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FROM 'EXPORTING THE REVOLUTION' TO 'POSTMODERN PAN-ISLAMISM':

A Discourse Analysis of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Ideology, 1979-2009

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ABSTRACT

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Since the early days of 1979, the Islamic Revolution of Iran has been seen as a phenomenon unique in history, one which must be viewed as somehow separate from other political Islamic movements in the 20th century.

In chapter 1, this thesis problematizes this interpretation of the Revolution by analyzing it through the lens of an earlier ideological movement, pan-Islamism, and applying methods from the study of conceptual history to draw linkages between this movement and the Islamic Revolution, rooting it more deeply in the region's political and intellectual history, and casting light on the poorly-understood pan-Islamic aspects of Iran's Revolutionary ideology.

In chapter 2, it applies methodological innovations from the digital humanities, more specifically corpus linguistics, in carrying out a series of five case studies to examine the transformation of Iranian ideology over time, by analyzing a set of five text corpora comprised of individual leaders' writings and speeches. It further illustrates how theoretical advances in discourse analysis and history seem to be moving towards the same point, and how the application of corpus linguistic methods advances these bodies of theory.

Chapters 3 through 7 comprise the case studies, which are, in order: Ruhollah Khomeini and Ali Khamenei, the two Supreme Leaders; Ali Akbar Hashemi Rasfanjani, Mohammad Khatami, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the three Presidents since 1989. These chapters illustrate through analysis of the textual data how each political leader has adapted the received political discourse to the exigencies of their times, and how pan-Islamism itself has remained a consistent, albeit dynamic, linking thread running through the period 1979-2009.

By studying pan-Islamism in the Iranian context, we can explain several features of Iranian political discourse which otherwise seem incomprehensible, and better situate the Islamic Republic within the political and discursive transformations taking place at the regional level of the Middle East, and the global level of the Muslim *umma*.

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It would be a foolhardy task to try and thank, in only a few short pages, everyone who helped this thesis come into being, from inception to its final completion. I do hope that, in inadvertently leaving any names off of this list, I do not cause any offense, but such are the risks entailed in attempting even a partial accounting of credit owed.

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In memory of my father,
Robert A. Berry
1942-2012

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A Note on Transliteration

The transliteration system followed in this thesis is a hybrid. Terms commonly rendered in English are given according to their conventional spelling (e.g., hajj, ayatollah). The same holds true with commonly-used names (e.g., Khomeini, Ahmadinejad). Exceptions are when such terms are cited in a direct quotation, or in a book title, where one of the transliteration systems below is used instead. Other terms in a foreign language or names which are not as widely-known are likewise transliterated.

For Arabic, the system of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES)* is used. Republican Turkish is rendered as it is ordinarily printed, while Ottoman Turkish is rendered mostly in Republican spelling (unless cited in a direct quote, in which case, the author's preferred transliteration scheme is preserved).

The far more frequent Persian terms are here transliterated in a largely phonetic manner, in order to avoid the Arabicizing tendencies of the *IJMES* system and to allow the reader to more easily follow the text. Long vowels are indicated with a bar (e.g., ā, ī, ū), initial *'eyn* or *hamze* are generally omitted, while medial and final *'eyn* and *hamze* are both rendered with an apostrophe. No special mark indicates the use of an Arabic retroflex or interdental consonant (as these are not pronounced as retroflex or interdental in Persian), while the genitive *ezāfe* construction is indicated through the use of *–e/-ye* rather than *–i/-yi*. Otherwise, this system tends to track *IJMES*. Thus, we get *Rezā Shāh* rather than *Riḍā Shāh*, and *khānande-ye azīz*, instead of *khwānande-yi 'azīz*.

Words in a foreign language are translated at their first appearance, and occasionally thereafter for the sake of convenience, usually within each new chapter. As for the titles of books in foreign languages, they are capitalized roughly as a title would be in English, thus articles and prepositions are not capitalized, while other parts of speech are.

I hope, dear reader, that this system, while unorthodox, will nonetheless make for a more easily readable text, particularly for Persian-speaking readers, and one that minimizes confusion by dispensing with conventions originally implemented for the transliteration of Arabic, rather than Persian.

