

# **SECURING REFORM?**

POST-ELECTION POWER SHARING AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN KENYA,  
TOGO, AND ZIMBABWE, 2006-2013

Alexander H. Noyes  
Lady Margaret Hall

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DPhil in Politics  
in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford

January 2017  
Word count: 99,375

# **Securing Reform? Post-Election Power Sharing and Security Sector Reform in Kenya, Togo, and Zimbabwe, 2006-2013**

Alexander H. Noyes, Lady Margaret Hall  
DPhil, Politics  
January 2017

## **ABSTRACT**

Power-sharing arrangements have become the default tool of international actors to resolve a vast range of conflicts worldwide, with a particular concentration in sub-Saharan Africa. Traditionally used to end high-intensity civil wars, recently power sharing has increasingly been used to terminate an array of lower-intensity conflicts, such as election-related violence in Togo in 2006 and Kenya and Zimbabwe in 2008. The thin but emerging scholarship on post-election power sharing is largely negative, maintaining that the model is unlikely to deliver the institutional reforms necessary to resolve the underlying roots of electoral conflicts. Yet the cases of Kenya, and, to a lesser extent, Togo, appear to complicate this narrative, suggesting that post-election power sharing may be able to deliver some key but thorny institutional reforms, such as security sector reform. While the power-sharing model continues to be used worldwide and security reform is widely identified by scholars and practitioners as critical to durable peace, the existing literature has generally ignored the potential link between the two.

As such, this dissertation seeks to answer the following questions: Does post-election power sharing lead to security sector reform? Which causal factors are most important in shaping security reform outcomes under post-election power sharing, and through what processes or mechanisms?

The two-step integrated theoretical framework presented here forwards a structured contingency approach, positing that a combination of long- and short-term domestic and international factors will drive or stymie reform of the security sector under post-election power sharing in democratizing countries. In short, the theory argues that two main long-term factors, the nature of civil-military relations and the character of external involvement, combined with two short-term mechanisms, the design of the political agreement and the type of political strategy deployed by the parties, will be the most important factors shaping security reform outcomes under post-election power sharing. I demonstrate that post-election power sharing plays a significant role in the causal process of security reform and can deliver some institutional reforms, under certain conditions.

The dissertation uses the method of structured, focused comparison to build and apply the theoretical propositions to the cases of Kenya, Togo, and Zimbabwe. Using process tracing and the logic of most-similar comparisons, I conduct two sets of cross- and within-case comparisons, utilizing elite interviews as the primary tool for data collection. I conducted over 100 interviews with key decision-makers in my case countries—including former prime ministers, cabinet ministers, top political party leaders, senior security officials, and international stakeholders.

|                                                                                        |            |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| <b>1. INTRODUCTION</b>                                                                 | <b>8</b>   |
| 1.1. Prologue                                                                          | 8          |
| 1.2. Research Puzzle: Power to Reform?                                                 | 9          |
| 1.3. Major Gaps and Theory Overview                                                    | 15         |
| 1.4. Major Contributions, Caveats, and Significance                                    | 19         |
| 1.5. Key Terms                                                                         | 24         |
| 1.6. Literature Review                                                                 | 26         |
| 1.6.1. Power Sharing: Critical of Post-Election Pacts, Focused on Civil War            | 26         |
| 1.6.2. Civil-Military Relations: Extensive But Largely Ignores Transitional Contexts   | 31         |
| 1.6.3. Security Sector Reform Literature: Overly Technical and Apolitical but Shifting | 35         |
| 1.6.4. Minimal Linkages                                                                | 37         |
| 1.7. Chapter Overview                                                                  | 39         |
| <b>2. THEORY AND METHODOLOGY</b>                                                       | <b>42</b>  |
| 2.1. Research Design Overview                                                          | 42         |
| 2.2. Research Problem                                                                  | 43         |
| 2.3. Theoretical Framework                                                             | 43         |
| 2.3.1. Hypotheses                                                                      | 45         |
| 2.3.2. Power Sharing in Practice: Variable Interaction and Four Ideal Types            | 49         |
| 2.4. Measurement Indicators                                                            | 55         |
| 2.5. Case Selection                                                                    | 61         |
| 2.5.1. Case Overview: The Electoral Crisis in Zimbabwe                                 | 65         |
| 2.5.2. Case Overview: The Electoral Crisis in Kenya                                    | 69         |
| 2.5.3. Case Overview: The Electoral Crisis in Togo                                     | 74         |
| 2.6. Data Collection                                                                   | 78         |
| 2.7. Data Analysis                                                                     | 82         |
| 2.8. Overcoming Potential Research Design Hurdles                                      | 83         |
| 2.9. Conclusion                                                                        | 85         |
| <b>3. EXCLUSIONARY SECURITY POLITICS IN ZIMBABWE</b>                                   | <b>87</b>  |
| 3.1. Overview                                                                          | 87         |
| 3.2. Nature of Civil-Military Relations: Roots of High ZANU-PF Reliance                | 88         |
| 3.2.1. Politicization vs. Militarization: Who's in Control?                            | 90         |
| 3.2.2. High Reliance                                                                   | 95         |
| 3.3. External Involvement: Regional Solidarity Politics Trump Western Influence        | 102        |
| 3.3.1. Softly Softly: Mbeki's Quiet Diplomacy                                          | 107        |
| 3.3.2. Indicators of Low Western Leverage and Regional Economic Dominance              | 111        |
| 3.4. Agreement Design                                                                  | 114        |
| 3.4.1. Weak SSR Content and External Monitoring                                        | 116        |
| 3.4.2. Roots of Weak Agreement Design                                                  | 118        |
| 3.5. ZANU-PF's Exclusionary Political Strategies Under Power Sharing                   | 123        |
| 3.5.1. Explaining ZANU-PF's Violent, Exclusionary Strategy                             | 127        |
| 3.6. MDC's Defensive Exclusionary Strategies Under Power Sharing                       | 128        |
| 3.6.1. Explaining MDC Strategy                                                         | 131        |
| 3.7. SSR Outcomes in Zimbabwe                                                          | 133        |
| 3.7.1. Weak Agreement Design Tied Hands of International and Domestic Actors           | 133        |
| 3.7.2. Exclusive Strategies Close Off Slight SSR Openings                              | 137        |
| 3.7.3. SSR Outcomes: Negligible Progress Under the GNU                                 | 141        |
| 3.7.4. SSR Efforts Prior to Power Sharing: No Real Attempts                            | 145        |
| 3.8. Conclusion                                                                        | 147        |
| <b>4. INCLUSIONARY COALITION POLITICS IN KENYA</b>                                     | <b>149</b> |
| 4.1. Overview                                                                          | 149        |
| 4.2. Roots of Low Incumbent Reliance                                                   | 150        |
| 4.2.1. A One-Way Street: Political Supremacy Over the Police                           | 152        |
| 4.2.2. Low Reliance under the GCG                                                      | 156        |

|                                                                              |            |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| 4.3. Character of External Involvement: Roots of High Western Leverage       | 159        |
| 4.3.1. The Role of the International Community during the 2008 Mediation     | 161        |
| 4.3.2. Indicators of High Western Leverage                                   | 164        |
| 4.4. Agreement Design                                                        | 168        |
| 4.4.1. Strong SSR Content and External Monitoring                            | 168        |
| 4.4.2. Roots of Strong Agreement Design                                      | 171        |
| 4.5. Inclusive Political Strategies Under Power Sharing                      | 174        |
| 4.5.1. PNU's Largely Inclusive Strategy Under Power Sharing                  | 176        |
| 4.5.2. Explaining PNU's Inclusionary Strategy                                | 179        |
| 4.5.3. ODM's Inclusive Strategy Under Power Sharing                          | 180        |
| 4.5.4. Explaining ODM's Choice of Strategy                                   | 183        |
| 4.6. SSR Outcomes in Kenya                                                   | 184        |
| 4.6.1. Strong Agreement Design Empowered International and Domestic Actors   | 185        |
| 4.6.1. Inclusive Strategies Facilitated Openings for Police Reform           | 190        |
| 4.6.2. SSR Outcomes: Despite Challenges, Major Progress Under Power Sharing  | 193        |
| 4.6.3. Limited Progress Prior to Power Sharing                               | 200        |
| 4.7. Conclusion                                                              | 202        |
| <b>5. COUNTERVAILING POLITICS IN TOGO</b>                                    | <b>204</b> |
| 5.1. Overview                                                                | 204        |
| 5.2. Nature of Civil-Military Relations: Roots of High RPT Reliance          | 205        |
| 5.2.1. High Incumbent Reliance and Political Influence of the Military       | 211        |
| 5.3. Character of External Involvement: Roots of High Western Leverage       | 215        |
| 5.3.1. The Role of External Actors in the 2005 Crisis and 2006 APG Mediation | 218        |
| 5.3.1. Indicators of High Western Leverage                                   | 222        |
| 5.4. Strong Agreement Design                                                 | 226        |
| 5.4.1. Strong SSR Content and External Monitoring                            | 227        |
| 5.4.2. Roots of Strong Agreement Design                                      | 230        |
| 5.5. Largely Conflicting Political Strategies Under the APG                  | 233        |
| 5.5.1. RPT's Moderated Political Strategies                                  | 233        |
| 5.5.2. Explaining RPT's Largely Moderate Strategy                            | 236        |
| 5.5.3. The Opposition's Largely Exclusionary Strategy Under Power Sharing    | 239        |
| 5.5.4. Explaining the Opposition's Strategy                                  | 243        |
| 5.6. SSR Outcomes in Togo                                                    | 244        |
| 5.6.1. Strong Agreement Design Amplified External Reform Pressures           | 245        |
| 5.6.1. Conflicting Political Strategies Led to a Halting Reform Process      | 249        |
| 5.6.2. SSR Outcomes: Against the Odds, A Moderate Degree of SSR Progress     | 252        |
| 5.6.3. Blocked Progress Prior to Power Sharing                               | 260        |
| 5.7. Conclusion                                                              | 261        |
| <b>6. CONCLUSION: SECURING REFORM?</b>                                       | <b>263</b> |
| 6.1. Overview                                                                | 263        |
| 6.2. Post-Election Power Sharing and SSR in Comparative Perspective          | 264        |
| 6.2.1. Summary of Theoretical Framework and Findings                         | 267        |
| 6.2.2. Provisional Extension of the Theoretical Framework                    | 275        |
| 6.2.3. Caveats                                                               | 279        |
| 6.3. Theoretical and Policy Implications                                     | 283        |
| 6.3.1. Policy Implications                                                   | 290        |
| 6.4. Avenues for Further Research                                            | 295        |

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, for his tireless support. Ricardo has an unrivaled mastery over many subjects and speaks in full paragraphs, so he can be a bit daunting to work under. Luckily, he is as generous and kind as he is learned. Thank you, Ricardo, for shepherding me through the Oxford labyrinth, for the countless conversations both on my topic and off, and for gently pushing me to be a better scholar. This dissertation would not exist without your invaluable guidance.

As an undergraduate at Connecticut College, I was fortunate to take a class with the force of nature that is Professor Tristan Anne Borer. That class, on human rights and world politics, set me on the winding path to study African politics, to my first job at the Council on Foreign Relations, to working abroad, and eventually to graduate school. Tristan, a heartfelt thanks to you for believing in me and for instilling in me the courage and confidence to pursue a career in international affairs at an early “critical juncture” in my life (please pardon the political science joke!). I know I am not the first student to express such sentiment, and certainly will not be the last.

Like all doctoral students, I incurred huge debts along the way and owe many thanks to a wide array of people. At Oxford, I would like to give a special thanks to Professor Nic Cheeseman for his indispensable guidance and feedback throughout this project. Nic deserves big thanks for the many conversations on power sharing in Africa, for encouraging me to come back to Oxford for my doctorate, and to generally think big in my intellectual pursuits. Professor John Gledhill has also been a tremendous resource on all things security studies and qualitative methods; many thanks to John for kindly and constructively steering the dissertation to where it is now. A big thank you also to Professor Peter Lewis at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies for kindly agreeing to serve as my external examiner. Your incisive and constructive feedback was incredibly helpful and will greatly improve any future iteration of this work.

I would also like to thank Professor David Anderson and the entire African Studies Centre at Oxford for their early support of this project. The MSc was a challenging but fruitful experience that was made enjoyable by a wonderful cohort of students from around the world. I am grateful to Professor Blessing-Miles Tendi and Jocelyn Alexander for allowing me to intermittently sojourn into the fantastic Zimbabwe circle at Oxford. I would also like to thank the Department of Politics and International Relations and my college, Lady Margaret Hall, for their great intellectual and financial support throughout my time at Oxford. Finally, a big thank you to the very sharp group of friends that I was fortunate to make at Oxford. Special thanks to those who were kind enough to read and discuss many iterations of this thesis, namely Bilal Baloch, Frances Brown, and Michaela Collard.

As a Yankee at Oxford, I also relied on a broad spectrum of people back home for both intellectual and emotional support. Many thanks to Professor William Rose for his advice and support, especially as I chose which graduate school path to take. I would like to thank Dr. Paul Stares at the Council on Foreign Relations for his early support of my intellectual

and professional interests. Paul was simply the best first boss and continues to be an amazingly generous mentor. I would also like to send a tremendous thank you to Dr. Dorina Bekoe, Professor Chet Crocker, Ambassador (ret.) William Mark Bellamy, and Dr. Carolyn Haggis for their helpful advice, comments, and generous sharing of contacts for this project.

A big thanks to Admiral Rick Porterfield, Dr. Stephanie Burchard, Ambassador (ret.) George Ward, Dr. Ashley Bybee, Dr. Janette Yarwood, Dr. Wade Hinkle, and Dr. Chuck Fletcher at the Institute for Defense Analyses for keeping me employed and for throwing me work projects throughout my studies. Dr. Julie Chalfin at the State Department also deserves big thanks for her guidance and understanding while I juggled a day job during the writing up process. Finally, I would like to sincerely thank Dr. Caryn Peiffer and Professor Pierre Englebert for kindly sharing their data with me.

This experience would not have been possible without the tremendous and unflagging support of my lovely family. My brilliant and beautiful wife, Gypsy Moore, has been a saint throughout my graduate work; a gigantic thanks for your love, support, and sense of humor (and for allowing me to depart on a year of fieldwork a month after we tied the knot!). A huge thank you to my mom and dad, Wendy and Sandy Noyes, for being awesome parents, instilling in me the tremendous value of education, and for not trying to dissuade me every time I flew to another conflict-affected country. I would also like to give a big thanks to my sister, Daisy Noyes, for always setting the bar impossibly high.

I would like to give special thanks to Ekoutiamé “Jules” Ahlin, my research assistant and translator in Togo, for his unstinting support during my time in Lomé. Last but certainly not least, an enormous thank you to the over 100 individuals interviewed over the course of this dissertation for their incredible generosity and candor, especially given the sensitive nature of the research topic. A giant thanks to all the interviewees turned friends in Kenya, Zimbabwe, Togo, and South Africa for being fantastic hosts during my research in your home countries. Of course, it goes without saying that all remaining errors and shortcomings of this work remain my own.

## ACRONYMS

|        |                                                                                                           |
|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| ACLED  | Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project                                                            |
| ANC    | African National Congress                                                                                 |
| ANC    | <i>Alliance Nationale pour le Changement</i> (National Alliance for Change)                               |
| APG    | <i>Accord Politique Global</i> (Comprehensive Political Accord)                                           |
| AU     | African Union                                                                                             |
| CAR    | <i>Comité d'Action pour la Renouveau</i> (Action Committee for Renewal)                                   |
| CCM    | <i>Chama Cha Mapinduzi</i> (Party of the Revolution)                                                      |
| CENI   | <i>Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendent</i> (Independent National Electoral Commission)            |
| CIC    | Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution                                                     |
| CIPEV  | Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence                                                         |
| CLO    | Coordination and Liaison Office                                                                           |
| CNSC   | <i>La Concertation Nationale de la Société Civile</i> (National Consultation of Civil Society Togo)       |
| CPDC   | <i>Cadre Permanent de Dialogue et de Concertation</i> (Permanent Framework for Dialogue and Consultation) |
| CPP    | <i>Convergence Patriotique Panafricaine</i> (Pan African Patriotic Convergence)                           |
| CUF    | Civic United Front                                                                                        |
| CVJR   | <i>Commission Vérité, Justice et Réconciliation</i> (Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission)       |
| DRC    | Democratic Republic of the Congo                                                                          |
| DV     | Dependent Variable                                                                                        |
| EAC    | East African Community                                                                                    |
| GCG    | Grand Coalition Government                                                                                |
| GDP    | Gross Domestic Product                                                                                    |
| GNI    | Gross National Income                                                                                     |
| GNU    | Government of National Unity                                                                              |
| GPA    | Global Political Agreement                                                                                |
| ECOMOG | ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group                                                                         |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States                                                                 |
| FOSEL  | <i>Force Sécurité de Élections Législatives</i> (Legislative Election Security Force)                     |
| FOSEP  | <i>Force Sécurité de Élections Présidentielles</i> (Presidential Election Security Force)                 |
| ICC    | International Criminal Court                                                                              |
| IG     | Inspector General                                                                                         |
| IGAD   | Inter-Governmental Authority on Development                                                               |
| IMF    | International Monetary Fund                                                                               |
| IPA    | Interim Political Authority                                                                               |
| IPOA   | Independent Policing Oversight Authority                                                                  |
| IREC   | Independent Review Committee                                                                              |
| IV     | Independent Variable                                                                                      |
| JOC    | Joint Operations Command                                                                                  |
| JOMIC  | Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee                                                             |
| KANU   | Kenyan African National Union                                                                             |

|         |                                                                      |
|---------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| KNDR    | Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation                           |
| LCD     | Lesotho Congress for Democracy                                       |
| LDP     | Liberal Democratic Party                                             |
| MDC     | Movement for Democratic Change                                       |
| MDC-M   | Movement for Democratic Change-Mutambara                             |
| MDC-N   | Movement for Democratic Change-Ncube                                 |
| MDC-T   | Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai                            |
| NARC    | National Rainbow Coalition                                           |
| NCA     | National Constitutional Assembly                                     |
| NPSC    | National Police Service Commission                                   |
| NSC     | National Security Council                                            |
| NSIS    | National Security Intelligence Service                               |
| NSS     | National Security Strategy                                           |
| MPLA    | People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola                       |
| ODA     | Official Development Assistance                                      |
| ODM     | Orange Democratic Movement                                           |
| OHCHR   | Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights                  |
| PDP     | <i>Parti Démocratique Panafricain</i> (Pan African Democratic Party) |
| PNU     | Party of National Unity                                              |
| PRIC    | Police Reforms Implementation Committee                              |
| REC     | Regional Economic Community                                          |
| RPT     | <i>Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais</i> (Togolese People's Rally)    |
| SADC    | South African Development Community                                  |
| SSR     | Security Sector Reform                                               |
| TJRC    | Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission                        |
| UFC     | <i>Union des Forces de Changement</i> (Union of Forces for Change)   |
| UN      | United Nations                                                       |
| UNDP    | United Nations Development Program                                   |
| UNIR    | <i>Union Pour la République</i> (Union for the Republic)             |
| UK      | United Kingdom                                                       |
| US      | United States of America                                             |
| USAID   | United States Agency for International Development                   |
| ZANLA   | Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army                            |
| ZANU    | Zimbabwe African National Union                                      |
| ZANU-PF | Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front                      |
| ZAPU    | Zimbabwe African People's Union                                      |
| ZIPRA   | Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army                                 |



# 1. INTRODUCTION

*“The grand coalition [unity government] will probably, historically, be recorded as the most transformative government in very many years to come...I don’t see a government in the near future having the kind of capacity to bring in radical reforms that the grand coalition brought.”<sup>1</sup>*

(Gichira Kibara, 2015, permanent secretary of Kenya’s Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion, and Constitutional Affairs; member of the Party of National Unity’s 2008 negotiating team)

*“Let’s admit, we had no experience of state affairs. Compared with people who have been in statecraft for almost 30 years. We were at a very big disadvantage. Did we think [President Robert] Mugabe was going to give up power? Did we think that Mugabe was going to share power? It was a degree of naiveté.”<sup>2</sup>*

(Morgan Tsvangirai, 2014, prime minister of Zimbabwe from 2009 to 2013)

*“We believe that without the international community, we would not have had the Accord Politique Global.”<sup>3</sup>*

(Gilchrist Olympio, 2015, former president of Togo’s main opposition party, the *Union des Forces de Changement* [Union of Forces for Change])

## 1.1. Prologue

August 27, 2010 was a landmark day for Kenya. After more than two decades of failed attempts at constitutional reform, President Mwai Kibaki signed the country’s new constitution into law in front of a cheering crowd of tens of thousands. Summing up the momentous occasion, at the signing ceremony Kibaki exclaimed: “this is the most important day in the history of our nation since independence.”<sup>4</sup> The new constitution, which included sweeping institutional reforms to the country’s notoriously politicized and corrupt police

---

<sup>1</sup> Personal interview, Gichira Kibara, former permanent secretary of Kenya’s Ministry of Justice, National

<sup>2</sup> Personal interview, Morgan Tsvangirai, former prime minister of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe, December 5, 2014.

<sup>3</sup> Personal interview, Gilchrist Olympio, former president of Togo’s main opposition party, the *Union des Forces de Changement* (Union of Forces for Change), Lomé, Togo, June 20, 2015.

<sup>4</sup> Mwai Kibaki, 2010, “Speech at the Promulgation of the New Constitution,” <http://www.nation.co.ke/blob/view/-/998162/data/189174/-/1m232f/-/kibaki+speech.pdf> (accessed February 23, 2016).

service, had been ratified by popular vote in a national referendum three weeks prior. After the new constitution was signed, a number of police reform bills were passed by parliament.

Despite delays and implementation challenges, the passed legislation and subsequent establishment of several oversight mechanisms provided the institutional framework to reform the structure and oversight of the Kenyan police. How did Kenya's power-sharing government, which came into office through protracted negotiations in 2008 after the country's worst bout of civil violence left over 1,000 killed and 600,000 displaced, achieve these constitutional and institutional reforms? Did these long delayed institutional reforms translate from paper to practice?

## 1.2. Research Puzzle: Power to Reform?

Post-conflict power-sharing arrangements and security reform efforts have proliferated across the globe over the last two decades. While international and regional actors use power sharing as a tool to end conflict on a global scale, from Honduras to Bosnia to Afghanistan, in recent years power sharing has become particularly preponderant in sub-Saharan Africa. From 1999 to 2010, twenty countries in Africa inked power-sharing pacts in an effort to resolve violent conflict.<sup>5</sup> Traditionally used as a mechanism to end high-intensity civil wars, inclusive governments have increasingly been used as a tool to terminate an array of lower-intensity violent conflicts in Africa, as seen in the semi-autonomous island of Zanzibar in

---

<sup>5</sup> Andreas Mehler, 2009, "Introduction: Power-Sharing in Africa," *Africa Spectrum*, 44, 3: 2-10. Mehler identified 17 agreements from 1999-2009; I have updated his findings to include Zanzibar (2010), as well as Togo (2006) and Lesotho (1999), which were not included in his count.

2010 and in Madagascar in 2009, as well as the high-visibility cases of electoral violence in Kenya and Zimbabwe in 2008.<sup>6</sup>

Although garnering less attention, the precedent for this trend of settling electoral disputes through executive power-sharing agreements in Africa was set by Lesotho in 1999 and Zanzibar in 1999 (and 2001) and followed by Togo in 2006.<sup>7</sup> Following a familiar trajectory in Africa, the state security sector has played a central and often deleterious role in many of these low-grade electoral conflicts, revealing blurred lines and politicized relations between civilians and security officials. In Kenya, Togo, and Zimbabwe, for example, the security sector was deeply involved in, if not directly responsible for, widespread electoral violence in 2005 in Togo and in 2008 in Kenya and Zimbabwe.

Over roughly the same two decades, international actors launched myriad security sector reform (SSR) programs in post-conflict and transitional states around the world, from Iraq to Kosovo to Liberia. Following the “third wave”<sup>8</sup> of democracy that spread over Africa in the early 1990s and as a response to long histories of security sector involvement in politics, a wide variety of SSR programs were stood up on the continent, frequently in the same countries that have had power-sharing arrangements. Indeed, Africa is often described as “ground zero for SSR.”<sup>9</sup> Multilateral institutions—including the United Nations (UN) Security Council—and scholars alike have identified democratized civil-military relations

---

<sup>6</sup> Parts of this chapter, as well as sections of Chapters 3, 4, and 6, draw from Alexander Noyes, 2013, “Securing Reform? Power Sharing and Civil-Security Relations in Kenya and Zimbabwe,” *African Studies Quarterly*, 13, 4: 27-52, <http://asq.africa.ufl.edu/files/Noyes-V13Is4.pdf> (accessed August 17, 2016).

<sup>7</sup> Dorina Bekoe, 2012, “Postelection Political Agreements in Togo and Zanzibar,” in Dorina Bekoe, (ed.) *Voting in Fear: Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace): 118-119.

<sup>8</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, 1991, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press).

<sup>9</sup> Mark Sedra, 2010, “Introduction: The Future of Security Sector Reform,” in Mark Sedra, (ed.) *The Future of Security Sector Reform* (Ontario: Centre for International Governance Innovation): 22.

and SSR as critical components to democratization, development, and the prevention of renewed violence in post-conflict societies.<sup>10</sup>

Despite an extensive literature on power sharing in contexts of civil war, scholars have not yet paid sufficient attention to the dynamics and outcomes of the model in lower-intensity, non-civil war cases like post-election violence. Moreover, the thin but emerging scholarship on post-election unity governments has generally been very critical of the model, maintaining that power sharing in such contexts is unlikely to deliver the institutional reforms necessary to resolve the underlying roots of conflict. Indeed, many studies have concluded that post-election power sharing is ineffective, unwieldy and prone to stalemate, and not worth the perceived trade-off between stabilization and democratization.<sup>11</sup>

Given the existing literature's largely negative critique of post-election power sharing, Kenya's ostensibly broadly positive experience highlighted above is surprising and raises a set of broader and as of yet unanswered theoretical questions: despite clear drawbacks and the expectations of scholars, can post-election power sharing deliver difficult to achieve institutional reforms, such as SSR?<sup>12</sup> Has the model led to a degree of security reforms in some countries, such as Kenya and Togo, but not in others, as in Zimbabwe? If so,

---

<sup>10</sup> United Nations Security Council, SC/8958, 5632nd Meeting, February 20, 2007, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc8958.doc.htm> (accessed February 11, 2014); Monica Duffy Toft, 2010, *Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press): 4; Robin Luckham, 2003, "Democratic Strategies for Security in Transition and Conflict," in Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham, (eds.) *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies* (London: Zed Books): 3.

<sup>11</sup> See for instance, Rowland J.V. Cole, 2013, "Power-Sharing, Post-Electoral Contestations and the Dismemberment of the Right to Democracy in Africa," *The International Journal of Human Rights*, 17, 2: 256; Michael Bratton, 2014, *Power Politics in Zimbabwe* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner): chapter 6; Adrienne LeBas, 2011, *From Protest to Parties: Party-Building and Democratization in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 157-158; Nic Cheeseman and Miles-Blessing Tendi, 2010, "Power-sharing in Comparative Perspective: the Dynamics of 'Unity Government' in Kenya and Zimbabwe," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 48, 2: 204.

<sup>12</sup> The term "security sector reform" is used here in place of "civil-military relations" reform in an effort to capture the relationship between elites in the political, military, police, and intelligence spheres, as explained below. When used in this study, the term civil-military relations is not restricted to the military but instead refers broadly to relations between civilian politicians and military, police, and intelligence officials.

what are the causes and consequences of these divergent reform outcomes? Which causal factors are most important in shaping SSR outcomes under power sharing, and through what processes or mechanisms?

While the power-sharing model continues to be deployed worldwide and democratic security governance is widely identified by scholars and practitioners as critical to durable peace, scholars have generally ignored this potential link between power sharing and security reform. Given the central role of security institutions in maintaining power, SSR is likely to be one of the most contentious and difficult institutional reforms to achieve.

Yet power-sharing moments provide a relatively unexplored opportunity to do so. One might expect full regime transitions or transfers of power to be the most favorable conditions for SSR.<sup>13</sup> But power sharing in semi-authoritarian regimes, under certain conditions, may actually generate more favorable conditions and incentives for SSR than either a full transfer of power or if the incumbent had remained in office.

If incumbents remain in power, there will be little to no incentive for them to reform the security sector. Although somewhat counterintuitive, this logic may also hold for a full transfer of power, as new leaders are unlikely to genuinely and voluntarily give up their freshly acquired control of a powerful tool to maintain power. Under power sharing, however, these incentives change, as opposition leaders are likely to seek SSR in order to lessen the incumbent's control over the security apparatus. With a share of power, they are relatively well positioned to do so, especially if backed by external actors. Moreover, given the likely internal and external reform pressures placed on incumbents under power sharing,

---

<sup>13</sup> Jendayi Frazer, 1995, "Conceptualizing Civil-Military Relations during Democratic Transition," *Africa Today*, 42, ½: 47.

incumbent leaders may be more likely to yield to SSR under power sharing than if they had remained solely in power.

Indeed, although fresh memories of violence can polarize political divides, power-sharing moments can provide ample opportunities for reforming security governance, as power-sharing agreements frequently include SSR provisions, particularly in contexts where security officials have played leading roles in political violence. As Hutchful argues, “post-conflict situations may provide strong motivation to overhaul the way security is produced, managed, and governed.”<sup>14</sup> Even if SSR is not directly addressed in the text of the pact, power-sharing negotiations and agreements almost always include institutional changes that affect oversight of the security sector, such as constitutional review initiatives or other political reforms, which can provide real SSR openings for opposition parties and external actors to exploit.

Power-sharing moments therefore have the potential to function as “critical junctures,”<sup>15</sup> which—by introducing a new party into executive governing institutions—could mark a shift in civil-military relations, especially in countries emerging from highly personalized, one-party, or militarized rule. As such, the expectation of the literature that

---

<sup>14</sup> Eboe Hutchful, 2012, “Security Sector Governance and Peacebuilding,” in Devon Curtis and Gwinyayi Dzinesa, (eds.) *Peacebuilding, Power, and Politics in Africa* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press): 66. For other works highlighting how post-conflict environments and power sharing offer entry points for SSR see Terrence Lyons, 2005, *Demilitarizing Politics: Elections on the Uncertain Road to Peace* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner): 102, 107-10; Paul Williams, 2003, *War and Conflict in Africa* (Cambridge: Polity): 177; Luckham, 2003, “Democratic Strategies,” 19-20; and Eboe Hutchful, 2009, “Security Sector Reform Provisions in Peace Agreements,” UK Department of International Development and African Security Sector Network: 20, 24-26, <http://www.ssrnetwork.net/documents/Publications/SSRIPA/SSR%20Main%20Report.pdf> (accessed December 2, 2014).

<sup>15</sup> The sizable literature on “critical junctures” and path dependence stems from the field of historical institutionalism; for overviews see Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, 1996, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” *Political Studies*, 44, 5: 936-957; Kathleen Thelen, 1999, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2: 369-404; Paul Pierson, 2000, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” *American Political Science Review*, 94, 2: 251-267; and Giovanni Capoccia and Daniel Keleman, 2007, “The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism,” *World Politics*, 59: 341-69. For a thorough overview of the numerous political science works that have utilized a critical junctures framework see *ibid*, 345-6 footnote 17.

post-election power sharing is unlikely to be able to deliver meaningful institutional reforms needs to be revisited. Of course, simply because there is an opening for reform does mean that any real change will necessarily be achieved under power sharing. Indeed, as demonstrated below, under certain conditions, power sharing may simply be used as a tool for regime maintenance that serves to perpetuate the status quo.

Branching off from the primary research questions outlined above is a cluster of others: To what degree has SSR featured in power-sharing agreements and progressed under unity government? What has been the interaction between structural constraints and contingent expressions of agency? Have international influences shaped security governance, or have the drivers and impediments to reform been primarily domestic? How has power and political preference actually been exercised, through formal channels or informal client-patronage networks? To what extent has apparent institutional progress on SSR translated from paper to practice?

With a focus on unearthing complex causal mechanisms and processes, and a limited number of cases in the empirical universe, the qualitative methodology of structured, focused comparison provides the most useful approach to answer these research questions. I use the method to develop a theoretical framework and apply the theoretical propositions to three democratizing, or semi-authoritarian, countries in Africa: Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Togo. Using the method of process tracing and the logic of most-similar comparisons, I conduct two sets of cross- and within-case comparisons, utilizing elite interviews as the primary tool for data collection. During my field research, undertaken from October 2014 to July 2015, I conducted over 100 interviews with key decision-makers in my case countries—including

former prime ministers, cabinet ministers, top political party leaders, senior security officials, as well as international diplomats and representatives of multilateral institutions.

### 1.3. Major Gaps and Theory Overview

Despite the potential linkages between power sharing and SSR highlighted above, the prevalence of power-sharing arrangements and SSR efforts around the globe, and SSR being seen as a key ingredient to democratization and durable peace, scholars have generally failed to investigate the relationship between power sharing and SSR. This study seeks to fill this gap and directly link the power-sharing, civil-military relations, and SSR literatures.

Three main critiques of the relevant bodies of literature are offered here. First, although extensive and theory-rich, the power-sharing literature has been overly focused on cases of civil war and the outcome of war recurrence. Only recently has the power-sharing literature begun to interrogate the experience of unity governments in lower-intensity, non-civil war cases—such as contexts of electoral violence—although the two types of cases often differ in fundamental ways, particularly in their political and institutional impacts. The studies that do focus on post-election cases have been largely critical of the model’s capacity to deliver institutional reforms, concluding that the power-sharing model is ineffective in these contexts and is not worth the perceived trade-off between stabilization and democratization.<sup>16</sup> The cases of Kenya and, to a lesser extent, Togo, however, appear to complicate this narrative and suggest that the empirical record may be more mixed.

Second, while rich, much of the civil-military relations literature has grown stale and has still not adequately addressed reform of civil-military relations in transitional contexts,

---

<sup>16</sup> See for instance, Cole, 2013, “Power-Sharing, Post-Electoral Contestations and the Dismemberment of the Right to Democracy in Africa,” 256; Bratton, 2014, *Power Politics in Zimbabwe*: chapter 6; LeBas, 2011, *From Protest to Parties*, 157-158; Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010, “Power-sharing in Comparative Perspective,” 204.



such as power sharing. Existing work has also narrowly focused on military coups, at the expense of other important outcomes, such as military reform or SSR. Third, while perhaps shifting as of late, the SSR body of work is largely under-theorized and focused on the technical, as opposed to the inherently political, aspects of SSR.

Building on the work of Bekoe and LeVan and Assenov,<sup>17</sup> I complicate the prevailing narrative in the literature by recognizing the drawbacks of power sharing but also highlighting the potentially positive institutional reform outcomes of the model. I theorize that post-election power sharing agreements and governments play a significant role in the causal process of SSR and can deliver some institutional reforms, under certain conditions. I argue that two main long-term factors, the nature of civil-military relations and the character of external involvement, combined with two short-term mechanisms, the design of the political agreement and the type of political strategy deployed by the parties, will be the most important factors shaping SSR under power sharing.

The outcome of interest of this study, or the dependent variable (DV), is the amount of SSR that has been achieved in each selected case since the signing of the power-sharing accord through the power-sharing period. What causal factors, or independent variables (IVs), have shaped SSR outcomes (the DV), and through what processes or mechanisms? To answer this question, I present the following heuristic model, which consists of a series of general theoretical propositions that are narrowed down to two sets of two hypotheses.

Put formally, I have conceptualized the following long-term IVs as:

IV1): Nature of civil-military relations

IV2): Character of external involvement

---

<sup>17</sup> Bekoe, 2012, "Postelection Political Agreements in Togo and Zanzibar," 140; A. Carl LeVan and Assenov, 2016, "Parties or Portfolio? The Economic Consequences of Africa's Big Cabinets," *Government and Opposition*, 51, 4: 661–690

While I have conceptualized the two contingent, causal mechanisms, as:

M1): Design of power-sharing agreement

M2): Type of political strategy

To tease out the specific theoretical expectations of this framework, I have formulated two sets of two long- and short-term hypotheses, which are briefly outlined here.

H1a): The “reliance” hypothesis maintains that the nature of civil-military relations prior to power sharing, more specifically the character and extent of former ruling party reliance on the security sector to remain in power, will shape the two contingent factors of political strategy and agreement strength, which, in turn, will shape SSR outcomes. Put simply, *higher levels of reliance will result in less SSR, and vice versa.*

H1b): The “external involvement” hypothesis maintains that the character of external involvement prior to power sharing, more specifically the degree of Western leverage and the nature of regional dynamics, will shape the strength of agreement design and the type of political strategies deployed under power sharing, which, in turn, will shape SSR outcomes. Put simply, *higher levels of Western leverage will result in more SSR, and vice versa.*

H2a): The “agreement design” hypothesis maintains that the design of the power-sharing agreement, more specifically its strength of SSR content and third party enforcement, will mediate international and domestic pressures for reform under power sharing, which, in tandem with the type of political strategy employed, will shape SSR outcomes. Put simply, *stronger agreement design will result in more SSR, and vice versa.*

H2b): The “political strategy” hypothesis maintains that the type of political strategies deployed by the respective parties, more specifically the use of inclusive or exclusive

political approaches, will, in tandem with agreement strength, shape SSR outcomes. Put simply, *more inclusionary political strategies will result in more SSR, and vice versa*.

As a point of departure, this framework assumes that former ruling parties under power sharing will likely seek to maximize their chances of remaining in power by maintaining control over the security apparatus. Conversely, former opposition parties likewise will seek to maximize their chances of remaining in power by reforming the former ruling party's control over the security sector. In addition to their independent causal effects, the explanatory factors specified above are expected to interact. The two long-term factors of the nature of civil-military relations and the character of external involvement are expected to shape the agreement design and political strategies deployed under power sharing. In turn, the two mechanisms are also expected to interact, with the strength or weakness of the agreement influencing the choice of political strategy and vice versa (see Figure 1).

A more comprehensive discussion of the theoretical framework is provided in Chapter 2. The discussion in Chapter 2 highlights the specific theories the framework builds on and engages with, discusses in an in depth manner the ways in which each variable is expected to operate and interact, forwards four “ideal types” of power-sharing politics, and outlines the various methods used to measure these complex factors and outcomes.




Figure 1: Overview of SSR-power sharing framework

#### 1.4. Major Contributions, Caveats, and Significance

Understanding the conditions under which power-sharing governments are likely, or, perhaps more importantly, unlikely, to lead to reform of the security sector has major implications for both theory and practice. This dissertation makes four main contributions to the existing political science scholarship. First, overall, my theoretical framework brings into question the largely negative tone of the post-election power-sharing literature, as I maintain that the model can deliver some meaningful reforms, under certain conditions. This finding complicates the existing narrative and suggests that scholars should consider revisiting the notion that post-election power-sharing governments are unlikely to deliver SSR and other institutional reforms and generally do more harm than good.

Second, to the best of my knowledge, this dissertation is the first in depth study that systematically investigates the relationship between post-election power sharing and SSR. In tackling this unanswered question, the study fills a large gap and directly links the power-sharing, civil-military relations, and SSR literatures. Third, contrary to much of the literature arguing for the supremacy of domestic variables in democratization processes and

institutional reform outcomes,<sup>18</sup> I contend that external influence, particularly from Western countries, may play a particularly critical role in power-sharing contexts in semi-authoritarian countries. While the dissertation's integrated framework posits that both domestic and external variables matter, I argue that under certain conditions exogenous factors have the potential to spur a degree of institutional SSR progress even in some of the most inauspicious of circumstances.

Fourth, the theoretical framework makes valuable contributions to the perennial scholarly debate on structure versus agency.<sup>19</sup> As highlighted below and in Chapter 2, the two-step integrated theoretical framework presented here departs from explanations of institutional reform that suggest the primacy of structural over proximate variables, instead deploying a structured contingency approach.<sup>20</sup> The flexibility and usefulness of this method in explaining SSR processes and outcomes under post-election power sharing, as demonstrated in the following chapters, suggests that a unified structured contingency approach may be a fruitful way to help bridge this scholarly divide.

The study also fills significant gaps and departs from much of the received wisdom in each of the respective case literatures. On Zimbabwe, I argue for reframing the existing debate around militarization to one of politicization, as civilian politicians, despite some military influence, have remained in supreme political control. On Kenya, I argue that the rich existing literature on Kenya's power-sharing period has not yet adequately addressed the

---

<sup>18</sup> See, for instance, Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Waal, 1997, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 20; Oisín Tansey, 2013, "Statebuilding and the Limits of Constitutional Design," in Mats Berdal and Dominik Zaum, (eds.) *Political Economy of Statebuilding: Power After Peace* (New York, NY: Routledge): 17-32. For an overview works arguing that international influence is limited in shaping institutional reform outcomes see Alan Kuperman, 2015, (ed.) *Constitutions and Conflict Management in Africa: Preventing Civil War through Institutional Design* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press): 232-33.

<sup>19</sup> For an overview of this debate in the field of historical institutionalism see Colin Hay and Daniel Wincott, 1998, "Structure, Agency, and Historical Institutionalism," *Political Studies*, XLVI, 951-957.

<sup>20</sup> Terry Lynn Karl 1990, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," *Comparative Politics*, 23, 1: 1-21.

causes and consequences of the institutional police reforms that were achieved under the unity government. On Togo, although to a lesser extent than Kenya, I argue that SSR has been more successful than scholars and outside observers might expect, given the country's long history of military coups. Moreover, compared to Kenya and Zimbabwe, the literature on Togo's experience with post-election power sharing is glaringly thin. The study's findings from all three cases offer new theoretical and empirical insights to the relevant case and regional literatures.

In addition to filling major gaps and offering new theoretical perspectives, the dissertation's findings have major implications for the policy world. By presenting the conditions under which SSR is likely to progress, international policymakers and negotiators are provided with criteria for when power-sharing governments are most likely to succeed or fail in delivering an institutional reform that is a key ingredient to democratization and political stability. The dissertation's theoretical framework and findings have seven main policy implications, with the first four concerning the design of the power-sharing accord.

First, the framework suggests that international, regional, and domestic mediators and negotiators would be wise to push vigorously for the inclusion of concrete SSR content and strong enforcement mechanisms in the text of political agreements, even in cases where SSR appears improbable. Second, clear implementation timelines for the arrangement should also be included. Third, given the potential for rollback, an emphasis should be placed on reforms that are difficult to reverse, such as constitutional reforms. Fourth, to help avoid the model's real costs to political competition and democratization in the long run, post-election power sharing arrangements should only be temporary, transitional mechanisms.

Fifth, external actors would also be wise to play a more active role in monitoring and enforcing the post-election power-sharing accord, as well as increase assistance for SSR efforts. Six, the findings suggest that domestic actors, particularly opposition parties, should consider crafting and deploying cohesive, inclusionary political approaches under power sharing in order to maximize the prospects for institutional reform. Finally, the finding on the importance of presidential term limits in encouraging incumbent leaders to agree to institutional reforms suggests that domestic, regional, and international actors should do more to encourage democratizing countries to both adopt and respect term limits.

The post-election power-sharing model is of course far from perfect; by their very nature, post-conflict unity accords are elite-driven and based on negotiated compromises. In addition to bloated cabinets and frequent policy deadlock, the most glaring drawback of the model is that—as its critics rightfully point out—power sharing can incentivize incumbents to foment violence and refuse to leave power after losing an election in the hope of remaining in power through an externally brokered accord. As such, international actors should discard the model in contexts where incumbents have clearly lost elections. However, in cases where it is difficult or impossible to decipher a true winner, or where the risk of a re-run could lead to mass violence, temporary post-election power sharing appears to be a viable compromise solution, which, if well designed and implemented, can lead to some institutional reforms that are likely to be key ingredients to democratic progress in the long term.

This latter point on implementation leads to an important caveat: the reform achievements of power-sharing governments will have minimal impact in the long run if post-power sharing leaders and governments do not fully implement or rollback institutional reforms. This issue is highlighted by the case of Kenya, as discussed below. In a similar vein,

it must also be emphasized that security reforms cannot be disentangled from other wider political and regime dynamics, both during and after power sharing. As such, SSR is certainly not a panacea. Security reform is only one component, however important, of a larger mosaic of institutional reforms and political dynamics that are necessary to the advancement of democracy in semi-authoritarian countries. These and other important caveats are discussed at length in the concluding chapter.

As unity governments have become a common method for settling conflict and state security sectors continue to play a critical and often detrimental role in governance and political violence, my research and findings are of significance and generalizable to a growing universe of cases in “hybrid” or semi-authoritarian countries. Following Gerring’s terminology, this universe, or population, of cases—i.e. cases in semi-authoritarian countries that have formed power-sharing governments in contexts of security sector involvement in electoral violence—constitute the “manifest scope” of inference, or scope conditions, for the study.

Moreover, the middle-range theory developed here has applicability to a wider set of cases in Africa and beyond—i.e. cases that share some but not all of these characteristics, such as countries that have implemented less formal versions of power sharing or have histories of deeply politicized or militarized civil-military relations. In Gerring’s terms, this wide range of cases falls within the “potential scope” of inference of the theory.<sup>21</sup> In light of the spread of power sharing and SSR initiatives worldwide, and because a democratized security sector is identified as crucial to achieving stability and economic growth, understanding the SSR outcomes of unity governments remains more important than ever.

---

<sup>21</sup> John Gerring, 2007, *Case Study Research: Principals and Practice* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press): 83.



The remainder of this introductory chapter is divided into three parts. The first section defines the key terms of the study. The second section critiques and identifies major gaps in the civil-military relations, SSR, and power sharing literatures. In doing so, it situates the study's theoretical framework within the extant theoretical debates. The chapter concludes with a detailed roadmap to the rest of the dissertation, providing an overview of each remaining chapter.

### 1.5. Key Terms

Power sharing has come to signify a variety of institutional arrangements in the political science literature, ranging from coalition governments in times of peace to various forms of governments emerging out of negotiated peace settlements—both transitional and longer-term—to more general ideas of federalism. Lijphart's classic theory of consociational democracy is a prime example of a more permanent, institutionalized power-sharing formula, which postulates that there are four necessary elements to effective power-sharing in plural societies: grand coalition, group autonomy, proportional representation, and minority veto.<sup>22</sup> This study focuses on transitional (i.e. temporary) power-sharing governments arising out of negotiated political agreements in contexts of low-grade post-election violence. As noted, such power-sharing governments are also known, somewhat paradoxically because of their frequently fractious nature, as unity governments. In broad terms, power-sharing arrangements can be defined as “formal institutions that distribute decision-making rights

---

<sup>22</sup> Arend Lijphart, 1990, “The Power-Sharing Approach,” in Joseph Montville, (ed.) *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books): 491-509.

within the state and define decision-making procedures”<sup>23</sup> among the relevant parties to the conflict.

Civil-military relations can be broadly defined as “the entire range of relationships between the military and civilian society at every level,” although, according to Feaver, traditionally the study of civil-military relations has focused on the “control or direction of the military by the highest civilian authorities in nation-states.”<sup>24</sup> For analytical clarity, this study builds on Croissant et al.’s circumscribed understanding of the concept, defining civil-military relations as “the interaction between the leaders of the armed forces and political elites occupying the key national government positions in the state.”<sup>25</sup> As noted above, I use the term security sector reform to broaden the scope of the analysis out to the police and intelligence services, but maintain the narrow definition of Croissant et al. that focuses on elite-level relations between political (civilian) leaders and security sector officials. When the term civil-military relations is used in this study, it refers broadly to relations between elite civilian politicians and elite military, police, and intelligence officials.

What is SSR? Within the international community, the concept of SSR is understood as efforts to establish democratic civilian oversight of the state security apparatus and depoliticize and professionalize the security forces in post-conflict, fragile, or transitional states.<sup>26</sup> Departing from the more traditional focus on national security, SSR typically emphasizes the security of the individual, or human security. While reforming the more

---

<sup>23</sup> Donald Rothchild and Philip Roeder, 2005, “Power-sharing as an Impediment to Peace and Democracy,” in Donald Rothchild and Philip Roeder, (eds.) *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press): 30.

<sup>24</sup> Peter D. Feaver, 1999, “Civil-Military Relations,” *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2: 211.

<sup>25</sup> Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn, Paul Chambers, and Siegfried Wolf, 2010, “Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-ism: Conceptualizing Civilian Control of the Military in Emerging Democracies,” *Democratization*, 17, 5: 951.

<sup>26</sup> Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC), 2007, “The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice,” 21. [http://www.oecd.org/document/8/0,3746,en\\_2649\\_33693550\\_45884768\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/8/0,3746,en_2649_33693550_45884768_1_1_1_1,00.html) (accessed June 6, 2014).

conventional spheres of the security sector is viewed as important, holistic SSR places equal emphasis on judicial and prison reform, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs, and the role of non-state actors, including civil society.<sup>27</sup> As Croissant et al. argue, this incredibly broad definition of the security sector is “too diffuse to be of analytical use.”<sup>28</sup> As such, following Toft, I use the term “security sector” to refer only to “core” security institutions—those authorized to use coercive force—namely the military, police, and intelligence services.<sup>29</sup>

Cases of low-level, or low-grade, political violence are defined here as internal conflicts that fall below the 1,000 casualty threshold per year average that is commonly used in the political science literature to define civil war (since combatants must also seek to capture state power to fit the definition, communal conflicts are typically not counted as civil wars).<sup>30</sup>

## 1.6. Literature Review

### 1.6.1. *Power Sharing: Critical of Post-Election Pacts, Focused on Civil War*

Negotiated peace settlements, typically containing some form of power-sharing mechanism, have become the prevailing method of civil war termination over the last two decades.<sup>31</sup>

Building on foundational works by Lijphart and Horowitz, who debated the best ways to

---

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Croissant et al., 2011, “Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-ism,” 951.

<sup>29</sup> Toft, 2010, *Securing the Peace*, 13.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid, 9-10; for a discussion of different measures of civil war, see Nicholas Sambanis, 2004, “What Is Civil War?: Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 48, 6: 814-858.

<sup>31</sup> Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, 2007, *Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press): 11-13.

manage ethnic conflict,<sup>32</sup> a lively and expansive political science literature on power sharing has developed, concentrating on whether the model is likely to lead to renewed conflict in cases of civil war. Two theoretical strands have emerged in the extant literature: the proponents and the skeptics.

Supporters of power sharing, such as Walter, Hartzell and Hoddie, Call, and Norris, stress the positive outcomes of power-sharing arrangements.<sup>33</sup> Hartzell and Hoddie delineate four different modes of power sharing (political, military, territorial, and economic) and assert that the more power-sharing mechanisms included within a peace agreement, the higher the chances for enduring peace.<sup>34</sup> On the other hand, scholars such as Rothchild and Roeder, Jarstad, and Tull and Mehler are more dubious of power-sharing arrangements, pointing out their unintended consequences and substantial costs and failures, namely constrained democracy and legitimacy, ineffective governance, and recurrence of civil war.<sup>35</sup>

Due to the large number of power-sharing governments that have been used to resolve an assortment of conflicts in Africa, a sizable portion of the literature has focused on the continent. Overall, such studies have tended to side with the skeptical school of thought.<sup>36</sup>

A number of scholars concentrating on Africa, such as Käihkö, Kriger, and Kirschke have

---

<sup>32</sup> For an overview of the debate between Lijphart and Horowitz, see Kuperman, 2015, (ed.) *Constitutions and Conflict Management in Africa*, 3.

<sup>33</sup> Barbara Walter, 2002, *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press); Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007, *Crafting Peace*; Charles T. Call, 2012, *Why Peace Fails: The Causes and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press); Pippa Norris, *Driving Democracy: Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

<sup>34</sup> Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007, *Crafting Peace*.

<sup>35</sup> Rothchild and Roeder, 2005, "Power-sharing as an Impediment;" Anna K. Jarstad, 2009, "The Prevalence of Power-Sharing: Exploring the Patterns of Post-Election Peace," *Africa Spectrum*, 44, 3: 41-62; Denis Tull and Andreas Mehler, 2005, "The Hidden Costs of Power-sharing: Reproducing Insurgent Violence in Africa," *African Affairs*, 104, 416: 375-398.

<sup>36</sup> See, for example, Ian Spears, 2002 "Africa: The Limits of Power-Sharing," *Journal of Democracy*, 13, 3: 123-36; Ian Spears, 2013, "Africa's Informal Power-Sharing and the Prospects for Peace," *Civil Wars*, 15, 1: 37-53; Donald Rothchild, 2005, "Reassuring Weaker Parties After Civil Wars: The Benefits and Costs of Executive Power-sharing Systems in Africa," *Ethnopolitics*, 4, 3: 247-67; and Andreas Mehler, 2009, "Peace and Power-sharing in Africa: A Not So Obvious Relationship," *African Affairs*, 108, 432: 453-473.

pointed out the unique impediments to effective power sharing in contexts where strong informal institutions and neopatrimonial political systems are the norm.<sup>37</sup> Mitchell is an exception to this trend in the literature focused on Africa, as he, examining Côte d'Ivoire's experience with power sharing, emphasizes the model's positive outcomes.<sup>38</sup>

Lively debates over the merits and trade-offs of power sharing have generated sound theories on the most salient factors that increase or decrease the likelihood of renewed violence in cases of civil war termination. However, the literature has yet to fully understand the dynamics and outcomes of using power-sharing arrangements in cases of lower-intensity conflict, such as electoral violence. This is significant because, as noted, these two types of cases and conflicts can have profoundly different causes and consequences, particularly in terms of their political and institutional conflict legacies. Supporting the notion that these two types of conflict are fundamentally different, Pearson et al. found that including cases of lower-level conflict in their model, i.e. cases that fell below the 1,000-death threshold, substantially changed their findings on the conditions and avenues for effective war settlement.<sup>39</sup>

Indeed, as Hutchful notes, civil wars often result in “widespread destruction of national institutions and infrastructure,” including the decimation or acute fractionalization of

---

<sup>37</sup> Ilmari Kähkö, 2012, “Big Man Bargaining in African Conflicts,” in Mats Utas, (ed.) *African Conflicts and Informal Power: Big Men and Networks* (London: Zed Books): 181-204; Norma Kriger, 2012, “ZANU-PF Politics Under Zimbabwe's ‘Power-Sharing’ Government,” *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 30, 1: 11-26; Linda Kirschke, 2007, “Semipresidentialism and the Perils of Power-Sharing in Neopatrimonial States,” *Comparative Political Studies*, 40, 11: 1372-1394; For succinct overviews of power sharing in Africa see Williams, 2011, *War and Conflict in Africa*, 168-83; and Andreas Mehler, 2012, “Power-Sharing,” in Devon Curtis and Gwinyayi Dzinesa, (eds.) *Peacebuilding, Power, and Politics in Africa* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press):189-201.

<sup>38</sup> Matthew Mitchell, 2012, “Power-sharing and Peace in Côte d'Ivoire: Past Examples and Future Prospects,” *Conflict, Security & Development*, 12, 2: 171-191.

<sup>39</sup> Frederic Pearson, Marie Olson Lounsbury, Scott Walker, and Sonja Mann, 2006, “Rethinking Models of Civil War Settlement,” *International Interactions* 32, 2: 109-128.

state security institutions.<sup>40</sup> Although instances of low-level electoral violence certainly bequeath their own damaging legacies, particularly in political terms, the formal institutions of the state usually remain intact in these cases, which, according to Cawthra and Luckham, improves the prospects for democratized civil-military relations and SSR.<sup>41</sup> This point has great relevance to this dissertation, and gives credence to the notion that post-election power sharing, despite its drawbacks, may be well positioned to deliver some SSR.

While theory remains underdeveloped in contexts of electoral violence, emerging power-sharing models have begun to engage with this “special” subclass of cases, although the existing studies tend to lump cases of low-level electoral violence together with civil war cases.<sup>42</sup> Scholars contributing to this emerging stream of research have shed much light on the dynamics and outcomes of post-election unity governments, and this dissertation builds directly on their pioneering work. That said, most of the works addressing post-election cases land in the skeptical camp of power sharing. Cheeseman and Tendi’s 2010 study, for instance, examines the internal dynamics of power-sharing governments in cases of disputed elections in Africa and argues that such governments do not create the “conditions for effective reform, which leads to a more general conclusion: unity government serves to postpone conflict, rather than to resolve it.”<sup>43</sup>

---

<sup>40</sup> Hutchful, “Security Sector Governance and Peacebuilding,” 72.

<sup>41</sup> Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham, 2003, “Democratic Control and the Security Sector: The Scope for Transformation and its Limits,” in Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham, (eds.) *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies* (London: Zed Books): 307. Cheeseman also makes a similar point, see Nic Cheeseman, 2011, “The Internal Dynamics of Power Sharing in Africa,” *Democratization*, 18, 2: 341.

<sup>42</sup> See, for example, Mehler 2009, “Introduction: Power-Sharing in Africa,” and Cheeseman, 2011, “The Internal Dynamics of Power Sharing.”

<sup>43</sup> Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010, “Power-sharing in Comparative Perspective,” 204.

Cole also argues that, “post-electoral power-sharing is at odds with the right to democracy.”<sup>44</sup> Both LeBas and Bratton are also highly critical of the post-election model, with LeBas arguing that such arrangements are “unlikely to foster democratization in the long run.”<sup>45</sup> Bekoe’s study on the impact of post-election agreements in Togo and Zanzibar and LeVan’s analysis of the unique challenges presented by “low-conflict” cases of power sharing in Africa also warn of the dangers of the model.<sup>46</sup> But Bekoe concludes on a more balanced note, noting both the costs and benefits of the approach. She argues that the gains of post-election power sharing, “will be short-lived if the interim period is not used to enact political reforms...”<sup>47</sup> On the other hand, Nassor and Jose, examining Zanzibar’s 2010 power-sharing agreement, fall squarely into the proponent’s camp, arguing that the experience of Zanzibar “points to a more positive democratic possibility.”<sup>48</sup> In more recent work, LeVan and Assenov use cross-national data from across Africa to highlight the surprisingly positive economic outcomes of power sharing, citing Zimbabwe’s economic stabilization and growth under post-election power sharing as an example. Based on their findings, LeVan and Assenov conclude that, “the proponents of consensus government may be right.”<sup>49</sup>

While recognizing the clear constraints of the approach, this dissertation departs from much of the literature by arguing that the model can work and deliver some reforms conducive to long-term democratization, under certain conditions. In sum, the power-sharing

---

<sup>44</sup> Cole, 2013, “Power-Sharing, Post-Electoral Contestations and the Dismemberment of the Right to Democracy in Africa,” 256.

<sup>45</sup> LeBas, 2011, *From Protest to Parties*, 258; Bratton, 2014, *Power Politics*, chapter 6.

<sup>46</sup> Bekoe, 2012, “Postelection Political Agreements in Togo and Zanzibar, 139;” A. Carl LeVan, 2011, “Power Sharing and Inclusive Politics in Africa’s Uncertain Democracies,” *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions*, 23, 1: 43.

<sup>47</sup> Bekoe, 2012, “Postelection Political Agreements in Togo and Zanzibar,” 139.

<sup>48</sup> Aley Soud Nassor and Jim Jose, 2014, “Power-Sharing in Zanzibar: From Zero-Sum Politics to Democratic Consensus?,” *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 40, 2: 247.

<sup>49</sup> LeVan and Assenov, 2016, “The Economic Consequences of Africa’s Big Cabinets,” 684.

literature is rich and diverse, but has generally focused on civil war cases, leading it to focus on binary outcomes of war and peace, while other outcomes—such as institutional reforms—have yet to be thoroughly investigated. Moreover, the emerging literature on post-election unity governments appears to be overly critical of the model’s potential capacity to deliver institutional reform. The power-sharing literature has also generally neglected to examine the link between inclusive government, civil-military relations, and SSR.

#### 1.6.2. *Civil-Military Relations: Extensive But Largely Ignores Transitional Contexts*

A rich interdisciplinary literature exists on civil-military relations, but to date the body of work has insufficiently addressed reform of civil-military relations in transitional contexts, such as power sharing. With roots stretching back to Plato, two main research streams, divided into political science and sociological schools of thought, have sought to understand the central questions of the civil-military “problematique”: “Who will guard the guardians?”<sup>50</sup> What factors lead to civilian control, or military intervention in politics? Building on seminal works by Huntington, Janowitz, and Finer,<sup>51</sup> the civil-military relations literature has traditionally focused on civilian control and coups d’état.

Despite this extensive literature, for decades the discipline struggled to move beyond the paradigms and debates outlined by Huntington, Janowitz, and Finer, leading two contemporary civil-military relations scholars, Feaver and Bruneau, to bemoan a lack of theoretical development and innovation, which has led to significant gaps and prevented the

---

<sup>50</sup> Feaver, 1999, “Civil-Military Relations,” 211.

<sup>51</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, 1957, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press); Morris Janowitz, 1960, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press); Samuel E. Finer, 1962, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (London: Pall Mall).



accumulation of knowledge in the field.<sup>52</sup> Huntington's normative theory of "objective" and "subjective" civilian control, which emphasizes professionalism of the military as the key to civilian supremacy,<sup>53</sup> has shown remarkable resilience. Feaver argued in 2003 that Huntington's theory "remains the dominant theoretical paradigm in civil-military relations."<sup>54</sup> Huntington and Janowitz focused primarily on civilian control of the military in stable democracies, the United States in particular, and the field has struggled to move outside of this domain.

For instance, even though civil-military relations are widely considered to be critical to democratization, until recently, and with some notable exceptions, the political science literature largely neglected the study of the military's role in transitions from authoritarian rule.<sup>55</sup> Indeed, in 2012 Barany asserted, "there is a long-standing, yawning hole both in the academic and the policy-oriented literature concerning the evolution of military politics in changing states."<sup>56</sup> The persistent salience of Huntington's early theory may be responsible for stifling theoretical innovation in transitional states. Bruneau notes that Huntington's, "formulation could possibly be useful for discussing civil-military relations in stable democracies, but it provides little help to those still in the process of reaching this state."<sup>57</sup>

---

<sup>52</sup> For critical overviews of the development of the field and the civil-military relations literature, see Thomas C. Bruneau, 2013 "Impediments to the Accurate Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations," in Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations* (New York, NY: Routledge): 1-21; Feaver, 1999, "Civil-Military Relations," 211-41.

<sup>53</sup> Huntington, 1957, *The Soldier and the State*.

<sup>54</sup> Peter D. Feaver, 2003, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press): 7.

<sup>55</sup> Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, 2013, "Introduction," in Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations* (New York, NY: Routledge): 1.

<sup>56</sup> Zoltan Barany, 2012, *The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press): 3.

<sup>57</sup> Thomas C. Bruneau, 2013, "Impediments to the Accurate Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations," in Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations* (New York, NY: Routledge): 13.

That said, a number of recent works do focus on the civil-military relationship during transitions,<sup>58</sup> including Barany's ambitious 2012 book, which goes a long way in helping to fill this narrowing gap.<sup>59</sup> Building on a long established stream of research analyzing civil-military relations in the Middle East,<sup>60</sup> a cluster of studies looking at the role of civil-military relations in the Arab Spring transitions have further contributed to the closing of this gap.<sup>61</sup> This dissertation further builds on this emerging body of work.

A number of studies emphasizing the importance of civil-military relations in democratizing or hybrid regimes have also focused on the unique challenges Africa faces in developing professional and democratized militaries.<sup>62</sup> Reflecting the broader trend in the field, the civil-military relations literature on Africa has principally focused on coups, with an extensive, if slightly outdated,<sup>63</sup> body of work theorizing on the conditions that predispose African countries to military intervention in politics.<sup>64</sup> Despite the many statistical and case studies focused on coups, the findings are far from settled, and in fact are often contradictory.

---

<sup>58</sup> For an early example, see Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, 1996, *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press). For an overview of such works see Feaver, 1999, "Civil-Military Relations," 223-4. For notable recent works see, Croissant et al., 2010, "Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-ism;" Aurel Croissant et al., 2011, "Theorizing Civilian Control of the Military in Emerging Democracies: Agency, Structure and Institutional Change," *Comparative Governance and Politics (Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft)*, 5: 75-98.

<sup>59</sup> Barany, 2012, *The Soldier and the Changing State*.

<sup>60</sup> See, for instance, Mehran Kamrava, 2000, "Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East," *Political Science Quarterly* 115, 1: 67-92; Hanna Batatu, 1981, "Some Observations on the Social Roots of Syria's Ruling Military Group and the Causes for Its Dominance," *Middle East Journal*, 35, 3: 331-44.

<sup>61</sup> See, for example, John Gledhill, 2013, "Assessing (In)security after the Arab Spring," *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 46, 4: 709-15; Zoltan Barany, 2011, "The Role of the Military," *Journal of Democracy*, 22, 4: 28-39; Eva Bellin, 2012, "Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring," *Comparative Politics* 44, 2: 127-49.

<sup>62</sup> See, for example, Mathurin C. Hounnikpo, 2010, *Guarding the Guardians: Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Governance in Africa* (Surrey: Ashgate); Herbert Howe, 2001, *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States* (London: Lynn Rienner); and Frazer, 1995, "Conceptualizing Civil-Military Relations."

<sup>63</sup> Howe, 2001, *Ambiguous Order*, this critique is made in note 3 of chapter 1, 20.

<sup>64</sup> For foundational works on coups in Africa see Claude Welch, 1970, *Soldier and State in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political Change* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press); and Samuel Decalo, 1990, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Motivations and Constraints* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press). For a more comprehensive review of the coup literature on Africa see Luckham

Luckham's taxonomy of coup explanations breaks down the litany of proposed variables into four primary clusters—namely dynamics internal to the military, broader political crises and contradictions, issues of “boundary relations” between society, the polity, and the military, and international and regional dynamics.<sup>65</sup> Luckham maintains, “coups have proved resistant to explanation,” emphasizing that one of the few settled findings in the literature is the “cumulative syndrome of militarization,” i.e. that coups are likely where plots and successful attempts have already occurred.<sup>66</sup> This finding is of great significance to this dissertation, as it suggests that a country like Togo, which has suffered multiple successful military coups, is likely to experience future coups, making SSR efforts aimed at establishing civilian control and dismantling the military's political influence particularly difficult.

The literature's traditional focus on the dichotomous variable of coups, however, is problematic as it obscures and vastly oversimplifies the complex and nuanced relationship between civilians and security leaders, particularly in democratizing countries. It also implies that a lack of coups indicates healthy civil-military relations.<sup>67</sup> An overemphasis on coups can thus lead to costly mischaracterizations of civil-military relations.<sup>68</sup> This point is also of great relevance to the dissertation, as a lack of coups in Zimbabwe does not indicate that the military has stayed out of politics. In fact, the opposite is true, as demonstrated below.

---

1994, “The Military, Militarization and Democratization in Africa,” 13-75; Sabastiano Rwengabo, 2012, “Regime Stability in Post-1986 Uganda: Counting the Benefits of Coup-Proofing,” *Armed Forces & Society*, 39, 3: 534-35; and Kristen A. Harkness, 2012, *The Origins of African Civil-Military Relations: Ethnic Armies and the Development of Coup Traps*, Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University: 21-36.

<sup>65</sup> Robin Luckham, 1994, “The Military, Militarization and Democratization in Africa: A Survey of Literature and Issues,” *African Studies Review*, 37, 2: 28-31.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid, 28, 31.

<sup>67</sup> Croissant et al., 2010, “Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-ism;” José A. Olmeda, 2013, “Escape from Huntington's Labyrinth: Civil-Military Relations and Comparative Politics,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, 61.

<sup>68</sup> Croissant et al., 2010, “Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-ism,” 954. For other recent efforts to move beyond coups, see Jan Angstrom, 2013, “The Changing Norms of Civil and Military and Civil-Military Relations Theory,” *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 24, 2: 224-36.

While the civil-military relations literature has made some strides in focusing on transitional contexts, the literature has not adequately addressed how civil-military relations play out in post-conflict power-sharing contexts, a lacuna this study helps fill. This reflects a larger gap in the literature regarding efforts to reform civil-military relations, a topic that, while understudied in the civil-military relations literature,<sup>69</sup> has generated an entire budding subfield dedicated to the concept of SSR.

#### 1.6.3. *Security Sector Reform Literature: Overly Technical and Apolitical but Shifting*

Given the clearly overlapping subject matter of the two fields, it is surprising that the SSR and civil-military literatures have rarely coalesced. Arising out of Western donor circles in the mid-1990s, the concept of SSR has faced difficulty escaping the influence of the policy environment from which it was born, with much of the SSR research to date driven and funded by international donor priorities.<sup>70</sup> This has resulted in what Chanaa identified in 2002 as a “conceptual-contextual divide,”<sup>71</sup> where the literature focused on the international, conceptual, and technical components of SSR programs with little empirical or theoretical attention paid to examining how domestic political and structural conditions are likely to facilitate or hinder SSR efforts. More recently, in 2010, Toft echoed this critique, writing: “SSR continues to receive little consideration in academic research...What little academic research exists on SSR is largely hooked into current policy practices.”<sup>72</sup>

---

<sup>69</sup> Thomas C. Bruneau, 2012, “Development of an Approach Through Debate,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, 24.

<sup>70</sup> Nicole Ball and Dylan Hendrickson, 2006, “Trends in Security Sector Reform: Policy, Practice and Research,” prepared for the workshop on “New Directions in Security Sector Reform,” Peace, Conflict and Development Program Initiative, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, November 2-4, revised January 2006, [http://www.ssrnetwork.net/uploaded\\_files/3278.pdf](http://www.ssrnetwork.net/uploaded_files/3278.pdf) (accessed 12.1.2013).

<sup>71</sup> Jane Chanaa, 2002, *Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges, and Prospects* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies): 61.

<sup>72</sup> Toft, 2010, *Securing the Peace*, 20. The latter part of this quote appears in note 4 of chapter 2, 177.

While this criticism of the early SSR literature is warranted, there are important exceptions to this trend, such as Cawthra and Luckham's 2003 volume arguing that the circumstances from which a country is transitioning are crucial to understanding whether SSR is likely to be successful. They assert that SSR efforts are much more likely to succeed in cases "where the state has remained reasonably functional...and its security institutions have remained largely intact."<sup>73</sup> This finding has important implications for this dissertation. Since post-election low-grade violence contexts are likely to have more intact security institutions than cases of civil war, SSR has a better chance of success in such settings.

Building on these early exceptions, a thin theoretical and empirical thread has developed in the SSR literature. In a response to Toft's critique, Nathan argued in 2011 that "there is in fact a sizeable literature" addressing SSR from an academic perspective.<sup>74</sup> Other recent academic works falling into this basket include Berg's 2012 study focused on the domestic political foundations of SSR and Hutchful's 2013 study, which also finds that local ownership and political contexts are "key to understanding security trajectories."<sup>75</sup>

Much of the recent research that touches on civil-military relations in Africa is found in the SSR subfield. With a long history of militarized rule and a concentration of fragile and post-conflict states, as noted, Africa is often described as "ground zero for SSR."<sup>76</sup> Much of the thinking on SSR in Africa has also largely been unable to escape the conceptual-

---

<sup>73</sup> Cawthra and Luckham, 2003, "Democratic Control and the Security Sector," 307. For other important exceptions, see Lyons, 2005, *Demilitarizing Politics*; Andreas Mehler, 2009, "Hybrid Regimes and Oligopolies of Violence in Africa: Expectations on Security Provision 'From Below,'" in Martina Fischer and Beatrix Schmelzle, (eds.) *Building Peace in the Absence of States: Challenging the Discourse on State Failure* (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management): 57-65.

<sup>74</sup> Laurie Nathan and Monica Duffy Toft, 2011, "Civil War Settlements and the Prospects for Peace," *International Security*, 36, 1: 206. For an overview of the SSR literature that Nathan classifies as falling into this category, see *ibid*, note 17, 206-7.

<sup>75</sup> Louis-Alexandre Berg, 2012, "Guns, Laws and Politics: The Political Foundations of Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform," *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law* 4, 1: 4-30; Hutchful, 2013, "Security Sector Governance and Peacebuilding," 72. For a recent SSR analysis that leverages the state-building literature, see Paul Jackson, 2011, "Security Sector Reform and State Building," *Third World Quarterly*, 32, 10: 1803-1822.

<sup>76</sup> Sedra, 2010, "Introduction: The Future of Security Sector Reform," 22.

contextual imbalance. The work of Hills is an important exception. Hills argues for more modest expectations and a scaled-down approach to security governance that conceptualizes reform as part of a “dialectic”—as apposed to a linear—process.<sup>77</sup>

As noted by Hills,<sup>78</sup> the fundamentally politicized role of African security institutions ensures that security reform outcomes will remain contingent on prevailing domestic political conditions. This finding meshes well with Berg and Hutchful’s findings. This dissertation builds on this emerging theoretical and empirical thread in the SSR literature by arguing that local agency and political strategies play significant roles in shaping SSR outcomes. Despite strides in the right direction, the relationship between SSR and local political dynamics remains understudied in the SSR literature.

#### 1.6.4. *Minimal Linkages*

Despite the opportunities for SSR engendered by power sharing noted above, links between the three bodies of literature remain mostly unexplored. As Peak and Scheye argue, “systematic analyses of SSR in the context of political or socio-economic change [such as power sharing] are rare.”<sup>79</sup> While connections between the different research areas are scarce, a few notable studies touch on power sharing, civil-military relations, and SSR.

Hoddie and Hartzell analyze military power-sharing arrangements, emphasizing their importance to the durability of civil war settlements.<sup>80</sup> In a similar vein, Toft’s theory of “mutual benefit and mutual harm” posits that when reform of the security sector is

---

<sup>77</sup> Alice Hills, 2008, “The Dialectic of Police Reform in Nigeria,” *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 46, 2: 217.

<sup>78</sup> Alice Hills, 2007, “Police Commissioners, Presidents and the Governance of Security,” *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 45, 3: 403-423.

<sup>79</sup> Gordon Peake, Eric Scheye and Alice Hills, 2006, “Introduction,” *Civil Wars*, 8, 2: 83.

