that minimally addressed the more securitized aspects of the policy. Local bureaucrats invested in consultation and broad-based community engagement, while establishing functioning intervention programs or identifying "at-risk" individuals were given comparably less focus and delivered in a more ad hoc way. Highlighting this, a council staff person leading on the policy area during Prevent I appeared to be less involved in or aware of how individual referrals were assessed and responded to, as intervention was clearly not a focus of their activities. A law enforcement officer in High Wycombe also highlighted to me that Channel was "in quite a naïve state and it didn't have that many cases" in 2012.[51] This is in contrast to the East Midlands cases where intervention programs were relatively quickly established with cooperation from different local agencies, and in part guided by insights from civic leaders and citizens. Having outlined how network dynamics shaped the ways Muslim elites and state actors initially responded to nascent Prevent agendas, I now turn to discuss how Muslim publics targeted by Prevent programs engaged with these programs.

Muslim Communities and Prevent I

High Wycombe presents a mixed picture of participation that points to the centrality of civic networks to explain how members of the public responded to Prevent I. Much like other areas, civil society leaders in High Wycombe used Prevent funding to invest in broader community development priorities, funding engagement projects with youth, women, and religious leaders. Elites with pre-existing ties to members of the public were able to mobilize higher levels of participation in community development programs, though I find comparably less evidence that Muslim civil society leaders or members of the public shared information about extremism with state actors. Also highlighting the centrality of networks, Muslim elites with fewer linkages to co-religionists appeared to face greater obstacles to mobilizing community involvement. At least in one instance, I find evidence that Muslim civil society leaders used elite-mass connections to curtail community participation in a Prevent program.

[51] Interview 36. 7 October 2015. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.

It is hard to identify precise attendance data about Prevent programs, but it is clear that a small number of civil society organizations were relied upon to facilitate some community participation in Prevent programs. Local government documents from this period describe smaller workshops with young people and women and larger events of around 200 attendees.[52] Though intervention efforts developed more slowly in High Wycombe, it appeared that at least one civil society organization was relied upon to conduct interventions with young people.[53] Outside of this, involvement from civil society leaders in Prevent appeared to focus almost exclusively on broader cohesion priorities.

Interviews highlighted the fact that members of the public were more willing to take part in Prevent programs when civil leaders were embedded in local networks and could draw on pre-existing networks of trust to mobilize participation, even in the context of suspicion around Prevent agendas. A civil society leader explained this dynamic to me saying: "It's a small community, there is a lot of trust with certain people. People think, 'Oh OK, they're running something I'll go,'" and noting "If (a community organization) then work with Prevent …I would respect something they did …that would be fine even with all my criticisms and negative experience."[54] Council staff in place during this period also recognized how one civil society organization in particular was uniquely positioned to represent Prevent agendas and reach young people in the city, building on earlier networks, what was described to me as the "best place"[55] where intervention type engagements could have occurred. A police officer involved in Prevent similarly noted to me: "There was no one else that was going to engage on that level."[56]

Other initiatives aimed to engage and provide skills to women in High Wycombe, reaching several hundred participants.[57] An interviewee described how the initiative relied on local religious leadership to access

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[52] A women's launch event had 200 women in attendance, subsequent workshops drew nearly 150 women who attended follow on workshops. Cohesion workshops were delivered to over 250 young people. A Muslim youth forum met with 25 young people on a regular basis. Weekly young women's workshops were attended by 12 young women. There was also engagement with mosques and imams in the city. See: Wycombe District Council. *Wycombe-One Partnership PREVENT Action Plan 2009 - 2011*. Provided by Wycombe District Council; Wycombe District Council. *Wycombe District PREVENT Action Plan 2008*. Provided by Wycombe District Council.
[53] Wycombe District Council. *Wycombe-One Partnership PREVENT Action Plan 2010 - 2011*. Provided by Wycombe District Council, 11.
[54] Interview 40. 29 August 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.
[55] Interview 39. 8 August 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Aylesbury, United Kingdom.
[56] Interview 73. 29 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.
[57] Wycombe District Council. *Wycombe-One Partnership PREVENT Action Plan 2009 - 2011*. Provided by Wycombe District Council; Wycombe District Council. *Wycombe District PREVENT Action Plan 2008*. Provided by Wycombe District Council.

participants, conceding that they would have been able to recruit more significant participation had they received support from male elders who could have drawn on family networks, explaining, "We partnered up with a local imam…and he would go with us and get people and that made a difference but it wasn't enough. Had we been able to access lay elders maybe that would have been more effective…the biraderi networks that really works in (the Mirpuri Pakistani) community."[58] It is significant that civil society leaders, local government, and police recognized that organizations with denser pre-existing links to members of the public were best able to mobilize community involvement in Prevent programs, even in the context of public suspicion about these agendas. It is also notable that civil society leaders described how they relied on religious networks to mobilize community engagement, but that they may have made further inroads had they secured cooperation from Muslim elites that could have drawn on longstanding kinship networks.

Further highlighting the point that elite connections to co-religionists shaped local policy responses, some interviewees cast doubt on the ability of Muslim elites with fewer elite-mass ties to facilitate community engagement around Prevent programs. A council staff person described how many community members did not recognize or trust some of the civil society leaders that received Prevent funding saying, "There was that kind of, who are these people?"[59] While a councilor noted: "These people were not really from the community as such…They didn't have roots within the community to take the message back."[60] It is a challenge for me to arbitrate these claims since these programs were able to mobilize at least some level of community involvement, to the extent that they were not completely rejected by members of the public. But it is significant that multiple interviewees (notably state actors who earmarked funding for these initiatives) viewed these programs as less able to mobilize public engagement because of the lack of network connections between Prevent funded leaders and members of the public. This is in contrast to other organizations where there was a consensus among interviewees that civil society leaders were able to sustain community involvement and reach young people in a persuasive way because they built on pre-existing elite-mass ties.

[58] Interview 77. 7 December 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.
[59] Interview 39. 8 August 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Aylesbury, United Kingdom.
[60] Interview 67. 22 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in London, United Kingdom.

Finally, in at least one case, civil society leaders appeared to use network connections to discourage community participation in counter-extremism programming. This demonstrates that the network linkages that accelerated participation may also be used to curtail public involvement. For instance, council staff I interviewed described their efforts to prepare for a Home Office-funded counter-narratives event. Despite promoting the program in advance, the event was attended by only four people. A council staff person charged with leading these efforts explained, "It turned out that there had been behind the doors conversations with the imams and various people and the imams had said no, we're not going to support this and sent a message out to the Muslim community, nobody go, and nobody went… it's a really difficult way of working whereby people were fairly closed about what was really going on."[61]

Why does this matter? I have described a mixed picture of participation during Prevent I in High Wycombe. There are obviously a number of legitimate reasons for Muslim civil society leaders and members of the public to be apprehensive about counter-extremism programs, but network dynamics appear to be an important factor shaping local responses. Where state actors relied on Muslim elites with pre-existing elite-mass ties, they were able to mobilize more significant participation around Prevent agendas, meeting the expectations of bureaucrats. By contrast, interviewees questioned the extent to which programs effectively reached members of the public when they were delivered by civil society leaders less embedded in local networks. Finally, it is highly significant that at least one Prevent program was essentially entirely rejected by members of the public when Muslim elites actively discouraged community participation.

Prevent II in High Wycombe

The 2011 revision of Prevent reformed the already contentious counter-extremism agenda, introducing new funding restrictions and requiring that local policy programs more clearly contribute to counter-terrorism objectives. In effect, the new iteration of Prevent removed the focus on community cohesion from counter-extremism, imposing new obligations for government agencies, particularly around interventions through the Channel program. On the ground, Wycombe was re-designated as a Prevent priority area in 2013, which catalyzed

[61] Interview 39. 8 August 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Aylesbury, United Kingdom.

further investment in intervention procedures and the training of local agencies. Amidst increasing pressure from central government, agencies outside the police engaged more actively with Prevent programming. In the sections that follow, I show how the tenuous coalition around counter-extremism agendas during Prevent I breaks down because of government reforms to the strategy and significant risks of reputational damage. With more limited cooperation from elites, state actors then struggled to mobilize community participation from members of the public.

Elite Responses to Prevent II

After the completion of funded projects under Prevent I, most Muslim elites in High Wycombe distanced themselves from counter-extremism efforts. Interviewees pointed to the central government's policy revision of Prevent as a breaking point, after which they distanced themselves from the agenda, stressing their disagreement over the shift toward more punitive and securitized policy approaches. Others noted that the grant funding that supported programmatic activity under the first iteration of Prevent had come to an end, effectively closing off opportunities to meaningfully cooperate with policy efforts.

However, I showed how it was possible for some Muslim elites in Leicester to remain cooperative with the Prevent agenda despite these policy reforms, and I argued that this was a function of network factors that largely insulated elites from reputational damage. In High Wycombe, by contrast, Prevent appeared to impose more significant risks for elites, heightening costs associated with the Prevent agenda in ways that seem to reflect more competitive dynamics in the city. For instance, a number of interviewees noted that Prevent exacerbated earlier tensions between Salafis and Barelvis in the city, with accusations from some Barelvis that Salafists were responsible for extremist links in the city, further heightening community divisions.[62] A civil society leader explained: "There is obviously sectarian challenges as well, sort of difficulties between particular Muslim groups in the town, and so you know one group will be like it's always them lot kind of thing and so that obviously… creates a bit of animosity within the town anyway."[63] It was a challenge to identify other instances where pre-existing network competition spilled over into the Prevent domain because interviewees did not specify where

[62] Interview 73. 29 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.
[63] Interview 64. 15 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.

they expected reputational damage to emerge from, speaking largely in general terms about co-religionists. However, interviewees both described competition as a persistent of feature of local civil society and explained how they anticipated facing a public challenge from co-religionists, with little of the kinds of protection described to me by Muslim elites in Leicester. The extent of these concerns was explained to me by a civil society leader: "We are not going to be snooping on our friends and neighbors and our clients…It would have shut us down completely…. Your clientele is what you are protecting."[64] A councilor also noted the costs associated with Prevent saying, "You really have to be either very brave or very stupid to stand up and support something which you are not 100% convinced about."[65] A Prevent practitioner described how leaders of a local civil society organization explained that they were unwilling to work with Prevent because it would jeopardize access to community donations that sustained their organization.[66]

It should now be clear that a key reason for disengagement around Prevent locally was the national shift in the policy's direction that made these programs more restrictive and punitive. But interviews also highlight that civil society leaders in High Wycombe were wary of engaging with the Prevent agendas because they anticipated significant risks of reputational damage in ways that appear to reflect pre-existing network dynamics. A number of interviewees described how Prevent enflamed tensions between religious factions in the city and that cooperation with counter-extremism efforts had the potential to irreparably destroy credibility and access to funding. This is in contrast to Leicester where civil society leaders in the city's highly connected network described how engagement with Prevent did not negatively impact their positions of community leadership. Together, this is powerful evidence that local network factors shape the risks of reputational damage associated with Prevent, producing steeper trade-offs around counter-extremism for Muslim elites in High Wycombe. As a product of these dynamics, state actors struggled to re-establish earlier civic partnerships or to identify new allies willing to forego risks associated with cooperating publicly with the strategy. Not surprisingly in light of these dynamics, I found more minimal evidence that Muslim civil society leaders assisted state actors in terms of mobilizing members of the public around Prevent programs or sharing information with the state.

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[64] Interview 70. 26 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.
[65] Interview 67. 22 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in London, United Kingdom.
[66] Interview 35. 21 August 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.

Community Responses to Prevent II

With few civil society partners facilitating community engagement, state actors struggled to mobilize participation around the Prevent agenda. Council staff and police leading on Prevent were unanimous in describing the obstacles they faced engaging local communities, with little evidence of public involvement in the Prevent agenda in High Wycombe outside of Prevent-funded programs that engaged with young people primarily building from education networks.[67] Effectively, the networks that before facilitated some community participation were now essentially shut off to state actors. A Prevent practitioner in High Wycombe explained to me that without information from members of the public he was "wandering around Wycombe with a blindfold on trying to do Prevent."[68] Other engagement efforts that progressed relatively easily elsewhere, such as community consultation, proved difficult, with members of the public and civil society organizations more reluctant to take part in these types of exchanges. For instance, a Prevent practitioner highlighted his struggles to organize programming for women in the city, detailing three separate, failed attempts to do so,[69] and noted his extensive efforts to organize a one-time consultation with around 40 people in attendance, which required almost individually recruiting attendees.[70] This is in contrast to Leicester where state actors routinely gathered groups of various sizes to interface with policy practitioners around Prevent, with no indication that they faced obstacles in doing so. While the Home Office has funded external organizations to deliver Prevent-funded programs across the country, a police officer I interviewed expressed suspicion about the ability of these initiatives to gain traction in Wycombe, explaining, "trying to bring them into a community that has got very localized links is going to be very, very difficult."[71]

It was also suggested to me that some community members actively discouraged engagement with Prevent, though I was unable to test the veracity of these claims. As a civil society leader explained: "Those filtering it through in such a way that it will scare people and say keep your doors and windows closed… They haven't got

[67] It is a challenge to access documents about community participation in Prevent programs after Prevent II, but a Prevent practitioner in High Wycombe described a project in schools that reached 3,000 young people. Outside school-based projects, there was a counter-radicalization project that reached 140 young women and a youth group for young men. Interview 35. 21 August 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.
[68] Interview 35. 21 August 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.
[69] Interview 35. 21 August 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.
[70] Interview 35. 21 August 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.
[71] Interview 73. 29 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.

any other word so that's the only word if you haven't got any other input you are only going to take the one that is given to you."[72] A Prevent practitioner conceded that cooperation from a well-connected local civil society organization would have made Prevent delivery "hugely easier."[73] It is highly significant that state actors described their struggles to facilitate participation without support from civil society leaders and that council staff acknowledged that cooperation from Muslim elites would have eased their ability to mobilize community engagement. It is also notable that interviewees claimed that discouragement about Prevent from co-religionists dissuaded individuals from taking part in counter-extremism activities.

In terms of information sharing, there appears to be very minimal willingness from community members to share referrals or other information with law enforcement that I was able to observe. A police officer delivering Prevent told me: "I don't think we've had one referral from the Muslim community directly,"[74] while another law enforcement officer explained that referrals from members of the public "just didn't happen."[75] Civil society leaders themselves described how "the community has shut off."[76] I was not able to find evidence that highly publicized terrorism-related developments related to High Wycombe[77] changed the dynamics around community participation, with a Prevent practitioner describing the significant obstacles to mobilizing community engagement (both in terms of accessing referrals and attendance at programming) in the aftermath of ISIS related connections in the city.[78]

In brief, central government reforms have essentially forced local government agencies to invest in Prevent programs, but state actors have struggled to sustain community involvement after losing earlier civic partners that lent assistance to the state during Prevent I. In effect, the notion of public participation in counter-extremism remains more of a state aspiration than a meaningful reality in the lives of even a small group of citizens in High Wycombe. I argued that this was a function of national policy developments and distinct network dynamics that

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[72] Interview 71. 26 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.
[73] Interview 35. 21 August 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.
[74] Interview 36. 7 October 2015. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.
[75] Interview 73. 29 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.
[76] Interview 70. 26 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.
[77] Grierson, Jamie. "Mother of Briton 'killed fighting for al-Shabaab' felt let down by authorities." *The Guardian*. 15 June 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jun/15/briton-thomas-evans-killed-fighting-for-al-shabaab; Sawer, Patrick and Nicola Harley. "Jihadi terror plots - the High Wycombe connection" *The Telegraph*. 9 November 2014. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11218551/Jihadi-terror-plots-the-High-Wycombe-connection.html
[78] Interview 35. 21 August 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.

heightened local trade-offs associated with the Prevent agenda. Having outlined the evolution of Prevent in High Wycombe, I now turn to a discussion of Prevent in Slough.

Slough

Slough is a relatively small, commuter town located just twenty miles outside of London. The city is highly diverse, one of England's first cities where white Britons are now a minority.[79] Slough remains a destination for migrants from around the world seeking employment in the city's trading estate which is among the largest in Europe.[80] Many of the city's migrants arrived from South Asia in the 1960s, first as single men who were later joined by their families who settled in England.

According to the 2011 census, Muslims in Slough comprise just under a quarter of the city's population numbering over 32,000.[81] Muslims in Slough reflect a wide range of ethnic and sectarian affiliations. Alongside the city's large Pakistani community which makes up nearly 18% of the total population,[82] there are smaller populations with Somali, Bangladeshi, Arab, and Sri Lankan backgrounds. Slough's Muslim community also features significant sectarian diversity with religious institutions catering to Deobandis, Barelvis, Shias, and Salafis, as well as ethnically orientated mosques with predominately Sri Lankan and Somali constituencies.[83]

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[79] Philipson, Alice. "White Britons a minority in Leicester, Luton and Slough" *The Telegraph*. 10 January 2013. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/9792392/White-Britons-a-minority-in-Leicester-Luton-and-Slough.html

[80] "Why have so many nationalities moved to Slough?" *BBC*. 21 April 2010. http://news.bbc.co.uk/local/berkshire/hi/people_and_places/history/newsid_8635000/8635697.stm

[81] Ali, Sundas. *British Muslims in Numbers*. London: Muslim Council of Britain, 2015.

[82] Office of National Statistics. *2011 Census: Ethnic group, local authorities in England and Wales*. London: Office of National Statistics, 2012. https://bit.ly/2xXM5oQ

[83] *Muslims in Britain: Mosques in Slough, Berkshire*. https://mosques.muslimsinbritain.org/maps.php#/town/Slough. Accessed 3 February 2019.



Figure 6.4 Slough Ward Map

Slough is on the whole more affluent than Leicester and Derby, but many Muslim residents live in higher concentration in wards with lower levels of employment and education compared to the national average[84] though a council staff person stressed that the local Pakistani population was more affluent than co-ethnics living elsewhere in the UK.[85]

Muslim Civic Networks

Muslim civic networks in Slough are relatively disconnected with a number of smaller, siloed clusters that maintain distinct representative institutions. Kinship and sectarian networks are less entrenched in Slough because Muslims in the city are drawn from a wider range of backgrounds, rendering these networks and community leaders that draw on them less influential over social and political life. Reflecting this, the ties between leaders and members of the public appear to be relatively weak. There is some competition between Muslim civil society leaders, and I find evidence of obstacles to civic coordination, but inter-elite competition appears to be more minimal than in High Wycombe where communal disputes repeatedly required third-party arbitration. Elite-state ties are also relatively

[84] Four wards in Slough (Chalvey, Central, Baylis and Stoke, and Wexham and Lea) have Muslim residents that make up over 30% of the population. These wards have higher rates of unemployment and residents with no qualifications than the average for Slough and England and Wales in 2011. See: Nomis: Official Labour Market Statistics. *2011 Ward Labour Market Profile*. London: Office for National Statistics, 2011. https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/reports/lmp/ward2011/1946157286/report.aspx

[85] Interview 72. 27 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Slough, United Kingdom.

underdeveloped in comparison to the other cities discussed so far. I first discuss the structural properties of Muslim civic networks in Slough in depth, before turning to the evolution of Prevent.

Elite-State Ties

Local government in Slough had invested in community cohesion efforts before the introduction of Prevent, notably via a city-wide faith partnership that brought religious leaders together with local government.[86] There was also formal and informal coordination between Muslim elites and the state in advance of the rollout of Prevent. For instance, a civil society leader described how they worked with police to remove Al Muhajiroun from a local mosque years before the start of Prevent.[87] Muslim community leaders also served in a number of high-profile leadership positions as elected councilors and as the city's mayor.

However, pre-existing elite-state ties appear to be comparably less developed in Slough than other cities discussed so far. Local government reports from 2009 highlight the lack of consultative spaces and the underdevelopment of Muslim civil society on the whole, noting that "The activity base in Slough in the Muslim community is at a fairly low level."[88] These reports describe the need to establish strategies to share information across Muslim communities, using High Wycombe's Communication Forum as a model.[89] It is significant that state actors during Prevent I describe the absence of networks or consultative routines to engage Muslim communities. This is in contrast to the East Midlands cases where these types of exchanges had been highly formalized around a range of policy areas in years prior, later becoming the basis for Prevent engagements.

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[86] Home Office. *Community Cohesion: Seven Steps A Practitioner's Toolkit*. London: Home Office. March 2005, 24. http://www.tedcantle.co.uk/publications/015%20Community%20cohesion%20seven%20steps%20%20Community%20Cohesion%20Unit%20.pdf

[87] Interview 75. 3 December 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Slough, United Kingdom.

[88] Slough Borough Council. *Slough Against Violent Extremism (SAVE) Action Plan 2008 – 2009*. April 2009. http://www.slough.gov.uk/moderngov/documents/s6530/Agenda%20Item%207%20Appendix%20B%20-%20SAVE%20Action%20Plan.pdf Accessed 3 February 2020.

[89] Slough Borough Council. *Slough Against Violent Extremism (SAVE) Action Plan 2008 – 2009*. April 2009. http://www.slough.gov.uk/moderngov/documents/s6530/Agenda%20Item%207%20Appendix%20B%20-%20SAVE%20Action%20Plan.pdf Accessed 3 February 2020.

Inter-Elite Ties

Connections between Muslim elites in Slough were also more underdeveloped, with minimal coordination between what were described as relatively independent Muslim civic institutions. The city lacked a coordinating structure through which to convene various Muslim civil society organizations in the city together, and interviewees described some competition between Muslim civic institutions. As one civil society leader explained, "Politics has prevented groups working together on important issues. Politics and personalities, it's very unique to Slough this. It has prevented progress that we could have otherwise made,"[90] noting how a Muslim institution refused to take part in a government consulting body because of the inclusion of another Muslim civil society organization. However, these rivalries did not seem to reach the level of contestation I observe in High Wycombe, where inter-communal disputes required third-party arbitration.

