

Contested boundaries: Consensus and dissensus in European attitudes to immigration

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Abstract

The paper explores differences in attitudes towards immigration both between and within countries. We draw on new questions, included in the ESS for the first time in 2014, about willingness to accept culturally distinct groups of migrants such as Muslims. These new measures yield additional insights about the nature of symbolic boundaries since they directly tap one of the most salient boundaries in contemporary migration discourse. The paper makes use of Multilevel Latent Class Analysis, a method enabling one to disentangle group-level from individual-level differences. The findings distinguish three classes of individual attitudes, labelled ‘restrictive’, ‘selective’ and ‘open’. The proportions of individuals belonging to these classes varies across European countries, which fit into three more or less distinct sets (labelled the Czech model, the Norway model and the Ireland model). These three sets display differing levels of internal homogeneity, with the Czech model being the most homogeneous and the Norway model the most heterogeneous. This pattern is also reflected in the degree of socio-economic polarization. In effect, the nature of the symbolic boundaries are more contested within the Ireland and Norway models, different groups having very different ideas of where the boundaries lie and how rigid they should be.

Key words: Symbolic boundaries, economic threat, cultural threat, polarization, European Social Survey, multilevel latent class analysis

Introduction

Immigration remains one of the most contentious contemporary political issues, as shown by the rise of anti-immigrant radical right parties in several European countries. Moreover, within many European countries the public appears to be deeply divided in their views of immigration, and there are clear national differences across Europe in willingness to accept refugees. The aim of this paper, therefore, is to map these divisions between European publics in their attitudes towards migrants.

Opposition to immigration has been largely understood in terms of threat. In Blumer's (1958) classic paper, threat to the prerogatives of the dominant group was postulated as the major driver of anti-immigrant sentiment. Most often, this threat has been conceptualized in economic terms (Quillian 1995). This provided an explanation for why anti-immigrant sentiment appeared to be especially prevalent among those in less-skilled jobs who were particularly vulnerable to competition from labour migrants.

However, economic threats fail to explain the strong relationship between levels of education or age and anti-immigrant sentiment. More recently there has been increasing attention paid to theories of cultural threat – threats to the traditional ways of life of the society, and especially threats from culturally-distinct non-Christian groups such as Muslims (Scheepers et al. 2002, Sears & Henry 2003, Hainmuller and Hopkins 2014). Rather than being driven by one's economic position, these sentiments appear to be linked to nationalism or to ethnic, as opposed to civic, conceptions of the nation (Heath and Tilley 2005).

The relative importance placed on economic and symbolic threat is likely to differ not only between social groups but also across European countries, reflecting differing economic interests, histories of past immigration, and contemporary discourses surrounding immigration. In other words we expect there to be contextual, country-level influences on individual sentiments about immigration. Considering economic threat first, Western European countries such as Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the UK have received large numbers of labour migrants. In contrast, some Eastern European countries have received relatively little labour migration, and some have been countries of net emigration rather than immigration. Countries in Eastern Europe tend to have small stocks of foreign-born populations, 1.8% in Poland, 4.8% in Hungary, 7.1% in the Czech Republic compared with 12.4% in France, 13.2% in Germany, 13.3% in Britain, 16.1% in Belgium, and 17.4% in Austria in 2014 (Table 1). One would therefore on these grounds expect economic threat to be relatively more significant in western countries than in eastern ones. On the other hand, the large volume of labour migration to western countries is a matter of demand for labour as well as supply of migrants. Historically, the post-war guest-worker programmes in Germany, Netherlands and Belgium actively recruited migrant workers. Business interests in many of these countries remain highly supportive of labour migration. One might therefore expect these countries to be more polarized, on economic lines, than those in Eastern Europe.

Table 1 about here

A third set of countries consists of Nordic countries which have been more noticeable for their willingness to accept refugees and humanitarian migrants, and which do not therefore fall quite so neatly into the western migrant worker model. Sweden is exceptional in this respect, having a particularly high ratio of asylum-seekers to total inflows. Denmark, Norway and Finland also have higher than average ratios. The situation is complicated however by the fact that, at least in 2014, Austria, Germany, Hungary and Israel also had large numbers of asylum seekers (relative to the overall inflows), so this is not an exclusively Nordic pattern.

A separate theme relates to the fact that migration flows to different countries also differ in their cultural distinctiveness from the majority group. In several but by no means all western countries there have been large inflows of migrants from Muslim countries. This is particularly the case in France, for example, but there have also been substantial proportions to Slovenia and Ireland, as well as to Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland (in the latter countries no doubt linked to the Muslim character of many contemporary flows of asylum seekers). Cultural threat therefore is unlikely to be absent in these countries.

Previous research has suggested that countries cluster into more or less distinct sets based on their attitudinal patterns, with a sharp divide between eastern and western European countries (Kunovich 2004) and a distinct Nordic cluster (Bail 2008). Bail's analysis is situated within the literature on symbolic boundaries (Barth 1969; Lamont and Molnar 2002). He describes his article as providing "a panorama of symbolic boundaries towards immigrants in 21 countries" (Bail 2008, p. 37). Europe is a set of "diverse diversities", which is to say that there are different histories of migration, in terms of origin countries and timing, but also differences in the political discourse and policy on immigration and ethnic integration. French *républicanisme*, for example, emphasises assimilation to a greater degree than the UK's *multiculturalism*. There are also country differences in terms of laws on citizenship such as the distinction between *ius soli* and *ius sanguinis*, although these distinctions are perhaps becoming a thing of the past.

Bail argues that antiracist discourse is now the norm in many countries, certain expressions of racism in particular being increasingly stigmatised. For this reason the boundaries that may once have depended on race or ethnicity have been replaced by religion, language, culture and human capital. In other words these social boundaries, previously protected by race, have been renegotiated (Bail, 2008). Indeed, it has long been noted that traditional negative outgroup attitudes have crystallised into new forms such as symbolic racism (Kinder and Sears 1981) and 'subtle' prejudice, in contrast to 'blatant' (Pettigrew and Meertens, 1995). Ramos and her colleagues (2018) use the metaphor of an ever-evolving virus of racism and suggests that symbolic threat and economic threat are means of legitimizing negative views towards outgroups.

With data from the 2002-3 European Social Survey, Bail (2008) operationalized symbolic boundaries with measures of public preferences on qualifying criteria for entry into the

country (race, religion, language, culture, education and occupation). His results are summarised in Table 2. Bail's first set is described as a group of new immigration countries on the periphery of Europe where religion and race are considered important criteria for who should be allowed to enter. The old immigration countries forming the core of Western Europe make up the second set, where education and culture are emphasised as symbolic boundaries. All criteria were rated less important in the final set which comprises three Nordic countries together with Switzerland.