<sup>80</sup> Matthew Hoddie and Caroline Hartzell, 2003, “Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military Power-Sharing Arrangements,” *Journal of Peace Research*, 40, 3: 303-20.

implemented after peace settlements, it “offers the potential for enduring and constructive peace.”<sup>81</sup> Hoddie and Hartzell and Toft make important linkages between peace settlements, SSR, and the durability of peace, which are key theoretical innovations that this dissertation builds on. However, both studies define SSR broadly, do not investigate the relationship between power-sharing government and SSR, or analyze the conditions under which SSR is likely to succeed. Moreover, the studies, like most of the literature, focus exclusively on civil war cases.

Cheeseman connects power sharing and institutional reform by using constitutional and security reforms as criteria to judge the likely outcomes of unity governments in Africa.<sup>82</sup> In doing so, he makes great strides in better understanding the relationship between power sharing and institutional reform outcomes. This dissertation builds directly on his work. However, the study considers power-sharing governments in contexts of low-grade electoral violence and cases of post-civil war together and is overly critical of the capacity of post-election power-sharing governments to deliver SSR. Other important exceptions include Hutchful’s study on SSR in peace settlements, which includes a section on peace agreements in transitional environments and a short discussion on power sharing, and Cornish’s analysis of the military dimension in contexts where “complex power sharing” is used to settle secessionist disputes of self-determination.<sup>83</sup>

In an effort to help fill the above gaps in the power sharing, civil-military relations, and security reform literatures, as well as contribute to their linkage, this study identifies the

---

<sup>81</sup> Toft, 2010, *Securing the Peace*, 4.

<sup>82</sup> Cheeseman, 2011, “The Internal Dynamics of Power Sharing in Africa.”

<sup>83</sup> Hutchful, 2009, “Security Sector Reform Provisions in Peace Agreements,” 24-26, 20; Paul Cornish, 2008, “The Military Dimension of Security Sector Governance in Complex Power-sharing Arrangements,” in Marc Weller and Barbara Metzger, (eds.) *Settling Self-Determination Disputes: Complex Power-sharing in Theory and Practice* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers): 571-91.

causal factors and mechanisms that have shaped the SSR outcomes of post-election unity governments, using Kenya, Togo, and Zimbabwe as cases. Again, this study complicates and calls into question the largely negative narrative of post-election power sharing, arguing that the model can deliver some reforms, under certain conditions. Moreover, by focusing exclusively on cases of low-grade electoral violence, looking at institutional reform outcomes instead of civil war, and seeking to understand the conditions under which SSR is likely to progress, this study makes original contributions to these three literatures and contributes to their linkage. In sum, this literature review has critiqued the three relevant bodies of work and discussed how the study fills major gaps and builds on emerging streams of research in the literature.

### 1.7. Chapter Overview

The dissertation consists of six chapters. This introductory chapter has presented a brief summary of the theoretical framework, highlighted the main contributions and significance of the study, defined key terms, and critiqued the power sharing, civil-military relations, and SSR literatures, situating the study within the extant theoretical debates.

The following chapter, Chapter 2, discusses the research design and presents the dissertation's theoretical framework in detail. It forwards the main hypotheses of the study and discusses four "ideal types" of power sharing in practice. The chapter then highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the chosen methods and discusses measurement, case selection, data collection, data analysis, and ways in which potential methodological challenges were overcome. Brief historical overviews of the three cases are included in the discussion on case selection. These case overviews describe each country's electoral crisis, briefly critique the



extant case literature, and lay the groundwork for the following three in depth case study chapters.

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 apply the theoretical expectations to the three cases. Chapter 3 analyzes the case of Zimbabwe. The chapter argues that high incumbent reliance on the security sector to remain in power, low levels of Western leverage, and the distinct character of regional politics in southern Africa led to weak agreement design and the practice of exclusionary *security politics* under power sharing. Weak agreement design and both parties' use of exclusionary, confrontational political approaches closed off opportunities for SSR generated by the electoral crisis and the political agreement, leading to a distinct lack of any meaningful SSR progress in Zimbabwe under post-election power sharing.

Chapter 4 turns to the case of Kenya. The chapter demonstrates that low incumbent reliance on the security sector to remain in power and a high level of coordinated Western leverage led to strong agreement design and the practice of largely inclusionary *coalition politics* in Kenya under power sharing. Strong SSR content and external enforcement mechanisms in the agreement and both parties' use of largely inclusionary political approaches, despite setbacks and delays, facilitated considerable SSR progress in Kenya, particularly at the institutional level. The chapter argues that the lack of an incumbent running in the next election cycle played a large role in allowing institutional reforms to progress under power sharing.

Chapter 5 analyzes the case of Togo. The chapter argues that high incumbent reliance on the security sector to remain in power accompanied by high levels of coordinated Western leverage led to strong agreement design and the practice of *countervailing politics* in Togo under power sharing. Strong agreement design and the parties' deployment of conflicting

political approaches led to some halting but unexpected movement on SSR in Togo, particularly regarding the conduct of security forces during elections. This chapter maintains that Western leverage—particularly from the European Union (EU)—along with a change in party leadership, played crucial roles in pushing some institutional reforms forward in Togo under power sharing.

In conclusion, Chapter 6 analyzes the SSR outcomes of each case in comparative perspective. The chapter argues that the three cases of Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Togo confirm the theoretical expectations forwarded in Chapter 2, lending considerable support to the study's central theoretical claims and hypotheses. It then discusses the generalizability of the findings to a broader set of cases, discusses a number of important caveats to the dissertation, explores the theoretical and policy implications of the study, and proposes fruitful avenues for further research on the topic.

## 2. THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

### 2.1. Research Design Overview

Given the nature of the research question, the fairly limited number of existing cases in the empirical universe, and the strengths of qualitative methods in identifying and assessing causal processes, this theory-building dissertation utilizes a comparative, small-N research design that employs George and Bennett's method of "structured, focused comparison."<sup>84</sup> Broadly speaking, the method of structured, focused comparison consists of three phases: designing the research, carrying out the selected case studies, and drawing the larger theoretical implications of the case findings.<sup>85</sup> The method is "structured" in the sense that data is systematically collected across cases and is "focused" in that only specific elements of each case under study are analyzed.<sup>86</sup> As outlined below, using the method of process tracing and the logic of most-similar comparisons, I conduct two sets of cross- and within-case comparisons, utilizing elite interviews as the primary tool for data collection.

According to George and Bennett, there are five, interrelated key components to a research design using the method of structured, focused comparison: one, formulating the problem and research objectives; two, specifying variables and developing hypotheses; three, selecting cases; four, conceptualizing variance in variables; and five, formulating data requirements.<sup>87</sup> Each of these steps is addressed in turn in the following sections of this chapter.

---

<sup>84</sup> Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, 2005, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press): 67.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid, 73.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid, 74-88.

## 2.2. Research Problem

The research problem is to understand the puzzle of why, against the expectations of much of the literature, some post-election power-sharing governments in semi-authoritarian countries appear to lead to some SSR while others do not. The research objective is to discover if such apparent diverging SSR outcomes do indeed occur and, if they do, develop a parsimonious theory explaining why. In keeping with the requirements of the method of structured, focused comparison, the research objective is focused in that it investigates a “subclass”<sup>88</sup> of the broader phenomena of both power sharing and institutional reform, i.e. SSR efforts under post-election power-sharing governments formed in contexts of low-grade violence. This focus on a subclass of cases allows the researcher to develop “middle-range” theory, which, in contrast to highly generalized “covering laws,” or macro-theories,<sup>89</sup> consists of “contingent generalizations”<sup>90</sup> that do not purport to apply in all contexts.

## 2.3. Theoretical Framework

An overview of the theoretical framework was briefly presented in Chapter 1 and is further elaborated here. At the most basic level, I theorize that power sharing agreements and governments play a significant role in the causal process of SSR and can deliver some institutional reforms, under certain conditions. I have specified the long- and short-term variables of the study in the following manner. The outcome, or DV, is the amount of SSR that has been achieved and successfully implemented in each selected case since the signing of the power-sharing accord through the agreement’s tenure. The question at the heart of this

---

<sup>88</sup> Ibid, 77.

<sup>89</sup> For a discussion of the difficulties in falsifying or confirming macro-theories, see Gerring, 2007, *Case Study Research*, 73-75.

<sup>90</sup> George and Bennett, 2005, *Case Studies and Theory Development*, 31.

study is: Which causal factors (IVs) are the most important in shaping SSR outcomes (the DV) under power sharing, and through what processes or mechanisms? To answer this question, this dissertation proposes a heuristic model, which consists of a series of general theoretical propositions that are then narrowed down to two sets of two hypotheses.

The two-step integrated theoretical framework presented here departs from theories of institutional reform that argue for the supremacy of endogenous versus exogenous variables or structure versus agency.<sup>91</sup> Instead, I forward a structured contingency approach. The structured contingency approach posits that both structure and agency matter in explanations of historical and institutional change. According to Karl, the structured contingency approach seeks to “relate structural constraints to the shaping of contingent choice.” Bratton and van de Walle assert that a structured contingency approach “allows that people can make their own history, even if not under conditions of their own choosing.”<sup>92</sup> Although not using the same terminology, Lewis also deploys a similar approach, noting that such a framework, “allows us to specify more clearly the role of agency and contingent elements...as well as the relative importance of structural factors.”<sup>93</sup>

Utilizing the structured contingency approach, I posit that a combination of domestic and international factors will drive or stymie reform of the security sector under power sharing. In short, the theory proposes that two main long-term factors, the nature of civil-military relations and the character of external involvement, combined with two contingent mechanisms, the design of the political agreement and type of political strategy employed, will be the most important factors shaping SSR under power sharing.

---

<sup>91</sup> Hay and Wincott, 1998, “Structure, Agency, and Historical Institutionalism.”

<sup>92</sup> Terry Lynn Karl 1990, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,” 1; Bratton and van de Waal, 1997, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, 45.

<sup>93</sup> Peter M. Lewis, 2007, *Growing Apart: Oil, Politics, and Economic Change in Indonesia and Nigeria* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press): 24.

Put formally, I have conceptualized the following long-term IVs as:

IV1) Nature of civil-military relations

IV2) Character of external involvement

While I have conceptualized the two contingent, causal mechanisms, as:

M1) Design of power-sharing agreement

M2) Type of political strategy employed

### 2.3.1. Hypotheses

To tease out the specific theoretical expectations of this framework, I have formulated two sets of two long- and short-term hypotheses (see Figure 2).<sup>94</sup>




Figure 2: SSR-power sharing framework

H1a): The “reliance” hypothesis maintains that the nature of civil-military relations prior to power sharing, more specifically the character and extent of former ruling party reliance on the security sector to remain in power, will shape the two contingent factors of political strategy and agreement strength, which, in turn, will shape SSR outcomes. Put simply, *higher levels of reliance will result in less SSR, and vice versa.*

<sup>94</sup> The same figure is displayed in Chapter 1; it is shown again here for illustrative purposes.

This relationship will obtain because in instances of high reliance, incumbents will use any means necessary—namely exclusive, coercive political strategies—to stymie any potential openings for SSR, such as strong agreement design, which threaten their hold on power. Low levels of reliance are expected to allow room for more inclusive political strategies and strong agreement design, translating into more SSR. A variety of historical factors are expected to influence the character and extent of reliance in each case, namely ideological or ethnic ties between ruling parties and the security sector and the presence or absence of government or intra-party turnover. These factors are detailed below in the section on measurement. The reliance hypothesis builds out of the focus on “military influence” and the importance of ideology within the civil-military relations literature.<sup>95</sup>

H1b): The “external involvement” hypothesis maintains that the character of external involvement prior to power sharing, more specifically the degree of Western<sup>96</sup> leverage and the nature of regional dynamics, will also shape the strength of agreement design and the type of political strategies deployed under power sharing, which, in turn, will shape SSR outcomes. Put simply, *higher levels of Western leverage will result in more SSR, and vice versa.*

High levels of Western leverage are expected to lead to high levels of Western involvement in the power-sharing mediation, leading, due to the importance Western countries place on SSR, to strong agreement design. In turn, strong agreement design will

---

<sup>95</sup> For an overview of the many works that have grappled with the military influence variable, see Feaver, 1999, “Civil-Military Relations,” 218-19; and Croissant et al., 2010, “Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-ism,” especially 954 and footnote 31, 965-6. For a focus on ideology in civil-military relations see Blessing-Miles Tendi, 2013, “Ideology, Civilian Authority and the Zimbabwean Military,” *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 39, 4: 829-43; Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, 2012, “Beyond Patronage: Violent Struggle, Ruling Party Cohesion, and Authoritarian Durability,” *Perspectives on Politics*, 10, 4: 869-889; and Luckham, 1994, “The Military, Militarization and Democratization in Africa.”

<sup>96</sup> Following Levitsky and Way, this study defines “the West” as the United States and EU countries, Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, 2010, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press): 41-43.

push parties toward more inclusionary political strategies, translating into more SSR. Low levels of Western leverage and involvement are expected to lead to weak agreement design, which will allow for the unchecked use of exclusive political strategies, translating into less SSR. Regional dynamics are also expected to play a crucial role here. Where deeply seated regional norms of non-intervention prevail, regional dynamics are expected to blunt Western leverage and involvement in the mediation, leading to weaker agreement design. On the other hand, in regions where norms are more open to international intervention, regional dynamics are expected to facilitate Western leverage and involvement. Again, a number of factors are expected to influence the character of external involvement in each case, namely each country's vulnerability to Western pressure and the prevailing dynamics and norms of regional organizations. The external involvement hypothesis builds out of the longstanding scholarly debate over the importance of external versus domestic actors in the democratization and institutional reform literature.<sup>97</sup>

H2a): The “agreement design” hypothesis maintains that the design of the power-sharing agreement, more specifically its strength of SSR content and third party enforcement, will mediate international and domestic pressures for reform under power sharing, which, in tandem with the type of political strategy employed, will shape SSR outcomes. Put simply, *stronger agreement design will result in more SSR, and vice versa.*

Stronger agreement design is expected to translate into more SSR because domestic, regional, and international actors can use this framework to push reforms forward by

---

<sup>97</sup> For an overview of the works arguing that international influence is limited in shaping institutional reform outcomes see Kuperman, 2015, (ed.) *Constitutions and Conflict Management in Africa*, 232-33. For works arguing for the importance of international variables, see, for instance, Levitsky and Way, 2010, *Competitive Authoritarianism*: 38; Bekoe, 2012, “Postelection Political Agreements in Togo and Zanzibar.” For a focus on the role of regional organizations and norms see, Christof Hartmann, 2016, “Leverage and Linkage: How Regionalism Shapes Regime Dynamics in Africa,” *Comparative Governance and Politics (Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft)*,” 10:79-98; for the impact of a “neighborhood effect” on reform processes, see Lewis, 2007, *Growing Apart: Oil, Politics, and Economic Change in Indonesia and Nigeria*, 17.



pressuring political players within the unity government to uphold their promises. Both the nature of civil-military relations and the character of external involvement prior to power sharing are expected to fundamentally influence the strength of agreement design. The agreement design hypothesis builds out of the focus on the “quality” of peace agreements and the importance of third-party enforcement within the peace agreement literature on civil wars.<sup>98</sup>

H2b): The “political strategy” hypothesis maintains that the type of political strategies deployed by the respective parties, more specifically the use of inclusive or exclusive political approaches (at the elite and grassroots levels), will, in tandem with agreement strength, shape SSR outcomes. Put simply, *more inclusionary political strategies will result in more SSR, and vice versa.*

More exclusionary, violent political strategies are expected to polarize inter-elite relations and lead to less SSR, while more inclusive strategies are expected to foster compromise and lead to more SSR under power sharing. The strategic choices of both incumbent and opposition parties are expected to matter, although not equally. Because the incumbent party is likely to remain in overall control of the security sector, its choice of political strategy is expected to be decisive in SSR outcomes. Akin to the agreement design hypothesis, both the nature of civil-military relations and the character of external involvement prior to power sharing are expected to fundamentally influence the type of strategy deployed by domestic parties. Another key factor expected to shape the choice of political strategy is whether or not an incumbent is running for office in the next election

---

<sup>98</sup> See, for instance, Virginia Page Fortna, 2003, “Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace,” *International Organization*, 57, 2: 337-372; Stephen John Stedman, 2002, “Introduction,” in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, (eds.) *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner): 1-40; Barbara Walter, 2002, *Committing to Peace*.

cycle. If an incumbent is running, they are expected to use more exclusionary strategies and tactics. If an incumbent is not running, they are expected to be more open to inclusionary approaches and institutional reforms. The political strategy hypothesis builds out of the political science research stream focusing on the importance of leadership, political will, and elite decision-making in political processes and outcomes.<sup>99</sup>

### *2.3.2. Power Sharing in Practice: Variable Interaction and Four Ideal Types*

Each explanatory factor highlighted above is expected to play an independent causal role in the SSR process under power sharing. That said, while the two long-term variables of the nature of civil-military relations and the character of external involvement continue to play an independent role throughout the life of the unity government, their primary causal effects are expected to be channeled through the two proximate factors of agreement design and political strategy. As such, the four explanatory factors specified above are expected to interact in each case. As noted, the two long-term factors of the nature of civil-military relations and the character of external involvement are expected to shape the agreement design and political strategies deployed under power sharing. The table below helps illustrate this first step of the theoretical framework (Figure 3).

---

<sup>99</sup> See, for example, Robert Rotberg, 2012, *Transformative Political Leadership: Making a Difference in the Developing World* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press); Emilie Hafner-Burton, D. Alex Hughes, and David Victor, 2013, "The Cognitive Revolution and the Political Psychology of Elite Decision Making," *Perspective on Politics*, 11, 2: 368-386; Lewis, 2007, *Growing Apart: Oil, Politics, and Economic Change in Indonesia and Nigeria*; Michael Horowitz, Allan Stam, and Cali Ellis, 2015, *Why Leaders Fight* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press); Peter VonDoep, 2009, "The Leadership Variable in Africa: Situating Structure and Agency in Governance Trajectories," Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 4, Toronto.

| Reliance on Security Sector | Western Leverage | Outcome                                         |
|-----------------------------|------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Low                         | High             | Inclusionary strategies/strong agreement design |
| High                        | Low              | Exclusionary strategies/weak agreement design   |
| High                        | High             | Exclusionary strategies/strong agreement design |
| Low                         | Low              | Inclusionary strategies/weak agreement design   |

Figure 3: SSR power-sharing framework, step 1

As illustrated by Figure 3, different combinations of these long-term variables are expected to shape the values of the two short-term variables. A low degree of reliance and high Western leverage is expected to result in inclusionary strategies and strong agreement design, while a high degree of reliance and low Western leverage is expected to result in exclusionary strategies and weak agreement design. A high degree of reliance and high Western leverage is expected to result in moderated but largely exclusionary strategies and largely strong agreement design. Finally, a low degree of reliance and low Western leverage is expected to result in inclusionary strategies and weak agreement design.

The two short-term mechanisms are also expected to interact, with the strength or weakness of the agreement influencing the choice of political strategy under power sharing and vice versa. The use of exclusive, polarizing strategies in the run-up to power sharing is expected to lead to weak agreement design, while more inclusionary political dynamics are expected to facilitate strong agreement design. In turn, weak agreement design is expected to allow exclusive, hardline political strategies to flourish, while strong agreement design is expected to push the parties toward more inclusive approaches and compromises.

To further illustrate how the second, short-term step of the theoretical framework operates, i.e. the mechanisms of agreement design and political strategies, four ideal types of power sharing in practice are forwarded here: *security politics* (weak design/exclusionary strategies), *coalition politics* (strong design/inclusionary strategies), *endogenous politics*

(weak design/inclusionary strategies), and *countervailing politics* (strong design/largely exclusionary strategies) (see Figure 4).




Figure 4: SSR power sharing framework, step 2

Where agreement design is weak and political strategies are exclusionary, the practice of *security politics* is expected to obtain and a low degree of SSR is expected under power sharing. In this scenario, due to high levels of incumbent reliance on the security sector to remain in power and low levels of Western leverage, incumbents will use exclusive, often violent political strategies to stymie any potential openings for SSR, such as strong agreement design, which threaten their hold on power, access to patronage networks, and potential freedom (through prosecutions for past political violence). In this polarized environment, opposition parties, through a process of defensive exclusion, are also expected to adopt confrontational, exclusionary approaches, further eroding common ground, moderation, and prospects for compromise. Weak SSR content and third party enforcement mechanisms in the agreement means international and domestic constituencies will be unable

to leverage the agreement to push reform under power sharing and the use of exclusive strategies will go unchecked. These conditions are expected to result in political deadlock and little to no movement on SSR. The case of Zimbabwe under power sharing is expected to fall into this category of *security politics* (see Figure 5).

Where agreement design is strong and political strategies inclusionary, the practice of *coalition politics* is expected to obtain and a considerable degree of SSR is expected. In this scenario, due to low levels of incumbent reliance on the security sector to remain in power and high levels of Western leverage, political relations will be less polarized and both incumbents and opposition parties are expected to deploy inclusionary political approaches that build political consensus. Strong SSR content and third party enforcement mechanisms in the agreement mean that international and domestic constituencies are able to leverage the agreement to push reform under power sharing and sanction attempts at political exclusion or hardline strategies. These conditions are expected to facilitate considerable openings for reform and deliver some SSR. In other words, the combination of low reliance and high external leverage, leading to strong agreement design and inclusionary strategies, are expected to be sufficient conditions to deliver some SSR progress. The case of Kenya under power sharing is expected to fall into this category of *coalition politics* (see Figure 5).

Where agreement design is weak and political strategies are inclusionary, the practice of *endogenous politics* is expected to obtain and minimal reforms are expected. In this scenario, due to low levels of incumbent reliance on the security sector to remain in power and low levels of Western leverage, incumbents are unlikely to frustrate reform but there is an absence of a strong agreement or international pressure to drive such a process. As inclusionary approaches will foster inter-elite compromise, however, these conditions can be

expected to facilitate some SSR as long as there is a strong endogenous constituency pushing reform. Since, to the best of my knowledge, the category of *endogenous politics* has yet to appear in the empirical universe, it is not examined at length in this dissertation.

Where agreement design is strong but political strategies are largely exclusionary, the practice of *countervailing politics* is expected to obtain and a halting but moderate degree of SSR is expected. In this scenario, due to high levels of incumbent reliance on the security sector to remain in power, incumbents will attempt to use largely exclusionary political strategies to try to block any potential openings for SSR while opposition parties are also expected to adopt confrontational approaches, leading to polarized inter-elite relations. At the same time, due to high levels of Western leverage, strong SSR content and third party enforcement mechanisms in the agreement means that international and domestic constituencies are able to leverage the agreement to push reform under power sharing.

Under these conditions, the SSR process is expected to be halting and unpredictable, with the abundant potential for reform being countervailed by party or security leaders impeding such efforts. Where the practice of *countervailing politics* prevails, international and regional pressure for reform is expected to be key. If a high level of coordinated, external leverage exists (both at the international and regional level), the expectation is that this combination of factors will have the potential to push incumbents toward more accommodating approaches, driving some SSR forward. In other words, strong agreement design backed by coordinated external pressure and leverage are expected to also be sufficient conditions to secure a measure of SSR, even in cases that feature high degrees of incumbent reliance on the security apparatus. The case of Togo under power sharing is expected to fall into this category of *countervailing politics* (see Figure 5).

To further illustrate where the three cases of Kenya, Togo, and Zimbabwe fit into this theoretical framework, in the figure below I show which combinations of the four explanatory variables are expected to obtain in each case. In Kenya, with a low degree of reliance on the security sector and a high degree of Western leverage, inclusionary strategies and strong agreement design are expected under power sharing, leading to the practice of *coalition politics* and a considerable degree of SSR. In Zimbabwe, with a high degree of reliance on the security sector and a low degree of Western leverage, exclusionary strategies and weak agreement design are expected under power sharing, leading to the practice of *security politics* and a low degree of SSR. In Togo, with a high degree of reliance on the security sector and a high degree of Western leverage, moderated but largely exclusionary strategies and strong agreement design are expected under power sharing, leading to the practice of *countervailing politics* and some halting progress on SSR. As noted, since the category of *endogenous politics* has yet to appear in the empirical universe, it is not analyzed in an in depth manner in this study.




Figure 5: Expected power sharing dynamics in each case

As a point of departure, the theoretical framework outlined above assumes that former ruling parties under power sharing will likely seek to maximize their chances of remaining in power by maintaining control over the security apparatus. Conversely, former opposition parties likewise will seek to maximize their chances of remaining in power by reforming the former ruling party's control over the security sector. The theoretical framework aims for parsimony, only identifying the most crucial out of variegated factors that mold the SSR outcomes of post-election unity governments in semi-authoritarian regimes. Akin to all post-conflict environments, power-sharing governments are extremely fragile and volatile, with their outcomes dependent on a broad range of factors that are nearly impossible to forecast. As such, it must be stressed that this framework only deals in probabilities, specifying the "generalized pathways"<sup>100</sup> that security reform efforts are likely to follow under power sharing.

#### 2.4. Measurement Indicators

Given the inherent difficulties and fuzziness of measuring social science phenomena, this dissertation uses a variety of ways to compare the study variables across cases. Utilizing data from the fieldwork phase of the research, the values of all variables are explained primarily through narrative-based analyses of the cases, which are supported by a number of other rough proxies and indicators.

The nature of civil-military relations and the extent of the former ruling party's reliance on the security sector (IV1) prior to and during power sharing are traced through each case using a fine-grained analysis of country's unique historical civil-military

---

<sup>100</sup> George and Bennett, 2005, *Case Studies and Theory Development*, 236.



relationship. Additionally, three other indicators are used to help roughly approximate the value of the reliance variable. First, is the level of security sector involvement in the electoral violence that precipitated the unity government (as measured by percentage of deaths attributed to security sector actors). A value of 20 percent responsibility or below is deemed a low degree of reliance, 21-40 medium-low, 41-60 medium, 61-80 medium-high, and 81 and above high. Second, is the prevalence of serving or retired security leaders in the cabinet of the unity government.<sup>101</sup> A value of 20 percent or below is deemed a low degree, 21-40 medium, 41-60 high, 61-80 extremely high, and 81 and above a security regime.

Third, to help establish if influence is flowing from politicians to the security sector (politicization) and not the other way around (securitization), the presence or absence of successful security sector coups at any time since the country's independence are also considered.<sup>102</sup> The absence of coups suggests politicization; their presence suggests securitization. These are imperfect indicators for the degree of reliance as they fail to capture the important informal ways party leaders and security actors wield their influence. That said, they do help to roughly gauge formal levels of reliance or influence. Based on the narrative analysis and these indicators, I assign each case an overall IV1 value ranging from extremely low, to low, to medium, to high, to extremely high.

The character of external involvement (IV2) is also traced throughout each case using a narrative-based analysis, with an emphasis on sources of Western leverage and regional dynamics. Additionally, I use two other indicators to help gauge the values of this variable.

---

<sup>101</sup> Compiled with data collected from the Central Intelligence Agency, 2016, "Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-leaders-1/index.html> (accessed September 24, 2016).

<sup>102</sup> Two commonly cited databases are used to measure military coups, Jonathan Powell, 2015, "Coups in the World, 1950-Present," <http://www.jonathanmpowell.com/coup-detat-dataset.html> (accessed November 23, 2015); Center for Systemic Peace, 2014, "Coups d'État, 1946-2014," <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html> (accessed November 23, 2015).

First, following Peiffer and Englebert, to gauge each country's vulnerability to external influence, or what they term "extraversion vulnerability," I calculate aid—Official Development Assistance (ODA)—as a percentage of export revenues, both during the years of unity government and in the five years prior.<sup>103</sup> According to Peiffer and Englebert, this measure more accurately captures countries' vulnerability to Western countries than other measures of aid dependence such as calculating aid as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or in per capita terms. They argue that, "From the point of view of incumbent elites, one of aid's main benefits is access to cash. The extent to which such access matters to a regime is a function of what other sources of cash it can rely on," such as cash from exports. As such, "Measuring aid in proportion to export revenues captures the relative importance of aid cash." An aid to export percentage of 10 percent or below is deemed as extremely low Western leverage, 11-20 percent as low, 21-30 percent as medium, 31-40 percent as high, and 41 percent and above as extremely high. Because Peiffer and Englebert's data only goes up to 2008, I updated their database to cover the 2009-2013 period under study.<sup>104</sup> To do so, I used export data from the World Trade Organization and the UN's International Trade Centre, and ODA data from the World Bank.<sup>105</sup>

Second, as an indicator to help gauge the importance of trade ties for each country, I collected data on each case's top five trade (import and export) partners, both before and over the life of the unity government (averaged). I again used World Bank data. I classify a 1-10

---

<sup>103</sup> Caryn Peiffer and Pierre Englebert, 2012, "Extraversion, Vulnerability To Donors, and Political Liberalization in Africa," *African Affairs*, 111, 444: 355–378. The authors also use oil rents and the type of external patronage (mainly Soviet) to measure extraversion vulnerability. These measures do not apply here because they do not classify any of my cases as oil producers or former Soviet patrons, and find that French influence is insignificant outside of the early 1990s (376).

<sup>104</sup> I sincerely thank Caryn Peiffer and Pierre Englebert for kindly sharing their data with me.

<sup>105</sup> International Trade Centre, 2016, "Trade Map,"

[http://www.trademap.org/Product\\_SelProduct\\_TS.aspx?nvpm=1||||TOTAL|||2|1|1|1|2|1|1|1|1](http://www.trademap.org/Product_SelProduct_TS.aspx?nvpm=1||||TOTAL|||2|1|1|1|2|1|1|1|1) (accessed July 3, 2016); World Bank, 2016, "Development Indicators," <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators> (accessed July 3, 2016).

percent bilateral trade share as low trade dependency, 11-20 percent medium, 21-30 percent as high, and 31 percent and above as trade dominant. While imperfect measures, these two indicators buttress the narrative-based analysis and help to gauge overall levels of Western leverage and regional trade dependence in each case.

The agreement design (M1) and its component parts of SSR and third party monitoring strength are also traced through each case using a narrative-based analysis. M1 is measured according to the inclusion or exclusion of seven SSR provisions within the text of the agreement and the presence or absence of third party enforcement mechanisms. The seven SSR provisions are: constitutional changes in security governance, demands of political neutrality, revisions in security reform legislation, government commissions investigating security sector complicity in political violence, training changes, domestic accountability mechanisms for those involved in political violence, and a timeframe to achieve such steps. While it could be argued that certain criterion are more important than others or operate on different levels, I have chosen to weight each category equally in order to provide an overall gauge of the strength of SSR content.

Third party monitoring strength is defined according to the presence or absence of mechanisms granting external actors the ability to enforce noncompliance of the agreement. Because of the expected importance of external enforcement, the presence of such a mechanism is more heavily weighted than other factors. Based on these indicators, I assign each case an overall M1 value ranging from weak, to moderately weak, to medium, to moderately strong, to strong.

The type of political strategy deployed (M2) is explained primarily through a narrative-based analysis highlighting the relevant parties' use of inclusive versus exclusive

strategies and tactics at the elite and grassroots level. Exclusive versus inclusive political strategies and tactics are measured according to four main categories. First, was whether the parties joined (or refused to join) the power-sharing government without delay after signing the political agreement. Second, was the parties' use (or absence) of widespread partisan political violence<sup>106</sup> (defined as 20 or more violent incidents a year, using data collected by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project [ACLED]). Third, were attempts at cross-party policy cooperation on key reforms contained in the agreement (or attempts to block); and, fourth, in the same vein, was what I have deemed as cooperative (or confrontational) approaches to SSR. To code the final two indicators, I utilize both public statements by top party and security sector leaders and evidence gleaned from interviews with party officials in each case.

An ideal type exclusive strategy would therefore be one in which the party refused to join or delayed joining the unity government, used widespread partisan political violence (20 or more violent incidents a year), attempted to block key reforms contained in the agreement, and took confrontational, polarizing approaches to SSR. The Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party in Zimbabwe is expected to exemplify the exclusive strategy ideal type under power sharing. On the other end of the spectrum, an ideal type inclusive strategy would therefore be one in which the party joined the unity government without delay, did not use widespread partisan political violence (under 20 violent incidents a year), attempted cross-party policy cooperation on key reforms contained in the agreement, and took cooperative, conciliatory approaches to SSR. The Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) party in Kenya is expected to exemplify the inclusive strategy ideal type.

---

<sup>106</sup> While ACLED counts both riots and peaceful protests as conflict events, I have disaggregated the data in each case and only classify riots as political violence, not peaceful protests.

Because of the expected importance of violence in polarizing inter-elite relations, the use of widespread political violence is weighted as more significant than other factors. Based on these four indicators, I assign each major party to power sharing an overall M2 value ranging from exclusive, to moderately exclusive, to moderate, to moderately inclusive, to inclusive. A more detailed explanation of how M2 is measured and coded in each case is provided in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.

Finally, akin to the IVs and mechanisms, a narrative-based analysis of SSR outcomes (the DV) explains the extent to which SSR efforts have advanced or faltered over the life of power sharing. In order to capture both institutional and policy changes as well as actual changes in security sector behavior, a variety of indicators are used to establish progress along a continuum. Changes in SSR policy are measured according to seven criteria: constitutional changes in security governance, demands of political neutrality, security reform legislation, government commissions investigating complicity in political violence, personnel changes of security leaders, changes in training curriculum, and prosecutions of senior-level security officials.

Shifts in actual security sector behavior are measured according to changes in three categories: partisan involvement in election-related violence, partisan involvement in political campaigns or elections, and statements of political partiality. Based on these ten criteria, the cases are assigned an SSR value ranging from low, medium-low, to medium, to medium-high, to high. Afrobarometer polling data is also used to gauge the public's opinion on security reforms. These are of course imperfect indicators, in that they do not fully capture other forms of negative security sector behavior—including involvement in corruption and non-election-related violence—or operational effectiveness. This study's focus on the

security sector's depoliticization and decreased involvement in electoral violence, however, is warranted because security sector involvement in these areas is one of the most critical challenges to achieving successful SSR and democratic consolidation in both Africa and beyond. It could also be argued that certain criterion are more important than others or operate on different levels. Taken together, however, these ten indicators provide an accurate overall gauge of SSR progress across cases, both at the institutional and behavioral levels.

## 2.5. Case Selection

Case studies as conceptualized in this study do not exist in isolation. Two recent works by prominent case study methodologists include references to a broader population of cases in their very definition of case studies. George and Bennett define the case study approach as “the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events.”<sup>107</sup> Gerring goes one step further, minimally defining a case study as “the intensive study of a single unit or a small number of units (the cases), for the purpose of understanding a larger class of similar units (a population of cases).”<sup>108</sup> This study adopts Gerring's definition of the case study approach.

As outlined by Bekoe, there have been five cases in Africa where power-sharing agreements were signed in contexts of low-grade—in terms of duration and fatalities when compared to civil war cases—electoral violence: Lesotho (1999), Zanzibar (1999 and 2001), Togo (2006), Kenya (2008), and Zimbabwe (2008).<sup>109</sup> Although not a case of post-election power sharing, Madagascar also signed a power-sharing agreement in 2009 in the wake of

---

<sup>107</sup> George and Bennett, 2005, *Case Studies and Theory Development*, 5.

<sup>108</sup> Gerring, 2007, *Case Study Research*, 37.

<sup>109</sup> Bekoe, 2012, “Postelection Political Agreements in Togo and Zanzibar,” 118-19.

low-grade political violence sparked by a military-backed coup. Zanzibar in 2010 also adopted a unity government, but this agreement was inked *prior* to elections.

Using the logic of diverse-case and most-similar methods of case selection, out of this population of five cases of post-election power sharing outlined above, I have further narrowed my cases to Kenya, Togo, and Zimbabwe. These cases were chosen primarily because, within the limited universe of the five cases outlined above, the cases of Kenya, Togo, and Zimbabwe feature the most variation on the study variables—both on the dependent and explanatory variables—and share the most similar background characteristics.

The diverse-case method of case selection chooses two or more cases with the intent of achieving “maximum variance” along the variables of interest, i.e. the goal is to select a “set of cases that encompasses a range of high and low values on relevant dimensions.”<sup>110</sup> Kenya, Togo, and Zimbabwe feature acute variance along both the DV and the explanatory variables proposed in the theoretical framework. In Gerring’s terms, this wide range of variance makes Kenya, Togo, and Zimbabwe diverse-cases, which are ideal to leverage and illustrate the dissertation’s theoretical expectations.

In hypothesis-generating studies such as this one, the most-similar method of case selection compares two or more cases that ideally feature similar background characteristics—which serve as controls—but have different outcomes. The researcher then compares the cases in an effort to identify the differences among them that are causing such variance.<sup>111</sup> Selecting these three cases from one geographical region (sub-Saharan Africa) will help apply such background controls.<sup>112</sup>

---

<sup>110</sup> Gerring, 2007, *Case Study Research*, 97, 101.

<sup>111</sup> Gerring, 2007, *Case Study Research*, 131-32; George and Bennett, 2005, *Case Studies and Theory Development*, 81.

<sup>112</sup> For an example of this approach see Call, 2012, *Why Peace Fails*, 232.

While certainly not perfectly matched, Kenya, Togo, and Zimbabwe's experiences with post-election power sharing share many characteristics. These include a disputed election, significant electoral violence, security sector involvement in such violence, and an internationally brokered power-sharing deal. The cases also share longer-term characteristics such as histories of executive dominated, personalized rule, a lack of large-scale civil wars, and, as such, relatively intact security institutions. Perhaps more importantly, the three cases share a distinct regime type, i.e. they are "hybrid" or, more specifically, "competitive authoritarian" regimes.<sup>113</sup> According to Levitsky and Way, competitive authoritarian regimes are distinct in that they are "civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbent's abuse of the state [including the use of the security apparatus to stay in power] places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents."<sup>114</sup>

That said, a number of clear differences between the three cases exist, most notably in their population sizes, levels of economic and institutional development, and in their colonial and settler legacies, as Kenya and Zimbabwe were colonized by Britain and had a significant settler presence, while Togo was mainly a colony of France and had few to no settlers (see below for short historical overviews of each case). Although the three cases exhibit these differences, this is the norm among studies that utilize the logic of the most-similar approach, as it is nearly impossible—due to the fuzzy and inexact nature of social science—to find cases with nearly identical background characteristics.<sup>115</sup> Indeed, when using the most-similar

---

<sup>113</sup> Levitsky and Way, 2010, *Competitive Authoritarianism*.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid, 5. Levitsky and Way do not include Togo in their universe of cases because they only examine regimes that were competitive authoritarian during the period from 1990 to 1995 (4, 32). Following Donno, I classify Togo as moving from a hegemonic authoritarian regime to a competitive authoritarian regime beginning in 1998; see Daniela Donno, 2013, "Elections and Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes," *American Journal of Political Science*, 57, 3: 703-716, Supplementary Appendix A: 2.

<sup>115</sup> Gerring, 2007, *Case Study Research*, 133.



method, Gerring advises: “some flexibility is admissible on the vector of controls that are ‘held constant’ across the cases.”<sup>116</sup> While the cases are imperfect matches, their background characteristics feature enough similarities to make applying the logic of the most-similar method useful. To help mitigate this potential issue, the method of within-case process tracing is used, as discussed below.

In the following chapters, I conduct two sets of comparisons. The first set compares all three cases spanning the periods since the signing of each country’s power-sharing agreement through the agreement’s tenure (2008-2013 in Kenya and Zimbabwe, and 2006-2010 in Togo). To decrease the risk of omitted variables and to discern the causal impact that the respective power-sharing agreements have had on SSR outcomes, I also examine the study variables and SSR outcomes in instances of non-power sharing. The cases of Kenya, Togo, and Zimbabwe are well suited for such analyses, as each country has experienced previous instances of security sector involvement in electoral violence where power sharing was not subsequently instituted, namely in national elections in 1997 in Kenya, 1998 in Togo, and 2002 in Zimbabwe.<sup>117</sup> I therefore conduct a separate set of three within-case analyses, comparing the periods of power sharing with previous periods within the same case where power sharing was not subsequently instituted. Comparing different time periods within the same cases allows me to effectively control for other background factors and leverage the impact of power sharing and my study variables, as well as possibly reveal previously omitted variables.

---

<sup>116</sup> Ibid.

<sup>117</sup> Scott Straus and Charlie Taylor, 2012, “Democratization and Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2008,” in Dorina Bekoe, (ed.) *Voting in Fear: Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace): 15-38.

The following three subsections provide overviews of each selected case. They first detail the electoral crises and bouts of electoral violence that gave rise to the three respective power-sharing arrangements and then briefly highlight the gaps in the extant case literature that the study helps to fill.

#### 2.5.1. Case Overview: *The Electoral Crisis in Zimbabwe*

Zimbabwe is a landlocked, low-income country with a population of 15 million located in Southern Africa. In 2014, it had a GDP of \$14.2 billion.<sup>118</sup> As noted, it is a semi-authoritarian country, with strong executive institutions and a long history of political violence. After an extended liberation war with Rhodesia led to the Lancaster House Agreement in 1979 and Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, leading nationalist Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) party came to power.

In 1987, after the *Gukurahundi* campaign brutally suppressed the opposition stronghold of Matabeleland and left over 20,000 dead,<sup>119</sup> ZANU merged with the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) opposition party, becoming the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). The political merger further entrenched Mugabe's power, with Zimbabwe becoming a de facto one party state. Despite the *Gukurahundi* violence, under Mugabe's first fifteen years of rule Zimbabwe was largely hailed internationally as a model of racial reconciliation<sup>120</sup> and the country's economy flourished, becoming known as

---

<sup>118</sup> The World Bank, 2015, "Zimbabwe," <http://data.worldbank.org/country/zimbabwe> (accessed July 3, 2016).

<sup>119</sup> Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 1999, "Breaking The Silence, Building True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands, 1980 to 1988 Summary Report," Legal Resources Foundation, <http://www.kubatana.net/html/archive/hr/990401ccjplrf.asp?sector=CACT> (accessed November 19, 2015).

<sup>120</sup> Blessing-Miles Tendi, 2011, "Robert Mugabe and Toxicity: History and Context Matter, *Representation*, 47, 3: 307-318.

the “breadbasket” of southern Africa. In the late 1990s, however, the economic and political situation began to change drastically.

Reacting to popular discontent with high-level corruption, declining social services, and a radically contracting economy, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) opposition movement—led by former trade unionist Morgan Tsvangirai—emerged in the late 1990s out of an alliance between trade unions, civic groups, students, and white farmers. In 2000, the MDC surprised ZANU-PF by dealing the ruling party its first major defeat in the 2000 constitutional referendum, which sought to further expand the powers of the presidency. This period marked the launch of ZANU-PF’s “third *chimurenga*” (armed struggle), a narrative linking resistance to conquest in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century to the liberation struggle in the 1970s and the land expropriations of white-owned farms in the 2000s.<sup>121</sup> The third *chimurenga* was framed in the selectively nationalist language of “patriotic history,”<sup>122</sup> which forwarded a strictly binary view of Zimbabwe’s past as a struggle between revolutionary “patriots” (liberation war veterans) and “sell-outs” (the opposition).<sup>123</sup> In this narrative, the opposition was dismissed as mere puppets of Western countries and ZANU-PF—the fathers of independence—enjoyed the right to “rule in perpetuity.”<sup>124</sup>

Enforcing this ideology was the state security apparatus, led by Mugabe and the Joint Operations Command (JOC), the supreme security body comprising the leaders of Zimbabwe’s military, police, Central Intelligence Organization, prison service, and high-ranking ZANU-PF members. From the year 2000, the JOC was responsible for managing

---

<sup>121</sup> Jocelyn Alexander and Miles-Blessing Tendi, 2008, “Tale of Two Elections: Zimbabwe at the Polls in 2008,” *Concerned Africa Scholars*, 8: 5.

<sup>122</sup> Terence Ranger, 2004, “Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation: the Struggle Over the Past in Zimbabwe,” *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 30, 2: 215-234.

<sup>123</sup> Miles-Blessing Tendi, 2010, *Making History in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe: Politics, Intellectuals and the Media* (Oxford: Peter Lang).

<sup>124</sup> Michael Bratton and Eldred Masunungure, 2008, “Zimbabwe’s Long Agony,” *Journal of Democracy*, 19, 4: 43.

violent campaigns to guarantee ZANU-PF's success in Zimbabwe's suddenly competitive presidential and parliamentary elections. This state-directed violence was carried out by a mix of security officials, party youth militia, and liberation war veterans, leading to electoral violence in the 2000, 2002, and 2005 elections.<sup>125</sup> The most acute violence took place in the 2008 national elections, precipitating the electoral crisis that eventually led to the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) and Zimbabwe's power-sharing government.

The first round of the 2008 elections were historic and largely peaceful, with ZANU-PF losing its majority in parliament for the first time since independence.<sup>126</sup> After a month delay, it was announced that Mugabe had lost the presidential contest to Tsvangirai. Since neither candidate purportedly won the necessary 50 percent, however, a second round was scheduled for June.<sup>127</sup> After the opposition's initial success, ZANU-PF structures and the JOC unleashed a vicious campaign of violence—code-named “Operation *Makavhoterapapi?*” (Where Did You Put Your Vote?)—leaving over 200 dead, more than 5,000 beaten or tortured, 36,000 displaced, and scores others missing or jailed.<sup>128</sup> Amid the violence, Tsvangirai withdrew, giving Mugabe an illegitimate victory that led to power-sharing negotiations headed by South African President Thabo Mbeki under the auspices of the South African Development Community (SADC) and, to a lesser extent, the African Union (AU).

---

<sup>125</sup> Brian Raftopoulos, 2009, “The Crisis in Zimbabwe: 1998-2008,” in Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo, (eds.) *Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-colonial Period to 2008* (Harare: Weaver Press): 215.

<sup>126</sup> Eldred Masunungure, 2009, *Defying the Winds of Change: Zimbabwe's 2008 Elections* (Harare: Weaver Press): 78.

<sup>127</sup> *BBC News*, “Zimbabwe announces poll results,” May 2, 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7380445.stm> (accessed November 19, 2015).

<sup>128</sup> Human Rights Watch, 2011, “Perpetual Fear: Impunity and Cycles of Violence in Zimbabwe,” 26, [https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/zimbabwe0311webwcover\\_0.pdf](https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/zimbabwe0311webwcover_0.pdf) (accessed November 21, 2015).

A protracted negotiation between the three parties ensued over the next two months in both Harare and South Africa, leading to the signing of the GPA power-sharing deal in September 2008. Under the agreement, Mugabe retained the presidency, while Tsvangirai, the leader of the larger faction of the two MDC groupings (MDC-T), filled the new position of prime minister. Arthur Mutambara, leader of the smaller MDC faction (MDC-M), secured the post of deputy prime minister. While the MDCs were able to secure some political power by gaining control of the Ministry of Finance, Mugabe maintained an iron grip on the state's coercive capacity, despite MDC-T securing a co-minister position in the Ministry of Home Affairs and ZANU-PF's concession to set-up a National Security Council (NSC), which would include MDC representation.

There is an extensive scholarly literature on Zimbabwe, with an emerging strand focused on the power-sharing period.<sup>129</sup> That said, since the 2008 negotiations were strictly closed door, even years later there remains a dearth of publically available information on the power-sharing negotiations. As such, with a few notable exceptions,<sup>130</sup> scholars have thus far failed to shed much light on the inner-workings of the negotiating process. My interviews with the key players in the 2008 negotiations, including the three head negotiators of the respective parties, help fill this gap. Moreover, besides broad references to the vague nature of the agreement, the emerging literature has tended to neglect the actual design and content of the GPA,<sup>131</sup> particularly regarding SSR provisions, another lacuna this study aims to fill.

---

<sup>129</sup> See, for example, Brian Raftopoulos, (ed.), *The Hard Road to Reform: The Politics of Zimbabwe's Global Political Agreement* (Harare: Weaver Press); Bratton 2014, *Power Politics*; and a special issue of the *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Jocelyn Alexander and JoAnn McGregor, 2013, (eds.) "Politics, Patronage and Violence in Zimbabwe," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 39, 4.

<sup>130</sup> See, for instance, Thys Hoekman, 2013, "Testing Ties: Opposition and Power-Sharing Negotiations in Zimbabwe," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 39, 4: 903-920.

<sup>131</sup> See, for instance, Gerald Mazarire, 2013, "ZANU-PF and the Government of National Unity 2009–12," in Brian Raftopoulos (ed.), *The Hard Road to Reform: The Politics of Zimbabwe's Global Political Agreement*

There is also a growing body of work focused on the expanding role of the military and security sector in Zimbabwe during the GPA period.<sup>132</sup> I contend that much of this research goes too far in arguing for the supreme political power of the military.<sup>133</sup> This interpretation has arguably become the default position among many academics and observers, with such claims frequently being proclaimed in the local and international press.<sup>134</sup> In contrast, I argue that while there is no question that the civil-military relationship has been mutually beneficial and that the security sector holds some political influence, Mugabe and ZANU-PF have always maintained civilian control. I argue that, even when it may have outwardly appeared otherwise, as during the 2008 electoral crisis, Mugabe has remained in supreme command. This argument builds on Tendi's recent work,<sup>135</sup> which is an exception to the trend in the literature noted above.

### 2.5.2. Case Overview: *The Electoral Crisis in Kenya*

Kenya is a lower middle-income country with a population of 44 million located in East Africa. In 2014, it had a GDP of \$60.9 billion.<sup>136</sup> Kenya is also a semi-authoritarian country, with a strong executive and a recent history of electoral violence. In contrast to Zimbabwe,

---

(Harare: Weaver Press),” 88; for an exception to this trend, see Adrienne LeBas, 2014, “The Perils of Power Sharing,” *Journal of Democracy*, 25, 2: 52-66.

<sup>132</sup> See, for instance, Charles Mangongera, 2014, “The Military vs. Democracy,” *Journal of Democracy*, 25, 2: 67-76; Martin Rupiye, 2013, (ed.) *Zimbabwe's Military: Examining its Veto Power in the Transition to Democracy, 2008-2013* (Pretoria: Africa Public Policy and Research Institute).

<sup>133</sup> For example see Bratton, 2014, *Power Politics*, 200; Mazarire, 2013, “ZANU-PF and the Government of National Unity 2009–12,” 76.

<sup>134</sup> See for example *The Telegraph*, “Zimbabwean Generals Have ‘Taken Mugabe’s Power,’” June 5, 2008, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/2080992/Zimbabwean-generals-have-taken-Robert-Mugabes-power.html> (accessed November 21, 2015); *Washington Post*, “Inside Mugabe’s Violent Crackdown,” July 5, 2008, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/04/AR2008070402771.html> (accessed November 21, 2015); *Zim Eye*, “Bloody Coup Looms in Zimbabwe, Top Analysts Say,” September 4, 2014, <http://www.zimeye.com/military-coup-looms-in-zimbabwe-top-analysts-say/> (accessed November 21, 2015).

<sup>135</sup> Tendi, 2013, “Ideology, Civilian Authority and the Zimbabwean Military,” Blessing-Miles Tendi, 2013, “Robert Mugabe’s 2013 Presidential Election Campaign,” *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 39, 4: 968.

<sup>136</sup> The World Bank, 2015, “Kenya,” <http://data.worldbank.org/country/kenya> (accessed July 3, 2016).

where political divides are largely drawn along ideological differences, politics revolve primarily around ethnic lines in Kenya. After gaining independence from Britain in 1963, the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) ruled for nearly the next four decades, first under nationalist leader Jomo Kenyatta, from 1963 to 1978, and then under Daniel arap Moi, from 1978 to 2002. Undergirding KANU's long rule was the top-heavy "bureaucratic-executive" state, which was buttressed by the Provincial Administration to enforce political order at the local level.<sup>137</sup> Also central to KANU's political power was the role of the Kenyan police.

With several notable exceptions, including a failed coup attempt in 1982, historically the military has largely remained outside of the political realm in Kenya, with the police serving as the favored tool of the presidency to exercise political control, particularly the paramilitary Administration Police and General Service Unit.<sup>138</sup> The police have a long history of politicization, a practice that intensified during the 1980s and early 1990s when Moi used the force to violently suppress political dissent.<sup>139</sup> Before Kenya's move to multipartyism in 1991, Moi had maintained that opposition parties would precipitate "tribal chaos" by splitting the nation along ethnic lines.<sup>140</sup> Directly after acquiescing to internal and external demands for multiparty politics,<sup>141</sup> Moi assured his prediction would come true by

---

<sup>137</sup> Daniel Branch and Nic Cheeseman, 2008, "Democratization, Sequencing and State Failure in Africa: Lessons from Kenya," *African Affairs*, 108, 430: 3.

<sup>138</sup> Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010, "Power-sharing in Comparative Perspective," 216-217. For exceptions to this trend, see David Anderson's work on the military's involvement in the Wagalla massacre in 1984 and, more recently, in the Mount Elgon conflict from 2006-2008: David Anderson, 2014, "Remembering Wagalla: State Violence in Northern Kenya, 1962-1991," *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 8, 4: 658-676; Gabrielle Lynch and David Anderson, 2014, "Democratization and Ethnic Violence in Kenya: Electoral Cycles and Shifting Identities," in Jacques Bertrand and Oded Haklai, (eds.) *Democratization and Ethnic Minorities: Conflict Or Compromise?* (Abingdon: Routledge): 83-102.

<sup>139</sup> Korwa Adar and Isaac Munyae, 2001, "Human Rights Abuse in Kenya under Daniel arap Moi 1978-2001," *African Studies Quarterly*, 5, 1: 1-17.

<sup>140</sup> Joel Barkan, 1993, "Kenya: Lessons from a Flawed Election," *Journal of Democracy*, 4, 3: 92.

<sup>141</sup> David Throup and Charles Hornsby, 1998, *Multi-Party Politics in Kenya* (Oxford: James Currey).

using gangs and ethnically based militias—armed and aided by the police—to attack political opponents in the run-up to both the 1992 and 1997 elections.<sup>142</sup>

Moi, of the Kalenjin ethnic group, used “Kalenjin warrior” militias to displace opposition supporters, mostly Kikuyu, Luo and Luyha.<sup>143</sup> By blurring the lines of accountability, Moi’s use of privatized violence allowed him to use electoral tactics—such as ethnic cleansing—that were out of bounds for state security actors such as the police.<sup>144</sup> These tactics worked in the short term. Despite a vibrant but fractured opposition movement, Moi and KANU triumphed in the flawed 1992 and 1997 elections. The victories, however, came at a substantial cost in lives. In the “ethnic clashes” that surrounded both elections, 3,000 were killed and 300,000 displaced.<sup>145</sup> The use of anti- and pro-government gangs and militias to win elections proliferated over the next decade, with national and local politicians across the political spectrum often losing control of hired militias or simply discharging them after elections. Over time, this widespread practice—combined with extra-state groups becoming increasingly involved in government functions as a response to policing failures<sup>146</sup>—led to what Mueller terms a “diffusion of violence”<sup>147</sup> in Kenya, meaning a process by which the state lost control over its monopoly on the use of force. This development would prove to be highly destabilizing for the country.

After Moi decided to obey term limits put in place in 1992 and did not to run in the 2002 elections, a broad-based opposition coalition, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC),

---

<sup>142</sup> Susanne Mueller, 2008, “The Political Economy of Kenya’s Crisis,” *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 2, 2: 190.

<sup>143</sup> Susanne Mueller, 2011, “Dying to win: Elections, Political Violence, and Institutional Decay in Kenya,” *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 29, 1: 103.

<sup>144</sup> Branch and Cheeseman, 2008, “Democratization, Sequencing and State Failure in Africa,” 13.

<sup>145</sup> Nic Cheeseman, 2008, “The Kenyan Elections of 2007: An Introduction,” *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 2, 2: 170.

<sup>146</sup> David Anderson, 2002, “Vigilantes, Violence and the Politics of Public Order in Kenya,” *African Affairs*, 101, 405: 531-555.

<sup>147</sup> Mueller, 2008, “The Political Economy of Kenya’s Crisis,” 187-9.



won in a relatively free and fair poll, bringing about Kenya's first electoral turnover since independence. Reflecting the fluid nature of political parties and elite coalitions in Kenya, NARC brought together a diverse mix of former KANU elites along with progressive opposition reformers and civil society activists.<sup>148</sup> Mwai Kibaki, who had previously served as Moi's vice president, led the ticket, with Raila Odinga, of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), also playing a prominent role. Despite a brief period of public euphoria and promises for democratic change by the incoming NARC government led by President Kibaki, political and ethnic tensions within the opposition coalition quickly arose, crystallizing around the 2005 failed attempt at constitutional reform.<sup>149</sup> In combination with a lack of institutional reform, this rupture between the erstwhile partners of Kibaki, of the politically and economically dominant Kikuyu ethnic group, and Odinga, of the historically sidelined Luo, set the stage for the 2007 electoral crisis and subsequent post-election violence.

Based off the two camps that emerged prior to the 2005 constitutional referendum, in the run-up to the 2007 election Kibaki formed the Party of National Unity (PNU) while Odinga formalized the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) into a political party. Upon the conclusion of an exceedingly close 2007 poll between the PNU and ODM, Kibaki declared victory and was hastily sworn in, despite allegations of electoral fraud. Led by militias and gangs supported by political patrons across political divides—with the involvement of the police a further complicating factor—the disputed elections triggered several waves of

---

<sup>148</sup> Karuti Kanyinga and James Long, 2012, "The Political Economy of Reforms in Kenya: The Post-2007 Election Violence and a New Constitution," *African Studies Review*, 55, 1: 39.

<sup>149</sup> Mueller 2008, "The Political Economy of Kenya's Crisis," 200.

ethnically-based violence between opposition and government supporters, in which over 1,100 were killed and more than 600,000 displaced.<sup>150</sup>

The two-month period of violence and political disorder was ended by the signing of a power-sharing deal in February 2008 brokered by Kofi Annan under the auspices of the AU's Panel of Eminent African Personalities and the UN. As stipulated by the power-sharing agreement, Kibaki retained the powerful presidency, while Odinga assumed the freshly created post of prime minister. Kibaki maintained control over the coercive apparatus, including the powerful Ministry of Provincial Administration and Internal Security, while Odinga had to settle for ministries less crucial to the exercise of state power, such as the Ministry of Agriculture.

A rich literature exists on Kenya, with a surge of recent political science scholarship focused on the causes and consequences of the 2007-2008 electoral crisis and the devastating election violence that brought Kenya, long seen as a stable bastion and international hub in the region, to the brink of civil war. As noted above, the literature forwards a number of factors that contributed to the crisis. While the short-term triggers of the violence were an exceedingly close election, reports of vote rigging, and Kibaki's decision to hastily declare victory, scholars have traced the underlying roots of the crisis to several longer-term trends in Kenya's history, including the state's loss over the monopoly of violence, the fragmentation of elites, and ethnically-based, high stakes "winner takes all" politics.<sup>151</sup>

---

<sup>150</sup> *Global Post*, "Kenya Election Prompts Fears of New Violence," February 28, 2013, <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/africa/kenya/130226/kenya-election-violence> (accessed March 13, 2016).

<sup>151</sup> See, for instance, Branch and Cheeseman 2008, "Democratization, Sequencing and State Failure in Africa;" Mueller 2008, "The Political Economy of Kenya's Crisis;" and a special issue of the *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, Daniel Branch and Nic Cheeseman, 2008, (eds.) "Election Fever: Kenya's Crisis," *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 2, 2.

There is also an emerging literature on the power-sharing period, with a number of studies focused on the long-awaited successful passage of Kenya's new constitution in 2010.<sup>152</sup> Many of the works on the electoral crisis and the power-sharing period cite the detrimental role that the police played in the electoral violence, and there is a sizable research stream focused on policing in Kenya, particularly prior to the post-election violence.<sup>153</sup> But the existing literature has not yet adequately addressed the causes and consequences of the institutional police reforms that were passed under the unity government. By focusing on the police reform process, this study builds on recent work by Ruteere and Osse and aims to further correct this omission in the case literature.<sup>154</sup>

### 2.5.3. Case Overview: *The Electoral Crisis in Togo*

Togo is a small, low-income country with a population of 7 million located in West Africa. In 2014, it had a GDP of \$4.5 billion.<sup>155</sup> Togo is also a semi-authoritarian country, with a strong executive and an extended history of military coups, militarized rule, an ethnically based north-south divide, and widespread electoral violence. From 1884 to 1919, Togo was a colony of Germany. After World War I, the country became a colony of France, gaining independence in 1960. Togo has up to 30 ethnic groups, with the northern-based Tem-Kabre

---

<sup>152</sup> See, for instance, Kanyinga and Long, 2012, "The Post-2007 Election Violence and a New Constitution," Godwin Murunga, Duncan Okello, and Anders Sjögren, 2014, (eds.) *Kenya: The Struggle for a New Constitutional Order* (London: Zed Books, Kindle Edition); Eric Kramon and Daniel Posner, 2011, "Kenya's New Constitution," *Journal of Democracy*, 22, 2: 89-103; and Nelson Kasfir, 2015, "Agency across Changing Sites: The Path to Kenya's 2010 Constitution," in Lucy Koechlin and Till Forster, (eds.) *The Politics of Governance* (New York, NY: Routledge): 52-71.

<sup>153</sup> See, for instance, David Anderson and David Killingray, 1991, *Policing the Empire: Government, Authority, and Control, 1830-1940* (Manchester: Manchester University Press); Alice Hills, 2009, "Policing in Kenya: A Selective Service," in Mercedes Hinton and Tim Newburn, (eds.) *Policing Developing Democracies* (Abington: Routledge): 237-259.

<sup>154</sup> Mutuma Ruteere, 2014, "Security and Human Rights in the New Constitutional Order in Kenya," in Godwin Murunga, Duncan Okello, and Anders Sjögren, (eds.) *Kenya: The Struggle for a New Constitutional Order* (London: Zed Books, Kindle Edition): locations 4022-5235; Anneke Osse, 2014, "Police Reform in Kenya: A Process of 'Muddling Through,'" *Policing and Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy*, 1-18.

<sup>155</sup> The World Bank, 2015, "Togo," <http://data.worldbank.org/country/togo> (accessed July 3, 2016).

groups, which include the Kabye, making up 30 percent of the population, and the southern-based Ewe-speaking groups comprising 44 percent.<sup>156</sup>

One family and political party has ruled Togo for nearly 50 years. Three years after Togolese independence, a group of soldiers that included Gnassingbé Eyadéma, a Kabye, killed the first elected president of the country, Sylvanus Olympio, an Ewe, in a coup.<sup>157</sup> The 1963 military coup was the first of its kind in independent Africa.<sup>158</sup> Although civilian rule returned shortly thereafter, in 1967 Eyadéma again seized power in a military coup and subsequently formed the *Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais* (RPT-Togolese People's Rally) party. With support from the Kabye-dominated military, Eyadéma would hold power for the next 38 years, violently suppressing the country's efforts at democratization and political reform in the early 1990s and remaining in office until his death in 2005.<sup>159</sup>

Upon Eyadéma's death in 2005, his son, Faure Gnassingbé, who was then a cabinet minister, was subsequently installed as "acting president" by the top echelons of the military. The legislature complied with the military's wishes and hastily changed the constitution in an attempt to legitimize the appointment of Gnassingbé.<sup>160</sup> Regional and international bodies decried this unconstitutional change of government, with the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) labeling the action as a military coup. After the AU and ECOWAS suspended and levied sanctions on Togo, Gnassingbé agreed to step

---

<sup>156</sup> Jennifer Seely, 2009, *The Legacies of Transition Governments in Africa: The Cases of Benin and Togo* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan): 45.

<sup>157</sup> Mathurin C. Hounnikpo, 2000, "The Military and Democratization in Africa: A Comparative Study of Benin and Togo," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, 28: 219.

<sup>158</sup> Seely, 2009, *The Legacies of Transition Governments in Africa*, 44.

<sup>159</sup> For a discussion of the military's recalcitrant role in Togo's 1991 national conference and move toward multi-party democracy, see *ibid*, 220-221; and John Heilbrunn, 1993, "Social Origins of National Conferences in Benin and Togo," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 31, 2: 277-299.

<sup>160</sup> Kaniye Ebeku, 2005, "The Succession of Faure Gnassingbé to the Togolese Presidency: An International Law Perspective," *Current African Issues*, 30: 5.

down and hold presidential elections in April 2005, but he would serve as head of the National Assembly in the interim.<sup>161</sup>

From the move away from a one-party state in 1991 to Eyadéma's death in 2005, elections followed a familiar, violent trajectory in Togo, with Eyadéma or the RPT confirmed as winners, the opposition either boycotting or calling fraud and protesting, and security forces and pro-RPT militia groups violently quelling dissidents.<sup>162</sup> The 2005 poll was no exception. Unsurprisingly, Gnassingbé was declared the winner, despite allegations that the military had manipulated the ballot. The main opposition group, the *Union des Forces de Changement* (UFC-the Union of Forces for Change) led in exile by Gilchrist Olympio, the son of Togo's first president, claimed fraud and called for street demonstrations. In the aftermath of the election, clashes erupted between protestors and the security forces, with security officials reportedly exacting revenge on those opposed to the regime in the south of the country, which has long been an opposition stronghold for Olympio.<sup>163</sup> Up to 800 fatalities—the highest death toll of any Togolese election—were reported in the 2005 post-election violence.<sup>164</sup>

More than ten attempts at political dialogue had been tried between the government and the opposition dating back to 1990. This acute electoral violence, however, along with increased pressure from international and regional actors—namely the EU and ECOWAS,

---

<sup>161</sup> Jennifer Seely, 2006, "The Unexpected Presidential Election in Togo, 2005," *Electoral Studies*, 25, 3: 612-13.

<sup>162</sup> Comi Toulabor, 2011, "Togo," in Alan Bryden, and Boubacar N'Diaye, (eds.) *Challenges of Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa: Realities and Opportunities* (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: LIT Verlag): 232-33.

<sup>163</sup> Jennifer Seely, 2011, "Togo's Presidential Election 2010," *Electoral Studies*, 30, 2: 372.

<sup>164</sup> United Nations, 2005, "Rapport: La Mission d'Etablissement des Faits Chargee de Faire la Lumiere sur les Violences et les Allegations de Violations des Droits de L'homme Survenues au Togo Avant, Pendant et Apres L'election Presidentielle du 24 Avril 2005," Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/1709B169CF1E9C4EC1257097004CB185-ohchr-tgo-29aug.pdf> (accessed September 20, 2016): 20, 42; *IOL*, "800 Died in Togo Election Unrest-Report," May 14, 2005, <http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/800-died-in-togo-election-unrest---report-241142> (accessed September 29, 2016).

compelled Gnassingbé and the RPT to finally negotiate in earnest. After a mediation process headed by Blaise Compaoré, then president of neighboring Burkina Faso, the RPT, five opposition parties, and two civil society groups signed the *Accord Politique Global* (APG-Comprehensive Political Accord) power-sharing agreement in August 2006.

Under the agreement, Gnassingbé would retain the presidency, while an opposition candidate would serve as prime minister. The APG, which built on a framework initially outlined in 2004 talks with the EU, was a wide-ranging document, calling for, in addition to a government of national unity, a revamped electoral commission (*Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante* [CENI-Independent National Electoral Commission]) with representation from the opposition and civil society, a new National Assembly based on fair and transparent legislative elections, reconciliation processes, and constitutional, justice, and security reforms, among other provisions. A monitoring committee (*Comité de Suivi*), to be chaired by Compaoré and comprised of all signatories of the APG, including representatives from the EU and ECOWAS, was tasked with monitoring and implementing the power-sharing agreement.<sup>165</sup>

In contrast to the cases of Zimbabwe and Kenya, the scholarship on Togo is quite thin, particularly the English-language literature. While a number of works focus on Togo's transition to multipartyism and the 2005 succession crisis,<sup>166</sup> the APG negotiations and country's experience with power sharing remains particularly under-researched.<sup>167</sup> Although garnering much less scholarly and popular press attention than the cases of Kenya and

---

<sup>165</sup> Government of Togo. 2006, "Accord Politique Global," [http://www.ceni-tg.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Accord\\_politique\\_global\\_200806.pdf](http://www.ceni-tg.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Accord_politique_global_200806.pdf) (accessed September 24, 2016).

<sup>166</sup> On the move to multiparty politics, see, for instance, Jennifer Seely, 2005, "The Legacies of Transition Governments: Post-Transition Dynamics in Benin and Togo," *Democratization*, 12, 3: 357-377; Heilbrunn, 1993, "National Conferences in Benin and Togo." On the 2005 succession, see, for instance, Ebeku, 2005, "The Succession of Faure Gnassingbé to the Togolese Presidency."

<sup>167</sup> For an important exception, see Bekoe, 2012, "Postelection Political Agreements in Togo and Zanzibar."

Zimbabwe did in 2008, Togo was one of the very first countries to experiment with settling electoral disputes through a power-sharing agreement. As such, its experience with the model is important to understand. Moreover, given Togo's ostensible halting progress on SSR—despite its long history of militarized rule—this omission in the literature is surprising.

To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first systematic look at Togo's civil-military relations and SSR efforts during the APG period. As such, this dissertation makes a substantial contribution to the case literature on Togo. Despite gaps in the literature on Togo, there is an emerging body of work focused on SSR in West Africa, which this study engages with and contributes to.<sup>168</sup> With high levels of external influence, I argue that regional and international pressure played a particularly important role in Togo under the APG. I contend this leverage and a change in party leadership allowed the country to secure some tangible, if fragile, security reforms, particularly in the area of election security.

## 2.6. Data Collection

Following the method of structured, focused comparison, my strategy for data collection consisted of posing the same set of general questions to each of my cases before asking more case-specific questions. In this manner, I was able to systematically compile comparable data across cases.<sup>169</sup> Questions asked of each case and each selected interviewee included: What were the most significant factors that shaped SSR outcomes under power-sharing government? Have any institutional changes actually shifted behavior, or have they been

---

<sup>168</sup> See, for instance, Abdul Raufu Mustapha, 2013, (ed.) *Conflicts and Security Sector Governance in West Africa* (Nigeria: Altus Global Alliance); Alan Bryden and Boubacar N'Diaye, 2008, (eds.) *Challenges of Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa: Realities and Opportunities* (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: LIT Verlag); Boubacar N'Diaye, 2009, "Francophone Africa and Security Sector Transformation: Plus Ça Change," *African Security*, 2, 1: 1-28.

<sup>169</sup> George and Bennett, 2005, *Case Studies and Theory Development*, 86.

merely cosmetic? Were the primary drivers and impediments of SSR domestic or international, formal or informal?

In conducting comparisons and a process trace of each case, I utilize a broad range of both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include the texts of the respective political agreements, constitutional changes, security-related legislation, government reports—including task forces or commissions of inquiry, as well as memoirs and autobiographies of those involved in security policy or the power-sharing government. Secondary sources include case-specific books, journal articles, “grey literature,” newspaper articles, blogs, and radio reports.

In order to collect new empirical evidence and substantiate the existing primary and secondary sources, over a series of extended research trips to my case countries from October 2014 to July 2015, I conducted over 100 semi-structured elite interviews with current and former senior government and security officials, as well as non-state, civil society, and international actors involved in security issues and the workings of the respective unity governments.<sup>170</sup> My interviewees included two former prime ministers, three deputy prime ministers, a handful of cabinet ministers and party presidents, and dozens of senior security officials, diplomats, civil society leaders, and representatives of multilateral institutions.

Elite interviewees were selected according to their involvement in or knowledge of power sharing and SSR in Kenya, Togo, and Zimbabwe. Following Tansey, I used both “reputational” as well as “positional” non-probability sampling methods,<sup>171</sup> i.e. respondents were chosen not only based on their formal positions but on their reputations or informal

---

<sup>170</sup> I also draw on field research conducted as part of my Oxford University master’s level research in Nairobi, Kenya and Harare, Zimbabwe in March and April 2011.

<sup>171</sup> Oisín Tansey, 2007, “Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-probability Sampling,” *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 40, 4: 770-71



influence within a particular political or security grouping. I secured the consent of all named and quoted respondents. Due to the sensitive nature of the research topic and to protect interviewees from possible negative consequences in their home countries, some interviews have been anonymized, following the respondent's wishes. Additionally, depending on the political environment in each case, I have also chosen to anonymize a handful of interviewees who spoke on the record but revealed information that could be viewed as controversial or potentially used against them.

Given this study's focus on elite relations between political and security leaders, elite interviews are particularly well suited to help answer the research question. As succinctly argued by Peabody et al., "One of the most potent, high-yield ways of studying political elites is to interview them."<sup>172</sup> The data collection method of elite interviewing is well matched to the chosen methods of data analysis outlined below, and can be particularly essential to the method of process tracing. As Tansey asserts, if respondents are well positioned, impartial, and candid, "elite interviews will arguably be the most important instrument in the process tracer's data collection toolkit."<sup>173</sup> Due to the scarcity of available public information in the subfield, elite interviews are particularly apposite to security studies. According to Davies, elite interviews are a "central tool in the study of intelligence and security services."<sup>174</sup> While the goals of elite interviewing can be myriad, both Tansey and Davies attribute the value of elite interviews primarily to their additive function, i.e. to fill holes in the empirical record and collect theory-relevant information.<sup>175</sup>

---

<sup>172</sup> Robert Peabody, Susan Webb Hammond, Jean Torcom, Lynne P. Brown, Carolyn Thompson, and Robin Kolodny, 1990, "Interviewing Political Elites," *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 23, 3: 454.

<sup>173</sup> Tansey, 2007, "Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing," 767.

<sup>174</sup> Philip H.J. Davies, 2001, "Spies as Informants: Triangulation and the Interpretation of Elite Interview Data in the Study of the Intelligence and Security Services," *Politics*, 21, 1: 76.

<sup>175</sup> Ibid, 78-9; Tansey, 2007, "Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing," 766.

