

SCANNED BY

**OXFORD UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES**
**IMAGING SERVICE**

FROM THE COLLECTIONS IN

# THE BODLEIAN LIBRARY
# UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD






Images © Bodleian Library, University of Oxford

# RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN PERSIAN BALUCHISTAN

## a study in the confusion of temporal and spiritual authority

by
B. J. Spooner

A thesis submitted for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the
University of Oxford

St. Antony's College
Oxford

BODLEIAN LIBRARY OXFORD
DEPOSITED
Thesis
11. 4. 67

Hilary Term
1967

Religious and Political Leadership in Persian Baluchistan:
A Study in the confusion of temporal and spiritual authority.


ABSTRACT

1. The aim of the thesis is threefold:

i) to present a fully dynamic analysis of leadership among the Baluch in the Persian Province of Baluchistan,

ii) to illustrate the sociological distinction (or lack of it) between sacré and profane on different planes in the society.

iii) to make some advance in the theoretical treatment of personality as a sociological factor in leadership.

2. The Baluch in general form a linguistic and sub-cultural unit within the broader cultural context of Eastern or Iranian Islam. The Persian Province of Baluchistan, which is roughly coterminous with the area of Persia where the Baluch form the majority of the population, is an isolated area which presents great extremes of altitude, climate and fertility. Natural conditions break the society down into small communities (whether settled or nomadic), and force it into dependence on a combination of agriculture and pastoralism in varying proportions. In almost every aspect of the material culture utter simplicity and dependence on the environment is evident. However, complex patterns of movement and other sociological factors keep all communities and classes constantly in touch with each other, and counteract the fragmenting effect of the environment.

Baluch society within the Province consists of

i) Baluch - who are predominantly nomadic,

ii) shahrI - who are generally peasants,

iii) ghulams - who until recently were slaves, and

iv) a superstructure of dynastic families, for which however there is no native term.

From the point of view of leadership, there are also four role-statuses:

i) kamāsh - who may be secular or religious,

ii) maulawī - who is religious,

iii) darwīsh - who is also religious, and

iv) "chief" - who is secular, and for which there is no really equivalent native term.

Political aspirations invariably function through one or other of these role-statuses, which however cannot be said to form a structure. A chief must be a member of a dynastic family, and is a leader by definition. Holders of the other three role-statuses are only potentially leaders: they may or may not lead in fact. The chief is generally but not necessarily more powerful than holders of the other role-statuses.

Every man inherits a tribal name agnatically, and the word for tribe (zāt) is best translated as "birth status". However, the zāt of a man's mother is also an important factor in determining his status. He may only improve his status within limits by his own achievements. There are also institutionalised forms of behaviour for particular occasions and situations, and there is a "formal" religion - Islam.

Beyond these factors there is no institutionalisation in the society, and so there is practically no specifically political institutionalisation at all. Furthermore, the terms for the three role-statuses which are named in the society are all of alien origin.

3. This situation makes it impossible to understand and analyse realistically the present framework of political conceptions in the society without taking cognizance both of the history of these conceptions and of comparative material from neighbouring societies, for all of these conceptions have at least archaistic aspects, and in some respects contact with the semantic origin of the term still conditions its use within the society.

In general, a zāt represents a group of immigrants into the Province.

The people who brought the name "Baluch" and the Baluchi language into the Province appear to have arrived there in the 11th century. There is evidence that agriculture flourished in the Province before the Baluch came, but we know nothing of any pastoral life there before them. The names of the main agricultural settlements were the same before the Baluch came as they are now. There are no other pre-Baluch names in the Province.

On the basis of the historical and comparative data available a theoretical model is constructed to demonstrate the synchronic and diachronic contexts of the present situation. This model is particularly relevant to the study of

i) relationships between settled and nomadic and the mixture of various ethnic, cultural, and linguistic groups,

ii) the ways in which social stratification may result from such mixtures,

iii) how certain political relationships - particularly the feudal relationship - may develop in these circumstances, and

iv) how the constellation and importance of kin and affinal relationships may be affected.

4. The kinship terminology is simple and cognatic. There are strong ties between brother and sister, and between cousins. Brothers and sisters generally inherit equal shares of land, except that the eldest son may be given an extra share. Livestock is generally inherited by sons only. Landownership is only of secondary importance to leadership. Marriage preference (for first or only wives) is for "cousins", and the bride-price is high and not affected by the choice of a father's brother's daughter. Some communities and classes are generally monogamous, others generally polygynous, and it is possible to discern a difference in the function and conception of marriage in the two cases. Matri- and patri-locality is better interpreted in terms of the fact that solidary political groupings (formed by marriage or allegiance)

are generally more important sociologically than geographical and ecological groupings. Among the nomadic Baluch a corollary of the orientation towards kinship, tribal affiliation, etc., is the instability of the individual camp. Marriage and inheritance practices reinforce "class" identity - particularly in the dynastic families where this identity is most important. Similarly, because of these practices, members of dynastic families acquire ownership interests in widely scattered pieces of land, and are therefore encouraged to move about continually.

5. The dynastic families form a superstructure. The chief is generally the paramount leader in a certain area, and has a certain vaguely defined "people". There are communities and areas without chiefs. Holders of the other role-statuses may also function as paramount leaders. Any leader automatically qualifies for one or other of the traditional role-statuses. This essay is concerned primarily with the chief who is seen (by the Baluch) as the most typical form of paramount leader but for whom nevertheless there is no native term. The main functions of the leader are to provide social control and initiative, but he also personifies the prestige of the community.

A chief (or other leader) rules generally through kamash, who form the basic political denominators of the society. Neither is directly chosen or elected by the other. The extent of a leader's power depends basically on two factors:

i) his "ecological" situation; i.e. parentage, alliance, etc.

ii) his "personality",

of which the first is little use without the latter, but the latter is to a large extent confined by the former. A certain quality attaches to this personality of the leader - particularly in the case of the chief - which has affinities with Weber's "charisma".

In the Baluch Period (before 1928), where possible a chief operated

from a fort in an agricultural centre, and generally either owed (informal) allegiance to a senior chief, or was owed allegiance by another chief or chiefs. He was traditionally entitled to a tithe on the produce of the land he controlled (apart from his major share of the produce from the land he owned), and service from the pastoralists. In addition to this in many cases he also collected a tax (in origin usurped from the Persian Government) from all sections of the population. Despite definite class distinctions, in some cases linked with differences in occupation and conventional behaviour, there is little real differentiation in standard of living between the leader and the led, and no privacy for the chief.

6. The overwhelming majority of all Baluch are Sunni muslims of the Hanafi rite, and the words Islam and religion are synonyms in Baluchi. Although the chief provides the major force for social control in the society, Islamic law (interpreted by the maulawī) provides an alien standard and constitutes a court of appeal. In present circumstances, now that the chiefs in general no longer have physical force at their disposal, the religious role-statuses play a greater part in social control and leadership. The basis of the legitimacy of this "formal religion" is alien, inasmuch as its representatives have to study outside the Province. Given "personality" this legitimacy may be sufficient to allow the maulawī to rival a chief as a leader. But even so, and despite the charisma of Islam, without physical force he would not be able to impose settlements any more than a chief. The personal element is as much a part of religious as of secular leadership.

Not all the religious concepts and practices in the Province are accepted by the formal religion. We therefore use the term "informal religion" to cover unrationalised religious attitudes and practices which though they may not be denied by the formal religion do not form a conscious part of it, and we treat the role-status of darvīsh as the personification of the informal religion in the society. The position

of the darvīsh may or may not be tribal, that of the maulawī is never tribal. The chief is often called on to fulfil many of the functions of the darvīsh.

7. In practice therefore in Baluch society now a leader may be either secular, formal religious, or informal religious, while the authority of his leadership is based on qualities of personality plus either birth, foreign religious learning, or esoteric religious knowledge respectively. Their power depends on these bases plus a combination of sociological factors such as kin, affinal and allegiance ties. Whatever the basis of the leader's legitimacy, or the scope of his power, the authority which he wields includes both temporal and spiritual aspects and these two aspects are not consciously differentiated. We can go no further in the analysis of leadership without analysing the "personality" of the leader.

8. In the context of this argument there is much similarity between the Persian Baluch and (among published ethnography) the southern Iraqi Kurds, the Swat Pathans, the Basseri in south Persia, the Marri Baluch in West Pakistan, the Somali, the Arab Bedouin, the Azande, and the feudal society of Mediaeval Europe, and comparative material from each of these societies is chosen to illustrate further various aspects of this type of leadership situation, and show the general relevance and importance of the Baluch material.

9. A third party judges a chief by the quality and quantity of kasāsh who own allegiance to him. In Baluch thinking men do not create a chief by selecting him as their leader. This is not surprising, for they do not have a word for chief. The chiefs come from certain families (referred to by the family or tribal name in lieu of a general term) which enjoy a higher status than any of the rest of the community. However, none of the role-statuses are in Baluch thinking elective. Four major criteria may be distinguished on which the Baluch choose a

particular chief as their leader. These are on two planes:

a) i ecological situation - in fact, his power,
   ii personality - the sum of his personal qualities,

b) i present - what the above factors amount to now, and
   ii past - what they amounted to in the past, e.g. in the case of his father, etc.

It is doubtful whether any one of these factors may be said to be generally more important than the others.

In general, individual social relationships are amazingly stable, - until they become political relationships, when they tend to be unstable. The Baluch have a certain degree of social, but no specifically political, institutionalisation. This situation leaves a wide field for values of personality, and personality may be regarded as the main factor in political "legitimacy", - though the Baluch themselves do not think in terms of political legitimacy or even of "political stability". Ecological divisions militate against large scale landownership as a stable basis for legitimacy, and together with the traditional isolation of the Province these divisions have meant that it has never been in the interests of the Baluch to have one paramount high-status leader for the purposes of treating with the Persian Administration or other foreign powers. However, the marriage and inheritance practices tend to define and preserve dynasties, even though genealogy as such is never a factor in establishing their legitimacy for the majority of their followers. Nevertheless, the chief always co-ordinates a number of sociological divisions among his followers - only he can have sufficient status and mobility to overcome all the sociological and ecological barriers to political unity.

10. Social differentiation between religious and secular in the society is forced by the acceptance of an alien formal religion. Decrease in the temporal power of the secular role-status of chief has been compensated by an increase in demand for the spiritual functions he can fulfil.

Paramount temporal power generally has its spiritual associations at least, if only because it symbolises the unity of the society. In the Baluch case, lack of institutionalisation and formality in the choice of leaders, together with the lack of conscious differentiation between spiritual and temporal, is linked with the political importance of values of personality in the society. Charisma is the "spiritual" aspect of these values.

The mode of choice defines the society's own conception of its leader, and therefore in this case it is the primary clue to an understanding of what we have felt constrained to call "charisma". "Personality" may be divided into

i) objective factors - which may be determined by analysing the total objective ecological relationship between the leader and his followers, and

ii) subjective factors - which are the values accorded by the followers to certain of the objective factors in the leader's personality.

Charisma is the combination of the subjective factors. It is the "otherness" which the followers accord the leader subjectively.

Therefore, there is an inverse ratio between the degree of political institutionalisation and the importance of personality in leadership. And the need to lend a personality political legitimacy causes the follower to accord it a charismatic otherness subjectively, and this takes the leader's authority beyond the purely temporal sphere.

## NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

Baluchi words which have been quoted in their Baluchi form are transliterated according to the system used in my "Notes on the Baluchi spoken in Persian Baluchistan" (Iran, the Journal of the British Institute of Persian Studies, V, 1967), except that sh is retained. However, Persian and Arabic loan words have mostly been quoted in their original form, so as to be more easily recognisable, and are therefore transliterated according to the traditional canons, and prefixed "P" or "A" (at the first occurrance) to indicate the provenance (not the etymological origin) of the form quoted. Nevertheless, some inconsistencies remain in the case of proper names particularly where these of hybrid or doubtful origin. Four other points should be noted:

i) in the tribal name ending "-zai" the long sign is omitted over the "i"; and similarly with Nārui and Brāhui. The long signs are also omitted from Balūch and Balūchī. In all other cases a final long -ī is marked to avoid confusion with the Baluchi genitive ending - which is a short i.

ii) the Persian idāfat is hyphenated to avoid confusion with the Baluchi genitive.

iii) 'ein is omitted in the initial position.

iv) the short back rounded vowel is represented by o in Persian and Baluchi forms, but u is retained for the same sound in Arabic forms. Since u is nowhere given a long sign this has led to an anomaly in the transliteration of the term hukumat.

CONTENTS


| | |
|---|---|
| **Abstract** | i |
| **Note on Transliteration** | ix |
| **Introduction** | 1 |
| PART ONE - Geography, Ecology and Material Culture | |
| Chapter 1 - The Environment | 4 |
| Chapter 2 - The Baluch in their Environment | 32 |
| PART TWO - Historical | |
| Chapter 3 - Literary Sources and External Evidence | 64 |
| Chapter 4 - Tribal History | 86 |
| PART THREE - Context | 105 |
| Chapter 5 | 107 |
| Chapter 6 - Assimilation | 138 |
| Chapter 7 - The Feudal Relationship | 146 |
| Chapter 8 - The Feudal Relationship and Kinship | 161 |
| PART FOUR - Political | 170 |
| Chapter 9 - The Tribe | 171 |
| Chapter 10 - Kinship, Marriage and Inheritance | 226 |
| Chapter 11 - Aspects of Age, Class and Sex | 248 |
| Chapter 12 - Institutions and Conventional Behaviour | 260 |
| Chapter 13 - The Chief | 266 |
| Chapter 14 - The Chief and the Ecology of Relationships and Roles within the Society | 276 |
| PART FIVE - Religion | 294 |
| Chapter 15 - The Formal Religion | 295 |
| Chapter 16 - Informal Religion | 308 |
| Chapter 17 - Religion and Leadership | 326 |

PART SIX - Leadership 529

Chapter 18 - The Various Types of Leadership 530

Chapter 19 - Selected Leadership Examples 564

Chapter 20 - Power and Authority 424

Chapter 21 - Personality 452

Conclusion 469

Appendix I 471

Appendix II 494

Bibliography 497

Maps at end

I - Baluchistan: Roads and Place Names

II - Baluchistan: Location and Modern Nationalist Claims

III - The Iranian Plateau

IV - Baluchistan: Mountains and Rivers, and Ecological Zones

V - Baluchistan: Modern Administrative Divisions

VI - Dashtiārī: Sketch of Drainage and Political Centres

# RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL UNREST IN PERSIAN BALUCHISTAN

A study in the confusion of temporal and spiritual authority

## INTRODUCTION

The material presented in this essay concerns the ecology, religion and politics of the people who call themselves Baluch, and live within the Persian provinces of Baluchistan and Sistan (ostān-i Baluchistān va Sīstān), excluding the area of the shahristān of Zābol or Sīstān. My aim is to describe and analyse:

a) the various types of leadership which occur in what the Baluch consider to be traditional Baluch society;

b) the roles of a number of "leaders"; and

c) finally, the resulting concepts of authority and leadership.

One of the main reasons why this particular area was chosen for research is that it has so far been comparatively little affected by either westernisation or the centralisation of the modern state. As a province it is the most isolated left in Persia today, and parts of it still preserve an internal political structure which can be understood without reference to non-Baluch factors. Apart from the intrinsic interest of such a situation within the context of eastern (i.e. non-Arab) Islam, it is suspected that such an analysis of Baluch structure and values will prove relevant to an understanding of the pre-modern (i.e. in some parts as late as pre-1955) social history of large areas of Islam outside the cities, and especially of the area enclosed by the Zagros, the Alburs and the Hindukush. Finally, we hope this material may provide a medium for a contribution towards social anthropological theory concerning leadership.

I first visited the province in February 1962, when I simply drove straight through from the north to the coast, and along the coast from the Pakistani border to Bandar Abbās (see Map I) - no more than three weeks in all. In the following year (1963) I was able to spend longer - some three months, from April to June, in the area between Saravān, Sarbās, and Irānshahr (cf. Map V). In 1964 I spent four months - April to July - between the Kuh Sefīd, Kalāh Kuh and Sarbās areas (cf. Map IV), and made short visits in August and October to Zāhidān (for discussions with

educated Baluch) and to the north-west of the Province respectively. Finally, in 1965 I spent four months - February to May - mostly in the extreme south-east of the Province, but with short visits to Afghan and Pakistani Baluchistan and Karachi for comparative purposes and discussion with educated Baluch and "leaders". A further short visit to the main centres was made in March 1966. Apart from these periods in Baluchistan, I have since July 1961 been resident in Iran and in constant contact with Baluch in Tehran and eastern Persia.

My material can, therefore, be divided into three main types:

1. Information collected first-hand in the province by observation and discussion in Persian and Baluchi;

2. Information gathered from educated and émigré Baluch in Zahidan, Tehran and elsewhere;

3. Information from literary sources (see bibliography). The literature is vast, but generally disappointing. It can be broken down into three main types:

a) The writings of civil and military servants of the British Indian and Pakistani administrations (both official and unofficial), which with a few exemplary exceptions are patently lacking in objectivity and observation, but coloured by a certain romantic admiration for tribes;

b) Persian (and Arabic) sources, which range from the early Muslim geographers and travellers to recent newspaper articles and publications by Persian army officers who have been employed in the Province under the Pahlavi (1925- ) administration. Their accounts are invariably coloured by the natural fear and disgust which the town-dweller has of the marauding tribesman. In the few cases where the writers have made a sincere attempt to acquire reliable and comprehensive information, they have mostly been handicapped by the quality of their informants;

c) Books and articles published by the Baluch themselves in Pakistan in English and Baluchi. These in their turn are distorted by either idealising Baluch nationalism - which in its most extreme form is an underground and émigré movement for an independent Baluchistan, or by the official Pakistani government policy which seeks to build an integrated Pakistani nation at the expense of minority traditions and ways of life.

The greater part of each of these three types of source deal either exclusively or primarily with British or Pakistani Baluchistan.

From this brief survey of the literature it will be obvious that, with very few exceptions (indicated in the text), for the purposes of this essay literary sources are generally only useful where they corroborate first-hand information, and, insofar as they are historical, give depth to an interpretation based on first-hand information.

I did not set out to study the role of leadership and the concept of authority among the Baluch either at the beginning in 1962, or even during my more prolonged stay with them in 1963. Rather, as my acquaintance and intimacy with them grew, the material I gradually acquired seemed to demand an analysis of this aspect of their society and direct my efforts towards it. It is this circumstance that lies behind the plan of the thesis: I start with a general description of the geography, ecology and material culture to show the conditioning power of an unusual and fragmenting environment, the extreme simplicity of the life and culture, and so the high degree of dependence of each community on its environment. I continue - in parts 2 and 3 - to show, so far as is possible, how the same environment and its population have interacted in the past, and the relationship the Province has had with neighbouring peoples. So far is the basis. Part 4 is a descriptive analysis of the social roles and structure which are relevant to the (non-religious) leadership of the community. Part 5 deals with religion and the leadership-potential of roles which the community accepts in the name of religion. Finally, part 6 attempts to show how leadership functions in a Baluch community, and the confusion between its temporal and spiritual aspects - in spite of the clear distinction between the respective ways of arriving at positions of secular and religious authority. This is done through discussion of individual cases and situations, and aims at an understanding of the Baluch conception of authority.

# PART ONE

## General Geography and Ecology, and Material Culture

## Chapter I

### I

A fairly recent publication by a Pakistani Baluch (Baluch, 1958) on the history of his people claims that Baluchistan is properly a vast triangular stretch of country, based on the northern coast of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean from Bandar Abbās in the west to Karachi in the east, with its apex as far north as Merv (Mary) in Soviet Turkmenistan (Map II). It is true that there are Baluch minorities to be found all over this area, (cf. esp. Ivanow, 1926 and MacGregor 1879) but the Baluch form the majority of the population, within approximate limits, only in the Persian province of Baluchistan and Sistan, in most of Western Pakistan west of the Indus, and in the deserts and narrow cultivated strips which border the Helmand river in south-western Afghanistan. This essay concerns only the Persian Province of Baluchistan and Sistan excluding the area of the shahrestān of Ṭābol or Sistan (referred to throughout as "the Persian Province" or simply "the Province".)

The Persian Province of Baluchistan is isolated from the rest of Persia and from the neighbouring regions of Afghanistan by broad tracts of desert (Map III). The southern part of the Province borders the similar but sociologically distinct region of Mashkardia[1] on the west. On the east the border with Pakistani Baluchistan is realistic only in so far as it reflects a vague division between traditional spheres of political influence: as a whole it has no natural ethnic, topographical or economic validity. The terrain is similar on both sides of the border; a number of tribes which exist on both sides of the border disregard it; and for the Persian Baluch in general it is simply a nuisance. The Mogul and British Empires in India have always exerted a stronger economic and cultural pull than Tehcran on the Persian Baluch, who still move backwards and forwards to Karachi in large numbers.

There are non-Baluch minorities in the Persian Province: of Sikhs from India, and Mīrjandīs, Marvārīs, Yazdīs and Bahā'īs from Persia.

These are very small, and economic as well as ethnic and cultural, minorities. The Sikhs are a relatively prosperous community of merchants in Zāhidān, which is the modern capital of the province, and is linked to Pakistan by rail. The Hindus are mostly connected with the civil service, but some also have minor property interests. They are mostly to be found in Khāsh (Khash)[2], Īrānshahr (Fahraj, Fahra), and Sarāvān, and their presence is to some extent due to the policies of previous khāns of the Ōmānī (cf. Lambton, 1953: 266). The Kermānis and Yazdīs are civil servants, small landowners and merchants mainly in Khāsh and Īrānshahr, and the Bahā'īs are usually small shopkeepers in isolated bakhsh[3] such as Kurān and Zāhedī (Nagma).

The remainder of the native population of the Province call themselves Baluch, which is to say that they have a common language and culture, distinct from their neighbours. The overwhelming majority speak Balochī - an Iranian language not mutually comprehensible with Persian - as their mother tongue. Some are peasants, some are nomads, some divide their time between fields and flocks. They are divided into groups of varying size by the criteria of tāyf (literally "tir-th") and allegiance, area of residence and occupation. (The word "tribe" will be used in this essay simply as a convenient English translation for Balochī tāyf, meaning a number of people acknowledging real or supposed links of agnatic kinship. The exact use and significance of the concept will be discussed in Part Four). While they now think of themselves as an ethnic unit, they are definitely not so in origin, and some of the tribes actually claim a very feasible and recent alien origin. The simplest definition is that a man is a Baluch if he calls himself a Baluch, for only the Baluch are proud of being Baluch, and they have an unwritten but universally recognised code of honour, which in so far as the modern state allows they still maintain (cf. Part Four, Chapter 12). The name Baluch is of unknown origin, but would seem to mean simply "pastoralist" (cf. the use of the words "Kurd" and "Arab" and Gershevitch 1959: 220 and his note 15). The Baluch use it with this meaning among themselves (cf. Chapter 2 below), and it is used similarly in Persian in Khurāsān.

## II

The Province may be generally described as semi-desert, providing reasonable grazing over large areas of mountain and plain after rain, with occasional, mainly riverine oases. The north of the Province is on the Iranian plateau. It averages some four thousand feet above sea level and is dominated by the semi-active volcano, Kūh-i Taftān, which rises to a height of over 13,000 ft. The altitude gradually drops down to the coastal plain in the south. The area is 169,704 sq. kil., and the (recorded) population is 275,990, giving an average density of under 2 per sq. kil. (according to figures given in the First Census of Iran, November 1956, vol. I, Table 7). The Province falls conveniently into five ecological divisions (Map IV):

1. The Sarhadd.
2. Sarāwān, or the drainage basin of the Nāhūk river.
3. The Jās Mūrīān depression.
4. The Makrān range.
5. The coastal plain.

1. The Sarhadd (literally "border country") is roughly co-extensive with the area of the shahristān of Khāsh, and is the only one of these five regions which is in fact clearly defined as one distinct region in Baluch nomenclature. There are several factors which tend to distinguish it from the rest of the Province. It is the only part of the Province which forms part of the central Iranian plateau proper, whereas the rest of the Province is strictly speaking off the plateau. Owing to its position a traditional arterial route from Kermān to Sīstān and the east and north east of Iran passes through it, whereas the rest of the Province has always tended to form a cul de sac as far as through communications are concerned. Probably for this reason, it seems to have been the first part of the Province to have been taken over by the Baluch (see Part Two). As an area it is composed mainly of isolated ranges of barren mountains in vast semi-desert plains. To the west and north the region drains away into the central Persian deserts, to the east - into similar

smaller deserts in south west Afghanistan and north west West Pakistan, while in its centre inland drainage forms an occasional saline sump. The whole region is dominated by the 13,[illegible] ft. Kuh-i Taftān, and its foothills. To the south west of it rises the 11,[illegible] ft. dormant cone of Kuh-i Basmān. The plains between these two peaks provide first class pasturage for camels, sheep and goats in good years. There are no rivers or perennial surface water beyond the occasional small spring. There is traditionally only one permanent settlement of importance in the whole region - at Khwāsh, in the plain due south of Kuh-i Taftān, and this settlement is fed by (P.) qanāts (Baluchi - kahn)[4]. Zāhidān, the modern capital, is an entirely artificial modern creation, on the site of an old watering place known as Dozdāp ("thieves' water") and has no relevance to the traditional social structure of the region or the Province. To the south east, in more mountainous country by the Pakistan border, the impressive white granite range of Kuh-i Sefīd (Koh Sapēt) rises to nearly 10,[illegible] ft. These are the main landmarks in the vast expanses of plain and mountain. But there is also another notable topographic feature to break the monotony: here and there (in the Sarhadd and Sarawān), often quite isolated in the middle of a plain, sometimes in a range of hills, a solitary rock of coral limestone (often white) rises one or two hundred feet above the surrounding country. These are known as gazz in Baluchi. They are usually formed of up-ended strata of a much greater age than the surrounding mountains, and are severely eroded into fantastic shapes. They thus form natural landmarks, and since where they rise from the centres of plains they signal irregularities in the surrounding water table, there is often a source of water or even a considerable settlement nearby, so that they easily become known as "the gazz (in effect "the landmark") of such and such a watering-place or settlement".

The Sarhadd forms then a quite individual region within the Province, and this is reflected in the human ecology. Although in the "post-Baluch period" (i.e. since the Province was firmly included within the centralised administrative framework of Persia by Reza Shāh in 1928) a number of small

semi-nomadic settlements have appeared, the region contained no true peasants except in Khwash and a few small villages in the foothills of Kuh-i Taftan. The remainder of the region was divided up between relatively large tribal affiliations centred a) west of Zahidan around Churu (Isa'Ilsai tribe)[5], b) around Kuh-i Taftan (Pilgi), c) east of Khwash (Yarmuhammadsai), and d) in and around Kuh-i Sefid (Ganshadsai)[6]. Within their rather limited areas these tribes were practically true nomads, and the Ganshadsai and at least most of the Isa'Ilsai and Yarmuhammadsai still are to a very large extent. On Baluch standards the region is first class for flocks and camel-rearing - which they consider their true way of life. A certain amount of their grain requirements was cultivated in small scattered non-residential fields, wherever a spring or wadi might be relied on, or perhaps just hoped, to provide sufficient water (see particularly in Dyer, 1921).

It is perhaps because the region is almost without fixed settlement, and perhaps also because it was the first region to be used by the Baluch and so may be ethnically quite discrete, that it is traditionally the least secure region of the Province. During the "Baluch Period" (P. dawrah-i Baluchi = pre-1926) it never owed more than nominal allegiance to any of the powerful chiefs of the Makran[7]. When the Government forces arrived under General A. Jahanbani in 1928 (cf. Jahanbani 1957) they were quite happy to acknowledge allegiance to the Shah. The region has given the authorities more trouble than the rest of the Province since that date, and even now much of it remains uncertain - in particular the Ganshadsai area in and around Kuh-i Sefid is in effect independent of the Administration, and so far as I could ascertain no gendarme patrols have yet penetrated it.

In summary then this region is the least isolated of the Province, but it is relatively the least integrated into the modern administrative system because of its generally more nomadic character. For the same reason the leaders of this region have shown no interest in acquiring

power outside their own people and have in general treated ambitious Baluch leaders from the Makrān and Persian officials and generals similarly i.e. according to expediency, avoiding any type of threatened interference. It may seem at first that they would therefore provide ideal material for a study of traditional authority. However, while the Sarhadd has resisted outside influence, the Makrān in general has been less open to it. And although the Makrān falls easily into four regional divisions for the purposes of this chapter, patterns of allegiance within it have not respected the ecological differences, with the result that an apparently hierarchical structure of political relationships has developed to a degree which, if it were not for their lack of stability and of institutionalised legitimacy, would qualify the Baluch of the Makrān to be described as a nation or even a state. They thus provide more interesting material for the subject of this essay.

2. The region of Saravān is most easily defined as the drainage basin of the Mashkīd river, although the boundaries of the modern administrative area of the shahristān of Saravān are more extensive. There are of course no definite borders, but the region as a whole presents certain characteristic features which I shall now describe. South of Kuh-i Taftān and defined on the west by Kuh-i Birg the terrain drops away from the plateau height of some four thousand feet above sea level to below three thousand feet in the dry river beds. The region forms a pattern of long narrow plains between parallel ranges dropping away towards the south east and the Pakistan border and is a natural corridor into Pakistan. The river crosses the border to turn north and end finally in a seasonal marsh not far from the Persian border. Here the main tributaries join near Mehak the river, flowing due east now, flows through a deeply eroded gravel plain and pene-plain, completely barren except in the bed of the occasional wadi where palmettoes grow in profusion. The Mashkīd and its tributaries carry running water only after rain, though in most years occasional pools last here and there in its bed throughout the year. In parts water will continue to flow long after the initial flood - and this is general throughout the Makrān: surface water becomes more and more frequent towards the south (except for the coastal plain itself).

particularly where the river flows through barren hills and the bed is coarse sand or gravel, except in the very worst years, here and there cool, fresh, clear water appears out of the gravel, as in a spring, flows perhaps a hundred yards down the bed and disappears again.

There are unfortunately no comparative figures for settled and nomad anywhere in the Province, but it is likely that in Sarāwān the settled - a large number of whom are pure peasants - form the majority. Sarāwān itself[8] is now the most important of a group of 19 settlements which are strung down the south west side of a long narrow plain, typical of the region, which is drained by an important tributary of the Mashkīd. A range of mountains separates it from a similar plain to the south west, which contains three similar and important settlements - Nīb (Neb), Sūrān, and Paskuh - which form a bakhsh along another tributary. South-west of that again, and over a range of hills, lies another plain containing the main tributary of the Mashkīd and the bakhsh of Sabalī (Nagas). These three centres are agriculturally among the most important in the Province, and since they rely mainly on qanāts for their water supply, suffer less than other parts of the Province in bad years. They also produce the best quality dates of the Province, allegedly because they are practically on the northern boundary beyond which the winters would be too cold for date palms, and because of the fine (Sūrān) saline soil. In fact, Sūrān is claimed to grow the best dates, while Nasuh, some thirty km. north west of it and slightly cooler, produces only very poor specimens.

In view of the lack of published statistics and information on the Province as a whole it may be useful here to give some figures to show the distribution of population in the Sarāwān plain. From north west to south east, the 19 villages are:

| | Villages | number of families | population | distance from Khastan |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | Gosht (properly gwasht?) | 440 | 2'00 | 72 km. |
| 2. | Ghasabād | 5' | 25' | 2' |
| 3. | Rushak | 15' | 6'' | 4 |
| 4. | Nakhshān | 15' | 6'' | 3 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5. | Shahtun (in Persian spelt "Shahistān") (no figures - pop. = perhaps 3,000) | | | |
| 6. | Sarju | 200 | 800 | 1 |
| 7. | Qal'eh-i Casān | 70 | 350 | 1½ |
| 8. | Dezak (renamed Davarpanāh after general who died there in campaign in 1926) | 200 | 800 | 6 |
| 9. | Forrakān | 40 | 200 | 6½ |
| 10. | Zangiān | 350 | 1,400 | 7 |
| 11. | Kalkasarī | 40 | 120 | 7½ |
| 12. | Mohammadī | 250 | 1000 | 9 |
| 13. | Deh | 40 | 200 | 9½ |
| 14. | Dashtak | 200 | 800 | 10½ |
| 15. | Kulu | 45 | 225 | 11 |
| 16. | Espīeh | 200 | 800 | 10 |
| 17. | Ziārat | 40 | 200 | 13 |
| 18. | Nāgān | 40 | 200 | 17 |
| 19. | Kalpurkān | 40 | 200 | 27 |

These figures are unofficial and were copied from the local office of the Community Development Scheme of the Ministry of Interior. They are substantially higher than those given in the Census (Vol. I, Table 13), and are obviously only approximate, but are certainly more reliable.

The following settlements in the region of Sarāvān are also agricultural and are populated by Baluch peasants: Jālq, Nāhuk, Kallagān (this name includes several riverine villages), Nehak, Nafandak, Kuhnk, Kant, Nēduch, Kahār, Afshān, Sarafshān. The intervening plains, hills, and mountains are roamed by pastoralists, and the mountainous area of Ramposht is ecologically similar to the Makrān range (see below). The importance of settled agriculture in this region is reflected in the relative political unimportance of sāt or tribe in the region, the greater importance of allegiance and the potentially greater power of the dynastic families. It is noteworthy that a considerable proportion of the population of the lower Sarāvān, and Sīb-Surān areas belong to a tribe known as Dehwārī. The Dehwārī claim to be Baluch and are accepted as such, but their speech is closer to Persian and distinct from the surrounding Baluchi. A tribe of the same name is reported in the neighbourhood of Kalāt in Pakistani Baluchistan, which actually claims Persian origin. It is possible therefore that these are responsible for the greater part of the basis of the present agricultural life of the

region, and it is significant that they claim to have entered the Province with the army of Nādir Shāh (1735-47).

3. To the west of Kuh Birg the country drains westwards into a depression some 300 km. long by 150 km. wide. Unlike most depressions in Persia the centre is comparatively free of salinity. It is in fact a seasonal marsh known as Jās Murian approximately 1,[illegible] ft. above sea level, fed from the west by the Halīlrud, and to a somewhat lesser extent from the east by a river which takes its name from the historically best known settlement in the east of the depression: Pasapur. The greater part of the depression is desert and semi-desert and there is a sand sea in the south east corner. Parts of it, however, are quite thickly wooded (mainly tamarisk), and the eastern end contains over a score of rich agricultural villages. The main centres of settlement are Iranshahr (previously Fahraj; Baluchi Fahra) and Pasapur. This agricultural area is the natural centre of the whole Province, and it has always been the most coveted centre of Baluch power within the Province. It is the most important agricultural and largest grain producing area of the Province. As a result of its role as the main headquarters of Baluch political power it has acquired a large population of negroid slaves, imported by the Baluch chiefs to provide their domestic and (later) military retinues, and other tribes of low social status. Since 1926 when the outward forms of political and military power were mostly taken away from the chiefs, who likewise gradually lost the greater part of their revenues, these slaves have become peasants. Consequently, in this region, even more so than in Sarāwān, for political purposes there is more emphasis on dynastic families and allegiance than on sāt.

However, in this region there is an additional complicating factor. The region is open to the west, and it has traditionally formed the main route of access into the Province from Kerman and Persia. It has therefore seen far more Persian influence than the rest of the Province.

this influence has been in the form of sporadic attempts (pre-1920) to subject the Baluch to the Shah's administration - in effect, to collect taxes. For Persia has always traditionally claimed the whole of Baluchistan (i.e. not only the present Persian Province), as an integral part of her territory. These attempts were usually made in the form of winter military, or quasi-military expeditions from the Governor-generalship of Kerman. Muhammad Shāh Qājar (1835-48) was particularly zealous in this connection. During his reign or that of his successor, Nāsiru'd-Dīn (1848-96), important agricultural lands in the area of Īrānshahr and Kanpur were taken over and made P. "khāliseh" (crown land, cf. Lambton, 1953: 255-6)[10]. This khāliseh was treated as the de facto private property of the head of the dynastic family of the Bārakzai tribe at the beginning of this century up until 1928 (= the end of the "Baluch Period" cf. Chapter 3) when it was taken over by the government again and the family lost its power and went into exile. When the head of the family later returned he started campaigning for the return of these lands to his family on the grounds that they had been the main source of a chiefly family's wealth, and if the Persian government wanted that family (for socio-political reasons) to resume residence and its social (if not political) role among its people, they must also provide its wherewithal. Eventually, in the middle fifties probably as much due to the general political climate and the programme for the distribution of crown lands as to Bārakzai campaigning, the land was returned. But by this time the peasants, the great majority of whom, being the descendents of slaves or of tribes very low on the social scale of Baluch values, were less conservative in their attitude towards traditional Baluch authority, were very loath to return under the close control of a native local landlord, and refused to work for or surrender their harvest to the Bārakzai family. A quite ugly social situation developed, mainly because of the lack of any policy - or certainly of any consistent policy - on the part of the Persian Government towards the Baluch "aristocracy" of dynastic families in general, with the result that the family receives as yet only a small income from the lands. (This

situation seems finally to have been resolved - in 1966 - by the effects of Land Reform.) And this situation is the main social characteristic of the agricultural part of this third region. Therefore, although the area of Īrānshahr and Bampur is the natural political centre of the whole Province, it is unsuitable material for the purposes of this essay.

Two other places in the region deserve mention: Apter and Dalgān. Apter is a small agricultural settlement east of Īrānshahr and the seat of a number of Bārakzai. Dalgān is the main centre of the other aspect of the life of the depression - the pastoralists and camel breeders who roam the plain at large. It is over 100 km. west of Bampur, situated in the north east centre of the depression, and its inhabitants breed the best fast riding camels in the Province. They are highly valued, tall, elite animals, highly trained. The best will cover 40 km. in an hour, and over 1[illegible] km. in a night.

4. The Makrān range is the strip of mountainous country which extends from Bashkardia through into Pakistan and separates the depression from the coast. It is formidable country, deeply eroded by torrents and extremes of temperature, and barren and poverty stricken - even on Baluch standards, but it is one of the main areas regarded by the Baluch as the home of all that is typical and highly valued in their tradition and way of life. What permanent settlement there is within the range is purely riverine and very small. The main names are: Bent, Pannuch (Pahnuch), Īrānshahr (formerly Iranch), Kasr Kand, Garbās, Āsak, Chāsp and Lāshār (see Map I). The only ways through the range are by river beds, and all the permanent settlements within the range are situated in places where a river broadens out from being little more than a torrent into the sweep of a bend, leaving a little cultivable soil on one side of its course.

The main ecological characteristic of this region is its lack of soil and relatively plenteous supply of water. In this region there is nearly always at least a trickle of fresh water to be found in the bed of any river somewhere in the length of its course, or at least easily obtainable by scraping away the gravel of its bed at a likely point.

Unfortunately the supply of water seldom coincides with a supply of soil sufficient for use for cultivation. Furthermore, natural vegetation is not sufficient, except in unusually good years, to maintain large enough flocks for the subsistence of the nomads in the mountains. This situation - as we shall see in Part Two - was not so disastrous in the past as it is now. There are two types of remedy, and more emphasis is placed on these now than formerly. They are both known as band or sabband and are a form of dam. The first is built across a torrent bed to trap soil and moisture - in pitifully small quantities but nevertheless enough for a few palms, and vegetables, and sometimes even a little grain. The second is found on the outskirts of the mountains where the valleys open out and contain soil but no water, and is built round terraces of first class alluvial soil, so containing the erosion process, in the hope of a sufficient rainfall - either directly, or indirectly by means of a flood which can be channelled on to the land - to grow a crop of grain (For technical description of this method see Raikes, 1965a). A large proportion of the grain in the Province is grown by this last method, which is a surprising state of affairs in a country where grain is one of the staple items of the diet and the rainfall is scant and completely unpredictable. Both these "dams" are always in danger of being damaged or even completely washed away, soil and all, by the results of a little too much rain.

The pastoralist population of these mountains (which is the great majority - the peasants are mainly descendents of slaves or "low caste" tribes around the forts of the chiefs who have settled in the few fixed points of settlement mentioned above) are divided into a number of quite small tribes, which in the Baluch Period owed allegiance to one or other of the dynastic families in the surrounding country. Within the mountains, however, they form a homogeneous society, with their social and political relationships based almost exclusively on their agnatic kin and affinal ties. In the "Baluch Period" they formed the tribal élite around the dynastic families, were great raiders and owned their own slaves. They are now the victims of an unfortunate situation. On the one hand they

are thought of with a peculiar nostalgia by the people of the plains as the real Baluch who still preserve the old traditions and the true Baluch way of life, while on the other hand they have lost more than any other section of the population of the Province by the passing of independent Baluch authority in the Province, are now among the poorest section of the population, and the farthest from government "relief" and contact with the outside world. There are but two jeepable tracks which traverse these mountains from north to south between Bashkardia and the Pakistan border, and one of these is an unimproved torrent bed - the Karbas river. There is no road along the coastal plain from which to approach them, nor along the Kaz Murian depression - though there is a jeepable track to Bent from Espakeh. This isolation lends a special character to the life of the mountains, for they are literally impenetrable, without the aid of a local guide, to anything short of a very well equipped expedition. Even with native guidance only the local donkeys, born and bred in the mountains, can cope with the paths, and even to travel with these deprives the traveller of visiting many places and seeing many things. It is not for nothing that the Pakistani Baluch traditionally think of the Persian side of the border with some trepidation and the Persian Baluch (primarily these mountain people) as wild and uncivilised. One section - that centred on Chanp and the Naju river above Kasr - and is even now without gendarme interference and insecure even for a Baluch traveller (though there are other reasons also for this, see Part Six).

For these reasons a section of the range which borders on Pakistan was chosen for more detailed study. This section is known as Kalah Kuh and is bounded on the north by the Chahri Kaur (river), on the east by the Rehang river (which constitutes the border with Pakistan), on the south west by the Sultan-Rong plain, and on the west continues into another section known as Fosur (Map IV). The section is defined as a unit to a certain extent by the nature of its inhabitants but mainly by its allegiance, which is exclusively to a section of the Barakzai dynastic family settled in Sarfshan. It is approximately 1,[illegible] square kilometres in area and

according to the Census (1956) has a population of 2,110. However, the chief in Rafshān claims a population of 6,000 families for Salāh min together with Hong and Sultān, which own the same allegiance. Even allowing for exaggeration on the part of the chief, this is a very large discrepancy. The Census seems to have been conducted generally on the basis of the issue of identity cards (P. shināsnāmeh), and since no tangible advantages accrue to the mountain Baluch from the possession of an identity card he has never been zealous in acquiring one. This on its own could account for a large part of the discrepancy. However, from my own experience in the region it would seem unlikely that the actual present population at any specific given time very far exceeds that shown in the Census. In fact the main answer to the discrepancy is almost certainly migration. From even the earliest first hand accounts of the Baluch (e.g. Pottinger, 1816) there is evidence of Baluch migration from the Makrān. In particular: most of the minority groups of Baluch who live today in various parts of Khurāsān, and even as far north as Marv, appear to have migrated northwards no earlier than the eighteenth century. Baluch émigrés are now to be found in Karachi - where there is a very large colony - all the way down the Arab side of the Persian Gulf from Kuwait to Muscat (where they constitute the greater part of the Sultan's army) and in Arabia itself (cf. Thesiger, 1959: 292-3), north west India, and the east coast of Africa and Zanzibar. There is constant contact between most of the émigré groups and their relatives and home communities in the Makrān. A community in Zanzibar has recently been preparing to return for good to the Makrān because of attempts by the new government to make them intermarry with the local (black) population. Apart from permanent migration, there is also seasonal and temporary migration, particularly to Karachi and the other side of the Gulf. This emigration seems always to have been caused by politico-economic factors in the Makrān, and these have worsened noticeably since 1920, whereas the economic attractions of Karachi and the Gulf Sheikhdoms particularly since the War have increased at a (for the Baluch) miraculous rate. There is so much coming and going between (for instance) the Makrān range and Karachi

and the Sheikhdoms, that it is quite possible (though unfortunately unprovable) that as much or even more than half of the Baluch who would themselves claim to belong to Ḵalāh Ḵān, and would be so claimed by the chief in Ḵarfshān, are at any given moment either temporarily or permanently resident in those émigré communities. The chief's claim that such people nevertheless still owe allegiance to him is not unfounded, and on the infrequent occasions that the chief visits these émigré communities it is adequately proved. One outstanding Baluch leader, Abdī Ḵhān Sardārzai, from Dashtiārī, has now been in voluntary exile on the Arab side of the Gulf for four years and continues to be supported by "his people".

However, the Baluch does not emigrate from choice. Even though he says that when God created the world and furnished it with all its variety of natural wealth he forgot about Baluchistan until it was too late and everything had been distributed, he still prefers his home land to anywhere else - so long as he can find a living there, and often even when he cannot.[11] But the attitude of the Baluch to these territories to the east and south with which he has such close relations (though as a "poor relation") is due to and contains an integral part of his present Weltanschauung. This is that wherever the British have set foot has prospered (harkoiā Englēsa pādi beshta ābād būta). For as long as he can remember (apart from the stories in his ballads which contain legends of the migration of the Baluch into Baluchistan from the west, see Part Two) his neighbours on the south and east have been under British rule. Although the Persian Baluch have never been directly politically subordinate to the British, they have nevertheless had intermittent dealings with them, mainly of a politico-economic nature (see Chapter 3), and the general attitude of the British Administration in India towards tribal structure and its policy of working through it wherever possible has left a definite mark not only on the Baluch attitude towards the British as distinct from other foreign powers (i.e. of course, mainly the Persians!) but also in the continued strength of traditional Baluch political ideas. For this reason it will be necessary to refer to Baluch-British attitudes and dealings at several points throughout this essay.

The most interesting aspect of the study of Saläh Ram was the opportunity of seeing and participating in the extraordinary degree of dependance of the population on its environment - which was laid so bare and patent (as the tortuous twists of the geological stratification have been by the extreme erosion) by the poverty and the absence of political hierarchy within the area. The most conspicuous ecological factor in the life of the people of the area is the use of the leaves of two species of palmetto or dwarf pala which grow in profusion in nearly every torrent bed wherever there is a modicum of soil and the hope of an occasional watering. These palmettoes grow in low sprawling clumps and the two species are not distinguishable to the eye of the untrained observer. The difference between them is simply in the relative coarseness of the leaves (called "pish"). The leaves of these palmettoes between them provide the raw material for every fabricated item of the Baluch equipment for life in the area, with the exception of cooking utensils and cloth, which are imported, and the strips of goat-hair cloth which are woven for the black tents.

Finally, the riverine agricultural settlements of the region are best typified by the string of villages which stretch down either side of the Sarbäz river - the main natural highway through the range - to Käsk in the south. I counted 48 villages in the first 15 miles south from the fort of Sarbäz. The gravel river bed of the gorge varies in width from 20 to 200 yards, hemmed in by high trackless mountains and bordered at intervals wherever there is sufficient soil (there is no shortage of water here) by date palms and rice fields. Inside the villages the atmosphere is quite tropical, and most villages also have a number of plantains and mango trees. A peculiarity of this string of villages is the disintegration and weakness of secular leadership and the strength and hold of the formal religion in them. The fact that the river is a natural highway into the Province from Pakistan and India may be partly responsible for this, since in so far as the Baluch have borrowed culturally from abroad at all they have always looked towards India and their formal religious knowledge and training comes almost exclusively from Karachi and Delhi (see Part Five).

This is the main east-west Makrān highway, and the fragmentation of the settlements which have to hug the foot of inhospitable mountains to avoid the destruction of irregular floods has perhaps hastened the disappearance of secular Baluch rule in the area and favoured the more abstract union of a universal religion.

5. Finally the coastal plain is for most of its length a narrow strip of rich alluvial soil. But the water table is so deep and the rainfall so scanty that there is scarcely enough drinking water for the few villages which do exist on it. The coast is inhospitable except for the Bay of Chābbahār (Chahbār). And the ports of Chābbahār and Kōmārak within this bay have scarcely sufficient depth of water to handle anything of more economic importance than pilgrims, contraband and a little fish. There are a few fishing settlements along the coast inhabited by Mēds - a name apparently applied to anyone who fishes for a living (but see Part Four, Chapter 3). The remainder of the plain is roamed by a few mobile villages, that is to say by small groups of people who build their one-room huts of tamarisk and gīsh and move their villages about irregularly within a limited area according to the availability of drinking water for themselves and their few animals.

Only on the extreme east, along the Pakistan border, the plain stretches back some 40-50 miles along the Nasan Kaur ("Great River" = the lower reaches of the Kārān river) and the Kājū river. And this section of the plain shows several features of interest. The Baluch divide it into two main parts: Pashtiārī, which is properly the north western arm containing the Kājū, but is also used to cover the whole of the plain west of the Nasan Kaur; and Kāhu, which includes everything east of the Nasan Kaur up to the Pakistan border. The Bay of Gwātar (Gwātr) on the border by the mouth of the river is surrounded by swamp and mangroves, which are valued as camel grazing. Behind the swamp stretch miles of completely barren alluvial mud flats. But the northern part of both these sections of the plain is so thickly wooded as almost to merit being called forest (in Persian and Baluchi it is called "jangal" = jungle), while the southern part of Pashtiārī proper is so intensely

cultivated as to invite comparison with the English countryside! This situation is undocumented, unexpected (to say the least), and needs explanation, for the reasons for it are closely bound up with the historical ecology and present way of life in the area.

The majority - which is also the dominant section of the population of the plain belong to a series of tribes who claim to have come to the area from Sind ten generations ago. Since there is no external evidence to contradict their account of the state of the plain when they arrived and its ecological history since, and their account fits the present situation, I repeat it here, although as we shall see later the figure of ten generations is repeated so often in the Baluch accounts of their own history as to make it at least suspicious. (A more detailed "biography" of these tribes will be given in Chapter Four.)

