Black Democrats in White America:

Racial Campaign Strategies in Majority-White Contexts, 1989-2013

RICHARD JOHNSON
Nuffield College, University of Oxford

Submitted for the DPhil in Politics

Abstract

Black electoral politics has undergone a profound transformation in the half century since African Americans statutorily secured equal voting rights with whites. Once confined to a small number of exceptional cases, the population of black elected officials has multiplied dramatically. The genre which studies African American politics has, likewise, vigorously proliferated, but theoretical deficiencies persist. In particular, the dominant model used to explain the choice of racial campaign strategies by African American candidates in jurisdictions where most of their voters are white is incomplete. The model's underlying hypothesis is premised on limited and increasingly outdated assumptions. Commentators continue to argue that successful black candidates must discard their racial identity in order to win white votes, yet a careful examination of the actual practices of black politicians in majority-white jurisdictions demonstrates that this argument is not substantiated empirically. As a result, scholars are mischaracterising the potential for black candidates to win elections in majority-white contexts.

This thesis is an attempt to advance the scholarship through a theoretical reconceptualisation of racial campaign strategies underpinned by original, empirical research. The thesis sets out to achieve two goals. The first goal is to provide a rich, analytical account based on primary research of the range of campaign strategies available to office-seeking African American candidates outside of majority-black election contexts. The thesis demonstrates the capacity for black candidates to embrace their racial identity and champion policies which redress racial inequality while still seeking support from white voters. The second objective is to offer plausible explanations as to the strategic decision-making process in these campaigns. The thesis highlights the shifting importance of three sets variables which candidates face when choosing their racial campaign strategies: racial context and history, the racial attitudes of supportive and opposing elite actors, and candidates' own racial biographies.

Title: *Black Democrats in White America: Racial Campaign Strategies in Majority-White Contexts, 1989-2013*
Candidate: Richard Johnson
College: Nuffield College
Degree: DPhil in Politics
Term: Trinity 2017

To my parents

Contents

Acknowledgements 5

List of Tables and Figures 7

Part I – Black Democrats in Majority-White Elections 11

Chapter 1 - Introduction 12

Chapter 2 – Theorising Racial Campaign Strategies 38

Part II – The Pioneers 60

Chapter 3 - Douglas Wilder (Virginia, 1989) 61

Chapter 4 - Harvey Gantt (North Carolina, 1990) 96

Chapter 5 - Carol Moseley Braun (Illinois, 1992) 132

Part III – Race-Conscious Campaigning in Democratic Primaries 159

Chapter 6 - Barack Obama (Illinois, 2004) 161

Chapter 7 - Keith Ellison (Minnesota, 2006) 212

Part IV – After Deracialisation 246

Chapter 8 - Harold Ford (Tennessee, 2006) 248

Chapter 9 - Cory Booker (New Jersey, 2013) 286

Part V – Conclusion 323

Chapter 10 - Conclusion 324

Appendix A: Interview Sources 336

Appendix B: Archival Sources 339

Appendix C: Newspaper Sources 341

Appendix D: Coding Method for Campaign Communications 343

Bibliography 349

Acknowledgements

Reflecting on his study of small-town Midwestern politics, the early twentieth-century political sociologist Robert Lynd posited that 'the ideal person for this job would have been a Chinese anthropologist', yet he acknowledged that there were also advantages to his insider-outsider position as someone of Midwestern origin but by then firmly a New Yorker.[1] I have found similar advantages in my study of American politics. As a British citizen, I was sufficiently an outsider for interview subjects to be candid and willing to explain dimensions of American politics which they perhaps would have taken for granted in an interaction with an American researcher. These explanations were, in themselves, extremely valuable because they helped me to get a sense of how political strategists thought about the worlds in which they operated. Yet, as someone who has spent considerable time in the United States, I was able to measure these analyses against my own knowledge of American social, cultural, and political practices.

This thesis is the work of nearly five years of graduate research during which I studied in-depth thirteen historic African American candidates for major public offices in the United States. This research took me to twelve different states and Washington, DC where I worked in twenty archival collections and conducted over 150 interviews with candidates, campaign staff, party figures, and other political elites. This manuscript focuses on seven Democratic candidates in my sample, but the other cases will form the basis of future manuscripts.

I would like to thank those who read earlier versions of this manuscript, including Anthony Johnson, Desmond King, Iain McLean, Lisa Miller, and Ezequiel González Ocantos. I am grateful to Haroon Mohamoud for providing the translation of a Somali-language radio broadcast into English.

The fieldwork for this manuscript has been both exhausting and exciting, involving six separate trips to the United States since 2013. I travelled the country without a driver's licence, instead relying on trains, buses, and lifts from interview subjects. Fieldwork grants from the Economic & Social Research Council (ESRC), the Rothermere American Institute, and Nuffield College made these research trips possible. I appreciatively acknowledge the Doctoral Training Studentship from the ESRC for funding my MPhil and DPhil studies.

I am very grateful to all ninety of the subjects who agreed to be interviewed for this manuscript (Appendix A) and to the many librarians and archivists who assisted me (Appendix B). I express particular gratitude to Governor Douglas Wilder, Senator Carol Moseley Braun, and Congressman Keith Ellison for allowing me to interview them. Senator Braun merits special thanks for taking me to dinner and giving me a tour of Chicago as she drove me from Chicago's downtown Loop to the house on 91st Street where I was staying. She kindly granted me access to her Senate campaign archive which is otherwise embargoed to researchers until 2048.

During my travels, I received help from too many people to thank individually, but there are several who deserve special recognition. Barbara Grey, whom I met by chance in a gallery at Virginia Union University (from which she graduated in 1947), was instrumental in helping me to secure an interview with Governor Wilder. Larry Jacobs provided me with the introductions to several key interviewees in Minnesota, including Vice President Walter Mondale. Bassam Gergi introduced me to Daniel Pereira who allowed me to act as his shadow while working in then-Mayor Cory Booker's campaign for the US Senate. Dan's parents kindly allowed me (a complete stranger) to stay in their basement.

[1] Robert Lynd, 'The Problem with Being Objective in Studying One's Own Culture', Lecture at Princeton University, 9 December 1938.

I have been fortunate to have been taught by some superb academics during my time at university. My university supervisor Desmond King deserves more thanks than anyone. Des has been an enormous source of intellectual direction and challenge, and he has been a fantastic guide through the academic world. I feel incredibly privileged to have been his supervisee. My college supervisor, Iain McLean, has been a ready source of advice throughout my graduate studies. His range of scholarly (and non-scholarly!) interests is simply prodigious.

From my undergraduate studies at Cambridge (Jesus College), I am particularly appreciative of Véronique Mottier, Duncan Kelly, Andrew Gamble, Chris Brooke, and Helen Thompson who helped me to grow as a scholar and gave me the confidence to pursue graduate studies. As an MPhil student at Oxford (Nuffield College), Nancy Bermeo was a source of wise counsel. Nigel Bowles was a brilliant tutor in American politics, and he inspired me to invest more time in my weekly tutorial essays than was rational. I have reaped the rewards of these efforts ever since. As a DPhil candidate, I benefited from the mentorship of other outstanding academics. Lisa Miller and Sidney Milkis, who each served as the Winant Visiting Professor of American Government at Oxford, were especially supportive and motivating. Fellow Oxford Americanists Ursula Hackett and Nina Yancy have provided welcome camaraderie along the way.

Nuffield College has been a sublime setting for my graduate studies, and I am grateful to the hard-working staff who make Nuffield such a pleasant place to live and work. I am deeply indebted to the brilliant team in the Nuffield College Library who have assisted me many times in finding obscure publications and who have ordered numerous books about American politics for me.

No doubt as a white researcher of black politics, my perspective will always be to some degree limited, but I hope that my preference for giving actors the opportunity to speak in their own voices diminishes the risk of 'speaking for' a community of whom I am not a member. I also hope that this thesis will give attention to works by black political scientists, many for whom attention is well-deserved but who have been unjustly neglected. I want to thank Vesla Weaver for exposing me to some of these authors in her Race and American Politics course at Yale. I had a magnificent time as a visiting student at Yale's Institution for Social and Policy Studies, and I want to thank everyone at Yale who made me feel welcome, including Vesla Weaver, Jacob Hacker, and David Mayhew.

There are many friends and family members who have supported me along the way. Above all, I want to thank my partner Ashley Walsh for his encouragement and companionship. There are too many friends to name, but I am grateful to them all.

Last, but not least, I want to thank my parents, Ruth and Anthony Johnson, for their support and unwavering commitment to my education. I especially want to acknowledge my mother who did not have the opportunity to go to university herself, but who impressed on me the importance of education and hard work since before I can remember. Without my parents, I could not have written this manuscript and, for that reason, it is dedicated to them.

List of Tables and Figures

Tables

1.1. Contrast between the 'deracialised' and 'racialised' campaign strategies
1.2. Racial campaign strategies (black candidates in majority-white jurisdictions)
1.3. Summary of cases
1.4. Interview subjects

3.1. Virginia Republican gubernatorial primary (1989)
3.2. Democratic candidates for statewide office in Virginia (1989)

6.1. Results of Democratic primary for the First Congressional District of Illinois (2000)
6.2. Policy content of targeted direct mail

8.1. Members of the Ford family who have held political office
8.2. Black voter participation in Tennessee (2004, 2006)
8.3. Alternative scenarios producing a Ford victory

9.1. Cory Booker's travel for paid speeches (2012-13)

10.1. Part II case studies: Dependent variable
10.2. Part II case studies: Explanatory variables
10.3. Part III case studies: Dependent variable
10.4. Part III case studies: Explanatory variables
10.5. Part IV case studies: Explanatory variables
10.6. Part IV case studies: Dependent variable

Figures

1.1. Deval Patrick for Governor of Massachusetts television advertisement (2006)
1.2. White support for Democrats in presidential and congressional elections (1968-2016)
1.3. Ken Gibson for Mayor of Newark leaflet (1970) – *black power*
1.4. Ken Gibson for Mayor of Newark leaflet (1970) – *multi-racial*
1.5. Hugh Addonizio's anti-Gibson literature (1970)

2.1. Racial campaign strategy – *multi-level concept analysis*
2.2. Variation in racial campaign strategy – *two by two chart*
2.3. Whites' perceptions of racial discrimination

3.1. Regions of Virginia
3.2. Douglas Wilder for Lieutenant Governor television advertisements (1985)
3.3. Sheet music for Doug Wilder campaign song
3.4. Localities visited at least once by Wilder to deliver a speech (1986-89)
3.5. Proportion of speeches made by Wilder outside of Richmond (1986-89)
3.6. Two Wilder advertisements featuring 'Don't let Marshall Coleman take us back'
3.7. Positive/negative content of Wilder and Coleman television/radio advertisements
3.8. Wilder advertisement critical of Coleman's ties to developers
3.9. Excerpt from the Nitzburg poll (1987)
3.10. Wilder campaigning in Martinsville, Virginia alongside A L Philpott (1989)

3.11. Death Penalty for Cop Killers, Wilder for Governor TV advertisement
3.12. Virginia governor election results, by county (1989)
3.13. Wilder vote share in southwest Virginia, by county

4.1. Proportion of black North Carolinians registered to vote (1940-90)
4.2. Charlotte mayoral election results (1979-87)
4.3. Excerpts from Willis Smith for US Senate campaign leaflet (1950)
4.4. Content analysis of Helms and Gantt television advertisements
4.5. Descriptions of Harvey Gantt in Helms television advertisements
4.6. Helms television advertisement: 'Harvey Denies'
4.7. Helms television advertisement: 'Jesse Jackson'
4.8. Helms television advertisement: 'Minority Preference'
4.9. Helms television advertisement: 'White Hands'
4.10. Gantt response advertisements to 'White Hands'
4.11. 'Dance to Dump Helms' – LGBT group fundraiser for Harvey Gantt
4.12. 'Harvey Gantt: New South, New Senator' badge
4.13. Gantt television advertisement: 'Reject the Politics of the Past'
4.14. Excerpt from Helms direct mail fundraising appeal
4.15. Policy content of Gantt's TV advertisements
4.16. Helms television advertisement: 'Dangerously Liberal'
4.17. Campaign Visits by Gantt and Helms (September-November 1990)
4.18. White voters' support for Gantt, by income
4.19. Results of Jesse Helms's Senate elections (1972-90)

5.1. Williamson television advertisement: 'Violence'
5.2. 1992 US Senate election and 2016 presidential election results in Illinois
5.3. Multi-racial meeting of independents with state representative-elect Carol Moseley Braun (1978)
5.4. Williamson for Senate television advertisements
5.5. Williamson television advertisement: 'Reckless'
5.6. Braun television advertisement: 'GP'
5.7. Williamson television advertisement: 'Ethics revised'
5.8. Braun performance relative to prediction (April/Nov 1992)

6.1. Population distribution in Illinois (1900-2000)
6.2. Comparison of overall population and Democratic voter distribution in Illinois
6.3. Harold Washington at Developing Communities Project job centre, Obama in background (1987)
6.4. Barack Obama wearing Harvey Gantt for Senate t-shirt (1990)
6.5. Excerpts from Barack Obama's University of Chicago Law course syllabus (1994)
6.6. Barack Obama on the cover of *N'Digo* (2003)
6.7. Barack Obama's state senate district (post-1990 and 2000 censuses)
6.8. Downstate Illinois results, Democratic US Senate primary (2004)
6.9. Direct mail: Paul and Sheila Simon endorsement
6.10. Obama television advertisement: 'Yes We Can'
6.11. Direct mail: African American voters
6.12. The Obama family (2000, 2004)
6.13. Obama speaking at Rainbow/PUSH with Jesse Jackson
6.14. Final public poll versus actual result
6.15. Chicago result, by ward

6.16. Chicago wards: whites as proportion of population and Obama vote share
6.16. Chicago wards: non-whites as proportion of population and Obama vote share
6.17. Regional share of candidates' primary vote totals (Braun 1992/Obama 2004)
6.18. Vote share for Braun and Obama in 1992 and 2004 primaries, by county

7.1. Racial population change in Minneapolis, 1910-2010
7.2. Geographic distribution of Minnesota Fifth District Democratic-Farmer-Labor primary voters
7.3. Profile of Keith Ellison which mentions 'his affiliation with Nation of Islam' (1998)
7.4. Keith Ellison's campaign website
7.5. Jesse Jackson campaigning with Keith Ellison
7.6. Martin Sabo's ideological placement within the US House of Representatives (1979-2006)
7.7. Votes cast in the Democratic-Farmer-Labor primary, by district geography
7.8. Democratic-Farmer-Labor primary result, by state legislative district

8.1. Tennessee county map: 1968 presidential election results and 2006 US Senate election results
8.2. Republican direct mail: 'Protecting our shared Tennessee values'
8.3. Ford Sr and Jr's ideological placement within the US House of Representatives (1987-2006)
8.4. Harold Ford Jr's congressional campaign headquarters (1996)
8.5. Republican direct mail: 'Dynasty and Political Machine'
8.6. Republican television advertisement: 'Harold Ford, Jr and Senior: Too Close for Comfort'
8.7. Republican direct mail: 'We know apples don't fall far from the tree'
8.8. The Little Rebel Bar and Grill
8.9. Ford's second visit to the Little Rebel
8.10. Barack Obama campaigning with Harold Ford
8.11. Democratic direct mail: Hurricane Katrina
8.12. Racialised reactions to Hurricane Katrina
8.13. Democratic direct mail: Earl Miller
8.14. Comparison of Ford's issue priorities, by targeted direct mail
8.15. Content analysis of Ford and Corker television and print advertisements
8.16. Republican television advertisement: 'Call Me'
8.17. Republican direct mail: 'Too bad Congressman Ford just doesn't get it'
8.18. Playboy party cartoon
8.19. Republican campaign internal tracking poll data

9.1. @LoneganforSenate tweet: Catholic voter
9.2. Black population distribution in Newark (2000)
9.3. Comparison of the racial demographics of New Jersey and Newark (2010)
9.4. Racial characteristics of Newark residents (1910-2010)
9.5. Content analysis of Lonegan radio/television advertisements
9.6. Lonegan television advertisement: 'Corrupt Liberal Mayor'
9.7. Lonegan television advertisement: 'King Cory'
9.8. Newark city council election leaflets (1998)
9.9. Newark municipal election poster (1970)
9.10. 'More Liberal than Obama, Worse than Sharpe James', Lonegan Television Advert (2013)
9.11. Booker direct mail: 'Bring People Together' (2013)
9.12. @CoryBooker tweet: First vegetarian
9.13. @SteveLonegan and @Shaftan tweets: Crack house

9.14. Lonegan television advertisement: ‘Cory’s Abandoned Crack House’
9.15. @CoryBooker tweet: Criminal justice and drug policy reform
9.16. Public polls and final result (August-October 2013)

Part I – Black Democrats in Majority-White Elections

Black electoral politics has undergone a profound transformation in the half century since African Americans statutorily secured equal voting rights with whites.[2] Once confined to a small number of exceptional cases, the population of black elected officials has multiplied dramatically. The genre which studies African American politics has, likewise, vigorously proliferated, producing an abundance of scholarship on minority voter mobilisation,[3] voters' racial attitudes,[4] black substantive and descriptive representation,[5] racial districting,[6] and urban racial politics more generally.[7] In spite of these contributions, theoretical deficiencies persist. In particular, the dominant model used to explain the choice of racial campaign strategies by African American candidates in jurisdictions where most of their voters are white is incomplete. The model's underlying hypothesis is premised on limited and increasingly outdated assumptions. Commentators continue to assert that successful black candidates must discard their racial identity in order to win white votes, yet a careful examination of the actual practice of black politicians in majority-white jurisdictions demonstrates that this argument is not substantiated empirically. As a result, scholars are mischaracterising the potential for black candidates to win elections in majority-white contexts. This thesis is an attempt to advance the scholarship through a theoretical reconceptualisation of racial campaign strategies underpinned by original, empirical research.

[2] For a state-by-state analysis of black voting rights in the South since the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, see the chapters in Davidson & Grofman (1994).
[3] E.g., Barreto et al (2004), Herron & Sekhon (2005), Washington (2006), Bedolla & Michelson (2012)
[4] E.g., Sniderman & Piazza (1993), Payne et al (2010), Piston (2010), Tesler (2013)
[5] E.g., Swain (1993), Cameron et al (1996), Mansbridge (1999), Dovi (2002), Tate (2003), James (2011), Davis et al (2011), Juenke & Preuhs (2012)
[6] E.g., Bullock (1987), Welch (1990), Guinier (1991), Swain (1993), Ingalls & Moore (1995), Cameron et al (1996), Canon, Shousen, & Sellers (1996)
[7] E.g., Fenno (2003), Cohen (2010), Perry (2013)

Chapter 1 – Introduction

'The most spectacular and exotic development in government in the history of white civilization…longest to be remembered, shuddered at, and execrated'
E Merton Coulter (1947), a segregationist historian, on the brief period of African Americans in elected office during the nineteenth century

***

The modern experience of African American office-holding in majority-white contexts is remarkably short. Twenty years before Barack Obama was elected president, no African American Democrat had ever been elected to the US Senate and no African American had ever been elected governor of any state. Most African Americans in the United States have been able to exercise the right to vote only since the 1960s.[1] The minority of African Americans who were able to vote before this period were almost entirely dependent on the forbearance of white-dominated, urban political machines, such as the Democratic machines of Richard Daley in Chicago and E H Crump in Memphis.[2] These organisations made only minor concessions to African Americans but otherwise fundamentally preserved the segregation and discrimination which had stricken the black community.[3]

For that reason, it is impossible to describe the United States as having been a full democracy for any more than fifty years. Paul Frymer and colleagues are correct to argue that the United States has been historically under-democratised because of its persistent exclusion of millions of Americans from access to political power.[4] A common position is that the United States was one of the first countries in the world to democratise. It has been argued that the United States has been basically democratic, albeit with some racist elements, for longer than most industrialised countries. In his classic 1944 study *An American Dilemma,* Gunnar Myrdal concluded that the United States was a fundamentally liberal, democratic polity but plagued by occasional irrational prejudices.[5]

Such an argument cannot be sustained given that essential features of a democratic polity (e.g., free and fair elections, multi-party competition, universal franchise, free assembly and speech) were not available to millions of US residents until the mid-twentieth century. People of Asian birth were not permitted to apply for US citizenship until 1952.[6] The secret ballot was not introduced in Georgia or South Carolina until the 1950s.[7] Until the 1960s, some states prohibited public sector workers from

[1] Therborn (1977), Mickey (2015), and Gibson & King (2016) have argued that comparative political scientists should not regard the United States as fitting in the category of a 'democracy' until the 1970s.
[2] On Chicago, see Marable (1985), Pinderhughes (1987), and Chapters 5-6 in this manuscript. On Memphis, see Biles (1986: 88-107) and Chapter 8 in this manuscript.
[3] Grimshaw, 1992.
[4] Frymer et al, 2006.
[5] Myrdal, 1944.
[6] King, 2000, 238.
[7] On Georgia, see Bernd (1972). On South Carolina, see Mickey (2015: 149).

joining black civic organisations such as the NAACP.[8] Municipalities passed ordinances barring residents from assembling to promote civil rights or voter registration.[9] Before the mid-1960s, millions of Americans were unable to vote or run for office due to the apartheid system which had been implemented in many states in the late nineteenth century as a reaction to black office-holding immediately following the Civil War.[10] It was not until the 1970s that all Native Americans could exercise the right to vote.[11]

Göran Therborn was correct when he argued in 1977 that the United States was one of the *last* major industrialised nations to democratise, not one of the first.[12] It was not until the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965 that African Americans began to win elected offices in substantial numbers. Black office-holding was dependent on the massive intervention of the federal government, secured through legislative reforms,[13] judicial interventions,[14] constitutional amendments,[15] and the physical presence of federal agents monitoring the voting rights of African Americans.[16] In the first two decades of universal African American voting rights, nearly all black office-seekers were elected in areas where African Americans were a majority of voters. There were a couple of notable exceptions – the Republican Senator Edward Brooke in Massachusetts and the socialist Democratic Congressman Ron

[8] Mickey, 2015, 226. This prohibition was particularly devastating because black teachers were the backbone of NAACP membership in many states. Private sector black workers, such as agricultural labourers, were already informally barred from joining such organisations by the white capitalists on whom they were economically dependent.

[9] Wade, 1998, 331.

[10] The major exception to non-white Americans' long history of political exclusion was the remarkable decade following the Civil War known as Reconstruction. During Reconstruction, the federal government, often through little less than military occupation (e.g., the Military Reconstruction Acts of 1867), guaranteed the political rights of African American men. During this interlude of just over a decade, roughly two-thousand African Americans were elected to public office. By 1900, they were all gone.

[11] Native Americans on reservations did not get the right to vote in Arizona, New Mexico, Idaho, Maine, Mississippi, or Washington until the 1940s. They did not get the right to vote in Utah until 1957 or in Colorado until 1970. Alaska banned Native Alaskans who were not proficient in English from voting until the 1970s. (National Commission on Voting Rights, 2014).

[12] Therborn, 1977.

[13] The single most important piece of legislation was the Voting Rights Act of 1965. On its powerful impact in enfranchising African Americans, see the state-by-state analyses in Davidson & Grofman (1994), as well as the histories by May (2013) and Berman (2015).

[14] Key cases of the 'reapportionment revolution' include *Baker v Carr* (1961), *Gray v Sanders* (1963), *Wesberry v Sanders* (1964), *Reynolds v Sims* (1964), *Lucas v 44th Colorado General Assembly* (1964), *Kirkpatrick v Preisler* (1969). For contemporary discussions of the representation inequalities addressed by these cases, see Baker (1955, 1966), Dahl (1956), Adrian (1960), Shubert & Press (1964), Dixon (1968), Silva (1968), Hill (1969), Elliot (1970), Duchacek (1970: 244-252).

[15] The two key constitutional amendments from this decade which affected black voting rights were the Twenty-Third Amendment (1961) and the Twenty-Fourth Amendment (1964). The former gave the District of Columbia voting rights in presidential elections. In 1960 Washington, DC was 54% black and would rise to 71% black by the end of the decade. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment banned the use of poll taxes (or any other non-payment of taxes) as a disqualification from voting. Poll taxes had been used in all of the former Confederate states after the Civil War to deny blacks access to the polls and were still in use in nearly half of the former Confederacy by the time of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment's ratification. However, see Ackerman (2014: Ch 6) who argues that Section 10 of the Voting Rights Act was more important than the Twenty-Fourth Amendment in achieving this goal.

[16] May (2013) and Berman (2015).

Dellums in Berkeley, California – but the vast majority of black elected officials were elected in jurisdictions where their victory was possible without winning a single white vote.[17]

In the 1980s, however, signs of success were apparent in some majority-white jurisdictions. Alan Wheat was elected to Congress in 1982 to represent the predominantly white Fifth District of Missouri (Kansas City).[18] That same year, Los Angeles mayor Tom Bradley came agonisingly close to being elected governor of California.[19] Soon after, Harvey Gantt was elected mayor of Charlotte, North Carolina, becoming the first black mayor of a predominantly white southern city in the twentieth century. Yet, even as Jesse Jackson sought the presidency for a second time in 1988, still no African American had been elected governor of any state, and no black Democrat had yet been elected to the Senate.[20]

Tuesday, 7th November 1989 is seen as something of a 'watershed' moment, and it is where this study begins.[21] Voters in the state of Virginia – the former capital of the Confederacy – elected L Douglas Wilder, the grandson of slaves, as their governor. It was two days before the Berlin Wall came down, and for that reason Wilder was knocked off the front pages of the weekly magazines and obscured from the common collective memory. That same day, which became known as 'Black Tuesday' by scholars of racial politics,[22] African American mayors were elected to lead majority-white cities such as Seattle and Durham.[23] Cities with large white populations, including New York and New Haven, also elected black mayors for the first time.[24]

In the quarter century which followed, African Americans were elected to major offices in a variety of majority-white jurisdictions. No state, since the nineteenth century, has been majority African American, and therefore most major political offices in the United States – senator, governor, and president – require African Americans to be elected in contexts which are majority-white. Therefore, I argue that it is appropriate to view the election of African Americans in these majority-white jurisdictions as part of a process of deepening American democracy. If democracy entails access to power for all members of that society, then the election of African Americans to these major offices must be understood as a form of American democratisation.

---

[17] On Brooke, see Cutler (1972), Brooke (2007), Riguer (2015: Ch 3), Johnson (*forthcoming*). On Dellums, see Canon (1999).
[18] Alan Wheat represented a liberal, majority-white district in Missouri. His predecessor Richard Bolling, a white Democrat, had been instrumental in ensuring the passage of the 1957 Civil Rights Act. In 1964, Bolling introduced the discharge petition which released the Civil Rights Act of 1964 from the Senate, a crucial move in the bill's passage.
[19] Pettigrew & Alston, 1988.
[20] Jackson won 13% of the white Democratic primary vote in his 1988 presidential campaign (Tate, 1994, 12).
[21] Gillespie, 2010.
[22] McCormick, 1989.
[23] Seattle (73.7% white), Durham (51.6% white)
[24] New York (43.2% white), New Haven (49.0% white)

The Argument

Political scientists have explained the electoral successes of black candidates in majority-white jurisdictions by relying on a model racial campaign strategy known as the 'deracialised' campaign strategy. David Wilson and Khalilah Brown-Dean define the deracialised campaign as one in which black candidates 'avoid using overt references to racial issues, public appeals to the Black community, and being associated with controversial racialized events or individuals. Candidates must also project a non-threatening or non-stereotypical political image'.[25] In sum, the key features of the deracialised strategy model are (1) the offer of a 'race-neutral' policy programme,[26] (2) the adoption of a 'non-threatening' political style,[27] and (3) the avoidance of racial discourse in targeted appeals to both black and white voters.[28] Commentators have held that the only way in which black politicians can win election in majority-white jurisdictions is by purging racial content from their campaigns and distancing themselves from their black racial identity. If black candidates can somehow convince voters that they are 'no different' than a white candidate, then they can minimise the salience of race in the campaign and attract white support on a non-racial basis.[29] Indeed, the assumption that whites will only vote for blacks who do not talk about racial inequality or their racial identity is a largely accepted maxim of US campaign politics. The elections of Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012 have been cited as evidence of the deracialisation strategy's formidable power to elect African Americans to office in majority-white contexts.[30] Daniel Gillion asserts in his 2016 book, 'politicians who represent a majority white jurisdiction risk their political futures by engaging in a discussion of race'.[31]

In this thesis, I question the accuracy of this long-held axiom of US campaign politics. The closer one looks at the actual expression of black campaign politics in majority-white areas, the more difficult the theory of deracialisation is to sustain. Numerous examples seem to defy the theory's logic. For example, why would Keith Ellison, a black candidate for Congress in a district which was 72 percent white, make 'civil rights' a central element of his campaign message? Why would Deval Patrick, a black candidate for governor in Massachusetts, tout his work as a civil rights lawyer in television advertisements (see Figure 1.1)? Why would Michael Steele, a black candidate for the US Senate, profess his support for affirmative action on television when most of his voters wouldn't be eligible to receive it? Why would Anthony Brown, a black candidate for governor, publish photos in his election leaflets of whites holding racist signs? Why would Carol Moseley Braun accuse her white opponent of racism for broadcasting

[25] Wilson & Brown-Dean, 2012, 4.
[26] Wilson, 1990.
[27] McCormick & Jones, 1993.
[28] Ibid., 76.
[29] For example, Jeffries & Jones (2006) contend that 'Whites are reluctant to vote for Blacks, especially high profile statewide candidates'. Therefore, they must adopt 'an effective deracialized campaign strategy…if they hope to offset white voter hostility' (243).
[30] E.g., Ifill (2009), Clayton (2010: 5), Liu (2010: Ch 3), Bonilla-Silva & Dietrich (2011), Wright-Austin & King (2011: 54), Nordin (2012: ix), Stout (2015: 77), Carter & Dowe (2015: 106)
[31] Gillion, 2016, 27.

an advert about Medicaid which didn't mention race? Why would Harold Ford Jr, a black US Senate candidate, pose with a Confederate flag in front of assembled reporters? Why would Mia Love, a black Mormon in Utah, organise her campaign around the message that she 'stands up *and stands out*' in a district which was 2 percent black?

Figure 1.1. Deval Patrick for Governor Television Advertisement (2006)



Source: Kanter Archive, Political Communications Center, University of Oklahoma

These and many other interventions suggest that it is not empirically true that all African American candidates in majority-white areas embark on a process of deracialisation. The purpose of this manuscript, therefore, is twofold. First, it is a descriptive account of the wider range of racial campaign strategies available to black candidates in majority-white areas. Second, it seeks to explain why candidates choose one strategy over the other. Why would a black candidate adopt a 'race-conscious' campaign strategy in a majority-white election context? When does a black candidate deracialise, and when does he or she adopt a different racial campaign strategy?

For most scholars of black politics in the past quarter of a century, there has been little need to explore the reasons *why* black candidates adopt particular racial campaign strategies because the answer was thought to be been a simple one: the racial composition of voters in a jurisdiction. A majority-white election environment necessitated a 'deracialised' strategy; a majority-black or predominantly ethnic minority environment demanded a 'racialised' strategy.[32] Relying on this assumption, many accounts have not captured the myriad ways in which black candidates have signalled their racial status or

[32] For studies which employ this binary, see Pettigrew & Alston (1988), Sonenshein (1990), Canon, Shousen, & Sellers (1996), Jeffries (1999), Smith (2009), Gillespie (2010), Nordin (2012). For characteristic applications of the 'racialised' model, see Carton (1984), Swain (1995: Ch 3), Tate (2003), Fenno (1978: Ch 3). For characteristic applications of the 'deracialised' model, see Sonenshein (1990), Prysby (1996), Gillespie (2012a).

position on racial issues in an effort to attract new support or mobilise existing constituencies. Even within majority-white jurisdictions there is a substantial degree of variation in voters' racial attitudes and elites' commitment to civil rights and racial justice.

The Theoretical Debate

Although some criticisms have been made in its direction, a truly comprehensive re-examination of the deracialised strategy from a critical perspective has hitherto been lacking.[33] In this section, I set out some of the weaknesses of the model. Following this discussion, I turn to broader theoretical debates about race and American politics. I highlight the work by Desmond King and Rogers Smith on 'racial policy alliances'.[34] I suggest that this framing, applied to the electoral arena, can provide the vocabulary for conceptualising the wider variety of campaign strategies available to black candidates in majority-white jurisdictions.

'Deracialisation' was first coined by Columbia University academic Charles Hamilton in the mid-1970s. His internal strategy document for the Democratic National Committee, written in 1976 and revised and published the following year, is taken to be the foundational expression of the concept.[35] Hamilton had written earlier about the need to find 'deracialized' policy solutions to the country's economic problems, but it is accurate to say that the 1976/77 document was his first major articulation of deracialisation as an *electoral* strategy.[36]

The co-author (with Stokely Carmichael) of *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation,* Hamilton was asked to write the paper by the national Democratic Party in the spring of 1976 as it was preparing its platform on 'issues of vital importance to Black Americans' in that year's presidential election.[37] The request for Hamilton's input was made in the context of the party's concerns over 'white backlash' to the Democrats' support for robust racial equality action, such as busing to accelerate school integration and greater welfare spending in deprived, predominantly black localities. Hamilton acknowledged concerns that the Nixon campaign in 1972 had 'racialised' George McGovern and the Democrats more generally by associating them with policies that had strong racial associations, such as welfare, busing, and crime. The 1972 election was the Democrats' worst ever performance among whites, with McGovern capturing just 31 percent of their support, as shown in Figure 1.2.

[33] E.g., King-Meadows (2009)
[34] King & Smith (2011, 2014)
[35] Correspondence with Joseph McCormick, 29 December 2014.
[36] See, for example, Hamilton (1973).
[37] Hamilton, 1977, 3.

Figure 1.2. White support for Democrats in presidential and congressional elections, 1968-2016



Source: Edson/Mitovsky Exit Polls, New York Times

Hamilton agreed that the Republican strategy of 'racialising' the McGovern campaign may have weakened the Democrats' ability to capture support from white voters.[38] Hamilton concluded that such a result undermined the black equality struggle because, on balance, Democrats were likely to be less harmful to black interests than Republicans were. In his essay, Hamilton proposed that the Democrats should 'deracialise' their campaign by adopting a racially transcendent issue agenda and avoiding racial language in their campaign discourse.[39] He argued that they should instead articulate a broad issue agenda of guaranteed full employment, national health insurance, and income maintenance. Hamilton's advice may have been partly vindicated in that Jimmy Carter secured the highest proportion of white support of any Democratic presidential nominee in the post-civil rights era (47%).

A number of scholars have wrongly stated that Hamilton's article was written to advise African American candidates on how they could win white support.[40] Dennis Nordin, for example, writes that Hamilton's paper was prompted by a request from the DNC on how to increase black representation.[41] Christopher Stout suggests that Hamilton's words were directed in part to black candidates.[42] Yet, the piece was directed to *white* candidates who were worried about the loss of racially conservative white voters to Republicans.[43] In the article, Hamilton explained that 'the de-racialization document was addressed to a strategy applicable to *electoral politics in the presidential contest in 1976.* It was not a strategy to be pursued at all times in all places'.[44] He added, 'The particular, immediate goal of a de-racialized strategy…was to defeat a Republican Party whose policies, on balance, were more harmful

[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.
[40] E.g., Perry (1996a), Albritton et al (1996), Middleton & Franklin (2009), Gillespie (2012), Nordin (2012), Stout (2015)
[41] Nordin, 2012.
[42] Stout, 2015, 5.
[43] Orey & Ricks, 2007, 326.
[44] Hamilton, 1977, 4-5, emphasis in original.

to Black interests than the policies of the Democratic Party'.[45] At a conference held at Columbia University in 2016, I asked Hamilton about the reception of his deracialisation article. He stated, 'The piece was a particular idea. It was for a particular context…We must become more politically literate [to face] different times, different leaders, different strategies'.[46] The election of a white Democratic president, rather than the election of African Americans to high office, was the subject of Hamilton's piece.

As was mentioned previously, the elections on 7 November 1989 of multiple African Americans to offices in non-majority-black jurisdictions – dubbed 'Black Tuesday' – served as a catalyst for intensified academic attention to the campaigns of black candidates facing majority-white electorates.[47] In order to explain these victories, a number of scholars in the subsequent months turned to Hamilton's concept of 'deracialisation' to frame their analyses.[48] 'Deracialised' black politics was first discussed at a December 1989 symposium called 'Blacks in the November '89 Elections: What is changing?' at the Joint Center for Political Studies in Washington, DC;[49] the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, which met in Memphis that same month; and the annual meeting of the National Conference of Black Political Scientists, which met in Atlanta the following April.[50] Influential contributions from this period include Georgia Persons's edited volume *Dilemmas of Black Politics*,[51] Huey Perry's edited volume *Race, Politics, and Governance in the United States*,[52] and several journal articles.[53] Empirically informed by the 'Black Tuesday' campaigns and others, these works endeavoured to set out the features of a deracialised campaign model to describe black candidates elected in majority-white jurisdictions.

The deracialised model addresses three components of a racial campaign strategy: political style, targeted appeals, and issue agenda. First, the model holds that a black candidate in a majority-white jurisdiction must have a 'non-threatening', 'mainstream' political style.[54] Second, it asserts that black candidates must avoid the subject of race in appeals to white voters and not make any direct appeals to black voters or campaign alongside other African Americans. This is because the model assumes that black voters will already be solidly supportive and that direct appeals to blacks will arouse suspicions

[45] Ibid., 4.
[46] My notes from a Q & A session with Charles Hamilton following his keynote, 'Taking Democracy Seriously: Black Power Politics Coping with Political Change', 20 October 2016. My thanks to organisers Fredrick Harris and Kimberley Johnson for inviting me to attend.
[47] McCormick, 1989.
[48] Correspondence with McCormick.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Persons, 1993.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Perry, 1996.
[53] E.g., Wilson (1990), Sonenshein (1990), Winn (1990), Perry (1990), Schexnider (1990), Smith (1990), Pierannuzi & Hutcheson (1991), Strickland & Whicker (1992), Sigelman et al (1995), Jeffries (1999)
[54] Strickland & Whicker (1992: 208), Wilson (1993: 176), Sigelman et al (1995: 244), Sigelman (1997: 181).

of racial favouritism from whites.[55] Third, the model contends that the black candidate should focus on non-racial issues, avoiding policy matters which contain either implicit or explicit racial content.[56]

The scholars who used Hamilton's concept, however, did not take seriously enough the fact that Hamilton's article discussed white politicians. While it is reasonable to expect, as Hamilton did, that the role of race might be minimised in a campaign between two white candidates, race cannot be easily ignored in a biracial campaign in which a black candidate faces a white opponent. This is a crucial distinction, which scholars of deracialisation have too frequently overlooked.

Additionally, as Phillip Thompson has written, deracialisation has become a byword for austerity politics and an implicit embrace of the American racial order.[57] The presentation of deracialisation as a *necessary* strategy is dangerous, I argue, because it effectively kills off any possibility for black elected officials to challenge racial inequality outside of areas where African Americans are already a majority. This is far from the spirit of Hamilton's original article which emphasised deracialisation's pragmatic, temporary, and limited application. As he and Carmichael explained in *Black Power*, Hamilton's guiding concern was to use the political system to maximise meaningful, material gains for African Americans.[58] One month after the 1976 election, Hamilton wrote an article in the *New York* Times 'What Blacks Want from Carter' which emphasised the importance of black voters in Carter's victory and listed their substantive policy demands.[59] In 1992, Hamilton reminded that deracialisation 'should not be seen as a means of co-opting black demands'.[60] As Hamilton conceived it, deracialisation strategy was not intended as a permanent embrace of insipid, symbolic identity politics at the expense of the black poor.

Nonetheless, in the quarter century since it was first applied to black electoral politics, deracialisation has shown impressive resilience as an analytical concept. It has been widely accepted with few modifications in recent scholarship on twenty-first century black politics. For example, most of the contributions in Georgia Persons's 2009 edited volume *Beyond the Boundaries*[61] and Andra Gillespie's 2010 edited volume *Whose Black Politics?*[62] used the model. Barack Obama, unquestionably the most

[55] Strickland & Whicker, 1992, 209.
[56] Wilson, 1990.
[57] Thompson, 2006, 284.
[58] Carmichael & Hamilton, 1967. In a demonstration of Hamilton's pragmatism, in the 1960s he contributed funds to both the Johnson/Humphrey presidential campaigns, as well as the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party which locked heads with them at the Democratic convention (Hamilton, 2016).
[59] Charles Hamilton, 'What Blacks Want from Carter', *New York Times*, 4 December 1976.
[60] Hamilton, 1992, 177.
[61] Persons, 2009.
[62] Gillespie, 2010.

prominent black politician of the contemporary period (and indeed in US history), has been widely described as a candidate who followed a deracialised political strategy.[63]

The 'deracialised' model is usually juxtaposed against the 'racialised' campaign strategy model, which is said to characterise racial campaign strategies in majority-black communities. Many commentators argued that the 'traditional' model of election in black communities was to adopt a militant political style, appeal only to black voters, and support policies of racial redistribution and reparation which sought to punish whites.[64] Christopher Karpowitz and colleagues define the racialised strategy as 'an aggressive style of political advocacy, a predisposition toward domestic interventionist policies, and a reflexive opposition to dispositional explanations of persistent racial inequality'.[65] Margaret Edds describes the 'traditional black politician' as 'evangelical, a fire-and-brimstone orator, passionate about poverty and justice, grounded in the civil rights movement'.[66] Abigail Thernstrom and Stephen Thernstrom assert that the racialised strategy is most effective in majority-black districts, whose racial homogeneity has 'invited the sort of militancy that became the model for the black legislative candidate'.[67] Table 1.1 displays how the two models are usually contrasted.

Table 1.1 Contrast between the 'deracialised' and 'racialised' campaign strategies

	Deracialised Strategy	Racialised Strategy
Mobilising Discourse	Racial silence	Racial rhetoric
Campaign Style	Non-confrontational	Militant
Policy Agenda	Race-Neutral	Race-Oriented

As an historical matter, it is unquestionably true that many of the first African Americans elected to municipal office in the initial years after black enfranchisement in the 1960s were connected to the black power movement. Regrettably, scholarly interpretations of elections in majority-black contexts remain too wedded to stereotyped depictions of black elected officials, who during this period were often portrayed by white-dominated media and politicians as hostile, corrupt, flashy, buffoonish, or incompetent. Andra Gillespie describes black politicians of the 1960s, 70s, and 80s as 'confrontational'[68] while Cathy Cohen argues that the black politicians of this period 'were not interested in transcending or able to transcend race'.[69] Melanye Price describes '[t]he blustery style of

[63] See, for example, Ifill (2009), Clayton (2010: 5), Liu (2010: Ch 3), Bonilla-Silva & Dietrich (2011), Wright-Austin & King (2011: 54), Nordin (2012: ix), Stout (2015: 77), Carter & Dowe (2015: 106), Price (2016).
[64] Jeffries & Jones, 2006, 247.
[65] Karpowitz et al, 2014, 9.
[66] Edds, 1990, 22.
[67] Thernstrom & Thernstrom, 1997, 483.
[68] Gillespie, 2010, 11.
[69] Cohen, 2010, 204.

early Black mayors' and argues that they positioned themselves as 'adversaries' to whites in city government.[70]

In contrast with these depictions, I argue that the extent to which mid-twentieth century black politicians worked to the *exclusion* of non-black (and, more specifically, white) political actors and voters is exaggerated. An exemplary case is the 1970 campaign for mayor of Newark, often understood as a classic 'racialised campaign' between white incumbent Hugh Addonizio and African American challenger Ken Gibson.[71] Gibson's successful campaign is often portrayed as simply a case of anti-white mobilisation by the city's growing minority population. Indeed, Gibson used the campaign slogan 'Make Black Count' and imposed it on an upwardly directed black power fist in his campaign literature (See Figure 1.3).[72]

Figure 1.3. Ken Gibson for Mayor leaflet (Newark, 1970), front and inside




Source: Cummings Information Center, Newark Public Library

Yet, as my archival work has unearthed, in the same election in which the 'Make Black Count' literature was distributed, the Gibson campaign produced a leaflet which argued that 'Gibson is the only leader in Newark who is known and respected by the entire community, *both black and white*, and who is responsive to their needs' (Figure 1.4). Far from being an official who worked to exclude whites, Gibson sought alliances with white political actors, winning the endorsement of his former white rival John Caulfield in the run-off round against Addonizio.[73] Gibson's approach, which in the early phases of his

[70] Price, 2016, 16.
[71] E.g., Kraus (2004), Johnson (2014)
[72] 'Black Power Now' (1970 Municipal Elections File, Newark Elections Collection, Cummings Information Center, Newark Public Library).
[73] Williams, 2014, Ch 10.

mayoralty involved working with whites but not by conceding the demands of the wider black power movement, was consistent with the essential message of Charles Hamilton and Stokely Carmichael in *Black Power*.[74]

Figure 1.4. Ken Gibson for Mayor leaflet (Newark, 1970), excerpts from front and inside



Source: Cummings Information Center, Newark Public Library

In fact, it was not Gibson but Addonizio who ran the confrontational campaign. Addonizio and his supporters produced a flurry of racist literature which suggested that Gibson supported killing whites and robbing department stores (Figure 1.5). The idea that the 'civil rights' generation of mayoral candidates were confrontational and hostile is a double-standard which minimises the extent of both

[74] Carmichael & Hamilton, 1967.

white racial hostility and genuine efforts on the part of black power leaders to work productively with white political actors who did not resist their political goals.

Figure 1.5. Hugh Addonozio's Anti-Gibson Literature (1970 Newark mayoral election)



Source: Cummings Information Center, Newark Public Library

The deracialisation/racialisation framing which has dominated the literature should be discarded because, in part, it does not seem to describe adequately the nature of racial campaign politics in the United States. Instead, developing the work of Desmond King and Rogers Smith, I propose that racial campaign strategies should be understood through a 'race-conscious' versus 'colour-blind' framework.

King and Smith contend that America is divided between racial policy alliances.[75] They define these as 'durable coalitions of political actors, activist groups, and governing institutions united by their stances on the central racial policy issues in the eras of American politics their conflicts help define'.[76] King and Smith's typology is valuable because it reorients focus to politicians' philosophical commitments rather than predominantly on their presentational differences.

In the current era, the 'colour-blind' coalition holds that the racial policies of the 1960s civil rights period have served their purpose and that the continued use of racially-targeted policies sows divisions between people on the basis of race. 'Colour-blind' advocates are willing to remove legal barriers to discrimination but oppose racially targeted policies and tend to discount the enduring role of race in

[75] King & Smith, 2011.
[76] Smith, King, & Klinkner, 2011.

shaping life outcomes.[77] Indeed, colour-blind advocates consider any race-based public policy to be inherently discriminatory and racist, even if such policies are targeted at assisting historically marginalised racial minorities.

In contrast, the 'race-conscious' coalition holds that centuries of slavery and racial apartheid in American have had an enduring social and political legacy, even in an era of formal, legal equality. They argue policies should be made with the explicit concern for reducing America's severe racial inequalities because the mere removal of *de jure* racial discrimination is insufficient to addressing the effects of centuries of racism in America. Advocates within the race-conscious coalition are critical of colour-blind philosophy which they believe 'disguises (sometimes deliberately) or normalizes (sometimes unwittingly) relationships of power and subordination'.[78]

Turning to electoral politics, if an African American candidate were to follow a 'colour-blind' campaign strategy, we would expect the candidate to avoid any acknowledgement of lingering structural racial inequalities and to purge racially targeted legislation from his or her policy agenda.[79] In contrast, if an African American candidate pursued a 'race-conscious' strategy, we would expect him or her to speak about race and racial inequalities openly as well as adopt positions which would be aimed at advancing the material conditions of African Americans.

In this thesis, I propose that the 'race-conscious' and 'colour-blind' alliances can be used to develop two distinct families of racial campaign strategies. The first family are two race-conscious strategies: the symbolic-substantive campaign strategy and the crusade campaign strategy. The second family are two colour-blind strategies: the deracialised campaign strategy and the post-racial campaign strategy. A fifth strategy, which I call the segregated campaign strategy, contains both race-conscious and colour-blind elements. It involves making distinct but mutually incompatible racial appeals to different groups of voters within a single election. Table 1.2 outlines the strategies, and Chapter 2 explains each in detail. It is important to acknowledge that these strategies are heuristic devices. I am using a schematic framework which overdraws the coherence of categories and their separations.

[77] King & Smith, 2014.
[78] Guinier & Torres, 2002, 42.
[79] Empirical differences in racial outcomes in housing, education, employment, health, and so forth are difficult to deny, but a colour-blind candidate would regard these differences as coincidental to race and racial attitudes rather than explained in part by them.

Table 1.2. Racial campaign strategies (black candidates in majority-white jurisdictions)

	Issue Agenda	Style	Targeted Appeals
1. Symbolic-Substantive	Race-conscious policies	Positive racial message	Blacks and whites hear consistent messages
2. Crusade	Race-conscious policies	Anti-racism	Blacks and whites hear consistent messages
3. Segregated	Ambiguous	Racial pride to co-ethnics, deference to whites	Blacks and white receive different messages
4. Deracialised	No race-conscious policies	Racial silence	Appeals only to whites, assumes solid black support
5. Post-Racial	No race-conscious policies	Dismissive of race's relevance	Appeals only to whites, little expectation of black support

King and Smith, in their joint work and with other collaborators, are inclined to doubt the viability of candidates with race-conscious agendas in majority-white contexts. In *Still a House Divided*, they write that probably no 'serious' candidate for national office could advocate race-conscious policies to the US's predominantly white electorate.[80] In a paper with Ursula Hackett on the politics of school reform, King writes, 'In twenty-first century America, color-blind appeals work; race-conscious ones do not'.[81] While this thesis does not 'test' such a claim directly, it will show by implication that such a conclusion may be overstated.

Hypotheses

My research question is '*What explains the choice of different types of racial campaign strategies by black Democratic candidates in majority-white areas since 1989?*'. The dependent variable, therefore, is the type of *racial campaign strategy* chosen. As discussed, there are five potential strategies which a candidate may choose: 'symbolic-substantive', 'crusade', 'segregated', 'deracialised', and 'post-racial'.

As the next chapter will explain in greater detail, this thesis sets out hypotheses which offer explanations for the research question. The hypotheses are propositions about political behaviour. They are distinct explanations, but they are not mutually incompatible. The three hypotheses are as follows:

(1) *Campaign environment will affect the racial campaign strategy chosen.*
(2) *The racial identity of the candidate will affect the racial campaign strategy chosen.*
(3) *The racial outlook of local elites will affect the racial campaign strategy adopted*.

The first hypothesis emphasises situational context. The whiter, more Republican, more conservative, more racially divided, and more Southern the electorate, the more likely a candidate will use a colour-blind campaign strategy. The second proposition emerges from the literature on black racial identity

[80] King & Smith, 2011, Ch 1.
[81] Hackett & King, 2015, 3.

and solidarity. It asserts that African American candidates who have spent long periods outside the black community, who were not raised or educated in majority-black contexts, who did not previously represent majority-black constituencies, and who possess right-of-centre political ideology will be more likely to choose a colour-blind campaign strategy. The final explanation draws on the campaign politics literature which emphasises the power of elite actors. It holds that the more racially hostile political elites (i.e. the media, party, opponent) are, the more likely a candidate will choose a colour-blind campaign strategy.

I am not seeking to make claims about the marginal effect of, for example, x% more whites in a district. Rather, my research highlights the relative importance of a few specific factors and causal processes which have been overlooked in the literature. I show that candidates do make choices beyond the simple racial composition of their jurisdiction, and the thesis offers to open the black box to reveal the causal chain that leads from a set of underlying factors to a specific campaign strategy. The conventional accounts are far too deterministic and fail to capture nuances and important differences in campaign strategies. These nuances and differences are important, I argue, because they reflect variations in the strategic incentives faced by politicians. In other words, they are not random or innocent variations in racial campaign approaches.

The Cases

The core empirical work of this thesis consists of a comparative study of seven black Democratic candidates in majority-white jurisdictions between 1989 and 2013. These cases were chosen because they are empirically interesting, historically important, and theoretically challenging. By their nature, the cases are deviations from 'politics as usual' because they are biracial contests in areas accustomed to mono-racial (white) candidate options.

Admittedly, the cases do not represent a 'random' sample of black candidates in majority-white areas. However, they have been chosen to capture an array of relevant explanatory variables. Therefore, the non-random variation is an advantage because I am able to combine similarities among cases and, then, explore them in a systematic way about why outcomes varied. John Gerring has written approvingly of this form of case study selection.[82]

The cases needed to satisfy five criteria to be selected:

1. The candidate must have identified as an African American and his or her opponent as white.
2. The electorate must have been at least 50% white.
3. The contest must have been for Governor, US Senator, or US Representative.
4. The candidate must have been a Democrat.

[82] Gerring, 2007, 131.

5. The candidate must have been electorally successful.[83]

The last two criteria deserve detailed explanation. First, I have chosen to limit this study to black Democratic candidates due to the unique partisan relationship which African American voters have with the Democratic Party. African Americans have been the most loyal voting constituency for Democratic candidates since universal black enfranchisement in the 1960s. Because of the strong association with African Americans and the Democratic Party, I argue that black Republican candidates must be considered separately.[84] Both black and white voters perceive black Republican candidates differently from black Democrats. Black Democratic candidates tend to receive strong support from African American voters, whereas black Republicans are often more adept at securing support from white voters than from African Americans. In fact, no black Republican candidate has won a majority of support from black voters in a major statewide contest since the 1970s.[85] This partisan-racial dynamic affects the strategies which black Republicans adopt in ways which are extremely different from black Democratic candidates.[86]

The last criterion emphasises that this manuscript is not a study about the relative effectiveness of one strategy over another. All of my candidates are 'successful', defined as capturing at least 45 percent of the two-candidate vote. I contend that it is important to separate 'office-seeking' black candidates from those who mount purely symbolic or quixotic candidacies. Not all candidates design vote-maximising strategies because not all candidates think that they can win. Some candidates run for office to raise the awareness of specific issues, consolidate a base, or simply save face. These uncompetitive candidates fall outside the scope of the argument.

What the thesis will demonstrate is that contrary to what the literature implies, successful black candidates in majority-white jurisdictions do not always shy away from the issue of race. Under certain conditions there are strategic incentives not to ignore race in order to maximise the vote share and increase the chances of winning.

From this population of cases, the final candidates were chosen on the basis of variation. Cases were chosen to represent a range of years, jurisdictions, competition types (i.e. primary or general elections), and geographies. The table below summarises the cases.

[83] Defined as capturing at least 45 percent of the two-candidate vote.
[84] See Nordin (2012:9), Rigeur (2015).
[85] Republican Edward Brooke, who served as US senator for Massachusetts from 1967-1979, won a majority of support from African American voters in his election and re-election campaigns (see Johnson, forthcoming).
[86] See Karpowitz et al (2014). For a dissenting view, see Jeffries & Jones (2006: 258).

Table 1.3. Summary of Cases

Section	Year	Candidate	Office	Jurisdiction	Opponent's Party	Percent White	Outcome
II – The Pioneers	1989	Douglas Wilder	Governor	Virginia	Republican	77.4	W
II – The Pioneers	1990	Harvey Gantt	US Senate	North Carolina	Republican	75.0	L
II – The Pioneers	1992	Carol Moseley Braun	US Senate	Illinois	Republican	74.8	W
III – Democratic Primaries	2004	Barack Obama	US Senate	Illinois	Democrat	67.8	W
III – Democratic Primaries	2006	Keith Ellison	US House	Minnesota (5th District)	Democrat	72.0	W
IV – Democratic Nominees	2006	Harold Ford Jr	US Senate	Tennessee	Republican	79.2	L
IV – Democratic Nominees	2013	Cory Booker	US Senate	New Jersey	Republican	59.3	W

Note: Demographic data are taken from the nearest census (e.g., 1989 and 1992 use the 1990 Census)

The cases are rich in empirical detail and theoretically challenging. There are a number of historic firsts which by their own merits should attract scholarly interest. They include the elections of the first black governor, the first black female US senator, the first black Democratic US senator, the first Muslim member of Congress, and the first black Democratic senatorial nominee. One of the cases, Barack Obama's campaign for the US Senate in 2004, is also of obvious interest because four years later the Illinois politician was elected president of the United States.

The cases also throw up a number of interesting puzzles. Why was Virginia – the former capital of the Confederacy and site of 'massive resistance' to integration – the first state to elect an African American governor? Why did Barack Obama repeatedly make reference to being the first African American president of the *Harvard Law Review* in his campaign advertisements? Why did Carol Moseley Braun and Harvey Gantt decide to accuse their opponents of racism but Keith Ellison and Harold Ford Jr didn't, in spite of being subject to similar implicitly racial attacks?

In addition to helping to answer the central research question of why African American candidates in majority-white areas choose different racial campaign strategies, the cases will serve to reveal other facets of American politics. They highlight the importance of structure and agency, partisanship, gender, class, local and regional political cultures, communications, voter mobilisation techniques, political consultancy, strategy, and more. The cases, therefore, are not simply accounts of black politics in white areas but are detailed depictions of campaign politics in the United States in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century.

Design of the Study

The thesis uses a case comparison design. It identifies an empirical puzzle, sets out several alternative hypotheses, describes the cases used as the basis of comparison, and finally compares cases systematically in order to assess the validity of the hypotheses.

Case comparison can lead to compelling conclusions if the following conditions are met. First, the sample of cases should be small enough to explore important details but large enough to introduce sufficient variation in both causes and consequences. The number of cases in my study is in line with other comparative works which have adopted a similar methodology. On the low end, Robert Mickey analyses three states in the Deep South, and Theda Skocpol analyses three revolutions.[87] Marcus Kurtz's study of Latin American state building involves four countries; James Glaser's book about Democratic Party survival in the South involves six congressional by-elections; and Tulia Flaetti's work on decentralisation studies six countries.[88] On the higher end, Robert Boatright uses ten congressional candidates as his case studies, and Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik study eleven elections across an eight year period in eastern Europe.[89] My seven case studies fall in the middle of this range.

Second, case selection must facilitate controls through methods of similarity and difference. As Table 1.3 indicated, there is a high level of both in this study. My cases allow comparison across and within time (i.e. elections occurring in the same year), between and within parties (i.e. general and primary elections), across three types of election (governor, senator, and representative),[90] across six different jurisdictions and within one jurisdiction (Illinois), and between and within election outcomes (four wins and two losses).

None of the comparisons will control perfectly for all possible confounders, but each one should do a decent job at controlling for at least some theoretical confounders, allowing me to focus on my explanatory variables (context, candidate background, and elites). Taken together, multiple paired comparisons allow a researcher to show that the argument indeed travels across theoretical contexts. Additionally, the cases are not just treated as separate but also potentially related, given diffusion effects. Cases should show when candidates learn from each other (or, indeed, fail to do so). What is the impact of being 'the first' versus 'the second'? Are there regional effects?[91]

Third, qualitative data are better at tracing motivations for action. Talking to the main actors involved in the campaign (or reading their records) seems crucial to being able to figure out why these individuals

[87] See Mickey (2015), Skocpol (1979).
[88] See Kurtz (2013), Glaser (1996), Falleti (2005).
[89] See Boatright (2004), Bunce & Wolchik (2011).
[90] For discussion about why these different types of office might generate varying electoral dynamics, see Abramowitz (1980), Jeffries & Jones (2006).
[91] See Tuch & Martin (1997).

choose to do Y or Z and, thus, to uncover the logic behind correlates. A large-N study could not tell us as much about motivation for action.

Sources: Interviews and Archival Research

Methodologically, such a design calls for in-depth, historically inflected political research. As my work is primarily focused on the motivations and decisions of candidates, political strategists, and other actors involved in elections, sources such as interviews, memoirs, newspaper accounts, internal memoranda, correspondences, and other archival materials formed the mainstay of my data collection. These sources enabled me to make inferences concerning elites' beliefs, goals, and preferences which guide them to form a political strategy.

Semi-structured interviews were one of the most important forms of data collection. Hilary Arksey and Peter Knight describe these types of interviews as ones wherein the 'main questions and script are fixed, but interviewers are able to improvise follow-up questions and to explore meanings and areas of interest that emerge'.[92] The open-ended nature of this data-gathering method allowed my respondents to challenge and elaborate upon questions and the assumptions which underlay them.[93] Consequently, subjects were able to declare what was relevant without being restricted by my preconceived notions as the interviewer of what was important.[94] Equally, responses could be placed in a wider semantic context of American electoral politics and political strategising.[95] These interviews enabled me, in the words of Kathleen Blee and Verta Taylor, 'to elicit a robust or "thick" description of a historical period or situation from the perspective of those who lived through that time'.[96]

For this manuscript, I interviewed 90 different candidates, campaign staff, and other political actors. A full list of interviewees is found in Appendix A. All interview subjects were 'elites', according to John Zaller's definition of political elites as 'persons who devote themselves full time to some aspect of politics or public affairs'.[97]

Interviewees were identified initially through a quota basis. I divided the relevant actors into four groups of differing significance. The first tier was the candidate and his or her campaign manager. When trying to discern the *choice* of campaign strategy, these two actors (who usually work in unison) are the ultimate deciders of the campaign direction.[98] However, these actors work closely with a second tier of

[92] Arksey & Knight, 1999, 7.
[93] See Apampa (2013).
[94] Berry, 2002.
[95] See Blee & Taylor (2002).
[96] Ibid, 102
[97] Zaller, 1992, 6.
[98] Indeed, Boatright (2004) found in his study of congressional challengers that candidates will sometimes disregard the evidence presented to them by their campaign consultants if it undermines the candidate's prior, strongly held assumptions.

campaign intimates who contribute their own strategic input. Campaigns for US Congress and statewide office have relied on complex organisations with distinct divisions of labour for at least thirty years.[99] These actors include those involved in 'field' organisation (i.e. voter mobilisation), communications (e.g., advertising), finance and fundraising, and relations with the media. In addition, many campaigns hire political consultants who may do some or all of these tasks, as well as other activities such as polling, opposition research, and managing relations with other political actors.[100] The third tier of actors is 'election influencers'. These are political actors in the jurisdiction who have no direct strategic input into the campaign. However, their actions can influence the decisions of individuals in Tier 1 and Tier 2. The final group of interviewees (Tier 4) are expert election observers. These are individuals who may make no contribution to the campaign itself but are knowledgeable about the candidate and his or her campaign.

Table 1.4. Interview Subjects

Tier 1 - Candidate	Tier 2 - Campaign Strategists	Tier 3 - Election influencers	Tier 4 - Expert Observers
Candidate	Field Organiser	Party elites	Academics
Campaign Manager	Communications Director	Journalists	Personal intimates
	Finance Director	Endorsers	
	Consultant	Activists	
	Press Secretary	Opponent & Team	

Initially, my data gathering method was exploratory, interviewing respondents as they were located and became available. I used contemporary media reports, memoirs, and archival sources such as memoranda and correspondences to provide me with the initial list of names to pursue. As the research progressed, I was able to exercise greater theoretical direction to the referral chain, following lines of inquiry that emerged during earlier interviews.[101] Where possible, I have named my interview sources; however, some subjects requested complete or partial anonymisation of their comments. I have assigned each interviewee a specific code, tied to their candidate and the order in which I interviewed them. For example, HF8 refers to the eighth subject I interviewed from the Harold Ford (HF) campaign, while KE3 refers to the third interview subject from the Keith Ellison (KE) campaign.

Of course, interview-based research carries inherent risks. Particularly on the subject of race, many respondents might assume that admitting to *any* kind of racial campaign strategy is itself racist, given the dominance of colour-blind ideology in American society. Therefore, when interview subjects admitted to making racial appeals, I could be fairly certain that they in fact had made such appeals in the campaign because it is an unexpected or even socially undesirable answer. Consultants who admitted making racial appeals to white voters were in particular defiance of politically correct or

[99] Thurber, 2010.
[100] Ware (1985) reports that professional consultants have played roles in senatorial and gubernatorial elections since the 1960s. See also Sabato (1981).
[101] Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981.

socially desirable statements. For example, I asked a white candidate's campaign manager whether his campaign had made appeals to white racial solidarity. My question was followed by a 15-second silence before the subject replied, 'I think the answer to that is probably yes, but it's not as simple as it sounds'. Another 10 seconds followed before the respondent then asked himself, 'How to explain that?'.[102] The hesitations suggest that he knew that his response was controversial and, therefore, I propose, probably a truthful answer. Ultimately, each interview, even when I was provided with conflicting details, was important in helping to sharpen my overall account of a campaign.

Memory is not always reliable. When possible, I triangulated and cross-referenced claims from interviews with archival sources. I worked in twenty-eight archival collections (see Appendix B) to uncover a range of primary sources, including internal strategy documents, memorandums, internal polls, schedules, fundraising records, petitions, correspondences, newspaper clippings, photographs, campaign ephemera, and other items. These items gave me crucial insight into candidates' decision making processes. They also provided me with rich historical insights into the political context in which the candidates operated. I agree with Herbert Simon that 'to understand political choices, we need to understand where the frame of reference for the actors' thinking comes from'.[103]

In addition, I read hundreds of newspaper articles from sixty-three (ten national and fifty-three local) newspapers and magazines, which provided me with contemporary analysis and rich quotations from candidates, elites, and voters. These quotations are cited throughout the text, and a full list of newspapers consulted in this thesis is found in Appendix C.

Finally, I am indebted to the Kanter Archive at the University of Oklahoma's Political Communications Center which contains complete or near-complete collections of all of the television and radio advertisements produced in each campaign. I spent a week in Norman, Oklahoma watching all of the advertisements pertaining to the seven cases (n=284 radio and television advertisements) and systematically coded them for racial and policy content. Both the black candidate's and their white opponent's advertisements were analysed. Appendix D contains the codebook used in this process.

Key Terms

This work uses a variety of terms whose meanings are contested or not immediately obvious. Here, I would like to provide clarification. The most obviously contested concept is the idea of race itself. Race and ethnicity are social constructs, and therefore defy objective specification.[104] Ta-Nehisi Coates describes race as 'the child of racism, not the father'.[105] Lawrence Bobo and Cybelle Fox define racial

[102] HG8.
[103] Simon, 1985, 302.
[104] Michael Omi and Howard Winant's work on racial formation is one of the most important in the field in establishing that racial identity is socially and political constructed and enforced (see Omi & Winant, 2014).
[105] Coates, 2015, 7.

categories as 'historically contingent social constructions' whose 'distinctions or categorizations will vary in configuration and salience over time'.[106] The black-white colour-line in the United States has been socially and politically enforced for centuries. The historian John Hope Franklin wrote that by the twentieth century, 'the color line was as well defined and as firmly entrenched as any institution in the land. After all, it was older than most institutions, including the federal government itself. More important, it informed the content and shaped the lives of those institutions and the people who lived under them'.[107]

I adopt the convention of using 'race' to refer to the following categories: black/African American, white, Hispanic/Latino, Asian, and Native American.[108] These are the most commonly used categories about race in the United States. Some scholars distinguish between 'race' and 'ethnicity' but, unless otherwise specified, they will be used interchangeably in this work. The term 'white', therefore, refers to the Census category 'non-Hispanic white'. I use the terms black and African American interchangeably to refer to people of African descent living in the United States.

It is worth explaining why this manuscript focuses on *black* candidates in majority-white contexts rather than a more inclusive category of 'non-white' candidates in white-dominated spaces. Although the representation of other ethnic minority groups is a matter worthy of scholarly investigation, the black-white paradigm retains special relevance for several reasons. First, blacks and whites possess a unique historical relationship. As Michael Dawson explains, the 'key' to African American social identity is rooted in the institution of slavery.[109] Historical institutions can have effects which long endure after they have been dismantled.[110] Few institutions have exerted as pervasive an economic, social, and political effect as that of American race-based chattel slavery. At the start of the Civil War, slaves were worth more than all of American industry – factories, workshops, and railways – combined. Cotton was the United States's largest export, and the richest and poorest people in America lived in the plantations of the Mississippi River Valley.[111] The slave history differentiates blacks from other groups such as Asian and Hispanic Americans who root their experience in a narrative of migration.[112]

Second, African Americans continue to have clearly identifiable interests distinct from whites on a range of issues, including incarceration, education, unemployment, health, and wealth, as Desmond King and Rogers Smith powerfully showcase.[113] Black home ownership today is at lower levels than it

[106] Bobo & Fox, 2003, 319.
[107] Franklin, 1993, 36.
[108] See, for example, Cohen (2010).
[109] Dawson, 1994, Ch 1.
[110] See Sewell (1996).
[111] Coates, 2015, 101.
[112] Boss, 2011. See also King (2007).
[113] King & Smith, 2011.

was for whites during the Great Depression.[114] The median black-white wealth gap is 1:12,[115] larger than it was in apartheid South Africa in 1970.[116] The median wealth of a single black woman midway through her working life is $5, compared to $41,500 for her white equivalent.[117] The chances that a young black man will be shot dead by the police are twenty-one times greater than they are for a young white man.[118] While African Americans make up 13.6% of the US population, they constitute 44% of all murder victims[119] and 38% of the US prison population[120]. Fifty-eight percent of youth admitted to state prisons are African American.[121]

Third, black identity remains strong and politically relevant across class, gender, and age categories. Blacks' ideological coherence is stronger than any other racial group. Donald Kinder and Lynn Sanders argue that the black-white political divide is 'without peer… Differences as drastic as these simply have no counterpart in studies of public opinion'.[122] Finally, due to the history of legally enforced segregation and enduring *de facto* segregation, blacks continue to be socially and politically isolated.[123] For example, according to Vincent Fu, 92 percent of married blacks and whites in the United States are married to other blacks and whites, respectively.[124]

In this thesis, I consider all of my candidates to be African American because they identify as such. Where possible, self-identification is the preferred mechanism to classify a person's race. While not denying the reality of physical differences, Bobo and Fox are careful to clarify that such differences are not enough objectively to constitute a racial category. Bobo and Fox hold that neither 'physical or biological markers…give ethnoracial categories their *social significance'*.[125]

Another key term used in this study is 'racial campaign strategy'. Chapter 2 is devoted to unpacking this term, but, put simply, by a 'racial campaign strategy' I refer to the deliberate ways a candidate chooses to include racial themes (or not to include them) in three aspects of a political campaign: issue agenda (what a candidate chooses to speak about), style (how the candidate says it), and targeted appeals (to whom the candidate says it).

---

[114] 'State of Housing in Black America', National Association of Real Estate Brokers, 2016.
[115] 'Exploring the Racial Wealth Gap Using the Survey of Consumer Finances', Series 2015-076, Division of Statistics & Monetary Affairs, Federal Reserve Board, Table 1.
[116] Nicholas Kristof, 'When Whites Just Don't Get It', *New York Times,* 30 August 2014.
[117] Mariko Chang & M Liu, *Lifting as We Climb: Women of Color, Wealth, and America's Future,* Insight Center for Community and Economic Development, 2010, 5.
[118] Ryan Gabrielson, Ryann Jones, Eric Sagara, 'Deadly force in black and white', *Pro-Publica,* 10 October 2014.
[119] 'Crime in the United States', Federal Bureau of Investigations, 2013, Table 6.
[120] 'Inmate Race', Federal Bureau of Prisons, 28 November 2015.
[121] 'Criminal Justice Fact Sheet', NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/pages/criminal-justice-fact-sheet.
[122] Kinder & Sanders, 1996, 27.
[123] See Hajnal (2009), Cohen (2010), Rugh & Massey (2013), White, Laird, & Allen (2014).
[124] Fu, 2007.
[125] Bobo & Fox, 2003, 319. Emphasis added.

Organisation

The manuscript is divided into five parts. Part I includes the research design, outline of key concepts, and an overview of the scholarly literature. Parts II-IV are the case study chapters which constitute the empirical work of the thesis. Part V is the conclusion.

This first chapter has described the historical phenomenon of black candidates running for election in majority-white contexts in the United States. It has established the purpose of this manuscript and the research question (*What explains the choice of different types of racial campaign strategies deployed by black Democratic candidates in majority-white areas since 1989?*). The chapter has explained why the cases were chosen to answer this question. Finally, it has set out the main theoretical debates, the study's key terms, and its argument.

The second chapter is a theoretical account of racial campaign strategies, outlining the concept and developing the three hypotheses which I subject to scrutiny in the empirical case study comparisons. The hypotheses are propositions cultivated from the existing theoretical literature about racial campaign strategies, especially the scholarship on 'deracialisation' and black electoral politics. They take both structure and agency seriously. On the one hand, they draw on the historical institutionalism tradition, which emphasises how institutions structure political conflict, privileging some interests while demobilising others. On the other hand, they recognise that historical institutionalists can sometimes attribute too much to structure, deemphasising agency and the importance of decision making. While structure matters, it does not predetermine. Candidates exercise choice, and this thesis unpacks the context of that choice.

The three case study sections are analytic narratives, defined by an approach which 'pays close attention to stories, accounts, and context' while extracting 'explicit and formal lines of reasoning'.[126] The cases have been arranged into three groups to maximise leverage through similarity and difference: the pioneers (Douglas Wilder, Harvey Gantt, and Carol Moseley Braun), Democratic primary candidates (Barack Obama and Keith Ellison), and Democratic general election candidates (Harold Ford Jr and Cory Booker).

In Part II ('The Pioneers'), I set out three cases of the first significant wave of black Democrats who were elected or nearly elected in major statewide elections. The cases have been grouped together not only for their temporal proximity but because they enable us to use the methods of similarity and difference to facilitate key controls. Two candidates (Gantt and Braun) faced outwardly hostile white opponents, two operated in the South (Wilder and Gantt), all three were liberals but one changed his position to a more conservative stance before the election (Wilder), two accused their opponents of

[126] Bates et al, 1998, 10.

racism (Gantt and Braun), two were darker complexion African Americans (Gantt and Braun),[127] one was a female candidate (Braun), and two were successfully elected (Wilder and Braun). I conclude from this study that one candidate (Wilder) chose a colour-blind strategy (with some modifications) while Gantt and Braun pursued similar race-conscious strategies (with some modifications).

Part III ('Race-Conscious Campaigning in Democratic Primaries') describes an extremely successful pair of candidates: Barack Obama and Keith Ellison. Both were progressive black Democrats in northern, liberal-leaning Democratic primaries. The cases show that black candidates in areas without large black populations nonetheless do make appeals to white voters on the basis of race-conscious themes such as civil rights and racial justice, symbolic aspirations for descriptive representation of racial minorities, and positive racial modelling. While similar in ideology and, to an extent, in campaign environment, the events of these two elections differed markedly. These candidates, to varying degrees, adopted largely race-conscious strategies, but one faced more racially hostile set of opponents than the other.

Part IV ('After Deracialisation') studies two prominent Democratic nominees in general elections against white Republican opponents: Harold Ford Jr and Cory Booker. Both faced a similar set of challenges, particularly questions of racial authenticity within the black community and Republican opponents who were willing to use racialised attacks. While one candidate (Ford) attempted to maintain a linkage with black insurgent politics, the other candidate (Booker) defined himself against a stylised image of old 'racialised' black politics. In front of white audiences, Ford studiously avoided racial discourse, whereas Booker engaged freely in discussions about race and the civil rights movement. Both candidates, I argue, ultimately chose not to challenge America's racial order. While Ford accepted the racial status quo by crudely embracing symbols of the Old South, Booker forwarded a colour-blind capitalist ideology which minimised party and race as tools of public policy analysis.

The conclusion (Chapter 10) revisits the basic puzzle, reports on the findings, and outlines pathways for further study. The appendices list the subjects interviewed (Appendix A) and the archival sources consulted for each case study (Appendix B). They also include a list of the newspapers consulted (Appendix C). Appendix D contains the codebook used to analyse campaign communications (television, radio, and print advertisements) as well as newspaper reports about each of the campaigns.

[127] Strickland & Whicker (1992) argue that complexion matters (i.e. dark versus light skinned African Americans), but Jeffries & Jones (2006) dispute this conclusion. For a general discussion about the social and political implications of skin colour within the black community, see Hochschild & Weaver (2007).

Chapter 2 – Theorising Racial Campaign Strategies

This manuscript aims to answer an empirical puzzle about racial campaign politics in the United States. What explains black Democratic candidates' choice of racial campaign strategy in majority-white jurisdictions? This empirical puzzle arose from earlier research I undertook about African American US Senate candidates.[1] I studied five candidates,[2] four of whom had been described in earlier accounts as following a deracialised campaign strategy. Upon closer inspection I found that the candidates' actions did not conform to that description.[3] Some candidates' targeted appeals, issue agendas, and rhetorical styles were much more race-conscious than had been previously assumed. Across the five cases, I detected three distinct racial campaign strategies which hitherto had been overlooked in scholarly literature.[4]

My earlier research, although formative, was nonetheless limited because it merely described, rather than explained, variation in campaign strategies. This manuscript advances the research by explaining why such variation occurs. In the language of social science, the dependent variable or outcome of interest is **the racial campaign strategy** chosen by a candidate. It varies along race-conscious and colour-blind dimensions. I offer three propositions ('hypotheses') to explain such variation. They are as follows:

(1) *Campaign environment will affect the racial campaign strategy chosen.*
(2) *The racial biography of the candidate will affect the racial campaign strategy chosen*.
(3) *The racial outlook of local elites will affect the racial campaign strategy chosen*.

Put simply, the propositions hold that variation in the choice of racial campaign strategy is explained by (1) racial characteristics of the electorate and election context, (2) the racial identity of the candidate, and (3) the racial attitudes of political elites.

This chapter will be divided into three sections. The first section offers a conceptual framework for understanding racial campaign strategies and their component parts. The second section describes the observed variation in the dependent variable, which is both *prima facie* and developed from my previous research on racial campaign strategies. The third section describes the hypotheses in depth. It sets out

[1] Johnson, 2014.
[2] The candidates were Edward Brooke (Massachusetts, 1966), Harvey Gantt (North Carolina, 1990), Carol Moseley Braun (Illinois, 1992), Michael Steele (Maryland, 2006), and Harold Ford Jr (Tennessee, 2006).
[3] On Brooke, see Jeffries (1999), Nordin (2012), Sokol (2014), Rigeur (2016). On Gantt, see Wilson (1993), Prysby (1996), Clemons (1998), Gillespie (2010). On Braun, see Tate (1997) and Nordin (2012: 126-142). On Ford, see Westen (2007), Smith (2009), Middleton & Franklin (2009), Persons (2009), Gillespie (2010b). King-Meadows (2009) recognised that Steele did not run a deracialised campaign.
[4] I determined that Brooke and Steele pursued 'symbolic-historic' strategies, Gantt and Braun pursued 'crusade campaign' strategies, and Ford pursued a 'situationally racialised' strategy, which in this thesis I have renamed a 'segregated' strategy.

the propositions which attempt to explain campaign strategy and variation. The subsequent empirical chapters will assess the validity of each of these propositions.

Before proceeding, I should be clear that this thesis does *not* set out to explain election outcomes. It does not identify which racial campaign strategy is the most *effective* nor does it establish which racial campaign strategy is necessary or sufficient to win in a given electoral context. While the findings of this manuscript will bear implications on these questions, they are not themselves being tested. As the previous chapter described, one of the selection criteria for the case studies was that the candidate be considered successful, defined as securing at least 45 percent of the two-party or two-candidate vote. All candidates in my sample either won their election or could plausibly have done so with minor alterations.[5] Therefore, given that all candidates were chosen in part because they achieved some degree of electoral success, it would not be appropriate to use the election result as the dependent variable.

Conceptualising Racial Campaign Strategies

For many years commentators dismissed the importance of political campaigns in determining election outcomes.[6] This view, sometimes known as the 'minimal effects' hypothesis, held that sociological factors were far more important than campaign strategy in determining who won an election.[7] More recently, some observers have argued that the importance of campaigns has been exaggerated by consultants seeking to generate profit from advising candidates or by commentators, especially in the media, who thrive on the drama of the campaign process.[8] Unsurprisingly, this manuscript rejects these conclusions, pointing to a large body of evidence which demonstrates that campaigns do matter.[9]

Nonetheless, while campaign strategies are often discussed in the scholarly literature, their definition requires clarification. John Sides and colleagues helpfully define a campaign strategy as simply 'a plan for how to win [based on] an understanding of who will vote for the candidate and why they will do so'.[10] Republican strategist David Winston offers a similar definition, defining a campaign strategy as the scheme to achieve 'a desired outcome [election] using a structured approach based on understanding

[5] See Levy (2015)'s description of a plausible counterfactual whose antecedent could have easily occurred requiring a 'minimal rewrite' of history (382).
[6] E.g., Lewis-Beck & Rice (1992), Salmore & Salmore (1989: 4), Fair (2002). Alan Abramowitz's presidential election forecasting models take no account of campaign effects, yet he has predicted the popular vote within an average of two percentage points for the elections since 1992. See Abramowitz (1996, 2001, 2004, 2008, 2012).
[7] See Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet (1944), Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee (1954), Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes (1960).
[8] On campaign consultants, see Thurber & Nelson (2000), Dulio (2004), Sides et al (2015: 144). On the 'horserace' aspect of campaigns, see Gelman & King (1993) and Iyengar et al (2004).
[9] For an excellent survey on the literature, see Jacobson (2015). See also Holbrook (1996), Thurber (2010).
[10] Sides et al, 2015, 122.

existing and potential environmental elements'.[11] These commentators affirm that there is only one overarching goal of a campaign strategy: to win.

I have learned through my archival research and elite interviews that major US campaigns typically produce a detailed strategy document at the start of the election period. I have been able to obtain the full strategy documents for two of my case studies (Douglas Wilder in Chapter 3[12] and Carol Moseley Braun in Chapter 5[13]). With these two exceptions, the dependent variable of this study ('racial campaign strategies') cannot be observed directly, and even in these two cases, the strategy was dynamic and responsive to campaign events. Public actions can give valuable evidence about the type of strategy being pursued, but they are often insufficient to providing insights into intentions and motives. Therefore, interviews and other internal campaign documents (e.g., internal memos) were vital in cross-verifying the unobserved quantity. Given the centrality of perceptions and motives to understanding strategic choice, the reader will encounter many more direct quotations than is typical in most works of political science.[14]

It is crucial to underscore that a campaign strategy is tied to strategists' *perceptions* of the political landscape, rather than objective reality. As Winston admits, 'every campaign manager embarks on a campaign with personal biases'.[15] Some academics have viewed these biases scornfully as little more than 'campaign folklore', but as the interviews in this manuscript will show, they are manifest in all political campaigns' decision-making processes.[16] Sometimes there are advantages to this headstrong approach. As people 'on the ground', candidates possess a form of local knowledge which is not always discernible through survey research (e.g., because the surveys ask the wrong questions or are based on faulty assumptions).

Political scientists who seek to explain why candidates make certain choices must accept that candidates and strategists may sometimes have the wrong assumptions. Richard Fenno showed that members of Congress sometimes have inaccurate perceptions of the demographics of their districts.[17] Even when provided with empirical evidence, such as polling data, Robert Boatright found that candidates would disregard information if it undermined their prior, strongly held assumptions.[18] These accounts suggest that while structure matters, it is not deterministic. It is not enough to look simply at the structural

[11] Winston, 2010, 36.
[12] David Doak to Doug Wilder, 'Strategy Memo, Governors [sic] Race 1989', 26 July 1988 (Series XI, Box 37, Wilder Archive, Virginia Union University).
[13] Untitled strategy memo, Spring 1992 (Box 878, Braun Archive, Chicago History Museum).
[14] See also Lee (2016).
[15] Ibid., 39.
[16] Thurber (2010) makes this observation about his academic colleagues.
[17] Fenno, 1978, Ch 1.
[18] Boatright, 2004.

conditions of a campaign environment (e.g., the proportion of black voters in a district) to explain political behaviour. Candidates and their campaign managers ultimately exercise choice.


According to Sides and co-authors, campaign strategies consist of what issues to emphasise, what message or theme to discuss, and which citizens to target.[19] Put succinctly, the three dimensions of a campaign strategy are (1) issue agenda, (2) style, and (3) targeted appeals. They are the *what*, *how*, and *who* of a campaign. Drawing from the methodological work of Gary Goertz, I propose viewing a racial campaign strategy as a multi-dimensional concept consisting of these three dimensions.[20]

A *racial* campaign strategy considers these three dimensions through a racial lens. As Raphael Sonenshein has rightly contended, race in US election campaigns is present not just in people's ultimate voting decisions but is embedded in the campaign battle itself.[21] I expect all candidates in my population (i.e. office-seeking African Americans in majority-white US contexts) to have a strategy which takes race into account. I embrace Christian Collet's observation that 'race and ethnicity remain an inherent part of any election in which a minority candidate is a contestant… [S]imply because observers do not "see" race or ethnicity in a campaign certainly does not mean that it is not a major component of a candidate's strategy.'[22] A *racial* campaign strategy, therefore, is defined as a plan to win an election using a structured approach to racial politics based on understanding existing and potential racial elements in the campaign environment.

Because campaigns rarely reveal their strategies explicitly, their strategies must be inferred from 'indicators'. Indicators consist of tactics which are observable in advertising, public events, speeches, press releases, endorsements, and other public manoeuvres. Tactics can be used to infer strategy because if tactics weren't tied to strategy, then they would lose their potency. As Winston puts it, 'tactics without strategy are the noise before defeat.'[23] For example, if a candidate's tactic is to sponsor a NASCAR driver, as Miami Congressman Kendrick Meek did in his 2010 campaign for the US Senate, then I can infer from this indicator that the candidate is engaging in a strategic targeted appeal to the segment of the electorate who are mostly likely to attend and view those events (i.e. predominantly white, male, middle-aged voters[24]). Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship.

[19] Sides et al, 2015, Ch 1.
[20] Goertz, 2006.
[21] Sonenshein, 1990.
[22] Collet, 2008, 712.
[23] Winston, 2010, 57.
[24] Opendorse, '2013 Sports Fan Demographics', http://opendorse.com/blog/2013-sports-fan-demographics/.

Figure 2.1 - Racial Campaign Strategy



I should note that the racial campaign strategy is ultimately a heuristic. While all campaigns have strategies, it is rare for candidates not to diverge to some extent from the plan on which they embarked at the start of the campaign. James Thurber writes that campaign plans involve 'a dynamic and endless series of dialogues within the campaign [organisation]'.[25] Therefore, while recognising that there may be modifications over the course of an election, I identify the dominant or chief campaign strategy for each of my case studies. To some extent, the identified campaign strategy is an artificial expedient.

Dimension (1) - Issue Agenda

Let us now consider racial campaign strategies' dimensions in turn. The first dimension is the issue agenda. The issue agenda consists of two elements. First, the candidate must choose which issues to raise and, second, he or she must decide what positions to take on those issues.[26] Staying 'on message' is very important in campaigns, and it partly requires candidates to focus on a small set of issues which are politically advantageous. As Sides and colleagues write, 'Candidates select issues for their campaign

[25] Thurber, 2010, 20.
[26] See Boatright (2004: Ch 5).

agenda with care and then seek to emphasize only those issues...In some ways, the main fight in the campaign [is] more about the agenda than specific proposals'.[27]

Candidates' issue agendas are important signs of strategic choice because, as Boatright observes, they are among the few 'mutable aspects of the political campaign'.[28] However, candidates cannot always control which issues become salient in a campaign. The candidate's opponent, the media, single-issue groups, or exogenous events may force a candidate to take a position on an issue which he or she would otherwise have wished to have ignored. Therefore, effective issue agendas are always sensitive to the wider political context of the campaign.

In the context of a *racial* campaign strategy, a candidate's issue agenda takes on additional importance. First, there are some issues which are explicitly racial, such as affirmative action, in that they are designed with specific reference to racial categories. Second, there are some issues which have been implicitly 'racialised', which refers to occasions when an ostensibly non-racial issue is associated with a racial group.[29] In the United States, welfare is associated with African Americans, even though they are not the main claimants of federal cash or cash-like benefits.[30] Usually such racialisation is the consequence of priming by political actors and the media or the result of entrenched historical associations. Third, some issue *positions* are stereotypically associated with African Americans. Generally, black politicians are regarded as more liberal, even when there is no evidence for or information about their issue positions.[31]

The indicators which I used for issue positions were content from television and radio advertisements, leaflets, direct mail, and speeches. I systematically coded this content for references to explicitly racial issues (e.g., affirmative action, racial quotas, civil rights, reparations) and implicitly racial issues (crime,[32] the death penalty,[33] drugs, [34] gun control,[35] taxes,[36] and welfare[37]). I also took note when candidates adopted counter-stereotypical positions on issues, such as when an African American candidate supported the death penalty or called for harsher 'law and order' measures. A full description of the coding method is located in Appendix D.

---

[27] Sides et al, 2015,113.
[28] Boatright, 2004, 92.
[29] See Tesler (2012).
[30] See Edsall & Edsall (1991, Ch 1), Gilens (1999).
[31] See Citrin et al (1990), Sigelman et al (1995).
[32] See Hurwitz & Peffley (1997, 2005), Alexander (2010), Filindra (2016).
[33] See Garland (2010), Williams (2012: 107).
[34] Alexander & Gyamerah, 1997.
[35] McIlwain & Caliendo, 2011, 24.
[36] Sniderman & Piazza, 1993, Ch 4.
[37] See Edsall & Edsall (1991: Ch 1) Peffley et al (1997), Gilliam (1996), Gilens (1999), Valentino, Hutchings, & White (2002). Not only is welfare associated by whites with black recipients but Keiser et al (2004) and Monnat (2010) also show that the bureaucratic implementation of welfare sanctions is not race-neutral.

Dimension (2) - Targeted Appeals

The second dimension of the racial campaign strategy is targeted appeals. These refer to the voters whom a candidate tries to mobilise and to persuade to vote for him or her. Campaign strategists explain that in order to win an election, candidates will first identify their 'base' and then 'don't knows'. To varying degrees, campaigns focus on turning out the first group and persuading the second group. The relative emphasis placed on voter reinforcement and conversion has typically been understood to vary based on the partisan and demographic makeup of a district, according to Daniel Shea and Michael Burton.[38]

In the context of a racial campaign strategy, the focus is on the racial and ethnic groups which candidates try to mobilise and persuade. A number of questions must be considered. Are black voters a reliable base for all African American candidates? Do black candidates spend campaign resources trying to turn out these voters? How do black candidates try to appeal to white voters? Can any white voters be considered a part of an African American candidate's base? Which white voters are persuadable?

The indicators used to identify these appeals come from several different sources. One source is from interviews. I asked candidates and their strategists which demographic groups they targeted, whom they considered to be reliable base voters, and who were seen as persuadable. Another source is media reports. I created a sample of newspapers for each day of the campaigns in my study. Using these, I took note of any references to the racial makeup of voters at campaign events. A third source is internal campaign documents. For a few of my campaigns, I was able to access internal strategy documents and letters which spelled out explicitly which types of voters the campaign was seeking to target. I also had access to a few candidates' campaign schedules, which I could then use to ascertain how often the candidate attended events for particular demographic groups (e.g., a speech at an NAACP dinner, a black church, or an historically black college would be identified as a predominantly African American event).

A fourth source was the campaign's advertisements on television, radio, and newspapers. Michael Dawson argues persuasively that segregation and inequality have entrenched a racialised public sphere. African Americans have developed a 'black counter-public', which includes black churches, black press and radio, and black social and community organisations.[39] If the campaign published an advertisement in a black newspaper like the *Chicago Defender* or broadcast an advertisement on WVON, a radio station with a predominantly African American listenership, they were assumed to be targeting African American voters.[40]

---

[38] Shea & Burton, 2001, Ch 8.
[39] Dawson, 2001, 27.
[40] While traditional sources of black media are largely in decline, they retain symbolic prestige (see Sydney Ember, 'Pillars of the Black Media, Once Vibrant, Now Fighting for Survival', *New York Times*, 2 July 2016).

I was also interested in the demographic makeup of campaigns' promotional materials. As Adam Berinsky and colleagues found in their experimental study, voters will use the racial composition of the people who appear on the campaign leaflet to draw inferences about the candidate's ideology, race, and issue positions.[41] A campaign which includes no African Americans in any of its campaign literature conceivably is appealing to a different group of people than a campaign which depicts a diverse set of supporters in its materials. To measure this tactic, television and newspaper advertisements were coded alongside printed leaflets for their racial composition. For printed adverts, I coded everyone in the leaflet. For television advertisements, I coded the racial compositions of the frames of a TV advert at the start, middle, and end of the advert and then took the average across the cases. I admit that such an approach is speculative and raises issues about removing individuals' agency from identifying their race. However, admitting these constraints, some useful findings did emerge.

A final source of information about targeting came from direct mail. Letters and other literature sent directly to voters' homes are perhaps the most precisely targeted tool of campaigns. Peter Brodnitz, who was director of operations at the polling firm for Barack Obama's presidential campaigns, told me, 'mailing is always very targeted…We have a lot of specific information about people's political proclivities that we can use to target, and then you use the polling and voter modelling to discretely target who gets what'.[42] Because of the discrete and targeted nature of these communications, samples of direct mail are usually quite difficult to obtain. However, I was able to generate a sample of printed literature for nearly of all of my case studies by using archival collections and items provided to me by campaign staff. Some campaign strategists also told whether a given leaflet had been targeted to a particular set of voters. For example, one Republican campaign strategist admitted to me that direct mails which warned about stiff penalties for voter fraud were sent exclusively to predominantly black neighbourhoods.[43]

Dimension (3) - Style

The third dimension of the campaign is style. Some scholars have argued that presentational style is even more important than issue agenda. How a candidate communicates can be just as important as what he or she says.[44] Drawing from Erving Goffman's seminal work, Richard Fenno writes that politicians use their 'presentation of self' to 'weave a tapestry of fellow feeling' with their voters.[45] According to the theorists of the deracialisation strategy, African American politicians in majority-white contexts embrace a 'quiet, conciliatory' style.[46]As Collet writes, strategy is a candidate's effort

For example, it is noteworthy that the first interview given by Barack Obama to a print publication after he was elected president was to *Ebony.*

[41] Berinsky et al, 2014.
[42] Interview with Peter Brodnitz, 12 September 2013.
[43] Interview with Carter Wrenn, 22 July 2015.
[44] Butler & Collins, 1994.
[45] Fenno, 1978, 74. See Goffman (1959).
[46] Strickland & Whicker, 1992, 208.

'to establish trust across white and minority constituencies through the selective use of language, symbols, cultural practices, policies, and personal biography'.[47]

Style is a conscious, strategic choice. It is not merely a description of immutable personality and presentational characteristics. Several of the candidates in my sample were extremely adept at 'style shifting' which refers to a speaker's change in vocabulary, syntax, and even pronunciation depending on his or her listener.[48] In a non-racial context, Richard Fenno observed that members of Congress from districts with a mix of rural, suburban, and urban voters adopted different presentational styles depending on where in the district they were.[49] For black candidates in multiracial contexts, style shifting occurs when speaking to audiences of different races. Barack Obama acknowledged his ability to style shift in a 2004 interview, 'That's not unique to me. Any black person in America who's successful has to be able to speak different forms of the same language…It's not unlike a person shifting between Spanish and English'.[50] Ronald C Rice, a former councillor in Newark, New Jersey, confirmed this phenomenon to me in an interview:

> 'We all have black talk. That's just the way it is in America if you want to be in the greater society. Black people…are more integrated into the world of whites…than whites will ever be integrated into our community. It's just a fact of life. And so [when it comes to] your behaviour, how you act, how you are perceived, we are very aware of how white people feel about us, all the time… It's not like it's a hard thing. I've been used to it all my life. But when you run for office, that's times ten, you know?'[51]

Style is difficult to operationalise due to its impressionistic nature. In this thesis, I study style by looking at how candidates respond to moments of racial controversy. When faced with a potentially explosive racialised controversy, I examine whether the candidate takes a colour-blind response which ignores (deracialised) or dismisses (post-racial) the relevance of race, or I look to see whether the candidate adopts a race-conscious posture which embraces their racial identity (symbolic-substantive) or speaks out against racism (crusade).

Describing Variation in Campaign Strategies


Issue agenda, targeted appeals, and style together compose a campaign strategy. The choice of racial campaign strategy is the outcome of interest or 'dependent variable' in this thesis. Racial campaign strategies vary along a race-conscious to colour-blind dimension and a positive/negative racial optimism dimension. There are five possible strategies which a candidate can choose. Along the first dimension,

[47] Collet, 2008, 713.
[48] Alim & Smitherman, 2015.
[49] Fenno, 1978, Ch 5.
[50] Barack Obama, quoted in Barkley (2006: 25).
[51] Interview with Ronald Rice, 10 July 2015.

two strategies are 'race-conscious', two are 'colour-blind', and one contains elements of both, contingent on audience. Race-conscious strategies seek to appeal to voters (both black and white), in part, on the basis of the candidate's racial identity, aspirations of improving descriptive and substantive representation for minorities, and a commitment to policies aimed at improving the material conditions of African Americans. Colour-blind strategies, in contrast, downplay the importance of race, hold descriptive racial representation to be irrelevant, and oppose racially-targeted policies. The second dimension refers to the racial optimism projected by the candidate. A candidate can offer a broadly positive or aspirational vision of race-relations, or a candidate can give a more pragmatic or pessimistic assessment of the possibility of overcoming racial divisions in the United States.

Spatially, we might picture the dependent variable in the following two-by-two table (Figure 2.2). The segregated campaign strategy draws from the four other strategies, depending on the candidate's perception of a given audience. It therefore has been positioned in the middle of the chart:

Figure 2.2 - Variation in Racial Campaign Strategy



Symbolic-Substantive Campaign Strategy (Race-Conscious)

The symbolic-substantive campaign strategy refers to campaigns in which a black candidate invites support on the basis of his or her racial identity and support for advancing the goal of descriptive representation and substantive racial equality. For some whites, the desire to 'make history' or demonstrate their racial tolerance by electing an African American to office is an important and

potentially decisive factor in their decision to support a black candidate. Under this strategy, candidates speak openly about their racial identity, include racially targeted issues in their policy agenda, and mobilise some white supporters on the basis of making history, bringing change, or 'doing the right thing'.

This model runs contrary to the common assumption that whites react negatively to a black candidate who speaks about race. Nearly all commentators assume that the fact that a candidate is black will be received with hostility by white voters. Charlton McIlwain and Stephen Caliendo admit that they 'take it for granted' that news articles which mention a candidate's race prime negative (rather than positive) racial attitudes.[52] Very few commentators have considered the possibility that white voters might be more favourable to a black candidate because he or she is black.[53]

It is important to clarify that a symbolic-substantive campaign model is not tokenism. I take it for granted that black candidates must meet the minimum qualifications for office that white candidates must also satisfy. Indeed, as in many other areas of life, African American candidates are often expected to possess 'exceptional' characteristics to be compared favourably to white candidates.[54] I reject the notion that an unqualified black candidate will win an election simply because he or she is black. Alongside their substantive qualifications, however, black candidates can fulfil a meaningful symbolic role. Richard Fenno suggests that on a symbolic level most African American legislators provide 'something more than descriptive representation'.[55] When they run for an office which has never been occupied by a black office holder before, as Dennis Nordin rightly observes, they inescapably fill the role of being one of 'the pioneering members of their race'.[56]

The second important clarification is that the symbolic-substantive campaign strategy model does not deny white racism. Racial stereotyping, even subliminally, has been shown to be pervasive and difficult to avoid. However, there is a growing body of evidence to suggest that racialised voting does not always imply anti-black voting. McIlwain and Caliendo asked a sample of whites to view television advertisements in a fictitious campaign between a white and black opponent. They found that whites who felt that race had been invoked negatively against the black candidate by his white opponents were more likely to show support for the minority candidate.[57]

Crusade Campaign Strategy (Race-Conscious)

The second race-conscious strategy is the crusade campaign strategy. Similar to the symbolic-substantive strategy, 'crusade' candidates speak openly about their racial identity and include racially

[52] McIlwain & Caliendo, 2011, Ch 4.
[53] McIlwain & Caliendo (2011) consider this possibility but ultimately dismiss it.
[54] Carter & Dowe, 2015.
[55] Fenno, 2003, 35.
[56] Nordin, 2012, 109.
[57] McIlwain & Caliendo, 2011, Ch 2.

targeted issues in their policy agenda. Their appeals to whites, however, involve a sharply defined contrast between themselves and their racially intolerant opponent. Therefore, the black candidate's historic-symbolic status assumes an additional layer of significance. Positioned against the racial villain, the black candidate invites whites to make a choice between racial tolerance or intolerance through their vote.

This strategy follows the logic that many white voters do not view themselves as racist, even if they hold views which are based on racial stereotypes. Therefore, in this strategy, it is believed that it is important for the black candidate to point out explicitly the racial content of attacks which might be only implicitly racial. By showing white voters that his or her white opponent is acting in a racist way, the black candidate might discourage white voters from giving their support the white candidate. This strategy is consistent with the social psychological research about whites' perceptions of their own racial biases conducted by Tali Mendelberg[58] and Drew Westen.[59] Whites generally do not like being perceived as racist, and it may be possible for some black candidates to exploit this inclination.

This strategy runs contrary to the assumption that a white candidate's priming of racialised policies and negative racial stereotypes will be harmful to black candidates. While some racially intolerant appeals have been shown to be effective, Westen has pointed out that these appeals have a limited audience.[60] Therefore, there may be an advantage for African American candidates to point out the unpalatable tactics of their opponent to sympathetic voters. Rather than waste time trying to woo hostile voters, the candidate calculates that his/her efforts are better spent on mobilising ethnic minorities and racially liberal white voters.

Deracialised Campaign Strategy (Colour-Blind)

The deracialised strategy should be understood as a 'colour-blind' strategy because of its fundamental aspiration that whites will vote for a black candidate on a 'non-racial' basis if he or she can successfully diminish the salience of race and demonstrate satisfactory distance from their black racial identity.

