

TRACING VISUAL KNOWLEDGE

The presence and value of images for Bedouin history and society in the
Negev



i

Emilie Le Febvre
St Cross College



2015

University of Oxford
Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy.

ABSTRACT

Based on eighteen months fieldwork with Bedouin of the Negev, this thesis explores the varied presence of images as photographs and digital copies for local historicity in order to achieve a greater understanding of representational politics in southern Israel. It emphasizes pictures' ability to transmute, circulate, and acquire value in various social settings in contrast to popular academic treatments, which primarily focus on photographs' iconography and visual history in the Middle East. To do so, the thesis details the biographies of a series of 'significant images' (c. 1906-2010) circulating in this society. It describes their photographic and digital graphic contents as floating referents with the capacity to be coded and recoded by people but also their presence as historical evidence that acquire value in different contexts. The thesis builds on the concept of visual economy as opposed to visual culture in order to landscape images' meanings, material and digital transformations, and their influence for the making of Bedouin history over the last century amid Orientalist, national, and local imaginings.

It argues that Bedouin in the Negev possess diverse representational repertoires and utilise a variety of techniques to pursue historical capital. In particular, local representations of the past are selective and instrumental but increasingly reliant on archival mediums such as photographs. Although it may be obvious, anthropologists of the Middle East have yet to adequately account for these occurrences among peripheral peoples and not merely urbanites in the region. Research found that Bedouin spokespersons treat photographs and digital images as evidentiary documentation during self-presentations of historical knowledge in the Negev. As they travel between visual economies, however, images become malleable proof for local history projects alternating between the tribal past, Islamic heritage, and ethnohistory. In conclusion, the thesis develops two theoretical themes in anthropology and visual culture studies of the Middle East: the material and visual efficacy of images for local historicity, and complicating self-representations among Bedouin in the Negev.

ⁱ Figure 0: 'Aref el-Aref and Bedouin Shaykhs' (c. 1920) by Eric Matson. See Appendix II for the Catalogue of Images.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many thanks are due to the people who made this work possible. Grateful acknowledgements go to the faculty and students of the Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology (ISCA) at the University of Oxford. I must also specifically acknowledge Marcus Banks and Cédric Parizot whose continued encouragement and insights have enriched this project. Thanks also go to the administrative staff at ISCA's and St Cross College who provided a supportive learning environment during my stay in Oxford. I dedicate this thesis to my husband Ike Belcher who accompanied me during fieldwork. His patience and support throughout my studies have made my research possible. I also am extremely grateful to my friends, peers, and host families in the Negev. In particular, this research would have been impossible if not for 'Amīr Shiblī, Ṣafā Abū Rabī'a, Shirley Kahana, Lisa Yehuda, and Henriette Dahan-Kalev. To Imogen Clark, Brian McQuinn, Ros Holmes, Charlotte Buckerman, and Karlijn Morsink, thank you for proof-editing and countless nights playing cards, having campfires, and cooking in Oxford. I would also like to thank the Wenner-Gren Foundation and the Palestinian American Research Centre for funding my fieldwork and archival research.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<i>ABSTRACT</i>	<i>ii</i>
<i>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</i>	<i>iii</i>
<i>TABLE OF CONTENTS</i>	<i>iv</i>
<i>PREFACE</i>	<i>vi</i>
<i>TRANSCRIPTION, ETHNONYMS, AND TERMINOLOGY GUIDE</i>	<i>vi</i>
I. Ethnonyms and Bedouin in the Negev	vii
II. Bedouin terminology in the twenty-first century	ix
III. Transliteration guide	xiv
IV. Glossary of Arabic, Hebrew, and dialect terms	xv

PART I MEDIATED HISTORIES xviii

INTRODUCTION CONTOURS OF PLACE, PEOPLE, AND ETHNOGRAPHY	1
I. Fieldwork encounters	3
II. Research questions and hypotheses	9
III. Practicalities and politics of fieldwork	20
IV. Structure of the thesis	31
CHAPTER ONE LOCALISING KNOWLEDGE AND VISUAL CULTURE	34
I. Studies of Negev Bedouin history and memory	37
II. Varied pasts, changing mediums, and diverse people	48
III. Poetics and politics of Orientalism and photography	60
IV. Widening post-Orientalist analyses	73
<i>A. Circulating images and changing contexts</i>	78
V. From visual history to visual knowledge	87
CHAPTER TWO SOCIO-HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE NEGEV BEDOUIN	90
I. Beersheba under Ottoman and British rule (c. 1900-1947)	92
II. Israel's Negev Bedouin 'tribesmen' (1948-1966)	103
III. Divided urbanisation (1967-1996)	115
IV. Israeli citizens and a Palestinian minority (1948-2013)	123
<i>A. Discussions on local politics, economy, and education</i>	128
V. The rise of Bedouin academics and civic spokespersons (c. 1990-2013)	136

CHAPTER THREE	CONSTRUCTING HISTORIES	140
I.	Socio-political life in Khashem Zana' (2012-2013)	142
II.	Shifting histories, spokespersons, and mediations.....	156
A.	<i>Poly-mediations and the expanding spectrum of proof</i>	180
PART II	IMAGES AMONG A PEOPLE	185
CHAPTER FOUR	SHIFTING IMAGE WORLDS	186
I.	Macro global and national visual economies.....	189
II.	Meso and micro visual economies.....	221
CHAPTER FIVE	CIRCULATING IMAGES: HISTORIES OF LINEAGES ('Ā'ILĀT)	245
I.	The presence(s) of images among three lineages	248
A.	<i>Al-Huzayyil's portraits: Family legacies</i>	250
B.	<i>Al-Šāna': Gender, authority, and contest</i>	276
C.	<i>Abū Rabī'a: Lost meanings and elders (kbār)</i>	301
II.	The value of images for tribalism	319
CHAPTER SIX	CIRCULATING IMAGES: COMMUNITY HISTORIES	327
I.	The presence(s) of image among community organisations.....	330
A.	<i>Framing the Grand Mosque</i>	331
B.	<i>Visual activism: Bedouin protests and al- 'Aragīb</i>	356
II.	The value of images for communities.....	380
CONCLUSION		385
END MATERIAL		393
APPENDIX I	DRAMATIS PERSONAE	394
APPENDIX II	CATALOGUE OF IMAGES	396
APPENDIX III	TRIBAL NAMESAKES, RESIDENCES, AND ORGANISATIONS	408
APPENDIX IV	LIST OF ARCHIVES.....	410
APPENDIX V	PHOTOGRAPHERS OF NEGEV BEDOUIN.....	413
REFERENCES		416

PREFACE

TRANSCRIPTION, ETHNONYMS, AND TERMINOLOGY GUIDE

The Arabic transcriptions in this work follow the *International Journal of Middle East Studies*' transliteration practices with some exceptions. For an analysis of the Negev Bedouin's local dialect see Roni Henkin (1996, 2000). English translations of Arabic, Hebrew, and French in this text are the author's unless otherwise stated. I am not an Arabist or a scholar of Hebrew language. My knowledge of both languages is practical as result of auditory dyslexia. I am extremely grateful to my friends and colleagues who assisted me with translating and transcribing my research. This thesis presents colloquial Arabic translations of relative terms spoken to me in Negev Bedouin dialect during fieldwork. Hebrew terms are transcribed into their popular English forms.

This thesis identifies regional places in the Negev in English. The names of localities are presented in transcribed Hebrew and Arabic relative to their Jewish or Muslim majorities. I use the word 'Negev' (contemporary English and Hebrew – dry) to describe Israel's southern desert region rather than 'Negeb' (English Biblical name), *Naqab* (contemporary Arabic term), or *as-sab'* (Bedouin dialect).¹ The thesis does not italicise place names. Along with localities in the Negev, I also transcribed tribal namesakes, lineages, and surnames of notable individuals described in the text. I provide pseudonyms for people's first names in order to anonymise direct identifiers, specifically people I interviewed in private settings. It must be noted, however, that most informants were public spokespersons and all interviewees consented to have their narratives recorded and published in this research project. Additionally, this thesis translates and transcribes relevant phrases, concepts, and terms from Arabic and

¹ See Glossary below for a list of terms and their definitions employed in this thesis.

Hebrew into English, along with the names of local authors when referring to them as individuals in their society and Arabic-language history published before 1900. The surnames of all other writers, including Arabic and Hebrew authors, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are presented as published in English from the twentieth century onward.

I. ETHNONYMS AND BEDOUIN IN THE NEGEV

In Arabic, *badū* is the term used by outsiders such as urbanites (*ḥaḍarī*, *ḥaḍar*) and villagers (*fallāḥ*, *fallāḥīn*) to describe pastoral persons who live in the desert (*bādiya*). Bedouin throughout the Middle East, however, typically refer to themselves as ‘*arab*’, a word meaning people. This term has become less popular in the Negev for reasons explained later. Ultimately, the term ‘*arab*’ in the Negev signifies genealogical connections to the Arabian Peninsula, an association accentuating one’s origins (‘*aṣl*, ‘*aṣīl*).² This thesis distinguishes the word ‘*arab*’ from ‘Arab’, which describes a modern pan-ethnicity in the Middle East and North Africa.³ To do so, I identify the latter with a capital ‘A’ in reference to Arab ethnicity (‘*arabiyyūn*) and the former ‘*arab*’ with the smaller case ‘a’ (which mostly appears in interviews). The goal is to differentiate the Bedouin’s unique experiences in the Negev which members consider distinct from Arab urbanites (*ḥaḍar*) and farmers (*fallāḥīn*) in Israel and the Palestinian West Bank and Gaza. This differentiation in terminology also avoids confusion with the phrase Israeli Arabs (that is Palestinian minorities in Israel).

² Kees Versteegh (1997) points out that both *badū* and ‘*arab*’ are contemporary words as the Qu’rān uses the words ‘*a’rab*’ and ‘*a’rabū*’ to describe tribal peoples living in the *bādiya* (also see Lewis 1969). The Qu’rān does not employ the term Arab. It alternatively uses the adjective ‘*arabiyyūn*’ to reference a ‘supra-tribalism’ in the sense of an ethno-cultural group (Versteegh 1997: 1).

³ Habib Hassen Touma (1996) defines an Arab in the modern sense of the word as a national of an Arab state who speaks Arabic, possesses knowledge of Arab tradition, and considers himself or herself Arab.

During the Ottoman Empire and British Mandate, Bedouin residing in the Negev referred to themselves as ‘*arab as-sab*’ (people of Beersheba), however, this phrase only signified those claiming origins (‘*aṣīl*’) to the Arabian Peninsula and not affiliated clients (*badū fallāḥīn*) of predominantly Egyptian or African descent (‘*abd*’, ‘*abīd*’). Whilst the latter groups are locally part of Bedouin society in the Negev, those claiming ‘*aṣīl*’ do not consider these people to be their equals, relationships that will be further detailed in this thesis. After the Israeli-Arab War (1948) or *Nakba* (Catastrophe), the newly created state of Israel labelled all Bedouin who remained inside the Armistice (1949) borders as *Habeduim Banegv* (Hebrew – Bedouin in the Negev), regardless of their internal social status.

The term ‘Bedouin’ is the English translation of the word *badū* (sing. *badāwī*) and commonly used by those writing for Anglo-American audiences⁴ to specify people living in desert lands (*bādiya*) throughout the Middle East and North Africa whose primary economic mode of production includes varying degrees of pastoralism. From 1948 onward, English speakers have used the phrase ‘Negev Bedouin’ or ‘Bedouin of the Negev’ (Marx 1967) to refer to Bedouin residing in southern Israel. Richard Randolph (1963) noted that during his own fieldwork in the 1950s informants understood the English word ‘Bedouin’ but they did not frequently use it because of confusion about its meaning. According to him, at that time Bedouin preferred ascriptive terms relating to specific tribal associations such as their lineage (‘*ā’ilāt*’) rather than those referencing their ecological or economic practices. Thus words such as ‘*arab*’ and *badāwī*’ referred to the ‘situation of one’s descent rather than to the ecological niche one occupies’ (Randolph 1963: 36).

⁴ Francophone scholars use the term *Bédouin* (see Bonet and Hounet 2009, Parizot 2001a) and German speakers use the word *Beduinen* (see Max von Oppenheim 1939, Biasio 1998).

As will be described in Chapter Three, Bedouin in the Negev continue to employ local tribal namesakes indicating lineage (*‘ā’ilāt*) designations among themselves and kin residing in the West Bank, Gaza, Egypt, and Jordan. In recent decades, individuals have adopted a Bedouin ethnic identity in the Negev (Cole 2003) and have consequently appropriated foreign terms such as *Habeduim Banegev* (Hebrew) and ‘Negev Bedouin’ (English) when interacting with outside audiences. Over the last ten years, the phrase *Badū an-Naqab* (contemporary Arabic) has also become popular among community advocates and local spokespersons. By using the term *Naqab* as opposed to the term Negev, members highlight their Palestinian history and connections to lands now governed by the Israeli state.

Whilst recognising the Orientalist stereotypes associated with Westerners’ descriptions of Middle Eastern people of pastoral nomadic heritage (issues complicated in the next section), this thesis employs the etic term ‘Bedouin’ rather than the emic label *badū*. This decision was made to promote the readability of this thesis for English-language audiences. For descriptive clarity, the phrase ‘Bedouin’ will also refer to people claiming Arabian origins (*‘aṣīl*) and those without origins (*badū fallāḥīn* and *‘abīd*) who today affiliate as a heterogeneous society. I also wish to acknowledge here that the majority of the Bedouin population in the Negev consider themselves Palestinian minorities in Israel at the beginning of the twentieth-first century.

II. BEDOUIN TERMINOLOGY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

What constitutes Bedouin-ism in the modern Middle East is a topic that preoccupies anthropologists but also state officials such as the Israeli government and Bedouin themselves. Confusion derives from the longstanding nostalgia associated with the term

‘Bedouin’ and Orientalist depictions of these populations (Eickelman 1989); characterisations exploited throughout the centuries by imperialists, colonialists, and states as well as peasants, urbanites, and traders in pursuit of their interests in the region.

Western imaginings often present Bedouin as ‘a people of the past’ devoted to their tribes and honour systems, idealisations that portray them as a generous, brave, independent, and tough people whilst romanticising their nomadic way of life (see Eickelman 1998, Graulund 2009). Many Western representations still depict Bedouin peoples as nomads living in black goat-hair tents and raising herds despite the fact various populations reside in houses and also practice agriculture and wage-labour. Consequently, Western literature continues to use the English words ‘Bedouin’, ‘Arab’, ‘nomad’, ‘pastoralist’, and ‘tribesmen’ interchangeably (Layne 1994). Middle Eastern residents and state governments also generally treat Bedouin as ‘a-temporal’ and ‘a-spatial’ populations, who possess no connection to the lands that they historically defended, migrated, and resided within and which are now controlled by various nation-states (Massad 2001).

These stereotypes have indelibly saturated anthropological studies of the Middle East and contribute to essentialised representations of Bedouin today (Cole 2003). In the early twentieth century, the term ‘Bedouin’ in social analysis described a social category of Arabic speaking persons who organised themselves into tribes and maintained a pastoral nomadic way of life.⁵ For some cultural ecologists and modernisation theorists, ‘being bedouin’ (*badāwa*) was the emic binary of ‘being civilised or urban’ (*ḥaḍāra*) (see Eickelman 1989: 74). This dichotomy exoticised Bedouin populations’ pastoral nomadic practices, presented their socio-political

⁵ Not all pastoralist, pastoral nomads, or tribespeople are Bedouin in the Middle East and *vice versa*.

relationships as static units within segmentary lineage systems theory, and isolated local ideologies of tribalism from growing affiliations with Islamic, ethnic, and national communities.

When describing a way of life, scholars frequently spelled ‘Bedouin’ with a lower case *b*. They also typically employed the term as an adjective rather than a noun connoting a ‘specific ethnic group or people’ (Eickelman 1989: 74). Other scholars argued that Bedouin are a distinct Arab people whose societies are characterised by unique economic customs (pastoralism) and social identities (tribal ascriptions). In these instances, writers spelled the term with a capital *B* in order to describe a group of Semite peoples known for the domestication of camels, trade and warfare practices, codes of honour, and heritage dating back to 6000 B.C. (Chatty 2006). Dawn Chatty (2006) employed the term ‘Bedouin’ to describe affiliates of confederations who claim origins (*‘aṣīl*) from Arabia. This thesis does the same but also includes members who do not claim Arabian origins (non-*‘aṣīl*) but who have nonetheless been a part of Negev Bedouin society over the last century.

Other scholars have focused on distinguishing authentic-bedouin from pseudo-bedouin groups. Here authentic-bedouin are characterised by their pastoral nomadic way of life (Gubser 1983) and the socio-political autonomy of their tribes (Salzman 1996, Kaplan 1980). While pseudo-bedouin were defined by their inclusion of sedentary agricultural practices, cultivation of land, residence in permanent houses, and wage-based labour. Others such as Linda Layne (1994) highlighted the difference between emic and etic terminology as Bedouin typically refer to themselves as *‘arab* rather than *badū* in Jordan. Consequently, she makes distinctions between the words Bedouin and *‘arab* in her study of the dialogics of identity making in Jordan (Layne 1994).

In all, ethnographies of Bedouin peoples must confront the dilemma of employing specific terminology and the politics of assigning ethnological concepts such as ‘tribe’ and ‘community’ to specific people. Today most studies recognise the complexities associated with the terms as discursive constructions. For example, Donald Cole (2003) argued that most Bedouin populations have multifaceted identities as a result of colonialism, state building, occupational change, tourism, and sedentarisation. As a result, the term ‘Bedouin’ has changed from denoting a past way of life to marking a contemporary identity wherein tribal ethos and segmentation coexist with market capitalism, nationalisms, and regional Islamic beliefs (see Cole 2003, Chatty 2014).

In light of the above-mentioned considerations, this thesis argues that Bedouin societies do not disappear when nation-states dominate, ethnicities are assigned, and communities assemble (Dresch and Scheele 2009). As such, it approaches terminology associated with Bedouin identities in the Middle East and the labels people affix to them as fluid and continually changeable ascriptions influenced by scientific discourses, political ethnicities, and community dynamics. All of these factors sway how a people remember, identify, and represent themselves as Bedouin to each other and outsiders. Additionally, it is important to understand that the labels scholars use to define social groups and histories, such as those typically attributed to Bedouin peoples, are also constructions. As such, the English phrase ‘Negev Bedouin’, as used in this thesis, is a referential qualification, an etic expression employed to describe a myriad of people and pasts. Thus the phrase’s durability, weakness, and applicability as a signifier of people ‘grouped’ within it will change over time and always functions uniquely in different venues with different audiences.

While academic debates about these terms might seem pedantic, the words used by locals, social scientists, and government officials matter, and imply a politics of

authenticity which influences the everyday lives of Bedouin in the Negev. In particular, terms associated with group labels such as bedouin (English), *beduim* (Hebrew) and *badū* (Arabic) in the Israeli and Palestinian context are regularly politicised. Consequently, they become malleable constructions whose meanings are purposely reworked by different actors to support or challenge various causes, resource acquisitions, and rights-based ideologies, so much so that the terms' original connotations are almost impossible to detangle.

In all, it is neither my intention nor the goal of this thesis to evaluate whether the Negev Bedouin are 'authentic' or 'pseudo' bedouin – *beduim* – *badū* or to question the political correctness of particular terms such as 'Negev' or *Naqab*, etc. This comes as scholars (Salzman 1996, Dinero 2004, Frantzman et al. 2012) have become fixated on delineating whether or not Negev Bedouin are true Bedouin, adjudicating their ethnic and indigenous claims, and evaluating their commitment to Israeli and Palestinian nationalities over the last decades. Instead, I take up Dale Eickelman's (1989: 74) suggestion to focus on: 'Who says of which group that they are bedouin, and why?' rather than defining 'What is bedouin?' by their ecological or cultural traits. As such, this ethnography broadly focuses on how, why, and when Bedouin in the Negev distinguish themselves from other groups. Specifically, this thesis asks: What do *they* consider to be their Bedouin past and society? How do *they* negotiate representations of their lives? How do *they* go about presenting their *own* history through media such as images? While anthropologists in other parts of the Middle East and North Africa have addressed these topics over the last century, they have yet to be fully explored by studies of Negev Bedouin society. As such, this thesis represents an important contribution to scholarship.

III. TRANSLITERATION GUIDE

ARABIC

Consonants:

ء	‘	ض	ḍ
ب	b	ط	ṭ
ت	t	ظ	ẓ
ث	th	ع	‘
ج	g or j	غ	gh
ح	ḥ	ف	f
خ	kh	ق	q or g or k*
د	d	ك	k
ذ	dh	ل	l
ر	r	م	m
ز	z	ن	n
س	s	ه	h
ش	sh	و	w
ص	ṣ	ة	a or at
		أ	’a

Long vowels

ا	ā
و	ū
ي	ī

Short vowels

َ	a
ُ	u
ِ	i or e

Doubles

ّ	Doubled consonants (for example ‘nn’)
َيّ	yy
َوّ	ww

*In colloquial Arabic ‘q’ is pronounced ‘g’ and sometimes ‘k’.

I also use ‘al-’ for the definite article ال.

IV. GLOSSARY OF ARABIC, HEBREW, AND DIALECT TERMS ⁶

- ‘Abd* (pl. *‘abīd*) – dialect for people of African descent brought to the Negev as servants⁷
- ‘Ā’ila* (pl. *‘ā’ilāt*) – dialect for tribal lineage or extended family
- ‘Ā’iliyya* – dialect for tribalism associated with one’s lineage (*‘ā’ilāt*)
- Al-aḥrār* – dialect for freemen or ‘brown skin’ (*sumrān*)
- Aliyah* – Hebrew for Jewish immigration
- Al-lajna al-maḥalliya* – dialect for village committee
- ‘Arab* – dialect for those who claim Arabian descent
- ‘Arabiyyūn* – Arabic for pan-national Arab ethnicity
- ‘Arḍ* – dialect for virtue, protectionism, and privacy associated with land and property;
eret (Hebrew)
- ‘Ashīra* (pl. *‘ashā’ir*) – dialect for a tribal network or pre-1948 tribes
- Ashkenazim* – Hebrew for Jewish people of Caucasian backgrounds
- ‘Aṣl* (pl. *‘aṣīl*) – dialect for those who claim Arabian origins, roots, or nobility
- Badal* – dialect for exchange
- Badāwī* (pl. *badū*) – Arabic for regional pastoralists and nomads; bedouin (English as pastoral nomad); Bedouin (English as ethnic group); and *beduim* (Hebrew)
- Bādiya* – Arabic term for desert
- Badū fallāḥīn* – Phrase used in this thesis to describe tribal associates and previous tribal clients without Arabian origins (pejorative dialect for *ḥumrān* – ‘red skin’)
- Bayt* (pl. *buyūt*) – dialect for house
- Beersheba – English for the Negev’s major city; *Birüssebi* (Turkish), Bi’r Sab‘ (contemporary Arabic); Beer Sheva (Hebrew); and *as-sab‘* (pre-1948 Bedouin dialect)
- Damm* – dialect for blood
- Dar* (pl. *dīra*) – dialect for property, land, or territory
- Dīwān* – Arabic for salon or formal living room
- Fallāḥ* (pl. *fallāḥīn*) – dialect for regional villagers or farmers
- Fatāwā* – Arabic for religious-legal judgements
- Gabaliyya* – dialect for tribalism associated with one’s tribal confederation (*gabīla*)
- Gabīla* (pl. *gabā’il*) – dialect for tribal confederation (*gabīla*)
- Ghurabā’* – dialect for strangeness
- Gōm* (pl. *agwām*) – dialect for agnate network, co-liaible group, or sub-lineage
- Ḥaḍarī* (pl. *ḥaḍar*) – Arabic for regional urbanites or those who reside in cities

⁶ This list disregards transliterated Arabic characters including *alif* and *‘ayn* or prefixes such as *al-* or *abū* in its alphabetisation.

⁷ ‘Dialect’ will specifically refer to the type of Arabic spoken by Bedouin in the Negev.

Hādīth – Arabic for Islamic text

Hajer – dialect for the custom of clearing stones from land to indicate ownership and use

Hāra (pl. *hārat*) – dialect for neighbourhood

Ḥarām – Arabic for forbidden

Ḥurrīa – dialect for freedom

ʿIlm – Arabic for knowledge

Intifāda – Arabic for a period between 2000 and 2005 of intensified Palestinian-Israeli violence

ʿIrd – dialect for personal virtue, integrity, protected, or privacy

ʿIshra – dialect for social bonds

ʿIzba – dialect for seasonal migrations

ʿIzza – dialect for respect

Kabīr (pl. *kbār*) – dialect for customary elders

Karam – dialect for generosity

Kfarim – Hebrew for towns

Kfarim bilti mukarim – Hebrew for shantytowns in reference to the Bedouin villages or
‘unrecognised villages’

Khūbaīzah – dialect for common mallow plant

Kidhib – dialect for lying

Kufʿ – dialect for unequal

Mahmiyāt – dialect for dependents

Mizrahim – Hebrew for Jewish populations with Maghreb, Yemen, Middle East, and
Central Asian descent

Muḥra – dialect for intimate quarters; *rabʿa* (private rooms)

Mukhtār – Arabic for village headmen or the ‘chosen’; *mukhtarim* (Hebrew)

Mukhtār-shuyūkh – Phrased used in this thesis to describe Israeli government assigned
shaykhs

Mujtama – Arabic for community

Mutakhallifīn – dialect for backward

Nakba – Arabic for ‘Catastrophe’ in reference to the 1948 Israeli-Arab War

Nasab (pl. *nasāb*) – dialect for genealogies

Negev – Hebrew for dry used to describe Israel’s southern desert region; other translations
include ‘Negeb’ (the English Biblical name); ‘Naqab’ (the new Arabic term), or *as-
sab*’ (dialect)

Negev Bedouin – English to describe Bedouin residing in southern Israel; *Habeduim Banegev*
(Hebrew); *Badū an-Naqab* (contemporary Arabic); and ‘*arab as-sab*’ (pre-1948 dialect)

Pezurah – Hebrew for ‘desert diaspora’

Rubaʿ – dialect for quarter and tribal network connected by four generations by patrilineal

ancestry

ṣaff – dialect for tribal sub-confederation or super-tribe network

Sha`ab – Arabic for people

Shaykh (pl. *shuyūkh*) – dialect for customary tribal leaders

Shevet (pl. *shevatim*) – Hebrew for administratively organised tribal units

Shigg – dialect for agnate meeting place

Sīyāj – dialect for ‘enclosed area’ or reservation

Sulāla – dialect for descent

Ṣumūd – Arabic for resistance or perseverance

Sūq – Arabic for market

Ṭābū – dialect for formal land registrations; customary land deeds (*sanād*)

Tā`rīkh – Arabic for history

Tarwīd (pl. *tarāwīd*) – dialect for wedding songs sung by women

Taṭawwur – dialect for progress or development

Teuda Zehut – Hebrew for Identification Card

Thaūb – dialect for traditional dress

Tiyaha – dialect for clients or tents

‘Ulamā – Arabic for learned men

‘Ulūm – Arabic for intellectual traditions

‘Urft – dialect for local custom

Wajih – dialect for public or social ‘face’

Wasam – dialect for symbols, brands, and tattoos indicating something of value and owned or
under the protection of a specific group of people

Yishuv – Hebrew for Jewish community

PART I

MEDIATED HISTORIES




Figure 1: Google map of Israel and field site around Beersheba in the central Negev (Google, Digital Globe 2015).

INTRODUCTION

CONTOURS OF PLACE, PEOPLE, AND ETHNOGRAPHY

The Negev Desert is located in southern Levant. The region's eastern border follows the Araba Valley to the city of Aqaba located on the coast of the Red Sea. Its northern boundary runs east from Gaza along the Beersheba Plain and Hebron Hills to the Dead Sea. In the past, the Negev was the Sinai Peninsula's northern frontier and a land bridge between Asia Minor and North Africa. Since the 1978 Camp David Agreement between Israel and Egypt, the Negev officially lies within Israel's 1949 territory. The international boundary between the two countries marks the region's western border (see Figure 1). Today the Negev is Israel's most southern district occupying 12,500 square kilometres, roughly fifty-five per cent of the entire state.

Since the creation of the Israeli state, national media, travel journals, and government propaganda have described the Negev as a vacant arid desert awaiting development. From the 1930s onward, Jewish people of Caucasian backgrounds (Hebrew – *Ashkenazim*) established *kibbutzim* and *moshavim*⁸ in the Negev's fertile valleys. In the 1950s, the state concentrated Jewish populations from the Maghreb, Yemen, Middle East, and Central Asia (Hebrew – *Mizrahim*) into the cities of Dimona, Arad, Mitzpe Ramon, and Beersheba (Hebrew – Beer Sheva, Arabic – Bi'r al-Sab'). The Negev was home to around 630,000 people as of 2011. Seventy-five per cent had Jewish ancestry (ICSB 2011). Nationalist narratives implying the region was *terra incognita*, however, discount the Negev Desert's Arab population – namely Bedouin descendants of pastoralists and farmers who have resided in the region in previous

⁸ This is a type of cooperative agricultural community in Israel.

centuries and who remained there after 1948. Today they constitute twenty-five per cent of southern Israel's population (ICSB 2011).⁹

Before the 1948 Israeli-Arab War or *Nakba*, there were between 60,000-90,000 Bedouin living in the Negev (Marx 1967). After the War only around 11,000 people remained as the rest were forcibly expelled or chose to join family in Gaza, the West Bank, Jordan, or Sinai (Marx 1967). Of the seven tribal confederations (*gabā'il*) recognised by the British Mandate, mostly members of the *Tiyāhā* stayed in the Negev.¹⁰ During Israel's Military Administration (1948-1966), the state forced families to relocate to a reservation (*Sīyāj*) consolidating Bedouin residence in the Negev. At the end of the 1960s, the state implemented an urbanisation policy (1967-1993) to coerce villagers in the 'desert diaspora' (Hebrew – *pezurah*) to move to state-built townships (Hebrew – *kfarim*).¹¹ Varying in size and demography, half of Israel's southern Bedouin population (approximately 110,000 people [NCF 2014]) today live in the state-built towns of Rāhaṭ, Lagīya, Ḥūra, Bi'r Hadāj, Tel as-Sab', Ksīfa, 'Ar'arat an-Naqab, and Shagīb as-Salām. Of these, many consider the city of Rāhaṭ, with its 55,000 inhabitants (ICBS 2011), the unofficial capital of the Negev's Bedouin population.

The remainder (approximately 100,000 Bedouin [NCF 2014]) live in villages primarily located within the previous *Sīyāj* – residences that the state and civil society organisations have labelled 'unrecognised villages'¹² or 'illegal shantytowns' (Hebrew – *kfarim bilti mukarim*).¹³ According to Israel's 1965 Planning and Construction Law, these villages are illegal because the state does not officially recognise Bedouin homesteads that existed before 1948 (NCF 2014) or those established by families during

⁹ Archaeological evidence of Bedouin residence includes cemeteries (*nawāmī*) and open-air mosques created in early Islamic periods (Avner and Magness 1998).

¹⁰ Bedouin lost ninety-five per cent of their Negev lands when the Israeli government declared large areas of the region state property in the 1950s (Marx 1967).

¹¹ Henceforth towns.

¹² Henceforth villages.

¹³ Labels such as 'shanty', 'diaspora', 'periphery', and 'illegal' give the illusion that these residences are not only scattered but also temporary (Parizot 2004).

the Military Administration (1948-1966). In the 1980s, the state intensified their ‘policy of pressure’ on these Bedouin villagers and sought to coerce them to move to the state towns by demolishing their homes and disqualifying them from governmental services. This policy continues today. Israeli officials justify the policy by arguing that they are enforcing the 1965 Law (which up until the 1980s was not implemented) and by explaining that residents lack building permits and deeds.

Consequently, public access to these villages is limited and visits by outsiders to them are generally rare. In the last decade, however, village spokespersons and community leaders have extended invitations to political tourists hosted by regional NGOs. Notwithstanding, the majority of Israelis typically ‘see’ these Bedouin villages as slums dotting the hills of the Negev Desert. As vehicles speed past these homes, passers-by rarely see past the corrugated roofs, pallet fencing, and herds of sheep; leaving many outsiders with preconceived ideas about Bedouin nomadism, primitivism, and exoticism in Israel. My own perceptions of the Negev and Bedouin villages were equally restricted until the summer of 2012. It was not until Suleīmān al-‘Athāmīn invited my husband Ike and I to live with his family in the village of Khashem Zana‘ that my connection to these Negev places and people became more intimate.

I. FIELDWORK ENCOUNTERS

Before moving to Khashem Zana‘ in 2012, Ike and I relocated to Beersheba in September 2011 to conduct fieldwork for my doctoral studies. I travelled to Bedouin towns such as Rāhaṭ, Ksīfa, Ḥura, and Lagīya to gather information on photographic collections owned by families and community organisations over the course of a year. At the end of the first year, I had spent most of my time with ‘Ā’isha al-Ṣāna’s

extended family (‘*ā’ila*) in Lagīya.¹⁴ During this initial period of fieldwork, it became apparent that Bedouin in the Negev are not rural desert residents isolated from the world and their neighbours.¹⁵ Alternatively, they regularly work, study, and socialise with a diverse group of people including state officials, tourists, and co-workers from various backgrounds. They also intermingle with other Palestinians, European diplomats, international journalists, and civil society activists. They visit kin in Gaza, the West Bank, Jordan, Sinai, and Israel. Ultimately, Bedouin maintain a vast range of relationships with outsiders but, at the same time, also possess unique senses of history and society; an exclusive ethos that I became more familiar with during my second year of fieldwork in the village of Khashem Zana’.

Towards the end of my time in Lagīya in the summer of 2012, I explained to ‘*Ā’isha al-Ṣāna*’ that I aspired to learn more about the way of life in the villages. She told that she had previously tried to organise stays for other students but had been unable to do so. According to ‘*Ā’isha*, village women view single Western females as troublesome because of ‘their men’s reactions’ and were thus not welcome. On the other hand, few men would allow a single male to live in his house and interact with his female relatives. After several weeks, ‘*Ā’isha* spoke with Suleīmān al-‘Athāmīn, a member of the Regional Council for Unrecognized Villages (RCUV) who frequently invites political tourists to visit his home in Khashem Zana’. She described my interest in living with his family and learning more about Bedouin villagers. Suleīmān agreed to host me but only if Ike, my husband, would join me and we both agreed to teach English to his children (five females between the ages of eleven and their late twenties; four males between the ages of ten and their late twenties).

¹⁴ See Appendix I Dramatis Personae for a list of informants and their gender, age, and profession.

¹⁵ This thesis notes the difference between community and society in the Negev (see Ingold 1996). Countering Donald Cole (2003), it labels Negev Bedouin a (non-static) small-scale ‘society’ because of their distinct forms of sociality and heterogeneity of their internal relationships. Alternatively, this thesis argues that there are several types of communities composing Negev Bedouin society.

Later in the week Suleīmān invited ‘Ā’isha and I to Khashem Zana’ so that I could meet his wife Fāṭimah and his family. Driving west out of Beersheba along highway twenty-five, the village is positioned next to Shagīb as-Sālām and Nevatim. It is composed of numerous homesteads where over 150 extended families (‘ā’ila) live next to one another, approximately 2,300 people in total. Located south of Highway 25, Suleīmān’s home is perched on the side of a hill and surrounded by a metal fence protecting the inner courtyard. Below the house are a playground and a one-room school. Two smaller houses, constructed out of intermodal shipping containers and cinderblock extensions, are located to the west of his home. Both homes have large solar panels on their roofs that are connected to water heaters. On the left of the house is a tented porch with a roof made of canvas and a plastic tarpaulin to keep out the winter rain.

Suleīmān and his fourth eldest daughter (eighteen years old) greeted and directed ‘Ā’isha and I to their reception room or salon (*dīwān*) when we arrived. There we met his wife and his three other daughters. After several hours of introductions and drinking tea, his fourth eldest daughter left the room and came back with a small laptop computer with a portable Internet drive connected to its USB port. My assumptions about the peripheral way of life in the Bedouin villages were dispelled when she opened the computer and asked me, ‘Do you have Facebook?’ Surprised, I told her I did. Meanwhile, the third eldest daughter went to her purse and pulled out a new Apple iPad. For the rest of the afternoon, Suleīmān’s daughters and I learned about each other through our Facebook profiles and by sharing pictures of our friends and videos of our weddings.

By the late afternoon, Suleīmān’s fourth eldest daughter became bored with the computer and asked me if I would like to walk around the village and meet her grandmother (her father’s mother). We left to travel to her grandmother’s property

while her sisters continued playing on their devices. Bending low to walk under the tent's side, I followed Suleīmān's daughter into her grandmother's house (*bayt, buyūt*). An elderly woman sat in a traditional dress (*thaūb*) with a long black veil and her chin covered with blue tattoos (*wasam*). Her grandmother explained that she would teach me to dress properly, make bread, harvest common mallow (*khūbaīzah*), and care for the herds. In that moment I realised that the succeeding months of my fieldwork would be marked by profound generational differences.

Ike and I lived in a remodelled shipping container next to Suleīmān's eldest son during our time in the village. We spent our days working and socialising around the homestead. Suleīmān, his eldest sons, and Ike constructed extensions to the main house. In the morning his wife and their elder daughters cleaned. I helped the younger children with the livestock after they returned from school. After dinner we sat around the cast iron stove and drank tea in what Ike and I affectionately called the wigwam rather than in the house, which the family reserved for sleeping, cooking, and hosting non-familial guests. At night Suleīmān's youngest son did his homework next to the light bulb that hung from an extension cord connected to a generator in the main house. Along with the light, a power plug was tied to the metal tent frame to power our mobile phones and computers. While Suleīmān's other younger children and I worked on our English and Arabic vocabulary, the rest of the family looked at the screens of their various electronic devices. Suleīmān read the news on his computer, his fourth eldest daughter viewed pictures on Facebook on the iPad, and his second eldest son listened to music videos on YouTube on his mobile phone.

Our daily worlds were largely limited to interactions with family members, neighbours, and extended family (*'ā'ila*) while living in Khashem Zana'. Ike often travelled with Suleīmān to an Israeli Jewish *moshav* to purchase concrete where our host discussed Israeli national events in Hebrew with business owners. Ike and I would

also serve as hosts when political tourists came to Khashem Zana¹⁶ from other cities in Israel, the West Bank, and abroad. On other occasions, we would take Suleīmān's jeep further into the desert to the back boundary of the village to visit his wife's family. There we would eat and drink tea with her charismatic cousin. Together, we would look at family photographs whilst they explained why Bedouin history in Israel is similar to that of 'red Indians in America'. On other occasions, I joined the women on trips to Beersheba's 'Bedouin market' where Suleīmān's daughters told me about the social differences between women claiming Arabian origins (*'aṣīl*) and 'those other women' from Rāhaṭ, which I later learned were people (*badū fallāḥīn*) locally considered to have Egyptian descent.

Through these experiences, I realised that Bedouin are not only immersed in complex socio-political networks but also engage with assorted media technologies and varied ideas of history,¹⁶ tribalism, Islam, nationalisms, ethnicity, and citizenship in southern Israel. In particular, I found that people's notions of 'insiders' and 'outsiders' in Bedouin society were diverse. They ranged from other Bedouin families, lineages (*'ā'ilāt*), or residential groups to Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab neighbours, and foreigners. Moreover, Bedouin members, who regularly interacted with non-Bedouin outsiders (such as Suleīmān), also frequently placed importance on 'Negev Bedouin history' in everyday conversations or public lectures with various audiences. They not only articulated the legacies of their *'ā'ilāt* but also strove to establish historical connections to other Bedouin populations through genealogy, to fellow Muslims through Islamic heritage, and to neighbouring Palestinians and Israelis through ethnohistory.

¹⁶ There is ambiguity about the definition of the word 'history'. In English, the term signifies representation of the past as recorded, the same holds true in Arabic.

When communicating local historical knowledge¹⁷ (*‘ilm*) to others, however, I found that Bedouin presentations often created divergent pictures of the ‘Negev Bedouin’ past and people. In particular, I observed how representations of history among members varied by audience with presenters drawing on oral stories, books, maps, and photographs to boast about their genealogies and create disparate tribal histories during dialogues in some occasions. At other times, they re-contextualised narratives to make statements of their Palestinian or Israeli Arab nationalisms or to explain Bedouin indigeneity to Western visitors. In all, Negev Bedouin history has been enunciated through various learned, governmental, and community discourses, which have impacted members’ own articulations since the time of Ottoman rule.

Of those media strategies practised in the Negev, during fieldwork I found that visual materials in the form of photographs and digital images played a significant role in people’s articulations of history and identity. In order to further explore these circumstances, this thesis investigates: (1) the apparent representational contentions between Bedouin members as a consequence of their varied presentations of history and society conveyed to specific audiences in the Negev; and (2) the presence¹⁸ and value of photographic and digital images as historical evidence involved in these presentations as they work alongside other forms of media and technologies such as books and websites.¹⁹

¹⁷ ‘Knowledge’ is defined as ‘justified true belief’ often conferred through oral exchanges, writing, audio recording, or visual mediums in specific contexts.

¹⁸ The term ‘presence’ is furthered explore in Chapter One but refers to a ‘state of being’ that bears literal and figurative ‘weight’ (see Runia 2006) along with historical and contemporary significance.

¹⁹ The names of websites and their URLs (along with dates accessed) are presented in the Reference List.

II. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES

Over the last twenty years, Bedouin in the Negev have strategically converted cultural knowledge (*'ilm*) and living memories into formal representations of the past amid popular Western, Israeli, Palestinian and local imaginings of their history and society. While not everyone in Negev Bedouin society is interested in history, local spokespersons (of particular networks of people)²⁰ who regularly host and interact with non-Bedouin outsiders often present family memories, lineage (*'ā'ila*) accounts, and personal experiences as 'official' descriptions of their society in order to improve their legitimacy and visibility in southern Israel. Increasingly, however, Bedouin reproduce and disseminate this disparate local information via maps, brochures, videos, websites, books, and news articles. Over the last decades, these enterprises have cumulated into a new repository of knowledge created by indigenous producers (Ratcliffe 2009) for various audiences but one promulgating very specific representations of Negev Bedouin history and society.

Over the last fifteen years, scholars of Negev Bedouin society such as Cédric Parizot (2001a), Richard Ratcliffe (2009), Emily McKee (2010), and Bogumila Hall (2014) have acknowledged members' strategic representational efforts. Of these, Parizot (2001a) and Ratcliffe (2009) highlighted the initial differences between tribal narratives espoused in certain public venues by customary leaders (*shaykh*, *shuyūkh*) and elders (*kabīr*, *kbār*), and the recent creation of community narratives circulated by civic and religious advocates. They describe how popular community descriptions often portray tribal (*gabaliyya* or *'ā'iliyya*) relations and other customary practices (such as parallel cousin marriage) as backward (*mutakhallifīn*) retrogressive barriers to progressive

²⁰ This thesis focuses on public spokespersons authorised by others to regularly act on their behalf. As described in Chapter Two, characteristics of these people are diverse and include tribal elders (*kbār*), academics and politicians, and civic and religious spokespersons. It should be highlighted, however, that individuals identification to these categories are temporal and multiple in that they may identify as an elder and/or civic activist simultaneously or during specific periods in their life.

(*taṭawwur*) development. In particular, the latter often argue that tribal narratives support Orientalist claims by the state that the population is primitive and hinder the community's shared future in southern Israel (Yiftachel 2009).

The mutability of local public vocabulary describing Bedouin experiences in the Negev reflects the dramatic changes to their way of life that have occurred over the last century; a situation in which pastoralism has become less popular among some and segmentary visions of their tribal past less pervasive in certain publics.²¹ By conspicuously obfuscating local particularisms, however, community spokespersons advocating civic and Islamic ideologies often leave outsiders with the impression that tribal dynamics are relatively absent from their everyday lives in comparison to fifty years ago. At the same time, on-going tribal oppositions and competition between lineages (*ʿā'ilāt*) may leave others with the impression that Bedouin are uncommitted to civic and religious universalisms prevalent in the lives of other Palestinian minorities in Israel.

To further explore these representational differences this thesis first investigates the ambiguity and heterogeneity of Bedouin self-presentations of local history and society. The thesis asks: What types of Bedouin histories circulate today? How do local spokespersons make and communicate this information? Is there internal representational antagonism between elders and community advocates for local historicity? To answer these questions, this work builds on Parizot's (2001a) and Ratcliffe's (2009) hypotheses that Bedouin partition 'political fields' in the Negev in order to diversify the number of representatives within their lineages (*ʿā'ilāt*) and extended families appealing for capital in southern Israel. They do so to obtain external funding and assets from various civic and religious sources that, once acquired, are

²¹ There are different privates and publics in the Negev or locations where people share interests and possess more knowledge than other members and, therefore, exert more influence in these spheres of interaction.

chiefly distributed through descent lines and among cognates. Irrespective of their public rhetoric, civic and Islamic spokespersons typically collaborate with elders (*kbār*) within their own tribal (*‘ashā’irī*) networks²² to buttress their extended families’ capacity to conduct bilateral negotiations with the Israeli state and NGOs; accumulate the political power; discredit competing networks; and acquire their own resources (Ratcliffe 2009).

Moreover, this thesis argues that internal discrepancies are not always necessarily *between* customary and progressive spokespersons but rather are the result of strategic Bedouin identification practices and mediations based on ‘acts of persuasion’ (Caton 1990) particular to tribal (*‘ashā’irī*) politics between lineages (*‘ā’ilāt*). Thus it suggests that self-presentations of Bedouin history or society in the Negev will nearly always respond to the interlocutor’s status (be they a member or outsider) within a specific network of people and modified by members accordingly. That is the rhetorical statement or representation a member chooses to put forward or not will depend on their audience and their mediation of positionality and status among different people. While such dialectics are symptomatic of sociality throughout the world, these practices among Bedouin are particularly distinguished by the nested nature of local *‘ashā’irī* politics but also the dramatic political tensions and clash of identities framing Israeli and Palestinian nationalisms and people’s everyday interactions in this part of the Middle East.

While lineages (*‘ā’ilāt*) have not only diversified the number of arbiters in their ranks (see Parizot 2001a, Ratcliffe 2009), this thesis posits that Bedouin have also expanded their representational repertoires and media techniques in order to navigate

²² While beyond the scope of this thesis, it is argued that socio-political relationships conducted under the banner of tribal namesakes in the Negev are more accurately described as tribal (*‘ashā’irī*) networks rather than tribes (*‘ashīra*, *‘ashā’ir*) implying static group membership and homogeneity as commonly used in literature.

the Negev's complex public politics, connect to various audiences, and appeal for resources. In particular, this thesis argues that the majority of Bedouin spokespersons, irrespective of their individual positionalities, strategically utilise the ambiguous nature of 'history' in the Negev and the heterogeneity of their relations to connect with others in the pursuit of authority. Consequently, Bedouin self-presentations of history and society have become both varied and strategic as they aim to validate a range of socio-political rights and acquire much-needed resources in the Israeli and Palestinian context.²³ This thesis also argues that these representational practices have become increasingly dependent on 'historical capital' in the form of documentary evidence and artefacts over the last twenty years. Specifically, one's Bedouin past is no longer simply inherited but rather must be affirmed by outsiders and supported by evidentiary materials such as photographs.

The pursuit of historical capital among Bedouin comes as Israeli state courts and *Knesset* members are adjudicating whether or not Bedouin village residents should be legally defined as semi-nomadic and determining whether Bedouin farmed Negev lands prior to 1948. These legal rulings, which have steadily intensified since the 1980s, directly influence Bedouin land and civic rights in the Negev today. For example, many Israeli state officials argue that the Bedouin are nomads and therefore cannot make historical claims to Negev lands²⁴ – Jewish national sentiments that have forced Bedouin to 'prove' their on-going presence on what the state has long considered the Negev's 'empty lands'.

As detailed in the next chapter, however, state officials throughout the Middle East typically disregard the Bedouin's customary oral histories as speculative stories of

²³ Iris Jean-Klein (2001: 92) also noted the 'strategic-ness' of Palestinians activists.

²⁴ They argue that Bedouin never permanently lived in the Negev (Frantzman et al. 2012); that their tribal society dissolved in 1948 (Salzman 1996); and that they are a nomadic people who possess no value for land (Avigdor Lieberman [former Foreign Affairs Minister of Israel] in Somfalvi 2013).

the past and consider them to be illegitimate forms of historical knowledge; leaving members unable to substantiate their connections to Negev lands through more traditional means. This thesis argues that, in light of the above-mentioned struggles, Bedouin are turning to (what are popularly perceived in the Israeli and Palestinian context to be) ‘learned historical materials’ which not only include archival texts and local writings but also old photographs and contemporary digital images. Of these materials, it contends that Bedouin are increasingly treating photographic and digital images as new types of evidence that authenticate their historical knowledge and current presence in the Negev. Moreover, this thesis posits that their intensified use of images has not only widened the temporal spectrum of proof²⁵ in the Negev but diversified Bedouin historicity²⁶ and the media strategies through which they feel compelled to legitimate themselves, their pasts, and present experiences in specific socio-political contexts²⁷ – a situation making a study that traces Bedouin’s visual knowledge through the presence of image-based evidentiary materials in southern Israel extremely pertinent.

As briefly suggested above, over the last decades Bedouin in the Negev have experienced a ‘shifting of media practices’ similar to other populations throughout the Middle East (see Miller 2007). Up until the late twentieth century, most Bedouin customarily relied on incorporating practices such as oral recitations to share and preserve their nonlinear histories predominantly among themselves. In the wake of the population’s improved literacy since the 1970s and access to the Internet in the 2000s,

²⁵ Oral and textual practices as they pertain to the construction of history in the Negev are explored in Chapter Three.

²⁶ This thesis employs Eric Hirsh and Charles Stewart’s (2005: 262) definition of ‘historicity’ as the manner in which people make sense of the past (authenticity) and the modes (social productions) by which they account for it. They suggested this analytic for investigations into non-Western understandings of the past.

²⁷ As not to over exaggerate the capacity of Bedouin to impose meanings over their Negev landscape, this thesis draws on the work of Dale Eickelman (1979). It argues that representational landscapes in the Negev are informed by and inform broader political economies of meaning (characterised by specific periods of time, power dynamics, and changes). Due to lack of space, however, the thesis cannot go into further detail about these broader firmaments.

individuals and groups have progressively privileged inscription practices in order to interweave their distinct narratives into uniform chronologies, record family gatherings as cultural events, and compile everyday objects into collections of artefacts. Over the last twenty years, in particular, they have utilised learned resources to call forth genealogies (*nasāb*), validate tribal histories, counter accusations of lying, and create community narratives to share among themselves and outsiders. This thesis argues that today these varied promulgations rely on diverse poly-media²⁸ (Madianou and Miller 2011), mediations that increasingly include visual materials such as photographic and digital images.

As of 2015, Bedouin in the Negev use laptops, cameras, and mobile phones to create photographs, videos, books, and files. These media technologies transform family archives, folktales, genealogical (*nasabī*) trees, and lineage (*‘ā’ilāt*) narratives into tangible and virtual ‘evidence’ regularly employed as representations of their histories. Individuals circulate this proof in physical and virtual spaces such as salons (*dīwān*), agnate meeting places (*shigg*), civic centres, schools, blogs, and Facebook. As stated, these disseminations rely on oral stories, historical books, and (more recently) photographic, and digital images. Of these mediums, old photographs, virtual graphics, maps, drawings, and other visual materials increasingly influence how Bedouin reference and present knowledge over the last decade.

Until the early 2000s, the presence and use of images among this population was not as prolific as before due to restricted access to visual technologies. In the past fifteen years, however, Israel’s economy has enabled Bedouin to easily purchase image-making technologies such as smart phones, cameras, and computers; technologies augmenting local access to social media, the Internet, and other web-based platforms. With their mobile phones, computers, and digital cameras, Bedouin collect old

²⁸ The concept of the poly-media is explored in Chapter One.

photographs, commission family portraits, hang images on walls, carry memorable pictures on their person, and capture images of their lives. These images are then disseminated and exchanged between people through various physical and digital platforms.

At the same time, new software and photographic technologies like Flickr are also facilitating images' circulation and adaptation among Bedouin in the Negev. While photographic images are still found in their original physical forms, digital images are by their very nature nonlocal – appearing on blogs, websites, and Facebook (Gruder and Haugbølle 2013). On many occasions, it is not the photograph itself but its graphic content or image that is removed and reinserted into people's archives, re-embedded in books and newspapers, projected onto television and computer screens, reprinted on paper and film, secured onto concrete and virtual walls, and compiled into databases and websites. Photographic images become dislocated from their original material constraints and spatial contexts through copying and digitising. It is a process wherein multiple individuals may then lay claim to images through co-option rather than owning originals (Gruder and Haugbølle 2013).

Although it may be obvious to note that photographic and digital images influence the ways people think about and communicate their pasts (Banks and Vokes 2010), anthropologists of the Middle East have yet to adequately account for these occurrences in the region's periphery and not merely among urbanites (see Armbrust 2006, Ryzova 2012). In response this thesis hypothesises that a study of visual materials employed during presentations of history can provide new insights about Bedouin representational politics in Israel's southern Negev Desert. While acknowledging the risk of repeating well-established dichotomies between media forms (such as those discussed in Chapter One), it argues that people throughout the world value different media in different ways. Of these, visual materials are popularly esteemed for their

perceived objective reliability and their ability to be sourced and disseminated through a wide range of channels.²⁹ Moreover, while visual materials, like of other forms media, inherently coexist with ideologies, discourses, and beliefs, they also maintain their own unique socio-political lives and agencies in the various contexts in which they are used – including those characterising the peripheral Middle East.

In response, this thesis details occasions when Bedouin deliberately insert visual accounts in the form of still photographs and digital images into oral and text-making enterprises in the Negev. It does not compare visual media to oral, aural, textual, embodied, and material expressions. Instead, this thesis questions how people expand their media practices over time (in recent decades) and in specific spaces by selectively incorporating new visual technologies and objects with more conventional media, such as books, when discussing the past among themselves and with others.³⁰

In the past five years, visual culture studies of the Middle East (see Gruder and Haugbølle 2013) have noted that new image-based technologies, such as digitisation, have expanded visual media's polysemous characteristics as floating signs circulating Orientalist iconography. Authors have also highlighted the fact that people continually re-code images' meanings as they travel between tangible and virtual spaces (Pinney 2003). They argued that, unlike oral statements and texts, photographs and digital images are unique communicators. These signs are malleable, their authorship can be tactfully disregarded, and their meanings continually reworked as they move in different contexts. Because of these representational instrumentalities, this thesis argues that images have come to influence presentations of the past and society among peripheral Bedouin peoples in Israel.

²⁹ The unique attributes of visual media are further described in the next chapter.

³⁰ Analyses of smartphones and websites are beyond the scope of this project. Instead, these technologies are treated as vehicles for communication.

In addition to their value as signs, however, this thesis suggests that images' influences on local history-making enterprises are also determined by their *polyvalent* presence as historical evidence in different settings (be they hung on walls, displayed on a smart phone, stored within an physical archive, or saved on computer files or websites). Thus the values of images in a society are not solely predicated upon their capacity to articulate multifarious meanings but also based upon their ability to maintain diverse presence(s)³¹ as material and digital evidence of the past. Together it is their dual capacity to mediate various meanings and distinctive presence(s) that make images both unique communicators for 'story-telling' but also significant 'objects' for local Bedouin historicity in the Negev.

In order to explore these processes, the second aspect of this thesis also asks: What are the changing meaning³² and presence(s) of photographic and digital images among Bedouin in the Negev? How do images travel as material and digital 'objects' in their society? How do visual materials work with oral and textual media to legitimate local historical knowledge? What are their values for local historicity? To answer these questions, it draws on material culture approaches describing the social lives of a collection of 'historical images' of Negev Bedouin and how they, as both objects and codes, are shaped by and in turn shape genealogies and tribal histories, Islamic heritage, and ethnohistory.

As detailed in the next section, archival (material and digital resources) and empirical (my own interactions with members) research aimed to find the 'original image' of eight 'significant images' (c. 1906 and 2010) circulating among Bedouin and employed for local historicity during my fieldwork. This approach provided a

³¹ The term 'presence(s)' is further discussed in the next chapter but refers to images' historical content and their material and digital manifestations that is their simultaneous 'states of multiple being' in the past and present.

³² The term 'meaning' in this thesis generally refers to images' changing interpretations or 're-readings'.

systematic way of establishing the images' biographies and accounting for the types of information derived from them along with their presence(s), movements, and values in contexts³³ inside and outside of the Negev. While drawing on a biographical method, this thesis acknowledges Elizabeth Edwards' (2012: 223) suggestion that this approach is 'perhaps too linear to accommodate the analytical needs of the complex flows....' of multiple image originals and copies across diverse landscapes and timeframes.

To account for images' divergent circulations with various 'political fields' and social contexts in the Negev (Parizot 2001a), this thesis employed Deborah Poole's (1997) concept of visual economies rather than visual cultures. For her, images' meanings are never solidified but instead the relationships between signifier and signified are continually reworked as they travel between different social settings (Poole 1997). The concept of visual economy is a productive way of landscaping images' representational politics, iconography, technological attributes, and object values at macro levels that is within and between national and international circuits. Her model does not, however, address: (1) the transformation of photographic objects into digital codes and *vice versa*; or (2) images' poly-mediations with oral and text-based information in a society; or (3) the production, consumption, and circulations of images within the nested socio-political contexts which characterise Bedouin lives in the Negev.

To this end, I argue for the importance of conceptualising visual economies at multiple scales in the Negev, not as a binary representational discourse between two countries (Banks and Vokes 2010). Differentiating visual economies in this way not only highlights the movement of images *between* national circuits but also stresses their distinct production, consumption, and exchange patterns *within* various communities in a society. I hypothesise that Bedouin engage images within six main visual economies

³³ Henceforth 'contexts' will also be referred to as 'landscapes' and 'discourses' in this thesis.

in southern Israel, which are organised in terms of proximity or closeness and distance characterising their local interactions and history projects.

Differentiating visual economies as distinct yet nested macro-meso-micro contexts also provides a discursive map upon which the photographic and digital images of Negev Bedouin exert their presence(s) and acquire their own unique socio-political biographies of value among Bedouin. Approached as such, it is hypothesised that this project can explain the apparent representational discrepancies between members through the manufacture and recoding of historical and social knowledge derived from images as internally competitive (in terms of tribal politics, gender, and generation) but externally collaborative (in terms of ethno-nationalism, activism, and heritage) as they inscribe visual evidence.

With this unique perspective, this thesis will contribute to a richer understanding of images' influence for the 'making of history' (see Peel 1984, Herzfeld 1991, Shryock 1997, Sahlins 2004) among Bedouin in the Negev. It postulates that Bedouin revere photographic and digital images as mediated artefacts that substantiate their local knowledge claims – information that increasingly relies 'on the materiality of the trace, the immediacy of the recording, [and] the visibility of the image' (Nora 1989: 13). While utilising a novel form of representation that materialises experience, the thesis hypothesises that most Bedouin spokespersons (irrespective of age, status, or residence) value the seemingly learned evidence provided by images' ability to realistically capture historical events, connect past people, and ground Bedouin in Negev landscapes. This thesis also postulates that spokespersons value images because their readings are not restricted to singular expressions like one's word or writings, which are bound by authorship and sequence. Alternatively, the knowledge validated by images is multifarious and well suited to the persuasion politics characterising historicity in this Bedouin society. Thus it is argued that Bedouin value images not only because they

evidence specific narratives but, more importantly, because they verify multiple histories and facilitate practices of strategic appropriation allowing spokespersons to mediate a range of relationships in the Israeli and Palestinian context.

III. PRACTICALITIES AND POLITICS OF FIELDWORK

In order to address these topics, this thesis draws on existing literature on Negev Bedouin society, media studies, and visual anthropology. It also presents data collected through multi-sited research and a range of methods including long-term ethnographic fieldwork and archival research conducted over eighteen months between August 2011 and April 2013 in the Negev. Locations predominantly included Beersheba, the towns of Rāhaṭ, Ḥura, Ksīfa, and Lagīya, and the villages of Khashem Zana‘ and al-‘Aragīb. During the first half of my fieldwork, I lived in Beersheba and Lagīya. The remainder of my time was spent in Khashem Zana‘.

During fieldwork, I documented local spokespersons’ history-making efforts and recorded how they used visual materials in their private daily lives and public exchanges with each other and outsiders. To do so, I employed participant observation, semi-structured interviews, photographic elicitations, and archival research. While living in Lagīya and Khashem Zana‘, I participated in the creation of family albums, wall hangings, framing of portraits, and filming weddings. I noted the presentation of images, their physical and virtual presence(s), and employment during conversations and writings. I also attended photographic exhibitions and video screenings hosted by NGOs and community centres. In addition to institutional venues, I was invited to weddings and other family events where members produced images along with several female photographic and video viewing parties. I observed presentations to outsiders, in

particular, Suleīmān's conversations with guests at his house and a visual literacy project hosted by a NGO in Khashem Zana'.

Along with participant observation, I also conducted semi-structured interviews with local elders, historians, professionals, and photojournalists along with archivists, NGO representatives, journalists, anthropologists, and local historians. I also organised numerous informal interviews with family members. Documentation consisted of audio recordings, personal field notes, and photographs. A fundamental challenge for my project was language. I conducted most interviews in a combination of English, Hebrew, and Bedouin dialect. Translating between these three languages occasionally posed problems. I was, however, fortunate to have 'Amīr Shiblī (a Bedouin man from northern Israel) to serve as my chaperone, translator, and key informant during fieldwork.

I also employed a social biography method in order to establish the socio-political biographies of eight 'significant images' (c. 1906 and 2010). This data is presented in the thesis' five main case studies.³⁴ This approach allowed me to also expand upon the images' readings and presence(s) in a variety of settings that is their initial displays in the Negev, that is their replicated existences and re-coding by members in a range of physical and digital venues.³⁵ During fieldwork, I noted their material descriptions (creator, content, location) and encounters with other media (books, oral stories, or digital platforms) in order to also account for their poly-mediations and value during varied presentations of the past.

This approach included photographic elicitations establishing the images' social biographies (see Harper 1987). The method provided 'sites of negotiation' (Edwards

³⁴ Specific images were chosen because: they routinely circulated within and beyond their society; their material and digital appropriations occurred in various contexts; they held value for those displaying them; and they were well-known among the population and routinely used by spokespersons to provide insight about local history and society.

³⁵ The lives of the images were meticulously investigated, however, due to constraints of time and space many of their biographies are incomplete. This reflects the piecemeal nature of object life stories.

2003), however, I endeavoured to move beyond personalised readings by asking questions about broader topics such as tribal histories and community events in order to place personal narratives in broader contexts (Banks 2001). The social biography method also involved multi-sited archival research in the United Kingdom, United States, Israel, and the West Bank³⁶ including a series of digital collections and personal collections of several anthropologists who had worked with Bedouin in the Negev over the last century.

During the collection of empirical data, my own personal history in the Negev along with my perceived marital status, gender, citizenship, religious affiliation, limits of language, and racial background irrevocably influenced my research. I believe, however, personal identity politics and our creative negotiations of them are indicative to most research encounters. For example, I was initially introduced to Bedouin society in the Negev in 2006 while studying for a Master's degree at Ben Gurion University of the Negev (BGU). At part of my graduate studies, I conducted fieldwork between 2007-2008 for my dissertation documenting the life story 'Ā'isha al-Şāna' who is a well-known feminist spokesperson in the Bedouin's civil society movement. During my fieldwork at that time, I found that representational politics, history-making, and visual practices were becoming increasingly important among members but had not yet been examined in literature; topics subsequently explored in this doctoral thesis.

Whilst conducting fieldwork in this society (for both my Masters and doctoral research), I also discovered that my marital status as a woman determined both my access to particular Bedouin informants and the type of data I was able to collect. During my Masters' fieldwork, I conducted interviews and attended events unaccompanied as 'a single woman'. As such, I was readily provided with information about women's issues but I was often referred to the work of male anthropologists that

³⁶ See Appendix IV for the List of Archives.

had previously worked in the Negev when inquiring about tribal politics or topics outside of the women's domain. Moreover, my data collection was largely limited to female-dominated spaces and public community venues.

When I returned to the Negev with my husband in 2011, I knew my status as a married woman would allow me more freedom to interact outside of the 'women's side of the tent' and meet with men in more intimate village areas. In particular, Ike's (along with my main informant 'Amīr) presence became instrumental during the collection of data particularly during interviews with male informants where they served as my male chaperones. This was done out of respect to male elders (*kbār*) and to augment my access to male dominated spaces, members and locations I would have had difficulty engaging as a lone woman. Nevertheless, on some occasions, a few men felt less compelled to speak with me about socio-politics and/or responded only to questions posed by Ike or 'Amīr. Moreover, my social world in the village was limited to the women's spaces and I relied on Ike or 'Amīr to tell me about their experiences with Bedouin men during weddings, celebratory events in the men's meeting place (*shigg*), or trips to mosques and agnate gatherings outside of Khashem Zana'.

In all, my gender significantly impacted my fieldwork, which at times impeded research and at other times provided me with special access to events and interviews. For example, on many occasions, women invited me to events that would have excluded a male researcher. I also experienced a great deal of freedom in the village. Unlike Ike and other adult males in Suleīmān's household, I was able to move freely around the village. This meant that I could walk between different homesteads, take the sheep to graze in the hills, and join Suleīmān's wife on visits to maternal family members. I was also able to travel and work in areas of our homestead reserved for women to prepare food, clean, and spend time with the family. Aside from my research travels outside the village with Ike and Amīr for interviews and archival research, I went with the women

to beauty salons, on trips to the medical clinic, and for shopping in the market (*sūq*). In addition, women also invited me to several women-only viewing parties, a contemporary event wherein female family members watched wedding videos and looked at photographs taken during their *hennā* parties. During interviews, I also found the women's responses less guarded and rehearsed than those of their male counterparts.

My status as a Western researcher (and thus assumed Christian) also had important implications. On most occasions, Bedouin responded to my background as evidence of my 'non-Jewish' status and, consequently, felt open to criticise Israeli government policy. At other times, being an outsider justified my ignorance about certain forbidden (*ḥarām*) behaviour and activities. On other occasions, being from the United States was problematic so much so that our host family frequently introduced us as being English rather than American. Suleīmān's wife would often say that, 'We do not want people to think you are like those other Americans here.' There were also occasions when people in other lineages (*'ā'ilāt*) felt uncomfortable with providing a foreigner or younger female academic access to their prized photographic archives.

Outside of Bedouin society, my personal interactions with Israeli Jewish people included long-lasting friendships, civil interactions, and occasional disagreements. I have many friends from *Ashkenazim* and *Mizrahim* backgrounds who were extremely helpful. At the same time, many Israeli Jewish residents we met while living in Beersheba often wanted to know why we lived in Israel if we were not Jewish and why we were collaborating with 'Bedouin terrorists'. For example, at university functions, several Ben Gurion University of the Negev (BGU) students told me that, 'The Bedouin are a dying culture and you should spend your time researching more productive members of Israeli society, not thieves and criminals.' In the village, there were also several occasions when Palestinian visitors from the West Bank directed their anger over American policies towards my husband and I, demanding to know why we were

not in the West Bank studying ‘real’ Palestinians as the ‘*badū* [Bedouin] in the Naqab [Negev] are not true Palestinians’.

During all of my interactions in the field, I endeavoured to maintain ethical standards and subject-to-subject reciprocity. I acknowledge what Donna Haraway (1988: 575) termed as the ‘situated knowledges’. While excessively reflexive, power differentials always saturate fieldwork despite well-intentioned labours to respect disparate political ideologies and minimise hierarchies between ethnographers and the people they work with. As Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1988) argued, qualitative studies must also confront the impossibility of representing marginal people and how scholastic representations often mirror exploitative relations. Thus regardless of my sensitive intentions, this research project inevitably involved erudition caught up in established power relations (Said 1989), the politics of representation, conflict and marginalisation, gender, and knowledge-production which contextualise interactions in this Bedouin society.

This is particularly relevant as my fieldwork set out to understand the ‘self-constructed-ness’ of local knowledge and representational contradictions among Bedouin in the Negev. Consequently, I tried not to focus solely on specific private or public terrains but instead the in-between spaces in which people’s self-orientations were ‘frequently at odds with the types of cultural representations that predominate in more self-consciously (and comparatively) public formats’ (Shryock 2004: 12). This occurs in situations where public identity displays are designed to foster unity, position a group within a nation-state, or undermine depictions of Otherness.

Politics of external visibility and invisibility in the Israeli and Palestinian landscape also greatly mark Bedouin society in the Negev. Labels such as ‘recognised’ and ‘unrecognised’ popularly articulate these dynamics yet form a part of everyday jargon employed by Bedouin spokespersons today. Over the duration of long-term

fieldwork, however, I was gradually able to move past these public narratives as I literally travelled inward at varying degrees of closeness, moving from Beersheba to the highly closed space of Khashem Zana'. During this progression, people slowly provided me with more details about their lives, information about their pasts, their opinions on various matters, and access to their prized photographic collections. Overtime my conversations with people became more nuanced as I observed the breakdown of official narratives in private chats between individuals. While, at other times, I continued to listen to the persuasive-ness of the rehearsed rhetoric conveyed to other visitors.

In all, my fieldwork focused on the dynamics associated with Bedouin people's efforts to mediate and express their histories and social identities by gaining insights about intimate local knowledge, familiarities often obscured from the public eye. In doing so, my field research consistently navigated the ethics and contradictions between information, things, relations, and activities regularly hidden from particular publics, which often came out during times of 'intimacy' (Shryock 2004). Michael Herzfeld (1997: 3) coined the term 'cultural intimacy' to define aspects of society considered to be sources of discomfort among people, which nevertheless generate sociality. Studying interactions of cultural intimacy indelibly creates situations whereby external observers, whose opinions do or are imagined to matter, are only given selective information and the researcher must navigate multiple truths of any in given account (Shryock 2004).

During my time in the Negev, I frequently came across inconsistencies, contested stories, and was regularly told not to trust others when it came to their statements about the Bedouin's past and society. I was often confused about who had the authority to speak on others' behalf and had to confront issues regarding my own status as younger American female academic. While my fieldwork set out to document the way in which members constructed their representational credentials through visual

materials, I often found myself asking why stories frequently changed when told to others. I was given responses such as: ‘Those people would not understand....’; ‘It is not their concern....’; ‘It is very important that they know....’. In each event, the abstract ‘they’ were composed of specific groups in the eyes of the Bedouin speakers and I also participated as an audience alongside them because of my own externality.

While conducting research, I also tried to be sensitive to lineage (*‘ā’ilāt*) politics although many interviewees initially assumed I did not know the different names of *‘ā’ilāt* since this information typically goes unnoticed by other visitors. People did not consider me loyal to any one particular *‘ā’ilāt* and therefore most interviewees outside my host family often felt comfortable elucidating others’ reputations and histories. It was only after a period of time that my affiliations with the al-‘Athāmīn and al-Ṣāna’ became more public and other members became more guarded in their responses. I was also frequently told by those who claim ‘Arabian origins’ (*aṣīl*) to be careful when asking questions about Bedouin heritage, ‘Do not go around asking who is *‘aṣīl* and who is not. It is a sensitive issue here and you might insult someone.’ I later learned that local heritage was intensely caught up in power dynamics associated with past patron-client relations and more recent genealogical (*nasabī*) reconstruction efforts.

The ethics of conducting fieldwork in unpredictable places such as Israel’s southern desert must also be discussed here. In order to minimise disruption in Khashem Zana’, Ike and I agreed to live in a shipping container located in the centre of Suleīmān’s neighbourhood that lacked the typical privacy fences or tented walls. As such, our daily activities within and outside of our home were made visible to and monitored by our neighbours (see vom Bruck 1997). In addition, we found that knowledge of social norms was not uniform among different generations or genders as family members often provided us with contrary information about what, where, or how we should act in light of our status as outsiders in the village. In order to address these

contradictions, we typically took elders' advice on such matters, dressed conservatively, and obeyed rules laid out by older adults despite attempts of younger members to convince us to go against convention.

Of these guidelines, gender and visibility politics among Bedouin women were particularly significant during my fieldwork and the writing-up of this thesis. Suleīmān allowed me to photograph the family including female relatives but requested that I not publish these images without blurring their faces. As Chapter Four discusses, however, Bedouin parents allowed non-Bedouin visitors to take photographs of their children regardless of the images' potential circulation outside of their communities. To address these concerns, all photographic and digital images presented in this thesis have been left in their original and simulated formats as I found them circulating in the Negev.³⁷ The only exceptions are those taken of 'living' Bedouin women and children, whose faces have been blurred out of respect for my host family and local conventions of visibility.

As stated earlier, Bedouin are not isolated in the Negev and thus tensions within their society are intensified by confrontations with hostile state representatives and ambivalent neighbours. Subsequently, two significant national events occurred in the Negev between 2011-2013 during my fieldwork: (1) the systematic demolition of Bedouin homes and routine harassment by Israeli state institutions; and (2) war between Israeli military and Gaza military groups during Operation Returning Echo (Israeli label) (9th - 29th March 2012) and Operation Pillar of Defence (Israeli label) (14th - 21st November 2012).

First, houses deemed illegal in villages such as Khashem Zana³ are routinely demolished by Israeli government bulldozers or by Bedouin members that are issued with state edicts demanding they deconstruct their homes. During fieldwork, Israeli

³⁷ See Appendix II for a Catalogue of Images.

officials also routinely harassed villagers. For example, on one occasion, family members and I witnessed two Israel Defence Forces' (IDF) jeeps driving circles across rows of wheat newly planted by villagers in Khashem Zana'. The soldiers had attached large Israeli flags to their vehicles and played loud Hebrew music on their radios while they destroyed the field. Second, during our stay in Beersheba and Khashem Zana', two wars occurred between the Israeli military and Hamas, al-Qassam Brigades, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). The longest occurred between 14th and 21st November 2012 during which 1,456 rockets were fired into the Negev from Gaza after an Israeli airstrike killed a Hamas military chief (UN 2012).³⁸ Rockets predominately landed outside of the city of Beersheba in the desert periphery where Bedouin villagers reside. Due to the illegal status of their villages, however, the state does not provide them with bomb shelters or sirens. Consequently, during the conflict one Bedouin man was killed and several injured (Ben Zion 2012).

In summary, this thesis acknowledges the ethics of highlighting representational contentions in a marginalised society and the politics of creating scholarship in the Israeli and Palestinian discourse. Most scholars writing about this part of the world are confronted with polemics of creating 'information' and 'misinformation' and the propriety of recording local discord, gossip and reputations, inconsistent narratives, and competition as internal contentions are antithetical to community advocates' agenda. This is especially relevant when dominating authorities in Israel present Bedouin society in the Negev as backward, primitive, and fragmented. I have tried to handle these issues as sensitively as possible.

First, I argue that the varied nature of Bedouin representations of the past does not make them any less valid than state or dominant historical narratives, which are also

³⁸ Israel responded with more airstrikes that killed 139 and wounded 971 Palestinians. In Israel, four citizens were killed and 219 were injured (UN 2012).

influenced by specific political frameworks. Second, I have left my own opinions pertaining to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict out of this thesis and instead emphasise my informants' points of view. Third, I recognise that this thesis, as a product of the academy, has the potential to become apart of the broader 'learned discourse' and possibly a new resource used by members to construct and validate their histories.

As a way of approaching the above-mentioned issues, this thesis employed a radical empiricist strategy (see Bowman 1997: 79) for presenting my ethnographic and archival data (particularly in Chapters Five and Six). As stated earlier, I used a social biography method as a systematic way to account for the movement of images and their changing readings and forms in different Negev contexts. Notwithstanding, the various stories composing the images' socio-political lives only came together in the writing of this thesis – events, objects, and people inevitably brought together and ordered via my own experiences and the research aims of this ethnographic project.

In keeping with this approach, I chose to describe my archival research efforts along with my empirical data in the writing up of the thesis' case studies. This tactic takes the reader through a series of research counters, including trips to the library, as if they were unfolding events which include, for example, verbatim transcripts of interviews along with descriptions of the Bedouin's visual history in the Negev. By doing so, I explicitly place myself as an orienting figure that interacted with the image objects alongside my Bedouin informants. This approach also highlights my in-between-ness and ability to engage in various contexts inside and outside of the Negev. Yet, at the same time, I (along with my informants) became a subject involved in the images' socio-biographies as any researcher becomes whilst conducting fieldwork.

Even with this approach, however, this thesis is not equivalent to Bedouin members' or my own internal narratives. Instead, this study explicitly renders itself a textual and visual production – an edited thesis that presents selected stories, images,

and information for evaluation. Finally, data conveyed in this thesis does not describe Bedouin society in its entirety and does not address many noteworthy features about their life. Alternatively, it describes how Bedouin express knowledge about their history and society in the Negev through visual documentation and how photographs and digital images in turn shape their views of the world and ideas of the past.

IV. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

The thesis is organised into two parts. The first part introduces the conceptual framework of this thesis and the complex and changing historical and media landscapes characterising Bedouin lives in the Negev. By doing so, it provides a discursive foundation for reading the second part of the thesis which focuses on the unique visual economies found in the Negev and the circulations of collection of ‘significant’ images (c. 1906-2012) for local historicity. The appendixes provide the reader with additional data gathered during my ethnographic research such as a list of archives and more detailed information about my informants.

In particular, Part I outlines the conceptual framework of the thesis, presents a socio-historiography of the Negev Bedouin, and explores oral and textual mediations for Bedouin historicity in the Negev. Chapter One is a critical review of literature on Negev Bedouin memory-making, studies on regional historicity and media-making, and visual culture studies of the Middle East. It argues that sustained anthropological focus on oral and textual productions hinders understandings of contemporary Bedouin historicity in the Middle East and thereby relegates local knowledge and histories to Folk Memory studies, isolating such narratives from Western, Israeli, and Palestinian discourses. Alternatively, this study of images’ unique communicative powers, diverse presence(s), and poly-mediated circulations will provide more insights about the value

of images for Bedouin historicity but also Bedouin members' multiple representations of their past, the malleability of evidence supporting their history projects, and the various purposes to which histories are put in southern Israel.

Chapter Two presents a Negev Bedouin socio-historiography and summarises writings produced by travellers, administrators, and cultural scholars over the last century. It argues that the quasi-exclusivity of this learned discourse ended in the late 1990s when Negev Bedouin's history was no longer merely *about* Bedouin life but was increasingly made *by* members themselves. Chapter Three then moves on to critically describe local trends associated with the oral and textual 'construction of history' among the growing numbers of Bedouin spokespersons in the Negev and their intensified promulgations of genealogical and tribal histories, Islamic heritage, and ethnohistory.

Part II of this thesis explores the specific role of images for Bedouin historicity. To do so, Chapter Four describes the production and consumption of Negev Bedouin photographic and digital images through an exploration of iconography and image-making technologies in six visual economies organised by foreign, non-Bedouin Israeli and Palestinian, and Bedouin image producers. It posits that while visual culture studies have examined the influence of photographs of Bedouin peoples within Orientalist and nationalist paradigms, scholarship has yet to document the influence of historical photographs among Bedouin and their own representations of the past and people amid outside imaginings.

Chapters Five and Six discuss the circulations of historical images in Bedouin society by documenting their polysemous readings and polyvalent presence(s) in order to ascertain their value as local historical evidence for local spokespersons. In particular, these chapters trace the display, poly-mediations, and physical/virtual movements of eight images (c. 1906-2010) of Negev Bedouin produced within nested

visual economies but popularly employed by members for their various history projects today. Five case studies are split between two chapters, which focus thematically on familial and community discourses, specifically three prominent lineages (*‘ā’ilāt*) and several community organisations. It organises these chapters into these separate themes in order to compare the common but different histories in which Bedouin in the Negev popularly ascribe to images and the ways spokespersons, of different statuses and persuasions, instrumentalise images in the pursuit of historical capital.

Together, these chapters demonstrate how the visual display and redisplay of famous Bedouin figures, Negev places, and historical events supporting tribal, Islamic, and ethnohistory projects tend to exert the most presence(s) (both material and digital) among Bedouin. In particular, they highlight the ways in which these malleable images are typically valued as unique types of evidence that legitimate local history projects associated with tribalism (*gabaliyya* and *‘ā’iliyya*) and community ideals. The relationship between knowledge and evidence among members, however, is specifically caught up in local politics associated with: (1) reputations and influence of members responding to tribal opposition, gendered knowledge, and generational differences; and (2) civic and Islamic community narratives responding to citizenship and religious identity in southern Israel. The final analysis answers the project’s research questions and summarises its findings. It concludes that a study of historical images of Negev Bedouin illuminates their increased use and value among Bedouin for making public statements pertaining to tribal ancestry and community-building in their society.

CHAPTER ONE

LOCALISING KNOWLEDGE AND VISUAL CULTURE

The image – like other modes of expression and representation ... includes a wide array of connotators that certainly can ‘speak’ to us, but whose intelligibility is nonetheless always bound by culturally encoded practices of looking.... Thus in rebounding to-and-fro between the image and its viewer, a visual manifestation frequently turns into a two-way conversation. But dialogue can quickly turn to debate, as cultural orders are very rarely uncontested or monologic.

(Christiane Gruder and Sune Haugbølle 2013: xxiv)

Among the diverse demographic landscape of the Middle East, Bedouin have occupied social and historical scholars’ imaginations for centuries. For early anthropologists, Bedouin were ‘seen’ as isolated pastoralists cut-off from the rest of the world and mid-to-late century ethnographers studied how urbanisation and nationalism ‘changed’ these societies. By the end of the twentieth century, critiques of Orientalism³⁹ forced scholars to reconsider their portrayals of exotic cultures in the Middle East and, alternatively, create politically and historically sensitive descriptions of Bedouin peoples’ varied experiences in the region. Intermingled within this complicated past of exoticism and nationalism are those studies specifically describing Bedouin life and history in Israel’s southern Negev Desert.

This thesis situates itself within literature produced in the last decades specifically addressing topics of Bedouin history and memory in the Negev, anthropological treatments of historicity and media-making in the Middle East, and photography theory as it pertains to Orientalism and images in the region. To do so, this chapter presents the thesis’ conceptual framework, which is divided into two parts with

³⁹ Edward Said (1978) argued the West interprets all Oriental societies as dissimilar to Occidental societies. This *a priori* knowledge, developed through art and literature, reinforces power inequalities between the East and West (also see Asad 1975, Abu Lughod 1993, Mitchell 1991).

five sections in total. The first section asks: How has literature approached the topics of history, memory, and representation in Negev Bedouin society? Through a critical review, it highlights current scholarship's propensity to: (1) rarefy Bedouin peoples' multiple histories; (2) disregard the diverse mediums and objects for local historicity; and (3) ignore members' internal competition and collaborations and their influences on the construction of historical and socio-political narratives. The second section asks: How has literature approached the communication of history and society in the Middle East, particularly among Bedouin peoples over time? It argues that while anthropologists have documented media changes among Middle Eastern urbanites, regional ethnography still predominantly focuses on the oral and literary practices among Bedouin populations for local historicity; thus neglecting the presence and role of photographic and digital images in these societies.

The remaining sections in this chapter specifically survey and critique literature theorising visual media and proposes a post-Orientalist approach for conceptualising the role of photographic and digital images in the Middle East. In particular, the third section asks: How has literature examined the topic of visual media more generally? How has literature addressed the topic of photography in the Middle East? To answer these questions, it first explores the poetics and politics of visual culture, namely: (1) analyses pertaining to visual semiotics and the interpretation of image content; and (2) Foucaultian inspired works on the dominating politics of images and Orientalism. This section argues that a series of scholastic assumptions have informed the study of images *of* the Middle East over the last half of the twentieth century and consequently hindered the study of images *in* the Middle East.

The next section moves on to review recent post-Orientalist studies of images, namely those describing visual practices among the region's nationalists and urban populations. It asks: How have studies approached the topic of photographic practices in

the Middle East? It argues that most studies, except a notable few (see Ryzova 2015), of visual practices in the Middle East commonly overlook the duality of visual materials such as photographs as being both a symbolic, culturally-formed image of an observed reality and a visible ‘object’ traveling in space and time (Pinney 2005: 262). Alternatively, this thesis proposes to take a more nuanced material culture approach to photographic and digital images in the Middle East; one that highlights the capacity of image objects for ‘infinite recoding’ in peripheral locations such as the Negev (Edwards 2003: 84).

To do so, the final sections of this chapter propose a broader post-Orientalist approach to the study of images *in* the Middle East, one that accounts for both vernacular practices and multiple contexts in which photographs and digital images are instrumentalised in the region. In summary, this approach is based on a multi-stranded analysis of: (1) photographic and digital images’ poly-mediations; (2) their changing material and digital presence(s); (4) the differentiated contexts in which they engage, treated here as visual economies (Poole 1997); and (5) their value as circulating evidence for local historical knowledge.

It argues that with this approach, this thesis can more thoroughly demonstrate how peripheral people such as Bedouin in the Negev use images to express visual knowledge during their own constructions of history and collective identity. It implies that Bedouin are incorporating and making photographic and digital images as sources of historical authenticity in ways that engage yet instil new meaning into Western-derived representation of Bedouin history and society for their own tribal and community purposes in southern Israel.

By doing so, this thesis is able to describe something that has not yet been investigated in the anthropology of the Middle East – how a group of marginalised people create and rework visual representations and materials (including such as those

created by their oppressors) and mobilise them to fulfil their economical and political necessities in different social contexts. This project not only indicates the Bedouin's awareness of the self and society but also infers a conscious appropriation of learned history and strategic use of documentary evidence, which demonstrates their on-going adaption of customary representational practices in the Negev.

I. STUDIES OF NEGEV BEDOUIN HISTORY AND MEMORY

Over the last century, scholarly accounts of Bedouin in the Negev have focused on a range of topics that reflect the thematic and theoretical trends of the times in which they were written. For the sake of my argument, this work is summarised here to be further detailed in the next chapter. After the 1948 War, cultural studies documented the lives of Israel's new Bedouin citizens residing around Beersheba. They explored the changing nature of tribal structures (Randolph 1963, Marx 1967, Boneh 1983, Marx and Shemueli 1984, Bar Zvi 1991, Giant 1997, Bailey 2001 [1991]); documented tribal law, honour codes, and cultural customs (Alafenish 1987, Stewart 1994, Bailey 2004); noted local economic transformations (Abu Rabia 2000, Marx 2000, Kressel 2003); and complicated state-based urbanisation and parochial politics (Jakubowska 1992, Ben-David and Gonen 2001, Parizot 2001a). Aside from an outstanding few (Ginat 1984, Parizot 2001a), many anthropological accounts produced over the last fifty years depoliticised Bedouin society and histories in the Negev and isolated their encounters within Israel's borders (for a polemic see Parizot 2004). These topics were otherwise taken up by ethno-minority studies of Negev Bedouin.

Because of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, topics of power and marginalisation occupied centre stage for regional scholarship at the end of the twentieth century. Since the 1980s, studies have aimed to recontextualise Bedouin as Israeli Arabs and

complicate classic ethnographies of ‘tribalism’. Consequently, many of these studies identified as ‘post-Zionist’⁴⁰ and set out to detail Negev Bedouin’s ethnicity in Israel (Shafir and Peled 2002), document the state’s ethnocratic control practices, and assess Israel’s Jewish citizens’ control over resources (Falah 1989, Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis 1995, Yiftachel 1999, Rabinowitz 2001, Ghanem 2011). They also critiqued Israel’s urbanisation policies (Meir 1997, Fenster 1999), recorded local and national political practices (Yiftachel 2004, Parizot 2006), and noted state discriminations of Bedouin in the south (Maddrell 1990, Lithwick 2000).