Rainfall and general humidity in the area is generally greater than in most parts of the Province. However, for the purposes of cultivation, and to a large extent, of pasturage also, the vital factor is the water brought into the plain by floods from the Nasan Kaur and Kaju rivers and their tributaries (Maps IV and VI). When these people arrived in the area there was no cultivation in either section of the plain, but only good camel pasturage (mostly trees). The bed of the Nasan Kaur was some distance east of its present course, and close enough to the surface for any water it carried to be channelled off for irrigation, and neither it nor the Kaju reached the sea in an unbroken course. As can be witnessed in most parts of the east of Persia after rain, when the flood issued from the mountains it simply spread over the plain, and where it did cut channels for itself these were quite shallow, and a channel cut by this flood was not necessarily continued by the next. For a people coming from Sind it was a comparatively easy project to turn such a plain into a paradise of cultivation, simply by a series of modest earthworks to deflect and contain the periodic and irregular floods. When the floods carried the earthworks away it was a simple matter to rebuild them, and the virgin alluvial soil was so rich that the returns made

the labour well worth while. Each flood brought not only enough water for a new crop, but also deposited another new layer of rich alluvial top-soil.

However, soon after they arrived the Nasan Kaur began to lengthen and deepen its course, and the Kāju began to form a definite course through Dashtiārī. But it took some time before this had any bad effects. In the middle of Kāhū a chain of hills stretched across the plain from the Pakistani border. On one of them there still stand the ruins of an impressive dry-stone fort. The Baluch recount how (like all conservative peoples they love stories of the past), not so very long ago (they say 90 years), from this fort as far as the eye could see was bāgār - groups of huts at intervals in fields of grain and beans and occasional clumps of palms. The more important irrigation channels and the old river bed can still be distinguished together with the occasional mud ruin - for most of the dwellings were built of tamarisk and palm.

Then the Nasan Kaur changed course to a more westerly line and started to advance and cut back. It changed course several times (the last being only a few years ago) until it reached its present course across the opening of Dashtiārī and its mouth into the sea in the Bay of Gwātar, and its bed became too deep for any but the most exceptional floods to rise high enough to be channelled off for irrigation. The result of this was that practically the whole of Kāhū was left without water for irrigation and reverted to its previous state of jangal - tree-pasturage - thick in the north, but only very thin in the south. Only now the trees were sparser for they no longer benefited from flood water, but had to rely on rain. For a little while they were able to dam the Nasan Kaur soon after it entered the plain, but it soon became too deep and strong to be checked by the earth and wood dams which were the best the local people knew how to build. (They say it is 70 years since they were last able to dam it successfully.) Kāhū was useless except for pasturage in years of relatively good rainfall, and narrow strips of occasional cultivation on the banks of the Nasan Kaur and in the bed of its former course, which still drew a little water from the

better floods. Dashtiārī remained. But there the Kāju was starting to cut permanently into the plain, - and worse still its excess flood waters now emptied into the deep Hasan Kaur as it passed by the eastern end of Dashtiārī, and they started to cut back a tributary through the soft white soil to meet eventually with the Kāju. (This tributary which is cutting back from Hasan Kaur towards the Kāju is known by the onomatopoeic name: Gargaruk.) The two have not yet met, but when I was last there in May 1965 there was little more than one hundred yards to go. When they meet and two more heavy floods will almost certainly do it - Dashtiārī also will as far as agriculture is concerned revert to its former state of "ten generations" ago. Only a few settlements on the south side close to the mountains where the water table rises can subsist on wells.

In Spring 1965 there were still a score of "bāzārs" cultivating with flood water from the Kāju. With their fields they cover perhaps thirty square miles, and within their limits particularly within a few months of a flood it is easy to understand why the Makran has sometimes been refered to as "Little India". Fields of waving cereals, divided by full dykes; multicoloured birds singing, tree rats, fine camels and horses (imported from Sind); groups of evergreen, spined trees, and tall palms round the water hole (utag) near each bāzār. The utag is the only drawback in this comparative paradise: it follows from the above description of the means of irrigation of the area that the provision of drinking water is a major difficulty. After each flood a certain amount of water is channelled into a hole (utag) averaging perhaps ten yards across by ten feet deep, where after a while its burden of sediment from the mountains settles to the bottom, and it becomes reasonably clear. However, since it serves all the needs of its bāzār, i.e. washing and watering animals as well as drinking, it very soon loses its colour and (comparative) freshness again, and becomes a cross between café au lait and vichyssoise in appearance. By the end of a year - and it is by no means abnormal for much more than a year to pass between floods - what remains is barely liquid, let alone digestible, and when it finally gives

and the only drinking water available is obtained by digging in the bed of the river, where water can usually be found at a depth of between 6-12 feet. But this is saline and dries up within the day, so that a fresh hole has to be dug each day.

It will not be found surprising that this area has lost perhaps a greater proportion of its population through migration than any other part of the Province. They claim there are 20,000 from Dāhu and Dashtiārī in Karachi alone. However, the people that remain, with their traditional dynastic family, form one of the most conservative communities of the Province - despite the inroads of the Gendarmerie, and have undergone a minimum of outside influence. They will therefore provide one of the main sources of material for this essay.

III

Climate

Obviously from the foothills of Kuh-i Taftān to the Gulf coast the general climate varies appreciably. On the plains of the Sarhadd it is very similar to the rest of the Iranian plateau. The summers can be cooler than Teheran, though in the winters snow is unusual, but the rainfall depends on the same regime as the rest of the plateau and averages well over five inches per year, falling mostly in the winter. Towards the south and the lower altitudes the temperatures increase and the average yearly rainfall almost certainly decreases, though there are unfortunately no reliable figures. As in the whole of the east of Persia south of the Alburz, the main feature of the precipitation pattern is its irregularity and unreliability (cf. Wolfachlan and Spooner, 1965). However, this feature is much more characteristic and demonstrable in the Makrān. For the Makrān is affected by the monsoon as well as the climatic regime of the plateau. This means that rain may fall at literally any time of the year. Obviously effects of the mons on are much greater near the coast than inland, but violent summer rainstorms are by no means unknown as far north as Nerāwān, and the monsoon would even seem to be

responsible for some of the cloud which settles on the peak of Kuh-e Sarbāz during the summer.

Summer rain is so much a feature not only of the general climate but of the ecology of the Makrān that it has a special name in Balochī. It is called Thash, and is a phenomenon which features in the poetry. Properly this is a period of wet weather, sometimes claimed to last for the symbolic number of forty days[12], of heavy cloud and severe storms interspersed with drizzle, during July and August, which is the date-ripening season. This is just the time of the year when the dates must have hot sun. In a humid atmosphere with no sun they rot on the palms without properly ripening. Thash is a catastrophe.

The monsoon every year brings at least greater humidity to the Makrān[13] and usually an occasional shower or storm - which causes no harm. On the contrary, it revivifies the pasturage and brings down the temperature, if only temporarily. It is only in exceptional years that a real thash occurs. In the summer of 1964 there was a partial thash. That is to say that it held off before the whole date crop was ruined. It was in the Sarbāz river valley in the middle of July. Every day for a fortnight there was heavy cloud, with rain at least every afternoon, and some days a continuous drizzle. The river was in fine flood and all communications blocked. A proportion of the date harvest was ruined. The people said that six years before most of the harvest was lost, and the last thash before that had been fifteen years ago. However the same rain that brings ruin to the date crop, brings an extra crop of grain in Dashtiārī, and revivifies the tree-pasturage of an area like Kalo to the extent that its effects are still evident several years afterwards.

Another phenomenon caused by the monsoon is called sad, and is a low grey cloud, sometimes low enough to be scotch mist. It comes in from the sea during the night affecting mainly the coastal plain, Dashtiārī and Gwāsh, and occasionally extending as far as Kalah Kuh. It seldom clears before noon and occasionally lasts throughout the day. This also is beneficial to the pasturage and harmful to the date crop, and brings the summer temperatures down. As a result the hottest time of the year on the coastal

plain is often during the months of April and May, and this is also sometimes the case in the rest of the Makrān.

As a result of this absolute unpredictability of the rainfall, the Baluch are able to say (and I have often heard it said) that the most essential feature of their climate depends absolutely and only on God, rather than any yearly cycle.

The hottest part of the Province is the Jās Mūriān depression, which is affected in the summer by the same wind that is famous further north in Sistan as the (P.) bād-i sad u bīst rug (the 120 day-wind). This is a hot wind, slightly west of north, which arrives in the depression direct from the central deserts of the plateau. Whenever it blows the temperatures soar into the fifties (Centigrade) and it brings considerable hardship.

Violent winds also occur elsewhere in the Province. They are a feature of the plains of Kāhū and Bashtiārī. Here, where large stretches of barren dry mud lie between the patches of jangal and cultivation, they fill the air with thick fine dust and reduce visibility to a few yards. When the wind coincides with a storm in the area it gives rise to a phenomenon known as sivāhcēt (the black wind). I experienced this on the 22nd April 1965, at Kāhū Kalāt in the north of Kāhū. A black wall of dust approached the settlement from the north, and passed straight through, reducing visibility to almost nil. For something over an hour we experienced the strongest wind I have ever seen. Only one lug (in this area called "kōll") lost its roof, though several others were damaged. These dwellings turned out to be far firmer than they appeared, for I fully expected to see most of them blown away, and it was an unsettling experience to sit inside them while the wind rocked them to and fro and poured showers of dust through the walls and roofs. However, while everyone scurried about attempting to bolster the structure against the tempest, the chief who was with us (Mīr Maulādād Sardārzai of. Part Six) continued to sit at his ease, unperturbed and scarcely interested. After a little we took refuge in the only mud building of the village - the mosque. There was a certain amount of banter as to the relative propriety of smoking or sucking tobacco inside the mosque, but no one so much as remarked

on the presence of a non-Muslim (cf. Part Five). Torrential rain soon took over from the wind. It was nearly three hours before conditions calmed enough for us to venture outside and take stock of the river which cut us off from where we hoped to arrive that night. The river had already risen considerably and there was no prospect of getting across for some days. We finally managed to swim across at Dalgān, some 20 miles further south, two days later, and the camels were swum across the following day.

IV

Communications

To complete the picture of isolation of the Province a few words must be said about communications (see Map I). Firstly, the position for motorised transport is as follows:

The arterial road from Kermān to Khurāsān passes through the Garhadd and serves the administrative capital, Zāhidān. It is reasonably adequate for all forms of transport. From Zāhidān an adequate dirt road continues south east to the border where it links up with the Pakistani road network. The remainder of the Province is virtually a cul de sac with no traditional through routes for any form of traffic (except perhaps in early historical and prehistoric times cf. Chapter 3). Reasonable dirt roads join Zāhidān with Khwash, Sarāwān, Kurān, Taftān and Irānshahr, though the last two are not suitable for heavy traffic. From Sarāwān there are jeepable tracks to Mīrjāwa, Jālq, Kuhak, one settlement in Naposht, Nīk, Kant, Mīdūch, Zāhōlī, Kahar, Krafshān, and Sartās. Irānshahr to Chāhbahār on the coast is also jeepable, but vehicles must negotiate the sand seas in the south east of the depression and a number of torrent beds which can be dangerous after rain. Flash floods have been known to overtake small lorries in these torrent beds and smash them up against rocks several hundred yards further downstream. Similar jeepable tracks link Kent, Fannūch, Dalgān and Bazmān with Irānshahr, and Gaar Land with Nīkshahr on the Chāhbahār track. From Sarbās to Chāhbahār via Kāsk, Nāhū and Dashtiārī is also jeepable. No vehicle can travel in the Jāz Mūrlān depression during the day without

hailing when the summer wind is blowing. Thus, with a jeep-type vehicle it is now possible to reach all the main centres of settlement, climatic conditions permitting. A well-equipped Land-Rover team can also penetrate many of the remaining areas. However, large expanses of mountainous country remain completely inaccessible to motorised transport, in particular the Makrān range and the country along the border with Pakistan.

Traditional Baluch lines of communication differ considerably from the motor routes. The border is almost disregarded, and neither side of it is realistically policed. The main natural routes across it are down the Mashkīd river over Kuhak into the similar neighbouring region of Panjgūr in Pakistan; down the Karān river to Pāsk, and across the border at Pīshīn into the neighbouring riverine region of Kech - perhaps the most thickly populated region of the whole of the Makrān on either side of the border; and from Bāhū across into Dasht, the continuation of the same plain in Pakistan, drained by the Dasht river[14] which is in effect the lower reaches of the combined Kech and Mehang rivers. Up until 1958 the Mekka of this region was the free Muscadine port of Gwādar, with a population (including its small hinterland round the Bay) of some 24,000. Since its inclusion into Pakistan its importance and prosperity have waned markedly. During the last century for a time Chāhbahār also belonged to Muscat, and there are still very strong social connections between the two places and with Muscat itself.

Within the Province traditional lines of communication are defined by the torrent beds which allow passage through the mountains. Movement is almost exclusively on foot, although animals are used for riding more in the plains (of the Garhadd, the depression and the coastal plain). Camels and horses are the most prized riding animals, donkeys the most general. Mules are unknown. Donkeys are also the most general transport animal. Animals are not shod, and those accustomed to the plains soon become lame when taken into the mountains. Similarly, camels accustomed to the mountains will slip and fall in mud on the plains, whereas camels bred in the plains will negotiate short stretches of mud without mishap.

However, after heavy rain and a full flood from the Nasan Kaur and the Kaj, no movement is possible at all in Bāhū and Dashtiārī until the plain dries.

V

The aim of this chapter has been to demonstrate the isolation and the great extremes of climate and environment as the two main natural factors which affect the life of the Baluch. These factors break down the society into small communities, and - in the Makrān as opposed to the Sarhadd - force them into varying degrees of dependence on agriculture in country where neither agriculture nor pastoralism severally, and often not even the combination of the two, can afford them a reasonable subsistance.

I have attempted to describe the principal geographical and related factors as they affect the human ecology, and to emphasise the ecological variety. Throughout this essay it will from time to time be necessary in the discussion of various topics to treat each region separately. However, so far as the material allows I shall avoid making this type of distinction, and move rather from topic to topic than from region to region. I feel this is methodologically important in order to reflect the cultural unity which the Baluch themselves feel. It is true that in times - not so very long ago - when they were even less aware of the outside world than they are now, they perhaps did not feel this unity to the same extent. And even now the feeling of unity is probably to some extent due to the intermarriage between the seven main dynastic families, and the (comparatively) common front which they present to the Administration. Unfortunately, we do not know how long ago this intermarriage started. We know only that it was a particularly important factor at the end of the Baluch Period (i.e. the 19th's). But for this unity to be felt now, it must surely have been potential earlier. Certainly, the power which remains to the intermarried dynastic families is based very firmly in the traditional way of life.

NOTES

1. For definition of this convenient "classicising" term, and brief description of the area, see Gershevitch 1959.

2. Throughout the essay names of places are for convenience given in their standard Persian form, where such a form exists. However, where the Baluchi form differs significantly from standard Persian, it is given in brackets after the Persian at the first occurence. In the case of towns which were renamed during the reign of Reza Shah (1925-41) I have in many cases kept the original name, but both names are given on the maps.

3. The Persian administrative system divides the country into provinces (ostān); the provinces into districts (shahrestān, a form which properly applies only to the main town of the district), and the districts into smaller areas known as bakhsh (cf. Map V).

4. Kanāts are underground water channels: "Shafts of decreasing depths are sunk at intervals along a line often at right angles to the valley wall, and an underground conduit is excavated to connect the bottoms of each shaft. Conduit and shafts are so made that the slope of the former is less than that of the ground surface, so that water is discharged above ground where the two slopes meet. This system has the additional advantage that very little water is lost by evaporation." (Persia 1945: 33 cf. also p.424 ibid).

5. This tribe is now officially renamed "Bahbahani", after having been pardoned by the Shah for revolt in 1934, cf. Part Two.

6. There are reports of a separate community of Persians, Zoroastrian in origin, high up in the foothills of Kuh-i Taftān. cf. Ekrimi, 1931; Gabriel, 1935: 253; Sykes, 1897.

7. Makrān is a very old word for the whole of the coast of Baluchistan - both Pakistani and Iranian - and a varying amount of the hinterland. At times it has been used almost interchangeably with "Baluchistan". The Persian Baluch today generally use it to mean the southern part of Pakistani Baluchistan i.e. south of Panjgur and Kalat, which has official sanction. I simply use it as a convenient, and not illegitimate, means of distinguishing the rest of the Persian Province from the Sarhadd.

8. The traditional name of the chief town and administrative centre of the region is Khastan, but, as often happens in Persia, it has usurped the name of the region. cf. Spooner 1965b, p. 97. However, in Baluchi it is still called Khastan.

9. It has been suggested that the name Khwārī may be derived from Koh Khwar. Khwar is the classical name of a region now known as Garmsar some 120 km. south east of Teheran. It is a feature of Baluchi that the labio-velar cluster khw, pronounced "kh" in Persian becomes "w" in Baluchi.

10. Professor Lambton states that "The land largely became khāliseh, its former owners having disappeared and records of their ownership not being available." Even if this reason for its being taken over is basically correct, it does not seem to be a sufficient explanation. If the land was cultivated before being made khālisah, somebody must have made the investment of building the irrigation channels - there is no non-irrigated land in the area - and the owners, presumably a Baluch chief or chiefs, must either have fought and been defeated prior to the takeover or have avoided fighting and hidden themselves temporarily. Whatever the history of landownership of the area, since any effective landowners must have been Baluch, there are prima facie unlikely to have been any records.

11. Some of the best known lines of Balochi poetry begin:

| | |
|---|---|
| "Koh ant Balucāni Kalāt | The Baluch mountains are their forts |
| "Gabāresh berāhēn gar ant | Their storehouses are in pathless rock faces... |

These lines are recited with great pride. Translation is difficult owing to the lack of exact English equivalents for many of the terms with which the Baluch classify their environment. However, a version may be found in Bazes, 1967.

12. cf. P. chelleh-i bozurg and chelleh-i kuchik = the greater and lesser forty days of winter and summer in Persian, and also the numerous places known as chehel dokhter, chehel tan (alternative name of Kuh-i Taftan) etc.

13. Once again there are unfortunately no reliable statistics.

14. The Dasht river has cut back in similar fashion to the Nasan Kaur, leaving it useless for purposes of irrigation after it leaves the mountains.

## Chapter II

## The Baluch in their Environment

I

Baluch/shahrī

There is an important division which cuts through the whole of Baluch society, and divides the population into two distinct categories: Baluch and shahrī. In simple, and certainly in superficial, terms this is a distinction between pastoralists and peasants: the pastoralists are Baluch and the peasants are shahrī. This, however, is not a complete answer. The complete answer lies in the historical background which I shall attempt to reconstruct from the available data (which is meagre) with the aid of a diachronic model. Suffice it for the moment to note that the permanent population of the main agricultural settlements mentioned in chapter I are shahrī, while in areas like Rudbar, Kalāh Kah and the Garhād there are no shahrī (except in Khwāsh and its environs, the foothills of Kūh-i Taftān, and perhaps now in some of the few very small one-qanāt villages which have appeared during the last few decades). However, in Nushkī where the people are predominantly settled and practice agriculture, these are in fact Baluch according to this categorisation, although in that region this distinction gives way to another: between Jadgāl - the dominant tribes of the area, who speak a patois derived from Sindhi as their mother tongue - and (other) Baluch.

Baluch(r), ghulām

There is one other division which must be mentioned here, and that is between Baluch and ghulām (slave)[1].

II

Agricultural life

The first thing to stress in the necessarily brief characterisation of agricultural life which follows here is its insecurity. For while in the greater part of the Province rain may fall at literally any time of the year, it may not fall for several years in succession. The spring of 1963 saw the end, in many areas, of a drought during which in most parts of the Makrān

there had not been a single rainfall of sufficient intensity or duration to be of agricultural use for as much as five years. The exact definition of a rainfall which is of agricultural use varies from area to area. In general a combination of intensity and duration is required, for any number of millimetres of drizzle will be of little use. What is needed is a good flood. A comparatively short sharp shower will run off the barren rocks and down the torrent beds at a sufficient rate to supply some small patch of cultivation with a watering, whereas a prolonged drizzle generates no impetus, and the moisture simply percolates through down to the water table - not lost, but useless for the greater part of the agricultural life of the Province. To provide a flood for Kashtiārī a series of storms or heavy rains are required in the catchment area of the Kāju in the Makrān range. For smaller areas of cultivable soil to the north of the range less is required, but it is often required in a much smaller and well defined area. Nearly the whole of the grain crop of the Makrān is grown from this type of irrigation: that is, on soil which has no water supply other than that brought by rain and floods. The Baluch say that permanent sources of irrigation water, such as springs and wells, are too valuable to be used for grain - which is a surprising state of affairs when it is remembered that bread is the staple item of diet. But there is another reason for this: permanent sources of irrigation water do not often coincide with patches of cultivable soil large enough to warrant their use for grain-growing. They tend therefore rather to be used for date palms and other fruit trees, vegetables, and tobacco. This lack of correspondance between the availability of soil and water is an ever-present source of frustration to the Baluch who seeks to increase his agricultural livelihood. Complementary to this is the tendency of rivers to change course when they flood. A classic example is the history of the Nasan Kaur mentioned in Chapter I. Higher up the same river in Kurbās and in much smaller torrents, where each flood forges a new channel in the river bed, nearly every flood takes with it some agricultural land somewhere.

Over against this unreliability and unpredictability of the water-supply there is the, once more, quite amazing fact that even at the end of

five years of drought, in 1963 the Narbās river still contained numerous stretches of flowing water, from which the settlements strung down the sides of its ravine continued to irrigate their rice and palms. The Bampur river also carried running water in the stretch between Īrānshahr and Bampur where a small diversion dam allows it to be distributed over the agricultural land nearby.

III

Crops

From the slopes of Kuh-i Taftān to the coastal plain the range of crops grown is naturally quite wide. The main crops are the various grains and dates. The Narhadd is too cold for dates. Palms are cultivated all over the Makrān, but the main centres are the region of Sarāvān, the Narbās valley, Nasr -and and Īkshahr, while on the coastal plain and in the Jās Kurīān depression they are poor because of the humidity and wind respectively. The main areas for grain are the Khāsh plain, the Īrānshahr-Bampur area and Nashtīārī, and, secondarily, Sarāvān. In the Narhadd all types of temperate fruits grow. Apples and apricots (of inferior quality) and pomegranates, grapes and limes flourish in Sarāvān, while in the Makrān range and the coastal plain there are plantains and mangoes and other immigrants from the sub-continent, and bananas, pawpaws, coconuts and sugar cane are being introduced with some success. Onions and peppers are the main vegetables produced, and unripe pomegranates are prized for flavouring in cooking. Most settlements in the Makrān grow enough tobacco for local consumption, as do the Baluch in their Sabands. The tobacco is allowed to dry and smoked green, or powdered and mixed with the ash of one of several wild plants according to the locality, to take away the bitterness, and sucked in a wad in the cheek or under the lower lip.

There are numerous kinds of date palms. In the Narbāz valley alone I counted 24. Most of them seem to be distinguishable only by their fruit, and the fruits of many are difficult to distinguish for the non-native. The main distinctions are between types which must be eaten as

they ripen and types which may be laid down and stored (in pīsh bags or, now, petrol cans) for the remainder of the year, and between the non-pedigree (kruṅ) which includes all wild palms or palms sown from seed, and the numerous kinds of pedigree palms which must be taken as a sucker from the parent. Such trees raised from offsets produce fruit in three to eight years and continue for three generations. They must be carefully watered for the first year or so, until the roots are deep enough to find for themselves. Subsequently they only need attention in the early spring when the female spathes must be artificially impregnated by the insertion of pollen bearing twigs from the male spathe. One male tree (which does not produce edible fruit) is considered sufficient to fertilise up to fifty females. Starting in early June in the south of the Province the fruit changes colour from green to yellow or reddish brown (rangakanīt or kolont abīt) and at the end of June begins to ripen. The season of the date harvest is called hangām, and is a pivotal point of the annual cycle. It is generally thought of as July-August, though some varieties remain on the trees until winter.

The most important grains grown in the Karhadd, Sarāvān and the Irānshahr-Fanpur area are wheat and barley. In the Karān valley and other similar riverine settlements in the Makrān range rice is the most important, almost to the exclusion of others except millet and sorghum. Both these are cultivated through the summer, and some wheat and barley is grown on the same land in the winter, but with poor results, and it is generally reckoned that land used for rice is useless for any other crop.

It remains to describe the agriculture of Bashtīārī, which is a special case. All the crops and fruit trees so far mentioned can be and (at least sometimes) are grown there. But the emphasis is on the cereals, and a type of bean (known as māsh). Red sorghum (gohrū) is perhaps the most prominent product. It has several advantages: it has great resistance to heat and drought, and if there is insufficient water for it to seed it still provides excellent fodder for the animals. However, it makes very inferior bread.

Each year in Dashtiārī what is sown is determined by when the water comes. And if none comes nothing is sown. When a flood comes, it is diverted by numerous small earthworks (band) and dykes (jū), each of which is named. As many fields as possible are flooded, and the water is left to soak in gradually. After a few weeks, or sometimes even more than a month according to the amount of water that has been let onto the field, they plough and sow.[3] If the water comes between October and December they sow wheat and barley, if it comes in January or February they sow millet, beans and sorghum. At any other time they sow sorghum. All crops sown at the same time are sown mixed on the same land. Lines of cotton plants (sarpās) are also often interspersed. They grow to a height of over six feet, and the ripe open bolls are used as camel fodder, and for stuffing cushions. There are two methods of sowing sohru: if they scatter it on the field after the flood while the earth is still soggy without ploughing, it grows quickly but needs another water if it is to give a harvest. This method is called ā r gand. However, if they wait a little and plough and then sow seed by seed, it grows slower but needs no more water to give a harvest. This method is called pal. It is a quite remarkable feature of agriculture in Dashtiārī that a field that has received one proper flood before sowing may need no further water to give a good harvest of grain. A field of wheat sown in December 1964 (I was told) in this way returned twenty five fold. Even more remarkable than this: it is possible in patches where the soil is particularly rich for the same field after one flooding to return two crops of sorghum in succession with no further water.

What they sow, and (with sorghum) how they sow it, depends also on how much grain they have in reserve and so how much of a hurry they are in to get a fresh crop. For, for instance, sohru ripens quicker than māsh, but they prefer māsh to sohru as food. In Dalgān when I left at the end of May 1965 all was set for them to harvest a fair crop of sohru at the end of May and a very good crop of māsh at the end of July. This was all from one water in the winter, and some of the sohru was

already over 6ft. tall. In fact at that point it was considered that more rain would be detrimental to the crop. All this must be due to the water-holding properties of the soil (although a flood will cut a channel straight through it, cf. on Sarparuk p. 23) and the fact that each water brings a new layer of rich silt-soil. Each flood's deposit is distinguishable in the flakes of dried mud. In Dalgān, which although it is on the west bank of the Nasan Kaur takes most of its irrigation water from the Kāju (since the Nasan Kaur runs too deep to irrigate anything but its own banks, except in exceptional floods), the fields close to the Nasan Kaur are never used for wheat. The reason given for this is that such fields are too rich and the wheat grows too high and being less hardy than sorghum becomes blighted.

In the present water situation most of the population of Dashtiārī and Bāhū and the coastal plain in general, relies more on animals than agriculture.

IV

Land

As a general rule there are no landless Baluch peasants in Persian Baluchistan. That is to say that man who till land and do not own any are normally not Baluch but ghulāms. The only method of measuring a plot of land is by the amount of seed it will take. For instance a field may be sad man tohm = 100 man of seed (one man = 10 sīr = 1187.84 grammes).

There are no large landowners. Traditionally the dynastic families tend to own more land than any other section of the community, but their power never depended on the amount of land they owned, or even on their position as landowners. Nevertheless, due to their position of power they tended to acquire land, and more important, owing to their tendency to make marriage alliances with other dynastic families they also tended to acquire plots of land in several different localities. The relevance of this will become apparent in Part Four. Here it is necessary to note only that land is considered a source of subsistance rather than a source

of power. The ownership of land was never a necessary basis for authority and for at least a large proportion of owners land is not the sole source of subsistance. On the other hand, however, the pattern of landownership is an important formative factor in the pattern of social and political relationships.

Levels of subsistance obviously vary greatly from the poorest peasant to the most powerful chief. The less a man owns - unless he also owns animals - the more likely he will be to supplement his subsistance by working also on some one else's fields. The ghulāms who work as peasants on the land of their master (mūla) receive simply their keep: either in the form of a small plot which they are allowed to cultivate for themselves, or they may eat from their masters' kitchen. In some cases they receive a definite share, as would normally also Baluch who worked on somebody else's land. In the part of Dalgān (Dasatiārī) which belongs to the Nardarmai dynastic family, where all the peasants are ghulāms, the peasants provide the seed and the plough animals and the owner takes one third of the harvest. Note that in this case the irrigation works are rudimentary and need little upkeep and the water (flood water) is not owned. Any radical repairs or innovations to the irrigation works would be financed by the owner. And absentee owner, or even an owner who is not present at the harvest, in many cases forfeits his share. This circumstance is admitted by both parties to the relationship, and with little visible ill-feeling on the part of the owner. The general poverty (at least in the present situation) at all levels of the society is recognised on both sides. If he were to press a case in the present situation the owner might be forced to go to the Administration and he would be loath to do this except perhaps against an equal. There is something dishonourable about resorting to an external source of authority to press a case against an inferior. The important thing is the personal relationship always rather than the economics.

Another example, which will at the same time serve to illustrate the wide variety of types of community within the one homogeneous

framework of political conceptions, is Nigwar (also pronounced Negor), a settlement west of the Hasan Kaur and approximately twelve miles north of the coast. This settlement is entirely agricultural, and takes its irrigation water from wells averaging 10-20 ft. deep by means of a skin bucket hauled up over a support above the well by an animal (usually a water buffalo) which walks down a slope away from the well. When the bucket reaches the top it spills over into a channel which takes it into the fields (cf. Persia, 1945, p. 425).[4] The population of Nigwar consists of some twenty families[5] of Sheikhs, one or two families of the Sardārzai tribe, and some forty families of ghulāms. The Sheikhs are members of the Sheikhzāda tribe. They claim to be of Arab descent and to have come into the Province with the Jadgāls from the east. Their head is also a religious leader and resides at Dalgān a few miles to the north, and his position as religious leader and tribal head lends them an aura of religiosity which they claim traditionally as a tribe (cf. Part Five). The Sardārzai are poor relations from lines agnatically related to the Sardārzai dynastic family. Both the Sheikhs and Sardārzai own the land but do not work on it. The ghulāms own nothing but do all the agricultural work. Theoretically the ghulāms take two fifths of the harvest, having supplied both seed and animals. In this case no dynastic family is involved and the capital investment of the wells is with the owner. However, the Baluch say that the ghulāms in fact get over half the crop, and the basic reason for this is that in present circumstances they need more than two fifths for subsistance, though the other factor of "disturbed power structure" should also be born in mind: the ghulām is since 1928 technically free to leave his master.

Finally, in many places the actual harvesting is done by the women and children, who then receive one twentieth of the crop as a wage.

V

Dwellings

In agricultural plots large enough to engage a permanent settlement, whether of Baluch or Brahuī, the people normally build huts of various

kinds. The most general name for these is lag, though there are different varieties with different names in different parts of the Province. The most general type is exactly similar to the dwellings found in the neighbouring region of Bashkardia. These are so ably described by Cernhevitch (1959, : 218) that I cannot do better than quote him:

"Throughout Bashkard the only type of dwelling is the so-called beehive hut, whose native /Bashkardi/ name is lahor. Its frame is built by thrusting into the ground two parallel rows of date stems, and joining with pish string the sticks that face each other, in such a way that the resulting arches are progressively lower the further they stand from the middle. The arches are then connected by horizontal and transverse date stems which run along the sides and the top. Once the frame is ready it is covered with pish mats. The shape of these huts resembles an egg cut lengthwise. The side mats can be raised to let in light and fresh air...." They are easily transportable:

"Whenever a move is decided on, the covering mats of the lahors are rolled up, and the frames taken to pieces; date stems and mats are loaded on donkeys and transferred to the new site, where new frames are quickly erected.

"The lahor is thus in principle a tent, with pish mats replacing the usual felt or canvas; its use reflects a semi-nomadic attitude to dwelling. Nevertheless there are sites which seem to have become permanent...."[6] In Baluchistan tamerisk and other brushes are sometimes used instead of date-stems - whatever in fact is most easily available.

Towards the north east of Bashkardia at Gwanchin and Tamerhk Cernhevitch finds "a more permanent hut, round and domed, called tun. The dome is covered with pish branches which are held together by a net made of pish ropes. The circular wall is a lattice made of reeds and date stems, which is sometimes covered on the outside with mats, sometimes wholly or partly coated with mud; in the latter case a solid two-leaved door made of carved... wood is fitted to the entrance. The tun thus closely resembles the mongolian yurt...

Beside tuṛa Ramesht also counts several kavān (Baluchi: kāṛar; Persian: kapar)[7], flat-roofed kiosks consisting of a square wooden frame which is covered, lightly at the sides, with gīsh branches. As they admit plenty of air these door-less shelters are well suited for social gatherings or collective naps when the sun is high." This structure is found throughout southern Iran. "The name is connected with an ancient root meaning 'to cover'."

Gershevitch also found the (P.) khār-khānsh, which "consists of a wooden frame similar to that of the kavār, but completely encased, except for the entrance, in a large tumulus-shaped heap of camel-thorn. The heap is surrounded by a ditch, from which a slave spends the hot days throwing water on the camel-thorn with a bowl. The fast evaporation produces a substantial drop of temperature inside the shelter." This is also found all over the south of Iran. "We too, like the Gabriels,[7] were told that the refreshing property of wet camel-thorn was discovered in Baluchistan by Nāṣer Khān's secretary Mīrzā Mehdī Khān, who had been ordered by his master to provide cool shelters on the way to India." Khār-khānsh is a Persian word, and I have heard no Baluchi equivalent (nor have I heard the story of its discovery). As is obvious from the mention of the need of a slave to make it work, and the channel which must run round it, this is a type of summer dwelling for a man who has khānas, a more or less permanent headquarters and a convenient supply of running water. There must also be a regular wind. For these reasons it is mainly used by chiefs in the Jāz Mūriān depression.

These types of dwellings then are all found in Baluchistan, except that the tūṛa would seem to be an ideal type for I have not seen it so tidily constructed as Gershevitch describes it (see his photo). A similar but smaller structure in the southern Makrān is called kōll. Finally, buildings are also constructed of mud with or without straw. These are of course, comparatively speaking, a considerable capital investment and are usually reserved for special purposes, such as mosques and guest houses or the dwellings of more prominent chiefs. They are known as kaṛ, kuṭī or kān. kaṛ is according to Gershevitch used in

Bashkardia to denote small square chambers built of stones for storing dates. He remarks that the word (with a non-retroflex 't') existed with the meaning of "store-room" already in Achaemenian times (i.e. 6th-4th centuries B.C.).

Gershevitch's observation that the use of the lūg reflects a semi-nomadic attitude to houses is most apt. The lūg is used to keep things in, as shade from the midday sun, and(not always very efficient) shelter from bad weather, but for little else, except for wives of high social standing in the Sarḥān area who generally live in a large kat or kān type of dwelling, and seldom if ever venture outside. Similarly, furniture and other household equipment is the bare minimum: mats woven of pīsh or perhaps a(P.)celīṭ (Baluchi: jull = woven rug of. below "handicrafts") to sit on, metal bowls and cauldrons for cooking, and skins and bags woven of pīsh for storing milk products, grain and dates. In every aspect of life (with the sole exception perhaps of women's dress and jewelry) utter simplicity and dependence on the environment is evident.

VI

The Pastoral Life

Among the Baluch as might be expected this simplicity is even more evident. Whereas the shahrī lives in a definite place - a village, most Baluch live in an area. Within this area they move about with their tents and flocks according to the availability of pasturage, surface water and the position of any ābgānis in which they have an interest.

The pasturage is the most important factor, since for most of the year it must be close enough to the mēṭag or halk (camp) for them to be able to take the flocks (predominantly goats with sometimes a small admixture of sheep) there and back once a day and leave enough time for them to graze. In the spring when the milk is most plentiful and the flocks are milked twice a day the pasturage must be close enough to do this twice a day. Only towards the end of the summer during the date

harvest (hāsīn) when the pasturage is scarcest and the flocks have little or no milk they are left to roam the mountains with a minimum number of shepherds without reference to a mētag.

The flocks should normally be watered every two days. In country like Salāh Kūh (cf. p. 16) the mētag is usually on top of or very near to a spring or part of a torrent bed where water flows on the surface. However, in the more open country of the Darhadē, for instance around Kūh-i Ferīd, where surface water is anyway more scarce, the water supply may be as much as two or three miles away from the mētag.

Owing to the inheritance pattern (cf. Part Four) one man may have an interest in several āshands dotted over the area. Every few days each āshand has to be visited by one of the men with an interest in it, so that its tiny crop may be attended to and its meagre trickle of water redirected from one irrigation segment to another.

In the Darhadē the total area roamed by one group of tribes may be comparatively large, while in the more mountainous and broken country of the Ma'rān range it tends to be much smaller. The nomads of Salāh Kūh in fact divide this section of the range into three parts, which they call Koh - the central part which contains most of the highest peaks, Sar Koh - the "upper" part, and Jahl Koh - the "lower" part, that is, according to the general drainage pattern of the whole area which is towards the Kohang river on the border. In fact, Koh contains a central watershed, from which the drainage divides into three directions: towards Nurtān, Shahri Kaur and Hong, respectively. There is comparatively little movement between these sections. In May 1964 when I moved from a mētag in Jahl Koh to another in Koh I found myself guiding my guide, since I had been to the mētag before, whereas my guide turned out to be relying purely on hearsay: he had never before been out of his own section (Jahl Koh).

## VII

**Animals**

The most important animal is the goat which is kept all over the province. The largest flocks are to be found with the Baluch in the Sarhadd, while most agricultural Pashtūn settlements have at least a few. A small admixture of sheep is often found amongst them, especially towards the north. The next most important animal is the donkey which is kept and bred for transport purposes. A special breed is kept by the mountain Baluch which is amazingly agile in country which no plains donkey could cope with. The camel is kept in large numbers in the Sarhadd, the Jās Murīān depression and the coastal plain, but is losing its importance owing to the encroachment of motorised transport in local values. Once again there is a division between mountains and plains: a plains camel soon becomes lame if taken into the mountains. This would appear to be purely a matter of training and environment: in the coastal plain, which becomes a sea of mud whenever it rains, an imported camel will not even be able to stand, whereas those bred in the area can cope surprisingly well. Cattle are kept in small numbers at reliable supplies of surface water, and water buffalo are particularly important in Dashtīārī and Rāmu. Mules are unknown, and horses are kept solely as prestige riding animals, and are now scarcely found outside Dashtīārī where they are imported from Sind.

The Baluch have a saying which both illustrates very well the requirements and habits of the three main animals in their economy and serves as an invaluable guide for anyone who will wander through their country alone off the main motor routes. It is this: "Harki ruka dīt, āwa dīt; harki hara dīt, halka dīt; harki oshtera dīt, gār dīt" - which means "If you see a cow, you have found water; if you see a donkey, you have found a camp; if you see a camel, you are lost."

Goats, sheep, cows and buffalo provide milk. It is said that camel milk may also be drunk, though I never saw this. The goats also provide hair for the black tents and (in some parts) donkey panier bags.

The camels are controlled by piercing their nose above the nostril, sometimes on one side, sometimes on both, when young, and inserting a wedge shaped piece of wood, to which the rein (sahār) is attached. Even Baluch who earn their livelihood from camels are very wary of them if the sahār becomes somehow detached, since they cannot be controlled without it. They say that they are unreliable animals with a tendency to be vicious (shaitān) and could not be controlled by ordinary harness. They know that the Arabs do use ordinary harness and explain that this is because of the Arabs' greater familiarity with their camels or alternatively because they have tamer animals! In general they have more respect for camels than their other animals (except perhaps horses) and say "Uhār kurt o bār bart" (Persian nouns with Baluchi verbs and probably therefore of Persian origin) "They eat thorns and carry burdens." Unlike their other animals, camels find their own pasturage and when they are not being used are left to wander as they will.

Though the camels wander where and as far as they will, and are on occasions stolen, the owners have little trouble in identifying and reclaiming them. Cattle and goats also occasionally get lost, and if they do not fall prey to wolves, or leopards, are similarly found or reclaimed. And yet the Baluch do not in general use brands or any other artificial markings. The Baluch have often amazed me by their ability to recognise their own and other people's animals: sheep and goats by sight, and the larger animals by their spoor and even (they claim) that of their ascendants and descendants in a direct line (cf. on similar ability among Arabs, Thesiger, 1959: 52). Once one of the Baluch walking with me in Jalāh Kuh (Koh) some ten miles from his own gētag suddenly stopped, pointed to the footprints of a cow in the soft bed of a torrent, announced that it belonged to one of his own cows - which should all have been some miles away, and set off to find it. Towards dusk, when the rest of us were relaxing in the gētag we had been making for, he came up driving his cow. The incident was so ordinary that it passed almost unnoticed by the rest of the company.

This is characteristic of their observation of and intimacy with their environment. The incredibly complicated topography of these mountains of the Makrān range is mapped in perfect detail in the minds of the Baluch who inhabit each section of them. And not only the topography but the flora also. Every feature and plant is distinctly classified: the main torrents (kaur), their tributaries (shēb), fast rock faces (talār), friable rock faces (shur), passes (kandag, dakk), cultivated patches (shahr) etc., are individually named, and they always know the site of the nearest wild plant for any particular medicinal or other use.

In such a generally barren country it is perhaps surprising that pasturage is normally not owned. The only claims to ownership of pasturage I found were within the bounds of owned cultivable and irrigable land. In Dashtiārī, which as we have seen, is in so many ways a special case, I was told that there used to be definite rights, but that little or no notice is taken of them now. Elsewhere I found no mention of such rights. During the drought (1958-63) in one instance a flock from the Rāskūd penetrated as far as the plains between Hōsh and Kurtān, south of Salāh Kūh, apparently without causing any trouble. The reason for this may be that pasturage for goats, is poor everywhere and differs little from place to place, and the flocks (at least now after the last drought) are never very large. There are no lush valleys to be competed for, as there are for instance in the Zagros. Cows anyway must have their own surface water supply, and camels are left to wander and find their own pasturage.

Shepherding is always done by small boys, when available. When a boy shepherds another family's flock, he receives his clothes, food (bread) and one tenth of the year's kids in pay. Shepherding therefore constitutes a major part of the education of many boys especially the sons of average Baluch. They learn to spend most of their time alone with the flocks and depend on the natural environment entirely except for their bread, milk and a ragged shirt and trousers. Their life is thus very similar to that of the boys who shepherd flocks owned in villages on the

plateaux, except that in a nomadic social context they are less separated from their own community. It is interesting that while a shepherd boy in Khurāsān becomes a social outcast, shy of and ridiculed by the villagers, the Baluch shepherd boy with a similar way of life and standard of living is well-spoken and cheerful.

VIII

The Encampment

Apart from the ʾāhbānis some Baluch also have other more extensive plots of cultivation. In many cases, as with Hong, quite a large plot of cultivation may have no permanent mētag in the vicinity at all. They are simply visited when they require attention, and at bāmēn when all the interested mētags gather round them. Where there is a permanent mētag next to the shahr a respectable distance is always left between them so that the flocks when they are in camp will not wander on to the crops.

The mētag normally composes from three to seven tents (gedān, palās). I have seen as few as one and as many as nine, though usually only in special circumstances where a family has temporarily migrated (a family left on its own soon has to join another mētag to subsist ) or where two mētags have temporarily joined forces. There is normally one nuclear family per tent with sometimes a grand parent or uncle or aunt whose own nuclear family is defunct. Occasionally two closely related families share a tent. The tents are simply strips of woven goat hair over two, three or four pairs of branch supports, held by guys of pīsh rope. Like the dwellings described for the shahrī communities there are many variations on the theme, the object apparently being solely to provide shade from the sun in summer and shelter from bad weather in winter rather than imitate an ideal dwelling whose proportions and construction are dictated by tradition. However, the tents are generally larger and tidier in the Sarhadd - which may indicate that poverty is responsible for a lapse in standards. South of the Sarhadd pīsh matting is substituted for goat hair cloth in the summer. In the summer the heat is often almost

intolerable even for the Baluch and the milk supply is dwindling. The winter is cold (at night) and men and animals snuggle together inside the tents for warmth. They say they prefer the summer since they seldom have enough clothing to keep warm in the winter nights, and there is usually no milk left then. In the spring when the pasture is at its best the mēlag moves every ten or twenty days in order to exploit it to the full, while in the late summer and autumn it makes little difference where they are and they move little, unless perhaps a child dies and they move away so as not to be reminded, leaving a grave up on the hillside terrace (where it will not be washed away by a torrent) - a low oblong mound of stones with a larger stone at the head if it was a girl, at each end if it was a boy.

When in the mēlag the men are usually idle, resting, or weaving nāh, unless they help occasionally with the milking. Other "domestic" tasks they will normally only perform when there are no women around to do them. But the women are never still. Water has to be fetched continually and its source is often in a torrent bed as much as a hundred feet directly below the terrace-site of the mēlag. The noise of the querns (hash) is continuous, for the grain must be ground and the bread baked separately for each meal - three times a day, if they have enough. It is a long laborious job, especially when there are guests, though they claim that a strong woman can grind as much as 35-40 kg. in a day. A smouldering palm log provides a constant source of fire. There also the young goats to mind. Any time left over from these tasks and the children and washing and turning the surplus milk into ghee is spent on the intricate embroidery which decorates the bodice and long pocket (kudul) on the front of their shifts.

IX

Interdependence

The main fixed point in the year around which the yearly cycle revolves is hāsīb - the date harvest, when all, except a minimum number

of shepherds who remain behind with the flocks, move off to the vicinity of a large date-growing area. For while the greater part of the date crop is probably grown by shahrī settlements, dates are of no less importance to the Baluch than to the shahrī. Hāsēn is looked forward to as the great event of the year. Prophesies are made of the exact day when the dates will turn colour. Everyone talks about how much fruit the palms will bear this year, and, later, how the season is progressing. Shahrī make reciprocal inter-settlement visits to each other. People where the dates are more advanced bring samples to their relatives in areas where the season starts later. The largest palm groves are at Nok Sohta ("the burnt palm"), on the border near the terminating swamp of the Māshkīd just over the border in Pakistan, and Jālq for the Sarhadd, Sarāvān, and Sarbās and Qasr Qand for the Makrān, but there are many other smaller centres. For hāsēn Salāh Mīr again divides itself into three sections. Some go to Trafshan, some to Hong, and some to Kurtān. For many the visit is based on a mutual kin or economic (usually with a kinship base) relationship. For instance, those whom the Baluch visits for hāsēn will return the visit in the spring in the mountains to drink milk when it is most plentiful. The Baluch can usually only grow a small proportion of their grain requirements, and the remainder they must acquire from the shahrī, who need ghee from them. The two natural times of the year for them to meet are hāsēn when both gather round the main date centres, and spring after lashing, when those shahrī who can move into the mountains to drink milk on an exchange basis. One of the bases for these "exchanges" may be that a shahrī owns a number of goats which he leaves with the Baluch to shepherd throughout the year. However there are a number on both sides who do not enjoy any such mutual relationship. For the shahrī it is less important since he can subsist on his grain and other things available in the village, but the Baluch (at least in the present situation) seldom has sufficient ghee (or spare animals) to enable him to purchase all the grain and dates he requires. Many simply gather round the date centres and collect the inferior fruit (mag) which fall to the ground - to which they have a recognised right, or they may be hired to pick.

The traveller also has a recognised right to satisfy his hunger in any shahr he passes on his way within the Baluch environment i.e. outside the larger agricultural settlements of the plains.[8] And travelling or movement is so general that it may be described as an institutional feature of Baluch society. Within a Baluch area the pattern of movement has already been indicated: it is almost continual and determined by availability of surface water, pasturage and the position of ārbands; once a year at hāmūn there is a general regular movement by the Baluch outside their area to a date centre, which is reciprocated by the shahrī at the time of the year when the milk is most plentiful. Perhaps the next most important movement pattern is that of the members of the dynastic families who are continually circulating not only from one area to another, but from one region to another, for because of their intermarriage with each other and the cognatic nature of kin relationships and the inheritance rules[9] they have land and "people" (garīb i.e. they are looked on as leaders) in a number of different places and areas. These are the main tangible factors which link the various regions, areas, parts and sections, into which I have divided the Province on purely ecological principles, into a cultural and sociological unit. There are several other subsidiary patterns of movement which reinforce this. For instance:

a) "Trade"[10] = movement for the purposes of acquiring grain, ghee, sugar etc.;

b) Looking for stray animals;

c) Periodically attending to widely scattered shahrs and ārbands;

d) Gonduk (dīlan) = mutual visiting;

e) Business with the dynastic families and, now, also the Administration;

f) Members of dynastic families visiting Baluch who owe them allegiance, mainly now for purposes of settling disputes;

g) Visiting informal religious "leaders" (cf. Part Five);

h) Movement of informal religious "leaders" on same principles as movement of members of dynastic families.