In the foundational volume *Dilemmas of Black Politics,* Joseph McCormick and Charles Jones define the deracialised campaign strategy as '[c]onducting a campaign in a stylistic fashion that defuses the polarizing effects of race by avoiding explicit reference to race-specific issues, while at the same time emphasizing those issues that are perceived as racially transcendent, thus mobilizing a broad segment of the electorate for the purposes of capturing or maintaining public office'.[61] They added that the strategy was 'needed to enhance effectively the likelihood of white electoral support in predominantly

[58] Mendelberg, 2001.
[59] Westen, 2007.
[60] Ibid. Mendelberg (2001) makes a similar point.
[61] McCormick & Jones, 1993, 76.

white political jurisdictions'.[62] Giving a similar definition in the same edited volume, Charles Jones and Michael Clemons write that deracialisation asserts 'the need to deemphasize race in order to garner the necessary degree of white electoral support to win in predominantly white jurisdictions'.[63]

With respect to three components of a racial campaign strategy, first, the model holds that a black candidate must have a 'non-threatening',[64] 'mainstream'[65] political style. Second, it asserts that black candidates avoid the subject of race in rhetorical appeals to white or black voters.[66] Third, the model contends that the black candidate will focus on non-racial issues, avoiding policy matters which contain either implicit or explicit racial content.

Post-Racial Campaign Strategy (Colour-Blind)

The post-racial strategy involves black candidates presenting themselves as 'racially transcendent' politicians who can look 'beyond' race. While the idea of a post-racial America, I would argue, is factually absurd, it is a powerful ideological claim which holds purchase with many white voters. Post-racial candidates tend to present themselves favourably in juxtaposition to other black politicians who 'wear race on their sleeve' or seem unable to 'get past' race.

Post-racialism consists of several related claims.[67] Post-racial proponents assert that (a) race is no longer a relevant category because (b) the racial goals of the civil rights movement have been achieved and (c) the United States has moved into a multi-racial milieu where traditional racial categories are irrelevant. According to post-racial philosophy, (d) to take account of race in an attempt to reduce racial inequalities is itself racist. Where lingering racial differences exist, political actors can (and should) do nothing about them. These claims are united by a philosophy which was summed up by Chief Justice John Roberts in his decision in *Parents Involved in Community Schools v Seattle*: 'The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race'.[68]

Like the deracialised strategy, a post-racial candidate avoids making targeted appeals to racial groups, invoking race as a reason to support his/her candidacy, or including racially targeted policies in his/her issue agenda. While sharing these ostensible similarities, it is important to distinguish between the two types of colour-blind strategies because they differ on the racial optimism dimension. The deracialised campaign strategy was originally offered, as Baodong Liu explains, as 'a pragmatic campaign

---

[62] Ibid.
[63] Jones & Clemons, 1993.
[64] Ibid.
[65] Strickland & Whicker (1992: 208), Wilson (1993: 176), Sigelman et al (1995: 244).
[66] Strickland & Whicker, 1992, 209.
[67] For a detailed interrogation of post-racial philosophy, see Taylor (2014).
[68] With specific reference to school desegregation, Roberts also wrote that for schools which 'have removed the vestiges of past segregation, such as Jefferson County, the way "to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis" is to stop assigning students on a racial basis' (*Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1*, 551 US 701 (2007)).

strategy'.[69] It assumed white racism, but the strategy held that white racism could be overcome if a black candidate took sufficient steps to distance himself or herself from his or her black racial identity. In contrast, the 'post-racial' strategy assumes that white racism is no longer a relevant consideration in electoral politics. It takes as a matter of first principles that white voters will evaluate a black candidate without regard to race.

Some commentators assert post-racialism as an empirical reality. For example, Dewey Clayton writes that the election of Barack Obama as president was evidence that the American political process has matured to a point where 'Americans examine candidates based not on the color of their skin but on their stances on the issues and choose the most qualified person'.[70] It is highly questionable whether this strategy rests on empirically valid assumptions, yet as I explained earlier, what matters in choosing campaign strategies is not the empirical reality but the belief of the candidate and his or her key strategists.

Segregated Campaign Strategy (Race-conscious and colour-blind)

Finally, the segregated campaign strategy includes both race-conscious and colour-blind elements. It refers to the strategy of deploying divergent (and mutually incompatible) racial appeals depending on the race of the intended audience. Specifically, black candidates attempt to raise the salience of the feeling of 'linked fate' (explained later in the chapter) among blacks while they emphasise to white voters their differences from 'traditional' black politicians who operate in majority-black contexts.[71] Politicians who follow this model walk a delicate tightrope between the need to show racial solidarity to black constituents while affirming their sympathetic disposition to white voters and, often, whites' prejudices about blacks.

Scholars of Asian and Latino politics have already noted different racial appeals pursued by candidates with bilingual electorates.[72] Often candidates include more explicitly race-conscious commitments in, for example, a Spanish-language advertisement than in an English-language broadcast.[73] Christian Collet found that Vietnamese candidates in California 'toggled' between a strategy which promoted 'racial and ethnic solidarity with the pragmatic need for out-group votes'.[74] Leaflets in Vietnamese were more likely to promote the former through cultural and policy signals, undetectable to English-speaking voters.

However, less attention has been paid to how such a segregated strategy would manifest itself in predominantly black-white contexts. There are two reasons we might expect such a strategy to be more

[69] Liu, 2014, 444.
[70] Clayton, 2010, 4.
[71] See Dawson (1994).
[72] Wright-Austin & Middleton, 2004.
[73] E.g., Flores (2016)
[74] Collet, 2008, 707.

difficult for an African American candidate. First, the vast majority of African Americans speak English as their primary language. Therefore, bilingual campaigning is rarely an option in appeals to black voters (but for an exception, see the discussion of Somali voters in Chapter 7). Second, it is arguably more difficult for an African American candidate to 'toggle' than it is for a Latino or Asian candidate. Whereas historically Latinos and Asians have been able to traverse the black-white divide, sometimes by being classified as 'white' or, at least, 'non-black', such ambiguity is not available for African American candidates.[75] Therefore, we should expect a segregated strategy to be both more desirable and more difficult to achieve for African American candidates.

A segregated campaign strategy relies on a black candidate's ability to draw on a reservoir of support from his or her co-ethnics while also establishing bonds of trust with white voters. To African American voters, assurances of a left-of-centre and race-conscious policy agenda will be made. In addition candidates will use language, symbols, cultural connections, and personal biography to signal their rootedness in the black community.[76] Testimonies and endorsements from other figures within the community will also emphasise group linked fate and the candidate's 'authentic' connection to the community.

To white voters, the segregated strategy involves an appeal which depends on a contrast made by the candidate between himself or herself and an image of 'traditional' black politicians. By juxtaposing themselves with stereotypes about black unfitness to govern, candidates who follow the segregated model are often guilty of amplifying the negative stereotypes themselves by implicitly acknowledging them and attempting to associate themselves more closely with a white ideal.[77] For example, a black candidate who does not want to be vulnerable to stereotypes about blacks and criminality may adopt an extremely hard-line approach to criminal justice. Yet, in doing so, he or she is implicitly acknowledging the view that most black politicians are 'soft' on crime. As Andra Gillespie explains, black politicians who try to prove that they are not like other black politicians can promote heavily racial – and indeed racist – sentiments.[78]

One objection to this model might be its apparent infeasibility. How can such a Jekyll and Hyde political strategy be possible? I argue that the lack of shared associational life between whites and blacks in

[75] For discussion, see Loewen (1968), Waters (1999), Kim (1999), Ngai (1999), Fox & Guglielmo (2012), Thompson (2015).
[76] See Fenno (1978) on candidates' construction of public 'presentations of self'.
[77] McIlwain & Caliendo, 2011.
[78] Gillespie, 2012.

America makes differential racial appeals possible.[79] Whites do not attend black churches;[80] they do not read or listen to the black media[81] or social media (e.g., 'Black Twitter')[82]; they do not live with blacks.[83] Therefore, a black candidate can plausibly make appeals to blacks which are at odds with the racial content of their appeals to whites. James Glaser is broadly correct in his assessment that 'whites simply do not hear the…message directed towards blacks'.[84]

Explaining Variation in Racial Campaign Strategies

The final section of this chapter outlines three explanations for the variation in campaign strategies described above. They are propositions about why an African American candidate in a majority-white area would be more likely to adopt a race-conscious campaign strategy compared to a colour-blind campaign strategy. The hypotheses are developed from the existing theoretical literature about black electoral politics.

H1 - Campaign environment will affect the racial campaign strategy chosen

The first proposition emphasises situational context. James Glaser has written that the racial composition of a district sets the strategic parameters within which candidates can operate.[85] The hypothesis focuses on (1) racial demographics, (2) racial history, and (3) partisan-racial dynamics of the electorate.

First, the hypothesis posits that the whiter the jurisdiction, the less likely an African American candidate will choose a race-conscious strategy.[86] This assumption is based on the idea that white voters are not responsive to race-conscious appeals. Commentators contend that white voters overwhelmingly view racially targeted policies as unfair to whites, believing that they advantage or enrich (underserving) African Americans at whites' expense. This fear of black-office holding has historical antecedents in the United States, dating to the period of black office-holding during Reconstruction, as evidenced in the epigram at the start of Chapter 1.[87]

---

[79] According to a PRRI study, 75 percent of white Americans have 'entirely white social networks without any minority presence'. Sixty-five percent of African Americans report having a core social network that is composed of people who are entirely black. (D Cox, J Navarro-Rivera, R Jones, 'Race, Religion and the Political Affiliation of Americans' Core Social Networks', PRRI, 8 March 2016).
[80] According to the 2012 National Congregations Study, 78.7% of US churches are mono-racial (i.e. at least 80% of congregants are white, black, or Hispanic).
[81] Glaser (1996: 7). See also Sydney Ember, 'Pillars of Black Media, Once Vibrant, Now Fighting for Survival', *New York Times,* 2 July 2016.
[82] Florini (2013), Clark (2014).
[83] Rugh & Massey, 2014.
[84] Glaser, 1996, 77.
[85] Glaser, 1996, Ch 2.
[86] Washington (2006) found that on average whites of both parties tend to be less likely to vote for their party nominee if he or she is African American.
[87] See also Foner (1993).


The second assumption behind this hypothesis is that the stronger the history of social and political racial divisions, the less likely an African American candidate will choose a race-conscious strategy. V O Key wrote in his classic *Southern Politics in State and Nation* about the seemingly paradoxical fact that areas in the South with more African Americans tended to vote for candidates who were more strongly pro-segregationist. Key had not in fact detected that black voters were more likely to support segregation than whites, but that whites in areas with histories of racial strife were more likely to support candidates who limited the opportunities of African Americans. As Key wrote, 'In these areas, a real problem of politics is the maintenance of control by the white [electorate]'.[88]

While Key was writing about pro- and anti-segregation politicians, his theory and its later manifestations have informed scholars of black electoral politics.[89] Strickland and Whicker contend that whites vote according to their racial prejudices, which are inherently anti-black, when they perceive a 'racial threat'. Therefore, it is to the advantage of white candidates to raise the spectre of blacks taking political, social, or economic power away from whites whereas the black candidate must show deference to existing social relations.[90] Such incentives are particularly important in areas where whites and blacks lack social integration. Thus, in the context of campaign strategy, one would suppose that whites are willing to support a black candidate so long as they feel that the candidate's election would not disrupt existing local racial hierarchies.[91] A colour-blind strategy would appear to be less offensive to these sentiments than a race-conscious one.

The hypothesis's third assumption is that the more Republicans and more conservatives in an area, the less likely a candidate will adopt a race-conscious strategy. This assumption follows a straightforward logic. The Republican Party now represents a white electorate who does not even recognise black deprivation, let alone agrees on whether such conditions should be alleviated using race-targeted or universalist policies. Overall, more than half of white Americans feel that racial discrimination against *whites* is at least as big a problem as racial discrimination against African Americans. More than three-fifths of Republicans and three-quarters of Tea Partiers feel that whites face at least as much discrimination as blacks (see Figure 2.3).

[88] Key, 1949, 5.
[89] E.g., Blalock (1967)
[90] Strickland & Whicker, 1992.
[91] On this Faustian bargain, see Smith (1990), McCormick & Jones (1993), Gillespie (2009).

Figure 2.3. Whites' perceptions of racial discrimination



Source: PPRI American Values Survey, 2014

H2 – Candidate identity and ideology will affect racial campaign strategy chosen

The second hypothesis asserts that a candidate's racial identity and ideology explains their choice of racial campaign strategy. Candidates who did not grow up or live in predominantly black communities, who did not represent black constituencies in earlier political offices, and who poses a more right-of-centre political ideology are less likely to adopt a 'race-conscious' campaign strategy.

This hypothesis is drawn from the literature on black 'linked fate', a concept developed by Michael Dawson which refers to the degree to which African Americans believe that their own interests in particular are tied to the interests of their race in general.[92] The continued experience of racial discrimination contributes to African Americans having a remarkably strong sense of linked fate, even across socio-economic strata.[93] In politics, linked fate manifests itself when black voters perceive that a black politician can credibly act as a representative of their community. In his study of black members of the House of Representatives, Fenno describes the sense of linked fate as being achieved when black constituents believe that their representative's 'achievements, his inclusion, his influence is also their achievement, their inclusion, their influence… He is a symbol of their aspirations, their struggles, and their progress'.[94] US Representative Louis Stokes captured these sentiments when he stated, 'When I vote my conscience as a black man, I vote right for my district'.[95]

[92] Dawson, 1994, 736.
[93] Gillespie, 2009.
[94] Fenno, 2003, 141.
[95] Louis Stokes, quoted in Fenno (2003:36).

In order to make a credible claim to linked fate, a politician's skin colour is insufficient. As one black preacher told his congregation in the 2006 Maryland senatorial contest, 'Everyone who's your color is not your kind…All your skinfolk is not your kinfolk'.[96] While contested, survey evidence shows that African Americans tend to express stronger sentiments of attachment to black elites who hold left-of-centre policy commitments, especially on racial and economic matters. Given the extraordinarily strong attachment most African American voters give to the Democratic Party, African American Republicans are viewed with suspicion.[97]

At the core of an effective linked fate appeal is the political potency of 'black identity'. Using data from the National Black Election Study, Jas Sullivan found that African Americans' evaluations of black politicians varied according to their perception of the politicians' attitudes and beliefs about black identity.[98] Black candidates, therefore, must demonstrate their 'authentic' connection with the black community through signals other than skin colour, such as cultural references,[99] family,[100] linguistic conventions,[101] and church attendance.[102] Michael Minta argues that African Amerian politicians' membership in black social organisations, such as black fraternities, black churches, and civil rights groups, helps to promote the image of a linked black group consciousness.[103]

Considering campaign strategies in majority-white contexts, however, the need for an African American candidate to appeal to black voters on the basis of their shared linked fate would be diminished for several reasons. First, numerically, it is not sufficient for an African American candidate to mobilise these voters to secure victory in any of these jurisdictions.[104] Second, if we assume that voters prefer candidates who reflect their own experiences, then signals of black linked fate might be off-putting to white voters. Finally, there is some evidence that white voters seek racially 'exceptional' black candidates, which refers to their ability to defy or reject whites' stereotypes about black identity.[105] Tim Wise defines this 'enlightened exceptionalism' perspective as a 'form of racism that allows for and even celebrates the achievements of individual persons of color, but only because those individuals generally are seen as different from a less appealing, even pathological black or brown rule'.[106]

---

[96] Delman Coates, quoted in 'Politics from the pulpits', *Washington Times*, 6 November 2006.
[97] Forgette & King, 2009.
[98] Sullivan, 2009.
[99] Cohen, 2010, 210.
[100] Gillespie, 2009, 35.
[101] Cohen (2010), Alim & Smitherman (2012).
[102] Dawson (1994, Ch 1-3), Harris (1999).
[103] Minta, 2011.
[104] Gillespie (2010) warns that black candidates would be wrong to take these voters for granted. But see Strickland & Whicker (1992) who suggest that when faced between voting for an African American candidate and a white candidate, black voters will remain loyal to the racially congruent candidate.
[105] See Carter & Dowe (2015).
[106] Wise, 2009, 8-11.

In order to identify these factors, I write detailed biographies about the candidates I study. Detailed candidate biography is important because it provides the 'thick description' necessary to make causal inferences, it is falsifiable, and it takes structure and agency seriously.[107] As Bartholomew Sparrow writes, biographies can provide insights into the micro-foundation of individual actions, such as education, class background, career, religion, or family influences.[108] While biographies are necessarily about agency, they are also sensitive to how structure offers agents some paths while foreclosing others. Additionally, as Sparrow points out, while biographies inherently focus on a single case, they can be silently comparative, often raising questions about alternative developmental paths, counterfactual histories, and new causal models.

H3 – Elites' racial attitudes will affect racial campaign strategy chosen

The final hypothesis argues that the racial outlook of local elites will affect the racial campaign strategy chosen. The more hostile local elites are, the more likely a candidate will pursue a colour-blind strategy. As the definition provided in Chapter 1 makes clear, elites can be those who work with the candidate as well as those who work against them. Therefore, when I write about elites, I include not only co-partisans or key civil society leaders but also the candidate's white opponent.

This hypothesis posits that black candidates who face racially hostile white opponents will be less likely to pursue a race-conscious strategy. Although racial stereotypes can feature in campaigns between two white candidates,[109] black candidates are 'uniquely vulnerable' to the use of racial stereotypes and racist symbolism by white opponents.[110] Kathleen Hall Jamieson shows that adverts tend to 'traffic in stereotypes', and in biracial contests, racial stereotypes assume an increased potency.[111] Racial stereotypes commonly used against black candidates include assertions of the candidate being corrupt,[112] uppity or fancy,[113] lazy,[114] extremely liberal or far-left,[115] sexually deviant or threatening,[116] untrustworthy,[117] and having a dysfunctional or broken family[118] (see Appendix D).

---

[107] See Brady & Collier (2004: 284).
[108] Sparrow, 2016.
[109] Mendelberg, 2001.
[110] Persons, 2009.
[111] Jamieson, 1992, 64.
[112] Gillespie, 2012, 10. Some younger African American candidates have been guilty of portraying the older generation of black politicians as essentially corrupt (see Gillespie, 2012a). Gillespie (2010) is right to condemn these assertions as containing racist and classist undertones (312). I would add that the stereotype of black elected officials as corrupt is a trope which was endemic to the racist historiography of black office-holding during Reconstruction (see discussion in Foner, 1993).
[113] Gillespie, 2012, 10.
[114] Tate (1997), McIlwain & Caliendo (2011, Ch 6), Gillespie (2012).
[115] Swain (1995, Ch 10), Gay (2000), McIlwain & Caliendo (2011), Tures (2014).
[116] Sniderman & Piazza (1993, Ch 4), Williamson (1997), Cohen (2010, Ch 3), McIlwain & Caliendo (2011: 11), Gillespie (2012).
[117] McIlwain & Caliendo, 2011.
[118] Cohen, 2010, Ch 3.

Sometimes white politicians will also deploy racial cues, which refers to concepts that are not ostensibly racial but which in practice promote negative racial associations. These cues include the use of exclusive language,[119] the portrayal of the black candidate as an 'extremist',[120] references to machine politics,[121] repeatedly tying the black candidate to a majority-black jurisdiction in the state,[122] and the gratuitous association of the black candidate with other black politicians.[123] For moral or strategic reasons, some white candidates do not attempt to raise the salience of race. However, when faced with an opponent who primes these negative racial attitudes, one would assume that an African American candidate would not seek a race-conscious strategy.

A second element of this hypothesis is that African American candidates who have the support of party elites will be less likely to pursue a race-conscious strategy. Some commentators have argued that the support of party elites is essential for a candidate to establish credibility with white voters.[124] Black candidates who lack the support of party elites may be more dependent on resources from traditional sources of support within the black community. Given that black politics was traditionally bounded by the opportunities and constraints of a relatively small, spatially concentrated, and 'low resource' base, the lack of support from broader party elites would make the practical ability of a candidate to construct a 'colour-blind' campaign more difficult.[125]

The final element of this hypothesis is that candidates who face a hostile media will be less likely to pursue a race-conscious strategy. Historically, American political science was sceptical of the role of the media in elections. The Columbia Studies presented minimal effects of the media in shaping elections.[126] Subsequent research continued to downplay its influence.[127] Nonetheless, the early scholars of the deracialised strategy held that the media played an important role. Specifically, they believed that the press can act as a 'racial ombudsman', limiting the impact of racist language and accusations by refusing to publish racially hostile content.[128] Similarly, a newspaper endorsement can be important in establishing an African American's credibility with white voters, given that the non-black (i.e. 'mainstream') media are, as James Llorens and colleagues put it, 'an articulator of white interests'.[129]

Conversely, the press can amplify these concerns. This is particularly important if a controversy which contains implicit racial content arises during the course of an election. Prompted by the opponent or by

[119] Kinder & Sears (1981), Tesler (2013: 110).
[120] Gomolin et al (2007), McIlwain & Caliendo (2011 : 1).
[121] Westen (2007, Ch 10).
[122] Bakke, nd, Ch 27.
[123] McIlwain & Caliendo, 2011.
[124] Clemons & Jones, 1993.
[125] Persons, 2009, ix.
[126] E.g., Lazarsfeld et al (1948), Berelson et al (1954). For discussion, see Bishop & Hillygus (2011).
[127] E.g., Patterson & McClure (1976). But see dissent in Bartels (1993).
[128] See Jones & Clemons (1993), Llorens et al (1996).
[129] Llorens, Parsons, & Perry, 1996, 110.

a third-party actor, how the media choose to report on the controversy can empower or disempower the candidate. For example, in the 2006 Massachusetts gubernatorial election, information was leaked to the *Boston Globe* that Deval Patrick's brother-in-law had been convicted of rape, but finding that the story had 'no relevance to Patrick's record or qualifications', the newspaper declined to publish the story. The right-leaning *Boston Herald*, however, published the story, which fit into a wider, racialised controversy about Patrick's role as a criminal defence attorney who had defended convicted murderers and rapists. In the end, the national media joined with the *Globe* in condemning the *Herald* for a 'sick…political dirty trick [which] turned a rape victim into political fodder'.[130] Patrick was able to diminish these attacks successfully in part due to the supportive position most media outlets took.

Conclusion

A shortcoming of the literature on deracialisation has been the reluctance to take context and choice seriously. Commentators have focused on how well a candidate has executed a campaign strategy rather than attempting to explain why the strategy was chosen in the first place. Such accounts ironically over-determine the role of structure in one sense (by assuming that one particular racial campaign strategy is necessary to win election in majority-white areas) while at the same time diminishing structure's importance by treating majority-white contexts monolithically. This thesis redirects focus to answer a fundamental question about candidates' choices in a racially divided country. Given a multivariate set of structural constraints, why would a candidate choose strategy X over strategy Y, Z, A, or B? In answering this question the manuscript contributes to our broader understanding of how political actors in the United States think about race and act on those assumptions in major elections.


[130] DeWayne Wickham, 'In Boston, the smell of a dirty trick', *USA Today*, 16 October 2006.

Part II – The Pioneers

This section studies three candidates who were instrumental in the development of the theory of the deracialised campaign strategy. They are the first significant wave of black Democrats who were elected or nearly elected in major statewide elections. In Virginia, Douglas Wilder in 1989 became the first African American elected governor in any state. The following year in North Carolina, Harvey Gantt became the first African American nominated by the Democrats to run for the US Senate in the party's history. Two years later in Illinois, Carol Moseley Braun became the first black Democrat elected to the Senate.

The cases have been grouped together not only for their temporal proximity but also because they enable the use of methods of similarity and difference to facilitate key controls. Two candidates (Gantt and Braun) faced outwardly hostile white opponents; two operated in the South (Wilder and Gantt); all three were liberals but one changed his position to a more conservative stance before the election (Wilder); two accused their opponents of racism (Gantt and Braun); two were darker complexion African Americans (Gantt and Braun);[1] one was a female candidate (Braun); and two were successfully elected (Wilder and Braun). I conclude from this study that one candidate (Wilder) chose a colour-blind, deracialised strategy (with some modifications) while Gantt and Braun pursued race-conscious, crusade campaign strategies. As I will explain in the conclusion (Chapter 10), I believe that scholars' initial focus on the Wilder victory obscured their recognition of the potential of race-conscious strategies, such as those pursued by Gantt and Braun.

Figure II.1. Racial Campaign Strategies Analysed in Part II



[1] Strickland & Whicker (1992) argue that complexion matters (i.e. dark versus light skinned African Americans), but Jeffries & Jones (2006) dispute this conclusion. For a general discussion about the social and political implications of skin colour within the black community, see Hochschild & Weaver (2007).

Chapter 3 - Douglas Wilder (Virginia, 1989)

'By contrast, Mississippi is a hotbed of democracy.'
V O Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation, *(Chapter 2 – Virginia)*

***

The first African American elected governor in US history, Douglas Wilder, in many senses, was the classic deracialised candidate.[1] The candidate avoided explicit racial appeals, refused to comment on controversial racial episodes, and took counter-stereotypical (conservative) positions on policies with implicit racial associations, such as crime and the death penalty. There is a strong basis for inferring that Wilder's approach was a strategic choice, given the vivid contrast between the manner in which Wilder campaigned for governor and his earlier reputation as a state senator.

As the most significant victor of the 1989 'Black Tuesday' elections, Wilder was the chief (and, in some cases, only) empirical source for the theory of the deracialised campaign strategy in its provenance.[2] Given this intellectual context, it is unsurprising that from a *prima facie* standpoint, Wilder's 1989 campaign for governor of Virginia possesses all of the characteristics of the deracialised model. As much as any candidate in the sample, Wilder pursued a deracialised strategy.

Yet, while Wilder is correctly identified as pursuing a deracialised strategy, his campaign also shows that race-conscious aspirations could not be repressed entirely. For voters who wanted to see it, the racial symbolism of Wilder's candidacy was unmissable. His campaign slogan described him as the manifestation of Virginia's 'New Mainstream', and his advertisements warned voters not to allow his opponent to 'take us back'. These messages could clearly be interpreted in a symbolic, racialised framework of the 'Old South' versus the 'New South' or 'Old Dominion' versus 'New Dominion'.[3] Reflecting on the election over a quarter of a century later, Wilder admits as much.

Nonetheless, the Wilder campaign's racial appeals were subtle and minor enough to justify classifying the campaign on balance as deracialised. At no point did Wilder make an appeal which could be classified *unambiguously* as racial. When opportunities arose for Wilder to make unmistakably racial

[1] The only African American governor before Wilder was P B S Pinchback, who served as acting governor of Louisiana for thirty-six days during the 1872-73 impeachment proceedings of Governor Henry Clay Warmouth. Pinchback's mother had been a slave who was impregnated by her white owner.
[2] See the papers discussed at the Joint Center for Political Studies' symposium 'Blacks in the November '89 Elections: What is changing?' (Washington, DC, December 1989), the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association (Memphis, December 1989), and the annual meeting of the National Conference of Black Political Scientists (Atlanta, April 1990).
[3] For this latter comparison, see Baker (1989), Sabato (1991: 64), Rozell (1999), Atkinson (2006:60). Virginia's nickname is the 'Old Dominion', a reference to the status conferred to it by Charles II for the colony's loyalty to the Crown during the Commonwealth. Virginia was one of only two colonies of the present-day United States to reject the authority of the English Commonwealth. The other was Maryland.

appeals, as I will show, Wilder studiously avoided them. This case study will provide the empirical evidence for this classification.

The case study, like the others to follow, is divided into two sections. The first section sets out the empirical data relevant to my three explanatory variables: context, candidate background, and local elites. The second section describes the three components of a racial campaign strategy: policy agenda, targeted appeals, and style. Finally, I conclude by explaining that Wilder's use of a deracialised campaign strategy does not imply a race-free or non-racist campaign environment. In fact, it was precisely because Wilder anticipated white racial hostility to the articulation of racial grievances that he chose to pursue this strategy.

Explanatory Variables: Context, Candidate, and Elites

Context: Virginia in 1989

Virginia was an unlikely setting for the first election of an African American governor. African slavery in British America began in Virginia.[4] During the nineteenth century, after the state's soil was exhausted, Virginian slave-owners took to breeding slaves rather than growing crops as their major source of revenue.[5] Fearful of a slave rebellion, the state government took efforts to repress black leadership, banning African Americans, even those who were not enslaved, from serving as ministers in black churches.[6] Famously, the city of Richmond, where Douglas Wilder lived his entire life, was the capital of the Confederacy[7] and was burned to the ground by its white residents rather than allow it to be captured by the Union army intact.[8]

In the twentieth century, Virginia's reputation improved little. During the civil rights period, the state was the site of 'massive resistance',[9] with its governor preferring to close down state schools than allow them to be integrated.[10] The state song 'Carry Me Back to Ol' Virginny', adopted in 1940, described a former slave's wistfulness for the good old times of slavery, under the kind gaze of 'old massa'. In his

[4] The first Africans in the present-day United States arrived in Virginia as slaves aboard the Earl of Warwick's ships in 1619.
[5] See Williams (2014: 7), Sublette & Sublette (2015).
[6] Geffert, 2006, 168.
[7] Richmond was known as the 'Gateway to the Confederacy' (Willliams, 2014: 7).
[8] Klinkner & Smith, 1999, 72. Wilder recounts family lore that the slaves of Richmond initially thought that the Union soldiers were coming to kill them, not realising that Abraham Lincoln himself would arrive two days later to celebrate their emancipation.
[9] For more on 'massive resistance', see Wilkinson (1968) and Atkinson (2006: Ch 8-11). One of Virginia's responses to *Brown* was the first use of private school vouchers, used by the state to send white children to private schools at taxpayers' expense. One such school in Norfolk had the creed, 'respect for God, the nation, the white race, and western civilization' (Duke, 1990: xxi).
[10] The governor in question, Democrat J Lindsay Almond, said that he would 'cut off my right arm' before he allowed black children to attend white schools ('If only white Virginia had followed its better instincts', *Washington Post*, 16 May 2004). One jurisdiction, Prince Edward County, shuttered its public schools for five years. For a detailed account, see Bonastia (2011).

first political act as a state senator in 1970, Douglas Wilder unsuccessfully attempted to change the state song.[11] One of the first correspondences he received as a state senator urged him to board 'a boat to Africa awaiting you at the dock. Write an African song when you arrive'.[12] He recalled later, 'You would have thought I touched the atom bomb. All hell broke loose. I got letters from all over the world…[t]elling me just keep my mouth shut and leave it alone...And, oh, it was hell. Really hell'.[13] State Senate clerk Jay Shropshire remembered, 'The Richter scale went beyond imagination. You would have thought he stood up and said that Robert E Lee and Stonewall Jackson were communists'.[14] 'Carry Me Back' remained the state song until 1997 and continues in the exalted status as Virginia's 'state song emeritus'. Wilder recalled, 'I was really shocked that that many said, "Yes, we are going to sing this song and if he doesn't like it, let him leave Virginia".'[15]

Politically, the state was dominated for most of the twentieth century by white, rural Democratic Party machines which successfully supressed the franchise. The most influential were, first, the political machine of Senator Thomas Martin and, later, the machine of Senator Harry Byrd.[16] By the 1980s, the remaining Byrd Organization was euphemistically called 'the Coalition'.[17] Due to the machine's strict policing of participation in the state's Democratic primaries, where victory was tantamount to election, only 8 percent of Virginian adults on average voted in statewide elections during Wilder's childhood.[18] Virginia had one of the most difficult literacy tests in the United States, asking broad questions of understanding such as 'who is an elector?'.[19] In his 1940s study of Southern politics, V O Key wrote of Virginia, 'By contrast, Mississippi is a hotbed of democracy'.[20]

The *Wall Street Journal* reporter David Shribman characterised Virginia in the twentieth century as 'a state long ruled by tobacco gentry, textile barons… [and] a tiny band of editorialists' committed to the philosophy of John C Calhoun and dominated by a political machine 'which deliberately kept voter

[11] In his speech to the Virginia state senate, Wilder decried the song's words which 'recall the memories of our shameful history'. The *Richmond News-Leader* returned with an editorial which said, 'slavery was not something that the Negro should be ashamed of' – rather missing the point.
[12] Quoted in Wilder (2015: 6).
[13] Douglas Wilder, interview with Jack Bass, Southern Oral History Collection (#4007), Southern Historical Collection, Louis Round Wilson Special Collections Library, UNC-Chapel Hill, 15 March 1974.
[14] Shropshire, quoted in Baker (1989: 275).
[15] Wilder interview with Bass, 1974.
[16] Carter Glass, a scion of the Martin and Byrd machines and a US Senator, was influential in the ratification of Virginia's racist 'redemption' state constitution, written in 1902. Glass declared at the convention, 'Discrimination! Why that is exactly what we propose; that is why this convention was elected – to discriminate to the very extremity of permissible action under the limitations of the federal constitution with the view to the elimination of every Negro who can be gotten rid of legally without materially impairing the strength of the white electorate' (quoted in Lewis, 1991, 21).
[17] Atkinson, 2006, 7.
[18] Sabato, 1978, 110.
[19] Another question asked, 'Can a minor hold office in Virginia?'. If a respondent answered in the negative, as nearly all applicants did, their registration was declared void on the grounds that eighteen-year-olds could run for notary public (Arthur Sears Henning, 'Virginia Keeps GOP Impotent by Intimidation', *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 28 November 1940).
[20] Key, 1949, 20.

turnout small, white, and easy to manipulate'.[21] By 1989 Shribman's description was no longer accurate. In the 1980s Virginia changed in significant ways. Inward migration from the North and growth in Virginia's DC-oriented, suburban northeast had changed the state's character.[22] Since the previous gubernatorial election in 1985, at least 100,000 new voters had moved to Virginia from other states.[23] Economically right-leaning, these voters were racial 'moderates', comfortable with symbolic black advancement but not necessarily committed to policies targeted at improving their material condition. In Desmond King and Rogers Smith's racial policy alliances, most of these voters would fit comfortably in the 'colour-blind' coalition.[24]

The successive victories of Democratic candidates for major statewide offices in 1981, 1985, and 1989 were premised on the notion that Democrats would keep taxes low and attract investment, while leaving aside the fraught racial controversies which had defined much of the state's politics in earlier decades. This break from the past was so powerful that Virginia journalist Dwayne Yancey dramatically declared that 'the great leap of faith Virginians made was not in electing a black [governor] but in electing [Governor Chuck] Robb in 1981…He redefined what it meant to be a Virginia Democrat'.[25] In common with other parts of the New South which were seeking inward investment from abroad and elsewhere in the US, the idea was that capitalism would render racism unsustainable.[26] Democratic Governor Gerald Baliles echoed this sentiment when he said in 1989, 'Virginia does not have time to waste on the old fears, the old habits, and the old divisions'.[27]


The decade also saw the increase in black representation in the state, Wilder's achievement notwithstanding. Before the 1980s, no more than four African Americans had served simultaneously in the 140-member Virginia General Assembly during the twentieth century. However, once the state redistricted after the 1980 Census, the number rose to seven, and by the time Wilder was elected governor, nine African Americans were serving in the state legislature.[28] Still, their numbers remained far fewer than during Virginia's period of radical Reconstruction, when as many of twenty-seven African Americans served in the state legislature at the same time.[29] Virginia did not elect an African American to the US House of Representatives until 1992.

---

[21] David Shribman, 'The New South', *Wall Street Journal*, 11 October 1989.
[22] Rozell, 1998.
[23] Edds, 1990, Ch 6.
[24] King & Smith, 2014.
[25] Yancey, 1988, 3.
[26] In this vein, the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce famously adopted the slogan, 'Atlanta: A City too Busy to Hate' (Horowitz, 1998: 295).
[27] Quoted in Atkinson (2006: 94)
[28] The Voting Rights Act was amended in 1982 to include an expressed discriminatory 'effects' standard rather than a weaker discriminatory 'intent' standard, overturning the Supreme Court's decision in *Mobile v Bolden* (1982).
[29] Buni, 1967, 9.

Virginia can be divided in several ways due to its ill-defined and overlapping geographical boundaries. Politically, I propose, it makes sense to consider the state consisting of seven regions: Northern Virginia (NoVA), Tidewater, Southside, Richmond, Piedmont, the Shenandoah Valley, and the Southwest, as shown in see Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1. Regions of Virginia



Created by the author based on interviews, Sabato (1991), and Atkinson (2006)

The Republican businessman Gordon Smith remarked, 'If you cut off Northern Virginia…the rest of the state would look like Arkansas'.[30] While something of an exaggeration, NoVA feels distinctively less 'southern' than the rest of the state. Its voters are culturally and politically more attuned to events in Washington than in Richmond. James Glaser describes NoVA as 'northern in character and population'.[31] Economically conservative but racial moderates, during the 1980s they typically voted Republican but split their ticket in state elections for vanguard Democratic candidates.[32]

The Tidewater area refers to the eastern part of the state and consists of the cities of Hampton, Newport News, Norfolk, and Virginia Beach. The Southside area is the area south of Richmond and east of the Blue Ridge Mountains. It is largely agricultural and was once the centre of the state's plantation economy. Richmond, the capital, has the largest black population in the state, but its suburbs were perhaps some of the most Republican in Virginia during this period. The Piedmont refers to the area in the central part of the state, which was generally conservative with the exception of Charlottesville, home of the University of Virginia and some of the most liberal voters in the state.

[30] Quoted in Edds (1990: 113). See also 'If Money Talks, Developers Are Shouting', *Newport News Daily Press*, 9 October 1989.
[31] Glaser, 1996, 42.
[32] Interview with Robert Holsworth, 17 July 2015.

The Shenandoah Valley, similar to analogous areas in West Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee (see Chapter 8), was generally more pro-Union than the rest of the state during the Civil War. Its economy had never relied on slave labour, consisting of relatively small farms. Progressive Republicanism survived in the area even during the days of the Byrd Organization, with the exception of Byrd's own hometown Winchester in the northern part of the Valley.


Finally, southwestern Virginia was coal country and organised around working-class, labour politics. Wilder's campaign manager Joe McLean explains, 'They were hard-core Roosevelt Democrats because of the mining industry and because of the unions…These were people who benefited from the New Deal and all of those programmes, who saw their families lifted out of poverty'.[33] It is geographically and, to some extent, culturally removed from the rest of the state. Pennington Gap, the town situated in the most southwestern part of Virginia, is nearer to eight other states' capital cities than it is to its own.[34]

Douglas Wilder's appreciation for the geographically differentiated political cultures of his state, I argue, was a key element of his statewide electoral success. Many African American candidates for statewide office suffer from a racialised association with a big city used to 'other' them from the rest of the state. White opponents have been known to tie black candidates to majority-black cities in an effort to generate suburban whites' resentment about their taxes funding economically unproductive cities or promote fears of urban violence (for examples, see discussion in Chapter 8 on Harold Ford and Memphis and in Chapter 9 on Cory Booker and Newark).[35] In spite of coming from the area with the largest black population in the state, Wilder largely avoided this association.

When Wilder first ran for statewide office as the Democratic nominee for lieutenant governor in 1985, he drove to every county in the state in a 3,500-mile journey, which was widely promoted in television advertisements (see Figure 3.2). Wilder stated in our interview that he was discouraged by party elites from undertaking the journey: 'I was told that it was a waste of time, that I should stay in the Richmond area fine tuning my campaign and trying to raise money.'[36] He adds that some advised him against the trip for his own safety: 'some people said, you never know what would happen to him if he goes out there to *those* people'.[37] But, Wilder defends the trip, 'It was letting people know you were not shy about campaigning anywhere, that you could go anywhere, anytime.'[38] Campaign manager Joe McLean recalls, 'He stayed overnight at a home of a guy who was literally flying the Confederate battle flag in front of his house. Wilder was fearless like that'.[39]

[33] Interview with Joe McLean, 10 July 2015.
[34] Charleston (WV), Columbus (OH), Indianapolis (IN), Frankfurt (KY), Nashville (TN), Raleigh (NC), Columbia (SC), Atlanta (GA)
[35] Stout, 2015, Introduction.
[36] Interview with L Douglas Wilder, 18 July 2015.
[37] Ibid., emphasis added.
[38] Wilder, quoted in Baker (1989: 167).
[39] Interview with McLean.


Figure 3.2. Douglas Wilder for Lieutenant Governor television advertisements, 1985



Source: Wilder Archive, Virginia Union University

The campaign even released a song which celebrated this journey, to a melody which was described on the song sheet as 'Old Irish Air' and which, when played, sounds like 'O Danny Boy' (Figure 3.3). The journey through the state left a lasting impression on Wilder and provided him with an empirical reference point about Virginia voters which contrasted with those from some of his (white) political consultants.[40] Wilder recalls that the people who were most discouraging about his candidacy were not the working-class, mainly white Virginians he met on the statewide tour but senior Democratic advisers. According to Wilder, Democratic elites would tell him, 'It's not me; I have no prejudices at all. It's that redneck – that nameless, faceless redneck… [I]n moving about the state, I haven't found that redneck they're talking about… Party leaders and the politicos are the ones who bring it up, not the John Does on the street'.[41] Wilder's experience contrasted with Ruth Strickland and Marcia Whicker's assumption that 'middle-to-lower class' voters are more likely to vote according to racial prejudices than affluent whites.[42]

Figure 3.3. Sheet music for the Doug Wilder Campaign Song, 'Doug Wilder, Dear'




Source: Wilder Archive, Virginia Union University (Series XI, Box 9)

[40] Wilder, 2015, 106.
[41] Wilder, quoted in Baker (1989:179-180).
[42] Strickland & Whicker, 1992, 204.

As lieutenant governor, a ceremonial position largely devoted to campaigning for governor, Wilder maintained this practice of visiting far-flung areas of the state, devoting over half of his time to giving speeches outside of the state capital (60.2% of speeches).[43] The Wilder Archive at Virginia Union University holds a copy of nearly two-hundred public speeches which Wilder delivered in his official capacity as lieutenant governor. I coded these speeches for location as well as other relevant factors such as content and likely race of the audience. The map in Figure 3.4 plots the localities in which Wilder made at least one speech as lieutenant governor. They reveal a wide spread of appearances.

Figure 3.4. Localities visited at least once by Douglas Wilder to deliver a speech, 1986-89




Source: Lt Governor Speeches, Wilder Archive, Virginia Union University; Created using BatchGeo

However, as Figure 3.5 shows, Wilder devoted a majority of his time outside of the state capital to the Northern and Tidewater regions. This is understandable. The 'Golden Crescent', as the areas were collectively known, was not only a very important growth area but it was where Wilder was most likely to find new support: economically right-leaning, college-educated whites, with moderate views on race.[44] Virginia's Speaker of the House of Delegates A L Philpott, who was from the Southside region, recognised in an October 1989 interview, 'Whether he wins will be determined by Northern Virginia and Tidewater'.[45] Long-time Virginia political commentator Jim Babb confirms to me, 'even then, NoVa was a vote-rich region, and key to any Democrat's hopes.'[46]

[43] Wilder himself described the job as 'a rather vacuous position. You just rap the gavel and do what a page for the most part could do' (quoted in Baker, 1989: 152).
[44] Edds, 1990, 124.
[45] A L Philpott, quoted in 'Wilder returns to Philpott fete more like lender than borrower', *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, 11 October 1989.
[46] Correspondence with Jim Babb, 22 September 2016.

Figure 3.5. Proportion of speeches made by Lt Gov Wilder outside of Richmond, 1986-89



N=189 speeches, Source: Wilder Speeches Collection, Wilder Archive, Virginia Union University

Candidate: Douglas Wilder

Born in Richmond in 1931, Douglas Wilder was raised, in the words of his pastor, in a 'typical, representative black family'.[47] The son of an insurance salesman, Wilder was raised in a respectable, lower middle-class household amidst stark racial segregation.[48] The seventh child of a youngest child, Wilder's grandparents and two of his father's elder siblings had been born into slavery.[49] Wilder recalls, 'That ancestry, so recently experienced and so close up and personal, imposed upon us a certain obligation that I never forgot…It was never abstract for me'.[50] Wilder was raised almost entirely within the black community. He recalls, 'During my early years, I was hardly aware of racism because I rarely interacted with white people'.[51]

After attending the all-black Virginia Union University built on the site of a former slave prison, Wilder served in the recently desegregated US army, seeing action in Korea. Although the army was desegregated, the rest of the country was not, and Wilder was not allowed to use the GI Bill to pursue further study at the segregated University of Virginia upon his return.[52] He instead went to the prestigious, all-black Howard University, where he studied law. Wilder points to the *Brown v Board* decision as having convinced him when he was twenty-three to embark on a legal career. Wilder reflects that the 'decision meant everything to me, and it turned my life around'.[53] He professes that it showed

[47] Rev Taylor, quoted in Baker (1989,13).
[48] Anne Cheney, 'Doug Wilder: Virginia's Next Governor', 1988, Unpublished mss (Shropshire Papers, Library of Virginia).
[49] Baker, 1989, Ch 2.
[50] Wilder, 2015, 11, 172.
[51] Ibid., 18.
[52] For an overview, see Frydl (2009).
[53] Wilder, 2015, 39.

him that politics and the law could defeat the 'apartheid that kept us in our place'.[54] Wilder was not a civil rights attorney, but he did handle cases for the NAACP which involved money.[55] As he explained in an interview with me, 'I was never identified as a civil rights lawyer but that wasn't meaning that I wasn't participating in the cases'.[56] When Wilder became a lawyer in 1959, he recalls, 'everything was segregated – the courtrooms, the jails, the bar association'.[57] Wilder broke the colour line by refusing to acknowledge these divisions in the courtrooms in which he worked.[58]

In 1969, Wilder was elected to the Virginia state senate, the first African American since Reconstruction.[59] Wilder won less than 20% of the white vote in his first election, identifying this group as 'the usual liberal white vote'.[60] As a state senator, Wilder was viewed as sitting on the left of the, admittedly conservative, Virginia Democratic Party. Frank Atkinson describes State Senator Wilder as 'a favorite of organized labor and liberals',[61] and Donald Baker writes that Wilder was a 'standard-brand liberal'.[62] Mark Rozell says that as a state senator, Wilder promoted 'unabashed liberalism'.[63] In 1985, the *Richmond-Times Dispatch* identified Wilder as 'a prominent member of the most liberal faction of the Democratic Party'.[64] The year before, Wilder had supported Jesse Jackson's candidacy for president.

As a state senator, Wilder pursued race-conscious policies. In addition to his attempt to change the state song, Michael Clemons and Charles Jones credit Wilder with opening black businesses' access to state procurement, liberalising voter registration laws, and establishing a Martin Luther King state holiday. Clemons and Jones write that legislative accomplishments for African Americans prior to the establishment of the Virginia Black Legislative Caucus in 1988 were 'largely due to the legislative acumen of Wilder'.[65] In 1980, when Wilder mulled a bid for the US House of Representatives in the Third District, he explained that part of his hesitation in running was that 'there would presently be a void if I left the Senate of Virginia at this time where my seniority has enabled me to assume positions of leadership heretofore unrealized by minority people'. He added, 'I would hope that in the immediate

[54] Wilder, 2015, 40.
[55] Wilder was counsel on the case *Tucker v Lower* (1972) in which an African American man's respirator was switched off without consulting his family. Wilder argued that racial motivations led the hospital to end the man's life prematurely in order to procure his organs. Wilder told the court that the hospital 'pulled the plug because he was poor and black, a representative of the faceless masses' (quoted in Lederer, 2006, 145).
[56] Interview with Wilder.
[57] Wilder, 2015, 45.
[58] As of 2011, *An Illustrated Guide to Virginia's Confederate Monuments* lists eighty-three Virginia courthouses which still have pro-Confederate monuments (Sedore, 2011, vii-xix).
[59] The last African American in the Virginia State Senate before Wilder was Nathaniel Griggs (1887-1890).
[60] Wilder interview with Bass, 1974.
[61] Atkinson, 2006, 7.
[62] Baker, 1989, 277.
[63] Rozell, 1998, 128.
[64] 'Baliles and Wilder, Maybe', *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, 14 March 1985.
[65] Clemons & Jones, 2000, 759.

future we could significantly improve upon the number of black representatives in the Virginia legislature in order that the present situation would not present itself'.[66]

In 1985, Wilder was narrowly elected lieutenant governor of Virginia, making him the first African American elected to statewide executive office in the South since the nineteenth century.[67] However, as will be described later in the chapter, in the years before Wilder ran for lieutenant governor and, especially, after he was elected lieutenant governor, Wilder began to adopt more traditionally conservative positions on issues such as crime and the death penalty.[68] For example, in his gubernatorial campaign stump speech, Wilder told voters, 'In dealing with criminals, the process of punishment must once again become punitive. Those convicted of crimes, if they have any records of prior criminal activity, must be severely, swiftly, and surely punished'.[69]

Wilder also promoted a strong respectability rhetoric within the black community. Fredrick Harris defines respectability politics as the 'twentieth-century black middle-class ideology [whereby]… virtues of self-care and self-correction are framed as strategies to lift the black poor out of their condition by preparing them for the market economy'.[70] Giving the keynote address at the NAACP Freedom Banquet in Lynchburg only one month after his inauguration as lieutenant governor, Wilder admonished African Americans that 'the fault is not in our stars but in our selves.' Wilder called on black fathers to take more responsibility, criticising 'the putative father or that gigolo who brags about the fruit of his loins but spends no dime or time to nourish it'.[71] The *Richmond Times-Dispatch* journalist Edward Grimsley recorded, 'White Virginians nodded approvingly when [Wilder] exhorted fellow blacks to stop blaming their problems on racism and to spend more time and energy trying to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps'.[72]

Writing in 1989, Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa describe Douglas Wilder in the *Atlas of American Politics* as 'a bit more conservative than Baliles', the incumbent, centrist governor.[73] Republican strategist Frank Atkinson reflects that 'Wilder had four years as lieutenant governor during which to complete his metamorphosis from liberal voice-in-the-wilderness to centrist insider, and he used his time wisely'.[74] Wilder's campaign manager Joe McLean goes further, 'If you look back, Wilder ran as

[66] Douglas Wilder, 'Press Release', 16 April 1980 (Box 10, Shropshire Papers, Library of Virginia).
[67] Edds, 1990, Ch 2.
[68] Fortner (2015) shows that punitive criminal policies found support from some black working-class and middle-class Americans as well during the 1970s and 1980s.
[69] Douglas Wilder, 'Wilder for Governor Stump Speech', 1989 (Box 10, Shropshire Papers, Library of Virginia). Emphasis in original.
[70] Harris, 2014.
[71] Douglas Wilder, 'Keynote Speech', NAACP Freedom Fund Banquet, Lynchburg, VA, 16 February 1989 (Series II, Box 1, Wilder Archive, Virginia Union University).
[72] Edward Grimsley, 'The Amazing Flight of Virginia's Political Bumblebee', *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, November 1989.
[73] Barone & Ujifusa, 1989, 1245.
[74] Atkinson, 2006, 74.

a very conservative candidate'.[75] By the time he ran for governor in 1989, Wilder's strategic, ideological repositioning was complete.

Elites: Marshall Coleman, the Old Guard, and the New Guard

In the 1989 gubernatorial election, Wilder's racial campaign strategy was shaped by his interaction with three sets of local elites. The first was his Republican opponent Marshall Coleman, who abandoned his reputation as a racial liberal by using racially coded attacks against Wilder. The second set was the 'old' Democratic Party establishment, consisting of conservative, rural, white politicians and press who were remnants of the Byrd Organization. The third set was the 'new' Democratic Party establishment, embodied in Wilder's two immediate predecessors as governor, Chuck Robb (1982-86) and Gerald Baliles (1986-1990). Wilder hugged closely to their legacy and public image when he ran for governor, but this relationship was a departure from his earlier political career.

Opponent: Marshall Coleman

Wilder's Republican challenger Marshall Coleman was a familiar face in Virginia politics. While Wilder's grandfather had been a slave, Coleman's grandfather had been a state legislator, known to his colleagues as the 'Rattlesnake'.[76] Coleman followed the family line into the Virginia House of Delegates and then served as state attorney general in the 1970s before launching an unsuccessful run for governor against the son-in-law of Lyndon Johnson, Chuck Robb, in 1981. In those years, Coleman had a reputation for being a 'racial moderate'.[77] When he ran for attorney general in 1977, Coleman strongly criticised his Democratic opponent Ed Lane for having once supported racial segregation.[78] In that election, the state's largest black newspaper the *Richmond Afro-American* endorsed Coleman, describing him as 'a young, enlightened man who has an unblemished civil rights record'.[79]

In 1989, Coleman won a narrow victory (see Table 3.1) in the Republican gubernatorial primary against former US Senator Paul Trible and northern Virginia Congressman Stan Parris. The crucial factor about the primary was that Coleman, who had previously run for governor on a pro-choice platform, had been compelled to pledge that he believed that life began at conception and that abortion should be illegal.[80] According to Robert Holsworth, 'To get the nomination in 89 he ran hard to the right against abortion…Coleman just could never get around that because the reason is Coleman never believed the position he took to get the nomination. He was a pro-choice guy.'[81]

---

[75] Interview with McLean.
[76] 'Coleman Fights Image of Political Chameleon', *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, 15 October 1989.
[77] Interview with Holsworth. See also Edds (1990: 3).
[78] Edds, 1990, 64.
[79] Quoted in Baker (1989: 94-95).
[80] Edds, 1990, Ch 8.
[81] Interview with Holsworth.

Table 3.1. Republican gubernatorial primary, 1989

Candidate	Votes	
J Marshall Coleman	147,941	36.8%
Paul Trible	141,120	35.1%
Stanford Parris	112,826	28.1%
TOTAL:	401,887	
Margin of victory:	6,821	1.7%

Soon after Coleman won the nomination, the Wilder campaign seized on Coleman's abortion stance and went to work portraying Coleman as an extremist. The Wilder campaign anticipated that Coleman would attack Wilder for being too liberal or too extreme to be governor of Virginia, and they wanted to turn the attack on its head. David Petts, who conducted polling and focus group research for Wilder, explained to me, 'a critical finding from the research was that if we moved early and aggressively to define the race along the terms of who was pro-life and who was pro-choice, [then] that could be very effective for many voters in blunting the impact of some of the liberal elements of his voting record'.[82]

Repeatedly, in speeches and in advertisements, Wilder warned that Coleman would 'take us back' (see Figure 3.6). Explicitly, Wilder's message was an attack on Coleman's anti-abortion stance, an issue which had skyrocketed to prominence after the Supreme Court's decision in July of that year in the case *Webster v Reproductive Health Services*.[83] However, for those who wanted to hear it, there was a coded racial message in Wilder's message as well. Petts explains that the slogan was in part about warning voters about going 'back to the days when abortion was illegal', but he admits that the slogan allowed voters to think, 'Don't take us back to the days of, you know – and sort of allow people to define it...So, I think obviously there was a direct linkage to the abortion issue but it might also have had some ancillary benefits just in terms of framing the race'.[84]

[82] Interview with Petts.
[83] The Court ruled that states could place limits on abortion. It was seen as the first limit of the *Roe v Wade* decision 16 years prior.
[84] Interview with Petts.

Figure 3.6. Two Wilder attack ads, featuring 'Don't let Marshall Coleman take us back'



Source: Wilder Archive, Virginia Union University

The abortion issue was potent because it doubly appealed to a key demographic: Republican-leaning, white, college-educated, suburban women.[85] Wilder's campaign manager explained to me, 'On the abortion issue, we knew that there was a very narrow group of people – nowadays we call them soccer mums. They didn't have a name back then. We just knew that there were suburban housewives… [in] northern Virginia and Tidewater and the close Richmond suburbs… for whom we could make Marshall Coleman unacceptable. And we knew [abortion] was one of the places we could do it. And then we were presented with a real opportunity [from] the Supreme Court'.[86]

The Coleman campaign was operating in largely uncharted waters. Frank Atkinson, Coleman's deputy campaign manager, reflected, 'We were constantly aware of the racial backdrop of the campaign'.[87] An internal, post-election assessment written by RNC National Committeeman Morton Blackwell to the Virginia Republican Party admitted that, 'Wilder was allowed to define Coleman as an extremist in the eyes of many voters… The theme "I am not an extremist" worked no better for Coleman than "I am not a crook" worked for Richard Nixon'.[88]

In his previous campaigns, Coleman had won a greater share of black support than the average Republican candidate. During the 1989 election, however, Coleman departed from his racial moderation and attacked Wilder in ways which could be regarded as racially coded. He criticised Wilder for owning a derelict property in the Church Hill neighbourhood of Richmond, which was the majority-black area of the city.[89] Coleman also highlighted allegations of impropriety and incompetence from when Wilder

[85] Sabato, 1991, 93.
[86] Interview with McLean.
[87] Atkinson, quoted in Edds (1990: 139).
[88] Morton Blackwell, 'The 1989 Lessons in Campaign Dynamics', Memorandum to the Republican Party of Virginia, nd (Series XI, Box 17, Wilder Archive, Virginia Union University).
[89] Coleman repeated the line about the house in Church Hill in several speeches. For example, in a speech to the Central Virginia Chapter of American Women in Radio and Television in October 1989, Coleman said of

was a lawyer. Corruption and incompetence are common tropes used against black politicians, dating from white, revisionist histories of Reconstruction.[90]

Most clearly, Coleman accused Wilder of benefitting unfairly in the election itself because of his race. At a press conference a week before polling day, Coleman declared, 'I don't think it matters how much history Doug Wilder's election on Tuesday would make…I, for one, am not going to stand by and watch a person who is unfit to preserve the tradition of Washington and Jefferson glide into office with a "feel good, make history" message and a cry of "negative" every time someone dares to tell the truth about him'.[91] Coleman listed a variety of criticisms of Wilder, repeating allegations of incompetence as a lawyer and neglect of his terraced house in Church Hill. Coleman believed that the media had overlooked these matters because they wanted to help Wilder get elected. Coleman concluded, 'I've said before and I will repeat it: I think that a double standard applies to Doug Wilder'.[92]

Suggesting a co-ordinated strategy, two days later the chairman of the Virginia Republican Party, Donald Huffman, repeated the line. Arguing that Wilder had been inconsistent about his support for the death penalty, Huffman charged, 'only the most vile sort of double standard will prevent the news media from holding Doug Wilder accountable for these proven acts of deception and untruth'.[93] Larry Sabato believes that the double-standard charge 'unmistakably' was referring to race.[94] For Wilder, the notion that he had received unfair, special treatment rankled because it was 'reminiscent of the typical complaint that African Americans were coddled by affirmative action'.[95] According to Wilder in 2015, 'Coleman was saying, in effect, that my election would be the height of affirmative action [which was] a dog whistle to the resentment felt by some segments of the white population'.[96]

Wilder recounts that in response to the 'double-standard' attack, several of his advisers were 'urging me to go after him and bring race out in the open'.[97] However, Wilder refused. Wilder's decision not to respond to Coleman's racially coded attack is a clear tactic of a deracialised campaign strategy. Assuming that whites would not respond favourably to calling his opponent racist, the deracialised strategy calls for ignoring the comment, which is precisely what Wilder did. Wilder writes in his

---

Wilder's commitments on abortion, 'If you believe that one, he's got some property in Church Hill he'll sell you'. In the copy of the speech at the Wilder Archives, this line has been marked for emphasis in pen by someone from the Wilder campaign ('Speech by Marshall Coleman to the Central Virginia Chapter of American Women in Radio and Television', 12 October 1989, Series XI, Box 1, Wilder Archive, Virginia Union University).

[90] See Foner (1993), Klinkner & Smith (1999).

[91] Coleman, quoted in 'Media Attack By Coleman is Termed Last-Ditch Effort', *Richmond Times-Dispatch,* 3 November 1989.

[92] Coleman, quoted in Edds (1990: 225).

[93] Huffman, quoted in 'Coleman says tapes will sink opponent', *Newport News Daily Press,* 5 November 1989.

[94] Sabato, 1991, 94.

[95] Wilder, 2015, 111.


[96] Ibid.

[97] Ibid.

memoirs that he chose not to respond because he had a 'promise to avoid a negative campaign', but this explanation does not stand up to scrutiny.

The Kanter Archive at the University of Oklahoma holds the entire population of TV and radio advertisements from the campaign. I watched and coded each of these 90 advertisements, and I detected that only 54.5% of Wilder's advertisements contained no negative content. 34.5% were 'contrast' adverts (both negative and positive content), while 10.9% were entirely negative. Although fewer of Coleman's advertisements were positive than Wilder's, as Figure 3.7 shows, it is wrong for Wilder to suggest that he avoided negative campaigning.

Figure 3.7. Positive/Negative Content of Wilder and Coleman TV/Radio Advertisements



Source: Kanter Archive, Political Communications Center, University of Oklahoma

Most of Wilder's negative attack advertisements focused on Coleman's position on abortion and his ties to property developers (see Figure 3.8).[98] While these criticisms had no ostensible racial content, I contend that if Wilder had complained about Coleman's 'double-standard' attack, it could only be interpreted as Wilder raising a racial grievance. Instead, I argue, Wilder's decision to fall silent on the racial 'double-standard' jibe was made based on his assumption that while whites appreciated, in his words, the 'uplifting' message of his candidacy, they were not prepared to become bogged down in a debate about continuing racial unfairness.[99]

[98] Wilder, 2015, 112.
[99] Ibid., 111.

Figure 3.8. Wilder television advertisement critical of Coleman's ties to developers ('Warning')



Source: Wilder Archive, Virginia Union University

In addition to Wilder's personal testimony in his memoirs, there is further evidence that his campaign was mindful about how to react to racial controversies. A private poll designed for Wilder by the New York pollster Arthur Nitzburg asked respondents, 'Because he is black, Doug Wilder is too quick to call criticism racist', as depicted in Figure 3.9. Regrettably, the results of the poll could not be located in Wilder's archives. Yet, the fact that Wilder and his consultants even asked the question suggests that Wilder's silence during racial controversies was the result of a strategic plan rather than an ad-hoc reaction.

Figure 3.9. Excerpt from internal Wilder campaign poll, November 1987

C)- DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS ABOUT DOUG WILDER ARE UNFAIR TO HIM. OR ARE THEY JUST ABOUT RIGHT?

	UNFAIR	RIGHT	NOT SURE
a. BECAUSE HE IS BLACK, DOUG WILDER IS TOO QUICK TO CALL CRITICISM RACIST.	17-1	2	3

Source: Letter from Arthur Nitzburg to Douglas Wilder, 19 November 1987 (Series XI, Box 28, Wilder Archives, Virginia Union University)

The Old Party Establishment: The Byrd Coalition

The second group of actors relevant to Wilder's election were the politicians who made up the Coalition, a remnant of the Byrd Organization. The Coalition no longer exerted the same power statewide that it once did, but they remained an important force in rural Virginian politics. In a close election, their support would be vital for the Democratic nominee.

As a state senator, Wilder had tussled frequently with the Coalition. His attempts to change the state song and establish a public holiday in honour of Martin Luther King were direct challenges to the symbolic racial hierarchy which the Coalition sought to preserve. In 1982 Albert Lee Philpott, the

Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates and the Coalition's most powerful actor in the 1980s, patronisingly referred to Wilder and other black state legislators as 'boys' in a dispute over the King holiday.[100] Wilder reveals that Philpott was 'not shy about using the "N" word' and describes Philpott as an 'Old South' character.[101] Journalist Jim Babb described Philpott to me as, 'a major force to be reckoned with and was a representative of the white establishment: old courthouse Democrats'.[102]


Yet, by the time Wilder ran for governor, he had made peace with the Coalition. The difficult work had already been done in 1985 when Wilder ran for lieutenant governor. On his statewide tour, Wilder stopped off in Martinsville in the Southside region where the Coalition remained dominant. Philpott endorsed Wilder at a breakfast, stating, 'This will be a great experiment for Virginia'.[103] Wilder reflects that it was 'a bit cringe-worthy, but I didn't mind. His endorsement and the photograph were worth it all'.[104]

Wilder repeated this visit in 1989, as shown in Figure 3.10. Overton McGhee, a Southside journalist, wrote that 'the speaker's endorsement was viewed as a healing of old political wounds and a symbol of acceptance by the Old Guard of the Democratic Party'.[105] Wilder had undergone a significant transformation. As a state senator, he was once described as 'a modulated Henry Howell with charm'.[106] 'Howlin' Henry Howell had been a fierce opponent of the Byrd Machine and stood on a pro-integrationist platform against the arch-segregationist governor Mills Godwin in 1973. Yet, when Wilder ran for governor, his stump speech shows him drawing a very different comparison. In the speech, held in the archives of the Library of Virginia, Wilder told voters, 'My example, and the man after whom I would seek to model my own approach as governor, was Colgate Darden'.[107] Darden was a Byrd Machine politician who was elected governor in an all-white primary in 1942.[108] While he moderated his position after leaving politics, as governor Darden was a supporter of segregation[109] and displayed a Confederate flag on his desk.[110] Wilder's citation of Darden as his model demonstrated a stark, strategic repositioning from his earlier reputation as a 'modulated Henry Howell'.

---

[100] 'House Speaker Apologizes to VA Black Delegates', *Washington Post*, 24 April 1982.
[101] Wilder, 2015, 82.
[102] Interview with Babb.
[103] Philpott, quoted in Wilder (2015: 82).
[104] Wilder, 2015, 82-83.
[105] Overton McGhee, 'Wilder returns to Philpott fete more like lender than borrower', *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, 11 October 1989.
[106] 'Baliles and Wilder, Maybe', *Richmond Times-Dispatch,* 14 March 1985.
[107] Douglas Wilder, 'Wilder for Governor Stump Speech' (Box 10, Shropshire Papers, Library of Virginia). It should be pointed out, however, that Darden was an early convert to school desegregation and attempted to repeal the poll tax.
[108] Heineman, 2015.
[109] John Barbanel, 'Colgate W Darden Jr Dies', *New York Times,* 10 June 1981.
[110] Alkebulan, 2014, 130.

Figure 3.10. Wilder campaigning in Martinsville, Virginia alongside A L Philpott, 1989



Source: Wilder: An American First, *PBS Documentary*

Philpott was not the only Coalition actor to lend his support to Wilder. Journalist Jim Babb suggests, 'if he [Philpott] said something. They [the old party establishment] listened'.[111] Former Congressman Watkins Abbitt, described as 'once a pillar of the segregationist organization', gave Wilder his support and served on a board of senior officials supporting Wilder.[112] Lower-level Coalition actors also backed Wilder. In an interview in 1989, Trinkle Phillips, the chair of the Russell County Democratic Party, predicted that Wilder would win his Southside county, 'and there's only one colored voter in the county...We're just common folk, and he's more or less our type'.[113]

While it should be stressed that Wilder had not joined the Coalition, he had said enough to signal that he would no longer seek to challenge their cultural politics in the way he had once done as a state senator. An internal strategy document from the Wilder campaign reveals that this was a strategic decision. Strategist David Doak stated that the campaign needed 'to send a signal to the Old Guard that

[111] Interview with Babb.
[112] Tyler Whitley, 'Reagan Coming to Richmond for Coleman Benefit', *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, 1 September 1989.
[113] Quoted in Edds (1990).

Doug Wilder is acceptable. Use of Senate and House endorsements to systematically provide credibility and underscore Doug's ability and experience is an absolute necessity'.[114] The support of this set of actors enabled Wilder to present himself as a deracialised candidate and eschew any lingering associations with the race-conscious policies he had pursued as a state senator. If even *the Coalition* could get behind Wilder, then surely moderate racial whites could do the same.

The New Party Establishment: Chuck Robb and Gerald Baliles

The third group of Virginian elites who were relevant to Wilder's racial campaign strategy was the new party establishment led by Chuck Robb and Gerald Baliles. Both men had been popular governors in the 1980s, governing Virginia as fiscally right-of-centre but socially progressive. When Wilder ran for governor, he cast himself as the inheritor of the Robb-Baliles legacy. In a focus group held in September 1989, Deborah Noxon, a swing voter from Tidewater, tied Wilder with the Robb-Baliles record in office: 'We've had a couple of Democratic governors in a row who have done a very acceptable job. I think that track record is very definitely going to help Doug Wilder'.[115] Yet only several years before, Wilder had been a trenchant critic of Robb and Baliles. Wilder's transformation from critic to disciple is another sign of his strategic positioning in the 1989 election.

In the early years of his lieutenant governorship, Wilder spectacularly fell afoul of both Robb and Baliles. Even though he was Baliles's lieutenant, Wilder opposed Baliles on key policy initiatives and distanced himself from the administration. Wilder, for example, opposed Baliles's proposal to allow death row inmates to have physical contact with their families on visits. He also spoke out against Baliles's attempt to raise taxes to invest in transportation infrastructure.[116] Joe McLean recalls an incident where Wilder spoke against Baliles's budget, in spite of having met with the governor to discuss it the day before and raising no objection:

> '[Wilder] said to a reporter, "I would take a butter knife to the Governor's budget. And you know what butter is made of? [pause] FAT." Woo! And from that point on we were persona non grata in the Governor's office. I mean, God, Baliles just went nuts. And he was justified because he felt like Wilder had sandbagged him, which he had'.[117]

In parallel, Wilder condemned Robb, who was seen by many as a future presidential candidate, for his continued association with the conservative Democratic Leadership Council, which Robb had co-founded in 1985. In a private correspondence in 1986, Robb told Wilder that his 'attitude [was] so incomprehensible'.[118] Robb wondered aloud to Wilder that 'you have decided not to make a serious

---

[114] David Doak to Doug Wilder, 'Strategy Memo, Governors [sic] Race 1989', 26 July 1988 (Series XI, Box 37, Wilder Archive, Virginia Union University).
[115] Deborah Noxon, quoted in 'Seaport's Diversity Makes Consensus on Issues Deficit', *Richmond-Times Dispatch*, 24 September 1989
[116] Atkinson, 2006, 70.
[117] Interview with McLean.
[118] Chuck Robb, 'Letter to Doug Wilder', 30 November 1985 (Series XI, Box 44, Wilder Archive, Virginia Union University)

effort to win the governorship in 1989, but instead [have chosen] to exploit your current role as the highest black elected official in state government for all its worth in publicity and honoraria, and then assume the martyr's role when you don't get the nomination in 1989'.[119]

Robb's prediction proved flawed when no one in the Virginia Democratic Party stepped forward to challenge Wilder in the Democratic primary for governor. Although, as Margaret Edds reports, the party establishment had been 'scrambling for an alternative', when none emerged, both Robb and Baliles gave their support to Wilder.[120] Remarkably, Wilder accepted their embrace and turned it into the centrepiece of his campaign. An internal strategy memorandum from David Doak to the Wilder team states explicitly, 'We must make Doug acceptable within the Virginia tradition – no more, no less. Our strategic imperative is to convince voters that we are within and will continue the Robb-Baliles tradition'.[121]

Wilder's two campaign slogans ('Virginia's New Mainstream' and 'Don't let Marshall Coleman take us back') were both explicitly themes built around about his proximity to the Robb-Baliles legacy. At a Labor Day speech in Buena Vista, the unofficial start of the campaign, Wilder told the crowds, 'The force I represent is Virginia's New Mainstream…On one side stands my opponent and his forces. On the other stands Doug Wilder, Chuck Robb, Jerry Baliles, and the forces of Virginia's New Mainstream'. Wilder explained, 'Virginia's New Mainstream looks forwards, not backwards. It tries to unify people, not divide them'. Wilder went on to contrast the New Mainstream with '[t]he opposing force, the one represented by my opponent is Virginia's New Extremism'. Tying this claim to the Robb-Baliles period, Wilder charged, '[t]he New Extremism has tried to block many of the most important gains Virginia has made over these eight years'.[122]

Yet, the 'New Mainstream' line had a subtle racial meaning for those who wanted to hear it. In the Labor Day speech, Wilder also suggested that his election had more to do than a simple continuation of the Robb-Baliles legacy. Wilder said, 'Not since the 1960s have the lines been drawn as clearly as they are in this election', hinting at a deeper divide.[123] According to RNC National Committeeman Morton Blackwell in an internal post-election assessment, Wilder's ability to cast the election in this binary was the decisive blow to the Coleman campaign. Blackwell lamented, 'Saying the Coleman campaign was

[119] Chuck Robb, 'Letter to Doug Wilder', 20 April 1986 (Series XI, Box 44, Wilder Archive, Virginia Union University)
[120] Edds, 1990, 53.
[121] David Doak to Doug Wilder, 'Strategy Memo, Governors [sic] Race 1989', 26 July 1988 (Series XI, Box 37, Wilder Archive, Virginia Union University).
[122] Douglas Wilder, 'Remarks Made to the Buena Vista Labor Day Celebration', 5 September 1989 (Series XI, Box 44, Wilder Archive, Virginia Union University).
[123] Ibid.

run expertly except in countering the main thrust of the Wilder campaign is rather like saying, "Aside from that, Mrs Lincoln, how did you enjoy the play?".'[124]

In addition, Wilder's call for voters not to turn the clock back was also ostensibly about the Robb-Baliles years. When he accepted the Democratic nomination, Wilder told the state party convention, 'We have come too far together in the last eight years to turn back now'.[125] Wilder repeated the line throughout the campaign. One Newport News journalist wrote on the eve of the election that the slogan was 'one of his most frequently repeated themes – potent racially as well as economically'.[126] Wilder was usually careful to include the words 'the last eight years', making it explicitly a point about the Democratic administrations' records of economic management.[127] Yet, for those who were willing to hear it, the racial symbolism of these two slogans was unmissable. Wilder adviser Jay Shropshire conceded, 'You were saying it, but you weren't saying it'.[128] Nonetheless, the Robb-Baliles heritage enabled Wilder to deny plausibly that these slogans were any more than an ideological point about the type of Democratic leader he would be.

Dependent Variable: Deracialised Campaign Strategy

Douglas Wilder pursued a deracialised campaign strategy. His policy agenda was purged of race-conscious policies and even contained a number of counter-stereotypical (conservative) positions on several policies with strong implicit racial associations. Wilder refrained from making direct, public appeals to African Americans and never explicitly mentioned his race as a reason for supporting him. In style, Wilder was conciliatory. He avoided racial controversies, even when they risked overwhelming his campaign. Wilder's strategy, I argue, was a deliberate one. It differed markedly from his approach as a state senator for the city of Richmond. Although Wilder promoted a 'colour-blind' strategy as a candidate, in his memoirs written in 2015, Wilder admits that personally 'I don't believe there is…such a thing as color blindness'.[129] Wilder's choice of racial campaign strategy shows the profoundly pragmatic and reactive character of the deracialised campaign strategy.

Policy Agenda

As I explained in Chapter 2, the first dimension of a racial campaign strategy is a candidate's policy agenda. According to the deracialised model, a black candidate will focus on non-racial issues, avoiding

[124] Morton Blackwell, 'The 1989 Lessons in Campaign Dynamics', Memorandum to the Republican Party of Virginia, nd (Series XI, Box 17, Wilder Archive, Virginia Union University).
[125] Douglas Wilder, 'Acceptance Speech for the Democratic Nomination for Governor of Virginia', 10 June 1989 (Wilder Archive, Virginia Union University).
[126] Tom Wicker, 'Wilder campaigned hard to win support around VA', *Newport News Daily Press*, 6 November 1989.
[127] 'Wilder Gets Warm Welcome at Williamsburg NAACP Event', *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, 28 October 1989.
[128] Shropshire, quoted in Edds (1990: 125).
[129] Wilder, 2015, 81.

policy matters which contain either implicit or explicit racial content. In addition, some theorists of deracialisation argue that an African American candidate will assume policy positions which are counter-stereotypical for a black politician.[130] For example, the candidate will oppose gun control, support the death penalty, and propose lowering taxes.

Wilder's policy agenda in 1989 followed along these lines. When he announced his candidacy on 26 January 1989, Wilder set out his main policy objectives: never to propose or initiate more taxes, an attack on drugs and drug-related crimes, jobs and housing for rural Virginians, and his support for the state's anti-union legislation. These positions stood in contrast to many of the policies he pursued as a state senator.

As indicated earlier in this chapter, as a state senator Wilder had been viewed as a straightforward liberal. Margaret Edds describes Wilder as pursuing a 'liberal, civil-rights oriented legislative agenda' in the state senate.[131] In the state senate, Wilder supported more robust fair housing laws, a holiday honouring Martin Luther King, proposals to remove consumption tax on food and medication, statehood for the District of Columbia, the abolition of the death penalty, more procurement for black-owned businesses, funding for sickle-cell anaemia detection,[132] and other racially liberal policies.[133] When I asked him about his work on behalf of his African American constituents as a state legislator, Wilder highlighted, 'When Virginia schools were closed during the massive resistance, the law requiring kids to go to school was taken off the books. I put that law back on, and that affected African Americans more than it affected anyone else. These were the kinds of things that I did in the legislature'.[134]

However, by 1989 Wilder had eschewed most of these racially liberal trappings, taking much more conservative positions on several key issues. Larry Framme, who was chair of the Virginia Democratic Party at the time, postulated to me that this repositioning was vital to Wilder's success: 'I mean to me, the key to the election of Doug Wilder had to do with the way he repositioned himself over the six to eight years prior to that election'.[135]


Wilder placed his issue positions at the centre of his campaign. For example, Wilder had long been an opponent of the death penalty. In 1977, he voted against the state re-introducing the death penalty; in 1980 and 1981 he voted against including mass murder as a capital crime. As Wilder stated in his interview with me and confirmed by other sources, Wilder's outspoken opposition to capital punishment as a state legislator had been explained in reference to the discriminatory application of the death penalty

[130] Strickland & Whicker, 1992.
[131] Edds, 1990, 38.
[132] As many as 80% of sickle-cell disease patients in the United States are African American (Carolyn Sayre, 'What You Need To Know About Sickle Cell Disease', *New York Times*).
[133] Baker, 1989, Ch 21.
[134] Interview with Wilder.
[135] Interview with Lawrence Framme, 14 July 2015.

against African Americans.[136] Between 1901 and 1962, 202 out of 236 people executed in Virginia were African American (86%). In 1951, when Wilder was twenty, Virginia infamously put to death seven young black men accused of a non-fatal rape of a white woman in an act described by historians as a 'legal lynching'.[137]

When he ran for governor, however, Wilder asserted that the death penalty was no longer practiced in a racially discriminatory way. He argued that the death penalty would be appropriate for certain crimes, such as killing a police officer. Wilder promoted this newfound position in his television advertisements, as shown in Figure 3.11.

Figure 3.11. Death Penalty for Cop Killers, Wilder for Governor TV Advertisement



Source: Wilder Archive, Virginia Union University

Wilder also promoted a hardline law and order message. Wilder told a conference on jail overcrowding organised by the Virginia Sheriff's Association, 'I am very much concerned with overcrowding in Virginia's jails – because I intend to help crowd them even more…But let me say emphatically and without qualification: I would rather deal with the problem of overcrowding than the nightmare of a society overrun by and run by criminals'.[138]

As lieutenant governor, Wilder was invited around the country to speak at events aimed at African Americans. He accepted a number of these invitations, yet his speeches usually included 'respectability' messages.[139] In one speech, Wilder told the African American audience, 'We have on occasions

[136] Interview with Wilder. See also Baker (1989: 278).
[137] Rise, 1998, 2.
[138] Douglas Wilder, 'Remarks to the Jail Overcrowding Conference of the Virginia Sheriff's Association', Richmond, 22 September 1988 (Box 4, Series II, Wilder Archive, Virginia Union University). Emphasis in original.
[139] See Harris (2014).

excused, forgiven, and condoned indolence and sloth, mediocrity, and even law-breaking'.[140] At a speech to the American Association for Affirmative Action, Wilder did not voice his support for a single affirmative action policy, arguing that 'the overall fairness of a majority of the American people' had been underestimated.[141] His speech at the Henrico County Martin Luther King Day rally in 1987 contained virtually no mention of the civil rights movement or the work of Martin Luther King, focusing almost entirely on the need to cut taxes.[142]

Targeted Appeals

The second dimension of the racial campaign strategy is targeted appeals. To what extent did Wilder make appeals directly to African American voters? How did Wilder appeal to white voters? Following the deracialised strategy, we would expect Wilder to appeal to whites on a colour-blind basis. We would also expect him to avoid campaigning in the African American community, taking their support for granted. In both instances, this was a largely accurate depiction of the campaign.

An early strategy document from political consultant David Doak to the Wilder team spells out explicitly, 'Doug cannot run as a black candidate. He must be a Virginian who wants to be governor, and who just happens to be black'.[143] Throughout the election, when charged to address it explicitly, Wilder repeatedly downplayed the symbolic significance of his candidacy. Margaret Edds describes Wilder's announcement speech as 'a color-blind recital of his twenty years' experience in state government'.[144]

The campaign decided not to appeal to voters on the basis of the symbolic racial history of Wilder's candidacy. Polling consultant David Petts recalled to me, 'I remember being amazed and *concerned* that in the final weeks of the campaign we actually had reporters from other countries that began covering the race obviously because of the historical significance of it…We wanted to deemphasise the historical nature of it'.[145] Indeed, when a *Washington Post* reporter asked Wilder about the historic significance of his candidacy, Wilder shot back, 'I will devote absolutely no time nor effort to that or discussing that'.[146] Wilder's campaign manager confirmed in our interview that this silence was a strategic choice decided early in the campaign:

---

[140] Douglas Wilder, 'Speech made to the YMC Black Achievers Banquet', Louisville, KY, 14 February 1987 (Series II, Box 3, Wilder Archive, Virginia Union University).
[141] Douglas Wilder, 'Remarks made to the American Association for Affirmative Action Eleventh Annual Conference', Atlantic City, NJ, 20 October 1987 (Series II, Box 1, Wilder Archive, Virginia Union University).
[142] Douglas Wilder, 'Greetings to Henrico County Mass Rally Martin Luther King Day', 19 January 1987 (Series II, Box 1, Wilder Archive, Virginia Union University).
[143] David Doak to Doug Wilder, 'Strategy Memo, Governors [sic] Race 1989', 26 July 1988 (Series XI, Box 37, Wilder Archive, Virginia Union University).
[144] Edds, 1990, 12.
[145] Interview with Petts, emphasis added.
[146] Wilder, quoted in Edds (1990: 12).

> 'We knew that it would be close because our ceiling was so low – just because of who Wilder was and what he was. We made the determination early in the race that we would not run on race. We would never mention race, and we never did…And when anybody mentioned the race issue, first of all, we let it be known to all the press and to everybody that we weren't going to talk about it. This was not going to be an issue in this race, and we were not going to discuss it…And when they did ask the question, he would immediately pivot off of that and say, you know, this not about that'.[147]

Running only a year after Jesse Jackson's presidential campaign, Wilder's style was inevitably compared to that of Jackson. Wilder himself drew the comparison during the campaign, stating, 'Jesse runs to inspire; I run to win'.[148] According to Wilder's friend Bob Holsworth, 'When he ran for governor, Jackson called him up and says, "I'll do anything you want. What can I do?". "Well", [Wilder says], "You can do anything you think is necessary so long as it's not in Virginia. Just stay out". He told Jackson, "there's no vote that you can get me that I shouldn't get on my own".'[149] Wilder confirmed in an interview with me that he told Jackson not to come to Virginia, adding 'My point was you don't need to tell the people of Virginia who I am'.[150] It should be noted, however, that Wilder's public distance from Jackson differed from the campaign's private linkages with Jackson. An internal strategy memorandum from the Wilder campaign reveals that 'National Jackson lists' (i.e. the list of contributors to the 1988 Jesse Jackson campaign) were being used by the Wilder campaign for fundraising solicitations.[151]

For some white voters, racial symbolism was clearly inspiring and attractive. Paul Duke writes that for some whites, 'the Wilder victory was a redemptive act'.[152] However, I would argue that this type of support was quite superficial. While some racially moderate whites were intrigued by the historic possibilities of Wilder's candidacy, they were not convinced by the need for a more substantive racial equality agenda to go alongside it. The Chairman of the Virginia Chamber of Commerce captured this sentiment when he distinguished between the racial symbolism of African Americans in high office and the active role of the state in achieving racial equality. He explained, 'I have felt that Jackie Robinson did more for integration in the United States than all the court-ordered programs'.[153]

In something of an aberration from the deracialised model's ideal form, the Wilder campaign did organise within the black community. Wilder's nephew Michael Brown was tasked with coordinating efforts with religious and other leaders in the black community. The task of voter mobilisation was

---

[147] Interview with McLean.
[148] Douglas Wilder, quoted in 'A Black Candidate in Virginia Runs for Office Not History', *New York Times*, 3 November 1989.
[149] Interview with Holsworth.
[150] Interview with Wilder.
[151] David Doak to Doug Wilder, 'Strategy Memo, Governors [sic] Race 1989', 26 July 1988, p11 (Series XI, Box 37, Wilder Archive, Virginia Union University).
[152] Duke, 1990, xii.
[153] Quoted in Edds (1990: 59).

largely devolved to these leaders, but the Wilder campaign remained involved through Brown. Campaign manager Joe McLean recalls, 'Michael Brown is the guy who was charged with the actual on the ground working that. And man, he went to every COGIC church – Church of God in Christ. He went to every COGIC. He went to every AME [African Methodist Episcopal]. He worked so hard'.[154]

For the large part, however, Wilder himself did not spend time in the African American community during the campaign. I did not find any reports in my newspaper sample which indicated that Wilder publicly campaigned in the black community. When I asked Lawrence Framme, who was chair of the Virginia Democratic Party at the time, why Wilder did not spend much time in the community, Framme replied, 'I don't think he had to, actually, because the black community was very aware of the historic nature of it, and they certainly didn't need Doug Wilder or anybody else to tell them that. So, I don't think there was a real need to go out in the African American community and beat the drum of how historic this would be. That community was very aware of it'.[155]

African American leaders seemed to agree that Wilder 'needed' to avoid the black community in order to be elected. Even Jesse Jackson admitted, 'To ask a man who could be governor to be the state's top civil rights leader all at the same time may be asking too much'.[156] Although Jackson had known Wilder since Jackson was a college student (both men were in the same historically black fraternity, Omega Psi Phi), Jackson knew that Wilder was in 'a delicate situation'.[157] He explained, 'When you volunteer to help someone, you get as close as you need to be, as far away as they need you to be'.[158]

The trust in the community, however, paid off, given that African American turnout was 8 percentage points higher than white turnout (73% to 65%). In many black precincts, turnout was at 'presidential levels', a goal which several other African American candidates in my sample have tried (but failed) to achieve (see, for example, Harold Ford Jr in Chapter 8).[159] While the Wilder campaign certainly did not neglect the necessary groundwork and get-out-the-vote effort in the African American community, there is little evidence that the candidate or the broader campaign made special appeals to African Americans.

Style

According to most observers of Douglas Wilder, there was a noted stylistic difference between his time as a state senator and as a candidate for statewide office. David Broder, whose report appeared in the *Newport News Daily Press*, wrote that Wilder had undergone a 'radical…transformation' between these two stages in his political life. Broder wrote, Wilder 'came to the state senate 20 years ago as an Afro-

[154] Interview with McLean.
[155] Interview with Framme.
[156] Jackson, 1989, xiii.
[157] Baker, 1989, 35.
[158] Jackson, 1989, xiii.
[159] Sabato, 1991, 84.

haircut advocate of black causes and now campaigns in the button-down conservative guise of the classic Richmond establishment lawyer'.[160] Confirming the idea of Wilder's subdued campaign style in 1989, Margaret Edds described Wilder as 'the most reassuringly conciliatory of politicians'.[161]

One of the major racial flashpoints of the campaign occurred on Labor Day weekend, the traditional symbolic start to American general election campaigns. That weekend, a group of predominantly African American students had come to an annual celebration at Virginia Beach. They clashed with local police, resulting in what Edds describes as 'a wave of racial violence' which left more than one-hundred shops and restaurants damaged.[162] Wilder recounts that the unrest 'aligned in a simple racial formula', with the African American students complaining about hostile white residents and heavy handed police and with the white residents describing the partying students as behaving like 'thugs'.[163]

Although the NAACP wanted Wilder to condemn the police, Wilder writes, 'I felt that the last thing anyone – including me – needed to do was make it the topic of a political campaign'. Wilder did his utmost to avoid comment on the matter, beyond a general condemnation of violence and a call for an investigation. He reflects that 'I had learned (and it's been demonstrated repeatedly since) that when there is a black-white clash, it's almost impossible to address in a reasoned way'.[164]

In spite of his silence, the white press reacted furiously. Journalist Robert Holland wrote a racially charged commentary in the *Richmond Times-Dispatch* calling on Wilder to condemn the black students. Holland wrote, 'If Wilder wanted to target specific agitators, he could start with Spike Lee, the radical-chic black film maker from New York City, whose hate-filled media creations played no small role in inflaming emotions at Virginia Beach…The civil rights protestors [of the 1950s and 1960s] did not drip with heavy gold chains or drive fancy cars. They were not out to raise Cain or pillage jewellery stores'.[165] While Wilder did not say it at the time, he writes in his memoirs that he personally rejected this depiction of the students: 'The double standard was obvious. When white students misbehaved, they were described as kids being kids. When African American students misbehaved, they were thugs and rioters'.[166]

Wilder's refusal to acknowledge the racial dimensions of such a manifestly racial conflict or to voice his personal belief that the black students were being portrayed by the media in racist ways stands in sharp contrast to his approach as a state senator. Wilder had frequently identified the racial content of even outwardly non-racial policies, such as a bill allowing doctors to procure organs from a patient

[160] David Broder, 'VA Election Goes Beyond Basic Drama', *Newport News Daily Press*, 29 October 1989.
[161] Edds, 1990, 22.
[162] Ibid., 179.
[163] Wilder, 2015, 107.
[164] Ibid., 107.
[165] Robert Holland, 'Echoes of Greekfest in the Governor's Race', *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, 20 September 1989.
[166] Wilder, 2015, 108.

without seeking approval from the family of the deceased. Evoking the image from black folklore of the 'Night Doctor' who stole black bodies for medical experiments, Wilder argued that the law would disproportionately target African Americans.[167] Wilder told the state legislature, 'They're not going to be taking the hearts of any white mayors. You know whose hearts they'll be taking. If this bill passes, it's going to be so that black mothers will tell their children, "Don't go walking down by the Medical College at night or the student doctor's going to get you".'[168] Reflecting on his time as a state senator, Wilder writes, 'I was always willing to work across the aisle and form relationships. But I never ducked a race-based challenge".'[169] In 1989, however, Wilder believed that he had no choice but to duck.

There is other evidence of Wilder's conciliatory style. It has long been suggested that African Americans for executive office find it even more difficult to win the support of whites than African Americans for legislative office do.[170] Six African Americans have been popularly elected to the US Senate; only two have been popularly elected governors.[171] One of the main explanations for this difference is that governors have pervasive powers of patronage, which some whites fear will be used to appoint (incompetent or less qualified) African Americans to jobs which would have otherwise been held by whites. *Washington Post* reporter Judy Mann recounts a voter in the Southwest's Wythe County expressing concern to her that Wilder 'would fill some 4,000 gubernatorial appointments with blacks, especially at the top'.[172] Wilder confirms in his interview with me, 'The governor of Virginia is a powerful constitutional office. Very powerful… [T]he governor not only has 4,000 appointments. We have a line item veto; we have amending authority of any bill that comes before the governor… [T]hat's why it's less formidable being elected to a congressional seat or even the Senate. The governor? That's more difficult. I don't hear many names of African Americans across this country going for governor'.[173]

The Coleman campaign exploited this concern, issuing a press release in September 1989 which stated that there were 'widespread and well-publicized doubts about who Wilder would appoint to key state post [sic] if elected Governor'. The Coleman campaign warned that 'Mr Wilder has staffed the key positions in his campaign with some of the most extreme liberal activists in the Democratic Party'.[174]

Evidently feeling the pressure of Coleman's attacks, the following month, Wilder made the unusual step of unveiling a 'Commission on Excellence', composed of white, elite Virginians. Wilder explained

---

[167] On the 'Night Doctor' character in black folklore, see Fry (1975).
[168] Quoted in Lederer (2008: 172, 179)
[169] Wilder, 2015, 57.
[170] See Sonenshein (1990: 230).
[171] The six popularly elected senators are Edward Brooke, Carol Moseley Braun, Barack Obama, Cory Booker, Tim Scott, and Kamala Harris. The two popularly elected governors are Douglas Wilder and Deval Patrick.
[172] Judy Mann, 'If merit elected a governor, Wilder would be a shoo-in', *Washington Post*, 1 November 1989.
[173] Interview with Wilder.
[174] Coleman for Governor, 'Wilder Disinformation Report' Press Release, 5 September 1989 (Series XI, Box 44, Wilder Archive, Virginia Union University).

that the Commission would advise him on all gubernatorial appointments. Such a move, I argue, was part of an effort to reassure whites that he would use his powers of appointment 'responsibly'. Margaret Edds assesses that what the Commission communicated 'to moderate and conservative white Virginians was, "You have nothing to fear".'[175] The attempt to show that Wilder would listen to white advisers was also echoed in his campaign advertisements. Over one-third of the television and radio advertisements produced by the Wilder campaign included at least one individual testifying for Wilder's character and qualification. Every single endorser in these nineteen advertisements was white.[176] Not a single non-white voter or politician spoke in any of Wilder's campaign advertisements other than Wilder himself.

Result

The result was the closest in state history. Wilder won 896,936 votes, and Coleman won 890,195. Wilder's majority of 6,741 was a difference of fewer than three votes per polling district. Given the closeness of the result, Coleman waited seven weeks before he formally conceded on 21 December 1989.

The Wilder election has become mythical in the history of election polling because pre-election polls *and* the day's exit polls both predicted Wilder winning by a significantly larger margin than the one which he received. Polls before the election showed Wilder with a lead of 4 to 11 percentage points.[177] The Mason-Dixon Opinion Research exit poll (n=4,700) showed Wilder defeating Coleman 55% to 45%, rather than the actual result of 50.1% to 49.8%.[178] Furthermore, the polling was inaccurate *only* for Wilder; the results for the Democratic candidates for lieutenant governor and attorney general were both within the margin of error. Many commentators have cited this phenomenon as an example of white voters lying to pollsters about their willingness to vote for a black candidate, sometimes called the 'Wilder effect'.[179]

There are reasons to challenge this thesis, however. First, the effect might have little to do with voters actively *lying* about voting for a candidate than to do with how pollsters count undecided voters. In the week before the election 92 percent of the 8 percent of the electorate who were still undecided were white, whereas only 77.4 percent of the overall population of Virginia was white.[180] Wilder's pollster David Petts agrees: 'the Wilder effect was if the whites did not say they were with you, they were not

[175] Edds, 1990, 199.
[176] These white endorsers included Governor Gerald Baliles, Governor Chuck Robb, state senator Virgil Goode, Sherriff Bill Overton, a white Republican woman, white police officers, a local politician from Tidewater, a white small businessman, a white farmer, a white mother, a retired white man, and an elderly white couple.
[177] Randolph Goode, 'Fib Factor May Have Affected Accuracy of Exit Polls', *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, 8 November 1989.
[178] There were 1,947 write-in ballots or 0.1% of the total.
[179] E.g., Finkel et al (1991), Traugott & Price (1992), Hopkins (2009)
[180] Coker, 1989.

going to be with you. It wasn't that people were lying per se… We knew that the white undecided vote would break pretty monolithically against us and so it was really about the way you analysed the poll than it was that the polling numbers were terribly wrong because you had people lying to you'.[181]

Second, while it is conceivable that voters lied to exit pollsters, another possibility is that anti-Wilder voters were less likely to participate in the exit poll to begin with, as the designer of the exit poll Bradford Coker speculates.[182] Polls tend to assume an equiprobability of error from refusals, but it is possible that there was systematic bias in the exit polls, being less likely to speak to non-Wilder voters.[183]

One pattern where the polls were not wrong was in predicting the likelihood of split-ticket voting. Three percent of exit poll respondents reported voting for Democrats Don Beyer for lieutenant governor and Mary Sue Terry for attorney general but Republican Marshall Coleman for governor. Given that Beyer led Wilder by only 4%, this pattern seems broadly accurate (see Table 3.2).

Table 3.2. Democratic candidates for statewide office in Virginia, 1989

Candidate	Office	Total Votes	Vote Share
Douglas Wilder	Governor	889,463	50.14%
Don Beyer	Lieutenant Governor	927,277	54.21%
Mary Sue Terry	Attorney General	1,074,062	62.95%


Larry Sabato assesses that 96% of African Americans voted for Wilder, while 41% of the white voters did. According to Edds, the Wilder campaign had aimed to win 42% of the white vote, but because the white-black turnout gap was large than expected (73% turnout among blacks, compared to 65% among whites), Wilder was able to win the election with a slightly smaller proportion of support from whites than he thought he needed.[184] Demonstrating Wilder's unique pull, in predominantly black precincts 17% of those who cast ballots only voted in the governor's race, leaving the lieutenant governor and attorney general votes unmarked. In contrast, only 5% of all ballots statewide contained a vote for governor but not for the other statewide offices.[185]

As expected, Wilder won a majority of white voters in the suburbs of Washington, DC, dominated by those with higher incomes and university degrees (see Figure 3.12). In fact, NoVA was the only region in which Wilder outperformed Gerald Baliles's result in the 1985 gubernatorial election.[186] However, in towns with similarly high proportion of university-educated whites, Wilder also outperformed

[181] Interview with Petts.
[182] Coker, 1989.
[183] Finkel et al, 1991.
[184] Edds, 1990, 126.
[185] Sabato, 1991, Ch 5.
[186] Ibid., 88.

previous years' Democratic results. In Williamsburg and Charlottesville, homes to William & Mary College and the University of Virginia, Wilder won a convincing majority of white votes.

Figure 3.12. Virginia Governor Election 1989, by county




Red=Coleman, Blue=Wilder. Source: Based on results from the Virginia Department of Elections

Yet, Wilder's success among white voters was not confined to the liberal middle classes. He also won a majority of the white vote in the working-class mining regions of southwestern Virginia. While Democrats normally won this area handily, the fact that an African American candidate was able to maintain most of this support is significant. Wilder seems to have done best in the counties with heavy mining industry as well as the independent city of Norton (Figure 3.13). All seventeen counties were more than 90% white.[187] In Tidewater, Wilder failed to win a majority of white votes, perhaps a reflection of the overt racial tensions in the area, but he still carried over 40% of the vote from whites.[188]

[187] United Mine Workers of America, 'Coal Counties' Vote Buck State-Wide Trend' (Series XI, Box 17, Wilder Archives, Virginia Union University).
[188] Hertzog, 1994.

Figure 3.13. Wilder vote share in southwest Virginia, by county



Brown= Coal mining county, Purple = non-coal mining county. Source: United Mine Workers of America, 'Coal Counties' Vote Buck State-Wide Trend' (Series XI, Box 17, Wilder Archives, Virginia Union University)

The white vote, it seems, was most supportive in areas where there were few African Americans. In no Virginia locality where more than one-third of the residents were black did Wilder win more than 25% of the white vote. This is consistent with 'black threat' theory, first suggested by V O Key. Kathleen Kemp made similar findings in her study of the 1983 Chicago mayoral election. She found that whites who were *most* separated from blacks due to economic and spatial barriers were the most supportive of Harold Washington's bid, compared to whites who lived in closer spatial and class proximity to blacks.[189]

Conclusion

For some whites and, of course, African Americans the symbolism of electing an African American was clearly potent, inspiring, and highly motivating. As Larry Sabato put it, 'a vote for Wilder became a badge of honor – objective proof that they were not racist – and symbolic separation from Old Virginia and all that the painful past of segregation and resistance represented'.[190] Commentators took Wilder's victory as a sign of the diminished importance of race in electoral politics. Margaret Edds wrote that the election of Douglas Wilder was 'a profound statement about the diminishing importance of race in

[189] Kemp, 1986.
[190] Sabato, 1991, 94.

Virginia, the South, and the country'.[191] She congratulated whites and Wilder himself for having 'take[n] race out of the election'.[192]

I profoundly disagree with these sunny estimates. The fact that Douglas Wilder felt compelled to change his policy positions, fall silent during racial controversies, reassure white voters that he would take the counsel of white elites in making executive appointments, and ignore what he personally felt to be a racial insult from his opponent shows that race and, indeed, racism was present in the election. Enough Virginians may have been prepared to elect the grandson of slaves as their governor, but the Wilder campaign clearly assessed that there would be little value in highlighting the enduring impact of slavery and Jim Crow in this election. This is in strong contrast to the viewpoint Wilder articulated as a state legislator.

Realistically, Virginians were never going to 'take race out of the election'. An October 1989 poll found that 6 out of 10 respondents agreed, 'race is a much bigger issue in the governor's campaign than most people are willing to admit'.[193] Sue Savage, a 47-year-old resident of the tiny Tidewater town Atlantic, admitted to a reporter, 'You just can't get your prejudice out of you as quickly as you would like…Race influences me and everybody else. It's my upbringing and the area I have lived in.'[194] There is no mistake that Douglas Wilder and his advisers appreciated this reality. Marian Tucker, a political aide to the Democratic majority leader in the House of Delegates, recalls that Paul Goldman, Wilder's chief campaign adviser, said 'it's going to come down to race and abortion, and all through the [campaign], he never lost sight of that'.[195]

Wilder behaved as many whites wanted to see a black candidate behave: one who would address *their* substantive issues but presume silence on the racial issues which had hitherto championed. Even when criticised by his opponent on grounds which could only be interpreted as racial, Wilder felt too constrained to point out this racism, for fear of being seen, in Wilder's own words, 'as yet another black individual complaining that he has been victimized by white discrimination'.[196]

Similar to Charles Hamilton's instruction that his strategy document was limited to the particular context of the 1976 presidential election, Wilder went to considerable lengths after his election to downplay his strategy's generalisability. Wilder perhaps recognised the limitations that the deracialised strategy placed on black candidates. Wilder declared the day after the election that his campaign strategy could not serve as a 'prototype relative to being a black candidate…There isn't any lesson to learn from

[191] Edds, 1990, 123.
[192] Ibid., 4.
[193] 'Race is an under-the-surface issue in VA's gubernatorial campaign', *Newport News Daily Press*, 5 October 1989.
[194] Sue Savage, quoted in 'Race is an under-the-surface issue in VA's gubernatorial campaign', *Newport News Daily Press*, 5 October 1989. Survey of 1,008 likely Virginia voters, interviewed 21-24 September 1989.
[195] Tucker, quoted in Edds (1990: 139).
[196] Wilder, quoted in Jeffries (1999: 586).

what we did in Virginia'.[197] An irony of Wilder's election is that a stylised version of his campaign strategy became the model used by political scientists to describe the necessary strategy for African American candidates to win in majority-white environments.[198] For example, Charles Jones wrote that 'key to the replication of the Wilder victory in other predominantly white electoral districts is the adoption of a deracialized political strategy'.[199]

In conclusion, Wilder ran primarily (if not exclusively) a deracialised campaign. This is not to say that Wilder 'overcame' race or that race was irrelevant to white voters' behaviour, as has sometimes been suggested. Instead, race was at the forefront of the minds of both the candidate and electors. Wilder knew how much the white electorate would tolerate. It was just enough to elect a governor whose grandparents two generations earlier had been held as chattel in the same state.