Elite-Mass Ties

Muslim leadership in Slough is diverse, and Muslim civil society leaders maintain different levels of connection to specific constituencies within the broader network. But overall, I find that elite-mass connections are less developed in Slough than other cities discussed so far. Biraderi systems play a role in social and civic life, but the influence of these networks was diluted because of the wider range of ethnic and regional diversity represented in the city. A civil society leader explained how leaders of mosque committees lacked strategies to share information from the state with co-religionists, explaining, "They have no mechanisms to do it and they've never done it... They never ever will feed it down to the people that need to know."[91] A number of interviewees reiterated how more established Muslim civil society leadership and mosques, in particular, lacked connections with young people.[92] As one councilor explained, "the two generations are not fully connected."[93] Community members I interviewed in Slough reiterated this picture, highlighting the lack of connections between mosques and young people. They also noted how community members sought out help and advice in more informal, ad hoc ways,

[90] Interview 68. 23 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Slough, United Kingdom.
[91] Interview 68. 23 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Slough, United Kingdom.
[92] Interview 68. 23 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Slough, United Kingdom; Interview 138. 25 February 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Slough, United Kingdom; Interview 139. 25 February 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Slough, United Kingdom.
[93] Interview 124. 11 February 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Slough, United Kingdom.

rather than relying on specific institutions or a center of civic elites.[94] Further highlighting the less developed elite-mass connections, some Muslim elites described facing public challenges from radical groups that maintained a presence in the city before the introduction of Prevent.

Together, a picture emerges of a more disconnected network, divided into relatively siloed clusters, lacking a clear civic center. On the whole, elites maintain fewer connections to other elites and the state, as well as less developed ties to members of the public. In the sections that follow, I show how pre-existing network dynamics dissuaded many elites from cooperating extensively with Prevent in the first phase of the policy, with important implications for the ways that state actors and community members interfaced with counter-extremism agendas during Prevent I.

Prevent I in Slough

In contrast to High Wycombe where prominent terrorism arrests drew attention to violent extremism and generated a degree of openness to the Prevent agenda, there were fewer obvious terror connections in Slough in the lead up to Prevent. Much like other cities, the Prevent strategy was quickly met with public suspicion in Slough, though council staff were obligated to deliver some Prevent programming after the policy's national roll-out. To guide these policy responses, state actors sought out Muslim civil society leaders as partners. As a council staff person in place at this time explained: "We should be giving something in tandem with the local communities, in partnership with them, almost through a commissioning approach, and therefore as part of that, there had to be consultation and dialogue with the Muslim community."[95]

Muslim Elites and Prevent I

In the section that follows, I show how network dynamics shaped how Muslim elites responded to nascent Prevent agendas in Slough. Some Muslim elites drew on pre-existing elite-state connections to access funding to deliver cohesion-oriented programs, but many community leaders limited their involvement with Prevent. In the

[94] Interview 135. 21 February 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Slough, United Kingdom; Interview 136. 21 February 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Slough, United Kingdom.
[95] Interview 66. 19 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in London, United Kingdom.

city's more disconnected network, I show that a number of elites lacked connections to state decisionmakers to secure policy incentives, while others remained concerned about risks of reputational damage from co-religionists. What resulted is that state actors lacked significant cooperation from Muslim elites outside a small number of community development projects.

A few civil society leaders who were already connected to state decisionmakers, having participated in state-sponsored consultation or received local government funding in the past, appeared to be best poised to access Prevent resources. A council staff person readily admitted that state actors relied on individuals already known to local government decisionmakers, what he described as "the usual suspects" and explaining "whenever there was consultation or dialogue that was required, they were the community gatekeepers so to speak."[96] Another interviewee noted how organizations with "good paperwork" and connections inside the local bureaucracy were the greatest beneficiaries of counter-extremism funding, though they questioned what some of these initiatives achieved.[97] As in other cities, Prevent funds were repurposed around broader community cohesion priorities that civil society organizations had prioritized before the introduction of Prevent.[98]

Outside of these funded projects, many Muslim civil society leaders remained relatively uninvolved in Prevent during the first iteration of the policy, which I argue was a function of gaps between Muslim elites and the state and concerns about reputational damage. I have already noted that local government documents from 2009 describe the underdevelopment of local Muslim civil society and the need to develop further engagement strategies.[99] Highlighting these dynamics, a local councilor described that a major Muslim civil society organization did not take a more active role in Prevent because of "a lack of awareness of what was available to them. In fact, if they knew they could get the funding to do more work they would have probably jumped on it. As with the mosques. I think again, mosques were sort of not connected with local authorities."[100] This is in contrast to the

[96] Interview 66. 19 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in London, United Kingdom.
[97] Interview 124. 11 February 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Slough, United Kingdom.
[98] Interview 66. 19 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in London, United Kingdom.
[99] Slough Borough Council. *Slough Against Violent Extremism (SAVE) Action Plan 2008 – 2009*. April 2009. http://www.slough.gov.uk/moderngov/documents/s6530/Agenda%20Item%207%20Appendix%20B%20-%20SAVE%20Action%20Plan.pdf Accessed 3 February 2020.
[100] Interview 124. 11 February 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Slough, United Kingdom.

East Midlands cases where comparably more organizations had close ties to the state and were quickly able to navigate bureaucratic requirements to access government funding and deliver Prevent programming.

Many elites also appeared to be reluctant about cooperating with Prevent because of organized public opposition that heightened the risks associated with backing Prevent, rendering involvement with the strategy costlier than other cities from the start. Multiple interviewees described to me how the group Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) actively used its existing networks to mobilize opposition against government Prevent efforts. A local bureaucrat explained his fears that HT would "undermine the other groups that had engaged with us …tarring anybody associated with the project."[101] A civil society leader described the reluctance among many Muslim elites to take part in Prevent to the fact that: "They had heard or knew that Prevent was not popular in the community. Therefore, they didn't want to be seen to be associated with it,"[102] which he partially credited to HT's local organizing.

As a result of these dynamics, many Muslim elites were cautious about the Prevent agenda and offered more limited support to the state. While some Muslim civil society leaders signaled support to government security objectives, this did not translate into the kinds of partnerships I observed elsewhere, where Muslim elites actively informed how state bureaucrats understood local community dynamics, developed Prevent programming, and engaged with Muslim publics. A civil society leader summarized this dynamic to me as, "Turn up at meetings, agree with the local authority policy, and go home, don't do anything yourself."[103] In contrast to the East Midlands cases where state actors described how they relied on community leaders to implement Prevent programs and at times advance intervention efforts, a local bureaucrat explained to me: "it wasn't like (civil society leaders at a particular mosque) took a lead role in any of this and actively pushed it… it wasn't a case of this is our project and we are going to lead it."[104] Having outlined how network dynamics, specifically the underdevelopment of elite-state connections and the organization of policy opposition, produced more minimal elite involvement in Prevent. I now show how these constraints shaped how local bureaucrats approached counter-extremism agendas.

[101] Interview 66. 19 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in London, United Kingdom.
[102] Interview 68. 23 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Slough, United Kingdom.
[103] Interview 68. 23 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Slough, United Kingdom.
[104] Interview 66. 19 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in London, United Kingdom.

Local Bureaucrats and Prevent I

I argue that state actors in Slough invested more minimally in counter-extremism efforts because of the lack of support for Prevent, both from civil society leaders and the wider public. As in other cities, bureaucrats were concerned about new and controversial counter-extremism programming and its potential to alienate Muslim minority communities. A council staff person I interviewed in place during this period stressed that, "(Prevent) needs to be owned by and driven by the Muslim community. If it's not, then it lacks legitimacy. The council doesn't have a mandate to go and do this," going on to describe, "If we get it wrong, it would burn our relationship with the Muslim community for a generation."[105] The need to develop Prevent approaches in partnership with communities was described as "crucial for success" in government documents from this period.[106] I also find comparably little evidence that Muslim elites helped state actors meet policy demands imposed by the central government. In the East Midlands cases, I showed how Muslim elites assisted state actors by facilitating public engagements and exchanging information, effectively easing the ability of state actors to deliver Prevent programs in line with central government demands. By contrast, in Slough, interviewees described how civil society leaders avoided promoting counter-extremism efforts, and there was also little to suggest that Muslim elites shared information with state actors that improved their capacity to deliver interventions.

Recognizing these constraints on local support, state actors delivered a softer iteration of Prevent that focused almost exclusively on community development priorities. A council staff person described this approach to me as focusing on non-controversial issues that "nobody could disagree with,"[107] such as language training, safeguarding, and youth development. Aspects of Prevent that dealt explicitly with violent extremism, such as accessing referrals and conducting interventions received comparably little investment in Slough during this period. Unlike the East Midlands cases where the local authority owned and advanced the development of intervention protocols, these

[105] Interview 66. 19 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in London, United Kingdom.
[106] Slough Borough Council. *Slough Against Violent Extremism (SAVE) Action Plan 2008 – 2009*. April 2009. http://www.slough.gov.uk/moderngov/documents/s6530/Agenda%20Item%207%20Appendix%20B%20-%20SAVE%20Action%20Plan.pdf Accessed 3 February 2020.
[107] Interview 66. 19 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in London, United Kingdom.

procedures in Slough were largely police-led. Evidencing this, council staff I interviewed that were leading on Prevent activities during this period were less involved with intervention activities in Slough.[108]

Putting this evidence together, it is clear that state actors recognized the political risks of delivering Prevent without civil society support, describing how they designed programs to avoid the more controversial components of the policy, preferring to invest in broader community development priorities, while more securitized aspects received less focus. I also find less evidence that civil society leaders in Slough proactively assisted local bureaucrats in order to engage co-religionists or develop intervention approaches to meet policy targets imposed by central government. Having explained the responses of elites and state actors, I now turn to look at how Muslim publics interfaced with the Prevent agenda.

Community Responses to Prevent I

I now show how network dysconnectivity shaped community participation during Prevent I in Slough. In Slough's more disconnected network, Muslim elites maintained fewer connections to co-religionists, meaning that civil society leaders were less able to draw from pre-existing network connections to mobilize participation around Prevent agendas. At the same time, I find suggestive evidence that public opposition from some civil society leaders and members of the public also dissuaded public engagement with local counter-extremism efforts. What results from this is comparably minimal community involvement in the first iteration of Prevent, with community attendance at some projects, while other initiatives saw delays and attendance at lower levels than expected.[109] I find little evidence that community members exchanged information or referrals, with intervention efforts appearing to be relatively sidelined from other Prevent activities. This is in contrast to the East Midlands cases where state actors managed to mobilize diverse community participation with fewer obstacles, at times accessing referrals from Muslim civil society leaders and members of the public.

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[108] Interview 66. 19 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in London, United Kingdom.

[109] Documentary evidence provides a mixed picture of participation. One event had 75 young people, another with 30 young people, while a women's event had lower attendance than expected. Efforts to establish community consultation appear to be delayed, still in the process of being established in 2009. Slough Borough Council. *Slough Against Violent Extremism (SAVE) Action Plan 2008 – 2009*. April 2009. http://www.slough.gov.uk/moderngov/documents/s6530/Agenda%20Item%207%20Appendix%20B%20-%20SAVE%20Action%20Plan.pdf Accessed 3 February 2020; Interview 66. November 19, 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Slough, United Kingdom. Local bureaucrats also described mixed responses to Prevent agendas, particularly outside civil society leadership.

I have described how many of Slough's civil society leaders sympathized with state security efforts, while avoiding active partnership with local bureaucrats around Prevent. The civil society leaders that received Prevent funding to deliver local programming were able to facilitate some engagement in particular sections of the network that reflected their organizational affiliations. But many interviewees from differing perspectives credited the lower levels of community participation in Prevent to the fact that the local authority relied heavily on groups that lacked substantial public trust.[110] Some of this is a function of network fractionalization, whereby various civil society leaders lacked a public following across different factions in the network. This was summed up to me by a council staff person from this period, who explained, "There was no one group that had a significant volume of people that it would then engage with. It was a bit…piecemeal."[111] This is in contrast to the East Midlands cases that were dominated by a particular ethnic and sectarian group, enabling bureaucrats to mobilize higher levels of engagement by relying on a few institutional partners, who could then draw on elite-mass and inter-elite linkages across Muslim civic networks.

The relatively low rates of participation observed in Slough are not only a function of network divisions but also in part because Muslim elites with connections to co-religionists appeared to avoid or discourage engagement with Prevent. A civil society leader explained how active opposition to Prevent from a local mosque's leadership impacted community participation, describing: "what their views were does impact…. If you have people like this in the community who are community leaders, people listen to them and people go and talk to them, that makes a huge difference."[112] This same interviewee highlighted how Hizb ut-Tahrir used its pre-existing networks in the city to organize and disseminate opposition to the Prevent agenda,[113] further dissuading members of the public from interfacing with nascent and controversial counter-extremism efforts.

In brief, the civil society leaders delivering Prevent programs during the first iteration of the policy in Slough appeared to lack dense network connections to co-religionists across the city's more divided network, leaving them less able to mobilize community participation. At the same time, other civil society leaders and organized

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[110] Interview 68. 23 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Slough, United Kingdom; Interview 75. 3 December 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Slough, United Kingdom; Interview 124. 11 February 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Slough, United Kingdom.
[111] Interview 66. 19 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in London, United Kingdom.
[112] Interview 138. 25 February 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Slough, United Kingdom.
[113] Interview 138. 25 February 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Slough, United Kingdom.

opposition movements discouraged community members from interfacing with Prevent or created obstacles to facilitating engagement. So far, I have outlined how network dynamics created steeper trade-offs for elites to take part in Prevent, producing more minimal cooperation from Muslim elites around nascent Prevent efforts. Caution among civil society leadership in turn dissuaded state actors from investing heavily in these agendas, while efforts to facilitate broader community engagement progressed at a slower pace due to divisions in the network. I now look at how Prevent outcomes changed amidst heightened top-down pressure on localities to invest in counter-extremism programs.

Prevent II in Slough

After the revision of Prevent in 2011, Slough was not re-designated as a priority area for several years, which meant the loss of local government Prevent funding, though law enforcement continued to maintain a number of Prevent officers responsible for counter-extremism. Policy activity on the ground centered around policing. As under the first iteration of Prevent, prominent local government personnel remained, as one council staff person put it, "extremely nervous" about the Prevent agenda, minimizing public consultation or prioritization of Channel procedures.[114] In 2015, Slough was re-listed as a "Tier 2" priority area, which brought with it a Home Office-funded Prevent Coordinator to lead counter-extremism efforts out of the city council. Also in 2015, the UK government enacted the Counter Terrorism and Security Act, compelling local actors to invest further in the Prevent agenda. In practice, this meant streamlining Channel intervention procedures, training local agencies to establish protocols around Prevent, and energizing efforts to engage community members with the addition of Home Office-funded Prevent personnel. I now show how network dynamics continued to shape policy outcomes, even amidst new top-down pressures.

Elite Responses to Prevent II

Much like before, many Muslim elites in the city remained relatively uninvolved, though supportive of local government Prevent efforts. I was told by a council staff person that much of the city's mosque leadership "let

[114] Interview 72. 27 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in London, United Kingdom.

(the Prevent agenda) slightly pass them by…they engaged to a degree but not proactively."[115] One unique development was that several civil society leaders established a consultative body in 2016 designed to present feedback to local and central government policymakers around Prevent. The group formed out of a recognition of the continued political significance of counter-extremism agendas and a motivation to interface directly with central government decisionmakers. For instance, concerns about the lack of attention on foreign policy in counter-extremism efforts and issues with Prevent training were aired. This committee also on occasion organized wider, public consultation forums, designed to highlight diverse perspectives around Prevent in the city. But activities were carefully framed so as to minimize potential reputational damage for Muslim elites that took part. Those involved in the group stressed in interviews that they operated without Prevent funding and prioritized sharing policy insights with key government decisionmakers, rather than merely advancing the policy objectives of central government. There was also a suggestion that HT's organizing activities had diminished locally, easing the ability for civil society leaders to engage policymakers, with less opposition than they would have faced under Prevent I.

What emerges is a growing willingness from a small group of civil society leaders to critically engage with local and central policymakers around the Prevent agenda, amidst policy developments that have further entrenched counter-extremism activities both nationally and in Slough. In the words of one civil society leader, there was a recognition that Prevent programs are "here to stay."[116] At the same time, there remains some understandable caution around counter-extremism efforts similar to what I described during the first iteration of the policy.

Community Responses to Prevent II

Amidst growing top-down pressure on local government, state actors were able to facilitate some level of community participation because they could navigate across the relatively disconnected civic network in Slough and establish direct ties with members of the public, without facing significant opposition from civic leadership. For instance, a police officer involved in Prevent described recruiting participants for Prevent initiatives by traveling between various community centers and other smaller gatherings, rather than relying on particular civil

[115] Interview 72. 27 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in London, United Kingdom.
[116] Interview 139. 25 February 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Slough, United Kingdom.

society organizations to facilitate engagement, noting how building these networks was made easier by the fact that civil society leaders did not actively discourage Prevent efforts, easing the ability of law enforcement to navigate across disparate civil society organizations to mobilize attendance at various Prevent programs.[117] A local Prevent practitioner readily admitted that policy efforts faced comparably few obstacles from civil society leaders saying, "If they wanted to, they could make my life difficult, but they understand that I'm trying to help them."[118] A councilor reiterated these sentiments, saying, "Rather than say, 'Oh, stop them working' we say 'OK, let me them do what they want to and we will do our own thing… if they think they can succeed, let them try it.'"[119] This stands in contrast to other areas where state actors faced sustained challenges to engage members of the public after civil society leaders disengaged from Prevent, effectively closing off civic networks that earlier accelerated participation.

While state actors were able to build direct connections in certain sections of the network, they still faced obstacles in the instances where elites appeared to use network connections to discourage participation. As was explained to me by a civil society leader: "In Slough we have a lot of mosques, but we have two main mosques. One mosque is really engaging, the other one is not engaging at all. We will have a community and people who are coming from (one mosque) but we won't get anyone from (the other mosque)."[120] A Prevent practitioner from outside of Slough described the challenges he faced mobilizing young people to attend a Prevent-funded program in the city—only recruiting two participants by his deadline—which he traced back to another civil society organization in the city that discouraged young people from attending his program.[121] The fact that some sections of the community were receptive to Prevent engagements, while other groups effectively avoided interfacing with Prevent practitioners over time, despite being on the receiving end of the same policy approach, by the same personnel is highly significant, pointing to the salience of network approaches. It is also notable that opposition from a local civil society leader to CVE programs impeded engagement with Home Office funded programming, again highlighting that citizens make decision about how they will interface with counter-extremism on the basis of networks of trust rather than other factors. A civil society leader in Slough explained how network

[117] Interview 42. 9 November 2015. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Slough, United Kingdom.
[118] Interview 41. 12 December 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Slough, United Kingdom.
[119] Interview 124. 11 February 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Slough, United Kingdom.
[120] Interview 138. 25 February 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Slough, United Kingdom.
[121] Interview 127. 18 February 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Slough, United Kingdom.

fractionalization shaped how communities engaged with Prevent, noting the diversity of faith perspectives in the city and the lack of domination by a single faction, saying, "There is not enough No's or Yes's, there is just enough that you've got Yes's and you've got No's, of course there are some who probably hate Prevent….There are so few that they can't make any difference."[122]

It is clear that there remains widespread suspicion about the Prevent agenda in Slough. Interviewees repeatedly highlighted that most members of the public were simply unaware of local counter-extremism efforts. Still, I find evidence that state actors more easily mobilized some degree of community engagement at Prevent consultations and programs[123] at levels that align with the expectations of bureaucrats, without the kinds of challenges and obstacles I observe elsewhere. There remains significant and understandable reluctance to share information with law enforcement that might then be fed into the Channel intervention procedure. I was told by a council staff person: "People would still see it as grassing on their friends, family, whatever and they would be very reluctant to do that."[124] A civil society leader stressed that members of the public would still prefer to bring concerns to individuals in the community that they trust, before going directly to law enforcement with a referral.[125] Despite this, there were examples where members of the public made referrals or brought concerns directly to state actors. For instance, a Prevent practitioner described to me that there had been community-based referrals in the past,[126] and a law enforcement officer described an increase in referrals from members of the public after a community engagement event in the city.[127]

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[122] Interview 125. 12 February 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Slough, United Kingdom.
[123] There is limited documentary evidence about the attendance at various consultations and programs, so I relied on interviews with Prevent practitioners to clarify the level of community participation. Prevent practitioners described a range of public meetings. One with around 80 people in attendance and smaller and routine consultations with 10 to 40 people. An event around Syria travel was attended by 50 to 60 people. A Home Office roundtable event exceeded the requested number of attendees with 33 people in attendance because, according to a Prevent practitioner, "everybody wanted to be part of it." Another event designed to engage women around Prevent was attended by 80 women. Various youth and women's projects were described as well attended and in alignment with expectations of local bureaucrats. Law enforcement led a number of women's engagement events that discussed extremism alongside other issues and managed sustained participation. I did not find evidence of the obstacles I observed elsewhere to mobilizing participation, in fact in some instances, members of the public and civil society leaders appeared to seek out additional engagement from state actors. See: Interview 41. 12 December 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Slough, United Kingdom; Interview 42. 9 November 2015. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Slough, United Kingdom.
[124] Interview 72. 27 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in London, United Kingdom.
[125] Interview 138. 25 February 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Slough, United Kingdom.
[126] Interview 41. 12 December 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Slough, United Kingdom.
[127] Interview 42. 9 November 2015. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Slough, United Kingdom.

Conclusion

I have shown how more disconnected networks in Slough at first slowed the development of Prevent agendas. While some civil society leaders were willing to use Prevent funding to deliver cohesion-oriented programming, most Muslim elites operated at a distance from counter-extremism efforts, either because they lacked elite-state ties or anticipated reputational damage due to organized, public opposition. State actors, in turn, invested more minimally in counter-extremism programs focusing on cohesion priorities, recognizing concerns among local stakeholders about Prevent. Constraints on elite cooperation and fractionalization across the network meant that Prevent efforts faced more obstacles facilitating participation than in other cities. Over time, however, I argue that this network dysconnectivity eased the ability for state actors to facilitate some participation around Prevent efforts. After the Prevent revision, state actors navigated across the relatively factionalized network to build some direct ties with members of the public and mobilize more participation than in neighboring High Wycombe. Still, community participation appears to be more limited than in Leicester's highly connected network, where elites leveraged their pre-existing ties to co-religionists to sustain higher levels of community involvement in Prevent over time.

Alternative Explanations

I have argued that local responses to Prevent in Slough and High Wycombe can be explained by the structure of local civic networks, but how can I be confident that these patterns emerge as a result of network structures and not other variables? I discuss these alternative explanations in turn, before drawing out the major conclusions from this chapter.