X

Diet

The staple items of diet (when they are available) in descending order of importance are: bread - of wheat when possible (nazan), dates (mā), oil - ghee if possible (rawan). Beans (māsh) also constitute a staple item in Bāhu and Dashtiārī. The word for bread is also a synonym for "food" or a "meal". Despite the important part which dates play in the general diet and hāsān in the annual cycle, except at the beginning of hāsān they are considered an inferior food not to be served to respected guests. Rice tends to be kept for occasions when guests are present, even by those who can afford it. Among the Baluch who have a reasonably constant supply there is a wide variety of ways of consuming milk and products made from it. These staple items are flavoured and eked out by (when available) chicken, eggs, peppers, onions, unripe pomegranates. Much use is also made of the wild flora, especially berries and the "cabbage" or bitter endive-like heart (kush - situated at the head of the stem, just under the tuft of leaves) of the palmetto or dwarf palm. In times of want the Baluch claim to subsist for considerable periods on this wild food.

One other periodic item of diet is fish. Every flood purges the extensive network of torrents and rivers of enormous quantities of fish, mostly tiny, but not rarely reaching half a pound in weight. As the force of the flood dies down the main flow is channelled between large stones over a specially fabricated mat of reeds (gwan) on which several pounds of fish may be stranded in an hour or so. Nets are also sometimes used, or the fish are "smoked out" of standing pools left after the flood by covering the surface with smouldering brushwood except for a small corner where they rise dazed. Fried in ghee they are considered a delicacy second only to game (partridge, gazelle, wild sheep) which is difficult to procure now the Baluch are mainly disarmed. Small amounts of dried fish are also brought up from the coast.

The main meal of the day is lunch, which may however be eaten at any time from ten in the morning to three in the afternoon, or even later. Eating has the appearance of a ritual: they eat fast, with one hand (usually the right, though there is no taboo against using the left) and drink deeply afterwards. A thin round of unleaven bread is used as a plate for solid food such as rice. The meal is eaten in the quickest most efficient way purely to satisfy hunger, whereas any delicacies, such as the fish or game, or fruit, are eaten at any time of the day and relished whenever they are available, quite independently of the demands of hunger. They are great tobacco addicts, but the ordinary people suck it inside the cheek or under the lower lip rather than smoke it. For the nomad this is simpler and needs no apparatus. The women use tobacco as much as the men, and young boys start early. They also consider tea an addiction, but avoid it for this reason, since they cannot grow it themselves.

XI

Values

The absolute cultural values of the Baluch are thought to stem from the life of the Baluch and to be preserved by them. They are values of endurance and courage[11], proficiency in the use of the natural environment, physical appearance, and generosity. A man should be strong and healthy, tall and handsome (and most of them are), be able to cover long distances on foot at great speed, be a good shot, and be proficient in weaving and fabricating the large variety of articles, and especially the sandals (_sapag_), which are made from the leaves (_pilah_) of the dwarf palm. As a man grows older, perhaps more than anything else he is known for his hospitality.

Cleanliness is little thought of, and hygiene, naturally, not understood. In epidemics infected men or animals are never separated from the healthy. Latrines are unknown except in certain _shahri_ settlements where they are merely a means of collecting a certain amount

of "night soil" for the fields. The general standard of health is however extremely high and there are apparently no endemic diseases except, in some parts, malaria.

XII

Handicrafts

Contrary to general belief, carpets are not woven in the Province, and appear never to have been. Baluch knotted carpets and rugs are made almost exclusively in Khurāsān - both by the Baluch minorities there and by Khurāsānī peasants, and also to some extent in Afghanistan and the north of West Pakistan. Their characteristic designs do not seem to owe anything to the Province either. A type of mat is woven (not knotted) in certain parts of the Province, but the patterns are geometric and repeating in stripe. Only the choice of colours and the overall sense of colour is similar to the famous Baluch carpets. Sense of colour, and also design, is very much a feature also of the intricate embroidery which covers the bodice and the long front pocket of the women's shifts, and consumes all their spare time, as it is of the women's clothes in general. The designs are all improvised, but within the framework of such a definite localised tradition that the women can recognise the origin of a piece of embroidery from its design.

Pottery, including water-pipes, is made in a few specialised villages. The clay is sifted and brought in by the men; the pots are shaped, without a wheel, by the women, who also in some places decorate them with a monocolour design drawn on with a wet stone of high iron content; they are then fired by the men, who travel the surrounding region to sell or exchange them for grain, etc.

However, the main craft of the Province is in the use of palm. It is twisted into ropes of various thicknesses[12], or woven. The ropes are made into (among other things) "chairs" (tur) for climbing palms, and rope sandals (sangā). It may be woven into various types of bags and

bags for storage, feeding animals, panniers, scales, sieves, prayer mats, ordinary large tent or room mats, etc. The *pīsh* is also used for tinder, and as a torch for lighting at night.

XIII

**Economics**

A general characterisation of Baluch traditional economy may come here, though certain features of it which concern the functions of chiefs must be left for discussion in greater detail in Part Four.

In traditional Baluchistan, internal and external trade in any regular or institutionalised form, existed only as the peculiar occupation of a handful of alien settlers such as the Sikhs, Bahāis and Hindus (cf. p. 4). A Baluch chief might be rich in land or gardens or flocks, but it would have been a disgrace (*nang*) for him to sell his produce. His retainers, servants, fighting men were "maintained" in grain and ghee. Fruit was never considered an article which could be traded or even used for "maintenance", since it has no value, i.e. it is not a staple food but simply a luxury. Money had scarcely any internal use at all[13]. A man either had the means to provide for his family's needs, or was in the service of another who therefore provided for them or a combination of the two. At the same time the general economy was bolstered by raiding both inside and outside the Province (cf. especially Pyer, 1921, chapter 16). Bad harvests were almost certainly offset by this means, and the standard of living of the Baluch who were more warlike and mobile than the *shahrī*, has dropped considerably since raiding has been stopped with the establishment of effective Persian rule and internal security, for they can no longer fall back on this activity to help them through difficult years.

Imports, or articles in common use not produced inside the Province, were arms and ammunitions, tea, cloth, and metal utensils for cooking, etc. Nearly all of these came from or through British India. Large amounts of cloth entered the Province as presents (or "retainers") to chiefs, or were made available to them at greatly reduced prices as part of the

general British border policy. The remainder presumably balanced against local surpluses (in good years) of dates and ghee. The economy, in so far as climatic factors allowed, was completely controlled by the chiefs, who took taxes, conducted raids and warfare, and attracted or repelled alien traders as they would (often on religious pretexts).

Apart from pottery (which affects only very few - to my knowledge three - specialised villages within the Province), all the handicrafts are made for personal use and prestige, not for sale or profit.

It is significant that a large proportion of the Anbands appear to have been built within the last thirty years and interest in them seems to be increasing, which suggests that they are an attempt by the Baluch to find a new security (though they can never in fact provide that) now that they cannot fall back on raiding and service to a chief. It is significant that in Salāh Kūh no one family appears to own more than 30 goats, which is exactly half the figure of adult sheep and goats that Barth suggests as necessary for economic stability among the Basseri (Barth, 1961: 109). Most Baluch certainly own far less.

The economy is then simple in the extreme, with the minimum of specialisation, and no conception of profit. Money, when and where it was used, had no value in itself, and a man's status depended only secondarily on his material wealth. The descendants of prominent chiefs of the Baluch Period appear to think of their capital as limited only by the extent of the allegiance owed them. They definitely do not budget even on the possible income from their property.

XIV

Language

During the last decade newspapers and magazines have been published in Pakistan in the Baluchi language, but before this, and still for the vast majority of Baluch everywhere, Baluchi is not a written language. It possesses however a considerable oral literature (cf. for instance, Dames, 1907). The most important part of this is poetry in the form of heroic or epic ballads, war ballads, love-songs and lyrics, and religious

and didactic poems. It is these traditional poems that preserve the canons of the Baluch way of life and are therefore the pride of the Baluch[14]. There are few men who cannot recite at least a few lines of this poetry, but it is mainly preserved now by wandering minstrels (bahlawān). In the Baluch Period one or more of these were always to be found in the dīwān (gathering, assembly) of an important chief and they still compose eulogies on the deaths of members of dynastic families.

Each type of poem goes with a type of music and is in many cases connected with a type of occasion. Some are used by the women only. Each type has a name, and although there is a generic term to cover all music (vir. sāz; there is no such generic term for poetry apart from music) the names for the individual types are used in preference. I have found nine distinct types, and there may be others or variations on these, for different informants in different places gave varying lists.

Apart from their oral "literature" there is a distinct pride in the language (zagān, particularly noticeable among the Baluch) and in its proper and efficient use: for instance in conversation both formal and informal in a dīwān. The language is richest in its capacity for description of the natural environment, of the stages of life and types of sheep and goats (zag), camels (oshter) and local flora and fauna, but it is a language which relies on idiom rather than inflection and is also expressive in the representation of abstract moods. The language is divided into two main dialect groups - east and west. The western is spoken throughout the Persian Province (though the mother tongue of the majority of the population of Dashtiārī and Fahū is Jadgālī), and there are less important dialect differences of vocabulary and pronunciation according to locality and sāt. Although there is no standard speech, it will be useful here to list and explain a number of key terms and characteristic conceptions which have general validity. Some of these have already been introduced and are given again here for convenience; others which are not given here are more relevant to later parts of the essay and will be introduced when appropriate.

[illegible] - (see p. 25). A prolonged period of rain and cloud during the summer which spoils the date crop.

[illegible] - flood.

[illegible] - rain, rain-clouds

[illegible] - low grey cloud, scotch mist.

[illegible] - rain not heavy enough to cause a flood

[illegible] - small white non-rain clouds, (there is no generic term for cloud in use).

[illegible] - river, river bed.

[illegible] - (in mountains), a tributary or smaller torrent.

[illegible] - stretch of water left standing in a [illegible] (or [illegible]). This is a major source of water for most of the year in the Makrān. It remains fresh surprisingly long, presumably because although it appears stagnant on the surface the water still flows at a lower level.

[illegible] - green algae; applied as an adjective to a [illegible] when it is no longer fresh but turning green with algae.

[illegible] - flat, usually barren stretch of terrain, plain.

[illegible] - pass.

[illegible] - stiff climb up to pass

[illegible] - part of mountain path passable only by climbing, and so impassable to donkeys or camels.

[illegible] - tall, solitary rock or outcrop, treated as landmark (see . 7).

[illegible] - face ) used in the formation of compound place names and, in the [illegible]-mouth ) oblique cases, to mean 'in front of'; 'at the opening of'; [illegible]-stomach and 'in the middle of', respectively.

[illegible] - friable rock

[illegible] - smooth, solid rock.

[illegible] - the inevitable stick which a man carries when he walks or rides.

[illegible], [illegible], [illegible] - (according to locality) blanket or quilt for keeping warm at night and sleeping on, and so also basic personal baggage of traveller.

[illegible] - leaves of the dwarf palm - two varieties: [illegible] and [illegible].

[illegible] - [illegible] rope

[illegible] - pith dried and beaten, ready for making [illegible] (sandals).

[illegible] - [illegible] rope on which [illegible] are woven.

**bāgh** - any patch of cultivation or palms, not including dwellings.[15]

**dēra, halk** - encampment or (Baluch) village or group of dwellings. (**Dēra** is an Iranian word; **halk** is in origin the Arabic **khalq** = people).

**kaddār** - group of dwellings (this term has no commercial connotations in Baluchi).

**laddag** - to load, and, therefore, to move camp.

**ma** (**mak**) - generic term for date palms.

**mask** - green dates before they turn colour.

**palang** - dates which have turned colour but not yet ripened.

**pō** - ripe dates.

**rōdag** - the date harvest period.

**shōrān** - non-irrigated land, cultivated with rain or flood water when available (P.-**deim**).

**shahk** (or **takuk**) - pond where water from spring or **qanāt** (Baluchi : **kahn**) with very small flow collects until sufficient to irrigate land.

**zamār** - generic term for dwelling, extended to mean wife and children or simply wife.

**zarrā** - man in the prime of life, approximately 15-40.

**zamāsh** - the senior man in any group or community, but he must be a man of personality and (comparative) means, i.e. there are communities without a **Zamāsh** and others with more than one (see Part Four).

**zirāt** - killing an animal and cooking and distributing the meat - feast/party particularly on official religious occasions (see Part Five), but no ritual significance.

**zōd** - healthy, strong, fit, efficient in Baluch way of life. This is what every Baluch should be, and it implies certain moral as well as physical characteristics.

**zrag** - (also colloquial Persian) talk, gossip, conversation - one of the main pastimes and pleasures of life. For its importance as a quasi-institution in the society of. Part Four.

**zulfir** - homesickness, a longing for a person, place or condition one has known.

**ā** - (from Urdu) a particle of respect, with which any sentence, affirmation or negation addressed to a superior is begun.

Finally, Baluch numeration after 50 and with the exception of the hundreds originally appears to have progressed in 20's, i.e. 60 = soi sIst (3 x 20s), 80 = sar sIst (4 x 20s), 120 = shash sIst (6 x 20s).

IV

Time and Space

As might be expected the Baluch have no exact conception of time. They do have a word for time, but it is of Arabic origin, and used only in idiomatic expressions (meaning e.g. "when" etc). It has no absolute abstract value. Degrees of the immediate past are usefully differentiated. They have words for:

today - saruzI

last night - dushI

yesterday - zI

the night before last - paranduzhI

the day before yeste day - parIrI (peirI)

three nights ago - pIsh paranduzhI

three days ago - pIshparIrI

last year - pArI

the year before last - pArArI

3 years ago - pIshpArArI[16]

Beyond this is simply the past. The less immediate past may be measured by reference to events or to the stage of life of a remembered historical or living person. They do not count the years of their age, but refer only to the stages of child (cok), marIk (see above p. 58), and old man (pIr). As we have seen, they also draw a dividing line at the end of the Baluch Period in 1928. Beyond this history shades into legend at various stages up to the distance of ten generations, when at least two of the main dynastic families claim to have entered the Province. The legends start soon after the beginning of Islam, when many of the tribes claim to have started on their long trail of migration from Halab (Aleppo). But there is no conception or remembrance of change or progression in their history or legend, with the sole exception of the (unfortunate) consequences of the end of the "Baluch Period".

The future as it comes is less differentiated. They distinguish:
tonight - Ishanī
tomorrow morning - sabahī
tomorrow - hendā
the day after tomorrow - pūshī
three days' time - paraspushī
beyond which is simply "with God" (bā hodā), again with no conception of progression.

"Day", "sunshine", and (in most senses) "sun" are all the same word in Baluchi: rwč. The passing of the day is marked by the five Islamic daily prayers: sóbeh - dawn, sóher - midday = approximately 2 p.m.: the prayer must be done before a man's shadow exceeds his own height, asr - afternoon - say 4 p.m., magreb - sunset, and ishā - evening, before retiring.

The day is also divided into: sóbeh - early morning, garm - the hot part of the day, say after 9 a.m., rūmus-noon, pēgah - the cooler hour or so before sunset, and shap - night.

"This year" is isbirī, or isbirīgēn sāl, and the year is divided into garmān - summer, and sargestān only, though within these bahārāh indicates the spring period when the pasturage should be fresh and green (the Persian word for spring - bahār - in Baluchi indicates the green shrubs themselves) and garmasēn which indicates a spell of (comparatively) refreshing cool weather with better pasturage after rain at any time of the year, though most often in autumn or spring. The Persian solar calendar is not used except in relations with the Administration. The Arabic lunar calendar is kept for the purposes of formal religion only. In some parts the stars guide the agricultural cycle.

There is no abstract measurement of distance. The distance between two places can only be expressed by saying for instance: "If you start out very early[17] and walk fast you will arrive before the heat of the day" (garm), or "You will sleep two nights on the way and arrive for the third."

The only traditional measurement values in use were an "armspan" (gaz = A. ḏirāʿ) for measuring the length of a canāt or irrigation channel, and a man's height (qad) for measuring depth of water or of a well. The measurement of weight is the man which among the Baluch is equal to 16 sēr Tabrīzī or 1187.84 grammes, and is divided into 2½ kīrās (A. qīrāṭ).

All the terms I have listed for time and space, apart from enabling the Baluch to know when the fulfill their religious duties, were applied simply as a means of relating past events and possible future ones to the present conversation or narrative. As such they constituted a terminology for giving depth or a time dimension to zān (see above "language", but also "hāl" in Part Four). Essentially, time and distance were purely aspects of human relations.

A more negative aspect of this situation is that historical persons and present persons or places which had no socio-political (real or assumed kinship or allegiance) relationship with the speaker could not be placed in time or space except through reference to a person or place which had. So, outside one's own environment, which was intimately socially connected with one through long and intimate use, everything both natural and human is seen in purely social terms. Therefore, a Persian is still a zalar (Šāh), since the first Persians to enter the Province in "Baluch history" were the tax-collecting officials and armies of the Qājar Shahs in the last century, and nothing has yet happened to make the Baluch re-evaluate or see the Persians in any different light and so relate them to any different socially known event. Similarly, the British in India gained a favourable entry into Baluch social or collective knowledge for they indirectly bolstered the traditional conceptions, respected Baluch values and allegiances, and made available large quantities of cloth - the most necessary import - at the right end of the socio-political scale. This, also, started in the last century, and nothing has so far happened to supersede it. The relationships within the Province between any given settlement or "Baluch" group and other Baluch are determined similarly both vertically - in time, and horizontally - in space.

All this is similar to the situation described among the Nuer by Evans-Pritchard (1940, chapter III) but differs insofar as the Baluch differ from the Nuer and Baluchistan differs from Nuerland. Thus, the Baluch do not think in lineages. They do not claim that all Baluch are descended from a Baluch Adam. They know they come from different origins. Their relationships with each other are defined by individual agnatic relationships within a shallow kin-group, as "cousin" relationships with the dynastic families and through them with other tribes of the same allegiance, and through the inter-marriage of the dynastic families with some tribes of different allegiance. It is these relationships which on the one hand give a time depth to the culture, and on the other hand classify the environment in a much more meaningful way than could be done simply with the aid of the terms listed above for topographical features.

XVI

Summary

This chapter completes a basic introduction to Baluch society and culture with special emphasis on the aspects which have an indirect relevance to their conceptions of leadership and authority. The main point I have been at pains to illustrate is the overall simplicity of the life and culture, and as a direct corollary to this - the close dependence on and intimacy with the natural environment. However, the direct relationship between culture and environment ceases here. Beyond the control which the environment exercises over the material culture because of the sheer simplicity of the latter, there is a high degree of variety and flexibility. But variations and change and adaptation nevertheless exist within a definite "Baluchness" - a cultural unity or harmony of conceptions which enable us to distinguish the Baluch from their neighbours.

NOTES

1. For details of the _chulas_ and his position and function in the society see Part Four, chapter 11.

2. For a similar situation cf. Thesiger, 1959, p. 239.

3. This is the method generally followed for this type of rain-watered land throughout the Makran.

4. Recently a few pumps have been imported from Dubai across the Gulf. The pump costs Rials 35,000 (= just under £150 ) which is equal to the price which two good water buffalo will fetch there. However, the pumps work much faster than the water buffalo and the wells run dry in a day and have to be left to fill up again.

5. The uncertainty of the figures in this example is due to the circumstance cited earlier of temporary migration and general travel which makes it uncertain at any given time what the true population of a settlement is.

6. My italics.

7. Alfons Gabriel, an Austrian, is perhaps the most travelled man in Iran south of the Alburs and east of the Agros, though he only saw the north west of Baluchistan and his main interest was the central deserts of Iran. He has produced several excellent books and articles of travel and geography. The work here referred to is his first: Im weltfernen Orient, 1929.

8. For similar "travellers right" among the Arabs cf. Thesiger, 1959: p. 143.

9. The kinship pattern and rules of inheritance will be discussed at length in Part Four.

10. For description of the basically non-monetary economy and lack of economic "infra-structure" see below " economics".

11. I was told (among other stories) of a Baluch who had to undergo an operation for appendicitis and refused an anaesthetic.

12. For similar use of it by Arabs, cf. Thesiger, 1959 : 72.

13. In cases where it was used the more common and trusted currency was Rupees, not Rials, i.e. the Province was an economic satellite of India, not Persia.

14. An interesting sidelight on this pride in language is illustrated by one particular rather long poem which I collected. This poem circulates in various versions, all full of Persian and Urdu words at various stages of corruption. Several men who had a reputation for knowing many poems, when asked to recite the best poem they knew, would recite a version of this one. However, when asked to explain its meaning, no one was ever able to give a logical explanation of every line, though they continued to assert that it was the most beautiful poem they knew and some one else would be able to explain it for me. After some research I have come to the conclusion that the poem is a badly understood Baluch version of some Indian Persian original which at some time caught the imagination of a learned Baluch and was incorporated into the "repertoire".

15. Cf. Pershevitch, 1962, p. 21, for similar use in Bashkardia.

16. On Iranian chronological adverbs in general cf. Pershevitch, 1964.

17. _Mahalla_ is used to mean "very early", "in very good time" for any differentiated section of the day, e.g. _sohab mahalla_ = "before dawn"; _nimh mahalla_ = "before the afternoon has cooled down".

# PART II

# HISTORICAL

## Chapter Three - Literary Sources and External Evidence

The purpose of this Part is to present aspects of the history of the Baluch and the Provinces which may be relevant to an understanding of leadership among them. At the same time it will give a general idea of their historical background - in so far as this can be known, though it is by no means a complete history. We have no direct first-hand data on the historical development of the Baluch of the Persian Provinces at any period, except for a few very sketchy and predominantly subjective accounts in travelogues of the last century. The most useful secondary sources are: Nizāmāddeh (1957), Sykes (1902), Pikulin (1959), Dames (1904) and Frye (1960 and 1961) - though each of these are necessarily interpretations of the meagre data available. Primary sources are listed in these works and in the bibliography at the end of this essay.

### I

A list of the various origins advanced for the Baluch is given and discussed by Dames (1904: 7 ff). The classical muslim geographers and travellers up to the Mongol period (i.e. ibn Khurdādbih 864, Mas'ūdī 943, Istakhrī 951, ibn Hauqal 978, Muqaddasi 985, etc. and the Tārīkh-i Sīstān 1044 and 1325) have references to the Baluch and the Makrān. The Baluch are invariably linked in with the Kuch.[1] Firdausi also mentions the Baluch as part of Kei Khosrau's army, and elsewhere he talks of an alliance between them and the tribes of Gīlān (south west Caspian coast) and war between them and Nushīrwān (who reigned 531-79 A.D., but cf. also Frye 1961: 47). The general opinion of scholars is that the Baluch came from the shores of the Caspian (Pikulin, 1959: 17), first to Kermān and Sīstān (where they are found in the early muslim sources, cf. also Frye, 1960). According to Yāqūt (1225) the Baluch were decimated by 'Aqudu'd-Dauleh the Buyid near Kerman (949-982). They continued their depradations until Mahmūd of Ghazna

and his son Mas'ud against them, who defeated them near Khabīs (now renamed Shahdād). Shortly after this time the eastward movement of the Baluch began, for they left Kermān and went into the Makrān (cf. Dames, 1904: 33).

"The earliest mention of [the Makrān], called Maka, is in the Old Persian cuneiform inscription of Darius at Behistun and Persepolis. Other names occur in classical sources, but very little is known of the country in pre-Islamic times. It is probable that Iranian speakers were late in coming to Baluchistan and the southern and eastern parts of Baluchistan were predominantly non-Iranian until well after the Islamic conquests ... At this time the Zott or Jats were in Makrān, which was not conquered by the Arabs. In the time of Mu'āwiya, ca. 664 A.D., the towns of Makrān were occupied [by the Arabs] and war was waged with the Meds [cf. below, Part Four, Chapter 9] of the coast, while raids extended as far as Sind ... It is probable that the Arabs maintained their influence only on the coast, but we have very little information about the entire area throughout the Abbasid caliphate [for more details cf. Frye, 1961]. It is possible that the strong centralised government of the Seljūqs made raiding unprofitable for the Baluch who consequently moved eastward. Two centuries later the Baluch are found in Sind. In the Kalāt highlands the Brāhui confederacy, including some Baluch and Afghan tribes, kept the main body of Baluch from inundating the area, and the Baluch then moved into Sind and the Punjab. No permanent kingdom was established but each tribe was under its own chief and inter-tribal fighting was common" (Frye, 1960. cf. also Dames, 1904: 26 ff.). This entry of the Baluch into the province from the north west of Iran is supported by the philologists according to whom the Baluchi language "belongs definitely to the 'North Western' group of Iranian, having been brought into its present home during the Middle Ages ..." (Morgenstierne, 1947). It would appear from this that the people who actually brought the name Baluch and the Baluchi language into the province arrived in the eleventh century, but which of the present Baluch tribes represent these people is impossible to determine

for certain, and it is unlikely (by their own accounts) that any of the present dynastic families are descended from them.

The state of affairs in the Makrān before the advent of the Baluch is interesting - in so far as we can recover it. The extant references are usefully, though uncritically, assembled by Nafīsī (1953) and Frye (1961). The following settlements were known in what is now the Pakistani and Iranian Makrān: Tīs, Kēch, Panjgūr, Desak (= "small fort"?), Rēsk, Fahraj (= "outpost" cf. Burhān ātē', Tehran 1963, vol. I, p. 430), Kolwa, Bent, Geh, Nasr and, Jālq, Khwāsh[3]. It is significant a) that these names have not changed, and b) that they include the main agricultural settlements of the present day. In fact, probably the names of all the agricultural settlements in the Province today - except those very recently started - are of pre-Baluch origin. (For the similar situation on the Pakistani side cf. Ross 1904: 25). All we are told of them in the pre-Baluch Persian and Arabic sources represents a settled and in some cases quite prosperous population. For instance, of some of them we are told that most of the "sugar candy" (qēnīz) in the world comes from these boroughs; Rēsk, the chief place of a district called Khurūj (or Jurūj), is "prosperous and very populous, and is a place possessing many merchants" (Minorsky, ed. Hudūd al 'Ālam, G.M.S. 1937: 123). The Jats (Kut) used dwellings made of reeds (Nafīsī, 1953: 1074) which were presumably similar to those described above (ch2). In the Hudūd al 'Ālam the town of Kēch is the capital of the Makrān whereas in Muqaddasī Panjgur plays this role (Nafīsī, 1955: 1080 and 1077 respectively). Supporting this impression of a pre-Baluch history of settlement in the Makrān are not inconsiderable "prehistoric" archaeological deposits in the areas of Sarāwān, Bampur, Nasr and, and Dashtiārī (cf. Stein; 1937: 70-137), and remains of bunds in the plains west of Kuh-i Taftān.[4] It would appear, therefore, that when the Baluch entered Baluchistan all they added to the human ecology of the Province was the pastoral element which roamed the semi-desert mountains and plains outside the main agricultural settlements. Whether or not such a pastoral element in fact pre-existed the Baluch in the Province we have no means of knowing, but all the evidence

points to the conclusion that the agricultural life of the Provinces was practically unchanged by the advent of the Baluch - except perhaps that it has declined. It would be natural to expect such decline if, as we might suspect, the advent of the Baluch changed the main political focus from local settled dignitaries to a tribal elite with nomadic pastoral traditions.[5] We shall return to this point later.

II

Meanwhile the only "inside" evidence we have (except for oral traditions which will be recounted in the next chapter) is in the heroic and epic ballads of the Baluch themselves (cf. Dames 1904 and 1907). These record internal fighting between the various Baluch tribes, fighting with external enemies, and vague details of the itinerary of their migration, but unfortunately no mention of fighting with an indigenous population in the Makrān. The substance of these ballads gives the impression that the first wave of migration only passed through the northern part of the Makrān and moved swiftly on eastwards into India. It will serve several purposes to quote here Dames' summary of the contents of these poems, for they form the oldest and most important part of the traditional lore of the Baluch and are still held in high esteem wherever the Balochi language is spoken. Furthermore, the present social status of the tribes which are mentioned in them benefits from the continued use of these poems, even though in the Persian Province they form only very small minorities and provide no dynastic families.

"The oldest poems say that there were forty-four bolaks [cf. Turkish: bölük = "Part; subdivision; fragment; compartment; company; squadron (mil.)" in Heny, H.C., A Turkish-English Dictionary, Oxford, 1947], of which forty were Baluch, and four were servile tribes dependent on them. There is no complete list of these bolaks. The oldest poem mentions seventeen Baluch and three servile clans, and a few others mentioned in other old ballads bring the number up to twenty-six, in addition to which three tribes with whom the Baluch were at war - Lengāhs, Hōthars and Kungs - are mentioned. Some of these tribes are not now known, and most of them are

found as clans only, and not as organised tumans [of. Turkish tümen = Great number; great heap; ten thousand; a Persian gold coin; division (mil.); ..., in vast numbers", in Hony, op. cit. The word is used to mean tribe by the Baluch in eastern Pakistani Baluchistan.]. The only names among them are found as tumans are Rend, Lāshārī, Drishak, Mazārī, Doumkī, and Khose, to which list should be added the Hūt tribe still found in Makrān, although broken up in the north. Many considerable tumans, such as the Lund, Leghārī Bozdār, Boghtī, Kasrānī, Boledhī (or Burdī) [= Boledai ], and Jakrānī, do not appear at all in the older poetry." (Dames, 1904: 5).

"The central event dealt with (in the poems) is the war of the Rends and the Lāshārīs, and some ballads refer to the events leading up to or following this war, and to the war of the Rends and Dudais. Briefly the argument may be stated as follows:

"The Baluch formed one body, divided into several tribes, of which the Rends and the Lāshārīs were the chief. A great movement of the race took place, which led to its descent into the plains of India by the Bolān, the Mullāh, and other passes, and the occupation of the lands Sibī (always called Sewī), Mūgh, Shaurān, and the plain of Kachhī generally. Here they soon began to quarrel, and a rivalry sprang up between Mīr Chākar, chief of the Rends, and Mīr Gwahrām, chief of the Lāshārīs. The principal cause of the feud was a lady named Gauhar, who was beloved by Gwahrām, but rejected his suit and took refuge with Chākar, who also loved her. About this time a horse-race took place, in which Hāmīn Lāshārī and Rehān Rend backed their mares. Hāmīn by right won the race but the Rends falsely awarded the victory to Rehān. A party of Lāshārīs then went off and slaughtered some of Gauhar's young camels. She attempted vainly to conceal this from Chākar, who vowed revenge. Bīvārog, a leading Rend, tried to restrain him, but his cousins, Mīr Hān and Rehān, and the fiery Jāro urged him on, and the Lāshārīs were attacked in the Mullāh Pass. The Lāshārīs were supported by the Muhānīs, under their chief Umar, who is held up as a pattern of liberality. Among the Lāshārīs the leading men were Nūdbendag, Gwahrām's old father, proverbial for his wisdom and generosity, Bahar, Bijār, Hāmīn and Bakar. In the battle

the Rinds were defeated and Bīvārag and Mīr Hān were killed. Chākar himself was saved by Nūdbandag, who mounted him on his mare Pol and let him escape out of the battle. Bīvārag's elopement with the King of Kandahār's daughter and his appeal for help to Gwahrām rather than to Chākar belong to a period before the feud began.

"Chākar took refuge with the Turks, that is with the Moghuls of Herāt and Kandahār, and finally obtained their alliance in spite of bribes sent by the Lāshārīs and the severe tests he had to undergo. The war went on for thirty years, and ended in the destruction of most of the Lāshārīs, and the emigration of Chākar to the Punjāb, followed by most of the Rend clans. The Rinds of Shaurān and the Magasī Lāshārīs of Jhal still continued in Kachhī. Chākar and his son Shāhzād formed an alliance with the Langāhs of Multān, and afterwards with the Moghuls under Humāyun, joining in the attack on Delhi. Many clans refused to accompany him, and re-crossed the Indus under Bījar, where they fought with the Dūdais, already established there under Sohrāb Khān ...

"The characters of the chief actors in this epic story stand out clearly throughout the ballads. Chākar himself is brave, generous, and rash, but with some of the failings of a semi-savage. He entices away Hānī from Worīd by unfair means, he provokes Jāro into killing his own son, and Haddeh, Chākar's brother-in-law, and then taunts him with what he has done. He does all this simply to test whether Jāro will keep his oath to kill anyone who touches his beard. On the other hand he behaves with magnanimity in the matter of the Lāshārī women taken prisoners by the Turks and towards Meibat when the latter took possession of his camels. He is still looked upon as the ideal Baluch chief, and his exploits are magnified by modern legends into something miraculous, but in the ballads the e is no mixture of the supernatural: the events described are such as may actually have happened. Nūdbandag is the Baluch type of generosity, and sets forth his views in characteristic fashion ... He sets the part of a chivalrous old man and saves Chākar's life in the battle because of a charge laid upon him by his mother in childhood. Later legend has connected miraculous events with his story as well as

Chākar's, and his name, which means 'the cloud-binder', would seem to have possibly been derived from some forgotten mythology. Mīr Hān and Jūro are fiery, impulsive Baluch warriors, impatient of restraint, and eager for revenge, while Bīvārag stands out as the man of honour and good counsel, who tried to restrain Chākar from following the advice which led to such a disastrous result. Shāhsād, Chākar's son, appears rather later in the story as a gallant leader in the attack on Delhi, and a man of mystical and religious character. Later legend attributes his birth to a mystical overshadowing of his mother by Alī " [6] (Dames, 1907, I, pp. 21-24.)

Dames' account and interpretation of this Baluch traditional lore, for which he remains the principal, if not the only, published authority, seems sound (even though his textual reading of the poems is often questionable), and the above quotation will be relevant in later parts of this essay. Here it is solely the historical aspect which interests us, and it is worth noticing that where they can be checked (e.g. the excursion into India) these legends appear to be quite historical at base (ibid. p. xxiv). One other point which interests us here is that the first poem in Dames' collection (ibid. pp. 1-3) gives the genealogy of the Baluch as from Mīr Hamza (uncle of the Prophet Muhammad), and the origin of their migration as "we arise from Halab [Aleppo] and engage in battle with Yazīd [the sixth Caliph 680-3] in Karbalā and Rampur [sic!], and we march to the towns of Sīstān " (ibid. p. 2; text in vol. II. Historically Sīstān has been used to cover the whole area from the central Persian desert to the Hindu Kush). Most Baluch claim their origin in these terms today (Cf. Fig. 15 in chapter 9, and see also Tārīkh-i Balūchistān, Lahore, 1907 (in Urdu) chapter 1).

## III

The "modern" history of the Baluch of the Persian Province is equally obscure, but the occasional detail is instructive of the respective effects of British and Persian interference and the nature of Baluch political attempts and expectations.

The Baluch were troublesome during the Safavid regime (1500-1722,

cf. Lockhart, 1958: 46-7, 129, 405-6) and later under Nādir Shāh (1736-47. cf. Lockhart, 1958: 117, 184). At the Afghan invasion of Persia (1722) Baluch elements joined the enemy (Lockhart, 1938: 8). Nādir Shāh conferred legality on the Baluch Khanate of Kalāt (cf. Ahmad 1957: 8), which was a Brāhui dynastic family within the framework of what we described in this essay as traditional Baluch political concepts, thus giving for the first time official, though feudatory, status to a Baluch ruler of Baluchistan. The Khān of Kalāt declared himself independent of Persia on Nādir's death, and the de facto division of Baluchistan along a line roughly approximating to the present Persian Pakistani border dates from this declaration, for the Khān of Kalāt never managed to maintain his influence for very long on what is now the Persian side of the border. The British Administration in India, which made its first official contact with Baluchistan in 1839 at the beginning of the First Afghan War, always treated with the Khān of Kalāt as the ruler of Baluchistan and acted through him in the government of that part of it which came under their control.

A comprehensive list of the early travellers in the Persian Provinces is given by Gabriel (1952). Pottinger (1816) was the first person to bring back a first-hand account of any part of Baluchistan. He made his celebrated journey from Sind to Kermān in disguise in 1810, and inaugurated British and western contact with the Baluch. "In 1854 Brig. Gen. John Jacob, the commandant of the Sind frontier, was deputed to make a treaty with the Khān of Kalāt [Nasīr Khān]. On condition of a faithful performance of his duties under this treaty, the Khān was granted an annual subsidy of rupees 50,000. Nasīr Khān died in 1856, and under his successor Khudādād Khān, a boy of 12, there was a rebellion of the turbulent chiefs who, dissatisfied with the presents they had received on his succession, attempted to depose him. The British government, although the Indian Mutiny was at its height at the time, deputed a British officer to reside at Kalāt in 1857. The Khān was wounded by his cousin, who seized Kalāt and ruled for a year, but was then assassinated. The chiefs reinstated Khudādād, who ruled precariously: so bad became the state of affairs that it became evident that further British intervention was imperative.

"In 1875, Capt. Robert Sandeman was sent on a mission to Kalāt, and he succeeded in composing the disputes between the Khān and his unruly chiefs and there was inaugurated the famous Sandeman system for the administration of the tribes through their own chiefs and in accordance with tribal customs, but under British supervision." (Ahmad, 1957: 8).

This British presence for over a hundred years among their "cousins" and the respect and protection of traditional authority which it came to imply could not fail to have an effect on the Baluch who remained outside the sphere of British influence. But the Baluch do not accept alien domination unless it is forced upon them, and they did not therefore necessarily co-operate with the British on occasions when they did attempt to exert influence beyond their own borders, i.e. the borders of the Khanate of Kalāt. However, according to Pikulin (1959) beginning in the 1870's yearly subsidies for the protection of the Indo-European Telegraph line (extended through the Persian Province in 1869-70 cf. Goldsmid, 1876: xlii) were paid by the British to the Khān of Geh (1,000 Rupees), to eleven "elders" of the Baluch communities of the oasis of Geh (1,600 Rupees), to the leader of the Mīrui tribe (600 Rupees), to the "Sardār" of Dashtiārī (600 Rupees), to three elders of Baluch communities of the oasis of Dashtiārī (400 Rupees each), to the "Sardār" of Bāhu Kalāt (100 Rupees) etc. (Pikulin, 1958: 123).[7]

On the Persian side Taqīzādeh (1957: 29) admits that after Nādir Shāh until Muhammad Shāh Qājār (i.e. 1747-1835) Persia's influence in Baluchistan was nominal only. Later according to Aitchison (1933) "The proceedings of the Persian authorities on the frontier of Baluchistan (i.e. Kalāt) were long a source of anxiety to the Khān of Kalāt. Founding her pretensions to dominion in Baluchistan on the conquests of former dynasties, Persia gradually advanced beyond the frontier which marked her possessions early in the nineteenth century, and justified her action by the necessity of repressing the border Baluch, who were in the habit of organizing marauding expeditions into the neighbouring province of Kermān. In this way the district of Bampur fell into the hands of the Persians in 1841; and nine years later, after the unsuccessful revolt of its Chief, it was permanently occupied by

date. Subsequently the chiefs of the western divisions of Makrān, viz. Jāsk, Sarbāz, Goh and Qasr Qand, paid tribute to Ibrāhīm Khān, the Persian governor of Bampūr. No opportunity was lost by Ibrāhīm Khān of asserting the claim of Persia, and his proceedings during the construction of the telegraph from Bushire to Gwādar in 1863, addressing threatening letters to the neighbouring chiefs, formed the subject of reference to Tehran. Five years later he manifested a disposition to interfere with the construction of the telegraph between Jāsk and Gwādar, and the threatening attitude adopted by him during that and the following year towards Kōch and other parts of Makrān owing allegiance to the Khān of Kalāt was productive of much excitement and disturbance in the border districts. The ministers of the Shah disclaimed any intention of asserting the claims of Persia to Kōch by force of arms; but the British Government, having treaty engagements with the Khān of Kalāt, could not view with indifference any intentions on the part of Persia which caused apprehension to the Khān, and the expediency of forbidding either open aggression or threats on the part of the frontier authorities was impressed on the ministers.

"A proposal was then made in 1870 by the Shah that, as the boundaries between Persia and Kalāt had not been clearly defined, if the British Government desired that the line of frontier should be traced, commissioners should be sent to the frontier by England, Persia and Kalāt for the purpose of settling the boundary. This proposal was accepted by the British Government; and in January 1871 the commissioners met on the frontier and, after collecting all the available information, Major-General Goldsmid, the British commissioner, proceeded to Tehran for the adjustment of the question. The Persian frontier, as defined in a memorandum by the British commissioner, and comprising Dasak and Bampoosht, Sarbās and Pīshīn, Bāhu and Dashtiārī, was accepted by the Shah in September 1871." (Aitchison, 1933; 14; an account of the border commission is given in Goldsmid, 1876.)

The fort of Bampur seems to have been bombarded by the Persians first in 1841 (Sepehr, 1857-8, II, 114). In 1850 the Governor of Kermān sent an expedition to the district of Bampur, which took the fort of Īrandegān (north

of Bushehr) from one sardār (Muhammad ʿAlī Khān) and gave it to another (Ahmad Khān). This is the first documented instance of the Persians playing off one chief against another. Later Muhammad ʿAlī Khān had his uncle intercede for him with the Governor of Kermān, with the result that he gained an assurance of the Government's goodwill towards him (ibid. III, 139).

In 1851 a band of pilgrims from Kermān to Meshed were raided by Baluch. The Baluch were fought off and defeated, but the incident persuaded the Governor of Kermān to quieten them once and for all. He sent a man called Ahmad Mīrzā to Bampur, Sarbāz and Naskant. Two Baluch chiefs, Mīr Aulīā Khān Gīchkī and Mīr Ahmad Khān Lāshārī, who had been persuaded by Ahmad Mīrzā to attend and had come from Baluchistan to Kermān, marched with Ahmad Mīrzā. A number of other chiefs [probably from the Jīroft district] also joined Ahmad Mīrzā on the way. Ahmad Mīrzā marched to Bampur, and on towards Sarbāz, and stopped four miles short of Naskant. He hoped to capture Mīr Dorrū Khān, who was in the Sarbāz fort and in revolt. Mīr Del Murād, who was secretly in league with Mīr Dorrū, came out of the Naskant fort to meet him. Ahmad Mīrzā released him, but when he returned to his fort, he set about preparing its defence. When Ahmad Mīrzā saw this he ordered an attack and Mīr Del Murād was taken prisoner with twenty of his men and the Naskant fort was razed. Ahmad Mīrzā then marched to the fort of Sarbāz, where he waited three days hoping to persuade the people to submit peacefully, but with no effect. On the fourth day he attacked. The army overcame the fort with difficulty and Mīr Dorrū Khān escaped. After this the Governor of Kermān decided to set out for Bam and Narmāshīr, and Baluch chiefs like Muhammad Taqī Khān the 'Ālīzāī' (Persian ṣāḥib = tax-collector: i.e. we may assume that he officially farmed the taxes of the area for the Governor) of Bampur, Shahdust Khān chief of the Bāmerī, Aʿsam Khān chief (ṣāḥib) of Fannuch, Saifu'd-Dīn Khān chief (ṣāḥib) of Nagas, Rashīd Khān chief (ṣāḥib) of the Serhadd and Sēlēr Khān chief (ṣāḥib) of Pushteh and Tasuj (unidentifiable) hastened to attend on him and show their allegiance. They were received favourably (ibid. III, 139-40).[8]

In 1856 (ibid. 290) Muhammad Shāh Khān of Sīb with his son Nādir Shāh also revolted, trusting in the impregnability of their fort, which judging by the description given and what may be seen still at the present day was probably at least as high and strong if not as large as the most famous fort in the Province at Bampur. They were however similarly reduced by an expedition from Kermān.

Returning to Taqīzādeh (1957: 30) we read that in 1870 Persia took Fahlīān, and Esfandak in 1871, and proceeded from there to take Kūhak. In the same year the Arabs of Muscat were expelled from Chāhbahār, which they had occupied for some eighty years.[9] From then on a permanent garrison was kept in Bampur, consisting of 300 infantry, 50 cavalry and 50 gunners with 6 guns, and a force of 500 Baluch irregulars was kept in the vicinity.

In 1869-70 the telegraph line was extended overland from Gwādar to Jāsk. In 1871 (we learn from Smith in Goldsmid, 1876: 217) the chief of Sarbās - Husain Khān[10] was the Persian nā'ib (sub-governor) for Sarbās, Dashtiārī and Kāhū. This, however, does not mean that he necessarily controlled all these areas, but rather that the Persian authorities on the one hand, and the local chiefs on the other, were content for him to represent these areas and be responsible for them to the Governor-Generalship.

General Albert Gasteiger Khān (Gasteiger, 1881: 133 ff.) who passed through the Province from Bampur to Jālq and back in 1880-1 remarks on the insecurity of the country immediately to the south of the Sarhadd. Even Dehdār Khān was apparently unable to control the Sarhadd tribes. He also mentions Delāwar Khān (Bozorgzāda, of Sīb) who he says had been a great soldier, but had later changed his tactics and by supporting the Administration had acquired official nomination to the sub-governorship of Jālq.

The Persian authorities played with the chiefs in typical bureaucratic fashion, and the Baluch, who were unused to the ways of the Persian bureaucracy, were easily taken advantage of. In the 1890's several chiefs were invited to Tehran and then not allowed to return until they had lodged the right bribe in the right quarter. Rights of government, and therefore

of income, were taken from one chief and given to another. For instance, according to an order issued by the (Persian) Governor of Baluchistan, two villages - Bakhshān and Kugnadeu[11] - were transferred, in consideration of a bribe, to the chief of Jālq from another smaller "feudatory". Matters reached the stage where the villagers concerned revolted against the Iranian Administration rather than be taken over by the chief of Jālq who was well known for his cruelty (Pikulin, 1959: 122 and Zarudny, 1916: 18 ff.).

Salinde (1890: 251) found a Persian revenue collector in Dezak when he passed through at the end of 1888, though it was the first he had seen on a journey which had taken him through Bent, Geh, Nasr Abad, Sarbāz and Rigan, so there would be unlikely to have been any others in the Province outside Bampūr.

After the death of Nāsiru'd-Dīn Shāh (1848-96) the Baluch thought there was no new Shah, and the absence of a Persian force fostered this delusion. Because of fear of the Kermān Governor-General (Farmān Farmā) there was no rebellion until he left Kermān. Then (1897) Sardār Hussein Khān attacked Fahraj (Sykes, 1902: 132 and Zarudny, 1916: 200) and led a general rebellion against the Persian Government in the Sarhadd, Narāwān and Bampūr, demanding reduction of taxes. This was refused and the revolt spread to Sarbāz, Dezak, Lāshār and Bampasht. Hussein Khān occupied Bampūr Fahraj and Basmān and other places which had small Iranian garrisons, and controlled most of the northern part of the Province, and several Baluch groups which had hitherto remained neutral in troubles between dynastic families and the "Gujars" also joined him. A large Persian force sent from Kermān to restore order in 1897 was defeated. The uprising lasted about three years and finished only when Hussein Khān was given the governorship. This was a major precedent, for now a Baluch chief, the head of a principal dynastic family, officially had the right and duty to collect the taxes of the whole Province, i.e. the Baluch from their own point of view had official local autonomy. Obviously, in this situation unless there was a strong governor in Kermān no taxes would leave the Province, while on the

other hand the prestige of the dynastic family which held Bampūr was raised much higher, and such a family now held a status not before known (so far as we know) in Persian Baluchistan. From now until 1928 Persian control of Baluchistan was again never more than purely nominal. (Pikulin, 1959: 123-6). In 1901 a British punitive expedition was led by Colonel Showers against Magas and Ērafshān (Pikulin, 1959: 123-6).[12]

"In the spring of 1908 Mīr Bahrām Khān, Bārānsai [synonymous with Bārakzai], of Dezak, an upstart Nasir of the Bozorgzāda Hākum [= governor] of Jālq and Dezak [this description can hardly be true, but see Chapter 4], succeeded in ejecting the Persian Governor from Bampūr, where he soon established himself. In September 1915 he raided British territory to within 8 miles of Gwātar, but was immediately driven out by the Nāzim of [British] Makrān. Early in 1916 German agents extended their activities to the Sarhadd and endeavoured to raise the tribes there against the British. General Dyer was despatched [from India] with a small force, and Major Keyes was sent from the south to pacify the tribes on the borders of Makrān, where the recent murder of Hughes, Commandant of the Makrān Levy Corps, and his Adjutant, Horst, had shewn the gravity of the situation. These measures, and the formation of the Sarhadd Levy Corps, led to the restoration of order ... Mīr Bahrām Khān of Bampur died in 1921 and was succeeded by Dust Muhammad Khān ... " (Aitchison, 1933: 36). Dust Muhammad Khān who was Bahrām Khān's brother's son, held his position until 1928.[13]

However, according to another version, which though not documented, relies on first-hand Baluch informants (Jahānbānī 1957), Sa'īd Khān Mīrhānsai, established in Bent and Geh, who had property from his mother (she was of the Bohādai tribe) in Asar and, set up Bahrām Khān Bārakzai (the two families may have been already related) in Sarbāz, and Islām Khān Rāhmānī in Bent. In 1907 the Persian sub-governor went to Kermān and entrusted the Fahraj and Bampūr forts to Sa'īd Khān and Bahrām Khān. Nothing could of course have suited them better, and they set about consolidating their position. Nothing was done about them until 1910 when Sardār Nusrat, Governor of Kermān, sent a strong expedition against them. In typical fashion

Sa'Īd Khān pledged his obedience, but Bahrām Khān resisted - and with success. In the end Sardār Nusrat not only failed to achieve the object of his expedition, but if it had not been for Sa'Īd Khān's help part of his force would never have returned to Kermān. For his pains Sa'Īd Khān was given the title of Governor. However, he was unable to take advantage of his new position, for Bahrām Khān - although he owed his position originally to Sa'Īd Khān - having repulsed a Persian force now felt powerful enough himself to try for the possession of the forts in question. By this time he had also consolidated his position in Sarāvān (cf. Pikulin, 1959: 127).