By the end of the twentieth century, a ‘new wave’ of research on the Negev Bedouin had emerged. This has hence been labelled the post-Oslo paradigm (2000-current) (Ratcliffe et al. 2015: 7).⁴¹ These studies argued that most cultural studies produced since the 1960s and ethnic-minority studies created in the 1990s homogenised Bedouin as a non-Jewish ethnicity, overlooked growing local resistance to the state, disregarded the influence of civic and municipal organisations, and neglected the Negev Bedouin’s sense of community and indigeneity. Over the last fifteen years, community-focused scholarship has broadly set out to ‘de-colonise’ research, reclaim indigenous orientations, and complicate Orientalist cultural studies of Bedouin in the Negev as Palestinian minorities in Israel (Ratcliffe et al. 2015).

A majority of writers within this paradigm are ‘academic activists’ supporting Bedouin negotiations over land and civic rights by evoking languages of community, indigenous rights, and cultural difference in both their public and scholastic works (Koensler 2013). They also set out to ‘counter academic fatigue with ethnographies

⁴⁰ Post-Zionism was an intellectual movement in the 1990s associated with the New Historians. These academics argued that Zionism fulfilled its ideological mission by creating the state of Israel and should not continue to guide state policy. The term is also used by right-wing Jews to refer to left-wing Israeli politics after the Oslo Accords.

⁴¹ The Oslo Accords were a set of agreements between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) created in 1993. They were a peace-treaty that aimed to fulfil Palestinians’ rights to self-determination.

focusing on tribal elites' (Pappé 2010: keynote) and resist state policies discriminating against the population. For example, Ilan Pappé (2010) argued that 'narrow' anthropological perspectives focusing on tribalism and pastoral practices have hindered Bedouin challenges to Israeli alienation, created ethnological terms used by 'Zionist manipulators', and overlooked the changing realities of the population. Alternatively, community-political research strives to highlight continual state marginalisation but also Bedouin political agency and resistance in the Negev over the last several decades.

Similar to other places in the Middle East, the Negev has witnessed an institutionalisation of civil politics whereby a diverse group of local spokespersons aim to strengthen governance and democratic rights by pressuring their governments for political equality (Bayat 2002). As Richard Ratcliffe et al. (2015) argued, Bedouin isolation in Israeli politics subsided in the late 1990s when individuals took up municipal positions in the towns, created their own NGOs, and increased their participation on national committees and in international forums. Since then, studies have noted the increased number of Bedouin NGOs as part of the general rise of Palestinian civil society in Israel (Payes 2005, Greenspan 2005). Among these, Ratcliffe (2009) most notably explored themes of Bedouin civil society, citizenship, and informal politics. He complicated local agents' production of knowledge and described the 'new politics' by which they pursue resources and rights for their community (Ratcliffe 2009: 218). Elisabeth Marteu (2005, 2009) detailed the development of women's collective political activities and highlighted their connections to international civil society (also see Abu Oksa-Daoud 2009, Abu Rabia-Queder 2007, Dahan-Kalev and Le Febvre 2012).

Activist academics (see Nasasra et al. 2015) in the post-Oslo paradigm have also examined the rule of law pertaining to Israeli planning policies and court cases in response to government land rulings, which largely treat the population as pastoral

nomadic traditionalists whose perceived rural-ness, poverty, and resistance to state intervention has limited their incorporation into Israel's 'modern lifestyle' (McKee 2010).⁴² Countering these arguments, Ahmad Amara (2015) detailed the socio-legal dynamics in Israel's discriminatory modernisation approach to Bedouin land claims. Sarah Matari (2010) and Deborah Shmueli and Rassem Khamaisi (2011) explored legal comparisons between Negev Bedouin land claims and other indigenous struggles in the world. Finally, Ahmad Amara et al. (2012) discussed indigenous rights to ancestral lands and mediation between Negev Bedouin and the state.

A central characteristic of this advocacy scholarship has been increased efforts to collect and publish historical evidence of Bedouin presence in the Negev. This includes textual documentation of Bedouin farming practices in the region and land ownership over the centuries (Abu Sitta 2009) alongside oral testimonies of the *Nakba* (see Richter-Devoe's 2014-2017 AHRC project). Archival research among scholars of the Negev Bedouin and their subsequent historical revisionisms, however, began much earlier in the mid-1980s. For example, Clinton Bailey's (1985) historiographical research explored pre-Ottoman archives (945-1516) for mention of Bedouin tribes in the Negev in order to highlight the population's on-going presence in the region. Later, New Historians produced historical scholarship on the Bedouin in Negev in the 1990s. Their works provided alternative analyses of declassified governmental and archival records in Israel. In particular, they presented alternative histories countering popular Israeli state narratives pertaining to the events of dispossession of Bedouin families from their lands and villages along with other Palestinians during the *Nakba* (see Morris 2004 [1987]).

⁴² According to their rationale, Bedouin who refuse to move into the towns have chosen 'a traditional, rural lifestyle and will be satisfied to forgo the technological developments and social services available to other Israeli citizens' (McKee 2010: 90).

In particular, Salman Abu Sitta (1998, 2009) compiled and published British records to demonstrate Bedouin land ownership, residence, and farming practices during the Mandate Period (1920-1947). Hillel Cohen (2010 [2008]) surveyed Israeli court, government, and media records to describe the treatment of several dozen Arab citizens of Israel during the Military Administration (1948-1966), which included several well-known Bedouin men. More recently, John Bitzan (2006) explored the historical role of Jewish headmen (Arabic – *mukhtār*, Hebrew – *mukhtarim*)⁴³ in the creation of early state policies directed towards the Negev Bedouin and interactions between the two populations before the creation of the Israeli state. Finally, reflecting New Historicism in Negev Bedouin scholarship, Mansour Nasasra (2011, 2014) produced his own historical revisions detailing Bedouin resistance to British rule during the Mandate Period. His work also recounted the activities of pro-Palestinian Bedouin fighters during the 1948 War and resistance to the state's early Military Administration in order to counter Israeli and Palestinian narratives depicting Bedouin as apolitical neutralists (Nasasra 2014).

These historians have done much by way of sourcing and compiling (largely) written archival documents pertaining to Negev Bedouin history. While providing much needed insight about the 'weight of history' (Jones and Murphy 2002: 1) and contentions associated with learned interpretations of past events in the Negev, both new and old historical revisionists typically focused on making and correcting 'truth claims' about Bedouin history and society. In doing so, they constructed historical revisionisms predominantly through Western historiography, which esteem written archival documents and records as authoritative evidence of past events. Moreover, they tend to periodise local history, juxtapose historical revisions to Ottoman, British, and

⁴³ The term *mukhtār* (the chosen) is an appropriated *fallāḥīn* term describing a state-assigned municipal leader in the Negev (Gubser 1983: 33).

Israeli narratives, and (most significantly) they typically disregard Bedouin's own historicity.

Studies of indigeneity in the Negev present yet another scholastic approach to the Bedouin past in southern Israel. Ismael Abu Saad (2001) was one of the first to argue that Bedouin experiences in Israel are similar to other indigenous groups in the world. Both Abu Saad (2001) and Nasasra (2010) argued that by contextualising the Negev Bedouin as an indigenous group, their studies emphasise the population's historical presence on Negev lands, critique Israeli state administration as colonialism, and note local resistance to discrimination. Here indigeneity relates to their 'prior presence before the arrival of new settlers' to the Negev and challenges official Israeli narratives arguing that the Bedouin have 'no historical attachment to the land' (Nasasra 2010: 86). For them, the concept of indigenous people is also a 'form of Bedouin identity and resistance' and counters ethnic-minority studies (such as those mentioned earlier) (Nasasra 2010: 88). They went on to criticise the framing of Bedouin history in the Negev, particularly terminology use by historians such as *Naqab* verses 'Negev', *Nakba* verses 'Israeli-Arab War', and 'Palestinian' verses 'Israeli'.

As with trends in the broader socio-historiography discourse, discussions of Negev Bedouin history have also experienced a 'memory-turn' in the last decade. In particular, a plethora of writers are collecting and recording local Bedouin remembrances in the Negev (see Abu Rabia 2008, Yiftachel 2009, Hall 2014). This research chronicled Bedouin memories of displacement since 1948 and described local memory practices. In particular, Oren Yiftachel (2009: 250) argued that Bedouin are 'cultivating their collective memories as a foundation of rebuilding their identity', efforts that have produced types of local history associated with traditionalism, Islamism, and Palestinian nationalism. For him, traditional memories focus on the 'putative rule' of tribal leaders; Islamic histories emphasise shared pasts with other

Muslims; and Palestinian histories capture remembrances of the *Nakba* (Yiftachel 2009). Bogumila Hall (2014) went on to describe Bedouin agency in terms of identity and memory projected onto ancestral lands. She noted a type of ‘strategic essentialism’ (Spivak 1997) in the Negev wherein historical land narratives differ among ‘various unrecognized villages ... [but] ... point to the mutual relationship between Bedouins and the place’ (Hall 2014: 155).

Prior to Hall’s (2014) analysis of ‘strategic essentialism’ in the Negev, Emily McKee (2010) explored local activists’ ‘essential representations’ of Bedouin society in the Negev. During her fieldwork, she ‘witnessed the same activists mobilize an essentialized image in one context and then critique this same simplification in another context’ (McKee 2010: 83). McKee (2010) argued that today marginalised groups often employ indigenous rights and community rhetoric during their publicity efforts directed at targeted audiences. Similarly, Negev advocates from local NGOs, who direct their activism to the Israeli Jewish public and international stakeholders, often ‘cluster around several one-dimensional portrayals’ of Bedouin culture in order to highlight the population’s marginalisation (McKee 2010: 85).

This comes as both spokespersons and academic activists often argue that the Bedouin’s unique cultural features and indigenous traditions connect them to their lands (see Almog 2000, Benvenisti 2002, Lavie 2003). For example, Bailey (2004) emphasised the Negev Bedouin’s nomadic cultural past and Amara et al. (2012) stressed the indigenous community’s connections to the land through their desert culture. These studies, however, typically leave culture undefined, references to tradition and custom uncomplicated, and understandings of society oversimplified and even caricatured. McKee (2010: 86) summarised:

Given this context, it makes political sense for Bedouins and their advocates to enlist rhetorical strategies that emphasize farming and ‘traditional’ elements of Bedouin lifestyles in their publicity. It also makes sense to look to Bedouins’ current and remembered lifestyles as valuable sources of information on adapting to desert ecologies. But there are risks in a narrative that celebrates Bedouins’ indigeneity in one-dimensional ways by painting Bedouins as close to the land and inherently in tune with nature. Such a portrayal is politically problematic because assigning Bedouins to the indigenous slot narrows their ability to be agents of their own change.

Despite addressing ahistorical approaches and acknowledging Bedouin’s strategic representations in the Negev, most recent studies (be it in critique or support) largely focus on what this thesis labels as the Negev Bedouin ethnohistory; a discourse advocating rationalised caricatures of their history and society for outside consumption.⁴⁴ Specific characteristics of Negev Bedouin ethnohistory include: presenting Israel’s state policies as coherent or systematic (for polemic see Marx 1990, Parizot 2006); the use of jargon (in English, Hebrew, and Arabic) such as ‘recognised’ and ‘unrecognised’, ‘power’ and ‘resistance’, ‘indigenous’ and ‘modern’; the use/misuse of ethnological concepts such as nomadism, tribalism, and customs; propensity to silence local affiliations with the Islamic nation; and finally, the consistent side-lining of tribal and genealogical (*nasabī*) accounts to community-based narratives.

Consequently, many scholars of the Negev Bedouin spend ‘more time collecting or piecing together substantive historical narratives and presenting them according to a Western conception of history than they have analyzing local historicities’ (Hirsh and Stewart 2005: 267). These efforts cannot be politically faulted as they strive to collect historical documentation that augments Bedouin members’ capacity to defend their rights in Israeli courts and counter state promulgations that they are a people ‘without a history’ (Wolf 1982: 19) and ‘without a society’. In the pursuit of advocacy, however,

⁴⁴ I do not imply that this ethnohistory is any less valid to tribal narratives.

these studies often silenced viewpoints they considered counterproductive to Bedouin interests in the Negev, thus creating an ethnohistory articulated from an outsider's point of view rather than producing analysis about historicity and sociality among Bedouin themselves (Hirsh and Stewart 2005).

Andrew Shryock (1997: 31) argued that the ethnohistory is a reactionary 'by-product of the relentless spread of nationalism and the modern state in the region' (see Axtell 1979 for further critique). He described his own resistance to it in the 1990s and argued that, unlike synchronic ethnohistory, local Bedouin understandings of the past in Jordan are diachronic and include genealogies and spatial narratives. Shryock (1997) suggested that it is less important to determine 'what really happened' as ethnohistories attempt to do, but instead illustrate how these types of narratives differ from local views. Eickelman (1989) also pointed out that while ethnohistory may be useful for describing the basic characteristics of a population in relation to history and nationalism, they typically essentialise peoples' complex realities and are less adequate for understanding inter-relationships in Bedouin societies.

This thesis argues, however, that unlike many Bedouin populations in the Middle East who have kept 'this familiar [ethnohistory] genre at bay' within their own conceptualisations of local history in places like Jordan (Shryock 1997: 36), Bedouin's parochial and regionalised histories in the Negev have been inherently entangled with Israeli and Palestinian national politics since 1948. In other words, unlike Bedouin in Balgā where the colonial encounter remained 'oddly peripheral to the making of Bedouin history' (Shryock 1997: 36), Bedouin spokespersons in the Negev purposely use ethnohistory to connect themselves and their pasts to Israeli-Palestinian narratives. Thus Bedouin ethnohistory has become a mainstay of local historicity alongside more customary articulations of genealogical and tribal past and Islamic heritage in certain public venues.

Nonetheless, because of the persuasiveness of this ethnohistory in the Negev (among Bedouin and non-Bedouin alike), this thesis posits that existing studies of Bedouin history, memory, and representational politics in the Negev have yet to adequately account for their diverse historicity and poly-mediations, in particular (1) the plurality of members' various histories and socialities often obscured by ethnohistorical accounts; and (2) the diversity of the media strategies and materials by which they create, consume, and disseminate knowledge of the past and peoplehood.

First, this thesis agrees with Yiftachel's (2009) suggestion that local Bedouin largely reference their past through tribal, Islamic, and national narratives (keeping in mind these are not ossified categories). It does not agree with his conclusion that tribal or genealogical (*nasabī*) representations 'split and weaken the Bedouin community, and enhances traditional, often chauvinist and reactionary elements....' in their society (Yiftachel 2009: 251). This argument (also see Nasasra et al. 2015) downgrades the significance of tribalism (*gabaliyya* and *ā'iliyya*) for local representations of the past because some stakeholders may consider these particularisms a hindrance to the Bedouin shared future in southern Israel. In contrast to this trend, Safa Abu Rabia (2008: 93-100) noted that Bedouin continue to share local memories through tribal references in the Negev. She argued that understandings of the past are both individually and collectively shared among tribal members but experienced differently by subsequent generations after 1948. Abu Rabia (2008) described: the significance of local commemorative visits for remembrances of the past; the use of oral narratives to pass on knowledge of genealogies, family stories, and tribal territories; and efforts to preserve proof of land ownership via old titles and maps.

Despite providing excellent ethnographic data, Abu Rabia's (2008) exclusively contextualises Bedouin treatments of their past as folk memories and not as regional histories. While memory or living heritage is inherently a part of people's everyday

lives and cultural identity in the Negev, this thesis argues that Bedouin are also involved in the strategic construction and organisation of memories into formal and multiple representations of the past (see Panitch 1996), in other words official histories. Thus while Bedouin also share remembrances of past events, figures, and places through memory practices, such as those noted by Abu Rabia (2008), state induced changes in their society over the last century have coerced members to streamline, record, and rationalise many of their memories into official histories, which have then purposefully been circulated in particular publics since 1948 (Nora 1989).

Additionally, researchers such as Abu Rabia (2008) and others (Yiftachel 2009, Hall 2014) predominantly focus on oral colloquies and written resources when discussing local memory-making. In doing so they overlook the diverse and multiple mediums, for example archival images, used by Bedouin individuals and communities to record, organise, and publicise memories in their local history projects. These practices are crucial to the transformation of memory into history within a society as is the increased presence of archival materials, documentary evidence, libraries and collections, data banks, and online encyclopedias (see Nora 1989). As such, this thesis aims to highlight the influential roles of photographs and digital images for the transformation of local memories into parochial representations of Bedouin history in the Negev.

It argues that visual materials have come to evidence numerous history projects, which among contemporary Bedouin are foremost strategic. Consequently, peoples' representations of the past are inevitably varied and multiple as they do not make claims to a single universal authority (Nora 1989) but to a diverse range of ideals including civicism and Islamism. Building from Yiftachel's (2009) work, it suggests that local history projects in the Negev predominantly connect to genealogy and tribalism (*gabaliyya* and *'ā'iliyya*) along with ethno-nationalisms and Islamism. These narratives

come together to characterise the most popular narratives produced by Bedouin history-making in the Negev today. In particular, this thesis posits that spokespersons use these different historical orientations strategically not only to represent various communities (and their subsequent ideologies) to outsiders but also to buttress the political and economic capacities of their own lineages (*'ā'ilāt*) and legitimate themselves as representatives of specific groups. This comes as Abu Rabia (2008) and others have disregarded internal competitions and collaborations in Bedouin society in the pursuit of resources to which these histories are put and often rarefy the diverse universalisms to which they aspire. Alternatively, this thesis strives to contribute to a growing body of literature highlighting the local heterogeneity of self-presentations of history and society in the Middle East in the twenty-first century.

II. VARIED PASTS, CHANGING MEDIUMS, AND DIVERSE PEOPLE

Anthropologists of the tribal Middle East have explored processes of Bedouin historicity over the last century. E.E. Evans-Pritchard (1950) argued for the study of how people put ideas of history to use in their lives. In particular, he noted anthropology's uncritical use of archival sources and the lack of attention given to 'the reconstruction of social institutions from the historical records of people or the verbal histories preserved by people themselves' (Peters 1977: 71). Later, Emrys Peters (1977) documented how Bedouin in Cyrenaica approach the past through oral stories. He found peoples' descriptions of historical events typically referenced local relationships to individuals and ancestors, lineages and descent networks, and tribal lands (Peters 1977). When referencing the past of the entire population, Bedouin employed broader scales of genealogical time whereby specificities were 'ironed out' to make historical narratives more available in Libya.

Genealogical (*nasabī*) reckoning was (and still is) a customary oral history and society-making exercise that predominantly deals with the distant past among various Bedouin populations in the Middle East. For example, genealogies in the Negev typically focus on tribal confederations (*gabīla*, *gabā'il*) such as the Tiyyāhā in the Negev as fixed reference points of connectivity among specific networks of people. These genealogies have, however, more to do with explaining sociality and territorial boundaries between people than with history *per se*. Here significance is placed on the types of groups whose histories are cited by observable contemporary evidence – facts created through reflection and casual links ‘about how things have come to be what they are’ (Peters 1977: 77). Shryock (1997: 35) explained the process in the 1990s in Balgā Jordan:

The continuity of Bedouin history is visible in the branches of tribal genealogies, and these genealogical structures connect tribespeople to an ‘age of shaykhs’.... In other words, ‘Abbad and ‘Adwan are social configurations which reproduce themselves *across and apart from* historical periods, and the personal and collective identities that membership in these groups convey are equally resistant to temporal periodization. Hence, ... ‘structures of conjunctures’ (Sahlins 1981) – can be set aside in the study of tribal history ... [since for the Bedouin] genealogies are both structure and history.

Because of the tensions between temporality, space, and structure associated with oral genealogies, mid-twentieth century anthropologists of the Middle East typically classified rural pastoralists (*badū*) as low-diglossic societies wherein vernacular language and incorporative⁴⁵ performances were thought to primarily communicate and maintain folk memories. Alternatively, studies of high-diglossic, urbanites (*ḥaḍar*) focused on regional literates use of archival documents when sharing information about their lives and past (Armbrust 2006). Studies at this time set out to

⁴⁵ Paul Connerton (1989: 74) argued that incorporating practices include bodily presence and interaction that can be understood as culturally specific postures and language actuated within specific ceremonial and everyday occurrences.

distinguish and compare types of folk, elite, mass, and popular media in the Middle East (Eickelman 1992). Here folk studies examined oral poetry, tribal narratives, and tales whereas elite studies focused on writing among learned urbanites (Armbrust 2006). As a result, a large percentage of ethnographies on Bedouin populations in the region produced between the 1930s and 1990s reproduced popular notions that knowledge of history in these societies is solely constructed and communicated through customary proverbs and poems.

Clinton Bailey (2001 [1991]), Steven Caton (1990), and Lila Abu Lughod (1999 [1986]) all described the centrality of oral songs, poetry, and proverbs among Bedouin in Negev, Sinai, and Yemen and highlighted the discord (*fitna*) and oppositional logic exemplifying their incorporative practices. These studies demonstrated how internal competition distinguishes local history. In particular, Shryock (1997) argued that tribal histories in Jordan are unique because they are continually re-worked over time in order to maintain tribal relationships. He suggested that through story-telling tribesmen share and re-share oral knowledge of ancestors and events during which names and outcomes appear and disappear. Because of these re-workings, many scholars argue oral mnemonic practices are divorced from temporal sensibilities, particularly when compared to the text-based practices in urban societies (*ḥaḍarī*). As Shryock (1997) noted, oral knowledge derived from folktales was thus often treated by classical scholarship as fictitious epic narratives and therefore speculative.

Alternatively, the written word is lauded for communicating knowledge of history throughout the ‘urban’ Islamic world.⁴⁶ In particular, the Qu’rān or *al-Kitāb* holds an incomparable place in Muslim societies (Atiyeh 1995, Armbrust 2012). Many consider knowledge conveyed through the written word in the Qu’rān to be fixed truth

⁴⁶ The Qu’rān asserts that knowledge comes from God and various *ḥadīth* encourage the acquisition of ‘*ilm*’ (Arabic – knowledge). Islamic scholars, theologians and jurists are often given the title of scholar (‘*ā’lim*’, ‘*ulamā*’)

and its memorisation a paradigm for religious learning. Throughout the Middle East, people believe the book safeguards God's message from the diversions of everyday oral articulation (Miller 2005). Moreover, Muslims frequently consider themselves 'a people of the book', yet until recently, most were not sufficiently literate to read the Qu'rān (Eickelman 1995). Up until the twentieth century, literacy was a luxury enjoyed by a few who were taught privately in the houses of teachers or inside mosques in urban centres. Thus various intellectual traditions (*'ulūm*) and learned men (*'ulamā*) held privileged status as persons to be consulted by the unlearned populace and men of power such as customary leaders (*shuyūkh*).

In addition to Qu'rānic text, many literate Muslim societies also construct local histories in the form of biographical writings connecting their families to important Islamic figures and places throughout the centuries; a long-established 'epistemology of revelation' whereby reputations and status are justified in the Muslim world (Shryock 1997). Through the written word, they recall their local history by connecting it to the history of the Caliphate (Peters 1977). For example, newer written works present explanations of ancestry and events as re-contextualisations and re-publications deriving from various historical sources. In many cases, however, these older written resources do not (or seem not to) exist. Nonetheless, social value continues to be placed on their imagined existence as an 'original copy' (see Gilsenan 1982, Messick 1993, Atiyeh 1995, Shryock 1997, Scheele 2009) and their assumed ability to legitimate family histories as learned resources.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the region's printing industry was established and, subsequently, expanded the circulation of texts. This event permanently changed local knowledge-sharing practices by centralising books and writing efforts in the everyday lives of people (Armbrust 2012). Publishing companies were set up in places like Jerusalem and print culture quickly flourished among the general public

(Eickelman 1995). Mass printing technologies increased local access to books and other printed materials such as newspapers, magazines, manuscripts, and official documents. For example, in the 1920s and 1930s, *shuyūkh* sent their children to regional schools and, consequently, the exclusivity of Islamic higher education waned as students from locations like the Negev became increasingly literate (Abu Rabia 2001).⁴⁷ Since the 1970s, mass education has continued to augment peoples' access to literature and text-based learning and has encouraged new ways of thinking about self and society throughout the Middle East and North Africa (Eickelman 1985).

Today literate Middle Easterners continue to value writing as practice and texts as artefacts for constructing knowledge. Epistolary documentation is considered a legitimate source for preserving and transmitting information about one's society and its memories, so much so, that peoples' capacity to remember the past seems to be fundamentally tied to systems of inscription (Rowlands 1993). Michael Rowlands (1993) suggested that the transmission of social knowledge becomes systematic when people are consistently exposed to high concentrations of material technologies invested with authoritative credibility. 'A socialised memory of this kind is not peculiar to Western conceptions of time but it does have a particular, if changing, relation to literacy ... which marks it with many of the features of an "inscribed practice"' (Rowlands 1993: 143). As such, 'the diffusion and elaboration of a society's systems of inscription ... [makes possible] ... an exponential development of its capacity to remember....' and exist (Connerton 1989: 102). For example, in the Middle East, 'before the late 19th century, *ta'rikh* seems to refer only to a kind of writing or knowledge, but in modern Arabic *ta'rikh* (English *history*, German *Geschichte*) is equivocal, comprising both events *per se* and verbal representation of these events' (Davis 2011: 14 [original italics]).

⁴⁷ This process is further detailed in Chapter Three.

Despite of the centrality of literary traditions in the Middle East, studies recognised that knowledge about the past is not confined to binaries between orality and text but is constructed and re-constructed through old and new mediums via practices of performative ‘code-switching’ (Bassiouney 2010) or as conceptualised in this thesis, poly-mediations (Madianou and Miller 2011). For example, Peters (1977) acknowledged that literacy no more binds people to a truer version of history than oral traditions. His work demonstrated that both media practices inform social relations because of peoples’ intrinsic concern for the past, which inevitably encapsulates present-day interests (Peters 1977). John Peel (1984) suggested perceptions of the past largely depend on people’s relative interest and their ever-expanding techniques for representing it. At the same time, he warns against presentist approaches to historicity and sociality (Peel 1984). Because a people’s sense of the society is integral to their production of collectivity through time, anthropological approaches to historicity must avoid the ontological pitfalls of completely unhinging the present from the past or persons from their peoplehood (Peel 1984).

As such, studies since the 1990s have highlighted the strategic-ness of narrating history and have examined the conjunction of oral and literary knowledge in the Middle East. According to them (see Abu Lughod 1990), discourse and practice often appear indistinguishable as ‘social and cultural life takes place in and through language’ (Salamandra 2004: 23-24) in this part of the world. In other words, mediated actions such as speaking, reading (or in the case of this thesis, visualising) simultaneously legitimate and define individuals’ positions, beliefs, and histories thus creating networks of social, political, and economic interaction.

For example, Caton (1990: 21) demonstrated that in tribal Yemen the act of speaking and writing down poems and epic stories contributes to ‘being’ a tribesmen and through poetry, tribesmen recreate identities. Shryock (1997) also recorded efforts

to write down and publish historical information that had previously only existed in speech among the tribes of Jordan. He revealed that modern schooling constitutes a significant break with the earlier emphasis on oral traditions. Moreover, he demonstrated that the written word is increasingly valued among Jordanian Bedouin as they become more literate and write down their oral narratives, a process whereby contested genealogies and their tribal histories were simultaneously created and adapted to public themes of nationalism in Jordan (Shryock 1997). The transition from one media to the other, however, is not always smooth as textual narratives are hard for tribal authors to construct since other tribesmen do not willingly share their stories with others (Shryock 1997).

Today cultural scholars accept that local knowledge and communication of history among people changes over time and place throughout the world. Consequently, peripheral peoples such as Bedouin in the Negev, who customarily relied on incorporating practices to share their histories and preserve their social customs, are now increasingly privileging inscription practices, especially within the last ten years. As literacy levels rise and multi-media engagements intensify, peoples who previously did not possess linear storylines about their past now make efforts to interweave separate narratives into official collective knowledge through uniform chronology and media diversification.

At the turn of the twenty-first century, studies went on to explore the influx of new media communicating popular culture and history through film, television, audiocassettes, computers, and mobiles in the Middle East (see Graham-Brown 1988, Danielson 1996, Abu Lughod 1997, Armbrust 2000, Salamandra 2004, Lynch 2006, Fandy 2007). Inspired by discussions on symbolic capital, these studies described mass media in urban centres in places such as Egypt, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. The discourse also includes studies of popular culture such as art and entertainment

(Armbrust 2004). Thematically, mass media studies typically documented the influence of state apparatuses on regional media, the relationship between media and nationalisms, and the production of new media by industry professionals and state governments throughout the 1990s and early 2000s.

While most acknowledge the influence of mass media on nationalism, Walter Armbrust (2006: 26) argued studies should move away from defining media typologies and instead question how media creates 'new scales of communication and new dimensions of modern identity'. For instance, Flagg Miller (2007: 454) examined links between 'modes of social subjectivity' and 'historical shifts in media practices' through audiocassettes in Yemen. There poets record political poems and verses onto cassette tapes which Yemenis use as cultural resources to further engage, debate, and work-out understandings of tribalism against political liberal critics, intensifying community politics, and the nationalisation of history (Miller 2007). Studies such as Miller's (2007) detail the intimate ways people use small media such as audiocassette tapes to undermine 'the theatre of the state' by creating 'the theatre of the streets' (Salvatore 1998); thereby representational authority bypasses traditional gatekeepers of knowledge (Armbrust 2012).

Consequently, new people or laymen are increasingly communicating their own versions of history and society through readily available micro-media enterprises in the Middle East (Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi 1994).⁴⁸ People use decentralised media such as private radio broadcasting which is 'more fragmented and diverse' than mass media (Ginsberg et al. 2002). In the last five years, studies have also explored the influence of the Internet, mobile phones, and digital video in the Middle East, often grouped under the heading of 'social media' or 'user-generated content' (see Agichtein

⁴⁸ This type of media is also known as community media, radical media (Downing 1984), and indigenous media (Ginsburg 1991).

et al. 2008). Amit Schejter and Noam Tirosh (2012) noted that social media encompasses old mass communication technologies such as radio and television and interpersonal media such as the telephone, creating new ‘mass self communications’ including the mobile Internet and social networking applications (that is Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube).

Most studies on social-media efforts in the Middle East, however, contextualise these practices as non-elite resistance among people whose voices, histories, and experiences are often side lined within broader mass media enterprises controlled by the state. In particular, multi-media and especially social media have become central to activism and protests in the last decade, most predominantly during the Arab Spring (2010). For example, Schejter and Tirosh (2012) explored the use of social media by local Bedouin activists in resistance to the Israeli state’s demolition of al-‘Aragīb in 2010. They argued that social media has given Bedouin in the Negev an international voice. In particular, Schejter and Tirosh (2012: 313) explained, ‘The mobile phone provided the isolated and disconnected Bedouin with needed connectivity, and later they used it as an organizing tool in their civic struggle. The Internet provides them with the ability to express themselves and reach people willing to hear about their plight.’

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to fully explore the novel use of mobile phones, the Internet, and video cameras in the Negev. Alternatively, it documents the values of photographic and digital images among members and explores how they use cameras and uploaded images on Facebook and Wikipedia to disseminate visual information about local histories and present-day experiences. Meanwhile, the majority of new media studies often overlook the unique significance of photographic and digital images in the Middle East in their analysis of new media versus old media (as the next section discusses this has only changed within the last five years). In addition to discounting the influence of visual media, the centrality of local representational politics

often gets lost in the debate and analysis pertaining to media in the Israeli and Palestinian context. In particular, this thesis argues that while micro-media practices have become more popular in the Negev, they are also diversifying established patterns of authority and the number of sanctioned public arbiters in this Bedouin society.

Since schooling was institutionalised in the Middle East from the 1950s onward, the style and scale of regional intellectual discourses have been reconfigured along with the nature of religious, political, and social thought and action (Eickelman 1987).⁴⁹ Debate over interpretations of the Qu'rān, for example, has involved large numbers of people since the mid-twentieth century as layman began to have direct access to Islamic materials and ideas. 'Because all knowledge is divine and religious, a chemist, an engineer, an economist, [and] a jurist are all ulama' (Turabi 1983: 245). Consequently, the privileged position customarily held by elders has been eroded today and authoritative expertise has shifted away from learned elites to professional representatives, political activists, and media spokespersons who rely on exposure and recognition rather than recitation and memorisation to produce and share religious, social, and historical knowledge (Eickelman and Anderson 2003).

Media studies of the Middle East have also described the rise of the media professionals in the last decades in order to account for alternative communication ecologies, changing technologies, and diversifying community identities in the region (Armbrust 2003). As literacy, education, and the accessibility of media technologies increases, younger elite people and the organisations they work with are steadily becoming the region's new communicative gatekeepers. Studies of these new generations set out to evaluate the ways their narratives do or do not concur with the

⁴⁹ Up until the mid-twentieth century, internal challenges to elders' authority largely 'revolve[d] around rights to interpret' (Eickelman and Anderson 2003: 6). Here emphasis was less on performances of collective voice and more on which individuals or groups had the authority to argue over 'correct interpretations' of knowledge.

pre-existing values and knowledge claims of the groups they represent (Hann and Dunn 1996). This comes as growing numbers of spokesperson now have the ability to assert their viewpoints in the public sphere leading to what many scholars have termed the ‘fragmentation of political and religious authority’ in the Middle East (Eickelman and Anderson 2003: 1).

These local media professionals also use their skills and expertise as a way to position themselves as community mediators to the outside world wherein they define collective identities to external audiences. Since the 1990s, efforts to speak on behalf of a group must not only appropriate newer media technologies but also account for rapid flows of information, successfully mediate local identities, and advocate particular ideologies (Eickelman and Anderson 2003). In a time of developing nationalisms, competing ethnicities, and growing market economies, people’s local histories and social identities have become mass-mediated constructions whose projects must be ‘acutely aware both of cultural difference and of the meanings difference might acquire in the minds of “external observers”’ (Shryock 2004: 22). Meanwhile, differentiated notions of community are increasingly saturating customary social landscapes in the Middle East such as those promulgated by Islamic religious and Western civil society movements in the Israeli and Palestinian context since the 1980s.

The creation of communities frequently entails the tactful production and distribution of information that legitimates specific historical and social representations and justifies particular resource allocations to select people (Eickelman and Anderson 2003). As a result, whose voices and which issues get channelled on to external stages are increasingly defined by the actors creating and circulating new media on behalf of a particular class, generational, national, tribal, or family interests (Eickelman and Anderson 2003). Thus media and owning it in the Middle East have become sources of cultural capital and, subsequently, characterised by contest over authority and

knowledge production. This situation has created what appears to be inherent ruptures and disagreements within societies over how their histories, communities, and social lives are presented to outsiders and who has the authority to communicate this information (Davis 2011).

In all, studies on small media in the Middle East largely focus on the burgeoning power of media professionals and community spokespersons and their newly obtained cultural capital. Despite complicating the local communicative economies, however, many studies not only compare new media to old media but also ‘new people’ are positioned against elders and civil ideologies are juxtaposed to customary values (Eickelman and Anderson 2003). For example, Shryock (1997: 316) explained, ‘The intelligentsia of the region have, throughout the Muslim era, posed tribal society as the antithesis of proper Islam and just government, and even today, tribes (and tribalism) are eagerly portrayed by the same learned elites as an obstacle.’ For the most part, media studies emphasised ‘breaks with the past’ and the empowering aspect of alternative knowledge practices among modern-educated urbanites in the Middle East.

Alternatively, Albert Hourani (1983: 114) argued that there is an intrinsic dilemma in completely disregarding traditional forms of intellectual authority and knowledge as it overlooks the continuity, flow, and subtle interaction between old and new ‘chains of transmission’. In many ways ‘a set of old, strongly held assumptions’ about the dialectics of knowledge sharing still inform everyday representations in the Middle East (Shryock 1997: 321). In other words, anthropologists of the Middle East must be careful not to overlook the diverse means and materials by which people within a society construct and preserve their legacies amid efforts to categorise and compare media practices and spokespersons (Armbrust 2000).

Despite these critiques, most regional ethnographies of media-making continue to centre on urbanites (*ḥaḍarī*) and peasant villagers (*fallāḥīn*) leaving the presence and

influence of new media in peripheral societies such as Bedouin in the Negev largely undocumented. At the same time, ethnographies of the region's Bedouin populations only focus on oral performances and occasional text-making initiatives inspired by nationalism. Because of these reasons, scholarship has failed to account for the growing presence and significance of micro-multi-media, such as photographs and digital images, for the local construction of tribal histories but also representations of the past inspired by Islamic or civic universalisms. Finally, while regional scholarship has noted the apparent representational contentions between elders and new media professionals in the Middle East, they overlook the fact that elders often award status to and collaborate with individuals within their tribal networks who are more proficient in new media technologies in order to contend with escalating change (Eickelman and Anderson 2003) in places such as southern Israel.

III. POETICS AND POLITICS OF ORIENTALISM AND PHOTOGRAPHY

Since its invention in the nineteenth century, photographic images were thought to depict unmitigated images of reality, a 'material vestige of its subject' (Sontag 1978: 154). People often consider the chemical fixing of the *camera obscura* image, hailed as photographic truth, an objective representation of reality created by the camera's optical and light recording mechanisms (Benjamin 2008 [1936]). For many, the camera is an instrument of evidence that connects real subjects placed before its lens to the reproduced photographic image (Barthes 1981). As Walter Benjamin (1931, 2008 [1936]) noted, photography's capacity as a technology of mechanical reproduction to communicate meaning, particularly as a documentary device that meticulously records details, has made it a powerful cultural innovation that 'illuminates social and material conditions' (Dant and Gilloch 2002: 17).

Despite being a quality commonly valued among large numbers of people, the idea of a photographic truth and the camera's ability to produce objective depictions of reality have been critiqued by visual theorists such as Susan Sontag (1978) who argued that visual materials are not simple records of the world. Instead, viewers make sense of images through trained exercises of encoding, a representational system whereby they 'achieve their communicative function in collaboration with pictorial conventions – some of which emanate from the medium itself and others which are determined by the culture in which we live' (Wright 1999: 69-70). There are several approaches explaining how this process works, this section explores constructionist positions (i.e. semiotic/poetic and discursive/political) due to their popularity in secondary literature.

Theoretical discussions on photography examine the creation of cultural representations and how people acquire information by looking at still images. Stuart Hall (1997) detailed the correlated processes whereby people use visual signs to produce and exchange meanings between themselves. He argued people create meanings via their relationships with signs and objects carrying meaning (Hall 1997).⁵⁰ People arrange signs into classification systems or 'conceptual maps' (Hall 1997: 18), which frame how images communicate information. In order to produce meaning, we manoeuvre between conceptual maps within our own specific cultural contexts, constituting processes of representation. As a result, subjects understand and learn representations through different codes of language equipping them with social knowledge, which enable people to function within their societies. Ultimately, representations associated with visual images, such as photographs, must be deciphered despite seeming natural in their presentation of information and thus their meanings are

⁵⁰ Hall (1997) suggests there are different kinds of signs: the iconic, such as visual images, which bear resemblance to the object they refer to; and the indexical which bear no resemblance and whose reference to an object is arbitrary.

constructions (Hall 1997). This process involves *interpretation* – that is how people understand representations of meaning.

Roland Barthes (1981: 37) also suggested that images do not have inherent meaning but operate within un-coded semiotics where the reading of a picture is not solely tied to its ability to represent a specific physical referent. Rather, once removed from its original context and circulated in society, the image acquires representational significance through a ‘myriad of interpretations’ influenced by viewers and their cultural codes for reading signs (Poole 1997: 18). Thus the meanings of an image are never solidified as the picture or floating signifier remains inherently tied to any one mental representation it conjures – the signified (Hall 1997: 31). This view claims images are signs that construct information in different ways: through their presentation and arrangement of visual information; presence as an object and power it exerts; and representation or manner in which objects operate with other media to produce authority (Hall 1997).

When pictures build mental maps through their confirmation of presence and ancillary documentation of experience, they typically work alongside oral and text-based mediums, however. Thus images largely achieve their communicative function from ‘languages of vision’ that work in collaboration with sound and speech (Wright 1999). Vision also works with other senses within the body to cognised sight thereby generating perception within the environment (Ingold 2000). Different factors influence how viewers of comprehend images, a process defined by Nicholas Mirzoeff (2002) as *intervisuality*. He argued that images are never perceived or consumed on their own; there is always an interaction between different kinds of visualities and referential exchanges between oral, textual, and physical phenomena (Mirzoeff 2002).

This thesis employs the concept of ‘poly-mediation’ to account for photographic images’ ability to communicate messages as necessarily co-dependent on other modes

of oral and textual communication and to highlight that this process is also determined by people's decisions to use one form of media over another (Madianou and Miller 2011). Mirca Madianou and Daniel Miller (2011) pointed out that, as a result of digital media (discussed later in this chapter), communication typically does not take place through one single media technology but rather people choose particular media over others and shift between them. Moreover, they suggested that the comingling of media during the communication of information not only creates new dialectical relationships between media but also establishes new relationships between people, sociality, and technologies (Madianou and Miller 2011).

In all, studies of photographic semiotics highlight the ways in which the conceptual processing of images is learned, passed on, and encoded through an 'Althusserian (1971) system of signs' (Gruber and Haugbølle 2013: xviii) that influence how people interpret the world through visual information and media technologies. Studies investigating the constructed nature of visual media emphasise that images can be imbued with different cultural meanings (see Pinney 2003, Strassler 2010) when an image's relationships between the signifier and signified are reworked; during their various presentation with 'written word or spoken "text"'; and amid their subjective readings in specific contexts of viewing (Edwards 2003: 84). This also implies that the meanings of images' are not only supported by mental mappings but also through their technological work in historical and cultural discourses. As a consequence, many early studies of photographic semiotics, such as C.S. Pierce's work (1977) for example, were later critiqued by political constructionist scholarship for not sufficiently exploring the discourses and power relations associated with producing and reading images in the Western contexts.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, studies of the 'politics' of photography criticised Western-based 'languages of vision', perceived rationalism and objectivity of

seeing, and the relationship between visualism and surveillance. Their work (see below) drew from theories such as Michel Foucault's (1977) Panopticon and employed discursive analysis to examine the relationship between power, race, vision, and photography. Leading theorists such as Allan Sekula (1986) and John Tagg (1988: 19) argued that photographic images are 'analogues of visual perception' created via cultural and political codes and interests. Here photographs are considered points of reference for making determinations about human traits, comparing different cultures, mapping landscapes, and depicting events. To that end, many studies of the politics of photographs critique the ways in which images inform Western cultural understandings of Others by examining how they serve as instruments for imperial projects and reflect colonial ideologies (Poole 1997: 17). For example, James Ryan's (1997) and Ann Maxwell's (1999) research explored the ways in which photography serviced institutional, administrative, governmental, and 'popular' ideas of race and non-Western peoples in the nineteenth century.

During this period, scholars also theorized the relationship between visuality and Orientalism as a representational discourse supporting colonial and nationalist ideologies about the Middle East (see Asad 1975, Said 1978, Mitchell 1991). For example, Walid Khalidi (1984), Sarah Graham-Brown (1988), Malek Alloula (1990), and Annelies Moors (2001) each explored how nineteenth and twentieth century Orientalist photographs of Middle Eastern and North African populations re-enforced unequal power relations between the West and the East (Jacobson 2007). Motivated by Edward Said's (1978) work, these studies deconstructed colonial depictions of the Oriental Other, representational strategies of colonial administrators, and highlighted the persistence of Oriental clichés and social taxonomies of the region's population.

Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for example, photographers scoured the Middle East and North Africa in a relentless quest to classify and catalogue ... their many 'exotic' peoples. In their efforts to capture each and every 'type' – the Druze, the Bedouin, the Jew, and so on.... these "orientalist" photographers ... gave orientalist photography its specificity and particular agenda ... [their] typology confirmed a world view, producing rather than reflecting reality.

(Schick 1990: 350-351)

These now familiar arguments connecting Orientalism and photography have been criticised in recent decades (see Hartmann et al. 1998, Pinney 2003, Jacobson 2007, Behdad and Gartlan 2013, and Ryzova 2015). In particular, Ken Jacobson (2007) noted that many postcolonial studies have a propensity to stereotype all early image-making practices as Orientalist and dismiss the history of local photography. He suggested that some analyses narrowly singled out poorly taken images as representing racist depictions or cheaply produced images as portraying indigenous people as 'stereotypes, freaks, or objects of sexual fantasy' (Jacobson 2007: 91). In doing so, many studies treated historical photographs, for example, as observable truths simplistically reflecting cultural and political dispositions held by image producers (Pinney 2003).

In all, more recent literature on photography and Orientalism have problematized earlier studies propensity to: overly dichotomise East/West power relations; emphasise the hegemony of 'visualizing rhetoric' (Morton and Edwards 2009: 3); and promote physiognomic readings of images whereby authors provide formal, surface readings that reflect their own pre-existing political hypotheses held by their producers (Ginzburg 1989). In particular, Ali Behdad and Luke Gartlan's (2013) argued that many earlier studies relied on reductionist theories inspired by Said (1978) and thus homogenised the political meaning of Oriental photographs and overlooked the historical and local contexts in which they were produced (Pasternak 2014: 226). Alternatively, their edited

volume reframed the histories of images of the Orient by discussing the various interactions of local and European photographers who worked together to create colonial-era images of the region amid their own personal artistic, cultural, and political contexts (Pasternak 2014: 227).

It has only been the last decade, however, that visual cultural studies of the Middle East have moved away from examining Orientalism and photography *of* the region among Westerners to instead investigate the role of photography *among* local populations. This comes as visual scholars today acknowledge that ‘concern with the political consequences of photography has effectively erased any engagement with its actual practice’ (Pinney 2003: 14).

In order to further explore these practices, this thesis instrumentalises visual culture in the Middle East in order to move beyond discussions on Orientalism that solely construe photography as Western iconography or a technology that objectifies people. While these positions are significant, I believe analyses that focus only on the ideological and dominating affects of images have a propensity to disregard the social lives of photographs and digital images and how they – as objects – shape people’s social lives and how peoples’ social lives shape the meaning of images. By addressing the capacity of images to be re-read by different people in various contexts, my project questions how the increased availability and expertise of visual technologies in the Middle East has augmented the presence of images in people’s lives but has also encouraged them to ‘speak for themselves’ in the same media that previously Otherised them (Marcus 1994).

IV. POST-ORIENTALIST ANALYSES OF PHOTOGRAPHIC PRACTICES

Since the 1990s, ethnographies have noted the ‘transformative impact’ of small-scale visual practices amid globalised media in places such as Latin America, South Asia, and Africa (see Ginsburg 1991, Shohat and Stam 2003, Rao and Wasserman 2007, Himpele 2008). Indigenous media studies documented the production of photographs for cultural communication, struggles for self-determination, and resistance to state domination (Ginsburg 1991, Sprague 1978). They emphasised the potential of visual media for empowering first nation peoples and ethnic minorities (Michaels 1991). For example, Terence Turner (1991) argued that visual practices deviate from customary methods of sharing but allow people to maintain local knowledge. Here visual media becomes an alternative form of cultural reproduction when traditional methods are no longer effective and frequently occurs in a society experiencing significant upheavals. In response, people ‘take up the camera’ as a way to mediate social ruptures and reconstruct the past and present (see Turner 1992, Ginsburg 1991).

As such, anthropologists, photographic theorists, and historians have increasingly investigated vernacular photographic practices outside of the West since the turn of the twenty-first century, particularly in places such as Latin America, Africa, South Asia, and the Pacific (see Pinney 1997, Pinney and Peterson 2003, Edwards and Hart 2004, Morris 2009, Strassler 2010, Wright 2013, Morton and Newbury 2015). Amid this ever-growing corpus of work, however, studies documenting the unique photographic practices the Middle East have only just emerged in the last few years. This thesis argues that there are several reasons for this scholastic delay: (1) examinations of visual aesthetics and practices in the Middle East have largely been relegated to Folklore Studies; (2) persistent misconceptions that photographic images are morally prohibited in Islam; and (3) established binaries promoting audiocentric

modes of authority in Muslim societies and the ocularcentric nature of European traditions (Armbrust 2012).

Discussions about visual semiotics in the Middle East, such as those associated with Bedouin populations for example, are typically limited to the disciplines of Folklore and Cultural Studies despite the fact that vision is embedded within moral and political significance in these societies. While topics of visual semiotics and aesthetics in Bedouin societies are ultimately beyond the scope of this thesis due to lack of space, it is important to note here that many Bedouin populations value sight as a sense for obtaining information about the ‘world out there’. Moreover, the ‘eye’ symbolically exhibits bravery, wisdom, and strength. Phrases indicating the value of ones’ eyes and sight include: ‘His eye is sharp, but his reach is short’ (Bailey 2004: 125); and ‘Putting out of an eye’ can be a fine for slander (Bailey 2004: 351). The power of the eye is also conveyed by popular beliefs about the ‘evil eye’.

In the Negev, particular colours and symbols also have visual significance. For example, Arif Abu Rabia’s (2012) work demonstrated that colours are an integral part of the Bedouin’s ‘language of vision’ (Wright 1999). There the colour white embodies the idea of blessing and often relates to milk and protection against the evil eye. For example, members tie white flags to cars during special events or in front of their homes as indications of God’s good will, symbolizing connections to saints and good fortune in a family. The colour of clothing is also significant, especially for women, who embroider specific colours of thread onto their dresses and belts. These indicate different stages in a woman’s life and her various statuses acquired throughout her life (Abu Rabia 2012).

In addition to colours, throughout the twentieth century Bedouin in the Negev employed pictorial signs to indicate beauty and ownership in the form of engravings, tattoos, and dyed graphics. These symbols (*wasam*) or markings were inscribed onto

objects, livestock, and persons.⁵¹ For example, many Bedouin women from older generations have facial tattoos on their chins, forehead, and hands indicating their status and *'aṣīl* (origins). In addition to these, men and women who continue to own livestock in the Negev brand their valued livestock with a sign (*sawawm*) to indicate ownership as each lineage (*'ā'ilāt*) retains their own symbols for communicating possession and value.

Within many Muslim societies such the Bedouin of the Negev, the discipline of seeing not only entails particular vernacular aesthetics but also entails considerable moral significance (Kubala 2010). In particular, people display ideals of modesty through veiling,⁵² which among strangers demonstrates respect for kin *in absentia* and is best understood as a symbolic language for communicating morality. Veiling is a both voluntary and situational act undertaken by both men and women to express their virtue during encounters with particular people. It communicates deference and respect or conforming to cultural ideals. Nevertheless, acts of veiling also correspond to broader discourse of visibility and invisibility associated with the dynamics of honour, modesty, and moral space.

In addition to the visual semiotics associated with morality, Walter Armbrust (2012) suggested that tensions between and perceived values of audiocentrism and ocularcentrism have intensified since revival of Islam as a moral authority in the Muslim world in the 1970s. He stated:

Islamic resurgence was (and remains) marked not just by audiocentrism, but by tangible anti-ocularism expressed most famously through debates over women's dress, but also in the promotion of putative prohibitions against representation

⁵¹ *Sawawm* (pl. *wasams*) is a sign, symbol, or mark that is used to distinguish ownership of things and people from others. They come in the form of stains, tattoos, or engravings on the body or object.

⁵² Jon Anderson (1982) argued that veiling is a form of social interaction, an informed language between persons based on respect.

that had been either ignored in practices, or at least debated (rather than simply accepted) for centuries.

(Armbrust 2012: 36-37)

In the last century, Islamic writings in the form of traditional texts (*hādīth*) and legal judgements (*fatāwā*) continually debate the morality of photography. Since the creation of the camera, thousands of *fatāwā* have been issued regarding the prohibition of photography by Sunni ‘*ulma*’⁵³ while others say that photography is acceptable. For example, Muhammad al-Ghazali (2009) suggested that Muslims must distinguish between two types of images: three-dimensional images of sculptors and two-dimensional representations produce through drawings on paper, skins, and other mediums. He argued that depictions, whether through photography or pencil, are a component of science, matters permissible as indicated in the *hādīth*. The only types of images that are forbidden are those depicting religious figures such as Buddha or Christian crucifixes or any religious token contrary to Islamic monotheism (*tawhīd*) (al-Ghazali 2009).

The comparison of Muslim values to Western attitudes compounds debates about the place of the ‘visual’ in the Middle East. It has been argued that Westerners often consider vision a sense that places one in relation to the world through sight, a process allowing people to create internal representations based on observation of their physical surroundings.⁵⁴ For example, Tim Ingold (2000: 24 [original emphasis]) has argued that most Westerners believe that ‘[v]ision ... defines the self individually in *opposition* to others and that hearing (and other senses) defines the self socially in *relation* to others’. Thus vision is characterised as externally objective, empirically knowledgeable, and analytically detached. European intellectualism is therefore

⁵³ Its forbidden-ness (*ḥarām*) varies greatly in the Muslim world.

⁵⁴ Rene Descartes (1637) argued light or *lux* is a source of illumination and the medium by which knowledge of the surrounding world could be obtained via the eye.

attributed to ocularcentrism whereas auditory senses are thought to characterise Arabic cultures; however, these are ultimately Orientalist differentiations (Armbrust 2012: 36).

Misconceptions regarding the importance of audiocentrism in the Islamic world emanate from the perceived connections Muslims have to sound and the revered status of recitation (Armbrust 2012). While scholars would not argue that pre-colonial societies in the Middle East undervalued vision, '[s]uperficial readings of certain Quranic and Hadith texts undoubtedly made Arab-Islamic aniconism seem more clear-cut than it actually was, but in reality "the relations between the visual world and ocular experience and its representations" is always complex and fluid' (Jay 1993 cited in Armbrust 2012: 36). Notwithstanding, Charles Hirschkind (2004) argued that many ethnographic studies of media-making in the Middle East have had a tendency to replicate Cartesian logic by ordering of the senses and reviving stereotypical binaries indicating that Muslims prefer sound to sight.

Despite above-mentioned misconceptions, there have been several noteworthy studies produced in the last few years documenting and examining visual practices in the Middle East.⁵⁵ Under the auspices of visual culture studies of the Middle East, Christa Salamandra (2005), Lucie Ryzova (2012), and Christine Gruder and Sune Haugbølle (2013) examined the creation of iconography in Middle Eastern in regional public spheres and explored their influence for national and Islamic discourses. In particular, Gruder and Haugbølle (2013: xxv) noted that the growing dominance of visual interactions has changed how people function within 'different scopic regimes' in the region, which have increasingly less to do with geography and more to do with

⁵⁵ This review excludes studies of Iranian (Persian) and North African (Maghreb) photography practices.

access to technologies. As a result, local populations are progressively producing and distributing their own visual media.⁵⁶

Through the combined efforts of re-using Western archival images and their own production of photographs, Middle Eastern intellectuals and ruling classes played a key role in the creation of national ‘truths’ and institutional ideologies of the state and its citizens. For example, Ronald Hawker (2002) noted how the national ruling class in the United Arab Emirates used photographs to produce and appropriate visual stereotypes of ‘Bedouin culture’ in order to justify their state power in the region since the 1970s. Through their re-appropriations of historical photographs created by foreign residents and visitors, such as Wilfred Thesiger (c. 1945-c. 1950) and Ronald Codrai (c. 1940-c. 1950), the ruling elite promulgated an indigenous national identity based on their ‘authentic Bedouin’ past (Hawker 2002).

More recently, studies have also examined localised visual practices such as indigenous photographic portraiture (Sheehi 2007, Aytemiz 2015, McClellan 2015); leisure and popular photography (Buchakjian 2015, Ryzova 2015); and family photography (Musleh-Motut 2015). Their works demonstrate how regional elites took up photographic enterprises over the last hundred years leaving the technology to disseminate unevenly among different classes and concentrate within urban centres throughout the central Middle East (Jacobson 2007).

While studies on visual practices in the Middle East such as those mentioned above have multiplied over the last decade, this thesis argues that most writings on the topic have a tendency to overlook several aspects of visual culture in the region. First, while describing the production of visual images in the Middle East, studies often emphasize the polysemous nature of images as floating signs or regional iconography

⁵⁶ For example, Lila Abu Lughod (2002) and Armbrust (2000, 2003) documented how elites utilise visual technologies such as television and film as a means to construct, legitimate, and solidify their control over resources, land, and national identities in Egypt.

but have yet to similarly complicate their polyvalent presence(s) as objects and increasingly as digital copies. By focusing exclusively on the production of visual works such as pictures, most studies typically gloss over the peoples' efforts to re-appropriate images produced by outsiders and therefore the capacity of these images to transform from tangible objects into digital, immaterial graphics and back again in different contexts and exchanges. In particular, studies on visual practices in the Middle East disregard the social lives of images and how – as objects and codes – they dialectically *affect* people's relationships.

Second, despite acknowledging local visual practices, studies predominantly treat visual culture and practices as homogenous enterprises among the groups they study, particularly in relation to regional nationalisms (see Abu Lughod 2002, Armbrust 2000, 2003, Gruder and Haugbølle 2013). As such, most (if not all) studies of vernacular photography in the Middle East, similar to studies of text-making in the region, focus on the visual practices and histories of urban elites (*ḥaḍarī*) and disregard similar efforts among the region's peripheral societies and minority groups. By doing so, most ethnographic and photographic studies ignore the conflicted presence and contentious role of images among the Middle East's highly diverse population.

IV. WIDENING POST-ORIENTALIST ANALYSES

Since the 1990s, portraits of leaders have hung on walls, Polaroids have been taped in albums, and photo files have been displayed on mobile phones throughout the Negev. All of these image-containing objects requisition and construct visual information. Rowlands (1993) points out heirlooms, souvenirs, photographs, and family videos are socially constructed artefacts that evoke knowledge and connote memory through their use, presence, and ownership throughout the world. As a result, these products and their

visual signs accumulate value, meaning, and authority. In other words, '[a]rtefacts do far more than just express human intention....' (Miller and Horst 2012: 24), they are central to processes of socialisation and culturally learned, habitual actions.

Material cultural analyses investigate the performance capacity of objects along with their agencies, social actions, and symbolisations (see Gell 1998, Knappett 2002, Miller 1997).⁵⁷ Their work suggests that rather than examining the world merely through social relations, anthropologists must consider how materiality orders and influences social networks. For them, 'things' are meaningful because they have the capacity to reproduce and influence social relationships and mediate peoples' different interests. Because of these abilities, objects are vehicles facilitating self-conceptualisations among peoples and 'affect' the creation of context, meaning, values, *habitus*, and identity (see Bourdieu 1977, Gell 1998, Miller 1997, Thrift 2000, Miller and Horst 2012).

For example, Linda Layne (1989) argued that government officials strive to link the modern Jordanian nation-state to idealisations of the tribal past through material cultural references such as everyday items taken from homes, which are then presented as artefacts in museums. Coffee urns, water pipes, headscarves (*kūfiyya*), and textiles are 'not ritual objects but objects from Bedouin's daily life subsequently re-cast as objects of shared citizenship' (Layne 1989: 30). These mundane items are transformed into nationalised artefacts symbolising Jordanian nationalism, which in turn influences local conceptualisations of 'Bedouin-ness'.

Material cultural approaches in the field of visual anthropology also examine the physical qualities and influence of image-containing objects such as photographs. Here materiality translates 'the abstract and representational "photography" into

⁵⁷ Material culture studies argued that Western philosophy upholds a persistent 'conceptual polarity' between individualised persons and commoditised things, a binary that places subjects in opposition to objects (Kopytoff 1986: 64).

“photographs” as objects that exist in time and space’ (Edwards and Hart 2004: 2). Daniel Miller (1997) and Elizabeth Edwards and Janice Hart (2004) have all argued that photographs are social agents that engage subjects through their material performances and their various re-appropriations. The question for them is ‘not simply what photographs mean, but how they act, why they do whatever it is they do and to whom’ (Porto 2004: 113). Photographs function in similar ways to other items as people encode meanings into them. Once created, however, these objects also reproduce and alter the social contexts in which they are consumed and circulated (Tilley 1994). Through practices of display and consumption, these photographs become ‘culturally endowed entities, hosting specific cultural meanings, and classified and reclassified into culturally constituted categories’ that mediate meaningful relationships in various spaces (Kopytoff 1986: 68).

Material cultural theorists also argue that some visual materials hold more ‘weight’ than others. In particular, Gell (1998) and Bruno Latour (2000) have suggested that some objects have more or less influence than others and thus people assign different values to them. For example, Lucie Ryzova (2012), in her study of Egypt’s photographic heritage, described how collectors are protective of their older photographs because they believe they contain more truth than contemporary images. These images are revered as vintage objects which are often ‘overvalued for their assumed evidentiary’ potential in some contexts, while among other people they are undervalued as ‘inferior historical documents’ (Ryzova 2012: 1). According to Ryzova (2012: 1), Egyptians regard photographs as both ‘three dimensional social objects’ and ‘two dimensional aesthetic texts’ taking advantage of the ‘ambiguity between photographs-as-images and photographs-as-objects’ for their own pursuits.

As a way of approaching both the historical contents and the material weight of photographs among Bedouin in the Negev, this thesis focuses on the ‘presence’ of

images – that is photographs’ literal and figurative existences in both the past and present and their varying significances in their society. This approach is particularly inspired by Elizabeth Edwards’s (2015) and Devorah Romanek’s (2015: 271) conceptualisations of ‘presence’, which build on Eelco Runia’s (2006) discussion of presence and history. He argued that people can reclaim knowledge of the past through their engagement with specific things because the presence of these objects and the experiences they record enables the transfer or communication of past into the present. Edwards (2015: 240) summarises:

On one register, presence is embedded in the photograph. It is traced into the very materiality of photographs, into its chemistry, and now its electronic bytes. It is the ontological scream of the medium — it was there, present. That is the photograph’s power and its symbolic significance.... [A] photograph is [also] a moment, positive or negative, happy or terrifying, that someone lived through — their being, their presence. Their standpoint, literally a “standpoint” is traced in the image [Baer 2002: 1, original emphasis].

As briefly noted above, the historical presence conferred from both the content and materiality of photographs are becoming more diverse and ‘transferable’ as access to historical images and other types of media has steadily increased as a result of digital and networking technologies such as the Internet. This comes digital photographs are quickly becoming the most popular sources of images among people throughout the world. For example, most Palestinians in Israel do not have physical access to archival photographs because most are located in foreign venues or state institutes. Instead, they turn to Internet databases to copy, compile, digitise, and share photographs depicting historical villages, landscapes, people, and events (a practice further described in

Chapter Five). Thus an image's simulations and re-materialised copies are increasingly appearing in peripheral landscapes.

Digital images are also diversifying the persuasiveness and simulated presence of visual materials as producers and viewers speak through them via symbolic virtual languages and new communicative practices thus creating alternative knowledge bases. Because of digitisation, historical and contemporary photographs are found on blogs and websites. These platforms divorce images from their materiality and original contexts. Consequently, many people disregard copyrights, authorship, ownership, and other source information. For example, Ryzova (2012) argued many Egyptians deem referential data pertaining to photographs un-important.

In particular, Daniel Miller and Heather Horst (2012: 24) highlighted that digital communications are intensifying the particularisms and universalisms that define the 'conditions of what we call culture.' While the anthropology of digital communications largely focuses on the sharing and movement of information emanating from digital technologies, Miller and Horst (2012) also acknowledged the material qualities of the 'digital'. For them, the 'materiality of the digital' emanates from: (1) digital goods such as cameras, CDs, computers, smart phones, USB drives, and external hard drives; and (2) digital contexts which are framed by issues of space and time or 'parameters of human interaction'. This implies that digital technologies, such as digital images, are both socio-politically landscaping new mediascapes (Appadurai 1996) but are also being shaped by pre-existing spatial realities and cultural conventions (DeNicola 2013).

Drawing on the above-mentioned literature on materiality, presence, and digitalism, this thesis not only accounts for photographs' polysemous readings (that is the changing and various meanings derived from images) but also maps their polyvalent presence(s) as 'objects' (that is their historical content and transformative material and online/digital existences) in various 'contexts' (Hall 1997) or 'image worlds' (Poole

1997) distinguishing Bedouin society in the Negev. In doing so, the thesis strives to account for images': (1) 'ability to originate, multiply, and to distribute themselves through the open fields of contemporary of communication ... immediately and anonymously....' (Groys 2008: 83); and (2) value as they transmute and circulate between material and coded object-hood and exert influence and information about the past at different scales and scopes.

A. CIRCULATING IMAGES AND CHANGING CONTEXTS

As discussed above, images have proliferated throughout the Middle East because of the Internet and digital technologies in the last twenty years. These new platforms have also made images 'highly prone to circulation, adaptation, and even subversion' as their use as tools of communication grows (Gruder and Haugbølle 2013: xv). While photographic objects are still found in physical venues and exhibitions, digital images are by their very nature 'illocal' and thus able to be viewed in multiple places at different times by various people (Gruder and Haugbølle 2013: xv). On many occasions, it is not the photograph that is centrifugal but its graphic content.

Today ambulating images are embedded and re-embedded in books and newspapers, projected onto televisions and computer screens, re-printed on paper and film, and secured onto concrete and virtual walls. As a result, graphic images are frequently dislocated from their original, material constraints and spatial contexts through copying, burning, and digitising; a situation creating new but oppositional virtual public spheres whereby authority over representations is legitimated through techniques of bricolage, re-contextualisation, and co-opting.

During these circulations, material and digital objects exert presence(s) at different times and places and through different forms or manifestations leaving Igor

Kopytoff (1986) to argue that ‘things’ such as images have numerous life histories entangled within complex networks of interaction or the ‘diverse *processes* wherein “inanimate” objects come to be socially alive’ (Knappett 2002: 97). For Kopytoff (1986), materials are not equal when it comes to constructing meaning and acquiring value. In order to account for these variations, he suggested a ‘biographical model’ for ‘things’ in order to ask: What are the biographical qualities contributing to a thing’s value and status in different periods and cultures? Where does the thing come from and who made it? How does the thing’s use change over time? (See Kopytoff 1986, Miller 1997, Edwards 2004, and Porto 2004.)

Despite the popularity of social biographical approach to objects, Edwards (2012: 223) has pointed out that ‘while effective, is, however, perhaps too linear to accommodate the analytical needs of the complex flows of multiple originals [and digital duplicates] of photographs. For photographs have divergent, nonlinear, social biographies spread over divergent multiple material originals and multiple, dispersed, and atomized performances’.

Because photographic objects have the capacity to circulate within various times and different spaces, Deborah Poole (1997) used the term ‘image worlds’ to describe the ‘conceptual maps’ (Hall 1997) where visual signs and objects move, come together, and create visual cultures. She argued ‘[s]eeing and representing are “material,” insofar as they constitute a means of intervening in the world’ (Poole 1997: 7). For her the effectiveness of visual representation relies on the referential nature of images, the social and institutional relations connecting image-makers to their viewers through their ability to be materially circulated (Poole 1997).

As images travel between worlds, they not only become ‘circulating referents’ (Latour 1999) or ‘mobile signs’ awarded meaning during multiple acts of ‘translation’ (Banks and Vokes 2010: 340) but they also become transformative objects. Gell’s

(1998) model of the ‘distributed object’ highlights the deviating social biographies of photographs, life stories they obtain as they simultaneously circulate and maintain presence(s) in multiple places, times, and paths. Edwards (2012: 224) summarised: ‘The meaning of photographs, material forms, and ideas of appropriateness shift through the double helix of image biography and the biography of material reconfiguration and remediation.’ Her Latourian (2007) actor network approach emphasises the social saliency of objects within networks of people and things, that is the flows of photographs as objects but the technologies and structures that give photographs meaning as signifiers.

Visual anthropologists have also argued that archives and personal collections are popular conceptual and physical sites wherein travelling image artefacts move and enact various material performances (see Banks and Vokes 2010, Edwards 2009).⁵⁸ Similar to Deborah Poole’s (1997) image worlds, scholars use the concept of ‘archives’ to detail the biographies of image artefacts and their changing values. The events wherein people consume image objects are locations that allow anthropologists to examine the ‘accumulation of micro-relationships in which objects are involved’ (Edwards 2001: 28-29). In these occasions, people have the capacity to re-read stereotypical, official images of themselves through photographic re-appropriation and repatriation in order to articulate their own versions of the past and maintain local knowledge (Edwards and Mead 2013). Additionally, for many people, images found in external collections and archives are becoming an ‘evidential source within the communities they depict, inscribing complex layers of cultural information and knowledge’ (Edwards 2003: 83).

⁵⁸ Photographic archives are ‘any set or collection of historical photographs, brought together with some purposeful intent, if only for storage’ (Banks and Vokes 2010: 338).

This comes as ‘contemporary subjects become reacquainted with [the travelling] images of their forbears and ancestors and how in turn those ancestral images and biographies become resutured into living memory’ upon their arrival back to source communities (Banks and Vokes 2010: 341) (a process further explored in Chapter Five). For example, Shryock (1997) described a historical photograph in northern Jordan that he came across on the wall in an informant’s house. The informant told him that the original came from the United Kingdom. When Shryock asked another friend about the picture, however, he told him the original picture in fact came from Spain and that the men were not of the originally-stated clan but another one. His friend then proceeded to show Shryock (1997: 294-295) his copy of the photograph wherein the men were assigned different names. ‘The picture of the “three shaykhs” was the most popular of [the shop owner’s] ... collection. I asked who the men in the picture were. “Well,” he said, with a sly twist in his voice, “that depends on which family you belong to....”.’

Shryock (1997: 297-298) also described how old photographs are often enlarged, ornamentally framed, and hung in a family’s public guest receiving rooms in ‘shrine-like space in which very different representations of time, identity, and power could all be simultaneously displayed’ throughout Jordan. Shryock posited that readings of these historic photographs is a highly contested activity whereby different tribesmen struggle to make claims about these images in order to make them their own and deny them to other tribes.⁵⁹

In order to account for photographic and digital images’ circulations, life histories, and contexts of viewing, this thesis documents the flow of visual information and materials involved in the ‘construction of history’ (Shryock 1997: 37) within

⁵⁹ Shryock does not detail visual practices in Jordan.

them.⁶⁰ This approach draws on Arjun Appadurai's (1986) research concerning the practices and spaces by which objects enable social cohesion and multiple levels of identification and interaction. According to him, focusing on the circulation of things also makes it possible to argue that, 'What creates the links between exchange and values is *politics*....' (Appadurai 1986: 3). This comes as the movement of things, such as photographs, also involves various types of competitions and collaborations, which in many cases coincides with pre-established social hierarchies and customary contentions over who has the authority to use documentary materials.

Different members strive to own and control visual media, for example, for their own and disparate purposes; efforts to acquire personal capital that often involve internal social debates as to what individuals, topics, themes, and events can be discussed and presented in various public spheres.⁶¹ In fact, visual technologies regularly support internal debates and competitive capital acquisitions between rivals and their disparate knowledge claims justifying pre-positions of power and influence (Turner 1991).

This thesis suggests that the presence(s) of images among people in the Negev is also characterised by discord. In particular, the historical knowledge derived from visual mediums, like text and speech, is situated within persuasive discourses thus presenting partial and subjective conceptions of truth, which is consciously or implicitly altered during reflections about history in Bedouin society in the Negev. In order to describe these contentions, it highlights the calculative resonances and silences intrinsic to sharing historical knowledge during specific encounters in the Negev. This comes as 'not all parties share the same *interests* in any specific regime of value, nor are the

⁶⁰ See Introduction for my approach to these representational landscapes as political economies of meaning (Eickelman 1987).

⁶¹ James Faris (1993) argued that making local culture visible to outsiders for political engagement does not free peoples from Western influence.

interests of any two parties in a given exchange identical' within any given society (Appadurai 1986: 57).

As such, this thesis describes the occasions where members select and value one image over another to communicate history. It does so by theoretically approaching images as visual signifiers but as objects and digital copies that acquire value as things during members' exchanges and interactions. The thesis argues that while images' *affects* are limited by viewing contexts (be they framed portraits or displays on a mobile phone) and the knowledge of their producers and consumers, Bedouin esteemed them for their documentary qualities and thus valued them as things to be possessed, protected, and utilised. In particular, it posits that photographic and digital images are valued as 'new' type of documentary evidence for circulating knowledge of history and society in various Negev contexts.

In addition to documenting the flow or circulation of image objects in and out of the Negev, this thesis also maps the 'representational regimes' (Appadurai 1996: 35) characterising Bedouin historicity in the Negev. In particular, it conceptualises the specific viewing contexts in which Bedouin members engage 'historically significant' images through Poole's (1997) notion of visual economy, image worlds (Poole 1997) that contribute to specific 'political fields' (Parizot 2001a) characterising the Negev. The concept of visual economy (Poole 1997) provides a productive theoretical landscape through which it is possible to think about how people produce, consume, and circulate images unevenly within national and international circuits. In particular, this thesis argues that the concept of visual economies is an analytically useful approach for mapping the power, role, and movement of photographic and digital images within highly contentious and complex spaces like Israel and Palestine.

Poole's (1997) work explored how images structure aesthetic dispositions and service ideas of race by tracing the comparative history of visibility between Europe and

Peru's Andean region. For her, the term 'visual culture' implies consensus and homogeneity associated with production, appropriation, and reading of images. By contrast, Poole (1997: 8) argued these processes are typified by unequal flows and exchanges of information within visual economies; a concept implying that peoples' interaction with images and photographic meanings have more to do with power relations as they do with shared meanings and senses of community. This thesis agrees with this assessment.

For Poole (1997), visual economies are organised at three levels. The first are the original productions of images by individuals and institutions publishing and circulating images. The second level highlights the economic organisation of images. Here focus is placed on the material and technological attributes of images and their ability to be transformed into valued materials or commodities. She took this idea further with the third qualifier, images' exchanges or circulations between particular social systems. It is within these schemes that images are assigned varied values and significances through circulation. She stated:

Regardless of the technical quality or pictorial content, possession of photographs conferred a special status on their owners. When we consider such social uses of photographic objects or commodities, it becomes clear that the value of images is not limited to the worth they accrue as representations seen (or consumed) by individual viewers. Instead, images also accrue value through the social processes of accumulation, possession, circulation, and exchange.

(Poole 1997: 11)

While Poole's concept of visual economy is a productive way of mapping the politics between different (macro) national and international circuits, her model does not address exchange and discordant practices within local (meso and micro) contexts.

Alternatively, this thesis suggests a study of distinctive but nested macro-meso-micro-visual economies will not only illuminate how images of Negev Bedouin have been produced and consumed over the last century but also their ability to acquire unique social biographies of value as they travel within and between politicalised representational landscapes – processes wherein images shape and are shaped by Bedouin's historicity and influence how members share knowledge of the past among themselves and with outsiders.

The significance of approaching the Negev as a multi-layered political field composed of nested visual economies (in part) critiques Ariella Azoulay's (2008: 12) discussion as to how photography constructs Israeli and Palestinian spaces. She rightly argues that 'acts of photography' plot political spaces in the Israeli and Palestinian context during which people create meaning between one another. In Azoulay's (2008) analysis, however, these interactions are solely contextualised as 'violent photographic events' between Israelis and Palestinians, for example, at security checkpoints. According to her, there are two main photographic by-products emerging from these encounters. One is the creation of photographic citizenship among 'several protagonists, mainly photographer and photographed, camera and spectator' who by the very act of 'photography' became part of the global 'photographic citizenry' (Azoulay 2010: 11). The other is the photograph itself, which according to Azoulay's (2008) neo-Benjaminian approach, accurately and authentically records historical events, landscapes, and peoples.

This thesis argues that Azoulay's (2008: 25) 'photographic citizenship' is a productive way to conceptualise the photographic-making of one 'political field' characterising Israeli and Palestinian spaces, namely nationalised sites of confrontation

between the Israeli state and its occupied Palestinian minority.⁶² This approach, however: (1) does not account for other, often more mundane, photographic encounters between Israelis and Palestinians that occur beyond institutional landscapes and include various types of joint social, political, and economic projects and competitions; (2) it homogenises photographed Palestinian people as the marginalised Other within Israeli spaces thereby dismissing their various interpretations of the region's visual history; (3) her emphasis on a singular photographic practice in the Israeli and Palestinian context, those of the Israeli state and professional photographers, dismisses vernacular image-making practices; and finally (4) Azoulay's focus on the 'photography event' (as inscribed on a photograph) overlooks the malleability of image content and a photograph's ability to support different types of visual history as it travels outside of nationalised spaces.⁶³

In contrast, this thesis argues that while image-making and the reading of visual history often entails unequal acts of Othering in the Israeli and Palestinian context, one cannot ignore the fact that the lives of these image objects and their contents have the capacity to change – to transform into evidence (not only used by the Israeli state but) by various Palestinian peoples (of which the Bedouin in the Negev are a part) in pursuit of their own goals. Here the historical value and meaning of an image object, such as a photograph, is no longer dictated by the socio-political contract of its birth or presence in state archives but instead accumulates other biographies and values during its life span as they circulate in different contexts. It is on these occasions that a people, like the Bedouin in the Negev who were once merely photographed subjects, not only appropriate images but also perform their own vernacular image acts. These images

⁶² In this manner, Azoulay's (2008) and Poole's (1997) work both solely focus on the role and significance of photography and photographs in national contexts.

⁶³ It is beyond the scope and space of the thesis to present a more comprehensive critique of Azoulay's (2008) approach to photography in the Israeli/Palestinian context.

then acquire lives outside of visual economies of Orientalism, colonialism, and nationalism where they become re-contextualised in multiple networks, multiple relationships, and multiple perceptions of the past.

V. FROM VISUAL HISTORY TO VISUAL KNOWLEDGE

As of 2015, most studies of photography and photographs in the Israeli and Palestinian context focus on the region's 'visual history'. In particular, the work of Sarah Graham-Brown (1980), Karen Serger (1981), Walid Khalidi (1984), Naseeb Shepard (1997), Kathleen Steward Howe (1997), Raffi Safieh (1999), Elias Sanbar (2014), and Ariella Azoulay (2011) all emphasis photographs as a type of documentary technology that records Israeli and Palestinian history and carries a visual 'testimony to the history it has experienced' (Benjamin 2008 [1936]: 215).

Their emphasis on visual history redresses the fact that the majority of studies of Israeli and Palestinian history simply incorporate photographic images as illustrative depictions of characters, events, and landscapes in support of their textual descriptions of the past. This comes as the established dichotomy between the subjectivities of the aesthetics and scientific efforts of objective relativism (Banks and Morphy 1997: 2) has encouraged many scholars to exclusively rely on text-based translations of history and cultural experience which consistently place precedence on written and printed word.

By inserting the 'visual' into Israeli and Palestinian history, visual historians and photographic theorists (such as those listed above) set out to rectify the visual absence or erasure of, for example, Palestinian spaces in the West Bank and Israel. Through archival research and applied photographic case studies, their works set out to support the 'official' Palestinian collective history by inserting visual evidence of events witnessed by photographers of the past. By doing so, these studies typically aim to

prove that specific events occurred, for example, during the *Nakba* through images sourced from seemingly measureless yet largely un-resourced photographic archives. This approach to history and photography has become a mainstay for Palestinian visual historical research today and directly responds to the active oppression and erasure of Palestinian's past by the state of Israel in the present.

While this research (much like the work of academic activists of the Negev Bedouin described at the beginning of this chapter) and their efforts to collect visual documents of the Palestinian past cannot be politically faulted, this thesis strives to move beyond discussions of visual history and the idea of a 'true' and 'accurately recorded' historical discourse in the Israeli and Palestinian context. Alternatively, it focuses on the production of visual knowledge of Bedouin in the Negev – a people largely regarded as without a photographic heritage and learned knowledge of the past. By doing so, the remainder of the thesis explores how Bedouin make and interpret their own visual history through their diverse knowledge-making practices wherein images are regularly employed as objects of historical 'authority and authenticity'. In other words, it documents how Bedouin have become active participants in the production of history in their own right as they emplace their knowledge of the past onto photographic documents thus creating their own visual histories.

This thesis' focus on 'construction of history' among Bedouin in the Negev is also significantly motivated by Shryock's (1997) examination of this practice among Bedouin in Jordan. My research departs, however, from his study in two ways: (1) it expands on the unique ways in which photographs in a Bedouin society are also treated as 'sources of proof' (*masdār aṣ-ṣaḥīḥ*) alongside texts but evidence historical knowledge, public authority, reputations, and truth claims in unique ways; and (2) it acknowledges the emergence of various Bedouin communities (alongside more customary tribal networks) in their Negev society and differentiates the various

‘historical constructions’ produced by members representing them – histories not merely reflecting nationalisms or tribalisms but also universalisms associated with civic society and Islamic nation.

Before investigating the presence and value of images for Bedouin historicity and sociality in the Negev (as detailed in Part II of this thesis), the next chapters explore treatments of Negev Bedouin history and society in southern Israel; predominantly those constructed via text-based and oral colloquies. In particular, Chapter Two moves on to explore the Negev Bedouin’s socio-historiography as created by learned scholarship through exclusively textual enterprises. Produced over the last century and up until 2000, this administrative and scholastic history is seemingly an objective and learned register that describes Bedouin experiences during the Ottoman Empire, British Mandate, and current state of Israel.

CHAPTER TWO

SOCIO-HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE NEGEV BEDOUIN

Insofar as history aspires to meanings, it is doomed to select regions, periods, groups of men and individuals in these groups and to make them stand out ... History is therefore never history, but history-for.

(Claude Lévi-Strauss 1966: 257)

A socio-historiography of Bedouin in the Negev is comprised of writings produced during the Ottoman Empire, British Mandate, and the state of Israel in a range of intellectual, government, and community paradigms. As such, imaginings of Bedouin history and society have been diverse over the last centuries. Early explorers, writers, Orientalists, and officials treated the population as rural nomads; their accounts were inspired by centuries-long myths and ideas of race pertaining to tribal pastoral peoples in the Middle East. Nineteenth and early twentieth century writings focused on the grand genealogies (*nasāb*) of tribal confederations (*gabā'il*) explaining how Bedouin came to be in their Negev territories. Mid-century anthropologists (see Randolph 1963, Marx 1967) created the first ethnographies of the population and documented changes in Bedouin's socio-political and economic practices after the 1948 War. Towards the end of the twentieth century, human geographers, sociologists, and political scientists from various scholastic backgrounds set about recording the consequences of coerced urbanisation and Israel's discriminatory policies towards its Bedouin minorities.

Since the early twentieth century, academic literature has divided the Bedouin population in southern Levant into three 'groups' (Negev, Galilee, and Sinai). Of these, Bedouin residing in Israel's Negev desert have been known as '*arab as-Sab*' (pre-1948 Bedouin dialect), *Habeduim Banegav* (Hebrew), Negev Bedouin (English), and *Badū an-Naqab* (Arabic) over the last hundred years. Moreover, learned writings have created

‘ways of discussing’ the Bedouin experience in southern Israel and, over time, have come to influence the Bedouin’s own perceptions of their history and society.

Today as then, however, there is little consensus between contemporary Bedouin and the Israeli state about historical events and socio-political truths in the Negev given that these complex pasts and realities are often purposely re-contextualised for political purposes in the Israeli and Palestinian context. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to requisition historical truths pertaining to these topics. Instead, this chapter explores the study of Bedouin in the Beersheba region, particularly that generated by Western, Israeli, and Palestinian discourses – writings that have come to compartmentalise popular rationalisations of Bedouin life in Israel but also Bedouin members’ own presentations of the past.

Whilst exploring the breadth and development of scholarship on Bedouin society in the Negev from the end of the Ottoman Empire to 2013, the following chapter keeps an eye on the developing anthropological discourse paralleling these events (occasionally footnoted for readability). It asks: How have Western, Israeli, and Palestinian studies come to describe the Negev Bedouin and their models of tribalism, Otherness, and minority development? Through critical description and content analysis of literature produced over the last centuries, the chapter describes history *about* the Bedouin of the Negev, the various administrations *of* the population, and the changes *within* their society in order to ascertain (in the next chapter) the types of history Bedouin express and produce today.

I. BEERSHEBA UNDER OTTOMAN AND BRITISH RULE

(c. 1900-1947)

Written records of Bedouin residing in this area first materialise in the tenth century in the form of documents listing tribal namesakes. According to anthropologist Clinton Bailey (1985), these include Muḥammad al-Ṭabarī (839- 923) and Muḥammad al-Hamdānī (1968 [893-945]).⁶⁴ Their works joined that of others such as Abū Zayd ibn Khaldūn al-Ḥaḍramī (1967 [1332-1406]) highlighting the difference between peasant and tribal peoples, distinctions informing the more definite typology employed today. This system of classification distinguishes Middle Easterners by their supposed urbanite (*ḥaḍarī*), peasant (*fallāḥ*), or pastoralist (*badāwī*) origins. The cataloguing of tribal namesakes continued in the mid-fourteenth and sixteenth centuries by local officials such as ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jazīrī (c. 1570-n.d.) from Cairo who also named tribes he met in the sixteenth century (Bailey 1985). Records from the Greek Orthodox Monastery of Saint Catherine’s also described tribal namesakes in the area from the fourteenth to the nineteenth centuries, when the region came under the rule of the Ottoman Empire (est. 1516).

Prompted by dynamics of discovery between the West and East, European imperial interest in the Middle East escalated from the sixteenth century onward and the uniqueness of tribal peoples captivated the imagination of Western scholars and travellers alike (see Burckhardt 1822, Doughty 1921 [1888], Hurgronje 1931 [1889], Robertson-Smith 1885). As European interest in the Middle East grew so did writings on ‘*arab as-sab*’ (Bedouin of Beersheba) in Ottoman-ruled Palestine. The earliest European texts include Constantin de Volney (2013 [1785]) and the *Description de l’Egypte* (2007 [1798]). Richard Pococke (1745) also recorded tribes he met during his

⁶⁴ Also see ‘Aḥmed ibn ‘Abdallah al-Qalqashandī (1959 [1356-1418]) and ‘Aḥmed ibn ‘Ali al-Maqrīzī (1847 [1364 -1442]).

travels but largely focused on Sinai. Ulrich Jasper Seetzen (2013 [1810]) provided an extensive list of tribes in the Beersheba region in the early nineteenth century, as did Claude Conder (1887), Antonin Jaussen (1907) (see Figure 2), and Alois Musil (1908) (also see Thompson 1856, Hull 1886).




Figure 2: Antonin Jaussen's 1908 Map of the Negev.

These writing were produced during a time when the Ottoman Empire ruled the Levant region (1516-1919). According to historian Selim Deringil (1998, 2003), the Empire ruled its southern desert inhabitants with remote governance during its early years. At the time, Bedouin in the region lived in similar ways as their ancestors in

Arabia. They resided in goat-haired tents, raised livestock, and migrated to different pastures with minimal interference from the Empire. Migrations were seasonal and families annually sowed wheat, barley, and common mallow throughout the northern Beersheba Plain, valleys, and riverbeds. Despite life in the periphery, anthropologists Emanuel Marx (1967) and Arif Abu Rabia (2001) pointed out that the population regularly interacted with the ‘non-bedouin world’ during the Ottoman Empire. Their encounters included foreign pilgrims *en route* to Mecca and Jerusalem. Moreover, they lived alongside settled Palestinians and Egyptians but often raided these neighbours at the time (Abu Rabia 2001). They also collected payment (*khawa*) for protection against other raiding parties in the area and on major routes from villagers throughout Syria and Palestine (also see Kressel and Ben-David 1995). Beyond raiding, Bedouin interacted with outsiders at markets in Gaza, Hebron, and Beersheba throughout the centuries.