The capacity and motivation of the personnel delivering Prevent were stressed in a number of interviews. Prevent practitioners also described the importance of their creativity in delivering programs and engaging members of the public. For instance, state actors devised creative ways to fund[128] wide-ranging engagement programs. My aim is not to diminish the importance of creative policy implementation, but the impact of policy activity still appears to

[128] Interview 42. 9 November 2015. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Slough, United Kingdom.

be shaped by network dynamics in important ways, where on the ground engagement efforts do not play out evenly. In Slough, particular network factions increased their engagement with Prevent over time, but state actors consistently struggled to facilitate engagement with other groups despite employing the same policy delivery approaches across the community. The fact that policy delivery approaches employed by the same personnel produce these varied community responses is an important indication of the salience of network dynamics.

I also find less evidence to suggest that trust in police alone can explain the evolution of community responses in these two cities. Slough and High Wycombe are both managed by the same police force and regional counter-terrorism unit—at times by the same personnel—which introduces an additional level of standardization in policing approaches between the two areas. Unsurprisingly, I find evidence of mixed views toward the police from interviews with both suspicion about law enforcement articulated, while others described positive experiences or more ambivalent views. Survey data shows that public confidence in the police force is similar to Leicester over time.[129] However, I find that Prevent policy outcomes change in the two localities over time, with state actors facing more obstacles to engaging members of the public in High Wycombe, while community engagement increased in Slough. I was not able to discern a significant shift in Prevent policing strategies over time, yet these activities produced different responses from local actors over time. While local perceptions about police are undoubtedly important, these two cases suggest that trust-levels on their own cannot explain policy outcomes.

My findings also cast doubt on threat-based explanations. Slough and High Wycombe are designated with the same threat level by the central government both as "Tier 2" priority areas, yet I observe more public willingness to cooperate with the Prevent agenda over time in Leicester and later in Slough than in High Wycombe where there appear to be comparably more publicized terror connections. Shocks like the emergence of ISIS and its recruiting efforts in UK cities did not seem to notably change the tone of community participation in either locality, with little evidence of a significant increase in public interest around Prevent or referrals from the

[129] Nicholas, Sian, Chris Kershaw, and Alison Walker. *Home Office Statistical Bulletin: Crime in England and Wales 2007/08*. London: Home Office, 2008. See Table 6.04: Confidence in the criminal justice system by police force area: 57% of respondents believe Thames Valley Police do an excellent/good job, similar to Leicester at 55%; Office of National Statistics. *Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) perception and ASB data by Police Force Area, year ending March 2016*. London: Office of National Statistics, 2016. See Table 2: Ratings of the local police and public confidence in the police and local council: 70% of respondents say that the Thames Valley Police are doing an excellent or good job; compared to 69% in Leicestershire.

community.[130] Bureaucrats in High Wycombe described the obstacles they faced facilitating community involvement in Prevent after ISIS-related connections in the city. This challenges the notion that community responses reflect the evolution of local terror threats, pointing toward other factors to explain local policy outcomes.

Nor does it appear to be the case that socio-economic explanations can explain policy outcomes on their own. Though many Muslim residents live in wards with above average levels of deprivation in High Wycombe and Sough, overall levels of deprivation are lower than the East Midlands cases. Yet, I find that community participation changes over time within the two cases. I observe more engagement in the first phase of the policy in High Wycombe. Policy documents from Slough during this period describe how local bureaucrats were actively seeking to replicate High Wycombe's engagement approach. Over time, however, participation appears to diminish in High Wycombe, while increasing among some sections of the community in Slough. Throughout socio-economic dynamics do not appear to shift significantly, challenging the view that socio-economic dynamics of minority communities drive how they will engage with state security efforts.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that network dynamics explain different local policy responses to Prevent in High Wycombe and Slough over time, even as a range of other variables are held relatively constant. In both cases, I argued that state actors invested comparably less in counter-extremism programs because of more cautious policy responses from many Muslim elites toward these agendas. However, the two cities diverge in terms of the ways that Muslim publics interface with counter-extremism efforts over time.

In Wycombe, I showed how elites with pre-existing ties to the state helped mobilize some participation in the first iteration of Prevent, leveraging elite-mass connections. By comparison, efforts to engage members of the public appeared to face more obstacles when the state relied on civil society leaders with few connections to co-

[130] Interview 41. 12 December 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Slough, United Kingdom; Interview 35. 21 August 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.

religionists and in instances where Muslim elites actively discouraged Prevent programming. Prevent II, introduced in 2011, cut off access to policy incentives and pushed Prevent in a more punitive direction. In the face of these constraints, most civil society leaders disengaged from counter-extremism efforts. In addition to broader policy concerns, civil society leaders remained reluctant about cooperating with Prevent because they anticipated significant reputational damage from co-religionists in the city's more competitive network. State actors then struggled to identify new ways to mobilize community participation without cooperation from elites.

In Slough, community participation progressed at a slower pace. The Muslim elites that delivered Prevent programming at the outset maintained fewer connections to co-religionists within the city's relatively disconnected Muslim civic network. I also found evidence that some individuals used network connections to actively discourage participation. After the introduction of Prevent II and the re-designation of Slough as a priority area in 2015, state actors in Slough managed to build some direct ties with members of the public across factions in the network. Slough's disconnected network first impeded public mobilization, but later appears to ease the ability for state actors to develop some connections to co-religionists without relying on intermediaries. Despite the increase in public involvement in counter-extremism efforts in Slough, I find evidence that community participation remains relatively low and falls behind Leicester where elites actively leverage built-up ties to members of the public within a highly connected network.

In the next chapter, I test the theory developed in the United Kingdom in two cities in the United States: Boston and Los Angeles, showing how in a very different national and sub-national context, network dynamics remain central in explaining local policy responses to countering violent extremism agendas.

Chapter 7 CVE in Two US Cities

The US CVE agenda takes direct inspiration from the UK's Prevent strategy.[1] Both the US and UK CVE strategies aim to prevent individuals from supporting or taking part in terrorism—through a combination of wide-ranging community development activities and more individual-level intervention activities. The US CVE strategy, explicitly and in practice, focuses on Muslim communities.[2] However, CVE efforts in the US operate in a vastly different context than in the UK. American counter-extremism efforts differ in scope and are comparatively under-resourced, with less top-down pressure on localities than in the UK. I first discuss how CVE policies have evolved in the US and how they differ from the UK's Prevent efforts, before examining broader differences between the US and UK contexts.

The US CVE strategy was first launched in 2011 under the Obama administration in coordination with several central government agencies, but without any additional federal resources designated for counter-extremism activities.[3] After the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing and amidst the emergence of the so-called Islamic State, policymakers refocused on the CVE agenda. In 2014, three "pilot cities" (Boston, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis-St. Paul) were announced to develop and rollout CVE programming, the policy intention being that these city-level programs would then inform the further expansion of CVE efforts nationally. The CVE pilot program provided each of these three cities with a small amount of funding ($216,000) to deliver CVE programming[4] and tasked a range of government agencies (with US Attorney's offices in a clear leading role) and civil society organizations with developing policy

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[1] McCants, Will, and Clinton Watts. *US strategy for Countering Violent Extremism: An Assessment*. Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2012.

[2] Congress.gov. *H.R.1022 - CVE Grants Act*. 24 February 2015. https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1022/text; Chaudry, Rabia. "Countering Violent Extremism Still an Uphill Battle" *The Observer*. 14 April 2015. https://observer.com/2015/04/countering-violent-extremism-still-an-uphill-battle/

[3] Hughes, Seamus. *Combating Homegrown Terrorism: Written Testimony of Seamus Hughes*. 27 July 2017. https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/HughesCombattingHomegrownTerrorism727.pdf

[4] Koumpilova, Mila. "In Boston, Los Angeles and Minneapolis, Federal Anti-Terror Programs Stoke Community Interest and Criticism." *Star Tribune*. 9 February 2016. http://www.startribune.com/in-boston-los-angeles-and-minneapolis-federal-anti-terror-pilots-stoke-community-interest-and-criticism/368091441/; Interview 85. 10 January 2019.Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Boston, United States.

frameworks. Reflecting differences between these cities, each pilot city identified distinct areas of programmatic focus.[5]

On the ground, CVE programs faced numerous obstacles and delays, while opposition movements quickly organized in selected cities.[6] In 2016, the Obama Administration planned to expand CVE programs beyond the three pilot cities, designating 10 million dollars to a range of organizations around the country, both Muslim civil society groups alongside other organizations, working to counter far-right extremism. But upon entry into office, the then-new Trump administration swiftly reorganized grants designated under the Obama administration. The new administration canceled funding earmarked to counter far-right extremism, and there were discussions about renaming CVE efforts as "Countering Radical Islamic Extremism." These policy revisions to the CVE agenda were followed by significant reductions to federal personnel and funding,[7] removing any notion of a top-down counter-extremism program beyond a handful of funded programs operating nationally. For many civil society organizations, cooperation on CVE programs under the Trump administration would become untenable.

There are a number of important procedural differences that distinguish the US from the UK CVE agenda. The US government has invested fewer resources into CVE programs than the UK. US government documents cast central government as a "convener"[8] disseminating best practices and funding research, rather than guiding local policy in practice. Policy implementation has also been complicated by the vast American bureaucracy, which involves coordination between many different law enforcement organizations and federal departments collaborating horizontally around the CVE agenda in partnership with local agencies. This has created confusion around how CVE activities are defined and

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[5] See description in: Vidino, Lorenzo and Seamus Hughes. *Countering Violent Extremism in America*. George Washington University: Program on Extremism, June 2015.
https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/downloads/CVE%20in%20America.pdf

[6] Koumpilova, Mila. "In Boston, Los Angeles and Minneapolis, Federal Anti-Terror Programs Stoke Community Interest and Criticism." *Star Tribune*. 9 February 2016. http://www.startribune.com/in-boston-los-angeles-and-minneapolis-federal-anti-terror-pilots-stoke-community-interest-and-criticism/368091441/

[7] Tracy, Abigail. "'We Are at a Turning Point': Counterterrorism Experts Say Trump is Inspiring A Terrifying New Era of Right-Wing Violence." *Vanity Fair*. 2 November 2018. https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/11/trump-administration-tree-of-life-shooting-domestic-terrorism

[8] The Office of the President. *Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*. 8 December 2011. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/sip-final.pdf, 10.

how strategic responsibility is delegated between organizations.[9] Finally, the American Establishment Clause places stricter limits on the scope of US CVE programming,[10] which focuses squarely on violence prevention, while the aspiration of the UK's Prevent strategy is much broader, addressing violent and non-violent extremism.

Cross-National Differences

The American context differs in a number of respects from the UK, making the US cases a good additional test of the argument developed in the UK. I detail some of the most relevant national differences before turning to a discussion of CVE policies in LA and Boston. First, American Muslims appear to be better integrated into social and economic life than their European counterparts according to comparative surveys. A 2007 Pew survey of Muslim Americans finds that: "Muslims living in the United States were middle class and mainstream: largely assimilated, happy with their lives and moderate with respect to global issues, especially in comparison with minority Muslim publics surveyed in several European countries by the Pew Global Attitudes Project," with broadly similar results reported from their 2011 survey.[11] Second, American police traditionally use force more aggressively than their UK counterparts and are increasingly connected to domestic intelligence agencies,[12] fostering a broadly more punitive policing culture. American Muslim communities, in particular, have been victims of hostile policing and surveillance, such as entrapment techniques in the years following September 2001.[13] Assessing how Muslim Americans perceive the police is complex. Gillum's 2018 national survey shows

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[9] Challgren, Jonathan, et al. "Countering Violent Extremism: Applying the Public Health Model." *Georgetown Security Studies Review*. October 2016, 7.
[10] See discussion on counter-radicalization and the Establishment Clause in Rascoff, Samuel J. "Establishing Official Islam-The Law and Strategy of Counter-Radicalization." *Stanford Law Review.* 64(2012): 125-90.
[11] Pew Research Center. Muslim Americans: No Signs of Growth in Alienation or Support For Extremism. Pew Research Center. August 2011.
[12] Price, Michael. *National Security and Local Police*. Brennan Center for Justice, 2013. https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/NationalSecurity_LocalPolice_web.pdf; Lartey, Jamiles. "US Police Kill More in Days than Other Countries do in Years." *The Guardian*. 9 June 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/09/the-counted-police-killings-us-vs-other-countries; "Cops or Soldiers?: America's Police have become too Militarised." *The Economist*. 22 March 2014. https://www.economist.com/united-states/2014/03/20/cops-or-soldiers
[13] Apuzzo, Matt and Adam Goldman. "After Spying on Muslims, New York Police Agree to Greater Oversight" *The New York Times*. 6 March 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/nyregion/nypd-spying-muslims-surveillance-lawsuit.html; Harris, Paul. "Fake terror plots, paid informants: the tactics of FBI 'entrapment' questioned" *The Guardian*. 16 November 2011. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/16/fbi-entrapment-fake-terror-plots

that foreign-born Muslims and noncitizens are more trusting of law enforcement than US-born Muslim Americans, who on the whole expect worse treatment of Muslim suspects.[14]

There is some suggestive evidence that the threat of Islamist-inspired terrorism (the focus of US CVE efforts) is lower in the US than in the UK, at least according to some indicators. There were less than half as many ISIS foreign fighters from the US than the UK,[15] though there were, of course, ISIS-inspired terrorist attacks in both countries. Radical groups like Al Muhajiroun have been slower to establish a US presence.[16] Reports from Pew have shown that: "Muslims in the United States reject Islamic extremism by larger margins than do Muslim minorities in Western European countries."[17]

Another important difference is that the US features a much vaster set of institutional players, both at the central and local level, with a wider range of central government bodies from the National Counter Terrorism Centre to the FBI and DHS involved in the implementation of counter-extremism. Locally, CVE efforts have been led by the US Attorney's office, DHS field offices, city governments, and city and county law enforcement organizations.

Despite these important differences, many of the fundamental challenges associated with CVE programs remain the same in the US. Like the UK's Prevent strategy, local actors are tasked by central government to build connections with members of the public to deliver community engagement and establish individual-level intervention strategies. However, there are a number of significant differences that distinguish the national and sub-national context of US CVE from the UK cases just discussed. The US cases thus present a unique opportunity to test whether network dynamics shape the ways local actors respond to CVE agendas, even in a context where the theory appears less likely to stand up to scrutiny. We might expect significant cross-national differences in terms of policing, community demographics, and the threat landscape to drive policy responses instead of network dynamics. Before turning to the

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[14] Gillum, Rachel M. Muslims in a Post-9/11 America: A Survey of Attitudes and Beliefs and Their Implications for US National Security Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2018.
[15] Meleagrou-Hitchens, Alexander, Seamus Hughes, and Bennett Clifford. *The Travelers: American Jihadists in Syria and Iraq.* George Washington University Program on Extremism. February 2018.
https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/TravelersAmericanJihadistsinSyriaandIraq.pdf, x.
[16] Cruickshank, Paul. "The growing danger from radical Islamist groups in the United States." *CTC Sentinel* 3.8 (2010): 4-10.
[17] Pew Research Center. Muslim Americans: Middle class and mostly mainstream. Pew Research Center, 2007.

two cases, I first map out how network dynamics differ between Boston and LA and the predictions this leads me to make about how local actors will respond to CVE agendas.

Civic Networks in Boston and Los Angeles

This chapter focuses on how CVE efforts have played out in two cities, Los Angeles and Boston, which were both selected as CVE pilot cities in 2014. The cities share several, relevant similarities, but the structure of Muslim civic networks in the two cities differs in a number of respects. I choose not to assemble social network analyses for the two US cases because of data limitations that would render SNAs less able to estimate the true nature of network connections. However, I use the same qualitative strategies to measure network dynamics that I employed in earlier UK cases.

Qualitatively Validating Network Dynamics

To validate elite-state linkages, I identify network connections, such as a history of prior state consultation or partnerships between Muslim civil society leaders and the state. I also look for evidence from interviews where state actors and civil society leaders both refer to pre-existing, interpersonal trust. Where multiple interviewees describe an absence of state-civil society consultation or where state actors express confusion about how to identify civil society partners, I take this as evidence of weaker elite-state linkages.

To measure inter-elite connections and estimate the level of competition, I identify incidents of elite coordination, such as mobilizing together around one-off political, or religious events, or shared membership on umbrella bodies. Where multiple interviewees from different perspectives describe a lack of network rivalry and where I find evidence that community leadership is organized with minimal complication, I take this as evidence of lower competition. By contrast, where elites are unable to coordinate together around common policy priorities, where interviewees refer to sustained inter-organizational competition, or when state actors describe that competition hinders their ability to engage communities, I take this as evidence of higher network competition.

Finally, to measure elite-mass connections, I use interviews with community members to understand if elites influence the political behavior of co-religionists, how frequently elites interface with members of the public, and to what extent, if at all, community members rely on elites for problem-solving. I triangulate this evidence with interviews from academics, interfaith leaders, and state actors. The table below highlights the broad properties of Muslim civic networks in Boston and Los Angeles using the ideal types presented in Chapter 3, as I review here and discuss in greater detail in this chapter.

Table 7.1Approximate Muslim Civic Network Structures

City	*Approximate Network Structure*
Boston	Disconnected-Like Network
Los Angeles	Elite- Connected Network

Muslim Civic Networks in Boston

Muslim civic networks in Boston are on the whole less connected, with fewer elite-state and elite-mass ties, though civil society leaders share some formal and informal civic connections. One civil society organization (the largest mosque in the region) holds a more central network position, with more established ties to the state, other elites, and members of the public than other institutions.

The network in Boston thus features many properties of a *disconnected-like network*, with one organization maintaining comparably more connections to the state and co-religionists. Importantly, the introduction of CVE coincides with the evolution of civic dynamics in the city that then shapes network dynamics. At the time that CVE programs were being devised in Boston, several civil liberties groups with close ties to the most connected organization in the network emerged and began to mobilize political opposition to nascent counter-extremism efforts.

Muslim Civic Networks in Los Angeles

In comparison to Boston, Muslim civic networks in Los Angeles feature denser elite-state ties, the product of many years of engagement by the city of Los Angeles and local law enforcement organizations. I also observed more established inter-elite connections. Community leaders both coordinated around common causes, while at times operating in competition, what an academic observer described as a "sibling rivals"[18] dynamic. Elite-mass connections appeared less developed throughout the network, though certain sections of the public were more connected to particular institutions and civic leaders. On the whole, the network loosely approximates features of an *elite-connected network* with both inter-elite and elite-state linkages, but less developed ties between civic leaders and Muslim publics.

Theoretical Expectations

While there are many ways that the US context differs from the UK, I expect that network dynamics should still structure how local actors choose to respond to CVE agendas. In Boston, Muslim civic networks are relatively disconnected outside of one more connected organization. As CVE agendas take shape in the city, public opposition groups had already begun to mobilize, leveraging earlier network connections to accelerate their organizing efforts. I expect that there will be higher risks of reputational damage for elites to cooperate with CVE programs in the face of organized public opposition, operating at the center of the loosely connected network. In the absence of civic partnerships, state actors are then more likely to minimize investment in CVE agendas to avoid alienating local civil society leaders. In effect, I expect that internal civic network dynamics should dissuade elites and state actors from prioritizing CVE agendas, despite top-down pressures, ultimately limiting the potential for members of the public to engage with counter-extremism efforts.

In Los Angeles, I anticipate that many civil society actors will be more willing to cooperate initially with nascent CVE agendas, leveraging their pre-existing ties to the state, and in the absence of mobilized

[18] Interview 79. 23 January 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Los Angeles, United States.

public opposition or challenges from rival civil society leaders. State actors should be more motivated to invest in CVE efforts because they can rely on cooperation from long-time civic allies. But after the Trump administration's policy reforms to the CVE agenda and growing local and national public mobilization against these agendas, I expect that a number of civil society leaders will disengage from CVE efforts in the midst of more significant risks of reputational damage. This should in turn produce more reluctance from state actors to invest in the policy area.

The US cases allow me to test how the theory developed in the UK plays out in a different national and sub-national context. Specifically, the case of Boston allows me to test how counter-extremism efforts play out where public opposition is already highly organized and relatively well-connected at the outset of CVE agendas. My theory would be ruled out if local actors invest in counter-extremism strategies and sustain at least some community participation despite network conditions that should make it more costly to do so.

In LA, my theory would face a challenge if elites choose to avoid CVE programs at the outset where they maintain pre-existing ties to the state and do not anticipate significant reputational damage. Equally, if state actors initially avoid CVE programs despite cooperation from civil society leaders or if state actors can sustain community participation without elite involvement, my theory would face a severe challenge. Finally, I would not expect the coalition around CVE agendas to hold up amidst a significant growth in anti-CVE mobilization locally.

Case Methodology

My goal in this chapter is to understand the extent to which CVE policies were delivered on the ground and the reasons behind distinct responses by local actors over time in Boston and Los Angeles. To do this, I use a range of strategies to capture the evolution of CVE agendas and test the theory in these two locations. Because of the political contestation around CVE programs and reforms under the Trump administration, CVE activities effectively never reached members of the public—outside of a few state-funded programs—as policymakers envisioned. Because of this, I use very similar, but slightly modified indicators to capture the extent that localities invested in delivering CVE policies and the nature of

community participation, recognizing differences in the scope of US CVE programs compared to the UK.

To measure policy delivery in the US cases, I identify whether state actors publicized CVE efforts and the extent that they formally engaged communities around counter-extremism efforts. I also work to determine whether state actors intended to and actively designed plans for government-led intervention efforts. Though US CVE programs have interfaced with citizens far less than in the UK, I still attempt to measure how members of the public responded to counter-extremism efforts in Los Angeles and Boston, where it is possible to do so. I use indicators such as the level of attendance at CVE programs and their alignment with the expectations of local bureaucrats.

To trace the causal chain in both cities, I use interviews and archival data to understand how and why elites responded to CVE agendas in different ways. I specifically test whether network dynamics, such as the presence of a mobilized opposition or pre-existing elite-state connections, impacted how civil society leaders approached CVE agendas. I also test responses by state actors, assessing whether local police and local government employees were impacted by elites with whom they shared network ties, or whether other factors like the threat of terrorism, local counter-terrorism capacity, or central government pressures significantly shaped local responses. Where relevant, I also work to understand city-level community responses, testing both the role of network dynamics as well as other variables, specifically, public trust in police, threats of terrorism, and socio-economic factors.