Islām Khān similarly was not disposed to serve under Sa'Īd Khān, and Sa'Īd Khān was obliged to move against him. Islām Khān, not considering it expedient to fight, made his peace.

Finally, in 1914, taking advantage of a temporary absence of Sa'Īd Khān, Bahrām Khān occupied the Bampūr fort and took over all the khāliṣeh lands which are irrigated from the Bampūr river (Jahānbānī, 1957: 35-7).

"In 1916 General Dyer entered the Sarhadd with a small force to punish the Dāmanīs for raiding on his line of communication [cf. Dyer, 1921]. After this and up to 1924 when the administration of the tract was formally[14] taken up by the Persians, we [sc. the British] occupied Khwāsh and administered the Sarhadd tribes consisting of the Yārmuhammadzai and Ismā'īlzais.

"In 1920 Mīr Dūst Muhammad, Baranzai, was elected to succeed his uncle the late Sardār Bahrām Khān and steadily carried on the policy of ousting the Bozorgzādas, the former Hākims [sc. rulers] of Persian Mākrān, as the Baranzais gained power. The foundations of the Baranzai power were laid by Bahrām Khān who, in 1908 when he was Wazir to the Hākim of Jālq, killed his son and set up as a Sardār in revolt against the Persian Government. He with his elder brother Alī Muhammad took refuge with the late Sa'Īd Khān, Kirū, [or Shīrkhānzai] who lent them his fort at Sarbās, of which they eventually took absolute possession. A year later, when the Persian Governor

ns turned out of his fort at Bampūr, the Bārānzais got possession of that also and started to consolidate their position in the country " (Baluchistan, 1932: 29-30).

These different versions are not entirely reconcilable, but together they illustrate the manner in which the Bārakzai came to power and extended their influence to the Marbēs region.

During the First World War the Persian Baluch chiefs were an obvious target for agitation by German agents (cf. Dyer, 1921). A classic incident has been recorded by the then British Consul-General in Meshed.

"Dr. Riach [a German agent under the guise of being an Austrian archaeologist] had made Bam his base of operations, and from there endeavoured to get into touch with Bahrām Khān of Bampūr, the most important chief in Persian Baluchistan. He might even be called without impropriety the King of that tract, for the province had not paid revenue to the Persian Government for some 15 years, and was virtually independent. Bahrām Khān intimated that he was prepared to see Dr. Riach and the current officer, and they visited him, and having been hospitably entertained, doubtless believed they had landed their fish, but the day after they had left Bampur they were attacked by robbers, at Bahrām Khān's instigation, and stripped of nearly everything they possessed. Bahrām Khān had been virtually independent for many years and the prospect of being controlled by Germans can have held few attractions for him, but his method of expressing his distaste was characteristic of a Baluch chief and must have been humiliating to Dr. Riach " (Haig, see bibliography. cf. also von Niedermayer, 1925: 265, 266).

According to Jahānbānī the British had also sent a party, under Major Keyes, to treat with Bahrām Khān. Major Keyes fared better than Dr. Riach and was able to persuade Bahrām Khān to agree to accept "the authority of the border governors of Iran in Baluchistan, and to obey the orders of the Government" (Jahānbānī, 1957: 37).

About this time Sa'Id Khān's son, Husein Khān, came on the scene, and took the Geh fort, which had belonged to his father, from Isalām Khān. Isalām Khān was finally killed in 1917 (ibid.). Husein Khān now became the most powerful member of the Shīrkhānsai dynastic family and gained control over the western part of the Makrān range, from Geh to Bent - which is the position the Shīrkhānsai (now called Shīrānī) hold today.

However, the Sarhadd was a continual source of trouble to British communications and supplies throughout the war, which was why Dyer was sent there to control the area (cf. Dyer, 1921).

"In March 1924 the control of the tribes of the Sarhadd district of Persian Baluchistan (who had enjoyed subsidies paid by the British Government subsequent to the occupation of the country in 1915-16) was formally surrendered to the Persian Government, who undertook to continue the payments hitherto made by the British authorities. The Persians, however, failed to keep this undertaking: and disturbances broke out in the Sarhadd during the summer of 1925 and again in 1926, owing partly to the high-handed methods of certain of the military officials and partly to discontent due to non-receipt of the subsidies. The disturbances were quelled, without serious fighting, after further assurances had been given by the Persian Government" (Aitchison, 1933: 37).

Accounts of the death of Bahrām Khān vary in date from 1919 to 1924. He was succeeded by his elder brother's eldest son, Dūst Muhammad Khān. In 1925 the new Persian Government (the last Qājār had been deposed) announced that the Baluch Khāns were no longer to be treated as independent rulers and the Persian administration was to take over. This occasioned a new general revolt which was headed by Dūst Muhammad Khān, and the Persian garrisons were surrounded and cut off. The new administration was embarrassed in other parts of the country as well, and as a result was obliged to settle with the Baluch peacefully for the time being. Dūst Muhammad Khān was therefore named official governor of the Province. Only in 1928 when the Government had settled its troubles in other economically

and strategically more important parts of the country it turned its attention again to bringing the Baluch to heel (Pikulin, 1959: 139-40).

According to Jahānbānī Dust Muhammad Khān supported a "platoon" of 200 armed ghulāms, and had acquired large quantities of arms. He had also given the tribal chiefs permission to keep a portion of the taxes of their areas which they owed him personally, for the purpose of keeping detachments of irregulars for his service when he required them. Dust Muhammad Khān's aim was simply to stop the Government from interfering. He was perfectly willing to own allegiance to the Shah and the central Government, and even to hand over a certain amount of annual tribute in the form of the legal taxes, so long as the internal affairs of the Province were left to him. He had in fact paid the sum of 170,000 Riāls taxes in 1926. He had consistently aimed at ensuring the support of the other dynastic families in case of any trial of strength with the Government and had made more marriage alliances with them, than would perhaps have been usual, with this end in view.[15] He established other members of his family in positions of power, under a feudal[16] relationship to him, in any area where he had sufficient influence and which was not already controlled by another dynastic family. Thus, he set up his father, Alī Muhammad Khān, and his brother, Nushīrvān, in different parts of Sarāvān (see Fig. I, Chapter 9). Each kept armed detachments, mainly of ghulāms, and had the responsibility of controlling and answering for their respective areas (cf. Jahānbānī, 1957: 39-40).

The Sarhadd chiefs went over to Jahānbānī as soon as he arrived in Khāsh. This was not a serious blow to Dust Muhammad since the Sarhadd tribes had never been brought to any real dependent relationship. However, after the distribution of pamphlets by air promising favourable conditions to any who surrendered peacefully to the Government forces several other chiefs including Muhammad Shāh Khān of Kīb also came over. When all attempts to persuade Dust Muhammad Khān to surrender peacefully had failed Jahānbānī ordered the advance from Khwāsh. Meanwhile among the Baluch the war had been proclaimed a jihād and Dust Muhammad Khān had announced that

"I have no wish to fight the Government, but if the army invades Baluchistan I shall wash my hands of the results." First Gosht was taken, then Mushīrvān was defeated between there and Paskuh. Jahānbānī released the prisoners and greeted the villagers well. Next Paskuh was taken and Mushīrvān fled to his father in Dezak. The fighting in Sarāvān was more difficult but, starting with Mushek one by one the forts were overcome leaving only Dezak itself. Jahānbānī made a further peace offer to Alī Muhammad Khān, who answered politely, asking for time to consult his son and decide whether they should surrender or flee to Afghanistan (the family claims to have come originally from Afghanistan, cf. Chapter 4). This was of course not granted, and the attack on the fort of Dezak was begun. Jahānbānī is probably right in supposing that the reason why the Baluch continued to resist against such patently hopeless odds (they had nothing to compare with the armaments of the Persian force) was that from the stories they had heard of former skirmishes with Persian forces they did not believe it possible that their forts could be taken. They had seen Persian armies come before, but they had always gone away without achieving anything permanent - beaten by the heat of the summer if they outstayed the winter. During the night before the fort was taken, Alī Muhammad Khān and Mushīrvān escaped unseen with four hundred men.

Jahānbānī moved from Sarāvān to Nagas where he was received peacefully. He was approached there by Dust Muhammad Khān's secretary with a request to give him time to surrender. He was told that if he surrendered immediately he and his family and property would be safe. The army moved on towards Fahraj but when they arrived at Iptar they received a report that Dust Muhammad Khān had vacated the fort and moved into the mountains with 300 of his personal ghulāms. As soon as Dust Muhammad Khān left the area the remaining chiefs of Makrān submitted. Dust Muhammad Khān now announced that if he were given two months he would go to Tehran in person and ask the Shah's pardon, and that in the meantime he would surrender himself to the army in Fahraj. Jahānbānī sent officers to escort him. After two days there was no news of them, whereas rumours were rife that Dust Muhammad Khān was regathering his forces.

However, eventually Dust Muhammad Khān did surrender and was taken to Tehran. Reza Shāh pardoned him and he lived in Tehran quite freely though under surveillance for a year, after which in an impractical attempt to escape back to Baluchistan he killed his guard and was, as a result, in due course hanged for common murder (Jahānbānī, 1957: 41-64, cf. also Aitchison, 1933: 36).

So ended the "Baluch Period". "In February 1930 the whole [Bārakzai] tribe consisting of nearly 1,000 men, women and children [the main lines and their close dependents] under Mīr Alī Muhammad sought refuge in British territory" (Baluchistan, 1932: 30). Leading members of the family were given allowances by the British Indian Government while they were in exile.

After the fall of Dūst Muhammad Khān the administration recognised Jām Muhammad Belēdai as Sardār of Lasbēla; Mehrāb Khān Bozorgzāde as Sardār of Jālq, returning to him the property which he had lost to Dust Muhammad Khān; Muhammad Shāh Mīr Murādzai as Sardār of Sīb; and Shāhbās Khān Bozorgzāde as Sardār of Dezak (cf. Baluchistan, 1932: 30-33, genealogies below, Chapter 9).

There have been uprisings since (cf. Pikulin 1959: 37, 140), but these have been local affairs. There has been no attempt to unite the Province, although there is widespread sympathy now with the Baluch in Pakistan who are holding out against the central government there, and similar hope centres on the now legendary character of Abdī Khān (see Part Six). So far as can be ascertained from the historical evidence available Dust Muhammad Khān built up for himself by purely Baluch methods and relying on no outside aid a position of greater power than has ever been concentrated in one man's hands among the Baluch.[17] When it was really put to the test and pitted against a far superior power it disintegrated overnight. Dūst Muhammad Khān's position of power in 1928 will be considered in this essay as the extreme development of a particular political system, and for this reason more space will be given to the Bārakzai dynastic family than to others, both during the Baluch Period and since. For after a temporary voluntary exile in British Baluchistan, the family returned to its people and took up its social role - without formal political power.

## NOTES

1. It is not certain who these were, but it is possible that Kuch u Baluch was originally simply a poetic hendiadys, cf. Firdausi (1010 A.D.) "Sipahi zi gurdan-i Kuch u Baluch, zigalideh-i jang nemand-i duch ..." = info the army of warriors of the Kuch and Baluch scheming war like the fighting ma' etc. - for "kuch" has a legitimate independent meaning in literary Persian - "migration" - "Baluch" does not. For this reference and other mentions of Baluch and Kuch in Firdausi cf. Dames, 1904: 22, 26-8, and Wolff, 1965.

2. In quotations throughout this essay I modify the spelling of names and transliteration in general for the sake of consistency to conform with my own usage.

3. I give the names in their modern form, except where they have been changed since the end of the Baluch period. There are also other place names mentioned in eastern Pakistani Makrān which are not relevant here. Some of the small settlements on the slopes of Kuh-i Taftān in the Sarhadd also appear to have pre-Baluch names.

4. For a discussion of the related "gabarbands" in Pakistani Makrān and prehistoric settlement in the area, see Stein 1936, Dames 1902 a & b and 1904, Raikes 1963, 1964 and 1965 a & b, and Wheeler 1964.

5. A word here must be said about qanāts (Baluchi: kahn): Stein 1937: 136 concludes that the introduction of qanāts explains the difference between, on the one hand, the chalcolithic pattern of settlement and, on the other, settlement in Iranian times (Achaemenian onwards) cf. also Stein, 1934: 186. This appears from the evidence available to be a valid comparison. However, the qanāts are very few in the Province today outside Sarawan and Jhalawan. Many so-called qanāts in the Makrān are in fact little more than irrigation channels led off under the bank of a river. Therefore, in the hands of the Baluch the art of qanat irrigation appears to have degenerated, and this has contributed to a decline in the agricultural exploitation of the plains.

6. Alī was the adopted son and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, the fourth Caliph, and the first Imām of Shī'a Islām. See also the individual poems translated in Vol. I, part 1 of the same book.

7. Pikulin's reference appears to be incorrect, but I have confirmed the substance of these figures by enquiry in the areas concerned, (cf. also Goldsmid, 1867: 271).

8. I have paraphrased and omitted irrelevant details. I have also given my own reading of some of the place names which are unidentifiable as they stand in the printed text.

9. They continued to hold Gwādar until 1958. Unless provoked the Baluch would not be likely to harm as them, for they were a merchant community and fulfilled the same purpose for the Baluch as the other merchant minorities already mentioned. Chahbahār, which like Gwādar and most of the "ports" on that coast still has no reliable drinking water supply, was of no interest as territory to either peasants or nomads.

10. For an isolated mention of this Husein Khān, which is difficult to link up with the other data, see Sykes, 1910: 17-33.

11. There is a Bakhshān close to Besak (cf. Chapter 1), but there may be another closer to Jālq - however, the Bakhshān close to Besak comes traditionally under the same dynastic family as Jālq. The second name is unidentifiable.

15. Not having access to several of Pikulin's sources, I have merely put my own interpretation on facts he quotes where they are corroborated by "oral history" in the Province. I have omitted parts which are not so corroborated, or are not relevant to this essay. Especial mention should perhaps however be made of reports of land-hunger among the Baluch which he quotes from Persian newspaper and Russian sources and of British connivance with Baluch chiefs against the Persian Government. It would appear from the evidence available that the former can only have been correct for small specialised areas and not typical of the Province, and the latter are at least strongly coloured by ideological views and expediency.

13. Pikulin, p.127, relying on different sources, says that Rahrām Khān's activities started in 1907. He also mentions that he was in fact "deposed" for a while by a Persian expedition assisted by a Baluch chief from Jīroft.

14. My italics.

15. Cf. for instance, Hussein (?) Khān "Son of Sardār Sa'īd Khān, Shīrkhānzai Kārui, of Geh. Married a daughter of the late Dust Muhammad, Bārānzai, with whose help he secured some authority. Took the fort from Bīn Muhammad of Dashtārī in 1925, and was given Fannuch, Gent and Rapoh (?) by his father-in-law" (Baluchistan, 1932: 31).

16. This word will be defined and its use justified later in Part Three.

17. The Khān of Kalāt at times, e.g. after Nādir Shāh, probably was more powerful, but outside forces were involved.

## Chapter Four

The last chapter was an account of the history of the Baluch, based on literary sources, in so far as it was relevant to the question of leadership among them. The present chapter complements this with relevant parts of the histories of two of the main dynastic families as they are remembered and told among them today. I do not claim that any one man would recount the story as I do. What follows is a synthesis of several independent versions. Incidentally I do not consider that the variations were, in general, significant in the manner which has been shown by Leach (1964, Chapter 9) in his treatment of Kachin mythology. The supernatural is not concerned in Baluch traditions. The very great "structural" distance between God and man in Islam would probably not allow it. In the case of the Baluch, I consider the variation in detail to be due simply to the situation wherein people are forgetting their own traditions because the social need for them is disappearing, but when they are reminded, they have a guilty conscience and try to remember more than they in fact can.

### I

### Sarāksai

Ten generations ago (for genealogy see Chapter 9, Fig. I) Mīr Abdullāh Khān Sāraksai entered the Province somewhere in the neighbourhood of Jālq and came to a place called Nāg, which is the present Nāhuk. He came from the Afghan Sāraksai, and was from among the leading families of that tribe.[1] He had fled from his people because he had killed one of his brothers,[2] and he brought with him among his small following Shakkal, Gamshēd, Husain, Jangī, and his son Mārān.[3] Shakkal, Gamshēd, Husain and Jangī became the eponymous ancestors of tribes which now form a large proportion of the population of Sarāwān. The Gamshēdzai have traditionally formed the nucleus of the Sarāksai "army". The Husainzai and Jangīzai are peasants. The Shakkalzai are thought of as artisans, and in the last two generations at least have provided close confidants and secretaries to the leading member of the

Jamkzai dynastic family. All that is known of them before they entered the Province is that they were socially junior (kaster) to Mīr Abdullah Khān. When they arrived in the region of Sarāvān the ruling tribe there was the Sheikhzāda (literally: "sons of a Sheikh" - which in this context means a holy man, cf. Part Five).

Some time prior to this Shāh Ni'matullāh Valī, a celebrated sufī, or Muslim mystic, had died in Māhān, some 120 miles south-east of Kermān.[4] His wife (referred to as Bībī) and two daughters set out to return to India,[5] but stopped in Jālq where Bībī gave her eldest daughter to wife to Kei Khosrau, the ruler of Jālq. The daughter died without offspring and Kei Khosrau took the second daughter, who in due course bore him a son. The son was named Khosrau Shāh, and from him started the gāt-name Bozurgzada[6] (literally: "born of a great, i.e. holy, man" - Shāh Ni'matullāh Valī).

(Sheikhzāda and Bozurgzāda give the same meaning, and this together with the time measurement of ten generations and the historical link with Shāh Ni'matullāh Valī who died in 1431, and the Barekzai in Afghanistan who are not known as a separate tribe before the eighteenth century, present an insoluble mass for the historian. However, from the sociological point of view from which I am writing, I see no reason to apologise for this.)

At this point, for some reason which is not remembered, Kei Khosrau was killed by the Sheikhzāda (his own people), and Bībī with her daughter and small grandson was forced to flee. She went to Nāhuk and was taken in and looked after by Bārān, whose father Mīr Abdullah Khān had by this time died.

At this time there was also trouble in Dezak. The local ruler, Jahān Shāh Afzal, also Sheikhzāda, was a tyrant, and among the oppressive features of his rule was his insistence on the droit de seigneur. A member of the Sepāhī tribe (a tribe still numerous and respected in the Sarāvān area) finally refused to surrender his bride on his wedding night, and fled with her to Nāhuk. Jahānshāh pursued him with a company numbering forty including himself. When they arrived at Nāhuk (a journey of probably three to four hours on a good horse) Bārān persuaded them to dismount and be his

guests. When they accepted, on the pretext that they were too many for him to entertain alone, he divided them among his people, allotting one guest to each family. (We are told that there were in fact just forty families in Dēzak at this time, excluding Bībī.) In anticipation Bārān had given orders to his people that they were each to kill their guests when they retired for the night - except for Jahānshāh's personal qelīndār. (The qelīndār - "water-pipe-holder" - is the personal servant who has the responsibility of having a freshly filled water-pipe ready for his master whenever he requires it, and is thus, though an inferior slave, the inseparable companion of any Baluch chief.) This done, Bārān at once set out for Nāhuk with his own forty men, including Jahānshāh's qelīndār. They arrived towards the end of the night. The qelīndār was made to shout the order for the guards to open the gates of the fort, which, recognising the voice, they did at once.

In this way Bārān occupied the fort of Dēzak and deposed the Sheikhzāda. However, instead of personally assuming Jahānshāh's position he made Khosrau Shāh (who was then seven years old) the official ruler of Dēzak. His reason for doing this was that he was still hoping to return to Afghanistan. Ever since his father had arrived in the Province they had hoped and anticipated that their people would send for them to return, and Bārān still hoped that he would eventually be able to return to his own people. In the end, however, he was obliged to reconcile himself to staying in Sarāvān, and he went to Khosrau Shāh to ask his permission to dig a qanāt below Dēzak. The permission was granted, but an old Sepāhī came to Bārān and advised him of the inherent dangers of this new situation. He must now either kill Khosrau Shāh or let his descendants be hēzum-kash (carriers of firewood) i.e. always servants of Khosrau Shāh. So Bārān left his qanāt below Dēzak and moved to Shastūn, which was far enough away from Dēzak to be independent of Khosrau Shāh. In this position he became in practice regent for Khosrau Shāh until he grew up.

In time Bārān died, and another group of outlaws appeared in Sarāvān having fled from Afghanistan. These were Sadozai (cf. Enc. Brit. 1957, I, 706). They sought asylum with Khosrau Shāh, and asked him to provide them

with a living. (It was the normal custom for a ruler to take a tenth of the agricultural produce of all land under his control. This tax is known as dah-yek, cf. Part Four.) Khosrau Shāh told them to go and kill Jamshīd and Mīr Kallu, Barām's sons, and take Shastun. They went and fought, but suffered more casualties than the brothers, and were forced to retire on Dezak.

The only mosque in the area was in Dezak, and it was the custom for everybody to repair there for the Friday prayers. The Sadozai evolved a plan to waylay Jamshīd and Mīr Kallu on their way back from the mosque. But once again they were unsuccessful, and were obliged to leave the area and return to Afghanistan.

However, the enmity between the Bārakzai and the Buzurgzāda was now in the open, even though Khosrau Shāh denied having abetted the Sadozai. The Bārakzai controlled Shastūn and Nāhuk in an area which otherwise belonged to the Sheikhzāda under their leading family, the Buzurgzāda, who sat in the fort at Dezak, and were closely related to other lines in the forts of Kallagān and Jālq.

Things continued in this rather uncertain position until the time of Jamshīd's grandson (according to some accounts, which insert an extra generation here, his great grandson) who is remembered as Sheikh Mehrēb. No one could remember why he was called "Sheikh" - which would normally imply claims to leadership in the sphere of either formal or informal religion (cf. Part Five). Intermarriage between the Bārakzai and the Mīrkhānzai, who at this time appear to have controlled Geh, Bent and Bampūr, was initiated by Sheikh Mehrēb. He was the first expansionist of the line, and his increasing power soon became a source of discomfort to the rulers of the surrounding districts. Eventually the chiefs of Khārān (British Baluchistan), Jālq and Dezak banded together to get rid of him. They met him on his way from Nāhuk to Shastun, and a major battle ensued, which was stopped only by a group of sayyids (from a nearby sayyid village called Pīrbēd) walking between the lines with Qur'āns on their heads (cf. Part Four). After this the Bārakzai pursued a positive offensive policy, and posted spies near each

of the Sheikhsāda forts to give notice whenever any of the chiefs prepared to come out. Eventually news came that Mehrāb, chief of Kallagān (between Jask and Jālq), was preparing to come out. Sheikh Mehrāb waylaid him and wiped out his company.

(Up to this point the story would seem to have been simplified into a legendary form which serves to represent the present Bārakzai relationship with the Bozorgzāda.)

With this success the Bārakzai position in Serāvān was consolidated, and they already had a foot in Bampur through their affinal relationship with the Shīrkhānzai.[7] The Sheikhsāda chiefs including the Bozorgzāda or M'mtullāh (the Sheikhsāda apart from the Bozorgzāda family are now of no account in Serāvān) continued to control their individual areas, but from now on their position was entirely dependent on the Bārakzai, to whom they were held responsible in a manner akin to the feudal relationships of Mediaeval Europe (cf. Part Three). They were never again able to gather enough strength to threaten seriously Bārakzai ascendancy during the Baluch Period.

Sheikh Mehrāb now spent most of his time in the fort at Fahraj (Īrānshahr), in which position he was now the most powerful chief in the Province. Only 24 kms. away in the Bampur fort sat his wife's brother, Mehrāb (Shīrkhānzai). Sheikh Mehrāb (he may have acquired the title Sheikh simply to distinguish him from his brother-in-law) was apparently a very proud if able leader, and his brother-in-law was jealous of him, and eventually had him assassinated. His sons were still very small when he died, and A'sam[8] - the most active of them - spent most of his life campaigning for his "rights" both within the Province and in Kermān. He eventually managed to extract the village of Shahr Berāj (near Īrānshahr) from the Shīrkhānzai as blood-price (P. khūn, cf. Chapter 14) for his father. A'sam's son, Rostam, therefore - who was another strong chief - in effect took over where his grandfather had left off on the road to expansion.

With Rostam's son, Behrām, we are in contact again with history

(cf. previous Chapter) and are approaching the zenith of Bārakzai power. Bahrām Khān is in fact spoken of by the tribes that traditionally own Bārakzai allegiance as the best chief they have ever had. He was strong and brave and knew how to use his power without being zālem (oppressive and tyrannical). And he was generous and hospitable as behove a good chief (cf. the description of him in Zaruday, 1916: 166).

An interesting incident which occurred at the end of Bahrām's "reign" concerns the Bāmerī. The Bāmerī are Baluch and roam the Jāz Mūriān depression and the barren country to the north of it. There are no big date centres in the depression, and the Bāmerī were accustomed to go to Geh each year for the season of hāmūn. The main Baluch tribe of the Geh area, who also formed the nucleus of the Shīrkhānzai fighting force and bore a similar relationship to the Shīrkhānzai as the Gamshādzai to the Bārakzai, were the Mārui. Compared to the Mārui the Bāmerī were poor[9] and had practically no malk (agriculture, whether in the form of small ōpbands or larger shahrs), and were therefore despised by the Mārui. One year during hāmūn in Geh a fight broke out between the Mārui and the Bāmerī in which two Mārui were killed. The Mārui were incensed and persuaded the Shīrkhānzai chief of Geh to award them a blood price (P. khun = lit. "blood") on the Bāmerī of 2,000 (?) mesqāl of gold. The Bāmerī chief went to Fahrāj to appeal to Mīr Bahrām Khān. Bahrām was sick, and ordered a tent to be erected outside the fort for the Bāmerī chief, and gave orders that if he should die whoever succeeded him was to pardon the Bāmerī.

This story is of crucial significance for an understanding of the hierarchical relationship between various chiefs, and between the chiefs and the client tribes during the Baluch Period, and it will be necessary to return to it in the analysis which will be attempted later.

Mīr Bahrām Khān died. Following the custom and whim of influential chiefs, he had had four wives. But none of them had borne him a child - a circumstance which was explained by the fact that he had had smallpox in his youth. His elder brother, Alī Muhammad, had five sons, and Bahrām had chosen the second of these, Nūshīrvān, to succeed him, mainly it seems because of his fondness for one of Nūshīrvān's wives who was like a daughter

to him. His fondness for Nūshīrvān's wife made him think also of Nūshīrvān as a son, and since Nūshīrvān had no villages to govern, whereas his elder brother, Dūst Muhammad Khān, had been given Sarju (Sarēvān) by his father, Alī Muhammad, and had acquired control over most of Sarēvān, he decided to set Nūshīrvān up in Fahraj. However, the people very soon grew dissatisfied with Nūshīrvān, who did not show the required suitability (P. līāqat) of personality and action of a good chief, which they had been used to from his uncle, and they sent a deputation to Dūst Muhammad Khān, who was a much more forceful character. Dust Muhammad Khān had been in Jālq when Bahrām died, and had stayed there watching developments, for he knew that Nushīrvān could not fill Bahrām's position, and he had a mind to fill it himself, but he did not want to move against his own brother without good reason. The deputation put it to Dust Muhammad that they would get rid of Nushīrvān if he would consent to take over - for they knew what was in his heart. Dust Muhammad let them know that he would, but that he would personally do nothing to get rid of his own brother. With this assurance the people sent an old man to Nushīrvān at night to warn him that the people were dissatisfied with him and were inclining towards his brother, and to go away himself before it was too late. Nushīrvān was already afraid of his brother and the situation was not lost on him. He straight away set about packing two pairs of saddle bags (P. khurjīn) with gold, and fled the same night. Dust Muhammad Khān was already approaching Fahraj, and when he heard that Nushīrvān had gone, he sent after him, knowing he would not come back now for shame.

Nushīrvān went to Nagas, and Dust Muhammad gave the area to him to rule under him. There he was senior to the Kurd dynastic family who claim descent from Husein Kurd who they thought had been sent into the Province by either Nādir Shāh (1736-47) or Shāh Abbās (1581-1628, cf. Chapter 9, Fig 8). The senior member of the Barakzai family was still Alī Muhammad, the father of Dust Muhammad and Nushīrvān. But Alī Muhammad had never been interested in the responsibility of ruling, and now he was getting old and had turned to religion as old men do. Knowing his inclination Dūst Muhammad hinted that he would make everything over to his father as his senior, but that if he must take the responsibility he must also have full control, and Alī Muhammad

gave him everything, except Shahr Derāj and Naukābād - two rich villages of no political significance near Fahraj, which had come to the family as blood price for Sheikh Mehrāb. So Mīr Dūst Muhammad Khān became undisputed leader.

In fact, his position then - or perhaps slightly later - was this: in the Jāz Mūrīān depression and Sarāvān he had no rivals - all the forts were controlled by him personally or by members of his family (Aptar, Shastum, Sarjū, Nāhūk, Magas, Kaurān, Īrafshān, Kārvāndar, Sarbāz) in acknowledged dependence on him, or by the Bazurgzāda (Jālq, Mushek, Dezak, Kallagān) or the Mīr Murādzai (Sīb, Paskuh, Kant, Gosht) - apparently a breakaway line of the Bazurgzāda who were by now closely intermarried with the Bārakzai (cf. genealogies in Chapter 9) - in a subordinate feudal relationship. The Baluch areas of Bamposht, Salāh Kūh, Hong, Mūrtān, Kazūr and the Jāz Mūrīān depression owed allegiance to him. The Shīrkhānzai who were dominant in the Makrān range from Geh westwards and the Bolēdai centred on Nāsk, Nasr Band, Bag and Hēt, could be relied on since it was in their interests to support a more powerful affine. The extreme south east - Dashtiārī and Bāhu - formed a small but powerful and united principality under the Sardārzai who were now closely intermarried with the Bolēdai and to a lesser extent also with the Shīrkhānzai and Bārakzai. Only the Sarhadd remained, and as we have seen the Sarhadd is an almost purely Baluch area, without the dynastic families of the Makrān or the aspirations which characterised them, but with tribes large enough to remain autonomous in their own areas. A mitigating circumstance also in the Sarhadd was that the Gamshādzai who, as we have seen, had an old client relationship with the Bārakzai roamed the area where the Sarhadd bordered Sarāvān and are thought of as a Sarhadd tribe, and the Dēmerī in the south west of the area were now in debt to the Bārakzai. Dūst Muhammad Khān's position, without foreign interference or the imposition of alien institutions with the aid of alien forces, could hardly have been stronger. He is even alleged to have exacted tax from Bashkardia.

However, Dūst Muhammad Khān had one failing: he was sālem. He allowed the acquisition and exercise of power to interfere with the attributes of (?) sardārdārī (taking a full and personal interest in his people, keeping

open house and being always available to discuss and attend to their needs and complaints), generosity and fairmindedness which the people expected from their ruling chief. From all accounts he was not over-tyrannical by Baluch standards, but he had followed after Mīr Rahīm Khān and was therefore naturally compared with him. In another idiom: he invited nemesis. This is how the Baluch account for the way his "empire" fell apart in 1928. It is almost certainly a contributory factor, but we must remember that there had never been a precedent for the Baluch uniting against an alien threat. They were all Baluch, spoke one language, recited the same poems, and subscribed to the same code of honour. The drive and aspirations of one family - in particular, three members of it, spanning five generations - working within the framework of agnatic ties of kinship and informal allegiance, which defined their traditional political conceptions, had brought them to an unprecedented degree of political unity. But as soon as a stronger alien factor was brought to bear on that same framework, the temporary unity immediately dissolved back into the underlying maze of individual and corporate kin and allegiance ties. Every community through its immediate leader sought its own expedient.

There is one more event in the story the Bārakzai tell of themselves which bears on our theme. When Dūst Muhammad Khān was taken to Tehran, the remainder of the family went into exile - into British Baluchistan where they were treated with respect and in some cases provided with a living. Dūst Muhammad Khān had left five sons by three wives. The mother of the eldest and third sons was Bārakzai, that of the second and fourth was Mīr Hurēdzai, while that of the youngest was of a prominent tribe in the Kēch valley (British Baluchistan). Only the first three concern us here. The eldest, Muhammad Umar, assumed the headship of the family on his father's death. It was natural that he should since he was a) the eldest son, b) his mother was a lady of high status of the same kāl, c) he showed the required qualities and the people looked to him and attended his dīwān.[10] When he returned to the Province, he spent his time between Irānshahr and Sarāvān, but as time progressed he spent most of his time in Irānshahr, since it was the most important centre, and left Sarāvān more to his brothers. We have already

mentioned that the Bārekzai property in the Īrānshahr area (including the Nāliguh) had been confiscated by the Government, and was not returned to the family until the fifties, but the leader is looked after by his people.

Muhammad Umar was very popular, greatly loved by the people and respected by the Government and the Persian officials, even though his position in Baluch society could have no official recognition in the Persian administrative system. He died suddenly in 1959. During his lifetime his brothers, though they respected his position and would never go against his word, had not lived as he had wished them to, and had given little time or thought to mardumdārī and the responsibilities of their status. Only the third, Muhammad Amīn, had in two places, Nāhuk and Īshār, carried out the duties of a ruling chief under his brother, without scandal and to the reasonable contentment of the people. Muhammad Umar left two sons, Rahmn and Amīr. Those concerned in the succession gathered in Īrānshahr at the funeral. Besides the brothers and the elder son, who was still only about fifteen, Mīr Murād Khān of the Mīr Murādzai family from Sīb and Lashkhah of the Bolēdai from Māsk were also present. Though a non-Bārekzai could not be head of the Bārekzai family, and the eventual successor must be confirmed in his position by his family and their following, nevertheless prominent affines had a say in the choice of a successor. The choice was a difficult one. Muhammad Umar on his death bed told Alam to live up to his responsibilities and commended him to the other brothers as their senior brother. Rahmn was too young. Alam Khān, the second brother, had so far in his life shown none of the necessary qualities for leadership, and there was also the point that he was of a different mother from Muhammad Umar, and his mother was not Bārekzai but Mīr Murādzai. This latter point did not disqualify him for his mother was simply of a different gāt and not of lower class. But choosing him would mean slightly deflecting the line of succession from pure Bārekzai. However, Rahmn's mother was also Rosorgzāda, and the usual form of succession was always ceteris paribus to the eldest son. Muhammad Amīn was of the same mother as Muhammad Umar, in the prime of life (early thirties), had some experience of responsibility, was much liked by the people and had been Muhammad Umar's favourite brother, but had not shown

himself altogether reliable or likely to command the same respect for upright living and disinterested mardomdārī as his brother. Amānullāh, the fourth brother by the same mother as Alam Khān, spoke for Muhammad Amīn. Amānullāh and Muhammad Amīn were and are the closest two friends of the five brothers, but Amānullāh told me that his reason for speaking for Muhammad Amīn was so that he should not think he favoured Alam because they were of the same mother. Alam Khān had stated at the outset that they should not choose him simply because he was the eldest brother. Muhammad Amīn would probably have been chosen had it not been for the presence of one man. This was Mīrzā Khān.

Mīrzā Khān was the senior member of another line of the Bārekzai family; the brothers called Mīrzā Khān "cousin" (pāk-zāhī = literally "uncle's child") and the two agnatic lines joined in Mīr A'zam Khān, the son and successor of Malik Mehrāb, and great-grandfather of Dost Muhammad. Mīrzā Khān's line held the fort of Arefshān and the area of Salāh Kuh, Hong and Murtān owned allegiance to them, but they always considered themselves subordinate to the head of the main Bārekzai line. Mīrzā Khān was older than the brothers of Muhammad Umar and therefore socially senior to them. Only the head of the family, when elected, would be senior to Mīrzā Khān and then only in matters which affected his political position - as a member of a social gathering he would defer and show respect to his elder "cousin". Mīrzā Khān said no to Muhammad Amīn. And it was then that the obvious compromise solution was agreed upon, that Rahman should succeed when he became of age if he showed the required aptitude, and in the meantime the next eldest brother, Alam Khān, should assume the responsibilities. But as we shall see further on (in Part Six) this was not a practical solution, for Muhammad Amīn was the more popular man. In the Baluch Period Muhammad Amīn would almost certainly have taken over, just as Dost Muhammad Khān succeeded to Mīr Behrām Khān. But in the new circumstances with physical force in the hands of the Administration which does not recognise the Baluch political roles, the pressures are much weaker and the roles more vaguely defined.

## II

### Sardārzai

This partial "autobiography" of the Bārakzai family has directly involved all the other major dynastic families of the Province except one: the Sardārzai, which was only indirectly involved through common intermarriage, and was too distant geographically, and to some extent isolated ecologically, to be closely involved politically. Some mention has already been made (in Chapter 1) of the Sardārzai account of their own origins. According to them, they have formed the most stable political entity in the Province, so much so that it is tempting to describe their comparatively small territory, which is also ecologically distinct from the rest of the Province, as a principality. The Sardārzai are the dynastic family of the Jadgāls who as their mother tongue speak a patois akin to, and almost certainly descended from, Sindhi. However, as soon as a boy grows old enough (7-8 years old) to sit with the men he gets to know Baluchi since not all the tribes of the area are Jadgāl and there are always travellers passing through the settlements, and Baluchi is the lingua franca. So all the men and probably most of the women speak Baluchi as well, though they never use it in a gathering of Jadgāls. It is puzzling that this should be the only language to have survived in the Province besides Baluchi, when many of the other immigrants must have brought other languages with them. The Sardārzai however now speak only Baluchi, and this is probably due to their greater contact with other tribes. The name Sardārzai seems to be a corruption of Saddāzai after an ancestor, Saddā (cf. Chapter 9, Fig. 6).

In Sind the choice of succession fell between two brothers. The elder was more inclined to spend his time on the chase than on sardārdārī, and the people opted for the younger brother. But the elder brother would not surrender his right. The people, however, disregarded him and "tied the turban" on the younger brother (pāg basta = symbol of chieftainship). The elder brother appealed to the Moghul Emperor[11] as a powerful neighbour to help him to retrieve his position. The Emperor sent him back with a force

under one of his own generals. War ensued and lasted a long time, but eventually the younger brother was killed. Annoyed at being kept so long fighting what was to him an unimportant war, the general kicked the corpse. Immediately fighting broke out again, but this time with the elder brother on the side of his own people against the foreign force, incensed that an officer whom he considered to be in his charge had dishonoured the corpse of his brother. But the foreign force was the stronger and tempers were high. The general had all the males the soldiers could find killed, and even had unborn children ripped from their mothers' wombs lest they should be sons.

So the people were forced to flee westwards. For reasons not remembered other tribes joined them on their way. They tried to settle in Kech, but the people there would not let them stay for they had many animals and pasturage was scarce. So they continued westwards across the Dasht river and what is now the border between Pakistan and Iran into Bāhu and the territory of the Bolēdāni. The Bolēdāi allowed them to stay at a place called Kāhā[12] - about two miles east of the present course of the Wasan Kaur. Soon, comprising the country to their native land and taking account of its potentiality they set about constructing small earthworks (bund) to deflect and contain the flood waters which poured into the plain at irregular intervals, and little by little they turned the area into a little Sind. When the Bolēdāi saw their success, they tried to exact taxes from them. The Jadgāls refused to accept subordinate status in such a manner, and in the ensuing battle successfully defended their holdings.

Peace between the two tribes was eventually sealed by intermarriage, and the present political identity of the area dates from this event. The present dominant line of the Sardārsni dynastic family resided in Mīrī Bāzār (Map VI). It is not clear whether this was always the dominant line. It seems at least probable that it was not, for the other main political divisions centred on Mushkīrwāni Kalāt and Dīrwān. The Map shows how each of these divisions relied on different sources of flood water for irrigation, and how other subsidiary divisions centred on Panni Sar ("the head of the Plain") and Dej were similarly ecologically independent.

We are not here concerned with inheritance of land - which will be explained in Part Four, but succession to political power. The two are not entirely distinct in practice, but the inheritance of land works according to strict rules, whereas succession to political power depends on a number of factors, not least of which (as we have already seen) is personal aptitude. We have also seen that although one man might attain paramount power, and his position was the result of a long progression in that direction, power was never thought of as indivisible. Dūst Muhammad's position of paramount power depended on individual relationships based on individual kin ties and allegiance, and corporate (i.e. tribal) ties of allegiance, some of which he took over from his uncle, some of which he had by virtue of his Barakzai birth, and exploited through personal aptitude and aspiration, and some of which he acquired after his succession. His predecessor had in this case made nothing over to him either formally or informally, by the formal rules of inheritance or personal will. Mīr Bahrām Khān had only set the stage for Nūshīrvān to succeed him in the Īrānshahr fort, thus giving him the chance to be the dominant member of the family in that ecological area of the Province by force of circumstance if he could hold it, i.e. if he showed the personal aptitude. It is true that the Īrānshahr fort was strategically the most important in the Province, and so an important factor was in Nūshīrvān's favour. As it happened he did not hold it, and according to the account we are given, this was due to his lack of personal aptitude. But the important point is that Bahrām was not attempting to hand over to Nūshīrvān his whole informal Baluch "empire". He was setting him up in one fort, and one of his reasons for doing this was that his brother already had more than one fort and Nūshīrvān had none. The point I wish to make is this: that although the historical evidence available shows a tendency towards one position of paramount power in the Province, the conception of succession was not necessarily aimed towards this. Basically, the aim was to provide each "prince" with a hukūmat - a "government" - an area dominated by a fort, from which he would receive the perquisites of ruling.

The circumstances of the Jodgāl area (eg. Bāhū and Dashtīārī) show this even more clearly, for it is a smaller area, more densely populated, subject

to a higher degree of agricultural exploitation, and with much stronger ties between the people and the dynastic family. Unfortunately, however, these details from the Jadgāl area are not documented historically and are not remembered in detail by the people themselves. Nevertheless, what is remembered, since it constitutes the Jadgāl's own explanation of the present situation, will serve our purpose.

When the head of the dynastic family died, apart from the land that each of his sons would as a matter of course inherit from him, he would attempt to give, at least to each of those whom he favoured, a settlement, a locality or an area, in which the people would look to his as their immediate chief, and where he would therefore live as local ruler. This could be quite apart from whether or not he owned any land in the locality, though he would almost certainly acquire land there in one of various ways in due course if he had none. Such a position is referred to throughout the Province as hukūmat ("government"), and a community which is without such a chief (hākim) will often solicit one from the head of the dynastic family to which it owns allegiance, in order that they should have someone to mediate their disputes, and the prestige of a "royal" dīwān. In return, the chief would have the right to a tithe on the produce of the community for the support of his menage. The father (or elder brother) will often have placed some of his family in such positions during his lifetime, and each man on his succession will expect to find a number of people in such positions who acknowledged a subordinate position to his predecessor. In this sense no succession to paramount power is a matter of course, and it is uncertain until all the chiefs and people have informally acknowledged or acquiesced in the new situation. A junior line should defer to a senior line, and a young brother to his elder brother. If a father should "set up" his second son in preference to his first, it would be considered wrong for the elder son to move against him, but if the people should gather to the elder son, the younger son will cease de facto to be his father's successor. Similarly, the man whom the dying chief "set up" in his own place de facto occupied the best strategic position.

In this way a situation arose among the Jadgāls wherein there were

three major political divisions - hukūmats centred in Mīri Bāsār (lit: "The Prince's village"), Nūshīrwāni Kalāt, and Dirmān.[13] From a purely strategic point of view Nūshīrwāni Kalāt must have been the most important fort, for it is situated on the top of a hill which rises some two hundred feet above the plain and in clear weather is a vantage point from which most of Bāhū and a large amount of Dashtiārī is visible. There are also remains of another smaller fort on the plain beneath it which is known as Gasab. Gasab is said to be later but it is not clear what occasioned the move. However, one thing is clear: when the Mazan Kaur changed course Nūshīrwāni Kalāt must have lost its strategic importance almost overnight. It is possible that for a few years a much reduced amount of flood water still reached the area and the fort of Gasab was built at this time. The wholesale evacuation of Bāhū, which the change in course of the Mazan Kaur caused (cf. above Pt.I) reduced the number of ecologically independent sections of the area, and must greatly have enhanced the prestige of the hukūmat of Mīri Bāsār, which was the residence of the presently dominant line of the dynastic family. The authority of the hukūmat in Nūshīrwāni Kalāt did not dissolve because it lost its agriculture, but because of the dispersal of its people. Despite their dispersal and migration the people would still show allegiance to their dynastic chief for a generation or so, until through sheer force of circumstances in a different environment a new allegiance took its place.

The days of Mīri Bāsār also were numbered, and soon one by one the hāmis of Dashtiārī were evacuated, until eventually Mīri Bāsār, the centre of the hukūmat, was left without access to irrigation water and had to be evacuated. However, the line of the dynastic family which held Mīri Bāsār also owned land in Dalgān. The head of the Sheikhzāda tribe lives in Dalgān and the Sheikhs and their ghulāms form the population and own all the land of Dalgān which is not owned by the Sardārzai - which is approximately one third. This circumstance and the fact that Dalgān obtained water from both the Kāju and the Mazan Kaur (in the higher floods) for its fields distinguishes Dalgān from the other settlements in the area. The part of Dalgān which belonged to the Sheikhzāda is sociologically similar to Nigwar (cf. above 39) except in that it contains the head of the Sheikhzāda tribe, who apart from

His political position as head of a tribe is also a focus of religious allegiance (cf. Part Five) which extends far beyond the borders of the Jadgāl area. Therefore the Jumā of the head of the Sheikhzāda tribe, Sheikh Cherāg, has always been well attended and important. After the evacuation of Mīri Bāzār, the Sardārzai main line (four brothers) cannot be considered to have been permanently resident in any one settlement. But because of their large holdings there they have been more closely connected with Dalgān than any other one place in the Jadgāl area. This accidental connection would seem to have been to the advantage of both "leaders". The religious defers to the political, and the political to the religious in their respective spheres. The following of the secular leader is better defined and more closely knit than that of the religious leader, but to a large degree the two coincide. It is therefore logical that the closer the two are - both territorially and temperamentally, the better it is for the position of each, and for the political stability of the area. It is due to these factors that the Mīri Bāzār line of the Sardārzai dynastic family has maintained its status among its people after the disintegration of its territorial centre and the change in its political status vis-a-vis the Persian Government, and the other lines of the family, particularly those resident in the area of Pirmān and Dasht Sar, have remained subordinate to them. Their continued status among the people has long been a source of worry to the Government, and it is partly due to this that the senior brother, Mir Abdi Khan (cf. above 18) now resides on the Arab side of the Gulf. And this brings us to the final and decisive factor in the continued status of the family: that it had sufficient men of sufficient personal aptitude for the circumstances. When the elder brother emigrated and the second brother died, the third brother, Mīr Maulādād, was not found wanting.

Without a full scale cadastral survey of the whole Jadgāl area (which in the circumstances would be extremely difficult to carry out) it is not possible to be certain what proportion of the cultivable land of the area is owned by the Sardārzai family, but I was assured by several informants and by my own observation that it was in fact an insignificant proportion. They have no official status, and the administration (at least at the local level) has

tried hard to discredit them with the people. They have by no means always been benevolent rulers. When pressed, the only reason Mauléed could give for his continued popularity was "the goodness of the people"! I had the privilege of wandering about the area with him from settlement to settlement in April 1965 and at least one superficial answer was very evident: he constituted a mobile court. And the advantages of this court over the system provided by the Persian Ministry of Justice were a) that it was on the spot instead of one or more days' journey away in an administrative centre - which would require a costly expedition, and b) the personal interest and adherence to tradition compared with the impersonality and indifference of the Persian court. Winter's description of the village court in Bamuka (Winter, 1958: 146) is equally true here: "It is quite clear from the procedure followed, the relative importance accorded to various cases, and the judgments given that the paramount aim of these proceedings is the restoration of breaches of solidarity. To put it briefly, when one man commits a wrong against another, what concerns the village is not so much the wrong itself as the ill feelings which it has generated between the parties involved. Thus the principal goal is the restoration of good relations between the men concerned, rather than the administration of justice in some more abstract sense." In this way the administration cannot compete with the dynastic family, so long as the dynastic family can provide somebody who can fulfil this function.

NOTES

1. It is not known whether the present colony of Bārakzai at Qal'a-i Fath on the left bank of the Helmand just inside Afghanistan existed at this time or not, and - if it did - whether Mir Abdullāh Khān was from them or from the main part of the Bārakzai tribe further east, though he is thought to have come from the main branch of the tribe. It is significant that the Qal'a-i Fath Bārakzai now speak Baluchi and are surrounded by an entirely Baluch population, but they are not reckoned Baluch. The Bārakzai in Persian Baluchistan - who do not now have any contact with Afghanistan - say that they were not Baluch, but are now. In any case they are not Baluch.

2. No other details of the reason for his flight are remembered. Thus, though we know there was a fratricidal war between the Bārakzai brothers in Afghanistan following the death of Muhammad Aglī in 1823 (cf. Enc. Brit. (1957) I, p.286) we have no evidence for linking the two events. 1823 would also be rather late, if the figure of ten generations is correct.

3. It is probably after this son that the family has sometimes been called Barānzai.

4. Historically he died in Mīhnā in 1451 where his tomb is still a popular place of pilgrimage. He was a descendent of the fifth Imām of the Shī'a and founded a tarīqa cf. Enc. Is., 1936, III, 922.

5. The Baluch say that Shāh Ni'matullāh Valī had originally come from India. Historically he was born in Aleppo, but after his death his grandsons migrated to India and were appointed to high office in the Deccan (ibid.)

6. The Baluch pronounce this Persian name Bemerzāde. It is normal for the Baluch to borrow from Persian in a religious context, since the lingua franca for literary purposes on all sides of them has always been Persian and traditionally literacy is equated with learning, and learning with religious learning.