0. Introduction

The Islamic Revolution of 1979 caught much of the world off guard. In a world divided between American capitalism and Soviet communism, the notion that a large, powerful, and modern country like Iran, located at the crossroads of much of the world, could by popular revolution remove its Westernizing Shah and replace him with an inscrutable, perhaps dangerously obscurantist, scowling, bearded cleric, struck many as incredible. But history cares little for the predilections and incredulities of its commentators, and happens regardless, leaving them to puzzle over events and to try to understand what they were blind to, what they got wrong.

In the case of Iran, this critical self-awareness seems yet to develop outside of the academy. Everything that has happened since 1979 in the Islamic Republic has been treated as a *sui generis* phenomenon, by and large, a break with the continuity of history. But history does not develop in a vacuum, nor do the people and ideologies which make it. The assumption that Khomeini and his revolution were an unimaginable and unprecedented phenomenon is one unworthy of the historical profession. Instead, historians should ask where it came from, what influenced it and how these ideologies developed into their contemporary form.

Of course, there are academics who have taken great strides in de-mystifying the Revolution.[1] And their efforts do a great deal to enlighten how this historical process unfolded. But this development is often viewed largely through the lens of Iranian history, or if it is viewed in the context of Islamic history more generally, then it is within the problematic rubric of Islam and modernity, itself a framework loaded

[1] See, e.g. Nikki Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), Roy Mottahedeh, *The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2000), Hamid Dabashi, *Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundations of the Islamic Revolution in Iran* (New York: New York University Press, 1993).

with worrisome assumptions about Islam, the non-Islamic world, and their interactions over the last few centuries.

More recent historical scholarship has problematized this approach, demonstrating the extent to which the Islamic world has been in a continual process of historical and cultural change, interacting with other cultures, Western and non-Western, as much an agent as an acted-upon in its transformations.[2] Perhaps most importantly, this scholarship underscores the arrogance behind the assumption that fundamentally different historical processes operate on a binary "West" and "East." Those historical nexuses where Orient and Occident have been seen to clash, such as colonialism, imperialism, and their progeny, have typically been the laboratory for scholars to critique the fundamental assumptions of both. For the most part, this has been a highly productive endeavor, uncovering processes and currents at work of which history had for generations been unaware.[3] That said, there are still areas and issues which have not been re-examined, and in which the classical understanding remains undisturbed.

One of these is pan-Islamism, a political, social, and religious phenomenon which, despite a brief flourishing of interest in the first half of the twentieth century, has for the most part remained an over-hyped or misunderstood ideological movement. It is ripe for a re-examination, and by applying conceptual tools from the fields of history and political theory, we can de-mystify pan-Islamism, and describe it in more precise terms than has hitherto been possible. In particular, the work of the

[2] For example, see Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), Cemil Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).
[3] See generally Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).

German conceptual historians, largely developed out of Bielefeld[4], and the political theory work of such scholars as Michael Freeden[5], which draws upon the work of this school, offer us productive tools for re-analyzing the puzzle that is pan-Islamism. By applying these tools, we find important similarities and connections between what has been viewed as a senescent historical movement and the very much living ideology which animates the institutions (and some individuals) of the Islamic Republic of Iran. These connections have barely been explored in the scholarly literature, with only a few notable exceptions.[6]

Fleshing out these connections requires us to make use of more than just the tools of historiography, however. The theoretical innovations of discourse analyis, itself an approach underutilized in the study of the Middle East and the Islamic World, help us in this regard.[7] In examining how this body of theory has evolved since it first emerged on the stage in the 1970s and 1980s, thanks largely to the influence of Foucault, we discover striking parallels between discourse analysis, the constellation of approaches underneath the umbrella of postmodernism, and the work of the conceptual historians. By entering into a dialogue on a single topic, such as pan-Islamism, these differing theoretical approaches can illuminate our subject from different angles, offering us new revelations and discoveries. This dialogue can also help to bridge some of the theoretical gaps which have arisen as the result of the parallel, independent development of these various bodies of theory.