Throughout this chapter, I use the same process tracing techniques I have employed elsewhere, looking for various interviewees from different perspectives to confirm that network factors significantly shaped how local actors approached controversial CVE agendas at each step in the causal chain. As I have discussed, I do not assemble social network analyses for the US cases, but I work to gauge social network dynamics qualitatively. To do this, I draw heavily on 58 interviews I conducted in these two cities between 2017-2019 with state actors, civil society leaders, academics, and members of the public, alongside extensive archival material from both cities. Before discussing CVE in Boston, I first look at how Boston and Los Angeles compare across a range of relevant variables.

Los Angeles and Boston: Cross-Case Comparison

Los Angeles and Boston share a number of similarities in terms of potentially confounding variables that could also be thought to drive local policy responses. Both cities were designated as pilot areas under the Obama administration and experienced fairly similar top-down pressure to deliver CVE agendas. Both are Democratic strongholds and have received national attention for ambitious police reform projects,[19] though tensions between police and communities remain. As sanctuary cities, Los Angeles and Boston both limit their cooperation with federal immigration officials.[20] Both cities have been the target of relatively recent acts of terrorism,[21] most notably the Boston Marathon Bombing in 2013 and the San Bernardino shooting in 2015.

The cities also differ in a number of important ways. The first is that Los Angeles is America's second largest city with a population of four million people, far vaster in size than Boston and its population of 700,000 residents. Estimates suggest that there are around 50,000 Muslims in Boston compared to 120,000 in greater Los Angeles.[22] Reflecting these differences in city size, the 2019 budget for the city of Los Angeles is more than double that of Boston's, but per citizen spending in Boston is higher than in LA.[23]

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[19] Pattani, Aneri. "White House recognizes Boston police for community policing." *Boston Globe*. 19 May 2015. https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/05/19/white-house-recognizes-boston-police-for-improvements-community-policing/kmH82gAyZfFGRNQWriB2jO/story.html; Rice, Connie. "Hail to the Police Chief" *New York Times*. 10 December 2013. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/11/opinion/william-j-brattons-record-bodes-well-for-new-york.html?_r=0race-riots

[20] Parekh, Serena, and Martha F. Davis. "Boston's Sanctuary City Protections: A Philosophical Perspective." *Northeastern University School of Law Research Paper* 325(2018): 1-15; Smith, Dakota and Matthew Ormseth. **"**It took a while, but L.A. formally declares itself a 'city of sanctuary.'" 8 February 2019. *Los Angeles Times*. https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-city-of-sanctuary-cedillo-20190208-story.html

[21] Grad, Shelby and Richard Winton. "Before Brussels, LAX was repeatedly a target of terrorism" *Los Angeles Times*. 22 March 2016. https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-before-brussels-lax-was-target-of-terrorism-20160322-story.html; Groll, Elias. "A brief history of terrorist attacks in Boston" *Foreign Policy*. 16 April 2013. https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/16/a-brief-history-of-terrorist-attacks-in-boston/

[22] The Pluralism Project: Harvard University. *Islam in Greater Boston***.** http://pluralism.org/landscape/boston/islam/; Mendelson, Aaron. "SoCal's Muslim community geographically, ethnically diverse." *Southern California Public Radio*. 11 December 2015. https://www.scpr.org/news/2015/12/11/56162/socal-s-muslim-community-geographically-ethnically

[23] The city of Boston's total budget for the year 2019 was $3.5 billion, while the city of LA's budget was $10.6 billion.

The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) is also larger in size in terms of personnel than the Boston Police Department (BPD).[24] The LAPD has pioneered new counter-terrorism approaches nationally, such as counter-terrorism training for officers and collaborations with private companies.[25] The LAPD created a "liaison section" within its Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau in 2008, employing up to six police and nearly 30 volunteers under the management of the city's deputy chief of police,[26] which led extensive engagement with Muslim community leaders and community members. The Boston Police Department has adopted some similar routines, such as strengthening coordination with intelligence agencies via structures like the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and engaging minority community leaders via consultative bodies like BRIDGES, though these efforts are comparatively more limited and receive less investment than in Los Angeles, as I go on to describe. Having outlined some of the major similarities and differences between the two cities, I now turn to a discussion of CVE in Boston.

Boston

Muslim Civic Networks in Boston

Boston is the largest city in New England and home to a diverse Muslim community, numbering around 50,000, with diasporic communities from the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia, alongside African-American converts.[27] Muslim civil society in Greater Boston was traditionally organized around local mosques serving specific diaspora communities. There were relatively few representative institutions that connected diverse sections of the community,[28] what one civil society leader described as a "dearth of

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[24] Governing: The States and Localities. *Police Employment, Officers Per Capita Rates for U.S. Cities.* 2016. https://www.governing.com/gov-data/safety-justice/police-officers-per-capita-rates-employment-for-city-departments.html

[25] Treverton, Gregory F., Matt Wollman, Elizabeth Wilke, and Deborah Lai. *Moving Toward the Future of Policing*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2011; Ervin, Clark. *Los Angeles' Preparedness for Terrorism*. The Aspen Institute Homeland Security Program, 2009.

[26] Weine, Stevan, Ahmed Younis, and Chloe Polutnik. "Community Policing to Counter Violent Extremism: A Process Evaluation in Los Angeles." *Final Report Office of University Programs, Science and Technology Directorate, US Department of Homeland Security*. College Park, MD: START, 2017, 4.

[27] The Pluralism Project: Harvard University. *Islam in Greater Boston*. http://pluralism.org/landscape/boston/islam/

[28] There was an umbrella organization that attempted to coordinate between mosques in the region, but most interviewees were either not aware of this organization or highlighted its limited convening power.

institutional presence."[29] A key exception is Boston's largest mosque which exerts significant influence—what Harvard's Pluralism Project calls "undoubtedly the most prominent landmark of Islam in Greater Boston."[30] The mosque acts as a hub for intra-Muslim coordination in the city and maintains established connections to the local state. It faced significant public opposition to its construction and launch in 2009, which catalyzed new connections between the mosque and other civil society organizations, as well as local state leadership.[31] Reflecting the mosque's network connections, there were repeated instances where it was able to mobilize co-religionists in large numbers (at times organizing over a thousand people) around various social issues in recent years.

The mosque's centrality was further cemented after the Boston Marathon bombing which placed enormous scrutiny on the local Muslim community and established it as a key ally for various law enforcement and government agencies.[32] As one Muslim civil society leader explained, "The trial by fire was the Boston Marathon incident…. (the mosque) came to be looked on as sort of the Muslim Voice …They were a reliable partner for a lot of law enforcement at the time, they worked to establish connections, with the mayor's office, with local city councils, the Boston Police Department."[33]

While the city's largest mosque was at the forefront of developing ties with state institutions, elite-state ties in Boston, on the whole, were relatively underdeveloped, although there were some consultative efforts that brought minority community leaders together with law enforcement. Demonstrating this, elite-state ties were so underdeveloped that some Boston civil society leaders and law enforcement reached out to a government official in Los Angeles to identify local partners after the Boston Marathon bombing.[34] As I will go on to discuss, this is in contrast to Los Angeles where elite-state partnerships were extremely developed locally, much before the introduction of CVE programs. The Marathon

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[29] Interview 61. 29 October 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Boston, United States.
[30] The Pluralism Project: Harvard University. *Islam in Greater Boston*. http://pluralism.org/landscape/boston/islam/
[31] Mahmood, Faiqa et al. *How a Mosque Managed a Crisis: The ISBCC Response to the Boston Marathon Bombing.* Institute for Social Policy Understanding. 19 July 2017, 6-11. https://www.ispu.org/how-a-mosque-managed-a-crisis-the-isbcc-response-to-the-boston-marathon-bombing/; *ISBCC: Our History*. https://isbcc.org/our-history/
[32] Mahmood, Faiqa et al. *How a Mosque Managed a Crisis: The ISBCC Response to the Boston Marathon Bombing.* Institute for Social Policy Understanding. 19 July 2017. https://www.ispu.org/how-a-mosque-managed-a-crisis-the-isbcc-response-to-the-boston-marathon-bombing/
[33] Interview 46. 19 April 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Boston, United States.
[34] Interview 96. 17 January 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Los Angeles, United States.

bombing and later introduction of counter-extremism efforts in Boston also helped catalyze a new generation of Muslim civic leadership, specifically with the growth of several civil liberties organizations focused on Muslim communities in Boston,[35] closely connected to the city's largest mosque. These new groups rose to prominence quickly amidst the relatively unpopulated civic landscape and utilizing connections to the most central Muslim civil society institution in the city.

Putting this evidence together, Muslim civic networks in Boston could be described as a relatively disconnected-like network, with the city's largest mosque loosely approximating a central hub. There are some connections between the state, Muslim elites, and members of the public, but these seem to be less developed and routinized than those I observed elsewhere. In the following sections, I look closely at the evolution of CVE programs in Boston. I show how policy opponents rapidly toxified counter-extremism efforts in the city, utilizing connections to the most central organization in the network to accelerate their activism, dissuading most civil society leaders and ultimately state actors from investing in these agendas.

CVE in Boston

Responses from Civil Society

In the aftermath of the Boston bombing and the designation of Boston as a CVE pilot, there was a growth of local civic activism and the emergence of new civil liberties organizations focused on Muslim communities. One organization in particular was established in response to Boston's selection as a pilot city.[36] Network conditions enabled these groups to accelerate their activism and maximize their influence because many of their organizers built off a longer history of civic involvement in the city,[37] with some maintaining ties to the mosque at the center of the network. A local civil society leader explained to me how some of these leaders built on longstanding family connections, saying: "It creates that sense of, yes

[35] Wangsness, Lisa. "New generation of Muslim leaders emerges in Boston" *Boston Globe*. 1 July 2015. https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/07/01/new-generation-muslim-leaders-rises-fore boston/77lrvP7afdJNqUqK2U4QxJ/story.html

[36] Luciano-Adams, Beige. "Federal Counterterrorism Program Inflames Criticism as L.A. Considers Taking Funds." *LA Weekly*. 6 July 2018. https://www.laweekly.com/federal-counterterrorism-program-inflames-criticism-as-l-a-considers-taking-funds/

[37] Interview 63. 5 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Boston, United States.

it's a large city, but the networks are very close and very intimate."[38] I argue that civic elites make decisions about how they will respond to CVE policies based on risks and incentives within their immediate networks. I will show that policy opposition from civil society groups operating at the center of the network shaped the narrative around CVE programs and heightened risks of reputational damage associated with CVE agendas, ultimately creating conditions that made it untenable for civil society leaders to cooperate with state security efforts.

After the designation of Boston as a pilot city, a number of young activists began community organizing, working to alert members of the public about CVE efforts and provide legal defense to community members that came in contact with the FBI. While CVE programs were only being devised locally, these groups worked to educate community leadership about CVE programs and attempt to dissuade them from taking part.[39] One civil society leader highlighted the role of this activism in shaping his response to counter-extremism efforts:

> "(Two community organizations) did a lot of education in the background … so there is this kind of ecosystem that was being built that we are all going to stand opposed to CVE… the outside educating was helpful in terms of also being real clear that this was not a place that I want to go."[40]

Another interviewee also credited this activism with fostering a sense of public caution around CVE agendas in the city.[41] In addition to educating the public about counter-extremism initiatives, these tactics also heightened the risks of reputational damage associated with cooperating on CVE efforts, creating steeper trade-offs around the policy area. A civil society leader explained to me that cooperating with CVE agendas "wasn't really an option for me. I feel like we would have really lost a lot of credibility,"[42] while another community leader described how refusing to participate in CVE demonstrated a

[38] Interview 63. 5 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Boston, United States.
[39] Interview 61. 29 October 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Boston, United States; Interview 78. 3 January 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Boston, United States.
[40] Interview 78. 3 January 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Boston, United States.
[41] Interview 62. 29 October 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Boston, United States.
[42] Interview 78. 3 January 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Boston, United States.

commitment to protect co-religionists.[43] In fact, a government official I spoke to noted their confusion about the unwillingness of civil society organizations to apply for federal CVE funding, saying, "The US Attorney's Office was kind of like, we'll give you money and you guys don't want to take it …we haven't really seen this before. They were really shocked."[44]

To be clear, there were differing views about CVE expressed within the community. For instance, a small group of community leaders lent some support to the state's CVE policy objectives out of a desire "to be part of the solution,"[45] but interviewees admitted to me that they did not openly advocate for these programs. It was also suggested to me that these views were expressed by individuals and organizations that lacked a central network position in order to meaningfully influence local policy responses.

As I go on to describe, most of the observable CVE activity in Boston took place within Boston's Somali community. A number of interviewees described that financial need from within the more economically disadvantaged Somali community motivated Somali civil society organizations to apply for CVE funding in order to resource badly-needed community services, though a Somali civil society leader I interviewed also emphasized that the impact of terrorism on Somali communities drove their cooperatioon with the CVE agenda.[46] Network factors also appeared to minimize the reputational damage Somali leaders expected to face for cooperating with CVE programs. This interviewee also suggested that because Somalis in Boston maintained their own civil society institutions and were to a degree less connected to other Muslim organizations in the city, this then meant that Somali organizations were initially insulated from oppositional activism in other parts of the network.[47] It was also suggested to me that these organizations were able to cooperate with CVE efforts without facing significant reputational damage because of the relative lack of organizations providing much-needed social services to Somalis in Boston.[48]

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[43] Interview 48. 11 May 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Boston, United States.
[44] Interview 60. 26 October 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Boston, United States.
[45] Interview 59. 25 October 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Boston, United States.
[46] Interview 52. 23 October 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Boston, United States.
[47] Interview 52. 23 October 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Boston, United States.
[48] Interview 55. 25 October 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Boston, United States.

On the whole, however, CVE programs were almost wholly rejected by civil society organizations in the city. The academic evaluator of Boston's CVE efforts estimated from extensive interviews with civil society representatives that "98 percent of interviewees stated bluntly that they would not take part in a program with the CVE label because it would risk undermining the trust and relationships they had worked to build with the communities they serve."[49] To summarize, civil liberties groups utilized their pre-existing connections to the city's largest mosque and other influential community leaders to quickly shape the narrative about the nascent CVE agenda. This activism drew attention to policy controversies and debates and created a degree of public caution around counter-extremism efforts. This policy opposition quickly mobilized at the time when local policymakers were only beginning to devise Boston's CVE framework, influencing the community at large and, as I have described, heightening the risks of reputational damage for civil society leaders in particular. It is highly significant that CVE as a policy area is essentially entirely rejected by civil society stakeholders in Boston as a result of concerns about the policy's potential impact on organizational credibility, despite the fact that CVE programs followed closely on the heels of the Boston Marathon Bombing and that the city faced direct top-down pressure to invest in these agendas. This underscores the fact that network dynamics and specifically political risks closer to home, continue to underscore responses to counter-terrorism policies, even where other factors seem more likely to take precedent.

The release of Boston's CVE framework which was developed through multi-agency consultation and discussion with civil society partners was presented by a small group at the White House CVE Summit in February 2015, highlighting seven "problem areas" including youth alienation, the need to develop intervention capacity, violent extremism on social media, and the influence of American foreign policy.[50]However, the framework explicitly included a letter of dissent from the director of the city's largest mosque, which noted: "for the government to offer us services based on concerns of violent extremism in our community – as implied by this framework – seems to reinforce the same stereotype

[49] Wynia, Matthew K., David Eisenman, and Dan Hanfling, "Ideologically Motivated Violence: A Public Health Approach to Prevention," *American Journal of Public Health* 107.8(2017), 1245.
[50] *A Framework for Prevention and Intervention Strategies: Incorporating Violent Extremism into Violence Prevention Strategies.* February 2015. https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-ma/pages/attachments/2015/02/18/framework.pdf, 2-3.

that society holds of American-Muslims: that they or Islam are inherently violent. This is unacceptable to our Boston-Muslim community."[51] Policy opposition was also expressed from a range of local stakeholders, including the first Muslim councilor in the Greater Boston Area.[52] In brief, most of the city's civic players—with the closest ties to the state and co-religionists—were largely united in publicly opposing CVE strategies, even before these agendas were well defined and implemented.

Responses from State Actors

Local bureaucrats[53] found themselves with a dearth of support from local civil society leadership, including the mosque that had served as a crucial ally in managing the aftermath of the Boston bombings. I find significant evidence that policy opposition from community leaders, particularly those with pre-existing ties to the state, was the key factor dissuading state actors from investing heavily in CVE agendas. This is a core point reiterated by multiple senior law enforcement officials, civil society leaders, academic observers, and federal government officials.

As one senior law enforcement official in Boston explained to me: "I was going to all these meetings…and people were outraged that this is what the government was going to be doing and that the Boston Police Department, their police were going to be participating in this. It was loud and clear and the mosque they wouldn't sign off on anything. They wouldn't participate in any way shape or form. The biggest mosque in New England. It would have been unprofessional for us to ignore their concerns."[54] A civil society leader that was involved in policy opposition efforts in the city highlighted, "The Boston Police Department has consistently said that they are not interested in doing CVE, they are interested in doing community policing. That is largely due to these kinds of organizations and groups having their ear

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[51] A Framework for Prevention and Intervention Strategies: A Framework for Prevention and Intervention Strategies: Incorporating Violent Extremism into Violence Prevention Strategie. February 2015. https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-ma/pages/attachments/2015/02/18/framework.pdf, Appendix C, 20.

[52] Nguyen, Rosa. "Civil rights groups protest federal program to combat extremism, saying it targets Muslims." 6 August 2015. *Boston Globe*. https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/08/06/civil-rights-groups-protest-federal-program-combat-extremism-saying-targets-muslims/XefStmtvTuJAyBr8Z8XWLJ/story.html

[53] There was a wide range of state agencies and actors involved in local CVE programs. In Boston, the US Attorney's Office and the Executive Office of Health and Human Services for Massachusetts took a particular leading role in developing and convening CVE efforts.

[54] Interview 83. 8 January 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Boston, United States.

and really letting them know this is where we stand."[55] Another civil society leader explained to me, "We have a clear relationship with the Mayor and the Mayor respects us significantly…They just realized it was going to hurt their relationships with the community."[56]

Local bureaucrats in Boston renamed CVE efforts as Promoting Engagement, Acceptance, and Community Empowerment (PEACE). The main way that CVE programs were implemented was through civil society projects supported via federal grant funding, first under the pilot program and later under a subsequent round of DHS funding designated in June 2017 under the Trump Administration. Outside the distribution of these grants, there was little evidence of other CVE efforts in the city, with government agencies largely avoiding the area of counter-extremism. In practice, this meant that there was little government investment (either from local government agencies or law enforcement) in designing or leading intervention programming, training, or public engagement around CVE. It is noteworthy that state actors (including law enforcement) describe opposition from civil society partners as a main factor driving local policy approaches, taking precedent over threat dynamics and central government pressures.

Community Responses

Funding designated under the pilot program was provided to three civil society organizations in Boston, two of which worked primarily with Somali communities.[57] Programming that operated with CVE funding focused largely on community development and cohesion priorities. Government documents describe how these programs were relatively well-attended,[58] in line with the expectations of these organizations. As one civil society leader explained to me about delivering CVE-funded programs, "We

[55] Interview 46. 19 April 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Boston, United States.
[56] Interview 78. 3 January 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Boston, United States.
[57] *Massachusetts Promoting Engagement Acceptance and Community Empowerment Project: FFY17 Q1 Report*. December 2016. https://www.muslimjusticeleague.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/MA-PEACE-Project-FFY17-Q1-report-12-21-16-2-4.pdf; The Massachusetts Executive Office of Health and Human Services designated CVE grants to three organizations: Empower Peace: $42,000, Somali Development Center: $63,000,United Somali Youth Project: $105,000.
[58] *Massachusetts Promoting Engagement Acceptance and Community Empowerment (PEACE) Project: Final Report.* 30 November 2017. https://www.muslimjusticeleague.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/PEACE-Project-Final-Report-11.30.17-4.pdf One organization used CVE funding to support a wide range of existing programming, reaching over 600 young people during the grant period. Another CVE program worked with over 200 people around community cohesion and skill building. A final program reached over 130 young people regarding social media.

didn't do anything special per se. We just integrated the education, the awareness, and the discussion in the general services that we do because that's how we do our best work. You don't want to be, 'Oh come over here, I'm going to talk about something called CVE.'"[59] There was evidence that programs directed by Somali civil society organizations were able to access participants by building on pre-existing network ties, which in part reflected longstanding family and kinship networks.[60]

Under federal funding first issued by the Obama administration and later reorganized by the Trump administration in 2017, the central government funded two additional programs in Massachusetts, one which focused on facilitating engagements between young Somalis and the Boston Police Department.[61] While this initiative went ahead, there was growing concern about CVE within sections of the Somali community, which appeared to be a product of increased oppositional organizing among Somalis. Another program led by the Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety and Security focused on over 100 prison inmates considered to have a "high risk for violent extremism."[62]

Counter-extremism efforts in Boston do not appear to have extended beyond these funded programs; the wider community seems, on the whole, unaware of CVE programming. I did not find evidence that civil society leaders regularly exchanged information with government officials in the context of CVE. As one civil society leader explained to me, "In general the government has not done a big publicity spike on this."[63] Another interviewee explained to me, "No one is promoting (CVE). The government is not promoting it. The people who get the money don't want to promote it because everybody who knows what it is knows its controversial and everyone who doesn't just continues not to know."[64] This was

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[59] Interview 52. 23 October 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Boston, United States.
[60] Interview 55. 25 October 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Boston, United States; Interview 58. 25 October 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Boston, United States.
[61] Office of Terrorism Prevention Partnerships. *Quarterly Update on Programmatic Performance: FY16 Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Grant Program*. March 2018. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Q3%20CVE%20Grant%20Program%20Summary%20Final%20508%20Compliant_1.pdf
[62] Office of Terrorism Prevention Partnerships. *Quarterly Update on Programmatic Performance: FY16 Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Grant Program*. March 2018. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Q3%20CVE%20Grant%20Program%20Summary%20Final%20508%20Compliant_1.pdf
[63] Interview 46. 19 April 2017. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Boston, United States.
[64] Interview 61. 29 October 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Boston, United States.

reiterated to me by another civic leader who highlighted that community members were unlikely to hear about CVE unless they were warned about it by people they trusted: "I don't think people would know about it necessarily unless they were taught about it… If your first introduction to something is being told by someone you trust how bad it is, that's going to have an impact"[65]

Effectively, outside a small number of funded programs designed to reach smaller constituencies in the city, there is not a public facing counter-extremism strategy in Boston, therefore rendering meaningful community participation in CVE not possible, despite the intentions of central government policymakers. In summary, I have shown how CVE efforts were essentially curtailed by policy opposition amplifying their message through pre-existing connections to the center of the network, in turn dissuading elites from cooperating with CVE efforts, and ultimately leading state actors to invest minimally in these policies.