Table 2 about here

Chylíková (2016) has repeated Bail's analysis with the 2014-15 ESS, and found a number of differences. With the more recent data, Finland now belongs with its geographical neighbours in set C, and Switzerland moves from set C to set B. Ireland now belongs to set B. Spain does not fit at all well into any set in the newer model while Hungary (previously atypical) now fits well into set A. Though Chylíková comments that Bail's model still fits well twelve years on, it looks more as if set A is largely occupied by eastern European countries and Bail's label of 'peripheral' seems less appropriate. New countries in round 7, Estonia and Lithuania, also belong to set A, thus confirming the idea that this looks more like an eastern European cluster.

There are two possibilities that might explain the difference between Bail's and Chylíková's results. First, the somewhat differing range of countries included in the different waves of the ESS might well influence the results. A second possibility is that socio-political-demographic changes over the twelve year gap have driven changes in attitude profiles and in country clustering. Thus Meuleman et al. (2009) show that attitude evolution (over the period 2002-2007) was not divided along regional lines. In Eastern Europe, for example, the data showed average attitudes towards immigration in Hungary hardening, while at the same time softening in Poland and Slovenia.

In addition to these differences between countries, within countries there are major differences between individuals, and these differences may interact with macro-level factors such as economic conditions (Burns and Gimpel, 2000). Kunovich (2004) for example has shown that regression slopes of socio-economic status on attitudes differ substantially between western and eastern Europe. These differences were at least partially explained by the size of the immigrant populations and the economic conditions of a given country. It follows then that we should look not only at the extent to which countries differ in their overall average level of support for or opposition to immigration, or differ with respect to the criteria which predominate in each country, but also at the extent of consensus or polarization within each country.

Our central aims in this paper, then, are to explore differences in sentiments both between and within countries, and their interplay. We attempt to move the discussion forward in two ways. Firstly, we draw on new questions, included in the ESS for the first time in 2014, about willingness to accept culturally distinct groups of migrants such as Muslims. These measures were not available to Bail but may be able to yield additional insights about the nature of

symbolic boundaries since they directly tap some of the most salient boundaries in contemporary migration discourse. Secondly, we base our investigation both on between and within country differences in public attitudes and sentiments. In doing so, we expand the discussion on the attitudinal profile of countries, moving beyond a categorization of countries based purely on their mean scores and additionally taking into account the degree of homogeneity and heterogeneity within societies.

We make use of Multilevel Latent Class Analysis (MCLA), a method enabling us to disentangle group-level from individual-level effects, the country-level clustering patterns taking into account the way in which attitudes cluster within individuals within countries. It is too simplistic, as we will go on to demonstrate, to think of countries as being entirely favourable or unfavourable towards immigration, and within all our country clusters, including in Eastern Europe, we see clusters of individuals with contrasting attitudinal profiles.

We begin with a brief overview of the data (described more fully in the introduction to this special issue) and go on to describe the analytic method in some detail, this being somewhat novel. In the section on descriptive results we describe the variables, give descriptive statistics and describe the operationalization of the model. In the analytical results section we describe the model output in terms of individual and country sets and go on to discuss the extent of attitudinal and socio-demographic polarization within countries. We finish with a discussion of the findings.

Data and methods

We make use of Round 7 of the European Social Survey. Round 7 was fielded in 2014-15 and included a detailed module on attitudes to immigration. The survey includes 20 European countries and Israel with sample sizes ranging from 1224 in Slovenia to 3045 in Germany. In all countries the questionnaires were administered in face-to-face interviews based on representative probability samples. Further details are provided in the introduction to the special issue (Heath et al, 2018).

While Bail (2008) and Chylíková (2016) applied cluster analysis, we instead choose the analytic method of Latent Class Analysis (LCA¹). LCA is similar to cluster techniques in its aim of classifying individuals into relatively homogeneous groups based on patterns of response to the observed items. However, it has a number of advantages over cluster analysis. Firstly, the outcome of a cluster analysis is dependent upon the scale of the manifest variables whereas LCA is not. Secondly, LCA methods provide diagnostic statistics which are valuable for model comparison and to determine the number of classes. Additionally, the maximum likelihood approach provides estimates for classification quality. Simulation studies have shown that LCA performs better than alternative techniques such as k-means clustering in the rate of misclassification (Magidson and Vermunt, 2002).

Like other latent variable methods, LCA can be considered a data reduction technique, but it is also a way of adding to the interpretability of data based on several different variables (McCutcheon 1987). LCA is founded on the assumption that the interrelations between the observed variables can be explained by a latent construct (here an attitude ‘type’ or ‘profile’). It is by studying those patterns of interrelations through the modelling procedure that the nature of the underlying classes can be characterised.

A further advantage is that LCA can be applied in a multilevel framework (MLCA). Standard LCA assumes that observations are independent, i.e. that the model parameters are the same for all level-1 units (individuals) in the model, an assumption that is almost certainly violated in comparative models (Henry and Muthén, 2010). In MLCA this assumption is relaxed, allowing the model parameters to differ across level-2 groups. This includes both the probabilities of belonging to a given class as well as other group-specific parameters.

One criticism that could be levelled at our approach is that our model assumes measurement invariance across all countries. However, previous studies have suggested that this is a valid assumption. Meuleman et al. (2009), for example, examine measurement invariance over time and between different countries with the first three waves of ESS data on immigration questions. Their findings show that the latent construct of ‘anti-immigration attitude’ was constructed in a scalar equivalent way in the 17 countries they examined, and concluded that comparative analysis is valid. The most notable deviation of scalar equivalence was noted in Hungary.

¹ We use the term LCA although this type of model where the dependent variables are continuous measures is sometimes known as Latent Profile Analysis.

Descriptive Results

We use questions on entry criteria just as Bail and Chylíková did. Entry criteria engage with policy debates such as those about points systems which privilege potential migrants with higher work and language skills. Qualifications for entry can also be conceptualised as varying according to acquired and ascribed immigration criteria (Green, 2009). Acquired immigration criteria consist of those individual competencies and attitudes (such as educational qualifications) that in principle immigrants could attain if they wish. Ascribed immigration criteria, in turn, are categorical qualities related to inherent, collective characteristics of a social category (such as being white). This distinction between ascribed and acquired characteristics mirrors the classic distinction made in the literature between ethnic and civic conceptions of the nation (Heath and Tilley, 2005).

The questions on entry criteria are as follow:

Please tell me how important you think each of these things should be in deciding whether someone born, brought up and living outside [country] should be able to come and live here. Firstly, how important should it be for them to...

- ...have good educational qualifications?
- ...be able to speak [country's official language(s)]?
- ...come from a Christian background? (In Israel 'Jewish background')
- ...be white?
- ...have work skills that [country] needs?
- ...be committed to the way of life in [country]?

