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Reputation and credit without collateral in Africa's formal banking.

Abstract:

The analysis of reputation as a contract enforcement instrument where legal institutions, especially commercial courts, fail to enforce commercial contracts has focused on informal credit markets. The literature centres on the argument that lenders or co-borrowers in group lending can easily monitor each borrower, given the small size of an individual lender's market. Verifiability allows the detection of opportunistic default and hence allows its punishment. This paper argues that in Africa,...

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Publisher:
CSAE (University of Oxford)
Series:
Working Paper Series
Publication date:
2005-01-01
Language:
English
UUID:
uuid:d54b0c98-dbb2-42f5-a186-33be4b702317
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:13245
Deposit date:
2011-08-16

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