7. See Part Four for an account of the conception of kinship and the rules of inheritance which make such affinal relationships of prime importance.

8. The Baluch pronounce this name "Ḥasan".

9. Their comparative poverty was probably to some extent due to their having no close connection with a prominent dynastic family.

10. cf. Part Four.

11. Unfortunately it is not known which Moghul Emperor.

12. They explain the name Sīāō as sī = 30, gāō - a measurement equal to 50 gaz or weapons - the area of land they were allowed to mark out for themselves.

13. Kāh Kalāt - the fort in the north of Kāhū - had been the Bolēdai fort in the area before the arrival of the Jadgāls. When the Jadgāls established their independence it appears to have remained in Bolēdai hands, and the senior member of the settlement is Bolēdai today.

PART THREE

The Context

In this Part I sketch a model which will serve as a diachronic context for the Baluch situation, and illustrate its affinities with neighbouring areas. It is divided into four chapters: the first (chapter 5) outlines the main framework of the model; the following three chapters (6, 7, and 8) define in more detail social relationships and aspects of social change which are implicit in chapter 5. There are three main reasons for inserting this in the middle of the essay, after the basic ethnography and history, and before the analysis of leadership:

a) On the one hand, it adds a new dimension to Parts One and Two. On the other hand, the complex of roles, statuses, etc., which are described in the remainder of the essay will not fit into an integrated analytical pattern after the manner of the "equilibrium" or structural-functional School in British Social Anthropology. These roles, etc., in the present situation are in effect traditional (popularly accepted) vehicles for the operation of suitable personalities in the leadership and control of the society. But each of them has arisen and become an accepted institution at different times, from different ethnic and cultural origins, and as the result of different social and religious pressures. Abstracted from the particular personalities which work through them at any given time, they do not form a structure. When any given secular role is not occupied by a politically positive personality, that role may be said to be an archaism (cf. Lévi-Strauss, 1958, Chapter VI). It is convenient, by means of the model, to make this clear before proceeding further.

b) Certain terms (e.g. "feudal") which will be required later must be defined before they are used, and this can best be done through the exposition of the model.

c) So far I have used the adjective "traditional" to denote aspects of Baluch culture which have not been affected by Persian rule. This has been convenient, but to some extent artificial. By introducing the model at this stage as a context for the remainder of the essay I make it plain

that I do not assume that the system I describe is static or stable. Although it may at first seem that I am substituting a cyclical for a static interpretation, this is not the case. I claim simply that each stage of the model is a sociologically feasible and natural progression from the previous stage, and that as a generalisation it fits a number of sets of particular facts.[1]

The discussion of the relevance of the various aspects of the model to the Baluch situation and the justification of the use of the terminology involved will necessitate reference to a number of areas outside the Province. This will also serve the purpose of emphasising the underlying sociological unity of the vast and predominantly desert and semi-desert area (of which at least half the Province is undoubtedly a part, and the remainder is closely connected with it) which is defined by three major mountain ranges: the Zagros, the Alburz, and the Hindukush. In what follows I refer to this area as "the Plateau" (see Map III). With the exception of a few of the cities on its edge this is an area for which very little is known in detail either historically or ethnographically, and none of the conceptions put forward in this Part have to my knowledge ever been applied specifically to this area before.

NOTES

1. Similar use of a model is made by Leach (1964, cf. Introductory Note) in the analysis of a political system which bears many similarities to the material used in this essay. Cf. also Firth, 1964, Part 1, esp. Chapter 1.

# Chapter Five

I

The essential basis of the model is implicit in Ibn Khaldun's celebrated Muqaddimah (1377, trans. Rosenthal 1958). Since the Muqaddimah presents a sociological view of Islamic history as a whole up to the 14th century I introduce this chapter by quoting relevant sections from this source (I have italicised particularly significant passages):

"...Since desert[1] life no doubt is the reason for bravery, savage groups are braver than others. They are, therefore, better able to achieve superiority and to take away the things that are in the hands of other nations. The situation of one and the same group changes, in this respect, with the change of time. Whenever people settle in the fertile plains and amass luxuries and become accustomed to a life of abundance and luxury, their bravery decreases to the degree that their wildness and desert habits decrease." (I, 282).

"(Respect for) blood ties is something natural among men, with the rarest exceptions. It leads to affection for one's relations and blood relatives, (the feeling that) no harm ought to befall them nor any destruction come upon them. One feels shame when one's relatives are treated unjustly or attacked, and one wishes to intervene between them and whatever peril or destruction threatens them. This is a natural urge in man, for as long as there have been human beings. If the relationship between persons who help each other is very close, so that it leads to close contact and unity, the ties are obvious and clearly require the (existence of a feeling of solidarity) without any outside(prodding). If, however, the relationship is somewhat distant, it is often forgotten in part...

"Clients and allies belong in the same category /as, as blood ties/. The affection everybody has for his clients and allies results from the feeling of shame that comes to a person when one of his neighbours, relatives, or a blood relation in any degree (of kinship) is humiliated. The reason for it is that a client (-master) relationship leads to close contact exactly, or approximately in the same way, as does common descent.

It is in that sense that one must understand Muhammad's remark, "learn as much of your pedigrees as is necessary to establish your ties of blood relationship."... (ibid. I, p. 264).

"Only those who share in the group feeling (of a group) can have a "house" and nobility in the basic sense and in reality, while others have it only in a metaphorical and figurative sense. This is because nobility and greatness are the result of (personal) qualities. A house means that a man counts noble and famous men among his forebears. The fact that he is their progeny and descendant gives him great standing among his fellows, for his fellows respect the great standing and nobility that his ancestors acquired through their (personal) qualities ... (ibid. p.273).

"A "house" possesses an original nobility through group feeling and (personal) qualities. Later on, the people (who have a "house") divest themselves of that nobility when group feeling disappears as the result of sedentary life ..." (ibid. p.274 ).

(For ibn Khaldun's conception which Rosenthal has translated "house", I use the term "dynastic family".)

"(Prestige) reaches its end in a single family within four successive generations. This is as follows: The builder of the glory (of the family) knows what it cost him to do the work, and he keeps the qualities that created his glory and made it last. The son who comes after him had personal contact with his father and thus learned those things from him. However, he is inferior in this respect to (his father), in as much as a person who learns things through study is inferior to a person who knows them from practical application. The third generation must be content with imitation and, in particular, with reliance upon tradition. This member is inferior to his of the second generation, in as much as a person who relies (blindly) upon tradition is inferior to a person who exercises independent judgement.

"The fourth generation, then, is inferior to the preceding ones in every respect. This member has lost the qualities that preserved the

edifice of their glory. He (actually) despises (those qualities). He imagines that the edifice was not built through application and effort. He thinks that it was something due his people from the very beginning by virtue of the mere fact of their (noble) descent, and not something that resulted from group (effort) and (individual) qualities. For he sees the great respect in which he is held by the people, but he does not know how that respect originated and what the reason for it was. He imagines that it is due to his descent and nothing else. He keeps away from those in whose group feeling he shares, thinking that he is better than they. He trusts that (they will obey him because) he was brought up to take their obedience for granted, and he does not know the qualities that make obedience necessary. Such qualities are humility (in dealing) with (such men) and respect for their feelings. Therefore, he considers them despicable, and they, in turn, revolt against him and despise him. They transfer (political) leadership from him and his direct lineage to some other related branch (of his tribe), in obedience to their group feeling, as we have stated. They do so) after they have convinced themselves that the qualities of the (new leader) are satisfactory to them. His family then grows, whereas the family of the original (leader) decays and the edifice of his "house" collapses."

"The rule of four (generations) with respect to prestige usually holds true. It may happen that a "house" is wiped out, disappears, and collapses in fewer than four (generations), or it may continue unto the fifth and sixth (generations), though in a state of decline and decay..." (Ibid. pp. 279-81).

"The conditions and stages of a dynasty are as a rule no more than five (in number).

"The first stage is that of success, the overthrow of all opposition, and the appropriation of royal authority from the preceding dynasty. In this stage, the ruler serves as model to his people by the manner in which he acquires glory, collects taxes, defends property, and provides military protection. He does not claim anything exclusively for himself to the

exclusion of (his people), because (such an attitude) is what is required by group feeling. (and it was group feeling) that gave superiority (to the dynasty), and (group feeling) still continues to exist as before.

"The second stage is the one in which the ruler gains complete control over his people, claims royal authority all for himself, excluding them, and prevents them from trying to have a share in it. In this stage, the ruler of the dynasty is concerned with gaining adherents and acquiring clients and followers in great numbers, so as to be able to blunt the aspirations of the people who share in his group feeling and belong to his group, who are of the same descent as he himself and have the same claim to royal authority as he has. He keeps them from power and bars them from the sources of (power). He stops them from getting to it, and, eventually, all the power is in the hands of his family. He reserves all the glory that he is building up to the members of his own house. He spends as much, or more, care to keep (his people) at a distance and to subdue them, as the first members of the dynasty expended in the search for power. The first (members of the dynasty) kept strangers away, and, all the people who shared in their group feeling supported them in this. He, on the other hand, keeps (his) relatives away, and he is supported in this effort only by a very small number of people, who are not related to him. Thus, he undertakes a very difficult task. [i.e. he attempts to build up a new "group". In the new "group" he is free, while the other members of the "group" have obligations solely to his].

"The third stage is one of leisure and tranquillity in which the fruits of royal authority are enjoyed. (These fruits are) the things that human nature desires, such as acquisition of property, creation of lasting monuments, and fame. All the ability (of the ruler) is expended on collecting taxes; regulating income and expenses, book-keeping and planning expenditures; erecting large buildings, big constructions, spacious cities, and lofty monuments; presenting gifts to embassies of nobles from (foreign) nations and tribal dignitaries; and dispensing bounty to his own people. In addition he supports the demands of his followers and retinue with money

and positions. He inspects his soldiers, pays them well, and distributes fairly their allowances every month. Eventually, the result of this (liberality) shows itself in their dress, their fine equipment, and their armor on parade days. The ruler thus can impress friendly dynasties and frighten hostile ones with (his soldiers). This stage is the last during which the ruler is in complete authority. Throughout this and the previous stages, the rulers are independent in their opinions. They build up their strength and show the way for those after them.

"The fourth stage is one of contentment and peacefulness. The ruler is content with what his predecessors have built. He lives in peace with all his royal peers. He adopts the tradition of his predecessors and follows closely in their footsteps. He imitates their ways most carefully. He thinks that to depart from tradition would mean the destruction of his power and that they knew better (what is good for the preservation of) the glory they themselves had built.

"The fifth stage is one of waste and squandering. In this stage, the ruler wastes on pleasures and amusements (the treasures) accumulated by his ancestors, through (excessive) generosity to his inner circle and at their parties. Also, he acquires bad, low-class followers to whom he entrusts the most important matters (of state), which they are not qualified to handle by themselves, not knowing which of them they should tackle and which they should leave alone. (In addition,) the ruler seeks to destroy the great clients of his people and followers of his predecessors. Thus, they come to hate him and conspire to refuse support to him. (Furthermore) he loses a number of soldiers by spending their allowances on his pleasures (instead of paying them) and by refusing them access to his person and not supervising them (properly). Thus, he ruins the foundations his ancestors had laid and tears down what they had built up. In this stage, the dynasty is seized by senility and the chronic disease from which it can hardly ever rid itself, for which it can find no cure, and eventually, it is destroyed" (Ibid.,353-5 ).

All this is perhaps not at first obviously applicable to the Baluch situation. The Baluch dynastic families never ruled on a large enough

ample - with the exception perhaps of the Brāhui dynasty in Kalāt (East Pakistan). It is, however, applicable to a large number of families which have ruled for periods in other parts of the Plateau (cf. below, IV), and I maintain that the Baluch dynastic families bear rong resemblances to these.

"It should be known that followers in a dynasty occupy different positions in (the) dynasty depending on whether their close contact with the ruler is of old or of recent date. The reason for this is that the purpose of group feeling, which is defense and aggression, can materialise only with the help of a common descent. For, as we have stated before, blood relations and other close relatives help each other, while strangers and outsiders do not. Client relationships and contacts with slaves or allies have the same effect as (common descent). The consequences of (common) descent, though natural, still are something imaginary. The real thing to bring about the feeling of close contact is social intercourse, friendly association, long familiarity, and the companionship that results from growing up together, having the same wet nurses, and sharing the other circumstances of death and life. If close contact is established in such a manner, the result will be affection and co-operation. Observation of people shows this to be so.

"Something similar can be observed in connection with the relation between master and follower. Between the two, there develops a special closeness of relationship which has the same effect (as common descent) and strengthens the close contact. Even though there is no (common) descent, the fruits of (common) descent are there.

"Whenever such a client relationship exists between a tribe and its client before the tribe has obtained royal authority, the roots of the relationship are more firmly intertwined, the feelings and beliefs involved are more sincere, and the relationship itself is more clearly defined, for two reasons.

"First: before (people obtain) royal authority, they are a model in their ways. Only in the rarest cases is a distinction made between (common)

descent and the client relationship. The position (of clients) is the same as that of close or blood relatives. However, if they choose followers after they have obtained royal authority, their royal rank causes them to make a distinction between master and client, and (another) between close relatives and clients or followers. The conditions of leadership and royal authority require this in view of (existing) distinctions and differences in rank. The situation of (followers) weakens, and co-operation, therefore, becomes less likely. This means that followers are now less (close to the ruler) than they were before (the ruler obtained) royal authority.

"Second: Followers from before (the time the ruler obtained) royal authority had the status of followers long before the dynasty (came to power). It is, thus, no longer clear (to contemporaries) how the close contact (originally) came about. As a rule, it is supposed to be a case of (common) descent, and in this case the group feeling is strengthened. On the other hand, (follower relationships formed) after (the ruler has obtained) royal authority are of recent date and equally well known to most people. (The origin of) the close contact is clear, and it is clearly distinguishable from (common) descent. The group feeling, in the latter case, is weak in comparison with the group feeling that results from the client relationship that existed before the dynasty (came to power)" (ibid., pp.374-5).

"It should be known that when the ruling dynasty starts on the road to senility and destruction, the rise and beginning of the new dynasty takes place in two ways:

"(The one way is) for provincial governors in the dynasty to gain control over remote regions when (the dynasty) loses its influence there. Each one of them founds a new dynasty for his people and a realm to be perpetuated in his family. His children or clients inherit it from him. Gradually, they have a flourishing realm. They often compete bitterly with each other, and aspire to gain sole possession of it. The one who is stronger than his rival will gain the upper hand and take away what the other had ...

"The other way is for some rebel from among the neighbouring nations and tribes to revolt against the dynasty. He either makes propaganda for some particular cause to which he intends to win the people, as we have indicated, or he possesses great power and a great group feeling among his people. His power is already flourishing among them, and now he aspires with the help of (his people) to gain royal authority. (His people) are convinced that they will obtain it, because they feel that they are superior to the ruling dynasty, which is affected by senility. Thus, to (the rebel) and his people, it is a fact that they will gain dominion over it. They constantly attack it, until they defeat it and inherit its power." (Ibid. II, pp.128-30).

Ibn Khaldun illustrates his theories with examples drawn from Islamic history. The above quotations are extremely selective but form an integral part of his theoretical framework, which runs to nearly fourteen hundred pages in the English translation. It may be thought unjust to quote so selectively, but this has been done in order to show aspects of his theory which bear particular relevance to the present subject. I have thought it worth while to quote at such length rather than simply to refer by paraphrase, since except for a short selection of passages in French translation published by G. Marçais and W. Hercher under the title of Recueil de textes de sociologie et de droit public musulman contenus dans les "Prolégomènes" d'Ibn Khaldun ("Bibliothèque de l'Institut d'Etudes Supérieures Islamiques de l'Algier", No. 6 (Algiers, 1951)) I know of no mention in a sociological context of this important work.

II

I now expound my own model, which though it was arrived at independently from first hand study of the Plateau, is perhaps best seen as a development of Ibn Khaldun's, applied to a particular area:

1. For reasons which concern their area of origin (and are therefore not relevant here) a pastoral, tribal people invades a settled area.

this people is composed of a nuclear group claiming unilineal (invariably patrilineal) descent from a common ancestor, and recognises within itself a dominant line or family, which may or may not constitute a lineage in the accepted sense. (It is this dominant family which in the new situation develops into what we have called a "dynastic family".)

2. Finding a power vacuum, owing to the weakness of the political structure and authority in the settled area it invades, it remains and becomes the dominant power in the area.

3. The "dynastic family" of the invaders becomes the focus of power in the settled area, and therefore the de facto rulers of both peoples: those that entered the area with it and those who were in the area when it came - the pastoralists and the agriculturalists. There may of course be more than one such family, in which case the area will become divided into their respective areas of influence and political control.

4a. Having become the political focus of a more extensive composite society, it also becomes more powerful, and richer (because of new and additional economic resources). Its tribal following, however, does not become either more powerful or richer, since its social position has basically not changed: it conducts the same way of life and feels the same relationship with the dynastic family as before. The settled people are subordinate to the dynastic family and the structural distance between them and the dynastic family is much greater than that between the dynastic family and its tribal following, but the direct relationship between the settled people and the tribal following is not defined.

4b. Before the invasion the settled people are unlikely to have had the same close relationship with their political leaders as the tribal following had with its dominant line. Being divided between a number of small villages over a large area, they are likely to have been politically subject to a "superstructure" of some kind, whether in the form of one single dominant "dynastic family", or an oligarchy of several inter-related minor ones (cf. Parsons, 1964, pp. 162-3 and Spooner, 1965a, p. 82). In either case, the structural distance between the settled people and its

rulers is likely to have been greater than that between the pastoralists and their dynastic family.

4a. In the new situation, therefore, as far as the settled people are concerned one "super structure" is simply substituted for another, and this will make little or no real difference to the social and political position of the great majority of them. The leaders that constituted their former superstructure will have been either killed, driven out or assimilated with them. In the latter case, certain of them (with the required personal qualities) may assume the role of popular leaders of their former people under the new superstructure.

4d. This is not so for the tribal following of the invading dynastic family. For them the first main result of the new situation is a greater prestige from having another stratum of people who are socially inferior to them a) by occupation (for pastoral values are dominant) and b) by structural distance from the rulers.

5. But such a situation cannot be static, for it has enhanced the political and economic position of the dynastic family more than that of its tribal following with the result that the original "group feeling" of the invaders is disturbed and the relationship between the dynastic family and its tribal following must change. The structural distance between them automatically grows. Whatever may have been the position before the invasion, the new composite population of the area is potentially divided into three "classes": invading dynastic family, tribal pastoralists, peasants, of which the status of the first and last are politically stable, the second unstable.

6. In the new situation the settled people are a source of agricultural wealth and labour for the dynastic family, while the tribal following is a source of military strength and, secondarily, pastoral products. At first the tribal following will be by far the most important to the dynastic family because it will stand in need of it as a source of military strength to consolidate its position. But as its position becomes firmer it will look more and more to the settled population as its main source of wealth.

7. Before arriving in the area the tribal people will have had a name, which will either have been the name of the agnatic nuclear group and applied to the leading family par excellence, or it may from the first have been the name of an eponymous ancestor of the dynastic family line and the tribal following applied it to themselves, so distinguishing themselves from other peoples by a name denoting their group allegiance. In either case this name now becomes applied gradually to the settled people as well as the tribal following, in effect to the realm of the dynastic family. That is, the political unit takes its name from its dominant element, and the remainder of the population loses its ethnic or cultural identity.

8. Its growing interest in the settled agriculture and therefore in the settled agricultural people will cause the dynastic family next to change its military outlook. Whereas before it had fought for and defended movable property only, it is now interested in defending immovable plots of cultivable land and crops and peasants. With this in mind it begins to feel the nakedness and insecurity of nomad life and starts to build forts (or take over and develop existing ones) for its protection and defence in the main agricultural centres.

9. Even so it will usually be some time before the dynastic family becomes settled. But these forts are a tangible symbol for all three classes of the population, of the growing ties between the dynastic family and the settled people and the gradual estrangement from its original tribal following.

10. Thus, not only does the tribal following realise more and more that it is losing its role in the new society, but it sees these (and other) signs of the dynastic family's estrangement from it, and as a result reacts against them.

11. For some time the dynastic family hankers after the old life as the source and justification of values in which it still believes, or would like to believe, and this may serve to stay the estrangement process for a time. However, this can only be temporary, and the effectual position

in the area is now this: the dynastic family from its detached position in a fort or forts in the richest agricultural centre or centres of the area rules a settled agricultural population either directly or through a feudal system of relationships, while the uncultivated parts of the total area under the political control of the dynastic family, i.e. mountains and desert or semi-desert plains, are roamed by the pastoral descendents of the original tribal following (including, possibly, any remains of pre-existing nomadic, pastoral elements, who would by now become assimilated to them). These still own at least nominal allegiance to the dynastic family, but are coming to be thought of more and more by the remainder of the population as outlaws. For the interests of pastoral and agricultural people cannot coincide except in a form of symbiosis where each depends economically on the products of the other (cf. e.g. Schurmann, 1962, p.30n.). Even where such an ideal economic situation obtains, the mutually opposing values of the two ways of life seldom allow complete or lasting peace between nomads and peasants. In this way the Kalhuch situation is something of an exception. Possible reasons for this will be suggested later.

12. The way is now open for the final or "cyclical" stage where

a) a new invader is impelled or attracted into the area, - or

b) the original tribal following is estranged to the point where it puts up a rival dynastic family.

The new conquerors provide a new super-structure. If the several classes which they found or brought with them on assuming this position, whatever were not destroyed or expelled from the area gradually assimilate to each other - the pastoral with the pastoral and the agricultural with the agricultural - in contra-distinction from the new superstructure as it evolves. Therefore, at any given time, the pastoral and agricultural populations of such an area are severally made up of composite communities of different strata which have entered the area at different times and been assimilated with their economic fellows because of political pressures. An (unstable) political unity is lent to the area

by the feudal power and/or prestige (based on former power) of a single dynastic family, or an oligarchy of a few closely allied dynastic families. There may of course also be movement between the agricultural and pastoral elements of the population in either or both directions, but this is subsidiary and for different reasons.

III

The above is presented as a theoretical model only and it is not claimed that it entirely fits any one case. What is claimed is this: there are numerous cases in the history of the Plateau, as there are in the western Islamic world (cf. Ibn Khaldun op. cit.), that fit this model at least in part, and that it is therefore a useful working hypothesis in any sociological analysis of the history of the Islamic world, in particular the Plateau, and, more particularly, the Province under discussion. It is of particular significance in Islamic history, since Islam spread primarily through a great desert and semi-desert belt: from the Arabian Peninsula to the Atlantic in the west and to the borders of China in the east, throughout which agricultural "oases" have continually been susceptible to pressure from surrounding areas of nomadic pastoralism. The whole of the area contained between the Zagros, Alburz and Hindu Kush ranges and large areas of the ranges themselves may be conveniently divided for the purposes of sociological analysis into areas of desert or semi-desert each dominated politically from a comparatively large agricultural settlement or group of settlements. The political and economic hinterland of these settlements has varied with the power and prestige of their dominant political elements. Similarly, each of these settlements with its hinterland has sometimes been politically independent or quasi-independent, and sometimes in a dependent relationship (often of a feudal nature) with another similar settlement - because of the relative power and prestige of the dominant political elements of the settlements concerned (for some examples cf. Spooner 1965b: 97). The political and economic hinterland of each of these centres - often varying in its extent - may be dotted with smaller agricultural settlements and is usually, if and as pasturage

is available, roamed at large by tribal pastoral elements. Wherever there is sufficient non-saline water and soil to support a (relatively) large and compact agricultural population - perhaps as few as 5,000 in the east of Persia, certainly fewer in parts of Baluchistan, but more in the north and west of the Plateau at the foot of the Zagros and Alburz ranges - such a political centre could develop. Map III shows the obvious examples. Some of the names are historically documented over a considerable period. Some less so. Most are obviously Iranian (i.e. pre-Islamic), some obviously not, some doubtful. In some cases we have historical evidence for determining the origins of some elements of the population of a particular centre, but in most cases this evidence - where it exists at all - is so sketchy and accidental as to be useful only in so far as it indicated the composite nature of the present population. Of particular significance here is the fact that the origins and composition of such major tribal groups as the Bakhtiāri, the Lurs and the Kurds, are unknown; I suggest that they would fit the model, and that the application of the model would clarify many aspects of their present social organisation (cf. e.g. the material presented in Barth, 1953, and below, chapter 7).

## IV

The main purpose of the model is to provide a dynamic context for the rest of the essay, which will allow certain elements of the ethnography to be explained by reference to their function in past situations, rather than being forced into an integrated synchronic pattern of analysis. The use of the model must first be justified diachronically by reference to a selection of historical episodes which are relevant to the Plateau and which fit the model in whole or in part. Because of the nature of the evidence for such of this material I have thought it best to quote acknowledged modern authorities - even though their interpretations are in some cases controversial[2]:

1. Little is known about the pre-Iranian population of the Plateau.

The Mitanni dynasty appear to have been an Aryan dynasty ruling over a non-Indo-European people (Frye, 1962: 22). These and other Aryans

(a people from the Indian branch of the hypothetical undivided Indo-Iranians) appear to have been absorbed into the local populations of western Iran and Mesopotamia on the coming of the Iranians (ibid. p. 23). We may assume (with Frye) that "the Aryans were in a nomadic stage of life, or perhaps better characterised as herdsmen who knew about agriculture ... Cattle seem to have been the staff of life of the Aryans as the camel was for the Arabs. Both in the Gathas and the Vedas cattle appear as a prime source of nourishment and wealth, and as significant in religion. Metals were known" ... According to the Vedas the horse and the chariot were used in warfare. "In social organisation, as might be expected of pastoralists, the clan (Avestan *zantu*, ... Latin *gens*) was the most important unit. Whether a larger unit, such as the people or nation or race, had any significance, is dubious... A tripartite composition (as existed in the later pre-Islamic empires) of people (in the clan) into those concerned with religion, the larger group of warriors, and the majority of herdsmen or just common folk is unproven. ...the concepts may well have existed, but their influence on the ordering of society is unknown" (ibid. pp. 23-4).

"The Aryans did split, however, the Indians moving to the great plains of the subcontinent where they found numerous settled folk living in towns, relatives of the builders of such cities as Mohenjo-Daro and Harappa. Although these enemies of the Aryans are ill-regarded in the hymns, surely the conquerors learned much from the conquered *dasyu* (= peasants) - whom they despised...

"One can tentatively propose the following general distribution of the Aryans about the seventh century B.C. when the Medes and Persians had attained their final resting grounds. In Azerbaijan and Western Iran, the Medes and other Iranian newcomers were in contact with a settled majority of non-Indo-European speakers represented by Urartians, Mannaeans, Hurrians, etc., possibly related somehow to the Palaeo-Caucasian or "Japhetic" languages of the present-day Caucasus. Also present were other Indo-Europeans, principally the first bands of the Armenians coming from the west, and possibly fragmentary remains of previous Aryan invaders.

To the south the Persians and other Iranian invaders found the land occupied by Elamites and related non-Indo-European speakers. Farther east were probably Dravidian peoples in Makrān, Sistan and Sind, represented today by their descendants, the Brāhuīs. Finally, in the Hindu Kush mountains were remnants of the people driven there by earlier Aryan migrations into India. In the course of centuries these non-Indo-Europeans were absorbed or pushed more and more into isolated valleys by Iranians from the west and Indians from the south and east until the last group is now represented by the Burushaski speakers in the high and isolated valleys of Hunza" (ibid. p. 26-7 cf. also Minorsky 1945: 73ff.).

"The patriarchal clan, with the important relationships on the male side, was the principal unit of Iranian society, for the smaller family and the larger tribe were secondary. One might express the 'vertical' structure of Iranian society in the following manner (the correlations, of course, are not perfect, khshathra, for example, is by no means clearly 'nation'):

| | | Avesta | Old Persian texts | Darius (as an example) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | family | nmāna | taumā- | = son of Vishtaspa |
| 2. | clan | vis- | vith- | = Achaemenid |
| 3. | tribe | zantu[3] | dantu- | = Pasargadai |
| 4. | province or country | dahyu- | dahyu- | = Persia |
| 5. | nation or people | khshathra- | khshassa- | = Arya[4]... |

New conceptions of rule over settled people, new traditions and a new shariaza[5] will have influenced the Iranians settling down in new homes, especially in western Iran. ...the clan lost its importance in favour of the family on the one hand and the tribe or nation on the other, which is not unexpected.

"The later 'caste system' of India or the rigid[7] 'class system' of Sasanian Iran is not found here, but slaves, servants and 'nobility' do exist.

the 'horizontal' organisation of society before the settlement of the invaders can be surmised by inference" (my italics. Frye, ibid p. 52).

"... Since the middle of the second millenium B.C. Indo-Europeans with their horses and chariots were no strangers to the Near East. The Indo-Europeans, however, were not present in sufficient numbers at the beginning to impose their languages or mores on the settled folk. They were, however, participants in the expansion of the Hurrians in the seventeenth century B.C. over the northern part of the 'Fertile Crescent' from Mesopotamia to the Mediterranean Sea, and they certainly were active in the founding of scores of small 'Hurrian' principalities" (ibid. p. 56).

"From about 1500 to 1150 B.C. a people called the Kassites from the Iranian plateau ruled in Babylonia. They too must have had contacts with Indo-Europeans to judge from some names of their deities and rulers. But the Kassites lost themselves in Babylonia much as the Mitanni in northern Mesopotamia and Syria at this same time were vanishing into the local populations" (ibid. p. 57).

2. Apart from additional data on the distribution of settlement and objects of material culture practically nothing else of specifically sociological import is known of the plateau in pre-Iranian times. The Iranians probably entered the plateau as horseman-nomads separated into a number of distinct tribal groups. When "history" starts it is a history of dynasties: first the Achaemenian dynastic family of the Persian tribe, then after an interval the Arsacids of the Parthian tribe, followed by the Sassanian dynasty of the Persian tribe again. The first and last of these claimed charismatic sanction for their status through close relationship with a universal "formal" religion (Zoroastrianism).

3. The Sassanians (cf. above, ibn Khaldun's fifth stage) were overtaken by the Arabs. About two centuries later breakaway officers of the Caliph's administration began to create local dynasties, each carving out for a time a province or so of the empire (e.g. Tahirids 820 - 872;

Bulafids c. 929 - c. 1055; 'Alids 864 - 928; Bagids 879 - 1930), and small native dynasties began to establish themselves independently in various areas, e.g. Saffārids 867-903; Sāmānids 874-999; Ziyārids 928-1042; Buwayhids 932-1055; Hasanweyhids 959-1015; etc. cf. Lane-Poole, 1925: 121-145).

4. "After the middle of the ninth century, the practice grew up in all Muslim kingdoms of purchasing Turkish prisoners and slaves from central Asia and forming them into regiments of guards. As each dynasty weakened, its Turkish officers acquired an increasing measure of control and occupied the chief political offices at the capital and in the provinces. This led in due course to armed rivalries and revolts, by which the power and authority of the dynasty were undermined" (Gibb, 1962, cf. also Bosworth, 1963: 107). It was from these slaves that the first Turkish dynasty arose - the Ghaznavids:

5. "Towards the end of the fourth/tenth century, various tribes in Turkistān were in a state of unrest and showing a general tendency to move westwards. Among them were the Ghuzz. About the year 425/1033-4 a body of Seljuq Ghuzz crossed the Oxus into Khurāsān and asked permission of Mas'ud ibn Mahmud, the Ghaznavid, to live under his protection. The nature of this movement was that of a tribal migration: the Ghuzz were accompanied by their families and their flocks. As they increased in numbers and influence, the need for fresh pastures became ever more pressing. They began to harry the Ghaznavid forces; and while avoiding direct conflict with them they occupied any places from which the Ghaznavids temporarily withdrew. The Seljuqs themselves were not originally leaders of the Ghuzz but as increasing, though not uninterrupted, success attended their forays and expeditions they were in due course transformed from shepherds into military conquerors, the final stage of this transition being marked by the battle

of Dindinqān (431/1040). After this it remained for them to consolidate their conquests in Khurāsān and the neighbourhood and to continue their movement westwards.

"The power of the Seljuqs during the period of expansion was based on the Turkomān tribes. Their background and customs belonged to the Central Asian steppe. They were as little able as had been the Arabs before them to take over the direct administration of their conquests. In the first stage of the Seljuq migration, before their transformation from shepherds into military conquerors had been completed, the tendency was for the local rulers to look upon the various groups of Turkomāns as tribal auxiliaries, useful to them in their local struggles; and as such they probably received from the local rulers assignments in accordance with the prevailing custom of making grants of land to the amīrs and soldiers. Gradually, as the Seljuqs increased their power, and became themselves rulers of a large empire, they reduced many of the former local rulers to the position of vassals and brought to an end the dominion of others. They also began themselves to assign large areas of the empire to their followers. In due course, after the initial period of expansion, the basis of their power began to alter, in the same way as the power of the caliphate had altered after the Arab expansion. The Seljuq government came to rely more and more on armies composed, not of Turkomāns, but of slaves and freedmen, who, as the dominant class, began to appropriate to themselves the privileges of the former ruling class, which included the collection of revenue. Moreover, since these Turkish slaves and freedmen were in many cases carefully trained not only in the art of war, but also in administrative affairs, it was natural that they should take over, in a large measure, the administration of the country, and that they should, when their power increased, divert the revenue from the central

treasury into their own pockets.

"There were thus two major problems which the Seljuqs had to solve, both of which closely affected land tenure and land revenue administration:

first, how to incorporate into the structure of their empire a large nomadic element, the basis of whose livelihood was the tending of flocks, and to whom the Seljūqs for family reasons were under special obligations; and secondly, how to pay their military forces. ...

"One of the important effects of the Seljuq migration was to introduce into western Asia a new element in the population, namely, the Turks. Many of the Turkomāns moved on to Asia Minor and Syria, but large bodies of them were to be found all over the empire, though probably to a lesser extent in Ṭabaristān and Daylam, which was inaccessible country populated by a robust and hardy people, and in Fārs and Kurdistān, which were already populated by semi-nomadic groups. The entry into Persia of the Turkish elements which at the present day form the majority of the population in Āzarbāyjān, Hamadān and the neighbourhood, and Gurgān, probably dates mainly from Seljuq times. The Seljuq family were themselves Turkomāns, and their leading military officials and provincial governors were mainly Turks or Turkomāns. ...

"The second major division of the population was between the nomads and settled, which in part cut across the division between Turk and non-Turk. The most important nomadic elements consisted of the Turkomāns. As the basis of the Seljūq power shifted from the Ghuzz Turks to slaves and freedmen, the position of the Turkomāns in relation to the rest of the population became less favourable. ...

"In addition to the tribal areas on the borders of Khurāsān there were also considerable tribal areas elsewhere, notably in Fārs. One of the most important of the tribal areas in Fārs was the Shabānkāreh, who gave repeated trouble to the Seljuqs and their governors.

"Finally, there was the division of the population into military and civil, which coincided largely with the first grouping, since the military were mainly Turks and the civil officials probably mainly non-Turks.

"Of the composition of the settled rural population there is not a great deal of information. Small landowners known as dihqāns continued to exist...

"The Seljuq leaders were the leaders of their people but not originally territorial sovereigns. This leadership was not of old standing, but the

result of military successes at the time when the Ghuzz moved into Transoxania and Khurāsān. They conceived of their rule, in all probability, as extending wherever their people roamed, and not, at first in any case, as being tied to, or confined to, any given area" (Lambton, 1953: 59-60 my italics).

6. Most of these new dynasties brought a new (or different) ethnic element to the top of the political structure - either from outside, or up from an indigenous but oppressed stratum of society, and at the same time increased the pastoral population of the country. That is, in general the changing hands of political power favoured the increase of pastoral nomadism; strength and stability of political power encouraged settlement. When the political power was itself a tribal element: "the gradual transformation of the Turkish Khans into Persian absolute rulers aroused the hostility of their clansmen, and this is in turn rendered more acute the struggle between the throne and the military class" (Barthold, 1928: xxi).

7. The effect of the Mongol invasions which followed this period was, "to intensify the process of nomadisation, by destroying most of the cities - especially those of Khurāsān [which includes all the north eastern part of the Plateau] during the first invasion under Jenghis Khan in 1220 - and disrupting the organisations in which the old traditions of Persian-Islamic culture were still cultivated... There is therefore some symbolic truth in the popular view of the Mongols, in so far as they finally destroyed the social and economic foundations upon which the culture of Persia had rested, even if more and more precariously, for a thousand years" (Gibb, 1957: 570).

8. After the Mongols and the Ilkhans came Tamerlane (1361) who destroyed almost entirely whatever elements of urban culture had survived. "Later risings were put down with ruthless cruelty; city after city was destroyed and their populations were massacred, except for the craftsmen who were transported to Samarqand to embellish the conqueror's capital" (ibid. p. 571).

"The devastation and depopulation of Persia had left only three centres of power outside Transoxiana: these were Herāt, Fārs and Tabrīz, and the

conflicts of the next century developed into a struggle between Herāt and Tabrīz" (ibid.).

9. Since quite early Islamic times at least (cf. Bosworth, 1965: 152) there has been a dichotomy and antagonism between the life of the cities and the life outside the cities. Everywhere on the Plateau is either (P.)ābādī or(P.)bīyābān. ābādī is essentially agricultural settlement with dwellings; bīyābān is best characterised in English as "desert", so long as it is remembered that it may not always be technically desert but rather country containing no significant permanent agricultural settlement. A small isolated village naturally falls between these two conceptions. As a generalisation it is true to say that the former is peasant country, the latter nomad or pastoralist country.

10. Finally a native Persian dynasty reappeared, in the form of the Safavids (1502-1736), once more (like the pre-Islamic dynasties) claiming strong charismatic sanctions for their authority (this time in the form of spiritual descent from the Prophet), and at the head of a tribal following.

11. The decline of the Safavid dynasty started with the death of Shāh 'Abbās in 1629, but it was nearly a century before it was overtaken by the (tribal) Afghans (in 1722) from its eastern border in a clear case of ibn Khaldun's fifth stage. The Afghans were, however, unable to establish a dynasty.

12. Next came Nādir Shāh at the head of his Turkish Afshār tribesmen, and finally:

13. Āghā Muhammad Khān, from the Turkish Qājār tribe, established the Qājār dynasty (1796-1925).

V

The above brief tour of Persian history by no means exhausts the opportunities for application of the model to the sociological history of the Plateau. Of perhaps even greater interest are the recent histories (primarily 1700 onwards) of a number of traditional centres of authority on the Plateau (cf. above, III). Most of the evidence for these must come from oral tradition, though a certain amount may be gleaned from occasional references in general histories (e.g. Sepehr Tārīkhe Ālārīyeh, 1957-8 repr. 1958) and local compilations (e.g. Tābandeh, 1954, on Gonābād, and Ayatī, 1948, on Birjand). One of the better known of these centres has been in Kuhistān (or Kūhistān, i.e. "the mountainous country", the central part of which is known as the Qā'inat), centred in the knot of mountains half way down the eastern border of Persia. The political centre was originally Qā'in, but was moved to Birjand during the 19th century. From the time of Nādir Shāh up to the present century it constituted in practice an independent principality under a line of Amīrs (= princes) descended from the Arab Khuzeimeh tribe. At the height of its power (during the 19th century) it controlled Tabas, Gonābād, and Sīstān (the main reason for moving the capital south) and acquired considerable influence in Baluchistan. A certain amount of intermarriage with prominent (but not Persian) Baluch families is reported, which gives basis to the claims which the family still makes to a special position of mediation between the Government and the Baluch[6]. The Baluch, however, resent this claim, since it amounts to a claim of superiority from non-Baluch. The sociology of the Qā'ināt still bears obvious traces of its special position as the vast (though sparsely populated) fief of a powerful family.

Tabas and Gonābād similarly were centres of dynastic families. These were sometimes dependent on the Amīrs of the Qā'ināt and sometimes independent; Gonābād was technically dependent on Tabas but at times this dependence appears to have been only nominal. The position of these ruling elements (as in other parts of the country) was bolstered in the

19th century by their managing to get themselves appointed official governors (hākim) of their areas by the Qājār Shāh, from whom they also received pompous titles.

VI

I have attempted to indicate within a broad framework the general relevance of the model to the Plateau as a whole. I shall now show how it applies to the specific Baluch situation:

All that remains in the Persian Province of Baluchistan today which must relate to a pre-Baluch population and is of general significance for the study of the Province as a whole (with the exception of prehistoric archaeological deposits which have not yet been usefully evaluated) are the names of the major agricultural settlements (cf. pp.64 ff), which are also mentioned in pre-Baluch written sources. All other topographical nomenclature in the province (with the exception only of topographical features such as Kuh-i Taftān, which may be interpreted as landmarks on arterial through routes) are of Baluchi or post-Baluchi origin. The population of these agricultural centres is made up of:

a) ghulāms;

b) people (shahrī) of a number of different agnatic affiliations (nāt), some of which intermarry and some of which do not, and which distinguish between each other on a scale of social prestige; and

c) dynastic families.

It is, prima facie, extremely unlikely that each of these (and the Baluch) could share a common origin. The situation bears strong resemblances to that described for Swat by Barth (1962), and it is interesting that Barth even goes so far as to make use of the term "caste" in his description.

Each place name may refer to one continuous settlement with its surrounding agricultural land and palm groves. Alternatively, the palm grove and agricultural land may be central with several groups of dwellings

(mītag or kōsār) distributed around the outside. In the first case the central feature of the settlement will be a rudimentary fort built up to overlook the settlement either on a convenient rock outcrop or an artificial mud foundation. The dwellings cluster round the foot of the fort and are built of mud and/or palm branches and pīsh. In the second case, the fort will be the central feature of one of the settlements, and the dwellings which cluster round it and those which form the other settlements will also mostly be of the more permanent type. Many of the forts have now fallen into disrepair and are no longer in use, since in the present political situation they no longer serve any useful purpose. In this case, the members of the dynastic family now live on a level with the rest of the population, though usually in a more impressive and spacious bān. The dwellings immediately surrounding its fort (P. qal'eh) or bān are generally those of the dynastic family's ghulāms. In places where the mītags are scattered round the edge of the agricultural land, one of the mītags is often composed solely of the dynastic family and its ghulāms or other low class retinue.

It seems, therefore, at least very likely that when the Baluch arrived in the Province they found it inhabited by an agricultural population distributed among a few small and isolated settlements or, at the very least, that agricultural values were dominant in the pre-Baluch society of the Province. If there was also a pastoral population roaming the semi-desert stretches which were not cultivated, no trace of them remains, or, rather, they are not distinguishable from the more recent pastoral elements. They would of course have been either annihilated, expelled, or absorbed by the invaders (see below - chapter 6 - on the mechanics of absorption). For reasons which will be elaborated later but are derived mainly from the present conception and function of sāt, it seems probable that these Baluch conceived of themselves as groups of pastoralists, linked together, within the group, by ties of agnatic relationship, and, inter-group, by ties of real or assumed agnatic descent, or client or allegiance relationships. For similar reasons marriage was probably normally within the group or with other groups with whom common agnatic descent was assumed.

The major wave of immigration - i.e. that which brought with it the name "Baluch" and the Baluchi language and was sufficiently strong and culturally unified to impose this name and language on the Province - was of pastoralists (Baluch), whereas subsequent immigrations also included dynastic families and other elements who were not Baluch. Such dynastic families however, usually brought with them among their following people who easily fitted into the categories of Baluch, and Shahrī (cf. e.g. Mīraksai in chapter 4). In this way the successive immigrations gave rise to the present "class structure". This class structure is from top to bottom in general terms:

1. Dynastic families. These tend to differentiate between themselves on the basis of past prowess and present "Baluch-ness" and whether or not they have at any time been brought into a position of subordination to any other dynastic family.

2. Baluch. These distinguish between themselves on the basis of agnatic affiliation (gāt), and the structural proximity between each gāt and a dynastic family, i.e. whether it entered the Province with the family, or has perhaps rendered outstanding service to it since. It is generally recognised that Baluch cultural values are originally their cultural values.

3. Shahrī. These again distinguish between themselves on the basis of gāt, though they have probably adopted this from the Baluch, since its significance is often only apparent in the pattern of intermarriage, and this should probably be seen in the context of the preference for marriage with a cousin which is common to the whole of the Plateau (cf. Spooner, 1965a). One gāt, darsāda, is always at the bottom of the scale. Several factors combine to suggest that this (and some other gāt) was originally a category or "class" of people (e.g. darsāda are to be found all over the Province instead of one or a few specific localities cf. below, chapter 9). They are now considered almost equivalent to ghulāms, for whereas before 1928 the former were technically free and the latter were not, this distinction no longer has any validity.

4. Ghulāms. The former slaves, mostly of negroid extraction. Many of these have now assumed the surname darsāda. This name has a better

connotation than durrāda, which means "born outside", i.e. of an inferior or illicit union: A. durr means "pearl".

Ghulām and durrāda are also thought of as gāt. Although nearly all of them throughout the Province are now interrelated, since they cannot intermarry with any other gāt, they definitely do not share a common agnatic ancestor. I suggest it is typical of a superimposed tribal élite to see the social structure of the remainder of the population in tribal terms, and similarly for non-tribal peasants and lower classes to adopt tribal terminology from such an élite (cf. Spooner, 1965b: 104).

Since the invading Baluch were stronger than the settled peasants, and their particular version of ibn Khaldun's "group feeling" which was the essence of their political organisation was more efficient than the political structure of the peasants, the leading member of the dominant Baluch line became the de facto ruler of whatever area his tribal following could dominate. Nothing of course is known of the political "superstructure" (if such it was, over the peasant society of the Makrān prior to the wave of Baluch immigration, except that it was always at least theoretically dependent on whatever power ruled the neighbouring part of the Plateau.

Gradually the emphasis in this situation changed: as the dynastic family became conscious of its newly acquired source of wealth from settled agriculture, the leader became the ruler of whatever area he could dominate through his tribal following. At this stage it would be natural for him to start building forts for the security of his family in the main centres of agricultural production, and to come into contact - friendly or hostile - with similar rulers of regions which bordered on the area under his control. As he came to depend more and more on agriculture, and also therefore on his newly acquired peasant subjects, agnatic descent - which was the basis of the most significant social relationship when he relied totally or mainly on his tribal following - would decrease in importance as a social or political concept, and a superior-subordinate or allegiance relationship would usurp its position. The concept of social and political

relationship would change with the change in the balance of political power.

The wholesale eastward movement of the first Baluch wave was stopped by a greater political power in India, but the reasons for individual groups staying in the Makrān would basically have been the same as those given above: the previous "superstructure" fell apart at their arrival, and they were drawn into a power vacuum. The new society took its name from the Baluch: for the Baluch controlled politically an ecological province, and Baluch cultural values were dominant.

This interpretation of the present situation would explain why the Baluch are at first sight so different from all the other tribal groups (Iranian and non-Iranian) which still exist in Iran today. This difference lies mainly in the lack of importance given to agnatic descent, and the degree of integration of pastoralism and agriculture in the culture. However, the geography of the province must also be a contributing factor, and further research among other tribal groups may bring to light close resemblances.

At the stage described in paragraph 4 of the model, the Baluch show a variation: the process of increasing dependence of the dynastic family on the peasants and the intimacy of the relationship between them and the estrangement from the original tribal following must have been arrested in mid stream. I suggest three possible reasons for this:

1. Owing to the smallness and propinquity of each political unit (centred on a fort) - compared with the scale of the examples given under IV above - the dynastic families began to intermarry (for reasons of security and expansion) with the dynastic families of neighbouring "principalities". These alliances and the rules of inheritance which attached to them were seen in purely cognatic terms (cf. below, chapter 8). Therefore, each dynastic family soon acquired pieces of immoveable property in other "principalities". I suggest that in this shift to a cognatic principle the political exigencies were not irrelevant. It is extremely unlikely to have been original because of surviving variant practices with an

unquestionably agnatic bias among some of the Baluch elements in the Province and elsewhere (cf. below chapter 9). In order to meet the demands of these new kin ties and to take advantage of pieces of inherited land - situated some way but not too far from the home fort - they were encouraged to continue to move about at just the period when, according to the model, we might have expected them to stop moving and become permanently settled. As it is, the principal members of the dynastic families still continually move about between quite widely distributed agricultural centres in which they own land. At the same time it is important to remember that the Baluch themselves maintain that land-ownership is not an important contributory factor to the power of a chief.

2. Despite the fact that agriculture was a newfound source of wealth for the invaders, nevertheless the Province as a whole - at least by the methods used for its exploitation[7] under Baluch domination - could not produce enough to ensure all the time the subsistence of the population. Therefore, raiding - particularly raiding abroad into the richer areas of the Persian plateau - continued to play an integral role in the economy. Therefore, the dynastic families continued to need their tribal following.

3. In 1928 the political power of the dynastic families was taken over by the Government - perhaps before the process had time to run its full course. The dynastic families were allowed to remain with their people (or to come back after varying periods of voluntary exile), but this put them in an anomalous position: the social situation required their presence, for there was no one else who could continue the daily regulation of many communities, in short to lead and decide disputes. However, they no longer had any physical force with which to enforce their decisions or their policies. Gradually, as the people became conscious of the new situation and the Government consolidated its control over the Province, the chiefs, though they were still needed by the community, began to lead and judge more as a personification of the majority view than ex cathedra. This change, imposed from outside, must have caused the dynastic families to hold on fast to whatever relationships with whatever sections of the people they could. Since there was a firmer basis to the relationship with the Baluch than with the peasants, and since the dynastic families

and the Baluch both suffered in much the same ways from the ending of the Baluch Period (i.e. particularly the loss of the prerogative to exercise physical force) the dynastic families and the Baluch would naturally tend to draw closer together again. With the peasants the position was more complicated: one would expect that as soon as the threat of the physical force of the "master" disappeared the "serf" would rebel, and so the allegiance relationship between dynastic family and peasants would gradually dissolve. However, the physical force had not in general been used specifically to keep the peasants in subjection (we suggested above that the dynastic family had anyway assumed an already existing and recognised position above the peasants in the social structure of the Province). Further, the newly arrived officials of the Persian administration were more interested in taxing the peasants through the existing machinery - the chiefs (i.e. by exaction of bribes, etc.), than in freeing a "subject" class. In fact, in areas where the dynastic families retained de facto control of their own land their relationship with the peasants changed very slowly if at all. However, in areas where they lost control of their own land (e.g. the Khaliqah in Bampur, cf. chapter 1) the tie of allegiance with peasants soon lost its effectiveness.