Table 3 about here

We show percentages agreeing that each of these six criteria are important in Table 3 (based on the proportions giving an importance score above the mid-point) and ordered by the lowest to highest percentage saying that work skills are important. Sweden and Norway top the table as their publics are the least likely to say that work skills are important, whereas we find the UK at the bottom with 83% assigning importance to work skills. There is a fairly similar rank order for the other acquired criteria such as qualifications and language, publics in Sweden and Norway placing relatively little emphasis on these criteria whereas the UK and Irish publics place much greater importance on them. The Swedish and Norwegian publics are also unlikely to place importance on the ascribed characteristics of race and religion, with just 3% in Sweden and 7% in Norway saying it is important to be white, for example. This conforms to expectations given the antiracist norm (Bail 2008, Kinder and Sears 1981, Ramos et al. 2018). Thus publics in the Nordic countries at the top of table 3 tend to downplay the importance of entry criteria in general whereas the eastern European countries towards the bottom of the table tend to attach greater importance to all the criteria. European publics thus differ in the extent to which they emphasize symbolic boundaries. Nordic publics tend to espouse weaker or more blurred boundaries whereas eastern European publics tend to espouse stronger and brighter boundaries.

However, in addition to these overall differences in the brightness of the boundaries, table 3 also shows differences in the rankings of the different criteria. Thus the UK and Ireland both rate work skills as highly important but rank around the middle or above on the importance of religion and race. In contrast, it tends to be countries such as Lithuania, Hungary and the Czech Republic where publics are the most likely to rate ascribed characteristics as important. It appears that in eastern European countries, race is still an observed boundary. Religion has the most importance, unsurprisingly, in Israel which is rather different to the other countries in our sample given its special status as the Jewish homeland.

Green (2009) showed that work skills were the key component of the acquired dimension while religion was the key component of the ascribed dimension. We therefore explore the ratio of the importance of work skills to religion in order to tease out variation in the attitudinal *profiles* in addition to the overall *levels* of support for different entry criteria. The variation in profile is considerable. These ratios allow us to distinguish the relative importance of the different criteria from the overall level of support for entry criteria as a whole. Thus in Ireland over three times as many people assign importance to work skills than to religious background, while in the Czech Republic this ratio is below two, despite the fact that overall levels of importance attached to entry criteria are quite similar in these two countries.

We also looked at the ratio of the importance of work skills to that of being white but found that the pattern was rather similar to the ratio of work skills to religious background². Finally we looked at the ratio of work skills to way of life but there was little variation here with almost all countries attaching very similar levels of importance to these two acquired factors. These two additional ratios therefore add little to the first one, and we carry just this one ratio forward into our main analysis.

In addition to these questions on entry criteria, the ESS survey module also included questions on different type of migrant as well as a question on the degree of support for refugees. The 2014 wave of the ESS included three new questions on Muslim, Jewish and Roma immigration, which are particularly relevant for understanding symbolic boundaries. These new measures relating to specific groups were not available to Bail but we expect them to yield additional insights about the nature of symbolic boundaries since these three religious groups have all in different ways been regarded as outsiders in political discourse. These questions allow us to investigate whether there is general opposition to outsiders or whether the occurrence of a symbolic boundary depends on the character of the particular group in question.

The word immigrant has different connotations in each country and the ESS question wording is therefore formulated in terms of foreigners coming to live in country from abroad (Card et al. 2005). For reasons of parsimony we set several survey items to one side, using them for sensitivity analysis rather than in the main analysis. These are questions with a

² The two ratios correlate at 0.84 – see Table A2 in the Appendix

highly correlated alternative³. The questions which we retain in order to gauge attitudes to incoming groups are:

To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country]'s people to come and live here?

How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe?

I am going to ask you about different groups of people who might come to live in [country] from other countries. Using this card, please tell me to what extent you think [country] should allow ...

...Jewish people from other countries to come and live in [country]

...Muslim people from other countries to come and live in [country]

...Gypsies from other countries to come and live in [country]

Some people come to this country and apply for refugee status on the grounds that they fear persecution in their own country. Using this card, please say how much you agree or disagree that...

...the government should be generous in judging people's applications for refugee status

The first of these questions on 'same race' does not directly tap into symbolic group boundaries, but serves as a benchmark of general acceptability of immigration, against which we can distinguish other boundaries. The second item, on poorer countries outside Europe, also serves as a benchmark item, but one that is a tougher benchmark for comparison of culturally distant groups, Muslims in particular, many of whom will originate from poorer countries outside Europe. Finally, the question on refugees taps into humanitarian concerns.

We show country averages for these items in Table 4, where we have ordered countries based on the percentage saying they would allow some or many immigrants from poorer non-European countries, from the most favourable at the top (Sweden, 86%) to the least favourable at the bottom (Hungary, 12%). Country clusters are again somewhat evident in this table, with the majority of the eastern European countries in the lower half of the table. Sweden tops the table across all the 'allow' questions though gypsies are less welcome (76%) than immigrants of the same race as the majority race (93%). However, a rather modest 59% of Swedes agree that the government should be generous to refugees, an attitude where Sweden is rather less generous than Portugal and Poland and at a similar level to Norway and France. This relatively unfavourable position, by Swedish standards, is perhaps a consequence of the high number of refugees arriving in 2014 (see Table 1)⁴.

³ The survey included two additional 'allow' questions. Correlations between these questions and the ones which we use are shown in appendix table A3.

⁴ We show pairwise correlations in tables A1 – A4 in the Appendix. The item on agreeing that the government should be generous to refugees correlates at around 0.3 – 0.4 with the 'allow' questions, while the 'allow'

Table 4 about here

Thus, as with the items on entry criteria, we find variation not only in the *levels* but also in the *profile* of attitudes in different countries in our sample. To capture some of the key features of attitudinal profiles we compute three sets of ratios in the table. First we calculate the ratio of the percentages allowing poor non-Europeans to the percentages urging generosity towards refugees. This ratio is correspondingly low for Sweden and similarly low in Germany, Switzerland, Netherlands and Belgium. The ratio is highest in Hungary, Finland, Ireland and Portugal. This ratio thus provides a rather different perspective on national attitudes. In effect, it tells us about deviations from a general tendency to be favourable, or unfavourable, across the board. Thus Sweden, Germany, Switzerland, Netherlands and Belgium all deviate in the sense of being less favourable to refugees than one would have expected given their favourable stances to migrants from poor non-European countries. The ratio thus provides a more nuanced view of the nature of boundaries.

As a way to further tease out attitudinal profiles, we calculate two additional ratios, namely the ratio of the percentage allowing Muslims to the percentage allowing poor non-Europeans, and the ratio of the percentage allowing Jewish people to that allowing people of the same race as the majority. Many countries such as Norway and Germany have ratios close to 1 indicating that publics in these countries do not, on average, make distinctions between these different types of migrant. France and the UK are the only countries where both of these ratios are well above 1, both being relatively pro-Muslim. Conversely, the Czech Republic, Israel, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Hungary are all relatively less favourable towards Muslims than they are to migrants from poorer countries outside Europe.