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[4] See, e.g., Reinhart Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002).
[5] Michael Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
[6] The primary exception is Wilfried Buchta, *Die iranische Schia und die islamische Einheit, 1979-1996* (Hamburg: Deutsches Orient-Institut, 1997). It is worth noting that this study was originally Buctha's doctoral thesis; for whatever reason, this topic has been a purely academic concern, and apparently one only of doctoral students.
[7] For one of the most influential studies to use this body of theory, see Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

These theoretical questions naturally bring us to an empirical one: how are we to go about actually answering the questions of how pan-Islamism came about, what constitutes it, and the effects it had on what came afterwards? (In the instant case, of course, this means the effects it had on the Islamic Republic of Iran, the IRI, and its ideology.) In attempting to answer this question, we must take note of one positive side effect of the Islamic Revolution, at least from a historian's perspective: the tremendous quantity of primary written materials available to scholars, particularly the vast body of writings and spoken texts which form the ideological underpinnings of the IRI, in such collections as the *Sahīfe-ye Nūr* and the *Hadīs-e Velāyat*. This surfeit turns the historian's usual problem on its head; instead of struggling to assemble sources sufficient to conduct a study, we must instead learn to manage a veritable flood of information. This is emblematic of the broader transformations occurring within the humanities as a whole, and the developing means of coping with these changes.

At the cutting edge of discourse analytical research lies the application of corpus linguistics to answer these sorts of questions. Put simply, corpus linguistics is the application of computational methods to analyze large amounts of naturally-occurring text, usually measured in the millions if not billions of words. This approach allows the analyst to empirically test hypotheses, and solves some of the theoretical/methodological problems, such as perceptual and confirmation bias, inherent in discourse analysis as a method, and which many of its critics have rightly pointed out. This approach also brings the study of pan-Islamism into the ambit of the nascent field of the digital humanities, demonstrating how such a field need not be confined to the study of our contemporary world, but can bring insight to all eras of history, and allow us to view historical sources through an entirely different lens. The

superficially similar but unrelated field that has branded itself "culturomics" can also be seen as a manifestation of this intellectual movement, albeit one with a very different scale, scope, and methodology.[8] Corpus linguistics is a more established field, with roots stretching back to the 1960s[9], which has influenced fields as different as literary studies[10] and law.[11] More recent theoretical developments within the field of corpus linguistics, particularly the school known as Corpus-Assisted Discourse Studies, or CADS, will be made use of here.[12]

Thus, this study has three main aims: 1) to explain part of the ideological genesis of the Islamic Republic of Iran, its links to earlier movements of political Islam, and to highlight through the analysis of textual data the underappreciated pan-Islamic aspect which is so foundational to its discourse, all of which goes to de-exoticize the phenomenon of the Islamic Revolution; 2) to interrogate the concept of pan-Islamism using historiographical, linguistic, and political theoretical tools, to de-mystify this concept and better describe it as a discrete field of study; 3) to demonstrate how corpus linguistics can be used to answer these kinds of questions, how historical studies can serve as a testing ground for methodological innovations within the field of corpus linguistics itself, and to demonstrate potential synergies between qualitative and quantitative methods, as well as the new kinds of scholarship which can arise from combining unrelated fields, all of which speak to the potential of

[8] The paper which gave birth to this field of study is Jean-Baptiste Michel et al., "Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books," *Science* 331, no. 6014 (2010).
[9] Henry Kučera and W. Nelson Francis, *Computational Analysis of Present-Day American English* (Providence, R.I.: Brown University Press, 1967).
[10] For one example, see Bettina Fischer-Starcke, *Corpus Linguistics in Literary Analysis: Jane Austen and Her Contemporaries* (London: Continuum, 2010). This topic has even attracted some journalistic attention. See Ben Zimmer, "The Jargon of the Novel, Computed," *The New York Times*, 29 July 2011.
[11] Stephen Mouritsen, "Hard Cases and Hard Data: Assessing Corpus Linguistics as an Empirical Path to Plain Meaning," *Columbia Science and Technology Law Review* 13, no. 1 (2011).
[12] This approach is laid out in Alan Partington, "Metaphors, Motifs and Similes Across Discourse Types: Corpus-Assisted Discourse Studies (CADS) at Work," in *Corpus-Based Approaches to Metaphor and Metonymy*, ed. Anatol Stefanowitsch and Stefan Th. Gries (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2006).

digital humanities as a field in which new kinds of research can be conducted and new kinds of knowledge formed.

This thesis goes about this task through a series of five case studies, examining corpora comprised of the texts of five key actors within the Islamic Republic over the past thirty years. These are the two Supreme Leaders since 1979, Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamenei, and three presidents since 1989: Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Mohammad Khatami, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Each actor is studied on their own using a corpus created specifically for this study, comprised of a collection of their speeches and writings. Each corpus aims to be as comprehensive as possible, and for the most part collects the vast majority of each actor's texts during the period under study. Precise details of how each corpus was compiled, as well as their potential shortcomings or flaws, are discussed at the beginning of each chapter.