Bottom-Up Violence Prevention Approaches

One notable development in Boston is that outside of formal, state-led CVE programming, civil society actors have worked together to pilot a broad violence prevention collaborative (which is explicitly not a CVE program). The collaborative provides additional services to young people that member civil society organizations and public agencies encounter in the course of their work. On a very small number of occasions this involved addressing issues around radicalization.[66] The pilot operates outside local government control, initiated without government knowledge and maintained without federal funding.[67] Police are involved as partners at the invitation of the collaborative. It was suggested to me by an interviewee involved in this work that civil society organizations made referrals that would not have been otherwise shared with police had it not been for the collaborative.[68] Though the collaborative remains in a pilot phase and is not actively promoted in the wider community,[69] it is significant that bottom-up

[65] Interview 63. 5 November 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Boston, United States.
[66] Interview 54. 23 October 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Boston, United States.
[67] Interview 54. 23 October 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Boston, United States.
[68] Interview 60. 26 October 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Boston, United States.
[69] Interview 54. 23 October 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Boston, United States.

violence prevention efforts have flourished in the absence of state control because they have operated outside the risks of reputational damage associated with government-led CVE programs, maintaining a degree of cooperation from some civil society leaders who would have otherwise been reluctant to engage in federal CVE efforts.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Muslim civic networks in Boston approximate a relatively disconnected network, with one organization maintaining comparably more connections to the state and co-religionists than other institutions. New civil liberties groups used their pre-existing connections to the most central civil society organization in the network to influence the way civil society leaders and co-religionists viewed nascent CVE agendas, by drawing attention to well-documented policy controversies as local policymakers were only being to devise these programs locally. Most civil society leaders were disinterested to take part in CVE agendas recognizing the significant risks of reputational damage they would face for doing so. Without support from the city's civic leadership, state actors responded cautiously—largely avoiding investment in these programs, outside of distributing funding for community development programming. The case of Boston thus highlights how network dynamics—specifically the early mobilization of policy opposition and the unwillingness of civil society leaders with elite-state state connections to take part in these agendas—drove how state actors chose to implement CVE efforts and ultimately the kinds of participation that are possible on the ground. I now turn to discuss the case of Los Angeles.

Los Angeles

Los Angeles shares a number of similarities with Boston—both are progressive, coastal cities, with a history of police reform, but LA is also unique in a number of ways that make it a good case to test the theory. First, the city of Los Angeles invested heavily in counter-terrorism before the introduction of CVE programs**,** and local law enforcement organizations have garnered national recognition for their engagement of Muslim minority communities as part of these efforts. Second, the city has a long history of punitive policing, though the LAPD has undergone extensive police reforms. Concerns about the

LAPD's aggressive style of law enforcement reached such heights that policing operations were placed under federal oversight through a consent decree by the Department of Justice because of historic abuses of power,[70] catalyzing what the *Los Angeles Times* called a "dramatic, forced transformation."[71] There have also been concerns about state surveillance targeted at Muslim communities. In the mid-2000s, the FBI famously placed an informant in a greater Los Angeles mosque to spy on Muslims in Southern California.[72] Finally, Los Angeles is America's second largest city and by far the largest city analyzed in this study. This makes Los Angeles a good case study to test the relevance of pre-existing state counter-terrorism capacity, a history of punitive community policing, and city size on policy outcomes.

I first outline civil society dynamics in Los Angeles before explaining responses from local actors. I show how network dynamics, specifically more developed elite-state connections and delays in the mobilization of public opposition, motivated more initial cooperation and state investment in CVE. Civil society leaders disengaged from the strategy only later as organized opposition and central government policy reforms heightened the risks of reputational damage associated with the policy, ultimately leading state actors to also back away from the policy. The case of LA thus highlights the salience of network dynamics, even in America's second largest city, and amidst top-down pressure to deliver CVE programs.

Muslim Civic Networks in Los Angeles

LA features a sizeable and highly diverse Muslim community.[73] Muslim civil society networks in Los Angeles are vaster, both in terms of size and geographical distance than those in Boston, with more clustering into distinct factions, though there also appears to be significant cross-over between Muslim organizations. The network features an enormous amount of civic activity but lacks a clear civic center.

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[70] Nagourney, Adam. "In Los Angeles, a Police Force Transformed." *The New York Times*. 12 August 2011. https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/13/us/13lapd.html

[71] Rubin, Joel. "Federal judge lifts LAPD consent decree." *Los Angeles Times*. 16 May 2013. https://www.latimes.com/local/la-xpm-2013-may-16-la-me-lapd-consent-decree-20130517-story.html

[72] Dolan, Maura. "9th Circuit revives Muslims' lawsuit charging FBI with spying at mosques." *Los Angeles Times*. 28 February 2019. https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-muslim-mosque-fbi-9th-circuit-20190228-story.html

[73] When I describe Muslim civil society networks, I refer here to Muslim communities in Greater Los Angeles, which includes Los Angeles city and the area of Orange County.

Many Muslim elites maintain highly established ties to the state, a product of extensive and at times controversial[74] government outreach to Muslim communities,[75] which included initiatives like the LA Sheriff's Department Muslim American Homeland Security Congress and the LAPD's liaison section of its Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau. The Bureau dedicated around 30 people to strengthen ties predominately with Muslim minority communities.[76] Much of this activity involved reaching out to Muslim community leaders at local "Muslim forums"[77] as well as more informal partnership building and mosque visitations. The Los Angeles city government also strengthened relationships with Muslim civic leaders via groups like the Human Relations Commission.

The network also features numerous inter-elite ties. Many of the city's Muslim civic leaders share both formal and informal network connections, though there also appears to be some degree of internal competition between organizations. For instance, observers have documented divisions between two of the largest Muslim representative institutions in the area.[78] Muslim publics appear primarily connected to their local mosque, with other institutions and civic leaders exercising a less obvious influence over their everyday lives.[79] Together, a picture emerges of a network that loosely approximates features of an *elite-*

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[74] MacFarquhar, Neil. "Los Angeles Police Scrap Mapping Plan, Elating Muslims" *The New York Times*. 16 November 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/16/us/16muslim.html; Freedman, Samuel G. "Los Angeles Police Leader Makes Outreach to Muslims His Mission" *The New York Times*. 6 March 2015. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/07/us/lapd-deputy-chief-muslims.html

[75] National Public Radio. "Building Ties to Counter Religious Extremism In LA." *NPR*. 18 January 2015. https://www.npr.org/2015/01/18/378116224/in-la-building-ties-to-muslim-communities; Weine, Stevan. "How Local Law Enforcement Uses Community Policing to Combat Terrorism" *Lawfare* 19 February 2017. https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-local-law-enforcement-uses-community-policing-combat-terrorism

[76] *Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department Muslim Community Affairs Unit.* http://shq.lasdnews.net/content/uoa/mca/mcaoverviewjan2010_lores.pdf; Weine, Stevan, Ahmed Younis, and Chloe Polutnik. "Community Policing to Counter Violent Extremism: A Process Evaluation in Los Angeles." *Final Report Office of University Programs, Science and Technology Directorate, US Department of Homeland Security*. College Park, MD: START, 2017, 4.

[77] Weine, Stevan, Ahmed Younis, and Chloe Polutnik. "Community Policing to Counter Violent Extremism: A Process Evaluation in Los Angeles." *Final Report Office of University Programs, Science and Technology Directorate, US Department of Homeland Security*. College Park, MD: START, 2017.

[78] Bokhari, Kamran. *Countering Violent Extremism and American Muslims*. George Washington University: Program on Extremism, October 2015. https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/downloads/CVE%20Bokhari.pdf, 5-6.

[79] I interviewed eight community members from a range of different LA-area mosques. A general consensus among interviewees emerged that Muslims in the Los Angeles area were most closely connected to their local mosques. National representative institutions appear to be less closely followed by members of the public—or engaged on an as-need basis that reflects the orientations of individual mosques. On the whole, it appears that a relatively small proportion of Muslims in the LA area are highly engaged in local civic politics beyond their mosque, although many prominent organizations and civic leaders were well known to those I interviewed.

connected network with inter-elite and elite-state linkages, but less developed ties between many civic leaders and Muslim publics.

CVE in Los Angeles

Due to LA's size and pre-existing counter-terrorism capacity, one might expect that the LAPD would be highly motivated to deliver CVE programs, regardless of local network dynamics. On the other hand, it could be assumed that Muslim civic leaders would be wary of cooperating with counter-extremism efforts, in light of the city's history of punitive policing and surveillance within Muslim communities. Instead, I show how network dynamics in Los Angeles, specifically more established elite-state ties and delays in the mobilization of public opposition, created more initial enthusiasm from a number of Muslim civil society leaders and state actors about the potential to invest in CVE agendas in LA. With support from many community leaders already known to government decisionmakers, state actors in LA were more willing to invest in nascent CVE strategies. But policy reforms under the Trump administration and the intensification of local public opposition disrupted these policy aspirations, just as CVE programs were due to be implemented in the city. I show how these shifts heightened the risks of reputational damage associated with CVE programs, breaking down the coalition around CVE locally and leading state actors to step away from the policy area.

Responses from Civil Society

There was opposition to CVE agendas from the designation of Los Angeles as a pilot city in 2014,[80] including a vote to oppose the strategy from a representative body that brought together most Muslim civic institutions in the city.[81] But for a number of Muslim civil society leaders with ties to government decisionmakers, there was a degree of optimism that local actors could identify creative policy solutions in

[80] Kim, Victoria. "L.A. groups criticize White House program on homegrown extremism" *Los Angeles Times*. 13 November 2014. https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-la-groups-criticize-homegrown-extremism-program-20141113-story.html
[81] *Letter to Members of the Los Angeles City Council*. 31 May 2018. https://advancingjustice-la.org/sites/default/files/CAIR-LA-CVE-org%20sign-on-letter_5.30.18.pdf

the domain of counter-extremism on the basis of earlier partnerships and because they did not anticipate hefty reputational damage.

As a civil society leader put it, "We had trust with the law enforcement. We knew that they would be very fair by us. We had no reason to mistrust…It's like a parent there might be a draconian law but knowing the parent would enforce it with kindness and compassion."[82] A civil society leader closely involved in discussions around CVE in Los Angeles explained to me how local policymakers "having established working relationships with key community leaders was able to get buy into at least the conversation to help see whether there would be any way to take the model of Los Angeles, which was succeeding and make it a national model."[83]

Cooperating with CVE also brought political and financial incentives that were especially valued by groups working with LA's most disadvantaged communities[84] in a context of resource scarcity. Other groups were motivated to influence broader policymaking.[85] As one academic observer noted, "I think there was an optimism. I also think that people wanted it to work because they wanted to provide a solution to this larger problem and in doing so it would elevate their work. It would be able to say LA has an answer."[86] Another interviewee concluded similarly, "Anytime LA can do something before anybody else in the country we tend to try to do it."[87]

Interviewees in Los Angeles described that they did not anticipate significant reputational damage for their involvement with CVE programs. As a civil society leader put it to me, "They thought it would be OK."[88] A policymaker involved in the development of CVE programs in LA described how policy opposition grew over time becoming more organized only after the presentation of the city's CVE

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[82] Interview 97. 18 January 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Los Angeles, United States.
[83] Interview 108. 22 January 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Los Angeles, United States.
[84] Interview 84. 9 January 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Los Angeles, United States; Luciano-Adams, Beige. "Federal Counterterrorism Program Inflames Criticism as L.A. Considers Taking Funds." *LA Weekly*. 6 July 2018. https://www.laweekly.com/federal-counterterrorism-program-inflames-criticism-as-l-a-considers-taking-funds/
[85] Bokhari, Kamran. "Countering Violent Extremism and American Muslims." George Washington University: Program on Extremism, October 2015. https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/downloads/CVE%20Bokhari.pdf, 7.
[86] Interview 79. 23 January 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Los Angeles, United States.
[87] Interview 90. 15 January 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Los Angeles, United States.
[88] Interview 97. 18 January 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Los Angeles, United States.

framework at the White House Summit in 2015.[89] In brief, a number of civil society leaders were willing to cooperate with nascent CVE programs at the outset of the policy based on the strength of earlier partnerships with state actors and because there were not obvious risks of reputational damage. It is notable that civil society leaders in Los Angeles, operating under the same policy constraints, reacted differently than their counterparts in Boston, where counter-extremism efforts struggled to sustain civic partnerships from the start. I argue that this divergence in elite responses is a result of city-level network dynamics, specifically in terms of denser elite-state ties and initially lower risks of reputational damage in LA compared to Boston.

Responses from State Actors

In contrast to Boston where state actors minimized investment in CVE efforts because they recognized the lack of civil society support, state actors in Los Angeles were more willing to invest in counter-extremism efforts because they could rely on cooperation from long-term partners. An academic observer explained the importance of civic partnerships for shaping policy responses, saying, "The Mayor's office would have never gone forward with (CVE) without their support. That's the reason we did it…we knew we were going to have a community that was going to be able to work with us."[90] A law enforcement official that developed CVE activities in the city told me that partnerships from local civil society organizations were critical in shaping the decision to invest in these programs, saying, "If I didn't have a partner that was interested in it …then I probably wouldn't have done it."[91]

At the outset, much time was dedicated to developing the city's CVE framework (which outlined the city's community engagement approaches and outlined the intention to invest in intervention programming).[92] State actors relied on civil society groups to develop these plans, which were then presented to national policymakers at the White House CVE Summit. Federal funding from the pilot

[89] Interview 85. 10 January 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Boston, United States.
[90] Interview 90. 15 January 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Los Angeles, United States.
[91] Interview 49. 18 October 2018. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.
[92] *The Los Angeles Framework for Countering Violent Extremism.* February 2015. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Los%20Angeles%20Framework%20for%20CVE-Full%20Report.pdf

program was dedicated to building policy capacity to rollout CVE programming in the future via contractors and academic consultants. As the policy evolved, city employees and law enforcement maintained consultations and engagements with civil society leaders and community members.

Though not funded through federal CVE funds, one important community engagement program often referred to in the wider context of LA's CVE efforts is the "Safe Spaces" initiative that provided mental health counseling in one of LA's largest mosques.[93] Programmatic activity focused on providing mental health services, rather than on violent extremism specifically, and reached over 4,000 people, with large numbers receiving mental health counseling; the follow-up report clearly outlined the importance of cooperation from mosque leadership for the delivery of these initiatives.[94]

The intention of policymakers was to rollout CVE programs in Los Angeles using additional federal funding under the Obama administration, designated in 2017. Policy plans highlighted in a 2016 grant application centered around the development of a network of organizations that could deliver wide-ranging violence prevention interventions in partnership with local civil society organizations.[95] The network was designed to provide services to the Los Angeles public, not only within Muslim communities, which was reflected in the diversity of civil society partners. These plans clearly relied on civic partners with pre-existing connections to that state. The 2016 grant proposal for federal funding developed by local government laid out how civil society partners would partner with state actors to deliver intervention approaches and assist with sourcing relevant referrals.[96] Civil society groups were listed as "sub-grantees" to ensure that state activities were designed with input from community

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[93] Muslim Public Affairs Council. *After Action Report for Safe Spaces L.A. Pilot Project*. 31August 2017. https://www.advancingjustice-la.org/sites/default/files/Safe-Spaces-LA-After-Action-Report.pdf; There is a discussion as to what extent this initiative can be considered a counter-extremism program (notably because the grant was funded by a $20,000 City of Los Angeles Mayor's Office grant rather than via federal CVE funding). However, the program is repeatedly described as part of broader CVE efforts by various stakeholders in Los Angeles.

[94] Muslim Public Affairs Council. Mayor of Los Angeles Office of Public Safety Building Healthy Communities: After Action Report for Safe Spaces L.A. Pilot Project. 31 August 2017. https://www.advancingjustice-la.org/sites/default/files/Safe-Spaces-LA-After-Action-Report.pdf, 12.

[95] *Building Healthy Communities in Los Angeles - Managing Intervention Activities*. 2016. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/EMW-2016-CA-APP-00294%20Full%20Application.pdf, 3-6.

[95]*Building Healthy Communities in Los Angeles - Managing Intervention Activities*. 2016. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/EMW-2016-CA-APP-00294%20Full%20Application.pdf, 3-6.

[96] *Building Healthy Communities in Los Angeles - Managing Intervention Activities*. 2016. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/EMW-2016-CA-APP-00294%20Full%20Application.pdf, 5-6.

leadership. In January 2017, the Obama administration granted almost one million dollars to the Los Angeles Mayor's Office of Public Safety for CVE activities,[97] with Los Angeles based civil society organizations granted over a million dollars in funding.

Trump Administration and Local Policy Opposition

These plans were disrupted due to policy reforms under the Trump administration and the intensification of public opposition that made LA a cite of national contestation about CVE agendas. These dynamics heightened the risks of reputational damage for civil society leaders, breaking down the loose coalition around CVE programs. Although there was controversy around CVE agendas from the designation of Los Angeles as a pilot city, public opposition grew over time after, mobilizing after the White House Summit where LA policymakers first rolled out the city's CVE framework, intensifying further after the designation of sizeable DHS grants for CVE activities in the city. What emerged over time was a highly organized coalition of activist groups united in opposing CVE agendas, bringing together lawyers, civil society leaders, and community organizers. Working together, the so-called "Stop CVE coalition" hosted events and built inter-organizational networks, as well as lawsuits to access public records from government on CVE.[98]

Policy opponents also interfaced directly with organizations slated to receive federal grants and lobbied elected officials. The Trump administration's anticipated reforms to the CVE agenda (which would make the targeting of Muslim communities even more explicit than under the Obama-era policy) were used to mobilize further public opposition. In fact, the role of the Trump administration and associated fears about the administration's treatment of Muslims, was highlighted across interviews, and it was deliberately used by policy opponents to highlight uncertainty around the CVE agenda.[99]

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[97] Department of Homeland Security. *Statement by Secretary Jeh Johnson Announcing First Round of DHS's Countering Violent Extremism Grants*. 13 January 2017. https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/01/13/statement-secretary-jeh-johnson-announcing-first-round-dhss-countering-violent

[98] #VigilantLove. https://www.vigilantlove.org/stopcve; See: Al-Wakeel, Shannon, Laboni Hoq, and Faduma Warsame. "Resisting CVE: Best Practices from Pilot Cities." https://www.advancingjustice-la.org/sites/default/files/National-Webinar-Resisting-CVE.pdf

[99] Interview 93. 15 January 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Los Angeles, United States.

Los Angeles quickly emerged as the epicenter of the national CVE debate, the cite of heightened media scrutiny and pressure from national civil liberties organizations. As a government actor involved in CVE explained to me, "Folks were not anticipating ground zero for anti CVE to become LA."[100] Civil society leaders in Los Angeles that were before relatively insulated from a public backlash faced intensifying criticism that (some claimed) began to impact access to public donations in some cases.

The Breakdown of the CVE Coalition in Los Angeles

The loose coalition around CVE efforts in Los Angeles rapidly deteriorated in the face of growing threats of reputational damage and new policy controversies under the Trump administration. The extent of public opposition and the personalization of tactics appeared to catch many local civil society groups off guard. Local civic institutions could do little to shield civil society leaders from intense criticism. As one academic observer explained to me, "The criticism wasn't local, it was national, and I don't think that (a major mosque) has the weight or the heft to put up a heat shield for anybody…from a national gaze. It could probably have done it if it was just an LA problem, but it was not an LA problem, because it was part of the national pilot cities."[101]

A number of interviewees stressed the intensity and coordination of CVE opposition efforts and the ways in which they felt personally targeted. One civil society leader noted, "I saw a dramatic shift in the viciousness…in terms of tactics, using social media to just go after people."[102] Another community leader explained to me "I don't think we anticipated how vicious it would be. The backlash, really personal and really skillfully orchestrated … so we didn't have the resources to respond … to the backlash that was coming at us like a freight train and we could only push back with our hands."[103] As a senior law enforcement officer explained, "Some of these partners that we are engaging are afraid to get into this

[100] Interview 96. 17 January 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Los Angeles, United States.
[101] Interview 79. 23 January 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Los Angeles, United States.
[102] Interview 108. 22 January 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Los Angeles, United States.
[103] Interview 88. 13 January 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Los Angeles, United States.

space now. They are afraid to get into it because they will be targeted or identified as somebody who is cooperating with this CVE effort…they don't want to jump into this and be targeted for criticism."[104]

Policy opponents maintained deeply held and legitimate concerns about CVE programs, but I also found suggestive evidence that local contestation around CVE programs reflected pre-existing network competition and divisions,[105] particularly between two of the city's largest Muslim representative organizations. Another interviewee described how civil society groups used opposition to CVE agendas to their political advantage, saying, "The community leaders who wanted to oppose it saw this as an opportunity to raise their street cred, to say look we've exposed this…and we're fighting for you and it undermined the competition from getting funding."[106] Others suggested that the politicization of CVE with the high-profile White House Summit effectively forced organizations to take an offensive stance,[107] while an academic observed that CVE debates had shifted into a broader competition for civic power.[108]

For a number of civil society leaders, growing policy opposition during the Trump administration and broader concerns about the government's treatment of Muslim communities made it untenable to progress with CVE agendas locally.[109] In the face of these pressures, a LA-based organization slated to receive nearly a million dollars in CVE funding turned down government funds,[110] while another organization removed itself as a partner under a federal grant.[111] Shortly after, due to the mobilized local opposition and the new political context around CVE programs, the Los Angeles mayor returned CVE

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[104] National Institute of Justice. Community-Level Efforts to Prevent Violent Extremism. 16 June 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=INBHz2Exmsw
[105] Interview 110. 23 January 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Los Angeles, United States; Interview 97. 18 January 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Los Angeles, United States.
[106] Interview 108. 22 January 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Los Angeles, United States.
[107] Interview 96. 17 January 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Los Angeles, United States.
[108] Interview 79. 23January 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Los Angeles, United States.
[109] Abdollah, Tami. "Fourth Muslim group rejects federal grant to fight extremism." *Associated Press*. 11 February 2017. https://apnews.com/094bda0413674c59bdda412b3fe43749/fourth-muslim-group-rejects-federal-grant-fight-extremism
[110] Nixon, Ron, Adam Goldman and Matt Apuzzo. "Pointing to Trump, Groups Reject U.S. Aid to Fight Extremism" *The New York Times*. 2 Feb 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/02/us/politics/trump-muslim-groups-aid-extremism.html
[111] Interview 110. 23 January 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Los Angeles, United States.

funding back to the federal government in August 2018, in turn curtailing the development of CVE activities on the ground,[112] and with it opportunities for community involvement.