The ratios relating to preferences for Jews as opposed to preferences for members of the majority race or ethnic group follow a somewhat similar pattern. Countries such as Hungary, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovenia and Poland are all relatively unfavourable to Jewish migrants, but as might be expected Israel is relatively favourable. It is also notable that almost every country deviates substantially from unity on at least one of these three ratios.

In summary, there are some common patterns that run across several different items. Most notably several Nordic countries – Sweden, Norway and Denmark (but not Finland) are consistently quite willing to accept migrants (although not to the same extent to accept refugees), while the Czech Republic, Hungary and Estonia (but not Poland or Slovenia) consistently are more restrictive. It appears then that there is relatively welcoming Nordic group of countries, a relatively restrictive East European group, and a middling West European group, exactly as Bail and Chylíková had found. However, the ratios bring out that

questions correlate rather more closely with each other from over 0.8 between the two ‘poorer countries’ questions to around 0.4 between allow gypsies and to allow members of the same race as the majority.

these patterns do not operate smoothly across the board and that the country profiles are more subtly differentiated than might appear at first sight. We therefore turn next to MLCA to explore these distinctions more rigorously.

Analytical results

MLCA model selection

We set out to specify a model using indicators which allow us to distinguish both the overall strength and the relative importance of different symbolic boundaries while at the same time aiming to keep the model parsimonious in order to maintain clarity and to avoid duplication and unnecessary complexity⁵.

For our main model we select the following six dependent variables which correspond to those items identified in Tables 3 and 4 that a) tap into different aspects of attitudes and symbolic boundaries, and b) all contribute significant variation.

- 1) Allow immigrants from poorer non-European countries (four-point scale from allow none to allow many)
- 2) Agree that government should be generous to refugees (recoded to binary, 1 for agree, else 0)
- 3) Work skills are important (11-point scale from 0-10)
- 4) Difference between allow Muslims and allow poor non-Europeans (7-point scale from -3 to +3, negative = relatively anti-Muslim)
- 5) Difference between allow Jewish people and allow majority race (7-point scale from -3 to +3, negative = relatively anti-Jewish)
- 6) Difference between the importance of work skills and importance of religious background as entry criteria (scale from -10 to +10, positive = skills relatively more important).

The first three indicators are intended to capture *absolute levels* of support for immigration and importance of entry criteria, corresponding to the overall differences in the brightness of the boundaries⁶. The second three indicators capture the *relative salience* of the different symbolic boundaries. They may be thought of as doing the same job as interaction terms in a regression model. We opt for differences rather than the ratios shown in tables 3 and 4 in order that the resulting scale can be interpreted in terms of points on the 'allow' scale.

Migrants are dropped from the model in order to ensure that we are comparing like with like across European countries, as migrants vary in number between countries and tend to have somewhat different attitudinal profiles from native populations (Ford and Heath, 2014).

One disadvantage of MLCA is that the models quickly become complex and computationally demanding, as a two-level solution, for example with 3 country-level classes and 5

⁵ We use MPlus version 7 (Muthén and Muthén, 2015).

⁶ Sensitivity analysis using the highly correlated items produces a similar model.

individual-level classes is effectively specifying a 15-class model⁷. Thus, while we make some use of model fit statistics for guiding our model choice we have a preference for model parsimony and also take account of the substantive interpretation of the results in our model selection. We show the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC⁸) for a number of model solutions in Table 5. We see a marked improvement in models allowing for country clusters as well as individual clusters. This means that the nature of the individual-level clusters differ across country clusters.

Table 5 about here

Whilst models with 4 country clusters fit better than 3 country clusters according to the BIC, the 4-country solution gives a separate class for a single country which does not add much in substantive terms to the three main clusters⁹. The 5-country cluster models bring relatively small returns in terms of model fit and we dismiss this option in order to maintain parsimony. From among the 3-country solutions, the largest gain in BIC comes when adding a third individual level class. In addition the 3-3 solution has the best entropy score¹⁰, thus suggesting that individuals are assigned to classes with greater certainty than in either the 3-4 or 3-5 solution¹¹. The 3 in 3 solution is therefore our preferred choice, this having the advantage that it produces, for each country set, a class of more favourable (generally pro-immigration) individuals, a class of unfavourable (generally anti-immigration) individuals and one that cannot be so simply characterised as favourable or unfavourable but where individuals have clear preferences for some types of migrant above others.

The results of the preferred model are shown in Table 6. For reasons explained below we label the three individual-level classes as 1) Restrictive, 2) Selective, and 3) Open. We label the three country sets after their prototypical countries (identified on the basis of the residuals¹²), namely the Czech, Ireland and Norway sets. We first compare the characteristics

⁷ Which, with six dependent variables involves estimating 6*15 parameters in addition to estimates for class membership counts.

⁸ ICs are based on the log likelihood, but impose a penalty for model complexity. The Bayesian IC imposes a harsher penalty for the number of parameters than the AIC.

⁹ The stand-alone country that often emerges is Sweden, distinct in its high levels of favourability. However, as we will go on to show, Sweden's attitudinal profile also has much in common with other countries in Northern Europe.

¹⁰ Entropy is the average class membership possibilities summarised into a single score. The score is a measure of how well people were assigned to classes with scores closer to 1 indicating that the classes are more clearly distinguishable and reflecting a clear delineation of the classes.

¹¹ Further, these two alternative solutions (the 3-4 model and the 3-5 model) produce sets of small sample size that we deem more nuanced than to be analytically useful in the context of this paper.

¹² Residuals allow us to appraise how well countries fit their sets. They are calculated by taking observed country means from the conditional estimates emerging from the latent class model. We show these in Figure A1 in the Appendix. The archetypal countries (CZ, NO, IE, but also LT, AU, FI) have residuals of close to zero across all six indicators. Several countries are well-fitting with a single exception. For example, both Estonia and the UK place more weight on work skills than religion compared to their respective sets. Israel, as one might expect, places more weight on religion as an entry criterion. Anti-Jewish sentiment is higher than the set average in Hungary, and anti-Muslim sentiment higher than the set average in Poland. Slovenia fits well into its set in the main, but is more similar to other former-socialist countries in its low level of support for refugees. Portugal has higher levels of support for refugees than its set. Belgium appears to be a 'borderline' country

of the members of the three individual-level classes, in effect looking down the columns, and then compare the country sets – looking along the rows.

