b) The Jadgals are particularly "conservative" in other ways also (e.g. language, lineage-villages, etc. see above), and they are relatively recent immigrants.

4. The property of the dynastic families is overwhelmingly in land rather than livestock and their income comes mainly from the peasants (though for loyalty and physical strength they used to depend largely on the nomadic pastoralists). In the Baluch Period they coveted fixed strategic positions in the form of forts in centres of particular agricultural importance. The pattern of land ownership and inheritance among them has been adapted to their new position as the ruling élite of the society, but still their group and class identity, on which they largely depend for their continued status, does not depend primarily on the geographical distribution of the land they own. They have not become tied to distinct, individual oases of cultivation. In their new situation at the top of a new composite society their material wealth changed from mobile livestock to fixed land, and they adopted the indigenous inheritance practice for transmitting the ownership of this new type of property from generation to generation while by the same means allying themselves almost inextricably with each other into a closely knit "superstructure" of the type which Parsons (1964: 162-3) sees as necessary for any degree of political stability in a society based on scattered peasant villages. But in making this adaptation they did not completely lose their "nomadic ethic" (in fact, not being of Baluch origin themselves in most cases, they "adopted" the old traditional Baluch epic poetry corpus) and although each chief normally has one main centre where his authority is greatest, the new fixed agricultural property, purely by the mode in which it is transmitted and continually redistributed by inheritance and marriage practices, has become a major factor in keeping the dynastic families on the move.

Finally, the marriage preference for a "cousin", particularly a first cousin, and the rule that a girl must never marry below her own social status makes for the formation of a "princely caste", for it is practically impossible for anyone to marry into a dynastic family unless

he holds comparative status elsewhere - i.e. is of another dynastic family or another line of the same family which has remained "dynastic", or is a first cousin and so is close enough related to share in the status of his prospective father-in-law. The rules of inheritance and bride price reinforce this situation. Furthermore, since this leaves a quite restricted field, it is often very desirable to marry into another dynastic family, and so the group identity not only of the individual dynastic family, but of the dynastic family class, is reinforced. The history of the marriage alliances of the European royal families shows a similar situation.

Footnotes

1. For completeness I give also here the Jadgālī terminology, in use where Jadgālī is spoken in Dashtiārī. Jadgālī is also an Indo-Aryan language, but being a corruption of Sindhi is closer to Urdu than to Baluchi or Persian, and distinguishes gender. The terms are:

pe - F; ma - M; cokara - S; cokari - D; ba - S; bin - S; kaku - FB; mamu - MB; goki - FZ; masi - MZ; raru - FF; rari - FM; namu - MF; nani - MM; rot - male grandchild; potaru - female grandchild; natu - SS; nanij - SD; sot - FBS/D; masat - MZS/D; mart - H; hart - W; aha - SW; sahuro - father-in-law; sas - mother-in-law; der - brother-in-law; dokaīc - sister-in-law (as in Baluchi). In addition to these, for grooms, MM and MM they say jān tru = Baluchi "aunt's darling"; and when speaking Baluchi they use nāku to mean father-in-law and wasark to mean brother-in-law. This terminology is then more extensive and descriptive than the Baluchi terminology. It is significant that in Dashtiārī (i.e. in the Jadgāl area) a number of villages (bāzār) have names ending in "-zai" and are therefore almost certainly in origin lineage settlements. This is in fact what we should expect if our argument so far has been correct. The Jadgāls should have entered the Province, like the Baluch, organised into groups of the lineage type with an emphasis on agnatic descent as a criterion for membership of the group. That being so it would be natural, when they spread out over their new area and split up into small territorially fixed groups, for each group to be known by its lineage name - particularly in an area which was not settled beforehand and was very poor in topographical features which might provide ready handles for place names. And this is exactly what we find: with very few exceptions which can mostly be easily explained, all the settlements which take their water for irrigation from the floods of the Nāju, all of which are Jadgāl, have names which must originally have been lineage names.

The retention of a different language, which gives daily expression to different concepts, may be expected to have kept the Jadgāls distinct from the surrounding population in certain respects of social organisation. This has in fact been the case, and the various aspects in which they do

differ will be dealt with as they occur in the discussion of the general Baluch system. (Cf. also the philological "Notes on the List of Terms of Relationship" and "Bilingual statement of terms of Relationship in the various languages spoken in Baluchistan" in Morgenstierne, 1948: 285ff.)

2. The actual forms of the terms as quoted here belong to the Sarawānī dialect.

Aspects of Class, Age and Sex

I

There are no true rites de passage in the life cycle of the Baluch. That is to say, there are no ceremonies or rituals marking points in a person's life by which he passes from one status to another and which have any function for the integration of the society, - with the exception perhaps of marriage in the case of women.

Boys are circumcised at any time between the ages of approximately seven years and seven years. When the father can afford it this will be celebrated with music and food for the community at his expense. It is at about the age of seven that boys begin to sit in the men's diwān and learn how to be men. They must be quiet and inconspicuous, and are liable to be treated as servants by any man of equal or higher birth. They will tend to sit either just inside the door - where the servants sit, or near an uncle. Outside, they tend to be most intimate with their cousins, with whom they have roughly equal status opportunities in adult life. Any eventual differences in status between them depend largely on their individual personal aptitudes. For this reason their relationships with each other vary from extremely close and intimate friendship to open and obstinate rivalry, and their games and past times are to a very large extent tests of precocious "Balochness". Most important of all, they must be daddī - physically fit and skilful, and brave. Girls, on the other hand, must be feminine,, softly spoken and learn their womanly tasks.

II

The degree of segregation and distinction between the sexes varies between two extremes: among the Baluch the women are quite free within the immediate environment of the camp, and may even entertain guests in the absence of the menfolk; in some of the dynastic families, particularly in the south

ly and among the Sheikhs, a married woman of high status never leaves the
's part of the house, and sees no men besides her husband, brothers,
, and perhaps one or two male *ghulāms* - but these will usually have
the same milk as babies and therefore be *mahram* (cf. Spooner, 1965a :
).

However, in all situations a high degree of sexual and social
is observed and a young woman will normally cover her face with her
in the presence of a stranger, and will on no account show her hair.
body, arms and legs are efficiently covered by her long voluminous shift.
also avoid showing their bodies - except in the case of low class labourers,
they will never uncover themselves completely even to bathe. Young boys
allowed to wander about quite naked before they arrive at the age where
start sitting with the men, but even the smallest infant girl will be
t covered. However, properly dressed, the Baluch baby girl is allowed and
encouraged to show considerable coquetry upto the age of about five,
hich she is fully occupied with the woman's part of life and assumes
olemn modesty.

This requirement of a high degree of modesty, and the limits put on
ir movements, obviously confines the social role of women - despite the
t that as a result of the rules of inheritance and *mahr* described in the
st chapter they can be technically considerable landowners. A further
miting factor is the conception of feminine beauty, which includes a large
ount of jewelry - particularly numerous earrings, graceful movement and a
y smooth gait. They dye their hair black - if it is not already black,
turns grey. They do not like fair or red or curly hair. They use gum
ragcanth to keep their hair tidy and straight. As young girls they like
ight coloured material - particularly red, but soon after they start bearing
ildren they turn to black for everything except the embroidery (in which
usually predominates) on the bodice and long front pockets of their shifts.
is thus seldom that one sees a woman over about twenty five wearing anything
t black.

Except in the nomadic Baluch communities the women tend to lead a quite separate life from the men, and they are proud of this. Their main aim in life is to have as many sons as possible, and it is comparatively rare that they play any significant political role. Similarly, it is rare that they administer their own property. They are not specifically excluded from these activities, but the limitations on their movements make it practically impossible at least until they achieve the respectable status of "matron" when they are approaching the age of 30 at the very least. By this time they will, so to speak have played out the greater part of their "woman's" life - that is, they will have born a number of children, and be no longer sexually attractive. Although examples are relatively rare, it will be useful to illustrate by a few examples how women of this age and of high social status can play a larger social or political role.

The first example is Gol Bībī, the wife of Shahsewār who flourished during and after the First World War. Dyer (1921, chapters 8 and 9) is the main source, though stories are still told of her. Dyer gives her credit for being the strongest personality in the Sarhadd at that time. She scolded the chiefs (including her husband) and entertained General Dyer in her own tent, even exchanging presents with him.

A second example is Murād Khātun, the sister of the late Dust Muhammad Khān Barakzai, the widowed wife of Dīn Muhammad Khān Sardārzai, who lives in Rāsk, and owns considerable property in Dashtiārī which came to her as mahr when her husband died. She keeps an independent household in Rāsk, and collects her lands in Dashtiārī yearly. However, unlike Gol Bībī, she manages to do this without entering the society of men: she is seldom, if ever, seen by men other than very close relatives and perhaps (though I was unable to ascertain this for certain) a few male ghulāms. She has several female slaves (mauled). When she leaves Rāsk she travels in a closed camel litter (kajāwa). It is impossible to be certain of her age, but judging from the probable age of her sons she must be, at the very least, in her middle sixties.

wife was privileged to be entertained by her in Rāsk in July 1964, and found her dressed entirely in white and attended by mauleds who also sang and danced. His example is particularly interesting because it comes from an area where women of her class are normally completely secluded, so that it is much more difficult for them to play a significant social role.

Thirdly, Muhammad Amīn Khān Bārakzai's full sister, the wife of Mehrāb Khān Murādzai in Paskuh is the close confidant of her brother in most of his activities. It is perhaps also significant to notice that neither this lady nor her two half sisters by the same father have any co-wives (hamak). And it is legitimate to assume - it is certainly said by the Baluch - that they have been able by force of personality to dissuade or prevent their husbands from taking additional wives.

III

The other social category which must be discussed here is the ghulām (male: mauled). The word is Arabic, and has been used throughout Islam to mean what may best be translated as "slave". An account of its historical development as a sociological category particularly in eastern Islam is given by Bosworth (Enc. Is.: Art. "Ghulām"). Its use in Baluchi is directly derived from its general Islamic use, and differs probably only insofar as the structure of Baluch society differs from the better known historical eastern Islamic societies for which Bosworth describes it. Among the Baluch a ghulām has no property rights, and has no place in any community except as his master's man. Before 1928 he was "legally" his master's property. His master would have acquired him by purchase, exchange, inheritance or capture, and had the power of life and death over him. In the Sarhadd many ghulāms were of Persian or other Iranian or Turkish origin, but further south they mostly entered the Sarhadd through the Muscadine ports of Chāhbahār or Gwādar and were of negroid origin. When ghulāms were freed by law after the 1928 campaign, those of Iranian northern origin could return to their homes. Even if they could not return it was possible for them to assume Baluch (but not Baluch) status

where in the Province, given initiative. The negroid ghulāms, however, were prevented from changing their status within the Province by their colour and general appearance. A similar colour bar prevented them from moving into Persia, and their retreat to their place of origin - even if they could remember where it had been - was cut off by the sea. As a result ghulāms in the Province today are almost exclusively negroid or of very dark complexion. A typical ghulām also has little or no facial hair.

During the Baluch Period the ghulām was normally employed in one of three ways: armed retainer of a chief (tofangchī), agricultural serf or labourer, or personal attendant (cf. celmār in chapter 4). Since the Baluch Period, obviously, the first of these occupations has disappeared, and the third has increased in numbers because of the effects on the chiefs' income and standard of living. It seems almost certain that because of these factors the total number of ghulāms in the Province has decreased considerably, and it seems likely that the surplus has emigrated permanently to Karachi and the south side of the Gulf, where in the more fluid social structure of city life they at least find a living as coolie labour.

Whereas in the Baluch Period besides chiefs, Baluch and Jadgāls often had ghulāms, the ownership of the ghulām population of the Province today is, so far as I could ascertained confined to chiefs and the two Sheikhzāda communities (Mīgwar and Dalgān, cf. chapters 2 and 4) in Dashtiārī. Owing to the fact that they cannot intermarry with Baluch and their numbers have not been increased by importation since 1928 at least[1] they are now all closely related, so that there is in fact more basis for refering to the category of ghulām as a gāt than would at first seem likely. However, it should be remembered that the proper criterion for membership of a particular gāt is matrilineal descent from a common ancestor, although (as we have argued above, chapter 9) in the social structure as it functions at present this is an ideal one, and perhaps the practice of refering to ghulāms as a gāt should be seen in this light. It should also be noted that it is up to the master to find a wife (gwaled) for his ghulām. This he may be able to do from his

'stock", or alternatively from that of another owner. As far as the ...ing of the actual wedding is concerned, all that is entailed is a present ...a couple of dresses to the mauled. However, although the ghulām has to ...nde his master to provide him with a wife, the master gets little ...fit from the marriage unless he also owns the wife. He seems to perform ...favour rather as a moral duty, and, perhaps, a reward for long service. ...any offspring from the union are the property of the mother's master.

Certain other aspects of the ghulām as a type kept within a definite ...cial category within the society may be seen against the background of these ...ctors which determine his role independently of his character or aptitude. ...instance: whereas a Baluch (and, even more so, a Baluch) should be stern ...laconic (sangīn = lit. "heavy") except among intimates, and show a strong ...se of moral and social responsibility, the ghulām tends to be a garrulous ...ndian, and is generally characterised as taking no thought for the ...nsequences of his actions. Thus:

... In a narrow shēp high in the Makrān range between Dashtiārī and Bog, ...ed on either side by dense clumps of palmetto (dās) where we stopped to ...p one night on the way from Dashtiārī to Bog with Mīr Maulādād Sardārsai, ...dān - one of his intimate ghulāms - set light to a clump of dās. There ...s no moon and the night was pitch black. The normal way of providing light ...uld have been to light dry fronds of dās in succession and hold them as a ...rch. By lighting a clump in situ he ensured near daylight for some time, ...the palmettoes were all very dry (it was May) and the flames spread fast ...on one side of the shēp below us and threatened to spread to the other side. ...here was little water. With great difficulty we managed to extinguish ...e blaze. If we had not succeeded, we should soon have been surrounded by ...aging inferno, and though we ourselves would almost certainly have managed ...escapein time, the camels would no doubt have been roasted. It had been ...very foolish thing to do. Once the situation had returned to normal, ...ullādād's only comment was "what do you expect from a ghulām?".

together with the ghulām's general air of irresponsibility goes ready
ulness and helpfulness. From Bahu Kalāt I insisted on visiting Garmēn
, a settlement on the Masan Kaur in the mountains between Rāsk and Bāhu.
ulām and camel were arranged for me by my host, who incidentally could not
erstand why I should insist on going there for, as far as he could see,
very good reason, and especially since I wanted to make the trip there and
in a day. It must have been over 80 kms. there and back and in parts
terrain was difficult. It wasobvious in the end that they were providing
with the facilities in order to see whether the Englishman was up to it.
would like to think an Englishman was (they knew a Persian certainly was
), but they would always have been willing to give me the benefit of the
t because of my "status" and would not have set out deliberately to test me.
ever, in the circumstances, having made sure I realised how "uncomfortable"
I was letting myself in for they provided me with a ghulām and a camel
let me go. It was arranged that the ghulām should wake me half way through
night so that we might be able to get there and back before the hot part
the day. In fact by the time the ghulām woke me it was nearly dawn. What
more, the weather looked unsettled. It would perhaps have been wiser not
go, but by now "face" was involved, and I set out. After we had entered
mountains and were about half way there was a sudden, heavy, cloud burst.
rain was so heavy that not only did we have to stop, but it would have been
ish not to seek shelter of some sort. We were in the broad bed of the
an Kaur. The banks were steep and there was little vegetation. We made
a solitary tree and drew ourselves in between the spined suckers which
rounded it, despite the frequent lightning and deafening thunder. After
half anhour the rain became less heavy and we moved on. Already the river
s rising fast, and where there had been one easily fordable stream meandering
ough the bed there were now two or three. We had to ford the river several
es, each time with more difficulty. At several points we thought we were
ff from both Garmēn Rūd and Bāhu Kalāt, for in parts there was no path
ept through the river bed. However, eventually we arrived at about 8.30.a.m.
mpleted what I had come to do in an hour and a half and we arrived back
Bāhu Kalāt at 1.30.p.m. - much to the surprise and relief of my hosts who
n they saw the rain and the river wished they had never let me go and were sure

stranded somewhere without food or shelter, which would have been a
se for them.

y reason for relating this personal story is this: although I had
the greater part of the way, for at least two thirds of the way,
se of the difficulty of the terrain, the ghulām had not. Furthermore,
of the time when he was not riding, he had had to trot, if not run, to
up, and test deep fast torrents to find fords for the camel. Even on
ish standards it was an exhausting and difficult trip, and he knew that
own people thought it a waste of time. But throughout the trip he was
ful, considerate and cheerful.

For each of my trips into Salāh Kuh I was considered to be the guest of
Mīraksai line in Ērafshān. For each trip I was allotted a ghulām.
hān consists of a number of qēlas strung down either side of the Shahri
over a distance of about two miles. One of these qēlas consists
ly of the dynastic family and their ghulāms and a few other hangers-on
g. a mullā). According to Mīrzā Khān all these ghulāms before 1928
ived wages and rifles from the chief. They now live as serfs on the
f's land. The family of one of the ghulāms who was alletted to me in
s way had emigrated to Sind. One year while I was in Ērafshān a brother
rned to Ērafshān to find a wife from his own people. In Sind he was not
ghulām in Ērafshān he was. He married a "cousin", and inthe normal way
ved in Ērafshān about a year after the wedding, even thoughhe was very
ppy about his status there.

A ghulām whose father was a tofangchī in the service of Dust Muhammad
Mīraksai and was killed in the campaign of 1928 at Desak has got himself
ployed as a local school teacher by the Ministry of Education, and by dint of
s own energy and initiative has opened two new government schools, one
Lahār and one in Ērafshān. In this way he has made a considerable
utation for himself, but in a Baluch gathering he is still a ghulām, i.e.
s status with the Administration and his education make no difference to
s Baluch social status.

One of Muhammad Amīn's favourite ghulāms, Sāleh, was settled by him on
an ono-qanāt village (Kekkī, near Āsher) which was started by Muhammad Amīn
Afrāsīāb Khān together approximately ten years ago. He lives off Muhammad
Amīn's share of the produce of the land and serves as Muhammad Amīn's
representative there. Owing to the drought and the fact that for some time
repair work had been carried out on the qanāt the water supply dwindled
and the produce was barely enough to keep Sāleh, let alone provide an income
for Muhammad Amīn. In May 1963 I spent a week in Kekkī, and it was naturally
understood that I was Muhammad Amīn's guest; in theory Sāleh would be feeding
part of Muhammad Amīn's share of the produce. It was only after I left
that I ascertained that although it was only some six weeks after the harvest
they had less than a week's supply of grain left. Apart from this their
capital consisted of a bull worth approximately £10, two donkeys - one male
which would be barely saleable and one female which might fetch £20-£25 and
nothing else. No attempt whatever had been made to let me know of their
embarrassment - if anything, it had been purposely concealed from me. The
ghulām had been perfectly loyal to his master (in his absence) and to
Arab standards of hospitality.

In the following year Sāleh went to Muhammad Amīn in Sarāvān to tell
him that the water supply was not enough to provide him with a living, and he
would have to leave if it was not increased (i.e. if Muhammad Amīn did not
invest further capital in the qanāt). Muhammad Amīn did nothing for a year.
Sāleh stayed. Even so (and probably even if Sāleh had not stayed) no
difference was made to the personal relationship between the master and
his ghulām.

Once a relationship of personal intimacy and loyalty has been built up
between any two people of the same or different "class" it will stand an enormous
amount of negligence of mutual obligation before it dissolves. This is of
course especially the case between a ghulām and a chief since the ghulām
can only lose by leaving the chief - unless he can find another master. However,
the degree of stability in such relationships is much less when it is a question
of the delegation of power.

For those ghulāms who have stayed in the Province therefore, little has changed since the Baluch period, except that they can no longer be tafangchī, and on the other hand if they wish to leave their masters they cannot be physically stopped. The main Baluch complaint in the new situation is that if they kill a ghulām the Administration takes blood for blood.

IV

It may be stated as a general rule that a man's social (as distinct from political) status increases with age up until the onset of senility, when although some respect will still be shown him he will be thought of as rather a nuisance.

There is nothing in the Baluch conception of death or in their funeral customs that contradicts general popular Islamic practice (for which cf. Smedfrey-Demombynes, 1950: 171-3). Death, at any age, is "God's will", whether it be by old age, illness or accident, and as such differs little from other adverse natural phenomena like droughts or epidemics. All such things are faced with a laconic stoicism as part of the natural course of things. But because of the social importance of affective attachments between people - particularly between close kin, death cannot be treated with complete indifference. We have seen (in chapter 2) that a Baluch may move camp after a death so as not to be reminded. Any ritual mourning (in the form of stylised wailing) or uncontrolled show of grief is left to the women, and the fourth and fortieth days after the death, and the anniversary are marked by the noise of their ululations. The graves of the two sexes are distinguished by placing two rough stones at either end of the low mound of stones that marks a man's grave, and only one at the head of a woman's (cf. among the Rwala Bedouin, Musil, 1928: 670). The graves are not marked. Only the graves of great men, particularly those connected with religion, either because of their piety or because of their learning, may have a low wall built round them, and perhaps be covered with a roof and develop into shrines. But this distinction is usually reserved for the more important darwēsh (cf. Part Five).

Widows may remarry, though seldom do unless still very young - under forty at the most. There are several examples among the dynastic families of the widows of chiefs being remarried to a brother or other close relative of their late husband, but there is no true levirate, i.e. there is no obligation and no exemption from mahr etc. Negotiations are at present in train for the remarriage of one of the widows (Besorgmäda, mother of Amir) of Muhammad Umar to his brother Muhammad Amin. Many people (who are not involved by close kin relationship) openly say that they do not approve of such remarriages. One of Muhammad Umar's other widows (in Sartäs) who is still very young (perhaps 25), wears black (though she did not bear him any children) and says that she will not remarry because of the tremendous admiration and respect she had for her husband, to whose memory she wishes to remain faithful. She lives in her brother's house, and he administers the property which came to her as mahr.

This brings out further factors in the segregation and difference between the sexes which operate throughout all aspects of the life of the society. These are least apparent among the nomadic Baluch, and at their most among the dynastic families and sheikhs in the south east. As a result of them a woman can have no recognised role in the society except as a wife or mother. Therefore, if the widow of Muhammad Umar mentioned above does not remarry she can do nothing for the rest of her life except live with her close relatives and perform routine household tasks - even though she is of the dynastic family class. Furthermore, it is evident from this, and from the practice of retiring wives mentioned above, that sex is the man's prerogative. It is acknowledged that he requires a wife for this reason, whereas a woman wants to marry only to have sons, who will support her in later life. The higher she is up the social scale the less chance she is likely to have of actually living with her husband for more than five years or so, and sexual relations outside marriage are difficult and rare.

Some Baluch in the Makrān maintain that importation actually stopped
ore that date.

Chapter Twelve

Institutions and Conventional Behaviour

Instrumental in the regulation and ordering of personal relations in Baluch society are a number of conventional ways of acting in given circumstances. I refer to these as "institutions" (cf. Radcliffe-Brown, 1952: 10). There is no such general term to cover them in Baluchi, but most of them do have an individual name. They may be divided into three types:

a) Particular institutions which go with particular occasions.

b) General institutions, which taken together form a Baluch "code of honour".

c) General institutions which are a part of everyday Baluch life.[1]

Certain of the institutions which belong to particular occasions, such as weddings, have already been indicated in chapter ten. The most important aspect of these entails mutual help towards the expenses of the occasion. The "code of honour" comprises the following:

1. To take blood for blood.
2. Never to refuse or grudge hospitality.
3. To protect a guest and his property, even if it means fighting to death.
4. Similarly to protect any article deposited for safe keeping.
5. To do one's utmost to prevent the killing or injury of a woman or a child.
6. To stop fighting if a woman or a sayyid or mullā should intervene carrying a Qur'ān on their head (cf. Pikulin, 1959: 112-3 , who also lists other items which I have not met but which are apparently found in Eastern (Pakistani) Baluchistan).

These require some qualification: the first item (so far as the Persian Province is concerned) was even during the Baluch Period something of an ideal. In practice blood-price was often accepted, and - more significant in the context of this essay - when the two parties concerned

were both firmly under the control of a strong dynastic family the chief fixed an obligatory blood-price and a fine which was paid directly to him personally (cf. below, chapter fourteen, and the related case of the Bāmerī in chapter four which occasioned a change in allegiance). At the present time the Persian Administration has naturally taken over the role of the chief in the control of homicide. On would expect traditional practices still to be found at least in areas which are only nominally controlled by the Administration, but unfortunately no instance of homicide in these areas came my way which did not involve the Administration.

In many ways hospitality (together with the following two items, which are entailed in the Baluch conception of it) is the most important item in the Baluch "code of honour", and one of the most important Baluch institutions since it is one of the main bases of social intercourse in the society. The higher a man's political position or ambition - from the senior man of a small settlement or mētag to thechief of a dynastic family - the greater will be his hospitality and the more he will seek to display it. But even the lowliest Baluch or shahrī will be careful not to allow it to be said that he turned away a guest, and it is proverbial that a poor Baluch will in winter time share his only blanket with his wife and guest. I have known families who only had enough food for a few days nevertheless not allow a guest to eat his own bread while he remained with them and they still had some. The great importance of hospitality in the life of the society must be seen in the context of what has already been said in Part One about the necessity to travel and the general poverty of the environment. A traveller will normally choose the tent or house of a man of similar political status, unless he has a relative in the community whose political status does not differ too widely from his own. He will usually only seek the hospitality of a political superior if he has business with him or is directly related by a blood, affinal, or client relationship. A particularly desirable or politically superior guest must be honoured, and where the host's

means allow, he will provide rice at each midday and evening meal, and kill a goat. He shows that he has killed by serving the breastbone to the guest. When a chief moves about his area, in each settlement if there is more than one kamāsh (cf. below chapter thirteen) each will claim the right to act as host for a proportion of the stay.

An important aspect and indeed implication of hospitality is asylum. A guest (and his property) must be protected by the host against any enemy as long ashe remains with him, and the host must make all arrangements within his power for his safe onward passage. This applies even if the guest is patently in the wrong and fleeing "justice" (whether tribal or official Persian). When a man enters another's lug simply for the purposes of protection and asylum this is know as lug potrag (lit. "entering the lug or dwelling) and is an accepted institution and the owner of the lug is duty bound to take his part against his pursuers. This and similar practices only make sense if seen in the light of the interpretation of the Baluch conception of justice already mentioned (cf. Chapter four): as a means not of exacting due retribution to satisfy the demands of an abstract law, but of restoring social solidarity (cf. the situation among Arab bedouin cited in e.g. van Gennep, 1960: 32, and Forde, 1063: 326).

The last two items (5 and 6) show fighting was (in the Baluch Period) accepted as a legitimate sanction in social relations, but that there were nevertheless conventions regulating its use. Finally, item No.6 in particular reminds us that there is a certain relationship, if not identity, between being a Baluch and being a muslim, despite the divergences already noted between certain Baluch practices and the Islamic law.

The most important general institutions which are a part of everyday Baluch life concern meetings and exchange of information (cf. Barth, 1964: 13-4). Although Baluch etiquette and formality is minimal compared to for instance, Persian, except when he is with intimates the Baluch is

properly always dignified, formal and laconic (sangīn). When a man enters another's house he says the traditional Islamic greeting - Salām aleikum (= peace to you) - and equals or inferiors rise. The newcomer "gives" hands with his host and any other men present with whom he has or would like to have some personal relationship. The host is not necessarily the owner of the house. The (honorary) role of host is played by the most senior man present who is least musāfer (A./P. traveller), i.e. a more senior man after the first day or so of his stay is treated asthough he were the owner and host.

The newcomer then sits, in the place indicated by the host, and the host turns to him and does the "wash ātk" (Baluchi: wash ātk akant. Wash ātk = lit. "well-come".), thus:

Host		Newcomer	
Wash ātkē	= You are welcome	Wash ātkē	= You are welcome
Jur ē?	= Are you well	Jur ē	= Are you well?
Mehrabānī kan	= Do kindness	Hodāi mehrābān int	= God is kind
Tau mehrābāni kan	= You do kindness		
Habar kan	= lit. talk, i.e. tell us the news		

In a very formal situation the newcomer will then give a short resume of the news he has, e.g. where he has come from (also, of course, in the unusual circumstance where this is not already known - who he is), what he has seen on his way and any recent developments in the region he has come from, in a nomadic region who is camped where - assuming of course that he has no reason for wanting to keep his hosts ignorant of these things. He will then, the formalities over, ask the health individually of the others present, including the families of any whom he may know (with the phrases jur ē? dadd ē? sharr daddē.). He will not be pressed to give the reason for his coming until the third day.

Where two people or more meet away from a settlement or camp the procedure differs only in that whoever is the senior man does the wash ātk. If any are mounted, they dismount before meeting. Then

they give hands, say "salām aleikum", and sit in a circle on the spot where they met for the remainder.

If the men concerned have met before the same day, or if each knows that the other has not been anywhere or is not likely to have any recent news since they last met the greeting "wash ātkē" is answered simply with "wash nām bē"(= "May you be well reputed") and an exchange of "ǰur ē?" or the whole thing may be reduced simply to an exchange of "salām".

The general Baluchi word for news is hāl (from Arabic ḥāl = condition, situation, actuality"). It is constantly being sought and exchanged. The two main occasions for the exchange of hāl are the wash ātk, and the dīwān-almost "court", an institution intimately connected with the position of chief,and therefore described in the following chapter - and these three terms together form the framework and afford the occasions for the greater part of all Baluch social intercourses and political activity.

Footnote

1. A number of these institutions are listed in an article entitled "Baluchi rasm" in Ulus, July 1964, by Abdulghaffar Hadim.

Chapter Thirteen

The Chief

I

There is no straight equivalent in Baluchi for "chief" or for "dynastic family". I have used the word chief throughout to denote a member of a dynastic family who plays an active political role as a leader. Baluch politics are not reducable to a neat system, and the subject does not lend itself readily to logical analysis into a formal hierarchy of abstract roles and principles. It would be extremely difficult to translate into Baluchi the following abstract discussion of Baluch political values and practices. We are dealing with a non-literate society composed of a large number of elements of widely differing racial and cultural origins, each assimilated gradually over a long period of time, and in the absence of any single continuous internal or external authority. In such circumstances it would be logical to expect that for each new element individual particular ad hoc arrangements would grow up according to the circumstances and the background and relative strength of each party, and gradually over a period of time these ad hoc practices would tend to be generalised through the area. However, in the absence of any organising or rationalising central authority there is no reason for us to expect that these arrangements would ever be reduced or formalised into a system.

The ordinary Baluch sees everything in terms of persons rather than political institutions or roles. If it were feasible to discuss with him how his society worked politically and what defined its working, I imagine he would answer primarily in terms of Islam, the dīwān, and the chief. However, these three "institutions" cannot be regarded as complementary elements of a system, and it is unlikely that any of the original constituents of Baluch society had all three before it entered the Province. However, any attempt at authority within the society now must work through all three in the long run. But the most

important variable in determining the success of any one's attempt to exert authority in Baluch society is the sum of the individual's personal qualities and aptitudes, or, simply, his personality.

Nevertheless, Baluchi does have what might be called a political vocabulary. The following terms in normal use in the Province have purely political signification, but none of them can be said to have an exact well-defined meaning or use: hākum (from A./P. hākim = governor), Mīr (from amīr = "prince"), Khān (pre-Islamic term in central Asia = tribal leader), sardār (P. = chief), kamāsh (from Brāhūī = gray haired[1]).

Hākum is a direct Persian borrowing. Under the Qājār administration a hākim was a provincial governor, usually subordinate to a governor-general (valī) and appointed by him. The system was not uniform throughout the country, but Baluchistan was always administratively dependent on Kermān. Thus, when the governor-general started appointing Baluch chiefs to the official governorship of Baluchistan, the term was gradually incorporated into the Baluchi vocabulary, until it became the normal term for the paramount leader - though usually only when there was some official Persian sanction for his status. However, by an understandable extension it tended to be used by ordinary Baluch for any chief who operated from a fort, and collected taxes.

The words Mīr and Khān are more titles than terms. A chief may always have the first prefixed and the second suffixed to his personal name, e.g. Mīr Akūb Khān. However, he may also be referred to as Mīr Akūb or Akūb Khān. Euphonic factors also play a part. For instance, a chief whose personal name is Mīrzā is called Mīrzā Khān, never Mīr Mīrzā or Mīr Mīrzā Khān - though a man with the personal name Khān Muhammad may be called Khān Muhammad Khān. Similarly, a personal name of more than two syllables normally dispenses with either prefix or suffix or even both, e.g. Nushīrwān or Mīr Nushīrwān - I never heard

Mīr Mushīrwān Khān or Mushīrwān Khān. One personal name - Bārān - although belonging to a prominent member of a prominent dynastic family, I never heard with either prefix or suffix. I imagine the reason for this is simply that it is a very rare and at the same time very prestigious name (cf. its place in fig. 1, chapter 9). Although it would normally be unusual to hear an ordinary Baluch address or refer to a chief without at least one or other of these titles, within the dynastic families all four variations (i.e. with both prefix and suffix, with one or other, or without either) may be used in connection with one name - even in reference to one person - with no apparent reason for the variation. The usage is in fact almost exactly similar to our own in the case of, for example, Sir Winston Churchill who may be referred to and called Churchill, Sir Winston, or just Winston by different types of people on different occasions, except that in this case the usage tends to bow to one or another convention. Among the Baluch the usage is more indiscriminate.

Basically, however, it is true to say that Khān is applied to socially and politically prominent men, though only as a suffix to a personal name, and not, as elsewhere, as an independent term, while Mīr basically means something like "prince" and as such may be prefixed to the personal name of any male member of any dynastic family, and even to prominent members of families which scarcely qualify to be included in our category "dynastic family" but which nevertheless have attained a traditional social position of prestige in a particular locality, cf. e.g. in fig. xvi, chapter 9. Bībī and Khātūn are parallel female titles.

The term sardār is practically effete in the Provinces today. It has had two uses. In ordinary standard Persian usage sardār is the word used to denote any Baluch leader. In Baluchi, however, the word was used to mean the headman of a village or nomadic group (i.e. not of a tūmān, but of an area, e.g. Salāh Kuh). These headmen were normally chosen by the chief to whom the community owed allegiance. Only in the

few communities which managed to remain relatively independent of direct interference from the dynastic families were they chosen entirely by the community itself on the basis of age and personality. In both cases they tended to remain in the same family for several generations. In a case such as the Gamshādzai tribe, which was always firmly allied to the Bārakzai dynastic family and politically subordinate to the Bārakzai leader, but also held a high social prestige of its own, the Bārakzai leader could influence the choice between rival candidates for the position of sardār, and would confirm the appointment by sending a messenger to "tie the turban" (pēg bandag) on the successful candidate.

Since the Baluch Period the Persian term for "village headman" - kadkhodā - has replaced this use of sardār, and except in the more isolated areas of the Province the local Persian administration has an important say in the appointment. The holder of this post may be in effect the representative of the chief or the local Administration (according to the relative power of each in the community). In at least one case the local dynastic family chief has himself taken on the Administration appointment of kadkhodā in order to acquire some legality for his continued position in the area vis-à-vis the Administration. A chief may also have one or more pēkār (a Persian term) or messenger/representatives to help him keep contact and control over distant or isolated areas.

The remaining term - kamāsh - is the most difficult to define. It is not a post or a title, and it is used in both a relative and an absolute sense. A small group of men faced with the problem of deciding whom lead to follow will solve it by addressing one of their number in the terms "Kamāsh tau ē" - "You are the kamāsh." This is equivalent to saying "You are the senior man in the group".

Any adult male member of a dynastic family is a kamāsh, and so are all members of Baluch society who "matter". For instance, in April 1965

I visited the village of Garmēn Bīd (between Rask and Bāhu Kalāt of. chapter 11). I was alone, except for a ghulām, and I made the trip as a day excursion from Bāhu Kalāt where my hosts were staying. It took me only an hour and a half to accomplish the purpose of my visit, and I spent this time wandering the agricultural land of the village. I was quite surprised to notice that throughout the time I was there no one took it upon himself to come up and greet me and invite me to a lug for tea and a smoke, as would have been normal. As this did not hinder me in what I had come to the place to do, I thought no more of it until I arrived back at Bāhu Kalāt, where it came up in the course of conversation. The ready reply from my hosts was that this was only to have been expected since there were no kamāch at Garmēn Bīd. This I seized on as an excellent circumstantial opportunity to obtain from them a definition of the word. It was not so simple as I imagined it might be, but it is to a large extent on the ensuing conversation that my account of the term here is based.

The meaning of the term is relative to the extent that it is used to denote a man who distinguishes himself from the majority of his community or temporary (e.g. traveller) group by his leadership potential. The reason why there was no kamāch in Garmēn Bīd is that all the population had been imported fairly recently to work on newly claimed agricultural land and plantations by a Boledāi chief. They were all low on the social scale, and their economic position was little better than that of serfs. None of them had the blood (nāt affiliation), or economic resources, and therefore (in Baluch thinking it follows) the personality or inclination to seek to distinguish himself from his fellows and show any political ambition among them and so take on the responsibility of inviting in a guest (ac. myself) who was obviously his social and political superior. This does not mean that if I had sought hospitality from any of them they would not have given it freely, though they would probably have thought it rather peculiar that I, by my colouring and clothing (which though Baluch marked me out as a member of the dynastic family "class" by its better

quality) obviously socially and politically far superior to them, should seek their hospitality and had not provided myself with better refreshment and retinue etc. than they would be likely to be able to offer. If there had been among them a kadkhodā at that time - there had not been - it would have been his duty on behalf of the community to look after me. But he would not necessarily have been a kamāsh.

We may therefore approximately define the use of the word as denoting a man who by a combination of birth, economic resources (the two tend to go together), personality and inclination is distinguishable from the majority of his community, and is ready to assume political responsibility. At the same time we must bear in mind that not every community necessarily has a kamāsh, some have several, and it is not impossible for every adult male member of a small community (besides ghulāme) to be kamāsh.

I have devoted more space to the discussion of this term for two reasons: despite the vagueness of the term it includes all members of Baluch society who are politically significant (including religious leaders, cf. Part Five), and all who are not kamāsh are in effect politically represented by a kamāsh. There are many levels of [illegible] effective headman of a small poor village or nomadic community to the leading member of the leading dynastic family (though to refer to this latter as kamāsh is almost a slang usage of the term). These various levels of kamāsh cannot be said to form a hierarchy of power, but the chief relies primarily on the support of the kamāsh among his people. Secondly, it shows very well how vague and informal the whole system is, and therefore how much it in the end depends on individual qualities or personality. The Baluch, however, consider these individual qualities (they use the Arabic word lāeqat - "suitability" in this context) to depend to a large extent on birth, i.e. the position and reputation held by a man's patrilateral and matrilateral ancestors. And although birth in this sense does not depend on economic resources, the two cannot be divorced for very long, as will be shown in due course.

The political orientation of the Baluch depends therefore on two pivotal but informal statuses in the society, neither of which is an exact conception in the language. For convenience, I refer to these as:

1. kamāsh
2. chiefs

and I use the word kamāsh to mean men who are respected in their local communities and are informally acknowledged as representatives of their local communities by both the community and the chiefs, - it must also be remembered that in Baluchi the word may also be applied to a chief. By chief I mean any member of a dynastic family who plays a political role. The dynastic families form a superstructure. The kamāsh are the basic political denominators of the society. In terms of the model (cf. chapter 5) these denominators include what would have been originally pre-Baluch local dignitaries and Baluch influential heads of "lineages". Neither level of leader is appointed by the other. It is impossible to become a chief unless one is born into a dynastic family. It is simpler to become a kamāsh, if one's father was a kamāsh, but this is not a necessary condition.

II

Therefore, simply by being a member of a dynastic family a man may potentially wield authority on a higher level - in my terms, be a chief. Just how important a political role he plays depends on the following factors:

1. his personal aptitude and ambition.
2. the political role played by previous generations of his family - particularly of course the immediately preceding generations.
3. (this depends to a large extent on 2 above) the extent of the alliances made in previous generations between his family and other dynastic families.
4. (this depends almost entirely on 2 and 3 above) the amount and distribution of malk owned by him and other members of his family who will acknowledge his political seniority.
5. as in 2, 3 and 4 above for the family of his wife - in the choice of whom he will not usually have had any say.

(e. whether and how he was "placed" by his father or other senior relative (cf. chapter 4).

Of these factors the first is by far the most important. So far as I could ascertain all the present dynastic families were already acknowledged a socially and politically superior status where we first hear of them which in some cases is when they entered the Province (cf. Bārakzai and Sardārzai in chapter 4). Although born into a dynastic family, if his potential followers do not recognise in a man the requisite personal aptitude, however high his ambition may be he will not have much success in the long run. The remaining factors listed above are important but subsidiary. That is, if they are favourable, they give him a good start. To some extent they are in fact tautological, for a dynastic family, in the present situation, is in fact a family which consistently over a number of generations, has played an important political role. If it ceases to play such a role, after a time lag of a generation or two it begins gradually to lose its status. If the family has played a reasonably important political role in the Province over a number of generations, it will in the natural course of things have made a number of alliances with other dynastic families, acquired items of melk in a number of different localities, and made a useful marriage alliance at least for the man whom it expects to be its senior member in the next generation.

When we remember that the whole conception of dynastic family and chief as I have defined it is not formulated in the language, it will be seen how extremely important the first of the factors listed above really is. A discussion of the qualities which go together to constitute this personal aptitude (P. līāqat) or personality (P. shakhṣīyat) in the ideal chief is reserved for Part Six of this essay. However, it seems necessary at this stage to indicate in broad terms the direction of the argument and its theoretical background. I propose to use Weber's term "charisma" to denote an essential intangible quality which attaches to members of the dynastic families in the attitude of the other members of Baluch society towards them. I consider this quality to be basic for the understanding

of the political and social status of the dynastic families in Baluch society. Just what constitutes this quality and its importance in the political situation will I hope emerge from the remainder of the essay and in particular Part Six. I consider my usage of Weber's term to be a development of his own in the context of a particular society, but I must first make quite plain what the charismatic quality of leadership in Baluch society does not include.

Most important of all diachronically it is not something extraordinary, nor is it something that can be acquired or lost (as in the case of an unsuccessful prophet). Rather, it is a quality which on the synchronic plane sets certain men apart from the rest. Secondly, it has nothing to do with formal or informal religion (as the terms are used in this essay, cf. Part Five) in the conscious thinking of the Baluch. Below the conscious level, however, there would appear to be some confusion between this quality and the functions of informal religion in the society.

Footnote 1: I am indebted to Dr. I. Gershewitch for information on the etymology of this term.

The Chief and the Ecology[1] of relationships and rules within the society

1. The chief is based on a fort in one of the major agricultural centres (cf. chapter 3), and he spends more time there than any other one place, but he may often actually be there for less than half of the year. Since the Baluch seized the forts have of course become redundant, and since they are no longer worth their upkeep most of them have fallen into disrepair, the chief and his family living in an ordinary house (usually a bān) nearby. The factors which cause the chief to spend so much of his life travelling are various: for instance, interest in widely dispersed plots of land and communities, business with related and/or "feudally" (cf. chapter 7) senior chiefs, business with the Administration (cf chapter 2). He does not delegate power in the usual sense. However, he may set up a senior (politically) junior relative in a position similar to his own in one of the areas under his control. If he did this he would expect the protégé always to accept his superior authority and to support him in a relationship similar to that imposed on the holder of a fief in mediaeval Europe. He would normally, however, surrender the income from the area, except in some cases for a certain tax. As we have seen in chapter 3 this often turned out to be an unworkable arrangement, and was turned by the subordinate into the first step on his own road to greater power and a viable political independence. For this reason it was generally only done for close relatives - in particular, sons and sons-in-law and nephews. Often the main reason for doing it was to provide the relative with an income and the wherewithal for the kind of life which was considered due to a member of a dynastic family who showed the required aptitude. On occasion, however, it was done because the particular community asked the chief to send them someone who would be on the spot for more time than he could manage himself and could give them more time as a judge and leader. This happened generally in communities which contained no one kamāsh who was acknowledged sufficiently superior status to have the authority to settle disputes

and impose a unity on the community (an example is given in Part Six).

2. The chief is by tradition entitled to a tithe (dah-yak) on the agricultural produce of all the land owned by the shahrī who he controls, (this must not be confused with his (major) share of the produce from the land which he owns personally), and service (mainly military - sarēnbandī; kasarbandī) from all Baluch who own allegiance to him. This is considered to be the traditional right of the chief and his payment for fulfilling his function. The origin of the practice is not known. When the Persian administration assumed the role of the chiefs it officially deprived them of this income. However, as has already been noticed, in practice the transfer of power was a long and gradual process, and is in fact still not really complete. At least one chief still collected dah-yak in 1966, but I know of no case of it being collected anywhere in the Province since then. Sarēnbandī for military purposes lost its function much earlier, but the tradition of it remains, and under this term as a general heading the Baluch are ready to perform services for the chiefs, and if a chief were to rebel against the Administration (yāqī beag) he could still count on the sarēn-bandī of his Baluch.

3. As a province of the Persian Empire Baluchistan always technically owed taxes (mālīāt) to the central government which in historical times was personified by the Governor-General in Kermān. The actual collection of these taxes was sporadic and irregular and depended on the comparative strength of the Baluch chiefs and the Governor-General. When Baluch chiefs were given the official status of Governor of Baluchistan by the Governor-General at the end of the last century (cf. chapter 3) they collected these taxes in their own right, and whether or not they passed on a proportion of what they collected to Kermān depended again on the relative strength of the Governor-General.

very soon mālīāt came to be considered the right of any chief strong enough to be able to collect them. And whereas dah-yak was collected only from the shahrī, mālīāt was collected from both the shahrī and the Baluch.

The income of a strong chief consisted therefore of:

a) his share (as owner) of the produce of his land, and sometimes also of flocks (cf. chapter 2).

b) dah-yak from his shahrī on all agricultural produce.

c) mālīāt from all his people on the produce of all land and flocks.

In practice none of these three categories of income was really exactly defined in quantity. A chief's potential income was defined by the number and resources of his effective following. It was spent on:

a) his household. He would normally have one room set aside, in which hospitality is offered to all comers, and a number of ghulāms occupied in purely household and personal tasks.

b) supporting armed retainers. These would consist of ghulāms who would require arms, clothing and their keep and "irregular" Baluch (under sarān-bandī) who would receive payment for their service in oil (rugan; roughan) and grain, and sometimes also arms.

c) his personal life which might include prolonged and expensive stays in Kerman or Tehran attempting to obtain favours or recognition from Persian authorities, and pleasures such as opium. (It should be noted that mahr (cf chapter 10) was calculated only on property, not income, so that whether or not a man held hukumat did not affect marriage arrangements in any directly tangible way.)

The first two items of income were collected at the harvest, but mālīāt could be collected at any time and the assessment in practice depended solely on the chief, or in some cases a representative of the chief.

4. We must here consider in more detail how a chief acquired and ran his own property. Some he will have inherited from his father; some will belong in fact to his wife, but will be his to administer.

arrangements for the necessary labour on the chief's land are many and varied. Labour is provided by ra'Īyat (cf. English "ryot") which is a term of Arabic origin used by the chief to include all who pay either dah-yak or maliāt whether or not they are also kamash. The term therefore potentially included all members of the population who were not members of dynastic families (but in fact seems not to have included the majority of the baluch of the Sarhadd). The arrangements under which the ra'iyat may work on the chief's land include the following:

a) share-cropping (cf. chapter 2). This is more frequent when the labour is provided by ghulams, who have no land of their own, and so no other income. It is not such a general practice in Baluchistan as it is on the plateau.

b) When labour is required, the chief may call out a number of people from each of a number of neighbouring villages in turn for one day at a time. The ra'Īyat, receive no direct return for this labour but it guarantees political protection from the chief when needed. Now that the chief has no official political function, and has no physical force to dispose of, the sanction nevertheless retains its force for the chief mediates between the Administration and the ra'iyat, providing, for instance, bail. This practice may be seen as an act of political solidarity with the chief.

c) A man may work on the chief's land in return for being allowed to use surplus water from the chief's supply for his own land.

Being in this position to command labour, the chief may also use this labour to increase his property either by preparing virgin land for dry cultivation (bagāh, cf. chapter 2), or developing a new source of water supply - qanāt or jū (cf chapter 2).