In the mid-nineteenth century, Sultan Abdülmecid I created the *Tanzimât*, which systemised government rule over Bedouin.⁶⁵ Previous Ottoman policies that left them ‘to their own devices’ over the last two hundred years were dispelled and replaced by active administrations (Deringil 1998: 41) due to rising geopolitical tensions with the British Empire and the construction of the Suez Canal. New administrative tenets directed at Bedouin in Palestine included: upgrading military forces regulating tribal warfare; construction of *gendarmérie* fortifications to halt raids; a policy of flattering powerful tribes with high titles, robes of honour and bribes; and, finally, encouraging migrating families to settle via the 1858 Land Law and classifying unused lands as *mawat* (uncultivated). Ottoman authorities expected the families residing on land labelled as *mawat* to register their names, receive land titles, and pay taxes on the property.

⁶⁵ The *Tanzimât* (Turkish – Reorganisation) was a policy of reformation (1839-1876).

In 1900, the Ottomans built the city of Beersheba.⁶⁶ Orientalist scholar Arif al-Arif (1933, 1934) described that the city was established on 2,000 *dunams* of land bought from the 'Azāzmah. In 1904, the Ottomans built a local Tribal School in Beersheba (Deringil 2003), reserved for the sons of powerful shaykhs (*shuyūkh*) who also constructed town-homes in the new city and participated in government activities (Al-Atauna 2005). 'It was hoped that the school would provide the future tribal leaders with the skills necessary for maintaining relations with the government officials' (Marx 1967: 35). Later, Ali Akrem Bey, who governed the Jerusalem area from 1906-1908, also initiated development projects to encourage semi-nomadic families to settle and farm (Abu Rabia 2001). He constructed water pumps, created housing loans, and imported tractors and other agricultural machinery to the region.

The construction of Beersheba and its official recognition as a capital coincided with the Sultan's redesign of several Palestinian districts whereby geopolitically significant regions were labelled administrative centres (Turkish – *mutasarriflik*) (Deringil 2003). The government labelled the sub-district in southern Palestine *Birüssebi*. As historian George Kirk (1941) suggested, there was no specific geographical name denoting this southern region in Arabic before the nineteenth century. Alternatively, he argued that Jewish writers revived the term 'Negev' during the rise of political Zionism in the late nineteenth century. These authors appropriated the old Hebrew appellation meaning 'dry' to vaguely define lands south of Beersheba during Ottoman Rule (Kirk 1941). Alternatively, throughout the Ottoman period, the Bedouin population was known as the '*arab as-sab*' (dialect).

⁶⁶ After the Umayyad conquest in the eighth century A.D., Beersheba largely served as a watering hole and market centre for Bedouin (Berman 1965).

Sultan Abdülhamid II revised the original *Tanzimât* to further augment Ottoman presence in the Negev at the turn of the century.⁶⁷ It proceeded to formalise tribal boundaries in 1917, which remained intact until 1948, and officially recognised a collection of tribal confederations (*gabā'il*) in the southern district (Abu Rabia 2001). Ottoman administrators also began mapping and recording Bedouin demography wherein they identified eight main *gabā'il* with established territory in the district: Tarabīn, Tiyāhā, 'Azāzmah, Ḥanājrah, Jubarāt, Sa'idīn, Aḥēwāt, and Jahalīn (al-Arif 1934). Of these *gabā'il*, the Tarabīn and Tiyāhā were the largest.

Bureaucratically, late Ottoman officials treated the tribal confederations (*gabā'il*) as 'closed' but independent units of people. In order to administer them, authorities created a system of 'officially' recognising some *gabā'il* over others and distinguishing their territories and leaders who they confirmed as mediators between the Empire and their groups (Marx 1967). Whilst regulated, Ottoman-recognised *shuyūkh*⁶⁸ and *gabā'il* were based on local Bedouin leadership customs and networked affiliations that typically operated independently of imperial oversight before 1917 (Abu Rabia 2001).

Intrusion of state administration on Bedouin affairs intensified after World War I. At this time, the residents of Ottoman *Birüssebi* became subjects of the British Empire. Between 1922-1948, the British Mandate took up similar coercion tactics as initiated by the Ottomans to administer the Bedouin populations in the Northern Sub-District and the Western Gaza Sub-District. During their rule, the British opened public schools. In particular, they continued to run the Tribal School but also made special provisions for migrating families wherein children were taught by 'appointed peripatetic teachers' at the shaykh's meeting place (*shigg*) within five tribal territories in the Negev

⁶⁷ In 1882, Great Britain ruled Egypt leading to conflict with the Ottomans. The conflict ended with a 1906 agreement that created the Sinai border stipulating that Britain would rule south of the line and the Ottomans north of the line.

⁶⁸ Henceforth 'shaykhs' will be referred to as *shuyūkh*.

(Abu Rabia 2001: 68). By 1935, a literate class comprising of the children of Bedouin elite had emerged whereas the rest of the population (approximately ninety-five per cent) remained illiterate (Al-Arif 1934). The British also expanded the Beersheba Bedouin Market, a well-established economic centre during Ottoman rule.

Penny Maddrell (1990) explained that the British also established the 1942 Bedouin Control Ordinance which was designed to encourage members to take up agriculture and to increase commissioners' control over local travel between areas and limit nomadic migrations. Despite intensifying policies regarding agriculture and taxation, the Mandate's policy regarding the Bedouin in Palestine was *ad hoc* (Maddrell 1990, Kark and Frantzman 2011). Local historian Mansour Nasasra (2011) argued that the British had trouble distinguishing between Bedouin who farmed from those who continued to migrate. They also struggled to identify various tribal memberships in the Beersheba region for the purposes of taxation (also see Abu Sitta 2009).

Consequently, the British commissioned administrators, explorers, and academics to gather information about Bedouin in Palestine's southern districts in the form of writings, maps, and historical records. For example, the Palestinian Exploration Fund mapped tribal territories, which cumulated into the 1946 Tent Survey.⁶⁹ Officials also created a census estimating that 65,000 Bedouin lived in Palestine between 1922 and 1931. Al-Arif, Beersheba's district officer (1933-1948), also extensively wrote about Bedouin society during his administration, which cumulated in a series of books based on Bedouin genealogies, territories, and customs. While providing information pertaining to tribal histories and namesakes (which Bedouin reference today as discussed later), his writings reflected urban Palestinian and British sentiments at the time presenting the population as an exotic tribal people.

⁶⁹ This survey of Palestine indicated that the northern Beersheba Plain was cultivated in 1937 (Maddrell 1990).

In addition to officials, Western historians and scholars also extensively wrote on Bedouin residing in British Palestine.⁷⁰ For example, Sigmar Hillelson (1937, 1938a, 1938b) and George Murray (1935) produced comprehensive genealogies of Bedouin in the Negev and Sinai. George Kirk (1941) discussed the types of Arabic speaking Muslims coexisting in southern Palestine. Later, Max Von-Oppenheim (1939) created one of the most accurate lists of tribes residing in southern Palestine wherein he summarised descriptions provided by earlier scholars. Of these, Murray (1935) described that both Tarabīn and the Tiyāhā⁷¹ reckon themselves pre-Islamic ‘descendants of Wā‘il, the ancestor of Banū [descendants of or house of] Atiya ... of Egypt’ (Murray 1935: 243). Whereas Hillelson (1938a) claimed the Tiyāhā are descendants of Suleīmān al-‘Anoud of the Banū Hilāl. According to his work, the Ma‘aza of western Saudi Arabia (al-Ḥijāz) drove the Tiyāhā and Tarabīn out of the Arabian Gulf during the Muslim Conquests (623–1050). The Tiyāhā were separated from the main group during their ‘famous march to the Maghreb [North Africa]’ with the Tarabīn in the tenth century (Hillelson 1938a: 55) and hence became known as the people of Jabal al-Tīh (Hills of the Wandering).

Murray (1935) explained that the Tarabīn and Tiyāhā frequently fought over control of the land but the two eventually made peace when representatives agreed to hold specific lands (see Figure 3). Despite established boundaries between each confederation (*gabīla*) there was often conflict because of sales, inheritance, leasing, and transfer of land between families; a situation exasperated by internal power struggles, which often resulted in war being declared by *gabīla*. One notable example was the War of Zari‘ al-Huzayyīl (1875–1887) during the late Ottoman Period in which

⁷⁰ Also see Hilma Granqvist (1931, 1935).

⁷¹ In 1931, the Tiyāhā numbered around 13,708 (Abu Rabia 2001).

Ḥukūk, ‘Alāmāt, Badīnāt, and Gdīrāt. Of these, the Gdīrāt resided on land established from north of Lagīya to the south near al-Sir during the British Mandate (see Figure 4).



Figure 4: Section of British Mandate Tent Map (1947). Red dots indicate Bedouin residences.

In addition to sub-confederations (*ṣaff*), the British also identified smaller tribal networks (‘*ashīra*’, ‘*ashā’ir*’) (al-Arif 1934). Up until 1949, tribes (‘*ashā’ir*’) varied in size but were ideally composed of networks of people that banded together during times of war, citing genealogical (*nasabī*) alliances for their cooperation. During the Mandate, tribes (‘*ashā’ir*’) were formally recognised as official associations among Bedouin and thus determined familial land rights and territorial boundaries according to the British administration (Marx 1967). By only recognising the customary land rights and alliances of the ‘*ashā’ir*’, the British did not administratively account for smaller networks and alliances, for example, those associated with *ruba’* (quarter). According to the customary model of tribal order before the 1950s four sub-tribes or *ruba’* came together to create a larger tribe (‘*ashīra*’) (see Randolph 1963).

Alternatively, British officials (and later the Israeli government) treated tribes (‘*ashā’ir*’) as homogenous units for the purposes of administration. As with vernacular

treatments of confederations (*gabā'il*) and sub-confederations (*ṣaff*), however, customary tribes (*'ashā'ir*) were heterogeneous networks of kin, cognates, and affiliates sharing territory (pastoral lands), political interests (banding together during times of conflict), and economic interests (selling livestock and farmed goods). Relationships within *'ashā'ir* were typically justified through kinship but all members did not necessarily share descent but rather affiliated under the same tribal namesakes during specific occasions. Marx (1967) also explained, in the mid-twentieth century, the shaykh of a tribe (*'ashīra*) customarily came from the most powerful *ruba'* and succession of the title would pass to his male nephews, brothers, and cousins of the core-group. *Shuyūkh* of larger tribes were also judges (see al-Arif 1934, Abu Rabia 2001).⁷³

Bedouin members did not possess the same status within the same tribe (*'ashīra*) or tribal (*'ashā'irī*) networks. For example, during the British Mandate land values rose and tribal regulation over land eased because of intensified agricultural enterprises. This allowed wealthy farmers (*fallāḥīn*) from Gaza to purchase property in the Beersheba Plain. Many *shuyūkh* also expanded their lands and employed affiliates as sharecroppers to work them (Marx 1967). Clientelism between outside farming *fallāḥīn* and land-owning Bedouin, who claimed to have Arabian origins (*'aṣīl*), intensified during the Mandate. Most tribes (*'ashā'ir*) in the northern Negev were also allied with specific client groups (Randolph 1963). Nevertheless, patronage between the Bedouin landowners and *fallāḥīn* farmers increased inequalities between the classes, along with creating disparities between *'ashā'ir* that could afford to patron clients against those who could not. Moreover, some clients were able to 'rent' land within the tribal (*'ashā'irī*) territory and acquire higher status than others in their tribal networks.

⁷³ The shaykh was a customary leader. He oversaw judicial cases and represented members to officials and non-Bedouin. The role of *shuyūkh* was dramatically altered after 1948.

As suggested above, despite connections under the same tribal namesakes, individuals and groups were only structural equals within the same class during the British Mandate. These include: individuals claiming ‘origins to Arabia’ (*‘arab ‘aṣīliyyin*); non-Arabian affiliates (non-*‘aṣīl*) farmers (*badū fallāḥīn*); and people of African descent from former slave groups (*‘abd*, *‘abīd*) (see Berkerleg 2007). Bedouin that claimed Arabian origins (*aṣl*, *‘aṣīl*) customarily maintained higher positions and owned land, advantages justified by their lines of descent (*sulāla*) and links to a notable male forbearer from the Arabian Peninsula through shared blood (*damm*). These people were reputed to possess generosity (*karam*), autonomy or freedom (*ḥurrīa*) and knowledge (*‘ilm*). Thus they ideally shared honour (*sharaf*) whereas their dependents (*mahmiyāt*) possessed virtue (*‘irḍ*) or ‘the face of honour’ (*wajih*) in the Negev (see Stewart 1994). Members believed to have virtue (*‘irḍ*) included: clients/tenants (*tiyaha*), females, children, and the elderly. Places also had virtue (*‘arḍ*), particularly private spaces occupied by those mentioned above.

Up until the 1960s, status assignments were based on perceived ‘origins’ (*‘aṣīl*), socio-political standing, and land ownership. As mid-century anthropologist Richard Randolph (1963) explained, ecological and economic assignments did not define non-originate (non-*‘aṣīl*) sub-groups but rather socio-political designations indicated that they were locally perceived as a people without Arabian origins or ‘roots’ to the Negev. Consequently, they held a lower status because of their perceived ‘lack of pedigree’, landlessness, and inability to intermarry with *‘aṣīl*. Within this sub-status group, internal *badū fallāḥīn* were thought to have Egyptian ancestry, being descendants of people who travelled to the Negev and lived among land-owning Bedouin. Until the mid-twentieth century, they cultivated land alongside *‘aṣīl* and adopted many aspects of the Bedouin way of life. Randolph (1963: 37-38) explained:

Several large families tracing their origins to the villages of the Gaza region and Egypt are not considered 'Bedouin' by the indigenous tribes of the area and are not given daughters of these tribes to marry. In this case, as in others, important social boundaries, especially those of status groups, are delineated by endogamy. Thus in this work, wherever Negev Fellahin are referred to they are not the usual Fellahin of the settled areas, but tent-dwellers who trace their descent to settled areas and who are low in the status hierarchy of the Negev.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Bedouin who claim Arabian origins (*'aṣīl*) continue to distinguish themselves from those with non-*'aṣīl* backgrounds. They use pejorative terms such as 'red skin' (*ḥumrān*) to describe *badū fallāḥīn* affiliates and 'swarthy' (*sumrān*) or 'freemen' (*al-aḥrār*) to describe themselves. The dynamics of decorum between the two continues to be morally saturated and volatile in the Negev today. While people are still concerned with matters of 'race', 'roots', and 'nobility' (as will be discussed in the next chapter), up until the creation of the Israeli state, *'aṣīl* were the land-owning class who employed landless non-*'aṣīl* tenants to farm their property (Abu Rabia 2012).

II. ISRAEL'S NEGEV BEDOUIN 'TRIBESMEN' (1948-1966)

In the late nineteenth century, the Zionist movement sought to create a new nation-state for Jewish people in then-Ottoman ruled Palestine; a land that they promulgated as a sparsely populated region without people since the nineteenth century. Imaginings of an empty Levantine landscape underlined Zionist ideology but overlooked the region's substantial population. Nevertheless, by the early twentieth century, Jewish settlement in Palestine gained international support as geopolitical interests of Western countries attenuated in the Middle East and the international status of Palestine's residents

remained invisible.⁷⁴ In 1917, the British government launched an alliance with the Zionist movement and legalised Jewish immigration to the region after they seized it from the Ottomans during World War I.⁷⁵

According to Ze'ev Zivan (1998), Bedouin interactions with Jewish populations in the Negev only intensified in the late 1930s (unlike locations in northern Palestine). The first Jewish settlement of Negba in the northern Negev was established in 1939 with other *kibbutzim* founded around Beersheba and Gaza in 1943. Zivan's historical research showed that relations between the two were predominantly marked by cooperation (Zivan 1998). Historian John Bitzan (2006) supported this conclusion. He documented the role of Jewish headmen (Hebrew – *mukhtārim*) in the Negev and their creation of knowledge about the Bedouin population in the area from 1943 to 1966. These Jewish leaders 'took upon themselves the task of winning the good will of the Bedouin, purchasing lands and resolving disputes over land use and occasional thefts' between their Jewish communities and Bedouin (Bitzan 2006: II). These men positioned themselves as experts of Bedouin peoples and advised the pre-1949 *yishuv* leadership and later the state of Israel.

After World War II, the United Nations Resolution of 1947 marked the end of the Mandate and Palestine was divided into two states, one for Jewish and one for Arabs. This declaration was rejected by both parties, which eventually led to the 1948 War in mid-May. Similar to other conflict zones, research did not systematically occur during the war. Alternatively, officials and journalists reported on the population. United Nations observers mentioned Bedouin experiences during the war and expulsion from their southern Palestinian lands (see Hutchison 1956). The Haganah (est. 1920-1948)

⁷⁴ Jewish immigration (Hebrew – *aliyah*) to the region came in two waves. The first were Zionist Jewish who established agricultural settlements in Ottoman-ruled Palestine in the 1890s. The second was a small part of the greater emigration of Jews from Eastern Europe, which lasted from the 1890s until the 1920s.

⁷⁵ The Peel Partition Plan for Palestine excluded the Negev from the boundaries of the new Jewish state (formally known as the Palestine Royal Commission 1937). The region was included in White Papers published in March 1939.

and the later Israeli Defence Forces (IDF est. 1948) also documented the names of tribes in the Beersheba region during this time; these records are now held in state archives.

According to Benny Morris (2003), an estimated 700,000 Palestinians were forcibly expelled or fled to Jordan, Lebanon, or Egypt; leaving hundreds of villages depopulated and destroyed during the 1948 War. Dan Boneh (1983), an anthropologist who worked with the population in the 1980s, explained that Bedouin in southern Israel experienced the 1948 War or *Nakba* differently due to their geographical positioning. He claimed some Bedouin joined relatives residing in remote areas where fighting was less intense, whilst others were forcibly expelled entirely from their lands by the Israeli military (Boneh 1983). Hundreds of individuals also fought during the 1948 War, some joining the Israelis and some the Arab forces. Others managed to avoid the conflict and remaining on their lands throughout the war (see Marx 1967, Boneh 1983).

These different circumstances determined which members remained in the Negev after the 1948 War and now comprise Bedouin society there today. The majority of the Tiyāhā did not leave the region and now account for most of the Bedouin population in the Negev. Based on Emanuel Marx's (1967) research, the total number of Bedouin in the region before 1948 was estimated at 60,000-90,000. By 1953, however, only 11,000-15,000 stayed in the country to become Israeli citizens. Of the Tiyāhā, who numbered 18,000 before the war, 14,000 were counted in the Israeli census of 1960 (Marx 1967). In all, most Bedouin remaining in the Negev were Tiyāhā (ninety per cent) as fewer than 1,000 'Azāzmah and Tarabīn stayed inside Israel's newly created borders (Marx 1967).

After the Armistice (1949), the new Israeli state established a Military Administration (1948-1966) for its new Arab citizens,⁷⁶ which lasted until 1966.

⁷⁶ The Military Administration was granted legal power via the Emergency Defense Regulation issued in 1945 by the British Mandate but was continued by the Israeli authorities until 1966 (Marx 1967).

Hutchison (1956) documented that Bedouin attempted to move back to their customary lands at this time, whilst others ambulated between Israel, Jordan, and Egypt due to their forced expulsion by the Israeli military. The main sub-confederations (*ṣaff*) in the south after 1948 were the Ḥukūk, Nutūsh, Zullām, and Gdīrāt (see Randolph 1963, Marx 1967, and Abu Rabia 2001). Because of the 1948 War, however, the relative autonomy and previous power held by confederations (*gabā'il*) weakened along with the geographical continuity of their territories (*dīra*).

Political geographer Oren Yiftachel (2003) later argued that the new Israeli government immediately took measures to 'secure' Negev lands for Jewish settlement in the 1950s by declaring large segments of the region a military zone and state property. Members displaced during the 1948 War were barred by the Israel state from land that they owned before the conflict. The government formalised the acquisition of Bedouin lands with the 1950 Absentees' Property Law. In it, the state declared that most Bedouin voluntarily fled the region during the 1948 War and thus abandoned their customary land holdings in Israel. The state could also appropriate land from Bedouin that remained in the Negev but had not registered or acquired documentation (*tābū*) legalising their property ownership with the Ottomans or British authorities (Yiftachel 2003). Finally, according to the new law, the state could take possession of any land, despite titled ownership, if officials considered it uncultivated (*mawat*) (see Maddrell 1990, Kram 2013). As a result, Bedouin had lost approximately ninety-five per cent of their traditional land holdings to Israel by 1967 (Maddrell 1990).

As part of this policy, the Military Administration proceeded to order a large number of Bedouin to relocate to the northeast part of the Negev, essentially a reservation known as the *Sīyāj* (Arabic – fence) (Figure 5). Noting the lack of security in the region, the state divided the *Sīyāj* into B1 and B2 zones, small territories established on what was only ten per cent of the Bedouin's customary land; property

previously owned by the Tiyyāhā (Swirski and Hasson 2006). Since the *Sīyāj* was apart of the Tiyyāhā's territory, members of this confederation owned land under customary law inside the reservation and thus continued grazing and using their agricultural property as they had before 1948. This included the tribes (‘*ashā’ir*’): Abū Rabī‘a, Abū Jūī‘id, Abū Grīnāt, al-‘Ā‘sam, al-‘Ā‘sad, Abū Ārugīg, and al-Huzayyil (Marx 1967).




Figure 5: Map of *Sīyāj* (Biasio 1998).⁷⁷

The Israeli Land Authority (ILA) (est. 1960) forcibly resettled other families to the *Sīyāj* from their lands outside the reservation. Once there, they were allowed to lease land on an annual basis from the state. This was property officially registered as ‘abandoned land’ that had belonged to tribesmen now residing outside of Israel’s borders after the war (Marx 1967).⁷⁸ To facilitate this, the ILA solicited the help of *mukhtār-shuyūkh* (government shaykhs) who mediated the land leases. Marx (1967) clarified that in the 1950s, fifteen out of nineteen *shuyūkh* were also awarded the title of ‘village headmen’ (*mukhtār*). They were given a salary, formal titles, a revolver, and

⁷⁷ English translation of German legend: Black dots – town, white dots – village, grey squares – Jewish towns, dotted lines – *Sīyāj*, full lines with dots – West Bank border, parallel lines – highway.

⁷⁸ Some tribes were able to prove land claims and did not participate in the leasing system (Marx 1967).

were made responsible for the actions of members within their tribal unit (*shevet*). From 1953 to 1966, this policy granted the *shuyūkh* more economic control than they had previously held, a process creating new socioeconomic divisions in their society (see Randolph 1963, Marx 1967, Parizot 2001a). For example, rations such as flour, oil, and sugar were first delivered to the *mukhtār-shuyūkh* who would sell part of them for profit before distributing them to tribal members. On several occasions, the *mukhtār-shuyūkh* lost their authority among their people because of their co-operation with the government (Boneh 1983, Abu Rabia 2001). Nevertheless, by 1955, most of the land inside the *Sīyāj* was leased by the state through *mukhtār-shuyūkh*. They, however, often secured the best plots for themselves and their affiliates (Marx 1967).

Despite attempts by the new state to consolidate Bedouin residence in the Negev inside the *Sīyāj* the policy was *ad hoc*, in reality, as some lineages (*‘ā’ilāt*) continued to live outside of government jurisdictions. Over this period, however, most members gradually stopped living in customary black goat-hair tents and began constructing permanent dwellings such as wooden or metal shacks on customary and leased lands in order to secure their ownership and prove their on-going use of the property (Amiran and Ben David 1979). According to Shamar Amrian and Joseph Ben David (1979: 657), Bedouin anticipated that these ‘permanent buildings’ would indicate their productive use of the land and ‘influence the government in its decisions concerning the appropriate location for permanent Bedouin settlement’.

The state restricted entry into the *Sīyāj* and regulated travel within the reservation between B1 and B2 areas. It did not technically allow people to visit their relatives or herd livestock between these areas without a permit. The only people allowed to travel out of designated areas were those who had wage-based employment beyond its borders (Boneh 1982). The policy of controlling travel came at a time when the state struggled to provide employment opportunities for Jewish workers in the

Negev (Yiftachel 2003). Over a twenty-year period, the Jewish population throughout the new state doubled to one million by 1961 with an average of 33,000 people per year granted Israeli citizenship by the state (Marx 1967).

According to Abu Rabia (1999), while living in the *Sīyāj*, families raised livestock but the government restricted seasonal migrations (*izba*). Consequently, land inside the *Sīyāj* became overgrazed because of the large concentration of animals feeding there (Abu Rabia 1999). Additionally, the state took measures to restrict pastoralism by making the sale of particular livestock illegal with the Black Goat Law of 1950.⁷⁹ Because of these restrictions, families increasingly lived on a combination of wage-labour, herding smaller flocks, and sowing and harvesting crops such as wheat. Landless tribesmen mostly worked as migrant labours throughout the Negev (Marx 1967). During the early state, Bedouin had a difficult time finding employment as Marx's research (1967) shows; he estimated that only four per cent of males were formally employed in 1958.

By the time the state abolished the Military Administration in 1966, both land-owning and landless Bedouin were dependent on the Jewish-dominated economic sector for employment. Local schools were closed in the area after the dissolution of the British Mandate and the displacement of the population between 1940 and 1953. Two schools reopened in 1954 but were reserved for the families of *shuyūkh* with only 150 students registered by the end of the 1950s. By the 1960s, Israel's Ministry of Education built a number of additional elementary schools for Bedouin, however only one high school was established in the village of Ksīfe for the entire Bedouin sector (Al-Atauna 2005). In all, spatial reorganisations and economic transitions significantly influenced

⁷⁹ The Black Goat Law argued that the black goats customarily breed by the Bedouin were an ecological danger.

the composition of the socio-political networks established in Bedouin society in the Negev before 1948.

After the 1948 War, anthropologists began documenting the transformed lives of the state's 'new' Bedouin citizens. The first two ethnographies of the population included monographs by Randolph (1963), who examined local kinship, and Marx (1967), whose seminal work explored the influence of state control on the tribal system in the Negev. It was at this time that the region of southern Palestine was officially labelled as the Negev. Their research came at a time when Bedouin peoples throughout the Middle East seemed far removed from Western societies and were experiencing significant upheavals in the light of war, encroaching nationalisms, and forced displacement.⁸⁰ By the end of the 1960s, the state referred to Bedouin around Beersheba the 'Bedouin of the Negev'; a situation based, in part, on Marx's (1967) work conducted just before the Israeli state introduced its urbanisation policy (est. 1967).⁸¹

Israeli anthropologist, Dan Rabinowitz (2002) argued that early ethnographic scholarship on the Bedouin population in Negev has been popularly reread to legitimate claims that Israelis are 'modern' whereas Palestinians are 'traditional'.⁸² In particular, he pointed out that Marx's work (1967) was employed by government officials and media to justify Israeli stereotypes of Bedouin:

Marx's work on the Bedouin was prepared at a time in which Israel was struggling to define its own geopolitical separateness from its Arab others, a time when zones along state borders were sites in which identity was being etched.... Marx's ethnography was thus much more than a study of tribal culture.... The significance of this ethnography for Israeli readers was its ability to lock the Negev Bedouin into their consciousness as a

⁸⁰ At this time, classic functionalism dominated anthropology. E.E. Evans-Pritchard (1949) developed the segmentary lineage model. Later literature focused on state-based modernisation (see Redfield 1953, Tait and Middleton 1958, Peters 1960, Cohen 1965, Barth 1965, Abu Zeid 1966, Gellner 1969).

⁸¹ Also see Sasson Bar Zvi (1991) and Mildred Berman (1965).

⁸² Khalil Nakhleh (1977) made a similar argument about early anthropology's exoticisation of Arabs in Israel.

community of essentialized, if by and large benevolent, *Others*. The clan, the shepherd, the kidnapped bride, the sacrificial sheep and other elements of Bedouin ‘culture’ became emblematic markers of the cultural boundaries of modernism, the Israeli state, and Jewish ethno-territorialism.

(Rabinowitz 2002: 310)

Nevertheless, Randolph’s (1963) and Marx’s (1967) works were instrumental in recording changes to the Bedouin’s tribal order in the Negev as a result of 1948 War and Israel’s policies. For example, Bedouin remaining inside the 1949 Armistice boundaries were required by the government to register or affiliate with one of the state-created nineteen tribe-based units (Hebrew – *shevet, shevatim*) (Randolph 1963, Marx 1967). As discussed earlier, the state assigned officials (*mukhtār-shuyūkh*) to each tribal unit (*shevet*) who served as the main administrative leaders through which Bedouin were governed. Members of tribal units (*shevatim*) were each given Israeli identification cards (Hebrew – *Teuda Zehut*), which listed their ‘tribe’, their legal residence (the house of their official shaykh), their birth date, and included a passport-style facial photograph. Marx (1967) explains that, ‘In most cases they rejoined the tribe they had belonged to before the turbulent events of 1948-49 scattered the tribes and broke them up ... [however] Bedouin often paid a chief varying amounts for consenting to have them registered in his tribe’ (Marx 1967: 40). The list (Figure 6) created by Marx (1967) named the tribal units (*shevatim*) and *mukhtār-shuyūkh* recognised by the Israeli government during the Military Administration (1948-1966).

Bedouin tribes of the Negev, 1960			
<i>Confederation and Tribal Group</i>	<i>Tribe</i>	<i>Tribal chief</i>	<i>Popula- tion</i>
<i>Tiāba</i>			
Hkūk	Hazail	Salmān ‘Ali Hazail	2,116
„	Abu al-Qi‘ān	Farhūd Gabr al-Qawa‘in	189
„	al-Asad	Farāg Salīm al-Asad	259
„	Abu ‘Abdūn	Ḥassan ‘Id Abu ‘Abdūn	198
Ntūsh	‘Aṭaunah	Mūsa Ḥassan al-‘Aṭaunah	528
Qderāt	Abu Rqaiq	‘Awaḍ Ibrāhīm Abu Rqaiq	3,067
„	al-‘A‘sam	Salmān Muḥammad al-‘A‘sam	961
„	al-Ṣane‘	Manṣūr Muḥammad al-Ṣane‘	1,193
—	al-‘Oqbi	Sālem Muḥammad al-‘Oqbi	543
—	Afēnish	Muḥammad Sālem al-Afēnish	315
Zullām	Abu Rbē‘ah	Ḥamād Sālem Abu Rbē‘ah	2,079
„	Abu Qrenāt	‘Ali Salmān Abu Qrenāt	1,452
„	Abu Gwe‘id	Mḥemmed Muḥṣin Abu Gwe‘id	1,148
„	al-Kashkhar	Sālem Sulimān al-Kashkhar	150 *
			14,198
<i>Tarabīn</i>			
Garawīn	Abu Sriḥān	Gabr Musallam Abu Sriḥān	118
Ghawāli	Abu ‘Amrah	Halail ‘Āsi Abu ‘Amrah	83
Nigmāt	al-Ṣane‘	Muḥammad Sulimān Abu Ṣhibān	322
			783
<i>‘Aḏāḏmah</i>			
—	Mas‘udīn	‘Audah Manṣūr Abu Mu‘ammar	1,023
		Total Population	16,004

Figure 6: List of tribal units (*shevatim*) in 1960 by Israel (Marx 1967).

While some tribal units (*shevatim*) were based on several customary tribes (*‘ashā’ir*) in the 1950s, other tribes (*‘ashīra*) such as the al-‘Athāmīn were not recognised by the state. Israeli officials regulated these members as affiliates of the al-‘Ā‘sam. According to Randolph (1963), during the British Mandate in 1946, the *rubā’* (quarter-tribe) al-Ḥawāshlah had a disagreement with the shaykh of the al-‘Ā‘sam of whose tribe they were members. The elders of the al-Ḥawāshlah proceeded to ask the British for official approval to become their own, new *‘ashīra* under the name of the Ashīrat Ḥawāshlah. Randolph (1963: 127-128) explained:

This group existed as a functioning ashiireh until the British withdrew and were replaced by the Israeli government. With the end of the hostilities in 1949 the Israeli military government formed the remaining Bedouin into new ashayir, occasionally taking notice

of the former groupings and in many cases regrouping named descent units into different ashayir. The Šana‘, Abu Rqayiq, and A‘sam remained as ashayir but all of the members of the Abu Kaff ashiirah, as well as all of the Hawaashleh, some of the ‘Athamin, and some of the Abu Sbitt were placed under the sheikh of the Abu Rqayiq ashirreh ... The Abu Rqayiq sheikh commands little respect among the ... [other] descent groups ... individual members [alternatively engage]...with the outside world mainly through their descent groups leaders (kabiir ar-ruba‘, sing.).

Anthropologist Cédric Parizot (2001a) later noted that the state policy of legitimating particular *ruba‘* as tribal units (*shevatim*) and acknowledging specific customary tribes (‘*ashā‘ir*’) over others was a strategic attempt by the state to create divisions in society after the 1948 War. The Israeli government also confiscated tribal (‘*ashā‘irī*’) territories belonging to ‘*ashā‘ir*’ considered by the state to be ‘disloyal to the Jewish community’ (anti-Jewish community or anti-*yishuv*) and gave them to loyal ones that had not customarily held power prior to 1948. On other occasions, the state would grant a once-dependent *ruba‘* the status of a tribal unit (*shevet*), for example a group composed of previous clients, thereby usurping custom and allowing these groups to challenge the authority and power of traditional leaders and lineages.

Customary tribes (‘*ashā‘ir*’) and their *shuyūkh* that managed to acquire official recognition (as *shevatim* and *mukhtār-shuyūkh*) by the state were able to further augment their power and status (Parizot 2001a), creating further economic and political disparities between their families and other *ruba‘*. Finally, the administration forcibly displaced or expelled disloyal or anti-*yishuv* Bedouin individuals and groups out of Israel and placed restrictions on Bedouin who remained in the country by forcing them to move to the *Sīyāj* reservation. For example, officials granted members of the al-Huzayyil and Abū Rabī‘a with special privileges such as bypassing travel limitations and residency requirements because officials considered them pro-*yishuv* or loyal to the state.

As detailed below, the legacy of Israel's nationalised Military Administration (1948-1966) 'changed' how people interacted with each other through their customary tribes (*'ashā'ir*).⁸³ After 1949, when the government institutionalised specific tribes (*shevatim*), they had to report any changes of tribal affiliation or alliance to the Israeli military governors (Marx 1967 and Parizot 2001a). As a result, the contractual nature of patron-client relationships fractured because of state manipulation (Parizot 2001a). Consequently, people could not officially switch alliances or affiliations without government approval. Local tribal (*'ashā'irī*) relations further changed after the abolition of the Military Administration on 1st December 1966, when the government loosened restrictions placed on the number of official tribal units (*shevatim*) allowed to affiliate in the Negev (Parizot 2001a). This had a profound influence on established group relations. Clients, for example, were less compelled to stay with established patrons in order to secure resources. Many previously dependent *ruba'* could also now negotiate with the state for formal recognition of their own administrative tribal unit (*shevet*). The policy established by the state also augmented both economic and political dependence between the government-sanctioned leader (*mukhtār-shuyūkh*) and their constituents.

As indicated by Randolph (1963), in many cases, people ignored government tribal assignments (*shevet*) except at times of national elections or certain legal matters involving land claims and use. In particular, descent groups that were reassigned to other tribal units (*shevatim*) by the Israeli administration paid little heed to their newly appointed *mukhtār-shuyūkh* and instead dealt with the outside world through their customary elders (*kabīr, kbār*). Consequently, the tribal (*'ashā'irī*) landscape in the

⁸³ 1960s-70s anthropology of Bedouin focused on 'change': forced settlement, state politics, and growing nationalisms (Tapper 1979); Islamic universalisms (Gilsenan 1982); cultural principles (Meeker 1976a, 1976b; Bourdieu 1965, 1977; Eickelman 1985; Dresch 1986); and economic change (Nelson [ed.] 1973, Pitt Rivers 1977, Bates 1973, Cole 1975, Serjeant 1977, Holy 1979, Asad 1980).

Negev changed radically after 1948, particularly at the level of the customary tribes (*‘ashā’ir*) and the alliances comprising *ruba’*. Nevertheless, as Kressel (1996) pointed out, while the Military Administration reorganised and institutionalised tribal namesakes at particular levels of unity, it did not completely eradicate the on-going significance of tribalism associated with past confederations (*gabaliyya*) and lineage-ism (*‘ā’iliyya*) for local politics, marriage, land residence, and ancestry. These origins and alliances still hold weight among Bedouin in southern Israel at the beginning of twenty-first century.

III. DIVIDED URBANISATION (1967-1996)

Until the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, both the Ottoman Empire and the British Mandate had somewhat integrated customary *shuyūkh* into their local administrations (Parizot 2001a). During Israel’s Military Administration, however, the government marginalised the Bedouin from the local political economy and regional Jewish society by ruling the population through *mukhtār-shuyūkh* (Parizot 2001a). Yiftachel (2003) argued that in the late 1960s, the government decided to take legal measures to urbanise Bedouin and reduce the size of the area within the *Sīyāj* reservation in which they resided. Several proposals were debated in the *Knesset*, leading to an urbanisation strategy that would relocate families to state-built townships in order to dismantle the Bedouin villages (Hebrew – *pezurah*). This plan sought to attract potential residents with services such as permanent housing, access roads, schools, electricity, and wage-labour. In addition, the state offered to compensate families for any property they had to relinquish inside the *Sīyāj* if they volunteered to move to a township.

The Housing Ministry built the first town, Tel as-Sab', in 1966. It consisted of forty-nine small houses (Abu Saad and Lithwick 2000) built in a linear pattern, streaming out from a small, centralised commercial centre consisting of a few shops, a school, and a clinic. This map is a diagram of Tel as-Sab''s urban plan organised in blocks.




Figure 7: Lay out of Tel as-Sab' (Alafenish 1987).

The state built the town without economic infrastructure or agricultural lands but provided regular access to water and electricity to houses with building permits. By 1976, however, only twenty-five of the forty-one homes were occupied (Swirski and Hasson 2006) by families who did not previously own or lease land in the area. Many members refused to move to the town citing mixed lineage (*'ā'ilāt*) residency and fear that they would lose their land claims outside of the towns in the eyes of the government if they did. Sociologist Salim Alafenish (1987: 333-334) explained that mixed residence spurred conflict between residents as officials did 'not take into consideration tribal composition and segmentary organisation either. Clashes between

noble families and non-noble groups were so heavy that some people were seriously injured’.

In light of problems in Tel as-Sab‘, the government adopted a new urban design to build Rāhaṭ in 1971. In particular, they sought to accommodate customary relations and separate residency in the form of neighbourhoods in order to ease the tensions between families in Rāhaṭ (Marx 2000). They built houses in this city on larger plots of lands to leave room for growing families and constructed visibility barriers in the form of empty space and fences between neighbourhoods. The Israeli authorities also gave the local elders (*kbār*) control over the purchasing of property within neighbourhoods, choice over which families were allowed to live in specific areas, and regulation of segregation boundaries and co-residence patterns (Swirski and Hasson 2006). While the planning model reduced some of the problems, it did not succeed in drawing people into the newly built towns, who had no desire to lose land claims by moving to them or to live next to non-family members (Boneh 1983). Nevertheless, the new strategy implemented in Rāhaṭ guided Israel’s policies in the Negev and in 1975, the Albeck Committee formalised Israel’s urbanisation procedures in the country. This is a diagram of the new urban model utilised by the state in Rāhaṭ as of 1987.




Figure 8: Map of neighbourhoods in Rāhaṭ (Alafenish 1987).

Because the state built towns on land customarily owned by particular familial networks, members hesitated to engage in acts of dishonour by moving to these locations and subsequently violating another's land (*'arḍ*). According to Parizot (2001a: 63), 'The authorities played on the divisions and tensions that had developed during the military administration between customary groups and the administratively created tribes....' in order to attract people to the townships. In particular, officials initially sent notification of land sells within the villages to those who had expressed the desire to leave the guardianship of a *mukhtār-shuyūkh* (government *shuyūkh*) and switch their affiliation to different assigned tribal unit (*shevet*). The *mukhtār-shuyūkh* gradually lost their hegemony as Israel's new civilian administration used more personalised governing methods, which dealt directly with smaller agnate networks (*agwām*) (Parizot 2001a). Over time, the *mukhtār-shuyūkh*'s 'exclusive intermediary status between members of the tribe' diminished as the state began to favour alternative

mediators, people that during the Military Administration (1948-1966) had not been allowed to interact with state officials unless granted permission by their patrons. Because of these changes, a plethora of new Bedouin spokespersons emerged as various people became able to conduct their own business with the state on the behalf of different groups (Parizot 2001a).

According to Abu Rabia (1986), these new administration changes did not necessarily mark the termination of the *mukhtār-shuyūkh*'s (government *shuyūkh*) influence with their constituents. Many of these men had a history of working with particular Israeli agents and maintained their trust over the years (Parizot 2001a), relationships that the newer intermediaries had yet to acquire. The Israeli administration regularly consulted with *mukhtār-shuyūkh* of tribal units (*shevatim*) in the construction of towns and neighbourhoods. For example, Shaykh Salmān al-Huzayyil consulted in the construction of Rāhaṭ and donated land under al-Huzayyil's control to build the city. Mostly previous client groups under the historical patronage of the al-Huzayyil moved to Rāhaṭ whereas the al-Huzayyil, for the most part, as a core lineage prefer to live outside of the town on their own territory.⁸⁴

Consequently, predominately client or smaller lineages (*'ā'ilāt*) moved to the towns between 1967-1993 in order to acquire their own property whereas 'customarily larger' *'ā'ilāt* claiming origins (*'aṣīl*) refused to do so, preferring to stay on customary lands located just outside of the localities or (in what the state considers) illegal homesteads or villages in the desert periphery (Ratcliffe 2009). The situation has created a dense semi-urban space around Beersheba in the form of towns inhabited mostly by previous client or smaller *'ā'ilāt* and peripheral villages whose leading residents often claim 'historical' *aṣīl* to the Negev. In all, Israel's state urbanisation policies have amplified tensions between *'ā'ilāt* by diversifying landownership, which

⁸⁴ As of 2013, 50,000 residents live in Rāhaṭ in thirty-three neighbourhoods.

not only bifurcates their society in terms of residence but also exasperates political and economic competition over limited resources.

According to the Negev Co-existence Forum (NCF) (Dukium 2014), over one half of the Bedouin population⁸⁵ in the Negev (210,000) today have relocated to the towns with approximately 5,700 living in Beersheba, Arad, or Dimona. Over the last twenty years, Israel went on to build the towns of Shagīb as-Salām (1979) and Ksīfā and ‘Ar‘arat an-Negev (1982). The state formally recognise the villages of Lagīya (1985), Hūra (1989), Bi‘r Hadaj (2004), and Tarabīn al-Šāne‘ (2012). Most towns had market centres, health clinics, gas stations, cafes, businesses, community centres, mosques, and schools by the mid-1990s. In particular, residents established Arab-focused businesses along with health, administrative, and educational services (as Israeli Jewish predominantly do not work in Arab sectors).

As briefly noted in the Introduction of this thesis, the remaining Bedouin in the south (approximately 100,000 residents) live in what NGOs have labelled the ‘unrecognised villages’ (Dukium 2014).⁸⁶ According to Israel’s 1965 Planning and Construction Law, these villages are illegal because the state will not officially recognise homesteads that existed before 1948. Because of their illegality, the state monitors construction of permanent buildings through official visits, satellite imagery, and photographic surveillance. The state considers unlicensed construction in the villages illegal and distributes arbitrary eviction orders. If not dismantled by the members, the state will forcibly demolish homesteads using bulldozers.

Up until 2010, local NGOs conducted most of the historical and social research pertaining to Bedouin villages. Over the last decade, however, scholars such as

⁸⁵ They have an annual population growth rate of 5.5%, which doubles their population every fifteen years however their infant mortality rate is the highest in Israel (AJEEC 2011).

⁸⁶ Ratcliffe (2009) argued that the term ‘unrecognised villages’ was developed in the late 1980s as a result of changes to state planning policies. Concerns associated with villages were politicised in the 1987 Markovitz Commission, which investigated unlicensed building practices among Israel’s minorities.

Bogumila Hall (2014) have begun documenting Bedouin life and history in the Negev villages. According to NCF (Dukium 2014), Bedouin villagers comprise forty-five per cent of the population, with villages ranging in size from 500 to 5,000 residents or sixty to 600 families over approximately 250,000 acres of land throughout the Negev.⁸⁷ Studies (see Dukium 2014) estimate that there are thirty-six villages but the exact number is unknown as the various state departments use different definitions of the term ‘village’. Many of these villages existed before the establishment of the state in 1948, whilst others were created during the Military Administration, which gave families permission to build in the area in the 1950s. Today most residents of the villages cannot secure building permits, the policy of housing demolition continues, infrastructure, such as roads, has yet to be built, and accessibility to water and electricity is sporadic.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the state continues to govern villagers through their official tribal units (*shevatim*). An Abū Shārib member explained the situation to local anthropologist Safa Abu Rabia (2008: 110):

If it was listed on our identity papers, ‘Al-Jamama’, they could not expel us. Why? Because then we would be on the land that we owned.... We all have listed on our identity papers: ‘Al-Atawana Tribe.’ Why? For them [the state] you have nothing, you are with the tribe and belong to the tribe, you have no land of your own, so that you won’t be able to prove that you live in a particular place and that this is our place. And so we are wanderers within the tribe.

Residents in the state towns, however, also still refer to this segment of the population as ‘*arab*’ or ‘*arab*’ and their tribal namesakes such as *al-‘Athāmīn*.

In all, over the last fifty years, younger Bedouin understandings of what constitutes a tribe (‘*ashīra*’) today are different from their parents and grandparents. While the tribal namesakes have not changed, their socio-political meaning and the group relationships

⁸⁷ For a list of villages, see Appendix III.

they designate have changed since the Ottoman's administration (Parizot 2001a). In particular, these non-Bedouin influenced vernacular practices of calling forth tribal relations.⁸⁸ For example, when Parizot (2001a) asked about the names of different tribal namesakes among his urban Bedouin friends in Rāhaṭ, several younger men could often identify their particular confederation (*gabīla*), sub-confederation (*ṣaff*), and lineage (*ʿāʾila*) but often had difficulty denoting the composition of a tribe (*ʿashīra*). Parizot (2001a: 89-90) explained:

Za'al, aged 26, replied: 'The Tiyāha are *gabīla*, the Hkūk form a *saff*, and Abu Msā'ad are *ʿāʾila*.' His cousin Salame nods. I then asked what entity is the *ʿashira*. Za'al replied by mixing Arabic and Hebrew...The *ʿAsira* is ... [et in Hebrew] address, that is to say, the place, ... [and Arabic] postal address!) With that, his cousins make fun of him, and a debate ensued to determine what corresponded to *ʿashira*. But convinced of the futility of such a discussion, my hosts quickly went to another topic. That for Za'al, the *ʿashira* refers to where is a group lineage is not trivial. Today the name of the tribal administrative unit (*ʿasira*) indicates the addresses of where related groups live today in the slums [unrecognised villages located] in the outskirts of towns and Beersheba.

As described, since the tenth century foreign officials and scholars have created lists of 'tribes' whereby writers employed diverse vernacular or emic (local dialect) and etic terms (various languages) to reference and conceptualise tribal relationships according to their specific interests (that is taxation, land registration, census). The Ottomans conceptualised 'tribes' in the Negev via confederations (*gabāʾil*) and thus engaged with only a few *shuyūkh*. Later, the British conceived tribal order as atomised groups associated with local tribal (*ʿashāʾirī*) namesakes (Parizot 2001a). At this point, a vernacular *ʿashīra* transformed into an administrative unit and, consequently, the

⁸⁸ By the end of the twentieth century, the ethnology of tribal pastoralists focused on specific times and places (Salzman 1980, Baer 1982, Atran 1986, Beck 1986, Lancaster 1981, Chatty 1986, Abu Lughod 1999 [1986], Eickelman 1989). They emphasised the referential nature of tribalism (Khouri and Kostiner [eds.] 1991), peoples' changing identities, and media practices (Caton 1990, Layne 1994, Shryock 1997, Cole 2003, Chatty [ed.] 2006, Miller 2007).

numbers of *shuyūkh* through which the British administered the population was higher than the Ottomans, with eighty-eight in 1931 and ninety-five before 1948 (al-Arif 1933).

Israel's administrative treatments of tribes (*'ashā'ir*) as tribal units (*shevotim*) in the 1950s further changed the role of tribal (*'ashā'irī*) networks and *shuyūkh*. Greater inclusion of municipal and civic leaders after the state's urbanisation policies (1960s onward) also changed these relationships. One outcome of this situation, however, was not the disappearance of tribalism in the Negev but rather the adaptation of tribal relations which began focusing more on lineages (*'ā'ilāt*) and less on tribes (*'ashā'ir*).⁸⁹ Notwithstanding, discerning and discussing broader tribal networks is also difficult because of state-based incursions and protectionism among the population. Distinctions are also opaque because of population growth leading to distortions in both vernacular terminology (vocabulary used to designate social groups) and in terms of scale (particular functions of specific tribalism with confederations [*gabaliyya*] or lineages [*'ā'iliyya*]) over the last decades. 'While an *'ashira* gathered on average between 500 and 1,000 people under the military administration, some *'ā'ila* can regroup more than 3,000 people today' (Parizot 2001a).

IV. ISRAELI CITIZENS AND A PALESTINIAN MINORITY (1948-2013)

Since the early twentieth century, Jewish and Arab nationalisms have played an essential role in the Middle East (see Said 2000, Sternhell 2009, and Hobsbawm 2012). According to Yiftachel (1999), Israel is similar to many states disseminating notions of a national identity in efforts to legitimate ideals of citizenship. More often than not

⁸⁹ As a polemic, Philip Salzman (1996) argued the Negev Bedouin are a post-tribal society, one that has 'evolved' into a peasant ethnicity because of forced change by governments over the last century. For Salzman (1996: 155), their inclusion within the state has 'completely eradicated' tribal order through the politics and 'psychology of subordination'.

elites promulgate their culture as the embodiment of model citizens, a process that excludes minority groups from their definition (see Anderson 1991, Giddens 1991, and Mitchell 1991). In the case of Israel, the *Ashkenazi* elite made early assertions that the new Israeli nation was a modern, Western state by reifying themselves against promulgated stereotypes of Palestinian primitivism.

Over the last sixty years, Jewish and Arab nationalists have presented Israeli-ness and Palestinian-ness as two competing national narratives, which inevitably polarised the region's diverse population including Bedouin in the Negev. For example, Longina Jakubowska (1992) and Parizot (2001b: 98) argued that urban Palestinians and Israelis consider Bedouin dissimilar from themselves because of their perceived nomadic culture, voluntary enlistment in the Israeli army, or 'reticence in presenting themselves as Palestinians' at the turn of the century; a situation which has changed in the last decade. As such, up until the early 2000s, in Israeli political view, the Bedouin of the Negev were an ethno-minority defined in opposition to Jewish Israelis but a population also frequently omitted from the *fallāḥīn* history of other Palestinians.

Leading scholar in the ethno-minority paradigm, Yiftachel (1999) argued that Israel's dominant elite class set out to smooth demographic challenges presented by Arab minorities while homogenising Palestinians residing outside of state-lines through government policy and law. Internally, the Israeli state set out to administrate its population through 'policies of ethnicisation' (see Smooha 1996, Yiftachel 1999). In particular, ethnic-minority studies (such as those mentioned in the last chapter) put forward that the Israeli state isolates Bedouin from both urban Palestinian and Israeli Jewish societies through *de facto* ethnic-based divisions and 'Machiavellian systems of control' that reinforce loyalty and disloyalty between different ethnic groups (Rabinowitz 2001).

In 1948, the Israeli government adopted the Ottoman's *millet* system, a scheme whereby all citizens are principally organised by their religious affiliation. According to Israeli policy, Jewish groups are foremost differentiated from non-Jewish groups (despite disparities between *Mizrahi* and *Ashkenazi*) and the state labels non-Jewish minorities as Israeli Arab citizens. This demographic is further *de facto* organised by their religions such as Christians, Druze, and Muslims. Israel also socio-politically differentiates ethno-minorities within religious groups such as Druze, Circassians, and Bedouin.⁹⁰ Subsequently, religious-civic leaders decree personal rights and status of their respective peoples.

Since the 1950s, Israeli officials have used these taxonomies to further allocate state-based rights to resources and assign specific civic obligations to its non-Jewish citizens. Within this scheme, Bedouin in Israel are grouped separately from Palestinian urbanites or villagers as the state classifies all Bedouin groups as *bedui* (plural *beduim*) in Hebrew – a term referencing those in the Negev and Galilee. Despite grouping all Bedouin under the same ethnic banner, the Israeli state treats its Bedouin citizens disparately depending on whether they live in the north or south of the country. As opposed to portrayals of Bedouin in other Middle Eastern countries, the population in southern Israel were popularly considered 'loyal and obedient' unlike other Muslims who were regarded as enemies of the state up until the late 1990s (Parizot 2001b).

By the end of the twentieth century, most Bedouin in the Negev considered themselves Palestinian by nationality and Israeli by citizenship. These self-ascriptions, however, depend on context. Yiftachel (2009) pointed out that Negev Bedouin as a group hold *de jure* legal status as Israeli Arabs but their *de facto* civil rights are unequal to Israel's Jewish citizens. As Israeli Arabs, they have the right to vote, run for public

⁹⁰ Others include: Yemen-Jewish, Moroccan-Jewish, Polish-Jewish, Ethiopian-Jewish, Arab-Villager, and Arab-Christian.

office, maintain permanent residence, and technically receive the same political rights as Jewish citizens of Israel. In reality, however, the state and major Jewish political parties and bureaucracies typically side-lined Bedouin interests as of 2000 (Amara et al. 2012). Moreover, non-Jewish Bedouin and other minority-focused agendas are increasingly perceived as a threat to the Jewish character of the state among law and policy makers today.

As of the twenty-first century, Palestinian groups in the north and south of Israel have adopted significantly different approaches to national politics. Political scholar Suheir Abu Oksa-Daoud (2009) pointed out that Bedouin votes in the north, for example, generally support Israeli Labour Parties. In 2009, the majority of Negev Bedouin voted for the United Arab List consisting of representatives from the southern Islamic Movement and the Arab Democratic Party (Abu Oksa-Daoud 2009).⁹¹ Bedouin Ṭalāb al-Šāne' served as their Deputy MK (member of the Knesset) from 1996 to 2012. In addition, Bedouin in the north come out to vote in larger numbers as opposed to those in the south who have the lowest Muslim voter turnout in Israel.

The different voting characteristics among the various Palestinian groups in Israel reflect their different agendas. Because of ethnicisation processes in Israel from the 1950s onward, Bedouin have developed a unique sense of ethnicity in the south. Parizot's (2001b) research showed that local politicians and activists began steadily employing ethnic and community politics to navigate the polarity between Israeli and Palestinian nationalisms and highlight their unique geopolitical circumstances in the Negev compared to those from the north since the 1970s onward. In particular, the internalisation of 'Negev Bedouin' as a national demographic was made popular in the

⁹¹ The Islamic Movement in Israel is a group that had been growing steadily since the 1970s as a result of perceived failures of secularism, Palestinian nationalism, and Israel's judiciary system. In the 1990s, the Islamic Movement in Israel, however, split into two factions along north/south lines. The southern Negev Bedouin groups in Israel allied with the Arab Democratic Party and the northern groups in Israel continued to be led by Shaykh Ra'īd Salāh (Abu Oksa Daoud 2009).

1970s when leaders, such as Ḥamād Abū Rabī'a, used the phrase as a collective identifier when referring to his constituents (Parizot 2001b). Jakubowska (1992) suggested that many groups used the term 'Negev Bedouin' or 'Negev Arabs' in the 1990s to avoid framing their concerns as Palestinians and emphasise their citizenship in Israel. Similarly, Marteu (2005: 283) argued that by 2005 proclaiming yourself Bedouin was 'about remembering your territorial anchorage and your attachment to the land' whereas calling yourself a 'Negev Bedouin', 'Palestinian', or 'Israeli' had more regional political and historical connotations.

For example, after the Six-Day 1967 War between Israel and surrounding Arab states, Bedouin in the Negev expressed their nationalist support of their fellow Palestinians during protests and commemorations of Land Day (a massacre that occurred on 30 March 1976). After the 1982 Israeli-Lebanon War and growing anti-Arab sentiment in Israel, however, many Palestinian leaders in Israel (including Bedouin politicians) acknowledged their circumstances were different because of their Israeli citizenship and politically distanced themselves from the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Hamas in Gaza. This process intensified with the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1992 which officially rendered Palestinian minority rights in Israel as an 'internal state issue', isolated the Bedouin population in the south, and attenuated their competition with other Israeli minorities (Abu Oksa-Daoud 2009).

As of 2010, Bedouin constituted approximately two per cent of Israel's population (ICBS 2011). As Yiftachel (2004) explained, however, Israel continues to function as an ethnocratic state where various ethnic groups must compete with other populations over land, services, and jobs. Consequently, NCF (Dukium 2014) argued that throughout the early 2000s there have been growing tensions between Israeli Jewish and Bedouin in the Negev due, in part, to escalating state policies aimed at relocating Bedouin residents in the villages to towns. Ratcliffe (2009: 216) stated, 'The

Negev Bedouin have come to embody the notion of discrimination against Arab citizens, where the Negev has increasingly been rendered (in advocacy usage) as *al-Negev*, a region emblematic of Israeli state discrimination, its renewed usages marking a nationalist reclaiming.’ In the last ten years, Bedouin have progressively become a strategic concern for the state, with government officials expressing fear of an ‘internal Bedouin *Intifada*’, population growth, and members’ Palestinian national sentiments (Ratcliffe 2009). In response, dozens of government committees, state plans, and legal measures have been introduced in the *Knesset* over the last five years as a way of dealing with the ‘Negev Bedouin problem’.⁹²

A. *DISCUSSIONS ON LOCAL POLITICS, ECONOMY, AND EDUCATION*

Under Israel’s urbanisation policy in the 1960s, the Bedouin did not initially control their own townships (Marx 1967). Alternatively, according to Maddrell (1990) throughout the 1950s and 1970s, regional Jewish councils managed the towns and controlled the allocation of resources there; a situation in which Jewish committees often side-lined Bedouin municipalities’ needs and instead prioritised their own (also see Lithwick 2000, Dinero 1997). The state governed the population outside of the towns through regional authorities such as the ILA, the Green Patrol (est. 1976), and the Bedouin Development Authority (est. 1984) (Falah 1989).⁹³ In the late 1980s, members protested and officially received autonomy from surrounding Jewish councils (El-Sana-Alh’jooj and Marteu 2005) with the first democratic elections held in Rāhaṭ in 1989.

⁹² For example, the Sharon Plan (est. 2003) policed ‘Bedouin crime’ and strengthened the capacity of the government to prosecute unsanctioned building in the region. Also see the 2006 Goldberg Committee and the 2011 Prawer Initiative.

⁹³ The latter was disbanded in the late 1980s.

Elections followed in other towns and most gained control over their own municipalities by 2000.

Based on research by Jakubowska (1985), Parizot (2001a), and Ratcliffe (2009), this thesis suggests local politics in the Negev has taken three general forms in the last several decades: (1) The established influence of lineages (*'ā'ilāt*) (as opposed to tribal units [*shevatim*] which were dissolved in the 1970s), whereby elders (*kbār*) serve as principle socio-political spokesmen (Parizot 2001a); (2) The inclusion of alternative representatives from previous clients (*badū fallāḥīn* and *'abīd*) and their *'ā'ilāt* within internal municipal and state regional politics (particularly in the towns in the 1980s); and (3) The increased public, external notoriety, and national influence of community spokespersons associated with Negev civil society and religious discourses in both villages and towns since the late 1990s.

According to Parizot's (2001a) doctoral thesis, lineages (*'ā'ilāt*) in the villages still guided local politics, providing *'ā'ilāt* arbitrators and spokesman at the end of the twentieth century. In particular, men from a powerful agnate group (*gōm*, *agwām*) functioned as leaders. These men not only managed the internal affairs of their families as elders (*kbār*) but also the entire village, for example maintaining collaborations with other *agwām*, neighbours, and affiliates. Since 2000, these villages have increasingly established alternative village spokespersons from within their kin networks to represent various 'communities' (more often than not from leading *agwām*) to outsiders, leaving *kbār* to deal with internal local politics.⁹⁴

For example, Ratcliffe (2009) described how local committees (*al-lajna al-al-maḥalliya*) from forty-five villages founded the Regional Council of the Unrecognized Villages (RCUV) in 1997. The RCUV was an elected political body as residents of each village voted-in three to seven members whose chairperson and head committee were

⁹⁴ This practice is detailed in the next chapter.

elected once every four years (Ratcliffe 2009). In reality, however, these elected committees were comprised of *kbār* 'joined by several "community professionals"' (Ratcliffe 2009). Despite representing several villages, the state does not acknowledge the RCUV committees and therefore its constituents cannot hold local municipal elections in these villages. Moreover, internal competition between committee members over limited resources also stifled their joint collaborations with the state.

In response to the problem, the state created the Abu Basma Regional Council to address the political and economic interests of villages in 2003. As part of the plan, the state agreed to 'officially recognise' selected villages, specifically 30,000 residents living in an area of 34,000 *dunams* (Baruch 2004), and provide them with a municipal status and basic services and infrastructure. The RCUV, however, argued that the Abu Basma Plan would transform the villages into urban ghettos and the council was still run by the Minister of Interior's appointees as of 2009.

Internal politics in the towns differs from the villages. Despite gaining control over their own municipalities by 2000, town councils are still largely governed by past patrons and their agnates (*agwām*) since local elections serve as platforms for these members to re-exert dominance over their former clients and acquire control of state resources (Parizot 2001a). The stratification between previous patrons and their former clients was institutionalised by the state (and in some cases strengthened) when the Israeli planners sought out local elites to design the towns thereby building systems of dominance and hierarchy into their municipal design and administrative mechanisms (Parizot 2001a). As such, each town is affiliated with particular customary land-owning lineages (*'ā'ilāt*): Rāhaṭ with al-Huzayyil, Shagīb as-Salām and Bi'r Hadaj with al-'Azāzmah, Ksīfa with Abū Rabī'a, Lagīya with al-Šāna', and Ḥura with al-'Aṭāwna.

Previous-client lineages (*'ā'ilāt*) have managed to obtain some representational authority for their *'ā'ilāt* through municipal channels (Parizot 2001a). Since the 1980s,

for example, solidarity between unrelated families has crystallised among co-residents who have strategically re-formed into their own *‘ā’ilāt*. Cohesion between families has also augmented as a result of limited access to local services and shared resentment towards their past patrons, whose control they tried to escape by moving to the towns (Parizot 2001a). Nevertheless, rivalries between *‘ā’ilāt* in the towns have splintered socio-political relationships leaving politicians to focus on specific neighbourhoods and families during municipal proceedings (Jakubowska 1985: 135-139). For example, in his study of local politics in Rāhaṭ, Parizot (2001a) found that by the end of the 1990s, elections mostly revolved around cleavages between various *‘ā’ilāt* and their efforts to gain control over the distribution of resources. To do so, they employed ideologies of tribal cohesion (*gabaliyya* or *‘ā’iliyya*), which guided the electoral behaviour of their members (Parizot 2001a).

While local elections are significant events whereby lineages (*‘ā’ilāt*) exercise and compete for power, Bedouin generally disregard national elections as a way to obtain formal, political representation or influence in the Israeli state (Parizot 2006). Unlike local municipal elections, elders (*kbār*) did not tend to participate in national elections because they did not strengthen their constituents’ access to public resources, bring economic or social power to the whole *‘ā’ilāt*, and their participation would have negatively affect their established tribal relationships (Parizot 2006). Alternatively, over the last half of the twentieth century, national elections have become more of a social event whereby Bedouin set out to ‘resist’ the official Israeli electoral system by purposefully committing electoral fraud and manipulating state officials (Parizot 2006).

Notwithstanding, McKee (2010) noted Bedouin political representatives are increasingly using national elections to pay lip service to community interests as a way of ‘speaking past’ intra-tribal politics over the last decades, despite the fact that local politics continue to be enshrined in tribal relations. To do so, Parizot (2001a) also

explained that they draw on affiliations with Arab nationalist parties such as: the Arab Democratic Party, National Democratic Rally, Communist Party, Muslim Brotherhood, and the southern Islamic Movement. Additionally, partisan political culture in the Negev has also incorporated civil society, gender, and Muslim communities over the last several decades. According Ratcliffe (2009), alternative community advocates also used local elections in the towns and regional civil society initiatives to demonstrate their leadership throughout the 2000s, an occurrence increasingly found in the villages.

Another unique aspect of local socio-politics has been the diversification of collective identities when referring to the Bedouin ‘community’. During interactions with outsiders, most members no longer use the term ‘*arab*’ as it implied peoples with Arabian origins (‘*aṣīl*’) and thus excluding large numbers in their society (today the term falls outside local decorum). Parizot (2001a) documented when speaking to larger (inter-mixed) groups of Bedouin at the turn of the century, spokespersons also avoided tribal namesakes and instead used terms such as ‘people’ (*sha’ab*), ‘honourable brothers’ (‘*akh ikhwān*’), ‘Arab unity’ (*whida ‘arabiyya*), and ‘community’ (*mujtama*). After the second *Intifāḍa*,⁹⁵ the terms ‘Palestinian Bedouin’ and ‘Palestinian Israeli Bedouin’ emphasised growing connectivity with shared nationalisms, religion, and ethnicity. Locally, however, tribal political rhetoric cannot be avoided in neighbourhoods where certain lineages (‘*ā’ilāt*’) dominate. As Parizot (2001a: 149) also described, while political speeches in community spaces may use phrases such as ‘United Family’, speakers must inevitably acknowledge their own extended familial affiliations leaving tribal relations ‘an inescapable metaphor for alluding to political alliances’.

⁹⁵ The second *Intifāḍa* (uprising) refers to a period between 2000 and 2005 of intensified Palestinian-Israeli violence.

Economic research conducted in the 1980s indicated that Bedouin men were wage-based labours but mostly in Jewish-run businesses in construction, trucking, motor services, agriculture, or industrial processing. Others partook in semi-urban pastoralism and farming (Meir 1997, Abu Rabia 1999); provided public and private, health, education, and other professional services; worked in informal economy including smuggling and bartering (Marx 1967); and formal business entrepreneurship (Meir and Baskind 2006). According to political geographer Tovi Fenster (1999), townswomen no longer herded livestock, gathered firewood, or collected water at wells in the 1990s. Women's formal employment is also limited because of gender segregation, the lack of private spaces, and the density of non-family in these urban environments (see Lewando-Hundt 1984). Most women work as housewives today. Women in the villages, however, continue to participate in some pastoral activities. In all, Israel's Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Labor (2010) indicated that thirty-five per cent of Bedouin men and eighty-one per cent of Bedouin women are unemployed.

As of the beginning of the twenty-first century, Avinoam Meir and Ayelet Baskind (2006: 75) argued that the average family relies on various sources of income based on pastoralism, wage labour, and NGOs (discussed in the next chapter). According to them, in addition to depending on several revenue sources and a general reluctance to visit Jewish stores and businesses, Bedouin also heavily draw on customary tribal, familial, and neighbourhood alliances to diversify and pool human and capital resources (Meir and Baskind 2006). Meir and Baskind (2006: 83) have gone on to label these practices as 'family enterprise strategies'. Jakubowska (2000: 99) also described this particular type of economic strategy as 'family firms', an extension of their 'cultural ideology of communism' and 'a complex system of reciprocal relations of exchange' allowing them to adapt to economic structural hindrances of the state and opportunities in the Negev.

According to Allan Degan (2007), despite arguments that pastoralism is unprofitable, many families continued to own livestock whether in the desert or the backyard of a town house at the beginning of the twenty-first century. He argued that they do so for four main reasons: cultural ethos, land claims, income, and monetary savings. Kressel (2003) and Abu Rabia (2001) argued that members claim raising sheep was ‘in their blood’, and ‘without the presence and smell of sheep, life has no meaning’ (Degan 2007: 132-133). Villagers still practice pastoralism and they believe the enterprise demonstrates their land claims and grazing livestock on family territories reminds others of their territorial markers and boundaries.

Only a thousand or so families exclusively raised livestock (mostly Awassi fat-tailed sheep) to sell in Beersheba, Tel as-Sab‘, and Rāhaṭ at the beginning of the twenty-first century (Degan 2007). Alternatively, many families raise smaller and more diverse types of livestock in pens, corrals inside villages, and take them to pasture in the spring and summer and later sell them for provisions or luxury items in the markets. They keep smaller herds of sheep and goats, fowl such as chickens and pigeons, and (occasionally) horses, donkeys, and camels. These Bedouin conduct husbandry alongside other economic activities such as agriculture (Stavi et al. 2006). Bedouin agricultural production is seasonal and fluctuates from year to year due to the unpredictable annual rains. Seasonal crops include winter grains such as wheat and barley, and summer crops such as vegetables, both grown for subsistence.

Abu Rabia’s (2001) research showed that during the Military Administration (1948-1966), the Israeli Ministry of Education listed the number of Bedouin attending nine schools (1950-1951) as approximately 360. The tradition of teaching children in the *shuyūkh*’s encampments continued in the 1960s with seven elementary schools located in the territories of selected tribal units (*shevatim*). At that time, fourteen per cent of the entire population was estimated to have schooling (Abu Rabia 2001). The

government went on to build schools in the towns in the 1970s as part of the urbanisation project, resulting in an increased number of educated and literate Bedouin children. By 1975, these numbers rose to 6,552 students (Meir and Barnea 1985). In 1995, 23,276 students attended thirty-seven schools constructed in both ‘permanent’ buildings in the towns and ‘temporary’ facilities in the villages (Abu Rabia 2001). As of 2003, sixteen elementary schools service the forty-five villages but there are as of yet no high schools. Alternatively, these students must attend high school in one of the townships (Abu Saad 2003). Today most children attend some form of schooling, however, many drop out after the age of fourteen.

According to education scholar Ishmael Abu Saad (2003), when compared to Jewish schools many Bedouin facilities lacked equivalent resources and budgets as of 2000. As of 2003, most children attend school up to eighteen years old, however, drop-out rates rise after the age of fourteen, particularly among young girls whose domestic labour is often required at home (Abu Saad 2003). Notwithstanding, Meir and Baskind (2006: 71) argued more people are also attending professional and university education. This has encouraged ‘ethnic entrepreneurialism’ (Meir and Baskind 2006) associated with the local creation of Bedouin-led transportation companies, construction firms, mechanic shops, industrial farming, and landscaping trades. As the next section details, studies by Ratcliffe (2009) and others also attribute greater educational levels to the ‘professionalisation’ of Bedouin civic and municipal politics in the Negev (Marteu 2009).

V. THE RISE OF BEDOUIN ACADEMICS AND CIVIC SPOKESPERSONS

(c. 1990-2013)

Produced over the last century and up until 2000, the scholarship discussed in this chapter thus far contextualised members' past experiences and present realities into linear timeframes, sequential forms, and synchronic narratives. For the most part, these mostly then-present-day examinations of Bedouin society were not concerned with history *per se* but over time became part of local historical narratives. The quasi-exclusivity of this learned and Western discourse, however, ended in the late 1990s. At this time, the Negev Bedouin's history was no longer merely *about* Bedouin life but increasingly made *by* members themselves. In particular, the Negev Bedouin discourse was subsequently transformed by the creation and dissemination of members' own local narratives and interests (be them in collusion or competition with the externally-created accounts presented here).

Since the 1980s, Bedouin academics have written articles, books, and pamphlets in English, Hebrew, and Arabic recounting their own past from oral histories (see Abu Rabia 2008), recorded living conditions (see Abu Saad 2003), written life narratives and poems (see Zochrot 2006), and archived old maps and documents generated during the Ottoman and British Periods (see Nasasra 2010). This information has been reproduced on various websites, documentaries, and visual aids. For example, Bedouin scholars associated with Ben Gurion University's Robert Arnow Centre compiled a digital database, which serves 'as a platform to study the Bedouin heritage, the changes taking place within the Negev Bedouin society and the challenges facing it, through academic research and public discussion' (Abu Bader 2010).

Ishmael Abu Saad (2010) argued that educated Bedouin must challenge popular Israeli views of Negev Bedouin historiography by filling in gaps in literature. In

particular, he advocates that Bedouin scholars and activists must challenge literature about their 'indigenous' community based on 'Orientalist/Israeli/Western paradigms for interpreting the Negev Palestinian Bedouin experience'. Abu Saad (2010: Conference Presentation) has gone on to suggest that the Bedouin need to 'exercise their fundamental right to represent themselves and to speak to the dominant society with their own voices and words, rather than to be spoken of or about' by others. His scholastic efforts, along with other Bedouin members such as Aref Abu Rabia and Mansour Nasasra, are receiving increased attention on international platforms. For example, the British Academy hosted a conference at the University of Exeter in 2010 and Columbia University hosted workshops in 2015 wherein approximately a dozen Bedouin scholars have presented, discussed, and disseminated their research on Negev Bedouin history and society.

Since the 1990s, Bedouin civic professionals have also taken up similar projects by creating standardised reports about Negev Bedouin and presenting them at UN forums, international aid conferences, and different cultural rights associations. Both Bedouin advocates and academics collaborate with NGOs to produce advocacy reports and briefing packets for visiting journalists, aid agencies, international and regional funders, government officials, and external university representatives. Local Bedouin representatives also regularly work with Israeli NGOs (see Appendix III) to produce web-based knowledge about their history and society. For example, NCF hired a team of Bedouin and non-Bedouin researchers, media producers, and spokespersons to systematically map, collect data, and publicise the history of each village between 2010-2014 for an online mapping application.

According to Marteu (2005), these growing numbers of professional Bedouin spokespersons are generating political capital through which they are able to self-obtain resources and take up employment with new municipal and civil society institutions.

Those working with these organisations are positioning themselves as community representatives exhibiting the new civic face of their people to outsiders. They often express non-tribal and liberally minded views in order to improve financial resources and public appeal in Israel and internationally (see Ratcliffe 2009). While civic spokespersons have ‘limited political legitimacy locally, a number of NGO activists are becoming prominent political professionals nationally, and internationally, and they are extensively linked to Palestinian, Jewish, and international groups’ (Ratcliffe 2009: 216).

In referencing the information created by local NGOs, Ratcliffe (2009) argued that their civically oriented data has acquired representational authority in three major ways. First, outsiders treat these local advocates as the ‘authentic voice’ of the Negev Bedouin despite the fact that their information is created in cooperation with outside stakeholders. Secondly, Ratcliffe (2009) pointed out their knowledge-products are ‘para-academic’ as most purposely streamline information in order to present a unified image of the Negev Bedouin community through statistics. Finally, he noted the attenuated political status awarded to local spokespersons through their affiliations with the UN and international aid agencies, etc., which legitimise the persons’ ‘citational’ (recirculating) qualities (Ratcliffe 2009).

Nevertheless, their narratives have become highly persuasive in different public domains over the last twenty years for several reasons: (1) It is knowledge produced and advocated by local spokespersons whose professional affiliations include academia, municipal committees, religious groups, and regional NGOs; and (2) It is a discourse designed for, disseminated among, and made regularly accessible to non-Bedouin outsiders through various languages such as English, Hebrew, and Levantine Arabic and media platforms. For example, academics and Bedouin civic spokespersons are circulating this locally produced information via online platforms such as Wikipedia.

Over the last ten years, this web-based encyclopaedia has become a persuasive virtual space for debate about different minority communities in the Israeli and Palestinian context. In particular, the English, Hebrew, and Arabic Wikipedia pages entitled the ‘Negev Bedouin’ have grown substantially over the last ten years. These sites are constantly edited and re-edited by political advocates and local historians (particularly on the Hebrew and English sites), with all striving to assert their version of the Negev Bedouin’s past and society in the public sphere.

In all, the turn of the twenty-first century marked the beginning of a new type of Negev Bedouin history in southern Israel; one in which narratives of the past inherently differ from oral poems, proverbs, and epics customary recited among members themselves (see Abu Lughod 1999 [1986], Bailey 2004). These new accounts focus on relationships with outsiders and produced by Bedouin academics, spokespersons, activists, and media-makers (often in conjunction with non-Bedouin) who are contributing and inserting their own representational works into public historiographical discourses.

This localisation of historiography, however, has also resulted in the promulgation of varied and disparate versions of the Bedouin’s past and present in the Negev. This is partly due to the fact that Bedouin historicity must strategically either counter or corroborate Western and Israeli descriptions but also relate to long-held parochial sources of authority amongst customary tribal elders (*kbār*), knowledge such as those associated with genealogies, and newer, but equally significant, civic and Islamic universalisms in southern Israel. As Chapter Three argues, however, the heterogeneity of contemporary Bedouin society, the multiplicity of local spokespersons, the varied mediums constructing and disseminating historical narratives have also diversified the types of local history presented by Bedouin to outsiders in specific public venues.

CHAPTER THREE

CONSTRUCTING HISTORIES

The study of history is one thing, the use of history is another.

(Emrys Peters 1977: 71)

Peripheral peoples throughout the Middle East transform memories into representations of the past and group histories. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, these enterprises typify peoples' efforts to define their collective identities amid encroaching nationalisms and economic competition. Chantal Mouffe (2000) argued, however, that these practices also often ossify pluralisms, restrict people's orientations, and intensify representational competition between marginalised people. Consequently, many of the world's minority populations are caught in a 'double bind' whereby advocating peoplehood requires members to essentialise their own pasts. In all, as Pierre Nora (1989: 15) pointed out, 'ethnic groups and social minorities, every established group, intellectual or not, learned or not, has felt the need to go in search of its own origins and identity'. In the wake of forced historical self-determinism, however, their enterprises have become increasingly dependent on media.

In order to explore these processes among Bedouin in the Negev, this chapter asks: What types of Negev Bedouin history circulate today? What are the common themes in these presentations? Who makes and communicates this information? To whom do they direct this information? What media do spokespersons typically use? These questions are answered through discourse analysis and empirical data focusing on oral (conversations and presentations) and textual (prepared writings such as books and websites) media associated with contemporary Bedouin historicity. This chapter leaves

analysis of visual media aside for now since Chapter Four explores the visual iconography and technologies associated with Negev Bedouin photographic and digital images and Part II documents images' unique circulations, presence(s), and poly-mediations in Bedouin society. This multi-stranded approach constitutes what this thesis argues is a more exhaustive approach to understanding local historicity, navigating the ambiguity of shifting narratives, and highlighting the multiplicity of peoples' representations of the past in this society.

To do so, the first section begins with an anthropological sketch of socio-political life in Khashem Zana' as I observed it between 2012-2013. This description aims to contextualise the internal socio-political landscape of Bedouin life in a village, note the various tribal and civic spokespersons representing villagers, and situate the village as a public venue for Bedouin historicity in the Negev.⁹⁶ This sketch also provides background for the next section, which explores popular rhetorical themes and socio-linguistic registers within local historicity through a series of events in which the village's main civic spokesman (Suleīmān al-ʿAthāmīn) presented information about the Bedouin past and society in the Negev to guests (mostly NGOs and political tourists) and myself.

In addition to discussing the thematic elements of Bedouin historicity, this chapter also describes the strategic representational practices by which spokespersons make historical appeals to diverse audiences and the network of representatives, of which Suleīmān is a part, that regularly speak and write on behalf of others in their society. These include Bedouin academics, religious spokespersons, and civic professionals along with the public liaisons discussed in the last chapter such as tribal elders (*kbār*) and politicians. This last section notes the ways in which spokespersons' make use of various types of learned resources and highlights the importance of

⁹⁶ Other venues include NGO offices, mosques, *shiggs*, and community centres.

situational context for their portrayals of the past. It argues that spokespersons communicate history, society, and identity in ways that are relative to his or her audience, their status with Bedouin society, and their necessary goals.

I. SOCIO-POLITICAL LIFE IN KHASHEM ZANA' (2012-2013)

Socio-political life in Khashem Zana' (between 2012 and 2013) for the majority of residents in the village, including Suleīmān al-ʿAthāmīn and his family, was divided between close (*garāba*) people and outsiders, or distant people.⁹⁷ These idealised proximities patterned everyday interactions, defined territories, and endowed events with significance. Residents closely associated to those in their extended family (*ʿāʾila*)⁹⁸ and sub-lineage (*gōm*), which in turn connected them to other people within their larger lineage (*ʿāʾilāt*) through residence, descent (*sulāla*), and genealogy (*nasab*). The closest relationships in Khashem Zana' included one's immediate family and the word house or tent (*bayt*) commonly referenced the tertiary household. Members identified each household (*bayt*) by the name of the senior male residing there along with his wife or wives, sons and daughters, son's wife or wives, and their children.⁹⁹ This network formed the minimal household unit.

Suleīmān's eldest son's family lived in a house next to Ike and I's shipping container, below Suleīmān's house. The three eldest daughters resided in houses with their families next to Suleīmān's wife Fāṭimah's kin. During fieldwork, the fourth eldest daughter married and moved to the paternal kin just north of Suleīmān's homestead.

⁹⁷ Clifford Geertz (1983) suggests the 'experience-distant' concept is useful for understanding the local ways people identify with familial, corporate, and territorial groups in the Middle East.

⁹⁸ The word *ʿāʾila* references many relationships in the Negev. These include a small nuclear family or extended families of cognates comprised of three hundred to three thousand living descendants claiming shared ancestry (Parizot 2006: xxv).

⁹⁹ In some cases, a man's newly married son lived in his father's house until he acquired his own economic independence.

The remaining children lived in the main house with Suleīmān and Fāṭimah. While frequently present in the household, daughters maintained residence outside of the main home though they shared economic responsibilities and social bonds (*‘ishra*). These daughters travelled to their natal home every day, assisted Fāṭimah with daily housework, visited with me, and frequently spent the night.¹⁰⁰ Suleīmān’s family ideally share space or *’arḍ* (distinguished from *’irḍ* or virtue), intimate quarters (*muḥra*), house (*bayt*, *buyūt*), property (*dār*, *dīra*), and dependents (*mahmiyāt*). These domains (and the people allowed in these spaces) were juxtaposed to the outside world or public arenas as the household exists in relation to villages, communities, regions, and nations (Bourdieu 1965).

Today households in the Negev differ between the villages and towns. Village homesteads tend to be constructed horizontally whereas town homes are built vertically due to building restrictions and the lack of building permits. Despite their different layouts, residences in villages are characterised by strict spatial boundaries created between one’s property (*dār*) and neighbourhoods (*hāra*, *hārat*) where male descendants live next to their paternal relatives’ homes.¹⁰¹ Most dwellings in the villages were similar to Suleīmān’s house in Khashem Zana’ wherein families constructed their houses out of permanent cinderblock structures (*buyūt cement*) and tin houses with attached tents (*buyūt al-sha’r*).¹⁰² Each house has designated areas for guests and family. This is a picture of the exterior of Suleīmān’s home:

¹⁰⁰ For more information about maternal kin, see Abu Lughod (1999 [1986]) and Peters (1990).

¹⁰¹ See Fenster (1999) and Meir (1997) for information about layouts of housing units in the towns.

¹⁰² Up until the 1960s, these tents were made out of goat-hair but today are largely made out of plastic tarpaulins.



Figure 9: Photograph of Suleimān's home – west facing (2012).

Each house in the village varied in size and dimensions, however, wealthier men such as Suleimān constantly added to their homes, building additional rooms with various functions. Moreover, influential tribal (*‘ā’iliyya*) networks, such as Suleimān's extended family, also possessed rights to larger grazing and farmlands in the village.

The interior space of each village home is divided into public spaces such as a guest reception room (*salon* or *dīwān*) and private spaces (*rab’a* or *muḥra*), distinguished by restricted insider/outsider access (that is where members of the *bayt* ([household] were allowed to enter as opposed to guests). Private domestic spaces typically include a kitchen, bedrooms, and bathing or shower rooms. These areas were constructed out of concrete walls and tin roofs whereas the guest or more public areas were a combination of tent and concrete spaces filled with mattresses, pillows, and a metal stove or fire pit. See a diagram of the interior of Suleimān's home:




Figure 10: Diagram of Suleimān's house – interior layout (2012).

Most houses (*buyūt*) in Khashem Zana' had electricity provided by petrol-fuelled generators or solar panels. Up until 1985, water was collected from wells and streams, however today most houses have indoor plumbing drawing on water purchased on the Israeli market or from water tanks provided by NGOs. Suleimān explained, 'Between 1948 until 1985, we carried water to the village on donkeys from nearby wells located three kilometres away.' During my fieldwork, kitchens contained gas stoves and faucets, and bathrooms possessed flushing toilets and showers connected to the water main and underground sewage tanks. In all, I found houses in the villages were not slums as popularly stereotyped in Israeli media and despite the rough appearance of privacy fencing around *buyūt*, the interiors were tidy with tiled floors, painted walls, and wood planked ceilings.

Each property (*dār*) was composed of a house, the immediate lands surrounding it, and ideally included an outdoor guest area, agnate meeting place (*shigg*), lands for grazing and farming, and livestock pens. Suleīmān's property hosted a large concrete slab on the eastside for hosting large events, to the west was a small field planted with wheat and two olive trees, and to the south there was a livestock sheds for sheep, goats, pigeons, and chickens. To the north of Suleīmān's land there was a playground, preschool, store, and mosque. Each property is situated within a larger neighbourhood (*hāra*), which in Suleīmān's case, included his younger brother's lands to the southeast, his eldest brother's land to the north of him, and his mother and middle brother's land to the west. Suleīmān's closest neighbours were thus his patrilineal kinsmen.

These neighbourhoods (*hārat*) were separated from others located to the east and south of Suleīmān's neighbourhood but comprised a village, which as a whole shared a cemetery, mosque, store, and preschool (see Figure 11). Suleīmān estimated that 2,300 people resided in the village as of 2012. Non-kin neighbours claim tribal affiliation with the al-‘Athāmīn, but who do not shared descent, also resided in Khashem Zana'. These neighbourly relations (‘*ishra*’) were established by living next to one another and these residents attended each other's ceremonies and events. Because non-kin mixed socially there was no strangeness (*ghurabā'*) between them as they are familiar with one another (Abu Lughod 1999 [1986]). For example, during Suleīmān's daughter's wedding in Khashem Zana', tribally affiliated but non-kinwomen attended and led songs (*tarwīd*, *tarāwīd*) which commiserated the matrimonial event, complimented the bride, and welcomed the guests.




Figure 11: Map of Khashem Zana' – neighbourhoods (2012).

Customarily, land ownership in the village was negotiated through *hajer*, a process whereby residents 'cleared a field of stones for sowing' (Marx 1967). Up until the late nineteenth century, members established ownership over land by demonstrating presence via dwellings and protecting boundaries, which (in the past) were indicated by planted bushes and large rocks with symbols (*wasam*) painted on to them. Since the late 1960s, members have used tractors to artificially construct dirt mounds to indicate the boundaries between homesteads. There were strict boundaries in the village between properties. Large fields, valleys, and networks of roads also created 'natural' boundaries between neighbourhoods in the village. Pallet privacy fencing, sheep sheds, and other man-made markers demarcated each property in a neighbourhood (*hāra*). These structures and paths separated ambiguous public spaces, lands, and pathways winding

between the homesteads and private land that required an invitation by their owners to enter. Families also fervently protected both village and property boundaries as crossing them potentially entailed social transgressions. Suleīmān, in an interview with Hall (2014: 156), explained:

Here the territory is divided between families. No stranger can enter my property without my permission. We all know each other, but when I go to see somebody, I do not go to his house; it belongs to the private sphere. It is a shame to enter it.... When men gather it is always in the *shigg* [guest-tent]. The house is for women and their guests. In towns, there are no divisions anymore, anyone can go anywhere. It is not how it is meant to be.