Elite interviews, like all methods, carry some inherent limitations, particularly regarding issues of the validity and reliability of collected information.<sup>176</sup> I draw on an expanding political science literature on how to best mitigate the drawbacks of the method.<sup>177</sup> While a host of strategies were used to minimize problems of validity and reliability in this study—including prioritizing first-hand accounts of an event and being carefully attuned to the consistency of a particular interviewee—following Davies and Tansey, I primarily used the method of data triangulation to reduce these risks. That is, I cross-referenced all interview data with other primary and secondary sources in order to corroborate the collected information.<sup>178</sup> Where interviews were the only source of information available, I required at least one other independent interview source to corroborate that particular piece of evidence before the claim could be viewed as reliable.<sup>179</sup>

In order to break through “received narratives” or tropes that often form within political parties or around particular historical events, I intentionally sought out a diverse set of interviewees, including those who were no longer members of their previous party. For instance, in Zimbabwe I secured interviews with former ZANU-PF and former MDC members, who were able to speak more freely on the mishaps or policies of their previous parties than current members. Due to the sensitivity and minimal amount of publicly available material on the study topic, elite interviews proved indispensable to the study.

---

<sup>176</sup> Jeffrey Berry, 2002, “Validity and Reliability Issues in Elite Interviewing,” *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 35, 4: 679-682.

<sup>177</sup> For instance, see “Symposium,” 2002, *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 35, 4: 663-688

<sup>178</sup> Tansey, 2007, “Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing,” 767; Davies, 2001, “Spies as Informants,” 73-4.

<sup>179</sup> *Ibid*, 78.

## 2.7. Data Analysis

A multi-method data analysis strategy is used for this study, consisting of a combination of within-case and cross-case analysis. As discussed above, using the method of process tracing and the logic of most-similar comparisons, I conduct two sets of cross- and within-case controlled comparisons. While commonly used by qualitative political scientists undertaking comparative research, controlled comparisons have major constraints. As noted, the main limitation is that, due to the fuzziness of the empirical world, exact background conditions can almost never be found across cases, rendering the results potentially spurious in that possible causal factors that ostensibly have been controlled for, in fact, have not been. When within-case process tracing is used in tandem with the method of controlled comparison, however, the latter's limitations can be mitigated.<sup>180</sup>

The method of process tracing investigates the causal pathways linking causal factors to the outcome in any particular case, i.e. causal mechanisms.<sup>181</sup> Checkel argues that the study of causal mechanisms is impossible without process tracing, noting that to study causal “mechanisms, we must use a method of process tracing.”<sup>182</sup> Using this method, I trace the proposed IVs through each case, identifying how each step in the causal chain has shaped SSR outcomes. The process tracing method is particularly valuable because it examines a proposed theory under highly unique circumstances,<sup>183</sup> allowing the researcher to consider and eliminate other rival factors that could possibly be causing variation in outcomes.<sup>184</sup>

---

<sup>180</sup> George and Bennett, 2005, *Case Studies and Theory Development*, 151-56, 179; David Collier, 2011, “Understanding Process Tracing,” *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 44, 3: 824.

<sup>181</sup> Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, 2015, “Process Tracing,” in Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, (eds.) *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Kindle Edition), locations: 286-288; George and Bennett, 2005, *Case Studies and Theory Development*, 206.

<sup>182</sup> Jeffrey T. Checkel, 2006, “Tracing Causal Mechanisms,” *International Studies Review*, 8, 2: 363.

<sup>183</sup> Stephan Van Evera, 1997, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press): 65.

<sup>184</sup> George and Bennett, 2005, *Case Studies and Theory Development*, 81.

## 2.8. Overcoming Potential Research Design Hurdles

This section outlines three main caveats or constraints to this research design and outlines the strategies used to surmount such potential hurdles. The first potential challenge was the sensitivity of the topic and the fact that successful process tracing requires large amounts of case data to be able to establish causal pathways.<sup>185</sup> While the modest amount of available information on my topic could have proven to be an obstacle to a thorough process trace, this limitation was surmounted by the collection of previously unavailable data through extensive fieldwork and elite interviewing.

As the dissertation focuses on highly fraught and political issues of security, elite interviewees—particularly senior public officials—could have proved unwilling to openly discuss the topic. Indeed, in describing the difficulties inherent in studying “elite cultures,” Shore argues that, “most military, economic, and political elites are unlikely to permit open and uncensored access to their internal organization.”<sup>186</sup> Fortunately, despite a few unsuccessful attempts to gain access, the overwhelming majority of interview requests were graciously granted in all three countries, including at the highest levels. My broad contact base in my three case countries, gleaned from previous academic and professional experience, proved highly valuable in this regard.

Along the same vein, the second constraint was my respondents’ level of knowledge and access to government information. A number of my interviewees were drawn from civil society, meaning that they did not have direct access to government information, which could potentially have led to distorted accounts of SSR. As noted, this potential hurdle was mitigated by triangulating civil society accounts with other sources of information, including

---

<sup>185</sup> Ibid, 223.

<sup>186</sup> Cris Shore, 2002, “Introduction: Towards and Anthropology of Elites,” in Cris Shore and Stephen Nugent, (eds.) *Elite Cultures: Anthropological Perspectives* (London: Routledge): 11.

interviews with current and former government actors. Similarly, portions of my interviewees were drawn from former opposition parties that did not enjoy unrestricted access to security policy information when they were part of the unity government. I alleviated this obstacle by triangulating information as well as securing as many interviews as possible with members of the former ruling party and security sector officials.

Finally, given the focus on the relationship between elite civilians and security sector leaders, the complex power struggles between and within particular agencies of the Kenyan, Togolese, and Zimbabwean security sectors are not analyzed at length, even though the security sectors of all three cases are far from unitary actors. This constraint is demonstrated by my focus on the police in Kenya. However, while other branches of the Kenyan security apparatus may require reform, the relationship between politicians and the police was the most politicized and in need of repair—as evidenced by heavy police involvement in the 2007-2008 violence. As such, the vast majority of all security reforms under unity government in Kenya were focused on the police.

Additionally, it could be argued that, due to less extensive training and access to heavy weaponry, police sectors typically possess less political power and influence than militaries do, and therefore policing structures may prove easier to reform than militaries. In Kenya, however, as the military has, for the most part, remained in the barracks and out of the political sphere, the police in Kenya have historically played the regime protection role, especially the paramilitary units such as the General Service Unit and the Administration Police, as further discussed in Chapter 4. Given these points, a focus on police reform in Kenya is warranted.

Despite these caveats and constraints, the methods delineated in this research design were chosen because they are particularly well suited to answering the type of research questions presented above, i.e. investigating understudied and data-poor, sensitive phenomena with the aim of unraveling complex causal chains and processes. One of the primary strengths of field-based case studies is generating new hypotheses.<sup>187</sup> Indeed, George and Bennett contend that, excepting “purely deductive theories,” case study methods of field research “typically lie behind every newly identified variable”<sup>188</sup> in political science. While this dissertation is a hypothesis generating, or heuristic study, in applying the proposed theoretical expectations to the three empirical cases the research design allows for an iterative process of refining theoretical explanations based on evidence collected from the cases.

## 2.9. Conclusion

This chapter has presented the theoretical framework and methodology of the dissertation. In sum, using a two-step structured contingency approach, I argue that two long-term factors, the nature of civil-military relations and the character of external involvement, combined with two short-term mechanisms, the design of the political agreement and the type of political strategy deployed by the parties, will be the most important factors shaping SSR under power sharing in semi-authoritarian countries.

I argue that variations in these four factors will result in four different types of power sharing in practice. One, *security politics*, the least favorable conditions for reform, where little to no SSR is expected. Two, *coalition politics*, the most favorable conditions for reform,

---

<sup>187</sup> Gerring, 2007, *Case Study Research*, 39.

<sup>188</sup> George and Bennett, 2005, *Case Studies and Theory Development*, 21.

where a considerable amount of SSR is expected. Three, *endogenous politics*, where some reforms are expected as long as there is a strong domestic constituency pushing SSR; and four *countervailing politics*, an unpredictable yet potentially favorable form of power sharing, where a halting but moderate degree of SSR is expected as long as a high level of coordinated, external leverage exists. How do these expectations and the two sets of hypotheses outlined above stand up to the evidence from the three case studies? The dissertation now turns to the three empirical chapters and applies the theoretical expectations to the cases of Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Togo.

### 3. EXCLUSIONARY SECURITY POLITICS IN ZIMBABWE

*“I’m not talking of capacity, or conventional military, I’m talking of political cohesiveness, collective political consciousness... This is an organic relationship. The British understood it, that’s why they would say we need to reform the military. To remove it, they think we are a boil, and we say no, we are not a boil, we are a wart!”*<sup>189</sup>

(Christopher Mutsvangwa, former minister of war veterans, ZANU-PF)

#### 3.1. Overview

A variety of historical factors shaped the dynamics and outcomes of power sharing in Zimbabwe. This chapter traces the historical roots of the nature of civil-military relations and the character of external involvement in Zimbabwe, demonstrating how these two long-term variables in turn shaped the two short-term mechanisms of agreement design and political strategy under the unity government, which was in office from 2009 to 2013. The power-sharing government came to be known as the Government of National Unity (GNU). The chapter first demonstrates that high incumbent reliance on the security sector, low Western leverage, and the distinct character of regional politics led to weak agreement design and the practice of exclusionary *security politics* in Zimbabwe. Weak agreement design and both parties’ use of exclusionary political approaches regarding SSR closed off reform opportunities, thwarting any meaningful SSR progress in Zimbabwe under power sharing.

The chapter then briefly discusses SSR efforts in Zimbabwe prior to the GNU. It argues that no genuine state effort to reform the security forces was attempted in the last two decades, despite increasing security sector involvement in electoral violence and calls from the opposition and international community to do so. The findings presented in this chapter confirm the theoretical expectation that the practice of *security politics* under power sharing will be extremely unfavorable to reform. The case findings are primarily based on dozens of

---

<sup>189</sup> Personal interview, Christopher Mutsvangwa, minister of war veterans, deputy minister of foreign affairs under the GNU, Harare, Zimbabwe, March 4, 2015.



elite level interviews with political leaders in ZANU-PF, the two MDC parties, security sector officials, and international stakeholders conducted in Harare and Mutare, Zimbabwe, and Pretoria and Johannesburg, South Africa, from November to December 2014 and February to March 2015.<sup>190</sup>

### 3.2. Nature of Civil-Military Relations: Roots of High ZANU-PF Reliance

Strong links and blurred lines between the polity and the security sector in Zimbabwe can be traced back to ideologies and practices forged during the liberation war.<sup>191</sup> During the war fought against Rhodesia, the party was named ZANU, merging with Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU party in 1987, becoming ZANU-PF. The armed wing of ZANU, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), was not merely a conventional force but a revolutionary guerilla army that also served political functions, such as politically educating ZANU members and the populace. Ndlovu-Gatsheni argues that the guerilla forces "operated as military cum mini-politicians."<sup>192</sup>

After independence ushered in a process of military integration, which merged the three forces of ZANLA, ZAPU's Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), and the Rhodesian Security Forces, the practice of using the military for political purposes continued. Shortly after independence in 1980, Mugabe undertook a brutal *Gukurahundi* (the rain that washes away the chaff) campaign of violence, using North Korean-trained military cadres to suppress Nkomo's ZAPU opposition party in Matabeleland. Over 20,000 were killed and

---

<sup>190</sup> I also draw on field research conducted as part of my master's level research in Harare, Zimbabwe in March and April 2011.

<sup>191</sup> Knox Chitiyo and Martin Rupiya, 2005, "Tracking Zimbabwe's Political History: The Zimbabwe Defence Force from 1980-2005," in Martin Rupiya, (ed.) *Evolutions & Revolutions A Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies): 331-363; Abiodun Alao 2012, *Mugabe and the Politics of Security in Zimbabwe* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press), 35-68.

<sup>192</sup> Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006, "The Nationalist-Military Alliance and the Fate of Democracy in Zimbabwe," *African Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 6, 1: 55.

security forces committed egregious human rights violations.<sup>193</sup> In spite of the military integration process, Mugabe largely kept the centralized Rhodesian military structure in place and rapidly sidelined non-ZANLA elements in the 1980s.<sup>194</sup>

Despite a long history of politicization, Mugabe and ZANU-PF became increasingly and overtly reliant on the security sector to remain in power after 2000, when their political hegemony was challenged by the MDC, the first viable opposition movement in Zimbabwe since independence.<sup>195</sup> As noted in Chapter 2, the year 2000 marked the launch of ZANU-PF's "third *chimurenga*," which linked resistance to conquest in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century to the liberation struggle in the 1970s and the land expropriations of white-owned farms in the 2000s.<sup>196</sup> The third *chimurenga* forwards a binary view of Zimbabwe's past as a struggle between revolutionary "patriots" (liberation war veterans) and "sell-outs" (the opposition).<sup>197</sup> As such, the opposition was dismissed as mere puppets of Western countries with ZANU-PF enjoying the right to "rule in perpetuity."<sup>198</sup> This ideology ran deep in Zimbabwe's security apparatus, particularly at the highest echelons.

Against the backdrop of a rising political threat to Mugabe in the MDC opposition movement, during the run-up to the 2002 national elections security leaders made a public political statement, asserting that they would not support or salute any political leaders who did not fight in the liberation war. The declaration was a clear indication that the security sector would not recognize a Tsvangirai election victory. Security chiefs made similar partisan utterances before every major election over the next decade. Such statements were

---

<sup>193</sup> Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 1999, "Breaking The Silence, Building True Peace."

<sup>194</sup> Paul Jackson, 2011, "The Civil War Roots of Military Domination in Zimbabwe: The Integration Process Following the Rhodesian War and the Road to ZANLA Dominance," *Civil Wars*, 13, 4: 385.

<sup>195</sup> Knox Chitiyo, 2009, "The Case for Security Sector Reform in Zimbabwe," Royal United Services Institute, 8.

<sup>196</sup> Alexander and Tendi, 2008, "Tale of Two Elections," 5.

<sup>197</sup> Tendi, 2010, *Making History in Mugabe's Zimbabwe*.

<sup>198</sup> Bratton and Masunungure, 2008, "Zimbabwe's Long Agony," 43.

not merely rhetoric, as the JOC—the supreme security body comprising the leaders of Zimbabwe’s military, police, intelligence organization, prison service, and high-ranking ZANU-PF members—were responsible for managing violent campaigns to guarantee ZANU-PF’s success in the 2000 and 2002 elections, as highlighted in Chapter 2.<sup>199</sup> This state-directed violence—carried out by a mix of security forces, militia, and war veterans—featured prominently in subsequent elections, culminating in the 2008 crisis.

The first round of the 2008 elections were historic and largely peaceful.<sup>200</sup> However, after the opposition’s initial success, ZANU-PF structures and the JOC unleashed an unprecedented campaign of violence that left over 200 dead and scores others missing or jailed.<sup>201</sup> Tsvangirai withdrew, giving Mugabe an illegitimate victory that precipitated power-sharing negotiations headed by South Africa’s President, Mbeki, under the auspices of SADC and the AU.

### 3.2.1. *Politicization vs. Militarization: Who’s in Control?*

As compensation for the security sector’s fealty to Mugabe and the party, since approximately the year 2000 Mugabe has increasingly awarded security leaders with plum positions in the state and party structures. As a result, the security apparatus penetrated every aspect of the Zimbabwean state, from the Reserve Bank and the Electoral Commission to many ministries and other state bodies (see below for an analysis of how many GNU cabinet members have security sector backgrounds).<sup>202</sup> In 2012, a Zimbabwean civil society

---

<sup>199</sup> Brian Raftopoulos, 2009, “The Crisis in Zimbabwe,” 215.

<sup>200</sup> Masunungure, 2009, *Defying the Winds of Change*, 78.

<sup>201</sup> Human Rights Watch, 2011, “Perpetual Fear,” 26.

<sup>202</sup> Bratton and Masunungure 2008, “Zimbabwe’s Long Agony,” 49; Human Rights Watch, 2013, “The Elephant in the Room: Reforming Zimbabwe’s Security Sector Ahead of Elections,” <https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/06/04/elephant-room/reforming-zimbabwes-security-sector-ahead-elections> (accessed December 4, 2015).

organization documented serving and retired military officials in an array of state positions, including in the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority, the Grain Marketing Board, the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe, and Zimbabwe Broadcasting Holdings, among others.<sup>203</sup>

The security sector became deeply involved in Zimbabwe's wider political economy, as those with direct or indirect ties to the security apparatus came to manage parastatal companies and many ostensibly civilian companies.<sup>204</sup> Mugabe and ZANU-PF also allowed the security sector to benefit greatly from its control over illicit sources of revenue such as the Marange diamond fields, where the military and police have been enriching themselves through illegal mining and trading since 2006, while in the process being implicated in widespread human rights abuses.<sup>205</sup> Security chiefs were also involved in the land invasions that proliferated across the country since 2000 under Mugabe's Fast Track land reform program, frequently being awarded the most lavish properties.<sup>206</sup> The military also benefited from its deployment to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 1998, where it was granted mining concessions by the DRC government, leading Jackson to designate the Zimbabwean military as a "conflict entrepreneur."<sup>207</sup> In short, supporting Mugabe and ZANU-PF paid off handsomely for many security officials in Zimbabwe. But is it accurate to

---

<sup>203</sup> Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2012, "The Military Factor in Zimbabwe's Political and Electoral Affairs," <http://www.swradioafrica.com/Documents/The%20Military%20Factor%20in%20Zimbabwe.pdf> (accessed November 21, 2015).

<sup>204</sup> Zimbabwe Institute, 2008, "The Security-Military Business Complex and the Transition in Zimbabwe;" personal interview, executive director of local research institute, Harare, Zimbabwe, March 31, 2011.

<sup>205</sup> David Towriss, 2013, "Buying Loyalty: Zimbabwe's Marange Diamonds," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 39, 1: 99-117; Human Rights Watch, 2009, "Diamonds in the Rough: Human Rights Abuses in the Marange Diamond Fields of Zimbabwe," <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/06/26/diamonds-rough> (accessed November 11, 2015).

<sup>206</sup> Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2012, "The Military Factor;" Jocelyn Alexander, 2006, *The Unsettled Land: State-making and the Politics of Land in Zimbabwe 1893-2003* (Oxford: James Currey): 186.

<sup>207</sup> Jackson, 2011, "Military Domination in Zimbabwe," 389.

view the process as civilians politicizing the security forces, or security forces militarizing the civilian sphere?

There is a growing body of work focused on the expanding role of the military in Zimbabwe.<sup>208</sup> The majority of studies tend to emphasize the gradual militarization of the state. Ndlovu-Gatsheni views this interdependent relationship as a “nationalist-military alliance,” while Bratton and Masunungure characterize it as a “civilian–military clique.”<sup>209</sup> Many accounts, however, go too far in arguing for the perceived political power of the military, concluding that it is the military, not civilian politicians, who are ultimately in control in Zimbabwe.<sup>210</sup> This interpretation has arguably become conventional wisdom among academics and commentators and such claims are frequently echoed in the local and international press when discussing Zimbabwe.<sup>211</sup> Even Tsvangirai apparently subscribes to this argument, stating in his 2011 autobiography that the military staged a “soft coup” in 2008.<sup>212</sup>

In contrast to this line of reasoning, I found that while there is no question that the civil-military relationship in Zimbabwe has been mutually beneficial to both sides and that the military had some political influence during the period of power sharing, Mugabe and ZANU-PF always maintained civilian control and, even when it may have outwardly

---

<sup>208</sup> For examples, see Charles Mangongera, 2014, “The Military vs. Democracy,” *Journal of Democracy*, 25, 2: 67-76; Rupiya, 2013, (ed.) *Zimbabwe's Military*; Jocelyn Alexander, 2013, “Militarization and State Institutions: ‘Professionals’ and ‘Soldiers’ inside the Zimbabwe Prison Service,” *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 39, 4: 807-828; Alao, 2012, *Mugabe and the Politics of Security*; Eldred Masunungure, 2011, “Zimbabwe’s Militarized, Electoral Authoritarianism,” *Journal of International Affairs*, 65, 1: 47-64; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006, “The Nationalist-Military Alliance.”

<sup>209</sup> Ibid; Bratton and Eldred Masunungure, 2008, “Zimbabwe’s Long Agony,” 50.

<sup>210</sup> For example see Bratton, 2014, *Power Politics*, 200; Mazarire, 2013, “ZANU-PF and the Government of National Unity 2009–12,” 76; Michael Bratton and Eldred Masunungure, 2011, “The Anatomy of Political Predation: Leaders, Elites and Coalitions in Zimbabwe, 1980–2010,” Development Leadership Program, Research Paper 9, 26, 31.

<sup>211</sup> See for example *The Telegraph*, “Zimbabwean Generals Have ‘Taken Mugabe’s Power,’” June 5, 2008; *Washington Post*, “Inside Mugabe’s Violent Crackdown,” July 5, 2008; *Zim Eye*, “Bloody Coup Looms in Zimbabwe, Top Analysts Say,” September 4, 2014.

<sup>212</sup> Morgan Tsvangirai and T. William Bongo, 2011, *In the Deep End* (London: Eye Books): 486.

appeared otherwise, as in 2008, Mugabe appears to have remained in supreme command. This argument builds on Tendi's recent scholarship,<sup>213</sup> which is an important exception in the literature. In order to emphasize Mugabe and the party's ultimate control of the security sector, I develop the concept of party "reliance" on the security sector as opposed to the notion of "military influence" common in the civil-military relations literature.<sup>214</sup> If applied to the Zimbabwean context, the concept of military influence erroneously suggests that ultimate power is flowing from the military to the political sphere instead of vice versa.

Evidence from elite level interviews with political leaders in ZANU-PF, the two MDC parties, and security sector officials, support the reliance concept over the military control argument. Patrick Chinamasa, a veteran ZANU-PF official who served as head ZANU-PF negotiator in the 2008 negotiations and minister of justice in the GNU, when asked if the military was ever in control, told me: "That is not true, that is the perception but is not true." Chinamasa said the "commitment of the war veterans" to the party "gives the impression of a militarized organization."<sup>215</sup> When I put the same question to Saviour Kasukuwere, a young but high-ranking ZANU-PF official who was minister of youth development, indigenization and empowerment in the GNU, he responded: "It's nonsense...People allege that the army is everywhere, no that's rubbish. We did it as a party; we're a political party."<sup>216</sup>

Welshman Ncube, who was deputy prime minister during the GNU and sat in NSC meetings with Mugabe and the service chiefs, when asked about who was in control, told me

---

<sup>213</sup> Tendi, 2013, "Ideology, Civilian Authority and the Zimbabwean Military;" Tendi, 2013, "Robert Mugabe's 2013 Presidential Election Campaign."

<sup>214</sup> Feaver, 1999, "Civil-Military Relations," 218-19.

<sup>215</sup> Personal interview, Patrick Chinamasa, minister of finance and head ZANU-PF negotiator in 2008, Harare, Zimbabwe, February 27, 2015.

<sup>216</sup> Personal interview, Saviour Kasukuwere, minister of youth development, indigenization and empowerment in the GNU, Harare, Zimbabwe, March 5, 2015.

that he was surprised by how many people are deceived on this point. He said, “No one has ever been in charge of ZANU[-PF] other than Mugabe....It’s a big chessboard, whether you are army, military, police, Mugabe is the chess player. Don’t be fooled.”<sup>217</sup> Tendai Biti, former secretary general of MDC-T, principal 2008 negotiator, and finance minister, who also sat in NSC meetings during the GNU, reiterated these points, arguing that, even in 2008, “Mugabe was always 1000 percent in charge...Mugabe uses the military, but ultimately he’s in charge...if Mugabe says no no no no, that’s not going to happen, it wouldn’t have happened. So I have no doubt that de facto and de jure and power, lies with Mugabe.”<sup>218</sup> Theresa Makone, who, as co-minister of home affairs during the GNU, sat on the NSC and even attended weekly meetings of the JOC, also held this perspective.<sup>219</sup>

Mugabe himself publicly weighed in on this debate during a press conference held on the eve of the 2013 elections. When a journalist asked about military generals saying they would not accept a leader without liberation war experience, Mugabe responded: “If one or two said so, it’s just those one or two. They’re not the army, and *they’re not the authority anyway* [emphasis mine].” Mugabe went on to say that military discipline is the reason why they follow his orders: “it’s military discipline that they obey, not the discipline you and I are used to. We get up as we like, and do things as we like. [For them] it’s ‘Left! Right! About Turn! March!’”<sup>220</sup>

---

<sup>217</sup> Personal interview, Welshman Ncube, former deputy prime minister and leader of MDC-N, Harare, Zimbabwe, December 14, 2014.

<sup>218</sup> Personal interview, Tendai Biti, head MDC-T negotiator in 2008 and minister of finance in the GNU, Harare, Zimbabwe, February 23, 2015.

<sup>219</sup> Personal interview, Theresa Makone, co-minister of home affairs under the GNU, Harare, Zimbabwe, December 12, 2014.

<sup>220</sup> *New Zimbabwe*, “Transcript: Mugabe’s Election Eve Press Conference,” July 30, 2013, <http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-11877-Transcript+Mugabes+election+eve+press+brief/news.aspx> (accessed November 21, 2015).

Mugabe and ZANU-PF's civilian control over the military can be traced back to the liberation war period. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni, during the war, "party commissars worked very hard in making sure guerrillas toed the party line."<sup>221</sup> Tendi pinpoints the subordination of the military to the 1965 Sikombela Declaration and a purging of insubordinate soldiers in 1976.<sup>222</sup> Founding member of ZANU, Enos Nkala, told Tendi that in 1976: "We dealt with these boys and controlled the soldiers after that. They were not supposed to be bigger than the party."<sup>223</sup> This balance of power proved strikingly resilient, remaining intact through independence and over the GNU period, despite fluctuations in the party's political strategies that led to increased politicization and reliance on the military after 2000.

Another indicator that lends further support to the reliance argument is the fact that security chiefs are on one-year contracts. As Biti told me, "Mugabe can easily fire any one of those generals. They serve at his mercy. The term of contracts for the army chief, they are one year. So in that way he's very powerful." Tendi also makes this point.<sup>224</sup> The evidence presented here demonstrates that, despite heavy reliance on the security services to stay in power, Mugabe remained in firm control of the security apparatus in the run up to and throughout the GNU period.

### 3.2.2. *High Reliance*

To supplement the above analysis and help to roughly gauge ZANU-PF's degree of reliance on the security sector directly before and during the GNU period (2008-2013), I use three

---

<sup>221</sup> Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006, "The Nationalist-Military Alliance," 58.

<sup>222</sup> Tendi, 2013, "The Zimbabwean Military," 8.

<sup>223</sup> Ibid.

<sup>224</sup> Ibid, 9.



indicators. As highlighted in Chapter 2, I first use the level of security sector involvement in the electoral violence that precipitated the GNU in 2008 (as measured by percentage of deaths attributed to security sector actors). As little as 1 percent of Zimbabwe's 2008 electoral violence has been attributed to the opposition, with the remaining 99 percent attributed to state forces or other actors coordinated by the security sector.<sup>225</sup> With the security apparatus involved in an overwhelming majority of the violence, ZANU-PF clearly falls into the highest possible category of reliance (81 percent and above) on this indicator.

Second, I analyzed, through background research and consultations with interviewees and country experts, the prevalence of individuals in both parties with security backgrounds (both pre- and post-independence) who served in cabinet at any time during the GNU.<sup>226</sup> While only 4 percent (1 of 25) of MDC cabinet members are made up of serving or ex-security sector personnel, 45 percent (13 of 29) of ZANU-PF cabinet members had security backgrounds. Thus, MDC falls into the low level of reliance category, while ZANU-PF earns a high degree (see Figures 6 and 7). To reiterate, these are imperfect indicators meant only to gauge rough levels of formal reliance and supplement the ample evidence presented above.

---

<sup>225</sup> Alexander and Tendi, 2008, "Tale of Two Elections," 11-12; Solidarity Peace Trust, 2008, "Desperately Seeking Sanity: What Prospects for a New Beginning in Zimbabwe?," 25-6, [http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/download/report-files/desperately\\_seeking\\_sanity.pdf](http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/download/report-files/desperately_seeking_sanity.pdf) (accessed December 23, 2015).

<sup>226</sup> Those with security sector experience in the Rhodesian security sector (two MDC cabinet members) prior to independence were not counted, as they would not have any residual allegiance to ZANU-PF. Where experts disagreed, I erred on the side of caution and chose to list an individual as having no security experience (this occurred with Robert Mugabe, who, despite leading the guerilla war, some said did not have any formal combat experience).

| <b>ZANU-PF Cabinet Position</b>             | <b>Name</b>            | <b>Security Background</b> |
|---------------------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|
| Pres.                                       | Robert MUGABE          | X                          |
| Vice Pres.                                  | Joyce MUJURU           | ✓                          |
| Vice Pres                                   | Joseph MSIKA           | X                          |
| Vice Pres.                                  | John NKOMO             | X                          |
| Min. of Ag., Mech., & Irrigation Dev.       | Joseph MADE            | X                          |
| Min. of Defense                             | Emmerson MNANGAGWA     | ✓                          |
| Min. of Env. & Natural Resource Dev.        | Francis NHEMA          | X                          |
| Min. of Foreign Affairs                     | Simbarashe MUMBENGEGWI | X                          |
| Min. of Higher & Tertiary Education         | Stanislaus MUDENGE     | X                          |
| Min. of Home Affairs (shared)               | Kembo MOHADI           | ✓                          |
| Min. of Justice & Legal Affairs             | Patrick CHINAMASA      | X                          |
| Min. of Lands & Rural Resettlement          | Herbert MURERWA        | X                          |
| Min. of Local Govt.                         | Ignatius CHOMBO        | X                          |
| Min. of Media, Info., & Publicity           | Webster SHAMU          | ✓                          |
| Min. of Mines & Mining Dev.                 | Obert MPOFU            | ✓                          |
| Min. of Small & Medium Enterprises          | Sithembiso NYONI       | X                          |
| Min. of Tourism & Hospitality Indust.       | Walter MZEMBI          | ✓                          |
| Min. of Transport & Infrastructure Dev.     | Nicholas GOCHÉ         | ✓                          |
| Min. of Women's Affairs & Gender            | Olivia MUCHENA         | X                          |
| Min. of Youth, Indigenization, & Empower.   | Savior KASUKUWERE      | ✓                          |
| Min. of State for Nat. Sec. in Pres. Office | Sydney SEKERAMAYI      | ✓                          |
| Min. of State in VP Office                  | Sylvester NGUNI        | ✓                          |
| Min. of State in VP Office                  | Flora BHUKA            | X                          |
| Governor, Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe          | Gideon GONO            | X                          |
| Minister of State for Pres. Affairs         | Didymus MUTASA         | ✓                          |
| Permanent Representative to the UN          | Boniface CHIDYAUSIKU   | ✓                          |
| Permanent Representative to the UN          | Chitsaka CHIPAZIWA     | X                          |
| Ambassador to the US                        | Simbi Veke MUBAKO      | ✓                          |
| Ambassador to the US                        | Machivenyika MAPURANGA | X                          |
| <b>Total</b>                                |                        | <b>13 of 29 = 45%</b>      |

Figure 6: ZANU-PF cabinet security backgrounds

| <b>MDCs Cabinet Position</b>           | <b>Name</b>              | <b>Security Background</b> |
|----------------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|
| Prime Min.                             | Morgan TSVANGIRAI        | X                          |
| Dep. Prime Min.                        | Thokozani KHUPE          | X                          |
| Dep. Prime Min.                        | Arthur MUTAMBARA (MDC-M) | X                          |
| Min. of Const. & Parliamentary Affairs | Eric MATINENGA           | X                          |
| Min. of Econ. Planning & Development   | Tapiwa MASHAKADA         | X                          |
| Min. of Education, Sport, & Culture    | David COLTART (MDC-M)    | X                          |
| Min. of Energy & Econ Planning         | Elton MANGOMA            | X                          |
| Min. of Energy & Power Development     | Elias MUDZURI            | X                          |
| Min. of Finance                        | Tendai BITI              | X                          |
| Min. of Health & Child Welfare         | Henry MADZORERA          | X                          |
| Min. of Home Aff. (shared)/Pub. Works  | Theresa MAKONE           | X                          |
| Min. of Industry & Commerce            | Welshman NCUBE (MDC-M)   | X                          |

|                                        |                      |                     |
|----------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| Min. of Info. Comm. Technology         | Nelson CHAMISA       | X                   |
| Min. of Labor                          | Paurina G.-MPARIWA   | X                   |
| Min. of National Housing/Home Affairs  | Giles MUTSEKWA       | ✓                   |
| Min. of National Housing               | Fidelis MHASHU       | X                   |
| Min. of Public Service                 | Elphas MUKONOWESHURO | X                   |
| Min. of Public Works                   | Joel GABBUZA         | X                   |
| Min. of Reg. Integration & Intl. Coop. | Priscila M.-MUSHONGA | X                   |
| Min. of Science & Technology           | Henri DZINOTYIWEI    | X                   |
| Min. of State Enterprises/State in PMO | Gorden MOYO          | X                   |
| Min. of Water Resources Mgmt & Dev.    | Samuel Sipepa NKOMO  | X                   |
| Min. of State in PMO                   | Jameson TIMBA        | X                   |
| Min. of State in PMO                   | Sekai HOLLAND        | X                   |
| Min. of State in DPO                   | Gibson SIBANDA       | X                   |
| <b>Total</b>                           |                      | <b>1 of 25 = 4%</b> |

Figure 7: MDC cabinet security backgrounds

Finally, according to two commonly cited coup databases, no credible military coup or attempt has been launched in Zimbabwe, despite a number of alleged plots used by Mugabe to purge perceived rivals.<sup>227</sup> The absence of coups or coup attempts further indicates that influence is flowing from politicians to the security sector (politicization) and not the other way around (securitization).

Three main factors have facilitated and conditioned Mugabe and ZANU-PF's high degree of reliance on the security sector in Zimbabwe. First, Mugabe's immense centralized powers as president and commander in chief; second, the close ideological ties between the party and the military forged during the liberation war; and third, the political uncertainty created by a rising opposition in the late 2000s. These three factors are briefly elaborated here before introducing a fourth factor that has played an enabling role in ZANU-PF's reliance relationship with the security sector: a lack of intra- or inter-party leadership turnover in Zimbabwe.

<sup>227</sup> Powell, 2015, "Coups in the World;" Center for Systemic Peace, 2014, "Coups d'État."

Mugabe inherited a strong centralized bureaucratic state with considerable coercive capacity and few checks and balances on the executive.<sup>228</sup> As argued by Bratton and Masunungure, “the legacy of a strong state provided readymade instruments for repression,”<sup>229</sup> which proved convenient tools for Mugabe once in power. By virtue of his position as commander in chief, Mugabe enjoyed even less restrictions on his power regarding the armed forces. Zimbabwe’s military abides by a strict chain of command,<sup>230</sup> with the service chiefs subordinate to him, as evidenced by Mugabe’s ability to terminate their contracts.

Such unfettered powers meant that Mugabe and ZANU-PF faced little organized resistance when they embarked on a strategy of politicization and reliance, from within the broader state or within the security services, especially at the highest levels. Of course the state, the security sector, and the party are not monolithic but complex and often factionalized organizations, and there were some pockets of resistance among all three bodies to this politicization process.<sup>231</sup> Indeed, there is evidence that MDC enjoyed some support among the security sector’s rank and file in 2008, even winning some polling stations that were located within army and police stations.<sup>232</sup>

Closely related to Mugabe’s formal powers is the second factor of shared ideology between ZANU-PF and many of the security chiefs. As highlighted above, such ideological ties were formed in the crucible of the liberation war. Mugabe noted the importance of

---

<sup>228</sup> Alexander, 2013, “Military and State Institutions,” 810.

<sup>229</sup> Bratton and Masunungure, 2011, “The Anatomy of Political Predation,” iii-iv.

<sup>230</sup> Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006, “The Nationalist-Military Alliance,” 68-9; Tendi, 2013, “The Zimbabwean Military,” 9.

<sup>231</sup> For an example of how professional civil servants resisted efforts to militarize the prison system, see Alexander, 2013, “Military and State Institutions;” for ideological inconsistencies and divides in the military and ZANU-PF see Tendi, 2013, “The Zimbabwean Military;” Towriss, 2013, “Buying Loyalty,” 101.

<sup>232</sup> Personal interview, Paul Madzore, chair of the home affairs and defense portfolio committee in parliament, Harare, Zimbabwe, March 31, 2011.

military force to the party in 1976, stating: “The people’s votes and the people’s guns are always inseparable twins.”<sup>233</sup> ZANU-PF has carefully maintained this nationalist ideology through its decades of rule, updating the ideology to fit the narrative of the third *chimurenga*. Chinamasa told me that ZANU-PF is so “resilient because of its liberation ethos” and that it’s the dedication, organizational capacity, and efficiency of the war veterans that “keep ZANU-PF going.”<sup>234</sup>

On the relationship between the military and the party, Christopher Mutsvangwa, who at the time was the minister of war veterans and a ZANLA veteran, explained to me that the military in Zimbabwe is a revolutionary one and that the relationship between the military and the party is an “organic” one. He said, “I’m not talking of capacity, or a conventional military, I’m talking of political cohesiveness, collective political consciousness.”<sup>235</sup> These shared liberation ideologies between the party, the security sector, and war veterans have, in Mutsvangwa’s terminology, organically facilitated an increased degree of politicization and party reliance on the security apparatus when ZANU-PF faced a credible threat to its political hegemony.

This threat, the third factor, came in the form of the MDC opposition movement which emerged in the late 1990s and unexpectedly fought and won a campaign against the 2000 constitutional referendum, which sought to expand the power of the executive. After the first electoral defeat of the ruling party, Mugabe and ZANU-PF responded with a combination of violence and increased patronage to its support base. Mugabe’s choice to

---

<sup>233</sup> Martin Meredith, 2008, *Our Votes, Our Guns: Robert Mugabe and the Tragedy of Zimbabwe* (New York, NY: Public Affairs): 226.

<sup>234</sup> Personal interview, Chinamasa, 2015. Scholars have also argued that ideological ties arising out of violent struggle can increase regime durability, see, for instance, Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, 2012, “Beyond Patronage: Violent Struggle, Ruling Party Cohesion, and Authoritarian Durability,” *Perspectives on Politics*, 10, 4: 869-889.

<sup>235</sup> Personal interview, Mutsvangwa, 2015.

embark on a violent Fast Track program of land reform aimed to punish white farmers for supporting the opposition while at the same time mobilizing and rewarding loyal political patrons and support networks.<sup>236</sup> As noted, security sector elites and war veterans benefitted greatly from the process.

Mugabe also reacted to this political threat with the practice of “government by operations,”<sup>237</sup> which used military operations, disguised as legitimate government efforts, to destroy opposition support bases and structures. Operation *Murambatsvina* (clean out the filth), for instance, ostensibly aimed at razing illegal housing structures in poor, high-density urban areas, left up to 500,000 homeless in areas seen as opposition strongholds. As argued by Mangongera, “In reality, these operations have been used to sideline professional bureaucrats, to create opportunities for rent seeking, and to silence regime opponents.”<sup>238</sup> This practice further facilitated and entrenched the party’s reliance on the security sector.

A fourth factor, a lack of intra- or inter-party leadership turnover, has enabled Mugabe’s cult of personality and system of security sector patronage to remain intact over the years. Roseline Zigomo, a senior official in the Office of the Prime Minister during the GNU, pointed out how decades of continued rule by one party have enabled the reliance relationship. She explained that, “the advantage that you have with 30 years of political supremacy is that you don’t demarcate between what is state and what is political party.”<sup>239</sup>

A number of studies echo Zigomo’s sentiment, arguing that leadership turnover is key to severing long-held patronage ties that tend to develop in semi-authoritarian systems of personal rule. As argued by Bienen and Herbst, “The great advantage of a new leader is that

---

<sup>236</sup> Alexander, 2006, *The Unsettled Land*, 86, 91; Raftopoulos, 2009, “The Crisis in Zimbabwe.”

<sup>237</sup> Mangongera, 2014, “The Military vs. Democracy,” 72-3.

<sup>238</sup> Ibid, 72.

<sup>239</sup> Personal interview, Roseline Zigomo, former principal director of rights and interest, Office of the Prime Minister, Harare, Zimbabwe, March 29, 2011.

he [or she] may not be as beholden to the established intricate network of patron-client relationships that underpin power structures in most African countries.”<sup>240</sup> Maltz examines the impact of leadership turnover in 92 electoral authoritarian regimes and argues that turnover “destroys the patronage networks and clientelistic relationships of electoral authoritarianism,” often leading to increased democratization.<sup>241</sup> This lack of new leadership in the party or in government in Zimbabwe has prevented the tight-knit political, ideological, and material bonds between Mugabe and the security apparatus from being broken, allowing the party’s reliance on the security sector to continue and deepen unabated.

This section has demonstrated ZANU-PF’s high reliance on the security sector to remain in power in the years leading up to the GNU and discussed the historical roots and events that shaped this relationship. The reliance hypothesis predicts that this high degree of reliance will translate to exclusionary political strategies, weak agreement design, and a low degree of SSR in Zimbabwe under power sharing.

### 3.3. External Involvement: Regional Solidarity Politics Trump Western Influence

Despite strong colonial legacies and historical ties to the United Kingdom, Zimbabwe’s external relations have been dominated by the politics of regional solidarity in southern Africa, limiting Western involvement and leverage. As Zimbabwe began sliding into political and economic crisis in the late 1990s and early 2000s, relations with Western countries, the United Kingdom and the United States in particular, soured over disputes concerning violent land seizures, increased political violence and abuse of human rights, and the subsequent

---

<sup>240</sup> Henry Bienen and Jeffrey Herbst, 1996, “The Relationship between Political and Economic Reform in Africa,” *Comparative Politics*, 29, 1: 33.

<sup>241</sup> Gideon Maltz, 2007, “The Case for Presidential Term Limits,” *Journal of Democracy*, 18, 1: 136; also see Nic Cheeseman, 2010, “African Elections as Vehicles for Change,” *Journal of Democracy*, 21, 4: 139-153.

imposition of Western sanctions against the Mugabe regime.<sup>242</sup> The United Kingdom has a long and complex relationship with Zimbabwe, from colonial rule, through the negotiated Lancaster House agreement that gave Zimbabwe its independence, through close diplomatic and military relations for most of the two decades after independence. The bilateral relationship quickly turned toxic in the late 1990s and early 2000s, mostly around the issue of land reform and disputes over the UK's commitments to the Lancaster House agreement.<sup>243</sup>

Mugabe framed the fight between the countries as an attempt by Western countries to re-colonize Zimbabwe and the region. As argued by Tendi, “Mugabe casts sovereignty as the reverse of colonialism and an important means of rhetorical and political self-defense against criticism, as well as threatened intrusions by external actors.”<sup>244</sup> During this confrontation with the United Kingdom and other Western countries, the SADC region closed ranks around Mugabe and ZANU-PF, invoking the principal of state sovereignty while often turning a blind eye to increasing human rights abuses.<sup>245</sup> World powers such as China and Russia also gave Mugabe and ZANU-PF cover on the international stage as they refused to countenance criticism at the UN and other international bodies, fracturing any efforts by Western countries to marshal coordinated pressure from the international community. In 2008, China

---

<sup>242</sup> For an overview of Zimbabwe's polarized relations with Western countries and a discussion of sanctions see Munyaradzi Nyakudya, 2013, “Sanctioning the Government of National Unity: A Review of Zimbabwe's Relations with the West in the Framework of the GPA,” in Brian Raftopoulos (ed.), *The Hard Road to Reform: The Politics of Zimbabwe's Global Political Agreement* (Harare: Weaver Press): 171-210.

<sup>243</sup> For an overview of this bilateral relationship through the lens of “toxicity” see Tendi, 2011, “Robert Mugabe and Toxicity.”

<sup>244</sup> Ibid, 316.

<sup>245</sup> Brian Raftopoulos, 2013, “An Overview of the Politics of the Global Political Agreement: National Conflict, Regional Agony, International Dilemma,” in Brian Raftopoulos (ed.), *The Hard Road to Reform: The Politics of Zimbabwe's Global Political Agreement* (Harare: Weaver Press): 25.



and Russia vetoed an attempted campaign to impose UN sanctions on Zimbabwe, citing state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention in other state's domestic issues.<sup>246</sup>

Regional politics in southern Africa have profoundly shaped Zimbabwe's international relations and the character and extent of external involvement in the country. Akin to the country's civil-military relations, Zimbabwe's strong relations and common ideologies with many of its neighbors can be traced back to their shared experiences wrought during the region's fight for independence from white settler colonialism, spanning the 1960s through the 1990s.

Longstanding liberation parties in the SADC region, which trained and supported each other's efforts to varying degrees, have been in office for decades in Angola (the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola-MPLA), Mozambique (the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique), Namibia (the South West Africa People's Organization), South Africa (the African National Congress-ANC), and Tanzania (*Chama Cha Mapinduzi* [CCM-Party of the Revolution]). As argued by Ndlovu-Gatsheni, these long-ruling parties "have maintained close ties rooted in common liberation histories and personal connections."<sup>247</sup> Because of this shared history fighting for majority rule, Mutsvangwa, the ZANLA veteran and minister of war veterans, told me that the region has developed a cohesive cross-border political consciousness. He explained to me that southern Africa is one of the only regions in the world with, "a collective political consciousness...it's geographical plus collective political consciousness, because we fought together."<sup>248</sup>

---

<sup>246</sup> *New York Times*, "Two Vetoes Quash UN Sanctions on Zimbabwe," July 12, 2008, [http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/12/world/africa/12zimbabwe.html?pagewanted=all&\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/12/world/africa/12zimbabwe.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0) (accessed December 18, 2014).

<sup>247</sup> Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011, "Reconstructing the Implications of Liberation Struggle History on SADC Mediation in Zimbabwe," Southern African Institute of International Affairs, Occasional Paper No. 92: 3.

<sup>248</sup> Personal interview, Mutsvangwa, 2015.

Explaining how Zimbabwe's opposition perceived SADC's history of solidarity politics, Jameson Timba, minister of state in the prime minister's office during the GNU and alternate MDC-T negotiator in 2008, told me that, "for many years SADC acted like a trade union of despots."<sup>249</sup> Jesse Majome of MDC-T, who was deputy minister of justice and legal affairs during the GNU, told me that SADC leaders have not stood up to Mugabe in part due to his seniority in the regional body. She said SADC leaders "are overawed by Mugabe. He towers above all SADC heads of state, in terms of his seniority."<sup>250</sup> Timba told me that during the years running up to the GNU, ZANU-PF had largely succeeded in convincing the SADC region that MDC was a Western-controlled party that threatened the political hegemony of liberation movements in southern Africa.<sup>251</sup>

Theresa Makone of MDC-T, the co-minister of home affairs during the GNU, told me that the only SADC government that consistently cooperated with the MDC was Botswana. She said, "we only had the cooperation of one government, Botswana. The others, he [Mugabe] just does whatever he wants with them."<sup>252</sup> While Botswana may have been the MDC's most consistent ally, Zambia and Tanzania also openly criticized Mugabe.<sup>253</sup>

Despite common liberation histories and revolutionary ideologies, the regional solidarity that largely prevailed in the years leading up to the Zimbabwean GNU was not necessarily preordained. The various liberation movements of the region were far from monolithic entities; they featured acute intra and inter-group rivalries, often based on divides

---

<sup>249</sup> Personal interview, Jameson Timba, minister of state in the prime minister's office during the GNU and alternate MDC-T negotiator in 2008, Harare, Zimbabwe, December 8, 2014.

<sup>250</sup> Personal interview, Jessie Majome, deputy minister of justice and legal affairs in the GNU, Harare, Zimbabwe, March 30, 2011.

<sup>251</sup> Personal interview, Timba, 2014.

<sup>252</sup> Personal interview, Makone, 2014.

<sup>253</sup> Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011, "Implications of Liberation Struggle," 6.

between their Soviet and Chinese patrons.<sup>254</sup> At times these divisions descended into internecine conflict, as seen in Zimbabwe between ZANU and ZAPU. ZAPU—ZANU’s rival during the liberation war—received support and training from the Soviets while ZANU’s patron was China. Due to linguistic and cultural ties, ZAPU also had long-standing relationships with the ANC (while ZANU was aligned with the Pan African Congress in South Africa).<sup>255</sup> After Zimbabwe’s independence, ANC cadres were caught up in ZANU’s crackdown on ZAPU in the early 1980s. Over 20 ANC fighters, at the time working with ZAPU, were imprisoned and some were tortured. According to Gevisser, Mbeki’s biographer, “the ANC’s infrastructure in Zimbabwe was destroyed; only in 1985 was an office set up that brokered enough of a truce for the ANC to start working properly from Zimbabwe again.”<sup>256</sup>

This history made it difficult for ZANU to forge close relationships with the ANC and other Soviet-trained groups with ties to ZAPU (such as the MPLA) in the first decade of independence. But over the years ZANU-PF made a concerted effort to cultivate and maintain close fraternal relationships with such groups. As noted by Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Mugabe has successfully reinvented a common history for ZANU–PF and the MPLA.”<sup>257</sup> Southall has termed these efforts the “myth-making of solidarity,” which, in reality, often “brush over much that is inconvenient in the past, inventing unities in struggle which were often totally absent in practice.”<sup>258</sup> Such myth making by ZANU-PF paid dividends, as

---

<sup>254</sup> Ibid, 7-11.

<sup>255</sup> Mark Gevisser, 2009, *Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred* (Jeppestown: Jonathan Ball): 300-301.

<sup>256</sup> Ibid, 301.

<sup>257</sup> Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011, “Implications of Liberation Struggle,” 7.

<sup>258</sup> Roger Southall, 2013, *Liberation Movements in Power: Party and State in Southern Africa* (Suffolk: James Currey): 72, 74.

evidenced by Mugabe and ZANU-PF's close relationship with the ANC, in particular with Mbeki.

### 3.3.1. *Softly Softly: Mbeki's Quiet Diplomacy*

While Zimbabwe has put time and energy into forging (or manufacturing) liberation ties throughout the SADC region, the most important regional player for Zimbabwe has always been South Africa. Mbeki played a pivotal role in the Zimbabwe crisis, acting as both an informal and formal mediator between ZANU-PF and the opposition all the way back to the early 2000s. Although Mugabe and President Nelson Mandela shared a mutual dislike for each other, Mbeki, in office from 1999 to 2008, shared a long personal history with Zimbabwe and Mugabe.

Mbeki's ties to Zimbabwe date back to the mid-1980s, when the ANC's Oliver Tambo sent Mbeki to make peace between the ANC and Mugabe's ZANU. Mbeki worked closely during this time with ZANLA veteran and Mugabe confidant Emmerson Mnangagwa, brokering a generous deal for ANC and ZANU-PF cooperation.<sup>259</sup> Mbeki's personal experience working with Mugabe continued over the years and helped shape Mbeki's style of diplomacy on the Zimbabwe question. Driven by his mantra of "African solutions to African problems" and antipathy towards Western policies in Africa, Mbeki developed a policy of "quiet diplomacy" toward Zimbabwe in the early 2000s, which would continue through his SADC mediation in 2008.<sup>260</sup>

---

<sup>259</sup> Gevisser, 2009, *Thabo Mbeki*, 301; personal interview, Timba, 2014.

<sup>260</sup> A number of studies have analyzed the origins and consequences of Mbeki's "quiet diplomacy." For examples see David Moore, 2010, "A Decade of Disquieting Diplomacy: South Africa, Zimbabwe and the Ideology of the National Democratic Revolution 1999–2009," *History Compass* 8, 8: 752–767; James Hamill and John Hoffman, 2009, "'Quiet Diplomacy' or Appeasement? South African Policy towards Zimbabwe," *The Round Table*, 98, 402: 373–384.

Mbeki's quiet diplomacy approach emphasized backchannel communication between heads of state and sustained negotiation over public confrontation, or what Mbeki's officials have derisively described as "megaphone diplomacy."<sup>261</sup> As asserted by Graham, the Mbeki doctrine was based on the belief that South Africa, "can assist in dealing with regional instabilities by offering its leadership to bring opposing groups to the negotiating table."<sup>262</sup> Many critics of the policy viewed it simply as appeasement of Mugabe. Antsey argues that, "South Africa's quiet diplomacy may have eroded its credentials as a principled mediator," in that it upheld flawed elections and failed to punish Mugabe for human rights abuses.<sup>263</sup> Mbeki's preference for back channeling with heads of state, or what Gevisser has termed "red-telephone diplomacy," meant that Mbeki had a "marked aversion to meeting with those who did not have [presidential] red telephones," i.e. opposition or civil society leaders.<sup>264</sup>

Due to this style of diplomacy and his liberation ties with ZANU-PF, Mbeki unquestionably held a strong preference toward Mugabe and a severe bias against MDC. Such biases were on full display in a leaked discussion document that Mbeki wrote in 2001 on the Zimbabwe question. On how to get Zimbabwe back on track, Mbeki wrote: "Our view is that this task must be carried out by the party of revolution—ZANU-PF." He continued, urging: "Immediately, our objective must be to reconfirm the party of revolution as the leading party of democracy."<sup>265</sup>

This strong support for ZANU-PF was underlined by a deep-seated belief that Zimbabwe's opposition, Tsvangirai in particular, was not up to the task of governing and

---

<sup>261</sup> Gevisser, 2009, *Thabo Mbeki*, 298.

<sup>262</sup> Victoria Graham, 2006, "How Firm the Handshake? South Africa's Use of Quiet Diplomacy in Zimbabwe from 1999 to 2006," *African Security Review*, 15, 4: 119.

<sup>263</sup> Mark Antsey, 2007, "Zimbabwe in Ruins: Mediation Prospects in a Conflict Not Yet Ripe for Resolution," *International Negotiation*, 12: 437.

<sup>264</sup> Gevisser, 2009, *Thabo Mbeki*, 298.

<sup>265</sup> Thabo Mbeki, 2001, "The Mbeki-Mugabe Papers, A Discussion Document," *New Agenda*, 1, 22, [http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/demgg/mbeki\\_mugabe\\_papers\\_010831.pdf](http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/demgg/mbeki_mugabe_papers_010831.pdf) (accessed November 29, 2015).

were mere Western pawns bent on bringing instability to the region. In a letter to Tsvangirai and Biti in 2008, Mbeki wrote, with thinly-veiled contempt: “It may be that, for whatever reason, you consider our region and continent as being of little consequence to the future of Zimbabwe, believing that others further away, in Western Europe and North America, are of greater importance.”<sup>266</sup> This bias was also prompted by a fear that if the MDC were allowed to unseat ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe, a dangerous precedent would be set in the region. Timba of MDC-T explained this reasoning to me, saying that the ANC feared a “domino effect” in the region if a labor backed, non-liberation party was allowed to come to power in Zimbabwe. He said, “If that succeeded, then they feared that COSATU [the Congress of South African Trade Unions in South Africa] would do the same in years to come. And that would affect the hegemony of the ANC itself.”<sup>267</sup>

My interviews with MDC leaders provide further evidence of Mbeki’s bias toward Tsvangirai and the opposition. Ncube, the MDC-M principal negotiator in 2008 who was also involved in Mbeki’s previous mediations, told me: “to the extent that you can say he [Mbeki] was biased, he would react, in sadness, in anger, in disappointment, to what he perceived to be Tsvangirai’s un-African-ness” and reliance on Western leaders for support and advice. “It was for that reason that he then developed a total contempt for Morgan [Tsvangirai],” said Ncube. He continued, arguing that Mbeki came, “to regard him [Tsvangirai] as an un-African person who has no pride in being an African. So for that reason you can then say he was biased... He really had contempt for an African, after our colonial history, who did not have pride in himself.”<sup>268</sup>

---

<sup>266</sup> *IOL*, “Mbeki and MDC’s Explosive Exchange,” November 27, 2008, <http://beta.iol.co.za/news/africa/mbeki-and-mdcs-explosive-exchange-427191> (accessed November 29, 2015).

<sup>267</sup> Personal interview, Timba, 2014.

<sup>268</sup> Personal interview, Ncube, 2014.

Priscilla Misihairabwi-Mushonga, a negotiator for MDC-M in 2008 and minister of regional integration and international cooperation under the GNU, spoke further on Mbeki's biases during the negotiations, saying, "he certainly did not have the respect and confidence around Morgan Tsvangirai." She said that as Mbeki was, "a serious Pan-Africanist, he really felt that if you wanted a proper African country to grow on its own, you needed a strong person to come in and that we had failed as an opposition to bring someone of that stature onto the table."<sup>269</sup>

MDC leaders contended that this bias against the opposition led Mbeki to clearly prioritize stability over democracy in his Zimbabwe mediation. As Tsvangirai told me, "Mbeki came in with a strategy. He was concerned about ZANU-PF out of power, because [he thought] it will lead to instability. So his strategy was not about democracy, it was about stability."<sup>270</sup> Biti, MDC-T's head negotiator in 2008, also subscribed to this point of view. He explained to me that, "Mbeki's remit was political stability as opposed to democracy. So, in his calculation, a Zimbabwe without ZANU-PF, would not last, would not be stable."<sup>271</sup> The evidence presented above demonstrates that, despite historical divides among the regional liberation movements, the practice of solidarity politics in the SADC region and Mbeki's quiet diplomacy muted Western involvement and leverage in the Zimbabwe crisis, giving ZANU-PF a firm advantage in the run up to the 2008 negotiations and the GNU period in Zimbabwe.

---

<sup>269</sup> Personal interview, Priscilla Misihairabwi-Mushonga, 2008 negotiator for MDC-M and minister of regional integration and international cooperation in the GNU, Harare, Zimbabwe, March 6, 2015.

<sup>270</sup> Personal interview, Tsvangirai, 2014.

<sup>271</sup> Personal interview, Biti, 2015.

### 3.3.2. *Indicators of Low Western Leverage and Regional Economic Dominance*

To supplement the above analysis and approximately gauge the character and extent of regional and Western leverage in Zimbabwe directly before and throughout the GNU period (2008-2013), I used two indicators: aid dependency and trade ties. First, as outlined in Chapter 2, following Peiffer and Englebert, to gauge Zimbabwe's vulnerability to donor influence ("extraversion vulnerability"), I calculated aid—ODA—as a percentage of export revenues, both during the years of unity government and in the five years prior. Zimbabwe's average over the five-year period prior to power sharing (2004-2008) was 18 percent, translating to a low degree of Western leverage. Zimbabwe's average over the five-year period of power sharing (2009-2013) was 26 percent, translating to a medium degree of Western leverage.<sup>272</sup> The low score prior to power sharing suggests that Western countries had limited leverage during this period, with a slight increase over the period of power sharing.

Second, as noted in Chapter 2, to help gauge the importance of trade ties, I collected data on Zimbabwe's top five trade (import and export) partners over the life of the unity government (averaged). According to World Bank data, Zimbabwe's trade was dominated by South Africa during this five-year period, with an average of 63.5 percent of all imports and 51 percent of all exports, well above the necessary 31 percent threshold to be deemed as trade dominant. No other country averaged double digits during the five-year period and only two other countries appeared in the top five for all five years (Mozambique for imports, with

---

<sup>272</sup> International Trade Centre, 2016, "Trade Map."



an average of 5.8 percent, and China for exports, with an average of 4.8 percent).<sup>273</sup> As such, Zimbabwe clearly was highly trade dependent on South Africa during the GNU period.

Although a medium score of aid dependency could potentially give Western donors a degree of leverage during the GNU period, Western countries actually had very little leverage in Zimbabwe during this period. Four main factors facilitated and conditioned the primacy of regional solidarity over Western leverage during this period. First, although perhaps self-evident, is Zimbabwe's geographical location. Being landlocked and located directly adjacent to the regional hegemon of South Africa has facilitated South Africa's trade dominance in Zimbabwe. This trade dependence played a large role in muting any potential leverage based on aid flows from Western countries, as South African trade greatly dwarfs overall aid.<sup>274</sup>

Second, as discussed in-depth above, fraternal liberation ties and shared ideologies led to deeply held beliefs on protecting hard-fought state sovereignty and in promoting African solutions to African problems in the region, shutting the door on any attempts for Western intervention. High-level cover from China and Russia in international bodies reinforced this dynamic of a fractured international community. Furthermore, because Western countries had already deployed the tool of bilateral sanctions, they were left with few options for applying added financial pressure. Third, increasing official and unofficial financial flows from China during this period further offset any potential Western donor leverage during power sharing. While accurately quantifying financial flows from China to Africa is notoriously difficult, Strange et al. found that China's official finance to Zimbabwe

---

<sup>273</sup> World Bank, World Integrated Trade Solution, "Zimbabwe Trade Summary 2009-2013," <http://wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/en/ZWE/textview> (accessed August 3, 2016).

<sup>274</sup> Ibid.

from 2000 to 2011 accounted for 4.1 percent of Zimbabwe's Gross National Income (GNI).<sup>275</sup> Over the same period, ODA accounted for 6.7 percent of Zimbabwe's GNI.<sup>276</sup> Significant amounts of illicit diamond revenues, estimated to be worth \$1 to \$1.7 billion per year, also helped ZANU-PF stave off pressure from Western countries.<sup>277</sup>

The final factor is the decentralized structure of the AU system, which gives a great deal of autonomy and primacy to the various regional economic communities (RECs) such as SADC. When the MDC and Western international actors attempted to bypass the SADC process on Zimbabwe in 2008 and use alternative channels to go through the AU, they made little to no headway because of the AU's deference to SADC. A senior Zimbabwean official, who worked closely with the ZANU-PF and MDC negotiation teams as well as both the Mbeki and Jacob Zuma SADC facilitation teams, told me that the AU defers to the regional bodies and cannot force the RECs to change course. He said that SADC is particularly sensitive on this issue, arguing that, "SADC jealously guards its area; there should be no interference from outsiders." So when Zimbabwe was discussed at AU meetings in 2008, "it came by way of a brief from SADC," meaning that AU officials "could not dissent."<sup>278</sup> Tsvangirai underscored this point, telling me: "South Africa was given the task as the facilitator. So any slap in the face of South Africa would not have been considered by the AU...anything that was going to undermine the abilities of South Africa, they would not accept. The region would not accept, the AU would not accept."<sup>279</sup>

---

<sup>275</sup> Austin Strange, Bradley Parks, Michael Tierney, Andreas Fuchs, Axel Dreher, and Vijaya Ramachandran, 2013, "China's Development Finance to Africa: A Media-Based Approach to Data Collection," Center for Global Development, Working Paper 323: 35, 39, <http://www.cgdev.org/publication/chinas-development-finance-africa-media-based-approach-data-collection> (accessed January 15, 2016).

<sup>276</sup> World Bank, 2016, "Development Indicators."

<sup>277</sup> Towriss, 2013, "Buying Loyalty," 99.

<sup>278</sup> Personal interview, senior Zimbabwean official who worked with the three negotiation teams as well as the Mbeki and Zuma SADC facilitation teams throughout the GNU, Harare, Zimbabwe, March 2, 2015.

<sup>279</sup> Personal interview, Tsvangirai, 2014.

This section has demonstrated how the prevailing practice of regional solidarity politics trumped any possibility of Western leverage being effectively wielded during the GNU period and discussed the historical roots and economic ties that shaped these regional dynamics. The external involvement and reliance hypotheses predict that the values on these long-term variables will shape the two mechanisms discussed in the next section, which, in turn, will translate to a low degree of SSR in Zimbabwe under power sharing.

### 3.4. Agreement Design

This section turns to the 2008 power-sharing negotiations and the two short-term mechanisms through which SSR outcomes in Zimbabwe were shaped under the GNU: weak agreement design and exclusionary, polarizing political strategies.

Mbeki had been involved as an informal mediator in various initiatives to resolve the Zimbabwe crisis dating back to the early 2000s. But it was not until Tsvangirai and a number of other MDC leaders were arrested and brutally assaulted by police in March 2007 that, after years of successfully fighting off external intervention, the region finally forced Mugabe to acquiesce to official SADC mediation, with Mbeki designated as the lead.<sup>280</sup> Mbeki's 2007 efforts led to a series of negotiations, mostly centered on constitutional reform, between ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations. A compromise agreement, the "Kariba" draft, was signed in September 2007, aiming to help establish a fair electoral environment in the run-up

---

<sup>280</sup> *Afrol News*, "Mugabe Forced to Accept SADC Mediation," March 29, 2007, <http://www.afrol.com/articles/24909> (accessed 12.2.2015).

to the upcoming elections in 2008.<sup>281</sup> Once signed, however, Mugabe balked at implementing the electoral reforms ahead of the polls in 2008.<sup>282</sup>

As noted, the first round of the 2008 elections were peaceful. However, after excessive violence led to Tsvangirai's withdrawal and Mugabe's unopposed "victory" in the second round of the presidential contest in June 2008, SADC again sent Mbeki to Zimbabwe to serve as "facilitator" to end the election crisis. This "facilitator" terminology, as opposed to "mediator" or a stronger title, reflects Mbeki and the region's quiet diplomacy approach. A protracted power-sharing negotiation between the three parties ensued over the next two months in both Zimbabwe and South Africa.

In keeping with Mbeki's quiet diplomacy approach, the 2008 negotiations were strictly closed door, with no media presence allowed. As such, even nearly a decade later there remains very little publically available information on the process. While there is an expanding literature on the GNU period in Zimbabwe,<sup>283</sup> with a few notable exceptions,<sup>284</sup> scholars have largely failed to investigate the inner-workings of the 2008 negotiating process. My interviews with the key players in the 2008 negotiations, including the three head negotiators of the respective parties (Chinamasa for ZANU-PF, Biti for MDC-T, and Ncube for MDC-M), help to correct this omission in the literature. Furthermore, besides passing references to the opaque character of the GPA, scholars have largely neglected the actual design of the agreement,<sup>285</sup> particularly regarding its provisions (or lack thereof) dealing with

---

<sup>281</sup> Stephan Chan, 2007, "Breakthrough in Kariba," *Prospect*, <http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2007/10/breakthrough-in-kariba/> (accessed 12.2.2015).

<sup>282</sup> Personal interview, Biti, 2015.

<sup>283</sup> See, for example, Brian Raftopoulos, 2013, (ed.) *The Hard Road to Reform*; Bratton 2014, *Power Politics*; and a special issue of the *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Alexander and McGregor, 2013, "Politics, Patronage and Violence in Zimbabwe."

<sup>284</sup> See, for instance, Hoekman, 2013, "Testing Ties."

<sup>285</sup> See, for instance, Mazarire, 2013, "ZANU-PF and the Government of National Unity," 88; for an exception to this trend, see LeBas, 2014, "The Perils of Power Sharing."

the security sector. This section analyzes the GPA and forwards several factors that explain the weak content and design of the agreement.

#### 3.4.1. *Weak SSR Content and External Monitoring*

The strength of the SSR content of the GPA is measured according to the inclusion or exclusion of seven criteria, while its monitoring strength is measured according to the presence or absence of mechanisms granting external actors the ability to enforce noncompliance, as outlined in Chapter 2. To reiterate, SSR content is measured according to provisions mandating constitutional changes in security governance, political neutrality, revisions in security reform legislation, government commissions investigating security sector complicity in political violence, training changes, domestic accountability mechanisms for those involved in political violence, and a timeframe to achieve such steps.

The GPA did not require security reforms to be included in the constitutional review process and did not establish a commission of inquiry or independent accountability mechanisms. While the GPA also did not mandate changes to extant security laws, negotiators did agree in principle to pass a new bill establishing the NSC, and Article 20.1.4 noted that the prime minister would sit on this body. Because the establishment of the NSC was not explicitly included in the text of the agreement, however, I granted the GPA only partial fulfillment of this category.

Article 13.1 of the GPA noted the need for state institutions to “remain non-partisan and impartial,” which could be read as an indirect reference to the long political history and

partisan role of state institutions in Zimbabwe, including the security sphere.<sup>286</sup> Because Article 13 did not explicitly single out the security sector, I have deemed the GPA as only in part fulfilling the impartiality category. Articles 12.1, 13.2, and 22.5 also call for new training curriculum for the security forces, including the police, on issues of human rights and rule of law. These provisions fully satisfy the changes in training criterion. Finally, the GPA provided no timeframe regarding the limited security reforms contained in the agreement. Based on these seven criteria, Zimbabwe's GPA fulfills one category in full and two others in part, earning the GPA a weak overall value in terms of its SSR content. The GPA's few SSR provisions highlighted here are, of course, only on paper; the degree of their implementation is analyzed in the next section.

While Article 22.6 lists SADC and the AU as “guarantors” to the GPA, the task of implementation and monitoring was granted to an internal body comprised of representatives from the parties called the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC). Article 22.4 reads: “JOMIC shall be the *principal body* [emphasis mine] dealing with the issues of compliance and monitoring of this Agreement and to that end, the Parties hereby undertake to channel all complaints, grievances, concerns and issues relating to compliance with this Agreement through JOMIC.”<sup>287</sup> As SADC and the AU were not given any specific enforcement powers, the GPA is also deemed as weak in the category of third party monitoring strength, giving the GPA an overall weak value in terms of agreement design, the lowest possible category.

---

<sup>286</sup> Government of Zimbabwe, 2008, “Global Political Agreement,” <http://www.kubatana.net/html/archive/demgg/080915agreement.asp?sector=OPIN> (accessed December 2, 2015).

<sup>287</sup> Government of Zimbabwe, 2008, “Global Political Agreement.”

### 3.4.2. *Roots of Weak Agreement Design*

The long-term factors of high reliance, low Western leverage, and regional solidarity politics primarily account for the weakness of the GPA. Due to their reliance on the security sector to remain in power, ZANU-PF simply would not allow meaningful security reforms on the negotiation agenda, resulting in opaque and anemic SSR content in the GPA. As Biti told me, “the provision dealing with the security sector was actually one of the last things which we negotiated. It remained parked for a long time because ZANU-PF did not want anything to do with upsetting the status quo vis-à-vis the military.”<sup>288</sup> Misihairabwi-Mushonga, one of MDC-M negotiators, echoed Biti’s point and noted that the SSR provisions in the GPA were primarily technical in nature. She told me that, during the negotiations, security issues were, “a difficult subject for ZANU-PF.” She noted that, “We did speak about the technical issues. But we did not go in the political issues.”<sup>289</sup>

Timba, who was also part of MDC-T’s negotiation team, made a similar point, arguing that security issues were only allowed to be discussed during the negotiations as long as they did not directly threaten the relationship between ZANU-PF and the security apparatus. Regarding discussions over the establishment of the NSC, he told me that there was actually little resistance, because the new body, “did not threaten ZANU-PF’s hold on the security sector...JOC was still going to be there. The head of state was still going to continue to have direct control on the operations of the security establishment, with or without the NSC.”<sup>290</sup> Sydney Mufamadi, the head of Mbeki’s South African facilitation team during the 2008 negotiations, also confirmed that robust SSR was out of bounds for ZANU-PF during the negotiations. When I asked him whether the question of the military was

---

<sup>288</sup> Personal interview, Biti, 2015.

<sup>289</sup> Personal interview, Misihairabwi-Mushonga, 2015.

<sup>290</sup> Personal interview, Timba, 2015.

broached, he responded by telling me: “Not directly...To the extent that ZANU-PF would have thought that part of their strength depends on the hold they have on the organs and levers of power, you couldn’t [discuss that].”<sup>291</sup>

A similar dynamic played out in the negotiations regarding issues of the GPA’s enforcement and implementation. Again ZANU-PF forcefully refused the idea of a strong external enforcement mechanism, citing the country’s hard-fought state sovereignty. On the idea of strong external enforcement, a senior Zimbabwean official who worked with the three negotiating teams in 2008 told me that ZANU-PF fiercely resisted any real third party monitoring. He told me that during the negotiation, “the discussion had taken place to have a monitoring unit by SADC,” but this was strongly rejected by ZANU-PF on the basis of sovereignty. To ZANU-PF, the idea was “tantamount to interference. So it was agreed to a local monitoring unit, which became JOMIC.”<sup>292</sup>

Biti explained to me that looking back, the MDCs should have pushed harder on an enforcement mechanism, but that based on ZANU-PF’s intransigence on any items that threatened their power, JOMIC may have been the best they could get.<sup>293</sup> JOMIC was acceptable to ZANU-PF because, as would become obvious once the GNU was formed, ZANU-PF could stiff-arm the body at every turn, as it had no real legal or institutional powers.

The practice of regional solidarity politics and Mbeki’s biases also shaped the weak content and design of the GPA, as Mbeki and his team refused to push Mugabe and ZANU-PF on the security question or any other issue that threatened the center of the party’s

---

<sup>291</sup> Personal interview, Sydney Mufamadi, head of Mbeki’s South African facilitation team during the 2008 negotiations, Johannesburg, South Africa, March 10, 2015.

<sup>292</sup> Personal interview, senior Zimbabwean official, 2015.

<sup>293</sup> Personal interview, Biti, 2015.



political power. Mufamadi, the lead on Mbeki's facilitation team, described the South African team's approach during the negotiations, saying that, "we were acting on behalf of the SADC appointed facilitator, and we were really just facilitating the negotiations between the parties." He noted that the parties, "must own the product that comes from" the negotiations.<sup>294</sup>

On the question of the military, Mufamadi said that it was "something you leave to the parties to work out, it is the art of politics. You can't decree that, they have to work it out themselves." Biti had a less charitable take on this negotiating approach, telling me that, "Mbeki pulled a fast one on Zimbabwe and Tsvangirai" during the negotiating period.<sup>295</sup> The hands-off, quiet diplomacy approach played directly into the hands of the more organized and experienced ZANU-PF during negotiations, which, with the backing of the state behind them, retained the balance of power.

Mbeki and SADC also put tremendous pressure on the MDCs to sign the GPA and put the crisis in Zimbabwe's rear-view mirror. According to Biti, finding a resolution to the question of Zimbabwe was a legacy issue for Mbeki. He told me: "This was so important for Mbeki, I think it was his legacy. And that is very important. Mbeki had a hands-on approach...to Mbeki this was *the* issue."<sup>296</sup> It appears that Mbeki did not want an activist Tsvangirai to stand in the way of his legacy achievement. Oddly enough, this pressure from Mbeki and SADC in part succeeded because of MDC-T's desire to gain favor in the eyes of the region.

During negotiations MDC-T resisted pressures from civil society organizations and Western diplomats, two of their traditional support bases, to reject power sharing as a flawed

---

<sup>294</sup> Personal interview, Mufamadi, 2015.