The contents of each chapter are as follows. Chapter one surveys the existing literature on pan-Islamism, beginning in the nineteenth century and progressing up to the twenty-first, and attempts to make sense of what is oftentimes a confused and sometimes self-contradictory body of literature. It describes the historical roots of pan-Islamism in the Caliphate debate, its golden age in the late Ottoman Empire, particularly during the reign of Abdülhamid II, and the various activists and intellectuals around the world who developed, promulgated, and critiqued it. It examines the relationship of pan-Islamism to modernity and modernization, and seeks to problematize their relationship, with the help of some recent scholarship re-examining the assumptions surrounding late Ottoman society. It also applies the work of the conceptual historians, mainly Reinhart Koselleck, and the political theory

of Michael Freeden, to develop a tri-partite approach to analyzing pan-Islamism, dividing it into institutional, affinial, and ecumenical aspects.

Chapter two further develops this theory and attempts to harmonize it with theoretical approaches in discourse analysis. This is all tied to the methodological approach of corpus linguistics, and the various theories, such as Critical Discourse Analysis, with which it contends. A compromise position is proposed to bring these differing theoretical approaches into alignment with historical theory, allowing this body of theory to inform our study's design and approach. The precise corpus linguistic methodologies to be used are explained in detail, as well as some of the technical quirks which arise from applying a set of technological tools largely developed with the study of European languages in mind to a set of Persian texts. While there is a small amount of corpus linguistic research that has been conducted on Persian (and Arabic), this is probably the single largest study of Persian source texts thus far.

The remaining chapters are the individual case studies; chapter three is a study of Ayatollah Khomeini, 1979-1989; chapter four of Ayatollah Khamenei, 1989-2009; chapter five of President Rafsanjani, 1989-1997; chapter six of President Khatami, 1997-2005; and chapter seven of President Ahmadinejad's first term, 2005-2009. This study has elected to only study the period 1979-2009, in part because President Ahmadinejad is still in office as of this writing, and in part because the political tumult following the results of the 2009 presidential elections appears to have fundamentally altered the very character of the Islamic Republic. It would be foolhardy to attempt to study, at least in this context, a polity and a discourse which are in a daily state of flux. Better to end with the discrete cut-off date of the 2009 election, and to leave the transformations occurring after that date to a future study.

While all efforts have been made to present these studies in a manner amenable to a non-technical, non-Persian speaking reader, by their very nature and heavy reliance on linguistic data, a technical background or knowledge of Persian will necessarily make them easier to comprehend. The experimental nature of this study should be borne in mind at all times; such basic matters as the methodology for conducting such a study and the best ways to present the results and their analysis are still unsettled, or (especially in the case of corpus studies of individuals) almost entirely unexplored. Any disfluencies or opacities are a byproduct of the imperfect state of the art and state of knowledge, including the author's own. Despite these limitations, these corpora reveal, for the first time, a highly dynamic, intricate, and at times revelatory discursive system underneath millions of words of what is all too frequently dismissed by scholars and non-scholars alike as mere empty propaganda. Hopefully, this study will prove the wisdom of taking a closer and deeper look.

1. A Brief History of Pan-Islamism

> I certainly should not have chosen this subject [pan-Islamism] for myself, because in the first place (and this you will admit is a serious objection), I am not quite sure what it means; and, in the second place, I am still less certain whether any such thing really exists.

E.G. Browne, speaking on pan-Islamism in a lecture at Cambridge, August 1902[13]

Writing in 1902, before the deposition of Sultan Abdülhamid II, the First World War, the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, and the subsequent fragmentation of the Middle East into its modern cacophony of states, one could perhaps consider Browne's skepticism towards pan-Islamism and its import to be prescient. His appraisal is certainly more generous than his report of a Muslim acquaintance's assertion that pan-Islamism "is a mare's-nest discovered by the *Times'* correspondent at Vienna,"[14] or Ronald Storrs' contention that Pan-Islamism was "mainly the creation of the India Office."[15]