The protection of property also included grazing areas. During the week, Suleīmān's youngest daughter (twelve years old) and I had watched over Fāṭimah's herd of thirty sheep and goats which grazed in the pasture and *wādī* located directly behind Suleīmān's lands. As mentioned above, the livestock in our family was Fāṭimah's property and her and the youngest daughter were responsible for taking them to pasture, constructing pens and housing, feeding, and medicating the herd. In addition to the sheep and goats, chickens were another main source of meat for the family. Suleīmān and Fāṭimah treated her livestock as an important investment for times of economic uncertainty (see Marx 1990). As stated earlier, Suleīmān is typical of many Bedouin men as he also maintained full-time employment as a security guard at a Jewish-owned grocery store located outside of Beersheba. In addition to these business activities, Suleīmān and Fāṭimah travelled to the market in Hebron located in the West Bank to purchase groceries every two weeks. They said they preferred Palestinian-run markets to Jewish-own shops in Israel closer to the village.

During these trips, they purchased fruit, baked goods, luxury items such as candies and new clothes, school supplies, and provisions for the small village store they

maintained on their land. This store was run and visited by younger males from various neighbourhoods (*hārat*) and served as an informal meeting place where they listened to music on their mobile phones, smoked cigarettes, and talked. In addition to the unlicensed selling of household goods, members also traded and sold livestock in desert markets away from government oversight. These unofficial trades and sales occurred among those who have not registered their herds with Israeli officials or do not have required transportation certifications (for trailers or trucks) to attend livestock markets in the urban centres.

As the main breadwinner, Suleīmān is the senior male within the household but also the public representative of the family. These responsibilities will be relinquished to the eldest adult son once Suleīmān passes away or becomes infirm. At this time, the son will establish his own independent household and take on the responsibility for the elders who then become his dependents. Every male child has the potential to create his own extended family (*‘ā’ila*) and establish agnate relationships (*agwām*) when needed. Thereby, his own familial networks’ interests may align with or go against those of his father, brother, or cousin; a situation encapsulated by the proverb, ‘Myself against my brother; my brother and I against my cousin; my cousin, my brother, and I against the outsider’ (quoted in Murphy and Kasdan 1959: 20)

Notwithstanding, each extended family (*‘ā’ila*) consisted of households located in a neighbourhood in which all members claim shared descent (*sulāla*) and connections reinforced through marriage ties. *‘Ā’ila* form co-resident groups comprised of cognates, related kin, or and larger lineages (*‘ā’ilāt*). Thus they tend to isolate themselves, strive for economic independence, spatial separation, and frequently reside on their own lands in a village. Internal group dynamics within *‘ā’ila*, however, strengthen or weaken in different circumstances as in-group solidarity and relationships are continually

reorganised because of conflict or alliances, births and deaths, marriages-in and marriages-out of households.

Consequently, extended families (*‘ā’ila*) set out to increase collective numbers through marriage in order to maximise social cohesion, economic resources, and political strength. This is ideally accomplished through parallel cousin marriage, which aims to strengthen shared descent between people and connect named ancestors thereby establishing sets of relationships that can be called forth and justified during times of need.¹⁰³ Over time the practice creates overlapping ties between individuals and reinforces the closeness of members within an *‘ā’ila* (Peters 1960). In all, parallel cousin marriage is a form of aggrandisement that indelibly promotes processes of affiliation through atomisation in their society (Murphy and Kasdan 1959: 17).

The main priority of matrimonial strategies is not necessarily the exchange of members but the establishment of ties through homology. ‘Thus groups are therefore structured around the concept of sharing to the extent in which their members define their status on their homology and through shared [marriage]’ (Bonte et al. 2001 cited in Parizot 2001a: 54). Consequently, marriages also hold symbolic significance for broader tribal dynamics as each spouse (both husband and wife) are representatives of their natal family and broader groupings. According to Kressel (1992), matrimonial alliances are characterised by competition between two families as groups use them to gain greater resources. Thus marriages typically position two inter-marrying networks in competition with one another rather than strictly establishing collaborative relationships between families (Parizot 2001a).

The local terms indicating conjugal relationships include: husband (*zawj*), wife (*zawja*), and in-laws (*nasāyib*). As stated, these relationships established through

¹⁰³ Robert Murphy and Leonard Kasdan (1959) argued that the main goal of this form of marriage practice is to increase the autonomy of agnates. The same holds true in the Negev.

parallel cousin marriage ideally occur within a named patrilineal descent group. Preferably, marriages are established through exchange (*badal*) wherein one's son is married to one's father's brother's daughter (*bint 'amm*) or between persons who are first to fifth cousins. In many cases, male descent groups share maternal relatives and kinsmen via endogamy but cases of exogamous marriage exist. Marriages are made between 'structural equals' and, ideally, not between those with unequal (*kuf*) status. Marriages between members (namely 'aṣīl and non-'aṣīl) exist but are limited to the 'taking of women' by 'aṣīl. Most 'aṣīl women are encouraged not to marry non-'aṣīl men.

In Khashem Zana', most married males had more than one wife, however, the first wife tended to claim 'Arabian origins' ('aṣīl) and, more often than not, was the man's patrilineal cousin.¹⁰⁴ The second and third wives were often non-'aṣīl from outside of the extended family ('ā'ila) from a client group or an Arab woman not native to the Negev, and on some occasions Bedouin women from Jordan. In the first instance, married cousins typically share kin through matrilateral or patrilateral ties. Ultimately, the goal of the first marriage is to establish alliances and influence within a named lineage ('ā'ilāt).¹⁰⁵ Thus the father or male patriarchs, in coordination with close male agnates, have the ultimate authority in choosing their daughters' husbands.¹⁰⁶ Generally, young persons do not arrange their own marriages.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, local marriages involved Israeli civil-secular law, *Sharī'a* (Islamic law), and 'ashā'irī (tribal) law. Despite the extension of civil laws in Israel, *Sharī'a* and 'ashā'irī law take precedence. Today there are two ways to register marriage, through formal contracts with a person charged by the

¹⁰⁴ Polygamy is common. Estimating the numbers of polygamous marriages is difficult as it is illegal in Israel.

¹⁰⁵ This is not a simple patrilineal society but instead bilateral since typically father's and mother's line merges with each ascending generation.

¹⁰⁶ Women's male relatives are responsible for her marriage. She can raise objections or indicate her wishes with the support of her female relatives.

Islamic court or through the local custom (*'urfi*) of bridal exchange (*badal*) (Jahshan 2005). Marriages between households, extended familial relatives, and neighbours also strengthen maternal relations but members consider these connections a weaker form of social identity as opposed to those established through paternity.¹⁰⁷ Notwithstanding, maternal kinship is highly valued. Women as well as men maintain close ties to their maternal homes for both strategic and practical reasons such as in the case of divorce or an abusive husband.

In summary, the closest social relations during my time in the village were concentrated within a house (*bayt*) and extended family (*'ā'ila*) out of which other larger, abstracted tribal connections were made and articulated. According to local belief, the capacity of familial units such as Suleīmān's household to collaborate or disassociate with multiple other households is one of the fundamental dynamics of lineage-based tribalism (*'ā'iliyya*) which characterise this Bedouin society. Members treat other households as opponents that compete on some occasions but on other occasions chose affiliate as an agnatic lineage (*'ā'ilāt*) group. These connections can be ideally established at different generational depths within the tribal network. As noted by Randolph (1963: 185) in the 1960s, *'ā'ila* were then (and continue to be today) 'strongly enmeshed in a network of kin ties with other families, and kinship provides the idiom for creating corporate groups to an extent not found in the West'.

One's relationships within an extended family (*'ā'ila*) connect them with other members through broader protracted named descent networks or lineages (*'ā'ilāt*) whose members relate to one another by corresponding ancestry between four to eight generations and justify their collaborations and competition through claims of shared patrilineal descent (*sulāla*). Named *'ā'ilāt* are referred to by the surnames of said ancestors. In the Negev, *'ā'ilāt* is a tribal namesake that is a part of the broader

¹⁰⁷ Emrys Peters (1960) and William Lancaster (1981) make a similar point.

language of tribalism among Bedouin, relative terms that express affiliation through one's customary tribe (*'ashīra*) and/or state tribal unit (*shevet*), sub-confederation (*ṣaff*) or confederation (*gabīla*). For example, Suleīmān's customary *'ashīra*, the al-ʿAthāmīn was not recognised by Israel as a *shevet*. Instead the state regulates these members as affiliates of the al-ʿĀʿsam. Nevertheless, Suleīmān and his family tribally affiliate with other members of the Gdīrāt *ṣaff* and the Tiyyāhā *gabīla* and each of these namesakes signify different types of socio-political and economic obligations and divisions in the Negev. Again, regardless of terminology, Bedouin typically do not experience ambiguity of reference because the articulation of namesakes depends on who is asking and what type of relationships the inquirer is attempting to establish. Both males and females with shared named descent will also share surnames and lands.

The affinal and bilateral relationships established through marriage in a lineage (*ʿāʾilāt*) ideally bring agnates together during times of collaboration or conflict in the form of a series of agnate or co-liaible groups (*agwām*). According to Parizot (2001a), these ensembles are led by a number of men who cement their bonds by privileging the intermarrying of their children (that is of their brothers and first cousins). When practiced over time, these matrimonial strategies gradually isolate and create closer relationships within a *gōm*. Members refer to a *gōm* by the name of their shared ancestor or the patrilineal forebear of the group that is 'Children (*ʿAwlād*) of "named" ancestor'.¹⁰⁸

Customarily, each *gōm* has male representatives or elders (*kbār*) who serve as spokespersons of the extended family (*ʿāʾila*) and jurally represents other members during times of mutual interest with other Bedouin representatives. On a daily basis, the *kbār* lead religious activities, mediate internal disputes, and protect alliances such as

¹⁰⁸ When asked about the term for lineage, members may also employ birth group (*hamūla*) and paternal clan (*khamṣa*).

those established through marriage. While influential and respected figures, they do not have complete authority over the internal affairs of the *‘ā’ilāt* as each male head maintains control over his own household. *Kbār* of large and powerful *agwām* may serve as representatives of the entire *‘ā’ilāt*.

Suleīmān is the second oldest son in his family. He and his four brothers all resided on their father’s land. Ḥamād, as eldest, often performed slaughtering during major feasts or holidays. He predominantly led familial and tribal-based activities in the neighbourhood and served as the spokesperson for his extended family. Suleīmān, as a middle-brother, however, does not possess the same influence as his older brother or elders (*kbār*) in Khashem Zana‘, particularly in regards to internal familial and intra-tribal (*‘ashā’irī*) affairs. Alternatively, Suleīmān heads the local committee (*al-lajna al-maḥalliya*) and serves as a civic spokesperson of the village to non-Bedouin outsiders.

As briefly described in the last chapter, community spokespersons’ positions, such as Suleīmān’s, have become more prominent in the Bedouin villages over the last ten years. As noted by Hall (2014), these men present themselves as spearheading the village’s political strategies, publicity campaigns, and lobby for resources by seeking outside supporters and allies (usually in the form of governmental officials and international NGOs). One practice by which spokespersons like Suleīmān accomplished their political and economic goals is by historicising their own villages such as Khashem Zana‘ and publicising their residents’ struggles with the Israeli state in various public forums. Their self-presentations of Bedouin history and contemporary circumstances are both varied and strategic as they aim to validate a range of rights and historical claims to external audiences in order to acquire resources from them – organisations and persons who provide funding, equipment, provisions, infrastructure, and other forms of capital.

Suleīmān later told me that when outsiders learn more about their marginalisation by the state they do more to help the people in the village. In reality, these visits were a type of business venture for him, a financial enterprise obtaining third sector resources. In all, his efforts have secured solar panels and hot water heaters, a preschool for their neighbourhood, and playground for his extended family (*‘ā’ila*); all paid for by NGOs and non-Bedouin donors through charitable and development projects. Nevertheless, while Suleīmān pays lip service to community interests, in reality he predominantly strives to buttress the capacity of his lineage (*‘ā’ilāt*) to obtain resources from outsiders through strategic representational practices, which distinguish their needs and emphasise their connections/differences from other populations in southern Israel.

In order to reach non-Bedouin audiences, Suleīmān regularly invites non-Bedouin political tourists and NGO representatives to his home. Over the last several years, his efforts have made Khashem Zana‘ a popular destination for outsiders. During my fieldwork between 2012-2013, visits by political tourists and foreign donors (approximately 300-400) to Khashem Zana‘ were predominantly organised by various NGOs (approximately a dozen) and other advocates working in Israel and the West Bank. The NGOs advertise village tours in order to raise awareness of Bedouin circumstances and solicit funding for their civic projects with Bedouin residents. Importantly for the purposes of this thesis, however, these encounters have become events of historicity in which Bedouin spokespersons and others create, rationalise, and disseminate knowledge in the form of historical narratives and corrections about the Negev Bedouin past to outsiders.

The next section describes occasions on which Suleīmān, as a Bedouin spokesperson, shared information about the Negev Bedouin past and society, which I treat theoretically as significant events of historicity. I found that Suleīmān’s rhetorical

themes and strategies were similar to other types of Bedouin histories articulated by other spokespersons over the course of my fieldwork. These ambiguous and diverse accounts focused on establishing connections and oppositions with others in different ‘communities’ predominantly through: genealogical (*nasāb*) and tribal (*gabaliyya* or *‘ā’iliyya*) past; Bedouin Islamic heritage; and politicisation of residencies as ethnohistory. Further research found that oscillation between these histories among various Bedouin spokespersons is common throughout the Negev, an observation that concurs with other scholars’ recent experiences in the Negev (see McKee 2010, Hall 2014).

II. SHIFTING HISTORIES, SPOKESPERSONS, AND MEDIATIONS

During visits, Suleīmān provided the guests (political tourists, journalists, politicians, and students) with tea or a meal, (depending on arrangements with the liaison),¹⁰⁹ a lecture on the Negev Bedouin (described below), and a ‘tour’ of Khashem Zana’. Afterwards, Suleīmān guided guests outside, across his concrete courtyard, and through a large dirt area, which unbeknownst to them was the homestead’s trash heap, over to a the hill next to Fāṭimah’s (his wife’s) sheep corral made from old pallets. Once there, visitors would take pictures of the trash, sheep, and the village houses. Back in the reception room, he directed visitors to a room filled with Bedouin handicrafts for sale. Afterwards, most visitors proceeded to their tour bus with new purchases and an informative pamphlet on the ‘unrecognised villages’. Once boarded, the NGO’s official host would give Suleīmān an envelope with a payment.

During the early days, when Suleīmān’s presentations were new to me, I often stayed in the guest reception room to learn more about the history of Khashem Zana’.

¹⁰⁹ This mostly consisted of boiled rice and chicken, salad, hummus, *labna*, and pita.

By the third month of receiving visitors, I realised that I was re-listening to a tailored presentation, one Suleīmān repeated over the course of my fieldwork. Among Western guests from Europe, his narrative (presented in Hebrew or dialect and translated into English or French *in situ*) was the following:

I am the head of the village council and a part of the RCUV and Abu Basma councils. I come from the al-‘Athāmīn tribe but the state of Israel does not recognise us. Khashem Zana’ is a historical village within the *Sīyāj* and we have never moved from place to place. My grandfather came here a hundred years ago and began to farm, created a cemetery, and used the caves as storage for grain. We have historical roots here. Before the state of Israel, we were found on maps. We had an address but the state deleted it from the map and told us to move from here. We now have no address only a tribal name on our ID cards. There are 2,300 people living in the village but we have no basic services unlike other Israelis. We have 600 school age children but no schools. When I was a child, I walked to school in another village for ten years. I had to wait until a group of children also went to school and I would sometimes take a donkey but my sisters were not allowed to go to school. Only in 1985 did they begin to go because there were buses to take them. When women and mothers do not go to school it influences the family’s life. The first Bedouin student to go to university was in 1982, he was from this area. We have no connection to electricity here and only four years ago we got generators. This is a problem.... We can’t do anything without electricity. We can’t create small businesses that might improve the land. There is today some electricity that passes through the village but it is not enough.... We do not have streetlights to get place to place like the Jewish villages. This is because we do not have formal documents [*tābū*] for our land between 1950s and the 1960s. They wanted us to give up twenty dunams for one dunam. But it doesn’t matter if you have a lease [*tābū*] or not. The Abū Kāff are being kicked off their land and they have these documents. They [the state] do not recognised Bedouin land ownership.

After the presentations, he passed out a flyer produced by the RCUV explaining the situation in the ‘unrecognised villages’ (see Figure 12). In particular, it describes the Bedouin as an indigenous (Hebrew – *y’lidiḥ*) population living on ancestral lands along with their housing struggles, poverty, and socio-economic marginalisation.




Figure 12: Photograph of RCUV brochure – Khashem Zana'.

In addition to giving presentations about Khashem Zana' to political tourists, Suleīmān also gave interviews to various reporters during my stay. For example, on one occasion Suleīmān re-oriented the history of Khashem Zana' as an 'unrecognised Palestinian village' with the West Bank-based news syndetic *Quds* in 2013. The information he conveyed during this interview was similar to his presentation given to Westerners (noted above). Interestingly, however, the Palestinian journalist later contextualised Suleīmān's 'Palestinian *Badāwī* history of Khashem Zana'' as such:

Khashem Zana' is a Palestinian Arab village in the Negev, and because they are not recognised by the Israeli authorities as a village, they are deprive the services.... The village [is] 'historic' and he tells the story of his grandfather ... who arrived hundreds of

years ago. 'Where did your grandfather come from?' Suleiman answered, 'We the [Tiyāhā] wandered from Sinai.... They say that there was a famine in Saudi Arabia and Yemen in the ancient times, and people began migrating to the Sinai and wandered there, and distributed tribes in different areas, and we have come to Palestine.' About the logic of the village's name, he told us, 'Khashem means the nose, it references here the nose of the mountain....'

I stopped his narrative, smiling and asked him about the Bedouin words he uttered that I did not understand. Suleiman said instead that his grandfather arrived here and had the 'honour' to cultivate land and take care of it. He told us that it is only prejudice in geography books that states everything in the Negev is 'desert'. His grandfather had the gift of cultivating land, digging wells, and holding workers to him. You feel that you are experiencing [Bedouin] hospitality in the Negev and more about their way of life. But I do not only have the task of compiling traditional press material. So you do not learn about history, but about 'making history' according to the stubborn *Badawi* model who have withstood, to put it mildly, 'uprooting' attempts [sic]. We had to leave our talk about the fun memories and family history, to talk about life under occupation.

(Qawasmi 2013)

Midway through my fieldwork, I sat with Suleīmān on another occasion when he presented Khashem Zana's history to an Israeli Jewish male representative working for NCF. This NGO was one that also regularly brought political tourists to the 'unrecognised villages' to meet with residents to hear about 'the historical and political processes that have shaped the current demographic challenges' (Dukium 2014). The interviewer also asked Suleīmān to explain the history of the village so that the NGO could advertise it on their website. This interview was part of the NGO's broader project aimed at rectifying 'misguided information' in the Israeli media about the villages and inserting village committees' (*al-lajna al-maḥalliya*) 'local knowledge' in the public sphere (Dukium 2014). Suleīmān's oral narrative was later contextualised by the NGO as such:

The unrecognized village of Khasham Zaneh is home to some 2000 people and predates the establishment of the State of Israel. The village has important historical sites including an ancient cemetery from the period of the Ottoman Empire, a well that was filled in by the government, several ancient houses, and caves that were carved for storing crops. The village is named after Zaneh a righteous woman who is buried in the village. The hill on which the village stands is shaped like a woman's nose, and the village is consequently called Hasham Zaneh – 'Zaneh's nose'....

(Dukium 2014)

Over the course of my fieldwork, I sat in the reception room and listened to Suleīmān give these oral presentations to various audiences and observed him hand out pamphlets about the 'unrecognised villages'. Upon further research, I later found that his oral accounts were re-produced in writing in Israeli, Palestinian, and international newspapers, academic articles, and websites. Eventually, it became apparent that Suleīmān's speeches remained largely consistent in content during these events but regularly shifted between Israeli, Palestinian, and indigenous identities. NGO and their affiliated Bedouin advocates (from other places in the Negev), however, also re-tailored Khashem Zana's history to meet the different expectations of their audiences in their text-based news articles and websites.

After observing these occasions in Khashem Zana and a half dozen other villages and towns (al-'Aragīb, Lagīya, and Rāhaṭ), I came to find that Suleīmān and other Bedouin spokespersons are presenting a new type of oral colloquy that differs from customary oral stories and poems. Alternatively, these oral presentations highlighted their 'historical rights', selectively negotiated between their multiple socio-political identities, and noted their socio-economic struggles to a vast range of outsiders. These presentations regularly entailed the use of Negev Bedouin ethnohistory, community descriptions, and civic vocabulary including such proscriptive terms used by state and international groups such as 'Israeli Arab minority' and 'Palestinian Bedouin in Israel'.

For example, in a presentation given to European visitors at the Rāhaṭ Community Centre, politician Ṭalib al-Šāna‘ (former Knesset Member) phrased the situation of the Negev Bedouin as Israeli Arabs:

We have become a national minority issue within the Jewish and Palestinian conflict but Bedouin have historical presence on this land. Today our cultural identity is a crime but thirty per cent of the Negev is Bedouin. The problem with the Zionist mind-set is that they are patronising to minorities in Israel. They teach their citizens in educational textbooks that Bedouin are thieves but use the army service as a way to distinguish us from other Arabs. They present the ‘Arab minority’ as ‘Bad Arabs’ or ‘Good Arabs’ using history and education to support these images but these presentations are taken out of context and set us against other minorities for human rights. The Palestinian and Bedouin differences are political and over different lands, but Israel treats us as ‘Our Arabs’ yet discriminate us all the same.

Since the late 1990s, spokespersons have also incorporated Hebrew, English, and Arabic civic vocabularies including terms such as ‘unrecognised’, ‘historical’, *y’lidiḥ* (Hebrew – indigenous), and *ṣumūd* (Arabic – steadfastness). Likewise, they thematically stress education, Bedouin presence and cultivation of land, and the lack of modern infrastructure in their presentations. These narratives, however, regularly omit kin-based allegiances, status hierarchies, and tribal heterogeneity from their representations in order to exemplify (or appear to exemplify) the entire community.

In addition to promulgating a unique type of local ethnohistory through speech, spokespersons are also handing out literature in Arabic, English, and Hebrew (created by local newspapers, religious and civic organisations, and municipalities). This literature not only temporalises tribal events but also maps Bedouin lands and rationalised the Negev Bedouin demographic. For example, information about major community events in the towns was written down and published in the local newspapers, pamphlets, and websites (see Figure 13).



Figure 13: Photograph of Arabic and Hebrew text-based media collected over the course of fieldwork (2010-2013).

Upon further research and interviews with spokespersons during fieldwork, I found that spokespersons' mediated efforts have been central to the successful acquisition of resources from state and non-state actors. It became apparent that since 1948, Bedouin spokespersons' (tribal, civic, and religious) negotiations and advocacy with Israeli state officials and international representatives have successfully acquired 'recognition' of specific villages once deemed by the state as illegal and have secured hard-to-obtain land and economic rights in the Negev. In the last two decades, spokespersons have also gone on to nurture relationships with particular NGOs to secure infrastructure in villages. Whilst conducting fieldwork, I found that much NGO-based funding was largely funnelled to specific Bedouin spokespersons and their

communities who had strong ties (social or political) with the specific organisation's leaders, personnel, and grant makers.

After several months of listening to Suleīmān's narrative about Khashem Zana', I asked him privately one evening if he could tell me more about the history of the Bedouin before 1948. To do so, Suleīmān did not begin with the history of the Israeli state but rather relayed a three-hour recitation that began with Zamzam, the holy water well in Mecca. He explained that God created Adam and Eve from all kinds of soil. Some of this soil was white and soft, some dark and hard, and some red and flexible like the Bedouin. 'This is why there are so many different types of people in the world.' According to Suleīmān, Jacob and the twelve tribes of Israel were Bedouin along with his sons Joseph and Benjamin who travelled out of Egypt to 'live here around Bi'r Sab' [Beersheba]'. He went on to tell the story of Moses, largely his youth and exodus from Egypt to Sinai. Suleīmān described how the Pharaoh drowned in the Red Sea and that God decided to make an 'example of him'. 'From the end of that time until today, the Pharaoh's people, the Egyptians, are an example of bad and weak people.'

Suleīmān explained that Judaism began 3,000 years ago and Christianity was established when Jesus came into the world through the breath of God. After his birth, the *shuyūkh* from Bedouin tribes came to talk to the infant prophet and provided him with wisdom about life. He went on to state:

Now at 2000 years, the Qu'rān was written down. But we Muslims believe in Moses, Jesus, and all of the prophets. We believe in the Torah, the Bible, and the Qu'rān but the Jewish know only the Torah and know nothing of the Qu'rān and Bible.... All of this in the Qu'rān. It says there in the history of the Qu'rān that Joseph was Bedouin. You can teach and learn about all of our stories. To know about the past, about today, and about the future. All of this is known from the Qu'rān but now you can find it on the Internet.

It was not surprising that Suleīmān presented the history of Bedouin through a Muslim perspective. When asked about his religious beliefs, Suleīmān was well versed in popular *Sharī'a* doctrine. He often took the time in the evenings to explain the stories from the Qu'rān to the family. Suleīmān made great efforts to not only acknowledge the Bedouin origins of various Islamic figures but also to connect them to Christian biblical figures. This was (in part) due to the fact that upon moving to the village, Suleīmān and his family had quickly assumed Ike and I were Christians because we were not Jewish nor Muslim, despite the fact that we said we were not religious. Finally, Suleīmān and Fāṭimah also prayed several times a day. A small mosque was located on the eastern side of Suleīmān's property, everyday he and his brother would share responsibility for giving the calls to prayer and he and his agnates travelled to nearby towns each Friday to worship at the larger mosques there.

Most Bedouin villages and towns have constructed mosques which are associated with specific lineages (*'ā'ilāt*). The size and construction of mosques differs dramatically as their presence has become a way to display the wealth of an *'ā'ilāt* and thus there is often competition between families to create grander mosques than their neighbours. Moreover, many mosques are constructed with financial assistance from not only wealthy members but also Muslim 'brothers' from places such as Qatar. As such, local Bedouin Islamic spokespersons go out of their way to appear not only pious but also unbiased by family affiliations in order to promote 'brotherhood' with these potential funders and the 'community of believers' (*'Ummah Wāhidah*) at large despite the fact that neighbourhood mosques are often associated with particular *'ā'ilāt*.

Many individuals are also taking up codes of piety and standard Islamic practices in order to gain moral authority and appeal for economic resources outside of the customary tribal system. Here younger generations such as Suleīmān are identifying with the broader Islamic community as being 'more rationalised' and offering 'a mode

of more egalitarian sociability to the inhabitants [among] families and lineages of modest status' (Parizot 2001a: 141). For example, Ibrāhīm Abū Shārib (Director the Rāhaṭ Community Centre) expressed this sentiment as the following:

Today the Bedouin community is trying to balance between modern and Bedouin honour, government, justice, and customs. Religion is bringing the Bedouin to the modern way of life because the tribal traditions are backward. Religion is bringing us closer to the modern way of life because women could not study under tradition and religion allows women to study. Tradition and religion do not agree.

Suleīmān explained a similar sentiment to me:

In the 1980s the Islamic Movement became very popular here and living a Muslim life became significant among the people here. The older generations resisted the Islamic Movement but the younger generations have accepted Islam. Islam is much more rational way to understand our life and history. It has better logic about life and explains the reasons ways things are as they are. I would rather go to the Mosque than sit in the *shigg* and listen to folktales about the past.

In all, while Islamic heritage in the Negev does not necessarily exclude elders (*kbār*) or wholly by-pass tribal (*‘ā’iliyya*) networks, the socio-political connections established between Muslims have become additional channels and stages through which *‘ā’ilāt* and religious spokespersons in their ranks obtain and legitimate resources from other Muslim groups and organisations outside of their society (Parizot 2001a).

Several months later towards the end of my fieldwork, I managed to privately sit with Suleīmān again and asked him to again explain the history of the Negev Bedouin and the village of Khashem Zana’. On this occasion, I also asked why the al-‘Ā’sam tribal namesake kept coming up during conversations about history when Suleīmān identifies as al-‘Athāmīn? He explained:

We are both part of the Tiyaḥā who wandered from Saudi and Yemen through to Sinai to the Negev in ancient times and they say that the Tiyaḥā got lost in the desert and separated from the tribes. We came to the Negev and al-ʿAthāmīn have lands within the Tiyaḥā and Gdīrāt territory and so do the al-ʿĀʿsam, which is now our tribe and al-ʿAthāmīn is our *ʿāʿila*. A hundred years ago my great grandfather went in search of his own land within the Tiyaḥā lands when he came upon a ridge located east of Biʿr Sabʿ [Beersheba]. He decided to live there and cleared the land through *hajer* and prepared the soil for farming. He established Khashem. It means nose because of the ridge to the west. He was the first to do agriculture and he was good at it and was able to live off of the products from the ground. So more and more families from within the tribe came to live here.

For members such as Suleīmān, Bedouin history before the creation of the Israeli state in 1948 is contextualised through one's tribal network including one's confederation (*gabīla*) such as the Tiyaḥā, sub-confederation (*saff*) such as the Gdīrāt, and tribe (*ashīra*) such as al-ʿĀʿsam. These affiliations were the broadest forms of tribal identification in both the past and today. For example, another informant further explained:

So many tribes come from the same tree. These trees have a Shaykh of Shaykhs. In the Negev, these trees are the Tarabīn, the Jubarāt, the ʿAzāzmah, and the biggest of them all, the Tiyaḥā. Now, I have to go back a long time ago, past 1,200 years. At 1,200 years, the biggest of all the Bedouin were living in the area known as Yemen today. Not in Saudi Arabia but in the Arab Gulf.... The Arabic Island. At 1,200 years, all the Bedouin that are today in Iraq, in Syria, in Lebanon, in Jordan, in Saudi Arabia, in Sinai, in Palestine, in Egypt, in Tunisia, in Libya, in Morocco come from Jabīlat al-Banī Hilāl and at that time, there was a very, very, big tribe. They also had a strong shaykh. Together, they made a tribal confederation and it was Banī Hilāl. In the Banī Hilāl there were many strong *gabāʿil* living in Yemen and Saudi today but the biggest tribes lived in Yemen. And before 1,200 years, they had a lot of cows and camels and sheep and had many women. However, at some point, the pastures started to become dry, cause of lack of rain, so they started to move north to look for a place where they could find grass.

However, because they were very strong, they would take over or occupy all the places before them....

However, there were some people in the group that were tired, who stayed in the back, and but they lost their way in Sinai because it is a large desert, you know. So they didn't find their way and got lost, so people called them the *Tiyāhā* or 'The People Who Lost Their Way'. And so the people that lost their way in Sinai, they came to be called the *Tiyāhā*. So they stayed in Sinai while the other people continued to occupy all North Africa, Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia, all of the Bedouin there are *Banī Hilāl*. So these Bedouin that stayed in Sinai, before say 580 years, they like others such as the *Tarabīn* came to Sinai. However, *Tarabīn* and *Tiyāhā*, they are the biggest of the *gabīla*. Around 580 years ago they moved north and occupied the Negev. From that time, they came together and took the land from the *Banī Jarīr* – *Abū Jāber*. So they divided the land, but this caused many wars such as the War of Zari' but I will tell you about that later.

In tribal contexts, Bedouin conceive of their socio-political connections 'as branches from the same tree' and *gabīla* namesakes provide shared but fixed reference points to rationalise how contemporary '*ā'ilāt*' came to be in the Negev. Through 'proven' links to common apical ancestors, genealogies communicate and legitimate previous tribal territories, familial reputations, and social positions. In particular, genealogical connections to the past establish members' pedigree and 'inherited' membership among other '*ā'ilāt*' with the highest status in southern Israel. Today when asked about the history of their lineages ('*ā'ilāt*'), people such as *Suleīmān* making claims to have Arabian origins ('*aṣīl*'), continue to reference their connections to the *Tiyāhā* through their tribes ('*ashā'ir*').

Members without established origins (non-'*aṣīl*') to Negev lands also employ genealogical rhetoric when discussing their histories with others (Parizot 2001a). In particular, they call forth tribal groups that were established after 1948 under alternative or 'new' namesakes (or constructed entities of tribal affiliation) and superimpose a genealogy onto said groups despite the fact that these tribal namesakes do not have a

common genealogical origins or (at the very least) their origins can be highly contested when compared to others. Up until the 1960s, those who once served as sharecroppers (*badū fallāḥīn*) to larger tribes (*‘ashā’ir*) could not customarily claim direct Arabian heritage through their lineage namesakes like their previous patrons. Today, however, a small minority within this status group declare themselves ‘persons with origins’ (*‘aṣīliyyin*) through ‘distant’ *gabīla* relations (confederations outside of the Negev) by circumventing their previous patrons’ *‘ashā’ir* in order to reassert their tribal connection (be it once client-based) to the Negev.¹¹⁰ As one informant stated, ‘They [non-*‘aṣīl*] are claiming our history, our heritage as their own. They want to be connected to the big families but their claims depend on who they are speaking to and to some they claim to be authentic people with roots to connect them to the lands and to others they cannot do this.’

Local reconstructions of genealogies continue to be the most ubiquitous form of collective historicity in the Bedouin Middle East. Shryock (1997: 314) pointed out that genealogical reconstructions have become ‘quite ordinary for the culture-making classes to drape new identities in the legitimacy of older, genealogical traditions and vice versa’. Drawing on his notion of ‘authenticating genealogy’ (Shryock 1997), this chapter suggests that common features of this practice among the Bedouin in the Negev include: (1) legitimating contemporary status through local historical discourses; and (2) intensified concern with proving descent and ancestry through archival documents.

For example, many families collect historical books such as Arif al-Arif’s (1933, 1934) works about Bedouin history produced during the British Mandate. Several chapters in his 1934 *Tā’rīkh* focus on tribal confederation namesakes (*gabā’il*), which further describe the history, leaders, territories, and reputations of tribes (*ashā’ir*)

¹¹⁰ They publically declare to have Arabian origins (*‘aṣīl*) through shared descent with confederations found in the Arabian Gulf.

composing these confederations. Today many spokespersons' historical narratives pertaining to genealogy 'read' similarly to al-Arif's writings. People often cite his written accounts during their retellings and, when unavailable, they look for other historical materials resourced from foreign archives; particularly materials that other lineages (*'ā'ilāt*) have yet to claim but reference more distant tribal *gabā'il* connected to the Arabian Peninsula from which they legitimate their affiliations.

As suggested in this chapter, however, genealogical (*nasabi*) heritage is not the only type of 'tribal' history in the Negev. After the 1948 War, lineage (*'ā'ilāt*) histories (nonetheless connected through genealogy) have also developed into unique but competitive representations of the past. Unlike genealogies, they set out to distinguish and compare groups with the same origins, status, and experiences during the 1948 War, Military Administration (1948-1966), and coerced urbanisation (1967-1996). As Abu Rabia (2008: 103) argued, members perceive this post-1948 past in 'an entirely different manner; the past now meant the era before the establishment of the state for those who experienced it, as opposed to the ... new life of displacement from their land and from their previous existence'.

Since the mid-twentieth century, these treatments of the past explain why certain lineages (*'ā'ilāt*) remained on their customary tribal (*'ashā'irī*) lands while the Israeli state forcibly displaced others to specific Negev areas after 1948 (Abu Rabia 2008) or why certain tribes (*'ashīra*) were recognised as tribal units (*shevetim*) by the state and others were not. Their articulations were the domain of tribal resident groups (in both towns and villages) who shared this knowledge among themselves and differentiate their *'ā'ilāt*'s experiences. Consequently, this localised past is inescapably particularised as 'entire tribal kinship groups participated in its handing down ... [thus] each tribe possesses its own history and truth' (Abu Rabia 2008: 101). In efforts to

establish their own forms of historical capital, these particularisms have intensified since the creation of Israel. For example:

Suleīmān: They [al-‘Athāmīn] did not get a *ṭābū* [land deed] from the Ottoman because it would cost money to bring the surveyors here to map the land. But the Abū Kāff did. They had enough money to pay for this and get a document that they have passed to their sons. But it does not matter today. Despite having these documents, the state takes away their lands. The British also wanted us to get a *ṭābū* and they came to Khashem Zana‘ from Bi’r Sab‘ [Beersheba] and started measuring the land. They created a military point on top of the hill but we did not see the necessity of the paper and paying them. The military point was a station on the road that led all the way to Jordan. The British took people from Khashem Zana‘ to repair the Suez Canal and many died there and are now buried underneath the water.

Emilie: What did the al-‘Athāmīn do during the 1948 War?

Suleīmān: In the War, the shaykh of al-‘Ā‘sam fled and left most their belongings. Many big families went out of Israel to Jordan. Others like us, refused to leave and some fought.... After Israel was created the state needed workers and made men from the family work on building roads with no pay. Khashem Zana‘ was in the *Sīyāj* so people did not move and convinced other families not to move from our historical roots.

As Suleīmān explained above, many lineages (‘*ā’ilāt*) at the time saw no need to get official documentation in the form of a *ṭābū* because the Ottomans charged money for deeds and fees for surveyors to map their tribal boundaries.¹¹¹ Alternatively, land-owning ‘*ā’ilāt* recorded the location and size of their plots on deeds (*sanād*), a traditional document outlining business arrangements with farming tenants who cultivated tribal lands (Kressel et al. 1991). ‘Every Bedouin recognizes and respects the

¹¹¹ The Ottomans often provided documentation of land sales between the Empire and tribes (‘*ashā’ir*). They also created written records of land inheritance and paper receipts of taxes paid on properties often registered and kept in courts in Jerusalem and Beersheba (Abu Sitta 2009).

sanad and knows exactly where his land lies - from which stone to which bush - and where his brother's land begins and ends' (Lori Haaretz 2010).¹¹²

Today old *tābū* and *sanād* are valued documents among those who own and preserved them as material records of their history and land claims (see Figure 14). People keep archival records in family libraries and, occasionally, framed and hung on the walls' of agnate meeting places (*shigg*). In an interview with Abu Rabia (2008: 104), a member of the Abū Shārib explained:

The papers are title deeds ... because this is our land that we planted ... our land is empty today, and we have proof that it is our land that we own. It is marked. This is my ownership, so one of these days, when perhaps I will die and their mother, too, this is what they will have left. They need to tell their children that there is land, and I have documents and photocopies. I photocopied those documents a few times and arranged them in my folder. I put all my papers away, in order.



Figure 14: Negev *sanād* document – n.d. (Dukium 2014).

Over the last half of the twentieth century, spokespersons have also utilised their particularised lineage (*‘ā’ilāt*) narratives to create parochial ethno-histories of state-built

¹¹² The British Mandate continued textual record keeping while at the same time both the Mandate and the Ottoman Empire, also recognised land ownership through customary law.

towns and ‘historic villages’ (see Suleīmān’s first narrative in this section).¹¹³ By doing so, they strive to ‘speak past’ familial politics to represent their residents as people (*sha’ab*) and communities (*mujtama*) to non-Bedouin outsiders. These narratives foremost define Bedouin experience in the Negev by their relationships with non-Bedouin and the governments that have ruled the Negev over the last century.

In all, Suleīmān’s oral presentations, hand-outs, and interviews pertaining to Bedouin and Khashem Zana’ not only established their genealogy but also strategically connected his family to tribal (*‘ā’iliyya*) namesakes but through rhetorical manoeuvres and literary materials also strived to identify himself and other Bedouin as Muslims and placed his village in national Israeli and Palestinian contexts. In particular, his narratives tactfully rationalised and connected local experiences to Western and Islamic ideals, regional languages, chronological periods, and broader international events; practices reflective of the particularities and universalisms prevalent in Bedouin lives in southern Israel. In doing so, however, most Bedouin spokespersons are socio-politically cognisant that in regional and national contexts: the historical origins of tribal namesakes do not mean anything to non-Bedouin audiences; expressions of Islamic heritage are uncomfortable to Jewish stakeholders; and their Israeli citizenship is frequently deemed problematic to Palestinian representatives and *vice versa*.

As a consequence, Suleīmān and other Bedouin spokespersons’ efforts have, over time, strategically merged local knowledge and learned historical registers thus creating a unique type of historicity. Building on Eickelman’s work (1989: 127), this chapter argues that generative historical registers among Bedouin in the Negev include:

(1) ideologies (such as genealogy and tribalism [*gabaliyya* or *‘ā’iliyya*]) customarily

¹¹³ As briefly noted, Bedouin spokespersons include: elders (*kbār*) representing lineage (*‘ā’ilāt*) members of particular tribal (*gabaliyya* and *‘ā’iliyya*) networks and their residential groups in villages and town neighbourhoods; municipal and professional politicians representing constituents on various state governmental stages; civic leaders working on behalf of particular villages, towns, and civil society groups including gender and youth groups; and religious leaders (including *imam* and Islamic Movement).

used by Bedouin to describe their society and history; (2) outside generated registers associated with nationalisms and universalisms such as tribal administration units (*shevatom*), religious associations, and civil society; (3) practical proclivities ‘implicitly held’ by members such as inherited social status that guide everyday behaviours; and (4) learned concepts employed by scholars and others when describing Bedouin societies such as notions of nomadism or pastoralism.¹¹⁴ This combination and shifting between learned and customary registers not only reflects the diverse nature of local history but also the heterogeneous nature of Bedouin society itself.

In all, spokespersons such as Suleimān and others have substantially expanded local representational repertoires communicating Negev Bedouin history in various public spheres over the last decades. Unlike many Bedouin populations in the Middle East who are not frequently in situations where they must reflect upon their social order or histories with outsiders (Eickelman 1989), Bedouin in the Negev have been forced to rationalise their own society and history since the 1960s because of Israeli marginalisation. As a result, from the mid-twentieth century onward, a diverse network of local Bedouin spokespersons has emerged; people who publically represent a range of ‘communities’ in their society. Their representational responsibilities are diverse and their internal relationships with each other vary (discussed at the end of this section). Nevertheless, most spokespersons encountered during fieldwork all drew on (in their unique ways) ethnohistorical, Islamic, and genealogical/tribal notions of the past to establish specific socio-political relationships in the Negev.

Local spokespersons present histories in order to create specific sets of relationships, even if only for a moment, in particular public venues. Because of the temporality of these meetings and the strong ideological beliefs often held by their

¹¹⁴ Eickelman (1989:127) labels these various representations as ‘generative schemes’ that when taken together ‘form matrices of symbolic representations – perceptions, appreciations, and actions – that mediate the conditions of [social] existence’.

audiences, Bedouin spokespersons must effectively and quickly draw on their knowledge of broader identity politics characterising various public domains. Parizot (2004: 4) explained:

[T]hese differences and antagonism are internalised and often perceived as a given. This is all the more true as people use these experiences to reconstruct dominant narratives that stress distinctions between these very populations.... Narratives about 'us' and the 'others' are often presented as facts ... encounters and experiences people drawn from them validate categories like, 'Bedouin' against 'Palestinian;.... In brief, while ... sharing of culture, they also foster processes of differentiation already at work among local populations. This is the case for the processes of ethnicity and community building undergone by the Bedouin who remained in the Negev.

Consequently, Bedouin spokespersons must treat their audiences as homogenised groups in order to successfully navigate the intensely diverse but highly political landscape of southern Israel. One by-product of these efforts is not merely the variation of local histories presented to various audiences but their inevitable and strategic essentialisation over time (McKee 2010).¹¹⁵

While symptomatic of sociality throughout the world, etic historical claims by spokespersons contended with a range of cross-societal encounters in Negev and universalisms familiar to their audiences. These local articulations of history, however, are also influenced by a cultural proclivity noted by Steven Caton (1990) in Yemen; acts of persuasions common to tribal politics in the Middle East. Specifically, he noted that among Yemeni tribesmen 'political rhetoric is a communicative act of persuasion which is made in response to conflict in the segmentary social order' (Caton 1990: 37-41). This chapter argues that Bedouin in the Negev also often employ historical references during private and public acts of persuasion among themselves wherein

¹¹⁵ This conclusion is similar to Michael Herzfeld's (1991: 226) argument about heritage politics which involves 'conflicting versions of the past and their realization in the present'. As he argued, people do not deny their history in light of encroaching nationalisms or alter their local engagements with the past but instead strategically multiply their regional meanings (Herzfeld 1991).

individuals, with various status, strive to legitimate, mediate, or differentiate their positionalities (at said time) within the tribal (*‘ā’iliyya*) network. These emic self-presentations (similar to etic expressions in practice) differ in content as they are directed to particular audiences comprising Negev Bedouin society, which are organised by notions of closeness and distance – socio-political proximities symptomatic to familial, tribal, and residential networks such as those described in Khashem Zana¹¹⁶ described in Section I.

The regularity and strategic-ness of these emic encounters equip Bedouin spokespersons with the ability to negotiate multiple affiliations and oppositions, which today include religious and national associations. These broader affiliations also require acts of persuasion, although they are etic in nature, to create connections and difference with others. Nevertheless, both types of representational strategies are dependent on the spokesperson’s own social knowledge, their own status among other Bedouin, their audience’s place or lack thereof in Bedouin society, and their skills at using various media. This situation makes ‘historical accounts’ (which form a substantial part of the broader identification practice) partly a by-product of persuading others (be they insiders or outsiders) of one’s social positions and negotiating similarities/differences through representational practices. To do so, spokespersons must tactically negotiate the complex socio-political landscape – situational contexts that significantly influence the variations and shifting of historical narratives articulated by Bedouin as they ‘bargain’ with others in the pursuit of status power, and resources.

While appeals to civic, religious, and state audiences have risen over previous decades, it is important to note that tribal hierarchies continue to frame local representational politics and elders (*kbār*) still largely authorise who may serve as

¹¹⁶ Eickelman (1985) discusses the practice whereby people maintain certain degrees of ‘boundary permeability’, which serve to strengthen socio-political inclusion and exclusion.

public spokespersons. This situation has encouraged extended families (*‘ā’ila*) to diversify their spokespersons and expand the scope of their representational expertise. They do so by awarding specific members the status of community advocates within their ranks, relying on them to act on their behalf towards specific audiences. Consequently, some spokespersons may not have highest status within their own tribal networks as affiliates, daughters, younger brothers, or cousins but they are typically born into dominant lineages (*‘ā’ilāt*). This is not to say, however, that members within *‘ā’ilāt* do not regularly express conflicting interests but rather, on the regional and national stages, most affiliates tend to rally together in the pursuit of resources.

In the Negev, appeals for capital, status, and resources increasingly rely upon new types of expertise, media, and evidence; creating opportunities for persuasive individuals such as Suleīmān to participate in historicity. Members such as Suleīmān are able to better engage with ethnohistory because customary leaders (*kbār*) are publically tied to tribal networks of people and cannot overtly advocate community narratives (see Parizot 2006). To do so would potentially strain their status as leading representatives of specific families and harm the reputations of their cognate networks, based on principles of independence, equality, and strength. In order to engage these community contexts, universal ideals, and national Israeli-Palestinian politics, Bedouin strategically rely on alternative intermediaries who tactfully avoid the contradictions of tribal politics whilst operating in public venues wherein they engage with non-Bedouin stakeholders.

Since the last half of the twentieth century, various extended families (*‘ā’ila*) and lineages (*‘ā’ilāt*) depend on members within their own ranks from different social and economic backgrounds, genders, and origins but who together form a new ‘class’ of advocates, historians, and politicians representing the ‘Negev Bedouin’ to the outside world (Ratcliffe 2009). To do so, however, the spokesperson’s community work must

strategically avoid the inherent particularisms of tribal histories and sociality in the Negev when working with outsiders because the ‘idea of a tribe’ is counter to Western civic ideals and regional nationalisms (Shryock 1997: 6). In order to achieve their representational credentials in external venues some intermediaries appear to overtly challenge the status of customary leaders and powerful lineages (Parizot 2006). For others, it is simply a matter of creating essentialised presentations of community history and society to non-Bedouin audiences (McKee 2010, Hall 2014) through media practices such as writing and speech-making. When doing so, they leave ‘certain things as “tribal”’ (Dresch 1989) in order to justify the uniqueness of their community, culture, land claims, and heritage (Nasasra et al. 2015).

Despite the diversification of representational responsibilities among lineages (*‘ā’ilāt*), the public domain is also an arena of intense competition among spokespersons. For example, in some venues such as community centres and municipalities (Parizot 2004), civic spokespersons publically argue that customary leaders (*shuyūkh*) and elders (*kbār*) have failed to acquire resources, rights, and recognition for the entire community because of tribal patronages, class-based inequalities, and established relationships with Israeli authorities (Parizot 2006). ‘Ā’isha, a well-known community advocate, explained the situation as such:

‘Ā’isha: Tribe can be considered as one of the important frames of our community. It is not the opposite of community. A tribe is a type or part of our community ... our common interests, shared responsibilities. Our tribes were established before the state of Israel and before our other senses of community. But the problem today with the tribal structure is that when the state of Israel was established they rearranged it and gave power to only certain parts of a tribe or certain people in the tribe. As a result, some aspects of the tribe disappeared and because of struggles the tribes have lost some of their communal values. So when I started community development work, I didn’t fight the tribal structures. We can’t do that. Instead, I wanted to bring back a sense of community

in the tribal structure as people that who share interests, values, and resources rather than competing for our concerns, values, and resources....

Emilie: Do people from your generation experience tribes and communities in different ways than your parents?

‘Ā’isha: Yes, we cannot bring back the tribes as they were in the past. We have to create new ways to bring people together. Our work as community organisers is to bring people together around issues of mutual interest to create a sense of people that not only are members of their tribes but they also belong to a community of activists, educators, youth. So this is how the issues such as Wādī Na’am [a village] is not just an issue for the ‘Azāzmah tribe. It is also an al-Šāna’ tribal issue. It is my concern. It is a community issue. We must bring attention to Bedouin community issues as shared concerns not just the concerns of one particular tribe because the government wants to separate us, tribe by tribe, to separate our interests in order to control and take over our land. We from the al-Šāna’ tribe always hear from the Israeli government for instance, that, ‘This is not your problem. It is the problem of the other tribe.’ As Bedouin activists, we have decided to take all individual tribal concerns and bring them together. The problem of ‘Azāzmah in Wādī Na’am together with al-‘Athāmīn in Khashem Zana’, and together al-‘Uqbī in al-‘Aragīb. We are all together in this struggle for recognition of our rights and land. So the activists try to make these community issues not only tribal issues.

In all, Bedouin spokespersons such as ‘Ā’isha set out to represent the community to outsiders rather than to represent particular families in civic platforms. By doing so, she and other civic spokespersons gained legitimacy among international funders and state officials because local NGOs and municipal politics should not ideally implicate family-based or class-based affiliations. As ‘Ā’isha indicated, however, despite their efforts among external audiences most spokespersons, like herself, must locally work with pre-existing lineage (‘*ā’ilāt*’) politics. This comes as community principles and ethnohistory ‘have not destroyed the authority and social organisational models registered in the tribal ethos, but coexist with them’ (Parizot 2001a: 317). In other words, while the numbers of spokespersons have diversified along with the

constituents they represent, their responsibilities are still pragmatically tied to the needs of their *‘ā’ilāt*.

Civic and religious spokespersons may challenge conservatism or tribalism (*‘ā’iliyya*) and subjugate tribal events, internal conflicts, unequal allocations of resources, and power plays in certain public venues to support collective interests and community narratives. Locally, however, these same civic and religious spokespersons often work with elders (*kbār*) to buttress the capacity of their *‘ā’ilāt* and cognates to conduct their own bilateral negotiations with various others (Ratcliffe 2009). In all, *‘ā’ilāt* networks have *kbār* and community advocates such as *‘Ā’isha* working on behalf of their interests. This is a similar occurrence in Jordan, ‘If a son of an ashira [tribe] works in the bureaucracy, he should help the members of the ashira meet their needs not on the basis of well-functioning bureaucracy (which is normally not recognized), but by means of his recognizable traditional authority and relationships in the bureaucracy’ (Al-Shboul et al. 2012: 224).

In conclusion, the ‘Negev Bedouin’ histories are ambiguous and the spokespersons creating them are diverse. Thus articulations of histories (presented in Hebrew, English, and Arabic) in the Negev hold various meanings to different people (including Bedouin members themselves) who interpret and reinterpret these constructions in multiple ways. Similar to Charles Piot’s (1993) description of the Kabre of Togo, Bedouin spokespersons have taken advantage of the multiple meanings of socio-political categories in southern Israel and disparate interpretations of history there. Bedouin strategically ‘play’ (see Gilsenan 1976) with the ambiguity of historical registers in order to conceal or reveal certain meanings, which in their emic categories of the world are not bound by Western notions of history in the same way. In particular, outsiders’ descriptions of their society and past differ from peoples’ own representations as ‘[s]ome meanings are shared, other are challenged or denied, and

most are consciously altered in the process of transmission' over time (Eickelman 1989: 127-180).

This meaningful 'play' of historicity, however, also involves strategic poly-mediations (Madianou and Miller 2011) such as selecting between audio recordings, written documents, material artefacts, and photographic images to communicate and legitimate tribal, Islamic, and ethno-historical narratives. While the presence of literature and multi-media platforms for these efforts has been explored in the anthropology of the Middle East, Bedouin inscriptive media practices and material appropriations in the Negev have not been fully examined, despite their specificity; namely, the highly intense political landscape of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the sheer numbers of outsiders Bedouin regularly interact with on a daily basis in which identity clashes are common and topics of history debated.

A. *POLY-MEDIATIONS AND THE EXPANDING SPECTRUM OF PROOF*

Over the last twenty years, Bedouin have increasingly utilised learned and web-based sources such as archival literature, documents, and artefacts not only in their everyday lives but in the decisive pursuit of much needed resources, which include: validating their various historical perspectives; countering accusations of lying; proving claims such as land ownership; and making connections and disconnections within a range of socio-political networks. Over the last three decades, these materials and aims have become central to the practices of historicity described in this chapter.

As discussed earlier, Bedouin members have intensified their use of evidentiary documentation, such as texts in the form of customary documents (*sanād*) and Ottoman and British land titles, over the last thirty years; particularly when dealing with the Israeli government. While treated as authentic and authoritative forms of knowledge

among Bedouin spokespersons, their use of historical documents in different contexts, for example during legal proceedings with the state, are proving problematic as Israeli courts often reinterpret these texts to support their own arguments and/or dismiss particular documents such as *sanād* as inconclusive.

For example, in a 2011 court case involving al-‘Ugbī land claims, scholars Oren Yiftachel and Ruth Kark were called as witnesses to debate the history of Bedouin nomadism and agriculture in the region wherein they presented land deeds and other historical records in the form of travel writings, specifically those of Alois Musil (1908), as evidence for both plaintiffs’ and defendants’ positions. The court ruled, however, in favour of state’s argument based on Kark’s testimony and her reading of Musil’s work suggesting the al-‘Ugbī did not consistently reside on said land over the last century and therefore could not make claims to the property today.

This thesis argues that, in light of the above-mentioned struggles, Bedouin in the Negev have increasingly turned to archival photographic and digital images as an additional type of evidence authenticating their own historical knowledge over the last ten years. It also suggests that the increased incorporation of images alongside oral testimonies and text-based accounts in these contexts has widened the Bedouin’s existing spectrum of proof in the Negev. As a consequence, their representational landscape is now, more so than ever before, characterised by Bedouin spokespersons’ poly-mediation of historical knowledge – a unique Negev discourse in light of: (1) the temporal nature of their media practices and shifting of spokespersons there (as discussed in the last section); and (2) the perceived ‘truth (*ṣaḥīḥ*)’ value’ of different media – that is the varied evidentiary authority awarded to oral, text, and visual media in the Negev for communicating and ‘proving’ historical knowledge.

Within this spectrum of proof, customary oral histories, testimonies have been the primary mode for communicating history in the Negev from time immemorial, a

representational repertoire and custom largely controlled by *shuyūkh* and elders (*khabār*). As literacy and urbanisation increased in the Negev from the 1950s onward, people such as *mukhtār-shuyūkh*, previous tribal clients (*badū fallāḥīn*), Bedouin academics, and local civic and religious spokespersons are now able to authenticate their historical knowledge of the Negev Bedouin not only in speech but also with the perceived authoritative assistance of written text.¹¹⁷ This thesis argues that over the last ten years Bedouin spokespersons in the Negev have continued to widen their poly-mediations to include visual media, particularly in the form of photographs and digital images, as various communication technologies become more readily available to them in the Negev.

For example, the Negev has witnessed a proliferation of radios, televisions, and cameras since the 1970s in family homes, particularly in the towns. Moreover, members' ability to read and access literature, watch programmes, listen to news and music, and access information has steadily improved because of telecommunications and the mobile Internet in Israel over the last ten years. Today they also use mobile phones, laptop computers, iPads, and other electronic and digital devices such as cameras, iPods, etc., irrespective of residence. In fact, most have regular access to mobile phones and a large percentage of younger adults possess or have access to computers or iPads, which connect to the Internet through Israeli service providers.¹¹⁸

Without delving too far into epistemology, this section argues that many Bedouin spokespersons utilise these communication technologies to source and present epistolary documentation in the form of photographic and digital images in order to 'evidence' their historical knowledge; particularly images that members perceive as

¹¹⁷ This thesis argues that oral and textual economies have their own unique communication processes (language/literacy), technological changes, and dialectics between people/discourse; however, these topics are beyond the scope of this thesis.

¹¹⁸ Most Israeli citizens have regular access to the Internet. Mobile companies such as Orange and Telecom offer a range of ways to own mobile and Web USB modems.

having stronger ‘truth values’ or more visual authenticity such as old pictures, for example, because of their age. Taking up Timothy Williamson’s (2000) position,¹¹⁹ this thesis argues that these documentary materials, when treated as evidence, are ultimately valued for the knowledge they are used to support. As such, photographs, for example, only have authority or ‘truth values’ as evidence if the person using them knows what types of knowledge are being justified through them. With this approach, this thesis argues that the authority of photographic and digital images as evidentiary objects is predicated on their ability to be ‘read’ and ‘used’ for legitimating specific types of local historical knowledge, which in the Bedouin case includes diverse and selective readings of tribal, Islamic, and ethno histories in different Negev contexts.

Amid the various forms of historical evidence available to Bedouin spokespersons, this thesis suggests that photographic and digital images’ are unique objects for the study of local historicity in the Negev. Unlike oral and text-based statements, images’ indexical qualities have the power of implied and multiple meaning, alternating temporalities, and diverse yet simultaneous display – all qualities expressed during their circulations in and between different visual economies. During their travels, images (and their collections) can also represent knowledge without saying or reading so, thus bypassing issues of language and literacy, and diversifying established patterns of authority in Negev Bedouin society. In particular, images communicate (what Bedouin believe to be) objective information not only as signs but also through their mediated but polyvalent presence(s) as material objects and digital codes, a situation that allows a wide range of images-users to confirm historical meaning through ownership, exhibition, archiving, and display.

In order to demonstrate how images as collections of evidentiary objects and floating signifiers are essential to understanding the inclusivity and exclusivity of local

¹¹⁹ For Williamson (2000: 185), evidence is whatever justifies a particular belief.

historicity among Bedouin in southern Israel, Part II describes the complex discursive landscape whereby popular visual iconography of Negev Bedouin and the technologies creating them have been produced and consumed over the centuries. It then presents five case studies in Chapters Five and Six describing and examining the unique circulations and presence(s) of images employed during the making of Bedouin historical narratives. These case studies document how a collection of ‘significant’ images circulate in and out of Bedouin society as they justify and legitimate various types of historical knowledge in the Negev. The conclusions of these chapters also briefly explore the last qualifier in Poole’s (1997) visual economy model: the values of images in Bedouin society. ‘Here it becomes important to ask not what specific images *mean* but, rather, how images accrue value’ (Poole 1997: 10).

PART II

IMAGES AMONG A PEOPLE

CHAPTER FOUR

SHIFTING IMAGE WORLDS

It is relatively easy to imagine the people of Paris and Peru, for example, participating in the same 'economy'. To imagine or speak of them as part of a 'shared 'culture' is considerably more difficult. I use the word 'economy' ... with the intention of capturing this sense of how visual images move across national and cultural boundaries.

(Deborah Poole 1997: 8)

As of 2015, photographic and digital depictions have saturated the people's lives in the Negev. For the most part, images circulate in isolation from one another. In many instances, they exert their presence(s) alone, unaccompanied by fellow images produced in the same series and instead communicate through poly-mediations in books, during conversations, and on websites. Notwithstanding their isolated sojourns, images of Negev Bedouin share 'histories' and work with one another through various technologies to create visual knowledge. Moreover, when brought together under certain conditions, say within specific networks of things and people, images of Bedouin in the Negev have generated unique visual tropes over the last centuries; specific iconography that has come to influence diverse representations of 'Negev Bedouin' history within various socio-political settings.

To further explore these dynamics,¹²⁰ the following chapter asks: What would a discursive map of nested visual economies in the Negev look like? What are the general production and consumption characteristics of images of Negev Bedouin? What are the main ideological and technological underpinnings of Bedouin visual iconography in southern Israel? To answer these questions, the proceeding sections draw on Poole's

¹²⁰ Throughout this chapter, the terms 'contexts' and 'image worlds' will both broadly refer to visual economies.

(1997) concept of visual economy and archival and empirical research conducted during my fieldwork to describe the production and consumption (this chapter), and circulation patterns of photographs and digital code (Chapters Five and Six) depicting Bedouin in the Negev. This chapter argues that the photographic and digital images produced over the last hundred years have created several nested but well-established visual economies – firmaments of vision and knowledge that contribute to the broader framing of Bedouin history and society in southern Israel.

In order to account for these visual economies, the succeeding sections augment Poole's paradigm by describing visual economies in the Negev at coexisting proximities but different levels of interaction. They argue that iconic images of Negev Bedouin have been produced and consumed within different representational contexts in recent centuries, creating six main visual economies in southern Israel.¹²¹ For the purposes of analysis, they are labelled: global (a) – international and religious communities (civic and Islamic); macro (b) – Israel/Palestinian nationalities; meso (c) – Bedouin (heterogeneous classes) society in the Negev; meso (d) – named lineages (*'ā'ilāt* - identified by tribal names, genealogical ancestry, and ancestral descent); micro (e) – extended family (*'ā'ila*) and networks of cognates; and micro (f) – immediate family (*bayt*). These visual contexts are organised by proximity or Bedouin ideals of closeness and distance that not only differentiate levels of interaction between members but also illuminate the various types of Negev Bedouin iconography contributing to local historicity today.

In addition to landscaping representational contexts, this chapter also describes the production of images of Negev Bedouin chronologically. The visual economies discussed are arranged by the dates of their dominant image producers, for example,

¹²¹ For the purposes of analysis, these visual economies have been evened-out. Notwithstanding, some visual economies, such as those characterising Israeli and Palestinian nationalisms, often have more influence in Bedouin lives than others.

individuals and institutions bringing specific images into the world.¹²² The chronology of each visual economy differs as Westerners, Israeli Jewish, Palestinian, and Bedouin people appropriated image-making technologies at various times but together they span the late nineteenth century up until 2013 (the end of my fieldwork). In this regard, the chapter provides a historiography of Negev Bedouin image-works and broader ideological contexts such as Orientalism and nationalisms influencing their making.¹²³

This chapter also describes the economic organisation (technological qualities) of images and their consumption or ‘viewings’ characterising each visual economy. At the end of the nineteenth century, for example, many images of Bedouin in Negev took the form of stereographs. During the mid-twentieth century, black and white film and paper images dominated. At the turn of the twenty-first century, images are digital codes. Throughout this time, images were stored in national and regional archives and consumed by outsiders in magazines and newspapers. In the twenty-first century, however, consumptions increased and now images cross international, language, and physical borders via the Internet, mobiles, and websites.

By differentiating visual economies in southern Israel as distinctive yet nested representational fields within politicalised knowledge ecologies, this thesis aims to provide a discursive map for ‘reading’ the landscapes through which images sojourn, maintain presence, influence historical meaning, and acquire values as they are circulated by and among Bedouin (such as those described in Chapters Five and Six). In particular, this chapter describes and organises the relevant visual economies whereby Bedouin living in the Negev engage ‘vision and knowledge’ (Poole 1997) through photographic and digital images of their society over the centuries.

¹²² For a list of photographers of Negev Bedouin, see Appendix V.

¹²³ It is beyond the scope and space of this project to account for exchange values among *non-Bedouin* or their visual practices. This thesis acknowledges that the visual practices of outsiders, such as Israeli photographers, extremely influence Bedouin members’ own image-making efforts and semiotics.

I. MACRO GLOBAL AND NATIONAL VISUAL ECONOMIES

The production of photographic and digital images of Bedouin peoples in the Negev by outsiders has a long history. Some are vintage postcards created and sold to Victorian tourists visiting the Holy Land whilst others are digital works commissioned by NGOs depicting human rights abuses in Israel. Non-Bedouin travellers, expatriates, colonialists, regional governments, missionaries, and foreign photographers are largest producers of these types of images of Negev Bedouin (Graham-Brown 1988). While the age, materiality, style, and production technologies of images of Bedouin in this part of the Middle East vary considerably; their contents, purposes, consumptions, and circulations within these broader visual economies have remained remarkably unchanged over the last hundred years.

(A) *Global – International Visual Economy* – Internationally and nationally-produced imagery of Bedouin in the Middle East depict cultural material objects, desert landscapes, and costumed subjects. Over time these depictions have created visual tropes pertaining to tribalism, honour, and tradition. In particular, images portrayed Bedouin in Levant as ‘a people of the past’, emphasising their pastoral nomadic way of life and highlighting their Otherness in relation to regional urbanites and Europeans. Consequently, over the last 150 years, visual representations of Negev Bedouin are firmly situated within Orientalist imaginings of tribalism and nomadism in the Middle East. These depictions present stereotypical images of the Holy Land and Bedouin natives but rarely accurately depict local ways of life. Thus photographic and digital images’ exchange values in these macro visual economies often say more about the interests, perceptions, technological capacities, and culture of the image-makers, in this case outsiders, than the Bedouin peoples depicted in them (Jacobson 2004).

The earliest visual depictions of Bedouin (regionally referred to as *badū* or '*arab*') populations developed alongside Islamic art in the seventh century. Visual art from this time is organised by period: Early Period (Umayyad Dynasty [661-750] and the Abbasid Caliphate [750-1258]), the Medieval Period (ninth-fifteenth centuries), and Modern Period (fifteenth century to 1815, a time when the Ottoman Empire or Caliphate ruled Levant). During these eras, people residing in this Muslim-ruled region created visual depictions of Middle Eastern peoples in the form of paintings, miniatures, illuminated manuscripts, and illustrations in bounded volumes or albums (*muraqqa*).

Many historians consider the Abbasid Caliphate (749-1258) the Islamic Golden Age. During this period, court patrons commissioned paintings depicting the Empire's peoples, events, and other scenes. Around the fifteenth century, however, Abbasid art patronages collapsed in the wake of colonisation by the Ottoman Empire and later European powers. During the early Ottoman Period (est. fourteenth century), manuscripts contained illustration of various Middle Eastern populations (see *Books of Festivals* [*Surname-I Hümayun*] 1524, 1530, 1582, 1720). For example, see Figure 15, a sixteenth century painting depicting the murder of an envoy by Bedouin in the Arabian Gulf.



Figure 15: 'Murder of Ma'sum Beg, the envoy of the Safavid Shah Tahmasp, by Beduins in the Hijaz' (1581).

From the eighteenth century onwards, European Orientalist styles influenced Islamic art produced under the rule of the late Ottoman Empire in the wake of Christian pilgrimages and tourism, Western colonisation and territorial wars, and commercial trade between Europe and Asia. During this 'rediscovery' of the Arab world, Europeans produced visual depictions of Bedouin peoples in the Middle East for Western audiences in the form of paintings and illustrations from the sixteenth century onward. For example, George Sandys (1615 [1577-1644]) published his experiences in Egypt and the Holy Land, included in his work were drawings and maps of the region's inhabitants and various populations residing in Levant. Illustrations of the region's peoples and landscapes were also included in *Description de l'Egypte* (1798), which contained the illustrative works of over 2,000 European artists, draftsmen and engravers who accompanied Napoleon Bonaparte's army on its 1798 Egyptian campaign. Another

example of early illustrations of Bedouin people in the Middle East is John Wilson's book *Lands of the Bible* (1847) produced during his visit to Egypt, Syria, and Palestine (see Figure 16).



Figure 16: Illustration Tiyāhā Shaykh (1847) by John Wilson.

By the nineteenth century, European fascination with the Orient solidified in art and scholarly discourses on the Middle East. 'On a visual art media-scape it influenced everything from the Orientalist school of painting in the French Academy to the picture postcards tourists sent home to their families' (Graham-Brown 1988: 5). In particular, French and British Orientalist schools of painting began to emerge associated with *Vogue de l'Orient* (Sanbar 2014). Artworks depicting Bedouin in the Orient focused on

visual clichés of the ‘wild Bedouin, harems, biblical characters, and Oriental decay’ (Graham-Brown 1988: 54). Painters portrayed Bedouin as fierce warriors and noble savages of the Middle Eastern deserts. One popular example was American tourist painter, John Singer Sargent who produced his ‘Bedouin series’ *in situ* during his travels in Ottoman Palestine (see Figure 17).



Figure 17: ‘Bedouin Camp’ (c. 1905) by John Singer Sargent.

Visual iconography of Bedouin substantially increased in both the Middle East and Europe with invention of plate (1839) and film (1885) photography. Because of their realistic indexical qualities, photographic portrayals of Middle Eastern cultures, people, and landscapes proliferated in the nineteenth century. Many photographs of Bedouin in the region often replicated Orientalist themes thus reflecting Victorian aesthetics of studio displays, theatrical poses, and exotic peoples, landscapes, and objects (see Figure 18). Foreign travelling photographers (see Appendix V) created

photographic images of Bedouin types. Their images were reprinted in a ‘deluge of books, slides, postcards, and other memorabilia of biblical Palestine’ (Graham-Brown 1988: 45). These images became souvenirs for tourists, artistic study aids for painters, and empirical documents for historians, scholars, and government officials (Jacobson 2007). Early anthropologists also used photographs for scientific study of ‘native Bedouin types’ associated with physiognomy conventions whereby full-face and profile portraits reproduced measurable information (see Shanklin 1946).



Figure 18: ‘Bedouin mothers carrying their children on their shoulders’ (c. 1870) by Félix Bonfils.

By the end of the nineteenth century, photographic technology was firmly established in the Middle East. Residents (both local and expatriate-Europeans) of cities

such as Istanbul, Jerusalem, Beirut, and Cairo had set up studios by the 1860s. In the Levant, earlier commercial foreign photographers depicting Bedouin populations produced images between 1857-1948 (see Appendix V). In addition to commercial photographers, many British officials and foreign institutions produced photographic records of Bedouin during the Mandate Period. These included: The Jerusalem and Middle East Church Association (est. 1841) which produced a large collection of magic lantern slides; the Palestinian Exploration Fund (est. 1865);¹²⁴ and the American Colony (est. 1881).

Of these, the photographers of the American Colony, for example, produced one of the largest collections of early Negev Bedouin photographs as most other photographers at the time concentrated on northern Palestine and Jerusalem. During the British Mandate (1922-1948), Arif al-Arif commissioned the American Colony to photograph the Bedouin (see Figure 19), their way of life, and customs in southern Palestine. The images, now held in the Library of Congress's Photographic Archive, were later reproduced in al-Arif's writings (further described in Chapter Five). This archive is by far the most extensive collection of early photographs and stereographs of Negev Bedouin society and history.

¹²⁴ Key projects included: 'The Survey of Western Palestine' conducted by Claude Conder and Horatio Kitchener (1871-1878) and 'The Wilderness of Zin Archaeological Survey' conducted by Sir Leonard Woolley and T.E. Lawrence (1913-1914).



Figure 19: Aref el-Aref and Bedouin Shaykhs (c. 1920) by Eric Matson.

As briefly stated above, photographers in the first half of the twentieth century were commissioned by elite patrons, news agencies, and local governments such the Ottomans and British. Along with professional photography, upper class Middle Eastern elites in regional metropolises also gradually took up the hobby and, consequently (described next), the technology disseminated unevenly among different classes with photographs circulated within urban centres (Jacobson 2007). Until the last half of the century, the region's marginal populations never fully took up photography, leaving many peripheral areas without extensive photographic histories.

By the mid-twentieth century and the growing accessibility of cameras and film, foreign photojournalists increased production of photographs of Bedouin in the Negev. During World War I, foreign military photographers (Ottomans, British, and Australians) photographed the Beersheba region. War photography of the Negev

includes images surrounding the events and people involved in World War I in particular the Southern Palestine Campaign (1917) between the British and the Turkish. During World War II, they took images of the Battle for Beersheba (1948) between Jewish *yishuv* and Egyptians; and attacks between Jewish and Arab nationalist groups. While most images of the 1948 War were taken by Palestinian and Israeli photographers (discussed below), some foreign photojournalists such as Robert Capa (1948) managed to work in the region at the time. Most of these images were consumed in foreign periodicals such as *TIME* and *LIFE*. Access to the war-torn Negev, however, was largely restricted for foreigner visitors. Instead, various staff created photographs for refugee and humanitarian organisations such as the United Nations (1948) (see Figure 20) and International Red Cross (1948) documenting the expulsion of the Israeli state's Arab populations.



Figure 20: 'A Bedouin refugee school-master from Beersheba who collects around him the children of his tribe in the open desert East of Jericho' (1953) by the United Nations.

It was not until the 1950s that commercial and amateur photographers were able to access the Negev Bedouin and produce their own images in the form of picture books, slides, and printed paper copies for commercial sale, personal collections, news agencies, and historical records. From 1950s onward, the region also witnessed a proliferation of photojournalism by foreign media whose staff employed contemporary styles of photography including colour and ‘firing squad’ snap shots but regularly superimposed old Orientalist themes, conventions, staging, and material objects in their images. Visual signifiers included costumes, desert landscapes, and livestock representing the ideal pastoral nomad. Many also incorporated objects used in social customs and representing values such as hospitality, strength, or pride, for example, coffee pots, goat-hair tents, and swords.

From the 1960s, the modern Middle Eastern nation-states were established and with them many foreign photographers set out to record what they considered to be the Bedouins’ disappearing way of life. ‘Salvage anthropology’ and associated image-making focused on pastoral tribes, Kurds, Berbers, and Druze, which often ‘embodied a romantic nostalgia, and sometimes an explicit wish to capture a version of these ‘pristine’ societies before they disappeared forever’ (Graham-Brown 1988: 53). At this time, themes of ‘change’ were visualised through ‘juxtaposition of images: of Bedouin against the motorcar ... the “biblical” Palestinian peasant against the “modern” Zionist settler’ (Graham-Brown 1988: 54). These works draw on visual dichotomies such as old/new, modern/backward, and rural/urban to justify and portray progress, government programs, and constructions of national heritage in newly established Middle Eastern states.

In the twenty-first century, photographic works depicting Bedouin in the Negev expanded with digital technologies. With the advent of compact digital cameras, smartphones, and single-lens reflex (SLR) cameras, foreign-produced photographs of

Bedouin people repeat similar themes in attempts to ‘capture’ the demise of tribal existence and poverty in the desert. Beliefs about the end of Bedouin culture are not merely characteristic to Israel but permeate most Middle Eastern countries. Regional urbanites ‘have been lamenting the loss of what they perceive to be “the Bedouin way of life” for centuries’ (Lanning 2009). For example, as early as the seventh century, regional writers have recorded their concerns about the decline of nomadism among Bedouin and the ‘breakdown of their ancient, nomadic, pagan culture’, which they considered to be in the ‘final stages of decay’ as a result of expanding influences of Islam, urban society, and modernity in the region (Khan 2008: 148).

Today international photographers regularly visit the Negev for the specific purpose of photographing Bedouin. For example, foreign photojournalists from *Reuters*, CNN, BBC, *Al Jazeera*, *The New York Times*, and the *Guardian* and staff from Amnesty International, Doctors without Borders, and various smaller organisations can frequently be found in the Negev in search of image-making opportunities for international photography awards, news articles, and humanitarian photo essays. These visits are usually hosted by regional or local NGOs such as the NCF and Bedouin spokespersons who take visitors to villages and towns (along with political tourists). These visitors’ photographic and digital by-products are consumed in European or American venues such as exhibitions, power-point presentations, databases such as Flickr, and individual websites. Many of these works highlight themes of poverty, Israeli discrimination, pastoral nomadism, and the Negev Bedouin life in the desert. For example, *Al Jazeera*’s reprint of a Getty photograph (2010) inserted into an article entitled ‘Israel’s Negev Frontier’.



Figure 21: Image insert into article 'Israel's Negev "frontier"' [Getty Images] (*Al Jazeera* 2010).

Since the mid-twentieth century, Middle Eastern nationalists have also played an important part in the production of photographic and digital portrayals of Bedouin history and society within their own national discourses. By appropriating Western archival images and creating their own visual materials, these non-Bedouin Middle Easterners also disseminate national truths regarding their Bedouin citizens. As such, Bedouin culture has come to signify different things to various Middle Eastern governments and nationals (Hawker 2002). For several nation-states such as Jordan, Bedouin identity is integral to their nationality and their statesmen use archival photographs and contemporary digital images to reference a national past (see Layne 1994, Shryock 1997). They employ foreign-produced archival photographs and state image-makers to institutionalise and represent Bedouin heritage and nationalities in ways that counter the inherent 'plurality of tribal identities' in their countries (Layne 1989: 35).

(B) *Macro – National Visual Economies* – Within the Palestinian national discourse (specifically the West Bank, Gaza, diaspora, and Israel), representations of Bedouin-ness have different meanings as opposed to countries where Bedouin heritage

has become a national signifier. Palestinian Arab nationalism, especially in the West Bank, is symbolised by the urban and farming peasant (*fallāḥīn*). Ted Swedenburg (1990) argued that the peasant is a unifying icon for West Bank Palestinian culture and historiography. According to him, images and symbols associated with peasant life, villages, and farming found in paintings, stories, and magazine illustrations are nationalised in order to ideologically ‘cover over significant differences within Palestinian society’ (Swedenburg 1990: 18). Notwithstanding, fellow Palestinians have also created their own images of Bedouin in the region since the arrival of the technology to the area. By the end of the nineteenth century, local Arab (non-Bedouin) and Armenian photographers worked throughout Ottoman Levant, setting up studios in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, and Nazareth.¹²⁵

Similarly to their European counterparts, elite patrons and wealthy families, news agencies, and local governmental officials commissioned early Palestinian photographers to produce images throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These images were consumed in the form of postcards, travel albums, and souvenirs for the tourist market depicting the Holy Land’s sites, religious ceremonies, staged biblical scenes, and Ottoman events and notables (Nassar 2006). These early image-makers reproduced Victorian conventions, Western staging, and material culture (see Figure 22). Unlike the Europeans, however, Palestinian image-makers also regularly photographed local families in studio portraits, community events, ceremonies, social occasions, and missionary organisations and activities mostly in urban centres. These images, however, almost exclusively focused on the region’s urban centres outside of the Negev region.

¹²⁵ Jewish photographers are discussed later.



Figure 22: 'Unknown Bedouin group' (c. 1925) by Karimeh Abbud in Nazareth.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Palestinian photographers (much like their Western counterparts) took up wartime press photography including studio portraits of army personnel, pictures of combat, and images of conflicts during World War I and World War II, which occasionally included the Beersheba region (Nassar 2006). This later generation of Palestinian photographers left the studio and went into the 'field' to take images of the war-torn region. Issam Nassar (2006: 151) explained, 'Several photographs from the 1940s by Hanna Safieh, for example, show leaders such as Abd al-Qader al-Husseini, commander of the al-Jihad al-Muqaddas (Holy War) Army, posing for the camera surrounded by other armed men.' Their work appeared in newspapers and magazines such as *National Geographic*, *Readers Digest*, and the *London News* throughout the mid-twentieth century (Nassar 2006).

It was also during this time that Palestinian photography increasingly focused on nationalist themes. Palestinians began information campaigns which employed

photographs for nationalist propaganda depicting life in Palestine and highlighting ‘modern’ commerce, agriculture, culture, and people in order to counter Zionist claims that Palestine was an empty landscape devoid of people (Sela 2014). Thus, for the most part, the region’s Bedouin populations and their peripheral way of life were seen to counter to these nationalist goals. Consequent, my archival research found little evidence of Palestinian photography of the Bedouin in Negev throughout the early to late twentieth century (for reasons outlined later in this section). For example, Khalil Rissas (1948) devoted his photography to ‘documenting the Palestinian resistance against the Zionist usurpers’ (UCCPSC 2013) but exclusively focused on urban Palestinian centres.

Since the 1980s, the tradition of documenting Palestinian life has continued with contemporary Palestinian photographers studying in art academies while others work with international press agencies. These photographers have begun to increasingly image Bedouin populations throughout Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. Of these, Ahlam Shibli uniquely defines herself as Palestinian of Bedouin descent from Israel whereas most other Palestinian photographers in Israel are labelled as Israeli Arabs in Israel's art scene. Her image works, sold in photography books and exhibitions, explore the life of ‘her Bedouin people’ in villages in the Galilee and Negev regions through visual depictions of Bedouin homes (Shibli 2000). Using photojournalist styles of documentary image-making she depicts ‘Bedouin’ landscapes, towns, cemeteries, and people (see Figure 23), which for the most part replicate images of Bedouin poverty and isolation in the Negev.



Figure 23: 'Tal al-Saba'a al-Naqab, Israel / Palestine' (c. 2002) by Ahlam Shibli.

Today the content of Palestinian photography and digital image-making focuses on themes of memory, humanitarian issues, political issues such as prisoners and West Bank settlements, struggles during the *Intifāḍa*, and visualisation of Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since the 1960s, these works have created a prolific visual narrative pertaining to Palestinian society, predominantly depicting people and events in the West Bank and Gaza. Visual tropes such as stone-throwing teenagers confronting Israeli soldiers, destroyed houses in abandoned villages, the separation wall, refugee camps, PLO and Hamas soldiers, mourning mothers, and long lines at border crossings have come to saturate the Palestinian image world. Over the last several decades, these images have been consumed via: newspapers such the *New York Times*; photography books by Whalid Khalil (1984) and Elias Sanbar (2014); national posters; creative visual works exhibited in cultural centres such as the Al-Bireh Cultural Centre with the United Nations Relief and Works Agencies; and digitalised on websites as photo essays for NGOs and international photography competitions.

This chapter argues that the absence of images depicting Negev Bedouin (as a distinct but interconnected Palestinian society) within Palestinian visual history from the early-to-mid twentieth century is due to several factors. First, it is difficult to distinguish internal social groups such as Palestinian and Bedouin villagers because their societies have become intertwined over several centuries and distinguishing markers such as clothing or landscape are often difficult to discern in images. Moreover, many Palestinian refugees are Bedouin and thus visualisations of Palestinians often do not distinguish between these members. Second, urbanite Palestinian photographers regarded the Bedouin way of life as nomadic, thus countering narratives of ‘historical presence’ exemplified by resident farmers and city urbanites. Third, photographs featuring the region’s minorities such as Bedouin were not thought to be representative of Palestinian population (Nassar 2006: 324) due in part to the Israeli government’s efforts to isolate its internal Bedouin from other Palestinians.

In light of Bedouin efforts in Arab parties and NGOs to increase the visibility of their conflict with the state since the 1990s, however, Palestinians outside of the Negev began acknowledging the plight of the Bedouin villages in the context of Israeli urbanisation efforts (see Ratcliffe 2009). Thus since the 1990s, Bedouin have become more politically photogenic in relation to the Palestinian struggle within the state of Israel and, consequently, this ‘national’ visual economy has witnessed an increased in Negev Bedouin images featured in the Palestinian press, by humanitarian organisations, and in fine art photography. Today images of Negev Bedouin are found in photographic archives such as those pertaining to the 1948 *Nakba* created by and for Palestinians over the last twenty years. For example, local and international Palestinian activists have created both physical and online archives such as The Palestinian Museum and Palestineremembered.com. These physical and digital archives not only collect oral

stories and texts but also historical photographs, maps, and videos depicting Palestinian villages and peoples throughout the region including Bedouin in the Negev.

Michelle Woodward (2009) argued that these visual practices are now common throughout the contemporary Middle East, giving way to an ‘archival impulse’ over the past decade. She pointed out that people in places such as the Palestinian West Bank are assembling physical and online image collections in order to counter the lack of institutional preservation of local Palestinian history. These efforts attempt to deliberately reshape the region's visual clichés of violence and Orientalist tropes of exoticism. ‘Contemporary photographers and culture workers are crafting new mechanisms for memorializing history through photography as they and their fellow citizens experience it, effectively creating an archive where they belong’ (Woodward 2009: 21).

For example, Palestineremembered.com was founded in 2000 by a group of Palestinian expatriates who manage the non-profit archival website from the USA. They search and compile documentary resources on Palestinian history and culture, especially for events pertaining to *Nakba*. Their website lists several Palestinian areas throughout the region, one of which includes ‘Beersheba’. There Palestineremembered.com and online contributors have included a range of photographs of Negev Bedouin society, history, and landscapes. On some villages’ pages (such as Lagīya), one can find digital copies of photographs of people uploaded on the website (see Figure 24). Underneath each image, the creators of the website have provided a blog space where visitors of the site can make comments (mostly in Arabic) about the photograph.



Figure 24: 'Picture of Lagīya' uploaded on Palestineremembered.com (2008).

In all, Palestineremembered.com is popular among Bedouin in the Negev and over the last decade the website has consolidated many archival images of their society and history. In particular, it became an important public venue for local Bedouin (detailed further later on) and other Palestinian photographers not only to upload their own photographs for the sake of preservation but also to share digital copies with others. In doing so, it has strengthened the connection between local image worlds and the broader Palestinian national visual economy. As suggested in the beginning of this section, however, Palestinian photographic and digital efforts are inherently influenced by the Israeli image world in which photographs of Negev Bedouin maintain different visual tropes; leaving Bedouin images caught up in the complex imaginings associated with Zionist ideology and Israeli Arab citizenship.

Jewish photography in Palestine or the Land of Israel (*Eretz Israel*) began in the early 1880s and coincided with the First Aliyah (1882–1903) and Second Aliyah (1903–

1914) during which immigrants from Eastern Europe moved to Ottoman Levant. Some brought cameras from Europe and set about imaging their Zionist enterprise through amateur photography (Sela 2013). During this time, emigrating Jewish commercial photographers also began working with local Arab and foreign expatriate studios in Palestine and with studios in Jerusalem, Haifa, and Jaffa. For example, Shlomo Narinsky and his wife Sonia Narinsky (c. 1900) came to Israel with the Second Aliyah. They produced a series of images of landscapes, sites and portraits which they featured on postcards. Most of them were sold through the Jamal Brothers Publishing House in Jerusalem.¹²⁶

Similarly to their European Christian and Palestinian counterparts, Jewish commercial photographs at the time produced images for the tourist market which also depicted landscapes in the Holy Land, Jewish religious ceremonies, and people of Levant, including the region's Bedouin populations (see Figure 25). Early Jewish photographers of Ottoman Levant, however, also photographed the growing Zionist enterprise in the region coinciding with the First Zionist Congress in Basel in 1897. Their images documented newly established *moshavim* (cooperative farming communities), 'empty' desert landscapes, Jewish 'pioneers', interactions with their Arab neighbourhoods, Jewish community organisations, and local Jewish religious life. These photographs were reproduced in newspapers and on postcards in order to document their new lives and the re-founding of the Jewish community (*yishuv*) in Ottoman Levant. Many of these images were also sent back to Europe to encourage Jewish immigration to the region.¹²⁷

¹²⁶ See Vivienne Silver-Brody (1998).