Table 6 about here

The individual-level classes

The open class is perhaps the most straightforward and represents the benchmark. In a nutshell, membership of this class is characterized by generous attitudes on the three absolute measures (attitudes to migrants from poor non-European countries, refugees, and the importance of work skills) and by the irrelevance of the difference measures (only two out of the nine coefficients in the bottom panel of table 6 being significant). Thus, looking down the columns of table 6, we see that individual members of this class tend to be more positive about immigration from poorer non-European countries and more generous towards refugees than are members of the restrictive class. Members of the open class are particularly notable compared with members of the other two classes in the low importance which they attach to the entry criterion of work skills. Given the non-significance of the difference measure, we should interpret this as indicating low importance attached to entry criteria in general. In other words members of the open class do not express strong cultural or economic resistance against migrants in general or against distinctive sorts of migrant.

The restrictive class is in several respects the polar opposite and members of this class tend to be very different from members of the open class on all three absolute measures. Thus, within the restrictive class, willingness to allow poor non-Europeans is low, as is willingness to treat refugees generously while its members also attach high levels of importance to work skills as an entry requirement. In contrast to the open class, however, the skills-religion difference measure is highly significant, members of the restrictive class giving much greater weight to work skills than to religious background. They are primarily concerned with economic threat and make little distinction between migrants of the same race or ethnic group and Jewish migrants (coefficients not significantly different from zero in any of the three country sets). Where a distinction is made between immigrants from poorer non-European countries and Muslims (sets 2 and 3) it tends to be in favour of Muslims.

The selective class stands out from the open and restrictive classes in the role which the difference measures play, all nine of the coefficients being statistically significant. Thus, as well as prioritizing work skills over religion as an entry criterion (as with the restrictive class), members of the selective class also make distinctions between types of migrant, with penalties for both Jewish and Muslim migrants.

The selective class also has a distinctive profile with respect to the three absolute measures. It is not a straightforward half-way house between the open and restrictive classes. Instead its members are similar to the restrictive class in the importance which they attach to work skills,

with moderate residuals on two indicators: it is less favourable to refugees and towards poorer non-Europeans than the rest of its set.

but similar to members of the open class in their more positive attitudes towards refugees and their willingness to allow migrants from poorer non-European countries. We could say that members of this class exhibit a less strong insider/outsider distinction than does the restrictive class but exhibit specific symbolic boundaries vis-à-vis both Muslims and Jews.

The country-level sets

Country set 1 (the Czech model) comprises four Eastern European countries of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Lithuania together with Israel. Country set 2 (the Ireland model) is the most heterogeneous in terms of geographical spread and includes two of the more favourable Eastern European countries (Poland and Slovenia) as well as the least favourable of the Nordic countries (Finland), together with Western European countries France, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the UK and central European Austria. Country set 3 (the Norway model) comprises the other three Nordic countries along with Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland (countries linked as it happens by their Germanic languages).

These three sets of countries correspond very closely to the hierarchy of countries shown in tables 3 and 4 (especially table 4), with the more generous Nordic countries along with Germany and the other countries at the top of table 4 coming in set 3. In contrast Israel and the eastern European countries coming at the bottom of table 4 all are allocated to set 1. This ordering is closely reflected in the patterns revealed in table 6. Thus, as we move along the rows of table 6, we see that average scores on ‘allow poor non-Europeans’ increase monotonically as we move from set 1 to set 3, while average scores on ‘work skills important’ decline. We also see a clear monotonic shift in the case of the skills-religion difference as we move along the rows; in effect the relative importance of religion diminishes as we move from set 1 to set 3 (again as noted in table 3). In other words, the three sets of countries differ both with respect to these two absolute measures and with respect to the skills-religion relative measure.

There is also a clear difference between the country sets on the absolute refugee item, although not a monotonic one: instead it is the countries in set 2 not set 3 which tend to be more generous towards refugees (again as noted in table 4).

In the case of the two remaining difference items (the ‘same race-Jewish’ and ‘poor non European-Muslim’ differences), patterns vary depending on the particular class of individuals under consideration:

- The preference for one’s own race over Jewish migrants becomes weaker as one moves from the Czech to the Norway sets although only among members of the selective set. (The difference is non-significant in all three sets among members of the other two classes.)
- The preference for migrants from poor non-European countries over Muslim migrants also becomes weaker within the selective class as one moves from the Czech to the

Norway sets. (But a preference for Muslim migrants becomes stronger among members of the restrictive class.)

Overall these patterns suggest what might be interpreted as contextual effects, the effects operating both on the absolute measures and on the relative measures (the difference scores). It may be tempting to see these contextual effects as indicative of different types of national culture. However, one should not reify national cultures at the expense of individual variation. As table 6 shows, within each set of countries there are major differences in attitudes and preferences between the restrictive, selective and open classes of individuals. In other words, all three sets of countries are marked by considerable internal heterogeneity.

Homogeneity and heterogeneity within countries

To explore the extent of heterogeneity and homogeneity we report in table 7 the proportions of individuals assigned to the restrictive, selective and open classes within each of the three sets of countries. The key finding is that there is very considerable heterogeneity within all three sets of countries, although the extent of heterogeneity is even greater in the Norway and Ireland sets than in the Czech set. This has the very important implication that we should beware of trying to categorize countries (apart perhaps from those in the Czech set) as having distinctive national symbolic boundaries. Rather, symbolic boundaries are contested within all sets, especially so in the Norway and Ireland sets.

Country set 1 (the Czech model) shows the greatest homogeneity with a majority in each of the five countries being assigned to the restrictive class. The percentage ranges from 73 in Hungary to 55 in Israel while the set average is 60. The average membership of the open class is lowest in this set of countries at 11 per cent. We can think of this set of countries, then, as being relatively consensual and it makes some sense to think of them as having distinctive symbolic boundaries. This makes particular sense in the case of Israel with its status as the Jewish homeland.

But in the other two sets, we find contested boundaries. Thus, despite having the highest proportions assigned to the open class (25 per cent) and the smallest proportion assigned to the selective class, set 3 (the Norway model) can be considered the least consensual and most heterogeneous. With just one exception (Sweden) no single class membership constitutes a majority and many countries show a rather even split between the restrictive, selective and open classes. This is particularly the case in Denmark, but Norway and the Netherlands are not far behind. The most frequent class membership in this set tends to be the selective class.

In set 2 (the Ireland model), populations are also fairly heterogeneous, though in contrast to the Norway model several class memberships constitute a majority. Over 50 per cent in Austria, Finland, the UK and Ireland are classed as restrictive. Finland looks rather similar to Denmark in terms of its rather polarized public with fewer than average in the selective class, and higher numbers than average for this set in the open class. The UK is the most consensual of this set and in terms of class membership proportions looks rather similar to Lithuania from set 1.