Nonetheless, Browne was not entirely correct. Pan-Islamism as an intellectual, social, political, religious, and historical phenomenon was very real, though subsequent scholars have found it no easier to give it a concise definition or even to sketch out its history and importance in the Muslim world.[16] This chapter

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[13] E.G. Browne, "Pan-Islamism," in *Lectures on the History of the Nineteenth Century - Delivered at the Cambridge University Extension Summer Meeting, August 1902*, ed. F.A. Fitzpatrick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902), 306. Some of Browne's fellow scholars were far more dismissive: "Margoliouth, relying upon Arabic sources, called Pan-Islamism 'a phantasm,' and Syed Ameer Ali, an Indian scholar, defined it as 'a figment of the brain, an invention designed to help in destroying the liberty of Mussulman natives.' Dwight E. Lee, "The Origins of Pan-Islamism," *The American Historical Review* 47, no. 2 (1942): 281.

[14] Browne, "Pan-Islamism," 307. In the final footnote of page 330 of his text, however, Browne, citing a recently published paper by Snouck Hurgronje, backtracks somewhat, stating that "[i]n the face of such an authority I cannot feel the same certainty as to the correctness of the views expressed in this Lecture, which, nevertheless, I continue to hold."

[15] A.C. Niemeijer, *The Khilafat Movement in India, 1919-1924* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), 38.

[16] Martin Kramer perceptively notes that, in this regard, the "inability to penetrate the worlds in which pan-Islam has had some meaning – from the religious orders of the nineteenth century to Islamic Jihad

aims to do just that, by surveying the extensive and oftentimes contradictory research on pan-Islamism's many manifestations, and by describing its constituent elements and its curious status as a fusion of concepts both Eastern and Western. What emerges is not a singular concept with a consistent meaning, but rather a set of three interwoven and closely related concepts whose relative emphasis and salience changes over time, and which constitute the essential conditions for yielding the intellectual current known to Western scholars as "pan-Islamism." In brief, these three concepts can be described as institutional unity, affinial unity, and ecumenicism. The derivation and specification of these concepts will be discussed in due course.[17]

After discussing the history of pan-Islamism since its inception, we shall turn attention towards the main object of this study, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and how we may read its ideology in light of this historical context. Finally, some recent advances in the sociology of the Muslim world will be assessed, with an eye towards the historical parallels between the milieu in which pan-Islamism originally arose and the present day.[18] But first, we must grapple with defining pan-Islamism, a task with which European writers in particular have struggled since the 1870s.

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in our own time – accentuates a tendency to over- or under-estimate pan-Islam." Martin Kramer, "Redeeming Jerusalem: The Pan-Islamic Premise of Hizballah," in *The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World*, ed. David Menashri (Oxford: Westview Press, 1990), 126. Fortunately, we now have far greater access to those worlds than did the Western scholars of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

[17] It should be noted that these concepts are not entirely novel. In fact, in explaining what he meant by unity of Muslims, Ayatollah Khomeini defined it as "the realization of a unity of outlook…among Muslims, political unity among Muslim countries, and brotherhood with other Islamic sects." This is from his book *On Palestine* (*Darbāre-ye Felestīn*), as cited in Farhang Rajaee, *Islamic Values and World View: Khomeyni on Man, the State and International Politics* (London: University Press of America, 1983), 85. This corresponds roughly to the concepts outlined above.

[18] The broad sweep of the historical narrative given here largely comports with that of Jacob Landau, whose *Politics of Pan-Islam* remains the definitive history of the subject, though several other works, including Kramer's *Islam Assembled*, and Aydin's rather recent *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia* flesh out specific aspects of this exceedingly complex topic, particularly in the early 20th century. This chapter aims not so much to supplant Landau's telling as to supplement it, and to tie in more recent scholarship on specific movements and areas which has been produced in the two decades since Landau wrote his book.

The Problem of Defining a Mare's Nest

The first attested usage of the term "pan-Islam" in a Western language is that of the German Franz von Werner, writing sometime before July 1876 under the *nom de plume* of Murad Efendi in *Türkische Skizzen*.[19] This is not long after its first documented use in the Ottoman press, in the November 9th, 1868 issue of *Hürriyet*, though the term in question here is the Ottoman Turkish phrase *İttihad-ı İslam*, rendered *İslam birliği* in Republican Turkish.[20] After 1876, the scholarly consensus on pan-Islamism's definition begins to break down.