¹²⁷ Most of these early photographs are kept in Israeli archives.




Figure 25: 'Palestine - A Beduin in his happy mood' (1921) by Shlomo Narinsky.

This period of Jewish photography in Ottoman Levant/British Palestine (c. 1880-c. 1930) is now considered the advent of Israeli photography (Silver-Brody 1998: 51) and many of their works were inspired by European romanticism. It was also during this time that the Jewish National Fund (English) or *Keren Kayemet LeYisrael* (Hebrew) (JNF-KKL) was established (1901) in order to coordinate the purchasing of land for Jewish development. Part of their project was also to 'redress the balance of photographs, documenting the Jewish presence in the land' (Silver-Brody 1998: 66). Over the subsequent decades, the JNF-KKL became one of the largest Jewish organisations to commission and produce photographs documenting this endeavour, specifically to 'record details showing the differences between traditional Arab buildings and modern [Jewish] methods of construction ... [and] institutional attitudes

towards the Arabs ... [but it] had little reason to include photographs of Arabs or of their culture, unless in a political context, or in a comparison' (Silver-Brody 1998: 75). These visual tropes set the precedent for the types of images produced by later Jewish photographers of Arab populations in the region (see Figure 26).



Figure 26: Bedouin from the area of Beersheba (c. 1920) by Yosef Schweig.

From the 1930s onwards, Jewish photography grew in British Palestine. Jewish nationalists used these images to propagate imaginings of an Israeli state and a Zionist worldview. Many images depicted the arrival of Jewish populations emigrating from Europe in the wake of anti-Semitism and the rise of Nazi Germany. The content of

Zionist photography increasingly focused on creative themes of ‘making the desert bloom’, building of cities such as Tel Aviv (est. 1906), developing Jewish businesses and industry, and creating schools and health clinics. In addition to professional photographic works, Jewish amateur photographers also produced images of pre-state Jewish society and relationships with Palestinians residing next to new settlements. Several new Jewish settlers of southern Palestine also took photographs of their Bedouin neighbours. Most of these images are housed in personal family collections and archives in regional *kibbutzim* and *moshavim* today. The images depicted Bedouin men in their robes with Jewish settlers dressed in ‘modern’ clothing such as shorts and alongside machinery (see Figures 27 and 29).



Figure 27: ‘Bedouins! – Founding of the kibbutz’ (c. 1934-1944) by Ralph Salinger.



Figure 28: 'Member of the kibbutz Mishmar Hanegev with arab' (1947) by Hans Pinn (GPO).

For example, residents of Kibbutz Lahav enjoyed a particularly close relationship with Bedouin in the Negev. This *kibbutz* was found in 1952, under the name Tziklag, and was an agricultural enterprise located approximately twenty kilometres northeast of Beersheba. Throughout the history of the *kibbutz*, its Jewish residents have developed a reputation among Bedouin for supplying historical photographs of their society and employing members in the *kibbutz* during the Military Administration (1948-1966). The *kibbutz* is also the location of the Joe Alon Museum for Bedouin Culture.¹²⁸ Anthropologists David Gal, Avner Goren, and Orna Goren established the museum in the 1974. According to their website (2013), the museum records the 'radical changes' and the 'almost-extinct way of life' among the Bedouin tribes 'scattered throughout the Negev and Sinai deserts' through their material culture, such as types of housing, style of dress, and more. The museum also includes a

¹²⁸ Jason Greenburg (1997) discussed the 'politics' of this museum.

collection of ethnographic materials and photographs taken by the Israeli anthropologists documenting Bedouin ways of life in different parts of the Negev and Sinai (see Figure 29).¹²⁹



Figure 29: Photograph of exhibition in the Joe Alon Museum of Bedouin Culture – Kibbutz Lahav.

Throughout the War period (1915-1949 [World War I and II and 1948 War]), Jewish ‘combat’ photographers also took up war and press photography, including studio portraits of army personnel, pictures of combat, and images of the aftermath of various conflicts, which occasionally included events in the Negev. These images, however, mostly depicted foreign and Jewish military forces and not the Bedouin civilian population. The first systematic production of photographs of Negev Bedouin

¹²⁹ The museum also hosts a ‘family tent’ where visitors experience ‘bedouin style hospitality ... and enjoy a “timeless” atmosphere’, a petting zoo with a donkey ride, and store selling “bedouin” handicrafts’ (Joe Alon Museum 2013).

by the newly created Israeli state occurred during the Military Administration (1948-1966) and involved the institutionalisation of identity photographs or *Teuda Zehut*. Today the state requires all Palestinian and Israeli adults to have and carry government issued ID cards. In 1949 and after the November 1948 census, the state gave all Jewish residents Israeli citizenship and ID cards in 1949 (Tawil-Souri 2011). Issuing ID cards for the Palestinian minorities in Israel was more complicated as these residents had to prove continuous residence in Israel between 1949 and 1952 in order to qualify for Israeli citizenship. As Ilan Pappé (2006: 201) notes, ‘the worst offence [for Palestinians inside Israel during the late 1940s and early 1950s] was not being in possession of one of the newly-issued identity cards....’ (cited in Tawil-Souri 2011 71). Not having an identity card would result in the loss of property ownership and in some cases expulsion from the country.

During the early years of the state, Israeli government photographers would travel to camps and villages in Negev with their cameras to take photographs of men for these identification cards. Later a photographic studio was established in Beersheba and Bedouin males were required to travel there in order to obtain official portraits for their IDs. The situation was different for Bedouin women, as will be detailed in the next paragraph. Notwithstanding, ID photographs are some of the earliest personal photographs for the majority of Bedouin in the Negev today. Consequently, they are often preserved and presented alongside family photographs in personal albums, particularly among elders such as Suleīmān Abu Rabī‘a (see Figure 30).



Figure 30: Cut and cropped *Teuda Zehut* portraits (c. 1930-c. 1990) of Ḥaj Sa'īd Abū Rabī'a – personal photograph album.

Suleīmān al-ʿAthāmīn, Khashem Zana' village spokesperson, explained that in the 1990s the *Knesset* had mandated that women should also be required to have their images display on their identity cards *Teuda Zehut*. Before this, women had been exempt. For both Bedouin and other religious parties in Israel, such as *SHAS*,¹³⁰ the issue of photographing women for the purposes of ID cards is still a highly political issue that often comes up during elections today.

Emilie: Are members still uncomfortable with Israeli officials taking ID pictures of women?

Suleīmān: Yes, Yes. Even Fāṭimah does not want to have her picture in the ID card. It has always been an issue for us. In 1985-1990, the issue went to the *Knesset*.

Emilie: Before this time, women did not have their pictures in their ID cards?

¹³⁰ *SHAS* is an acronym for Sfarad's guards (of the Torah). It is an ultra-orthodox Jewish political party in Israel founded in 1984 and represents the interests of *Mizrahim*.

Suleīmān: No, not in passport and not in their identity cards. These are for cultural reasons. Even *SHAS* brought this issue up in the last elections. And this is for a very simple and practical reason. As far as the family structure is concerned it is the same for us as it is them. *SHAS* represents Jewish religious families and it just so happens that concern over this issue coincides with the Bedouin families. Here neither of us want to have our families photographed by the government.

Emilie: Could you explain why you and your families don't want images on these cards?

Suleīmān: This was for cultural reasons. This is why we do not want these photographs. Today, however, women have their picture taken for these cards so that they can vote and travel. Islam also says women can show their faces, however, our customs in Bedouin tradition say women cannot show their faces but these ideas are fading and Islamic principles are coming in. But there are still many, many women here that do not want their photograph taken for their identity cards. In fact, the issue of women covering is still very resistant to change in our society, more so than many other issues.

Israeli Jewish photographers of Negev Bedouin during the state's Urbanisation Period (1967-1993) also produced images for government records, news outlets, and commercial sale. Early Israeli commercial photojournalists created images of Bedouin in the Negev, which were then circulated by the Israeli government press office (GPO) and later stored in state and military archives. Most of these images depict Israeli government led 'processes of modernisation' among Bedouin in the south. Here visual tropes include picturing Bedouin men in Western suits, watering yards in front of the state's newly built houses in townships, driving cars, and hosting Israeli government officials and international notables (see Figure 31).



Figure 31: 'Abdul Kanir Ibn Bari watering the vegetable garden in the backyard of his house in the Bedouin village of Tel Sheva' (1969) by Fritz Cohen.

The Negev Bedouin as a minority demographic have maintained a relatively strong existence in Israeli national photographic archives, which are organised into two types: one compiling photographs produced by Israeli civil establishment serving national goals; and those associated with military establishments preserving archival government records (see Appendix IV). Of these, the Government Press Office's Photography Department (GPO) has a particularly large collection of images taken of the Negev Bedouin which the state digitised into the Israel's National Photo Collection located in Jerusalem in 1998.

In the 1960s and 1970s, Jewish residents of the Israeli metropolises of Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Beersheba also set up public studios in the cities for commercial photography. These businesses provided photographic services for residents such as wedding photography, school portraits, and provided film processing/dark room access along with access to printing, enlarging, and framing services. These businesses can still be found in Beersheba's Ottoman centre and surrounding shopping complexes such as local malls (including Canyon ha-Negev and Big) and include the Alberto Studio and several dozen others. Since the 1960s, Bedouin, particularly those from wealthier families visited these studios and commissioned their own personal photographs (see Figure 32).



Figure 32: Anonymous Bedouin informant's personal archival image (c. 1970).

Again, however, most studio photographers at this time were Israeli Jewish image-makers. I am unaware of any local Bedouin commercial photographers that operated in the 1950s as most Bedouin photographic efforts only proliferated in the late twentieth century. Notwithstanding, consumption of these types of personal studio image is

restricted within Bedouin society and do not overtly circulate within Israeli Jewish or broader Palestinian image worlds.

As of the Post-Oslo Period (2000-current), Israeli documentary photography and digital images of Bedouin peoples frequently reflect competing national politics. Some photographers set out to visually capture the ‘harsh’ existence of Bedouin’s life and poverty in Israel (see Figure 33) whereas photographers working with nationalist organisations tend to record Bedouin protests. In this context, images include young Bedouin men holding Palestinian flags, throwing rocks, and resisting arrest. As suggested above most contemporary photographs of the Negev Bedouin are produced and circulated by photojournalists and commercial photographers for Jewish audiences via national newspapers such as the *Haaretz*, *Yedi’oth*, and the *Jerusalem Post*, exhibitions in the Tel Aviv Museum, Eretz Israeli Museum, Joe Alon Museum, and numerous displays in other museums, art galleries, urban public spaces, and artist websites.



Figure 33: ‘The Bedouin are easily the poorest community in Israel’ (2012) by Limor Edri for the *Haaretz* newspaper.

In addition to news media and fine-art photography, Israeli Jewish documentary photographers created images of Negev Bedouin for various alternative-media and civil society outlets, NGOs, advocacy, and special interest groups such as co-existence organisations such as 972magazine, NCF, Adalah, Rabbis for Human Rights, and Zochrot. In addition to these, there are nationalist groups such as the Regavim and para-state institutions such as the JNF-KKL. Photographic by-products of these organisations are largely found in Israeli Jewish and Western venues. Their works are contextualised as documentaries, visual literacy, and photographic awareness projects. For example, photographers associated with Activestills such as Oren Zvi have become particularly well known for creating a vast range of images of Negev Bedouin society and their experiences with marginalisation in southern Israel (see Figure 34).



Figure 34: 'Bedouin from the destroyed Negev village of Al 'Aragib' (2010) by Activestills - Oren Zvi.

In all, image-making within the Israeli and Palestinian national contexts is a contentious affair. Photographs and digital images of Negev Bedouin are fraught with biases characterising broader Orientalist and national knowledge production, news coverage, technological access, and social media in the Middle East. As with Orientalism, Israeli and Palestinian nationalists often imagine Bedouin in the Negev through particular scenes, subjects, and actions, which purposely omit, re-contextualise, and select images that support their various ideologies and goals. Ultimately, participants such as photographers and non-Bedouin viewers within these broader visual economies indelibly influence the reading and worth of photographs by Bedouin themselves.

As argued in Chapter One, critical studies of regional photography such as Azoulay (2008, 2011) tend to focus on the violence of photographic exchanges and contextualising these encounters as colonial/national enterprises. While informing photographic encounters in the Negev, however, studies in the Israeli and Palestinian context overlook local photographic practices, particularly among peripheral populations residing in the area. This comes as Bedouin have taken up photography and digital image-making themselves in the last twenty years; visual practices that indelibly respond to frictions in larger global national fields, on-going transformations of way of life, and stereotypical images of their society. The next sections describe members' recent photographic productions and explore their creation of parochial and intimate visual economies characterising Negev Bedouin society.

II. MESO AND MICRO VISUAL ECONOMIES

Bedouin engagement with photographic and digital technologies in the Negev is a relatively recent affair, beginning *en masse* among the Bedouin elite in the 1970s.

Whilst the number of local professional producers is low, the number of amateur photographers is steadily growing, especially in relation to the increased availability of digital cameras since 2000, particularly those found on smartphones and mobile technologies. The remainder of this chapter draws on empirical research collected during fieldwork to describe the visual economies characterising Bedouin society, lineages (*‘ā’ilāt*), and more intimate image worlds of the extended (*‘ā’ila*) and immediate families. In doing so, this discussion, unlike the previous section, is not chronologically organised but ordered in terms of proximity relating to internal interactions among members. The broadest visual economy is presented first in this section as it includes the largest number of local Bedouin image producers and consumers. Images within the closer, micro visual economies involve the fewest number of people and are presented in last in this section. The consumption of digital and photographic objects within these contexts are especially regulated since ‘seeing’ them entails closer relationships between Bedouin members.

(C) *Meso – Bedouin Society in the Negev Visual Economy* – Between the 1950s and 1960s, wealthy individuals travelled to Jerusalem or Beersheba to obtain professional photographs *in situ* from non-Bedouin Arab and Jewish photographers. Since the 1970s and 1980s, the number of locally operating Bedouin commercial photographers working in the villages and towns in southern Israel has gradually risen, however, as photographic equipment has become less expensive and both film and digital image-making no longer requires dark rooms, expensive chemicals, and equipment. Indeed, the number of commercial photographers operating locally in the Bedouin towns significantly increased in the 1990s and 2000s due to the influx of low-cost digital cameras, computers, and printers.

Today, however, there are two types of Bedouin professional photographers in the Negev that produce images within this Negev Bedouin visual economy. These are

commercial image-makers commissioned by members to photograph family celebrations and photojournalists hired by local newspapers, organisations, and municipalities to photograph notable people and events. Both types of professional photographers use digital cameras for their works and imaging techniques learned in community colleges such as those hosted by Sapir College. With the advent of iPhones, Instagram, Flickr, and Facebook, professional Bedouin photographers not only creatively experiment with production techniques, they also use these platforms to exhibit, share, and circulate their image works. According to a local photographer interviewed during fieldwork, ‘Aṭīya Abū Madīghem, most commercial Bedouin photographers start out as wedding photographers (he estimated that there are thirty-five operating in the Negev as of 2012), with a handful progressing into photojournalism and fine art photography.

Fathers, like Suleīmān al-‘Athāmīn, often hire a professional photographer for their daughter’s wedding events, in particular to take images during their *ḥennā*’ party. Appropriated and adapted from other Palestinian populations, pre-nuptial *ḥennā*’ parties are popular in the Negev and have become a regular part of the larger wedding celebrations.¹³¹ Today, however, the celebrations are significant events and are scheduled several weeks before the actual wedding. They are usually organised by female relatives at the natal home of the bride, whose mother serves as hostess. The celebration includes dinner, music, coordinated dancing, and handing out of package sweets. Today these events are occasions when family, neighbours, and friend celebrate their daughter’s nuptials; they are also, however, a time when women of extended families (‘*ā’ila*) display their status to other women.

¹³¹ These parties are named after the dye from which temporary tattoos in the form of body art are applied to the bride’s skin before her nuptials.

While living in Khashem Zana¹ in 2012, Suleīmān al-‘Athāmīn’s fourth eldest daughter celebrated her wedding. For the occasion, Suleīmān hired a local family from Shagīb as-Sālām who run a commercial photography business out of their home. The business included a male professional photographer, his wife (a hair and make-up stylist), and their two daughters who worked as assistants. In addition to photographing the *ḥennā*² party, the family who provides pre-party services for the bride such as hair styling, professional make-up, acrylic nails, and studio portraits in their Shagīb as-Sālām house.¹³² After being styled and photographed offsite, the bride was brought back to her natal house where a large party of female relatives and friends greeted her and took pictures of her with her family. The festivities were held on a large concrete space located next to Suleīmān’s house on his domestic property (*dār*), which is surrounded by a high privacy fence to protect the visibility of his female guests. During the celebrations, the hired photographers took images of the bride while she danced and intermingled with her guests (see Figure 35). While photographing the bride’s family, they do not take individual pictures of the female guests as only women can take photographs of other women usually close friends and family.

¹³² In addition to family-run photography businesses, several NGOs also support micro-businesses for Bedouin female photographers who provided similar services for *ḥennā*² parties.



Figure 35: Wedding photographer and his daughters during Islām's *ḥennā'* party.

After the celebrations, the photographers printed the digital images (several hundred) on eight-by-ten paper photographs. Suleīmān then travelled to Shagīb as-Sālām to pick up the photographs delivering them to his daughter in plastic sack. She stored them in a cardboard box, showed them to her female relatives over the course of the week after the wedding, and chose one to frame and hang on the wall of her newly built house in her husband's family property.

More often than not, professional photographers hired for *ḥennā'* parties maintain a different, typically lower status than the family that hires them for their photography services, which in the Negev can mean numerous things to various people (those who lack of origins [non-*aṣīl*], non-Bedouin, or non-Negev locals). This situation is less difficult for female photographers since socially they are granted more freedom to intermingle with women not from their own lineages (*'ā'ilāt*) and may travel within domestic spaces where *ḥennā'* parties are held. This is not the case for professional

male photographers, who according to Suleīmān al-‘Athāmīn must not be ‘Bedouin’ or ‘*arab*’.

Emilie: Why are women ok with taking pictures at their *hennā* parties but not for their ID card?

Suleīmān: It depends on where the pictures go. Who is taking the pictures? What are they taking pictures of? If they are taken of the family, the pictures must not leave the family. I can take pictures of my mother, my sisters, but for other men, outside of the family, taking pictures is a completely different matter.

Emilie: How so?

Suleīmān: It matters if the photographer is family or not family. If his is ‘*arab*’ or not ‘*arab*’. I am not ready for an ‘*arab*’ to come into my house and take pictures of my daughters but it is ok for someone that it is not ‘*arab*’ as long as the pictures stay in family. Women do not mind having their pictures taken by non-‘*arab*’ so long as the pictures will not be seen by other non-‘*arab*’.¹³³

The next type of professional photographers in Bedouin society are the largest contributors to this Negev visual economy. These photographers are mostly younger men from Rāhaṭ such as ‘Aṭīya Abū Madīgam. Their photographic and digital works are similar to other Palestinian photographers in Israel and focus on political and fine art themes of protest, the ‘unrecognised villages’, Negev landscapes, and public gatherings during weddings, religious, civic, and political events. Their visual tropes emphasize resistance, the Palestinian narrative in Israel, ‘Bedouin culture’, and ‘life in the desert’. A large proportion of their creative photographic and digital works are self-initiated for exhibitions throughout the Negev (see Figure 36), Israel, and overseas in places such as Paris.

¹³³ While professional photographers of these parties generally produce images within broader visual economies associated with (c) Negev Bedouin society and (d) lineages (‘*ā’ilāt*’), their photographs are only consumed with (e) extended family and (f) immediate family (*bayt*) contexts due to their content.



Figure 36: Exhibition in al-‘Aragīb (‘Aṭīya Abū Madīgam n.d.).

NGOs such AJEEC and NCF, municipalities such as the Rāhaṭ and Ḥūra Community Centres, local politicians such as Ṭalib al-Ṣāna‘, and local newspapers such as *Ahkbār an-Naqab* and *Panorama-Pane.net* also commission photojournalists to visually document events such as visits by international representatives, Islamic and civic community events, political speeches, and protests. Male photojournalists do not normally photograph Bedouin women in the public sphere but can do so with the permission of the woman. Members also consume photographic and digital works via Arabic websites, local newspapers (see Figure 37), and flyers.



Figure 37: Photograph of inset in local Bedouin newspaper *Ahkbār Al-Naqab*.

Maintaining neutrality is difficult for photojournalists such as ‘Aṭīya (a freelance photographer who sells images to a local newspaper) who must tactfully navigate the complex socio-political situations in which he photographs. He explained to me that the local ‘politics of photography’ include both the act of taking the photograph and its subsequent circulations in the Negev. According to ‘Aṭīya (as a male photographer), he does not normally photograph younger women or children but older women are typically comfortable with being photographed. He found that younger children in villages express fear of flash photography and most do not prefer ‘close’ photography but instead prefer with photography ‘at a distance’. Moreover, once images are taken and produced, ‘Aṭīya must be extremely sensitive about sharing them, that is he does not ‘post images of women Facebook as their brothers or fathers may get angry’ and avoids selling photographs that might show people in disrespectful contexts. According to him, each photographic situation is dependent on not only his position as a

photographer but also the subjects' positions in terms of gender, status, lineages, and circumstances of the event (see Figure 38).



Figure 38: Photograph of Bedouin amateur and professional photographers at the 2011 protest against the Prawer Plan.

In all, the general differences between these two types of professional photographers relate to the content (*hennā'* or news events), style (portrait or journalistic), consumption (familial or communal), and circulation (private or public) of their images. These disparities, however, do not merely reflect the photographers' specific interests but also the result of the image-makers' socio-political access to other members and the private/public spaces in which they photograph – access predominantly determined by their status in their society. In particular, a commercial Bedouin photographer's relative status within his or her broader society regulates what type of images he or she can create, that is whether or not the photographer is male or female, young or old. Their lineage (*ā'ilāt*), status, tribal affiliations, and perceived origins (*aṣīl*) are also significant for these practices. In general, most commercial photographers have moderate status within the local socio-political system because their

presence holds less status during group events whereas the presence of a person with higher status holds more social value in Negev Bedouin society.

(D) *Meso – Named Linages* (‘ā’ilāt) *Visual Economy* – The next visual economy in which Bedouin engage is that associated with making visual statements pertaining to origins (‘aṣīl), genealogy (*nasab*), lineages (‘ā’ilāt), and neighbourly relations. This context is defined by tribal relations (described in Chapter Three) and specific spaces associated with tribal networks in this society. The production and consumption of members’ photography of members in this visual economy centres on agnates’ meeting places (*shigg*), men’s sides of weddings, specific areas or rooms wherein families host formal guests, and increasingly informative and editable websites such as Wikipedia created by tribesmen about their genealogies.

The introduction of photographs into lineage (‘ā’ilāt) spaces began in the 1960s (among an elite minority) as people appropriated and commissioned photographs from outsiders such as Palestinians in the West Bank and Jewish-run studios in the region. At this time, a small number of local tribesmen from particularly wealthy tribes also began taking photographs of their own ‘ā’ilāt, for example, local photographer Dr Ḥamād al-Ṣāna‘. These ‘amateur’ photographers increased in numbers from the 1970s onwards as cameras and film development became more readily available and less expensive. While these amateur photographers create images of family events, people, and landscapes, a selective few are also commissioned to photograph lineage notables, such as tribal leaders and patriarchs.

In all, since the 1960s, a few Bedouin photographers (but mostly Bedouin commissioned outsider Jewish and Arab image-makers) have produced a unique type of studio-quality forefather portrait depicting male patriarchs. These images pose men in their customary finery, positioning them in front of draped backdrops. In them, the men wear their headscarves (*kūfiyya*), long robes (*thoūb*), black caps, and sometimes show

them with bandoleers and a knife (see Figure 39). The portraits include full frontal poses and occasionally ‘Bedouin items’ such as horses, swords, and coffee pots are positioned next to them in the image. The men in the photographs are distant patriarchs of their families, that is great-grandfathers or grandfathers (occasionally fathers and uncles) who are often representatives of particular tribal networks such as agnate groups (*gōm*).



Figure 39: Framed photograph of Shaykh Salmān al-Huzayyil in his son's house.

These ancestral portraits range from black and white photographs to colour digital prints on paper, framed, encased in glass, and hung on walls throughout the Negev. For example, these types of photographs are often displayed in agnates' meeting places (*shigg*) to memorialise ancestors, past events, and lost landscapes associated with various tribal namesakes. Today agnate meeting places (*shigg*) continue to serve as places of tribal politics, remembrance, and mediation. *Shigg* are separate from

residential houses and instead are located on the property of the senior male head of an extended family (*‘ā’ila*). They are constructed out of concrete and metal with a tarpaulin or metal roof with decorated interior walls. In general, they are places where agnates gather to: discuss economic enterprises and social topics such as folklore, marriage, and religious events; mediate political and tribal affairs; and share information about genealogies, reputations, gossip, and local news.¹³⁴

The images hung in *shiggs* range in size from medium ten-by-twelve inches to larger thirty-by-forty inches. Next to them on the wall Bedouin will often hang other photographs of men and honoured non-Bedouin visitors and guests (see Figure 40), and pictures also given to members by outsiders or images appropriated from non-Bedouin sources and consumed between cognates (discussed in the next chapters). In addition to other photographs, Bedouin also hang (if they possess them) framed newspapers clippings, documents such as land registrations (*tābū*), old maps of Negev, and letters from officials in Arabic, Hebrew, and English. In addition to documents and photographs, members display ‘Bedouin artefacts’ such as Oriental rugs, swords, Qu’rān-ic texts and Islamic calligraphy, hand painted genealogical trees, and calendars. On walls, members also create shelves where other material culture such as brass coffee pots, embroidered pillows, baskets, and books can be displayed.

¹³⁴ The location of *shigg* also demonstrates established hierarchies within and between lineages.



Figure 40: Photograph of political tour in Wādī Na'am, a Bedouin village, with Arab and Jewish guests (Abu Rabia 2013).

As briefly noted above, Bedouin in the Negev have also experienced an 'archival impulse' reflective of the broader Palestinian population in the past decade. Consequently, lineages (*'ā'ilāt*) are also posting their 'distant' patriarchs' portraits online particularly on websites such as Wikipedia and pages such as Facebook created and designed for specific families. Several *'ā'ilāt* such as the Abū Rabī'a, al-Huzayyil, and al-Ṣāna' have their own websites describing their history, notable members, customary lands, and purported reputation. This practice sets out to expand the consumption and circulation of forefather portraits corresponding to the augmented emphasis of genealogies among *'ā'ilāt* and distinguishing their roots to the Negev. For example, see the Abū K'ishk's website, whose ancestry comes from Egypt, displays a forefather portrait:




Figure 41: Screenshot of Abū K'ishk's Wikipedia website with an upload photograph of the lineage's ('*ā'ilā*) patriarchs.¹³⁵

In addition to agnate and guest meeting places (*shigg*) and websites, Bedouin also display photographs of their family 'close' patriarchs or senior males (usually a father or grandfather) in their salons (*dīwān*); practices contributing to the second closest visual economy characterising Negev Bedouin society.

(E) *Micro – Extended Family* ('*ā'ila*) *Visual Economy* – Most Bedouin families have reception areas (*dīwān* or *salon*) inside their residential houses (*buyūt*) where cognates and guests of the family meet. These areas consist of two reception rooms located in the entrance of the home and often (but not always) presented into 'two faces' – one traditional and one modern.¹³⁶ One area will have sofas and TVs in the Western-styled areas while the Arab-styled areas recall Bedouin 'tradition' with mattresses and more intimate family photographs. Both *shigg* and salons function as key places of social ritual, cohesion and boundary-making among Bedouin in the Negev wherein members construct and share genealogies and tribal histories.

¹³⁵ Hebrew caption reads: 'Avraham Shapira (old guard) and Sheikh Shaker Abu Kishk, in the early 20s of the 20th century' (Unknown 2014).

¹³⁶ According to Irene Maffi (2009), these two spaces evoke specific temporalities through 'Arab-styled' and 'Western-styled' items in Jordan.

Because of the regularity of patrilineal cousin marriage, the couple's often share a grandfather. Portraits of their shared forefather are typically hung on the walls of couples' salons along with images of their individual fathers next to them. On some occasions, members will also hang semi-formal, often contemporary colour photograph or printed digital images of their extended family (*'ā'ila*) and older matriarchs. The photographs consumed here are similar to those in *shigg* and are often positioned next to other wall decorations such as framed passages from the Qu'rān. These elements on the walls in both the salons and *shigg* produce a shrine-like space containing different representations of time, identity, and influence (see Figure 42).



Figure 42: The salon or *dīwān* in Fāṭimah al-Ṣāna's house.

The nature of photographs hung in salon (*dīwān*), however, is more personalised and therefore more contemporary as most images were taken in the residents' lifetimes. The importance of the semi-formal image in the *dīwān* not only reflects the extended family's (*'ā'ila*) connections but also the identity and notoriety of the individual owner and nuclear family. Thus viewing the photographs is synonymous with entering their

semi-familial space where members discuss, debate, and decide household (*bayt*) politics, matters, and engagements. Consequently, the photographs hung in these rooms reflect more intimate or private themes, subjects, and landscapes. Not only are the contents of these images more private but their place within houses (*buyūt*) are significant as they, along with furniture and other decoration, symbolise the ‘in-between-ness’ of the salon in Negev Bedouin socio-political, family life. They are cognate spaces that are not entirely private or public places but the people, objects, and events in these rooms are situated between realms of interactions and the familial photographs hung in these areas reflect these dynamics. In particular, the subjects are dressed in formal clothes, and they are posed and staged, often taken during special family events.

As Gillian Rose (2010) has described in the global north, family photography has become a popular past time. Today the same can be said about the global south as a result of the accessibility of digital cameras, particularly those found on mobile phones, smartphones, iPads, and other communicative devices in the last decade. As discussed previously, Bedouin society in the Negev has witnessed a proliferation of digital technologies because of Israel’s relatively strong economy and again most people now own their own smartphones which have digital image-making capacity. Because of the abundance of mobile phones and compact cameras, the act of taking and creating photographs and digital images has become less invasive during everyday encounters. As ‘Aṭīya Abū Madīgam mentioned, Bedouin prefer photography at a distance, which does not involve steady poses and close-up interaction as the act of image-making involves a range of politics associated with both the photographer and their subjects’ social standing. Within the family, these politics are intertwined with the domestic or familial sentiments that influence the patterning of interactions during special events

such as wedding processions and receptions (smaller events than the *ḥennā* party), and everyday activities such as herding livestock and family time (see Figure 43).



Figure 43: Framed photographs of children in Fāṭimah al-Ṣāna's house.

Extended family members also produce images of their relatives of same gender during weddings and at other social events, practices reflecting the segregation of gendered spaces and social restrictions within extended familial (*ʿāʾila*) spaces. For example, images are typically taken of the wedding procession is an event at which female relatives announce the couple's wedding. Men usually decorate and photograph their vehicles (see Figure 44), drive in villages and towns (or between localities if the groom and bride are from different ones), and play loud music to announce the wedding. The vehicles have coloured flags attached to them, each symbolising various sentiments.



Figure 44: Exceptional example of a decorated wedding vehicle in Lagīya (2012).

For women, the procession is a more intimate occasion. Female relatives gather in the bride's natal home and await her arrival from the wedding ceremony during which they sing and take photographs (and increasingly videos) of the bride upon her return. The bride is then ushered into a vehicle and driven to her new husband's natal home where she is then greeted by her husband's female relatives that is her mother-in-law and others (see Figure 45). Except for her mother and sisters, the bride's female relatives from her natal extended natal family do not join in the festivities in the groom's property because they consider the bride-turned-wife to now be part of her husband's extended family (*ʿā'ila*). Again, women from both sides of the family take photographs during the event (from the bride's natal home and husband's family's home), however, once inside the groom's maternal household, the bride's mother and sisters do not take photographs. Alternatively, they publically express sentiments of sadness and remove themselves from the dancing by sitting at the back of the tent or room.



Figure 45: A woman showing photographs taken during the wedding procession in a bride's natal home in Khashem Zana'.

(F) *Micro – Immediate Family (buyūt) Visual Economy* – In addition to special events such as weddings where extended family are allowed to take images, families also image the mundane. These photographic and digital activities contribute to the most intimate visual economy in Bedouin society in the Negev. While conducting fieldwork in Khashem Zana' in 2012 and 2013, Suleīmān al-‘Athāmīn and his family often took images of each other at home, in the fields, with livestock, and during trips outside of the village. Even younger people such as his daughter of twelve would take photographs of sheep, flowers, and herself while taking the herd out to pasture. Images of family members focus on happy occasions such as humorous antics, group meetings, and events of togetherness. Bedouin also frequently photograph landscapes, animals, flora and fauna, campfires, cooking (outdoors), and other objects and scenes outside of the home but within spaces either outside of their society or owned by their own lineage (*‘ā’ilāt*). See, for example, a series of images taken by Suleīmān in the last year (2014) which he uploaded onto his Facebook page:



Figure 46: Picture of goats taken by Suleīmān and uploaded onto his Facebook page (2014).



Figure 47: Picture of outdoor cooking taken by Suleīmān and uploaded onto his Facebook page (2014).



Figure 48: Picture of snow on Suleīmān's northern property taken by Suleīmān and uploaded on his Facebook page (2014).

This visual economy is unique in that families actively restrict the consumption of intimate family photographs and digital images. Contemporary digital images taken with smartphones and compact cameras are not frequently printed out but are rather saved on iPads, USBs, and computer files. A select few are commercially printed in Beersheba or larger towns, as most families in the villages do not own printers. Most visual documents are also stored in plastic bags, loosely in drawers within chests, boxes, and occasionally inserted in albums, however, these are expensive in the Negev (see Figure 49). Of these images, a select few may be framed and hung on walls, placed on tables and shelves, and adhered to mirrors but only within the close domestic space in the house. Members will typically never display images of 'close' and younger female family members (after puberty and before marriage) in public spaces or in reception rooms (*dīwān*). Consequently, the consumption of these types of photographs is also

highly limited. Bedouin women will not display their portraits on Facebook pages, nor will male relatives circulate images of their female relatives. In fact, familial portraits of living adults are not popularly circulated outside of the extended family (*‘ā’ila*).



Figure 49: Photograph of picture album owned by Sa‘īd Abū Rabī‘a.

There is, however, an exception to this practice. Family members, parents, and friends are increasingly uploading and displaying images of children (female and male alike usually before puberty) on Facebook. When non-Bedouin visit towns or villages, their hosts do not typically object when they take photographs of children but they will not allow them to take images of female teenagers or women. One way of analysing this phenomenon is to suggest that children in this society have yet to obtain significant social standing whereas women’s status is closely tied to familial reputations. Unlike

children, her visibility or protection communicates the status or respectability of her relatives to others in her society. Another way to approach the growing practice is simply to note that many people do not fully understand the private/public dynamics of online social media networks and the diverse ways images uploaded to the Internet may circulate. Notwithstanding, family photography in the Negev is predominantly guided and restricted by the same cultural principles characterising the interactions between Bedouin, be they family (*bayt*), extended family (*‘ā’ila*), or other members. As such, image production and consumption involve issues of visibility associated with Bedouin moral principles (see Chapter One) and technological accessibility making these practices socially and politically significant.

In conclusion, this chapter has detailed the nested visual economies in which images of Negev Bedouin history and society have been produced and consumed over the previous centuries. These are not isolated discourses, however, but rather nested contexts brought together in a landscape connected by peoples’ vast interactions, shifting knowledge, and flows of commoditised objects. While visual depictions of Negev Bedouin may be distinguished by their production and consumption characteristics within each visual economy in terms of proximity, some of the images originating in them have the capacity to travel or circulate between and into unintended image worlds. During their material and digital sojourns, images acquire various weighted presence(s) (Kopytoff 1986) and what Poole (1997) terms ‘exchange values’ among a diverse range of people.

To document this movement, Chapters Five and Six of this thesis will move on to examine the varied circulations but concentrated polysemous readings and polyvalent presence(s) and values of collection of historically significant images (c. 1906-2010) in Bedouin society in the Negev. They do so by describing five case studies demonstrating the unique ways in which Bedouin appropriate, emplace meaning onto, and strategically

place significant historical images within and outside of their society. In particular, it documents: their social biographies and poly-mediations within and between various visual economies; the range of local spokespersons who employ these images during different exchanges; and the wide range of encounters in which these images acquire historical value.

CHAPTER FIVE

CIRCULATING IMAGES: HISTORIES OF LINEAGES (‘*Ā*’*ILĀT*)

The nobler the face – and the more public its expression – the more likely it is to merit photographic attention.

(Andrew Shryock 1997: 296)

As discussed in Chapter Three, one significant feature of the Negev Bedouin’s socio-political landscape are the dozens of tribal (*gabaliyya* and ‘*ā*’*iliyya*) networks connected by their genealogies, alliances, and residences who compete over resources in southern Israel. Since 1948, some tribal namesakes in the form of lineages (‘*ā*’*ilāt*) managed to accumulate or maintain higher status than others due in part to their large numbers and patronages, established relationships with government officials, and relative control over specific towns such as Rāhaṭ, Lagīya, and Ksīfa. As such, they have sustained prominent places in Bedouin politics, maintained regular access to private and state funds, and many of their members (particularly younger affiliates) have gained university education and technical expertise. Likewise, older generations within these families possess higher status as reputed elders (*kbār*) and leaders. Because of these circumstances, these tribal namesakes have generally accumulated popular histories, host well-known figures, and possess affiliated lands in the Negev but also uphold a strong presence in archival records.

During fieldwork, it became obvious that tribal histories (irrespective of generation) are still a central concern for spokespersons from these prominent lineages (‘*ā*’*ilāt*). Coincidentally, within the mnemonic and socio-political landscape of the Negev, tribal namesakes associated with these networks of people are significant sources of capital. Long-standing inter-group rivalries between ‘*ā*’*ilāt*, however, require intensive

redressing of both internal extended familial relationships and external reputations, which are then compared to and directed at other *‘ā’ilāt*, the Jewish state, and other stakeholders. This is an arena where rivalries or oppositions over local status, power, and reputations among *‘ā’ilāt* are enacted and contested. They are also, however, self-presentations limited by gender and age and are unavoidably framed by members’ interactions with outsiders.

As explained, local historicity continues to be significantly influenced by tribalism (*gabaliyya* and *‘ā’iliyya*) that is communicating genealogies and the historical particularisms of tribal lineages (*‘ā’ilāt*) to Bedouin and non-Bedouin alike. Specifically, people reference past events, highlight the influence of their ancestors with state officials, chronicle the longevity of their group’s influence, aim to prove their land ownership prior to the establishment of the Israeli state, and evidence their origins to the Negev from Arabia. Over the last decade, however, these expressions of historical capital have become dependent on archival documentation in the form of media artefacts, in particular evidentiary materials such as photographs and digital images contesting or corroborating local, Western, Israeli, and Palestinian imaginings of Bedouin history and society.

‘Large’¹³⁷ lineages (*‘ā’ilāt*) (most of whom were once labelled by the state as tribal units [*shevatim*]) have extensive and unique visual legacies in the form of historical photographs, heritage websites, and digital images. Specific spokespersons representing these *‘ā’ilāt* are also particularly active in genealogical and tribal reconstructions, visual media production, and collecting old family pictures. Many of these people have also positioned themselves as image-keepers of tribal histories. They

¹³⁷ The size of a tribal assemblage such as a lineage is significant. In the past, this meant that the group could rally more people in pursuit of their interests and could maintain broad alliances through marriages, patronage, and economic control. As such, up until today, people will use the adjective ‘large’ or ‘big’ to describe influential tribal namesakes.

not only engage in the regular production of images as amateur photographers but they also actively reproduce and circulate historical photographs and digital images among members and outsiders as spokespersons. These individuals (described here) emphasise specific readings of their images within various visual economies, doing so as owners, distributors, protectors, and experts of their *‘ā’ilāt*’s visual heritage (see below). Whether boasting the legacy of ancestors or countering the reputations of others, their images have come to confirm local historical truths and correct perceived untruths circulating in Bedouin society.

In order to further explore these practices, this chapter asks: What are the poly-mediated presence(s) of historically significant images in the Negev? How do they shape and are shaped by *‘ā’ilāt* members’ various perceptions of history? What are their values among members? To answer these questions, this chapter focuses on spokespersons from three prominent lineages (*‘ā’ilāt*) historically comprising part of the Tiyāhā: al-Huzayyil, al-Šāna’, and Abū Rabī’a. My focus on these families came about for several reasons: general happenstance of meeting people with these associations; their presence and activities in academia and community organisations; their accessibility in terms of language (Hebrew, Bedouin dialect, and English); their diversity in age (+/-30, +/-40, and +80); and mutual interest in images. These individuals also expressed a basic willingness to participate in my research project, arranged times to show me their image collections, and were interested in discussing Negev Bedouin history with me. The tribal namesakes to which these individuals affiliate are also recognised inside and outside the Negev. Importantly, however, these *‘ā’ilāt* (as a whole) have relative equal status in Bedouin society but thus also compete with each other for historical prestige in the Negev.

This chapter argues that old photographs and their digital reproductions (c. 1900-c. 1960) circulating within Negev Bedouin lineages (*‘ā’ilāt*) are treated and

circulated as forms of documentary evidence that are produced and consumed in various visual economies (predominantly indicated by their Hebrew, English, Arabic, and Bedouin dialect contexts). These images are appropriated and circulated by Bedouin in the Negev and used to reference locally known events and figures associated with particularised tribal histories. This chapter posits that old images within tribal (*‘ā’iliyya*) networks hold more presence among Bedouin when they can be used to support local historical knowledge, that is viewers are able to name, recognise, and identify the ancestral *shuyūkh*, people, and landscapes within them. The more weight an image has among members, the more likely the image will be displayed locally in venues, circulated by members within other visual economies as validation of tribal power and status, and transformed into various material and digital reproductions as learned evidence. While maintaining presence(s) in broader visual economies, these case studies demonstrate that the graphic contents of these images undergo material/digital transformations and recoding for the Bedouin’s *tribal* past as they circulate – practices that are strategic and revisionary among spokespersons. The last section of this chapter briefly explores the value of these images within the broader language by which Bedouin authenticate their historical narratives and ‘play’ with their evidence of tribalism (*gabaliyya* and *‘ā’iliyya*).

I. THE PRESENCE(S) OF IMAGES AMONG THREE LINEAGES

This section explores the circulations of six images (out of the eight discussed in this thesis), which are grouped into three in-depth case studies focusing on the al-Huzayyil, al-Šāna‘, and Abū Rabī‘a lineages (*‘ā’ilāt*). These case studies are loosely arranged by chronology corresponding to the age of an image’s socio-political biography but also their initial displays (as presented to me) in the Negev, and their subsequent replicated

existences and recordings in other physical and digital venues (*shigg*, NGOs, Wikipedia, and Facebook). The photographs and digital images discussed in this section were described by members from within and outside of these *‘ā’ilāt* as ‘significant’ historical images of their families and tribal events, places, and relations in the Negev. Moreover, these *‘ā’ilāt* were ‘locally’ reputed or known to not only possess but also ‘work with’ historical photographs and digital images in their society, which is why these particular case studies were chosen for investigation.¹³⁸

As stated in the Introduction of this thesis, I conducted empirical and archival research to find the ‘original image’ of popular images appropriated for local historicity during my fieldwork. This approach provided a systematic way of establishing the images’ biographies and accounting for their current presence(s), movement, and values in contexts within and beyond the Negev. In addition to describing the images’ social biographies, this section details my own interactions with spokespersons and how they recode or play with the narratives of the past attributed to images of ancestor portraits and snap-shots of tribal (*‘ā’iliyya*) events in ways that relate to pre-existing forms of local historical knowledge in Bedouin society but also Orientalism and Israeli-Palestinian nationalisms as presented through oral stories and books. Finally, this section also highlights how spokespersons’ engagements with both historical images and tribal historicity are limited by their gendered and generational knowledge which dictates people’s access to communicative technologies, experience with lineage (*‘ā’ilāt*) events, and their command of broader Orientalist stereotypes and nationalisms.

¹³⁸ For additional criteria, see Introduction.

A. *AL-HUZAYYIL'S PORTRAITS: FAMILY LEGACIES*

During an interview a local photographer from Rāhaṭ, Karīm Abū Latīf explained that 'big' Bedouin families usually own large archives of old photographs depicting their 'tribes'. According to him, the al-Huzayyil is Rāhaṭ's 'biggest family' and one of the Negev's most famous *shuyūkh* came from this 'tribe', Shaykh Salmān al-Huzayyil II. Karīm went on to say that the deceased shaykh's youngest living son is a man named Ḥassan al-Huzayyil who is reputed to possess the tribe's large collection of old photographs. He believed that Ḥassan lived in his father's previous homestead located northwest of Rāhaṭ with his Swiss wife and two sons. Karīm said that he had never 'seen' the images for himself but that Ḥassan might be willing to show me his collection.

In the hopes of interviewing Ḥassan about his photographic collection, my key informant 'Amīr Shiblī and I thought it best if he called Ḥassan to make the initial request. 'Amīr's assistance in making initial contact with Bedouin male interviewees was instrumental throughout my fieldwork. I knew that in my position, as a young woman, I would struggle to gain access to significant events, male groups, and materials. Knowing this would be the case for a female researcher in the male-dominated Bedouin public-political world, I solicited 'Amīr's help early on. 'Amīr had taught in Negev Bedouin schools for the last decade and his tribal connections as a Shiblī (northern Bedouin) were known among most southern Bedouin. He also possessed equal status to individuals and groups claiming Arabian origins (*'aṣīl*) and thus male interviewees were more inclined to speak with us as a team rather than me alone.

After several weeks of speaking with various contacts we managed to find Ḥassan's mobile number. During the phone conversation, he agreed to show us his large

photograph collection at his home in Khirbet az-Zibale. Indeed, Ḥassan seemed extremely interested in sharing his father's legacy with a northern Bedouin man and a Western female researcher. Later in the week, 'Amīr and I drove to Hassan's house where he and his wife greeted us and directed us to their salon. There he explained the history of the al-Huzayyil and his father's legacy in a mixture of Hebrew, Bedouin dialect, and English. Afterwards, Ḥassan showed us his photographic collection in albums and digital collection on his Facebook page from his office computer. At the end of the interview, Ḥassan took us to a metal structure located on the edge of his property, which now serves as the agnates' meeting place (*shigg*).

'This is Shaykh Salmān al-Huzayyil al-Ḥukūk al-Tiyāhā. He was the King of the Shaykhs, the Shaykh of the Shaykhs in his time.' Ḥassan said while pointing to an old photograph encased in a small black wooden frame hung on the *shigg*'s wall. The image was a creased photocopy of a black and white photograph printed, framed, and preserved behind glass. In it, a middle-aged man of stood in front a faded backdrop with his left hand resting on the back of a wooden chair. He was dressed in a customary stripped robe with a dark suit jacket and a long cape draped from his shoulders. Around his chest and waist he wore bandoleers, on his head a *kūfiyya*, and a cigarette burned in his left hand. Below the image, the caption read, 'SHAYKH SALMAN EL-HUZEIL OF THE TAYAHA TRIBE, MARRIED 26 WIVES' (original capitals).¹³⁹

I looked at the enclosed image and recalled what Ḥassan had previously told me about the man in the picture earlier in his salon:

Ḥassan: Ok, so Shaykh Salmān was the second because there was Shaykh Salmān the first. The first Salman was very strong, very charismatic, but there were

¹³⁹ Some authors misidentify Salmān as Salaam or Suleīmān.

always misunderstandings between him and the Turkish.¹⁴⁰ His son, Shaykh Salmān II was born in 1882 and he died 1982. He lived around 100 years. You can say he lived ninety-eight years very healthy until 1982.... Yes, in his whole life he married thirty-nine wives. My mother is the last wife and he married her in 1948 and after he married her he never married another wife. I am the seventy-third child of his. Ok, he had seventy-six children but only fifteen boys and the rest of the sixty-one were girls. There are three under me, and that is why I say I am the seventy-third.

In the history of the Bedouin just twice has there been a shaykh of all the shaykhs. Now I know that you already study about the Bedouin, about our tribe. You know every tribe has a shaykh. However, the shaykh of the tribe is not like the times now in Israel. Before, there was a shaykh from each tribe. Now the shaykh would have to come from the biggest family, they had to be little bit rich, and have knowledge of Bedouin justice, and, if he can, be a medicine man. However, sometimes there was a shaykh of the shaykhs and in the Negev there was one from every *gabīla*, from Tarabīn, from Tiyyāhā, from the Jubarāt, and from the ‘Azāzmah. However, the biggest shaykh from all of the *gabīla* was the shaykh from the Tiyyāhā.

The first shaykh of the shaykhs in the history of the Bedouin was Shaykh Salmān I and then Shaykh Salmān II who was the shaykh over all of the shaykhs for sixty years. They called him the King of the Bedouin ... Shaykh Salmān II married thirty-nine women, because, you know he was the King of the Bedouin and most of the others wanted to have a political relationship with him and so they gave to him a daughter to marry....

Oh, have you heard of the story? There was one girl that was grown by her aunt and one day Shaykh Salmān was riding his horse when he came across a well. And there he saw a little girl there. I think today, that he felt that this little girl was of his blood. Something from inside him told him this because she was really, a very strong little girl. When he saw the girl he said to her, ‘Give my horse water, please.’ She said to him, ‘No! Who are you that I should give you water. I am the daughter of an important shaykh!’ Shaykh Salmān looked at her and recognized her as his own blood, and before he left, he said, ‘I am your father.’ And then he decided to take her back with him. However, the story people tell in the Negev is different from this one. But what I tell you now is the truth! This is how it happened. People say that the shaykh didn’t know that she was his daughter and he wanted to marry her but this is not true.

¹⁴⁰ These ‘misunderstandings’ occurred during the War of Zāri’. The Ottomans did not intervene the internal conflict until Salmān al-Huzayyil came to control the Tiyyāhā. At this point the Ottomans interceded and executed him as a ‘troublemaker’ (Marx 1967).

‘Amīr: She said that if you knew who my father was you would never talk to me.

Ḥassan: Yes! She said that!

‘Amīr: You know maybe I should tell my students here in the Negev this version of the story. You know they talk about it in the classrooms.

Ḥassan: But now you both know the truth! This girl is a sister of mine. She is today around eighty years old. She has two children. One of her sons is a doctor and the other is a dentist. Ok, so, now back to the pictures. As I said, Shaykh Salmān II was very important man and his first picture was taken a long time ago. It can be found in an English book where ‘Ārif al-‘Ārif wrote about him. He was very young in the picture, maybe thirty-five or forty, and he had already married twenty-six wives. It is written there. Already, at that time, when this picture was taken.

Emilie: Do you own this book and the picture?

Ḥassan: I will show you pictures and the book later. But it is important to know that Shaykh Salmān was a very young shaykh. All of the north Negev was under his control because it was the family’s ancestors’ land. There is a history about him. These are things that are written. The most important thing for you to know is that if he was not here, there would be no Bedouin here in Israel. You must know what is true!

After completing his story, Ḥassan got up and disappeared into the next room and returned with a photograph album, a blue file folder filled with plastic sleeves. In each sleeve were black and white photocopies, newspaper clippings, small snapshot photographs on paper, and pages with images torn out of books. I later realised that copies of these images were also framed and hung in the agnates’ meeting place (*shigg*). He placed the album next to me on the sofa and told me I should go through it. Ḥassan explained the events, people, and places depicted in the images but paused when we came across a yellowed page that he had carefully removed from another, older book and inserted into its own plastic sleeve in the album (see Figure 50).



Figure 50: A photograph of Shaykh Salmān al-Huzayyil II located on a page removed from al-Arif's (1944) book in Ḥassan al-Huzayyil's photographic album c. 1900.

I asked him if this was the image he was speaking of earlier in our conversation?

Pointing again at the album page, he explained:

Yes, this is it. I took it from 'Ārif al-'Ārif's [1944] English book. I own his books. I have read these books! I have one book from him that was translated into Hebrew some six years ago. I have read this. But he writes many things that are not true about the al-Huzayyil but every family knows of these books. See this, this picture here. It is the earliest photograph I have of my father. [Ḥassan pointed to the picture in Figure 50]. However, don't believe what you read about the al-Huzayyil in 'Ārif al-'Ārif's books. 'Ārif wrote about this and that. He wrote that Shaykh Salmān I was very hard on the people. That he would take unwilling girls from the people. He wrote this but the story is not true. No! He was a very strong shaykh and his people knew him and loved him and I

want to tell you something very, very, very important. The Bedouin that have *shorashim* [Hebrew – roots] here in the Negev, if they are famous and they have big families they would never make the mistake of giving their family a bad name or reputation. It would never happen! ‘Ārif al-‘Ārif was disliked here and that is the reason he started these rumours about the shaykhs of the al-Huzayyil. But his writings are lies because those stories would have never happened because a shaykh would not bring a bad reputation upon his people. Nor would any Bedouin in general. Not the Tiyyāhā, and not even people from the Tarabīn. They would not make the mistake of giving the family a bad name, especially against the tribe that they come from.

After Ḥassan finished describing the pictures in the album, he directed us to his personal library. It was a small room located down the hallway with walls lined with books and held a large desk with a computer. Rather than reaching for the books to show us the images in the printed volumes, however, Ḥassan went to his desk and turned on the computer. ‘I want to show the Facebook page I recently made in memory of my father.’ ‘Amīr and I sat down next to him as he began navigating the Internet in search of the Facebook profile. ‘On this Facebook page I’ve upload most of the images and documents that I have collected.’ Clicking on the homepage, he signed into the special account dedicated entirely to the life and visual history of his father.

Ḥassan: To get to this Facebook page, you must read it in Hebrew not in Arabic. See here. [Pointing to the screen] It reads Shaykh al-Huzayyil in Hebrew. If you go there you will see all of his pictures. Now I go inside. [Clicking the mouse] You see. These are all of the pictures and writings that I have of him, here on Facebook.

Emilie: When did you create the Facebook page?

Ḥassan: Maybe around a half a year or so ago.

Emilie: Do many people ask to ‘friend’ the page?

Ḥassan: Yes, but I don’t take everybody. Facebook is good but I don’t know ... maybe putting them here was a mistake. I don’t want everyone to see. I don’t know. A lot of people go inside to look at these pictures. Lots of people! From everywhere! I have people from Russia, Ukraine, Demark, and Sweden. They come to visit here to see the pictures. Oh, here we are! [Scrolling down through the page] Here is a copy of a book that

was written in English and in Arabic but it really best if you see the original books, not like here, on the computer.

[I recognised the pages were from Clinton Bailey's (2004) book *Bedouin Poetry From Sinai and the Negev*. In fact, all of the poems in the book that mentioned the al-Huzayyil tribe had been copied, photographed, digitised, and posted on this page.]

Emilie: Are those poems from Clinton Bailey's book?

Ḥassan: I don't know who wrote them but there are a lot of things written about Shaykh Salmān there in English and Arabic.

The entire homepage was composed of archival photographs, films, and pages from Hebrew, Arabic, and English documents. Clicking on the page's album collection, Ḥassan went through the digitised collection of each photograph that he had previously showed us in family albums. Ḥassan had contextualised each image with Hebrew, Arabic, and German captions.¹⁴¹ In addition to the captions, followers of the page also inserted comments about the images (see Figure 51).



Figure 51: Screen shot of Facebook image dedicated to Salmān al-Huzayyil II.

¹⁴¹ Many Bedouin in the Negev have connections to Germany. This is due in part to the legacy of WWI Turkish-Germany influence in the Negev and the fact that many younger men travel to Germany to obtain undergraduate degrees.

Once again, Ḥassan went through each image and explained who was in the picture, the past event in which it was taken, and the importance of the shaykh's legacy. Towards the end of the online collection, we came to a digitised copy of the earliest photograph taken of the shaykh, the image taken from al-Arif's book (see Figure 52).

Ḥassan: Ok, so now we come to 'Ārif al-'Ārif. This is a photograph is taken from 'Ārif al-'Ārif [s books] and here [pointing to the screen] see it says again, 'Shaykh of all the Tiyaha'. At that time, he was the shaykh of all the Tiyāhā. See it says here in the photograph. [Scrolling down the homepage] That is him with 'Ārif al-'Ārif and his sword. Here see this photograph [pointing to the image]. It says, 'The Sheikhs of Beersheba.' In 1920, the British took the shaykhs, those who really had power in the Negev, and put them together in a shaykh's court. See it says, 'Shaykh al-Huzayyil of the Tiyaha was a member of the Tribal Court.' There were eight shaykhs there.

Emilie: Do you know the names of any of the others?

Ḥassan: No, they are written in the Arabic books. Their names stay there but not in the English and Hebrew books, only in the Arabic books. English and Hebrew books do not recognise everyone or give us their names. You know I want this book in Arabic. I only have the Hebrew one. They say these books are in Ben Gurion Library. The originals of the books are there at the Ben Gurion University.

Emilie: Where did you get these pictures? The images you put here on Facebook and the albums? Are they from your father's personal collection?

Ḥassan: They were around. Most of the pictures were collected by my mother and me. Some were given to us. There might be more out there but I don't know. I have what I have ... that is all. But, you see, there are lots of pictures here and good ones too. The originals are in the albums not like you see like here on the computer, but they also now hang in our *shigg*.



Figure 52: Screen shot of Facebook images dedicated to Salmān al-Huzayyil II.

Back in the newly constructed *shigg* of the al-Huzayyil, I studied the same image of his father, which was a photocopy of the image in the album (see Figure 53).



Figure 53: Photograph of framed photocopy in al-Huzayyil's *shigg*.

Around it hung twenty-five other pictures of Ḥassan's father in variously sized frames. The quality of the images ranged from glossy colour photographs to dull photocopies taken from newspapers and books. Their content included stoic portraits, posed group pictures, and spontaneous snap-shots taken during group events or meetings from the 1930s up until the shaykh's death. In most, the shaykh was depicted with well-known figures such as Israel's former Prime Minister Simon Peres (1977), the state's former Minister of Defence Moshe Dayan (1967-1974), and other leaders from the Negev. Arranged alongside the photographs were also framed documents including personal correspondences and newspaper articles in Hebrew, Arabic, and English script. In addition to the documentary materials there were other material items such as a large blue Oriental rug along with coffee urns and commemorative plates.

Looking over the picture wall, another image caught my eye. This one was in a decorative wooden frame and appeared to be a photocopy of an original photograph (see Figure 54). The picture depicted Shaykh Salmān II with Eleanor Roosevelt and an Israeli military officer. Below the image was Hebrew text that had been cut from its original context and glued to the same mount containing the copied photograph. The caption read in Hebrew, 'Honourable Guest Flew into the Country. Eleanor Roosevelt, widow of a President, came down to the Negev to meet with Sheikh al-Huziel in his camp next to Kibbutz Shuval.'



Figure 54: Photograph of framed photocopy of Shaykh Salmān al-Huzayyil II, Eleanor Roosevelt, and Michael Hanegbi.

Ḥassan explained that he had photocopied the image from a newspaper given to him by a friend, which he then framed and hung next to other portraits, group photos, documents, and letters on a wall commemorating the life of his father and the power of his family in the *shigg*.

Emilie: I heard that after the creation of Israel many international representatives came to the Negev to visit the shaykh. Is that Eleanor Roosevelt with him?

Ḥassan: Yes, I want to tell you about this now. It happened in 1955 maybe or around then. You know that a lot of tourists come to Israel and they heard that there is a famous shaykh here in the Negev and they wanted to come visit him. So one day, an American from *Newsweek* magazine, a journalist wrote an article in America that Shaykh al-Huzayyil would like to marry with an American wife.... Why do I tell you this? At this time, the president's wife Eleanor, she decided to visit the shaykh after the president died and she was a widow. I think that she read the *Newsweek* and heard that the shaykh

wanted a wife and was curious [laughing] but she did not look nice so he didn't take her [laughing again]. No, no, I am joking. But there is a picture of this meeting also on the Facebook page that I showed you. So you know, usually because he was the most famous shaykh in the Negev all of Israel's presidents came to visit him. It began with Ben Gurion and Begin and Rabin and everybody was here to visit him. Even people from the Knesset during election and even people from the outside, those people even came to visit him.

After we finished looking at the images, Ḥassan guided us back through his private garden into his house where we had our earlier discussion. After we finished our conversation, we said our goodbyes. As we walked through the gated entrance, we thanked him for his time. 'Oh, by the way, Emilie, here is my business card. You should also look on the Internet. There is more information about my father there. Many, many websites because as I told you, he was a very important man for our people.' He said in English. I thanked him once again and we said our goodbyes. As I drove the truck out of the parking area, 'Amīr exclaimed, 'Emilie, look!' I followed his finger pointing over the fence line towards a tall metal post emerging from garden next to Ḥassan's house. There on the lamppost was an enlarged and framed black and white portrait of the shaykh, looking out over the parking lot to the expanse of the Negev's northern hills.

A couple of weeks after our interview with Ḥassan, I travelled to Ben Gurion University (BGU) in Beersheba to find the books containing the images displayed on the *shigg* wall and the shaykh's son's Facebook page. I was looking for the Arif al-Arif's¹⁴² English volume *Bedouin Love, Law, and Legend* (1944) and the Hebrew and Arabic versions of *Tā'rīkh B'ir al-sab' wa-Qabā'ilihā* (1934) (English – History of Beersheba and Its Tribes). As stated in Chapter Three, al-Arif also wrote extensively about Bedouin society during his administration, which cumulated into the above-mentioned series of books. While providing information pertaining to Bedouin genealogies, territories, and customs, his writings and the photographs contained within

¹⁴² Arif al-Arif's name is not transcribed as an author. See Preface.

them reflected urban Palestinian and British Orientalist sentiments pertaining to the Negev Bedouin; contributing to popular readings of images of this society among outsiders.

There on the shelves, I found a variety of al-Arif's books in BGU's Middle Eastern Collection and skimmed them for the images, in particular the portrait of the young Shaykh Salman II. There were Hebrew translations of al-Arif's work, which the Joe Alon Museum of Bedouin Culture and BGU translated in 2006; a publication directed at Hebrew reading audiences. In each book, however, someone had torn out the pages containing larger portraits of Bedouin *shuyūkh*. In addition to ripping out the pages, a person had also gone through all of the Hebrew copies and translated each of the smaller images' captions from Hebrew into Arabic in pencil (see Figure 55).




Figure 55: Photograph of book page containing portrait of Shaykh Ḥamīd al-Ṣānaʿ in the Hebrew translation of *Taʿrīkh*.

Flipping through the pages of al-Arif's English (1944) volume, I came across Shaykh Salman II's early portrait. It was located on page seventy-three in his chapter entitled 'Divorce and Polygamy'. In the paragraph next to the image, al-Arif (1944: 72 [original italics]) wrote:

If you were to ask a Badawi what is the most important material factor in his life, his answer probably would be land. If you asked him what is the second in importance, he would answer women. In his relationship with women, divorce and polygamy are freely practised. The prophet has said that divorce is tolerated but hated by God. It comes under the category of *El-Halal* (things which are permitted though frowned upon) as distinct from *Haram* (things that are forbidden). It is said in the *Koran* – 'You may marry, twice, thrice, four times, but if you fear you will not do justice you should marry only one'. *Shaykh Salman Huzeil* married twenty-six, and one of his ancestors married 28 women. The *Huziel* tribe are known to indulge living in polygamy. At no one time does the number of wives exceed four as laid down in the *Koran*.

Despite emphasising the 'exotic' practice of polygamy among Bedouin in the Negev, al-Arif provided no citation for the shaykh's portrait displayed in the al-Huzayyil's *shigg*. The remaining photographic reprints in the books, however, were all carefully referenced and attributed to the American Colony's Photo Service.¹⁴³ Did al-Arif forget to cite it? Did he own the image or take it himself?

After perusing al-Arif's Arabic works, it became apparent that photographers from the American Colony of Jerusalem produced most of the images in his books. In addition, each translation contained most of the same photographic images initially produced by these photographers. Moreover, as the shaykh's son asserted, the Arabic version was the only volume that listed and identified *shuyūkh* by name. In fact, it listed

¹⁴³ The Department of Photography of the American Colony was established in October 1898. In 1903, Ferdinand Vester and John Whiting purchased a store in Jerusalem, a time when the photography department gained notoriety. Many of their photographs sold at the store and later reprinted in various publications. Whiting, Hol Lars Larsson, and Eric G. Matson became the most well known of the Colony's photographers.

the names of each shaykh posed in the group photographs and described each pre-1948 tribal lineage. Upon careful examination, it also became clear that al-Arif or his publisher had identified each shaykh from the group photographs, cropped their image, and re-printed their smaller portrait in the relevant chapters describing their tribes (see Figure 56). Additional images of Shaykh Salman II showed him sitting with other Tiyāhā leaders participating in tribal courts established during the British Mandate. One was the picture that the shaykh's son had copied and posted on his Facebook page. The portrait of younger Shaykh Salman II in the English (1944) book was not, however, among the images in the Arabic (1933) or Hebrew (2001) versions.



Figure 56: Shaykh Salmān the Second's portrait is the top right image.

Confronted with a dead end regarding the biography of the early portrait, I met with local Bedouin professor 'Ārif Abū Rabī'a from BGU in attempt to get more information about Arif al-Arif's books and the photographic collections in them. 'Ārif explained that there are three translations of al-Arif's volumes in Arabic, Hebrew, and English. The Israeli translators presented the Hebrew version as a direct translation of the Arabic book, however 'Ārif informed me that they significantly altered some of the information from al-Arif's Arabic text. For example, they added and took away several images presented in the original Arabic version.¹⁴⁴ Moreover, he clarified that the English edition is an Orientalised version of the Arabic and only focuses on cultural aspects of the Negev Bedouin society and does not go into detail about tribal (*'ā'iliyya*) histories, unlike Hebrew and Arabic versions.

Unfortunately, 'Ārif had no additional information about the history of the photographic images other than that they originated from the American Colony, which had initially produced them. 'You know, most people believe that the photographs were taken by al-Arif himself since most find them in his books. These books are the only means for people to access these important images but as you have read, al-Arif clearly states that the images were taken by the American Colony photographers.' He went on to explain that these photographs are the earliest surviving images of the Negev Bedouin and highly valued by members. I asked him why so many of the pages containing the *shuyūkh*'s portraits were removed from the Hebrew books. He stated in English, 'Bedouin students take them, especially pictures of shaykhs from their own tribes. In fact, these are probably the only photographs of their ancestors. Once taken, students make copies to frame and hang on the walls of their houses and *shigg*, and you can even find them on the Internet nowadays.'

¹⁴⁴ There are no images in Hillelson's (1937, 1938a, 1938b) English translations of the *Ta'rikh*. Secondly, Leo Haefeli (1938) translated *Bedouin Love, Law, and Legend* into German but I am unaware if there are images in this version.

After our conversation, I conducted a more thorough Internet search for pictures of the shaykh. In addition to the shaykh's son's Facebook page, I found the portrait on a Hebrew version of Wikipedia created by another member of the lineage (‘*ā’ilāt*), ‘Alī al-Huzayyil. The webpage was entitled in Hebrew *Salman al-Huzel* (English – Salman al-Huzayyil) and recounts several stories popularly relayed in the Negev about the shaykh, such as the desert well story involving his daughter (see first interview in this section). The online version of the story is recounted by another shaykh who supposedly accompanied Shaykh Salman II on the day in question. Today this account, not the shaykh's son's version, is the more popular version of the ‘well story’.

Those days we went hunting and went riding horses. One day we passed one of the wells in the Negev. Around the well were women drawing water for their flocks. We stopped to water the horses. Shaykh found a beautiful young girl among the women and as usual began to charm her for himself. He turned to her and asked, ‘What tribe you are from? What your father's name?’ And she replied, ‘Al-Huzayyil tribe and my father is Shaykh Salmān.’ He then asked her who is your mother? She answers and tells her mother was deported to her parents when she was a baby and now she lives with an aunt. She went on to say, ‘I have not seen my father for my entire life and I do not know him at all.’ The shaykh said surprised and disappointed, ‘I am that Shaykh and you are my daughter.’

(Al-Huzayyil 2013)

In addition to this story, the website contained a digital image of the young shaykh in the left hand margin of the page – it was a copy of the portrait taken directly from al-Arif's English edition (Al-Huzayyil 2013). The caption reads, ‘Shaykh Salman al-Huzayyil in his youth.’ Once again, however, there is no citation for the image (see Figure 57).



Figure 57: Screen shot of Hebrew Wikipedia pages created by 'Alī al-Huzayyil.

Pursuing my final lead, I researched Eric Matson, a photographer from the American Colony, as little is known about Matson among local historians. In the hopes of locating the source of the shaykh's portrait, I visited the Library of Congress in the United States where the Matson Collection is held – a large archive of early photographic portraits of the *shuyūkh* mostly taken by Matson at the beginning of the twentieth century. The collection is composed of approximately 22,000 glass and film photographic negatives and transparencies, and over 1,000 photographic prints, including stereographic images and eleven albums, most of which have been recently

digitised and made available online. The collection depicts events such as Sir Herbert Samuel's¹⁴⁵ arrival to the Negev, customary wedding day feasts, and Bedouin way of life during the British Mandate. Included in his black and white portfolio are portraits of *shuyūkh* commissioned by al-Arif. In most, the leading noblemen sit in front of Beersheba's stone buildings with their swords, guns, and wearing their best clothing. As seen in Figure 58, group photographs were taken of *shuyūkh* of particular tribes (*ashā'ir*) and usually with al-Arif sitting or standing among them.



Figure 58: 'Aref el Aref and Bedouin Sheikhs' by Eric Matson (c. 1920-1933).

As described in Chapter Four, the Matson Collection and its reprints in al-Arif's books constitute one of the earliest visual records of the Negev Bedouin today. None of the Bedouin men images in the group photographs, other than al-Arif, were identified in these photographs; similar to al-Arif's English and Hebrew books. Instead, the

¹⁴⁵ Sir Samuel served as Britain's 1st High Commissioner of Palestine between 1 July 1920 and 30 June 1925.

photographs' captions simply read 'Aref el Aref and Bedouin Sheikhs', as Ḥassan noted in our conversation. After reviewing the entire collection, I was not able to locate the 'original' copy of the young Shaykh Salmān II's portrait in its holdings. Thus the reconstruction of this particular image's biography came to an end, lost in the hinterland of missing citations and private family libraries. Despite its forgotten origin, however, the portrait of the shaykh continues to amass its own story as evidence for the history of the al-Huzayyil and their legacy in the Negev, a source of ancestral pride today that supports popular historical narratives such as that presented on the lineage's (*ʿā'ilāt*) Hebrew Wikipedia page, which stated:

It is known throughout the region that Shaykh Salman al-Huzayyil was a legend in his lifetime. He has an exceptional status not only among the tribes Tiyaha, but across the Negev, Sinai, and Jordan. He had many purebred Arabian horses, some of which had a lavish heritage of five generations or more. Shaykh possessed great leadership, wisdom, courage, generosity and ability to negotiate with any government. He was a striking appearance: tall, noble-looking, fair skin and blue eyes. He also had popular healing abilities.... He also served as a judge in court Bedouin Beersheba.

(Al-Huzayyil 2013)

After failing to locate the original image of Shaykh Salmān II in al-Arif's books, I went back to BGU library several weeks later to research the biography of the image depicting the shaykh, Eleanor Roosevelt, and the Israeli Military Governor. I began by taking up Hassan's suggestion to take a more comprehensive look at his Hebrew Facebook page. There he had also uploaded a digital copy of the Roosevelt photograph in the page dedicated to his father (see Figure 59):



Figure 59: Screen shot of Facebook images created by Ḥassan al-Huzayyil.

The photograph, like others uploaded onto his account, was captioned in English, German, Hebrew, and Arabic. Additional research found that Eleanor Roosevelt had made three visits to Israel in 1952, 1955, and 1959. In 1952, Roosevelt had visited Beersheba where she met with Shaykh Salmān II. According to the *Jewish Telegraphic Agency* (19 February 1952) (an international periodical for American English readers), ‘Mrs Roosevelt visited Beersheba where she lunched with the major and local notables. Later she visited Sheikh Al-Huziel and his tribe.’ Mrs Roosevelt made two subsequent trips to Israel. During each she took time to visit Shaykh al-Huzayyil.

The story of Shaykh al-Huzayyil and Mrs Roosevelt’s meeting was described in another news article directed at English reading audiences in Russia. In particular, the *St Petersburg Times* (3 December 1957) described how Roosevelt had met the shaykh six weeks earlier during a tour of the Middle East and that he asked her to marry him despite having thirty-nine wives. The marriage proposal was also mentioned in an

article published by *The Sydney Morning Herald* (8 December 1957: 17) entitled 'Mrs Roosevelt Refused, but 1,000 want a sheik'. It stated:

He is the desert Casanova who has already proposed three times to Mrs Roosevelt.... The sheik, known as the King of the Bedouins, lives in a fortress-like mansion built of massive limestone blocks and mud in the desert near Beersheba. Surrounding it are packs of horses, camels, dogs, arabs, palm trees – and sand. There are also dozens of children. Most of them are the sheik's, by his 39 wives, but some are his grandchildren. He isn't sure which are his. The sheik, who is at least 70, has mahogany skin, a hooked nose, piercing brown eyes, an Errol Flynn mustache, and chin whiskers. At present he has only two wives. A reporter asked what happened to the other 37. The sheik's son, Shalet, answered by snapping a thumb over his shoulder like a baseball umpire. He gets rid of a wife by giving her clothes and pointing to the door. He specially wants Mrs Roosevelt, 73, to be his fortieth wife. 'Of course,' the sheik says, 'I could never hope to match my grandfather. He had 45.'

In 1960, *The Sydney Morning Herald* (17 January 1960) published a report entitled, 'Mrs Roosevelt: The sheik still tries.' It describes that Mrs Roosevelt met the shaykh in 1953 and '[s]ince then he has been wooing her with spoken and written words.... Mrs Roosevelt admitted that she was "tickled pick" by the sheik's first proposal. Since then she has maintained a stony silence about her desert admirer.'

I cross-referenced the dates of the articles with the Israeli government's newly established online National Photographic Collection (with Hebrew and English versions), which today houses the largest and oldest collection of historical images of Negev Bedouin pertaining to the Israeli visual economy. There I found that Fritz Cohen of the Israeli Government Press Office (GPO) took the original photograph on 15 February 1952 (see Figure 60). The image was captured during Eleanor Roosevelt's visit to the Negev with the shaykh and Israeli District Governor Michael Hanegbi in 1952. The original copy is now stored at Israel's National Photo Collection located in Jerusalem but the GPO's Photography Department produced a digitised copy in 1998.

Along with the photograph of Shaykh al-Huzayyil and Eleanor Roosevelt, the Photographic Collection houses hundreds of images of Bedouin notables and events from 1949 to the late 1990s. Satisfied with locating the original copy of the photograph hanging in Hassan's *shigg*, I did not pursue the image's biography any further at the time.



Figure 60: Screen shot of Israel's National Photography Collection's page (1992).

Several months later, however, while attending a dinner party in Rāhaṭ with Bedouin members of the al-Huzayyil and al-Ṣāna', the photograph's more recent and controversial biography in the Negev was brought to my attention. *Good Arabs* (2010 [2006]) by Hillel Cohen, a professor from Hebrew University, described the 'political relationships' of several dozen Arab citizens of Israel with the newly formed Jewish state as articulated in recently declassified court, government, and media records

previously withheld by the state of Israel (Cohen 2006, 2010).¹⁴⁶ Among these men are several well-known Bedouin from the Negev who, accordingly to Cohen's research, worked with the new Israeli state in various ways during the 1948 War and Military Administration (1948-1966). During the conversation (in Bedouin dialectic) between the Bedouin diners attending the party, the guests discussed Cohen's (2006, 2010) books and expressed their mutual concern about the prospect of his research injuring the reputations of the tribesmen mentioned in his book and further ramifications for their families. After their heated debate concerning which of their Bedouin ancestors 'cooperated' more with the Israeli government than others the dinner party concluded.

Several days after the event, I went in search of a hard copy of the book in BGU's library. Upon locating it, I was surprised to find that on the front cover of English version was the photograph of Shaykh Salmān II, Eleanor Roosevelt, and Governor Michael Hanegbi taken by Fritz Cohen in 1952 (see Figure 61).

¹⁴⁶ The book was initially published in Hebrew in 2006 with an English translation completed in 2010.



Figure 61: Screen shot of book cover of *Good Arabs* (Cohen 2010 [English edition]).

I later learned that in both editions, Hillel Cohen (2006, 2010) devotes a section in Chapter Six to ‘The Noble Savage and Breached Boundaries’ in which he describes Bedouin individuals from the Negev who liaised with the Israeli officials and the patronising treatment by Israeli officials of Bedouin leaders. To illustrate this point, Cohen (2010 [2006]) details several occasions in which Shaykh Salmān II hosted and met with Israeli officials as an appointed civil servant wherein he served as an official go-between or *shuyūkh-mukhtār* for their tribal members. In addition to the written description of Shaykh Salmān II’s dealings with police in the chapter, Cohen (or possibly his publishers) also chose the GPO’s 1952 photograph for the cover of the English edition (2010) (see Figure 62) but not the Hebrew edition (see Cohen 2006).

art,
 y
 ice
 .
 n
 it
 of
 at
 he
 to
 lin



Figure 62: Screen shot of photograph in *Good Arabs* (Cohen 2010).

Since the publication of *Good Arabs* in 2006 and 2010, other lineages (*‘ā’ilāt*) frequently reference the book and photographic illustrations as proof of the al-Huzayyil’s loyalty to Israel, which in the eyes of some Bedouin is a disavowal of Arab nationalism. This comes as both historical and contemporary accounts of Bedouin cooperating with the Israeli government are increasingly decried by other members as working against the solidarity of the Bedouin as a Palestinian minority in Israel. During fieldwork, I was often told by various people that certain *‘ā’ilāt* had worked ‘behind the backs of the community and collaborated with the state to get recognition of their own family’s lands’.

While these accusations are not only characteristic of tribal politics in the Negev, Bedouin's more general interest in local historiography and subsequent revisions and/or confirmations of local tribal history have grown since the Israeli government opened¹⁴⁷ several archives to the general public in the 1990s and the publication of the New Historians' findings (mostly in Hebrew and English), such as that of Hillel Cohen (2006, 2010). Some Bedouin spokespersons, such as those from the al-Şāna' at the dinner party in Rāhaṭ, claim that these documentary disclosures merely substantiate the 'truth' of al-Huzayyil's loyalty to Israel; others, such as those from the al-Huzayyil lineage (*'ā'ilāt*), argued that al-Arif's (1934, 1944) and Cohen's (2006, 2010) books are recorded proof of their ancestors' influence with the various governments ruling the region such as the nascent Israeli state. They expressed a viewpoint similar to Ḥassan's belief that Shaykh Salmān II was personally responsible for convincing Israeli officials to let Bedouin remain in the Negev after the 1948 War, particularly tribes they considered to be loyal to state. This occurrence, however, solidified the historical reputations of other *'ā'ilāt*, like the al-Şāna', as troublemakers among their fellow Bedouin and considered anti-*yishuv* (anti-Jewish community) by Israeli officials. In fact, it was this reputation that led the Israeli government to forcibly expel al-Şāna' from their Negev lands in the area of Lagīya and to try, unsuccessfully, to relocate them to Jordan in 1952.

B. *AL-ŞĀNA' : GENDER, AUTHORITY, AND CONTEST*

'Ā'isha al-Şāna' and I first met in 2007 while I was conducting research for my graduate degree at Ben Gurion University (BGU). While politically influential on a regional and national stage, 'Ā'isha, as a woman, does not have the same status in the

¹⁴⁷ Public access to these archives had been previously restricted by the government because of security concerns.

al-Šāna‘ lineage (‘*ā’ilāt*) as her father who is a prominent elder (*kabīr*). Nevertheless, as a well-known figure, she has established unique relationships with other ‘*ā’ilāt* and civic organisations – a notable achievement for a Bedouin woman. During my fieldwork in 2007-2009, I became acquainted with ‘Ā’isha’s extended family during holidays. I also lived with her immediate family in Beersheba where she worked as the director of a local NGO the Arab Jewish Center for Economic Empowerment and Corporation (AJEEC).

Upon my return to the Negev in 2011 for my doctoral research, ‘Ā’isha agreed to help me find old photographs of Bedouin circulating in the Negev. Over the course of the first year, she introduced me to local photographers and took me to places she believed old images were displayed. On one such occasion, ‘Ā’isha and I visited a NGO named Desert Embroidery located next to her brother’s house in her hometown of Lagīya. The NGO is part of the Lagīya Women’s Association founded in 1996 by ‘Ā’isha and other female relatives such as her older sister (since 2001 she has been supervisor of the organisation). Their projects provide 160 women around Lagīya with alternative sources of income from micro-economic projects where they sell embroidered handicrafts and textiles to visitors and museums.

‘There it is! The photograph I told you about ... the one showing the history of Lagīya during the *Nakba*!’ (see Figure 63) ‘Ā’isha said while pointing to a large poster set into a black and gold frame that dominated the wall behind the cash register in Desert Embroidery’s storefront. The poster was an enlarged black and white copy of a photograph depicting a group of Bedouin women and children sitting and standing alongside a dirt road in a desert landscape. In the foreground, a young boy was looking at an object in his hands while a group of veiled women sat and stood behind him. In the far distance one could pick out a group of camels and men, along with a military jeep. Below the image, the poster’s caption read in English, ‘Members of the es-Sani

waiting to be searched before being taken back into Israel.’ Above the image, an additional caption had been inserted and printed onto the poster copy in Arabic. It read, ‘March 3 In Remembrance of Earth Day,’ along with a logo of the Association of Women of Lagīya. Below a caption in Arabic read, ‘17 September 1952 Deportation of the Population of Lagīya to Beyond the [Israeli] Border.’



Figure 63: Photograph of framed poster depicting the al-Şāna‘ on the Jordanian border in Desert Embroidery.

I recognised the picture she pointed to and recalled the first occasion ‘Ā’isha had shown me another copy of this photograph in her apartment in Beersheba in 2007. During one of our earlier interviews, I had questioned her about the al-Şāna‘’s experiences during the 1948 War. Then ‘Ā’isha explained in English that she owned a

book that describes the history of the al-Şāna' during the Military Administration after 1948:

'Ā'isha: Here. [Placing the book on my lap]. You should take a look at this book. The book is in English so it will be easy for you to read. The history of family is in there. See the history of the al-Şāna' has been written down. There you can find the history of my family after the *Nakba*.

Emilie: Did you buy this book?

'Ā'isha: No, I didn't. A professor gave it to me but I don't want to hurt him, so I won't tell you his name. Maybe he stole it from the library.

Emilie: When did he give it to you?

'Ā'isha: When? 2003 he gave it to me.

Emilie: Why?

'Ā'isha: One day we were talking about my family, my tribe, and our history and he explained to me that he had found a book in a foreign library in the USA that recorded the al-Şāna's experiences during the *Nakba*. He was conducting interviews with my father at the time. He later gave me the book. See, here, it is written by a man named Hutchison when he worked here in the Negev with the United Nations. This man tried to help our tribe when we were trapped on the Israeli border and the Jordanians would not let us enter. See here, he even took pictures. [Flipping through the book she showed me the images.] See here, this photo is my tribe and there. [Pointing to another photograph.] This is my great-grandfather Ibrāhīm al-Şāna'. He was the shaykh of the al-Şāna' at the time.¹⁴⁸ Our tribe was very strong then and we were involved in politics like my great-grandfather, Ibrāhīm, who was a moral man, a judge, and spoke with King 'Abdullāh of Jordan. He was someone he used to meet with. Like everyone in my tribe, he was strong and an educated man.

Emilie: Had you seen this book before or photographs of your family in it?

'Ā'isha: No, it was the first time when the professor gave it to me.

The book was entitled *Violent Truce* (1956) and, as 'Ā'isha indicated, it was written by Elmo H. Hutchison, a United States' Navy Reserve commander and Military

¹⁴⁸ During the British Mandate, Ibrāhīm al-Şāna' was made the shaykh of the al-Şāne' and led them from 1927 until his death in 1952 (Abu Rabia 2001). Ibrāhīm was educated in Beersheba and Istanbul at the Tribal School. Ibrāhīm has hence become an important figure during the British Mandate as a tribal judge on the district council of Beersheba (al-Arif 1934). He was known as al-Salah (al-Şāne' the Righteous).

Officer with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO),¹⁴⁹ and published by the Devin Company in New York. In it, Hutchison described his experiences during an assignment to the UNTSO in Israel-Palestine during the 1951-1954 Armistice Period. In the preface, he explained the difficulties facing United Nations Truce officers overseeing the 'transition' of land between the Israelis and Palestinians. Flipping through the pages, I discovered Chapter Five was entitled, *es' Sanis; The New Refugees*. There as 'Ā'isha has said, Hutchison provided a first hand account of the al-Şāna' 's forced displacement from the newly created state of Israel into Jordan and their eventual return to Israel's Negev desert in 1952.¹⁵⁰

Hutchison (1956) stated that on the morning of the 17 September 1952, he travelled to the Israeli-Jordanian border to oversee a dispute between the al-Şāna', Israeli officials, and Jordanian officers. 'Ā'isha's great grandfather, Shaykh Ibrāhīm al-Şāna' had invited both the UNTSO and the Jordanian District Police Commander to explain how Israeli officials had expelled the al-Şāna' from their Negev lands and forced them to cross the border into Jordan just south of Hebron.¹⁵¹ Jordanian officers had greeted them upon their arrival but told the Shaykh Ibrāhīm that the al-Şāna' could no longer stay inside the country and must travel back to Israel. The Commander argued that Jordan's arable lands were overcrowded with Palestinian refugees and if the Jordanian government allowed the al-Şāna' to stay in their country, they feared the Israelis would push more Bedouin across the border. The UNTSO oversaw several complaints of this nature by neighbouring states of Jordan and Egypt, who protested Israel's 'cutting down of her Arab populations by driving Bedouins and even Arab villagers across their borders' since the signing of the Armistice (Hutchison 1956: 30).

¹⁴⁹ For more information about the UNTSO's work in Israel, see Andrew Theobald (2009).

¹⁵⁰ It should be noted here that part of the al-Şāna' were expelled to Gaza (Abu Rabia 2001).

¹⁵¹ According to family members, Ibrāhīm sent a message to King Abdullah that said, 'I bring you 'Ashīrat al- al-Şāna'.' The Jordanian king, however, responded with 'Stay in Palestine!' despite of their previous good relationship.

Hutchison explained that upon arrival to the Jordan-Israeli border he found approximately one hundred families, nearly a thousand al-Şāna‘ camped with all their belongings along the Jordan-Israeli border. There he met Shaykh Ibrāhīm who explained to the UNTSO officer the following story:

[E]s-Sanis were once a rich tribe. Their many herds grazed over the lands of the Negev but the people, other than those assigned to tend to the herds, lived on the lands they cultivated southeast of Beersheba at El Sharia. At the end of the Arab-Israeli hostilities, the Israelis forced them to leave these lands and move to El Laqiya, northeast of Beersheba. The land there was poor, but they worked hard, and during the next three years they had made it productive to the extent that Israel declared a quantity of their grain surplus crop and demanded that it be sold to the government at a fixed price.