[197] Wilder, quoted in 'Wilder Begins Inauguration Plans After Historic Defeat of Coleman', *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, 8 November 1989.
[198] See Jones (1991), Strickland & Whicker (1992).
[199] Jones, 1991, 112.

Chapter 4 - Harvey Gantt (North Carolina, 1990)

'You're running against a black. So race is just automatically part of the election. There's no running from it. There's no hiding from it. And in the South, there are lines.'
Carter Wrenn, Jesse Helms for Senate Campaign Director, Interview with author

***

The fundamental assumption of the deracialised campaign model is that white racial hostility causes black candidates to forsake their racial identity when facing a majority-white electorate. Based on this assumption, the circumstances of Harvey Gantt's 1990 campaign for the Senate ought to imply a very strong case for the deracialised campaign model. Gantt operated in a highly racially hostile context, standing in a Southern state against an incumbent senator considered to be an 'unabashed white racist'.[1] Accordingly, scholars have argued that Gantt followed the deracialised campaign model.[2] Zaphon Wilson claims that 'Gantt shied away from racial problems' and projected the view that 'race was an issue that had been resolved and was not an important part of the overall problem'.[3] Agreeing with this perspective, Zoltan Hajnal writes, 'Harvey Gantt tried hard to run a nonthreatening, deracialized contest'.[4]

In this case study, I will argue that Gantt did not run a deracialised campaign. Contrary to the deracialised model, Gantt did not avoid racial discourse nor did he adopt a 'race-neutral' policy programme. Gantt would have been the first black Democratic senator in US history and the first black senator from the South since Reconstruction. His campaign promoted the symbolic-historic significance of his candidacy, framing him as a manifestation of the 'New South'. However, I argue that because he was situated in a racially hostile election environment, Gantt chose an adversarial racial campaign strategy. Specifically, he presented a symbolic contrast between himself as the embodiment of New South racial tolerance and his opponent Jesse Helms as the embodiment of Old South racial intolerance. A vote for Gantt was not only a vote to affirm America's racial progress, but it was also a vote against a regressive view of race relations. Rather than reflect the deracialised model, I argue that Gantt followed the crusade model of black candidacy.

[1] David Broder, *Washington Post*, 29 August 2001.
[2] E.g., Wilson (1993), Perry (1996b), Prysby (1996), Clemons (1998), Gomolin et al (2007: 18), Gillespie (2010), Stout (2015)
[3] Wilson, 1993, 179.
[4] Hajnal, 2007, 53.

Explanatory Variables: Context, Candidate, and Elites

Context: North Carolina in 1990

North Carolina has been described as a 'microcosm of the South'.[5] It has a large 'black belt' in the east and Piedmont, with roots in cotton agriculture, while the mountainous western part of the state is overwhelmingly white. It lacks a central metropolis, but in 1990 its urban areas made up over 40 percent of the state population. Historically dependent on cotton, tobacco, and textiles, by 1990 the state was integrating into the political economy of the New South. Its capital, Charlotte was becoming a leading banking centre. In *Dixie Rising,* Peter Applebome described Charlotte as the city of 'God and Mammon' whose citizens have 'a desire to do good and a desire to do well'.[6] The Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill 'Research Triangle' was becoming a 'southern Silicon Valley'[7] with one of the country's highest concentrations of PhDs.[8] These areas, situated in the central Piedmont region of the state, were its most 'economically, politically, and culturally powerful'.[9]

Politically, the state has a longer history of two-party competition than most others in the South. A fusion of black Republicans and white Populists in the 1890s scored rare electoral triumphs against the white segregationist Democrats who had recaptured many state and local offices after the federal government abandoned Reconstruction.[10] Yet, two-party competition was brutally contested. In 1898, after a biracial coalition of black Republicans and white Populists was elected to Wilmington City Council in North Carolina, a mob of white Democrats burned down the headquarters of the local black newspaper and murdered as many as sixty African Americans. Thousands more fled, and the lawful election results were overturned.[11] Lauren Collins accurately describes the event as a 'coup d'état'.[12] Two years later, US Congressman George White who represented the area chose not to contest the 1900 elections out of a sense of futility and fear of further violence. He was the last southern black Congressman for over 70 years and the last from North Carolina until 1992.[13]

Many political scientists and historians have explained political change in the South through modernisation theory.[14] Merle Black and Earl Black explain Republican advancement by emphasising the growth of white southerners' incomes, industrialisation, urbanisation, and the arrival of non-native

---

[5] Packer 2012, 9.
[6] Applebome, 1996, 155.
[7] Christensen & Fleer, 1999.
[8] Leslie Phillips, 'Election has elements of high drama', *USA Today*, 18 September 1990.
[9] Luebke, 1990, 67.
[10] In 1894, Republicans and Populists won control of the state legislature, and in 1896 Republican Daniel Russell was elected governor. He expanded the franchise, but these gains were soon reversed after the Democrats regained the legislature in 1898 and the governor's office in 1900.
[11] See Cecelski & Tyson (1998).
[12] Lauren Collins, 'A Buried Coup d'Etat in the United States', *New Yorker*, 19 September 2016.
[13] The first black US Congressman elected from North Carolina in the twentieth century was Mel Watt, Harvey Gantt's campaign manager, in 1992.
[14] E.g., Black & Black (1987), Bartley (1995), Shafer & Johnston (2006)

whites to the region.[15] Similarly, Byron Shafer and Richard Johnston attribute the growth of Republican voting to the upward lift of southern whites' incomes in the post-war period and the move from a primarily agricultural to a more diversified economy.[16] Other modernisation factors include increased levels of education and exposure to mass culture.[17]

Modernisation accounts make a contribution to understanding political change in the South, but they should not overshadow the more fundamental issue, which is that since the Civil War vibrant two-party competition in North Carolina has *only* existed when African Americans have had the franchise. With the exception of 1928, when the party nominated an anti-Prohibition Catholic, Democrats won North Carolina in every single presidential election from the end of Reconstruction until the Voting Rights Act. Between 1900 and 1972 (roughly the same period as black disenfranchisement), Democrats won every single gubernatorial and senatorial election in the state. Once two-party competition returned with the re-enfranchisement of African Americans, the state's Democratic and Republican parties became strongly polarised as liberal whites and blacks voted Democratic and conservative whites moved to the Republicans.[18] Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa write that, unlike some Southern states with split-ticket voting, in North Carolina the two parties tended to be 'distinctive, non-overlapping in their ideas and bitter in their rivalries'.[19]

North Carolina is sometimes perceived as having a stronger tradition of racial tolerance and political progressivism than other Southern states.[20] V O Key identified this phenomenon in his 1949 classic *Southern Politics*, remarking, 'It has been the vogue to be progressive. Willingness to accept new ideas, sense of community responsibility toward the Negro, feeling of common purpose, and relative prosperity have given North Carolina a more sophisticated politics than exists in most southern states'.[21] When the Democrats included a civil rights commitment in their 1948 platform, the North Carolina delegates were the only Southern delegation not to abandon Harry Truman for Georgia senator Richard Russell at the party's national convention. Jack Bass and Walter DeVries write that, unlike other parts of the South before the Voting Rights Act, in North Carolina 'the Negro was given a degree of paternalistic protection and allowed marginal participation'.[22]

In spite of these perceptions, that tradition of racial tolerance in the state is overstated, not least for the aforementioned example of the Wilmington massacre in reaction to the election of black elected

[15] Black & Black, 1987.
[16] Shafer & Johnston, 2006.
[17] E.g., Mayo (1964)
[18] Yet, even as late as 1990, vestiges of the one-party South remained. While only 40% of voters identified as Democrats in opinion surveys, 65% of the *electorate* were still registered Democrats (Christensen & Fleer, 1990, 97).
[19] Barone & Ujifusa, 1989, 885.
[20] Strickland & Whicker, 1992, 210.
[21] Key, 1949, 210.
[22] Bass & DeVries, 1976, 221.

officials. Indeed, Thomas Kazee qualifies that while North Carolina may have been more progressive than other Southern states in terms of spending and investment, he sees the state as being very cautious on civil rights.[23] In 1985, 60% of whites in North Carolina agreed with the statement 'I'm not prejudiced, but everything I have seen leads me to believe that blacks are less intelligent than whites'.[24] One member of Gantt's campaign staff recalled Gantt facing racial prejudice in some parts of the state: 'the rural areas were really tough. In the rural areas, he would still be called the "n word" to his face. And in passing, people would say, "What's that n[igger] doing here?".'[25]

Although 60% of white North Carolinians endorsed the idea of black intellectual inferiority, their waning power relative to African Americans opened new opportunities for black office-seekers. As a result of the Voting Rights Act, within Gantt's own lifetime the proportion of African Americans registered to vote in North Carolina increased from 5% in the 1940s to 63% by 1990. In 1986, African Americans made up 16% of the registered electorate; by 1990, they were 19% of registered voters. The growth of this constituency diminished the extent to which Gantt needed to appeal to racially intolerant whites. In fact, even if 95% of whites who believed blacks were less intelligent than whites voted against Harvey Gantt, he could still win the election. Gantt's campaign calculated that he could defeat Helms by winning only 35 to 40% of the white vote, but to do so he needed record turnout from African Americans.[26] As I will argue, Gantt's strategy did not involve appealing to the 'median' intolerant white voter but instead aimed to generate high African American turnout and solidify support from racially tolerant whites.


As mentioned, the Voting Rights Act had been crucial in enfranchising the state's black population, but its achievements were incomplete. Unlike many southern states, North Carolina was only partially included by the strict federal 'preclearance' in Section 5 of the Act. Because literacy tests had been used in North Carolina in a county-by-county basis, only 40 out of 100 counties were covered by Section 5.[27] Thompson writes that in these counties in 1965, fewer than 1 in 3 African American adults were registered to vote compared to more than 3 in 4 whites.[28] In the decade following the passage of the Voting Rights Act, black registration increased 21.6 percentage points in the Section 5 jurisdictions. Between 1975 and 1980 alone, the Justice Department used their powers under Section 5 fifty-two times to block attempted electoral changes in these forty covered counties.[29] However, gains were not

[23] Kazee, 1998.
[24] Quoted in Varley (1992: 3).
[25] HG1.
[26] It is worth pointing out that in the 2012 presidential election, Barack Obama won only 39% of the white vote but compensated for this historic low in white support for a winning presidential candidate by mobilising record turnout among African Americans.
[27] Keech & Sistrom, 1994.
[28] 77.6% of whites were registered to vote in these counties, while only 32.4% of African Americans were registered (Thompson, 1986).
[29] Thompson, 1986.

mirrored in the sixty non-covered counties, where African American voter registration increased by only 0.9 percentage points from 1965.[30]

In spite of the substantial increase in black registration over these decades, as depicted in Figure 4.1, a black-white registration gap persisted. 63% of African Americans were registered to vote compared to 67% of whites. Although small, I contend that this 4 percentage point deficit was significant in the 1990 election outcome. African Americans composed 22% of the state's population, but they were 19% of total voters, a gap of 3 percentage points. Had African Americans voted in proportion to their overall share of population, then Gantt would have won.

Figure 4.1. Proportion of black North Carolinians registered to vote, 1940-1990



Sources: Key (1949), Thompson (1986), Keech & Sistrom (1994), Earls, Wynes, & Quatrucci (2005), Christensen (2010)

Candidate: Harvey Gantt

Harvey Gantt was born in 1943 in the Daniel Jacobs Projects, segregated public housing in Charleston, South Carolina. Gantt was brought up in what he describes as 'totally all black…salt-of-the-earth, working class neighbourhood'.[31] One of five children, his father Christopher Columbus Gantt had an eighth-grade education and worked as a drycleaner and a shipyard mechanic in Charleston harbour. His mother did not finish high school.[32]

[30] Thompson, 1986.
[31] Gantt interview with UNCTV.
[32] Hunter Kome, 'Harvey Gantt: Former Charlotte Mayor Refuses to Run Campaign in Predictable Fashion', *Lexington Dispatch*, 23 October 1990.

Gantt attended segregated schools and socialised entirely among African Americans.[33] In 1960, while still at high school, Gantt was arrested for participating in a sit-in at a segregated lunch counter at Kress department store in Charleston. He later asked Matthew Perry, the NAACP lawyer who represented him at the sit-in, to help him gain access to the all-white Clemson University in the rural upcountry of South Carolina.[34] While the lawsuit took its course, Gantt attended the integrated Iowa State University on an academic scholarship. Finally, in January 1963, under the protection of a court order and state troopers, Gantt was admitted to Clemson, only a few months after James Meredith famously desegregated the University of Mississippi.[35] Gantt graduated from Clemson with an honours degree in architecture. He then studied at MIT, where he received a master's degree in urban planning.[36]


After working as the planning director of the Housing and Urban Development's project Soul City in northeastern North Carolina, Gantt made his political career and home in Charlotte, North Carolina's largest city, to which he moved in 1968 to set up an architectural practice.[37] According to Michael Clemons, Gantt's political mentor was Fred Alexander, Charlotte's first black city councillor. When Alexander was elected to the North Carolina state senate in 1974 (the first African American since Reconstruction), Gantt was chosen by other Democratic councillors to fill Alexander's seat.[38] Subsequently, Gantt was twice elected to the council. In 1977, Gantt was the only member of Charlotte City Council to vote to remove the memorial to Confederate war dead which sat in front of Charlotte City Hall. During the debate, Gantt called the memorial an 'affront' to the city's black population.[39]

Harvey Gantt ran for mayor four times, failing to secure the Democratic nomination in 1979, winning both the nomination and general election in 1983 and 1985, and narrowly losing office in 1987 (see Figure 4.2). At the time, less than one-quarter of registered voters were black.[40] Winning 41% of the vote in Charlotte's predominantly white precincts, Gantt's victory was heralded with much symbolic fanfare.[41] It was the same year that Harold Washington was elected mayor of Chicago and Wilson Goode was elected mayor of Philadelphia. A *Charlotte Observer* reporter described Gantt's mayoralty as 'a stamp on Charlotte's credentials as a New South frontier'.[42] However, Gantt's support in the predominantly white sections of the city was highly variable and inconsistent. In 1985, his best overall

[33] Ibid.
[34]Clemson is a prestigious land-grant university which was the alma mater of many South Carolinian elites (Mickey, 2015: Ch 7).
[35] The same year that Gantt desegregated Clemson, the courts ordered the desegregation of the University of South Carolina. The new black students were lynched in effigy and one of the student's homes was bombed.
[36] Bill Hewitt & Luchina Fisher, 'Hoping to Go Where No Black Democrat Ever Has – To the Senate', *People*, 15 October 1990.
[37] Clemons, 1998
[38] Ibid.
[39] Harvey Gantt, quoted in 'A look into Gantt's way of thinking', *Greensboro News & Record*, 23 September 1990.
[40] 'Historic Election: Victory for Gantt, Charlotte', *Charlotte Observer*, 9 November 1983.
[41] Ken Eudy, 'Decades of Change Primed Charlotte for Gantt', *Charlotte Observer*, 11 November 1983.
[42] Jim Morrill, 'To Some, Gantt's Loss Tarnishes City's Image', *Charlotte Observer*, November 1987.

result, Gantt's support ranged from a low of 28.3% to a high of 72.4% in Charlotte's predominantly white polling districts.[43]

Figure 4.2. Charlotte Mayoral Elections (1979-87)



Note: 1979 result is for the Democratic primary

Gantt's victory was in large part indebted to extraordinarily high levels of support in the city's black precincts. *Charlotte Observer* reporter Lolo Pendergrast described Gantt's candidacy as a 'shot-in-the-arm' for the city's African Americans.[44] In 1983, he won an average of 98% in these precincts, and in 1985, his support in African American areas ranged from a low of 96% to a high of 99%. When he lost in 1987, Gantt still won between 94% and 99.5% of the vote in the predominantly black precincts, but his support from white voters dropped 21 percentage points from 57% to 36%. Earlier in his term, Gantt had commented at a Martin Luther King Day event, 'A mayor is not worth his salt if he can't help create a few black millionaires by the time his term is over'.[45] Shortly before the election, Gantt's Republican opponent Sue Myrick took out an advert in the *Charlotte Observer* featuring the comment in bold type.[46] Gantt lost by 997 votes. Myrick later campaigned for Jesse Helms, telling a crowd of supporters four days before the 1990 Senate election, 'They don't want equal rights…They want more than the rest of us'.[47]

After losing the mayoralty in 1987, Gantt returned to his architectural practice. Zaphon Wilson argues that the election of Douglas Wilder in 1989 encouraged Gantt to run for Senate.[48] Wilson contends that

[43] Clemons, 1998.
[44] Lolo Pendergrast, 'Savoring a Moment in History: Gantt's Victory Sparks Feelings of Pride, Anticipation', *Charlotte Observer*, 12 November 1983.
[45] Gantt, quoted in 'Charlotte Mayor's Defeat Echoes Far', *New York Times*, 9 November 1987.
[46] Clemons, 1998, 237.
[47] Sue Myrick, quoted in 'Helms defends his TV ads', *Greensboro News & Record*, 3 November 1990.
[48] Wilson, 1993, 176.

Gantt saw the Wilder campaign as an exemplar of the deracialised model, which he then applied to his effort in North Carolina.[49] In terms of racial strategy, Wilson claims, the Gantt campaign was 'no different' from the Wilder campaign.[50] However, I believe commentators have tied these two campaigns too closely together. In an interview, Gantt's campaign manager Mel Watt stated to me that Gantt made his decision to run 'probably in 1988', a year before Wilder was elected governor.[51] Watt, who has known Gantt since the 1970s and considers Gantt to be his 'best friend', is well-positioned to assess Gantt's decision-making timeline. Gantt himself recalls that he made the decision in a conversation with Watt after the two were playing tennis in their shared back garden.[52]

Additionally, Wilson's claim that Gantt followed the Wilder campaign strategy is inaccurate. Watt dismisses this idea out of hand, stating that from a strategic point of view, he did 'not worry about just because somebody black had won in another state that it would necessarily apply in our state'.[53] In another interview, Watt stated, 'At the beginning, we'd do almost anything to keep people from saying, "They're just trying to duplicate the Wilder race".'[54] Georgia Persons, furthermore, has highlighted that the Gantt campaign's issue agenda was much more liberal than the Wilder campaign's policy priorities.[55] North Carolina Democratic Party director Lawrence Davis repeated to me, 'Douglas Wilder presented himself [in] perhaps a more middle-of-the–road fashion than Harvey, an easier sell'.[56] As I will show in this case study, in terms of style, strategic appeals, and policy agenda, the Gantt and Wilder campaigns diverged substantially.

Gantt publicly declared his candidacy in January 1990. He won the Democratic primary in May with 37.5% of the vote. His nearest competitor was Mike Easley, a 39-year-old district attorney from Brunswick County in the rural eastern part of the state. Although Easley was 'quietly' backed by key party establishment figures such as former governor Jim Hunt and former senator Terry Sanford, Mel Watt explains that the very real possibility that Gantt would be the nominee led them to be cautious in expressing their support lest they alienate Gantt supporters.[57] North Carolina required a run-off election for any nominee who won less than 40% of the vote. Traditionally, run-offs had been used in the South to ensure white bloc voting against African American candidates.[58] Gantt, however, won the primary run-off 57% to 43%. Mac McCorckle, who had served as Easley's campaign manager, reports that in

[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Interview with Mel Watt, 7 March 2014.
[52] Gantt, interview with UNCTV.
[53] Interview with Watt.
[54] Watt, quoted in Varley (1992: 30).
[55] Persons, 1993, 4.
[56] Interview with E Lawrence Davis, 22 July 2015.
[57] Watt, quoted in Varley (1992: 11).
[58] For example, Howard Lee, the African American mayor of Chapel Hill lost in the second round of the 1976 primary for Lieutenant Governor due in part to white bloc voting.

internal polls they found that Gantt had a 'lock' on both African American voters and white liberals.[59] On 5 June 1990, Harvey Gantt became the first African American nominated to run for the Senate as a Democrat in US history.[60]

Elites: Jesse Helms, Liberal Advocacy Organisations

More than any other case in my sample, the North Carolina Senate contest involved a clear-cut battle of ideals and identities. Harvey Gantt's opponent, three-term incumbent Senator Jesse Helms, was a doyen of the socially conservative Right. Peter Flaherty, chairman of the Conservative Campaign Fund, described Helms as 'the national leader of the conservative movement'.[61] In 1990 Helms's protégé Charles Black had assumed the position of RNC spokesperson, effectively running the operations of the Republican National Committee in the absence of the ailing Lee Atwater, who would die the following year of brain cancer.[62]

With Gantt's background as a civil rights activist and Helms's reputation as 'perhaps the nation's foremost opponent of civil rights',[63] the two candidates possessed, in Amy Bollinger's terms, 'racially symbolic histories'.[64] As a senator, Helms had blocked funding for HIV research, the National Endowment for the Arts, and access to abortions, attracting the ire of liberal advocacy organisations across the country. Harvey Gantt's candidacy, therefore, elicited the support of not only civil rights groups but also many national liberal organisations. The combination of Helms's social conservativism and the strong backing Gantt received from liberal organisations shaped Gantt's racial campaign strategy.

Opponent: Jesse Helms


Senator Jesse Helms is the most racially hostile white candidate across my seven case studies. When Helms announced his retirement in 2001, David Broder of the *Washington Post* wrote, 'What really sets Jesse Helms apart is that he is the last prominent unabashed white racist politician in this country'.[65] I agree with Dennis Nordin who argues that in no post-civil rights era campaign had a white candidate relied more directly on the 'race card' than Jesse Helms did against Harvey Gantt.[66]

Helms appealed to white racial animus in campaigns throughout his political career. When he was 29, Helms assisted segregationist candidate Willis Smith in his campaign for the US Senate against Frank Porter Graham, whom Smith accused of favouring the 'intermingling of the races'. Smith infamously

[59] McCorckle, 1991, 20.
[60] Michael Oreskes, 'Feinstein Wins Primary Race in California', *New York Times,* 6 June 1990.
[61] Peter Flaherty, quoted in 'Nation antes up for Gantt, Helms', *Greensboro News & Record*, 16 October 1990.
[62] Alan Pell Crawford, 'GOP's Charles Black may be a true believer', *Los Angeles Times,* 7 October 1990.
[63] Steve Riley, 'Senate race's outcome will be voters' message', *Raleigh News & Observer*, 4 November 1990.
[64] Bollinger, 1997, 5.
[65] David Broder, *Washington Post,* 29 August 2001.
[66] Nordin, 2012, 111.

used the slogan, 'White People Wake Up: Before It's Too Late'. After Smith won, he hired Helms to work in his office in Washington where Helms worked until Smith's sudden death two years later.[67]

Figure 4.3. Excerpts from Smith for US Senate campaign leaflet (1950)



Source: Learn NC, UNC School of Education

Throughout the 1960s, Helms resisted the civil rights movement, campaigning for segregationist candidates, supporting literacy tests, and opposing black enfranchisement. Barone and Ujifusa write that Helms's opposition to civil rights measures went 'beyond differences of principle to genuine hostility'.[68] In a 1966 letter, Helms worried that following the enfranchisement of Mississippi's black population, the state was 'soon to be a Negro republic (or a Negro dictatorship)'.[69] As a commentator for North Carolina's second largest television station during the 1960s and 1970s, Helms 'nightly railed against civil rights, integration, and communism' to a substantial audience.[70] He told viewers in 1964, 'it is not overstating the case to say that the Civil Rights Bill is the single most dangerous piece of

[67] Barone & Ujifusa, 1989, 891.
[68] Ibid., 888.
[69] Letter from Jesse Helms to H A Dart, 14 March 1966 (Jesse Helms Center Archive, quoted in Thrift (2005: 324)).
[70] 'Helms and Gantt supporters clash', *Burlington Times-News*, 5 November 1990.

legislation ever introduced in the Congress'.[71] Helms was a vocal critic of Martin Luther King and warned his television viewers that King was backed by communists.[72]


Helms did not modify his views after entering the Senate in 1973. He was the leading opponent of affirmative action and busing, efforts to strengthen black civil rights and voting rights, and the creation of the Martin Luther King federal holiday.[73] Tom Packer describes Helms as 'unrepentant' and 'unusually consistent' in his opposition to civil rights legislation.[74] Rob Christensen and Jack Fleer call Helms an 'unreconstructed foe of civil rights'.[75] Ted Arrington, a political scientist at the University of North Carolina, asserted in 1990, 'Jesse hasn't changed a lick since 1945'.[76] As late as the 1990 campaign, Helms was arguing that school desegregation had been a mistake.[77]

As shown previously, racial hostility was an inescapable background factor in the political culture of North Carolina, and Helms was willing to prime these latent racial hostilities.[78] William Link argues that race 'played a central role in the campaign strategy'.[79] Years later, Helms's campaign strategist Carter Wrenn was forthright in an interview: 'Don't let anybody kid you. The definitive issue of that campaign was race, from start to finish'.[80] He added in an interview with me, 'You're running against a black. So race is just automatically part of the election. There's no running from it. There's no hiding from it. And in the South, there are lines'.[81]

Helms primed latent racial hostilities through the deployment of racial cues, racial stereotypes, and racialised policy issues in his prolific television campaign advertising. I watched and coded 108 television advertisements – purportedly the entire population of TV adverts – at the Kanter Archive at the University of Oklahoma. My results showed that both campaigns were hard-hitting. Only 26.6% of Helms's advertisements and 18.2% of Gantt's advertisements lacked negative content. The vast majority of Gantt advertisements (70.5%) portrayed a contrast between him and Helms, consistent with the crusade campaign theme.

[71] Jesse Helms, Viewpoint 814, 13 March 1964 (Jesse Helms Center Archive, quoted in Packer (2012: Ch 6)).
[72] Bollinger, 1990, 33.
[73] Packer, 2012, 197.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Christensen & Fleer, 1999, 81.
[76] Ted Arrington, quoted in 'Hoping to Go Where No Black Democrat Ever Has – To the Senate', *People*, 15 October 1990.
[77] 'Helms criticizes federal involvement in state schools', *Winston-Salem Journal*, 23 September 1990.
[78] See Bass & DeVries (1976: 221), Thompson (1986), Keech & Sistrom (1994), Packer (2012).
[79] Link, 2008, 378.
[80] Carter Wrenn, quoted in Link (2008: Ch 10).
[81] Interview with Carter Wrenn, 22 July 2015.


Figure 4.4. Analysis of Helms and Gantt Television Advertisements



Source: Analysis of 108 advertisements in the Kanter Archive, University of Oklahoma

Three-quarters of Helms advertisements mentioned Harvey Gantt. In these 47 adverts, Helms attributed traits to Gantt which were associated with negative stereotypes about African American politicians. Based on my content analysis, an astonishing 76.6% of these Helms' adverts called Gantt a liberal, and over half of them described Gantt as 'extreme'. The 'outsider' and 'untrustworthy' frames were present in roughly one-third of Helms's descriptions of Harvey Gantt. Because the racial dimension of the 'untrustworthy' cue is not immediately obvious, it merits further attention.

Figure 4.5. Descriptions of Harvey Gantt in Helms TV advertisements




Analysis of Helms campaign advertisements which mention Harvey Gantt (n=47), Source: Kanter Archive, University of Oklahoma

While many politicians describe their opponents as untrustworthy, Helms added an explicit racial overlay to many of these attacks. For example, some of Helms's adverts warned voters that Gantt was

secretly advertising on ‘all-black radio stations’. One advertisement warned that Gantt had a ‘secret campaign’ where he made pledges to blacks promising ‘more welfare spending and more quotas for minorities’.[82] Visually, many of Helms’s adverts depicted Gantt looking off camera in a suspicious way (see Figure 4.6). McIlwain and Caliendo are correct to conclude that these adverts promoted the stereotyped image of the black man being up to no good, alluding to some form of criminality or impropriety.[83]

Figure 4.6. Helms television advertisement: ‘Harvey Denies’



Source: Kanter Archive, Political Communications Center, University of Oklahoma

My coding procedure likely underestimates the instances in which Helms made these negative racial associations. I relied strictly on key words or phrases in writing or speech (see Appendix D for codebook). Such a method, although reliable, undoubtedly excludes some advertisements which would fit under a particular frame due to their visual content.[84] For example, the Helms campaign produced two advertisements featuring Harvey Gantt and Jesse Jackson in ways which visually suggested untrustworthiness, but the adverts lacked the textual basis for me to code them as such. The narration consisted of Jackson’s words endorsing Harvey Gantt (‘I ask you to join me helping to elect Harvey Gantt. Harvey Gantt shares our values’). The accompanying video depicts Jackson removing a suspicious envelope from his jacket and giving it to Gantt. There is no explanation provided as to what

[82] Quoted in Link, 2008, 375.
[83] McIllwain & Caliendo, 2000, 10.
[84] Mendelberg (2001) voiced a similar frustration.

the envelope is, but clearly the advertisement conveys the idea that Gantt was doing special favours for African Americans on the sly.

Figure 4.7. Helms television advertisement: 'Jesse Jackson'




Source: Kanter Archive, Political Communications Center, University of Oklahoma

Tali Mendelberg argues that a widely-held 'norm of equality' prevents explicitly racial attacks in American politics, but the Gantt-Helms campaign suggests that Mendelberg's confidence in the constraining strength of the norm is overstated.[85] More than any of my other cases, Jesse Helms was comfortable with raising explicitly racial policies in his attacks against Gantt. Helms's attacks centred on claims that Gantt supported affirmative action, including racial quotas, to promote undeserving African Americans. Gantt, himself, was accused of having enriched himself through affirmative action. For example, in one Helms advert, the narrator asks, 'Why was Harvey Gantt defeated as mayor? The Charlotte *Observer* reports Gantt used his office and a minority preference programme to get a TV

[85] However, Mendelberg (2001: 100) cites Helms as 'the anomalous example' to her theory.

station to help minorities. Gantt invested just $679, and only weeks later sold the licence to a white corporation for $450,000' (see Figure 4.8).

Figure 4.8. Helms television advertisement: 'Minority Preference'



Source: Kanter Archive, Political Communications Center, University of Oklahoma

This advert was later run by the Helms campaign with one significant change. It now reported that Gantt had 'become a millionaire' by using his 'minority status'.[86] Letetia Daniels Jackson, who ran Gantt's field operation in Charlotte, explained to me that the notion of a rich black man was antithetical to some old southern mores, describing Helms's message as follows: 'He's used his blackness to get rich. It's sort of like, be careful if you let this happen. You're going to let the floodgates in. These black people are going to take everything that you have'.[87] The charge was repeated in a press release by the Helms campaign three days before the election, asking, 'Who became a millionaire trading on his minority status? Harvey Gantt'.[88] In a heated exchange of letters by fax, Jesse Helms's press secretary Beth Burrus rebuked suggestions by a reporter that the accusation was racist. Burrus replied to one letter, 'Harvey Gantt is the candidate guilty of racism because he took advantage of the fact he's black to get a minority preference that allowed him to become a millionaire'.[89] In an interview with me, Jesse Helms's campaign director Carter Wrenn thought it was the most important and impactful advertisement of the campaign.[90]

Consistent with the crusade campaign model, the Gantt campaign produced a television advertisement which directly responded to Helms's attack. In the advert, which is held in the Kanter Archive at the University of Oklahoma, Gantt looked into the camera and said, 'Jesse Helms is running another smear

[86] Link, 2008, 377.
[87] Interview with Letitia Daniels Jackson, 9 December 2013.
[88] Helms for Senate Press Release, 3 November 1990 (North Carolina Collection, UNC Chapel Hill).
[89] Letter/Fax from Beth Burrus to Seth Effron, 10 October 1990 (North Carolina Collection, UNC Chapel Hill).
[90] Interview with Wrenn.

campaign, charging me with using my race for financial advantage…Those ads are lies and Jesse Helms knows it. For eighteen years, he's been playing on people's fears and killing this state's hopes in the process. This time, it's got to stop'.

In the final week of the election, the Helms campaign continued its emphasis on affirmative action producing two television advertisements which highlighted the issue. The first has received virtually no attention in any of the scholarly accounts of the campaign. In it Helms speaks directly to the camera and says,

> 'For twenty years, the Washington liberals have controlled education. Twenty years of mistakes: forced busing, neighbourhood schools wrecked, plummeting SAT scores. And now comes Ted Kennedy's quota bill hiring teachers based on racial quotas and not qualifications. Mr Gantt complains that I voted against federal controls of our schools – and you bet I did'.

The second advert is undoubtedly the most famous advert of the campaign and, indeed, one of the most famous in US election history. The so-called 'White Hands' advert (Figure 4.9), broadcast six days before the election, featured the hands of a white man who angrily crumples up a letter from a potential employer. The narrator explained, 'You needed that job. You were the best qualified, but they had to give it to a minority because of a racial quota'. The advert then contrasted Harvey Gantt and Jesse Helms, claiming that Gantt favoured racial quotas whereas Helms opposed them.

Figure 4.9. Helms television advertisement: 'White Hands'



Source: Kanter Archive, Political Communications Center, University of Oklahoma

Both adverts were ostensibly attacks on Gantt's support for the 1990 Civil Rights Act, which President George H W Bush vetoed days earlier (24 October 1990).[91] Although not in the content of the bill, Helms claimed that the effect of the legislation would be to impose racial quotas in hiring, which was


[91] Helms's charge that the legislation would impose racial quotas in employment practices was groundless because the Supreme Court had already ruled such quotas to be unconstitutional in *Bakke* in 1978 (*Regents of the University of California v Bakke* 438 US 265).

opposed by 80% of white southerners.[92] Both advertisements criticised racial quotas, but White Hands alluded to more general concerns about job competition at a time when many blue collar jobs in the state were disappearing.[93] Gantt reflected in an interview, 'we had been losing textile jobs in North Carolina, but they didn't have anything to do with affirmative action programmes at all, but he paired…the loss of jobs going overseas or other places with people's fear of affirmative action. And when you put those two combinations together, it becomes a dynamite ad'.[94] Letetia Daniels Jackson agreed, 'I think that it was clearly designed to scare white people in North Carolina who may have been excited by the campaign and may have felt that Harvey Gantt was a good candidate to basically say to them, You better be careful because they're going to take your jobs. First they're going to take your Senate seat and then they're going to take your jobs. It was that underlying racism'.[95]

Harvey Gantt saw the Hands advert the night before it appeared on television: 'We had a mole in one of the stations that brought this thing over and he ran it on his DVR and it showed this ad, and we said, He wouldn't dare. He can't be running an ad like that. My goodness. That's just pure racism'.[96] Consistent with the crusade campaign model, the Gantt campaign publicly rebuked the advert. The day after the advert first broadcast, Harvey Gantt denounced it as 'divisive' and accused Helms of attempting 'to divide people along the lines of race'.[97] Mandy Grunwald, Gantt's media advisor, told the press, 'There isn't an ad they don't have on TV that doesn't directly make a play to racial tensions'.[98] Gantt's consultancy firm Sawyer-Miller Group made two response advertisements which featured images of the 'White Hands' advert, depicted in Figure 4.10. They described the Helms advert as part of 'Jesse Helms's smear campaign' in which Helms was 'willing to pit people against each other to tear down Harvey Gantt and tear this state apart'. One also criticised Helms for trying to intimidate voters, featuring a newspaper clip about Helms using a 'ballot security' programme in predominantly black areas to diminish turnout.

[92] Jon Healey, 'Helms' ad is most overtly racial', *Winston-Salem Journal,* 1 November 1990.
[93] A Gantt campaign worker recalled a story to me in which he received an explicitly hostile reaction on the basis of the advert while he was campaigning for Gantt in Sylva, Jackson County: 'I'm 23 years old. I'm a white male. A guy walks up to me on the street. He says, "Are you working for the Harvey Gantt campaign?". I said, "Yes, I am." And then he spit on me. He said, "I've seen that ad about Harvey Gantt taking jobs from white people." I was really taken aback by it.' (HG2)
[94] Gantt, interview with UNCTV.
[95] Interview with Jackson.
[96] Gantt, interview with UNCTV.
[97] Gantt, quoted in 'Helms injects race issue into Carolina campaign', *Washington Post,* 1 November 1990.
[98] Mandy Grunwald, quoted in 'Helms again tests hold on NC', *USA Today,* 2 November 1990.

Figure 4.10. Gantt television advertisement: Response to White Hands



Source: Kanter Archive, Political Communications Center, University of Oklahoma

Jesse Helms was crucial to structuring Harvey Gantt's racial campaign strategy. By being unusually explicit in his racial hostility, Helms enabled Gantt to respond more explicitly to racial hostility than many other African American candidates in my sample.

Liberal Advocacy Organisations

In addition to Helms's racial animus, his hard-line social conservative positions animated numerous liberal groups across the country, particularly women[99], gay citizens[100], and artists[101]. A deputy finance director for the Gantt campaign described them to me as 'a combination of white liberals – very wealthy white liberals – in North Carolina and very wealthy areas of the country: New York, Chicago, LA'.[102] These groups, I argue, were vital in providing a ballast of financial support for the Gantt campaign, which by the end of the election was out-fundraising Jesse Helms.

The more the Helms campaign pushed Gantt on social issues, the more attention the campaign attracted and the more support it received from liberals in North Carolina and around the country. Gantt recalled in an interview, 'He started to help us raise money. You might ask, how did Jesse Helms help you raise money?...[H]is extreme positions started us to get more national coverage, and more and more people started sending money to North Carolina and we started not to worry about money anymore.'[103] Monty Halger, who worked as a deputy finance director for the Gantt campaign, told me that by October 'the team could barely keep up with processing all the cheques...We were taking in $200,000 a day'.[104]

---


[99] Gantt was the keynote speaker at the 1990 National Organization for Women (NOW) annual conference in San Francisco. He also received support from the pro-choice group NARAL.
[100] E.g., ACT UP, Cure AIDS Now
[101] Helms tried to de-fund the National Endowment for the Arts after it was revealed in 1989 that a $15,000 grant had been given to the Southern Center for Contemporary Art in Winston-Salem, North Carolina for an exhibit which included a print of a small plastic crucifix immersed in a glass of the artist's urine.
[102] HG1.
[103] Gantt, interview with UNCTV.
[104] Interview with Monty Halger, 20 November 2013.

Gantt's ability to fundraise more than Helms in the final weeks of the campaign was a significant achievement given that Helms's 'Congressional Club' political action committee was one of the most prodigious political fundraising bodies in the country.[105] Ted Arrington stated that an objective of the Congressional Club was 'to make it so painful to run against Helms that most people don't do it'.[106] Helms's previous re-election campaign had been one of the most expensive in US history to that point.

A vivid example of this effort was the enthusiastic support LGBT citizens gave to Gantt's candidacy. Helms was known for making homophobic remarks and for supporting a ban on sodomy. Helms told his supporters that Gantt's support of increased AIDS research funding represented 'a breakdown in the morals of our country'.[107] He pledged at another event at Rocky Mount that he would stand up against 'Harvey Gantt's friends… the homosexuals, the lesbians, the Molly Yard people, all of them' and instead stand with the 'deeply religious' people of North Carolina who 'reject the notion that sodomy should be regarded as just another lifestyle'.[108] At another campaign stop, Helms mocked Gantt (a heterosexual) for wanting to 'get on Ted Kennedy's lap. And I would warn him that's a pretty dangerous place to be'.[109] Committed to defeating Helms, LGBT groups in Washington, San Francisco, New York, and other parts of the county held fundraising events for Gantt. An example is found in Figure 4.11. This dynamic of mutual support pro-LGBT African American politicians and LGBT groups across the country was left unexplored in Cathy Cohen's otherwise powerful account of race and the AIDS crisis in the early 1990s.[110]

[105] First established to help Helms pay off his 1972 campaign debt, the National Congressional Club was by 1978 the largest PAC in the country (Gomolin et al, 2007: Ch 3).
[106] Ted Arrington, quoted in 'A stillness in North Carolina politics', 15 April 1990, *New York Times.*
[107] Jesse Helms, quoted in 'Gantt retains lead into final days', *Charlotte Observer*, 3 November 1990.
[108] Jesse Helms, transcript of speech at Rocky Mount, 29 September 1990 (North Carolina Collection, UNC Chapel Hill).
[109] Jesse Helms, quoted in 'Helms-Gantt Senate Race Notebook', *Charlotte Observer,* 3 November 1990.
[110] Cohen, 1999. Carol Moseley Braun, also unmentioned by Cohen, received strong backing from LGBT groups. David Olson reports, 'Never before have so many gay and lesbian volunteers mobilized for a statewide candidate and never before has so much gay money been given…Braun has gone further in her support for gay and lesbian issues than any previous candidate' ('Braun promises leadership role on gay, lesbian rights', *Windy City Times*, 8 October 1992).

Figure 4.11. Dance to Dump Helms – LGBT Group Fundraiser for Harvey Gantt, 1990



Source: North Carolina Collection, UNC Chapel Hill

Charles Prysby argues that the willingness of donors to contribute to Gantt's campaign was a sign of Gantt's ability to pursue a deracialised campaign.[111] I would argue that the strong financial support which Gantt received from liberal groups was a mutually enforcing race-conscious relationship. Gantt received support because he was unflappable in his liberal viewpoints and in his racially symbolic identity. One of Gantt's fundraising team said to me, 'I don't think any white man could have run and raised that much money'. She said that for many donors, 'if someone of a different race could win a statewide election a state like North Carolina, it is a show of progress. All that work that went into the 1960s… That's why people gave'.[112] Susan Green, Harvey Gantt's director of finance, confirms that Gantt's out-of-state donors were motivated to contribute because of the Old South versus New South dynamic to the race.[113] In turn, the support of liberal advocacy groups gave Gantt the financial stability to forward his liberal agenda without needing to moderate his positions to receive financial support from centrist or conservative donors. Their support also gave Gantt, in some ways, an obligation *not* to moderate his views on race or other social issues.

[111] Prysby, 1996, 33.
[112] HG1.
[113] Varley, 1992, 14.

Dependent Variable: The Crusade Campaign

According to Link, in the Gantt-Helms contest, 'the race issue rarely left the minds of the electorate'.[114] He is correct, but the role of race has been widely misinterpreted. In contrast to the deracialised model, Gantt's symbolic status as an African American candidate and the potential of being the first popularly elected black senator from the South were themes which were promoted by the Gantt campaign to white audiences. For example, at an event in the week before the election, Gantt proclaimed, 'It's more than just making history by sending the first Democratic African-American to the US Senate. The whole world is watching us to see whether we will choose moving forward or standing still, whether we will vote our worst fears or our best hopes and aspirations'.[115] Mel Watt repeated a similar message in an interview with me, stating 'this was not a symbolic run, but I don't think it was all necessarily about winning or losing either. This was a time in history. It was time to do this'.[116] This symbolic potential was juxtaposed explicitly against Helms's racial attitudes, demonstrating a race-conscious, 'crusade' campaign strategy.

Targeted Appeals

Assuming that Gantt tried to pursue a deracialised campaign strategy in his appeals to white voters, many commentators believe that Helms made Gantt's task doubly difficult by continually raising the salience of race.[117] However, I argue that Helms's constant priming of race played directly into the crusade campaign strategy which Gantt was pursuing. In other words, Helms's racial intolerance provided a useful foil from which the Gantt campaign could force white voters to choose a racial position in unambiguous terms. According to Ted Arrington, many whites 'would not be comfortable with overt racism. Subtle racism they would tolerate and might not even notice. So Gantt's campaign wanted them to notice'.[118] Gantt explained this reasoning in an interview after the election,

> '[Jesse Helms] was the kind of opponent I'd love to have…I thought for us to have any kind of chance, we had to have a candidate whose views were solidly on the other side – and who could even be perceived as a villain maybe – as opposed, for example, to running against a very nice Republican whom people could find a good excuse to vote for to hide whatever feelings they might have about voting for a black person'.[119]

Contrary to the deracialised model, in the crusade model a racially intolerant opponent can be a helpful variable in preventing white voters from defecting to the white candidate. Whites might choose to stick with a black candidate because they don't want to be perceived as endorsing his or her opponent's racism. Charles Cook, a polling analyst, assessed that the key undecided voters in the race were

---

[114] Link, 2008, 365.
[115] Harvey Gantt, quoted in 'Senate race's outcome will be voters' message', *Raleigh News & Observer*, 4 November 1990.
[116] Interview with Watt.
[117] E.g., Strickland & Whicker (1992), Wilson (1996)
[118] Correspondence with Ted Arrington, 16 August 2015.
[119] Gantt quoted in Varley (1992: 8).

'culturally a little uncomfortable with Helms'.[120] Gantt needed to raise their level of discomfort such that it precluded a vote for Helms. This is consistent with Mendelberg's assertion that some voters will respond positively to appeals to racial egalitarianism out of a desire to receive 'social approval' or to confirm 'a virtuous conception of self'.[121] An example of this strategy is found in the comments of Russ Atkinson, a director of the National Federation of Independent Businesses. He explained to a reporter a week before the election, 'I've been a Republican all my life'. He had voted for Helms in the senator's three previous campaigns, but 'I hang my head in shame to find out what the real Jesse Helms stands for – bigotry, racism, and lies…He doesn't speak for me'.[122] In an interview with me, campaign manager Mel Watt reflected, 'this seemed to us to be the right opponent'.[123]

Jesse Helms helped to create the contrast by which the Gantt campaign could credibly appeal to white voters who wanted to affirm the state's racial progress. For Gantt, this spirit of change was captured in the juxtaposition of the 'Old South' and the 'New South'. A September 1990 report in the *Burlington Times News* wrote that Gantt 'is often presented as a symbol of the New South'.[124] Betty Chafin Rash, who had served on Charlotte City Council with Gantt, told a reporter, 'Gantt to me is representative of the New South and embodies all of the values of the New South. Jesse Helms is clearly an embodiment of the Old South with all its conservatism and prejudices…and, certainly, racism'.[125]

Unlike the Wilder campaign which explicitly rejected the same symbolic association, the Gantt campaign embraced it. For example, the Gantt campaign produced a badge with the label, 'Harvey Gantt: New South, New Senator' (Figure 4.12). In an effort to make voters choose between the two, Gantt told voters at a rally, 'There ain't much half-stepping that can be done in the middle…You've got to be for the future, or you want to stand still and look backward to some time that's not here anymore'.[126] Consequently, some voters expressed sentiments that the election would signal the South was changing. Teresa Houser, a white secretary in Lincolnton, said that the election of Gantt would indicate that North Carolina was 'making a stand to let the South know change is on the way'.[127]

---

[120] Charles Cook, quoted in Seth Effron, Associated Press Report, Raleigh Bureau, nd (North Carolina Collection, UNC Chapel Hill).
[121] Mendelberg, 2001, 17.
[122] Russ Atkinson, quoted in 'Gantt says whole world is watching', *Greensboro News & Record*, 4 November 1990.
[123] Interview with Watt.
[124] 'Helms, Gantt wage fiery negative war', *Burlington Times News*, 25 September 1990.
[125] Betty Chafin Rash, quoted in 'Gantt Helms see eye to eye on little', *Raleigh News & Observer*, 4 November 1990.
[126] Harvey Gantt, quoted in 'Hoping to Go Where No Black Democrat Ever Has – To The Senate', *People*, 15 October 1990.
[127] Teresa Houser, quoted in 'Election has elements of high drama', *USA Today*, 18 September 1990.

Figure 4.12. 'Harvey Gantt: New South, New Senator' badge




Source: North Carolina Collection, UNC Chapel Hill

One journalist described the campaign theme as 'a referendum on the future'.[128] Following this message, Gantt portrayed Helms as a character with antediluvian views on race. He called Helms 'the last of a dying breed' in Southern politics.[129] He told the North Carolina Democratic state convention, 'Mr Helms is irrelevant for the times we live in'.[130] At a Mule Day Parade in Benson in October 1990, Gantt reflected on the dynamic between him and Helms: 'Jesse Helms is the most natural opponent I can have…His views are diametrically opposite of mine. And that's the perfect kind of political race – where he doesn't welsh on his positions and I don't welsh on mine'.[131]

The notion that Helms's politics represented the politics of the past was promoted in Gantt's television advertisements (see Figure 4.13). Unlike in the Wilder campaign where the slogan 'Don't let Marshall Coleman take us back' was explicitly about the achievements of the Democratic administrations of the 1980s, Gantt had no such record to reference. In these cases, I argue that the 'politics of the past' line was unambiguously racial. In explaining this slogan, Gantt would reference his own racial identity. For example Gantt said at one campaign event, 'In Jesse's vision of America, I would have never had a chance to attend Clemson University and run against Jesse for the US Senate. In his vision of America, I wouldn't even have been allowed to vote'.[132]

[128] Matthew Davis, 'US Senate campaign in last sweep', *Burlington Times-News*, 6 November 1990.
[129] 'Helms vs Gantt: A state divided', *Burlington Times-News*, 11 November 1990, 5C.
[130] Harvey Gantt in 'Gantt ready for Helms Campaign', *Burlington Times-News*, 16 June 1990.
[131] Harvey Gantt, quoted in 'Hoping to Go Where No Black Democrat Ever Has – To The Senate', *People*, 15 October 1990.
[132] Harvey Gantt, quoted in Barry Smith, 'A knock-down, drag-out campaign', *Gastonia Gazette*, 2 Sept 1990.

Figure 4.13. Gantt television advertisement: 'Reject the Politics of the Past'



Source: Kanter Archive, Political Communications Center, University of Oklahoma

Crucially, Gantt maintained this message consistently regardless of the race of the audience. Rob Christensen, who covered Gantt's speeches before both black and white voters, reflected, 'Mr Gantt's campaign speech to black audiences varies little from the one he gives to white audiences'.[133] In both settings, the historic stakes of the election were presented in high contrast. Unprompted, in an interview, one of Gantt's (white) researchers described the campaign to me as a crusade. He said, 'It really had a crusade feel to it because you had an African American man running against, you know, a Southern icon who[m] many people would recognise as a holdover from the Jim Crow, pre-Civil Rights Act era: Old South versus New South'.[134] Gantt himself described the campaign in this way. He told reporters, 'We want people to get excited about this election. We want them to be driven crazy by the notion that they can make a difference. We want a crusade'.[135]

Contrary to the deracialised campaign model, the Gantt campaign made direct appeals to African American voters. While the Wilder campaign largely devolved black voter mobilisation to word-of-mouth efforts from black pulpits and the black counter-public, the Gantt campaign took a more proactive stance. Gantt personally campaigned in black neighbourhoods. At one stop in eastern North Carolina, Gantt urged blacks to register to vote, stating, 'It's so important for the black community, which is a significant part of the Democratic Party, to appreciate the importance of this election'.[136] The

[133] Rob Christensen, 'Blacks finding inspiration in Gantt', *Raleigh News & Observer*, 20 September 1990.
[134] HG3.
[135] 'Unseating Helms: Rival Charts His Uphill Climb', *New York Times*, 16 July 1990.
[136] Harvey Gantt, quoted in 'Gantt says Helms has ignored NC farmers, workers', *Raleigh News & Observer*, 20 September 1990.

Gantt campaign was not covert about these campaigning activities. Many of the events which Gantt held in the black community were publicly advertised in the Gantt campaign daily schedules released to the press, as I found in the North Carolina Collection at UNC Chapel Hill. The (majority-white) press were invited to these majority-black events, and the press reported about them in state newspapers.[137]

In addition, Gantt also operated within the traditional organisational auspices of the black community, such as the black church. Gantt himself was a Baptist who attended a predominantly black church and sang in the choir.[138] Rob Christensen reported in the Raleigh *News and Observer*, 'Mr Gantt has plugged into a network of black churches which traditionally have played an important political role'.[139] Finally, the Gantt campaign produced special adverts which played on radio stations with predominantly black audiences. Gantt's adverts on black radio were deliberately designed to increase black turnout. In one such advert, two people recall a nightmare of waking up to find that Helms had won the election by one vote. One media consultant explains, 'You can hit a lot harder on [black] radio because the other side has more difficulty keeping track of what you're saying'.[140]

As his near-unanimous support from African Americans during his mayoral campaigns had already demonstrated, the black community held a strong sense of linked fate with Gantt's political success and personal history of advancement.[141] Rob Christensen found that many of the African Americans whom he interviewed regarded Gantt as 'an excellent role model for young black people'.[142] McCorkle remembers that for African Americans, 'Harvey's race was so historic, and Helms was so hated in the black community'.[143] John McClees, a retired African American agricultural labourer who was born in 1918, vowed to a local reporter, 'If they have to carry me in on a stretcher, I will vote for Harvey Gantt'.[144]

There are signs that Gantt's candidacy encouraged higher levels of black participation. Black voter registration in 1990 dramatically outpaced white registration. From April 1990, the month before the Democratic primary, to October, the month before the general election, black voter registration increased by 10.6%, double the rate of white registration.[145] In some counties, black voter registration

[137] E.g., 'Black Turnout Pivotal: Gantt Preaches Need to Register', *Charlotte Observer*, 28 September 1990; John Monk, 'Gantt takes his positions to projects, Myers Park', *Charlotte Observer*, 4 November 1990.
[138] Rob Christensen, 'Blacks finding inspiration in Gantt', *Raleigh News & Observer*, 21 September 1990.
[139] Rob Christensen, 'Gantt is hopeful in final days', *Raleigh News and Observer*, 5 May 1990.
[140] Quoted in Glaser (1996: 7).
[141] For the classic discussion of black sentiments of linked fate, see Dawson (1994). See also discussion in Chapter 1.
[142] Rob Christensen, 'Blacks finding inspiration in Gantt', *Raleigh News & Observer*, 21 September 1990.
[143] Interview with Pope 'Mac' McCorkle III, 12 December 2013.
[144] John McClees, quoted in 'Black Turnout Pivotal: Gantt Preaches Need to Register', *Charlotte Observer*, 28 September 1990.
[145] Link, 2008, Ch 10.

increased as much as 600% faster than white registration.[146] In comparison, during the equivalent period before the 1986 mid-term elections, black voter registration only increased by 2.0%.[147] The charity ProjectVOTE! was out in force aiming to register at least 40,000 new black voters.[148]

Style

The deracialised campaign model insists that black candidates adopt a 'quiet' and 'conciliatory' tone, but this was not the tone adopted by Harvey Gantt or his campaign surrogates. State Democratic Party Director Lawrence Davis recalled to me, 'Harvey had a way of firing people up'.[149] For example, Gantt addressed a 'raucous' crowd of one-thousand in Greensboro a few days before the election, stating, 'Now it is up to you to catch fire, to get some religion, [and] to get crazy about this thing'.[150]

As discussed earlier, I operationalise 'style' in terms of a candidate's response to racial controversies. Zaphon Wilson contends that 'Gantt shied away from racial problems' and projected the view that 'race was an issue that had been resolved and was not an important part of the overall problem'.[151] My analysis of the content of Gantt's public speeches leads me to draw a very different conclusion. In a speech he gave as mayor, Gantt was explicit that he did *not* believe racism had been resolved and urged white citizens not to grow complacent. Gantt stated, 'many of our white friends are lulled into a sense of security and righteous when they marvel of how far we have come. I hasten to alert and remind all of us that the sickness of racism still exists – if not in our laws – certainly in the hearts of men and in the practices of our institutions'.[152]

During the Senate campaign, rather than pretending that racism was a 'resolved' matter, Gantt pointed to Helms's racism as a serious problem. Gantt attacked Helms directly for his views on race, making reference to his own status as a black man. When asked by reporters what he considered to have been a more difficult experience in life than running against Helms, Gantt replied frankly, 'Being able to survive a childhood in segregation and not come out of it bitter'.[153]

Some commentators, in order to justify their claim that the Gantt campaign was 'deracialised', assert that Gantt did not respond to the racial attacks against him. Gomolin et al argue that Gantt's failure to


---

[146] In Pasquontank County, for example, the number of black voters increased by 9% whereas the number of white voters increased by 1.5%. In Mecklenburg County, where Charlotte is the county seat, black registration increased by 11% while white registration increased by 3%.
[147] Prysby, 1996, 42.
[148] Jim Morrill, 'New-Voter Efforts More Low-Key than in '84', *Charlotte Observer*, 21 September 1990. The same organisation was chaired two years later in Illinois by Barack Obama during Carol Moseley Braun's campaign for the US Senate, as detailed in Chapters 5 and 6.
[149] Interview with Davis.
[150] Harvey Gantt, quoted in 'Helms, Gantt in hot pursuit of votes', *Raleigh News & Observer*, 4 November 1990.
[151] Wilson, 1993, 179.
[152] Harvey Gantt, 'Martin Luther King Day Services', First United Methodist Church Charlotte, 15 January 1984 (Series II, Folder: Speeches, Gantt Archive, UNC Charlotte).
[153] Harvey Gantt, quoted in 'Gantt Ready for Helms' Campaign', *Burlington Times-News*, 16 June 1990.

criticise Helms for racism was 'a costly mistake'.[154] This is not accurate, as demonstrated earlier in the discussion about Helms's television advertisements. Mel Watt emphasised to me, 'You know, if we thought it was racist, we would say it was racist'.[155]

In addition to television and radio advertisements, Gantt responded to the racial themes in Helms's direct mail solicitations. Helms sent out fundraising letters depicting Gantt only with black politicians. One Helms fundraiser letter mentioned Jackson twenty-four times. I found an example of these letters in the papers of Republican activist Boyd Cathey at UNC Chapel Hill (see Figure 4.14). It depicts Gantt alongside DNC Chair Ron Brown and Vernon Jordan, the former president of the Urban League. Neither was a household figure, but crucially they both were African Americans.

Figure 4.14. Excerpt from Helms Direct Mail Fundraising Appeal



Source: Boyd Cathey Collection, University of North Carolina

In another solicitation, headed with Jesse Helms's Senate letterhead, Helms's campaign manager Peter Moore writes about the worrying prospect of African Americans registering to vote to support Gantt:

> 'I <u>will</u> tell you one thing that greatly concerns me. Harvey Gantt's voter registration drive. It's headed by Reverend Ben Chavis, executive director of the United Church of Christ's Commission for Racial Justice. At their United Black Christians convention… [Chavis] targets Gantt's candidacy as an occasion to conduct a voter registration campaign among an estimated 300,000 unregistered African-Americans in North Carolina. That's their goal. Our job is to match them <u>voter for voter</u>, or Senator Helms will lose. Please don't let the nightmare I described earlier come true'.[156]

Consistent with the crusade campaign theme, Gantt publicly identified these correspondences as racist. Gantt told reporters that some of Helms's letters 'have certainly been clearly racist'.[157] Gantt continued,

---


[154] Gomolin et al, 2007, 18.
[155] Interview with Watt.
[156] Peter Moore to Sarah Hains, Helms Fundraising Letter, 17 August 1990 (North Carolina Collection, UNC Chapel Hill)
[157] Quoted in 'Hems: Fund-raising letters not racist", *Wilmington Morning Star*, 27 August 1990.

'We've called it what it is. It's racism'.[158] Gantt's press secretary Susan Jetton agreed that the letters were aimed at 'obviously making sure people are aware that Harvey Gantt is black and trying to imply that there is some sort of conspiracy'.[159]

Policy Agenda

Finally, I argue that Gantt did not have a 'deracialised' issue agenda. Zaphon Wilson argues that Gantt made 'a strong appeal to non-racial issues'.[160] Wilson notes that Gantt's advertising overwhelmingly focused on the 'non-racial' issues of education and the environment. My content analysis of forty-four television advertisements produced by the Gantt campaign (the entire population of TV adverts) confirms Wilson's observation that education and the environment were the dominant policy issues, featuring in over one-third and one-quarter of Gantt's advertising respectively.

Figure 4.15. Policy content of Gantt's television advertisements



Source: Kanter Archive, University of Oklahoma (n=44 television advertisements from Gantt campaign)

However, Wilson has wrongly concluded from this observation that Gantt's policy agenda fits in line with the deracialised campaign model. It deviated on two grounds. First, Gantt *did* discuss racial policies, mentioning affirmative action in three TV adverts. Relatedly, I would dispute that education was a deracialised issue. Since *Brown v Board of Education*, federal involvement in education has been cast in racial terms. Jesse Helms argued explicitly that federally enforced school desegregation had been disastrous.[161] At a press conference in September 1990, Helms told reporters, 'Even blacks – the

[158] 'Helms denies racist claims', *Spartanburg Herald-Journal*, 27 August 1990.
[159] Ibid.
[160] Wilson, 1993, 190.
[161] 'Helms' Education Stance is Poles Apart from Gantt's, *Charlotte Observer*, 23 September 1990.

minorities – acknowledge now that this has been highly destructive to their interests'.[162] Referring to the segregated, all-black Ligon High School in Raleigh, Helms recalled, 'You guys in Raleigh may remember a very fine black school that had pride in its academics, in its extracurricular things, its football team, its basketball team – and that school does not exist anymore'.[163] For Helms, separate but equal was preferable, he claimed, because both races benefited. When Gantt and Helms clashed over federal involvement in education, they were talking about race.

In addition, Gantt was vocal in expressing support for racially liberal positions at campaign events and at press conferences. A clear example of this policy contrast was the candidates' positions on South Africa. Gantt had been a long-time opponent of apartheid, writing a strongly worded letter to P W Botha when he was mayor of Charlotte and refusing to visit the country when invited.[164] In contrast, Jesse Helms described the African National Congress (ANC) as an organisation which 'put bicycle tires around the necks of people of [their] own race…filled them with gasoline, and set them on fire'.[165] When Nelson Mandela came to Washington in June 1990 to address the US Congress after his release from prison, Helms boycotted the speech. Gantt, having recently won the Democratic nomination, went for dinner with Mandela in Washington and described him as 'a freedom fighter'. He told the local press, 'I see the man as a freedom fighter; he [Helms] sees him as a terrorist'.[166] Gantt spoke out in favour of sanctions on the apartheid regime, arguing that the United States should not be 'so presumptuous [to think] that simply because Mandela's free that it is time to loosen up on the sanctions… Sanctions should remain in place until there is clear movement to end apartheid'.[167]

Second, Gantt took avowedly liberal policy positions, which runs counter to the deracialised strategy. Albritton et al claim that 'race-neutral' campaigns involve 'conservative appeals to whites'.[168] Yet, as journalist Hunter Kome wrote in October 1990, Gantt was 'running as an avowed liberal'.[169] In a retrospective of the campaign, deputy campaign manager Mac McCorkle agreed that Gantt ran as a 'full-throated' liberal.[170] In an interview with me, deputy press secretary David Wofford described Gantt as a 'pretty unreconstructed liberal'.[171] While Douglas Wilder declared himself to be a vigorous tax-cutter, Harvey Gantt argued that the wealthy were not paying enough taxes.[172] In the week before the election, Gantt credited 'public housing and other aid' for helping him to enter the middle class. He

[162] Jesse Helms, quoted in Ibid.
[163] Jesse Helms, quoted in 'Helms criticizes federal involvement in state schools', *Winston-Salem Journal*, 23 September 1990.
[164] Harvey Gantt to P W Botha, 15 July 1986 (Gantt Collection, UNC Charlotte).
[165] Helms, quoted in 'Gantt, Helms see two different men', *Greensboro News & Record*, 27 June 1990.
[166] Gantt, quoted in Ibid.
[167] Gantt, quoted in Ibid.
[168] Albritton et al, 1996.
[169] Hunter Kome, 'Harvey Gantt: Former Charlotte mayor refuses to run campaign in predictable fashion', *Lexington Dispatch*, 23 October 1990, 10.
[170] McCorkle, 1991, 24.
[171] Interview with David Wofford, 9 December 2013.
[172] 'As the mud flies, candidates accuse each other of lying', *Greensboro News & Record*, 3 November 1990.

warned Democrats not to abandon 'liberal positions such as support for social programs' out of fear of Republican attacks.[173]

Jesse Helms's campaign director Carter Wrenn described Gantt to me as 'a dyed-in-the-wool liberal'. I asked him if he thought Gantt would have been better off moderating his positions, consistent with Albritton et al's instruction for running a deracialised campaign. Wrenn dismissed the idea that Gantt could run as a centrist candidate 'because he really wasn't. I think he ran as what he was, and in campaigns like that…if you try to be a phony and try to run as something you're not, you'll get nailed.'[174] On the other side of the campaign, Lawrence Davis who led the North Carolina Democratic Party agreed: 'he didn't pull any punches in defining liberal versus conservative, and he was on the liberal side. Helms was so far on the conservative side he was indecent. It's hard to imagine how it would have been done otherwise. Harvey would have had to jump out of his skin'.[175]


Nonetheless, such positions undoubtedly opened Gantt to criticism from racially intolerant whites. As Martin Gilens and others have established, support for welfare benefits in the United States is interpreted through a racial frame by many white voters.[176] In this vein, a tractor engineer told a reporter for the *Lexington Dispatch* that he would vote for Helms because he 'won't give everything to the blacks like the other fellow will'.[177]

Similar sentiments were promoted by Helms, who described Gantt as an extreme and dangerous liberal, as shown in Figure 4.16. We might assume that Gantt would try to reject this label by shifting his policy in a more conservative direction, as Wilder did in Virginia on key issues such as the death penalty. Gantt, however, did not revise his policy positions. Gantt's deputy campaign manager Mac McCorkle confirmed to me, 'He was pretty much a conviction politician. He did not want to…moderate'.[178] Gantt retained his opposition to the death penalty stating, 'I can't support the death penalty…I believe that fighting crime is more than simply saying I support the death penalty'.'[179] This unrepentant strategy appears to have been effective because in spite of the death penalty being supported by a majority of the North Carolina electorate,[180] slightly more voters believed that Gantt would do a better job on law-and-order issues than Helms (36% to 31%).[181]

---

[173] 'Gantt expects barrage of negative Helms ads', *Lexington Dispatch*, 20 October 1990.
[174] Interview with Wrenn.
[175] Interview with Davis.
[176] Gillens, 1999.
[177] 'Personalities of candidates and of voters come to fore', *Lexington Dispatch*, 1 November 1990.
[178] Interview with McCorkle.
[179] Gantt, quoted in Varley (1992: 17).
[180] In an October 1990, *Raleigh News & Observer* poll of North Carolina voters, 67% favoured mandatory death sentences for those convicted of premeditated murder, 23% were opposed, 10% weren't sure ('Survey indicates voters worried over economy, against tax hike', *Raleigh News & Observer*, 5 October 1990).
[181] 'Poll: Support for Gantt, Helms even', *Burlington Times-News*, 22 September 1990.

Figure 4.16. Helms TV advertisement: 'Dangerously Liberal'



Source: Kanter Archive, Political Communications Center, University of Oklahoma

Not only did Gantt retain his liberal policy positions, but he embraced the 'liberal' label itself, in spite of its racialised connotations. The day after winning the Democratic nomination, Gantt said, 'If wanting to do something, wanting to challenge North Carolinians and Americans to do something makes me a liberal, so be it'.[182] On the final weekend of the campaign, Gantt told a crowd of roughly 700 in Mecklenburg County that he embraced the perception of him being a liberal. 'If being a liberal means you care about people, you can call me a liberal'.[183] During the speech he explained, 'a liberal…means caring about education, caring about housing, caring about [the] environment. It means caring about the people.' Gantt, then, grinned and added puckishly, 'Jesse Helms says I'm extremely liberal'.[184] Watt professed to me that Helms's repeated attacks on Gantt for being a liberal were not damaging: 'It was like pouring water on a duck's back because we weren't running from the fact that Harvey believed in what he believed in'.[185] Contemporary evidence supports this assertion. Gantt's press secretary Susan Jetton told a reporter in September 1990, 'Jesse Helms was going to call Harvey a liberal anyway. Why not identify yourself first?'.[186]

Such behaviour can be explained through the lens of the crusade campaign strategy, where the candidate's tactic is to sharpen contrasts with his or her opponent rather than attempt to minimise them. Gantt reflected in an interview in 2016, 'People either were for you or they were against you. There was almost no in between.'[187] Mel Watt explained that the campaign believed it to be very important for Gantt to take a consistent line. He took confidence in the fact that even though North Carolinians

[182] Harvey Gantt, quoted in 'Nation's Eyes on Gantt-Helms Match', *Charlotte Observer,* 25 June 1990.
[183] 'Gantt, Helms supporters clash at campaign rally', *Lexington Dispatch,* 3 November 1990.
[184] Harvey Gantt, quoted in 'Liberal label fits fine, Gantt says', *Charlotte Observer,* 4 November 1990.
[185] Interview with Watt.
[186] Susan Jetton, quoted in 'Gantt defines position; not letting Helms do it', *Elizabeth City Daily Advance,* 23 September 1990.
[187] Gantt interview with UNCTV.

disagreed with Helms on many of his numerous conservative positions, they still marked him highly for integrity.[188] Watt explained,

> 'We understood that on the substantive issues, if he [Helms] could do it on the conservative side, we could do it on the liberal side because people admired somebody who would tell them where they stood on the issues…So, that freed us up to be on the left or on whatever positions Harvey had strong opinions about – just as free as Helms had been in expressing his opinions…We were trying to be Harvey Gantt on one side and Jesse Helms on the other side'.[189]

By identifying as a liberal, Gantt violated a core feature of the deracialised campaign model, but from the perspective of his campaign strategists, it was necessary for drawing the strategic contrast with Helms. This is a key characteristic of the crusade campaign strategy.

Result


In the end Jesse Helms defeated Gantt with 52.6% to Gantt's 47.4% of the vote. According to Voter Research Survey's exit poll, Gantt won 37% of the white vote and 95% of the black vote. Gomolin et al argue that Gantt failed to unseat Helms because he was unable to garner 40% of the white vote.[190] It is true that Gantt would have won if he had received three percentage points more of the white vote, but he would have also won if black voters had composed 22% of the electorate, which was their proportion in the overall population. As it turned out, due to having not reached parity with whites in voter registration rates, blacks consisted 19% of those who voted, an increase of three percentage points from the last mid-term elections but insufficient to bring Gantt to victory.[191] By comparison, when Barack Obama won North Carolina in 2008 (the only African American to win a major statewide election in the state), he won the same share of the African American vote (95%) as Gantt but a smaller share of the white vote (35%). The difference was that African Americans by 2008 composed 23% of voters.

For a candidate who had never stood for statewide office before, Gantt's support was remarkably consistent throughout the state. In the twenty-three western rural counties, where blacks consist 3.3% of the electorate, Gantt received 41.7% of the vote. In the rural east where African Americans are 28.3% of the electorate, Gantt received 46.7% of the vote. In urban and metropolitan counties, Gantt's support sat between 49.2% and 55.7% of the vote.[192] Gantt's broad statewide showing reflects impressive breadth of campaign stops compared to those of Jesse Helms. Using the archives at UNC Chapel Hill, I was able to access the daily schedules of the candidates' public events. I supplemented these schedules with newspaper reports to capture some additional events which did not appear on the schedules. I found that Gantt campaigned far more frequently and in more places than Helms. Between Labor Day and

[188] Watt, quoted in Varley (1992: 16).
[189] Interview with Watt.
[190] Gomolin et al, 2007.
[191] Varley, 1992.
[192] Prysby, 1996, 37.

Election Day, Gantt campaigned in 67 different towns making a total of 156 campaign stops. In contrast, during this same 61 day period, Helms campaigned in 24 locations and made a total of 29 stops.[193] The map in Figure 4.17 shows where the candidates made at least one campaign stop.

Figure 4.17. Visits by Gantt and Helms between 5 September and 6 November 1990



Note: Blue dots=Gantt visit only, Red dots=Helms visit only, Purple dots=Visits from both candidates
Source: Newspapers and press releases, made using batch GEO

Like many scholars who have studied this campaign, Katherine Tate concludes that Gantt lost due to his race. She credits Helms's victory to a strategy of 'waging a racially charged media campaign that effectively mobilized conservative white voters'.[194] Strickland and Whicker agree, pointing to an exit poll in which ten percent of North Carolina voters stated race as the biggest factor in their decision.[195] However, Strickland and Whicker overlook the full implications of this information. First, half of these voters were black, and the other half were white. Since blacks are a much smaller proportion of the overall electorate, these data tell us that blacks were much more likely to report voting on the basis of race than whites were. Second, Strickland and Whicker appear to assume that the whites voting on the basis of race were driven by anti-black racism. They do not consider the possibility that at least some of these voters were motivated because they wanted to send an African American to the Senate.[196] We know from Gantt's internal polls that 25% of white voters indicated that Gantt's race made them *more* likely to vote for him.[197] Additionally, given Gantt's near-unanimous support among African

[193] Some of this differential in campaign activity is explained by the fact that the federal government was experiencing a budget crisis during the campaign period, and Helms was in Washington for much of this time.
[194] Tate, 1997, 267.
[195] Stickland & Whicker, 1992.
[196] Ibid.
[197] Varley, 1992.


Americans, it is reasonable to conclude that the black voters who cited race as the most important factor in deciding their vote were also casting their vote *for* Gantt *because* he was African American.

Multiple commentators have argued that the White Hands advert decisively shifted the result in Helms's favour by motivating working-class North Carolinians to cast their vote against Gantt.[198] Carter Wrenn, however, counters that Helms's internal polls did not support this conclusion. He argues that the advert was ineffective because it confirmed what voters already knew. He explained to me, 'It didn't move the numbers in the [internal] polls at all. It was just flat…You could make a case that that ad crossed the line racially, and I wouldn't want to argue with that. But there's just no case at all that it decided the outcome of the election. It just didn't work'.[199] Wrenn's counterpart in the Gantt campaign, Mel Watt, echoed these same conclusions to me, 'I've always thought that the White Hands ad was overstated'.[200]

The notion that the Hands advert drove the white working class away from Gantt into the Helms camp is premised on the assumption that white, working-class voters are most likely to cast their votes on the basis of racial hostility to blacks.[201] Using education as a proxy for class, Helms performed best among the lowest education group of voters (61% to 39%). However, Larry Bartels has shown that education is not a good proxy for class in America, with more than forty percent of those without a college degree earning double the median income.[202] I agree with Bartels that income is a more suitable proxy for class than educational attainment. Among white voters, there was no statistically significant difference in support for Gantt by income. Davidson County journalist Hunter Kome agrees that the characterisation of the working-class as the sole progenitors of racism compared to a racially tolerant white, middle-class is unfair. In his 2,000 miles covering the campaign in fifty-six counties, Kome reports 'racist comments rarely came from stereotypical "rednecks",' whereas he did witness racist comments from affluent voters and middle-class shop proprietors.[203]

[198] E.g., Wilson (1993), Prysby (1996), Christensen & Fleer (1999)
[199] Interview with Wrenn.
[200] Interview with Watt.
[201] Stickland & Whicker, 1992, 205.
[202] Bartels, 2006.
[203] Hunter Kome, 'Inescapable Fact: Racism is playing a role', *Lexington Dispatch*, 3 Nov 1990.


Figure 4.18. White voters' support for Gantt, by income



Source: Voter Research and Surveys Exit Poll

Although Gantt did not win, his performance was squarely in line with the white Democrats who had faced Helms in his three previous statewide contests. Indeed, Gantt's 1990 challenge was the second strongest performance. Jim Hunt, the 'phenomenally popular' incumbent governor who faced Helms in 1984, performed only 0.4 percentage points better than Gantt's result.[204] Given that Gantt was a (defeated) former mayor who had not held office in three years and had no statewide experience going against a three-term incumbent, I would argue that Gantt's ability to match the result of the former governor suggests that Gantt performed robustly.

Figure 4.19. Results of Jesse Helms's Senate elections, 1972-1990



Conclusion

In this case study, I have demonstrated that Harvey Gantt's senatorial campaign against Jesse Helms in 1990 did not follow the deracialised campaign model. I have established that Gantt possessed a strong

[204] Interview with Wrenn.

black identity, which he did not discard or ignore during the campaign. Gantt faced a racially hostile opponent who primed the latent racial hostilities present in the election environment. Gantt's campaign responded to these attacks by promoting a narrative which symbolically contrasted Gantt's 'New South' racial progressivism against Helms's 'Old South' racial intolerance. This 'crusade' motif was used to invite the support of racially liberal whites and to motivate greater turnout among African Americans. Ultimately, while Gantt fell short of unseating Helms, I conclude that racial hostility is not a sufficient factor to explain Gantt's defeat.

Chapter 5 - Carol Moseley Braun (Illinois, 1992)

'[My opponent is] trying to frighten people with the image of a bomb-throwing welfare mother running for the Senate'
Carol Moseley Braun

***

Carol Moseley Braun was the first black woman elected to the US Senate. In spite of her historic status, her successful senatorial campaign in 1992 has had surprisingly little impact on the development of the theory of racial campaign strategies. Dennis Nordin,[1] Christopher Stout,[2] Huey Perry,[3] and Katherine Tate[4] attempt, unsuccessfully, to situate Braun's candidacy within the deracialised campaign model. Roger Oden acknowledges that the deracialised campaign model is an ill-fit for her campaign, yet he is inconsistent in his assessment of Braun's racial strategy. At one point, Oden appears to recognise that Braun's race was relevant to voters, noting that after her nomination 'the populace felt the possibility that history could be made'.[5] Yet, later in his chapter, he argues that Braun's race was an irrelevant factor except to black Chicagoans.[6] Ultimately, in failing to provide a convincing account of Braun's racial appeal, the existing scholarship demonstrates the limitations of the theoretical toolkit which has hitherto been used to study black candidates who operate in majority-white election contexts.

In this case study, I argue that Braun pursued a crusade campaign strategy. Contrary to the deracialised model, Braun freely acknowledged her symbolic-historic status when she communicated to both white and black audiences. The aspiration to increase descriptive representation in the Senate was a major campaign theme, which I argue invited the support of white voters as well as African Americans. Unlike in the symbolic-historic campaign model, however, Braun operated in a racially hostile campaign environment. Specifically, her opponent Rich Williamson primed implicit racial cues and stereotypes in his attacks against Braun. Rather than ignoring the racial content of these attacks, as the deracialised model would suggest, Braun publicly condemned them in explicit racial terms. Symbolically, Braun portrayed Williamson as a personification of the white, male establishment whom she and her supporters aimed to defeat.

Explanatory Variables: Context, Candidate, and Elites

Carol Moseley Braun's crusade campaign strategy was shaped by three sets of explanatory variables. First, Braun's election was defined by a powerful political base of support from white liberals, women,

[1] Nordin, 2012, 126-142.
[2] Stout, 2015, 70.
[3] Perry, 1996a, Conclusion.
[4] Tate, 1997.
[5] Oden, 1996, 52.
[6] Ibid., 57.

and African American voters and elites. Braun's early political career was cultivated at a nexus of good government, reformist white liberals and non-machine black politicians. These twin supports provided her with a firm political foundation from which she could articulate a race-conscious policy agenda. Second, Braun herself possessed a strong commitment to a racial equality agenda, shaped by her experiences in the civil rights movement, working in a civil rights law firm, and as Harold Washington's floor leader in the state legislature. Third, Braun faced an opponent who, although not explicitly racist, deployed numerous racial cues which promoted negative stereotypes about African American politicians. In the face of this racially hostile opponent, Braun's political and biographical context, coupled with solid support from key elites and constituencies, enabled her to promote a campaign message which highlighted Braun's identity as a black woman juxtaposed against an opponent who represented the white, male establishment who dominated the US Senate.

Context: Illinois in 1992

In the 1990s, 44.6% of Illinois's population[7] and 51.0% of Democratic voters lived in Cook County where the city of Chicago is located.[8] Adding the five satellite 'collar counties' surrounding Cook, nearly three-quarters of the Illinois population lived in the Chicago area.[9] Therefore, an analysis of the historical and political context of the 1992 Illinois Senate contest inescapably focuses to a great extent on Chicago politics.

Founded by an African-Caribbean man in the late eighteenth century, the city of Chicago has the longest continuous history of black electoral politics in the United States.[10] Fredrick Harris calls it 'the political capital of black America'.[11] It was, as the authors of the classic work *Black Metropolis* describe, the 'city of refuge' for African Americans, first, as the terminus of a line on the Underground Railroad and, later, as the place of settlement for hundreds of thousands of African Americans fleeing the tyranny of the Jim Crow South during the Great Migration.[12] It was contemptuously described by southern commentators as 'a sinkhole of abolition'.[13] Illinois's first state constitution banned the institution of slavery in perpetuity, yet the state's black codes, a complicit federal government, and racist municipal regimes in Chicago ensured that African Americans operated separately and unequally from the state's white population.[14]

---

[7] 1990 US Census
[8] Both in the 1988 and 1992 presidential elections
[9] Merrill Goozner, 'Collar counties' population surges', *Chicago Tribune*, 30 September 1988.
[10] Jean Baptiste Point du Sable, described by a contemporary as 'a handsome Negro', is regarded as the first permanent, non-native resident of present-day Chicago. (Dollinar, 2013: 3).
[11] Harris, 2012, Ch 2.
[12] Drake & Cayton, 1945, 32.
[13] Quoted in Drake & Cayton (1945: 33).
[14] For a classic analysis of the federal government's complicit role in twentieth century racial segregation, see King (2007). For a discussion of its effects in Chicago, see discussion in Ta-Nehesi Coates's 'The Case for Reparations', *The Atlantic*, June 2014.

While never more than a fifth of the statewide electorate, African Americans' concentration in Chicago – and their further spatial concentration within the city due to severe racial segregation – created powerful blocs of African American voters. These blocs were able to elect African American representatives to city, state, and even federal office from the 1920s, giving African Americans a political foothold in Illinois politics earlier than anywhere else in the North. The political strength of African Americans in Illinois was 'unique' not only due to their demographic concentration but also due to the efforts of independent black political mobilisation.[15] However, for many decades, black politics in Chicago was dominated by white-led machines.

Braun's home for forty years, Hyde Park is the South Side's liberal, multiracial enclave near the University of Chicago.[16] The area has long consisted of a mix of University of Chicago intelligentsia, working-class ethnic whites, and poor and middle-class African Americans.[17] In 1949, the Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference was formed on the 'basis that the well-being of Hyde Park could be served only by affirmatively urging and inviting Black residents to live in Hyde Park so that the community might establish a stable inter-racial community of high standards'.[18] Fifth Ward Alderman Leon Despres, a Hyde Parker independent of the Democratic machine, described the area as 'the closest we have in Chicago to a large, stable interracial community'.[19] Braun, who represented Hyde Park for five terms in the state legislature (1979-1988), jokingly referred to Despres, who was white, as 'the best black alderman ever because he was one of the few who would stand up to Daley on behalf of issues touching the black community'.[20] Echoing this assessment made to me by Braun in 2015, I uncovered a 1966 article from the *Negro Digest* in the Chicago History Museum which also called Despres 'the lone "negro" spokesman in Chicago's city council'.[21] Hyde Parker Jacky Grimshaw explains to me that Despres was the most important independent politician in the city: 'he would not appreciate being called the "godfather" but, you know, he was kind of the independent leader'.[22]

Outside of Chicago, the five 'collar counties' surrounding Cook County, were swing areas where in the 1990s Republicans had the edge. Braun's communications director David Eichenbaum recalls that they were 'solidly moderate Republican territory' but in 1992 they were perceived as winnable because of 'white Republican women who wanted to believe in Carol Moseley Braun'.[23] Strategically, Braun


[15] Interview with Steve Cobble.
[16] 'Alderman looks back on his long political career' (Leon Despres papers, Chicago History Museum).
[17] Interview with Braun, 22 August 2013.
[18] Leon Despres, 'What's past is prologue: A view of the history of Hyde Park', speech delivered to the Hyde Park Historical Society, St Thomas the Apostle School, 12 May 1976 (Papers of the Hyde Park Historical Society [Series I, Box 1], University of Chicago).
[19] Lepon Despres, 'On the democratization of the Democratic Party', remarks to the McGoverrn Commission on the Democratic Party, 7 June 1969 (Leon Despres papers, Chicago History Museum).
[20] Interview with Carol Moseley Braun, 15 April 2015.
[21] 'Black Power and the Civil Rights Crisis', *Negro Digest*, December 1966.
[22] Interview with Jacky Grimshaw, 14 April 2015.
[23] Interview with David Eichenbaum, 12 September 2013.

designated a Republican, female state representative from the collar counties as her deputy campaign manager to bolster her appeal to these voters.[24]

The rest of the state outside of the Chicago metropolitan area is known as 'Downstate Illinois', including areas which are to the geographic north of Chicago. Downstate includes a mix of rust belt industrialism, a plains agriculture economy, and even a Mississippi River floodplain. The far south of the state, as one Braun campaign worker described to me, 'in general is like Mississippi, and it's physically closer to Mississippi than it is to Chicago'.[25]

Nordin argues that downstate there is a 'prejudice' against Chicago which damaged Braun who was unquestionably tied to the city.[26] A Greenberg-Lake opinion survey taken in early October 1992 found that 40% of Illinois voters viewed Braun as 'a typical Chicago politician'.[27] Braun's field director Heather Booth agrees that Braun's Chicago association posed a challenge for the campaign. She remembers Braun meeting with a community leader in the far south, who told Braun, 'you've got three strikes against you. It's not just that you're black. It's not just that you're a woman, but you're from Chicago'.[28] Journalist Russ Stewart believed that Braun faced the problem that voters saw her 'not only as a black woman but also a Chicago Democrat'. Braun's opponent attacked her in multiple advertisements as 'just another machine politician' (see Figure 5.1), which is ironic given that Braun had been a lifelong opponent of the Cook County Democratic machine.

Figure 5.1. 'Violence NRSC', Williamson for Senate Television Advertisement




Source: Kanter Archive, Political Communications Center, University of Oklahoma

[24] Interview with Steve Cobble, 10 September 2013.
[25] CMB11.
[26] Nordin, 2012, 110.
[27] Steve Neal, 'Braun suddenly appears vulnerable', *Chicago Sun-Times*, 9 October 1992.
[28] Interview with Heather Booth, 13 September 2013. Braun recalls a similar story but from when she ran for the state legislature. She was told by 'a pundit', 'Whites won't vote for you because you're black; blacks won't vote for you because you're not part of the machine; and nobody is going to vote for you because you're a woman' (Interview with Braun, 2015).

Braun maintains that she had deeper connections in downstate Illinois than many commentators appreciate. Since the late 1970s, as a state legislator, she had worked closely with downstate representatives and formed social connections to elected officials from rural communities. In fact, she argues that she had closer ties with downstate legislators than with Chicago legislators who ostracised her for her anti-machine politics.[29] Internal strategy documents reveal that the Braun campaign from the start recognised that downstate would be a challenge, especially for an African American woman, but the campaign did not use the voters' conservative racial or gender attitudes as reasons not to seek their support. One internal memo states 'CMB is going to have to do her own persuasion of these voters, to get them to vote for her – positive persuasion which emphasizes change, populist economics, anti-elite and anti-Washington themes, and hard core Democratic issues like jobs, health care, and education'.[30] Braun's two to one margin of victory in downstate Illinois suggests that perceptions of being tied to Chicago were not, in her case, politically devastating.

It is a telling contrast to white, Illinois native Hillary Clinton's inability to win these voters in 2016. While Hillary Clinton also won Illinois, the spread of her victory was noticeably different from Braun, as Figure 5.2 shows. Outside of Chicago and its suburbs, Clinton was uncompetitive in large swaths of Illinois. For example, Donald Trump won Franklin County, an historic coal-mining county in the south of the state with 68% of the vote. The county is 97.7% white. Yet, in 1992, Carol Moseley Braun won Franklin County with over 60% of the vote.

Figure 5.2. Left: 1992 US Senate election; Right: 2016 presidential election



Blue=Braun/H Clinton, Red=Williamson/Trump, Source: OurCampaigns.com

[29] Interview with Braun, 2013.
[30] Untitled strategy memo, Spring 1992 (Box 878, Braun Archive, Chicago History Museum).

Candidate: Carol Moseley Braun

Carol Moseley Braun's life demonstrates strong social rootedness in Chicago's African American community, while also the maintenance of political linkages to the city's mostly white, anti-machine liberals. These twin connections, I argue, were vital in the advancement of Braun's political career at all levels.

Born in 1947, Carol Moseley was the daughter of an officer in the Chicago police force, Joseph Moseley.[31] Significantly, in municipal politics the Moseley family supported candidates who were independent of the Democratic machine. Joseph Moseley, for example, worked alongside Leon Despres in unionising the city's prison guards in spite of Daley-machine opposition.[32] In addition to inheriting her parents' anti-machine politics, Braun was instilled with a strong sense of her black racial identity. Her maternal grandparents had been supporters of the black nationalist Marcus Garvey, 'race men, as they were called at the time', Braun explains.[33] In an article for the black magazine *Ebony*, Braun writes that her parents 'raised us in a world that did not acknowledge or legitimize racism. Ethnic pride was part and parcel of this world'.[34]

As a child, Braun lived in the Chatham area of Chicago's South Side, which she describes as a 'middle-class black neighborhood'.[35] However, other areas in the South Side, such as Gage Park where her grandmother lived, were plagued by racial tensions in the 1960s. The community was chosen by Martin Luther King Jr as the stage for civil rights protests against housing discrimination, and Braun marched with King on two occasions.[36] She also engaged in protests as a student, refusing to leave an all-white café until she was served and going swimming at a segregated beach.[37] Although she never joined the Black Panthers, Braun tells me that she was a volunteer at the Black Panthers' free breakfast programme[38] which distributed meals to hundreds of Chicago's children every day.[39] As an adult, she was also active in anti-apartheid work, which is where two of my interviewees first met her.[40]

After an undergraduate degree at the University of Illinois (Chicago), Braun graduated from the prestigious University of Chicago Law School in 1972 and settled in Hyde Park near the university. After working in the US attorney's office, in 1978 Braun was encouraged by anti-machine liberals and

[31] Gutgold, 2006, Ch 5.
[32] Gretchen Reynolds, 'Behind the Braun Phenomenon', *Chicago*, October 1992.
[33] Carol Moseley Braun, 'Between WEB Du Bois and BT Washington', *Ebony*, November 1995.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Correspondence with Carol Moseley Braun, 15 April 2014.
[36] Gretchen Reynolds, 'Behind the Braun Phenomenon', *Chicago*, October 1992.
[37] Gutgold, 2006, Ch 5. The choice of attempting to desegregate a beach was an especially powerful move given that Chicago Race Riot of 1919, the worst in the state's history, was sparked by the murder of a black swimmer at a white-only beach.
[38] Interview with Braun, 2013.
[39] Witt, 2007, 35.
[40] Interviews with Jim Charlton (26 August 2013) and Ira Cohen (27 August 2013).

feminists to run for the Illinois House of Representatives.[41] She succeeded the white, liberal independent Robert Mann. While a state legislator, Braun also worked for the firm Miner, Barnhill, and Galland, the same law firm at which Barack Obama worked while he represented Hyde Park in the state legislature a decade later.[42]

After Harold Washington was elected Chicago's first black mayor in 1983, he designated Braun as his floor leader in the state assembly.[43] Jacky Grimshaw, who was manager of Washington's office, explains that Braun was the chief sponsor of the mayor's 'city agenda' in the state house, and her colleague Richard Newhouse was the chief sponsor in the state senate. As a state legislator, Braun was the chief sponsor of bills to establish ethnic minority and female set-asides and to ban discrimination in housing and by private clubs.[44] Braun's office also served as a physical organising space for the Washington administration. Grimshaw explains that when she went to Springfield on behalf of the mayor, 'we didn't have offices; so, we usually hanged out in the state represenatives' offices, and her office was a place that I hung out in'.[45] As a state legislator, Braun also filed and won an important reapportionment legal action which affirmed the 'one person, one vote' principle in Illinois. Barack Obama worked on a similar case relating to Chicago council wards while he served as Richard Newhouse's successor in the state senate the following decade.

While aligned to Harold Washington, the mayor's support was not unconditional. After his nomination as Democratic candidate for mayor, a petition of 251 signatures was submitted to Washington urging him to nominate the 'wonderful' Braun as his successor for the historically black First US Congressional District seat.[46] Washington did not, which one source speculates was because he saw Braun, who was Assistant Majority Leader, as a more valuable ally in Springfield.[47] In 1986, Braun had begun to call on Chicago black leaders to support her candidacy for lieutenant governor, but this effort was blocked by Washington.[48] A journalist from the *Chicago Sun-Times* suggested to me that Washington 'didn't want Carol elevated to a perch from which she could challenge him for mayor'.[49] Alton Miller, who was Washington's speechwriter, explains to me that the mayor promoted people 'strategically'. He could block people, but when he did promote them, he was very able at 'making sure that the full reach of his influence was behind their getting into place'.[50]

---

[41] 'Robert Mann: Former legislator was staunch liberal', *Chicago Tribune*, 31 March 2008.
[42] Gutgold, 2006, Ch 5.
[43] Interview with Braun, 2013.
[44] Biographical Sketch (Box 878, Carol Moseley Braun Archive, Chicago History Museum).
[45] Interview with Grimshaw.
[46] Nominating Petition for Carol Moseley Braun, March 1983 (Box 47, Harold Washington Archive Collection, Harold Washington Memorial Library).
[47] Interview with Cobble.
[48] Ibid.
[49] CMB8.
[50] Interview with Alton Miller, 27 August 2013.

Shortly before his death, at the encouragement of South Side alderman Bobby Rush,[51] Washington agreed to support Braun for the position of Cook County Recorder of Deeds.[52] Journalist Andy Shaw explains, 'His blessing for such an obscure job was probably enough to ward off competition'.[53] The following year, in 1988, Braun was successfully elected to the post which had a budget of $8 million and 300 employees.[54] Her Republican opponent Alderman Bernard Stone had told a newspaper, 'I don't expect your newspaper to endorse me. Just run a picture of Braun. That's all I ask'.[55] Braun's campaign manager Al Raby shot back that Stone's actions represented 'the politics of division'.[56] Multiple sources close to Braun speculates that she ran for Recorder of Deeds with the long-term plan to run for mayor of Chicago.[57] Another added that Illinois was unparalleled in its number of launching pads for political office because of its large and complex elected municipal and state governments.[58] In Cook County, there were roughly 40,000 patronage jobs controlled by municipal leaders.[59]

In October 1991, Illinois's two-term Democratic Senator Alan Dixon made the fateful decision to vote for the nomination of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court.[60] Dixon, a self-described 'moderate' and 'friend of business'[61] had already angered liberals by his support for anti-abortion legislation and financial deregulation.[62] Thomas had been accused of sexually harassing a former colleague, Anita Hill, who was an African American woman. Hill's treatment by an all-white, all-male Senate Judiciary Committee angered liberals, who felt that as a woman of colour she had not been taken seriously.[63] Soon after Thomas's confirmation, female members of the Illinois Democratic State Central Committee stated that they would not support Dixon's re-nomination for a third term the following year.[64] One prominent fundraiser who had hitherto been a loyal supporter of Dixon told him, 'Alan, I am not going to help you, and I don't want lunch. My God, even Howell Heflin of Alabama voted against Clarence Thomas. In fact, I want you to know that I am going to do all I can to send you back to Belleville'.[65] On reflection, Dixon described the vote for Thomas as his 'basic undoing'.[66]

---

[51] Interviews with Braun (2013), Grimshaw.
[52] Reynolds, 'Behind the Braun Phenomenon', *Chicago*, October 1992.
[53] Correspondence with Andy Shaw, 5 August 2013.
[54] Tate, 1997.
[55] Quoted in 'Stone's tactics unlikely to dim Braun's rising star', *Chicago Sun-Times*, 7 November 1988.
[56] Quoted in 'Stone campaign brochure called divisive', *Chicago Tribune*, 21 October 1988.
[57] CMB 5, CMB12. See also 'Williamson, Braun still miles apart', *Southtown Economist*, 26 October 1992.
[58] Interview with Cobble.
[59] Leon Despres, 'Chicago politics an anti-Negro business', 5 November 1963 (Folder 1, Box 72, Papers of Leon Despres, Chicago History Museum). See also Thompson (2006: 63).
[60] Dixon, 2013, 302.
[61] Ibid., 294.
[62] Kenney & Hartley, 2012, Ch 18.
[63] Vavrus, 1998, 221-223.
[64] Dixon, 2013, Ch 5.
[65] Quoted in Ibid., 307.
[66] Ibid., 309.

Braun was recruited to challenge Dixon by the same Hyde Park liberals who had encouraged her to run for the Illinois House of Representatives in 1978.[67] Braun's challenge of Dixon has been explained in other accounts on the grounds that Braun was offended by the treatment of a woman by an all-male Senate Judiciary Committee.[68] Dennis Nordin suggests that Braun's race was inconsequential in her candidacy.[69] While it is true that Braun was outraged by Hill's treatment, commentators are wrong to use gender as a way to divorce Braun from her racial identity. In an interview with me, she explains vividly that her primary objection to Thomas was racial. Below she recalls meeting with Senator Dixon to try to persuade him not to vote for Thomas:

> 'The conversation from my end was why Clarence Thomas was so inappropriate as a successor to Thurgood Marshall. And, I went to great lengths to explain the civil rights issue; what was involved with those of us who had marched; how important Thurgood Marshall had been in my life…The Warren Court made such a huge difference for a little black girl like me that I felt that it was imperative that the next African American Supreme Court justice be worthy to fill the shoes of Thurgood Marshall and that Bush's nominee Clarence Thomas in no way fit that description. Now I mean I was passionate, and see I still get passionate about it because that was just a deal killer for me. And I tried to talk to Dixon in terms of, Don't you understand that to allow Clarence Thomas to become the successor to Thurgood Marshall is essentially to deny all the sacrifices of all these people who have been pushing in the direction of equality for black people? And this is just wrong on that front. I had [a] second meeting with Dixon in that period. And again, the same plea, Please, please, please, please, please don't do this. You know this is wrong for civil rights reasons.'[70]

According to Wayne D'Orio, two white women (Susan Getzendanner and Christy Hepman) were also considered as potential challengers to Dixon.[71] I argue that Braun's race was an important distinguishing factor which carried strong symbolic and electoral resonance. Braun's political advisor Steve Cobble recalls, 'the women that were helping to engineer this were smart enough to realise that a credible black, woman feminist had a much better chance against two white men than a white [female challenger]. Carol could win a primary based on being a positive black woman who was credible, whereas a white woman probably would not have gotten over the top'.[72]

In the Democratic primary, Braun was aided by the entry of a white lawyer named Al Hofeld, who challenged Dixon on charges of corruption.[73] Braun's communications advisor Alton Miller, who had worked as Harold Washington's speechwriter, believed that the three-way split made it possible for Braun to win. He explains, 'We were convinced that we were watching a replay of what happened with

[67] Interview with Miller.
[68] E.g., Tate (1997), Nordin (2012)
[69] Nordin, 2012, 128.
[70] Interview with Carol Moseley Braun, 15 April 2015.
[71] D'Orio, 2004, 12. Also, interview with Braun, 2015.
[72] Interview with Steve Cobble.
[73] Tate, 1997, 271.

Harold Washington'.[74] In 1983, Washington had defeated the incumbent mayor of Chicago Jane Byrne in a divided three-way Democratic primary, securing 37% of the vote against Byrne's 33% and challenger Richard Daley's 30%. Not dissimilarly, Braun won the Democratic senatorial primary with 38.3% of the vote, with Dixon securing 34.6% and Hofeld winning 27.1%. Although Braun was elected in a statewide primary, more than half of the electorate was concentrated in Chicago. Her communications director told me in our interview in Chicago, 'It was all here… I don't remember ever leaving'.[75] Such was the Chicago electorate's importance that Dixon and his wife moved from their downstate home in Belleville to Chicago in January 1992 in order to devote all of their time to campaigning in the city.[76]

Elites: The Independent Voters of Illinois, the Women's Movement, Richard Williamson

Carol Moseley Braun had the strong backing of three sets of elites with overlapping aims but distinct identities. First, she had the support of anti-machine black leaders in whose tradition she herself had operated as a state legislator but, second, she was also supported by the Independent Voters of Illinois, a group of (mainly white) liberals who also operated in opposition to the Cook County Democratic Party machine. These groups had backed Braun for her entire political career. The third group which supported Braun were women's advocacy groups, such as the National Organization for Women. These groups were arguably Braun's most important supporters as she sought to build support beyond Chicago, especially to women in the populous suburban collar counties outside Chicago. All three groups were united by a common commitment to increasing descriptive representation. Braun's opponent, Richard Williamson, only deepened their commitment after engaging in a series of racially charged attacks on Braun.

The Independent Voters of Illinois (IVI)

From Reconstruction until the New Deal, African American Chicagoans were tied to Republican patronage,[77] before switching their allegiance to the Irish-dominated Cook County Democratic Party machines of Edward Kelly and Richard Daley.[78] As William Grimshaw has written, the machine made only minor concessions to African Americans but otherwise fundamentally preserved the segregation and discrimination which had stricken the black community.[79] African American leaders of the black sub-machine, as Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton describe, such as William 'Boss' Dawson, and Oscar De Priest were always junior partners in 'the Organization'.[80]

[74] Interview with Miller
[75] Ibid.
[76] Dixon, 2013, Ch 5.
[77] Walton, 1972, 105.
[78] Marable, 1985.
[79] Grimshaw, 1992.
[80] Massey & Denton, 1993, 156.