Table 7 about here

A final point of interest is the role of the socio-demographic factors which have been shown to be associated with attitudes to immigration. The finding that the degree of influence varies widely between Eastern and Western European countries (Kunovich 2004) suggests that the socio-demographic antecedents are a further way in which countries can be judged as consensual or polarized. To explore this angle, we run separate multinomial logistic regression models for each country-level set, with the 'restrictive' class as the omitted category (Table 8).

The results suggest that indeed the magnitude of the socio-demographic divides parallels the extent of attitudinal heterogeneity. In set 1, typified by the Czech Republic, we find the socio-demographic differences between the three attitude types to be rather small, with household income having no significant effect, and the effect of education being rather weak. In the two other sets (the Norway and Ireland models), on the other hand, publics appear to be sharply divided by education and income. The divisions with respect to the restrictive/open contrast are particularly large in the case of the Norway model, echoing our finding from table 7 that this set of countries are the least consensual.

We also test whether strength of national belonging ("feeling close to country") influences attitudes differentially, and again find that differences are sharper in the Ireland and Norway models than in the Czech model. We find that individuals who do *not* feel close to their country are more likely to belong to the open class. This echoes findings about the relationship between national identity and attitudes to immigration.

In summary, both socio-economic and cultural (national identity) factors are important in explaining the kind of attitude profile which an individual will exhibit; countries which are less consensual in their attitude profiles are also more polarized in terms of the social groups that typically hold those attitudes.

Table 8 about here

Discussion

Our multilevel latent class analysis has shown important differences both between countries and between publics within countries. While, as a first approximation, we can think of individuals and countries as being generally more or less favourable to immigration, with Sweden and North European countries being the most favourable and Hungary and some other East European countries being the least favourable, this approximation misses crucial distinctions which are important both theoretically and practically.

Firstly, at the individual level, the MLCA distinguished what we labelled restrictive, selective and open attitude profiles. Members of the open class tend to have weak or blurred boundaries against migrants and are generally more favourable. They also show little in the way of preferences for different sorts of migrant based on race or religion. In contrast members of the restrictive class tend to exhibit what might be termed strong, insider versus outsider, boundaries against migrants, being generally unfavourable to immigration but having a marked preference for work skills over other entry criteria. Members of the selective class, on the other hand, while relatively generous overall, take a more differentiated view of immigration with stronger preferences between different sorts of migrant.

Secondly, at the country level, the MLCA distinguished three interpretable sets consisting of what we termed the Czech, Ireland and Norway models respectively. These three models can be broadly differentiated in terms of their overall favourability towards immigration, the Norway model being the most favourable and the Czech model the least favourable.

Thirdly, our multilevel approach demonstrates an important, and readily interpretable, interplay between country and individual clusters. Thus the relative preferences between different sorts of migrants are stronger in the Czech model and weaker in the Norway model, although only among members of the selective class of individuals. The three models are thus qualitatively and quantitatively different from each other.

The multilevel approach also brings out the way in which the degree of internal heterogeneity and homogeneity varies between national contexts. In the Czech model we find a fair degree of consensus, with a majority of individuals in each of the five constituent countries belonging to the restrictive class. In the other two models there is more dissensus. In the Norway model the modal class is the selective not the open class. Furthermore, individuals within this set tend to be the most evenly distributed between the three classes and therefore, the Norway set of countries is actually the most heterogeneous. They also display the greatest socio-demographic polarization. In other words, countries in the Norway set, despite their overall greater favourability towards migrants, are far from consensual or united. Categorizing countries simply as more or less favourable may therefore miss the point. Among some countries which appear to be favourable towards immigration based on their country averages, we still find considerable percentages of individuals classified as restrictive, for example 43 per cent in Denmark, 42 per cent in Belgium and 37 per cent in Switzerland. In these countries it appears that attitudes are rather polarized. This polarization

is likely to be relevant for understanding why far right political parties can have considerable success in countries which are relatively favourable to immigration.

These findings clearly indicate that we need to have a more sophisticated view of symbolic boundaries than would be offered by a simple comparison of average scores in the different countries. In particular our multilevel approach shows that it would be unwise to essentialize or generalize the nature of boundaries characterizing countries. Most strikingly we have emphasized the high degree of heterogeneity within the publics of Northern and West European countries. To put this matter somewhat differently, the nature of the symbolic boundaries are contested within these countries. Different groups within these countries have very different ideas of where the boundaries lie, or indeed whether they should be any boundaries at all.

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Table 1: Migration to the survey countries, 2014

	Total stock of foreign born (000s)	Foreign-born as percentage of the population	Annual inflow (000s)	Inflow of asylum seekers (000s)	% coming from poor non-European countries*	Proportion coming from predominantly Muslim countries*
Austria	1,485	17.4	154	28	12.5%	17.0%
Belgium	1,812	16.1	124	14	10.1%	7.9%
Czech Republic	745	7.1	39	1	12.9%	4.5%
Denmark	501	8.9	49	15	30.9%	17.6%
Estonia	133	10.1	1	0.1	Not available	
Finland	322	5.9	24	4	38.4%	17.1%
France	7,921	12.4	168	59	93.2%	69.2%
Germany	10,689	13.2	1,343	173	12.2%	12.0%
Hungary	476	4.8	26	41	31.9%	3.3%
Ireland	754	16.4	49	1	67.1%	20.3%
Israel	1,817	22.1	24	6	4.3%	0.0%
Lithuania	Not available					
Netherlands	1,953	11.8	139	24	25.0%	14.0%
Norway	705	14.4	61	13	26.6%	16.6%
Poland	675	1.8	32	7	27.4%	4.0%
Portugal	885	8.1	35	0.4	58.8%	0.0%
Slovenia	341	16.6	18	0.4	0.0%	33.1%
Spain	6,155	13.2	266	6	44.3%	0.0%
Sweden	1,604	16.6	106	75	68.9%	60.3%
Switzerland	2,355	28.8	152	22	5.0%	0.0%
UK	8,482	13.3	504	31	32.4%	3.4%

Sources: OECD 2016, 2017

Notes:

* Percentages of the 15 largest sending countries in 2014 (NB: on average the top 15 account for 70% of total inflow of migrants)

Countries classified as Muslim based on CIA World Fact Book. We include Bosnia & Herzegovina (51% Muslim), Malaysia (61%), Nigeria (50%). We counted Eritrea and Somalia as Muslim majority country despite lack of statistics.

Turkey and Kazakhstan are classed as non-European.