El Hajj¹⁵² Ibrahim continued. He explained that over a month ago the Israeli Military Government had told him Israel was going to establish a settlement at El Laqiya and that his tribe would have to move to Tel Arad. He knew the Tel Arad well and seeing no possibility of survival there, ignored the order. A week later the Israelis brought in tractors and a representative of a land company; work was started on the es-Sani lands. El Hajj Ibrāhīm took his complaint to the Israeli courts and, according to him, they granted him a provisional judgment against the Military Government of Beersheba and the land company engaged in the work. The tribe was given permission to stay at El Laqiya.

The legal action, however, did not stop the Israeli Military Governor, who moved in rapidly to enforce his demands. When he stated that the tribe would have to go to Tel Arad, by force if necessary, the old Shaykh countered by saying that he would move his tribe to Jordan before he would go to Tel Arad. The Military Governor claimed this would be against the terms of the Armistice with Jordan but he would make no attempt to stop the move. El Hajj Ibrahim took the offer and the border east of El Laqiya, usually carefully guarded by Israel against infiltration, remained open until his tribe crossed into Jordan. ‘Now,’ he concluded in a shout, ‘You stop me. Where can I lead my people?’ El Hajj angrily whacked the carpeted ground. Following this conference we immediately arranged for a meeting between the Israeli and Jordanian representatives.... Here we were informed by the Military Governor ... and Chief Israeli Delegate ... that El Hajj Ibrahim es’ Sani had asked if he could move his tribe, ‘residents of Tel Arad,’ into Jordan. The

¹⁵² The title ‘Hajj’ refers to a person that completes a pilgrimage to Mecca. In the Negev, it is also used as a term of respect.

Military Governor stated that he had told the Shaykh he could not grant such permission but would not object to the move.

(Hutchison 1956: 33-34)

Upon hearing the two different versions of the stories, the UNTSO officers checked published court verdicts to see if the shaykh's story was correct and understand why the al-Şāna', if from Tel Arad as the Governor claimed, would choose to cross into Jordan at the Lagīya border (Hutchison 1956). During their research, they came across a 28 September 1952 Israeli press announcement [unknown periodical] stating, 'Bedouin Tribe Moved.' The article documented that:

Tribesman of the Kiderat El Sana Teljaha tribe were moved last week from their former homes at El Laqiya, east of the Beersheba-Hebron road, to a new site at Tel Arad.... On September 15th, the High Court in Jerusalem issued an order *nisi* [order to show cause] against the Military Governor ... against the enforced move of the tribe.

(Hutchison 1956: 35).

In short, the Israeli news article corroborated Shaykh Ibrāhīm's version of events. Using this evidence from the newspaper along with the court verdict, UNTSO filed a formal request that Israel be forced to accept the return of al-Şāna' back into Israel in light of the Military Governor's illegal efforts to dispel the tribe from their customary lands in Lagīya.

After days of mediation, it was arranged for the al-Şāna' to move back into Israel. The Israeli officials, however, requested the members be transported inside Jordan to a border crossing closer to Tel al-Sab' rather than at their current location nearby Lagīya. The Jordanian authorities refused and the al-Şāna' crossed back into Israel on 26 October 1952 at Lagīya. Amid the dispute, however, the Israeli court action against moving the al-Şāna' to Tel as-Sab' from their home in Lagīya was forgotten.

‘By allowing the es-Sani to cross into Jordan under threat of being sent to Tel as-Sab’, the Israeli Military Governor had very cleverly been able to make credulous his claim that these were nomadic people who should not be allowed to control the more productive areas’ (Hutchison 1956: 38). The Israeli Governor then proceeded to argue that al-Şāna‘ had broken the Armistice agreement with Jordan and the Israeli government confiscated the grain they had brought with them.

In addition to Hutchison’s written account of the event, the chapter included several photographs he had taken during his mediation at the border. Two of which were full-page, black and white gloss insets (see Figure 64 and 65):



Figure 64: ‘El haj Ibrahim es-Sani’ in *Violent Truce* (Hutchison 1956).




Figure 65: 'Members of the es-Sani' in *Violent Truce* (Hutchison 1956).

While not essential to my research at the time, I made copies of the images (as seen above) and filed them away.

It was not until later in February 2010 that Hutchison's photographs of the al-Şāna' re-appeared in a public venue. This time a copy of the group photograph reappeared in the United Kingdom during a conference entitled 'Rethinking the Paradigms: Negev Bedouin Research 2000+' at the University of Exeter's campus where a group of Israeli-Jewish, Bedouin, and international academics discussed current research on the Negev Bedouin. On the first day of the conference, after welcoming remarks, one of the event organisers Manşūr Naşāşra, a Negev Bedouin PhD student at Exeter University in the UK, presented his paper entitled, 'Transfer and Expulsion of Palestinian Bedouin Tribes from the Negev 1948-1959.' In it, Manşūr recounted his doctoral research in which he conducted fifty oral history interviews with 'indigenous tribes in the Negev' and extensive archival research in order to 'investigate the

Palestinian Bedouin's resistance to the Israeli Military Government 1948-1967' (Nasasra 2010: 1).

Like most presenters of the day, Maṣṣūr created a PowerPoint slideshow to accompany his presentation during which he displayed several archival photographs and documents, including Hutchison's picture of the al-Ṣāna' taken at the Jordanian border. During the coffee break, I asked him why he had chosen to exhibit that particular photograph. Maṣṣūr explained that Hutchison's book presented visual *evidence* of the al-Ṣāna's forced expulsion from the Negev and illustrates *how* the Negev Bedouin, on occasion, successfully resisted the Israelis attempts at forcible displacement during the *Nakba*.

After Maṣṣūr's presentation, several members of the audience raised their hands to give comments on his paper. By the end of the panel discussion, Hutchison's (1956) photograph became the focal point of discussion wherein various Bedouin (not of the al-Ṣāna' tribe) in the audience took opportunities to make public claims that they, in fact, were descendants of the people depicted in the photograph; a group who is locally perceived as successfully resisting the Israeli government. Because of the large amount of interest both the book and the photograph generated among the Bedouin audience and the fact that 'Ā'isha had shown me years earlier in the Negev, I decided to find out where the original photograph might be archived and to learn more about Hutchison's book after the conference concluded.

After the UNTSO mission ended, a number of its officers published first-person accounts of their experiences during their service (Glubb 1957). Of these accounts, Hutchison's *Violent Truce* (1956) was remarkable in that, according to Andrew

Theobald (2009), it was written as a ‘passionate, bitter response’ to his experiences with the new Israeli state government.¹⁵³ Theobald (2009: 75) elaborated:

Hutchison technically completed his tour rather than being dismissed, although the Israeli smear campaign ended his effectiveness as a peacekeeper. His plight showcased not only Israel’s changed opinion of the peacekeepers, but also the peacekeepers’ altered view of Israel. For his part, Hutchison, ignorant of the conflict when he arrived, hardened into an outspoken public advocate for change in America’s ‘pro-Israel’ foreign policy, as did Bennike and other officers. The Israeli campaign against him played a major role in this decision, but his bitter and hastily-published recollections, *Violent Truce*, traced the shift to a long series of Israeli actions that flaunted the Armistice Agreements and abused the peacekeepers.

Because of the rarity of published accounts pertaining to ‘documented’ abuses by the Israeli forces against Negev Bedouin during the Transition Period, Hutchison’s book and the photographs in it have become increasingly popular among Bedouin academics and activists for local historicity in the last ten years.

Continuing the search for the original copy of Hutchison’s photograph of the al-Šāna‘ at the border of Jordan in 1952, I contacted the Devin-Adair Company who published *Violent Truce* in 1956. Roger Lourie, their Head Copyrighter did not know where the photographs were, as they did not have copies of them on file. He suggested contacting Hutchison’s family to see if they might possess the originals. After his resignation as a UNTSO officer and the publication of *Violent Truce*, Hutchison relocated to Egypt where he served as the director of the American Friends of the Middle East (ARAMCO) in 1958, a CIA funded organisation.¹⁵⁴ According to his obituary in the *New York Times* (26 June 1964) Hutchison drowned in Egypt’s Red Sea in June 1964. The article also mentioned that his widow Thelma and son Guy moved

¹⁵³ See Major-General E.L.M. Burns (1970) and John Bagot Glubb (1957).

¹⁵⁴ The American Friends of the Middle East is a private organisation whose purpose is to improve relations between the United States and Middle East nations.

back to Texas that same year. Unfortunately, I was unable reach Guy in 2012 thus ending my search for the original image.

Jumping forward to Lagīya in 2012, I stood next to ‘Ā’isha in Desert Embroidery’s storeroom reflecting an enlarged copy of Hutchison’s (1956) photograph and recalling the occasions I had seen it at her apartment in 2007 and in Exeter in 2010. With me now was a group of visiting European consultants and funders, who were currently at the store to purchase handcrafted Bedouin products as souvenirs. The embroidered goods were arranged in display cases, all intricately decorated with designs sewn by Bedouin women participating in a micro-economic initiative in Lagīya. The Europeans had come to the Negev to learn more about the ‘community’ and their marginalisation as a Palestinian minority in Israel’s south. Their goal was to collect information in order to produce a ‘truth-finding’ report about the Negev Bedouin’s situation to present at the EU Parliament. The group had just completed a two-week tour of the West Bank, led by an American activist who arranged to bring them to the Negev to meet with community spokespersons such as ‘Ā’isha.

Knowing my interest in visitor tours, ‘Ā’isha had called me the day before and asked if I would like to join them and locate more old photographs. She picked me up in a taxi in Beersheba that day and introduced me to the group. Over the course of the tour, the group listened to speeches by Ibrāhīm Abū Shārib of Rāhaṭ’s Community Centre and Ṭalab al-Šāna‘, ‘Ā’isha’s uncle, a former Knesset Member (see Chapter Three for presentations). In addition, we visited two villages, al-‘Aragīb and Khashem Zana‘ during which spokesmen relayed their community narratives. We then travelled to the old city of Beersheba and the Grand Mosque in the hopes of viewing The Beer Sheva Photography Museum, which unfortunately proved to be closed to the public, meaning that we were unable to visit.

Our last stop of the day was Desert Embroidery, a concrete building with a store, workroom, and large black goat-hair tent equipped with rugs and pillows placed around its edges to form a guest area for eating and listening to lectures. The store room is grandly decorated with handicrafts hung on the walls along with dozens of other photographs and several plastic photo albums strung about the table in the entry way (see Figure 66).



Figure 66: Photograph of photograph wall at Desert Embroidery.

Thumbing through the albums, I noticed the images documented the women's activities with the NGO and visits by dignitaries, foreign tourists, ambassadors, and international funding representatives over the course of the organisation's inception. Returning the albums to their place, I followed the European visitors back onto the tour bus, which took us to Muḥammad al-Šāna's house (Ā'isha's father's house) to spend the night.

Later that month, I found myself back at Ā'isha's apartment in Beersheba where I had initially seen the photograph (see Figure 63) in 2007. There I took the opportunity to ask her about the poster hung in Desert Embroidery:

Emilie: When did you hang the Hutchison photograph in Desert Embroidery?

‘Ā’isha: In 2004, I hung it up. Every year, we celebrate Land Day and I wanted to celebrate the event with something real. We are always talking about land issues and I wanted to make these talks personal. I wanted my family, my people, to be proud of who they are. So when they celebrate the event, it is not only about Land Day but it is also about our history. So I went to a special place in Rāhaṭ to make a copy of the photo from the book and I put the logo of Lagīya Women’s Association on it because I wanted the women’s organisation to be behind the idea and then we gave it to everyone in the village. Now most people in Lagīya have this poster hung in their house. I wanted to prove to my tribe that we are rooted in the land and to know who we are, we know our history, and we are proud of who we are. I wanted to tell the story of our tribe. When I showed it to my grandmother, Rugīya, she started to cry and all of a sudden the other elders started to feel awake, like a wake up call. Because really, all of a sudden the elders can talk about what happened to them in 1948 and 1953. All of a sudden, they began to feel that Land Day is our day. It represents us, our experiences. And the kids, I wanted the old and young generations to talk about these things cause the younger generation are very involved in Land Day but not from a personal or family point of view. So I wanted them to start to speak with their older family members about these things and to start understand that this day is not just a National Day, but a family, personal event.

Emilie: However, other non-al-Şāna’ members live in the village, such as the al-Āsad. Is this a part of their history too? Were they with the al-Şāna’ in 1953 when your tribe was forcibly removed from their land?

‘Ā’isha: Yes, there are Abū Sa’ad, Abū Bader, and more. These questions you have to ask my father. I don’t want to give the wrong answers, so we must ask my father. But how it used to be is that big tribes would take smaller families under their protection. And they would protect them. They would take them with them wherever they travelled. So Abū Sa’ad, Abū Bader, and umm ... were all under the protection of the al-Şāna’. So when the Israeli government moved the al-Şāna’ they all moved with them. Did the al-A’sad move? No, they were not with the al-Şāna’.... Someone told me the story about why they did not move but I forgot who. Maybe Salmān Abū Bader. He remembers why especially the al-Şāna’ were forced to move from Lagīya. Why the government especially wanted them off of the land and to kick the al-Şāna’ out of Israel or what at that time was to become Israel. He said that the Jewish Military General.... [stopping]

Well, you know that the Abū Rabī’a were not taken from their lands right? They stayed because they collaborated with the state and they were not removed. A man from Abū Rabī’a asked the General, ‘What do you think of the al-Şāna’ tribe?’ The Abū Rabī’a

said, 'You know, they are trouble makers.' Then the General said, 'Then I don't need them here. I will kick them out of Israel if they are troublemakers.' Cause you know the story in 1938, when my grand-grandfather Ibrāhīm brought all of the heads of the tribes together and asked them to swear that they would not sell land to Jewish people or the state of Israel. So grand-grand father was very political aware and he had the ability to organise people together and when he would say, 'Come!', they would come.¹⁵⁵

Emilie: Why would the Abū Rabī'a tell the General this information?

'Ā'isha: They saw us as competition.

Emilie: But after the al-Şāna' were let back into Israel didn't the Abū Rabī'a help the al-Şāna' by providing them with food?

'Ā'isha: I don't know. This is where my father can help.

Emilie: Are the al-Şāna' 'known' for being Arab nationalist?

'Ā'isha: Yes, the al-Şāna' are known throughout the Negev for being politically aware. My great-grandfather used to be friends with King Ḥusseīn and they have relatives in Gaza and in Lagīya and this was their area before the state of Israel and when fights started with Israel they used to bring the guns from Gaza.

Emilie: So why is the Hutchison photograph important to the al-Şāna'?

'Ā'isha: Because it is evidence of this event ... of us getting kicked off of our land. Yes, and when people today see the picture it wakes up them up in terms of our relationship with the state of Israel and our history. It proves our case. That we are not lying about our history and that Israel is discriminating against us - that Israel is taking us from our land. We own this picture and with it we can say, 'See, look this is what happened in 1953.'

Emilie: If I would ask these same questions to the Abū Rabī'a about this period of time with Israel state, would they tell me a different version of these historical events or would they tell the same story?

'Ā'isha: I don't know but I would like to ask them, the Abū Rabī'a. But more importantly, I want to ask the al-Huzayyil about their collaboration with the Israelis. You always get different stories from each tribe about what happened during this time and who collaborated with whom.

Emilie: I recall that you sister's husband is al-Huzayyil. He told me the reason there are Bedouin here in Israel is because of the al-Huzayyil.

'Ā'isha: Yes, they are proud that they worked with the Israelis. If this were my family's story I would kill myself. I would not want this to be my family's story.

¹⁵⁵ In 1937 Ibrāhīm hosted the Grand Mufti Amin al-Hussiny in his home along with many *shuyūkh* in order to coordinate a response to the influx of Jewish settlers in the Negev emigrating with the Zionist Movement (Abu Rabia 2001). He circulated a pledge among the Negev *shuyūkh* in which they promised not to sell land to them.

Emilie: Have you seen the Hutchison photograph outside of Lagīya? It showed up at a conference that I attended in the UK, but have you seen it circulating anywhere else in the Negev?

‘Ā’isha: No, it is only here with the family, our tribe. We own it.

Emilie: So who were the strongest tribes of the Tiyyāhā before 1948 who remained in Israel?

‘Ā’isha: Al-Şāna‘, Abū Rabī‘a, al-Huzayyil, al-‘A‘sad, al-‘Ā‘sam, Abū Rabī‘a, Abū Ghānem, Abū ‘Abdūn, al-‘Aṭāwna, al-‘Azāzmah, and more. I do not know exactly but you should speak with Professor ‘Ārif Abū Rabī‘a. He has all of this information. He writes about it.

Emilie: Al-‘Aṭāwna live in Ḥūra, yes?

‘Ā’isha: So you understand that the recognised towns were established on each of these tribal lands?

Emilie: Yes, but yet different tribes had different relationships with the state?

‘Ā’isha: Yes, for example, many in the Abū Rabī‘a served as military trackers, in the army, and as policemen. But none of the al-Şāna‘ did these things. Never! Never, would they do these things!

Emilie: So how did the al-Şāna‘ kept their power and influence in the Negev after 1948?

‘Ā’isha: Our education and political awareness. My tribe knew that if they went to the UN court in 1953 they would have their case heard. They knew at that time how to work the system.

Emilie: Many people from your family are very educated being teachers, doctors, and lawyers. Is it the same with others?

‘Ā’isha: Al-‘Aṭāwna are the same, like us. They never worked for the government. They never collaborate with them. And only because of education and our political awareness have we achieved our history and power.

Today Hutchison’s written account along with archival photographs are considered specifically by al-Şāna‘, such as ‘Ā’isha, as evidence of their particular ancestors’ forced expulsion from the Negev. For them, the image depicts a rare but significant case wherein they as Arab nationalists, not other families, successfully resisted the nascent Israeli state’s Military Administration (1948-1966). For the purposes of local historicity, however, ‘Ā’isha’s statements in the above-mentioned

discussion such as ‘These are questions you need to ask my father’ should not be overlooked amid her contributions to her lineage’s (*‘ā’ilāt*) history and the Negev Bedouin’s ethnohistory. This comes as lineage (*‘ā’ilāt*) members’ historical knowledge and the evidence they use to demonstrate it (for example, compared between ‘Ā’isha and her father) are varied and treated differently in assorted contexts. Peoples’ different treatments of history are not only the result of their ages, experiences, tribal status, and educational levels but also the consequence of gender.

Emilie: As far as local knowledge of the past goes, you said several times during the interview that I should ask your father. Are their particular people in every family that have or keep this type of knowledge?

‘Ā’isha: Yes, these are the elders and many of them are dying. So people are traveling around and writing down their stories, video recording their stories. There are many in my family doing this, Tālib for example, is doing this.

Emilie: Do you think these tribal histories are important for you community work? Is tribal heritage important?

‘Ā’isha: Yes, of course they are extremely important. We need them to redevelop our self-confidence of the community and an important part of this is rebuilding our history, rebuilding our heritage. This is essential because people will not fight for their rights if they are not proud of who they are. Pride comes from knowing who you are, knowing who are your people, and knowing what is your history. This demands us to put the puzzle of our past together, our pieces of history and without them we might be a community, as a person we might be an activist, but without knowledge of the past you are an activist of global issues not an activist for local people with a past.

‘Ā’isha, as a woman, does not normally participate in her agnate’s socio-politics nor does she attend events in the *shigg*, a place where women are excluded but where the nuances of tribal relations and histories are discussed and debated. Thus her and her female relatives’ familiarity with al-Şāna’s tribal relationships are based on their age, personal experiences with these networks, and overall status in the lineage (*‘ā’ilāt*). Over the last ten years, however, younger generations (irrespective of gender) have

become increasingly active in appropriating and producing various types of visual materials including old photographs and digital images such as the one discussed above. It was, nevertheless, 'Ā'isha's unique relationship with the Israeli professor that resulted in the exchange of Hutchison's book and the presentation of its images as an historical artefact for her 'ā'ilāt not the other way around. As such, she set out to publically claim ownership of the old photograph, particularly for members of her own 'ā'ilāt by distributing copies of it to relatives and printing it on a poster that now hangs in Desert Embroidery.

Most generations in 'Ā'isha's family network, however, also possess, share, and display photographs, portraits, and video collections of their own depicting their elders such as Rugīya and specific forefathers in their homes. It is in these extended families ('ā'ila) and private households (*buyūt*) that Bedouin women are the dominant image-keepers. They also actively take charge of compiling family photographs, enlarging and copying them, framing, arranging them in their homes, and distributing them among their own close relatives. Similar to Hassan's mention of his mother in the last section, 'Ā'isha's mother, aunts, and sisters also hang old photographs of their own agnates and husband's forefathers in their salons (*dīwān*) and guest receptions areas.

The first time I came across the practice was during a *hennā*' party hosted at 'Ā'isha's parents' house for their youngest daughter's wedding held in 2012. Non-Bedouin guests of family (several North American, Israeli Jewish and Arab women) were asked to go inside and eat at a table rather than to sit on the floor of the outside patio with the other Bedouin female guests invited to the wedding. While we ate at the long table filled with food, drinks, and paper plates, I noticed a large framed portrait dominating the wall behind the female guests. The image was a black and white portrait of young man in a chequered *kūfiyya* (see Figure 67).



Figure 67: Portrait of Salmān al-Ṣāna' hanging on the wall of his son Muḥammad's house.

Next to the image was another colour portrait of a man encased in a wooden frame. Other than these two portraits, the walls of the room were devoid of any decoration. After eating, I took a picture of the larger portrait and reminded myself to ask 'Ā'isha more about the framed image and why it was hung on the salon's (*dīwān*) wall in the house.

A day after the wedding celebrations for her sister ended, I had a chance to sit with 'Ā'isha and her father, Muḥammad, to ask them more about the image and its significance for the family. Sitting on Muḥammad's back patio, they proceeded to tell me more about the family photographs and their display on the wall:

Emilie: Where did you get the old portrait hanging in the house?

'Ā'isha: The picture is of my grandfather Salmān al-Ṣāna' who was the son of Karīm. First, you have to speak with my uncle. He is the first one of the family to start taking pictures in the 1960s. He lives down the hill and works at Lagīya's health clinic. He is my father's uncle and he is the father of Philistin, the wife of my brother. So now you have two Ḥamāds to meet in the future. The first one lives in the mountains and he speaks English. You can spend the entire night with him. He was among the first to establish an NGO in the Negev. It was Lagīya's Sons Association so he knows the

whole history. The other Ḥamād is now the head of the tribe. You need someone to help introduce you. He lives right next to my family. You also need to talk to Salmān. He is a friend of my father. He lives in Lagīya also. My aunt she is seventy-five years old. She can tell you more about what happened in 1953. So you can reach her through my sister Mīrīām. (She gives me phone numbers of everyone). Mīrīām also has the same portrait. She took the one here from my father's house and made copies of it for the family. One copy is currently in my sister Fāṭimah's house. We will see it later.

Emilie: Do you know where they got the image of your grandfather?

‘Ā’isha: My uncle Dr Ḥamād took this picture. My uncle is a great resource for pictures. But he is very protective of his pictures. He has all of the negatives since the early sixties and I believe that if you want to try to turn them into CDs since they are in big boxes now and there is no one to help him. Each time I went there to get pictures of my parents. He would not give me the pictures. Instead, I had to scan them and take only copies with me. He will never give the pictures to anyone and he only gives family members scans. If you go there, you will find lots of pictures of me as a baby. But you need to find his ‘key’ because he is protective over his images.

‘Ā’isha finished the conversation by going into the house to get her belongings. Coming back to the patio, she told me that we were going to her sister's house to see her aunt's copy of the portrait.

‘Ā’isha's sister lives behind their father's property just south up on a hill overlooking the Hebron plain. Similarly to ‘Ā’isha's other relatives, she lives in the al-Ṣāna's residential neighbourhood. Her house itself is constructed out of light coloured stone with large windows and Arabesque breezeways and entrances; the interior is comprised of four floors. On the main level there is an entrance hall, formal and ‘traditional’ salon (*dīwān*), dinning room, kitchen, and informal family room. ‘Ā’isha's sister and her husband lived on the top level and their eldest son, his wife, and young baby living in the bottom apartment. Throughout the house family photographs adorn the walls the rooms.

No one was home when ‘Ā’isha and I arrived so she proceeded into the unlocked house and took me into the dinning room where the portrait was being stored before going to their aunt’s house. There on the floor behind a glossy wood dining set was the portrait ‘Ā’isha had referred to (see Figure 68).



Figure 68: Portrait of Salmān al-Šāna‘ hanging on the wall of his granddaughter Fāṭimah’s house.

As she said, it was another copy of her grandfather’s portrait. I quickly took a picture of the framed photograph and we left her sister’s house. We travelled back across the street, through a small pasture and back to her father’s property onto a patio where Muḥammad sat on a plastic chair waiting for us to return. After serving tea, ‘Ā’isha explained to her father my interest in the portrait and asked him if he could tell us more about his forefathers. He explained in Bedouin dialect:

Muḥammad: Ok, let me tell you the story about my grandfather Karīm, father of Salmān. He was a strong fighter and my grandfather was part of a group of *‘arab* who joined the Turkish army to fight against the British Mandate. He fought with them and this is how he was shot. However, the British defeated the Turkish and so when the British came here to Lagīya, they found out that Karīm was the shaykh, head of the tribe. They said to him, ‘You can no longer be head of the tribe because you fought against us.’ So they did what Israel is still doing now with the tribes here and the English took someone from another weaker tribe, the same family who is now the head of the unrecognised village council and he was put as the leader of the al-Ṣāna‘ tribe under the protection of the British but he was not al-Ṣāna‘! He was not one of us. So my grandfather got very, very angry about this situation. So he travelled to Gaza and said to the British officials there, ‘Look what you did to me. You, the British, took from me my rightful position and gave it to someone who is not one of us!’ They said to him, ‘Look, we cannot do anything about this. It says here in the documents your name. It says here that you fought against us. You have to figure out if one of your brothers can take the position as shaykh since you cannot.’

So he came back to Lagīya and met with his brother Ibrāhīm who he decided should be shaykh. Together they went to the court in Bi’r Sab’ [Beersheba] and said to the British, ‘I know you will not take me to be the leader of the al-Ṣāna‘ so take here my brother Ibrāhīm.’ So how did Ibrāhīm then go to Turkey to study at the tribal school? Because Karīm had a good name with the Turkish and they agreed to take his brother to Turkey to educate him. My grandfather Karīm was in charge of collecting the taxes during the time of the Turkish. He was in charge of all of the Tiyaḥā. Two of his children 19 and 18 years old, they were killed at that time by a disease, the same disease that makes people cough blood and only my father Salmān whose picture hangs on the wall in the *bayt* [house] was alive because he not born yet. Karīm, my grandfather was much stronger with much more influence than Ibrāhīm but because he had to give his position away to Ibrāhīm who is better remembered by the *‘arab* as a shaykh and not as a *kabīr* that he was before my grandfather gave him his position.

Several days after my conversation with Muḥammad, I contacted ‘Ā’isha’s uncle Ḥamād to see if I could view his photographic collection of lineage (*‘ā’ilāt*). After several attempts, I finally reached him. I described my research and ‘Ā’isha’s suggestion that I contact him. Ḥamād said that he could arrange a time for me to see his collection.

Before my arrival, however, he wanted to scan all of the images. He went on to explain that the scanning process would take several months. I tried to soothe his concerns by telling him that I did not want to take the photographs nor did I require scanned versions of them, but I merely wanted to speak with him about his interest in photography and take snapshots with my own camera. He said he would think about it and requested I call him back in a couple of weeks. Upon doing so, Ḥamād clarified that he would feel more comfortable if he brought the collection to Muḥammad's house and I view the images there. He said he would make the arrangements and would call me when it was convenient.

After several weeks passed, Ḥamād never returned my phone calls. In a last effort to view the lineage's (*ʿā'ilāt*) extensive photographic collection, I phoned Muḥammad and asked if he had spoken with Ḥamād? Similar to 'Ā'isha, he explained that his nephew is extremely protective of the photographic collection of the *ʿā'ilāt* and would most likely never arrange a meeting with me. Yet again, my reconstruction of the image's biography came to an end as a result of the protectionism over personal photographic collections.

In all, Ḥamād's attitude towards his collection of historical images was similar to that of other Bedouin men I encountered or attempted to engage with during fieldwork. When the content of old photographs present (what is considered to be) mundane events or socio-politically insignificant people, they maintain presence(s) as 'family images' and are circulated among predominantly Bedouin women as heirlooms of family memories, stories, and occasions. In these instances, Bedouin men treated both photographs and the visual practices of displaying them as hobbies, craft, and decoration. When the content of an old photograph recorded, what are locally believed to be significant events, well-known and influential ancestors, and formal settings, Bedouin (often men) prized these images as historical records and their display of them

have become socio-political acts, public demonstrations, and objects to be owned, protected, and selectively presented to outsiders. It is on these occasions that an image collection became a photographic archive and memories were transformed into histories among lineages (‘*ā’ilāt*’) such as the al-Ṣāna’.

In 2014, however, having put the biography of Salmān al-Ṣāna’'s portrait aside (having completed my fieldwork), I accidentally stumbled upon another copy of the image. This time in the form of a digital copy that had been posted by (I assume) a member of the al-Ṣāna’ who had obtained a copy (from either Ḥamād or one of the female relatives of the family), scanned it, and uploaded onto the popular website *Palestineremembered.com*. There under the heading BEERSHEBA is an additional link to ‘Laquiya’. Under the pictures category, someone had uploaded the photograph with the Arabic title ‘Lagīya: Shaykh Salmān ‘Abdūlla Karīm al-Ṣāna’ (see Figure 69).




Figure 69: ‘Portrait of Salmān al-Ṣāna’ uploaded to *Palestineremembered.com* (2008).

Under the image, the website included a comment box where people wrote various notes in Arabic, added information about the photograph, or discussed historical information pertaining to the image. Interestingly, however, the comment's connected to this digitised photograph on Palestineremembered.com included not only blessings and memorials to the shaykh (as would be expected), but also insults pertaining to the shaykh and his al-Şāna' descendants. They read (translated from Arabic into English):

Comment 1: May you rest in peace (God have mercy on you Shaykh Salmān) you give birth to sons who are considered most respected among Arabs, specially his son 'Abdūlla, may you rest in peace.

Comment 2: Shaykh who is not worthy and his sons are also worthless (disrespected).

Comment 3: To [Anonymised] al-Şāna', please fear God (you should not say that) about these people who controlled the land, may God show you the right way instead of attacking each other, may he rest in peace.

Comment 4: May he rest in peace but al-Şāna' family is not Gdīrāt, they originally came from the area of Shobak Jordan but there they are called al-Musa.

Comment 5: Seriously the courage is noticed by the look of Muḥammad, and he is noble ('aṣīl) and brave, come and see his sons and grandsons who had children and did not die.

Comment 6: This is my grandfather, may rest in peace, everything after him has gone down the drain.

Subsequently, while the display of forefather portraits such as Salmān al-Şāna's among extended family ('ā'ila) may venerate ancestors and family histories families inside homes and lineage ('ā'ilāt) archives, their presence(s) in other public venues have the potential to encourage broader debate about the origins and reputations of particular 'ā'ilāt and their pasts. In particular, this image spawned debate about the 'worthiness' of the al-Şāna', their claims to have Negev origins through the Gdīrāt sub-

confederation (*ṣaff*), and perspectives about the quality of Bedouin life in southern Israel after 1948. Moreover, while Ḥamād strove to protect the original photograph confining it within his photographic archive and declining to show it to outsiders such as myself, the image nonetheless escaped the confines of his library, assisted by the very family members he allowed to make copies of it for their homes. Coincidentally, it now travels the Internet as both a historical image of Palestinian Beersheba, a visual signifier of the history of Lagīya, and a focal point for an extremely public discussion between ‘*ā’ilāt*’ members about the worthiness of their ancestors and the ancestry of the al-Ṣāna’s ‘*ā’ilāt*’ itself.

C. *ABŪ RABĪ’A: LOST MEANINGS AND ELDERS (KBĀR)*

Blinded briefly by the sunlight, it took a minute for my eyes to adjust to the dark interior of the stone building. The small one-room *bayt cement* was lined with rugs, mats, and pillows along the bottom corner of three walls empty of any décor except for one black and white photograph enclosed in a thin black frame. ‘Amīr and I proceeded to walk further into the building following a young boy from the West Bank who directed us to the cushions. Once sat, the boy left to announce our arrival to the rest of the household who were located in the other buildings in the homestead. As ‘Amīr made himself comfortable on the mat, I took a closer look at the photograph on the wall.

Upon close examination, I found the picture depicted a group of men in the desert. In all, there were fourteen men: ten looked to be Bedouin, with their *kūfiyya*, bandoleers, and daggers; two men appeared to be of Western origin as they sported hats; and the final two men were possibly of non-Bedouin origin, indicated by their differentiated dress and lack of a *kūfiyya*. All of the men appeared to be holding a firearm or rifle. Some of the men knelt whilst most of the Bedouin men stood in front

the camera. Behind the party was a desert landscape, which appeared to be the western Negev close to the Dead Sea, known today as the Judean Desert (see Figure 70).



Figure 70: ‘Photograph of group of Bedouin, Arab, and Jewish men’ in Ḥaj Sa‘īd Abū Rabī‘a’s guesthouse.

‘Amīr and I awaited the arrival of Ḥaj Sa‘īd Abū Rabī‘a in his guesthouse, an elder (*kbār*) of the Abū Rabī‘a lineage (‘*ā’ilāt*) well known among the Negev Bedouin for his service during the British Mandate, knowledge of Bedouin history before 1948, and reputation as an accomplished long-range marksman and desert scout. We were there, however, for another reason: Sa‘īd’s extensive photographic collection with images spanning a time period from the 1930s up until today. Several members of the Abū Rabī‘a had mentioned the collection to ‘Amīr and I and suggested we pay a visit to Sa‘īd in light of my interest in historical photographs. He was accommodating and invited us to come to his homestead located on Ksīfe’s outskirts, a township on the eastern edge of the Negev. The homestead was composed of three small adobe

buildings including the guest building we now sat in, and was located on the edge of valley. Just south of the property was a corral with a single camel pacing around inside.

After several minutes, Sa'īd arrived with the young boy who had previously greeted us following behind him with tea. We made our introductions and I explained my research on the history of the Negev Bedouin, my interest in his photographic collection, and any other stories of the past he might be willing to share with us. After sipping our tea, Sa'īd began with his life story in Bedouin dialect, starting with his work as a Police Officer for the British Mandate's Administration:

Sa'īd: I served with the British Police. I worked in communication under the British Administration...I was born in 1927. They took me from school because I understood English then and when I started working for the Police Force I was approximately 16 years old.

Emilie: Did you know 'Ārif al-'Ārif?

Sa'īd: Who worked with the English? Yes, yes. Here is the book he wrote. [Pointing to a plastic bag] We all have a copy of this book here in the Negev. Here is my copy. [He goes through a plastic bag and gives me the unbound book, essentially a collection of papers].... My family is pictured in there. All of the important tribes are there.

'Amīr: Yes, we have this same copy and have seen the pictures.

Sa'īd: Do you know who are the people in them? It says there ... [He selects a loose page from the unbound book (see Figure 71)]



Figure 71: Shaykh Salmān Abū Rabī'a is the top right image.

‘Amīr: Yes, we have identified them. This is your ancestor, no? [Pointing to the image of Shaykh Salmān Abū Rabī'a on the far right. He nodded.]

Emilie: Did the Abū Rabī'a get on with ‘Ārif al-‘Ārif when he worked here and gathered this information and pictures for his book?

Sa‘īd: Yes. Al-‘Ārif loved to travel with the ‘*arab* outside of Bī'r al-Sab‘ [Beersheba] and be with us, spend time with us. He used to come here to the Abū Rabī'a. I even met him one time. I used to live next to a place not too far from where Dimona is today and ‘Ārif al-‘Ārif came over there. I was still a little child then and I was shepherding with a herd and ‘Ārif al-‘Ārif came because there was supposed to be a meeting with the Shaykh Salmān Abū Rabī'a and Jedūr al-‘Ā'sam. You know if Shaykh Salmān Abū Rabī'a was still alive today, there would not be this war between Jews and Arabs because he understood everything. He was a great leader. This meeting was about land and al-‘Ārif stayed with them until the meeting was finished.

Emilie: At this time, were Jewish settlers starting to buy land in the Negev?

Sa‘īd: Yes, Jews were trying to buy the land even before Israel was a country, even back at this time when the British were here. However, there were very few ‘*arab* that sold them the land or wanted to sell the land to them. Maybe one per cent of the ‘*arab* were willing to sell the land.

Emilie: After the British left the area did you stop working for the Police?

Sa‘īd: When they left, I stopped working. The last place I served is in what Israelis call Eilat today.

Emilie: Do you have pictures from these days?

Sa'īd: Yes, yes but you know talking is much better than pictures!

Sa'īd then asked the young boy to bring him a stack of albums and a plastic sack that had been placed next to the entrance. Opening the sack, he began to tell us about the event and people in each photograph, 'See here, this is a photograph of me (see Figure 72) at the British Academy in Bethlehem,' Sa'īd said handing the photograph to 'Amīr.



Figure 72: Photograph of group portrait of Ḥaj Sa'īd Abū Rabi and other British Mandate Police Officers.

He then preceded to hand me a photograph album containing several dozen images. Several were ID photographs clipped from their original, plastic settings and Sa'īd explained how the state of Israel's Interior Ministry came to the Negev to take the photographs of Bedouin for their ID cards rather than requiring them go to Beersheba to have their picture taken. Other photographs included old black and white images of men

and more modern colour pictures of foreign visitors with Sa'īd. He described the background of each person in the photographs and when they were taken.

Emilie: The Abū Rabī'a were always here, no? Did you go to Sīyāj after 48?¹⁵⁶

Sa'īd: No, we always stayed here even before the Ottoman times. We are from the Ḥijāz of Saudi. Zullām [Abu Rabī'a tribe's *saff* or sub-confederation], not like others tribes in the Tiyyāhā, have always been here in the Negev.

Emilie: Who is the shaykh of the Abū Rabī'a now?

Sa'īd: We don't have a real shaykh but there is one in the local council, he is in charge.¹⁵⁷

ʿAmīr: You know before, shaykhs ruled. It was a better time than today because when people committed a crime or something they decided on the punishment.

Emilie: And now, it is not like this?

ʿAmīr: No.

Emilie: [Still flipping through the album, I located a portrait that I had seen before.] Is this Shaykh Ḥamād Abū Rabī'a? (see Figure 73) [I showed it to ʿAmīr as Ḥaj Suleīmān spoke with the boy.]

ʿAmīr: Yes! Yes! That is him! He was the first Bedouin member of the Israel's Knesset. This is him. [Dropping his voice dramatically] But he was later killed. I don't want to talk about this here but I will tell you later about the significance of this man.

Emilie: Ok. [Changing the subject as Ḥaj Suleīmān returned to the conversation] Where did you get all of these photographs?

Sa'īd: Different people. Whoever comes and visits me here and take pictures will later send me a copies or come back and give me them. This is how I have all of these photographs.

¹⁵⁶ Most of the Abū Rabī'a remained in the Negev after 1948. A small part of the tribe moved to Jordan (Abu Rabia 2001: 130).

¹⁵⁷ After 1948, the tribe was lead by Shaykh Ḥamād Abū Rabī'a until his murder in 1981. He was succeeded by Shaykh Khalīl Salmān Abū Rabī'a.



Figure 73: Photograph of portrait of Ḥamād Abū Rabī'a.

Towards the end of the visit I took the opportunity to ask Sa'īd about the lone photograph he had hung on the wall.

Emilie: Ḥaj, could you tell me about the framed photograph here on the wall? [Pointing above where I sat, he got up and took the photograph off of the wall and placed in on the floor between us.]

Sa'īd: I took this picture. I took it on the way back home and gave the men in the picture copies of it. This photograph was taken at a time when Shoshanna Basel, a sister of a person in the Israeli government, was killed. Jordanians had killed her and the body was left there. Her brother was an Israeli soldier who told the government where he thought her body was left and I and some other *'arab* were asked to get the corpse.

Emilie: Who are the men in the photograph?

Sa'īd: Ok ... This is Ethan who was there. Again in 1953.... [Turning once again to the boy and whispering to him]

Emilie: [Quietly I looked at 'Amīr and asked] Have you heard about this story about Shoshanna?

'Amīr: No, I have not heard about this story maybe its not important for us but you should do some more research to find out about it.

Emilie: [Once Suleīmān returned to the conversation, I asked]. Can I take a picture of you holding the photograph?

Sa'īd: Yes, Yes, let me fix my *kūfiyya*! [He said laughing see (Figure 74)]



Figure 74: Photograph of Haj Sa'īd Abū Rabī'a.

After we left the guesthouse, I asked 'Amīr about Ḥamād Abū Rabī'a. 'Amīr said that he did not want to talk about it because the topic makes him feel uncomfortable. He vaguely explained to me that the Abū Rabī'a still have a 'blood oath' against the Druze in response to the assassination of Ḥamād who was a member of the Knesset in the 1980s. He ended this brief explanation with a warning, 'Emilie, don't go

around asking about Ḥamād Abū Rabī'a. It is dangerous. People here have long memories and it involves a blood feud, which is not something you should be asking people about, especially members of the Abū Rabī'a!

Heeding 'Amīr's warning I was nevertheless intrigued by his reaction to the questions about the shaykh. Later, I went to BGU's library in order to find out more about Shaykh Ḥamād Abū Rabī'a and the history of his portrait among Suleīmān Abū Rabī'a's image collection. My Internet research found a Wikipedia page created by members of the Abū Rabī'a in Hebrew, similar to the one created by the al-Huzayyil discussed in the last chapter. The page was entitled, 'Shevet Abu Rab'ah' (English – Abu Rabia Tribe), which promoted the honourable reputation of the tribe by describing their tribal (*'ā'iliyya*) territory, listing notables, and recounting the historical legacy of several members such as Salem Abū Rabī'a (The Great). Translated from Hebrew to English, a section of it reads:

Many members of the tribe have higher education and are teachers, professors, and doctors. The Abū Rabī'a are considered the most well known tribe of the Bedouin tribes in the south and have most influential tribe past and present. Sheik Salman Abū Rabī'a led the tribe during the British Mandate and were closely connected with the Gulf nations and the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan. He was a Qadi [traditional judge] known as Eid Salem Abū Rabī'a, court to resolve disputes between rival tribes, from the region, known and famous to this day.... Ḥamād Abū Rabī'a was the first MK among the Bedouin tribe members. During his tenure, Abū Rabī'a worked hard for the promotion of the Bedouin Arab in the south, and in 1981, due to the fact that he refused to resign to allow Shaykh Jaber to enter the Knesset, was killed by the sons of Jaber.

(Abu Rabia 2014)

Further research on Shaykh Ḥamād Abū Rabī'a lead to another Wikipedia page created by the Abū Rabī'a. This one was titled 'Hamad Abu Rab'ah' with a Hebrew hyperlink to the 'Shevet Abu Rab'ah' webpage discussed above. This page recounted

the biography and controversial death of the shaykh who was born in 1929 and was assassinated on 12th January 1981 by the sons of an Israeli Arab Druze politician. Ḥamād was considered the ‘first Bedouin Israeli member of the Knesset’ after his election in 1973 to the Arab List for Bedouins and Villagers (Abu Rabia 2014). He was re-elected in 1977 and became a member of the Committee for Public Services. During this election, however, the United Arab List won only one seat. In a compromise between two representatives of the Israeli Arab minority, Ḥamād Abū Rabī‘a from the Negev Bedouin and a representative of the Druze residing in northern Israel, agreed to rotate their time and service in the Knesset.

When time came to rotate, Ḥamād Abū Rabī‘a refused to vacate his position – a decision that was supported by the Israeli Supreme Court who ruled that the agreement of rotation was invalid to begin with. The Druze’s sons assassinated Ḥamād Abū Rabī‘a outside a hotel in Jerusalem, and in spite of the family’s links to the killing, the Druze representative replaced him in the Knesset.¹⁵⁸ The page also contained a well-known picture of Shaykh Ḥamād Abū Rabī‘a (see Figure 75); this was not the same portrait as featured in Ḥaj Suleīmān’s collection, however.

¹⁵⁸ *The New York Times* (1981) later reported, ‘Last week Israeli officials persuaded elders of the Abu Rabia tribe to put off the blood vengeance required by their tradition until the police completed their investigation.’

חמאד אבו רביעה



נוח (סיעת

ללית במגזר

ירועי יום

בא בתור

ההונתו של

י, [4]. לאחר

תאריך לידה	1929
תאריך פטירה	12 בינואר 1981 (בגיל 51 בערך)
כנסות	9, 8
סיעה	רשימה ערבית לבדואים וכפריים, המערך, רשימה ערבית מאוחדת

Figure 75: Screen shot of Wikipedia pages of Ḥamād Abu Rabī'a in Israel's Photographic Collection

According to the website, the photograph was taken by Yaacov Saar on 28th January 1974. After tracing its biography, I found that the original image is now held in the State of Israel's Photographic Collection (see Figure 76).



[Additional Information](#)



This site is hosted by the server system of project [Tehila](#)
 Copyright (c) 1997-1998, The State of Israel. All Rights Reserved. ([Terms of Use](#))
 Information and proposals, contact feedback@itpolicy.gov.il
 This page last updated on 3-6-98

Figure 76: Screen shot of Ḥamād Abu Rabī'a in Israel's Photographic Collection.

After the assassination, however, the shaykh's portrait reappeared in numerous Israeli and International newspapers such as *The New York Times* and the popular Israeli paper *Yedi'oth* (see Figure 77). In the latter Hebrew-language paper, the media described the conflict between the two Israeli Arab representatives and their struggles for power.



Figure 77: Portrait of Ḥamād Abu Rabī'a in *Yedi'oth* Newspaper (1981).

Satisfied with the biography of the portrait, I then went about investigating Ḥaj Sa'īd's 'Shoshanna Story'. Going on the dates Sa'īd had mentioned during the interview and the keywords 'Shoshanna, murder, and Jordan', I quickly came across a controversial event in early Israeli state history, one in which he had played an important role: The Har Zion Affair.

More research found that Shoshanna's last name was Har-Zion. In February 1955 she, along with her German boyfriend Oded Wegmeister, both from Degania Bet and eighteen years old, were hiking illegally across Israel's border into Jordanian controlled territory travelling from Jerusalem to the Ein Gedi.¹⁵⁹ During their hike, they were captured and murdered by 'Bedouin tribesmen from Wadi al-Ghar' (Ben Yehuda 1993).¹⁶⁰ Shoshanna also happened to be the sister of Meir Har-Zion, an Israeli Military

¹⁵⁹ During the 1950s, around a dozen Israeli teenagers were killed attempting to reach Petra in Jordan. Such cross-border treks were considered a rite of passage for youth. After a group were killed attempting the trek the trips were banned by the new Israeli state (Ben Yehuda 1993).

¹⁶⁰ In 1953, he was one of the founding members of Unit 101. He took part in the unit's first operation at the end of August 1953, which attacked the 'Azāzmah camps at al-Auja.

commander who served with the Israeli Defence Forces in the 1950s. Upon hearing of his sister's death, Har-Zion and three ex-members of Israel's 890th Battalion drove across the Armistice Line into Jordan. Once in Wadi al-Ghar they found and captured six young Bedouin men from the Jaḥālīn and 'Azāzmah, who they interrogated. They killed five of the men and left one man alive to return to his tribe 'to tell what happened to others out of revenge' (Ben Yehuda 1993). Evidence later showed that the murdered Bedouin men most likely had nothing to do with the killing but may simply have belonged to the same tribe as the murderers (Morris 1993).

The events that happened after the murder vary according to popular Israeli nationalist accounts and those of New Historians such as Benny Morris (1993). According to him, upon returning back into Israel, Har-Zion and his three companions were held in Israeli police custody for twenty days. The Minister of Justice of the time, Pinchas Rosen demanded that they be prosecuted, while Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion wanted the case be handled quietly. Ben Gurion won the debate and Har-Zion and the men were suspended from the army for six months and later returned to full service without punishment for the murders.

While the above-mentioned story above is now available to the Israeli public, less is known about the events occurring in the backdrop of the governmental debate and the controversy regarding Har-Zion's actions – a coordinated attempt by the Israeli government to retrieve the bodies of Shoshanna and Obed (as described by Sa'īd). It appeared that the photograph hanging in the Ḥaj's building was, as he said, a photograph 'taken when Shoshanna Basel, a sister of a person in the Israeli government, was killed. Jordanians had killed her and the body was left there'. Calling Amīr, I told him about my research into the Shoshanna Story and we quickly arranged to go back to Sa'īd's residence later that week so that we could ask him more about these events and the photograph.

Upon arrival at Sa'īd's house, another young boy asked us to sit in the guesthouse and wait for his arrival. Sa'īd joined us several minutes later and the interview proceeded in a similar fashion as our last one, starting with tea and looking at more photographs in his personal collection. 'Amīr quickly noted, however, that Sa'īd appeared grumpy and not very talkative, being somewhat reluctant to explain who people were and the events depicted in the photographs. After approximately two hours, I found an opportunity to ask him about the picture hanging on the wall.

Emilie: Ḥaj, last time we were here to visit with you I was unable to write down the names of each man in the photograph on the wall here. Do you mind telling me again? [Getting up from his sit, the Ḥaj took the picture off of the wall once again and placed it in front of us on the floor.]

Sa'īd: [Pointing at the first man in the centre.] This is Ḥamād Abū Rabī'a, the one to his left is his uncle. This one here is Etan Feldman. He was inspector of environment for the state. The picture was taken in the Judea desert and all of these guys were hunting. We were very good at hunting, everything we put their eye on they could get. We were hunting deer in Judea and helping the Jewish guys here.

Emilie: Is this the party that went to find the body of Shoshanna? [The Ḥaj does not respond and seems distracted by the boy sitting in the corner and doesn't answer. I look at 'Amīr who whispered to me while the Ḥaj was speaking to the boy about lunch preparations.]

'Amīr: I don't know. Emilie, he is now talking about hunting party. Seems as if the story about the picture has changed. He is grumpy today and seems to be angry at the new boy worker. I think the boy is from the West Bank and can't understand the Ḥaj's dialect. [The Ḥaj returns to us to resume the conversation]

Sa'īd: The picture was taken after the six days war maybe in the 1970s. [Once again, he stops mid-sentence to talk to the boy.]

Trying a different line of questioning, I asked him to tell me about the Shoshanna story disregarding the photograph. Just as the Sa'īd began his narrative again, however, lunch arrived and was placed before us to eat. He looked at me and said, 'Oded and Shoshanna Har Zion. After lunch I will tell you the story.' We ate lunch

in relative silence, however, although after the meal he briefly told us about his involvement in the event:

Shoshanna Har Zion and her boyfriend went to the Judean Desert to the Ein Gedi valley when two people saw them and shot them in 1953. Later we came from Bi'r Sab' through the UN Hebron to al-Quds then back to Ein Gedi. We found the bodies to bring them back. We got the bodies under shooting from the Ali Jawleen but we had to carry them by hand and they were heavy and this was difficult to do because of the distance and the hills to bring them back. Then the army came and Meir Har Zion came and went to the Jordan area and killed some 'arab there. The reason I went was that I know the area very well, even today I know this area. If anything happens in this desert they called me but today there are no high-ranking 'arab in the Army.

After his storytelling, Sa'īd seemed extremely tired and 'Amīr and I thought it best to wrap up the interview and, subsequently, we did not clarify whether or not the photograph hanging on his wall was of a hunting or retrieval party once back in Israel. We did not get a chance to re-interview Sa'īd before my fieldwork was completed in 2013.

A year later, I stumbled upon an article in the Israeli newspaper *Walla* about Sa'īd written in July 2014. The article was entitled in Hebrew. 'The man who found the body of a sister of Meir Har-Zion' (Yagna and David 2014). Apparently, Sa'īd had given an interview to an Israeli reporter after a local Israeli Jewish Study group from the Kfar Etzion field school paid a visit to him during a student trip in 2014. According to the newspaper, the students were in the Negev undertaking a regional tour to learn more about 'the historical events and the subject of Arab retaliations against Jewish citizens in the region' (Yagna and David 2014). Student interest in the topic had grown after the death of Meir Har-Zion in 2014. Looking to find more information about the events of Har-Zion's life, the head of the Hof Ashkelon Regional Council, Yair Farjun told the students the story of Sa'īd Abū Rabī'a. The Jewish school director Yaron Rosenthal

later explained: ‘We went to interview Abu Rabia and luckily he remembered it all so clearly we could gather more information and a different perspective on what happened’ (Yagna and David 2014). The *Walla* article describes Ḥaj Sa‘īd’s role in the Har-Zion affair:

After the searches for the bodies were unsuccessful, the IDF contacted the Abu Rabia for assistance. ‘The Army came to us because the area in which they were traveling was close to the border with Jordan,’ [Sa‘īd] said. ‘They asked us to organise teams of men in order to search for the body of Shoshanna and her boyfriend. The army knew we were experts in the desert, we knew the area well.’ Today [Sa‘īd] is considered an expert in the field. There is no piece of land in the Negev that he has not set foot in it, and is well versed in the history of any place and anywhere. [Sa‘īd] was the head of one of the search teams, who scoured the area around the Dead Sea and the Judean Desert. After a few weeks with no results, the men were searching the area where the tribe lived in Abu Rashida. ‘Suddenly we saw a Bedouin woman, a shepherdess, and began to ask her questions about the area. She motioned to us that there was a cave nearby, “You might want to look there”. We went and found several caves and water well. At first we thought they fell into the well, but they were not there. We combed the caves and then we discovered the two bodies including Shoshanna.’ According to [Sa‘īd], they immediately informed the army about finding bodies and their location within the cave. ‘After a short time the military came to take them,’ he says. The centrality of revenge in Meir Har Zion story was not absent. ‘Everyone here remembers what Har Zion did after we found the bodies,’ said [Sa‘īd]. After finding out about finding the bodies, Har Zion with three other ex-combatants, Yoram Nahari, Ze’ev Slutsky, and Amiram Hirshfeld, murdered five Bedouins suspected of Shoshanna’s murder.

(Yagna and David 2014)

Similar to Suleīmān al-‘Athāmīn’s presentations given to Israeli journalist described in Chapter Three, Sa‘īd Abū Rabī’a’s assistance to the IDF in retrieving Shoshanna Har-Zion’s body in Jordan was re-contextualised by the Israeli-Jewish journalists as providing information about the life of Meir Har-Zion rather than highlighting Bedouin history *per se*. Notwithstanding the contextualisation and

publication of Sa'īd's account of the past event, I was unable to clarify the content of Sa'īd's group photograph due to his changing stories and dates attributed to particular events. While concluding either way is beyond the scope of this thesis, the different narratives pertaining to the image nonetheless highlight the image's capacity for strategic reinterpretation and/or miscommunication within various visual economies. Did Sa'īd merely use the Shoshanna Story as a period reference for contextualising the photograph during the first interview and 'Amīr and I misinterpreted his phrasing? Or did he purposely change his story? Or did he simply get his story confused?

Perplexed about the changes to Sa'īd's oral story pertaining to the photograph, I recalled lamenting to 'Amīr after the interview that it appeared that photograph was not of the men that retrieved Shoshanna's body as he originally told us but most likely a snapshot taken after a hunting party. In attempt to address my frustrations, 'Amīr explained the situation:

Yes, it appears the Ḥaj has either changed his story or we got his information mixed up. He is eighty-three and elders like him often get confused. This is why it is so important for us to write down this history before it gets lost to us forever and we can never get it back. This is why our work is important, we have to record and keep this knowledge.... This is also why we may never find out the truth.

At the time, I did not realise the significance of 'Amīr's words but later realised that he had explained the difficulties of recording historical narratives through photo-elicitation in the Negev. Whether out of forgetfulness, confusion amid translation, strategic alteration, or the mixing of information that occurred between 'Amīr, Sa'īd, and myself during our discussion, the connections between the historical events pertaining to the image hanging in his guesthouse were not made clear. For elders (*kbār*) from older generations (such as Sa'īd) recording oral testimonies and publishing written words retains greater pertinence and importance than sharing old images illustrating

historical events. Nevertheless, most members of the older generation, such as Sa'īd, preserve and display their photographic collections on the walls of their *shiggs* and salons as decorative confirmation of their own and their family's legacies in the Negev.

II. THE VALUE OF IMAGES FOR TRIBALISM

The historical photographs discussed in this chapter were initially produced within (a) global and (b) macro national visual economies as Orientalist visualisations of Bedouin 'natives', documentary evidence of the *Nakba*, images of well-known leaders and events associated with the Israeli government, however, their historical meanings and presence have the capacity to change – to acquire new readings and authority beyond the initial contexts in which they were created and embedded as they begin to intentionally and unintentionally circulate between contexts including 'closer' visual economies associated with (d) meso – named linages (*'ā'ilāt*) and (f) extended families (*'ā'ila*).

This chapter documented the social biographies of a series of images, be they incomplete and fractured, in order to account for their re-appropriations and circulations through their changing material and digital presence(s) as: family heirlooms contained within a photographic albums; artefacts of tribal (*'ā'iliyya*) reputation hung on the walls of *shigg*; printed illustrations of Bedouin Otherness in al-‘Ārif’s book; records of Bedouin leaders as Israeli Arabs; and digital images of Negev Bedouin history on the Internet. It detailed their production (original and replication) and consumption (physical and symbolic) during their circulations (material and digital) focusing on various characteristics of these images and their diverse presence(s) in visual economies, but particularly those relating to Bedouin tribal (*'ā'iliyya*) histories in southern Israel.

As these case studies illustrate there are divergent accounts about who produced these old images, where they came from, what type information they contain, and the circumstances through which they came to the Negev. Until the late 1990s, the only access Bedouin had to archival images were largely from books found in regional libraries such as BGU or those photographs given to individuals by outsiders as gifts. Today original images are still typically unavailable to local collectors as archival photographs and, along with other historically significant documents, are held in external institutions or Israeli state archives. Thus in most instances, the original production information for old images remains unknown. For example, aside from the aforementioned professor at BGU, when asked about the historical photographs in Arif al-Arif's books most people admit that they assumed al-Arif had taken the photographs himself since they had copied them from his volumes.

When old photographs originate and/or arrive in the Negev, however, they are often valued as the property of specific lineage (*'ā'ilāt*) members who own, protect, source out, and (try to) regulate or control their exchanges among their own families and neighbours. Individuals such as Ḥassan, 'Ā'isha, and her uncle regard their old photographs as objects that 'mean' something for their tribal histories and thus they frame them, purposely hang them on walls, and preserve them in albums. It must be said here that not all families and *'ā'ilāt* possess extensive image collections or photographic archives depicting ancestors, past events, or groups, however. In fact, the al-Huzayyil, al-Ṣāna', and Abū Rabī'a and the local image-keepers discussed here are exceptional and Bedouin outside of these *'ā'ilāt* publically acclaim these collections. Notwithstanding, most *'ā'ilāt* and families typically possess smaller collections, mostly old forefather portraits, and exchange and care for them as valuable historical objects. In fact, most Bedouin (in both the villages and towns that I visited) hung these types of images in their salons and stored them in family albums.

Over the last ten years, however, the Internet has substantially expanded people's ability to research photographic databases and source documentary information about their Negev histories. In particular, search engines such as Google allow them to locate and share important archival materials, which they add to their collections. Unlike historical images that originate in the Negev, local collectors do not seem overly concerned about the images' producers or the quality of the images found online. Most digital reproductions such as the *shuyūkh*'s portraits on Wikipedia, Facebook, and other webpages such as Palestineremembered.com are simply taken from their original production contexts or uploaded onto websites through copy-paste applications into new formats omitting citations.

Once sourced, members' ability to derive meaning from the image is based on their capacity to name, recognise, and (more significantly) identify the ancestral *shuyūkh*, people, and landscapes within a photograph. In particular, Bedouin visual knowledge involves reading and translating pictorial symbolisms, graphic content, physical features, and characterisations recorded by photographs of Bedouin of the Negev. For example, I often heard people say: 'That is a member of the al-Šāna'. You can tell by the shape of his nose.' This interpretation came irrespective of an image's lack of text-based captions or other contextualising information. Ultimately, the value of old images of Negev Bedouin for local knowledge of history is (in part) dependent on their graphic contents and the languages of visualisation, history, and identification unique to this society not those of the photographs' original (and often non-Bedouin) producers.

These identifications are also essential for powerful lineages (*ʿā'ilāt*) to make ownership claims to old images. The fact that the photograph was taken of an ancestor, group evens, or Negev landscape also allows members to profess and evidence their tribe's influence and connections. This is especially the case for those who have the

ability to recognise photographed individuals with a degree of certainty; even more so when this information can be validated by oral and text-based stories or captions. Moreover, family members also employ visual depictions of their ancestors to make public statements about their heritage and ancestry in various visual economies (see Wikipedia pages) – one of the significant but competitive practices by which members legitimate their internal social positions and status. This comes as archival portraits of lineage leaders or *shuyūkh* are typically requisitioned as documented ‘truth’ of their ‘historical’ influence in the region.

Spokespersons and image-keepers also strive to control the reading and consumption of historical images by tactfully presenting them in public venues connected to the lineage (*‘ā’ilāt*) and moving them between material and digital displays. Similar to Shryock’s (1997: 296) description in Balgā, ‘Buying the pictures and hanging them on the walls of one’s own home turned out to be the most decisive means by which a person could gain control over what was considered, by every one involved, a kind of documentary evidence.’ Similarly, people strategically presented copies of significant images in various visiting areas and other public yet political venues such as *shigg* and salons. As described in a case study here, Ḥassan owned several copies of Shaykh Salmān II’s portrait that he tactfully presented in different spaces in order to celebrate his father’s life and work. One such location was the picture wall he created in the al-Huzayyil’s *shigg* (see Figure 80).



Figure 80: Photograph of picture wall in the al-Huzayyil's *shigg*.

There Ḥassan fashioned a shrine-like gallery presenting historical images and other objects associated with Bedouin material culture. He created and presented his lineage's (*ʿā'ilāt*) genealogical and tribal past through material culture, recasting items such as photographs, coffee urns, water pipes, hand-woven rugs, and embroidered textiles (see Figure 80) as historical artefacts and using them to symbolise his father's legacy and thus preserve the history of their *ʿā'ila*. Such a display relies on both the physical and simulated ambiguities offered by images, also their poly-mediations (be they continually reworked) and relationships with material artefacts, books, oral stories, and websites (Madianou and Miller 2011). Through such exercises, Bedouin re-contextualise the meaning of images by disregarding or actively countering information that does not fit with their own preferred historical narratives and knowledge.

Rather than merely locating, emplacing meaning onto, and physically owning these reconfigured images, Bedouin are also actively using the Internet to circulate them

as evidence of their particular versions of local history. They are doing so by creating webpages, producing YouTube videos, organising photographic essays on Flickr, and sharing images via Bluetooth. In all, the Internet has become a tool for constructing and promoting the reputations of particular lineages (*‘ā’ilāt*) and their own versions of history to wider Arabic-, Hebrew-, and English-reading publics. As described in the case studies, Wikipedia has become an extremely popular and accessible website for tribesmen and women to fulfil these goals. The website not only allows the average person to insert information on the page but also promotes open-source editing. Wikipedia also seems to be viewed by Bedouin as a legitimate resource through which they can advance their own historical knowledge. Ultimately, Bedouin are using the Internet to saturate and solidify public discourse with their own versions of the reconstructed past and mediated legacies.

In all, through the re-contextualisation and strategic placement of material photographs and digital media, lineage (*‘ā’ilāt*) members frequently set out to rectify perceived untruths or to ‘set the record straight’ about their tribal legacies as presented in other visual economies such visual histories advocated by the state of Israel. As described in this chapter, old pictures are believed to reflect reality, the truth of events, the persona of an ancestor, or evidence of participation. At the same time, people attempt to control, emplace, and localise these truths by reconstructing, emphasising, and circulating their own interpretations of historical events, connections or disconnections with officials, and the influence of their ancestors.

As such, tribal histories differ and are often produced in opposition to the histories of other *‘ā’ilāt* as they compete for prestige and influence through the legacies of their *shuyūkh*. For the al-Huzayyil, Shaykh Salmān II’s work with the Israeli government was crucial for making claims that he mediated the on-going residence of Bedouin people in the Negev after 1948. At the same time, the shaykh’s turbulent

relationship with al-‘Ārif as encouraged some al-Huzayyil to disregard the content of some of his writings. For the al-Ṣāna‘, the Hutchison photographs proved Shaykh Ibrāhīm’s legacy of resistance to the Israeli state and Arab nationalism in the Negev. Finally, Shaykh Ḥamād’s position with the Israeli government has enabled his ‘*ā’ilāt* to continue residing on their own tribal (‘*ā’iliyya*) territory.

While customary historicity includes oral stories and more recent text-making initiatives, old photographs are unique. They differ from oral and text media insofar as lineages (‘*ā’ilāt*) may disregard and actively counter, ignore, or play with specific information that does not bolster particular interpretations of the past. For example, al-Arif presented the younger Shaykh Salmān II’s portrait in his English book to illustrate the uniqueness of Bedouin culture in the Negev. In particular, the insertion of the studio image of Shaykh Salmān II in the text does not convey specific information about the al-Huzayyil but, rather, supports Orientalist tropes by imaging a Bedouin man who ‘indulges’ in polygamous marriages. In an attempt to dislodge the photographic portrait from this unfavourable textual account, Ḥassan physically removed the image from this original context, disconnecting it from al-Arif’s caption and writings.

In summary, images are proving to be an extremely useful and valuable type of evidence that can be easily removed from unflattering oral and textual narratives by simply cutting away captions and repositioning them within new contexts, a practice by which Bedouin are able to reconstruct their own local historical ‘truths’. Photographs are a versatile medium for spokespersons as authorship, dates, and places can be ignored, changed, and revised. These exercises are more difficult to achieve with oral and text-based media. For both, oral stories and writings, authorship is often paramount to the validity of the information represented in audio and textual forms. Bedouin, however, do not treat authorship of an image or a photographer in the same regard. Authorship comes second to content and ownership.

Knowledge pertaining to history, such as that extrapolated from photographs, however, is not a limitless or plastic resource nor are the objects of evidence supporting them. Alternatively, re-contextualisation efforts are dialogically affected or landscaped by pre-existing authority of members based on their political position (or lack thereof), gender, and generational knowledge. Moreover, framing efforts in their society relied on the spokesperson's access to and control over other representational mediums such as oral histories or books, which were usually kept by specific members such as elders (*kbār*). These labours must also contend with the relative fixity of an image's graphic content and external interpretations of particular historical accounts by officials, external institutions, and the Orientalist stereotypes connected to them – reciprocal practices interwoven into systems of power, control, and response influencing growing 'community' concerns in southern Israel. Thus the presence(s) of historical photographs and their values are constantly changing in the complex Negev landscape. In order to contend with these changes, Bedouin are manipulating the reading and taking advantage of the physical and simulated ambiguities offered by images in order not only to strategically validate tribal histories but also to promote community narratives in the Negev such as those described in the next chapter.

CHAPTER SIX

CIRCULATING IMAGES: COMMUNITY HISTORIES

The wide spread use of cameras by people around the world has created more than a mass of images; it has created a new form of encounter between people who take, watch, and show other people's photographs, with or without consent, thus opening new possibilities of political action and forming new conditions of its validity.

(Ariella Azoulay 2008: 24)

In addition to the region's tribal historical landscape, representations of the Bedouin past in the Negev are also comprised of various communities. As discussed in Chapter Three, Bedouin connections to Islamic heritage and ethnohistory and members' articulations of these affiliations in certain publics have expanded alongside the growing influence of community organisations, ideals, and politics in the region over the last thirty years. For example, political parties, civil society NGOs, and community centres have acquired powerful sway in Negev Bedouin society; specifically in towns such as Rāhaṭ and among ever-increasing numbers of Bedouin participants from younger generations including both males and females from all status groups.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, these community organisations (ranging in size, demographics, and engagements) began to play a prominent role in Bedouin historicity. They have created micro-economic projects tapping into Bedouin folk art; restored and preserved Muslim cemeteries; defended Islamic heritage, hosted 'Bedouin cultural days' at schools; and organised political tours through which outsiders learn about 'historical processes' in the Negev. Aside from these engagements, these community organisations also promulgate specific rationalisations of Negev Bedouin history and society among both members and outsiders alike through oral presentations, written text, and photographs. This comes as civic, political, and

religious spokespersons have begun to serve as public liaisons for the Negev Bedouin in recent decades.¹⁶¹ Along with political tours, they coordinate meetings between stakeholders, give presentations to outsiders and the media, and most significantly they disseminate specific ‘information’ about Negev Bedouin connected to specific universalisms such as religion and ethnic-minority politics.

In all, during my fieldwork I found that organisations and their spokespersons not only routinely presented different histories of the Negev Bedouin amidst the above-mentioned activities but they have also intensified their use of visual materials in their presentations to outsiders. In particular, I observed the amplified presence (since 2007) of photographic and digital images of Negev Bedouin on the walls of Bedouin NGO lobbies, in community centre hallways, municipal offices, on local websites, in regional newspapers, and in other public venues. Moreover, community organisations had also begun to systematically hire young commercial Bedouin photographers. These people were not only asked to take pictures of community projects, they were also considered visual historians playing an important role in finding and consolidating iconic images of the Negev Bedouin to display and archive in NGOs, regional centres, and schools.

While the images they produce and collect possess diverse formats, ages, and contents, they also exert unique meanings for Negev Bedouin ideals of ‘community’ history. Newer images (c. 1990) include depictions of Bedouin culture including camels, tents, and other material culture; Bedouin children living in poverty; and Bedouin protests confronting lines of Israeli police forces. Older pictures (c. 1906-1948) in these contexts present early-to-mid century Bedouin events such as inaugurations of Beersheba buildings, the ‘Bedouin Market’, wedding fests, and official visits from governmental personnel. Similar to those described in the last chapter, these images not

¹⁶¹ See Appendix III for a short list of these organisations.

only circulate within and between various visual economies, they also rely on oral and textual poly-mediations to communicate their messages and exist in different formats. Nevertheless, they are unique from those concentrated within familial and lineage (*‘ā’ilāt*) visual economies because (be it through chance or strategy) they largely authenticate different aspects of the Negev Bedouin ‘community’ narratives.

To complicate the presence(s) of images in these settings, this chapter asks: How do these images present selective views of Bedouin community history and society in the Negev? Why do they maintain the most significance in regulated community places in which encounters with outsiders are frequent? What are their values? To answer these questions, part of my fieldwork focused on community photographers and visual historians working with several prominent community organisations including: AJEEC (Arab Jewish Economic and Empower Centre), the southern Islamic Movement, NCF (Negev Coexistence Forum for Civil Equality), the Rāhaṭ Community Centre, the Mandel Centre, and Step Forward Foundation. My focus on local community photographers and organisations arose for several reasons: their local reputations as professional spokespersons and image-keepers; their presence and activities in community organisations, their accessibility in terms of language (Hebrew, Bedouin dialect, and English), and their willingness to participate in my research project on images. These individuals are also locally considered relative ‘equals’ in status that is most lack ‘Arabian origins’ (non- *‘aṣīl*) in Negev Bedouin society.

In all, this chapter argues that Bedouin differentiate community images from closer images associated with lineages (*‘ā’ilāt*) because the former depict themes and tropes solely associated with civic and religious narratives that ‘appear’ to lie firmly outside of the highly regulated spaces of family, genealogies, and tribal relations. For the most part, these images typically efface inter-tribal histories and contentions and

instead promote communalisms on various public stages inside and outside of the Negev. Bedouin communities in the Negev (as imaged, spoken, and written about) are strategic and controlled discourses for members. Consequently, visual representations of them tend to convey information about pre-designated spaces, peoples, and events deemed relevant or evidentiary to universalisms (like those associated with civil society and Islam) in the pursuit of recognition and resources from outside donors, state institutions, and international charities. These images, however, rarely depict Bedouin society itself.

I. THE PRESENCE(S) OF IMAGES AMONG COMMUNITY ORGANISATIONS

Rather than describing the photographic activities of the aforementioned individuals and organisations *per se* (see Chapter Four for discussion), this chapter focuses on the presence(s) of two photographs (1906 and 2010) along with their poly-mediations with oral stories and books in which community stakeholders engage. In particular, it explores visual themes associated with community histories through the remaining two case studies presented in this thesis. These images were chosen for investigation due to their popularity among Negev Bedouin community organisations and the insight they provide into international, national, and regional Negev Bedouin socio-political relations. The first case study traces the biography of a photograph depicting the Ottoman's inauguration of Beersheba's Grand Mosque (c. 1906); and the second focuses on an image of Ṣayīāḥ Abū Madīgam al-Ṭūrī during the 'now famous' protest in al-ʿAragīb (2010). These case studies are again ordered chronologically, by the age of the images' social biographies and my own introduction to them in the Negev. This section also details my own interactions with community spokespersons and highlights

civic and Islamic community narratives responding to nationalised readings of regional history, visual activisms, and Bedouin heritage in southern Israel.

A. *FRAMING THE GRAND MOSQUE*

At the beginning of my fieldwork, several informants told me that AJEEC's Bedouin Volunteer Tent (BVT) possessed a large collection of historical images. The NGO AJEEC was established by 'Ā'isha al-Šāna' in 1998 and is a subsidiary of the Israeli-Jewish administered Negev Institute for Peace and Development (NISPED). Over the course of fifteen years, AJEEC has created a series of empowerment and economic projects with 'the Negev Arab Bedouin community' (AJEEC 2011). Several months later, I arranged a meeting with the organisation's official photographer, 'Ānas al-'Ubra, a community activist from Rāhaṭ who agreed to show me their collection and tell me more about the BVT's work a subsidiary organisation that strengthens 'communal responsibility and active citizenship' among the Bedouin (AJEEC 2011).

Their facilities are composed of two buildings in an area known today as Beersheba's old city. The Ottoman government originally constructed the 'old city' in the early 1900s (see Chapter Two). It is comprised of administrative buildings such as the Governor's House, the old Police Station, the Grand Mosque, and private stone houses constructed by notable *shuyūkh*, which they temporarily occupied during meetings with the Turkish officials and business trips in Beersheba. Various (mostly Jewish) businesses now own these houses. AJEEC's offices are comprised of two buildings, which had been converted into offices and meeting rooms to accommodate the NGO's activities and guests.

After a brief tour, 'Ānas directed me to a large meeting room at the far left corner of the southern complex. 'And here is the Bedouin Tent's meeting room,' he said

while pointing to an open door. 'Ānas directed me into the large room located at the back of the sunny interior courtyard. In it, chairs lined the walls and above them, a collection of enlarged, framed photographs each encased behind glass hung at eye level.

'See these!' 'Ānas said. 'These are old photographs of the Bedouin community in the Negev.' Scanning the room, I saw approximately twenty framed images ranging in size, content, and age. Some images were muted in colour and others were prints in black and white (see Figure 79). The content of images included portraits of young children sitting on dirt floors; others depicted livestock such as camels and goats; and some displayed items such as coffee pots. In addition to these, a few images presented activities such as a man preparing coffee, a woman baking bread, and a young girl making cheese.



Figure 79: Photograph of picture wall at AJEEC.

While walking around the room looking at the assortment of photographs adorning the walls, I wondered why the NGO considered this collection significant and what about these ordinary or even stereotypical postcard-like image of Bedouin life were appealing to the organisation? While pondering these questions, one archival photograph located in the back right corner of the room caught my eye.

The image was an enlarged black and white photograph whose content contrasted with that of the other images. The framed image depicted a ceremonial event in the centre of old Beersheba recognisable from the Grand Mosque and the Governor's House located in the background. Behind the building, the landscape was open indicating the image was taken, most likely, during the Ottoman Period when the city was a small outpost and had few buildings. In the foreground, a large assembly of men stood around a stage decorated with Ottoman flags, white curtains, and woollen rugs. On the stage stood a group of men wearing fezzes, military uniforms, and moustaches typical of the style, dress, and grooming of Ottoman military officers at the end of the nineteenth century. Facing the stage and located several metres from its front stood a line of men wearing fezzes with lighter coloured uniforms. To the left of the platform was a crowd of what appeared to be Bedouin men identifiable by their white *kūfiyya* and long dark robes. The men in front also stood in line five persons deep diagonally extending outward from the stage. To the right of the stage were also Bedouin men but on horseback, each with their rifle raised (see Figure 80).



Figure 80: Framed photograph of ‘Ottoman opening of Beersheba’ in AJEEC’s meeting room.

The picture appeared to be a photocopy and I asked ‘Ānas where it had come from. He briefly explained that it depicted the Ottoman opening of the city of Beersheba during which the Ottomans invited notable Bedouin and bestowed gifts of honour upon them. I went on to inquire about the entire collection:

‘Ānas: The pictures came to AJEEC in 2003.

Emilie: Do you know anything about the person who brought them here?

‘Ānas: We used to have a photographic curator, here, at the Bedouin Tent. However, he had a stroke and he can’t remember much about the photos. I think he lost his long-term memory. But the story is that he collected them from a rubbish bin in one of the *kibbutz* around here in the Negev. Either he got them from the trash or someone gave them to him. But we don’t know what year this happened or what year the photos were taken.

Emilie: Do you know anyone in the photos?

‘Ānas: No, no one. Not even the curator knows this information. No one knows this information. It is lost. You know that this building, AJEEC’s office, and the photographs on the wall were purposely set on fire last year?

Emilie: Yes, several people here told me about the fire here at AJEEC.

'Ānas: At first, we thought it was conservative Bedouin or Jewish people that had difficulties with the social agenda of the Bedouin Tent and they set fire to the building in order to stop our activities here. However, the police said that someone probably did it by mistake. That someone wanted to burn the house next to us but accidentally burnt AJEEC. But we do not believe this is what happened.

Emilie: Were the originals of the photographs burned or copies?

'Ānas: I don't know. The original copies that the curator brought here were large. When he found them they were large photos, so maybe they were used in a museum or someone's house in the kibbutz. These, the new ones you see here hung on the walls, have been reprinted on canvas. Luckily we had copies of the photographs on file and after the fire we sent them to Netanya, up north, to get repaired and now they are here as you see them.

Emilie: Why did you or AJEEC decide to hang them here?

'Ānas: They are photographs of the Arab-Bedouin community here. They show our way of life and history here in the Negev.

After we finished our tour of the meeting room, 'Ānas took me back out to the courtyard. He served tea and asked if I would be interested in seeing more historical photographs of the community? I said I would, thinking that the NGO might have a photographic album or hard copies of other photographs. To my surprise, 'Ānas went into the office and brought back a laptop computer. Sitting next to me, he turned it on and opened his Facebook account. 'This is the best way to see old photographs of the Bedouin community,' he explained. After several minutes, he found one of his friend's profile pages and clicked on his albums. 'My friend here, he is from the north but he collects historical photographs from all over Palestine but there are some of the Bedouin here. They are very rare and important images that only he owns.' We spent the next hour viewing each image in his friend's 'original' digital collection. Despite 'Ānas's proclamation, however, most of the images had been copied and pasted from websites such as Palestineremembered.com and appropriated from digitised archives such the Library of Congress' Matson Collection.

After 'Ānas finished showing me his friend's digital collection, I asked if he was familiar with the website Palestineremembered.com. 'Ānas explained that he had heard of it and proceeded to find it on the web. After locating the site, 'Ānas clicked on the city of Beersheba's link. We slowly went through the image files when we came across an image entitled: 'BEERSHEBA – The opening ceremony of the city, 1906' [original capitals]. The image had been uploaded on the website on 5th October 2011 by Rami Atwane. There was no additional information about the content, source, or photographer of the image. 'Emilie, look it's the same photograph that we have hanging in the meeting room!,' 'Ānas exclaimed. The photograph was certainly taken during the Ottoman's official opening ceremony of the Grand Mosque but a closer appraisal indicated that the image on Palestineremembered.com depicted a different moment of the same event. The empty space between the line of officers and the stage was gone, replaced by Bedouin men (see Figure 81):



Figure 81: Screen shot of 'BEERSHEBA - The opening ceremony of the city, 1906' [original capitals] on Palestineremembered.com.

I asked 'Ānas once again if he knew where the photograph hanging in AJEEC's meeting room came from. 'I don't know,' he replied. 'I think the information is lost because of the curator's stroke but you should go to the photography museum in the Grand Mosque. You might find out more information about historical images of Beersheba there.'

Several days later, after my conversation with 'Ānas at AJEEC, I stood at the roundabout connecting Hertzl and Ha-Atsmaut streets to get a better look at the Ottoman buildings surrounding Allenby Park, the location of the opening ceremony in the photograph (see Figure 81 above). Facing north, the old Tribal School was located to the southwest but was now covered in high barbed fencing and home to the city's Police Department. The Grand Mosque and the Turkish Governor's House were nestled within a green park surrounded by a high security fence with a gated entrance. Arif al-Arif's house (which was built later during the British Mandate) was located the northeast and is now privately owned by an Israeli insurance company. As cars quickly circled the roundabout, it seemed as if the heart of the old city of Beersheba was an unlikely, if not downright odd, place in which to view some of the oldest photographs of Negev Bedouin, who today mostly live outside the predominantly Jewish-administered city.

Walking in the direction of the Grand Mosque, I entered the gated entrance to the Negev's Museum Complex (that is the grounds of Grand Mosque and the Ottoman Governor's House). According to Frommer's English travel guide to Beersheba, the museum complex includes:

The museum's small collection combines antiquities, historical artefacts, and contemporary art, all presently housed in the turn-of-the-20th-century Turkish governor's house, set in a pleasant little park adjacent to Beersheva's Ottoman-Turkish mosque in the centre of the Old City. Old photographs of pašhas, provincial governors, staff officers in

ancient motorcars, and early settlers provide a glimpse into Beersheva's early days as a municipality.... As you approach the mosque, the most beautiful and interesting building in Beersheva, note the graceful tughra (the Ottoman sultan's monogram) in a medallion over the main door. After much of the area's Arab population fled during the 1948 war, the mosque housed the museum for a number of decades, but it has recently been restored and returned to its original status as a house of worship.

(Ullian 2010: 434)

As with a considerable amount of travel information in Israel, the 2011 Frommer's Guide was wrong. In 2011, the state did not allow Muslims in the Negev to pray in the Mosque – instead, it housed the Beer Sheva Photography Museum.

With my out-of-dated travel guide in tow, I walked towards the mosque-turned-museum expecting it to be closed to public in light of on-going controversy about the Photographic Museum. AJEEC's staff had told me that visitor access to both the Grand Mosque and Governor's House was sporadic at best, often being closed for renovations. This occasion, however, proved successful and I was able to visit the exhibition to try to locate the 'original' copy of the 'Ottoman's Inauguration of the city', whose copy was displayed in AJEEC's meeting room.

The entrance to the 'museum' is located on the north side of the Mosque through an unmarked side-door. After knocking with no answer, I slowly entered into a room where two young women were busy working in what appeared to be an office. Surprised, one of the girls asked if she could help me. I told her I would like to visit the Photography Museum. I paid for a ticket and she pointed to the door and told me the exhibition's entrance was across the interior courtyard. Once inside, I found the exhibition was located in the prayer hall or (*musallā*). In the centre of the room was a video installation (see Figure 82). Surrounding the installation were exhibition walls constructed at the four corners of the *musallā* with photographs, mannequins dressed in military clothing, and artefacts hung and positioned against the interior walls of the

Mosque. The exhibition was loosely organised in chronological order with exhibition spaces dedicated to the Ottoman Period and British Mandate, the 1948 War, Jewish emigration to the Negev, and the urban development of Beersheba.



Figure 82: 'General Exhibit at Big Mosque in Beer el-Sabe December 2011' (Adalah 2011).

Perusing the exhibition, I was particularly interested in the first display, which presented what the museum labelled as its oldest collection of photographs. Each archival image had been enlarged, pasted onto matte board, and hung onto an exhibition wall. Next to each photograph was a small metal plate that identified the image's caption, date, and archival source in English, Hebrew, and Arabic. All of the

photographs in this display were, yet again, copies of originals sourced from four archives: the Library of Congress's Matson Collection; the Negev Art Museum's Australian War Memorial Collection; BGU's Toviyahu Archive; and the Goel Drori Archive – The Turkish Album Collection. Many of the images depicted Ottoman, British, and Bedouin notables and visitors, the city's historic monuments and urban development, military battles during war, and encampments. Among them, just as 'Ānas had informed me, was a photograph of the Ottoman inauguration of the city (see Figure 83).



Figure 83: 'The inauguration of the four buildings' from The Goel Drori Archive – The Turkish Album Collection.

The exhibition's photograph was labelled 'The inauguration of the four buildings – the distribution of gifts to the sheikhs (The Goel Drori Archive – The Turkish Album Collection)'. Neither a date nor a photographer was accredited to the photograph. At

first glance, the image appeared to be the same photograph hanging on AJEEC's wall. After closer appraisal, however, I found that it was not the same image, as the participants stood at a slightly different angle in this photograph of the event. Yet again, I had found a third image of the Ottoman ceremony that while similar to pictures in AJEEC and on Palestineremembered.com, was taken at the same event but a different time.

In the rest of the exhibition, the photographic collection went on to depict the history of Beersheba's Israeli Jewish residents in a range of black-and-white and colour photographs, most of which appeared to be enlarged copies of originals. After 1948, indications of Bedouin residence in or around the city disappeared from the visual history of Beersheba as laid out in the exhibition, indicating that the exhibition's intended audience was Israeli Jewish and foreign visitors not the region's Arab population. Completing my visit, I left the Negev Museum Complex and set out to research the three images of the Ottoman event circulating in the Negev (that is in AJEEC, on Palestineremembered.com, and in Beer Sheva's Photography Museum).

To do so, I interviewed several Bedouin and Israeli Jewish informants about the photographs of the Ottoman event, however, it quickly became apparent that the Photography Museum was controversial among the Negev's Bedouin residents. Indeed their opinions about the photographs were all intrinsically connected to debates about the mosque and the Israeli Jewish-dominated visual history of the city in the exhibition – a situation that had become increasingly politicised in 2011 during my fieldwork. Bedouin informants explained that the mosque has been the centre of tensions between the Negev's Muslim and Jewish residents for the last decade. In particular, several people explained that activists and the Islamic Movement in the south had filed several requests with the Major's office about access to the Grand Mosque for Friday prayers.

The Mayor had rejected their appeals. For example, several hundred local Muslims, mostly Bedouin residents associated with the southern Islamic Movement, tried to stage a prayer at the mosque which resulted in a conflict between city officials and 'local Jewish right-wing' groups in 1997 (Adalah 2012).

After several years, the case went to Beersheba's municipal court and eventually was referred to the Israeli Supreme Court, which ruled on 22nd June 2011 that the Muslim community could not worship there but the city had to convert the mosque into a museum dedicated to Islamic culture in the Negev. Conversion of the building into an Islamic Cultural Museum had never occurred and city officials decided to convert the building into the Photographic Museum instead. The following explanation provided by a regional NGO clarifies the situation on their website:

On 26 December 2011, Adalah sent a letter to the Mayor of Beer el-Sabe (Be'er Sheva) requesting a meeting to discuss the municipality's total failure to implement the 22 June 2011 Israeli Supreme Court decision to open the city's Big Mosque as an Islamic museum. The Mayor's office responded to the letter and a meeting is scheduled for 19 February 2012. Dr Thabet Abu Rass, Director of Adalah's Negev Office, wrote the letter following the December 2011 opening of a general historical exhibit, entitled, 'History of Be'er Sheva: From 1900 – 2011.' In the letter, Adalah referred to the 2011 Supreme Court decision and inquired into the 'preparation of the municipality in this matter'. On 27 December 2011, Dr Abu Rass also met with the municipality's chief engineer, who is responsible for the preservation of historic sites. During the meeting, the engineer acknowledged that while she was aware of the Supreme Court's decision, she had not received any direction to alter the municipality's stated policy towards the mosque.... On 22 July 2011, the Supreme Court rejected the Municipality's position that the mosque should be converted to a general museum, and stated that doing so ignored the history of the mosque, its design and cultural and religious importance for the Muslim community.