In response to the machine's malevolence, from the 1960s, reformist black leaders stood as candidates independent from 'the Organization', often winning election.[81] Braun explains that the black independent movement 'came out of the civil rights imperative'.[82] As I will discuss in the next chapter, black independents such as Richard Newhouse were able to use their leverage in the state legislature from not being aligned with the machine to secure concessions from downstate representatives. Al Raby, who later managed Braun's campaign for Cook County Recorder of Deeds, wrote at the time that 'the future of the South Side – and of the city as a whole – depends largely on the quality of the independent black leadership it develops'.[83]

For many years, operating in parallel to these black reformists, progressive whites in the South Side's Hyde Park area had been agitating for good governance reform, also in opposition to the Cook County Democratic Party machine. The Hyde Park independents sought an end to patronage politics and promoted electoral reform, government accountability, anti-discrimination policies, and the representation of minorities in government.[84] Electorally, the Hyde Park independents were organised into a group known as the Independent Voters of Illinois (IVI). Braun, who grew up in the predominantly black South Side neighbourhood of Chatham but lived in Hyde Park as an adult, emerged from these two traditions (see Figure 5.3). The IVI were Braun's main backers when she ran for the state legislature, and she received the support of white independent stalwarts including Bob Mann, Leon Despres, and Al Raby.[85] Jacky Grimshaw, a longtime Hyde Parker, explains that 'when you got the IVI support, you were pretty much assured a victory in Hyde Park'.[86]

[81] These included figures such as Charlie Chew, Richard Newhouse, Eugene Sawyer, Carol Moseley Braun, William Cousins, A A Raynor Jr, and (latterly) Harold Washington.
[82] Interview with Braun, 2015.
[83] Al Raby, 'Al Raby for Con-Con', July 1969 (Folder 4, Box 83, Papers of the Hyde Park Historical Society, University of Chicago).
[84] Hyde Parker Michael Shakman, for example, launched the case *Shakman v Democratic Organization of Cook County* which asserted that the First Amendment rights of public employees were being violated because their employment was conditioned on support for a particular slate of candidates (see Don Rose, 'The Lawyers who Reformed Chicago', *Chicago Reader*, March 2011).
[85] Interview with Braun, 2015.
[86] Interview with Grimshaw.

Figure 5.3. A meeting of African American and white independents with state representative-elect Carol Moseley Braun in 1978



From left to right: Lee Bryant, Raynard Hall (independent activist and journalist), Ross Lathrop (independent alderman for the 5th ward), Carol Moseley Braun, William Barbaro (Chicago Park District), William McClurg (Chicago Park District), Judith Godshalt, Lois Freiberg-Dobry (a leader of the independent movement), Barbara Currie (Braun's fellow representative for the multi-member 24th state legislative district). Source: Papers of the Hyde Park Historical Society, University of Chicago

The Women's Movement

The Braun campaign must be situated in the broader context of the 1992 wave of elections in which women and minorities were elected to office in record numbers. Known as 'the year of the woman', Mary Vavrus describes 1992 as 'a year in which political outsiders were spoken of reverently'.[87] As the first black woman ever to run for the Senate from a major party, Braun was an unmistakable outsider. One person, who says she cried when she heard Braun speak at a National Organization for Women event in the summer of 1992, stated that 'her very persona – African-American woman running for the US Senate – epitomized change'.[88]

From the beginning, women's groups played a vital role in Braun's campaign. The Braun campaign was supported by the Cook County Democratic Women, co-ordinated by Jacky Grimshaw and Valerie Jarrett, who later both became personal friends of Barack Obama. Other prominent activists such as

[87] Vavrus, 1998, 215.
[88] 'I feel duped', *New City*, October 1992.

Marilyn Katz and Julie Amos were also involved.[89] In addition, the National Organization for Women provided organisational and field support. Heather Booth, Braun's field director, describes NOW as having 'a major part' in the field operation, particularly in the primary. 'NOW was the infrastructure', she explains.[90] Ira Cohen, who worked for Braun in both the primary and the general elections, remembers that during the primary, the campaign structure was more 'rudimentary' and 'sort of surfed along the women's movement'.[91] When feminist Gloria Steinem came to endorse Braun in the primary campaign, Braun says hers was 'the single most important source of support for my candidacy bar none'.[92]

Indeed, support from the women's movement in the primary came more readily than from machine-tied African American leaders, many who backed Braun's white opponents in the Democratic primary.[93] Roland Burris, the state attorney general and first statewide elected official in Illinois, did not endorse her.[94] Thirty-six African American ministers endorsed Al Hofeld over Braun.[95] Harold Washington's office manager Jacky Grimshaw, however, cautions that not too much should be read into the initial non-endorsements from the city's African American leadership. She explained to me, 'Richard, in this town, the political leaders are really political followers [laughs]… The thing was they were still of the belief that there was some power in the machine, in spite of Harold's two victories. They were ingrained that way: the Democratic political leadership, they know what's best…So, it was blindness on their part'.[96]

Commentators have too often, I argue, used Braun's gender as a way to 'deracialise' the candidate and her political campaign strategy. Tate, for example, argues that by focusing on gender rather than race, Braun successfully developed a 'racially neutral campaign'.[97] Stout adopts a zero-sum framework, whereby he argues that Braun 'deemphasized race' by instead emphasising women's rights.[98] Nordin asserts that to Illinois voters Braun was seen more 'as a female office seeker than as an African American'.[99] Vavrus repeats that 'gender superseded race as the most important identity component'.[100]

These accounts do not engage fully with the empirical evidence, and they require deeper theorisation of intersectionality. I argue that Braun's race and gender cannot be separated nearly as easily as these

[89] Interview with Grimshaw.
[90] Interview with Booth.
[91] Interview with Cohen.
[92] Braun, quoted in Gutgold (2006: 142).
[93] The lack of support in the primary did not translate into lack of support during the general election. It should be remembered that over 150 black ministers publicly supported Richard Daley in the Democratic primary against Harold Washington in 1983 (Harris, 1999: 196).
[94] Oden, 1996.
[95] Harris, 1999, Ch 2.
[96] Interview with Grimshaw.
[97] Tate, 1997, 276.
[98] Stout, 2015, 28.
[99] Nordin, 2012, 128.
[100] Vavrus, 1998, 226.

commentators imply. As a black woman, Braun occupied a distinct status, with her race and gender identities being mutually constituted and mutually constitutive. I agree with Tasha Philpot and Hanes Walton's contention that the identity of a black woman cannot be separated into two discrete identities of 'black' or 'woman'. Rather it is itself a distinct identity which is greater than the sum of its parts.[101] In 1992, women were not ignorant of Braun's race; African Americans were not ignorant of her gender. This 'intersectional' approach more accurately captures Braun's status than the 'additive' conception of identity which views gender and race as exclusive identities.[102] I agree with Oden that 1992 was 'a year in which voters put a high priority on change and diversity'.[103] While gender representation was clearly a major theme, racial diversity was not inconsistent with these sentiments. As a black woman, Braun appealed to both African Americans and women but not in discrete or separable ways.

Opponent: Richard Williamson

Braun's general election opponent, Richard Williamson, was described as 'the quintessential Reagan-era man'.[104] Williamson had served in several positions in the Reagan administration, overseeing Reagan's 'new federalism' policy which aimed to reduce the size of the federal government by cutting federal spending on domestic programmes and encouraging states to pay for the services themselves.[105] Over the twelve years of Reagan and Bush, Illinois lost $8 billion in federal spending on public services and investment in education, employment, health care, and infrastructure.[106] Williamson also served the administration as a diplomat before leaving to work in the private sector. Regarded as an awkward and uncharismatic campaigner, journalist Andy Shaw characterised Williamson to me as a candidate 'with a great résumé but limited political skills'.[107]

Dependent Variable: The Crusade Campaign

Braun's strategy fits the crusade campaign model for three reasons. First, she did not avoid race in her campaign discourse before white audiences, and she made strong appeals to African Americans on the basis of their linked fate in widely publicised appearances. Second, she reacted to her opponent's implicitly racially hostile attacks in explicitly racial terms, symbolically drawing a contrast between her historic status as a black, female candidate and his status as a member of the white, male establishment. Third, Braun remained committed to a racially liberal policy programme. Unlike Wilder but like Gantt, Braun retained her racially liberal positions on issues such as drug decriminalisation and the death

[101] Philpot & Walton, 2007, 59.
[102] For a discussion of 'intersectional' versus 'additive' categories of identity, see Ward (2014).
[103] Oden, 1996, 52.
[104] David Moberg, 'He's Rich and He's Proud', *Chicago Reader*, 30 October 1992.
[105] Ibid.
[106] Ibid.
[107] Correspondence with Shaw.

penalty. She also cited racial inequalities as one of the explanations for her policy positions on such issues.

Targeted Appeals

In 1990, African Americans made up 13.4% of the Illinois electorate. An internal strategy document from the Braun campaign calculated that 'CMB needs 42.5% of the white vote… a higher figure than Doug Wilder got'.[108] The strategy memo identified three groups of voters whom she would target in what it described as a 'new coalition:

- A strong (record) share of the African-American vote;
- A strong share of suburban, independent women (not really a "crossover" vote, though there will be some Republican switchers…)
- Holding onto traditionally Democratic voters, in particular blue-collar white males'

While the deracialised campaign model would suggest that Braun downplay the symbolic-historic significance of her candidacy, her approach was the opposite. As one senior Braun advisor put it, descriptive representation was a 'central theme' of the campaign.[109] In Braun's announcement speech, she alluded to the idea that she could increase the representativeness of the US Senate, stating, 'I am a living witness that representative leadership works'.[110] Shortly after being nominated, Braun said in a *New York Times* interview that voters had selected her because they saw the Senate as full of 'just garden-variety politicians making bad speeches…Women were asking, "Where are the women?" Minorities said, "Where are the minorities?" Working people said, "Who are these millionaires? These aren't regular Joes".'[111]

In addition to the notion of diversifying the Senate, the Braun campaign promoted the idea that Braun was an historic figure. Indeed, one of her internal campaign strategy document lists 'make history' as one of the top messages that the campaign wanted to promote among 'African-Americans, women's groups, strong liberal/progressive voters'.[112] After she won the nomination, Braun declared in language which contrasts sharply with that of Douglas Wilder, 'It's a historic candidacy, and we're going to make history. The state is ready and willing to strike a blow for reviatalizing our democracy and opening the doors to the Senate'.[113] The Braun campaign produced a television advertisement which listed Braun's many electoral 'firsts' describing her as someone who 'makes history'. A press release from the Braun campaign echoed the TV advertisement, describing Braun as someone who had already 'made history

[108] Untitled strategy memo, Spring 1992 (Box 878, Braun Archive, Chicago History Museum). It is worth noting that elsewhere in the document, the campaign acknowledged that 41.3% of the white vote would be enough to give Braun a bare majority.
[109] CMB11.
[110] 'Announcement Speech', 19 November 1991 (Box 878, Braun Archive, Chicago History Museum).
[111] Braun, quoted in 'Woman in the news, storming the Senate club', *New York Times*, 19 March 1992.
[112] Untitled strategy memo, Spring 1992 (Box 878, Braun Archive, Chicago History Museum).
[113] Braun, quoted in 'Shoestring campaigner dumps Illinois incumbent, may make history', *San Bernardino Sun*, 22 March 1992.

when she was elected Cook County Recorder of Deeds'. It added, 'Braun is the first woman and the first black ever elected to county-wide Executive office in Cook County'.[114] David Axelrod, who produced advertisements for Braun's campaign, confirms that Braun 'galvanized African Americans, liberals, and suburban women who were thrilled by the opportunity to elect the first black woman to the US Senate'.[115] A senior member of the Braun campaign reiterates, 'It was an opportunity to make history…the first Democratic African American senator and first African American woman'.[116] Jacky Grimshaw confirms that this message was 'a large part of the campaign – here is the opportunity to elect a woman, to elect a black woman in the Senate'.[117]

The Braun campaign also recognised that by promoting the message of making history, Braun would be able to attract attention from the press. In campaign jargon 'earned media' refers to the instances where a candidate appears in the print or broadcast media without paying for the privilege (in contrast to 'paid media' which refers to advertisements). An internal strategy document from the Braun campaign acknowledged that 'we are far more dependent on the earned media than Wililamson is; fortunately we are also far more likely to receive it, if we do our job right'.[118] By doing their job right, the campaign was referring to promoting the message of Braun's history-making candidacy. For example, the *Southtown Economist* reported that when Braun won the Democratic nomination, she was 'swamped by a tidal wave of interest in her candidacy and the possibility that she would "make history" as the first black woman elected to the Senate'.[119] With less than one month to go before the campaign, Braun's name recognition was 86%, while Williamson's was only 46%.[120]

Braun pursued a targeted racial message which focused on her outsider status as an African American woman from a blue collar family in comparison to Richard Williamson's status as a white, male Reagan-administration insider. David Axelrod, a consultant for the Braun campaign, told a reporter that while Richardson 'is something old and familiar[, s]he represents the new and exciting. That's something he can't overcome'.[121] Mary Vavrus describes Braun's campaign as consisting of an 'almost evangelical quest-for-justice narrative'.[122] The context of her emergence, in response to the Clarence Thomas nomination, gave Braun a moral credibility and fervour which she promoted on the campaign trail.

The Braun campaign believed that it needed to generate historically high turnout in the African American community in order to win. An internal Braun campaign memo stated, 'our goal must be to

---

[114] 'Carol Moseley Braun announces candidacy for Democratic nomination', Braun for Senate Press Release (Box 878, Braun Archive, Chicago History Museum).
[115] Axelrod, 2015, 103.
[116] CMB12.
[117] Interview with Grimshaw.
[118] Untitled strategy memo, Spring 1992 (Box 878, Braun Archive, Chicago History Museum).
[119] 'Braun for US Senate', *Southtown Economist*, 26 October 1992.
[120] Russ Stewart, 'Braun still has big lead despite tarnished image', *Northwest Side Press*, 14 October 1992.
[121] Axelrod, quoted in 'Braun stays in national spotlight', *Southern Illinoisan*, 14 July 1992.
[122] Vavrus, 1998, 224.

match Harold Washington's levels in African-American precincts in Chicago, while establishing new record levels in all African-American precincts around the state'.[123] In order to do this, the Braun campaign believed that it needed 'an outstanding grassroots organization' in the black community.[124] The African American church, as with Wilder and Gantt, was the key institution through which the campaign mobilised black supporters. Like Gantt, but unlike Wilder, Braun made widely publicised appearances to black audiences, contrary to the deracialised model's expectation that the candidate would 'avoid[] other black leaders and appearances before majority black audiences'.[125]

Braun's rootedness in the black church was a major theme promoted in the black community. One of her final campaign stops was at her own church, Vernon Park Church of God, where she was joined by Governor Douglas Wilder.[126] Black churches are a major mobilising vehicle for black voters. Michael Preston partly credits black churches for the 30 percentage point increase in black turnout at Harold Washington's mayoral elections.[127] Fredrick Harris quotes Rev Elmer Fowler of Third Baptist Church telling an audience, 'talk to every black person you see and get them registered to vote'.[128] The church is not only important for votes but also for volunteers. Harris concluded that the black church provides psychological resources for political action, engendering feelings of group efficacy.[129] His work echoed Steven Peterson's findings that activity in church-centred activities have a 'spillover effect' into secular forms of political participation.[130] Braun clearly appreciated this reality telling a gathering of black ministers, 'The church is the single most important institution we have'.[131]

In her appearances, Braun forwarded clear, crusade campaign rhetoric, drawing a sharp contrast between her opponent and herself. She told one congregation, 'the bottom line is that it is the same struggle between good and evil and right and wrong'.[132] Religion has historically helped to frame political narratives for African Americans. At one campaign event Braun was likened to the biblical character Esther, protecting 'her people' from catastrophe.[133] Bishop Arthur Brazier compared Braun with David and Dixon with Goliath.[134] Braun, herself, quoted from scripture when speaking to black religious audiences.[135]

---

[123] Untitled strategy memo, Spring 1992 (Box 878, Braun Archive, Chicago History Museum).
[124] Ibid.
[125] Stout, 2015, 28.
[126] Harris, 1999, 25. Braun joined Vernon Park in 1976.
[127] Preston, 1983.
[128] Quoted in Harris (1999: 22).
[129] Harris, 1999, Ch 3.
[130] Peterson, 1992.
[131] Braun, quoted in Harris (1999, 21)
[132] Braun, quoted in Ibid., 25.
[133] Quoted in Ibid.
[134] Harris, 1999, 19.
[135] A favourite passage was from Galatians 6:9, 'let us not lose heart in doing good; for in due time, if we do not faint, we shall reap'.

Also in contrast to the deracialised campaign strategy, Braun invited prominent African American leaders to campaign alongside her. For example, one month before election day, Braun threw a fundraiser at the Chicago Hilton with Ron Brown, the first black chair of the Democratic National Committee, headlining the event. The Sunday before Election Day, Braun was joined by Douglas Wilder as she campaigned on the South Side.

Braun's lifelong residence on the South Side, I argue, was crucially important in establishing a linked fate appeal with African American voters. At a gathering of black ministers, Rev Willie Barrow, Jesse Jackson's 1984 presidential campaign manager, situated Braun firmly within the community. She stated that Braun 'lives on our side – don't live in the suburbs. She lives right here on the South Side with a black child'.[136] A churchgoer told a reporter that Braun 'can identify with us because she grew up in this community'.[137] In his participant-observation study, Fredrick Harris records black leaders telling other African Americans to 'support our very own'.[138] Braun, in turn, highlighted her connection to the black community by using the first-person plural when addressing black audiences and speaking about her happiness at 'coming home' when at she spoke at events in Chicago's mostly black neighbourhoods, including on the West Side of Chicago which is predominantly black.[139] At one of Jesse Jackson's Operation PUSH gatherings, a speaker declared, 'You're not sending Carol Moseley Braun to the US Senate. You're sending yourself'.[140]


Style

Although Illinois is not a southern state and had a long history of black political participation, I contend that Braun operated within a racially hostile campaign context. Richard Williamson primed racial stereotypes and cues, while also forwarding an issue agenda in which racialised issues such as welfare, drugs, and tax increases featured prominently. Consequently, even right-leaning newspapers in the state argued that the Williamson campaign had been racially divisive.[141]

After Braun won the Democratic nomination, an internal strategy memo predicted, 'Rich Williamson is going to show CMB's picture on television a lot[142]'. After having viewed the entire population of Williamson adverts (n=16) at the Kanter Archive at the University of Oklahoma, I can confirm the prediction of Braun's strategy team. Out of 16 different adverts produced by the Republican campaign, 11 (68.6%) included a photograph of Braun. Examples are depicted in Figure 5.4.

[136] Barrow, quoted in Harris (1999, 23).
[137] Quoted in 'Senate foes hunt for votes', *Southtown Economist*, 2 November 1992.
[138] Quoted in Harris (1999, 13).
[139] Reynolds, 'Behind the Braun Phenomenon', *Chicago*, October 1992.
[140] Quoted in 'I feel duped', *New City*, 2 October 1992.
[141] E.g., 'Braun for Senate – with reservations', *Crain's Chicago Business*, 19 October 1992; 'Braun for US Senate', *Southtown Economist*, 26 October 1992.
[142] Untitled strategy memo, Spring 1992 (Box 878, Braun Archive, Chicago History Museum).


Figure 5.4. Clips from Williamson for Senate television advertisements



Source: Kanter Archive, Political Communications Center, University of Oklahoma

Williamson deployed a number of racial cues in his adverts against Braun. In particular, he used exclusive language to promote the idea that Braun was an outsider. According to the *Chicago Sun-Times*, Williamson's campaign distributed campaign literature which suggested that 'Braun doesn't share American values'.[143] In public statements, Williamson accused Braun of being far 'out of the mainstream'.[144] He also used extreme language to describe Braun and her positions. In campaign advertising, he condemned Braun for holding 'reckless' positions (see Figure 5.5) on child pornography, taxes, murder, and drugs.[145] Williamson told reporters in the Republican-leaning collar counties outside Chicago that Braun and her supporters were 'radically reckless liberals'.[146]

Figure 5.5. Williamson television advert: 'Reckless'




Source: Political Communications Center, University of Oklahoma

[143] Steve Neal, 'Why Voters Don't Trust Williamson', *Chicago Sun-Times*, 12 October 1992.
[144] Williamson, quoted in Gutgold (2006: 144).
[145] Basil Talbott, 'Williamson hits Braun as soft on porn, drugs', *Chicago Sun-Times*, 27 October 1992.
[146] Williamson, quoted in 'Senate Rivals Work Strongholds', *Chicago Sun-Times*, 2 November 1992.

Braun responded defiantly telling a gathering at Du Page College, also in the collar counties, 'My opponent calls me reckless. Didn't they call Anita Hill that? Reckless? Excuse me'.[147] By comparing herself to Anita Hill, I argue that Braun forwarded the crusade campaign narrative which aligned Williamson to the same insensitive white, male establishment who had motivated her to run for the Senate in the first place. As one Braun advisor explained to me, the campaign presented Williamson as 'representative of the white, male Senate and that it was time to change. That was what we ran on'.[148] Following this theme, Braun criticised Williamson for being a member of a country club in Wilmette, a suburb of Chicago. The country club had no black, Jewish, or Latino members.[149] Braun stated a week before the election that Williamson belonged to 'an exclusive, all-white country club. Now he's trying to get into another exclusive all-white club, namely the Senate'.[150] In an interview with me without prompting, Braun's research director referred to the Senate as 'a white boys' club'.[151]

A strategy memo written at the start of the general election campaign resolved that Braun would be 'hitting back on all charges'. It vowed that the campaign would 'not [be] doing a Dukakis – i.e., we will answer our opponent's attacks quickly and forcefully'.[152] These primary sources provide evidence of an intentional crusade campaign strategy.[153] The Braun campaign was unflinching in calling out Williamson for racism when they saw it. They ran a television advertisement in which they directly identified Williamson as running a racist advert (see Figure 5.6). What is most noteworthy about Braun's interventions is that she was willing to identify racism *explicitly* when Williamson engaged almost entirely in *implicit* racial attacks, unlike Jesse Helms (see Chapter 4).

Figure 5.6. Braun television advertisement: 'GP'



Source: Kanter Archive, Political Communications Center, University of Oklahoma

[147] Braun, quoted in Ibid.
[148] CMB5.
[149] Michael Briggs & Larry Weintraub, 'Worried Williamson Quits Club', *Chicago Sun-Times*, 29 October 1992.
[150] Braun, quoted in *Southtown Economist*, 29 October 1992.
[151] Interview with Cohen.
[152] Untitled strategy memo, Spring 1992 (Box 878, Braun Archive, Chicago History Museum).
[153] Ibid.

A scandal which emerged near the end of the campaign offers a case study of how both candidates reacted to a set of circumstances in which a racial stereotype (corruption) was combined powerfully with a racialised policy issue (welfare).[154] As numerous studies have shown, the dominant racial frame of welfare is one of undeserving African Americans taking from hard-working whites.[155] Rather than ignore the racial content of her opponent's attacks, however, Braun addressed it directly.


On 28 September, WMAQ-Channel 5 revealed that Braun's mother Edna Moseley had not disclosed to the Illinois Department of Public Aid her receipt of $28,750 from the sale of timber rights she inherited from her great-great aunt's farm in Union Springs, Alabama.[156] Moseley lived in a nursing home which was funded by Medicaid, a means-tested public health insurance programme administered by the states. While the proceeds of the windfall would normally be expected to contribute to the costs of her care, Moseley distributed the money to her surviving children, including giving $10,000 to Braun. Braun claimed that the money was a legitimate repayment for a loan.[157]

Regardless of the legal technicalities, the episode was manipulated by the Williamson campaign for political advantage. When WMAQ-Channel 5 first broke the story, the Williamson campaign received a cash injection of $240,000 from the National Republican Senate Campaign Committee (NRSCC) with a further $500,000 to follow. Williamson then regularly broadcast adverts questioning Braun's ethics (see Figure 5.7).[158] Although he did not evoke race explicitly, Williamson's attacks were hard-hitting. In public comments, Williamson accused Braun of criminal activity and cheating the welfare system for her own gain. He told a gathering in St Charles, a majority-white town in the collar counties, 'She was a cheat. She tried to defraud the people'.[159] At another event in Lemont, Williamson told reporters, 'My opponent cheated the system'.[160] At a Republican fundraiser with Williamson, Illinois Secretary of State George Ryan – who later spent more than five years in federal prison for corruption –

[154] There is a certain irony in welfare being viewed as a 'black' programme given that for much of American history, African Americans were systematically excluded from receiving it. A 1933 Department of Labor report found that 96% of families receiving state welfare benefits were white. On the exclusion of African Americans from the federal welfare system, see Katznelson (2005).
[155] For scholars who have drawn the intimate connection between race and welfare policy in the United States, see Quadango (1994), Lieberman (1998), Brown (1999), Gilens (1999), Neubeck & Cazenave (2001), Schram et al (2003), King & Smith (2014).
[156] William Gaines & Robert Blau, 'Braun Flap Sprouts in Alabama Acreage', *Chicago Tribune*, 4 October 1992.
[157] In Illinois, Medicaid patients are obliged to use windfalls to pay for medical expenses, but an exception is made for patients who have other pre-existing debts. The Illinois Department of Public Aid's official account shows that Moseley owed her children money which 'exceeded the distributions made to the Moseley children'. However, the Department concluded that Moseley distributed $15,239.92 to her children for categories of expenses which were not viewed as debts which took precedent over paying for Moseley's care. Braun refunded the state of Illinois the full amount on 30 October 1992 and the Department considered 'this matter resolved as of October 30, 1992' (Letter from the Illinois Department of Public Aid to Carol Moseley-Braun, 22 January 1993 (Box 878, Braun Archive, Chicago History Museum).
[158] Basil Talbott, 'Braun, Wiliamson facing critical test', *Chicago Sun-Times*, 11 October 1992.
[159] Williamson, quoted in 'Williamson calls rival a cheat', *Chicago Tribune*, 1 November 1992.
[160] Williamson, quoted in 'Senate foes hunt for votes', *Southtown Economist*, 2 November 1992.

demanded, 'The voters ought to know if she's guilty of Medicaid fraud'.[161] Williamson was eventually censured by CONDUCT (Committee On Decent Unbiased Campaign Tactics), a group which monitors campaigns for racial divisiveness.[162]

Figure 5.7. Williamson television advert: 'Ethics Revised'



Source: Political Communications Center, University of Oklahoma

Due to the highly racialised associations of welfare and corruption, I contend that Williamson's attacks were racially hostile. Thomas Edsall and Mary Edsall record the reflections of a white carpenter whom they interviewed at the campaign headquarters of Republican state senator Robert Raica in Chicago. The carpenter articulated the racialised associations which the Braun campaign were desperate to avoid:

> 'You could classify me as a working-class Democrat, a card-carrying union member. I'm not a card carrying Republican, yet…We have four or five generations of welfare mothers. And they [Democrats] say the answer to that is that we need more programs. Come on…It's well and good we should have compassion for these people, but your compassion only goes so far. I don't mind helping, but somebody has got to help themselves. You've got to pull. When you try to pick somebody up, they have to help…Unfortunately, most of the people who need help in this situation are black and most of the people doing the helping are white…We are tired of paying for the Chicago Housing Authority and for public housing and public transport that we don't use'.[163]

Tate believes that the Medicaid scandal was 'potentially devastating' because it served to invoke racial stereotypes of African Americans as underserving recipients of welfare.[164] A senior member of the Braun team agrees, 'it fits into the stereotype almost of the welfare queen that African Americans are tarred with by a white establishment'.[165] Indeed, it was in Chicago where Ronald Reagan himself spoke (erroneously, as it turned out) of the 'welfare queen' with 'eight names, thirty addresses, twelve Social

[161] Ryan, quoted in 'Williamson backers bash away', *Chicago-Sun Times,* 8 October 1992.
[162] Basil Talbott, 'Braun, Williamson slug it out', *Chicago Sun-Times,* 1 November 1992.
[163] Quoted in Edsall & Edsall (1991: 6).
[164] Tate, 1997, 243.
[165] CMB11.

Security cards' whose 'tax-free income alone is over $150,000'.[166] Braun characterises the Republican strategy as trying to plant the idea that people were willing 'to take a chance on this black candidate, but uh oh, on second thought, we're not here to take a chance on a welfare queen'.[167]

As noted before, Williamson did not mention race explicitly in any of his attacks during the Medicaid scandal. While the deracialised model would hold that Braun ignore the implicit racial content of Williamson's charge, she took the opposite tack. At a press conference, Braun stated that Williamson had 'attempted to peddle racism'[168] and was 'trying to frighten people with the image of a bomb-throwing welfare mother running for the Senate'.[169] According to one senior campaign official, Braun's decision to describe the Medicaid attacks as racist was 'heatedly debated' by her advisors.[170] Braun, herself, contends that she had no qualms about the strategy:

> 'I've always been very straightforward about [race] – I've never hid that light under a bushel. I feel if I'm in a room, part of the value I bring to that room is a perspective based on the fact that I am female with brown skin. Otherwise, I may just as well be another white guy, no offence, but you see what I'm saying? What's the point? If I'm not going to articulate and give voice to the set of experiences that are defining for me, then I have no legitimacy. So, calling it a racial attack, I had no problem doing that because that's exactly what it was'.[171]

Her research director Ira Cohen agrees, stating, 'in my own judgement, there's no question that she should have responded in that vein'.[172]

While residents were not impressed with Braun's handling of her mother's finances, I posit that Braun's decision to identify the racial content of Williamson's attacks was important in retaining her support from liberal white voters. By portraying Williamson as a racially hostile personification of the white, male establishment, Braun made it difficult for voters to switch their support to him. At a focus group conducted during the campaign, a 52-year-old white travel agent from northern Chicago captured these sentiments. She stated, 'I am for Carol Moseley Braun. Even though I don't agree with what she did, blacks and women are grossly underrepresented in Congress'.[173] Cohen argues that Braun's response rendered Williamson's attack ineffective: 'In the end, I think it was counterproductive for him. In the end, I think it boomeranged'.[174]

---

[166] Ronald Reagan, quoted in Edsall & Edsall (1991: 148)
[167] Interview with Braun, 2015.
[168] Braun, quoted in 'Braun takes heat on funds', *Chicago Sun-Times*, 1 October 1992. Braun's full quote is, 'The same people who attempted to peddle racism in this campaign found that it wasn't going to be bought by the people of Illinois, and now they are trying to manufacture a scandal'.
[169] Braun, quoted in Gutgold (2006: 144).
[170] CMB6.
[171] Interview with Braun, 2015.
[172] Interview with Cohen.
[173] Eleanor Murray, quoted in 'Panel pines for third choice', *Chicago Sun-Times*, 13 October 1992.
[174] Interview with Cohen.

Policy Agenda

The deracialised model also states that black candidates will forward a race-neutral policy agenda, taking conservative policy positions in order to avoid alienating whites.[175] However, Braun did not retreat from her liberal positions or avoid issues with racialised content. She indicated to me that it is 'one of the reasons, particularly in government, that I've been able to sleep as well as I do at night [laughs]'.[176] During the Democratic primary, she challenged Alan Dixon from the left, telling reporters that she was running to 'return a true Democrat to the Senate'.[177] Later in the campaign, like Gantt, Braun did not reject the liberal label, in spite of Williamson's description of the candidate as 'recklessly liberal'. In an interview the week before the general election, Braun was asked whether she accepted the liberal label. She replied, 'I'll take liberal. I don't have a problem with that. I'm not reckless'.[178]

Similar to Harvey Gantt, the Braun campaign believed that clearly expressed policy positions would be important to establishing Braun's credibility. Braun explains to me, 'My view was that if I believe something is right…I'm going to (a) say that and (b) stand by what I think is right'.[179] An internal strategy document states, 'We must combat the subconscious stereotype that many people (and much of the media) have that African-Americans are less substantive than white males; we must use CMB's speeches, issues papers, and debates to show that she is both compassionate and intelligent'.[180]

Braun's positions included cutting the Pentagon's budget, a higher top rate of income tax, increased infrastructure spending, opposition to the death penalty,[181] drug decriminalisation,[182] and a single-payer healthcare system.[183] Braun maintained these positions in spite of fierce attacks from Williamson. For example, she maintained her position that cannabis should be decriminalised[184] in spite of Williamson's attacks that Braun was 'recklessly liberal' on drug policy.[185] In some cases, Braun justified her policy positions with reference to explicit racial inequalities. For example, Braun stated that she opposed the death penalty because she believed that it was disproportionately used against ethnic minorities.[186]

Nordin states that Braun rarely spoke about race explicitly, fearing white backlash.[187]As I have demonstrated, such a claim is not substantiated by the evidence. Braun herself made very clear in her interview with me that she rejected the idea that she ought to deracialise in order to win white votes:

---

[175] Wilson, 1990.
[176] Interview with Braun, 2015.
[177] Braun, quoted in Tate (2003: 271).
[178] Braun, quoted in *Southtown Economist,* 29 October, 1992.
[179] Interview with Braun, 2015.
[180] Untitled strategy memo, Spring 1992 (Box 878, Braun Archive, Chicago History Museum).
[181] 'Braun clarifies death penalty stance in campaign speech, *Chicago Defender*, 8 June 1992.
[182] Steve Johnson, 'Williamson rips Braun on marijuana', *Chicago Tribune*, 19 June 1992.
[183] Interviews with Miller, Cohen, Cobble, Booth. See also Gutgold (2006: Ch 5).
[184] Frank James, 'Large gap separates Williamson and Braun on crime', *Chicago Tribune*, 19 October 1992.
[185] 'Williamson hits Braun as soft on porn, drugs', *Chicago Sun-Times,* 27 October 1992.
[186] James, 'Large gap separates Williamson and Braun on crime', *Chicago Tribune*, 19 October 1992.
[187] Nordin, 2012, 131.

'You can put lipstick on a pig and call it Monique and it's still a pig [laughs]. You know, race is like that. You can talk around it all you want, but unless you're honest about it, you'll never be able to communicate appropriately'.[188] A senior member of the campaign team agrees, 'Here's the thing about Carol – despite the dysfunction of the campaign and the imperfect nature of it, she's an incredibly smart woman who knows what she believes, has clear positions on issues, and she's not a vessel…She was very clear about what she believed'.[189]

Result

On 3 November 1992, Carol Moseley Braun was elected the first black female senator. She defeated Williamson with 53.3% of the vote to his 43.1%. Braun and Williamson split the white vote almost evenly: 48% of whites voted for Braun while 52% voted for Williamson.[190] Braun won 5.5 percent more of the white vote than her campaign had initially predicted. Tate argues that Braun's substantial support from whites was due to 'her careful avoidance of racial issues', but my closer analysis of Braun's communications and campaign rhetoric has complicated Tate's claim.[191] Far from avoiding race to appeal to white voters, Braun's racially symbolic status and the contrast she was able to draw against a racially hostile opponent was, from the perspective of Braun and her campaign advisors, seen as important in maintaining the support of white voters.

Unsurprisingly, Braun received 95% of the black vote, and in some majority-black Chicago precincts her support was over 99%. This was consistent with results shown by Harold Washington in 1983 and 1987, as well as Jesse Jackson in 1988.[192] Black turnout in the 1992 senatorial election was 75.1%, which was level with white turnout, a goal which had been set by the campaign in a spring 1992 strategy document.[193]

However, Braun's victory extended far beyond the black community. Nearly 75% of Braun's support came from white voters,[194] and she out-polled Williamson (49% to 46%) in the twenty-eight Illinois counties with virtually no (<1%) ethnic minorities.[195] Braun performed strongly downstate, defeating Williamson by a 2:1 margin. She also outpolled presidential candidate Bill Clinton by 177,776 votes.[196]

The Braun archive provides a rare opportunity to compare the campaign's strategic objectives with actual outcome. In April 1992, Braun's campaign manager Kgosie Matthews commissioned Larry

[188] Interview with Braun, 2015.
[189] CMB10.
[190] Tate, 1997, 275.
[191] Tate, 1997, 277.
[192] Oden, 1996, 53.
[193] Untitled strategy memo, Spring 1992 (Box 878, Braun Archive, Chicago History Museum).
[194] Mark Brown, 'Braun runs strong among white voters', *Chicago Sun-Times*, 4 November 1992.
[195] Oden, 1996, 55.
[196] 'The Senate Race', *Chicago Tribune*, 5 November 1992.


Shapiro to project the outcome of the election using raw turnout, registration, and voting data from 1988 presidential election, the 1990 senatorial election, and 1992 presidential primary.[197] These data were used to predict what a generic Democrat facing a generic Republican would likely receive. There are three noteworthy findings from this research.

First, these generic data were surprisingly accurate at predicting the outcome six months before the fact. On average, the data were only 6,437 votes off from predicting Braun's actual vote totals in each county and only 2,184 votes off on average from predicting Williamson's total votes in each county. Second, the inaccuracies were generated by Braun's consistent over-performance from the 'generic' Democratic candidate. Overall, Braun was predicted to win 2,405,959 votes or 52.1% of the vote. In fact, she won 2,579,162 votes or 55.0% of the total two-party vote.[198]

Finally, the distribution of Braun's over-performance and under-performance is instructive (Figure 5.8). Shapiro's analysis predicts county-level results for the states' twenty-three largest counties, as well as an overall prediction for the rest of downstate. Among these, in number of votes, Braun over-performed most in DuPage (net Braun over-performance of 22,471 votes) and Lake (net Braun over-performance of 39,524 votes) counties. These are both 'collar counties' where Braun had hoped to attract women reacting to the Anita Hill controversy. However, what is also telling is that Braun over-performed in 'downstate' Illinois by a net improvement of 87,480 votes. In other words, Braun did *better* downstate than a generic Democrat was expected to have done in spite of these rural areas being overwhelmingly white.

[197] Memo from Larry Shapiro to Kgosie Matthews, 24 April 1992 (Box 878, Braun Archive, Chicago History Museum)
[198] Six minor-party candidates won a total of 3.6% of the total vote.

Figure 5.8. Performance relative to internal prediction, by county (April 1992/November 1992)



Comparison of memo from Larry Shapiro to Kgosie Matthews, 24 April 1992 (Box 878, Braun Archive, Chicago History Museum) with official results.

Conclusion

Carol Moseley Braun's historic campaign for the US Senate deserves more detailed attention from political scientists than it has hitherto received. For the field of black electoral studies, this campaign is especially important because it presents a potentially devastating challenge to the dominant theoretical assumption that black candidates must discard their racial identity in order to secure white votes. Braun's candidacy also shows that the assumption that black candidates will be subjected to negative backlash from white voters if they accuse their white opponents of racism may be overstated. Most importantly, Braun demonstrates that black candidates can confront racially hostile opponents within majority-white electoral contexts and emerge victorious.

Part III – Race-Conscious Campaigning in Democratic Primaries

A shortcoming of the scholarship on deracialisation is the failure to come to terms with ideological and demographic changes which have occurred within the Democratic Party in the past two decades. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, black Democratic candidates outside of predominantly black election contexts could reasonably anticipate the need to appeal to white Democratic voters with racially conservative attitudes. In the twenty-first century, racial attitudes have sorted more clearly into the two main political parties than at any time in American history.[1] As Michael Tesler has shown, when O J Simpson faced trial in 1995, white Democrats' and white Republicans' reactions to the verdict had little substantive difference (4 percentage points). In contrast, there was a 43 percentage point difference between white Democrats and white Republicans in their reaction to George Zimmerman's trial in 2012.[2] In the twenty-first century, racial liberals are almost uniformly supporters of the Democratic Party while racial conservatives have now vanished from the erstwhile party of Dixie.[3]

For black politicians in majority-white contexts, these changes have profound implications which have largely been unexplored by theorists of racial campaign strategies. It is no longer a clear expectation that black Democratic candidates will need to maintain the support of racially conservative whites to be elected in majority-white contexts. When Douglas Wilder was elected governor of Virginia in 1989, the Democratic coalition included voters and politicians who had opposed school integration. Twenty years later, these Democrats were largely deceased, and their descendants voted Republican.[4]


In areas where the Democratic Party is dominant, this partisan-ideological sorting offers even greater opportunities for black candidates to pursue race-conscious campaign strategies. This is especially true in areas where the Democratic primary is the more important competition than the general election itself. In such contests, the median voter is more likely to have liberal views on race and a firm left-of-centre set of policy preferences. While by no means immune from racist campaign tactics or negative racial stereotypes, these campaign contexts open up the possibility for black candidates to campaign by appealing to white voters' aspirations of increasing diversity, sending a message about racial inclusivity, and achieving racial progress. In these contexts, it is not a disadvantage for a black candidate to be perceived as liberal, including on issues with strong racial associations such as crime, welfare, or taxation. Additionally, it is possible for black candidates to make the case for racially targeted policies, alongside broad universal commitments, even if most of their electorate would not personally benefit

[1] See King & Smith (2014), Johnson (2017a, 2017b).
[2] Tesler, 2016.
[3] Levendusky, 2009.
[4] See Green et al (2004: 141) on the importance of cohort replacement in the shifting ideological centres of American political parties.

from these policies. A philosophical commitment to ending racial inequality though race-conscious policies is increasingly a defining characteristic of Democratic electorates.

Part III examines two prominent Democrats whose racial campaign strategies diverged substantially from the deracialised campaign strategy: Barack Obama and Keith Ellison. Both were symbolically significant candidates whose campaigns made direct appeals to voters' aspirations of making history and increasing diversity in the US Senate and the US House of Representatives. However, their racial strategies were far from being *merely* symbolic. Both candidates articulated clear positions on racial inequality and argued in favour of policies aimed at alleviating the material condition of racial minorities, especially African Americans. Rather than attempt to convince white voters that they were 'no different' than previous (white) candidates, as the deracialisation model would suggest, these candidates' strongly expressed racial identities were deployed in campaign appeals to highlight their difference from the status quo. Both candidates appealed to white Democrats' aspirations of change while actively mobilising minority voters in their constituencies. For these reasons, Obama and Ellison cannot be described as 'deracialised' candidates. They pursued racially conscious, symbolic-substantive campaign strategies.

Figure III.1. Racial Campaign Strategy Analysed in Part III



Chapter 6 - Barack Obama (Illinois, 2004)

'I'm going to be very proud of this one'.
Senator Paul Simon about Barack Obama, November 2003

***

Barack Obama is unquestionably the most significant African American elected official in United States history. His electoral success has been attributed to his faithful adherence to the deracialised campaign strategy. Melanye Price contends that when he ran for president, Obama followed 'old techniques African American candidates used in efforts to deracialize'.[1] Christopher Stout argues that Barack Obama adopted a 'nonracial campaign strategy'.[2] Niambi Carter and Pearl Ford Dowe describe Obama as having a 'deracialized' message 'void of a pursuit of racial group interests'.[3] Denis Nordin credits Obama with pursuing a 'race-free strategy'.[4] Dewey Clayton concludes, 'Obama sought the presidency by running a deracialized campaign'.[5]

Such scholarly accounts of Obama's election and re-election to the US presidency abound, but less attention has been directed to his earlier electoral contests.[6] In particular, the only other campaign in which Obama ran for office in a majority-white setting against white opponents – the 2004 Democratic primary for the US Senate in Illinois – has received scant attention from academics.[7] In this case study, I redirect focus to this key election and argue that conclusions about the type of racial campaign strategy Obama pursued in 2008 or 2012 cannot simply be reapplied to describe his strategy in 2004. While Obama may have 'deracialised' in 2008 to win the presidency, the evidence does not support that he did so to win his Senate seat four years earlier.

Instead, this case study argues that Obama pursued a race-conscious 'symbolic-substantive' campaign strategy. Obama's electoral coalition consisted of two groups of voters who were not only open to but also responded positively to race-conscious appeals: African Americans and liberal whites. The Obama campaign believed that they could win the election by mobilising these electorates and designed their strategic appeals accordingly. For African Americans, Obama offered a race-conscious analysis of material inequalities in the United States and highlighted his policy accomplishments as a state senator on issues such as criminal justice, racial profiling, tax credits, and healthcare. He also produced targeted radio and print advertisements which tied him firmly to the black community, often drawing on elite

[1] Price, 2016, 159.
[2] Stout, 2015.
[3] Carter & Dowe, 2015, 106.
[4] Nordin, 2012, ix.
[5] Clayton, 2010, 5.
[6] For stand-out research on the 2008 and 2012 elections, see Ceasar et al (2009), Lewis-Beck et al (2010), Liu (2010), Block (2011), Carter & Dowe (2015), Tesler (2016).
[7] Jackson (2006) and Frasure (2010) are the exceptions.

black political figures to affirm his racial authenticity. To liberal whites, Obama was presented as a history-maker and barrier-breaker. Contemporary focus groups and internal research showed that white progressives responded positively to information about Obama's previous historic 'firsts', especially his status as the first African American president of the *Harvard Law Review*.[8] Obama's historic *potential* was also highly salient, with white commentators already describing Obama as a future first black president before he had even won his party's nomination for the US Senate.[9]

For its impact on subsequent electoral politics, the 2004 contest was Illinois's most important statewide election since the 1858 senatorial campaign between Stephen Douglas and Abraham Lincoln, both of whom would go on to be their parties' presidential nominees two years later.[10] In addition to its intrinsic historical importance, however, attention to the March 2004 Democratic primary is merited for several reasons. First, it was Barack Obama's first election in a predominantly white election environment. Previously, all of Obama's elections had been in African American-majority jurisdictions against black opponents. It was also the first time Obama fought an election campaign outside of Chicago's South Side.[11] Second, it was a genuinely competitive election, unlike the subsequent general election in which Obama defeated a black Republican candidate in the largest landslide in state history.[12] In the primary, Obama's competitors were white, better funded, and better known.[13] Languishing in third place for most of the campaign, Obama's ultimate success shows the importance of both contingent events and strategic appeals. Structural dynamics, such as the demographics of the jurisdiction, are not sufficient to explain Obama's victory. Finally, by focusing on the primary election, this case removes partisan competition as a variable, allowing an analysis of how Democratic voters responded to an inter-racial contest within their own party.

Explanatory Variables: Context, Biography, and Elites

Context: The Democratic Primary Electorate of Illinois in 2004

As explained in Chapter 5, the state of Illinois can be divided into three regions: Cook County, where Chicago is located; the suburban collar counties which surround Chicago (DuPage, Kane, Lake, McHenry, Will); and the rest of the state, referred to as 'Downstate', even in areas which are geographically to the north of Chicago. Since the late 1970s, African Americans have won election to

[8] Interview with Chris Sautter, 16 February 2017.
[9] Burt Constable, 'Best candidate has worst name, but both parties have choices', *Chicago Daily Herald*, 2 March 2004.
[10] For this view, see Jackson (2006).
[11] With one qualification: Obama's state senate district was re-drawn to stretch beyond the South Side after the 2000 Census. However, the only time Obama stood for election under this configuration (2002), he was returned to the state senate unopposed.
[12] Nowlan et al, 2010, 53.
[13] Jackson (2006) describes the primary as 'by far the biggest hurdle Obama faced that year' (3).

several of Illinois's lower-tier executive offices (Comptroller, Attorney General, Secretary of State), displaying a longer record of black statewide office-holding than nearly any other US state.

The city of Chicago dominates Illinois, especially its politics, a dynamic which has been especially important for African Americans.[14] As Barack Obama once described, Chicago is regarded by many as 'the capital of the African American community in the country'.[15] Founded by an African-Caribbean explorer in the eighteenth century, black people have lived in the Chicago area longer than any group except for Native Americans.[16] Their long history of residence and spatial concentration (due to intense segregation) made Chicago the epicentre of black political life in the United States, producing a longer period of sustained black political representation than virtually any other locality in the United States.[17] Given this backdrop, the historian Timuel Black insisted, 'The first African American president could *only* have come from Chicago'.[18]

The South Side, black Chicago's 'citadel', has continuously elected African Americans to public office longer than any other area in the country.[19] The South Side has been represented by African Americans in the Illinois state legislature since the election of John Thomas in 1876.[20] The First Congressional District (IL:01), anchored in the South Side, sent the first post-Reconstruction black politician to Congress in 1928 and has been represented by African Americans ever since. The district has been represented by key black Chicago figures, including Oscar De Priest, William 'Boss' Dawson, Ralph Metcalfe, and Harold Washington, who represented the district until he was elected mayor of Chicago in 1983. Barack Obama unsuccessfully sought election to this seat in 2000.


Arriving in 1985 from New York, Barack Obama spent most of his adult life in Chicago. Although Obama was an outsider, Chicago has long been the site of refuge for African Americans. Between 1940 and 1960, well over half a million African Americans moved to the city from other parts of the country, especially the South. Timuel Black recalls meeting the twenty-something Barack Obama in the mid-1980s. In their conversation Obama explained to Black that he saw himself as being a part of black Chicago's history of migration.[21]

Chicago is located in Cook County, the second largest county in the United States and where a plurality of the Illinois population has lived since 1930. While a proportion of Illinois residents shifted steadily

[14] This has not always been true historically. In the 1858 US Senate election, Abraham Lincoln gave the overwhelming majority of his public speeches in central Illinois, making only one in Chicago (Nowlan et al, 2010: 9). See also the map in Sutton (1976: 369).
[15] Obama, quoted in 'Is Bobby Rush in Trouble?', *Chicago Reader*, 17 March 2000.
[16] Cohen & Taylor, 2000, 30.
[17] See Williams (2008).
[18] Black, quoted in Remnick (2010: 143).
[19] Harris, 2012, 36.
[20] Williams, 2008, Ch 1.
[21] Remnick, 2010, Ch 4.

into the suburban collar counties from the 1960s, as Figure 6.1 shows, Cook County was still the most politically important region in the state.[22] In 2004, all six of the state's popularly elected executive officers were from Cook County.[23] In 2003, the new governor of Illinois, Rod Blagojevich, even decided not to move to the capital city, Springfield, preferring to live at his home in northwest Chicago and conduct his business as governor from Chicago's downtown Loop.

Figure 6.1. Population distribution in Illinois (20th century)




Based on data from US Census Bureau

Cook County's influence is even more outsized in the Democratic Party. In some elections, solid support in Cook County can be sufficient to ensure victory. A 2007 survey found that 75.6 percent of Chicagoans identified as Democrats, compared to only 8.4 percent who viewed themselves as Republicans.[24] In 2004, while 43.3 percent of the state population resided in Cook County, 58.0 percent of Democratic primary voters were Cook County residents. Figure 6.2 illustrates the regional skew of Democratic voters in the 2004 primary. Such was Chicago's political dominance – both in voter distribution and candidate recruitment – that in the 2004 Democratic Senate primary, all seven of the candidates were from the city.[25] This study will focus on the three major candidates: Barack Obama,

[22] Between 2000 and 2006, nearly all of the state's population increase of 412,000 residents occurred in the collar counties around Chicago
[23] Rod Blagojevich (Governor), Pat Quinn (Lt Governor), Jesse White (Secretary of State), Lisa Madigan (Attorney General), Judy Baar Topinka (Treasurer), Dan Hynes (Comptroller)
[24] Nowlan et al, 2010, 236 fn57.
[25] Bernard Schoenburg, 'Off and running: Candidates file to be on March 16 ballot', *Springfield State Journal-Register*, 9 December 2003.

Dan Hynes, and Blair Hull. The four minor candidates were Maria Pappas, Gerry Chico, Joyce Washington, and Nancy Skinner. None received more than 6 percent of the vote.

Figure 6.2. Comparison of overall population and Democratic voter distribution in Illinois



Sources: 2000 US Census, Illinois State Board of Elections (2004)

In the post-war period, Chicago has been dominated politically by the Cook County Democratic Party, known colloquially as the Organization or the Democratic machine. In the mid-twentieth century, the Organization was headed by Richard J Daley, who served as mayor of Chicago from 1955 until his death twenty-one years later. Daley's power – and reputation for it – was immense. With few exceptions, for most of his mayoralty, only a small band of Democrats centred in Hyde Park were 'independent' from the machine's patronage and influence.[26] By 2004, the Organization continued to exist, under the leadership of Daley's son Richard M Daley, who served as mayor for even longer than his father (1989-2011). However, its influence – always dependent on uneasy alliances with ethnic sub-machines – was less impenetrable than it once had been. In 2004, key factions divided over the candidates in the Democratic primary: the Irish machine (Hynes), the black machine (Obama/Hynes), black nationalists (Obama/Hull), a growing Hispanic leadership (Chico), and white independents (Obama).

The Obama campaign's strategy was to win Cook County, perform well in the collar counties, and avoid catastrophe Downstate especially by doing well in college towns and areas with African American populations.[27] Obama's base of supporters throughout the state was African Americans and liberal

[26] Interview with Abner Mikva, 7 February 2016.
[27] Interviews with Pete Giangreco (14 February 2017) and James Cauley (6 March 2017). See also Remnick (2010: 357).

whites.[28] Nate Tamarin, Obama's deputy campaign manager stated to me, 'we knew it was going to need to be some combination of African American support plus white progressives basically'.[29] Hynes targeted whites in the suburbs and Downstate, while also aiming to use his connections to the Democratic machine to mobilise ethnic whites and some African Americans in Chicago.[30] Blair Hull tried to replicate Governor Rod Blagojevich's successful strategy in 2002.[31] Although he was from Chicago, Blagojevich abandoned the city during the Democratic primary in favour of campaigning in the small towns and labour halls downstate. Blagojevich won the nomination in spite of losing Chicago, described by one Downstate journalist as 'a novel political strategy based on some daring math'.[32]

Candidate: Barack Obama

Born to a white mother and a black, Kenyan father, Barack Obama's racial background does not fit neatly within the conventional African American narrative of descent from southern black slavery which is the common tie among the vast majority of black people in America.[33] Niambi Carter and Pearl Ford Dowe propose that because Obama's mother was white there is 'a great deal of ambiguity' about how people view Obama's racial identity.[34]

For Obama, however, this ambiguity is not present. He has argued that he should not be regarded as a 'tragic mulatto trapped between two worlds' and has repeatedly and unambiguously identified himself as an African American.[35] In an interview, Obama explained, 'I self-identify as African American. That's how I'm treated, and that's how I'm viewed. I'm proud of it'.[36] In another interview, Obama cited 'my status as an African American in this country' as informing his political beliefs.[37] According to Newton Minow, who hired Obama as an assistant in his law firm Sidley Austin in 1989, 'I just think he took the view, I'm black – period'.[38] Mentor and colleague Abner Mikva stated to me that in their twenty-five years of friendship, 'He has never thought of himself as anything but as a black person'.[39] An African American lobbyist who first met Obama as a state senator in the 1990s confesses to me, 'I had no idea that he was biracial'.[40] Consistent with this viewpoint, in the 2010 US Census, Obama

[28] Paul Merrion, 'In Senate race, give a big edge to the officeholders', *Crain's Chicago Business*, 11 August 2003.
[29] Interview with Nate Tamarin, 13 March 2017.
[30] Mendell, 2007, 224.
[31] Interview with Giangreco. See also Gregory Giroux, 'Land of Lincoln will be crucial in Democratic strategy to win back the Senate', *Congressional Quarterly*, 15 March 2004.
[32] Kevin McDermott, 'Senate Race may Be Decided Downstate', *St Louis Post-Dispatch*, 14 March 2004.
[33] See Dawson (1995). On Obama, see Walters (2007).
[34] Carter & Dowe, 2015.
[35] Obama, 2004 [1995], xv.
[36] Barack Obama, quoted in P Bacon, 'Rock solid support for Obama, but will the black vote follow', *Washington Post*, 2007.
[37] Obama, quoted in Mendell (2007: 200).
[38] Interview with Newton Minow, 15 April 2015.
[39] Interview with Mikva.
[40] BO3.

ticked (only) the box 'Black, African Am, or Negro' in spite of there being an option for 'two or more races'.[41]

Obama first lived on the South Side of Chicago in the mid-1980s as a community organiser for the Developing Communities Project (DCP), which was a faith-based programme of about twenty-five black churches on the far South Side. The project aimed to provide support for residents who had been affected by the closure of many of the South Side's manufacturing industries, concentrated on the South Side's Calumet area. In the mid-twentieth century, Chicago produced more steel than the United Kingdom or West Germany did, and the city even outpaced Pittsburgh, considered to be the steel capital of the United States.[42] Director Jerry Kellmer hired Obama because he believed a black community organiser would be more likely to win the trust of the African American residents than he could as a white person. The project operated in the South Side communities of Roseland, West Pullman, and Calumet Park, but Obama chose to live in Hyde Park, the South Side's liberal, multiracial enclave near the University of Chicago.[43]

Kellmer recalled that at their first meeting Obama made it clear, 'he wanted to work with the poor, with people who have faced racial discrimination. His heroes were the civil rights movement, but that was over. This was as close as he could get. And he needed to live in a black community'.[44] Obama confirmed in an interview in late 2003, 'I took a lot of inspiration from the civil rights movement and the way the movement brought ordinary people into extraordinary positions of leadership'.[45] His experience at DCP was later politically significant. For example, Paul Davis, a journalist for the black magazine *N'Digo*, wrote in a profile during the US Senate primary that Obama 'earned his spurs by toiling in the hood'.[46]

While Obama worked as a community organiser, Harold Washington was mayor of Chicago, and they briefly met six months before Washington's untimely death (see Figure 6.3). According to Obama's colleagues from the Developing Communities Project, Obama saw Washington as a model for his own ambition. Mike Kruglik, who worked alongside Obama, recalls, 'when he [Obama] though about the path to power himself, he thought of becoming a lawyer, then a state legislator, then a congressman, then a mayor'.[47] In an our interview, Newton Minow posits, 'one of the reasons I think Barack moved to Chicago was he had seen that a black candidate had run for mayor'. Minow recalls that Obama 'asked me some things about Harold. I knew Harold back at law school. Harold was a year behind me at

[41] King & Smith, 2011, Ch 7.
[42] 'Chicago: Steel Capital', *Chicago Tribune*, 16 December 1953.
[43] Remnick, 2010, Ch 4.
[44] Jerry Kellman, quoted in Remnick (2010: 135).
[45] Obama, quoted in Mendell (2007: 200).
[46] Paul Davis, 'Barack Obama seeks to shape the national debate for Illinois', *N'Digo*, 6-12 March 2003.
[47] Mike Kruglik, quoted in Remnick (2010: 161).

Northwestern. So I knew him then'.[48] Obama confirmed in a speech to the Congressional Black Caucus in 2008, 'I originally moved to Chicago in part because of the inspiration of Mayor Washington's campaign'.[49] Fredrick Harris believes that Obama recognised the unique strength of the black community in Chicago.[50] It contrasted with New York where he lived between 1981 and 1985. There, the black population was more diffuse and politically demobilised.[51]

Figure 6.3. Harold Washington visits a DCP job centre, Obama in background (1987)



Source: Harold Washington Library

In 1991 Obama returned to Chicago after graduating from Harvard Law School. At Harvard, Obama had been an executive of the Black Law Students Association and attracted national attention for being elected the first black president of the *Harvard Law Review*. In a *New York Times* interview in 1990, Obama reflected that his election was a sign of progress but refused to allow his individual success to be read as evidence of wider equality. Obama said,


> 'The fact I've been elected shows a lot of progress. It's encouraging. But it's important that stories like mine aren't used to say everything is OK for blacks. You have to remember that for every one of me, there are hundreds or thousands of black students with at least equal talent who don't get a chance…I personally am interested in pushing a strong minority perspective. I'm fairly opinionated about this. But as president…I have a limited role as only first among equals'.[52]

[48] Interview with Minow.
[49] Barack Obama, Speech to the 38th Annual Legislative Conference of the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation, September 2008.
[50] Harris, 2012, Ch 2.
[51] For the challenges of black political mobilisation in New York City, see Waters (1999), Kim (2000), Thompson (2006).
[52] Obama, quoted in 'First Black Elected to Head Harvard's Law Review', *New York Times*, 6 February 1990.

Unsurprisingly, as a result of this attention, Obama was offered a clerkship on the powerful District of Columbia Circuit Court by Chief Judge Abner Mikva. Mikva explained to me, 'I was always looking for a more – to have more diversity among my law clerks. Mine was considered a good clerkship because a lot of my clerks went on to become Supreme Court clerks'.[53] Mikva had coincidentally represented Hyde Park and the North Shore as an anti-machine 'independent' in the state legislature and US Congress before being appointed to the DC Circuit by Jimmy Carter.[54] Mikva was described by Edward McClelland as 'an avatar of the independent liberalism that defines politics in Hyde Park'.[55]

Rather than accept this prestigious offer, Obama chose to return to Chicago and assumed the directorship of the Illinois affiliate of Project Vote, a non-profit organisation which aimed to register over one-hundred thousand African Americans to vote. Obama explained the decision in a 1991 newspaper interview: 'people like myself are learning a certain language of mainstream society, of power and decision[-]making. We have an obligation to go back to the black community, to listen and learn and help give our people a voice'.[56] Project Vote had been active in the previous midterm elections, working in North Carolina to register African Americans to vote for Harvey Gantt, the first black Democrat ever nominated for the US Senate.[57] Obama had followed Gantt's campaign as a final-year student at Harvard and later described Gantt as 'an early inspiration' (see Figure 6.4).

Figure 6.4. Barack Obama in 1990 wearing a Harvey Gantt for US Senate shirt



Source: North Carolina Public Radio

[53] Interview with Mikva.
[54] Mikva stood down in 1994 as Chief Judge and was replaced by Merrick Garland, whom Obama later nominated to the US Supreme Court.
[55] McClelland, 2010, 88-89.
[56] Obama, quoted in 'Degrees of Hatred', *Washington Post*, 16 June 1991.
[57] Jim Morrill, 'New-Voter Efforts More Low-Key than in '84', *Charlotte Observer*, 21 September 1990.


In the March 1992 Illinois Senate primary, Carol Moseley Braun won the Democratic nomination, unseating the white incumbent Alan Dixon, making Braun the first black woman nominated for the US Senate. A Braun campaign internal strategy document from the spring of 1992 explained that to win, 'we need a record African-American turnout to win…[O]ur goal must be to match Harold Washington's levels in African-American precincts in Chicago, while establishing new record levels in all African-American precincts around the state'.[58] Obama's job was, in part, to meet this target. Even though Project Vote was officially non-partisan, McClelland writes that 'it practically became an arm of the Moseley Braun campaign'.[59]

At the same time as he began his work with Project Vote, Obama was given a two-year visiting fellowship at the University of Chicago Law School to write his first book, a memoir about race.[60] Obama would stay at the University of Chicago Law School for twelve years, serving as a lecturer from 1992 to 1996 and a senior lecturer from 1996 until 2004.[61] One of his courses was called 'Current Issues in Racism and the Law'.[62] Obama's syllabus (see Figure 6.5) included scholarly readings from George Fredrickson,[63] Kwame Anthony Appiah,[64] Derrick Bell,[65] and William Julius Wilson.[66] Students were also expected to present on a wide variety of racial topics, including afrocentric education, interracial adoption, racial gerrymandering, racially discriminatory criminal sentencing, criminal profiling, hate crimes, racial bias in the media, welfare policy, reparations, and affirmative action. The theoretical readings and the choice of presentation topics reveal the influence, but not a full embrace, of Derrick Bell, a prominent critical race theorist who taught Obama at Harvard Law School. While Bell appears on the reading lists in three out of four of Obama's lectures, his work is balanced by scholars with other perspectives. The choice of presentation topics, too, suggests some influence of critical race theory. Stacey Gahagan and Alfred Brophy have pointed out that ten of the twelve topics on the syllabus appear in a standard introductory textbook of critical race theory.[67] While by no means evidence that Obama saw himself as a critical race theorist, Gahagn and Brophy conclude that Obama's syllabus suggests a 'critical race pragmatism'. At the very least, the syllabus is evidence of Obama's intimate familiarity with scholarship on institutional racism, patterns of racial inequality, and the enduring legacies of slavery and Jim Crow in the United States.

---

[58] Untitled internal strategy document (Box 878, Carol Moseley Braun Archive, Chicago History Museum).
[59] McClelland, 2010, 69.
[60] Obama, 1995.
[61] Obama taught full-time in the autumn term, one course in the winter term, and no courses in the spring term when he'd be in Springfield at the state legislature ('Obama says autobiography teaches lessons', *Chicago Daily Herald*, 8 March 2004).
[62] Noni Ellison Southall, 'When the president was my professor', *CNN*, 25 February 2013.
[63] Fredrickson, 1988.
[64] Appiah, 1990.
[65] Bell, 1973.
[66] Wilson, 1987.
[67] Gahagan & Brophy, 2014.

Figure 6.5. Excerpts from Barack Obama's 1994 course syllabus



Reading Packet #1

Current Issues in Racism and the Law

Spring Term 1994

Prof. Obama

10) **Reparations** -- Given the perceived failures of the traditional civil rights agenda in bringing about racial equality in the US, a number of black commentators argue that a program of reparations is the only legitimate means of making up for three-hundred plus years of slavery. More recently, some white commentators have also supported a variant of the reparations concept -- for example, the government financing a Community Reinvestment funds that would be controlled by the black community and render affirmative action obsolete. Do such proposals have any realistic chance of working their way through the political system? Would there be any legal impediments to such a broadly-conceived reparations policy?

Source: New York Times

During this time, starting with *Shaw v Reno*, the Supreme Court began to move in the direction of establishing the idea of the 'colour-blind' constitution.[68] In our interview, Abner Mikva recalled discussing this jurisprudential shift with Obama at their breakfast meetings at the university, 'I think that was our first recognition that we had an awful lot of ideas in common…We were aware that this movement towards a so-called colour-blind constitution was going to pull out some of the supports of the civil rights progress that we had made. [We talked about] how a colour-blind constitution is inconsistent with affirmative action or some of the other minority support programmes that people had in this country. And we talked a lot about it'.[69]

After the 1992 election, Obama started working for Davis, Miner, Barnhill, & Galland, a civil rights law firm. David Axelrod, later Obama's US Senate and presidential campaign strategist, points out that the firm was 'well known around town for its support of progressive causes'.[70] Mikva described the firm's principal partner Judson Miner as 'one of these great progressives who was involved in the civil rights struggle and understood all of its aspects'. According to Mikva, Miner 'would take on cases that would push for empowerment for the black community'.[71] Fittingly, Obama pursued a classic issue on which race-conscious politics and good governance progressivism met: electoral reform.[72] Obama was

[68] *Shaw v Reno*, 509 US 630 (1993).
[69] Interview with Mikva.
[70] Axelrod, 2015, Ch 8.
[71] Interview with Mikva.
[72] It should be noted that Obama's first book contract was in fact from Simon and Schuster for a book about voting rights, but he eventually turned them down in favour of the book project which would become *Dreams from My Father* (McClelland, 2010, Ch 5).

part of a legal team which pursued fair minority representation in city council wards after boundaries were redrawn[73] and on a case which sued the state to implement the National Voter Registration Act.[74] For his work on the case *ACORN v Edgar*, Obama was awarded the IVI-IPO (the organisational arm of Hyde Park's anti-machine independents)'s Legal Eagle Award by Senator Paul Simon.[75] Obama's choice of employment (a progressive law firm and the University of Chicago), as well as his decision to settle in Hyde Park, was evidence to David Axelrod that Obama 'was shrewdly and methodically preparing himself for a career in public life'. It was, as Axelrod puts, 'the perfect base for a brainy, reform-minded black man contemplating a run for public office'.[76]

In September 1999, Obama decided to announce his challenge to Bobby Rush, a founding member of the Illinois Black Panther Party, who was the incumbent US Congressman representing the historically black First District. Rush had fared poorly in his mayoral election against Richard Daley the previous year and Obama made the (mistaken) assessment that because Daley had outperformed Rush in parts of Rush's congressional district, Rush was himself vulnerable.[77] David Axelrod describes this as a 'very bad calculation'.[78] Eric Adelstein, Rush's campaign manager, explained to me, 'What that calculus failed to take in to account was how very different a municipal and a Federal election are in the City of Chicago…Rush was an important advocate and prominent voice for the community. But he was not perceived as being ready to run the city government. Those are two very different things'.[79]

Rush represented a black nationalist tradition. Associated in Chicago with South Side figures such as Rush, Gus Savage, and Lu Palmer, the black nationalists believed that white liberals exercised excessive influence on the black empowerment agenda. William Grimshaw writes that they were suspicious of the 'racially inclusive goals of "fairness" and "equity",' touchstones of the Hyde Park progressive tradition.[80] The black nationalists, as Abner Mikva describes, 'believed that integration wouldn't work. What you had to do was give blacks power but not power as part of an integrated community'.[81] In contrast, Obama represented the Hyde Park independent tradition, which was fundamentally coalitional and integrationist. When asked whether white politicians from Hyde Park were expected to take on black empowerment causes, Jacky Grimshaw, who had run Harold Washington's mayoral office and

[73] *Barnett v Daley* 809 F. Supp. 1323 (N.D. Ill. 1992)
[74] *Acorn v Edgar*, 880 F. Supp. 1215 (ND Ill. 1995)
[75] McClelland, 2010, 79.
[76] Axelrod, 2015, 120.
[77] An assessment shared in the *National Journal's* House Race Hotline series, describing Rush as 'considered potentially vulnerable since only garnering only 28% in the '99 Chicago mayoral election' ('Dems Rushing to the Challenge', *National Journal*, 3 August 1999).
[78] Axelrod, 2015, 122.
[79] Correspondence with Eric Adelstein, 27 February 2017.
[80] Grimshaw, 1992, 173.
[81] Interview with Mikva.

lived next door to the Obamas, replied affirmatively: 'Yeah, I think the white people knew they were kind of on an island [laughs] and it was important if you were going to represent the district'.[82]

Obama faced difficulties in establishing himself in this challenge. Obama conceded that he saw 'eye to eye on virtually all policy issues' with Rush.[83] A large part of the difference was candidate biography. Axelrod identifies Rush's approach was to portray Obama as an 'effete candidate of outsiders'.[84] Rush's campaign manager Eric Adelstein described to me, 'Obama came off as intellectualizing the movement'. Adelstein added that Rush's history as a Panther meant that voters 'were always going to choose someone who WORKED in the civil rights movement over someone who TAUGHT about the civil rights movement. Bobby Rush lived it'.[85] During the election, another opponent Donne Trotter (a state senator and black machine candidate)[86] commented, 'You have to look at his supporters. Who pushed him to get where he is so fast? It's these individuals in Hyde Park'.[87] Rebecca Janowitz writes that Rush and Trotter argued that 'Obama was too close to "them" to be one of "us".' Importantly, Janowitz clarifies that the them-us distinction was not a simple black-white divide. She writes, 'Them, of course, referred to Hyde Parkers, black and white alike'.[88] Mikva adds that 'this little island of Hyde Park-Kenwood [was an area] where blacks were welcome but it was a kind of class distinction. The blacks who were welcome were predominantly academics, scientists, professionals. It was not a place where a black working man could live'.[89] Obama lost the election badly, as Table 6.1 shows.

Table 6.1. Democratic Primary for the First Congressional District of Illinois [IL:01] (2000)

Candidate	Votes	Percentage
Bobby Rush	59,599	61.0%
Barack Obama	29,649	30.4%
Donne Trotter	6,915	7.1%
George Roby	1,501	1.5%

Source: Illinois State Board of Elections

Following Obama's 2000 defeat, the politician began to investigate possibilities of standing for other offices. Adelstein remembers that 'fairly soon after the loss' in 2000, 'he and I had lunch to talk about what that would take and to get my thoughts on what went wrong in the Congressional race'.[90] Some friends suggested that Obama consider standing for a state executive office, such as Attorney General

[82] Interview with Grimshaw.
[83] 'Chicago voters will apply judgment to Rush in Tuesday's primary', *Congressional Quarterly*, 15 March 2000.
[84] Axelrod, 2015, 122.
[85] Correspondence with Adelstein.
[86] Interview with Don Rose, 15 February 2017.
[87] Donne Trotter, quoted in 'Is Bobby Rush in Trouble?', *Chicago Reader*, 17 March 2000.
[88] Janowitz, 2010, 221.
[89] Interview with Mikva.
[90] Correspondence with Adelstein.

in 2002.[91] Obama passed over these opportunities, but intimates noted to me that by the autumn of 2002, Obama was already preparing to run for the US Senate for the seat held by Republican Peter Fitzgerald.[92] Fitzgerald had narrowly won the seat from Carol Moseley Braun in 1998. When Braun announced her decision not to stand to reclaim her seat in January 2003, Obama days later announced his candidacy.

Elites: Hyde Park liberals, the Machine, Black leaders, and Paul Simon

There are four groups of actors who shaped Barack Obama's choice of racial campaign strategy. The first group was the Democratic machine, who supported Obama's chief opponent Dan Hynes. Machine politicians were gatekeepers to thousands of voters, and in an earlier time, their support would have been enough to win the nomination. The second group were many African American elites who chose to support Obama, in spite of some having close ties with the Daley administration. These included Valerie Jarrett and, especially, Emil Jones, the president of the Illinois State Senate. Separate from both of these groups was a set of wealthy, white liberals in Hyde Park and Chicago's Lakefront who embraced Barack Obama's liberal policy agenda and supported him financially. The fourth group were Downstate Democrats, especially Senator Paul Simon and his daughter, who provided Obama with a key endorsement. While Obama did not perform as well in this region as he did in Chicago or its suburbs, he nonetheless came in second place, exceeding expectations.

Hyde Park and Lakefront Liberals

To understand Barack Obama's political approach to race commentators must understand the unusual interracial politics of Hyde Park where he lived for two decades. Steve Cobble, who ran Jesse Jackson's political action committee from a converted synagogue in the neighbourhood, described it to me as, 'One of the only seriously integrated places of Chicago…It's the place where you go if you made it professionally as a black, but you're also living around whites because of the University of Chicago'.[93]

In 1995, Obama was encouraged by Hyde Park progressives, organised into a group known as the IVI-IPO (Independent Voters of Illinois-Independent Precinct Organisation), to run for the state senate in the following year's election. Obama's campaign manager Alan Dobry had been a stalwart of independent politics in Hyde Park.[94] In a private letter to his half-brother Malik Obama in July 1995, Barack Obama revealed his reasons for running were in part motivated by racial concerns. He told Malik, 'some colleagues of mine here have talked me into running for the Illinois State Senate…I have agreed, since I have an interest in politics to deal with some of the serious issues blacks face here'.[95]

[91] Interview with Sautter.
[92] Ibid.
[93] Interview with Cobble.
[94] Hendon, 2009, 10.
[95] Barack Obama, letter to Malik Obama, 25 July 1995. ('Obama's Kenyan Brother Sells Letter He Wrote To Him In 1995 To US Media For Millions', *Niaje*, 30 June 2015).

Obama was elected to represent Hyde Park and the neighbouring areas of Englewood and the South Shore. He replaced Alice Palmer, a respected black intellectual[96] who had been disqualified from the ballot on a technicality.[97]

Obama served as a state senator from 1997 until his election to the US Senate in 2004. His constituency, the Thirteenth State Senate District, was anchored in Hyde Park and had been represented since the 1960s by black independents.[98] Before Palmer, Richard Newhouse represented the area in the state senate from 1967 until 1991. Newhouse was fiercely independent of the machine, often threatening to abstain on key votes in the closely divided state senate until the machine conceded to his demands. He was able to secure the the passage of the Illinois Fair Housing Practices Act.[99] In 1975, when Richard J Daley ran for a sixth term as mayor, Newhouse stood against him, making him the first African American candidate for mayor of Chicago.[100] Don Rose, who was active in Hyde Park politics during Newhouse's tenure, remembers that in the 1960s and 1970s Newhouse 'was often cited as [one day] our first black president'.[101]

Obama, as a successor to Newhouse's senate district, followed much the same independent imperative in his work as a state senator. Although they would soon fall out, Palmer initially gushed, 'Barack Obama carries on the tradition of independence in this district, a tradition that continued with me and most recently with Senator Newhouse'.[102] He pushed for a liberal, race-conscious policy agenda while largely resisting the patronage of City Hall. He even asked his wife Michelle to quit her job in the Daley administration as he was preparing to run for the state senate.[103] Michelle's family had been supporters of the Organization, and her late father had been a precinct captain for the machine in the 5th Ward.[104]

The Thirteenth State Senate District proved to be an ideal political base for Obama. His constituents consisted of African Americans (many of whom were middle class) and wealthy liberals in Hyde Park and the Lakefront. When he ran for statewide office in 2004, they provided Obama with a solid financial base, much in the same way that they did for Hyde Park resident Carol Moseley Braun in 1992. Indeed, Obama admitted in an interview that if Braun had tried to reclaim her Senate seat in 2004, 'I would probably have stepped out of politics for a while…Our bases overlapped so much – not just that she was an African American, but she came out the progressive wing of the party…and our donor base

[96] Remnick, 2010, 278.
[97] Hendon, 2009, 10.
[98] After the 1980 census, the district was re-numbered from the 24th to the 13th District, but it covered similar areas.
[99] Williams, 2008, 31.
[100] Newhouse won 7.9 percent of the vote.
[101] Interview with Rose.
[102] Palmer, quoted in 'Hyde Parker Announces Run for State Senate Seat', *Hyde Park Herald*, 4 October 1995.
[103] Interview with Rose.
[104] Interviews with Braun (2013) and Mikva.

would have been fairly similar'.[105] Gbemende Johnson and colleagues suggest that because black officials tend to be elected from poor, working-class, urban areas, they have smaller fundraising bases than most white politicians.[106] Obama's campaign manager James Cauley expressed similar sentiments in an interview with me, 'If you can raise money, you can play the game…and a lot of African American candidates don't have the networks with which to raise those significant sums'.[107] Hyde Park provided both Braun and Obama with immediate access to campaign capital which many black politicians do not have.[108]

Obama ingratiated himself with this community of wealthy white liberals in three ways. First, as their state senator, he established a positive policy reputation in Springfield on issues which Chicago independents tended to care about, such as ethics and campaign finance reform.[109] Early in his tenure, Obama championed Paul Simon's Gift Ban Act, an effort to curb corruption in one of the few states which had no cap on campaign contributions or gifts to politicians.

Second, Obama distinguished himself in dramatic fashion in October 2002 by publicly opposing a planned invasion of Iraq. At a rally organised by key white liberals such as Bettylu Saltzman, Marilyn Katz, and Don Rose, Obama condemned Iraq as a 'dumb war'. At the time, Gallup tracking polls showed only 37 percent of Americans were opposed to going to war.[110] Weeks later, eighty-seven US senators voted to allow the war.[111] However, Obama's position endeared him to Hyde Parkers, many who had been politicised by the anti-Vietnam War movement.[112] Strategist Pete Giangreco says that the speech was 'a huge part' of the campaign's message to donors in the weeks to follow.[113]

Third, Obama's Columbia and Harvard education, as well as his lecturer position at the University of Chicago Law School and reputation as a published author, provided him with institutional credibility among liberal white elites. One member of the campaign team believed that these credentials were particularly important for Obama as an African American politician. She explained, 'speaking as an African American person, you kind of always have to go further to prove yourself and explain where you come from and what your credentials are. I couldn't tell you where Dan Hynes went to college…or Blair Hull'.[114] Obama's résumé, combined with his work as a civil rights lawyer and community

[105] Obama, quoted in 'A Series of Fortunate Events', *Washington Post*, 12 August 2007.
[106] Johnson et al, 2012. Nordin (2012) makes a similar argument.
[107] Interview with Cauley.
[108] On black politicians' traditionally limited resource pool, see Swain (1997).
[109] Adriana Colindres, 'Justices put Gift Ban Act back in effect', *Springfield State Journal-Register*, 24 May 2002.
[110] 'Seventy-Two Percent of Americans Support War Against Iraq', Gallup News Service, 24 March 2003.
[111] Bernard Schoenburg, 'Senate candidates spar in Springfield', *Springfield State Journal-Register*, 24 February 2004.
[112] McClelland, 2010. 201.
[113] Interview with Giangreco.
[114] BO3.

organiser, generated a positively reinforcing image of Obama as a well-heeled, liberal-leaning African American voice for the community. Hermene Hartman, the editor of the black magazine *N'DIGO* and a Hyde Park resident, describes, 'Obama was the perfect gentleman to represent Hyde Park's intellectual, urban-mixed university community'.[115]

These networks were vital to his fundraising operation. Reflecting on his 2004 candidacy, Obama admitted that 'it became fashionable among wealthy donors to promote my cause'.[116] Bettylu Saltzman, described by *Crain's Chicago Business* as 'a veteran North Shore Democratic fund-raiser', told the newspaper in 2003, 'I find it easy' to raise money for Barack Obama.[117] Another journalist reflected that Obama was, 'the progressives' darling in the field, drawing enthusiastic support from white Lake Shore liberals'.[118] Gwen Ifill detected a similar phenomenon when Obama ran for president in 2008, saying that 'to white people who considered themselves forward-thinking…the idea of Obama was deeply appealing'.[119]

These whites were open to a symbolic-substantive campaign appeal from Barack Obama. Newton Minow, senior counsel of Obama's first law firm reflects, 'they wanted to help a black candidate, as I did…[A] lot of whites want to do justice when there has been terrible injustice in the way black people were treated in this country'. Minow, who is Jewish, adds that such race-conscious concerns were particularly salient in the Jewish community, telling me, 'A lot of Jewish people who supported him, like Penny Pritzker and the Crown family, were always sympathetic to the plight of the blacks and wanted to help them'.[120]

The Organization

The nemesis of the Hyde Park independents was the Democratic machine, under titular control for most of the post-war period by the Daley family. In the mid-twentieth century, the blessing of the Daley machine was tantamount to election, especially in the Democratic primary. Built on patronage, at the machine's height, the mayor of Chicago could appoint directly 45,000 municipal employees, ten times the number of staff who can be appointed by the president of the United States.[121] The machine directed the votes not only of ethnic whites but also of most of the city's black population. Such was Daley's co-optation of the city's black leadership that the entertainer Dick Gregory once remarked, 'You have

[115] Hartman, 2009, xii.
[116] Obama, 2006, 113.
[117] Bettylu Saltzman, quoted in 'Obama's appeal drives cash flow', *Crain's Chicago Business*, 15 September 2003.
[118] Harold Meyerson, 'A Bright Hope in Illinois', *Washington Post*, 12 March 2004.
[119] Ifill, 2009, 66.
[120] Interview with Minow.
[121] Erie, 1988, 154.

to respect Daley. He has a big job being mayor, governor, prosecutor, and president of the Chicago Branch of the NAACP'.[122]

In the Democratic primary, three of the seven senatorial candidates were 'regulars', a colloquial term for someone who is a member of the machine. Gerry Chico had been Richard M Daley's chief of staff and was appointed by Daley as Chair of the Chicago School Board.[123] Maria Pappas held a countywide patronage-dispensing office. However, there was little doubt throughout the campaign that Dan Hynes, the Comptroller of Illinois, was the Organization's favoured candidate. The only candidate with statewide elected experience, Obama described Hynes as 'my most formidable opponent in the Democratic primary'.[124]

Hynes's father, Tom Hynes, had been a key machine figure. Hynes had been a state senator (serving as its president), Cook County Assessor (a county patronage-dispensing position), and a member of the national committee of the Democratic Party.[125] Tom Hynes and Richard M Daley shared a flat in Springfield when they served in the state legislature together.[126] David Mendell writes that 'Daley was the foremost Irish political name in Chicago; Illinois house speaker Michael Madigan placed second in that category; and Hynes arguably came in third'.[127] Dan Hynes was first elected to statewide office only three months after he turned thirty-years-old. It is difficult to see how he could have done so without the Hynes family name.

In 2004, most of the biggest names in the Illinois political establishment supported Hynes. On the day he announced his candidacy, Hynes had the endorsements of 83 percent of the Democratic Party county chairs in the state.[128] Key supporters included Richard Daley and his brother John Daley (a Cook County Commissioner and chair of the 11th Ward Democratic Party, a position which had been held by the Daley family for six decades), Speaker of the House Michael Madigan (who was also state party chairman) and his daughter Lisa Madigan (Attorney General of Illinois), and John Stroger (president of the Cook County Board). Stroger was one of the few machine African American politicians to remain loyal to the Organization's candidate, showing that even in 2004 some black elites remained inextricably tied to the Irish-dominated Democratic machine.[129]

---

[122] Gregory, quoted in Travis (1987: 318).
[123] 'US Senate Democratic Candidates', *Springfield State Journal-Register*, 29 February 2004.
[124] Obama, 2006, 117.
[125] Bernard Schoenburg, 'Madigan backing Hynes for US Senate', *Springfield State Journal-Register*, 18 November 2003.
[126] McClelland, 2010, 200.
[127] Mendell, 2007, 182.
[128] Obama, 2006, 117.
[129] Remnick, 2010, 367.

Black Elites and Emil Jones

Although Obama did not have the support of the Irish-led machine, black establishment figures provided Obama with core support. From the day he announced his candidacy, most of the city's established black leadership (Bobby Rush and John Stroger excepted) supported him. African American elites were critical to Obama's racial campaign strategy in three ways.

First, they provided access to key blocs of voters and the organisation to turn them out. As Don Rose writes, Obama had 'the backing of most of the African American ward organizations'.[130] Obama's campaign manager James Cauley informed me that the campaign budgeted 'several hundred thousand dollars that was just, you know, if an African American state senator wanted to do a rally, hell, I'd pay for it…Any time that an African American politician asked us for something…when money was flowing we tried to make sure we'd do anything they asked. That happened quite regularly'.[131]


Second, African American elites were Obama's earliest source of financial backing. Valerie Jarrett, who was a member of one of the most prominent African American families in Chicago, chaired Obama's finance committee. The committee included key African American fundraisers such as John Rogers, who had been Carol Moseley Braun's finance chair in 1992. Jarrett, too, had been a fundraiser for Braun and drew a direct comparison between the two candidates in a 2003 interview with *Crain's Chicago Business*.[132] Of the first $500,000 Obama raised during the primary, nearly half of his contributions came from African American donors.[133] Obama's first campaign loan ($50,000 to open a campaign office) came from Al Johnson, a wealthy black Chicagoan whom Edward McClelland describes as a 'traditional source of money for black politicians', having been a financier of Harold Washington.[134] Hermene Hartman writes that the Chicago consortium of black business owners, known as the 'Alliance of Business Leaders and Entrepreneurs' (ABLE), were early fundraisers for Obama. Obama's friend Jim Reynolds, founder of the largest black-owned investment firm in the United States, served as ABLE's president.[135] Obama's early ability to fundraise helped in strengthening the campaign's capacity by attracting high-level talent to work for the campaign.[136] Campaign manager James Cauley, who was recruited by David Axelrod after helping to elect the first black mayor of Jersey

[130] Don Rose, 'The end of racial voting?', *Chicago Tribune*, 2 May 2004.
[131] Interview with Cauley.
[132] Paul Merrion 'Obama's appeal drives cash flow', *Crain's Chicago Business*, 15 September 2003.
[133] Obama, 2006, 240.
[134] McClelland, 2010, 213.
[135] Hartman, 2009.
[136] Obama also received donations from black celebrities such as Michael Jordan who donated $10,000 to the Obama campaign. Jordan's donation is noteworthy because it stands in contrast to his decision fourteen years earlier not to become involved in the 1990 US Senate campaign in his native North Carolina. Although Harvey Gantt was running as the first ever black Democratic Senate nominee, Jordan refused to endorse Gantt because, as he reportedly told a friend, 'Republicans buy sneakers, too' (quoted in Smith, 1995).

City, tells me that if Obama had not raised $1 million early in the campaign, then Cauley would not have agreed to work for him.[137]

Third, black media provided Obama with his earliest publicity. One black politician described the black press as 'the backbone, the anchor…one of the most important institutions in the Black community'.[138] Obama's first front-page magazine feature was with the black-owned weekly *N'Digo* (Figure 6.6). His first radio publicity was on the black-oriented radio station WVON,[139] on which he had 'frequently' been a guest as a state senator.[140] WVON's call sign originally stood for 'Voice Of the Negro'. Ricky Hendon, a state legislator from the West Side of Chicago, believes that black radio in Chicago may have an even broader reach than the black church.[141]

Figure 6.6. Barack Obama on the cover of *N'Digo* (March 2003)



Source: New York Public Library

[137] Interview with Cauley.
[138] Hendon, 2009, 26.
[139] Obama, 2006, 240. Interview with Sautter.
[140] Hartman, 2009, xiv.
[141] Hendon, 2009, Ch 5.

The most important black elite supporting Barack Obama was state senate president Emil Jones. In 2004, Jones was the only African American leader of a state senate in the United States. First elected to the General Assembly in 1972, Jones had been a part of the Daley machine since the 1960s.[142] Like many machine African Americans, he did not support Harold Washington in the 1983 Democratic primary; however, in the 2004 election, Jones led many black machine operatives away from Dan Hynes and Blair Hull, instead giving their support to Barack Obama.[143]

It was once the case that a machine African American leader like Jones would have been inhibited from defecting to a non-machine candidate. During the mayoralty of Richard J Daley, the father of the incumbent mayor Richard M Daley, the six black aldermen on Chicago City Council were so total in their loyalty to Daley and quiet in their criticism that they were known as the 'Silent Six'.[144] Leon Despres, the white alderman from Hyde Park, was jokingly referred to as the 'lone Negro' on Chicago City Council because he was the only alderman – black or white – willing to challenge the Daley administration on matters such as racial discrimination in employment and housing.[145]

Fredrick Harris describes Obama as less of a 'purist' than his Hyde Park predecessors in his willingness to work with the machine.[146] Confirming this assessment, long-time independent Don Rose told me, 'he called himself an independent and he voted independent, but he never attacked the mayor'.[147] When I asked Abner Mikva if Hyde Parkers were uncomfortable with Obama's relationship with Emil Jones, he replied, 'A little bit, but on the other hand, Emil was not one of the mean regulars…There was nothing in the relationship that suggested Emil was getting anything out of it except the joy, the pride in having been a mentor for this great star about to emerge'.[148] Obama kept on good terms with Jones, and Jones acted as a mentor to Obama. Jones was often described as Obama's 'political godfather',[149] a role in which Jones himself revelled, allegedly using the tune of the *Godfather* film as his mobile phone ringtone.[150] While conducting archival research in Emil Jones's papers at the University of Illinois (Chicago), I found a copy of the *Godfather* novel among his personal effects.

Jones was instrumental in three key ways. First, Jones used his power as state senate president to push key legislative items under Obama's stewardship. In 2002, the Democrats won complete control of the Illinois legislature and governor for the first time since 1976. The party's capture of the institutions of state power, David Mendell writes, 'could not have come at a more opportune time for Barack

[142] Leah Friedman, 'Senate president pays visit to Southeast', *Springfield Journal-Register*, 26 February 2004.
[143] Harris, 2012, Ch 2.
[144] The Silent Six were Ralph Metcalfe, Claude Holman, William Harvey, Kenneth Campbell, Robert Miller, and George Collins (Biles, 1995, 93).
[145] 'Black Power and the Civil Rights Crisis', *Negro Digest*, December 1966.
[146] Harris, 2012, 41.
[147] Interview with Rose.
[148] Interview with Mikva.
[149] Hendon, 2007, 4.
[150] Harris, 2012, Ch 2.

Obama'.[151] Jones promoted Obama as chair of the Health and Welfare Committee and directed hundreds of key bills to Obama's committee. In that one session of two years, Obama sponsored nearly eight-hundred bills, and two-hundred-eighty were signed into law by the new Democratic governor Rod Blagojevich.[152]

Not accidentally, some of these bills helped Obama to curry favour with key Democratic constituencies, especially organised labour. Dan Hynes's father had been an active trade unionist, and the unions were expected to support Hynes.[153] However, Obama's strengthening of the state's Earned Income Tax Credit, in particular, was popular with labour and helped him to secure the support of key unions such as the SEIU, AFSCME, and Unite/Here.[154] After endorsing Obama, the president of the Illinois branch of the SEIU, which represents workers in service industries, praised, 'Our members know Barack…He has been with us on the picket lines. He has been with us in the state legislature'.[155]

Obama credited the union endorsements with having been 'critical in giving my campaign some semblance of weight'.[156] Mendell calls the endorsements, particularly from the SEIU, as 'a major coup'.[157] Remnick observes that because the primary was relatively 'open', endorsements were important cues to voters about which of the seven candidates had momentum, substance, and viability.[158]

Second, Jones was crucial in providing Obama access to most of Chicago's black machine voter mobilisation operations. Hermene Hartman credits Jones with having 'made everyone line up' in support of Obama during his Senate bid.[159] Campaign manager James Cauley agreed. He described Jones to me as 'Barack's path to the old school guys'. Obama had damaged his reputation among some black leaders by challenging Bobby Rush in 2000. Jones's support was enough to convince black leaders of the importance of supporting Obama. Cauley added, 'Emil was at the front of the old guard, and he could talk to them in a way and say, hey, I don't care what he [Obama] did in the past; you're going to get in line. And I mean roughly. Emil gets his way when he wants something. He's an old school pol through and through'.[160]

---


[151] Mendell, 2006, 180.
[152] Mendell, 2006, Ch 13.
[153] Axelrod, 2015, Ch 9.
[154] Ibid.
[155] Tom Balanoff, quoted in 'Madigan backing Hynes for US Senate', *Springfield State Journal-Register*, 18 November 2003.
[156] Obama, 2006, 118.
[157] Mendell, 2007, 207.
[158] Remnick, 2010, Ch 10.
[159] Hartman, 2009.
[160] Interview with Cauley.

The third way in which Jones helped Obama was ensuring that his state senate district was redrawn after the 2000 Census to give him closer access to wealthy white liberals who lived along the Lake Michigan shore. Redistricting is a deeply partisan process in Illinois, which can lead to profoundly uncompetitive elections in much of the state. In 2002, an astonishing 38 out of 59 state senate candidates (64.4% of the state senate) were elected unopposed.[161] In Illinois, when there is no unified control of state government, partisan control of the state redistricting process is decided by lot, which Democrats won after the 2000 Census.

Obama's constituency originally held the mainly white Hyde Park, the South Shore where many middle-class African Americans live, and Englewood, a poorer, predominantly black area.[162] Jones is alleged to have been behind the decision to redraw Obama's state senate district to take out most of Englewood but keep Hyde Park and the South Shore, as depicted in Figure 6.7. In addition, he added the affluent Lakefront up to the North Shore. Steven Strahler, a writer for *Crain's Chicago Business,* remarked in 2001 that the inclusion of these areas, which included the Gold Coast's Goethe Street, 'could fatten his [Obama's] kitty for future campaigns'.[163] Abner Mikva who had represented the North Shore in Congress describes it 'as liberal as Hyde Park and Kenwood but is much more affluent'.[164] As a result of this newly drawn state senate district, Obama had, as his deputy campaign manager Nate Tamarin puts it to me, 'a rationale for engaging with them very early on… He had spent a lot of time cultivating this set of donors as a state senator'.[165] Don Rose attests, 'He pretty much got the district he wanted'.[166]

[161] Illinois State Board of Elections.
[162] Gregory Giroux, 'Chicago voters will apply judgment to Rush in Tuesday's primary', *Congressional Quarterly*, 15 March 2000.
[163] Steven Strahler, 'Have bank résumé, will travel', *Crain's Chicago Business*, 29 October 2001.
[164] Interview with Mikva.
[165] Interview with Tamarin.
[166] Interview with Rose.

Figure 6.7. Barack Obama's state senate district. (1996-2002 in black, 2002-2004 in red)




Based on maps from the Illinois State Board of Elections

Paul Simon and the Downstate Democrats

Obama's campaign was disproportionately focused on Chicago and its environs, yet the campaign did not neglect the Downstate area. The Obama campaign heeded the old state tourism slogan, 'Just outside

Chicago is a place called Illinois'.[167] Deputy campaign manager Nate Tamarin informs me, 'we wanted to make sure he was out there [Downstate]. He was visible, but it wasn't a huge constant piece of the campaign strategy'.[168] Obama won one-quarter of the Downstate vote, securing a small edge over Blair Hull for second place, in spite of Hull having done 'extensive advertising' in the region.[169] Since Obama became a state senator in 1997, he and his chief of staff Dan Shoman had travelled extensively throughout the region, and Obama continued to make appearances in the region during the 2004 primary.[170]

Figure 6.8. Downstate Illinois Result (2004 Democratic US Senate Primary)



Based on data from the Illinois State Board of Elections

In spite of his third place finish, Blair Hull's campaign had invested heavily in the region, running adverts in Downstate television markets as early as June 2003.[171] The Hull campaign was extremely well financed. Hull had no elected experience, but he had recently sold his firm for half a billion dollars. With a net worth of $471.6 million,[172] he was the richest ever person to seek office in Illinois.[173] His staff and payroll budget were larger than those of any candidate running for president in the 2004 Democratic primaries.[174] As Obama's campaign manager James Cauley described to me, Hull 'had not one but three communications persons that were getting paid twenty grand a month…Hull had these

[167] Doug Finke, 'Chicago: The Real Capital of Illinois?', *Peoria Journal Star*, 15 July 2012.
[168] Interview with Tamarin.
[169] Bernard Shoenburg, 'Obama, Ryan pace race for Senate', *Springfield State Journal-Register*, 14 March 2004.
[170] Obama, 2006.
[171] 'Chicagoan brings quest for Senate to Metro East area', *St Louis Post-Dispatch*, 27 June 2003.
[172] 'Will voters take a gamble on Hull for US Senate?', *Springfield State Journal-Register*, 23 October 2003.
[173] Joshua Green, 'A Gambling Man', *The Atlantic*, Jan/Feb 2004.
[174] Mendell, 2007, 214.

$20,000 hired hands out of DC, and you're like holy crap'.[175] In contrast, Cauley was Obama's highest-paid staff member during the primary, earning $10,000 per month. Largely thanks to Hull's decision to spend nearly $30 million of his own personal wealth, the campaign became the most expensive primary contest in Illinois history to that point.[176]

Hull travelled rural Illinois on a luxury campaign bus which he gave the name 'Hull on Wheels'. The title was especially ironic given that Hull had such a stilted personality that one journalist recalled that Hull 'could seem uncomfortable just saying, "Hello".'[177] While David Remnick writes that initially Hull was the candidate whom Obama 'took most seriously',[178] in his memoirs Obama places more emphasis on the Hynes campaign, which had the support not only of the Democratic establishment in Chicago but of Democratic Party leaders throughout the Downstate region.[179] In one Downstate congressional district (IL:17), as early as July 2003, Hynes had the backing of over one-hundred Democratic elected officials.[180]

Key to providing Obama with his second place finish was support from one of the Downstate region's most famous Democratic figures, Paul Simon. Simon had been US senator for Illinois from 1985 until 1997, living in Carbondale which is situated in the Downstate sub-region known as Little Egypt, a reference to its towns with names such as Cairo, Karnak, and Thebes. Simon was well-regarded throughout the state, known to be 'passionately liberal, disarmingly honest, and definitely his own man'.[181] The Simon endorsement was politically important, especially in the primary, because, as Axelrod writes, Simon was a 'hero' to 'the liberal base of the party'.[182]

In the autumn of 2003, Obama's mentors Newton Minow and Abner Mikva asked Paul Simon to endorse Obama, and according to both of them in interviews with this author, Simon agreed. Mikva and Simon had been flatmates when they served in the state legislature together, and Mikva stressed in his interview with me the confluence of Obama's reformist politics and that of Simon.[183] In addition, the racial symbolism of Obama's election was a factor. I asked Newton Minow what he and Mikva said to Simon to persuade him to support Obama. Minow replied, 'We said, this guy has got it all. He's got the brains. He's got the temperament. And I said, having a black senator from Illinois would simply be

[175] Interview with Cauley.
[176] Bernard Schoenburg, 'Costly primary: Winner of expensive race could shift Senate power', *Springfield State Journal-Register*, 29 February 2004.
[177] Mendell, 2007, 203
[178] Remnick, 2010, 367.
[179] Robert Goodrich, 'Costello gives his endorsement to Hynes in campaign for Senate', *St Louis Post-Dispatch*, 17 July 2003.
[180] Bernard Schoenburg, 'Lane Evans endorses Barack Obama for Senate', *Springfield State Journal-Register*, 2 July 2003.
[181] Mendell, 2007, 228.
[182] Axelrod, 2015, 143.
[183] Interview with Mikva.

marvellous'.[184] Simon had a record of encouraging African Americans to reach for higher elected office. According to Carol Moseley Braun in an interview with this author, Simon had encouraged her to run for president for the 2004 Democratic nomination.[185] David Axelrod believes Simon's reasons for backing Obama were related to having 'spent his life fighting for civil rights and political reform'.[186]

The Obama campaign and Simon believed that the endorsement should be made public in the new year to provide some momentum as the March primary approached.[187] Although Simon had not yet announced his choice, the *Chicago Tribune* journalist David Mendell recalls bumping into Simon in a lift in late November 2003, with Simon telling Mendell, 'I'm going to be very proud of this one', hinting at his still-confidential choice of candidate.[188]

Two weeks after meeting Mendell, Simon was dead, unexpectedly succumbing to complications from a routine surgery. The Obama campaign faced a quandary in that there was no public record of Simon's endorsement. His daughter Sheila, however, agreed to endorse Obama on behalf of her late father. In both a television advertisement and in a printed leaflet (see Figure 6.9), Sheila Simon attested that 'Barack Obama will be a US Senator in the Paul Simon tradition'. She also made campaign appearances for Obama Downstate. At one campaign stop in Springfield, Sheila Simon explained that her decision was 'one that was well-supported by Dad. Dad was a big fan of Barack Obama'.[189]

Figure 6.9. Paul and Sheila Simon Endorsement Direct Mail



Source: Peter Giangreco

[184] Interview with Minow.
[185] Interview with Braun, 2015.
[186] Axelrod, 2015, 143.
[187] Bernard Schoenburg, 'Obama gets endorsement from Simon's daughter', *Springfield State Journal-Register*, 26 February 2004.
[188] Paul Simon, quoted in Mendell (2007: 227).
[189] Sheila Simon, quoted in 'Obama gets endorsement from Simon's daughter', *Springfield State Journal-Register*, 26 February 2004.