Therefore, simply by having a following a chief has a potential income and the means to increase this income up to the limits imposed by the potentiality of the land controlled by him and his following and the agricultural and engineering techniques at his disposal. By doing this successfully he also attracts a larger following. And no other

member of the community has the means to do this on the same scale.

5. From the above it may be readily seen to what extent the life of a community must revolve around the chief where there is one. Local kasāsh may show initiative and authority in their immediate community, and if this community is structurally relatively distant from the nearest chief (i.e. he owns no land there and has no close relatives living near) the community may be relatively independent of his influence. But in general most initiative in development and the settling of disputes depends eventually on a chief.

6. "Whether public or private, whether undertaken lightheartedly or in defence of life and property, war was for many centuries to be regarded as the normal thread of every leader's career and the raison d'etre of every position of authority" (Bloch, 1965: 451, on mediaeval European feudal society).

In some areas in the Baluch period the chief actually kept a group of armed retainers (tofangchī) in every major agricultural settlement (e.g. in Dashtiārī). To resist openly the chief's authority was to become (i.e.) yāghī, and there was usually no future in it unless the chief was growing weak and this was the beginning of a more general movement away from his allegiance, or another chief could be found to support the rebel. The yāghī is now a rebel against the authority of the Persian Administration. There is no shame or disgrace attached to being yāghī, only with some of the deeds (e.g. contravening the code of honour, cf. chapter 13) to which a yāghī may be forced in order to maintain his position. That is, it is possible (but difficult) to remain a good Baluch and yāghī, but it is in practice extremely difficult particularly for the shabānī who is tied to his land. An indeterminate number of Baluch have been yāghī against the government in Pakistani Baluchistan for some eight or nine years, and this success has boosted the morale of the Baluch in general. The word yāghī is now

connected with nationalistic ideas of a free Baluchistan, and the status of Baluch values vis-à-vis dependence on a disliked alien administration - whether Persian, Pakistani, or Afghan.

7. In such a system law and order, justice and security, political and social seniority, are all embodied in one man - the chief. Ordinary, everyday disputes over melk or other property are settled on the basis of traditional criteria, and the formal religion (Hanafi Islam) is considered to be the preserver of law and order and social security. "In this society, in which protective relationships had multiplied, every chief - and there were certainly as much of them - desired to be a judge", wrote Bloch (1965: 369) about feudal mediaeval Europe, and the same holds true in the Baluch situation. If a chief was strong enough he could always impose settlements according to personal whim, but Islamic law (shari'at) was always considered to provide the basic criteria for settlement. If there was any doubt about the interpretation of these criteria in any particular situation, a man trained in the interpretation of the shari'at (mulawi, cf. part five) could be chosen by the parties concerned and approached for a solution. This procedure is known as shari'at kanag. Now that the chiefs cannot impose solutions resort is made more often to this procedure. But the mulawi cannot impose a solution (even with the backing of the shari'at) any more than the chief can. In the present absence of any effective power for the execution of justice (even the Administration when resorted to is often not effective outside its main centres of activity) the emphasis is even more than ever on the restoration of the breach of social solidarity which has been caused by the offence in the community or between the two parties concerned. It is natural for parties in a dispute to approach whomever they consider more interested and fairer in effecting this restoration, whether chief or mulawi. As a result of this situation the opportunities for religious leaders in Baluch society have been somewhat enhanced since the Baluch period. But the only effective sanction, for the settlement of a dispute in the long term is public opinion, and in the public opinion the difference in authority

between the mullawī and the chief is that the mullawī is trained to interpret Islam, and Islam has an absolute value and authority in the society; whereas the chief, as the member of a dynastic family, embodies in himself an informal and undefined but nevertheless Baluch value (cf. on charisma below, Part Six). The chief therefore has a start over the mullawī, and particularly so if he is also a religiously minded man.

8. Two delicts require separate treatment: adultery and killing or mutilation: Adultery is extremely rare. The Baluch claim that during the Baluch Period it was practically unknown, and that its occurrence is even now confined to areas where the true Baluch way of life has been polluted by "Gajar" influence. For the Baluch, sexual relations outside marriage constitute the most heinous sin. A mullā preaching against a particular activity says that whoever commits it is as though he had committed adultery (A. kamā annahu 'amala'al-zinā). With the sanction of the sharī'at a husband finding his wife in the act of adultery has the right to kill both parties. According to Baluch conventions a woman known to have committed adultery should be killed. However, it is no one's particular duty to kill her. A strong, religiously minded chief may (but may not) consider it his duty to have killed a woman known to have committed adultery. If this duty is not taken on by the chief, her husband, or perhaps if they are in the same community her father or brother, within a short time after the commission, she will go free. In the only recent case which came to my knowledge the woman was hauled into a dīwān (cf. below, section 10) of kamāsh - there was no chief in the vicinity - who were debating whether or not she should be killed, when the husband arrived and persuaded them to allow him to take her home as though nothing had happened. His reason was simply that if she were to be killed he would not be able to afford another wife.

9. The original situation with regard to blood price is difficult to ascertain. Again it is complicated by the heterogeneous composition of the society and whether or not a chief or hākim is involved, and the fact that now punishment for all killing and injury is a right appropriated and

jealously guarded by the Administration. Unfortunately, no case came to my notice from areas where the Administration still has no control at all.

In the Baluch Period each Baluch mät had a traditional blood price (hun = P. khun: blood). This varied from mät to mät, but was generally between twelve and eighteen thousand Rupees. For instance, that of the Rend was 12,000 Rupees. Therefore, if a Rend were killed by a man from another mät, that man - to settle the feud - would have to pay 12,000 Rupees to the dead man's family. This however was not usually paid in cash, and its interpretation in kind varies according to circumstances. Furthermore, before settlement could be made the two parties had somehow to be brought together. This would be difficult if both parties did not own allegiance, or at least have access, to an interested chief. If they did, the chief would exact a fine from the offender (say 500 Rupees) and attempt to bring them to agreement. For instance, a good donkey might be accepted as 1,000 Rupees in an area where donkeys were valued for transport or riding purposes. If the settlement was earnestly desired by the injured party, 100 Rupees might be accepted foranother thousand (sic!), and so on. If agreement could not be reached, the close relatives of the dead man (father, brother, son, uncle or cousin, according to age and means) would seek to kill the murderer, or, apparently in some cases a comparable (from the point of view of political seniority) member of his solidary political group. If they were successful, an interested chief might again exact a fine and attempt to settle. If peace was made, in some cases the offending party gave one of its marriageable girls (of suitable social standing) as a bride for a close relative of the dead man to seal the settlement - not as part of the settlement.

Alternatively, the killer could go to the home of the killed (cf, the institution "lug yotrag", chapter twelve). Obviously, he would only do this if the killing had been accidental, or, at least, if he very much regretted it, and he would normally take with him a sheikh or other religious man or a kamash. By doing this, he effectively

sought asylum from those duty bound to kill him. It is now said that it would be unthinkable for the killer not to beforgiven under these circumstances.

The Bārakzai claim that they had no "khun", i.e. if one of their number were killed they would either kill in return or forgive the killer. It was beneath their dignity to take payment. This seems to have been the general practice for the powerful dynastic families.

Such is the system which the Baluch claim to have adhered to in the Baluch Period for dealing with "private killing". A man killed in "public" fighting between tribes or communities dependent on rival chiefs did not lead to private feud and could not be settled, since there was no way for the two parties to come together. Death caused in this way simply increased the enmity between the two tribes or groups.

It is relevant to notice that there were two main modes of settlement and that one worked through the paramount authority of a chief while in the other the political superstructure of chiefs and dynastic families was irrelevant. It is claimed that under this system private killing with intent was almost unheard of, whereas under the Persian administration it is more common. However, in the absence of a strong and interested chief or common economic interests (e.g. adjacent landownership) there might be no pressure to settle, and in such cases the parties involved may choose simply to avoid each other.

When a wife was given or exchanged in addition to the settlement, this might be done with reduced mahr, or even in exceptional circumstances with no mahr at all. The practice does not seem to have been very common. In one case that came to my notice, between Mīr Abdī Khān Sardārzai and the Mubāraki in the early thirties it was unsuccessful. The areas of influence of the Sardārzai and Mubāraki meet in Qasr Qand - a Bolēdai hukumat - and they are structurally related through common intermarriage with the Bolēdai and the Shērkhānzai. The Bolēdai were in fact involved in a

mediating capacity in this case. A bride was to be given by Abdī Khān to the Mubārakī. The religious aqd wasduly performed but the actual wedding (sur - an occasion for merriment) was not carried out and so the marriage was not consummated and the bride remained with her family. In fact, although both sides hadbeen persuaded by the Bolēdai mediator to make this gesture of complete peace, neither side was sufficiently reconciled at heart to put it into effect. (This incident perhaps demonstrates the relative present and recent weakness of the Bolēdai, who have nevertheless still kept their status as a dynastic family). But the girl was 'legally' married, and in these circumstances to effect a divorce would have been - at least superficially - an unfortunate retrograde step in the relations between the two families, even though both soon realised that neither was willing to go through with the marriage. Eventually, some years later, again through the mediation of the Bolēdai, divorce was in fact effected, and the unfortunate girl freed.

More detailed information on the actual amounts of khun is given in Pikulin (1959:113).

10. The chief functions publicly in a dīwān (for history of usage of this Perso-Arabic word, cf. Enc. Is. II, 1965: 323 ff.). The Baluch dīwān is an informal assembly which gathers in the presence of a chief. A chief can never sit for long anywhere (outside the women's rooms of his own home) without a dīwān forming round him. The function of the dīwān is free discussion of any dispute or topic which interests those present, and entrance to it is open to all. Apart from the fact that the chief tends to sit in the most comfortable place and ghulāms in the least comfortable, the relative social standing of those present can only be guessed from general demeanour and the quality of clothing.

The main function of the dīwān is the exchange of news and discussion (cf. on "hāl" above, chapter twelve, and Ulus, July, 1964, p.20), but its importance in the society is far greater than even this would suggest, since in practice the whole of Baluch life revolves around one or another

dīwān, and a man with any political ambition makes his mark inthe dīwān. The chief normally has a special room set aside for it - the larger the better, and this serves also as a guest room. As such it bears many similarities to the "men's house" described among the Swat Pathans by Barth (1959; 53-6). For instance, "mere presence in a man's house is no criterion of membership in a permanent social group associated with it... Where chiefs visit each other's men's houses, this explicitly symbolises a informal political alliance between them; if one person repeatedly visits the men's house of another, his political subordination to the chief of the house he visits is thereby indicated.

"Rarely does one find a men's house entirely empty. All through the day it is occupied by an informal group of changing membership and fluctuating numbers...

"The morning is the slackest time. At that time work is at its peak, and landowners tend to be out inspecting the work in their fields," etc...

"A certain number of men return to the men's house before noon,... After eating and gossiping for a while, some people linger on to enjoy the siesta hour there; the chief, unless there are visitors present, usually retires to his home for that purpose. All through the early afternoon sleeping forms are scattered around on beds and squatting in corners, bundled up in their blankets or toga-like wrappers as a protection against flies. Occasionally a man will fuss with the covers, move his head to catch the breeze and avoid the sun, or fetch a drink of water from the water-jug in a corner of the verandah. A few keep up a murmured conversation. Occasional work, such as tying fish-nets, mending small tools or twining rope, may also be done intermittently through the day.

"By 3.30 or 4 p.m most of the more prominent men,with the hangers-on, assemble for tea - Indian tea, boiled with milk and sugar. After this, some disperse, some stay on, and others arrive; the agricultural workers return from the fields, the craftmen close their shops. By sundown, most of the normal frequenters of any men's house have assembled in it, some taking their evening meal there, others absenting themselves briefly to eat it at home. Farmers and craftsmen report on their activties and

experiences of the day, news of political or economic importance discussed, and decisions on action forthe next day are reached. All through the evening visitors keep dropping in. As the evening passes on, all this interaction assumes a more recreational character;... One after another the men planning to sleep in the house bed down, often several to a bed, after quilts and pillows have been allotted to all present... Activity slowly peters out; maybe one indefatigable story-teller drones on into the small hours...

"When eating, the Pakhtuns [high class men] have their meal first, leaving what remains to low status hangers-on. When thirsty, the Pakhtuns call for a glass of water, to be supplied by any low status person present...

"Extreme variations are found, from villages where only passing strangers sleep in the men's houses to others where all males do so."

The dīwān differs from the men's house among the Swat Pathans to the extent that it is more personal - depending always on the person of the chief, and the chief is never completely settled in one community and his dīwān forms wherever he happens to be. When he is away from his own home theexpense of the dīwān is born by his host - though if his host does not have the means he will contribute to the cost or even bear it entirely.

Whenever there is no urgent work to be done people tend to sit around in a group and talk, and since such groups often contain at least one kasāah they may be referred to as dīwān (though properly only a chief may preside over a dīwān), and it may be said as a generalisation that when the pressure of work allows the tendency is to spend a large proportion of one's time in a dīwān. The ordinary purpose of these gatherings is simply to sit and talk (Baluchi and colloquial Persian: gap) - perhaps the favourite pastime. As in the favourite pastimes of any community considerable expertise is acquired by at least some members of the community - in this case particularly in the use of language. For although there is no formality, and all may speak atthe same time or no one may speak at all, the man who can

hold his audience by expert expression of his argument has a good start over a less articulate rival. Even a ghulām or an itinerant beggar will be listened to for hours if he can talk well and interestingly.

The dīwān is thus an important primary source for Baluch ethnography, for so much of what goes on in Baluch society which is sociologically significant is best observed in the dīwān. Two things in particular which are difficult to document but may be relevant here may be ascertained correctly only by listening for hours to 'gap'.

The first concerns individual personal relations. The dīwāns show evidence of a quite extraordinary ability on the part of men of widely differing character and aims to live together and "get on" with each other. When men do fall out it is nearly always over some specific incident or project. Their quarrel may indeed be the result of a basic difference in character but this difference does not generally keep them always at odds. This point shows an important social function of the dīwān: it provides a vehicle for public community life, into which a large proportion of all social intercourse is channelled. No comparable vehicle exists for instance in the ordinary village in the east of Persia, with the result that, there, not only is there no incentive for the community to meet as a community, there is no institutionalised means for this to happen. Even in a Persian village where there is one main mosque, as adherents of the Shi'a version of Islam the inhabitants are under no obligation to attend the mosque at all, let alone as a community function on a Friday. The dīwān thus plays an important integrating role in the life of a community both when it is a chief's court and when it is a meeting of roughly equal kamāsh, with or without some of their following.

Secondly, the dīwān is the place where all talk more or less freely with each other, both in small groups or as a forum. It is the place where all views are sooner or later aired, and therefore where "Baluch" attitudes are formulated and can be ascertained. Although a quite

remarkable sense of humour is seldom absent for very long, the most significant attitude is a sense of isolation from the developments in the rest of the world (about which they learn through the radio and from the officials of the Administration) and a kind of stoicism or even mystical detachment from both these developments and the natural vicissitudes which are a part of their physical environment and which as they well understand, bind them to it and isolate them economically as well as geographically from the rest of the country. This will be relevant again in the discussion of religion in Part Five. Serious, informal moments or phases in the conversation generally show pessimism and the idea that Baluch ills are due to the failure of Baluch to live up to the true Baluch way of life.[2] In the Baluch Period when their chiefs were relatively independent they were better off. The Baluch Period, rightly or wrongly, tends to be looked back on by most people as a Golden Age, though it is in fact doubtful whether the majority could have been any better off during it. Insofar as the Persian Administration has brought economic changes, these have been very slow to take effect though so far as the majority are concerned, they must have been for the better. But it is the political and social changes which are noticed more. They talk in terms of a creeping pollution of their moral standards brought about by the growing interference and influence of the central government and the outside world. They can always escape it temporarily, and many of them do or have done, by prolonged stays in Karachi or the Sheikhdoms on the other side of the Gulf. But it is difficult for them to stay away permanently, because they would always be aliens (garīb; "gharīb"). A man must live where he belongs, with his own people, and, though there is evidence of permanent Baluch emigration since the beginning of the last century at least, it is never regarded as permanent and return is always possible even after several generations. Despite the poverty, and despite all the ills and the pessimism about the future, there is always tremendous pride in being Baluch. No Baluch ever forgets he is Baluch, and the home of the Baluch is Baluchistan.

11. The chief had the power by showing favour to grant (informally, and within limits) status in the community. This could be important in two ways.

a) By particularly favouring a low class member of the community, he automatically caused the man to gain a certain amount of status, though he would have to show great force of personality to maintain it after the death of the chief.

b) He could attract or repel aliens (for instance, Hindu merchants, and give them a protected status in the community for a specific purpose (e.g. trading).

12. The word class has been used on several occasions in this essay as a convenient abstract term to cover each of the main horizontal divisions of Baluch society: dynastic families, Baluch, shahrī, and ghulāms. The divisions are not as clear cut as they may have appeared, and in many areas equally valid divisions could be drawn within each. But the use of the term has some analytical value.

Conventional or expected behaviour differs on the basis of these class divisions. This is less obvious in the case of the latter three, and perhaps purely the effect of the difference of occupation and way of life. But in the case of the dynastic families it is quite marked, and accords with the charismatic quality already noted which the Baluch require to see in their chiefs. Though they live essentially the same life, with the same physical limitations, and must always be accessible, and do not seek any pomp or regalia, nevertheless they must somehow be distinguished. Comparison with mediaeval Europe is once again relevant. "Everything tended to induce him [sc. the feudal lord] to live in the country" (Bloch, 1965, p.299), but where he lived a "whole little world of permanent residents, with an admixture of transient guests, lived together in conditions that admitted of no privacy. Partly, no doubt, this was due to lack of space, but it was also the result of habits which in that age seemed inseparable from the position of a chief. Day and night, the baron was surrounded by retainers - men-at-arms, menials,

household vassals, young nobles committed to his care as 'muralinga' - who served him, guarded him, conversed with him and who, when the hour of sleep at last arrived, continued to keep faithful watch over him even when he was in bed with his wife. 'It is not seemly that a lord should eat alone' was an opinion still held in thirteenth-century England..." A corollary of this was that "On the cultural side, it meant that among the nobles knowledge was transmitted much less by books and study than by reading aloud, the reciting of verse, and personal contacts" (ibid. p.302).

The lives of the great chiefs like Bahrām Khān and Dust Muhammad Khān must have been very much like this, for there is still a close resemblance to be seen in the lives of their successors, who, shorn of most of the outward political authority, live on a much reduced scale. Above all a chief is not expected to do anything physical for himself, and the utmost comfort (though never very considerable) in any given surroundings is always solicitously provided him, even though, on some occasions - for instance when travelling - this may consist simply of the best shade available from a lone and almost leafless tree. In their present position of much reduced responsibility this naturally gives rise to much idleness, and the problem of how to pass the day (ruc gwāzēnag) is posed with a frequency frustrating to the ethnographer.

Thus, though there is nothing shameful about physical idleness, and the most strenuous work expected from the chief (at least now that there is no fighting or raiding) is the travelling involved in keeping personal contact with different communities and properties and the Administration, somehow the time must be passed. Practically the only available "pleasures" in Baluchistan are opium and women. The second is the worst sin in the Baluch interpretation of Islam, but provided it is followed discreetly it may be condoned fora number of years in a young member of a dynastic family who nevertheless fulfils the requirements of membership of his class otherwise (cf. below Part Six). It is in fact a not uncommon failing. Opium, on the other hand, even though it is legally prohibited by the Persian Administration, is not restricted by religious sanction.

A man who allows severe addiction to interfere with his social duties (e.g. mardom-dārī, etc.) will in time be censured by society, but such cases are not frequent, and in general they show a remarkable capacity to give up even a quite strong addiction without visible difficulty.

Such ability is of course expected of a Baluch (cf. above chapter 2 on endurance) and a chief, to hold his position, must always adhere to the Baluch canon of values. In the present situation chiefs in fact tend to be distinguished on the criteria of Baluch-ness, which shows again how strong the cultural tradition is.

Footnotes

1. The usage of this term is borrowed from Parsons 1964: 93, and has been chosen in an attempt to avoid the question-begging associations of such terms as "structure", "system", "organisation".

2. A similar argument in a different context recurs all over the Plateau as the explanation of the backwardness of muslim countries as compared to Christian - European - countries.

PART FIVE

RELIGION

Chapter Fifteen

The Formal Religion

The existence of a formal sophisticated religious faith, the validity of which no one thinks of questioning indicates another parallel between Baluch society and Mediaeval Europe (cf. Bloch, 1965, Part II, chapter 5), particularly since this formal religion trains its own interpreters who are always separate and often aloof from the secular leadership.

I divide religion into formal and informal because there is a certain dichotomy within the society between religious doctrine and roles which derive their validity from outside the Province, and attitudes and functions which in general do not. The former is the Hanafī version of Sunni Islam and is the subject of this chapter; the latter will be treated in the chapter which follows.

I

The overwhelming majority of all Baluch are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafī rite, (cf. Enc. Is. 1966, art. Hanafī) and in the popular mind there is a vague equation between Baluch-ness and Islam. Any Baluch who are not Sunni Muslims are either Shī'a (Ja'farī) or Zikrī.

Shī'a Baluch are confined to Jīroft, Sīstān and the north west of the Sarhadd, and therefore enter little into the life of the Province. In fact most Baluch do not know that there are Shī'a Baluch. To a Sunni, the Shī'a are heretics, and since the Persians are Shī'a and the established religion of the whole of Iran is Shī'ism, the popular mind equates "Gajar" and Shī'a, and this does not improve relations between the Baluch and the Administration. The situation is aggravated by the periodic invasion into the Province of Shī'a Mullās attracted by the Persian officials to serve their religious needs. The resultant de facto alliance between the Administration and the heresy before Baluch eyes leads sometimes to unpleasant incidents.

The Zikrīs are now confined mostly to villages near the coast in the Pakistani Makrān and the Kēch valley. It is a heretical sect, based on Islamic ideas but beyond the pale. It is said that they believe that their founder, Dust Muhammad, was the Mahdī of orthodox Islam, and his abode, Kuh Murād, near Turbat in the Kēch valley (West Pakistan), takes the place of Mecca as the object of their pilgrimages (cf. Dames, 1909: 340; Hughes-Buller, 1902; Baluchistan 1952: 23; Field, 1959: 67; and Baluch, 1958: 234).

Some mention must also be made of evidence which suggests that the Baluch were once mostly Shī'a, since it is relatively unusual for a people or community to change from Shī'ism to Sunnism, and we know of no external factors which might have led to such a change. The possibility of the Baluch having been originally Shī'a was noticed by Dames (1909: 339) who writes that although they all profess to be Sunni, "in practice they show great laxity, and follow many customs rather resembling those of the Shī'a and others, which no doubt go back to the days of paganism. They show the greatest respect to Ali, Hasan and Husain [the first three imams of the Shī'a], and observe the full ten days of the Muharram fast, like the Shī'a, and not only the last day, as among the strict Sunnis." "Ferishta [cf. bibliography] relates that Shahzad [the son of Mīr Chākar, cf. chapter 3] was the first person to bring the Shī'a creed into vogue at Multan [east of the Indus]. Baluch legend represents Shahzad as of mysterious origin. A shadow (that of Alī) fell upon his mother while she was bathing, during Mīr Chākar's absence at the siege of Delhi with the emperor Humāyun. She conceived and gave birth to a son shortly before her husband's return. When he returned, the child, who was then three months old, addressed him and told him to fear nothing, as he had been begotten by the influence of the saint. A mystical poem [which Dames quotes], half in Baluchi and half in corrupt Persian, which is attributed to Shahzad has been verbally handed down to the present day."

It is important to note that Dames was familiar with the north eastern part of Pakistani Baluchistan, and he came there from India. This story is alien to Persian Shī'ism. Moreover, I have not heard it in the Persian province, or of any similar miracles connected with Alī. Nor do the Persian Baluch mark any of the first ten days of the month of Muharram (and the Persian Shī'a do not anyway generally fast during that period). Nevertheless, there are other factors in the ethnography of the Persian Province which suggest some attachment between Shī'ism and both the Province and the Baluch at some period. For instance, at Lādiz (north east of Kuh-i-Taftān) there still stand the ruins of a shrine which is remembered to have been a qadamgāh of Alī - that is, a shrine built over a spot where Alī left the imprint of his foot. Again, although the Shī'a mourning period of the first ten days of Muharram (the first month of the Islamic lunar year, on the tenth day of which the third Shī'a Imām, Husein, the grandson of the Prophet, was martyred at Karbalā) is not now marked in any way by the Baluch, according to one informant some thirty years ago in the Sarāvān area women used to go round the villages singing songs about this episode of Islamic history and collecting money (rather like carol singers) and on the tenth day - the anniversary - they produced food for a communal village meal, a funeral meal in honour of Husein.

These hints of original Shī'ism in the Province and among the Baluch do not suggest any simple explanation, but in the Province today, except for perhaps slightly more emphasis on the person of Alī than is normal in orthodox Sunni Islam, (cf. e.g. the personal name Alī Muhammad in fig. I) there is no trace of Shī'ism among the Sunni majority. But there are a few communities of Sayyids. Sayyids are descendents of the Prophet, and enjoy a favoured social status in Shī'a communities. The Sayyids in the Persian Province claim to have come from the area of Isfahān in Safavid times (i.e. 16th-17th centuries). This would mean that they left a society where Shī'ism was more powerful than it has ever been and where they therefore had a secure and favoured social status, to live among Sunni tribesmen. They are now all Sunnis, but continue to be

known as sayyids, and descendents of the Prophet. No special advantages accrue to them from this. They simply form another shahrī qāt, though of relatively high social standing similar to that of the Sheikhs who will be treated in the following chapter.[1]

II

In the Province today the practice of Sunni Islam and its role in the life of the society bears many similarities to that described for other nomadic, pastoral tribal peoples in Islam. It is not, I think, idle to note the resemblance between Baluch society and that of the Bedouin in Arabia in the seventh century. Evans Pritchard (1949: 4) noted a similar resemblance with the Bedouin of Cyrenaica. Unlike the Bedouin of Cyrenaica the Baluch and the shahrī normally do pray five times a day, but like the Bedouin probably the most important aspect of the practice of their faith for them is the fast of the month of Ramazān, which is most strictly observed.

Three role terms are associated with this formal religion: maulawī, mullā and (P.) qazī. None of these are actually essential either to the life of the society or to the practice of the formal religion. They imply stages and types of (religious) learning, acquired almost exclusively in the Subcontinent, mostly in Karachi and Delhi, and subsequent competence to interpret the teachings of Hanafī Islam. A maulawī has usually studied for some twelve years. Considerable status is attached to the role, and holders of it are almost exclusively from the shahrī category of the society. They are always settled permanently in a particular town or village. Mullās, however, are accorded little or no extra status, and may be of either Baluch or shahrī origin, itinerant or settled. They are supposed to have studied two or three

1. There are a few small Shī'a communities among the low class Mēds on the coast. It was very difficult to obtain reliable information about these, but it would appear that they adhere to a different form of Shī'ism - Zaidī - and their presence on the Makran coast is due to seafaring contacts.

in Pakistan or India. Whereas there is formal recognition of the status of maulawī at the school where the man has studied, there is no such recognition of mullā, and it would seem that any man with religious inclinations may go to Pakistan, acquire a modicum more knowledge of his religion than is the heritage of every Baluch, return and call himself a mullā. For the Baluch the basic meaning of the term is "learned". Conventionally, the mullā is called upon to give the call to prayer (azān), lead communal prayers (there is virtue in praying communally rather than separately), perform marriages, and recite the Qur'ān at funerals. None of these functions has to be performed by a mullā, but any man who performs any of them habitually will soon be referred to as a mullā.

The term qāzī denotes one who judges according to the sharīat (Islamic law), and is therefore applied to a maulawī when he performs this function. Consequently any religious man who is often resorted to for decisions of this type may be generally referred to as qāzī (an example is given in the following chapter). These roles are all that link the Baluch with formal Islam physically. The maulawīs are the only members of Baluch society who have systematic formal knowledge of Islam. But none of these roles is vital to the life of the community.

Practically every village in the Persian Province of Baluchistan has a small mud building set aside for use as a mosque. The religious (lunar) yearly cycle is second in importance only to the agricultural and pastoral yearly cycle in the popular mind. The two most important events in it are Ramazān and Eid Qurbān. The latter is referred to simply as Eid and is marked by communal prayers for which people come in from outlying villages and areas to be together in the larger centres. All who can afford it kill a sheep, goat or camel, and the greeting is peil kan ("forgive") which is answered by tau peil kan ("you forgive"). Most Baluch attend the mosque at least once a day - usually for the evening (ishā) prayers - and in some areas as often as five times a day.

The mosque therefore naturally becomes the general meeting place for shahrī communities, and in some areas - especially where there is no chief - the meeting in the mosque after the evening prayers takes the place of the dīwān.

The only other activity connected with the formal religion which is important in our context is the hajj. It is the ambition of every Baluch to make the pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in his life. By taking a boat across the Gulf this can be done very cheaply indeed and thousands go every year. Although this journey barely takes them out of Baluchistan (for there are Baluch émigré communities in the Gulf Sheikhdoms, and in Mecca and elsewhere in Arabia) it nevertheless brings some familiarity with non-Baluch things and material for conversations in dīwāns. However, although those who are able to make the hajj are considered luckier in life than those who are not, a man cannot improve his social status by becoming a hājjī, and it is not unusual to see a hājjī living in very poor circumstances and even acting as a servant to a chief (cf. Barth, 1953: 96).

III

It is an almost popular impression in the West that Islam in general is an impersonal religion consisting of a comprehensive law of life which dictates how the adherent must live, but does not allow him to approach his God or have a "personal" relationship with him. This idea has been used as an explanation for the appearance of a number of informal movements which promise a personal relationship with God, and the institution of Sufism in Islam. These movements have sometimes been accepted as orthodox, sometimes branded as heterodox by formal Islam, but they have appeared in some form or other since the beginnings of Islam and throughout its geographical extent. This interpretation has been much maligned as a gross over-simplification. Aetiologically this may be true. It may be an over-simplification. But the fact nevertheless

remains that there is a dichotomy between these two religious attitudes present in the actual practice of religion throughout most of Islam (cf. e.g. Spooner, 1963, especially pp. 93-5). I therefore maintain that so long as we remember that it is an over-simplification it is a useful working hypothesis from which to start in the analysis of the function of religion in an Islamic society.

It is impossible to know what was the religion of the people who brought the Baluchi language into the Province before Islam, or what was the religion in the Province before the Arab conquest. But it is legitimate to assume that when the Baluch arrived in the Province the only accepted formal religion was Islam (with the possible exception of Zoroastrianism it was almost certainly also the only one known), and that the Baluch and each of the other groups which have entered the Province since came from areas where the only accepted formal religion was similarly Islam.

Religious conflict tends to occur between formal religions, rather than between a formal religion and informal religious practice. Many of the religious conflicts which have occurred in the history of Islam have been due to movements towards a more personal interpretation of the religion claiming formal status (e.g. Bābism in Persia in the middle of the last century), or, alternatively localised "personality conflicts" between representatives of the formal religion and an informal movement (e.g. in Gomābad in the latter half of the last century, cf. Tābandeh, 1954). It is perhaps a truism, but nevertheless significant and seldom noticed, that new religious movements generally start as informal and consider themselves within the pale of the existing formal religion. Their religious purpose is to re-interpret or renovate it.

The sociology of the Persian Province of Baluchistan may have been similar in type to that described in this essay long before the advent of Islam. It is certain that for some time before the Baluch arrived,

and ever since, for the pre-Baluch population of the Province and each of the groups which have entered the Province since, "religion" and "Islam" have been synonyms. In all the known possible ethnic or cultural constituents of Baluch society (i.e. Semitic, Indo-Iranian and Turkic) religion (in the sense of man's orientation towards the super- or para-natural) was not anthropocentric, and contained nothing that could lead to a misunderstanding of Islam on the scale of the Melanesian misunderstanding of Christianity. Therefore, probably the most significant doctrinal imports of Islam are the uniqueness and unity of one God, and the great gulf between God and man - the pillars of the formal religion.

Basic and fundamental re-adaptation or perversion of the imported creed to fit with indigenous religious attitudes and practices was and is precluded by the fact that Islam was completely naturalised culturally in the cultural area of which the Province was a part, and was and is taught in the area by men who have studied in the great religious centres and fully understood the principles and orientation of the creed. Therefore all religion on the conscious plain was equated with Islam, without causing any basic perversion of it. But this situation need not affect the informal day to day behaviour with regard to the supernatural and the unknown. This can quite happily continue, even when it implies contradictions of doctrines of the formal religion, so long as no formal status is claimed for it. It is this which I refer to in this essay as the informal religion. Much or all of it may die out naturally in time, particularly if it is not contested, and if the formal religion can fill the gaps it would leave. Other aspects of it may take on new vitality through informal personal religious movements.

I have attempted to define from a historical point of view the significance of Islam as the formal religion in Baluch society. More will be said about informal religion in the next chapter, and both are perhaps equally important sociologically. In the remainder of this chapter I discuss briefly the present sociological significance of the

formal religion in the Province.

IV

It is important to remember that, despite what has been said above about how long Islam and religion have been synonyms for the population of the Province, since Islam belongs primarily to a sophisticated city culture Baluch religion cannot be compared sociologically to, for instance, Nuer religion or Lugbara religion. That is, Islamic values and Baluch values, whether or not they coincide in practice, and whether or not they are equated in practice, spring from two discrete traditions. In fact, they are equated in the popular mind, and they often do coincide in practice. When they conflict (and from the sociological point of view they only conflict significantly in the inheritance practices, cf. chapter 10 above) the Islamic rules are generally ignored and local tradition is followed. (It should be remembered that inheritance practices diverge in practice from strict Islamic rules in many tribal societies within the Islamic cultural area.)

As a generalisation it is true to say that Baluch tradition is the immediate sanction for all decisions and settlements, but that when there is doubt about the interpretation of this tradition in any particular instance the ultimate sanction is Islam - interpreted by a maulawī (cf. on sharīat above, Part Four chapter 14.) However, when it is a question of the settlement of a dispute between two men, not even the official pronouncement of a maulawī is necessarily binding. If it is not acceptable to both parties, and the case is not of a nature to rouse public opinion against the party unwilling to accept the settlement, the dispute may continue indefinitely. However, in the case of new practices or new institutions introduced into the Province by the Persian administration or simply by the general "westernisation", the adverse pronouncement of a maulawī, though it may not keep the innovation at bay for good, will normally persuade the majority

of the population to have nothing to do with it for some time (cf. Parsons, 1964: 334). For instance, when the Agricultural Bank was introduced into the Province as part of the Government's scheme to make money available for individual agricultural investment several maulawīs immediately condemned its loans because it charged interest and usury is condemned by Islam. The officers of the Bank tried in vain in some localities to persuade the people that the interest charged was minimal and solely for the purpose of financing the running of the Bank. The trouble could probably have been avoided if on their forms at the top of the interest column the Bank had printed not (A.) ribh = interest, but, for instance, (A.) haqqu'l-zahma = fee. In a different sphere, when the government attempted to persuade the Baluch to volunteer to fight against the insurgent tribes in the south west of the country in the early summer of 1963, a prominent maulawī in Zāhidān spoke against it. In both of these cases the actual formulation of the maulawīs concerned was that whoever took bank loans or went to fight their "brothers" would make themselves ka annahu 'amala'l-zinā ("like one who had committed adultery").

In the same way that each chief has his following, each maulawī also has a following, though the following of a maulawī, being primarily concerned with or based on religious matters, is much more vaguely defined than that of a chief. The force of any particular maulawī's pronouncement is strongest in his own locality, and how far it spreads beyond his own locality depends on the personal reputation and fame of that particular maulawī. That is, even in the interpretation of the formal religion, which is considered to be the ultimate sanction for all Baluch practice, the personal element is not only not absent, but it is an important factor in the efficacy or application of Islamic principles in Baluch life. For it is perfectly possible (though unusual) for two maulawīs in the same locality to take opposite sides in a dispute. In the first of the cases cited above many of the people who were likely in fact to be granted loans by the Bank or be interested in making serious

use of them - the wealthier members of the society, mostly members of dynastic families - were sufficiently independent of mawlawī leadership to go their own way, and gradually personal interest got the better of strict adherence to the local interpretation of the formal religion. In the second case the pronouncement (so far as I could gather - for political reasons and because of the involvement of the secret police it was difficult to obtain accurate information) was entirely effective, except that certain leaders of a tribe in the Sarhadd, who have a close relationship with the administration and could not therefore disregard what amounted to an order for fear of reprisals and loss of the benefits of that relationship on which much of their present status in Baluch society depends, managed to provide the Government with a not very large number of their own followers. This would not have been enough to save the Government's face, except for the fact that the whole affair had been surrounded with the utmost secrecy, and nothing was known in the rest of the country of the request or the response.

In connection with this last instance it should be borne in mind that until not very long ago, and certainly during the Baluch Period, the response would probably have been excellent. Such a "legitimate" excuse for fighting seldom came their way.

It seems very likely that the authority of the mawlawīs, who are in effect potential leaders who rely on the popular attitude to the formal religion for the basis of their social status, has increased significantly since the Baluch Period. Detailed evidence for this assertion is difficult toassemble, but the following points suggest it:

a) It is generally said in most of the settled areas of the Province that the numbers and the status and authority of mawlawīs has increased since the end of the Baluch Period.

b) Dancing is very rare in the Province today, and it is generally said throughout the Province that both music and dancing used to be a much commoner, if not a favourite pastime. Both music and dancing are

considered unlawful in Islam (cf. e.g. Hughes, 1885, arts. "Music" and "Dancing") and the increase in the authority of the maulawīs is cited as the reason for their disappearance.

c) We know that since the Baluch period the political status of the chiefs has gradually been whittled away by the Administration. This has in general resulted in some degeneration of the social and political responsibility of the present chiefs. The Administration has in most cases been unable to fill the gaps in the leadership which the people expect from the super-structure which the chiefs constituted. It is reasonable to surmise that these gaps have in some cases been filled by religious leaders. In at least one settled area where there is now no resident chief (the upper Sarbāz valley) there is a very large number of maulawīs - at least one per village. There has been no comparable increase in the number of informal religious leaders (cf. next chapter).

I consider therefore that we are entitled to posit a general fall in the activity of secular leadership (i.e. chiefs) and a corresponding rise in the activity of formal religious leadership (i.e. maulawīs) and a relationship between the two. If we have been correct so far, in a way the two types of leadership are comparable in some important respects. Each depends for its status on something fundamentally or originally alien to Baluch society. Neither is entirely integrated into the society. The charisma of the chief is attainable only through birth into a dynastic family. The maulawī's qualification can be obtained only after some twelve years study abroad. Neither of these qualifications on its own makes its holder a leader. Whether or not the holder of either of these qualifications becomes a leader depends on his own personality and ambition. But given this personality and ambition the "legitimacy" of the leader's position depends on the respective qualification.

Here the similarity ends. Of the good chief the Baluch can feel that he is "one of them". He upholds and glories in the Baluch code

of honour and the old poems and traditions. The maulawī, although he is also proud of being Baluch and of the Baluch tradition, is a very different type of character from the chief. He is conscious always of being the representative of something which, although it would never be thought was in any way incompatible with Baluch-ness, is supra-Baluch. He claims extra respect for being the representative of Islam, and seldom, if ever, unbends, as the Baluch in general do whenever they can, to conversational intimacy or garrulousness.

Islam, in its capacity as the formal religion of the Baluch, is a constant law, which defines the distant relationship between man and God, explains the daily vicissitudes of life as dependent on the unfathomable will of that God, and prescribes rules (e.g. for praying, fasting, etc.) by which a man should live in order to attain the better alternative for life after death. Everything is simple, certain, constant and impersonal. There are no mysteries, everything is straightforward. This Islam is unquestioned, it is a part of Baluch life. The authority of the chief is always potentially greater than that of the maulawī, because the attraction of the chief is personal, so long as the chief does not attempt to lead against Islam. The maulawī cannot generally win in competition with the chief unless the chief is being patently un-Islamic in his public life - which would mean he was also being un-Baluch. That is, the maulawī is tied to two codes explicitly, one of which is more rigorous, and he suffers by generally not having the personal contact or personal charisma that the chief has. Nevertheless, where the chief leaves a vacuum, the maulawī may fulfil some of the most important functions of the leader of a community.

Chapter Sixteen

Informal Religion

The distinction I am making between the formal and informal religion is not made consciously by the Baluch. Both are religion, and therefore both are Islam. But there are two basic types of men who claim greater religious knowledge than the generality. The maulawīs and mullās who were discussed in the last chapter and whose knowledge is acquired by studying abroad, constitute one type. The other type, who claim esoteric knowledge, have seldom studied abroad, and are treated in this chapter under the heading of informal religion. They may be referred to as darwīsh, sufī, pakīr (= Arabic "faqīr") or simply wāja. They are normally addressed as wāja, which is also the normal (secular) term of address used for equals or superiors, but particularly for chiefs. For convenience, I refer to all these informal religious leaders as darwīsh.

Like the maulawīs, the darwīsh also claim an alien justification for their status and function. They claim to belong to the Sufī tradition of Islam (cf. Enc Is. 1934, art. "Tasawwuf") or Islamic mysticism. But these claims are not so important or conspicuous in the justification of their social status as those of the maulawīs. For the Baluch, the darwīsh are simply holy men, men who are closer to God than they are. Relationship with a darwīsh allows a man to feel that he has an intercessor with God - who is otherwise too distant for him to reach or feel sure of. There is a general incompatibility between these two roles: maulawī and darwīsh. On the conscious level this incompatibility is due to the historical development of the two in Islam. On the spot in Baluchistan - and elsewhere - it goes deeper than this. The darwīsh is much closer to the people than the maulawī and personifies and gives conscious representation of the unconscious religious aspects or attitudes of everyday life. He is assimilated into the Baluch tradition.

The mawlawī represents an alien tradition, which though it is accepted and has an absolute value and a definite function in the ecology of roles in the society, is not fully assimilated.

Just as the distinction between these two roles and what they represent is not explicitly made by the Baluch, so they are not always entirely distinguishable in any given locality to the ethnographer. In any given locality there may be a representative of one and not the other, in which case religion in that locality will be seen more in terms of the type which is explicitly represented. Again there are mawlawīs who incline to the darwīsh interpretation, either in themselves, or because of the magnetic personality of an outstanding darwīsh in the same locality. Similarly, there are men whose background qualifies them to be darwīsh, but play a role in society which makes them barely distinguishable from a mawlawī. But the distinction nevertheless exists, and each type has a general validity in the Province as a whole.

The formal religion is much stronger among the shahrī than the Baluch simply because mawlawīs are always settled in shahrī communities, but both Baluch and shahrī, (and mawlawīs and darwīsh) pray five times a day and attend a mosque frequently when there is one near. The mawlawīs are equated with learning and learning is hard to attain for the shahrī and practically unattainable for the Baluch, and this is largely responsible for the gulf between the majority of the mawlawīs and the people, but they nevertheless command great respect because they are the representatives and interpreters of the religion. The informal religion plays a greater part in the thinking of the Baluch (and particularly of the Baluch) because it is more on their level. They understand it better and it caters more for their everyday needs. The darwīsh in a sense personify the informal religion.

To describe all the practices, which are not taught by the formal religion but are traditional modes of religious expression in the every-

day life of the Baluch and therefore constitute the informal religion, would require a book in itself. Since they differ little from what is general to the whole of the east of Persia and a very useful compendium of these practices in the east of Persia exists (Donaldson, 1938, cf. also Masse, 1938) it will be sufficient here to characterise this informal religion with a few examples which have specific relevance to the subject of this essay.

The following is a typical traditional Baluch story of a darwīsh:

"Pīr Sohrī belonged to the Pīrumānī Mutānī section (of the Bogtī tribe) [east of Quetta, West Pakistan]. One day he was grazing his goats in the jungle, when the four friends of God [i.e. the first four caliphs: Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthmān, Alī] came up and asked him to give them a goat. Sohrī replied: 'This flock of goats is not mine, I am only a goatherd. I have one goat which I have earned as my hire. I will give you that one.' So saying he brought it and gave it to them. The four fakīrs cooked and ate it. Then they called Sohrī and giving him their blessing, said: 'On the day that the owner of the goats dismisses you from being goatherd, build a large cattle-pen at the place where you live. Bring as many goats as you possess and put them in the cattle-pen, and by the command of God, your whole cattle-pen will be filled with goats. Goats of such a kind will come to your cattle-pen, that no one else will be able to recognise them.' Besides this the four fakīrs gave Sohrī a stick and said - 'Wherever you want water, in dependence upon God, strike this stick on the ground, and on that spot water will spring out of the earth; drink yourself and give it to your goats.' The four fakīrs having said so much went home. Thereafter Sohrī did not, as he had been wont, take the goats to a place where there was water; wherever he happened to be at midday, he struck the ground with his stick, and brought out water, which he gave to the goats. The owner of the goats after a few days began to think that his goatherd did not, as he had been wont, bring the flock to the watering place, and said to himself: 'I can't say whether he waters it at another place, or whether my goats

are dying of thirst.' One day he went and concealed himself in the jungle. He saw Sohrī giving the goats water on a stony hill. When Sohrī took the goats to another spot, the owner of the goats went to the place where water had been given to them, and saw that there was no water or watering-place there. On this he went to Sohrī and said: 'Tell me about this water, and whence you got water for the goats upon the hill.' At first Sohrī prevaricated, but at length from the very place where he was sitting he drew out water by means of his stick, and gave it to the owner of the goats. In the evening the owner of the goats went home and told the whole story to his wife. They agreed that the man was one of God's fakīrs, and that it was improper to keep him as a goatherd. Sohrī, as he was wont, brought the goats to the hamlet, and at night slept in the goat-pen. Early in the morning, when the owner of the goats went to wake him, he saw a black snake sleeping beside him. The owner of the goats got still more frightened and said: 'You are a fakīr, I can't keep you as a goatherd.' On this Sohrī built a big cattle-pen near his home, and fetching one goat of his own, which he had earned by his labour, he put it in the pen and slept there at night. He woke very early in the morning and saw that the whole pen was filled with goats. Most of the goats were of a dun colour (sohr), some had dun-coloured ears and white (bodies). They were goats of a kind that no one had ever seen before. One day Sohrī was grazing his goats, when a Beledai robber band came down and killed him, so that that place where he died is known as Sohrī Koshtāk. They were carrying off his goats, when Sohrī became alive again, and went up and met his enemies, who cut off his head a second time and threw it away; but Sohrī again took up his head in his hands and said to them: 'Give me back my goats!' When his enemies saw the state in which he was, they gave up the goats in terror, and laying hold of his feet craved his blessing. Sohrī went home as he was without his head, and then fell down dead on the ground. Before this he had told his children that when he died, they should tie him on a camel, and that wherever the camel went to, and after sitting down did not rise up again, they should build his ziyārat (shrine).

His sons did as they had been told. At first the camel went and sat down at four places, where there were kanda trees, which trees exist to this day. Then it went to the place where Sohrī's ziyārat now stands, and, after sitting down there did not get up again. There they built Sohrī's ziyārat. Sohrī's daughter died on the same day, and her ziyārat was also built beside Sohrī's, but next day they noticed that the ziyārat of Sohrī's daughter had moved in another direction, and was not standing in its former position. Many other miracles took place by the power of Pīr Sohrī, which I cannot fully relate. Ever after the Darkhānīs and most of the other hill and plain Baluch greatly reverenced him. The oath by Pīr Sohrī is a very binding one in [eastern] Baluchistan; through fear of Pīr Sohrī the Baluch will not take a lying oath. Baluch say that if a man swears a lying oath by Sohrī, assuredly Sohrī will bring on him great misfortunes. Generally, Baluch give as an offering to Sohrī a dun-coloured goat. When a man's wishes have come to pass, he takes a dun-coloured goat and presents it. A 'mujewar' ['guardian'] sits at the shrine. He kills the goat, and whoever are present at the time divide it equally among themselves. Baluch call the whole Nutanī section of the Bogtī tribe Fakīr. At present Fatehān is the chief headman of the Pīruzānī section. Baluch pay great respect to him, and in this way he has become a powerful and influential headman. Most Baluch fear him because he belongs to Sohrī's section. Many meet daily at Sohrī's ziyārat. Sohrī's ziyārat is one day's march to the west of Siyah-āb" (Hetu Ram, 1885: 77-81, with original in the eastern dialect of Baluchi in adjacent columns).