(Adalah 2012 [original insertions])

This conflict came to a head in 2012, when city officials decided to host the Salut Wine and Beer Festival (the sixth consecutive year for the event) within the grounds of

the mosque-now-museum. The southern branch of the Islamic Movement protested the event, arguing that it was an offence to the sanctity of the holy site. An Israeli academic, Seth Frantzman expressed his opinion about the event in the English edition of the politically right-wing newspaper, *The Jerusalem Post* (9th May 2012). He argued that the politicisation of the wine festival by the Islamic Movement was indicative to the ‘re-Islamification of Beersheba’:

The battle [over Beersheva’s Mosque] has to be understood as a struggle to re-Islamify unused sites in Israel. This is actually part of a global struggle by Muslims to re-assert their claims to former places of worship that were once in the Dar al-Islam, or the ‘domain of Islam’.... THE SUDDEN interest in the Beersheba mosque is similar to these other battles. Does it reflect a true feeling that the mosque is being threatened with desecration and that it is a site that is deeply connected to the Bedouin population, or is the mosque simply an issue that politicians know they can get people to rally around to whip up sentiment and world opinion in order to expand their power base and test the commitment of the state to maintaining a free and secular environment in the public space?

(Frantzman 2012 [original capitals])

Over the last several years (2011-2013), the southern-based Islamic movement has organised mass prayers of a hundred or so people on the Great Festival (*Id al-Fitr*) in the courtyard of a mosque. In addition to mass prayers, the organisation has also hosted a series of events wherein the head of the southern branch’s Islamic Movement, for example, and others give speeches and distribute pamphlets calling for their right to be able to use the mosque for religious purposes. In addition to community events such as these, the Movement has also released statements to new syndicates articulating their protest against Muslims’ inability to worship in the mosque. Despite these efforts the mosque (in 2015) continues to house Beersheba’s photographic heritage.

Returning to biographies of the Ottoman photographs, I went in search of the Museum's photographic curator, Goel Drori. To paraphrase an acquaintance of Drori:

He is an extremely nice man who is extremely knowledgeable about the Negev's photographic history. Drori has done a lot for the preservation of important photographs of the city but be extremely sensitive when approaching him for information about his photographic collection and position as the Museum's curator. However, local and foreign journalists and politicians have hounded him about the controversies surrounding his photographic collection for the past year.

During my first attempt to contact Goel via phone, I spoke with his wife and explained my interest in historical photographs in the Negev. She told me he was busy and to call back in several days. Upon doing so, she told me that he was still busy and unable to speak with me. After several more attempts, I realised that I had made a mistake when I initially tried to contact him by explaining to his wife that I was researching the Negev Bedouin while living in Khashem Zana'. This comment along with my non-Israeli status might have positioned me as 'pro-Bedouin' and thus may have made Goel or his wife wary of my intentions for an interview.

As such, I gave up on speaking directly with Goel and researched his work on the city's visual history online and through informants. I subsequently found a 2011 article *Yedi'oth* (an Israeli Hebrew newspaper) entitled 'Coded Images Beersheba: How it all began' written by Illana Curiel and Goel's website <http://drory.net>. The latter was a link entitled 'Society for Preservation of Israel Heritage Sites' where Goel had uploaded several collections of images that mostly focused on the Negev area and Beersheba. Investigating further, I located an article entitled the 'The Album of the Establishment of the Turkish City of Be'er Sheva.' There Goel explained how he had come to possess the Ottoman opening ceremony photograph (Drori 2010).

According to a Hebrew book entitled *Beer Sheva 'Iyad Abot vaBeneem* (English – *Be'er Sheva City Fathers and Sons*) by Zev Vilnay (1967), the Negev Museum (once the Tribal School) possessed a photographic album that contained a large collection of images of Turkish Beersheba created approximately sixty years ago (c. 1900). The album was originally owed by the Ottoman paşa (a title indicating high rank, such as a governor) of Beersheba, Assaf Belge Bey, at the turn of the nineteenth century. After his death, his son inherited the album and gifted it to the Israeli embassy in Turkey. Embassy officials decided to return the pasha's album back to the city of Beersheba where it was housed at the Negev Museum Complex (Curiel 2011). At the time of Vilnay's book publication in 1967, however, the Museum had lost its copy of the paşa's album. The only indication of the album's existence in the Museum was a receipt indicating the album's successful arrival from the Israeli embassy in Turkey.

In 1974, local cultural scholar Sasson Bar Zvi discovered that a second copy of the pasha's album had been given to Beersheba's first mayor, a Bedouin man named Shaykh Suleīmān al-ʿAṭāwna. After his death, his grandson Shaykh al-ʿAṭāwna inherited the album (Curiel 2011). As of 1974, this album was stored in the al-ʿAṭāwna family's archive in Hebron. Sasson and Goel contacted Shaykh al-ʿAṭāwna and asked him if they could interview him and take the album to the Museum to make a copy. The shaykh refused but invited Sasson and Goel to Hebron to make copies of it at his home. Goel told the journalists that the shaykh 'insisted we get up to Hebron ... and refused to release the album from the city limits' (Curiel 2011).¹⁶² With the reproduced materials in tow, Goel made three additional copies of the album: one containing the negatives currently in Goel's possession; a second album was given to Sasson; and a third album gifted to the deputy mayor of Beersheba at the time (Curiel 2011).

¹⁶² According to Abu Rabia (2001), portions of al-ʿAṭāwna were expelled to the Hebron after 1948.

Goel explained to the newspaper, that as a visual historian, he had kept the album away from the public over the last decades until he found ‘a special moment to expose’ it to Beersheba’s community (Curiel 2011). This moment happened to be the opening of the city’s Photography Museum in the Grand Mosque in 2011. Omri Salmon, the CEO of the Council of Preservation and Heritage in Israel described the presence of the album in the Museum: ‘The exhibition in Be’er Sheva, including the exposure of the Turkish pasha photo albums are ... a salute from the conversation field and demonstrate to the Israeli people the work and devotion given to the upkeep of buildings, documents, photos and cultural enrichment of the state of Israel’ (Curiel 2011).

In an article describing the event, the *Yedi’oth* author also included several copies of images found in Goel’s version of the paşha’s album (see Figure 84). One happened to be the Ottoman inauguration which bore the heading: ‘Declaration ceremony in the city of Be'er Sheva by Akram Bay, governor of Jerusalem in 1906. Background mosque and the governor, the arch reads: Allah save thy Sultan’ (Curiel 2011).



Figure 84: 'Declaration ceremony in the city of Be'er Sheva by Akram Bay, governor of Jerusalem in 1906' (Curiel 2011).

While the article explained the source of the museum's photograph, it did not cite the image's original photographer.

Later research found that the only photographers working in Beersheba during the late Ottoman Empire were John Whiting, Hol Lars Larsson, and Eric Matson – photographers of the American Colony. Whilst researching their photographic collection at the Library of Congress, I found another depiction of the event in the George Grantham Bain Collection (see Figure 85). The image was labelled, 'Turk Negotiations with Arabs' and, according to their archives, the photograph was taken by Whiting and later published by Bain News Service, an American news syndicate operating out of New York at the turn of the nineteenth century. The description of the photograph states: 'Photo shows the official opening of Beersheba (Israel) by the Ottoman Turkish government before World War I' (Archive – Library of Congress

2014). The photograph was, yet again, another version of AJEEC's photograph and Goel's images but also taken at a different time. In fact, it was the same image that had been cropped and uploaded on Palestineremembered.com.



Figure 85: 'Turk negotiations with Arabs' in the Bain Media Collection at the Library of Congress (c. 1906).

Unlike the others, however, this photograph possessed a hand written note. The note suggested a more detailed narrative of the photographed historical event rather than the more general label attributed to image in Israeli contexts as 'The official opening of the city of Beersheba'. According to Bedouin informants, the event in the photograph evidences the Ottoman's coercive practices with regard to tribal populations in the Empire (including Libya and Yemen), in which officials bestowed presents such as cars, horses, houses, and honorary titles upon notables who assisted Ottoman administrators in the periphery. These gifts were distributed to local men during special events organised by Ottoman officials who very publically honoured Bedouin citizens through symbolic gestures and bribery. Deringil (2003: 330-331) further explained:

The nomadic leaders or notables had to be treated carefully and all care was to be taken to avoid ‘provoking their wild nature and hatred’.... If at all possible, the leaders of the nomads or the provincial notables were to be won over by ‘giving them a little something’ ... and ‘flattering their leaders’.... It is sufficient to flatter them and occasionally give them presents and robes of honour ... for they are very fond of pomp and display.

The Ottomans often organised special public events for Bedouin in Beersheba at different periods (c. 1900-c. 1915) during the city’s construction. The initial recognition of Beersheba as an Ottoman city was overseen by Isma’il Kamal Bey who ‘pitched a governor’s tent and took control of the wells’ on land purchased from a local tribe (‘*ashīra*’) in 1896 (Abu Rabia 2001: 10). The first stage of construction of the city occurred between 1900 and 1903 and was led by the second governor of region, Muhammad Effendi Jaralla who oversaw the building of the governor’s house, main streets, and barracks for policemen or *gendarmerie*. The second stage of construction occurred 1904-1906 and was overseen by the city’s third governor, Assaf Belge Bey, who built the Grand Mosque, a flourmill, post and telegraph office, market centre, and the Tribal School (Abu Rabia 2001). This governor was well known among the Bedouin for hosting social events and ceremonies in Beersheba to which notable men were invited (Abu Rabia 2001).

According to al-Arif (1934), Assaf Belge Bey held a special inauguration of the Grand Mosque during which Beersheba was officially ‘enhanced’ as an important centre of Islam and Muslim religious activity in 1906. The surrounding tribes (‘*ashā’ir*’) had donated thousand of pounds sterling for the construction of the Grand Mosque and the Ottomans coordinated an large public ceremony and feast to inaugurate its opening. At the time ‘Ali Akrem Bey, (governor of the Jerusalem area from 1906-1908) encouraged these formalised gestures which he believed brought ‘the Bedouin closer to

the government and capital city by means of generous presents and honours' (Abu Rabia 2001: 13).

Taking into consideration the dates attributed to the photographs, the event most local historians such as Goel simply read as the 'official opening of the city of Beersheba' also depicts the 1906 inauguration of the Grand Mosque and the elevation of the city as an Islamic centre by Ottoman Empire, a historical event typically removed or left out of Israeli state readings of the image's visual history. This event was organised by Assaf Belge Bey and led by his superior 'Ali Akrem Bey during which they distributed copies of the Qu'rān and robes of honour to participating Bedouin notables.

Two additional photographs lent more information about the photographed occasion (see Figures 88 and 89). Upon initial viewing, the connection between the images was not apparent as the photographs were housed in different archives. The image entitled the 'Turk Negotiations with Arabs' (Figure 85) is isolated from the others in the Bain Media Collection. The other two photographs are located in the Library of Congress's archive entitled 'World War I in Palestine and the Sinai'. This archive is comprised of two photographic albums also produced by the American Colony photographers. The collection contains two images also taken at the Ottoman inauguration indicated by presence of 'Ali Akrem Bey, the same rug, decorations, and the men standing on the stage. The first (see Figure 86) is entitled: 'Turkish official opening of Beersheba in pre-war days. Faïdy Eff. Haj' Shawa of Gaza'; and the second: 'Turkish official opening of Beersheba in pre-war days. Ali Akram Bey. Sheik Msalam ibn Said' (see Figure 87).



Figure 86: 'Turkish official opening of Beersheba in pre-war days. Faigy Eff. Haj' Shawa of Gaza (c. 1906).



Figure 87: 'Turkish official opening of Beersheba in pre-war days. Alie Akram Bey. Sheik Msalam ibn Said' (c. 1906).

Despite their different vantage points, the ‘Turk Negotiations with Arabs’ in the Bain Media Collection and those mentioned above from the ‘World War I in Palestine and the Sinai’ Collection, were both accredited to the American Colony’s photographers who were known to have been regularly commissioned by Turkish officials to record important events in Ottoman-ruled Palestine and, according to both literature and my own research, they were the only ‘known’ resident photographers to have worked in the Negev at the time. As discussed in Chapter Four, the American Colony was a commercial studio and thus would have made copies of photographs, such as the ones discussed in this section, available to customers and patrons. Thus the ‘pasha’s album’ rediscovered by Sasson and Goel in 1974 was most likely commissioned by Assaf Belge Bey and originally photographed by the American Colony’s photographers, who during their attendance took the series of photographs which accounts for the various and multiple photographs of the event circulating in the Negev today.

With this information, I ended my research of the BVT’s specific photographic depiction of the Ottoman inauguration now hanging in AJEEC’s meeting room. Despite having not located the ‘original’ version of the image I initially encountered at the NGO (see Figure 79), I was satisfied with locating the image’s original producers and the history of the photographed event.

During the last months of my fieldwork, however, I unintentionally came across an exact copy of AJEEC’s photograph. Before leaving the Negev, I decided at the last-minute to conduct a comprehensive review of books and documentary resources pertaining to the Negev Bedouin society currently held at the Rāhaṭ Community Centre’s library in the Bedouin city of Rāhaṭ. My interest was two-fold. First, to document the type of written materials pertaining to local history and society regularly available to Bedouin because access to many Jewish-run libraries and archives in

Beersheba, such as that at BGU, are restricted to members. Second, to identify which of these resources contain the old photographs currently circulating and being displayed in the Negev.

The Rāhaṭ Community Centre's library houses a large collection of Arabic and Hebrew literature including fiction and nonfiction books. Most of the nonfiction books are studies, descriptions, and writings on the Bedouin in the Negev. During my visit, the librarian informed me that *Akḥbār an-Naqab*, the newspaper syndicate operating out of Rāhaṭ, had recently bequeathed the institution a large collection of books previously kept at their office over the last decade. She directed me to the corner of the library where over hundred books lay on a table awaiting shelving. Flipping through them, I found that most of the books were written by Israeli Jewish, Palestinian Arab, and Bedouin scholars and described numerous aspects of the Negev region, Beersheba, and Bedouin society more generally. Within them were hundreds of photographs employed as secondary illustrations.

Taking my own shots of the images, I hoped to keep them on file for later research. While doing so, I came across a Hebrew work entitled *Beer Sheva va-Atareem* (English – *Beer Sheva and Sites*) published in 1991. The book was an edited volume with chapters describing the Negev, significant historical and archaeological sites, and the history of the city of Beersheba. Among these was an article written by Ilan Gal-Nar (1991) entitled, 'Establishment of Beersheba in the Ottoman period'. In it were several photographs of Ottoman Beersheba including one labelled, 'Celebrations and ceremonies held in Bedouin Beersheba featured by the Turks: Celebration of the inauguration of the city c. -1907' (see Figure 88).



Figure 88: ‘Celebrations and ceremonies held in Bedouin Beersheba featured by the Turks: Celebration of the inauguration of the city c. -1907’ (Gal-Nar 1991).

This photograph happened to be the same depiction of the Ottoman inauguration in 1906 as that hanging in AJEEC. Unfortunately, similar to the AJEEC’s curator, the author did not identify the image’s photographer or any source information. Alternatively, the introduction pages of the entire book stated that the images fall within the book’s copyright and that Sasson (who discovered Assaf Belge Bey’s album in 1974) had consulted on the creation and publication of the book. Maybe Sasson provided the author with a copy of the Ottoman inauguration image from his own edition of the pasha’s album? Did he provide another one to AJEEC’s late curator?

In the hopes of finding the answers, I contacted ‘Ā’isha, the founder of AJEEC. She, similar to ‘Ānas, explained the situation with AJEEC’s late curator and his stroke, stating that she did not know where the photograph had come from. Like others, she

also relayed the controversy of the Grand Mosque in Beersheba and the inability of members to worship there. I concluded the conversation by asking why she hung this image in AJEEC's meeting room along with other photographs depicting stereotypes of Bedouin life in the Negev. She replied:

You see, the Arab community has been here in the Negev for centuries. There were no Jews here then, during the Ottoman time. Only '*arab*' lived here in the desert then. Do you see any Jewish people, any *kippāh* in the photograph? No, they were not here. Ottomans, unlike the Israelis now, respected us. They held events like this for the community.... They knew that they needed us in order to rule the Negev. The shaykhs were consulted by the Ottomans. Not like today, not like the Israelis who do not let us even worship in our own Mosque. This is why the picture is important for the Bedouin community as a whole. It is our community's history.

In all, the presence(s) of the image of the Ottoman's opening of the Grand Mosque and its various versions have a particularly long and complicated socio-biography among both Israeli Jewish and Bedouin residents in the Negev. The disparities between both the reading of historical events and the display of the image(s) among these two populations are (in part) indicative of many Bedouin's current cross-societal interactions in southern Israel. It also reflects their different understandings of the history of Beersheba, its role as an Islamic centre before 1948, and the significance of Islamic heritage for religious spokespersons but also civic leaders such as 'Ā'isha. Notwithstanding, the presence(s) of this image for religious and civic community organisations is also unique to those circulating among the lineages (*'ā'ilāt*) because the people pictured in it cannot be identified and thus cannot be singularly affiliated with one particular '*'ā'ilāt*', a situation making this photograph available to community spokespersons and photographers such as 'Ānas. On other occasions, however, an image that is strategically presented within community and nationalised contexts may

also possess the opposite quality that is it depicts people and events locally associated with universal themes of Islamic heritage and idealised self-presentations of the Bedouin community's civic solidarity.

B. VISUAL ACTIVISM: BEDOUIN PROTESTS AND AL-'ARAGĪB

The office of NCF, locally known in Hebrew as *Dukium* (English – Coexistence), opened in 2006. The organisation is located in the Dalet neighbourhood of Beersheba and housed in a city bomb shelter. During my fieldwork, it was opened to the public during rocket attacks on Israel's southern region coming from Gaza during Operation Pillar of Defence (November 2012). The NGO is comprised of meeting and exhibition space, officially known as the Multaqa-Mifgash Centre (Arabic and Hebrew – meeting) Centre for Arab-Jewish Understanding. Early on during my fieldwork, several informants told me about NCF's joint Jewish and Arab work and its director Haia Noach. She along with NCF's Bedouin employees and other volunteers worked with local Bedouin spokesmen in villages, such as Suleīmān al-'Athāmīn in Khashem Zana', on advocacy and civil society projects to bring both 'awareness' and 'resources' to the Bedouin villages. In particular, the NGO's mission and activities are:

NCF is engaged in a wide range of grassroots activities. Since 2000, for instance, we have worked with community leaders in 'unrecognized' Bedouin villages to deliver vital basic services to their communities.... In collaboration with other NGOs, the NCF has filed legal petitions against discriminatory practices affecting Bedouin communities in the Negev.... We also work to provide accurate, reliable information to the public and to decision-makers shaping public policy.... NCF ensures the reliability of the information contained in such reports by conducting its own fieldwork and research.

(Dukium 2014)

I visited NCF to interview Haia about the organisation's photography workshops with Bedouin children and the regular photographic exhibitions hosted in their Multaqa-Mifgash. Each year, the NGO organises an annual photography workshop for children living in Bedouin villages during their winter school holiday. Volunteer photographers from around Israel are invited each day of the month-long Photographic Literacy workshop to teach the children photography techniques. In 2013, the workshop was held in al-Sir and Khashem Zana'.¹⁶³

Upon my arrival to the office, a secretary greeted me and told me Haia would be with me in a minute and suggested that I take a look at their display tables upon which lay dozens of newsletters, maps, pamphlets, and NGO reports.¹⁶⁴ Most of the literature was produced by the NCF and available for free to those interested in learning more about 'Israel's Bedouin citizens' and the demolition of the villages. In addition to literature pertaining to the NGO's activities, however, there were also photographic calendars, postcards, posters, and books for purchase. These photographic materials compile and present images taken by Bedouin youth in conjunction with their Photographic Literacy Projects. Among both the literature and postcards were also business cards and flyers advertising the services and businesses of Bedouin members.

While perusing these materials, I came across an advertisement (see Figure 89) for a local Bedouin photographer, 'Aṭīya Abū Madīghem, who like a handful of commercial Bedouin photographers (see Chapter Four) have begun producing, exhibiting, and circulating images on political themes of protest, particularly those associated with the 'unrecognised villages'.

¹⁶³ This workshop is detailed later in this section.

¹⁶⁴ I volunteered with the NGO on their mapping of the 'unrecognised villages' project as an assistant researcher in the collection of oral histories in 2011-2012.



Figure 89: 'Aṭīya's flyer advertising his photography (2012).

The advertisement displayed several photographs taken by 'Aṭīya during Negev Bedouin 'community' events throughout 2011 and 2013 in which people marched and protested against the Israeli state's Praver Plan and demolitions. Among them, in the top row, second on the right of the logo was a small cropped image of a moustached Bedouin man wearing a white headscarf (*kūfiyya*) standing below a line of uniformed Israeli police, dressed in black and wearing helmets, holding metal shields and bludgeons. What drew me to the small, inset photograph was the fact that I had 'seen' this photograph many times before in the Negev (what I later learned was a similar images taken at the same dramatic 'photographic event' [Azoulay 2008]). Looking at it, I realised that it was an image of Ṣayīāḥ Abū Madīghem al-Ṭūrī, during one of the armed evictions of Bedouin villagers from their al-ʿAragīb lands – one of the better documented protests that has occurred in the Negev in recent years.

Al-ʿAragīb is located approximately five miles north of Beersheba and a mile or so east of highway forty. According to local spokesperson Nūrī al-ʿUgbī, the al-ʿUgbī have owned the land in al-ʿAragīb since the Ottoman's 1858 Land Law. Like many members, at the time they registered their plots through *sanād* rather than with Turkish

officials since registration entailed taxation. Nūrī explained that during the British Mandate and Israeli Military Administration, however, they paid taxes to both governments. '[W]e have documents from September 22, 1937, stating that my grandfather paid taxes on that land. Also in the early period of the State of Israel, in October 1950, my father paid 113 pounds and 139 mils in taxes to the military governor for planting summer crops....' (Lori *Haaretz* 27 August 2010).

In 1951, however, the Israeli state informed the lineage (*ʿā'ilāt*) that they were requisitioning their land for six months and relocated them next to Ḥura. After this six-month period, the *ʿā'ilāt* tried to move back to their land but received trespassing fines from the state who informed them that they must submit and register official claim forms with the Israeli Land Administration (ILA) in order to return to their property. They did so, but since the 1970s the Administration has never completed nor processed the *ʿā'ilāt*'s application for registration. Nūrī summarised the situation as such:

Al-'Arāqīb, historically, is the land belonging to the al-'Okbi tribe. It is marked on the first map from the Ottoman period, and so it is on the second and third map.... In 1949 an aerial photograph was taken and al-'Arāqīb is marked there too. The al-Ṭūrī family came to the region around 100 years ago, they came to us. They were farmers and cultivated land. They bought a piece of land from my grandfather, the father of my uncle.... All this is registered in the documents, Turkish and British ones. Even from the period of the Israeli military rule. There was a certificate from JNF-KKL which stated that people from the al-'Okbi tribe, all the farmers in al-'Arāqīb, possessed 26 000 dunams of land.... And today Israel is saying 'You don't have any land. It is state's land, it is dead.' How is it dead? And we, where are we from?

(Hall 2014: 153-154)

In addition to the al-'Ugbī, a portion of lands composing al-'Aragīb (approximately 4,600 acres (Dukium 2014) are also owned by the Abū Madīghem al-Ṭūrī who purchased their land from al-Huzayyil (once their patrons) in 1905. In an

interview with Hall (2014), Ṣayīāḥ described the Abū Madīghem al-Ṭūrī's land purchase:

We've been on this land since Turkish times, we bought it in 1905. In 1917 the British occupation started, but we stayed in the same place, together with some other families ... In 1914, our forefathers built an Islamic cemetery here.... This cemetery with people buried in all different times, is the tangible proof that this has been our land, that we have been here continuously.... In 1953, when they ordered us to leave the area and [to move] towards the north, they told us 'it's just for 6 months'. Yet, until now, we were not allowed to return.

(Hall 2014:153-154)

Since the 1990s, several families built homes on the land when it appeared that the state was attempting to seize their lands because residents could not produce Ottoman land deeds to the ILA (Sanders 2010). In 2000, the state proceeded to ban families again from living there, demolished their homes, and fumigated their wheat fields by crop dusting poison as a way of 'encouraging' them to leave.

In 2005, Nūrī made an additional request to the Administration (similarly to those made previously) that it finalise his tribe's ('*ashīra*) land registry. On this occasion, however, the state decided to formally sue Nūrī for trespassing on what they claimed was now *mawat* land (Ottoman term for unused land). In response, Nūrī proceeded to construct a small tent in al-ʿAragīb, in protest of the suit and the state's refusal to formally acknowledge his land claim. Soon after, a large number of Israeli police demolished his tent and arrested him. Several weeks later, once released from jail, Nūrī travelled back to his land and reconstructed his tent, this time his efforts were supported by Bedouin advocacy groups in the Negev. Over time, other former and

scattered residents of al-‘Aragīb (most of whom now live in Rāhaṭ) joined Nūrī in constructing dwellings on their lands.¹⁶⁵

In 2010, the Jewish National Fund (English) or Keren Kayemet LeYisrael (Hebrew) (JNF-KKL) announced a forestation project in the Negev. This plan was labelled the *Ambassadors’ Forest* in which diplomats and other Jewish and Christian groups are solicited to purchase trees and plant them in order to ‘Make the Desert Bloom’ (an early Zionist motto referring to the Negev desert) by JNF-KKL representatives. Soon after launching the initiative, JNF-KKL ploughs began tilling and terracing lands in areas where the state had experienced on-going conflict with Bedouin residents regarding land rights and what the state considers to be their illegal residence in villages such as al-‘Aragīb. In July 2010, under orders of the Israeli Land Authority (ILA), over 1,300 Israeli Police Officers were dispatched to al-‘Aragīb to evict and demolish resident dwellings, arrest residents and a slew of Bedouin, Jewish, and Palestinian activists who had come to protest JNF-KKL’s ‘planting’.

Back at the Multaqa-Mifgash, I had picked up the advertisement with the image and placed it in my bag when Haia greeted me. Sitting on a sofa, I interviewed her about NCF’s activities including the Photography workshops and their mapping and research of the villages. During the interview, I asked her about the picture of Ṣayīāḥ circulating in the Negev and on the Internet. Haia explained that during the 2010 large-scale demolition, a large group of Bedouin and Israeli Jewish photographers took pictures during the mass police operation. Besides herself, other professional Israeli Jewish photographers with Activestills (see Figure 90), and Bedouin photographers had joined the al-‘Aragīb residents and protesters the night before when it was learned that the police operation was scheduled for the next day. ‘Several of us were taking pictures and

¹⁶⁵ Nūrī al-‘Ugbī’s land claim was finally taken up by the Israeli court in 2011. It was denied.

were standing at the right angle to capture Ṣayṭāḥ walking up the stone steps to confront the police. It was a particularly dramatic moment during the demolition and we all knew it would make for a great picture’ (see Figure 91).



Figure 90: Photograph taken by Oren Zvi of Activestills’ at the al-‘Aragīb 2010 protest.



Figure 91: Haia Noach’s (NCF) personal photograph taken at al-‘Aragīb 2010 protest.

Among these photographers was twenty year-old ‘Aṭīya, a member of the Abū Madīghem al-Ṭūrī in al-‘Aragīb. ‘Aṭīya lives in Rāhaṭ and studied photography for a year and half at Sapir College. Since then, he became interested in both fine art photography and photojournalism. Today he is a commercial photographer (see Chapter Four). ‘Aṭīya’s photograph of the event (and the one of more popular images of the event circulating throughout the region today) is slightly different from the more spontaneous snapshots taken by Haia or the quiet drama of Activestills’ photographer Oren’s wider angle image. ‘Aṭīya’s photograph, instead, captures Ṣayīāḥ with his arm stretched out and pointing defiantly at the Israeli police unit (Figure 92).



Figure 92: ‘Aṭīya’s photograph taken at al-‘Aragīb 2010 protest.

Since the ‘photographic event’ in 2010 (Azoulay 2008), I found that ‘Aṭīya has hence printed, exhibited, and disseminated this particular photograph in several physical and virtual venues within and beyond the Negev. In particular, he created a photographic exhibition entitled ‘Bāqūn’ (Arabic – remaining) which documents ‘people in the Negev who insist on clinging to their ancestral lands’ through photography (Zochrot 2013). His first exhibition was held in al-‘Aragīb in 2012 in the newly constructed *shigg* (see Figure 93) and was shown in the Community Centre in Rāhaṭ, the NCF in Beersheba, Zochrot in Tel Aviv, and Kafr Qara in northern Israel along with several other venues.



Figure 93: Activestills photographic exhibition in al-‘Aragīb, similar to the one ‘Aṭīya held in 2012.

On 11th June 2013 he was invited by Haia to exhibit at the Multaqa-Mifgash to a mixed audience of Israeli Jewish residents from Beersheba and surrounding *moshavim* and Bedouin residents from various towns and villages. The Multaqa-Mifgash serves as

a proposed meeting place to encourage face-to-face debate and to ‘bring communities together’ by providing ‘opportunities for Jews and Arabs to come together in meaningful ways’ and working ‘towards changing the way people think and dispelling myths and prejudices’ (Dukium 2014). The venue also hosts regular talks on the Negev Bedouin by Israeli Jewish and Bedouin experts; photographic exhibitions displaying images produced by both the NCF in coordination with their Photography Literacy Projects along with foreign and local photographers; and film screenings.

Later, ‘Aṭīya went on to present this image along with others (see Figure 94 for exhibition flyer) in Tel Aviv with an organisation named Zochrot. Zochrot was established in 2002. As an organisation, it sets out to ‘challenge the Israeli Jewish public's preconceptions and promote awareness, political and cultural change within it to create the conditions for the Return of Palestinian Refugees and a shared life in this country’ (Zochrot 2013). Their work includes political education workshops, visual research in the form of photographic and visual art exhibitions and projects, tours of destroyed Palestinian homes in Israel, film festivals, and oral and text research in the form of books, audio-recorded interviews, re-mappings, and the ‘Truth Commission’ (a local conference and testimonies by former Israeli military about the *Nakba*). Similar to NCF, their audience largely includes Israeli Jewish, international, and Palestinian residents in Israel. Their Tel Aviv office also hosts a Visual Research Laboratory or exhibition space where visual artists, filmmakers, and photographers display their works and give presentations about their inspiration and goals.

‘Aṭīya’s exhibition was held in July 2013 in Tel Aviv and curated by Eitan Bronstein Aparicio. It ran from 28th July 2013 to 19th September 2013 (see Figures 94 and 95). During his opening interview, ‘Aṭīya explained his exhibition in Hebrew:¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁶ The informant’s name has been anonymised in this text.

Eitan: Tell me about the photographs. Where and when are they from?

[‘Aṭīya]: They’re all from the Negev, from unrecognized localities. They document demolitions, demonstrations, life in the Negev. The photos in the exhibit were taken on July 27, 2010, the day Araqib was demolished for the first time. The photographs were first exhibited in Araqib in 2012; they became part of the struggle to remain there. The large demonstrations that were held show that the population organized and came together during that period. Everyone participated, women, children and men.

Eitan: But the photos aren’t only from Araqib?

[‘Aṭīya]: Right, there are also photos of other locations....

Eitan: So you’re an activist photographer?

[‘Aṭīya]: You could say that. When the first demolitions occurred they called me at 11 PM and told me to come quickly because Araqib was being destroyed. My parents didn’t want me to go; they were afraid something bad would happen to me. I spoke to my older brother, who convinced them to agree. When I arrived I was surprised to discover that the demolition crews hadn’t come yet. We went to sleep there. There were about 150 of us, from both Israel and from abroad, who’d come in solidarity. Toward morning we received a phone call announcing that the Lahavim junction had been blocked and that forces were mobilizing at a gas station in Beersheba. The entire route from the main road to Araqib was closed down. There were about 1200 soldiers and police officers. I’ll never forget how they stood in a line facing us; the commander you see in this photograph said over his loudspeaker: Either you leave peacefully or we’ll use force. One photograph shows Sheikh Si’ah standing opposite the security forces, pointing his finger accusingly at the destruction they caused.

Eitan: Do you live in an unrecognized locality?

[‘Aṭīya]: No, I live in Rahat.

Eitan: So what’s your connection to this struggle?

[‘Aṭīya]: First of all, I have family in Araqib. I live in the Negev; I’m afraid the demolitions will reach Rahat. There have already been demolitions there. I see people who’ve come in solidarity and been beaten. They also could have said, ‘Why should I care? What business is it of mine? Why should I be beaten?’ That’s my reality; I’m one of them. Now the Praver plan wants to move people to recognized localities and give them a little more money. The inhabitants don’t agree. If that happens, for the rest of our lives we’ll be mankubin, people who’ve suffered a Nakba.

Eitan: What made you begin taking photographs?

[‘Aṭīya]: I studied photography at Sapir College, and learned more on my own. When I began photographing, it wasn’t an obvious decision. People wondered what I was

doing, why I was involved in art. Later they saw it helped and today there are more photographers and I'm happy to assist them. I'm a photographer who comes from the community; I know what is permissible to photograph and what's forbidden. When I photograph a woman I don't show her face. Usually it's a problem, but they know me and grant me permission. They know I do so for the good of the Bedouin population.

(Zochrot 2013)



Figure 94: 'Aṭīya's exhibition flyer for his exhibition in Zochrot in Tel Aviv (Zochrot 2013).



Figure 95: 'Aṭīya's exhibition in Zochrot in Tel Aviv (Activestills 2013).

‘Atīya’s exhibitions coincided with what was intended to be the state’s implementation of the Prawer Plan. In September 2011, the Israeli parliament introduced a bill entitled the Prawer (or Prayer and/or the Bill on the Arrangement of Bedouin Settlement in the Negev) proposed to resettle between 30,000-40,000 ‘semi-nomadic Bedouin’ (Benjamin Netanyahu, *The Times of Israel* [6 May 2013]) living in villages in Negev into designated townships. Government officials argue that the bill aims to narrow the gaps between the Bedouin and the rest of the Jewish Israeli residents in Negev by investing ‘millions of shekels’ for their ‘inclusion and modernisation’ (*The Times of Israel* 2013). The bill draws on the Goldberg Commission 2007 run by a retired judge, Eliezer Goldberg who was commissioned by the Israeli government to make recommendations about ‘dealing’ with the Negev Bedouin ‘land problem’.

After meeting with Bedouin representatives, Goldberg advised that most of the villages should be officially recognised because of their historic claims to the land. Ehud Prawer, head of policy planning in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office, was put in charge of implementing Goldberg’s recommendations and went on to lead what came to be known as the Prawer Plan. He proposed that fifty per cent of land currently occupied by families should be transferred to the state, with minimal compensation for the remaining land, from which families would be relocated. In alteration of Goldberg’s plan, the Prawer Plan called for the demolition of thirty-five villages because they did not possess ‘the correct’ documentation pertaining to their rights to their land.

Negev Bedouin leaders, academics, and activists all argued that the Prawer Plan was ‘a declaration of war’ on the Bedouin because the population were not consulted nor involved with the development of the plan (Bailey cited in Sheen 2011).

Alternatively, they argued that the bill set out to consolidate people from the villages into a smaller geographical area in order to remove them from their established land-holdings and eradicate their customary way of life. Anthropologist Clinton Bailey was quoted in the *Haaretz* (12 October 2011) saying; ‘They're giving the Bedouin much too little, much less than they deserve.... It doesn't really relate to all the Bedouin population, whereas it should, in terms of reparations for land that's been taken, in land or in money’ (Sheen 2011). Bailey also explained that the basic wording of the government plan was insulting to Bedouin:

Generally speaking, most Bedouin are opposed to it. These people had land claims. They were based on unwritten law. Our legal system depends on written evidence of such things, deeds, contracts. They didn't have it, and we also wanted to make sure that we controlled as much of the Negev as possible, because it's half the size of the country. So there was a natural conflict.... But they don't want the whole Negev, they want certain parts of it. And there were ways of dealing with it respectfully and fairly.

(Sheen 2011)

In response to the Praver Initiative, local Bedouin advocates held a protest on the 6th October 2011 where over 8,000 men, women, and children, along with outside supporters rallied in central Beersheba. According to Bailey, ‘That's the largest demonstration that the Bedouin have ever gotten together. This has served to unite Bedouin in a way that nothing else has ever been able to’ (Sheen 2011).

Since its announcement in 2011, civil society organisations such as the NCF, Adalah, AJEEC, and numerous others strategically set out to protest and advocate against the implementation of the Praver Plan within and outside of Israel. Over the course of two years, Bedouin spokespersons gave interviews on a host of Israeli news syndicates such as *Haaretz*, *Aharonot*, and *Yedi'oth*, and international news outlets such as CNN, BBC, *Al Jazeera*, *The New York Times*, and the *Guardian* – community

activisms that substantially increased in 2014. For instance, Morād al-Şāna⁶ discussed The Praver Plan and its implications for ‘Palestinian Bedouin in the Naqab’ at the Palestine Centre in Washington, DC. Morād, who worked as a lawyer and director of Adalah, described the plan as Israel’s ‘final solution’ for Bedouin in the Negev (Hanley 2014).

Amid the protests and media engagements, arguments between non-Bedouin Israelis and international news commentators soon arose. On various news sites, blogs, and public platforms, these outsiders debated the framing of not merely the Praver Plan as a state initiative to regularise land settlement among Israel’s southern Bedouin population but also debated as to whether or not the Negev Bedouin are Israeli or Palestinian. For example, Haviv Rettig (3 December 2013) stated in the English edition of *The Times of Israel*:

In October, the second-largest bloc in the European Parliament, the Socialists and Democrats group, held a conference on the issue in which posters urged parliamentarians to ‘Stop Praver-Begin Plan, no ethnic cleansing of Palestinian Bedouin’. The idea of the plan ... is to move some of the Negev’s Bedouin, Arab Israelis who lead a semi-nomadic lifestyle, off of unrecognized hamlets on state land and into cities. Last week, 50 British artists, musicians and left-wing activists penned a letter to the Guardian newspaper accusing Israel of planning the ‘the expulsion and confinement of up to 70,000 Palestinian Bedouins’, and of ‘systematic discrimination and separation.’...

But it wasn’t the British activists or European parliamentarians who set the tone in framing the Bedouin resettlement debate as part of a generations-long Arab-Jewish war ... Israeli Arab leaders, never ones to miss an opportunity to benefit from populist rabble-rousing, teamed up with the most incendiary of Jewish politicians to transform a carefully crafted development scheme, cultivated over several years by professional planners and economists, into a nationalist tug-of-war.... And it is the ordinary, unassuming families of the sprawling tent-cities who are the true suffering victims of their own leaders’, and Israel’s, collective neglect. And who are not being usefully served by the passionate, largely under-informed, and in some cases perniciously motivated international outcry.

‘Aṭīya’s photograph of Ṣayīāḥ pointing at the Israeli Police Unit in 2010 soon became a visual signer for both sides in the debate. For example on *Al Jazeera*’s ‘The Stream’ in July 2013, bloggers continued argue as to whether or not the Negev Bedouin are Israeli or Palestinians when web administrators posted ‘Aṭīya’s photograph on their Google+ feed (see Figure 96).



Figure 96: *Al Jazeera* Stream with ‘Aṭīya’s photograph on blog about Bedouin in Israel (Stream 2013).

In 2013, the first official reading of the Praver Plan passed in the Knesset and, by the fall, protests in the Negev soon escalated as did international and national media coverage of Bedouin community-led advocacy against it; including information tours in the form of lectures, interviews, seminars, and rallies supported by fellow Israelis and Palestinians in both Israel and the West Bank. For example, in September 2013, Ṣayīāḥ and ‘Aṭīya travelled north to the Arab village of Kafr Qasim’s municipal community centre, which hosted both ‘Aṭīya and Ṣayīāḥ during a ‘Solidarity Event’, which set out

to strengthen dialogue between Arab residents in the north and south of Israel. There Şayīāḥ was introduced to a large crowd of non-Bedouin Palestinian residents as a ‘Negev Bedouin freedom fighter’ (*Alqaria* 2013). During his speech in Arabic, he presented the problems of the Prawer Plan and the experiences of al-‘Aragīb. During the event, ‘Aṭīya also re-exhibited his photographic collection on the centre’s walls (see Figure 97). Their hosts in Kafr Qasim declared that ‘Aṭīya’s photographs showed the ‘punishment of settlement’ and ‘the bitter reality and claws of the Bill on the Arrangement of Bedouin Settlement in the Negev and dire situation of these villages’ (*Alqaria* 2013).



Figure 97: ‘Aṭīya’s exhibition in Kafr Qasim (*Alqaria* 2013).

In November 2013, Negev Bedouin community advocates along with supportive Israeli and Palestinian activists organised a ‘Day of Rage’ in further protest of the Prawer Plan. Advocates gathered on Saturday 30th November 2013 in an area located outside of the town of Ḥura, and were joined by others organised throughout Israel, the

West Bank, and internationally in places such as London. 'Aṭīya's photograph was redesigned into the poster advertising the event (see Figure 98).¹⁶⁷



Figure 98: Day of Rage poster with 'Aṭīya's photograph (2013).

The protest in Ḥura brought over a thousand protesters and, similar to other Bedouin protests in the Negev, they were met by several hundred armoured and mounted Israeli riot police who tried to confine the protest to a small barricaded area and move the event away from the visibility of the highway. Soon, younger protesters tried to leave the barricade but undercover Israeli police within the crowds began to

¹⁶⁷ Today 'Aṭīya is currently working as a freelance graphic designer.

clash with protestors. A week after the protest, state officials released a statement ordering all Israeli media outlets to turn over all photographs and digital images taken during the 'Day of Rage' to the police. The *Haaretz* (2 December 2013) reported:

Police provided no explanation for the unusual order, but they are investigating violent clashes between stone-throwing demonstrators and police, who employed stun grenades, tear gas and water cannons during the protests against the Praver plan. The 'day of rage' demonstrations ended with 34 protestors arrested and 15 officers wounded. The Southern District of the Israel Police communicated the order, which was approved by Be'er Sheva Magistrate's Court..., directly to photographers via a text message. 'All the media in the State of Israel to hand over any documentation of the riots at Hura Junction and the surroundings on November 30, 2013,' the message said....

(Seidler 2013)

A month after the 'Day of Rage' protest, Benny Begin who had worked on the bill with Ehud Praver, told the media during a press conference that 'the prime minister accepted my advice to delay bringing the Bill on the Arrangement of Bedouin Settlement in the Negev to a Knesset vote' (*The Times of Israel* 2013). He stated that there was not enough of a majority in the Knesset to support the bill and 'all sorts of interest groups have gotten involved, trying to take advantage of the plight of the Negev Bedouin in order to achieve political gain' (*The Times of Israel* 2013). Begin also acknowledged that despite claims by Ehud Praver, local Bedouin representatives had not been consulted on the drafting of the bill. The bill was subsequently put on hold. For Negev Bedouin advocates and visual activists such as 'Aṭīya, the state's decision to shelve the Praver Plan was considered a great success of 'Bedouin community activism' and media engagement. For al-'Aragīb, however, the cancellation of the Praver Plan did not stop the demolition of the village as it was destroyed twenty-nine times between 2013 and 2014.

The corpus of visual works used for community narratives such as al-‘Aragīb by professional photographers such as ‘Aṭīya also increasingly include images produced by amateur Bedouin image-makers. As discussed in Chapter Four, the accessibility of cameras (particularly on mobile phones) has significantly augmented the production, consumption, and dissemination of images among members over the last ten years. For local advocates with connections to al-‘Aragīb, for example, image-making itself has now become a form of activism which allows them to document and then later evidence their own marginalisation and discriminations at the hands of the state of Israel. Schejter and Tirosh (2012) describe how young people use their smart phones to: organise meetings; share news of recent demolitions; social network with family, friends, journalists, and activists; and record demolitions, protests, and visits by Israeli Jewish, other Palestinian, and international representatives. A young individual explained to Schejter and Tirosh (2012: 311): “I photo the homes when they are here when being wrecked and after being wrecked ... the photo is the big testifier,” she said. “It is the one that tells the truth, let’s us see the truth.... I take photos to send to the world so they will see how they destroy [what is] ours and how they beat us up”.’

As mentioned in the beginning of this case study, activist photography in al-‘Aragīb is not only practiced by residents and relatives but also by NGO staff such as NCF and Activestills who record the events and conditions in the villages and regularly instruct Bedouin advocates and children about how to do the same. In particular, NCF hosts a photography course in the villages and provide children with digital cameras for these purposes. For example, during my stay in Khashem Zana‘, Suleīmān and Haia arranged for NCF to host a month-long photographic literacy project with children from the village over their winter school holiday. The goal of the project was to teach village

children basic photography skills so that they could document their lives in the ‘unrecognised villages’.

Each week a professional photographer, mostly Israeli Jewish from Tel Aviv travelled with NCF’s female Bedouin coordinator to Khashem Zana‘. Once there, they would meet a group of ‘village children’ which were in fact mostly Suleīmān’s offspring and those of close relatives in the pre-school building located on his property (which was built by another NGO several years prior). In the class, the children were given digital camera by the NGOs. The instructor would explain in Hebrew, which the female coordinator translated into Bedouin dialect to the children, about how to use the camera and image-making techniques (see Figure 99).



Figure 99: Visual literacy project in Khashem Zana‘ in the local preschool.

Once explained, instructors would then try to take the children to the top of the hill behind Suleīmān’s home to capture images of the landscape, houses, or livestock

(see Figure 100). The problem was that many of the instructors did not realise that they could not simply wander about the village. And so Suleīmān usually came from his house to direct the instructor to a specific location behind his property for the purposes of guiding the instructors on where they could travel in the village – the very place each Israeli, Palestinian, and international tour group was brought during their visit or ‘village experience’ in Khashem Zana‘ (see Chapter Three).



Figure 100: Visual literacy project in Khashem Zana‘ next to the sheep pens.

Upon the close of the workshop, several instructors along with representatives of the NGO expressed their dismay at the minimal success of this project in Khashem Zana'. They explained that children in other villages seemed more interested in the Photography Literacy initiative, took better photographs, and were 'more responsive' to the project goals. In particular, the organisers were upset that Suleīmān had only allowed children from his lineage (*'ā'ilāt*) and neighbouring houses to participate in the project, mostly boys, and that the children did not 'appreciate' the free cameras. 'The project in al-Sir was much better than in Khashem Zana'. The children there were less exposed to cameras so the act of photography was also less new to them.'

For example, after the NGO organisers and consulting instructors left for the day, Suleīmān's youngest daughter often took her camera with her while we led the sheep and goats graze in the hills behind her father's property. During chores, she often took photographs but complained that that camera's resolution was poor although she enjoyed its video capacity. In fact, contrary to assumptions by NGOs, children in the village had been 'exposed' to digital devices and cameras long before the arrival of the project. For example, most nights the family sat together in the tent with their mobiles, smartphones, computers, and iPads connected to the Internet and electricity via an extension cable run from the generator in the main house.

Nevertheless, once the photography project was completed, the organisation provided each child with a thumb drive with copies of their images saved on it. The organisers had selected what they perceived to be the best photographs taken by the children in each village, printed off copies, and then reprinted them into books, calendars, and pamphlets. These images were then exhibited and sold in Multaqa-Mifgash and other outside venues. The number of photography books depicting the children's photographs and life in the villages have grown substantially in the last five

years and are often shown to visitors in the villages by local village representatives. For example, upon a visit to al-‘Aragīb with the EU delegation, we were shown a large collection of photography books, snap shots, and digital images on a spokesperson’s computer as part of the village tour (see Figure 101).



Figure 101: Local child taking a photo with his mobile phone of EU delegation looking at photographic essay book at al-‘Aragīb.

These same images are also uploaded onto al-‘Aragīb’s Facebook pages directed at specific audiences. Schejter and Tiosh (2012: 310-311) explain:

‘M’, the villager ... launched a Facebook page called...‘We are all Al-‘Arakeeb’ to which he uploads pictures and videos of events that take place in the village. ‘It’s as if I am the communications person for Al-‘Arakeeb,’ he said....When he was away once, one of the villagers recruited a professional photographer who took pictures of a demolition ‘and after 20 minutes it was already on the Internet. It even made it to the cellular [phones] of journalists. One journalist called me and said, “I heard you have the material,

pass it on to me immediately,” and I did.’ ‘M’'s Facebook friends include members of Jewish activist groups and journalists, and he uses their networks to further expand his own....

Together, however, these photographs and digital pictures are increasingly becoming a part of the Negev Bedouin community's 'visual history' – a complex discourse wherein the interests of *‘ā’ilāt* are being re-contextualised as community issues and worked out in public venues.

II. THE VALUE OF IMAGES FOR COMMUNITIES

The photographic and digital images discussed in this chapter, like those in Chapter Five, maintain various presence(s) among Bedouin in the Negev. In order to explore these instances, this chapter traced the socio-political biographies of several images and documented their changing meanings and material and digital transformations as: photographs of community heritage hung on the walls of a NGO meeting rooms; printed illustrations of Bedouin culture found in text books and newspapers; pictures of Bedouin history hung on exhibition walls; and digital images of Negev Bedouin protest on the web.

These photographs and digital pictures were initially produced by various sources from various (a) global, (b) macro, and (c) meso visual economies. The photograph of the Ottoman inauguration of the Grand Mosque (and its different copies and versions) is the oldest (c. 1906) known image of the Negev Bedouin community and consequently possesses a long and convoluted biography. As with the images discussed in Chapter Five, outsiders such as the American Colony photographers, Israeli Jewish citizens, and government officials have nearly always produced the older images circulating in Negev Bedouin society. In the last decade, however, Bedouin have

begun to produce community images as, for example, photographers like ‘Aṭīya become proficient in visual technologies. Thus in part, photographic and digital works reflect the viewpoints, aesthetics, and socio-political interests of their Bedouin creators. For example, ‘Aṭīya’s photograph of Ṣayīḥ Abū Madīghem al-Ṭūrī, unlike those taken by Israeli Jewish representatives of NCF and Activestills, presents a ‘resistance fighter’ with Ṣayīḥ’s arm stretched and pointing at the Israeli police.

In both instances, the visual content of community images are unique in that they are nearly always taken during specific photographic encounters (Azoulay 2008) that were largely staged (or re-staged) public events such as the c. 1906 Ottoman inauguration and 2013 Day of Rage in Ḥura in which Bedouin not only engaged with each other but also with outsiders such as government officials, visitors, and neighbours. These images depict specific places, people, and events associated with community histories and experiences. They are, however, unique in that include demolition sites but not the houses themselves, mosques but rarely the extended families owning them, protests in public spaces but never tribal conflicts over lands, and subjects such as community advocates and protestors but not the elders (*kbār*) observing them on the side-lines. The latter aspects of Bedouin society cannot be isolated from their families, classes, and lineages (‘*ā’ilāt*) – these associations are the antithesis to shared community narratives such as those articulated by the southern Islamic Movement and civil society NGOs such as NCF.

Today the production of community images (particularly those created by ‘Aṭīya and NCF’s visual literacy project) has acquired an additional purpose. In the early to mid-twentieth century photographers (including those described in the last chapter) recorded official events, notable persons, and noteworthy activities. Image-making in the Negev has, however, also become valued as a type of snapshot evidentiary

enterprise whereby both Bedouin and non-Bedouin photographers use their cameras for political advocacy by recording protests, conflicts, and discriminations; a type of visual activism in which images are instrumentalised to document abuses. Activist photographers are not only purposefully attending contentious events such as the 2010 al-‘Aragīb protest but also demolitions, marches, and demonstrations in the Gaza and the West Bank during which they visually record and monitor happenings in these places through photography. Israeli police and government also treat these photographers and their images as a type of evidence and are beginning to demand that they turn over unflattering or controversial images in an attempt to restrict their consumption and circulations.

As such, the circulations of community images are characteristically wide and publically diverse, much more so than images associated with specific lineages (*‘ā’ilāt*). Many of these images are hung on regional and international exhibitions walls and installations such as those in AJEEC and the Rāhaṭ Community Centre. In many instances, community images are displayed and valued as aesthetic objects pertaining to fine art photography and Negev Bedouin culture. Here they are also sold as pieces of art and advertisements on calendars, books, and postcards. Increasingly, however, these art works are transformed, re-framed, and valued as objects of evidence particularly documenting Bedouin activism. For example, these types of images are frequently inserted into politically motivated visual essays depicting scenes of Bedouin poverty, destruction, and protest in the Negev. On other occasions, these images are valued as auxiliary illustrations or documentary evidence used in news articles, blogs, books, and websites to prove happenings at events, the participation of specific people, and advocate the viewpoints of various political players.

The changing readings of community images are ultimately dependent on their physical and digital circulations and presence(s) as they transform from film and code and travel from exhibition walls to textbooks and websites. During these movements, images present multiple types of community discourses wherein Bedouin participate in southern Israel. For example, the photograph of the Ottoman inauguration of the Grand Mosque travelled from a photographic album located in Hebron to an Israeli textbook on Negev Bedouin culture to the exhibition walls inside the Grand Mosque itself and AJEEC's gallery in the old city. During its various sojourns the image was used by a diverse set of Bedouin and non-Bedouin stakeholders all significantly contributing to imaginings of Negev Bedouin history, their connections to historical Beersheba, Islamic heritage, and their on-going marginalisation as a minority community.

In another example, when 'Aṭīya's photograph was exhibited in al-'Aragīb it was connected to the Abū Madīghem al-Ṭūrī (of which he is a member), it also joined others in his collection to demonstrate the struggles of Israel's Bedouin minority in Tel Aviv, and it also depicted 'Bedouin resist fighters' in Kafr Qasim. With each sojourn outside of Negev Bedouin society, however, the value of these community images shifted from depictions of Bedouin kin to Israeli citizens to Palestinian nationals to an ethnic minority to a Muslim community.

In all, this chapter highlighted how images' evidentiary capacities, as both a material and representational medium, are not merely accrued through their production or consumption but through their controlled display and circulation in a society. Similar to the presence(s) of photographs and digital images described in the last chapter, these images are also valued as the property of specific members largely those associated with Bedouin community organisations who own, protect, source out, and (try to) regulate their exchanges among their own members and viewers in their NGOs, galleries, and

civic and Islamic spaces. This comes as the visual knowledge derived and instrumentalised from these image documents are typically used by members to substantiate socio-political collaborations and record their communities' activities.

Visual knowledge pertaining to these community histories, similar to those discussed in the last chapter; however, is also not a limitless or plastic resource. Particular images are chosen over others for their 'truth values' often evaluated by their imaging of well-known but controversial historical events such as the 2013 Prawer Protest. Moreover, re-contextualisation efforts in their society typically rely on the authority of spokespersons employing them as evidence during speeches and news articles about the Negev Bedouin. These labours must also contend with external interpretations of particular historical accounts, for example by Israeli state and EU political tourists, and the increasing influence of civic and Islamic universalisms in their society today – a constantly changing and complex landscape whereby Bedouin strategically instrumentalise images to validate their presence, rights, and histories in the Negev.

CONCLUSION

The power of these pictures is the reverse of what they seem. We may think we are going to them for knowledge about the past, but it is the knowledge we bring to them which makes them historically significant, transforming a more or less chance residue of the past into a precious icon.

(Raphael Samuel 1994: 329-30)

This thesis set out to further anthropological understandings of contemporary Negev Bedouin representational politics through a study of photographic and digital images and their influences for local historicity. In particular, it investigated: (1) What types of Bedouin history circulate in the Negev today? Is there representational antagonism between elders and community spokespersons? How do they make, localise, and communicate this information?; and (2) What are the presence(s) and value of photographic and digital images among Bedouin in the Negev? How do visual materials work with oral and textual media to legitimate local historical knowledge? How do images travel as material and digital ‘objects’ in their society?

The thesis began by noting two significant changes that have occurred in Bedouin society in the Negev since 1948: (1) The diversity of Bedouin representatives as a result of the institutionalisation of the *mukhtār-shuyūkh* in the 1950s (and their later discontinuation) and the creation of Bedouin municipalities from the 1960s onward; and (2) The rising influence of Bedouin academics and civic and religious spokespersons (alongside tribal leaders and politicians) serving as both knowledge makers and representatives of Negev Bedouin to outsiders since the 1980s. Both of these occurrences suspended the quasi-exclusivity of Negev Bedouin historiography in the 1990s as members began to routinely insert their own narratives into learned discourse.

In order to further contextualise spokespersons production of Bedouin historicity over the last the ten years, the thesis employed empirical research to describe the local trends associated with oral and text-based constructions of the past. It suggested that the efforts of public liaisons (along with customary leaders) are increasingly standardising local historical knowledge in their society in various public spheres particularly those associated with genealogical and tribal histories, Islamic heritage, and ethnohistory. These representatives also strategically use media to rationalise Bedouin collectivity wherein they often oscillate between Western, Islamic or tribal-based understandings of the past when dealing with Israeli-state criticisms, Orientalist claims of Bedouin primitivism, and internal tribal competition. In doing so, this thesis demonstrated that peripheral societies in the Middle East, such as Bedouin in the Negev, not only possess the capacity to ‘create history’ (Kaplan 2005, Peel 1984, Sahlins, 2004) amid prevailing universalisms in their lives but also maintain their own unique ‘historical imaginations’ (also see Collingwood 1961 [1946], Comaroff and Comaroff 1992) through the adaptation of their representational practices.

The thesis went on to explain that despite what initially appears to be representational antagonism between elders and community spokespersons on particular public platforms, representations of history and society are rather strategically based on one’s audience, social status, and context. It highlighted that elders (*kbār*) in lineages (*‘ā’ilāt*) commonly rely on members within their own extended families and tribal (*‘ā’iliyya*) networks to gain much-needed resources in venues in which they cannot typically engage, such as those involving civic and religious ideologies. Moreover, it noted that this type of representational division of labour is unique when compared with other Bedouin populations in the Middle East due to the regularity with which members in the Negev must ‘persuade’ others of their history amid the extraordinary strains and

identity clashes characterising the Israeli-Palestinian political landscape. This situation has coerced members to ‘play’ with their histories in both content (narratives) and form (poly-mediations).

While describing the role of oral and text-based media for local historicity, this thesis argued that analyses that solely focus on one type of spokesperson (that is elders [*kbār*] or civic activists), one type of historical narrative (typically tribal or national), or one type of media practice (typically oral or text) are inevitably trapped by singularity and authorship, which hinders acknowledgement of the strategic and diverse nature of Bedouin self-presentations of historical knowledge circulating in the Negev. Alternatively, this thesis proposed that a study of photographic and digital images’ evidentiary meanings and material qualities among a diverse range of spokespersons could provide more insight about the inclusive and exclusive nature of Bedouin representational strategies as they pertain to local historicity in the Negev in various contexts among a range of people.

To do so, it first described the representational landscapes in which photographic and digital images of Negev Bedouin have been produced and consumed over the last century. It utilised empirical and archival data to map the nested visual economies characterising Bedouin society in the Negev; organised by production period, technological qualities, and ideals of closeness and distance framing members’ interactions among themselves and with others. It demonstrated how visual culture and Orientalist imaginings have created specific types of Bedouin iconography and described members’ own growing command of visual technologies over the last twenty years along with the cultural principles influencing the visual practices in their society.

In order to further explore local instrumentalities of historically significant images, this thesis described the socio-political biographies of eight images (c. 1906-

2010) of Negev Bedouin, specifically their presence(s) along with their physical/virtual ‘travels’, poly-mediations, and values within various visual economies in which spokespersons engage topics of history. It presented ethnographic and archival data in the form of five case studies which thematically focused tribal (*‘ā’iliyya*) and community discourses. In particular, they described images among the al-Huzayyil, al-Şāna‘, and Abū Rabī‘a lineages (*‘ā’ilāt*) and several community organisations such as AJEEC, the southern Islamic Movement, and NCF.

Three of these case studies demonstrated that old images within tribal (*‘ā’iliyya*) networks hold more presence(s) among members when they are able to name, recognise, and identify the ancestral *shuyūkh*, people, and landscapes within a photograph. Thus the value of image collections significantly relies on Bedouin (irrespective of literacy, status, and personal knowledge) members’ ability to interpret meaning from visual depictions. This includes images of recognisable persons (by facial or dress indicators) or vaguely known historical events, local landscapes, and cultural objects. The travels of images associated with specific lineage (*‘ā’ilāt*) are characteristically smaller as their displays of proof are more often than not directed at other Bedouin members and convey knowledge pertaining to on-going tribal competitions.

The remaining two case studies illustrated how the presence(s) of community images are unique, particularly because they are nearly always taken at highly public photographic encounters and depict specific places, people, and events popularly associated with the broader communities and their visual histories but rarely displayed or consumed by specific families, classes, and *‘ā’ilāt*. The travels of community images, however, are characteristically wider than images associated with specific lineage

(*‘ā’ilāt*) as their displays of proof are more often than not directed at outsiders as evidence of socio-political collaboration.

Nevertheless, the images presented in Chapters Five and Six are all endowed with more presence(s) than others and thus they are also more likely to be strategically reformatted by Bedouin and circulated among members and outsiders alike – that is within a range of visual economies and transformed into material and digital reproductions as empirical proof of local history projects. In particular, spokespersons routinely referenced these images when discussing the past and redisplayed them in various settings, copied and distributed them, and uploaded them onto websites such as Facebook.

Together these Chapters documented how Bedouin set out to substantiate their visual knowledge by strategically transforming images into historical evidence through display, reframing, and recontextualisation; particularly oral and text-based claims such as local stories or captions connected to the images. While on some occasions Bedouin used poly-mediations to emphasise the information initially connected to the original images, they also used oral and textual media to re-inscribe new meanings that countered or changed the ways in which viewers ‘read’ specific images in different contexts or visual economies. In some cases, such as images among the al-Huzayyil and al-Šāna‘, this involved adding and removing material and digital captions from the images. Or, as the case study with the Abū Rabī‘a demonstrated, the oral stories connected to specific images maybe lost in translation or strategically changed for particular audiences. At the same time, however, the local interpretation or meaning of historical images also emanated from exchanges between Bedouin and outsiders that is the representational ‘conversations’ between members and outside stereotypes or imaginings of their history be them exotic tribesmen or an impoverished minority (for

example) as promulgated within Orientalist and regional Israeli and Palestinian national discourses.

Chapters Five and Six also highlighted the value of historic images in Negev Bedouin society predominantly as ‘learned’ evidence of lineage (*‘ā’ilāt*) and community narratives among spokespersons. It argued that members value images as polysemous signs and polyvalent materials for making public statements pertaining to history, ancestry, and community. This comes as photographic images are on one hand treated as documents confirming historical ‘truths’ with weighted presence(s) as objects both inside and outside of the Negev. At the same time, however, spokespersons ‘play’ with these images’ ambiguous meanings to construct various historical narratives legitimating the pursuit of resources among specific groups of people. This ‘play’ allows members to code and recode their knowledge about the past through the cutting and pasting of alternative texts and oral stories, physically and digitally removing and collecting images from foreign sources, and locally preserving them as documents in boxes, albums, and digital files.

In all, the value of historical photographic and digital images among Bedouin in the Negev comes from the mutability of visual media and images’ ability to be presented in various forms, with a range of other media in multiple places and among diverse people. Because of the circulations and transformations, images of Negev Bedouin are both strategic representations of the past and evidentiary documents that circulate knowledge in the present. Consequently, through historical images Bedouin in the Negev connect themselves and their past to Western, Israeli, and Palestinian audiences – outsiders who also typically treat photographic and digital images as objective documentation of history.

More broadly, this thesis demonstrated the Bedouin value the ‘truth (*ṣaḥīḥ*) of sight’ provided by visual materials and their ability to realistically capture Negev events, people, and landscapes but also revere their presence(s) as indexes that can be experienced, touched, owned, compiled, and displayed. Like text and oral knowledge, however, the relationship between visual knowledge and evidence among members is, however, specifically caught up in local politics associated with competitive particularisms such as tribal reputations, gender, and age, and collaborative universalisms such as religion and citizenship characterising Bedouin lives in the Negev.

In conclusion, this thesis presented the first ethnographic study of visual materials in a Bedouin society in the Middle East. To do so, it demonstrated the importance of acknowledging the varied presence(s) and value of a series of photographs as objects and digital copies for local historicity among Bedouin in the Negev, however, future research is required to explore the implications of mobile technologies, Internet websites such as Facebook and Wikipedia, and video cameras for Bedouin representations of the past and contemporary sociality. The absence of images, the role of images in processes of forgetting, and the digital manipulation of image content through Photoshop are also topics for further inquiry along with the value of images for mundane activities.

Whilst acknowledging these topics, this ethnography illustrated how a combined archival and ethnographic approach to the study of visual practices in the Middle East and historicity among peripheral peoples is both fruitful and much needed today. This comes as anthropological studies of the region have a tendency to analyse media ahistorically, overlooking the continued influence of customary modes of transmitting knowledge in a society and how people diversify their representational practices and

acquire new communicative technologies over time. Moreover, ethnographers of the Middle East must move out of the regional urban centres and beyond national discourses to account for the influence of 'new' technologies in unexpected places such as the periphery where minorities such as the Bedouin in the Negev and others are appropriating media in unique and surprising ways.

END MATERIAL

APPENDIX I DRAMATIS PERSONAE¹⁶⁸

‘Ā’isha al-Şāna’ is a Bedouin female in her early forties. She is a well-known feminist and civil society activist in the Negev. She lives in Beersheba with her husband and children.

Suleīmān al-‘Athāmīn is a Bedouin male in his mid-forties. He is a well-known spokesperson for Khashem Zana’. He works as a security guard, farmer, and tour guide.

‘Amīr Shiblī * is a Bedouin male in his early forties. He is a high school teacher who has worked in the Negev for ten years.

‘Aṭīya Abū Madīghem is a Bedouin male in his late twenties. He is a well-known photojournalist who resides in Rāhaṭ

Ibrāhīm Abū Shārib* is a Bedouin male in his late forties. He is director of the Rāhaṭ Community Centre who resides in Rāhaṭ.

Ṭalab al-Şāna’* is a Bedouin male in his late fifties. He is a former *Knesset* member who resides in Lagīya.

Karīm Abū Latīf is a Bedouin male in his thirties. He is a well-known photojournalist who resides in Rāhaṭ.

Ḥassan al-Huzayyil is a Bedouin male in his fifties. He is well known for his photographic collection. He resides in Khirbet az-Zibale.

‘Ārif Abū Rabī’a * is a Bedouin professor of anthropology at Ben Gurion University of the Negev who resides in Ksīfe.

Muḥammad al-Şāna’ is a Bedouin male in his seventies. He is a retired truck driver who resides in Lagīya.

Ḥamād al-Şāna’ is a Bedouin male in his sixties. He is a medical doctor and resides in Lagīya.

Sa’īd Abū Rabī’a is a Bedouin male in his eighties. He is retired and lives in Ksīfe.

’Ānas al-‘Ubra is a Bedouin male in his late twenties. He works at AJEEC as a civic advocate who resides in Beersheba.

Haia Noach* is Israeli Jewish women in her fifties. She is the director of NCF and lives in Omer.

¹⁶⁸ These informants are listed in order of appearance in the thesis. Those names with * are not anonymised.

Şayīāḥ Abū Madīghem al-Ṭūrī * is a Bedouin male in his sixties. He is a village representative of al-‘Aragīb who lives in Rāḥaṭ.

Nūrī al-‘Ugbī * is a Bedouin male in his sixties. He is a village representative of al-‘Aragīb who lives outside of Ḥura.

APPENDIX II CATALOGUE OF IMAGES

- Figure 0: ‘Aref el-Aref and Bedouin Shaykhs’ (c. 1920) by Eric Matson. Original photographer: Eric Matson. Source: Matson Collection American Colony. Reproduction number: LC-DIG-matpc-03791 (digital file from original photo). Repository: Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C. 20540, USA. Original date: c. 1920 to 1933. Access date: 14 September 2013.
- Figure 1: Google map of Israel and field site around Beersheba in central Negev (2015).
- Figure 2: Antonin Jaussen’s 1908 Map of the Negev. Original producer: A. Jaussen. Source: *Costumes des Arabes au pays de Moab, Paris: Victor Lecoffre*. Original date: 1908.
- Figure 3: Map of c. 1900 tribal territories in the Negev and Sinai by Clinton Bailey (2001 [1991]). Original producer: C. Baily. Source: *Bedouin Poetry From Sinai and the Negev: Mirror of Culture*, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Original date: 2000 [1991].
- Figure 4: Section of British Mandate Tent Map (1947). Archivist: Oren Yiftachel. Original producer: British Mandate Palestinian Exploration Fund map 298, ISA. Location of original document: Unknown. Secondary source: <http://rhr.org.il/eng/2013/11/prawer-response-to-right-wing-report/>. Original date: 1947. Access date: 20 October 2014.
- Figure 5: Map of *Sīyāj* Reservation. Original producer: E. Biasio. Source: *Beduinen im Negev: Vom Zelt ins Haus*, Zürich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung. Original date: 1998.
- Figure 6: List of tribal units (*shevatim*) in in 1960 by the state of Israel. Original image: E. Marx. Source: *Negev Bedouin*, Manchester: University of Manchester Press. Original date: 1967.
- Figure 7: Lay out of Tel as-Sab’ (c. 1976). Original producer: Salim Alafenish. Source: ‘Processes of Change and Continuity in Kinship System and Family Ideology in Bedouin Society’, *Sociologia Ruralis*, vol. XXVII-4. Original date: 1987.
- Figure 8: Map of neighbourhoods in Rāhaṭ (1987). Original producer: Salim Alafenish. Source: ‘Processes of Change and Continuity in Kinship System and Family Ideology in Bedouin Society’, *Sociologia Ruralis*, vol. XXVII-4. Original date: 1987.
- Figure 9: Photograph of Suleīmān’s home – west facing (2012). Content: Suleīmān’s main house with front tent in Khashem Zana’. Original photographer: Emilie Le Febvre. Original date: 21 November 2012.
- Figure 10: Diagram of Suleīmān’s house – interior layout (2012). Content: Photograph of house diagram. Original photograph: Emilie Le Febvre. Original date: 5 December 2012.
- Figure 11: Map of Khashem Zana’ – neighbourhoods (2012). Content: Photograph of map. Original creators: Emilie Le Febvre and Suleīmān al-‘Athāmīn. Source: Field notes and interview with Suleīmān. Original date: 20 February 2012.

- Figure 12: Photograph of RCUV brochure – Khashem Zana'. Original producer: Regional Council for the Unrecognized Villages. Secondary photographer: Emilie Le Febvre. Original date: Unknown. Access date: 14 January 2013.
- Figure 13: Photograph of Arabic and Hebrew text-based media collected in the Negev over the course of fieldwork (2010-2013). Content: newspapers, NGO pamphlets, etc. Secondary photographer: Emilie Le Febvre. Original dates: 1933-2012. Access date: 20 November 2012.
- Figure 14: Negev *sanād* document. Original producer: Unknown. Secondary producer: NCF. Source: <http://www.dukium.org/press-release-ncf-publishes-positon-paper-concerning-forest-of-german-states-and-spd-responses-to-december-letter/>. Original date: Unknown. Access date: 1 July 2014.
- Figure 15: *Murder of Ma'sum Beg, the envoy of the Safavid Shah Tahmasp, by Beduins in the Hijaz* (1581). Original producer: Sehname-i Selim Han Nakkas Osman. Reference number: A.3595, folio 68a. Source: <http://kilyos.ee.bilkent.edu.tr/~history/ottoman2.html>. Original date: 1581. Access date: 2 March 2014.
- Figure 16: Illustration Tiyāhā Shaykh (1847). Original producer: John Wilson DD, FRS. Source: *The Lands of The Bible* (visited and described in an extensive journey undertaken with special reference to the promotion of Biblical research and the advancement of philanthropy), Vol. 1, page 275. Edinburgh. Copy source: Negev Bedouin Wikipedia page. Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negev_Bedouin. Original date: 1847. Access date: 25 November 2014.
- Figure 17: 'Bedouin Camp' (c. 1905) by John Singer Sargent. Content: watercolour and dimensions - 25.4 × 35.7 cm (10 × 14.1 in), American Art Collection Brooklyn Museum's Online Collection of Brooklyn Museum 09.811_transp3227.jpg. Source: https://www.brooklynmuseum.org/opencollection/objects/20364/Bedouin_Camp. Original date: c. 1905. Access date: 24 February 2015.
- Figure 18: 'Bedouin mothers carrying their children on their shoulders' (c. 1870) by Félix Bonfils. Content: Colour photo taken in the late nineteenth century by the French photographer Félix Bonfils. Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Beduin_mothers_carrying_their_children_on_their_shoulders.jpg. Original date: c. 1870. Access date: 15 January 2015.
- Figure 19: See Figure 0.
- Figure 20: 'A Bedouin refugee school-master from Beersheba who collects around him the children of his tribe in the open desert East of Jericho' (1953) by United Nations. Original producer: Unknown. Location: Jordan Valley: Reference Number: Photo number131491. Source: <http://www.unmultimedia.org/photo/detail.jsp?id=131/131491&key=0&query=Beersheba&lang=en&sf=>. Original date: 1

January 1953. Access date: 17 January 2015.

Figure 21: Image insert into article “Israel’s Negev “frontier” [Getty Images] (Aljazeera 2010).

Original producer: Getty Images. Secondary producer: *Al Jazeera* News. Source: <http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2010/04/20104592655951622.html>. Original date: 7 April 2010. Access date: 10 April 2015.

Figure 22: ‘Unknown Bedouin group’ (c. 1925) by Karimeh Abbud in Nazareth. Content:

Photograph of Bedouin in Nazareth at the market. Original photographer: Karimeh Abbud. Source: Nazareth%20Karimeh%20Abbud.jpg. funny-pictures.picphotos.net. Original date: c. 1925. Access date: 30 November 2014.

Figure 23: ‘Tal al-Saba’a al-Naqab, Israel / Palestine’ (c. 2002) by Ahlam Shibli. Original producer: Ahlam Shibli. Reference number: Goter no.13), 2002 – 2003, Courtesy de l’artiste, © Ahlam Shibli. Original date: 2002. Access date: 24 March 2015.

Figure 24: ‘Picture of Lagīya’ uploaded on Palestineremembered.com (2008). Original photographer: Unknown. Secondary producer: username – khaledlaura8178. Source: http://www.palestineremembered.com/GeoPoints/Laquiya_1381/Picture_26663.html. Original date: Unknown. Uploaded: 20 March 2008. Access date: 24 March 2015.

Figure 25: ‘Palestine - A Beduin in his happy mood’ (1921) by Shlomo Narinsky. Original producer: Shlomo Narinsky. Producer of postcard: Jamal Bros, Jerusalem (Palestine) 1921. Content: Sepia toned print of young bedouin man in keffiyeh (headdress) and jacket; Medium postcard 5 1/2" x 3 1/2". Reference number: Part I, Box 2, Folder 15. Source: American Colony in Jerusalem Source Collection; Repository – Manuscript Division, <http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.mss/mamcol.044>. Original date: 1921. Access date: 21 February 2015.

Figure 26: Bedouin from the area of Beersheba (c. 1920) by Yosef Schweig. Original producer: Yosef Schweig. Source: V. Brody. 1998. *Documentors of the Dream: Pioneer Jewish Photographers in the Land of Israel, 1890-1933*, Jerusalem: Magnes Press and. Hebrew University. Original date: c. 1920.

Figure 27: ‘Bedouins! – Founding of the kibbutz’ (c. 1934-1944) by Ralph Salinger. Original producer: Unknown: Source: <http://www.jewishvilkaviskis.org/The%20Bedouins%20.html>. Original date: c. 1934-1944. Access date: 15 March 2015.

Figure 28: ‘Member of the kibboutz Mishmar Hanegev with arab’ (1947) by Hans Pinn (GPO). Original producer: Hans Pinn. Archive: Government Press Office. Reference number: CC BY-NC-SA 2.0. Original date: 1947. Access date: 14 March 2015.

Figure 29: Photograph of exhibition in the Joe Alon Museum of Bedouin Culture – Kibbutz Lahav. Original producers: Avner and Orna Goren. Content: Culture –Bedouin music. Secondary photographer: Emilie Le Febvre. Original production date: c. 1970s. Access date: 30 September 2011.

- Figure 30: Cut and cropped by *Teuda Zehut* Portraits (c. 1930-c. 1990) of Ḥaj Suleīmān Abū Rabī'a – personal photograph album. Original producer: Unknown. Source: Ḥaj Suleīmān Abū Rabī'a's personal collection. Secondary photographer: Emile Le Febvre. Original dates: c. 1930-c. 1990. Access date: 25 November 2012.
- Figure 31: 'Abdul Kanir Ibn Bari watering the vegetable garden in the backyard of his house in the Bedouin village of Tel Sheva' (1969) by Fritz Cohen. Original producer: Government Press Office photographer Fritz Cohen. Source: Israeli National Photographic collection. Reference number: Item no. 038667, photograph code, D304-096. Original date. 1969. Access date: 1 February 2011.
- Figure 32: Anonymous Bedouin informant's personal archival image (c. 1970). Original producer: Anonymised. Original date: 1970s. Source: www.facebook.com. Access date: 31 March 2015.
- Figure 33: 'The Bedouin are easily the poorest community in Israel' (2011) by Limor Edri for *Haaretz*. Original producer: Limor Edri. Source: <http://www.haaretz.com/news/features/settling-the-bedouin-question.premium-1.490285>. Original date: 27 December 2012. Access date: 23 January 2015.
- Figure 34: 'Bedouin from the destroyed Negev village of Al 'Aragīb' (2010) by Activestills - Oren Zvi. Original producer: Oren Zvi. Archive: Activestills. Source: http://972mag.com/forcible-relocation-of-30000-bedouin-biggest-dispossession-since-1948/24107/bedouin_400/. Original date: 2010. Access date: 23 January 2015.
- Figure 35: Wedding photographer and his daughters during Islām's *Hennā* party (Le Febvre 2012). Content: Wedding photographer and his daughters during Islām's *Hennā* party in Khashem Zana'. Original photographer: Emilie Le Febvre. Original date: 23 November 2012.
- Figure 36: Exhibition in al-'Aragīb ('Atiya Abū Madīgam n.d.). Producer: 'Atīya Abū Madīgam. Source: www.facebook.com. Original date: Unknown. Access date: 24 November 2014.
- Figure 37: Photograph of inset in local Bedouin newspaper *Ahkbār Al-Naqab* (Le Febvre 2012). Original producer: Unknown. Secondary photographer: Emilie Le Febvre. Original date: Unknown. Access date: 1 March 2012.
- Figure 38: Photograph of Bedouin amateur and professional photographers at the 2011 protest against the Praver Plan (Le Febvre 2011). Photographer: Emilie Le Febvre. Original date: 6 October 2011.
- Figure 39: Framed photograph of Shaykh Salmān al-Huzayyil in his son's house (Le Febvre 2012). Original producer: Unknown. Secondary producer: Ḥasan al-Huzayyil. Third producer: Emilie Le Febvre. Original date. Unknown. Access date: 20 December 2012.
- Figure 40: Photograph of political tour in Wādī Na'am, a Bedouin village, with Arab and

- Jewish guests (Abu Rabia 2013). Original producer: Unknown. Secondary producer: Rawia Abu Rabia. Source: www.facebook.com. Access date: 2 August 2014.
- Figure 41: Screenshot of Abū K'ishk's Wikipedia website with an upload photograph of the lineage's (*ā'ilāt*) patriarch. Original producer: Unknown. Original date: Unknown. Access date: 30 September 2013.
- Figure 42: The salon or *dīwān* in Fāṭimah al-Šāna's house. Photographer: Emilie Le Febvre. Original date: 24 July 2012.
- Figure 43: Framed photographs of children in Fāṭimah al-Šāna's house. Original producer: Unknown. Secondary photographer: Emilie Le Febvre. Original date: Unknown. Access date: 24 July 2012.
- Figure 44: Exceptional example of a decorated wedding vehicle in Lagīya. Photograph: Emilie Le Febvre. Original date: 24 July 2012.
- Figure 45: A woman showing photographs taken during the wedding procession in a bride's natal home in Khashem Zana'. Producer: Emilie Le Febvre. Original date: 23 November 2012.
- Figure 46: Picture of goats taken by Suleīmān and uploaded onto his Facebook page (2014). Original producer: Suleīmān al-'Athāmīn. Source: www.facebook.com. Original date: Unknown. Accessed date: 20 March 2014.
- Figure 47: Picture of outdoor cooking taken by Suleīmān and uploaded onto his Facebook page (2014). Original producer: Suleīmān al-'Athāmīn. Source: www.facebook.com. Original date: Unknown. Accessed date: 20 March 2014.
- Figure 48: Picture of snow on Suleīmān al-'Athāmīn's northern property taken by Suleīmān and uploaded onto his Facebook page (2014). Original producer: Suleīmān al-'Athāmīn. Source: www.facebook.com. Original date: Unknown. Accessed date: 20 March 2014.
- Figure 49: Photograph of picture album. Content: Ḥaj Suleīmān Abū Rabī'a images and documents. Original producer: Unknown. Producer of copy: Emilie Le Febvre. Original dates: Unknown. Access date: 17 July 2012.
- Figure 50: Photograph of Shaykh Salmān al-Huzayyil II book page now in Ḥassan al-Huzayyil's photographic album c. 1900. Content: Portrait of a young Salmān 'Alī Salmān al-Huzayyil. Original Photographer: Unknown. Photographer: Emilie Le Febvre. Source of original: Arif al-Arif (1944) *Bedouin, Love, Law, and Legend*. Original date: c. 1900. Access date: 25 September 2012.
- Figure 51: Screen shot of Facebook image dedicated to Salmān al-Huzayyil II. Content: Ḥassan al-Huzayyil's Facebook page dedicated to Salmān al-Huzayyil. Producer: Ḥassan al-Huzayyil. Source: www.facebook.com. Screenshot by: Emilie Le Febvre. Original date: c. 1900. Accessed date: 17 August 2012.

- Figure 52: Screen shot of Facebook images dedicated to Salmān al-Huzayyil II. Content: Ḥassan al-Huzayyil Facebook page dedicated to Salmān al-Huzayyil. Producer: Ḥassan al-Huzayyil. Screen shot taken by: Emilie Le Febvre Source: Facebook. Accessed date: 17 August 2012.
- Figure 53: Photograph of framed photocopy in al-Huzayyil's *shigg*. Content: young Salmān al-Huzayyil II framed photocopy in al-Huzayyil's *shigg*. Original source: Arif al-Arif (1944) *Bedouin, Love, Law, and Legend*. Photocopier: Ḥassan al-Huzayyil. Producer of copy: Emilie Le Febvre. Original photographer: Unknown. Original date: early 1900s. Copy date: Unknown. Access date: 21 November 2012.
- Figure 54: Photograph of framed photocopy. Content: Shaykh Salmān al-Huzayyil, Eleanor Roosevelt, and Michael Hanegbi photocopied from unknown newspaper in framed and displayed in al-Huzayyil's *shigg*. Photocopier: Ḥassan al-Huzayyil. Original photographer: Fritz Cohen. Producer of copy: Emilie Le Febvre. Original date: 15 February 1952. Copy date: Unknown. Access date: 21 November 2012.
- Figure 55: Photograph of book page containing a portrait of Shaykh Ḥamīd al-Ṣāna' in Hebrew translation of *Ta'rikh Bi'r al-Sab' wa-Qabā'iliha*. Original Photographer: Eric Matson. Producer of copy: Emilie Le Febvre. Archive: Ben Gurion University of the Negev. Original source: Matson Collection of the American Colony. Reference number: LC-DIG-matpc-02908 (digital file from original photo). Call Number: LC-M32- 3780 [P&P]. Original archive: Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C. 20540 USA. Original date: c.1920 to 1933. Access date: 25 September 2012.
- Figure 56: Shaykh Salmān the Second's portrait is the top right image. Photograph of book. Content: Shuyūkh of the Tiyyāh in Arabic version of *Ta'rikh Bi'r al-Sab' wa-Qabā'iliha*. Original photographer: Eric Matson. Producer of secondary copy: Arif al-Arif. Producer of third copy: Emilie Le Febvre. Archive original image: Thought to be apart of the Matson collection in Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C. 20540 USA. Original date: approximately 1920 to 1933. Access date: 20 May 2013.
- Figure 57: Screen shot of Hebrew Wikipedia pages. Content: Wikipedia page dedicated to Salmān al-Huzayyil, entitled Salm'an 'al Huḏel in Hebrew. Page creator: Alī al-Huzayyil. Screen shot taken by: Emilie Le Febvre. Location of Image: <http://Wikipedia.com>. Accessed date: 17 January 2013.
- Figure 58: 'Aref el Aref and Bedouin Sheikhs' by Eric Matson (c. 1920-1933). Original Photographer: Eric Matson. Location of original image: Matson collection. Reproduction Number: LC-DIG-matpc-03791 (digital file from original photo). Repository: Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C.

20540 USA. Date of original: c. 1920 to 1933. Accessed date: 14 September 2013.

Figure 59: Screen shot of Facebook images created by Ḥassan al-Huzayyil. Content: Ḥassan al-Huzayyil Facebook page dedicated to Salmān al-Huzayyil. Original producer: Unknown. Secondary producer: Ḥassan al-Huzayyil. Screen shot taken by: Emilie Le Febvre. Source: Facebook. Original date: Unknown. Accessed date: 17 August 2012.

Figure 60: Screen shot of Israel's National Photography Collection. Content: Digital archival page categorising photograph no. 088751 with Shaykh Salmān al-Huzayyil. Original producer: Fritz Cohen. Screen shot by: Emilie Le Febvre. Source: Israeli National Photographic Collection. Original date: 1952. Accessed date: 17 August 2011.

Figure 61: Screen shot of book cover of *Good Arabs* (Cohen 2010). Content: Fritz Cohen's photograph. Original producer: Fritz Cohen. Secondary producer: Hillel Cohen. Screen shot taken by: Emilie Le Febvre. Original source: Israel's National Photography Collection. Secondary source: Cohen, H. 2010. *Good Arabs: The Israeli Security Agencies and the Israeli Arabs, 1948-1967*, Berkeley and London: University of California Press. Third copy: <https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=K7bfI3GUpAMC>. Original date: 1952. Secondary date: 2011. Accessed date: 17 August 2011.

Figure 62: Screen shot of photograph in *Good Arabs* (Cohen 2010). Content: Fritz Cohen's photograph. Original producer: Fritz Cohen. Secondary producer: Hillel Cohen. Screen shot by: Emilie Le Febvre. Original source: Israel's National Photography Collection. Secondary source: Cohen, H. 2010. *Good Arabs: The Israeli Security Agencies and the Israeli Arabs, 1948-1967*, Berkeley and London: University of California Press. Third copy: <https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=K7bfI3GUpAMC>. Original date: 1952. Secondary date: 2011. Accessed date: 17 August 2011.