It was an endorsement from the grave. One interviewee believed the Sheila Simon endorsement had the added benefit of the image of a white, Downstate woman publicly supporting a black man from the South Side.[190] Peter Giangreco contends that the power of the advert was not a question of Simon being popular and his popularity transferring to Obama. The advert, Giangreco explains, showed that 'Barack Obama came from the Paul Simon, Abner Mikva, sort of Bobby Kennedy wing of the party. The sort of insurgent reformer…principled reformer, anti-machine kind of candidate who stood on principle and not on what deal did you cut and who's on line next for the job'.[191] The power of the advertisement, I argue, was that it appealed to the non-machine and anti-machine Democrats, many of whom had been backing Blair Hull.

The local press responded favourably to the advertisements, in spite of the risk of being seen as exploiting a recent death. One journalist based in Springfield wrote, 'The "posthumous" endorsement by late Sen Paul Simon helps a lot'.[192] Evidence of its penetration can be seen in a letter written to the *Chicago Daily Herald* by Margery Frisbie from Arlington Heights, a suburb of Chicago which is over 90 percent white and less than 1 percent African American. Frisbie wrote, 'I think of our good fortune in having had the principled Paul Simon to represent us for so many years. Paul Simon thought that Barack Obama could be the next Paul Simon. That's good enough for me'.[193]

Dependent Variable: The Symbolic-Substantive Campaign Strategy

Barack Obama's racial campaign strategy in 2004 lacks the hallmarks of the deracialised campaign strategy. Instead, it much more closely resembled a race-conscious, symbolic-substantive campaign strategy. First, in contradiction to the deracialised strategy, the candidate retained a liberal policy agenda, spoke openly about racial inequality, and proposed race-conscious policies to address racial injustice. Second, while the deracialised strategy encourages candidates not to evoke race in appeals to white voters, Obama and his campaign touted Obama's racial achievements (e.g., as first black president of the *Harvard Law Review*) and his racial potential (his prospective status as the lone African American in the US Senate). In addition, while the deracialised strategy discourages direct appeals to African Americans, Obama very visibly campaigned in the black community and produced targeted communications with explicit racial themes. Finally, the deracialisation strategy entails candidates' silence in the face of racial controversies. None of Obama's opponents invoked race in the campaign or attacked him racially. Nonetheless, Obama himself brought up a racially controversial topic – his African name – acknowledging its exoticness at every campaign speech. By speaking about the Swahili

[190] BO5.
[191] Interview with Giangreco.
[192] 'Negativity creeps into campaign', *Springfield State Journal-Register*, 6 March 2004.
[193] Mergery Frisbie, quoted in 'Letters', *Chicago Daily Herald*, 10 March 2004.

meaning of his name, as well as the Kenyan father with whom he shared it, Obama violated a key assumption of the deracialised campaign strategy: reducing the salience of one's racial identity.

Targeted Appeals


The deracialised campaign strategy is premised on the notion that the median voter in a biracial election in a majority-white jurisdiction is a politically centrist or conservative white who is opposed to race-conscious policies. However, in this thesis, I argue that there is a good deal of variation among majority-white electorates. Indeed, it is not unreasonable to expect a Democratic primary electorate to be more left-leaning politically and more liberal on racial issues than the general election voting population. In addition, in elections with multiple viable candidates, winners need to secure a smaller share of the vote and, thus, can ignore a larger proportion of the white electorate.

These two factors are crucial to understanding the targeting strategy of the 2004 Obama campaign. In the Democratic primary, Barack Obama's two 'core constituencies' were African Americans and liberal whites.[194] African Americans made up about 20 percent of the primary electorate. The Obama campaign aimed for 80-85 percent of the black vote, which was roughly 16 percent of the total primary electorate.[195] David Axelrod believed that the ceiling for Obama to win the nomination was 42 percent of the overall vote. To reach this ceiling, Obama needed to win about 30-35 percent of white support. In a three-way split, Obama could conceivably win the nomination with as little as 25 percent of the white vote.[196] Therefore, Obama's targeted population of white voters was not political or racial centrists or conservatives. It was the most liberal one-third of white, registered Democrats in the state.

For both black and white constituencies, the Obama campaign made race-conscious appeals, but they were crafted in different ways. For whites, far from de-emphasising Obama's race, the campaign promoted his racially symbolic status as a major campaign theme. Specifically, the campaign presented Obama as a history-maker and barrier-breaker. The campaign regularly repeated the line that Obama was the 'first black president of the *Harvard Law Review*'. According to Chis Sautter, who wrote internal polls for both Obama's 2000 congressional campaign and the 2004 Senate primary, 'The white voters responded very positively to the fact that he was the first African American editor of the *Harvard Law Review*… the fact that he was kind of a pioneer'.[197] In this vein, the campaign chose to open its first television advertisement (in which Obama first used the slogan 'Yes we can') with this biographical fact, as depicted in Figure 6.10. Obama begins the advertisement by saying, 'They said an African American had never led the *Harvard Law Review* until I changed that'.

[194] Mendell (2007: 185), Remnick (2010: 345)
[195] Barkley, 2006, 20. Interview with Cauley.
[196] Barkley, 2006, 20.
[197] Interview with Sautter.

Figure 6.10. Obama television advertisement: 'Yes, We Can'



Source: Kanter Archive, Political Communications Center, University of Oklahoma

David Axelrod explained that the line helped to establish Obama as someone with strong (white) institutional credentials but also someone who made history. 'It worked on two levels…There were those who thought that breaking barriers is very important. And for others, the *Harvard Law Review* was a major credential in itself'.[198] It was the second most repeated biographical fact about Obama in the print press. From a sample of 311 articles about Barack Obama in the lead-up to the Senate nomination, it was mentioned 49 times.[199] Forty-seven out of forty-nine of those incidents specifically mentioned that Obama was the first African American to hold the post. This appeal to white voters on the basis of Obama's racially historic status is a key characteristic of the symbolic-substantive campaign strategy.

Second, Obama's historic *potential* was heavily promoted by his campaign. As David Mendell observed, David Axelrod promoted Obama as 'a potential star in the making', which was helpful in attracting not only votes from whites who wanted to support somebody historic but also in wooing donors.[200] The message was promoted in the press. In early March 2004, when Obama was still in third

[198] Axelrod, quoted in Mendell (2007: 204).
[199] n=311 articles in *Chicago Herald, Crain's Chicago Business, St Louis Post-Dispatch, Springfield State-Journal Register, Bloomington Pantagraph, Washington Post, New York Times, Jet, Congressional Quarterly*
[200] Mendell, 2007, 203.

place in some public opinion polls, journalist Burt Constable predicted, 'Given a chance on the national scene, he'll soon be on a short list to become our nation's first African-American president'.[201] Throughout the campaign, Obama argued that his status as the country's only African American senator would give him a national profile unlike most freshmen senators. He told the *Chicago Daily Herald,* 'There's no doubt that as the only African-American senator, that would give me a platform to talk about issues that are important nationally as well as issues that are important to Illinois that wouldn't be typical for a freshman senator'.[202]

Third, as Braun did in 1992, Obama made the argument that his election was needed to diversify the Senate. Since Braun's defeat in 1998, the country's most powerful legislative chamber had no black members. In one interview, Obama explained, 'You know we've got a hundred US senators from across the country and right now not one of them is African American. So part of what we hope to do is break that barrier'.[203] Obama repeated a similar line at Mt Zion Baptist Church in East St Louis, the same church where Jesse Jackson began his 1984 presidential campaign. In a rhetorical display of paralipsis, Obama told the congregation, 'I'm not asking you to work for me because I'm African-American, but don't we deserve to have at least one in the Senate?'.[204] To white voters as well, deputy campaign manager Nate Tamarin assured me that Obama's record as a civil rights lawyer and as someone who fought for greater racial representation was not something he would have 'stayed away from because it would have only had some kind of positive response… knowing that it would have an appeal to white progressives'.[205]

In addition to appealing to whites, in part, on the basis of Obama's symbolic-substantive racial status, the campaign aggressively promoted Obama to African American voters using explicit racial messages. The campaign had two objectives. First, it needed to persuade African Americans to support Obama. As strategist Peter Giangreco accepted in an interview with me, 'the African American vote wasn't automatically his'.[206] In January 2004, twelve months after Obama had declared his candidacy, he still only had the support of 29 percent of black voters.[207] By early March, Obama's support among African Americans had risen to three in five black voters, and on election day, he won 95 percent of the vote from African Americans.[208]

---

[201] Burt Constable, 'Best candidate has worst name, but both parties have choices', *Chicago Daily Herald,* 2 March 2004
[202] Obama, quoted in 'Betting on name recognition Senate candidate Obama hopes unique moniker will attract votes', *Chicago Daily Herald,* 15 February 2004.
[203] Obama interview with P Diddy, 2004.
[204] Obama, quoted in McClelland (2010: 238)
[205] Interview with Tamarin.
[206] Interview with Giangreco.
[207] Frasure, 2010, 142.
[208] Frasure, 2010, 142.

As it became clear that he would win the vast majority of black voters, the second objective was to mobilise high turnout. Obama's campaign manager James Cauley informs me that the campaign spent substantial resources on polling day to turn out voters in heavily African American parts of Chicago: 'I probably spent $800,000 turning out the base vote. Everybody thinks that thing just magically happened. That's bullshit. We probably had one-hundred-fifty 12-passenger vans. I probably had 3,000 people working for us on election day just flushing votes…Real serious resources went into turning out that vote for Barack'.[209]

Hull and Hynes both attempted to court black voters, seeking endorsements from black political elites. As mentioned earlier, Hynes had the support of the Chicago machine black leader John Stroger. Black South Side state representative Monique Davis also supported Hynes.[210] Blair Hull won the support of some black leaders Downstate. For example, the minority caucus of the Sangamon County Democratic Party, where Springfield is located, announced that they were backing Hull.[211] In addition, Obama's 2000 campaign against Bobby Rush came back to haunt him. As one *Chicago Tribune* reporter observed, 'Rush's grudge against Obama was intense as ever'.[212] Rush signed on as an honorary co-chair of the Blair Hull campaign and did, as Mendell puts it, 'everything he could to poison Obama's image among blacks'.[213] *Chicago Sun-Times* writer Laura Washington observed that Rush and his fellow black nationalists 'are whispering that Barack is not black enough. He's of mixed race, he hangs out in Hyde Park, and is the darling of white progressives; he's not to be trusted'.[214]

To counter these assertions and bolster Obama's support among African Americans, the campaign engaged in direct targeting of African American voters, a departure from the deracialisation strategy. First, Obama regularly campaigned in front of black audiences. One (white) journalist who shadowed Obama throughout the campaign recalls that from early 2003, Obama 'filled nearly every Sunday' with speaking appearances at black churches.[215] At his zenith, Obama was visiting up to five black churches on a Sunday.[216] When Obama spoke to black audiences, he would mention that he attended Trinity Church of Christ. Don Rose suggests that Trinity was not an obvious choice of church for a black Hyde Parker. There were other black churches which were closer in proximity and socio-economic profile to where the Obamas lived. The difference, Rose believes, is that Trinity had a strong cachet as one of the most important black churches in the city, instantly recognisable to working-class blacks living on the

[209] Interview with Cauley.
[210] Todd Spivak, 'In the Black', *Illinois Times*, 25 March 2004.
[211] Bernard Schoenburg, 'Blair Hull announces bid for US Senate', *Springfield State Journal-Register*, 26 June 2003.
[212] Mendell, 2007, 186.
[213] Ibid.
[214] Laura Washington, *Chicago Sun-Times*, September 2003.
[215] Mendell, 2007, 187.
[216] Mendell, 2007, Ch 13.

South Side.[217] One African American member of the campaign team assured me, 'Most people in circles here in Chicago – African American circles – know the church he went to, Trinity. It's a very large and established church'.[218] Gwen Ifill describes Trinity as 'unashamedly black and unapologetically Christian'.[219] In mentioning that he and his wife were members of Trinity, Obama was signalling to voters that these were accurate descriptions of his family as well.

Obama's stump speech to African Americans involved a strong linked fate appeal.[220] One journalist recalls that in front of black audiences, Obama 'linked his own political ascendance to the forward momentum of the black cause in general. He spoke in terms of his success being a step in the larger success of blacks nationwide…In making himself part of that cause, Obama was conveying that a vote for him was a vote for freedom of all blacks, a vote for blacks not to be held down'.[221]

In addition to what he said, *how* Obama delivered his message was important in signalling his rootedness in the black community. Linguists have noted that when Obama campaigned in front of black audiences, he tended to use African American Vernacular English (AAVE). Obama himself admitted to 'being able to speak different dialects' in an interview in 2004. He added, 'That's not unique to me. Any black person in America who's successful has to be able to speak different forms of the same language…It's not unlike a person shifting between Spanish and English'.[222] An example of Obama's use of AAVE is evident in a 2004 interview with the rapper P Diddy, in which Obama highlighted issues disproportionately associated with African Americans:

> 'We got a lot of ex-offenders in Chicago. On the South Side of Chicago, brothers coming out of prison, they need job training. They want a better life for themselves, but if they can't get a skill or they can't get their GED because there's no money because that money got used in Iraq, then they're gonna give up. There are a lot of brothers who've got a substance abuse problem. They want to clean up, but if they can't get into a treatment programme because the money's been wasted, then they're not going to be able to focus…'[223]

The pleonastic pronoun ('brothers coming out of prison, *they* need') is a widely noted feature of African American Vernacular English.[224] Samy Alim and Geneva Smitherman argue that Obama was adept at signalling his racial solidarity through the way he spoke. They believe that Obama's use of African

[217] Interview with Rose.
[218] Interview with Valerie Corr Hanserd, 19 January 2017.
[219] Ifill, 2009, Ch 2.
[220] See Dawson (1994).
[221] Mendell, 2007, 188.
[222] Obama, quoted in Barkley (2006: 25).
[223] Obama interview with P Diddy, 2004.
[224] See Schneider (1993: 213), Martin & Wolfram (1998: 17), Rickford (1999: 7).


American Vernacular English was 'very much a conscious racial project or, at the very least, a result of secondary language socialization (becoming an adult in a Black community)'.[225]

Second, the Obama campaign produced printed literature specifically for African American voters, as Obama's direct mail designer confirmed to me.[226] Figure 6.11 is an example of a direct mail piece sent by the Obama campaign to black voters. It shows Obama at a black barbershop, a key institution of the black counterpublic. Melissa Harris-Lacewell writes, 'Barbershops are the archetype of the black public space'.[227] They tend to be one of the few economic institutions which operates outside of the fiscal control of whites. It is telling that throughout his political career, when questions of his racial authenticity were raised, Obama used his barbershop as a symbol of his rootedness in the black community. For example, in a 2007 interview with the black magazine *Essence*, Obama was asked if he had settled questions surrounding his racial identity, given his biracial parentage, in the eyes of black presidential primary voters. Obama replied, 'I'm done with it [laughs]. I don't know 'bout y'all. I'm sure not confused about it…And the truth is, I don't think most folks are. Most of the folks in my barbershop are not confused about it'.[228]

Figure 6.11. Targeted Direct Mail to African American Voters (both sides)



[225] Alim & Smitherman, 2012, xvi.
[226] Interview with Peter Giangreco.
[227] Harris-Lacewell, 2004, Ch 1 and, especially, Ch 5.
[228] Obama, quoted in 'The Candidate', *Essence*, October 2007.



Source: Pete Giangreco

The leaflet highlights Obama's policy achievements as a state senator. It includes references to explicitly racial policy goals ('ending racial profiling in Illinois') as well as policies with strong implicit racial content (e.g., the death penalty). In addition to listing Obama's union and newspaper endorsements, the leaflet includes the names of three prominent black politicians who endorsed him: Emil Jones, Congressman Jesse Jackson Jr, and Congressman Danny Davis. No white politician is mentioned.

Third, the Obama campaign targeted black voters in radio and television advertising. Campaign manager James Cauley informed me that whenever ratings suggested that a programme had a large black audience, he would buy airtime for Obama's television advertisements.[229] He stated that the campaign was 'skewing the TV buys towards African American voters... You're not going to buy *Friends* on Thursday night…We were buying kind of the afternoon soaps that were African American. When the demographics said there are African Americans watching those shows we bought those ads'.[230]

In addition, the campaign created bespoke advertisements to be played on black radio stations, especially WVON. I have listened to two of these advertisements, which are archived at the University of Oklahoma's Political Communications Center. One advertisement uses key black elites to vouch for

[229] Interview with Cauley.
[230] Ibid.

Obama. It began with a narrator stating, 'Respected voices within our community agree: State Senator Barack Obama for the United States Senate'. Testimonials then came from Rev James Meeks, who was also a state senator, and West Side Congressman Danny Davis. In the second advertisement, Obama spoke directly to the audience:

> 'My father was from Kenya, and he was part of that first generation who came to the United States right after independence. I teach constitutional law at the University of Chicago. I've been a member of Trinity United Church of Christ for the last fifteen years, and my faith as a Christian is deeply important to me. It provides me with the values that inform my politics.'

The narrator then proceeds to list Obama's policy achievements in Springfield: extending healthcare to uninsured children, tax relief for the working poor, a ban on racial profiling, and 'historic' death penalty reform. It is worth noting that Obama only mentioned his father's origin, not his mother from Kansas. This stands in contrast with Melanye Price's criticism that Obama readily evokes his Kansan heritage as a way of deracialising himself.[231]

Finally, the campaign promoted Obama through the black printed press. A profile in the Chicago-based black magazine *Jet* shortly before the election highlighted numerous race-conscious themes. It serves as a useful example of the symbolic-substantive messages promoted by the Obama campaign to the black community. First, the article highlighted Obama's historic candidacy, stating, 'He is on track to become the only Black in the US Senate and the first Black male senator from Illinois'. It also mentioned he was 'the first Black president of the *Harvard Law Review*'. Second, the article highlighted that Obama attended Trinity Church of Christ.

Third, the piece featured a photo of Barack Obama with his wife Michelle and two young daughters, all who are African American (see Figure 6.12). Several of my interviewees mentioned that for some African American voters, it was important that Obama had a black wife. Cynthia Miller, who managed Obama's office in his 2000 campaign against Rush, remembers that voters would often ask her if Obama's wife was white or black. 'It was the first question I would get – and I would get it a lot'.[232] Obama's 2000 campaign manager Chris Sautter confirmed to me that it was a frequently asked question. Sautter recalls, 'when our campaign workers would go door-to-door in black neighbourhoods and hand out his brochure, oftentimes they would hear remarks that the voters were happy to see that his wife was black. They would make that comment…that his daughter was, you know, obviously African American as well, and that reassured people as to that point. So, we always made sure that Michelle [was on the literature]'.[233] As I will show in Chapter 8, when Harold Ford Jr ran for the US Senate, the

[231] Price, 2016.
[232] Cynthia Miller, quoted in Mendell (2007: 189).
[233] Interview with Sautter

rumours that he dated only white women was viewed as damaging by some African American members of his staff. At least one black, West Side politician admits that Michelle Obama's personal reassurances were crucial in persuading him to support Obama.[234]

Figure 6.12. The Obama Family (2000, left, and 2004)




Sources: Chris Sautter(left), 'Barack Obama Runs for US Senate Seat', Jet, *15 March 2004 (right)*

Fourth, the *Jet* article underscored Barack Obama's support from black elites. It noted that Jesse Jackson was 'among his biggest supporters' and featured a photo of Obama campaigning at Jackson's Rainbow/PUSH Coalition (see Figure 6.13).[235] It highlighted other key black endorsers including Congressman John Conyers, the longest-serving black member of Congress in history, and the jazz pianist Ramsey Lewis, who performed at a fundraiser for Obama.

[234] Hendon, 2009. See also McClelland (2010: 220)
[235] One of my interviewees suggested that Jackson's support was, in fact, lukewarm in part because Jackson had hoped that his son Jesse Jackson Jr would run for the US Senate (BO3).

Figure 6.13. Obama speaking at Rainbow/PUSH with Jesse Jackson looking on



Source: 'Barack Obama Runs for US Senate Seat', *Jet*, 15 March 2004

I agree with David Mendell's conclusion, 'no one could dispute that he did anything but campaign tirelessly in the black community'.[236] Obama's targeted appeals to African Americans contrast sharply with the instructions of the deracialised strategy not to make such appeals. Significantly, however, Obama did not limit his race-conscious analysis simply to black audiences. In an interview for a profile in the *Chicago Tribune* (a centre-right paper with a disproportionately white readership) in late 2003, Obama repeated similar themes:

> 'When I see young African-American men out there and the struggles they go through, then I can connect with that. I know what that means…[I]n my book I mention that I dabbled in drugs [and] that I was acting tough. I put that in there explicitly because what I wanted to communicate was the degree to which many young men, particularly African-American men, engage in self-destructive behavior because they don't have a clear sense of direction…That is the reason I work on ex-offender legislation. I say to myself that if I had been growing up in low-income neighborhoods in Chicago, there is no reason that I wouldn't be in jail today…'[237]

[236] Mendell, 2007, 187.
[237] Obama, quoted in Mendell (2007: 202).

Obama's willingness to make similar communications to white voters about his racial history, racial identity, and diagnosis of racial inequality further illustrate Obama's pursuit of the symbolic-substantive campaign strategy.

Policy Agenda

The deracialised strategy model holds that black candidates should avoid taking liberal policy positions, especially on issues with implicit racial content.[238] Furthermore, commentators argue that black candidates should avoid engaging in discussions about policy issues which are explicitly about race. Yet, in the 2004 Democratic primary, Obama violated both of these core assumptions. He pursued a liberal policy agenda and offered a race-conscious analysis of American inequality. Notably, Obama was consistent in the content of his message to both white and black audiences.

As a state senator, Obama was aligned with the liberal/progressive wing of the Democratic Party.[239] The row of seats on which he sat in the state legislature was termed by other state senators as 'Liberal Row'.[240] One journalist described Obama as having 'developed a reputation as an impassioned progressive' in the state legislature.[241] After the Democrats won a majority in the state senate in the 2002 elections, Obama was elevated by Emil Jones as chair of the Illinois Senate Health and Human Services committee, overseeing the creation of a state earned income tax credit and childcare subsidies for low-income families.[242] He was also publicly aligned with a range of other centre-left policies including the expansion of the Children's Health Insurance Program to include all Illinois families earning 200 percent of the federal poverty level or less,[243] calls as early as 2000 to limit subprime mortgage lending,[244] a moratorium on executions,[245] and the introduction of video recordings in police interrogations.[246] At the start of each legislative session, Obama proposed a constitutional amendment guaranteeing healthcare to all citizens in Illinois.[247] In a forum four months before the US Senate primary, Obama expressed his support for a single-payer healthcare system.[248] For an African American Democrat aspiring for statewide office, Obama's liberal policy positions on these issues, many which carried implicitly racial themes, is far more suggestive of the race-conscious symbolic-substantive campaign strategy than the deracialisation strategy.

---

[238] Strickland & Whicker, 1992.
[239] Interview with Giangreco.
[240] Renshon, 2012, 45.
[241] Harold Meyerson, 'A Bright Hope in Illinois', *Washington Post*, 12 March 2004.
[242] Kenney & Hartley, 2012, Ch 21.
[243] McClelland, 2010, Ch 12.
[244] 'Loan battle brews anew: Subprime lenders, activists set to spar again in Springfield', *Crain's Chicago Business*, 11 December 2000.
[245] Remnick, 2010, 338.
[246] Ibid., 351.
[247] Brian Wallheimer, 'Policy council endorses Obama', *Springfield State Journal-Register*, 26 October 2003.
[248] McClelland, 2010.

During the US Senate primary campaign, Obama largely maintained the same policy positions he had held in the state legislature. Edward McClelland describes Obama as 'the most liberal candidate in the field' during the 2004 election.[249] From Obama's direct mail consultant, I obtained four targeted direct mail pieces produced by the Obama campaign. The leaflets highlight issues with which Obama was consistently associated in the state senate: expanding access to healthcare and medication, reforming capital punishment, and support for abortion rights. Two of the leaflets highlight Obama's opposition to the Iraq War. One leaflet which was bespoke for African American voters explicitly mentioned Obama's efforts to end racial profiling. The leaflet which differed the most from the sample was Obama's leaflet targeted at Downstate voters, which lists his commitments to fair trade practices and tax incentives to prevent jobs being sent overseas. Overall, none of the commitments in the leaflets were at odds with the broadly liberal/progressive voting record Obama established in the state senate.

Table 6.2. Policy Content of Targeted Direct Mail (colour background for common policies)

Leaflet 1: General	Leaflet 2: Paul Simon	Leaflet 3: Downstate	Leaflet 4: Black Voters
Reform health insurance coverage	Ethics and campaign finance reform	Enforce trade laws	Reform health insurance coverage
Cheaper prescriptions	Stop wrongful executions	Tax companies who send jobs oversees	Strop wrongful executions
Healthcare for children and 'working families'	Anti-Iraq War	Tax relief to companies who keep jobs in USA	Anti-Iraq War
Pro-Choice	Pro-Choice	------	End racial profiling

Analysis based on Obama for Senate direct mail sample, Source: Peter Giangreco

In addition to his liberal policy positions on issues with implicit racial content such as welfare, as a state legislator Obama also supported legislation which explicitly targeted racial inequalities. For example, he sponsored an anti-racial profiling bill, which required the state to compile and report data on traffic stops to ascertain whether minority motorists were being unfairly harassed by police officers.[250] In one of his speeches in favour of the bill, Obama said, 'There is at least a perception in black communities that driving while black is a crime'.[251] He added, 'You will be hard-pressed to find a black or Hispanic family who does not have at least one member who feels they've been stopped because of their race'.[252] During the primary, he highlighted to the black magazine *Jet* his work on racial profiling, capital punishment, domestic violence, and children's health insurance. He told the magazine, 'Given my track

[249] McClelland, 2010, 202.
[250] 'Will this nab a Jordan endorsement?', *National Journal*, 19 January 2000.
[251] Obama, quoted in 'Lenders criticize bill that sets limits on interest', *St Louis Post-Dispatch*, 13 January 2000.
[252] Obama, quoted in 'Several bills target racial profiling', *Springfield State Journal-Register*, 27 February 2000.

record in addressing these issues, I know I can make an important contribution in the United States Senate. I also think that I can give voice to African-Americans and other minorities who currently have no representation'.[253]

Furthermore, Obama offered a broad, race-conscious analysis about inequality in America. In an interview with the black magazine *N'Digo*, Obama noted general trends in the growing wealth gaps as well as dimensions of inequality which disproportionately affected racial minorities. The article reports,

> 'According to Obama, the economic growth of the 1990s disguised some disturbing trends in this country. Chief among them, [Obama] says, is the growing disparity between the rich and the poor, an ongoing disparity in the mortality rates between African Americans, Hispanics, and their white counterparts, a decline in the quality of public school education, and an enormous rise in the rate of incarceration of African American youth who are trapped in a drug economy.'[254]

Obama repeated his race-conscious analysis even when speaking to predominantly white audiences and publications, an indicator of a symbolic-substantive campaign strategy rather than a segregated campaign strategy. For example, in a January 2004 interview with the *Springfield State Journal-Register*, Obama told the reporter, 'I think that race is still an enormous problem in our country'.[255] He went on to explain that race continued to shape outcomes in education and in criminal justice. In a 2004 interview, Obama explained that he believed it was important to raise white voters' awareness of racial inequalities. He stated,

> 'I will talk about issues that are of high concern to black voters, for example, in predominantly white audiences, [but] I'm not going to get in their faces and say, "Look at these terrible things you are doing to me." What I'm a lot more likely to say is, "Look at this injustice and what can we – as people of goodwill – do to solve this injustice?".'[256]

The quote indicates that, consistent with symbolic-substantive campaign strategy, Obama openly discussed racial inequality in front of white voters. However, unlike the crusade campaign strategy, which involves a more confrontational framing, Obama's race-conscious appeals to whites were typically positively constructed, appealing to liberal whites' desires to make racial progress. This approach differs from the deracialised strategy which discourages discussing racial policies altogether.

---

[253] Obama, quoted in 'Barack Obama Runs for US Senate Seat', *Jet*, 15 March 2004.
[254] Paul Davis, 'Barack Obama seeks to shape the national debate for Illinois', *N'Digo*, 6-12 March 2003.
[255] Obama, quoted in 'Issues of race a painful part of Obama family history', *Springfield State Journal-Register*, 11 January 2004.
[256] Obama, quoted in Barkley (2006: 32).

Style

The final dimension of a racial campaign strategy is style, which I have operationalised to refer to how a candidate responds to incidents of racial controversy. In the 2004 Democratic primary election, there were no major racial flashpoints. Neither of Obama's main opponents raised racial themes to attack Obama. While Blair Hull released at least two direct mail pieces 'focusing on Obama',[257] these focused on Obama's failure to vote on key abortion bills, an attack which had little credibility given that Obama had been endorsed by Planned Parenthood.[258] In addition, there were no racialised scandals which emerged through the media reporting of the campaign. While the deracialised campaign strategy implies that a candidate ought to avoid potential racial controversies, the symbolic-substantive campaign strategy is open to a candidate engaging with these issues, but usually in a positive racial framing.

The Obama campaign voluntarily entered into racially controversial territory in Obama's decision to highlight the exoticness of his African name at campaign events. While the name 'Barack Obama' is exceedingly familiar now, a mere four years before he ran for president, newspaper articles included parenthetical guides of how to pronounce his name. In addition to being unusual, Obama's name sounded similar to Osama bin Laden and, as one member of his communications team acknowledged, 'I mean his middle name is Hussein and this was around the time that they were looking for Saddam Hussein'.[259] One campaign strategist joked with me that after turning down the opportunity to work for Hynes and Hull, 'I remember thinking to myself, we just gave away the frontrunner and the guy with all the money to work for some black guy called Barack Obama. What am I doing?'.[260]

In editorials, journalists discussed Obama's name with a tone of resigned pity. Having a foreign-sounding (Muslim/African) name made this otherwise bright and capable candidate into an ethnic oddity. The *Chicago Daily Herald* described Obama as the candidate with 'the best qualifications and the worst name. The casual voter hears the name Barack Obama and decides it sounds a bit like Iraq Osama'.[261] The *Washington Post* wondered, 'You'd think his name alone would keep him from winning…Put an "Obama for Senate" bumper sticker on your car and the dyslexic or myopic might just want to punch you out'.[262] The political editor of the state newspaper in Springfield wrote, 'I question his viability not because he's African-American but because his name, Obama, sounds too much like Osama'.[263]

---

[257] Tom Polansek, 'Negative Hull ad mistakenly airs on TV', *Springfield State Journal-Register*, 14 13 March 2004.
[258] Eric Krol, 'No negative TV ads, but race got nasty anyway', *Chicago Daily Herald*, 14 March 2004.
[259] Interview with Hanserd.
[260] BO4.
[261] Burt Constable, 'Best candidate has worst name, but both parties have choices', *Chicago Daily Herald*, 2 March 2004.
[262] Harold Meyerson, 'A Bright Hope in Illinois', *Washington Post*, 12 March 2004.
[263] 'Negativity creeps into campaign', *Springfield State Journal-Register*, 6 March 2004.

Obama had been keenly aware that his name would likely pose an obstacle. In an interview during the general election, Obama recalled political consultants telling him that he was unlikely to win the nomination because he had 'a black name that folks can't even pronounce. And it sounds Muslim!'.[264] Obama's 2000 campaign manager Chris Sautter explains that Obama's name initially made consultants wary about joining the campaign. He said to me in an interview, 'He [Obama] wanted to [hire] somebody who had experience with US Senate races. So, I made calls around – this is after 9/11 [laughs], shortly after 9/11. I'm making calls on behalf of a guy called Barack Obama, a name that sounds like Osama bin Laden'.[265] According to David Remnick, Obama approached one Chicago media consultant in 2001 about his interest in standing for statewide office but was informed that his name would be too much of an obstacle.[266] Additionally, Obama fielded an internal poll in the summer of 2002 with a split sample between 'Barack Obama' and 'Barry Obama'. According to Dan Shoman[267] and Chris Sautter,[268] the internal poll showed that 'Barry Obama' performed better than 'Barack Obama'.

Instead of avoiding the topic or using a different alias, Obama integrated his racialised name into his stump speech. At each campaign stop, Obama would begin, 'People call me "Alabama". They call me "Yo Mama". And that's my supporters! I won't say what my opponents call me'.[269] David Mendell, who accompanied Obama at numerous campaign events throughout the state, remembers that Obama almost always began his stump speech joking about his name. Mendell recalls that 'Obama delivered it with such frequency that as the primary wound down, he had to remind himself to smile in response to audience laughter'.[270] Obama would then go on to explain that he had inherited his Swahili name from his father, who was from Kenya.

Not only did Obama talk about his name at campaign events, but he also talked about his name in media interviews. For example, he told the *Chicago Daily Herald*, 'This is the name I was born with. It was my father's name. Out of respect for him, I haven't monkeyed around with it, much to the regret of my political consultants who[m] I'm sure wish I had a catchy nickname they could use'.[271] Obama repeated similar sentiments in an interview Downstate with the *Springfield State Journal-Register* in January 2004. Obama revealed that he stopped using the name 'Barry' and began using the name 'Barack' after his father had been killed in a car accident. Obama told the reporter, 'It was really sort of a gesture

[264] Obama, quoted in Barkley (2006: 18)
[265] Interview with Sautter.
[266] Remnick, 2010, Ch 9.
[267] Ibid., Ch 10.
[268] Interview with Sautter.
[269] Obama, quoted in Remnick (2010: 370).
[270] Mendell, 2007, 225.
[271] Obama, quoted in 'Betting on name recognition Senate candidate Obama hopes unique moniker will attract voters', *Chicago Daily Herald*, 15 February 2004.

towards him…much to the regret of my political consultants'. Obama joked that he could have been known as 'Barry Dunham, which isn't a bad ballot name'.[272]

I argue that Obama disarmed the potency of his racialised name by taking ownership of it and highlighting its exoticness. Valerie Corr Hanserd, a member of the communications team, attests, 'I think he kind of defused that upfront'.[273] His strategist Peter Giangreco agrees, 'I mean, he owned it… And the name almost was refreshing' because it wasn't 'old and conventional'.[274] This was particularly true in a state which had been governed by a variety of dynasties: the Daleys, the Hyneses, the Lipinskis, the Madigans, the Jacksons. Several men with the surname Ryan had held high office in the state within several years of each other, but there had never been an Obama. In raising the salience of his racialised name rather than diminishing it, Obama's stylistic approach is a sign of a symbolic-substantive campaign strategy.

Result


Weeks before the election, Blair Hull's campaign imploded over revelations about the candidate's divorce. The Obama campaign was concerned that Hull's white supporters would transfer to Dan Hynes. Obama's legislative director Dan Shomon recalls that many on the campaign felt that 'if Blair Hull dropped out, it would be a negative for us. We wanted Hynes and Hull to split the more conservative white vote'.[275] Abner Mikva confirms, 'We didn't think all of Hull's votes would go to Barack'.[276] The final public poll of the election showed Obama with a comfortable lead over Dan Hynes, but it was possible that as Hull's vote decreased, Hynes would be the beneficiary of Hull's voters and the vast proportion of undecided voters. In the end, Obama was the clear beneficiary, securing 53 percent of the total vote. Upon reflection, Obama communications consultant Valerie Corr Hanserd suggests the defections to Obama were not surprising, given that Hull and Obama were both 'outsider' candidates who were not supported by the Illinois political establishment. She notes, 'Blair Hull was an outsider… And I think if you look at the list of people who were running and were qualified, Barack Obama might fit the outsider bill better than Dan Hynes'.[277] Chris Sautter, who assisted the Senate campaign with internal polling agrees, 'when Hull collapsed, Obama just shot up, and it was like, OK, it's now between Hynes and Obama. You know, do you want an old hack or do you want this new face? That was when Obama really began to take off'.[278]

---

[272] Obama, quoted in 'Issues of race a painful part of Obama family history', *Springfield State-Journal Register*, 11 January 2004.
[273] Interview with Hanserd.
[274] Interview with Giangreco.
[275] Shomon, quoted in Remnick (2010: 377).
[276] Interview with Mikva.
[277] Interview with Hanserd.
[278] Interview with Sautter.

Usually pollsters conclude that when a black candidate faces a white opponent, the undecided voters will disproportionately break in favour of the white candidate.[279] However, in this case, the final public poll underestimated Obama's support by 16 percentage points, higher than the total percentage of reported undecided voters in the final poll (14%). Obama's 53 percent victory was 11 percentage points higher than what David Axelrod had imagined would be the candidate's ceiling.

Figure 6.14. Final Public Poll vs Actual Result




N=400 likely Democratic voters, phone survey, margin of error of +/- 5 percentage points, Source: 'Obama, Ryan pace race for Senate', Springfield State Journal-Register, *14 March 2004; Illinois State Board of Elections*

While the Obama campaign had expected to do well in Chicago, the scale of his victory in the city was surprising. Obama won 64.4 percent of the vote in Cook County. He even won some of the machine's most reliable wards.[280] However, there were some lingering signs of the white machine's strength, especially in the southwest side. Obama's worst wards were Ward 11, which includes Bridgeport (the ancestral neighbourhood of the Daley family, currently represented on Chicago City Council by the Richard J Daley's grandson), and Ward 13, controlled by State House Speaker Michael Madigan.[281] Obama won less than 15 percent of the vote in both of these wards, which Don Rose describes as

[279] Brodnitz, 2006.
[280] Don Rose, 'The end of racial voting?', *Chicago Tribune*, 2 May 2004.
[281] Bernard Schoenburg, 'Madigan backing Hynes for US Senate', *Springfield State Journal-Register*, 18 November 2003.

'notoriously hostile' to non-machine candidates[282] and 'the most racist wards in the city'.[283] When Harold Washington ran for mayor he won less than 1 percent of the vote in the 13th Ward. These wards show the strength of the white machine in city politics, but the fact that they stand out as exceptions also shows its diminished vitality. During Harold Washington's mayoralty, Chicago was known as 'Beirut-on-the-Lake', a reference to its brutal, ethnically fractious politics.[284] The ward map from the 2004 primary provides little evidence of such divisions.[285] Campaign manager James Cauley posits that some of this difference has to do with the nature of a legislative versus executive office, an idea also raised with me by Douglas Wilder (Chapter 3). Cauley suggested, 'There's no jobs in a US Senate seat. So, they ['regulars'] are not going to break their hump just to be nice to somebody'.[286]

Figure 6.15. Chicago result by ward winner




Based on data from the City of Chicago Data Portal

In fact, the whiteness of a ward did not have a strong effect on predicting Obama's vote share. In the 1983 mayoral election, 80 percent of white Democrats refused to support the black Democratic

[282] Don Rose, 'The end of racial voting?', *Chicago Tribune*, 2 May 2004.
[283] Interview with Rose.
[284] Pacyga, 2009, 281.
[285] Obama's was not the first election with such wide support across the city. In 1996, Bill Clinton became the first presidential candidate to carry all fifty wards.
[286] Interview with Cauley.

nominee.[287] Yet Obama was able to win over two-thirds of the vote in some the city's whitest wards, as Figure 6.16 shows.

Figure 6.16. Chicago Wards: Whites as proportion of population and Obama vote share




Based on data from the Illinois State Board of Elections and 2010 Census

The clearest divide was between non-white wards. Obama did extremely well in the predominantly black wards, but poorly in Hispanic dominated wards (see Figure 6.17). The more Hispanics in a ward, the less well Obama tended to do. Obama lost four heavily Hispanic wards to Richard Daley's former chief of staff, Gerry Chico. These were the only localities in the state where Chico did well. He won only 5.6 percent of the vote in Cook County and came in fifth place statewide. One Obama campaign strategist confessed to me that the campaign made little effort to appeal to Hispanic voters, partly due to their low turnout propensity.[288] The Obama coalition was strictly African Americans and liberal whites.

[287] Baek & Landau, 2011.
[288] Interview with Tamarin.

Figure 6.17. Chicago Wards: Non-white populations and support for Obama



Based on data from the Illinois State Board of Elections and 2010 Census

Conclusion

In conclusion, Barack Obama pursued a symbolic-substantive campaign strategy. A key feature of Obama's strategy was to mobilise African Americans and sympathetic whites on the basis of making racial progress, diversifying the United States Senate, and propelling a history-maker and barrier-breaker to high office. The factors explaining Barack Obama's campaign strategy bear many similarities with those which facilitated Carol Moseley Braun's successful run for the US Senate in 1992. They merit some detailed consideration. The first black Democrat elected to the US Senate, Braun demonstrated that an African American could win statewide federal office, and that it was possible to do so with a reasonably liberal, race-conscious policy programme. David Axelrod credits Braun with having 'pave[d] the way' for Obama's candidacy in 2004.[289]

America's first two black Democratic senators shared numerous similarities. They both lived in Hyde Park and had represented the area in the state legislature. Both were lawyers with ties to the University of Chicago and who had even worked for the same civil rights law firm. Both were race-conscious candidates who had the support of both African American voters and liberal whites. In their primary campaigns, each faced two white men: an established statewide elected official backed by the pillars of the Democratic establishment (Alan Dixon in 1992 and Dan Hynes in 2004) as well as a millionaire, anti-politics insurgent with seemingly endless financial resources and a top-rate campaign team (Al Hofeld in 1992 and Blair Hull in 2004). Both Braun and Obama were initially expected to finish in third

[289] Axelrod, 2015, 106.

place. Their elections, too, had a direct connection. Obama's first political job involved registering over one-hundred thousand new voters for Braun.


This case study does not seek to argue that Obama's nomination in 2004 was a mere repeat of Braun's in 1992. There are key differences. First, in percentage terms Obama's victory was greater than that of Braun. Braun won the nomination with only 38.3 percent of the vote; Obama won 52.8 percent of the vote. Second, Braun's and Obama's relationships with black elites differed. Braun had close linkages with South Side black leaders, including black nationalists on the far South Side. Braun had been active in the civil rights movement and had volunteered at the Black Panthers' breakfast clubs, although she was never a member.[290] It was former Black Panther leader Bobby Rush who encouraged Harold Washington to put Braun on his slate for countywide office (Cook County Recorder of Deeds).[291] Obama, in contrast, made a political foe of Rush when he tried to unseat him in a primary challenge in 2000. As a result, Rush refused to endorse Obama in the 2004 primary.

Third, Braun's and Obama's racial biographies differed. Braun was born and spent her entire life on the South Side. She was raised in a lower middle-class black family where, as she put it, 'ethnic pride was part and parcel of [her] world'.[292] Obama, in contrast, was a Chicagoan by choice and had not grown up in the black community. For Obama, support from black voters was not guaranteed. During the primary, Obama made targeted appeals to shore up black voters' support, a necessary (but not sufficient) component of his winning majority.

However, while Obama's support was deeper than that of Braun, the geographical distribution of his support was broadly similar. 73.8 percent of Braun's primary vote came from Cook County, where Chicago is located; 70.8 percent of Obama's vote was from Cook County, as Figure 6.18 shows.

[290] Interview with Braun, 2013.
[291] Ibid.
[292] Carol Moseley Braun, 'Between WEB Du Bois and BT Washington', *Ebony*, November 1995.


Figure 6.18. Regional share of candidates' primary vote totals (Braun 1992/Obama 2004)



Based on data from the Illinois State Board of Elections

County-level data from both primaries reveal that Obama's and Braun's vote share followed similar patterns. While Barack Obama substantially outperformed Carol Moseley Braun in absolute terms, winning 14.5 percentage points more than Braun, the distribution of their support was broadly similar. In counties where Braun had done well, Obama tended to do well, as Figure 6.19 shows.

Figure 6.19. Vote share for Braun/Obama by county in 1992/2004 Democratic primaries



Based on data from the Illinois State Board of Elections

I argue that it is no coincidence that the first two black Democratic US senators shared many characteristics. The distinctive arena of interracial politics in Hyde Park gave Obama and Braun access to powerful white elites while maintaining connections with black elites and black voters. Yet, the two elections are remembered differently. While Braun's election is often rendered as a freak accident, Obama's success is credited to his rare abilities and skill. Edward McClelland calls Braun's victory a 'fluke'.[293] That Braun's election is absent from most accounts explaining Obama's rise to political prominence is characteristic of attempts to exceptionalise Obama, detaching him from wider histories of black electoral politics and erasing a pioneering black woman from historical memory. While Obama was undoubtedly an extremely talented politician whose political trajectory has been unsurpassed by any other African American politician, David Mendell makes the error, in my view, of seeing Obama as 'an entirely new and unique politician'.[294] While Melanye Price may be correct to argue that Obama followed 'old techniques African American candidates used in efforts to deracialize' when he ran for president in 2008, his racial campaign strategy in the 2004 Senate campaign entailed a far more race-conscious approach.[295]

[293] McClelland, 2010, 172
[294] Mendell, 2007, 8.
[295] Price, 2016, 159.

Chapter 7 - Keith Ellison (Minnesota, 2006)

'If you don't see colour, you need to see an eye doctor'.
Congressman Keith Ellison, Interview with author

***

Keith Ellison was the first Muslim elected to the US House of Representatives. An African American criminal defence lawyer who was raised as a Catholic in Detroit before converting to Islam and moving to Minneapolis as an adult, Ellison bore little biographical resemblance to his predecessor, Representative Martin Olav Sabo, the Lutheran founder of Congress's 'Friends of Norway Caucus'.[1] After Sabo's retirement in 2006, Ellison was elected to Congress in Minnesota's Fifth District (MN:05), which was only 13 percent African American. The District had never elected an African American to Congress, and before Ellison no African American had ever been nominated by a major party for federal office in Minnesota.

This case study explains Keith Ellison's choice of racial campaign strategy in pursuit of his party's nomination. While the Fifth District was a safe Democratic seat in general elections, the primary was described as 'the most competitive race that the district's voters have seen in decades'.[2] Beyond its historic significance, this primary election is worth studying because it demonstrates how an African American candidate who faced racialised attacks chose neither the deracialised strategy nor the crusade campaign strategy. Throughout the primary, Ellison was subjected to a series of implicitly and explicitly racialised attacks, which many commentators thought would be fatal to his candidacy.[3] He was criticised by his opponents and the local press for being a 'scofflaw' due to his failure to pay fees for driving and parking infractions.[4] More damagingly, he was criticised for his past association with the Nation of Islam, which local commentators identified as an anti-white and anti-Semitic organisation. Ellison's campaign team privately identified these attacks as racist; however, they made the strategic choice not to identify their racial content publicly.[5]

Such a response is a tactic of the deracialised strategy. However, other aspects of Ellison's campaign make it impossible to describe him as a deracialised candidate. The Fifth District was a progressive constituency. For many of its residents, a commitment to civil rights was at the centre of their political identity. Ellison's campaign embraced this element of his candidacy, explicitly referring to his 'historic campaign' in campaign communications and emphasising the importance of diverse representation. Alongside this symbolic appeal, Ellison maintained a substantive policy commitment to racial and

[1] 'Rep Sabo to end his long career in Congress', *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 18 March 2006.
[2] Rochelle Olson, 'Four DFLers dash for every last vote', *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 10 September 2006.
[3] 'Dead Man Walking', *Politics in Minnesota*, 12 July 2006.
[4] Tom Scheck, 'Rivals say Erlandson crosses the line', *Minnesota Public Radio*, 7 September 2006.
[5] Interviews with Pam Costain (21 April 2015), John Stiles (22 April 2015), Carla Kjellberg (19 June 2015).

economic justice, presenting himself as the most left-wing of the main three contenders in the primary. Furthermore, Ellison made direct appeals to two key minority communities in the District: native-born African Americans and naturalised East Africans. These appeals emphasised his commitment to their substantive policy concerns, including on several racially explicit policy issues. Ellison also invited high-profile African American figures, such as Jesse Jackson, to campaign for him at public events, a major violation of the deracialisation strategy. In sum, Ellison chose a symbolic-substantive campaign strategy.

Explanatory Variables: Context, Candidate, and Elites

Context: Minnesota's Fifth Congressional District

The Fifth District of Minnesota (MN:05) is one of the most progressive congressional districts in the United States. Political scientist Larry Jacobs, also a district resident, referred to the Fifth District as 'the United Republic of Social Democracy'.[6] *Roll Call* described the district as 'a bastion of liberal activism'.[7] Barry Casselman, a Minnesota political commentator, asserted that the district's Democrats were even more liberal than Democrats in San Francisco.[8]

The Fifth District is anchored in Minneapolis, the second largest city in the Midwest (after Chicago) and described by *New York Times* journalist Dirk Johnson as 'the Stockholm of America' because the city 'has long boasted a tradition of generous social programs'.[9] Minneapolis has been congratulated by commentators for its long record of 'enlightened views on race relations'.[10] Indeed, the city has a lengthy history of electing African Americans in spite of its overwhelmingly white makeup. In 1898, the affluent Kenwood area of South Minneapolis, with fewer than 50 black residents out of 9,000, elected John Francis Wheaton, the first African American graduate of the University of Minnesota Law School, to the Minnesota House of Representatives.[11] In 1972, the Minneapolis suburb of St Louis Park, which had only twenty-six black residents, elected Bob Lewis, an African American, to the Minnesota Senate.[12] More recently, Minneapolis elected a black mayor, Sharon Sayles Belton, who held office for two terms (1994-2001).

On racial policy, the state of Minnesota pioneered civil rights legislation earlier than most other parts of the United States. As early as the turn of twentieth century, the state legislature passed a bill

[6] Larry Jacobs, quoted in 'Rep Sabo to End His Long Career in Congress', *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 18 March 2006.
[7] Nicole Duran, 'Sabo sets off Twin Cities slug fest', *Roll Call*, 29 March 2006.
[8] Barry Casselman, quoted in 'Sabo Sets off Twin Cities slug fest', *Roll Call*, 29 March 2006.
[9] Dirk Johnson, 'Ethnic Change Tests Mettle of Minneapolis Liberalism', *New York Times*, 18 October 1997.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Brady, 2007, 67.
[12] Curt Brown, 'Decades apart, they crossed the color line', *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 12 June 2016.

outlawing racial discrimination in pubs and bars.[13] In 1921, while the Dyer anti-lynching bill languished in Congress, Minnesota passed its own anti-lynching law.[14] In 1957, the state passed a fair housing law, a decade before the federal Fair Housing Act of 1968, which itself was sponsored by a Minnesota US senator (Walter Mondale). Within this context Minneapolis, the state's largest city, was correspondingly committed in its push for civil rights initiatives. In the 1940s, the mayor of Minneapolis, Hubert Humphrey, created the Mayor's Council on Human Relations. The body, which largely relied on private philanthropists for funding, investigated racial discrimination and researched race relations in the city.[15] More significantly, under his mayoralty, Humphrey persuaded the city council to create the Fair Employment Practices Council (FEPC) which banned discrimination on the basis of race, creed, colour, national origin, or ancestry in hiring, conditions of employment, promotions, compensation, and union organisation.[16] While similar bodies existed in other parts of the United States (such as in Chicago, Cleveland, and Milwaukee), Minneapolis's FEPC was notable in that it both possessed and used enforcement powers to sanction instances of racial discrimination in the workplace.[17]

There is little doubt that white Minneapolis residents believed (and continue to believe) that their city was at the vanguard of racial progress in the United States. As one campaign strategist in Minneapolis stated to me, 'Minnesotans like to tell themselves and each other stories about how they are unique and about how Minnesota is unique'.[18] Throughout the post-war period, Minneapolis newspapers regularly contrasted their city favourably with racial practices in the South. The *Minneapolis Tribune*, for example, denounced southern states for 'cheating Negro veterans of GI benefits'.[19] Yet, for most of its history, Minneapolis was overwhelmingly white, meaning that actual interracial interactions were limited. When Hubert Humphrey chastised the national Democratic Party at its 1948 convention for not being sufficiently bold on civil rights, less than 1 percent of his city's residents were black. Therefore, racial liberalism was largely an abstract concept of fairness rather than one which required citizens to adapt their behaviours or institutions to accommodate an interracial space. John Powell, the director of the Institute for Race and Poverty at the University of Minnesota, assessed, 'Being liberal in Minnesota didn't cost anything'.[20]

In addition, the extent to which Minnesota was a bastion of racial tolerance is overstated, I argue. Keith Ellison remarked in a 1993 interview that when he moved from Detroit to Minneapolis, he thought 'that


[13] Delton, 2002, Ch 4.
[14] On the travails of the Dyer bill, see Zangrando (1980) and King (2000: 147-152).
[15] The Council researched and investigated reports of racial and religious discrimination, monitored literature and films for racist content, and engaged in public education about racial discrimination.
[16] For an overview of fair employment practices (FEP) legislation from the 1940s-70s, see Chen (2009).
[17] The FEPC had the power to enforce with a fine of $100 or 90 days in jail (Delton, 2002: 106).
[18] Interview with Stiles. This was the self-image promoted by Garrison Keller in *A Prairie Home Companion.*
[19] 'Civil Liberties Belong to All Americans', *Minneapolis Tribune*, 29 July 1947.
[20] John Powell, quoted in 'Ethnic Change Tests Mettle of Minneapolis Liberalism', *New York Times*, 18 October 1997.

Minnesota would probably be more open and receptive to ideas of equality and tolerance. I have not found that to be true'.[21] Behind the façade of civil rights liberalism, Minnesota was not immune to dark episodes of racial violence and entrenched discrimination. For example, although Minnesota's anti-lynching law was passed at a time when Congress was unable to pass a federal equivalent, its passage was provoked by the horrific 1920 lynching of three black circus workers in the northeast city of Duluth.[22] Photographs show smiling Minnesotans standing next to the labourers' beaten and disfigured bodies hanging from a lamppost. This episode underscores Desmond King and Stephen Tuck's insistence that lynching should be viewed as a nationwide project of white supremacy rather than as a southern peculiarity.[23]

Since the 1970s, Minneapolis has diversified, but it still remains predominantly white, as Figure 7.1 shows. When Keith Ellison ran for Congress, two out of three Minneapolitans were white. Within Minneapolis there are two primary centres of black residence. The first major area is North Minneapolis. In the mid-twentieth century, the near North Side was known as 'the Jewish center of the Upper Midwest', but as African Americans migrated to the city and settled in the area, its Jewish residents moved further westward and into the suburbs.[24] The second area is the Cedar-Riverside area, known locally as 'Little Mogadishu', whose black inhabitants are primarily East African immigrants. According to a 2011 Minneapolis Compass report, 43.0 percent of the inhabitants of Cedar-Riverside speak a language other than English at home, compared to 19.2 percent of the city overall.[25] Minneapolis has the most diverse black population – in terms of national origin – in the United States, with the country's largest Somali population both proportionately and in absolute numbers.[26]

[21] Keith Ellison, quoted in 'Interview: Keith Ellison of the Legal Rights Center', *Twin Cities Reader*, 7 July 1993.
[22] Spangler, 1961, 100.
[23] King & Tuck, 2007.
[24] Nathanson, 2010, 121.
[25] http://www.mncompass.org/_pdfs/neighborhood-profiles/Minneapolis-CedarRiverside-102011.pdf
[26] Copeland-Carson, 2004, xiii.

Figure 7.1. Racial population change in Minneapolis, 1910-2010



Based on data from the US Census Bureau


It is no accident that the city's black population today is overwhelmingly concentrated in North Minneapolis. Like many northern cities, Minneapolis maintained segregation through a racist form of capitalism. Racially restrictive covenants were used through the 1940s to ensure no 'person of the Negro race or any person married to or living with a person of the Negro race' could buy or rent houses in sections of the city.[27]

Economically, African Americans in Minneapolis lived precarious existences, mainly restricted to menial service jobs. In 1945, two-thirds of all employed black Minneapolitans worked in the city's hotels.[28] In the twenty-first century, the black population continued to be excluded from much of the city's prosperity. African American unemployment in the city was nearly four times that of white unemployment (10.9% for blacks compared to 2.8% for whites)[29] and six times as many African Americans lived below the poverty line as whites did (26.4% of blacks compared to 4.2% of whites).[30] Within the black community, there was further social stratification. Amidst this poverty, Minneapolis had the highest proportion of university-educated African Americans in the United States.[31]

[27] Quoted in Nathanson (2010: 102, deed filed on 10 May 1927). See also Sapngler (1961: 90-95). For more on the use of racially restrictive covenants across the United States, see Plotkin (1999, 2001).
[28] Governor's Interracial Commission, 'The Negro Worker in Minnesota', 1945, 21.
[29] Connie Razza, 'Wall Street, Main Street, and Martin Luther King Jr Boulevard', New York: Center for Popular Democracy, March 2015, 58.
[30] Bureau of Labor Statistics, monthly tracked unemployment rate.
[31] Copeland-Carson, 2004, 67.

In addition to Minneapolis, the Fifth District of Minnesota contained a collection of first-ring suburban towns situated to the city's north, west, and south.[32] The suburbs were majority Democratic but were more affluent than the city of Minneapolis.[33] They were also overwhelmingly white,[34] making Ellison's district 72 percent white overall.[35] Politically, these suburbs resembled the city in voting behaviour and identity. Jeff Blodgett, who ran Senator Paul Wellstone's constituency office from 1991 to 2002, informed me that 'the Twin Cities and the first-ring suburbs have sort of really blended in a way…[T]he first ring suburbs look a lot like Minneapolis and Minneapolis looks a lot like the first ring suburbs'.[36] Ellison agreed in his interview with me that 'the suburbs and Minneapolis have a substantial amount of commonality…It's kind of uniform'.[37] Some suburban towns possessed a robust left-of-centre political identity, similar to Minneapolis. For example, one of the District's suburbs, St Louis Park, was home to a large proportion of the region's Jewish population. *New York Times* commentator Thomas Friedman, who was brought up in the town, remarked, 'If Finland and Israel had a baby, it would be St Louis Park'.[38] In 2006, voters from the suburbs made up just over one-third of the voting population in the Democratic congressional primary (see Figure 7.2).

Figure 7.2. Geographical distribution of MN:05 DFL primary voters (2006)



Based on data from the Minnesota Secretary of State

[32] These towns are New Hope, Crystal, Robbinsdale, Golden Valley, St Louis Park, Hopkins, Richfield, Columbia Heights, St Anthony, Hilltop, Fridley, and Spring Lake Park.
[33] Curtis Gilbert, 'Why Democrats rule the city', *Minnesota Public Radio*, 20 February 2008.
[34] Rochelle Olson, 'DFLers queue up quickly for the chance to fill Sabo's seat', *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 18 March 2006.
[35] 'American Community Survey', US Census Bureau, 2005-2007.
[36] Interview with Jeff Blodgett, 21 April 2015.
[37] Interview with Keith Ellison, 7 July 2015.
[38] Friedman, 2016, Ch 14.

Candidate: Keith Ellison

Keith Ellison was born and raised in a middle-class black family in a Detroit neighbourhood described by Ellison as 'probably one of the nicest parts of the city'.[39] Ellison was brought up a Roman Catholic and attended fee-paying Catholic schools. His father was a psychiatrist whose mental health clinic treated mainly black patients. His mother was a social worker. Ellison's parents were both grandchildren of slaves, with his family coming up from Georgia and Louisiana during the Great Migration.

Ellison had a strong sense of his black racial identity. He admits to being a voracious reader of race-conscious books as a young man, including works about the psychological trauma of racism,[40] novels and memoirs about African Americans' experiences of white supremacy in the United States,[41] studies of urban uprisings,[42] and anti-colonial texts.[43] As a young man, Ellison identified with the black power movement and wore an Afro pick with 'a little black-power fist at the end'.[44] In his memoirs, Ellison expresses clearly his commitment to his black racial identity, 'Identity does count… We say we're black and proud. What we mean is that people like us who were denied full participation in American society still added to this country despite the effort to marginalize us. We used to be property. We endured the Jim Crow era. We understood that as a people denied liberty in the land of liberty, we will always be committed to liberty and justice for all – no exceptions'.[45]

For his undergraduate degree in economics, Ellison attended Wayne State University in Detroit, which Ellison recalls as having an 'urban, working-class campus'.[46] Ellison's father and brothers all attended the university.[47] Ellison was involved in the black student union, the anti-apartheid campaign, and the student newspaper *South End*.[48] At Wayne State, Ellison converted to Islam at the age of nineteen, taking the shahada (the profession of faith) in 1982.[49] Ellison's conversion, in part, was a political act.[50] When Ellison ran for Congress in 2006, he stated that his conversion to Islam 'had a political angle to it, a reaction to status quo politics'.[51] In his memoirs he writes that he was inspired by Islam's message of 'universal brotherhood, the evils of racism, and the common origins of all humanity',[52] themes which were cited in Eric Lincoln's classic *The Black Muslims in America* as foundational to African American

[39] Ellison, 2014, 41.
[40] E.g., Grier & Cobbs (1968).
[41] E.g., Wright (1940, 1945), Paton (1948), Malcolm X (1965), Brown (1965).
[42] E.g., Widick (1972), Surkin (1975)
[43] E.g., Fanon (1952, 1959, 1961)
[44] Ellison, 2014, 42.
[45] Ibid., 64.
[46] Ibid., 74.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid., Ch 5.
[49] Ibid., 74.
[50] Ellison, quoted in Gillespie & Perez (2010: 281).
[51] Ellison, quoted in 'Muslim candidate plays defense', *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 11 September 2006.
[52] Ellison, 2014, 76.

Muslim identity.[53] Ellison credited Malcolm X's autobiography as a major influence in his decision to convert to Islam.[54]

Ellison joined the Muslim Center mosque in Detroit, which followed the teachings of Warith Deen Mohammed. Ellison's description of his Islamic identity bears a great number of similarities with those of W D Mohammed's teachings. Mohammed was the son of Elijah Muhammad, the leader of the Nation of Islam (NOI) from 1934 to 1975. W D Mohammed was expelled several times from the NOI in the 1960s and 1970s before assuming leadership of the organisation after his father's death. The younger Mohammed attempted to deconstruct the organisation by revising his father's teachings about black separatism, allowing white membership, and embracing the tenets of mainstream Sunni Islam.[55]

In spite of not being an NOI member, Ellison expressed sympathy towards the black empowerment aims of the NOI and worked with the organisation during the 1990s. At the Hennepin County Library, I found a clipping from a 1998 local newspaper article which referred to Ellison's 'affiliation with the Nation of Islam' (see Figure 7.3).[56] Eric Harmon, the author of the 1998 article, added, 'Anticipating possible criticism for his NOI affiliation, Ellison-Muhammad[57] says he is aware that not everyone appreciates what the Nation does and feels that there is a propaganda war being launched against its leader, Minister Louis Farrakhan'.[58] These comments, however, must be put into the context of the mid-1990s during which the NOI was a major engine of black activist politics.[59] Like Ellison, Barack Obama attended Farrakhan's Million Man March in Washington, DC in 1995, but Obama did not join the organisation.[60]

[53] Lincoln, 1961.
[54] Ellison, 2014, 70. See also Gillespie & Perez (2010: 281).
[55] Curtis, 2002, Ch 6.
[56] Eric Harmon, 'Keith Ellison-Muhammad will run for house 58B seat', *Insight*, 9 February 1998.
[57] In the 1990s, Ellison called himself 'Ellison-Muhammad', but by 2002 he no longer used the name in political or professional contexts. It is not uncommon for converts to Islam to adopt an honorific Muslim name.
[58] Eric Harmon, 'Keith Ellison-Muhammad will run for house 58B seat', *Insight*, 9 February 1998.
[59] Gibson & Berg, 2017.
[60] Hank de Zutter, 'What Makes Obama Run?', *Chicago Reader*, 7 December 1995.

Figure 7.3. Profile of Ellison which mentions 'his affiliation with the Nation of Islam' (1998)



Keith Ellison-Muhammad will run for house 58B seat

Insight, 2-9-98 p.1,3

By D. Eric Harmon
Contributing Writer

"Our neighborhood is not nearly as peaceful, safe, and economically vibrant as any of us would like it to be," says Keith Ellison-Muhammad, attorney and radio talk show host who recently announced his candidacy for the State Legislature House seat in District 58B. And because the community is in such a state, Ellison-Muhammad, whose legal name is Ellison, but wishes to be identified with his Muslim name, says he wants to be the person to help change all of that.

"My motivation for running has to do with the needs of the community—it has to do with my talents, skills, and passion for serving people. I'm running because our community needs a strong voice in the legislature—a vocal legislator who will use his office to organize and galvanize the people, and I think I am well-suited to do those things."

Ellison-Muhammad, who says his affiliation with the Nation of Islam doesn't mean he isn't running to represent all the people in the district, feels the critical issues on the table include criminal justice, education, and economic development.

"The streets of North Minneapolis are not safe and are not perceived to be safe, and that puts a damper on business development and on people with valuable skills moving into the neighborhood," says Ellison-Muhammad, who also feels the community needs to find ways of becoming safe without turning into a police state. His solution? To use organizations that are already set up for community safety to contribute significantly to securing the neighborhood. Ellison-Muhammad would support legislation that bolsters patrol groups like Mission of Peace, the Nation of Islam, M.A.R.C.H., Inc., AMAN, and SALAAM. "These un-

ELLISON: *Turn to 3*

Keith Ellison-Muhammad

Ellison-Muhammad resigns from Legal Rights Center in order to run for office

By D. Eric Harmon
Contributing Writer

Keith Ellison-Muhammad, Executive Director of the Legal Rights Center (LRC), is resigning his position to enter private practice and to run for the State legislature in House District 58B on the Northside of Minneapolis.

Ellison-Muhammad, who has been with the LRC since 1993, will join the law firm of Hassan & Reed on February 15. The trial attorney, who recently successfully defended teenager Lawrence Miles on felony charges of making terroristic threats against Minneapolis police officers, says he is making the move to private practice to engage in more diverse areas of the law, including personal injury and discrimination as well as criminal law. "I also want to have more freedom," Ellison-Muhammad said, citing that his bid for the seat being vacated by Richard Jefferson will require a flexible schedule.

In a letter written to a colleague at the LRC, the attorney wrote, "While I am looking forward to

CAMPAIGN: *Turn to 3*

Source: Special Collections, Hennepin County Library

From 1987 to 1990, Ellison attended the University of Minnesota School of Law where he was president of the Black Law Students Association.[61] Ellison describes himself as having been 'a full-fledged student activist'.[62] In 1989, Ellison disrupted a Minneapolis City Council meeting to protest the death of two elderly African Americans who died in a mistaken police raid.[63] In 1992, he organised a rally against police brutality following the Los Angeles riots, which was attended by about 6,000 people.[64] Ellison reflected on this activist period in an interview when he ran for Congress, 'my perspective was

[61] Ellison, 2014, Ch 6.
[62] Ibid., 79.
[63] Tom Scheck, 'Keith Ellison dogged by his past', *Minneapolis Public Radio*, 30 June 2006.
[64] Chris Williams, 'At a Glance: Keith Ellison', *Skyway News*, 19 May 1992.

a tunnel vision; I was mostly concerned about the welfare of the African American community. That was the era of "Do the Right Thing". Remember that? People had their black, yellow, and red kufi caps on. There was higher African American consciousness'.[65]

Ellison was outspoken about racism throughout the 1990s. For eight years, Ellison was the co-host of a radio programme called 'Black Power Perspectives'. Ellison explains that their target audience was mainly black public housing residents. Guests included OJ Simpson's lawyer Johnnie Cochran and Betty Shabbaz, the widow of Malcolm X, and Ellison believes that the programme raised his profile locally.[66] A 1993 newspaper profile describes Ellison as a person who had 'made a name for himself around town protesting police brutality and racism', and Ellison told the reporter, 'We live in a racist society'.[67] In another profile written about Ellison's work in organising the black community after the 1992 police beatings of Rodney King in Los Angeles, Ellison set out his perspective of the pervasiveness of racism in the United States:

> '[Racism is] a systematic problem. Any time a black person walks into a store, no matter how nice his suit, he will be followed and watched. It would be unusual for any black male under 18 to grow up in an urban environment without being harassed by the police at least once. White people just don't understand how easy their lives are socially, not necessarily economically, because they don't have that bullshit'.[68]

Ellison's confidants contend that Ellison did not deviate from this basic analysis of racial inequality, nor do they believe that he had felt compelled to revise this assessment for strategic purposes in any of his election campaigns. Carla Kjellberg, who has known Ellison since his law school days, suggested to me that Ellison would have been comfortable repeating this paragraph twenty years later: 'He would say that today, but he wouldn't use the word bullshit'.[69]

Ellison's first job as a lawyer was with Lindquist and Vennum, one of the leading corporate law firms in Minnesota, but after three years he moved into criminal defence, becoming the executive director of a legal charity which defended the poor.[70] Ellison's office was based in a building owned by the Urban League, an historic African American organisation.[71] Ellison defended his clients who faced charges of drug trading[72] and violent crime.[73] Even during the 2006 primary, Ellison continued to represent clients. In June 2006, he worked as the lead counsel on a case which successfully defended two young black

---

[65] Ellison, quoted in 'Muslim candidate plays defense', *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 11 September 2006.
[66] 'A Question of Service', *Insight News*, 7 October 2002.
[67] Rose Farley, 'Interview: Keith Ellison of the Legal Rights Center', *Twin Cities Reader*, 7 July 1993.
[68] Keith Ellison, quoted in 'At a Glance: Keith Ellison', *Skyway News*, 19 May 1992.
[69] Interview with Kjellberg.
[70] Ellison, 2014, 101.
[71] Rashard Zanders, 'MN Rep Ellison running for US Congress', *Minneapolis Spokesman-Recorder*, 6-12 April 2006.
[72] E.g., *US v Glauning* 211 F.3d 1085 (2000), *State v Foster* 630 N.W.2d1 (2001), *US v Gutierrez* 367 F.3d 733 (2004)
[73] E.g., *US v Davis* 21 F.Supp.2d 979 (1998), *US v Davis* 174 F.3d 941 (1999)

men from a murder charge.[74] Ellison was publicly known for his concerns over police accountability.[75] On at least one occasion, Ellison sued the local police force for misconduct and excessive use of force.[76] In 2004, as a state legislator, Ellison called for the resignation of Minnesota's Commissioner of Public Safety after racial slurs made by the commissioner fifteen years earlier came to light.[77]

In 1998, Ellison ran for the state legislature in the predominantly black 58B state house seat. Ellison did not secure his party's endorsement, but four years later when the incumbent vacated the seat, Ellison won the nomination and was elected in the general election. Ellison's district was 76 percent non-white.[78] Ellison was re-elected with 84 percent of the vote in 2004.

Elites: The Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, DFL 'Giants', DFL Nominating Convention

The Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party

In order to understand the racial campaign strategy which Keith Ellison adopted in his bid for his party's nomination in 2006, it is essential to recognise the peculiar history of left-of-centre politics in Minnesota. As a political entity, the Democratic Party ceased to exist in Minnesota in 1944. Its successor organisation, the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party (DFL), was the merger of two, once mutually antagonistic, parties: the Democratic Party and the Farmer-Labor Party. Most significantly for the purposes of understanding Ellison's choice of racial campaign strategy, I argue that a strong commitment to civil rights united the DFL coalition and defined the politics of its political elite in the post-war period. This, in turn, explains in part why key DFL figures (e.g., Walter Mondale and Donald Fraser) endorsed Ellison during the primary, in spite of pressures not to do so.

The Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party has been described by Richard Valelly as 'the most successful case of a radical, state-level third party that American politics has ever seen'.[79] Formed in 1922 through an alliance between the agrarian socialist 'Non-Partisan League' and the Minnesota Federation of Labor, the Farmer-Labor Party was a vibrant early twentieth century 'prairie populist' party.[80] The party supported public ownership of the means of agricultural production to protect farmers from exploitation by private enterprise, as well as sought to guarantee various social protections for labourers and to strengthen unions.[81] In Minnesota during the 1920s and 1930s, the Farmer-Labor Party produced twelve members of the US House of Representatives, four US senators, and three governors. Farmer-Labor

[74] Margaret Zack, 'Two go on trial for ambush killing', *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 12 June 2006.
[75] 'A Question of Service', *Insight News*, 7 October 2002.
[76] *Miles v City of Minneapolis* 185 F.Supp.2d 1026 (2002)
[77] Woodbury, 2010.
[78] Tim Jones, 'Candidate finds past ties a real bind', *Chicago Tribune*, 30 June 2006.
[79] Valelly, 1989, xiii.
[80] Lebedoff, 1969, Ch 2. For a classic account of American agrarian social democracy, see Goodwyn (1978).
[81] Mitau, 1970, Ch 1.

Governor Floyd Olson (1931-36) was described by journalist John Nichols as 'very possibly the most radical figure ever to govern an American state'.[82]

Ideologically, the Farmer-Labor Party can be described as a social democratic or labour party, similar to those which flourished in western Europe during the same period. Its closest international analogue, however, was the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, which described itself as Canada's 'Farmer-Labour-Socialist' party and became the present-day New Democratic Party (NDP).[83] Although other state-level labour parties existed in the United States at this time – notably the North Dakota Non-Partisan League, the Washington (state) Farmer-Labor Party, and the Oklahoma Farmer-Labor Reconstruction League – none was as politically successful for as long a period as the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party.[84] Some commentators have credited the upper Midwest's high proportion of Scandinavian immigrants in the early twentieth century for having imported a social democratic ethos to the region.[85]

In the 1940s, the Farmer-Labor Party was struggling electorally and merged with the Democratic Party in 1944 to ensure its survival. Commentators have offered a variety of explanations for this move. David Lebedoff has suggested communist infiltration seriously weakened the Farmer-Labor Party's popular appeal.[86] Valelly has proposed that the New Deal's nationalising of the welfare function and macroeconomic duties of the central state undercut the appeal of state-level social democratic parties.[87] Valelly's line is consistent with Sidney Milkis's crediting of the New Deal with providing the setting for the two major American parties to nationalise in a broad ideological framework.[88] The Democratic Party's shift from being a party oriented around patronage (i.e. political machines) and sectarianism (e.g., Catholicism in the North and dissenting Protestantism in the South) to a left-of-centre policy-oriented party diminished the distinct appeal of the Farmer-Labor Party.

In his 1966 book *Midwest Politics*, John Fenton argued that Minnesota had a stronger tradition of policy-oriented, programmatic parties than most other parts of the country, with only Wisconsin as a possible rival.[89] As Fenton put it, by the mid-twentieth century, parties in Minnesota were 'issue-oriented rather than primarily job-oriented'.[90] At the core of this post-war Democratic policy programme in Minnesota was a commitment to a liberal agenda on civil rights. Civil rights liberalism was (and remains) core to DFL identity in Minnesota, in spite of historically being an overwhelmingly white state.

---

[82] John Nichols, 'Portrait of the Founder', *The Progressive*, January 1999.
[83] Lipset, 1971.
[84] Valelly, 1989, Ch 1.
[85] Interview with Stiles. See also 'The Secret of their Success', *The Economist*, 2 February 2013.
[86] Lebedoff, 1969.
[87] Valelly, 1989.
[88] Milkis, 1993, esp 52-74.
[89] Fenton, 1966.
[90] Ibid., 87.

The figure of Hubert Humphrey, in particular, loomed large in Minneapolis, where his bronze statue stands in the archway of the city hall where he served as mayor from 1945 to 1948. As mentioned previously, Humphrey came to national prominence in 1948 when he told the Democratic convention in Philadelphia that there must be 'no hedging – no watering down – of the instruments of the civil rights program'.[91] Humphrey's intervention was decisive in the convention's subsequent adoption (by 651.5 votes to 582.5 votes) of a civil rights programme for the first time in the Democratic Party's history. In turn, this vote led to the departure of thirty-five southern delegates from the convention and the formation of the States' Rights Democratic Party (the 'Dixiecrats'). Gary Donaldson credits Humphrey's speech with having 'catapulted' the mayor of Minneapolis 'into the forefront of the coming civil rights movement'.[92]

Humphrey's speech belies the common instrumentalist narrative that Democrats embraced civil rights as a response to the Great Migration. Keneshia Grant, for example, argues that black migration in the twentieth century caused Democratic politicians to support civil rights as a means of attracting votes from new black residents in northern cities.[93] However, there is little evidence that Humphrey's commitment was due to electoral pressure from African Americans, given that blacks made up less than 1 percent of Minneapolis residents.

While many of Humphrey's biographers credit Humphrey's personal conviction, I believe that alongside this moral impetus there was an instrumental explanation for Humphrey's emphasis on civil rights as mayor of Minneapolis. In particular, I am persuaded by Jennifer Delton's contention that a strong commitment to civil rights was used as a means of strengthening the reputation of the DFL to *white* voters in Minnesota. Before Humphrey, the Democratic Party in Minnesota had long been seen as 'the party of corrupt bosses, Catholics, and southern racists'.[94] Republican newspaper proprietors in Minnesota regularly highlighted racial barbarism in the solidly Democratic South as a means of tarnishing the image of the Democratic Party in Minnesota.[95] Humphrey's speech helped to break the symbolic connection in Minnesota voters' minds between the Democratic Party and southern racism. A pro-civil rights agenda became integral to Democratic identity in Minnesota. In our interview, Walter Mondale told me that as a young senator he was told civil rights was none of his business because he represented a mostly white state: 'I thought that was out of order. I thought civil rights was very much some of my business'.[96] This tradition, I argue, was invoked by the Ellison campaign to persuade white Democratic primary voters to support his nomination.

[91] Hubert Humphrey, Speech to the Democratic National Convention, 14 July 1948 (Philadelphia, PA).
[92] Donaldson, 1999, 163.
[93] Grant, 2014. See also Sitkoff (1971), Reed (1991), Kato (2016: Ch 5).
[94] Delton, 2002, xxiv.
[95] E.g., 'Supremacy Issue to Face Democrats', *Minneapolis Tribune*, 21 May 1944.
[96] Interview with Walter Mondale, 20 April 2015.

DFL 'Giants': Walter Mondale and Donald Fraser

During the 2006 campaign, DFL Party Chairman Brian Melendez described Minnesota as 'a state known for political giants'.[97] In the post-war period, the DFL produced left-of-centre politicians of national reputation, including four US senators who distinguished themselves as heroes of the Democratic Party's left-wing: Hubert Humphrey, Eugene McCarthy, Walter Mondale, and Paul Wellstone. Both Humphrey and Mondale served as vice presidents and were nominated as Democratic presidential candidates in 1968 and 1984, respectively. Valelly adds Donald Fraser, who represented the Fifth District in Congress from 1963-1979 and served as mayor of Minneapolis from 1980-1993, to his list of 'America's most social democratic politicians'.[98]

In his 2006 campaign for the DFL nomination, Ellison aligned himself closely with these figures. At his announcement speech, Ellison stated that he was running for Congress in 'the Wellstone tradition and the Humphrey tradition'.[99] Reflecting on the election in his memoirs, Ellison stated, 'I ran for Congress in the spirit of Hubert Humphrey'[100] and described Paul Wellstone as 'my model, my exemplar of an effective politician'[101]. At another campaign event, Ellison trumpeted 'the civil rights spirit of Humphrey, Mondale, Wellstone'.[102] A supportive article in the historically black *Minnesota Spokesman-Recorder* suggested that 'Ellison has the potential to go to Washington and become the next Paul Wellstone'.[103] Sam Kaplan, a major donor to Ellison's candidacy, stated that when he first met Ellison 'our minds flashed back 16 years [to] our first long conversation with Paul Wellstone'.[104] Particularly given the context of Wellstone's sudden death in a plane crash less than four years earlier, the desire for Minnesota to elect a prominent left-wing voice was palpable, as several interviewees expressed to me.[105] One observer remarked, it was 'no accident' that Ellison's campaign signs and t-shirts were same shade of 'spruce green' worn by Wellstone supporters.[106] Ellison also sent a direct mail piece featuring a photograph of Ellison with the late senator.[107]

By 2006, Donald Fraser and Walter Mondale were the last living members of this aforementioned set of DFL 'giants'. Both endorsed Ellison. Fraser wrote a letter to the *Minneapolis Star Tribune* stating

---

[97] Brian Melendez, quoted in 'Tearful Martin Sabo Announces Retirement from Congress', *Minnesota Public Radio*, 18 March 2006.
[98] Valelly, 1989, 2.
[99] Ellison, quoted in 'Ellison's kickoff part of crowed Fifth scene', *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 21 March 2006.
[100] Ellison, 2014, 286.
[101] Ibid., 124.
[102] Keith Ellison, quoted in 'Jesse Jackson campaigns for Keith Ellison in Minneapolis', *Minnesota Public Radio*, 30 June 2006.
[103] Isaac Peterson, 'Ellison Unplugged', *Minnesota Spokesman-Recorder*, 15-21 June 2006.
[104] Sam Kaplan, quoted in 'Keith Ellison, the DFL's endorsee for Congress in the Fifth District, has spent this summer countering attacks from Republicans and Democrats', *City Pages*, 30 August 2006.
[105] KE2, KE9, KE13.
[106] Rochelle Olson, 'Rebounding Ellison vows', *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 5 September 2006.
[107] Rochelle Olson, 'It's Day 1 of Round 2', *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 13 September 2006.

that 'Ellison's work in Congress will make us all proud'.[108] Fraser's and Mondale's endorsements, I argue, were in part motivated by their commitment to civil rights. In our interview, I asked Mondale whether he viewed his endorsement as part of his civil rights work. He replied, 'Yes, I wanted to move those issues forward. I wanted to get new people into politics. I've had a history of opening doors, get[ting] women into office, help[ing] minorities get elected…[Ellison] could be our first black congressman, and he was also a Muslim'.[109] Ellison's main rival Michael Erlandson confirmed independently to me that the Vice President had phoned him in advance of endorsing Ellison and explained that he was doing it because 'much of the Vice President's career was based on the civil rights movement. So, I think it was consistent with that'.[110]

The endorsements were major coups for Ellison, especially given that Martin Sabo publicly supported Michael Erlandson. Larry Jacobs explains that when 'Mondale came out and endorsed Ellison [he was] challenging his life-long friend (Sabo) and a good part of the [DFL] Party power structure'.[111] In addition to tying Ellison with this tradition of DFL progressivism, the endorsements opened up campaign funds to Ellison from wealthy liberal whites. Both Mondale and Fraser held a fundraiser for Ellison at the home of Sylvia and Sam Kaplan,[112] two powerful Minnesota fundraisers who helped launch Paul Wellstone's campaign for Senate and later were among the top fundraisers for Barack Obama.[113] Sam Kaplan told a local newspaper during the campaign that, in addition to his progressive policy positions, 'there is an appeal that we might send off a black Muslim to Washington…We could be proud to be associated with that kind of change'.[114] Wellstone's campaign manager Jeff Blodgett described the Kaplans to me as 'sort of kingmakers in town'.[115] Ellison describes the fundraiser as 'the turning point in the campaign'.[116]

The DFL Nominating Convention

The 2006 Democratic primary was provoked by the announced retirement of Martin Sabo, who represented the Fifth District since 1979. Sabo's departure was only the third time the seat changed hands in the post-war period. In the event of a vacancy or challenge for the congressional nomination, the process in the Minnesota Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party takes part in two stages: a convention endorsement and a popular primary. In the May before an election, roughly two-hundred party activists

[108] Donald Fraser, 'Letter: Vote hope, not fear', *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 8 September 2006.
[109] Interview with Mondale.
[110] Interview with Michael Erlandson, 21 April 2015.
[111] Correspondence with Larry Jacobs, 13 April 2015.
[112] Tom Scheck, 'Former Vice President Walter Mondale and Sam and Sylvia Kaplan will hold fundraiser for Keith Ellison', *Minnesota Public Radio*, 26 July 2006.
[113] Kevin Diaz, 'Back from Morocco Sam and Sylvia Kaplan resume political life', *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 6 July 2013.
[114] Sam Kaplan, quoted in 'Keith Ellison, the DFL's endorsee for Congress in the Fifth District, has spent this summer countering attacks from Republicans and Democrats', *City Pages*, 30 August 2006.
[115] Interview with Blodgett.
[116] Ellison, 2014, 161.

gather at a pre-primary convention to endorse their congressional district's candidate. After the convention, the endorsed candidate either proceeds to the general election without opposition or must face a popular primary four months later. Since the 1960s (and increasingly in the twenty-first century), the DFL endorsement has not been tantamount to nomination.[117] Challengers, especially those who are well-funded or have some other institutional support, have been known to defeat the convention's endorsed candidate in the September primary.

Ellison won his party's endorsement at the 6 May 2006 nominating convention. According to *Roll Call*, 'the most liberal party activists' tend to 'control' the outcome of the convention.[118] Interviewees confirmed to me that the convention was dominated by the party's liberal activists, who were attracted to Ellison's robust opposition to the war in Iraq. A comparison could be drawn between Ellison's support from anti-war white liberals and those who supported Obama in his quest for his party's Senate nomination in 2004. Similarly, the historic symbolism of Ellison's nomination was significant. Arvonne Fraser, who was a delegate at the convention, explained to me that in endorsing Ellison, 'We were breaking new ground…And we like to do that'.[119] Minneapolis historian Iric Nathanson agreed, 'People who came to the endorsing convention, I think…liked the idea of having an African American candidate'.[120]

The convention's endorsement carries some material benefits: access to party funds, party staff, and party voter ID lists.[121] It also ensured that Ellison received the support of elected officials throughout the state, including the mayor of Minneapolis R T Rybak and Congresswoman Betty McCollum who represented the neighbouring 'Twin City' of St Paul.[122] In addition, for some older voters in the District, the endorsement was still regarded as very important. Martin Sabo joked to me that he suspected one Minnesota DFL politician would not even vote for his own wife if she did not receive the convention's endorsement.[123] For these reasons, Jeff Blodgett, who was the campaign manager for Senator Paul Wellstone in 1990, 1996, and 2002, agreed with me that the DFL's convention endorsement was necessary but not sufficient for Ellison's victory.[124]

Although Ellison won the pre-primary convention, he faced two serious opponents in the primary itself.[125] Ellison's most important competitor was Mike Erlandson, who had served as Martin Sabo's

[117] But for a dissenting view, see Matthew Little, 'Undermining Ellison's Endorsement Victory', *Minneapolis Spokesman-Recorder*, 8-14 June 2006.
[118] Nicole Duran, 'Sabo Sets Off a Twin Cities Slugfest', *Roll Call*, 29 March 2006.
[119] Interview with Arvonne Fraser, 21 April 2015.
[120] Interview with Iric Nathanson, 21 April 2015.
[121] Tom Scheck, 'Former Party Chief Now Bucks the Party Process', *Minnesota Public Radio*, 6 July 2006.
[122] Rochelle Olson, 'Olson drops out of race for Sabo seat', *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 9 May 2006.
[123] Interview with Martin Sabo, 22 April 2015.
[124] Interview with Blodgett.
[125] There were four other candidates on the ballot, who together won 7.2 percent of the vote.

chief of staff, and whom Ellison admits was 'the odds-on favorite' to succeed his boss.[126] Erlandson was the consummate establishment figure, having served as chair of the Minnesota DFL until 2005.[127] He had worked for Sabo for much of his adult life, becoming one of the youngest chiefs of staff on Capitol Hill at the age of 28.[128] Sabo continued to support Erlandson after the pre-primary convention. Erlandson's campaign signs said 'Sabo endorsed', and Sabo was featured prominently on Erlandson's leaflets.[129] Walter Mondale recalled in his interview with me, 'Everybody knew Mike was his candidate. He'd worked for Marty for years…Mike's an old friend of mine, but I thought it would be better to get a new face, a new kind of dynamic to that office. I thought Keith could do it'.[130] One of Ellison's advisors agreed that many District voters 'did not want another Martin Sabo. They wanted something new, and they didn't want another white guy. All we'd had was white guys, you know?'.[131]

Ellison's other serious competitor was Ember Reichgott Junge, a state senator who represented the western suburban areas of the federal congressional district. She had the backing of the feminist group EMILY's List, who donated $100,000 to her campaign.[132] However, she was a more centrist candidate than either Ellison or Erlandson.[133] She favoured charter schools and had served as the state chair of pro-Iraq war candidate Joseph Lieberman's presidential campaign in 2004.[134] For Ellison, I contend that Reichgott Junge's candidacy was important because she attracted the support of some centrist white voters away from Erlandson. Indeed, in our interview Erlandson informed me that his internal polls showed that he could defeat Ellison if Reichgott Junge left the campaign. He appealed to her privately to withdraw, but she refused to do so.[135]

Dependent Variable: Symbolic-Substantive Campaign

Targeted Appeals

Targeted appeals refer to the basis on which a candidate encourages voters to support him or her. In this study, I am interested in whether these appeals had racial content and what form these racial appeals took. During his primary campaign, Ellison's language was typically cast in racially inclusive rhetoric. For example, at the DFL pre-primary convention, Ellison told the audience, 'We have to come together from the suburb and the city. We have to come together – straight and gay, black and white, red and

[126] Ellison, 2014, 158.
[127] Nicole Duran, 'Rep Sabo Calls It a Career', *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 20 March 2006.
[128] Rochelle Olson, 'DFLers jockey to fill Sabo's shoes', *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 5 May 2006.
[129] Rochelle Olson, 'Mike Erlandson hopes to succeed ex-boss', *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 6 September 2006.
[130] Interview with Mondale.
[131] KE9.
[132] Britt Robson, 'Keith Ellison, the DFL's endorsee for Congress in the Fifth District, has spent this summer countering attacks from Republicans and Democrats', *City Pages*, 30 August 2006.
[133] KE9, K10.
[134] Ellison, 2014, 158.
[135] Interview with Erlandson.

yellow. We have to come together'.[136] At another campaign event during the primary campaign, Ellison explained that 'the main thing we are going to Washington to do is argue that we are all better off together than apart…Black, white, brown, yellow. We have to come together as one people'.[137] Ellison's campaign stump speech began with the line, 'I am running for Congress because I believe that we have to boldly and unapologetically assert the idea that we are better off together than we are apart'.[138]

In spite of the universalist framing in much of his rhetoric, I argue that Ellison also made distinct race-conscious appeals to three groups of voters who composed Ellison's winning coalition: liberal whites throughout the district, African Americans in North Minneapolis, and East Africans, especially in the Cedar-Riverside area ('Little Mogadishu'). During the primary, Ellison told a reporter that he was 'working to attract minorities, peace activists, environmentalists, and more liberal members of the party'.[139] Ellison's campaign manager confirmed to the local newspaper that 'Ellison is working to get out voters who are black, Somali, gay and lesbian, peace activists'.[140] One of Ellison's field coordinators stated that 'progressives [and] people of colour' made up Ellison's electoral base.[141]

Many of my interview subjects believed that liberal whites in the District wanted to elect an African American to express their commitment to racial progress. Ellison's racial identity was highly salient in the campaign. One campaign advisor explained to me that Ellison was 'very black identified. I mean the guy doesn't hide his African American identity at all'.[142] Donald Fraser, who represented the Fifth District in Congress before Martin Sabo, told me, 'I think that was one of Ellison's great strengths – was that he was black. That would tend draw a number of people to him, even if they didn't know much about him'.[143] A letter by a white woman to *Minneapolis Star Tribune* after the primary captured these sentiments. She congratulated Fifth District voters for being 'forward-thinking' and stated, 'It's exciting to be on the verge of electing the first black Minnesotan and the first Muslim to Congress…I've never been prouder to be a Minneapolitan'.[144] A white teacher who was active in the Somali community recalled feeling 'that thrill of, wow, an African American in a leadership position. How exciting. How thrilling. That's the narrative I have in my head'.[145] One interviewee took a more dismissive view,

[136] Keith Ellison, quoted in 'Keith Ellison wins endorsement in 5th district', *Minneapolis Public Radio,* 6 May 2006.
[137] Keith Ellison, quoted in 'Jesse Jackson campaigns for Keith Ellison in Minneapolis', *Minnesota Public Radio,* 30 June 2006.
[138] Ellison, quoted in 'Keith Ellison, the DFL's endorsee for Congress in the Fifth District, has spent this summer countering attacks from Republicans and Democrats', *City Pages,* 30 August 2006.
[139] Tom Scheck, 'Keith Ellison dogged by his past', *Minnesota Public Radio,* 30 June 2006.
[140] 'Four DFLers dash for every last vote', *Minneapolis Star Tribune,* 10 September 2006.
[141] Interview with Betty Folliard, 20 April 2015.
[142] KE9.
[143] Interview with Donald Fraser, 21 April 2015.
[144] Susan Maas, 'Letter: Ellison's Historic Win', *Minneapolis Star Tribune,* 14 September 2006.
[145] Interview with Michael van Keulen, 20 April 2015.

describing the Fifth District as having 'a lot of guilty white liberals',[146] an assessment which Ellison rejected in his interview with me.[147]

To liberal whites, Ellison promoted the goal of diverse representation. At his campaign launch, Ellison stated, 'Diversity is important'.[148] An editorial in the local newspaper acknowledged after his nomination that '[t]he diversity he would bring to the US House was an asset in this race'.[149] Iric Nathanson, a Minneapolis historian, stated to me, 'there were good, white liberals who felt that we should be diverse, and here was a highly qualified African American candidate. So, I think the timing [as the first] and those factors really worked for him'.[150] One of Ellison's campaign workers explains that she supported him in spite of being friends with another candidate because she 'thought it was time for a person of colour…I felt it was a combination of Keith's politics plus the fact that this district needed a new face'.[151] Ellison's website, archived from 3 September 2006, directly refers to Ellison's 'historic campaign for Congress' in the context of his endorsement from the *Jewish World*, as shown in Figure 7.4. One of Ellison's strategic advisors informed me that his advice to Ellison on the historic nature of his candidacy was to 'embrace it'.[152]

Figure 7.4. Keith Ellison's Campaign Website (3 September 2006)



Source: Internet Archive, Wayback Machine, www.keithellison.org

In addition, consistent with the symbolic-substantive strategy, Ellison's campaign promoted the idea that electing a historically significant candidate would provide Ellison with a higher profile in Congress

[146] KE12.
[147] Interview with Ellison.
[148] Keith Ellison, quoted in 'Ellison's kickoff part of crowded Fifth scene', *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 21 March 2006.
[149] 'Change was driver in primary election', *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 14 September 2006.
[150] Interview with Nathanson.
[151] KE9.
[152] KE13.

than most first-year members. Mordecai Spector, publisher of the *American Jewish World* who was asked by Ellison's supporters to write an endorsement of the candidate,[153] forwarded the view that in electing Ellison, 'voters could make an emphatic statement – one that would gain national and international attention'.[154] Clinton Collins, writing in a local newspaper, described Minnesota as 'a state that loves "firsts" and "onlys".'[155] Ellison's campaign directly acknowledged this aspiration, stating on his website on 16 May 2006 that Ellison's endorsement at the DFL convention 'puts Ellison in a strong position to become the first black member of Congress from Minnesota'.[156]

In our interview, I discussed with Ellison whether he felt compelled to diminish the salience of race in his appeals to white voters. Ellison stated that he did not believe he needed to purge race from his campaign rhetoric, a clear departure from the deracialised strategy:

> 'I think there's an assumption that if you're a black candidate you can't talk about racism against black people or else it seems self-serving or something like that. There's sort of a little bit of a taboo against doing that, you know what I mean? You have to act like we are the world, we love everybody, we don't see colour. Of course, this is all nonsense... My point is, yeah, I always felt comfortable [speaking about race] because I figure that – come on – white people know this country had slaves. It's not like they don't know that. They know there's segregation. They know there's societal racism now. And the ones who refuse to admit or who kind of want to sanitise, they're not voting for me anyway'.[157]

Based on Ellison's own words as well as the testimony of my interview subjects, it is evident that the candidate felt that it was important to be straightforward to voters about his views on racial inequality and the need for targeted racial policies. I asked Ellison's communications advisor Carla Kjellberg if the campaign discussed a strategy which avoided mentioning race in order to appeal to white voters. She replied, 'That certainly was talked about, and it was absolutely rejected. He rejected it; a majority of the people [in the campaign] rejected it'.[158] Paul Wellstone's campaign manager Jeff Blodgett believed that Ellison's straightforward approach mirrored that of Wellstone on matters of inequality. Blodgett recalled, '[Wellstone] had a number of people who voted for him and didn't agree with him but they liked that he was a conviction politician, and he was very clear about where he stood…So people thought he was an honest broker. So whether they agreed or disagreed with him they liked that style in their elected officials…I think Keith has some of that going for him'.[159] Pam Costain, a political advisor to Ellison, agreed in our interview that Ellison was 'really clear [that] race matters in our

---

[153] Interview with Vic Rosenthal, 22 April 2015.
[154] Mordecai Spector, 'Keith Endorsed by *American Jewish World*', Press statement: Ellison for Congress, 1 September 2006.
[155] Clinton Collins, 'Ellison needs to mend some African American fences', *Minnesota Spokesman-Recorder*, 10-16 August 2006.
[156] www.keithellison.org (Internet Archive Wayback Machine, 16 May 2006)
[157] Interview with Ellison
[158] Interview with Kjellberg.
[159] Interview with Blodgett.

society'.[160] Ellison confirmed in his interview with me, 'I mean you can't make yourself palatable enough for some people not matter what you do. You might as well have a firm set of beliefs that you go in with'.[161]

Christopher Stout states that a deracialised campaign strategy involves 'avoiding other black leaders and appearances before majority black audiences', yet in a second departure from the deracialised campaign strategy, Ellison visibly campaigned in the African American community.[162] For example, in the middle of the campaign, Ellison marched in the annual Juneteenth parade in North Minneapolis. Juneteenth is a traditional African American holiday held on 19th June which celebrates the anniversary of the General Gordon Granger's proclamation which confirmed the emancipation of slaves in Texas.[163] Revived in the late twentieth century and made a state holiday in Minnesota in 1996, Minneapolis's celebration is one of the largest in the country.[164] The event was promoted in the 'campaign events' section of Ellison's website.[165]

Additionally, in contradiction to the deracialised campaign, Ellison enlisted the support of prominent African American political figures. For example, Ellison organised a campaign event with Jesse Jackson in North Minneapolis (see Figure 7.5). Jackson told the crowd at North Commons park, 'What a statement from Minnesota to send Keith to Congress'.[166] Ellison also campaigned alongside Rev Jerry McAfee, an outspoken minister on the North Side. Ellison confirmed that the campaign made direct appeals to minority voters. On the night of his primary victory, he stated, 'We said we wanted to affirmatively and deliberately reach out into the diverse communities…And we did'.[167]

[160] Interview with Costain.
[161] Interview with Ellison.
[162] Stout, 2015, 28.
[163] Tom Scheck, 'Keith Ellison dogged by his past', *Minneapolis Public Radio*, 30 June 2006.
[164] Trang Do, 'Celebrating Juneteenth in Minneapolis', *Twin Cities Daily Planet*, 22 June 2010.
[165] www.keithellison.org (Internet Archive Wayback Machine, 3 June 2006)
[166] Jackson, quoted in 'Jackson warms up the crowd for Ellison', *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 1 July 2006.
[167] Quoted in Ellison (2014: 162).

Figure 7.5. Jesse Jackson campaigning for Keith Ellison



Source: Minnesota Public Radio

Finally, Ellison also appealed directly to minority groups for funding and support. He flew to Washington, DC to meet with the Congressional Black Caucus, who agreed to donate $5,000 to his campaign. He also received $4,000 from the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux tribe, who are located 30 miles southwest of Minneapolis.[168] Muslim groups also contributed to the Ellison campaign,[169] a fact which was noted to me by Mike Erlandson in our interview.[170]

The third group to whom Ellison appealed on a race-conscious, symbolic-substantive basis was the District's Somali population, the largest community in the United States. In the 2010 Census, about 25,000 people of Somali origin lived in Minneapolis, which was about one-third of the total Somali population in the United States. It is important to analyse this group separately from the District's native-born black population.[171]

---

[168] Greg Gordon, 'Minnesota races drawing big names to lure big bucks', *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 19 July 2006.
[169] 'DC Muslim Group to Hold Ellison Event', *Roll Call*, 20 July 2006.
[170] Interview with Erlandson.
[171] Ellison (2014: 64) uses the term 'traditional African American', but in this manuscript I use the term 'native-born' to distinguish from immigrant. Ordinarily such a distinction might risk confusing second generation

I agree with Mary Waters that many black immigrants in the United States struggle because they have a strong sense of their ethnic/national identity, but they are primarily seen through their racial identity by outsiders.[172] Almost without exception, African immigrants are assigned a 'black' racial identity in America's dichotomous racial order, whereas other immigrants, such as Latinos and Asians, at various points in American history have been able to straddle these boundaries and, at times, found themselves classified as 'white'.[173] As many anthropologists who have studied black immigrant communities in the United States have pointed out, black immigrants must accept the state/society-imposed category 'African American' while holding a desire to preserve a separate national or regional identity, especially due to perceptions of African Americans' subordinate status in American society.[174]

The Somali community in Minneapolis exists in this dual consciousness. On the one hand, Somalis in the city have a strong sense of their national origins and identity. They are organised culturally through organisations such as the Confederation of Somali Community, and they have a growing political voice, especially through organisations such as Somali Community Action.

Somalis are a majority of Muslims in Minneapolis. Ellison's religion was undoubtedly a key factor in appealing to these voters. At the same time, Ellison's appeal to African immigrants contained a racial dimension which should not be discounted. Ultimately, as Mary Waters describes, race is 'a master status in the United States [which] soon overwhelms the identities of the immigrants'.[175] In her ethnography of African immigrants in Minneapolis, the anthropologist Jacqueline Copeland-Carson showed that pan-African identities were often invoked in shared spaces between native-born and immigrant blacks in the city through efforts to foster a shared race-based solidarity (rather than a religion-based solidarity).[176] Groups such as the African Development Center, which I visited during my fieldwork, and the Cultural Wellness Center are organised around this basis. They constitute a shared 'black public sphere' which, as Copeland-Carson puts it, encourages black people in Minneapolis 'to stay African while living in America'.[177] Somali leaders whom I interviewed in Minnesota expressed pride in Ellison's blackness, in addition to his faith. For example, one leader stated to me that it was 'an historic primary election because we have politicians in the past who mainly all

immigrants with those who have ancestry in the US for many generations. However, given that nearly all of Minneapolis's East African population arrived after the 1980s, there were very few US-born, second-generation Somalis in the District who were of voting age.