Another probable consequence of this sudden change in the position of the dynastic family concerns religion and will be dealt with in more detail in Part Five, but it is also relevant to the present argument and brief mention of it must be made here also.

Theoretically, in 1928 all political authority in the Province was taken out of the hands of the Baluch, i.e. of the dynastic families. In practice, because of the methods of the Persian administrative officials it was a slow process. According to what the Baluch say themselves (accounts vary in intensity from place to place, but I have heard no one contradict this) attention to religion, both formal and informal, is much greater now than it used to be. It seems therefore very likely that as the indigenous secular power decreased, that of religion increased. Apart from the recognised representatives of formal and informal religion

(cf. Part Five) some members of the dynastic families are now looked to for certain quasi-religious purposes. There is no means of telling whether or not this is in fact a new development, but it would be a natural way of compensating for the loss of secular power (cf. below Parts Five and Six). Similarly, religious leaders now often play an important secular role.

The relationship between the Baluch and the peasants (shahrī) has also changed, for the Baluch have lost their extra-pastoral economic supports and are now in general no better off as a class than the shahrī. In many cases they are worse off, if only because they are more isolated and therefore further from the tentacles of modernisation and economic relief which are gradually spreading out from Tehran, mainly on the principles of structural distance between individual communities and the centralised administration. The direct relationships between Baluch and shahrī (cf. chapter 2, IX) which in some cases reach a degree which might be called symbiosis, though they obviously did not start in 1920, must nevertheless have been greatly encouraged by the situation as it has developed since then. Similarly, the reputation of the Baluch as the repository and preservers of the true Baluch way of life, and descendents of the subjects of the old heroic ballads, must also have become a proportionately more important factor in the attitude of the other sections of the society towards them.

The ghulāms lost one of their social functions outright: that of armed retainers to the chiefs. In compensation for this many emigrated, many became serfs on their chiefs' land. The of their functions, however, remained practically unchanged: that of personal servants and in some cases confidant/jokers to their chiefs - though for purely economic reasons there was room for less of these than before.

We departed from the model half way through because of the deus ex machina of the Persian army armed with modern equipment which came on to the scene before the process had run full cycle. However, if we return to the model at the end we see that the situation has developed basically in the same way. The four classes - dynastic families, Baluch, shahrī,

and ghulams - have been brought closer together, and are thought of on both sides as a homogeneous population in contra-distinction to the Persian officials who constitute the new ruling class. In this situation those members of the dynastic families who show personal aptitude have gradually become in effect the popular leaders of their "people" and the main points of contact between them and the Administration, although there is no institutional basis for this position in the Persian Administrative system. Therefore, the basic difference between the present situation and what the model might lead us to expect is that the new "superstructure" is an impersonal administrative system operated from outside the Province, from Tehran. It is this variation on the model that constitutes the essence of present "cultural" change in the Province. Prior to this, (up to 1926), each new alien element was gradually incorporated into the local population and the local framework of political conceptions. This may also happen in time with the Persian Administration. But since this new element differs so basically in quality (by being impersonal and based outside the Province) the process is causing a more fundamental change. Throughout this essay the word "traditional" is applied to things not affected by this latest new element.

VII

This model then concerns "emergent dynamics" (cf. Firth, 1964: 9). It indicates forces responsible for changes in social form, and demonstrates the relationship between the existing and antecedent conditions and social relationships. It also indicates the "direction or trend of events, by relating antecedent and existing conditions to some further probabilities in the pattern of development." It recognises "a series of phases or stages in social change, with relative constancy of institutional form at each phase." It is also capable of greater generalisation (ibid. pp. 8-9 my italics).

NOTES

1. Meaning briefly "nomadic" as distinct from settled agricultural life with a division of labour. But see also below p.127 on an Islamic conception of desert.

2. To prove this argument from primary sources would require a full-length thesis in itself, whereas simply to paraphrase without full documentation would lay the writer open to accusations of fitting the facts to the theory.

3. Above Frye equates this term with "clan".

4. In eastern Iran numbers four and five probably fell together into a confederation of tribes under a kayi. Kayi seems probably to have been differentiated into two distinct usages in different places: a) leader of dynasty, and b) religious leader (cf. Frye, 1962: 38).

"A further identification of the first three terms in Avestan with three Gathid words, proposed by Benveniste, has been modified by Thieme who, instead of equating the two series, would say that in the nmana 'house' lives the khvaetu 'the family'; in the vis- 'settlement' lives the var zana 'the clan', and in the zantu- 'the territory of the tribe' lives airyaman 'hospitality', or 'those with whom one is connected by hospitality'. This is an important analysis by Thieme which has interesting ramifications in the religious sphere, but showing here a clear continuity from Aryan times. Numbers four and five above have to do with rule and rulers, a somewhat different relationship between members of a society and their 'national rulers'."(Frye, ibid. 52).

5. My italics. Frye does not define his use of this word. Though I would not myself have used it here, I take it to allude to the change in the type of leadership and the new attitude towards it. Thus, it would conform with the model. I have also found the term useful in the political analysis.

6. The last obvious instance was in 1963 when the Shah sent Amir Husein Khwarizmi 'Alam to Shiraz to invite the Baluch to send volunteers to Fars to help the Government to quell the tribal revolt there (cf. below, chapters 15 and 19).

7. There is some reason to suggest that the Province had been more productive agriculturally before the advent of the Baluch than it is now (cf. chapter 3).

## Chapter VI

## Assimilation

In the previous chapter I have attempted with the aid of a theoretical model constructed from observation of historical processes over a much broader cultural unit to add a third dimension to the political structure of the Provinces, and at the same time to show the relevance of the Baluch situation in the broader context of the Iranian cultural area. Three points arise implicitly from this which require discussion.

The first concerns the apparent but unexplained ease with which some languages and cultures assimilate others. This is not the place to attempt a generalised explanation of this, but since it has been implicitly assumed in what has gone so far and will also be relevant to the remainder of the essay, it must at least be stated explicitly that: from the evidence available the Baluchi language, together with the culture and values for which it is the vehicle, appears to show a particular ability and even proclivity to spread among and assimilate aliens within a given ecological area. The Turkish and Persian languages have also shown a great ability to assimilate in certain times and places on the Plateau. In their case the assimilation is more easily demonstrated to have been an adjunct of political assimilation - though some cases (for instance the Turkish speaking Shādlu Kurdish Khāns of Bajnurd) are puzzling.

Within the area which is predominantly Baluchi speaking (Persian, Pakistani and Afghan Baluchistan) two languages (both of inferior cultural status to Baluchi) continue to be spoken by minorities, who nevertheless use Baluchi as a lingua franca: Jadgāli in Bashkārd and Sārāwān, and Brāhui in the neighbourhood of Kalāt in Pakistan and certain communities in Afghanistan and Persian Sistan. No studies of Jadgāli have ever been made beyond determining that it is closely akin to and almost certainly directly descended from Sindhi (cf. above pp.97 ff.). More work has been done on Brāhui (cf. especially Bray, 1909), and it is generally accepted as belonging to the Dravidian family of languages and was probably spoken throughout much of the Makrān before the advent of the Baluch. The Khāns of Kalāt, who ruled from c. 1666 (de Lambert, 1956: 376) until the inclusion of their State into Western Pakistan, are Brāhuis, and their position must

be a factor in the continued survival of the Brāhui language - even though they used Baluchi as a lingua franca and Persian for relations with foreign powers. However, the survival of Brāhui has only been maintained at a price, for a very large proportion of its vocabulary and certain features of its syntax and accidence have been assimilated to the Baluchi pattern (cf. also Emeneau, 1964, and Morgenstierne, 1932).

It was a philologist who first observed that "the tribal system of the Baluch and Brāhui, which in contrast to that of the Pathans favours the assimilation of racially foreign elements into the tribe, has no doubt led to frequent changes of language within many Baluch and Brāhui clans" (Morgenstierne, 1932, pp. 8-9, quoted by Barth, 1964, p. 13). Taking Morgenstierne's observation as a text in a paper published in a Festschrift presented to him on his 70th birthday (Barth, 1964) Barth sets out "to demonstrate that the recent northward spread of Baluchi at the expense of Pashtu in the hill country west of the Sulaiman range (West Pakistan) depends precisely on the structural differences in the tribal systems of these two peoples, to which Morgenstierne refers."

From the foregoing chapters of this essay it would seem to be more correct to refer to particular social situations and political concepts rather than absolute Pathan and Baluch tribal systems, for apart from the theoretical consequences of the historical explanation advanced above for the distinction between Baluch and Baluch (p.32), Barth himself elsewhere (Barth, 1959) describes Pathans within a completely different - "vertical" - social structure, which in fact closely resembles that of the Baluch who form the subject of this essay. Having made this point it will be useful to follow Barth further.

He goes on to describe the tribal political structures of the particular Pathan tribes which he has in mind as essentially "acephalous and ... constituted by lineage councils (jirgas) arranged in a hierarchy of inclusiveness. Within councils of every level the interests - and in the longer run, survival - of individuals and segments can only be secured through debate, requiring the skilled use of the idiom.

"Baluch tribes, on the other hand, are socially stratified and have a centralized form, and the structure is composed of channels of communication through echelons of leaders. [As a generalisation this also fits the situation in the Persian Province of Baluchistan.] In such a system foreign language bodies might be encapsulated and communicate upwards through a bilingual leader, as do linguistic minorities in S. Persian tribes [cf. Barth, 1961]. However, in their precarious niche as nomadic mixed herders in a harsh environment, the widely dispersed Baluch camps and segments depend for survival also on another network of communication, mediating information on the availability of grazing, water, and the movements of other persons and camps rather than political decisions. This network is formalised in the Baluch institution of hāl [cf. below, Part Four, chapter 12] - exchanges of information given in a peculiar intonation and stereotyped phrases as formal greetings whenever tribesmen meet. In both cases, in other words, membership in a tribe implies membership in a linguistic community." (Barth, 1964, pp. 13-14).

Barth goes on to note reasons (which I consider valid) why we should expect the balance to favour the spread of Pashtu: e.g. numbers and density of population, standard of living, fertility rates, reputation for military aggressiveness both in mutual estimation and judgement of third parties. However, "fundamentally, both tribal forms derive from the shared principles of patrilineality [this, if Barth is correct, is less true of the Persian than the Pakistani Baluch], honour and obligation" (ibid, p. 16), but "Baluch tribal organization, though derived from the same concepts, is not based on the particular mechanism of the egalitarian council. Though defence of honour among equals is important, it thus does not become built into the political system as a major tactical consideration. A model for the Baluch political system is the relationship between a father and his sons - one of authority stemming from status, and common submission to this authority as the basis for joint action. Instead of working in terms of rhetoric and rallying of equals, with the ultimate sanction of talion, the Baluch political and judicial mechanism is based on vertical communication between ordinary men and big leaders, with communal action as the

ultimate sanction. Political activity thus mainly takes place between unequals, and the important principle that is brought into play is not honour but obligation. Tribal status in such a system does not require an assertion of equality, but is based on a chain of clientage and patronage between minor and major leaders in a hierarchy. A Baluch tribe as a whole becomes divided into segments in a formal pattern very much like a Pathan tribe, and membership and position in the system are ascribed on the basis of patrilineal descent; but the politically crucial aspect of the organization is the recognition of a political clientship tie to the leader of each group by its members. These leaders again work in the same "vertical" pattern - political manoeuver does not involve appeal to equals in a council, but communication with and mobilization of more influential, high echelon leaders ...

"When a man in this system is dishonoured, the consequences are of a different order from what they are for Pathans. Conflicts of honour and revenge between equals lead to fission of their immediate group, but need not in fact be resolved between the parties, since territorial separation can take place without consequences for the persons' positions in the political structure. A relationship of clientship to the same leader can thus be such as to involve the leader and thus force one faction to secede. But where a man or group does secede, this implies no 'necessary' important loss of rank, and a new clientship relation may be established to another leader. Again in contrast to the Pathans such seceders are welcomed in their new status: the importance and influence of a Baluch leader is roughly commensurate with the number of his effective followers, and the decision to grant new followers protection and rights lies with him, and need not be debated and accepted by a council of his equals ...

"The structural differences sketched here imply clear differences in the assimilative capacities of the two forms of tribal organization. Disorganized personnel such as is generated at a high rate during relatively anarchic periods is readily incorporated in a Baluch 'system': persons may seek the protection of, and swear fealty[1] to, a recognized leader within that 'system'. In the case of the Marri (a Baluch tribal group inhabiting the mountainous area, similar to the Makran range, east of

(with in West Pakistan), their tribal organization was also clearly thought of as a predatory organization, and for purposes of offence and increased loot, as well as defence, it was in everybody's interest to increase the personnel. Thus one Marri leader, himself of Pathan descent explained to me: 'In those days there was war (jang) - nobody asked who is your father, brother - you joined the force (lashkar), moved and conquered and moved again'.

Though the same military consideration also held for Pathan tribes along the boundary, incorporation of personnel into their tribal system could either require that newcomers accept servile status or that a plenary meeting of the whole tribe agreed to accept them as equals, allotted them a compact block of land, and determined their position in the tribal scheme of segmentation. Though both of these forms of incorporation have occurred, they are rare, and one would expect the growth rate by incorporation into Baluch tribes far to exceed that of Pathan tribes.

There can be little doubt that so is the case. Some of the Pathan tribes along the boundary have sections or, to my knowledge persons, claiming Baluch descent ...

"In the Marri tribe, on the other hand, all sections have traditions of incorporation, and many sections and subsections trace Pathan descent, often to existing Pathan tribes ... The growth of one section has taken place so predominantly through incorporation of Pathans that it is referred to as 'Pathan' by other Marris, though it is uniformly Baluchi speaking" (ibid. pp. 17-8 my italics).

In each of those three cases - Brahui, Jadgal and Barth's Baluch and Pathans - we can say that assimilation has taken place from one type of political system into another, or from a smaller political group into a larger system. A fourth case - that of the Barahui and Sardarani (above, chapter 4) - is similar, except that unfortunately we cannot be sure whether or not the Barahui were Baluchi speaking when they arrived in the area. In the first case the assimilated group was probably aboriginal; in the second and fourth the assimilated groups were immigrant; and in the third case (Barth's) the assimilation has taken place on a

linguistic border which also separates two types of political system. In the first, second and fourth cases the assimilated group has provided the dominant political element in its area within the system to which it has assimilated.

The most characteristic single feature of the assimilating system is the existence and status within it of a superstructure of dynastic families. In the next chapter I discuss the theoretical implications of the relationship between these dynastic families and their communities.

NOTES

1. I know of no formal or informal swearing of fealty in the Persian Provinces.

# Chapter VII

## The Feudal Relationship

# I

This chapter takes up discussion of a second point arising from chapter 5.

Barth bases his paper (quoted in the previous chapter) on a type of social relationship which is seen as basic to the Baluch social system: a political relationship between unequals, wherein one man accepts an inferior status to another in return for leadership. This is an insufficient definition of the relationship, but it will do to start from. The relationship will gradually be defined more comprehensively in the remainder of the essay. I have avoided defining it so far since it cannot be properly discussed without also discussing the concept of "feudalism". And owing to the amount of careless use of the words "feudalism", "feudal", "feudatory", etc. in sociological literature, especially in the last two decades, and attempts to clarify how, if at all, these terms may be usefully applied outside their original European context (cf. Goody, 1963, Beattie, 1964; Nadmayne, 1961), I have tried to avoid using them before defining exactly what I mean by them.

These terms have often been applied to societies within the Iranian cultural area (cf. e.g. Barth, 1953; Lambton, 1953; Meisner, 1954; Altheim and Stiehl, 1954; Colbourn, 1956; Petrushevsky, 1960; Halpern, 1963) but never, to my knowledge, accompanied by any exact definition of their use. In these circumstances it might be thought best to avoid the use of the term altogether. However, despite the uniqueness that is claimed for mediaeval European feudal society, the term "feudal" and its derivatives are good English words which denote a special type of political relationship. Therefore, if the theory of social anthropology is to develop through the formulation of general "laws" based on the comparative ethnography of different societies, on the analogy of the treatment of phonemes and morphemes in structural linguistics (cf. Lévi-Strauss, 1958: 39ff.), and according to the principle that "the same structural pattern may turn up in any kind of society" (Leach, 1961: 8), it is surely sheer waste of a good term not to isolate the essential "phonemic" value of the mediaeval European feudal relationship and make

use of it, where it is relevant, in the analysis of other societies - so long as this is done scientifically and the phrase is not simply applied as a blanket term to suggest an undefined type of society. That is: although mediaeval European feudal society may have been unique, from the sociological point of view it was based on the individual feudal relationship between two men, and this individual relationship is less likely to have been so unique. As the adjective from "feud" (="fief"), "feudal" is applied ideally to this relationship, since there could be no fief without the feudal relationship. The fact that the word has been extended to vaguer emotive uses is unfortunate, but irrelevant. I therefore tend to accept Coulborn's (op. cit.) judgement that the term "feudalism" is probably at best not useful and at worst misleading. But I consider that the "feudal relationship", if properly defined, may have abstract validity and be useful for generalisation in comparative studies.

In this chapter I define this relationship as it has been applied in the study of mediaeval European society and show how and why it may be useful to apply it as an analytical concept in both the diachronic analysis of the material with which this essay is concerned. I am not here concerned with whether or not it is useful in the analysis of African or other societies outside the Iranian cultural area.

Beattie (1964) in considering the usefulness of the concept of feudalism in African contexts, based his attitude towards it on Bloch (1961 repr. 1965) whom he understands to have defined five fundamental ingredients in it:

"i. The fief, usually but not essentially land;

ii. The personal nature of the bond of political dependence;

iii. The dispersal of authority - rulers have to delegate and they have to make loyalty worth while;

iv. A reference to a specialised military class; and

v. The reference to the survival in some form of the idea of the state."

*of societies within the Iranian cultural area, and, more particularly, in the analysis

"this last point," Beattie considers, "is important: if European feudalism in its beginnings implied the weakening, even the break-down, of the state, and the distribution of powers formerly held by it among private individuals - in most African states, far from expressing the breakdown of a formerly more strongly centralised authority, it represents in many cases, what appear to be the first beginnings of such authority. Thus, among the Alur (cf. Southall, 1956) hitherto chiefless communities have in historical times come voluntarily under the dominion of chiefly lines, and the evidence suggests that in the case of at least some of the interlacustrine Bantu kingdoms intrusive minorities imposed centralised forms of government on pre-existing segmentary societies." The Iranian Plateau, however, and, more particularly, the Persian Province of Baluchistan, have formed in the past integral parts of a centralised "state". But can "the reference to the survival in some form of the idea of the state" really constitute an indispensable factor in the individual political feudal relationship?

The quotation from Bloch is perfectly valid for the society which was based on this nuclear feudal relationship in mediaeval Europe. However, in the following, I attempt to abstract not the society, but a particular ingredient of the society. Bloch himself, whose book is the major treatment of the subject of European feudalism, is not so exclusive in his use of the terms. In the final part (Part VIII), in a chapter entitled "Feudalism as a Type of Society", section 2 "The Fundamental Characteristics of European Feudalism" he writes (the italics are mine): "European feudalism should therefore be seen as the outcome of the violent dissolution of older societies. It would in fact be unintelligible without the great upheaval of Germanic invasions which, by forcibly uniting two societies originally at very different stages of development, disrupted both of them and brought to the surface a great many modes of thought and social practices of an extremely primitive character. It finally developed in the atmosphere of the last barbarian raids. It involved a far-reaching restriction of social intercourse, a circulation of money too sluggish to admit of a salaried officialdom, and a mentality attached to things tangible

and local. When these conditions began to change, feudalism began to cease" (Bloch, 1965, p. 443).

Further "It was an unequal society, rather than a hierarchical one - with chiefs rather than nobles; and with serfs, not slaves. If slavery had not played so small a part, there would have been no need for the characteristically feudal forms of dependence, as applied to the lower orders of society. In an age of disorder, the place of the adventurer was too important, the memory of man too short, the regularity of social classification too uncertain, to admit of the strict formation of regular castes.

"Nevertheless the feudal system meant the rigorous economic subjection of a host of humble folk to a few powerful men. Having received from earlier ages the Roman villa (which in some respects anticipated the manor) and the German village chiefdom, it extended and consolidated these methods thereby men exploited men, and combining inextricably the right to the revenues from the land with the right to exercise authority, it fashioned from all this the true manor of mediaeval times ...

"In feudal society the characteristic human bond was the subordinate's link with a nearby chief ... Land itself was valued above all because it enabled a lord to provide himself with 'men' by supplying the remuneration for them" (Bloch, 1965, pp. 443-4).

Again: "A subject peasantry; widespread use of the service tenement (i.e. the fief) instead of a salary, which was out of the question; the supremacy of a class of specialized warriors; ties of obedience and protection which bind man to man and, within the warrior class, assume the distinctive form called vassalage; fragmentation of authority - leading inevitably to disorder; and, in the midst of all this, the survival of other forms of association, family and State, of which the latter, during the second feudal age, was to acquire renewed strength - such then seem to be the fundamental features of European feudalism" (ibid, p.446).

Bloch goes on, on the basis of this paragraph, to justify giving a general historical and sociological validity to the term "feudalism".

While I do not deny the possibility of this, I am here at pains to justify the general validity only of the nuclear feudal relationship and its usefulness in the study of societies on the Iranian Plateau. That this was in fact the most basic element of feudal society shows throughout Bloch's work. For instance: "To be the 'man' of another man: in the vocabulary of feudalism, no combination of words was more widely used or more comprehensive in meaning. In both the Romance and the Germanic tongues it was used to express personal dependence par excellence and applied to persons of all social classes regardless of the precise legal nature of the bond. The count was the 'man' of the king, as the serf was the 'man' of his manorial lord. Sometimes even in the same text, within the space of a few lines, radically different social stations were thus evoked" (ibid. p. 145).* But this difference may be seen as due to incidental differences between Islam and Christianity (which formed the respective "formal" religious contexts of the two societies), rather than to any essential difference in the actual relationships.

"In yielding thus to the necessities of the moment these generations of men had no conscious desire to create new social forms, nor were they aware of doing so. Instinctively each strove to turn to account the resources provided by the existing social structure and if, unconsciously, something new was eventually created, it was in the process of trying to adapt the old. Moreover, the society that emerged from the invasions had inherited a strange medley of institutions and practices in which the traditions of the Germans were intermingled with the legacy of Rome, and with that of the peoples whom Rome had conquered without ever completely effacing their native customs ... [The vocabulary itself is] full of elements of diverse origin subsisting side by side, some borrowed from the speech of the conquered people or that of the conquerors, or newly coined, like 'homage' itself. Such a vocabulary is surely a faithful reflection of a social régime which, though itself deeply moulded by a composite past, was above all the product of contemporary conditions. 'Men', says the Arab proverb, 'resemble their own times more than they do their father'" (ibid. p. 148).

*A significant difference between the European and the Baluch situations is that with the Baluch there was no formal homage ceremony or direct use of religion to strenghten and justify the relationship (cf. ibid. pp.145-6).

The society itself as a whole structure is continually developing and changing. Bloch even divides it into two ages. "From the second feudal age onwards, not only were the orders of society more and more strictly differentiated; there was also an increasing concentration of forces round a few great authorities and a few great causes" (ibid. p.281). Compare with this the degree of unity and authority attained by Dost Muhammad Khan at the end of the Baluch Period.

Many other elements appear in Bloch's synthesis which may be profitably collated with the Baluch situation. I have restricted myself to quoting only what I consider to be the most significant, though I should also point out that nothing that Bloch formulates as integral to the mediaeval European feudal relationship is absent in quality from the Baluch situation. However, before proceeding to a systematic collation of the two relationships - the Mediaeval European and the Baluch - it will be worth referring also to the formulation of another great synthetist - this time not historical but sociological - Weber. Weber brings out well the elements of specifically political relevance. For him:

"A. A fief involves the following elements:-

1) The appropriation of powers and rights of exercising authority...

2) The grant of the fief takes a very specific form. It is carried out on a basis which is purely personal for the lifetime of the lord and of the recipient of the fief, his vassal.

3) The relationship is established by a contract, thus it is presupposed that the vassal is a free man.

4) In the type of case which is here treated as the feudalism based on fiefs, the recipient is a person who carries on a special social class tradition, that of a 'knight'.

5) The contract of fealty is not an ordinary business contract, but establishes a relation of personal solidarity which, though naturally unequal, involves reciprocal obligations of loyalty. Those obligations are upheld by a social class honour of the knight and are clearly delimited.

"It was pointed out above that the object of appropriation as a fief may be only the land, whereas the position as such retains its originally charismatic[1] character. On the other hand, powers and authority may also, in addition to land, be appropriated. The transition tends to take place when fiefs are appropriated on hereditary basis subject only to the condition that each new vassal will pledge fealty to his lord and the existing vassals will do so to a new lord. It is further promoted by the ability of a feudal administrative staff to compel the granting of fiefs because all fiefs are treated as sources of support for the members of their class ...

"B. To the extent that it [this type of feudalism] has been approximated, it has had the following principal consequences:-

1) The authority of the chief is reduced to the likelihood that the vassals will voluntarily remain faithful to their oaths of fealty.

2) The political corporate group is completely replaced by a system of relations of purely personal loyalty between the lord and his vassals and between these in turn and their own sub-vassals and so on. Only a lord's own vassals are bound by fealty to him; whereas they in turn can claim the fealty of their own vassals, and so on ...

4) There is a hierarchy of social rank ...

"It goes without saying that whenever this type of feudalism is highly developed, the status of supreme authority is precarious. This is because it is always very dependent on the voluntary obedience and hence the purely personal loyalty of the members of the administrative staff who, by virtue of the feudal structure, are themselves in possession of the means of administration. Hence, the struggle for power, which is always latent in authoritarian structures, comes to be chronic between a lord and his vassals. The ideal extent of feudal authority has never been effectively carried out in practice or remained effective on a permanent basis" (Weber, 1964, trans. Parsons, pp. 373-6 my italics).

II

For the existence of this type of relationship in the pre-Islamic Iranian Empires (Achaemenian, Parthian and Sasanian) see Christensen, 1944,

passim, but especially the Introduction, and chapters II and V. Christensen's interpretation is generally accepted by Iranian scholars. There has been very little specifically sociological study of the Iranian plateau either before or since Islam, but it has been generally thought of as a society of more or less isolated cities. This is in my opinion a misleading impression, which is mainly due to the lack of detailed information on life and history outside the cities, which again is due to the fact that history was written in the cities. The conception (in the cities) that civilisation belongs to the cities and anything outside the cities is uncivilised seems to have grown up early (cf. above, chapter 5, on ʿāmmī and bīyābān). This dichotomy seems to have increased sharply after the Mongol invasions which resulted in a sharp decrease in the population of the cities. It is no exaggeration to speak now of a dual culture on the Iranian plateau: a) of the cities, and b) of the bīyābān (literally = plain without water (bī āb) or vegetation, cf. Burhān-i Qāṭiʿ, Teheran, 1342, MS, vol. I, p. 330, but generally applied to any stretch of country without large permanent settlement.) It is the latter which concerns us here and in which I consider the concept of the nuclear feudal relationship to be useful, if not indeed important, in any attempt to analyse or understand the social or political structure.

The Iranian Plateau - apart from a ring of cities directly under the surrounding mountains, e.g. Yazd, Kāshān, Qum, Teherān, Tīsmān, Damghān, Shāhrūd (formerly Bistām), Sabzavār, Nīshāpūr - contained no large permanent settlements (cf. above, chapter 5, V). In the last few centuries in eastern Persia the main political centres have been Ṭabas, Gonābād, and Kāʾin/Birjand (cf. Map III). Each of these centres has been the seat of residence of a dynastic family (often of tribal origin) of which that in Birjand became the most powerful. But perhaps most interesting in the context of the present study was the situation in Gonābād where the two poles of authority existed side by side: for apart from being the seat of a dynastic family, one of the villages of Gonābād is also the hereditary seat of one of the most influential Sufī (Islamic mystic) lines in modern Persia. The political structure of the varying sphere of influence of

each of these families (so far as can be ascertained from the evidence available, which apart from the two books cited above is mostly oral, for little has remained of the traditional system under the present régime, and the dynastic line in Sarāwān has for all practical purposes died out) was similar to that which obtained and still to a large extent survives in Baluchistan. The other permanent centres of political authority in the area were either for the most part within the sphere of influence of one of these settlements, or controlled from one of the cities under the outer ring of mountains. When central government was strong the whole Plateau was controlled by one or other of the cities on its edge. When central government was weak - particularly in the last two centuries - effective control of large parts of the Plateau was usurped by families of tribal origin operating from small agricultural centres by means of network of feudal relationships.

III

Having thus indicated the extent of the relevance of the concept of the feudal relationship for the analysis of the social history of a large part of the Iranian cultural area, I now return to the Baluch situation.

First I must stress once again that despite the importance I am giving to the feudal relationship I am not suggesting that in Baluch society these nuclear relationships are linked together into a comprehensive system which as a whole is necessarily comparable to mediaeval European society, nor am I suggesting that it is the only significant relationship in the society. What I am suggesting is that leadership in the society works primarily through individual relationships which are directly comparable to the feudal relationship in mediaeval European society, and that it is therefore relevant to collate the two.

To return first to Beattie, each of the five points which he derives from Bloch are essentially present in the Baluch situation. To take these points in turn:

i. The Baluch "fief" is basically not land, but the responsibility for a community to a (superior) chief; this implies control and exploitation of the land of the community and an income from it, and the obligation to remit a part of the income to the grantor of the "fief", and to support him physically and morally as required. Such feudal relationships may be divided into two types, internal and external: those between leaders of dynastic families and other members of their family or members of other dynastic families related to them by marriage, and (less often) between chiefs and representatives from other classes of the society; and, between the Governor-General in Kerman and the Baluch chiefs to whom he delegated authority in the Province. (For the first type cf. e.g. in chapter 2 especially the case of Sa'id Khan p. 77 ff. and for the second type pp. 71, 75-6, 80-81 ).

ii. In each of these cases the bond is purely personal, and though it may later in practice be inherited this is not an integral part of the relationship as it is understood on both sides at its inception.

iii. There are two basic reasons for forming these relationships:

a) that the dominant partner in the relationship requires to delegate authority because he is unable to control a distant area by direct rule; or, subsidiarily, in the second type above, he is unable to control the area through employed officials and is obliged to delegate authority to a locally accepted chief; and

b) (in the first type) that there was a candidate for the type of living provided by such a position, i.e. a member of a dynastic family who showed the required aptitude.

The basic defect in the system was that there was no religious or other sanction for loyalty, and the dominant partner in the relationship always had great difficulty in making loyalty worth while for his subordinate for any length of time. In the internal relationship kinship - whether agnatic or cognatic (the relation between them will be discussed in Part Four) - was one answer to this problem, but basically for both the internal and external types the threat of superior physical force was the only really

reliable sanction. But this was difficult to ensure: for, internally, the difference in potentiality of each area was seldom sufficient to ensure enough superiority to enforce loyalty in a separate area; externally, the position between the Governor-General of Kermān and a Baluch Governor of Bampur was much the same - unless the Governor-General could split the internal loyalty of the Baluch, which was usually not difficult, or rely on superior military equipment. In the final analysis loyalty depended on the relative force of personality and leadership potential of the men involved. As we shall see in the last Part of this essay force of personality carries with it in Baluch society a certain quality which may be termed "charisma". Any member of the society may acquire this, but it is expected of members of the dynastic families. Its main effect is that if the superficial vicissitudes of personal fortune of a given leader were on a graph, the strength of loyalty shown him and the numerical strength of his following would smooth out the curves. That is, the charismatic aspect of his personality holds his following and softens and delays the adverse effects of individual reverses on his position of authority.

iv. The specialised military class was at the beginning the tribal following which accompanied the dynastic family into the Province. Gradually this was supplemented, and to some extent but never entirely replaced, by "mercenaries" in the form of armed *ghulāms*. The *ghulāms* had little hope of escape out of the Province, and, since they were negroid, would not be allowed to fit into the life of the Province in any other way except in the service of the members of dynastic families which owned them. Those who were used as mercenaries were usually not badly treated. There were, therefore, more reliable ties of loyalty between the dynastic family and its *ghulāms* than between it and other leaders or other Baluch. This use of *ghulāms* may be compared with Bloch's "second feudal age", and the developments in European feudalism which cause him to divide it into two ages.

v. Beattie gives great importance to this last point, though mainly it would seem because it is the one factor which seems most obviously absent from the situation with which he is familiar. However, if the theoretical model constructed in the first section of this chapter has any validity

and the evidence for the pre-Baluch situation in the Province has been correctly interpreted, we can claim fulfilment of this condition as well, for both surely imply some form of settled centralised authority in the Province in pre-Baluch times. We know that at least from time to time the Makran had formed an official province of one or other of the Iranian Empires.

However, I would wish to rephrase and alter the emphasis in Beattie's sentence of judgement on the term feudalism. European feudalism did not imply the weakening or the breakdown of the state. Rather, in an anarchical situation where the recognised institutions whereby society was wont to be regulated had lost their effectiveness, political power and with it authority was (dare we say inevitably?) distributed among private individuals through personal relationships of personal dependence, whereby one party expected loyalty and service from the other in return for a living and the delegation of (restricted) authority. Only thus could a ruler rule beyond the range of ecological dependence on his own chosen centre of residence until new institutions could grow up to channel his direct authority out over a wider area.

Therefore, if, in the case which Beattie cites (from Southall, 1956) "hitherto chiefless communities have in historical times come voluntarily under the dominion of chiefly lines", and "in the case of at least some of the inter-lacustrine Bantu kingdoms intrusive minorities imposed centralised forms of government on pre-existing segmentary societies", we should surely look for some factor to explain why these communities surrendered (voluntarily or not) part of their individual authority and freedom to a dominant line or central power. In the latter case an answer is already hinted in the phrases "intrusive minorities," and "pre-existing segmentary societies", which suggests similarity to the case of the Baluch: the existing system of institutions was interfered with, with the effect that they were no longer adequate for the new situation.

However, my own argument lays principal emphasis on the second and third of Beattie's "five fundamental ingredients": the personal nature of the bond of political dependence; and the dispersal of authority, with

the problem this poses of making loyalty worth while. The other three ingredients I would consider as definitely fundamental in an analysis of mediaeval European feudal society, but as corollaries of the feudal relationship in that particular situation, likely to be present wherever the feudal relationship occurs but not inevitable catalysts.

If we now turn back to the passages quoted directly from Bloch and Weber the relevance of the term "feudal" to this fundamental relationship in Baluch society becomes even clearer. For if the argument in chapter five is accepted, the Baluch case has grown out of violent dissolution of political structure of a settled society by the invasion of tribal groups. Thus, because more powerful external forces had sent the invaders and kept them there, two societies which were originally at very different stages of development were forcibly united at the cost of the internal disruption of each of them. Money ceased to be an economic agent. At the top of the uncertain classes which developed were chiefs rather than nobles, for a) they did not form one integrated social class - they were men occupying similar positions in similar but distinct communities, and b) their position was not necessarily hereditary. At the bottom, to start with were serfs - the pre-existing peasants, not slaves. With the later import of slaves, or possibly also the taking over of slaves from the pre-existing system, the position of the dynastic families acquired more stability, with the extreme case of an organisation approximating to a state in Kachtiari.

Exploitation of peasants by rulers was a continuation of the pre-existing system, and combined the right to the revenues from the land (without necessarily owning it) with the right to exercise authority. But the only way to exercise authority outside the centre of residence was to delegate it by personal relationship to a man who could a) hold the position and b) would remain loyal: the man to whom authority is delegated must therefore be thought of as belonging to the same social category as the delegator, otherwise he would not be expected to be able to exercise authority, and since he would not respect the same values there would be no reason for him to remain loyal except by the naked

threat of force. Therefore, in the Baluch case, the leader tends to delegate power only to relatives, and, although there is nothing inherently hereditary in the delegation, the "fief" tends soon to become hereditary, and, the man who rules, the chief, whether delegating or delegated, carries on a distinct social class tradition. In the same way, any son of a chief, if he shows reasonable aptitude, may expect to be given a "fief" since it becomes regarded as a badge of membership to his own class.

Further, as the system progressed, the authority of the leader amounted to little more than the likelihood that his (politically) junior relatives would voluntarily remain loyal to him. The status of supreme authority, even as developed under Khan Muhammad Khan, was precarious, and the history of the Province is one long struggle for power.

In conclusion I wish to emphasise the basic informality of the relationship in Persian Baluchistan as compared with mediaeval Europe. In Europe the oath of fealty was an important sanction in ensuring the loyalty of the knight. There was often a religious oath before the altar (Bloch, 1965: 316-7), but much more important and even essential to the relationship was the little secular ceremony between lord and vassal (ibid. 145-6). There was nothing of this nature among the Baluch. The relationship has no sanctions in Islam, and there was never any "outward and visible form" of either a religious or a secular nature at the inception of the relationship. It was completely informal. There is in fact no specific word for it in Baluchi. This is very significant, but not so surprising as it may at first seem - since authority was normally only delegated to men who already stood in some recognised relationship with the leader, i.e. were related in some way by real or assumed agnatic, cognatic, or affinal ties. The new position of "enfeoffment" was not explicitly distinguished as a separate relationship. However, since it offered potential independence, it had its effect on the general conception of kinship in Baluch society. I discuss this in the following chapter.

NOTES

1. The use of this term is explained and discussed below in Part Six.

## CHAPTER EIGHT

## The Feudal Relationship and Finance

1. Once again the argument involves collation of the Baluch situation with similar factors in mediaeval Europe, for what we are concerned with here is this: what are the effects of the appearance of the feudal relationship as a basic or important political relationship on the pre-existing conception and function of kinship. The authorities used for the pre- or proto-feudal European situation are Lancaster (1958) and Phillpotts (1913). Here we are fortunate in having also available ethnographic material from a comparable Islamic tribal society: the Kurds of Southern Kurdistan (Barth, 1953).

Representative Baluch genealogies and details of kinship terminology and marriage and inheritance practices are given in Part Four. For the present purpose it is necessary to state only that (although there is once again a considerable variety of detail from community to community) tribal affiliation (gēl) is inherited agnatically - but a man who is, for instance, agnatically Mardārzai but who's wife, mother and father's mother etc. were Bolēdai may say he is as much Bolēdai as Mardārzai. Thus, in certain contexts, e.g. when no Mardārzai are present or when the conversation concerns Bolēdai exclusively, it is difficult to see any differentiation between his matrilineal and patrilineal affiliations. In fact, the only obvious distinction is that matrilateral and affinal connections do not qualify a man for explicit political seniority.

In the same case, the man's property (malk) will consist of a) an inherited share of his father's property, b) an inherited share of his mother's property, and c) whatever he may have developed or acquired himself, in addition to which the property which his wife will have inherited from her mother and father will be his to administer (brothers and sisters inherit equal shares). Therefore, the greater part of the property he effectively controls is likely to be, in origin, Bolēdai, not Mardārzai.

This example is from a particular dynastic family, and is typical of this "class". Among other "classes" (i.e. Baluch and Ahmadzai) the practice varies between the two extremes of this and strict patrilineal descent and inheritance.

2. In Southern Kurdistan (Barth, 1953: 9) the society consists of "a great number of small, compact villages, essentially similar in their physical aspects, yet highly variegated with respect to their composition and organisation, ranging from extended lineage organizations to fully developed feudal organization. Thus, on the village level, there is a great diversity of forms of social organisation. Yet the culture of the area seems essentially uniform, and these alternative principles of organisation are universally known. In the recent history of some villages, there has been a rapid, fundamental change from one type of social organisation to another[1]...

"However, one type of basic organisation may be said to be autonomously Kurdish. This is usually called tribal, and is based on the lineage principle. Any movement away from this basic framework of organisation may be seen as a step in a "de-tribalisation process".

"A striking feature of the Kurdish kinship system is the small number of basic terms[2]... The group of relatives covered by these terms is a bilateral kin group, and includes all individuals in the elementary families of which ego or ego's parents are members during their lives" (ibid. p. 32).

"Political organisation... shows great regional variation, the tribal types being built on the lineage principle, others disregarding descent in a non-tribal, feudal organisation, which is based on residential groups only" (ibid. p. 34). There follows a description of each type of organisation, with statistics (ibid. p. 68) to show how the change from tribal to feudal modifies marriage practices.

I do not claim that the Baluch and Kurdish systems are comparable throughout, but there are obviously a number of relevant similarities. The main significant difference is that among Barth's Kurds "tribal" and "feudal" to a large extent co-exist: there is a synchronic relationship between the two as well as a diachronic process from the former to the latter. Among the Baluch I distinguished no such obvious co-existence of two equally valid structures or systems. Rather, I found a variation of emphasis between agnatic and cognatic values in the conception of kin relationship, which I was unable to explain without positing the diachronic process - a process which I shall now attempt to show might be expected on the basis of the model expounded in chapter 5.

3. Returning to Bloch (1965: 123) we find that in mediaeval Europe "the ties based on blood relationship existed long before, and were by their very nature foreign to the human relations characteristic of feudalism." But they continued to exert an important influence in the new structure. "A comprehensive picture of feudal institutions can be legitimately attempted because, originating at the very time when a real Europe was taking shape, they spread without fundamental differences to the whole European world. But the institutions of blood-relationship were, on the contrary, the legacy - and a singularly tenacious one - of the particular past of each of the groups of diverse origins whose destiny had brought them to live side by side" (Ibid.). "Vast gentes or clans, firmly defined and held together by a belief - whether true or false - in a common ancestry, were unknown to western Europe in the feudal period, save on its outer fringes, beyond the genuinely feudalised regions" (Ibid. p. 137).

"The Roman gens had owed the exceptional firmness of its pattern to the absolute primacy of descent in the male line. Nothing like this was known in the feudal epoch. Already in ancient Germany each individual had two kinds of relative, those 'of the spear side', and those 'of the distaff side', and he was bound, though in different degrees, to the second as well as to the first. It was as though among the Germans the victory of the agnatic principle had never been sufficiently complete to extinguish all trace of a more ancient system of uterine filiation. Unfortunately we know almost nothing of the native family traditions of the countries conquered by Rome. But, whatever one is to think of these problems of origins, it is at all events certain that in the mediaeval West kinship had acquired or retained a distinctly dual character. The sentimental importance with which the epic invested the relations of the maternal uncle and his nephew is but one of the expressions of a system in which the ties of relationship through women were nearly as important as those of paternal consanguinity. One proof of this is the clear evidence from the practices of name-giving.

"The majority of Germanic personal names were formed by linking two elements, each of which had a meaning of its own. So long as people

continued to be aware of the distinction between the two stems, it was the common custom, if not the rule, to mark the filiation by borrowing one of the components. This was true even in Romance-speaking regions where the prestige of the conquerors had led to the widespread imitation of their name system by the native peoples. "Children took their names either from the father or the mother; there seems to have been no fixed rule" (ibid. cf. on Polish naming below Part Four, chapter ).

"The tie of kinship was one of the essential elements of feudal society; [but] its relative weakness explains why there was feudalism at all" (ibid. p. 142). "The relationships of personal dependence had made their entry into history as a sort of substitute for, or complement to, the solidarity of the family, which had ceased to be fully effective" (ibid. p. 224).

Feudal society "did not rely on kinship alone. More precisely, feudal ties proper were developed when those of kinship proved inadequate ... Feudalism coincided with[3] a profound weakening of the State, particularly in its protective capacity. But much as feudal society differed from societies based on kinship as well as from those dominated by the power of the State, it was their successor and bore their imprint. For while the characteristic relationships of personal subjection retained something of the quasi-family character of the original companionage[4], a considerable part of the political authority exercised by innumerable petty chiefs had the appearance of a usurpation of 'regalian' rights" (ibid. p. 443).

4. Phillpotts (1913) traces the decline of the kindred group in the middle ages and after in Scandinavia, Northern France and Germany, England and Iceland. Among the overwhelming majority of Teutonic races in historical times kinship was reckoned through both parents (ibid. p. 2). No trace is found of Teutonic society ever having been originally agnatic (ibid. p. 268). Discrimination in favour of agnation appears to occur only in places where the kindred as a corporate group disappeared early (e.g. England, Iceland, Norway - ibid. 269).[5] The original limits of the Teutonic kindred are unknown (ibid. p. 274). Where cohesive kindreds persist into the later Middle Ages there the peasant or townsman tends to

be free. Where, on the other hand, the solidarity of the kindred disappears early, there the liberty of the individual suffers and seigneurial rights make their appearance (Ibid. p. 254)

More information about the working of the Anglo-Saxon kinship system is given by Lancaster (1958), where it is stated that every individual had, in general, the option of tracing affiliation to a set of persons through both his parents (and their descendants) and his parents' parents ( and their descendants) and so on (p.232 ), and there was a distinction drawn between FB and MB, and similarly between FZ and MZ (p.237 ). The solidarity of this kin group in shown by the list of duties it owed to ego (p.268-9). Those included: avenging his death, either by prosecuting a feud or by exacting wergild payments; support in feud or payment of wergild; presence at marriage and probably at baptism; aid when imprisoned. "A man who had sought sanctuary from pursuers in a church, according to Alfred's laws, could hand over his weapons to those who were in pursuit of him and remit his kinsmen's help in settlement. The pursuers had the duty to let the kinsmen know their help was needed. Similar considerations applied to the man who was besieged in his own home." However, a man did not incur a feud if he slew another while fighting for his lord (p.371 ). Certain other special cases were also kept outside the kindred system: thus, a man did not incur a feud if he slew another while fighting for a wrongfully accused kinsman; nor if he were attacking an adulterer who was with his sister, daughter or mother; or a thief (Ibid.).

Lancaster in fact discerns two substitutes for kin: a man's lord and his associates, and remarks that "it would provide a pattern easily grasped if we could find a man's ties to his lord becoming stronger over the period, as his ties to his kin group became weaker, but this does not seem to be the case. Early, in the Chronicle for 757 (755) one may see that men who chose lord above kin were highly regarded, while in the earliest laws concerning slaying the emphasis on what is owed the lord as compensation is almost as great as that owed the kin. Internal evidence alone warns us against assuming constant change in the balance between these two ties. It is possible on the other hand that friends and associates became constantly

more valuable as supporters. But here a problem is set by determining the meaning of Old English freond or fryndˊ (p.374). In the eleventh century Wulfstan deplores the lack of protection of kin by kin, and "kinship certainly tended to decline in importance over the period, but an irregular movement seems most faithfully to represent the scanty facts" (ibid).

5. It is interesting that side by side with this kindred solidarity (which though it tended to decline, remained one potent force of social control up to the Norman conquest) "the evidence points to the possibility that Anglo-Saxon marriages were frequently unstable as far as relations between spouses were concerned," even though "divorce as a complete severance of the marriage tie was not approved legally or ecclesiastically." It would seem therefore that the kindred consisting of patrilateral and matrilateral relatives provided ego with a measure of social security irrespective of the solidarity of his nuclear family; this security was complemented by his solidarity with his lord and with his peers.

6. On the basis of this evidence I maintain that, in any society, when the feudal relationship arises as a basic factor in the political structure, it is bound to coincide with (either may bear a causal relationship to the other) a modification in the formal composition of the pre-existing solidary group (e.g. kindred, lineage etc.), since it will take over at least some of the political functions of that group.

We should expect that the people who brought the Kalushi language into the Province were politically organised into extended families with a patrilineal emphasis (cf. account of Indo-European and Iranian terminology in Buck, 1949), approximating to a lineage system. The same would be likely to be true of later invaders, since it is generally true so far as is known of pastoral nomads in the Iranian cultural area (Persian, Turkish and Arab). By staying and forming a politically dominant minority they caused the gradual political fusion of two societies and, later, more immigrant social groups. The pre-existing society, though we know nothing of it except that it was probably based on isolated

villages and groups of villages, is likely to have been similar to that described in Spooner (1965a). Some of the political effects of this fusion have already been reconstructed.

The function of kinship in the structure of the invaders is best understood as being a natural method of defining a primary solidary group, and suggesting a leader within it. With the change in the political structure the role of the solidary group based on kinship lost its importance, and the leader which it defined became redundant outside the purely domestic or local sphere. Therefore, outside the domestic sphere, kinship ceased to have the same political relevance. Therefore, it was natural for the patrilineal bias in the conception of kinship to disappear. But there is no immediate reason for certain patrilineal traits such as the inheritance of a name to change. Further, although the political reasons for marriage choice are no longer valid, and there is no longer any political reason for keeping property in the patrilineal line by special rules of inheritance, there is also no immediate political reason for changing them (except for purposes of alliance between the dynastic families), and it is natural that they should change sooner in some tribes than others. As these rules disappear it would be natural for the terminology to be similarly modified. From comparison with other Iranian-speaking tribal groups we would expect there to have been only one differentiating term between paternal and maternal relatives: between MB and FB. These are not differentiated in Baluchi in the Province. However, they are differentiated in at least some of the isolated Baluch tribes in Khurāsān (by Arabic terms, presumably adopted from Persian), and among the Jadgāls who have kept a strong patrilineal bias.