<sup>295</sup> Personal interview, Biti, 2015.

<sup>296</sup> Ibid.

idea and discard the GPA as a weak agreement. As argued by Hoekman, because MDC-T had “been successfully framed as a ‘puppet of the west’ by ZANU-PF for nine years, the party felt the need to actively reject western influences in an effort to gain regional legitimacy, and felt forced to make significant concessions” on the content of the agreement.<sup>297</sup> In this manner, Mbeki and the region’s practice of regional solidarity politics helped shape the weak design of the GPA, which, in turn, also played a major role in the monitoring and implementation of the agreement during the life of the GNU, as outlined below.

In addition to the nature of civil-military relations and the character of external involvement, another contributing factor to the weak design of the GPA was the MDCs lack of a cohesive strategy during the negotiations, particularly on the key question of how to curb the politicized nature of the security sector. Tsvangirai surprised me with his frankness when he admitted that his party had not addressed some of the most basic strategic questions before heading into the power-sharing negotiations. He told me: “When we came to the negotiation and its outcome, I think that the MDC, did not prepare itself. What do we want to achieve out of these negotiations?”<sup>298</sup>

Gandhi Mudzingwa, a longtime aid to Tsvangirai who served as security advisor in the Office of the Prime Minister during the GNU, told me that the NSC idea did not stem from any strategic thinking. He said the NSC was “just done at the spur of the moment...it was not really that the people that suggested it applied their minds properly.”<sup>299</sup> Biti was also forthcoming on the fact that the party had put little thought into how to deal with military

---

<sup>297</sup> Hoekman, 2013, “Testing Ties,” 904.

<sup>298</sup> Personal interview, Tsvangirai, 2015.

<sup>299</sup> Personal interview, Gandhi Mudzingwa, former security advisor to Tsvangirai, Harare, Zimbabwe, November 21, 2014.

questions during negotiations, in fact referring to SSR as a “grey area” for the party. He told me that the idea of the NSC was a way of “postponing,” since the parties were never going to agree on the issue. He said, “to be honest with you, whilst politically we knew what had to be done...*how to effect the actual reform was a grey area, to all of us* [emphasis mine].”<sup>300</sup> In this manner, this lack of a cohesive strategy, particularly on the SSR issue, also led to weak agreement design.

Divides between the two MDC parties, and ZANU-PF’s shrewd exploitation of them, stifled the formation of a cohesive overall strategy during the negotiations. As Misihairabwi-Mushonga, the MDC-M negotiator, told me: “After the 2008 election there was more tension between ourselves and the MDC-T. MDC-T had taken the position that they didn’t want us at the table. Whereas ZANU, for one reason or the other, felt that we should be at the table.”<sup>301</sup> ZANU-PF’s divide and conquer strategy appears to have worked, as the two MDC parties often did not see eye-to-eye on issues during the negotiations and struggled to form a common front.

Misihairabwi-Mushonga told me that the two parties had initially agreed to have pre-negotiation meetings amongst themselves before meeting with ZANU-PF in an effort to present one voice, but that such meetings quickly broke down over disagreements between the parties on the nature of power sharing.<sup>302</sup> The head of Mbeki’s facilitation team, Mufamadi, also spoke on the divide between the two parties and how it contributed to a lack of strategic coordination. He told me the dynamic between the MDC parties was “not like ‘we are strategic allies, what is the strategic objective, how do we work together to obtain that strategic objective’...the two formations of MDC, they were not always behaving in a

---

<sup>300</sup> Personal interview, Biti, 2015.

<sup>301</sup> Personal interview, Misihairabwi-Mushonga, 2015.

<sup>302</sup> Ibid.

way which shows strategic coherence.”<sup>303</sup> The next section turns to the second mechanism through which SSR processes were shaped: the respective parties’ choice of political strategy under power sharing.

### 3.5. ZANU-PF’s Exclusionary Political Strategies Under Power Sharing

ZANU-PF has a long history of using violence and exclusionary political strategies to maintain and consolidate power, as highlighted above.<sup>304</sup> Mugabe has not shied away from this history, saying in 2000 that he held “a degree in violence.”<sup>305</sup> A leading ZANU-PF official, Nathan Shamuyarira, echoed these sentiments, also declaring in 2000 that “The area of violence is an area where ZANU-PF has a very strong, long, and successful history.”<sup>306</sup> Indeed, ZANU-PF has not reserved the strategic use of violence only for its political opponents. It also deployed violence in the 2000s against its own party structures, in an effort to enforce party discipline and solidarity. As argued by LeBas, “violence was used by particular elites within the party [ZANU-PF] to expand their control over decision making” and “threaten those they suspected of opposing the centralization of party.”<sup>307</sup> This intra-party violence also had a demonstration effect, as it showed the opposition that it was in firm control of its own support base.<sup>308</sup>

ZANU-PF’s history of exclusionary, violent political strategies proved difficult for the party to shake once it entered the GNU in 2009, despite the pledges it made in the GPA to end political violence and unite with its erstwhile opponents. While reports suggest that

---

<sup>303</sup> Personal interview, Mufamadi, 2015.

<sup>304</sup> For an overview of the continuities in ZANU-PF’s electoral strategies, see Norma Kriger, 2005, “ZANU(PF) Strategies in General Elections: 1980-2000: Discourse and Coercion,” *African Affairs*, 104, 414: 1–34.

<sup>305</sup> Meredith, 2008, *Our Votes, Our Guns*, 226.

<sup>306</sup> Ibid.

<sup>307</sup> Adrienne LeBas, 2006, “Polarization as Craft: Party Formation and State Violence in Zimbabwe,” *Comparative Politics*, 38, 4: 429.

<sup>308</sup> Ibid, 431.

initial levels of political violence and harassment declined during the GNU, ZANU-PF militias and state security forces continued to commit acts of political violence and intimidation throughout the GNU period.<sup>309</sup> In 2011, the *New York Times* reported that the police had arrested over a quarter of Mugabe's opponents in parliament since the formation of the unity government, including a number of MDC ministers, on trumped up charges.<sup>310</sup> According to data compiled by the ACLED, ZANU-PF and their affiliated militia groups were implicated in 310 incidents of political violence over the GNU period.<sup>311</sup>

By introducing the MDCs into executive governing structures, the GNU marked a significant change for ZANU-PF at the elite level, as the party was forced to develop and deploy new strategies and tactics to deal with their opponents within the formal confines of government, where blatant violence and intimidation would not be tolerated. Within the GNU, ZANU-PF's strategies were slightly less brazen, but just as exclusionary. Although the GPA was signed in September 2008, immediately after the signing ceremony, Mugabe and ZANU-PF unilaterally made appointments, violating the spirit and letter of the agreement and delaying the actual formation of the unity government until February 2009. Once the unity government was stood up, Mugabe and ZANU-PF continued using old security channels or set-up new parallel structures to circumvent MDC's involvement, and otherwise delayed and attempted to obstruct MDC attempts at institutional reform.<sup>312</sup>

---

<sup>309</sup> For an overview of state security sector involvement in political violence during the GNU, see Human Rights Watch, 2013, "The Elephant in the Room."

<sup>310</sup> *The New York Times*, "Robert Mugabe Hounds Rivals in Zimbabwe, Parties Say," November 4, 2011, [http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/19/world/africa/19zimbabwe.html?\\_r=1&ref=zimbabwe](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/19/world/africa/19zimbabwe.html?_r=1&ref=zimbabwe) (accessed December 4, 2015).

<sup>311</sup> ACLED, Version 5 Data (1997-2014), <http://www.acleddata.com/data/> (accessed December 4, 2015).

<sup>312</sup> International Crisis Group, 2011, "Zimbabwe: The Road to Reform or Another Dead End," 11, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/southern-africa/zimbabwe/173-zimbabwe-the-road-to-reform-or-another-dead-end.aspx> (accessed December 8, 2015).

In describing their broad-based approach under the unity government, ZANU-PF officials outlined a long-term strategy to win back full power in the next elections. Chinamasa told me that the unity government served as a cooling off period, where the party was able to “recharge our batteries, so to speak” with an eye on the 2013 elections.<sup>313</sup> Kasukuwere, the ZANU-PF minister, told me that, as a party, “we had our sights on the next five years...as we walked into the unity government, we knew it was time to recharge our batteries, organize ourselves. It was a necessary breather.”<sup>314</sup> Ncube of MDC-N characterized Mugabe and ZANU-PF’s approach under the GNU as “the strategy of the Ds: delay, deceive, and destroy.”<sup>315</sup> The evidence overwhelmingly supports Ncube’s characterization of an exclusive, confrontational, and violent political approach.

In the area of national security and SSR, ZANU-PF deployed an especially recalcitrant and exclusive political strategy. Paul Mangwana, ZANU-PF’s head negotiator in the constitutional review process under the GNU, admitted as much to me, saying: “You cannot have an inclusive situation on security.”<sup>316</sup> The initial meetings of the new national security body, the NSC, serve as a prime example of this exclusionary strategy. A handful of interviewees who sat on the NSC told me that in the first several meetings of the new body, ZANU-PF openly and unapologetically identified the opposition and a number of its traditional allies in civil society as one of the primary threats to Zimbabwe’s national security.

Describing one of the first NSC meetings, Tsvangirai told me: “They tried to push us through a debate around national strategic challenges, and some of those challenges were the

---

<sup>313</sup> Personal interview, Chinamasa, 2015.

<sup>314</sup> Personal interview, Kasukuwere, 2015.

<sup>315</sup> Personal interview, Ncube, 2014.

<sup>316</sup> Personal interview, Paul Mangwana, head of ZANU-PF team to the Constitution Parliamentary Select Committee (COPAC), Harare, Zimbabwe, February 25, 2015.

MDC, the opposition. They must be stupid...How can we be sitting here and you're telling us we're a national security threat?"<sup>317</sup> Ncube reiterated this story, saying that ZANU-PF principals and the generals initially identified "us as the biggest threat to national security."<sup>318</sup>

One of the few exceptions to this strategy of exclusion was the constitutional review process. Despite a rocky start and sluggish progress, the two lead ZANU-PF and MDC-T negotiators on the constitution, Mangwana and Douglas Mwonzora, developed a mercurial but ultimately functional working relationship and delivered, albeit far behind schedule, a new constitution in 2013.<sup>319</sup> Despite this exception of constitutional reform and the adoption of slightly less exclusionary approaches within the unity government, it is clear from the above discussion that ZANU-PF's well-worn path of exclusionary, violent political strategies continued into the GNU period, particularly regarding the issue of national security and SSR.

Exclusive versus inclusive political strategies and tactics are measured according to four categories: joining the power-sharing government without delay, the use of widespread partisan political violence, evidence of attempts at cross-party policy cooperation on key reforms contained in the agreement (or attempts to block), and cooperative (or confrontational) approaches to SSR, as outlined in Chapter 2. As discussed, Mugabe and ZANU-PF delayed the formation of the unity government and continued to use security forces and party militias to commit widespread acts of partisan political violence and intimidation. In all but one year (2013), ZANU-PF and its affiliated militias committed well over the threshold of 20 violent incidents per year.<sup>320</sup> ZANU-PF also attempted to block key reforms outlined in the GPA (as discussed in detail below). Mugabe and ZANU-PF leaders

---

<sup>317</sup> Personal interview, Tsvangirai, 2014.

<sup>318</sup> Personal interview, Ncube, 2014.

<sup>319</sup> Personal interview, Mangwana, 2015; personal interview, Douglas Mwonzora, head of MDC-T team to COPAC, Harare, Zimbabwe, December 12, 2014.

<sup>320</sup> ACLED, Version 5 Data (1997-2014).

also took a confrontational, polarizing approach to SSR, as shown by the evidence presented above from personal interviews with party leaders. ZANU-PF therefore fulfills all four exclusionary categories. As such, ZANU-PF's political strategy under the GNU falls into the exclusive category, the lowest possible score.

### *3.5.1. Explaining ZANU-PF's Violent, Exclusionary Strategy*

Akin to the mechanism of agreement design, the two long-term variables of the nature of civil-military relations and the character of external involvement played a crucial role in shaping ZANU-PF's choice of political strategy in the GNU. Because ZANU-PF had come to rely so heavily on the security sector to remain in power, it was nearly impossible for the party to change course on its own volition once the party entered into the GNU, for obvious reasons. Most importantly, an inclusive strategy would have meant remaining open to real institutional reforms, which would have attenuated ZANU-PF's prime means of staying in power: their control of the security apparatus. Two other related factors account for this choice of political strategy.

First, ZANU-PF and the security chiefs' fear of losing access to lucrative patronage networks, such as growing revenue from the Marange diamond fields, as well as fear of prosecution for past complicity in political violence.<sup>321</sup> Second, while certainly politically convenient, it also appears that many high-ranking ZANU-PF and security officials genuinely believed the "patriotic history" narrative that painted the MDC as mere puppets of Western countries, which further explains their strategic choices. Mangwana, of ZANU-PF, suggested to me that this perceived foreign threat from MDC fed ZANU-PF's exclusionary

---

<sup>321</sup> Personal interview, Nelson Chamisa, MDC-T minister of information communication technology and spokesperson for the party under the GNU, Harare, Zimbabwe, April 1, 2011.



strategies on the security front, telling me, “How do you discuss security with people who you think are threatening you?”<sup>322</sup> These fears and ideological beliefs further ossified the bonds of ZANU-PF and the security sector during the GNU, causing the party to double down on strategies of exclusion. The practice of regional solidarity politics and the weak enforcement mechanisms of the GPA also played into and enabled the party’s approach, as ZANU-PF knew they could deploy such exclusionary strategies without any real pushback from the region or domestic bodies, as explained below.

### 3.6. MDC’s Defensive Exclusionary Strategies Under Power Sharing

The MDC also has a long history of using confrontational, exclusionary, and at times violent political strategies.<sup>323</sup> Since its emergence out of the constitutional reform movement in the 1990s, the party has not shied away from confrontation. Indeed, its organizational antecedent, the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), while outwardly embracing democratic values, often used combative strategies and tactics, crashing their opponent’s meetings and even assaulting government representatives.<sup>324</sup> In the early 2000s, after facing widespread violence from ZANU-PF and the state, the MDC developed confrontational and coercive mobilization strategies, which, much like ZANU-PF’s, created and reinforced strict lines between the parties in an attempt to polarize and bifurcate voters into two distinct political groups.<sup>325</sup>

LeBas calls this process “defensive radicalization;” I use the term defensive exclusion. As argued by LeBas, MDC “party leadership did not see dialogue or cooperation

---

<sup>322</sup> Personal interview, Mangwana, 2015.

<sup>323</sup> While the two MDC formations may have had slightly differing political strategies under the GNU, given their common histories and largely uniform positions, they are treated here as one party for the sake of parsimony.

<sup>324</sup> LeBas, 2006, “Polarization as Craft,” 426.

<sup>325</sup> Ibid, 420.

with the government as a possibility from fairly early on.”<sup>326</sup> The MDC formed informal “action committees,” which often used violence and coercion in service to party headquarters. As outlined by LeBas, since the action committees were created “to deal with violence,” they “displayed a willingness to coerce popular participation in mass actions or use other tactics that run counter to the MDC’s liberal democratic principles.”<sup>327</sup> Such violent tactics were mostly internally focused and used to enforce party discipline. Disagreements over the use of internal violence became pronounced in the mid-2000s, playing a role in the 2005 split of the party into two camps, one led by Tsvangirai and the other by Mutambara.<sup>328</sup> The combination of ZANU-PF and MDC’s exclusive strategies led to an increasingly polarized political environment in the run up to the 2008 elections.

Akin to ZANU-PF, MDC’s use of exclusive, confrontational political strategies also carried strong legacies into the GNU period, and the party faced difficulty in changing course, particularly regarding SSR. While some studies have argued that the MDC largely abandoned its polarizing approach during the GNU,<sup>329</sup> my interviews revealed strong continuities with MDC’s earlier approaches, particularly on questions of national security. Although the MDC showed a remarkable lack of strategic thinking on SSR during the negotiations, as discussed above, once the GNU was formed it quickly lapsed back into rabble rousing about the military’s political influence.

After so many years of calling out the security sector for its partisanship and being in the pocket of ZANU-PF, the party found it difficult to depart from this *modus operandi* and actually substantively engage the security sector and ZANU-PF on issues of national

---

<sup>326</sup> Ibid, 432.

<sup>327</sup> Ibid, 434

<sup>328</sup> Tendi, 2010, *Making History in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe*, 209.

<sup>329</sup> See, for instance, Julia Gallagher, 2015, “The Battle for Zimbabwe in 2013: From Polarization to Ambivalence,” *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 53, 1: 30.

security. As an example, in March 2011 Tsvangirai publicly questioned if Mugabe was still in control of the country, saying: “It appears the civilian authority is no longer in charge and dark and sinister forces have engaged in a hostile takeover of running the affairs of the country, with or without the blessing of some leaders of the civilian authority.”<sup>330</sup>

Tsvangirai and the MDC were just as confrontational behind closed doors when it came to questions surrounding security reform. In one of the first meetings within the NSC centered on formulating a new National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2012, the MDC produced a draft document accusing Mugabe and ZANU-PF of being illegitimate and accusing the military of corruption, violence, and human rights abuses.<sup>331</sup> Of course these allegations were based in fact, yet the strategy was unlikely to cultivate openings for SSR. The above discussion illustrates the process of defensive exclusion by the MDC regarding SSR under the GNU.

The MDC also found it difficult to completely eschew its violent roots once it joined the unity government. Although on a much lower level than ZANU-PF and the state security forces, MDC party militias continued to commit acts of political violence during the GNU period. As in the period prior to power sharing, most of these incidents were internal to the party. For example, in the run up to the 2011 MDC-T congress held in Bulawayo, intra-party violence broke out, as youth groups aligned to rival candidates clashed in several voting

---

<sup>330</sup> *The Telegraph*, “Morgan Tsvangirai Says Military Junta is Running Zimbabwe,” March 11, 2011, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/8391196/Morgan-Tsvangirai-says-military-junta-is-running-Zimbabwe.html> (accessed December 4, 2015).

<sup>331</sup> MDC-T, 2012, “Proposed National Security Strategy/Policy.”

districts.<sup>332</sup> According to ACLED data, MDC groups were implicated in 71 incidents of political violence over the GNU period.<sup>333</sup>

In sum, the MDC did not delay the formation of the unity government, and did not attempt to block key reforms in the GPA. The MDC did, however, continue to commit acts of political violence, although on a much lower level than ZANU-PF. In all but one year (2011), MDC groupings committed less than 20 violent incidents per year.<sup>334</sup> Party leaders also took a largely confrontational, polarizing approach to SSR, as demonstrated above. Thus, the MDC fulfills two inclusionary and two exclusionary indicators (see Chapter 2). However, because the use of political violence is weighted as more significant than other factors, MDC's political strategy under the GNU falls into the moderately exclusive category.

### 3.6.1. *Explaining MDC Strategy*

Two main factors explain MDC's strategic choices during the GNU: ZANU-PF's own use of violent strategies, and the MDC's inexperience and lack of capacity on security issues. In a process of defensive exclusion, the MDC-T chose continuity over change in its political strategy, resuming its historical use of confrontational approaches coached in rhetoric around Mugabe's illegitimacy, corruption, and human rights violations. MDC's inexperience with governance also shaped this confrontational approach, as the party knew of no other strategy. As Tsvangirai told me: "Let's admit, we had no experience of state affairs. Compared with people [ZANU-PF] who have been in statecraft for almost 30 years. We were at a very big

---

<sup>332</sup> *SW Radio Africa*, "MDC-T to Launch Independent Inquiry into Violence," May 6, 2011, [http://www.swradioafrica.com/News\\_archives/files/2011/May/Fri%2006%20May/lg-mdc-violence-and-party-response.html](http://www.swradioafrica.com/News_archives/files/2011/May/Fri%2006%20May/lg-mdc-violence-and-party-response.html) (accessed March 16, 2016).

<sup>333</sup> ACLED, Version 5 Data (1997-2014).

<sup>334</sup> *Ibid.*

disadvantage.”<sup>335</sup> Misihairabwi-Mushonga, of MDC-N, also made this point: “The thing that was clear when we got into government was that all of us were so naïve [about how the government works].”<sup>336</sup>

Both MDC parties were particularly thin on experience and capacity in the security sphere. Two of their most experienced officials on this front, Giles Mutsekwa and Martin Rupiya, had served in the Rhodesian regime and therefore were seen as traitors from ZANU-PF’s perspective. Outside of these two, only Augustus Mudzingwa, who was a medical doctor for ZANU-PF during the liberation war and served in the army after independence, had any real military experience. But he died in 2012. As such, the MDC parties had very few options to turn to for advice or to liaise with the military on national security or SSR issues, leaving the work to be done by staff with mostly student activism and civil society backgrounds. A quick read of the MDC-T’s NSS document reveals this lack of security sector experience and expertise within the party (see below). These factors led to a striking lack of political intelligence on security issues, which had consequences for SSR under the GNU, as demonstrated below.

The two previous sections have examined the mechanisms of agreement design and political strategy in the Zimbabwean context, deemed them as weak and exclusionary, respectively, and discussed the various historical factors and events that led to these circumstances. The agreement design and political strategy hypotheses predict that the combination of weak agreement design and exclusionary political strategies will translate to a low degree of SSR in Zimbabwe under power sharing.

---

<sup>335</sup> Personal interview, Tsvangirai, 2014.

<sup>336</sup> Personal interview, Misihairabwi-Mushonga.

### 3.7. SSR Outcomes in Zimbabwe

To what extent did the above theoretical expectations prove accurate during the GNU? How did SSR processes actually play out under power sharing in Zimbabwe? The GPA negotiation had the potential to function as a critical juncture in Zimbabwe, as it presented political actors with genuine, if highly structured, opportunities for institutional reform and a chance to take the country on a more democratic trajectory. These tight windows of structured contingency, however, closed quickly after the GPA was signed and the practice of exclusionary *security politics* took hold, with a resumption of the status quo political dynamic. While some paper reforms were achieved on the security front, namely within the new constitution, little to no behavioral changes were accomplished during this period. The following section discusses these processes in detail and then highlights the various indicators that help gauge the extent of SSR achieved under power sharing. As expected, the case of Zimbabwe is assigned a low degree of SSR under power sharing. The section concludes with a discussion of the very limited SSR efforts prior to power sharing in Zimbabwe.

#### 3.7.1. *Weak Agreement Design Tied Hands of International and Domestic Actors*

The weak design of the GPA in Zimbabwe played a crucial role in shaping the country's anemic SSR outcome. Weak agreement design prevented domestic and international actors from coalescing around specific reforms and being able to apply concerted pressure on the government. The failure of the GPA to comprehensively address the practice of *security politics* made broaching the subject of SSR during the life of the unity government exponentially more difficult for both international and domestic actors. Since the GPA's

wording on SSR was vague, the principal implementation and monitoring body—JOMIC—had very few concrete security reforms to implement or monitor. Moreover, since the GPA’s passages on implementation were also weak, JOMIC was rendered toothless, with no real enforcement powers to compel actors to follow through on the few SSR provisions that were contained in the GPA. Therefore, outside of the NSC, which Mugabe chaired, the MDC parties and JOMIC were unable to use the GPA to push genuine SSR discussions.

Patience Chiradza, national director for JOMIC under the GNU, explained to me how the imprecise language of the GPA made JOMIC’s job of monitoring and implementation very difficult. She diplomatically told me that, “The role of JOMIC was to monitor what had been agreed on, so as long it wasn’t agreed on, then it became difficult for JOMIC to do much about it.”<sup>337</sup> Ian Makone, Tsvangirai’s chief advisor in the GNU, made a similar point, telling me: “There were some weaknesses, yeah. It goes back to the GPA itself. It didn’t have teeth...JOMIC didn’t enforce anything...The GPA itself was weak in the sense that it was not complete.”<sup>338</sup> Elton Mangoma, an MDC-T representative to JOMIC and a negotiator in 2008, spoke on JOMIC’s lack of enforcement powers, saying: “we didn’t have any power or defined authority from the GPA or from the constitution. [Monitoring] was really more a work of goodwill and moral persuasion.”<sup>339</sup> He argued that a more formal enforcement mechanism was needed, saying, “Where it’s moral persuasion, it’s a waste of time.”<sup>340</sup>

This dynamic played out similarly on the international stage. The external guarantors—SADC and, in theory, the AU—had no real SSR foothold in the GPA to compel

---

<sup>337</sup> Personal interview, Patience Chiradza, national director for JOMIC under the GNU, Harare, Zimbabwe, December 5, 2014.

<sup>338</sup> Personal interview, Ian Makone, former chief advisor in the Office of the Prime Minister, Harare, Zimbabwe, December 4, 2014.

<sup>339</sup> Personal interview, Elton Mangoma, an MDC-T representative to JOMIC and negotiator in 2008, minister of energy and power development under the GNU, Harare, Zimbabwe, February 26, 2015.

<sup>340</sup> Ibid.

ZANU-PF to reform. Therefore, when external actors attempted to engage the GNU on SSR matters, ZANU-PF could simply assert that foreign powers could not interfere on internal security matters, and international stakeholders were unable to cite specific SSR guidelines in the GPA to refute such claims. This difficulty was exemplified by Jacob Zuma's struggles in 2011 to even discuss SSR in Zimbabwe. Zuma, who took over as head of the SADC facilitation team from Mbeki, requested meetings with Zimbabwe's security leaders to discuss reforms in 2011. But ZANU-PF announced that the SADC team was prohibited from meeting with security chiefs and that SSR would not be considered, arguing that foreigners cannot intervene on matters of national security. Rugare Gumbo, ZANU-PF's spokesperson at the time, said, "Where on earth have you seen people coming to see security forces of another country? It is nonsensical."<sup>341</sup>

Despite not having a concrete reform or enforcement footing from the GPA, SADC certainly could have pushed ZANU-PF harder on implementation. But, no doubt influenced by the prevailing practice of regional solidarity politics, both the Mbeki and Zuma teams led weak monitoring efforts by SADC. As argued by Misihairabwi-Mushonga, once the GPA document was signed, it appears that SADC and South Africa felt that the crisis in Zimbabwe was over. Whereas if SADC had been more forceful on implementation, "if ZANU-PF knew we [the MDCs] were sitting with SADC...some of these reform issues would be much easier managed."<sup>342</sup>

She summed up this point by saying: "I really think that if SADC had worked a bit harder, had invested more time, had been more strategic, we could have gotten more from the

---

<sup>341</sup> *Africa Review*, "Mugabe Party Rubbishes SADC Bid to Engage Generals," May 12, 2011, <http://www.africareview.com/News/Mugabe-party-rubbishes-SADC-bid-to-engage-generals/-/979180/1161326/-/aodx1m/-/index.html> (accessed December 7, 2015).

<sup>342</sup> Personal interview, Misihairabwi-Mushonga, 2015.



Zimbabwean situation.”<sup>343</sup> Although some local observers anticipated that Zuma would implement a change in tone and increased willingness to confront Mugabe, SADC’s practice of quiet diplomacy continued unabated after the change over in facilitation teams.<sup>344</sup> My interviews revealed that, if anything, Mbeki was actually the more engaged SADC facilitator. A Zimbabwean official who worked with the three negotiation teams as well as the Mbeki and Zuma SADC facilitation teams throughout the GNU, told me that, regardless of his biases, “the Mbeki team got us the GPA, the Zuma team got us nothing....the level of commitment was extraordinarily different between Mbeki and Zuma. Zuma never found time for Zimbabwe.”<sup>345</sup>

In retrospect, the MDCs recognized their error on not pushing for more concrete SSR or a strong external enforcement mechanism in the GPA. Nelson Chamisa, an MDC-T minister and spokesperson for the party under the GNU, told me: “With hindsight, we are beginning to realize and discover that we made a mistake to actually just go there in our GPA without asking for some fundamental reform” in the security apparatus.<sup>346</sup> MDC-T’s Mutsekwa echoed this sentiment when I asked him if, looking back, he would have changed anything in the GPA. He said: “Yes, and I’m talking about security. Yes, a lot....we should have had an opportunity to overhaul the structure of that [security sector]. And that was a serious oversight.”<sup>347</sup>

---

<sup>343</sup> Ibid.

<sup>344</sup> Brian Raftopoulos, 2013, “The 2013 Elections in Zimbabwe: The End of an Era,” *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 39, 4: 987.

<sup>345</sup> Personal interview, senior Zimbabwean official, 2015.

<sup>346</sup> Personal interview, Chamisa, 2011.

<sup>347</sup> Personal interview, Giles Mutsekwa, former co-minister of home affairs under the GNU, Mutare, Zimbabwe, March 7, 2015.

Tsvangirai also made this point, noting that the GPA “left the status of a highly politicized security sector intact. That was a mistake.”<sup>348</sup> Tsvangirai also nicely summed up how the lack of strong enforcement on the GPA hurt the prospects for reform. He told me: “JOMIC had no executive power...*What was absent in the agreement was an enforcement mechanism. And that undermined us, to a great extent* [emphasis mine].”<sup>349</sup> The weak agreement design and domestic and international inability to enforce the GPA emboldened ZANU-PF early on in the GNU years, informing the party’s political strategies.

### 3.7.2. *Exclusive Strategies Close Off Slight SSR Openings*

As noted, ZANU-PF took a hardline, exclusionary stance on the topic of SSR in the GNU, both publicly and privately. At a speech during ZANU-PF’s congress in late 2009, Mugabe stated that the party “shall not allow the security forces of Zimbabwe to be the subject of any negotiations for the so-called security sector reforms...That is the most dependable force we could ever have, it shall not be tampered with.”<sup>350</sup> Mugabe reiterated such sentiments a number of times during the GNU. In 2011, he claimed that calls for security reform are “nonsense...they [the security forces] don’t need any reform.”<sup>351</sup> In April 2013, ZANU-PF’s Sydney Sekeramayi, then the minister of state security, said: “Nobody should sit in London or elsewhere and tell us to do security sector reform, security sector alignment and that type of rubbish. That will not be done.”<sup>352</sup>

---

<sup>348</sup> Tsvangirai and Bongo, 2011, *In the Deep End*, 538.

<sup>349</sup> Personal interview, Tsvangirai, 2014.

<sup>350</sup> International Crisis Group, 2011, “Zimbabwe: The Road to Reform or Another Dead End,” 11.

<sup>351</sup> *Southern Times*, “Mugabe: In His Own Words,” May 20, 2011, <http://southernafrican.news/2011/05/20/mugabe-in-his-own-words/> (accessed 12.7.2015).

<sup>352</sup> Human Rights Watch, 2013, “The Elephant in the Room.”

Behind the closed doors of the GNU, ZANU-PF and Mugabe made good on their public promises, rejecting specific SSR proposals, such as the disbanding of the JOC and the formation of a new intelligence organization, which were brought up for discussion by the MDC in late 2009.<sup>353</sup> Despite the MDCs having seats on the NSC and a co-minister in home affairs (which oversees the police), the GNU's balance of power regarding national security still heavily favored Mugabe, giving ZANU-PF the power to block and delay most SSR efforts. Ian Makone, Tsvangirai's chief advisor, told me that some fruitful discussions around "security sector realignment," as opposed to SSR—which had become a curse word to ZANU-PF—were made in 2012, but that nothing concrete ever came out of process because ZANU-PF scuttled talks when they began preparing for the 2013 elections.

Makone told me: "There were a few notable concessions that came out. But when the thing collapsed with the election fever, they became meaningless."<sup>354</sup> ZANU-PF likewise jettisoned MDC proposals for a formal code of conduct for the security sector ahead of the elections.<sup>355</sup> In an exception to this trend, some SSR progress was made late in the game during the constitution-making process, as discussed below. Despite this exception, ZANU-PF was able to stifle any real movement on SSR and protect their own and the security sectors' political and economic interests.

Through a process of defensive exclusion, the MDC parties also adopted confrontational, exclusionary approaches to SSR in the GNU, as highlighted above, which further sealed off any potential openings for reform generated by the GPA. The national security document (NSS) referenced above serves as a telling example. I was fortunate to

---

<sup>353</sup> *The Nation*, "Mugabe's Grip on Defense Forces Main Problem in Power Talks," December 20, 2009, [http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/dec21\\_2009.html](http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/dec21_2009.html) (accessed December 12, 2015).

<sup>354</sup> Personal interview, Ian Makone, 2014.

<sup>355</sup> Personal interview, Zigomo, 2014.

gain access to a copy of the document that was presented in the NSC. It describes the two routes that Tsvangirai and Mugabe came to power as: “a leader enjoying obvious electoral victory [Tsvangirai] versus the *fait accompli* [sic] of seized power and refusal to concede by the incumbent.” It later references the “the illegitimate presidential authority” of Mugabe.

The second of three “Guiding Principles” describes human rights abuses at the hands of ZANU-PF and the military and calls for accountability, reading: “The second pillar is to confront Zimbabwe’s sad history of violence, violation of human and citizens’ rights violations [sic]...the March to June 2008 Electoral [sic] violence deserve administrative and juridical closure in order for victims to get compensation and be able to deal with trauma.”<sup>356</sup> In a defensive response to ZANU-PF’s naming of the MDC as a national security threat, the document boldly names ZANU-PF’s reliance on the military as the biggest security challenge. It states: “A permanent revolution keeps Zimbabwe and the security institutions in a state of perpetual state of emergency. Herein lies the *country’s greatest security challenge* [emphasis mine].”<sup>357</sup>

These types of statements roiled ZANU-PF and the security chiefs to the point where near fistfights broke out in the NSC. Jeremy Brickhill, a ZIPRA veteran and head of the Zimbabwe Peace and Security Trust, an organization that engaged the parties and the state on security sector transformation under the GNU, argued that the MDC-T viewed the NSC as “a place that Morgan Tsvangirai took his demands...Morgan’s first two presentations were essentially opposition politician parliamentary rebel rousing statements.”<sup>358</sup> At one of the first NSC meetings, Tsvangirai made a statement that was so inflammatory that the country’s vice

---

<sup>356</sup> MDC-T, 2012, “Proposed National Security Strategy/Policy.”

<sup>357</sup> Ibid.

<sup>358</sup> Personal interview, Jeremy Brickhill, ZIPRA veteran and head of the Zimbabwe Peace and Security Trust, a nongovernmental organization that engaged the parties and the state on security sector transformation under the GNU, Harare, Zimbabwe, December 9, 2014.

president at the time, John Nkomo, angrily yanked off his shirt to show Tsvangirai scars on his back from his time in prison under the Rhodesians. Ncube eventually intervened and suggested they adjourn the meeting and revise their approach.<sup>359</sup>

Ncube described this incident to me, saying Nkomo, “took off his shirt, in the meeting, literally, and said to Morgan [Tsvangirai] you, literally about to poke him, how do you think I got all of this, I am scarred for life, and you dare tell me there was something good in Rhodesian racism, this is what they did to me.”<sup>360</sup> Ncube went on to explain how this confrontational approach backfired and closed the door on any potential openings for SSR. He said that such incidents in the NSC, “stopped everything we were talking about, just because you pressed the wrong button. Once they are there, you can’t make progress, pack your bags.”<sup>361</sup>

A similar dynamic played out when MDC-T shockingly staffed its security positions with officials who had served in the Rhodesian military, such as Rupiya and Mutsekwa. Tsvangirai told me that Mutsekwa’s appointment and presence in the NSC was “actually like a red flag in front of a bull because he was with the Rhodesians.”<sup>362</sup> Mutsekwa also used this terminology, telling me that his and Rupiya’s appointments were “like waving a red flag in front of two bulls,” as they were seen as enemies of the state.<sup>363</sup>

These were obvious strategic and tactical errors on the part of the MDCs. Mufamadi, the head of Mbeki’s facilitation team, commented on the ineffectiveness of the MDCs’ confrontational style regarding SSR: “I think MDC did not master that well. And we would advise from time to time, [saying] the leader of MDC can’t be heard to be saying that people

---

<sup>359</sup> Ibid; corroborated by Ncube in a personal interview, 2014.

<sup>360</sup> Ibid.

<sup>361</sup> Ibid.

<sup>362</sup> Personal interview, Tsvangirai, 2014.

<sup>363</sup> Personal interview, Mutsekwa, 2015.

in the police, people in the army, that committed atrocities...will have to face the international criminal court and so on.”<sup>364</sup> Mufamadi said the approach did not work because it did not give the security officials “an opportunity to demonstrate that they can be loyal to the new dispensation.”<sup>365</sup> Of course, even if MDC had taken a more inclusive, compromising approach, there is no guarantee that ZANU-PF would have significantly changed their tune. That said, the above evidence clearly demonstrates how exclusionary approaches by both sides further sealed the fate of SSR under the GNU.

### *3.7.3. SSR Outcomes: Negligible Progress Under the GNU*

The practice of exclusionary politics and the weak design of the agreement sculpted the unpromising security reform landscape in Zimbabwe, rendering SSR efforts under the GNU as stillborn. As noted in Chapter 2, movement on SSR policy is measured according to progress made on seven criteria essential to SSR: constitutional changes in security governance, demands of political neutrality, security reform legislation, government commissions investigating complicity in political violence, personnel changes of security leaders, changes in training curriculum, and prosecutions of senior-level security officials. Shifts in actual security sector behavior are measured according to changes in three categories: partisan involvement in election-related violence, partisan involvement in political campaigns or elections, and statements of political partiality.

From the formation of the GNU through the July 2013 elections, the unity government passed one significant piece of security reform legislation, the National Security Council Bill. Passed in early 2009, the bill created the NSC, which intended to provide the

---

<sup>364</sup> Personal interview, Mufamadi, 2015.

<sup>365</sup> Ibid.

MDC with a say in security policy. The prime minister and his deputies sat on the NSC, theoretically breaking up ZANU-PF's monopoly over the state's coercive capacity. However, although the NSC was initially envisaged to have a managerial role, the passed legislation only provided the body with the capacity to review security policy.<sup>366</sup> Despite the formation of the NSC, the JOC remained intact and the security apparatus continued to function in the partisan manner it did prior to the GNU (see below). Although the passage of the NSC bill failed to adequately oversee the security sector and compel it to act apolitically, the GNU is deemed as fulfilling the category of security reform legislation.

The GNU made slow and halting progress toward crafting a new constitution. The constitutional outreach process—intended to incorporate the views of the general population into the draft—was marred by incidents of violence and intimidation campaigns by ZANU-PF elements, including the police.<sup>367</sup> After five years, the new constitution was passed in a referendum held in March 2013 and signed into law in May, only two months before the July 2013 elections that put an end to the GNU. The new constitution contained some notable security reforms, including demands for security sector impartiality, two term limits for security chiefs, and parliamentary oversight.<sup>368</sup>

While some party officials I interviewed considered these provisions as SSR achievements, others pointed out that all of these laws were already on the books in previous defense acts and other existing security legislation, which simply had been ignored by ZANU-PF over the years. Mangwana, ZANU-PF's top official on the constitution reform process, told me that SSR in the new constitution, “was nothing really...we are only

---

<sup>366</sup> Chitiyo, 2009, “The Case for Security Sector Reform,” 38.

<sup>367</sup> International Crisis Group, 2011, “Zimbabwe: The Road to Reform,” 16.

<sup>368</sup> Government of Zimbabwe, 2013, “2013 Constitution,” Chapter 11, [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Zimbabwe\\_2013.pdf](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Zimbabwe_2013.pdf) (accessed December 8, 2015).

upgrading what is already in the Defense Act and putting it in the constitution. To me it was no gain...They [MDC] saw that as a victory, and I was prepared to give it to them. *It was no security sector reform at all. Nothing* [emphasis mine].”<sup>369</sup> Moreover, these paper reforms in the constitution were unable to be implemented before the July elections and the end of the GNU.<sup>370</sup> Because of these caveats, I have given the GNU only partial fulfillment of the constitutional changes category. As the constitution includes demands for impartiality of the security sector, I have scored the GNU as fulfilling this category.

In May 2011 the GNU approved a bill establishing the Human Rights Commission, which was also included in the 2013 constitution. However, the commission struggled to become operational and was tasked to only investigate rights violations that occurred after February 2009. As such, no commission was tasked with investigating the security sector’s role in the 2008 political violence.<sup>371</sup> The GNU also failed to hold security sector leaders accountable for the 2008 violence, either through prosecutions or removal from their posts.<sup>372</sup> The Organ of National Healing and Reconciliation was stood up, but the body’s mandate does not include accountability or justice mechanisms. The GNU therefore did not fulfill these two categories. The police and security forces did complete some new training on human rights and security sector governance under the GNU. Brickhill, of the Zimbabwe Peace and Security Trust, told me that his organization had trained over 600 members of the security forces and established a university course on security sector governance for police and other members of the armed forces.<sup>373</sup>

---

<sup>369</sup> Personal interview, Mangwana, 2015.

<sup>370</sup> Human Rights Watch, 2013, “The Elephant in the Room.”

<sup>371</sup> Human Rights Watch, 2015, “World Report 2015: Zimbabwe,” <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/zimbabwe> (accessed December 8, 2015).

<sup>372</sup> Human Rights Watch, 2013, “The Elephant in the Room.”

<sup>373</sup> Personal interview, Brickhill, 2014.



Despite some paper achievements, namely on legislation, the constitution, demands for impartiality, and new trainings, these policy actions had little to no impact on the actual behavior of the security apparatus, which remained highly politicized. As noted above, Zimbabwe's security chiefs have a long tradition of openly pledging allegiance to ZANU-PF and of refusing to salute Tsvangirai. This behavior did not change during the GNU, even after the new constitution explicitly banned such behavior.

In May 2013, in the run-up to the 2013 elections, the commander of Zimbabwe's defense forces, Constantine Chiwenga, said: "It's just not possible for me to entertain the MDC-T leader, we are different. Just like oil and water, we cannot mix. As the defense forces we will not respect or entertain people who do not value the ideals of the liberation struggle."<sup>374</sup> Rugare Gumbo, ZANU-PF spokesperson at the time, in direct contravention of the freshly passed constitution, echoed Chiwenga's sentiment a week later, saying that the security forces came out of the liberation struggle and as such, "*You cannot expect them to be non-partisan and neutral* [emphasis mine]. It would be unfair to say the security forces should be impartial given our history of the liberation struggle."<sup>375</sup> Because security sector officials continued to make statements of partiality in the run-up to the 2013 elections (with no consequences), the GNU clearly did not fulfill this category.

Finally, in a similar vein, these statements again proved to be more than mere rhetoric, as the security sector continued to be deeply involved in political processes and partisan violence throughout the GNU, particularly in the run-up to the 2013 elections. Although the 2013 elections themselves were relatively peaceful, Human Rights Watch reporting highlights scores of incidents where soldiers and police violently coerced voters

---

<sup>374</sup> Ibid.

<sup>375</sup> Ibid.

and openly campaigned for ZANU-PF in the run-up to the 2013 polls. For instance, in November 2012, over 20 uniformed soldiers, holding AK-47 assault rifles, disrupted an MDC rally in Mashonaland West province and assaulted MDC supporters.<sup>376</sup> The police also continued to harass and detain the opposition at an alarming rate, arresting scores of MPs during the GNU, as noted. Retired and active duty security sector officials were also directly involved in ZANU-PF's 2013 campaign.<sup>377</sup>

In light of this evidence, despite a decrease in levels of electoral violence, it is clear that the GNU did not fulfill two out of three behavior measures. Afrobarometer polling data indicates that the public's opinion of the military did not change much over the life of the GNU. In 2005-2006, 17.7 percent of Zimbabweans had no trust in the military, while those expressing a little, some, or a lot of trust in the military made up 80.8 percent. In 2011-2013 the number of Zimbabweans with no trust in the military rose slightly to 19.3 percent, while those with a little, some, or a lot of trust in the military stayed steady at 79.2 percent.<sup>378</sup> These figures demonstrate that any SSR changes failed to shift the public's opinion of the military. In sum, the above discussion demonstrates that, despite some limited SSR movement on paper, the power-sharing government in Zimbabwe failed to deliver any real changes in actual security sector behavior, achieving an overall low degree of progress on SSR.

#### *3.7.4. SSR Efforts Prior to Power Sharing: No Real Attempts*

A separate most-similar comparison of SSR efforts in Zimbabwe prior to the GNU revealed that over the two decades prior to power sharing, no government effort was attempted to

---

<sup>376</sup> Human Rights Watch, 2013, "The Elephant in the Room."

<sup>377</sup> Tendi, 2013, "Robert Mugabe's 2013 Campaign," 969.

<sup>378</sup> Afrobarometer, 2016, Online Data Analysis Tool, <http://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online> (accessed November 1, 2016).

reform and depoliticize the security forces.<sup>379</sup> Despite growing security sector involvement in election-related violence in 2000, 2002, and 2005—along with calls from the opposition and international actors to undertake SSR—Mugabe and ZANU-PF refused to budge on the issue. Mbeki’s 2007 negotiation efforts centered around constitutional reform led to a compromise agreement in September 2007 (the “Kariba” draft) that included a number of broad institutional reforms meant to help establish a level playing field for the upcoming 2008 parliamentary and presidential elections.<sup>380</sup> Mugabe and ZANU-PF, however, balked at implementing the agreement ahead of the 2008 vote, as noted above.<sup>381</sup>

While this may appear self-evident, similar factors as those presented in the theoretical framework above explain the lack of SSR prior to the 2008 electoral crisis and the unity government in Zimbabwe. Akin to the GNU period, high incumbent reliance on the security sector to remain in power, especially after the year 2000, led to exclusionary political strategies and the practice of *security politics* in Zimbabwe prior to power sharing. While the opposition had representation in parliament prior to 2008, because they sat outside of the powerful executive branch, Mugabe and ZANU-PF were able to stifle any discussion of SSR. The practice of regional solidarity politics and muted international influence in the area of national security also allowed the practice of *security politics* to flourish and continue unabated prior to power sharing. While the GNU period did not deliver much genuine SSR, the findings from this second comparative analysis suggest that even less reform would have

---

<sup>379</sup> While the military integration process undertaken after independence in 1980 noted above could be viewed by some as a type of SSR, this process is not analyzed here because of several key differences between the two periods, making them ill suited for a most-similar comparison. These differences include that military integration is a separate process from SSR as defined in this study, which focuses on depoliticizing the security sector, and, perhaps most importantly, that the 1980s process was undertaken after an extended civil war. As noted, this study focuses exclusively on cases of low-level conflict.

<sup>380</sup> Stephan Chan, 2007, “Breakthrough in Kariba.”

<sup>381</sup> Personal interview, Biti, 2015.

been achieved if the incumbents had stayed in power and no GNU agreement had been instituted.

### 3.8. Conclusion

In sum, this chapter has argued that SSR processes under the GNU period in Zimbabwe played out in the following manner: high incumbent reliance on the security sector, low Western leverage, and the distinct character of regional politics led to weak agreement design and the practice of exclusionary *security politics*. Weak agreement design mediated international and domestic pressures for reform, precluding pro-reform constituencies from being able to coalesce around specific reforms outlined in the document and apply pressure on the unity government. Weak internal and external enforcement also influenced and emboldened ZANU-PF's hardline strategies, as they quickly discovered they could block and delay the GPA's implementation with impunity. As such, ZANU-PF simply refused to countenance any real discussion of SSR under the GNU, and obstructed any attempt to do so. Exclusionary political strategies by both ZANU-PF and the MDCs led to further polarization and political clashes in the NSC, sealing off any potential moments to genuinely reform security governance. Developments in Zimbabwe's post-power sharing SSR trajectory are explored in Chapter 6.

The case findings presented in this chapter confirm the theoretical expectations presented in Chapter 2, which posited that the practice of *security politics* under power sharing would be extremely unfavorable to reform. It bears repeating that ZANU-PF, the MDCs, and the security sector in Zimbabwe are of course complex and far from monolithic organizations. As such, the heuristic devices employed here clearly do not fully capture all

the variations and complexities of each entity and their shifting relationships with one another. That said, the variables and mechanisms discussed above go a long way in explaining SSR outcomes in Zimbabwe under the GNU. The following chapter now turns to the case of Kenya.

## 4. INCLUSIONARY COALITION POLITICS IN KENYA

*“We [PNU] would say, at this time, we can go to bed with a porcupine, because it was necessary to do so...So that was one of the strategic things that we did.”*<sup>382</sup>  
(Peter Kagwanja, former senior advisor to President Kibaki)

### 4.1. Overview

A multitude of historical factors shaped the dynamics and outcomes of power sharing in Kenya. This chapter traces the historical roots of the nature of civil-military relations and the character of external involvement in Kenya, showing how these two long-term variables in turn shaped the two short-term mechanisms of agreement design and political strategy under the unity government. The unity government was in office from 2008 to 2013 and came to be known as the Grand Coalition Government (GCG). The chapter first demonstrates that low incumbent reliance on the security sector and high Western leverage led to strong agreement design and the use of largely inclusionary political strategies, giving rise to the practice of *coalition politics* in Kenya. These conditions facilitated significant openings for reform, leading to a considerable, if fragile and incomplete, amount of security reforms in Kenya under power sharing, particularly at the institutional level.

The chapter then discusses SSR efforts in Kenya prior to the power sharing. It argues that while some reform efforts were initiated after the 2002 government turnover, ethnic and political considerations quickly dashed hopes of any genuine SSR being achieved prior to the GCG. This finding shows, perhaps counter intuitively, that the unity government in Kenya was actually more favorable to delivering SSR than even the full regime transition that took place in 2002, demonstrating the causal import of the power-sharing model. The findings presented in this chapter confirm the validity of the theoretical expectation that the practice

---

<sup>382</sup> Personal interview, Peter Kagwanja, former senior advisor to Kibaki, Nairobi, Kenya, April 28, 2015.

of *coalition politics* under power sharing will be promising for reform. The case findings are primarily based on dozens of elite level interviews with political leaders in the Party of National Unity (PNU), Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), security sector officials, and international stakeholders conducted in Nairobi, Kenya from April to May 2015.<sup>383</sup>

#### 4.2. Roots of Low Incumbent Reliance

After gaining independence from Britain in 1963, the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) ruled for the next 39 years, first under nationalist leader Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978), and then under the increasingly authoritarian Daniel arap Moi (1978-2002). As noted in Chapter 2, undergirding KANU's long rule from 1963 to 2002 was the top-heavy "bureaucratic-executive" state, in which the paramilitary Administration Police and the General Service Unit, which were directly under the control of the presidency, played crucial roles. Until a 2011 police reform bill placed them under the same command, the police in Kenya were split into two branches, the Kenya Police Force and the Administration Police. With a few exceptions, most notably a failed coup attempt in 1982, the military in Kenya has largely remained outside of politics.<sup>384</sup> Instead, the police have historically played the regime protection role, particularly the Administration Police and the General Service Unit.

The Kenyan police have a long history of being used for political purposes. The politicization of the post-colonial police can be traced back to the years after independence when Kenyatta retained the paramilitary structure of the colonial police and jettisoned the

---

<sup>383</sup> I also draw on field research conducted as part of my master's level research in Nairobi, Kenya in April 2011.

<sup>384</sup> Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010, "Power-sharing in Comparative Perspective," 216-217. As noted in Chapter 2, for exceptions to this trend, see David Anderson's work on the military's involvement in the Wagalla massacre in 1984 and, more recently, in the Mount Elgon conflict from 2006-2008: Anderson, 2014, "Remembering Wagalla;" Lynch and Anderson, 2014, "Democratization and Ethnic Violence in Kenya."

police's autonomy a year after independence.<sup>385</sup> The political role of the police deepened during the 1980s and early 1990s, as Moi's rule took on an increasingly authoritarian turn and he used the police to violently suppress political dissent.<sup>386</sup> Democracy agitators during this period were often subjected to widespread torture at the hands of the police.<sup>387</sup> After the move to multipartyism in 1991, Moi ignored calls from domestic and international actors for police reform. Instead, he used the police to arm and aid ethnically based militias, which were deployed to attack political opponents in the run-up to both the 1992 and 1997 elections.<sup>388</sup> By blurring the lines of accountability, Moi's use of privatized violence allowed him to use electoral tactics—such as ethnic cleansing—that were formally out of bounds for state security actors such as the police.<sup>389</sup> In the “ethnic clashes” that surrounded both elections, in which Moi prevailed, 3,000 were killed and 300,000 displaced.<sup>390</sup>

In a context of growing violent crime and endemic corruption, Mwai Kibaki came to power in 2002 on a campaign of renewal, launching a police reform program in 2003 aiming to professionalize the decaying, corrupt force and experiment with community policing. However, the rhetorical move toward democratic policing achieved little (see below), as the entrenched civil-police relationship endured and Kibaki continued the Kenyan tradition of using the police for regime maintenance. Kibaki's politicization of the police increased in the run-up to the 2007 election, culminating in the partisan involvement of the police in the electoral process and the 2008 post-election violence. The government of Kenya's Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), also known as the Waki

---

<sup>385</sup> Hills, 2009, “Policing in Kenya,” 238.

<sup>386</sup> Adar and Munyae, 2001, “Human Rights Abuse in Kenya under Daniel arap Moi 1978-2001.”

<sup>387</sup> Edwin Gimode, 2007, “The Role of the Police in Kenya's Democratization Process,” in Godwin Murunga and Shadrack Nasong'o, (eds.) *Kenya: The Struggle for Democracy* (London: Zed Books): 249-250.

<sup>388</sup> Mueller, 2008, “The Political Economy of Kenya's Crisis.”

<sup>389</sup> Branch and Cheeseman 2008, “Democratization, Sequencing and State Failure in Africa,” 13.

<sup>390</sup> Cheeseman, 2008, “The Kenyan Elections of 2007,” 170.



commission, concluded that the police had been blatantly used for political purposes during the 2007 elections. The most glaring example of this practice was when 1,600 Administration Police were deployed in plainclothes as party agents to disrupt polling stations in opposition strongholds days before the vote.<sup>391</sup>

After an exceedingly close vote between Kibaki's PNU and Odinga's ODM—Kibaki declared victory and was hastily sworn in, amid allegations of electoral fraud by the opposition. Led by militias and gangs supported by politicians on both sides of the conflict—with the involvement of the police a further complicating factor—the disputed elections triggered several waves of ethnically-based violence between opposition and government supporters, leaving over 1,100 dead and more than 600,000 displaced.<sup>392</sup> Amid rumors that the police had adopted a “shoot-to-kill” policy, the Waki Commission implicated the police in 405 out of a total of 1,133 fatalities and the wounding of 557 more.<sup>393</sup> The violence and political crisis lasted for two months, finally coming to an end with the signing of a power-sharing deal in late February 2008 that was brokered by Kofi Annan under the auspices of the AU's Panel of Eminent African Personalities with support from the UN.

#### 4.2.1. *A One-Way Street: Political Supremacy Over the Police*

Although the police have been heavily politicized in Kenya, the civil-police relationship has remained unidirectional, i.e. politicians—namely the executive—have enjoyed tremendous influence in the policing sphere, but the police have not amassed the political power

---

<sup>391</sup> Government of Kenya, 2008, “Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV),” [http://www.knchr.org/portals/0/reports/waki\\_report.pdf](http://www.knchr.org/portals/0/reports/waki_report.pdf) (accessed July 12, 2016).

<sup>392</sup> *Global Post*, “Kenya Election Prompts Fears of New Violence,” February 28, 2013.

<sup>393</sup> Government of Kenya, 2008, “Commission of Inquiry,” 383-85, 417.

necessary to influence the political arena. My interviews in Kenya help substantiate this point.

Murshid Mohamed, a commissioner on Kenya's National Police Service Commission (NPSC), told me that the police in Kenya have over the years been "a tool, if you want, of the state. It's not that the state is its tool."<sup>394</sup> Peter Kagwanja, a senior advisor to Kibaki and PNU, explained that, historically, "the police certainly had nothing to do with the politics, let's be very clear about that. They are completely out of politics."<sup>395</sup> Hassan Omar Hassan, former commissioner at the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, a government body, also maintained that the relationship is a one-way street. He told me that, "There is a lot of leverage that the executive asserts over the police."<sup>396</sup>

What explains the supremacy of civilians over the police in Kenya? Why have the police become highly politicized yet failed to accumulate political influence? While politicians have continually manipulated the police for political purposes, incumbents have not relied exclusively on the police to remain in power, particular in the multi-party era. Instead, politicians have relied on informal militias and fluid elite coalitions to maintain and gain access to power. These two main factors largely explain the power imbalance between politicians and the police in Kenya.

Since the shift to multipartyism in the early 1990s, politicians have used gangs and ethnic militias—abetted by the police—to kill and displace political opponents, as noted above and in Chapter 2. In the lead up to the 1992 and 1997 elections, Moi used such groups

---

<sup>394</sup> Personal interview, Murshid Mohamed, commissioner, National Police Service Commission, Nairobi, Kenya, April 18, 2015.

<sup>395</sup> Personal interview, Kagwanja, 2015.

<sup>396</sup> Personal interview, Hassan Omar Hassan, former commissioner at the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, Nairobi, Kenya, April 4, 2011.

to attack and displace ethnic groups not aligned to KANU, forming a “KANU zone.”<sup>397</sup> The ethnic clashes and expulsion were framed in the language of *majimboism*—a radical form of regionalism with complex historical roots dating back to pre-independence, as a struggle over land between “indigenous” (Kalenjin and Maasai) and “non-indigenous” ethnic groups in the Rift Valley.<sup>398</sup> In this manner, the conflicts linked local and national power struggles, and entrenched and ossified the politicized nature of ethnicity in Kenya. Subsequently, this practice spiraled, as national and local politicians across the political spectrum used ethnically aligned gangs and militias to win both national and local elections, often losing control of their hired militias or simply discharging them after elections. These groups included the Mungiki, the Sabao Land Defense Force, the Taliban, the Bagdad Boys, and Sungu Sungu, among others.<sup>399</sup> Such groups emerged as powerful organizations and political militias for hire, many running shakedown and protection rackets.<sup>400</sup>

This widespread practice led to a “diffusion of violence” and the state lost control over its monopoly on the use of force.<sup>401</sup> While this practice proved to be highly destabilizing for the country in the near and medium term, politicians’ dependence on privatized violence meant that militias and gangs, not solely the police, were largely responsible for carrying out

---

<sup>397</sup> Branch and Cheeseman 2008, “Democratization, Sequencing and State Failure in Africa,” 14.

<sup>398</sup> David Anderson, 2010, “Majimboism: The Troubled History of an Idea,” in Daniel Branch, Nic Cheeseman, and Leigh Gardner, (eds.) *Our Turn to Eat: Politics in Kenya since 1950* (Berlin: Lit Verlag): 34-42; David Anderson and Emma Lochery, 2008, “Violence and Exodus in Kenya’s Rift Valley, 2008: Predictable and Preventable?,” *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 2, 2: 329-330.

<sup>399</sup> For an overview of the Mungiki and the group’s role in Kenyan politics see Jacob Rasmussen, 2010, “Outwitting the Professor of Politics? Mungiki Narratives of Political Deception and their Role in Kenyan Politics,” *Journal of Eastern Africa Studies*, 4, 3: 435-449.

<sup>400</sup> Mueller, 2011, “Dying to win,” 103.

<sup>401</sup> Mueller 2008, “The Political Economy of Kenya’s Crisis,” 187-9. On the use of political militias and gangs in Kenya, also see Anderson, 2002, “Vigilantes, Violence and the Politics of Public Order in Kenya,” Jacqueline Klopp, 2001, “Ethnic Clashes and Winning Elections: The Case of Kenya’s Electoral Despotism,” *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 35, 3: 473-517; Peter Kagwanja, 2003, “Facing Mount Kenya or Facing Mecca? The Mungiki, Ethnic Violence and the Politics of the Moi Succession in Kenya 1987-2002,” *African Affairs*, 102, 406: 25-49; Adams Oloo, 2010, “Marginalization and the Rise of Militias in Kenya,” in Wafula Okumu and Augustine Ikelegbe, (eds.) *Militias, Rebels and Islamist Militants* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies): 147-181.

the coercive strategies that helped to secure electoral victories. As such, politicians did not need to devolve decision-making power and influence to the police in order to maintain their loyalty, as political leaders could simply hire militias to carry out their unseemly practices before the next election.

In addition to utilizing diffused violence, politicians in the multiparty era in Kenya have also relied heavily on different configurations of elite ethnic coalitions to ensure ballot success. Despite being punctuated by moments of elite fragmentation, “Kenya’s political elite has a history of relatively cohesive co-existence,” note Cheeseman and Tendi. Indeed, over the last two decades, a lack of any real party ideologies and a weak party system has led to a process of “elite musical chairs,” whereby nearly all of Kenya’s leading politicians have at some point worked together as colleagues, whether in government or in the opposition.<sup>402</sup> For instance, both Kibaki and Odinga were part of KANU (Kibaki served as Moi’s vice president from 1978-1988 while Odinga briefly served as minister of energy in 2001-2002) before they joined forces under the banner of NARC in the run up to the 2002 election.

Gichira Kibara, who was a member of the PNU’s negotiating team in 2008 and later served as permanent secretary of Kenya’s Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion, and Constitutional Affairs, told me that, akin to many other African countries, “big man” politics are more important than parties in Kenya. He said: “Parties are not really strong in Kenya. So it’s more personalities rather than parties.”<sup>403</sup>

The ever-shifting constellations of elite alliances in Kenya are due in large part to the country’s electoral rules, which—after changes in 1991—required presidential candidates to

---

<sup>402</sup> Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010, “Power-sharing in Comparative Perspective,” 212-14.

<sup>403</sup> Personal interview, Gichira Kibara, former permanent secretary of Kenya’s Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion, and Constitutional Affairs; member of the PNU’s 2008 negotiating team, Nairobi, Kenya, May 4, 2015.

win at least 25 percent of the vote in five out of Kenya's eight provinces. As Kenya's ethnic groups are heavily concentrated regionally, this electoral rule made it imperative for candidates to forge cross-ethnic alliances to win elections.<sup>404</sup> This inclusive political practice of elite alliances contributed to the one-sided civil-police relationship in two ways: it further lessened political leaders' reliance on the police to guarantee political power and it diminished opportunities for the police and politicians to build and maintain entrenched symbiotic relations, as politicians were constantly shifting alliances and positions within and outside of government.

#### *4.2.2. Low Reliance under the GCG*

To buttress the above analysis and help to roughly gauge the incumbent's degree of reliance on the security sector, both directly before and during the period of unity government (2008-2013), I use three indicators. As highlighted in Chapter 2, I first use the level of security sector involvement in the electoral violence that precipitated the unity government in 2008 (as measured by percentage of deaths attributed to security sector actors). According to data from the government of Kenya's CIPEV report, the police were responsible for 36 percent (405 of 1,133) of fatalities in Kenya's 2008 electoral violence, with the remaining fatalities attributed to civilian-on-civilian violence, primarily led and executed by gangs and militias.<sup>405</sup> With police involved in just over a third of the violence, PNU falls into the medium-low category of reliance (21-40 percent) on this indicator.

---

<sup>404</sup> Denis Kadima and Felix Owour, 2006, "The National Rainbow Coalition: Achievements and Challenges of Building and Sustaining a Broad-Based Political Party Coalition in Kenya," in Denis Kadima, (ed.) *The Politics of Party Coalitions in Africa* (Auckland Park: Electoral Institute of Southern Africa): 179-221.

<sup>405</sup> Government of Kenya, 2008, "Commission of Inquiry," 343, 347.

Second, through background research and consultations with interviewees and country experts, I analyzed the prevalence of individuals with security backgrounds who served in cabinet at any time during the unity government. No cabinet members were found to possess any security sector experience. As such, both the PNU and the ODM fall into the lowest level of reliance on this indicator (see Figures 8 and 9).

| <b>PNU Cabinet Position</b>                 | <b>Name</b>              | <b>Security Background</b> |
|---------------------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|
| Pres.                                       | Mwai KIBAKI              | X                          |
| Vice Pres.; Min for Home Affairs            | Stephene Kalonzo MUSYOKA | X                          |
| Dep. Prime Min.; Min. for Trade             | Uhuru KENYATTA           | X                          |
| Min. of Education                           | Sam ONGERI               | X                          |
| Min. of Energy                              | Kiraitu MURUNGI          | X                          |
| Min. of Env. & Mineral Resources            | John Njoroge MICHUKI     | X                          |
| Min. of Foreign Affairs                     | Moses WETANGULA          | X                          |
| Min. of Prov. Admin. & Nat. Security        | George SAITOTI           | X                          |
| Min. of Forestry & Wildlife                 | Noah WEKESA              | X                          |
| Min. of Gender & Child. Aff.; Min of State  | Naomi Namsi SHABAN       | X                          |
| Min. of Housing                             | Peter Soita SHITANDA     | X                          |
| Min. of Information & Comms.                | Samuel Lesuron POGHISIO  | X                          |
| Min. of Just., Nat. Cohesion, & Const. Aff. | Martha KARUA             | X                          |
| Min. of Just., Nat. Cohesion, & Const. Aff. | Eugene WAMALWA           | X                          |
| Min. of Nairobi Metro. Dev.; Justice        | Mutula KILONZO           | X                          |
| Min. of Livestock Development               | Mohamed Abdi KUTI        | X                          |
| Min. of Nairobi Metro. Dev.; Finance        | Robinson NJERU GITHAE    | X                          |
| Min. of Nairobi Metro. Dev.                 | Jamleck KAMAU            | X                          |
| Min. of Pub. Health & Sanitation; Trade     | Beth Wambui MUGO         | X                          |
| Min. of Transport                           | Amos KIMUNYA             | X                          |
| Min. of Trade; Env. & Min. Resources        | Chirau ALI MWAKWERE      | X                          |
| Min. of State for Defense                   | Yussuf Mohamed HAJI      | X                          |
| Min. of Gender, Child. Aff.; Min. of State  | Esther Murugi MATHENGE   | X                          |
| Attorney Gen.                               | Amos WAKO                | X                          |
| <b>Total</b>                                |                          | <b>0 of 24 = 0%</b>        |

Figure 8: PNU cabinet security backgrounds

| <b>ODM Cabinet Position</b>           | <b>Name</b>               | <b>Security Background</b> |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|
| Prime Min.                            | Raila Amolo ODINGA        | X                          |
| Dep. Prime Min.; Min. for Local Govt. | Wycliffe Musalia MUDAVADI | X                          |
| Min. of Agriculture                   | William Samoei RUTO       | X                          |

|                                         |                           |                     |
|-----------------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|
| Min. of Agriculture                     | Sally Jepngetich KOSGEY   | X                   |
| Min. of Cooperative Dev.                | Joseph NYAGAH             | X                   |
| Min. of East Af. Comm.; Higher Ed.      | Helen Jepkemoi SAMBILI    | X                   |
| Min. of Fisheries Development           | Amos Kingi JEFFAH         | X                   |
| Min. of Industrialization               | Henry Kiprono KOSGEY      | X                   |
| Min. of Lands                           | Aggrey James ORENGO       | X                   |
| Min. of Medical Services                | Peter Anyang NYONGO       | X                   |
| Min. of Public Works                    | Chris OBURE               | X                   |
| Min. of Regional Dev. Authorities       | Fredrick Omulo GUMO       | X                   |
| Min. of Roads                           | Kipkalya KONES            | X                   |
| Min. of Roads                           | Franklin BETT             | X                   |
| Min. of Tourism                         | Mohamed Najib BALALA      | X                   |
| Min. of Tourism                         | Danson MWAZO              | X                   |
| Min. of Water and Irrigation            | Charity Kaluki NGILU      | X                   |
| Min. of Youth and Sports                | Paul Nyongesa OTUOMA      | X                   |
| Min. of Higher Ed., Science, & Tech.    | Margaret KAMAR            | X                   |
| Min. of State for Immigration           | Gerald Otieno KAJWANG     | X                   |
| Min. of State for Nat. Heritage & Cult. | William Ole NTIMAMA       | X                   |
| Min. of State for Planning & Nat. Dev.  | Wycliffe Ambetsa OPARANYA | X                   |
| Min. of State for Public Service        | Dalmas Anyango OTIENO     | X                   |
| Min. of State of Dev. & Arid Lands      | Ibrahim MOHAMED           | X                   |
| Ambassador to US                        | Elkanah ODEMBO            | X                   |
| <b>Total</b>                            |                           | <b>0 of 25 = 0%</b> |

Figure 9: ODM cabinet security backgrounds

Finally, the absence of successful security sector coups in Kenya further indicates that influence is flowing from politicians to the security sector (politicization) and not the other way around (securitization).<sup>406</sup> This section has analyzed the historical roots and events that shaped the unidirectional relationship between civilian politicians and the police in Kenya, demonstrating that incumbents in Kenya had a low degree of reliance on the security sector to remain in power. The reliance hypothesis predicts that this low degree of reliance will allow for strong agreement design, largely inclusionary political strategies, and a considerable degree of SSR in Kenya under power-sharing government.

<sup>406</sup> Powell, 2015, “Coups in the World;” Center for Systemic Peace, 2014, “Coups d’État.”

#### 4.3. Character of External Involvement: Roots of High Western Leverage

Kenya has a long history of close relations and political, economic, security, and cultural ties with Western countries, the United Kingdom and the United States in particular. Since independence in 1963, Western countries mainly viewed Kenya as a strong geostrategic ally with a well-performing, market economy. Despite Kenya's deepening authoritarianism after independence and in the 1980s, Kenya's reputation as a stable bastion in an unstable area earned it strong and continuing assistance from Western capitals.<sup>407</sup> Kenya's capital city of Nairobi has for decades been a bustling international hub housing a wide array of international, regional, and civil society organizations, including the UN and the largest US embassy in the region.

Kenya remains the gateway to the region and an attractive trade partner for Western countries. Following the 1998 bombings of the US embassy in Nairobi and the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, Kenya's counterterrorism and security ties with Western countries increased sharply. Indeed, Brown and Raddatz note that Kenya has a, "higher-than-average intensity of linkages" to Western countries compared to most other African countries.<sup>408</sup> Due to these myriad ties between Western countries and Kenya, Barkan argued that, "donor influence has probably been greater than in any other African country" outside of South Africa.<sup>409</sup> My interviews substantiated this view. A former senior ODM official told me that Kenya, "really needs the West. The influence of the West in Kenya is

---

<sup>407</sup> Stephen Brown, 2001, "Authoritarian Leaders and Multiparty Elections in Africa: How Foreign Donors Help to Keep Kenya's Daniel arap Moi in Power," *Third World Quarterly*, 22, 5: 726.

<sup>408</sup> Stephen Brown and Rosalind Raddatz, 2014, "Dire Consequences or Empty Threats? Western Pressure for Peace, Justice and Democracy in Kenya," *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 8, 1: 46.

<sup>409</sup> Joel Barkan, 1998, "Toward A New Constitutional Framework in Kenya," *Africa Today*, 45, 2: 217.



extraordinary.”<sup>410</sup> Unlike Zimbabwe, weak regional institutions in East Africa have further facilitated Western countries’ high leverage in Kenya, as discussed below.

Despite a high degree of leverage and influence, the West’s degree of involvement in Kenya’s internal affairs has varied over the past two and half decades since the move to multi-party politics. Donors have ranged from actively deploying their leverage during the transition to multipartyism, to largely turning a blind eye to Moi’s electoral violence and chicanery in the 1990s, to direct intervention in the 2008 post-election violence and power-sharing negotiations.<sup>411</sup> At the end of the Cold War, Kenya was swept up in the wave of democratization that spread across Africa in the early 1990s. Donors, suddenly more concerned with democracy and human rights issues in their deployment of aid, played an influential role in this shift. In 1991, donors suspended \$350 million worth of aid to Kenya, joining a domestic chorus of demands for political liberalization. Weeks later, after decades of one-party rule, Moi altered the constitution to allow for multiparty competition.<sup>412</sup>

After this move to procedural democracy, however, donor countries generally refused to stand up to Moi’s violent tactics surrounding the 1992 and 1997 elections, and wielded their leverage in an inconsistent manner. After the 1992 polls, which Moi won against a divided opposition with only 37 percent of the vote, credible reports documented government sponsored ethnic cleansing, unfair voting conditions, and other irregularities. Despite such reports, donor countries—with few exceptions—endorsed the election, praising it as a procedural success, and subsequently resumed aid.<sup>413</sup> Moi learned a valuable lesson from the

---

<sup>410</sup> Personal interview, former senior ODM official, May 15, 2015.

<sup>411</sup> The donor community in Kenya is obviously not a monolithic actor, with inter- and intra-governmental actors often having different priorities and even working at cross-purposes. On this point, see, for instance, Stephen Brown, 2005, “Foreign Aid and Democracy Promotion: Lessons from Africa,” *The European Journal of Development Research*, 17, 2: 179-198.

<sup>412</sup> Brown, 2001, “Authoritarian Leaders and Multiparty Elections,” 726.

<sup>413</sup> *Ibid*, 732.

1992 elections: donors' pesky concerns with political liberalization could be satisfied by minimal, mainly superficial, concessions, such as the holding of a deeply flawed but procedurally successful multiparty election.

In the 1997 elections, Moi applied the same blueprint and was rewarded with similar results, winning with 40 percent of the vote. Although prior to the election donors suspended \$400 million of aid due to concerns over state violence and corruption, Moi agreed to a number of largely cosmetic reforms and aid again resumed after the elections.<sup>414</sup> Prior to the 2002 election, donors won a significant victory by applying backroom pressure on Moi, helping to convince him to respect his term limits and retire from KANU.<sup>415</sup> KANU's internal struggle over Moi's successor opened the door for the broad-based opposition coalition, NARC, to finally oust KANU from power in a relatively free and fair poll. Donors enthusiastically supported the new government led by Kibaki, and Kenya went on to become a key partner in the US-led "Global War on Terror" in the run up to the 2007 elections.<sup>416</sup>

#### 4.3.1. *The Role of the International Community during the 2008 Mediation*

With Kenya's authoritarian past and problems with electoral violence seemingly in the rearview mirror, the flawed 2007 elections and their violent aftermath caught donors by surprise. The international community, however, intervened in the 2008 crisis in a largely cohesive and coordinated fashion, playing a fundamental role in resolving the conflict.<sup>417</sup>

---

<sup>414</sup> Barkan, 1998, "Toward A New Constitutional Framework in Kenya," 218.