One civil society leader described CVE as a "dead conversation in Los Angeles,"[113] while a government employee highlighted how CVE efforts were essentially shut down at the first moment they would have reached members of the public, noting: "This is another irony of it. The first time there was anything that was actually termed CVE that was tangibly touching anybody in the community was the grant. Before that, that there was nothing."[114] Despite initial enthusiasm around counter-extremism efforts, a CVE program with an intervention component that interfaces with members of the public in Los Angeles remains more a state aspiration[115] than a reality at the local level.

Conclusion

What can be learned from the case of CVE in Los Angeles? I argue that the evolution of counter-extremism efforts in LA highlights how network dynamics, specifically denser elite-state connections and initially lower risks of reputational damage, motivated some civil society leaders to cooperate with nascent CVE efforts. This cooperation in turn enabled state actors to plan for a more significant investment in counter-extremism agendas. Only later, as the controversy around CVE in LA became nationalized amidst growing fears about the policy's direction under the Trump administration did the coalition around CVE programs break down, with state actors effectively rejecting these programs. As I go on to discuss, it is notable that network dynamics appear to have more explanatory power than counter-terrorism capacity, police-citizen relations, and threat dynamics, which are held relatively constant in Los Angeles over time.

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[112] Bharath, Deepa. "LA mayor turns down $425K in federal funding to counter violent extremism after opposition from civil rights groups stalls process." *Los Angeles Daily News*. 16 August 2018. https://www.dailynews.com/2018/08/16/la-mayor-turns-down-425k-in-federal-funding-to-counter-violent-extremism-after-opposition-from-civil-rights-groups-stalls-process/

[113] Interview 84. 09 January 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Los Angeles, United States.

[114] Interview 96. 17 January 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Los Angeles, United States.

[115] Interestingly, the state of California has distributed grant funding to deliver several counter-extremism programs across the state, though I do not analyze these programs as part of this dissertation. See: Alexander, Brad. "Cal OESAnnounces Grant Funds for Non-Profit Programs Creating Safer Communities in California." *Cal OES News*. 12 October 2018. http://www.oesnews.com/cal-oes-announces-grant-funds-for-non-profit-programs-creating-safer-communities-in-california/

Testing Other Explanations in the US

The US cases allow me to test the theory and additional, alternative mechanisms in a different country context. In the section that follows, I show how other variables, while important, seem less able to explain CVE policy outcomes on their own, further highlighting the centrality of network dynamics.

First, the literature suggests cities are likely to invest more in counter-terrorism operations when threats of terrorism are perceived to be higher. But local policy responses to CVE agendas do not proceed clearly in relationship to threat levels. One might assume that Boston's high-profile Marathon Bombing which preceded the roll-out of CVE programs would produce greater investment in counter-extremism efforts. Yet, I observe that these policies are more swiftly rejected in Boston than in Los Angeles where there was greater optimism around these policies even before the ISIS-inspired San Bernardino shooting in December 2015. These realities suggest that local actors are not merely reacting to external threat levels, pointing to the presence of other causal mechanisms.

Second, I find less evidence to suggest that pre-existing counter-terrorism capacity can independently explain local policy outcomes. Although Los Angeles and Boston were given a small amount of funding ($216,000) to deliver CVE pilot programs, Los Angeles had invested more in counter-terrorism—in terms of dedicated personnel, training, and intelligence capacity—as the second largest city in the United States.[116] In particular around community engagement, law enforcement in LA developed new routines to maintain partnerships and engagements with local Muslim communities. Later, CVE programs were delivered by two full-time personnel in Los Angeles, whereas CVE was added to the existing portfolios of government employees in Boston.

My goal is not to dismiss the fact that LA's earlier investment in counter-terrorism was important for shaping how bureaucrats approached CVE policies. However, interviewees in Los Angeles still explained their willingness to collaborate on CVE agendas as a function of pre-existing relationships between state

[116] Ervin, Clark. *Los Angeles' Preparedness for Terrorism*. The Aspen Institute Homeland Security Program, 2009.

actors and civil society groups, rather than the extent of state power and the nature of local threats. Moreover, I showed how CVE agendas ultimately break down because network factors change in Los Angeles, despite significant and sustained investments in counter-terrorism. This points to the continued salience of network explanations.

Third, survey data indicates that American Muslims are comparably better integrated in social and economic life than their European counterparts.[117] The literature on counter-terrorism might lead us to expect that higher levels of integration will catalyze support for and cooperation with state security agendas. But this relationship is not borne out in the US cases. Rather, I find that higher levels of social capital repeatedly fueled better-organized local opposition to CVE programs than in the UK. In both cities, highly educated activists leveraged their professional expertise and network connections to mobilize community members against CVE agendas, drawing attention to civil liberties concerns. This, in turn, raised the costs for both government and civil society actors to cooperate with these strategies.

Finally, the US cases provide a good opportunity to test how trust in police shapes policy outcomes. From the 1992 Los Angeles riots to more recent police shootings in Los Angeles and Boston, the LAPD and the BPD have a more punitive policing history than in the UK case studies I have described. More broadly, the introduction of Joint Terrorism Task Forces and Fusion Centers have pushed local police forces closer to federal intelligence organizations. Assessing how Muslim Americans feel about the police is complex, and survey data shows that views of the police become more negative as Muslim Americans naturalize.[118] At the same time, a number of Muslim civil society leaders in both cities pointed to their positive relationships with law enforcement. In Boston, CVE efforts were swiftly rejected, with little willingness from civil society partners to take part, despite the fact that a number of interviewees expressed confidence in local law enforcement. In Los Angeles, policing approaches that I could observe remained broadly the same over time, but policy responses from civil society and state actors changed, from initial enthusiasm to policy breakdown. While procedural justice explanations are important, my

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[117] Pew Research Center. *Muslim Americans: Middle class and mostly mainstream*. Pew Research Center, 2007.
[118] Gillum, Rachel M. *Muslims in a Post-9/11 America: A Survey of Attitudes and Beliefs and Their Implications for US National Security Policy*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2018.

findings highlight the point that local responses to counter-terrorism are not a function of citizen perceptions of the police in isolation. Having examined CVE programs in six cities, I now turn to the conclusion.

Chapter 8 Conclusion

CVE agendas have emerged as a popular tool in a growing arsenal of government counter-terrorism tactics, aiming to curb support for violent extremism by building so-called community "resilience" and providing intervention programs to individuals thought to be "at-risk" of becoming involved in violence. These policies have been critiqued on a number of grounds. A persistent criticism is that counter-extremism programs produce a "chilling effect," whereby citizens become hesitant to express their views.[1] As Prevent-style programs expand, fears have grown that governments will use CVE agendas to criminalize and suppress their critics.[2] In practice, policy efforts to date have predominately focused on Muslims in urban centers and often counterproductively alienated these communities.

CVE policies are based on the logic that governments require cooperation from citizens to challenge violent extremism, effectively bringing counter-terrorism into the public domain in unprecedented ways. By definition, counter-extremism efforts center around local communities and draw from civic partnerships and highly interpersonal, local networks to deliver both broad-based community programs and more controversial, individual-level interventions. A key component of CVE programs is the reliance on intelligence from members of the public, through which those thought to be "at-risk" can then be engaged by the state. But the process by which citizens provide this much sought-after intelligence has received minimal theoretical and empirical attention. Both academics and policymakers cast the intelligence community members provide as an input into the security apparatus, with less attention to the causal mechanisms that produce highly sensitive and often controversial information sharing. When policymakers discuss community involvement in counter-terrorism, they can often rely on untested assumptions or focus on factors exogenous to these communities.

This dissertation has shown that CVE programs cannot be theoretically understood without giving attention to community dynamics, specifically the structural properties of highly local networks and the trade-offs they create

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[1] UK Parliament. *Factors Inhibiting Freedom of Speech*. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201719/jtselect/jtrights/589/58907.htm 18 January 2019.
[2] Bartlett, Jamie. *Radicals*: *Outsiders Changing the World*. London: Random House, 2017; Dodd, Vikram and Jamie Grierson. "Greenpeace included with neo-Nazis on UK counter-terror list." *The Guardian*. 17 January 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/jan/17/greenpeace-included-with-neo-nazis-on-uk-counter-terror-list

for local actors. I argue that these networks continue to shape on the ground policy considerations both from civil society leaders, state actors, and members of the public, even in a policy domain as sensitive and urgent as counter-terrorism. Relying on in-depth qualitative data and social network analysis, I both conceptually theorized and quantitatively measured civic network dynamics, highlighting significant differences in terms of state-civil society and inter-communal connectivity.

I then qualitatively showed how the pre-existing features of Muslim civic networks shape policy response from local actors, leading to divergent policy outcomes on the ground. This kind of mixed-methods, comparative research of different localities, over time that gives deep consideration to the communities on the receiving end of state counter-terrorism programs, is critical to build a richer, theoretical understanding of CVE and to surface potential insights about how policymakers might improve these agendas. The rest of this chapter reviews the core puzzle, the argument in brief, the essential theoretical and policy contributions, and implications for future research.

The Puzzle in Brief

Despite the fact that CVE policies have received sustained public opposition, governments have continued to expand these programs and seek out participation from local communities. There is much evidence that community support is critical for the success of state counter-terrorism efforts.[3] Scholars have observed that CVE agendas implicitly acknowledge that governments have been unable to counter violent extremism on their own.[4]

But members of the public have many legitimate reasons to be wary of engaging with the state around counter-terrorism—not least a long history of governments engaging punitively with Muslim communities in the name of

[3] Kurzman, Charles. *Muslim-American Terrorism Since 9/11: An Accounting. Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security*. 2 February 2011. http://kurzman.unc.edu/files/2011/06/Kurzman_Muslim-American_Terrorism_Since_911_An_Accounting.pdf; Cronin, Audrey Kurth. *How terrorism ends: Understanding the decline and demise of terrorist campaigns*. Princeton University Press, 2009; Michael, John Horgan, and William Evans. "The Critical Role of Friends in Networks for Countering Violent Extremism: Toward a Theory of Vicarious Help-Seeking." *Behavioural Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*. 8.1 (2016): 45–65.

[4] Thomas, Paul. "Changing experiences of responsibilisation and contestation within counter-terrorism policies: the British Prevent experience." *Policy & Politics* 45.3 (2017): 305-321.

national security. Mistrust of CVE agendas is widespread both inside and outside the Muslim community[5] and has only grown with time. CVE policies also pose risks for local state actors who are often wary of the potential political costs of investing in counter-extremism. State actors I interviewed were well-aware of both the administrative challenges and political costs associated with these programs, at times attempting to evade or reorient the focus of local programming. In the UK, these local policy responses produced warnings from central government that local bureaucrats were "not taking the problem seriously,"[6] later culminating in a duty on local agencies to implement Prevent agendas in line with central government guidance. In brief, CVE programs require cooperation from both members of the public and local state actors, but this cooperation imposes hefty costs on local actors that make it unlikely that governments can secure the assistance they seek.

Despite the fact that CVE programs create these similar pressures for local actors, I observe important differences in the ways that local bureaucrats and community members respond to CVE agendas both between cities and within individual locations over time. In some areas, local bureaucrats have chosen largely to avoid CVE programs or focus solely on broad community development, giving little attention to central government security priorities. In other areas, state actors have invested heavily in community engagement and quickly established functioning intervention efforts. Once CVE programs are rolled out, I also observe different responses from local Muslim publics targeted by counter-extremism efforts. In some areas, these efforts were essentially rejected, with little willingness from members of the public to share information or interface with state actors at CVE programs or consultations. In other areas, some members of the public cooperated with CVE efforts over time, both in terms of sharing information and taking part in various programming, even where citizens remained critical of state counter-extremism policy. The existing scholarship lacks a theory to explain this puzzling sub-national variation.

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[5] "According to David Anderson QC, the independent reviewer of Terrorism Legislation at the time of writing, there is a 'very wide sense' among British Muslims that Prevent is part of plan to threaten Islam. It's even been boycotted by several organisations, including the National Union of Students, and a recent report by the Open Society Foundation, based on an in-depth study of several Prevent projects, found the programme is 'counterproductive' and damaging the trust between the police and members of the Muslim community." See: Bartlett, Jamie. *Radicals: Outsiders Changing the World*. London: Random House, 2017, 131.

[6] HM Government. *Report from the Prime Minister's Task Force on Tackling Radicalisation and Extremism*. London: Cabinet Office, 2013. www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263181/ETF_FINAL.pdf, 4.

Reviewing Existing Explanations

While I draw from the literature on counter-insurgency, the dynamics around CVE programs do not closely resemble a competition between insurgent groups and the state, with communities loyal to whoever can best ensure their safety and provide public goods.[7] Others have explained divergent local government investment in counter-terrorism as a function of local threat perception.[8] Yet, I find that local bureaucrats and communities responded differently to CVE agendas among cities with the same central government threat designation. Moreover, in a number of cases I did not observe a marked increase in community cooperation or state investment in CVE after shocks like high-profile attacks or recruitment efforts by the so-called Islamic State.

Nor can participation be explained solely as a function of trust in police at the individual level.[9] In several cases, I observe very little public involvement in CVE programs where civil society leaders report a decent rapport with local law enforcement. The nature of community participation in CVE programs also changes over time in some cities, appearing to become significantly more limited in cases where local policing practices remain unchanged and local views about police are held relatively constant. While the relations between police and CVE practitioners with members of the public are undoubtedly important, I show that the impact of policy delivery approaches is repeatedly structured by network dynamics, with policy efforts making inroads in certain sections of local networks and not others, despite law enforcement employing identical engagement efforts. This points to the fact that trust in law enforcement in isolation cannot explain divergent local responses to counter-extremism.

A final approach centers around the socio-economic features of minority communities to explain relations between members of the public and police.[10] But I find that local bureaucrats and community members diverge in their responses to counter-extremism efforts, even where I establish controls on socio-economic factors. Further highlighting this point, policy outcomes change over time in individual cities, both in terms of increased and

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[7] See literature reviewed in Berman, Eli, and Aila M. Matanock. "The empiricists' insurgency." *Annual Review of Political Science* 18 (2015), 447.
[8] Davis, Lois et al. Combating Terrorism: How Prepared Are State and Local Response Organizations? Santa Monica: RAND, 2006.
[9] For example, see the discussion of procedural justice and citizen cooperation in counter-terrorism in: Huq, Aziz., Tom Tyler, and Stephen Schulhofer. "Mechanisms for Eliciting Cooperation in Counter Terrorism Policing: Evidence from the United Kingdom." *Journal of Empirical Legal Studies* 8.4 (2011): 728–61.
[10] See discussion on "race-class subjugated communities" in: Soss, Joe, and Vesla Weaver. "Police are our government: Politics, political science, and the policing of race–class subjugated communities." *Annual Review of Political Science* 20 (2017): 565-591.

decreased willingness to engage with counter-extremism programs, where socio-economic variables do not change. It is also notable that public opposition to CVE programs is better organized and more influential in the US context where Muslim communities are more affluent and by a number of measures better integrated into American life. This challenges the logic that economic affluence or integration corresponds with more cooperative relationships with law enforcement. Surprisingly, I also show how Prevent efforts in Leicester, UK sustain comparably more engagement over time than other cities, despite the fact that Leicester ranks amongst the most segregated cities in the UK[11] and a US diplomat described Muslims in Leicester as among the most conservative she had observed in Europe.[12] All this points to the fact that socio-economic factors or the level of community integration cannot independently explain local policy responses. Out of this emerges two questions: why do local bureaucrats respond to CVE agendas differently? Why do predominately Muslim communities that are targeted by government CVE policies participate in counter-extremism efforts differently in different localities?

Core Argument

I have argued that civil society networks shape how local actors decide to take part in controversial counter-extremism efforts. I conceptualize these networks across several dimensions, in terms of the relationships between Muslim elites, state actors, and other co-religionists. Muslim elites, in particular, act as the causal mechanism that translates network structures into local policy outcomes. These responses, in turn, are likely to determine whether bureaucrats decide to invest in counter-extremism policies and how communities take part in the long term.

I argue that CVE policies create steep trade-offs for Muslim civil society leaders, in particular, placing these individuals under pressure from both communities and local government. While these programs make new financial and political incentives available to local civil society organizations, they also create risks of reputational damage if policy opponents cast leaders as advocating for a punitive state security agenda. I argue that elites are

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[11] "The ten places where ethnic minorities are most segregated from the White British (as measured by the index of dissimilarity) within schools are: Blackburn with Darwen, Birmingham, Haringey, Bradford, Rochdale, Kirklees, Leicester, Oldham, Rotherham, and Manchester." See: Policy Exchange. *Integration Hub: Education.* http://www.integrationhub.net/module/education/ Accessed 16 February 2020.

[12] Bowen, Innes. Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in Brent: Inside British Islam. Hurst & Co: London, 2014, 27.

likelier to cooperate with state security policies when they have existing connections to the state and where inter-elite competition is low, in the absence of a mobilized opposition. Pre-existing elite-state linkages should ease the ability of community leaders to access policy incentives, while lower levels of competition should insulate leaders from reputational damage.

The position of Muslim elites within social networks vis-à-vis the local state and co-religionists is likely to determine how elite responses shape policy outcomes. Local bureaucrats can more easily invest in CVE agendas relying on cooperation from well-known community leaders to manage the political sensitivity and administrative challenges associated with counter-extremism efforts. By contrast, when highly connected elites oppose CVE agendas or where the state lacks established linkages with Muslim civil society leaders, bureaucrats should be warier of the risks associated with CVE programs. They may then choose to avoid the policy entirely or partially deliver counter-extremism efforts in a way that avoids security issues.

Where elites cooperate with CVE policies and maintain connections to other co-religionists, I argue that they can use their network ties to mobilize more participation in CVE programming, even in the face of public suspicion about these agendas. Where civil society leaders back CVE efforts but are not highly embedded in local networks, they should have less traction when it comes to motivating members of the public to engage with counter-extremism strategies. But local responses are not set in stone. Where the risks of reputational damage increase, I expect that local actors will limit their cooperation with CVE agendas. I have argued that elites are likelier to face growing reputational damage in networks with greater inter-elite competition or where there are wider gaps between elites and members of the public, easing the ability of opposition movements to mobilize. Elites should only be able to maintain a cooperative stance where highly connected networks provide a shielding effect that limits reputational damage from other elites or the emergence of public opposition. State actors are likely to struggle to sustain community participation around CVE in the absence of civic partnerships.

In brief, I argue that civil society leaders, state actors, and members of the public make decisions about how to engage with government counter-terrorism programs based on community dynamics closer to home, rather than other variables like state capacity or terror threat levels. In effect, features of civic networks that pre-exist the

introduction of CVE programs ultimately shape the possibility for local actors to cooperate with controversial central government security policy, determining whether governments can mobilize the public support they seek.

To test the theory, I use several methodological approaches, fusing a case selection strategy that attempts to establish controls on potentially confounding variables with within-case social network analysis and process tracing. The six case studies draw upon a wide range of archival materials and 139 interviews. I expect that the argument I developed will hold in other democratic settings, where community engagement is a core component of CVE agendas and where participation in CVE programs remains voluntary. By testing the theory in the US, I can have more confidence that the theory will have explanatory power in other national and sub-national settings outside the UK. The theory stresses the role of Muslim civic networks in explaining the policy responses of state actors and Muslim communities because existing CVE efforts have focused disproportionately on these communities. I expect that the core insight of this dissertation, that policy responses are shaped by local trade-offs that reflect specific civil society network dynamics should be able to provide insights about CVE efforts in a wide range of contexts. However, it is likely that in other settings, specific network dynamics and the nature of trade-offs on local actors may differ and require additional specification.

Reviewing the Evidence

My task in the dissertation is to situate a theory that explains sub-national responses to CVE policies in relation to the existing literature and broader security developments. I then systematically tested the theory in multiple locations over time. In the introduction chapter, I laid out this dissertation's major claim that the structure of local Muslim civil society networks shapes how local actors navigate trade-offs associated with these programs and ultimately respond to CVE agendas.

In Chapter Two, I showed how CVE policies operate at the crux of different strands of governance that impose new pressures on British and American Muslim communities. I then reviewed the evolution of CVE agendas in the US and UK and engaged with the extensive critical literature around counter-extremism policies. In Chapter Three, I highlighted the core puzzle and reviewed a wide range of literatures before presenting the core theory. I laid out a framework to understand how CVE programs impose specific trade-offs on local actors and then offered specific hypotheses using different hypothetical network structures. Chapter Four laid out the multi-

pronged methodological approach, which combines a case selection technique that controls for potentially confounding variables with within-case social network analysis and process tracing.

In Chapter Five, I compared two cities in the East Midlands of England, Derby and Leicester. I showed how policy outcomes evolved in fairly similar ways at the start of Prevent, with elites using pre-existing connections to the state to access policy incentives, without concerns about reputational damage in lower competition networks. Cooperation from a number of community leaders in turn enabled state actors to invest more heavily in Prevent efforts in both cities. Muslim civil society leaders then leveraged earlier ties to co-religionists to mobilize higher levels of participation, despite public misgivings about Prevent.

The coalition around Prevent broke down over time in Derby because elites faced growing reputational damage from policy opponents that utilized network gaps between civic elites and members of the public, at the same time as the policy became more punitive and restrictive. With more limited support from community leaders, state actors then struggled to sustain community participation. By contrast in Leicester, elites were better protected from reputational damage by tighter elite-mass linkages that limited opposition movements from organizing and targeting elites. This enabled some civil society leaders to continue cooperating with the state and leverage network ties to mobilize more sustained participation from some sections of the community.