Figure 63: Photograph of framed poster (Le Febvre 2012). Content: Framed image of 'Ashīrat al-Šāna' on the Jordanian border in Desert Embroidery. Original producer: Elmo Hutchison. Producer of copy: Emilie Le Febvre. Original source: Hutchison, E. 1956. *Violent Truce: A Military Observer Looks at the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1951-1955*, New York: The Devin-Adair Company. Original date: September 1952. Secondary date: Unknown. Access date: 30 April 2012.

Figure 64: 'El haj Ibrahim es-Sani' in *Violent Truce* (Hutchison 1952). Original Photographer: Unknown (possibly Hutchison). Producer of copy: Emilie Le Febvre. Secondary source: 'Ā'isha's personal collection. Original source: Hutchison, E. 1956. *Violent Truce: A Military Observer Looks at the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1951-1955*, New York: The Devin-Adair Company. Original date: September 1952. Secondary date: Unknown. Access date: 8 July 2007.

Figure 65: 'Members of the es-Sani' in *Violent Truce* possibly by (Hutchison 1952). Original

Photographer: Elmo Hutchison. Producer of copy: Emilie Le Febvre.

Secondary source: 'Ā'isha's personal collection. Original source: Hutchison. E. 1956.

Violent Truce: A Military Observer Looks at the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1951-1955, New

York: The Devin-Adair Company. Original date: September 1952. Secondary date:

Unknown. Access date: 8 July 2007.

Figure 66: Photograph of photograph wall at Desert Embroidery. Content: Images of Desert Embroidery's Projects and members. Photographer: Emilie Le Febvre. Date: 30 April 2012.

Figure 67: Portrait of Salmān al-Ṣāna' hanging on the wall of his son Muḥammad's house. Content: Portrait of Salmān al-Ṣāna'. Original Photographer: Ḥamād al-Ṣāna'. Producer of copy: Emilie Le Febvre. Original date: Unknown. Access date: 06 June 2012.

Figure 68: Portrait of Salmān al-Ṣāna' hanging on the wall of his granddaughter Fāṭimah's house. Content: Portrait of Salmān al-Ṣāna'. Original Photographer: Ḥamād al-Ṣāna'. Producer of copy: Emilie Le Febvre. Original date: Unknown. Access date: 06 June 2012.

Figure 69: 'Portrait of Salmān al-Ṣāna' uploaded to Palestineremembered.com (2008). Original photographer: Unknown. Secondary producer: username – khaledlaura8178. Source: http://www.palestineremembered.com/GeoPoints/Laquiya_1381/Picture_37857.html. Original date: Unknown. Uploaded: 20 March 2008. Access date: 24 March 2015.

Figure 70: 'Photograph of group of Bedouin, Arab, and Jewish men' in Ḥaj Suleīmān Abū Rabī'a's guesthouse. Content: Unknown. Original Photographer: Ḥaj Suleīmān Abū Rabī'a. Producer of copy: Emilie Le Febvre. Original date: Unknown. Access date: 17 November 2012.

Figure 71: Shaykh Salmān Abū Rabī'a is the top right image. Photograph of book. Content: Shuyūkh of the Tiyyāhā in Arabic version of *Ta'rikh Bi'r al-Sab' wa-Qab'iliha*. Reprint: Arif al-Arif. Original Photographer: Eric Matson. Location of book: personal collection. Producer of copy: Emilie Le Febvre. Original source: Thought to be apart of the Matson collection in Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C. 20540 USA. Original date: c. 1920 to 1933. Access date: 20 May 2013.

Figure 72: Photograph of group portrait of Ḥaj Suleīmān Abū Rabī'a and other British Mandate Police Officers (Le Febvre 2012). Content: Ḥaj Suleīmān Abū Rabī'a and other British Mandate Police Officers. Original photographer: Unknown. Producer of copy: Emilie Le Febvre. Original date: Unknown. Access date: 17 July 2012.

Figure 73: Photograph of portrait of Ḥamād Abū Rabī'a. Content: Ḥamād Abū Rabī'a images and documents in Ḥaj Suleīmān Abū Rabī'a's personal collection. Original photographer: Unknown. Producer of copy: Emilie Le Febvre. Original date: Unknown.

Album Collection. Content: Photograph located in the Grand Mosque's photography exhibition. Original photographer: possibly John Whiting. Producer of secondary copy: Goel Drori. Producer of third copy: Emilie Le Febvre. Original source: Unknown. Secondary source: Shaykh al-ʿAṭāwna's personal collection. Third source: Goel Drori's personal collection. Fourth source: Photography Museum of Beer Sheva. Original date: c. 1906. Secondary date: 1974. Access date: 10 November 2011.

Figure 84: Declaration ceremony in the city of Be'er Sheva by Akram Bay, governor of Jerusalem in 1906 (*Ynet* 2011). Original photographer: possibly John Whiting. Producer of secondary copy: Goel Drori. Producer of third copy: Ynet. Producer of fourth copy: Emilie Le Febvre. Original source: Unknown. Secondary source: Shaykh al-ʿAṭāwna's personal collection. Third source: Goel Drori's personal collection. Fourth source: Ynet – <http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4070905,00.html>. Original date: c. 1906. Secondary date: 1974. Third date: 2011. Access date: 10 November 2011.

Figure 85: Turk negotiations with Arabs' in the Bain Media Collection at the Library of Congress (1906). Creators: Bain News Service, publisher. Content: 1 negative: glass 5 x 7 in. or smaller. Summary: Photo shows the official opening of Beersheba (Israel) by the Ottoman Turkish government before World War I. Source: John D. Whiting Collection photographs: LOT 13833, no. 132 and no. 136. Archive: Bain Media Collection at the Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C. 20540 USA. Reference number: LC-DIG-ggbain-08968 (digital file from original neg.): LC-B2- 2138-14 [P&P]. Original date: c. 1900 and 1915. Access date: 1 May 2012.

Figure 86: Turkish official opening of Beersheba in pre-war days. Faigy Eff. Haj' Shawa of Gaza (c. 1906). Creator: Bain News Service, publisher. Source: Bain Media Collection at the Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C. 20540 USA. Reference number: LC-DIG-ppmsca-13709-00133 (digital file from original on page 39, no.132). Original date: c. 1900 and 1915. Access date: 1 May 2012.

Figure 87: 'Turkish official opening of Beersheba in pre-war days. Alie Akram Bey. Sheik Msalam ibn Said' (c. 1906). Creator: Bain News Service, publisher. Source: Bain Media Collection at the Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C. 20540 USA. Reference number: LC-DIG-ppmsca-13709-00132 (digital file from original on page 39, no.131). Original date: c. 1900 and 1915. Access date: 1 May 2012.

Figure 88: 'Celebrations and ceremonies held in Bedouin Beersheba featured by the Turks: Celebration of the inauguration of the city c. -1907' (Gal-Nar (1991). Original creator: possibly John Whiting. Secondary producer: possibly Sasson Bar-Zvi. Third producer: Ilan Gal-Nar. Fourth producer: Emilie Le Febvre. Original source: Unknown.

Secondary source: Gal-Nar, I. 1991. 'Establishment of Beersheba in the Ottoman period', in *Beer Sheva and Sites*, Gideon Begar and Eli Shiler (eds.), Jerusalem: Ariel Publishing House. Original date: c. 1906. Secondary date. 1991. Access date. 25 May 2014.

Figure 89: 'Aṭīya's flyer advertising his photography (2012). Original producer: 'Aṭīya Abū Madīgam. Producer of copy: Emilie Le Febvre. Original date: Unknown. Access date. 27 May 2012.

Figure 90: Photograph taken by Oren Zvi of Activestills' at the al-'Aragīb 2010 protest. Original producer: Oren Zvi. Source: Oren Zvi/Activestills collection. Original date: July 2010.

Figure 91: Haia Noach's (NCF) personal photograph taken at al-'Aragīb 2010 protest. Original producer: Haia Noach. Source: Haia Noach/NCF's Collection. Original date: 2010.

Figure 92: 'Aṭīya's photograph taken at al-'Aragīb 2010 protest. Original producer: 'Aṭīya Abū Madīgam. Original source: 'Aṭīya Abū Madīgam's personal collection. Original date: July 2010.

Figure 93: Activestills photographic exhibition in al-'Aragīb, similar to the one 'Aṭīya held in 2012. Original producer: Oren Zvi. Original source: Activestill's collection. Original date: 2012.

Figure 94: 'Aṭīya's exhibition flyer for his exhibition in Zochrot in Tel Aviv (Zochrot 2013). Original producer: Unknown. Source: <http://zochrot.org/en/gallery/54886>. Original date: 2013. Access date: 4 March 2015.

Figure 95: 'Aṭīya's exhibition in Zochrot in Tel Aviv (Activestills 2013). Original producer: Unknown. Source: <http://zochrot.org/en/gallery/54886>. Original date: 2013. Access date: 4 March 2015.

Figure 96: *Al Jazeera* Stream with 'Aṭīya's photograph on blog about Bedouin in Israel (Website Stream 2013). Original producer: 'Aṭīya Abū Madīgam. Secondary producer: *Al Jazeera* Stream. Original source: 'Aṭīya Abū Madīgam's personal collection. Secondary source: <https://plus.google.com/+TheStream/posts/aoMzTS7aifE>. Original date: 2010. Access date: 4 March 2015.

Figure 97: 'Aṭīya's exhibition in Kafr Qasim (Alqaria.net 2013). Original producer: Unknown. Source: Alqaria.net. Original date: 2011. Access date: 4 March 2015.

Figure 98: Day of Rage poster with 'Aṭīya's photograph (2013). Original producer: 'Aṭīya Abū Madīgam. Original source: 'Aṭīya Abū Madīgam's personal collection. Original date: 2010.

Figure 99: Visual literacy project in Khashem Zana' in the local preschool (Le Febvre 2012). Photographer: Emilie Le Febvre. Date: 25 December 2012.

Figure 100: Visual literacy project in Khashem Zana' next to Fāṭimah's sheep pens.

Photographer: Emilie Le Febvre. Date: 25 December 2012.

Figure 101: Local child taking a photo with his mobile phone of EU delegation looking at photographic essay book at al-ʿAragīb. Photographer: Emilie Le Febvre. Date: 30 April 2012.

APPENDIX III TRIBAL NAMESAKES, RESIDENCES, AND ORGANISATIONS

Pre-1948 tribal namesakes in the Negev

Tiyāhā confederation in 1938 included: ‘Alāmāt Abū Jukīm, ‘Alāmāt Abū Liba, ‘Alāmāt Abū Shunār, Ḥukūk Abū ‘Abdūn, Ḥukūk al-‘Asad, Ḥukūk al-Burīkī, Ḥukūk al-Huzayyil, Gdīrāt al-‘Athāmīn, Gdīrāt Abū Kāff, Gdīrāt Abū Āruqīq, Gdīrāt al-Ṣāna‘, Ḥullām Abū Rabī‘a, Ḥullām Abū Jūrīd, Ḥullām Abū Qurīnāt, Ramādīn Masāmrah, Ramādīn Shu‘ūr, Nutūsh, Rūāshdah, Sha‘lālyyin, Qalāzīn Tiyāhā, ‘Urūr, Bili, al-‘Uqbī, Budīnāt, Qaṭāṭūh, and Janābīb (al-Arif 1938)

List of Negev Bedouin villages

(Pre-1948 villages) al-Makīman, al-Rarā‘, al-‘Aragīb, al-Mesā‘dīa, al-Ḥatāna, al-Sira, Bāt al-Sarāī‘a, Bir al-Ḥamām, Bir al-Meshāsh, Ḍaḥīa, Wādī al-Na‘am, Wādī al-Meshāsh, al-Bakār, Khirbat al-Waṭan, Khashem Zana‘, Karkūr, Khirbat Zubālah, Ṭūwaīl Abū-Jarwal, Maṭaḥer, Ṣawāwīn, Sa‘wa, ‘Abdah, ‘Awajān, ‘Aza, ‘Amra, ‘Aṭīr, Qaṭāmāt, Rakhamah, Tel al-Malāḥ, Tel ‘Arād, and Tāl ‘a Rashīd.

(Post-1948 villages) al-Za‘arūrah, al-Zarnūgh, al-Sdīr, al-Shabī, Um al-Namīlah, Um al-Hirān, Um Ratam, al-Beḥīra, al-Bāṭ, al-Bāṭel, al-Baqī‘ah, al-Khomra, al-Maḍabah, and al-Mazar ‘ah.

As of 2013, the state of Israel, has acknowledge other unrecognised villages in the Negev including: Abū-Tlūl, Um Baṭīn, Um-Mitnān, al-For‘ah, al-Qreīn, Bir-Ḥadāj, Derījāt, Wādī Ghauīn, Koḥleh, Makhūl, Caṣār al-Sir (NCF 2014).

Regional and Local Bedouin-Affiliated Organisations

Abu Basma Regional Council (Negev)

Activestills (Tel Aviv)

Adalah (Hafia)

A New Dawn (Rāḥat)

Arab Jewish Economic Empowerment, and Corporation (AJEEC) (Beersheba)

Ben Gurion University’s Robert Arnow Centre (Beersheba)

Bustan (Beersheba)

Desert Embroidery (Lagīya)

Hagar (Beersheba)

Islamic Movement – southern branch (Rāḥat)

Negev Centre for Peace and Development (NISPED) (Beersheba)

Negev Co-existence Forum (NCF) (Beersheba)
Rāḥaṭ Community Centre (Rāḥaṭ)
Regional Council for Unrecognized Villages (RCUV) (Negev)
Sidreh (Lagīya)
Step Forward Foundation (Rāḥaṭ)
Zochrot (Tel Aviv)

APPENDIX IV LIST OF ARCHIVES

Physical Archives¹⁶⁹

Activestills Photography Archive (Tel Aviv, Israel)
Ahkbar Al-Naqab's Photographic Archive (Rāhaṭ, Israel)
Al-‘Ārif’s Family Archive (Ramallah, Palestinian West Bank)
Arab Jewish Economic Empowerment and Corporation (AJEEC) –
 Bedouin Volunteer Tent’s (BTV) Photographic Collection (Beersheba, Israel)
Desert Embroidery’s Photographic Collection (Lagīya, Israel)
Israel Defence Forces (IDF) and Ministry of Defence Archives (Jerusalem, Israel)
Israeli Government Press Office (GPO) in the Israel National Photo Collection (Jerusalem,
 Israel)
Israel State Archives (Jerusalem, Israel)
Jewish National Fund Archive (Jerusalem, Israel)
Negev Coexistence Forum (NCF) Photography Collection (Beersheba, Israel)
Palmach Archive (Jerusalem, Israel)
Rāhaṭ’s Community Centre Library’s Collection (Rāhaṭ, Israel)
Sir Samuel Herbert’s Personal Collection in Parliamentary Archives (London, United
 Kingdom)
The Bain Media Collection in the Library of Congress (Washington D.C., United States of
 America)
The Central Zionist Archives (Jerusalem, Israel)
The Goel Drori Archive – The Turkish Album Collection (Beersheba, Israel)
The Hagganah Archive (Jerusalem, Israel)
The Joe Alon Museum of Bedouin Culture (Kibbutz Lahav, Israel)
The Matson Collection in the Library of Congress (Washington D.C., United States of
 America)
The Museum of Beersheba’s Photographic History (Great Mosque – Beersheba, Israel)
The National Library of Israel (Jerusalem, Israel)
The Negev Art Museum’s Australian War Memorial Collection (Beersheba, Israel)
Tuviyahu Archives at Ben Gurion University of the Negev (Beersheba, Israel)

¹⁶⁹ The list of physical archives not visited for this study but which are most likely to contain photographic and digital images of Negev Bedouin include: (Israel) Israel State Archives, the Central Zionist Archives in Jerusalem, Keren Kayemet Leyisrael, The Lavon Institute for Labor Research (Davar), the IDF Archives, the Haganah Archives, the Palmach Archives, the Israel Broadcasting Authority Archives, the Israel Archives of Maps and Aerial Photographs at the Hebrew University; and (United Kingdom) the National Archive and the Imperial War Museum.

University of Oxford - St. Anthony College's Middle East Photographic Archive (Oxford,
United Kingdom)

Zochrot's Documentary Archive (Tel Aviv, Israel)

Digital Archives

Goel Drory (<http://drory.net>)

Israeli National Photography Collection (<http://147.237.72.31/topsrch/defaulte.htm>)

Palestineremembered.com – Online Photographic Collection

(<http://www.palestineremembered.com/>)

Walla (<http://www.walla.com>)

Personal and Lineage Archives¹⁷⁰

‘Ā’isha al-Ṣāna’ (Beersheba, Israel)

‘Aṭīya Abū Madīgam (Rāḥaṭ, Israel)

Eli Atzmon (Beesheba, Israel)

Emanuel Marx (Tel Aviv, Israel)

Ḥassan al-Huzayyil (Rāḥaṭ, Israel)

Karīm Abū Latīf (Rāḥaṭ, Israel)

Klaus Otto-Hundt (Warwick, United Kingdom)

Muḥammad al-Ṣāna’ (Lagīya, Israel)

Richard Randolph (University of California Santa Cruz, United States of America)

Sa’īd Abū Rabī’a (Ksīfe, Israel)

Sheglah Weir (London, United Kingdom)

Newspapers

Ahkbar an-Naqab (Rāḥaṭ, Israel)

Al-qaria.net (Nazareth, Israel)

Arutz Sheva - International Israeli News (Jerusalem, Israel)

Haaretz (Tel Aviv, Israel)

Jewish Telegraphic Agency (New York, United States of America)

Panorama- Panet.net (Tel Aviv, Israel)

Quds (Ramallah, Palestinian West Bank)

St Petersburg Times (Tampa, United States of America)

The Jerusalem Post (Jerusalem, Israel)

The New Yorker (New York, United States of America)

¹⁷⁰ Most likely several *moshavim* and *kibbutzim* and private family collections in the Negev possess image archives relating to the Negev Bedouin.

The New York Times (New York, United States of America)

The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney, Australia)

The Times of Israel (Jerusalem, Israel)

Yedi'oth Ahronoth (Tel Aviv, Israel)

APPENDIX V PHOTOGRAPHERS OF NEGEV BEDOUIN¹⁷¹

Early commercial foreign photographers (1857-1948)

Félix Bonfils under the Maison House (1831-1885)

Tancrède Dumas (1830-1905)

Lucien Gautier (1850-1924)

Rudolf Lehnert (1878-1948)

British government and Mandate photographers (1917-1948)

James McDonald (1822-1885)

Alan Saunders (1886-1964)

Reginald Monckton (1896-1975)

Ivan Lloyd-Phillips (1910-1984)

J.H.H. Pollock (n.d.)

P.S. Coghill (n.d.)

Early Palestinian photographers (1859-1950)¹⁷²

Garabed Krikorian (1847-1920)

Karimeh Abbud (1896-1955), the first Palestinian female photographer

Khalil Ra'ad (1854-1957) known as 'Palestine's first Arab photographer'

Ali Za'arur (Zaarour) (1900-1972)

Hanna Safieh (1910-1979) (the American Colony in Jerusalem)

Yessai Garabedian (1859- n.d.)

Daoud Sabonji (1892- n.d.)

Fadil Saba (c. 1920-n.d.)

Other early Palestinian photographers (n.d) in the nineteenth and twentieth century include:

Muhammad Salih al Kayyali from Jaffa, the Alhambra Studio, The Roxy Studio, Khalil Qaddura, Photo Boudayr in Ramallah, the Sam'aan Brothers, The Shamiyya Brothers, Photo Basil, the Mikel Studio in Bethlehem, the Shahrur Studio in Nablus, the El Rashid Studio in Tulkarem, and the El-Aharam Studio in Jenin (Raz 2011).

¹⁷¹ This list includes non-Bedouin photographers and digital image-makers of the Negev Bedouin population whose works can typically be found in the public sphere (excluding several private collections that I viewed during fieldwork). The names of Bedouin photographers have been excluded for anonymity.

¹⁷² The Arabic names in this Appendix are not transcribed for the sake of list consistency and readability. The list is also organised by chronology by death of the photographer, not alphabetically. Those photographers without dates are still living.

Well-known contemporary Palestinian-identifying photographers (c. 1950-2012)

Alaa Badarneh (<http://www.corbisimages.com/photographer/alaa-badarneh>)

Ahlam Shibli (<http://www.ahlamshibli.com/>)

Khalid al-Zagari (http://www.1001arabian.net/palestine/palestine_info.htm)

Muhammed Muheisen (<http://www.apimages.com/Collection/Landing/Photographer-Muhammed-Muheisen-/cddec7686a464b809dc45be9d6373461>)

Rula Halwani (<http://www.selmaferiani.com/artists/rula-halawani/>)

Early Jewish photographers in Palestine (c. 1850- c. 1920)

Mendel John Diness (1827-1900)

Peter Bergheim (1813-1895)

Tsadok Bassan (1882-1956)

Shlomo Narinsky (1885-1960) and Sonia Narinsky (n.d.)

Avraham Soskin (1881-1963)

Yaakov Ben Dov (1882-1968)

Zoltan Kluger (1896–1977)

Later century Jewish photographers in Israel (commercial, press, and government) (1950-2010)

Yosef Schweig (1905-1984)

Tim Gidal (1909-1996)

Teddy Brauner (1914-2000)

Alex Levac (<http://alexlevac.tumblr.com/>)

Carmit Hassine (<http://carmitphotography.com/about.php>)

Chananya Herman (ninoherman.blogspot.net)

David Eldan (GPO collection)

David Rubinger (GPO collection and Jerusalem Fine Art Prints Collection)

Fritz Cohen (GPO collection)

Ilan Malocho (private collection)

Menahem Adler (GPO collection)

Micha Bar-Am (<http://www.michabaram.com/index2.html>)

Miki Kratsman (Chelouch Gallery, Peabody Museum, and Artspace)

Moshe Milner (GPO collection)

Oren Zvi (www.activestills.org)

Shaul Schwarz (<http://www.shaulschwarz.com/>)

Tal Adler (www.facebook.com/tal.adler.54)

Yacov Sa'ar (GPO collection)

Contemporary international photographers of Negev Bedouin (1950-2010)

Elmo Hutchison (1910-1964)

Ron Kelley (*Transitions: Russians, Ethiopians, and Bedouins in Israel's Negev Desert* [1998])

Silvia Boarini (<http://www.silviaboarini.com/>)

REFERENCES

ARABIC

- Al- 'Ārif, A. 1933. *Al-Qaḍā' bayn al-Badū*, Al-Quds: Matba'at Bayt al-Maqdis.
- 1934. *Tā'rīkh B'ir al-sab' wa-Qabā'ilihā*, Al-Quds: Matba'at Bayt al-Maqdis.
- Al-Jazīrī, 'Abd al-Qādir ibn Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm al-Anṣarī. 2002. *Ad-Durar al-fara'id al-munadhama fi akhbar al-Hajj wa tariq Makka al-mu'azima*, Cairo: Dar al-al-Ilmieh Kotb.
- Al-Maqrīzī, 'Aḥmed ibn 'Ali. 1847. *Al-Bayān wal-I'rāb 'ammā Arḍ Miṣr min al- A'rab*, F. Wüstenfeld (trans.), Göttingen: Self-published.
- Alqaira.net. 2013. 'No title', (8 September 2013), *Alqaria*, URL: <http://www.kufur-kassem.com/news-32-117864.html>, Accessed 10 November 2014.
- Al-Qalqashandī, 'Aḥmed ibn 'Abdallah. 1959. *Nihāyat al-Arab Mi'rafat Ansāb al-'Arab*, Cairo: Al-Sharikah al-'Arabiyyah li al- Ṭiba'ah wa al-Nashr.
- Al-Ṭabarī, Muḥammad ibn Jarīr, 1939 [1326]. *Tā'rīkh al-Umam wal-Muluk*, Cairo: Dar al-Macarif.
- Qawāsmi, H. 2013. 'Fee al-Naqab... ḥal taṭāl braka "zana" 'azmana al-qahar', *Quds*, URL: <http://www.qudsn.ps/article/10674>, Accessed 20 May 2013.

ENGLISH¹⁷³

- Abu Lughod, L. 1989. 'Zones of Theory in the Anthropology of the Arab World', *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 18: 267-306.
- 1990. 'The Romance of Resistance: Tracing Transformation of Power Through Bedouin Women', *American Anthropologist*, 17 (1): 41-55.
- 1993. *Writing Women's Worlds: Bedouin Stories*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- 1997. 'The interpretation of culture(s) after television', *Representations, Special Issue: The Fate of "Culture": Geertz and Beyond*, 59: 109-134.
- 2000 [1986]. *Veiled Sentiments: Honor and Poetry in a Bedouin Society*, Second Edition, Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press.
- 2002. 'Egyptian melodrama: Technology of the modern subject', *Media worlds:*

¹⁷³ English references are ordered by the Roman alphabet including definite articles (that is anglicised *Abu* and *al-*).

- Anthropology on new terrain*, F. Ginsburg, L. Abu Lughod, and B. Larkin (eds.), California: University of California Press.
- Abu Oskha-Daoud, S. 2009. *Palestinian Women and Politics in Israel*, Florida: University Press of Florida.
- Abu Rabia, A. 1986. 'Control and Allocation of Grazing Lands among the Bedouin Tribes of the Negev', *Nomadic Peoples*, 20: 5-11.
- 1999. 'Some notes on Livestock Production among Negev Bedouin Tribes', *Nomadic Peoples: New Series*, 3 (1): 22-30.
- 2000. 'Employment and unemployment among the Negev Bedouin', *Nomadic Peoples*, 4 (2): 84.
- 2001. *Bedouin Century: Education and Development among the Negev Tribes in the Twentieth Century*, New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books.
- 2012. 'The Significance of Colours in Pastoral Bedouin Society', *Serendipity in Anthropological Research: The Nomadic Turn*, H. Hazan and E. Hertzog (eds.), England and United States of America: Ashgate.
- Abu Rabia, S. 2008. 'Between Memory and Resistance, an Identity Shaped by Space: The Case of the Naqab Bedouin', *Hagar: Study in Culture, Polity, and Identities*, 8 (2): 93-120.
- 2012. 'Is Slavery Over? Black and White Bedouin Women in the Naqab (Negev)', *Struggle and Survival in Palestine/Israel*, M. LeVine and G. Shafir (eds.), Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Abu Rabia-Queder, S. 2007. 'Permission to rebel: Arab Bedouin women changing negotiation of social roles', *Feminist Studies*, 33 (1): 161-187.
- Abu Saad, I. 2001. 'Education as a tool for control vs. development among indigenous peoples: The case of Bedouin Arabs in Israel', *Hagar: International Social Science Review*, 2 (2): 241-259.
- 2003. 'Bedouin Arabs in Israel between the Hammer and the Anvil: Education as a Foundation for Survival and Development', *The Future of Indigenous Peoples: Struggles For Survival and Development*, I. Abu Saad and D. Champagne (eds.), United States: UCLA American Indian Studies Center.
- 2010. 'Keynote Lecture 2: The Essential Role of Indigenous Naqab Palestinian Bedouin Researchers in Knowledge Production', *Rethinking The Paradigms: Negev Bedouin Research 2000+ Conference*, United Kingdom: University of Exeter & the British Academy.

- Abu Saad, I. and Lithwick H. 2000. *A Way Ahead: A Development Plan for the Bedouin Towns in the Negev*, Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Israel: The Center for Bedouin Studies and Development and The Negev Center for Regional Development.
- Abu Sitta, S. 2009. 'The Denied Inheritance: Palestinian Land Ownership in Beer Sheba', Paper presentation, *International Fact Finding Mission*, Beer Sheba: Initiated by RCUV.
- Abu Zeid, A. 1966. *Honor and Shame Among Bedouin in Egypt*, Chicago: University of Chicago.
- Adalah. 2012. 'The Right to Pray in the Big Mosque in Beer el-Sebe (Beer Sheva)', URL: <http://www.adalah.org/en/content/view/6677>, Accessed 3 April 2014.
- Agichtein, E., Castillo, C., Donato, D., Gionis, A., and Mishne, G. 2008. 'Finding high-quality content in social media', *Proceedings of the 2008 International Conference on Web Search and Data Mining*: 183-194.
- Alafenish, S. 1987. 'Processes of Change and Continuity in Kinship System and Family Ideology in Bedouin Society', *Sociologia Ruralis*, 27 (4): 323-340.
- Al-Arif, A. 1944. *Bedouin, Love, Law, and Legend*, Jerusalem: Cosmos Publishing.
- Al-Atauna, R. 2005. 'Chapter 4: Education', *The Arab Women of the Negev: Realities and Challenges*, Maan (ed.), Beer Sheba: Maan – The Forum for Bedouin Women's Organization.
- Al-Ghazali, M. 2009. *The Sunna of the Prophet: the People of Fiqh versus People of Hadith*, Aisha Bewley (trans.), London: Dar Al Taqwa Limited
- Alloula, M. 1990. *The Colonial Haram*, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
- Almog, O. 2000. *The Sabra: The Creation of the New Jew*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Al-Shboul, A., al-Shboul, N., Abu Dalou, A., al-Rousan, M., and Alibeli, M. 2012. 'Al-Madafa and Ad-Diwan among Al-Shboul Tribe: A Case Study in Ash-Shajarah Village of Jordan', *International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, 12 (14): 210-225.
- Althusser, L. 1971. *Lenin and philosophy and other essays*, New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Amara, A. 2015. 'Colonialism, Cause Advocacy, and the Naqab', *The Naqab Bedouin and Colonialism: New Perspectives*, M. Nasasra, R. Ratcliffe, S. Abu Rabia-Queder, and S. Richter-Devroe (eds.), New York: Routledge.

- Amara, A. Abu Saad, I. and Yiftachel, O. (eds.) 2012. 'Unsettling Settlements: Law, Land, and Planning in the Naqab', *Indigenous (In) Justice*, 69, Boston: University of Harvard Press.
- Anderson, B. 1991. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso.
- Anderson, J. 1982. 'Social Structure and the Veil: Comportment and the Composition of Interaction in Afghanistan', *Anthropos*, 77 (3/4): 397-420.
- Appadurai, A. (ed.). 1986. 'Introduction: Commodities and the politics of value', *The Social Life of Things: Commodities in a Social Perspective*, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- 1990. 'Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy', *Theory, culture and society*, 7 (2): 295-310.
- 1996. *Modernity at large: cultural dimensions of globalization Vol. 1*, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
- Arab and Jewish Center for Equality Empowerment, and Cooperation (AJEEC). 2011. 'The Facts', URL: <http://en.ajeec-nisped.org.il/the-facts/bedouin-of-southern-israel/>, Accessed 1 February 2011.
- Armbrust, W. (ed.) 2000. 'Introduction', *Mass Mediations: New Approaches to Popular Culture in The Middle East and Beyond*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- 2003. 'Bourgeois Leisure and Egyptian Media Fantasies', *New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging Public Sphere*, D. Eickelman and J. Anderson (eds.), Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- 2004. 'Egyptian Cinema on Stage and Off', *Off Stage/On Display: Intimacy and Ethnography in the Age of Public Culture*, A. Shryock (ed.), United States: Stanford University Press.
- 2006. 'Audiovisual Media and History of the Middle East', *Middle East Historiographies: Narrating the twentieth century*, I. Gershoni, A. Singer, and Y. Hakan Erdem (eds.), United States: University of Washington Press.
- 2012. 'History in Arab Media Studies: A Speculative Cultural History', *Arab Cultural Studies: Mapping the Field*, Tarik Sabry (ed.), New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd.
- Asad, T. 1975. *Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter*, New York: Ithaca Press.
- 1980. *The Kababish Arabs: Power, Authority and Consent in a Nomadic Tribe*,

- London: Athlone Press.
- Atiyeh, G. 1995. *The Book in the Islamic World: The Written World and Communication in the Middle East*, New York: University of New York Press and The Library of Congress.
- Atran, S. 1986. 'Hamula organisation and Masha'a tenure in Palestine', *Man*, 21 (2): 271-295.
- Avner, U. and Magness, J. 1998. 'Early Islamic Settlement in the Southern Negev', *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research*, 310: 39-57.
- Axtell, J. 1979. 'Ethnohistory: An historian's viewpoint', *Ethnohistory*, 6 (1): 1-13.
- Aytemiz, P. 2011. 'Making Grandfather Come Out Better', *Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication*, 8 (2-3): 355-373.
- Azoulay, A. 2008. *The Civil Contract of Photography*, Massachusetts: Zone Books.
- 2010. 'What is a photograph? What is photography?', *Philosophy of Photography*, 1 (1): 9-13.
- 2011. *From Palestine to Israel: A Photographic Record of Destruction and State Formation, 1947-1950*, United States of America: Pluto Press.
- Baer, G. 1982. *Fellah and Townsman in the Middle East: Studies in Social History*, Chicago: Frank Cass and Company Limited.
- Baer, U. 2002. Baer, Ulrich. *Spectral Evidence: The Photography of Trauma*, Cambridge: MIT Print.
- Baily, C. 1985. 'Dating the Arrival of the Bedouin Tribes in Sinai and the Negev', *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 28 (1): 20-49.
- 2001 [1991]. *Bedouin Poetry From Sinai and the Negev: Mirror of Culture*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- 2004. *A Culture of Desert Survival: Bedouin Proverbs from Sinai and the Negev*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Banks, M. 2001. *Visual methods in social research*, London: Sage.
- Banks, M. and Vokes, R. 2010. 'Introduction: Anthropology, Photography, and the Archive', *History and Anthropology*, 21 (4): 337-349.
- Barth, F. 1965. *Nomads of South Persia*, Prospect Heights: Waveland Press.
- Barthes, R. 1981. *Camera Lucida*, London: Jonathan Cape.
- Baruch, N. 2004. 'Spatial Inequality in the Allocation of Municipal Resources', *Adalah Newsletter*, 8: 1-4.
- Bassiouny, R. (ed.) 2010. 'Introduction', *Arabic and the Media: Linguistic Analyses*

- and Applications*, Leiden: Brill.
- Bates, D.G. 1973. *Nomads and Farmers: A Study of the Yörük of Southeastern Turkey*, Anthropology Papers 52, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Museum of Anthropology.
- Bayat, A. 2002. 'Activism and social development in the Middle East', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 34 (1): 1-28.
- Beck, L. 1986. *The Qashqa'i of Iran*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Behdad, A., and Gartlan, L. 2013. *Photography's Orientalism: New Essays on Colonial Representation*. Los Angeles: Getty Publications.
- Benjamin, W. 1931. 'A Short History of Photography', *The New Photography: Germany 1927-33*, London: Arts Council of Great Britain.
- 2008 [1936]. *The work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction*, London: Penguin Group.
- Benvenisti, M. 2002. *Sacred Landscape: The Buried History of the Holy Land since 1948*, M. Kaufman-Lacusta (trans.), Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Ben-Yehuda, N. 1993. *Political Assassinations by Jews: A Rhetorical Device for Justice*, New York: SUNY Press.
- Berkerleg, S. 2007, 'African Bedouin in Palestine', *African and Asian Studies*, 6 (3): 289-300.
- Berman, M. 1965. 'The Evolution of Beer Sheva as an Urban Center', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 55 (2): 308-326
- Bitzan, J. 2006. *When Lawrence of Arabia met David Ben-Gurion" A History of Israeli 'Arabist' Expertise in the Negev (1943-1966)*, Unpublished Master of Art's Dissertation, Beer Sheva: Ben Gurion University of Negev.
- Boneh, D. 1983. *Facing Uncertainty: The Social Consequences of Forced Sedentarization Among the Jaraween Bedouin, Negev, Israel*, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Brandeis University and University Microfilms International.
- Bourdieu, P. 1965. 'The sentiment of honour in Kabyle society', *Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society*, J. Peristiany (ed.), United Kingdom: Weidenfeld & Nicholson.
- 1977. *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bowman, G. 1997. 'Radical Empiricism: Anthropological Fieldwork after Psychoanalysis and the "Année Sociologique"', *Anthropological Journal on European Cultures*, 6 (2): 79-107.

- Buchakjian, G. 2015. 'Beirut by Night', *Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication*, 8 (2-3): 256-281.
- Burckhardt, J. L. 1822. *Travels in Syria and the Holy Land*, London: John Murray.
- Burns, E.L.M. 1970. *General Mud: Memoirs of Two World Wars*, Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Company Limited.
- Caton, S. 1990. *The Peaks of Yemen I Summon*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Chatty, D. 1986. *From Camel to Truck: The Bedouin in the Modern World*, United States: Vantage Press.
- (ed.) 2006. 'Introduction', *Nomadic Societies in the Middle East and North Africa: Entering the 21st Century*, Leiden and London: Brill Publications.
- 2014. 'The Persistence of Bedouin Identity and Increasing Political Self-Representation in Lebanon and Syria', *Nomadic Peoples*, 18 (2): 16-33.
- Clifford, J. 1988. *The predicament of culture*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Cohen, A. 1965. *Arab Border-Villages in Israel*, Manchester: University of Manchester Press.
- Cohen, H. 2010 [2006]. *Good Arabs: The Israeli Security Agencies and the Israeli Arabs, 1948–1967*, H. Watzman (trans.), United States of America: University of California Press.
- Cole, D. 1975. *Nomads of the Nomads: The Al Murrah Bedouin of the Empty Quarter*, Prospect Heights: Waveland Press.
- 2003. 'Where have all the Bedouin gone?', *Anthropological Quarterly*, 76 (2): 235-267.
- Collingwood, R. G. 2005 [1946]. *The Idea of History*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Comaroff, J. and Comaroff, J. 1992. *Ethnography and the historical imagination*, New York: Westview Press Inc
- Conder, C. R. 1887. *Tent Work in Palestine*, London: Palestinian Exploration Fund.
- Connerton, P. 1989. *How Societies Remember*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dahan-Kalev, H. and Le Febvre, E. 2012. *Palestinian Activism in Israel: A Bedouin Woman Leader in a Changing Middle East*, New York: Palgrave.
- Danielson, V. 1996. 'New nightingales of the Nile: popular music in Egypt since the 1970s', *Popular Music*, 15 (3): 299-312.
- Dant, T., and Gilloch, G. 2002. 'Pictures of the past Benjamin and Barthes on

- photography and history', *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, 5 (1): 5-23.
- Davis, R. 2011. *Palestinian Village Histories: Geographies of the Displaced*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Degen, A. 2007. 'Traditional livestock production among Bedouin in the Negev Desert', *International Handbook of Research on Indigenous Entrepreneurship*, L. Dana and R. Anderson (eds.), Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing Inc.
- DeNicola, L. (2013). 'Geomedia: The Reassertion of Space within Digital Culture', *Digital Anthropology*, H. Horst and D. Miller (eds.), London and New York: Berg Publishers.
- Deringil, S. 1998. *The Well Protected Domains, Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1909*, London: L.B.Tauris.
- 2003. "'They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery': The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 45 (2): 317.
- Descartes, R. 1988. *Descartes: Selected Philosophical Writings*, J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and B. Murdoch (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dinero, S. 1997. 'Female role change and male response in the post-nomadic urban environment: the case of the Israeli Negev Bedouin', *Journal of Comparative Family Studies*, 28 (3): 248-261.
- 2004. 'New Identity/Identities Formulation in a Post-Nomadic Community: The Case of the Bedouin of the Negev', *National Identities*, 6 (3): 262-275.
- Doughty, C.M. 1921 [1888]. *Travels in Arabia Desert*, London and New York: Random House.
- Downing, J. 1984. *Radical Media: the political experience of alternative communication*, Massachusetts: South End Press.
- Dresch, P. 1986. 'Significance of the Course of Events Take in Segmentary Systems', *American Ethnologist*, 13 (2): 309-324.
- 1989. *Tribes, Government, and History in Yemen*, Oxford: Clarendon Paperbacks.
- Dukium (NCF). 2014. 'Map and Info of the Villages', URL: http://www.dukium.org/eng/?page_id=1294, Accessed 20 August 2012.
- 2014. 'Advocacy', URL; http://www.dukium.org/eng/?page_id=2502, Accessed 10 March 2014.
- Edwards, E. 2001. *Raw Histories: photographs, anthropology and museums*, Berg

- Publishing, New York.
- 2003. 'Talking Visual Histories', *Museums and Source Communities*, L. Peers and A.K. Brown (eds.), London: Routledge.
- 2004. *Photographs Object Histories: On the Materiality of Images*, New York: Routledge.
- 2009. 'Photography and the material performance of the past', *History and Theory*, 48 (4): 130-150.
- 2012. 'Objects of Affect: Photography Beyond the Image', *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 41: 221-234.
- 2015. 'Anthropology and Photography: a long history of knowledge and affect', *Photographies*, 8 (3): 1-18.
- Edwards, E. and Hart, J. (eds.). 2004. *Photographs objects histories: on the materiality of images*, Chicago: Routledge.
- Edwards, E. and Mead, M. 2013. 'Absent Histories and Absent Images: Photographs, Museums and the Colonial Past', *Museum and Society*, 11 (1): 19-38.
- Eickelman, D. 1979. 'The political economy of meaning', *American Ethnologist*, 6 (2): 386-393.
- 1985. *Knowledge and Power in Morocco: The Education of a Twentieth-Century Notable*, Princeton Studies on the Near East, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- 1987. 'Changing interpretations of Islamic movement', *Islam and the Political Economy of Meaning: Comparative Studies of Muslim Discourse*, W. Roff (ed.), London: University of California Press.
- 1989. *The Middle East and Central Asia: An Anthropological Approach*, Fourth edition, Upper Saddle River New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- 1992. 'Mass higher education and the religious imagination in contemporary Arab societies', *American Ethnologist*, 19 (4): 643-655.
- 1995. 'Print, Islam, and the Prospects for Civic Pluralism: New Religious Writings and Their Audiences,' *Journal of Islamic Studies*, 8 (1): 43-62.
- 1998. 'Being Bedouin: Nomads and Tribes in the Social Imagination', *Changing Nomads in a Changing World*, J. Giant and A. Khazanov (eds.), Sussex: Academic Press.
- Eickelman, D. and Anderson, J. 2003. *New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging Public Sphere*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

- El'Sana-Alh'jooj, A. and Marteu, E. 2005. 'Participation in Politics and Public Life', *The Arab Women of the Negev: Realities and Challenges*, Maan (ed.), Beer Sheba: Maan – The Forum for Bedouin Women's Organization.
- Evans-Pritchard, E.E. 1949. *The Sansui of Cyrenaica*, London and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 1950. 'Social anthropology: past and present, the Marett Lecture', *Man*, 50: 118-124.
- Falah, G. 1989. 'Israeli state policy toward Bedouin sedentarization in the Negev', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 18 (2): 71-91.
- Fandy, M. 2007. *(Un)civil War of Word: Media and Politics in the Arab World*, Westport Connecticut: Praeger Security International.
- Faris, J. 1993. 'A Response to Terence Turner', *Anthropology Today*, 9 (1): 12-13.
- Fenster, T. 1999. 'Space for Gender: Cultural Roles of the Forbidden and The Permitted', *Environment and Planning: Society and Space*, 17: 227-246.
- Foucault, M. 1977. *Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison*, New York: Vintage.
- Frantzman, S. 2012. 'Terra Incognita: The re-Islamification of Beersheba', (9 May 2012), *The Jerusalem Post*, URL: <http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Terra-Incognita-The-re-Islamification-of-Beersheba>, Accessed 1 November 2012.
- Frantzman, S., Havatzelet, Y., and Kark, R. 2012. 'Contested Indigeneity: The Development of an Indigenous Discourses on the Bedouin of the Negev', *Israel Studies*, 17 (1): 78-104.
- Geertz, C. 1983. *Local Knowledge*, New York: Basic Books.
- Gell, A. 1998. *Art and Agency: An Anthropological Theory*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gellner, E. 1969. *Saints of the Atlas*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
- Ghanem, A. 2011. 'The Expanding Ethnocracy: Judaization of the Public Sphere', *Israel Studies Review*, 26 (1): 21-27.
- Giddens, A. 1991. *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*, Cambridge: Polity.
- Gilsenan, M. 1976. 'Lying, Honor, and Contradiction', *Transaction of Meaning*, B. Kapferer (ed.) Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues.
- 1982. *Recognizing Islam: Religion and society in the modern Arab world*, New York: Pantheon.

- Ginat, J. 1984. 'Blood Revenge in Bedouin Societies', *The Changing Bedouin*, E. Marx and A. Shmueli (eds.), New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
- 1997. *Blood Revenge: Family Honor, Mediation and Outcasting*, Brighton: Sussex Academic Press.
- Ginsburg, F. 1991. 'Indigenous Media: Faustian Contract of Global Village', *Cultural Anthropology*, 6 (1): 92-112.
- Ginsburg, F. Abu Lughod, L. and Larkin, B. (eds.) 2002. 'Introduction', *Media Worlds: Anthropology on New Terrain*, United States: University of California Press..
- Ginzburg, C. 1989. 'From Aby Warburg to E. H. Gombrich: A Problem of Method', *Clues, Myths, and the Historical Method*, J. and A. Tedeschi (trans.), Baltimore: The University of John Hopkins Press.
- Glubb, J. 1957. *A Soldier with the Arabs*, London: Hodder and Stoughton.
- Graham-Brown, S. 1980. *Palestinians and their society, 1880-1946: A photographic essay*, London: Quartet Books Limited.
- 1988. *Images of Women: The Portrayal of Women of the Middle East 1860-1950*, London: Quartet Books.
- Granqvist, H. 1931. *Marriage conditions in a Palestinian village I*, Helsingfors: Societas Scientiarum Fennica.
- 1935. *Marriage conditions in a Palestinian village II*, Helsingfors: Societas Scientiarum Fennica.
- Graulund. 2009. 'From (B)edouin to (A)borigine: the myth of the desert noble savage', *History of the Human Sciences*, 22 (1): 79-104.
- Greenberg, J. 1997. 'Representing the State: Class, Race and Nationhood in an Israeli Museum', *Visual Anthropology Review*, 13 (1): 14-27.
- Greenspan, I. 2005. *Mediating Bedouin Futures: The Roles of Advocacy NGOs in Land and Planning Conflicts Between the State of Israel and the Negev Bedouins*, United Kingdom: York University.
- Groys, B. 2008. *Art Power*, United States: MIT Press.
- Gruder, C. and Haugbølle, S. 2013. (eds.) 'Introduction', *Visual Culture in the Modern Middle East*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- Gubser, P. 1983. *Jordan: Crossroads of Middle Eastern Events*, United Kingdom: Croom Helm.
- Hall, B. 2014. 'Bedouins' Politics of Place and Memory: A Case of Unrecognized Villages in the Negev', *Nomadic Peoples*, 18 (2): 147-164.

- Hall, S. 1997. *Representations: Cultural Representation and Signifying Practices*, London: Sage Publication.
- Hanley, D. 2014. 'Dr. Morad Elsana Describes Israel's Prawer Plan', *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, URL: <http://www.wrmea.org/2014-may/human-rights-dr.-morad-elsana-describes-israels-prawer-plan.html>, Accessed 20 June 2014.
- Hann, M, and Dunn, E. 1996. *Civil society: Challenging western models*, London: Routledge.
- Haraway, D. 1988. 'Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspectives', *Feminist Studies*, 14: 575–599
- Harper, D. 1987. *Working Knowledge: Skill and Community in a Small Shop*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Hartmann, W., Silvester, J., and Hayes, P. 1998. *Colonising Camera: Photographs in the making of Namibian History*, United States: Ohio University Press.
- Hawker, R. 2002. 'Imagining A Bedouin Past: Stereotypes and Cultural Representation in the Contemporary United Arab Emirates', URL: www.inhouse.lau.edu.lb/bima/papers/R_W_Hawker.pdf, Accessed May 2005.
- Henkin, R. 1996. 'Negev Bedouin vs. Sedentary Palestinian Narratives Styles', *Studies in Modern Semitic Languages Vol. 16*, S. Izre'el and S. Raz (eds.), Leiden: E.J. Brill.
- 2000. 'Narrative Styles of Negev Bedouin Men and Women', *Oriente Moderno: Studi di Dialettologia Arabia*, Nuova serie, Anno 19, 80 (1): 59-81.
- Herzfeld, M. 1991. *A place in history: Social and monumental time in a Cretan town*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- 1997. *Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation-State*, New York: Routledge.
- Hillelson, S. 1937. 'Notes of the Bedouin Tribes of the Beersheba District I', *Palestine Exploration Fund*, 69 (4): 242-252.
- 1938a. 'Notes of the Bedouin Tribes of the Beersheba District II', *Palestine Exploration Fund*, 70 (1): 53-63.
- 1938b. 'Notes of the Bedouin Tribes of the Beersheba District III', *Palestine Exploration Fund*, 70 (2): 117-126.
- Himpele, J. 2008. *Circuits of culture: Media, politics, and indigenous identity in the Andes Vol. 20*, United States: University of Minnesota Press.

- Hirsh, E. and Stewart, C. 2005. 'Introduction: Ethnographies of Historicity', *History and Anthropology*, 16 (3): 261-274.
- Hirschkind, C. 2004. 'Hearing Modernity: Egypt, Islam, and the Pious Ear', *Hearing Cultures: Sound, Listening, and Modernity*, V. Erlmann (ed.), New York: Berg Publishers.
- Hobsbawn, E. 2012. *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Holy, L. 1979. 'The segmentary lineage structure and its existential status', *Segmentary Lineage Systems Reconsidered - Papers in Social Anthropology*, Belfast: Queen's University.
- Hourani, A. 1983. *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hull, E. 1886. *The Survey of Western Palestine: Memoir on the Physical Geology and Geography of Arabia Petraea*, London: Committee of the Palestine Exploration Fund.
- Hurgronje, C.S. 1931. *Mekka in the Latter Part of the 19th Century*, United States of America: Library of Congress Publication.
- Hutchinson, E. 1956. *Violent Truce: A Military Observer Looks at Arab-Israeli Conflict 1951-1954*, New York: The Devin-Adair Company.
- Ingold, T. 1996. 'Social relations, human ecology, and the evolution of culture: an exploration of concepts and definitions', *Handbook of Human Symbolic Evolution*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 2000. 'Stop, look, Listen! Vision, Hearing and Human Movement', *The Perception of the Environment*, Oxford: Routledge.
- Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS). 2011. 'Populations by settlement', URL: http://www1.cbs.gov.il/reader/cw_usr_view_Folder?ID=14, Accessed 1 September 2011.
- Israel's Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Labor. 2010. 'The Israeli Economy', URL: <http://www.gov.il/FirstGov/TopNavEng/Engoffices/EngMinistries/EngIndustry>, Accessed 19 January 2015.
- Jacobson, K. 2007. *Odalisques and Arabesques: orientalist photography 1839-1925*, London: Quaritch Ltd.
- Jahshan, T. 2005. 'Chapter 9: Bedouin women and Personal Rights Status', *The Arab Women of the Negev: Realities and Challenges*, Maan (ed.). Beer Sheba: Maan –

- The Forum for Bedouin Women's Organization.
- Jakubowska, L. 1985. *Urban Bedouin: Social change in a settled environment*, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Stony Brook: State University of New York.
- 1992. 'Resisting 'Ethnicity': The Israeli State and Bedouin Identity,' *The Paths to Domination, Resistance, and Terror*, C. Nordstrom and J. Martin (ed.), Berkeley: University of California Press.
- 2000. 'Finding ways in make a living: employment among the Negev Bedouin', *Nomadic Peoples*, 4 (2): 94-105.
- Jay, M. 1993. *Downcast eyes: The denigration of vision in twentieth-century French thought*, California: University of California Press.
- Jean-Klein, I. 2001. 'Nationalism and resistance: the two faces of everyday activism in Palestine during the Intifada', *Cultural Anthropology*, 16 (1): 83-126.
- Jewish Telegraphic Agency. 1952. 'Mrs. Roosevelt Visits Negev; Meets with Jews and Arabs' (19 February 1952), URL: <http://www.jta.org/1952/02/19/archive/mrs-roosevelt-visits-negev-meets-with-jews-and-arabs>, Accessed 2 September 2011.
- Joe Alon Museum. 2013. 'The Museum of Bedouin Culture', URL: <http://www.joealon.org.il/Content.aspx?itemId=18>, Accessed 4 November 2014.
- Jonas, H. 1966. *The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology*, Chicago: Northwestern University Press.
- Jones, C. and Murphy, E. 2002. 'The weight of history', *Israel: Challenges to identity, democracy, and the state*, C. Jones and E. Murphy (eds.), London: Routledge.
- Kaplan, I. 1980. 'The Society and Its Environment', *Jordan: A Country Study*, R. Nyrop (ed.), Washington D.C.: Foreign Area Studies, The American University Press.
- Kark, R. and Frantzman, S. 2011. 'Bedouin Settlement in Late Ottoman and British Mandatory Palestine: Influence on the Cultural and Environmental Landscape, 1870-1948', *New Middle East Studies I*: 1-24, URL: <http://www.brismes.ac.uk/nmes/?s=kark>, Accessed 5 June 2015.
- Kelly, R. 1998, *Transitions: Russians, Ethiopians, and Bedouins in Israel's Negev Desert*, New York: Ashgate.
- Khaldun, I. 1967. *The Muqaddimah*, Second edition, Franz Rosenthal (trans.), Bollingen Series, 43, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Khalidi, W. 1984. *Before Their Diaspora: A Photographic History of the Palestinians 1876-1948*, United States of America: Washington Institute of Palestine Studies Press.

- Khan, R. 2008. 'Pastoralism and the 'Wild Man' in an Early Arabic Romance,' *Middle Eastern Literatures*, 11 (2): 139–153.
- Kirk, G. 1941. 'The Negev, or southern desert of Palestine', *Palestine Exploration Quarterly*, 73 (2): 57-71.
- Knappett, C. 2002. 'Photographs, Skeuomorphs, and Marionettes: Some Thoughts on Mind, Agency, And Object', *Journal of Material Culture*, 7 (1): 97-117.
- Koensler, A. 2013. 'Frictions as opportunity: mobilizing for Arab-Bedouin ethnic rights in Israel', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 36 (11): 1808-1828.
- Kopytoff, I. 1986 'The cultural biography of things', *The Social Life Of Things*, A. Appadurai (ed.), Cambridgeshire: Cambridge University Press.
- Kram, N. 2013. *Clashes over recognition: The struggle of indigenous Bedouins for land ownership rights under Israeli law*, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, California: California Institute of Integral Studies.
- Kressel, G. 1992. *Descent through Males: An anthropological investigation into the patterns underlying social hierarchy, kinship, and marriage among former Bedouin in the Ramla-Lod area (Israel)*, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.
- 1996. 'Being Tribal and Being Pastoralist', *The Anthropology of Tribal and Peasant Pastoral Societies*, U. Fabietti and P. Salzman (eds.), Pavia Collegio Chislieri: Ibis.
- 2003. *Let Shepherding Endure: Applied Anthropology and the Preservation of a Cultural Tradition in Israel and the Middle East*, Albany: State of University of New York Press.
- Kressel, G. and Ben David, J. 1995. 'The Bedouin market-Corner stone for the founding of Be'er-Sheva: Bedouin traditions about the development of the Negev capital in the Ottoman period', *Nomadic Peoples*, 36/37: 119-144.
- Kressel, G., Ben David, J., and Abu Rabia, A., 1991. 'Changes in the Land Use by the Negev Bedouin Since the mid-19th century', *Nomadic Peoples*, 28: 28-55.
- Lancaster, W. 1981. *The Rwala Bedouin Today*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lanning, R. 2009 *Inverting the Lens: Insider Photography by the Manaja's family, Humayma, Jordan*, Unpublished Master of Arts' Dissertation, Canada: University of Victoria.
- Latour, B. 1999. 'Circulating reference: Sampling the soil in the Amazon forest', *Pandora's Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies*, Cambridge: Harvard

- University Press.
- 2007. *Reassembling the social*, Hampshire: Oxford University Press.
- Lavie, S. 2003. *The Poetics of Military Occupation*, Berkeley and New York: The University of California Press.
- Lawrence, T. 1926. *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, Subscribers' Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Layne, L. 1994. *Home and Homeland: The Dialogics of Tribal and National Identities in Jordan*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- 1989. 'The dialogics of tribal self-representation in Jordan', *American Ethnologist*, 16 (1): 24-39.
- Lévi-Strauss, C. 1966. *The savage mind*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lewando Hundt, G. 1984. 'The Exercise of Power by Bedouin Women in the Negev', *The Changing Bedouin*, E. Marx and A. Shmueli (ed.), London: Transaction Books.
- Lewis, B. 1969. 'What is an Arab?', *Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East*, A. Shiloh (ed.), New York: Random House.
- Lithwick, H. 2000. *An urban development strategy for the Negev's Bedouin community*, Beer Sheva: Negev Center for Regional Development.
- Lori, A. 2010. 'Reclaiming the Desert', *Haaretz Magazine*, URL: <http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/magazine/reclaiming-the-desert-1.310558>, Accessed 21 September 2014.
- Lynch, M. 2006. *Voices of the new Arab public: Iraq, Al-Jazeera, and Middle East politics today*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Maddrell, P. 1990. 'The Bedouin of the Negev,' *The Minority Rights Group*, Report no. 81, United Kingdom.
- Madianou, M. and Miller, D. 2011. *Polymedia: towards a new theory of digital media in interpersonal Communication*, URL: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/anthropology/people/academic_staff/d_miller/mil-23, Accessed June 2013.
- Marteu, E. 2005. 'Some Reflections on How Bedouin Women of the Negev Relate to Politics: Between Political Marginalisation and Social Mobilisation', *Bulletin du Centre de Recherche Français de Jérusalem*, 16: 271-286.
- 2009. *Civil Organizations and Protest Movements in Israel*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Marx, E. 1967. *The Bedouins of the Negev*, Manchester: University of Manchester

- Press.
- 1990. 'Economic Change Among Pastoral Nomads in the Middle East,' *Nomads in a Changing World*, P.C. Salzman and J.G. Galaty (eds.), Naples: Dipartimento di Studie Asiatici, Istituto Universitario Orientale.
- 2000. 'Land and work: Negev Bedouin struggle with Israeli bureaucracies', *Nomadic Peoples*, 4 (2): 106.
- Marx, E. and Shemueli, A. 1984. *The Changing Bedouin*, United States: Transaction Books.
- Massad, J. 2001. *Colonial effects: The making of national identity in Jordan*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Matari, S. 2010. 'Mediation to Resolve the Bedouin-Israeli Government Dispute for the Negev Desert', *Fordham Int'l LJ*, 34: 1089.
- Maxwell, A. 1999. *Colonial photography and exhibitions: representations of the native and the making of European identities*, New York: Leicester University Press.
- McClellan, K. 2015. 'Damascenes', *Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication*, 8 (2-3), 374-397.
- McKee, E. 2010. 'Of Camels and "Ca-mail": Engaging Complex Representations of Bedouins in Activism', *Collaborative Anthropologies*, 2: 81-92.
- Meeker, M. 1976a. 'Meaning and Society in the Near East: Examples from the Black Sea Turks and the Levantine Arabs (I)', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 7 (2): 243-270.
- 1976b. 'Meaning and Society in the Near East: Examples from the Black Sea Turks and the Levantine Arabs (II)', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 7 (3): 383-422.
- Meir, A. 1997. *As Nomadism Ends: The Israeli Bedouin of the Negev*, United States: Westview Press.
- Meir, A. and Baskind, A. 2006. 'Ethnic Business Entrepreneurship Among Urbanising Bedouin in the Negev, Israel', *Nomadic Peoples*, 10 (1): 72-100.
- Merleau-Ponty, M. 1962. *Phenomenology*, United States of America: Humanities Press.
- Messick, B. 1993. *The Calligraphic State*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Michaels, E. 1991. 'Aboriginal content: who's got it - who needs it?', *Visual Anthropology*, 4 (3-4): 277-300.
- Miller, D. (ed.) (ed.) 1997. 'Why some things matter', *Material Cultures*, London and Chicago: UCL Press and University of Chicago Press.

- Miller, D. and Horst, H. (eds.) 2012. 'The Digital and the Human: A Prospectus for Digital Anthropology', *Digital Anthropology*, H. Horst and D. Miller (eds.), London and New York: Berg Press.
- Miller, F. 2005. 'Of Songs and Signs: Audiocassette Poetry, Moral Character, and the Culture of Circulation in Yemen', *American Ethnologist*, 32 (1): 82-99.
- 2007. *The Moral Resonance of Arab Media: Audiocassette Poetry and Culture in Yemen*, United States: Present and Fellows of Harvard College Press.
- Mirzoeff, N. (ed.) 2002. *The visual culture reader*, London: Psychology Press.
- Mitchell, T. 1991. *Colonising Egypt*, United States: University of California Press.
- Moors, A. 2001. 'Presenting Palestine's Population Premonitions of the Nakba', *MIT Electronic Journals of Middle East Studies*. URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/11245/1.195790>, Accessed 12 April 2010.
- Morris, B. 1993. *Israel's Border Wars, 1949–1956. Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation, and the Countdown to the Suez War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 2003. *The Road to Jerusalem: Glubb Pasha, Palestine and the Jews Vol. 1*, New York: IB Tauris.
- 2004 [1987]. *The birth of the Palestinian refugee problem, 1947-1949*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Morris, R. C. (ed.) 2009. 'Photography and the power of images in the history of power: notes from Thailand', *Photographies East: The Camera and Its Histories in East and Southeast Asia*, Durham and London: Duke University Press.
- Morton, C. and Edwards, E. 2009. *Photography, Anthropology, and History: Expanding the Frame*, United Kingdom: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
- Morton, C., and Newbury, D. (eds.) 2015. *The African photographic archive: research and curatorial strategies*, London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Mouffe, C. 2000. *The democratic paradox*, London and New York: Verso.
- Murphy, R. and Kasdan, L. 1959. 'The structure of parallel cousin marriage' *American Anthropologist*, 61 (1): 17-29.
- Murray, G.W. 1935. *Sons of Ishamel: A Study of the Egyptian Bedouin*, United Kingdom: G. Routledge & Sons, Limited.
- Musleh-Motut, N. 2015. 'From Palestine to the Canadian Diaspora', *Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication*, 8 (2-3): 307-326.
- Nakhleh, K. 1977. 'Anthropological and sociological studies on the Arabs in Israel: A

- critique', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 6 (4): 41-70.
- Nasasra, M. 2010. 'Transfer and Expulsion of Palestinian Bedouin Tribes from the Naqab 1948-1959', *Rethinking The Paradigms: Negev Bedouin Research 2000+ Conference*, United Kingdom: University of Exeter and the British Academy.
- 2011. 'The Southern Palestine Bedouin and British Mandate Relations 1917-1948: Resistance to Colonialism', *The Arab World Geographer Journal*, 4 (14): 305-335.
- 2014. 'Memories from Beersheba: The Bedouin Palestine Police and the Frontiers of the Empire', *Bulletin of the Council for British Research in the Levant*, 9 (1): 32-38.
- Nasasra, M., Richter-Devroe, S., Abu Rabia-Queder, S., and Ratcliffe, R. (ed.) 2015. *The Naqab Bedouin and Colonialism: New Perspectives*, New York: Routledge.
- Nassar, I. 2006. 'Familial Snapshots: Representing Palestine in the Work of the First Local Photographers', *History and Memory*, 18 (2): 139-155.
- Negev Coexistence Forum for Civil Equality (NCF). 2014. 'The Village Project', URL: http://www.dukium.org/eng/?page_id=1294, Accessed 20 August 2012.
- Nelson, C. (ed.) 1973. *The Desert and the Sown: Nomads in Greater Society*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- The New York Times. 1964. 'Elmo Hutchison, Aide in Middle East' (26 June 1964), URL: <http://news.google.com.newspapers>, Accessed 15 September 2014.
- 1981. 'Druze sheik takes seat in the Israeli Parliament', (21 January 1981), URL: <http://www.nytimes.com/1981/01/21/world/around-the-world-druse-sheik-takes-seat-in-the-israeli-parliament.html>, Accessed 15 September 2014.
- Nora, P. 1989. 'Between Memory and History', *Representations*, 26: 7-24.
- Panitch, J. 1996. 'Liberty, equality, posterity?: Some archival lessons from the case of the French Revolution', *The American Archivist*, 59 (1): 30-47.
- Pappé, I. 2006. *A history of modern Palestine: One land, two peoples*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 2010. 'Opening', *Rethinking The Paradigms: Negev Bedouin Research 2000+ Conference*, United Kingdom: University of Exeter and the British Academy.
- Parizot, C. 2001b. 'Gaza, Beesheba, Dhahriyya: Another Approach to the Negev Bedouin in Israeli-Palestinian Space', *Bulletin du CRFJ*, Automne, 9: 98-110.
- 2004. 'Crossing and Constructing Borders within Daily Contacts: Social and Economic Relations between the Bedouin in the Negev and their Networks in

- Gaza, the West Bank, and Jordan', *Note de Recherche* n° 287 – 2004/10, Marseille: Université Paul Cézanne – Aix-Marseille III.
- 2006. 'Counting Votes That Do Not Count: Negev Bedouin and the Knesset Elections of 17th May 1999, Rahat, Israel', *Nomadic Societies in the Middle East and North Africa: Entering the 21st Century*, D. Chatty (ed.), Leiden and London: Brill Publications.
- Pasternak, G. 2014. 'Book Review: *Photography's Orientalisms: New Essays on Colonial Representation*', Special Issue: Visualising Ethnography: Ethnography's Role in Art and Visual Cultures, *Visual Studies*, 29 (2): 226-228.
- Payes, S. 2005. *Palestinian NGOs in Israel: The Political of Civil Society*, London and New York: Tauris Academic Studies.
- Peel, J. 1984. 'Making History: The Past in the Ijesho Present', *Man*, New Series, 19 (1): 111-132.
- Peers, L. and Brown, A.K. (eds.) 2003. *Museums and Source Communities*, London: Routledge.
- Peters, E. E. L. 1960. 'The Proliferation of Segments in Lineage of Bedouin of Cyrenaica', *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland*, 90 (1): 29-53.
- 1977. 'Local History in Two Arab Communities', *Bulletin for British Society for Middle Eastern Studies*, 4 (2): 71-81.
- 1990. *The Bedouin of Cyrenaica: Studies in Personal and Corporate Power*, E. Marx and J. Goody (eds.), Cambridge: University of Cambridge.
- Pierce, C.S. 1977. *Semiotics and Signifies*, Charles Hardwick (ed.), Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Pinney, C. 1997. *Camera Indica: the social life of Indian photographs*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- 2003. 'Introduction', *Photography's Other Histories*, C. Pinney and N. Peterson (eds.), United States: Duke University Press.
- 2005. 'Things Happen: Or, from Which Moment Does That Object Come?', D. Miller (ed.), *Materiality*, Durham and London: Duke University Press.
- Pinney, C. and Peterson, N. 2003. *Photography's Other Histories (Objects/Histories)*, Durham and London: Duke University Press.
- Piot, C. 1993. 'Secrecy, ambiguity, and the everyday in Kabre culture', *American Anthropologist*, 95 (2): 353-370.

- Pitt-Rivers, J. 1977. *The Fate of Shechem: or, the Politics of Sex: Essays in the Anthropology of the Mediterranean No. 19*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pococke, R. 1745. *A Description of the East and Some other Countries Vol. II*, W. Boyer, London.
- Poole, D. 1997. *Vision, Race, and Modernity: A Visual Economy of the Andean Image World*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Porto, N. 2004. 'Under the Gaze of the Ancestors: Photographs and performance in colonial Angola', *Photographs Object Histories*, E. Edwards and J. Hart (eds.), London: Routledge.
- Rabinowitz, D. 2001. 'The Palestinian Citizens of Israel, the Concept of Trapped Minority and the Discourse of Transnationalism in Anthropology', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 24 (1); 64-85.
- 2002. 'Oriental othering and national identity: A review of early Israeli anthropological studies of Palestinians', *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power*, 9 (3): 305-325.
- Randolph, R. 1963. *The Social Structure of Qdiiraat Bedouin*, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Berkeley: University of California.
- Rao, S., and Wasserman, H. 2007. 'Global media ethics revisited A postcolonial critique', *Global Media and Communication*, 3 (1): 29-50.
- Ratcliffe, R. 2009. 'The Battle for Recognition: Civil Society, Citizenship, and the Political Rise of the Negev Bedouin', *Civil Organizations and Protest Movements in Israel*, E. Marteu (ed.), United States: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ratcliffe, R., Nasasra, M., Abu Rabia-Queder, S., and Richter-Devroe, S. 2015. 'Introduction', *The Naqab Bedouin and Colonialism: New Perspectives*, New York: Routledge.
- Redfield, R. 1953. *The Primitive World and Its Transformations*, New York: Cornell University Press.
- Rettig, H. 2013. 'Sound and fury masking true debate over Bedouin resettlement', (3 December 2013), *The Times of Israel*, URL: <http://www.timesofisrael.com/sound-and-fury-masking-true-debate-over-bedouin-resettlement/>, Accessed 4 August 2014.
- Roberston-Smith, W. 1885. *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia*, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

- Romanek, D. 2015. 'Presence, Significance and Insistence: Photographs in place', *Photographies*, 8 (3): 1-22.
- Rowlands, M. 1993. 'The role of memory in the transmission of culture', *World Archaeology*, 25: 141-151.
- Runia, E. 2006. 'Presence', *History and Theory*, 45 (1): 1-29.
- Ryan, J. 1994. *Picturing Empire: photography and the visualization of the British Empire*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Ryzova, L. 2012. 'I Have the Pictures! Egypt's Photographic Heritage between Digital Reproduction and Neoliberalism', *Jadaliyya*, URL: <http://photography.jadaliyya.com>, Accessed October 2014.
- 2015. 'Unstable Icons, Contested Histories', *Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication*, 8 (1): 37-68.
- Safieh, R. (ed.) 1999. *Hanna Safieh, A Man and His Camera, Photographs of Palestine 1927-1967*, Jerusalem: Raffi Salieh Press.
- Sahlins, M. 1981. *Historical metaphors and mythical realities*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 344.
- 2004. *Apologies to Thucydides: Understanding History as Culture and Vice Versa*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Said, E. 1978. *Orientalism*, New York: Vintage Books.
- 1989. 'Representing the Colonialized: Anthropology's Interlocutors', *Critical Inquiry*, 15 (2): 205-225.
- 2000. 'Invention, memory, and place', *Critical Inquiry*, 26 (2): 175-192.
- Salamandra, C. 2004. *A New Old Damascus: Authenticity and Distinction in Urban Syria*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- 2005. 'Television and the ethnographic endeavor: The case of Syrian drama', *Transnational Broadcasting Studies* 'Culture Wars: The Arabic Music Video Controversy', Egypt and Oxford: The American University of Cairo and St. Anthony's College Oxford.
- Salvatore, A. 1998. 'Staging Virtue: the Disembodiment of Self-Correct-ness and the Making of Islam as a Public Norm', *Yearbook of the Sociology of Islam*, 1: 87.
- Salzman, P. 1980. *When Nomads Settle: Processes of Sedentarization as Adaptation and Response*, New York: Praeger.
- (ed.) 1996. 'Peasant Pastoralism', *The Anthropology of Tribal and Peasant Pastoral Societies: The Dialectics of Social Cohesion and Fragmentation*, U.

- Fabietti and P. Salzman (eds.), Pavia Collegio Ghislieri: Ibis.
- Samuel, R. 1994. *Theatres of Memory Volume 1: Past and Present in Contemporary Culture*, London and New York: Verso.
- Sanders, E. 2010. 'Israel razes homes in Bedouin village' (28 July 2010), *Los Angeles Times*, URL: <http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/28/world/la-fg-israel-bedouins-20100728>, Accessed 20 May 2015.
- Sandys, G. 1615. *The Relation of a Journey begun an. Dom. 1610*, London: W. Barrett.
- Schejter, A. and Tirosh, N. 2012. 'Social Media New and Old in the Al-'Arakeeb Conflict: A Case Study', *The Information Society*, 28 (5), 304-315.
- Scheele, J. 2009. *Village matters: knowledge, politics & community in Kabylia, Algeria*, United Kingdom: James Curry Publishing.
- Schick, I. 1990. 'Representing Middle Eastern women: feminism and colonial discourse', *Feminist Studies*, 16 (2): 345-380.
- Seetzen, U. 1810. *A Brief Account of the Countries Adjoining the Lake of Tiberias, the Jordan, and the Dead Sea*, London: Palestine Association of London.
- Serger, K. (ed.) 1981. *Portrait of a Palestinian Village: The Photographs of Hilma Granquist*, London: Third World Centre.
- Seidler, S. 2013. 'Israel Police order Media Hand Over all Photos from Bedouin Protests in the Negev', (2 December 2013), *Haaretz*, URL: <http://www.haaretz.com/news/israel/.premium-1.561354>, Accessed 23 November 2014.
- Sela, R. 2014, 'Rethinking National Archives in Colonial Countries and Zones of Conflict: The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and Israel's National Photography Archives as a Case Study', URL: <http://www.ibraaz.org/essays/78>, Accessed 20 February 2015.
- Shafir, G., and Peled, Y. 2002. *Being Israeli: The dynamics of multiple citizenship Vol. 16*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Shanklin, W. 1946. 'Anthropomorphy of Transjordan Bedouin with a Discussion of their Racial Affinities', *American Journal of Physical Anthropology*, 4 (3): 323-375.
- Sheehi, S. 2007. 'A social history of early Arab photography or a prolegomenon to an archaeology of the Lebanese imago', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 39 (2): 177-208.
- Sheen, D. 2011. 'Israeli plan to relocate 30,000 Bedouin a gross injustice, say

- researchers', (21 October 2011), *Hareetz*, URL: <http://www.hareetz.com>, Accessed November 2011,
- Shepard, N. 1997. *The Zealous Intruders: The Western Rediscovery of Palestine*, London: Collins Publishing.
- Shibli, A. 2000. 'Unrecognised', *Ahlam Shibli*, URL: <http://www.ahlamshibli.com/Work/unrecognised.htm>, Accessed 20 March 2014.
- Shmueli, D. and Khamaisi, R. 2011. 'Bedouin communities in the Negev: Models for planning the unplanned', *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 77 (2): 109-125.
- Shohat, E., and Stam, R. (eds.). 2003. *Multiculturalism, postcoloniality, and transnational media*, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.
- Shryock, A. 1997. *Nationalism and the Genealogical Imagination: Oral History and Textual Authority in Tribal Jordan*, Berkeley and New York: University of California Press.
- (ed.) 2004. 'Chapter One – Other Conscious/Self Aware: First Thoughts on Cultural Intimacy and Mass Mediation', *Off Stage/On Display: Intimacy and Ethnography in the Age of Public Culture*, United States: Stanford University Press.
- Silver- Brody. V. 1998. *Documenters of the Dream: Pioneer Jewish Photographers in the Land of Israel, 1890-1933*, Jerusalem: Magnes Press and Hebrew University.
- Smootha, S. 1996. 'Ethnic Democracy: Israel as an Archetype', *Zionism: Contemporary Dispute Special Issue*, P. Ginossar and A. Bareli (eds.), Sde Boker Israel: Ben Gurion Research Center.
- Somfalvi, A. 2013. 'Avigdor Lieberman: Our lands are being robbed', (30 November 2013) *Ynet News*, URL: <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4459669,00.html>, Accessed December 2014.
- Sontag, S. 1978. *On Photography*, United States: Dell Publishing Co. and University of California.
- Spivak, G. 1987. *In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics*, New York: Routledge.
- 1988. 'Can the Subaltern Speak?', *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (eds.), Basingstoke: Macmillan Education.
- Sprague, S. 1978. 'Yoruba photography: How the Yoruba see themselves', *African Arts*, 12 (1): 240-60.
- Sreberny, A. and Mohammadi, A. 1994. *Small Media, Big Revolution: Communication*,

- Culture, and Iranian Revolution*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Stasiulis, D. and Yuval-Davis, N. 1995. *Unsettling Settler Societies: Articulations of Gender, Ethnicity, Race and Class*, United States of America: Sage.
- Stavi, I., Kressel, G., Gutterman, Y., and Degan, A. 2006. 'Flock use among Bedouin in 'spontaneous' Settlements in the Negev Desert, southern Israel', *Nomadic Peoples*, 10 (1): 53-69.
- Sternhell, Z. 2009. *The founding myths of Israel: Nationalism, socialism, and the making of the Jewish state*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Steward-Howe, K. 1997. *Revealing the Holy Land: The Photographic Exploration of Palestine*, Santa Barbara: Santa Barbara Museum of Art.
- Stewart, F. H. 1994. *Honor*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- St. Petersburg Times. 1957. 'Mrs. Roosevelt as 40th Wife' (3 December 1957), URL: <http://news.google.com/newspapers>, Accessed 2 September 2013.
- Strassler, K. 2010. *Refracted visions: Popular photography and national modernity in Java*, Durham: Duke University Press.
- Swedenburg, T. 1990. 'The Palestinian Peasant as National Signifier: Tendentious Revisions of the Past in the Construction of Community', *Anthropology Quarterly*, 63 (1): 18-30.
- Swirski, S. and Hasson, Y. 2006. *Invisible Citizens: Israel Government Policy Toward the Negev Bedouin*, Tel Aviv: Adva Center.
- The Sydney Morning Herald. 1957. Mrs. Roosevelt Refused, but 1,000 want a sheik', (8 December 1957), URL: <http://news.google.com/newspapers>, Accessed 2 September 2013.
- 1960. 'Mrs. Roosevelt – The Sheik Still Tries' (17 January 1960), URL: <http://news.google.com/newspapers>, Accessed 2 September 2013.
- Tagg, J. 1988. *The Burden of Representation*, Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press.
- Tait, D. and Middleton, J. 1958. *Tribes without rulers*, London: Routledge.
- Tapper, R. 1979. *Pasture and Politics: Economics, Conflict and Ritual among the Shahsevan Nomads of Northwestern Iran*, New York and London: Academic Press.
- Tawil- Sourì, H. 2011. 'Colored Identity The Politics and Materiality of ID Cards in Palestine/Israel', *Social Text*, 29 (2): 67-97.
- Theobald, A. 2009. *Watching the War and Keeping the Peace: The United Nations*

- Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East, 1949-1956*, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Canada: Queen's University.
- Thompson, W. 1856. *The land and the Book: Pilgrimage and Mission in Palestine*, New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers.
- Tilly, C. 1994. 'Interpreting material culture', *Interpreting objects and collections*, S. Pearce (ed.), London: Routledge.
- The Times of Israel. 2013. 'Government bill aims to regular Bedouin settlement', (6 May 2013), URL: <http://www.timesofisrael.com/government-bill-aims-to-regulate-bedouin-settlement/>, Accessed 4 August 2014.
- Touma, H. 1996. *The Music of the Arabs*, Laurie Schwartz (trans.), Portland: Amadeus Press.
- Turabi, H. 1983. 'The Islamic State', *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, J. Esposito (ed.), United States of America: Oxford University Press.
- Turner, T. 1991. 'The social dynamics of video media in an indigenous society: the cultural meaning and personal politics of video-making in Kayapó communities', *Visual Anthropology Review*, 7 (2): 68-72.
- 1992. 'Defiant Images: the Kayapó appropriation of video', *Anthropology Today*, 8 (6): 5-16.
- Ullian, R. 2010. *Frommer's Israel*, New Jersey: Wiley Publishing, Inc.
- United Nations. 2012. 'Secretary-General's remarks to the Security Council [as delivered]', URL: <http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=6452>, Accessed 14 May 2014.
- United States Central Intelligence Agency. 2001. 'Map of Israel', URL: http://mapas.owje.com/maps/2874_Israel-Political-Map.html, Accessed 3 April 2010.
- University of College Cork Palestine Solidarity Campaign (UCCPSC). 2013. 'Khalil Rissas', URL: <http://cosmos.ucc.ie/cs1064/jabowen/IPSC/php/authors.php?auid=53434>, Accessed 20 March 2014.
- Versteegh, K. 1997. *The Arabic Language*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Vom Bruck, G. 1996. 'Being Worthy of Protection: The Dialectics of Gender Attributes in Yemen', *Social Anthropology*, 4 (2): 145-162.
- 1997. 'A House Turned Inside Out Inhabiting Space in a Yemeni City', *Journal of Material Culture*, 2 (2): 139-172.
- Williamson, T. 2000. *Knowledge and Its Limits*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wilson, J. 1847. *Lands of the Bible*, Edinburgh: William Whyte and Company.

- Wolf, E. 1982. *Europe and the People with-out History*, Berkeley: University California Press.
- Woodward, M. 2009. 'Creating Memory and History: The role of archival practices in Lebanon and Palestine', *Photographies*, 2 (1): 21-35.
- Wright, C. 2013. *The echo of things: the lives of photographs in the Solomon Islands*, Durham and London: Duke University Press.
- Wright, T. 1999. *The Photography Handbook*, London and New York, Routledge Press.
- Yiftachel, O. 1995. *Planning and Social Control: Policy and Resistance in a Divided Society*, United States of America: Pergamon.
- 1999. 'Ethnocracy': The Politics of Judaizing Israel/Palestine', *Constellations*, 6 (3): 364-390.
- 2003. 'Bedouin Arabs and the Israeli Settler State: Land Policies and Indigenous Resistance', *The Future of Indigenous Peoples: Strategies of Survival and Development*, D. Champagne, and I. Abu Saad (eds.), United States: UCLA American Indian Studies Centre.
- 2004. 'Understanding 'ethnocratic' regimes: the politics of seizing contested territories', *Political Geography*, 23(6): 647-676.
- 2006. *Ethnocracy: Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- 2009. 'Critical theory and 'gray space': Mobilization of the colonized', *Planning Theory*, 8 (1): 88-100.
- Zochrot. 2006. 'Testimonies', URL: <http://zochrot.org/en/testimony/all>, Accessed 8 March 2013.
- 2013. 'Baqon (Remaining): Photography Exhibit', URL: <http://zochrot.org/en/gallery/54886>, Accessed 3 March 2015.

FRENCH

- Bonaparte, N. 2007 [1809-1829]. *Description de l'Égypte*, London: TASCHEN.
- Bonté, P., and Ben Hounet, Y. 2009. 'Introduction', *Études rurales*, No. 184, *La tribu à l'heure de la globalisation*, Juillet-Décembre: 13-31.
- Bonté, P., Conte, E., and Dresch, P. 2001. *Émirs et présidents. Figures de la parenté dans le monde Arabe*, Paris: CRNS éditions.
- De Volney, C. 2013 [1787]. *Voyages à travers la Syrie et l'Égypte dans les années*,

- Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dresch, P. and Scheele, J. 2009. Les Mots et Les Choses: L'Identité Tribale en Arabie', *Études rurales: La tribu à l'heure de la globalisation*, Juillet-Décembre (184): 185-202.
- Jaussen, A. 1908. *Costumés des Arabes au pays de Moab*, Paris: Victor Lecoffre.
- Maffi, I. 2009. 'La Madāfa en Jordanie: Un Lieu du Mémoire', *Études rurales*, No. 184, *La tribu à l'heure de la globalisation*, Juillet-Décembre: 203-215.
- Parizot, C. 2001a. *Le mois de la bienvenue: réappropriations des mécanismes électoraux et réajustements de rapports de pouvoir chez les Bédouins du Néguev (Israël)*, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Paris: EHESS.
- Pouillon, F. 1996. 'Bédouins des Lumières, Bédouins romantiques: mouvement littéraire et Enquête sociologique dans le voyage en Orient (XVIIIe-XIXe siècles)', *The Anthropology of Tribal and Peasant Pastoral Societies: The Dialectic of Social Cohesion and Fragmentation*, U. Fabietti and P.C. Salzman (eds.), Italy: Pavia Collegio Ghislieri.
- Sanbar, E. (2004) *Les Palestiniens: La photographie d'une terre et de son peuple de 1839 à nos jours*, Vanves: Hazan Publishers.
- Serjeant, R. 1977. *Sadan: Le mobilier au Proche-Orient médiéval. x, 179 pp., 8 plates.*, Leiden: EJ Brill.

GERMAN

- Al-Arif, A. 1938. *Die Beduinen von Beerseba; ihre rechtsverhältnisse, sitten und gebräuche*. L. Haefeli (trans.), Luzern: Räber.
- Al-Hamdānī, Muḥammad al-Ḥasan ibn Aḥmad. 1968. *Sifāt Jazīrat al-'Arab: Geographie der Arabischen Halbinsel*, D. Muller (trans.) Leiden: Oriental Press.
- Biasio, E. 1998. *Beduinen im Negev: Vom Zelt ins Haus*, Zürich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung.
- Haefeli, L. (trans.) 1938. *Die Beduinen von Beerseba : Ihre Rechtsverhältnisse Sitten und Gebräuche*, Luzern: Räber & Cie.
- Musil, A. 1908. *Arabia Petraea, III*, Deutschland: Kaiserl Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien.
- Von Oppenheim, M. 1939. *Die Beduinen Vol. 3*, Deutschland: Georg Olms Verlag.

HEBREW

- Al-'Arif, 'A. 2000. *Tuldut Bir Sheva' Vashabatim: Shavati Habado'im Bamahoz Bir Sheva*, E. Nawi (trans.), Yerushalayim: 'Ari'el Prima Publishing.
- Abu Rabia, n.n. 2014. 'Shevet Abu Rab'ah', *Wikipedia*, URL: http://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/רביעה_אבן_שבט, Accessed 3 February 2015.
- Al-Huzayyil, 'A. 2001. *Shaykh Salman al-Huzayyil, Shamo Shel ha-Aba of ba-Negev*, Yerushalayim: Presim Ari'el.
- 2013. 'Salman al-Huzayyil', *Wikipedia*, URL: http://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/סלמאן_אל_הוזייל, Accessed 17 January 2013.
- Amiran, S. and Ben-David, J. 1979. 'Ha-Hayishabat ha-beduyot ba-Beersheva ha-yamok', *Ha-Negev Eretz, Adom va-Madbar*, S. Avshalom and Y. Gradus (eds.), Tel Aviv: Misrad ha-Bitahon.
- Bar Zvi, S. 1991. *Masoret ha-shiput shel Bedve ha-Negev: iyunim mevusasim al magaim im zikne ha-Bedvim*, Tel Aviv: Misrad ha-bitahon.
- 1998. *Masoret ha-shiput shel Bedve ha-Negev: iyunim mevusasim al magaim im zikne ha-Bedvim*, Tel Aviv: Misrad ha-bitahon.
- Ben David, Y., and Gonen, A. 1979. *Bedouim V'Bedouim Falahim B'Tahalich HaIyur BaNegev*, Yerushalayim: Universitat ha-'Ivrit.
- Curiel, I. 2011. 'Tamonot Makoddot Beer Sheva', *Yedi'oth* (20 May 2011), URL: <http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4070905,00.html>, Accessed 30 November 2013.
- Gal-Nar, I. 1991. 'Ha-'Ikamot Beer Sheva baTakopah haOttomanot', *Beer Sheva va-Atareem*, Gideon Begar and Eli Shiler (eds.), Yerushalayim: Presim Ari'el.
- Meir, A. and Barnea, D. 1985. 'Petot Shel M'racot ha-Tinor Ha-Bedeem Banegev', *Eretz: Universitat Ben Gurion Banegev*.
- Tzva Hahagana LeYirsra'el. 1954. *Beduei HaNegev bi-Medinat Israel*, [Archived], Tel Aviv.
- Vilnay, Z. 1967. *Beer Sheva 'Iyad Abot vaBeneem*, Yerushalayim: Presim Ari'el.
- Yagna, I. and David, A. 2014. 'Has'sh Shamatza at Gopot Aphoto Shel Ma'ir Har Tzion' *Walla*, URL: <http://news.walla.co.il/item/2758870>, Accessed 3 March 2014.
- Zivan, Z. 1998. *Ha-Ma'aseh vеха-mediniyut ha-Yisre' eliyim ba-Negev ha-deromi, 1949-1957*, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Yerushalayim: Universitah ha-'Ivrit.