<sup>415</sup> Brown, 2005, "Foreign Aid and Democracy Promotion," 189.

<sup>416</sup> On the impact of counterterrorism assistance in Kenya, see Jan Bachman and Jana Hönke, 2010, "'Peace and Security' as Counterterrorism? The Political Effects of Liberal Interventions in Kenya," *African Affairs*, 109, 434: 97-114; and Jonathan Fisher and David Anderson, 2015, "Authoritarianism and the Securitization of Development in Africa," *International Affairs*, 91, 1: 131-151.

<sup>417</sup> Karuti Kanyinga and Sophie Walker, 2013, "Building a Political Settlement: The International Approach to Kenya's 2008 Post-Election Crisis," *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development*, 2, 2, 34: 1-21;

During the two months of diplomatic intervention and mediation in January and February 2008, the involvement of donors in Kenya's internal politics reached unprecedented levels. Western intervention in Kenya was coached in terms of the emerging "responsibility to protect" doctrine, which was endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 2005 in an effort to prevent mass atrocities.<sup>418</sup> The outbreak of violence prompted several high-level visits to Kenya from international and regional actors, including the highest-ranking US diplomat for Africa, Jendayi Frazer, and the chairperson of the AU and then president of Ghana, John Kufour.

Once a recount or rerun of the election were deemed impossible due to logistic issues and too dangerous due to the ongoing violence, international actors, led by the United States, made it clear to the conflict protagonists that a negotiated solution was the only viable way to bring Kenya back from the precipice of civil war. When Frazer arrived in Kenya, she told me that, "I brought a very heavy stick, which was the United States, which made it very clear to everybody that there was going to be a negotiation."<sup>419</sup> Adding to this external pressure, the donor community issued a joint declaration in mid-January threatening to suspend aid if the parties did not act to end the crisis.<sup>420</sup>

After the PNU and ODM sides jettisoned a number of other potential mediators, both sides agreed that Annan would serve as the mediator under the auspices of the AU's Panel of Eminent African Personalities and the UN. Former president of Tanzania, Benjamin Mkapa, and Graça Machel of Mozambique, would support Annan in the mediation. Donors and the

---

Stephen Brown, 2009, "Donor Responses to the 2008 Kenyan Crisis: Finally Getting It Right?," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 27, 3: 389-406.

<sup>418</sup> Roger Cohen, 2008, "How Kofi Annan Rescued Kenya," *New York Review of Books*, <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2008/aug/14/how-kofi-annan-rescued-kenya/> (accessed July 22, 2014).

<sup>419</sup> Personal interview, Frazer, 2015.

<sup>420</sup> African Union, 2014, *Back from the Brink: the 2008 Mediation Process and Reforms in Kenya*, Office of the Panel of Eminent African Personalities, 2e.

UN provided logistical support. A secretariat office was stood up to support the mediation team, with administrative and staff support from UN agencies, the nongovernmental Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue's Nairobi office, and other technical experts.<sup>421</sup>

Once the mediation was under way, Western countries applied further pressure at key points in the negotiations to break PNU's intransigence and overcome logjams that arose over the content of the agreement. High level visits from foreign officials and travel bans on members of the PNU proved to be particularly effective. In February 2008, when the parties were at loggerheads and it looked as though a deal might not be reached, Condoleezza Rice, US secretary of state at the time, personally made a trip to Kenya and applied pressure on both parties to sign the power-sharing deal. Frazer, who participated in these meetings, told me that Rice, "pretty much read everybody the riot act. She first met with Kibaki and those guys and they were shocked, just how strong she was. And then she went and did the same thing on the Raila [Odinga] side." In this manner, Frazer told me that Rice "brought a very heavy stick to help break loose those negotiations."<sup>422</sup>

Also in February 2008, a number of Western countries threatened or implemented visa bans on politicians and businessman that were believed to have supported or incited the post-election violence.<sup>423</sup> Caroli Omondi, who was a member of the ODM mediation team and chief of staff to Odinga when he was prime minister, told me that these visa bans on politicians and their family members were very helpful in driving concessions during this

---

<sup>421</sup> Ibid, 23.

<sup>422</sup> Personal interview, Frazer, 2015.

<sup>423</sup> Brown, 2009, "Donor Responses to the 2008 Kenyan Crisis," 397.

period, particularly because many politician's children were abroad in Western countries for higher education.<sup>424</sup>

While domestic civil society groups and the business community helped to push the parties to end the violence, my interviews revealed that outside pressure and involvement was the decisive factor in resolving the crisis in Kenya. Kibara, a member of the PNU's 2008 negotiating team, told me that in the run up to and during the negotiations, "I would say that international community had a quite substantial influence, on both the opposition and the government."<sup>425</sup> A senior member of ODM's negotiating team went further, telling me that, "if you remove the international community from it, I do not know if it [the power-sharing agreement] would happen."<sup>426</sup> Peter Kagwanja, the advisor to PNU and Kibaki, spoke in even stronger terms, telling me that that Annan's mediating role was so central that his involvement, "almost made him the *governor of the republic* [emphasis mine]" during this period.<sup>427</sup> These insights from senior officials involved in the 2008 negotiations on both sides of the conflict highlight the critical role of international actors in the Kenya's power-sharing mediation.<sup>428</sup>

#### 4.3.2. *Indicators of High Western Leverage*

To buttress the above analysis and approximately gauge the character and extent of Western leverage in Kenya directly before and throughout the tenure of the GCG, I again used two

---

<sup>424</sup> Personal interview, Caroli Omondi, chief of staff in the Office of the Prime Minister, member of ODM mediation team in 2008, Nairobi, Kenya, April 29, 2015.

<sup>425</sup> Personal interview, Kibara, 2015.

<sup>426</sup> Personal interview, senior member of ODM negotiating team and former minister, Nairobi, Kenya, May 5, 2015.

<sup>427</sup> Personal interview, Kagwanja, 2015.

<sup>428</sup> While largely outside of the time period focus of this dissertation, Kenya's relations with Western countries soured after the 2013 elections, when Uhuru Kenyatta, who at the time was under indictment at the International Criminal Court for his alleged role in the 2008 violence, won the presidency.

measures: aid dependency and trade ties. First, following Peiffer and Englebert, to gauge Kenya's vulnerability to donor influence I calculated aid—ODA—as a percentage of export revenues, both during the years of unity government and in the five years prior. In contrast to Zimbabwe, Kenya's average over the five-year period of power sharing was 43 percent, falling into the extremely high category of Western leverage, the highest classification on the scale outlined in Chapter 2. Kenya's average over the five-year period prior to power sharing was slightly lower, with 29 percent, translating to a medium degree of Western leverage during this period.<sup>429</sup>

Second, to help gauge the importance of trade ties, I collected data on Kenya's top five trade (import and export) partners over the life of the unity government (averaged). According to World Bank data, Kenya had a well-balanced trade portfolio during this five-year period of power sharing, especially when compared to Zimbabwe's economic dependence on South Africa. Uganda and the United Kingdom were Kenya's two top destinations for exports, at 13.2 percent and 9.5 percent respectively. Tanzania (8.1 percent), the Netherlands (6.8 percent), and the United States (5.5 percent) were also important partners. For imports, India (12.8 percent), the United Arab Emirates (11.8 percent), and China (11.5 percent) were the most important partners, with South Africa (6.4 percent) and Japan (5.7 percent) rounding out the top five.<sup>430</sup> As such, Kenya was not overly dependent on any specific trade partner. That said, especially compared to Zimbabwe—where no Western country cracked the top five, Western countries were substantial trading partners during the years of the unity government. Indeed, if the Western countries landing in the top five spots

---

<sup>429</sup> International Trade Centre, 2016, "Trade Map,"

[http://www.trademap.org/tradestat/Country\\_SelProductCountry\\_TS.aspx](http://www.trademap.org/tradestat/Country_SelProductCountry_TS.aspx) (accessed August 3, 2016). Data for the year 2012 was unavailable.

<sup>430</sup> World Bank, World Integrated Trade Solution, "Kenya Trade Summary 2009-2013,"

<http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/KEN/Year/2013/Summarytext> (accessed July 21, 2016).

are considered as a bloc, they make up the biggest share of export partners over this period with 22.8 percent, translating to a high degree of trade dependence, the second highest category. Western countries as a bloc also account for the fourth biggest share of imports, at 8.6 percent.

Together, these two indicators lend strong support to the argument that Western countries had a high degree of leverage in the lead up to and during the period of unity government in Kenya. Three main factors helped shape this high degree of Western leverage. First, were Kenya's myriad political, economic, and cultural ties with Western countries, which developed over the decades as a result of Kenya's long history as a geostrategic ally of the Western bloc, as highlighted above. These ties provided Western countries with a variety of pressure points to influence Kenya's domestic affairs.

Second, regional institutions in East Africa are relatively weak and under-institutionalized, with norms more open to international interventions than the SADC-region in Southern Africa. East Africa has two regional organizations, the East African Community (EAC), consisting of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi, and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), made up of Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Uganda, Sudan, and South Sudan. Both are relatively new institutions, with the EAC founded in 1999 and IGAD in 1986. Overall, the two bodies lack a strong collective identity, with weak leadership, secretariats, and norms.

Indeed, Khadiagala argues that, "East Africa remains relatively constrained by weak regionalism that remains rhetorical." He notes that the EAC and IGAD do "not have the collective clout and voice" of other regional organizations, such as SADC or ECOWAS.<sup>431</sup>

---

<sup>431</sup> Gilbert Khadiagala, 2009, "Regionalism and Conflict Resolution: Lessons from the Kenyan Crisis," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 27, 3: 434.

Hartmann also makes this point, arguing that, the EAC is weakened by rivalries between Kenya and Ethiopia and that IGAD has “no competencies to monitor regime dynamics in member states.”<sup>432</sup> These weaknesses and lack of collective regional norms hampered the ability of the two organizations to wield any real influence in the region during the 2008 negotiations and the period of power sharing. These regional dynamics afforded Western countries further leverage in Kenya.

Third, again in contrast to Zimbabwe, official and unofficial financial flows from China are low compared to flows from Western countries. Although quantifying financial flows from China to Africa is extremely difficult, Strange et al. found that China’s official finance to Kenya from 2000 to 2011 accounted for only .41 percent of Kenya’s GNI.<sup>433</sup> Over the same period, ODA accounted for 4.1 percent of Kenya’s GNI.<sup>434</sup> As Kenya was unable to use financial assistance from China to offset Western influence, the relatively small amount of flows from China to Kenya further increased the leverage of Western countries in Kenya during the period under study. This section has demonstrated how a high degree of Western leverage in Kenya gave external actors considerable influence in the lead up to and during the period of power sharing and discussed the historical roots and economic ties that shaped these dynamics. The external involvement and reliance hypotheses predict that the values on these long-term variables will shape the two mechanisms discussed in the following section, which, in turn, will translate to a considerable degree of SSR in Kenya under power sharing.

---

<sup>432</sup> Hartmann, 2016, “How Regionalism Shapes Regime Dynamics in Africa,” 89.

<sup>433</sup> Strange et al., 2013, “China’s Development Finance to Africa,” 39.

<sup>434</sup> World Bank, 2016, “Development Indicators,”

<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.GN.ZS?end=2014&locations=KE&start=1960&view=chart>, (accessed 7.3.2016).



#### 4.4. Agreement Design

The following sections now turn to the two short-term mechanisms through which SSR outcomes were shaped under power sharing in Kenya: strong agreement design and largely inclusionary political strategies. The 2008 post-election violence in Kenya came to an end with the signing of the power-sharing agreement in February 2008, which was brokered by Annan under the auspices of the AU with support from the UN. The nearly six-week negotiation process headed by Annan—the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR)—produced the National Accord agreements, which were divided into four agendas.<sup>435</sup> As stipulated by the National Accord, Kibaki retained the powerful presidency, while Odinga assumed the newly created post of prime minister. Kibaki maintained control over the coercive apparatus, including the powerful Ministry of Provincial Administration and Internal Security, while Odinga had to settle for ministries less crucial to the exercise of state power. The following section analyzes the content of the 2008 power-sharing accord in Kenya and forwards several factors that explain the strong design of the agreement.

##### 4.4.1. *Strong SSR Content and External Monitoring*

To what extent did the National Accord call for security reforms? Like the case of Zimbabwe, the strength of the SSR content of the National Accord in Kenya is measured according to the inclusion or exclusion of seven criteria, while its monitoring strength is measured according to the presence or absence of mechanisms granting external actors the ability to enforce noncompliance, as outlined in Chapter 2. To reiterate, SSR content is

---

<sup>435</sup> When I use the term the National Accord, I refer broadly to all agreements signed under the KNDR process, starting with the first agreement signed on February 1, 2008, and ending with the completion of Agenda Four, on July 29, 2008. Each signed agreement is reproduced in full in the Annexes section of African Union, 2014, *Back from the Brink*, 247-310.

measured according to provisions mandating constitutional changes in security governance, political neutrality, revisions in security reform legislation, government commissions investigating security sector complicity in political violence, training changes, domestic accountability mechanisms for those involved in political violence, and a timeframe to achieve such steps.

Early in the negotiations, on February 1, 2008, the parties signed an agreement stating that the security forces must act in an apolitical manner. The agreement read: “The security forces must carry out their duties and responsibilities with complete impartiality and without regard to ethnicity, political persuasion, or other partisan consideration.”<sup>436</sup> Agenda Four of the National Accord, concerned with “long-term issues and solutions,” had an entire section on police reform. It stipulated that an independent police commission was to be established in the constitutional review process. It also mandated security laws to be updated to reflect a democratic disposition, requiring the power-sharing government to: “Review laws and issues related to security and policing...to make them consistent with modern democratic norms.”<sup>437</sup> These provisions of the National Accord successfully fulfill the first three categories.

The Waki Commission (CIPEV) and the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC), were also grounded in the National Accord framework. The Waki Commission was authorized to collect evidence, identify those most responsible for the violence, and recommend measures to bring perpetrators to justice. The TJRC was mandated to investigate human rights abuses from 1963 to the formation of the coalition government in 2008.<sup>438</sup> While both bodies were authorized to investigate state security involvement in the

---

<sup>436</sup> Government of Kenya, 2008, “National Accord,” in African Union, 2014, *Back from the Brink*, 257.

<sup>437</sup> Ibid, 303.

<sup>438</sup> Ibid, 287-294.

2007-08 violence, successfully fulfilling the fourth category, neither body established concrete domestic accountability mechanisms, failing to fulfill the fifth category.<sup>439</sup>

Agenda Four of the National Accord also called for more training of the police.<sup>440</sup> Lastly, the National Accord provided a demanding timetable to achieve the delineated SSR reforms, stipulating that the constitutional review process be completed in 12 months, the legislative review in 6 months, and the recruitment and training of new police to be finished by 2012.<sup>441</sup> Due to its fulfillment of six out of seven categories, it is clear that the National Accord's SSR content should be deemed as strong. The National Accord's SSR provisions highlighted here are, of course, only paper promises; the degree of their implementation is analyzed in the next section.

While the GCG was designated as the lead implementer of the agreement, a strong monitoring and implementation role for the international community can be found throughout the text of the National Accord. The "Statement of Principles on Long-Term Issues and Solutions" tasked the AU, through the Panel of Eminent African Personalities, as the primary external body responsible for implementation of the agreement. It stated that the parties: "request the Panel to continue to provide, on a need basis, support in the implementation of these and previous agreements."<sup>442</sup> The parties agreed that the Panel of Eminent African Personalities would set up a Coordination and Liaison Office (CLO), with support from the UN Development Program (UNDP), to monitor and implement the National Accord. The terms of reference for the CLO were broad. The CLO was mandated, among

---

<sup>439</sup> The Waki Commission, once it completed its work, did include a provision whereby, if no domestic tribunal was established, Annan would hand over the names of suspected post-election violence perpetrators to the International Criminal Court, as is discussed below.

<sup>440</sup> Government of Kenya, 2008, "National Accord," in African Union, 2014, *Back from the Brink*, 303.

<sup>441</sup> Ibid.

<sup>442</sup> Ibid, 300.

other duties, to assist, “the Panel in mobilizing international support and resources for the implementation processes,” keep the GCG “informed about the status of donor contributions to the work of the Panel,” and liaise with the GCG “on the implementation of the reform agenda.”<sup>443</sup>

The National Accord also stipulated leading roles for other international actors in the monitoring and implementation process, including in the constitution-making process and the various commissions created by the National Accord. The agreement mandated that the Waki Commission, the Independent Review Committee (IREC), and the TJRC all include international representation (two members for the Waki Commission and three for both IREC and the TJRC).<sup>444</sup> Although not included in the formal agreement, the broader National Accord framework also led to the International Criminal Court (ICC) playing a prominent and controversial role in the power-sharing period, as is discussed in detail below. As the AU and other international actors were given specific roles in implementing the National Accord, the agreement is deemed as strong in the category of third party monitoring strength. Taken together, the strong SSR content and strong third party monitoring give the National Accord an overall strong value in terms of agreement design, the highest possible category on the scale highlighted in Chapter 2.

#### *4.4.2. Roots of Strong Agreement Design*

The long-term factors of the nature of civil-military relations and the character of external involvement primarily account for the strength of the National Accord. Due to the incumbent party’s low reliance on the security sector to remain in power and high levels of Western

---

<sup>443</sup> Ibid, 52.

<sup>444</sup> Ibid, 284, 289, 293.

involvement and pressure to reform the police, PNU allowed meaningful security reforms on the negotiation agenda, resulting in strong SSR content in the National Accord. The civilian nature of politics and the unidirectional civil-police relationship in Kenya meant that SSR did not threaten the incumbent's main means to power. As such, politicians were impervious to any anti-reform pressures from the police during negotiations, allowing significant SSR content to be included in the agreement. Hassan, the former commissioner at the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, told me that, no "police officer has the audacity to stand up to any member of the executive."<sup>445</sup>

ODM pushed hard on the need for police reform during the negotiation process. Omondi, a member of the ODM mediation team and aide to Odinga, said that the party prioritized police and security reforms in large part due to the police's involvement in the post-election violence. He said that ODM, "wanted to get [police commissioner Mohammed Hussein] Ali...ODM supporters were shot by police, in the back...our targets were the state security organs."<sup>446</sup> While ODM pressure certainly played a key role, international pressure was again decisive on the issue of the SSR content in the National Accord. During negotiations, Annan and Western countries made it clear that the issue of police reform had to be addressed. Philip Ransley, a retired Kenyan justice who in 2009 headed the GCG's National Task Force on Police Reforms, told me that, "there was a lot of pressure from outside embassies, that were concerned that the police should be reformed. I think Kibaki took that on board that that should be done."<sup>447</sup>

---

<sup>445</sup> Personal interview, Hassan, 2011.

<sup>446</sup> Personal interview, Omondi, 2015.

<sup>447</sup> Personal interview, Philip Ransley, former Kenyan justice, head of National Task Force on Police Reforms, Nairobi, Kenya, May 5, 2015.

A similar dynamic played out in the negotiations regarding issues of the National Accord's monitoring and implementation. Due to Kenya's long history of strong relations with Western countries and a lack of cohesive regional norms against outside intervention, the leaders of both the ODM and PNU parties largely agreed on the need for a strong external monitoring role of the agreement. Kibaki's acquiescence on this issue came against internal pressure from some hardliners within his own party, who felt that Annan and other international actors had too much power over Kenya's internal affairs during this period.

PNU's outspoken head negotiator, Martha Karua, complained publicly about Western, particularly US, influence during the negotiating period, saying: "Why are your [Western] countries superior to mine...There is a class issue and kind of racism in the world: I am a Kenyan minister and nobody listens to me...Why should Washington run the world?"<sup>448</sup> Kagwanja, the advisor to PNU and Kibaki, told me that, "there was an overwhelming influence of the external players." He even went so far as to say that, "For us [PNU] he [Annan] was the prime mover; Raila [Odinga] is the stooge. He [Annan] was really the owner of the stooge."<sup>449</sup> In spite of these voices within his own party, Kibaki bowed to international pressure for strong external monitoring. His reasoning for doing so is explored at length below in the section on PNU's choice of political strategy.

In addition to the nature of civil-military relations and the character of external involvement, another contributing factor to the strong design of the National Accord was the participation of civil society actors in the negotiation process. The majority of security reforms in the National Accord were contained in Agenda Four, which, as noted, outlined the institutional reforms designed to resolve the underlying causes of the Kenya crisis. Samuel

---

<sup>448</sup> Cohen, 2008, "How Kofi Annan Rescued Kenya."

<sup>449</sup> Personal interview, Kagwanja, 2015.

Mohochi, a human rights lawyer and former director of the Independent Medico-Legal Unit, a nongovernmental organization in Kenya, told me: “If it had not been for the involvement of civil society in Kenya...you would not have had Agenda Four.”<sup>450</sup> The following section turns to the second mechanism through which SSR processes were shaped in Kenya: each party’s choice of political strategy under power sharing.

#### 4.5. Inclusive Political Strategies Under Power Sharing

Kenya has a violent political history since the move to multipartyism in the early 1990s, with the executive using security forces to help maintain political control and politicians on both sides of the political spectrum using political militias to achieve electoral gains, as noted. A lack of any serious attempts to hold politicians accountable has fueled a vicious cycle of violence and impunity.<sup>451</sup> As highlighted above, despite the prevalence of political violence in Kenya, the country’s politics has remained remarkably inclusive, with a long list of ephemeral and ever-shifting elite political coalitions in the run up to and after elections.<sup>452</sup> Indeed, the two main protagonists in the 2008 crisis, Kibaki and Odinga, prior to the formation of PNU and ODM, had previously worked together under the banner of the opposition coalition that won the 2002 elections, NARC. Reflective of Kenya’s cohesive elite relations and lack of strong ideological party positions, NARC brought together a diverse mix of former KANU elites—many of whom had been implicated in past cycles of political violence and corruption scandals—along with progressive opposition reformers and civil society activists.

---

<sup>450</sup> Personal Interview, Samuel Mohochi, human rights lawyer and former director of the Independent Medico-Legal Unit, Nairobi, Kenya, April 4, 2011.

<sup>451</sup> Anderson and Lochery, 2008, “Violence and Exodus in Kenya’s Rift Valley, 2008,” 338.

<sup>452</sup> Both of these trends in Kenya’s history were discussed at length above.

After the NARC alliance collapsed due to Kibaki's refusal to respect a pre-election memorandum of understanding to appoint Odinga as prime minister and other political and ethnic tensions, the Kibaki and Odinga camps went head to head during the 2005 failed attempt at constitutional reform.<sup>453</sup> Following a series of internal battles and further shifting allegiances, these two camps then were formalized into the ODM and PNU coalitions in the lead up to the 2007 elections. The PNU alliance was led by Kibaki and was made up of a variety of smaller parties, including elements of the Democratic Party, the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Kenya, the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-People, KANU (namely Uhuru Kenyatta and Moi), and New KANU. The ODM alliance (the ODM name was first used prior to the 2005 referendum in reference to an orange that appeared on the "No" ballot card) was headed by Odinga and also consisted of a number of other parties, including the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and some elements of KANU, namely the camp of William Ruto.<sup>454</sup>

The 2008 crisis was marked by a period of intense elite fragmentation and prominent individuals in both the PNU and ODM camps were implicated in helping to organize the post-election violence.<sup>455</sup> That said, once the National Accord was signed, both the ODM and PNU parties largely chose to follow the Kenyan tradition of elite cohesion,<sup>456</sup> choosing to deploy relatively inclusive, compromising political strategies under the period of power sharing in Kenya.

---

<sup>453</sup> Mueller 2008, "The Political Economy of Kenya's Crisis," 200.

<sup>454</sup> Elischer, 2008, "Ethnic Coalitions of Convenience and Commitment," 24.

<sup>455</sup> *The Guardian*, "ICC Accuses Six Kenyans of Crimes Against Humanity During 2007 Violence," December 15, 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/15/kenya-election-violence-suspects-named> (accessed July 31, 2016).

<sup>456</sup> Cheeseman, 2011, "The Internal Dynamics of Power Sharing in Africa."



#### 4.5.1. *PNU's Largely Inclusive Strategy Under Power Sharing*

Kibaki and PNU used the police and other security sector institutions for political purposes in the run-up to the 2007 elections and during the post-election violence, as noted. Prominent members of his party, most notably Kenyatta, the son of Jomo Kenyatta and KANU's presidential candidate in 2002, were also linked to militia violence, carried out by the Mungiki militia, in the post-election period. After Kibaki and PNU signed the National Accord, however, they largely shifted their political strategies away from outright violence and back toward inclusion and political compromise under power sharing.

After the 2008 crisis and the signing of the National Accord, Kibaki and PNU officials knew they had to undertake a degree of institutional reforms due to overwhelming domestic and international pressure. Under the GCG, Kibaki therefore adopted a broad pro-reform strategy that was focused on how best to implement institutional reforms in a manner that suited his preferences and interests. On the issue of constitutional reform for instance, Kagwanja, Kibaki's advisor, told me that PNU supported the new constitution because it was politically necessary. He said, "We can go to bed with a porcupine, because it was necessary to do so. Why? Because not achieving the constitution meant losing the nation." He went on, saying: "With the constitution [issue] gone, then you are able to steer the debate toward the implementation of the institutions that are recommended in the constitution. So that was one of the strategic things that we [PNU] did."<sup>457</sup>

A similar dynamic played out in the area of SSR and police reform, where the party again took a largely inclusive, compromising political approach. Kibaki and the PNU agreed in principle on the necessity of reforming the police, the question became the extent and what form the reforms would take. Peter Nyong'o, secretary general of ODM and minister in the

---

<sup>457</sup> Personal interview, Kagwanja, 2015.

CGG, told me that Kibaki was on board with the need for police reform, saying, “He [Kibaki] was genuinely interested in seeing those reforms undertaken.”<sup>458</sup> The issue of accountability mechanisms for the post-election violence was an important exception to this pro-reform trend, as elements of the party fought strongly against such mechanisms, as detailed in the following section.

To reiterate, exclusive versus inclusive political strategies and tactics are measured according to four categories: joining the power-sharing government without delay, the use of widespread partisan political violence, evidence of attempts at cross-party policy cooperation on key reforms contained in the agreement (or attempts to block), and cooperative (or confrontational) approaches to SSR, as outlined in Chapter 2. In contrast to the incumbent party in Zimbabwe, Kibaki and PNU did not delay the formation of the unity government. The GCG was sworn in on April 17, 2008, six weeks after the parties formally agreed on the specifics of a power sharing government through the signing of the National Accord and Reconciliation Act on February 28, 2008.

As to be expected when former rivals come together under one roof, the inner-workings of the GCG were far from collegial at all times. Issues of accountability and appointments were particularly contentious, as discussed below. In his memoir, Odinga noted that while there was often agreement at top levels, PNU frequently attempted to stifle ODM actions lower down in the bureaucracy. Odinga wrote that, “there was a concerted effort to undermine ODM ministers by appointing PNU-leaning permanent secretaries (PSs) to serve under them...they were given specific instructions to ensure our ministers did not appear

---

<sup>458</sup> Personal interview, Peter Nyong'o, secretary general of ODM and minister of medical services in the GCG, Nairobi, Kenya, April 24, 2015.

effective.”<sup>459</sup> There were also bitter disagreements among the parties on how best to implement the agreed on reforms (see below).

That said, at the top levels, and with the important exception of accountability mechanisms, Kibaki did not attempt to block most of the key reforms outlined in the National Accord, as exemplified by his strong support for the constitution. As demonstrated by the evidence above from personal interviews with party leaders, Kibaki also took a rather inclusive approach to SSR. Although PNU did take a harder stance later on in the SSR process regarding disputes over the powers of the agreed to oversight mechanisms, Kibaki agreed in principle on the need for police reform and played a largely supportive, if hands off, role, especially in the early years of the GCG.

Moreover, while overall political and communal violence remained relatively widespread in Kenya under the GCG, party-based violence and political militia activity fell in the 2009-2013 period. While accurately attributing acts of political violence to political parties is difficult in Kenya due to the diffuse and often-ethnically based nature of violence, according to data compiled by ACLED, only seven incidents of partisan political violence can be directly attributed to PNU under the years of power sharing, a number that clearly falls well below the threshold of 20 violent incidents per year.<sup>460</sup> PNU therefore fulfills all four inclusionary categories. As such, PNU’s political strategy under the GCG falls into the inclusive category, the highest possible score.

---

<sup>459</sup> Raila Odinga and Sarah Elderkin, 2013, *The Flame of Freedom* (Nairobi: Mountain Top, Kindle Edition): locations 17676-17680.

<sup>460</sup> ACLED, Version 5 Data (1997-2014); for more on the patterns and dynamics of political violence in Kenya during this period see, Caitriona Dowd and Clionadh Raleigh, 2013, “ACLED Regional Report: Kenya,” [http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/ACLED-Country-Report\\_Kenya\\_December-2013\\_updated.pdf](http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/ACLED-Country-Report_Kenya_December-2013_updated.pdf) (accessed July 31, 2013).

#### *4.5.2. Explaining PNU's Largely Inclusionary Strategy*

What explains PNU's inclusionary strategy under power sharing? Analogous to the mechanism of agreement design, the two long-term factors of low reliance on the security sector and a high degree of Western leverage played an important role in shaping Kibaki's and PNU's choice of political strategy in the GCG. Because of the high degree of Western leverage and involvement under power sharing, and concerted international and regional pressure to undertake police reform, Kibaki's hand was forced to move on this issue. Failing to do so would have risked cutting off aid from donors and souring Kenya's strong relations with Western countries. Due to PNU's low level of reliance on the security sector to remain in power, Kibaki and his party were willing to capitulate on the need for police reforms, as doing so did not directly threaten their means of staying in office.

Two other main factors contributed to this choice of an inclusive political strategy. First, in sharp contrast to Mugabe in Zimbabwe, was Kibaki's past as a member of the pro-reform political opposition that fought for political liberalization in Kenya. As the head of DP, Kibaki was leader of the official opposition in parliament from 1998 to 2002, and in 2002 he was elected on the reform agenda of the NARC. Despite some hardline positions that Kibaki took during his first term and his authoritarian tendencies in the 2007 election and ensuing crisis, because of his past in the opposition he was not diametrically opposed to the very idea of democratic reform, and had forged many personal relationships with many in the ODM camp.

Nyong'o, the ODM secretary general, described Kibaki to me as, "someone who is liberal in nature." Nyong'o said that, unlike Mugabe, Kibaki was a democrat at heart: "He didn't want his children to inherit political power. Kibaki is a very different head of state

than Mugabe. I mean he's a conservative liberal."<sup>461</sup> Kibara, from the PNU mediation team, also made this point, noting that, PNU's roots stemmed from "a reformist government. They [NARC] won on a reformist agenda. And that was both from the ODM side and the Kibaki side."<sup>462</sup>

Second, was Kibaki's lack of incumbency and concern over his legacy. Given Kenya's term limits and Kibaki's intention to step down after his second term was up in 2013, Kibaki was much more inclined to agree to reforms that constrained his executive powers than if he was standing for reelection. A handful of high-level officials from both PNU and ODM brought up this point. Nyong'o, of ODM, put this argument to me regarding the issue of SSR, saying that Kibaki "was not going to stand in 2013. He didn't have any interest in resisting police reforms." Nyong'o also spoke on the issue of Kibaki's legacy, claiming that Kibaki did not want to be solely remembered for the dark period of the 2007 election and subsequent post-election violence. Nyong'o told me that Kibaki, "wanted to leave a legacy. When all is said and done, I don't think he was very happy about 2007."<sup>463</sup> Kibara, of PNU, also made this point, telling me that, "you have a president who wants a good legacy, because he's not running in the next election."<sup>464</sup>

#### *4.5.3. ODM's Inclusive Strategy Under Power Sharing*

From serving as a minister in Moi's government to linking up with Kibaki to defeat Moi in 2002, Odinga has shown a willingness to compromise and build alliances. That said, Odinga and the ODM also have a history of embracing more exclusive strategies and tactics, with

---

<sup>461</sup> Personal interview, Nyong'o, 2015.

<sup>462</sup> Personal interview, Kibara, 2015.

<sup>463</sup> Personal interview, Nyong'o, 2015.

<sup>464</sup> Personal interview, Kibara, 2015.

prominent members of the ODM coalition in 2007, most notably Ruto—a Kalenjin and mentee of Moi’s—linked to militia violence in the 1990s and during the post-election violence in 2008.

In aligning himself with Ruto and other proponents of the radical form of regionalism known as *majimboism*, including Henry Kosgey, Odinga adopted an exclusionary electoral strategy in 2007 which, given past communal violence committed in the name of *majimboism*, predictably led to significant violence in the run-up to and after the 2007 election.<sup>465</sup> Once Odinga and ODM signed the National Accord agreement, however, they, like PNU, largely reverted back toward inclusionary and compromising political strategies under power sharing.

Odinga had long been a proponent of the need for broad institutional, namely constitutional, reform in Kenya.<sup>466</sup> Under power sharing, Odinga and ODM continued to push vigorously for far-reaching reforms. With strong backing from international and domestic constituencies, and high-level buy in from Kibaki on the need for reform, Odinga and his party adopted inclusionary political strategies. The exception to this trend was in the realm of accountability mechanisms for the post-election violence, as segments of ODM fought vigorously against such mechanisms, as discussed at length in the following section.

In addition to Odinga’s pro-reform ideological leanings, electoral, security, and constitutional reforms would also help him and ODM win future elections in Kenya by evening out the playing field and solidifying Odinga’s reformist credentials. The AU’s official publication on its mediation makes this point, noting that for Odinga, the “main advocate for change, the new constitution would provide a solid platform on which to

---

<sup>465</sup> Anderson and Lochery, 2008, “Violence and Exodus in Kenya’s Rift Valley, 2008,” 329-330.

<sup>466</sup> Odinga and Elderkin, 2013, *The Flame of Freedom*, locations 12938-12940.

campaign for the country's highest office."<sup>467</sup> Kibara, of the PNU mediation team, echoed this sentiment, arguing that Kibaki and Odinga both wanted reforms, but for different reasons. He told me that both Kibaki and Odinga, "needed the reforms. For one, his legacy...the other, to win the election."<sup>468</sup>

This dynamic and choice of inclusive political strategies obtained in the realm of SSR and police reform as well. With Kibaki and PNU on board with the need for police reform, the debate between the two parties did not center around if institutional police reforms should happen, but on their form and manner of implementation. Due to Kibaki's use of the police for political purposes and scores of ODM supporters being shot by police in the post-election violence, Odinga and ODM placed a high priority on the issue of police reform, as noted. In contrast to the MDC opposition party in Zimbabwe, however, Odinga and ODM chose to take an inclusive approach to SSR and police reform under power sharing.

In sum, the ODM did not delay the formation of the unity government, and, with the exception of accountability mechanisms—as discussed below, did not attempt to block key reforms in the National Accord. While prioritizing the issue of SSR and police reform, Odinga and ODM took an inclusionary approach to the issue, working in cooperation with PNU on institutional oversight and other reforms (see below). Moreover, despite an increase in party-based political violence around the 2013 elections, only six incidents of partisan political violence can be directly attributed to ODM during the tenure of the GCG, falling below the threshold of 20 violent incidents per year.<sup>469</sup> ODM therefore fulfills all four inclusionary categories, meaning ODM's political strategy under power sharing falls into the inclusive category, the highest score.

---

<sup>467</sup> African Union, 2014, *Back from the Brink*, 162.

<sup>468</sup> Personal interview, Kibara, 2015.

<sup>469</sup> ACLED, Version 5 Data (1997-2014).

#### 4.5.4. *Explaining ODM's Choice of Strategy*

As the pro-reform candidate and party, Odinga and ODM's strategic choices are more intuitive to explain than PNU's. Because of the political consensus on the need for reforms, backed by cohesive international and regional pressure, Odinga was able to take an inclusive approach on the reform agenda. Two other main inter-related factors contributed to ODM's choice of a largely inclusive political strategy under the GCG. First, akin to Kibaki's past and indicative of the fluid nature of political alliances in Kenya, was Odinga's past relationships working with politicians and parties across the political spectrum, from his stint in KANU to playing second fiddle to Kibaki under NARC in the 2002 elections. When Annan asked Odinga if it would be difficult to work with Kibaki and his party in 2008, Odinga replied that, "it would not be a problem for us, as most of the team had already been Cabinet ministers and we all knew one another."<sup>470</sup>

Second, along the same vein, were Odinga and the ODM's political maturity and past experience in government. In contrast to the MDC parties in Zimbabwe, Odinga and ODM were veteran politicians with firsthand experience of the inner workings of government and the intricacies of policy formation. Odinga knew how to play the game of politics. A number of interviewees made this point to me. A former ODM advisor told me that Odinga, "was a master strategist. He knew politics."<sup>471</sup> This experience and political maturity led ODM to realize that, after years of frustrating failure to achieve genuine democratic reforms, the 2008 crisis had finally provided the impetus to achieve their pro-reform agenda. Instead of forcing their agenda down their opponent's throats, the Odinga and ODM astutely decided to roll up

---

<sup>470</sup> Odinga and Elderkin, 2013, *The Flame of Freedom*, locations 16855-16857.

<sup>471</sup> Personal interview, former senior ODM official, May 15, 2015.



their sleeves and work in an inclusive, compromising manner with PNU to help guide the pro-reform agenda through the power-sharing government.

The two previous sections have discussed the mechanisms of agreement design and political strategy, demonstrating that they were strong and largely inclusionary, respectively, and examined the various historical factors and events that led to these conditions in the Kenyan context. The agreement design and political strategy hypotheses predict that the combination of strong agreement design and largely inclusionary political strategies will translate to a considerable degree of SSR in Kenya under power sharing.

#### 4.6. SSR Outcomes in Kenya

Did these theoretical expectations hold up under power sharing in Kenya? Akin to Zimbabwe, the power-sharing negotiation had the potential to be a critical juncture in Kenya's trajectory, but in this case it opened up a real, if highly structured, moment for democratic change. In contrast to Zimbabwe's experience, this window of structured contingency remained open after the National Accord was signed, as the practice of largely inclusionary *coalition politics* obtained in Kenya under the GCG. After decades of failed attempts at institutional reform in Kenya, the power-sharing government delivered on a number of fragile but significant constitutional, security, and judicial reforms, particularly at the institutional level.

While the police reform process was slow, uneven, and beset by implementation challenges, the GCG passed a number of significant reforms that provided the institutional framework to reform the structure and oversight of the Kenyan police.<sup>472</sup> Although behavioral

---

<sup>472</sup> Ruteere also makes this point. See Ruteere, 2014, "Security and Human Rights in the New Constitutional Order in Kenya," locations 4342-4343.

changes lagged behind institutional reforms, levels of police involvement in electoral processes and violence fell drastically during this period. The following section outlines these processes in detail and then highlights the various indicators that help gauge the extent of SSR achieved under power sharing in Kenya. As expected, despite implementation challenges, Kenya achieved considerable SSR under power sharing. The section concludes with an examination of SSR efforts in Kenya prior to power sharing, demonstrating that while some SSR was attempted after the 2002 KANU transition, little to no genuine progress was made.

#### *4.6.1. Strong Agreement Design Empowered International and Domestic Actors*

The strong design of the National Accord in Kenya was critical in shaping the country's significant progress on SSR. As seen in Zimbabwe, the content of political agreements sets the parameters and shapes the manner in which power-sharing governments will be implemented and monitored. The strong agreement design of the National Accord facilitated reform in Kenya because domestic, regional, and international actors were able to leverage the specifics of the agreement to pressure and cajole members of the coalition government to uphold their reform promises.

On the domestic front, pressure from the various commissions set up by the National Accord and local civil society organizations played a key role in pushing the GCG on SSR. While the IREC and the TJRC played contributing roles, the Waki Commission, which painstakingly documented police involvement in the post-election violence, was the most prominent and forthright of the National Accord commissions on the need for comprehensive police reform. Mohamed, the NPSC commissioner, asserted that the Waki Commission

played a central role in driving the police reform process under the GCG, leading first to the Ransley report, which, in turn, drove the Police Reforms Implementation Committee (PRIC) process, which later led to the two oversight bodies, the Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) and the NSPC, as detailed below.<sup>473</sup> Ransley echoed this point on the importance of the Waki Commission to the police reform process, telling me that the report, “magnified the situation. Made it obvious. And then others jumped in on that. Outside forces said look, you’ve got to do something. Civil society said we’ve got to have this. After that they really got going.”<sup>474</sup>

As noted by Ransley, local civil society organizations then picked up the ball on the issue of police reform. Hassan, the former commissioner at the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, told me that, “We have a very robust civil society...a charged citizenry in terms of calling government to account.”<sup>475</sup> Tom Kagwe, formerly of the nongovernmental Kenya Human Rights Commission who went on to become a board member of the IPOA, explained to me that civil society complemented the official AU monitoring and implementation role. He said: “we have very clear civil society institutions that have really pushed this [National Accord] Agenda framework.”<sup>476</sup> South Consulting, a Kenya-based consultancy, was selected by the AU team to assist in monitoring and implementation efforts, adding additional attention to the reform agenda through regular reporting. South Consulting also held civil society meetings and conferences, in tandem with the AU, on the state of the National Accord’s implementation.<sup>477</sup> In this fashion, domestic constituents used the strong

---

<sup>473</sup> Personal interview, Mohamed, 2015.

<sup>474</sup> Personal interview, Ransley, 2015.

<sup>475</sup> Personal interview, Hassan, 2011.

<sup>476</sup> Personal interview, Tom Kagwe, formerly head of research, Kenya Human Rights Commission, board member, Independent Policing Oversight Authority, Nairobi, Kenya, April 6, 2011.

<sup>477</sup> African Union, 2014, *Back from the Brink*, 57-58.

agreement design and SSR content of the National Accord to apply pressure on the GCG from below.

Concurrently, regional and international actors applied pressure from above, using the framework provided by the strong agreement design and content of the National Accord to compel the coalition government to move toward security reform. The AU Panel of Eminent African Personalities, headed by Annan and supported by the CLO, played an active monitoring and implementation role over the life of the power-sharing government. In contrast to Zimbabwe, the AU was able to help advance reforms precisely because the National Accord provided the body with tangible reforms and benchmarks to enforce. When progress was lagging on implementation of the institutional reforms outlined in Agenda Four, for example, the AU applied political pressure on both parties to expedite the reform process. This point is made in the AU's official account of its role in Kenya under power sharing. The report reads: "whenever it became necessary the Panel helped remove obstacles to implementation. It made use of quiet diplomacy and also intervened publicly by means of press statements, or visits to Kenya, between 2008 and 2012."<sup>478</sup>

Manifold actors within the international community also used the National Accord framework to push security reforms. After years of often conflicting messaging and actions, the donor community, which as demonstrated above had a high level of leverage in Kenya during this period, acted in a cohesive and coordinated fashion, as it lined up behind Annan and the AU and wielded its considerable leverage with one voice.<sup>479</sup> Frazer, the former US assistant secretary of state for Africa, told me that, "Kofi [Annan] was very effective in mobilizing the international community behind him." Donors, most notably the United

---

<sup>478</sup> Ibid, 56.

<sup>479</sup> Brown, 2009, "Donor Responses to the 2008 Kenya Crisis."

States, United Kingdom, and the EU, publicly and privately pushed for police reform, with key donors tying their development assistance to reform efforts.<sup>480</sup> With the Kenyan police in the domestic and international spotlight, other external actors piled on. Philip Alston, the UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial killings, released a report in 2009 on the Kenyan police that reiterated domestic calls for sweeping reform, applying further external pressure on the unity government to deliver on police reforms.<sup>481</sup>

Speaking on the role of international influence in pushing the police reform agenda forward under power sharing, Ransley told me that Kibaki paid great attention to pressure from donor embassies. Ransley said that Kibaki took the views of the embassies on board, “and then he dispatched his minions to set it [the police reform process] up.” Haron Ndubi, director of Haki Focus, a Kenyan civil society organization, asserted that demands from the international sphere were effective in pushing reform because the international community “wields the kind of sword that the government fears...Political as well as economic pressure.”<sup>482</sup> If significant SSR had not been included in the National Accord along with other institutional reforms, security reforms would not have been susceptible to such outside pressures.

The National Accord set the agenda for SSR in Kenya, guaranteeing that it would be discussed in the various domestic and international forums and monitoring reports that proliferated after 2008. Mutuma Ruteere, director of the Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies, made this point to me, saying: “If you really want to be seen to be carrying out any

---

<sup>480</sup> *Daily Nation*, “UK Pledges Kenya Reforms Support,” April 28, 2010, <http://www.nation.co.ke/News/UK+pledges+Kenya+reforms+support/-/1056/927630/-/1614tkz/-/index.html> (accessed August 2, 2016).

<sup>481</sup> *CNN*, “UN Report Alleges Widespread Killings by Kenyan Police,” April 6, 2009, <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/06/05/kenya.united.nations.investigation/> (accessed August 2, 2016).

<sup>482</sup> Personal interview, Haron Ndubi, director of Haki Focus, nongovernmental organization, Nairobi, Kenya, April 7, 2011.

of the reforms, police are essential...It's part of the Agenda Four reforms. And there are constant reviews of that, in terms of where we are on that. So that keeps the fire on them [the GCG]."<sup>483</sup> The ICC, which opened cases into the post-election violence in 2010 after the GCG failed to set up a special tribunal (see below), also played a prominent and contentious external role during this period. A number of scholars have debated the impact of the ICC on the reform process in Kenya.<sup>484</sup> My interviews revealed that while the ICC may have helped to shine a brighter light on the police through its indictment of the former police commissioner, Mohammed Hussein Ali, the ICC was not a decisive factor in pushing the police reform process forward.

The strong agreement design of the National Accord pushed the police reform agenda forward in Kenya in two further ways. First, was the inclusion of concrete timelines in the National Accord. These timeframes gave domestic and international actors a further foothold to push the GCG on the timely implementation of the reform agenda. A handful of interviewees stressed the importance of timelines in the National Accord to me. Nyong'o, the ODM secretary general, told me: "If there were no timelines, we would not have the constitution in August 2010, we would not have had the elections in 2013, a lot of things would have gone wrong."<sup>485</sup> Omondi, of the ODM negotiating team, also stressed this point, telling me that the concrete implementation guidelines and timeframes were very important to the reform process. He told me, "As ODM, we felt there must be details, otherwise it will not be done."<sup>486</sup>

---

<sup>483</sup> Personal interview, Mutuma Ruteere, director, Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies, Nairobi, April 4, 2011.

<sup>484</sup> See for instance, Stephen Brown and Chandra Sriram, 2012, "The Big Fish Won't Fry Themselves: Criminal Accountability for Post-Election Violence in Kenya," *African Affairs*, 111, 443: 244-260; Lionel Nichols, 2015, *The International Criminal Court and the End of Impunity in Kenya* (Cham: Springer).

<sup>485</sup> Personal interview, Nyong'o, 2015.

<sup>486</sup> Personal interview, Omondi, 2015.

Second, was the fact that the detailed reform agenda outlined in Agenda Four of the National Accord was included in the new constitution, passed in 2010. Because of its inclusion in the constitution, SSR and police reforms became part and parcel of the broader effort at implementing the constitution, led by the Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution (CIC).<sup>487</sup> Schedule Five of the constitution required that new laws pertaining to the constitution must be passed within a five-year period, with the failure to do so triggering harsh penalties, including the entire dissolution of Kenya's legislature.<sup>488</sup> This arrangement helped push the overall reform agenda forward in a timely manner and forced politicians in the GCG to compromise. Kibara told me that because of the CIC and Schedule Five, "it was no longer their [politicians'] game, in terms of whether reforms went forward or did not go forward. The institutions had got their own momentum. Their own institutional capacity to push...they changed the game completely." Nyong'o echoed this point, telling me that, "Schedule Five was very important" in keeping the pressure on the GCG and driving reforms forward.<sup>489</sup>

#### 4.6.1. *Inclusive Strategies Facilitated Openings for Police Reform*

For different reasons, both Kibaki and Odinga chose to deploy largely inclusionary political strategies under power sharing in Kenya, as demonstrated above. Due to the PNU's low degree of reliance on the security sector, pressure from donors, and concern over his legacy, Kibaki was able to overcome significant pressure from within the police and adopt an

---

<sup>487</sup> African Union, 2014, *Back from the Brink*, 4.

<sup>488</sup> Yash Pal Ghai, 2014, "Constitutions and Constitutionalism: the Fate of the 2010 Constitution," in Godwin Murunga, Duncan Okello, and Anders Sjögren, (eds.) *Kenya: The Struggle for a New Constitutional Order* (London: Zed Books, Kindle Edition): locations 3212-3216.

<sup>489</sup> Personal interview, Peter Nyong'o, secretary general of ODM and minister of medical services in the GCG, Nairobi, Kenya, April 24, 2015

inclusive, pro-reform approach to SSR. The unidirectional nature of the relationship between the executive branch and the police meant that the police simply did not possess the necessary political influence to effectively stymie reform.

This was not for lack of trying. Odour Ong’wen, a member of the PRIC, emphasized this point on resistance to change in the police, telling me, “The first major obstacle we are seeing as a committee is the resistance from the very top [of the police hierarchy]...A few of them might be well disposed toward reforms, but a staggering majority are resisting.”<sup>490</sup> Despite intransigence from the police leadership, because of the executive’s supremacy over the police, Kibaki’s inclusive, pro-reform approach won out, especially in the early years of the power-sharing period. In 2011, Ruteere told me that the police, “are being forced to change...The police find they have no choice, they have to show the motions of reforming, even if they do not want to reform.”<sup>491</sup>

Indeed, Kibaki appears to have been truly interested in reforming the police, as demonstrated in the above section. Kagwanja, Kibaki’s advisor, confirmed this point, telling me that, “Police reforms, and those [SSR] reforms, were necessary, the question was how far do you want to go...The need to reform security, the police specifically, was agreed upon.”<sup>492</sup> Given that PNU agreed in principle on reforming the police, the debate between the parties focused on the details and content of the reforms. For instance, Kagwanja explained to me that certain elements of PNU thought that Agenda Four was too much of an open-ended,

---

<sup>490</sup> Personal interview, Odour Ong’wen, member of the GCG’s Police Reforms Implementation Committee, Nairobi, Kenya, April 4, 2011.

<sup>491</sup> Personal interview, Ruteere, 2011.

<sup>492</sup> Personal interview, Kagwanja, 2015.



activist agenda, and wanted reforms to be more circumscribed and not driven by external paradigms and actors.<sup>493</sup>

Despite some opposition from PNU hardliners, Kibaki's support for the reform agenda mostly trickled down the ranks of the party and facilitated strong working relations within the top levels of the power-sharing government. An ODM minister stressed to me that that cross-party relations in the cabinet were largely cordial, saying: "If you served in the cabinet and you had work to do...the party lines disappeared immediately. You worked really well together, really well."<sup>494</sup> The official AU account of the GCG period echoed this point regarding the constitution-making process, asserting that, despite some elements within both parties being against the constitution, Kibaki and Odinga "managed to project an image of 'a unified executive.' They consulted regularly and on occasion both presented the government's policy on important national questions."<sup>495</sup> Omondi, Odinga's advisor, reported a similar dynamic on the issue of SSR and police reforms, telling me that Kibaki, by his nature and leadership style, was happy to delegate without interference once the issue was agreed to in the National Accord. Omondi told me, "Even with the police reforms, he [Kibaki] took a backseat. I mean we've agreed...these things would probably be good for this country. We've agreed, let's implement it."<sup>496</sup>

Therefore, while Kibaki and the PNU were largely on board with the police reform agenda, Odinga and the ODM side were the real drivers of the process within the power-sharing government. Ong'wen, of the PRIC, made this point, telling me that Odinga and his office tracked the details of the police reform process closely. Ong'wen told me that: "the

---

<sup>493</sup> Ibid.

<sup>494</sup> Personal interview, senior member of ODM negotiating team and former minister, 2015.

<sup>495</sup> African Union, 2014, *Back from the Brink*, 76.

<sup>496</sup> Personal interview, Omondi, 2015.

Office of the Prime Minister has been very very passionate about this, every time [we met] they demanded that we give them reports and that kind of thing.”<sup>497</sup> Ruteere seconded this point, telling me that while both parties were involved in the police reform agenda: “ODM has kept the police on the crosshairs.”<sup>498</sup>

This is not to say that inter-party relations under the GCG were smooth at all times. Indeed, on the topic of accountability for the post-election violence, as explored below, and issues of appointments and dismissals, Odinga and Kibaki and their respective parties, disagreed bitterly, causing several bouts of damaging delays and paralysis within the GCG.<sup>499</sup> Despite these areas of contention, both PNU and ODM generally harkened back to Kenya’s long tradition of fluid politics and elite alliance formation, adopting largely inclusionary stances on the topic of SSR. These strategic choices meant that domestic, regional, and international actors were largely in agreement on the importance of the reform agenda in Kenya. This consensus fostered an atmosphere of compromise around police reforms within the power-sharing government, which further opened the door to considerable SSR progress, particularly at an institutional level.

#### 4.6.2. SSR Outcomes: Despite Challenges, Considerable Progress Under Power Sharing

The strong design of the National Accord agreement, coordinated external pressure, and the practice of largely inclusionary *coalition politics* shaped the promising security reform environment in Kenya, leading to considerable, if halting and incomplete, SSR progress under power sharing, especially at the institutional level. To reiterate, movement on SSR policy is measured according to progress made on seven criteria essential to SSR:

---

<sup>497</sup> Personal interview, Ong’wen, 2011.

<sup>498</sup> Personal interview, Ruteere, 2011.

<sup>499</sup> African Union, 2014, *Back from the Brink*, 76-78.

constitutional changes in security governance, demands of political neutrality, security reform legislation, government commissions investigating complicity in political violence, personnel changes of security leaders, changes in training curriculum, and prosecutions of senior-level security officials. Shifts in actual security sector behavior are measured according to changes in three categories: partisan involvement in election-related violence, partisan involvement in political campaigns or elections, and statements of political partiality.

After decades of delays, the GCG in Kenya promulgated a new constitution in August 2010, prompting Kibaki to proclaim at its signing: “this is the most important day in the history of our nation since independence.”<sup>500</sup> The new constitution included meaningful changes to security governance. Article 238 required national security to be pursued in line with the rule of law, human rights, and democracy, while Article 239 demanded that the security sector be apolitical. Article 240 established a National Security Council that reports annually to parliament, thereby providing a parliamentary oversight role that aims to diminish the executive’s long-standing dominance of security affairs. The new document also placed the two branches of the Kenyan police—the Kenya Police Service and the Administration Police—under a single command, while also creating an oversight mechanism comprised of both civilians and police.<sup>501</sup>

The GCG also made considerable progress on revamping security legislation, most notably in regards to the police. Five police reform bills were drafted by the PRIC in 2010. In August 2011, parliament passed the three most important of these bills, the National Police Service Bill, the National Police Service Commission Bill, and the Independent Policing

---

<sup>500</sup> Kibaki, 2010, “Speech at the Promulgation of the New Constitution.”

<sup>501</sup> Government of Kenya, 2010, “Constitution,” <http://www.kenyalaw.org/kl/index.php?id=398> (accessed August 18, 2016).

Oversight Authority Bill.<sup>502</sup> The process of translating these bills from paper to practice, however, was sluggish, due to political disagreements at the highest levels over personnel appointments.<sup>503</sup>

The NPSC, which was mandated with preventing political manipulation, vetting officers, overseeing a new training curriculum, and integrating the Kenya Police Force and Administration Police under one command, was not sworn in until October 2012. The IPOA, responsible for providing civilian oversight, investigating excessive use of force, and handling complaints from the public, also did not begin work until November 2012.<sup>504</sup> The new position of the inspector general (IG) of the police, replacing the position of commissioner, was not sworn in until December 2012. Despite delays, the passed legislation and subsequent establishment of the above institutions, after years of failed attempts, provided the framework to change the structure, leadership, and oversight mechanisms of the Kenyan police.<sup>505</sup> Although many of these changes were delayed and not fully implemented by the 2013 election, the GCG clearly fulfills the first three categories of constitutional and legislative changes and demands of political neutrality.

The GCG also investigated security sector involvement in the post-election violence, with the Waki Commission completing its work in 2008. As the commission recommended, the government formed a panel to spearhead the police reform process—the National Task Force on Police Reforms—which was succeeded by the PRIC. The police also introduced new training, curriculum, and a code of conduct, all of which emphasize human rights and

---

<sup>502</sup> International Crisis Group, 2013, “Kenya’s 2013 Elections,” <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/197-kenyas-2013-elections> (accessed August 2, 2015): 30.

<sup>503</sup> African Union, 2014, *Back from the Brink*, 204.

<sup>504</sup> Ibid, 30-31.

<sup>505</sup> Ruteere, 2014, “Security and Human Rights in the New Constitutional Order in Kenya,” locations 4342-4343.

other tenets of democratic policing. Police training was extended to 21 months, and a number of training schools were qualified by the Ministry of Higher Education to grant diplomas. As of June 2012, 446 police officers at the senior and mid-level had been trained.<sup>506</sup>

The GCG made substantial personnel changes to the police leadership. The former police chief, Ali, and his deputy were relieved of command in 2009.<sup>507</sup> Mathew Iteere, who replaced Ali as commissioner, was relieved of command in 2012 and replaced by the first IG, David Kimaiyo, and Kimaiyo's deputies were later sworn into office in January 2013.<sup>508</sup> Vetting of top police leadership began in 2011, but was later suspended after objections from civil society organizations about lack of involvement.<sup>509</sup> While falling outside the time period under study, the NPSC started the vetting process again after the 2013 elections, leading to the firings of nearly 400 police officers.<sup>510</sup> Despite implementation challenges and delays, the GCG therefore successfully fulfills the next three categories of commissions, trainings, and personnel changes.

The GCG in Kenya failed to try perpetrators of the post-election violence, including within the security sector, despite several attempts to form a special tribunal. This failure was caused by the formation of an anti-accountability alliance made up of elements within both PNU and ODM who were suspected of complicity in the post-election violence. Led by Kenyatta on the PNU side and Ruto on the ODM side, this remarkable alliance of erstwhile enemies—their respective Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities were involved in some of the

---

<sup>506</sup> African Union, 2014, *Back from the Brink*, 205-207.

<sup>507</sup> *Time*, "Kenya's Police Chief Fired: The Start of Reform?," June 16, 2009, <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1921781,00.html#ixzz1MXkMtBRC> (accessed August 2, 2016).

<sup>508</sup> African Union, 2014, *Back from the Brink*, 205.

<sup>509</sup> *Ibid*, 206.

<sup>510</sup> *Associated Press*, "Kenya Fires 302 Police Officers as it Fights Corruption," June 9, 2016, <http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2016-06-09/kenya-fires-302-police-officers-as-it-fights-corruption> (accessed August 2, 2016).

most deadly clashes in 2008—blocked all attempts to set up a special tribunal as recommended by the Waki Commission, earning the alliance the moniker of the “politics of collusion.”<sup>511</sup> This failure prompted Annan to provide the ICC with the names of those suspected by the Waki Commission of orchestrating the worst of the violence, a backstop accountability mechanism created by the Waki Commission in the case that a local tribunal was not established.

The ICC subsequently opened cases on the suspects listed and, in 2010, charged six prominent Kenyans—including Kenyatta, Ruto, and the former police commissioner, Ali—with crimes against humanity. The charges against Ali were later dropped in 2012 due to insufficient evidence.<sup>512</sup> Despite an international attempt to prosecute Ali, no prosecutions of senior level security sector officials took place domestically under the GCG.<sup>513</sup> This police impunity, which has a long history in Kenya, was a considerable setback to the overall SSR process in Kenya under power sharing. After the anti-accountability alliance of Kenyatta and Ruto won the presidency in the 2013 elections and the Kenyatta administration fought the ICC at every turn, the international court dropped all charges against those accused of planning the 2008 post-election violence. The failure to hold any high-level suspects accountable, including the police, was one of the greatest failures of the GCG.

Despite this lack of accountability, the GCG fulfilled six of the seven SSR criteria highlighted above. To what extent did these considerable reforms change actual police behavior under the GCG? Although the police in Kenya during the GCG were implicated in

---

<sup>511</sup> Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010, “Power-sharing in Comparative Perspective.” For an overview of the ICC’s role in Kenya see Brown and Sriram, 2012, “The Big Fish Won’t Fry Themselves.”

<sup>512</sup> *Voice of America*, “ICC: 4 Kenyans to Face Trial for Post-Election Violence,” January 22, 2012, <http://www.voanews.com/content/icc-4-kenyans-to-face-trial-for-post-election-violence-137889033/151022.html> (accessed August 2, 2016).

<sup>513</sup> Amnesty International, 2013, “Police Reform in Kenya: ‘A Drop in the Ocean,’” 7, [https://www.amnesty.nl/sites/default/files/public/kenya\\_afr\\_32\\_001\\_2013.pdf](https://www.amnesty.nl/sites/default/files/public/kenya_afr_32_001_2013.pdf) (accessed November 22, 2016).

worrying incidents of extra-judicial killings (particularly in the fight against violent extremism) and widespread corruption,<sup>514</sup> it appears that the institutional framework and other reforms did help to depoliticize the police ahead of the 2013 elections. In spite of concerns over the police's preparedness and pervasive fears of a re-run of the 2008 election violence, overall, the police (including the paramilitary General Service Unit and the Administration Police) conducted themselves in a professional and praiseworthy fashion during the 2013 elections.

A larger police presence was deployed in areas that were flashpoints in 2008. While overall levels of violence were low in the 2013 elections, in areas where violence did break out, the police sent quick reinforcements. Despite several instances of excessive use of force and improper use of live ammunition, police conduct during the polls earned high praise from independent outside observers. The International Crisis Group asserted that police behavior was "greatly improved" from 2007-2008, calling their conduct in the 2013 poll a "measured response."<sup>515</sup> In stark contrast to 2007-2008, where the police were responsible for 405 deaths, only six deaths were attributed to the police in the 2013 elections.<sup>516</sup>

Again in contrast to the 2007 election, the police in 2013 were not involved in partisan campaigning or electoral processes in the run up to the poll, and did not make any statements of political partiality during the GCG period. Indeed, my interviews with senior police leaders and civilians that oversee the police in Kenya revealed that, in a break from the past, the police acted in a non-partisan, largely independent manner during the election period. Kimaiyo, the first IG of the police, told me that he never felt any political pressure or

---

<sup>514</sup> Ibid.

<sup>515</sup> International Crisis Group, 2013, "Kenya After the Elections," 3-4, <http://ruc.ac.ke/cmdps/pdf/elections.pdf> (accessed August 3, 2016).

<sup>516</sup> Ibid, 4.

executive interference during the election. He told me, “I did not have any pressure at all toward me from any authorities saying that you have been given instructions to use abuse or violence, no.”<sup>517</sup> Mohammed, of the NPSC, also made this point, saying that he did not feel any political pressure when carrying out his NPSC duties.<sup>518</sup>

In sum, despite continued police impunity, persistent corruption, and involvement in extra-judicial killings and abuse—particularly in the fight against terrorism<sup>519</sup>—it appears that the security reforms achieved during the tenure of the GCG made a real difference in depoliticizing and shifting police behavior in the 2013 elections, as the GCG successfully fulfilled the three behavioral categories outlined above. Afrobarometer polling data indicates that the public’s opinion of the police shifted upward during the power-sharing period. In 2008-2009, just after the post-election violence, 44.4 percent of Kenyans had no trust in the police, while those expressing a little, some, or a lot of trust made up 53.2 percent. In 2011-2013, after significant police reforms had been passed, the number of Kenyans with no trust in the police dropped to 32.7 percent, while those with a little, some, or a lot of trust in the police increased to 66.4 percent.<sup>520</sup> These figures suggest that the police reforms achieved under the GCG lifted the public’s opinion of the police. While progress was slow in merging the different branches of the police under the same command, the fact that the paramilitary Administration Police and General Service Unit—which, as noted, have historically played the regime protection role—were included in the overall police reform process at the institutional level is particularly notable.

---

<sup>517</sup> Personal interview, David Kimaiyo, former inspector general, Kenya National Police Service, Nairobi, Kenya, April 27, 2015.

<sup>518</sup> Personal interview, Mohamed, 2015.

<sup>519</sup> Amnesty International, 2013, “Police Reform in Kenya;” Human Rights Watch, 2013, “You Are All Terrorists: Kenyan Police Abuse of Refugees in Nairobi,” [https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/kenya0513\\_ForUpload\\_0\\_0.pdf](https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/kenya0513_ForUpload_0_0.pdf) (accessed November 2, 2016).

<sup>520</sup> Afrobarometer, 2016, Online Data Analysis Tool.



The above discussion demonstrates that, in spite of some setbacks and implementation challenges, the power-sharing government in Kenya achieved a considerable amount of progress on police reform, particularly at the institutional level. Mohamed, the NPSC commissioner, summed up the state of police reform in Kenya under the GCG, telling me that there are, “so many limiting factors in carrying this through, but it is a sea change, a 180-degree turn, I can tell you that.”<sup>521</sup>

#### *4.6.3. Limited Progress Prior to Power Sharing*

A separate most-similar analysis comparing the GCG period to SSR initiatives in Kenya prior to the power-sharing period revealed that, over the approximately 15 year period from the move to multipartyism to the 2007 election, some attempts at broader SSR and police reform had been attempted, but they failed to deliver any meaningful institutional reforms or behavioral changes. Following the move to multi-party politics in 1991, Moi jettisoned internal and external calls for SSR and used security forces to crackdown on opponents and arm the political militias he deployed in the 1992 and 1997 elections, as noted. In the late 1990s, however, as Moi was beginning to consider stepping away from politics, he capitulated to some SSR, particularly of the intelligence service, as the notorious Special Branch, officially the Directorate of Security Intelligence, was removed from its home in the police and reestablished as the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS).<sup>522</sup>

When Kibaki came to power in 2002, he spoke of a need for institutional renewal, linking operational level police reforms and improved police effectiveness to lowered crime rates and economic development. Police reforms fell under Kibaki’s broader Governance,

---

<sup>521</sup> Ibid.

<sup>522</sup> Ruteere, 2014, “Security and Human Rights in the New Constitutional Order in Kenya,” locations 4128-4130; personal interview, Wilson Boinett, former director of NSIS, Nairobi, Kenya, April 22, 2015.

Justice Law and Order Sector initiative, but focused mostly on train and equip efforts as opposed to institutional level reforms and oversight.<sup>523</sup> This rhetorical nod to police reform failed to achieve any tangible successes, as it soon fell victim to the political and ethnic divides that emerged between Odinga and Kibaki. After their split, Kibaki closed ranks, appointing his Kikuyi ethnic kin to the top security positions and reverting back to Kenya's long history of using the police for regime protection purposes, especially in the run up to the 2007 elections and in the 2008 violence.

What explains the differing SSR outcomes of these two periods in Kenya's recent history? Two main factors, analogous to those forwarded in the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 2, account for this earlier failure at police reform. First, in contrast to the period of power sharing, was a lack of international pressure and monitoring. After nearly four decades of KANU rule, international actors hailed Kibaki's 2002 victory as a major democratic breakthrough in Kenya. Over the next five years, donors largely grew complacent and ignored Kibaki's abandonment of the reform agenda.<sup>524</sup>

Second, was Kibaki's choice of exclusionary political strategies. Following the collapse of the NARC alliance and his fallout with Odinga, Kibaki, facing a growing political threat from ODM, chose to revert to exclusionary ethnic favoritism and other authoritarian-leaning tendencies, such as using the police for regime security. Ruteere underscores this point, arguing that the political fallout from the implosion of the NARC coalition "doomed any prospects for a radical reform of the police" in this earlier period.<sup>525</sup> The findings from this second comparison show, counter intuitively, that the period of unity government in Kenya was actually more favorable to achieving some police reform than even the aftermath

---

<sup>523</sup> Osse, 2014, "Police Reform in Kenya," 14.

<sup>524</sup> Brown, 2009, "Donor Responses to the 2008 Kenyan Crisis," 400-401.

<sup>525</sup> Ruteere, 2014, "Security and Human Rights in the New Constitutional Order in Kenya," location 4153.

of the full democratic regime transition in 2002. This finding lends considerable evidence to the argument that power sharing can play a central causal role in the SSR process and that the model is capable of generating incentives and conditions that are more favorable to reform than complete transfers of power, as highlighted in Chapter 1.

#### 4.7. Conclusion

Summing up, this chapter has argued that SSR processes under the GCG in Kenya played out in the following fashion: high Western leverage and low reliance on the security sector led to strong agreement design and the practice of largely inclusionary *coalition politics*. Strong agreement design mediated external pressures for reform, empowering pro-reform constituencies to apply pressure on the unity government and encourage largely inclusionary, compromising political strategies. These conditions led to substantial openings for reform, facilitating considerable, if fragile and incomplete, security reforms in Kenya under power sharing, especially at the institutional level.

The case findings presented here again confirm the theoretical expectations presented in Chapter 2, which posited that the practice of *coalition politics* under unity government will be favorable for reform. It bears repeating that the PNU and ODM coalitions, and the different police and security sector branches in Kenya, are far from unitary actors. While the heuristic devices used in this dissertation go a long way in helping to distill and explain SSR outcomes in Kenya under the GCG, many of the nuances of each organization and their multifaceted relations are not covered at length in this case chapter. It is also worth reiterating that the considerable SSR progress made during the period of unity government in Kenya remained susceptible to reversals after the GCG left office. Indeed, Kenyatta's

subsequent government moved to rollback and dilute several of the police reforms passed by the power-sharing government, as discussed at length in Chapter 6. The following chapter now turns to the case of Togo.

## 5. COUNTERVAILING POLITICS IN TOGO

*“The opposition in Togo thinks that to go into the government is to become RPT. And if someone joins the government, they are then not trustworthy. If you go into the government, you participate in the assassination of [Togo’s first president] Sylvanus Olympio.”*<sup>526</sup>  
(Gabriel Sassouvi Anyron, former UFC official, minister of culture)

### 5.1. Overview

Akin to the cases of Zimbabwe and Kenya, an assortment of factors shaped the dynamics and outcomes of the power-sharing period in Togo. This chapter discusses the historical roots of civil-military relations and the character of external involvement in Togo, demonstrating how these two long-term variables shaped the two short-term mechanisms of agreement design and political strategy under power sharing in Togo. Togo’s power-sharing agreement, known by its French name, the *Accord Politique Global* (APG-Comprehensive Political Agreement), was signed in August 2006 and effectively ended after the 2010 elections, when many of the power-sharing institutions stood up by the APG ceased to function. This chapter first explains how the combination of high incumbent reliance on the security sector to remain in power and high Western involvement and leverage led to strong agreement design and conflicting political strategies, giving rise to the practice of *countervailing politics* in Togo. These conditions led to a moderate, if halting, amount of SSR in Togo under the APG, particularly regarding the conduct of the security sector during elections.

The chapter ends by briefly examining SSR efforts in Togo before the 2006 power-sharing agreement. It argues that despite some reform rhetoric from Gnassingbé Eyadéma and his RPT party in the early 1990s and before his death in the 2000s, there was no real effort to move away from militarized rule and toward democratic security governance prior

---

<sup>526</sup> Personal interview, Gabriel Sassouvi Anyron, former UFC official, minister of culture, Lomé, Togo, June 18, 2015.

to the APG. This finding again demonstrates the causal impact that power sharing can play in the SSR process. The findings presented in this chapter confirm the theoretical expectation that the practice of *countervailing politics* will be a volatile yet potentially favorable form of power sharing that is able to deliver a moderate degree of SSR.

This chapter is based on dozens of elite level interviews with senior political leaders as well as security sector officials and international stakeholders. Interviews were conducted with officials from the former ruling party, the RPT, which in 2012 transformed into the *Union Pour la République* (UNIR-Union for the Republic) and is led by President Faure Gnassingbé, as well as with officials from the longest standing opposition party in Togo, the UFC, led by Gilchrist Olympio. I also met with the top leadership of the *Alliance Nationale pour le Changement* (ANC-National Alliance for Change) headed by Jean-Pierre Fabre, which split away from the UFC in 2010 after Olympio joined a coalition with the RPT, the *Comité d'Action pour la Renouveau* (CAR-Action Committee for Renewal) led by former Prime Minister Yowovi Agboyibo, and a number of other opposition party and civil society leaders. Interviews were primarily conducted in Lomé, Togo from June to July 2015.<sup>527</sup>

## 5.2. Nature of Civil-Military Relations: Roots of High RPT Reliance

Togo has an extended history of turbulent civil-military relations, with frequent military intervention in politics and periods of militarized rule. Three years after Togo gained independence from France in 1960, the first elected president of the country, Sylvanus Olympio—amid souring relations with the army based on an emerging ethnically based north-south divide—was killed in a coup by a group of Togolese soldiers. Gnassingbé Eyadéma led this group of soldiers, who had been demobilized from the French colonial

---

<sup>527</sup> I also draw on field research conducted in June 2013 in Lomé.

army after combat experience in Algeria. Eyadéma is believed to have shot and killed Olympio himself. After the coup, civilian rule returned when power was handed off to Nicolas Grunitsky. In 1967, however, as calls were made to arrest and charge those responsible for Olympio's death, Eyadéma again seized power in a military coup.<sup>528</sup> With staunch support from the security forces, Eyadéma would rule Togo with an iron fist for the next 38 years.

Upon taking power in 1967, Eyadéma banned all political parties and dissolved Togo's existing political structures.<sup>529</sup> Although Eyadéma formed the RPT party two years after the coup, in 1969, and promised quick elections, he ruled without constitutional authority until 1979. The 1979 constitution formally established the supremacy of the RPT and disallowed independent political groups outside of the party's four "marching wings," comprising labor, youth, women, and traditional chiefs.<sup>530</sup> Until the early 1990s, the only formalized political opposition to the Eyadéma regime existed outside of Togo's borders, with Sylvanus Olympio's son, Gilchrist, and other family members leading a vocal anti-Eyadéma movement from France and neighboring Ghana.<sup>531</sup>

While Eyadéma attempted to civilianize his political control and cultivated a cult of personality style of rule, he played up his military background and his main pillar of support remained the military. The armed forces brutally enforced Eyadéma's authoritarian regime, violently cracking down on any dissent. Under Eyadéma, the military amassed a litany of human rights violations and allegations of murder and torture, garnering denunciations from

---

<sup>528</sup> Boubacar N'Diaye, Adboulaye Saine, and Mathurin C. Hounnikpo, 2005, *Not Yet Democracy: West Africa's Slow Farewell to Authoritarianism* (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press): 165; J. Tyler Dickovick, 2013, *Africa: The World Today Series 2014-2015* (Lanham, MD: Stryker Post Publications): 142-145.