Table 2: Summary of Bail (2008)'s country sets

	A	B	C
Descriptive label	New immigration countries on the European periphery	Old immigration countries in the core of Western Europe	Accommodating isolationists
Geographical coverage	Peripheral	Core	Nordic
Features of symbolic boundary	++ religion/race -- Culture - Education + Occupation	-- religion/race ++ Culture + Education - Occupation	- All
Countries in group	ES, PT, IT, FI, PL, CZ, IE, HU, GR	UK, FR, DE, BE, NL, LU, SI, AT	CH, NO, SE, DK
Prototypical	ES	UK	CH
Atypical	IE, HU, GR	SI, NL	

Table 3: Comparison of importance of ascribed and achieved criteria for accepting migrants, percentages and ratios (2014/5)

	Percentage agreeing that ... is important								
	Work skills	Religious background	Speak language	Be white	Commitment to way of life	Have good qualifications	Ratio: work skills to religious background	Ratio: work skills to be white	Ratio: work skills to way of life
Sweden	32%	7%	32%	3%	72%	32%	4.42	10.84	0.45
Norway	50%	13%	53%	7%	56%	44%	4.02	7.20	0.91
Denmark	60%	18%	46%	7%	59%	64%	3.28	8.27	1.02
France	61%	16%	83%	8%	75%	67%	3.90	7.55	0.81
Finland	64%	19%	50%	9%	87%	60%	3.29	6.96	0.73
Germany	64%	10%	74%	3%	84%	70%	6.37	20.29	0.77
Netherlands	65%	9%	80%	5%	87%	61%	7.11	13.55	0.74
Poland	67%	43%	68%	22%	67%	60%	1.56	3.11	1.01
Spain	69%	22%	59%	11%	77%	64%	3.10	6.29	0.90
Switzerland	69%	19%	75%	7%	82%	68%	3.67	10.12	0.84
Belgium	71%	15%	82%	12%	91%	71%	4.90	5.79	0.78
Israel	72%	71%	49%	14%	71%	66%	1.02	5.13	1.01
Portugal	73%	29%	65%	17%	69%	63%	2.48	4.29	1.06
Slovenia	74%	19%	76%	14%	80%	53%	3.88	5.35	0.93
Austria	75%	23%	84%	13%	74%	75%	3.20	5.63	1.01
Czech Rep	75%	40%	69%	35%	87%	61%	1.85	2.14	0.86
Ireland	79%	24%	80%	14%	69%	74%	3.29	5.58	1.13
Hungary	81%	41%	74%	41%	91%	49%	1.95	1.96	0.89
Lithuania	81%	51%	77%	45%	78%	71%	1.58	1.79	1.05
Estonia	83%	35%	56%	32%	85%	72%	2.38	2.61	0.98
UK	83%	18%	88%	8%	86%	75%	4.74	10.84	0.97

Source: European Social Survey Round 7, 2014/15 (all countries participating in round 7), weighted with design weights

Factor analysis suggests that 1) qualifications, work skills and language load on an employability factor; 2) race and religion load on an ascribed characteristics factor; and 3) way of life is a weaker factor on its own (eigenvalue below 1). This is similar for both the individual level and country level analysis

Table 4: Comparison of support for different types of immigrant percentages and ratios (2014/5)

	Percentage willing to allow some or many								
	Muslims	from poorer non-European countries	Jewish people	Same race as majority	Gypsies	% agree gov't should be generous to refugees	Ratio of refugees: migrants from poorer non-European countries	Ratio of Muslim migrants: migrants from poorer non-European countries	Ratio of Jewish people: migrants of same race as the majority
Sweden	79%	86%	90%	93%	76%	59%	0.69	0.92	0.97
Norway	65%	67%	80%	83%	47%	56%	0.83	0.96	0.95
Germany	70%	66%	87%	90%	58%	40%	0.61	1.07	0.96
Switzerland	54%	54%	70%	83%	42%	34%	0.63	1.00	0.85
Netherlands	53%	53%	70%	71%	45%	32%	0.60	1.01	0.98
Belgium	52%	52%	66%	73%	39%	30%	0.58	1.01	0.90
France	65%	52%	75%	73%	50%	57%	1.10	1.25	1.03
Poland	30%	50%	52%	66%	33%	60%	1.19	0.61	0.79
Spain	40%	50%	51%	60%	35%	55%	1.11	0.80	0.85
Slovenia	52%	50%	56%	72%	38%	37%	0.74	1.04	0.77
Portugal	35%	46%	47%	63%	27%	67%	1.45	0.76	0.75
Denmark	53%	44%	78%	82%	36%	45%	1.02	1.20	0.95
Austria	44%	43%	60%	68%	39%	37%	0.87	1.03	0.89
UK	54%	42%	70%	63%	40%	46%	1.09	1.28	1.12
Ireland	42%	42%	55%	60%	26%	55%	1.31	1.00	0.92
Lithuania	28%	37%	48%	67%	20%	27%	0.72	0.76	0.72
Finland	36%	35%	54%	64%	29%	50%	1.44	1.04	0.84
Estonia	27%	30%	62%	71%	18%	25%	0.82	0.90	0.88
Czech Republic	14%	27%	44%	42%	11%	21%	0.77	0.53	1.05
Israel	15%	24%	87%	82%	15%	19%	0.77	0.59	1.06
Hungary	10%	12%	25%	50%	8%	22%	1.83	0.83	0.50

Source: European Social Survey Round 7, 2014/15 (all countries participating in round 7), weighted with design weights

Countries are ordered with countries that are more positive towards immigration at the top.

Highest correlations on raw variables are observed between allow poor non-European and allow poor European (.85), and between different race and poor non-European (.77) and between gypsies and Muslims (.78) – See Table A1.1 in the Appendix

Table 5: Bayesian Information Criteria (BICs) and entropy scores for MLCA models

	Base	2 country-level	3 country-level	4 country-level
2 individual-level	644189 (0.84)	636659 (0.92)	634573 (0.94)	633685 (0.94)
3 individual-level	637186 (0.69)	628708 (0.82)	626836 (0.85)	624875 (0.87)
4 individual-level	632783 (0.79)	625356 (0.79)	623220 (0.82)	621854 (0.85)
5 individual-level	630291 (0.75)	622874 (0.79)	620635 (0.82)	a
6 individual-level	627104 (0.76)	619607 (0.80)	a	617128 (0.85)