Therefore, we would modify Beattie's formulation to the effect that feudalism implies not the weakening of the State, but the weakening of pre-existing solidary groups whatever they were. In itself feudalism does not weaken anything: kinship, State, or whatever other political solidary groupings pre-existed it, remain as conceptions or collective representations in the culture, and the system of feudal relationships which is

now dominant derives strength from each of these conceptions which co-exist and share their sociological significance with it.

Thus, among the Kurds and the Baluch, the "tribal" organization, as it is presently conceived, is the ideal. They say they prefer to marry their FaBrDa: actual practice among the Baluch shows no differentiation between cousins; among Barth's Kurds "feudal" shows no differentiation from "tribal" practice. But since these conceptions in their original context were part of the framework of obedience to authority, and the man who within that original framework held authority now owes allegiance through a feudal relationship to a superior who may or may not be related patrilineally, the feudal relationship derives strength from the archaic conception.

Where the Teutonic kindred loses its force as a solidary group <u>before</u> conditions arise which lead to the establishment of feudal relationships, agnation takes its place; for there must be some solidary group for society to continue. Where the feudal relationship is introduced as a political factor: if a cohesive kindred persists, it protects the freedom of the vassal; if it does not persist, other solidary groups also appear (cf. Lancaster's "associates").

The feudal relationship does not replace kin, but simply because it usurps at least part of the political function of the kin relationship, it is bound in due course to modify it. Hence the variation in Baluch society in the use made of kin relationships - from community to community and from "class" to "class".

NOTES

1. My interpretation of Barth's material differs somewhat from his but is not really incompatible with it. He attempts "to discuss these various types of organization as they express themselves in the actual power hierarchy of individuals in the village," and sees this "fluid and complex situation" as a type which is probably "characteristic of societies which lie in the shatter zone between larger culture areas - in this case, between the Arab, Persian and Turkish. Such a location produces familiarity with various competing normative systems, principles of organization, and power hierarchies. This familiarity on the part of the villager leads to attempts at manipulating these various systems and principles. Thus competing factions, manipulating the familiar (but in part mutually exclusive) systems, will establish different power hierarchies in different villages, resulting in the present variety of forms of social organization found in the area." (Barth, 1953: 9). Without having any first hand knowledge of the area, I concur with his description of the situation and use of the term "shatter zone" - though I see these in terms of the model expounded in chapter 5. However, I do not consider his explanation sufficient: why should the villagers apparently voluntarily attempt to manipulate various alien systems and principles? and, how did they become familiar with them? - unless, perhaps, as in the Baluch situation, the society has been built up from a number of immigrant groups each bringing with it practices which have been modified and included in the present composite system.

2. Barth (ibid. Diagram No. 2, p. 31) gives sixteen. cf. also Leach, 1940. The Baluch also have sixteen basic terms. However, the Kurds also use a large number of compound terms - Barth gives 21; whereas the Baluch only use five (cf. below Part Four, Chapter 1[1]).

3. My italics: I consider this wording important and perfectly compatible with my criticism of Beattie (cf. above, Chapter 7).

4. cf. ibn Khaldun's "group feeling" above Chapter 5.

5. Phillpotts' contention on the same page that "It is obvious that there must be a strong tendency to an agnatic reckoning of kinship wherever a conquering race takes possession of a subject land" does not seem to be substantiated by the data she supplies.

PART FOUR

Political

## Chapter Nine

## The Tribe

### I

The object of this chapter is to define the meaning of <u>ant</u>, (the Balochi word we have translated as "tribe"), illustrate its use, and show the political relevance of the concept.

We shall approach the problem historically through the main accounts which have been left by travellers and geographers. This method, will simplify the explanation of certain elements of what is now an extremely complex situation.

1. Up until the beginning of the last century when the Baluch are first described by a Western eye-witness, - that is, in all references to the Baluch by medieval muslim travellers, geographers and historians up to the beginning of the QAJAR period (the end of the 18th century), - the Baluch are described as a tribe (P. <u>tāyifeh, qabīleh, īl</u>). It is only in the modern era that accounts begin to differentiate among them. Pottinger, the inaugurated Western contact with the Baluch by his journey through Baluchistan from east to west in 1810, has the following accounts of tribes among them.

In Las Bela (south east Makrān, now Pakistan) the population of twenty five thousand souls "of which nearly one-third are wandering families who change their places of residence as convenience or inclination prompts... are all of one tribe, though known by the four different appellations of Noomree, Jadgāl, Sokhya, and Jeth, which latter is the most commonly used term, and literally signifies a husbandman" (Pottinger, 1816: 29-30. Jadgāl is Jadgāl and Jeth is Jat. The other two names are not known in the Province.) The Dehwārs around Kalāt are given as a non-Baluch "class" (<u>ibid.</u> p.51) "The Baluchees, from the most accurate information I could acquire on this perplexing subject, branche in the first instance, from the original class of that name, into three principal tribes, called Wharecee /= Mārut/, Rinds /= Rind/, and Mughsees /= Magas/...

"The subdivisions of the Kharoos tribe are about eight or ten, and those of the Rinds and Laghsees each amount to many more than double that number. I annex a list:

Kharoos Balooche Tribes

| Names | Chiefs |
|---|---|
| 1, Rakhshanees [Rakhshānī] | Mihrab Khan |
| 2, Bajedees [= Bajjēdī] | Mir Shah Suwar |
| 3, Khasoggas [?] | |
| 4, Koords [= Kurd] or Shuhedees [= Shahīdī] | Golfat Khan |
| 5, Leengs or Linds [?] | Shah Suwar Khan |
| 6, Urbabees [= Arbābī] | Shah Mihrab Khan |
| 7, Mullikahs [= ? malek] | Esa Khan |

To the first of these the head of the class belongs, and the whole are, in consequence of that, as frequently distinguished in common conversation, by that appellation as that of Kharoos. The authority however, which Mihrab Khan enjoys is merely titular" (ibid. p.55-6).

Pottinger then continues to give 25 subdivisions of the "Rind Balooche Tribes" and 16 subdivisions of the "Laghsee Balooche Tribes". Among these it is interesting to note that of presently existing Persian Baluch nāt - names he includes Booledés (Bolēdai), Housherzenées (Hushīrzānī), Lasharées (Lāshārī); of genuine Pakastani Baluch nāt names - Doorbukées (Durbukī), Bugothées (Bogtī), Marees (Marrī), and Kharanées (Kharānī denotes inhabitants of Kharān, - the north western section of the Pakastani Balūchistān).

Further on he lists 74 Brahooé (Brāhuī) tribes as a specimen from which "the diversity of the whole will be appreciated, and the consequent perplexity and not impossibility of making satisfactory inquiries will be more readily understood." Some of these are very unlikely to have been Brāhuī in origin. Brāhuī is now primarily a linguistic distinction in the central part of Pakastani Baluchistan (but see Morgenstierne 1932 and Jaeneau 1964 on relationship between the two languages and likelihood of some tribes having changed from one language to the other more than once.) Brāhuī is a Dravidian language,

and is generally thought to derive from the pre-Baluch population of the area. It is, however, puzzling that the Baluchi historical ballads contain no mention of any encounter with the Brāhui. The only sāt name Pottinger specially mentions for Persian Baluchistan is "Kurd". These Kurds - there are many now in the foothills of Kuh-i Taftān, and they constitute a dynastic family in Zāhidān - are "Baluchised" Kurds transplanted into the Province from the Zagros by Nādir Shāh and/or Shāh 'Abbās.

Pottinger did not understand the concept "sāt", or what constituted the basic solidary group in Baluch society. Nevertheless, his account, with its mistakes, is instructive: he has the most prestigious sāt names of what is now Pakistani Baluchistan (i.e. the part of Baluchistan that was politically more organised because of the Kalāt Khānate); he understands all the other sāt names which he collected to be sub-tribes of these, and among these sub-tribes he includes names which denote merely a place of origin. If, with our knowledge of the present situation, we reconstruct on the basis of Pottinger's data, it would seem most likely that Nārui, Rend and Magasī were the most highly regarded sāt (the last two in particular feature in the old ballads) and contained politically dominant lines which provided leaders; some of the sub-tribes he gives would have been separate lines of these sāt agnatically related to the dominant line, others would have been client sāt and others shahrī spoken of in sāt terms, though by a name which in origin simply denoted their place of residence.

2. The first published list of tribes in the Persian Province is given by Sykes (1902). It is an incomplete list and does not distinguish between the Persian and the British Makrān. Sykes notes that many of the tribes do not form integrated communities, but are scattered over a wide territory:[1]

| | No. of Families | Habitat |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Gīchkī | 600 | Panjgūr and Kēch |
| 2. Bolēdai | 400 | Bolēda |
| 3. Malek | 600 | Kolwa |
| 4. Rushkīwānī | 1000 | Kharān, Panjgur, Kolwa, Bolēda |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6. | Besanju | 1600 | Kolwa, Kir, Ormara, Bīr |
| 7. | Mīrūī | 1000 | Valley of Bampur Sarhadd |
| 8. | Mut | 1000 | Bāhu, Dashtiārī Lāshār |
| 9. | Mīrasai ) Sakosai ) Ashāhi ) | ) Rend 1000 | Mand, Pīshīn, Dashti |
| 10. | Kauda | 1200 | Dashtiārī |
| 11. | Jadgāl | 800 | Bāhu and Dashtiārī |
| 12. | Shāhsāda | 800 | Bāhu and Dasht |
| 13. | Kalmatti | 300 | Kalmat, Pasnī and Kolanch |
| 14. | Rāis | 100 | Koch |
| 15. | Mīd | 1600 | Ormara, Kalmat |
| 16. | Lutī | 1200 | Bāhu and Dasht |
| 17. | Darsāda | 100 | Pasnī and Bampur valley |
| 18. | Gurgīch | 400 | Bāhu, Dasht, Chānbār |
| 19. | Lurī | 400 | Scattered |
| 20. | Sangar | 1600 | Ormara, Kalmat, etc. |
| 21. | Wardilis | 120 | Kolanch, Kōch |
| 22. | Band | 1200 | Kolanch, Kōch, etc. |

"In the above list only the chief tribes have been mentioned, and of course many of them change their habitat at various seasons of the year. Even so, we have an ethnological medley, which is of extreme interest.

"To take the first tribe on the list, the Gīchkī are the descendants of a Rajput family which settled in Baluchistan as late as the seventeenth century. The Bolēdai hail from Maskat, the Malik are descendants of the Saffār dynasty [68-after 1480 in Sistān cf. Sumbeur, 1927: 199-200] ... while the Mushīrwānī were dispossessed by Shāh Abbās, who drove them from the neighbourhood of Ishfahān to make room for Armenian settlers.

"The Bezanju are a branch of the aboriginal Bēlūrī and the Nārui are still the most influential tribe in Persian Baluchistan under Sardār Husein Khān. The Huts are a branch of the turbulent Rends, who resemble Arabs more closely than any other Beluch and are proud of the fact; while the Akasai, Sadozai and Askānī Rends, the Kauda and Jadgāl, the Kalmatta and the Gurgich claim to be descended from Aleppo exiles, but Jadgāl merely signifies Jat speech. The Shahzāda tribe claims descent from the princes of Qandahār, and the Rais are, I understand, descended from the famous or infamous Ghazz [= Ghuzz, a Turkish tribe, cf. Anc.Is 1965,Vol.II, p.1107]. The Mēd are aboriginal pirates, and the Darzāda are serfs. The Lurī represent the gypsies, and the Wardili immigrated from Sind" (Sykes,1902:96-7).

Further on (p.122) he supplemented this information with the following note:

"The tribes [in the Bampur region] are divided dwellers on the right and left banks of the Bampur river.

| | |
|---|---|
| Nārui | left bank |
| Bāmeri | right bank |
| Sabakī | " " |
| Abdullāhī | " " |
| Dakalī | both banks |
| Hut | left bank |
| Zeinu'd-Dīnī | " " |

"No numbers are available but, in 1900, the tribes of Persian Baluchistan ranked in the following order:- (1) Nārui; (2) Dāmenī; (3) Bāmerī; (4) Yārmuhammadzai;[2] (5) Bolēdzai; (6) Gamshādzai; and (7) Hamalī. The three latter live in the eastern part of the Province."

Further lists of tribes are given for Īranshahr (p.123), Magas and Sarbās (p.128), Paskuh (p.129) while of the Sarhadd we are told (p.131) that "The most influential tribe is one of the smallest, the Yārmuhammadzai only aggregating some 50 families, but, owing to their raiding propensities under the notorious Jīand Khān [for this character cf.also Dyer, 1921,passim]

, hegemony has been established, so that the Yārmuhammadsai control perhaps 1000 families. Next in importance are the Rīgī, who aggregate 600 families while the Lemē 'Elsai [now renamed Shahbakhsh, following a royal pardon after revolt in the 1930's] clan is rather stronger, numbering 800 families. The Nards, who were at one period the leading tribe, are now almost lost,... they number perhaps 20 families. In 1900 it was estimated that the entire population of Sarhadd was about 8000 families, say 40,000." Some of these figures are so different from the situation today that it would seem almost certain that Sykes was misled by his own conception of what a tribe should be. This order of ranking must have been wrong then as now. It is significant that his ranked list are all Baluch. However, Dēwānī is a "blanket" term for the Baluch sāt who rose the southern part of the Sarhadd, and the Harnalī are a branch of the Gamshādzai. Further sāt names are given for Kohān (ibid. p.138) and Jālq (ibid. p.239)

Sykes, whose study of the Baluch was conducted under much more favourable circumstances than Pottinger, was also able to learn something from those who had been before him, and he came much closer to understanding the nature of Baluch social and political grouping. From his account the following points arise:

i. Some "tribes" are obviously scattered to the extent that although they keep the same sāt name, they cannot be considered a solidary corporate group.

ii. Some of the names he gives are not traceable today - at the very most, three generations later.

iii. The variety of origins is recognised - even though in some cases almost certainly wrongly.

iv. Some are quite late arrivals in the Province; and some are of "royal" origin.

v. Though he does not state it explicitly it is implicit in his account that some of the tribes are really categories.

vi. There is a difference of status between the various sāts.

vii. Some tribes are subdivided cf. no.8.

viii. Sardar Huse in Khān who is here referred to as the chief of the Nārui is in fact the paternal grandfather of the present leading member of the

Shirani dynastic family in Nikshahr. The Nēruī are not found mainly in Sistan and in the Makrān range. The latter group are traditionally thought of as the main warrior support of the Shirāni dynastic family.

Some of the names are derived from personal names, some are from place names, while some (e.g. Zēd, Hut) are of non-Baluch, perhaps non-Iranian, or even pre-Iranian origin.

Quite soon after Sykes' travelogue there appeared the first and only western monograph devoted to the serious study of the "Baluch Race". It is by M.Longworth Dames and was published by the Royal Asiatic Society and the Folklore Society of 1904. Dames had firsthand experience of the north western Baluch of British Baluchistan and his approach is historical. He seems to have been mainly interested in interpreting the cycle of Baluch epic poetry (cf.also Dames 1907) as he found it in that area. What he presents therefore is an analysis of what the Baluch there think was their age-old pattern of social organization.

"The complete tribal organization is still retained by those tribes which inhabit the Suleiman Mountains south of the thirty-first parallel of latitude to the plain of Kachi, and westwards to the Bolan Pass, the plain of Kachi itself (called on our maps Candava or Kach-Gandava), and the territory stretching from the mountains and from Kachi towards the Indus, in some cases as far as the Indus itself, in others stopping short of it. The tribe is known by the name of tuman, and is presided over by a chief known as Sirdar. The post is hereditary, and is always held by a member of one family belonging to one clan of the tribe. Each tuman is made up of several distinct clans, known as phēd (a Sindhi word meaning section or share), and these are again subdivided into septs known as phalli. The terminology here is not Baluchi and differs from that in use in the Persian Province. It was most likely adopted under the influence of the neighbouring Mogul Empire.

"The name tuman is from the Turkish tuman, ten thousand, which appears to have been first used as an appellation of the nomad tribes of Persia in the time of the Seljuk Sultans. Among the Baluch it is not so old, and never occurs in the heroic ballads which relate to the events of the fifteenth and

nineteenth centuries. The oldest name for a tribe found in the poems is Bolak, also, like tuman, a word of Turkish origin (T.Bulak, a band or crowd). This word seems rather to refer to the original clans, and not to the modern composite tribe or tuman, which is built up of several clans, connected one with another mainly by acknowledging a common chief. Within the clan the members are supposed to be of the same kindred, and as a rule the nucleus of the tuman consists of a few clans which consider themselves to be closely connected by blood. These have served as a centre of attraction for other less powerful or unattached clans, which have lost their original tribes either through internal quarrels or through the tribe having been defeated and broken up. The new tie is not always a very strong one, and such members of a tribe are the first to leave it if it is defeated, and look for a more powerful protector. Sometimes mere discontent with the chief, or an internal feud, is sufficient to drive a clan from one tuman to another.

"The oldest poems say that there were forty-four bolaks, of which forty were Baluch and four were servile tribes dependent on them. There is no complete list of these bolaks. The oldest poem mentions seventeen Baluch and three servile clans, and a few others mentioned in other old ballads bring the number up to twenty-six, in addition to which three tribes with whom the Baluch were at war - the Langahs, Nahars, and Kungs - are mentioned. Some of these tribes are not now known, and most of them are found as clans only, and not as organised tumans. The only names among them now found as tumans are Rend, Lāshārī, Drishak, Mazārī, Dombkī and Khusa, to which list should be added the Hut tribe still found in Makrān, although broken up in the north. Many considerable tumans, such as the Lon , Leghārī, Bozdār Bugtī, Kasrānī, Bolēdaī (or Bordī) and Jakrānī, do not appear at all in the older poetry.

"The septs, or phallis, are th units out of which the larger organisations are built up, and may be compared to the gortras of a Hindu caste. In a few cases one of the larger clans composing a tuman appears to be rather a subordinate tribe than a clan, and has its own important section , not all necessarily of the same blood. Sometimes there are more than one in this position. These may conveniently be known by the name of 'subtumans'. Such are the Haddiani section of the Leghārī tribe, the Dorkānī and Lāshārī

among the Gorchānī, the Ghulāmānī among the Bozdār, the Shambānī among the Jagti, and the Masūranī among the Marri. These subtumans are very independent and not so obedient to their tumandars as the ordinary clans. In many tumans one section, either clan or phalli, is found which has a hereditary feud with the chief, and is in habitual opposition to him. The Mahmūds among the Khusas, the Heibatānī among the Leghārī and the Mistākānī among the Mazārī are examples of this. In spite of this, however, the general feeling in a Baluch tribe is in favour of supporting the chief's authority and if he is a moderately good man according to the Baluch standard, just, generous, and of an even temper, he can generally enforce it without much difficulty. What a really able and straightforward man can do is shown by the history of Nawab Sir Imām Bakhsh Khān, K.C.I.E., the tumandar of the Mazāri, a tribe formerly considered irreclaimable robbers and pirates on the Indus who have now settled into a law-abiding and loyal tribe, and over whom he still successfully presides, though blind and eighty years of age " (Dames,1904: 5ff). This is the only source which appears, though unconsciously, to concern itself with Baluch only, and although it really tells us little enough it suggests a more definite organisation with more emphasis on blood ties than is to be found in the other sources.

4. Apart from British and Persian sources, the only first hand account of Persian Baluch tribes of any detail is in a book published by a Russian (Zarudny 1916) in St. Petersburg, giving an account of a journey he made through the Province from north to south and back in 1900-1. The book is of great interest and deserves mention because of the different political bias of the writer. However, his account of the tribes, though perhaps less misleading than others, does not really increase our knowledge.

4. The remaining accounts are Iranian but nevertheless all owe something to the preceding western accounts. The details they provide are given in Appendix I while here I merely summarize the more significant points which may be learnt from them.

4. They fail completely to distinguish between solidary groupings based on

a) common origin

b) kinship

c) informal allegiance relationships

d) class or occupation

an obvious reason why they fail to make these distinctions is that the Nilotes themselves do not make them explicitly. A zāt may be based on any one or more of these criteria.

(ii) zāt names are of several different types; they may be derived from a personal name, a place name, a class name, a status etc.

(iii) one man or group may be spoken of as belonging to different zāt which may or may not be mutually exclusive) according to the sociological context.

(iv) not all zāt are headed by a chief.

I now give my own account of Baluch sēt. It is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather to illustrate the present use of the term and its political implications. Areas for which I have inadequate first hand material are characterised rather than described in detail.

1. Sarhadd:

The main sēt names in the Sarhadd now are:-

i. Shahbakhsh,[3] previously known as Is-ē'Isai. They roam the north western Sarhadd, centred on Shuru, where the senior member - Jum'a Khān - lives (cf.Oyer, 1821, passim). Jum'a Khān is now very old and nearly blind and his son functions generally in his stead. (They performed sarēnbandī, i.e. served as irregulars for Dust Muhammad Khān, in Baluch Period).

ii. Mīr Baluchsai, roam eastern Sarhadd. No family line which ranks as aristocratic family, but probably most respected Baluch of the region, said to be of Kurdish origin.

iii. Shahnavāzī[3] previously known as Yārmuhammadsai, second only to ii in prestige which depends on "Baluch-ness", probably largest tribe in Province (? 5,000-6,000 men).

iv. Rīgī, politically most prominent tribe in the region mainly because of the activities of Sidu Khān ( cf.Oyer,1821,passim) They are probably in fact not very many, but have assimilated a number of smaller sēt e.g.Bolēksai.

v. Kurd, now clients to Rīgī. They claim to have been sent into the region by Shah Abbas (1587-1629) and have in the past been very powerful (cf.Gasteiger, 1911:123ff.)

vi. Nārui. There are independent sections of the Nārui in Sīstān(where they send a delegate to the Iranian Majles). the Sarhadd and the Makrān. In the Sarhadd, they are centred on Nusratābad Sīpī.

vii. Gurgīch - around Zāhidān.

viii. Gamshēdsai - on borders between Sarhadd and Sarhān, traditionally former-clients of Bēraksai.

These are the main sēt names of the Sarhadd. There are numerous other sēt names, but all the remainder consider themselves - for all practical purposes - hangers-on of one or other of the above eight sēt. Some of them very likely

genetically related to one or other of these "tribes", in which case they have acquired their present (sub-) sāt[4] name by a process of segmentation similar to that generally referred to as "lineage segmentation". Others have been included into the system of the more powerful corporate group by a process of political assimilation. In either case the result is the same, for in terms of political hierarchy once an allegiance relationship has been established it tends to supersede agnatic or other kinship ties in political importance. It is probably for this reason that there is no general effort to extend the depth of genealogical memory in order to preserve or forge an agnatic kin link.

It has already been noted in Part One that the Serhadd is in many respects distinct from the rest of the Province. Of the senior branches of the main "tribes" listed above only the Pīpī could be considered settled in the same way as the dynastic families of the Bakrān, i.e. traditionally centred on a particular fort or forts, and the Pīpī only achieved political importance in this century.

4. Sarāvān

In the remaining areas the picture is more complex, and for the Sarāvān area in particular it is necessary to bear in mind what can be known of the history of the region (cf. Part Two).

Of the four surviving brothers of the main Bērakzai dynastic family one (Ilām Khān), who is technically the senior, spends most of his time in Irānshahr with occasional visits to Sarāvān (Shastūn); one (Muhammad Amīn Khān) divides most of his time between Shastūn and Irānshahr, but also visits regularly most other parts of Sarāvān;and the third (Amānullāh) divides his time between Shastūn, Nāhuk, Jīb, and Irānshahr; (the fourth, Bahrām, divides his time between Turp, in Pākistān, and Irānshahr). The latter two are now not really important from the point of view of leadership. The elder son (Rahmān, aged approx. 21) of the deceased elder brother (Muhammad Umar - cf. below Fig. I) is already prominent in Irānshahr. In Sarāvān, there is another line of the Bērakzai, which though it acknowledges a junior political relationship to the main line holds the status of dynastic family. The leading member is Mīrāb Khān. Yet another line holds this status in Kaurān,

n the Zābulī plain, and the leading member, Navāb Khān, under Dust Muhammad Khan ld the lower part of the Zābulī plain centred on Kaurān and the lower rt of the Sarbāz valley, from Dap Kaur to Fīrusābād. This line is inter-rried with the Kurds of Zābulī. The fort of Sarbāz was held by Alī Muhammad lik, the father of Dust Muhammad.

Three uncles of the four main brothers, i.e. the brothers of Dust hammad Khān, are still alive. They are no longer politically active, but eir past activity has left its imprint on the present situation. These are lso, though socially senior, politically junior to the four main brothers. e eldest, Nushīrvān (cf.chapter 4), held the upper part of the Zābuli ain, Sarju, and Nāhuk under Dust Muhammad Khān. The present position of e Kurd dynastic family in Zābuli, which is client to the Bārakzai, should be en in this context. Nushīrvān now lives "in retirement" in Nāhuk. Of the o other brothers, the eldest, Ayyub Khān, held the lower Sarbās valley der Dust Muhammad Khān, and now lives in Nāsk. Ayyub Khān's second son, Abdullāh (known as Bārān in Sarāvān to distinguish him from his cousin), fter a prolonged stay in Teheran, where he achieved a (comparatively) nsiderable level of education and was imprisoned for a period for alleged mmunist sympathies, has now returned to the Province, and spends his time inly between Shestum, Surān and Krafshān. Though technically politically nior to the four main brothers, because of great leadership aptitude he is w in practice second only to Muhammad Amīn in the Sarāvān area (cf.Part Six hapter 18). The youngest brother of Dust Muhammad Khān, Mīr Ykub(= A.Ya'qub) lik, lives in Nāsk and has never been politically active. Through Ayyub lik and their sister Amrād Bībī (cf.Fig.XIII) the Bārakzai are inter-married ith the Bolēdai and the Sardārzai and all three dynastic families meet egraphically in Nāsk.

The remainder of the Bārakzai <u>qēt</u>, i.e. men who can legitimately call emselves Bārakzai because of agnatic descent from Mīr Abdullāh Khān (cf. hapter 4 and fig.I below) range from local status in some of the settlements

of the Sarbaz valley and Aptar to complete insignificance in the villages of Saravān and Īranshahr. They are not of course very numerous, being the descendants of one man only ten generations back, but it is significant that their kinship link with the dominant family does not in itself afford them any measure of status.

The next most important zāt name in the Saravān region is Bozorgzāda (cf. chapter 4). The historical basis for the status of this zāt has been indicated in chapter 4. It now contains two dynastic families, politically at odds with each other.

The most important of these calls itself Mīr Murādzai. It is not clear how far back this line achieved independent status, but the earliest Mīr Murād Khān of which mention is preserved (Chapter 3) lived in the middle of the last century, and it is likely that he is the eponymous ancestor of this (sub-) zāt. Under Dust Muhammad Khān the Mīr Murādzai intermarried with the Bārakzai and acknowledged junior political status to him outside their own areas. In 1928 they held the forts in Sīb, Sarān, Paskuh, Kant Kahūt, and Mushak, (cf. Map I and the list of villages in central Saravān in Chapter I). Sīb was the major fort and was probably the largest in the province after Bampur. In the eclipse of the Bārakzai after 1928 the Mīr Murādzai were the dominant family in the Saravān area, and while there has never been any serious open conflict between the two families it would seem that the relative status of the Bārakzai and Mīr Murādzai dynastic families in Saravān as an area centred on Shastun has depended mainly on the relative personal aptitude of the leading member of each at least since the beginning of this century. Thus: although Dust Muhammad Khān was dominant at the end of the Baluch Period, Mīr Muhammad Shāh Khān Mīr Murādzai took over to the Government independently in 1923 and took the responsibility for disarming the area later. When the Bārakzai returned from exile, Muhammad Umar Bārakzai became dominant, but the Bārakzai were obliged to divide their time and energy between Saravān and Īranshahr (particularly because they hoped their lands on the Bampur river would be returned to them), and when Muhammad Umar died in the late fifties the dominant position in the

political centre of Shastun went not to his brother, Muhammad Amīn, but to his nephew Khān, the eldest son of Muhammad Shāh Mīr Sarēdzai. When Mīr Amīn was killed in a hunting accident in the early sixties nobody was left to dispute the authority of Muhammad Amīn.[5] However, with the death of Sarēd Khān, the family was left without a candidate for anything beyond purely local leadership roles, for Muhammad Shāh although still alive is now senile. Members of the dynastic family now live in Paskuh, and Kant, but are of little practical importance outside the Sīb-Surān plain.

b. The main branch of the Bamurgzada, who also call themselves Ni'matullāhī (cf. chapter 4), are now of little import and are purely locally dominant in Ajiq and Dāvarpanāh. (Desak). However, the son of the present senior member of the family has for some time been attempting to win status through direct relations with the Administration.

iii. The only other zāt in the Sarāvān region with a family of dynastic family status are the Mushīrvānī, who control the lower Mashkīd area and are resident in Kuhak and Isfandak (and across the border, cf. Baluchistan, 1932) for a long time they maintained an independence and almost nomans-land status between Kalāt and Iran, but from the beginning of this century they were in practice politically dependent on Shastun. They claim to have come from Western Persia.

The remaining zāt names of the area denote varying degrees of political dependence on one or other of these dynastic families. Once again, I do not attempt to list them all: without an extremely detailed census of the whole province - which would be a formidable task because of the patterns of movement already mentioned - I do not believe a comprehensive list is possible; and it would only serve purely demographic purposes.

a. Dehwārī, purely agricultural, in main Sarāvān valley below Shastun, and lower Sīb-Surān valley. Several sub-zāt names are also used. It is quite probable that Dehwari was originally a supra-zāt name, i.e. a name applied to a group of people who entered the province together but were not genetically related.

Shahmalsai of.chapter 4, also known as Ustāī (= craftsmen). Also found
Mohtiārī (of.chapter 4).

Shebsāda, are Sayyids(of.Part Five).

Maleksāda, mainly in Zangiān. (NB Malek is Arabic for "King").

Darsāda - shahrī only, scarcely distinguished from ghulāms, many of whom
ve adopted Darsāda as a zāt name. Many of both have turned Darsāda into
r (for durrapearl) sāda (of.above Part three chapter 5, VI)

Lurī - musicians and dancers. This is more obviously used as a
ategory. However, it is said that they are the original gypsies who were
troduced into Iran from India by Bahrām Gur (5th century cf.Barnes 1904: 17)
ey are of very low social status.

Ghulām, cf.below chapter twelve. "Ghulām" is used exactly as a zāt name
s the ghulāms form a caste, in that they constitute the lowest stratum of
ciety and fulfil specific functions within it, and even now that they are
nomically free they cannot change their position except by removing themselves
m Baluch society.

Mūtsai - Baluch near Asfandak.

Sepāhī Also in Sīb Surān. Warrior tribe of Bozorgzāda and Mīr
ādsai. They divide themselves into e.g. Musāzai, Gīsherzai, Kutwalzai,etc.

Nusratzai - shahrī.

Arbāb - peasants, shahrī. Arbāb is an Arabic word, used in Persian
th the meaning landowner or overlord.

Dehqānsai - two tribes of the same name, claiming no connection with each
her. One of them claimsto have been brought from Mushkī (d) (in Pakistani
khtūnistan) by the Mīr Murādzai

Alīsai - shahrī.

Shahbor - Baluch.

Chākarbor - Baluch.

Abdulsai - Baluch

Chākīsai - Baluch

Darrīsai - main Baluch zāt in Bamposht and Mēduch

Rand - main line = dynastic family of Sagas, cf.i above; remainder
e warrior zāt of the local dynastic line of the Bārāksai. They also used to
ntrol Bamposht and were allied with the Bārāksai, before the Bārāksai moved
to the area(of Maruny 1816:191)

xiii. Askānī
xiv. Porkī
xv. Seipēēk (literally 3-footed)

Baluch in the mountains on either side of the Shahri Kaur The first two compose the entire population of Salēh Kuh where they are so intermarried that they scarcely distinguish themselves between the two sāt

The Askānī claim to be descended from Gwahrām (cf.chapter 3) and therefore to be of "original" Baluch blood. They say Askān was the name of a settlement which they adopted as a sāt name when they split off from the main body. However, they do not attempt to substantiate their claim with genealogies. The Porkī make no such claim - which puts their social status somewhat below the Askānī. However, they have the reputation of having been closer to the Bērahzai and more reliable when the Bērahzai were weak - and this in turn enhances their status.

xvi. Rais
xvii. Watkār

Shahrī especially in Ērafshān

The former, though the word is in fact the Arabic and Persian word for "chief", are accounted very low in social status. Watkār literally means "self-work" and it is therefore not surprising that it applies to a sāt of low status. However, these two sāt together own most of the land in Ērafshān and it is thought locally that they might be the descendants of the pre-Baluch inhabitants of the area.

4. Sarbāz valley and adjacent areas

i. Apart from tribes already mentioned, ir is the most common sāt in this region. They are Baluch and highly thought of. The word might be translated as "prince" (cf.below, chapter 13).

ii. Rend, cf.chapter 3. There are only a very few families of this celebrated sāt in the Persian Province, and they mostly constotute the most highly thought of families in the localities in which they have settled. They are Baluch but settled in small villages in the Sarbāz valley.

iii. Glohkī. These, like the Rends, are small isolated families of high social status in small settlements in the Sarbaz valley. The Glohkī are the dominant tribe in the neighbouring area of Pakistan. Both the Rends and the Glohkī are in constant contact with their "cousins" in Pakistan.

Rais. These also enjoy high status and claim to have no connection with the other Rais already mentioned above.

4. Īrānshahr - Bampur

Bearing in mind what has already been said about this region (cf. chapter 1) the zāt in this region may be simply divided into the two categories: shahrī and Baluch. Both categories include several zāt that have been mentioned already in other regions, and are all of low social status. All the main dynastic families - but especially the Bārakzai, Shīrānī and Mubārakī - have influence in the area.

5. Western Makrān range

This area is dominated by the Shīrānī (previously known as Shirdhānzai) dynastic family from the forts of Nikshahr, Fannuch, and Sent. The most important Baluch are the Nārūī, of whom the Shīrānī are in origin a branch. The coastal plain west of Chāhbahār is from the political point of view included in this area.

6. Chāmp - Lāshār

This area forms a relatively small enclave of territory in the Makrān range south of Īrānshahr, controlled by the Mubārakī dynastic family who seem to be an offshoot of the Shīrānī dynastic family. It is said that Mubārakī is really a modification of Mārakī (mār = snake; mubārak = blessed) in the same spirit as Durzāda for Darzāda, and that Mārak was the eponymous ancestor of the line where it broke away from the Shīrānī, but I found no one to give me more detail.

While the Mubārakī are the dominant family in the area, the western part of the area (Pīp, Espaka, Marīdok etc.) contains a number of Lāshārī (cf. chapter II) who are highly regarded. The part of the area which does not contain any Lāshārī centres on Chāmp and the northern part of the Kāju river from Chāmp to Nasr Band. The zāt in this area are collectively referred to as Āhurānī (the area is called Āhurān). They are Baluch, but for reasons which are blamed mainly on the personalities of the leading members of the Mubārakī family the area is insecure to the extent that not even the Baluch

travellers' rights are always respected (cf. Part Six chapter 19).

f. South east Makrān

The remainder of the Province includes the main centres of Kāsk, Kasr and and Chāhbahār, and the Bolēdai, Sardārzai and part of the Bārakzai ruastic families. The dominant lines of these three families are so closely inter-married that it is not always easy to distinguish between them. Any attempt at differentiation is complicated by the fact that the Sardārzai element, owing to the ecological situation in Dashtiārī - their traditional seat of residence (cf. chapters 1, 2 & 4), is continually on the move between Chāhbahār, Dashtiārī, Bāhu, Kasr and and Kāsk. Technically the leading member of the Bolēdai family is Hājj Karīmbakhsh Sa'īdī in Kāsk. However, the most prominent "leader" in the region is the senior remaining Sardārzai brother - Mīr Saulēdād Khān. Another Bolēdai, Shīrdel Khān, is the leading resident in Kasr and. In Chāhbahār itself the Sardārzai compete with the Shīrānī.

Traditionally, the Bolēdai ruled from forts in Kāsk, Kasr and, Bag and Bēt, and their "warrior" zāt were the Bar. The Sardārzai relied principally on the Jadgāls. Jadgāl is really a "supra-"zāt category name, but the linguistic difference between them and the other Baluch of the area has meant that their individual zāt names have no significance outside a Jadgālī-speaking gathering.

There are certain other zāt in the area which must be mentioned. Some of these claim to have entered the region with the Jadgāls: e.g. Shaikhs, Sayyad (= Sayyid cf. Part Five), Mīrī. Others claim to have been in the area much longer: in particular the Hut, Singalī; while the remainder are non-Baluch categories: in particular, Mēd, Katrī, Bāpārī, Ustā. The Hut are unusual in that while they are very likely of pre-Baluch origin in the Province, they are accounted Baluch and considered of high social status. The Singalī are inferior to them. The Katrī are merchants, and Bāpārī actually means merchant. Ustā means craftsman and is used as an alternative

name for the Shakkalzai. The term Mēd is applied exclusively to those who fish from small settlements along the coast: e.g. Gwātar, Pasā Bandar, Jarīs, Chāhbahār, Tīs, Kunārak, Posm, etc., and they may therefore very well be the aboriginal "Ichthyophagi" of the Greeks.

III

Now that officially everybody should have a surname, zāt names and surnames are tending to become confused. Although many people register their zāt name as their surname, a significant number choose a quite distinct name. For instance a group of the Askānī in Salāh Kūh have taken the surname Yasdānshenās (= "believer"). Two of the main Bārakzai brothers have taken the surname As'adī (cf. list B II 1 and 2 - one of them mistakenly registered himself Asadi), after their father Dūst Muhammad Khān who held the Ājār honorific title As'adu'd-Dawla. Many such titles were converted into surnames when the titles were officially abolished in 1925. Also, it has been known for a chief to obtain an identity card (Parshenāsnāma) for a favourite of lower social status and in doing so to give the man his own surname (though this would not be done for a ghulām.). It may be legitimate to see this as another factor pointing to the unimportance of kinship, or, alternatively, its decreasing importance.

Appendix I

IV

The nature of the relationship between tribes can best be seen through the working of two social processes: disputes and marriage.

More will be said about the settlement of disputes later in Parts Five and Six. Here it may be said, briefly, that two parties in dispute who wish to have the dispute settled and cannot settle it between themselves have a single course of action open to them (i.e. within the purely Baluch social context - now, of course, they can if they wish resort to the institutions of modern Persian Law, but cf. chapter 2, p. 37): they must find a referee whose decision they will both accept. This referee tends to be one of two types of social figure: a chief, or a man who is an accepted authority and

interpreter of the "Sharī'at", (Islamic Law, cf. Part Five). Even so neither party can now be forced to accept any decision except by public opinion (although in the Baluch Period a chief who had physical force at his disposal could of course usually impose a settlement if it suited him.) It is purely a matter of personal inclination, mutual agreement, and the personalities of eligible and available referees, whether the "religious" or "secular" course is chosen. The "religious" course is theoretically extra-zāt, though in fact the religious referee or "āsi" will usually be closely connected and intimate with a dynastic family and/or a particular tribal or local group, so that his decisions tend not to be any more unprejudiced or abstract than those of a secular referee. The decisions of both are in fact based on precedent and social expediency, but those of the āsi derive extra force from the charismatic quality of the sharī'at which is alone is supposed to know and be able to interpret. Therefore, if the two parties to a dispute are of the same zāt, or of two zāt related by allegiance to the same chief, their choice of referee has no bearing on the question of inter-zāt relationships. Where the two parties are of different zāt not related by similar allegiance the situation is complex; but may be formulated as follows:

(a) since allegiance is to a large extent determined in practice by locality the situation is not likely to arise normally, except in regions like Sarāvān and Īrānshahr-Bampur where more than one dynastic family has influence in one area.

(b) in localities where there is a definite choice of secular leadership between dynastic families, such as parts of Sarāvān and Īrānshahr-Bampur, or where there is a marked absence of strong secular leadership as in the upper part of the Sarbāz valley (cf. chapter 1, p. 19), formal religious leadership (cf. Part Five) tends to be stronger and less compromised by intimacy with one or other dynastic family. Therefore, in the more thickly populated parts of Sarāvān and in the Īrānshahr-Bampur area the religious option tends to be favoured.

(c) elsewhere, two parties in dispute who are of different zāt not related by common allegiance are unlikely to have any means of coming together for the purpose of seeking a peaceful settlement or incentive to do so, for they are unlikely to have, for instance, interests in adjacent pieces of land.

two options therefore remain: fighting or avoidance. In present circumstances, fighting (or any form of feud) is relatively rare because of the threat of external interference from the Administration, and avoidance is more normal. Avoidance is also a possible course for men related by common allegiance or sāt (cf. Barth, 1964:16).

We see, therefore, that of the two social processes that the concept of sāt might be expected to affect, in the first it is practically irrelevant: the two relevant factors are allegiance, and/or any basis for social contact (which might be adjacent landownership, common "visiting-relationship" with religious figure, affinal ties, etc.).

V

The second social process which might be expected to affect the creation and maintenance of relationships between sāt, and therefore help us to define more clearly the concept of sāt, is equally complex. And this complexity is another sign of the vagueness of the Baluch conception itself. Thus:

i. some sāt give and take wives freely with each other, while some do not;

ii. some will take wives from another particular sāt, but will not give wives in exchange, and the other sāt in some cases accepts this position and in other cases does not.

iii. some sāt, though they will not intermarry in one locality, intermarry indiscriminately in another locality - which may not be far away.

However:

(a) there is no intermarriage with ghulāms.

(b) As a general rule Baluch tend not to intermarry with shahrī.

The following particular instances will serve as examples:

i. The Bārakzai dynastic line in Kasurān take wives from the Kurds in Kasrān, but will not give wives to them, and the Kurds accept this position.

ii. In Bashtiārī and the surrounding region, the Jadgāls will not intermarry with non-Jadgāls; no one intermarries with the Katrī (who are

and Baluch or Jadgāl); the Sardārzai (not the dynastic family), the Mut, and the Sheikhe intermarry freely with each other, but will not give or take brides with other zāt in the area.

(c) In Nāhuk all zāt intermarry indiscriminately. Even the most respected zāt (e.g. in that area, Sepāhī, Nusratzai, and Arbāb) intermarry even with Jarāda, whereas in Jālq, only 25 km. away, the same zāt never intermarry.

This situation can only be explained by the interpretation that considered as a corporate group for the regulation of marriage choice, zāt is itself is dependent on two more basic factors and these are:

(a) considerations of relative social status or class (which can vary for one zāt from one locality to another), and

(b) the desire to marry close kin.

The latter is a factor in traditional patterns of marriage choice all over the Middle East, and is similarly present in Baluchistan (see next chapter), but it is stronger in some localities than others.

The word zāt is perhaps most commonly heard in an encounter between a chief and a man he does not recognise. The chief asks:

"Tō nām kai?" - literally "Your name who?"

to which the answer is a simple personal name, e.g.

"Nasīr"

he then asks:

"Zāt kai?" - literally, "Zāt who?"

to which the man may answer, for instance, "Sepāhī" which would be a "true" zāt name; or "Jadgāl" which would place him in a distinct group of zāt; or "Ahalkār" or "Bāparī" or "usta" which would place him in a category or class. In addition to these two questions the chief may ask a third:

"Pūt kai?" - literally, "Child who?", i.e. "Son of whom?"

to answer to which he will give his father's personal name, e.g. "Mehrāb".

the net purpose and result of these three questions will be that the chief will learn the social position of the man and the social distance (by both class and the chain of social relationships - the two together we might call social ecology cf. Parson 1964:93) between them. The man will almost certainly know or have recognised the chief, if not personally, by those with him, and will have adapted his answer to the second question with this purpose in view.


I have chosen the example of an encounter between a chief and a man he does not know or recognise because it is normally only in a situation where a man is obviously socially superior that he would immediately proceed to such direct questioning. In other circumstances a man would normally wait and hope to find out without asking a direct question or ask a third party.

The above is an ordinary, everyday example of the use of the term. A personal example will perhaps bring out more clearly its function as an abstract term which may cover a number of categories - agnatic descent groups, origin, "caste" (e.g. ghulām), trade, race, religion - which define the most relevant aspect of a social relationship in various contexts:

When I arrived in a locality where I was not known, people would sooner or later ask my guide or my host (they would usually assume - despite my Baluch dress - from my complexion or the status of my fellow travellers that I was socially senior (mas-ter = bigger) to them, and therefore not ask me personally) what my zāt was, and they would be told either "Angrezī" (English) or "Masrānī" (Christian), according to whether secular or religious values were uppermost in the context. When I asked someone his zāt he would most likely first answer "Baluch", particularly if a) he was Baluch anyway, and b) he did not know of my intimacy with the general social context. Similarly, the zāt of all Persians (i.e. non-Baluch citizens of Persia) is Ajam (ʿAjam): except when terms of intimacy are achieved with particular individuals whose zāt would then be their surname or an adjective derived from their place of origin, e.g. Birjandī.

This usage is obviously similar to that observed among the Nuer by Evans-Pritchard (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, 1940, pp. 281ff.) but differs from it in as much as the structure of Baluch society differs from that of Nuer society. Thus, whereas a Nuer's reply varies according to context from minimal lineage up to "Nuer", the reply of the Baluch also varies according to the assumed structural distance from the questioner. But Baluch society does not segment as Nuer society does: it is made up of a number of geographically defined groups and class stratifications, membership of which depends on widely differing criteria. There is no such simple progression from small solidary group up to all- inclusive ethnic group.

The argument so far has brought us to the position where we have to conclude that either the concept of mēt among the Baluch is undefinable, or that the word does not in fact signify a vital concept at all. mēt is simply a convenient abstract term which includes all "labels" which denote relative social status, or indicate the relationship between two people in a given context. If this is true, we must also say that (in the present context) the English term "tribe" is misleading if used as a translation of the Baluchi mēt - except that there is nevertheless some semantic affinity between the two words: mēt must originally have meant simply "birth", and in the sense that this is the only common semantic factor between the usages we have differentiated above, this is still its essential meaning. The definitions of "tribe" given in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary show a similar variety of meanings. We seem now to have said that the Baluch are a tribal society but have no tribes! And in a sense this is true. The form of social relationship which is most basic to and obvious in the society is that which springs from the knowledge of common (agnatic) ancestry, but there are also other forms of relationship which are at least as important. It cannot of course be proved, but it would seem likely that these other forms of relationship have grown up due to particular political circumstances, and while they have by no means replaced the concept of kinship, they have nevertheless made the larger tribal unit - the tribe - superfluous as a solidary group.




continues on following page.

**Fig I - Bārakzai agnatic line**

*Fig. I - Bāraksai agnatic line*

1. cf. figs. II, VII
2. cf. figs. II, VIII
3. cf. figs. II, VII, VIII, IX
4. cf. figs. II, VIII, XIII
5. cf. figs. II, VIII, XII
6. cf. fig. II
7. cf. fig. III
8. cf. fig. III
9. cf. figs. VII, VIII, IX
10. cf. fig. III
11. cf. fig. III
12. cf. fig. VII, IX
13. also known as SHĀHMUHAMĀB cf. Pottinger 1816:164
14. cf. figs. IX, X
15. cf. fig. IX
16. cf. figs. VII, XIA, XII
17. cf. fig. XII
18. cf. figs. VIII, IX
19. cf. fig. VII
20. cf. figs. VIII, XIII
21. cf. fig. VII





**Fig. II - Bārakzai detail**

1. cf. fig. VII
2. cf. figs. III, VII, VIII, IX, XIA, XIII
3. cf. fig. VIII
4. cf. figs. VIII, XIII
5. cf. figs. VIII, XII





Fig III

A - Erafshān Bārakzai line, agantic descent

B - Kaurān Bāraksai line, agnatic descent

C - Iranshahr lines

D - Cognatic detail of B

1 cf. fig VII  2 of. figs II, VII, VIII, IX, XI A, XIII





Fig. IV - Gamshādzai eponymous line

207
163





Fig. V - Agnatic line of Kurd dynastic family of Magas

(intermarried with Bārakzai, Bozurgzāda, GĪchkĪ, NushĪrwānĪ, and Bolēdai dynastic families.)

1 = PASOND MALEK Fig. IX





Fig. VI - Sardārzai dynastic line.

## VII

The following genealogies serve to illustrate further the kinship aspects of the usage of the word zāt, which - simply because the basic meaning of the word is "birth" - we assume to be primary:

Figures I-VI are agnatic family trees. This is one aspect of the Baluch conception of kinship: the line of the ideal succession of authority and the zāt name. The names of the politically senior men in each generation are underlined. Figure I is the tree of the main Bārakzai line from their entry into the Province to the present day. In the latter generations I have included some daughters (in the lower case) - these would not normally be given in this context - for ease of reference in the later figures. The eldest son is always credited with more detailed knowledge of the family history than the others, and it would seem that since it is considered his right to succeed his father if he shows the personal aptitude and inclination, and since his mother anyway hopes that he will succeed, she teaches him the family history in his childhood. Since the mother often comes from another family, he also learns from her the detailed history - as it is remembered - of another line. In Figure I it is interesting that there is some disagreement on the fourth generation, though most people seem to think that the first Mehrāb listed is fictional - which is probable (cf. below, section VIII). They remember that the dīwān of Sheikh Mehrāb and the activity of the famous poet Mir Muhammad coincided. Sheikh Mehrāb was the first to intermarry with the Shīrkhānzai, who were then the most powerful family in the Province, centred on Sampur. Notice that in three cases it is not the eldest son who takes over supreme authority from his father.