<sup>529</sup> N'Diaye, Saine, and Hounnikpo, 2005, *Not Yet Democracy*, 168.

<sup>530</sup> Seely, 2009, *The Legacies of Transition Governments in Africa*, 47.

<sup>531</sup> *Ibid*, 48.

international human rights groups such as Amnesty International.<sup>532</sup> Over nearly four decades of largely unchecked rule, Eyadéma carefully cultivated the fealty of the armed forces by stacking the security sector with members of his own northern ethnic group, the Kabye (70 percent of the armed forces are thought to be Kabye), and appointing the military brass to myriad party, political, and commercial positions.<sup>533</sup>

Eyadéma also kept the military happy by maintaining a disproportionately large armed force for such a small country, despite not facing any real external threats.<sup>534</sup> As noted by Okonufua, under Eyadéma the military was “used as tool of domestic repression rather than an instrument for national defense.”<sup>535</sup> The French played an enabling role in Eyadéma’s symbiotic relationship with the military, providing military training and support, including direct military assistance to help put down an alleged coup attempt launched from Ghana in 1986 (France’s key role in Togo’s politics is discussed in detail below).<sup>536</sup>

This mutually beneficial relationship between Eyadéma and the armed forces paid dividends for his regime in the early 1990s, as the military violently suppressed the country’s efforts at democratization, allowing Eyadéma to remain in office until his death in 2005. Facing a growing internal opposition, an acute economic crisis, crippling strikes, and international and regional pressure, Eyadéma capitulated to Africa’s wave of democracy in the early 1990s, reluctantly agreeing to move to multipartyism and hold a National

---

<sup>532</sup> See, for instance, Amnesty International, 1993, “Togo: Impunity for Killings by the Military,” <https://www.amnesty.org/download/.../afr570131993en.pdf> (accessed September 11, 2016).

<sup>533</sup> Toulabor, 2011, “Togo,” 232.

<sup>534</sup> Seely, 2009, *The Legacies of Transition Governments in Africa*, 47.

<sup>535</sup> Benjamin Okonufua, 2015, “Democratic Governance in the ‘New’ Republic of Togo,” in Claire Metelits and Stephanie Matti, (eds.) *Democratic Contestation on the Margins: Regimes in Small African Countries* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books): 87.

<sup>536</sup> Comi Toulabor, 2008, “Togo,” in Alan Bryden, Boubacar N’Diaye and ‘Funmi Olonisakin, (eds.), *Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa* (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: LIT Verlag): 308; Kathryn Nwajiaku, 1994, “The National Conferences in Benin and Togo Revisited,” *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 32, 3: 441.



Conference in 1991. The National Conference held promise for political liberalization, and a transitional government headed by opposition member Joseph Koffigoh delivered a host of reforms, including a new constitution in 1992.

The prospects for meaningful democratic change in Togo during this period, however, were dashed by the overreach of opposition groups and the violent overreaction of Eyadéma and the military.<sup>537</sup> When the National Conference, which was dominated by opposition parties, threatened to unseat Eyadéma and overhaul the security forces, the military directly intervened several times. Opposition rhetoric continued to become increasingly hostile to the military, with the National Conference passing several resolutions indicting the military in past killings and other crimes.<sup>538</sup>

The decision of the National Conference to dissolve the ruling RPT party and seize its assets in November 1991 was the final straw. After the French ignored pleas from Koffigoh for military assistance, the military attacked Koffigoh's house with tanks, killed several of his bodyguards, took him hostage, and hauled him before Eyadéma. On television, Koffigoh was forced to rescind the dissolution of the RPT.<sup>539</sup> In the lead up to presidential elections in 1993, the security sector was also implicated in a spate of brazen killings and disappearances, including several incidents that left 28 dead and forced up to 200,000 to flee to Ghana and

---

<sup>537</sup> For more detail on the military's recalcitrant role in Togo's 1991 National Conference and move toward multi-party democracy, see Houngnikpo, 2000, "The Military and Democratization in Africa;" Heilbrunn, 1993, "Social Origins of National Conferences in Benin and Togo;" Nwajiaku, 1994, "The National Conferences in Benin and Togo Revisited."

<sup>538</sup> Heilbrunn, 1993, "Social Origins of National Conferences in Benin and Togo," 290; Julien Morency-Laflamme, 2011, *La Démocratisation au Togo et au Bénin: L'influence des Stratégies des Groupes d'Opposition* (Universitaires Europeennes).

<sup>539</sup> Seely, 2005, "The Legacies of Transition Governments," 368; and Seely, 2009, *The Legacies of Transition Governments in Africa*.

Benin.<sup>540</sup> The military's consistent intervention in this period highlights its centrality to the Eyadéma regime.

Although tactics shifted, the military's key role in Eyadéma's rule did not dissipate after the National Conference and the move to multiparty politics. Elections in Togo have been some of the most violent in Africa, with the security forces being the most critical actor in this violence.<sup>541</sup> As highlighted in Chapter 2, since Togo's move to multipartyism to Eyadéma's death in 2005, elections followed a familiar violent trajectory, with Eyadéma or the RPT confirmed as winners, the opposition either boycotting or calling fraud and protesting, and security forces and pro-RPT militia groups violently quelling dissidents.<sup>542</sup> The 1993, 1998, and 2003 presidential elections, as well as the 1994, 1999, and 2002 legislative elections, all, to varying degrees, followed this script.<sup>543</sup> Although the RPT lost its majority in the 1994 legislative elections, with the help of the military, Eyadéma was able to survive the move to multipartyism.

Revealing the enduring influence of the military in Togo, upon Eyadéma's death, his son, Faure Gnassingbé, who was a cabinet minister at the time, was unconstitutionally installed as "acting president" by the top echelons of the military. The legislature (National Assembly) complied with the military's wishes and hastily changed the constitution in an attempt to legitimize Gnassingbé's appointment.<sup>544</sup> Regional and international bodies decried this unconstitutional change of government, with the AU and ECOWAS labeling the installation of Gnassingbé as a military coup. After the two bodies suspended Togo's

---

<sup>540</sup> Ibid, 129-130.

<sup>541</sup> Bekoe, 2012, "Postelection Political Agreements in Togo and Zanzibar," 123.

<sup>542</sup> For an overview of militia groups in Togo, see Toulabor, 2011, "Togo," 232-33.

<sup>543</sup> Straus and Taylor, 2012, "Democratization and Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa," 25-26.

<sup>544</sup> Ebeku, 2005, "The Succession of Faure Gnassingbé to the Togolese Presidency," 5.

membership and levied sanctions, Gnassingbé agreed to step down and hold presidential elections in April 2005, but would remain as head of the National Assembly.<sup>545</sup>

Despite a change in party leadership, the 2005 poll proved to be no exception to the country's trend of violent elections. Unsurprisingly, Gnassingbé was declared the winner, despite allegations that the military had manipulated the ballot.<sup>546</sup> The main opposition party, the UFC, led by Olympio, claimed fraud and called for street protests. Clashes soon erupted between protestors and the security forces, with security officials reportedly exacting revenge on those opposed to the regime in the south of the country, which, with a primarily Ewe population, has long been an opposition stronghold for Olympio.<sup>547</sup> Up to 800 fatalities—the highest death toll of any Togolese election—were reported in the 2005 post-election violence.<sup>548</sup>

This acute electoral violence, along with increased pressure from international and regional actors—namely the EU (although France remained ambivalent) and ECOWAS, compelled Gnassingbé and the RPT to come to the negotiating table. After an extended mediation process headed by Blaise Compaoré, then-president of Burkina Faso, the RPT, five opposition parties, and two civil society groups signed the APG power-sharing agreement in August 2006. The APG led to the formation of a unity government and the establishment of various inclusive mechanisms aimed at resolving the political crisis and ushering in a number of significant electoral, institutional, and security reforms.

---

<sup>545</sup> Seely, 2006, "The Unexpected Presidential Election in Togo, 2005," 612-13.

<sup>546</sup> Jennifer Seely, 2011, "Togo's Presidential Election 2010," *Electoral Studies*, 30, 372.

<sup>547</sup> Ibid. For an historical overview of this long-standing north-south divide in Togolese politics, see Seely, 2009, *The Legacies of Transition Governments in Africa*, 45-49.

<sup>548</sup> United Nations, 2005, "Rapport," 20, 42; *IOL*, "800 Died in Togo Election Unrest-Report," May 14, 2005.

### 5.2.1. *High Incumbent Reliance and Political Influence of the Military*

To reinforce the above analysis and help to approximate the incumbent's degree of reliance on the security sector, both directly before and during the period of the APG (2006-2010), three indicators are used. As outlined in Chapter 2, I first use the level of security sector involvement in the electoral violence that precipitated the power-sharing accord in 2006 (as measured by percentage of deaths attributed to security sector actors). Determining the exact number of deaths and perpetrators of the 2005 election-related violence in Togo is difficult, as many victims were deliberately hidden in mass graves.<sup>549</sup>

A 2005 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) report, based on a fact-finding mission to Togo after the 2005 election violence, found that approximately 400 to 500 had been killed in the violence, with thousands others wounded.<sup>550</sup> The non-governmental *Ligue Togolaise des Droits de L'homme* (Togolese Human Rights League), reported that 790 had died in the election violence.<sup>551</sup> The OHCHR report suggests that approximately 16 deaths could be directly attributed to opposition supporters and militias. The report, however, attributed the majority of the violence to the state security forces and RPT militias, concluding that: "The *principal responsibility* [emphasis mine] for the political violence and violations of human rights" lay with "the state security forces" and RPT-affiliated militias.<sup>552</sup> With security forces involved in a large majority of the violence, RPT falls into the highest category of reliance (81 percent and above) on this indicator.

---

<sup>549</sup> United Nations, 2005, "Rapport," 32.

<sup>550</sup> Ibid, 20, 42.

<sup>551</sup> *IOL*, "800 Died in Togo Election Unrest-Report," May 14, 2005.

<sup>552</sup> United Nations, 2005, "Rapport," 42; for the English translation of this passage, see *UN News Centre*, "Hundreds Died in Togolese Unrest, UN Says," September 26, 2005, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=15994> (accessed September 20, 2016).

Second, through background research and consultations with interviewees and country experts, I analyzed the prevalence of individuals with security backgrounds who served in cabinet at any time during the APG. While no opposition cabinet members were found to have security backgrounds, 10 percent (4 of 42) of RPT cabinet members did. Despite the presence of four individuals with security backgrounds, both parties therefore fall into the low level of reliance category (see Figures 10 and 11). Unlike the cases of Kenya and Zimbabwe, however, this indicator applied to the case of Togo does not fully capture the informal ways in which the security sector wielded its considerable political influence, which was attained through several successful military coups (see below).

| <b>RPT Cabinet Position</b>               | <b>Name</b>               | <b>Security Background</b> |
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|
| Pres.                                     | Faure GNASSINGBE          | X                          |
| Min. of Agriculture & Fisheries           | Charles AGBA              | X                          |
| Min. of Cities                            | Marc AKITEM               | X                          |
| Min. of Communication/Judiciary           | Kokou TOZOUN              | X                          |
| Min. of Development & Terr. Mgmt.         | Yendja YENTCHABRE         | X                          |
| Min. of Economy, Finance & Privatization  | Payadowa BOUKPESSI        | X                          |
| Min. of Environment & Forest Resources    | Issifou KANTCHATI         | X                          |
| Min. of Environment & Forest Resources    | Kossivi AYIKOE            | X                          |
| Min. of Equipment, Transp. & Telecomms    | Kokouvi DOGBE             | X                          |
| Min. of Health                            | Suzanne ASSOUMA           | X                          |
| Min. of Higher Ed. & Research             | Fidel NOUBOUKPO           | X                          |
| Min. of Hum. Rights, Democ. & Reconcil.   | Loreta AKUETE             | X                          |
| Min. of Hum. Rights, Democ. & Reconcil.   | Ykoubou HAMADOU           | X                          |
| Min. of Labor/Primary and Sec. Ed.        | Yves NAGOU                | X                          |
| Min. of Mines, Energy & Water             | Kokou AGBEMADON           | X                          |
| Min. of Pop., Adv. of Women               | Kangi DIALLO              | X                          |
| Min. of Primary & Sec. Ed.                | Komi KLASSOU              | X                          |
| Min. of Primary & Sec. Ed.                | Sambiani Sankardja LARE   | X                          |
| Min. of Relations w/ Institutions of Rep. | Comlangan D'ALMEIDA       | X                          |
| Min. of Relations w/ Institutions of Rep. | Ninsao GNAFAME            | X                          |
| Min. of Security                          | Pitalouna-Ani LAOKPESSI   | ✓                          |
| Min. of Security                          | Atcha TITIKPINA           | ✓                          |
| Min. of Social & Women's Promotion        | Sayo BOYOT                | X                          |
| Min. of Social & Women's Promotion        | Memounatou IBRAHIMA       | X                          |
| Min. of Tech. Ed. & Pro. Training         | Antoine EDOH              | X                          |
| Min. of Tech. Ed. & Pro. Training         | Henriette Kuevi AMEDJOGBE | X                          |
| Min. of Territ. Admin & Decentralization  | Katari FOLI-BAZI          | X                          |
| Min. of Territ. Admin & Decentralization  | Pascal BODJANA            | X                          |

|                                            |                       |                      |
|--------------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| Min. of Youth & Sports                     | Agouta OUYENGA        | X                    |
| Min. to the Pres. for Defense & Veterans   | Kpatcha GNASSINGBE    | ✓                    |
| Min. of State/Coop., Dev. & Land           | Gilbert BAWARA        | X                    |
| Min. of State/Agriculture & Fisheries      | Kassegne ADJONOU      | X                    |
| Prime Min./Min of Health                   | Komlan MALLY          | X                    |
| Min. of Agriculture and Fisheries          | Kossi Messan EWOVOR   | X                    |
| Min. of Comms & Culture/Youth & Sports     | Oulegoh KEYEWA        | X                    |
| Min. of Culture, Tourism, & Leisure        | Batienne KPABRE-SYLLI | X                    |
| Min. of Economic Affairs & Privatization   | Adj. Otheth AYASSOR   | X                    |
| Min. of Labor, Employment, & Civil Serv.   | Octave Nicoue BROOHM  | X                    |
| Min. of Foreign Affairs & Reg. Integration | Kofi ESAW             | X                    |
| Min. of Mines, Energy, & Water             | Noupokou DAMIPI       | X                    |
| Min. of Water and Sanitation               | Zakari Nandja         | ✓                    |
| Min. of Urban Dev. & Housing               | Issifou KANTACHI      | X                    |
| <b>Total</b>                               |                       | <b>4 of 42 = 10%</b> |

Figure 10: RPT cabinet security backgrounds

| <b>Opposition Cabinet Position</b>         | <b>Name</b>              | <b>Security Background</b> |
|--------------------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|
| Prime Min.                                 | Yawovi AGBOYIBO          | X                          |
| Min. of Commerce, Industry & Trades        | Jean-Lucien Savi de TOVE | X                          |
| Min. of Culture, Tourism, & Leisure        | Gabriel DOSSEH-ANYRON    | X                          |
| Min. of Foreign Aff. & African Integ.      | Zarifou AYEVA            | X                          |
| Min. of Justice & Keeper of the Seals      | Tchessa ABI              | X                          |
| Min. in Prime Min., Private Sect. & Dev.   | Idrissa DERMANE          | X                          |
| Sec. of State to Min. of Pop. & Soc. Affs. | Agnele MENSAH            | X                          |
| Sec. of State to Min. for Youth & Sports   | Gilbert ATSU             | X                          |
| Min. of For. Affs./Commerce & Industry     | Leopold GNININVI         | X                          |
| Min. of Higher Ed. & Research              | Messan Adjimado ADUAYOM  | X                          |
| Min. of Communication & Civ. Train.        | Georges GAHOUN HEGBOR    | X                          |
| Min. of Hum. Rights & Democracy            | Célestine AKOUAVI AÏDAM  | X                          |
| Min. of State                              | Amah GNASSINGBÉ          | X                          |
| <b>Total</b>                               |                          | <b>0 of 11 = 0%</b>        |

Figure 11: Opposition cabinet security backgrounds

Finally, and perhaps most importantly in Togo, the presence of three successful military coups in the country since independence (1963, 1967, 2005—it could be argued that the military’s intervention in the 1991 National Conference should be counted as a fourth successful military coup) indicates that influence was flowing in both directions.<sup>553</sup> The presence of successful military coups suggests that, while politicians have historically used

<sup>553</sup> Powell, 2015, “Coups in the World;” Center for Systemic Peace, 2014, “Coups d’État.”

the security sector for regime protection in Togo, the military also had considerable political influence, as highlighted by the 2005 coup where the military stepped into the power vacuum created by Eyadéma's death.

These civil-military dynamics raise the question of who was in ultimate political control in Togo, politicians or the military? The small existing literature on Togo's civil-military relations does not offer a definitive answer to this question. Toulabor argues for the supremacy of the military, asserting that the armed forces were at the "heart of the political system" and that the RPT therefore only played "an auxiliary role."<sup>554</sup> Kohnert, on the other hand, says that it is unclear who held the upper hand, arguing that the "president is possibly not always in command" of the army.<sup>555</sup> Drawing on her research of Togo's National Conference in the early 1990s, Seely argues that while many of the participants she interviewed saw the military as "acting on its own accord" during this period, in fact "the military were wielded more like a tool by Eyadéma when he needed to push his advantage or display displeasure..."<sup>556</sup> My interviews in Lomé lend further support to the argument that while the military clearly enjoyed considerable political influence, ultimately Eyadéma did, and Gnassingbé does, retain the upper hand in the civil-military relationship in Togo, mostly due to the supreme power of the presidency.

Taken together, these three indicators help demonstrate that the incumbent party heavily relied on the military to stay in power and that the military had a considerable amount of influence in the political sphere in Togo. Three main factors conditioned these

---

<sup>554</sup> Toulabor, 2011, "Togo," 231.

<sup>555</sup> Dirk Kohnert, 2016, "Togo: Political and Economic Development (2013 to 2016): author's extended version of BTI 2016 Togo Country Report, 8, [http://www.academia.edu/10017634/Togo\\_political\\_and\\_economic\\_development\\_2013\\_to\\_2016\\_Author\\_s\\_extended\\_and\\_up-dated\\_version\\_of\\_BTI\\_2016\\_Togo\\_Country\\_Report\\_forthcoming\\_](http://www.academia.edu/10017634/Togo_political_and_economic_development_2013_to_2016_Author_s_extended_and_up-dated_version_of_BTI_2016_Togo_Country_Report_forthcoming_) (accessed August 15, 2016).

<sup>556</sup> Seely, 2009, *The Legacies of Transition Governments in Africa*, 127, 111.

civil-military dynamics. First, most obviously, was Eyadéma's military background. As a military man who came to power via a military coup, Eyadéma accessed and then consolidated his power through military means, as discussed above. Indeed, over his 38 years in power, Eyadéma never actually resigned from the military.<sup>557</sup>

Second, akin to Zimbabwe, is the ruling party's nearly five decades in office. The RPT's decades of uninterrupted rule allowed Eyadéma's cult of personality and military patronage system to remain intact over the years (this dynamic began to shift after 2005). Third, beginning with the move to multipartyism in the early 1990s, the RPT and the military shared a joint fear of losing power to an Ewe-dominated opposition, who they believed was bent on revenge after decades of being excluded from politics.<sup>558</sup> This fear of prosecution and loss of access to patronage networks drove the RPT and the military closer together and pushed them to double down on their strategy of force and exclusion, particularly prior to 2005, as discussed at length below.

This section has analyzed the historical roots and events that shaped the mutually beneficial relationship between RPT politicians and the security forces in Togo. It has demonstrated that incumbents in Togo had a high degree of reliance on the security sector to remain in power and that the military held a considerable amount of political influence in the lead up to the APG period.

### 5.3. Character of External Involvement: Roots of High Western Leverage

Despite Togo's 1963 and 1967 coups, the country's subsequent stability and relatively well-performing free market economy in the 1970s and early 1980s earned Togo the moniker of

---

<sup>557</sup> Ibid, 161.

<sup>558</sup> Nwajiaku, 1994, "The National Conferences in Benin and Togo Revisited," 433.



the “Switzerland of West Africa,” leading Eyadéma to develop close political, economic, and security relations with Western countries during this period.<sup>559</sup> France, as the former colonial power in Togo, and the United States, were especially close allies of Eyadéma’s. Cold war politics played a major role in Togo’s close relations with Western countries, as Eyadéma publicly played up his anti-communist credentials in a region with a number of communist-leaning regimes. As noted by Heilbrunn, “Cold war politics and a radicalization of West African regimes allowed Togo to pose as a bastion of capitalism surrounded by three radical regimes: the People’s Republic of Benin, Ghana, and Upper Volta [Burkina Faso].”<sup>560</sup>

France was and remains the major external player in Togo. Eyadéma came to be known as the *bon élève* (good student) of France, and, as argued by Nwajiaku, he was for decades, “one of France’s long-time favorite allies in West Africa.”<sup>561</sup> From independence through to the present period, Togo and France shared close economic, political, and military ties. Togo had large minerals reserves, and was a major producer of phosphate. While Eyadéma helped advance French interests in Togo and within African institutions such as the Organization of African Unity (the precursor to the AU), France granted Togo favorable terms in their export of phosphate and other minerals to France.<sup>562</sup>

The French also had strong military ties with Eyadéma, as noted above. Beginning with the signing of a military assistance agreement in 1963, France provided Togo with a host of services, including embedded trainers, equipment and material assistance, as well as training for officers at France’s war colleges. The two countries held frequent joint military

---

<sup>559</sup> *Washington Post*, “Togo’s Ruler Aims to Create the Switzerland of Africa,” June 15, 1980, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/09/AR2006080901228.html> (accessed September 12, 2016).

<sup>560</sup> John Heilbrunn, 2007, “Equatorial Guinea and Togo: What Price Repression?,” in Robert Rotberg, (ed.) *Worst of the Worst: Dealing with Repressive and Rogue Nations* (New York, NY: Brookings Institution Press): 241.

<sup>561</sup> Nwajiaku, 1994, “The National Conferences in Benin and Togo Revisited,” 446.

<sup>562</sup> *Ibid*, 430.

exercises, and France maintained a supply base in Niamtougou, in northern Togo. A number of defense agreements were signed in the 1970s, which granted France the permission to intervene to help protect Togo from foreign aggressors, if called upon to do so.<sup>563</sup> After the signing of an agreement in 1976, France stationed a detachment of up to 75 troops in Togo.<sup>564</sup> Under these security umbrella agreements, the French military helped put down an alleged coup attempt reportedly launched from Ghana by the Olympio family in 1986.<sup>565</sup>

Eyadéma also cultivated close ties with the United States, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) in particular, as well as international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). When Togo's economy began to contract in the 1980s, Eyadéma welcomed the IMF into Togo and instituted several structural adjustment programs. As such, Western capitals hailed Togo as "a model of economic probity."<sup>566</sup> Eyadéma gained further goodwill and assistance from the international community by fashioning himself as a regional peacemaker. He helped mediate a variety of conflicts in West Africa, ranging from Chad, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and between Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire. Touting his own accolades as a peacemaker, Eyadéma told the *Washington Post* in 1980: "A mediator must be seen as neutral...and other heads of state accept me because I follow a policy of noninterference in their affairs."<sup>567</sup>

Eyadéma's pro-Western stance and close-knit ties with the donor and international commercial communities made Togo a desirable location for international conferences and a

---

<sup>563</sup> Toulabor, 2008, "Togo," 308.

<sup>564</sup> *New York Times*, "France Sending Forces to Togo in Wake of Attack," September 26, 1986, <http://www.nytimes.com/1986/09/26/world/france-sending-forces-to-togo-in-wake-of-attack.html> (accessed September 13, 2016).

<sup>565</sup> Nwajiaku, 1994, "The National Conferences in Benin and Togo Revisited," 441.

<sup>566</sup> Heilbrunn, 2007, "Equatorial Guinea and Togo: What Price Repression?," 241.

<sup>567</sup> *Washington Post*, "Togo's Ruler Aims to Create the Switzerland of Africa," June 15, 1980,

regional hub for economic activity in West Africa.<sup>568</sup> By the late 1980s, however, as Togo faced an economic crisis, increasing outrage over rampant corruption and human rights abuses, and a vocal internal opposition, Western donors began souring on Eyadéma. During the violence surrounding the National Conference, France suspended military cooperation with Togo in 1992 and suspended all cooperation in 1993 after a crackdown by the military killed nearly 30.<sup>569</sup> The EU also cut off development assistance after the opposition boycotted the 1993 presidential elections, citing a “democratic deficit” in Togo.<sup>570</sup> The United States and other donors followed suit. While France resumed aid after the 1994 legislative elections, the majority of the international donor community, led by the EU, refused to resume major aid flows with Togo until after Eyadéma’s death and the holding of peaceful legislative elections in 2007.<sup>571</sup>

#### 5.3.1. *The Role of External Actors in the 2005 Crisis and 2006 APG Mediation*

Following the 1993 stoppage of donor assistance, Togo was aid starved with a flagging economy, and Togolese politicians across the political divide became intensely focused on the resumption of regular international aid flows. Although the EU began to reengage the Eyadéma regime in the early 2000s, leading to the government pledging to honor 22 “democratic commitments” in 2004, Eyadéma’s unexpected death in office and the subsequent succession crisis jettisoned this rapprochement with the EU.<sup>572</sup> As outlined above, following Eyadéma’s death, his son, Gnassingbé, was installed as acting president by the

---

<sup>568</sup> Heilbrunn, 2007, “Equatorial Guinea and Togo: What Price Repression?,” 241.

<sup>569</sup> Seely, 2009, *The Legacies of Transition Governments in Africa*, 100-101.

<sup>570</sup> Toulabor, 2011, “Togo,” 233.

<sup>571</sup> Seely, 2009, *The Legacies of Transition Governments in Africa*, 167-168.

<sup>572</sup> Ibid, 168-169.

armed forces while the head of the National Assembly, the constitutional temporary heir to the presidency, was out of the country.<sup>573</sup>

After an international and regional outcry, the AU and ECOWAS labeled the action as a military coup, suspended Togo's membership, and levied sanctions, including travel bans. The *Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie* (International Organization of the Francophonie) also suspended Togo. In the wake of the coup, ECOWAS stated: "The heads of state strongly condemn the military intervention...this constitutes a coup d'état and they condemn the subsequent manipulation of the constitution by Parliament."<sup>574</sup> Togo's neighbors remained united against the unconstitutional installation of Gnassingbé, with Nigeria, Gabon, Senegal, and Benin rebuffing RPT efforts to curry support.<sup>575</sup> Due to this regional and international pressure, Gnassingbé eventually stepped down and agreed to hold presidential elections in April 2005.

Nigeria, as the regional economic and political hegemon, played an outsized role during the succession crisis. Olympio, the leader of UFC, told me that Olusegun Obasanjo, who in 2005 was the president of Nigeria and chairperson of the AU, was critical to Gnassingbé stepping down. Olympio told me that Obasanjo: "spoke very well. He told this boy, this boy Faure [Gnassingbé], if you want to behave like your father, *I will send a gunship from Nigeria to Togo and kick you out* [emphasis mine]. But if you want to change, and accommodate help, I shall be on your side."<sup>576</sup> Francis Ekon, president of the *Convergence Patriotique Panafricaine* (CPP-Pan African Patriotic Convergence) party,

---

<sup>573</sup> Ebeku, 2005, "The Succession of Faure Gnassingbé to the Togolese Presidency."

<sup>574</sup> Ibid, 5-6.

<sup>575</sup> John Heilbrunn, 2005, "Togo: Dictatorship without a Dictator," West African Research Association Newsletter, 20-21, <https://www.bu.edu/wara/files/pdf/WARA-NL-Spring-2005.pdf> (accessed August 3, 2016).

<sup>576</sup> Personal interview, Gilchrist Olympio, former president of Togo's main opposition party, the UFC, Lomé, Togo, June 20, 2015.

echoed these sentiments, noting that Obasanjo, as the president of Nigeria and hence the de facto leader of ECOWAS, was “very powerful” during this period.<sup>577</sup>

Following Gnassingbé’s resignation, presidential elections were held in April 2005. Unlike past presidential elections, the opposition did not boycott. Like past elections, the RPT prevailed and the opposition protested. Gnassingbé officially won 60 percent of the vote, while the UFC’s Emmanuel Akitani-Bob (a stand in candidate for Olympio, who was barred from participating) garnered 38 percent. The opposition cried fraud and challenged the results at the Constitutional Court and the CENI. While France and ECOWAS approved of the election process, the EU and the United States criticized the vote, saying it had not been free and fair.<sup>578</sup> After results were announced, protests were staged in Lomé and other areas in the south, which quickly turned violent.

This severe post-election violence spurred action from international and regional actors—namely the EU (although, again, France remained ambivalent) and ECOWAS. After a number of domestic attempts to mediate the crisis, the UFC demanded an international mediation, saying only international pressure and guarantees could break the political impasse, compel the RPT to agree to a negotiated solution, and ensure Gnassingbé and his party would keep their word. Agboyibo of CAR, who participated in the APG mediation, signed the agreement, and then served as the prime minister of the unity government from 2006-2007, stressed this point to me, telling me that, “the UFC preferred to have international facilitation.”<sup>579</sup>

This UFC demand led to the choice of Compaoré as the facilitator. Although the UFC

---

<sup>577</sup> Personal interview, Francis Ekon, president of CPP, Lomé, Togo, June 19, 2015.

<sup>578</sup> Seely, 2006, “The Unexpected Presidential Election in Togo, 2005,” 614-615.

<sup>579</sup> Personal interview, Yawovi Agboyibo, prime minister of the unity government from 2006-2007, president of CAR, and a negotiator in the 2006 APG mediation, Lomé, Togo, June 24, 2015.

initially suggested someone from the UN system, the RPT and the opposition eventually agreed on Compaoré. Senior officials from both the RPT and the opposition told me that, overall, they believed Compaoré acted in good faith throughout the process and was a relatively fair facilitator. Olympio told me that Compaoré: “was a quite a good chairman. He conducted the discussions in a very professional way.”<sup>580</sup> Others in the opposition thought that Compaoré held a bias in favor of Gnassingbé, with Agboyibo telling me that, “When the facilitator was selected as Compaoré, the government party brought out the bottles of champagne!”<sup>581</sup> Under Compaoré’s facilitation, the APG power-sharing agreement was signed in August 2006, finally putting an end to the 2005 electoral crisis. Under the agreement, Gnassingbé would retain the powerful presidency, while an opposition candidate would serve as prime minister.

International and regional actors were deeply involved in the facilitation, with the EU and ECOWAS even participating in the negotiation process itself. A number of senior political leaders in Togo explained to me that while domestic forces were important, it was international pressure, from the EU and ECOWAS in particular, that was the most decisive factor in compelling the RPT and Gnassingbé to come to the negotiating table and sign the APG power-sharing accord (see below for more on the importance of ECOWAS). Anyron, the former UFC official and minister of culture, underscored the importance of pressure from the EU, saying, “Before they [the EU] would restart the cooperation, Togo must respect the agreement. This pressure led to the APG.”<sup>582</sup> Sambiri N’wakin Targone, a member of parliament from the *Parti Démocratique Panafricain* (PDP-Pan African Democratic Party), reiterated this point, telling me, “it was international pressure. Without the international

---

<sup>580</sup> Personal interview, Olympio, 2015.

<sup>581</sup> Personal interview, Agboyibo, 2015.

<sup>582</sup> Personal interview, Anyron, 2015.

pressure, I am not sure we would have arrived at that agreement.”<sup>583</sup>

#### 5.3.1. *Indicators of High Western Leverage*

To supplement the above analysis and approximately gauge the character and extent of Western leverage in Togo directly before and throughout the APG period, two indicators are used: aid dependency and trade ties. As outlined above in the cases of Zimbabwe and Kenya, first, following Peiffer and Englebert, to gauge Togo’s vulnerability to donor influence I calculated aid—ODA—as a percentage of export revenues, both during the APG years and in the five years prior. The five-year period of the APG in Togo was the highest of all three of the cases on this indicator, at 56 percent, falling into the extremely high category of Western leverage, the highest classification on the scale outlined in Chapter 2.<sup>584</sup> Due to Togo being cut off from most international aid flows since the early 1990s, the country’s average over the five-year period before the APG was just 18 percent, translating to a low degree of Western leverage. This low ratio, however, does not adequately reflect the actual amount of Western leverage in this period. Indeed, donors in fact wielded a high amount of leverage in the years leading up to the APG because they were able to hold out the promise of aid resumption if political reforms were instituted, which the political class in Togo desperately wanted.

Second, to help gauge the importance of trade ties, I collected data on Togo’s top five trade (import and export) partners over the APG period (averaged). According to the World Bank, Togo had a relatively balanced trade portfolio during this five-year period of the APG. For imports, only France and China appeared in the top five every year over this period, at

---

<sup>583</sup> Personal interview, Sambiri N’wakin Targone, PDP member of parliament, June 18, 2015.

<sup>584</sup> International Trade Centre, 2016, “Trade Map.”

14.1 percent and 14.8 percent respectively. If Western countries (namely the additions of Netherlands and Belgium) are considered as a bloc, however, they make up the biggest share of import partners over this period with 24.8 percent, translating to a high degree of trade dependence, the second highest category outlined in Chapter 2. For exports, Togo's most important partners were all focused regionally, with only Burkina Faso (13.2 percent) and Benin (12.4 percent) landing in the top five every year over this period.<sup>585</sup> Taken together, these two indicators strongly support the argument that Western countries had a very high degree of leverage in the lead up to and during the APG period in Togo. The ODA to export ratio (56 percent) over the period of the APG is particularly compelling.

Three main factors helped shape this high degree of Western leverage in Togo. First, was Togo's long history of political and economic ties with Western countries, which developed with France as a colonial legacy and then over decades of strategic partnership with Western countries during the Cold War, as highlighted above. Second, again in contrast to Zimbabwe, official and unofficial financial flows from China were low compared to flows from Western donors. To reiterate, quantifying financial flows from China to Africa is extremely difficult. That said, Strange et al. found that China's official finance to Togo from 2000 to 2011 accounted for only 1.31 percent of Togo's GNI.<sup>586</sup> Over the same period, ODA accounted for 7.9 percent of Togo's GNI.<sup>587</sup> Therefore, incumbents in Togo have been unable to use financial assistance from China to offset Western influence.

Third, the main regional institution in West Africa, ECOWAS, was quite strong and institutionalized. With backing from the regional hegemon, Nigeria, it wielded considerable

---

<sup>585</sup> World Bank, World Integrated Trade Solution, "Togo Trade Summary 2006-2010," <http://data.worldbank.org/country/togo> (accessed July 21, 2016).

<sup>586</sup> Strange et al., 2013, "China's Development Finance to Africa," 39.

<sup>587</sup> World Bank, 2016, "Development Indicators."



leverage on member states.<sup>588</sup> Perhaps more importantly, in stark contrast to SADC in Southern Africa, ECOWAS had norms that were open to international and regional intervention and a relatively cohesive mandate to uphold democratic principals. Founded in 1975, in 1978 ECOWAS passed a non-aggression protocol, reflecting the Cold War thinking on non-intervention.<sup>589</sup> In the early 1990s, however, regional norms in West Africa began to shift toward regional intervention and the promotion of good governance and democracy.

Indeed, ECOWAS has a history of military and diplomatic interventions in neighboring countries, beginning in the 1990s in Liberia and Sierra Leone with the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) military operations.<sup>590</sup> In 1999, member states formally enshrined ECOWAS's right to humanitarian intervention in the region with the adoption of the Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security, known as the "Mechanism," and in 2001, ECOWAS adopted the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance.<sup>591</sup> Because it includes the right to humanitarian intervention, Abass argues that the 1999 Mechanism "probably is the most ambitious instrument on the regulation of collective security ever attempted to date."<sup>592</sup> Although ECOWAS has a mixed record of upholding and enforcing democratic principals in West Africa, the regional body has acted decisively on a number of occasions in the name of democracy. Hartmann maintains that the "Nigerian-backed ECOWAS action in Sierra Leone

---

<sup>588</sup> Khadiagala, 2009, "Regionalism and Conflict Resolution," 434; Hartmann, 2016, "How Regionalism Shapes Regime Dynamics in Africa," 87.

<sup>589</sup> Akin Iwilade and Johnson Uchechukwu Agbo, 2012, "ECOWAS and the Regulation of Regional Peace and Security in West Africa," *Democracy and Security*, 8, 4: 363.

<sup>590</sup> For more on ECOMOG, see Adekeye Adebajo, 2002, *Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner); Peter Arthur, "ECOWAS and Regional Peacekeeping Integration in West Africa: Lessons for the Future," *Africa Today*, 57, 2: 2-24.

<sup>591</sup> Iwilade and Agbo, 2012, "ECOWAS and the Regulation of Regional Peace and Security in West Africa," 366.

<sup>592</sup> Ademola Abass, 2000, "The New Collective Security Mechanism of ECOWAS: Innovations and Problems," *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, 5, 2: 212.

in 1998 was the first African military intervention for the restoration of democracy.”<sup>593</sup> ECOWAS also intervened diplomatically in Côte d’Ivoire in the name of democracy in 2002, and, as highlighted above, in 2005 in Togo.<sup>594</sup>

Since the deployment of ECOMOG in 1990, ECOWAS has worked in close coordination with the international community, the UN in particular.<sup>595</sup> Indeed, the 1999 Mechanism allows for international intervention by the AU or UN, if invited. This close relationship and burden sharing on regional peace and security issues with international actors upped ECOWAS’s status on the international stage.<sup>596</sup> In Togo, these regional dynamics meant that Western countries were not at loggerheads with ECOWAS during the APG period, and as such were able to wield their considerable leverage effectively. As ECOWAS’s and Western donor’s goals and norms on intervention were largely aligned, the two worked in a generally coordinated and unified manner during the 2005 succession crisis and the APG negotiations.

This section has demonstrated how a high degree of external leverage in Togo endowed regional and international actors with considerable influence in the lead up to and during the period of power sharing, while also tracing the various historical roots that shaped these dynamics. The external involvement and reliance hypotheses predict that these long-term variables will shape the two short-term mechanisms discussed below, which, in turn, will lead to the practice of *countervailing politics* and a moderate, if halting, degree of SSR in Togo under the APG.

---

<sup>593</sup> Hartmann, 2016, “How Regionalism Shapes Regime Dynamics in Africa,” 87.

<sup>594</sup> Iwilade and Agbo, 2012, “ECOWAS and the Regulation of Regional Peace and Security in West Africa,” 368.

<sup>595</sup> Clement Adibe, 1997, “The Liberian Conflict and the ECOWAS-UN partnership,” *Third World Quarterly*, 18, 3: 471-488.

<sup>596</sup> Nina Wilen, 2012, *Justifying Interventions in Africa: (De)Stabilizing Sovereignty in Liberia, Burundi, and the Congo* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan): 184.

#### 5.4. Strong Agreement Design

The following sections turn to the two short-term mechanisms through which SSR outcomes were shaped under the APG in Togo: strong agreement design and largely conflicting political strategies. Several mediation efforts were attempted after the 2005 election violence. After a number of failed attempts, an internal negotiation process headed by Agboyibo, running from April to July, 2006, made some headway but could not break the impasse, leading the UFC party to demand international mediation. The externally led mediation process, headed by Compaoré, ran from August 7 to 19, 2006, and concluded with the signing of the APG in August in Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso. The RPT, five opposition parties, and two civil society groups signed the APG, as did Compaoré.

The APG called for the establishment of a government of national unity, noting that the “Government of National Unity is open to political parties and civil society organizations in a spirit of national reconciliation and mutual trust to consolidate the process of healing.”<sup>597</sup> Although Gnassingbé promised the UFC, the largest opposition party, the prime minister position, he instead gave the position to Agboyibo, the leader of CAR, a substantial but smaller opposition party. In protest, Olympio and the UFC refused to join the unity government when it was formed in September 2006, although one party official broke with Olympio and joined as an independent.<sup>598</sup>

Despite the UFC’s boycott, Agboyibo’s unity government included wide representation from the opposition, with 11 out of 35 cabinet positions going to opposition or

---

<sup>597</sup> Government of Togo. 2006, “Accord Politique Global.” For an English translation of the APG see Appendix 1 of United Nations, 2009, “Report of Security Sector Reform Activities in Togo,” UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, 42-50, [http://www.agora-parl.org/sites/default/files/UNREC\\_Report\\_on\\_Security\\_Sector\\_Reform\\_Activities\\_in\\_Togo.original.pdf](http://www.agora-parl.org/sites/default/files/UNREC_Report_on_Security_Sector_Reform_Activities_in_Togo.original.pdf) (accessed October 3, 2016).

<sup>598</sup> Personal interview, Agboyibo, 2015.

independent candidates. Gnassingbé retained the powerful presidency and the RPT maintained control over the coercive apparatus, including the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Security. Opposition candidates assumed control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Trade, and Ministry of Mines and Energy, among others.<sup>599</sup> The following section analyzes the content of the 2006 power-sharing accord in Togo and forwards several factors that explain the strong design of the agreement.

#### *5.4.1. Strong SSR Content and External Monitoring*

Like the cases of Zimbabwe and Kenya, the strength of the SSR content of the APG in Togo is measured according to the inclusion or exclusion of seven criteria, while its monitoring strength is measured according to the presence or absence of mechanisms granting external actors the ability to enforce noncompliance, as outlined in Chapter 2. To reiterate, SSR content is measured according to provisions mandating constitutional changes in security governance, political neutrality, revisions in security reform legislation, government commissions investigating security sector complicity in political violence, training changes, domestic accountability mechanisms for those involved in political violence, and a timeframe to achieve such steps.

The APG, which built on a framework initially outlined in 2004 talks with the EU, was a comprehensive document. In addition to the formation of a government of national unity, the APG highlighted a number of political and institutional reforms that were to be undertaken by the unity government. These included a revamped electoral commission (CENI) with representation from the opposition and civil society, a new National Assembly based on fair and transparent legislative elections—to be held in October 2007, a new census

---

<sup>599</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006, “Togo: Country Report,” 4.

and voter's register, equal access to the media for all political parties, women's candidate quotas, reconciliation processes, and constitutional, justice, and security reforms, among other provisions.<sup>600</sup>

Nearly two full pages of the APG were dedicated to security reforms. Section 2.1.1 of the APG demanded the political neutrality of the security forces, reading: "necessary measures shall be taken for the solemn reaffirmation and the effective observance of the non-political role and national and republican nature of the Army and Security Forces." Recognizing Togo's history of military interventionism, section 2.1.2 goes further, noting that the unity government, "will take all the useful measures to ensure that the Defense and Security forces do not interfere in any way in political discussions." Section 2.1.1 also noted the need to delineate the roles of internal and external forces, "so that the Army be dedicated to its mission of defense of the integrity of the national territory and the Police forces and National Gendarmerie to their missions of law enforcement and public security."<sup>601</sup>

Section 3.1. called for constitutional reforms that will ensure the "the republican character of the Army and Security Forces" and the consolidation of "democracy, the rule of law, and good governance." The APG also stipulated that the legislature must prioritize reform of the security forces, with section 3.5 calling for reform of the processes and "texts that govern" the security forces so that they are in "strict observance of republican legality." Section 2.2.2 notes that the signatories of the APG agree to establish a "Commission of Inquiry" tasked with investigating "the issue of impunity" and acts of political violence committed from 1958 to 2006. Section 2.1.3. of the APG called for the expansion and increased training for the police and gendarmerie "in order to enable them to effectively carry

---

<sup>600</sup> Government of Togo. 2006, "Accord Politique Global."

<sup>601</sup> Ibid.

out their duties, including ensuring the security of the activities of the political parties and the electoral operations.”<sup>602</sup> The above provisions of the APG successfully fulfill the five categories of impartiality, constitutional reforms, legislative reforms, a commission of inquiry, and training changes.

While section 2.2.2 of the APG noted the need to reform the courts and other institutions that aim to “control impunity,” the agreement failed to establish any accountability mechanisms for past political and electoral violence. The APG instead urged “forgiveness and national reconciliation.” The APG only alluded to a timeline for the considerable security reforms outlined in the agreement, with section 3.5 noting that security reforms should be a “priority” of the unity government.<sup>603</sup> But the APG failed to include any strict timelines. As such, the APG failed to fulfill the two categories of accountability mechanisms and timelines. That said, due to its fulfillment of five out of seven categories, it is clear that the APG’s SSR content should be viewed as strong. The APG’s SSR provisions outlined above are, of course, only on paper; the degree of their implementation is analyzed below.

The APG outlined a comprehensive and central external role in the monitoring and implementation of the agreement. Section 5.2 established a monitoring committee (which would become the *Comité de Suivi*), to be chaired by Compaoré, comprising all signatories of the APG—including representatives from the EU and ECOWAS. This committee was tasked with “the responsibility of ensuring the effective implementation of this Agreement.” Section 5.5 reiterated the centrality of external actors in the monitoring of the APG, stating that the signatories: “agree that the Facilitator and the EU and ECOWAS observers supervise the

---

<sup>602</sup> Ibid.

<sup>603</sup> Ibid.

transitional process to its final conclusion.” The APG also formally requested support from the EU and the international community, with section 5.4 asking for “financial and technical support to this on-going process.” Further demonstrating the importance of the resumption of EU aid to Togo, the APG implored the parties to “agree to appeal to the international community, particularly the EU, for the quick resumption of co-operation.”<sup>604</sup>

As the EU and ECOWAS were given specific and central roles in monitoring and implementing the APG, the agreement is deemed as strong in the category of third party monitoring. Together, the strong SSR content and strong third party monitoring earn the APG an overall strong value regarding agreement design, the highest possible category on the scale outlined in Chapter 2.

#### *5.4.2. Roots of Strong Agreement Design*

Given the RPT’s high degree of reliance on the security sector and the military’s significant political influence in Togo, the inclusion of a robust SSR component in the APG may appear surprising. What explains its inclusion? The long-term variable of the character of external involvement and leverage was the decisive factor responsible for the strength of the APG’s SSR content in Togo. In negotiations, the EU’s leverage, amplified by ECOWAS’s support and permissive norms on international intervention, outweighed the nature of civil-military relations and the RPT’s history of reliance on the military. Under these external pressures, Gnassingbé’s hand was forced, and he chose reengagement with the international community over doubling down on RPT’s well-worn script of reliance on military force (see below for more on Gnassingbé and the RPT’s political strategy under the APG).

---

<sup>604</sup> Ibid.

As noted above, international and regional actors were deeply involved in the negotiations leading up to the APG, with the EU and ECOWAS playing primary roles in the negotiation process itself. Indeed, the APG built directly out of the 2004 EU framework of 22 “democratic commitments,” which Eyadéma had pledged to uphold before his death. This EU involvement directly shaped the SSR content of the APG. Lare Penn, a member of parliament for the ruling party and first secretary in the National Assembly, stressed the significance of the previous EU discussions to the content of the APG, telling me that, “the 22 agreements signed with the EU in 2004 were the origin of the APG.”<sup>605</sup> In this manner, the EU played a crucial role in forcing the RPT to concede to the security reforms outlined in the APG, with the promise of restored economic ties being particularly effective in bringing Gnassingbé and the RPT to the bargaining table and shifting the party’s previous aversion to a broad SSR framework.

This dynamic of international centrality played out in the negotiations regarding issues of the APG’s monitoring and implementation as well. As noted above, the UFC party was skeptical that the RPT would follow through on any promised reforms if international actors were not involved. As such, the UFC demanded an international component to the mediation. This domestic pressure, in combination with coordinated external pressure and involvement from the EU and ECOWAS, pushed the RPT to accept international and regional monitoring of the agreement.

Some hardliners in the RPT disagreed with the strong external monitoring role and participation in the *Comité de Suivi*. Despite qualms from some of Gnassingbé’s close advisors on having donors directly involved in the *Comité de Suivi*, Agboyibo told me that,

---

<sup>605</sup> Personal interview, Lare Penn, UNIR member of parliament and first secretary in the National Assembly, Lomé, Togo, June 17, 2015.



“Faure [Gnassingbé] accepted this committee.” Agboyibo also stressed the importance of the EU’s role in the strong design of the power-sharing agreement, telling me, “That was the whole game...that the EU would come back, reengage and cooperate with Togo. So RPT accepted, saw the utility of it [the APG].”<sup>606</sup> Olympio also made this point, asserting that, “We believe that without the international community, we would not have had the *Accord Politique Global*.”<sup>607</sup>

In addition to the importance of external involvement, another contributing factor to the strong design of the APG was the participation of civil society actors in the negotiation process. In contrast to both Kenya and Zimbabwe’s negotiations, in Togo two women’s civil society organizations, the *Groupe de Reflexion et d’action, Femme Democratie et Developpment* (Group of Reflection and Action for Women in Democracy and Development) and the *Réseau des Femmes Africaines Ministres Parlementaires* (Network of African Women Ministers and Parliamentarians), participated directly in the negotiations and signed the APG document. As Paul Amegakpo, head of the civil society group *La Concertation Nationale de la Société Civile* (CNSC-the National Consultation of Civil Society Togo), told me, the “APG was the first agreement in Togo that required the participation of civil society.”<sup>608</sup> This civil society participation put additional domestic pressure on Gnassingbé and the RPT to agree to the strong design of the APG.

---

<sup>606</sup> Personal interview, Agboyibo, 2015.

<sup>607</sup> Personal interview, Olympio, 2015.

<sup>608</sup> Personal interview, Paul Amegakpo, head of the CNSC, Lomé, Togo, July 1, 2015. Interview conducted by my research assistant in Togo, Ekoutiamé Ahlin.

### 5.5. Largely Conflicting Political Strategies Under the APG

This section now turns to the second mechanism through which SSR processes were shaped in Togo: the opposition and ruling parties' choice of political strategy under power sharing. Both the ruling party and the main opposition party in Togo share long histories of deploying exclusionary, polarizing political strategies and tactics. Surprisingly, only the RPT chose to largely depart from this trajectory, particularly regarding SSR, while the UFC, for the most part, continued to choose confrontation and boycotts over political inclusion during the APG period.

#### 5.5.1. *RPT's Moderated Political Strategies*

The RPT party has an extended history of using political violence and exclusionary political strategies to gain and maintain political control. These exclusionary strategies and tactics can be traced all the way back to the Eyadéma-led military coups of the 1960s through the period of harsh militarized rule in the 1970s and 1980s. Although Eyadéma and the RPT initially moved to less exclusionary political practices in the early 1990s, capitulating to the standing up of an inclusive National Conference, they quickly regressed to their old ways with a violent military crackdown and intervention in the processes of the transitional government, as noted.<sup>609</sup> From the 1993 though the 2002 multiparty but flawed presidential elections, Eyadéma and the RPT continued to maintain power through a combination of election violence, voter intimidation, outright election fraud, and sowing of divisions in the opposition.<sup>610</sup> Despite a slight rapprochement with the EU in 2004 that led to promises of democratic reforms, after Eyadéma's death in 2005 the RPT and the military again closed

---

<sup>609</sup> Seely, 2009, *The Legacies of Transition Governments in Africa*.

<sup>610</sup> Bekoe, 2012, "Postelection Political Agreements in Togo and Zanzibar;" Seely, 2006, "The Unexpected Presidential Election in Togo, 2005."

ranks and reverted to strategies of force, unconstitutionally installing Gnassingbé and violently quelling protests around the 2005 elections.

With the signing of the APG, Gnassingbé and his pro-reform faction within the RPT decided to largely depart from the party's decades of overtly violent and exclusionary political strategies. They instead chose to prioritize reengagement with the international community and deployed more moderate strategies and tactics under the APG, particularly in the period of unity government leading up to the October 2007 legislative elections. After the 2005 election violence and the signing of the APG, Gnassingbé and the RPT understood that, if they wanted the EU and other donors to resume aid and cooperation, they had to agree to a degree of inclusivity and remain open to various institutional reforms. Under the APG, Gnassingbé and the RPT therefore joined and participated in the inclusive institutions stood up by the APG, adopting a mix of inclusionary and exclusionary strategies during the APG period.

In the area of SSR, Gnassingbé and the RPT again took a largely moderate political approach, remaining open to discussions on a host of reforms aimed at depoliticizing the security forces and lessening their involvement in political processes, most notably during elections (see below). According to Anyron, the former UFC official and minister of culture, given the army's history of involvement in politics and political violence, Gnassingbé and the RPT understood that some security reforms would have to be undertaken under the APG. He told me that, "The government knew that the army was a weakness for them...Certain reforms were necessary."<sup>611</sup> While the RPT moderated some of its strategies and tactics, it continued to use exclusionary, if less brazen and violent, practices in other areas, such as the

---

<sup>611</sup> Personal interview, Anyron, 2015.

sowing of divisions in Togo's fractured opposition, making unilateral appointments, and refusing to hold anyone accountable for the 2005 election violence.

To reiterate, exclusive versus inclusive political strategies and tactics are measured according to four categories: joining the power-sharing government without delay, the use of widespread partisan political violence, evidence of attempts at cross-party policy cooperation on key reforms contained in the agreement (or attempts to block), and cooperative (or confrontational) approaches to SSR, as outlined in Chapter 2. Although Gnassingbé did go against his promise to appoint a UFC candidate as prime minister of the unity government, Gnassingbé and the RPT did not delay the formation of the power-sharing government.<sup>612</sup> The unity government, led by Agboyibo of CAR, took office on September 16, 2006, less than four weeks after the parties signed the APG. Because Gnassingbé broke his word on appointing a prime minister from the UFC, the RPT only earns partial fulfillment of this category. Party-based violence and political militia activity fell in the 2006-2010 period in Togo, especially from 2006 to 2009. According to ACLED data, no incidents of partisan political violence can be directly attributed to the RPT during the 2006-2010 period, clearly falling below the threshold of 20 violent incidents per year.<sup>613</sup>

The introduction of opposition and civil society representatives into Togo's executive governing structures marked a shift for both the RPT and the opposition, as the various parties had to develop strategies to deal with their rivals from within the halls of government. As noted, the RPT deployed a mixed approach to the main reforms outlined in the APG, at times agreeing in principle to certain reforms but not fully implementing them, as with the *Commission Vérité, Justice et Réconciliation* (CVJR-Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation

---

<sup>612</sup> Personal interview, Olympio, 2015.

<sup>613</sup> ACLED, Version 5 Data (1997-2014).

Commission), and other times attempting to outright block or ignore some key APG reforms, as with the issue of constitutional reform. Despite some inclusive practices, because the RPT attempted to block some key reforms in the APG, the party was not deemed as inclusionary in this category. That said, when it came to the issue of reforming the security forces, Gnassingbé took a relatively inclusive approach to SSR, remaining open to the discussion on a number of reforms designed to minimize the role of the security in political processes, as discussed in detail in the following section. The RPT therefore fulfills two inclusionary categories and partially fulfills one more. As such, the RPT's political strategy under the APG falls into the moderately inclusive category.

#### *5.5.2. Explaining RPT's Largely Moderate Strategy*

What explains the RPT's shift to a more moderate strategy under power sharing, particularly regarding SSR? Akin to the mechanism of agreement design, the high degree of coordinated external leverage, namely from the EU and ECOWAS, played a decisive role in shaping the RPT's choice of political strategy under the APG. The EU's leverage, again enhanced by support and aligned goals with ECOWAS, was able to compel the party to largely switch their political modus operandi away from their past reliance on the security sector and toward reengagement with the international community. Agboyibo explained to me that there was a general consensus with the RPT on the APG process because of continued pressure from international actors, which was amplified by their participation in the *Comité de Suivi* monitoring mechanism. He said: "There was agreement to advance all of these reforms, and it was because of the *Comité de Suivi* and the international community."<sup>614</sup> Toulabor also

---

<sup>614</sup> Personal interview, Agboyibo, 2015.

makes this point on the centrality of the resumption of international aid to the RPT's changed approach, calling Gnassingbé's strategy: "democratization for money."<sup>615</sup>

Two other main factors shaped the RPT's choice of a moderated political strategy under the APG. First, in contrast to Zimbabwe's ZANU-PF, which has only known one leader, was Togo's change in party and presidential leadership, due to Eyadéma's death. As noted in Chapter 3 on Zimbabwe, a number of scholars have found that leadership turnover is crucial to breaking long-held patronage networks in semi-authoritarian and personalized regimes.<sup>616</sup> The case of Togo suggests that this logic may also hold in cases of intra-party turnover, especially if a successor has some pro-reform tendencies. Although legacies of a one-party state and Eyadéma's personalized rule undoubtedly persisted in Togo—most notably the supreme power of the presidency—the change in party leadership gave Gnassingbé the opportunity to at least try to escape the shadow of his father and break some entrenched patterns of overtly violent political strategies.

The trajectory of a new party leader is of course contingent on their style of leadership and disposition towards reform, bringing us to the second factor: Gnassingbé's somewhat pro-reform stance. The RPT party, and now UNIR, is divided between a camp of young reformers and a group of old guard hardliners, or "hawks," who held influential positions under Eyadéma and are against reform and compromise with the opposition. While Gnassingbé faced strong international and regional pressures to move toward a more inclusive style of rule under the APG, Gnassingbé also appears to have a moderately pro-reform disposition. He has a business degree from George Washington University in the United States, speaks fluent English, and has a mixed ethnic heritage, as his mother is an

---

<sup>615</sup> Toulabor, 2011, "Togo," 234.

<sup>616</sup> Bienen and Herbst, 1996, "The Relationship between Political and Economic Reform in Africa;" Maltz, 2007, "The Case for Presidential Term Limits;" Cheeseman, 2010, "African Elections as Vehicles for Change."

Ewe from the south of the country.<sup>617</sup> Olympio, who has worked closely with Gnassingbé, told me that, “He is not like the father, he is more open. The father was just brutal. An army sergeant who would bump you off because he didn’t like your face, that’s all. But he’s [Gnassingbé] more open, and also educated.”<sup>618</sup>

Indeed, my interviews revealed that Gnassingbé has surprised many hardliners within his own party by not “doing exactly like his dad.”<sup>619</sup> It appears that some of the old guard, reactionary forces that brought Gnassingbé to the presidency in the wake of Eyadéma’s death have come to regret that action, as they view Gnassingbé as overly reform-oriented.<sup>620</sup> Ogamo Bagnah, an RPT/UNIR “elder,” former minister of interior, and member of Togo’s reconciliation commission (CVJR), spoke on rifts within the ruling party, telling me that, “Sometimes the people of the north, they tell Faure [Gnassingbé] that he is going too far in this [pro-reform] direction.” Bagnah attributed Gnassingbé’s more inclusive political stance in part to his mixed ethnic heritage. He told me, “Faure [Gnassingbé], his mother is from the south, and his father from the north. He is for the mixture of the people, and he does that with strength.”<sup>621</sup> Despite a number of important continuities in Togo’s politics, Gnassingbé has showed a willingness and desire to forge his own identity and, to a certain extent, depart from his father’s strongman political strategies and tendencies, particularly regarding SSR, as discussed below.

---

<sup>617</sup> Amandine Gnanguènon, Paulin Maurice Toupane, and Esso-Wèdeou Gnamke, 2014, “Politicians Talk Past Each Other as Togo’s 2015 Elections Approach,” *ECOWAS Peace and Security Report*, Institute for Security Studies, 3.

<sup>618</sup> Personal interview, Olympio, 2015

<sup>619</sup> Personal interview, head of civil society group dedicated to rule of law reform, Lomé, Togo, July 12, 2013.

<sup>620</sup> Ibid.

<sup>621</sup> Personal interview, Ogamo Bagnah, RPT/UNIR “elder,” former minister of interior, and member of the CVJR, Lomé, Togo, June 29, 2015.

### *5.5.3. The Opposition's Largely Exclusionary Strategy Under Power Sharing*

The fractious opposition in Togo also has an extended history of using confrontational, exclusionary, and sometimes violent political approaches and tactics. Analogous to the case of Zimbabwe, these practices developed through a process of defensive exclusion, whereby Togo's opposition largely mirrored the exclusionary and polarizing approaches of the ruling party. Emerging out of the democratization movement in the early 1990s, two main camps developed within the Togolese opposition: the moderates and the radicals. Broadly speaking, from the early 1990s to 2010, the moderates consisted of the CAR, the CPP, and a number of smaller affiliated parties, and were led by Edem Kodjo and Agboyibo, the leaders of CAR and CPP, respectively.

The radicals were made up of the UFC, Togo's largest opposition party until it split after the 2010 elections, and an assortment of other less prominent parties. Olympio and a number of his surrogates, including Emmanuel Akitani-Bob, who ran in Olympio's place in the 2003 and 2005 presidential elections, led this camp. Kodjo was seen as the most moderate and willing to compromise with the RPT, followed by Agboyibo, with Olympio and other UFC leaders as the most radical.<sup>622</sup> Agboyibo described the two political traditions in the opposition as one favoring force and the other, negotiation. He told me: "If you look at the history of democratization in Togo, it's always on one hand the orientation of the fighters, versus negotiation. The logic of the UFC is there is no dialogue, just get him [the president] out!"<sup>623</sup> Despite a number of attempts in the early 1990s and in the lead up to subsequent elections, the opposition has largely failed to unite under a common umbrella in an effort to unseat the RPT and, much to the benefit of the ruling party, has remained

---

<sup>622</sup> Seely, 2006, "The Unexpected Presidential Election in Togo, 2005," 613.

<sup>623</sup> Personal interview, Agboyibo, 2015.



perennially divided along these radical and moderate lines. The RPT has helped to cultivate these splits in the opposition through a strategy of selective cooption, as noted above.

Given the UFC's size and popularity (until 2010), its more confrontational strategies have largely won out in Togo. These exclusionary strategies can be traced back to the 1991 National Conference, where the opposition deployed increasingly combative approaches in an effort to force Eyadéma and the RPT out of office. The opposition declared the National Conference sovereign, attempted to dissolve the RPT and freeze the party's assets, and tried to overhaul and prosecute the security forces, leading to intervention from the military, as noted above.<sup>624</sup> The opposition also did not shy away from deploying violence to achieve its political ends, although on a much smaller scale than the RPT. Opposition groups formed a number of militias during the National Conference period, including the Ekpémog and the Movement of October 5. These groups functioned as the military wings of the opposition, and often clashed with security forces, in one case destructing and looting the homes of RPT members in 1991.<sup>625</sup> Olympio described the opposition's strategies during the National Conference as "demagogic." He told me that during this period: "Nobody wants to give in...it was quite demagogic in a way."<sup>626</sup>

These exclusionary strategies continued through the country's move to multipartyism, with the opposition either boycotting or launching large-scale street demonstrations after every legislative and presidential election in Togo up to 2007. Akin to the MDC in Zimbabwe, these confrontational political strategies and divides within the Togolese opposition carried strong legacies into the APG period, as the UFC faced difficulty in

---

<sup>624</sup> Heilbrunn, 1993, "Social Origins of National Conferences in Benin and Togo," 290; Julien Morency-Laflamme, 2011, *La Démocratisation au Togo et au Bénin*.

<sup>625</sup> Seely, 2009, *The Legacies of Transition Governments in Africa*, 120, 188.

<sup>626</sup> Personal interview, Olympio, 2015.

changing its combative political approach. Although the UFC signed the APG power-sharing agreement in August 2006, the party refused to join the unity government the following month, when Gnassingbé broke his verbal promise to Olympio that the position of prime minister would go the UFC. Although the UFC did not disavow the APG outright and did join other shared institutions, such as the *Comité de Suivi* and the CENI, the UFC continued to deploy largely exclusionary political strategies during the APG period.

Once the UFC boycotted the government of national unity led by Agboyibo, the party proceeded to attack the more moderate parties like CAR for “selling out” and joining the government. Agboyibo told me that the UFC used this point as a major part of their campaign for the 2007 parliamentary elections, telling me, “The UFC campaigned against me, saying I was coopted by RPT and the government...of course the big winner was the RPT.”<sup>627</sup> The radical opposition’s exclusionary rhetoric even went so far as to accuse those who did participate in the unity government as essentially being an accomplice in the killing Togo’s first president, Sylvanus Olympio. Anyron, the former UFC official and minister, told me that the thinking in the opposition during this time was that “to go into the government is to become RPT. And if someone joins the government, they are then not trustworthy. If you go into the government, *you participate in the assassination of Sylvanus Olympio* [emphasis mine].”<sup>628</sup> Another UFC politician, Douti Kombate Kolani, a current member of parliament, reiterated this point to me, saying: “Joining the government is like killing the first president of Togo, Sylvanus Olympio. And then you are no longer popular with the population.”<sup>629</sup>

The UFC’s strategies within the APG institutions that they did choose to participate in, namely the *Comité de Suivi* and the CENI, were only slightly less confrontational and

---

<sup>627</sup> Personal interview, Agboyibo, 2015.

<sup>628</sup> Personal interview, Anyron, 2015.

<sup>629</sup> Personal interview, Douti Kombate Kolani, UFC member of parliament, Lomé, Togo, June 18, 2015.

exclusionary. The UFC used its participation in the *Comité de Suivi* as a platform to denounce the RPT and the government, criticizing the lack of prosecutions for political violence, the make up of the constitutional court and CENI as biased against the opposition, and other complaints. When these shared institutions were not sufficiently reformed to the party's liking, the UFC reverted to its old playbook and simply withdrew from and boycotted them. In the run up to the 2010 presidential elections, after the RPT unilaterally appointed new representatives in 2009 to the successor organization of the *Comité de Suivi*, known as the *Cadre Permanent de Dialogue et de Concertation* (CPDC-Permanent Framework for Dialogue and Consultation), the UFC and the CAR withdrew from the CPDC. Just before the 2010 election the UFC also withdrew from the CENI and the National Assembly, citing disagreements on the composition of the electoral commission.<sup>630</sup>

Because of the UFC's absence from the unity government, it was unable to directly participate in the government's SSR discussions during this period. But the party continued to denounce the military's past abuses and expressed worry about its future role in elections.<sup>631</sup> In sum, the UFC refused to join the unity government, precluding Togo's main opposition party from participating in discussions on key reforms of the APG, including SSR. As noted above, party-based violence fell in the 2006-2010 period in Togo, particularly from 2006 to 2009. According to ACLED data, three incidents of partisan political violence can be directly attributed to the opposition during the 2006 to 2010 period, falling below the threshold of 20 violent incidents per year.<sup>632</sup> The UFC therefore fulfills three of four

---

<sup>630</sup> Bekoe, 2012, "Postelection Political Agreements in Togo and Zanzibar," 127, 130.

<sup>631</sup> UFC, 2007, "Evaluation du Processus Électoral par l'UFC," <http://www.ufctogo.com/Evaluation-du-processus-electoral-1752.html> (accessed September 28, 2016).

<sup>632</sup> ACLED, Version 5 Data (1997-2014).

exclusionary categories, meaning the party's political strategy under the APG falls into the moderately exclusive category.

Reflecting the historic divide within Togo's opposition, the moderate camp's strategic choices, led by Agboyibo and CAR, were generally more inclusionary and conciliatory. They joined the unity government, did not attempt to block key reforms in the APG (although they did boycott the CPDC prior to the 2010 elections), did not deploy violence, and participated in SSR discussions during Agboyibo's tenure as prime minister.<sup>633</sup> As the smaller faction in the opposition, however, their strategic choices were less consequential, as discussed below.

#### *5.5.4. Explaining the Opposition's Strategy*

Similar to the MDC in Zimbabwe, two main factors explain the opposition's strategic choices during the APG in Togo: the RPT's long history of exclusionary, violent, and polarizing strategies, and the opposition's inexperience and personality-driven dynamics. In a process of defensive exclusion—rooted in the fierce battles fought with the RPT and the security forces during the country's move toward multiparty politics—the UFC and the radical opposition chose continuity over change during the APG period. The UFC continued their confrontational approaches, boycotting the unity government and harshly criticizing both the RPT and the moderate camp of the opposition. The RPT's continuing use of selective cooption helped perpetuate the divide between the radical and moderate camps in the opposition, exemplified by Gnassingbé's choice of Agboyibo as prime minister.

Inexperience and personality-driven politics also played a role in the opposition's choice of strategy under the APG. Anyron, the former UFC minister, told me that the party decided to boycott the unity government because they believed they could win the legislative

---

<sup>633</sup> Personal interview, Agboyibo, 2015.

elections in 2007 outright, and thereby claim the prime minister position. This strategy was a political miscalculation.<sup>634</sup> Party officials admitted to me that this was a strategic mistake, as discussed below. The opposition in Togo, akin to many other opposition groups in Africa, also failed to develop strong party platforms and political ideologies, instead focusing on personal interests and historical rivalries. Olympio explained to me that this tendency was also forged during the National Conference in the early 1990s, saying that the opposition at this time did not “know how political bodies develop ideologies and so on. Everybody was fighting for his movement, for personal interests, or for his friends.”<sup>635</sup> This legacy carried into the APG period as well. Agboyibo stressed this point, criticizing Olympio for focusing more on his family’s personal historical animosity with the RPT than the good of the country. He told me: “The battle that Olympio was fighting in the APG period was for his father, not for his country.”<sup>636</sup>

The two prior sections have discussed the mechanisms of agreement design and political strategy and examined the main historical factors that led to these conditions in Togo. The agreement design and political strategy hypotheses predict that the combination of strong agreement design and largely conflicting political strategies will translate to a moderate, if halting, degree of SSR under the APG.

## 5.6. SSR Outcomes in Togo

Akin to the two other case studies, the APG negotiation had the potential to function as a critical juncture in Togo’s political history, as it presented a genuine, if highly structured, opportunity to put the country on a more democratic trajectory. This window of structured

---

<sup>634</sup> Personal interview, Anyron, 2015.

<sup>635</sup> Personal interview, Olympio, 2015.

<sup>636</sup> Personal interview, Agboyibo, 2015.

contingency remained open after the signing of the APG, but shrank considerably after the main opposition party boycotted the unity government and the practice of *countervailing politics* obtained in Togo. Although in many ways the country reverted back to the status quo political dynamic prior to the APG, after over a decade of mostly failed attempts at democratic reform in Togo, despite many setbacks, the APG delivered a few key electoral and security reforms. This halting but moderate SSR progress helped the country largely overcome its dark past of electoral violence. While behavioral changes within the security forces have been uneven, levels of security sector involvement in electoral violence and processes fell drastically during the APG period.

The following section discusses these processes in detail, arguing that the strong agreement design of the APG mediated and amplified external pressures for reform while conflicting political strategies of the main political parties led to a halting reform process. The section then outlines the various indicators that help gauge the extent of SSR achieved under power sharing in Togo. As expected, despite enormous challenges, including anti-reform elements in the ruling party and the military, and a largely uncompromising opposition, Togo achieved a halting but moderate degree of SSR during the APG period, particularly regarding election security. The section concludes with an examination of the limited SSR efforts in Togo before the APG.

#### *5.6.1. Strong Agreement Design Amplified External Reform Pressures*

The strong design of the APG in Togo, backed by coordinated external pressure, played a decisive role in shaping the country's halting but moderate progress on SSR. As seen in the other two cases of Zimbabwe and Kenya, the content and design of power-sharing

agreements set the parameters and shape the way the agreements will be subsequently implemented and monitored. The strong agreement design of the APG, especially its strong third party monitoring and detailed SSR content, enabled and amplified international, regional, and domestic pressures, as such constituencies were able to leverage the APG to help force political leaders to uphold some of their reform promises. While both ECOWAS and the EU played roles in this process, the EU was the most influential. Interviews with the major political players during the APG period revealed that the promise of EU reengagement and the resumption of financial flows were a major catalyst for the reforms that took place under the APG, especially during the tenure of the unity government headed by Agboyibo (2006-2007).<sup>637</sup>

The main mechanism that the EU used to exert their high degree of leverage to support reform during the APG period was the *Comité de Suivi* (and later the CPDC). With support and participation from the EU and ECOWAS in the actual proceedings, the *Comité de Suivi* played a central and active monitoring and implementation role, especially from 2006-2007. From November 2006 to August 2007 the monitoring committee met monthly in sessions that were chaired by Compaoré to discuss progress made on APG reforms and other issues, including the management of the CENI and the establishment of an electoral code of conduct. The *Comité de Suivi* also pushed for weekly meetings between other domestic and international stakeholders, including the CENI, the government, the EU, and UNDP.<sup>638</sup>

In contrast to Zimbabwe but akin to Kenya, the *Comité de Suivi* was able to help push reforms forward in Togo because the APG provided the committee with actual concrete reforms to enforce. Agboyibo spoke forcefully on the prime importance of external pressure

---

<sup>637</sup> Bekoe also makes this point, see Bekoe, 2012, "Postelection Political Agreements in Togo and Zanzibar," 129.

<sup>638</sup> Ibid, 126.

and participation in the APG's monitoring and implementation institution, telling me: "There was agreement to advance all of these reforms, and it was because of the *Comité de Suivi* and the international community. Having the international community in these [*Comité de Suivi*] meetings was a precious help, *having them was the most important thing* [emphasis mine]." <sup>639</sup> To drive his point home, Agboyibo reiterated the importance of EU participation in the *Comité de Suivi* to the overall reform process in Togo, telling me that. "The EU can track these reforms because they are participating in the *Comité de Suivi*." <sup>640</sup>

If considerable security reforms had not been included in the package of institutional reforms outlined in the APG, the SSR process would not have been susceptible to such outside monitoring pressures. Because of the military's overtly political role in Togo's recent history, the EU and other donors placed an emphasis on reforming the security sector. Anyron, the former UFC minister, spoke on this point, telling me that the RPT recognized that the military was a weak point for them, "that is why they reformed it." Anyron went on to tell me that outside pressures were key to the moderate degree of SSR progress achieved during the APG period, saying: "Pressure from the international community helped reform the army. The government wanted to prove to the international community and the EU that they had done something." <sup>641</sup>

Gnassingbé's strategic choice to deliver on some key reforms and hold peaceful elections with the expectation of renewed donor assistance paid immediate dividends. After the very first meeting of the *Comité de Suivi* monitoring committee in November 2006, the

---

<sup>639</sup> Personal interview, Agboyibo, 2015.