[172] Waters, 1999.

[173] For overviews, see King (2006) and Thompson (2012). On Asians in America, see Loewen (1968) and Kim (1999). On Latinos, see Haney Lopez (2000) and Fox & Guglielmo (2012) .

[174] See, for example, Sanchez (1997) on Cape Verdeans, Waters (2001) on West Indians, and Stoller (2001) on West Africans.

[175] Waters, 1999, 8.

[176] Copeland-Carson, 2004.

[177] Ibid., 79.

were white, although they were progressive and Democratic, but still'. He expressed pride in seeing the election of 'a person who has the same skin colour we have'.[178]

Ellison had been involved with the East African community in Minneapolis since the early 1990s. One Somali leader stated to me, 'When the Somalis arrived and came to Minnesota, he was one of the first leaders we met, and he stand for us [sic] for a long time'.[179] Ellison's congressional campaign, as several interviewees expressed, was a key motivator for Somalis' engagement in electoral politics.[180] Abdisalam Adam, director of the Dar al-Hijrah Cultural Center, told a local reporter that many in the Somali community had been sceptical about electoral politics, but 'with Keith coming in at this point it really helped a lot, and it really galvanized the community'.[181] Pam Costain, an Ellison campaign advisor, believes that by working for Ellison, the Minneapolis Somali population 'learned to do American politics. You know, they learned door knocking and house parties and leafletting and that kind of thing…I think the Somali community really kicked open the door with Keith'.[182] Ellison, in his interview with me, confirmed, 'we really changed the political landscape for the Somali community'.[183] A Somali leader confirmed to me that Ellison's election was a catalyst for the organisation of the Somali community in electoral politics, noting 'many Somali-Americans [were] knocking on doors who never knocked on doors'.[184] Martin Sabo expressed to me, 'I was surprised by their level of activation. They learned how to get politically involved in that campaign, and they learned well'.[185]

The Ellison campaign made direct appeals to the Somali community both on the basis of Ellison's symbolic status but also through race-conscious policy goals. A transcript of a Somali-language radio broadcast from September 2006 demonstrates Ellison's efforts to appeal directly to the East African community on both the basis of shared religious identity as well as a race-conscious policy agenda (civil rights and immigration reform). The translated transcript is as follows:[186]

> 'The gathering on Sunday was attended by a candidate for the US Congress, a Muslim named Keith Ellison, who urged the Muslim community to vote for him in the upcoming [local] US Congress primary elections [in the district], being held on 12 September 2006. SomaliTalk had the opportunity to put questions to Keith Ellison. If elected, what policies or changes do you hope to implement, particularly ones which benefit the Somali community? He replied, "I will address community safety and I will strive for the protection of civil rights. In particular, I will cooperate with the Somali community regarding issues around immigration, especially decreasing the long waiting times for naturalisation. I will also work for greater economic

[178] KE11.
[179] Ibid.
[180] Interviews with Michael van Keulen (20 April 2015), Mohamud Noor (20 April 2015), and Hashi Shafi (22 April 2015).
[181] Adam, quoted in 'Muslims learning politics in 5th district race', *Minnesota Public Radio*, 13 October 2006.
[182] Interview with Costain.
[183] Interview with Ellison.
[184] Interview with Shafi.
[185] Interview with Sabo.
[186] I am grateful to Haroon Mohamoud, a history student at Cambridge University, for providing the translation.

> justice"… He concluded by affirming his commitment to address this, hopeful that members of the American-Somali community would vote for him on 12 September.'[187]

Ellison's historic-symbolic status as the first Muslim elected to Congress resonated beyond the Muslim community. One Jewish member of the Minnesota state legislature touted Ellison as an exemplar of a Muslim candidate, telling Minnesota Public Radio, 'To have a potentially historic election, the first Muslim ever elected to Congress, and to have the first Muslim ever elected to Congress to be a strong friend of the Jewish community…is a real plus'.[188] Ellison himself stated during the primary campaign that his election would make an important statement, telling reporters, 'It's good for people to see a reasonable, moderate face of Islam'.[189] Walter Mondale told me that he endorsed Ellison in part because he would 'be the first member of that faith in the Congress. He'll be a lightning rod, and he'll tell a story of moderation and good sense, and he can give four of five million Americans some hope for due process'.[190]

I agree with Andra Gillespie and Amber Perez that Ellison's native-born African American identity may have been less threatening to whites than an immigrant Muslim candidate.[191] According to a 2007 Pew Research survey, about 20 percent of Muslims in the United States are native-born African Americans.[192] One long-standing white DFL activist stated to me, 'What was so different about Ellison was he was Muslim, but he talked a great deal that he, you know, grew up in Detroit and he moved here. He made himself sound like he is – a middle-class black…He was more an American black Muslim. He was not a Middle Easterner Muslim, and that was very different'.[193] Other interview subjects agreed.[194]

Policy Agenda

While traditional models of black candidates in white districts presume that the candidate should position himself or herself in the centre of the ideological space, Ellison's approach was to appeal to the most left-wing segment of the electorate through a progressive policy agenda.[195] When I asked one Ellison advisor whether Ellison had the most left-wing policy agenda of the primary candidates, she replied, 'That was the point'.[196]

---

[187] http://www.somalitalk.com/2006/sept/mutamar2.html
[188] Frank Hornstein, quoted in 'Keith Ellison dogged by his past', *Minneapolis Public Radio*, 30 June 2006.
[189] Ellison, quoted in 'A Pivotal Political Day', *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 7 May 2006.
[190] Interview with Mondale.
[191] Gillespie & Perez, 2010.
[192] 'Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream', Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, May 2007.
[193] KE5.
[194] E.g., KE10
[195] KE8, KE10, KE12, KE13.
[196] KE14.

The central issues of Ellison's campaign were largely universalist and ostensibly non-racial issues, such as opposition to the war in Iraq as well as support for single-payer health care,[197] renewable energy,[198] and a higher minimum wage.[199] Ellison's campaign team emphasised Ellison's commitment to economic redistribution.[200] Nonetheless, Ellison did not shy away from race-conscious policies or issues which had a strong racial content. At his announcement speech, Ellison listed 'civil and human rights' as key priorities.[201] Later in the election, Ellison told the *Minnesota Spokesman-Recorder* that he believed 'that civil and human rights are the most important things in our country'.[202] In an interview with the *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, Ellison affirmed, 'historic targets of discrimination deserve advocacy'.[203]

Ellison also highlighted the racial implications of ostensibly race-neutral policies. For example, Ellison described universal access to healthcare as 'the civil rights issue of our time'.[204] In framing his support for single payer healthcare in racialised terms, Ellison contravened key assumptions of the deracialisation strategy. In addition, he was a fierce critic of Republican efforts to require proof of citizenship to vote, describing the proposal as 'voter suppression, pure and simple'. Ellison cited racial minorities as among those who would be affected by the law.[205]

As a state legislator, Ellison pushed for race-conscious policies, including affirmative action. He continued this advocacy even during the primary campaign. For example, in June 2006, Ellison sponsored an amendment to a bill to authorise a new baseball stadium in the Twin Cities. Ellison's amendment was an affirmative action provision which placed quotas for hiring and contracting minority and female labourers. Ellison also stated that he hoped that the building firm would be 'preferably minority owned' and that labourers would be recruited at the Minneapolis Urban League (an historically black organisation), the Sabathani Community Center (a black community organisation), and the American Indian Opportunities Industrialization Center.[206] Walter Mondale confirmed to me that Ellison was straightforward about his support for affirmative action during the campaign: 'I don't think he was pulling back on issues that he really felt he wanted the public to hear. Certainly affirmative action is standard, accepted position for Democrats, liberals in Minnesota'.[207]

---


[197] 'Campaign Report', *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 30 July 2006.
[198] Tom Scheck, 'Former Party Chief Now Bucks the Party Process', *Minnesota Public Radio*, 6 July 2006.
[199] Brandt Williams, 'Jesse Jackson campaigns for Keith Ellison in Minneapolis', *Minnesota Public Radio*, 30 June 2006.
[200] Interview with Kjellberg.
[201] 'Ellison's kickoff part of crowded Fifth scene', *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 21 March 2006.
[202] Ellison, quoted in 'Ellison Unplugged', *Minnesota Spokesman-Recorder*, 15-21 June 2006.
[203] Ellison, quoted in 'DFL endorsee for Sabo's seat Rep Ellison faces tough scrutiny', *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 15 May 2006.
[204] Ellison, quoted in 'Keith Ellison, the DFL's endorsee for Congress in the Fifth District, has spent this summer countering attacks from Republicans and Democrats', *City Pages*, 30 August 2006.
[205] Dane Smith, 'Panel Oks bill requiring citizenship proof to vote', *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 16 March 2006.
[206] 'If the Twins ever go, their name will stay', *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 27 May 2006.
[207] Interview with Mondale.

Finally, I suggest that the deracialised campaign strategy's insistence that a black candidate adopt more centrist or conservative set of policy positions was not appropriate for the Fifth District. Several interviewees highlighted that Martin Sabo was one of the most left-leaning members of Congress. Arvonne Fraser, whose husband Donald Fraser was Martin Sabo's predecessor, told me, 'This district was used to having a Congressman that was very liberal'.[208] Betty Folliard, a former Minnesota state senator, described to me, 'Minneapolis has the most impassioned progressives, the most extraordinary far-left liberals'.[209]

Sabo had served as Chair of the Democratic Study Group, which was an organisation of left-leaning members of Congress whom Arthur Stevens and colleagues credit as having been instrumental in mobilising liberal strength in the House of Representatives.[210] In fact, Sabo's voting record closely resembled the ideological position of a typical African American member of Congress. Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal provide their DW-NOMINATE spatial mapping of Congress members' ideology in each session of Congress.[211] Each member is given a score from -1 to +1, where -1 is most liberal and +1 is most conservative. Using their data on the first dimension, I calculated the scores of the average House member, the average white Democratic representative, and the average black Democratic representative. I then compared these scores to Sabo's ideological score. Throughout his time in Congress, Sabo was consistently closer in voting behaviour to the average black Democrat than to the average white Democrat. By the mid-1990s, Sabo's voting record was even more liberal than that of the average black Congressperson. In his final term in Congress, the two members of the House of Representatives whose DW-NOMINATE scores were closest to Sabo were Jesse Jackson Jr, who represented the South Side of Chicago, and Major Owens, an African American congressman from Brooklyn.

[208] Interview with Arvonne Fraser.
[209] Interview with Folliard.
[210] Stevens, Miller, & Mann, 1974.
[211] McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, 2006.

Figure 7.6. Sabo's ideological placement within US House of Representatives, 1979-2006



Based on DW-Nominate data from VoteView.com, scaled from -1 to 1, where -1 is most liberal and 1 is most conservative. Each point on x-axis indicates one two-year term of Congress (e.g., 2003-2004).

Style

Taken in its conventional sense, Ellison was not known for a quiet conciliatory style in his public oratory. One black newspaper reporter described Ellison as having 'brought down the house with his Martin Luther King-style rhetoric' at the DFL's pre-primary convention.[212] A member of the campaign team informed me that Ellison had received advice from a high-powered Washington-based polling consultant to deliver his speeches in a manner which was 'reassuring to the broader electorate' but 'he didn't follow any of that advice at all… He just gets up and says, "This is about love, y'all! This is about love." I'm like, um, this is not in the talking points'.[213]

As mentioned in previous chapters, I analyse 'style' as manifested in candidates' reaction to racialised controversies. In this regard, Ellison adopted a demure style. Unlike Barack Obama in 2004 who largely avoided any racial criticism during his primary campaign, Keith Ellison was the subject of several racialised attacks. These controversies can be divided into two categories. First, Ellison was accused of being a 'scofflaw' for his failure to pay parking fines.[214] Second, Ellison was accused of supporting an anti-Semitic 'hate group', due to his work with the Nation of Islam in the 1990s. Both of these charges

[212] Matthew Little, 'Glimpses of a political convention', *Minneapolis Spokesman-Recorder*, 25 May-1 June 2006.
[213] Interview with Stiles.
[214] Nick Coleman, 'What is so unnerving about a Muslim with parking tickets', *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 9 July 2006.

had implicit racial dimensions, but Ellison's campaign chose deliberately not to identify their racial content.

First, Ellison was criticised both in the press and by his opponents for failing to pay parking and driving tickets,[215] which led to his driver's licence being suspended.[216] Michael Erlandson distributed a direct-mail leaflet which directly criticised Ellison for these failures.[217] The leaflet included a black-and-white photograph of Ellison with the headline, 'Does he think he's above the law?'.[218] One of Ellison's campaign coordinators describes the 'literature that was aimed at Keith…was very nasty'.[219] Two other members of the campaign team both asserted that Ellison's primary opponents specifically described him as a 'scofflaw'; although, I could not find confirmatory evidence in public statements available in my archival research.[220]

These attacks, which were widely discussed in the press, contributed to a sense that Ellison did not follow the law and that his behaviour was criminal. The publication *Politics in Minnesota* condemned Ellison, stating, 'Reasonable people of all political stripes cannot accept a candidate who wants to make the laws but not obey them'.[221] This sentiment was echoed in a letter to the *Minneapolis Star Tribune* in which a voter denounced 'Ellison's complete disregard for the law'.[222] A member of Ellison's strategy team described the parking ticket attacks as framed to present Ellison as 'generally being criminal, having little regard for laws, law and order, that sort of thing'.[223] Crucially, the campaign believed that the attacks had a clear racial dimension. One campaign member stated to me that he believed that the attacks 'absolutely' had a 'racial undercurrent'.[224] A strategist lamented to me that the racial undertones were 'barely under…It was such a nasty, racially coded thing to say'.[225] Another advisor stated that Ellison was 'attacked viciously and very racially'.[226]

Ellison's response, however, was muted, a departure from his earlier approach to racial controversies as an activist and state legislator. Ellison responded to Erlandson's leaflet by stating that he didn't dispute Erlandson's claims[227] but that he was 'a little disappointed' that Erlandson had chosen to engage

[215] Ellison admitted that he was wrong not to pay the tickets; however, one of his friends suggested that his tardy payments were a form of casual obstructionism (KE9). As the Justice Department's Ferguson Report showed, African Americans are disproportionately and excessively the subject of parking and other vehicle tickets.
[216] Dane Smith, 'Driving records of candidates aired', *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 7 July 2006.
[217] Tom Scheck, 'Rivals say Erlandson crosses the line', *Minnesota Public Radio*, 7 September 2006.
[218] Rochelle Olson, 'Erlandon's new mailing takes aim at two of his Fifth District opponents', *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 7 September 2006.
[219] KE3.
[220] KE13, KE14.
[221] 'Dead Man Walking', *Politics in Minnesota*, 12 July 2006.
[222] Dana Ferreira, 'Letter: Disrespect for the law', *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 12 July 2006.
[223] KE13.
[224] Interview with Stiles.
[225] KE13.
[226] KE14.
[227] Tom Scheck, 'Rivals say Erlandson crosses the line', *Minnesota Public Radio*, 7 September 2006.

in negative campaigning.[228] Ellison's response stands in contrast to those of his supporters who believed that Ellison was being unfairly depicted as a lawbreaker for trivial offences. *Minneapolis Star Tribune* columnist Nick Coleman wrote a piece positing whether Ellison had been victim of crimes which 'fall into the category of DWB – driving while black'.[229] However, the campaign deliberately did not call the attacks racist, a clear departure from a crusade campaign strategy. Communications advisor Carla Kjellberg confirmed to me, 'It was intentional not to attack back like that, to be honest, not to say "you are using racial stereotypes". He never said that. We never said that'.[230]

Second, Ellison was criticised for his past associations with the Nation of Islam. Vic Rosenthal, a Jewish supporter of Keith Ellison, recalled in his interview with me that 'the tone about it implied that this was a dangerous figure and that he would be bad for our community…he's not good for the Jews'.[231] Dan Rosen from the Jewish Community Relations Council attacked Ellison for a 'public multiyear association with a vicious anti-Semitic organization'.[232] Katherine Kersten, a writer for the *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, compared Ellison's NOI affiliation to a white politician being affiliated with a white supremacist group.[233] A letter to the paper from a voter in the suburb of St Louis Park echoed that Ellison's association was 'just as disturbing as it would be if an aspiring white politician had past associations with a white-supremacist organization…Ellison supported this bigoted organization'.[234]

Rather than denounce these attacks as racist, Ellison responded by distancing himself from the NOI. He wrote a public letter to the executive director of the Jewish Community Relations Council of Minnesota and the Dakotas (based in Minneapolis) in which he explained his ties to the organisation. In the letter, Ellison admitted that he had 'worked with local members of the Nation of Islam…on a variety of issues primarily involving civil rights, race relations, and the urgent need to address concerns surrounding African-American men'. However, Ellison went on to state that he had 'long since distanced myself from and rejected the Nation of Islam due to its propagation of bigoted and anti-Semitic ideas and statements'. Ellison nonetheless defended his work on racial matters, citing his authorship of anti-hate crime legislation in the state legislature and described himself as a politician who 'fought for racial justice and equal rights'. According to Ellison's strategist John Stiles, 'We had to walk a fine line of not exactly apologising because a big core of Keith's base was African American…he couldn't walk away from people. He couldn't say, I'm going to act like I don't know you anymore'.[235] Instead, Ellison

[228] Rochelle Olson, 'Erlandon's new mailing takes aim at two of his Fifth District opponents', *Minneapolis Star Tribune,* 7 September 2006.
[229] Nick Coleman, 'What is so unnerving about a Muslim with parking tickets', *Minneapolis Star Tribune,* 9 July 2006.
[230] Interview with Kjellberg.
[231] Interview with Rosenthal.
[232] Quoted in 'Ellison letter addresses his past ties', *Minneapolis Star Tribune,* 3 June 2006.
[233] Katherine Kerseten, 'Let's not forget Ellison's support of Nation of Islam', *Minneapolis Star-Tribune,* 8 June 2006.
[234] Alain Einisman, 'Letter: Past raises concerns', *Minneapolis Star Tribune,* 10 June 2006.
[235] Interview with Stiles.

used his racial identity as a means to express solidarity with Jewish people. He stated, 'As an African-American, I understand the pain, injustice, and outrage caused by racism. This worldview helps me understand the Jewish community's similar reaction to acts of anti-Semitism'.[236]

Ellison's muted response is instructive when compared with the passionate defence made for him by members of the black community. The president of the Minneapolis NAACP Duane Reed wrote to the *Minneapolis Star Tribune* charging the newspaper with having been 'unfair and racist' in its focus on Ellison's past associations and statements.[237] The main editorial of the black-owned *Minnesota Spokesman-Recorder* lashed out at the *Minneapolis Star Tribune* for what they believed as 'the appearance of grave racial bias' in their 'unremitting, ongoing character assassination of Keith Ellison'.[238] The newspaper defended Ellison, stating that he had 'spoken out passionately in defense of African Americans' and that he was not wrong to express 'outrage in the face of injustice'.[239] These comments reveal a plausible combative response which Ellison could have embraced had he wanted to pursue a crusade campaign strategy rather than a symbolic-substantive campaign strategy.

Result

Ellison won the primary, but he failed to win a majority of the vote overall. According to Erlandson, his internal polls showed that he could defeat Ellison in a two-person competition.[240] However, members of Ellison's campaign team believe that Ellison could still have defeated Erlandson in a head-to-head contest.

Table 7.1. Results of the DFL Primary, 12 September 2006

Candidate	Votes	%
Keith Ellison	29,003	41.2
Mike Erlandson	21,857	31.1
Ember Reichgott Junge	14,454	20.5
Others	5,060	7.2
TOTAL	**70,374**	**100.0**


Source: Minnesota Secretary of State

The distribution of Ellison's votes was skewed to Minneapolis rather than the suburbs (see Figure 7.7), which more than anything else, I believe demonstrates a shrewd campaign strategy. Most of the voters lived in Minneapolis, and therefore it made more sense for Ellison to spend time mobilising city voters

[236] Letter from Keith Ellison to Stephen Silberfarb, 28 May 2006. Copy of correspondence in possession of this author.
[237] Duan Reed, 'Letter: Why Focus on Ellison?', *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 1 July 2006.x
[238] 'In Our View: Reporting on Dist 5 Congressional race dangerously unbalanced', *Minnesota Spokesman-Recorder*, 20-26 July 2006.
[239] 'In Our View: Reporting on Dist 5 Congressional race dangerously unbalanced', *Minnesota Spokesman-Recorder*, 20-26 July 2006.
[240] Interview with Erlandson.

rather than those in the suburbs. Ellison won 51.5 percent of the votes cast in Minneapolis and two thirds of the vote in North Minneapolis, where the city's African American population was concentrated and where Ellison lived.

Figure 7.7. Votes cast in DFL primary by district geography




Based on official results from the Minnesota Secretary of State

As Figure 7.8 shows, Erlandson won the northern and southern suburbs, while Ember Reichgott Junge won the western suburbs which she represented in the state legislature. Ellison's performance in the northern suburbs was particularly poor. He won only 14 percent of the vote in New Hope, a northern suburb, which is 75 percent white and 14 percent African American.[241] However, Ellison won south Minneapolis and southwest Minneapolis, the whitest and most affluent part of the city.

[241] Mike Kaszuba, 'Minneapolis voters were key to Ellison's strong showing', *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 14 September 2006.

Figure 7.8. DFL Primary Result, shown by winner of state legislative district



Blue=Ellison, Red=Erlandson, Green=Reichgott Junge
Source: Minnesota Secretary of State, OurCampaigns.com

Conclusion

Ellison, in some respects, might be seen as a contender for pursuing a post-racial campaign strategy. Ellison publicly repudiated his past work with the Nation of Islam, an organisation which his critics described as racist against white people. Ellison's policy agenda focused on universalist policies of ending the war in Iraq, stronger action on climate change, and the creation of a publicly funded health service. Ellison's rhetoric emphasised the collective; his slogan was 'Everybody Counts, Everybody Matters'.

In other respects, however, Ellison cannot be described as pursuing a colour-blind strategy. Ellison's predominantly white campaign team and key supporters cite Ellison's historic-symbolic significance as an important reason why they and others supported the candidate. On policy matters, Ellison promoted himself as the most left-wing candidate in the field and retained his commitment to civil rights. He *raised* the salience of race by describing universal healthcare as a civil rights issue. Ellison's campaign targeted black voters and mobilised a key new voting bloc (East Africans), for whom Ellison's election

was cited as a turning point in their political involvement.[242] Ellison openly campaigned at African American community events and appeared alongside prominent African American figures, such as Jesse Jackson, another departure from the deracialised campaign strategy.

Ellison himself expressed scepticism over the value of a deracialised campaign strategy. He acknowledged that the strategy was a possible one, and he could think of some black candidates who pursue the strategy, telling me, 'there is such a thing as sort of like a safe black candidate'. Yet, he questioned its value, 'To me that's the strategy about someone who is more concerned about being in office than actually making changes with their office'. He did not believe that the strategy described his own strategic approach, explaining, 'I'm just not that guy because I'm in politics to do something not to be something. I don't give a damn about being a Congressman. It doesn't matter to me. I would leave this job tomorrow if I could find a more effective way to do what I'm doing'.[243]

Ultimately, Ellison's racial campaign strategy is properly defined as a race-conscious, symbolic-substantive strategy. Ellison's continued commitment to civil rights, his articulation of the importance of diversity, the relevance of Ellison's symbolic-substantive status to key supporters, and the campaign's active organising in the African American community are more indicative of a race-conscious campaign strategy than a colour-blind strategy. Ellison said in our interview, 'if you don't see colour, you need to see an eye doctor'.[244] Ellison's strategy, I conclude, comported with the Fifth District's self-consciously progressive image, which at its core included a philosophical commitment to civil rights and racial diversity. As a local newspaper editorialised, voters in the Fifth District were 'eager...to break the white-male mold for elected officials'.[245]

[242] Interview with Van Keulen.
[243] Interview with Ellison.
[244] Ibid.
[245] 'Change was driver in primary election', *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 14 September 2006.


Part IV – After Deracialisation

The case studies in the previous section demonstrated the capacity for African American candidates to pursue race-conscious campaign strategies in predominantly white environments. Political contexts with histories of whites supporting racial equality, coupled alongside strong institutional backing from liberal white elites and well-organised black communities and leaders, appear to be favourable conditions for such strategies.

However, in many parts of the United States, these conditions do not exist. Black candidates must operate in areas where whites, including (or especially) white elites, have historically shown little interest, strong disdain, or often outright hostility to alleviating the material conditions of African Americans. In such contexts, it is reasonable to expect that some African American candidates will pursue strategies which are more consistent with a colour-blind ideology which either ignores or rejects the need for race-conscious politics. For the last two decades, it was assumed that the only viable campaign strategy in these contexts was the deracialised strategy.

The case studies in this section (Harold Ford of Tennessee and Cory Booker of New Jersey) pursued two strategies which sit partly or completely within colour-blind ideology, yet they cannot be described as wholly deracialised because they violate core elements of the traditional deracialised campaign model, as Figure IV.1 below shows.

Figure IV.1. Racial Campaign Strategies Analysed in Part IV



Both cases show that candidates can operate within the 'colour-blind' racial policy alliance without abandoning reference to race or association with racialised themes. Cory Booker, for example, showed that black politicians can define themselves *against* traditional black politics, not by avoiding the language of race but by re-defining the goals and public history of the civil rights movement. Unlike candidates pursuing a deracialised campaign strategy, Booker was comfortable speaking about race, but he framed the discussion about race as a way to promote himself as a racially *transcendent* candidate, simultaneously delegitimising race-conscious politics.

Ford showed the limits of the deracialised strategy's assumption that black voters will give strong support to deracialised black candidates. Ford's campaign calculated that black voters needed direct appeals from the campaign on traditional themes of left-of-centre policy proposals and signals of racial pride between the candidate and community. At the same time, the Ford campaign believed that this message was unpalatable to whites, adopting a divergent (and mutually incompatible) message. To whites, Ford suggested that race was irrelevant to his political thinking and even embraced symbols historically associated with white superiority, such as the Confederate flag. Although neither candidate was silent on racial matters, both candidates signalled a high level of racial optimism among white audiences, usually with reference to the success of the civil rights movement. This approach is consistent with the ideational claims of the colour-blind coalition described by Desmond King and Rogers Smith.[1]

[1] King & Smith, 2014.

Chapter 8 - Harold Ford (Tennessee, 2006)

'[It was] an all-out assault with race being the organizing and consistent theme'.
Harold Ford Jr

***

Harold Ford Jr's 2006 senatorial campaign in Tennessee appears to be a strong *prima facie* case of the deracialised campaign strategy. Robert Smith argues that Ford 'ran a textbook deracialized campaign', and in many ways Ford's campaign ostensibly shares the characteristics of the deracialised model.[1] In his public discourse, Ford appeared to avoid allusions to his race and to the symbolic-historic significance of his candidacy. His campaign style was described as 'polite and humble, almost deferential'.[2] On policy, Ford eschewed the liberal label, positioning himself on the centre-right of the Democratic Party. Even when his opponent launched attacks which Ford and his campaign staff viewed as racist, Ford declined publicly to acknowledge their racial content.

In spite of these appearances, Ford's campaign was not uniformly 'deracialised'. Commentators who have identified Ford simply as a deracialised candidate have overlooked his campaign within the African American community. I argue that Ford's campaign style, targeted appeals, and issue agenda were consistent with a race-conscious approach but one which was limited to African American voters. In contrast, Ford's racial strategy in the white community involved signalling to whites that he was not like other black politicians and reassuring them that he would not challenge their bonds of white racial solidarity. In this case study, I will argue that Ford followed a segregated campaign strategy because he adopted divergent (and mutually incompatible) racial appeals depending on the race of his audience.

Ford's candidacy is instructive for several reasons. In spite of losing to Republican Bob Corker, attention to Ford is merited on the basis that he was (and remains) the best-performing black Democratic candidate for the US Senate in southern history. Second, Ford demonstrates the possibility but also the limitations of deploying differently targeted racial appeals depending on the race of the audience. Scholars of Latino and Asian politics have observed this 'toggling' strategy with bilingual electorates, but there has been less attention with monolingual black candidates.[3] Third, Ford's racial campaign strategy exposes vividly the myth that 'colour-blind' appeals are racially neutral. As Ford shows, deracialisation implicitly embraces the racial status quo which provides economic and cultural benefits to whites.

---

[1] Smith, 2009, 5.
[2] Bakke, nd, 6.
[3] On Asian politics, see Collet (2008). On Latino politics, see Underwood (1997) and Wright-Austin & Middleton (2004).

Explanatory Variables: Context, Candidate, and Elites

Context: Tennessee

Alexander Lamis described Tennessee as a 'composite of all the South'.[4] While something of an exaggeration, the state undoubtedly contains a cross-section of multiple southern cultures due to its widely spaced eastern and western boundaries, which stretch from Arkansas and Missouri in the west to Virginia and North Carolina in the east. Mountain City in eastern Tennessee is nearer to Canada than it is to Memphis, Tennessee's largest city. Consequently, the state of Tennessee can be divided into at least three political regions, a fact which is recognised by the three stars on its state flag.[5] According to the state constitution, no more than two of the state's five supreme court justices can come from any one of these regions.


For many decades, the hill country of eastern Tennessee was the most heavily Republican area of the South. The party's political dominance in the area dates back to the Civil War when poor, white farmers objected to secession.[6] At the East Tennessee Convention in 1861, representatives of twenty-six eastern counties petitioned to form a new state loyal to the Union (similar to Wheeling Convention in West Virginia), but their request was denied, and the area was occupied by Confederate forces. Historically suspicious of Democrats who monopolised the politics of middle and western Tennessee, east Tennessee's two congressional districts have both elected Republicans to Congress, without exception, every two years since 1881. As a result, V O Key commented in 1949, 'Tennessee in a sense has not one one-party system but two one-party systems'.[7]

Michael Nelson argues that it would be a misnomer to describe Tennessee's eastern 'Mountain Republicans' as the historic 'base' of the Tennessee Republican Party because 'little [else] was built on it'.[8] Middle and western Tennessee defected from the Democratic Party in presidential elections in the mid-twentieth century after the Democratic Party nationally embraced civil rights. The Mountain Republicans' loyalty to the party predated these considerations. For example, in the 1968 presidential election Richard Nixon narrowly carried Tennessee by dominating the historic Republican vote in the east. Racially conservative white Democrats in the middle and western part of the state defected more heavily to George Wallace than to Nixon. In sub-national elections, many voters in these pro-Wallace counties continued to vote for Democratic candidates. Even in 2006, Ford carried a majority (56.8%) of the counties which voted for George Wallace, unlike John Kerry (29.5%) two years earlier or Barack Obama (9.1%) or Hillary Clinton (4.5%) in subsequent presidential elections. These results support the

[4] Lamis, 1990.
[5] Majors, 1986.
[6] Glaser, 1996, Ch 2.
[7] Key, 1949, 75.
[8] Nelson, 2014, 183.

thesis that partisan realignment in the South was a slow, 'trickle-down' process.[9] Southern whites' sub-national Democratic loyalty persisted longer than their commitment to Democratic presidential candidates.

Figure 8.1. 1968 Presidential Election + 'H' indicates counties won by Harold Ford in 2006



Red=Nixon, Green=Wallace, Blue=Humphrey, darker shades correspond to stronger support

Middle Tennessee stretches from the Tennessee River in the east to the Central Time Zone in the west. The region has historically been characterised by small-scale farming, typical of the upper South. Its population centre is Nashville, Tennessee's capital city. Western Tennessee abuts the Mississippi River and was the heart of the state's plantation economy.[10] Although Tennessee is considered to be a part of the upper South, west Tennessee's political culture is much more similar to 'the cotton and river culture of the Deep South'.[11] Western Tennessee forms the northern part of the Mississippi Delta region, which 'begins in the lobby of the Peabody Hotel in Memphis and ends on Catfish Row in Vicksburg[, Mississippi]'.[12]

In addition to these three regions, Harold Ford's home city of Memphis, situated along the Mississippi River in Tennessee's southwest corner, is geographically, culturally, and politically isolated from the rest of the state. The city has long suffered from economic inertia, in part stemming from a yellow fever epidemic which drove out or killed 70 percent of the city's white population in the late nineteenth century, leaving behind only the impoverished and immobile poor black and Irish residents.[13] The city lacks, as Wanda Rushing puts it, both 'Old South traditions…as well as New South achievements'.[14] Alluding to Memphis's enduring economic troubles, as well as its majority-black racial makeup, the *Wall Street Journal* described Memphis as 'the Sunbelt's dark spot'.[15] A Ford campaign consultant explained to me, 'this happens in a lot of states…where certain regions have a reputation for a different culture from the rest of the state. In Tennessee, you have a lot of people who say Memphis has a different

[9] See Glaser (1996), Black & Black (2003), Knotts (2005), Cochran (2012).
[10] Majors, 1986.
[11] Taylor, 1986, 2.
[12] Cohn, 1948, Part I.
[13] Interview with Marcus Pohlmann, 20 August 2013. See also Crosby (2006), Keith (2012).
[14] Rushing, 2009, 36.
[15] Neil Maxwell, 'Memphis: The Sun Belt's Dark Spot', *Wall Street Journal*, 21 August 1978.

kind of political culture'.[16] Andrew Patrick, who was an organiser for the Ford campaign in east Tennessee, informed me that 'voters in the rural areas of east Tennessee could see Memphis as being a different state completely'.[17]


This difference became relevant during the 2006 campaign, as the Republicans attempted to depict Memphis as something 'other' than Tennessee. Ford's campaign manager Beecher Frasier explained to me that Ford's aim was 'to set himself apart because he wasn't Harold Ford Jr from Memphis but Harold Ford Jr from Tennessee'.[18] The Corker campaign, in turn, attempted to define Ford as an outsider who did not share 'Tennessee values'. The Corker campaign continually tied Ford to Memphis as a way of contrasting him with the rest of Tennessee. In his speeches, Corker and his surrogates warned that the people of Tennessee did not want 'a Memphis congressman representing us in the US Senate'.[19] Bonna de la Cruz of the *Nashville Tennessean* accused the Corker campaign of attempting to portray Ford as a 'Tennessee imposter'.[20] Several Republican television advertisements stated that Corker was 'a real Tennessean', while Ford was not.[21] In an interview featured on the PBS Newshour shortly before election day, Corker told a reporter, 'I don't think there's any question. I mean, you know, he does not – he is not of Tennessee'.[22] In another interview, Corker told a reporter, 'I more fully represent the values of this state'.[23] While ostensibly an ideological claim or a reference to Ford's time spent in Washington, DC, there was an unmistakable racial frame. Memphis's majority-black population makes it 'conspicuously different' from the rest of the state.[24] While over 80 percent of the rest of Tennessee was white, Memphis was 63.1 percent African American.[25] Ford's finance chairman suggested that the Republican campaign wanted to remind people 'that he was a Ford, that he was African American, that he was from Memphis, and therefore he was going to be some wide-eyed liberal'.[26]

Figure 8.2 shows a 2006 Republican direct mail leaflet which advocates 'Tennessee values' with images of rural landscapes and white families. The two non-rural landscapes are of the Tennessee state capital in Nashville and the eastern Tennessee city of Knoxville. Both cities are majority-white. Memphis, the state's largest city, is not pictured at all. Ford writes in his autobiography that he believed the contrast between Memphis and the rest of Tennessee was a racial cue, but he never levelled this accusation during the campaign itself.

---

[16] HF15.
[17] Interview with Andrew Patrick, 9 September 2013.
[18] Interview with Beecher Frasier, 12 August 2013.
[19] Ford, 2010, 220.
[20] Bonna de la Cruz, 'Ford stakes the middle ground to appeal to GOP in Eaststate', *Nashville Tennessean*, 4 October 2006.
[21] 'Corker, Ford agree: Ad goes too far', *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, 14 October 2006.
[22] Bob Corker, quoted in 'Fight to Finish in Tennessee Senate Race', PBS Newshour, 1 November 2006.
[23] Corker, quoted in 'Will Tennessee swing?', *Newsweek*, 14 August 2006.
[24] Rushing, 2009, 5.
[25] 'American Community Survey, 2006-2008, US Census Bureau, 2008.
[26] Interview with Charles Robert Bone, 12 August 2013.

Figure 8.2. Tennessee Republican Party direct mail (2006)



Source: Jim Hester

Memphis had a culture of machine politics which was not found in the rest of the state.[27] In the first half of the twentieth century, the city's politics were dominated by the local Democratic Party leader E H Crump. Crump was described by *Time* magazine as 'the most absolute political boss in the US' and by Franklin Roosevelt as 'a good Tammany Hall Tennessean'.[28] Crump, a white businessman, personally selected nearly every Memphis mayor and municipal leader, as well as many statewide politicians, from roughly 1909 until 1948. In order to do this, Crump facilitated black voting much earlier than in the rest of the South.[29] Crump paid black voters' poll taxes and coerced black residents to support his candidates as a bloc in exchange for protection from physical violence.[30] The 'Colored Democrats Club' of Memphis was described as 'the African American wing of the Crump organisation'.[31]

[27] Chattanooga in eastern Tennessee was sometimes described as 'little Chicago' during the tenure of police commissioner James 'Bookie' Turner, but this title referred to the prevalence of organised crime (gambling, bootlegging) rather than battles over patronage or electoral power (see Martin, 2007: Ch 22-23).
[28] Quoted in Dowdy (2005).
[29] Wright, 2000, Ch 3.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Dowdy, 2010, 14.

This protection was of vital importance for black Memphians who had been intermittently terrorised by the city's white population for decades, beginning soon after emancipation. In reaction to the presence of black federal soldiers in the city in 1866, whites embarked on a riotous killing spree, murdering 46 black residents, raping five black women, and burning to the ground all twelve of the city's black schools, four black churches, and 91 homes.[32] While security from physical violence is a basic function (and foundational feature) of the modern state, until well after World War II many parts of the US existed in a condition of little less than racialised anarchy, where public officials refused to protect citizens from physical harm.[33] While Crump suppressed the Klan and prevented lynchings, he was personally committed to white supremacy, abandoning Harry Truman in the 1948 election in protest of Truman's support for civil rights.[34] Crump was also prepared to permit violence against blacks who did not follow his political imperatives, turning a blind eye to the beating of Memphis minister Reverend George Long after he invited union leader A Phillip Randolph against Crump's instructions to speak to his black congregation about trade unionism.[35]

Crump was not alone in exploiting black citizens in this way, as Malcolm Macmillan shows in his study of black voting during Jim Crow in parts of Alabama.[36] Nonetheless, Memphis was one of the most prominent sites of black voting in the South after Reconstruction. As a result of its relatively high proportion of black voter registration, Tennessee was one of only three states in the former Confederacy not to receive any coverage under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.[37] In 1960, while the average proportion of black voter registration in the South was 30 percent, in Tennessee it was as high as 60 percent.[38] Marcus Pohlmann and Michael Kirby estimate that African Americans in Memphis likely voted at higher rates than anywhere else in the pre-Voting Rights Act South.[39] The Voting Rights Act was instrumental in other ways, however. Section 2 of the Act was used to end the run-off requirement for the Memphis mayoralty, ensuring that the city's first black mayor was elected in spite of not receiving an overall majority of the vote.[40]

Crucially, unlike in Chicago (see Chapters 5-6), there was not a strong biracial coalition of liberal whites and African Americans working against the Crump machine. The Crump machine withered as black Memphians became more politically assertive, but white Memphians did not support them. Harry Holloway wrote fifteen years after Crump's death that the 'lack of continuing ties with a particular

[32] See Ryan (1977), Waller (1984).
[33] Kato, 2016.
[34] Dowdy, 2010, Ch 1.
[35] Honey, 1993, 206.
[36] Macmillan, 1955, 218. See also Key (1949: 651), Bass & DeVries (1976: 55), Pohlmann & Kirby (1996: xvi).
[37] Davidson & Grofman, 1994.
[38] Alt, 1994, 353.
[39] Pohlmann & Kirby, 1996, 64.
[40] Vanderleeuw, Liu, & Marsh, 2004.

segment of the white community means that Negroes [in Memphis] really are on their own'.[41] In the 1960s, white Memphis voters supported George Wallace while black voters rallied behind Hubert Humphrey. Well into the 1990s, the city engaged in stark patterns of racially polarised voting. When Memphis elected its first African American member of Congress (Harold Ford's father Harold Ford Sr) in 1974, only 15 percent of whites voted for the black Democratic nominee. When W W Herenton was elected Memphis's first black mayor in 1991, racially polarised voting was even more intense. James Vanderleeuw and colleagues estimate with Gary King's oecological inference software that Herenton secured 98.8 percent of the African American vote and only 9.7 percent of the white vote.[42]

Candidate: Harold Ford Jr

Harold Ford Jr was born in 1970 in Memphis to a prominent and politically active black family. Ford explains, 'In a lot of ways, politics was – and remains – a part of my genetic makeup'.[43] His grandfather, Newton John 'NJ' Ford, was the first in the family to run for office, standing in 1965 for the 96th district seat of the Tennessee House of Representatives. NJ lost, but as the director of a large funeral home he remained a prominent figure in South Memphis life. Funeral homes, like barbershops (discussed in Chapter 6), have been key sites of independent economic power for African Americans.[44] According to Sekou Franklin, running a funeral home was a high-prestige job. It meant that the Fords had money and were seen as important in the black community.[45] NJ and his wife Vera had twelve children. Seven of the twelve were elected to public office (see Table 8.1).

[41] Holloway, 1969, 302.
[42] Vanderleeuw, Liu, & Marsh, 2004, 511.
[43] Ford, 2010, 1.
[44] See Graham (1999), Cole & Omari (2003), Laderman (2003: 161-163).
[45] Interview with Sekou Franklin, 14 August 2013.

Table 8.1. Members of the Ford family who held political office

Name	Relationship (to Ford Jr)	Office	Years
Harold Ford Jr		US House of Representatives	1997-2007
Harold Ford Sr	Father	Tennessee House of Representatives	1970-1974
		US House of Representatives	1975-1997
John Ford	Uncle	Memphis City Council	1971-1979
		Tennessee Senate	1975-2005
		Shelby County General Session Court	1992-1996
James Ford	Uncle	Memphis City Council	1979-1993
		Shelby County Board of Commissioners	1994-2001
Emmitt Ford	Uncle	Tennessee House of Representatives	1974-1981
Joe Ford	Uncle	Memphis City Council	1994-1999
		Shelby County Board of Commissioners	2002-2009
		Mayor of Shelby County	2009-2010
Edmund Ford Sr	Uncle	Memphis City Council	1999-2007
Ophelia Ford	Aunt	Tennessee Senate	2005-2014
Edmund Ford Jr	Cousin	Memphis City Council	2007-
Justin Ford	Cousin	Shelby County Board of Commissioners	2009-2014

Sources: Memphis City Council, Shelby County Election Commission, Tennessee Secretary of State

When Ford was four-years-old, his father Harold Ford Sr was very narrowly elected to the US House of Representatives, becoming Tennessee's first black member of Congress.[46] Ford Sr was the first African American in the twentieth century elected in a majority-white House district. The district was 48 percent black and became a majority-black district through demographic changes by the next election cycle.[47] Defeating Republican Congressman Dan Kuykendall, Ford Sr was the first (and to date only) African American to defeat an incumbent Republican in a House election.[48] Richard Fenno classifies Ford Sr as the last member of the 'pioneer cohort' of black US representatives, first elected after the enfranchisement of black populations throughout the South in the 1960s and 1970s.[49]

Ford Jr – who will be described as 'Ford' in contrast to his father 'Ford Sr' – received an elite education while Ford Sr served in Congress. On the recommendation of alumnus Al Gore, Ford studied at St Albans Preparatory School in Washington, DC where he was educated alongside sons of senior politicians, including those of Ted Kennedy, George H W Bush, and John D Rockefeller IV .[50] Ford's sights were set on politics from a young age. In the Ford family collection at the Benjamin Hooks

[46] Ford Sr won by 532 votes.
[47] Tate, 2003, 55.
[48] Ford, 2010, Ch 1.
[49] Fenno, 2003, 115.
[50] Ford, 2010, Ch 2.

Library, I found an article from 1987 in which the seventeen-year-old Ford told the local paper, 'I wouldn't mind if the avenue [politics] presented itself. I would probably seek the opportunity'.[51]

After St Albans, Ford attended the University of Pennsylvania, an Ivy League university. At Penn, Ford was member of the Black Student League and founded a monthly black newspaper called *Vision*, which was financially supported by his father and other members of the Congressional Black Caucus.[52] Ford graduated in in 1992 and then attended University of Michigan Law School. Although educated in primarily white environments, Ford maintained his links with the black community. David Sutphen, who first met Ford in a minority affairs programme at Michigan and later served as Ford's chief of staff, explained Ford's social world to me, 'I think one of the reasons Harold and I became such good friends is because we were both equally comfortable in the kind of the African American milieu, so to speak, at Michigan as we were hanging out at a bar on campus. And that kind of ability to navigate both worlds was a strong dimension of our friendship and bond'.[53] The ability to navigate both social worlds, I argue, was instrumental to Ford's ability to run a segregated campaign strategy in his US Senate campaign.

During his final semester of law school, Ford declared his intention to run for the US House seat held by his father, who was retiring. Easily winning the majority-black Ninth District seat in 1996, Ford mimicked his father's emphasis on constituency service.[54] Like his father, Ford set a rule in his office that every telephone call and every letter would receive a response. According to one Ford confidant, 'they ran that congressional office from a constituency service standpoint just as good as anybody in the country'.[55] Ford himself would personally handle three to four cases every few weeks. When he hired new staff, Ford explains, 'the only requirement was that they be willing to do casework – no one was above doing the most important work in the office'.[56] Both Fords would take on matters which had no connection to the federal government such as late bill payments and landlord-tenant disputes.[57]


Ford's emphasis on constituent service served a tactical function. Gbemende Johnson and colleagues argue that one of the reasons no incumbent African American member of the House of Representatives has been elected to major statewide office is that their ideologically left-leaning districts constrain them from holding centrist policy positions which are more consistent with the views of the politically heterogeneous statewide electorate.[58] Ford believed that his strong record of constituency service enabled him to support policies at odds with the left-leaning dispositions of his constituents.[59] Ford's viewpoint was grounded in empirical evidence. Richard Fenno argues that the priority a congressperson

[51] Ford, quoted in 'New Wave', *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, 19 August 1987.
[52] Ford, 2010, 64.
[53] Interview with David Sutphen, 23 October 2013.
[54] K Goad, 'Risking star of Ford Jr shines bright in DC', *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, 9 November 1998.
[55] HF1.
[56] Ford, 2010, Ch 6.
[57] Ibid., Ch 1. See also interviews with Bone, White, Greer, Freeman, Francis.
[58] Johnson et al, 2012. See also Gerber (1996).
[59] Ford, 2010, 141.

places on casework and constituent service can be a signal to his or her constituents of mutual identification and empathy.[60] Stephanie Larson found that constituents filter their interpretation of a representative's ideological positions based on their personal affection for the representative.[61] Furthermore, John Griffin and Patrick Flavin discovered that white constituents tend to punish ideologically divergent legislators more heavily than blacks do.[62]

As a result, Ford pursued a more ideologically conservative position than most black members of Congress and, indeed, the average white Democratic member of Congress (see Figure 8.3).[63] Ford started his congressional career with a nearly identical policy liberalism score as his father. A reporter wrote in 1996 that '[s]eldom does anyone ask him for his stance on the issues, seeming to take for granted that his views are his father's views'.[64] However, over time, his voting record became more conservative, and in his penultimate session of Congress his voting record was nearly identical to the mean of Tennessee's four white Democratic US House members. Ford voted to extend tax cuts on capital gains and dividends, supported a balanced budget amendment, and voted for a bill to make it more difficult for people to file for bankruptcy.[65] Nichole Francis, who worked for Ford in Washington and in Memphis, admitted that Ford 'walked a fine line because his district was so progressive', but his reputation in the district enabled him to take more conservative positions.[66]

Figure 8.3. Ideological voting comparisons for Ford Jr & Sr by race and state (1987-2006)



Author's analysis using DW-Nominate, first dimension (Carroll et al, 2014)

[60] Fenno, 1978, Ch 4.
[61] Larson, 1990.
[62] Griffin & Flavin, 2007.
[63] See also Gillespie (2010: 27).
[64] Nate Hobbs, 'Eager Ford embraces his father's legacy', *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, 9 June 1996
[65] Interview with Sherman Greer, 16 August 2013.
[66] Interview with Nichole Francis, 5 September 2013.

In 1997, one year after his first election, a local reporter wrote, 'Ford is no Blue Dog conservative', yet by the early 2000s Ford had joined the conservative 'Blue Dog' caucus in Congress.[67] In 2002 he challenged Nancy Pelosi for the leadership of the House Democratic Caucus from the right.[68] Although the challenge was quixotic, Jonathan Darman argues that Ford 'lay the groundwork' for a statewide run by 'establishing himself as a conservative alternative to the party's leadership'.[69] When he ran for Senate four years later, Ford informed voters that he had challenged Pelosi because he thought the party 'had moved too far to the left'.[70] In his classic study of House members in their districts, Fenno quotes a congressperson telling him 'I do what I do here [i.e. the district] so I can do what I want to do there [i.e. Washington]'.[71] For Ford, the district-level service facilitated his Washington-level interests, which in turn served his statewide aspirations.

According to his colleagues, Ford spent about six years preparing to run for statewide office. He hired a political consultancy firm in 2000 to help raise his profile after Al Gore invited him to deliver the keynote speech at the Democratic National Convention.[72] During these years, Ford was careful to ensure that he did not restrict his activities to Memphis. Sherman Greer, who helped to manage Ford's congressional office in Memphis, explained to me that Ford instructed his office to answer all casework requests 'no matter where you lived in the state. You could live anywhere in Tennessee, if you called [the Memphis office], we were going to help you'.[73] With virtually no opposition from within his party after declaring his candidacy in May 2005, Ford spent the first year of the Senate campaign as the presumptive party nominee while the Republicans were embattled in a rancorous three-way primary. In August 2006, they settled on Bob Corker, the mayor of the eastern city of Chattanooga.


Elites: The Ford Family Machine

Michael Nelson explains that Tennessee has a deferential political culture in two respects. First, Tennessee has a tradition of re-electing incumbents. After Harold Ford Sr narrowly defeated Dan Kuykendall in 1974, no US House, US Senate, or gubernatorial candidate lost re-election until 2008. Second, it is viewed as quite acceptable for children to enter political office following a parent.[74] As Richard Middleton and Sekou Franklin put it, the state has a 'patrimonial political culture, which privileges politically powerful families'.[75] The state has hosted many such familial pairs: Albert Gore Sr and Al Gore Jr, Howard Baker and Cissy Baker, Prentice Cooper and Jim Cooper, John Duncan Sr

[67] James Brosnan, 'Fellow politicians hail Harold Ford Jr's first year a success', *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, 30 November 1997.
[68] James Brosnan, 'Ford loses to Pelosi in leadership bid', *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, 15 November 2002.
[69] Jonathan Darman, 'Tennessee's Harold Ford Jr's Path to Power', *Newsweek*, 30 October 2006.
[70] Ford, quoted in 'Ford stakes middle ground to appeal to GOP in east state', *Nashville Tennessean*, 4 October 2006.
[71] 'Congressman N' in Fenno (1978: 199).
[72] HF1, HF11, HF12, HF16.
[73] Interview with Greer.
[74] Nelson, 2014, 193.
[75] Middleton & Franklin, 2009, 63.

and John Duncan Jr, Frank Clement and Bob Clement, and Harold Ford Sr and Harold Ford Jr. When Harold Ford Jr succeeded his father in Congress at the age of 26, his campaign emblem was simply the letters 'Jr', as depicted in Figure 8.4.

Figure 8.4. Harold Ford Jr's congressional campaign headquarters, 1996



Source: John Freeman

Ford Sr won his election to Congress on the basis of extremely high levels of support from African Americans, with minimal support from whites. In 1974, he defeated Kuykendall by mobilising the support of 97 percent of black voters.[76] After his election to Congress, Ford gained a reputation of being able to pick winners in city elections, often members of his own family.[77] Kathryn Bowers, who lost to Harold Ford Sr's brother James in a city council election, lamented, 'I did not lose a race to James Ford but instead lost to Harold Ford…There are people in this city that worship Congressman Ford as people worship a god'.[78] Sharon Wright describes Harold Ford Sr as 'the most powerful politician in Memphis'.[79] Bobby White, who worked as the chief of staff for Memphis mayor A C Wharton, informed me, 'there are few people you can run into in Memphis who don't have some connection with the Fords'.[80] Another member of Ford's staff described Ford Sr as 'the godfather', a title which was also given to Barack Obama's mentor Emil Jones (see Chapter 6).[81]

[76] Dowdy, 2010, 115.
[77] Interview with Bobby White, 19 August 2013.
[78] Bowers, quoted in 'Family's Weight Helped Lift James Ford to City Council Seat', *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, 6 October 1979.
[79] Wright, 2000, 86.
[80] Interview with White.
[81] Interview with Sutphen.

Ford Sr's power extended beyond Memphis. According to a long-time intimate of the Ford family, Harold Ford Sr's reputation for delivering the black vote in Memphis meant that statewide candidates often looked to him for endorsements. In turn, they ensured that Ford Sr was always well-funded and resourced.[82] Jonathan Darman writes that the Fords were '*the* family to see in west Tennessee. Democratic candidates for president, governor, senator, and down the list showed up to Sunday night suppers at their home'.[83] Memphis mayor Wyeth Chandler recalls that from the 1970s until the 1990s 'you couldn't get anything done in the black community without Harold Ford'.[84] For Democratic politicians who needed black support in order to win primaries or general elections, Ford Sr became a crucial conduit to political power. As a result, the idea of there being a 'Ford family machine' developed in Tennessee political folklore. Some compared the Ford machine to a revived Crump machine, except with black politicians in control.[85]

Unlike in some of my other case studies where elites placed a premium on racial coalition-building, I argue that in Memphis a sense of racial tension was important in motivating African Americans to turn out to vote.[86] Historically, Memphis had 'an exceptionally small' number of white liberals compared to other major cities discussed in this manuscript.[87] For good reasons, black Memphians were suspicious of purportedly liberal or moderate white political organisations in the city. The reformist Dedicated Citizens' Committee of Memphis, which Marcus Pohlmann and Michael Kirby describe as 'as liberal a white group as had ever existed in the city', did not allow African Americans on its executive committee and supported the maintenance of an all-white school board.[88] Even in 1993, not a single white city council member voted with African American councillors in their attempt to prevent all-white private clubs from appointing members to public bodies in the city. Reflecting this racial schism, in an interview shortly before his election to Congress, Ford Sr explicitly ruled out coalition-building with liberal whites: 'I would never try and get a coalition with white liberals. In fact, I have not even called them, and I won't call them to get a coalition going. I think the greatest damage to the black race is that white liberal'.[89]

Without white support, Harold Ford Sr encouraged a high level of black political participation in the district. Claudine Gay found black participation in Ford Sr's Ninth District was anomalously high in her study of turnout in black-held House seats between 1990 and 1994. When Ford Sr ran for re-election

[82] HF10.
[83] Jonathan Darman, 'Tennessee's Harold Ford Jr's Path to Power', *Newsweek*, 29 October 2006.
[84] Chandler, quoted in Wright (2000: 91).
[85] Wright, 2000, Ch 5.
[86] For a similar argument, see Sparks & Preston (1990) on the election of Harold Washington as mayor of Chicago in 1983.
[87] Pohlmann & Kirby, 1996, xxiv.
[88] Ibid., 14.
[89] Jack Bass interview with Harold Ford Sr, Southern Oral History Project, 19 August 1974 (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill).

for the final time in 1994, black turnout was an astonishingly high 77 percent, ten percentage points higher than white turnout.[90] It was in the top decile of black turnout in the country.[91]

The Ford family provided Ford Jr with a political base and firm connection to the black community in Memphis, in spite of spending most of his life in predominantly white, elite contexts in Washington, DC and northern universities. Yet, the political power of the Ford family machine should not be overstated. The family was often fractious and members were known to endorse different candidates in the same election.[92] John Freeman, who worked for both Ford Sr and Jr, argues that while Ford Sr had a powerful constituency organisation, its sophistication was greatly overstated. Freeman qualified in an interview with me,

> 'We used to...laugh about the Ford machine. The machine was six people [in the district office]. The machine was the congressman. The machine was taking care of the people – his love for the community. He was always in the community, always helping constituents, like I said helping little Johnny getting into school, helping people with their utility bills, their telephone bills, anything that you can imagine…[Constituents] came up to the office and sobbed. They cried and thanked the congressman. Story after story – that's the machine'.[93]

Sharon Wright is not even convinced that it is appropriate to call Harold Ford Sr's organisation a 'machine' because it did not have patronage-dispensing powers.[94] While Ford Sr (and Ford Jr) could offer excellent casework services, these were approximations of a political machine's true power, which is in providing jobs and financial security for campaign workers and supporters. The reputation of the machine, I will argue, became self-defeating in the 2006 election. Ford Sr overestimated his ability to mobilise high black turnout for his son in the US Senate election. Bobby White, a lifelong Memphian who worked for Ford, explained to me, 'The aura was not there in 2006 in the way it was in 96 for Harold Ford Sr…He's off the scene. Harold Ford Sr [was] no longer engaged in political circles and politics on the local level like he had been for many years'.[95]

To whites in Tennessee, the Fords were an uncomfortable sign of black power usurped from whites who became the subordinate political group in Memphis by the mid-1990s. The Republican chairman of Shelby County described Ford Sr in 1992 as 'the embodiment of evil'.[96] The Fords were regularly portrayed as intemperate and corrupt.[97] Robert Hicks, a researcher of Tennessee history, described the Ford family as 'a family that seems always ready to stretch the bounds of propriety'.[98] The day after


[90] Gay, 2001.
[91] Ibid.
[92] Interview with Franklin.
[93] Interview with John Freeman, 20 August 2013.
[94] Wright, 2000, Ch 7.
[95] Interview with White.
[96] John Ryder, quoted in 'Election Aftermath as Simple as Black and White?', *Memphis Flyer*, 13-19 August 1992.
[97] Dwight Lewis, 'Family Matters Shouldn't Matter', *Nashville Tennessean*, 5 October 2006.
[98] Robert Hicks, 'My Return to Balance', *New York Times*, 24 September 2006.

Ford announced his candidacy for the US Senate, his uncle John Ford, a state senator, was indicted for accepting a $55,000 bribe.[99] Months later, Ford's aunt Ophelia was charged with electoral fraud.[100] Ford writes that his father was 'caricatured by the Memphis press over the years as a fiery black politician'.[101] One Ford campaign official told me that his white family in eastern Tennessee had negative views 'about Democrats, and certainly blacks, and certainly Fords'.[102]

Although Bob Corker had initially promised not to attack Ford's family, in the final month of the campaign he abandoned this commitment.[103] Corker's campaign manager, Tom Ingram, confessed to me that he wanted to win without using the Memphis machine and Ford family material, but because their internal polls showed Corker losing to Ford in the final weeks of the campaign, Ingram concluded that it was necessary 'to take on Harold Sr'.[104] In his first debate against Ford, Corker raised the family's influence in Memphis politics. Corker stated, 'I'm making an observation that it's pretty much a family business…And I think it's something we all see and know… that there's a type of machine politics'.[105] Corker repeated these attacks in print and broadcast literature, as well as in interviews with journalists.[106] Over one-fifth of the Republican adverts in my sample (n=22) tied Harold Ford Jr to machine politics. Figure 8.5 illustrates one example.

[99] 'Former Tennessee Lawmaker John Ford Convicted of Taking Bribes', *Washington Post*, 28 April 2007.
[100] Ken Whitehouse, 'Senate Ousts Ophelia Ford', *Nashville Post*, 19 April 2006.
[101] Ford, 2010, 80.
[102] HF12.
[103] Andy Sher, 'Corker says Ford family not an issue in Senate race', *Chattanooga Times Free Press,* 25 August 2006.
[104] Field notes, 13 July 2015 (Washington, DC).
[105] Bob Corker, quoted in 'Ford's family, Corker's job site draw fire in candidates' first debate', *Nashville Tennessean*, 8 October 2006.
[106] Bonna de la Cruz, 'Corker targets Metro's collar counties in neck-and-neck race', *Nashville Tennessean*, 3 October 2006.

Figure 8.5. Republican direct mail: 'Dynasty, Political Machine'



Source: Jim Hester

Harold Ford Jr, himself, was never charged with corrupt practices. Nevertheless, the Republican campaign raised the question of whether Ford Jr was also implicated in his disorderly family's corrupt practices. Tennessee Republican Party chairman Bob Davis told the *Memphis Commercial Appeal* that voters 'can't help but think about [Ford's family]…At the end of the day, people are going to be thinking about whether Harold Ford Jr is like his father or [Uncle] Emmitt or [Aunt] Ophelia'.[107] A Ford communications advisor reflects that Corker's ultimate aim was to convince people that Ford 'was acting just like his dad'[108] and another long-time Ford family confidant describes the 'constant hammering… of the association with Harold Jr and Harold Sr' (for example, see Figure 8.6).[109] I agree with Dennis Nordin that these attempts to tie Ford with corrupt machine politics undoubtedly had a racial undertone, in spite of Corker campaign officials' protestations to me that there were no such racial considerations.[110] Ford pollster Pete Brodnitz believes that the Republican strategy was 'to marginalise him as one of those old-fashioned Memphis guys'.[111] Tom Ingram told me that the criticism 'wasn't

[107] Bob Davis, quoted in 'Ford Jr's family problem's, *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, 20 December 2005.
[108] HF10.
[109] Interview with Jay Lindy, 19 August 2013.
[110] Nordin, 2012, Ch 4.
[111] Interview with Brodnitz.

black politics; it was machine politics',[112] but I argue that given the identifiably black character of the Ford machine, such images were difficult to separate.[113]

Figure 8.6. Corker television advertisement: Harold Ford, Jr and Sr - Too close for comfort?




Source: Kanter Archive, Political Communications Center, University of Oklahoma

Ford's pollster, Pete Brodnitz, believes that the Corker campaign's focus on the Ford family was based on polling evidence which showed latent unease in the white electorate about the powerful, black family. Brodnitz informed me that in the Ford campaign's internal focus groups, 'voters kept on saying they had concerns about Harold because of allegations related to his family, and the expression that kept on coming up…was they would say, the apple doesn't fall far from the tree'.[114] As Figure 8.7 shows, the phrase 'apples don't fall far from the tree' appeared in Republican Party literature. Brodnitz does not believe that its use was accidental: 'they heard exactly the same thing [in their focus groups], and they used it'.[115]

[112] Interview with Ingram.
[113] See Westen (2007: Ch 10).
[114] Interview with Brodnitz.
[115] Ibid.

Figure 8.7. Republican direct mail: 'We know apples don't fall far from the tree' (in red)



Source: Jim Hester

Dependent Variable: The Segregated Campaign Strategy

The Ford campaign's goal was to 'roll up huge majorities among black voters' and to win over 40 percent of the white vote.[116] I argue that the strategy which Ford pursued to achieve these twin goals involved making different (and mutually incompatible) racial appeals. It judged that an exclusive focus one racial electorate at the expense of the other would not be successful. To African Americans, Ford signalled his historic-symbolic status as potentially the first black US senator from the South since Reconstruction. To whites, Ford presented himself in the mould of a traditional southern conservative candidate. He told FOX News shortly before the election, 'what Tennesseans will get' if they elected him 'is a Jesus-loving, gun-supporting believer that family should come first, that taxes should be lowered, and that America should be strong'.[117]

Targeted Appeals

In his autobiography, Ford admits that he knew that racial concerns were strongly held by the electorate. He reflects, 'From the outset of the campaign, I knew that race would be an issue. It was on the minds of everyone who thought about me, the Senate, and Tennessee'.[118] In spite of this highly racialised context, Ford deliberately downplayed his symbolic racial status when addressing white Tennesseans.

[116] Nelson, 2014, 201.
[117] Ford, quoted in 'Center Stage', *Memphis Flyer*, 2 November 2006.
[118] Ford, 2010, 194.

When asked how he would feel to be listed as the first black senator elected from Tennessee, Ford replied, 'The only thing I want to be listed as is a senator from the state of Tennessee'.[119] One advisor, who had known the Ford family since the 1970s, posited to me that that Ford did not truly appreciate the symbolic significance of his candidacy to white voters. He believed that Ford could have made a symbolic-substantive appeal to Tennessee whites, but he chose not to do so because he calculated that a colour-blind message would be more effective.[120]

Predominantly white media and Ford's campaign in white areas both avoided racially symbolic language. When both of Tennessee's major newspapers endorsed Harold Ford, neither of them mentioned his race.[121] When Bill Theobald profiled Ford in a two page feature in the *Nashville Tennessean*, he did not mention Ford's race once, let alone the symbolic significance of Ford's candidacy.[122] Adam Gomolin and colleagues assert that Harold Ford Jr ran as a 'New South' candidate. However, this term was never used by any of the people I interviewed from the Ford campaign. I also did not detect a single use of the phrase 'New South' in any of the 94 newspaper articles I analysed for this case study. In contrast, the phrase 'New South' appeared in 7.7 percent of the articles in my Gantt-Helms newspaper sample and was mentioned by Gantt campaign workers in interviews, often without prompting (see Chapter 4).

Instead, I argue that Ford's appeals to whites involved an embrace of symbols of the Old South, especially the symbolic heritage of the Confederacy. The Confederate flag, sometimes known as the Rebel flag, is an exclusively white emblem, in spite of the protestations by some white southerners that the flag is merely a symbol of their regional history. It cannot be, given that black southerners do not view the Confederate flag as a symbol of regional pride. The Confederate flag was so alien to black southerners that one black southern writer recalls 'to my astonishment, Mama had never seen the Confederate flag and didn't know what it was…because the community in which she lived was strictly segregated, and few people, black or white, ever "crossed the line".'[123]

The circumstances of the flag's revived usage in the twentieth century unmistakably link it to anti-black white supremacy.[124] As Wallace Best points out, after the South's humiliating defeat in the Civil War, the flag was a symbol of defeat, not local pride. However, as the civil rights movement grew strength in the 1950s, the flag re-emerged as a symbol of defiance against federally mandated integration.[125] For

[119] Harold Ford, quoted in 'Senate election seen as gauge of racial attitude', *Nashville Tennessean*, 5 November 2006.
[120] HF10.
[121] 'Ford for US Senate', *Nashville Tennessean*, 15 October 2006; 'For the Senate: Harold Ford Jr', *Memphis Commercial Appeal ,* 22 October 2006.
[122] Bill Theobald, 'Memphians have Ford's ear but he misses votes in House', *Nashville Tennessean*, 15 October 2006.
[123] Best, 2001, 14.
[124] Glaser, 1996, 65.
[125] Best, 2001, 14.

example, the Confederate flag was not flown over the Georgia statehouse until 1956, two years after *Brown v Board of Education.*[126] Alabama did not fly the Confederate flag over its public buildings until 1963, after Governor George Wallace clashed with the federal government over integration.[127] It is a symbol not only of the Confederacy but also of segregation and white attempts to block black racial equality in the mid-twentieth century.[128]

There are two episodes which demonstrate Ford's acceptance of Confederate symbols and his attempt to tie himself to them. These incidents carry a larger significance than the moments in which they occurred because they were reiterated by Ford in his 'stump speech' at campaign events, suggesting that he wanted to communicate that he viewed them as significant and important moments. The first incident occurred while Ford and two colleagues were driving through the town of Jackson, which is equidistant between Nashville and Memphis. Ford insisted on visiting the 'Little Rebel Bar', an eatery with large Confederate flags painted onto its outside wall, with another large Confederate flag above the establishment (see Figure 8.8). John Freeman, Ford's driver and aide, recalled the incident in his first-hand account to me,

> 'We would take a short-cut through Jackson on several occasions. We would make comments and laugh about a hole-in-the-wall dive bar, which had a huge metal rebel flag on the outside of it. We were driving by, and I made some joke about it as we were driving past. He [Ford]'s like, "I want to go in." I laughed and kept driving. [Ford said,] "Seriously really I want to go in there." I said, "Harold, there are a bunch of pick-up trucks with rebel flags and gun racks on the trucks. I really don't think we are going to be welcomed there." He said, "I want to go. I want to go." It was amazing. We pulled up, and it was redneck heaven in that parking lot: bumper stickers with Jesus loves you, NRA, and all that other stuff. We walked through the front door. It was NASCAR everywhere...One of the waitresses came up and said "Oh my god. It's Harold Ford Jr. I love you." She came up and gave him a big hug. Well, what the hell, we must have stepped into the twilight zone…We were there for two hours'.[129]

[126] Martinez, 2008, 201.
[127] Thornton, 1996, 236.
[128] Flying the Confederate flag under the guise of southern 'heritage' can be regarded as a white American 'invented tradition' (see Hobsbawm, 1983).
[129] Interview with Freeman.

Figure 8.8. The Little Rebel Bar and Grill



Source: Google Maps

Ford repeated his visit to the Little Rebel later in the campaign, but this time he invited the press to join him. With a camouflage hunting cap, Ford posed for photographs in front of the Little Rebel's large Confederate flag (Figure 8.9). Ford's tactics demonstrate that his campaign amongst whites was not 'race-neutral', given the highly racial connotations of the flag's symbolism. It, therefore, differed from a traditional deracialised strategy which seeks to diminish the salience of race.

Figure 8.9. Ford's second trip to the Little Rebel



Source: Nashville City Paper

Another incident occurred in March 2006 at the annual Mule Day parade in Columbia, central Tennessee. According to a senior Ford campaign official, Ford joined the Sons of Confederate Veterans marchers. The men, whom the official described to me as 'ex-KKK', were dressed in Confederate Army

regalia and wore Confederate flag insignia.[130] Jon Meacham of *Newsweek* reported, 'Ford worked the Confederate caucus with hugs and high-fives'.[131]

These episodes were symbolic and important to Ford, evidenced by his integration of the stories into his stump speeches.[132] By, literally, embracing those wearing Confederate insignia, Ford signalled to whites that he would not challenge their bonds of white racial solidarity. Corker's campaign manager Tom Ingram confessed to me that he was surprised at how effective Ford was in appealing to whites in these settings: 'He was knocking it out of the park there in redneck bars on redneck highways'.[133]

In contrast, when appealing to black voters Ford made targeted race-conscious appeals on the basis of Ford's racial symbolism, black racial solidarity, and a traditional left-of-centre set of policy commitments. Organisationally, the Ford campaign built a distinct structure for its work in the African American community with the campaign in majority-black Memphis organised autonomously from the rest of the state. Ford's statewide campaign manager Beecher Frasier explains, 'the Memphis campaign was a campaign within itself. Harold Ford Sr took care of that. I didn't even touch that because I was called Mr Invasive in that regard, and then there was the rest of the state because what was done in Shelby County [i.e. Memphis] could not be done [elsewhere in the state]'.[134] John Freeman, who ran the Memphis field campaign effort, informed me that of about 80,000 households targeted by the campaign in Memphis, about 78,000 were African American households.[135] The campaign was specifically interested in turning out African Americans who voted in the presidential election in 2004 but had a propensity not to turn out in mid-term elections. Additionally, Ford's polling consultant confirmed to me that the campaign 'did some tailoring' in its broadcast advertisements because Memphis has its own media market, separate from the rest of the state.[136]

There are several ways in which Ford defied the deracialised campaign strategy by making race-conscious appeals directly to African American voters. First, Ford emphasised his links with black politicians, especially his family. Andra Gillespie has argued that Ford's family connection was crucial to ensuring that he could claim a credible connection to the lives of African Americans.[137] In an August 2006 article in the historically black *Tri-State Defender*, Ford reminisced about his family's history of winning political office, including his great-grandfather who served as a local magistrate: 'When I first learned of what my great-grandfather and the residents of his district accomplished together, I was proud, and I still am'.[138] According to John Bakke, Ford's uncle John was 'the symbol of black power'

[130] HF6.
[131] John Meacham, 'The Editor's Desk', *Newsweek*, 13 March 2010.
[132] Ford also later mentioned them in his autobiography and in a 2008 *Newsweek* article.
[133] Interview with Ingram.
[134] Interview with Frasier.
[135] Interview with Freeman.
[136] Interview with Brodnitz.
[137] Gillespie, 2009.
[138] Ford, quoted in 'Ford tradition headed to Senate', *Tri-State Defender*, 3-9 August 2006.

on Memphis City Council and, later, in the state senate.[139] Although his uncle and aunt both faced corruption charges during the campaign, Ford refused to condemn them. Against the advice of his (white) campaign advisors, Ford refused to endorse Steve Cohen, a Jewish state legislator, to succeed him in the Ninth District even though Cohen was the Democratic nominee.[140] Cohen had defeated Ford's cousin Joe Ford Jr in the Democratic primary. Harold Ford Jr attacked Cohen for 'singing from the Ford family attack hymnal'.[141] A deracialised candidate would have distanced himself from racially polarising family members, but Ford chose not to do so.

Relatedly, in a departure from the deracialised campaign strategy, Ford invited out-of-state black politicians to campaign for him. For example, the only black member of the US Senate Barack Obama campaigned with Ford in historically black churches in Nashville and Memphis and at open-air rallies attended mainly by African American residents of the cities (Figure 8.10). At one event held at the historically black Mt Zion Baptist Church in Nashville, Obama told the audience, 'I know that all of you are going to work the next couple of days to make sure [Ford's election] happens, because I'm feeling lonely in Washington', referencing his status as the only African American in the US Senate.[142] This idea that Ford would 'stand out' in the Senate because he and Obama would be the only black senators was promoted within the black community. One of Ford's African American members of staff informed me, 'He [Ford] would say, if I am one of one or one of two [blacks] in the Senate, I am going to be more electrifying than another person who looks like nearly everybody else in the Senate'.[143]

Figure 8.10. Barack Obama campaigning with Harold Ford (2006)



Source: Los Angeles Times

[139] Bakke, nd, Ch 4.
[140] Ibid.
[141] Ford, quoted in 'Family ties hurting Jr, says Cohen', *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, 21 October 2006.
[142] Barack Obama, quoted in 'Senator Obama Stumps for Ford in Tennessee', *Washington Post*, 6 November 2006.
[143] HF7.

Second, the Ford campaign highlighted the importance of increasing diversity in the US Senate. The campaign appealed to African Americans on the basis that Ford's election would be historic and that as a new African American senator, he would change the face of the Senate. As one black voter told a reporter, 'Not only is he a new face, he is an African American face'.[144] Ford's success was linked with the wider success of the African American community. An African American voter told a reporter that Ford's election would represent that 'we've come a little further. We're moving on up'.[145]

Finally, the Ford campaign called on the traditional institutions of the black community to assist in voter mobilisation. The black church was especially important, and Ford spent many hours appearing in black churches throughout the state.[146] Charles Robert Bone, Ford's finance director, explains that the Ford family's longstanding ties to the black church meant that '[t]hey naturally just came out of the woodwork to help, whereas nobody else would have been able to get that support'.[147] For a city of its size, Memphis has a very high proportion of churches, many of which cater to the city's predominantly African American population. Memphis has the fifth highest number of churches per capita in the United States, with one church for every 804 residents.[148] Ford's deputy district director Sherman Greer, a native Memphian, noted, 'Look at Memphis. Every corner, you've got a church. If you ride around this city, every corner you have a tonne of churches. So he would do the churches [each Sunday]'.[149] The week before the election, a Ford rally was held at Temple of Deliverance Church of God in Christ, Memphis's largest black Pentecostal church. A reporter for the *Memphis Commercial Appeal* describes the scene as reminiscent of 'a revival of sorts…The party faithful swayed, sang, waved signs, and chanted "Harold Ford".'[150] Nearly 4,000 people attended. This event violates the deracialised strategy's condition that black candidates avoid publicly campaigning in the black community.

Policy Agenda

Ford modified his policy agenda depending on which racial audience he was targeting. Members of Ford's campaign team professed to me the candidate's extraordinary versatility when discussing policy issues depending on the type of audience. Ford's finance chairman stated to me, 'He had an amazing ability to talk about issues in one way in a very rural part of the state and in a different way in the urban part'.[151] When appealing to white voters, Ford emphasised a conservative set of policy issues. Dennis Nordin writes that from the perspective of white voters, Ford and Corker had 'almost identical' policy

[144] Quoted in 'Black voters express excitement at the ability to vote for Ford', *Nashville Tennessean*, 31 October 2006.
[145] Quoted in 'Senate vote seen as racial milepost', *Nashville Tennessean*, 5 November 2006.
[146] Halimah Abdullah, 'Exchanging Jabs', *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, 2 November 2006.
[147] Interview with Bone.
[148] Matthew Speiser, 'The US cities with the most religious venues per capita aren't quite what you expect', *Business Insider*, 3 June 2015.
[149] Interview with Greer.
[150] Halimah Abdullah, 'Exchanging Jabs', *Commercial Appeal*, 2 November 2006.
[151] Interview with Bone.

programmes.[152] In contrast, to black voters Ford, forwarded a much more outwardly left-of-centre policy programme. Sekou Franklin writes, 'in African American communities, he [Ford] presented himself as a race-conscious candidate, a defender of social welfare'.[153] An August 2006 profile of Ford in the historically black *Tri-State Defender* emphasised Ford's support for raising the minimum wage and 'extend[ing] incentives for hiring welfare recipients'.[154]

By way of demonstration, let us compare two differently targeted direct mail leaflets promoting Harold Ford. Ford's polling consultant Peter Brodnitz confirmed to me that 'mailing is always very targeted'.[155] The first leaflet is targeted to African American voters (Figure 8.11). It condemns George Bush for doing 'nothing' as Hurricane Katrina 'killed thousands' in New Orleans, a city which was 67 percent African American. The advert on one side features six African Americans wading through knee-deep water. On the other side, Ford is featured holding a young black child.[156] Without prompting, Sekou Franklin, an African American academic living in Nashville, mentioned this leaflet in our interview. I wrote Franklin's reactions in my field notes: '[Franklin] remembers receiving a piece of direct mail which criticised George Bush for his handling of Hurricane Katrina. He believes this was clearly racial and would leave blacks in Nashville w/ the impression that HF was more radical than he actually was'.[157]

[152] Nordin, 2012.
[153] Franklin, 2010, 222.
[154] A L Wbb, 'Ford tradition headed to Senate', *Tri-State Defender*, 3-9 August 2006.
[155] Interview with Brodnitz.
[156] Ford was unmarried and childless.
[157] Field notes, 14 August 2013 (Nashville, TN).

Figure 8.11. Hurricane Katrina Direct Mail, Tennessee Democratic Party (both sides)




Source: Jim Hester

The decision to highlight Bush's role in Hurricane Katrina is particularly instructive of Ford's segregated campaign strategy. Interpretations of the 2005 disaster in New Orleans varied strongly by race. According to a Pew survey (Figure 8.12), 66 percent of African Americans thought that the response to the Hurricane would have been faster if most of the victims had been white. Only 17 percent of whites agreed.[158] 91 percent of African Americans agreed with Kanye West's statement during a televised Hurricane Katrina fundraiser that the disaster showed that 'George Bush doesn't care about black people', while a majority of whites disagreed with West.[159]

[158] Frymer et al, 2006, 42.
[159] Harris-Perry, 2011, 316.


Figure 8.12. Racialised reactions to Hurricane Katrina



Source: 'Hurricane Katrina Survey', 7-8 September 2005, Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (Harris-Perry, 2011: 11, 316)

The second leaflet featured a white man named Earl Miller standing next to packets of horse feed (Figure 8.13). Miller is said to be from Franklin County, which has a white population of 91 percent.[160] On the reverse side of the leaflet, Ford is shown talking to a group of parents, none of whom is black. The leaflet was intended to appeal to white voters in the state's rural counties.

Figure 8.13. Earl Miller Direct Mail, Tennessee Democratic Party (both sides)



Source: Jim Hester

Significantly, while both leaflets outline Ford's policy agenda, the content of the agenda differed between the two leaflets (see Figure 8.14). In the Hurricane Katrina leaflet targeted to black voters, Ford's priorities include traditional liberal Democratic policies of affordable healthcare, protecting Social Security, better jobs and higher wages, and improving education. In the Earl Miller leaflet, targeted to white voters, Ford's five policy priorities were slightly modified. Unlike the Hurricane

[160] American FactFinder, 2000 US Census.

Katrina leaflet, Ford promised to 'put values back in the classroom'. On employment he promised to 'reward hard work', which I posit is a recognition of whites' perceptions that welfare supports lazy African Americans.[161] An additional commitment to securing America's borders and restricting amnesty for illegal immigrants also appears exclusively on the Earl Miller advert.

Figure 8.14. Ford's issue priorities: Earl Miller leaflet (left), Hurricane Katrina leaflet (right)




Source: Jim Hester

Style

Given its highly racialised context, the 2006 senatorial election provides numerous opportunities to study Ford's style. In their communications to voters, both campaigns were largely negative. From my coded sample of printed and broadcast communications, I found that 86.7% of Ford adverts and 81.1% of Corker adverts contained negative content about their opponent, as Figure 8.15 shows.[162] Ford's criticisms focused on Corker's wealth and competence as mayor of Chattanooga.

[161] See Peffley et al (1997), Gilens (1999), Valentino et al (2002)
[162] 'Contrast' advertisements contain both positive and negative content. To arrive at the percentage of advertisements which contained some negative content, I added together the percentages of advertisements coded as either 'negative' or 'contrast'.

Figure 8.15. Positive/Negative Content of Ford and Corker TV/Print Advertisements



Source: Kanter Archive, University of Oklahoma (TV) and Jim Hester (print)

According to one Chattanooga journalist, Tom Ingram, who became Corker's campaign manager in late September 2006, 'faced a choice: Either reconstruct Bob Corker's image or take apart the positive impression of Rep Ford. They knew both could not be accomplished with limited time and money, so the decision was to deconstruct Rep Ford'.[163] Ingram confirmed in an interview with me that before his arrival, Corker's campaign team 'weren't really defining Harold…So I said trash all of the television and start over, and we'll do a different message'.[164] Ford's pollster Peter Brodnitz informed me that internal tracking polls showed that the negative advertisements were having an downward effect on Ford's ratings in the final weeks. Brodnitz explained to me that 'it created so much smoke that ultimately people concluded there must be a fire here'.[165]

The Corker campaign's offensive strategy consisted of at least two elements, both of which I described earlier. First, the Corker campaign set out to describe Ford as someone who lacked Tennessee values. Second, the campaign aimed to tie Ford to a corrupt urban political machine. In his memoirs, Ford identified both of these lines of attack as having inextricable racial elements, but he refused to acknowledge their racial content during the campaign. It should be noted that Republican campaign officials did not agree that their attacks were racial. Corker's campaign manager stated to me, 'I don't think there was anything that we did which you could say played the politics of race'.[166]

[163] Griscom, quoted in Kaiser (2013: 244).
[164] Interview with Ingram.
[165] Interview with Brodnitz.
[166] Interview with Ingram.

While the Republican attacks lacked outward racial content, I argue that the association of an African American candidate with corrupt black politicians and the accusation that Ford did not represent the values of the state in which he was born can both be seen as having racial undertones. Ford's campaign manager Beecher Frasier agreed, 'Those racial innuendos were played wherever they could…You throw it up and see what sticks – and that's what they were doing there within a certain group of constituency to basically say, this guy is black'.[167] However, consistent with a deracialised campaign strategy, among white voters, Frasier argued that Ford 'had to be careful not to cry foul or race card on those issues all the time'.[168]

A third element of the offensive campaign against Ford had a more obvious, sinister racial element: the suggestion that Ford slept with white women. These attacks were most memorably articulated in a television advertisement against Ford paid by the Republican National Committee. On 20 October 2006, the Republican National Committee released an advert featuring a blonde woman who did not appear to be wearing any clothes. She smiled at the camera and claimed, 'I met Harold at the Playboy party', before winking at the camera and cooing, 'Harold, call me' (Figure 8.16). The advert was a reference to Ford's attendance at a Super Bowl party in Jacksonville, Florida in February 2005 which had been sponsored by Playboy.[169] During the furore following the advertisement's broadcast, Ford confirmed that he had attended the party.[170]

Figure 8.16. Republican National Committee television advertisement: 'Call Me'



Source: Kanter Archive, Political Communications Center, University of Oklahoma


[167] Interview with Frasier.
[168] Ibid.
[169] Colby Sledge, 'Cooper calls on Corker to force GOP to pull ad', *Nashville Tennessean*, 23 October 2006.
[170] 'I was there, Ford says of Playboy party', *Nashville Tennessean*, 25 October 2006.

The advert was widely believed to be racially charged.[171] A commentator in the *Chattanooga Times Free Press* argued that the advert illustrated the Republicans' 'ready willingness to trade on sex, race, and the Old South taboo against interracial relations and miscegenation to attack Mr Ford'.[172] The *Nashville Tennessean* referred to it as a 'sleazy, racist ad'.[173] The advert's potency would have been particularly felt in the South where historically, Joel Williamson explains, 'white people were murderously sensitive to the character of attentions that a black man might pay a white woman'.[174] As one commentator described, 'The ad's evocation of the white South's primal fear of black men having sex with white women could not have been less subtle'.[175] Richard Middleton and Sekou Franklin argue that the advert aimed to 'convince white voters that a Ford victory would violate the South's traditional customs regulating relations between black men and white women'.[176] The chairman of the Tennessee Democratic Party described the advert to me as 'a vile attempt on the part of the Republicans to play on rural, white fears about a black man having a white girlfriend or sleeping with a white woman'.[177] Even Corker's campaign manager admitted to me that the advert 'crossed the racial line…I think it played the politics of race. If he had said that, I wouldn't have disagreed'.[178]

The Corker campaign denied prior knowledge of the advertisement. They argued that due to finance laws which restrict coordination between a candidate and their party, Corker campaign officials stressed that there was no coordination between them and the producers of the particular 'Call Me' advertisement. Corker's communications director Todd Womack stressed to me, 'I just want to make sure in what you're writing that it's very clear that [with], you know, the "Harold Call Me" stuff, there was no coordination. Zero'.[179] According to Robert Kaiser, some members of the Ford campaign remain sceptical of these protestations.[180] In our interview, Tennessee Democratic Party chairman Chip Forrester refuted, 'Bob Corker said, I didn't run the ad, I didn't pay for the ad, I didn't have anything to do with it. That's just not true. You're not at that level and not able [to exercise control]'.[181] It is difficult to assess which side is correct, but the Corker campaign did promote the information about Ford's attendance at the Playboy party in other communications, as Figure 8.17 shows.[182]

[171] Gomolin et al, 2007, 2.
[172] 'Republicans Still Run Dirty Ad', *Chattanooga Times Free Press*, 28 October 2006.
[173] John Mashek, 'Ford Must Remember Swift Boats and Fire Back', *Nashville Tennessean*, 31 October 2006.
[174] Williamson, 1997, 1228. See also McIlwain & Caliendo (2011: 11).
[175] Nelson, 2014, 201.
[176] Middleton & Franklin, 2009, 64.
[177] Interview with Forrester.
[178] Interview with Ingram.
[179] Interview with Todd Womack, 7 July 2015.
[180] Kaiser, 2013, 244.
[181] Interview with Chip Forrester, 14 August 2013.
[182] Interview with Ingram.

Figure 8.17. Corker direct mail leaflet which mentions the Playboy party (in red)



Source: Jim Hester

Commentators have rarely observed that accusations of Ford's attendance at the Playboy party predated the 'Call Me' advert. For example, twelve days before it was broadcast, the *Nashville Tennessean* wrote that Corker was giving speeches 'trying to paint him [Ford] as a jet setter who attends Playboy parties and has expensive tastes'.[183] A cartoon published in the *Memphis Commercial Appeal* two weeks before the 'Call Me' advert shows Ford dressed as a pimp praising the Lord surrounded by a set of scantily clad Playboy bunnies (Figure 8.18). Crucially, this set of women was multi-racial. Furthermore, in mid-August 2006, two months before the 'Call Me' advert, Ford publicly returned $3,600 in campaign contributions from people affiliated to the Playboy enterprise and adult film studios.[184] None of these incidents gained the same level of traction in public commentary. Therefore, I argue, the Playboy accusations themselves were not sensational. It was the insinuation of a racial transgression which mattered.

[183] Larry Daughtrey, 'Your Mom Can't Win It for You, Mr Corker', *Nashville Tennessean*, 8 October 2006.
[184] Michael Davis, 'Ford Returns Contributions from Playboy', *Chattanooga Times Free Press*, 16 August 2006.

Figure 8.18. Playboy party accusations predate 'Call Me' advert



Source: Memphis Commercial Appeal, *5 October 2006*

In a demonstration of a 'conciliatory' campaign style, Ford refused to acknowledge, let alone condemn, the advert's racial content. In an interview with *Washington Post* reporter David Espo, Ford 'repeatedly' declined to say whether he thought the advert was racist. Ford stated, 'You have to ask them [Republicans] about race. I don't focus on those things'.[185] When asked to comment on the Call Me advert at a meeting with reporters, Ford merely responded, 'I was there. I like football, and I like girls'.[186] Democratic co-ordinated campaign manager Jim Hester believed that the racial image Ford had cultivated among whites made it impossible for him to condemn the attacks. He explained to me, 'I don't know what you could do against it. I think the decision to not be the black candidate meant not calling out the race card. I think he did a really good job not doing that. Even with Call Me. He said, I don't think that was a racial ad. I don't know what he personally thought, but publicly he just dismissed it'.[187]

Ford's public reaction in 2006 was very different from the position he took in his 2010 autobiography. Ford accused the Republicans of attempting to 'launch an all-out assault with race being the organizing and consistent theme'.[188] He writes that the Call Me advert 'reminded people I was black', and he explicitly identifies it as playing on race.[189] The disparity in his reaction suggests that Ford deliberately

[185] Ford, quoted in 'GOP consultant cuts ties with Wal-Mart', *Washington Post*, 27 October 2006.
[186] Ford, quoted in 'I was there, Ford says of Playboy party', *Nashville Tennessean*, 25 October 2006.
[187] Interview with Jim Hester, 14 August 2013.
[188] Ford, 2010, 221.
[189] Ibid., 223.

avoided identifying the racial content of the advert for strategic reasons. Hester confirmed to me, 'I think it would have hurt him if he had tried to call it out as a racial thing. I think that has to do with Southern mentalities. You know, [for] the typical Southern white male, if you had an African American guy calling racism, they would just dismiss it as, there he goes'.[190] Remarkably, even though Ford refused even to identify the racial content of the advertisement, one white voter is quoted in a Nashville newspaper article complaining that Ford was 'claiming racism to distract people'.[191]

While this advertisement has received extensive attention in scholarly and journalistic accounts of the campaign, nearly all commentators have overlooked the reaction of the black community. For some African American voters, the idea that Ford slept with blonde women reinforced a suspicion, in spite of his efforts to the contrary, that he was not as rooted in the black community as he implied. Ford admitted in his memoirs that the advert 'hit at my dating habits'.[192] Sekou Franklin stated in our interview, 'some blacks didn't like Ford because he was known to date white women'.[193] An African American member of Ford's staff told me, 'It was like, "Ooh man. Somebody hit it"… For some [in the black community] it was like, "Oh yeah, he likes those white girls".'[194] Bobby White, who was Ford's district director in Memphis, agreed that the Call Me advertisement 'had a double effect', which 'for some [black] folk it smacked of some truth-telling'.[195] Sherman Greer, an African American who also worked in the Memphis office, agreed that some African Americans locally were not comfortable that Ford dated white women. Greer stated, 'when they put that ad out there, I think they were playing to catch black women'.[196] When I asked Ford's deputy campaign manager Nichole Francis, who is African American, if the advertisement was likely to have activated black discomfort with the idea of Ford dating white women, she replied, 'Not feeling comfortable? Mhm. There's truth to that. People were aware of that….You know, interracial dating is not as widely accepted [in Memphis] as it is in New York, LA, or larger cities'.[197] Another African American who worked for Ford told me, 'For African Americans, particularly African American women, it's like, Oh he's one of those guys – black guys – who likes white women, which is a very profound, strong dynamic tension within the African American community'.[198]

As Chapter 6 detailed, when Barack Obama faced charges of insufficient commitment to the black community, his campaign team ensured that his wife Michelle was featured on campaign leaflets. In

[190] Interview with Hester.
[191] 'Some web posters notice race, some don't, *Nashville Tennessean*, 27 October 2006.
[192] Ford, 2010, 223.
[193] Field notes, 14 August 2013 (Nashville, TN).
[194] HF9.
[195] Interview with White.
[196] Interview with Greer.
[197] Interview with Francis.
[198] HF17.


contrast, Ford's white girlfriend was not mentioned by the candidate or in public communications.[199] David Sutphen, who had known Ford since law school, stated to me, 'if Harold had been married with a little kid – married to a black woman – with a little baby in his arms the year he ran for Senate, I think he would have won'.[200] Another African American member of Ford's congressional staff agreed, 'Emily was with him at this time. His wife now. You know, sweet white lady. But here's the thing with that…that [charge of preferring white women] wouldn't have a stickiness if you had a Michelle Obama-type person on your arm, you know?'.[201] Additionally, Ford's upbringing at an expensive private school in Washington, DC meant that he already had a biographical distance from many black Memphians. His Memphis district director Bobby White suggested to me that while 'there are some raw skills that he had but quite frankly, and I'll say this to you…there's a kind of rhythm that you don't necessarily get going to St Albans in DC, right? [laughs]'.[202] The idea that Ford was not sufficiently socially rooted in the black community was particularly damaging because Ford was relying on a linked-fate appeal to motivate African American voters to turn out at record high levels.

Result

Ford narrowly lost, receiving 48.0 percent of the vote to Bob Corker's 50.7 percent. With the exception of Douglas Wilder's election in Virginia in 1989 and Barack Obama's victories in 2008 and 2012, Harold Ford's 2006 result was the best performance of a black Democrat in a major statewide general election in southern US history. Corker's campaign advisors generously supplied me with the internal Republican tracking poll data from the general election (Figure 8.19). The data show that the race was extremely close from the beginning of the general election at the end of August until polling day on 7th November. For much of the time, Ford held a small but steady lead over Corker.

[199] Interviews with Bone and White.
[200] Interview with Sutphen.
[201] HF9.
[202] Interview with White.

Figure 8.19. Corker campaign internal tracking poll data (14 September-7 November 2006)



Author's analysis of polling data, shown to author by Tom Ingram and Bob Womack. Points shown as final day on which polling data was collected.

Nordin strongly believes that white racism was the reason Ford lost the election. He argues that 'it was the winner's willingness to inject race into the campaign that definitively produced a profound effect on the election'.[203] In agreement with Nordin, Drew Westen argues that the Call Me advert was an extremely significant factor contributing in Ford's loss.[204] The first poll which indicated Corker was ahead of Ford was based on fieldwork conducted from 22nd-24th October. The 'Call Me' advert was first broadcast on the 20th October. Based on a survey of those who had voted early, 81 percent had seen the 'Call Me' advert. Among them, 23 percent said it had made them more likely to vote for Corker. 10 percent said it had made them more likely to vote for Ford.[205] Pete Brodnitz, however, warns against attributing too much power to the Call Me ad. Ford's internal polls reveal that by the end of the campaign the self-described undecided voters were disproportionately middle-aged to older, married, white, regular church attendees, and self-described moderate to conservative voters.[206] Therefore, those whom the Call Me advert 'influenced' were demographically expected to be more receptive to Republican messages anyway.

[203] Nordin, 2012, 113.
[204] Westen, 2007, Ch 10.
[205] David Waters, 'New numbers give Corker a solid 50-38 lead', *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, 5 November 2006.
[206] Brodnitz, 2006.

I argue that Ford's loss can be attributed partially to his failure to mobilise black voters successfully. The black community had developed a tradition of bloc voting since the Jim Crow period under E H Crump.[207] Consistent with this, Ford won 95 percent of the African American vote. The proportion of African Americans who turned out to vote was identical to the proportion in the 2004 presidential election. However, these turnout figures were below the goals set by the Ford campaign. The Ford campaign was attempting to achieve the same *number* (not *proportion*) of African American voters as had voted in the presidential election two years earlier. Jim Hester confirmed to me, 'Our goal was to reach that African American number – the Kerry number – and if we'd done that we would have won.[208] By calculating the proportion of blacks in the electorate and the share of black vote John Kerry received in 2004, I estimate that 288,054 African Americans voted for Kerry in Tennessee in 2004. With a lower overall turnout but voting in the same proportions, 226,461 blacks voted for Harold Ford in 2006. This difference of 61,593 black voters was larger than Bob Corker's statewide majority of 49,935 votes over Ford (see Table 8.2).

Table 8.2. Black voter participation in Tennessee, 2004 and 2006 comparison

	Total voters	Black voter proportion	Total black voters	Blacks voting Democrat	Total black votes for Democrat
2004 - President	2,434,949	13%	316,543	91%	288,054
2006 - Senate	1,833,693	13%	238,380	95%	226,461

Based on data from 2004 and 2006 CNN exit polls

In effect, there were two paths to victory which Ford narrowly missed (see Table 8.3). Had Ford increased his support among whites[209] from 41 percent to 43 percent, he would have won. However, Ford could have won the election purely by driving up black turnout by increasing black turnout from 13 percent of voters to 15.5 percent of voters. African Americans made up 16.7 percent of the state population; so, this target was not unreasonable. I suggest that Ford's segregated campaign strategy ultimately meant that the candidate performed strongly but inadequately among both racial groups.

Table 8.3. Alternative scenarios producing a Ford victory

	Black turnout	Ford black support	Non-black turnout	Ford non-black support	**FORD**	**CORKER**	Winner
2006 ACTUAL	13.0%	95.0%	87.0%	41.0%	48.0%	50.7%	Corker
Ford wins: black turnout	15.5%	95.0%	84.5%	41.0%	49.4%	49.3%	Ford
Ford wins: white votes	13.0%	95.0%	87.0%	43.0%	49.8%	48.9%	Ford

Constant: Minority party candidates receive 1.3% of the vote, Based on data from 2006 CNN exit poll

[207] Majors, 1986, Ch 6. Hamilton (1979) observed that, alongside their malevolent attributes, political machines could serve as a vehicle for mobilising and politicising working-class electorates. Beckett (2001) similarly suggests that many anti-machine electoral reforms were supported by rich and educated middle class elites to disempower working people.

[208] Interview with Hester.

[209] This figure includes the 2% of voters in Tennessee who identified as Latino or Asian.

Conclusion

In the early wave of scholarship on deracialisation, it was assumed that African American candidates could largely ignore black voters in their campaigns for statewide office. Ruth Strickland and Marcia Whicker, for example, believed that black voters would be loyal to the African American candidate in a biracial contest.[210] This assumption was problematic for two reasons. First, it was patronising to assume that black voters would vote entirely on the basis of racial symbolism, irrespective of candidates' policy positions. Second, it misunderstood that a key feature of winning elections in the United States is differential turnout. The strength of black voters is not only in their bloc voting for Democratic candidates but in their turnout potential relative to whites. When he served in Congress, Harold Ford Sr successfully cultivated black support such that in his final election for Congress, black turnout exceeded white turnout by more than ten percentage points. His son, however, was unable to achieve these levels of black turnout. If he had done so, he would have defeated Bob Corker.

In the white community, Ford lacked the institutional support from white liberals which Gantt, Braun, Obama, and Ellison enjoyed. Progressive, liberal, and social democratic politics have all historically been weaker in Tennessee. Even neighbouring North Carolina had a stronger repository of white liberal and left-leaning voters due to its stronger university and research base. As Marcus Pohlmann and Michael Kirby conclude in their study of racial politics in Memphis, 'unlike minority citizens in most other large United States cities, Memphis blacks simply have not had a reliable white liberal contingent with which to align in a long-term coalition'.[211] Outside of Memphis, liberal whites – both at the mass and elite level – were even sparser. Therefore, the coalition of white voters to whom Ford needed to appeal was more conservative – economically and racially – than any other set faced by a candidate in my sample, with the possible exception of Douglas Wilder. Given these constraints, Ford ran an impressive campaign, which earned the admiration of his opponents. Corker's campaign manager Tom Ingram confessed to me, 'I think if we had gone another week, I don't know if we would have survived because we spent everything we had. Harold was a really good candidate'.[212]

[210] Strickland & Whicker, 1992.
[211] Pohlmann & Kirby, 1996, 73.
[212] Interview with Ingram.

Chapter 9 - Cory Booker (New Jersey, 2013)

'He is African American, but he can walk in the shoes of others'
Booker for Senate video (Translated from Spanish)

***

Cory Booker is the only black mayor of an American city to be elected to major statewide office.[1] Booker's election to the US Senate in a by-election in October 2013 is a rare example of an African American politician moving directly from a 'traditional' site of black politics (mayor of a majority-black city) to electoral success in a majority-white context.[2] Some authors posit that office-holding in majority-black settings acts as an institutional constraint on the advancement of black politicians into higher-level offices, which tend to be majority-white.[3] The 'racialised' rhetoric, style, and policy agenda, which are seen to be necessary to win in the former setting, are believed to be off-putting to white voters in the latter setting. If black mayors are to have any success in statewide contests, one would expect that such candidates would need to adopt a radically different (deracialised) campaign strategy compared to their earlier political experience.

Contrary to these expectations, this case study argues that Cory Booker's mayoral and senatorial campaign strategies should be regarded as fundamentally continuous. Booker's willingness to pay tribute to the legacies of the civil rights movement and to take liberal policy stances on issues strongly associated with minorities (e.g., criminal justice reform) are violations of the deracialised campaign strategy. On the other hand, Booker's campaign strategy does not resemble either of the race-conscious strategies. Booker's campaign did not promote a symbolic or historic narrative associated with the symbolic-substantive campaign strategy (e.g., Barack Obama as a 'barrier breaker' in Chapter 6 or Keith Ellison as a 'history maker' in Chapter 7). Similarly, in violation of the crusade campaign strategy, Booker did not accuse his Republican opponent Steve Lonegan of racial unfairness in spite of Lonegan's repeated racialised attacks about Booker and about Newark, the predominantly black city of which Booker was mayor. During the campaign and in interviews, Booker's campaign staff described some of these attacks to me as racialised, but Booker studiously avoided identifying their racial content. Finally, there is no evidence that Booker made 'linked fate' appeals specifically to African American voters, ruling out a segregated campaign strategy.