Along with the definitions mentioned above, we have that of the "German orientalist and colonial adviser to his government, C.H. Becker," who in 1904 described pan-Islamism as "a movement toward 'realization of an Islamic ideal, the unity of the Muslims in the world under the direction of a leader [imam] commanding the world community."[21] Pan-Islamism had earlier been defined by the great Hungarian Orientalist Ignaz Goldziher as "the spiritual fusion of a politically disarrayed Islam into a great unity. The external form of this unity is the institution of the indivisible Caliphate, which is the oldest political structure of Islam. Those who wish to prepare the renaissance of Muhammadan power, which has reached the maelstrom of decomposition, dream of its revival."[22] Already, the tensions between pan-Islamism's spiritual and political dimensions were apparent, and in some sense the two components cannot be wholly disentangled. Lee usefully notes that both

[19] Jacob M. Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization (2nd ed.)* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 1, Lee, "The Origins of Pan-Islamism," 280.
[20] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 2-3.
[21] As cited in Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, 16.
[22] Ignácz Goldziher, "Muhammadan Public Opinion," *Journal of Semitic Studies* 38, no. 1 (1993): 97. This article is a translation of Goldziher's original article in the January 1882 edition of *Budapesti Szemle*.

Becker and Hurgronje "distinguish between the Pan-Islamic idea or *Tendenz* which is inherent in Islam and the movement itself. They believe that the latter came about only when Abdul Hamid II tried to utilize the Pan-Islamic tendency for essentially political purposes."[23] That Abdülhamid tried to utilize this *Tendenz*, however, does not mean that its political application began with him, or that it was not present earlier in Islamic thought. This will be discussed below.

More recent studies have described "Pan-Islamic ideology during the last hundred years, approximately, as the corpus of writings (and speeches) which focuses on the importance of overall Muslim unity – less from a religious standpoint and with greater emphasis on political or economic aspects – and proposes ways and means to achieve this end."[24] Kemal Karpat likewise sees pan-Islamism as the "international dimension" of a "European-type movement of liberation and change, clad in Islamic garments and apparently led by the traditional head of the Muslim community, the caliph."[25] Naveed Sheikh has abstracted this concept further for the post-Caliphal era, stating that by pan-Islamism, he means "the ideational subscription to a unification, or integration, of Muslim peoples, regardless of divisive antecedents such as language, ethnicity, geography and polity."[26]

This does not exhaust our terminological dilemma. Aydin, returning to the Hamidian period, notes that "the origin of the term 'Muslim Unity' goes back to the mid-1870s, [while] the transnational vision of pan-Islamic solidarity as a geopolitical concept belongs to the 1880s."[27] As this ought to remind us, the terminology in question is not "pan-Islamism," at least in 19th-century writings. "Muslim unity" is

[23] Lee, "The Origins of Pan-Islamism," 279.
[24] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 5.
[25] Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, 18.
[26] Naveed S. Sheikh, *The New Politics of Islam: Pan-Islamic Foreign Policy in a World of States* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 16.
[27] Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia*, 60.

but one expression used at that time, alongside "Islamic solidarity," "union of Muslims," and the various permutations thereof. As if this were not problematic enough, scholars cannot even seem to agree on what to call the Western construct. Piscatori distinguishes between "Pan-Islam – that is, giving concrete form to the idea of Muslim political unity" which is "not simply pan-Islamism, the ideology promoting unity."[28] This division of the two terms does not seem to have found any other adherents as of yet.[29]

Helpfully, Adeeb Khalid, in writing on late Ottoman society, suggests a way of examining the phenomenon which may help us find our way forward, and "distinguish[es] between three different aspects of the problem:

(1) pan-Islamism as it was understood by contemporary Europeans;
(2) pan-Islamism as an Ottoman state policy (and which I will call 'state pan-Islam'); and
(3) pan-Islamism as a new form of affective solidarity that knitted Muslim elites together around the Ottoman state (which I will call 'public pan-Islam')."[30]

Here, Khalid effectively divides up pan-Islamism by its application and interpretation, its effects in the world. The consistent emphasis on this approach in the scholarly literature has led us astray by forcing us to focus on the phenomenon's effects rather than its causes, roots, or ideological substance.