<sup>640</sup> Ibid.

<sup>641</sup> Personal interview, Anyron, 2015.



EU restarted some development assistance (€57 million in the first year of renewed aid).<sup>642</sup> After the 2007 legislative elections were deemed generally free and fair, one of the main stipulations of the APG, the EU resumed full economic ties with Togo, the World Bank recommended forgiving \$145 million of debt, and a 2008 conference in Brussels with international donors was organized on Togo.<sup>643</sup> While the EU's great influence may have lessened once full reengagement and financial assistance was resumed after the 2007 legislative elections, EU pressure continued to play a significant role in incentivizing movement on reforms, including on the issue of SSR. Anyron stressed this point to me, saying: "In the 2007 to 2010 period [after the 2007 legislative elections], we continued to put in place the reforms outlined in the APG. It was possible because the pressure from the EU continued."<sup>644</sup>

The APG set the stage for SSR in Togo, ensuring that it would be discussed in the domestic and international monitoring forums and reports that were stood up after the agreement was signed. A prime example of this was Togo's CVJR, stood up in 2009 (see below for more details). Although the commission's final report was not released until 2012, its creation and mandate to investigate past political violence also helped put additional pressure on the security reform agenda. Again, this was primarily due to leverage from the EU and other international donors. Anyron explained to me that, "the CVJR was a condition of the EU cooperation. So that is why the government went through with that reform."<sup>645</sup>

Although the APG was a well-designed document, its lack of clear benchmarks and timelines, outside of the 2007 legislative elections, hurt the prospects for expedient and

---

<sup>642</sup> Bekoe, 2012, "Postelection Political Agreements in Togo and Zanzibar," 128; Tyson Roberts, 2008, "The Legislative Election in Togo, October 2007," *Electoral Studies*, 27, 3: 558.

<sup>643</sup> Bekoe, 2012, "Postelection Political Agreements in Togo and Zanzibar," 129.

<sup>644</sup> Personal interview, Anyron, 2015.

<sup>645</sup> Ibid.

complete reforms. This lack of a reform timetable meant that external and domestic actors were unable to point to specific deadlines for each item on the broad reform agenda and press the government to respect the agreement's timeframes. In retrospect, the opposition understood that this was a mistake committed during the negotiation process. Olympio told me: "we believe it would have been appropriate to add that the agreement has an implementation timetable."<sup>646</sup>

#### *5.6.1. Conflicting Political Strategies Led to a Halting Reform Process*

Gnassingbé and the opposition chose to deploy largely conflicting political strategies under the APG in Togo, as discussed above, leading to a halting reform process. Due to strong regional and international pressure, Gnassingbé and his younger, pro-reform faction of the RPT were pushed to largely depart from the party's past reliance on the security sector to stay in power, as they instead chose to reengage with the international community and implement a number of the APG reforms, including some SSR. Although financial and other incentives played a large role in Gnassingbé's strategic calculus, his somewhat pro-reform disposition appears to have helped as well. Indeed, officials involved with SSR initiatives in Togo during the APG period expressed to me that support from Gnassingbé on SSR seemed sincere.<sup>647</sup>

Gnassingbé's commitment to some key APG reforms, including SSR, angered hardliners in the RPT, particularly a group of military and civilian hawks associated with Gnassingbé's half brother and former minister of defense, Kpatcha Gnassingbé (who was arrested in 2009 for an alleged coup attempt, as discussed below). Because of the powerful

---

<sup>646</sup> Personal interview, Olympio, 2015.

<sup>647</sup> Personal interviews with local and international officials, Lomé, Togo, July 8-12, 2013.

presidency, however, Gnassingbé was able to overcome significant pressure from elements within his party and the security sector and adopt a mixed but largely moderate political strategy under the APG, particularly towards SSR. As the RPT remained in control of the military, this moderated political strategy of Gnassingbé's was crucial to the SSR reforms that were achieved during this period.

Gnassingbé did not depart entirely from his father's exclusionary tendencies, as he deployed a mixed approach to the APG's reform agenda. The inner-workings of the unity government and other shared institutions, such as the *Comité de Suivi*, got off to an auspicious start in the 2006-2007 period.<sup>648</sup> With Gnassingbé largely on board with the need for some key reforms, there was general agreement among international, regional, and many domestic actors on the importance of the reform agenda in Togo, particularly in the early period of unity government. This relative consensus helped facilitate a flurry of reforms in the run up to the 2007 legislative elections and opened the door to a moderate degree of progress on SSR, particularly in the area of depoliticization and election security (see below).

After the peaceful, free and fair 2007 legislative elections took place, however, and Agboyibo's unity government was replaced by an RPT dominated one, inter-party relations became more contentious, as both the RPT and the opposition began to relapse into more exclusionary practices and the window for reform shrank significantly. Indeed, the end of Agboyibo's unity government marked a closing of the previously relatively inclusive political space in Togo, even though the opposition had fresh representation in the National Assembly and remained part of the *Comité de Suivi* and the CENI. The RPT and the opposition disagreed sharply on the composition and procedures of the CPDC and the CENI during this period, especially in the run up to the 2010 presidential election, as noted. When

---

<sup>648</sup> Personal interview, Agboyibo, 2015.

the RPT unilaterally appointed new representatives to the CPDC, the UFC withdrew entirely from the body.<sup>649</sup> Citing a lack of good faith on part of the RPT and disagreements on the composition of the CENI, the UFC also withdrew from the electoral commission and the National Assembly prior to 2010 election.<sup>650</sup> These exclusionary maneuvers from both parties after the 2007 elections repolarized the political environment, lessening the likelihood of any further APG reforms being implemented.

Because of the UFC's absence from the 2006-2007 unity government, Togo's largest opposition party was unable to directly participate in the government's reform discussions that took place during Agboyibo's tenure as prime minister. The UFC's choice to boycott the unity government and continue its historical use of largely exclusionary political strategies thus hurt the prospects for a comprehensive and truly transformative reform agenda in Togo under the APG, as the UFC was prevented from wielding its considerable weight to push the RPT further on reform. Indeed, my interviews revealed that the party's boycott of the unity government was a major reason why a number of the APG reforms never were fully implemented. Jean-Pierre Fabre, formerly the UFC's secretary general and now leader of the ANC, which broke away from the UFC after the 2010 elections, told me that, "Agboyibo didn't have the force of the UFC behind him to implement the [APG] reforms. They needed the force of the people behind them for reforms, but didn't have that under Agboyibo."<sup>651</sup>

Senior leaders in the opposition and the ruling party explained to me that, in retrospect, it was a strategic mistake for the UFC to boycott the unity government, especially given the high degree of international leverage that existed in the run up to the 2007

---

<sup>649</sup> Bekoe, 2012, "Postelection Political Agreements in Togo and Zanzibar," 130.

<sup>650</sup> Ibid, 127, 130.

<sup>651</sup> Personal interview, Jean-Pierre Fabre, former secretary general of the UFC, president of the ANC, Lomé, Togo, June 26, 2015.

legislative election. Agboyibo said: “When it comes to the application of this accord, it was very important to have everyone present in the unity government.” He explained to me that, “The nine parties managed to agree on all the reforms together in the APG. To achieve those reforms, the parties had to be in government, but they wouldn’t do that. *Since the UFC refused to join the government, we couldn’t do all the reforms of the APG* [emphasis mine].”<sup>652</sup>

Anyron echoed this sentiment, saying: “It was an error not to join the government...It would have been better to join in 2006 because at that time you have the collaboration of the international community, the EU and so on.”<sup>653</sup> Senior officials from the RPT also made this point to me. Bagnah, the RPT “elder,” explained to me that the unity government had a unique moment of leverage for reform. He said: “If there was something that should have been done, it should have been done before the [2007] election. Everybody was agreeing [to reforms] because everybody wanted to go to elections.”<sup>654</sup> In this manner, despite some key reforms achieved during the APG period, the main opposition party’s decision to boycott the unity government in many ways squandered this fleeting window of opportunity to more fully transform Togo’s political system.

#### 5.6.2. SSR Outcomes: Against the Odds, Some SSR Progress

The strong design of the APG power-sharing agreement—backed by coordinated external pressure—and the RPT’s shift toward more inclusive political approaches, created a small but genuine opportunity for security reform in Togo. These conditions, however, were countervailed by the exclusionary practices of the UFC and some hardline elements within

---

<sup>652</sup> Personal interview, Agboyibo, 2015.

<sup>653</sup> Personal interview, Anyron, 2015.

<sup>654</sup> Personal interview, Bagnah, 2015.

the RPT, leading to a volatile and halting security reform environment in Togo where a moderate degree of SSR was achieved under the APG, particularly in the area of election security.

As outlined in Chapter 2, movement on SSR policy is measured according to progress made on seven criteria essential to SSR: constitutional changes in security governance, demands of political neutrality, security reform legislation, government commissions investigating complicity in political violence, personnel changes of security leaders, changes in training curriculum, and prosecutions of senior-level security officials. Shifts in actual security sector behavior are measured according to changes in three categories: partisan involvement in election-related violence, partisan involvement in political campaigns or elections, and statements of political partiality.

In 2007 and early 2008, a series of legislative bills and government decrees were passed relating to SSR, including, among others, law no. 2007-010 on military personnel, which called for the political impartiality of the armed forces, decree no. 2008-006 on the “Powers of the Chief of the General Staff, Chiefs of Defense Staff, and the Inspector General of Police,” decrees no. 2008-007, 2008-009, and 2008-014 on the reorganization of the army, navy, and air force, and decree no. 2008-011, which established a “higher military council.”<sup>655</sup> Although imperfect, particularly because the military and gendarmerie remained under the thumb of the presidency, these laws and decrees were a major step forward for SSR in Togo. A former member of parliament, who is the head of a civil society organization in Lomé dedicated to the rule of law, explained to me that these laws and decrees,

---

<sup>655</sup> Mathias Hounkpe and Alioune Badara Gueye, 2010, “The Role of Security Forces in the Electoral Process: the Case of Six West African Countries,” Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 66, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/07532.pdf> (accessed October 3, 2016); Toulabor, 2011, “Togo,” 237-38, 246.

particularly the 2007 law, were real SSR advancements, as they provided an essential basic statutory framework for the security sector, which was previously sorely lacking.<sup>656</sup>

The government also establishment by decree special election security forces in the run up to the 2007 legislative and 2010 presidential elections, which aimed to depoliticize election security and end Togo's long history of election-related violence. These forces, named the *Force Sécurité de Élections Législatives* (FOSEL-Legislative Election Security Force) and the *Force Sécurité de Élections Présidentielles* (FOSEP-Presidential Election Security Force), were created to “maintain the peace, ensure security and free movement of persons” and observe “absolute neutrality towards all” during election period.<sup>657</sup> They were comprised of up to 6,000 primarily police and gendarmes, who were specially trained and outfitted with distinct uniforms to distinguish them from regular forces.<sup>658</sup> Regional and international actors supported the standing up and training of FOSEL and FOSEP. ECOWAS deployed military observers to monitor the special election forces during the 2007 and 2010 elections (100 in 2007, 146 in 2010), and the EU and UNDP provided training and financial support.<sup>659</sup>

Various local, regional, and international security sector training efforts were launched during the APG period. Local civil society initiatives, led by rule of law groups such as the *Centre d'Observation et de Promotion de l'Etat de Droit* (Center for Observation and Promotion of the Rule of Law), conducted workshops focused on training the military, police, and gendarmerie on the role of security forces in a democracy and on human rights

---

<sup>656</sup> Interview with former member of parliament and chairperson of a local civil society organization, Lomé, Togo, July 10, 2013.

<sup>657</sup> Hounkpe and Gueye, 2010, “The Role of Security Forces in the Electoral Process,” 46.

<sup>658</sup> Ibid, 46, 88.

<sup>659</sup> *AllAfrica*, “West Africa: ECOWAS Force to Help Deter Country Vote Violence,” February 21, 2010, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201002220605.html> (accessed October 3, 2016); Kohnert, 2016, “Togo: Political and Economic Development,” 4; Seely, 2011, “Togo's Presidential Election 2010,” 373.

issues. They also helped train the FOSEL and FOSEP forces in the lead up to the 2007 and 2010 elections.<sup>660</sup> An array of other training initiatives also took place at the international level. The UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, under their African Security Sector Reform Programme, held a series of capacity building programs with the government, political parties, and National Assembly aimed at establishing “good governance in defense and security institutions.”<sup>661</sup> The Konrad Adenauer Stiftung foundation, UN Population Fund, and West African Network for Peacebuilding also undertook similar training programs during the APG period.<sup>662</sup> The above SSR advancements fulfill the three categories of legislative changes, demands of political neutrality of the security forces, and training changes.

Following the 2005 polls through the 2010 presidential elections, Gnassingbé made considerable personnel changes within the security sector, particularly in the army. After the OHCHR’s 2005 report fingered the military for complicity in the 2005 election violence, in October 2005 Gnassingbé replaced nearly 20 commanders of the army units that were believed to be most involved.<sup>663</sup> In July 2009, amid the fallout from the Kpatcha Gnassingbé coup attempt, Gnassingbé also dismissed or rotated out a number of other military leaders.<sup>664</sup> Although the 2005 replacements took place before the APG was signed, they serve as another indicator that Gnassingbé was willing to undertake security reforms and assert his control over the military. Since the most significant personnel changes took place outside of the time period under study, the government only receives partial fulfillment of this category.

---

<sup>660</sup> Personal interviews with local and international officials, Lomé, Togo, July 8-12, 2013.

<sup>661</sup> United Nations, 2009, “Report of Security Sector Reform Activities in Togo,” 6.

<sup>662</sup> Toulabor, 2011, “Togo,” 245.

<sup>663</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit, 2005, “Togo: Country Report,” 14; Toulabor, 2011, “Togo,” 237.

<sup>664</sup> Ibid.



The CVJR was set up in 2009 and tasked with investigating political violence and human rights violations in Togo from 1958 to 2005, including security sector involvement in the 2005 post-election violence. The commission was led by Nicodème Benissan-Barrigah, a bishop, and supported by the UNHCR. During its deliberations, the body received more than 20,000 petitions from the population. While falling outside of the period under study, the CVJR released its final report in 2012, which named the military as perpetrators of past violence and called for reparations and mechanisms to address impunity.<sup>665</sup> Although a previous government commission was stood up after the 2005 election to investigate the poll violence, which found both the security forces and opposition parties responsible, it was created prior to the signing of the APG and therefore is not considered here.<sup>666</sup> Because the CVJR was stood up during the APG but failed to complete its work before the 2010 elections, the government is deemed as only partially fulfilling this category.

Constitutional reforms regarding the security sector, although spelled out in the APG, did not advance under the 2006 to 2010 period. The unity government and the RPT appear to have prioritized other areas of SSR, and no real efforts were made for broader constitutional reforms until after this period, when the opposition pushed for the reintroduction of presidential term limits. Anyron told me that the high levels of international pressure deployed to enforce peaceful elections and other reforms were not matched when it came to constitutional reform.<sup>667</sup> Togo also failed to hold any senior leaders accountable for past political violence during the APG period. Although the 2005 government commission of inquiry and the establishment of the CVJR in 2009 suggested progress on this front, no

---

<sup>665</sup> Kohnert, 2016, “Togo: Political and Economic Development,” 36.

<sup>666</sup> *IRIN News*, “Official Inquiry Says 154 Died in Political Violence,” November 11, 2015, <http://www.irinnews.org/news/2005/11/11/official-inquiry-says-154-died-political-violence> (accessed October 3, 2016).

<sup>667</sup> Personal interview, Anyron, 2015.

headway was made on prosecutions for Togo's past violence and human rights abuses during the APG period.<sup>668</sup>

Despite this lack of accountability and constitutional reforms, during the APG period Togo fulfilled three and partially fulfilled two other categories of the seven SSR criteria highlighted above. Did these security reforms translate from paper to practice and alter the behavior of Togo's security forces during this period? For the most part, the behavior of the security forces was much improved since the APG was signed, particularly during elections. During the 2007 legislative elections and the presidential election of 2010, the security forces remained in the barracks and generally conducted themselves in a restrained, apolitical manner. Although the security forces were implicated in corruption and faced allegations of excessive use of force,<sup>669</sup> they were not involved in large-scale election-related violence, electoral processes or political campaigns, and, to the best of my knowledge, did not make statements of political partiality during the APG period.

Although the RPT again triumphed in the 2007 legislative elections—winning 50 of 81 seats, with the UFC taking 27, and CAR 4—the security forces did not intervene or interfere and the poll was peaceful, marking a significant departure from the cycle of violence seen in previous polls in Togo. International and regional actors played a large role in the entire election process, as a total of 3,500 outside observers monitored the election. Despite some minor irregularities, observers deemed the election as free and fair. Indeed, Roberts asserts that the 2007 elections were “arguably the first freely contested multiparty elections since Togo became independent in 1960.”<sup>670</sup> Agboyibo was pleased with the 2007

---

<sup>668</sup> US Department of State, 2011, “2010 Human Rights Report: Togo,” <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/af/154374.htm> (accessed October 3, 2016).

<sup>669</sup> Toulabor, 2011, “Togo,” 236-237; US Department of State, 2011, “2010 Human Rights Report: Togo.”

<sup>670</sup> Roberts, 2008, “The Legislative Election in Togo, October 2007,” 558.

election process, despite the unfavorable outcome for his party. He told me: “I managed to organize and achieve a good election process. We achieved electoral reforms.”<sup>671</sup>

The first presidential election since the signing of the APG was held in March 2010. Because of its higher stakes for Gnassingbé, these elections served as a more stringent test of the institutional reforms achieved during the APG period. Gnassingbé and the RPT again won the election, garnering 61 percent of the vote, compared to 34 percent for the UFC’s Jean-Pierre Fabre (a stand in for Olympio). Despite allegations of fraud by the opposition, and some campaign irregularities, the poll was largely peaceful and again judged as free and fair by international observers.<sup>672</sup> Akin to the 2007 legislative election, security forces behaved in a professional manner and remained outside of the electoral process during the election.<sup>673</sup> After the election, however, as the opposition staged protests contesting the vote, the police dispersed demonstrators and then destroyed files and computers at UFC headquarters. Despite this worrying post-election behavior by the police, there is little question that the behavior of security forces in the 2007 and 2010 elections was a remarkable improvement over previous elections. Indeed, Hounkpe and Gueye, argue that since the 2007 legislative elections in Togo, the armed forces’ “balance sheet of ensuring the security of elections is rather positive.”<sup>674</sup>

This is not to say that significant challenges to comprehensive SSR did not remain or that civil military relations during the APG period were all rosy. Indeed, rifts within elements of the military and the RPT were starkly exposed during Gnassingbé’s heavy-handed response to a rumored coup attempt in 2009 by his hard-liner half brother and former

---

<sup>671</sup> Personal interview, Agboyibo, 2015.

<sup>672</sup> Seely, 2011, “Togo’s Presidential Election 2010,” 373; US Department of State, 2011, “2010 Human Rights Report: Togo.”

<sup>673</sup> Ibid.

<sup>674</sup> Hounkpe and Gueye, 2010, “The Role of Security Forces in the Electoral Process,” 52-53.

minister of defense, Kpatcha Gnassingbé. The two family members have a long rivalry dating back to the fight to succeed their father. Despite ultimately losing the succession battle, as defense minister and leader of the hardliner camp of the RPT, which enjoyed support from elements of the military, Kpatcha became a powerful figure, even coming to be referred to as the “co-president” of Togo.<sup>675</sup> As a full Kabye, he was seen as representing his father’s northern roots and militaristic tendencies. Tensions between Kpatcha and Gnassingbé, and the pro- and anti-reform camps of the RPT, intensified when Gnassingbé sacked Kpatcha as minister of defense in December 2007. Tensions finally came to a head with the 2009 alleged coup attempt, which left three of Kpatcha’s bodyguards dead. Kpatcha was arrested, along with 18 soldiers and 10 civilians, and charged with rebellion.<sup>676</sup> He was convicted in 2011 and given a sentence of 20 years in prison.

While this incident revealed divides and tensions in the civil-military relationship, it can also be viewed as evidence that reforms achieved during the APG period may have been having a real impact and threatened the former status quo. In this light, it appears that Gnassingbé’s movement toward reform may have been so threatening to the hardliner’s vested interests that they sought to overthrow Gnassingbé.<sup>677</sup> The coup attempt therefore could be seen as further evidence that Gnassingbé was genuinely attempting to distance himself from Eyadéma’s former military coterie. Gnassingbé’s motives were likely not all magnanimous, however, as the coup attempt also presented Gnassingbé with a convenient pretext to remove a formidable rival from the political scene.

In sum, despite continued security sector impunity, divides, and corruption, it appears that the moderate degree of SSR achieved during the APG period helped shift the behavior of

---

<sup>675</sup> Roberts, 2008, “The Legislative Election in Togo, October 2007,” 560.

<sup>676</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit, 2009, “Togo: Country Report,” 14-15.

<sup>677</sup> Ibid.

the security forces in Togo, particularly during elections, as Togo successfully fulfills the three behavioral categories. Unfortunately, Afrobarometer polling data is not available for Togo during the APG period. The above discussion demonstrates that the APG period delivered a halting but moderate degree of progress on SSR, both at the institutional and behavioral levels. Senior officials from both ends of the political spectrum spoke to me about the state of SSR in Togo, explaining that despite many ongoing challenges, the APG helped the country move beyond the dark days of militarized rule. Olympio told me that, regarding reform of the security forces, “progress has been made. There is no doubt, a lot of progress.”<sup>678</sup> Penn, the first secretary of the ruling party in the National Assembly, said: “Before you would see the military on the street, now you won’t see that. The question of the army has been discussed and things have been improved.”<sup>679</sup>

#### *5.6.3. Blocked Progress Prior to Power Sharing*

A most-similar analysis comparing the 2006-2010 period to SSR efforts in Togo before the APG showed that, over the decade and a half since the country’s adoption of multiparty politics up to the 2005 election, a few minor attempts at SSR had been attempted but ultimately were unsuccessful in securing any real reforms. Recommendations made by the opposition during the 1991 national conference for a military overhaul and downsizing sparked fierce resistance from the armed forces and Eyadéma, prompting a military crackdown, as noted above. Although the 1991 national conference, subsequent constitutional reform efforts in 1992 and 2002, and the 2004 dialogue with the EU all touched on issues related to security governance, no real SSR progress was achieved, as

---

<sup>678</sup> Personal interview, Olympio, 2015.

<sup>679</sup> Personal interview, Penn, 2015.

evidenced by the disastrous involvement of the military in the 2005 succession and the bloody 2005 elections.

Akin to the Zimbabwe case, and in line with the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 2, two main factors are responsible for the this lack of SSR prior to the APG: Eyadéma and the RPT's high degree of reliance on the security sector to remain in power, and lower levels of interest and leverage from external actors. Under these conditions, Eyadéma and the RPT were able to continue their use of highly exclusionary and violent political strategies and tactics, as they steadfastly refused to countenance any genuine SSR. Indeed, a 2005 study by Bryden, N'Diaye, and Olonisakin found "resistance to change" in Togo with "no commitment to reform" by the government."<sup>680</sup> This finding again demonstrates the causal significance of power sharing to the SSR process, showing that the model can generate incentives and conditions that are more favorable to reform than if incumbents remained solely in power, as highlighted in Chapter 1.

### 5.7. Conclusion

In sum, this chapter has argued that the SSR process under the APG period in Togo was erratic and halting, but ended up delivering a moderate degree of SSR, particularly regarding election security. The SSR process during this period played out in the following way: high Western leverage was able to largely outweigh high reliance on the security sector, leading to strong agreement design and moderated but conflicting political strategies, giving rise to the practice of *countervailing politics*. Strong agreement design enabled and amplified strong external pressures for reform, pushing Gnassingbé in a pro-reform direction, while anti-

---

<sup>680</sup> Alan Bryden, Boubacar N'Diaye, and 'Funmi Olonisakin, 2005, "Democratizing Security Sector Governance in West Africa: Trends and Challenges," *Conflict, Security & Development*, 5, 2: 217.

reform elements in the ruling party and the UFC opposition party's largely exclusionary approaches hurt reform efforts. These countervailing pressures, from external actors, the RPT hardliners, and the UFC, led to a volatile and halting reform process. Despite setbacks and imperfections, ultimately these conditions facilitated enough of an opening to achieve a moderate amount of SSR in Togo under the APG, particularly regarding the conduct of the security sector during elections. The chapter maintains that Western leverage—particularly from the EU—as well as a change in party leadership, played a critical role in pushing some reforms forward in Togo during the APG period.

The case findings presented in this chapter again confirm the soundness of the theoretical expectations of the framework presented in Chapter 2, which predicted that the practice of *countervailing politics* would be a volatile and halting, yet potentially favorable form of power sharing that has the capability of delivering a moderate degree of SSR. It bears repeating again that the different security sector organs in Togo are not monolithic, as discussed in the sections on security sector divides. It is also worth reiterating that, akin to Kenya, the moderate degree of SSR successes achieved during the APG period in Togo remained susceptible to backsliding after the 2010 elections effectively put an end to the APG period. This issue of reform durability in all three cases is discussed at length in the following concluding chapter.

## **6. CONCLUSION: SECURING REFORM?**

### **6.1. Overview**

This dissertation began by highlighting the significant, if uneven and fragile, institutional reforms achieved by Kenya's post-election unity government, which came into office in 2008 following post-election violence that brought the country to the precipice of civil war, leaving over 1,000 dead and 600,000 displaced. Given the existing scholarship's largely negative critique of post-election power sharing and its expectation that the model is unlikely to deliver meaningful institutional reforms, Kenya's ostensible reform progress, particularly in the thorny realm of the security sector, was puzzling and seemed to complicate the existing narrative. This puzzle, and a lack of existing scholarly explanations to help answer it, led me to my primary research questions: Does post-election power sharing lead to SSR? Which causal factors are most important in shaping security reform outcomes under post-election power sharing in hybrid, semi-authoritarian regimes, and through what processes or mechanisms?

The preceding chapters have sought to systematically answer this question. I have used George and Bennett's method of structured, focused comparison to build a parsimonious theoretical framework that explains the likely SSR outcomes of post-election power sharing and then applied the theoretical propositions of this framework to the cases of Zimbabwe (2008-2013), Kenya (2008-2013), and Togo (2006-2010). Using the method of process tracing and the logic of most-similar comparisons, I have conducted two sets of cross- and within-case comparisons, using evidence collected from over 100 interviews with key decision-makers in my case countries, including former prime ministers, cabinet ministers, top political party leaders, senior security officials, and a wide range of



international, regional, and domestic stakeholders. The three empirical chapters affirmed the theory presented in Chapter 2, illustrating the explanatory power of the middle-range theory.

This concluding chapter first summarizes the main findings of the dissertation, discussing post-election power sharing and SSR in comparative perspective. This section includes a provisional discussion of the implications of the theoretical framework to other cases of post-election power sharing in my “manifest scope” of inference, namely Lesotho (1999) and Zanzibar (2001). I then note the main caveats of the study, highlight the theoretical and policy implications of the research, and close by forwarding a number of promising avenues for future research.

## 6.2. Post-Election Power Sharing and SSR in Comparative Perspective

Power-sharing arrangements and SSR efforts have proliferated worldwide since the early 1990s, with a particular concentration in Africa. As noted, from 1999 to 2010, a total of twenty African countries signed power-sharing accords in order to end a variety of conflicts.<sup>681</sup> Traditionally, power-sharing mechanisms were used to end high-intensity civil wars. But recently, unity governments have been deployed to end lower-intensity violent conflicts, such as electoral violence in Togo, Kenya, and Zimbabwe, where state security sectors were central actors in this election-related violence.

As a response to Africa’s long history of military intervention and security sector involvement in politics, external and domestic actors also have initiated a wide array of SSR programs on the continent since the early 1990s, often times in the same countries that signed power-sharing agreements. Because of the essential role that security institutions play in

---

<sup>681</sup> Mehler, 2009, “Introduction: Power-Sharing in Africa.” As noted in Chapter 1, Mehler identified 17 agreements from 1999-2009; I have updated his findings to include Zanzibar (2010), as well as Togo (2006) and Lesotho (1999), which were not included in his count.

maintaining political power, SSR is liable to be one of the most contentious and challenging institutional reforms to achieve under power sharing. That said, power-sharing moments may also provide potential windows of opportunity to advance SSR.

As highlighted in Chapter 1, one might expect full regime transitions or transfers of power to be the most ideal conditions for successful SSR. Yet, as demonstrated above by the cases of Kenya and Togo, power sharing can actually generate conditions and incentives for SSR that are more favorable to reform than either a full transfer of power or if the incumbent remained in office.

To reiterate, if incumbents remain in power, there will be little to no incentive for them to undertake SSR. While perhaps counterintuitive, this logic may also hold when a full transfer of power occurs, as new leaders are unlikely to genuinely and voluntarily part with such a powerful tool to maintain power, as seen in Kenya in 2002. Under power sharing, however, opposition leaders are likely to push strongly for SSR in an effort to lessen the incumbent's control over the security sector. Because the opposition has a share of power, they are in a relatively good position to do so, especially if backed by coordinated external pressure, as shown above. At the same time, incumbents are more likely to yield to SSR under power sharing than if they remained solely in power, given the internal and external reform pressures that incumbents are likely to face under power sharing, as illustrated by the case of Togo.

Power-sharing moments therefore can function as “critical junctures” that have the potential to help mark a shift in the trajectory of a country's civil-military relations. Indeed, power-sharing agreements almost always include some SSR provisions or other institutional reforms that touch on security sector governance, which can provide genuine SSR

opportunities for opposition parties and external actors to exploit. Of course, simply because there is an opening for reform does mean that any real change will necessarily take place under power sharing, as demonstrated above by the case of Zimbabwe.

Although the power-sharing model continues to be deployed by conflict mediators worldwide and SSR is widely identified by scholars and practitioners as a crucial component of durable peace, this potential link between power sharing and SSR has not yet been adequately examined in the scholarly literature. Moreover, despite a broad literature on power sharing after civil war, scholars have not sufficiently explored the utility of the model in non-civil war contexts such as post-election violence. This is important because the two types of conflicts differ significantly in their causes and consequences, especially regarding civil-military relations. While civil wars decimate security sectors and polarize civil-military relations, security institutions usually remain relatively intact in cases of lower-intensity conflict, improving the likelihood of democratized civil-military relations and SSR in these contexts.<sup>682</sup> As noted, this point is not adequately reflected in the thin but emerging research stream that does focus on post-election power sharing, which, I argue, has taken an overly negative position on the model and its potential capacity to deliver meaningful institutional reforms that are key ingredients to democratization.<sup>683</sup>

This thesis has aimed to fill these gaps and introduce some further complexity into the existing narrative in the literature by arguing that post-election power sharing agreements and

---

<sup>682</sup> Cawthra and Luckham, 2003, “Democratic Control and the Security Sector,” 307; Cheeseman, 2011, “The Internal Dynamics of Power Sharing in Africa,” 341.

<sup>683</sup> See for instance, Cole, 2013, “Power-Sharing, Post-Electoral Contestations and the Dismemberment of the Right to Democracy in Africa,” 256; Bratton, 2014, *Power Politics in Zimbabwe*, chapter 6; LeBas, 2011, *From Protest to Parties*, 157-158; Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010, “Power-sharing in Comparative Perspective,” 204.

governments play a significant role in the causal process of SSR and can deliver some security reforms, under certain conditions.

### 6.2.1. *Summary of Theoretical Framework and Findings*

In this dissertation I have forwarded a two-step integrated theoretical framework that departs from theories of institutional change that argue for the supremacy of structure over agency or endogenous over exogenous variables, as outlined in Chapter 2.<sup>684</sup> Using a structured contingency approach,<sup>685</sup> I argue that a combination of domestic and international factors will drive or confound reform of the security sector under post-election power sharing. In short, the theoretical framework maintains that two main long-term factors, the nature of civil-military relations and the character of external involvement, combined with two short-term contingent mechanisms, the design of the political agreement and type of political strategy employed, will be the most important factors shaping SSR under post-election power sharing (see Figure 12).




Figure 12: SSR-power sharing framework

<sup>684</sup> Hay and Wincott, 1998, "Structure, Agency, and Historical Institutionalism."

<sup>685</sup> Karl 1990, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," 1; Bratton and van de Waal, 1997, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, 45.

Based on these factors, two sets of two hypotheses were presented in Chapters 1 and 2. As a reminder, in brief, the “reliance” hypothesis (H1a) argued that the nature of civil-military relations prior to power sharing, more specifically the character and extent of former ruling party reliance on the security sector, will shape the two contingent factors of political strategy and agreement strength, which, in turn, will shape SSR outcomes. Put simply, *higher levels of reliance will result in less SSR, and vice versa*. This hypothesis built on the research stream in the civil-military relations literature that examines both “military influence” and the significance of political ideology.<sup>686</sup> The “external involvement” hypothesis (H1b) argued that the character of external involvement prior to power sharing, more specifically the degree of Western<sup>687</sup> leverage and the nature of regional dynamics, will also shape the strength of agreement design and the type of strategies used under power sharing, which, in turn, will shape SSR outcomes. Put simply, *higher levels of Western leverage will result in more SSR, and vice versa*. This hypothesis built on the work of scholars in the democratization and institutional reform literature that argue for the salience of external factors in reform processes.<sup>688</sup>

Turning to the two contingent factors, the “agreement design” hypothesis (H2a) argued that the design of the power-sharing agreement, more specifically its strength of SSR content and third party enforcement, will condition international and domestic pressures for reform under power sharing, which, in combination with the choice of political strategy, will shape SSR outcomes. Put simply, *stronger agreement design will result in more SSR, and*

---

<sup>686</sup> On military influence, see Feaver, 1999, “Civil-Military Relations,” 218-19; and Croissant et al., “Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-ism,” especially 954 and footnote 31, 965-6. On ideology, see Tendi, 2013, “Ideology, Civilian Authority and the Zimbabwean Military;” Levitsky and Way, 2012, “Beyond Patronage.”

<sup>687</sup> Following Levitsky and Way, I define “the West” as the United States and EU countries, see Levitsky and Way, 2010, *Competitive Authoritarianism*, 41-43.

<sup>688</sup> Ibid; Bekoe, 2012, “Postelection Political Agreements in Togo and Zanzibar;” Hartmann, 2016, “Leverage and Linkage;” Lewis, 2007, *Growing Apart: Oil, Politics, and Economic Change in Indonesia and Nigeria*, 17.

*vice versa*. This hypothesis built on the research stream within the peace agreement literature that examines the importance of third-party enforcement and the “quality” of agreements.<sup>689</sup> Finally, the “political strategy” hypothesis (H2b), argued that the type of political strategies deployed by the parties under sharing power, more specifically the use of inclusive or exclusive political approaches, will, in combination with agreement strength, shape SSR outcomes. Put simply, *more inclusionary political strategies will result in more SSR, and vice versa*. This hypothesis built on the political science literature that argues for the importance of agency and elite strategic choice in political outcomes.<sup>690</sup>

| Reliance on Security Sector | Western Leverage | Outcome                                         |
|-----------------------------|------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Low                         | High             | Inclusionary strategies/strong agreement design |
| High                        | Low              | Exclusionary strategies/weak agreement design   |
| High                        | High             | Exclusionary strategies/strong agreement design |
| Low                         | Low              | Inclusionary strategies/weak agreement design   |

Figure 13: SSR power-sharing framework, step 1

Figures 13 and 14 summarize how each of these explanatory factors, in addition to their independent causal effects, were expected to interact. In step one of the theory, a low degree of reliance and high Western leverage was expected to result in inclusionary strategies and strong agreement design, while a high degree of reliance and low Western leverage was expected to result in exclusionary strategies and weak agreement design. A high degree of reliance and high Western leverage was expected to result in moderated but largely exclusionary strategies and strong agreement design, while a low degree of reliance and low Western leverage was expected to result in inclusionary strategies and weak agreement design.

<sup>689</sup> Fortna, 2003, “Scraps of Paper?,” Stedman, 2002, “Introduction,”; Walter, 2002, *Committing to Peace*.

<sup>690</sup> Rotberg, 2012, *Transformative Political Leadership*; Hafner-Burton, Hughes, and Victor, 2013, “The Cognitive Revolution and the Political Psychology of Elite Decision Making,” Lewis, 2007, *Growing Apart: Oil, Politics, and Economic Change in Indonesia and Nigeria*; Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis, 2015, *Why Leaders Fight*; VonDoep, 2009, “The Leadership Variable in Africa.”

In step two of the theory, the two contingent factors were also expected to interact. Exclusive, polarizing strategies in the run up to power sharing were expected to lead to weak agreement design, while more inclusionary political approaches were expected to facilitate strong agreement design. At the same time, weak agreement design was expected to allow exclusive, hardline political strategies to flourish under power sharing, while strong agreement design was expected to push political parties toward more compromising and inclusive approaches. Based on these expectations, four ideal types of power sharing were forwarded: *security politics* (weak design/exclusionary strategies), *coalition politics* (strong design/inclusionary strategies), *countervailing politics* (strong design/largely exclusionary strategies), *endogenous politics* (weak design/inclusionary strategies). As noted in Chapter 2, since the category of *endogenous politics* has yet to appear in the empirical universe, it is not examined at length in this dissertation.




Figure 14: SSR power sharing framework, step 2

How did these theoretical expectations play out in the empirical world? As demonstrated in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, the theoretical framework stood up to the extensive evidence collected from the cases of Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Togo, illustrating the model's utility and explanatory power.

As expected in Zimbabwe, high incumbent reliance on the security sector, low Western leverage, and the distinct character of regional politics led to weak agreement design and the rise of exclusionary *security politics* under the GPA power-sharing period (2008 to 2013). Weak agreement design conditioned international and domestic pressures for reform, preventing pro-reform constituencies from coalescing around specific reforms. Weak enforcement also influenced and emboldened ZANU-PF's exclusionary strategies under power sharing, as Mugabe learned he could veto and delay the GPA's implementation with little to no repercussions. As such, ZANU-PF blocked any meaningful discussions of SSR. At the same time, exclusionary political strategies by the MDC opposition party regarding SSR led to further polarization, shutting the door on any fleeting SSR openings that were created by the GPA. Under these conditions, no genuine SSR progress was made under the GPA, as the status quo political dynamic quickly returned to Zimbabwe.

On the other hand, as expected in Kenya, higher levels of Western leverage and low reliance on the security sector led to strong agreement design and the practice of largely inclusionary *coalition politics* during the GCG period (2008 to 2013). In stark contrast to Zimbabwe, strong agreement design empowered domestic and external pro-reform constituencies to apply pressure on the GCG, facilitating the use of largely inclusionary, compromising political strategies. With both Kibaki and Odinga—and most elements of the PNU and ODM parties—largely committed to the reform agenda, Kenya's unity government



generated some genuine openings for SSR. Under these conditions, some considerable, if fragile and incomplete, police reforms were achieved in Kenya under the GCG, particularly at the institutional level.

Finally, as expected in Togo, a mix of countervailing forces led to a halting reform process during the APG period (2006 to 2010). Extremely high levels of Western leverage were able to largely outweigh a long history of incumbent high reliance on the security sector, leading to strong agreement design but conflicting political strategies, which gave rise to the practice of *countervailing politics*. Strong agreement design enabled and amplified strong external reform pressures (from the EU in particular), pushing Gnassingbé in an inclusionary direction, while anti-reform elements in his party pushed him toward an exclusionary approach. At the same time, the main opposition party at the time, the UFC, had trouble discarding their extended history of deploying largely exclusionary strategies and tactics. Under these conditions, despite a halting and imperfect process, the APG generated enough of a window to achieve a moderate amount of SSR, which positively impacted the previously disastrous conduct of the security sector during elections.

While a number of other factors were found to be associated with or contributing in part to SSR outcomes—including the relative strength of political parties, levels of democratization in each country, and the extent of prior SSR initiatives—the three case chapters demonstrated that differing values on the study variables outlined above account for a great deal of the variation between the cases. Figure 15 summarizes how the selected case studies fit into the theoretical framework presented above.




Figure 15: Power sharing dynamics in each case

In sum, the theoretical framework of the dissertation maintains that the practice of *security politics*, as demonstrated by the case of Zimbabwe, features the least favorable conditions for reform, and little to no SSR is likely to obtain. The practice of *coalition politics*, as illustrated by the case of Kenya, features the most favorable conditions for reform, and a considerable amount of SSR is likely to obtain under this variant of power sharing. The case of Kenya suggests that the combination of low reliance and high external leverage, leading to strong agreement design and largely inclusionary strategies, will be sufficient conditions to deliver some SSR progress. While *security politics* (exemplified by Zimbabwe) and *coalition politics* (exemplified by Kenya) fall on the two extremes of the post-election power-sharing spectrum, the next two categories fall in the middle ground, where a minimal to moderate degree of SSR is likely to obtain.

The practice of *endogenous politics*, although no real world cases as of yet fall into this category, features relatively unfavorable conditions for reform, but a minimal amount of

SSR is likely to obtain if there is a strong domestic constituency pushing for reform. Finally, the practice of *countervailing politics*, as demonstrated by the case of Togo, features unpredictable yet potentially favorable conditions for reform, and a halting but moderate degree of SSR is likely to obtain, as long as a high level of coordinated, external leverage exists. The case of Togo suggests that strong agreement design, backed by high levels of coordinated external pressure and leverage, will also be sufficient conditions to secure a measure of SSR, even in seemingly inauspicious cases that feature high degrees of incumbent reliance on the security sector.

The three case studies comprising Chapters 3, 4, and 5, demonstrated that, while the explanatory factors outlined above all played an independent causal role in the SSR process under post-election power sharing, the primary causal effects of the two long-term variables were mainly channeled through the two contingent factors of agreement design and political strategy. The cases also confirmed the soundness of the assumptions that underpinned the theoretical framework. The case studies affirmed that incumbent parties under power sharing will seek to maximize their chances of remaining in power by maintaining control over the security apparatus and that former opposition parties likewise will seek to maximize their chances of remaining in power by attempting to reform the security sector. However, the cases of Kenya and Togo demonstrated that the strategic choices of incumbents regarding SSR are not immutable and are susceptible to high degrees of coordinated external pressure and leverage. Both President Kibaki and President Gnassingbé, largely to due external pressure from international donors, chose to moderate their previously exclusionary hardline strategies and agreed to undertake a degree of SSR under power sharing.

### 6.2.2. *Provisional Extension of the Theoretical Framework*

Although in depth analyses of post-election power sharing in the two other cases within my population of five cases—i.e. Lesotho (1999) and Zanzibar (2001)—lie beyond the scope of this dissertation, an initial reading of these cases suggests that they fall into the categories of *coalition politics* and *security politics*, respectively. The following provisional discussion suggests that the two long-term variables and two short-term mechanisms identified by this dissertation are at work in these two cases, demonstrating the potential usefulness of applying the theoretical framework to a broader set of cases to explain SSR process and outcomes under post-election power sharing.

Lesotho is an extremely small, lower middle-income country with a population of just over 2 million located in Southern Africa. The country is entirely surrounded by South Africa. In 2014, it had a GDP of \$2.2 billion.<sup>691</sup> Although Lesotho in later years came to be hailed as one of the few democratic success stories in Africa, during its experiment with post-election power sharing (1999-2002), it was a semi-authoritarian country.<sup>692</sup> Lesotho, which gained independence from Britain in 1966, has a long history of military intervention in politics, complex relations between the monarchy and the divided security sector, political floor crossings, and disputed elections.

Following decades of rule by King Moshoeshoe II and the Basotho National Party, a coup in 1986 ushered in seven years of military rule. The holding of democratic elections in 1993 did not bring stability, instead leading to a violent political crisis that was ended by

---

<sup>691</sup> The World Bank, 2015, “Lesotho,” <http://data.worldbank.org/country/lesotho?view=chart> (accessed October 29, 2016).

<sup>692</sup> Freedom House, 1999, “1998 Freedom in the World: Lesotho,” <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/lesotho> (accessed October 29, 2016).

regional meditation.<sup>693</sup> In the 1998 polls, Pakalitha Mosisili and the ruling Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) won 60 percent of the vote. But opposition protests contesting the vote, backed by mutinying elements of the security forces, turned violent, leaving 60 dead and the capital city, Maseru, burned to the ground.<sup>694</sup> The 1998 poll violence was ended by a South African-led SADC military intervention.

After the SADC intervention, the parties to the conflict signed a power-sharing accord in 1999 and a unity government, known as the Interim Political Authority (IPA), was stood up. According to the agreement, each of the twelve parties that took part in the 1998 elections would have two representatives in the IPA. Although security forces played a primary role in the 1998 post-election violence, the LCD did not enjoy support from key parts of the security sector.<sup>695</sup> This low level of incumbent reliance on the security sector, combined with strong external pressures, appears to have led to strong SSR content in the IPA agreement. The agreement also featured relatively strong enforcement mechanisms, with SADC and the Commonwealth playing key monitoring and implementation roles.<sup>696</sup>

Despite bitter disagreements, the parties deployed largely inclusionary political approaches under the IPA, and significant SSR and other reforms were achieved, including electoral reforms that moved the country toward a system of proportional representation. Due to low levels of reliance and strong international monitoring—facilitated by Lesotho’s high-level of dependence on South Africa—the IPA power-sharing accord can be viewed as a

---

<sup>693</sup> Roger Southall, 2003, “An Unlikely Success South Africa and Lesotho’s Election of 2002,” *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 41, 2: 269-296.

<sup>694</sup> Freedom House, 1999, “1998 Freedom in the World: Lesotho.”

<sup>695</sup> Southall, 2003, “An Unlikely Success South Africa and Lesotho’s Election of 2002,” 271.

<sup>696</sup> Government of Lesotho, 1999, “Memorandum of Agreement between the Government of Lesotho and the Interim Political Authority,” [http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/LS\\_991203\\_MoU%20between%20the%20government%20of%20Lesotho%20and%20IPA.pdf](http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/LS_991203_MoU%20between%20the%20government%20of%20Lesotho%20and%20IPA.pdf) (accessed October 23, 2016).

success, at least in the medium term.<sup>697</sup> The 2002 elections were peaceful, free, and fair, with the security sector playing an apolitical role. While Lesotho would go on to be touted as a democratic success story, in 2014 a military coup attempt brought Lesotho back to the brink of crisis, with SADC again forced to mediate a series of political accords.

Zanzibar is a separate federal entity island region of Tanzania, located off the coast of East Africa. The semi-autonomous Zanzibar consists mainly of the two islands of Pemba and Unguja and has a population of 1.3 million. The populace is comprised of mainland African, Arab, and mixed ethnic groups, and is 96 percent Muslim.<sup>698</sup> Following independence from Britain in 1963, the minority Arab ruling class was overthrown in a bloody revolution in 1964, where up to 17,000 were killed. After the revolution, Zanzibar formed a political union with mainland Tanzania (then named Tanganyika), under which it retained its own parliament and president.

The move to multi-party politics in 1995 led to a contentious period of polarization between the ruling *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM-Party of the Revolution) party and the main opposition party, the Civic United Front (CUF). Tightly contested elections in 1995 and 2000 featured varying levels of violence, with the opposition alleging fraud and vote rigging by the ruling party. After the opposition launched widespread protests in the wake of the 2000 poll, between 20 and 70 people were killed at the hands of the police, with 600 more wounded.<sup>699</sup>

---

<sup>697</sup> Khabele Matlosa, 2005, "From a Destabilizing Factor to a Depoliticized and Professional Force: the Military in Lesotho," in Martin Rupiya, (ed.) *Evolutions & Revolutions: A Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies): 85-109; Khabele Matlosa and Neville W. Pule, 2001, "The Military In Lesotho," *African Security Review*, 10, 2: 62-74; Southall, 2003, "An Unlikely Success South Africa and Lesotho's Election of 2002."

<sup>698</sup> Mohammed Bakari and Alexander Makulilo, 2012, "Beyond Polarity in Zanzibar? The 'Silent' Referendum and the Government of National Unity, *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 30, 2: 196.

<sup>699</sup> Nassor and Jose, 2014, "Power-Sharing in Zanzibar: From Zero-Sum Politics to Democratic Consensus?," 248.

Following the bloody 2000 election, Zanzibar signed a domestically brokered post election power-sharing accord known as *Muafaka II* (Swahili for “accord”), which built out of *Muafaka I*, signed in 1999. Security forces played a prominent role in past election-related violence, suggesting deep politicization and a medium-high degree of incumbent reliance on the security forces to remain in power in Zanzibar. These conditions, combined with weak external pressures, led to only a few SSR provisions being included in the *Muafaka II* power-sharing accord. The agreement was also relatively weak on enforcement, as only a domestic joint implementation committee was stood up, with no formal external mechanism for monitoring.<sup>700</sup>

While it appears the ruling and opposition parties adopted largely inclusive political strategies under the first year and a half of power sharing, both parties eventually drifted back toward exclusive, confrontational approaches in the run up to the 2005 elections. With medium-high degrees of reliance and weak domestic and international monitoring, the *Muafaka II* power-sharing accord was largely a failure. Relatively few significant institutional reforms, including SSR, appear to have been accomplished during the power-sharing period in Zanzibar, and security forces were implicated in election violence surrounding the 2005 poll.<sup>701</sup>

To reiterate, formal testing of other cases is beyond the scope of this study. That said, the above provisional analyses illustrate that the main variables and mechanisms forwarded by the dissertation appear to be at play and help to explain and predict the SSR outcomes of post-election power sharing in Lesotho and Zanzibar. As such, the above discussion

---

<sup>700</sup> Bekoe, 2012, “Postelection Political Agreements in Togo and Zanzibar,” 132-138.

<sup>701</sup> Greg Cameron, 2002, “Zanzibar’s Turbulent Transition,” *Review of African Political Economy*, 92: 313-330; Ben Rawlence, 2005, “Briefing: The Zanzibar Election,” *African Affairs*, 104, 416: 515-523.

illustrates the potential portability and generalizability of the dissertation's concepts and theoretical framework to a broader set of cases.

### 6.2.3. *Caveats*

Before moving on to the theoretical and policy implications of the theoretical framework and findings of the dissertation, a number of caveats are discussed and revisited here. First, the middle-range theory presented above and in Chapter 2 aims to be parsimonious, and therefore only identifies the most critical out of a multitude of factors that play a role in molding the SSR processes and outcomes of post-election power sharing in semi-authoritarian countries. As in all post-conflict settings, post-election unity governments are formed in extremely fragile and volatile environments, with power-sharing dynamics and outcomes dependent on a range of factors that are enormously difficult to forecast. As such, it must be emphasized that the dissertation's theoretical framework is not deterministic but functions in terms of probabilities, specifying the "generalized pathways" that SSR processes are likely take under post-election power sharing.<sup>702</sup>

Second, is the issue of the durability and longevity of the security reforms achieved under post-election power sharing. As with all institutional reforms, security reforms passed under power sharing remain in many instances susceptible to the proclivities of the president or administration that follows the power-sharing period. Pierson has called this issue regarding institutional reform efforts the "problem of actor discontinuity,"<sup>703</sup> i.e. when leaders in office after power sharing (in many cases the same leaders) may try to rollback reforms passed during the power-sharing period. While security reforms that are enshrined in the

---

<sup>702</sup> George and Bennett, 2005, *Case Studies and Theory Development*, 236.

<sup>703</sup> Paul Pierson, 2004, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press): 120-122.



constitution can be difficult to revise or reverse, policy or legislative changes are more vulnerable to the political dispensation and whims of the next president and his party, particularly in Africa where legislatures are generally weak. Moreover, given the power of the presidency, future presidents can in many cases simply choose to disregard any SSR achieved under post-election power sharing. This cautionary point is illustrated by recent developments in the cases selected for this study.

While the SSR trajectories of Zimbabwe and Togo have largely continued to follow the same path they did under power sharing, the Kenyatta administration in Kenya has attempted to revise and rollback some of the institutional police reforms passed under power sharing. In Zimbabwe, no progress has been made after Mugabe and ZANU-PF convincingly won the 2013 elections, which the opposition and international actors criticized as “deeply flawed” and not free and fair.<sup>704</sup> In Togo, the halting SSR process has continued, with some further, mostly administrative, security reforms being pushed by Gnassingbé after he and the RPT prevailed in the 2010 elections.<sup>705</sup> Despite some setbacks regarding the behavior of the security forces, including instances of excessive use of force, Togo’s 2013 legislative elections and 2015 presidential elections remained largely non-violent, with special election forces maintaining security and the regular security forces staying in the barracks.<sup>706</sup> Indeed, writing in 2015, Okonofua asserted that since 2007, “there has been a dramatic improvement in the conduct of elections in Togo.”<sup>707</sup>

---

<sup>704</sup> US Department of State, 2013, “Zimbabwe’s Presidential Election,”

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/08/212658.htm> (accessed October 17, 2016).

<sup>705</sup> After the 2010 elections, the UFC reversed its long-held position against working with the government and decided to join forces with Gnassingbé and the ruling party, forming a coalition between the RPT and the UFC. This decision led to a bitter divide in the UFC, with the majority of the party eventually splitting away to form the ANC party under the leadership of Fabre.

<sup>706</sup> US Department of State, 2016, “2015 Human Rights Report: Togo,”

<https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/252951.pdf> (accessed October 3, 2016).

<sup>707</sup> Okonofua, 2015, “Democratic Governance in the ‘New’ Republic of Togo,” 90.

In Kenya, however, president Kenyatta and his Jubilee party have moved to revise and rollback several of the legislative police reform acts passed by the unity government in 2011. In 2014, several amendments to the 2011 acts were passed, curtailing some of the powers of the police oversight mechanisms stood up under power sharing.<sup>708</sup> Police also continue to be implicated in extra-judicial killings, and the paramilitary General Service Unit responded with deadly violence to opposition protests in May and June of 2016, raising fears about partisan violence in Kenya's upcoming 2017 elections. Although Kenya's main oversight authority, IPOA, retains its independence<sup>709</sup> and is actively investigating these and other incidents of police abuse,<sup>710</sup> only time will tell if the reforms passed under power sharing are durable enough to survive political pressure from Kenyatta and subsequent administrations.

In a similar vein, it should also be emphasized that security reforms achieved under post-election power sharing are embedded in a larger political landscape and are often beholden to other wider pressures and institutional reform dynamics that could easily derail SSR processes after the power-sharing period is over. SSR is no cure-all. Security reform is only a single component, albeit a very important one, of a larger patchwork of institutional reforms—including electoral, constitutional, and judicial reforms—that are necessary to the advancement of democracy in semi-authoritarian countries.

Third, as this dissertation is focused on theory building, the theoretical framework has yet to be rigorously tested against the evidence of other cases of post-election power sharing and therefore should not be viewed as exhaustive. Out of a universe of five possible cases

---

<sup>708</sup> Osse, 2014, "Police Reform in Kenya," 7.

<sup>709</sup> Personal interview, senior IPOA official, Nairobi, Kenya, April 23, 2015.

<sup>710</sup> *Voice of America*, "Kenya Police Under Fire for Brutality," May 18, 2016, <http://www.voanews.com/a/kenya-police-under-fire-brutality/3335965.html> (accessed October 18, 2016).

(Zimbabwe, Kenya, Togo, Zanzibar, Lesotho), the cases of Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Togo were selected to illustrate the theoretical framework. Using the logic of diverse-case and most-similar methods of case selection, these three cases were chosen because they feature the most variation on the study variables—both on the dependent and explanatory variables—and share the most similar background characteristics, as highlighted in Chapter 2.

As such, outside of the provisional analyses above, I have left the experience of other post-election power sharing accords as topics for further research. Cases of power-sharing governments formed in contexts of low-grade, but not post-election, conflict—such as Madagascar and Honduras, which both undertook power sharing in the wake of coups in 2009, and Zanzibar, which in 2010 adopted a pre-election power sharing accord—also remain as promising avenues for further research to test and refine the theory (see below for more on calls for future research on the topic).

Fourth, the method of elite interviewing comes with some inherent constraints, as outlined in Chapter 2. Although I was fortunate to be able to interview a broad range of key actors during the period of post-election power sharing in all three cases, the information collected via this method was susceptible to issues of reliability and validity, such as memory lapses and concern with personal legacies or safety.<sup>711</sup> In order to mitigate these constraints, I employed a host of best practices and strategies, including prioritizing first-hand accounts, tracking the consistency of a particular interviewee, and cross-referencing all interview data with other primary and secondary sources in order to substantiate the evidence, as discussed in Chapter 2. While it is, of course, impossible to be absolutely certain, ultimately I am

---

<sup>711</sup> Berry, 2002, “Validity and Reliability Issues in Elite Interviewing.”

confident that these measures sufficiently mitigated the above constraints and that the vast majority of the information that I collected and used is both reliable and valid.

Finally, because I have focused on elite-level relations between civilian politicians and security sector leaders, the complex relations and power struggles between and within specific branches and departments of the three cases' security sectors have not been detailed in this dissertation, as outlined at the end of each case chapter. As such, it bears reiterating that the Zimbabwean, Kenyan, and Togolese security sectors are not monolithic organizations and that SSR processes in each case played out in differing ways across each respective branch of the country's security sector. Despite these cautions and caveats, the in depth case studies conducted above clearly confirm the explanatory power of the dissertation's theoretical framework, leading me to conclude that post-election power sharing agreements and governments do play a significant role in the causal process of SSR and can deliver some institutional reforms, under certain conditions.

### 6.3. Theoretical and Policy Implications

Better understanding if, and under what conditions, post-election power sharing will lead to progress on SSR has a number of major implications for both the scholarly and policy communities. The four main theoretical implications of this dissertation are discussed here.

First, the theoretical framework and case findings presented above complicates the existing, largely negative narrative on post-election power sharing, arguing that the model has the potential capacity to deliver some positive reform outcomes, under certain conditions. There is no question that institutions are "sticky" and that institutional reform is extremely

difficult in all contexts, not just in semi-authoritarian or democratizing countries.<sup>712</sup> One need look no further than the policy deadlock surrounding healthcare reform in the United States or long-running debates over Security Council reform at the UN. After a decidedly mixed record by domestic constituencies and Western countries to push non-democracies toward a host of democratic and institutional reforms over the past several decades, including SSR, much of the scholarship on the topic has grown deeply skeptical. Indeed, writing in 2009, Seely asserts that, “Pessimism reigns when analyzing the potential for meaningful political reform, especially in the African context.”<sup>713</sup>

This pessimism on the prospects for institutional reform in semi-authoritarian countries has bled into the power-sharing literature as well, as noted above. Despite Lesotho and Zanzibar’s experiments with post-election power sharing in the late 1990s and Togo’s experience with the model in 2006, there was a relative dearth of scholarly interest on the topic until both Kenya and Zimbabwe signed high profile accords in 2008. The cluster of studies that emerged in the wake of post-election power sharing in these two countries made innovative contributions to this still relatively thin research stream, taking significant steps towards better understanding the dynamics and outcomes of the popular conflict resolution model. Much of the extant work, however, maintains that post-election power sharing is ineffective and incapable of delivering the institutional reforms needed to help resolve long-running conflicts and foster democratization.

LeVan, for instance, argues that post-election pacts often lead to bloated budgets and ineffective policy gridlock.<sup>714</sup> On the potential for reform, Cheeseman and Tendi argue that post-election power sharing does not create the “conditions for effective reform, which leads

---

<sup>712</sup> Tansey, 2013, “Statebuilding and the Limits of Constitutional Design.”

<sup>713</sup> Seely, 2009, *The Legacies of Transition Governments in Africa*, 13.

<sup>714</sup> LeVan, 2011, “Power Sharing and Inclusive Politics in Africa’s Uncertain Democracies,” 41.

to a more general conclusion: unity government serves to postpone conflict, rather than to resolve it.”<sup>715</sup> While this study builds directly on this excellent and expanding body of work, I call into question its largely negative tone. Based on the case findings highlighted above, I complicate this narrative by arguing that the model can deliver some meaningful reforms, under certain conditions. My work suggests that scholars may therefore be wise to revisit the assumption that the model is unlikely to be able to deliver SSR and other reforms. That said, my findings should in no way be seen as discounting the significant drawbacks of the model, as discussed below in the section on policy implications.

In emphasizing the potentially positive institutional reform outcomes of post-election power sharing, my findings build on Bekoe and LeVan and Assenov’s recent work, which recognize the possible benefits of the model. Bekoe, while noting the drawbacks of the approach, underscores the prime importance of achieving credible institutional reforms during post-election power sharing to ensure longer-term gains, arguing that, “without substantial and credible reforms, governments of national unity and other forms of joint governance can bring only temporary relief to violent electoral conflict.”<sup>716</sup> In a recent study, LeVan and Assenov note the surprisingly positive economic outcomes of power sharing, highlighting the case of economic stabilization and growth in Zimbabwe during the GPA. Based on cross-national data from across Africa, they argue that, “multiparty cabinets in Africa enhance economic policy accountability by promoting horizontal monitoring across the government.” Weighing in on the scholarly debate between the skeptics and proponents

---

<sup>715</sup> Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010, “Power-sharing in Comparative Perspective,” 204.

<sup>716</sup> Bekoe, 2012, “Postelection Political Agreements in Togo and Zanzibar,” 140.

of power sharing, as outlined in Chapter 1, LeVan and Assenov conclude that, “the proponents of consensus government may be right.”<sup>717</sup>

The second main theoretical contribution of the dissertation is to help link the surprisingly segregated power sharing, civil-military relations, and SSR political science subfields. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first systematic examination of the relationship between post-election power sharing and SSR. As noted in Chapter 1, there is a distinct lack of connections between these three streams of research. This is unfortunate, as each subfield often grapples with similar questions, and the accumulated knowledge within each body of work has great relevance to the others. There are a few exceptions to this trend, including Hoddie and Hartzell’s study on military power sharing, Toft’s and Hutchful’s work on SSR and peace settlements, and Cheeseman’s work on the internal dynamics of unity governments in Africa.<sup>718</sup> Building on these works, the dissertation has drawn on, engaged with, and contributed important theoretical findings to all three bodies of work.

Specifically, building out of the more theoretically grounded civil-military relations literature proved to be particularly useful in helping to better understand how prevailing domestic political conditions and civil-military relations will be conducive to SSR under post-election power sharing. In this manner, my findings help to correct the aforementioned “conceptual-contextual” imbalance in the SSR literature.<sup>719</sup> At the same time, the SSR literature, which is heavily focused on transitional contexts, helped to better understand how civil-military relations would likely play out in transitional settings such as power sharing, a

---

<sup>717</sup> LeVan and Assenov, 2016, “Parties or Portfolio? The Economic Consequences of Africa’s Big Cabinets,” 662, 684.

<sup>718</sup> Hoddie and Hartzell, 2003, “Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military Power-Sharing Arrangements;” Toft, 2010, *Securing the Peace*; Hutchful, 2009, “Security Sector Reform Provisions in Peace Agreements,” Cheeseman, 2011, “The Internal Dynamics of Power Sharing in Africa.”

<sup>719</sup> The “conceptual-contextual” divide is a term coined by Chanaa used to describe how the SSR body of work, until recently, has remained largely under-theorized and focused on the international and technical side of SSR. See Chanaa, 2002, *Security Sector Reform*, 61.

topic that has not yet been adequately addressed in the civil-military relations subfield. In tackling the largely unaddressed topic of the relationship between post-election power sharing and SSR, this study has helped to close a major gap and contributed to the linkage of the power-sharing, civil-military relations, and SSR literatures.

Third, is this dissertation's finding on the importance of external (both international and regional) factors in pushing SSR progress under post-election power sharing. Much of the political science scholarship on democratization and institutional reform processes argues for the primacy of domestic factors in shaping political liberalization and reform outcomes.<sup>720</sup> Indeed, Bratton and van de Walle assert that, "arguments based on domestic factors have seemingly won the day in the transition literature." Based on their findings, they go on to argue that, "the trajectory of political transitions is most directly affected by domestic factors...."<sup>721</sup>

While certainly not discounting the fundamental import of domestic factors, I contend that external influence is crucial in shaping post-election power-sharing outcomes in semi-authoritarian countries. Indeed, the cases of Kenya and Togo—as outlined in Chapters 4 and 5—demonstrated that a high degree of leverage and coordination from external and regional actors played a significant causal role in pushing SSR forward. The experience of Togo, where international leverage was the highest of all three of the case studies, showed that coordinated external pressure has the potential to spur a degree of SSR progress even under some of the most inauspicious conditions. The case of Zimbabwe also demonstrated how

---

<sup>720</sup> For an overview of the works arguing that international influence is limited in shaping institutional reform outcomes, see Kuperman, 2015, (ed.) *Constitutions and Conflict Management in Africa*, 232-33.

<sup>721</sup> Bratton and van de Waal, 1997, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*: 33. For another argument emphasizing the limits of international efforts to influence institutional change, see Tansey, 2013, "Statebuilding and the Limits of Constitutional Design," 18.



SADC's regional solidarity with ZANU-PF played a central role in preventing any real SSR progress.

These findings align with a recent stream in the literature that argues for the importance of international and regional factors in democratization processes, in part spurred by Levitsky and Way's work on competitive authoritarianism.<sup>722</sup> Building on this work, the integrated theoretical framework presented above, while not downplaying the weight of domestic variables, provides persuasive evidence to the camp emphasizing the import of external factors in institutional reform outcomes in semi-authoritarian countries.

Finally, in a similar vein, the theoretical framework has implications for the long-running scholarly debate on structure versus agency. Hay and Wincott describe this debate as one of the "perennial issues or dilemmas of social science."<sup>723</sup> As highlighted in Chapter 2, the two-step integrated theoretical framework presented above departs from explanations of institutional reform that suggest the primacy of structural versus proximate variables.<sup>724</sup> Instead, following Karl and others, I forward a theoretical framework that puts equal emphasis on both structure and agency: a structured contingency approach. As noted by Bratton and van de Walle: a structured contingency approach "allows that people can make their own history, even if not under conditions of their own choosing."<sup>725</sup>

I maintain that the combination of two long-term variables, the nature of civil-military relations and the character of external involvement, and two contingent factors, the

---

<sup>722</sup> For an overview of other studies arguing for the importance of international factors, see Levitsky and Way, 2010, *Competitive Authoritarianism*, 38. On the role of regional influences see, Hartmann, 2016, "Leverage and Linkage: How Regionalism Shapes Regime Dynamics in Africa;" Lewis, 2007, *Growing Apart: Oil, Politics, and Economic Change in Indonesia and Nigeria*, 17.

<sup>723</sup> Hay and Wincott, 1998, "Structure, Agency, and Historical Institutionalism," 953.

<sup>724</sup> For an overview of this debate in the field of historical institutionalism, see *ibid.*

<sup>725</sup> Karl 1990, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America;" Bratton and van de Waal, 1997, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, 45. Also see Lewis, 2007, *Growing Apart: Oil, Politics, and Economic Change in Indonesia and Nigeria*, 24.

design of the political agreement and the strategic choice of the parties to post-election power sharing, will be the most important factors shaping SSR processes and outcomes. The utility of this method in explaining SSR outcomes under post-election power sharing, as demonstrated by the above chapters, suggests that a unified structured contingency approach may be a useful way to help bridge this perennial scholarly divide moving forward.

In addition to the four major theoretical implications discussed above, the dissertation's findings also have implications for and help to fill significant lacuna in the Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Togo case literatures. As noted above, I argue that much of the work on civil-military relations and SSR in Zimbabwe goes too far in making the case for the political power of the military.<sup>726</sup> In contrast, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, I build on Tendi's recent work and argue that, although the military enjoyed some political influence during the period of power sharing, civilian politicians—namely Mugabe—have remained in supreme political control in Zimbabwe.<sup>727</sup> This finding suggests that the existing debate around militarization in the Zimbabwe case literature could be reframed to emphasize the politicization of the security sector, as opposed to the supreme power of the military.

On Kenya, I argue that the existing scholarly literature on the country's power-sharing period, while extensive and rich in theory, has not yet adequately addressed both the causes and consequences of the institutional police reforms that were passed under power sharing. Building on a small but emerging research stream focusing on the police reform process,<sup>728</sup> my work, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, suggests that the debate around Kenya's

---

<sup>726</sup> For example see Bratton, 2014, *Power Politics*, 200; Mazarire, 2013, "ZANU-PF and the Government of National Unity 2009–12," 76; Bratton and Masunungure, 2011, "The Anatomy of Political Predation," 26, 31.

<sup>727</sup> Tendi, 2013, "Ideology, Civilian Authority and the Zimbabwean Military."

<sup>728</sup> Osse, 2014, "Police Reform in Kenya;" Ruteere, 2014, "Security and Human Rights in the New Constitutional Order in Kenya."

power-sharing period should be reoriented to include a more nuanced discussion of the role of the police and the institutional police reforms passed during the GCG.

In comparison to the case literature on Kenya and Zimbabwe, the body of work on Togo is quite thin, especially on the APG power-sharing period. This dissertation therefore helps fill a major gap in the Togo case literature. Moreover, given Togo's long history of military coups and militarized rule, scholars and outside observers might expect SSR efforts to be highly unsuccessful. Indeed, the literature on SSR efforts in Francophone West Africa remains largely pessimistic on the prospects for reformed security governance in the region.<sup>729</sup> One of the few studies that addresses civil-military relations in Togo argues, while acknowledging progress, that the country's security reforms have largely been "too timid" and primarily for international consumption.<sup>730</sup> While this point on international influence is also reflected in my findings, I complicate the prevailing narrative by demonstrating that Togo made some SSR advancements during the APG period, especially regarding election security, as outlined in Chapter 5.

#### 6.3.1. *Policy Implications*

The theoretical framework and findings presented above also have major implications for domestic, regional, and international policymakers. While structural variables are often very difficult to manipulate, and therefore strictly structurally-based explanations are often of limited use to the policy world, the contingent factors forwarded above suggest a number of important lessons for the policy community. As the dissertation's theory and findings highlight the conditions under which SSR is likely—or unlikely—to progress, policymakers

---

<sup>729</sup> See, for instance, N'Diaye, 2009, "Francophone Africa and Security Sector Transformation."

<sup>730</sup> Toulabor, 2011, "Togo," 238, 50.

and negotiators are provided with a tool to better understand the likely costs and benefits of post-election power sharing arrangements. While all policy options have advantages and disadvantages, and some are easier to implement than others, the below suggestions offer relatively low-cost options for international, regional, and domestic policymakers to help push SSR and other institutional reforms under power sharing. Seven main policy implications of the dissertation are highlighted here.

The first four policy implications concern the design of the power-sharing agreement. First, the finding that the design of the power-sharing agreement plays a key role in driving the reform process forward suggests that international and regional negotiators should push forcefully for the inclusion of concrete SSR content and strong external enforcement mechanisms in the text of political agreements, even in cases where the implementation of SSR is likely to be difficult or appears improbable. External and domestic constituencies can then use the agreement to pressure the parties to uphold their promises and implement SSR. Second, the finding on the importance of timelines within the power-sharing agreement suggests that mediators should also insist on including specific implementation timeframes, and the consequences for failing to meet them, for all reforms outlined in the accord.

Third, the caveat on “actor discontinuity,” i.e. when leaders after power sharing (in many cases the same leaders) may try to rollback reforms accomplished during the power-sharing period, indicates that mediators should push for the inclusion of the kinds of security and other reforms that are difficult to reverse. Constitutional reforms, which would require significant political support to override, fall into this category and should be prioritized. External efforts to influence the design of the agreement will be more successful where international and regional actors have a history of significant involvement in the case and

levels of leverage are high. There are, of course, limits to the catalytic potential of even the best-designed power-sharing agreements. As noted, power-sharing arrangements take place in fragile and dynamic post-conflict environments. Even if strong SSR content and enforcement mechanisms are included in the text of an agreement, unforeseen impediments may neuter an agreement's potentially positive impact.

Fourth, the theoretical framework and findings outlined above have clear implications for the ideal length of power sharing. As negotiated elite compromises, almost all forms of power sharing place constraints on democracy. To help avoid these very real costs to political competition and democratization in the long run, mediators should ensure that post-election power sharing arrangements are only temporary, transitional mechanisms used to end violence and facilitate institutional reforms that will help resolve the roots of conflict. Mediators therefore would be wise to delineate clear end dates within post-election power-sharing accords.

Fifth, the finding on the crucial role of external actors in the monitoring and enforcement of the power-sharing agreement, suggests that international and regional actors should play a more coordinated and sustained role in monitoring and enforcing the implementation of post-election power-sharing accords. External actors should also offer and provide increased training and support to SSR processes. International organizations such as the UN, and regional organizations such as the AU, should consider expanding the size and funding of their mediation and SSR teams.

Given the finding on the prime importance of regional norms and practices to power sharing and SSR outcomes, regional organizations should also clarify and strengthen their guidelines on peace interventions and support the creation or expansion of mediation and

SSR units. International actors, the United States in particular, should also step up their efforts to support SSR following the signing of power-sharing agreements. A good place to start would be for the United States and other international actors to prioritize security sector governance and institution building in their post-conflict security assistance packages, instead of continuing to focus on short-term counterterrorism and tactical level train and equip assistance.

Six, the dissertation's theory and findings have implications for the strategic choices of domestic political actors under post-election power sharing. The finding on the varying impact of inclusionary versus exclusionary political approaches on SSR processes and outcomes suggests that politicians, particularly within opposition parties, should consider crafting and utilizing cohesive, inclusionary political strategies and tactics under power sharing. Departing from previous approaches and practices may prove difficult. But adopting flexible strategies that are more conducive to governing instead of rabble rousing and condemning incumbents will help to maximize the prospects for achieving meaningful SSR and other thorny institutional reforms under post-election power sharing.