There are no darwīsh in the Persian Province now of quite such outstanding holiness, nor are there any shrines with a reputation as great as that of Pīr Sohrī. However, the following features of the above story are significant for an understanding of the informal religion in the Persian Province.

a) The story concerns ordinary Baluch in an ordinary Baluch environment.

b) While the story as such could take place in any religious context,

it is nevertheless given an Islamic context.

c) The supernatural aspects of the story are simple, ingenious, child-like, almost unnecessary miracles.

d) A shrine (ziyārat - lit. = "pilgrimage") is built over his grave.

e) His descendents share to a limited extent in the "charisma" of his holiness, and the head of the family of his descendents, given the personal aptitude, can exploit this heritage in a political and/or religious direction.

In the Persian Province of Baluchistan today there are three darwīsh of sufficient social standing to require their being taken account of in any discussion of leadership in the Province. These are: Sheikh Cherāg, Qāzī Muhammad Hasan Arjomandī, and Wāja Mullā Mīā. It is noteworth that each is conventionally given a different title: Sheikh, Qāzī and Wāja Mullā respectively.

Sheikh Cherāg is the leader of the Sheikhzāda zāt and resides in Dalgān (cf. above, chapter 2). The Sheikhzāda are a zāt which may be compared with the dependents of Pīr Sohrī in the story quoted above, for, though they do not claim any one ancestor so outstanding as Pīr Sohrī, more than one of their recent ancestors has a shrine over his grave, and the name of the tribe means that they are descended agnatically from a Sheikh or holy man. Sheikh Cherāg, therefore, apart from his own personal aptitude, occupies a position which potentially combines political and (informal) religious authority. This potentiality is well exploited by his own personal qualities, and the fact that there are no maulawīs in the surrounding area to compete with him in the interpretation of religion or in leadership functions.

Qāzī Muhammad Hasan Arjomandī resides in Qasr Qand. He claims to be of Afghan origin. His grandfather came to the Persian Province and there is a wall round his grave (which is in Nigwar, cf. chapter 2), which would suggest that it was used as a shrine, though I noticed no

evidence of such use. Neither Sheikh Cherāg nor Qāzī Muhammad Hasan have studied outside Baluchistan. They learnt all they know from their fathers and other Baluch darwīsh or maulawīs. In the case of Sheikh Cherāg, who has, anyway, as we have seen, more auxiliary justification for his status, this does not amount to much. His main extra-ordinary claim is an ability to be able to deal with jinn (evil spirits, see below) and cure madness (cf. below under dam). Qāzī Muhammad Hasan on the other hand has at least a reasonable knowledge of Persian and Arabic, and probably comes as close to fulfilling the maulawī role as is possible for a man who has not studied outside the province, and so does not have the formal maulawī qualification, - hence his title Qāzī. He is highly respected in the Qasr Qand area and has enough melk to provide him with a reasonable standard of living. His main social function (the purely religious roles of both the darwīsh and the maulawīs are not relevant to the subject of this essay) appears to be as mediator in disputes (sharīat kanag) and preacher (examples of his preaching are given below). Again there are no maulawīs in his area to rival him in the religious sphere, but in this case it is not easy at first to distinguish him from a maulawī in his relationship with his community. The distinction lies in fact in his reliance on his own personal interpretation and the tradition of his line rather than the criterion of alien schools for his position.

Māja Mullā Miā is very different from these two, and probably more typical of the general Baluch conception of darwīsh. He comes originally from the lower Marbāz area, and has made his home now in Ashār. Unlike Sheikh Cherāg he has no zāt status. The tribe he comes from is respectable but widely dispersed, and he has no special status within it. Unlike Qāzī Muhammad Hasan he shows no pretensions to social status. Ashār is a shahrī village surrounded by mountains which are roamed by Baluch. In the late fifties the second Barakzai brother (Muhammad Amīn) was hākum of Ashār and Mīrzā Khān Barakzai was hākum in Brafshān some 15 miles to the east. (cf. Part Six chapter 19).

Mãja Mullã Mĩa, therefore, had natural and easy contact with all classes of the society, including two prominent chiefs of the leading dynastic family. He is an old man, small but with an impressive countenance and white hair and beard. He enjoys good health, and perhaps because he lives in an area where the population is either Baluch or scattered in small villages, spends probably at least half the year travelling - for one reason or another. He knows Arabic and is supposed to have bested maulawĩs in theological argument (which is basically a test of knowledge of religious texts). He does not speak Persian, but appears to have a reading knowledge of classical Persian. He lives a simple life, does not wait for respect but is generally shown it, spends much of the day apparently in meditation or singing religious poetry to himself, and has a great reputation for healing (cf. below on "dam"). For some years now the Bãraksai chiefs have kept his company and shown him respect, and much of his travelling is due to their summoning him to cure relatives, etc.

The extent of the influence of this type of religious leader and that of the maulawĩs is much harder to gauge than that of the chiefs. Further, their influence in fields which are not specifically concerned with religious belief and practice (in a broad sense) is often indirect only. As a general guide it may be stated that Sheikh Cherãg is the primary informal religious leader in Dashtiãrĩ, Bãhu and the coastal plain; Qãzĩ Muhammad Hasan in the area of Qasr Qand and the mountains from Geh to Mãsk; and Mãja Mullã Mĩã in Sarãvãn and the eastern Jãs Kurĩãn. It may be seen from the summary description I have given of these three characters that although their status and influence is in each case based on the role of darwĩsh, they are nevertheless very different sorts of people and therefore function in different ways. The main difference between them and the maulawĩs is that they overtly claim a personal allegiance and a personal charisma as mystically appointed representatives of God, appointed to lead those who are mystically shown the way. The maulawĩs although they may in some cases acquire a quite

considerable personal allegiance cannot claim it since it would conflict with the whole basis of their formal religious role. There is therefore more similarity between the darwīsh and the chief in this respect: that each depends for the degree of his success as a leader on the ascription to him by his followers of a personal charisma. The difference between the two lies in the fact that in the case of the chief the charisma must be inherited and entitles to paramount (secular) authority in the society, whereas in the case of the darwīsh the charisma is not inherited, depends exclusively on personal qualities from which a certain otherworldliness must be inferred (though the actual quality of this varies a great deal from case to case) and confers directly potential authority in purely spiritual matters only. Any other authority which a darwīsh may acquire is only secondary to this and may usually only be wielded indirectly. For instance, Āqa Mullā Mīā commands a certain amount of secular authority through his influence with the Bārakzai family and through people referring to him problems other than those of purely spiritual import. Qāzī Muhammad Hasan commands secular authority in the (comparatively) large agricultural centre of Qasr Qand by having acquired for himself the position of a major kamāsh in the village. He has managed this by a combination of ownership of malk, and claims to social importance on the basis of his religious authority. Sheikh Cherāg (like the descendents of Pīr Sohrī in the story quoted) on the other hand combines by right in his person the leadership of the tribe and the mystical leadership of the darwīsh: the tribe is highly respected because of the religious status of certain of his ancestors, whether or not he functions as a darwīsh himself.

Apart from such potential leaders in the informal religion there are also a few itinerant religious mendicants who are usually referred to by the term pakīr (This term may also be applied to the characters already mentioned - it means poor in worldly things and by extension therefore rich spiritually.) These usually have no learning, but claim a mystical inner closeness to God. They sometimes show symptoms of

insanity, and in some cases seem to make a point of acting in an irrational way. They are tolerated to an amazing degree, apparently because it is thought that they may have some mystical power, and their prayers and curses may be answered, but they also have some entertainment value. In the house of the leader of the Bārakzai in Īrānshahr in March 1966 there was a pakīr. He was dressed in rags and would sit for hours in a corner of the guest room making no sound. At other times he would break into speech, but often what he said would either be nonsense or ridiculous. At that time there were three other chiefs staying in the house, and one or other of them would usually give him a sympathetic hearing, though it was difficult to tell sometimes whether they were treating him seriously or simply as an amusing diversion. However, he was fed regularly and allowed to sleep in the same room at night. It was said that he was by origin a Baluch from the Sarhadd, had wandered for many years in India and Pakistan, and now wandered from village to village in the Jāz Murīān.

The substance of the informal religion is the asking of favours from the supernatural. The supernatural is personified as the God of the Qurān, or one of his special representatives in history, for example a dead darvīsh over whose grave a shrine has been built. A shrine is usually in the form of four walls built round a grave or supposed grave. If it is well frequented it will be covered with a small dome-roof, and often the whole exterior is whitewashed. Most shrines are of this type, but two other types deserve mention.

To the first belongs a far grander building (though essentially of the same type) outside Chāhbahār. This shrine is to a certain Ghulām Rasul, and according to the local people was built by a group of men from Hyderabad (Sind) about 115 years ago. Ghulām Rasul had been a Sayyid and (obviously) a kawāsh. He had died at Chāhbahār on his way to Mecca to perform the hajj, and had ordered that after his death a wedding celebration of eight days duration should be held for him each year on the anniversary of his death, since he had planned to marry on

his return from the hajj. This shrine, therefore, would appear to have been built, and at first controlled, by foreigners, in honour of a foreigner on a recognised "charismatic" (i.e. because of its connection with the hajj) route. Gradually the festival attracted and included the local population -mostly low class Mēds and ghulāms - and continued to flourish, although apparently forgotten in Hyderabad. This appears to be a unique institution, but fulfils the same functions as other smaller shrines throughout the Province.

The second type concerns the same general region, more specifically the coast itself. Along the coast from the Pakistan border to Jāsk a number of points which jut out into the sea are held to be sacred to Khezr (Arabic: Khidr). A few have shrines built on them. Khezr (the name comes from the Arabic root meaning "green") is a vague legendary mystical figure who appears in the Qur'ān and is connected with the legendary "water of life" and considered to rule the sea (cf. Donaldson, 1938: 93 and Enc. Is. 1934: art. Khidr). These shrines, therefore, are not historical, and are confined apparently in origin to a relationship between coast-dwellers and the sea. However, so far as I could ascertain, there is nothing in their sociological function to distinguish them from the other shrines in the Province, or indeed in the east of Persia in general.

The visible representations of this informal religion, then, are not homogeneous. Insofar as the darwīsh is typically a mystic, the informal religion includes mysticism and may perhaps be said to be generally mystical. The shrine is for the every day business of asking favours in return for vows (nazr), but the site of the shrine may depend on the site of the grave of a religious man, or on a natural phenomenon (cf. Spooner, 1963, for six-fold classification of shrines by origin). Both the shrines and the darwīsh may be asked to cure illnesses. My reason for including these different religious ideas under one term - informal religion - in distinction from the formal religion of the

maulawīs is that the formal religion is theoretically opposed to all of them. The maulawīs command great respect - so long as they live up to their teaching. Their influence is stronger in the shahrī communities than the Baluch communities. But it is a valid generalisation that the for Baluch - and especially for the Baluch - the informal religion is an integral part of their community life, whether or not there are any informal religious leaders in the vicinity, whereas apart from the five daily prayers and the fast of Ramazān and the festival of Eid Qurban the formal religion is not. The formal religion is something they have to make a conscious effort to learn - the informal religion is part of the life in which they grow up.

Informal religion includes the treatment of and modes of behaviour towards otherwise unexplainable phenomena, including serious illness, and madness. Such things are often, though not always, explained in terms of the activity of jinn. The jinn have a definite place in the formal religion. According to formal Islamic theology they are "bodies composed of vapour or flame, intelligent, imperceptible to our senses, capable of appearing under different forms and of carrying out heavy labours.... They were created of smokeless flame while mankind and the angels, the other two classes of intelligent beings, were created of clay and light. They are capable of salvation" (Enc. Is., 1965, II, p.547). There is some confusion over their relationship with the devil (Iblīs), since in one place the Qur'ān refers to Iblīs as a jinn, and in another as an angel (ibid). The word is of course Arabic, but the etymology is obscure, and "the possibility of explanation through borrowing from Latin (genius) is not entirely excluded" (ibid.). But there were jinn in Arabia before Islam. They were "the nymphs and satyrs of the desert, and represented the side of the life of nature still unsubdued and hostile to man (ibid). Whether or not the present use of the word in Baluchi includes the survival of a pre-Islamic conception or not, the jinn may now be both naturalis deus uniuscuiusque loci - not necessarily either good or evil, but to be treated with circumspection - or the cause of

madness, serious illness or disease, or even strabismus.

Since the subject of this essay is leadership, the account of the informal religion given here is confined to those aspects of it which are specifically relevant to the roles of leaders - whether chiefs, maulawīs or darwīsh.

The only case of madness I came across was taken to Sheikh Cherāg. On discussion of this aspect of his powers it was generally asserted that Sheikh Cherāg was not particularly good at, for instance, "binding" fevers or dealing with other types of affliction, but jin o min jur jat - "he was O.K. with jinn". (In fact with this particular case he had no success.) This was not unusual: in general the people who are approached to perform these functions are leaders, though nearly always chiefs or darwīsh, not maulawīs. Leaders who are sought out for cures are usually known for their success in one particular "branch". For instance, Sheikh Cherāg with jinn - which generally means insanity; Mīr Akub Khān Bārakzai, a not very significant member of the Bārakzai dynastic family, but nevertheless the brother of Dust Muhammad Khān, for curing toothache; Nushīrwān, another brother of Dust Muhammad Khān, for snake bite, etc. These people - chiefs and darwīsh, but not (i.e. not necessarily) maulawīs - have according to our analysis so far one exclusive characteristic in common; they were attributed a personal charisma.

A few years before my stay in the Province there was a quite unusual outbreak of jinn activity in the village of Arabzai in Dashtiārī. In one particular lug for a period of some twenty days glasses of tea often rose from the ground and dropped. Similar things happened with the tops of water-pipes. Bedclothes inexplicably moved off the sleeping inmates, and stones sailed through the air. In fact all the activities associated with the European poltergeist were observed and it was all put down to jinn. One old woman who sickened and died soon afterwards said she had been hit by one. It was confined to the one lug, and the

inmates, who were by sāt katrī - neither Baluch nor Jadgāl, soon moved to another lug, whereupon the activity ceased. However, before this perhaps obvious move was resorted to, mullawīs had read the Qur'ān aloud in the presence of the jinn with no effect. There had apparently been no darwīsh in the vicinity at the time.

Apart from such conspicuous activities on the part of the jinn, it was very difficult to obtain explicit information about their general existence and relations with men. On more than one occasion I thought I heard a reference to them while walking with a group for instance past the mouth of a shady narrow shēp, but when questioned, the Baluch with me always denied it.

The most common practice (which is part of the informal religion) for stilling or neutralising the activity of jinn, or curing fever, snake-bite, etc. is called dam or dam-chu (dam is a Persian word the primary meaning of which is "breath"; -chu is explained as being onomatopoeic), and consists of murmuring under the breath inaudibly various formulas and blowing on the person concerned or on a piece of thread which will be then tied round his ankle or arm. The "secret" formula may be referred to as werd (i wird = recitation of section of the Qur'ān in private meditation, cf. Enc. Is. 1934 art. "wird"). It was a long time before I was told that these formulas have been published in India along with instructions to be carried out before their use will become effective. However, although some leaders may have learnt their dam either directly or indirectly from such books, I do not think the fact that these formulas have been published is relevant to their function in the informal religion of Baluch society. For although it may be important to some of the leaders who practise dam-chu as the ultimate justification of their power, it is not a factor in the trust of their patients. The Baluch asks for a dam from a man with charisma. The fact that the dam is performed with some show of mystery adds to the impression of charisma - particularly if it is successful or the practitioner

shows some record of success. Individual failures can always be explained - and are readily explained - by the fact that the patient, for instance, had some bad intent at the time, or he "was not meant" (i.e. by God) to recover.

The various types of dam are in far more demand among the Baluch than the shahrī, in the more isolated parts of the Province than in the main settlements. This may be explained both by the presence of the maulawīs and the influence of modernisation and the availability of medicine in the main settlements. Both are certainly relevant. As a result of this, when a leader (with charisma) normally resident in one of the main shahrī settlements travels into the more isolated Baluch areas of the Province he is continually asked for dam whether or not he has any claim to practise it. In some cases he may never have done it before. Even I (having been accepted into the society with the social status of a member of a dynastic family, and therefore being attributed some vague charismatic quality) was on occasions approached. More ordinary kamāsh may also be approached, but there is always a quite wide gap in status between doctor and patient.

The following are some standard examples of the practice of dam by recognised "specialists":

1) For prevention of snake bite: The formula is murmured over a handful of black peppercorns which are then blown on. Each "patient" must eat an odd number of them, usually seven. It is effective for one year, and is claimed to enable the recipient to catch snakes as well. (The Bārakzai dynastic family in general claims to be able to catch snakes without being bitten, and that snake bites have no effect on them.)

2) For snake-bite: Dam performed over a glass of water, and then on the patient, who also drinks the water.

3) For fever: Dam performed on thread which is then tied round the ankle of the patient.

4) For tooth-ache: On the only occasion I saw this performed the leader wrote a seraal (which might have been a corruption of W.q.F. - the Arabic root for "stop"), on a piece of paper, which was then nailed on a wall while the patient held the ailing tooth. The tooth-ache stopped soon afterwards.

One further religious element is relevant to the present enquiry. I include this under the informal religion not because it is essentially connected with anything that has gone before, but because it tends to be a part of the function of the darwīsh. A favourite evening pastime is story-telling, whether legendary or historical. Generally, the historical is more usual, but the legendary is also very much enjoyed. The legendary may be divided into two types: Baluch (which should perhaps rather be called traditional (for examples cf. James, 1904 & 1907), and stories from the qur'ān and the traditions (A. hadīth). The Baluch legends are best told by pahlawāns or old men; the religious by darwīsh. Whenever a darwīsh is present at an evening dīwān he is liable to be asked to tell the stories of the qur'ān. The favourite stories are those of the lives of the men who according to the qur'ān were Muhammad's predecessors in prophethood. Most of them are characters who also feature in the Bible. Their stories as they are told in the qur'ān in many cases differ somewhat from the Bible, often because in the qur'ān they are told with a simple moral purpose. If anything this difference is accentuated in the Baluch context. The following examples will not be irrelevant to our main theme:

1) God told Gabriel that man is the noblest thing in creation. Gabriel was rather surprised and pointed out that when Joseph was being pulled out of the well and the rope broke, Gabriel was ordered to catch and save him. At the time Gabriel was in the third heaven, and as is known it is a 500 year journey from heaven to heaven, but he nevertheless reached the well in time and saved Joseph from hitting the bottom. Now surely a man cannot be as quick as that?! God told him to go down to where the Prophet Muhammad was leading prayers in the mosque in Medina

and when he finished to go up to the last man to leave the mosque and ask him where Gabriel was. (Now the first to arrive in the mosque and the last to leave was always Abu Bakr Diddīq [later the first caliph]. When Gabriel went up to Abu Bakr and asked him the question, he said: "You should go and ask the Prophet that sort of thing, for he is always in close contact with Gabriel." However, when Gabriel insisted, he closed his eyes and "looked inwards". (For the seven heavens and the earth and whatever else there is are all contained in the breast of man.) Then he answered: "Either I am Gabriel, or you are," for when he looked inwards and surveyed all the seven heavens and the earth he could not see him. Gabriel was nonplussed, and God said: "Is that quick enough for you?.

Moral: Man is potentially capable of anything, but he must live the life of a good muslim.

2) The story of Jonas as told in the Qur'ān and by the commentator Beidāwī (cf. Sale 1734: 370). Moral: it is not possible to escape God's will.

3) Joseph and his dreams (cf. Sale 1734: 187). Moral - how God works.

4) Mariam and the birth of Jesus (cf. Sale 1734: 250). Purports to show "true" nature of Jesus' "prophethood" and the ridiculousness of the Christians' beliefs about him.

Certain aspects of the way these stories are told are interesting. Firstly, there is always an atmosphere of the class before the school teacher. The darwīsh (or other narrator) is never just telling a story, he is teaching. He may even punctuate every other sentence with "You understand?" (sar-pad abē?). The stories he is telling are, it is true, common knowledge. Every one has heard them time and time again. But still they are treated very differently from the traditional Baluch stories. I have only heard religious stories told by maulawīs, mullās or darwīsh - most usually the latter. The traditional Baluch stories are normally told by pahlawāns (minstrels) or old men. Basically, both types of story are entertainment. Except in obvious cases of religious

preaching from the pulpit (minbar) which is rare or confined to large towns, I could discern no other reason for people asking to hear either type of story. However, the appeal of the stories is their representation and justification of traditional values. The Baluch stories represent and justify Baluch values, and the Islamic stories represent and justify Islamic values, both of which are subsumed in the corpus of Baluch values. Secondly, there is always great emphasis on unnecessary miracles, many of which do not occur in the Biblical version of the stories. This fits well with the general Baluch indifference to natural disasters and reliance on divine bounty.

To sum up this characterisation of the religious side of Baluch culture:

Although (in Baluchi) Islam is a synonym for "religion", Baluch values are not necessarily synonymous with Islamic values, though the reason for this may be that a certain amount of learning is generally considered to be necessary to become a really good muslim, but not to become a good Baluch. The formal religion then, although it is the final court of appeal on all counts, is not fully integrated into Baluch culture. In the same way, one might say, that the informal religion (which after all includes all that remains at the present time of pre-Islamic practices and ideas), is not fully integrated into Islam. The two are held to be the same thing, only the former is consciously recognised and it is therefore the formal arbiter of what is right and what is wrong in the latter, but it is the latter which is the religion of the ordinary man. The former is anti-mystical, the latter, if it does not include a mystical attitude, allows mysticism.

Chapter Seventeen

Religion and Leadership.

In the sense of leadership within the purely religious sphere, the interpretation of religious doctrine and exhortation to religious practice, this essay is not concerned with religious leadership. It is concerned rather with leadership in general within the society, and attempts to analyse the authority on which it is based and the sociological criteria which determine whether a man becomes a leader. In this analysis we make use of the following terms (besides those which have been formally introduced already): religious, secular, temporal, spiritual, leadership, authority, power. Figure XVII is designed to make clear precisely how these terms are used in this essay, and at the same time to show schematically the stage we have reached in the argument.



Figure XVII

It is of course nothing unusual for temporal authority to be justified by religious claims. The Roman Emperors and the old Germanic kings, as well as the old kings of Persia and Mesopotamia claimed varying degrees of religious sanction for their authority, even to the point of direct descent from the gods or actual godhead. Even christianity allowed a sacred character to kingship. Mediaeval kings were by no means

priests, but nor were they pure laymen: in the words of one contemporary writer they "participated" in the ministry of the priesthood. "The consequence of this - and an extremely serious one - was that in their efforts to govern the Church they believed, and others believed that they acted as members of it, though this view never found general acceptance in ecclesiastical circles. In the eleventh century the Gregorian reformers attacked it with great vigour and perspicacity. They argued for that distinction between the spiritual and the temporal which Rousseau and Renan have taught us to recognise as one of the greatest innovations introduced by Christianity. Moreover, their purpose in separating the two powers so completely was to humble the rulers of men's bodies before the rulers of their souls - 'the moon', which is only bright through reflection, before 'the sun', the source of all light. But in this they had little success. Many centuries were to elapse before kingship was reduced in the eyes of the people to the role of an ordinary human power" (Bloch, 1965: 381). The popular conception of kingship surrounded the persons of kings with a marvellous aura, though this did not mean respect was always shown for their authority (ibid.).

In discussion of the feudal relationship I have compared chiefs with feudal lords, and now in discussion of religious authority I have compared the same chiefs with kings. There is some justification for this apparent confusion: both chiefship and kingship were the paramount positions of authority in the respective societies. In the one society kingship was an archaism from a former age: it was a conception of great and ancient prestige which was rejuvenated politically in the new system by being feudalised (ibid). In Baluchistan there was no conception of kingship, which could thus live on into a feudal age, a shatter-zone of history, and be feudalised, and the cultural origins of the role of chief in Baluch society can only be guessed.

Thus much justifies the comparisons. Obviously the main difference

is one of scale, but we are comparing in the first place two relationships - the feudal relationship in each of two societies; and in the second place two roles, the role of paramount leadership in each society. The role of king in mediaeval Europe was supported by religious sanctions (cf. for instance the stories in the Old Testament). Orthodox Islam after Muhammad never allowed such divine justification for supreme authority.

Of the two types of religious authority in Baluch society, one - that of the maulawī - springs from alien learning; the other - that of the darwīsh - springs from claimed inner knowledge. Probably in the Baluch period neither the maulawī nor the darwīsh could ever approach a position of paramount authority - except perhaps in such extreme cases as the founder of the Zikrī heresy, who would be included in our category of darwīsh. Generally they would be treated as (perhaps rather specialised) kamāsh in the ecology of political relationships. However, now that the position of paramount power is circumscribed and made vaguer by the presence of the Persian Administration, it is much easier for the maulawī or the darwīsh to compete with the chief. But the important point to be made here is that whether any given leader is a chief, a maulawī, or a darwīsh, there are both spiritual and temporal aspects to the authority he wields, and these two aspects are not consciously differentiated. Hence our introduction of the term "charisma" to characterise the attitude of the led towards the leader. Part Six of this essay, which follows, is devoted to a discussion and attempted analysis of these two aspects of the authority of Baluch leaders, and the charismatic quality of personality which is present in all cases of leadership in the society.

PART SIX

LEADERSHIP

Chapter Eighteen

The Various Types of Leadership

I

INTRODUCTORY

The purpose of this final Part is to investigate the relationship between the leaders and the led in Baluch society: that is, more particularly, in the absence of any institutionalisation of specific leadership roles, how are the leaders defined in the society by their followers, and what are the attitudes of their followers towards them? It is in this last point that the crux of the matter lies: where we come up against the social value of personality - a word which has become more and more of a problem during the last decade or so in sociological analysis, to the extent that it might almost be spelled with a capital letter and compared with Mana or Baraka. In fact, as we shall see later on, the conception of personality among the Baluch is not without similarity with the Arabs' Baraka - except for the quasi-personification of the latter.

We shall start by distinguishing the different levels and types of leadership. Then an account will be given of a selection of (mostly contemporary) leaders in Baluch society. Notice again there is no word in normal usage in the Province which may be translated simply as chief, and all words with any leadership connotation at all are of alien origin and either retain at least something of their alien character or have no definite absolute meaning. I consider this a lacuna of native political terminology so important to any understanding or analysis of the politics of Baluch society that it will be necessary to stress it again and again. The account of a number of individual leaders in action will be somewhat disconnected but this is unfortunately necessary since the argument requires a number of representative "leadership situations". Continuous biographical accounts of three or four leaders would not give

a broad enough selection of such situations. This section will therefore contain a number of descriptions of personalities and personality-situations, the aim being to give as full a catalogue as possible of the forms of behaviour and demeanour which are expected from political superordinates by subordinates, and which is in fact the basis of the super- and sub-ordination. This will be followed by a chapter on the nature of authority and political power among the Baluch, and finally, the last chapter is a discussion of what is seen to be the crucial factor in the total set of diachronic and synchronic relationships which together define the political functioning of Baluch society: the types of politically positive and negative personality and their sociological and cultural value.

II

The Terms of Analysis

So far we have broken down Baluch leadership into:

a) Three conventional channels - one secular and two religious: the role-statuses of chief (who may or may not be a hākim), maulawī and darwīsh.

b) Two levels denoted by the terms "leader" and "kamāsh" (in whichever "channel").

c) Two (not consciously differentiated) spheres: temporal and spiritual.

A few remarks must be made about each of the terms chosen before proceeding further. It becomes gradually more and more obvious, the further we proceed in the analysis, what difficulties are presented by the material: that it can in no way be regarded as a "system", and that the various factors we must account for have not been rationalised or institutionalised. The classification contains no purely native Baluchi term, yet in spite of this:

a) nothing has been borrowed in toto from any one neighbouring system (it is almost certain, as the model implies, that the Baluch situation

is the result of the mixture of immigrant elements and ideas within the Province and that the present channels for political aspirations are the results of this mixture),

b) this composite Baluch scheme of roles and concepts is capable of spreading among (more homogeneous) neighbouring systems - at their expense (cf. chapter 6).

Maulawī and darwīsh are, respectively, of Arabic and Persian origin. Baluchi Islam appears to have more affinities with Indian Islam than with Persian or Arabian, and all maulawīs (and mullās) are trained in the subcontinent, - a fact that gives the maulawī a definite non-Baluch basis to his status. Darwīsh-hood probably includes a number of practices and concepts of pre-Islamic vintage - there are certainly some left outside the informal religion. Once again on the conscious level it is an importation, and claims spiritual descent from alien tarīqas (cf. Enc. Is. 1934, IV Art. tarīka), but the successful darwīsh need not necessarily ever leave the Province. However, the chief, though his genealogy may go back to an alien origin, claims no alien justification whatsoever for his present status.

I use the terms "leader" and "kamāsh" to refer to levels of authority. Although kamāsh may mean (simply) any superior person who accepts the social and political responsibilities of his superiority, I use it (for convenience) to exclude the idea of leader. A kamāsh may be secular or religious, for the majority of maulawīs and darwīsh - who are not leaders - are nevertheless kamāsh. Secondly, since chief is a purely secular role-status and maulawī and darwīsh besides being religious only, do not necessarily denote any political status, 'leader' is the most convenient word to use to denote the highest (inter-community) level of authority - to which the maulawī or darwīsh may or may not aspire or attain, (cf. Figure XVIII).

CHANNELS OF AUTHORITY

	Secular	religious	
		formal	informal
Leader	chief	maulawī	darwīsh
kamāsh	kamāsh	maulawī	darwīsh

Figure XVIII

Finally, the two spheres of leadership: the temporal and the spiritual. At first sight it may seem that "political and religious" or "secular and religious" would provide a better terminological framework. However, I need to be able to distinguish between types of leaders and types of authority. The leaders in Baluch society (whether chief, maulawī, or darwīsh) are qualified for their role by specifically secular or religious qualifications. The secular leaders must defer to religious authority (or be called godless), and the maulawīs and darwīsh must defer to the chiefs in non-religious matters where stronger secular leadership exists (as it normally does). We may therefore say that chiefs are secular leaders, and maulawīs and darwīsh (where they are leaders) are religious leaders. But the actual functions of leadership which they severally perform in their respective communities or followings cannot be so easily divided between them. The distinction is vaguer and rather different in quality. The separate set of terms - "temporal" and "spiritual" - are necessary in order that we should be able to discuss this confusion.

III

The (Synchronic) Context

We are primarily interested in the social and political quality of the chief as the most developed and conspicuous form within the society of a type of informal status and authority which is characteristic of the life of the society. However, because of this it will be

necessary to include in the ethnographic examples and the analysis and theoretical construct considerable attention to the other categories of leaders (sc. maulawī and darwīsh), since they illustrate the same principles of informal personal authority with reference to other scales and bases of legitimacy. Not all political groupings of communities contain the full quota of these role-statuses which are potentially leadership roles. If we may be permitted to construct an ideal Baluch power hierarchy on the basis of the most typical characteristics of each conventionally accepted role-status, it would be:

1. 1 chief, closely connected by affinal and cognatic ties with other dynastic families in neighbouring areas, with perhaps an adult son who would be considered almost equivalent to his father in authority and status whenever his father was not present.
2. 1 maulawī, the local interpreter of the formal religion, not linked to the chief by any institutionalised ties.
3. 1 darwīsh, the resort of conscious informal religious attitudes, also independent of any institutionalised political ties.
4. Any number of (secular) kamāsh.

If there was any question of a balance of power between the first three, it would be determined by the informal allegiance and personal inclination of the kamāsh.

However, there is in fact no hierarchy of power implicit in these terms as they are normally used. The chief is normally paramount, but in certain circumstances a maulawī or darwīsh may be socially and politically more important and more powerful. For instance, in the upper Sarbāz valley where there is no chief in permanent residence - the chiefs with traditional interest in the upper Sarbāz valley now live in Kāsk and Kaurān - there is a plethora of maulawīs, almost one per village. There are a few men descended from dynastic lines (cf. Fig. III, chapter 9), but none of these have the status or the pretensions of a chief, though they are of course kamāsh, and the maulawīs share paramount political power, as it were, by default.

Secondly, in Qasr Qand and its environs there are two chiefs and one darvīsh. Of the chiefs, Shīrdel Khān Bolēdai represents the traditional hukumat, but, though not without a certain presence, is lax and spends a large proportion of the day with his opium pipe. Another chief, Mīr Maulādād Sardārzai, has taken over the Dashtiārī hukumat from his elder brother (Abdī Khān, see below, chapter 19) and has acceded to the traditional Bolēdai hukumat of Bog (just downstream from Qasr Qand on the Kāju) by marriage. He comes from a more powerful family than Shīrdel Khān and has better leadership qualities. It would be natural for him anyway to spend some time in his wife's community - especially at the beginning of the marriage - for hehas his wife's property there to administer. However, because of the fate of his own traditional seat - Mīri Bāzār (cf. chapter 2) - he has kept his wife in Bog even though he is often absent for long periods because of his property and leadership responsibilities in Dashtiārī, Bāhu and Kāsk. He is almost certainly the strongest and most Baluch leader personality in the area, but because of his long absences and the fact that he is primarily interested in his own people in the south, he does not dominate the other two. The third is Qāzī Muhammad Hasan Arjomandī, technically a darvīsh, who has been characterised in Part Five (chapter 16). A definite antagonism and rivalry is noticeable between Shīrdel Khān and Qāzī Muhammad Hasan, the two who are more or less permanently resident. And this is usual where there are two leaders in one community, and particularly where one is secular and the other religious. Mīr Maulādād, when he is present maintains a balance between them, but this is due mainly to his personal religious sentiments and his personal relationship with each of the two men. It would perhaps be more typical if he were to side with either one against the other for reasons of his own purely political ambition.

Ideally, then, in our theoretically ideal community, the chief is paramount; the maulavī and the darvīsh have no institutionalised or conventional political ties with him. Each are islands of (less im-

portant) centripetal allegiance groups and potential checks on the abuse of the chief's authority. As leaders they may oppose or complement each other, but the pattern of relationships between the three will usually be determined by one or more of the following considerations:

1 - the extent of the political protection the chief can offer owing to his connections outside the area (with other dynastic families) and outside Baluch society (with Government officials). Normally the maulawī and the darwīsh are not able to offer or command such protection. By operating such protection a chief (or anyone) may make a man beholden to him for the rest of his life - according to the magnitude of the favour required or obtained. For, although it is not unheard of, it is very "un-Baluch" to return a good service with a bad.

2 - the religious inclinations of the chief

3 - the relative leadership potential and ambition of each

4 - the tribal composition of the area: if it includes a number of tribal affiliations which tend traditionally or, for instance, for economic reasons, to be at variance with each other, a maulawī or darwīsh so inclined may benefit greatly from this situation.

Finally, the kamāsh represents a lower level of leadership than the chief, and it is the one category that is universal. Every Baluch acknowledges the political superiority of at least one kamāsh (most normally - though not necessarily - in the same community), unless he claims to be a kamāsh himself in which case he normally, but not necessarily, acknowledges the superiority of a chief. Even in the unusual - and to some extent artificial circumstance where a community contains no kamāsh itself (cf. Garmen Bīd, above chapter 13) the people are invariably obliged in some way to a kamāsh in a neighbouring community. Therefore, in any political situation in the Province, at least one kamāsh, chief, maulawī, or darwīsh is always concerned.

We may therefore say that in any given Baluch situation (in the Province) the actual ecology of power relationships will be arranged in

one of the following ways:

1. chief
   maulawī
   darwīsh
   kamāsh
   Baluch

2. chief
   darwīsh
   maulawī
   kamāsh
   Baluch

3. chief maulawī
   darwīsh
   kamāsh
   Baluch

4. chief
   maulawī darwīsh
   kamāsh
   Baluch

5. chief
   maulawī
   kamāsh
   Baluch

6. chief
   darwīsh
   kamāsh
   Baluch

7. chief maulawī
   kamāsh
   Baluch

8. chief
   kamāsh
   Baluch

9.	maulawī	darwīsh
	kamāsh	
	Baluch	
10.	maulawī	
	kamāsh	
	Baluch	
11.	darwīsh	
	kamāsh	
	Baluch	
12.	chief	
	Baluch	
13.	maulawī	
	Baluch	
14.	darwīsh	
	Baluch	
15.	kamāsh	
	Baluch	

Other permutations are very unlikely. In each situation there may be one or more kamāsh. In cases where there are more than one some Baluch will adhere to one and some to another, and there may or may not be rivalry between the kamāsh. The maulawī and darwīsh tend not to stand in a direct line, especially if there is no chief above them. Similarly, the chief and maulawī tend not to stand in a direct line unless the chief is weak and religiously inclined. Where there is a chief, there will usually also be other male adult members of his dynastic family, which may complicate the situation. At the present time (i.e. 38 years after the end of the Baluch Period) in the large centres of population which are also points of contact between Baluch society and the Administration, each category tends to form an island of political power, and the relations between leaders are determined by personalities, religious inclinations, and relationships with officials.

IV

The (diachronic) roads to leadership

We have stressed the extreme degree of informality and lack of institutionalisation in Baluch society, and shown the headings and concepts to which any successful aspirant leader in the society will be assimilated. We now discuss briefly by what means and qualifications a potential or aspirant leader arrives at one of the role-statuses.

Each of the three categories of leadership - chief, maulawī, darwīsh, - is built on a different combination of qualifications and training, birth, ambition and aptitude. The qualifications necessary to attain the role-status of maulawī or darwīsh have already been indicated in Part Five. Where these role-statuses are used for conscious leadership purposes, certain qualities of personality are also necessary, and these will be discussed in the final chapter. Personality is the constant factor which is essential in some measure to the exercise of leadership under any form. Descent or birth may be a relevant factor in the case of any leader: it is of prime importance for a chief; a (secular) kamāsh in general may not be of lower birth than the majority of his community - and certainly no one would openly own allegiance to a secular leader of lower birth than himself; for the maulawī and darwīsh it is of little importance and they tend to be of lower origin. Descent from a line of maulawīs would not enhance the status of a maulawī, but descent from a line of darwīsh would tend to enhance that of a darwīsh, and descent from a line of kamāsh is of great advantage for a (secular) kamāsh. A chief is by definition a member of a dynastic family. Therefore, chief appears now to be a closed category, while the other three are open. The question remains how the dynastic families became dynastic families in the first place. Although there is no conclusive evidence for this, it would appear that there have been three ways in which the number of dynastic families may be added to:

i - a man might enter the Province claiming "rulers'" status and with

sufficient military strength to force acceptance of his claim

ii - an existing dynastic family may split (cf. the probable cases of the Mīr Murādzai and the Mubārak, chapter 9);

iii- a particularly prominent kamāsh, supported by a distinguished line of kamāsh, may raise the status of his family to the degree where the status of dynastic family is accorded to it - the Shīrānī (Shīrkhānzai) may perhaps have risen out of the Nārui in this way;

These are the ascriptive aspects of qualification for leadership. The achieved aspects are the efficient performance of the social and political functions which the Baluch expect from their leaders. These may be broken down into the following:

1. Social control. The reputation of a chief depends probably more than anything else on the social security and Baluchness (cf. code of honour, Part Four) obtaining among his people. This indicates something of the reciprocal nature of the relationship between Baluch and chief, and, generally, between leader and led in Baluch society. The good chief lives up to the Baluch code of honour and encourages it among his followers and (during the Baluch period) punished unequivocally criminal lapses from it (i.e. in particular, adultery, theft, homicide). The most important positive aspects of the Baluch code of honour from this point of view are generosity, austerity, and religious practice. As has been noted already (Part Five), religion (= Islam) is thought of as the justification and preserver of good order in the society. The ordinary Baluch prays five times a day and fasts throughout the month of Ramazan, but he is usually not fanatical - that is, he normally would not discriminate socially or politically against a man solely because he did not pray or fast. It is not uncommon of course for a maulawī to be fanatical, but there tends anyway to be antagonism between the maulawī and the secular authority - which is probably to some extent due to latent theocratic ideas in the formal religion.

It is not uncommon for a chief to be careless of formal religious

observance. If he does not keep the fast, he will at least normally be careful not to break it in anybody's presence, but as far as the five daily prayers and attendance at the mosque are concerned he may be completely negligent. Something has been said already about this side of the chief's way of life in Part Four. The chief is in fact allowed to break a number of the rules of "Baluch-ness" with impunity, even expected to, so long as he does not do it too blatantly. A certain laxity of (sexual) morals in private and interest in other sensual diversions (e.g. opium, alcohol) belongs to an expected behaviour pattern of a young chief. Negligence of the formal religion is a part of the same thing (it would rarely be found in an elderly chief). However, it must be remembered that we are talking now of the formal religion only - not the informal religion. This laxness towards the formal religion, or at least its obligations, does not imply any tendency towards agnosticism or atheism. It may even coincide with an increased attention towards informal religion, and it is not unusual for a chief to have a quite close relationship with a darwīsh. One very good example of this is the very close relationship between Wāja Mullā Mīā (cf. Part Five) and the whole of the Mērakzai dynastic family. Each of the surviving brothers of the main branch of the family have a quite infamous past in this respect, but in at least one case it is linked with some sense of political responsibility, and a good measure of political success. Another example would be the relationship between the Sardārzai dynastic family and the head of the Sheikhs - at present Sheikh Cherāg, though this is more difficult to analyse since Sheikh Cherāg is the senior member of a zāt of considerable social standing besides coming under the category of darwīsh.

Nevertheless the status of Islam in Baluch thought and the emphasis on communal religious practice is such that a good chief may enhance his standing enormously by occasional attendance at the mosque, even if it is known that apart from these occasional attendances he pays no attention whatever to prayer or fasting. Every one else prays

and fasts according to the rules laid down by God for man, but if the chief cannot be bothered to do it all the time, well, that does not really matter: he's a chief. It must however be remembered that this is not explicit in Baluch thought. It cannot be: they do not have a word for chief or dynastic family.

2. Protection. By this we mean the ability to safeguard a follower's interests outside the sphere of his own direct authority. An important factor in this was always the extent of the chief's affinal and kin ties with neighbouring chiefs, and perhaps patronage by the Governor General in Kerman. Since the Baluch Period relationships with Persian officials have become an additional factor.

3. Mardomdārī which may be characterised briefly as making oneself always available to one's followers, paying attention to and settling their disputes, and keeping open house for them.

A bad chief may live and function for a time on the capital built up by his predecessor. The conception of the closed hereditary descent of the chief's status (though not necessarily to the eldest son) allows for a generally smooth succession of this - the most important - category of leadership. There is after all no crown or post to fight for. There were the hukumats, but no longer. In the other categories succession is less important: there may be many maulawīs or darwīsh in a community and they may or may not wield any political power. There may also be many (secular) kamāsh, and normally are. Therefore, they are not categories which may be fought for, for the existence of one does not exclude the claims of another - though, at the same time, since the conception of hereditary succession of status exists in the society, a good genealogy is an asset at any level. Even if a chief loses his power to another chief, it may be some time before he loses his chief's authority, simply because there is no post or crown to be won or lost outright.

The traditionally favourable attitude or, at least, respect of the Baluch for the English is to a large extent due to the fact that there was less difference between Baluch and English standards of behaviour than there was between Baluch and "Gajar" standards: for instance, the Persian government did not respect (in practical terms) a Baluch chief because they had respected his father; the British tended to. (However, there is also the fact that the Persian government always claimed sovereignty over the Persian Baluch; the British did not. Further, the British were the superior physical force in the area.)

One more point must be made clear at this stage. Throughout the essay so far the adjectives "political" and "social" have been used without defining them either absolutely or relatively. Such arbitrary usage does not, I think, require any excuse, but it will be well here to indicate - before discussing individual cases - how difficult it is to distinguish between the two in Baluch society. It is, I think, possible to distinguish between the two only in the abstract analysis. The need to distinguish will become clearer in the next chapter when we come to examine examples, and is occasioned by the fact that ascribed status (the result of heredity and/or physical or mental ability) is potentially a qualification for political power or leadership, but is not always exploited to this end. Actors with such ascribed status who do not exploit it are nevertheless socially very significant people. We shall therefore use "political" to denote relevance to leadership and conscious social control, and "social" to denote lack of interest in or even avoidance of (political) responsibility. Even the definition shows that the distinction is to some extent artificial; it amounts in effect to little more than a difference of degree between relatively positive and negative attitudes towards leadership and political responsibility.

V

Comparative material

As has been noted already the Baluch situation shows many similarities with other tribal communities in the Islamic cultural area. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to a discussion of comparative material from Kurdish communities in Iraq (Barth, 1953), Pathans in Swat (Barth, 1959), Basseri in South Persia (Barth, 1961) Marri Baluch in Pakistan (Rumsey, 1957), Somali (Lewis, 1961), and Bedouin (Theisiger, 1964). Certain aspects of the political situation among the Azande (Evans-Pritchard, 1965) and in Mediaeval Europe (Bloch, 1965), which fit our model, will also be taken account of.

These studies have all in some measure been interested in the political aspects of the societies concerned, and, mostly, in the channelling of authority vertically or horizontally as the case may be, through the society. They, therefore, differ significantly in orientation from the present study, which is concerned rather with how and why people are accorded leader status in the society, insofar as this can be defined or analysed sociologically - that is, insofar as it is relevant to social anthropology rather than psychology. This comparative material is introduced in order to throw certain aspects of the Baluch situation into greater relief, and indicate to some extent its general relevance.

1. In the Pathan-dominated society of Swat, ecologically isolated in northern West Pakistan, the political aspect of the life of the society has been described (Barth,1959: 2) in terms of "relations between super- and sub-ordinates" which are "reciprocal but differentiating contracts". There is a hierarchy of strata in the society which in a later publication (1962) Barth goes so far as to call castes, and there are two distinct channels of leadership, one secular and one religious, which he calls Pathans and Saints. These correspond very closely with the Baluch chief and darvīsh. Barth takes as his central problem "to explore the kinds of relationship that are established bet-

ween persons in Swat, the way in which these may be systematically manipulated to build up positions of authority, and the variety of politically corporate groups which result" (ibid.). The following are some of the more important ethnographic facts for our purpose.

In Swat "allegiance to the [Pathan] chief is expressed by the mere act of visiting his men's house. This allegiance is reinforced and deepened by the acceptance of hospitability [sic!] from the chief" (Barth, 1959: 11). "The emphasis, as throughout in Pathan social organisation, is on relations between unequals, not on lateral relations with peers and equals" (ibid. 56 - this applies to Swat only, for Pathans outside Swat cf. e.g. Barth, 1964). Groups "which are structurally equivalent" to those which form in the "men's houses" of Pathan chiefs also form around prominent Saints" (ibid.).

The term "Saint" like our darwīsh, denotes a religious status which may or may not - according to the individual - have political significance. But if a Saint is socially prominent or important, it almost follows that he will be also politically important. "The Saints of Swat are revered and respected by most of the local population. This special position and authority derives from three main sources: the ownership of the graves of their saintly ancestors which serve as shrines, their traditional role as privileged mediator and adviser to others, and their claim to spiritual leadership due to legal knowledge and moral dedication" (ibid. 57). The Saints would seem therefore to combine the functions of the Baluch maulawī and darwīsh.

Further on (ibid. chapter 5) Barth describes "a series of groups relevant to specific fields of activity, mainly production, recreation, and religious studies, mostly with overlapping membership and none of them explicitly political in their functions." "Each is characterised by an internal authority system," and "they are formed by a series of dyadic contracts between a pivotal person and individual subordinates.

They thus define positions of leadership and vest certain persons with authority which they may use for political purposes." However, even though "Pathans, when discussing political events or contemplating political action, are naturally aware of the existence of definite alignments of people who can be mobilized as corporate units in the event of conflicts," nevertheless, they were as unable as Barth "to see any simple principle for the recruitment of such groups. One does not hear reference to 'my descent group', 'my association', 'my caste', or even 'my men's house' in such contexts - the reverence is always to the 'party of so and so'" (ibid. 71). Similarly, the Baluch can only speak in terms of 'a man' or 'men' in this sense: for instance, "I am his man", "those are our men", or "we have men in that place". Furthermore, "The activities of groups are discussed in terms of the actions of their leaders...." (ibid.).

The "men's house group" of each chief is, "as it were, a central island of authority ... in a politically amorphous sea of villagers. From this centre his authority extends outwards with decreasing intensity. There may in fact be a zone of considerable autonomy - or overlap - between his field of authority and that of the next chief" (ibid. 91).