Entropy scores in parentheses: scores closer to 1 indicate greater certainty of assigning cases to classes

a models not identified

Preferred solution in bold

Table 6 Multi-level Latent Class Model results

	Country set 1: CZ EE HU IL LT		Country set 2: AT ES FI FR UK IE PL PT SI		Country set 3: BE CH DE DK NL NO SE	
	(5664)		(7054)		(3677)	
<i>Restrictive</i>	Mean	SE	Mean	SE	Mean	SE
Work skills important	8.111	0.094	7.876	0.159	7.624	0.129
Allow poor non-Europeans	1.499	0.042	1.676	0.057	1.838	0.069
Govt should be generous to refugees	0.151	0.007	0.309	0.036	0.157	0.014
Difference: skills-religion	2.554	0.236	3.887	0.24	4.782	0.285
Difference: same-Jewish	0.122	0.173	-0.039	0.074	-0.005	0.047
Difference: poor nonEur-Muslims	-0.119	0.062	-0.329	0.081	-0.409	0.044
	(2736)		(5837)		(4929)	
<i>Selective</i>	Mean	SE	Mean	SE	Mean	SE
Work skills important	7.492	0.161	7.309	0.1	6.714	0.125
Allow poor non-Europeans	2.851	0.06	2.941	0.056	3.008	0.039
Govt should be generous to refugees	0.331	0.03	0.678	0.03	0.445	0.04
Difference: skills-religion	2.708	0.409	4.213	0.29	4.504	0.182
Difference: same-Jewish	0.355	0.116	0.252	0.062	0.102	0.031
Difference: poor nonEur-Muslims	0.914	0.114	0.453	0.098	0.258	0.023
	(935)		(2047)		(2761)	
<i>Open</i>	Mean	SE	Mean	SE	Mean	SE
Work skills important	2.706	0.616	2.05	0.138	1.766	0.213
Allow poor non-Europeans	2.043	0.193	2.946	0.052	3.232	0.118
Govt should be generous to refugees	0.242	0.039	0.663	0.019	0.657	0.043
Difference: skills-religion	-2.171	1.554	0.118	0.239	0.736	0.102
Difference: same-Jewish	0.032	0.135	0.062	0.035	-0.01	0.015
Difference: poor nonEur-Muslims	0.205	0.059	0.103	0.062	-0.013	0.024

Ns given in brackets, based on most likely membership counts

Entropy score (i.e. average probability of class membership) is 0.85

Table 7: Class membership proportions of countries by country set

	Restrictive	Selective	Open	Total
Country set 1: CZ EE HU IL LT				
CZ	58%	31%	11%	100%
EE	60%	34%	7%	100%
HU	73%	19%	8%	100%
IL	55%	24%	21%	100%
LT	55%	38%	7%	100%
Mean	61%	29%	10%	100%
Country set 2: AT ES FI FR UK IE PL PT SI				
AT	53%	37%	10%	100%
ES	41%	44%	16%	100%
FI	52%	27%	21%	100%
FR	42%	39%	19%	100%
UK	57%	36%	7%	100%
IE	52%	40%	8%	100%
PL	35%	46%	20%	100%
PT	41%	48%	12%	100%
SI	44%	43%	13%	100%
Mean	46%	40%	14%	100%
Country set 3: BE CH DE DK NL NO, SE				
BE	42%	45%	13%	100%
CH	37%	47%	16%	100%
DE	30%	51%	19%	100%
DK	43%	32%	25%	100%
NL	40%	43%	18%	100%
NO	23%	46%	31%	100%
SE	9%	37%	54%	100%
Mean	32%	43%	25%	100%

Notes: Estimates are weighted. Weights account for sampling design and country sample size. Average class membership probabilities are rather similar in all countries and across all classes, though the lowest probability of .74 is seen in assigning Hungarians to the Open class, and the highest probability of .94 is assigning Swedes to the Open class.

Table 8: Socio-demographic characteristics of attitude types by country set

	Class 1: The Czech model		Class 2: Ireland model		Class 3: Norway model	
	Selective	Open	Selective	Open	Selective	Open
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Age	-0.012*	-0.011*	-0.008*	-0.019*	-0.001	-0.016*
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.001]	[0.002]
Female	0.212*	0.250*	0.101*	0.316*	0.037	0.384*
	[0.053]	[0.081]	[0.041]	[0.059]	[0.048]	[0.058]
Education (7-point ISCED)	0.067*	0.025	0.149*	0.169*	0.114*	0.237*
	[0.017]	[0.027]	[0.013]	[0.018]	[0.014]	[0.017]
Household income deciles	-0.017	0	0.039*	0.014	0.028*	0.035*
	[0.014]	[0.021]	[0.009]	[0.013]	[0.010]	[0.012]
Income missing dummy	-0.079	0.180+	-0.196*	-0.203*	-0.051	-0.169
	[0.069]	[0.096]	[0.055]	[0.083]	[0.081]	[0.104]
Feel very close to country (reference)						
Close	0.265*	0.091	-0.011	0.147*	0.163*	0.215*
	[0.056]	[0.086]	[0.045]	[0.066]	[0.053]	[0.065]
Not close	0.227*	0.297*	-0.055	0.460*	0.151	0.472*
	[0.101]	[0.148]	[0.077]	[0.104]	[0.096]	[0.115]
Constant	-0.520*	-1.480*	-0.511*	-1.564*	-0.451*	-1.824*
	[0.120]	[0.183]	[0.104]	[0.156]	[0.114]	[0.153]
Country dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	9082		14654		11202	

Notes: multinomial logistic regression models with Restrictive as the omitted category. Country dummies are included but coefficients not shown; Estimates are weighted. Weights account for sampling design and country sample size; * indicates statistical significance at $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.1$

Appendix A

Table A1 Correlations of the six immigration criteria using original 11-point scales

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Qualifications	1					
2. Language	0.53	1				
3. Religious background	0.28	0.25	1			
4. Race	0.22	0.25	0.55	1		
5. Work skills	0.58	0.50	0.34	0.34	1	
6. Way of life	0.32	0.38	0.26	0.24	0.48	1

N = 39,000

Table A2 Country-level correlations of criteria ratios

	1	2	3
1 Ratio importance of skills: religious background	1		
2 Ratio importance of skills: be white	0.8433	1	
3 Ratio importance of skills: way of life	-0.5299	-0.4957	1

N = 21

Table A3 Correlations of the 7 ‘allow’ questions using original (4-point) scales and the ‘agree that the government should be generous to refugees’ question (0-10 point scale)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1 Allow same/ majority	1							
2 Allow different race	0.67	1						
3 Allow poor European	0.59	0.77	1					
4 Allow poor non-European	0.56	0.76	0.85	1				
5 Allow Jewish people	0.59	0.52	0.48	0.48	1			
6 Allow Muslims	0.46	0.65	0.62	0.64	0.59	1		
7 Allow Gypsies	0.43	0.60	0.60	0.63	0.53	0.78	1	
8 Agree should be generous to refugees	0.27	0.39	0.40	0.41	0.26	0.39	0.38	1


N = 39,000

Table A4 Country-level correlations of ‘allow’ ratios

	1	2	3
1 Ratio of allow Muslims: poor non-European	1		
2 Ratio of be generous to refugees: allow poor non-European	-0.0392	1	
3 Ratio of allow Jewish people: same race	0.2564	-0.4969	1

N = 21

Figure A1 Standardized residuals by country by variable



Residuals are calculated by taking actuals from latent class estimate with 95% confidence intervals; standardized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of 1.