Opposition parties that join power-sharing arrangements will need to strike a delicate balance between remaining open to inclusive negotiation and political compromise but also standing firm on their reform principles so as not to be steamrolled by incumbent parties, which more often than not will have much more experience in government than members of the opposition. International actors could also play a role in this process through urging inclusive political approaches and providing trainings and seminars on peaceful conflict resolution to all respective parties under post-election power sharing.

Finally, the finding on the importance of presidential term limits in encouraging incumbent leaders to agree to institutional reforms suggests that domestic, regional, and international actors should ramp up efforts to push democratizing countries to adopt and respect term limits. Regional and international actors should be willing to sanction and cut aid to leaders that do not respect or try to get around term limits.

There is little question that the post-election power-sharing model of conflict resolution is far from perfect. Indeed, power-sharing accords, by their very nature, are based on extensive negotiation and compromise. As the critics of post-election power sharing rightfully note, in addition to bloated cabinets and the risk of policy deadlock, the most obvious drawback of the model is that it can incentivize incumbent leaders to deploy violence and ignore the will of the electorate. If an incumbent leader appears to be headed toward defeat or in fact loses, they may refuse to leave power in the hope of extending their rule through an externally brokered power-sharing accord.

In order to avoid this scenario, international and regional actors should discard the post-election power-sharing model in cases where incumbents have clearly lost elections, such as Zimbabwe in 2008. However, in circumstances where it is difficult or impossible to untangle which candidate actually won, or where a poll re-run would likely risk mass violence, temporary post-election power sharing appears to be a viable, if imperfect, compromise solution. Post-election power sharing is certainly not a panacea or a one size fits all solution to resolve election-related or other types of low-level violence. That said, the above findings suggest that post-election power sharing accords, if well-designed and enforced, can under certain conditions facilitate meaningful institutional reforms, such as SSR, that will help facilitate democratization in the long term.

#### 6.4. Avenues for Further Research

While this dissertation makes strides toward better understanding the SSR processes and outcomes of post-election power sharing, the study also uncovered a series of other related questions that lay beyond the scope of this research. This concluding section highlights these questions and forwards six main promising avenues for further research.

First, to what extent does the middle-range theory developed here apply to a broader set of cases? As a theory building study, the theoretical framework and findings of this dissertation have yet to be systemically tested. While the provisional analysis on Lesotho and Zanzibar undertaken earlier in this chapter suggests that the framework will have utility to a broader set of cases, rigorous theory-testing lay beyond the scope of this research. As such, the experience of post-election power in these two understudied cases would be excellent starting points for future research on the topic. Given Lesotho's ostensible success, despite a history of military coups, in securing significant institutional and electoral reforms, its experience may be particularly illuminating.

In a similar vein, cases of power-sharing accords formed in contexts of low-grade, but not post-election, violence, such as Madagascar and Honduras in 2009 and Zanzibar in 2010, would be promising cases to further extend and refine the theory presented in this dissertation. Both Madagascar and Honduras undertook power sharing in 2009 following military coups, and, as noted, Zanzibar signed a pre-election power sharing accord in 2010. Other countries that have experimented with less formal versions of power sharing and have histories of politicized civil-military relations, in both Africa and beyond, would also be fruitful avenues for further research on the topic.



Second, what are the longer-term impacts of post-election power sharing? While the issue of the durability of institutional reforms passed under power sharing was discussed above, the question of the model's longer run affects on the political leaders and parties that sign up to post-election power-sharing accords remains largely unexamined. The three cases analyzed in this dissertation suggest that the model may not be conducive to building stronger and more unified opposition parties, despite providing opposition figures with valuable governing experience. While poll results are not a perfect measure for party strength in semi-authoritarian countries, all three main opposition parties in Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Togo lost elections following the power-sharing period (the poll result was razor thin in Kenya, larger in Zimbabwe and Togo). In Togo and Zimbabwe, the major opposition parties went on to fracture and split into different factions once the power-sharing period ended. Research on the causes and consequences of these processes and outcomes would shed additional light on the costs and benefits of the power-sharing model.

Each case study also raised interesting and counterintuitive questions that could be explored on a broader scale. Third, the within-case analysis comparing Kenya's reform experience under power sharing (2008-2013) to the country's reform outcomes after electoral turnover (2002) showed that, against the theoretical expectations of the literature, unity governments can actually better deliver SSR and other reforms than even full regime transitions. Future research should further investigate this finding in other power-sharing contexts.

Fourth, the Zimbabwe case findings on the negative impact of politicization suggests that civil-military relations scholars should consider looking more systemically at the causes and consequences of military politicization, as opposed to the literature's more traditional

focus on “military influence” and coups. The Zimbabwe case showed that politicization of the security sector despite a lack of coups can be just as deleterious to democratic civil-military relations and democratization.

Fifth, the finding in Togo that a change in intra-party leadership in the incumbent party helped open the door to some institutional reforms suggests that intra-party leadership turnover should be considered by scholars as a potential variable to explain institutional reform and democratization in semi-authoritarian cases. This promising avenue for both qualitative and quantitative future research could build directly on the substantial body of work in the democratization literature arguing that electoral turnover is key to democratization processes and outcomes.<sup>731</sup>

Lastly, despite the steps this dissertation has taken to help bridge these divides, large gaps remain between the civil-military relations, SSR, and power-sharing literatures, even though the subfields seek to answer a number of shared research questions. Given the usefulness of the integrated approach in the above chapters, my work suggests that further scholarly efforts should be made to more systematically connect and share accumulated knowledge from the three subfields. Specifically, SSR scholars would be wise to conduct more research that takes advantage of the deep theoretical knowledge within the civil-military relations literature and seek to better understand how complex civil-military histories will impact the potential for SSR success in a variety of settings. On the other hand, the somewhat dated and still relatively US-centric civil-military relations literature could learn from SSR and power-sharing scholars that focus on post-conflict environments by

---

<sup>731</sup> Bienen and Herbst, 1996, “The Relationship between Political and Economic Reform in Africa;” Maltz, 2007, “The Case for Presidential Term Limits;” Cheeseman, 2010, “African Elections as Vehicles for Change.

undertaking large-scale collaborative research projects in transitional and democratizing contexts.

Given the largely negative critique of the post-election power-sharing model among academics and political commentators, I was surprised by the number of political leaders I interviewed in all three countries that stressed the many virtues of the inclusive model, despite its considerable drawbacks. Even in Zimbabwe—the least successful case of the three examined here, at least in terms of SSR—opposition officials in the power-sharing government argued that much good came out of the power-sharing period. A year and a half after power sharing came to an end in Zimbabwe, I asked Tsvangirai, the former opposition prime minister, if post-election power sharing was a model that could be replicated in other countries suffering from electoral conflict.

“I think that if there is political polarization, and there’s a stalemate, I think inclusive approaches actually can unlock a lot of political tension, and set a country on a positive trajectory,” he told me.<sup>732</sup>

I put the same question to Biti, the main opposition negotiator in 2008 and former minister of finance during the power-sharing period.

“I would recommend inclusive, national governments without hesitation...do not use this Zimbabwe experience as a way of discarding what can be a model of inclusivity,” he answered.<sup>733</sup>

While remaining much more cautious about recommending the use of the model, based on the findings highlighted in this dissertation I understand Tsvangirai and Biti’s

---

<sup>732</sup> Personal interview, Tsvangirai, 2014.

<sup>733</sup> Personal interview, Biti, 2015.

perspective. Although certainly imperfect and not a remedy that should be used in all circumstances, the findings of this dissertation have introduced some further complexity into the largely negative narrative on post-election power sharing. I have demonstrated that the model plays a significant role in the causal process of SSR and can deliver some institutional reforms conducive to democratization, under certain conditions.

In the preceding pages I have demonstrated that a combination of long and short-term domestic and international factors drive or stymie reform of the security sector under post-election power sharing in semi-authoritarian countries. In sum, I maintain that two main long-term factors, the nature of civil-military relations and the character of external involvement, in combination with two short-term mechanisms, the design of the political agreement and the type of political strategy deployed by the parties, will be the most critical factors shaping SSR processes and outcomes under power sharing.

The experience of Zimbabwe confirmed that the practice of *security politics* under power sharing is extremely unfavorable to reform. In contrast, the experience of Kenya affirmed that the practice of *coalition politics* is favorable to reform. Lastly, the experience of Togo confirmed that the practice of *countervailing politics* under post-election power sharing, while volatile and halting, is potentially favorable to reform as long as backed by coordinated external pressure and high degrees of leverage.

State security sectors continue to play a crucial and often injurious role in election-related violence in Africa, as illustrated by a number of recent cases, including Gabon in 2016, Guinea in 2015, and the DRC and Côte d'Ivoire in 2011. In Côte d'Ivoire, after incumbent president Laurent Gbagbo refused to step down after losing the 2011 election, post-election violence surged—eventually leaving over 3,000 dead—with the security sector

deeply involved in the violence. While calls were made for a post-election power-sharing accord, the idea was eventually discarded as a joint military intervention was launched, led by French, UN, and domestic forces loyal to the internationally recognized winner of the election, Alassane Ouattara. As a result of the intervention, Gbagbo was arrested and eventually hauled before the ICC.

The case of Côte d'Ivoire in 2011 may have temporarily slowed the wave of post-election power sharing that has flowed across Africa over the last two decades. But international military intervention will not be possible or desirable in all circumstances. The persistence of violent elections and a lack of a viable conflict resolution alternative guarantees that the post-election power-sharing model will remain popular and continue to feature prominently in the toolkits of domestic, regional, and international mediators. Indeed, at the time of writing, Gabon is in the midst of discussions regarding a unity government following its most recent bout of post-election violence. Understanding the reform processes and outcomes of post-election power sharing therefore remains more important than ever.

### Works Cited:

Ademola Abass, 2000, "The New Collective Security Mechanism of ECOWAS: Innovations and Problems," *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, 5, 2: 211-229.

Korwa Adar and Isaac Munyae, 2001, "Human Rights Abuse in Kenya under Daniel arap Moi 1978-2001," *African Studies Quarterly*, 5, 1: 1-17.

Adekeye Adebajo, 2002, *Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner).

Clement Adibe, 1997, "The Liberian conflict and the ECOWAS-UN partnership," *Third World Quarterly*, 18, 3: 471-488.

African Union, 2014, *Back from the Brink: the 2008 Mediation Process and Reforms in Kenya*, Office of the Panel of Eminent African Personalities.

*Africa Review*, "Mugabe Party Rubbishes SADC Bid to Engage Generals," May 12, 2011, <http://www.africareview.com/News/Mugabe-party-rubbishes-SADC-bid-to-engage-generals/-/979180/1161326/-/aodx1m/-/index.html> (accessed December 7, 2015).

Afrobarometer, 2016, Online Data Analysis Tool, <http://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online> (accessed November 1, 2016).

*Afrol News*, "Mugabe Forced to Accept SADC Mediation," March 29, 2007, <http://www.afrol.com/articles/24909> (accessed December 2, 2015).

Abiodun Alao 2012, *Mugabe and the Politics of Security in Zimbabwe* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press).

Jocelyn Alexander, 2013, "Militarization and State Institutions: 'Professionals' and 'Soldiers' inside the Zimbabwe Prison Service," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 39, 4: 807-828.

---. 2006, *The Unsettled Land: State-making and the Politics of Land in Zimbabwe 1893-2003* (Oxford: James Currey).

Jocelyn Alexander and JoAnn McGregor, 2013, "Politics, Patronage and Violence in Zimbabwe," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 39, 4.

Jocelyn Alexander and Miles-Blessing Tendi, 2008, "Tale of Two Elections: Zimbabwe at the Polls in 2008," *Concerned Africa Scholars*, 8: 5-17.

*AllAfrica*, "West Africa: ECOWAS Force to Help Deter Country Vote Violence," February 21, 2010, <http://allafrica.com/stories/2010022220605.html> (accessed October 3, 2016).

Amnesty International, 2013, "Police Reform in Kenya: 'A Drop in the Ocean,'" [https://www.amnesty.nl/sites/default/files/public/kenya\\_afr\\_32\\_001\\_2013.pdf](https://www.amnesty.nl/sites/default/files/public/kenya_afr_32_001_2013.pdf) (accessed November 22, 2016).

---. 1993, "Togo: Impunity for Killings by the Military," <https://www.amnesty.org/download/.../afr570131993en.pdf> (accessed September 11, 2016).

David Anderson, 2014, "Remembering Wagalla: State Violence in Northern Kenya, 1962–1991," *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 8, 4: 658-676.

---. 2010, "Majimboism: The Troubled History of an Idea," in Daniel Branch, Nic Cheeseman, and Leigh Gardner, (eds.), *Our Turn to Eat: Politics in Kenya since 1950* (Berlin: Lit Verlag): 34-42.

---. 2002. "Vigilantes, Violence and the Politics of Public Order in Kenya," *African Affairs*, 101, 405: 531-555.

David Anderson and Emma Lochery, 2008, "Violence and Exodus in Kenya's Rift Valley, 2008: Predictable and Preventable?," *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 2, 2: 328-343.

David Anderson and David Killingray, 1991, *Policing the Empire: Government, Authority, and Control, 1830-1940* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).

Jan Angstrom, 2013, "The Changing Norms of Civil and Military and Civil-Military Relations Theory," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 24, 2: 224-36.

Mark Antsey, 2007, "Zimbabwe in Ruins: Mediation Prospects in a Conflict Not Yet Ripe for Resolution," *International Negotiation*, 12: 415–442.

Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, Version 5 (1997-2014), <http://www.acleddata.com/data/> (accessed December 4, 2015).

Peter Arthur, "ECOWAS and Regional Peacekeeping Integration in West Africa: Lessons for the Future," *Africa Today*, 57, 2: 2-24.

*Associated Press*, "Kenya Fires 302 Police Officers as it Fights Corruption," June 9, 2016, <http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2016-06-09/kenya-fires-302-police-officers-as-it-fights-corruption> (accessed August 2, 2016).

Jan Bachman and Jana Hönke, 2010, "'Peace and Security' as Counterterrorism? The Political Effects of Liberal Interventions in Kenya," *African Affairs*, 109, 434: 97-114.

Mohammed Bakari and Alexander Makulilo, 2012, "Beyond Polarity in Zanzibar? The 'Silent' Referendum and the Government of National Unity," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 30, 2: 195-218.

Nicole Ball and Dylan Hendrickson, 2006, "Trends in Security Sector Reform: Policy, Practice and Research," prepared for the workshop on "New Directions in Security Sector Reform," Peace, Conflict and Development Program Initiative, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, November 2-4, revised January 2006, [http://www.ssrnetwork.net/uploaded\\_files/3278.pdf](http://www.ssrnetwork.net/uploaded_files/3278.pdf) (accessed 12.1.2013).

*BBC News*, "Zimbabwe Announces Poll Results," May 2, 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7380445.stm> (accessed 11.21.2015).

Zoltan Barany, 2012, *The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).

---. 2011, "The Role of the Military," *Journal of Democracy*, 22, 4: 28-39.

Joel Barkan, 1998, "Toward A New Constitutional Framework in Kenya," *Africa Today*, 45, 2: 213-226.

---. 1993, "Kenya: Lessons from a Flawed Election," *Journal of Democracy*, 4, 3: 85-99.

Hanna Batatu, 1981, "Some Observations on the Social Roots of Syria's Ruling Military Group and the Causes for Its Dominance," *Middle East Journal*, 35, 3: 331-44.

Jean-François Bayart, 2000, "Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion," *African Affairs*, 99, 395: 217-267.

Dorina Bekoe, 2012, "Postelection Political Agreements in Togo and Zanzibar," in Dorina Bekoe, (ed.) *Voting in Fear: Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace): 117-44.

Eva Bellin, 2012, "Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring," *Comparative Politics*, 44, 2: 127-49.

Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 1999, "Breaking The Silence, Building True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands, 1980 to 1988 Summary Report," Legal Resources Foundation, <http://www.kubatana.net/html/archive/hr/990401ccjplrf.asp?sector=CACT> (accessed 11/19/2015).

Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, 2015, (eds.) *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool* (Cambridge University Press, Kindle Edition).

Louis-Alexandre Berg, 2012, "Guns, Laws and Politics: The Political Foundations of Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform," *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law*, 4, 1: 4-30.



Jeffrey Berry, 2002, "Validity and Reliability Issues in Elite Interviewing," *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 35, 4: 679-682.

Henry Bienen and Jeffrey Herbst, 1996, "The Relationship between Political and Economic Reform in Africa," *Comparative Politics*, 29, 1, 23-42.

Daniel Branch and Nic Cheeseman, 2008, "Democratization, Sequencing and State Failure in Africa: Lessons from Kenya," *African Affairs*, 108, 430, 1-26.

---. 2008, (eds.) "Election Fever: Kenya's Crisis," *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 2, 2.

Michael Bratton, 2014, *Power Politics in Zimbabwe* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner).

Michael Bratton and Eldred Masunungure, 2011, "The Anatomy of Political Predation: Leaders, Elites and Coalitions in Zimbabwe 1980–2010," Development Leadership Program, Research Paper 09.

---. 2008, "Zimbabwe's Long Agony," *Journal of Democracy*, 19, 4: 41-55.

Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Waal, 1997, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Stephen Brown, 2009, "Donor Responses to the 2008 Kenyan Crisis: Finally Getting it Right?," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 27, 3: 389-406.

---. 2005, "Foreign Aid and Democracy Promotion: Lessons from Africa," *The European Journal of Development Research*, 17, 2: 179-198.

---. 2001, "Authoritarian Leaders and Multiparty Elections in Africa: How Foreign Donors Help to Keep Kenya's Daniel arap Moi in Power," *Third World Quarterly*, 22, 5: 725-739.

Stephen Brown and Rosalind Raddatz, 2014, "Dire Consequences or Empty Threats? Western Pressure for Peace, Justice and Democracy in Kenya," *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 8, 1: 43-62.

Stephen Brown and Chandra Sriram, 2012, "The Big Fish Won't Fry Themselves: Criminal Accountability for Post-Election Violence in Kenya," *African Affairs*, 111, 443: 244-260.

Thomas Bruneau, 2013 "Impediments to the Accurate Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations," in Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations* (New York, NY: Routledge): 13-21.

---. 2013, "Development of an Approach Through Debate," in Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations* (New York, NY: Routledge): 22-25.

Thomas Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, 2013, "Introduction," in Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations* (New York, NY: Routledge): 1-10.

Alan Bryden and Boubacar N'Diaye, 2008, (eds.) *Challenges of Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa: Realities and Opportunities* (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: LIT Verlag).

Alan Bryden, Boubacar N'Diaye, and 'Funmi Olonisakin, 2005, "Democratizing Security Sector Governance in West Africa: Trends and Challenges," *Conflict, Security & Development*, 5, 2: 203-226.

Charles T. Call, 2012, *Why Peace Fails: The Causes and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press).

Greg Cameron, 2002, "Zanzibar's Turbulent Transition," *Review of African Political Economy*, 92: 313-330.

Giovanni Capoccia and Daniel Keleman, 2007, "The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism, *World Politics*, 59: 341-69.

Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham, 2003, "Democratic Control and the Security Sector: The Scope for Transformation and its Limits," in Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham, (eds.) *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies* (London: Zed Books): 305-27.

Center for Systemic Peace, 2014, "Coups d'État, 1946-2014," <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html> (accessed November 23, 2015).

Central Intelligence Agency, 2016, "Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-leaders-1/index.html> (accessed September 24, 2016).

Stephan Chan, 2007, "Breakthrough in Kariba," *Prospect*, <http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2007/10/breakthrough-in-kariba/> (accessed December 2, 2015).

Jane Chanaa, 2002, *Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges, and Prospects* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies).

Jeffrey T. Checkel, 2006, "Tracing Causal Mechanisms," *International Studies Review*, 8, 2: 362-70.

Nic Cheeseman, 2011, "The Internal Dynamics of Power Sharing in Africa," *Democratization*, 18, 2: 336-365.

---. 2010, "African Elections as Vehicles for Change," *Journal of Democracy*, 21, 4: 139-153.

---. 2008, "The Kenyan Elections of 2007: An Introduction," *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 2, 2: 166-184.

Nic Cheeseman and Miles-Blessing Tendi, 2010, "Power-sharing in Comparative Perspective: the Dynamics of 'Unity Government' in Kenya and Zimbabwe," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 48, 2: 203-29.

Knox Chitiyo and Martin Rupiya, 2005, "Tracking Zimbabwe's Political History: The Zimbabwe Defence Force from 1980-2005," in Martin Rupiya, (ed.) *Evolutions & Revolutions: A Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies): 331-363.

Knox Chitiyo, 2009, "The Case for Security Sector Reform in Zimbabwe," Royal United Services Institute.

Roger Cohen, 2008, "How Kofi Annan Rescued Kenya," *New York Review of Books*, <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2008/aug/14/how-kofi-annan-rescued-kenya/> (accessed June 22, 2014).

CNN, "UN Report Alleges Widespread Killings by Kenyan Police," April 6, 2009, <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/06/05/kenya.united.nations.investigation/> (accessed August 2, 2016).

Rowland J.V. Cole, 2013, "Power-Sharing, Post-Electoral Contestations and the Dismemberment of the Right to Democracy in Africa," *The International Journal of Human Rights*, 17, 2: 256-274.

David Collier, 2011, "Understanding Process Tracing," *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 44, 3: 823-30.

David Collier, Henry Brady, and Jason Seawright, 2010, "Introduction to the Second Edition: A Sea Change in Political Methodology," in Henry Brady and David Collier, (eds.) *Rethinking Social Inquiry* (Lanham, MD: Roman and Littlefield): 1-10.

Paul Cornish, 2008, "The Military Dimension of Security Sector Governance in Complex Power-sharing Arrangements," in Marc Weller and Barbara Metzger, (eds.) *Settling Self-Determination Disputes: Complex Power-sharing in Theory and Practice* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers): 571-91.

Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2012, "The Military Factor in Zimbabwe's Political and Electoral Affairs," <http://www.swradioafrica.com/Documents/The%20Military%20Factor%20in%20Zimbabwe.pdf> (accessed November 21, 2015).

Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn, Paul Chambers, and Siegfried O. Wolf, 2010, "Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-ism: Conceptualizing Civilian Control of the Military in Emerging Democracies," *Democratization*, 17, 5: 950-75.

Aurel Croissant, David Kühn, Paul Chambers, Philip Völkel, and Siegfried O. Wolf, 2011, "Theorizing Civilian Control of The Military in Emerging Democracies: Agency, Structure and Institutional Change," *Comparative Governance and Politics (Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft)*, 5: 75-98.

*Daily Nation*, "UK Pledges Kenya Reforms Support," April 28, 2010, <http://www.nation.co.ke/News/UK+pledges+Kenya+reforms+support/-/1056/927630/-/1614tkz/-/index.html> (accessed August 2, 2016).

Philip Davies, 2001, "Spies as Informants: Triangulation and the Interpretation of Elite Interview Data in the Study of the Intelligence and Security Services," *Politics*, 21, 1: 73-80.

Samuel Decalo, 1990, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Motivations and Constraints* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).

Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, 1996, *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press).

J. Tyler Dickovick, 2013, *Africa: The World Today Series 2014-2015* (Lanham, MD: Stryker Post Publications).

Caitriona Dowd and Clionadh Raleigh, 2013, "ACLED Regional Report: Kenya," [http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/ACLED-Country-Report\\_Kenya\\_December-2013\\_updated.pdf](http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/ACLED-Country-Report_Kenya_December-2013_updated.pdf) (accessed July 31, 2013).

Daniela Donno, 2013, "Elections and Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes," *American Journal of Political Science*, 57, 3: 703-716, and Supplementary Appendix.

Kaniye Ebeku, 2005, "The Succession of Faure Gnassingbé to the Togolese Presidency: An International Law Perspective," *Current African Issues*, 30: 1-33.

Economist Intelligence Unit, 2009, "Togo: Country Report."

---. 2006, "Togo: Country Report."

---. 2005, "Togo: Country Report."

Sebastian Elischer, 2008, "Ethnic Coalitions of Convenience and Commitment: Political Parties and Party Systems in Kenya," German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Working Paper 68: 1-27.

Pierre Englebert and Denis Tull, 2008, "Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas about Failed States," *International Security* 32, 4: 106-39.

Stephan Van Evera, 1997, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).

Peter D. Feaver, 2003, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).

---. 1999, "Civil-Military Relations," *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2: 211-41.

Samuel E. Finer, 1962, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (London: Pall Mall).

Jonathan Fisher and David Anderson, 2015, "Authoritarianism and the Securitization of Development in Africa," *International Affairs* 91, 1: 131-151.

Virginia Page Fortna, 2003, "Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace," *International Organization*, 57, 2: 337-372.

Jendayi Frazer, 1995, "Conceptualizing Civil-Military Relations during Democratic Transition," *Africa Today*, 42, 1/2: 39-48.

Freedom House, 1999, "1998 Freedom in the World: Lesotho," <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/lesotho> (accessed October 29, 2016).

Julia Gallagher, 2015, "The Battle for Zimbabwe in 2013: From Polarization to Ambivalence," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 53, 1: 27-49.

Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, 2005, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).

John Gerring, 2007, *Case Study Research: Principles and Practice* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press).

Mark Gevisser, 2009, *Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred* (Jeppestown: Jonathan Ball).

Yash Pal Ghai, 2014, "Constitutions and Constitutionalism: the Fate of the 2010 Constitution," in Godwin Murunga, Duncan Okello, and Anders Sjögren, (eds.) *Kenya: The Struggle for a New Constitutional Order* (London: Zed Books, Kindle Edition).

Edwin Gimode, 2007, "The Role of the Police in Kenya's Democratization Process," in Godwin Murunga & Shadrack Nasong'o, (eds.) *Kenya: The Struggle for Democracy* (London: Zed Books): 227-260.

John Gledhill, 2013, "Assessing (In)security after the Arab Spring," *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 46, 4: 709-15.

---. 2013, "Conclusion: Managing (In)security in Post-Arab Spring Transitions," *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 46, 4: 736-9.

*Global Post*, "Kenya Election Prompts Fears of New Violence," February 28, 2013, <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/africa/kenya/130226/kenya-election-violence> (accessed March 13, 2016).

Amandine Gnanguênon, Paulin Maurice Toupane, and Esso-Wèdeou Gnamke, 2014, "Politicians Talk Past Each Other as Togo's 2015 Elections Approach," *ECOWAS Peace and Security Report*, Institute for Security Studies.

Government of Kenya, 2010, "Constitution," <http://www.kenyalaw.org/kl/index.php?id=398> (accessed August 18, 2016).

---. 2008, "Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV)," [http://www.knchr.org/portals/0/reports/waki\\_report.pdf](http://www.knchr.org/portals/0/reports/waki_report.pdf) (accessed 7.12.2011).

Government of Kenya, 2008, "National Accord," in African Union, 2014, *Back from the Brink: the 2008 Mediation Process and Reforms in Kenya*, Office of the Panel of Eminent African Personalities: 247-310.

Government of Lesotho, 1999, "Memorandum of Agreement between the Government of Lesotho and the Interim Political Authority," [http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/LS\\_991203\\_MoU%20between%20the%20government%20of%20Lesotho%20and%20IPA.pdf](http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/LS_991203_MoU%20between%20the%20government%20of%20Lesotho%20and%20IPA.pdf) (accessed October 23, 2016).

Government of Togo. 2006, "Accord Politique Global," [http://www.ceni-tg.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Accord\\_politique\\_global\\_200806.pdf](http://www.ceni-tg.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Accord_politique_global_200806.pdf) (accessed September 24, 2016).

Government of Zimbabwe, 2013, "Constitution," [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Zimbabwe\\_2013.pdf](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Zimbabwe_2013.pdf) (accessed 12.8.2015).

---. 2008, "Global Political Agreement," <http://www.kubatana.net/html/archive/demgg/080915agreement.asp?sector=OPIN> (accessed December 2, 2015).

Victoria Graham, 2006, "How Firm the Handshake? South Africa's Use of Quiet Diplomacy in Zimbabwe from 1999 to 2006," *African Security Review*, 15, 4: 114-127.

*The Guardian*, "ICC Accuses Six Kenyans of Crimes Against Humanity During 2007 Violence," December 15, 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/15/kenya-election-violence-suspects-named> (accessed July 31, 2016).

Emilie Hafner-Burton, D. Alex Hughes, and David Victor, 2013, "The Cognitive Revolution and the Political Psychology of Elite Decision Making," *Perspective on Politics*, 11, 2: 368-386.

Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, 1996, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," *Political Studies*, 44, 5: 936-957.

James Hamill and John Hoffman, 2009, "'Quiet Diplomacy' or Appeasement? South African Policy towards Zimbabwe," *The Round Table*, 98, 402: 373-384.

Kristen Harkness, 2012, *The Origins of African Civil-Military Relations: Ethnic Armies and the Development of Coup Traps*, Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University.

Christof Hartmann, 2016, "Leverage and Linkage: How Regionalism Shapes Regime Dynamics in Africa," *Comparative Governance and Politics (Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft)*, 10: 79-98.

Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, 2007, *Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press).

Colin Hay and Daniel Wincott, 1998, "Structure, Agency, and Historical Institutionalism," *Political Studies*, XLVI, 951-957.

John Heilbrunn, 2007, "Equatorial Guinea and Togo: What Price Repression?," in Robert Rotberg, (ed.) *Worst of the Worst: Dealing with Repressive and Rogue Nations* (New York, NY: Brookings Institution Press): 223-249.

---. 2005, "Togo: Dictatorship without a Dictator," West African Research Association Newsletter, 20-21, <https://www.bu.edu/wara/files/pdf/WARA-NL-Spring-2005.pdf> (accessed August 3, 2016).

---. 1993, "Social Origins of National Conferences in Benin and Togo," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 31, 2: 277-299.

Alice Hills, 2009, "Policing in Kenya: A Selective Service," in Mercedes Hinton and Tim Newburn, (eds.) *Policing Developing Democracies* (Abington: Routledge): 237-259.

---. 2008, "The Dialectic of Police Reform in Nigeria," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 46, 2: 215-34.

---. 2007, "Police Commissioners, Presidents and the Governance of Security," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 45, 3: 403-423.

Matthew Hoddie and Caroline Hartzell, 2003, "Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military Power-Sharing Arrangements," *Journal of Peace Research*, 40, 3: 303-20.

Thys Hoekman, 2013, "Testing Ties: Opposition and Power-Sharing Negotiations in Zimbabwe," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 39, 4: 903-920.

Michael Horowitz, Allan Stam, and Cali Ellis, 2015, *Why Leaders Fight* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press).

Mathurin C. Hounnikpo, 2010, *Guarding the Guardians: Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Governance in Africa* (Surrey: Ashgate).

---. 2000, "The Military and Democratization in Africa: A Comparative Study of Benin and Togo," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, 28: 210-229.

Mathias Hounkpe and Alioune Badara Gueye, 2010, "The Role of Security Forces in the Electoral Process: the Case of Six West African Countries," Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/07532.pdf> (accessed October 3, 2016).

Herbert Howe, 2001, *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States* (London: Lynn Rienner).

Human Rights Watch, 2015, "World Report 2015: Zimbabwe," <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/zimbabwe> (accessed December 8, 2015).

---. 2013, "The Elephant in the Room: Reforming Zimbabwe's Security Sector Ahead of Elections," <https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/06/04/elephant-room/reforming-zimbabwes-security-sector-ahead-elections> (accessed December 4, 2015).

---. 2013, "You Are All Terrorists: Kenyan Police Abuse of Refugees in Nairobi," [https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/kenya0513\\_ForUpload\\_0\\_0.pdf](https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/kenya0513_ForUpload_0_0.pdf) (accessed November 2, 2016).

---. 2011, "Perpetual Fear: Impunity and Cycles of Violence in Zimbabwe," [https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/zimbabwe0311webwcover\\_0.pdf](https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/zimbabwe0311webwcover_0.pdf) (accessed November 21, 2015).

---. 2009, "Diamonds in the Rough: Human Rights Abuses in the Marange Diamond Fields of Zimbabwe," <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/06/26/diamonds-rough> (accessed November 21, 2015).

Samuel P. Huntington, 1991, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press).



---. 1957, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).

Eboe Hutchful, 2012, "Security Sector Governance and Peacebuilding," in Devon Curtis and Gwinyayi Dzinesa, (eds.) *Peacebuilding, Power, and Politics in Africa* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press): 63-86.

---. 2009, "Security Sector Reform Provisions in Peace Agreements," UK Department of International Development and African Security Sector Network: 20, 24-26, <http://www.ssrnetwork.net/documents/Publications/SSRPIPA/SSR%20Main%20Report.pdf> (accessed December 2, 2013).

International Crisis Group, 2013, "Kenya After the Elections," 3-4, <http://ruc.ac.ke/cmdps/pdf/elections.pdf> (accessed August 3, 2016).

---. 2013. "Kenya's 2013 Elections," <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/197-kenyas-2013-elections> (accessed August 2, 2015).

---. 2011, "Zimbabwe: The Road to Reform or Another Dead End," <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/southern-africa/zimbabwe/173-zimbabwe-the-road-to-reform-or-another-dead-end.aspx> (accessed December 8, 2015).

International Trade Centre, 2016, "Trade Map," [http://www.trademap.org/Product\\_SelProduct\\_TS.aspx?nvpm=1||||TOTAL|||2|1|1|1|2|1|1|1|1](http://www.trademap.org/Product_SelProduct_TS.aspx?nvpm=1||||TOTAL|||2|1|1|1|2|1|1|1|1) (accessed July 3, 2016).

*IOL*, "Mbeki and MDC's Explosive Exchange," November 27, 2008, <http://beta.iol.co.za/news/africa/mbeki-and-mdcs-explosive-exchange-427191>

--. "800 Died in Togo Election Unrest-Report," May 14, 2005, <http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/800-died-in-togo-election-unrest---report-241142> (accessed September 29, 2016).

*IRIN News*, "Official Inquiry Says 154 Died in Political Violence," November 11, 2015, <http://www.irinnews.org/news/2005/11/11/official-inquiry-says-154-died-political-violence> (accessed October 3, 2016).

Akin Iwilade and Johnson Uchechukwu Agbo, 2012, "ECOWAS and the Regulation of Regional Peace and Security in West Africa," *Democracy and Security*, 8, 4: 358-373.

Paul Jackson, 2011, "Security Sector Reform and State Building," *Third World Quarterly*, 32, 10: 1803-1822.

---. 2011, "The Civil War Roots of Military Domination in Zimbabwe: The Integration Process Following the Rhodesian War and the Road to ZANLA Dominance," *Civil Wars*, 13, 4: 371-395.

Morris Janowitz, 1960, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press).

Anna K. Jarstad, 2009, "The Prevalence of Power-Sharing: Exploring the Patterns of Post-Election Peace," *Africa Spectrum*, 44, 3: 41-62.

Denis Kadima and Felix Owour, 2006, "The National Rainbow Coalition: Achievements and Challenges of Building and Sustaining a Broad-Based Political Party Coalition in Kenya," in Denis Kadima, (ed.) *The Politics of Party Coalitions in Africa* (Auckland Park: Electoral Institute of Southern Africa): 179-221.

Peter Kagwanja, 2003, "Facing Mount Kenya or Facing Mecca? The Mungiki, Ethnic Violence and the Politics of the Moi Succession in Kenya 1987-2002," *African Affairs*, 102, 406: 25-49.

Ilmari Kähkö, 2012, "Big Man Bargaining in African Conflicts," in Mats Utas, (ed.) *African Conflicts and Informal Power: Big Men and Networks* (London: Zed): 181-204.

Mehran Kamrava, 2000, "Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East," *Political Science Quarterly* 115, 1: 67-92.

Karuti Kanyinga and James Long, 2012, "The Political Economy of Reforms in Kenya: The Post-2007 Election Violence and a New Constitution," *African Studies Review*, 55, 1: 31-51.

Karuti Kanyinga and Sophie Walker, 2013, "Building a Political Settlement: The International Approach to Kenya's 2008 Post-Election Crisis," *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development*, 2, 2, 34: 1-21

Terry Lynn Karl 1990, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," *Comparative Politics*, 23, 1: 1-21.

Nelson Kasfir, 2015, "Agency across Changing Sites: The Path to Kenya's 2010 Constitution," in Lucy Koechlin and Till Forster, (eds.) *The Politics of Governance* (New York, NY: Routledge): 52-71.

Gilbert Khadiagala, 2009, "Regionalism and Conflict Resolution: Lessons from the Kenyan Crisis," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 27, 3: 431-444.

Mwai Kibaki, 2010, "Speech at the Promulgation of the New Constitution," <http://www.nation.co.ke/blob/view/-/998162/data/189174/-/1m232f/-/kibaki+speech.pdf> (accessed February 23, 2016).

Linda Kirschke, 2007, "Semipresidentialism and the Perils of Power-Sharing in Neopatrimonial States," *Comparative Political Studies*, 40, 11: 1372-1394.

Jacqueline Klopp, 2001, "Ethnic Clashes and Winning Elections: The Case of Kenya's Electoral Despotism," *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 35, 3: 473-517.

Dirk Kohnert 2016, "Togo: Political and Economic Development (2013 to 2016): author's extended version of BTI 2016 Togo Country Report,  
[http://www.academia.edu/10017634/Togo\\_political\\_and\\_economic\\_development\\_2013\\_to\\_2016\\_Author\\_s\\_extended\\_and\\_updated\\_version\\_of\\_BTI\\_2016\\_Togo\\_Country\\_Report\\_forthcoming\\_](http://www.academia.edu/10017634/Togo_political_and_economic_development_2013_to_2016_Author_s_extended_and_updated_version_of_BTI_2016_Togo_Country_Report_forthcoming_) (accessed August 15, 2016).

Eric Kramon and Daniel Posner, 2011, "Kenya's New Constitution," *Journal of Democracy*, 22, 2: 89-103.

Norma Kriger, 2012, "ZANU-PF Politics Under Zimbabwe's 'Power-Sharing' Government," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 30, 1: 11-26.

---. 2005, "ZANU(PF) Strategies in General Elections: 1980-2000: Discourse and Coercion," *African Affairs*, 104, 414: 1-34.

Alan Kuperman, 2015, (ed.) *Constitutions and Conflict Management in Africa: Preventing Civil War through Institutional Design* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press).

Julien Morency-Laflamme, 2011, *La Démocratisation au Togo et au Bénin: L'influence des Stratégies des Groupes d'Opposition* (Universitaires Europeennes).

Adrienne LeBas, 2014, "The Perils of Power Sharing," *Journal of Democracy*, 25, 2: 52-66.

---. 2011, *From Protest to Parties: Party-Building and Democratization in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

---. 2006, "Polarization as Craft: Party Formation and State Violence in Zimbabwe," *Comparative Politics*, 38, 4: 419-438.

A. Carl LeVan, 2011, "Power Sharing and Inclusive Politics in Africa's Uncertain Democracies," *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions*, 23, 1: 31-53.

A. Carl LeVan and Assen Assenov, 2016, "Parties or Portfolio? The Economic Consequences of Africa's Big Cabinets," *Government and Opposition*, 51, 4: 661-690.

Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, 2012, "Beyond Patronage: Violent Struggle, Ruling Party Cohesion, and Authoritarian Durability," *Perspectives on Politics*, 10, 4: 869-889.

---. 2010, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press).

Peter M. Lewis, 2007, *Growing Apart: Oil, Politics, and Economic Change in Indonesia and Nigeria* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press).

Arend Lijphart, 1990, "The Power-Sharing Approach," in Joseph Montville, (ed.) *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies* (Lexington MA: Lexington Books): 491-509.

Robin Luckham, 2003, "Democratic Strategies for Security in Transition and Conflict," in Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham, (eds.) *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies* (London: Zed Books): 3-28.

---. 1994, "The Military, Militarization and Democratization in Africa: A Survey of Literature and Issues," *African Studies Review*, 37, 2: 13-75.

Gabrielle Lynch and David Anderson, 2014, "Democratization and Ethnic Violence in Kenya: Electoral Cycles and Shifting Identities," in Jacques Bertrand and Oded Haklai, (eds.) *Democratization and Ethnic Minorities: Conflict Or Compromise?* (Abingdon: Routledge): 83-102.

Terrence Lyons, 2005, *Demilitarizing Politics: Elections on the Uncertain Road to Peace* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers).

Gideon Maltz, 2007, "The Case for Presidential Term Limits," *Journal of Democracy*, 18, 1: 128-142.

Charles Mangongera, 2014, "The Military vs. Democracy," *Journal of Democracy*, 25, 2: 67-76.

Eldred Masunungure, 2011, "Zimbabwe's Militarized, Electoral Authoritarianism," *Journal of International Affairs*, 65, 1: 47-64.

---. 2009, *Defying the Winds of Change: Zimbabwe's 2008 Elections* (Harare: Weaver Press).

Khabele Matlosa, 2005, "From a Destabilizing Factor to a Depoliticized and Professional Force: the Military in Lesotho," in Martin Rupiya, (ed.) *Evolutions & Revolutions: A Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies): 85-109.

Khabele Matlosa and Neville W. Pule, 2001, "The Military In Lesotho," *African Security Review*, 10, 2: 62-74.

Gerald Mazarire, 2013, "ZANU-PF and the Government of National Unity 2009–12," in Brian Raftopoulos, (ed.) *The Hard Road to Reform: The Politics of Zimbabwe's Global Political Agreement* (Harare: Weaver Press): 71-116.

Thabo Mbeki, 2001, "The Mbeki-Mugabe Papers, A Discussion Document," *New Agenda*, 1, 22, [http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/demgg/mbeki\\_mugabe\\_papers\\_010831.pdf](http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/demgg/mbeki_mugabe_papers_010831.pdf) (accessed November 29, 2015).

Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai, 2012, "Proposed National Security Strategy/Policy."

Andreas Mehler, 2012, "Power-Sharing," in Devon Curtis and Gwinyayi Dzinesa, (eds.) *Peacebuilding, Power, and Politics in Africa* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press): 189-201.

---. 2009, "Introduction: Power-Sharing in Africa," *Africa Spectrum*, 44, 3: 2-10.

---. 2009, "Peace and Power-sharing in Africa: A Not So Obvious Relationship," *African Affairs*, 108, 432: 453-473.

---. 2009, "Hybrid Regimes and Oligopolies of Violence in Africa: Expectations on Security Provision 'From Below,'" in Martina Fischer and Beatrix Schmelzle, (eds.) *Building Peace in the Absence of States: Challenging the Discourse on State Failure* (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management): 57-65.

Martin Meredith, 2008, *Our Votes, Our Guns: Robert Mugabe and the Tragedy of Zimbabwe* (New York, NY: Public Affairs).

Matthew Mitchell, 2012, "Power-sharing and Peace in Côte d'Ivoire: Past Examples and Future Prospects," *Conflict, Security & Development*, 12, 2: 171-191.

David Moore, 2010, "A Decade of Disquieting Diplomacy: South Africa, Zimbabwe and the Ideology of the National Democratic Revolution 1999–2009," *History Compass* 8, 8: 752–767.

Susanne Mueller, 2011, "Dying to win: Elections, Political Violence, and Institutional Decay in Kenya," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 29, 1: 99-117

---. 2008, "The Political Economy of Kenya's Crisis," *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 2, 2: 185-210.

Godwin Murunga, Duncan Okello, and Anders Sjögren, 2014, (eds.) *Kenya: The Struggle for a New Constitutional Order* (London: Zed Books, Kindle Edition).

Abdul Raufu Mustapha, 2013, (ed.) *Conflicts and Security Sector Governance in West Africa* (Abuja: Altus Global Alliance).

Laurie Nathan and Monica Duffy Toft, 2011, "Civil War Settlements and the Prospects for Peace," *International Security*, 36, 1: 202-10.

Aley Soud Nassor and Jim Jose, 2014, "Power-Sharing in Zanzibar: From Zero-Sum Politics

to Democratic Consensus?,” *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 40, 2: 247-65.

*The Nation*, “Mugabe’s Grip on Defense Forces Main Problem in Power Talks,” December 20, 2009, [http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/dec21\\_2009.html](http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/dec21_2009.html) (accessed December 5, 2015).

Boubacar N’Diaye, 2009, “Francophone Africa and Security Sector Transformation: Plus Ça Change,” *African Security*, 2, 1: 1-28

Boubacar N’Diaye, Adboulaye Saine, and Mathurin C. Houngnikpo, 2005, *Not Yet Democracy: West Africa’s Slow Farewell to Authoritarianism* (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press).

Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011, “Reconstructing the Implications of Liberation Struggle History on SADC Mediation in Zimbabwe,” Southern African Institute of International Affairs, Occasional Paper No. 92.

---. 2006, “The Nationalist-Military Alliance and the Fate of Democracy in Zimbabwe,” *African Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 6, 1: 49-80.

*The New York Times*, “Robert Mugabe Hounds Rivals in Zimbabwe, Parties Say,” November 4, 2011, [http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/19/world/africa/19zimbabwe.html?\\_r=1&ref=zimbabwe](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/19/world/africa/19zimbabwe.html?_r=1&ref=zimbabwe) (accessed December 4, 2015).

---. “Two Vetoes Quash UN Sanctions on Zimbabwe,” July 12, 2008, [http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/12/world/africa/12zimbabwe.html?pagewanted=all&\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/12/world/africa/12zimbabwe.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0) (accessed December 18, 2014).

---. “France Sending Forces to Togo in Wake of Attack,” September 26, 1986, <http://www.nytimes.com/1986/09/26/world/france-sending-forces-to-togo-in-wake-of-attack.html> (accessed September 13, 2016).

*New Zimbabwe*, “Transcript: Mugabe’s Election Eve Press Conference,” July 30, 2013, <http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news11877Transcript+Mugabes+election+eve+press+brief/news.aspx> (accessed November 21, 2015).

Lionel Nichols, 2015, *The International Criminal Court and the End of Impunity in Kenya* (Cham: Springer).

Pippa Norris, 2008, *Driving Democracy: Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Alexander Noyes, 2013, “Securing Reform? Power Sharing and Civil-Security Relations in Kenya and Zimbabwe,” *African Studies Quarterly*, 13, 4: 27-52, <http://asq.africa.ufl.edu/files/Noyes-V13Is4.pdf> (accessed August 17, 2016).

Munyaradzi Nyakudya, "Sanctioning the Government of National Unity: A Review of Zimbabwe's Relations with the West in the Framework of the GPA," in Brian Raftopoulos, (ed.) *The Hard Road to Reform: The Politics of Zimbabwe's Global Political Agreement* (Harare: Weaver Press): 171-210.

Kathryn Nwajiaku, 1994, "The National Conferences in Benin and Togo Revisited," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 32, 3: 429-447.

Raila Odinga and Sarah Elderkin, 2013, *The Flame of Freedom* (Nairobi: Mountain Top, Kindle Edition).

Benjamin Okonofua 2015, "Democratic Governance in the 'New' Republic of Togo," in Claire Metelits and Stephanie Matti, (eds.) *Democratic Contestation on the Margins: Regimes in Small African Countries* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books): 85-98.

José A. Olmeda, 2013, "Escape from Huntington's Labyrinth: Civil-Military Relations and Comparative Politics," in Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations* (New York, NY: Routledge): 61-76.

Adams Oloo, 2010, "Marginalization and the Rise of Militias in Kenya," in Wafula Okumu and Augustine Ikelegbe, (eds.) *Militias, Rebels and Islamist Militants* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies): 147-181.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee, 2007, "The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice," 21, [http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/the-oecd-dac-handbook-on-security-system-reform\\_9789264027862-en](http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/the-oecd-dac-handbook-on-security-system-reform_9789264027862-en) (accessed November 19, 2015).

Anneke Osse, 2014, "Police Reform in Kenya: A Process of 'Muddling Through,'" *Policing and Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy*, 1-18.

Robert Peabody, Susan Webb Hammond, Jean Torcom, Lynne P. Brown, Carolyn Thompson, and Robin Kolodny, 1990, "Interviewing Political Elites," *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 23, 3: 451-455.

Gordon Peake, Eric Scheye and Alice Hills, 2006, "Introduction," *Civil Wars*, 8, 2: 83-6.

Frederic S. Pearson, Marie Olson Lounsbery, Scott Walker, and Sonja Mann, 2006, "Rethinking Models of Civil War Settlement," *International Interactions* 32, 2: 109-128.

Caryn Peiffer and Pierre Englebert, 2012, "Extraversion, Vulnerability To Donors, and Political Liberalization in Africa," *African Affairs*, 111, 444: 355-378.

Paul Pierson, 2004, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).

---. 2000, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics," *American Political Science Review*, 94, 2: 251-267.

Jonathan Powell, 2015, "Coups in the World, 1950-Present," <http://www.jonathanmpowell.com/coup-detat-dataset.html> (accessed November 23, 2015).

Ben Rawlence, 2005, "Briefing: The Zanzibar Election," *African Affairs*, 104, 416: 515-523.

Brian Raftopoulos, 2013, "An Overview of the Politics of the Global Political Agreement: National Conflict, Regional Agony, International Dilemma," in Brian Raftopoulos, (ed.) *The Hard Road to Reform: The Politics of Zimbabwe's Global Political Agreement* (Harare: Weaver Press): 1-38.

---. 2013, "The 2013 Elections in Zimbabwe: The End of an Era," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 39, 4: 971-988.

---. 2009, "The Crisis in Zimbabwe: 1998-2008," in Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo, (eds.) *Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-colonial Period to 2008* (Harare: Weaver Press): 201-232.

Terence Ranger, 2004, "Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation: the Struggle Over the Past in Zimbabwe," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 30, 2: 215-234.

Jacob Rasmussen, 2010, "Outwitting the Professor of Politics? Mungiki Narratives of Political Deception and their Role in Kenyan Politics," *Journal of Eastern Africa Studies*, 4, 3: 435-449.

Tyson Roberts, 2008, "The Legislative Election in Togo, October 2007," *Electoral Studies*, 27, 3: 558-561.

Robert Rotberg, 2012, *Transformative Political Leadership: Making a Difference in the Developing World* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press).

Donald Rothchild, 2005, "Reassuring Weaker Parties After Civil Wars: The Benefits and Costs of Executive Power-sharing Systems in Africa," *Ethnopolitics*, 4, 3: 247-67.

Donald Rothchild and Philip Roeder, 2005, "Power-sharing as an Impediment to Peace and Democracy," in Donald Rothchild and Philip Roeder, (eds.) *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press): 29-50.

Martin Rupiya, 2013, (ed.) *Zimbabwe's Military: Examining its Veto Power in the Transition to Democracy, 2008-2013* (Pretoria: Africa Public Policy and Research Institute).



Mutuma Ruteere, 2014, "Security and Human Rights in the New Constitutional Order in Kenya," in Godwin Murunga, Duncan Okello, and Anders Sjögren, (eds.) *Kenya: The Struggle for a New Constitutional Order* (London: Zed Books, Kindle Edition).

Sabastiano Rwengabo, 2012, "Regime Stability in Post-1986 Uganda: Counting the Benefits of Coup-Proofing," *Armed Forces & Society*, 39, 3: 534-35.

Nicholas Sambanis, 2004, "What Is Civil War?: Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 48, 6: 814-858.

Jennifer Seely, 2011, "Togo's Presidential Election 2010," *Electoral Studies*, 30, 2: 372-375.

---. 2009, *The Legacies of Transition Governments in Africa: The Cases of Benin and Togo* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan).

---. 2006, "The Unexpected Presidential Election in Togo, 2005," *Electoral Studies*, 25, 3: 611-616.

---. 2005, "The Legacies of Transition Governments: Post-Transition Dynamics in Benin and Togo," *Democratization*, 12, 3: 357-377.

Mark Sedra, 2010, "Introduction: The Future of Security Sector Reform," in Mark Sedra, (ed.) *The Future of Security Sector Reform* (Ontario: Centre for International Governance Innovation): 16-27.

Cris Shore, 2002, "Introduction: Towards and Anthropology of Elites," in Cris Shore and Stephen Nugent, (eds.) *Elite Cultures: Anthropological Perspectives* (London: Routledge): 1-21.

Solidarity Peace Trust, 2008, "Desperately Seeking Sanity: What Prospects for a New Beginning in Zimbabwe?," [http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/download/report-files/desperately\\_seeking\\_sanity.pdf](http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/download/report-files/desperately_seeking_sanity.pdf) (accessed December 23, 2015).

Roger Southall, 2013, *Liberation Movements in Power: Party and State in Southern Africa* (Suffolk: James Currey).

---. 2003, "An Unlikely Success South Africa and Lesotho's Election of 2002," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 41, 2: 269-296.

*Southern Times*, "Mugabe: In His Own Words," May 20, 2011, <http://southernafrican.news/2011/05/20/mugabe-in-his-own-words/> (accessed December 7, 2015).

Ian Spears, 2013, "Africa's Informal Power-Sharing and the Prospects for Peace," *Civil Wars*, 15, 1: 37-53.

---. 2002 "Africa: The Limits of Power-Sharing," *Journal of Democracy*, 13, 3: 123-36;

Stephen John Stedman, 2002, "Introduction," in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, (eds.) *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers): 1-40.

Austin Strange, Bradley Parks, Michael Tierney, Andreas Fuchs, Axel Dreher, and Vijaya Ramachandran, 2013, "China's Development Finance to Africa: A Media-Based Approach to Data Collection," Center for Global Development, Working Paper 323, <http://www.cgdev.org/publication/chinas-development-finance-africa-media-based-approach-data-collection> (accessed 1.26.2016).

Scott Straus and Charlie Taylor, 2012, "Democratization and Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2008," in Dorina Bekoe, (ed.) *Voting in Fear: Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace): 15-38.

"Symposium," 2002, *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 35, 4: 663-688.

*SW Radio Africa*, "MDC-T to Launch Independent Inquiry into Violence," May 6, 2011, [http://www.swradioafrica.com/News\\_archives/files/2011/May/Fri%2006%20May/lg-mdc-violence-and-party-response.html](http://www.swradioafrica.com/News_archives/files/2011/May/Fri%2006%20May/lg-mdc-violence-and-party-response.html) (accessed March 16, 2016).

Oisín Tansey, 2013, "Statebuilding and the Limits of Constitutional Design," in Mats Berdal and Dominik Zaum, (eds.) *Political Economy of Statebuilding: Power After Peace* (New York, NY: Routledge): 17-32.

---. 2007, "Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-probability Sampling," *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 40, 4: 765-772.

*The Telegraph*, "Morgan Tsvangirai Says Military Junta is Running Zimbabwe," March 11, 2011, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/8391196/Morgan-Tsvangirai-says-military-junta-is-running-Zimbabwe.html> (accessed December 4, 2015).

---. "Zimbabwean Generals Have 'Taken Robert Mugabe's Power,'" June 5, 2008, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/2080992/Zimbabwean-generals-have-taken-Robert-Mugabes-power.html> (accessed November 21, 2015).

Blessing-Miles Tendi, 2013, "Ideology, Civilian Authority and the Zimbabwean Military," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 39, 4: 829-43.

---. 2013, "Robert Mugabe's 2013 Presidential Election Campaign," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 39, 4: 963-70.

---. 2011, "Robert Mugabe and Toxicity: History and Context Matter," *Representation*, 47, 3: 307-318.

---. 2010, *Making History in Mugabe's Zimbabwe: Politics, Intellectuals and the Media* (Oxford: Peter Lang).

Kathleen Thelen, 1999, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2: 369-404.

David Throup and Charles Hornsby, 1998, *Multi-Party Politics in Kenya* (Oxford: James Currey).

*Time*, "Kenya's Police Chief Fired: The Start of Reform?," June 16, 2009, <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1921781,00.html#ixzz1MXkMtBRC> (accessed August 2, 2016).

Monica Duffy Toft, 2010, *Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).

Comi Toulabor, 2011, "Togo," in Alan Bryden, and Boubacar N'Diaye, (eds.) *Challenges of Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa: Realities and Opportunities* (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: LIT Verlag): 229-253.

---. 2008 "Togo," in Alan Bryden, Boubacar N'Diaye and 'Funmi Olonisakin, (eds.) *Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa* (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: LIT Verlag): 303-321.

David Towriss, 2013, "Buying Loyalty: Zimbabwe's Marange Diamonds," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 39, 1: 99-117.

Morgan Tsvangirai and T. William Bongo, 2011, *In the Deep End* (London: Eye Books).

Denis Tull and Andreas Mehler, 2005, "The Hidden Costs of Power-sharing: Reproducing Insurgent Violence in Africa," *African Affairs*, 104, 416: 375-398.

UFC, 2007, "Evaluation du Processus Électoral par l'UFC," <http://www.ufctogo.com/Evaluation-du-processus-electoral-1752.html> (accessed September 28, 2016).

*UN News Centre*, "Hundreds Died in Togolese Unrest, UN Says," September 26, 2005, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=15994> (accessed September 20, 2016).

United Nations Security Council, SC/8958, 5632nd Meeting, February 20, 2007, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc8958.doc.htm> (accessed February 11, 2014).

United Nations, 2009, "Report of Security Sector Reform Activities in Togo," UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, <http://www.agora->

parl.org/sites/default/files/UNREC\_Report\_on\_Security\_Sector\_Reform\_Activities\_in\_Togo.original.pdf (accessed October 3, 2016).

---. 2005, "Rapport: La Mission d'établissement des Faits Chargee de Faire la Lumiere sur les Violences et les Allegations de Violations des Droits de L'homme Survenues au Togo Avant, Pendant et Apres L'élection Presidentielle du 24 Avril 2005," Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/1709B169CF1E9C4EC1257097004CB185-ohchr-tgo-29aug.pdf> (accessed September 20, 2016).

US Department of State, 2015, "Human Rights Report: Togo," <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/252951.pdf> (accessed October 3, 2016).

---. 2013, "Zimbabwe's Presidential Election," <http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/08/212658.htm> (accessed October 17, 2016).

---. 2011, "2010 Human Rights Report: Togo," <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/af/154374.htm> (accessed October 3, 2016).

*Voice of America*, "Kenya Police Under Fire for Brutality," May 18, 2016, <http://www.voanews.com/a/kenya-police-under-fire-brutality/3335965.html> (accessed October 18, 2016).

---. "ICC: 4 Kenyans to Face Trial for Post-Election Violence," January 22, 2012, <http://www.voanews.com/content/icc-4-kenyans-to-face-trial-for-post-election-violence-137889033/151022.html> (accessed August 2, 2016).

Peter VonDoep, 2009, "The Leadership Variable in Africa: Situating Structure and Agency in Governance Trajectories," Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 4, Toronto.

Barbara Walter, 2002, *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).

*Washington Post*, "Inside Mugabe's Violent Crackdown," July 5, 2008, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/04/AR2008070402771.html> (accessed 11.21.2015).

---. "Togo's Ruler Aims to Create the Switzerland of Africa," June 15, 1980, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/09/AR2006080901228.html> (accessed September 12, 2016).

Claude Welch, 1970, *Soldier and State in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political Change* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press).

Nina Wilen, 2012, *Justifying Interventions in Africa: (De)Stabilizing Sovereignty in Liberia, Burundi, and the Congo* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan).

World Bank, 2016, "Development Indicators," <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators> (accessed July 3, 2016).

---. 2015, "Kenya," <http://data.worldbank.org/country/kenya> (accessed July 3, 2016).

---. 2015, "Lesotho," <http://data.worldbank.org/country/lesotho?view=chart> (accessed October 29, 2016).

---. 2015, "Togo," <http://data.worldbank.org/country/togo> (accessed July 3, 2016).

---. 2015, "Zimbabwe," <http://data.worldbank.org/country/zimbabwe> (accessed July 3, 2016).

---. 2010, World Integrated Trade Solution, "Togo Trade Summary 2006-2010," <http://data.worldbank.org/country/togo> (accessed July 21, 2016).

---. 2013, World Integrated Trade Solution, Kenya Trade Summary 2009-2013, <http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/KEN/Year/2013/Summarytext> (accessed July 21, 2016).

---. 2013, World Integrated Trade Solution, "Zimbabwe Trade Summary 2009-2013," <http://wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/en/ZWE/textview> (accessed August 3, 2016).

Paul Williams, 2003, *War and Conflict in Africa* (Cambridge: Polity).

Zimbabwe Institute, 2008, "The Security-Military Business Complex and the Transition in Zimbabwe."

*Zim Eye*, "Bloody Coup Looms in Zimbabwe, Top Analysts Say," September 4, 2014, <http://www.zimeye.com/military-coup-looms-in-zimbabwe-top-analysts-say/> (accessed 11.21.2015).

#### Elite Interviews (by country):

##### **Zimbabwe**

Anonymous, senior Zimbabwean official who worked with the three negotiation teams in 2008 as well as the Mbeki and Zuma SADC facilitation teams throughout the GNU, Harare, Zimbabwe, March 2, 2015.

Anonymous, colonel in the Zimbabwean military and ZANLA veteran, Harare, Zimbabwe, March 8, 2015.

Anonymous, ZANLA and CIO veteran, Harare, Zimbabwe, March 5, 2015.

Tendai Biti, minister of finance in the GNU and head MDC-T negotiator in 2008, Harare, Zimbabwe, February 23, 2015.

Jeremy Brickhill, ZIPRA veteran and head of the Zimbabwe Peace and Security Trust, a nongovernmental organization that engaged the parties and the state on security sector transformation under the GNU, Harare, Zimbabwe, December 9, 2014.

Nelson Chamisa, MDC-T minister of information communication technology and spokesperson for the party under the GNU, Harare, Zimbabwe, April 1, 2011.

Emmanuel Chimwanda, former assistant police commissioner, former MDC-T security advisor, Harare, Zimbabwe, December 16, 2014.

Patrick Chinamasa, minister of finance and head ZANU-PF negotiator in 2008, Harare, Zimbabwe, February 27, 2015.

Patience Chiradza, national director for the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee under the GNU, Harare, Zimbabwe, December 5, 2014.

Knox Chitiyo, fellow, Africa Program, Chatham House, former head of the Africa Programme, Royal United Services Institute, phone interview, March 18, 2011.

David Coltart, former minister of education in the GNU, phone interview, November 26, 2014.

Fortune Gwaze, former MDC-T technical advisor during the 2008 negotiations, Harare, Zimbabwe, November 28, 2014.

Titus Gwemende, program manager, Transparency International Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe, March 31, 2011.

Sekai Holland, co-minister of national healing, reconciliation and integration in the GNU, Harare, Zimbabwe, December 9, 2014.

Saviour Kasukuwere, minister of youth development, indigenization and empowerment in the GNU, Harare, Zimbabwe, March 5, 2015.

Morgan Komichi, deputy chairperson, MDC-T, Harare, Zimbabwe, December 12, 2014.

Thokozani Khupe, deputy prime minister in the GNU, vice president of MDC-T, Harare, Zimbabwe, December 15, 2014.

Paul Madzore, chair of the home affairs and defense portfolio committee in parliament, Harare, Zimbabwe, March 31, 2011.

Jessie Majome, deputy minister of justice and legal affairs in the GNU, Harare, Zimbabwe, March 30, 2011.

Ian Makone, former chief advisor in the Office of the Prime Minister, Harare, Zimbabwe, December 4, 2014.

Theresa Makone, former co-minister of home affairs under the GNU, Harare, Zimbabwe, December 12, 2014.

Ibbo Mandaza, executive director, Southern African Political Economic Series Trust, former ZANU-PF official, Harare, Zimbabwe, December 3, 2014.

Elton Mangoma, MDC-T representative to JOMIC and negotiator in 2008, minister of energy and power development under the GNU, Harare, Zimbabwe, February 26, 2015.

Charles Mangongera, former director of research and policy, MDC-T, Harare, Zimbabwe, November 24, 2014.

Paul Mangwana, head of ZANU-PF team to the Constitution Parliamentary Select Committee, Harare, Zimbabwe, February 25, 2015.

Priscilla Misihairabwi-Mushonga, 2008 negotiator for MDC-M and minister of regional integration and international cooperation in the GNU, Harare, Zimbabwe, March 6, 2015.

Lovemore Moyo, MDC-T national chairperson, speaker of parliament during the GNU, ZIPRA veteran, Harare, Zimbabwe, December 13, 2014.

Thabani Mpfu, former head of research and development, Office of the Prime Minister, Harare, Zimbabwe, November 25, 2014.

Earnest Mudzengi, executive director, The Media Center, former director of the National Constitutional Assembly, Harare, Zimbabwe, April 1, 2011.

Gandhi Mudzingwa, former security advisor to Prime Minister Tsvangirai, Harare, Zimbabwe, November 21, 2014.

Elias Mudziri, minister of energy in the GNU, Harare, Zimbabwe, December 10, 2014.

Sydney Mufamadi, head of Mbeki's South African facilitation team during the 2008 negotiations, Johannesburg, South Africa, March 10, 2015.

Arthur Mutambara, deputy prime minister in the GNU, former president of MDC-M, Harare, Zimbabwe, December 4, 2014.

Giles Mutsekwa, former co-minister of home affairs under the GNU, Mutare, Zimbabwe, March 7, 2015.

Christopher Mutsvangwa, minister of war veterans, deputy minister of foreign affairs under the GNU, Harare, Zimbabwe, March 4, 2015.

James Muzondidya, research manager, Zimbabwe Institute, Harare, Zimbabwe, March 31, 2011.

Douglas Mwonzora, head of MDC-T team to Constitution Parliamentary Select Committee, Harare, Zimbabwe, December 12, 2014.

Welshman Ncube, former deputy prime minister and leader of MDC-N, Harare, Zimbabwe, December 14, 2014.

Wilson William Nharingo, program manager, Zimbabwe Liberators Platform, ZANLA veteran, Harare, Zimbabwe, December 9, 2014.

Charles Ray, former US ambassador to Zimbabwe, Washington, DC, January 15, 2015.

Tony Reeler, former director the Research and Advocacy Unit, nongovernmental organization, Harare, Zimbabwe, December 2, 2014.

Pedzisai Ruhanya, former program manager, Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, Harare, March 29, 2011.

Martin Rupiya, former MDC-T advisor on security, former Rhodesian soldier, Johannesburg, South Africa, February 19, 2015.

Megan Shortridge, political officer, US Embassy, Harare, Zimbabwe, March 30, 2011.

Jameson Timba, minister of state in the prime minister's office during the GNU and alternate MDC-T negotiator in 2008, Harare, Zimbabwe, December 8, 2014.

Morgan Tsvangirai, former prime minister of Zimbabwe and president of MDC-T, Harare, Zimbabwe, December 5, 2014.

D. Bruce Wharton, former US ambassador to Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe, December 2, 2014.

Roseline Zigomo, former principal director of rights and interest, Office of the Prime Minister, Harare, Zimbabwe, March 29, 2011.

## **Kenya**

Anonymous, former senior ODM official, May 15, 2015.

Anonymous, journalist, former ODM official, May 15, 2015.



Anonymous senior IPOA official, Nairobi, Kenya, April 23, 2015.

Anonymous, senior member of ODM negotiating team and former minister, Nairobi, Kenya, May 5, 2015.

Wilson Boinett, former director of NSIS, Nairobi, Kenya, April 22, 2015.

John Campbell, senior fellow for Africa policy studies, Council on Foreign Relations, former US ambassador to Nigeria, New York, NY, December 28, 2011.

Edward Clay, former British high commissioner to Kenya, Oxford, England, January 20, 2011.

Wendy Dougherty, program manager, US Office of Antiterrorism Assistance, US Embassy, Nairobi, Kenya, April 4, 2011.

Comfort Ero, Africa director, International Crisis Group, London, England, May 7, 2015.

Andrew Franklin, managing director, Franklin Management Consultants, security consultancy, Nairobi, Kenya, May 2, 2015.

Jendayi Frazer, former US assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Washington, DC, February 4, 2015.

Dennis Galava, former managing editor, *The Nation*, Nairobi, Kenya, April 26, 2015.

Christopher Gitari, head of Kenya office, International Center for Transitional Justice, Nairobi, Kenya, May 4, 2015.

Hassan Omar Hassan, former commissioner at the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, Nairobi, Kenya, April 4, 2011.

J. Anthony Holmes, deputy to the commander for civil-military activities, US Africa Command, phone interview, February 25, 2011.

Wanjohi Kabukuru, journalist, Nairobi, Kenya, April 20, 2015.

Peter Kagwanja, former senior advisor to Kibaki, Nairobi, Kenya, April 28, 2015.

Tom Kagwe, formerly head of research, Kenya Human Rights Commission, board member, Independent Policing Oversight Authority, Nairobi, Kenya, April 6, 2011.

Musambayi Katumanga, professor, University of Nairobi, April 30, 2015.

Gichira Kibara, former permanent secretary of Kenya's Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion, and Constitutional Affairs; member of the Party of National Unity's 2008 negotiating team, Nairobi, Kenya, May 4, 2015.

David Kimaiyo, former inspector general, Kenya National Police Service, Nairobi, Kenya, April 27, 2015.

Guyo Liban, senior officer for peacebuilding, National Cohesion and Integration Commission, Nairobi, Kenya, April 4, 2011.

Murshid Mohamed, commissioner, National Police Service Commission, Nairobi, Kenya, April 18, 2015.

Samuel Mohochi, human rights lawyer and former director of the Independent Medico-Legal Unit, a nongovernmental organization, Nairobi, Kenya, April 4, 2011.

Courtenay Morris, lead for the US Security Governance Initiative, US Embassy, Nairobi, Kenya, April 28, 2015.

Kenneth Mpyisi, director, Institute for Security Studies, Nairobi, Kenya, April 7, 2011.

Haron Ndubi, director of Haki Focus, nongovernmental organization, Nairobi, Kenya, April 7, 2011.

Peter Nyong'o, secretary general of ODM and minister of medical services in the GCG, Nairobi, Kenya, April 24, 2015.

Odour Ong'wen, member of the GCG's Police Reforms Implementation Committee, Nairobi, Kenya, April 4, 2011.

Caroli Omondi, chief of staff in the Office of the Prime Minister, member of ODM mediation team in 2008, Nairobi, Kenya, April 29, 2015.

Dickson Omondi, country director, National Democratic Institute, Nairobi, Kenya, April 21, 2015.

Felix Odhiambo, country director, Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa, Nairobi, Kenya, April 30, 2011.

Philip Ransley, former Kenyan justice, head of National Task Force on Police Reforms, Nairobi, Kenya, May 5, 2015.

Mutuma Ruteere, director, Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies, Nairobi, April 4, 2011.

J. Olang Sana, chairman, Citizens Against Violence, nongovernmental organization, Nairobi, Kenya, April 8, 2011

Roba Sheramo, head of the Conflict Prevention Program, Institute for Security Studies, Nairobi, Kenya, April 5, 2011.

Helaena White, political officer in charge of police reforms portfolio, US Embassy, Nairobi, Kenya, April 6, 2011.

Michela Wrong, journalist, Oxford, England, January 20, 2011.

## **Togo**

Komi Adogli, translator, US Embassy, Lomé, Togo, July 10, 2013.

Yawovi Agboyibo, prime minister of the unity government from 2006-2007, president of CAR, and a negotiator in the 2006 APG mediation, Lomé, Togo, June 24, 2015.

Ekoutiamé Ahlin, co-coordinator of academic affairs, Center for Research and Opinion Polls, Lomé, Togo, June 15, 2015.

Paul Amegakpo, head of the CNSC, Lomé, Togo, July 1, 2015. Interview conducted by my research assistant in Togo, Ekoutiamé Ahlin.

William Andrews, political officer, French Embassy, Lomé, Togo, June 22, 2015.

Gabriel Sassouvi Anyron, former UFC official, minister of culture, Lomé, Togo, June 18, 2015.

Ogamo Bagnah, RPT/UNIR “elder,” former minister of interior, and member of the CVJR, Lomé, Togo, June 29, 2015.

Kamissa Camara, senior program officer, National Endowment for Democracy, Washington, DC, June 11, 2015.

Rossi Ezi Dantodji, director, Ministry of Reform of the State and Modernization of the Administration, Lomé, Togo, June 25, 2015.

Maxime Domegni, editor in chief, *L'Aternative*, Lomé, Togo, June 26, 2015.

Francis Ekon, president of CPP, participated in 2006 APG negotiations, Lomé, Togo, June 19, 2015.

Jean-Pierre Fabre, former secretary general of the UFC, president of the ANC, Lomé, Togo, June 26, 2015.

Alexandre Giraldez, EU political counselor, Lomé, Togo, June 16, 2015.

Koffi Gozo, consultant, political refugee, Lomé, Togo, July 10, 2013.

Simon Hankinson, deputy chief of mission, US Embassy, Lomé, Togo, July 10, 2013.

Sambiani Pierre Jimongou, member of parliament, UFC official, Lomé, Togo, June 20, 2015.

Gerard Kerebel, defence attaché and head of Defence Cooperation, French Embassy, Lomé, Togo, June 30, 2015.

Zidol Kokou, former member of UFC, now NID (the Nest) party official, Lomé, Togo, June 18, 2015.

Douti Kombate Kolani, UFC member of parliament, Lomé, Togo, June 19, 2015.

Seveamenou Dra Kossi, member of parliament, ANC, Lomé, Togo, June 18, 2015.

Leonardo Lara, political affairs officer, UNREC, Lomé, Togo, July 11, 2013.

Gilchrist Olympio, former president of Togo's main opposition party, the UFC, Lomé, Togo, June 20, 2015.

Nicolas Berlanga Martinez, EU ambassador to Togo, Lomé, Togo, June 16, 2015.

Kako Nubukpo, minister of long-term strategy and evaluation, Lomé, Togo, June 22, 2015.

Lare Penn, UNIR member of parliament and first secretary in the National Assembly, Lomé, Togo, June 17, 2015.

Aboubaker Tanai, director of cabinet, Ministry of Reform of the State and Modernization of the Administration, Lomé, Togo, June 25, 2015.

Sambiri N'wakin Targone, PDP member of parliament, Lomé, Togo, June 18, 2015.

Ouro-Bossi Tchacondoh, chairman of COPED, nongovernmental organization, former member of parliament, Lomé, Togo, July 7, 2013.

Koffi Toussah, former chairman of COPED, nongovernmental organization, Lomé, Togo, June 19, 2015.

Robert Whitehead, former US ambassador to Togo, Lomé, Togo, June 22, 2015.