Barth describes very well some of the ways in which his Saints - for which we may equally well read Baluch maulawīs or darwīsh - may play a political role, and in particular the potential political influence derived from the Saint's role as mediator:

"The dilemma of the Saint is that he is in a position more or less to propose settlements in favour of either of the conflicting parties; but if his proposed settlement is not accepted though this in no way reduces his religious merit and repute, it does immediately reduce his political influence. Chiefs and other pretenders value a Saint as an ally to the extent to which he works for them, and to the extent to which his decisions affect the situation. His political influence depends on the extent to which he can modify the actual course of any conflict or dispute, as judged by his past performance.

"In making political capital of their role as peacemakers, Saints must thus take numerous variables into account and, in fact, be rather clever. This prevents few of them from trying. In the words of one prominent Saint: 'I look like a simple man; I live simply - but oh! the things I do!' The settlements which a Saint proposes must be justified by reference to some rule or ideal. They must also take cognizance of de facto situations, and the Saint must be skilled in inventing compromises and face-saving devices. As those who consult and appoint him are realists, he can also use the technique of 'passing the buck'. For example, one Saint's village lies very close to the border between Swat and Dir, and much of the political importance of its leader derives from his spiritual influence in the neighbouring Dir areas. When his settlements go in favour of parties in Dir, he can silence the Swatis by saying he must sometimes work against Swat, lest he lose his good repute among Diris. If within Swat one party feels wronged by his decisions, he can hint darkly that he only saved them from a worse fate at the hands of the Ruler or a prominent chief. If they are unconvinced by the logic of his verdict, he picks up his Koran and shouts: 'This is Islamic law, go and ask your mullah!' ... "But without some force to back them, such manipulations sooner or later fall to the ground. The necessary force derives from several sources. Some of it is provided by the situation itself - where the Saint suggests a compromise between two more or less equally balanced parties, each is eager to defend its rights in the compromise. The consideration of the future value of the Saint's good will serves also as a coercive force. A man who has the good will of a Saint can, with fair confidence, appeal when needed to the impartiality of that Saint and expect him to do his best to arrange an advantageous settlement. And such good will is solicited by a public show of respect, and by submitting to the Saint's verdict where the cost is not too great. It is also won by outright support; a small chief not involved in a particular conflict may find it opportune to exert pressure in support of the settlement proposed by a Saint. In return for such favours he expects the Saint to exert himself

on his behalf in later conflicts. The complementarity of the position of chiefs and Saints encourages this type of alliance between them" (ibid. 98-9).

Another interesting similarity between the two situations concerns the pattern of allegiance to each type of leader with regard to territorial distribution. It will be remembered that the Swat Pathans and the Persian Baluch are sharply distinguished by their respective attitudes towards landownership. Among the former it is of primary importance for political authority and for social prestige, while among the latter it is of secondary importance at the most. With this fact in mind we may note another similarity between the two situations. The lands of the tribally organised Pathan elite used to be periodically re-allotted so that the equal shares originally distributed when the Pathans conquered the valley should retain the character of an abstract equal share (cf. ibid. 9). Land belonging to Saints was not re-allotted. Now, the lands of the Saints are "dispersed without particular reference to the borders between units in the land re-allotment system. Thus, while the dependents of a chief tend to be concentrated in his own ward and those immediately adjoining it, so that his political influence is contained within the segmentary hierarchy of re-allotment units, the dependents of Saints are dispersed. Saints own much less land than chiefs and thus control far fewer dependents; but their channels of communication and influence extend much further. They spread their web of direct political influence over a much wider area. While the lands of chiefs help them to build a solid nucleus of control for purposes of administration and military dominance, the lands of Saints enable them to extend their influence over many communities, for purposes of arbitration, mediation, the collection of information, and political intrigue" (ibid. p.99). This is directly comparable to the Baluch situation, though in the latter the difference is due to the difference in the bases of the appeal which each offers, not the pattern of land ownership. A secular leader's following, insofar as it is committed, tends always to

take the form of one or more compact units. This is much less the case for the religious leader's following.

"The political authority of Saints derives also from the reputation for holiness and piety which they may gain by appropriate actions. Such a reputation constitutes an independent source of authority for Saints, as does honour for chiefs. This is most clearly shown in the case of the mystic recluses who are found occasionally in the Swat area. Without property of any kind, physically dependent on others rather than leaders of groups of dependents, and even without being active as mediators in actual conflicts, they are held in respect and awe by most villagers and in the course of time acquire very considerable influence. In the careers of politically prominent Saints, this reputation frequently precedes other factors as a source of their authority" (ibid. 99-100).

"A Saint's reputation in terms of performance is evaluated by criteria quite different from those applied to chiefs. Many acts which would bring honour to a chief, such as the immoderate display of violence, would be regarded as most inappropriate in a Saint, and might seriously harm his reputation....

"The awe in which Saints are held by the villagers, is derived from their knowledge and mystic powers....

"By appropriate acts and demeanour, Saints may thus enhance their reputation for holiness. This reputation gives their opinions great weight, particularly among the more pious or gullible sections of the population, and thus contributes to their political influence"(ibid. 100-101).

2. The situation in Southern (Iraqi) Kurdistan has already been indicated above in chapter 7. One or two more points from Barth's description (Barth, 1953) are relevant here.

For instance, he tells us that khēl (= encampment) leadership

devolves on an elder man who is informally chosen on the basis of relative power and prestive (p. 38), and that the khēl is not a stable social unit (ibid.). That is, although the members of a khēl will usually act in concert politically, the sons of the present members will not necessarily remain together. Unlike, for instance, the units defined by Evans-Pritchard in The Nuer (1940) the khēl cannot be treated as an independent political unit. It does have a certain political identity, but this is unstable and unreliable. This khēl is almost exactly comparable to the Baluch mētag or halk, and in parts of Pakistani Baluchistan the Baluch themselves use the word khēl. Among the Baluch the mētag is always referred to and known by the name of its senior member or leader (for instance: Ahmadi mētag = Ahmad's mētag). Ahmad is de facto a kamāsh. Or, at least, the reply to the question "Ē mētaga kamāsh kei o?" (literally: "In this mētag who is the kamāsh, or senior man?") will be "Ahmad". It may be that Ahmad is a man about whom it may be said: "Ī kamāsh nahe." - "He is no kamāsh", but this is equivalent to saying that he is not fit for the job, and is using the word in a different way. Such a distinction in usage is however not normal practice. It would be more likely, if Ahmad were not a kamāsh and the mētag in fact contained no kamāsh, for the mētag to be left without a name. There would generally be no reason to refer to a mētag which had no kamāsh, unless it were to say, for instance: "Ā kauri dapa mētagē ha, hordokēnē" ("Where that river/wadi joins another there is a mētag, a small one") in the way of directions for the road. Similarly, a mētag which contains more than one kamāsh is quite likely to be called after either of them at will. We might surmise that if there were two kamāsh in one mētag but the one towered above the other in prestige and political status, the mētag would always be called after the former. However, such a situation is very unlikely to arise, since if two such men were to form one mētag either the weaker would have to submit himself to the stronger, in which case he would lose his independent kamāsh status, or he would resent him, in which case the economic co-operation implied in the formation of one mētag would be impossible and he would break

away to join or form another.

It must surely follow from this that the political significance of the mētag is superficial only, and the political unit is in fact the kamāsh. This implies of course the kamāsh with those who seek or submit to his authority. But a kamāsh does not necessarily have an explicit following. As has been noted already, any community may contain any number of kamāsh. It is quite conceivable even for all the adult males of a community (discounting, of course ghulāms) to be kamāsh. (This is unlikely, but such a situation is approached very nearly in settlements such as Jangal, Peshāmak and Negwar where the non-ghulām population of a small community is composed entirely of high status sāt.) In this case they could not all be said to have a distinct political following. However, they would each have a political voice, and in crisis circumstances would be used by Baluch without a political voice for leadership and protection.

In his discussion of southern Kurdish political ideas, which are perhaps closer to the Baluch than any others recorded (it is interesting to note that the Kurds also form a subculture within eastern or Iranian Islam) Barth (1953: 49) notes the "universal application of status difference, and the resulting lack of conceptualisation of 'the office', as apart from the total person occupying it at any one moment" (my italics). Barth uses "authority" to mean "the more or less 'legitimate' powers attached to a specific office or part-status, and the blanket term power" to mean the political potential of "the total status position of a particular individual, and his personal charisma." This latter "is taken to cover the individual's total ability to lead or otherwise control the actions of other people" (ibid. 50).

Barth is conscious that the distinction between power and authority "is generally not made by the Kurdish villager". He considers that the reason for this is that "the abstract concept of an office is hardly

developed". Barth considers that the "total status position of the individual, from which his power stems, is a product of all his part-statuses, not only in the political field, but also in other hierarchies (e.g. hierarchies of religious power, wealth and class status etc.)" (ibid.). It may be possible to make such distinctions among Barth's Kurds where for instance land ownership plays a more important political role, but among the Baluch I think such distinctions are unreal. Barth seems to suggest that the distinction is in fact unreal among the Kurds also when he says (ibid. 79) that "the Kurdish villager sees ... in terms of ... named and familiar people, each with a familiar total status." However, Barth insists on working from the abstract concepts of office, organisation, lineage etc. (cf. also ibid. pp. 61, 92 and 130 and passim) whereas we consider these concepts irrelevant, and have therefore avoided them in this essay.

3. That the Baluch should be compared with Kurds and Pathans might be thought only right and proper, but that they should be compared with the Azande will perhaps be thought surprising if not inapt. However, I think a number of interesting points may be more clearly appreciated through the mirror of such (on the surface anyway) alien material. In the historico-political description given in "The Zande State" (Evans-Pritchard, 1965, chapter 5) there are many elements which fit our model, and, in particular resemble the Baluch situation: for instance, the ethnic mixture, the migration, the low population density over an enormous area, their distribution into a number of distinct political units under their own leaders whom Evans-Pritchard calls kings. "Nevertheless, in spite of ecological and historical diversity political institutions appear to have been everywhere fundamentally the same" (ibid. p. 105). The value of the following collation of some Azande and Baluch political elements lies in the fact that there is absolutely no cultural connection between the two peoples.

The Azande spread by conquest. Where the mass of the population was

foreign the ruling house (cf. ibn Khaldun's "house", above, chapter 5) seems to have been more autocratic and aloof, exacting a subordination their own people would not have endured. Submitted peoples were left in their territories but authority over them was entrusted to Azande chiefs, who demanded only acknowledgement of their paramountcy and tribute in labour and produce. Gradually all became Azande in race and speech. The fact that there was no marked difference in the standard of living to which both conquerors and subjects were accustomed speeded the process of assimilation.

"Clanship" is relatively unimportant in the highly organised political society of the Azande (ibid., p. 109). In the course of Zande expansion the conquests came to be ruled by several dynasties, though in this case the different royal houses were all closely related members of the same family or clan, the Avongara. However, there are some dynasties not related to this clan (ibid. pp. 110-1).

Though each kingdom had clearly demarcated boundaries, designated by rivers, and could be so defined, in discussing the ruler-subject relationship Azande place the emphasis on personal allegiance rather than on tenure. "It is true that in a sense the king owned the land and could order a subject off it, and in that sense anyone who lived on land over which he held dominion was ipso facto his subject. But no one was tied to any particular piece of land or district. The country was thinly populated, perhaps ten to the square mile, or even fewer, and people settled very much where they pleased, frequently moving their homes from one place to another. Landed property had little importance in a political context ... if a Zande was dissatisfied with his lot in one kingdom he could move to another ... and he then transferred his allegiance to the ruler in whose territory he went to live ... In speaking about a kingdom Azande do not have so much in mind its boundaries as the relation of a community of subjects to a person... Also... a kingdom had no territorial longevity. On the death of the sovereign

it broke up into separate kingdoms ruled over by his elder sons, and the inhabitants of each then became the subjects of independent rulers, whereas, before, these rulers had acknowledged the paramountcy of their father. Consequently one cannot speak of a Zande kingdom in the sense that one can speak of, for example, the kingdom of Bunyoro, where there has been a succession of monarchs whose authority can be clearly defined in territorial terms, as can the succession of dynasties in England" (ibid. pp. 122-3).

Before giving a detailed account of the concepts and linguistic framework which defines the politics of a Zande kingdom, Evans-Pritchard devotes some space to explaining the Zande term gbia. "This word can be used for the superior person in any relationship involving authority on one side and subordination on the other, which for the Azande means all social relationships, though its first meaning is any member of ... the nobility" (ibid. pp. 113, my italics). Evans-Pritchard uses the terms: "king" for "the ruler of a kingdom"; "prince" "in a political sense only, to denote those members of the aristocracy who ruled a province of a kingdom as representatives of its monarch, by whom they were appointed and to whom they were responsible"; and "nobles" "in reference to all members of the aristocratic clan, giving the word a social rather than a political sense, for although all kings and princes were also in this sense nobles, most members of the clan have in recent times held no, or very minor, political office, though they have always had, and still have, a superior social position with which went certain privileges" (ibid. p. 114). These terms appear from the article to be Evans-Pritchard's own formulations rather than translations from a Zande terminology. In either case, the definitions correspond almost exactly with (in our context) the

1) chiefs who are hakuma and acknowledge no feudal relationship with a superior,

2) chiefs who are hākuma and do own a feudal relationship with a superior, and

3) other members of dynastic families,
respectively, and there is nothing in the Azande network of concepts so far adduced that would in any way be alien to the Baluch.

The parallel is so close that we may usefully follow Evans-Pritchard's account further. "A king divided his realm into provinces, between river boundaries (cf. Baluch ecological areas), keeping a large central one for himself and establishing in each of the others his representatives to rule in his name" (ibid. 114). It would seem also that a noble - a chief's son - expected "princeship" as a badge of membership of his class, and the situation is compared to that of mediaeval Europe (ibid. 117). Justice came from the king's oracle, i.e. a "religious" mechanism superficially independent of the king (who executed its decisions) but in fact dependent on him (ibid. 118 cf. the chief-maulawī relationship, which in the case of a powerful chief in the Baluch Period is thought to have worked like this.)

The basic economics are also parallel. The king commanded the labour of his subjects in certain traditional circumstances for agricultural purposes. He took a tribute from the subjects of his own province (c.f. dah-yak), and an annual tribute from the prince-governors who were in subordinate feudal relationships with him (cf. mālīāt). He spent this income on "open house" hospitality and his court and keeping up the standard of living expected of him (ibid. 120-1). But "royalty did not want wealth so much as personal prestige; or, perhaps one should rather say that princes liked riches because they liked to win renown by giving them away. It was that which counted most, and in the thought of the people the economic advantages were subsidiary to the power they served to sustain" (ibid. 123).

The bearing and behaviour of the kings and princes is also parallel. "Most Europeans who have known Zande kings and princes in the days before their power was broken have paid tribute to them. Cunning and ruthless

[they] may have been, and had to be if they were to survive, just as the Italian princes in Machiavelli's time had to be, but what European travellers admired in them were their natural dignity of bearing, unostentatious pride, courteous manners, cordiality composure, reserve, intelligence, prudence, and so forth... One could pick them out among commoners at a glance" (ibid. 127). I have applied the same words to the Baluch chiefs.

Evans-Pritchard's interpretation of succession among the Azande is also interesting and not without significance in this context. He observed that "the rules of succession to royal office must be sought in historical actualities rather than in any principle, for there does not appear to have been any theory of primogeniture or any other order of succession. Indeed, we may say that there was, properly speaking, no succession at all. It stands to reason that the elder sons were in a better position to gain their father's personal heritage at his death than his younger sons, for they were already firmly rooted as rulers of principalities which were almost autonomous states." There was nevertheless bitter competition to acquire the personal royal domain "with the prestige and large population that went with it ... The victory was likely to go to the prince who had the confidence of his late father's immediate subjects, their backing being the deciding factor" (ibid. 130).

Many aspects of the Azande political environment I have simply passed over since they are not parallel, but I do not think I have in any way stretched the context of those aspects which seemed relevant. The Azande are politically more organised than the Baluch. Nevertheless, the basic historical antecedents to the political situation which Evans-Pritchard describes, and the basic relations and statuses are parallel. And this in a degree of organisation which can be referred to as a state, in flat grass lands, with absolutely no historical or cultural connections.

4. Another useful parallel, this time once more from another Islamic tribal subculture, is the situation among the Bedouin. There is no really comprehensive ethnography of the Bedouin of the Arabian peninsula, less still of the more isolated of them in the south east around the Empty Quarter. However, the account given by Thesiger (1964) must be one of the best sources of ethnographical data not compiled by a professional ethnographer. Even though there is no question of "caste" among the Bedouin, the situation of the chief is nevertheless comparable. On the subject of leadership and social control among them he writes that "Arabs rule but do not administer. Their government is intensely individualistic, and is successful or unsuccessful according to the degree of fear and respect which the ruler commands, and his skill in dealing with individual men. Founded on an individual life, their government is impermanent and liable to end in chaos at any moment. To Arab tribesmen this system is comprehensible and acceptable, and its success or failure should not be measured in terms of efficiency and justice as judged by Western standards. To these tribesmen security can be bought too dearly by loss of individual freedom" (46-7). This description brings out the relationship between informality and personality as political values.

As the leader, the "Bedu sheikh has no paid retainers on whom he can rely to carry out his orders. He is merely the first among equals in a society where every man is intensely independent and quick to resent any hint of autocracy. His authority depends in consequence on the force of his own personality and on his skill in handling men. His position in the tribe, in fact, resembles that of the chairman of a committee meeting (ibid., my italics).

5. For the mētag level there are two other useful sources of comparative material. The northern Somali are pastoral muslim tribes, the main analytical components of whose political life are kinship in the form of an almost ideal segmenting lineage system complemented by a type of formal Social Contract. This last may compare with what I

have called the feudal relationship in Baluch society: for in each of these two societies there are two main complementary bases to solidary relationships of political significance. In the one these are kinship and the Social Contract, and in the other they are kinship and the feudal relationship. On the metag level; "where the hamlet has a permanent composition and is not merely as sometimes a temporary grouping of kinsmen it is led by the eldest agnate of most forceful character and personality. This informal position of leadership is most clear-cut when the hamlet consists of one nuclear or polygynous family or of an extended family under the authority of the father. It is least definite where the hamlet consists of a group of close agnates, but not brothers, and it is here particularly that force of character, ability and general qualities of leadership cause one man's counsels to prevail over those of his peers" (Lewis, 1961: 60). Once again we are left with the riddle of personality.

6. This second example is included because it concerns Baluch - the Marri in the eastern part of Pakistani Baluchistan - and is the only published work on any form of Baluch society by a trained ethnographer (another on the same community is awaited, edited by F. Barth). It is a short article (Rumsey, 1957) on leadership, and presents a completely different picture from the material of this essay. The account is not always clear[1] but once again it brings out the importance of personal qualities in the choice of leaders, particularly at the mētag level.

7. To return once again to the position of paramount chief: among the Basseri, in South Persia, according to Barth (1961: 71), "the pivotal position ... in the whole tribal organization is that of the chief. He is the central, autocratic leader of the tribe. In keeping with the historical forms of centralised leadership found elsewhere in the Middle East, he is traditionally granted a vast and not clearly delimited field of privilege and command, and power is conceived as emanating from him, rather than delegated to him by his subjects."

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1. For instance, in the definitions of wadera and mukaddam.

8. This invites comparison once again with mediaeval Europe. "For the king or the great baron there were virtually only three fundamental duties. He had to ensure the spiritual salvation of his people by pious foundations and by the protection of the true faith; to defend them from foreign foes (a tutelary function to which, when possible, was added conquest, prompted as much by considerations of honour as the desire for power); and lastly to maintain justice and internal peace" (Bloch, 1965: 408-9). This meant that most of the time he was kept busy fighting (whether internal or external enemies) and dealing out "justice". This form of government could not be called an administration, and it was seldom if ever more than intermittently effective. Local rebellions were everyday affairs, and could often cause disruptions far in excess of their importance (ibid.). Some of the causes Bloch gives for this state of affairs are identical with the Baluch situation: for example, "the slowness and the general difficulties of communication; the absence of monetary reserves; the need for direct contact with men, indispensable to the exercise of genuine authority (ibid.). But, in fact, "no chief, whatever his rank, could make any serious decision without first taking counsel. This did not mean, of course, taking counsel with the people, which no one considered it necessary to consult either directly or through its elected representatives: were not the rich and the powerful its natural representatives, according to the divine plan?" (ibid. 410, cf. the kasagh). But despite this, confusion, disorder, and most of all, violence were the distinguishing features of the age.

However, "in the course of the second feudal age political authority, which up to that time was much subdivided, began everywhere to be concentrated in larger organisms. (These were not new, of course, but their effective powers were genuinely revived.)" (ibid. 421). It is of course impossible to say which is cause and which is effect. But it is surely a reasonable proposition that a situation of instability among lesser princes could only be remedied by the superimposition of the

authority of a greater prince and this is even more likely when it can be shown, as Bloch has (412), that there had grown up first a general desire for peace and stability.

Territorial centralisation of leadership (in whatever form) would seem therefore to be a natural trend for the remedying of the typical ills of this informal, ad hoc, anarchic type of society. We have seen how in the Persian Province of Baluchistan the trend was always to a higher and more comprehensive pyramid of power, though each new addition was by a personal relationship, which by its very nature could be no more stable than the fortunes of the two personalities involved. Thus, Dust Muhammad Khān had political relations either direct or indirect, with every other community in the province, and with at least one - Bashkardia - outside it. A large number of these relationships were feudal (cf. above, chapter 7) relationships with local chiefs or kamāsh; a few, for instance in the Sarhadd, were little more than the acknowledgement of the existence of the other. But in each relationship Dust Muhammad was the superior party. On traditional criteria there were certain services and other benefits he could expect from each of these relationships, though in the case of some of the Sarhadd communities this amounted to little more than respect and the likelihood that they would perform sarān-bandī for him in a Baluch cause when he required it. But as we have seen the pyramid under Dust Muhammad Khān disintegrated on the invasion of a superior alien power, for its political unity was not a Baluch conception. The Baluch only saw the individual relationships, and everybody knew that each individual relationship was breakable. Therefore, although the trend seems to have been towards the centralisation of power, there was no conceptual basis for this, and so there were no moral sanctions in its favour. The same would seem also to be true of Bloch's first feudal age. The basic political conceptions seem to have been these:

a) feudal relationships between unequals

b) groups, membership of which implies potential equality, e.g. knights,

cf. dynastic families,

c) superior persons - kings, princes, chiefs, (cf. hākums) - from whom power emanates, whose power-status is legitimised by a hereditary charisma (dynasty), but may only be fully utilised when the holder also enjoys personal charisma. These may or may not be directly relevant to any particular community. They may be good or bad.

The main analytical components which have been shown to be politically significant in Persian Baluch society include:

a. a hierarchy of relative birth statuses, which bears a similar relation to the territorial distribution of the population as does the caste system in the subcontinent (cf. Leach, 1962). That is, some communities may contain only one, so that its identity will only affect that community's external relations; no community contains them all. In any community, these may define a group or one or more dispersed single individuals.

b. a number of role-statuses, partly ascribed, partly achieved, which, according to the personal inclinations of the holders, may or may not be political. (The "chief" by definition must be political. Membership of a dynastic family, however, which is the basis of his status, need not be political.)

c. Broad general social divisions between: dynastic families, Baluch, shahrī, and ghulāms.

In any given community, the highest birth statuses (assuming that the community contains some) are those of members of dynastic families, and the lowest is that of the ghulāms. The remainder are taken up by Baluch and shahrī. (There is probably no difference between the highest Baluch zāt and the highest shahrī zāt, though I have come across no community or situation where representatives of both were present. However, perhaps the highest reputed Baluch zāt, e.g. Rend, enjoy their reputation throughout Baluchistan, and, because of their place in the traditional corpus of poetry, wherever Baluchi is spoken; whereas the standing of the highest shahrī zāt, e.g. Sepāhī in Saravān, is contained

within an ascertainable radius from their own area, beyond which no one will have heard the name. Further, the lowest shahrī sāt generally count lower than the lowest Baluch sāt.) A shulān may not hold a role-status, though his status may differ somewhat according to his occupation (cf. chapter 11). All chiefs are by definition members of dynastic families; members of the dynastic families do not occupy either of the religious role-statuses.

With particular regard to leadership we may re-state this situation thus:

a) leadership is performed by men occupying role-statuses.

b) men occupying role-statuses who perform leadership are allowed to do so because they are combining certain achieved qualifications (e.g. training of maulavī) and ascribed qualifications (e.g. birth of chief) with a quality of personality. For the time being I am keeping the term "personality" apart from the categories "ascribed" and "achieved" qualifications. As will be shown later on I consider it to include (as of course it does psychologically) both ascribed and achieved aspects.

c) if a man has this required quality of personality, he achieves one of the role-statuses - most commonly that of kamāsh. (By definition, he cannot achieve the status of chief, unless he happens to be a member of a dynastic family. Similarly, by definition, if he is a shulān, he cannot achieve any role-status: but no shulān ever possesses this quality of personality, and it is unthinkable for a Baluch that a shulān ever could.)

d) Aside from personalities and role-statuses men are important only insofar as they may be used by holders of role-statuses for economic, military or quasi-military purposes. But not only do they not have a political voice: they are not necessarily obviously connected with a leader or role-status-holder, and may only seek such a connection should an occasion ("crisis") arise. Similarly, a leader/personality/role-status-holder does not lose his political voice simply because he does not have an obvious following. In crisis circumstances a following

would become explicit - or, alternatively, he would be politically defeated. It might be thought that it should follow from this that he would therefore lose also his role-status and his "personality"; Otherwise, what can the achieved part of his role-status amount to? This would not happen immediately; but if he could not somehow retrieve the situation this would in fact happen in time: it would be natural for him, if his circumstances permitted, to move from the community, but if he stayed his social personality would in fact change! By social personality I mean personality insofar as it is relevant tosociological analysis. For instance, he would resent his defeat and become vengeful and suspicious; or he would accept his defeat (which is unlikely except perhaps in a religious man) and become retiring and quietist. As in the case of the Pathans (Barth, 1959: 71), "From Pathan descriptions of conflicts, one might think they were duels" for only the personalities are mentioned and remembered.

Therefore, in this essay we are considering together, simply as different aspects of one sociologically significant and analysable function, leadership, authority and "personality", and we are approaching the analysis of the latter through the former.

Chapter Nineteen

Selected Leadership Examples

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce and characterise a number of leaders - mostly known personally to the writer - representing between them various different types of leadership - in leadership action contexts. Ideally, we should here show, for each leader introduced, a "crisis" situation, since it is only in "crisis" situations that the full quality and value of any particular leadership example is explicit. Unfortunately, however, again owing to the nature of the society - of Baluch social action (particularly in the present situation where physical force is not in general in the hands of the Baluch, and there is at least the suggestion of a common duty to keep up a united front before the unwanted presence of Persian officialdom) - action patterns are often not allowed to reach the degree of crisis where the analytical components we are seeking would become explicit. We hope nevertheless that enough may be abstractable from the following episodes and situations to suggest, allowing consideration of the ethnographic material and analysis which has gone before, and the comparative material adduced, a working hypothesis for the understanding of the nature of personal authority and power in this type of society (in chapter 20) and of personality in leadership (in chapter 21).

The following examples are all additional to the material already presented in Part Two which contains a number of episodes equally relevant to the argument of this Part.

I

Religious Leaders

A. Darwish

1. We shall start with an example which is not from the writer's personal

experience. It is more relevant to Pakistani Baluchistan than the Persian Province, and it is historical. Weber's charisma is a convenient way of suggesting the orientation of followers towards a leader, and therefore the social value of a particular type of personal authority. This first example is a (perhaps unique) Baluch example of charisma and charismatic authority in precisely the sense which Weber meant, and is therefore a useful bridge to my modification of his usage (cf. Appendix II).

The founder of the Mikrī sect and the movement he founded has already been mentioned in Part Five, chapter 16. It is interesting to note here that in the List of Leading Personages in Baluchistan (Corrected up to 1st July, 1931, and published by the Government of India Central Publication Branch, Calcutta, in 1932), which covers the whole of Baluchistan (not only the part under British rule or protection), the only entry which describes a "religious" personage is:

"Mullā Bayān, Mikrī -

Son of the late Mullā Yār Muhammad. Born about 1896. He is recognised by the Mikrīs as the head of their sect. Lives at Kalag, in Kulanch. He is one of the richest men in Makrān, owning good land, and receives a voluntary revenue from the members of his sect, who form a considerable portion of the population of Makrān, south of the Panjgur Illaqa" (p. 25 my italics). The charisma of the founder of the sect has been routinised (Weber's Veralltäglichung) in his successors. No centre of authority-action can remain permanently extraordinary - so to keep Weber's definition and use of the term charisma it is necessary to retain the straightforward charismatic quality for the originator (whether religious or secular). For his successors it must be routinised - unless they are either to forego the status they might expect to inherit or become themselves in turn originators of a new movement. This is surely an important factor in the analysis of the significance of the concept of "dynasty" - which will be treated in the next chapter in the discussion of power and authority. Here we must note that Weber drew a distinction between the "routinisation of charisma" eg. into a political

system, and "the transformation of charisma in an anti-authoritarian direction" eg. a type of quietist or opposition religious movement, as, for instance, the Ja'farī Shī'a movement of Islam before it supplanted Sunnī Islam as the established religion of Persia at the hands of another charismatic leader at the beginning of the 16th century (cf. e.g. Donaldson, 1933).

I hope to show that in my adaptation of Weber's use of the term he introduced I am not destroying his analytical framework, nor am I spreading the term to cover a category so vague that it no longer has any analytical value (which is a charge which has been brought against the term - post Weber - more than once, cf. e.g. Watman, 1964). I am simply adapting it for a more general - and therefore more useful - purpose.

Weber's routinised charisma is similar in quality (if not the same as) what sociologically validifies "dynasty" as a political concept. Hence the confusion between temporal and spiritual authority in kings - at least before they became constitutional.

However, the head of the Zikrī sect does not fit properly into either Weber's idea of routinisation or his alternative of "transformation in an anti-authoritarian direction" - even though its originator was without a doubt a charismatic leader (he was a prophet), and his charismatically founded movement has by no means dissolved or lost its sociological significance after his death. In our terms the present head of the Zikrī sect is a religious as distinct from a secular leader - of the darwīsh category. His role-status is of exactly the same order as that of the darwīsh in Persian Baluchistan and that of the Saint in Swat. The political potentiality of his role-status is similarly exactly comparable. The main difference is of course that (although definitely within the tradition of Islam) he is without the pale of Islam. But in terms of the relationship between the religious and the secular in the

society, this is at most of secondary importance. Where there is antagonism between Zikrī and orthodox in the one society, there is antagonism between the darwīsh (and followers) and the orthodox (= mawlawī and followers) in the other.

Therefore, this first example fits Weber's charisma perfectly so far as its origin is concerned, but falls between the two alternatives of what Weber says should happen to charisma in the successors. However, if we modify this concept of charisma by allowing it to be heritable and define it specifically as an abstract quality which is applied to certain leaders by their followers in certain circumstances but which need not die with the person to whom it has been applied - because it may be inherited in circumstances where the inheritance of authority or status is conventional, then we have surely not only increased the value of charisma as an analytical concept, we have also linked it to the problem of succession of non-institutionalised authority, and more particularly perhaps to the concept of dynasty in the Baluch context, which term I am using to denote the hereditary succession of potential authority. This is not to say that charisma is never routinised (i.e. institutionalised or rationalised) or transformed into something non-charismatic. But Weber is saying that as soon as the charisma has been inherited it has become routinised. However, it would seem to be normal for charisma to continue (perhaps in a steadily more diluted form) to attach to the holder of a post that is thus established through charisma. Does not a charismatic quality attach for instance to kings, and (at least, for believers) to Catholic popes and Shī'a Imams, even to Sunni caliphs? Or, if this is not charisma, how does it differ in quality from the charisma which attached to the originators? Though this is not explicit in Weber, I think it is a difference of emphasis rather than a contradiction of his - even though strictly speaking the very term routinisation by Weber's own definition implies a negation of charisma (cf. his terms "ausseralltäglich" and "Veralltäglichung". He does, it is true, also have Erbcharisma but implies that this is no

longer Charisma).

It might be contended that all this means is that people in high positions of authority - whether religious or secular - are held in awe by the masses and that this is natural because they are kept separate or at least distinct from the masses who are led by the equivalent of clever stage-managing to believe that they must be a different type of being. Such an explanation might be allowed to stand for the Roman Emperors, but the Baluch chief is not thus distinguishable from his followers. They live basically the same kind of life in the same circumstances. Nor does charisma ever accompany economic wealth as such in Baluch society.

Having digressed so far already in this first example, and since all the relevant terminology and related aspects of the argument have already been introduced, it may be as well to note here and now that Weber treats of Feudalism within the framework of his theory of the routinisation of charisma, and claims that in Mediaeval Europe orientation to the charismatic character of political authority never disappeared entirely (Weber, 1964: 186 ff.)

Thus, we have shown a sociological relationship between personality, charisma, dynasty, and the feudal relationship. I hope the remaining examples may serve to make this relationship clearer.

Though this example is the only "prophet" type of charismatic political phenomenon recorded among the Baluch (i.e. including an originator and one or more successors) there are of course many examples in Islam at large and outside Islam: for instance, the Báb in Persia, the Mahdi in the Sudan, etc. - some including physical force and some not. It is a type of charismatic movement with wide comparative validity.

2. Until recently none of the four surviving Bārakzai brothers had very much time for the formal religion. They all follow a fairly typical pattern. They were primarily interested in sensual pleasures (e.g. opium, women, alcohol), inclined towards the informal religion, and ignored the formal. Only the eldest brother, Muhammad Umar, now deceased (cf. chapter 4), the senior member of the family since 1929, devoutly practised the formal religion. Since his death the next eldest brother, Alam Khān who formally took his place, now, at least as far as appearances are concerned, devoutly practises the formal religion. This would seem to indicate some analytical relationship (on the part of chiefs) between acknowledged senior political responsibility and practice of the formal religion. The senior members of the other main dynastic families also devoutly practise the formal religion. Other members (including those who may be accounted chiefs) of their families sometimes do and sometimes do not.

In each case - both with those who practise and those who do not - there tends to be a closer, or at least an easier, relationship between them and a darwīsh than between them and a maulawī. In the case of the Bārakzai brothers this relationship is perhaps closer and more common to the whole family than in any other case. The darwīsh concerned has already been mentioned in Part Five: Khāja Mullā Miā.

Mullā Miā is a quite remarkable man by any standards. He is small, perhaps in his sixties, with full white beard and white hair. He possesses that attractive, calm, almost radiant countenance that it would seem people generally - at least in the consciously systematised religions of the Judaeism-Christianity-Islam complex - wish to see in their spiritual leaders, whether within or without the pale of the orthodox system. He is said to come from the Sarbās region, of the Mīr zāī - which is Baluch and of quite high status, but widely dispersed in the Sarbās and neighbouring regions and with no traditional close connection with any of the dynastic families. I recount this as hearsay,

since although Mullā Miā is quite an easy man to talk to, on the subject of his own origins and training he always appears to know little or nothing, often in fact referring such questions to others present - who know as little or less than he himself divulges. This - in so far as it is conscious - is I think due not to any desire to have origins of a miraculous nature ascribed to him, but to have his charismatic quality depend entirely on his own presence and action, rather than in part on any combination of antecedents whether genealogical or mystical.

As long as he has been sociologically significant he has had a house in Āshār, and therefore insofar as he belongs to any specific community it is to that of Āshār, but he has taken a wife from Kozur and therefore spends some time there also. His own property in Āshār and his wife's in Kozur is perhaps enough for subsistance, barely more. He is, however, seldom to be found in Āshār, and is mostly travelling somewhere in the region (roughly enclosed between Īrafshān, Barāvān, Īrānshahr and Sarbāz) of primary Bārakzai influence, most often at the behest of one of the Bārakzai brothers. His life is austere, with no seeking after non-Baluch comforts despite the great respect shown him and the scope offered him for improving his material position.

Therefore, Mullā Miā is shown great respect by the chiefs of an area, but takes no visible advantage of it. He does not even seek (so far as I could ascertain) to dissuade them from some of their habits and activities which are sinful or not approved of in the eyes of the formal religion. He advises them on religious matters, and he is said to have defeated properly trained maulawīs on points of religious learning. In such cases he is relying on his personal charisma while they are relying on their learning, and it is indicative of the general attitude toward the power of personality that (at least outside Zāhidān) he has a larger following than any trained maulawī.

The political power, therefore, of Wāja Mullā Miā is never explicit

or obvious, but he has the ear of the chief and the highest religious sanctions for his views. In a recent trial of strength between the Bārakzai and an unhappy coalition of a Bozorgzāda and a Kurd chief in the Sarāvān area for influence and status vis-a-vis the Administration it was openly said that since he was with the Bārakzai they were bound to win.

This darvīsh type, though named in the language and much less vague than "chief" and "kamāsh" (but not as definite as maulawī) presents a wide variation and is difficult to define satisfactorily except by giving a number of differing examples each of which would be included in this category by the Baluch. The first example was perhaps rather arbitrarily put in this class: I do not think the Baluch would in fact include any one connected with the Mikrī sect in the category of darvīsh - but this is for one very special reason: the anathema of heresy. The social value of the concept of Islam and the formal religion as a conscious framework for less conscious conceptions has been dealt with in Part Five. In this case it is very much an appeal to imposed alien standards to justify an unreal social distinction. On a sociological level there is no difference in quality between the claims and social orientations of the originator of the Mikrī sect or his followers and the darvīsh, and we therefore feel justified in including him in the category.

The second example - Mōja Mullā Mīā - is the closest I have to the general Baluch conception of "darvīsh" and also of the politically significant darvīsh. I now proceed to two more examples, which though by no means unique, are not so central to the abstract conception of the role-status of "darvīsh" - whether with or without political significance.

3. The senior member of the Sheikhs or Sheikhzāda, Sheikh Cherāg (cf. above, Parts Two and Five) might be said to represent a distinct sub-category. I only came across one similar example within the Province

of any significance - the Shahzāda zāt in Sarāvān. It resembles closely the conception of sayyid in Persia, and the validity of this distinct sub-type of social status is acknowledged throughout the Province.

Besides being a zāt of relatively high and independent social standing, the Sheikhs claim and are accorded a vague and undefined religious standing qua zāt. What exactly this amounts to is vague and difficult to define. They claim to be Arabs by origin but to have come into the Province from the east (with the Jadgāls, cf. chapter 4). It is possible that they entered the society in Sind as learned (ag. in religion) immigrants from Arabia. The senior member of the tribe is senior both politically and religiously, but since he has not studied abroad he cannot be classed as a maulawī. Furthermore, whether or not he is personally inclined towards the religious aspect of his position, the mantle so to speak is laid on him by his genealogical position. He inherits by birth potentiality for both religious and political (at the kamāsh level) leadership.

The Sheikhs are among those upper zāt in the Mardārzai area who owned their own ghulāms. A very large proportion of heads of families in the zāt are kamāsh. Therefore the prestige attaching to the position of senior Sheikh - even disregarding "personality" or the aspirations of the incumbent - is considerable. The fact that the Sheikhs still retain sufficient ghulāms not to have to work their land themselves (they are all settled), traditionally wear white only, and wear larger and larger turbans according to their standing within the zāt, sets them apart from the rest of the population. In addition to this their features also tend to distinguish them. However, the present incumbent, Sheikh Cherāg, despite a considerable presence and a reputation for dealing with noxious jinn, carries probably no more weight politically than one would expect from a kamāsh with an explicit following so large and distinguished - which is anyway considerable, and Mīr Maulādād Mardārzai (cf. fig. VI) the senior member of the dynastic family, whose allegiance

the Sheikhs traditionally own, never fails to visit him and show him respect whenever he is in the vicinity. Sheikh Cherag's dīwān is the focal political point for Bashtiārī and Bāhu, superseded only by that of Mīr Maulādād when he is in the area.

4. The final example of this class is Qāzī Muhammad Hasan Arjomandī, who has also been introduced already in Part Five. He comes at the end of this class because although his qualifications - both ascribed and achieved - put him in this class, he shows obvious pretensions to more general power and authority. For, although his genealogical predecessors seem to have been certainly of relatively less importance he is known to have come from a line of darwīsh who had come not so many generations ago from Afghanistan (it is uncertain exactly how many, but probably three or four) and the last two of whom have tidy walled graves (which, however, appear not to be used as shrines) in the cemetry beside Nagwar. There is therefore a suggestion of inherited charisma. He claims to have undergone no organised religious training, but is not forthcoming about how he in fact acquired his considerable knowledge including his ability to speak quite fluent and good Persian. That is, he would once again appear to be consciously increasing the grounds for the attribution to him of personal charisma. However, unlike what we should expect from a darwīsh he tends to set himself up as an independent political authority, particularly in Qasr and, in much the same way as a maulawī. That is to say that he preaches and takes part in local affairs as an independent kanāsh, opposing chiefs. He justifies this on the basis of his learning which gives him the responsibility to guard the community - i.e. in much the same way as a maulawī. Furthermore, he has sufficient property in Qasr and to allow him a relatively comfortable life (on Baluch standards). He is generally at variance with Shīrdel Khān Boledai - the senior member of the local branch of the relevant dynastic family.

Therefore, Qāzī Muhammad Hasan Arjomandī has the ascribed and achieved

qualifications of a darvīsh - not of a maulawī, but he fulfils the functions of a maulawī and he is able to do this because the people consider that learning acquired in a mysterious way is worth more than that acquired in the straightforward way. As has been noted above he has no quarrel with the Sardārzai (they are not primarily interested in Qasr Qand) and Mīr Muhammad in fact pays him considerable respect. I was told by another member of the Sardārzai family that the reason why they regard him as they do is that he combines the qualities of the darvīsh and the maulawī, i.e. he has the maulawīs degree of religious learning and the darvīsh's nearness to God.

b. Maulawīs

1. In spite of what has been said about alien standards and an alien training, there is nothing less Baluch about the maulawī as a person than there is about the darvīsh or in fact any other Baluch. As persons they are as conscious of their Baluchness as any, - perhaps more so simply because of their learning and the fact that they have been outside Baluchistan. When the most prominent maulawī in Zāhidān (cf. Part Five) declared from the minbar in defiance of the Government that whoever went to Fars to fight "brother tribesmen" for the Persian Government was ka annahu 'qatala'l-nās - had committed the worst sin a Baluch could commit, he was talking Baluch nationalism, and was bringing the weight of the formal religion (of which he was the prime interpreter) and his own personal authority (the legitimacy of which was provided by the formal religion) to bear in a purely Baluch political sphere. For it is the duty of the maulawī to call a jihād - an institution of religious war sanctioned and commanded by the formal religion in certain circumstances (cf. Enc. Is. 1965, art. "Djihād") - even though it would have to be led by a chief or a khān. In other words the maulawī had the power to lend or withold from a political war the support of the formal religion. In this case it was being emphatically withheld.

2. As has been mentioned already in Part Five, because of their training,

their learning and their functions, the maulawīs tend to gravitate towards the larger settlements and the newly created towns of the Province. The case of one Maulawī Abdu'l-Wāhed who lives the life almost of a recluse in a small village called Haqqābād above Paskuh (Sarāwān), coming into Paskuh often only once a year to lead the namāz-i eid (A. 'id-i qurbān), is quite exceptional, and denies him political influence, though it does not lose him prestige or a certain degree of potential political authority, should he at any time wish to use it.

3. The area of Sarbāz differs in this respect. As has been mentioned already, in the upper Sarbāz valley there are no resident chiefs and the population is strung out along both sides of the gorge in ribbon-like villages. Historically the area is within the Sarāwān realm (cf. chapter 9, II & VII). The focal point of most of these villages is one or other outward and visible representation of the formal religion: whether a resident maulawī, the mosque, or both with a religious school run by the maulawī. Nor are there any prominent darwīsh in the area. This is I think a unique situation, but it accounts for a quite considerable population, for this river valley is the most densely populated area in the Makrān range (within the Province). The people are all shahrī, but a large proportion are of quite important zāi - including for instance several of the Sarāwān tribe closely related to the dynastic family (cf. Fig. III). A possible explanation for the situation has already been suggested (chapter 1). It is of course neither possible nor necessary to be sure how the situation has arisen. The value of the example is this: that here we have an area - once again definable on the basis of ecological criteria - in which the prominent leaders are maulawīs, rather than chiefs, darwīsh or ordinary (secular) kanagh. I was unfortunately unable to spend any length of time in any one community in this area, but while there I received the impression - which was confirmed in discussion with Baluch later - that social control or leadership in these communities was more democratic superficially, simply because the maulawī never has hereditary charisma and can seldom bring

any personal charisma to bear. The sociological status of the abstract formal religion - which he represents - has a certain charismatic quality and the kamāsh of these communities rely solely on this the basis of legitimacy of authority. Exceptional saulavia may transcend this situation and be attributed a certain (personal) charisma in their own right, but this is not general.

II

Secular Leaders

A. chiefs

1. Before embarking on a series of examples of secular leaders, it will be interesting to note here some of the more general factors in the political situation in Pakistani Baluchistan. In the Persian Province there has been no conscious effort on the part of the Persian Administration - at least until very recently - to change the local political conceptions of the people. More recently - particularly since the Shah's Six Fold Declaration on the 6th Bahman 1340 (January 1962) - the reforms and the rationalisation[1] process has affected the Baluch in basically the same ways as the rest of the country. The chiefs have been treated as landowners and due to the land reform programme some of them have lost much of the income they enjoyed from land. Further, the secret police have always been suspicious of many of the chiefs, both because of their previous connections with Dust Muhammad Khān or the British, and later because of periodical rumours of Pan-Baluch movements. Apart from these isolated incidental points of contact between the Administration and the Baluch there has been little positive interference.

In Pakistan, on the other hand, after a hundred years of acquaintance with the ways of the almost avuncular British who generally attempted to work through the existing political conceptions and conserve them, even

1. In the terminology used by Binder, 1962.

in the face of natural changes brought about by indigenous forces, which were in no way due to the foreign interference which they tried to make as inconspicuous as possible[1] - then came the Pakistani Administration with a new political ideology, corrupt and inefficient it is true, but followed by Ayyub Khan, under whom there has been a definite continuous policy of undermining the power of the chiefs. But the Pakistani Government was bound to take more notice of the Baluch chiefs within its borders than the Persians were, because the Baluchistan which Pakistan took over from Britain comprised a much larger percentage of the total area of the country and was to all intents and purposes divided into legally recognised semi-independent principalities - the Kalāt state, Las Bela, Panjgur, Kharān, Makrān, etc. In Persia the situation was much more vague and unstable, and of course the most important chief, Dust Muhammad Khān, was out of the way and had left no immediate successor to take over where he had left off. The contact with the new forces of the twentieth century - both in the form of the new Pakistani Administration and Western intellectual ideas was bound to affect Pakistani and Persian Baluchistan differently from the point of view of political conceptions and leadership.

In fact, nationalist ideas came to the Baluch through Pakistan and were adapted as a defence against "colonial exploitation" by the Pakistani Government. Intermittent fighting started in the mountainous

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1. It is interesting to consider this trait of British Colonial Administration in connection with the British "equilibrium" school of Social Anthropology - which was at its zenith before the wholesale break up of the Empire (i.e. the 1940's) and began to run into troubled waters almost immediately after the partition of the Subcontinent when the British public began to condition itself for the loss of all the numerous colonies within the foreseeable future. Could there be a direct relationship between them? Wherever they sent the colonial administrators tended to try to keep the native system running as it was with the minimum of (political) interference. Gradually, there grew up the idea that there is a permanent, almost divine, difference between the prosperous industrial West and the poor primitive rest, and that the rest of the world could never become remotely like the west except perhaps under the benevolent guidance of Western technocratic elites. On top of this came the first theoretical formulation of the new "scientific" discipline of Social Anthropology that primitive societies not only do not change but even have built-in mechanisms to stop them changing!

country east of Quetta in the middle fifties between Government forces and tribesmen who knew nothing of nationalism. By young Baluch intellectuals and nationalists this was incorporated into the list of results and justifications of the nationalist cause. Karachi was already full of Baluch (economic) refugees from all parts of Baluchistan, and is of course to a large extent a refugee city, - an excellent centre for the expression of political discontent.[1] There were already large Baluch minorities in the Sheikhdoms on the Arab side of the Persian Gulf and Muscat which provided excellent havens for political (as well as economic) refugees from Karachi and all parts of Baluchistan. The Baluch in Afghanistan are still barely touched by all this.