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[28] James Piscatori, "Imagining Pan-Islam: Religious Activism and Political Utopias," *Proceedings of the British Academy*, no. 131 (2005): 426.
[29] Accordingly, in order to avoid causing confusion, I do not use Piscatori's distinction in this study. Throughout this study, I shall privilege the term "pan-Islamism," and its various morphological variants, except in quotations.
[30] Adeeb Khalid, "Pan-Islamism in Practice: The Rhetoric of Muslim Unity and Its Uses," in *Late Ottoman Society: The Intellectual Legacy*, ed. Elisabeth Özdalga (London: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 201-2.

Given the sometimes incompatible definitions of pan-Islamism laid out in prior writings, it would seem preferable to instead examine its characteristics over time, what it amounted to in both practice and ideology, by examining those figures, ideas, and movements commonly described (or self-described) as pan-Islamist, and to use this examination to construct a more analytically rigorous and comprehensive definition of the phenomenon known as pan-Islamism. This will allow us to not only describe a given figure or movement as pan-Islamist, but to point to specific reasons as to why this is so, or, in some cases, to offer non-idiosyncratic grounds for rejecting the application of this label in some cases where it has been applied.[31]

Discourse Analysis: A Conceptual Approach?

Further examination of this issue first necessitates a theoretical digression. Part of this problem of definition arises from the nature of the phenomenon under examination; that is, attempts to describe ideas in plain language, absent any theoretical or conceptual framework, will necessarily prove somewhat mercurial. We shall attempt to resolve this problem by analyzing pan-Islamism via a concept around which several disciplines, such as history, linguistics, and politics, seem to be revolving, much like planets in orbit around the sun, each using their own vocabulary and slightly varying theorization. Here we shall privilege the term "discourse," and

[31] For example, the typology hinted at above allows us to distinguish the claims of Piscatori, among others, that al-Qāʿida is pan-Islamist on the grounds that *takfīrī* groups, by definition, fail to espouse ecumenicism, which has been a key component of pan-Islamism since its inception. See Piscatori, "Imagining Pan-Islam," 435, Michael Laffan, "Lectures on the Present, Lessons from the Past: al-Qaʿida as the New Pan-Islam," *International Institute for Asian Studies Newsletter*, no. 29 (November 2002).

On a less militant note, one can reach a similar conclusion about the Tablighi Jama'at missionary society, whose "fervent apoliticism" means that their ideology does not entail institutional unity of any sort, thus they cannot be considered pan-Islamist, though affinial unity and ecumenicism are part and parcel of their thinking. Peter Mandaville, *Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma* (London: Routledge, 2001), 143-45.

treat pan-Islamism as such, though this term, too, must be defined if it is to be applied in any meaningful way.

But first, let us begin with an approach more intuitively accessible: that of the study of political ideologies. Pan-Islamism would seem amenable to such a treatment. As a reasonably well-organized body of ideas, displaying consistent characteristics over time, it could be reasonably classified as a kind of political ideology.[32] However, as the history sketched out below will demonstrate, pan-Islamism is far from unchanging, and particularly after momentous changes in the history of the Islamic world, such as the abolition of the Caliphate, one can reasonably ask whether we can even speak of the same phenomenon over such an extended time period. We must have a way of analyzing ideologies which is not only consistent, but also offers substantial flexibility, and a means for explaining and describing change over time.

Fortunately, Michael Freeden has provided just such an approach. He defines ideologies as "distinctive configurations of political concepts…[which] create specific conceptual patterns from a pool of indeterminate and unlimited combinations."[33] This state of affairs leads to a property Freeden terms *ideological morphology*, whereby differing configurations of these concepts lead to different resultant ideologies, which can be analyzed in terms of their componential makeup, as well as their relations to each other. As he puts it: "Ideologies are modular structures, frequently exhibiting a highly fluid morphology."[34] That is to say, the modular makeup of ideologies is not

[32] This is quite close to a common definition used in political science. Here, Kathleen Knight cites John Gerring on defining ideology: "the importance of *coherence* is virtually unchallenged…Ideology, at the very least, refers to a set of idea elements that are bound together…One might add, as corollaries, *contrast* and *stability*-the one implying coherence vis-à-vis competing ideologies and the other implying coherence through time." Kathleen Knight, "Transformations of the Concept of Ideology in the Twentieth Century," *American Political Science Review* 100, no. 4 (2006): 619.
[33] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 4.
[34] Ibid., 88.

fixed, but variable, and allows for shifts over time, particularly in regards to their conceptual salience and configuration. Ideologies can thus take on, lose, or alter their arrangement of concepts without necessarily becoming different ideologies.