[1] Other black mayors who were Democratic nominees for major statewide office (governor or US senator) include Tom Bradley (Los Angeles/Governor), Harvey Gantt (Charlotte/Senate), and Ron Kirk (Dallas/Senate).
[2] The by-election was caused by the death of 89-year-old Senator Frank Lautenberg in June 2013. Booker had already declared his interest in replacing Lautenberg, who was expected to retire when his term concluded at the end of 2014.
[3] E.g., Persons (2009), Johnson et al (2014)

Instead, I argue that Booker pursued a 'post-racial' campaign strategy. The 'post-racial' strategy promotes a 'colour-blind' ideology while including a willingness to acknowledge the importance of civil rights history and the reality of racial division. While the post-racial campaign sits alongside the deracialised campaign in my typology of 'colour-blind' approaches to racial campaign politics (see Chapter 2), the post-racial strategy differs from the deracialised strategy because 'post-racial' candidates do not purge the language of race from their campaigns. Instead, they speak about race openly but in the context of signalling their movement 'beyond' racial politics into a more 'unified' conception of politics. Throughout his political career, Booker consistently crafted himself as someone who stood in opposition to traditional 'racialised' black politicians, especially his mayoral predecessor Sharpe James. Unlike Douglas Wilder whose 'deracialised' strategy aimed to recast himself in the mould of the white centrist politicians who preceded him (see Chapter 3), Booker presented himself as a 'new' kind of African American politician who was an inheritor of the civil rights movement's accomplishments but personally 'transcended' racial differences.

In addition to the interview and archival sources described in the Appendices, this case study is unique in that I was able to engage in active participant-observation research for a portion of the campaign. In the month before the 2013 election, I spent a week with one of Booker's political aides (Daniel Pereira) who introduced me to Cory Booker and enabled me to shadow the then-mayor at campaign events in New Brunswick (an American football 'tailgate'), Princeton (meeting voters in shops, restaurants, and on the street), and Little Falls (a union rally). I also had an opportunity to observe and speak with staff at the campaign headquarters in Newark. Due to the intimate nature of an internal campaign setting, I have anonymised the comments from these aides.

Explanatory Variables: Context, Candidate, and Elites

Context: New Jersey

Nestled between New York City and Philadelphia, the state of New Jersey has been described as 'the slave of two cities'.[4] For statewide political candidates, New Jersey's lack of a unique media market makes for extremely wasteful political campaigns.[5] Instead, candidates are forced to buy advertisements on the New York and Philadelphia media markets, the first and fourth most expensive in the United States, where only one-third of viewers actually live in New Jersey.[6] It is, therefore, unsurprising that Cory Booker spent at least a week in California during the 64-day general election campaign raising


[4] Wilson, 1923, 56.
[5] Interview with Brad Lawrence, 25 February 2015.
[6] Salmore & Salmore, 2013, 86. See also Herb Jackson, 'As Political Campaigns Go, NJ is No Virginia', *Bergen Record*, 30 September 2013.

money to pay for television broadcasts. Television advertisements typically consume about 80% of the budget of New Jersey statewide campaigns.[7]

With the highest population density in the United States (1,200 people per square mile), New Jersey is the only state in which all of its counties are classified as 'urban' by the Census Bureau's Combined Statistical Area. However, in population terms, no single city dominates. Only 1 in 11 residents live in the state's six largest cities, misleading named 'the Big Six'.[8] The most populous county in New Jersey (Bergen) lacks a major city and is instead composed of seventy suburban townships. Cory Booker was brought up in one of Bergen County's suburbs.

Three in five New Jersey residents are white, but unlike in my other case studies, African Americans are not the largest minority group. Since the 2010 Census, there have been more Latino than African American residents. New Jersey also has the third highest proportion of Asian residents in the United States. Among religious groups, New Jersey has the second highest proportion of Catholics and the second highest proportion of Jews. Jews make up about 5.5% of the state's population and 7% of voters.[9] Catholics make up about half of the electorate. The Republican campaign highlighted their candidate's Catholic faith and publicised the support he received from Catholic voters on the campaign's official Twitter account (see Figure 9.1).[10]

Figure 9.1. Tweet from Lonegan for Senate campaign account



Source: @LoneganforNJ


Although by no means dominant as a population centre, New Jersey's largest city Newark merits special attention due to its important role in the state's racial history, in Cory Booker's political development,

[7] Ibid, 96.
[8] Newark, Jersey City, Paterson, Elizabeth, Trenton, and Camden (Laura Manserus, 'New Jersey's Cities: Sad Urban Presence Encircled by Wealth', *New York Times*, 26 September 1999).
[9] Seth Berkman, 'Cory Booker, Eyeing NJ Senate Run, Banks on Long and Deep Jewish Ties', *The Forward*, 6 June 2013.
[10] Booker is a Baptist, but he has also attended services with Jewish groups since his student days in Oxford.

and in the 2013 Senate campaign. Jonathan Wharton describes Newark as having 'long been considered one of the African American capitals of the United States'.[11] In the mid-twentieth century, the city was host to a number of key gatherings of the burgeoning black power movement. Newark has elected an African American mayor in twelve of the last twelve mayoral elections (i.e. every election since 1970), a US record. Booker's post-racial campaign strategy, I argue, was structured in part as a reaction to what he portrayed as Newark's old-fashioned, racialised politics.

Situated along the Passaic River in northern New Jersey, Newark is a twenty minute journey by train from midtown Manhattan, to which it has been described as a 'rough cousin'.[12] Geographically, the inhabited city is shaped like a cross (see Figure 9.2) with the downtown district located in the 'Central' ward, and four wards which emanate from it, eponymously labelled the North, East, South, and West wards. Three of the city's wards – the Central, South, and West wards – are predominantly African American, whereas Hispanics form the majority in the North and East wards. According to Claudia Granados, Cory Booker's liaison with the trade unions, 'the wards are very [racially] segregated…I use the word racial because I think everything [here] is seen under that lens: whether it's a new construction project, whether it's a new school that comes in. No matter what it is, there's always a racial component to it'.[13]

Figure 9.2. Black population distribution in Newark (2000)




Source: Minnesota Population Center, University of Minnesota

[11] Wharton, 2013, 49.
[12] Xan Brooks, 'Wherever American cities are going, the battle will be won or lost in Newark, not New York', *The Guardian*, 18 November 2014.
[13] Interview with Claudia Granados, 21 February 2015.

Since the 1970 Census, Newark has been a majority-black city. In the 2010 Census, African Americans made up 52.6% of the city's population, while Hispanics composed one-third of residents. In spite of their majority status in the population, African Americans own only 23 percent of Newark's businesses.[14] As Figure 9.3 shows, the city's racial demography differs starkly from New Jersey's overall racial composition. In Booker's mayoral elections, whites were a small fraction of the electorate (11.6%), whereas when he ran for Senate they were nearly three-fifths of the statewide population (59.3%). On standard assumptions about racial campaign strategies, which often only emphasise the racial composition of a jurisdiction, these stark demographic differences would be expected to necessitate two intensely different racial campaign strategies. Yet, as I will show, the post-racial campaign strategy which Booker deployed during the Senate campaign bore strong continuities with his political approach as mayor of Newark.

Figure 9.3. Comparison of the racial demographics of New Jersey and Newark (2010)



Based on data from the 2010 US Census

In addition, Newark differs starkly from the rest of New Jersey on socio-economic measures. After adjusting for the local cost of living, nearly half of Newark residents live in poverty, and about 90 percent of children in Newark state schools qualify for free or reduced-fee school meals.[15] The 'owner-occupier' housing rate in New Jersey is 64.5%, while in Newark it is 23.8%. While 37% of New Jersey residents have at least an undergraduate degree, only 9% of Newark residents do.[16] In 2012, 30.6% of

[14] Gillespie, 2012a, Introduction.
[15] Noguera & Wells, 2011. See also Dale Russakoff, 'Schooled', *New Yorker*, 19 May 2014.
[16] 2010 US Census.

Newark residents lack secondary school qualifications compared to 11.7% of the state overall.[17] Xan Brooks described Newark as an 'industrial city marooned in the post-industrial era'.[18]

In 1967 Newark was the site of one of the worst urban riots in US history. Known as the 'Rebellion' by some Newark residents, five days of civil unrest in July 1967 ended with 26 dead and over one-thousand people injured.[19] Twenty of those who were killed were African Americans gunned down by the police and the New Jersey national guard. The origins of the riots can be traced to a combination of economic decline, the demolition of a stable predominantly black housing estate in the Central Ward to make way for a medical university,[20] the denial of important city positions to African Americans,[21] and antagonistic tactics by the predominantly white police force, culminating in the beating of a black man by local police on the day that the riots began.[22]


More than any other event, the riots have shaped the social makeup of the city and its political identity. Jeffrey Kraus rightly calls it the 'defining moment' of the city's recent history.[23] Former city councillor Mamie Bridgeforth, who lived in Newark during the rebellion, explained in our interview, 'It holds a symbolic impact on the city because it was the watershed event that took the African American and Hispanic population, if you will, from being oppressed to being actively involved not only in the power structure in the city of Newark but the power structure in the state of New Jersey'.[24] Modia Butler, Cory Booker's chief of staff, explained that the riots 'framed the way folks thought about representation and thought about how you campaign, how you govern, [and] how you develop a city'.[25] The riots also signalled the end of white leadership in the city. The following spring, eight days before his murder in Memphis, Martin Luther King visited Newark and declared that the city needed a black mayor.[26] James Haskins asserts that the riots increased blacks' determination about the need to elect black officials to government, spurring the first Black and Puerto Rican Convention in 1969.[27] In 1970, the first mayoral election following the riots, Kenneth Gibson was elected the first black mayor of Newark.[28]

After the riots, the city's population shrunk from 405,220 in the 1960 Census to a low of 272,665 in the 2000 Census, before stabilising by the 2010 Census. As Figure 9.4 shows, the decline of the city's white inhabitants was particularly stark: from 265,889 whites in 1960 to only 32,122 white residents in 2010,

[17] American Community Survey, US Census Bureau, 2012.
[18] Xan Brooks, 'Wherever American cities are going, the battle will be won or lost in Newark, not New York', *The Guardian*, 18 November 2014.
[19] Kraus, 2004, 2.
[20] See Newman (2004), Williams (2014: Ch 7).
[21] Interview with Mamie Bridgeforth, 27 February 2015.
[22] See Porambo (1971).
[23] Kraus, 2004, 2.
[24] Interview with Bridgeforth.
[25] Interview with Modia Butler, 26 February 2015.
[26] Woodward, 1997, 26.
[27] Haskins, 1972, 146.
[28] Gibson was the third black mayor ever elected in a non-southern city. He was preceded by Carl Stokes in Cleveland, OH (1968-71) and Richard Hatcher in Gary, IN (1968-87).

an 87.9% decline. This sense of departure and abandonment left many Newark residents sceptical of outsiders. One Newark city councillor described to me that Newark had 'every reason to be' suspicious of outsiders because they 'felt that whites for instance have abandoned the city not just due to the rebellion… [but also] basically raping the city, taking the spoils back to the suburbs'.[29] One of Booker's senior political consultants explained to me, 'There's a real identity…whether you would share the Newark experience, which they viewed in many ways as a negative experience, but there was a bond in having shared that negative experience *in Newark*. Having had the riots, survived the riots, the decline of the city…that was sort of a bonding thing in a way'.[30]

Figure 9.4. Racial characteristics of Newark residents, 1910-2010



Based on data from the US Census Bureau


Newark has continually been besmirched by whites who live outside of the city. Typical of this posture, a journalist who lived in a white suburb near Newark wrote in a 2008 *Esquire* piece, 'I leave Newark and feel nothing except happy that I don't live there…Everybody with the means to flee fled long ago…[It] is a town known only for murder, blight, and feckless negritude'.[31] It is essential to recognise that Newark residents' identity is bound in a collective experience of struggle and endurance against the poor odds set for them by outsiders. Sharpe James, who preceded Booker as mayor of Newark from 1986 until 2006, captured these sentiments when he told a gathering in the majority-black West ward, 'The people who left Newark could never believe we'd still be here'.[32] James wrote in a 2005 letter

[29] CB14.
[30] CB6.
[31] Scott Raab, 'The Battle of Newark', *Esquire*, July 2008.
[32] Sharpe James, quoted in 'A Mayor Runs on His Record', *New York Times*, 5 May 2002.

which I found in his papers at the New Jersey Historical Society, 'when you ridicule the city, you are making fun of the many families who have successfully raised their children and grandchildren in this city…We have climbed the rough side of the mountain'.[33] In contrast, when Cory Booker spoke to national audiences on television about Newark's difficulties, Robert Curvin writes that his 'constant harping about the negatives of the city…offended Newark residents'.[34]

In the 2013 Senate election, Cory Booker's Republican opponent Steve Lonegan regularly used the problems facing Newark as a way of criticising Booker. Many of Lonegan's advertisements directly used Newark as a foil with the rest of the state (see Figure 9.5), not unlike Bob Corker's portrayal of Memphis discussed in Chapter 8. Describing himself as a 'suburban mayor' in his advertisements, Lonegan's communications strategy drew from strongly racial urban-suburban dynamics. Booker's senior strategist Brad Lawrence summed up Lonegan's message as 'Newark is a lousy place; you're the mayor of this lousy place'. Lawrence added, 'most people in Jersey do not look favourably on the city of Newark…[and] part of the reason probably a lot of people in New Jersey don't like Newark is because it's where a lot of people of colour live'.[35] Lonegan's language about Newark was unremittingly harsh. For example, during a debate, Booker remarked on cranes in his city, but Lonegan retorted, 'The only birds in Newark are the vultures…picking away at the carcasses of the taxpayers'.[36]

Figure 9.5. Racialised Motifs in Lonegan's Radio/Television Advertisements



N=18 radio and television advertisements, Source: Kanter Archive, University of Oklahoma

In 1969, Paul Friesema accurately predicted that white flight and de-industrialisation would have several harmful consequences for new black-dominated cities. First, the traditional revenue source of American local government (property tax) would become even more inadequate in meeting cities' needs

[33] Letter from Sharpe James to Joan Whitlow, 12 April 2005 (Sharpe James Vertical File, New Jersey Historical Society).
[34] Curvin, 2014, 260.
[35] Interview with Lawrence.
[36] 'Cranes versus Vultures', *North Jersey Observer*, 9 October 2013. Lonegan's official campaign similarly tweeted, 'The only birds in Newark are vultures picking the pockets of taxpayers' (Tweet: @LoneganforNJ, 10 October 2013).

as the property tax base departed while the number of residents dependent on public services would be likely to grow. Friesema predicted that other sources of funding – state and federal governments – would become less inclined to provide funds to aid cities due to changed demographic and political composition.[37] White legislators would be less likely to represent urban constituencies and/or their constituents would grow less sympathetic to urban plight when they came to associate urban dwelling with being black. Similarly, whites in the nearby suburbs would be acutely aware of differential resources and demands, and would, therefore, be less likely to engage in cooperative metropolitan projects which hitherto would have been of mutual benefit for cities and their surrounding communities. Overall, Friesema predicted a loss of internal self-rule in black cities, with black mayors sitting in visible public positions but without the resources necessary for substantially altering their constituents' lives. Phillip Thompson, who worked for Newark mayor Kenneth Gibson, recalls the mayor telling him in 1983 that under these structural constraints, 'progress is maintaining the status quo'.[38] Although Friesema believed that 'status rewards seem probable', with blacks gaining some psychic and symbolic benefits from electing one of their own to power, Friesema believed that from the perspective of many whites, it would be a 'cheap price that comfortable people pay to maintain a clear racial hierarchy'.[39]

Consistent with Friesema's 'hollow prize' theory, Steve Lonegan promoted the theme that undeserving residents in Newark were unfairly taking the tax revenues earned by hard-working New Jerseyans in the suburbs.[40] For example, three-quarters of Newark's billion-dollar annual schools budget came from state sources rather than city funds.[41] At a debate with Booker in October 2013, Lonegan lamented that New Jersey residents' 'tax money gets poured into that big, black hole of Newark'.[42] While many interpreted the description of Newark as a '*black* hole' as being a racial double entendre, a *Wall Street Journal* report indicates that Booker 'declined to say after the forum if he thought the comment was racist'.[43] The theme of squandered taxes featured two-thirds of Lonegan's advertisements. Newark was cited specifically as a place of profligate public spending. For example, in one of Lonegan's radio advertisements, the narrator complains that 'our tax dollars' pay for nearly all of Newark's budget. One of Lonegan's television advertisements bemoaned that 'nearly all of Newark's budget and agencies are funded by our tax dollars' (Figure 9.6). The advertisement did not indicate to whom 'our' refers, but I

[37] See also Caraley (1996).
[38] Gibson, quoted in Thompson (2006: 4).
[39] Friesema, 1969, 78-79.
[40] An irony of Lonegan's position was that as mayor of Bogota, he requested $500,000 additional funds from the state of New Jersey to fill a town budget shortfall. The aid received constituted 3.5% of his city's budget (David Giambusso, 'Steve Lonegan received state bailout as mayor of Bogota', *Newark Star-Ledger*, 8 October 2013).
[41] Since the 1985 New Jersey state supreme court decision in *Abbott v Burke* (and successor decisions), the state of New Jersey has been required to ensure at least equal per-pupil spending across school districts, resulting in a far more redistributive fiscal allocation of education funds across the state than in many other parts of the United States. For detailed discussion, see Yaffe (2007).
[42] Lonegan, quoted in *Burlington County Times*, 'Candidate Clash', 11 October 2013.
[43] 'Booker, Lonegan Spar at Last Debate', *Wall Street Journal*, 10 October 2013.

contend it is reasonable to view ‘our’ as a largely white categorisation, in contrast to the predominantly black city.

Figure 9.6. Lonegan television advertisement: ‘Corrupt Liberal Mayor’



Source: Kanter Archive, Political Communications Center, University of Oklahoma

In spite of being an overwhelmingly Democratic city from which he could hope to gain little support, 13.3% of Lonegan’s public events were held in Newark.[44] I propose that Lonegan’s appearances were not targeted to voters in Newark but were publicity stunts intended to discredit the city (and by connection Booker) in the eyes of suburban whites. As Herb Jackson of the *Bergen Record* observed, Lonegan’s ‘numerous conferences in Newark [aimed] to highlight crime, especially murder, in the city’.[45] In his campaign advertisements, Lonegan promoted apocalyptic images of city violence. Half of all of Lonegan’s advertisements mentioned crime. For example, several radio advertisements warned of ‘murder and violent crime out of control’ in Newark. Lonegan tweeted that Booker had not quelled ‘rampant crime in Newark’.[46] One of Lonegan’s television advertisements depicted a silhouette of an armed robbery in Newark, with Booker mockingly portrayed as a corrupt king (Figure 9.7). A radio advert said, ‘his city is falling apart: a murder epidemic of ten killings in ten days, skyrocketing taxes, expensive failing schools, and 14% unemployment…Don’t let Cory Booker do to America what he’s already done to Newark’. At a debate, Lonegan claimed that people could not swim in the Passaic River ‘because of the bodies floating around from the shooting victims in your city’.[47] While Booker chastised

[44] Based on analysis of 30 public events which Lonegan advertised on his personal and campaign Twitter accounts during the general election.
[45] Herb Jackson, ‘America Can Be Great for Every American’, *Bergen Record*, 17 October 2013.
[46] Tweet: @Lonegan, 2 September 2013.
[47] Lonegan, quoted in ‘Smooth Going on River’, *West Paterson Herald News*, 13 October 2013.

Lonegan for the 'insulting' comment, he did not call it racist, instead stating, 'We're one state with one destiny', a central theme of the 'post-racial' campaign strategy.[48]

Figure 9.7. Lonegan television advertisement: 'King Cory'



Source: Kanter Archive, Political Communications Center, University of Oklahoma

Candidate: Cory Booker

Cory Booker was born two years after the Newark riots and raised twenty miles away in Harrington Park, an affluent Bergen County suburb where the Bookers were the only African American family. Booker's parents both worked for IBM, and his father was a company executive.[49] Due to illegal, discriminatory practices by estate agents, the Bookers were only able to move to Harrington Park from their home in Washington, DC after the intervention of the Fair Housing Council in 1971.[50] Booker attended local state schools and graduated from his local comprehensive Northern Valley Regional High School in 1987.[51] In his memoirs, Booker reflects that he 'felt at home in New Jersey's predominantly white, more affluent suburbs'.[52] After high school, Booker attended Stanford, Oxford, and Yale, where he received degrees in politics, sociology, history, and law.[53] While at Oxford, Booker studied history at the Queen's College as a Rhodes Scholar.[54]

[48] Booker, quoted in 'Senate debate at Rowan is anything but collegial', *Newark Star-Ledger*, 10 October 2013.
[49] 'Complicating the Race', *New York Times Magazine*, 28 April 2002.
[50] Booker, 2016, Ch 1.
[51] Jay Levin, 'Cary Booker, 76, Father of Senate Candidate', *West Paterson Herald News*, 11 October 2013.
[52] Booker, 2016, 48.
[53] Booker earned a BA in Political Science from Stanford in 1991, a Masters in Sociology in 1992 from Stanford, a BA in History from Oxford in 1994, and a JD from Yale in 1997. ('Cory Booker Councilman Central Ward: Biography', City Clerk Division, Department Box 0402, Newark City Archives).
[54] Grayson, 2010.

In 1996, Booker moved to Newark while still a law student at Yale University. Living in a block of flats intended for low-income residents, Booker was paid by a Skadden fellowship to establish the Low-Income Tenants Council, which was a legal clinic 'franchise' of the Urban Justice Center.[55] He graduated from Yale the following year. Booker's move was motivated by a middle-class desire to help working-class residents improve their condition. Booker explained his decision to relocate to Newark in a 2008 interview, 'All my life I've fantasized about fighting the good fight…[L]et me move to the worst [street] I can find and just *be there*, a young lawyer. Be there. For the people'.[56]

In spite of his intentions, I agree with Jonathan Wharton that Booker's do-gooding, 'slumming it' approach was by no means universally welcomed by the people on whose behalf Booker sought to fight 'the good fight'.[57] This gesture was viewed as patronising by many residents. Journalist Andrew Jacobs remarked, 'Many seem to take offence at his decision to move into Brick Towers', the block of low-income flats where he lived.[58] It only furthered suspicions that he was 'an inauthentic, overeducated interloper'.[59] Jermaine James, who was born and brought up in Newark, explained to me, 'Back then… you were trying to get out of Newark. You weren't trying to come here. So you got to understand that people already had suspicions of, Why are you here? [laughs]'.[60]


In addition, Booker's arrival seemed like a challenge to the local power which residents had fought to secure. A focus group respondent in the West ward explained to Andra Gillespie her resentment about Booker's pitch, 'Being able to determine our own destiny is an important thing we've been fighting [for] years and…to come from outside and try to tell us what's best for us, I think it's a slap in the face'.[61] Tom Hayden, an historian of Newark, has written critically of university students and graduates (e.g., Students for a Democratic Society) who have 'descended' on Newark since the 1960s 'taking vows of poverty (except on some weekend lapses in the Village)' with misguided attempts to draw residents out of what Hayden views as their 'well-deserved cynicism'.[62]

According to Booker, he was encouraged by the tenants of Brick Towers to stand for city council; however, Newark historian Robert Curvin recalled to me that Booker met with him and local leaders in 1997 and 'said he would run for mayor, but people in the meeting encouraged him to run for council

[55] 'Cory Booker is on a Mission', *Yale Law Report*, Summer 2008, 38. See also Dale Russakoff, 'Schooled', *New Yorker*, 19 May 2014.
[56] Booker, quoted in 'The Battle of Newark', *Esquire*, July 2008.
[57] Wharton, 2013, Ch 3.
[58] Andrew Jacobs, 'A Political Neophyte in Newark Challenges a Shrewd Incumbent', *New York Times*, 29 March 2002.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Interview with Jermaine James, 27 February 2015. Another Newark native put the point to me more bluntly. She suggested that many Newarkers were fearful that Booker was being used by 'the powers that be' to hand the city over to developers who 'were not willing, as people said behind closed doors, to let these niggers continue to have Newark' (CB11).
[61] Quoted in Gillespie (2012: 81).
[62] Hayden, 2014, xiv.

instead'.[63] Booker decided to challenge incumbent councillor George 'Buddy Gee' Branch for the Central ward seat on Newark City Council in 1998 (see Figure 9.8).[64] Branch was described to me by a former councillor as a 'kind of a home-town country guy who didn't appear to be very bright but he was highly visible and he loved the people'.[65] During the election, Branch described Booker as 'an outsider who was controlled by whites who had abandoned the city in its time of need'.[66] Booker narrowly defeated Branch in a 'bitter' run-off election and became the youngest councillor in the city's modern history.[67] Curvin argued that Booker won the seat (narrowly) due to the power of the (white) political boss Steve Adubato who 'poured all of his troops behind Booker' in the run-off against Branch.[68] Curvin maintained that the Booker-Adubato relationship was 'the most critical factor in building a path for Booker's future victories'.[69]

Figure 9.8. George Branch and Cory Booker Central ward municipal election leaflets, 1998



Source: Newark Public Library (left), New Jersey Historical Society (right)

During his four years on the council, Booker endeavoured to highlight the plight of his constituents, staging hunger strikes and camping on street corners in an effort to attract police resources and public attention to drug dealing and violent crime.[70] Booker's efforts gained the attention of *Time* magazine and the television programme '60 Minutes', unusually high-profile coverage for a city councillor. As

[63] Field notes, 27 February 2015 (Newark, NJ).
[64] 'Booker's Challenge', *Newark Star-Ledger*, 7 April 2002.
[65] CB11
[66] Ronald Smothers, 'A Newcomer is the winner in Newark's Runoff Election', *New York Times*, 10 June 1998.
[67] Jesse Drucker & George Jordan, 'Booker wins in Newark Upset', *Newark Star-Ledger*, 10 June 1998.
[68] Curvin, 2014, 221.
[69] Ibid., 222.
[70] Dale Rusakoff, 'Schooled', *New Yorker*, 19 May 2014.

he approached the end of his term on the council, on 8 January 2002, Cory Booker announced his intention to challenge Sharpe James for the mayoralty of the city.[71]

The Oscar-nominated film *Street Fight*, directed by Brooklyn-based filmmaker Marshall Curry, propelled Booker to national celebrity. An account of the 2002 mayoral election, the film portrayed Booker as the plucky outsider who aimed to eject James who was portrayed, in the words of one journalist, as 'an old-school ghetto despot…who bled the city dry for thirty odd years'.[72] Robert Curvin, a strong critic of the film, argues that it set up an image of 'a contest between a choirboy (Booker) and a clubhouse brute (James)', neither of which were fully accurate depictions.[73] Furthermore, the film lacked contextualisation of Newark's politics and of urban electoral politics more generally. Newark historian Clement Price explained that the city's elections had historically been raucous. He lamented that journalists from outside of Newark misinterpreted standard practices of urban electioneering as evidence of a city 'on the verge of political implosion, and it's just not the case. We're just having a race'.[74] The film, I argue, was one of the first of Booker's many appeals to whites to present himself as a 'post-racial', new generation black leader. This strategy depended on a rejection of old, 'racialised' black politics, which was portrayed as abrasive, corrupt, and myopic. Booker was involved in the film's production from its earliest days. Curry admitted to me that he met Booker at 'a cocktail party fundraiser hosted by [Curry's] brother' and the two agreed to make the film.[75]

Booker lost to James in 2002, but Booker was elected mayor after James's retirement in 2006 and was re-elected in 2010. Due to his upbringing and education as well as his 'visibly strained [attempts] to speak the local black vernacular', Kevin Mumford writes that Booker was 'enigmatic to many black Newarkers'.[76] In his mayoral campaigns, Booker sometimes campaigned with his parents and often made reference to their involvement in the civil rights movement. Booker's mother Carolyn served as president of the North Jersey Fair Housing Council, and Booker told voters, 'My parents were sitting at lunch counters. My parents were integrating schools'.[77] Through his parents' activism, Booker attempted to demonstrate the linkage between his life in white suburbia and the hardships which the poor and working-class African Americans of Newark had experienced.

However, I argue that these references tended to be lost on many African American voters. As Jonathan Wharton has observed, many Newarkers struggled to empathise with the Bookers' story of integrating

---

[71] Andrew Jacobs, 'Rising Star in Newark Starts Mayoral Run Against Sharpe James', *New York Times*, 9 January 2002.
[72] Scott Raab, 'The Battle of Newark', *Esquire*, July 2008. Independently of this article, one of my interviewees who had worked for Cory Booker (CB13) described Sharpe James to me as 'essentially a political despot'.
[73] Curvin, 2014, 222.
[74] Quoted in 'Newark Relives Day of Machine in Mayor's Race', *New York Times*, 9 April 2002.
[75] Field notes, 26 February 2015 (Brooklyn, NY).
[76] Mumford, 2007, 220.
[77] Cory Booker, quoted in Seth Mnookin, 'The New Natural', *New York Magazine*, March 2002.

white communities and schools.[78] I suggest there are two major reasons for this. First, most of the residents of Newark had never lived in majority-white communities, and therefore virtually none shared the Bookers' experience of being the only African American family in a town or school district.[79] Additionally, many Newarkers viewed the middle-classes who had relocated from Newark to the suburbs with antipathy, believing them to have abandoned the city in its time of need.[80] Booker's implicit argument that moving to the majority-white suburbs was a sign of black success and advancement ran contrary to Newarkers' identity

For whites, however, these appeals signalled that Booker was a product of the 'good' civil rights movement, one which levelled the legal playing field but which did not make more radical demands about the need to redistribute power and wealth to communities of colour. As Desmond King and Rogers Smith have noted, America's 'colour-blind' coalition does not reject the civil rights movement.[81] Indeed, they claim to be its inheritors. The colour-blind coalition holds that the goals of the civil rights movement were to move away from race-based claims to a universal conception of politics. For these reasons, Booker sat comfortably within the colour-blind coalition.

Elites: Party Bosses, National Donors, Black Insurgents, Steve Lonegan

Party Bosses

New Jersey has traditionally had strong local political organisations but weak statewide politics.[82] As previously stated, the media consumed by its citizens on television, in newspapers, and by radio are largely based out of New York or Philadelphia.[83] The media landscape makes it difficult for politicians with genuine statewide appeal to emerge, thus increasing new statewide candidates' dependence on local party infrastructure to mobilise supporters. Compounding these difficulties, New Jersey is an extremely fragmented state, with 565 municipalities and 21 counties all with their own systems of local governance.[84] One commentator described New Jersey local politics as consisting of 'municipalities the size of…[a] living room'.[85] Mayors and county executives have historically played important roles because there are substantial 'patronage payoffs' associated with these jobs.[86] For decades, they were the gatekeepers to holding office. In 1910, a Hudson County political boss joked of gubernatorial

[78] Wharton, 2013, 74.
[79] One of Booker's senior staff stated to me that many residents rarely left the city and, therefore, had few experiential reference points beyond Newark's racial dynamics. He stated, 'people are born and raised here. They don't leave here for the most part. I mean, you look out the window, you see Manhattan. Very many people here don't go to Manhattan. They don't go to Jersey City!' (CB8).
[80] Interview with Rice.
[81] King & Smith, 2014.
[82] Salmore & Salmore, 2013.
[83] New Jersey is one of two states (the other being Delaware) which does not have its own broadcast media market.
[84] The smallest fully incorporated municipality in New Jersey has three households. In the 2010 Census, it had a population of five.
[85] Karcher, 1998, 17.
[86] Salmore & Salmore, 2013, 60.

candidate Woodrow Wilson, 'How the hell do I know whether he'll make a good governor? He will make a good candidate, and that is the only thing that interests me'.[87] Civil service reform, the retrenchment of public sector employment, and the increasingly important role of primaries have shifted campaigns to be more candidate-centred.

In spite of these structural changes, party stalwarts still hold considerable sway, especially through executive offices (governor, county executive, mayor). One of Booker's mayoral staff explained to me as she gave me a tour of Newark City Hall that 'nearly all of the jobs, including the reception desk attendant, were political patronage'.[88] A union leader informed me that when he fell afoul of Sharpe James for supporting Booker in 2002, 'those who were associated with [the union leader], including family members who held city jobs, were fired'.[89] According to Booker, when he first announced his intention to stand against James, the governor tried to persuade him against standing, instead proposing, 'The county bosses will give you the line for Essex County Executive'.[90]

All of my interviewees agreed that Newark is a 'politicised' city, with an unusually vibrant political culture. Kathe Newman describes the city as 'awash' with community organisations which are in the control of local political elites.[91] Because of the local population's disproportionate employment in the public sector, the people who occupy patronage-dispensing positions wield substantial power over voters.[92] At the start of the twentieth-first century, the city payroll had close to 4,000 employees and more were employed in county, state, and federal public sector jobs.[93] As Modia Butler, Booker's chief of staff, described to me, '[Elections are] like when two UFC [Ultimate Fighting Championship] street fighters get in the ring because people are literally fighting for their lives. I mean, you know, they're knocking on doors because their livelihood may depend upon it. And that's how it is. So the stakes are really high when you have an election in Newark'.[94] Claudia Granados, who coordinated labour relations in the Booker administration, confirmed that elections are 'really a means to gain employment, frankly'.[95]

Given that the city is overwhelmingly Democratic and therefore lacks inter-party competition, Newark's political machines are ethnically organised. The political director of the New Jersey NAAPC explained to me, 'if you look at the quote-unquote ward bosses, it's really based upon ethnic and racial dynamics'.[96] Unusually for a black mayor, Booker largely shunned African American political bosses,

[87] Bob 'Little Boss' Davis, quoted in Chance (2005: 52).
[88] Field notes, 21 February 2015 (Newark, NJ).
[89] Field notes, 27 February 2015 (Newark, NJ).
[90] Booker, quoted in 'The Battle of Newark', *Esquire*, July 2008.
[91] Newman, 2004, 45.
[92] Interview with Granados.
[93] Ibid.
[94] Interview with Butler.
[95] Interview with Granados.
[96] Interview with Walter Fields, 23 February 2015.

instead forming ties with bosses in the predominantly Latino North and East wards.[97] In the East ward, Booker aligned himself with Pablo Fonseca, a major political figure in local Hispanic politics who directed the Newark group CHISPA (Concerned Hispanics In Search of Progress and Advancement).[98] Booker's most crucial supporter was North ward boss Steve Adubato, whom Robert Curvin describes as 'one of New Jersey's most powerful' party bosses.[99] A *Newark Star-Ledger* article described Adubato as having 'dominance over political patronage in Essex County'.[100] A voice for North ward Italians since the 1970s, Adubato had worked in coalition with black leaders starting with the Gibson mayoralty, but he was fundamentally interested in preserving his own control in the North ward, which over Adubato's lifetime moved from being predominantly Italian to predominantly Hispanic.[101] Adubato's influence extended beyond the North ward into the predominantly black Central ward and across Essex County, in which Newark is located. Modia Butler, Booker's chief of staff, agreed that Adubato is 'probably the shrewdest politician [sic] in the state of New Jersey…He produces reliable pluralities for whoever he backs'.[102]

During the 2013 Senate campaign, I found in my fieldwork that Booker's political operatives believed it was important for Booker to have good relations with city and county bosses across the state.[103] A member of Booker's campaign team informed me that much of his job involved ensuring that Booker 'maintains good relations with the 500+ Democratic politicians in New Jersey'. [104] This work involved organising meetings between Booker's political staff and each of the twenty-one Democratic Party chairs during the general election. While in the Newark headquarters, one of the jobs I was tasked with doing was looking up the addresses of all of the Democratic candidates in New Jersey who were standing for election so that they could be contacted by Booker.[105]

National Donor Networks

Booker, however, was by no means entirely dependent on the party bosses. Booker was advantaged both by his popular reputation throughout the state and by his connection to a network of wealthy donors across the country. Through the film *Street Fight*, high-profile media appearances,[106] and social

[97] Curvin, 2014, Ch 8.
[98] CB4, CB8.
[99] Curvin, 2014, 13.
[100] George Jordan, 'Squabbles herald Newark mayoral race', *Newark Star-Ledger*, 20 April 1997.
[101] Adubato reportedly stated that he was determined not to allow the black leadership of the city to 'Africanize' the North ward (Williams, 2014: 302).
[102] Interview with Butler.
[103] Field notes, 15 September 2013 (Newark, NJ).
[104] Ibid.
[105] Ibid.
[106] For example, Booker engaged in a spat with *The Late Night* host Conan O'Brien who insulted Newark on his programme. Booker made a video in praise of his city, which O'Brien showed on the popular programme and invited Booker as guest to speak about the city. A Booker aide informed me, 'This gave CB a lot of attention' (Field notes, 14 September 2014).

media,[107] Booker had cultivated a high level of familiarity which is famously difficult for New Jersey statewide candidates. According to Patrick Murray, director of polling at Monmouth University, Booker 'had name recognition that no other New Jersey politician had'.[108] In my participant-observation research, I was struck by how easily people recognised Booker, even when he campaigned outside of Newark. At an American football 'tailgate' in central New Jersey, I noted that Booker did not have any signs indicating who he was yet '[a]lmost all of the tailgaters knew'. Booker's aide informed me, 'CB does not need these markers (incl[uding] balloons, leaflets, signs, chum [trinkets])'.[109] At another event in Princeton, I observed that residents walking past on the street asked to take their photos with Booker, while none asked to have a photo with their member of Congress who had represented the district for fourteen years. I wrote, 'a crowd of passers-by soon gather. CB is taking photos with lots of people. [Congressman] Holt is in some [photos] but most people do not seem to know who he is and ignore him'.[110]

Because of Booker's high profile, he was able to draw on the support of wealthy elites across the country. Many of these connections were formed over the years while Booker was mayor, as he cultivated support outside of the traditional base of the black community. While mayor of Newark, Booker persuaded Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg to donate $100 million to help fund the city's schools.[111] In the second half of my week in New Jersey, Booker was in California raising money for the campaign in Silicon Valley, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. I observed his staff use the campaign's proprietary databases, as well as public websites, to create profiles of potential donors whom he was likely to meet at each fundraiser. These profiles were sent to Booker with a list of topics 'so he knows what to talk to them about (e.g., someone asked if CB was an Eagle Scout)'.[112]

Some commentators, such as Georgia Persons, have described majority-black office holding as 'a politics of low resources', with black politicians bounded by the opportunities and restrictions of a relatively small and spatially concentrated black support base in economically badly off constituencies.[113] Such dynamics are perceived to limit the resource pool for candidates who need to substantial sums to run for statewide office.[114] Such problems were not apparent for Booker. Booker spent the years prior to his Senate candidacy raising money both around New Jersey and across the country. Booker formed his federal political action committee CoryPAC in 2011.[115] According to one

[107] Booker had 1.4 million followers on Twitter at the time of his election, the most of any politician who had not run for president.
[108] Patrick Murray, quoted in 'Cory Booker stumbles to finish line', *MSNBC*, 13 October 2013.
[109] Field notes, 14 September 2013 (New Brunswick, NJ).
[110] Field notes, 14 September 2013 (Princeton, NJ).
[111] Dale Russakoff, 'Schooled', *New Yorker*, 19 May 2014.
[112] Field notes, 17 September 2013 (Newark, NJ).
[113] Persons, 2009, ix.
[114] See Johnson et al (2014).
[115] Gillespie, 2013.

of Booker's mayoral staff, Booker had 'checked out' by 2012 and spent much of his time preparing for statewide office.[116] Jonathan Wharton agreed in his 2013 book that it was 'increasingly clear' by late 2012 that Booker was not interested in re-standing for mayor.[117]

Although a Baptist, Booker drew substantial support from the Jewish community, with whom he had strong ties since his days as the student leader of the Chabad Society in Oxford. In 2010, Booker was the keynote speaker at the American Israeli Political Action Committee (AIPAC) national summit.[118] In April 2013, the North Jersey Political Action Committee (NORPAC), organised by prominent Jewish leaders in northern New Jersey, held a fundraiser for Booker which collected over $100,000. The Jewish newspaper *The Forward* reported that in the spring of 2013 Booker raised nearly $2 million 'courting Jewish donors across party lines'.[119]

Booker's Senate financial disclosure report gives some insight into the national connections the candidate cultivated during this period. Federal law required Booker to report all earned non-investment income for the period from February 2012 until April 2013. During these fourteen months, Booker made 25 visits to give paid speeches in sixteen different states, amounting to nearly half a million dollars of personal income (Table 9.1). While these speeches were not themselves fundraisers for his campaign, it is not unreasonable to conclude that some of these visits would have coincided with campaign fundraising activities. At the very least, they show a candidate with national stature and connections well outside of Newark city politics or even New Jersey party politics.

Table 9.1. Booker's Travel for Paid Speeches (February 2012-April 2013)

Source	Date	Address	Amount	Source	Date	Address	Amount
NYU Stern School of Business	Feb-12	NY - New York	$10,500	Wilkes University	Oct-12	PA - Wilkes-Barre	$15,400
University of Chicago	Feb-12	IL - Chicago	$14,000	Northwestern University	Oct-12	IL - Evanston	$19,250
Universal McCann	Feb-12	WY - Teton Village	$24,500	Bridges	Oct-12	TN - Memphis	$17,500
Hofstra University	Feb-12	NY - Hempstead	$17,500	US Green Building Council	Nov-12	CA - San Francisco	$24,500
Association of Perioperative Nurses	Feb-12	LA - New Orleans	$17,500	Jewish Federation of Los Angeles	Dec-12	CA - Los Angeles	$31,500
George Washington University	Mar-12	DC - Washington	$15,400	Southwest Michigan First	Jan-13	MI - Kalamazoo	$17,360
Jackson State University	Apr-12	MS - Jackson	$17,500	West Virginia University	Feb-13	WV - Morganville	$17,500
Ohio State University	May-12	OH - Columbus	$21,000	NYU Stern School of Business	Feb-13	NY - New York	$10,500
Jewish United Fund	Jun-12	IL - Highland Park	$21,000	United Way of Greater Los Angeles	Feb-13	CA - Los Angeles	$28,000
Jane Street Capital	Aug-12	NY - New York	$17,500	University of Mount Union	Mar-13	OH - Alliance	$21,000
NYU Stern School of Business	Aug-12	NY - New York	$17,500	Equality Virginia	Apr-13	VA - Richmond	$27,500
Commmunity College of Baltimore	Sep-12	MD - Baltimore	$17,500	Salem University	Apr-13	MA - Lynn	$24,500
Plymouth Housing Group	Sep-12	WA - Seattle	$24,500			**Total:**	**$490,410**

Source: Public Financial Disclosure, Secretary of the United States Senate

[116] Field notes, 21 February 2015 (Newark, NJ). There is other evidence that Booker was hoping to stand for office in 2013 (governor) or 2014 (US senator). In the documentary *Brick City*, Booker is filmed in a budget meeting tells his advisors that he wanted Newark to be debt free. An advisor suggests it could be by 2014. Booker replies, 'by 2012 please' (Episode 2, Spring 2008).
[117] Wharton, 2013, 175.
[118] Curvin, 2014, 220.
[119] 'Cory Booker, Eying NJ Senate Run, Banks on Long and Deep Jewish Ties', *The Forward*, 6 June 2013.

Black Insurgent Leaders

In the mid-twentieth century, Newark was the most important centre of black political organisation on the East Coast of the United States. It was the first city in the northeast to elect an African American mayor. The first national black power conference was held in Newark in July 1967 and was addressed by Charles Hamilton and Stokely Carmichael, who also published their foundational book *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation* that year.[120] Nearly five decades after this convention, Newark politics still had an identifiably black nationalist political tradition epitomised by two prominent figures in city politics: Amiri Baraka and Sharpe James. I argue that Booker defined his approach to racial politics in part based as a stylised foil to these leaders.

For fifty years, the leading black power advocate in Newark was Amiri Baraka. Baraka had been trained as a student by Black Panther leaders Huey Newton and Bobby Seale, establishing with them the first black studies course in the United States at San Francisco State College. In 1969, Baraka led the first Black and Puerto Rican Political Convention in Newark which propelled Ken Gibson to the mayoralty the following year.[121] During Booker's mayoralty, Baraka was a fierce critic. At a 2007 protest against public sector redundancies, Baraka told a crowd outside City Hall, 'Some people around the city are beginning to call this place "occupied Newark",' a reference to Booker's perceived outsider status.[122] At an event in 2008 commemorating the 1967 Newark riots, Baraka offered a scathing assessment of Booker [*audience responses in italics*]:

> '[He is] a law-educated, white, racist Negro…Cory Booker, educated at Stanford University [*boo*]. Condoleezza was at the same place [*laughter*]. Educated at Yale Law School, you have to understand [*laughter*]. A Rhodes Scholar [*boo*]. He was president of the Oxford University Jewish Students Organisation, if you can get that in your head [*that's right*]. So, now he's come here to help us – but he didn't come over here to help us. He came here to serve us to the people's he's helping [*that's right*]. Do you understand what I'm saying? [*hey*] Be careful what you wish for'.[123]


Amiri Baraka's son, Ras Baraka was elected to Newark City Council in 2010. Andra Gillespie describes the younger Baraka as Booker's 'constant gadfly' while he was mayor, largely echoing his father's black empowerment agenda.[124] A senior figure in Booker's staff accused Ras Baraka of 'try[ing] to draw us into the racialised politics, and we always tried to stand above that'.[125] Another member of Booker's staff, who was Hispanic, described the younger Baraka to me as acting like a 'thug'.[126] In

[120] See Woodward (2003: 295-297).
[121] Gillespie, 2013, Ch 2.
[122] Amiri Baraka, quoted in 'Newark's Mayor Battles Old Guard and Rumors', *New York Times*, 3 July 2007.
[123] Amiri Baraka, quoted in *Brick City*, Episode 2, Spring 2008.
[124] Gillespie, 2013, 45.
[125] CB8.
[126] CB1.

2014, Baraka was elected mayor of Newark to replace Booker, defeating the candidate whom Booker supported.

The other major black empowerment figure against whom Booker defined his 'post-racial' campaign approach was Sharpe James. Andra Gillespie describes James as 'one of the last remaining insurgent style black mayors…[who made] direct challenges to the prevailing white dominated political order'.[127] James's political career began in the historic 1970 election when he was elected to Newark City Council at the same time that Ken Gibson was elected mayor (see Figure 9.9). In his memoirs, James described himself as 'Black man who had bucked the establishment by helping to usher in Black political and economic power'.[128] He was viewed as a powerful 'rainmaker' in city and state politics due to the loyalty he commanded from the city's African American population across five mayoral elections and four city council elections.[129]

Figure 9.9. Poster from the 1970 Newark municipal elections



Source: New Jersey Historical Society

In the film *Street Fight* as well as in his speeches about his predecessor, Booker portrayed Sharpe James as an 'old-fashioned' racialised politician whose race-conscious approach had held the city back from significant process. James wrote in his memoirs that Booker travelled the country and 'sermonized to

[127] Gillespie, 2007, 80, 83.
[128] James, 2013, 7.
[129] Wharton, 2013, 38. See also interview with Granados.

White audiences' about the 'filth..., drug dealers, criminals, barefoot children, seniors with no teeth', and other undesirables who made up the city of Newark.[130] While an exaggeration, it is true that Booker did speak to white audiences about Newark with reference to what a *Washington Post* journalist described as his 'ghetto heroism'.[131] During the Senate campaign, the *New Republic* described Booker as having embarked on a '15-year-plus tour of duty in a hub of urban dysfunction', likening Newark to a battlefield.[132] In an interview with me, one of Booker's campaign workers, who was not from Newark, praised Booker for 'living in a slum in Newark'.[133] Indeed, during the 2013 campaign, Booker referred to having spent 'so much of the last 20 years…living in two well-known drug areas of Newark'.[134]

Booker was largely untroubled by criticisms from these black insurgent leaders. Indeed, their hostility invited an opportunity for Booker to define himself against them. One of Booker's campaign staff informed me that 'where we're different from the guy from the civil rights movement is they wear race on their sleeve'.[135] His chief of staff explained to me, 'we didn't get bogged down in the racialised politics in Newark…We didn't let that happen to us'.[136] Yet, I argue that politics in Newark is inescapably racial.

What set Booker apart from most other black leaders was that his most reliable base of electoral support came from the city's Hispanic population.[137] Andra Gillespie found in her analysis of 167 voting precincts in Newark that Booker's electoral performance in 2006 was *negatively* correlated with the proportion of blacks in a precinct. As the percentage of blacks in a precinct increased from 1% to 100%, Booker's vote share declined 35.9 percentage points.[138] When Booker ran for re-election in 2010, he failed to carry the predominantly black South ward and won the predominantly black West ward by only 662 votes.[139] Booker won his elections as mayor by commanding the overwhelming support of Latinos and whites, with divided support from African Americans. According to union leader Rahman Muhammad, Booker told him that he did not need to be overly concerned with criticism he received from black leaders because in mayoral elections, 'I only need 30 percent of the black vote'.[140]

Steve Lonegan

In the 2013 Senate election, Booker's Republican opponent Steve Lonegan was a self-proclaimed 'Jersey conservative'. Lonegan had served as mayor of Bogota, a small suburban town in Bergen

[130] Ibid., 239.
[131] Jason Horowitz, 'Cory Booker explains T-Bone', *Washington Post*, 30 August 2013.
[132] Noam Scheiber, 'Great for Newark, Not for DC', *New Republic*, 6 September 2013.
[133] CB15.
[134] Booker, quoted in 'Manufactured controversy hasn't slowed Booker', *South Jersey Times*, 4 September 2013.
[135] CB8.
[136] Interview with Butler.
[137] Wharton, 2013. See also interviews with Granados and Fonseca.
[138] Gillespie, 2013, 99.
[139] Ibid., 215.
[140] Muhammad, quoted in Curvin (2014: 233).

County which was about three-quarters white, from 1996 until the end of 2007. Before being elected mayor, Lonegan was a salesman who sold kitchen furniture and fittings.[141] After his tenure as mayor, Lonegan worked as the New Jersey state director of Americans for Prosperity, a right-wing political action committee funded by the brothers David and Charles Koch.[142]

For years, the New Jersey Republican Party had nominated centrist candidates with some success, especially in gubernatorial elections. Lonegan lost the 2009 Republican gubernatorial nomination to Chris Christie, who was perceived to be a more moderate candidate, in a 'tough primary battle'.[143] In contrast to Christie, Lonegan opposed the minimum wage, supported replacing a progressive income tax with a flat tax, disagreed that the state had a responsibility to guarantee access to healthcare, described Social Security as a 'Ponzi scheme',[144] and believed that Medicare had been a mistake.[145] While Lonegan's policy preferences were not aligned to those of most New Jersey voters, Passaic County journalist Charles Stile noted that his 'unapologetic, straightforward style' was perceived by some voters as 'more authentic, Jersey genuine'.[146]

Lonegan was comfortable with championing racially antagonistic policies. As mayor, he had attempted to hold a referendum declaring English to be Bogota's official language, but he was blocked by state officials due to its perceived unconstitutionality.[147] In 2006, Lonegan attempted to remove a McDonald's billboard because it advertised in Spanish.[148] On the campaign trail, Lonegan used explicit racial rhetoric. In August 2013, Lonegan joked, 'I have a handicap, you know. I am a white guy running in the state of New Jersey'.[149] The comment echoed the suggestion of white opponents in my other case studies (e.g., Marshall Coleman in Chapter 3) who complained that the black candidate was given more favourable treatment by the press because of their race. Lonegan also tied Booker with Sharpe James, even though the two men have very distinct governing styles (see Figure 9.10).

[141] Herb Jackson, 'All Eyes Are On Unusual Senate Vote', *West Paterson Herald News,* 14 October 2013.
[142] Michael Linhorst, 'Lonegan tax returns show over $1 million in 3 years of income', *West Paterson Herald News,* 10 September 2013.
[143] Herb Jackson & Michael Linhorst, 'Booker treated like Senator at mayor's panel in DC', *West Paterson Herald News,* 20 September 2013.
[144] Lonegan, quoted in 'Wake-up call gets Booker's attention', *West Paterson Herald News,* 6 October 2013.
[145] 'Cory Booker is fending off question about e-flirting with a stripper in Oregon', *South Jersey Times,* 1 October 2013.
[146] Charles Stile, 'Wake-up call gets Booker's attention', *West Paterson Herald News,* 6 October 2013.
[147] 'Cory Booker wins US Senate election in NJ', *New York Daily News,* 17 October 2013.
[148] Brian Aberback, 'Bogota formally requests billboard removal: Calls McDonald's Spanish ad divisive', *The Bergen Record,* 14 July 2006.
[149] Lonegan, quoted in 'Senate hopeful defiant in race tweet', *NorthJersey.com,* 10 August 2013.

Figure 9.10. 'More Liberal Than Obama, Worse Than Sharpe James' Television Advert (2013)



Source: Kanter Archive, Political Communications Center, University of Oklahoma

Lonegan could have been a useful racial foil if Booker had decided to pursue a crusade campaign strategy. Lonegan's racialised attacks and extreme policy standpoints could have been woven into a crusade narrative about defeating racism and making history in New Jersey. But at no point in the election did Booker describe his opponent or his comments as racist. Indeed, Booker more commonly drew symbolic contrasts between himself and other black politicians than with Lonegan's racial rhetoric.

Dependent Variable: Post-Racial Campaign Strategy

Booker's lack of political or financial dependence on Newark's black political leaders or on New Jersey's Democratic Party bosses enabled the candidate to pursue a distinctive racial campaign strategy which was neither deracialised nor symbolic-substantive. I disagree with Andra Gillespie that Booker was a 'classic deracialized black candidate'.[150] Unlike deracialised candidates, Booker did not purge racial language or allusions to racial history from his campaign. Yet, at the same time, he appealed to whites on the basis of his *difference* from other black politicians. Booker's strategy was premised on an embrace of a selective interpretation of the legacy of the civil rights movement, while presenting himself in contrast to his adopted city's traditions of black power politics. Both as mayor and as a candidate for the US Senate, Cory Booker presented himself as someone who could, in Jonathan Wharton's

[150] Gillespie, 2013, 41.

assessment, 'see beyond Black and White politics'.[151] Booker's campaign strategy, therefore, bore the hallmarks of a post-racial campaign strategy.

Targeted Appeals

Booker appealed to whites by presenting himself in juxtaposition to 'traditional' black leadership. One profile in the *Atlantic* written shortly after Booker won the Democratic nomination in August 2013 described him as 'a black politician who has attempted to transcend racial divisions and has challenged inner-city black machine politics'.[152] Booker's appeal took two forms: (1) a break from a narrowly black approach to racial politics and (2) as a unifier with unique credentials to bring people together.

As has been discussed in previous sections, the first aspect of Booker's targeted appeal to whites involved presenting himself as a break from old-style, racialised black politics, which he suggested figures such as Sharpe James represented. In his Senate campaign communications, Booker presented the record of the James administration as a catastrophe, highlighting his own role as someone who cleaned up the mess after 'decades of neglect, mismanagement, and decay'. On his campaign website, Booker described how he defeated 'the political operation of a five-term incumbent…and immediately began uniting people to tackle problems that had been plaguing Newark for decades'. Booker's website accused James of having left the city's finances 'in shambles' and 'violent crime was rising; businesses were leaving'.[153] Ron Rice, a councillor from the predominantly black West ward, informed me that he was personally uncomfortable with the symbolic contrast which the Booker campaign drew with Sharpe James: 'I think that one bad thing about the race…and one thing I refused to do as a member of the Booker team was I refused to criticise Sharpe James in a way that depicted him as a failing mayor because he was anything but that'.[154] I agree with Andra Gillespie that Booker's implicit claim to be abolishing stereotypes about black unfitness to govern relied, ironically, on perpetuating such stereotypes with regard to his mayoral predecessors.[155]

While I conducted my participant-observation research at the campaign headquarters in Newark, I noticed that the vast majority of campaign aides in the office were white. In informal discussions, I asked aides why they had decided to work for the Booker campaign. Several cited the *Street Fight* film as motivation. I wrote in my field notes that aides told 'me of Sharpe James's highly racialised language against CB', in contrast to Booker's 'transcendence' of racial politics.[156] My experience corresponded with Andra Gillespie's earlier participant-observation research in Booker's mayoral campaign offices where she found that many of Booker's campaign workers were whites who unwittingly portrayed

[151] Wharton, 2013, 58.
[152] Molly Ball, 'Why do liberals hate Cory Booker?', *The Atlantic*, 23 August 2013.
[153] 'About Cory', www.corybooker.com, 17 August 2013.
[154] Interview with Rice.
[155] Gillespie, 2012a.
[156] Field notes, 14 September 2013 (Newark, NJ).

Newarkers and black politicians in Newark in a stereotypical manner, especially as 'buffoons or incompetents', as a way of praising Booker.[157]

At the same time, in contradiction to the deracialised strategy, Booker did not distance himself from the legacy of the civil rights struggle. He presented himself as an inheritor of the work done by those in the civil rights movement. During the general election, Booker went to Washington, DC to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the March on Washington. Booker noted his parents' involvement in the movement, and he acknowledged that he stood on their shoulders. Yet, much of his rhetoric framed the racism which they faced as an historical artefact. In a video on his campaign webpage, Booker spoke about the civil rights progress which had been made since his parents first moved to New Jersey, stating, 'It was the civil rights movement where blacks and whites came together in this country and said, hey, we have to be a nation which treats everyone equally in America'.[158] To voters, Booker presented the civil rights movement as having accomplished its purpose, a key position of the colour-blind coalition, as Desmond King and Rogers Smith have written.[159]


The second aspect of Booker's targeted appeal to whites involved presenting himself as someone who possessed unique credentials to bring voters together. This was a theme Booker had articulated since he first ran for Newark City Council in 1998. In the New Jersey Historical Society archives, I found a letter Booker wrote as an appeal for donations to his 1998 council campaign. In it, Booker describes himself as one of 'perhaps a handful of people in this country who have the potential to bridge the gap between our urban and suburban realities'.[160] This theme was continually repeated by Booker throughout his public life.

During the Senate election, Booker presented himself as a unifier. On the night he won the Democratic nomination for Senate, Booker stated, 'All our state has one destiny because we are one people, and there is only one way to be successful – and that is together'.[161] In campaign communications, as the direct mail leaflet in Figure 9.11 illustrates, Booker underscored the need to 'bring people together'. Echoing this theme, on the anniversary of the March on Washington, Booker tweeted 'I have a dream that…we realize we're all in this together'.[162] Booker argued that he could overcome partisan division in Congress because 'our common history is a powerful perpetual testimony to overcoming seemingly impossible challenges', overlooking the fact that America's racial and political history has been characterised far more by deep divisions than a 'common history'.[163] In a television advertisement,

[157] Gillespie, 2013, 233.
[158] 'Vote for Cory Today', Booker for Senate online video (Kanter Archive, Political Communications Center, University of Oklahoma).
[159] King & Smith, 2014.
[160] 'Meet Cory Booker: Candidate for Newark City Council', 1998 (New Jersey Historical Society).
[161] Tweet: @Booker4Senate, 14 August 2013.
[162] Tweet: @CoryBooker, 28 August 2013.
[163] Tweet: @CoryBooker, 27 September 2013.

Booker stated, 'No matter what your background, race, culture, gay or straight, North Jersey or South Jersey, rich or poor, our lives are interconnected. We cannot have policies which divide rather than bringing us together…Join me. Together we will do better'.[164] Walter Fields, the former political director of the New Jersey NAACP, believed that Booker's targeted appeal to whites was 'to cast himself as this above the fray, race-neutral, post-partisan candidate'.[165]

Figure 9.11. Booker for Senate direct mail (2013)




Source: Steve DeMicco and Brad Lawrence

While Booker repeatedly stressed the importance of coming together, he diminished the salience of the symbolic-historic significance of his own election. Booker's senior strategist reflected, 'It wasn't part of the dialogue in any way…It wasn't a big deal here that he was going to be the first black senator. I mean it just wasn't'.[166] Booker was the first black mayor and the first black Democrat who was not from Illinois to serve in the Senate.[167] Yet, Booker was dismissive – even flippant – about his symbolic-historic status. During the general election, Booker minimised his historic racial status by likening it to him being the first vegetarian senator. In his only direct public comment on the matter, Booker replied to a tweet about his racial status by sardonically replying, 'But would I be the 1st vegetarian?' (see Figure 9.12).[168]

[164] 'People', Booker for Senate television advertisement (Kanter Archive, Political Communications Center, University of Oklahoma).
[165] Interview with Fields.
[166] Interview with Lawrence.
[167] As of 2013, Illinois was the only state to send black Democrats to the Senate: Carol Moseley Braun, Barack Obama, and Roland Burris. Burris was appointed rather than elected to fill the end of Barack Obama's Senate term after he was elected president.
[168] Tweet: @CoryBooker, 28 August 2013.

Figure 9.12. First Vegetarian Tweet



Source: @CoryBooker

Consistent with his post-racial strategy, there is little evidence that Booker attempted to appeal to African American voters on the basis of their shared linked fate. It is not even clear that Booker embraced the concept of linked fate personally. Andra Gillespie asked Booker if he felt a sense of linked fate with other African Americans. Booker responded by telling her that he felt a sense of linked fate 'with everyone, not just blacks'.[169] One African American leader informed me, 'when it comes to certain aspects of being black…Booker just didn't get it'.[170]

In addition, Booker's portrayal of black life drew criticism from African American leaders. Newark historian Clement Price condemned Booker's 'civic stunts' (e.g., living in Brick Towers, sleeping in a tent at an intersection known for drug dealing). Price reflected, 'I wonder if Cory's youth and upbringing are so privileged that, not unlike whites, he has an imagined view of blacks… I come from a wholesome black family life; I went to church, never got in trouble – and I said to myself, Why is he doing this? Is he out of his fucking mind?'.[171] Without prompting four of my interviewees speculated that black Newarkers voted for Booker in the Senate election in order to remove him from the mayoralty and return the city's black insurgent leadership to power.[172] As one former city councillor put it to me, 'I think people's view of Cory when he ran for [Senate] was thank God he is getting out of here…Let him go!...Get him out of Newark. Just get him out of here'.[173]

By contrast, there is evidence that Booker communicated a race-conscious message to Latino voters, based on my analysis of his speeches and advertisements in Spanish. For example, in one Spanish-language advertisement a Latina voter describes Booker as 'one of those leaders who is committed to the Latino community in all areas…He is African American, but he can walk in the shoes of others'.[174] While living in Newark, Booker learned Spanish, and during the Senate campaign Booker addressed

[169] Gillespie, 2010, 72.
[170] Field notes, 24 February 2015 (Maplewood, NJ).
[171] Price, quoted in 'The Battle for Newark', *Esquire*, July 2008.
[172] CB1, CB5, CB11, CB14
[173] Interview with Bridgeforth.
[174] 'Voces Para Cory: Laureana Organ' (Kanter Archive, Political Communications Center, University of Oklahoma). My translation.

some Latino audiences in Spanish.[175] Demonstrating this proficiency, one video on the 2013 campaign's official YouTube channel shows Booker speaking Spanish to an audience in Elizabeth. Booker told the audience, '*Es tan importante en este campagña que tenemos los votos de la communidad Latino por que votes es poder*'.[176]

I found no equivalent campaign videos or communications in which Booker spoke in similar group-based language to black voters.[177] When speaking about African Americans, Booker emphasised the need to come together, but in his Spanish-language communications, Booker made direct appeals to Latino ethnic group identity and solidarity. Fredrick Harris detected a similar pattern in Barack Obama's governing approach as president, where he made group-based policy offers to Latinos, the LGBT community, and women, but he refrained from making an equivalent group-based policy offer for African Americans.[178] An implication of this approach is that black racial justice claims are seen as illegitimate unlike other group-based claims.

Style

As has already been shown, Steve Lonegan used racialised cues throughout the campaign providing multiple opportunities to study Booker's campaign style. Consistent with the post-racial strategy, Booker did not condemn any of Lonegan's racist advertisements. Booker's racial silence was clearly strategic, given that his campaign staff expressed to me, unambiguously, that they believed that Lonegan used race to attack Booker. Booker's chief strategist Brad Lawrence stated to me, 'I think there is no doubt that there was an attempt to play the race card on their part'.[179] Booker's other senior strategist Steve DeMicco offered a similar assessment to me, 'there was, if not explicit, certainly implicit racism in his characterisation of the mayor's record'.[180] In spite of these assessments, Booker's adopted an 'above the fray' style in which he condemned his opponent for being inaccurate but not for being racist.

While I was conducting my participant-observation research, I observed an instance where Lonegan publicly attacked Booker using strongly racial codes (drugs/crack cocaine). Booker's team immediately interpreted the attack as racial in the campaign office where I was working, yet neither Booker nor his

[175] *Street Fight* director Marshall Curry informed me that when Booker first ran for mayor, his Spanish was imperfect. When Booker tried to record a radio advertisement in Spanish 'he messed up the lines over and over' (Interview with Curry, 26 February 2015). By 2013, videos of Booker speaking Spanish at public campaign events suggest substantially improved proficiency.
[176] My translation: 'It is so important that we get the votes of the Latino community because your vote is power'.
[177] Based on my analysis of twenty-one Booker campaign videos held in the Kanter Archive at the University of Oklahoma, as well as a complete set of direct mail and leaflets shared with me by his print literature designers.
[178] Harris, 2012.
[179] Interview with Lawrence.
[180] Interview with Steve DeMicco, 25 February 2015.

campaign staff publicly identified the comment as racial. It is worth recounting the incident in full because it provides a perspective from *within* the campaign about Booker's strategic campaign style.

On 17 September 2013, Steve Lonegan invited the press to Newark for one of several campaign visits he made in the city during the 64-day campaign (more than any other city or town he visited).[181] The Lonegan campaign e-mailed reporters to inform them that Lonegan 'will hold a press conference today in front of Cory Booker's abandoned property, now a crack house'.[182] The terraced house, as Booker's campaign staff confirmed to me, had been owned by Booker until June 2013 when he sold it for a peppercorn sum to a charity which he had founded. Neighbours complained that the abandoned house was being used by drug users. Lonegan described the building as Booker's 'abandoned crack house', and Lonegan's chief strategist Rick Shaftan tweeted the hashtag #CrackHeadsForCory, saying that Booker had 'admitted to letting drug dealers stay at his home' (Figure 9.13).[183]

Figure 9.13. Tweets by Steve Lonegan and campaign strategist Rick Shaftan (17 Sept 2013)



Source: Twitter

As Lonegan's press conference unfolded, I was working in Booker's campaign headquarters in Newark. One member of Booker's staff said to me, 'You were looking for race in this campaign, well here it is'. I recorded in my field notes, 'The big controversy of the day was Steve Lonegan's press conference…claiming CB owned a crack house, which the staff immediately recognised as racial'.[184] Lonegan proceeded to criticise Booker for his 'abandoned crack house' in television advertisements (see Figure 9.14).

[181] Based on an analysis of events advertised on Lonegan's and his campaign's Twitter accounts.
[182] See also Michael Linhorst, 'Booker draws criticism for home in disrepair', *The Press of Atlantic City*, 16 September 2013.
[183] Tweet: @Shaftan, 17 September 2013.
[184] Field notes, 17 September 2013 (Newark, NJ).

Figure 9.14. Lonegan television advertisement: 'Cory's Abandoned Crack House'



Source: Kanter Archive, Political Communications Center, University of Oklahoma

Crack is an identifiably African American form of cocaine, as opposed to powder cocaine, which is associated with better-off whites.[185] In 1986, Ronald Reagan signed into law the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which weighted sentences relating to crack cocaine one-hundred times more than crimes relating to powder cocaine because crack was understood to be more harmful than powder cocaine. The result was an extreme racial disparity in incarceration.[186] While blacks use drugs in similar proportions to their presence in the overall population (about 12% of illegal drug users), more than half of prisoners for drug-related offences are African American.[187] In 2010, Barack Obama signed into law the Fair Sentencing Act which decreased the crack-powder cocaine disparity from 100:1 to 18:1 and also eliminated the federal mandatory five-year minimum sentence for conviction of crack cocaine possession.[188]

In spite of its obviously racial content, neither Booker nor his campaign staff acknowledged the racial dimension of Lonegan's 'crack house' attack. Booker was away in California at the time of the press conference and gave no public comment about the house. Booker's spokesperson Kevin Griffis, who was based at the Newark headquarters with me on the day of the incident, told a New Jersey newspaper, 'This is just more hyperbole and nonsense from a desperate, extreme campaign'.[189] The intensely

[185] United States Sentencing Commission, 'Special Report to Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy', 2007.
[186] See Tonry (1995), Welch (2007).
[187] 'Criminal Justice Fact Sheet', NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/criminal-justice-fact-sheet/.
[188] 'Fair Sentencing Act', American Civil Liberties Union, https://www.aclu.org/feature/fair-sentencing-act.
[189] Griffis, quoted in 'Some Booker supporters spoil a visit by Lonegan', *West Paterson Herald News*, 18 September 2013.

racialised content of Lonegan's attacks, I argue, strains the credulity of statements from senior Booker campaign staff who professed to me, 'Cory really isn't viewed as an African American politician'.[190]

Policy Agenda

In spite of Booker's racial silence in the face of racialised attacks, it would be inappropriate to describe Booker as following a 'deracialised' campaign strategy. On policy, the deracialised strategy involves a candidate presenting an ideologically centrist or conservative position, twinned with an avoidance of issues which carry explicit or implicit racial content.[191] Booker's ideological reputation was mixed – admittedly more classically liberal than social democratic. Nonetheless, during the campaign itself Booker tended to promote himself as a conventional Democrat, supporting public spending for popular welfare programmes and an equitable tax regime. Furthermore, Booker did not avoid issues with strong racial associations, especially criminal justice. However, in evidence of a post-racial campaign strategy, Booker embraced 'colour-blind' solutions to these racialised problems.

Booker's politics were classically liberal, in a sense familiar to Europeans.[192] He believed in a limited role for the state both in economic and social relations. Therefore, he was a strong supporter of 'liberal' positions such as same-sex marriage, but he was also embraced a pro-capitalist worldview. In the 2012 presidential election, Booker defended Mitt Romney from Barack Obama's criticisms of Romney's hedge fund connections, describing Obama's attacks as 'nauseating'.[193] Booker supported a state constitutional amendment proposed by Republican governor Chris Christie which would have capped property (council) tax increases to no more than 2.5 percent, which would impose a fiscal straightjacket on cash-starved localities.[194] Booker stated in a CNN interview that the age of Social Security eligibility would likely need to increase because 'we need to recognize we can't start collecting Social Security as early as our parents did'.[195] Most prominently, as mayor of Newark, he had been an active promoter of charter schools ('free schools')[196] and, even more controversially, private school vouchers.[197] Booker sat on the board of Democrats for Education Reform.[198]

During the Senate campaign, Booker was identified by commentators as belonging to the New Democratic wing of the party. Noam Scheiber in a September 2013 *New Republic* article described Booker as 'a few ticks to the right of a Clinton-era New Democrat'.[199] Brigid Harrison of the *Bergen*

---

[190] CB6.
[191] Albritton et al, 1996.
[192] In Booker's papers at the Newark Public Library, I found private e-mails which show that Booker has personal connections with activists in the Liberal Democrat Party in the United Kingdom.
[193] Raymond Hernandez, 'Surrogate for Obama Denounces Anti-Romney Ad', *New York Times*, 20 May 2012.
[194] Noam Scheiber, 'Great for Newark, Not Great for DC', *New Republic*, 6 September 2013.
[195] Cory Booker on *Piers Morgan Tonight*, CNN, 13 July 2011.
[196] Melissa Hayes, 'Political foes paint favorites as extremists', *Bergen Record*, 8 September 2013.
[197] Valerie Strauss, 'Cory Booker has crossed the aisle before: On school reform', *Washington Post*, 23 May 2012.
[198] Molly Ball, 'Why do liberals hate Cory Booker?', *The Atlantic*, 23 August 2013.
[199] Noam Scheiber, 'Great for Newark, Not Great for DC', *New Republic*, 6 September 2013.


Record described Booker in an article written the same month as 'a liberal new Democrat, espousing cooperative approaches between business and government but not allowing government to shirk its responsibility to those in the greatest need'.[200] In their endorsement, the *Newark Star-Ledger* described Booker as 'a pragmatic centrist'.[201] I agree with Jonathan Wharton that Booker's politics resemble a 'progressive Clinton-centrist Democrat, not a figure of traditional black politics'.[202]

However, during the Senate campaign, Booker did *not* emphasise his more centrist or right-leaning policy positions, contrary to a deracialised campaign strategy. Booker's Senate campaign agenda followed clear Democratic themes. Booker described himself as 'a proud progressive'.[203] Booker's senior strategist Brad Lawrence stated to me, 'we definitely ran a more progressive campaign but not a particularly left-of-centre campaign'.[204] In his printed literature, Booker highlighted his support for conventional Democratic policies: support for social security, Medicare, abortion, a higher minimum wage, and fair taxation.

In contravention of the deracialised strategy, Booker was willing to discuss policy issues strongly associated with minorities. In his memoirs, he writes that when he ran for Senate, 'I almost always discussed reforming our nation's criminal justice system' even though he 'was warned that I shouldn't talk much about it'.[205] Policy material from the campaign supports Booker's contention. Booker released a sixteen-page policy document during the general election entitled *Reforming America's Criminal Justice System*. The document contained over thirty specific policy proposals to reduce incarceration and its harmful impact on former inmates and their home communities. Proposals included diverting low-level drug offenders from prison to rehabilitation programmes, eliminating mandatory minimum sentences for low-level crimes, revising federal prosecutors' metrics of success from convictions to recidivism rates, increased support for education within prisons, 'ban the box' employment reforms, and the enfranchisement of former prisoners. Related to the document, Booker's campaign organised a petition on his website which encouraged voters to register their support for reforming the criminal justice system. Booker tweeted multiple times about his support for criminal justice reform, as Figure 9.15 illustrates, and he appeared on national television arguing for his reform proposals.

[200] Brigid Harrison, 'Power of Personality', *Bergen Record*, 15 September 2013.
[201] 'Booker for Senate', *Newark Star-Ledger*, 6 October 2013.
[202] Wharton, 2013, 41.
[203] 'The Choice', Booker for Senate Campaign Video, 22 August 2013.
[204] Interview with Lawrence.
[205] Booker, 2016, 204.

Figure 9.15. Booker tweet in favour of criminal justice and drug policy reform (Aug 2013)



Source: @CoryBooker

Booker's approach to this issue, I argue, was consistent with a post-racial campaign strategy because he framed incarceration as an issue which incidentally but not deliberately impacted minorities. In the policy document, Booker wrote that some law enforcement practices 'often unintentionally…lead to disparate impacts' on ethnic minorities.[206] While he recognised the empirical reality that 'blacks are more likely to be arrested for crack-related crimes', Booker's solutions were 'colour-blind'.[207] Booker's chief of staff admitted that African Americans were disproportionately 'swept up in a criminal justice system in the United States of America, but we're not wearing our race on our sleeve when we talk about it… I think that's the distinction'.[208]

Instead, his criticism of the American criminal justice system focused on it being wasteful of taxpayers' money. Booker argued that there were post-partisan solutions to the issue. He emphasised his agreement on the solutions to mass incarceration which he shared in common with Republican senators (e.g., Rand Paul, Mike Lee, Jeff Flake, and Dean Heller).[209] In his 2013 policy document, Booker praised the work of the Manhattan Institute, a right-wing think tank, for taking up the issue 'because this issue is not a left or right problem…It's a question of making our communities safer or continuing to waste law enforcement resources and taxpayer dollars'.[210]

Strategist Brad Lawrence summarised Booker's policy message to me as, 'I am going to break the gridlock in Washington because I am above that…You know, I'm not a partisan. I'm somebody who brings people together'.[211] Booker's embrace of a post-partisan policy agenda with colour-blind solutions, as Robert Curvin has posited, is 'really putting race aside as a significant factor in terms of


[206] Booker, 2013, 5.
[207] Ibid.
[208] Interview with Butler.
[209] Booker, 2016, Ch 7.
[210] Booker, 2013, 2.
[211] Interview with Lawrence.

the philosophic-political interpretation [of society]'.[212] Without purging the language of race or failing to acknowledge racial differences, Booker's ultimately colour-blind approach to public policy is consistent with the post-racial campaign strategy.

Result

Cory Booker defeated Steve Lonegan on 16 October 2013 with 54.9% of the vote. The result was closer than many commentators expected.[213] Patrick Murray, director of polling at Monmouth University, commented, 'He should have had an easy win'.[214] In public polls at the beginning of the general election, Booker commanded as much as a 28-point lead over his Republican rival. However, by the beginning of October, Lonegan was polling at least 40%, and on election day, he secured 44% of the vote, as Figure 9.16 shows.

Figure 9.16. Public Polls and Final Result (30 August-16 October 2013)



6 public tracking polls + final result (Sources: Farleigh Dickinson University, Rutgers University, Quinnipiac University, Monmouth University)

The narrower-than-expected margin has two main explanations. The first is cyclical. Booker's team emphasised to me in interviews after the election that it was a low-turnout by-election where Republicans would have been more motivated to vote against the incumbent Democratic president. In addition to this explanation, however, I believe that Booker's result was diminished by the candidate's 'light schedule…[and] above-the-fray approach', as one journalist described.[215] I observed a level of complacency in the Booker campaign when I visited in mid-September. As I recorded in my field notes,

[212] Interview with Robert Curvin, 27 February 2015.
[213] Jessica Taylor, 'Cory Booker stumbles to finish line', *MSNBC*, 13 October 2013.
[214] Patrick Murray, quoted in Ibid.
[215] Charles Stile, 'Wake-up call gets Booker's attention', *West Paterson Herald News*, 6 October 2013.

'Due to their large lead, [a Booker aide] suspected that on this particular Sunday almost no one would be at the office in Newark'.[216] At a trade union rally, Booker excused himself early because, according to the host, Booker had a long-standing commitment. However, as I left the event with the Booker team, Booker turned to us before getting into his car and stated, 'Let's go Big Blue!'. A campaign aide explained to me that Booker's 'long-standing commitment', in fact, was a New York Giants American football match.[217] Also perhaps a sign of Booker's overconfidence, Booker flew to Buffalo, New York during the general campaign to give a speech.[218]

Conclusion

Booker's political trajectory has not followed those of other big-city black mayors, but this is perhaps because Booker (quite deliberately) is not like most of them. It has long been assumed that the major base of black mayors would be the black community, but throughout his political career, Booker's support from blacks was 'fragmented and uncertain'.[219] As mayor, Booker owed his electoral success to solid support from Hispanic voters as well as infrastructural support from Hispanic and white political bosses. While Booker eschewed black machine politics (as he highlighted on his Senate campaign website), he nonetheless developed his own national political 'machine' through cultivating an impressive network of wealthy donors. As Latino leader Pablo Fonseca explained to me, 'Cory has an incredible rolodex. Cory has an incredible amount of fundraising capacity'.[220]

I agree with Andra Gillespie that the notion of a 'post-racial' America as a statement of fact is 'farcical'.[221] However, it is a powerful ideological claim, especially among white Americans, which Booker forwarded to powerful effect. One of Booker's senior campaign staff said to me, 'Cory really isn't viewed as an African American politician…He transcends that'.[222] It is doubtful that any candidate can, in fact, transcend race, but the post-racial campaign strategy's presentation of a racially transcendent black politician has the strategic advantage of delegitimising race-conscious claims while giving whites the opportunity to vote for a liberal candidate who claims inheritance of the civil rights movement. Yet, in assessing these candidates, I ultimately side with Joy Jones who is strongly critical of whites who 'valorize themselves as the "good" white people because they will vote for the "good" black people",' which, in her assessment, means a black candidate who 'expresses no racial

[216] Field notes, 15 September 2013 (Little Falls, NJ).
[217] Ibid.
[218] His staff informed me that they had been told not to publicise the speech or tweet about it (Field notes, 16 September 2013, Newark, NJ).
[219] Curvin, 2014, 228.
[220] Interview with Pablo Fonseca, 24 February 2015.
[221] Gillespie, 2012a, Introduction.
[222] CB6.

solidarity'.[223] While Booker was by no means a 'deracialised' candidate, his post-racial strategy situated him firmly within the colour-blind coalition.

[223] Jones, 2009, 2.

Part V – Conclusion

Chapter 10 – Conclusion

'It is important for the African American community, in its diversity, to stay true to one core aspect of the African American experience, which is we know what it's like to be on the outside...And if we ever lose that, then I think we're in trouble. Then I think we've lost our way'.
Barack Obama

***

Georgia Persons predicted in 1993, 'Deracialization will likely become the preponderant pattern of black electoral politics'.[1] In the two decades since she made her prediction, few scholars challenged her claim.[2] Deracialisation has sustained relatively few revisions since it was first used by political scientists in the late 1980s and early 1990s to explain the electoral success of black politicians outside of majority-black cities. Such has been deracialisation's longevity that Barack Obama was said to have been elected and re-elected president in 2008 and 2012 using the same racial campaign strategy pursued by Douglas Wilder in his election as governor in Virginia in 1989.[3] In this thesis, I have argued that this characterisation strains credulity.

For too long, commentators have attempted to force black politicians into a Faustian bargain in which they must choose between maintaining their commitments to race-conscious politics and losing or abandoning such commitments and winning. Paul Frymer and colleagues wrote in the mid-2000s that it was 'political suicide' for politicians seeking major office to discuss racial inequality because the median voters in these contests 'have little interest in these issues'.[4] In 2009, Robert Smith wrote that while black candidates winning in majority-white jurisdictions was 'a sign of growth and development in American politics', he worried that 'it also may mean the continued decay of black politics'.[5] Similarly, Herman George lamented that black success in majority-white areas necessitated candidates' acceptance of a deeply unequal racial order.[6]

As I have shown in this manuscript, contrary to these expectations, the deracialised campaign strategy has never been the sole strategy deployed by successful African American candidates in majority-white jurisdictions. As Carol Moseley Braun demonstrated as early as 1992, deracialisation is not – and never has been – a *necessary* strategy for black political advancement in predominantly white contexts. Andra Gillespie was correct to say that a fixation on winning by appealing to whites through abandoning

[1] Persons, 1993, 10.
[2] For a partial exception, see Perry (2013). From the perspective of black Republican politics, King-Meadows (2009) rejects the deracialisation thesis entirely.
[3] E.g., Ifill (2009), Clayton (2010: 5), Liu (2010: Ch 3), Bonilla-Silva & Dietrich (2011), Wright-Austin & King (2011: 54), Nordin (2012: ix), Stout (2015: 77), Carter & Dowe (2015: 106)
[4] Frymer et al, 2006, 52.
[5] Smith, 2009, 5.
[6] George, 2004, 144.

commitments to race-conscious policies is 'anathema to black self-determination'.[7] For at least twenty-five years, black candidates have been aware of this danger and rejected it. Braun told me in our interview, 'part of the value I bring…is a perspective based on the fact that I am female with brown skin. Otherwise, I may just as well be another white guy, no offence, but you see what I'm saying? What's the point? If I'm not going to articulate and give voice to the set of experiences that are defining for me, then I have no legitimacy'.[8]

I agree with Phillip Thompson that commentators have been too quick to dismiss the possibility that African American candidates can 'enlarge' the white public's understanding of racism and poverty.[9] As several of the candidates in this study have shown, under the right conditions, successful African American candidates can (and do) make race-conscious appeals to whites. Racial politics does not need to be regarded as purely zero-sum (even if it is some or most of the time). Some whites died trying to register blacks to vote. Rather than dismiss white support for race-conscious black candidates as 'irrational', political scientists should spend more time thinking about the potential for a deeper racial politics beyond narrow assumptions of voting by racial group 'self-interest'.

The continued expectation that deracialisation is necessary for black advancement in non-majority black contexts is not only empirically wrong but it is also deeply damaging. It inhibits black political advancement because it implies that black candidates cannot forward a race-conscious political agenda outside of the black community.[10] When Charles Hamilton initially conceived of deracialisation as a political strategy in the 1976 presidential election, he emphasised that it was a contingent and temporary means of extending a viable policy agenda which would materially advance the conditions of African Americans, especially the poor. Yet, by the 1990s, the concept took on a different meaning which described how black candidates needed to appeal to white conservatives by downplaying race and the needs of the black poor in order to win high-level office.

Comparative Case Analysis

The seven Democratic candidates in this manuscript were all historically significant figures in their own terms: the first elected black governor (Wilder), the first black Democratic Senate nominee (Gantt), the first black female senator (Braun), the first black president (Obama), the first Muslim member of Congress (Ellison), the best-performing black Democratic senatorial candidate in the South (Ford), and the first black mayor elected to major statewide office (Booker). While highlighting their individual contributions, I have drawn connections across the cases throughout the manuscript. All of these cases

[7] Gillespie, 2009, 143.
[8] Interview with Braun, 2015.
[9] Thompson, 2006, 23.
[10] Thompson (2006) was one of the few authors who has remarked upon this distortion of Hamilton's original concept (284).

had influences on subsequent candidates, if only in reshaping what was perceived as politically possible. For that reason, there are subtle learning effects.

For example, although Harvey Gantt lost the 1990 US Senate election in North Carolina, as I showed in Chapter 6, Harvard Law student Barack Obama followed the campaign and described Gantt as an 'early inspiration'. Two years later, Obama turned down a prestigious clerkship to take up the state directorship of Project Vote in Illinois, the same group which had been formed in North Carolina to register African Americans to vote for Gantt. Obama's work for Project Vote contributed to the election of Carol Moseley Braun to the US Senate, a seat Obama himself would fill twelve years later. The 1990 Gantt candidacy also inspired Gantt's campaign manager Mel Watt to run for Congress in the next congressional cycle. Watt won his election and became the first African American to win election to Congress from North Carolina since the nineteenth century. By the time I interviewed Watt in 2014, he had been appointed by President Obama as Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency. Watt told me that Obama himself understood the connections between these campaigns:

> 'Barack Obama will tell you if you talk to him privately that that [the 1990 Gantt-Helms] race had significant influence on him and his thinking. Did it have implications for me and what I've done in politics? Absolutely, you bet. But did we win the race? The answer to that is no – not in electoral terms. But, did we move the ball forward and bend the arc of history towards justice? I would say absolutely we did'.[11]

Part II – The Pioneers

Taken together, the three case studies in Part II displayed two distinct approaches to campaigning in majority-white elections (see Table 10.1). The Wilder election followed closely the (colour-blind) deracialised campaign strategy model, which is not surprising given its (distorted) influence on the early scholarly literature about racial campaign strategies. However, the Gantt and Braun campaigns demonstrate the potential for race-conscious appeals in predominantly white environments. In both cases, the candidates pursued a crusade campaign model of a racial campaign strategy. On each of the dimensions of the classic deracialised campaign strategy, Carol Mosely Braun and Harvey Gantt violated its stipulations. They used race in their discursive appeals to voters of all races both on the campaign trail and in the media. They were unflinching in their willingness to describe their opponents' attacks as racist. They did not adopt a more conservative policy agenda or purge racial issues or explanations from their policy agenda. They even embraced the 'liberal' label.

[11] Interview with Mel Watt, 7 March 2014.

Table 10.1. Part II Case Studies - Racial Campaign Strategies (Dependent Variable)

		Douglas Wilder	Harvey Gantt	Carol Moseley Braun
Style		Conciliatory	Confrontational	Confrontational
Policy Agenda		Centrist/Conservative	Liberal	Liberal
Racial Appeals	*To whites*	None (explicit)	Yes	Yes
	To blacks	None (explicit)	Yes	Yes
CAMPAIGN STRATEGY		Deracialised	Crusade	Crusade

To explain these choices of racial campaign strategy, I have shown how the candidates and their strategists confronted the particular racial landscapes of their election. Racial tension is always latent in American politics and history. So, understanding this choice is not nearly as simple as indicating whether a jurisdiction was racially hostile or not. Nor, in these cases, is it sufficient to look solely to the candidates' racial background. All three were strongly rooted in the African American community and products of the particular black experiences of mid-twentieth century African Americans in their state. Gantt and Braun were more actively involved as protestors in the civil rights movement, but, as I have shown, Douglas Wilder participated in the black equality struggle during his period as a lawyer and legislator. All three received historically high levels of support from African American voters and elites.

In these three cases, I argue, the most important factor in explaining their choice of racial campaign strategy is the nature of the elites to whom the candidates appealed and whose support they sought. These mutually re-enforcing relations make causal chains difficult to identify, but the case of Wilder is most instructive. As he moved from a race-conscious to colour-blind candidate, he dropped his challenge of the state's white supremacist old guard and simultaneously embraced the colour-blind capitalism of the state's new guard. The twin support of these groups of elites proved crucial for credibly constructing the message of continuity which he projected throughout the campaign. Wilder essentially sought to replicate the winning coalitions of his two white, Democratic predecessors.

Table 10.2. Part II Case Studies (Explanatory variables)

		Douglas Wilder	Harvey Gantt	Carol Moseley Braun
Biography		Strong linked fate	Strong linked fate	Strong linked fate
Context		Continuity	Change	Change
Elites	*Supporters*	Colour-blind /white supremacist	Race-conscious liberals	Race-conscious liberals
	Opponent	Implicit hostility	Explicit hostility	Implicit hostility

Gantt and Braun were both influenced by their political allies, but unlike Wilder who depended on members of the 'white-supremacist racial order', Gantt and Braun's elite allies were racial egalitarians.[12] In Braun's case she had been active in race-conscious liberal politics throughout her career, based at the heart of Chicago's progressive, independent community. Gantt's strong backing from liberals provided him with a solid financial ballast and enforced his campaign's moral purpose,

[12] See King & Smith (2005).

but the particular elite actor who mattered most for him was his opponent, an unreconstructed white supremacist. Jesse Helms's willingness to speak openly about race and his opposition to race-conscious measures ironically strengthened Gantt's capacity to present the opposite line.

The historical contexts of these elections were also relevant. Wilder was a candidate of continuity, following eight years of centrist Democratic rule. Both Gantt and Braun were candidates of change. Gantt's candidacy was premised on upending the racial order of the Old South which Helms personified. Through her defeat of an incumbent senator in her own party, Braun was unmistakably a change candidate. She was also the candidate, in part, of a movement outraged by the treatment of a black woman (Anita Hill) by an all-male, all-white Washington establishment. She was elected in a year which prioritised outsiders, standing against opponents (both in the primary and general elections) who typified the Washington insider crowd.

Part III – Race-Conscious Campaigning in Democratic Primaries

The two campaigns in Part III display the potential potency of race-conscious appeals in majority-white Democratic contests. Both Barack Obama and Keith Ellison highlighted their symbolic-historic status as a means to differentiate themselves from competitors as well as a way to appeal to liberal whites' aspirations of making history and diversifying America's federal legislature (see Table 10.3). At the same time, neither candidate felt the need to disavow their race-conscious policy commitments, showing that their elections were not only symbolically significant but also substantively race-conscious. In addition, both candidates worked assiduously within minority communities, without whose solid backing such a strategy would not be possible. Given the propensity of minority voters to support Democratic candidates over Republican candidates regardless of race, I suggest that this approach can also be applied in general election contexts by black Democratic candidates but not by black Republican candidates.

Table 10.3. Part III Case Studies (Dependent Variable)

		Barack Obama	Keith Ellison
Style		Unreserved (but not confrontational)	Conciliatory
Policy Agenda		Liberal	Liberal/Progressive
Racial Appeals	*To whites*	Yes	Yes
	To blacks	Yes	Yes
CAMPAIGN STRATEGY		Symbolic-Substantive	Symbolic-Substantive

In both of these cases, left-wing elites provided support, such as money and endorsements, which many African American candidates lack. Such backing, I argue, was vital in enabling the candidates to establish themselves as 'credible' to white voters who might otherwise have been put off by a race-conscious candidate. White voters were prepared to support black candidates who moved race relations forward, but such appeals needed to be framed within familiarly white social frameworks. For example,

Obama's status as the first African American president of the *Harvard Law Review* appealed to liberal whites' desires to elect a trailblazer and barrier breaker, whereas Ellison's work with the Nation of Islam during the Million Man March did not.

Both candidates were extremely well-educated in the history and sociology of American racial inequality, and they had shown a willingness in their pre-electoral periods to pursue careers with racial justice dimensions. However, Obama's mistaken decision to challenge a former Black Panther for Congress weakened his credibility in the black community, necessitating (perhaps ironically) a more aggressively race-conscious campaign in the black community when he ran for the Senate four years later (see Table 10.4). Obama's appeals to black voters were assisted by his support from key black elites, such as state senate president Emil Jones, and the image he consciously projected of his wife and family. Obama is sometimes credited with being a successful African American candidate in majority-white contexts because of his biracial heritage, but we should question how necessary a biracial identity is for a crossover candidate. Keith Ellison demonstrates that white parentage is not necessary for electoral success in majority-white contexts.

Table 10.4. Part III Case Studies (Explanatory Variables)

		Barack Obama	Keith Ellison
Biography		Medium linked fate (intensified over campaign)	Strong linked fate
Context		Change	Racial change, ideological continuity
Elites	*Supporters*	Race-conscious liberals	Race-conscious liberals
	Opponents	No hostility	Implicit hostility

Part IV – After Deracialisation

The campaigns in Part IV demonstrate that candidates who pursue colour-blind campaign strategies in recent years have modified their approaches from the colour-blind strategy pursued by Douglas Wilder in 1989. It is worth considering how they compare. Cory Booker shows the development of colour-blind campaigning from being a pragmatic strategy pursued to diminish the salience of race as a defence against white racism (i.e. the deracialised campaign strategy) to a racially optimistic strategy which proclaims the diminished salience of racism as a fact (i.e. the post-racial campaign strategy). Unlike Wilder, Booker was willing to speak about race, pay tribute to the legacies of the civil rights movement, and discuss policies with strong racial content. However, he did so by advancing on a colour-blind analysis which rejected the utility of race-conscious policies and presented black insurgent politics as myopic and self-defeating. It is questionable whether Booker's assertion of himself as a racially transcendent politician was empirically accurate, given the strongly racialised content of his opponent's attacks and his own group-based appeals to Latino voters.

Harold Ford Jr is the closest candidate in my sample to Wilder in the political and racial backdrop of his election. Nonetheless, Ford deviated from the deracialised strategy in important ways. Unlike

Wilder, Ford made clearly targeted racial appeals to African Americans and campaigned actively within the black community, while also promoting a colour-blind appeal to whites.

Candidate biography and the timing of the elections were important variables in explaining Ford's and Wilder's different choice of strategy. Wilder was justified in expecting high levels of support from African Americans because of his long history of service for the black community as a state legislator and lawyer, his strong social rootedness the black community, and the particular historic significance of his candidacy as the grandson of slaves running to be the first elected black governor of an American state. Ford could not take high levels of black support for granted, nor could he afford to ignore them. Ford's elite upbringing and social relations were obstacles to his appeal within the African American community. The latter concern in the black community was ironically worsened by racially hostile attacks from the Republican Party about his romantic life which has hitherto been thought by commentators to be targeted (only) to whites. While Wilder and Ford both advanced conservative policy agendas to white voters, Wilder's black community credentials were never in doubt in the same way that they were for Ford, allowing Wilder to focus almost exclusively on the white electorate.

Table 10.5. Part IV Case Studies (Explanatory Variables)

		Harold Ford Jr	Cory Booker
Biography		Medium linked fate (diminished over campaign)	Weak linked fate
Context		Continuity (white voters)/Change (black voters)	Contrast to black power politics
Elites	*Supporters*	Colour-Blind Whites/ Race-Conscious Blacks	Colour-Blind Capitalists/Latino leaders
	Opponents	Strong implicit racial hostility	Strong implicit racial hostility

As Table 10.6 suggests, Ford's campaign strategy was the result of an unenviable balancing act, which in many ways Ford executed masterfully if ultimately incompletely. To whites, Ford followed a largely deracialised campaign strategy in which the candidate went to extreme lengths to defer to white racial hierarchies and to forward a centrist/conservative policy programme. To African Americans, Ford offered a symbolic-substantive approach which embraced his family's tradition of black insurgent politics, articulated a symbolic-historic narrative, and emphasised left-of-centre policy positions. Unlike Booker, Ford refused to repudiate black insurgent politics entirely both because his campaign recognised the necessity of record levels of African American turnout but also because the black insurgents were members of his own family.

Table 10.6. Part IV Case Studies (Dependent Variable)

		Harold Ford Jr	Cory Booker
Style		Conciliatory	Direct but not racially confrontational
Policy Agenda		Centrist/Conservative	Progressive/Pragmatic Centrist
Racial Appeals	*To whites*	Yes (White Racial Solidarity)	No (Post-Racial/Post-Partisan)
	To blacks	Yes (Black Racial Solidarity)	No
CAMPAIGN STRATEGY		Segregated	Post-Racial

For Cory Booker, his previous electoral context as mayor of a majority-black city would typically be regarded as a hindrance to his statewide aspirations. Yet, from his first campaign for city council, Booker spent his political career presenting himself as a 'bridge' between urban and suburban politics. Booker's national network of powerful supporters in finance, law, and Silicon Valley, as well as the support he commanded from Latino and white elites locally, provided him with the institutional ballast to eschew the traditional institutional base of the black community and, indeed, frame himself to a large extent against a caricature of 'racialised' black politics.

Findings

When considering each of the three hypotheses below, several patterns recur.

(1) *Campaign environment will affect the racial campaign strategy chosen.*
(2) *The racial identity of the candidate will affect the racial campaign strategy chosen.*
(3) *The racial outlook of local elites will affect the racial campaign strategy adopted*.

First, campaign environment undeniably has a strong effect on the choice of racial campaign strategy in rich and complicated ways. There are two prevalent dynamics. Areas with an history of racial egalitarian politics unsurprisingly facilitate candidates' choice of race-conscious campaign strategies (e.g., Minneapolis). However, race-conscious strategies can also be viable in areas where racial egalitarianism is strongly contested by a white supremacist political order. This context forces voters to choose on which side of America's racial orders they wish to align themselves (e.g., North Carolina). Second, while the deracialisation strategy was premised on a median-voter theory of seeking the racial and political 'moderate' in a campaign, it is clear that some black candidates eschew this centre-seeking approach for one which focuses on motivating key constituencies of supporters (e.g., Gantt, Braun, Ford) or by appealing to the most politically and racially liberal voters (e.g., Ellison, Obama). Candidates who embrace a median-voter theory of politics (e.g., Wilder, Booker) seem more likely to choose a colour-blind racial campaign strategy.

Second, candidate biography clearly matters, but not quite as the second hypothesis assumed in Chapter 2. Candidates with strong rootedness in the black community have greater flexibility about their choice of racial campaign strategy. Candidates who grew up and socialised in black communities – Douglas Wilder, Harvey Gantt, Carol Moseley Braun, Keith Ellison – did not need to work on establishing bonds of trust with black voters in the ways in which Barack Obama or Harold Ford did. This flexibility enabled Wilder to ignore black voters altogether yet still acquire record levels of support from the black community, while Ford was forced to construct a unique appeal to the black community and still floundered in generating turnout from black voters sufficient to win. Cory Booker, however, showed that black candidates without strong ties to the black community are not limited simply to working with whites. They might forge links with other groups such as the Latino community. This seems more likely as states become more multi-racial, largely through Asian and Hispanic population growth.

Third, the racial outlook of local elites played a surprisingly large role in black candidates' choice of racial campaign strategy. Candidates with linkages to well-organised, politically mobilised, and well-financed liberal elites tended to choose race-conscious political strategies (e.g., Gantt, Braun, Ellison, Obama). Ford, who had strong linkages with black elites but not white liberals, limited his race-conscious appeals to black voters. Wilder's elite support base rejected race-conscious politics, conceivably restricting his choice of race-conscious strategies. The white elites who supported Booker also rejected, even parodied, race-conscious black politics.

Contribution

This thesis represents a theoretical reconceptualisation of the existing explanations of black candidates' choice of racial campaign strategy. The thesis has endeavoured to advance the scholarly literature through the presentation of new theoretical models which take seriously differing racial contexts, candidate background, and coalitions of elite actors in shaping a candidate's choice of racial campaign strategy.

I have set out to achieve two goals. The first goal was to provide a rich, analytical account based on primary research of the range of campaign strategies available to office-seeking African American candidates outside of traditional, majority-black election contexts. In spite of the dominance of deracialisation in the scholarly literature and, to some extent, as an axiom of campaign politics more generally, I have shown that some African American candidates have chosen to cast aside the deracialised strategy in favour of alternative approaches. These candidates, sometimes motivated in large part by personal conviction and often aided by supportive coalitions of black and white elites, demonstrate the capacity for black candidates to embrace their racial identity and champion policies which redress racial inequality while still seeking support from white voters.

The second objective was to offer some plausible explanations as to the strategic decision-making process in campaigns. Decision-making in campaigns is rarely linear, and I have not set out to 'process trace' from one decision to the next. Instead, I have shown the rich set of variables which candidates face when determining their racial strategies: racial context and history, the racial dispositions of supportive and opposing elite actors, and candidates' own racial biographies. I have highlighted the shifting importance of these factors for each of the candidates.

The findings give cause to revisit central assumptions about black-white political engagement. First, I have shown that scholars have been too circumscribed in their assessment of black-white voting patterns. While a jurisdiction's racial demography is not an irrelevant consideration, the assumption that a majority-white electorate required a particular racial campaign strategy was far too deterministic. The election of an African American can be a powerful motivator for some white voters. Scholars

should address the extent to which voters of all races actively seek to promote candidates who increase the representation of racial minorities.