Approaches have been made to the British in the High Commission in Karachi and probably to some of the British agents in the Gulf for help and support of the Baluch cause. This has embarrassed the diplomats concerned who have wanted (understandably) to have nothing to do with it, but not really known what to do about it and - what is rather unfortunate - have not known anything of the people who have thus approached them, of their organisation and standing in their own communities or of what was going on generally in Baluch thought. In this they are perhaps not so much to blame as might at first appear since despite the long history of "Anglo-Baluch" relations (in the British Indian context) and a certain romantic admiration for wild tribesmen before Partition, since Partition the Baluch are of practically no strategic or economic or, therefore, political importance, and the Pakistani Government has no romantic admiration for them. For some years, at least, even so they have been surprisingly efficient at keeping almost the whole area isolated from the rest of the world. For instance,

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1. I am not here going into the causes of Baluch political discontent with the Pakistani regime, as they are not relevant to the argument. They are mainly due to a sense of Punjabi colonisation and insufficient political representation at any level - most of which is due to the express Pakistani government policy of forging one Pakistani nation out of all the numerous ethnic and linguistic minorities which together make up the population of West and East Pakistan.

there have so far to my knowledge been no reports in Western newspapers of the intermittent (though often serious) fighting which has for nearly ten years been going on between Baluch tribesmen and Government forces in the mountainous area between Quetta and the Indus.

In spite of all this, the young Pakistani Baluch nationalists are primarily orientated against the traditional Baluch chiefs, and only secondarily against Ayyub Khan. It is surely significant that in Pakistani Baluchistan nationalism is primarily an internal political revolution against the chiefs, when just over the (largely artificial) border nationalist aspirations, so far from being divorced from or anti the chiefs, are invariably closely connected with one or other of the traditional chiefs and recently, in particular, Abdī Khān, who will be discussed at greater length below (cf. Fig. VI).

This difference in aim between the Pakistani and Persian Baluch nationalist may of course be mainly due to nothing more than a difference in degree of isolation. In Pakistan they have acquired communist-inspired ideas; in Persia they still think in terms of their own traditional political concepts. However, though there may possibly be some truth in this, it is hardly likely to be a sufficient explanation because of the large amount of coming and going and exchange of information not only between all parts of Baluchistan but also with the colonies in exile and with the revolutionaries. It would suit the argument presented in this essay if the difference were due to a difference in attitude toward the political value of hereditary charisma and this for historical reasons. This proposition is probably not susceptible to proof, and I certainly do not have the material with which to prove it in this case, but I maintain that it is feasible, and if it is not a cause it is at least certainly an implication. Under British protection and conserving influence there was an over-institutionalisation of leadership. In the Persian Province no succession to authority is automatic. Every new chief has to prove himself. If the obvious successor to a chief's role-

status does not prove himself, not only is he not accepted as a chief, but - more gradually, though just as definitely - the family loses its special status of dynastic family unless this is maintained by another member of the family. Under the British in Pakistani Baluchistan in the interests of stability, security, and (false) equilibrium, political role-statuses were kept in the hereditary line when the only traditional factor of legitimacy they possessed was hereditary charisma. The hereditary aspect of charisma, though a factor in legitimacy, was not sufficient on its own, i.e. without "personality". British favour did, and probably still would, confer its own charismatic quality and add to the legitimacy, but not enough to fend off the new nationalist ideas. Pakistani Government favour (seen through Baluch eyes anyway mainly as Punjabi) bestows no charisma.

I offer this as a feasible and logical explanation of the facts available because of the scope it offers for illustration of the analytical concepts of charisma and personality which have been introduced already, and as a context for the more particular examples of leadership by chiefs which follow.

2. It is difficult to discuss any leader in isolation and without assuming considerable knowledge of other leaders and kamāsh and a number of communities and traditional relationships. It is hoped that enough of the "context" of each of the examples which follow has been made clear already under other headings. The following group of examples concerns mainly the Bārakzai brothers, the Gamshādzai, and the communities of Nāhuk and Īshār.

On his return with other members of his family from voluntary exile in British Baluchistan Muhammad Umar Khān Bārakzai (Fig. I) spent most of his time in Sarāvān, for his family had longer and firmer connections with the people of Sarāvān, and although they owned more property in Īrānshahr this had all been confiscated (cf. chapter 4) and a long campaign

lay ahead of him before it was to be returned to their ownership.

While Sarāvān (Shastun, was the obvious place for the senior member of the family to reside, there were a number of other settlements in the Sarāvān region which traditionally expected to have their own Bārakzai chief. This, as has already been noted was for two main reasons: a) social control, and b) the prestige of a "royal" dīwān. Principal among these was Nāhuk, traditionally the first foothold of the Bārakzai within the Province, and therefore embodying much in the way of sentimental attachment on both sides. Of all the junior brothers Muhammad Amīn, Muhammad Umar's only full brother and the next but one in order of birth, was probably the closest and dearest to Muhammad Umar. He also seems to have shown more aptitude for leadership than the other brothers. When he was in his early twenties (that is, probably, as early as possible) Muhammad Umar set him up as hākim in Nāhuk. That is, he gave him a choice hukumat.

The traditional relationship between the Bārakzai and the Gamshādzai has already been related in chapter four. At this time the senior member of the leading family of the Gamshādzai was an unusually strong and ambitious man, Lashkar Khān (Fig. IV). Nāhuk occupies a valley in the mountains north of Shastun in the middle of Gamshādzai territory, so that in view of the traditional relationship between the Gamshādzai and the Bārakzai, a Bārakzai hākim of Nāhuk is automatically the man who provides the main point of contact within that general relationship. In other words, there is a traditional ideal relationship between the two mīl which is of the type characterised as feudal above in chapter seven. But in normal conditions of peace this ideal general relationship need be no more than the context for the relationship between the Bārakzai hākim of Nāhuk and the leader (a kasāsh) of the Gamshādzai. Other points of contact may of course always exist, e.g. individual Gamshādzai visiting Shastun, but only this is continuous and unavoidable. It is impossible to be certain of dates but it must have been at least fifteen

years since there had been a permanently resident Bārakzai hākim in Nāhuk, and though Lashkar Khān had not repudiated this particular relationship it had practically become a dead letter by default. The Bārakzai had unavoidably lost something of their prestige with the Ghashādzai by their absence and, though nobody had replaced them as chiefs, the Ghashādzai leader had grown used to not having chiefs to defer to in his own area. In this context it will be understood that the establishment of Muhammad Amīn in Nāhuk was regarded by Lashkar Khān as at best unwanted and at worst an interference or even a threat to his own position. The position was made much worse by the fact that Muhammad Amīn was only in his early twenties. Lashkar Khān put it about that the people were letting themselves be governed by "a mere boy" and attempted to intimidate Muhammad Amīn by bringing up a number of his tribesmen in fighting form and surrounding Nāhuk with them. According to the story as it is now told Muhammad Amīn managed to get a messenger through to Shastun at night, and before Lashkar Khān could follow up his intimidation Muhammad Umar came up from Shastun with a superior force. Lashkar Khān made no more open attempts to change the situation.

Some years later the people of Ishār petitioned Muhammad Umar for a hākum. I was unable to find any satisfactory explanation for the origins of the Bārakzai connection with Ishār. They own no property there. It is true that Ērafshān which has for some generations been the centre of a branch of the Bārakzai dynastic family (cf. Fig. III) is only some 25 km. to the east. It seems that the fort at Ishār (of which only ruins now remain) was originally built by a Bārakzai chief (A'zam Khān, Fig. I) but I could obtain no details.

Muhammad Umar now sent Muhammad Amīn to Ishār, where he remained hākum until Muhammad Umar's death. The people of Ishār wanted a hākum because although they were not without kasāgh these could not agree among themselves, with the result that there was neither effective social control nor leadership initiative within the community. This was a com-

spicuous lack and had somehow to be supplied. It was natural in such circumstances to seek a hākum, somebody far above the status of the local kamāsh, to come and preside in the locality and be the fountain of authority.

This is the purely political aspect of Muhammad Amīn's biography up until Muhammad Umar's death: he was placed by his senior brother successively in two communities - each having a centralised population of perhaps 3,000 and an indefinite hinterland. He was responsible to his elder brother in the political sense that anyone dissatisfied with his conduct could (and did) complain to Muhammad Umar, who would constrain him, and domestic responsibility to obey his elder brother constrained him to obey in other spheres as well. Muhammad Umar was responsible for him - both to support him with force if necessary, and morally as his own personal representative in that area, and he was also responsible to the people of the communities. If the people were dissatisfied with the hākum he sent them or with his own treatment of them, they could reject the hākum and invite influence in the area from another dynastic family.

It should physically not have been too difficult to reject an unwanted hākum if the population were united in wishing it (except perhaps in Dashtiārī and Bāhu where ghulāms seem to have been used as an armed police force on a more organised basis). However, even though there is no shortage of stories of oppression and injustice, in short, of every form of bad government on the part of a large proportion of hākums, there is to my knowledge no historical case of a community rejecting its hākum by physical force. Before, however, treating this as a simple factor in the determination of the value of charisma in leadership, we must note that it is by no means so rare for individual kamāsh or representatives of the community as a whole to incite another chief to supplant him. The difference is perhaps subtle, but nonetheless significant, for it shows that although there is good reason (cf. Part Three)

to suspect that the role-status of chief is a superstructure, that is, is super-imposed at any rate on the Baluch and most likely (though with a longer history) on the Brahūī also, there now seems to be no effort to reject or overthrow the role-status as such - only to reject certain holders of it. But this method of changing hākum depended directly on two important factors: a) the availability of an alternative chief, and b) persuading that chief to oppose the current hākum - which if he happened to be his brother, or attached to him by some other close kin, affinal, or feudal relationship, he should be unwilling to do. He would almost certainly at least appear to be unwilling to start with. A good example is the case of Dust Muhammad and his brother Bushīrwān (cf. chapter 4), where everything was accomplished very neatly without force and without breach of relationships - even to the point of providing the expelled hākum with another - though minor - hukumat.

Very often therefore there was probably no alternative to a bad hākum. And this may be an important reason why very much which was obviously not good in a hākum was condoned as a matter of course, and the word hākum is practically a synonym for debauchery and (a certain amount of) oppression - but it is nevertheless not hated and the charismatic quality still attaches to the role-status.

Apart from the mutual responsibilities between the small community hākum and his feudal senior which have been shown, there was also the economic side of the relationship (cf. Part Four, chapter 14). In brief, it was understood traditionally by all parties that the hākum had a right to dah-yak - one tenth of all the agricultural produce of the people of the area of which he was hākum; and that this right amounted to a badge of membership to his class - something similar to the mediaeval knight. It could of course be a blanket term for whatever proportion the hākum in fact collected. Further, in some cases, in particular under Dust Muhammad Khān, the hākum would also collect mālīāt - in origin, the Persian Government tax - keep some of it to

cover the expense of his local riflemen (tofangchī), and remit the rest to his feudal superior.

Therefore, in allotting a hukumat to his favourite brother, however good and philanthropic a chief Muhammad Umar may have been - and it appears that he was very good, it is almost certain that the purpose of providing him with a "living" would have been at least as high in his mind as that of providing the communities in question with immediate local leadership.

I think sufficient has been said to indicate that at all levels, from chief to ra'īyat, the role-status of chief was accepted and in fact positively considered as having an independent and necessary value even though there was no generic term, only the various family names. Each had duties to the other, but it could by no means be maintained that the role-status of chief existed solely for the sake of the ra'īyat, or even that its existence was justified purely by the need of the ra'īyat for a leader. It did exist for this purpose, and it was justified in this way, but the basic reason (for the Baluch) why there were chiefs is that there were men with a combination of these particular ascribed and achieved qualifications. It existed because of charisma, hereditary and personal. It existed because of personality.

It is not quite certain how it was that Muhammad Amīn was free to take up the new hukumat. How had he ceased to be hākim of Nāhuk? This uncertainty helps to illustrate the degree of informality and lack of institutionalisation. Muhammad Amīn as hākim of Nāhuk was the son of Dust Muhammad Khān (who had taken the role-status of chief higher than ever before, so that despite his defeat he left behind him more hereditary charisma than anyone else before - it was probably even to the family's advantage that he had eventually been killed by the Persian Government. The ignominy of the circumstances and the impersonal conception of justice which implied it had no meaning for the Baluch mind) and a Bārakzai mother;

he was young, handsome, irresponsible, impulsive, and Baluch (physically strong, proficient and active). Despite the formal demise of native Baluch power in the Province (the implications of which the Baluch anyway had no means of understanding, and the Persians were slow to make clear) he could scarcely, according to his own standards, occupy a more ideal position: in his early twenties he had a comfortable kukmat, could rely on his senior brother to support him, and if necessary rescue him, if he got into difficulties, and had little to do besides seek his own pleasures - which were normal for a man in his position - hunting, women, and opium, for all three of which Nāhuk was ideal. It is perhaps not surprising that in this position he became more oppressive than the kamāsh of Nāhuk thought was necessary to put up with for the sake of the advantages of having a resident chief. It would seem that the relationship between him and the local kamāsh gradually deteriorated to the point where, although they would not show him disrespect, they would avoid his dīwān and his business with them, and might very well have attempted to encourage a rival but for their long attachment to the Bārakzai, with whom as a whole they had no quarrel, and the lack of any suitable rival. It gradually became obvious to all three parties to the relationship how unsatisfactory the position was, but no party wished to lose face. Muhammad Amīn gradually spent longer and longer each year away from Nāhuk (mostly in Dhastun). Less and less of his dah-yak was collected, and gradually people stopped referring to him as the hākum (which it will be remembered was in no way "official" to start with, cf. chapter 15).

Thus, though, in a sense, Muhammad Amīn had been formally sent to Nāhuk by his brother, after a time the people of Nāhuk gradually ceased to have a hākum, and Muhammad Amīn gradually ceased to be a hākum, and when Muhammad Umar was asked by the people to send some one to Ashār, Muhammad Amīn was the obvious choice.

Muhammad Amīn was still very much in the prime of life, and he had

barely changed from his early days at Māhuk, except in what he had learnt by experience. The years in Āshār might be referred to as his opium period. As has been mentioned already, opium is even now - despite prohibition and large scale efforts at supression by the police throughout the country at large - by no means an unusual habit in Baluchistan, particularly among the dynastic families. Comparatively little, if any, shame attaches to addiction to it as such. Quite good quality opium is still easy to come by there, and may cost less than the equivalent of fifteen pounds Sterling (£15) per kg., and is smoked quite openly. Muhammad Amīn became addicted to the extent that for weeks at a time he would do little if anything else but smoke opium. He would smoke far into the night, sleep till the following afternoon, and as soon as he woke, call for the pipe again. This behaviour, though perhaps not common, was by no means unique for members of his class, and is still not unheard of. Some of the men who became close confidants of Muhammad Amīn during this period, both kamāsh of Āshār and favoured ghulāms, have told me that often it would take months from the time he decided, for instance, to set out from Shastun for Āshār (a journey which might be accomplished very comfortably in four days at the most) before they actually arrived there - simply because of the laziness induced by the drug and the little time it left for any other activity.

However, opium does not account for the whole of the period he spent at Āshār. Only four hours away in Ārafshān was his "cousin" and brother-in-law, Mīrza Khān secure in the hukumat traditionally held by his branch of the family, senior to him in age, junior politically and by (hereditary and personal) charisma. They spent much time together, and made long hunting trips into the mountains to the south of the two settlements, enjoying a close connection with the Baluch of the area who owned an obligation of sarēn-bandī directly to Mīrzā Khān and indirectly therefore to Muhammad Amīn also. They also founded and peopled together a small new agricultural settlement between their two centres (Kokkī), and added to or improved others in the neighbourhood. There

were, therefore, intervals in the devotion to opium, and when summoned to his elder brother - who was now in Īrānshahr - he could (for the sake of pride) go without the drug altogether.

A reconstruction of the "succession" on the death of Muhammad Umar has already been given (chapter 4). This left Alam Khān as the senior member of the tribe, but Muhammad Amīn as by far the most popular chief in the part of the Province which owned Bārakzai supremacy. I maintain that this popularity can be due to nothing which is not implied in the following ascribed qualifications;

a) inherited charisma due to parentage and genealogy;

b) personal charisma or a particular quality of personality.

Personal achievement in this case accounted for nothing - except perhaps in that in mardomdārī he compared very favourably with his brothers, and it is difficult to say whether this should be regarded as an achieved qualification. He was and is almost universally admired as a character, even by people who frowned deeply on his way of life, his irresponsibility, and his laziness.

Life has been growing steadily more and more difficult for Muhammad Amīn. As a hākum, he grew up to expect always an unlimited income, and he has not adapted well to the new circumstances. It is no longer possible to be hākum in Baluchistan - though the title is still applied a little wistfully to some of the old hākums who though they have lost the income have retained the status. During the last two years new Government policies have deprived Muhammad Amīn of the Mayorship of Sarāvān (the post has not been refilled) - a post he has held for two years or so, which he had enjoyed, and for which from the Baluch point of view he had been superbly suited, and of a large proportion of his share of the lands in the Īrānshahr area. But still a large number of the kamāsh of Shastun and other parts of Sarāvān pay him a jealous loyalty. I had not realised the extent of this until in 1965 I arrived in Īranshahr from the south to find that Muhammad Amīn was there and had not

been to Sarāvān for some months. On two occasions a number of the kamāsh of Sarāvān had actually sent a jeep to bring him back, but he had procrastinated. I had to go to Sarāvān myself and apart from the fact that I wanted to see Muhammad Amīn fulfil his role-status to the fullest extent possible I wanted to have him with me in Sarāvān for my own purposes. Since he considered himself my host and therefore bound as a Baluch to please his guest, I was able to get him to return to Sarāvān when his own people had not been able to. I had not realised the full significance of my own - partly selfish - action until, in Sarāvān, I was visited by a number of the local kamāsh and thanked in unambiguous terms for bringing his back. He had only been permanently resident in Shastun for three years - since he had been made Mayor (shahrdār). The kamāsh were so keen to see that he did not move elsewhere even though he had lost the shahrdārī that they offered to make up the salary themselves to keep him.

Muhammad Amīn Khān is practically never alone. But apart from the procession of shahrī, Baluch, kamāsh and ghulāms, who continually seek him out for private and public business, and other members of his family of affines - of whom there are usually at least one or two with him,[1] there are a number of close personal intimates, varying in number, and ranging from domestic ghulāms, some old, some young, to local kamāsh, and young men from his own sāt or one of those closely related - e.g. Mir Murādsai - who have attached themselves to him in a spirit almost of hero worship, but relying also on some measure of personal favour from him in return. These are continually at his beck and call and ready to serve him faithfully and implicitly in absolutely anything he may decide on.

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1. It is perhaps significant that there is a particularly close attachment between him and the sons of his deceased elder brother - Rahman and Amīr, both of different mothers. Rahman is just over twenty and enjoys a close and sincere mutual friendship with Muhammad Amīn; Amīr is about eight, and very precocious. He lives nearby in Dezak with his mother, whom Muhammad Amīn has been negotiating to marry for the last two or three years. Muhammad Amīn treats Amīr like a favourite small son - except that if he were his son he would be more reserved with him in public (cf. Part Four, chapter 10).

The picture I have tried to draw of Muhammad Amīn Khān is one of a man superbly suited for the role-status of chief in Baluch society, but who has (perhaps typically, made little effort to exploit the situation for long term benefits. On top of this he makes little positive effort to adapt himself to the new conditions which are being imposed on the Province by the new social and economic development programmes. Of course, the great chiefs of the past did take positive advantage of the opportunities - at least some of them - which were offered them. But in most of the little stories or anecdotes about them that from time to time crop up in conversation I recognised the same old "failings" of procrastination, addiction to sensual pleasures and extravagance, which I had seen in Muhammad Amīn. Muhammad Amīn is not in any essential way different from the greatest of them. The most important resemblance between him and them is also the greatest asset of all of them: personality. For this reason Muhammad Amīn is a first class example for any investigation of leadership in Baluch society, for he ranks high on the scale of ascribed qualifications and has achieved little, but as a chief is almost without rival.

In fact, Muhammad Amīn has one rival in Marāvān who has recently caused him trouble. His name is Ghulām Muhammad Bi'smatullāhī (cf. Figs. XI A and B), and, the Mīr Murādzai branch apart, he is except for his own father (who is not very active politically) the senior active member of the Bozorgzāda - the old rivals of the Mērakzai in Marāvān. Ghulām Muhammad is an extremely active and ingenious operator, but his successes are always shortlived. It is interesting to note that he is of an inferior mother, but more important than anything else he does not have "personality".

3. Leadership in Ērafshān - although entirely Mērakzai - presents a quite separate story, and it is entirely dominated by the figure of Mīrzā Khān. The other relevant figures are his younger brother, A'zam Khān, another brother by an inferior mother, Qāderbakhsh, two sons of

an elder deceased brother, Abu'l-Hasan and Khesmeh, and very recently Amānullāh Bārakzai (Karān), the younger son of Ayyub Khān of Kāsk (Fig. III).

Mīrzā Khān, though still under fifty, has had the status of hākim longer than any other active living chief. Furthermore Krafshān is perhaps the most isolated hukumat-centre in the Province at the present time, and according to Keruany (1916: 205) this was also true at the turn of the century. It saw no motorised traffic at all until 1962, and has seen only occasional jeep-type vehicles since then. There has altogether, until the last year or two, been little outside influence of the nature which would disturb Mīrzā Khān's position. Mīrzā Khān is generally known as the most oppressive Baluch hākim in modern times. Due mainly to the isolation of the place, the generally low status of the zāt of most of the population, and his own incorrigeable character, he was able to and did collect dah-yak up until and including 1964 - by which time this was a unique phenomenon in the Province. He imposed severe or (even for the Baluch) disgusting sentences on reputable men for questionable crimes.

For instance, in some riverine agricultural settlements such as the mētage of Krafshān latrines are built in the form of mud cubicles some 9 or 10 feet high. Half way up a floor is constructed with several small holes in it. Users climb up rude steps to this floor. The night soil is periodically collected at ground level and distributed over the rice fields. These latrines are normally only used by women. A woman who had been washing clothes at the side of a small kwalā (cf. above p. 55) complained to Mīrzā Khān of a man who came to water his donkey closeby at the same small kwalā, rather than going elsewhere or waiting for her to finish and go away. Although there are no explicit Baluch rules of behaviour to cover such circumstances, no notice would be taken of such an action unless the man also behaved in an offensive manner. There were no witnesses. Mīrzā Khān had the

man kept in the lower part of one of the latrines for several days.

Developments in the rest of the Province have meant that for several years now he has had no obvious physical force at his disposal with which to hold for himself this sort of position in the community. Why then do the people continue to tolerate it? A satisfactory answer is difficult to find, and can only be given in roughly the same terms as have been expounded already - with perhaps a little more detail. It is noteworthy that, compared with Muhammad Amīn, Mīrzā Khān is a far more serious and religiously-minded man. Although he is a confirmed opium addict he would never for instance touch alcohol or condone any behaviour which is condemned by the formal religion. On this count there is nothing against him. In the eyes of his own community - and the Baluch of Malāh Kuh - he has the whole weight of the Bārakzai hereditary charisma behind him. His father was killed fighting for Dust Muhammad Khān, and many of them had fought with him. Similarly, although Muhammad Amīn disapproves of his behaviour, Mīrzā Khān is older than he and therefore his social senior. He could tell Mīrzā Khān what he thought and try to persuade him to change his ways - which he did - but to withdraw his support of him would be in Baluch eyes a worse fault than Mīrzā Khān's behaviour. The people of Ērafshān and the Baluch of Malāh Kuh knew Muhammad Amīn as the son of Dust Muhammad and had got to know him at first hand when he lived as hākum in Ushār. Their loyalty and regard for Muhammad Amīn encouraged them to tolerate Mīrzā Khān.

It was not, however, that some of the kamāsh had not looked around for an alternative. There were the sons of Baluch Khān, Mīrzā Khān's deceased elder brother. But of these the elder, Abulhasan, had forsaken the field when still young for a career as a Ministry of Education teacher in the Province, and he would not allow his brother Khosrau - who still lived in Ērafshān - to compete for the leadership even if Khosrau had been suitable and willing. In short, though both of them

would have liked to be rid of their uncle as hākum of Kharfshān they did not think it worth fighting over, - and they knew that Mīrzā Khān would not stand down meekly even if the majority of the population were to forsake him overnight.

This left A'zam Khān, Mīrzā Khān's younger brother. A'zam Khān was not unwilling, but once again was far from eager for any open break with his brother. Furthermore, A'zam Khān was a very ordinary man and by no means over intelligent. It is difficult to find in him any qualifying quality at all besides his birth and his share of hereditary charisma. But the people began to use him as a figure-head of opposition and to form a secondary quasi-dīvān in his house - which was in fact better suited architecturally for it than Mīrzā Khān's. This situation, when the brother's houses were anyway in the same mētag and practically side by side, could of course not fail to cause an open split in the community between the followers of each brother. Had A'zam Khān had the personality, he would almost certainly have won the situation without requiring to undertake any positive action. In fact the situation oscillated for some two years until a new factor appeared on the scene.

Amānullāh Barakzai - Barān - is by any criterion an outstanding man in Baluch society. He is FRS of Muhammad Amīn, but attached to the area of the Barbās river valley by the residence of his father and his matrilateral kin relationships which are with the Sardārzai and the Belēdai. However, for a variety of reasons which would cause too much of a digression to recount here, he had spent some time in Teheran, and in prison for political reasons. On his return he spent most of his time in Saravān. Barān was born about 1937 and therefore is not only still very young to be playing an independent political role but did not know the Baluch Period or the temporary exile which followed it. He is also extremely peremptory in his manner, and while he does not openly flout his seniors, he does not hesitate to speak his mind in their presence - if he sees any reason to do so, or to avoid them if their behaviour annoys

him. Nevertheless, this "revolutionariness" does not go so far as to conflict with his Baluch-ness, and his self-assurance also stands him in good stead. It might be said that Bārān is probably the only chief in the whole Province whose authority is rising at the present time - and this despite the fact that he is the second son of the youngest brother but one of Dost Muhammad, and had no status of malk in his own right north of Sarbāz.

Bārān wanted a wife - preferably a "cousin" who was bilaterally Barakzai. A'sam Khān had such a daughter. The girl's mother had died, which meant that her own property by inheritance and her mahr from A'sam Khān now belonged to her children on whose behalf A'sam Khān administered it and enjoyed its produce. However, on the marriage of her daughter, the daughter's (equal) share - though still technically hers - would pass in practice from her father to her husband. Therefore, although it was very much in A'sam Khān's interests to acquire a zāmād, and particularly one so well born and strong as Bārān, it would prove financially very expensive. As an example of the way Baluch marriage arrangements work this is of course extreme rather than general. A'sam had by this time lost two good (i.e. well-born) wives. While their children remained unmarried he continued to enjoy the income of the large proportion of his own property which had been made over to them as mahr and their own property. He needed another wife, but he could not take a well-born one since he no longer had sufficient (alienable) property left to make over as mahr. He would therefore be forced in time to take to wife a young girl of low class status, which would cost him little or nothing in mahr, for it was practically unheard of for a man to live permanently without a wife and people were beginning to talk. Despite, therefore, the attraction of having Bārān as zāmād, he knew that his daughter - though no more than plain in looks - had for her age no rivals in birth. The union was almost inevitable, but the more mahr he could extract from Bārān for his daughter, although it would make no financial difference to him, the more stable would be the relationship between him and his zāmād.

and therefore the stronger his political backing in Krafshān against his brother. The negotiations dragged on for some two years, with Muhammad Amīn bearing the main burden of them. The wedding finally took place in 1965. In the following year Bārām spent some six months in the (for him) complete political isolation of Krafshān, and its environs. He lived in A'zam Khān's house and simply because he assumed that he was the supreme authority in the area nobody disputed his leadership. Mīrzā Khān left the settlement temporarily. As a result of the addition of his new wife's property to his own - which he had mostly acquired by his own efforts - Bārām was now probably the largest landowner in the Sarāvān regions. This is by no means large on general Persian standards, but in the Baluch environment it shows an admirable ability and inclination to adapt to the changing conditions of the Province from within the Baluch tradition. This is the value of the example of Bārām: that remaining completely within the Baluch tradition, enjoying the requisite ascribed qualifications to a sufficient degree to allow him easy access to the role-status of chief (though not as the obvious successor to any hukumat) he has been able to increase his authority and spread its basis (i.e. by attention to sardemārī and malk) at a time when because of the direct and indirect effects on Baluch society of non-Baluch power and policies the star of most chiefs is waning.

4. The last example from the Bārakzai also concerns Krafshān. The subject is the only surviving brother of Mīrzā Khān and A'zam Khān - Qāderbakhsh. Being of a low sāt mother Qāderbakhsh naturally never had any pretensions to the hukumat or even to the role-status which we have defined and called "chief".

His ascribed status is determined by patrilateral descent from an important dynastic family, but the social status of his mother precludes him from any of the advantages of this except that he receives an equal share of his father's property by inheritance and he is closer to his half-brothers (by kin tie) than any one else in the same generation. His

social status may best be defined by saying that his parentage makes him a member of the Bārakzai mīr but not of the dynastic family. Moreover, he is politically worse off than for instance a kamīsh of a lower status but independent mīr, for he may not leave the settlement permanently since his income depends on the malk he has inherited within it, and as long as he stays in Ṭrafshān his whole status is entirely dependant on his senior brothers. He may of course rebel, but would have scant chance of success, since his hereditary charisma does not approach that of his brothers, and it would take a high degree of personal charisma to make up for the difference and secure a sufficient following to ensure any permanent independent security.

Ḳāderbakhsh has in fact been almost ideally loyal, though it is perhaps a good thing that he lives in a different mētaz - which allows him a certain degree of domestic independence. There have been times when he has had his differences with one or both brothers, has avoided them and even left Ṭrafshān for a time, but he has never set himself up in rivalry to them - even though he must often have been tempted to do so. For Ḳāderbakhsh has a much more intimate relationship with a large number of the people of the area than either of his brothers. Moreover, he is very well thought of by Muhammad Amīn, and his services are valued by his two brothers. Two main reasons may be seen for this. These are almost entirely accounted for by his qualities of Baluch-ness.

The bastard prince who bears a grudge against the world because of his illegitimacy which disqualifies him from succeeding his father, and keeps him in an inferior position to his brothers is a not unfamiliar theme in European literature but it will not serve as a model for the equivalent in Baluch society. One obvious difference is that the Baluch equivalent - because of polygyny - is not illegitimate; but in the most significant aspect of the situation - the disqualification from succession - there is no difference. I suggest the reason why the literary type rebels against his destiny while his Baluch counterpart acquiesces

is that the literary type belongs to a society with comparatively developed institutions and comparatively loose class structure. If the European bastard could win the crown he was king: for his Baluch counterpart there has never been any such outward and visible sign to fight for.

Qāderbakhsh excels in all the Baluch virtues and spends much of his time with the Baluch in the mountains around Sarafshān. His mother in fact came from the Baluch to the north of the Shahri Kaur. For many years (particularly after Mīrzā Khān's health began to fail - he suffers badly from asthma) Mīrzā Khān had used him as a kind of personal representative when he had business with Baluch in the mountains, e.g. Salāh Kuh. I only saw Qāderbakhsh either in the presence of one of his senior brothers or in Salāh Kuh where he was by that time traditionally accorded the additional charisma of "personal representative of the hākim". In the former situation he was meek and dutiful, and in the latter he was treated as a member of a dynastic family. It is significant that when he was travelling in the Baluch areas he was always in great demand for dam, particularly for fevers, but also for other ailments.

5. Much has already been said about the ecological and political area of Dashtiārī and Bāhu in the extreme south east of the Province under its own dynastic family - the Sardārzai - and the nuclear Jadgāl element of the population. It has sometimes been referred to as a principality. This term was used to suggest an extreme and centralised (but not institutionalised) constellation of the roles and concepts described in Part Four. Here we are not concerned with the structure as such but with the quality of the leadership, the paramount authority and power in the area.

Mīr Abdī Khān Sardārzai, the senior member of the dynastic family, has also been mentioned already. It might be expected that having des-

cribed the area as a principality - this would suggest some special qualities also in the hākim of the area. The senior member of the Sardārzai dynastic family was traditionally the hākim of Dashtiārī and Bāhu, and the family has for some generations been closely inter-married with the Beledai to the north (Fig. XIII). Abdī Khān is now in his fifties, and succeeded to this position when his father died in the thirties. It is only very recently that the Administration has interfered in any positive or organised way in the internal affairs of the area. However, they had on a number of occasions interfered with Abdī. It is perhaps unavoidable that there should always be trouble between a man like Abdī, in complete control of an isolated and distinct ecological area which even had its own language (and it is practically impossible to find a non-Jadgāl who speaks Jadgālī), and an administration represented by inefficient, lazy, often dishonest, jealous officials, afraid of their superiors and hating their "exile". There was of course inevitably from time to time contact between Abdī (and his predecessors) and the British on the other side of the border - for whom he was the only effective person to deal with in the first instance in any question concerning border relations. And it is equally inevitable that the Administration should suspect and accuse him first of collusion with the British and then treason. It is similarly natural that such suspicions and accusations should have no meaning for him. He was of course bound to have some sort of relations with his neighbours - especially across an undemarcated and very largely unreal land border. But the idea of scheming to make himself a vassal of the British does not make Baluch sense. Furthermore, it constituted a slur on his character, on his Baluchness, which he - naturally again - felt obliged to rid himself of. It was, therefore, easy for the Administration to inveigle him, to make him play their game, their ultimate aim being to discredit him among his own people. Hence the several journeys to Tehran, and the period in prison. However, it is by no means easy for the Gajars to discredit a Baluch among his own people.

Meanwhile, one would think that if it were possible to discredit Mīr Abdī with his own people, he had done all that was possible in this direction himself. But it is impossible now to disentangle from the present almost mythical concept of Mīr Abdī what he actually was to his people some five years ago. For about then Mīr Abdī left the Province and Iran for the other side of the Gulf. He went on the pilgrimage to Mecca, but did not return. The following year he made the hajj a second time. The hajj has tremendous spiritual value for the Baluch. Because of this I am forced to account for the sociological value of this person in the opposite of chronological order. For any information which may be gathered now about his pre-hajj life is seen through the coloured glasses of the "hajj-aura". Up until his first hajj he had paid (so far as any one remembers) little or no attention to the formal religion. This hajj, particularly when followed, as it was, by a second, and by continued absence, must have had an extremely beneficial effect on his popular image among those who had known him. This image now began to spread. People coming back from the other side of the Gulf said they had seen him in Mecca, then Dubai, then Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Kuwait. Almost automatically, his name became connected with the idea of a Free Baluchistan and used by the Nationalists. It was only a matter of time before the rumour spread that he had been to Cairo, talked with Nasser, and broadcast from Cairo radio. It was of course by now impossible politically for him to return to Iran - he was too deeply compromised by rumour if not by fact with external anti-Iranian forces and Iran's present arch-enemy, Egypt. But for his people, for those who had known him in the Province, and for those to whom the message was spread he became the figurehead, the symbol in the Province of the underground movement for a Free Baluchistan, the expulsion of the hated Gajars, prosperity.[1]

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1. These ideas are presented simply as sociologically valid concepts. I imply nothing political, either as fact or opinion. The ideas are in fact quite nebulous (within the Province), and nobody really has very much idea what they imply.

We may now consider the historical background of this man, which is at once the basis of the present myth, but the memory of which is now (I suspect) strongly coloured by the events described in the previous paragraph. Mīr Abdī appears to have lived in Karachi for some years at the expense of the British Indian Government (cf. Baluchistan, 1932: 30) - an honour he was accorded in return for his and his family's traditional good neighbour value to the British. Dīn Muhammad (his father) had also earlier lived in Karachi as a British guest for some time following the defeat of Dust Muhammad Khān in 1928, when so many of the chiefs and other members of the dynastic families - having no idea what the defeat would mean for them - went into voluntary exile in British territory. Any account of Mīr Abdī's life before his hajj normally at least alludes to this period in Karachi as the extreme degree of debauchery (mainly because of the better facilities) in a long career of debauchery. And the whole story is one of Baluch deeds (P. kār-hā-ye Baluchī) - impulsive leadership of men, hunting and shooting prowess, extreme endurance, etc. - and debauchery. As it progresses the debauchery gradually accounts for a larger and larger proportion, until by the time he left for the hajj his name was a byword and (it is said) he was beginning to be despised and rejected by his own people. It had passed the limits which were condoned in young chiefs and he was no longer young. The main items once again were opium, alcohol and women. The most remarkable thing about men like Mīr Abdī and Muhammad Amīn is that their debauchery never seems to deprive them of their superb physique and their ability to excel at "Baluch deeds". One suspects that if it did, their charisma would suffer immediately and seriously, but unfortunately there is no evidence for such an assumption. Despite the depths to which he sank (it is now said) he never entirely lost control of himself. On one occasion after having smoked large quantities of opium every day for a long period, he suddenly stopped completely and people who were with him night and day at the time (it will be remembered that privacy does not exist) swear that he did not eat any either - a common ruse adopted by addicts who for some reason wish it to be thought that they

have given up the drug, or when they are in circumstances in which they may not let it be known that they are addicted. Furthermore he gave no sign of discomfort. Similarly, his younger brother, Mir Maulādād, who is almost continually on the move and very seldom resident for any length of time in any one place, obviously genuinely enjoys smoking opium. But as is the way with the Baluch in most things he does not consider planning for the future. He often has with him a pipe of sorts - often improvised - and a small quantity of opium, but it would be contrary to his pride to provide consciously for tomorrow even for such an addiction.[1]

It is interesting that Mīr Abdī is close to being for Mīr Amīn (Muhammad Amīn, Fig. I) what might in our terms be described as his personal hero. Mīr Amīn is perhaps fifteen years younger. The Sardārsai probably enjoy a degree of hereditary charisma second only to the sons of Rust Muhammad Khān. I suggest that this together with a high degree of personal charisma forms the basis of Mīr Amīn's admiration of Mīr Abdī, for, especially when added to a hukumat, it means being accorded a high degree of status and income without active effort - which in turn allows (on Baluch standards) gratification of the sensual pleasures without loss of Baluchness. It becomes clear that personal charisma in a chief tends to go with a good constitution.

In his middle fifties Mīr Abdī changed. He went on the hajj once and again, and did not come back, and according to the reports which are brought back is a completely reformed man. He was an extreme case, but it can nevertheless be believed, because it is qualitatively not an unusual thing to happen. What is more, without the past, much of the mystical appeal of the present image would be lost. The present image is the whole Baluch chief on an almost heroic scale. Each of the

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1. It is interesting in this connection that the Persian word hesāb-gar - one who keeps account, eg. of what he lends and borrows, takes and receives, and thus provides for the future - has a derogatory connotation.

following elements (all of which have featured in the discussion and analysis so far) are combined in generous proportions:

i hereditary charisma

ii personal charisma

iii hukumat

iv Baluchness

v debauchery

vi endurance

vii all these crowned at last with a double hajj and white-bearded, responsible respectability entirely committed to Baluch society and values.

6. Since Mīr Abdī's departure the senior member of the family in the province has been Mīr Maulādād, his only surviving brother (cf. Fig. VI). (His son, Brāhīm, would have been unlikely to be able to assert himself straight away anyway because of age, but the son is so different from the father in this context that we might characterise him by the term "unpersonality" cf. below, III). Mīr Maulādād is one of the outstanding chiefs still active in the Province today, and he is perhaps one of the most active from the Baluch point of view. It is tempting to compare him with Mīr Amīn. In two things they are very similar: hereditary charisma - they both have an elder brother living who for one reason or another leaves them an open field among their own people; and personal charisma - their personal appeal for the majority of their people. Maulādād is older than Amīn and in some ways more Baluch (Baluch-ter). Dashtiārī and Bāhu as an ecological unit has been perhaps the most isolated area of the Province, and Maulādād has spent very little time outside it, and like Mīr Amīn has scarcely travelled at all outside the Province. His Persian, though quite adequate for his now quite onerous relations with the Administration, is self taught and spoken with a strong Baluchi accent. He never speaks it when it is not necessary. He smokes opium, but I have never noticed him let it interfere with other things.

The reasons for his itinerant life within the Province have already been given. He travels very light, carrying only an attache case containing shaving equipment, cigarettes, writing material, his "official file", and one change of clothes - one shirt and one pair of Baluch trousers. He is often even unaccompanied by a ghulām (though one reason for this is that he smokes cigarettes and not the normal water-pipe which requires a ghulām to keep it at the ready, cf. chapter 4). He does not own his own transport. When he is among his own people they provide him with mounts - usually camels. There are always people to travel with him from village to village, but these are travel companions or people involved in the same business which is the reason for his own journey rather than servants. Since his journey is invariably occasioned by either their direct relations with him or their need of him to regularise their own relationships it is in their own interests to move him about. This form of travelling takes him as far as Rīsk, Qasr Qand, and Chāhbahār. When similar business involves the Administration and he is obliged to go further afield to Īrānshahr or Zāhidān, he takes a seat on whatever vehicle is going, paying if the driver is not in some way connected to him. He would not be conspicuous in a crowd (as would for instance, Mīr Amīn or Mīr Abdī). He talks little, laughs little. He excels particularly in the ideal chiefly sang-froid, which becomes almost a mystical detachment from "petty" things and danger (cf. his behaviour during the storm in Bāhu Kalāt, above chapter 1, p. 25).

The nature of the typical internal or domestic disputes has already been described. Wherever he dismounts a dīwān forms and the other-ness of his status allows disputants, who could not otherwise come together, to seek a settlement of their disputes by him. He sits sometimes for many hours, sometimes day after day, in the dīwān listening to all who have any opinion on the subject and making comments himself, and finally attempts not to pronounce justice, but to heal the breach in the social relationships of the community. It may not be a continual process, and several things may go on at once, in the same way that a dīwān may contain

several conversations at the same time. There is no ceremony, no formality or set way of doing things - only a role-status. It is true, we have called the dīwān an institution, and in a sense it is, but it does not imply formality. The formality was in the first meeting of two people, sanctions for asylum, marriage, etc., and scant even there - not in ordinary social relations.

Cases which involve the Administration do not at first sight perhaps differ all that much, and should probably be regarded as a compromise between the traditional conception, above, and the ideal of absolute justice - though official Tehran government policy is often a complicating factor.

There are always odd individuals or groups somewhere in the Province who are at least technically yāghī - in a state of rebellion from the Administration. In some cases these are simply men who know that if they make an appearance in a town they will be arrested because of some previous offence, and so long as they do not make any appearance the Administration cannot be bothered to pursue them actively. In some cases however it constitutes active rejection of the authority of the Administration. In the autumn of 1964 a number of men were yāghī in Dashtiārī and the country around it. The Gendarmes managed to catch one of them and were taking him in to Chābbahār when they were waylaid by the remainder who tried to persuade them to let the man go. Both sides knew that the captured man was one of the yāghīs' best men. It is necessary to bear in mind that most of the gendarmes are also Baluch, though invariably from another part of the Province, and often from Sīstān. They are bound however to have some understanding of the local people's point of view and sympathy with their code of honour - however far they may have assimilated themselves to the (different) ethics of the Administration. Even so the gendarmes could not afford to agree. Inevitably a fight broke out. The yāghīs had no firearms, and the gendarmes - either because they could not bring themselves to fire on unarmed

Baluch, or because the yāghīs in some way prevented them from using their rifles - did not use theirs. The result, fought with knives, was a victory for the yāghīs.

When the news reached Chāhbahār, the gendarmerie - as is not unusual in such cases - sent a posse into the area which proceeded to capture a number of people who had had nothing to do with the incident.[1] The next step was to send for Mīr Maulādād who was to tell them which two of the men they had captured were responsible for the killings. Mīr Maulādād, who of course knew the yāghīs, and the details of the fight and what had happened subsequently from his own people, told them that they had captured the wrong people. The gendarme commander attempted to make it understood that he did not think this very important. If Mīr Maulādād would do him the favour of identifying two of the men they had there as the culprits it would be better for both of them and save themmore trouble. Maulādād could not of course agree, and as a result the commander turned on him with the order that he must in that case bring in the guilty ones. Maulādād responded quite frankly with the information of where they could be found and the offer to help in bringing them in if the commander would provide him with a posse of gendarmes. This the commander was not prepared to do - he probably considered it too risky, and anyway he wanted to force Maulādād to play his own game. Maulādād made an alternative suggestion: he would find out from his people exactly what their movements were so that the commander could send a posse to ambush them. The commander suspected a trap. The only other course Maulādād could suggest was that they should wait until in time one by one the yāghīs would venture to make secret visits to their villages in Dashtiārī, and that he would have them captured by his own people then.[2] But this was no good

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1. The gendarmerie commander in a place like Chāhbahār in present circumstances is very often a young man trying to make a name for himself, and, what is more important, to obtain a transfer to a more civilised part of the country. His main interest is in satisfying his superiors and seeing that any trouble in his area is quashed as quickly and quietly as possible. He has no feeling of obligation to the local people and does not think of them as fellow-countrymen.

2. It must be remembered that if a small group of local people choose to

continued overleaf ....

either, for the commander had to have the matter cleared up quickly. From this point on the interview appeared to have gone something like this:

The commander: "Go and find them and bring them in with your own arms."

Mīr Maulādād: "I don't have any arms."

"What! You're a sardār[1] and you have no arms!"

"All right! Perhaps I do, but I have no official sanction to use them for this purpose, and I should be silly anyway to give you such proof that I do have arms."

"Just say it was two of these men, and we'll fix the rest."

"But none of these men had anything to do with it."

"You're Mīr Abdī's brother and you want to start a revolution."

"By acting like this it is you who are playing the part of Mīr Abdī's brother, for at every act of injustice by Persian officials another score or so men finally make the decision to migrate to the other side of the Gulf and join the movement that Mīr Abdī stands for."

Impasse. The commander sent in a complaint to his superiors in Zāhidān of Maulādād's lack of co-operation with the Administration. Maulādād similarly filed a complaint against the commander. So far there has

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make themselves scarce in the Makrān range of mountains it is practically impossible to track them down without the active help of the remainder of the population.

A good example of this was the episode of Badshāh in 1956. Badshāh was an ordinary Baluch from the western part of the Makran range who had turned yaghī. Little or no notice was taken of him until he killed an American in the Sarha gorge. The American was the head of C.A.M.S. in Iran. Badshāh had intended to ambush a gendarme officer, but the American jeep came through first. He realised his mistake too late and, scared, eventually killed the American's pregnant wife also - an unforgivable sin in the Baluch code. The reaction in Tehran was of course uproar, and all available forces were mobilised to catch, dead or alive, what was thought must be the leader of an incipient revolution - entirely without success. Eventually, he was caught and killed by other Baluch under the direction of the chiefs of the area "to redeem Baluch honour".

1. Sardār is the word the Persians use for a Baluch chief cf. chapter 13. It is of course illegal to have arms (except with a hunter's license), or armed men at one's disposal, and has been ever since the Province was disarmed following the 1920 campaign. Nevertheless, certain parts of the Province are still quite well armed - particularly for instance Koh Kapēt, and when it suits the purposes of local officials the suspicion is regularly levelled at any chief. Maulādād's people could hardly be said to be well armed, but I suspect he could in fact muster a quite dangerous band of armed men if he needed to.

been no further development, and one might normally expect that nothing further will happen, except that another grey mark will have been put beside the name of Mīr Kaulādād in the files of the secret police.

The main point of this example, so far as the subject of leadership is concerned, is to show that the better remaining chiefs cannot survive as they are in the present situation. They are caught between their own people and the Administration. Assuming they remain in the Province - and they are unlikely to enjoy a permanent income outside it (from this point of view Mīr Abdī's continued exile is a mathing of a mystery) - unless they turn themselves into capitalist landowners (which by nature and training they are unlikely to do - here Barāh is an exception) they are bound to keep closer to their people than to the Administration. And since a) they are the most conspicuous members of the population, and b) they are sociologically at their most valuable when there is friction of some kind between their people and the Administration, it is a valid generalisation to say that there is an inverse ratio between the effectiveness of the leader as chief and the social and political security accorded him by the Administration.