In Chapter Six, I looked at Prevent programs in High Wycombe and Slough. Both cities have less developed elite-state ties than in the East Midlands cases, with comparably more inter-elite competition. I showed how a few Muslim elites in High Wycombe with pre-existing state connections lent some support to the state's counter-extremism agenda. However, there was greater caution among many elites about the new strategy from the start in the higher competition network. State actors in turn invested more minimally in Prevent agendas recognizing the political risks associated with the strategy, focusing more narrowly on cohesion objectives. Despite concerns about Prevent I, several civil society leaders used established network connections to co-religionists to mobilize some participation, though less than I observed in the East Midlands cases. When the Prevent agenda became more punitive and restrictive of policy incentives, most civil society leaders further limited their involvement with counter-extremism efforts, with many anticipating significant reputational damage in the city's more competitive

network should they be seen to cooperate with Prevent. State actors then struggled to facilitate community involvement in the absence of civic partnerships, which effectively slowed to a halt in High Wycombe.

Slough's more disconnected network features the most underdeveloped elite-state ties among the UK cases. Some elites lacked connections to capitalize on policy incentives associated with Prevent, while others anticipated reputational damage they might face for cooperating with counter-extremism efforts, much of which appeared to emanate from locally mobilized opposition groups with a longstanding network presence. These dynamics dissuaded much of the city's civic leadership from becoming highly involved with the Prevent agenda, outside a small number of cohesion-oriented projects. State actors recognized the political risks of proceeding with counter-extremism efforts without civic partnerships and invested more minimally in these programs, producing little in the way of policy activity or community participation. Amidst growing top-down pressure on local governments after the revision of Prevent and introduction of the "Prevent Duty" in 2015, state actors built some ties directly with members of the public across the more factionalized network, facilitating some community participation, though less than in Leicester where elites actively leveraged connections to co-religionists to mobilize participation over time.

In Chapter Seven, I tested the theory developed in the United Kingdom in the United States, comparing two "pilot cities" of the US CVE strategy. I showed how opposition groups in Boston, utilizing pre-existing connections to the most central institution in the network, rapidly shaped the local narrative around CVE and raised the risks of reputational damage associated with the policy. These activities dissuaded civic elites and state actors from investing in CVE programs, producing little in the way of policy activity on the ground outside a handful of government funded community development programs. In Los Angeles, elites with pre-existing ties to the state were initially more willing to cooperate with CVE agendas, enabling state actors to plan for a more extensive CVE program. Only later, amidst the mobilization of local and national opposition after the Trump administration, did plans to implement CVE programs break down.

Core Contributions

CVE agendas represent a significant and novel way in which governments are interfering directly in the lives of citizens and working pre-emptively to counter terrorism. Much of the debate around counter-extremism to date

has understandably focused on normative issues, while researchers have paid less attention to different implementation approaches and community responses.[13] This dissertation thus represents a crucial first step in theorizing sub-national dimensions of counter-extremism, contributing to our understandings of counter-terrorism and local policing, two areas where scholars have highlighted a lack of attention in the past.[14] This research also contributes to our understanding of Muslim civil society leaders and their impact on social and political life. While some scholars have examined the role of local Muslim elected officials,[15] Muslim civil society leaders have received little theoretical focus.[16] I offer a new conceptualization of local civic networks and a new framework to understand the social and political trade-offs associated with positions of civic leadership.

The data I have gathered is unique and helps to contribute to broader understandings of CVE programs and civil society networks. This dissertation details the evolution of CVE strategies over time in four UK cities and two US cities. Of particular importance is that I gathered data about how communities have participated over time at the city-level, in terms of attendance at CVE programming and willingness to provide information to the state. This sub-national data on community involvement in CVE programming extends earlier research, which used survey methods to measure how respondents anticipate cooperating with law enforcement around counter-terrorism.[17] Finally, this dissertation provides a new approach to measure the structural properties of civic networks, which scholars may find useful in a wide range of research areas.

Policy Implications Beyond CVE

While this research focuses on CVE, my core finding that pre-existing civil society networks shape local risks and ultimately citizen participation can speak to other policy areas. Two such examples are public health policies and

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[13] See discussion in O'Toole, Therese, et al. "Governing through prevent? Regulation and contested practice in State–Muslim engagement." *Sociology* 50.1 (2015): 1-18.
[14] Soss, Joe, and Vesla Weaver. "Police are our government: Politics, political science, and the policing of race–class subjugated communities." *Annual Review of Political Science* 20 (2017): 565-591; Byman, Daniel. "Counterterrorism Strategies." ed. by Erica Chenoweth et al. *The Oxford Handbook of Terrorism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019
[15] Dancygier, Rafaela M. *Dilemmas of inclusion: Muslims in European politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017; Dancygier, Rafaela M. "Electoral rules or electoral leverage? Explaining Muslim representation in England." *World Politics* 66.2 (2014): 229-263.
[16] There has been some scholarship that explores the role unelected Muslim civil society leaders. See: Jones, Stephen H., et al. "A 'System of Self-Appointed Leaders'? Examining Modes of Muslim Representation in Governance in Britain." *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 17.2 (2015): 207-223.
[17] Huq, Aziz, Tom Tyler, and Stephen Schulhofer. "Mechanisms for Eliciting Cooperation in Counter Terrorism Policing: Evidence from the United Kingdom." *Journal of Empirical Legal Studies* 8.4 (2011): 728–61; Gillum, Rachel M. *Muslims in a Post-9/11 America: A Survey of Attitudes and Beliefs and Their Implications for US National Security Policy*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2018.

online content regulation efforts. Like CVE programs, public health initiatives require public participation. Some health interventions, such as contraception, can be politically controversial and divisive[18] in many countries, including the United States.[19] While public health efforts often rely on civil society leaders to encourage public health practices among the wider population[20], civic leaders might invite reputational damage for cooperating with what are seen as controversial health interventions.[21] I expect that my argument that local network dynamics shape both the nature of local risks and how civil society leaders can influence policy adoption can help illuminate how public health initiatives will play out sub-nationally. If network-specific, reputational costs drive policy outcomes as I expect, this might point toward potential strategies to promote health programs by working to minimize these risks at the local level.

The findings also have online implications in the broader field of social media content regulation (which includes terrorist content) but also hate speech, threats of violence, and misinformation. Major technology companies have implemented a range of content regulation strategies, and there have been efforts to experiment with counter-speech by providing ad credits and training to NGOs to challenge extremist messages online.[22]

Many of these initiatives rely on NGOs and other influencers considered to be credible interlocutors to disseminate counter messages, but such initiatives may expose these individuals to reputational damage and other risks. Online network dynamics will likely define the risks that these interlocutors will face for sharing counter-messages as well as their ability to influence other users. While the vastness of online networks differs from the local civic networks I described in this dissertation, I expect that the core argument can help inform how policy initiatives to challenge misinformation, promote content flagging, or other policy initiatives will play out. Since these counter-messaging efforts are only likely to increase in the coming years, understanding how network-

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[18] Hultman, Tami. "Africa: Beyond Contraceptive Controversy - Melinda Gates Bets on Pro-Life Policies." All Africa. 23 July 2012. https://allafrica.com/stories/201207230079.html

[19] MacIvor Thompson, Lauren and Lina-Maria Murillo. "The Trump administration's assault on contraception." Washington Post. 18 June 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2018/06/18/the-trump-administrations-assault-on-contraception/

[20] Hultman, Tami. "Africa: Beyond Contraceptive Controversy - Melinda Gates Bets on Pro-Life Policies." All Africa. 23 July 2012. https://allafrica.com/stories/201207230079.html; Morava, Maria. "Encouraging Imams to Promote Family Planning." Stanford Social Innovation Review. 30 May 2016. https://ssir.org/articles/entryencouraging_imams_to_promote_family_planning

[21] Goodstein, Laurie. "Vatican Ends Battle With U.S. Catholic Nuns' Group." *The New York Times*. 16 April 2015. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/17/us/catholic-church-ends-takeover-of-leadership-conference-of-women-religious.html

[22] Woollaston, Victoria. "Facebook launches Online Civil Courage Initiative to tackle rising extremism in the UK." Wired. 23 June 2017. https://www.wired.co.uk/article/facebook-online-civil-courage-iniative

specific reputation costs shape policy outcomes could be a focus of further research and help surface potential policy improvements.

Future Research

This dissertation answers an important question, but it leaves open new avenues for future research. First, this dissertation has focused on the way that governments deliver counter-extremism agendas and responses by Muslim communities who have been historically targeted by these efforts. This dissertation has less to say about how efforts to counter the far-right will play out because existing CVE programs have given these threats comparably less attention. But this is changing over time, as policymakers in some countries prioritize far-right threats. The UK's most recent Channel statistics highlight the growth of referrals relating to the far-right.[23] However, US policymakers have been slower to recognize these threats.[24] Future studies could examine how the causal mechanisms identified in this study hold up as CVE programs shift in focus and prioritize threats from the far-right. There are likely to be some synergies as well as distinctions that would be useful to surface.

Another avenue for potential research is to look at how civic networks impact community participation in counter-insurgency settings. Some scholars have argued that elite preferences, in combination with specific network structures, motivate members of the public to withstand repression.[25] It would be useful to lend the theory and methodological approach to test this theory in a broader range of case studies in which state actors seek community participation.

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[23] Pickard, Jim, and Isabelle Gray. "UK's counter-terrorism programme receives surge in far-right referrals." *Financial Times*. 19 December 2019. https://www.ft.com/content/cee58e14-2254-11ea-b8a1-584213ee7b2b

[24] Reitman, Janet. "U.S. Law Enforcement Failed to See the Threat of White Nationalism. Now They Don't Know How to Stop It." 3 November 2018. *New York Times Magazine*. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/03/magazine/FBI-charlottesville-white-nationalism-far-right.html

[25] Siegel, David A. "When does repression work? Collective action in social networks." *The Journal of Politics* 73.4 (2011): 993-1010.

Policy Implications

There is a large body of evidence that suggests that CVE efforts are ineffective if not actively counter-productive.[26] Violent extremism in the UK has not been rooted out despite the UK's sustained investment in Prevent. For instance, Al Muhajiroun, a banned radical group the UK government was dedicated to disbanding, continues to operate in the UK.[27] The *Financial Times* in-depth investigation of Prevent questions the excessive lengths the UK government has gone in the name of preventing violent extremism.[28] By contrast, Matt Collins, the head of the UK's Prevent strategy, has claimed that the policy deterred 150 people from traveling to Syria to join the Islamic state.[29] Other scholars have suggested that the UK's focus on community engagement within its counter-terrorism efforts will ultimately prove more effective than other approaches that shun collaboration with the public.[30]

Ultimately, I am not able to say whether CVE programs "work," when it comes to dissuading individuals from committing acts of terrorism. The research is limited in its ability to definitively evaluate policy effectiveness because I cannot observe and assess government intervention efforts due to the secretive nature of the policy area. I have fewer insights about what happens after members of the public attend CVE programs or provide information to the state. To be clear, my goal is not to advocate for CVE programs in their current iteration. Although I try to understand the reasons behind the patterns of local community responses, it is not my intention to claim that community members owe the state their assistance. In fact, I have detailed many of the important reasons citizens may be wary of engaging with the state around counter-extremism. My research, however, does

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[26] United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Requesters. *Countering Violent Extremism Actions Needed to Define Strategy and Assess Progress of Federal Efforts.* April 2017; Hamilton, Fiona. "Most programmes to stop radicalisation are failing." *The Sunday Times*. 6 June 2018. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/most-programmes-to-stop-radicalisation-are-failing-0bwh9pbtd

[27] Yeginsu, Ceylan. "One of U.K.'s Most Prolific Extremist Cells Is Regrouping." *The New York Times*. 18 May 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/18/world/europe/uk-extremist-cell-anjem-choudary.html

[28] Warrell, Helen. "Inside Prevent, the UK's controversial anti-terrorism programme." *Financial Times*. 24 January 2019. https://www.ft.com/content/a82e18b4-1ea3-11e9-b126-46fc3ad87c65

[29] Bartlett, Jamie. *Radicals*: *Outsiders Changing the World.* London: Random House, 2017, 139.

[30] Connett, David and Dean Forrester. "Paris: Met Police hopes close ties with minority groups will give it warning of potential terrorist attacks." *The Independent*. 14 November 2015. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/paris-attack-met-police-hopes-close-ties-with-minority-groups-will-give-it-warning-of-potential-a6734921.html; Foley, Frank. "Charlie Hebdo attack: is France's counter-terrorism model still the example to follow?" *The Telegraph*. 16 February 2020. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11341186/Charlie-Hebdo-attack-is-Frances-counter-terrorism-model-still-the-example-to-follow.html

provide suggestive evidence about how CVE programs could be improved by addressing some of the most common policy concerns local actors surfaced throughout this research, which I detail in the following section.

CVE programs have a number of major strategic shortcomings. Time and time again these policies have been shown to be counterproductive for a number of reasons, notably for placing excessive scrutiny on Muslim communities, as I have discussed earlier. Effectively, a policy designed to promote voluntary partnerships between Muslims and the state has created further obstacles to cooperation. Much of the policy and academic literature around CVE programs has focused on the national domain, drawing important attention to these design flaws. My aim is not to dismiss these concerns, rather to focus on the local dimensions where actors have responded differently to controversial CVE programs, despite acknowledging their shortcomings.

Network Structures Shape Costs Associated with CVE Programs and Require Place-Specific Policy Modification

One of the significant insights from the dissertation is that local actors do not experience CVE efforts the same as their counterparts elsewhere. I argued that local civic network structures shape the risks associated with cooperating with CVE programs in place-specific ways. Specifically, I argued that civil society leaders in highly connected networks should be able to collaborate with controversial counter-extremism efforts more easily because they are protected from threats from rivals and the emergence of organized public opposition. In other networks without this shielding effect, cooperation with CVE programs is likely to become more costly over time.

This dissertation's theoretical argument poses several suggestive policy insights that are worthy of consideration and would require further testing. Most importantly, the findings suggest that governments should deliver CVE programs in ways that acknowledge and work to mitigate trade-offs for local actors. In many cases, local bureaucrats were aware of and expressed concerns about central government policy reforms that would make on the ground cooperation more costly and worked to identify local approaches that were more palatable to local stakeholders. Too often, these insights were ignored by policymakers in Washington and London who pushed for more punitive and restrictive reforms, jeopardizing relations between citizens and the state. If CVE agendas are truly about members of the public collaborating with the state, policymakers have an obligation to design these programs in ways that make cooperation from citizens sustainable. The trajectory of CVE programs in the US and

UK has too often trended in the opposite direction. I now outline several suggestive policy recommendations informed by my research.

Local Actors should be able to pursue policy alternatives to CVE

CVE agendas are often touted as the "softer," so-called "hearts and minds" arm of government counter-terrorism strategies. But at the same time, state actors have added further restrictions and constraints on the administration of CVE programs. In the UK, cooperation with Prevent is now a legal duty on local agencies. These restrictions often appear at odds with encouraging voluntary partnerships between citizens and the state around common security priorities.

My findings suggest that these priorities may be better served by giving local governments and communities the freedom to reject CVE programs to identify other more organic, violence-prevention methods[31] that can maintain the support of key, local stakeholders. For instance, in Boston state actors have largely rejected CVE agendas. This has then created space for novel violence prevention collaborations led by civil society. These efforts have become embedded because they operate without government funding, limit the control of state entities, and are distinct from government CVE efforts and its associated policy controversies. Counterintuitively, my findings point to the fact that counter-extremism objectives may be better served when communities can reject central government programs in favor of bottom-up alternatives that sustain the public's cooperation. However, central governments are often motivated to standardize policy outcomes and reticent to allow bottom-up solutions. This dissertation surfaces insights into potential ways that central governments might begin to promote policy investment on the ground, minimizing the kinds of divergence in policy implementation I described in this dissertation.

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[31] Kenney, Michael. *What is to be done about al-Muhajiroun? Containing the emigrants in a democratic society***.** Paper Prepared for the Commission for Countering Extremism. London, United Kingdom.
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/836686/what-is-to-be-done-about-al-muhajiroun.pdf, 15.

Addressing Civil Liberties Concerns

My findings point to the fact that a primary reason local governments avoided or underinvested in CVE agendas is that they anticipated high political costs. To promote policy standardization, policymakers should seek to minimize these costs, by addressing some of the most common policy shortcomings and civil liberties concerns. Several suggestive policy modifications emerge from this dissertation. The focus on a single type of extremism has consistently been shown to be counterproductive and generated legitimate concerns about the alienation of Muslim minority communities that persist today. To potentially mitigate this, governments should more significantly resource efforts to counter far-right extremism and hate crimes from the outset of CVE agendas. This might have begun to address some of the most glaring controversies around CVE programs.

To address other, major civil liberties concerns, one potential strategy would be to re-organize CVE agendas around broader violence prevention goals, rather than solely on ideologically inspired violent extremism. Part of this might include removing agencies like the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism and the Department of Homeland Security from leadership roles within CVE programs. The involvement of these agencies in ostensibly "soft," resilience-building activities has understandably provoked concerns, particularly around government surveillance. Leadership from other agencies on CVE might be an initial step toward addressing these critiques. Extending from this effort, central governments could better specify from the outset a more limited remit for police in CVE agendas. Over-involvement by police in various aspects of CVE has been a consistent source of controversy and generated fears around intelligence gathering and criminalization. More precise policy planning that designates the specific remit for police, for instance, by resourcing other agencies to lead on CVE agendas might also help to address these concerns.

Finally, efforts to promote policy standardization might benefit from integrating local government priorities into the policymaking process. This would likely help surface aspects of CVE agendas that make local investment less likely and expedite potential policy solutions. To facilitate this, one strategy might be to relocate a small number of local policy practitioners to work in central government agencies for a fixed period. Closer working relationships between front-line workers and central government policymakers could promote new solutions that make policy investment more sustainable on the ground. Such an arrangement would not be able to reflect the diverse

concerns of every locality. Still, it might be a critical step to ensure that central governments include the priorities of city governments and CVE practitioners in the design of CVE programs from the outset.

These potential policy reforms would not minimize all policy divergence on the ground nor would they be able to address all the legitimate policy concerns raised in the critical literature and contemporary policy debates. Still, efforts to address the most significant civil liberties concerns and integrate the interests of local bureaucrats into the policymaking process would be likely to begin to address some major obstacles to policy implementation observed in this dissertation.

Unburden Financial Incentives

My findings also suggest that governments should provide less restrictive financial incentives as part of CVE programs. For instance, more UK civil society leaders found it feasible to cooperate under Prevent I when the policy provided significant flexibility in the distribution of funding. This could take the form of allowing civil society organizations to use CVE funding for broader community development priorities or violence prevention outside the context of extremism alone.

In the UK context, there were well-documented concerns about melding cohesion and counter-terrorism, effectively securitizing benign engagements with citizens. This was quite clearly problematic. At the same time, most civil society leaders now find cooperation with the UK's Prevent strategy untenable because policies are required to align so closely to the government's counter-terrorism agenda in a way that risks irreparably damaging the credibility of local organizations. Rather than imposing narrow guidance about funding it may be more useful for local governments and civil society leaders to designate funding in alignment with local priorities together, while also being transparent with service-users about the sources of financing.

Publicity Can Endanger CVE's Success

Another observation from this study is that policymakers may be making it harder to sustain cooperation with controversial CVE agendas by amplifying attention on local collaborators. A US policymaker I interviewed noted the problems associated with the US White House CVE Summit, arguing that this high profile event highlighted nascent CVE programming, effectively inviting other civil society organizations to oppose fledgling programs and

their leaders.[32] In effect, governments may be undermining policy objectives and key allies by insisting on promoting their counter-extremism activities.

These findings echo those of Krebs and Chowdhury, who have examined the role of "moderates" in counter-terrorism.[33] Although they derive their conclusions in vastly different contexts from those discussed here, they make similar claims that governments may be better able to mobilize "moderate" voices by operating at a distance from, or even criticizing these individuals.[34] To be clear, my aim is not to advocate that governments should be secretive about their CVE programs or the institutions that receive CVE funding. But rather that policymakers should recognize that the national spotlight may not always be conducive to the types of highly sensitive inter-personal work involved in countering extremism by definition.

Cuts to Public Funding Can Damage Civic Networks

The research also points to the fact that at the city level, CVE programs do not operate in a vacuum. Other areas of city governance will strongly impact the outcomes of counter-extremism policy. I have suggested that members of the public make decisions about whether they will participate in counter-extremism efforts based on networks of trust between citizens, civil society, and the state. Civil society organizations and leaders often sustain their ties to the state and members of the public through access to government funding that enables them to function.

Scholars have described how, in the UK, aggressive austerity cuts to local government are breaking down civic networks,[35] with potentially significant ramifications for community cohesion.[36] The Muslim Council of Britain warned that cuts to police funding would further damage trust between law enforcement and Muslim communities.[37] While the UK government has continually re-doubled its efforts to invest and expand Prevent, my

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[32] Interview 96. 17 January 2019. Conducted by Talene Bilazarian in Los Angeles, United States.
[33] Chowdhury, Arjun, and Ronald R. Krebs. "Making and mobilizing moderates: Rhetorical strategy, political networks, and counterterrorism." *Security Studies* 18.3 (2009): 371-399.
[34] Chowdhury, Arjun, and Ronald R. Krebs. "Making and mobilizing moderates: Rhetorical strategy, political networks, and counterterrorism." *Security Studies* 18.3 (2009): 371-399.
[35] Davies, Jonathan. Austerity *Leicester: Between Revitalisation, Retrenchment and Resistance.* Leicester: Centre for Urban Research on Austerity, 2017. https://www.urbantransformations.ox.ac.uk/blog/2017/austerity-leicester-between-revitalisation-retrenchment-and-resistance/
[36] Mayor of London. *A Shared Endeavour: Working in Partnership to Counter Violent Extremism in London.* Greater London Authority: June 2019. https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/a_shared_endeavour_working_in_partnership_to_counter_violent_extremism_in_london.pdf, 11.
[37] Dodd, Vikram." Muslim group warns police cuts will harm trust with communities." *The Guardian*. 22 November 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/nov/22/muslim-group-warns-police-cuts-will-harm-trust-with-communities

research provides suggestive evidence that other governance reforms that roll back the services states provide locally could damage civic networks and impact local CVE policy outcomes.