The confusion between Bārakzai and Bārēnzai in the name of the tribe which has been noticed in chapters 2 and 3 is presumably due to the name "Bārak" far enough back in the agnatic line (its similarity to Bārak may also be a factor) to usurp an eponymous position. Alternatively, it is possible that the family never had any connections with the Bārakzai of

of Afghanistan, and were known as Bārānzai, which they changed to Bārakzai to enhance their status. I incline however to the former view.

Figure II - Alī Muhammad, although he submitted to the supreme political leadership of his younger brother Mahrām, was nevertheless the senior member of the family and fully respected as such. This is always the situation when a son which is not the eldest is acknowledged leader of the tribe, and the situation cannot work unless the eldest is content to surrender the political authority (cf. for instance in the Bārdārzai "autobiography" chapter 4, II), and between Dust Muhammad and Rushīrwān in the Bārakzai "autobiography" chapter 4, I). Of the sons of Alī Muhammad none would have succeeded by right if Behrām had had any sons. However, since he did not, the political authority passed back to the senior line. Rushīrwān also fulfilled important leadership roles in Darāwān and Magas under his brother's hegemony. Ayyub, whose mother lived in Hāsk (cf. Figure VIII), ruled in the Darbāz valley also under his brother's hegemony. Each of these junior lines died out in the second generation as far as a localised authority was concerned, but Amānullāh (Bārān) by sheer force of personality has held his position in the "leadership class" without any localised base or well defined following.

Figure III shows the Ārafshān and Kaurān lines and how they link agnatically with the main line. It is still remembered that the Ārafshān line was the senior line i.e. Nāder was the eldest brother. Owing to the fact that the present leading member of the line - Mīrzā Khān - is older than the leading member of the main line, any status he would have because of the seniority of his line is impossible to assess since he is himself senior in age anyway.

The third of A'zam's sons intermarried with the Kurds of Magas and divided his time between Kaurān and the middle reaches of the Darbāz valley. In this line the second Nawāb was an important ruler under the hegemony of Dust Muhammad Khān. The line from the fourth son settled in the Īrānshahr area and has intermarried with the Hāzarī. They have provided no leaders.

Once again it has been convenient to include a number of cognatic lines in this table. In IIIc Shāhdust was in 1964 a school teacher in Magas - a Bārakzai area. To all appearances he was treated as a Bārakzai of a non-dynastic line would normally be treated: his Bāmerī connection, though agnatic, was sociologically neutral in an area where the Bāmerī were not sociologically relevant, whereas his Bārakzai connection naturally gave him a place in the community.

Figure IV shows the agnatic line of the Camshādzai back to the ancestor who entered the Province with Mīr Abdullāh Khān Khān Bārakzai (cf. chapter 4 & Fig. I). The Camshādzai give only seven generations back to this time as compared to the Bārakzai ten. This is suspicious and suggests telescoping, but is perhaps technically possible. Where several brothers in succession held the status of leading member of the tribe I have numbered them. Broken underlining denotes effective leadership status. Thus, Lāl Khān leaving no suitable sons was succeeded by Azzat, who in turn for the same reasons was succeeded by Khalīl Khān. When Khalīl Khān died his son, Shīr Muhammad was too young to succeed and the position went for a short time to a fourth brother - probably the fifth in order of birth, though no one was certain of this order - who was succeeded by Lashkar Khān by sheer force of personal aptitude and ambition. For though Lashkar Khān was by birth the senior man of his generation, seven of his cousins were now "politically" senior to him. In the natural course of things Lashkar Khān was succeeded by his son, Khalīl Khān. But compared to at least three of his "cousins" - Shīr Muhammad, Ghulām Muhammad, and Palang - Khalīl Khān is an insignificant character. The resulting situation has anomalies but is interesting: the leadership has not been physically contested, but Khalīl Khān is recognised as the leader of the tribe by the administration and with Government help has constructed a qanāt in the northern part of the main Garāvān plain and, to all intents and purposes, settled taking the brunt of the Administration's discontent with the greater part of his tribe which remains nomadic and centred on its mountain fastness, Kuh-i Sefīd, and led in effect by the three above mentioned "cousins" who will have nothing to do with the Administration.

Figure V shows the dynastic line of the Kurds of Nagas back to Husein Kurd who is said to have been brought into the Province by Nāder Shah. Since the 1920's they have little authority outside the upper Nagas plain, and even there they are in effect now largely subject to the hegemony of the Bārakzai line in Kaurān, which in turn acknowledges the hegemony of the Bārakzai line of Sarāwūn (Muhammad Amīn Khān). They are now allied by marriage to the Bārakzai, Bozorgzāde, Gīlchkī, Mushīrwānī, and Bolēdai dynastic families. As an isolated dynastic pocket - there are no other Kurds in the Province outside the Sarhadd - it was probably inevitable that they should intermarry a great deal with the surrounding rulers. They have however kept intact their agnatic descent line. Since the Bārakzai established unquestionable superiority over them under Dust Muhammad Khān, the Bārakzai no longer give wives to the Kurds, but take wives from them. According to the theory expressed in this essay this will mean that the next generation will probably lose its dynastic status altogether because of inferior parentage - unless the Bārakzai should move out of the area altogether - which is possible in the present political situation - thus leaving a political vacuum in the Nagas plain. At present there is a "cold war" for leadership between the brother and the son of Malek A'zam, who has recently died. This is a direct result of the personal ineptitude of the son and is therefore not an unusual or abnormal state of affairs. It will, however, by the time it is resolved have the effect of further weakening the position of the Kurd dynastic family in Nagas.

The Kurds of the Sarhadd are now entirely client (politically) to the main Sarhadd tribal groups, mainly the Nīrī. There seem to have been no marriage alliances with them for some time, though they maintain that this is a comparatively recent development.

Figure VI shows the dynastic line of the Bardārsai back to an eponymous ancestor Sadda, cf. Chapter 4. There is some doubt as to whether it was he who brought the family and its following into the Province or not. Assuming that it was he, this genealogy fits well with the "autobiography" given in chapter 4 and with the Bolēdai genealogy in Figure XIV below.

however, this would make their entrance into the Province a mere seven generations ago, when they themselves think in terms of ten generations and when pressed for more detail tend to increase the number rather than decrease it.

VIII

Before going on to consider the other conception of kinship which the remaining figures have been selected to illustrate, it will be convenient here to consider Baluch names and nomenclature. Dames (1904: 25) says he made a list of 190 proper names, including all the names he found in the older poetry and in the genealogies he collected - which mainly seem to have been "ideal" tribal agnatic genealogies (cf. ibid. Appendix III). "Of these only fifty-three are Arabic names [by origin] twenty are Persian or compound Persian and Arabic (as Dust Muhammad, Imāmbakhsh, etc.) four are Turkish, and twenty-three seem to be of Indian origin, although mostly not identical with modern Hindu names. The remaining ninety are names peculiar to the Baluch, of which a good many are capable of explanation from Baluchi or from the older Iranian languages, and I am of the opinion that the Arabic element is less important than among most Muhammadan races" (ibid. p. 25). Not having access to Dames' list I am unable to verify his philology, and although the Baluch on both sides of the border appear from published material to draw on the same repertoire of names certain names seem to occur more frequently in some tribes than others and therefore also on the Pakistani side than on the Persian side. Moreover, Dames had first hand knowledge only of the eastern Baluch, who differ somewhat in dialect from their western "cousins" as well as being separated from them by the Brāhui strip.

With no attempt to make an exhaustive collection of Baluch names - in fact, restricting the selection to people personally known to me and alive in the Persian Province today, I have 152 different personal names, which may be divided into the following categories: Arab-Islamic 82; compound Arab-Persian 24; Persian 26; Baluch (possibly including some which belong philologically to other eastern Islamic groups, particularly in Pakistan

and Afghanistan) 20. These are all men's names: women's names are less diverse, and are largely elaborated terms of endearment or words denoting beauty (e.g. mâh = moon) with Bîbî or Khâtun prefixed or suffixed to suggest status. Of the words included in the first three categories above several are so far as I know not used as personal names except by the Baluch. Many are variations on a theme: for instance, 22 are compounds of Muhammad and an Arabic or Persian element - e.g. Dust Muhammad = 'the friend of Muhammad", Gol Muhammad = lit. "the rose of Muhammad." Of the pure Persian names most are "epic" names i.e. they are associated with the characters in the Persian national epic, the Shâhnâma ; others include compounds like Shîrdel = "Lion-heart". These names of pure Baluchi origin, or not known by me to be used by non-Baluch, include names denoting natural things e.g. Palang = "Leopard", Nazar = "Tiger", Mârûn = "Rain", Mud = "Cloud", (also in the old poems - Mud bandag = 'cloud-binder".) Used as names however these words seem to lose their natural associations. They are not very common now but are still highly thought of.

This quite chance selection of personal names shows unusual range and variety, especially when compared to the standard Islamic repertoire. It suggests also a readiness to improvise. Furthermore, a name is not an inalienable personal appendage of a man. And there is no distinctive naming ceremony. We have seen already that Mahmûdâh (cf. Figure II) in Serbaz is Mârûn in Mardâvan. In this case the change is made for convenience, to save confusion between two people of the same name when they are in the same locality. But names are changed for other reasons - often amounting to little more than a whim. One man I met claimed to have changed his name because he had had a run of bad luck. In the dynastic families I came across several cases where a son had been given one Islamic name at birth but was now called by a different (Iranian) name, though in this case the first name was still thought of as his proper name.

This brings me to the main reason for introducing the question of personal nomenclature at this juncture. Before passing from the figures which show agnatic kinship to the discussion of those which illustrate

agnatic ties we must note how names tend to recur if not to alternate from generation to generation particularly in the dynastic families. Of the figures we have considered so far Fig. I has no instances of this; II has one instance; III has several; IV has three; V shows none; and VI has four. In each figure the instances tend to be commoner at the bottom than at the top of the genealogy. This is an additional factor in support of the theory advanced in Part Three that whereas the political structure of the Province has probably altered very little in type, the political structure of the Baluch (i.e. all the individual immigrant groups before and since the "true" Baluch) has been greatly affected by the general ecological and pre-existing sociological situation of the Province since their entry into it. This will become clear as we consider the figures VII-XIV where the recurrence of personal names in altern te generations becomes a definite feature rather than an interesting though isolated occurrence, for the alternation is not necessarily in the direct line. (However, it is possible that if more genealogical data were available for the earlier periods it would show a similar alternation of names.)

## IX

Figures VII-XIV have been selected to illustrate a different conception of kinship among the Baluch. Or perhaps it would be more appropriate to say that whereas figures I-VI show agnatic descent where and insofar as it is relevant as a factor justifying the "legality" of the status of a particular family, figures VII-XIV show affinal alliances between and within dynastic families insofar as they are remembered because they are relevant as a basic factor in the ecology of relationships between influential men in the Province today. Figures I-VI were "vertical" figures connecting the present leader to the leader who entered the Province: figures VII-XIV are "horizontal", spreading over the Province today, and cannot usually be extended vertically beyond four generations at the most. The choice of these figures is "Bārakzai-centred", i.e. I have included other dynastic families only insofar as they are significantly allied to the Bārakzai.





**Fig. VII** - Cognatic detail of I

1. cf. figs III, VIII, IX
2. cf. figs II, III, VIII, IX, XI A, XIII
4. cf. fig II
5. cf. figs VIII, XI A, XI, XII
6. cf. fig III A.

Fig I





Fig VIII - Cognatic detail of Barakzai, showing alliances with Mir Muradzai, Boledai, and Sardarzai.

1. cf. figs III, VII, IX
2. cf. figs II, III, VII, IX, XIA, XIII
3. cf. fig VI
4. cf. fig XIII





Fig. IX - Bārakzai cognatic detail

1. cf. Figs. II, III, VII, VIII
2. cf. Figs. II, III, VII, VIII, XI A, XIII
3. cf. Fig. V





Fig X - Another Barakzai cognatic detail

1 cf.fig IX





**Fig XI A** - Part of the Bozorgzāda complex, Sarāvān

1. cf. figs. II, III, VII, VIII, IX, XIII
2. cf. Baluchistan, 1932: 32





Fig XI B - Another detail of the Bomorgmāda complex, Sarāvān, complementary to Fig XI A.





Fig XII : Bārakzai, Mīr Murādzai, Gīchkī alliances.

1. cf. Fig I





Fig XIII - Bolēdai, Sardārsai, Shērkhanzai and GĪchkī alliances.

1. cf. figs II. III. VII, VIII, IX, XI A
2. cf. fig VI





FIG XIV - Sherkhānzai dynastic family

Figure VII - is centred on Dust Muhammad Khān Bārakzai. It shows his inherited connections with the Mushīrwānī (British Baluchistan) from his FaMo, with the Mīr Murādzai (Sīb) from his FaSiHu and possibly from his FaFaWi - though this would depend on whether or not they had lived in the same house or not and not on the tie itself; possibly with the Shirkhānzai from his FaFaBaHu - though this would depend on considerations similar to the foregoing. In his own generation he made personal alliances with the Shīrkhānzai(Qeh), Mīr Murādzai (Sīb), and Gīchkī (Kēch - British Baluchistan) and the Sayyids of Bam and Narmāshīr. It is significant that his first marriage was with a "cousin" and the daughter of a Bārakzai woman. This would mean that provided she performed her function properly and promptly provided him with a son, his eldest son would be senior not only by the rules of primogeniture but by being Bārakzai both from the mother and the father. If Fātema's father was also Bārakzai it would have been ideal, but it is often very difficult to find a first wife whose mother and father were both Bārakzai of high standing simply because of the marriage pattern. He also reinforced his ties with the Mīr Murādzai by giving a sister to Muhammad Shāh (Sīb), and allied himself with his "cousin" line in Brafshān, with the Boledai (Rask) and the Bardārzai (Dashtiārī) by means of his other sisters (cf. Fig. VIII). He reinforced these alliances by the marriages he arranged for his three daughters. By this time the Mīr Murādzai, though originally a break-away line of the Bozorgzāda, is intermarried at the highest level with the Bārakzai in three succeeding generations and a fourth marriage which has just taken place (1964) is shown below. However, each family retains its "agnatic integrity". There is similar repeated intermarriage with the Brafshān line.

Figure VIII is centred on Alī Muhammad, Dust Muhammad's father, and adds to the detail of Figure VII. Alī Muhammad's brother, Bahrām who was politically senior but left no children, had four wives: 1 - his FaBrDa the daughter of Nawāb Khān; 2 - an Askānī Baluch; 3 - an ordinary woman from Hāmuk; 4 - a mauled (female ghulām) who was however a concubine, not a legal wife, but was his favourite throughout. This is an even better example of a "leader's" marriages than Dust Muhammad Khān: after the first, the rest are pretty girls of steadily decreasing social status. Of the

presently living Bārakzai of the main line Nushīrwān, Alam, Muhammad Amīn, and Amānullāh all have wives from Nāhuk (cf. above, on lack of discrimination between zāt in Nāhuk), but only in the case of Amānullāh (who was the fourth son and therefore never likely to lead the family) is the Nāhuk woman the first wife, and Amānullāh has recently (1964) with much ceremony (which is less usual in a second marriage) taken a second wife, a "cousin", his Bahrōba, the daughter of Mīr Murād Khān (Bīb). (On Bahrām's death his first wife remarried to his elder brother, Alī Muhammad, and his fourth wife, his favourite, to his favourite nephew (Brso), Nushīrwān.)

Figure IX centres on Alī Muhammad's father, Rostam Khān, and shows an alliance with the Kurds of Magas and some detail of the non-dynastic lines.

Figure X centres on Muhammad Amīn, the brother of Alī Muhammad and Bahrām, showing a similar marriage pattern and how the son of a low class mother may hold status in the society: Jangīz, given the personal aptitude, was an ideal candidate to be Dust Muhammad Khān's "general" - Fahrōo by an inferior mother he was "noble" enough to command the loyalty of the troops (armed ghulāms and irregulars), but not noble enough to attempt to usurp Dust Muhammad's position. In this generation Mīrzā Khān (Arefchān) has used his half brother Haderbakhsh (Fig. IIIA) in a similar way - as his representative in a part of his domain which his own health no longer allows him to travel (cf. below, chapter 13).

Figure XI centres on Madad Khān Bozorgzāda and shows alliances with the breakaway Mīr Murādzai line and the Bārakzai - despite the indifferent relations between them - for "dynastic" purposes, and with other forts in the Sarāvān region. The agnatic line is now in a poor condition because Sohrāb Khān is getting old, and the only son he has who is of age is of a low class mother.

Figure XII shows the alliances between the Mīr Murādzai, a junior line of the same family in Mushak, and other Bārakzai lines, and also another widow re-marriage.





Fig. XV - Genealogy of Mullā MAULĀDĀD & KĀNĪ - Salāh Kuh (Jahl Koh).

Figure XIII centres on the two main lines of the Bolēdai and shows the main alliances between them and the Sardārzai, the Bāraksai and the Gīchkī.

Figure XIV accounts for the Shīrkhānzai forts.

From these figures we see that the same names recur continually in alternating generations. However, new names are also continually being introduced, and the choice of name from the second ascending generation is not only not confined to the direct agnatic line (though names in the direct line are always remembered with respect), they are not confined bilineally either, and names do also recur at intervals of three and more generations. In fact this name recurrence would seem to be determined simply by desire to renew the memory of a distinguished or well thought of ancestor, living or dead, but since the nearer ancestors are also closer in the affections and mothers' fathers or mothers' fathers' brothers are as close in the affections as patrilateralancestors, the present pattern evolves despite the patrilineal emphasis on descent as a factor in the justification of the "legality" of authority. More examples could be added from the names mentioned in chapter 3.

X

Finally, figure XV shows a quite amazing and (in my experience) unique genealogy given to me by an Askānī Baluch in Kalāh Kuh (Jahl Koh). The following points are important:

1. This genealogy was given to me by a Baluch, who was not distinguished in any way from the other Baluch of his area (38 families - 7 mētags) except that he was the leading man of his mētag and was referred to as Mullā (= "learned" with religious overtones).

2. Kinship connections in the area which could be readily remembered in any detail and had any relevance to present social relationships generally did not go back more than two generations.

3. Only three of the names in the figure as they were given to me are prefixed with the "princely" title "Mīr", and of these two are at the top of

the line which although it is the informant's own agnatic descent line, only goes back seven generations from the informant, whereas the longest line goes back fifteen generations from the informant. One would expect the most "aristocratic" line to be the longest.

4. The only function of the genealogy would seem to be that it justifies the prestige of the Askānī mīr by showing its agnatic connection with Islam - although in this form it simply goes back to the generations before the migration from Aleppo (cf. above, chapter 3). But, again, the stages of the migration are connected - as they were given to me - not with the longest line (which from the informant's FaMoFaMo onwards is agnatic) but with the line of nearly equal length which is the informant's wife's agnatic line.

5. Out of fifteen complete marriage relationships of which details were given only four were shown to be between relatives of known degree, and only two of these were true cousins (FBD). No attempt was made by the informant to connect the lines in any way beyond those shown, and when questioned further he could not provide any other information.

This surely shows very plainly and in a quite unexpected way the complete confusion between two concepts and two social functions of kinship within the society - and this is among nomadic Baluch: for

(a) the direct lines (longer even than any I could collect from the dynastic families) provide agnatic "legality" - but not for the informant; and

(b) No form of kin-ties, except in a direct agnatic line from the present, was remembered - even by such an informant - between the ascending lines beyond four generations (except for one connection at the sixth generation in the informant's own direct agnatic line).

The upper reaches of the two longest lines are of course almost certainly fictitious, since there are no records of a migration into the Province from Syria through Persia nine generations ago, but this does not affect the argument. Similarly, the names in the two longest lines are predominantly Iranian, and Nud, at the top of the "Aleppo" line is pure Baluch.

Both among Baluch like the Makānī, and among shahrī, kin relationships between people living today beyond two degrees are simply "cousins" (lit. "uncle's or aunt's child") or "uncle" or aunt". Therefore, any member of ego's zāt who is more than two degrees distant from him is his "cousin" - as is any member of any other zāt which he knows in general is closely intermarried with his own zāt. So what independent meaning remains for the term "zāt"? It might, it seems, be compared with Barth's use of the term caste in his work on the Swat Pathans (e.g. in Leach, 1962; there is certainly some similarity between the two situations, though in general I agree with Leach (ibid. introduction) that the word should not be used outside its proper Indian context, unless perhaps after very careful definition and justification.) Among the Baluch in the Persian Province a man's social status is determined first and foremost by that of his parents, both parents, and their status is determined in turn by that of their parents. And although the mother could not conceivably be of higher status that the father, she may very well be of lower status.

Zāt, therefore, though it was originally almost certainly a solidary corporate group, membership of which was based on common agnatic descent, is now in the new situation used to cover all hereditary factors which help to determine a man's social status and "ecological" situation. And this is as true for the Baluch (who we assume brought the term into the Province), as for the shahrī.

Footnotes

1. From here onwards I have changed the transliteration where necessary to conform with the rest of the essay. Where the identification is uncertain I have not altered Sykes' spelling.

2. Sykes has Yarahmadzai. The mistake is a common one and is due to the fact that the Baluch pronounce Muhammad: "Mahmad".

3. The Isma'Ilzai and the Yarmuhammadzai were renamed during the Reza Shah Period (1925-41) after being pardoned for revolt against the Government.

4. i.e. if zāt basically means (or originally meant) a group of people agnatically descended from a single ancestor, "sub-zāt names" would indicate groups which have "segmented" away from the original zāt. I also use the term "supra-zāt" to indicate names which must have originally been applied to a number of "true" zāt which for some reason or other (e.g. entered the Province together) were put into the category.

5. The leadership aspects of this alternation between the two families will be treated in more detail in Part Six.

## Chapter Ten

## Kinship, Marriage and Inheritance

### I

In the previous chapter we relegated the significance of kinship to a somewhat subordinate role. We must now, however, see just what its significance is. The terminology is extremely simple. The coverage of simple terms is shown in figure XVI.

| AFFINES | | KIN | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | PIRŌK/Bellok | | |
| WASEK/wasuk | PET/Mät | | NĀKU/Tru |
| (WASEK-ZAHT)/Dokaic | ĀMĀD/Neshār | SOC BRĀT/Gohār | (NĀKU-ZAHT) (TRU-ZAHT) |
| ĀMĀD/Neshār | COK | (BRĀ-ZAHT)(GOHĀR-ZAHT) | |
| | NANĀSAG | | |

Fig. XVI

Terms denoting males, or not distinguishing sex, are shown in the upper case.

Terms denoting females are in the lower case.

Compound terms formed from a simple term and -zaht (or zātk) = "born of" are put in brackets.

They are:

i. Pet - F

ii. Mät - M

iii. Brāt - B

iv. Gohār (in Saravān: warg) - Z

v. Cok - child: son or daughter, also simply "baby".

vi. Nanāsag - grandchild: male or female

vii. Nāku - uncle: MB or FB

viii. Tru - aunt: MZ or FZ

ix. Pirok - grandfather: MF or FF

x. Bellok - grandmother: MM or FM

xi. Neshār - bride, sister-in-law, daughter-in-law: BW or SW

xii. Zēmad - groom, brother-in-law, son-in-law: ZH, DH

xiii. Wasērk - father-in-law: WF, HF

xiv. Wasuk - mother-in-law: WM, HM

xv. Dokalc - sister-in-law: WZ, HZ

xvi. Hapuk - co-wife.

1. These terms may be used as terms of address in which case "pet" and "māt" are usually prefixed with the word "mani" - "my".

2. "Nāku" is used to address an elderly stranger.

3. Pet and māt may also be used reciprocally:

M and F may address a son "mani pet" - "my father"

and a daughter as "mani māt" - "my mother" (cf. Persian usage, Spooner 1965a, p. 24).

It is said that an elder brother also may address his younger brother "mani pet" but I have not actually heard this.

4. In situations where the senior male (father or elder brother) has high status in the society, he is usually addressed and referred to by all - kin and non-kin - as "wāja" (approx. "Sir").

5. Brāt and gohār are also applied to cousins and "cousins" in such a way that it is often difficult to ascertain the true relationship.

6. The terms petu and mātu exist to distinguish step-father and step-mother respectively from true parents.

7. The compound terms: brā-zaht, gohār-zaht, nāku-zaht, and tru-zaht are also in common use for nephews and nieces, and cousins and wasērk-zaht is used to mean WB/HB. (The suffix -zaht or -zātk is cognate with zāt and means "born of"). I have made the distinction between compound and simple terms because it seemed analytically interesting, but it is an artificial distinction: the Baluch make no distinction between degrees designated by compound terms and those designated by simple terms. Nāku-zaht is used indiscriminately in a classificatory sense to denote solidary social relationship, whether or not the true relationship is remembered or in fact ever existed.

Every field worker has to decide sooner or later, or have it decided

for him, where he is going to fit into the community he is studying. Thus, Evans-Pritchard (1940 p. 15) found "Azande treated me as a superior; Nuer as an equal." The problem is in fact often solved not by the field worker but by the political concepts of the people themselves, or alternatively their previous experience of, and relationships with, aliens. In my case it was determined by previous Baluch experience of the English (from India) and by the way in which I was introduced into the Province - although for purely physical reasons I should probably have found it difficult to fit in any other way. It so happened that the first Baluch with whom I became acquainted in the area where I decided to start my research (Sarāvān) was Muhammad Amīn Khān Mērakzai (cf. Fig. I). We established an immediate rapport - which meant that I was straight away fitted into Baluch society at the highest level. Nothing I could have done (except purposely alienating Muhammad Amīn - which might have had serious consequences for the possibility of my carrying out any field-work in the area at all) would have enabled me to go back as it were and try to fit myself in on a lower level. When people came into Muhammad Amīn's dīwān and asked him who I was his natural answer was that I was his nāku-zaht. No more questions were asked. It was not necessary to know anything more about me. (I am not of course trying to say that the Baluch are so uninquisitive that they never wanted to know where I came from, how many children I had, how much money I earned and many other things, but these questions were only asked much later after a fair degree of intimacy had been reached with each questioner. My actual presence in the Baluch milieu was entirely explained by Muhammad Amīn's introducing me as his "cousin".)

8. Certain features of standard behaviour associated with kin relationships which might be called "conventional" are discernable particularly in the dynastic families. The leading member of the family (and other senior members of the family who have authority in their communities) is addressed by the term "mīr" (cf. 4 above) and marked respect is shown him by his sons and younger brothers. Complementary to this "minus" relationship, there is a marked closeness between cousins, particularly it

would seem between sons of brothers, and comparative intimacy between uncle and nephew, again particularly it would seem between father's brother and brother's son. They explain this by saying that they would not wish their brother to think that they favoured their own sons more than his. Amānullāh's explanation of why he supported his half-brother in the succession rather than his full brother (cf. chapter 4) is similar in quality to this. This practice has the effect of increasing the intimacy within each generation, particularly inside the dynastic families. Brothers' (and sisters') sons grow up together almost like an age grade, and when they live at a distance there is often much reciprocal visiting.

9. Although the terminology does not distinguish between the mother's and the father's siblings, when I forced them in spite of the language to make a distinction they always emphasised the connection with and through the father's brother above the other collateral relationships. Thus, when my "relationship" with Muhammad Amīn was translated into Persian it became pesar amu - father's brother's son. However, it is possible that the usage of the Persian language itself is responsible for this (cf. Spooner, 1965a: 29). Similarly, they say they marry cousins, and when pressed to distinguish they say they prefer to marry the father's brother's daughter. However, in practice there does not seem to be a marked preference for this marriage choice.

10. There is one other conventional attitude in Baluch kin-linked behaviour patterns, and this distinguishes them from their Persian neighbours (cf. Spooner, 1965a: 30): the relationship between brother and sister is very close and intimate, both before and after marriage (cf. also Ramsey, 1957: 125-6). Therefore, assuming that - as is the general pattern - first or main marriages (in the dynastic families) take place normally between "cousins" of the same generation, this "positive" conventional attitude between brother and sister will serve to cement the solidarity of each generation within the dynastic families.

11. Ancestors in either direct line may be referred to by the Arabic

term jadd (fem. jadda).

12. The following terms should also be mentioned in this context:

| | |
|---|---|
| wastār | suitor, betrothed (of man) |
| dashtār | betrothed (of woman), now also used to mean girl-friend by Baluch in Teheran. |
| sālūk | bride ) used just before and just after the wedding night only. |
| bāmur | groom ) |

13. It remains to note that the Baluchi language makes no distinction of gender at all beyond the kinship terms in ego's own generation and the two ascending generations, the affinal terms, and the words for "male", "female", "man" and "woman", and finally all the kin terms seem to be of genuine Baluchi origin except bellok, which is Brāhui (cf. Morgenstierne, 1932(a): 38).[1]

## II

In theory, and in most spheres also in practice, the Baluch are strict Sunni muslims of the Hanafi rite. However, in one aspect of their adherence to the Law - inheritance - the strict rules are generally disregarded. I do not need to give the details of the Islamic rules of inheritance here as they are well known (cf. especially Gaudefroy-Demombynes 1950: 159ff). A useful account of their ideal application is given by Nicolaisen (1963, p. 137-8). Briefly, the principle of these rules is that the greater part of the property of a deceased man is divided between his sons equally. Daughters should receive half a son's share, and provision is made for the mother, or widow. No matrilineal relative besides the mother (or if there is no mother, the mother's mother), receives anything.

Among the Baluch the practice varies, and there are a minority who keep the spirit of the Islamic rules - though these are mostly communities with greater claims to religiosity than average (e.g. Sayyids, Sheikhs, cf. Part Five). A larger minority give everything to the sons and exclude

entirely daughters, mothers, matrilateral relatives and all women. Prominent among these are the Jadgāls and the Gamashādzai. The majority, however, which includes all the dynastic families and most Baluch, give equal shares to sons and daughters, while often reserving an extra share for the eldest son.

For the present purpose it is this last majority practice which is most interesting since it is the practice of the dynastic families and is therefore particularly relevant to the context of leadership. The practice which excludes all females interests us also in as much as it is characteristic of the Jadgāls who differ in other ways also. The details of the majority practice are:

1. Melk - i.e. cultivable land is divided into (as near as possible) equal shares with no discrimination between sons and daughters.
2. Jewelry and household equipment goes to daughters only.
3. Livestock usually and arms always go to sons only.
4. Before the distribution of the melk and/or flocks, if all the sons and daughters agree, a special (extra) portion is set aside for the eldest son. This extra share is called "mīrwandī" which translated literally means something like "the share for leadership". This affects in no way the subsequent equal distribution of the remainder, from which the eldest son will receive another share equal to each of the shares of his brothers and sisters. As the name would suggest, this practice is found mainly among families which have some claim to political authority in their community, and in particular among the dynastic families. Mīrwandī would normally only be given where it was assumed that the eldest son would in fact succeed his father in the position of political authority, and the practice serves of course to reinforce the eldest son's position.

Rule 2 normally applies throughout the Province in all types of community, whether or not they subscribe to this majority inheritance practice. Rule 1 obviously produces different results according to whether or not the family in question has most of its property in land or flocks, and it is obviously particularly significant in the case of the dynastic

families since in general they own more land than other sections of the population. It would seem very likely that the practice has in the past been adopted by the Malugh at the recommendation of, or in imitation of, the dynastic families. In support of this view is the fact that Mīr Maulādād, the presently leading member of the Sardārzai dynastic family to which the Jadgāls own allegiance, maintains that he has tried repeatedly to persuade the Jadgāls a) to make marriage alliances with non-Jadgāls, and b) to give inheritance to their daughters as well as their sons, but the Jadgāls are obstinate. He says that his father made similar attempts. When asked why, his answer is simply that it is not good to discriminate against daughters in this way. The Jadgāls emphasise their unwillingness to take wives from outside rather than any dislike of giving their own daughters to outsiders. The motive behind this cannot be purely religious, since, as we have seen, the Qur'ān only rules half shares for daughters anyway. The Jadgāls reply that to them the ṣamad is an outsider, not a member of their family: if they give inheritance to their daughters, it will amount to alienating it.

Rule 1 practised in conjunction with the marriage practices described above will obviously go further towards integrating the dynastic families as a class and undermining the social function or concept of mēt since each alliance must result in a transfer of ownership of agricultural land and the total land belonging to the families which intermarry is thus continually being redistributed between the various agnatic lines. In this way the class and group identity of the intermarrying families or groups of families is continually reinforced. The Sardārzai, who (perhaps as a result of intermarrying with the main dynastic family complex) have adopted the marriage and inheritance rules of this class, desire their people to change their practice in a similar direction, so that their traditional following should acquire alliance connections and social mobility (at a lower class level) over the same geographical region as themselves. As it is, the Sardārzai have two distinct sets of "people": those who entered the Province with them, and those whose allegiance they have gained through intermarriage with the Bolēdai and other dynastic families.

I have not found any similar evidence of attempts to change the practice of the Sarhadd Baluch in a similar fashion. This is possibly because I have spent less time in the Sarhadd. However, if the argument so far is correct this is exactly what we should expect since the Sarhadd Baluch are not closely attached (at present) with any of the dynastic families which practice this rule.

I do not want to give the impression that these rules are carried out to the letter. Informants of one or two tribes (e.g. Dehwārī) have admitted when pressed that sons among them in fact do get a little more than daughters. With the rudimentary form of land measurement (cf. chapter 2) at their disposal it would be almost impossible to divide absolutely equally anyway. These rules are the ideal, and they show I think an important principle.

The remaining sections of this chapter provide additional detail and examples in support of the conclusions indicated so far.

III

A few details about land ownership within the Bārakzai dynastic family may help to clarify the potential relevance of land ownership to leadership in the society, before we pass on to the question of marriage payments.

When, in the 1950's, the Administration returned to the Bārakzai the property in the Īrānshahr area which it had confiscated in 1928, it was automatically up to Muhammad Umar Khān to decide how to apportion it. The property consisted in the main of three villages: Shahr Derāj, Muhammadābād, and Naukābād. Muhammad Umar divided it all into 10 equal shares as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| Muhammad Umar | 2 |
| Alam | 1 |
| Muhammad Amīn | 1 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Amānullāh | 1 |
| Bahrām | 1 |
| Muhammad Azīm | 1 |
| Murād Bībī | 1 |
| Gol Bībī | 1 |
| Nur Malek | 1 |

i.e. equal shares for each of Dust Muhammad Khān's sons and daughters, with an extra share, in this case an extra equal share, as mīrwandī, for himself (cf. Fig I). Bahrām's full brother - Muhammad Azīm - died without offspring, and his share went to Bahrām, his only full brother. Bahrām also married Muhammad Azīm's widow. Of the sisters - Murād Bībī was married to Nāder Shāh Mīr Murādzai, Gol Bībī to Mehrāb Khān Mīr Murādzai, and Nur Malek to Mīrzā Khān Barakzai (Barafshān) cf. Fig. VII. The shares of the sisters were automatically administrated by their husbands. When Muhammad Umar died his two shares were divided equally between his two sons, Rahman and Amīr and two daughters - who were married to Ghulām Rasul and Alī Muhammad (both Barakzai). There was no mīrwandī, because there was no question of the eldest son directly succeeding his father. Therefore, the de facto distribution now (1965) is:

| | |
|---|---|
| Alam Khān | 1 share |
| Muhammad Amīn | 1 |
| Amānullāh | 1 |
| Bahrām | 2 |
| Nāder Shāh | 1 |
| Mehrāb Khān | 1 |
| Mīrzā Khān | 1 |
| Rahman (½ belonging to his younger brother, Amīr) | 1 |
| Ghulām Rasul | ½ |
| Alī Muhammad | ½ |

Rahman has married the daughter of Mehrāb Khān and so will eventually re-acquire (through his wife's inheritance) a part of Gol Bībī's share. Amīr's share is in his hands until Amīr grows up. Only Alam Khān and Nāder Shah are more or less permanently resident in Īrānshahr.

IV

The reason given for the marriage preference for cousins - which is universal for the first wife - is that such a wife will always be content with her husband no matter what sort of life should befall them. These marriages are often planned when the prospective bride and bridegroom are still very young, and it is considered a great disgrace if a girl should refuse to marry the husband her father has decided on for her - so much so that I found no case of successful protest - though I was told of one case of suicide (by eating oleander). The fulfilment of this marriage preference makes no difference to the mahr. The mahr is an Islamic practice whereby the husband guarantees property or a sum of money which becomes technically the wife's property and must be paid over to the wife in the event of either divorce or the husband's death. In the case of the wife's death it may be inherited by her children by that husband. It is thus a form of life insurance for the wife. There seems to be a tendency in societies where the preference is definitely for the father's brother's daughter, for the mahr to be reduced when the preference is fulfilled; but where the preference is for a cousin generally the mahr is not affected (cf. e.g. Barth, 1953: 28 and Spooner, 1965a: 27).

The mahr is high. Among poor Baluch in Salāh Kuh it was around Rials 10,000/- (£47. 10s.). Barān (Amānullāh Bārakzai) was obliged to stake Rials 1,500,000/- (£7,143) for A'zam Khān's daughter. One traditional though not universal method of calculating mahr is "sei bahr o yak čārak" - literally three parts and a quarter. That is, three quarters of the bridegroom's property - or expected property if he is expecting to inherit - must be staked as mahr to the (first) wife, and must become hers if he should divorce her or die before her. Similarly, it may only be inherited by her children, and not by his children by another wife. This practice is characteristic of the Bārakzai dynastic family complex and is a major contributive factor to the generally high status of women in Baluch society and the particularly high status of women in the Bārakzai dynastic family complex (cf. below, chapter 12).

Betrothals (sāng) may take place at a very early age (e.g. 7 years old) between cousins, and in this case there will not normally be very much difference between the ages of the prospective partners. It is not unknown for the wedding (arusī, sur) also to take place at such an early age, but when this happens it is usually for some special reason. For instance the father may be very old and ailing and want to see his son's wedding before he dies. The wedding celebration is paid for by the bridegroom's family. No gifts are brought to the wedding, but during the year or so before it takes place the bridegroom will solicit contributions towards the expense from his relatives. This practice is known as bijārī. No distinction is made between relatives for this purpose, except on the basis of personal intimacy, i.e. a man would expect a bigger contribution from a relative with whom he was particularly intimate than from a relative of any particular degree of equal means with whom he was not so intimate. These contributions are made on the understanding that the man will return a roughly equal contribution whenever it is solicited in similar circumstances.

The wedding celebration itself is the most important and colourful event in the life cycle (cf. description in Gabriel 1935: 233-61). The actual details of the celebration and the number of days it continues varies from place to place and according to the social standing and material means of the bridegroom or his father. There are, however, certain "institutions" which recur as a part of the celebration throughout the Province, and although they may not actually be practised in every wedding are generally acknowledged as Baluch practice. For instance:

1. A wedding is the classic occasion for music and dancing. The increased authority of formal religion (cf. Part Five) since the Baluch Period has, because of the official Islamic disapproval of music, meant a great decrease in the number of musicians available for such occasions. However, away from the main centres of religious influence weddings are still invariably accompanied by some effort to provide the traditional show of music and dancing. This pays for itself by the institution of tās gardēn[2] - lit. "circulating the bowl": the musicians "take the hat

round" and each of the guests contributes a few coins towards the expense of the musicians and dancers.

2. On the last afternoon before the wedding night the bride and bridegroom are, independently, ceremoniously washed. For the bride this is of course done by the women and in private. The bridegroom is taken in procession, preceded by dancing musicians, to a convenient nearby stream or spring.

3. Hannā gardēn[2] - circulating the henna (with which the nails of the bride are tinted) provides a collection for the bride's nurse.

4. Cam dīdukānī - lit. "the seeing of the eyes" - is a "toll" taken by an old nurse of the bride from the groom for the right of seeing his bride's face as he enters the hejla - bridal tent (Arabic). On entering he first performs two rak'at namāz - standard Islamic prayers. (Cf. also examples of songs sung at each stage in Morgenstierne 1948: 278ff).

Wherever it is feasible, and particularly in the dynastic families, the bridegroom does not see the bride before the wedding, and in any case the bride would avoid her prospective groom between the betrothal and the wedding (though not necessarily before puberty).

The wedding normally takes place in the wife's village or mētag, and the new wife does not normally move away from her people directly after the wedding. When the husband does take her away, or whether he takes her away at all depends on several factors, which can best be illustrated by examples:

1. At a wedding I witnessed in Salāh Kuh (Koh) in 1963 the groom was from a family which had emigrated to Pakistan. The man had come back to the community which his family had originally belonged to in order to take a wife from his own people. He would in the normal course of things stay there for some time, perhaps a year, after the wedding. When I pressed the point there was some doubt as to whetherthe bride's father would let him take her away after that period, since he could provide them both with a reasonable living there.

2. Amānullāh (son of Dust Muhammad Bārakzai) when he married his Mīr

Marādzai wife in Sīb in 1964 said that he would not be able to live with her in Sīb beyond a reasonable period after the wedding because the people of Sīb were not his own people. That is, the people of Sīb owned allegiance to the Mīr Marādzai, and even though this was part of the same "allegiance complex" there was no direct allegiance relationship between them and Amānullāh, and therefore to stay there beyond a reasonable period - perhaps again one year - would threaten his own independence.

3. A leading member of a dynastic family will often marry several wives. Often only the first one will be of high birth, though this is not an invariable rule. In this situation it is considered quite natural for the man to live with one wife for, say, five years, having perhaps five children from her, then to marry another wife and "retire" the first one, and so on. Often each wife will live in a different locality where the chief has land and be maintained from the income of the land. The sons as they grow up will tend to move about with the father (though usually visiting the mother regularly) while the daughters will remain with the mother. It happens in this situation that the wife spends most of her life living in her own community.

4. An obvious reason for close connection between the husband and his wife's locality, and therefore also with her family, is that he has her inherited melk to administer, or, while her father is still alive, he is in a sense one of his prospective heirs.

It is obvious then that the various social pressures affecting the choice of residence of the newly married couple differ according to their social position and type (Baluch or shahrī). There are certain similarities with the situation described among the Tuareg by Nicolaisen (1963: 142). He writes:

"The rules of residence are based upon both patrilineal and matrilineal principles as follows:-

(1) When the wedding ceremony is over the newly-married couple will stay one year in the camp of the wife's parents. This one year's stay in the camp of the wife's family has nothing to do with bridal service. Very frequently the husband does not live continuously with his wife throughout

this period, but lives in his parents' camp and pays occasional visits to his wife. Some Tuareg say that the main reason for this one year's stay in the camp of the wife's family is due to the fact that about one year is needed to prepare tent, household implements, and the like for the newly-married couple.... The stay in the wife's family camp is not always strictly one year, but may be longer or shorter. But if the wife is pregnant she must leave her parents' camp to bear her child in the camp of the husband's family.

(2) After the one year's stay the couple will settle with the husband's father to remain with him as long as he is alive."

Despite the similarities there are also extra ingredients in this which are not part of the Baluch situation as I have described it. I quote it because I believe that the comparative ethnography of nomadic and sedentary groups throughout the Islamic world is of especial importance for two reasons:

1. The scale of movement and mixing of ethnic groups which the spread of the religious and political authority of Islam caused has been responsible also for the diffusion of originally non-Islamic ethnographic traits.

2. Although local non-Islamic "archaisms", if not functional survivals, are often to be found, Islam has so powerfully imposed a common "law" of both religious and secular significance on each individual society that any similarities, however apparently superficial, should be noted.

In this case I think it is misleading to interpret the Baluch practice in terms of matri- or patrilocality. The important thing is the solidarity of the group, rather than attachment to any particular locality, and solidary (political) groupings transcend geographical groupings.

There is a certain relation between relative marriage stability and the concept of marriage as a monogamous union - a life partnership between one man and one woman on the one hand, or on the other as an

institution whereby a man satisfies his sexual and domestic labour requirements - polygyny with any number of wives (only four simultaneous legal wives are allowed by Islam, any additional women being concubines). Bearing in mind the fact that first or only marriages are nearly always with "cousins" and therefore with women of equal social status, and it is only these marriages which are invariably well "insured" by the mahr arrangements: in general, the Baluch are monogamous; the shahrī, the Jadgāls and the dynastic families tend to be polygynous. It is natural to expect that a marriage between two closely related people, with substantial mahr, will not normally be dissolved - even though in the case of the dynastic families such a wife may be sexually retired after five years or so. In fact they claim that in the Baluch Period divorce was unknown and its incidence now is a result of the contact with Persians and found only in the major settlements of the north and west of the Province where that contact mostly takes place. Adultery similarly is denied, and it is very difficult to obtain information on it. The strongest Islamic sanctions are quoted against it (cf. Sale, Koran, 1734: 83n).

I think we are justified therefore in distinguishing two parallel types of relationship: in one - generally first or only marriages - we have a stable bilateral alliance between equals (i.e. on the criteria of descent and wealth), which further unites two families through the succeeding generation; in the other we have unions between a socially superior man and one or more socially inferior women, the offspring of which (in the higher classes) are higher in status than their mother but lower than their father. Polygyny is practised both at the very top of the social scale - by the dynastic families, and at the very bottom - by, for instance, the peasants in Īrānshahr and Bampur, and in some cases by ghulāms.

V

One final aspect of group solidarity which must be mentioned here

concerns the stability, or lack of it, of the Baluch mētag. In Selāh Deh in May 1964 there were six mētags in Jahl Keh and six in Keh containing, in all, 63 tents, which gives an average of between five and six tents per mētag. All the population were "cousins", and of two zāt: Askānī and Porkī. When asked about their kin relationships and zāt, this very general information was all they considered relevant. They even tended not to distinguish between the two zāt - apparently because they were closely intermarried and the "cousin" relationship was more important to them. Under more intensive questioning I ascertained from them in each case one particular cousin relationship (e.g. FB3, MFZDS, but never going back beyond two generations with certainty) connecting each head of family/tent with one other relevant member of the community - within the same mētag where such a tie existed (which was the great majority of the cases), failing that with another mētag in the same section of the area, or in a few cases with another section of the area, or another Baluch area. They were bewildered as to why I should want to know the exact relationship - all that was relevant to them was that they were "cousins" (nāku-zaht) - and in quite a few cases they did not appear to know it. Agnatic descent "proved" that the zāt was descended from the Rends, who had come originally from Aleppo and Mīr Hamza (cf. chapter 3). They did not know the details, but "someone else did". It was a basic assumption for them that they were all "cousins". They only married "cousins". All Askānī were "cousins"; and the Porkī were also "cousins", since they were closely intermarried. But the details of particular relationships were only known where they were obvious - where there was a direct blood or alliance tie through living or recently deceased persons.

Two important features of the social structure of these Baluch derive from this situation:

a) There are no distinct "kindred" groupings (e.g. lineages) into which they are or could be sub-divided, and

b) There is no reason why the immediate ascendants or descendants of the present inhabitants of a particular mētag should form or have formed one mētag together, though at the same time there is no reason why they should not.

Therefore, kinship in itself does not contribute to or detract from the stability of the mētag as a sociological unit. Nor does alliance - when a man marries a bride from another mētag (as is quite usual since the mētags seem never to exceed ten families at the most) he will normally spend a year or so with the wife's mētag, after which he may return to his father's mētag, or join up with another, or remain indefinitely with his wife's people.

Further, the stability of the mētag is affected by the optimum size for an economic grazing unit. The upper limits of this are dependent on a) the number of goats which one shepherd can efficiently herd - which in the terrain of Salāh Kuh is quite small, though of course one mētag may field two or more shepherds, and b) the amount of water available at each source of surface water.

Finally, it depends on personal relations. If two men of the same mētag fail to compose a quarrel, the simplest solution is for one of them to leave and join or form another mētag, since this does not entail loss of face (cf. Barth, 1964: 18).

The mētag is therefore not a stable unit, nor does it require to be stable. The only thing that is fixed in the area are the specially prepared plots of cultivable land. Where two or more people have shares in one plot of land, one man cannot alienate his share except with the consent of his partners. But this cannot tie a man to a locality in a community like Salāh Kuh where ownership of land in fact forms only an insignificant part of a man's economic capital (cf. chapter 2).

Therefore, within the traditionally defined area (i.e. Sar Koh, Koh, or Jahl Koh) considerations of kinship and alliance are relatively unimportant in determining their patterns of movement and formation of encampments.

VI

Even though the pre-Baluch population may have been agricultural and sedentary, and even though contact with it may have profoundly modified the structure of the invading Baluch, nevertheless the culture which prevailed after the mixture of the two was more Baluch than "aboriginal". The fixed points in the Baluch conception of the Province today - the place names - are patches of cultivation (fixed because of the coinciding availability of water and soil) not the surrounding mēṭage or bāzārs where people live. Any place names to which this does not apply (insofar as they are not simply names of natural features) are properly names of areas, not of places, and these areas are only vaguely defined by natural, ecological criteria. We have mentioned already that land-ownership is not a primary factor in determining the extent of political authority, that there is no direct relationship between a chief's authority and the extent or distribution of the land he owns. The general rules of marriage and inheritance which we have described are in principle the same for each type of community. They affect different types of property in different ways. In theory, in land men and women have equal shares - in practice, except in unusual cases, the men administer their own and their women's shares; livestock is usually owned by men only. In the model in Part Three we suggested a situation in which a strongly patrilineal nomadic tribal group invaded an area inhabited by a sedentary, agricultural population in which kinship was not such an exclusive form of social relationship and patrilineal descent was emphasised only slightly (if at all) more than matrilineal. The wealth of the former was exclusively in livestock, of the latter in land. It should not therefore surprise us that in the present situation we find that:

1. Livestock tends to be inherited by sons only.
2. In the inheritance of land no discrimination is made between sons and daughters.
3. Of the communities which are exceptions to these rules:

a) The Sarhadd Baluch are comparatively practically landless.