Kaulādād was one of the few Baluch who owned sufficient land to be affected by the Persian Land Reform Laws. These were enacted in 1962 and are being executed throughout the country in three stages. In brief, the first stage was designed to eliminate as quickly and simply as possible the large estates of the landowning aristocracy of Persia, and left the Province of Baluchistan practically untouched. The remaining stages were to level out inconsistencies and the grosser injustices which remained from mediaeval times and bring an end to absentee landlordism at least so far as the crop-sharing peasant is concerned. Naturally it took some time for these measures to be extended to the whole of the country. In March 1966 I was with Kaulādād in Qāsemābād - some 25 kms west of Bampur - while he attempted to settle the question for the part of that village which was his responsibility.

According to Baluch criteria Mīr Mauladād was effective owner of one fifth of the village. In fact this was the property of his aged father-in-law Purdel Khān Boledai.[1] It had been awarded him originally by the Administration from the Bampur khāliseh for a living in recognition of his role-status. Mīr Mauladād was not only his son-in-law and therefore due for his daughter's share on his death, but also because of his superior position in the society it was natural for him to take over the administrative responsibility for the whole property.

The problem now was to satisfy the new law. In fact, the Persian Administration was showing its nuisance value again and had to be obviated. The difference in this particular case was that the other party to the newly created problem - the peasants - were not his own people, but low-class Bampur peasantry accustomed for over a century to working land which entailed no personal allegiance. That is, they were not Baluch, and were unused to the normal Baluch forms of leadership. Landowners (owning more than a certain amount - which varied according to the type of land) were obliged to follow one of the following courses, unanimous agreement upon which had first to be reached between the peasants and the landowner and then registered with the Land Reform Office in Īrānshahr.

i The landowner may sell to the peasants at a price agreeable to both.

ii He may lease the land to them for thirty years.

iii He may sell the share that the peasants normally get. That is, for example, if the peasants normally take three parts of the crop while he takes two, he may retain two parts of the land for himself and divide the other three parts among the peasants.

iv He may abolish the traditional cropsharing arrangement and pay the peasants a daily wage. That is, the peasants become daily paid labourers.

v Or they may, if both sides wish it, carry on as they were.

Failing unanimous agreement the Administration would enforce a settlement.

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1. In fact, Boledai was the surname he had adopted. By nāt he was Gīchkī; on his mother's side he was closely related with the Boledai. He was originally from Pakistan. Although there are other Gīchkī in the Persian Province, they are very few and in a distinct area.

The morning after we arrived in Qasemābād a dīwān formed in the room which we had occupied. Some of the peasants of the fifth share of the village which was in question could be accounted kasānah. most of them were present with the addition of the kadkhodā of the whole village and most of the kasānah of the remainder of the village (which had now for some time been divided up between those who worked it). Naulādād first explained the position. After some two hours discussion from which it was difficult to distinguish any definite direction he invited them to go away and make up their minds. They came back after about an hour.

It should perhaps be explained that of the five options only the fifth - technically known as (P) urf-i mahall or the "custom of the locality" - was in fact a practical proposition for the landowner - at least in this particular case. If he were to sell he would be unlikely to get a fair price. If he leased it would be the same. To make them daily paid labourers was impractical for an absentee landlord. The men themselves decided on the third option - which was probably on their part not a bad choice. For ideally it should mean that their income remained the same but they would no longer be obliged to an absentee landowner and the land and water would be their own to sell if they so wished. However, for the landowner the disadvantages are obvious: he loses all control of the local population and is obliged to find some new way of providing the labour necessary for the cultivation of his own two fifths.

Up to this point Mīr Naulādād had made no effort at all to influence their decision. He now openly spoke his own mind. Urf-i mahall, he said, was in fact the best option for both parties. The new laws may be good for some areas of the country, but they had nothing to offer in a completely Baluch environment. If they insisted on their own choice it would be pointless for him to attempt to stop them, since if landowner and peasant did not agree the Administration would force a settlement which (according to him) would be to the advantage of neither party.

However, by doing this they would gain independence at the price of the loss of all protection- which meant in effect cutting themselves off from effective membership of the Baluch community.

There was not very much resistance. Within half an hour, at the price of granting each a plot of land on which to build a house and allowing them to make an orchard out of one of the two āyash[1] of which the village was constituted, Mīr Maulādād had persuaded them to accept urf-i mahall. It was further agreed that if thereafter they should decide to split (i.e. option No. 3) the orchard would be divided on the same basis. It is significant that these people were Mīr Maulādād's ra'īyat, but not his people - i.e. there was no kin or allegiance relationship between them. It was basically a straightforward landlord-peasant relationship. There was no other basis to the relationship. Nevertheless, the relationship was saved by an appeal to the values of the Baluch relationships which were described in Part Four.

Finally, a number of points concerning Mīr Maulādād illustrate well the community's need for a chief. In Pog, just below Sar Band and Hōt on the Nāju, and traditionally one of the Bolēdai hukumats, the water supply comes from the river - most of it direct from the main stream or one of the gwalas it leaves in the dry periods. Such water is never owned. It can often be increased by digging what the Baluch call a kahn (= Persian qanāt - though the Persian muqannī would scarcely dignify this particular type with the name since it is a very shallow and insecure affair) in the bed of the river. Very often, as in this case, the bed of the river is gravel and rocks of varying size at least a hundred yards wide. Within this bed water may flow in one or several streams and when there is no water on the surface, there is nevertheless normally a good supply not far below the surface. By driving a quite shallow underground channel across the bed in these circumstances quite

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1. A village of two āyash is a village of which half the cultivable land is left fallow each year.

amazing amounts of flow may often be released into the irrigation channels. The word "kahn" in the mountainous areas invariably means this type of river-bed construction. It naturally follows from this description that each flood of any significance fills the kahn in and therefore decreases rather than increases the amount of water available for irrigation, unless and until the channel is rebuilt - which usually constitutes one whole day's work at the most.

As has been indicated in the geographical and ecological accounts above in Part One, in this mountain type of environment in the Province, where the permanent agricultural settlements are almost entirely riverine, the limiting factor in agriculture is the availability of soil rather than water, and ownership is by land not water. Obviously the man who has most to gain or lose from the produce is likely to be most active in preserving or increasing the water supply - but perhaps not for the obvious reasons. Should the crop fail he- the rich man - will of course suffer less than the poor man. Similarly, the rich man may have enough surplus and be lazy enough not to worry if production decreases. But in our context it is this man - the man who stands to gain or lose most - who provides the framework whereby the rest of the community may be marshalled together to work as a team on something which will benefit the community as a whole. The man who stands to gain or lose most is the hākum, since one tenth (dahyak) of the whole harvest is his. He may be and usually is also the largest landowner, but it is his income from dah-yak which is the more important sociological factor, and it will be remembered that (with the exception of ghulāms) almost all peasants have their own land - though they may also work on the land of the hākum or someone else on one of the bases already indicated.

Mīr Maulādād, though he has no hereditary right to the hukumat - even if such a post still existed (though he would be the natural candidate for it by marriage if it did), is the most important chief with any connection with the village, and since the hereditary line of hākums

are his in-laws anyway, they are happy to let him take the initiative. He is after all seldom there for more than half the year at the most.

With these qualifying factors in mind, the following little incident is a typical "leadership situation". While Mīr Maulādād was touring Nashtiārā in the spring of 1965 a series of good rains caused floods on the stretch of the Kāju which passes Beg and filled in the kahn (which had been built on Mīr Maulādād's initiative not many years previously. At the beginning of May when he arrived back in Beg no one had attempted to clear the channel. The following afternoon we went for a walk up the river to the site of the kahn to see just how bad the situation was. In less than an hour working with our hands only (including Mīr Maulādād) we released as much as half the previous flow. The reason the local people gave for not having done anything about it before Maulādād returned was that they had been unable to agree on when, how and by whom it should be done.

This is perhaps an extreme example of the objective and subjective value of leadership within this particular type of community. I do not think it is typical of the whole Province, but it is typical of this particular type of settlement within the Province. We have already indicated the type of differences - on the historical plane - which seem likely to distinguish this type of community from others. Very often a difference in the composition of the population of the communities can be distinguished today simply on the basis of the relative prestige of the zāt represented. However, on some occasions quite high status zāt are represented among the population of this type of shahrī settlement. There would seem to be a tradition of having one sole source of (rather oppressive) authority in these communities with a quite wide gap in status between the zāt of the hākim and that of the majority of the population - in fact, a class difference. The implication of course is that the majority of the population were helots, and the chief owed his living to a senior chief - either in that or a previous generation - who

claimed some sort of hegemony over the ecological region, and with whom he stood in a feudal relationship in addition to being usually but not always a relative or affine. How the chief occupies an essential pivotal position in the community, without which there can be no initiative or effective social control and the economic and agricultural situation is bound to decline.

In Kaserābād the historical basis of Maulādād's relationship with the peasants was so far as the peasants were concerned, based purely on landownership. In Nag it was his affinal relationship with the traditional hākum which made them his people. In Nasr Qand and Rask where he is also connected because of the residence of one or more of his ancestors in one or other direct line, and the resultant inheritance of malk, there are also prominent Bolēdai chiefs (closely related to him cf. Fig. XIII) of the traditional line of hākums, and since he has no quarrel with these he plays no independent role (cf. above on Qāzī Muhammad Hassan).

In Dashtiārī and Bāhu Mīr Maulādād is the senior member (i.e. present in the Province - cf. above on Mīr Abdī) of the dynastic family which has traditionally provided the hākums of this area and who according to tradition led the present population into this area of the Province just ten generations ago. This with the addition of Maulādād's personal qualities, and the more closely knit political structure of this area, adds up to a great degree of charisma - both hereditary and personal (it would be beaten by, for instance, Mīr Amīn if it was not for the presence of his elder brother Alam; Alam himself loses on his own personal qualities.)

Though traditionally, the family - like the population of the area - is settled, their seat was Mīri Bāzār (literally - "the chief's village") which like many other villages in Bāhu and Dashtiārī (cf. Part One) have been rendered uninhabitable in recent decades by hydrological processes. When Mīri Bāzār became waterless the senior branch

of the Sardārzai dynastic family had to move, and did not as a family set up a residential headquarters anywhere else. Their close ties with the Bolēdai and the fact that by now they had inherited property (malk) in most of the Bolēdai hukumats through intermarriage made it natural for them to gravitate towards Nasr Gand and Rask. Maulādād's affinal connection with Bog marked that settlement as a natural place for him to spend much of his time. For despite the large holdings which the family still owned in Dashtiārī and Bāhu, the movements of the rivers and a series of droughts which happened at about this same time had made agriculture in the area so insecure that it was barely worth their while bothering about it. For some years the whole family was absent from the area. And this was the time when many of the great number of émigrés from the area now resident in Karachi and elsewhere actually left their homes. The reasons for this exodus were twofold: a) economic - the changes in the courses of the rivers and the lack of rain and floods; and b) to a large extent as we have seen a result of the economic reasons, political, - the loss of the traditional central authority and its powers of social control - though a subsidiary cause was the political insecurity of the family vis-a-vis the Administration. Then Abdī Khan left the country.

It was generally admitted by both parties - Maulādād and the people - that the Baluch code of honour tended to lapse in some of its less important aspects during this period. For instance, stranger-travellers were less likely to be taken in and given hospitality as a social duty. But it was emphatically denied by both sides that the area became any less secure from the traveller's point of view, i.e. that any of the local population would during this period or at any other period have molested a stranger in whatever circumstances. Lack of leadership would have had an adverse effect on their relationships between themselves. Similar results are claimed to have been caused by the leadership vacuum left by the Bārakzai in Īrānshahr and Sarāwān after 1928, but this has been on a much larger scale and is much more difficult to reduce to any

concrete factual examples.

In the spring of 1965 I met Maulādād by chance in Dalgān on the banks of the Wazan Kaur and spent the next six weeks or so wandering with him from village to village throughout both Dashtiārī and Bāhu - i.e. both sides of the river, in the parts which are still intensely cultivated around Dalgān and Muhammadzai (i.e. water permitting - it was a good year), the parts which are thick jangal - e.g. near Talāng and Sīrjā, and the parts which are completely bare - the centre of Dashtiārī and the south of Bāhu. It had been some time since Maulādād had spent so long in the area and many years since most of the population had seen him. The welcome which he received in every hāsār was quite unequivocal. He stayed nowhere more than three nights at the most - in some simply for one lunch or one dinner and a night's sleep. It was difficult to be certain but I think we were never allowed to be the same man's guest for more than one meal. At nearly every meal the breast bone of a goat was laid before us (cf. above, chapter 12.).

I was puzzled at the consistency of this reception over such a long period, when the hosts had been used to living without a resident chief for so long, and had no legal economic obligations to him whatsoever, for this was far in excess of the obligatory hospitality for any guest-stranger. Further, the Sardārzai had the reputation of being strong resolute bākuna - which carried with it associations of being at least to some extent zālem (arbitrary, tyrannical, oppressive, cf. chapter 2). (I know of only one bākun who died with the generally acknowledged reputation of having been good, strong, resolute, and not zālem - Bahrām Khān, cf. chapter 4.) Maulādād admitted quite freely that his family (he included himself) had been zālem at least on occasions, and when pressed for more detail said that they had taken more than they had a right to under the headings of dah-yak and māliāt. Perhaps the present mythical nature of Mīr Abdī as a sociological concept in the community might have been active here, and added to the

"hereditary" charisma of Maulādād. In any case, Maulādād, however far pressed, made no pretence at being able to answer the question, and would only say that it was because of the people's own goodness that they still treated him as a chief. The people had a more pragmatic explanation. It was, of course, social control. Wherever we went disputes were brought before him, and were always settled, in time, to the satisfaction of the majority of people in any way concerned, and with sometimes little or no regard for the values of absolute justice. Throughout the tour we probably spent more time in Bakk (Kucha) than anywhere else, and we did this against our will since time was very short and so much of it had to be spent actually travelling, but Sheikh Muhammad - a sheikh and the principal kamāsh of the settlement - refused to let Maulādād go because the people needed him for the settlement of more disputes. The head of the gendarmerie post in Talāng supported his view wholeheartedly - unusual in a government servant not of local origin. Many disputes were mainly over irrigation channels (juy) and cultivable land (daqār) and often between quite closely related men (it will be remembered that the affinal link is sociologically very weak in this area, cf. chapter 10). The most common source of trouble was at the point where the several juys diverge just behind the band, since each flood was bound to change the banks sufficiently for one man to gain at the expense of another.

But why should Maulādād be the only man who could perform this function - especially when he and his brothers had left a complete vacuum in the area for many years? Nor is there a shortage of good kamāsh in the area. I suggest that the answer can only be found in the analysis of leadership as an absolute quality which must include what we have chosen to call charisma. However, the charisma, to be useful as an analytical term, must itself be analysable (cf. chapter 21).

7. The Boldādai dynastic family is in certain respects different from the Sardārzai and the Bārakzai, and resembles more closely the Shīrānī

in the following respects:

a) They have almost certainly been in the Province and the area much longer;

b) they once controlled a much wider area (cf. chapter 4);

c) the family is much more evenly divided into comparatively equal hukumats, whereas in the Bārakzai there are definitely leading branches in each family;

d) they have an unusual and in some respects unstable relationship with a leading Baluch zāt in their area.

This latter is very likely a weakening factor in their position. It seems very likely that the Shīrānī are in origin a leading lineage of the Nārui - perhaps the most numerous, widespread and well known of Baluch zāt in Persia. At one point during my field work it seemed to me that the relationship between the Nārui and the Shīrānī, the Bar and the Bolēdai, the Gamshādzai and the Bārakzai, the Jadgals and the Sardārzai, and the Sepāhī and the Mīr Hurādzai, was essentially the same: that each main dynastic family had a special relationship with one Baluch zāt on which it traditionally relied for the backbone of its physical strength. However, though there may be some value in this for the analysis of present social relationships, there are also important differences. The Shīrānī or Sherkhānzai are almost certainly themselves a lineage of the Nārui and it is likely that they did not separate or become more superior than a prominent kanāgh line until relatively recently. There are therefore very close ties between them. According to their own tradition the relationship between the Sardārzai and the Jadgāls has not changed in any essential way since before they left Sind. The Sardārzai are themselves Jadgāls by origin - Jadgāl is a zāt only to a non-Jadgāl, by origin it is a linguistic and "ethnic" term. In fact, the Sardārzai are one of the lineages of a Jadgāl tribe. The Jadgāls form the nucleus of the Sardārzai's people. The case of the Gamshādzai and the Bārakzai differs from this in that the Gamshādzai no longer form the nucleus (if they ever did) of the Bārakzai's people. Finally the historical basis for the present relationship between the Bar and the Bolēdai is obscure.

The present situation would seem to be determined by the following factors:

a) The Bar had no family which according to the terms defined in this essay could be called a dynastic family, and the tribe has performed sarēnbandī for the Boledai.

b) The Bolēdai dynastic family controlled a number of relatively small hukumats.

c) In the late twenties and early thirties there was trouble between the two bāt, and both sides lost many good men.

d) The senior Boledai though he has been prominent in the political life of the Province for some twenty years, and has built up some reputation for himself as an agricultural capitalist even in Tehran, is known as an inconsequential chief because his own tribe does not now have good men and he has no prominent kasāsh in his following.

It follows from this that, comparatively speaking, he lacks both hereditary and personal charisma.

8. One dynastic family remains which has not come into any of the examples given so far. The Mubārakī appear to be in origin a breakaway lineage from the Shīrānī, or possibly a rival lineage from among the Nārui. Once again the details are obscure. The family is dominant in the area generally known as Chāmp and Lāshār. Lāshār is the collective name for the line of villages which stretch back from the south side of the Espaka sends along the route of the present main road from Īrānshahr to Chāhbahār to where it plunges into the gorge known as Tang-i Sarha. It may be characterised as a collection of fertile oases between the Jās Murīān and the Makrān Range. Apart from some members of the Mubārakī dynastic family (there is also one in Harīdek just south of the Tang-i Sarha) the most prominent bāt in this area are the Lāshārī - one of the famous old Baluch tribes (cf. chapter 3 - if they are in fact the same tribe)-and they hold their status there with a number of good kasāsh.

The remainder of the Mubārakī area centres on Chāmp and the Kāju river from its source down to Nasr Qand and includes the surrounding parts

of the Makrān Range. It is the sort of area where we should expect to find the best type of Baluch - barren, deeply eroded mountains. However, this whole area is a rather strange political island. Whereas the other main dynastic families - Bārakzai, Mir Murādzai, Sardārzai, Bolēdai, Shīrānī, - are closely intermarried and present or try always to present a united coalition front to the Administration, the Mubārakī are not intermarried with them (in recent times) and their relations with these other five are not secure. As a family they derive extra prestige and status from the fact that they now provide one of the two representatives to the Tehran majlis which are allowed from the Province. (The other is sent by the Rīgī of the Sarhadd, who are considered below.) The five main dynastic families have never sent a representative to the Iranian majlis. The reason for this is not far to seek. The representatives are of course not elected. They are appointed, or at best chosen by a local oligarchy and the choice is either suggested or approved from Tehran. It is significant that the Mubārakī and the Rīgī were the first two major elements to surrender to the Government forces in the person of General Jahānbānī in 1928.

The Chāmp area is one of the two main areas in the Province which is still insecure, and does not even contain the minimum of gendarmerie posts to represent the Persian law and Administration. However, while the insecurity of the other area - Kuh Sefīd and the Gamshādzai - is only a matter of the relationship between the tribe and the Administration rather than a reflection on the Baluchness of the area, in Chāmp the situation is different: it is generally maintained that because of

a) ineffective leadership on the chief level and

b) no kanūsh worthy of the name, therefore

c) the general Baluch criteria of behaviour have no value to the extent that even petty theft may occur, and nobody would vouch for the safety of a stranger who ventured into the area without protection. Each of these three factors - which I have given in a cause and effect relationship - are an aspersion on the dynastic family. The social condition

of the area is seen and judged in terms of leadership qualities of the relevant dynastic family. The dynastic family is judged in terms of the Baluch-ness of the people who own its hegemony.

9. All the examples so far have come from the Makrān, none from the Sarhadd. Strictly speaking, according to the terminology which has been used in the essay there are no dynastic families - and therefore no chiefs - in the Sarhadd. The main reason for this would seem to be the different ecology of the area: the plain of Khwāsh is traditionally the only agricultural centre large enough to support a hukumat. But the very fact that Khwāsh is unique in the Province means that it has had a unique history and is not easily comparable with the agricultural centres of the Makrān.

However, since the Sarhadd is a part of the Province which forms the basis of this study, some account of it must be given in this Part also. It is obvious to any one who will read The Raiders of the Sarhadd (Dyer, 1921) that the Sarhadd has its tribal leaders. But without the differences in relative class-status, which in the Makrān are brought about by the mixture of occupations and origins, there is not sufficient social differentiation to give rise to such a status as the dynastic family. Practically the whole population - except the Khwāsh peasants - are Baluch. The tribal leaders are according to our terminology kamāsh, or rather, they are the senior kamāsh of each tribal group. They are comparable to the chiefs of the Makrān because each is the paramount authority in their particular area, but the distinction between them which is brought out by our terminology is valid because: the different marriage and inheritance practices tend to form vertical social and political groupings of the lineage type, rather than horizontal groupings of cognatically inter-related dynasties. The various tribal groupings of the area are each headed by kamāsh who are related to each other by kin (agnatic) and/or client relationships, both of the subordinate - superordinate type. Most important is the fact that there is no class

difference in the Sarhadd between the tribal leader and his following. Further, no Makrān chief ever served a Sarhadd tribal leader, but it was quite normal for a Sarhadd tribal leader to serve a Makrān chief in sarūbandī. Therefore, the relationship between a Sarhadd tribal leader and his following is exactly similar in quality to that between a Makrān kamāsh and his following, although, simply because there are no chiefs in the Sarhadd, the Sarhadd tribal leader is a much more powerful man than the ordinary Makrān kamāsh.

B. Secular kamāsh

It remains to say something about the category of secular leader which we have called kamāsh. Practically everything we have said about chiefs applies equally for kamāsh - but only less so. For instance, a kamāsh has a role-status for which he qualifies by a combination of hereditary and personal charisma - but less. He carries out the same functions as a chief, but on a smaller scale. There is a status differentiation between him and his people but less than that of a chief and not necessarily a class differentiation. Therefore although a certain amount of hereditary charisma may be gathered by a line of kamāsh and the family of a kamāsh obviously benefit by being closely attached to him, this is not sufficient to justify the use of a term like dynastic family for them.

1. The kamāsh may be at the head of a semi-independent system as in Kōsh Kaur, where the community, at least at the present time, is politically self sufficient. This is also an area without gendarme representation or interference. It is a Baluch area with a large amount of land available for dry (bashān) cultivation when conditions permit. The political centre of the area is the settlement of a kamāsh of the Ra'īs sāt (cf. chapter 9) and all communal business is conducted at the mosque after the evening prayers. It is a matter of some pride to this community that they have never either had recourse to or had to be interfered with

by the gendarmerie - i.e. by non-Baluch methods of social control. For this community the kamāsh is the highest internal authority. He has in fact very favourable relations with neighbouring chiefs, but no regular relations with them. In the Baluch Period it is likely that this was no so (at least for any length of time) in this particular case, for the community was surrounded by relatively strong hukumats. Nevertheless we know that this was a normal type of community. Once again it could contain one or more kamāsh. The actual difference between the kamāsh in these conditions and the more usual chief lies only in the difference in scale - i.e. the kamāsh is not a member of a family which as a family enjoys a hegemony over a much larger area, and the community is relatively small. Similarly, these conditions normally obtain in a small area which has some ecological identity.

2. More normally the kamāsh represents his small group of people before a chief. This is very similar to the way in which a chief now tends to represent his people before the Administration. The kamāsh of Kōsh Kaur if he needed to face the Administration would almost certainly do so through or with the support of one of the neighbouring chiefs.

III

Leadership has been seen to depend on the availability of leadership-positive personalities - whether they are by qualification chiefs, maulawīs, darwīsh or secular kamāsh, with the proviso that in certain cases a store of inherited charisma may for a time - even for a generation - suffice to keep a man without personal charisma in the role-status of chief. The lack in some men of the positive personal qualities required for leadership in Baluch society can be so utter that they might be termed "unpersonalities". Two very good examples of such unpersonalities are Brāhīm, son of Abdī (Fig. VI) and Barakat, son of Mīr Murād (Fig. XII), both of whom could by now have succeeded to their respective fathers' role-status, but have in fact, in both cases, left the field

open to their fathers' brothers. They are treated like ordinary members of a dynastic family though their behaviour is sometimes manifestly silly. They are perhaps tolerated for the sake of their fathers.

It may be hoped that by now a number of types or typical traits of personality have become clear to the reader. The force of hereditary charisma can best be seen when after an impressive line of chiefs, the succeeding son is suddenly an unpersonality. There may or may not be an easy or convenient alternative to him as successor. If there is, the switch is quite easily made, though the hereditary charisma is still respected. However, if a dynastic family or a branch of it, were to fail to provide positive leadership through two successive generations it would almost certainly lose its status - though we have no actual case of this.

Chapter 20

Power and Authority

It has been said that "events only come to be structured in so far as they are endowed with order by the imposition of verbal categories" (Leach, 1964: xiv), and it is generally accepted that language is the vehicle of abstraction (cf. Malmberg, 1964: 131). In view of what has been said about the scope of vernacular terminology in Baluchi, we are in this chapter, even more than in previous chapters, attempting to formulate and analyze abstract concepts of which the Baluch themselves cannot be consciously aware except through the medium of a foreign language. Leadership in the society is conducted from one or other of four role-statuses: chief, maulawī, darwīsh, kamīsh. Of these the first is generally paramount, but while the latter three have definite Baluchi terms, the first has no term and is not formulated as a political concept in the language. It is this lack of formulation, this lack of institutionalisation, this informality, which forms the background to our discussion. The position of chief is very definitely defined in practice as a role-status with a definite social prestige and authority and conventional behaviour patterns, but it cannot be said to be part of a definite system or structure. In the political environment of any particular community there may or may not be a chief. A community which "uses" a chief but for some reason loses him, cannot simply create another. Another may naturally succeed to this position; another may in time be created, but this is usually a slow process; or the community may transfer its allegiance to a chief of another line if there is a suitable candidate available from both the political and geographical points of view. Or the community may remain without a chief - and this need in no sense mean that it becomes in any way an "incomplete" community or that there is any political vacuum in it. There is therefore an acceptance of superimposed power and authority (of a particular type only) in the society, which is nevertheless so informal as not to be formulated into

a vernacular concept. This is why the final chapter of this essay is devoted to the subject of personality as a factor in sociological analysis. But first something more must be said about the nature of power and authority in the society.

I

The Definition of Power and Authority

The belated discovery of Weber by modern sociology has had such an impact that any discussion of the bases and types of authority in a society must at least take into account his theoretical formulations, or be accused of disregarding its own intellectual context. For Weber, "Macht"[power] bedeutet jede Chance, innerhalb einer sozialen Beziehung den eigenen Willen auch gegen Widerstreben durchzusetzen, gleichviel worauf diese Chance beruht.

Herrschaft [authority - for translation of this word cf. Weber ed. and trans. Parsons, 1964: 152 n. 83] soll heissen die Chance, für einen Befehl bestimmten Inhalts bei angebbaren Personen Gehorsam zu finden;

1. Der Begriff "Macht" ist soziologisch amorph. Alle denkbaren Qualitäten eines Menschen und alle denkbaren Konstellationen können jemand in die Lage versetzen, seinen Willen in einer gegebenen Situation durchzusetzen. Der soziologische Begriff der "Herrschaft" muss daher ein präziserer sein und kann nur die Chance bedeuten: für einen Befehl Fügsamkeit zu finden...

2. Der Tatbestand einer Herrschaft ist nur an das aktuelle Vorhandensein eines erfolgreich andern Befehlenden, aber weder unbedingt an die Existenz eines Verwaltungsstabes noch eines Verbandes geknüpft; dagegen allerdings - wenigstens in allen normalen Fällen - an die eines von beiden....

1. Der Hausvater herrscht ohne Verwaltungsstab. Der Beduinenhäuptling, welcher Kontributionen von Karawanen, Personen und Gütern erhebt, die seine Felsenburg passieren, herrscht über alle jene wechselnden und unbestimmten, nicht in einem Verband miteinander stehenden Personen,

welche, sobald und solange sie in eine bestimmte Situation geraten sind, kraft seiner Gefolgschaft, die ihm gegebenenfalls als Verwaltungsstab zur Erzwingung dient. (Theoretisch denkbar wäre eine solche Herrschaft auch seitens eines Einzelnen ohne allen Verwaltungsstab.) (Weber, 1964: 38-9). Thus, a chief has authority but may not have power; a hākum by definition has power. Weber also makes clear (ibid.) how any particular authority is conditioned by the manner in which it is legitimised. More will be said about legitimacy below.

Weber further says about authority that it does not include "jede Art von Chance, "Macht" und "Einfluss" auf andere Menschen auszuüben. Herrschaft ("Autorität") in diesem Sinn kann im Einzelfall auf den verschiedensten Motiven der Fügsamkeit: vom dumpfen Gewöhnung angefangen bis zu rein zweckrationalen Erwägungen, beruhen. Ein bestimmtes Minimum an Gehorchenwollen, also: Interesse (Äusserem oder innerem) am Gehorchen, gehört zu jedem echten Herrschaftsverhältnis.

"...jede Herrschaft über eine Vielzahl von Menschen bedarf normalerweise (nicht: absolut immer) eines Stabes von Menschen d.h. der (normalerweise) verlässlichen Chance eines eigens auf Durchführung ihrer generellen Anordnung und konkreten Befehle eingestellten Handelns angebbarer zuverlässig gehorchender Menschen" (ibid. 157). These followers will obey because of the particular ties they have with the leader. These ties - in a traditional society - are likely to be varied and complex. Certainly (as Weber says), if they were economic only, they would be unstable. But "Keine Herrschaft begnügt sich, nach aller Erfahrung, freiwillig mit den nur materiellen oder nur affektuellen oder nur wertrationalen Motiven als Chancen ihres Fortbestandes. Jede sucht vielmehr den Glauben an ihre "Legitimität" zu erwecken und zu pflegen" (ibid.) In the Baluch case the basis of legitimacy of the chief is by a type of descent (dynasty, hereditary charisma) and certain personal qualities (personality, personal charisma).

Despite the emphasis we have laid on the informality of all Baluch political practice, authority in Baluch society nevertheless comes under

Weber's heading of "legitimate authority" - if only because we have in fact been able to make such abstract formulations about the abstract concepts of power and authority in the society. Of the "three pure types" into which Weber divides legitimate authority (ibid. 159) the Baluch would be included under those justified on traditional grounds. Weber himself sees that "keiner der drei ... Idealtypen historisch wirklich 'rein' vorzukommen pflegt" (ibid. 160), and we have found it convenient to borrow a concept - charisma - from his charismatic type. Our concept of hereditary charisma is in a sense parallel to Weber's Veralltäglichung of charisma, but in our material, it continues to have a charismatic content. The concept of dynasty must be based always on an original charismatic quality which is tacitly assumed to validate the legitimacy of the line. And the Baluch chief must always have this charismatic quality. It is never subject to Veralltäglichung so long as the chief remains a chief.

In Weber's "traditional authority" "Der Herr (oder: die mehreren Herren) sind kraft traditional überkommener Regel bestimmt" (ibid. 167). The fact that these are not explicit among the Baluch does not invalidate the identification. "Gehorcht wird ihnen kraft der durch die Tradition ihnen zugewiesene Würde" (ibid.) "Widersetzend richtet sich, wenn er entsteht, gegen die Person des Herrn (oder: Dieners), der die traditionalen Schranke der Gewalt missachtete, nicht aber: gegen das System als solches ("traditionalistische Revolution")" (ibid.). "Aber überhaupt ist festzuhalten: Grundlage jeder Herrschaft, also jeder Fügsamkeit, ist ein Glauben: [it is surely more than simply conditioning] "Prestige" - Glauben, zugunsten des oder der Herrschenden." (ibid. 195).

Weber's theoretical formulations were made on the basis of familiarity with large-scale complex societies - civilisations - principally Europe but also the Caliphate, and the Indian and Chinese Empires. It is worth noting that his work reaches a degree of abstract - and generally acceptable - generalisation on the political plane far beyond anything seriously

attempted from within the discipline of social anthropology. It is perhaps more relevant in our context than to the study of the type of primitive society which social anthropology traditionally occupied itself with in e.g. Africa and the Pacific. We have already mentioned (Part Three) that Baluch society belongs to one of the world's great culture units - Islam, and the significance of many roles and other sociological factors within it cannot be fully understood without reference to the greater cultural unit. It is only recently that social anthropology has begun to turn its attention to this type of society, and the special problems they present have barely been approached (though the formulation and discussion of "archaisms" by Levi-Strauss (1958, chapter VI) is supremely relevant).

Thus, of the main Baluch political terms we have dealt with: hakum, maulawī and darwīsh are borrowed from the Persian language (which in turn had borrowed the first two from Arabic) and as political or religious concepts were in general (if not specific) use elsewhere in the eastern Islamic world. Chief has no equivalent in Baluchi. Kamāsh, appears originally to have meant simply "greybeard" and to be a Brāhūi word. Such concepts cannot be fully understood or explained in their context without at least taking some account of their origin, history and the manner of their assimilation in the "sub-culture" simply because their content in Baluch society is continually reinforced by contact with their semantic origin. This is why so much space has been given to historical reconstruction in this essay.

Therefore it is difficult to fit an analysis of Baluch conceptions of power and authority into either the corpus of sociological theory of the maintainance of social order, or the social anthropological, for they belong at the same time to the primitive and the sophisticated context.

With this in mind it seems most useful to modify Weber's definitions

in the light of what we have already learnt about this particular society, thus:

1. Power seems in this context to be sociologically a potential quantity, some degree of which may be posited for every member of the society (though negligible below the level of kamāsh), but which is increased and decreased by the number of social ties which connect each member with other members of the society and the relative social status of the others, and therefore is possessed in the highest degree by chiefs since they have closer ties of kin and allegiance with more people and they are always (except in the case of their ties with other chiefs) in a relatively higher social status than the other party to each tie.
2. Authority on the other hand is limited by (potential) power, but depends almost absolutely on personality - one of the principal ingredients of which is one or (more usually) both types of charisma.
3. Effective authority and power emanate from role-statuses only.

II

The Nature of Power and Authority

What makes Baluch thinking so difficult to analyse and transfer on to the plane of an abstract model is the completely different political views and expectations which exist side by side in the society - which on the theoretical plane seem self-contradictory, but in practice do not cause conflict. They are in fact a part of the informality which has already been stressed, and they make for great adaptability. Particular individuals in particular situations have particular political expectations. The Baluch in Kalāh Kuh knows no chief or political superior - within the domestic annual cycle of his two hundred square miles of mountains. He surrenders initiative in domestic affairs to a kamāsh - but retaining all the while the option of keeping his own counsel or changing his kamāsh. In anything that affects relations between the Kalāh Kuh society and the rest of the Province the relationship between the Baluch and the chief in Ḫafshān comes into play. For the

Baluch in the Sarhadd the situation is very rarely so clearcut. In some cases, e.g. the Gamshādzai, they may approach the Sāraksai if they require protection. In the case of most of the Baluch of the Sarhadd they would be most likely to do this through their own kamaah, not having any relationship with a chief even if they required it.

At the other end of the scale are the few examples of the highly successful chiefs, e.g. Dust Muhammad Khān, who at the height of their power began to borrow the paraphernalia of the governor-generals of Kermān which in turn was modelled on the Kājār court in Tehran - the descendent of an ancient Iranian autocratic system. For instance, at the height of his power, in Dust Muhammad Khān's dīwān the Persian words vazīr, sepahsālār (commander-in-chief) and munshī (secretary) were used, even though they probably never reached any degree of institutionalisation. However, Jangīz (cf. fig. X) is remembered as Dust Muhammad Khān's commander-in-chief. But it is almost certain that this was nothing more than imitation of the more prestigious Persian system (the only system known) simply for the purpose of increasing his own prestige. It had no tangible effect on the method of rule or the functioning of power, but it probably increased his personal charisma and therefore also his authority. From the point of view of the led this was simply an exaggerated aspect of the "expected behaviour" of the leader (cf. above, chapter 14: 12).

Because of this characteristic informality and the importance of both relative and absolute qualities of personality it is very difficult to give an account of the general scope of authority, or, in other words, the ways in which authority may be checked. The most obvious check to authority which must be present and positively active in some degree in any political environment is of course public opinion. This is most effective in the politically more homogeneous type of Baluch community like, for instance, Salāh Kuh (chapter 2) but surprisingly ineffective in the type of community like that of Ērafshān under Mīrzā

Khān (cf. above, chapter 19: II, A, 3). The effectiveness of public opinion as a check on authority is in fact to a large extent determined by the social distance between the politically senior member of the community and the members of the community who are capable of formulating public opinion. Therefore, in a community containing a chief and a number of effective kamāsh it is unlikely that the chief will be able to disregard the opinions formulated in the dīwān by the majority of the kamāsh so long as they agree among themselves. If he does so he will lose his power.

In other words public opinion is ineffective until it is channelled through a kamāsh, or one might even say that for the purpose of this analysis public opinion does not exist without personality. This may be logically explained by saying that the function of public opinion in the political context is to express discontent with conditions imposed from above. Discontent wants change. Change can only be effected through the medium of an alternative leader. An alternative leader can only be found in a personality - whether kamāsh or leader, religious or secular.

Individual opinions or requests of individual supplicants may be conveyed to the chief in a number of ways - for instance either directly or via one of the chief's personal ghulāms, but these could not normally be considered checks on the chief's authority.

We may say then that public opinion may check authority, but that it may only function through kamāsh, who may or may not anyway be the supreme authority in any community. Firth's interesting enquiry into the working of public opinion as a force of social control (1949, repr. 1964, chapter 5) is of little use to us here because it concentrates on institutionalised uses of it, but it is noteworthy that in his society also, which is vastly different from the Baluch, public opinion must be expressed through the "nobility".

One final aspect of the nature of this type of political power and the relationship between leader and led from the point of view of the sociological study of personality is well brought out by Simmel (1964). Firstly, Simmel formulates the way in which the leader is led. Simmel is at pains to show that in any superordinate-subordinate relationship, even those apparently most autocratic or tyrannical, the subordinated is in fact much freer, much less involved than is generally thought. The idea that the political leader is in fact mainly led by the relatively passive suggestion of those he leads is now of course almost a truism. What appears to be an absolute master-slave relationship is in fact "an interaction, and exchange of influences, which transforms the pure one-sideness of superordination and sub-ordination into a sociological form" (ibid. p. 186).

Further on (pp. 201-3), Simmel considers this interaction in the plural relationship between one leader and many led. "Rule-by-one has innumerable times been reproached for the contradiction which is supposed to lie in the purely quantitative disproportion between the one-ness of the ruler and the many-ness of the ruled... is a matter of fact, the resolution of this contradiction reveals a very peculiar, basic sociological constellation, which has important consequences... the mass, the ruled element, injects only parts of all the personalities which compose it into the mutual relationship, whereas the ruler contributes all of his personality. The ruler and the individual subject do not enter the relationship with the same quanta of their personalities. The "mass" is formed through a process by which a great many individuals unite parts of their personalities - specific impulses, interests, forces - while what each personality really is, remains outside this common level. It does not enter the "mass": it does not enter that which is actually ruled by the one individual.

"It need not be emphasized that this new ratio which balances the full personality quantum of the ruler with the many partial quanta of the ruled gains its quantitative form only as a symbolic makeshift

expression. Personality itself is completely outside any arithmetic concept. Therefore, when we speak of the "whole" personality, of its "unity", of a "part" of it, we intend to convey something qualitative and intimate, something which can be experienced only through intuition. We have no direct expression for it, so that these other expressions, taken as they are from a totally different order of things, are quite inadequate - but, of course, they are nonetheless indispensable. The whole rulership relation between the one and the many - and evidently not only in the case of political domination - is based on this decomposition of personality" (my italics). It might almost be said that the good chief has no private life, while the ordinary Baluch has no public life.

"... It is one of the highest tasks of political art ... to learn to recognize and, as it were, chemically prepare, those sides of man with which he forms the more or less levelled "mass" and above which the ruler can tower at a height that is alike for all members of the mass. These he needs to distinguish from those other sides that must be left to the freedom of the individual - although it is only the conjunction of both which make up the whole personality of the subject.

"Groups are characteristically different according to the proportion between the members' total personalities and those parts of their personalities with which they fuse in the "mass". The measure of their governability depends on this difference in quanta. More precisely, a group can be dominated by one individual the more easily and radically, the smaller the portion of the total personality that the member contributes to that mass which is the object of subordination. There, on the other hand, the social unit covers so much of the component personalities; where they are so closely interwoven with the group as was true of the inhabitants of the greek city states or of the burghers of medieval cities, government-by-one becomes something contradictory and impracticable" (ibid.).

Other factors to be taken into consideration are of course the size

of the subordinate group and the differentiation of the individual personality (ibid).

In a society in which it is so tempting anyway to reduce everything to "personality" as a sociological form in the analysis these formulations of Simmel's are supremely relevant. For they show a connecting principle which helps us to see how so many different degrees of authority may be active in the society, varying from community to community and from time to time within the community. It is altogether a very helpful model for appreciating the functioning of leadership and the inherent instability of it when it is not stabilised by (the natural growth of) institutions (which in turn could only come about through a passive unconscious desire for stability in the community).

However, it still says nothing about the quality of the personality which is chosen to lead - which in this society is one of the main bases of an informal, unrationalised legitimacy. The whole question of legitimacy is very difficult to determine in this type of society, because it is not explicit. Nevertheless, some implicit concept of legitimacy must exist, for the alternative would have to be anarchy. In discussing the study of a "whole political system" but with Iran mainly in mind, Binder (1962: 38) finds it difficult to distinguish between what is legitimate in the context and what is not, but finally plumps for a list of activities which tapers off at the end into things which at least in these circumstances seem to defeat the purpose: "The most important forms of legitimization, under the traditional system, are delegation of authority, consultation, contractual agreements, the grant of audiences, honors or rewards, marriage, and the like. But on the following page he also is reduced to citing "the cultivation of charisma" among other processes which "point to greater concern with "personal power", loyalties, or"character" ... (p. 39)! There are still other points to be made on this "relationship between personalities" in addition to Simmel's model above, before in the final chapter we turn to the discussion of the

leader-personality itself. It is in fact on this aspect of the sociological significance of personality (i.e. the relationship between any two personalities in the society, - as distinct from the qualities of personality which are significant in leadership) that a considerable amount of work - albeit preliminary - has been done, particularly by Talcott Parsons.

Parsons' point of view differs somewhat from ours, and it is natural therefore that his terminology should also differ, but this is mainly a difference in emphasis. Parsons is trying to formulate a system of classification for the whole immense range of social phenomena which together form <u>modern</u> society -- particularly modern western society, and reduce society to the system. In an essay first published in 1940 (Parsons, 1964a: 75-6) he gives a "classification of bases of differential valuation, which though by no means final and exhaustive, has been found to be relatively concrete and useful." These in fact have much in common with what might be called in our context "the bases of legitimacy of leadership" since these are best seen as aspects or qualities of any given whole person, as constituent elements of personality. They are:

1. membership of the particular "kinship unit" which is sociologically significant in the society in question. In many ways and in whatever society, this membership is bound to affect a man's sociological position, and is an inseparable and usually unchangeable element in his personality.
2. Personal qualities. These Parsons defines as "any of those features of an individual which differentiate him from another individual, and which may be referred to as a reason for "rating" him higher than the other: sex, age, personal beauty, intelligence, strength, etc." but which are not achievements.
3. Achievements, which are "the valued results of the actions of individuals."
4. Possessions. These are transferable, as distinct from items 2 and 3 which are not.

5. Authority. This for Parsons is "an institutionally [my italics] recognised right to influence the actions of others, regardless of their immediate personal attitudes to the direction of influence." This may be applied in the present context if we interpret the word "institutionally" to cover the role-statuses which are traditionally accepted in the society.

6. Power. This term is used by Parsons to mean the informal ability influence apart from the "authority" of a role-status.

"The status of any given individual in the system of stratificatiom in a society may be regarded as a resultant of the common valuations underlying the attribution of status to him in each of these six respects." These six items in fact are criteria by which an account may be rendered of any given society in terms of the personalities of its political actors.

In 1953 in another paper which Parsons considered to be a revision of the earlier one (Parsons, 1964a, chapter XIV) "membership", "authority" and "qualities" (sg. 1, 2, and 5 above) were all consolidated into one general category of qualities, but this was defined more broadly than before to include any qualities of a unit of a social system, not only "personal" qualities, and these are now called "relational" qualities (ibid. 392n). (This change shows a movement away from his earlier emphasis on the importance of personality as such.)

These are Parsons main general formulations for the analysis of the relationship between personalities in society. He makes two more observations which are relevant to the Baluch situation. Firstly, he notices (ibid. 84) that in the United States "there is a tradition of respect for inherited wealth which has never quite been extinguished, and where the status is ascribed and the wealth naturally never regarded as an effect of its possessors' achievements." That is, he acknowledges heredity as a part of the whole sociological personality. Secondly, - and this is the essence of the sociological relevance of any personality in context - "in ordinary social relations it can be said that there is

a mutual obligation to take the other party at his face value, to 'take him seriously' as it were" (ibid. 157). Parsons makes this observation in a paper (1964a: first published in 1942) on Propaganda and Social Control in a section devoted to one of his favourite "special cases" - the medical profession. The doctor-patient relationship often crops up in Parsons' theoretical writings, for besides the fact that he made a special study of the medical profession it is a completely abnormal social relationship - it is of course in fact an asocial relationship, and I suppose the only one (relatively) easily available for study, and it therefore serves as a useful mirror for the study of the ordinary social relationship. "It is this very obligation [sc. to take the other party at face value] and its reciprocal expectations, which creates a primary opening for the operation of the vicious circles which may eventuate in neuroses, for by distorting the cognitive definition of the situation by rationalization, by concealing - usually unconsciously - actual motives and putting up an acceptable front, one forces others into the fulfilment of the obligations of their statuses and roles although one is not "really" in terms of actual social values entitled to this fulfilment. The striking thing here about the role of the physician is his ability to avoid being put in this position. He does not "argue" with his patient about his rationalizations and his motives; to do so would grant a status of reciprocity which he cannot grant. But neither does he accept the patient's rationalizations at their face value, and while he does not "refute" them, it is quite clear to the patient from his behaviour that he does not accept them. This again forces the patient to further analysis of his own motives" (ibid.). So in the asocial situation; what happens in the normal social situation is exactly the opposite. The reaction of the other party follows a convention and reinforces the "stance" taken up by ego - assuming of course that ego can keep it going. The point of all this in the present context is to show the part that "expected behaviour" can play when conventionally attached to certain role-statuses etc., as a sociological force continuing the status quo, or when adopted by a new man as an innovating force.

This degree of reciprocity, or interaction, between leader and led, which must be present in any social situation, but so much more in a society based so largely on values of personality, is particularly relevant to an understanding of loyalty and the existence of the idea that it is not necessarily the people's responsibility to punish a bad ruler (cf. Binder, 1962: 38), for both parties partake in a reciprocal social relationship. This again leads (perhaps a little paradoxically) to an attitude towards leadership which seems to give it an absolute value in the society whether it is in fact good or bad. For despite the fact that the leadership of the chief in Baluch society is almost certainly, originally, for part of the population a superimposition on an older tribal and politically less differentiated system, it is nevertheless true to say from the synchronic point of view that leadership functions through individual social relationships between individual leaders and individual or group followers.

Lest it should be said that if the synchronic and diachronic points of view can be distinguished so easily why in a sociological analysis have we bothered so much about the diachronic, I feel obliged to stress that without the diachronic analysis we could never approach an understanding of the present broad social divisions across which these political leader-led relationships are formed.

III

Succession and Dynasty

"Succession to office and position of authority implies a need by the society for continuity of personnel" (Firth, 1964: 145). This is the normal conception of succession, and I therefore have to make it quite clear at the start that I am using the word slightly differently because of the already belaboured informality of the Baluch situation and the fact that no community has to have a chief (a proposition which it will be remembered they could not say in their own language). With the chief

who is hākum of course the situation is different, for since this is a vernacular term (though of alien origin), the disappearance of a hākum is bound to be sociologically more conspicuous and create something of a vacuum. Nevertheless, it is still true that no community has to have a hākum. Some traditionally did, some traditionally did not; some sometimes did and sometimes did not. We have indicated the general relationship between the incidence of hākums and the agricultural potentiality. Hākums therefore probably tended to be formally succeeded more often than other types of leader.