I recognize that these policy recommendations are based on deep analysis of CVE in only six cities. It must be said that policymakers should test potential policy interventions before they are implemented. However, my observations point toward some initial ways in which governments could modify CVE agendas to encourage cooperation from civil society leaders and members of the public, in ways that reflect the priorities and concerns of local actors.

Conclusion

Controversial CVE agendas operate in a context where Muslim communities in the West have experienced growing scrutiny by law enforcement and Islamophobia has reached unprecedentedly high levels.[38] While these policies remain unpopular, they have played out on the ground in different ways, with a broader range of responses from local actors than might be expected. To explain these patterns, this dissertation stresses the relevance of sub-national network dynamics for counter-terrorism programs. I argue that local actors make decisions about how they will engage with security agendas based on local network dynamics, rather than other factors like state capacity or threat levels that have received much attention in contemporary counter-terrorism debates.

Terrorism continues to consume the minds of security policymakers with growing attention devoted to threats from the far-right, and it is unlikely that governments will cease seeking out community support to advance counter-terrorism objectives. As governments expand and revise CVE programs, this dissertation highlights the need for governments to pay attention to the local communities most impacted by these agendas, and their network dynamics specifically, acknowledging the place-specific risks and pressures security policies impose on local actors. My work provides suggestive evidence that policy modifications that can help reduce burdens on

[38] Hellyer, H.A. "Islamophobia Is Boris Johnson's Problem Now." *Foreign Policy*. 16 December 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/16/britain-election-conservative-party-islamophobia/

local actors by addressing local concerns and priorities may be more conducive to sustained participation. As such, this dissertation draws attention to both the theoretical and policy need for bottom-up approaches in order to enhance our understanding and ultimately our ability to improve counter-terrorism efforts.

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Appendix A Social Network Analysis

To assemble social networks, I use UK Charity Commission reports to assemble a list of what I call "Muslim charities" in a given locality and to map connections between organizations, their board members, and local government from 2014-17. I deliberately sample across several years to ensure that I maximize available information—since for some years, some charities do not submit reports to the Charity Commission.

Identifying Charities for Inclusion in the SNA

To assemble a database of Muslim charities in each of the four UK local authorities, I gathered a complete list of registered charities located in the local authority postcode and that list themselves as operating in the same city, county, or country as the local authority of interest in 2017 or before. To do this, I identified charities that designated themselves as operating in the selected case study areas (both the specific cities, e.g., High Wycombe, Derby, Leicester, and Slough, the county areas, e.g., Leicestershire, Derbyshire, Buckinghamshire, and Berkshire.) I also included charities that designate their area of operations as throughout England, which would de-facto include these areas. I then restricted the charities according to those registered in the same postcodes as these cities.

From this database, I individually coded thousands of registered charities to make a sub-sample of what I designate as "Muslim charities" in each of the four UK cities. To do this, I use multi-part coding criteria to delineate a charity as a Muslim civil society organization using both the charity name and the short description of charitable activities that are included on the Charity Commission website. I identify charities that are explicitly Muslim, such as mosques or madrassahs that are associated with Islam and describe promoting Islam or Muslim identity in the description of their charitable activities. I also include those organizations that target a specific ethnic group that is Muslim majority—such as Pakistani or Somali organizations. I also include charities listed in the charity commission as "focusing on a specific racial or ethnic group," that in practice serve a Muslim-majority ethnic group from the "About Us" page of the Charity's website. Finally, I include charities focusing on inter-faith relations, Black Minority and

Ethnic (BME) communities, South Asian communities, or refugees that are likely to serve Muslim constituencies within their work.

Connections Between Nodes

To map connections between civil society organizations what I call inter-elite linkages, I follow from the work of Fennemma and Tillie, who focus on "interlocking directorates."[816] In line with Fennema and Tillie's criteria, I measure a connection between two civil society organizations where an individual is a board member on both civil society organizations within the selected dates. This individuals' shared board membership thus serves as a path of length two between the civil society organizations. I exclude board members from the social network analysis that are not paths between at least two nodes in the network.

To identify shared board memberships, I downloaded Annual Returns (ARs) that registered charities submit to the UK Charity Commission. These returns list budgetary information and board-members for each Charity annually. Using these ARs, I gathered board member names from each Charity and then inputted them into a database of board memberships.

I establish elite-state ties in several ways: where a charity board member is a city councilor, a city council candidate, or selected as an official community representative on a city-level minority consultation forum, where this information is available. I also characterize an elite-state tie when a charity receives local or central government funding.

To collect data on whether charities received local government funding. I use budgetary information that charities report in their Annual Returns, which includes their annual sources of funding. I also gather data about all local city councilors and council candidates for all elections between 2014-2017, using election data reported by each local authority. Where local government documents were publicly available that

[816] Fennemma and Tillie define what they call "interlocking directorates" as, "those linkages between ethnic organisation that come into being when one person serves simultaneously on the governing board of two or more ethnic organisations." See: Fennema, Meindert, and Jean Tillie. "Political participation and political trust in Amsterdam: civic communities and ethnic networks." *Journal of ethnic and migration studies* 25.4 (1999), 713.

detailed routine, local government consultation, I also included these lists of designated representatives that consulted with local government.

Analyzing the Data

I used Network X to build social network graphs, to capture both inter-elite and elite-state connections, and to measure structural properties of the network and individual nodes.

To measure the connectivity of the network I calculate:

- The number of nodes (both organizations and connecting board members)
- The number of links between Muslim civil society organizations via shared board memberships
- The average degree, which is the average number of links each node has to other nodes across the network
- I also calculate the betweenness centrality of each node in the network and report the node of highest betweenness centrality. This provides a sense of whether specific nodes are more central than others in the network. I also use betweenness centrality as an estimation of the connectivity of the network on the whole. Where all nodes have a very low betweenness centrality value, I take this as a less connected network. This is compared to those networks where specific nodes are more central vis-à-vis other nodes in the network, which I take as an estimation of some degree of connectedness and the existence of central civic actors.

I measure all of these variables both with and without the local government. The local government is unlike other civil society organizations because many organizations have an interest in being connected to local government to gain access to funding or political representation. Including local government can overpower network measures in the analysis.

Challenges with Data Collection

My aim in assembling SNAs is to estimate network structures before the introduction of Prevent agendas in each of these cities. I attempted to build SNAs for 2005-2008 in the lead up to Prevent, which required

issuing Freedom of Information requests to the Charity Commission to access Annual Returns from these earlier years. The Charity Commission rejected many of my requests on a number of grounds, notably that they introduced undue burdens upon the Commission. The Annual Returns from 2005-2008 that were provided to me were also heavily redacted, removing board member names which would have problematically skewed the data quality due to large amounts of missing data. Because of these challenges I faced accessing data from earlier years, I assemble SNAs based on Annual Returns from 2014-2017 because these documents were made publicly available online at the time of writing this dissertation.

I still consider the 2014-2017 data a legitimate way to estimate network structures before the introduction of Prevent for several reasons.

For one, I use qualitative evidence to measure civic network dynamics over time and to identify any changes in the overall structural properties of the network. One major change is the nature of elite-state linkages. Cuts to local government since 2005 have meant that budgets for consultation and state funding to civil society organizations have diminished across the UK over time, limiting the types of exchanges and funding that would result in elite-state ties. My expectation is thus that the network analyses from 2014-2017 will underestimate the strength of elite-state connections across all cities.

Recognizing these important limitations, I used qualitative data alongside the social network analysis to confirm network dynamics, particularly to get a sense of network properties before Prevent and to ensure alignment between network dynamics captured in the SNA and qualitative indicators.

There is much community activity that cannot be gathered from Charity Commission reports and from the strict shared board membership criteria I use to capture inter-elite ties specifically. Muslim elites are often connected through many informal connections, such as one-off political coordination, membership within umbrella groups, or ethnic and sectarian ties. In the case study chapters, I use qualitative evidence from interviews to measure inter-elite dynamics outside of shared board memberships alone.

Another challenge I face is that this method assumes that all organizations are the same size. But, of course, the size and prominence of civil society organizations varies hugely in any given locality. Some groups are very small and informal, with limited resources, while others have a decades-long history, and

command significant funds, hosting large public audiences. In measuring network structures and the centrality of specific organizations and individuals, it is essential to estimate these differences, but I lack a standardized way of determining organization size. These details are not included in the Charity Commission data.

I deal with these challenges by visualizing what I believe to be the largest mosque in a given locality and the city's largest ethnic association as twice the size of other nodes, where I have the appropriate qualitative indicators to do so. This allows the reader to visualize the network more accurately. Where I lack this information, I simply do not include a visualization of these differences in size. Throughout, I choose not to allow these differences in size to impact network calculations because I cannot standardize measures of size across the network.

The data limitations I faced are not insignificant, but they were held constant across all cities. I still find important differences in the structural properties of these different networks. This provides a valuable, standardized coding of the independent variable, giving added confidence that the differences I measure qualitatively have been verified via quantitative measures.

I have identified a new methodology to estimate the structural properties of local Muslim civil society networks, enriching the earlier literature, which has to date focused mainly on qualitative data. I hope that this methodology can be used by other scholars to better understand state-society relations and the role of local civil society in political life.

Appendix B Semi-Structured Interview Questions

This dissertation relies on data gathered from semi-structured interviews I conducted from 2015-2019. These were the general questions I sought to ask in interviews, though there was a degree of flexibility in individual interviews.

Network Dynamics

Can you describe how Muslim communities are organized in your city?

How do community leaders maintain a public following?

How much competition between community leaders is there?

How hard is it for leaders to work together and arrive at a consensus? Can you provide examples of where this has happened in the past?

Before the introduction of CVE programs, how did Muslim civil society organizations relate to local government?

Responses from Muslim Elites

How did Muslim civil society leaders engage with CVE programs at the outset of these policies? What was the nature of the collaboration?

What motivated these responses?

Did civil society leaders anticipate any risks for taking part in counter-extremism programs?

Policy Implementation

How did the police and the local government initially approach CVE programs? Why?

Can you describe how CVE programs are delivered?

How did local bureaucrats identify civil society partners?

How soon after the introduction of CVE programs were intervention programs rolled out? How do these programs operate? How are local governments and other agencies involved in these efforts?

Participation

How do civil society leaders or local government access participants to attend various CVE programs?

What was participation like at these programs, and how did it compare with your expectations? How diverse was it? What was the average number of attendees at CVE programs?

Is there formal, regular public consultation? What is attendance like at CVE consultation?

Do you think people know what to do with concerns about violent extremism?

How would you describe community willingness to make referrals to intervention programs?

Are there examples of community-based referrals?

Were there examples where civil society leaders provided information or referrals to local government or police about CVE?

What factors do you think account for the participation of members of the public around CVE programs?

Policy Responses Over Time

Did the responses of civil society leaders to CVE programs change over time? If so, why?

Why do you think that community participation changed over time?

How were opposition groups able to emerge and organize members of the public? What was the influence of these groups?

Under what conditions do you think there would have been more public participation in CVE efforts?

What is the current path to deal with concerns around extremism, if not CVE programs?

Alternative Explanations

Has the city's prior experiences of terrorism shaped approaches to CVE agendas? If so, how?

How does the level of affluence within the local Muslim community impact policy outcomes?

How would you describe relations between Muslim communities and local law enforcement? How has the quality of these relationships impacted how communities think about and engage with CVE programs?

I use a different set of questions with community members that aims to understand how members of the public relate to community leadership, if at all.

How would you say the Muslim community is organized in your city? Which are the major organizations?

How do community leaders become established and maintain a community following?

Are community leaders a major influence in local community life? How so? Do they impact how you think about political issues?

Do you rely on community leaders to solve problems? How so?

Do you think community leaders accurately represent the concerns and priorities of community members?

Is there a difference in the local influence of lay compared to religious leaders? In your day to day life, do you typically rely more on lay leaders or religious leaders?

How much does your family interact with religious leaders? How frequently do you or your family interact with leaders that are not religious leaders?

Do community leaders influence your day to day life, like voting or how you participate in community organizations? How so? Can you provide general examples?

Do you rely on community leaders when you interact with the city council? Do community leaders help with accessing housing or finding jobs?

Do you think there is much competition between community leaders? Does this competition effect your life in anyway?

Appendix C List of Interviewees

Interview Number	*Date of Interview*	*Case Study City*	*Interview Type*[817]
Interview 1	23 March 2017	Derby, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 2	13 February 2017	Derby, UK	Academic
Interview 3	24 March 2017	Derby, UK	Local Government Official
Interview 4	24 February 2017	Derby, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 5	15 March 2017	Derby, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 6	24 February 2017	Derby, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 7	27 February 2017	Derby, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 8	15 March 2017	Derby, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 9	24 February 2017	Derby, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 10	23 March 2017	Derby, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 11	24 February 2017	Derby, UK	Local Government Official
Interview 12	20 October 2015	Derby, UK	Local Government Official
Interview 13	20 October 2015	Derby, UK	Law Enforcement Official
Interview 14	23 March 2017	Derby, UK	Law Enforcement Official
Interview 15	07 February 2018	Derby, UK	Local Government Official
Interview 16	07 February 2018	Derby, UK	Academic
Interview 17	13 February 2018	Derby, UK	Local Government Official
Interview 18	15 February 2018	Derby, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 19	18 March 2019	Derby, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 20	15 February 2018	Derby, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 21	22 February 2017	Derby, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 22	28 February 2017	Leicester, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 23	28 March 2017	Leicester, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 24	22 March 2017	Leicester, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 25	03 February 2016	Leicester, UK	Law Enforcement Official
Interview 26	5 March 2019	Leicester, UK	Law Enforcement Official
Interview 27	20 March 2019	Leicester, UK	Local Government Official
Interview 28	18 January 2016	Leicester, UK	Law Enforcement Official
Interview 29	20 January 2016	Leicester, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 30	13 March 2017	Leicester, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 31	20 March 2017	Leicester, UK	Local Government Official
Interview 32	26 November 2015	High Wycombe, UK	Law Enforcement Official

[817] I deliberately designate interview types to maximize anonymity. Interviewees at times fell into more than one interviewee type, though I specify the main type here. When I quote specific interviewees in the dissertation, I often provide further specification as to their specific, local role.

Interview 33	20 August 2018	High Wycombe, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 34	21 August 2018	High Wycombe, UK	Law Enforcement Official
Interview 35	21 August 2018	High Wycombe, UK	Local Government Official
Interview 36	7 October 2015	High Wycombe, UK	Law Enforcement Official
Interview 37	15 August 2018	High Wycombe, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 38	16 August 2018	High Wycombe, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 39	8 August 2018	High Wycombe, UK	Local Government Official
Interview 40	29 August 2018	High Wycombe, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 41	12 December 2018	Slough, UK	Local Government Official
Interview 42	9 November 2015	Slough, UK	Law Enforcement Official
Interview 43	23 May 2017	Boston, US	Law Enforcement Official
Interview 44	2 May 2017	Boston, US	Local Government Official
Interview 45	27 April 2017	Boston, US	Law Enforcement Official
Interview 46	19 April 2017	Boston, US	Civil Society Leader
Interview 47	28 April 2017	Boston, US	Civil Society Leader
Interview 48	11 May 2017	Boston, US	Civil Society Leader
Interview 49	18 October 2018	Los Angeles, US	Law Enforcement Official
Interview 50	22 October 2018	Boston, US	Civil Society Leader
Interview 51	22 October 2018	Boston, US	Civil Society Leader
Interview 52	23 October 2018	Boston, US	Civil Society Leader
Interview 53	23 October 2018	Boston, US	Civil Society Leader
Interview 54	23 October 2018	Boston, US	Civil Society Leader
Interview 55	25 October 2018	Boston, US	Civil Society Leader
Interview 56	25 October 2018	Boston, US	Academic
Interview 57	25 October 2018	Boston, US	Academic
Interview 58	25 October 2018	Boston, US	Academic
Interview 59	25 October 2018	Boston, US	Civil Society Leader
Interview 60	26 October 2018	Boston, US	Law Enforcement Official
Interview 61	29 October 2018	Boston, US	Civil Society Leader
Interview 62	29 October 2018	Boston, US	Civil Society Leader
Interview 63	5 November 2018	Boston, US	Civil Society Leader
Interview 64	15 November 2018	High Wycombe, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 65	17 November 2018	High Wycombe, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 66	19 November 2018	Slough, UK	Local Government Official
Interview 67	22 November 2018	High Wycombe, UK	Local Government Official
Interview 68	23 November 2018	Slough, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 69	23 November 2018	Slough, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 70	26 November 2018	High Wycombe, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 71	26 November 2018	High Wycombe, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 72	27 November 2018	Slough, UK	Local Government Official

Interview 73	29 November 2018	High Wycombe, UK	Law Enforcement Official
Interview 74	30 November 2018	High Wycombe, UK	Local Government Official
Interview 75	3 December 2018	Slough, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 76	05 December 2018	Slough, UK	Local Government Official
Interview 77	07 December 2018	High Wycombe, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 78	3 January 2019	Boston, US	Civil Society Leader
Interview 79	23 January 2019	Los Angeles, US	Academic
Interview 80	09 January 2019	Los Angeles, US	Civil Society Leader
Interview 81	01 Mar 2019	Leicester, UK	Academic
Interview 82	18 March 2019	Derby, UK	Law Enforcement Official
interview 83	08 January 2019	Boston, US	Law Enforcement Official
Interview 84	09 January 2019	Los Angeles, US	Civil Society Leader
Interview 85	10 January 2019	Los Angeles, US	Central Government Official
Interview 86	11 January 2019	Los Angeles, US	Civil Society Leader
Interview 87	11 January 2019	Boston, US	Community Member
Interview 88	13 January 2019	Los Angeles, US	Civil Society Leader
Interview 89	14 January 2019	Los Angeles, US	Civil Society Leader
Interview 90	15 January 2019	Los Angeles, US	Academic
Interview 91	16 January 2019	Los Angeles, US	Civil Society Leader
Interview 92	15 January 2019	Los Angeles, US	Civil Society Leader
Interview 93	15 January 2019	Los Angeles, US	Civil Society Leader
Interview 94	15 January 2019	Los Angeles, US	Civil Society Leader
Interview 95	17 January 2019	Los Angeles, US	Community Member
Interview 96	17 January 2019	Los Angeles, US	Central Government Official
Interview 97	18 January 2019	Los Angeles, US	Civil Society Leader
Interview 98	18 January 2019	Los Angeles, US	Law Enforcement Official
Interview 99	18 January 2019	Los Angeles, US	Law Enforcement Official
Interview 100	18 January 2019	Los Angeles, US	Community Member
Interview 101	18 January 2019	Los Angeles, US	Community Member
Interview 102	17 January 2019	Los Angeles, US	Community Member
Interview 103	17 January 2019	Los Angeles, US	Community Member
Interview 104	17 January 2019	Los Angeles, US	Community Member
Interview 105	17 January 2019	Los Angeles, US	Community Member
Interview 106	20 January 2019	Los Angeles, US	Community Member
Interview 107	22 January 2019	Los Angeles, US	Local Government Official
Interview 108	22 January 2019	Los Angeles, US	Civil Society Leader
Interview 109	22 January 2019	Los Angeles, US	Law Enforcement Official
Interview 110	23 January 2019	Los Angeles, US	Civil Society Leader
Interview 111	24 January 2019	Los Angeles, US	Law Enforcement Official
Interview 112	24 January 2019	Los Angeles, US	Civil Society Leader

Interview 113	24 January 2019	Los Angeles, US	Community Member
Interview 114	24 January 2019	Los Angeles, US	Civil Society Leader
Interview 115	25 January 2019	Los Angeles, US	Civil Society Leader
Interview 116	25 January 2019	Los Angeles, US	Academic
Interview 117	05 February 2019	High Wycombe, UK	Community Member
Interview 118	05 February 2019	High Wycombe, UK	Community Member
Interview 119	05 February 2019	High Wycombe, UK	Community Member
Interview 120	05 February 2019	High Wycombe, UK	Community Member
Interview 121	05 February 2019	High Wycombe, UK	Community Member
Interview 122	05 February 2019	High Wycombe, UK	Community Member
Interview 123	03 February 2016	Slough, UK	Local Government Official
Interview 124	11 February 2019	Slough, UK	Local Government Official
Interview 125	12 February 2019	Slough, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 126	13 February 2019	Slough, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 127	18 February 2019	Slough, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 128	19 February 2019	Derby, UK	Community Member
Interview 129	19 February 2019	Derby, UK	Community Member
Interview 130	20 February 2019	Leicester, UK	Community Member
Interview 131	20 February 2019	Leicester, UK	Community Member
Interview 132	20 February 2019	Leicester, UK	Local Government Official
Interview 133	20 February 2019	Leicester, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 134	20 February 2019	Leicester, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 135	21 February 2019	Slough, UK	Community Member
Interview 136	21 February 2019	Slough, UK	Community Member
Interview 137	22 February 2019	Derby, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 138	25 February 2019	Slough, UK	Civil Society Leader
Interview 139	25 February 2019	Slough, UK	Civil Society Leader

Appendix D: UK Priority Areas

This appendix lists the 46 areas designated as priority areas in 2015.[1] Priority Areas are divided into two categories. "Tier 1" areas are considered higher risk areas than local authorities designated as "Tier 2," though Tier 2 areas remain priority areas for Prevent. Because the UK government continually reviews the list of priority areas, the list is likely to change over time. However, I used the 2015 priority areas for the purposes of case selection in this dissertation.

Tier 1 Priority Areas

Birmingham

Manchester

Tower Hamlets

Newham

Waltham Forest

Hammersmith & Fulham

Kensington & Chelsea

Westminster

Ealing

Brent

Tier 2 Priority Areas

Barking and Dagenham

Barnet

Blackburn with Darwen

Bradford

Brighton and Hove

Burnley

Calderdale

Camden

Cardiff

Coventry

Crawley

Derby

Dudley

Enfield

Greenwich

Hackney

Haringey

High Wycombe

Hounslow

Islington

Lambeth

Leeds

Leicester

Lewisham

Liverpool

Luton

Kirklees

Portsmouth

Redbridge

Sandwell

Sheffield

Slough

Stoke-on-Trent

Southwark

Walsall

Wandsworth

[1] National Association of Head Teachers. *Advice & Guidance: Prevent Campaign*; See also the reference to 46 Prevent Priority areas in: HM Government. *Prevent duty awareness event*. https://www.isc.co.uk/media/2975/prevent-duty-awareness-event-keynote-slides-luton.pdf Accessed 10 July 2020.

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