In addition to its theoretical and empirical output, this manuscript makes a methodological contribution. My research approach has been heavily influenced by the historical institutionalist approach in political science, especially the school of American Political Development (APD) research. Consistent with APD scholarship, this thesis has been provoked in part by a desire to challenge the liberal assumptions of American politics and to unravel teleological claims about its development. While some commentators have portrayed APD scholars as 'closet historians who somehow ended up in the wrong PhD program', I hope that I have demonstrated that an historically oriented approach to the study of politics is possible within the discipline of political science.[13]

Specifically, I maintain that even when political science research is modest in its conclusions – recognising that findings are rarely timeless and not always strictly falsifiable – it can nonetheless be rich and informative. As the historical institutionalist scholars Ronald Kahn and Ken Kersch write, research can be 'simultaneously descriptive, interpretive, and empirical' without needing to subscribe to faceless models and bleak statistical displays.[14] Suzanne Mettler and Richard Valelly are right to lament the privileging of a particular kind of 'methodological virtuosity' which entails a deeply positivist preoccupation with resolving problems of causal inference.[15] While APD scholarship takes causal inference seriously, it does not take its reliability to be utterly primary.

At the same time, I do not shun the many insights of quantitative political science. Analytical rigour, detailed psephology, and careful statistical analyses unquestionably played vital roles in this research. The position, then, is to be able to speak meaningfully to scholars from all methodological worlds.[16] Gabriel Almond, a leader of the behaviouralist revolution who latterly felt it had gone astray, famously described political scientists as sitting at 'separate tables' rather than eating communally at the canteen.[17] This manuscript is dedicated to communal dining.

I owe a great deal to Andra Gillespie, whose research encouraged me to move beyond data tables and into political actors' offices, living rooms, and local greasy spoons. Forming relationships has been vital to this research, and the hundreds of hours spent interviewing political actors across the United States have provided me with an intuitive sense of these campaigns and their environments which could not simply be understood from reading words on a page. I share Gillespie's 'appalled' reaction to

[13] Orren & Skowronek, 2004, 5.
[14] Kahn & Kersch, 2006, 15.
[15] Mettler & Valelly, 2016, 3.
[16] Ware (1985) wrote approvingly of this 'pluralistic' approach.
[17] Almond, 1988, 830.

political scientists who seem to lack an interest in politics.[18] As Gillespie writes, we must keep the 'politics' in 'political science'.[19]

Avenues for future research

An obvious lacuna in this manuscript is the number of female candidates. Only one of the seven candidates in my sample was female. However, this bias is an unfortunate reflection of an intense bias against black women in predominantly white electoral politics. Since the 1980s, over 90% of black candidates for major statewide offices have been male.[20] Successful black female candidates are even rarer. No black woman has even been *nominated* by the Democratic Party to run for governor in any state. There have only been two black female senators (Carol Moseley Braun and Kamala Harris), but only one of them (Braun) defeated a white opponent. The other, Senator Kamala Harris of California, was elected in 2016 after defeating a Latina candidate during the primary and general elections. She therefore did not meet my selection criteria, described in Chapter 1, of needing to face a white opponent.

Only one black female Democrat has been elected to Congress from a majority-white House constituency (Cynthia McKinney). In a wider sample of cases, McKinney's re-election deserves attention. It is worth noting, however, that McKinney initially won election to her district when it was majority-black before court-ordered redistricting created a bare-majority white district. In sum, a study of *successful* African American candidates in majority-white jurisdictions is skewed, by its nature, towards male candidates.

Furthermore, while the models have deliberately focused on black-white relations, the racial strategies of other ethnic minority candidates, especially Hispanics and Asians, deserve further attention. Future researchers might wish to consider incorporating these other groups into the analysis, while taking care to identify differences in political culture between ethnic groups. The study of campaign strategies among multi-lingual electorates would be a fruitful place to begin.

Discussion

Paul Frymer and colleagues were being generous when they stated that the United States has historically been 'underdemocratized' due to its exclusion of African Americans' political voices.[21] The racist exclusion of blacks from the franchise and civic life – as well as their precarious access to basic public goods such as protection from arbitrary violence – impairs any notion that the United States was a democracy before the 1960s. Even after the 1960s, the inability for African Americans to win elections in areas where most of the voters were white blocked their admission to the greatest offices of power in the American system: the US Senate, governorships, and the presidency. Whites' unwillingness to vote

[18] Gillespie, 2012b, 87.
[19] Ibid., 83.
[20] Stout, 2015, Conclusion.
[21] Frymer et al, 2006, 44.

for black candidates also placed a cap on the proportion of seats African Americans could win in the House of Representatives.

The inclusion of African American political voices, through their election in majority-white jurisdictions, should be understood as a process of deepening American democracy. On the same week that the Berlin Wall came down, the grandson of slaves was elected governor of the former capital of the Confederacy. While the former event is rightly recognised as a profound moment in democratic history, the latter event also should be.

Due the size of their population and the historic imbalances of power in the American system, African Americans who seek democratic power are charged with being more integrated into the world of whites than whites need to be in the black community. As one black politician stated to me, 'We are very aware of how white people feel about us -- all the time, seven days a week, 365 days a year -- in a way that white people do not have to'.[22] The deracialised strategy assumed that in order to be politically successful outside of majority-black environments, black politicians needed to diminish their racial identity and abandon racial policy commitments under the white glare. In 1989 Jesse Jackson posited, 'To ask a man who could be governor to be the state's top civil rights leader all at the same time may be asking too much'.[23] The candidates in this thesis suggest that there are viable alternatives to the deracialised campaign strategy. The capacity of black candidates after the Wilder victory to win election outside of the black community while also promoting the specific concerns of African Americans is a major challenge for American democracy. The candidates in this study suggest that while Jackson's assessment has not been fully repudiated, it may have been overstated.

[22] Interview with Ron Rice, 10 July 2015.
[23] Jackson, 1989, xiii.

Appendix A – Interview Sources

Chapter 3 – Douglas Wilder (Virginia, 1989)

Name	Position
L Douglas Wilder	Candidate, Governor of Virginia (1990-94)
Joe McLean	Campaign Manager
David Petts	Pollster
Larry Framme	Chairman of the Virginia Democratic Party
Jim Babb	Journalist (WWBT-TV, Richmond)
Robert Holsworth	Academic (Virginia Commonwealth University)

Chapter 4 – Harvey Gantt (North Carolina, 1990)

Name	Position
Mel Watt	Campaign Mangaer
Mac McCorkle	Deputy Campaign Manager
David Wofford	Press Secretary
Letetia Daniels Jackson	Field Director, Mecklenberg County
Will Polk	Opposition Research
Monty Halger	Finance Director
Martha Khanna	Fundraiser
E Lawrence Davis	Chairman of the North Carolina Democratic Party
John Humphrey	Director of the North Carolina Democratic Party
Carter Wrenn	Director of Jesse Helms for US Senate
Ted Arrington	Academic (University of North Carolina)

Harvey Gantt's own reflections are brought out through comments he made to Pamela Varley in a lengthy interview for her 1992 case study of the campaign and in an hour-long interview with UNCTV in 2016.[1]

Chapter 5 – Carol Moseley Braun (Illinois, 1992)

Name	Position
Carol Moseley Braun	Candidate, US Senator (1993-99)
Steve Cobble	Political Director
Ira Cohen	Research Director
John Rodgers	Finance Director
Heather Booth	Field Director
Alton Miller	Communications Director (Primary)
David Eichenbaum	Communications Director (General Election)
Hope Daniels	Press Secretary
Jacky Grimshaw	Office Manager, Office of Mayor Harold Washington
Karen Yarbrough	Cook County Recorder of Deeds
Jim Charlton	Political activist
Andy Shaw	Journalist (*Chicago Sun-Times*)

[1] Varley, 1992.

Note I interviewed Carol Moseley Braun on two occasions: August 2013 and April 2015. The interviews are cited as 'Interview with Braun, 2013' or 'Interview with Braun, 2015' in the footnotes.

I also benefited from the first-hand accounts of the campaign given by Braun's Democratic primary opponent Senator Alan Dixon in his memoirs[2] and from Fredrick Harris's study of the Braun campaign's organisation in the black church.[3]

Chapter 6 – Barack Obama (Illinois, 2004)

Name	Position
James Cauley	Campaign Manager
Nate Tamarin	Deputy Campaign Manager
Peter Giangreco	Direct Mail Designer & Strategic Advisor
Valerie Corr Hanserd	Public Relations Manager
Newton Minow	Former boss of both Barack and Michelle Obama (Sidley Austin LLP)
Abner Mikva	University of Chicago Law colleague & political mentor
Jacky Grimshaw	Next-door neighbour & Hyde Park political activist
Don Rose	Organiser of 2002 anti-Iraq War rally & political activist
Chris Sautter	Campaign Manager (2000 IL:01 congressional campaign)
Eric Adelstein	Campaign Manager for US Rep Bobby Rush

Barack Obama's own reflections are drawn from his 2006 memoir and public interviews.[4]

Chapter 7 – Keith Ellison (Minnesota, 2006)

Name	Position
Keith Ellison	Candidate, US Congressman for MN:05 (2007-*present*)
Mike Erlandson	Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party Primary Opponent
Pam Costain	Political Advisor
John Stiles	Strategic Advisor
Betty Folliard	Suburban Vote Coordinator
Carla Kjellberg	Communications Advisor & Legal Counsel
Walter Mondale	Vice President of the United States (1977-81)
Martin Sabo	US Congressman for MN:05 (1979-2007)
Donald Fraser	US Congressman for MN:05 (1963-79), Mayor of Minneapolis (1980-93)
Arvonne Fraser	Political activist
Jeff Blodgett	Campaign Manager for Senator Paul Wellstone (1990, 1996, 2002)
Mohamud Noor	Somali political activist
Hashi Shafi	Somali political activist
Michael van Keulen	Political activist & headmaster of predominantly Somali school
Vic Rosenthal	Executive Director of Jewish Community Action
Iric Nathanson	Historian of ethnic minority relations in Minneapolis

While in Minneapolis, I visited three Somali community centres: the African Development Center, the Confederation of Somali Community, and Somali Community Action.

[2] Dixon, 2013.
[3] Harris, 1999.
[4] Obama, 2006.

Chapter 8 – Harold Ford (Tennessee, 2006)

Name	Position
Beecher Fraser	Campaign Manager
Jim Hester	Executive Director of the Co-Ordinated Campaign
Nichole Francis	Deputy Campaign Manager
Pete Brodnitz	Pollster
Charles Robert Bone	Finance Chair
Liz Lowery	Fundraiser
John Bakke	Communications Advisor
John Freeman	Field Director, Memphis
Andrew Patrick	Field Organiser, East Tennessee
Mark Shuermann	Chief of Staff
Bobby White	District Director
Sherman Greer	Deputy District Director
Chip Forrester	Chairman of the Tennessee Democratic Party
Don Majors	Legislative Assistant, Office of US Rep Jim Cooper
Jay Lindy	Family friend
David Sutphen	Personal friend & Congressional Office Manager
Tom Ingram	Campaign Manager (Bob Corker for US Senate)
Todd Womack	Communications Director (Bob Corker for US Senate)
Marcus Pohlmann	Academic (Rhodes College)
Sekou Franklin	Academic (Middle Tennessee State University)

Ford's own reflections come from extensive commentary in his 2010 autobiography.[5]

Chapter 9 – Cory Booker (New Jersey, 2013)

Name	Position
Brad Lawrence	Senior Strategist
Steve DeMicco	Senior Strategist
Modia Butler	Chief of Staff
Daniel Pereira	Political Advisor
Claudia Granados	Trade Union Liaison
Jermaine James	Deputy Chief of Staff
Van Parish	Campaign Manager (Mayoral Campaign)
Pablo Fonseca	Latino Outreach Director
Anant Raut	Field Operative
Mamie Bridgeforth	Newark City Councillor, West Ward
Ron Rice	Newark City Councillor, West Ward
Dave Giordano	Leader of the Firefighters Union
John Abeigon	Political Director of the Teachers Union
Walter Fields	Political Director of the New Jersey NAACP
Robert Curvin	Historian & political activist
Marshall Curry	Director of *Street Fight*

[5] Ford, 2010.

Appendix B – Archival Sources

This appendix lists the archives which I consulted for this thesis. In addition to the sources listed below, I made extensive use of online materials, including cached campaign webpages and Twitter. These online sources are cited throughout the text. From the Lexis-Nexis online newspaper search, I downloaded and read hundreds of contemporary local and national newspaper articles about the campaigns. Appendix C lists the newspapers which were consulted for this thesis. Only newspaper sources which were not available on Lexis-Nexis are listed below.

All Cases

(n=284 radio and television advertisements)

Collection	Archive	Location
Kanter Archive of Political Advertisements (Radio & Television)	Political Communications Center, University of Oklahoma	Norman, OK

Chapter 3 – Douglas Wilder (Virginia, 1989)

Collection	Archive	Location
Papers of L Douglas Wilder, Governor of Virginia	Virginia Union University	Richmond, VA
Papers of Jay Shropshire, Clerk of the Virginia State Senate	Library of Virginia	Richmond, VA

Chapter 4 – Harvey Gantt (North Carolina, 1990)

Collection	Archive	Location
Papers of Harvey Gantt, Mayor of Charlotte	University of North Carolina, Charlotte	Charlotte, NC
North Carolina Collection	University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill	Chapel Hill, NC
Papers of Boyd Cathey, conservative political activist	University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill	Chapel Hill, NC

Chapter 5 – Carol Moseley Braun (Illinois, 1992)

Collection	Archive	Location
Papers of Carol Moseley Braun, US Senator	Chicago History Museum	Chicago, IL
Papers of Leon Despres, Hyde Park Alderman	Chicago History Museum	Chicago, IL
Papers of Harold Washington, Mayor of Chicago	Harold Washington Library	Chicago, IL
1992 Election Folder	Harold Washington Library	Chicago, IL
Papers of the Hyde Park Historical Soceity	University of Chicago	Chicago, IL

Chapter 6 – Barack Obama (Illinois, 2004)

Collection	Archive	Location
Papers of the Hyde Park Historical Society	University of Chicago	Chicago, IL
Papers of Harold Washington, Mayor of Chicago	Harold Washington Library	Chicago, IL
Papers of Emil Jones, President of the Illinois State Senate	University of Illinois, Chicago	Chicago, IL
Papers of Carol Moseley Braun, US Senator	Chicago History Museum	Chicago, IL
Papers of Leon Despres, Hyde Park Alderman	Chicago History Museum	Chicago, IL

Peter Giangreco, who designed Barack Obama's print literature, kindly shared the campaign's direct mail pieces with me.

Chapter 7 – Keith Ellison (Minnesota, 2006)

Collection	Archive	Location
Keith Ellison Folder	Hennepin County Library	Minneapolis, MN
Minneapolis Spokesman-Recorder Microfilm Collection	Hennepin County Library	Minneapolis, MN

Chapter 8 – Harold Ford (Tennessee, 2006)

Collection	Archive	Location
Ford Family Folder	Benjamin Hooks Library	Memphis, TN
Tennessee Newspaper Collection (political cartoons)	Nashville City Library	Nashville, TN

Bob Corker's campaign manager provided me with the Republicans' internal tracking poll data. Democratic co-ordinated campaign director Jim Hester gave me eighteen leaflets and direct mail communications from the Democratic and Republican campaigns.

Chapter 9 – Cory Booker (New Jersey, 2013)

Collection	Archive	Location
Sharpe James Administration Files	City of Newark Archives and Records Management Center	Newark, NJ
Newark City Council Collection	City of Newark Archives and Records Management Center	Newark, NJ
New Jersey Elections Collection	Cummings Information Center, Newark Public Library	Newark, NJ
Newark Elections Collection	Cummings Information Center, Newark Public Library	Newark, NJ
Cory Booker Binders	Cummings Information Center, Newark Public Library	Newark, NJ
Sharpe James Files	New Jersey Historical Soceity	Newark, NJ
Frank Hutchins Papers	New Jersey Historical Soceity	Newark, NJ
Stanley Winters Papers	New Jersey Historical Soceity	Newark, NJ

Brad Lawrence, Steve DeMicco, and Dan Pereira generously shared a sample of direct mail and other printed materials from the Senate campaign. Dave Giordano kindly gave me badges, a hat, and a shirt from Booker's various candidacies.

Appendix C – Newspaper Sources

All Cases

The Atlantic
Congressional Quarterly
Ebony
The Economist
Esquire
Essence
The Guardian
Jet
Los Angeles Times
National Journal
Negro Digest
Newsweek
New Republic
New York Times
New Yorker
People
Roll Call
USA Today
Wall Street Journal
Washington Post

Chapter 3 – Douglas Wilder (Virginia, 1989)

Newport News Daily Press
Richmond News-Leader
Richmond Times-Dispatch

Chapter 4 – Harvey Gantt (North Carolina, 1990)

Burlington Times-News
Charlotte Observer
Elizabeth City Daily Advance
Gastonia Gazette
Greensboro News & Record
Lexington Dispatch
Raleigh News & Observer
Spartanburg Herald-Journal
Wilmington Morning Star
Winston-Salem Journal

Chapter 5 – Carol Moseley Braun (Illinois, 1992)

Chicago Defender
Chicago Magazine
Chicago Reader
Chicago Sun-Times
Chicago Tribune
Crain's Chicago Business
New City
Northwest Side Press
Southern Illinoisian
Southtown Economist

Chapter 6 – Barack Obama (Illinois, 2004)
Chicago Daily Herald
Chicago Reader
Chicago Tribune
Crain's Chicago Business
Hyde Park Herald
N'Digo
Peoria Journal Star
Springfield State Journal-Register
St Louis Post-Dispatch

Chapter 7 – Keith Ellison (Minnesota, 2006)
City Pages
Insight
Minneapolis Spokesman-Recorder
Minneapolis Star Tribune
Skyway News
Twin Cities Daily Planet
Twin Cities Reader

Chapter 8 – Harold Ford (Tennessee, 2006)
Chattanooga Times Free Press
Memphis Commercial Appeal
Memphis Flyer
Nashville Tennessean
Tri-State Defender

Chapter 9 – Cory Booker (New Jersey, 2013)
Bergen Record
Burlington County Times
The Forward
Newark Star-Ledger
New York Magazine
North Jersey Observer
The Press of Atlantic City
South Jersey Times
West Paterson Herald News

Appendix D – Coding Method for Campaign Communications

Racial Stereotypes

Racial stereotype	Identifying phrases	Newspaper article example	White opponent advert example
Corrupt	➢ accused/arrested ➢ corruption/ corrupt ➢ criminality/ criminal ➢ cronyism ➢ ethical failings/ shortcomings/ indiscretions/ lapses ➢ felon ➢ fraud ➢ law-breaking/ law violation ➢ nepotism ➢ patronage ➢ scandal ➢ under investigation	'Richard Williamson spent Sunday blasting his Democratic opponent Carol Moseley Braun for what he called a litany of ethical lapses, patronage, cronyism, and corruption'. Source: 'Williamson hits Braun's ethics', *Chicago Tribune*, 5 October 1992	'Ford gave campaign funds to the legal fund of a nightclub owner accused of manslaughter…but was forced to pay it back because he violated election laws'. Source*:* 'It's about protecting our shared Tennessee values', Tennessee Republican Party direct mail
Dysfunctional family	➢ affair ➢ divorced ➢ family in disarray ➢ immoral lifestyle ➢ lacks 'family values' ➢ lack of parental involvement/ monitoring of children ➢ single-parent	'…the young black liberal from a family that seems always ready to stretch the bounds of propriety…' Source*:* 'My return to balance', *New York Times*, 24 September 2006	Accuses Gantt of lacking family values because he wants girls to have abortions 'without their mother or father knowing' Source: 'How extremely liberal is Harvey Gantt?', Helms campaign leaflet
Fancy/uppity	➢ elitist ➢ expensive tastes ➢ extravagant ➢ fancy ➢ lavish ➢ living it up ➢ references luxury items ➢ slick	'Jesse Helms is accusing Democrat Harvey Gantt, who is black, of using government for personal gain…"It made Mr. Gantt a millionaire," Helms said." No wonder he has a swimming pool in his back yard and a tennis court. He made that off of a deception".' Source: 'Those last-minute shockers', *Associated Press*, 4 November 1990	'Harold Ford has taken 69 junkets paid for by private interests to places like Florida and the Virgin Islands…Ford spent over $2,500 of campaign funds for an Armani suit'. Source*:* 'It's about protecting our shared Tennessee values', Tennessee Republican Party direct mail
Lazy	➢ didn't earn/didn't work	'His daddy handed him his seat in Congress…the narrator says'.	'Does it matter that he didn't show up for work? Yeah, it matters to us'

	for what he/she has ➢ doesn't show up for work ➢ hand-out ➢ lazy ➢ undeserving ➢ work-shy	Source: 'Corker, Ford agree: Ad goes too far', *Commercial Appeal*, 14 October 2006	Source*:* 'Does it matter', Republican National Committee direct mail
Liberal	➢ communist ➢ liberal ➢ left-wing ➢ leftist ➢ Marxist ➢ socialist	'Mr. Williamson, a lawyer, has painted Ms. Braun as a tax-and-spend liberal with what he has called "reckless" ideas like universal health care'. Source: 'Senate race tightens amid dispute over ethics', *New York Times*, 29 October 1992	'Her liberal agenda would hurt working men and women' Source: 'Violence', Williamson campaign TV advert
Sexually deviant/ threatening	➢ flirtatious ➢ loose morals ➢ predatory ➢ promiscuous ➢ reports sexual history ➢ sex/sexual	'A blond party girl coos that she met Harold at a Playboy party'. Source: 'Corker: Anti-Ford ad tacky', *Tennessean*, 21 October 2006	[image of white woman] 'The murder was one of the most notorious in the city's history – she was raped, strangled, and left to bake in the trunk of her car…Why would Harold Ford Jr want to put this notorious murderer back on Tennessee streets?' Source: 'Harold Ford Jr: Weak on crime, easy on criminals', Tennessee Republican Party direct mail
Untrustworthy	➢ can't be trusted ➢ fooling people/ tricking people ➢ imposter ➢ liar/lied ➢ misleading ➢ pretending to be something he/she is not ➢ questions honesty ➢ secretive ➢ shady/shifty ➢ something to hide ➢ untruthful ➢ up to no good	' "The liberal newspapers don't tell you about Harvey Gantt's secret campaign running radio ads that play only on black radio stations," a Helms radio ad says…The insinuation is clear – blacks are up to something in secret, so it can't be good for whites'. Source: 'Inescapable fact: racism is playing a role', *Lexington Dispatch*, 3 November 1990	'It seems Harvey Gantt is running <u>two</u> campaigns – a public campaign and a secret campaign' Source: 'Fundraising', Helms campaign TV advert

Racial Cues

Racial cue	Identifying phrases	Newspaper example	White opponent advert example
Exclusive language	➢ doesn't share our values/concerns ➢ doesn't understand us/our values ➢ not from here ➢ not one of us ➢ out of the mainstream ➢ un-American	'Republican Bob Corker tells Tennesseans that Ford is not one of us – he's from DC and doesn't share Tennessee values'. Source: 'VU prof sees racial code in canceled [sic] ad: Corker team says idea is ridiculous', *Tennessean*, 26 October 2006	'Harvey Gantt: extreme liberal values, Jesse Helms: North Carolina values' Source: 'Death penalty', Helms campaign TV advert
Extreme language	➢ extremely/extreme ➢ radical ➢ reckless ➢ too [characteristic]	'And taking a page from the Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee playbook, Williamson called Braun recklessly liberal for what he said were her predilections to higher taxes, big government, and a softness on crime'. Source: 'In final hours candidates print to the finish', *Chicago Tribune*, 1 November 1992	'Harvey Gantt is asking you and me to approve of some pretty awful things…That's too liberal. Harvey Gantt is asking us to approve some pretty extreme views to vote for him'. Source: 'Awful things', Helms campaign TV advert
Reference to machine politics	➢ Political machine/machine politics	'Corker has accused Ford's prominent Memphis political family of running machine-style politics in winning numerous local elections and seats in Congress and the state legislature'. Source: 'Senate hopefuls spar on war', *Tennessean*, 11 October 2006	'Carol Moseley Braun is just another machine politician'. Source: 'Ethics revised', Williamson campaign TV advert
Reference to majority-black jurisdiction	➢ Wilder – Church Hill ➢ Gantt – N/A ➢ Gantt – N/A ➢ Braun – South Side ➢ Obama – South Side ➢ Ellison – North Minneapolis ➢ Ford – Memphis ➢ Booker - Newark	'Ford inoculated himself against charges that he was an unwelcome, out-of-touch liberal from Memphis'. Source: 'The GOP gets nervous in Tennessee', *Time*, 20 October 2006	'The Fords of Memphis…a family dynasty failing to protect our Tennessee values'. Source: 'Dynasty, political machine', Tennessee Republican Party direct mail
Reference to black politician/ black leader	➢ Name of a black politician, celebrity, or leader	'Helms compared recent statements by Gantt to those made by supporters of [black] Washington mayor Marion	Braun is condemned for sponsoring a resolution in the state legislature honouring Gus Savage,

		Barry, convicted recently of a misdemeanour drug charge'. Source: 'Helms: fund-raising letters not racist', *Wilmington Morning Star*, 27 August 1990.	black US representative known for anti-Semitic comments Source: 'Resolution', Williamson campaign advert

Racialised policies

Implicitly racialised policy	Newspaper article example	White opponent advert example
Crime	'[Peabody] did not shirk from needling his opponent Republican Atty General Edward W Brooke, particularly over the loss of some of the Crime Commission cases'. Source: 'Brooke, Peabody more alike than not', *Boston Herald*, 6 November 1966	'Harold Ford, Jr's idea of protecting our children: Letting criminals out of prison early'. Source: 'The Harold Ford Jr Plan for Improving Education', Tennessee Republican Party direct mail
Death penalty	'The challenge for Mr. Gantt is to steer the debate away from emotional issues like the death penalty, which he opposes and which is often used to drive a wedge between conservative Democrats and their party'. Source: 'In North Carolina's Senate race, a divisive TV fight over values', *New York Times*, 23 September 1990	Black background, image of Braun, with red letters underneath which say 'Opposes death penalty' Source: 'Violence', Williamson campaign TV advert
Drugs	'Rich Williamson on Thursday introduced marijuana as an issue in his U.S. Senate campaign against Carol Moseley Braun, criticizing the Democratic nominee as being soft on crime because she supports decriminalization of the popular illegal drug'. Source: 'Williamson rips Braun on marijuanna', *Chicago Tribune*, 19 June 1992	'Drugs a menace to our society and our children', but Harvey Gantt opposes the death penalty for drug traffickers. 'Harvey Gantt is too liberal'. Source: 'Drug comparison', Helms campaign TV advert
Guns	'Daniel Wilson stood toe to toe with Gantt and asked him why he supported gun registration and a waiting period for ownership'. Source: 'Harvey Gantt: Former Charlotte mayor refuses to run campaign in predictable fashion', *Lexington Dispatch*, 23 October 1990	A man ironically states, 'Ford is right. I do have too many guns'. *Source:* 'Call Me', Republican National Committee TV advert
Taxes	' "There is not a doubt that if Congressman Ford goes to the US	'Carol Moseley Braun voted to raise your taxes 11 times'

	Senate he will cast his vote with Ted Kennedy and Hillary Clinton for a Democratic agenda to raise taxes and waken national security," [Corker press secretary] Womack said'. Source: Ex-VA governor stumps for Ford, *Tennessean*, 2 October 2006	Source: 'No tax', Williamson campaign TV advert
Welfare	'The message, as absorbed by some white voters, would be along the lines that blacks are always leaching on white taxpayers for welfare and food stamps'. Source: 'Braun still has big lead despite tarnished image', *Northwest Side Press*, 14 October 1992	'Braun denies wrongdoing in Medicaid flap [but] $28,750 question hounds Braun'. Source: 'Ethics revised', Williamson campaign TV advert

Explicit racial references

Reference	Identifying phrases	Newspaper article example	Black candidate advertisement example
Black racial identity	➢ African American ➢ black ➢ candidate of colour ➢ minority/ethnic minority ➢ race ➢ Negro	'…a crowd of several hundred at the University of Maryland in the home county of the Republican candidate, Lt. Gov. Michael Steele, who is black'. Source: 'Obama campaigns for Cardin in Maryland race', *Washington Post*, 27 September 2006	'Jesse Helms is running another smear campaign, charging me with using my race for financial advantage, charging me with requiring gay teachers in schools. Those ads are lies and Jesse Helms knows it'. Source: 'Smear', Gantt campaign TV advert
Symbolic-historic status	➢ descriptive representation ➢ do the right thing ➢ historic ➢ make history ➢ make us proud ➢ symbol of change ➢ the first… ➢ unprecedented candidacy	'As DFL state Rep. Keith Ellison tries to win a historic election to Congress, he's doing it without food or water during the daylight hours' Source: 'Running fast - and fasting - along the campaign trail', *Minneapolis Star-Tribune*, 13 October 2006	'Braun makes history…the first African American woman to be elected to county office…' Source: 'Bio', Braun campaign TV advert
Explicitly racial policies	➢ affirmative action ➢ black history commemoration ➢ busing ➢ civil rights ➢ federal aid to blacks ➢ integration/ segregation	'Helms…shook a victorious fist when [Senator Bob] Dole praised his being the 34th vote needed to uphold President George Bush's veto of the Civil Rights Bill'. Source: 'Helms castigates Gantt about advertisements',	'…under President Clinton, he scored landmark victories for civil rights' Source: 'Leader', Deval Patrick campaign TV advert

	➢ racial representation ➢ racial quotas	*Burlington Times-News*, 4 November 1990	

Bibliography

Abramowitz, Alan. 1980. A Comparison of Voting for US Senator and Representative in 1978. *American Political Science Review* 74:3 (Sept), 633-640.

Abramowitz, Alan. 1996. Bill and Al's Excellent Adventure. *American Politics Research* 24:4 (Oct), 434-442.

Abramowitz, Alan. 2001. The Time for Change Model and the 2000 Election. *American Politics Research* (May), 279-282.

Abramowitz, Alan. 2004. When Good Forecasts Go Bad. *PS: Political Science & Politics* (Oct), 745-746.

Abramowitz, Alan. 2008. Forecasting the 2008 Election with the Time-For-Change Model. *PS: Political Science & Politics* (Oct), 691-695.

Abramowitz, Alan. 2012. Forecasting in a Polarized Era. *PS: Political Science & Politics* 45:4 (Oct), 618-619.

Ackerman, Bruce. 2014. *We the People: The Civil Rights Revolution*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Adrian, Charles. 1960. *States and Local Governments.* New York: McGraw-Hill.

Albritton, Robert, George Amedee, Keenan Grenell, Don-Terry Veal. 1996. 'Deracialization and the New Black Politics' in H Perry (ed) *Race, Politics, and Governance in the United States*. Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press.

Alexander, Michelle. 2010. *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in an Age of Color-Blindness*. New York: The New Press.

Alexander, Rudolph & Jacquelyn Gyamerah. 1997. Differential Punishing of African Americans and Whites Who Possess Drugs: A Just Policy or a Continuation of the Past?. *Journal of Black Studies* 28:1, 97-111.

Alim, H Samy & Geneva Smitherman. 2012. *Articulate While Black: Barack Obama, language, and race in the US.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Alinsky, Saul. 1971. *Rules for Radicals*. New York: Random House.

Alkebulan, Paul. 2014. *The African American Press in World War II.* Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Almond, Gabriel. 1988. Separate Tables: Schools and Sects in Political Science. *PS: Political Science & Politics* 21: 4 (Autumn), 828-842.

Alt, James. 1994. 'The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Black and White Voter Registration in the South' in C Davidson & B Grofman (eds) *Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact of Voting Rights Acts, 1965-1990.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ansolabehere, Stephen & Shanto Iyengar. 1995. *Going Negative.* New York: Free Press.

Apampa, Ifedolapo. 2013. *Protest and Mobilisation in Sub-Saharan Africa: Occupy Nigeria and the Political Process Model*. MPhil thesis in Sociology. University of Cambridge.

Appiah, Anthony Kwame. 1990. 'Racisms' in D Goldberg (ed) *Anatomy of Racism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Applebome, Peter. 1996. *Dixie Rising*. New York: Crown Publishers.

Arksey, Hilary, & Peter Knight. 1999. *Interviewing for Social Scientists: An Introductory Resource with Examples.* London: Sage.

Atkinson, Frank. 1992. *The Dynamic Dominion*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Atkinson, Frank. 2006. *Virginia in the Vanguard.* Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Axelrod, David. 2015. *Believer: My Forty Years in Politics*. New York: Penguin Press.

Baek, Young Min & Jocelyn Landau. 2011. White Concerns About Black Favoritism in a Biracial Presidential Election. *American Politics Research* 39:2, 291-322.

Baker, Donald. 1989. *Wilder: Hold Fast to Dreams*. Cobin John, MD: Seven Locks Press.

Baker, Gordon. 1955. *Rural Versus Urban Power: The Nature and Consequences of Unbalanced Representation.* New York: Doubleday.

Bakke, John. Nd. *The Problem Solver vs the Man from Tennessee: Competition of Images in the 2006 Election of Bob Corker.* unpublished mss.

Barkley, Charles. 2006 [2005]. *Who's Afraid of a Large Black Man?*. New York: Riverhead Freestyle.

Barone, Michael & Grant Ujifusa. 1989. *The Atlas of American Politics 1990.* Washington, DC: National Journal.

Barreto, Matt. 2007. Si Se Puede: Latino Candidates and the Mobilization of Latino Voters. *American Political Science Review* 101:3 (Aug), 425-441.

Bartels, Larry. 1993. Messages Received: The political impact of media exposure. *American Political Science Review* 87:2 (Jun), 267-285.

Bartels, Larry. 2006. 'Vote Decision Making and Campaign Effects' in H Brady & R Johnston (eds) *Capturing Campaign Effects*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Bartels, Larry. 2008. *Unequal Democracy.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Bartley, Numan. 1995. *The New South, 1945-1980: The Story of the South's Modernization*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

Bass, Jack & Walter de Vries. 1976. *The Transformation of Southern Politics: Social Change and Political Consequences since 1945.* Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press.

Bates, Roberts, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, & Barry Weingast. 1998. *Analytic Narratives*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Beck, Paul, Russell Dalton, Steven Greene, & Robert Huckfeldt. 2002. The Social Calculus of Voting: Interpersonal, media, and organizational influences on presidential choice. *American Political Science Review* 96:1 (Mar), 57-73.

Beckett, Sven. 2001. *The Monied Metropolis: New York and Consolidation of the American Bourgeoisie, 1850-1896.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bedolla, Lisa & Melissa Michelson. 2012. *Mobilizing Inclusion: Transforming the Electorate Through Get-Out-The-Vote Campaigns.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Bell, Derrick. 1973. *Race, Racism, and American Law*. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co.

Berelson, Bernard, Paul Lazarsfeld, & William McPhee. 1954. *Voting: A study of opinion formation in a presidential campaign*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Berinsky, Adam, Justin de Benedictis-Kessner, Megan Goldberg, Michele Margolis. 2014. Implicit Cue-Taking in Elections. MIT Political Science Department Research Paper. Number 2014-27.

Berman, Ari. 2015. *Give Us the Ballot: The Modern Struggle for Voting Rights in America*. New York: Macmillan.

Bernd, Joseph. 1972. 'Georgia: Static and Dynamic' in W Havard (ed) *The Changing Politics of the South*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

Berry, J. 2002. Validity and Reliability Issues in Elite Interviewing. *PS: Political Science and Politics* 35:4, 679-682.

Best, Wallace. 2001. Mama and the Confederate Flag. *Callalo* 24:1 (Winter), 14-17.

Biernacki, P, & D Waldorf. 1981. Snowball Sampling: Problems and Techniques of Chain Referral Sampling. *Sociological Methods Research* 10:2, 141-163.

Biles, Roger. 1986. *Memphis in the Great Depression*. Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press.

Biles, Roger. 1995. *Richard J Daley: Politics, Race, and the Governing of Chicago.* De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press.

Bishop, Bradford & D Sunshine Hillygus. 2011. 'Campaigning, Debating, and Advertising' in R Shapiro & L Jacobs (eds) *Oxford Handbook of American Public Opinion and the Media*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Black, Earl & Merle Black. 2003. *The Rise of the Southern Republicans.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Black, Merle & Earl Black. 1987. *Politics and Society in the South.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Blalock, Hubert. 1967. *Toward a Theory of Minority Group Relations.* New York: Wiley & Sons.

Blee, Kathleen, & Verta Taylor. 2002. 'Semi-Structured Interviewing in Social Movement Research' in B Klandermans & S Staggenborg (eds) *Methods of Social Movement Research.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Block, Ray. 2011. Backing Barack Because He's Black: Racially motivated voting in the 2008 election. *Social Science Quarterly* 92:2 (Jun), 423-446.

Bloodworth, Jeffrey. 2013. *Losing the Center: The Decline of American Liberalism, 1968-1992.* Lexington: University of Kentucky Press.

Boatright, Robert. 2004. *Expressive Politics: Issue Strategies of Congressional Challengers*. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press.

Bobo, Lawrence & Cybelle Fox. 2003. Race, Racism, and Discrimination: Bridging Problems, Methods, and Theory in Social Psychological Research. *Social Psychology Quarterly* (Dec), 319-332.

Bobo, Lawrence, James Kleuegel, & Ryan Smith. 1997. 'Laissez-Faire Racism: The crystallization of a kinder, gentler, antiblack ideology' in S Tuck & J Martin (eds) *Racial Attitudes in the 1990s*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Bobo, Lawrence. 2011. 'Somewhere between Jim Crow and Post-racialism'. *Daedalus* 140:2 (Spring).

Bolick, Clinton. 1996. *The Affirmative Action Fraud*. Washington, DC: Cato Institute.

Bollinger, Amy King. 1997. *Jesse Helms Versus Harvey Gantt: The Race in Black and White.* MA Thesis in Communications Studies: University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

Bonastia, Christopher. 2011. *Southern Stalemate: Five Years without Public Education in Prince Edward County, Virginia*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo & David Dietrich. 2011. The Sweet Enchantment of Color-Blind Racism in Obamerica. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* 634 (Mar).

Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo. 2003. *Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Booker, Cory. 2013. Reforming America's Criminal Justice System: Refocusing on Delivering Results, Aligning with our Values, and Restructuring the Burden on Taxpayers. Newark, NJ: Booker for Senate Policy Paper.

Booker, Cory. 2016. *United: thoughts on Finding Common Ground and Advancing the Common Good*. New York: Random House.

Boss, Michael. 2011. 'Stories of Peoplehood: An approach to the study of identity, memory, and historiography' in M Boss (ed) *Narrating Peoplehood Amidst Diversity*. Aarhus: Aarhus University Press.

Brady, Henry & David Collier. 2004. *Rethinking Social Inquiry.* Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Brady, Tim. 2007. *Gopher Gold: Legendary Facts, Brilliant Blunders, and Amazing Feats at the University of Minnesota.* St Paul: Minnesota Historical Society.

Brodnitz, Pete. 2006. Harold Ford Jr and the Problem with Polls. *The Polling Report* 22: 24 (Dec).

Brooke, Edward. 2007. *Bridging the Divide: My Life.* New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Brown, Claude. 1965. *Manchild in the Promised Land*. New York: Macmillan & Co.

Brown, Michael. 1999. *Race, Money, and the American Welfare State.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Bryman, A. 2012. *Social Research Methods* 4th edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bullock, Charles. 1987. Redistricting and Changes in the Partisan and Racial Composition of Southern Legislatures. *State and Local Government Review* 19, 62-67.

Bunce, Valerie & Sharon Wolchik. 2011. *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Post-Communist Countries.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Buni, Andrew. 1967. *The Negro in Virginia Politics*. Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press.

Butler, Patrick & Neil Collins. 1994. Political Marketing: Structure and Process. *European Journal of Marketing* 28:1, 19-34.

Cameron, Charles, David Epstein, & Sharyn O'Halloran. 1996. Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?. *American Political Science Review* 90:4, 794-812.

Campbell, Angus, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, & David Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. New York: Wiley.

Campbell, James. 1996. Polls and Votes: The Trial-Heat Presidential Election Forecasting Model, Certainty, and Political Campaigns. *American Politics Research* 24:4 (Oct), 408-433.

Canon, David, Matthew Shousen, & Patrick Sellers. 1996. The Supply Side of Congressional Redistricting: Race and Strategic Politicians. *Journal of Politics* 58:3, 846-862.

Canon, David. 1999. *Race, Redistricting, and Representation: The Unintended Consequences of Black Majority Districts*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Caraley, Demetrios. 1996. Dismantling the Federal Safety Net: Fictions Versus Realities. *Political Science Quarterly* 111:2 (Summer), 225-258.

Carmichael, Stokely & Charles Hamilton. 1967. *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation*. New York: Vintage Books.

Carter, Niambi & Pearl Ford Dowe. 2015. The Racial Exceptionalism of Barack Obama. *Journal of African American Studies* 19, 105-119.

Carton, Paul. 1984. *Mobilizing the Black Community: The effects of personal contact campaigning on black voters.* Washington, DC: Joint Center for Political Studies.

Ceasar, James, Andrew Busch, & John Pitney. 2009. *Epic Journey: The 2008 Elections and American Politics*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Cecelski, David & Timothy Tyson. 1998. *Democracy Betrayed: The Wilmington Race Riot of 1898 and its Legacy.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Chance, James. 2005. *1912: Wilson, Roosevelt, Taft, and Debs.* New York: Simon & Schuster.

Chen, Anthony. 2009. *The Fifth Freedom: Jobs, Politics, and Civil Rights in the United States, 1941-1972*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Christensen, Rob & Jack Fleer. 1999. 'North Carolina: Between Helms and Hunt No Majority Emerges' in A Lamis (ed) *Southern Politics in the 1990s*. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press.

Christensen, Rob. 2010. *The Paradox of Tar Heel Politics.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Citrin, Jack, Donald Green, David Sears. 1990. White Reactions to Black Candidates: When does race matter?. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 54:1 (Spring), 74-96.

Clark, Meredith.2014. *To Tweet Our Own Cause: A Mixed-Methods Study of the Online Phenomenon 'Black Twitter'.* PhD dissertation. University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill).

Clayton, Dewey. 2010. *The Presidential Campaign of Barack Obama: A critical analysis of a racially transcendent strategy*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Clemons, Michael & Charles Jones. 2000. African American Legislative Politics in Virginia. *Journal of Black Studies* 30:6 (Jul), 744-767.

Clemons, Michael. 1998. The Mayoral Campaigns of Harvey Gantt: Prospects and Problems of Coalition Maintenance in the New South. *Southwestern Political Review* 26:1 (Mar).

Coates, Ta-Nehisi. 2015. *Between the World and Me.* New York: Spiegel & Grau.

Cochran, Augustus. 2012. 'How the South Has Influenced the Nation' in C Bullock & M Rozell (eds) *Oxford Handbook of Southern Politics*. Oxford Oxford University Press.

Cohen, Adam & Elizabeth Taylor. 2000. *American Pharaoh: Mayor Richard J Daley.* Boston: Back Bay Books.

Cohen, Cathy. 1999. *The Boundaries of Blackness*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Cohen, Cathy. 2010. *Democracy Remixed: Black youth and the future of American politics.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cohn, David. 1948. *Where I Was Raised.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Coker, J Bradford. 1989. Virginia Déjà vu. *The Polling Report* 5:22 (Nov).

Cole, Elizabeth & Safiya Omari. 2003. Race, Class, and the Dilemmas of Upward Mobility for African Americans. *Journal of Social Issues* 59:4 (Dec), 785-802.

Collet, Christian. 2008. Minority Candidates, Alternative Media, and Multiethnic America: Deracialization or Toggling?. *Perspectives on Politics* 6:4 (Dec), 707-728.

Collier, Ruth. 1999. *Paths Toward Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Copeland-Carson, Jacqueline. 2004. *Creating Africa in America: Translocal Identity in an Emerging World City*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Coulter, E Merton. 1947. *The South During Reconstruction*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

Cox, Gar & Jonathan Katz. 2002. *Elbridge Gerry's Salamander: The electoral consequences of the reapportionment revolution.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Crosby, Molly. 2006. *The American Plague*. New York: Berkley Books.

Curtis, Edward. 2002. *Islam in Black America*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Curvin, Robert. 2014. *Inside Newark: Decline, Rebellion, and the Search for Transformation.* New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Cutler, John. 1972. *Ed Brooke: Biography of a Senator.* Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merill Company.

D'Orio, Wayne. 2004. *Carol Moseley-Braun.* Philadelphia: Chelsea House Publishers.

Dahl, Robert. 1956. *A Preface to Democratic Theory*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Darby, Darrick & Argun Saatcioglu. 2014. Race, Justice, and Desegregation. *Du Bois Review* 11:1, 87-108.

Davidson, Chandler & Bernard Grofman (eds). 1994. *Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact of Voting Rights Acts, 1965-1990.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Davis, Belinda, Michelle Livermore, Younghee Lim. 2011. The Extended Reach of Minority Political Power. *Journal of Politics* 73:2 (Apr), 494-507.

Dawson, Michael. 1994. *Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African American Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Dawson, Michael. 2011. *Not in our lifetimes: The future of black politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Delton, Jennifer. 2002. *Making Minnesota Liberal: Civil Rights and the Transformation of the Democratic Party*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Diana Kapiszweski, Lauren MacLean, Benjamin Read, *Field Research in Political Science: Practices and Principles*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dixon, Alan. 2013. *The Gentleman from Illinois: Stories from Forty Years of Elective Public Service.* Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

Dixon, Robert. 1968. *Democratic Representation: Reapportionment in Law and Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dollinar, Brian. 2013. *The Negro in Chicago.* Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Donald, David. 1965. *The Politics of Reconstruction, 1863-1867*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

Donaldson, Gary. 1999. *Dewey Defeats Truman.* Lexington: University of Kentucky Press.

Dovi, Suzanne. 2002. Preferential Descriptive Representation: Will just any woman, black, or Latino do?. *American Political Science Review* 96:3 (Dec), 729-743.

Dowdy, Wayne. 2005. A Good Tammany Hall Tennessean: The Life and Papers of Edward Hull Crump. *West Tennessee Historical Society Papers* 59.

Drake, St Clair & Horace Cayton. 1945. *Black Metropolis*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Duchacek, Ivo. 1970. *Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimension of Politics*. New York: Holt, Reinhart, & Winston.

Duke, Paul. 1990. 'Prelude to a New Day' in M Eds *Claiming the Dream: The Victorious Campaign of Douglas Wilder of Virginia.* Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin Books.

Dulio, David. 2004. *For Better or Worse? How Campaign Consultants are Changing Elections in the United States*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Earls, Anita, Emily Wynes, & LeeAnne Quatrucci. *Voting Rights in North Carolina, 1982-2006.* Report from the Center for Civil Rights, University of North Carolina School of Law.

Edds, Margaret. 1990. *Claiming the Dream: The Victorious Campaign of Douglas Wilder of Virginia.* Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin Books.

Edsall, Thomas & Mary Edsall. 1991. *Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics*. New York: W W Norton & Co.

Elliot, Ward. 1970. Prometheus, Proteus, Pandora, and Procrustes Unbound: The Political Consequences of Reapportionment. *University of Chicago Law Review* 37:3.

Ellison, Keith. 2014. *My Country Tis Of Thee: My Faith, My Family, Our Future*. New York: Gallery Books.

Erie, Steven. 1988. *Rainbow's End: Irish-Americans and the Dilemmas of Urban Machine Politics, 1840-1985.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Erikson, Robert & Christopher Wlezien. 2012. *The Timeline of Presidential Elections: How campaigns do (and do not) matter.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Fair, Ray. 2002. *Predicting Presidential Elections and Other Things*. Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press.

Falleti, Tulia. 2005. A Sequential Theory of Decentralization. *American Political Science Review* 99:3 (Aug), 327-346.

Fanon, Frantz. [1963] 1961. *The Wretched of the Earth*. New York: Grove Press.

Fanon, Frantz. [1967] 1952. *Black Skin White Masks.* New York: Grove Press.

Fanon, Frantz. [1967] 1959. *A Dying Colonialism.* New York: Grove Press.

Farquharson, K. 2005. A Different Kind of Snowball: Identifying Key Policymakers. *International Journal of Social Research Methodology* 8:4, 345–53.

Fenno, Richard. 1978. *Home Style: House Members in their Districts*. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co.

Fenno, Richard. 2003. *Going Home: Black representatives and their constituents.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Fenton, John. 1966. *Midwest Politics*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.

Filindra, Alexandra. 2016. Black Group Violence and Whites' Gun Policy Attitudes in the 21st Century. Paper presented at the annual conference of the Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA). Chicago, IL.

Finkel, Stephen, Thomas Guterblock, & Marian Borg. 1991. Race-of-Interviewer Effects in a Preelection Poll: Virginia 1989. *Political Opinion Quarterly* 55, 313-330.

Flores, Alejandro. 2016. Do Bilinguals Respond More Favorably to Candidate Advertisements in Spanish or English?. Paper presented to the annual conference of the American Political Science Association (APSA). Philadelphia, PA.

Florini, Sarah. 2013. Tweets, Tweeps, and Signifyin: Communication and cultural performance on 'Black Twitter'. *Television New Media* (Mar), 1-15.

Foner, Eric. 1993. *Freedom's Lawmakers: A directory of black officeholding during Reconstruction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ford, Harold. 2010. *More Davids than Goliaths: A Political Education.* New York: Crown Publishers.

Forgette, Richard & Marvin King. 2009. 'Electoral Cycles in Racial Polarization and the 2006 Senate Elections' in G Persons (ed) *Beyond the Boundaries: A New Structure of Ambition in African American Politics*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Fortner, Michael. 2015. *Black Silent Majority: The Rockefeller Drug Laws and the Politics of Punishment.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Fox, Cybelle & Thomas Guglielmo. 2012. Defining America's Racial Boundaries: Blacks, Mexicans, and European Immigrants, 1890-1945. *American Journal of Sociology* 118:2 (Sept), 327-379.

Franklin, John Hope. 1993. *The Color Line.* Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press.

Franklin, Sekou. 2010. 'Situational Deracialization, Harold Ford, and the 2006 Senate Race in Tennessee' in A Gillespie (ed) *Whose Black Politics? Cases in Post-Racial Leadership*. New York: Routledge.

Frasure, Lorrie. 2010. 'The Burden of Jekyll and Hyde: Barack Obama, Racial Identity, and Black Political Behavior' in A Gillespie (ed) *Whose Black Politics? Cases in post-racial black leadership.* New York: Routledge.

Fredrickson, George. 1988. *The Arrogance of Race: Historical Perspectives on Slavery, Racism, and Social Inequality*. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press.

Friedman, Thomas. 2016. *Thank You for Being Late.* New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux.

Friesema, H Paul. 1969. Black Control of Central Cities: The Hollow Prize. *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* 35:2, 75-79.

Fry, Gladys-Marie. 1975. *Night Riders in Black Folk History*. Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press.

Frydl, Kathleen. 2009. *The GI Bill.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Frymer, Paul, Dara Strolovitch, & Dorian Warren. 2006. New Orleans is Not the Exception: Re-politicizing the study of racial inequality. *Du Bois Review* 3:1, 37-57.

Fu, Vincent. 2007. How Many Melting Pots? Intermarriage, panethnicity, and the black-non-black divide in the United States. *Journal of Comparative Family Studies* (Spring), 215-237.

Fullmer, Elliot.2015. Early Voting: Do More Sites Lead to Higher Turnout?. *Election Law Journal* 14:2 (Jun), 81-96.

Gahagan, Stacey & Alfred Brophy. 2014. Reading Professor Obama: Race and the American Constitutional Tradition. *University of Pittsburgh Law Review* 75 (Summer), 495-581.

Garland, David. 2010. *Peculiar Institution: America's Death Penalty in an Age of Abolition*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Pfress.

Gay, Claudine. 2000. The Impact of Black Congressional Representation on Political Attitudes. San Francisco, CA: Public Policy Institute of California.

Geffert, Hannah. 2006. *Prophets of Protest: Reconsidering the History of American Abolitionism.* New York: The New Press.

Gelman, Andrew & Gary King. 1993. Why are American Presidential Election Campaign Polls So Variable when Votes are so Predictable?. *British Journal of Political Science* 23:4 (Oct), 409-451.

George, Herman. 2004. Community Development and the Politics of Deracialization. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 594:1, 143-157.

Gerber, Alan. 1996. African Americans' Congressional Careers and the Democratic House Delegation. *Journal of Politics* 58:3 (Aug), 831-845.

Gerring, John. 2007. *Case Study Research: Principles and Practice.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gibson, Dawn-Marie & Herbert Burg. 2017. 'Introduction' in D-M Gibson & H Berg (eds) *New Perspectives on the Nation of Islam*. New York: Routledge.

Gibson, Edward & Desmond King. 2016. 'Federalism and Subnational Democratization: The South in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries' in J Behrend & L Whitehead (eds) *Illiberal Practices.* Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Gilens, Martin. 1999. *Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, media, and the politics of anti-poverty policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Gillespie, Andra & Amber Perez. 2010. 'Race, Religion, and Post-9/11 America: The Election of Keith Ellison' in A Gillespie (ed) *Whose Black Politics? Cases in Post-Racial Leadership.* New York: Routledge.

Gillespie, Andra & Emma Tolbert. 2010. 'Racial Authenticity and Redistricting: A comparison of Artur Davis's 2000 and 2002 Congressional campaigns' in A Gillespie (ed) *Whose Black Politics? Cases in Post-Racial Leadership*. New York: Routledge.

Gillespie, Andra, Niambi Carter, Tyson King-Meadows, Shayla Numnally. 2015. The Contours of Contemporary Black Republicanism. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (APSA), San Francisco.

Gillespie, Andra. 2007. 'From Insurgency to Deracialization: The Evolution of Black Mayoralties' in J Davis (ed) *Perspectives on Black Politics and Black Leadership*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

Gillespie, Andra. 2009. 'The Third Wave: Assessing the Post-Civil Rights Cohort of Black Elected Leadership' in G Persons (ed) *Beyond the Boundaries: A New Structure of Ambition in African American Politics*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Gillespie, Andra. 2010. 'Meet the New Class: Theorizing young black leadership in a post-racial era' in A Gillespie (ed) *Whose Black Politics? Cases in Post-Racial Leadership*. New York: Routledge.

Gillespie, Andra. 2012a. *The New Black Politician*. New York: New York University Press.

Gillespie, Andra. 2012b. 'My Research Approach' in M Mitchell & D Covin (eds) *Charting the Range of Black Politics*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Gillespie, Andra. 2013. 'Beyond Booker: Assessing the prospects of black and Latino mayoral candidates in Newark, New Jersey' in R Perry (ed) *21st Century Urban Race Politics.* Bingley: Emerald.

Gilliam, Franklin. 1996. Exploring Minority Empowerment. *American Journal of Political Science* 40:1, 56-81.

Gillion, Daniel. 2016. *Governing with Words: The political dialogue on race, public policy, and inequality in America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Glaser, James. 1996. *Race, Campaign Politics, and Realignment in the South*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Goertz, Gary. 1996. *Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Goffman, Erving. 1959. *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. New York: Random House.

Gomolin, Adam, Joshua Green, Nina Home, Justin Kidd, & David Kirp. 2007. *Race Bait '08: Lessons Learned from the Political Dirty Dozen*. Berkeley: Goldman School of Public Policy.

Gooding-Williams, Robert. 2014. Autobiography, Political Hope, Racial Justice. *Du Bois Review* 11:1.

Goodwyn, Lawrence. 1978. *The Populist Movement: A Short History of the Agrarian Revolt in America*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Graham, L O. 1999. *Our Kind of People: Inside America's Black Upper Class.* New York: Harper Collins.

Grant, Keneshia. 2014. *Relocation and Realignment: How the Great Migration Changed the Face of the Democratic Party*. PhD Dissertation. Syracuse University.

Grayson, Richard. 2010. Localism the American Way. *Public Policy Research* (Jul-Aug), 75-79.

Green, Donald, Bradley Palmquist, & Eric Schickler. 2004. *Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political parties and the social identities of voters*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Grier, William & Price Cobbs. 1968. *Black Rage.* New York: Basic Books.

Griffin, John & Patrick Flavin. 2007. Racial Differences of Information, Expectations, and Accountability. *Journal of Politics* 69 (Feb), 220-236.

Grimshaw, William. 1992. *Bitter Fruit: Black Politics and the Chicago Machine, 1931-1991*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Guinier, Lani & Gerald Torres. 2014. *The Miner's Canary: Enlisting Race, Resisting Power, Transforming Democracy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Guinier, Lani. 1991. No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality. *Virginia Law Review* 77:8 (Nov), 1413-1514.

Gutgold, Nichola. 2006. *Paving the Way for Madam President.* Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Hacker, Andrew. 2003. *Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal.* New York: Scribner.

Hackett, Ursula & Desmond King. 2015 When Are Color-Blind Policies Really Color-Blind? The racial politics of school vouchers. Paper presented at the annual conference of the Midwest Political Science Association Conference (Apr).

Hajnal, Zoltan. 2007. *Changing White Attitudes to Black Political Leadership*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hajnal, Zoltan. 2009. Who Loses in American Democracy? A Count of Votes Demonstrates the Limited Representation of African Americans. *American Political Science Review* 103:1 (Feb), 37-57.

Hamilton, Charles. 1973. 'Full Employment as a Viable Issue' in A Brimmer (ed) *When the Marching Stopped: An analysis of black issues in the '70s*. New York: National Urban League.

Hamilton, Charles. 1977. Deracialization: Examination of a Political Strategy. *First World* (Mar/Apr).

Hamilton, Charles. 1979. The Patron-Recipient Relationship and Minority Politics in New York City. *Political Science Quarterly* 94:2 (Summer), 211-227.

Hamilton, Charles. 1992. The Politics of Deracialization in the 1990s. *National Political Science Review* 3, 175-178.

Hamilton, Charles. 2016. Taking Democracy Seriously: Black Power Politics Coping with Political Change. Conference in Honor of Charles V Hamilton, Columbia University: Keynote Address.

Haney Lopez, Ian. 2000. 'Race and Erasure: The Salience of Race to Latinos/as' in R Delgado & J Stefanic (eds) *Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge* 2nd edition. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

Harris, Fredrick. 1999. *Something Within: Religion in African American Political Activism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Harris, Fredrick. 2012. *The Price of the Ticket: Barack Obama and the Decline of Black Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Harris, Fredrick. 2014. The Rise of Respectability Politics. *Dissent* 61:1 (Winter), 33-37.

Harris-Lacewell, Melissa. 2004. *Barbershops, Bibles, and BET: Everyday Talk and Black Political Thought*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Harris-Perry, Melissa. 2011. *Sister Citizen: Shame, Stereotypes, and Black Women in America*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Hartman, Hermene. 2009. 'Two Gentlemen from Illinois: A Perspective' in R Hendon *Black Enough , White Enough: The Obama Dilemma*. Chicago: Third World Press.

Haskins, James. 1972. *A Piece of Power: Four Black Mayors*. New York: Penguin.

Hayden, Tom. 2014. 'Forward' in J Williams *Unfinished Agenda: Urban Politics in the Era of Black Power*. Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic Books.

Heineman, Ronald. 2015. 'Colgate Darden' in *Encyclopedia of Virginia*. Richmond, VA: Virginia Foundation for the Humanities.

Hendon, Ricky. 2009. *Black Enough , White Enough: The Obama Dilemma*. Chicago: Third World Press.

Herron, Michael & Jasjeet Sekhorn. 2005. Black Candidates and Black Voters. *Journal of Political Studies* 67:1 (Feb), 154-177.

Hertzog, Mark. 1994. White Flight in the Voting Booth: The racial composition of localities and partisan voting in Virginia in the 1980s. *National Political Science Review* 4, 163-183.

Hibbing, John & Sara Brandes. 1983. State Population and the Electoral Success of US Senators. *American Journal of Political Science* 27:4 (Nov), 808-819.

Hill, A Spencer. 1969. The Reapportionment Decisions: A Return to Dogma?. *Journal of Politics* 31:1 (Feb), 186-213.

Himelstein, Jerry. 1983. Rhetorical Continuities in the Politics of Race. *Southern Speech Communication Journal* 48 (Winter), 153-166.

Hobsbawm, Eric. 1983. 'Inventing Traditions' in E Hobsbawm & T Ranger (eds) *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hochschild, Jennifer & Vesla Weaver. 2007. The Skin Color Paradox and the American Racial Order. *Social Forces* (Dec).

Holbrook, Thomas. 1996. *Do Campaigns Matter?.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Holloway, Harry. 1969. *The Politics of the Southern Negro.* New York: Random House.

Honey, Michael. 1993. *Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights: Organizing Memphis Workers.* Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Hopkins, Daniel. 2009. No More Wilder Effect, Never a Whitman Effect: When and why polls mislead about black and female candidates. *Journal of Politics* 71:3, 769-781

Horowitz, Tony. 1998. *Confederates in the Attic: Dispatches from the Unfinished Civil War.* New York: Vintage.

Hughey, Matthew. 2012. Show Me Your Papers: Obama's birth and the whiteness of belonging. *Qualitative Sociology* 35, 163-181.

Ifill, Gwen. 2009. *The Breakthrough: Politics and Race in the Age of Obama*. New York: Doubleday

Igo, Sarah. 2007. *The Averaged American: Surveys, Citizens, and Making of a Mass Public.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Ingalls, Gerald & Toby Moore. 1995. The Present and Future of Racial Gerrymandering. *Southeastern Geographer* 35:1 (May), 58-74.

Isaac, Jeffrey. 2015. For a more public political science. *Perspectives on Politics* 13:2 (Jun), 269-283.

Iyengar, Shanto, Helmut Norpoth, & Kyu Hahn. 2004. Consumer Demand for Election News: The Horserace Sells. *Journal of Politics* 66:1 (Feb), 157-175.

Jackson, Jesse. 1989. 'Introduction' in D Baker *Wilder: Hold Fast to Dreams*. Cobin John, MD: Seven Locks Press.

Jackson, John. 2006. The Making of a Senator: Barack Obama and the 2004 Illinois Senate Race. Occasional Paper of the Paul Simon Public Policy Institute, Southern Illinois University.

Jacobson, Gary. 2015. How Do Campaigns Matter?. *Annual Review of Political Science* 18, 31-47.

James, Michael Rabinder. 2011. The Priority of Racial Constituency over Descriptive Representation. *Journal of Politics* 73:3 (Jul), 899-914.

James, Sharpe. 2013. *Political Prisoner*. Newark, NJ: Nutany Publishing.

Jamieson, Kathleen Hall. 1992. *Dirty Politics: Deception, Distraction, and Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Janowitz, Rebecca. 2010. *Culture and Opportunity: Obama's Chicago*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Jeffries, Judson & Charles Jones. 2006. Blacks who Run for Governor and the US Senate: An examination of their candidacies. *The Negro Educational Review* 57: 3-4 (Fall/Winter 2006).

Jeffries, Judson. 1999. US Senator Edward Brooke and Governor L Douglas Wilder Tell Political Scientists How Blacks Can Win High-Profile Statewide Office. *PS: Political Science and Politics* 32:2 (Sept), 583-87.

Jeffries, Judson. 2002. Press Coverage of Black Statewide Candidates. *Journal of Black Studies* 32:6 (Jul), 673-697.

Johnson, Gbemende, Bruce Oppenheimer, & Jennifer Selin. 2012. The House as a Stepping Stone to the Senate: Why do so few African American members run?. *American Journal of Political Science* 56:2 (Apr), 387-399.

Johnson, Lawrence. 2014. Race in the Color-Blind Era. Deracialization and Black Elected Officials. *Sociology Compass* 8/9, 1100-1111.

Johnson, Richard. 2014. *Black Candidates Facing White Electorates: Racial Campaign Strategies in United States Senate Elections.* MPhil thesis in Politics. University of Oxford.

Johnson, Richard. 2017a. 'Racially Polarised Partisanship and the Obama Presidency' in E Ashbee & J Dumbrell (eds) *The Obama Presidency and the Politics of Change*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Johnson, Richard. 2017b. 'Race, Ethnicity, and Immigration' in G Peele, B Cain, G Peters, J Herbert (eds) *Developments in American Politics 8*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Johnson, Richard. Forthcoming. Proudly for Brooke: Race-Conscious Campaigning in 1960s Massachusetts. Under review.

Jones, Charles & Michael Clemons. 1993. 'A Model of Racial Crossover Voting' in G Persons (ed) *Dilemmas of Black Politics*. New York: Harper Collins.

Jones, Charles. 1991. The Election of L Douglas Wilder. *Western Journal of Black Studies* 15:2 (Summer), 105-113.

Jones, Joy. 2009. Campaigns Against Blackness: Criminality, Incivility, and Election to Executive Office. *Critical Sociology* 36:1, 1-20.

Juenke, Eric Gonzalez & Robert Preuhs. 2012. Irreplaceable Legislators? Rethinking Minority Representatives in the New Century. *American Journal of Political Science* 56:3 (Jul), 705-715.

Kahn, Ronald & Kenneth Kersch. 2006. *The Supreme Court and American Political Development*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

Kaiser, Robert. 2013. *Act of Congress*. New York: Knopf.

Karcher, Alan. 1998. *New Jersey's Municipal Madness*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Karpowitz, Christopher, Tyson King-Meadows, J Quin Monson, & Jeremy Pope. 2014. Dynamics of Candidate Race, Party, and Messaging with Voters' Racial Resentment. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.

Kato, Daniel. 2016. *Liberalizing Lynching: Building a New Racialized State.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Katznelson, Ira. 2005. *When Affirmative Action Was White.* New York: W W Norton & Company.

Kazee, Thomas. 1998. 'North Carolina: Conservatism, Traditionalism, and the GOP' in C Bullock & M Rozelle (eds) *The New Politics of the Old South*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Keech, William & Michael Sistrom. 1994. 'North Carolina' in C Davidson & B Grofman (eds) *Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act, 1965-1990.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Keiser, Lael, Peter Mueser, Seung-Whan Choi. 2004. Race, Bureaucratic Discretion, and the Implementation of Welfare Reform. *American Journal of Political Science* 48:2 (Apr), 314-327.

Keith, Jeanette. 2012. *Fever Season.* New York: Bloomsbury Press.

Kemp, Kathleen. 1986. Race, Ethnicity, and Urban Spatial Context. *Urban Studies* 23:3 (Jun), 197-208.

Kennan, R (ed). 2011. *The Cross of Redemption: Uncollected Writings of James Baldwin.* New York: Vintage.

Kenney, David & Robert Hartley. 2012 [2003]. *The Heroic and the Notorious: US Senators from Illinois* 2nd edition. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

Key, V O. 1949. *Southern Politics in State and Nation.* New York: Alfred Knopf.

Kim, Claire. 2000. *Bitter Fruit: The Politics of Black-Korean Conflict in New York City*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Kim, Clare. 1999. The Racial Triangulation of Asian Americans. *Politics & Society* 27:1 (Mar), 105-138.

Kinder, Donald & David Sears. 1981. Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic racism versus racial threats to the good life. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 40:3 (Mar), 414-431.

Kinder, Donald & Lynn Sanders. 1996. *Divided By Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

King, Desmond & Rogers Smith. 2005. Racial Orders in American Political Development. *American Political Science Review* 99:1 (Feb), 75-92.

King, Desmond & Rogers Smith. 2011. *Still A House Divided: Race and Politics in Obama's America.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

King, Desmond & Rogers Smith. 2014. Without Regard to Race: Critical Ideational Developments in Modern American Politics. *Journal of Politics* (Oct), 958-971.

King, Desmond & Stephen Tuck. 2007. De-centring the South: America's nationwide white supremacist order after Reconstruction. *Past and Present* 194, 213-253.

King, Desmond. 2000. *Making Americans: Immigration, Race, and the Origins of Diverse Democracy.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

King, Desmond. 2006. *The Liberty of Strangers: Making the American Nation.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

King, Desmond. 2007. *Separate and Unequal: African Americans and the Federal Government* Revised Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

King, Gary. 2014. Restructuring the Social Sciences. *PS: Political Science & Politics* (Jan), 165-172.

King-Meadows, Tyson. 2009. 'Running on Race and Against Convention: Michael Steele, Kweisi Mfume, and Maryland's 2006 Senate Contest' in G Persons (ed) *Beyond the Boundaries: A New Structure of Ambition in African American Politics*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Klinkner, Philip & Rogers Smith. 1999. *The Unsteady March: The rise and decline of racial equality in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Knotts, Gibbs H. 2005. Grassroots Republicanism: Evaluating Trickle Down Realignment Theory in North Carolina. *Politics & Policy* 33:2 (Jun), 330-345.

Kraus, Jeffrey. 2004. Generational Conflict and Urban Politics: The 2002 Newark Mayoral Election. *The Forum* 2:3.

Kraus, Neil. 2013. *Majoritarian Cities: Policy Making and Inequality in Urban Politics*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Kurtz, Marcus. 2013. *Latin American State Building in Comparative Perspective.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Laderman, Gary. 2003. *Rest in Peace: A Cultural History of Death and the Funeral Home in Twentieth-Century America.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lamis, Alexander. 1990 [1984]. *The Two-Party South* 2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Larson, Stephanie. 1990. Information and Learning in a Congressional District: A Social Experiment. *American Journal of Political Science* 34:4 (Nov), 1102-118.

Lazarsfeld, Paul & Allen Burton. 1951. 'Qualitative Measurement in the Social Sciences' in D Lerner & H Lasswell (eds) *The Policy Sciences*. Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press.

Lazarsfeld, Paul, Bernard Berelson, & Hazel Gaudet. 1948. *The People's Choice* 2nd edition. New York: Columbia University Press.

Leal, David, Matt Barreto, Jongho Lee, &Rodolfo de la Garza. 2005. The Latino Vote in the 2004 Election. *PS: Political Science & Politics* 38 (Jan).

Lebedoff, David. 1969. *The Twenty-First Ballot: A Political Party Struggle in Minnesota*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Lederer, Susan. 2006. 'Tucker's Heart: Racial Politics and Heart Transplantation in America' in K Wailoo, J Livingston, & P Guarnaccia (eds) *A Death Retold.* Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

Lederer, Susan. 2008. *Flesh and Blood.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lee, Frances. 2016. *Insecure Majorities: Congress and the Perpetual Campaign.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Levendusky, Matthew. 2009. *The Partisan Sort: How liberals became Democrats and conservatives became Republicans*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Levy, Jack. 2015. Counterfactuals, Causal Inference, and Historical Analysis. *Security Studies* 24:3, 378-402.

Lewis, Earl. 1991. *In Their Own Interests: Race, class, and power in twentieth-century Norfolk, Virginia.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Lewis-Beck, Michael & T Rice. 1992. *Forecasting Elections*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.

Lewis-Beck, Michael, Charles Tien, & Richard Nadeau. 2010. Obama's Missed Landslide: A Racial Cost?. *PS: Political Science & Politics*. (Jan), 69-76.

Lieberman, Robert. 1998. *Shifting the Color Line: Race and the American Welfare State.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Lincoln, C Eric. 1961. *The Black Muslims in America*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Link, William, 2005. *Righteous Warrior: Jesse Helms and the Rise of Modern Conservatism*

Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1971 [1950]. *Agrarian Socialism: The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Liu, Baodong. 2010. *The Election of Barack Obama.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Llorens, James, Sharon Parsons, & Huey Perry. 1996. 'The Election of Troy Carter to the Louisiana House of Representatives' in H Perry (ed) *Race, Politics, and Governance in the United States*. Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press.

Loewen, James. 1988 [1968]. *The Mississippi Chinese: Between Black and White* 2nd edition. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press.

Luebke, Paul. 1990. *Tar Heel Politics: Myths and Realities.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Lui, Baodong. 2014. Post-Racial Politics? Counterevidence from the Presidential Elections, 2004-2012. *Du Bois Review* 11:2 (Oct), 443-463.

Macmillan, Malcolm. 1955. *Constitutional Development in Alabama, 1798-1901*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Majors, Wililam. 1986. *Change and Continuity: Tennessee Politics since the Civil War*. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press.

Malcolm X. 1965. *The Autobiography of Malcolm X.* New York: Grove Press.

Mansbridge, Jane. 1999. Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Should Women Represent Women?. *Journal of Politics* 61:3 (Aug), 628-657.

Marable, Manning. 1985. Black Power in Chicago: An historical overview of class stratification and electoral politics in a black urban community. *Review of Radical Economics* 17:3, 157-182.

Martin, Bob. 2007. *Both Sides of the Fence: Corruption and redemption in Chattanooga, Tennessee from the 1940s through the 1980s.* Bloomington, IN: Author House.

Martin, Stephan & Wolfram, Walt. 1998. 'The Sentence in African-American Vernacular English' in S Mufwene, John Rickford, Guy Bailey & John Baugh (eds) *African-American English: Structure, history and use*. New York: Routledge.

Martinez, Michael. 2008. The Georgia Confederate Flag Dispute. *The Georgia Historical Quarterly* 92:2 (Summer), 200-228.

Massey, Douglas & Nancy Denton. 1993. *American Apartheid.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

May, Gary. 2013. *Bending Toward Justice: The Voting Rights Act and the Transformation of American Democracy*. New York: Basic.

Mayo, Selz. 1964. Social Change, Social Movements, and the Disappearing Sectional South. *Social Forces* 43:1 (Oct), 1-10.

McAdam, D. 1982. *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

McAdam, Douglas. 1988. *Freedom Summer*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

McCarty, Nolan, Keith Poole, & Howard Rosenthal. 2006. *Polarized America*. Cambridge. MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.

McClelland, Edward. 2010. *Young Mr Obama: Chicago and the Making of a Black President*. London: Bloomsbury Press.

McCorckle, Mac. 1991. Gant Versus Helms: Toward a New Progressive Era. *Reconstruction* 1:3, 18-24.

McCormick, Joseph & Charles Jones. 1993. 'The Conceptualization of Deracialization' in G Persons (ed) *Dilemmas of Black Politics: Issues of Leadership and Strategy*. New York: Harper Collins.

McCormick, Joseph. 1989. Black Tuesday and the Politics of Deracialization. Paper delivered at the Joint Center for Political Studies, Washington DC (Dec).

McDonald, Loughlin, Michael Binford, Ken Johnson. 1994. 'Georgia' in C Davidson & B Grofman (eds) *Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact of Voting Rights Acts, 1965-1990.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

McIlwain, Charlton & Stephen Caliendo. 2002. How do I look? An analysis of television advertisements for black candidates and their opponents, 1952-2000. Paper presented to the annual conference of the Midwest Political Science Association.

McIlwain, Charlton & Stephen Caliendo. 2011. *Race Appeal: How Candidates Invoke Race in US Presidential Campaigns*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Mendelberg, Tali. 2001. *Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages, and the Norm of Equality*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Mendell, David. 2007. *Obama: From Promise to Power.* New York: Amistad.

Mettler, Suzanne & Richard Valelly. 2016. 'The Distinctiveness and Necessity of American Political Development' in R Valelly, S Mettler, & R Lieberman (eds) *The Oxford Handbook of American Political Development*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Meyer, Jane & Jill Abramson. 1995. *Strange Justice: The Selling of Clarence Thomas.* New York: Plume.

Mickey, Robert. 2015. *Paths Out of Dixie: The Democratization of Authoritarian Enclaves in America's Deep South.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Middleton, Richard & Sekou Franklin. 2009. 'Southern Racial Etiquette and the 2006 Tennessee Senate Race: The Racialization of Harold Ford's Deracialized Campaign' in G Persons (ed) *Beyond the Boundaries: A New Structure of Ambition in African American Politics*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Milkis, Sidney. 1993. *The President and the Parties: The Transformation of the American Party System Since the New Deal.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Minta, Michael. 2011. *Oversight: Representing the interests of blacks and Latinos in Congress.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Mitau, G Theodore. 1970 [1960]. *Politics in Minnesota.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Monnat, Sharon. 2010. The Color of Welfare Sanctioning. *Sociological Quarterly* 51:4 (Fall), 678-707.

Mumford, Kevin. 2007. *Newark: A History of Race, Rights, and Riots in America.* New York: New York University Press

Myrdal, Gunnar. 1944. *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy.* New York: Harper.

Nathanson, Iric. 2010. *Minneapolis in the Twentieth Century: The Growth of an American City.* St Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press.

Nelson, Michael. 2014. 'Tennessee: From Bluish to Reddish to Red' in C Bullock & M Rozell (eds) *The New Politics of the Old South* 5th edition. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Neubeck, Kenneth & Noel Cazenave. 2001. *Welfare Racism: Playing the race card against America's poor*. New York: Routledge.

Newman, Kathe. 2004. Newark: Decline and Avoidance, Renaissance and Desire. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 594 (Jul), 34-48.

Ngai, Mae. 1999. The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law. *Journal of American History* 86:1 (Jun), 67-92.

Noguera, Pedro & Lauren Wells. 2011. The Politics of School Reform: A Broader and Bolder Approach for Newark. *Berkeley Review of Education* 2:1, 5-25.

Nordin, Dennis. 2012. *From Edward Brooke to Barack Obama: African American Political Success, 1966-2008*. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press.

Nowlan, James, Samuel Gove, & Richard Winkel. 2010. *Illinois Politics*. Champaign: University of Illinois Press.

Obama, Barack. 1995 [2004]. *Dreams from My Father: A Story of Race and Inheritance.* New York: Three Rivers Press.

Obama, Barack. 2006. *The Audacity of Hope.* New York: Crown Publishers.

Oden, Roger. 1996. 'The Election of Carol Moseley-Braun in the US Senate Race in Illinois' in H Perry (ed) *Race, Politics, and Governance in the United States*. Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press.

Omni, Michael & Howard Winant. 2004. *Racial Formation in the United States* 3rd edition. New York: Routledge.

Oppenheimer, Bruce. 1996. The Representational Experience: The effect of state population on senator-constituency linkages. *American Journal of Political Science* 40:4 (Nov), 1280-1299.

Orey, Byron & Boris Ricks. 2007. A Systematic Analysis of the Deracialization Concept. *National Political Science Review* (Jan).

Orren, Karen & Stephen Skowronek. 2004. *The Search for American Political Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Packer, Thomas. 2012. *Jesse Helms and North Carolina Politics, 1972-84*. DPhil in Modern History, University of Oxford.

Pacyga, Dominic. 2009. *Chicago: A Biography*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Paton, Alan. 1948. *Cry, the Beloved Country.* New York: Scribners.

Patterson, Thomas & Robert McClure. 1976. *The Unseeing Eye: The myth of television power in national elections*. New York: Putnam.

Payne, Keith, Jon Krosnick, Josh Pasek, Yphtach Lelkes, Omair Akhtar, & Trevor Tompson. 2010. Implicit and Explicit Prejudice in the 2008 American Presidential Election. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 46, 367-374.

Peffley, Mark, Jon Hurwitz, & Paul Sniderman. 1997. Racial Stereotypes and Whites' Political Views of Blacks in the Context of Welfare and Crime. *American Journal of Political Science* 41:1 (Jan), 30-60.

Perry, Huey, 1990. Recent Advances in Black Electoral Politics. *PS: Political Science and Politics* 23:2 (Jun), 141.

Perry, Huey. 1996a. 'The value of deracialization as an analytical construct in American politics' in H Perry (ed) *Race, Politics, and Governance in the United States*. Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press.

Perry, Huey. 1996b. 'Introduction: An Analysis of Major Themes in the Concept of Deracialization' in H Perry (ed) *Race, Politics, and Governance in the United States.* Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press.

Perry, Ravi. 2013. 'Deracialization Reconsidered: Theorizing Targeted Universalistic Urban Politics' in R Perry (ed) *21st Century Urban Race Politics: Representing minorities as universal interests*. Bingley: Emerald.

Persons, Georgia (ed). 1993. *Dilemmas of Black Politics: Issues of Leadership and Strategy*. New York: Harper Collins.

Persons, Georgia. 2009. 'Editor's Note' in G Persons (ed) *Beyond the Boundaries: A New Structure of Ambition in African American Politics*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Peterson, Steven. 1992. Church Participation and Political Participation: The Spillover Effect. *American Politics Quarterly* 20:1 (Jan 1992), 123-139.

Pettigrew, Thomas & Denise Alston. 1988. *Tom Bradley's Campaign for Governor: The Dilemma of Race and Political Strategies*. Washington, DC: Joint Center for Political Studies.

Philpot, Tasha & Hanes Walton. 2007. One of Our Own: Black Female Candidates and the Voters Who Support Them. *American Journal of Political Science* 51:1, 49-62.

Pierannuzi, Carol & John Hutcheson. 1996. 'The Rise and Fall of Deracialization: Andrew Young as Mayor and Gubernatorial Candidate' in H Perry (ed) *Race, Politics, and Governance in the United States*. Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press.

Piliawsky, Monte. 1989. Racial Politics in the 1988 Presidential Election. *The Black Scholar* 20, 1-11.

Pinderhughes, Dianne. 1987. *Chicago Politics: A Reexamination of Pluralist Theory.* Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Piston, Spencer. 2010. How Explicit Racial Prejudice Hurt Obama in the 2008 Election. *Political Behavior* 32, 431-451.

Plotkin, Wendy. 1999. *Deeds of Mistrust: Race, Housing, and Restrictive Covenants in Chicago, 1900-1953.* PhD dissertation. University of Illinois (Chicago).

Plotkin, Wendy. 2001. Hemmed In: The Struggle Against Racial Restrictive Covenants and Deed Restrictions in Post-WWII Chicago. *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society* 94:1 (Spring), 39-69.

Pohlmann, Marcus & Michael Kirby. 1996. *Racial Politics at the Crossroads: Memphis elects Dr W W Herenton.* Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.

Porambo, Ron. 1971. *No Cause for Indictment: An Autopsy of Newark.* New York: Melville House.

Preston, Michael. 1983. The Election of Harold Washington: Black voting patterns in the 1983 Chicago mayoral race. *PS: Political Science* 16:3 (Summer), 486-488.

Price, Melanye. 2016. *The Race Whisperer: Barack Obama and the Political Uses of Race.* New York: New York University Press.

Prysby, Charles. 1996. 'The 1990 US Senate Election in North Carolina' in H Perry (ed) *Race, Politics, and Governance in the United States*. Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press.

Quadango, Jill. 1994. *The Color of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Reed, Merl. 1991. *Seedtime for the Modern Civil Rights Movement*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

Remnick, David. 2010. *The Bridge: The Life and Rise of Barack Obama*. New York: Alfred Knopf.

Renshon, Stanley. 2012. *Barack Obama and the Politics of Change*. New York: Routledge.

Rickford, John. 1999. *African American Vernacular English*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Riguer, Leah Wright. 2015. *The Loneliness of the Black Republican*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Rise, Eric. 1998 [1995]. *The Martinsville Seven: Race, Rape, and Capital Punishment.* Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press.

Robinson, Eugene. 2010. *Disintegration: The Splintering of Black America.* New York: Anchor Books.

Rozell, Mark. 1998. 'Virginia' in C Bullock & M Rozell (eds) *The New Politics of the Old South*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Rugh, Jacob & Douglas Massey. 2013. Segregation in Post-Civil Rights America: Skilled integration or end of the segregated century?. *Du Bois Review* 10:2, 1-28.

Rushing, Wanda. 2009. *Memphis and the Paradox of Place: Globalization in the American South.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Ryan, James. 1977. The Memphis Riots of 1866: Terror in a Black Community During Reconstruction. *Journal of Negro History* 62:3 (Jul), 243-257.

Sabato, Larry. 1978. *The Democratic Party in Virginia: Tantamount to Election No Longer.* Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press.

Sabato, Larry. 1981. *The Rise of Political Consultants: New ways of winning elections*. New York: Basic Books.

Sabato, Larry. 1991. *Virginia Votes, 1987-1990.* Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Center for Public Service.

Salmore, Barbara & Stephen Salmore. 1989. *Candidates, Parties, and Campaigns*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.

Salmore, Barbara & Stephen Salmore. 2013. *New Jersey Politics and Government: The Suburbs Come of Age* 4th edition. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Sanchez, Gina. 1997. The Politics of Cape Verdean American Identity. *Transforming Athropology* 6:1-2, 54-71.

Schexnider, Alvin. 1990. The Politics of Pragmatism: An Analysis of the 1989 Gubernatorial Election in Virginia. *PS: Political Science and Politics* 23:2 (Jun), 154-156.

Schneider, Edgar. 1993. 'Africanisms in the Grammar of Afro-American English' in S Mufwene (ed) *Africanism in Afro-American Language Varieties*. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press.

Schorr, Daniel. 2008. Postracial Politics. *New Leader* (Jan/Feb).

Schram, Sanford, Joe Soss & Richard Fording (eds). 2003. *Race and the Politics of Welfare Reform.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Sedore, Timothy. 2011. *An Illustrated Guide to Virginia's Confederate Monuments*. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press.

Sewell, William. 1996. Historical Events as Transformational Structures. *Theory and Society* 25, 841-881.

Shafer, Byron & Richard Johnston. 2006. *The End of Southern Exceptionalism: Class, Race, and Partisan Change in the Postwar South*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

Shaffir, William & Robert Stebbins. 1991. *Experiencing Fieldwork: An Inside View of Qualitative Research.* New York: Sage.

Sharkey, Patrick. 2014. Spatial Segmentation and the Black Middle Class. *American Journal of Sociology* 119:4 (Jan), 903-954.

Shea, Daniel & Michael Burton. 2001. *Campaign Craft: The strategies, tactics, and art of campaign management.* Westport, CT: Praeger.

Shubert, Glendon & Charles Press. 1964. Reapportionment: Measuring Malapportionment. *American Political Science Review* 53:8 (Sept), 463.

Sides, John, Daron Shaw, Matt Grossman, & Keena Lipsitz. 2015. *Campaigns and Elections: Rules, Reality, Strategy, Choice* 2nd edition. New York: Norton.

Sigelman, Carol, Lee Sigelman, Barbara Walkosz, & Michael Nitz. 1995. Black Candidates, White Voters: Understanding racial bias in political perceptions. *American Journal of Political Science* 39:1 (Feb), 243-265.

Sigelman, Lee. 1997. 'Blacks, Whites, and the Changing Guard of Black Political Leadership' in S Tuck & J Martin (eds) *Racial Attitudes in the 1990s*. Westport CT: Praeger.

Silva, Ruth. 1968. 'One Man, One Vote, and the Population Base' in R Goldwin (ed) *Representation and Misrepresentation: Legislative reapportionment in theory and practice*. Chicago: Rand McNally.

Simon, Herbert. 1985. Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science. *American Political Science Review* 79:2 (Jun), 293-304.

Sitkoff, Harvard. 1971. Harry Truman and the Election of 1948: The Coming of Age of Civil Rights in American Politics. *Journal of Southern History* 37:4 (Nov), 597-616.

Skocpol, Theda. 1979. *States and Social Revolutions.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sleeper, Jim. 1997. *Liberal Racism.* New York: Viking.

Smith, A Wade. 1997. 'Prologue: Reflections on Racial Attitude Research' in S Tuck & J Martin (eds) *Racial Attitudes in the 1990s: Continuity and Change*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Smith, Robert. 1990. Recent elections and black politics: The maturation or death of black politics?. *PS: Political Science and Politics* 23:2, 160-162.

Smith, Robert. 2009. 'Beyond the Boundaries' in G Persons (ed) *Beyond the Boundaries: A New Structure of Ambition in African American Politics*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Smith, Rogers, Desmond King, & Philip Klinkner. 2011. Challenging History: Barack Obama & American Racial Politics. *Daedalus* 140:2 (Spring), 11-36.

Smith, Rogers. 2015. Political Science and the Public Sphere Today. *Perspectives on Politics* 13:2 (Jun), 366-376.

Smith, Sam. 1995. *Second Coming.* New York: Harper Collins.

Sniderman, Paul & Thomas Piazza. 1993. *The Scar of Race.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Sokol, Jason. 2014. *All Eyes Are Upon Us: Race and Politics from Boston to Brooklyn*. New York: Basic Books.

Sonenshein, Raphael. 1990. Can Black Candidates Win Statewide Elections?. *Political Science Quarterly* 105:2 (Summer), 219-241.

Spangler, Earl. 1961. *The Negro in Minnesota.* Minneapolis, MN: T S Denison & Co.

Sparks, Robert & Michael Preston. 1990. 'Harold Washington and the Politics of Reform in Chicago' in R Browning, D Marshall, & D Tabb (eds) *Racial Politics in American Cities*. New York: Longman.

Sparrow, Bartholomew. 2016. Why Would a Political Scientist Write a Biography?. *Perspectives on Politics* 14:4 (Dec), 1101-1111.

Stepan, Alfred & Juan Linz. 2011. Comparative Perspectives on Inequality and the Quality of Democracy in the United States. *Perspectives on Politics* 9:4 (Dec), 841-856.

Stevens, Arthur, Arthur Miller, & Thomas Mann.1974. Mobilization of Liberal Strength in the House, 1955-1970: The Democratic Study Group. *American Political Science Review* 68:2 (Jun), 667-681.

Stoller, Paul. 2001. *Money Has No Smell: The Africanization of New York City*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Stout, Christopher. 2015. *Bringing Race Back In: Black politicians, deracialisation, and voting behavior in the age of Obama.* Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.

Strickland, Ruth Ann & Marcia Lynn Whicker. 1992. Comparing the Wilder and Gantt Campaigns: A model for black candidate success in statewide elections. *PS: Political Science and Politics* 25:2 (Jun), 204-212.

Sublette, Ned & Constance Sublette. 2015. *The American Slave Coast: A history of the slave-breeding industry*. Chicago: Chicago Review Press.

Sullivan, Jas. 2009. 'Black Identity' in G Persons (ed) *Beyond the Boundaries: A New Structure of Ambition in African American Politics*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Surkin, Marvin. 1975. *Detroit: A Study of Urban Revolution.* Chicago: Haymarket Books.

Sutton, Robert. 1976. *The Prairie State: A Documentary History of Illinois*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.

Swain, Carol. 1995 [1993]. *Black Faces, Black Interests: The Representation of African Americans in Congress.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Swain, Carol. 1997. 'Women and Blacks in Congress, 1870-1996' in L Dodd & B Oppenheimer (eds) *Congress Reconsidered.* Washington, DC: CQ Press.

Tate, Katherine. 1994. *From Protest to Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Tate, Katherine. 1997. 'African American Female Senatorial Candidates: Twin assets or double liabilities?' in H Walton (ed) *African American Power and Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Tate, Katherine. 2003. *Black Faces in the Mirror: African Americans and their Representatives in Congress.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Tate, Katherine. 2012. 'Black Power in Black Presidential Bids from Jackson to Obama' in M Mitchell & D Covin (eds) *Black Politics in a Time of Transition*, New Brunswick. NJ: Transaction.

Taylor, Paul. 2014. Taking Postracialism Seriously: From movement mythology to racial formation. *Du Bois Review* 11:1, 9-25.

Taylor, Peter. 1986. *A Summons to Memphis.* New York: Alfred Knopf.

Tedesco, John. 2005. Issue and Strategy Agenda Setting in the 2004 Presidential Election: Exploring the candidate-journalist relationship. *Journalism Studies* 6:2, 187-201.

Tesler, Michael & David Sears. 2010. *Obama's Race: The 2008 Election and the Dream of a Post-Racial America.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Tesler, Michael. 2012. The Spillover of Racialization into Health Care: How President Obama polarized public opinion by racial attitudes and race. *American Journal of Political Science* 56:3 (Jul), 690-704.

Tesler, Michael. 2013. The Return of Old-Fashioned Racism to White Americans' Partisan Preferences in the Early Obama Era. *Journal of Politics* 75:1 (Jan), 110-123.

Tesler, Michael. 2016. *Post-Racial or Most-Racial: Race and politics in the Obama era*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Therborn, Göran. 1977. The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy. *New Left Review* 103 (May/Jun).

Thernstrom, Stephen & Abigail Thernstrom. 1997. *America in black and white*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Thompson, Debra. 2012. Making (Mixed-) Race: Census Politics and the Emergence of Multi-Racial Multiculturalism in the United States, Great Britain, and Canada. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 35:8, 1409-1426.

Thompson, Debra. 2015. .What Lies Beneath: Equality and the Making of Racial Classifications. *Social Philosophy and Policy* 31:2 (Apr), 114-136.

Thompson, J Phillip. 2006. *Double Trouble: Black Mayors, Black Communities, and the Call for a Deep Democracy.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Thompson, Joel. 1986. The Voting Rights Act in North Carolina. *Publius* (Fall), 81-96.

Thornton, Kevin. 1996. The Confederate Flag and the Meaning of Southern History. *Southern Cultures* 2 (Winter), 233-245.

Thrift, Bryan. 2005. *Jesse Helms, the New Right, and American Freedom.* PhD dissertation. Boston University.

Thurber, James & Candice Nelson (eds). 2000. *Campaign Warriors: Political Consultants in Elections.* Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Thurber, James & Candice Nelson (eds). 2010. *Campaigns and Elections American Style: Transforming American Politics* 3rd edition. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Thurber, James, Candice Nelson, David Dulio. 2000. *Crowded Airwaves: Campaign Advertising in Elections*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press.

Thurber, James. 2010. 'Understanding the Dynamics and Transformation of American Campaigns' in J Thurber & Candice Nelson (eds) *Campaigns and Elections American Style: Transforming American Politics* 3rd edition. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Tonry, M. 1995. *Malign Neglect.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Traugott, Michael & Vincent Price. 1992. Exit Polls in the 1989 Virginia Gubernatorial Race. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 56:2 (Summer), 245-253.

Travis, Dempsey. 1987. *An Autobiography of Black Politics.* Chicago: Urban Research Press.

Tuch, Steven & Jack Martin. 1997. 'Regional Differences in Whites' Racial Policy Attitudes' in S Tuch & J Martin (eds) *Racial Attitudes in the 1990s*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Tuck, Stephen. 2009. 'The Reversal of Black Voting Rights after Reconstruction' in D King, R Lieberman, G Ritter & L Whitehead (eds) *Democratization in America: A Comparative-Historical Analysis*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Tures, John. 2014. The Role of a Voting Record for African American Candidates in Statewide Elections. *Western Journal of Black Studies* 38: 1, 53-63.

Underwood, Katherine. 1997. Ethnicity is not enough: Latino-led multiracial coalitions in Los Angeles. *Urban Affairs Review* 33:1, 3-27.

Valelly, Richard. 1989. *Radicalism in the States: The Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party and the American Political Economy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Valentino, Nicholas, Vincent Hutchings, & Ismail White. 2002. Cues that matter: How political ads prime racial attitudes during campaigns. *American Political Science Review* (Mar), 75-90.

Vanderleeuw, James, Baodong Liu, & G Marsh. 2004. Applying Black Threat Theory, Urban Regime Theory, and Deracialization: The Memphis Mayoral Elections of 1991, 1995, and 1999. *Journal of Urban Affairs* 26:4, 505-515.

Varley, Pamela. 1992. Jesse Helms vs Harvey Gantt: Race, Culture, and Strategy in the 1990 Senate Battle. Cambridge, MA: Kennedy School of Government.

Vavrus, Mary.1998. Working the Senate from the Outside In: The Mediated Construction of a Feminist Political Campaign. *Critical Studies in Mass Communications* 15:3 (Sept), 213-235.

Voss, Stephen D & David Lublin. 2001. Black Incumbents, White Districts: An appraisal of the 1996 congressional elections. *American Politics Research* 29:2 (Mar), 141-182.

Wade, Wyn. 1998. *The Fiery Cross: The Klu Klux Klan in America*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Waller, Altina. 1984. Community, Class, and Race in the Memphis Riot of 1866. *Journal of Social History* 18:2, 233-246.

Walters, Ronald. 2007. Barack Obama and the Politics of Blackness. *Journal of Black Studies* 38:1 (Sept), 7-29.

Walton, Hanes. 1972. *Black Politics: A Theoretical and Structural Analysis.* Philadelphia: Lippincott.

Ward, Orlanda. 2014. Double Disadvantage? National and Statewide Newspaper Coverage of Minority Female House Candidates at the 2012 General Election. Paper presented to the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington, DC.

Ware, Alan. 1985. *The Breakdown of Democratic Party Organization, 1940-1980*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Washington, Ebonya. 2006. How Black Candidates Affect Turnout. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 121 (Aug), 973-998.

Waters, Mary. 1999. *Black Identities: West Indian Immigrant Dreams and American Realities.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Watkins, S Craig. 2005. *Hip Hop Matters: Politics, Pop Culture, and the Struggle for the Soul of a Movement*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Webb, Eugene, Donald Campbell, Richard Schwartz, & Lee Sechrest. 2000. *Unobtrusive Measures* revised edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Welch, Kelly. 2007. Black Criminal Stereotyping and Racial Profiling. *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice* 23:3 (Aug), 276-288.

Welch, Susan. 1990. The Impact of At-Large Elections on the Representation of Blacks and Hispanics. *Journal of Politics* 52:4 (Nov).

Westen, Drew. 2007. *The Political Brain: The Role of Emotion in Deciding the Fate of the Nation*. New York: Public Affairs.

Westlye, Mark. 1991. *Senate Elections and Campaign Intensity.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Wharton, Jonathan. 2013. *A Post-Racial Change is Gonna Come: Newark, Cory Booker, and the Transformation of Urban America*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

White, Ismail, Chryl Laird, & Troy Allen. 2014. Selling Out? The politics of navigating conflicts between racial group interest and self-interest. *American Political Science Review* 108:4 (Nov), 783-800.

Whitman, Mebane Rash. 1995. The Evolution of Party Politics: The March of the GOP Continues in North Carolina. *North Carolina Insight* (Sept), 81-97.

Widick, B J. 1972. *Detroit: A City of Race and Class Violence*. New York: Quadrangle.

Wilder, L Douglas. 2015. *Son of Virginia: A Life in America's Political Arena.* Guilford, CT: Lyons Press

Wilkinson, J Harvie. 1968. *Harry Byrd and the Changing Face of Virginia Politics.* Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press.

Williams, Dianne. 2012. *Race, Ethnicity, and Crime.* New York: Algora.

Williams, Erma Brooks. 2008. *Political Empowerment of Illinois' African-American State Lawmakers from 1877 to 2005.* Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

Williams, Junius. 2014. *The Unfinished Agenda: Urban politics in the era of black power*. Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic Books.

Williams, Linda. 1990. White/Black Perceptions of the Electability of Black Candidates. *National Political Science Review* 2, 145-64.

Williamson, Joel. 1997. Wounds Not Scars: Lynching, the National Conscience, and the American Historian. *Journal of American History* 83:4 (Mar), 1221-1253.

Wilson, David & Khalilah Brown-Dean. 2012. 'Greater Expectations: The Double-Edged Sword of Deracialization' in M Mitchell & D Covin (eds) *Charting the Range of Black Politics*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Wilson, Edmund. 1923. 'New Jersey: The Slave of Two Cities' in E Gruening (ed) *These United States*. New York: Boni & Liveright.

Wilson, James Q. 1960. *Negro Politics.* Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.

Wilson, William Julius. 1987. *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass ,and Public Policy.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Wilson, William Julius. 1990. Race Neutral Policies and the Democratic Coalition. *The American Prospect* 1, 74-81.

Wilson, Zaphon. 1993. 'Gantt Versus Helms: Deracialization Confronts Southern Traditionalism' in G Persons (ed) *Dilemmas of Black Politics: Issues of Leadership and Strategy*. New York: Harper Colllins.

Winn, Mylon. 1990. The Election of Norm Rice as Mayor of Seattle. *PS: Political Science and Politics* 23:2 (Jun), 158-159.

Winston, David. 2010. 'Creating a Winning Campaign Strategy' in J Thurber (ed) *Campaigns and Elections American Style* 3rd edition. New York: Avalon Books.

Winter, Nicholas. 2009. *Beyond Welfare*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.

Wise, Tim. 2009. *Between Barack and a Hard Place: Racism and White Denial in the Age of Obama.* San Francisco, CA: City Lights Publishers.

Witt, Andrew. 1997. *The Black Panthers and the Midwest.* New York: Routledge.

Wood, Elisabeth. 2007. 'Field Methods' in C Boix & S Stokes (eds) *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Woodard, Komozi. 1997. *A Nation within a Nation.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Woodard, Komozi. 2003. 'It's Nation Time in Newark' in J Theoharis & K Woodard (eds) *Freedom North: Black Freedom Struggles Outside the South.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Woodbury, Julie. 2010. 'Dwelling among the Righteous: Keith Ellison' in D Weiss (ed) *What Democrats Talk About When They Talk About God*. Washington, DC: Lexington Books.

Woodward, Komozi. 1997. *A Nation within a Nation: Amiri Baraka and Black Power Politics*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Woodward, Komozi. 2003. *Freedom North: Black Freedom Struggles Outside the South, 1940-1980.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Wrenn, Carter. 1998. 'Rcent Conservative Politics in North Carolina' in K Kennelly & Boyd Cathey (eds) *The Conservative Perspective: A view from North Carolina.* Charlotte: North Carolina Policy Council Press.

Wright, Richard. 1940. *Native Son*. New York: Harper & Brothers.

Wright, Richard. 1945. *Black Boy*. New York: Harper & Brothers.

Wright, Sharon. 2000. *Race, Power, and Political Emergence in Memphis.* New York: Garland.

Wright-Austin, Sharon & Danielle King. 2011. 'President Barack Obama and Racial Politics' in J Davis (ed) *The Barack Obama Presidency*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Wright-Austin, Sharon & Richard Middleton. 2004. The Limitations of the Deracialization Concept in the 2001 Los Angeles Mayoral Election. *Political Research Quarterly* (Jun), 283-293.

Yaffe, Deborah. 2007. *Other People's Children: The Battle for Justice and Equality in New Jersey's Schools*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Yancey, Dwayne. 1988. *When Hell Froze Over: The Untold Story of Doug Wilder*. Dallas: Taylor Publishing.

Zaller, John. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Zangrando, Robert. 1980. *The NAACP Crusade Against Lynching, 1909-1950.* Philadelphia: Temple University Press.