The relative importance of the two main factors in succession - heredity and informal election - has been treated at the end of chapter 4. Some comparative material on the interaction of the hereditary and non-hereditary principles in determining succession may be seen in a sociologically different (Pakistani, Marri) Baluch society in Ramsey (1957: 123-4) on both the mēiag and higher levels. It is interesting that the word pāg (turban) and the phrase pāg bandag (to tie on the turban) are used there with the symbolic meaning of hereditary leadership and succession. The usage is found also in the Persian Province. Choice for succession to chiefship in our Baluch society is confined to the dynastic families, and the concept of dynasty is one that we have formulated ourselves - it is not formulated in the language. Barth devotes considerable attention to this question of the conception of dynasty among the Basseri and its political importance. We have already noted that he finds that among them power is conceived as emanating from the chief, rather than delegated to him by his subjects. The Basseri had actually been deprived of their chief by the Persian Administration some years before Barth visited them (Barth, 1961: 71n) and now explained all their contemporary ills by "the resulting lack of a centralised coercive authority" (ibid. 75). The Basseri differ from the Baluch in that they traditionally had one (dynastic) chief whose sphere of authority covered the whole tribe, that is, all who called themselves Basseri. Their dynastic line of chiefs, then, or their "dynasty", was very closely integrated

with the whole "tribe" in a social relationship between one very small "leadership-group" and the led who included all other Basseri. So far from such simplicity each Baluch dynasty also includes among those in direct political relationship with it settled, semi-settled and nomadic communities.

According to Barth the Basseri dynasty is a section (lineage?) of the Kolumbei sulāḥ (sub-tribe.) They make no claim to be the senior line of the sulāḥ and the genetic connection between the chiefs and the sulāḥ has no relevance to the legitimacy of the dynasty as chiefs of the Basseri although it is a source of pride to the Kolumbei. Tribesmen respect all members of the dynasty (p. 83) and comply with the orders of the chief's collaterals in periods of stable rule. Despite the differences cited in the previous paragraph between the respective sociological situations of the Baluch and Basseri dynasties, this paragraph holds true for both. We may follow Barth further substituting Baluch for his Basseri: "The chief and his immediate relatives belong in a category entirely apart from the rest of the Basseri, both in the minds of the tribesmen, and to an outsider. They are the Khavānīn, the Khān's dynasty, they are shown respect and granted authority ..." (73; cf. also Jettmar's review in Tribus 1962, no. 11, p. 165; he introduces the term charisma into the situation, and applies a model to Barth's material which however I am not sure is strictly applicable).

"... a 'tribe' among South Persian nomads is a political concept; its unity is not ethnic, but depends on its allegiance to a chief" (85).

Through the omnipotent Khan or chief, "as a bridge of communication, the nomads' relations with sedentary society may be mediated. By being the leader of tribesmen, a power factor in the province, he can become a member of the privileged urban elite, and is thus able to defend the interests of the tribe within the sedentary hierarchy of authority, from a vantage point which is unattainable to any active pastoralist..." (90). This has never been so true for the Baluch as for most of the "tribal dynasties" in Persia, but it is nevertheless a factor of analyt-

ical importance, and I include it here in order to show yet another constituent of the whole sociological concept and function of dynasty among certain tribes (and in particular the Baluch) which tends to confirm and maintain the relatively high social and political status of the dynasty and so the continuation of its dominance and its privilege of providing the ruler of a whole society. It may be seen now how these constituents partly depend on internal relationship within the society, and partly on external - foreign - relations. Perhaps the main reasons why the role-status of chief has not in general been essential to any given Baluch community are:

a) the Province in general has been so isolated from contact with the outside-world that each individual community did not require to have a high status representative to negotiate with it, and

b) because of the social (horizontal and vertical) and ecological divisions within the Province, no paramount chief has been able to set up a dynasty which could impose itself on the Province as a whole.

Another reason may be that ecological factors again did not allow any one family to gain widespread power through landownership.

The most important single constituent element which serves to maintain the character of a dynasty is the pattern of marriage and inheritance practices. Because of these practices: in our context the part of any given dynastic family which is to remain dynastic - obviously some lines tend to fall out in every generation - can only give wives to equally dynastic lines (whether of the same or another family), and since they anyway take their wives from a close collateral line or the main line of another dynastic family (which may amount to the same thing), it is naturally very unusual for marriage to bring a new member into the dynastic family class or for any one to leave the dynastic family class through marriage. Further, marriage obviously tends to join the dynastic families closer and closer together by more and more alliances, until it is sometimes difficult to make a meaningful distinction between families - in certain

cases even the Baluch do not distinguish (cf. chapter 9). This fosters, if it does not indeed force, the idea of class on the society. Once any given line of a dynastic family has for some reason or other dropped a class it can never climb back, though it may hold on to some extra status by maintaining attendance at the dīwān and keeping a close personal (subordinate) relationship with the chief.

Two important points to remember in connection with the political functioning of what we have called dynasty in Persian Baluchistan are:
a) The Barakzai (for instance), according to generally accepted tradition, entered the Province with the same sort of status as at least one line has traditionally held since - though of course, as we have seen, their actual political fortunes have varied greatly.
b) It is a valid generalisation (though it is not without exception - cf. fig. 15) that dynastic families preserve longer genealogies than other classes. It is interesting nevertheless to note that there is some reason to suspect that some if not all of the genealogies preserved by dynastic families (even though they are not really very long) have been unconsciously telescoped (cf. chapter 9). However, so far as I could ascertain, they are never known in any great detail by elements outside the dynastic family itself. It would seem therefore that they are not a factor in the acceptance of the legitimacy of the dynastic family or the chief or hākim by the community at large, but rather simply in the conception of the dynastic family of itself. If this is correct it lends even more importance to the concept of charisma as a factor in the analysis of the attitude of the led towards the leader.

In this chapter and chapter 18 I have mustered even more than in previous chapters theoretical arguments and comparative material which, with material already presented in mind, make it imperative to attempt to analyse in the final chapter the sociological value of personality in leadership as the basic dynamic element in a society with little or no institutionalisation - of which the Baluch provide a perhaps extreme example.

The most significant function or role that the chief can fulfil in the Province, and in a sense only he can do it, is to provide a co-ordinating link between the mit (his existence may have been the cause of the decadence of this concept), and, even more important, between Baluch and shahri. Only the role-status of chief can include in one political unit each and every (vertical and horizontal) division of the society.

The concept of the feudal relationship is again valuable here in that it brings out the personal aspect of all political relationships. We have been through a number of conventional attitudes which continually modify the relationships between personalities, but it is nevertheless this direct relationship between personalities which is one of the most, if not the most, important single factor in determining the synchronic "structure" (or, as I prefer, the ecology of significant relationships) of the society at any given moment in time, and the diachronic pattern - the historical processes of the society. The point of this here is that it stresses the mutual interaction between persons on all levels of the society and across those levels, and the tendency for all other values to depend for their effectiveness on the personalities involved. So, under the authority of a chief, or a hakum, there is no kingdom, no territorial concept. "When Philip Augustus disputed the Pope's right to dispose of the property of a heretic count, he could still say quite naturally, 'this county is held of me as a fief'; not, 'it is part of my realm' (Bloch, 1965; 338). I have not made use of the word fief though in view of what I have said in Part Three chapter 7 it is perfectly applicable in certain cases; however, it does not have so wide a relevance as the "feudal relationship". It is in fact the feudal relationship, or the sum of feudal relationships, which determines the scope of the power of any chief, and his dynasty, and the succession, though kin relationships play an important part in determining feudal relationships.

IV

Temporal and Spiritual

Despite the sub-title of this essay, very little has so far been said about the confusion of temporal and spiritual authority. Furthermore, another distinction - between religious and secular - has been introduced. The distinction between religious and secular has been used to distinguish things which are easily distinguishable and which are explicitly distinguished in the society - principally, the two explicit bases of social role-status. The terms "temporal" and "spiritual", however, are used to indicate spheres of authority: these are not always easily distinguishable, and are not explicitly differentiated. The following comparative material may help to put this formulation in context.

For there to be some confusion between temporal and spiritual authority, whether it issues from a religious or a secular source, is nothing new or unusual; neither has it passed unnoticed in ethnographic or social anthropological writing - especially where kings are concerned. For instance:

"Rex est mixta persona cum sacerdote. This is because a king symbolises a whole society and must not be identified with any part of it. He must be in the society and yet stand outside it and this is only possible if his office is raised to a mystical plane. It is the kingship and not the king who is divine" (Evans-Pritchard,1962: 84). I am not of course directly comparing the Baluch chiefship with divine kingship either among the Shilluk or anywhere else. Following Evans-Pritchard "though I would insist that a sufficient explanation of the sacral kingship can only be derived from a detailed and painstaking comparative study of a wide range of monarchical institutions, which implies a yet wider comparative study of types of political structure, I do not wish to maintain that because all kingship has some of the features of the

divine kingship the divine kingship is not in respect of other features a distinct type of institution. It is to the credit of Sir James Frazer to have shown that it is;..." (ibid.) It is interesting that Evans-Pritchard goes on to suggest that "it is an institution typical of, though doubtless not restricted to, societies with pronounced lineage systems in which the political segments are parts of a loosely organised structure without government functions. In societies of this kind the political organization takes a ritual or symbolic form which in polities with a higher degree of organization gives way, though never entirely, to centralised administration" (ibid.).

It is true that in a sense among the Baluch we have chiefs without a chiefship, so that it would mean nothing to say that the chiefship and not the chief is divine among them; and although some communities within the Province do have relatively pronounced lineage type formations of the type Evans-Pritchard stipulates, nevertheless these cannot be said to be typical of the Province as a whole, or of the society. There is, however, here the beginnings of an answer to our problem.

Since Evans-Pritchard's essay on the Shilluk divine kingship was written, Firth has formulated some ideas on the same subject with regard to his own special field - Tikopia. In 1951 (repr. 1964: 55) he wrote that it was the "ultimate religious sanction" on which the authority of the Tikopia chiefs relied. "Temporal power is believed to reside in the possession of spiritual weapons."

A few years later positive statements began to appear in print about the symbolic reflection of a people's social order in their myths or beliefs, by Leach (1954, repr. 1964) and Firth (1955, repr. 1964, chapter 3). The material involved was from the Shilluk, Tikopia, and the Kachins. Of these the Kachins are perhaps closest to the Baluch in their political conceptions, and their ethnographer, Leach, used new ideas to account for them - which have still not been assimilated into

the corpus of anthropological theory. The theoretical standpoint taken in this essay owes much to these ideas. The Kachin chief "holds no priestly office; yet his power derives from a religious role; the diviner has no formal political power, yet he is in a position of considerable political influence" (Leach, 1964: 183). This situation is comparable (for our purposes) with the political and religious role-statuses among the Baluch - in particular chief and darwīsh.

"Gumsa Kachins appear to think of themselves as having a very clear-cut authority system. The chief is regarded as an autocrat placed at the peak of a hierarchy of ranked classes, differentiated from one another by rules of caste-like rigidity. In this ideal structural pattern everything fits together very perfectly, each person and each group of persons has an appointed place in a clearly defined system. But the reality does not correspond to the ideal. In the reality the chiefly office is only one of many offices which contain elements of authority; prestige and status do not rely solely on birth status;... (ibid. 194). In an exactly similar fashion, among the Baluch, political and religious conceptions inter-act on each other. The conception of the role-status of maulawī is largely determined by alien factors with which it is continually in contact. The usage to which we have limited the term kamāsh in this essay may be viewed as the basic common denominator of social and political action. The darwīsh is the personification of native attitudes to the spiritual things. As such he is in (implicit) opposition to the (alien) maulawī, but because of the presence of the maulawī and the consequent equation: religion = Islam, he is nevertheless seen as a religious, Islamic role-status. The high prestige role-status of the chief is a result of the social hierarchy which resulted from the origins of the present society. Islam (= maulawī) obliges the chief to have a close relationship with religion; but he tends to keep a closer personal relationship with the darwīsh than the maulawī - because of relative "Baluchness". We venture here to suggest that it is the presence of the formal religion - this explicit religious system of alien origin (and continually reinforced by contact with its alien source) but represented

in the society by learned men who are by no means thought of consciously as alien - that forces the explicit differentiation between secular and religious in role-status, while the temporal and spiritual aspects of authority remain undifferentiated, and so may be seen in both religious and secular contexts. This is in a sense the reverse of the situation Leach sees among the Kachins. But although the differentiation is forced by an alien - though apparently completely integrated - conceptual system ("system" is here the correct word), nevertheless the (politically) successful religious man - maulawī or darwīsh - is granted a role-status comparable to that of chief. And the latter is explained historically.

A year later Firth observed that it was "fashionable nowadays to argue that it is just as rational for people to believe that the health and fertility of the land depend on the virility of the king as to believe otherwise... [but] to say that the Shilluk and the Tikopia are making symbolic statements about their social order (cf. Leach, 1954, p. 14) is a preferable form of expression.

"What is symbolised? Grant that the mystical bond is the symbol of the effective state of the society, that the people in each case phrase an administrative issue in mystical terms. But they could drop this mystical bond and the same problem would still arise. It does in fact arise in all societies; leadership must follow some structural lines..." (Firth, 1964: 77).

This is perhaps improved on in a later essay (first published 1959) by a re-formulation (forced on him by the complete conversion of the Tikopia to Christianity); that "religion ... provided avenues of expression for the political relationships and values, and helped to buttress them but was not indispensable to them" (Firth, 1964: 255), for "the Tikopia seemed to have pinned their faith on chieftainship as a cardinal, even absolute political value, independent of the religious system" (ibid.). Surely, however, Firth has gone too far. The religious conceptions may

complement and (unconsciously) justify the social and political conceptions of a society. Certainly, if both are natural indigenous growths and not imposed or directly borrowed from outside, there is bound to be such a relationship between the religious and social "collective representations". But the connection is not on the conscious plane, and the conversion of the community to an alien (formal) religion (by definition it would not be possible to be converted to an informal religion) - e.g. Christianity or Islam - need have no immediate effect on the social conceptions. For one thing it is possible that the new formal religion may similarly complement the existing social conceptions. If it did not, it would surely take more than a few years to change them noticeably (Pirth only allowed three years). Even then it would be some time before the outward form (rather than the inner content) of the social conceptions was modified. That is, they would keep their chiefs, and the chiefs would keep their respect, but their actual function may gradually be modified, as the concepts of the people are modified by the new religion. However, among the Baluch, the (formal) religion is a system which functions - with some modifications and conditions - as a final court of appeal, and provides other social criteria (e.g. of prestige and aptitude) in certain contexts, but is something apart from the native culture, and does not define the native conceptions of spiritual and temporal within that culture. Since the end of the Baluch Period, because of a new alien political factor, the actual power of the Baluch chiefs has suffered and that of the formal religion has gained in relation to - and probably to some extent at the expense of - the informal religion, but in this case the quality of chiefship has scarcely been modified unless it has been to increase the demand on the chief for spiritual functions (cf. dam, chapter 16).

It is therefore, no new thing to mix temporal and spiritual authority, whether or not religious and secular have been distinguished by the advent of a formal religion. "The kings of ancient Germania liked

to claim descent from the gods ... The Roman emperors had also worn the halo of divinity, and from this double heritage, but especially from the Germanic element, the kingships of the feudal age derived their sacred character. Christianity [the new formal religion] had sanctioned it, while borrowing from the Bible an old Hebraic or Syrian accession rite" (Bloch, 1965: 379-80). That is, in this case the new formal religion confirmed at least one important aspect of the pre-existing political structure, and made far more definite the social differentiation between religious and secular.

The relationship between priest and king in early mediaeval Europe was ambiguous (ibid. 380-1). Only the priest could perform the Mass, and the Church annointed the king. The kings were not priests, but neither were they ordinary laymen. In their efforts to govern the Church the kings "believed, and others believed, that they acted as members of it, though this view never found general acceptance in ecclesiastical circles". This is a third division: between Church and State. We have now made three distinctions:

1. between "spiritual" and "temporal" - distinction of function.
2. between "religious" and "secular" - a distinction of bases of legitimacy, the social differentiation of "spiritual" and "temporal".
3. between "church" and "state" - a distinction between two differentiated "systems", which are religious and secular, respectively.

This last is not of course found among the Baluch. It is a logical development from the first two. In mediaeval Europe it was initiated by the Church which thought to gain by it at the expense of the kingship. However, "many centuries were to elapse before kingship was reduced in the eyes of the people to the role of an ordinary human power" (ibid.). Because of a particularly valid form of consecration "the kings of France, certainly from Philip I and probably from Robert the Pious, and the kings of England from Henry I, were believed to possess the power to cure certain sicknesses by the touch of their hands. When in 1081 the ex-communicated Emperor Henry IV passed through Tuscany, the peasants crowded

the route and strove to touch his garments, convinced that by so doing they were making sure of good harvests" (ibid.). Royal authority was on a different plane - "of a genuinely different order" (ibid. 362). Although often rebelled against and disobeyed, these kings seldom died a violent death at the hands of their subjects (ibid. 381), and the same may be said of the Baluch chiefs. Bloch sees as one of the most potent forces in the maintainance of the peculiar role-status of kingship in Mediaeval Europe, particularly during his "first feudal age", "the inviolate heritage of its ancient prestige" (ibid. 385), and in the Baluch situation, apart from the history of chiefship, it would be unwise to leave entirely out of account[1] the ancient Iranian tradition of kingship which has been particularly strong throughout Iranian history surviving, scarcely modified, violent ethnic admixtures, complete conversion from one formal religion to another of very different ethos, and showing through alien domination. It is, however, not feasible to go into this possibility in detail here. (For general characterisation of Iranian kingship as a traditional collective representation in Iranian culture cf. for instance, Frye, 1964, and Boyce, 1954). Of these three distinctions made at the beginning of this paragraph: in Baluch society the third does not exist and the second is an alien importation and superficial. As a result the first remains undifferentiated.

This lack of differentiation is seen most obviously in the following:

a) Though they may function differently, both religious and secular leaders may and do function as judges.

b) In certain less usual cases the mawlawī or darwīsh may function as chiefs. Also the mawlawīs proclaim jihād and in the upper Sarbāz valley the villages guest-houses are often run by mawlawīs in conjunction with their religious schools, on an impersonal basis but unmistakably attached to the formal religion.

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1. Note, for instance, their use of the old Persian "heroic" names in their personal nomenclature (cf. chapter 3).

c) The informal religious functions which the chief is called on to perform, e.g. dam, and which he shares with the darvish.

This general lack of differentiation is seen to be closely tied up with the lack of institutionalisation and informality which has been stressed throughout this essay, and similarly with the great significance of personality. In fact, we consider the analysis of the sociological content and function of personality to be the key to an understanding of how Baluch society in the Persian Province works. For all the conscious social differentiations which one might expect in the society are either non-existent or are in some degree archaisms. This personality as a factor in leadership can be accorded a value by the led which may be called spiritual. Hence our use of the term charisma, and it is for this reason that we devote the final chapter to a discussion of personality from the sociological point of view.

Chapter 21

Personality

This final chapter is a discussion and an attempt to cope on a sociological plane with a question which is usually begged in sociological discussions of leadership. I do not claim that it succeeds absolutely. I consider that it will be more than justified if it simply formulates clearly some of the problems involved and relates them with, on the one hand, relevant theoretical points of view, and on the other, our Baluch material. The unusually important role that personality plays in Baluch society should in this way help us to make some advance in the treatment of personality as a sociological factor in leadership.

I

Objective Personality

There seems to be a general temptation in sociological writing to break off the analysis when the factor of personality is reached and a general shyness in accounting for it. Compare for instance the following two examples:

1) "The Tikopia material ...demonstrates how, in an illiterate community with a kinship system of ramifying segmentary groups and a hierarchical class structure, social tension can be resolved and social control exercised. This is done by using as a counter-weight to the predominant representatives of authority - the chiefs - an amorphous set of officials drawn from the existing rank structure, and relying for their authority not on ritual powers but on social prestige and personality" (Firth, 1964: 142).

2) "In Iran, the important base values appear to be age, courage, agnatic relationship, eloquence, apparent shrewdness, and landed wealth. Here

to a far larger extent than in the industrialised democracies, we find Persians attributing power to individuals, not only as a consequence of ascribed status but also as a function of what is loosely known as personality." (Binder, 1962: 18).

In neither case does the author enquire into the nature of this personality or attempt to define it. Parsons seems to be fully aware of the problem and pays a great deal of attention to personality in his grand design for a comprehensive, systemic sociological theory (Parsons, 1951, repr. 1964). He does not attend specifically to the problems posed by personality as a factor in leadership, but his formulations are nevertheless relevant.

First he cites the importance of "role-involvements", but notes that these do not "exhaust the orientation or interest system of any personality." A personality has social and non-social aspects or sectors. It has "internal" or "narcissistic" and individually creative foci of interest, and orientations to non-social aspects of his situation. Again for two different personalities only in a limiting case would these non-social aspects of the total orientation system be identical. Since this non-social sector of his personality is interdependent with the social sector, differences in this realm would have repercussions in the field of social motivations." He notes also the importance of physical aptitude and ability (for this aspect cf. also Sorokin, 1964). "The relation between the constitutional basis of role-behaviour and the overt behaviour will be different with different individuals in the same role. Fulfilment of a given set of expectations will impose a greater "strain" on one actor than on another" (Parsons, 1964: 44-5). Further on, he notes the effects on ego of his own and alter's achieved and ascribed part-statuses (ibid. 64), which is to a large extent simply another way of looking at the same aspect of the problem. (Barth, 1953, explained his Kurdish material almost entirely in terms of Parson's "part-statuses")

We have also the immense field of personality traits. "It is perhaps questionable how far it is legitimate to treat these as primary ascriptive criteria at all, since they are so intimately bound up with the social system itself... The most important distinction within the classificatory category seems to be between those traits which are primarily significant to performances and those which are not. The former may be called "performance-capacities"....

"... it is important to emphasize that performance capacities are attributes which may function as ascriptive criteria. Even though, as is frequently the case, past performance serves as the empirical criterion, still persons regarded as having the trait in question or having it in the requisite degree, are classified together, and belonging to this class may be taken as the criterion of status-ascription, independently of any specific expected performance. Indeed every performance, once it has been accomplished, becomes in its consequences an aspect of a given situation and the person who has done it has the attribute of being the one who did. This is the basis of certain dynamic relations between achievement and ascription.

"...generally there is room for considerable variability in the personality traits of the members of a status class.

"To be distinguished from membership in a status-class are the two types of secondary relational criteria, participation in an "ecological" system and membership in a collectivity. By an ecological system is meant a state of mutually oriented interdependence of a plurality of actors who are not integrated by bonds of solidarity to form a collectivity but who are objects to one another [my italics, cf. ibid. p. 77]. The "customers" of a commercial firm constitute such a category as do in general the participants in a market. Another example is the antagonists in a contest. Of course their interaction is oriented to a system of "rules of the game" and in their orientation to these rules they are members of the collectivity which upholds them. For ecological interactors in this capacity the only "sanction" is failure to achieve the goal or to avoid injury to self. Only the rules, not the specific

orientations thus are institutionalized, and the relevant institutions are regulative not relational. As a relational category such participants must belong to the same concrete system of interaction...

"Membership in a collectivity is also a secondary relational criterion. Such a collectivity may, like a kinship group or a community, be constituted by primary relational criteria, but it need not be. Even where membership is achieved by the individual actor, not ascribed to him, once he is a member this becomes a basis of further ascription" (ibid. 92-4 I have added to Parsons' own italics.).

Eventually Parsons attempts a comprehensive "categorisation of actor-units in object-roles" of which the first section ("A") breaks down the "individual actor". This is important for the analysis of the sociological significance of personality in general - if only for its pioneering merit:

"1. Ascriptive quality foci

a. Classificatory

Sex

Age

*Organic and personality traits

b. Relational

Biological position

Spatial location

Temporal location

"Ecological" situation

Collectivity memberships

2. Performance-capacity foci (all classificatory)

a. Instrumental primacy

Technical competence

Instrumental leadership capacity (executive and representative)

b. Expressive primacy

*Capacity to elicit receptiveness and response

*Capacity to form and maintain diffuse attachments and loyalties

*Expressive leadership capacity

c. Moral primacy

"Private" moral "character" } both eliciting approval

*Moral leadership capacity (charisma) } and esteem"

(Ibid. 142).

The items I have marked * seem rather to beg than to answer questions and in fact together constitute the concept personality as we have been using it in this essay. The remaining items have already been treated. Parsons adds the term "charisma" in brackets after the last item only. However, this term (as we shall use it in the final section of this chapter) accounts in part for all the other items which we have marked. In fact, it is difficult to see how some of the distinctions Parsons has made here could be logically upheld. They seem to amount rather to different ways of looking at the same thing, than divisions between constituent elements of personality. Further, in our context, they are likely at least in some degree to result from the role status itself, as well as being criteria for reaching it.

The remainder of this section of the chapter is devoted to discussion of the non-charismatic elements of the leader's personality and the conditioning force of the ecological situation, i.e. the relationship between the leader's personality and the society.

1. In a sense this is another way of looking at the obligation to take the other person at face value - mentioned already in the previous chapter. Parsons' formulation here is the "complementarity of expectations." That is, "the outcome of ego's action, in terms of its significance to him, is contingent on alter's reaction to what he does. This reaction in turn is not random but is organized relative to alter's expectation concerning what is "proper" behaviour on ego's part. The reaction, then, is organized about the problem of whether, and to what degree, ego "conforms" with alter's expectations of what he should do. At the very beginning the expectations may be purely predictive, but very soon they

acquire a normative content" (ibid. 154). In other words (in Parsons' terminology) the articulation may be said to be at the point of contact between ego's need-dispositions and alter's role-expectations.

2. A summary of personality types of Baluch leaders has been given in chapter 19. It will be useful here to compare these with similar types used for sociologically similar (political) purposes both inside and outside the same cultural area.

One of the few ethnographers who has given some prominence to the description of personality in comparable leadership roles is Evans-Pritchard. For instance, of Zande kings and princes, he writes that he has "been most impressed by - in general, for not all are alike - their proud bearing, their politeness, fastidiousness, reticence, even shyness; their intelligence, sharpened by suspicion of Europeans to cunning; their conservative clinging to tradition, a demeanour and manners unsurpassed by any aristocracy in the world, ... and a superiority which requires for its acceptance neither display of force nor ornament; the ability to take in a situation and assess a man quickly and decisively and with great severity ... Even under European rule their prestige was quite considerable and their power, though curbed by alien governments, was strongly exercised behind the scenes; ..." (1962: 87) Evans-Pritchard then gives a more detailed description of an old and well remembered Zande king, Gbudwe (ibid. 89 ff.). A few points of this are interesting to compare with what has been said of Mīr Bahrām Khān Bārakzai, for Evans-Pritchard's older informants had been Gbudwe's subjects just as mine had been Bahrām's. When Evans-Pritchard first visited the Azande (1927) all the Zande kings had already lost their independence over twenty years before (as the Baluch had when I was with them). The description refers to the period around 1900. "Gbudwe was the Zande ideal of what a king should be and his name epitomizes to his subjects all that they are proud of in their past and all that they have lost by European [for the comparison, of course, read "Persian"] conquest:

their independence and the stability of their political and domestic institutions - all that they look back to with pride, longing and with regret..." (ibid. 91). The ideal is placed at just about the extent of living memory, and just before the subordination of the traditional system to an alien administration, and is remembered in terms of the qualities of the leader's personality.

This suggests also that direct "personality" rule - in the Lande case quite strongly institutionalised, in the Baluch case not so - can never be simply replaced by impersonal authority, even if perhaps sometimes uninstitutionalised "ecological" situations may be institutionalised, as, for instance, in British Baluchistan (cf. above, chapter 18).

Within the Islamic cultural area in north Arabia the personal qualities of the ideal chief among the Rwala Bedouins are described by Musil (1928: 471ff), and his description is identical with the ideal of the Baluch chief. It includes physical strength, bravery, farsightedness, kindness, truthfulness ("he disregards trifles... knows no distinction between great and small"), generosity ("he ... will not always insist on his rights, gladly yielding to one weaker than himself and sometimes giving up his claim to a thing which clearly belongs to him").

Among the Swat Pathans where, according to Barth (1959: 81) "the intangible factor of prestige or reputation becomes a major source of authority ... The ideal personality of a leader is virile and impetuous, given to extremes rather than compromise, sometimes unwise, but always brave (cf. the Baluch story of Mīr Chākar, chapter 3.)

Finally, to these traits must be added the attitude of indifference towards disasters and reliance on divine bounty, which, particularly in view of what has been said on the distinction between the formal and informal religion, and the closer relationship of the chief with the informal religion, might be viewed as a reliance on the chief's charisma.

3. After allowing for archaisms, there must be a direct relationship between the way leaders are chosen and defined in a society and the general conception of leadership in that society. Further, even though we have been at pains to show that so many aspects of Baluch society are archaic remains from pre-Baluch systems, their continued practice must have some conditioning force.

The most important factors in the selection of a Baluch chief are:
1. informality - any given community may or may not have a chief, and where it has one he may be immediately or only distantly concerned in its affairs.
2. heredity - which defines a class from which all chiefs must come, and
3. election (always informal) - which interacts with primogeniture within that class.
These three factors inter-act, and are subordinate to qualities of personality, but they also (cf. Parsons, above) modify and confine these qualities of personality, and for this reason it seems best to say something more about them at this stage.

The complementary of hereditary succession and election is noted in Mediaeval Europe by Bloch (1965: 383), where it was in fact institutionalised to the extent that Henry II of Germany could say "We have obtained the unanimous election of the peoples and the princes and the hereditary succession to the undivided realm." "And in France, according to that excellent canonist Ivo of Chartres: 'That man was rightly crowned king, to whom the kingdom fell by hereditary right and who was designated by the unanimous consent of the bishops and great men'" (ibid. 383-4). This meant of course, in fact, that election could operate among a small group of people who were qualified by heredity. "Men believed in the hereditary vocation not of an individual but of a dynasty; [which] alone they thought capable of producing able leaders" (ibid. my italics). In other words the necessary qualities of personality are thought of as being possessable only by members of a certain class or group. But the collec-

tive heritability tended to result in individual heritability in the direct line. Collective heritability confines the number of candidates to a small number and sometimes also suggests the successor from among these. If the man thus automatically suggested is obviously unsuitable (i.e. lacking in personality), the convention of election allows the led to select another of the candidates who share the collective heritability. A similar situation is indicated among the Bakhtiarī by Bakhash (Kayhan International, 19.6.66: p.4). Among the Baluch there is the further safeguard that the community may do without a chief, and on the other hand, new dynasties may start from lines (i.e. where the principles of heredity and succession have both been satisfied long enough for them to start being thought of in dynastic terms) of kamāsh.

So many safeguards surely warrant the point of view that these are in fact no more than ancillary legitimising factors in the choice of personality.

4. Although the Baluch conceive of authority and power as emanating from the chief, rather than delegated to him, and accord the status an absolute (though vague) value in the society, nevertheless, what we have called the "sociological personality" of the leader justifies itself in the long term by the degree and constancy of loyalty it can command. Loyalty also, therefore, has a conditioning effect on the personality of the leader - although of course both the traditional culture and other aspects of the ecological situation form the framework within which loyalty may or may not be maintained. Parsons fits the loyalty "process" into his social system by seeing it as "a clear expressive homologue of the instrumental category of co-operation in the cathectic-expressive aspect of ego's integration with alter; where this integration is institutionalized", he calls it "solidarity", and "short of this" he calls it "loyalty". "There are two aspects of this loyalty. In the purely cathectic sense alter may be an object of attachment. This means that the relation to alter is the source, not merely of discreet unorganized, ad

hoc gratifications for ego, but of an organized system of gratifications which include expectations of the future continuance and development of alter's gratificatory significance. In the normally integrated case, as between individual actors, there would, of course, be a mutuality of this attachment significance. What the attachment does is to organize a plurality of need-dispositions in relation to a particular object into an integrated system.

"The second aspect of the loyalty derives from the fact that the attachment is organized in terms of a cultural pattern which, in the first instance, will be a pattern of expressive symbols, the meanings of which are shared between ego and alter" (Parsons, 1964: 77). Basically, loyalty is the degree of stability of the political relationship between any two people, and the membership of an individual in a collectivity is an extension of this. As such it has been discussed already. However, in the context of this chapter it should be seen as the scale of the basic relationship between the leader and the led, through which the led modify the personality of the (uninstitutionalised) leader.

5. In chapter 6, a contrast was drawn between the (Persian) Baluch and the Pathans (as described by Barth, 1964), for the purposes of which it was said that the Pathans were organized on horizontal lines while the Baluch had a vertical structure. This was sufficient for the context, but it was admitted at the time that it was a gross over-simplification. On the basis of our analysis and the terminology introduced so far it may now be said that both the societies may best be discussed in terms of ecological situations rather than organizations, structures, or systems. Similarly, as the term implies, even though compared to the Pathans, authority is among the Baluch (albeit almost ad hoc) built up and channelled vertically rather than horizontally, this is simply because of the social stratification, and the word hierarchy would be a misnomer since it would imply a definite political structure. Reference to these societies in terms of ecological situations allows us to formulate the difference

between them much more exactly, and say that the political actors in one - the Pathans - jealously claim social equality with each other, whereas the political actors among the Baluch need not do this. In the one society, loyalty is basically to social equals, in another it is to unequals. Thus, we have formulated the basic political difference between the two societies without positing either explicitly or implicitly any definite structured relationship between any two given actors.

In order to make this as clear as possible it may be well to refer here to a passage in Leach,(1961), where in order to illustrate a similar approach he points as an analogy to the branch of mathematics known as topology. For, "considered mathematically society is not an assemblage of things but an assemblage of variables." Leach characterises topology thus:

"If I have a piece of rubber sheet and draw a series of lines on it to symbolize the functional interconnections of some set of social phenomena and I then start stretching the rubber about, I can change the manifest shape of my original geometrical figure out of all recognition and yet clearly there is a sense in which it is the same figure all the time. The constancy of pattern is not manifest as an objective empirical fact but it is there as a mathematical generalisation..."The fundamental variable in topology is the degree of connectedness" (Leach, 1961: 7). The same may be said of the "structure" of Baluch society. Each role-status is defined independently of the others; the degree of connectedness between them depends on who (i.e. what personalities) occupy the fixed points. It is these personalities which are the fundamental variables in the society and in turn vary the relationships between personalities, and charisma denotes a particular type of connection between personalities. It is a type of subjective evaluation by a man of his leader, and is therefore similar in quality to the more general "face-value" relationship noted by Parsons (quoted above).

6. But remembering for a moment that all members of the society begin by being subordinate rather than superordinate - at least within the

class into which they are born - how do they cease to be subordinate and become superordinate? According to Simmel (1964: 183-4): "A person of superior significance or strength may acquire, in his more immediate or remote milieu, an overwhelming weight of his opinions, a faith, or a confidence which have the character of objectivity. He thus enjoys a prerogative and an axiomatic trustworthiness in his decisions which excel, at least by a fraction, the value of mere subjective personality, which is always variable, relative, and subject to criticism. By acting "authoritatively", the quantity of his significance is transformed into a new quality: it assumes for his environment the physical state - metaphorically speaking - of objectivity." (Or alternatively it may work in the opposite direction: for instance, "A super-individual power - state, church, school, family or military organisations - clothes a person with a reputation, a dignity, a power of ultimate decision, which would never flow from his individuality.") "... evidently, at this point of transition and change-over [from the merely personal to the authoritative situation], the more or less voluntary faith of the party subjected to authority comes into play. This transformation of the value of personality into a super-personal value gives the personality something which is beyond its demonstrable and rational share, however slight this addition may be. The believer in authority himself achieves the transformation. He (the subordinate element) participates in a sociological event which requires his spontaneous co-operation" (my italics, cf. once again, the "face-value" theory).

Simmel's "super-personal value" is simply another approach to what we have called charisma (cf. also Weber: Grundlage jeder Herrschaft... ist eine Glauben, quoted above, chapter 20).

II

Subjective personality

I consider sociological personality as it functions in the society

to be made up of two major constituents, which might be called objective and subjective. We have discussed the former and we now come to the latter. We have borrowed for it the term charisma, and we have already distinguished between that part which is heritable and that which is purely personal ("hereditary" and "personal" charisma).

As a term charisma was inadequately defined when it was introduced into the terminology of the social sciences (cf. below, Appendix II, Weber 1964: 155 & 179 ff. and Ratnam, 1964: 34ff.) and has been much abused since. Like feudalism, and almost as much, it has been thrown around to such an extent without being properly defined that it is doubtful whether it has any analytical as distinct from emotive value left. For this reason, again like feudal above, I am at pains to show that it can have analytical and generalising value.[1]

In one quite basic sense I differ from Weber. Weber considers charismatic authority to be specifically irrational in the sense of being foreign to all rules ("Regelfremdheit", Weber, 1964: 180). The aim of this chapter is to show that this is not so for our sense of the term. Furthermore, this does not basically differ (qualitatively) from what has been called charisma in such vastly different cases of leadership as, for instance, Muhammad, Hitler, or Nkrumah.

Ratnam (op. cit.) wishes to discard the term altogether, but in the process of his discussion makes some interesting points, illustrating in particular many of the emotive ways in which the word has tended to be used in academic sources. Ratnam is at pains to show that leaders do not just occur, but that the term charisma as it has been used tends to suggest always that charismatic leaders do just "occur" - so that,

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1. For better modern usages of it cf. e.g. D. Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition, Princeton, 1955; D. Rustow, Politics and Westernization. Princeton, 1956; E. Shils, "Concentration and Dispersion of Charisma..." World Politics, XI/1 October 1958. My usage of the term differs from these mainly because I am writing primarily from within the theoretical framework of social anthropology rather than sociology or political science.

therefore, we need not bother to try to understand how! (Ibid. 346). He is very well aware that "we must not fall into the error of believing that leaders whom we regard as 'charismatic' are individuals whose exceptional qualities come to be spontaneously recognized by their populations." The charisma is in the eyes of those who want to be led, and must be to a large extent modified by the culture - by expectations which are conditioned by institutionalised ways of thinking and acting. All these factors operate in the choice of any leader. Similarly, the choice is to a large extent mutual - though perhaps not consciously so: the leader takes advantage of a situation he knows and qualities he possesses to attract followers and so become a leader; the followers are in need of a leader. The charismatic leader does not impose himself by physical or other force.

Therefore, charisma is a way of referring to that part of the whole personality which (either potentially or actually) sets a man apart and makes him a potential leader in a society (or a context) where the process of choosing leaders is not institutionalised. It is not incompatible with this to say that this charisma may also be present and sociologically relevant - though perhaps to a lesser degree - in societies where the choice of leaders is institutionalised. What we have called informality or lack of institutionalisation is an important catalyst, though on occasions charisma and institutionalisation may coincide, but this is not relevant to the Baluch situation since among the Baluch the choice of leaders is not institutionalised - only the role-statuses through which leaders may function are conventional.

Our view of charisma as a sociological component should by now be clear. Occasionally it may be developed in such a way that it transcends the conventional role-statuses, as, for instance, by the founder of the Zikri movement or Sheikh Mahmud among the Kurds (cf. Barth, 1953, pp. 61-6). It is in this way that it is applicable to the great "charismatic leaders" such as Muhammad, Napoleon, etc.

Weber saw that charisma could be inherited. In his discussion of social stratification and class structure he gives as one of the bases for the development of distinct strata hereditary charisma "durch erfolgreiche Prestigeansprüche kraft ständischer Abstammung (Geburtsstände)" (1964: 227).

Personal charisma is in fact the ability to attract and hold followers irrespective of institutionalised roles or statuses. Hereditary charisma is the political premium that the successor is allowed by the led simply because his predecessor or ancestor had personal charisma.

This importance of personality in the society (and by implication of that part of the personality which we have called charisma) and of the charismatic quality of successful personality is simply another aspect of the confusion between the spiritual and the temporal. This was noticed as long ago as Frazer but its significance was not seen. It was also noticed by Weber but not exploited (Weber 1964: 860: "Der Haupt-ling der Frühzeit, der Vorläufer des Königtums, ist noch eine zwiespältige Figur: patriarchalen Familien- oder Sippenhaupt auf der einen Seite, charismatischer Anführer zur Jagd und zum Kriege, Zauberer, Regenmacher, Medizinmann, also Priester und Arzt, und endlich Schiedsrichter auf der anderen Seite.").

Quite apart from the institution of kingship, it is reasonable to expect in any primitive society which chooses a paramount leader, particularly when it makes that position unattainable to the great majority of the population, that the very unattainability of the position will lend its holder a certain vague spiritual power simply because of the "otherness" it confers on him. In the Balesh case a man becomes a chief because he has charisma, and there is no "position" which could confer the charisma on him. A chief must come from a dynastic family and, therefore, he already has, by definition, hereditary charisma, which distinguishes him from the rest of the society.

Charisma is in fact the sociological "otherness" of the leader. It is a particular value which a community puts on a particular type of leadership, and it is led to do this largely because of the social stratification, which in turn is due to the historical antecedents of the present situation. What constitutes this otherness? An important ingredient is the hereditary charisma which the chief has by definition. Beyond this he requires a certain amount at least of personal charisma. To be accorded this he must be:

i) a personality as distinct from an unpersonality (cf. chapter 18). That is to say he must have sociologically positive personality traits. He must accept, if not seek, social and political responsibilities: he must show initiative, and pay attention to nardomārī.

ii) "Baluch": physically attractive and active, a good shot, rider, etc. and uphold the code (cf. chapter 12).

iii) generally successful in his social and political (previously including military) enterprises.

However, although he should score personally under each of these three heads, this in itself does not make him different from many other members of his community, i.e. this in itself is not charisma. The hereditary charisma is the basic "otherness". From among the closely defined group which enjoys hereditary charisma the chief will be chosen by his score under these heads - always remembering that in a decision between two roughly equal candidates, other sociological factors will come into play, in particular:

a) primogeniture

b) placing and favouritism on the part of the father or an uncle.

When he has become chief, then his better personal qualities become his personal charisma because of the subjective quality lent them by his followers.

We have arrived at an equation: that the lack of institutionalisation of leadership, and the importance of personality - with its charisma,

imply a lack of differentiation between temporal and spiritual values in the society (cf. Fig. XIX).



Fig. XIX

CONCLUSION

Throughout this essay we have attempted to present the material and conduct the argument keeping three explicit context in mind:

i cultural

ii theoretical

iii diachronic

The need for this type of approach has been shown in particular recently by Evans-Pritchard (1962: 21ff., and 61-2, and 1965: 31), Levi-Strauss (1960) and Firth (1964, chapter 1), and does not require defence. It has been called "dynamic" and aims at generalisation. However, it may be as well to sum up here the relevance of these contexts in this essay.

1 The aim of social anthropological analysis is

a) to understand how a particular society works in terms of its internal sociological relationships and the relationship between the society and its environment, and

b) by comparing similar sociological features in different societies, to generalise, or make general statements about these relationships (always remembering, however, that "if the specificity of a fact is lost, the generalisation about it is valueless"(Evans-Pritchard, 1962: 49)). Hence the amount of comparative material we have included both from within the same vast cultural area of Islam and outside.

2. As the comparative ethnographic material indicates the context of Balum ethnographic material, so the reference to relevant theoretical sources shows the theoretical context from which the writer is working. By citing these sources he not only makes obvious the origins of his own ideas, but relates his analysis to the development of the theory of his subject.

3 There are two main reasons for including historical material:

a) the collective thinking of the society - both sociological concepts

and conventional attitudes - is either the result of, or has been conditioned by historical events and processes, and

b) it is necessitated by our view that there is no one definite social or political structure to be abstracted from an analysis of Baluch society. There are a number of structures (and viewed historically this number might be indefinite), and each individual community may vary between any number of them. Therefore, only a diachronic approach could make it plain that not only is there no stable political structure but the concept of political stability is irrelevant to the study of this society. We may nevertheless have given an impression of some social stability in the form of a social stratification. This was perhaps inevitable because of the nature of our material, but we do not assume that the social stratification as we have described it is in any way an equilibrium. We insist only that if our analysis of the political situation is correct it implies the existence always of some form of social differentiation into strata. These strata do not have to be stable, but if the stratification as such were to disappear the political situation would be bound to change.

In this way we have intended to present a fully "dynamic" analysis of leadership among the Baluch in the Persian Province of Baluchistan, and we also hope that we have contributed some advance in the theoretical treatment of personality as a sociological factor and the various ways in which distinction may or may not be made sociologically between the sacré and the profane.

APPENDIX I

General A. Jahān_bānī gives (Jahān_bānī 1:67), the following data collected when he conducted the campaign against the Baluch in 1928:

Name of Tribe and/or Place	Chief	no. of families	
I			
1. Ismā'īlzai, inhabit western Sarhadd	Jum'a Khān resides in Celugān	40	
2. Yārmuhammadzai, Sarhadd, Rampur, Sarāvān	Jīand Khān	300	collectively known as Dareni
3. Ganshīzai mostly in Sarāvan	Lashkar Khān in Jālq	300	
4. RīgI (consisting ar und Kuhi Taftān of many sub-tribes)	Kidu Khān in Khwash	5600	
5. Kurd (client to north of Khwash RīgI)	Heibar Khān & Nasrullāh Khān	100	
6. Mīr Baluchzai (client to RīgI - agricultural)	Cherāg Khān Nasrullāh Khān	150	
7. Hāshemzai (from Sistān - client to RīgI)	Dād Karīm	45	
8. Tamindānī (Persian, heights of Kuhi Taftān		60	
9. Barāhuī (client to RīgI)	Baluch Khān	30	
10. Khwāshī (originally Dehwārī from Sīb and Rampur, peasants)		130	
11. Gosht (by origin = Bārānzai, and live in fort, peasants)	Mīr Ghulām Rasul Khān father of Muhammad Shāh Khān of Sarāvān	200	
II Sarāvān			
1. Bārānzai (in the forts of Desak, Shastun and Mushak)	Alī Muhammad Khān	3000	Tribes in this region mostly live in forts and are therefore known by the name of their fort, but in fact they are Bārānzai
2. Mahuk	Mushīrvān Khān	300	
3. Kafandak	Mehrab Khān	50	
4. Kuhak	Mīr Yāderbakhsh	300	
5. Dehak	Abu'l-Fath Khān	1000	
6. Dehwārī	Dust Muhammad Khān	1000	

7.	Sarju	Nushīrvān Khān	200
8.	Sīb	Muhammad Shāh Khān)	2000
9.	Surān	Mir Alam Khān)	
10.	Paskuh	Mīr Alam Khān	500
11.	Hāduch	Mīr Muhammad Shāh Khān	2000
12.	Lagas	Nushīrvān Khān	500
13.	Kaurān	Navāb Khān	1000
14.	Rakhī (in Jālq)	Jalāl Khān	500
15.	Ērafshān	Baluch Khān and Ibrāhim Khān	200
16.	Rampasht	Dust Muhammad Khān	1200
17.	Jālq	" " "	200
18.	Sīnukān	" " "	50
19.	Kahni Dāud	Nushīrvān Khān	50
20.	Sar Kuhī	Ausā	400
21.	Sepāhī	Shīr Muhammad	150
22.	?	Jalāl Khān	60
23.	Abdulzai	Nazer	500
24.	Jawshīdzai	Mīr Abdul	60
25.	Khākizai	Durr Muhammad	50
26.	Ahmadzai	Pīgī	80
27.	Chārīzai	Ghulām Muhammad	300
28.	Mahmudzai	Darmān	30
29.	Kallagān	Mehrāb Khān	300

III. Central Baluchistan (= Jās-murān depression)

1.	Siyāh Khānī (in Aptar)	Naqīb	100
2.	Fahraj and environs	Sardār Dust Muhammad Khān (in Irandagān)	400
3.	Jawshīdzai	Abbās and Abdul	100) under
4.	Abdulzai	Qāderdād	100) Dust Muh. Khān
5.	Salāh Kuhī		100
6.	Zard Kuhī	Lashkar Khān	200
7.	Dāmanī	Mīrzā Khān	300
8.	Dāmanī	Alī Khān	300
9.	Kalkalī	Kheir Muhammad and Malek	200

10.	Burhānzai	Ghulām Hussein Khān	200
11.	Bamūn	Cherāgh Khān	40
12.	Bāmerī	Zamān Khān	300
13.	Sābeqī	Mīr Hātem Khān	200
14.	Abdullāhī	Dād Alī Khān	300
15.	Shāh Valī Pur	Khodā Murād Khān	300
16.	Hājjīzai	Bāqi Khān	400
17.	Nārui	Gergīn, Walī Muhammad	900
18.	Rabjārzai	Khān Muhammad	45
19.	Hawalī	Faqīr Shāh	400
20.	Hut	Abdān-Nabī	100

IV Makrān

1.	Dashtiārī	Sardār Dīn Muhammad Khān (lives in Chāhbahār)	3000
2.	Qasr Qand	Sardār Jān Muhammad Khān	1080
3.	Bent and environs	Mandī Khān and Ayyub Khān	3000
4.	Geh and environs	Sardār Hussein Khān	3000
5.	Chāmp	Rostam Khān	2000
6.	Fannuch and Poshteh	Sardār Muhammad Khān	2500
7.	Lāshār	Mīr Hutī Khān	3000
8.	Rāsk and Pīshīn	Hajj Navāb Khān	3000
9.	Hut, Gurgich etc.	Sardār Ahmad Khān	2000
10.	Hūt	Hājj Navāb Khān	200
11.	Bīshān (west of Pashkardia)	Mīr Barakat Khān	1000
12.	Jāsk	Mustafā Khān	1000
13.	Gwatar	Sa'dān Khān	200
14.	Pīrumbād	Sardār Alī Muhammad Khān	100

In his later publication (1900) Jahānbānī gives the following lists:-

Various tribes of Serbās valley

Tribe (tīreh)	Names of influential men (mutaeffiān)	No of families	Main place of residence
	Dīn Muhammad Askānī	20	Martān

		Rahīm Khān Dīnārzai	20	Martūn
		Ghulām Muhammad Shīrzai	30	"
		Pīr Muhammad Baluch	15	Kamalo
		Vali Muhammad Lalazai	10	"
		Shīru Askānī	40	Brenjakān
		Bahādur Askānī	30	Ashtagān
		Shafī' Muhammad Askānī	60	Kalag
		Ahmad Askānī	50	Batok
10.		Karīmbakhsh Askānī	200	Pashāwak
11.		Asīa Askānī	100	Bangol
12.		Shahīd Mirthānzai	150	Chārī Bangol
13.		Bhakar Rahmānzai	100	Tākbon
14.		Mehrāb Dīnārzai	200	Hong
15.		Fāzel Dīnārzai	60	Nam Ju
16.		Khudābakhsh Askānī	30	Se Gurān
17.		Kamar Kamarzai	50	Jongaki
18.		Alī Din Baluch	30	Jagaki
19.		Bīru Baluch	10	Dasani
20.		Ashraf Baluch	20	Angurī
21.		Shahzīr Baluch	15	Karpāī
22.		Ādam Askānī	90	Kallag Jogri
23.		Shāhdust Dehānī	10	Tākbon
24.		Sa'dān Askānī	60	Pīrlat
25.		Malek Shāh Askānī	20	Jangol
X	**Mīrakzai (Sarāvān)**			
1.		Alam Asadī (chief of whole tribe, lives in Isfahshehr)	100	Shestun
2.	Jangīzai	Kadkhodā Fath Muhammad	100	"
3.	Omara	Hussein and Sarvān	50	"
4.	Dorsāda	Hussein	70	"
5.	Arbāb	Shāhbās	50	"
6.	Mullīzai	Mullā Lashkar Khudābanda	40	"
7.	Rahmānī	Hājj Shīr Muhammad	20	"
8.	Barakzai	Mīrak Khān	100	Arafshān
XI	**Bāsirī**			
1.	Shahdīzai	Shahbāg	200	Chāh Shūr

		Zamān Nawābī (chief of whole tribe)	300	Kuṭiān
b.	Abdullāhī	Dād Alī Mālaki	50	Irānshahr and environs
c.	Rudīnsai	Mīrzā son of Dorrā	100	Nagīrī
d.	Nūsorī	Īsā Mā'īzāda	400	Dalgān
e.	Dorrakī	Allāhyārān	200	Dalgān
f.	Sābakī	Abdō	500	Nandān
g.	Shāh Walī Dar	Muhammad Īsa	400	Darreh Āhu
IV	Bolēdai			
1.		Karīmbakhsh Sa'īdī (chief of the whole tribe)	100	Kēsk
2.		Walī Muhammad Bolēdai	20	Pishīn
3.		Muhammad Dar	150	Talār Ser Pishīn
4.		Jān Muhammad Bahrāmsai	120	Nang Pishīn
5.		Muhammad Muhammad Hasanī	100	Pishīn
6.		Hasan Sharbasai	50	Pishīn
7.		Kamāl Khān Ashkānī	200	Ilāt Pishīn (i.e. Nomads around Pishīn)
8.		Hājj Nawabi	40	Sulēmān
9.		Abūbakr Darsāda	15	Pishīn
10.		Dagārī Ghulāmī	60	Pishīn
11.		Abdullāh Mullāsaī (= Q.v. of Part Five)	12	Pishīn
12.		Pāīn Sandal	40	Pishīn
13.		Hājj Hasan Baluch	300	Jakki Gwar
14.		Pīr-bakhsh Dar	80	Kārtān
15.		Dust Muhammad Hut	50	Kārtān
16.		Khudābakhsh Darsāda	60	Kārtān
17.		Mahmud Ghulāmī	50	Kārtān
18.		Hājj Dalmurād Hut	30	Khadīr
19.		Hāshem Darsāda	20	Khadīr
20.		Chākī Ghulāmī	30	Khadīr
21.		Washdel Baluch	50	Khadīr
22.		Faqīr Muhammad Bolēdai	80	Kēsk

16.	Darvīš Mīr	70	Nīak
16.	Mullā Shīh Gotad	80	Nīak
17.	Chahār Shasha Darvāda	80	Nīak
18.	Lashka Ghulām	150	Nīak
19.	Qāsem Baluch	50	Tīat Nīak (Jamada around Nīak)
20.	Shahdād Muhamd.	90	Kanjak
21.	Nur Muhammad Muhammī	100	Mī Gadak
22.	Dehmurād Muhammī	80	Namada
23.	Mahmūd Shahnai	40	"
24.	Nur Muhammad Dehāni	60	"
25.	Mīrak Baluch	90	"

I Nīai

1.	Ardībesai	Kadkhodā Golsār Hasan Khān 300	Lādes
2.	Brāhuī	Darra - Hussein Khān 60	Khwash - Kalchāt
3.	Dalāl Mīrmai	Hājj Mehrāb 200	Gauhar Kuh
4.	Dehāderzai	Kadkhodā Karam 300	Shahdād Shīru
5.	Tavindānī	Javānmard, Kadkhodā Chupān 500	Gusha - Tavindān
6.	Javehīdzai	Cherāgh 200	Sayan
7.	Jarrizai	Kadkhodā Hussein 200	Andeh - Mīrjava
8.	Hasanzai	Pīrdād 200	Kacheh - Khān Muhammad Chah
9.	Rakhshānī	Kadkhodā Isā 100	Lādes - Rīg Malik
10.	Sālārzai	Kadkhodā Valī Muhammad 200	Anjanak - Rupee
11.	Sanadzai	Kadkhodā Hājjī 200	Mīrjāva - Shurak
12.	Sandakzai	Ghulām Muhammad 100	Gumīch
13.	Sohrābzai	Asā 100	Deh pā-ye bīd
14.	Shahnzai	'Atā Muhammad and sons 200	Bid-Nārō-Hotillah
15.	Shahwīrzai	Hājj Pasand 250	Darra Biabān Kacha-Kartāka
16.	Shīhīzai	Kadkhodā Barfī 100	Mīrjāva - Shurak
17.	Shahvalī bar	Kadkhodā Karam 100	Gumīch

10.	Shambazai	Kadkhodā Qādirbakhsh	300	Lādan Sīāh Jangal
12.	Zangīzai	Ghāzar	300	Samsur - Kahārī Kuh
13.	Īzzai	Kadkhodā Hussein	500	Chahmalī
11.	Chelandarzai	Hajj Mullā Yusef	200	Gaukar Kuh - Shurāb
12.	Karvandarī	Kadkhodā Hussein	200	Karvāndar
15.	Kahrāzai	Darvīsh	30	Southern slopes of Kuhi Taftān
14.	Gangazai	Mullā Nīk Muhammad	205	Gasu - Garuk
15.	Gasuli	Kadkhodā Sulaimān	100	Lādez - Mashkīd Gasu
16.	Muhammadzai	Hajj Feis Muhammad	100	Tahlīb - Pīrus
17.	Mahmudzai	Kadkhodā Afzal	250	Chāh Ghethī
18.	Mardīdzai	Fath Muhammad son of Malekdad	100	Anda - Tahlīb
19.	Mīr Baluchzai	Kadkhodā Khān Muhammad	300	Mīrābad - Nāzil
20.	Mandīzai	Lāgar	50	Darra Bādān - Istakhru
21.	Mīrdīzai	Hājj Ghulām Muhammad	400	Eskelābād
22.	Watuzai and Pīgī	Hushang, Muhammad Rezā	500	Khwash - Lādez
23.	Nasrui	Mulla Fath Muhammad	200	Andi
24.	Nashtizai	Aghaī - Nāstr	300	Nauabād - Bazmān

V Bahrāzai - client to Pīgī

1.		Nawab Khān Bahrāzī	60	Hushak and Kahn-i Dāud
2.	Salmzai	Shahmurād	70	Hushak
3.	Mullīzai	Mullā Lāl Muhammad	30	"
4.	Yusefzai	Mehrāb	20	"
5.	Hussein Bor	Nur Muhammad - Ibrahīm	200	Gosht

VI Hussein Bor Pīgī (Jālq)

1.		Qadirbakhsh Pīgī (Chief of whole tribe)	70	Chegard
2.	Shaukazī	Haidar	70	Shaukān
3.	"	Shamba	60	"
4.	Rais	Jahand	400	Jālq
5.	Sardār	Muhammad Karīm	500	Jālq

VII Sardīrzai or Saddīzai of Rahu Kalāt

1.	Sardīzai	Mīrāb Khān (Chief of Rāhu Kalāt section of Sardāzai)	120	Rāhu

2.	Mīrāḥ Rus	200	Bāhu Kalīt
3.	Nur Muhammad Latti	150	Sulēmān
4.	Ghulam Rubbānī	120	Basut
5.	Nusrat Gurgīch	120	Kalī
6.	Ashraf Jadgāl	200	Zamu
7.	Valīdād Gurgīch	100	Karag Mīru
8.	Sheikh Cheragh	120	Kallāni
9.	Chutī Baluch	100	Sangīn
10.	Ādam Rend	200	Sīrjā
11.	Safar Jadgāl	180	Shahbāgnai
12.	Umar Kaurāki	100	Dalīlā
13.	Allu Jadgāl	80	Chīnī
14.	Mazār Mīrjat	60	Jagrānvāru
15.	Darvīsh Musa	200	Nemade

IX Sardārmai or Saddāmai of Bāhu Kalīt - Mīr Se'bān's subtribe

1.	Mīr Se'bān Khān Sardārmai (Chief of this clan of Sardārmai, has no fixed residence)	200	Sand, Bahu
2.	Haqnaqq Latti	200	Kallāni
3.	Umar Baluch	200	Sand Hamsah
4.	Qadirbakhsh Baluch	250	Pasā Bandar
5.	Asīn Kadkhudāi	200	Gwādar (now living across the bay of Jiwani in Pakistan)
6.	Pīrī Latti	100	Wādan
7.	Ādam Baluch	50	Dur
8.	Dur Muhammad Baluch	60	Sand Mīrahmadī
9.	Valī Muhammad Jadgāl	80	Mazan Pīg

Sardārmai of Dashtiārī

1.	'Adhī Khān Sardārmai (Chief of whole tribe)	350	Dalgān
2.	Mīru Baluch	100	Halegdārī
3.	Dādkarīm Sābera	200	Nauhandīān
4.	Ashraf Sheikhzāda	120	Nagmar
5.	Khudādād Darzāda	50	"

6.	Shīrīn Hut	300	Petāw
7.	Mīrān Mīr	200	Surkup
8.	[illegible] Jadgāl	150	Sīāw
9.	Abdulghanī Baluch	200	Kēlīn
10.	Lāl Muhammad Baluch	400	Hīpag
11.	Usmān Jadgāl	200	Jādamai
12.	Abūbakr Baluch	300	Sādiqmai
13.	Ibrāhim Hut	400	Shahristān
14.	Abdrahmān Jadgāl	600	Chukīt and Dashtiārī
15.	Vali Muhammad Jadgāl	600	Pallan and environs
16.	Shīrmuhammad Hut	500	Kuchu
17.	Qadirdād Sangola	200	Dalgarī
18.	Ghanī Jat	300	Nomads
19.	Musā Katrī	60	Arabmai

II. Sardārmai of Daj and Talīng.

1.	Dalīvar Khān Dothīn (Chief of tribe)	60	Talīng
2.	Nawās Khān Khānzai	200	Fath Alī Kalāt Rums
3.	Jān Muhammad Ladī	150	Dērwān
4.	Abdullāh Jadgāl	300	Chumak and environs
5.	Shukrullāh Rusa	150	Urkī
6.	Haidar Rusa	150	Urkī
7.	Sidīq Katrī	50	Hajjī Nāsār
8.	Nur Muhammad Katrī	30	Bamu
9.	Dust Muhammad Supak	150	Rushang A Kal Sagān
10.	Malwān Baluch	60	Gasīmai
11.	Shīrān Jadgāl	70	Katum
12.	Rusā Muhammad Baluch	90	Sardaj
13.	Shīr Muhammad Baluch	60	Ladakān
14.	Ilāhbakhsh Baluch	90	Daj
15.	Ghulām Muhammad Baluch	100	Lāthān
16.	Faqīr Muhammad Jadgāl	70	Kādu
17.	Yār Muhammad Jadgāl	300	Bemāru & environs

12.	Pīrdād	400	Barrāni & environs
13.	Kalīr Darmāda	60	Dombedap
14.	Shahkarem Jat	50	Nomads
15.	Kalīr Baluch	120	Washmān
16.	Sulemān Rais	80	Kambel
17.	Dehwarāl Rut	60	Sheirān
18.	Bakhshī Jadgāl	50	Torkānī

III Shah-Bakhsh or Isma'īlzai

The chief of the tribe, Jum'a Khān, having become blind, has abdicated in favour of his son, Pardel Khān.

1. Ahmadzai	Hājj Karān	200	Mensel Āb - Khwāja Mesk
2. Allāh-bakhshzai	Rushen	350	Faqīr Ghāt, Zāhidān
3. Baluchzai	Abdul	250	Chishma - Pa Mi
4. Jamshīdzai	Dor Muhammād	300	Jahāngīr, Chisma
5. Rasanzai	Sefar	150	Zāhratgāh, Bog
6. Dārumzai	Bolgīr	400	Kauren, Shurchāh
7. Mādūzai	Yār Muhammad	150	Darreh Shur, Gal'eh Bīd
8. Shīrāzai	Khodābakhsh	100	Shurchāh, Padagī
9. Tutīzai	Malek Amīr	50	Dehmard, Sorakī
10. Faqīrzai Shahbakhsh	Pardel Khān	500	Shuru, Garg & Haidarābad
11. Culundurzai	Culundur	30	Kauren
12. Cambarzai	Hājj Lāl Muhammad	300	Dehak, Dahu
13. Garshādzai	Sharīf	150	Zāhratgāh, Hamāl-ed-dīn
14. Rutīzai	Hasan Khān	250	Zāhratgāh, Zāhidān

IV Mubārakī

1.	'Isa Khān Mubārakī and Islām Khān Mubārakī (joint chiefs of whole tribe)	500	Chāsp
2.	Gharīb	50	"
3.	Ghāsher	40	
4.	Nur Muhammad	200	Gavang
5.	Kadkhodā Asrullāh	200	Berashk
6.	Kalīr	80	Shahrīnoh
7.	Khodāhamda	200	Kallagān
8.	Shamba	200	Nagur

9.		Shirdel	250	Ahuran
10.		Jland	250	Qasrabad
11.		Hasan	200	Mashhad
12.		Gul Muhammad	400	Hamada
13.		Ashraf	100	Bijnord
14.		Jalab	300	Sistangan
15.		Abdi	100	Sagar
16.		Kadkhada Umar	250	Kija
17.		Mira	200	Mat Sang
18.		Ibrahim	60	Mehmat
19.	Mahmadi	Yusef Khan	200	Urmak
20.	"	Seyyed Muhammad	60	Nukd'i Kal
21.	"	Yar Muhammad	80	Kah Aban
22.	"	Abdul Karim	100	Dashtandar
23.	"	Rasulbakhsh	100	Gurig
24.		Dust Muhammad	30	Kasag
25.		Muhammad Khan Mubaraki	180	Sarakh
26.		Jangi Khan	80	Jahli Shahr
27.		Rahimdad	250	Espaka
28.		Mirza Khan	400	Kohki Espaka
29.		Nur Muhammad	50	Bagdan
30.		Ayyub Khan Mubaraki	350	Hathan
31.		Haidar	70	Jakin
32.		Hathalan	300	Khabik
33.		Faqir Muhammad	100	Karaidin
34.		Salimi	20	Marunan
35.		Muhin Khan	50	Dilati
36.		Mahdid Khan Mubaraki	250	Shafak

IV Gamshadzai

(Chief of whole tribe is Khalil Khan)

1.	Arslzai	Lashkar Khan son of Shibu	115	Around Kuh-i Safid
1.	Jahangirzai	Ali Mardan Qizilbakhsh	30	Siahband and Karvandar
1.	Gharibzai	Yar Muhammad son of Zabardast	150	Around Kuhi Pirg
1.	Dadkhodazai	Ghulam Muhammad son of Din Muhammad	200	Around Gosht and Kuhi Safid

5.	Darrēsai	Khān Muhammad Son of	70	Dashti Shōlah near Sarawān
6.	Sanjarsai	Pulād son of Samad	60	Shikhand & Kanrēnder
7.	Sandaksai	Qajar son of Hayāt	100	Pīgol near Kanrēnder
8.	Shahdādsai	Walī Muhammad son of Muhammad	60	Kuhi Birg
9.	Shahristānsai	Atā son of Sangul	50	Around Kuhi Birg near Zabulī
10.	Abdulsai	Fais Muhammad, Kamāl Khān	200	Zābulī and Irandagān near Sarbāz
11.	Karamsai	Akbar son of Mādād	40	Kuhi Gīlī & Bandarān and area of Gasht
12.	Ganchedsai	Abdullāh son of Gulshēr	100	Sharu and Gluguh near Shahbalkoh
13.	Murādsai	Ba Khair son of Mahmāl	120	Around Tafthān & Gasu & Drukan & Kuhi Murpish
14.	Nasarsai	Dād Alī son of Nasar	110	Around Kuhi Birg
15.	Muhammadsai	Shahbād son of Lāla	30	Garm Āb near Gīlī
16.	Nokhedsai and Mahmadsai	Ghulām Muhammad son of Darwān	130	Pīgol and around Zābulī

IV Lashārī

1.		Muhammad Khān Lashāri	180	Kanrēdok
2.		Qāsī Muhammad Nain	150	Pīp
3.		Kadkhodā Darrā	60	"
4.		Abbās Khān	100	Gwashīn
5.		Kadkhodā Khān Muhammad	250	Kūp
6.		Mullā Ayyub	100	Kanrēdok
7.		Malik Abbās	80	Gardeshān
8.		Mulla Īsā	100	Jahus
9.		Nur-ed-din Khān	50	Nurābād
10		Walī Gul Muhammad	350	Nomads
11.		Shāh Murād	200	Asabāg
12.		Kadkhodā Shāhqolī	200	Sarha
13.		Kadkhodā Habeeb	80	Sarkuh
14.		Kadkhodā Hasan	40	Habundān
15.		Kadkhodā Maleng	200	Bamrud
16.		Kadkhodā Bāqer	300	Nomads around Jagas
17.		Ghulām Muhammad	300	Shēr Abād
18.		Kadkhodā Abdok	200	Kuchīnk

19.	Kadkhodā Abdunabi	100	Nasparān
20.	Feisullāh	100	Maluran
21.	Kadkhodā Helāl Khān	250	Shigān
22	Kadkhoda Faqīr Muhammad	40	Nagar
23.	Yār Muhammad	150	Dārushān
24.	Hasan	50	Dashtkalrān
25.	Dād Rahmān	52	Komordān
26.	Alī Muhammad	150	Chahān

XVI Mīr Marādsai

1.	Mīr Marādsai	Muhammad Shāh	100 Sīb A Surān
2.	Sepehī	Mehrāb	100 " "
3.	Mīrāsai	Gwahrām	50 " "
4.	Chākarzai	Nasīr-ed-dīn	60 " "
5.	Dihqānzai	Dust Muhammad	70 " "
6.	Dehāni	Nasar	100 Kant - Dehān
7.	Gangosārī	Mehrāb	50 Sīb
8.	Bahutsai	Hājj Lāl-bakhsh	100 Surān
9.	Bajjarsai	Jān Muhammad	100 "
10.	Runeksai	Hājj Shīr Muhammad	200 "
11.	Dihqān Khulā	Dor Muhammad	100 "
12.	Dehwārī	Jān Muhammad	100 Kahn Kareveshīh
13.	Mullāsai	Zulfeqār	50 Kahn Malik
14.	Yasdāni	Jum'a	170 " "
15.	Sepehī	Deer Khān	20 Surān
16.	Mīr Marādsai	Mehrāb	50 Paskuh
17.	Pīrīsai	Sheikh Muhammad	150 "
18.	Zufaksai	Dīn Muhammad	150 Paskuh
19.	Mīr Marādsai	Ahmad	20 Kant
20.	Darrāsai	Rahrām	90 Dūduch
21	Porki	Mullā Malik	500 Nomads
22.	Sardār Bor	Nāīb Muhammad	100 Nomads around Kant
23.	Kantī	Shahdād	200 ± Kant
24.	Kallahukānī	Habash	100 Kallahukān

XVII Mirzurāīsai of Bakhshān

1.	Hāshim Mīr urādsai (Chief of whole tribe)	20	Bakhshān
2. Dihqān	Haidar	60	"
3. Mullāsai	Mullā Atā Muhammad	50	"
4. Kului	Khān Muhammad Dihqān	40	"

XVIII Shahnavāzī (previously known as Yārmuhammadsai)

1. Allāhresānsai	Murād Muhammad and Karīm Khān	100	Sam
2. Husainsai	Delmurād	100	Garanoben
3. Raushensai	Qāsim	50	Shagband
4. Tālibsai and Shahnavāzsai	Khān Muhammad and Mehrāb (joint chiefs of whole tribe)	100	Torsh Āb and Gasu
5. Mīrwaisai	Rostam	50	Sayār

XIX Gīrgēch (chief of whole tribe: Mir Muhammad Gīrgēch of the Gabrzai sub-tribe

1. Hasansai	Abdul Qādir	200	Nar - Mīr (claimed by Shahbakhsh)
2. Qamarsai	Asā	400	Manzil Āb
3. Gabrzai Gīrgēch	Muhammad Rahīm	250	Tāhidān - environs

XX Nārui (chief of whole tribe = Malek Shāh)

1. Āqā ai Nārui	Wakal Khān	50	Gelek - Hesāru
2. Hājīsai Nārui	Sohrāb Khān	200	Nusratābād - Gelek
3. Sosaki Nārui	Āqā Khān	200	Hesāru - Gelek
4. Murpishī Nārui	Mīr Nūr-ed-dīn	150	Hul - Gertut
5. Mīrusai Nārui	Shāhdād	100	Gelek - Gerāsha

XXI Pērūnsai

1. Jamshīdsai	Muhammad Karīm	150	Kaurān
2. Kahni Mullāī	Khnagī	50	Kahné Mullā
3. Meskānsai	Mehrāb	100	Kaurān
4.	Nawāb Nārakshāi (chief of Nārakshāi tribe)	10	Kaurān

XXII Nushīrvānī (Kuhak, Esfandak and Kallagān)

1. Nushīrvānī	Mohamd Nushīrvānī	500	Kuhak and environs
2. Nushīrvānī	Mahla Nushīrvānī	500	Esfandak and environs
3. Kallagānī	Gol Khān	90	Kallagān
4. Nushīrvānī	Mahla Nushīrvānī	100	Kalladīn and Nāgān

XXIII Zābulī Kurd

1. Kurd	Malek A'sam	80	Zābuli (Nagas)
2. Dahānī	Sardār Tāj Mohammed	500	nomads between Sarbāz and Zābulī
3. Sardār	Khān Mohamed Kurd	100	Area of Zābulī, nomads
4. Lagar	Kadkhodā Nasīr	70	Area of Zābulī, nomads
5. Dihqān	Dihqān Hasan	100	" " " "
6. Sarāvī	Kadkhodā Shukr	150	Kahreqār
7. Hussainai	Jān Muhammad	80	"
8. Mullāsai	Mullā Shīr Muhammad	40	"
9. Dehwarī	Muhammad Karīm	55	Kahni Karīmbakhsh
10. Dahānī	Tāj Muhammad	100	Nomads

XXIV Qasr Qand

1. Bolādai	Shīrdel	100	Qasr Qand and environs
2. "	Mīr Maulādād	100	Bog
3. "	Mīr Yār Muhammad	200	Barbog
4. Ruk Shakī	Nur Muhammed	150	Baghband
5. Muhteshimī	Dorrī	100	Hēt

XXV Nikshahr

1. Shīrānī	Ahmad Shīrānī (chief of whole tribe)	50	Nikshahr
2. Tīsī	Walī Muhammad	800	Tīs and environs
3. Komārakī	Nunak	200	Komārak
4. Hut	Gol Muhammed	150	Kahīr
5. Hut	Mīr Shahbāg	200	Mīr

j.	Baluch	Gheidī	100	Bandīnī
k.	Ballaki	Shahbēk	200	Ballak
l.	Gayjī	Jihend	200	Gaujg
m.	Pashanda	Dellēver Jangīsai	150	Mīkshahr

XVI Bent and environs

a.		Rahrēm son of Alī (chief of whole tribe)	100	Bent
b.	Tutenī	Jalīl	150	Tutēn
b.	Rafsī	Hājj Rafs	300	Bent
c.	Karvānī	Hasan Bēg	300	Karvēn
d.	Dastgirdī	Dīrdād	100	Dastgird
e.	Dahēnī	Alī Muhammed	400	Dahēn
f.	Dahēnī	Ilāhi	100	Bent

XVII Various tribes of the Fanmuch area

a.	Malek Meshēd	Muhammed Umar	200	Fanmuch
b.	Malek	Amrād	100	"
c.	Hut	Muhīa and Hasan Khān	500	Maskutēn
d.	Shīrānī	A'zam	200	Rēnk
e.	Shīrānī	Muhammed Alī	500	Hīdarabēd
f.	Farangesh	Hasan	150	area of Fanmuch
g.	Malēr	Nādir	500	Ramesk
h.	Sarhaddī	Hussein	200	Between Ramesk and Kotīch
i.	Shīrānī	Hājj Bakhtiēr	200	Kotīch
j.	Hut	Karrambēh	300	Chēh Ishāq
k.	Mīr	Alī	100	Refend

(there are also a number of unnamed tribes in this area).

XVIII Various tribes of Irānshahr

a.	Demanī	Cherāgh	200	Gambuseēn
b.	Sarkahvarēnī	Jalīl	80	Sarakhvarēn
c.	Hemmī	Zarrēn and Sotuda	180	Kuhi Hasmand

6.	Zard Kuh	Shahdīr	100	Zard Kuh
5.	Kalkalī	Nasīr	100	Kallink
6.	Nārui	Asīm	100	Gurpasht
7.	Karamsai	Alam Beg	120	Shamsābād
8.	Nārui	Valī Muhammad	100	Seifābād
9.	Dāmanī	Khā	50	Damen

XIX Various tribes of the villages of Sarbīz

1.	Ārāmesh	Bahrām	20	Pirdān
2.	Arbābī	Ghulām Mohammad	30	Kandar
3.	Arbābī	Muhīb	30	Kajder
4.	Asādīd	Gāzikhān	500	Barīz - Kuh Nuk
5.	Askānī	Karīmbakhsh	80	Pashāmak
6.	Askānī	Sharī Muhammad	70	Mīnān
7.	Irandust	Khair Muhammad	70	Mīnān
8.	Mīrakzai	Hussein	40	Kusetāg
9.	Norhānī	Qādirbakhsh	40	Asnā
10.	Bolādai	Seyyed Muhammad	35	Ziaratjān
11.	"	Shahdust	90	Tīrud
12.	"	Qāsim	35	Darkuur
13.	"	Nazār	80	Mog
14.	Jamālzai	Dīn Muhammad	80	Dehpīr
15.	Kusetzai	Abul Khair	70	Bītek
16.	"	Hasan	20	Shāh Kahur
17.	"	Nādir	20	Kandaz
18.	Dorudā	Asā	20	Karahgīn
19.	Dehmurādzai	Mehdī	80	Nashmat
20.	Rend	Ahmad	50	Hīt
21.	Rendī	Musā	20	Gumsulkān
22.	Rendī	"	30	Dezbogān
23.	Reddī	"	30	Jamīdar
24.	Rais	Shirjān	25	Ītk

35.	Ra'is	Ghulām Rasul	20	Bandān
36.	"	Hājj Nur Muhammad	300	Kothkaur and environs
37.	"	Ghāzi Khān	30	Rudbon
38.	Ra'īsī	Ya'qūb	25	Patān
39.	"	Jān Muhammad	25	Bopātān
40.	Sardashtī	Mahmūd	50	Sardasht
41.	Sotuda	Dur Muhammad	30	Hut
42.	Sa'ādati	Asā	25	Bogān
43.	Sagari	Sayyed Muhammad	40	Kān
44.	Shahbāzai	Hāt	35	Sard Āb
45.	Shahdādzai	Nūr Muhammad	50	Gulāh
46.	Shahsavārzai	Yār Muhammad	90	Sarkaur
47.	Shāhrzai	Mārdust	25	Chārsaggān
48.	Malek Ra'is	Abūbkr	35	Dez
49.	Malek Ra'is	Mullā Abdul Rahmān	60	Murtak
50.	Kuh Wandī	Shīr Muhammad	200	between Sarbān & Ārmarān
51.	Jangalī	Rostam	50	Jangal

III Bozorgzāda

1.	Mi'matullāhī	Mehrāb Mi'matullāhī	10	Dāvarpanāh
2.	Dehmārī	Ahmad Khān - Mullā Abbās	1200	Muhammadī and Āspīch
3.	Sheikhzāda	Yār Muhammad	100	Kulu and Dashtak
4.	Mallāzāda	Hājj Jahāngīr	200	Rangīn
5.	Sheikhzāda	Khalaqdād	30	"
6.	Darzāda	Mullā Musa	100	Kalkasarī
7.	Bozorgzāda	Kadkhodā Ya'qub	60	Dāvarpanāh
8.	Sepāhī	Bahrām and Jalāl	100	"
9.	Durzāda	Abdīn	60	"
10.	Gheibzāda	Abdul Majīd	40	"

XXXVI Ni'matullahi of Jalq

1. Nusratī	Ghulām Muhammad Ni'matullāhī (chief of whole Ni'matullāhī tribe)	100	Jālq
2. Darrāsa - Dihqān	Amānullāh	100	Nāhuk
3. Arbāb	Ya'qub Karīm	300	"
4. "	Asad Nusratī	30	"
5. Zargar	Mullā Shīr Muhammad	70	Jālq
6. Kashānī	Ustād Khān Muhammad	50	"
7. Fāzelī Kallagānī	Kashānī Hasan son of 'Abbās	30	"
8. Iajī	Mīrzā Khān	100	Iajī
9. Gurīchī	Gurīch	20	Kashān and Kallagān
10. Pahra'ī	Rasul-bakhsh	100	Pahra (Kallagān)
11. Khīkī	Ayyub Khan	150	Khīk

XXXVII Darrāsai in Ramposht

1. Askānī	Rahīm	200	Askān
2. Baluch	Rahut	300	Sarjangān
3. Darrāsai	Khān Muhammad	200	Geshtagān
4. Sarjangānī	Yār Muhammad	200	Sarjangān
5. Mullāsai	Mullā Malek	50	Ramposht
6. Porkī	Ashraf	500	Porkī
7. Darrāsai	Dust Muhammad (chief of whole tribe)	200	Murtī
8.			

XXXVIII Radīk

1. Rind	Asā Rind	100	Radīk
2. Rind	Dādullāh Kāsai	90	Surāb

XXXIX Various tribes of Rasmān, Narmāshīr and environs

1. Sayyids of Rasmān	Sayyed Ja'far Sajjadī	100	Rasmān & environs
2. Palangī	Khwājeh Misām	200	Narmāshīr
3. Shaikhī	Sahrāb son of Zaman	500	Ābi Rais and Narmashīr

Similar lists are given by Kaiban (1932, Vol.II, p.92ff.), but these appear to be based on Jahanbani and are less detailed and add nothing to our knowledge, except that he remarks (though without adding any evidence) that most of the tribes consist of people who fled from Persia after the Arab conquest (7th century); the original inhabitants of the region were forced to take refuge in the mountains, but after a while returned and mixed with the invaders to form the present tribes. The present tribes of the region therefore consist of various Turkish, Kurdish and Arab tribes and the original (i.e. pre-Baluch) inhabitants and isolated elements of later immigrants sent by various rulers of Persia. The only other list to be published (Rasmārā, 1941: 42-6) adds nothing to the sum of published information.

These lists are obviously inconsistent and confused but they represent well the sort of information the Baluch generally offer an enquirer. There is much in them which is certainly erroneous (as it stands), or, at best, misleading. I make no attempt to correct them. I merely comment on certain items, for my overall aim is to show the complexity of the concept "zāt" as it functions in the society at present and justify my own interpretation of it by pointing out how previous attempts to give an account of it have been mistaken or misled. In fact, these lists do give a fairly representative cross-section of zāt-names for the purposes of our classification and analysis.

Jahānbānī has obviously had considerable difficulty in deciding how to classify his list. In the first book he does not properly distinguish between the name of a tribe and the name of the place or area it inhabits. He divides the Province into four parts which approximate to the ecological divisions I have made myself except that my Makrān ranges and the Coastal Plain together form one of his regions. In his second book he keeps "tribe" and "main place of residence" separate in his column headings, and no longer claims to give us the name of the chief of each, but simply gives us the names of influential men with one "chief" for the whole of each section. In several of the lists, however, he leaves the "tribe" column blank, so that in effect lists like BI and BIV amount to something very different from what he appears to intend: each list concerns an area and for each area we are given a list of influential men with the name of the village in which each resides and the numbers of families connected with them (we are not told how they are connected).

The following points of interest arise:

1. Throughout, the number of families shown for each of Jahānbānī's "tribes" are only feasible if they are taken to represent the number of families owning allegiance in the particular context. In no other way could for instance 5,600 families be attributed to the Rīgī.

2. In A.I. Nos 1-7 are true zāt names, 8 and 10 are adjectives formed from place names (by the addition of the suffix -ī), and 11 is a simple place named

3. In A.II. Mīr Ghulām Rasuli is not Bārānsai by origin. He is Pusurgsāda but he was closely related to the Bārakzai (or Bārānsai of. Figs VII & VIII) and owned allegiance to Dust Muhammad Khān Bārakzai. However, the people of Qosht - who are presumably meant by the "300 families" - belong to completely different zāt, but owned allegiance at that time to Mīr Ghulām Rasul Khān

4. In A.II, 2-13, 15-19 and 22 are place names in the region of Seravān Nos.14, and 20-21 are zāt names. No.1 is also a zāt name - in fact, the name of the dynastic family to whom all the rest owned allegiance. The confusion does not end here. The 3000 families attributed to Alī Muhammad Khān (father of Dust Muhammad Khān Bārakzai) probably in fact include most of the other figures given for the other 22 "chiefs". They certainly include some of them. For instance: Shīr Muhammad (21) together with the 150 families attributed to him all owned allegiance to Mīr Alam Khān in Zīb, who with his 3000 families all owned allegiance to Alī Muhammad Khān and Dust Muhammad Khān Bārakzai. Again, Mushīrvān in II, 2 is the same man as the Mushīrvān in II, 7 and II, 12 and II,19; Muhammad Khān Khān (8) is the same man as Muhammad Shāh Khān (11), and here it is almost certain that the two thousand families mentioned in each case are actually the same families.

5. Many of the "chiefs" mentioned in A.II are in fact chiefs according to the terminology adopted in this essay, but many (e.g. nos 20-22) are not. Among the chiefs four dynastic families are represented, who are it is true all interconnected by kin, affinal, and allegiance relationships, but do not share the same zāt. The people who own allegiance to these families include a large number of separate and different zāt, and are almost exclusively related to the dynastic families by nothing except allegiance relationship.

Throughout the lists many names are given without an accompanying ṣāt
me, while in some cases the word "baluch" (signifying simply "Baluch") is
given in place of a ṣāt-name. In some cases new modern "surnames" are given
in place of ṣāt names.

In B II. for example, Alam Asadi is more generally known as Mīr Alam Khān
the Baluch. His ṣāt is Bērakzai - he has taken Asadi as a surname - and
is technically the leading member of the Bērakzai dynastic family (cf.
Chapter 4). Of the remainder of this list, 2,3,5,6,and 7 are shahrī ṣāt, 4
are ghulams, while 8 is another branch of the Bērakzai family which
holds Ērefshān. As a unit then list B II is not homogeneous. It is true
that all technically owe allegiance to Alam Asadī but do so (and did) many
more - for instance, lists B XVII, XVI, XXIII, and many but not all of I and
III,etc. Therefore, most of these lists may be considered as having some
sort of unity from the point of view of common allegiance and geographical area
of residence. Moreover, those which do not in fact share this unity do not
contain any figure which could be called "chief" according to the terminology used
in this essay, and are relatively loosely connected to any larger allegiance unit.

It is difficult to see on what criteria (for instance) list B VII forms
a separate list, for none of the items included in it is interrelated by
either allegiance or kin ties. Furthermore, Hussein Bor Bīgī is given what
is in origin two independent ṣāt names (i.e. Bor and Bīgī). It is also
worth mentioning that Nīmukān is a place name (cf. Map IV) near Nāhuk and Jālq
is Sarāwān; Rais is an Arabic word used in Persian to mean "chiefs"; and
lashkī means (in Persian) "military", "soldiers" and is the name of the ṣāt
which is traditionally closely connected with the Borsargazāda and the Mīr
Mākhai dynastic families.

In lists B VIII, IX, X, XI Sardārzai is the ṣāt which has provided the
dynastic family to which all the population of the area owe allegiance (cf.
Chapter 4). In the second column of these lists, the second name of each
entry is in some cases a "supra-ṣāt" name - e.g. Jadgāl, Baluch (item 8 in list

VIII is in fact simply a "religious" prefix plus personal name, cf.Part Five).

10. In list B XIV we might classify "Gamshēdzai" as the sāt name and the names in the first column of the list as sub-sāt names. Khalīl Khān is technically the senior man of the sāt, but is settled, while most of the sāt are nomadic, and in fact he has little influence in the leadership of the sāt as a whole - a situation which is mainly due to two factors: a) his lack of personal aptitude for the role; and b) the fact that several of his close agnates, who are also descended from chiefs of the sāt, do show the required personal aptitude (cf.fig.IV).

11. In list B XXI Navēb Khān (4) is the leading member of another (junior) branch of the Pārakzai dynastic family resident in Kaurān. The first three names are Baluch and Shehrī sāt in the area who own allegiance to him.

12. In lists B IV and XVIV, Bolēdai is a sāt-name of the dynastic family which provides the chief in item 1 of each list in Pēsh and Nasr Band respectively (cf.fig.VIII).

I think these points are sufficient for our purposes. The reason for putting such misleading information is this:

a) Any superficial enquiry into Baluch "tribal organisation" is I think bound to produce similar results. And the reason for this is that the Baluch (obviously) do not (at any rate now) see the sāt on its own as anywhere near such an important primary factor in their political grouping as might normally be expected in what is after all a tribal society.

b) I do not any ay consider it feasible or useful to give a complete detailed list of the sāt of the Persian Province of Baluchistan which would be definitive and correct.

Appendix II

"Charisma" appears to have been used first as a sociological them by Weber (cf. Weber, 1964: 159-60). Weber introduced the term from the vocabulary of early Christianity to denote "eine als ausseralltäglich (ursprünglich, zumahl bei Propheten wie bei therapeutischen wie bei Rechts-Weisen wie bei Jagdführern wie bei Kriegs-helden: als magisch bedingt) geltende Qualität einer Persönlichkeit, um derentwillen sie als mit übernatürlichen oder übermenschlichen oder mindestens spezifisch ausseralltäglichen, nicht jedem andern zugänglichen Kräften oder Eigenschaften begabt oder als gottgesandt oder als vorbildlich und deshalb als "Führer" gewertet wird. Wie die betreffende Qualität von irgendeinem irgendeinem ethischen, ästhetischen oder sonstigen Standpunkt aus "objektiv" richtig zu bewerten sein würde, ist natürlich dabei begrifflich völlig gleichgültig: darauf allein, wie sie tatsächlich von den charismatisch Beherrschten, den "Anhängern", bewertet wird, kommt es an" (ibid. p. 179)

Weber divides legitimate authority into three pure types, based respectively on rational, traditional and charismatic grounds. The charismatic type rests "auf der ausseralltäglichen Hingabe an die Heiligkeit oder die Heldenkraft oder die Vorbildlichkeit einer Person und der durch sie offenbarten oder geschaffenen Ordnungen ruhen (charismatische Herrschaft).

Im Fall der satzungsmässigen Herrschaft wird der legal gesetzten sachlichen unpersönlichen Ordnung und dem durch sie bestimmten Vorgesetzten kraft formaler Legalität seiner Anordnungen und in deren Umkreis gehorcht. Im Fall der traditionalen Herrschaft wird der Person des durch Tradition berufenen und an die Tradition (in deren Bereich) gebundenen Herrn kraft Pietät im Umkreis des Gewohnten gehorcht. Im Fall der charismatischen Herrschaft wird dem charismatisch qualifizierten Führer als solchem kraft persönlichen Vertrauens in Offenbarung, Heldentum oder Vorbildlichkeit im Umkreis der Geltung des Glaubens an dieses sein Charisma gehorcht" (ibid. p. 159).

"Der Herrschaftsverband Gemeinde: ist eine emotionale Vergemeinschaftung. dem "Propheten" entsprechen die "Junker", dem "Kriegsfürsten" die "Gefolgschaft", dem "Führer" überhaupt: "Vertrauensmänner". Es gibt keine "Anstellung" oder " "Absetzung", keine "Laufbahn" und kein "Aufrücken"... Es gibt keine "Hierarchie"... keine "Amtsregel" und Kompetenzen..." etc. (ibid. p. 180).

I have made this selection from Weber's definition of his use of the term because Weber's use differs slightly from that to which I propose to put it. The above selection shows the similarity between his usage and mine, and I think there is sufficient similarity to justify my adaptation of his term. In his use of the term Weber was thinking primarily of prophets like Muhammad or Joseph Smith on the one hand, and the old Germanic kings or the Chinese monarch on the other. For instance he explicitly says (ibid. p. 179) "Über die Geltung des Charisma entscheidet die durch Bewährung - ursprünglich stets: durch Wunder - gesicherte freie, aus Hingabe an Offenbarung, Heldenverehrung, Vertrauen zum Führer geborene, Anerkennung durch die Beherrschten. Aber diese ist (bei genuinem Charisma) nicht der Legitimitätsgrund, sondern sie ist Pflicht der kraft Berufung und Bewährung zur Anerkennung dieser Qualität Aufgerufenen. Diese "Anerkennung" ist psychologisch eine aus Begeisterung oder Not und Hoffnung geborene glaubige, ganz persönliche Hingabe".

"Die charismatische Herrschaft ist, als das Ausseralltägliche, sowohl der rationalen, insbesondere der bureaukratischen, als der traditionalen, insbesondere der patriarchalen und patrimonialen oder ständischen, schroff entgegengesetzt. Beide sind spezifische Alltags-Formen der Herrschaft, - die (genuine) charismatische ist spezifisch das Gegenteil. Die bureaukratische Herrschaft ist spezifisch rational im Sinn der Bindung an diskursiv analysierbare Regeln, die charismatische spezifisch irrational im Sinn der Regelfremdheit. Die traditionale Herrschaft ist gebunden an die Präzedenzien der Vergangenheit und insoweit ebenfalls regelhaft

Orientiert, die charismatische stürzt (innerhalb ihres Bereiches) die Vergangenheit um und ist in diesem Sinn spezifisch revolutionär. Sie kennt keine Appropriation der Herrengewalt nach Art eines Güterbesitzes, weder an den Herrn noch an ständische Gewalten. Sondern legitim ist sie nur soweit und solange, als das persönliche Charisma kraft Bewährung "gilt", das heisst: Anerkennung findet, und "brauchbar" ist der Vertrauensmann, Jünger, Gefolge nur auf die Dauer seiner charismatischen Bewährtheit.

Das Gesagte dürfte kaum eine Erläuterung benötigen. Es gilt für rein "plebiszitären" charismatischen Herrscher (Napoleons "Herrschaft des Genies", welche Plebejer zu Königen und Generalen machte) ganz ebenso wie für den Propheten oder Kriegshelden" (ibid. pp. 180-1)

I do not think it necessary to enter here into a discussion as to whether Weber is entirely consistent in his definition of his own term. I consider that his classification is (at the least) a useful introduction to any discussion of authority, and that therefore his terminology, however much it may have been abused (cf. chapter seven on the term "feudal") is also worth serious consideration.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following bibliography is in two sections: first, details of sources referred to in the text are given according to the part in which the first reference occurs; secondly, a bibliography is given of all the published sources which the writer considers to be in anyway relevant to the study of the Persian Province of Baluchistan - with the following exceptions:

1) Sources relevant to the language only. A full bibliography of sources relevant to the study of Baluchi may be found in my "Notes on the Baluchi spoken in Persian Baluchistan" to be published in Irān, Journal of the British Institute of Persian Studies, V (1967).

ii) Official gazetteers and censuses of the Indian, Pakistani and British Indian governments. Details of these, and of most other sources relevant to the Baluch in general - which the writer considers irrelevant to the present study, may be found in the bibliographies of the works listed.

iii) Mediaeval Persian and Arabic sources. Insofar as these are in any way relevant to the present study, the information contained in them is included in reliable secondary sources which have been included.

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

MAP I

BALUCHISTAN : Roads and Place-Names

Scale : 0 ——— 150 kms.



MAP II

BALUCHISTAN : Location — — — — **Modern Nationalist Claims**

NOTE TO MAP III

As a generalisation it is true to say that, on the Plateau, the 1,000 and 1,500 m.contours tend to coincide with the limits of the desert and mountainous areas respectively. As a general rule the major settlements on the Plateau - both historical and present - are contained within the belt of country between these two contours. The exceptions to this general rule are in fact only barely exceptions, and are very close to the intermediate belt. In order to throw this situation into relief on this map, where these contours are relevant to the Plateau, the upper one has been bordered with shading, and the lower with stippling.


THE IRANIAN PLATEAU
MAP III
Scale : 0 200 kms.
1000 m. contour
1500 m. contour
N
Tabrīz
ALBURZ
KHURĀSĀN
Bastām
Shāhrud
Dāmghān
Sabzavar
Meshed
Tus
Nīshāpur
Tehrān
Semnān
Kāshmar/Torshīz
HINDU KUSH
Herāt
Qom
Kāshān
GONĀBĀD
Ferdaus/Tun
Qā'en
Tabas
QĀ'ENĀT
Birjand
ZAGROS
Yazd
Qandahār
SĪSTĀN
Kermān
FARS
BĀSHKARDIA
BIĀBĀN



MAP IV

BALUCHISTAN : Mountains, Rivers and Ecological Regions



MAP V

BALUCHISTAN : Modern Administrative Divisions


JANNI SAR
TALANG
KUCHA
DIRMĀN
KĀJU
PIRSOHRĀB
PATĪLĪ
ZAHRĀB
TORKĀNĪ
BONU
NALĒT
BĀHU KALĀT
SANEJI
MAZAN KAHOR
D A S H T I Ā R Ī
ARABZAI
MĪRI BĀZĀR
DAJ
DALGĀN
NUSHĪRHĀNI KALĀT
SANGĀN
SĪSĀD
RĪMDĀN
WASHNĀM
MAP VI
DASHTIĀRĪ : Sketch of Drainage and Political Centres
Scale : 0 8 kms.
N