In international relations, Henrik Larsen's application of discourse analysis bears a close resemblance to Freeden's work, and helps to link the approach taken here with Freeden's conceptual approach.[35] His understanding of discourse's role in the formation of foreign policy helpfully divides discourse into several hierarchical levels, with certain "governing statements" forming the trunk of the discursive tree, from which branch off several levels of derived statements, in increasing order of specificity:

From Governing Statements-> DS1-> DS2->… DS*n*.[36] The utility of this approach lies in his insight that "a change *in* discourse is not a complete change *of* discourse."[37] That is to say, changes can occur further down the branch, such as at the DS2 or DS3 level, without impacting upon the governing statements which lie at the trunk. In Foucauldian terms, a change of discourse therefore does not impact upon the discursive formation as a whole; the conceptual structure allows for a certain degree of variance. Freeden's theory makes a similar allowance for variation, by further refining his concept of ideological morphology to encompass core, adjacent, and peripheral concepts, which can exist in relations of logical or cultural adjacency.[38] The compatibility of these theories suggests that we can productively examine pan-

[35] Henrik Larsen, *Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis: France, Britain and Europe* (London: Routledge, 1997). His definition of discourse is likewise quite similar to the one used in this study. Larsen's insight lies in drawing out the linkages between discourses and institutions, without assuming a simplistic or determinative configuration of "power relations."

[36] Ibid., 17. This notion derives from Foucault's distinction between *discursive formations*, which are superordinate to historically situated instances of specific *discourses*. (p. 16)

[37] Ibid.

[38] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 68-91, esp. 77-78. His notion of cultural adjacency helps to explain ideological syncretism and localized variations, which should be borne in mind in regards to the discussion of pan-Islamism's relationship to local nationalisms below.

Islamism as both ideology and discourse, applying the theoretical framework afforded by Larsen whilst utilizing the tools supplied by Freeden for the analysis of ideologies.

While Freeden is aware of the resemblance of his ideas to those of other fields, he curiously argues that they have not reached as high a degree of sophistication. On conceptual structure and interrelations, he writes: "Similar conclusions have been reached, via different routes, in linguistics and in anthropology. But the analysis of conceptual structures offered in both disciplines is still relatively unsophisticated."[39] This is an odd statement to make, as George Lakoff in the 1980s proposed the concept of *radial categories* within the broader framework of cognitive grammar, which operate very much like Freeden's ideas of core and peripheral concepts, and Lakoff's work is nothing if not sophisticated.[40]

But setting aside these theoretical quibbles, we can still usefully implement Freeden's ideas alongside Larsen's. If anything, these additional parallels to linguistic and anthropological theory would seem to further recommend our combined approach of studying political ideology as discourse. From this perspective, then, pan-Islamism is most easily conceived of as an ideology composed of multiple concepts, rather than a single, unitary body. As such, it can be divided, roughly, into three components, the boundaries of which are somewhat fuzzy, and may at times overlap. These definitions will be explored further after our examination of pan-Islamism's history, but we will lay out their preliminary definitions here:

1) Institutional unity – Here, we are dealing with the more formal political elements of unity, such as the Caliphate, military, political, and economic

[39] Ibid., 74.
[40] Regarding radial categories, see George Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 91-114, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), passim.

cooperation, and interstate arrangements. These need not be strictly institutional in a legal sense, but rather, they deal with those aspects of unity which are most archetypally "political."

2) Affinial unity – Cultural, social, and interpersonal aspects of unity, the sorts of "soft power"[41] ties which exist outside of the high political arena. More abstractly, these are what comprise the sense of "brotherhood," or common culture shared among Muslims.
3) Ecumenicism[42] – Rapprochement, the effort to minimize or resolve sectarian and doctrinal differences among Shi'a and Sunna, sometimes going even further to embrace groups considered schismatics by many Muslims.

These concepts may indeed be present in other ideologies in different configurations, or alongside other components, yielding very different results. But this particular arrangement, with some variations of salience and prioritization over time and in different contexts, encompasses the core of pan-Islamism.

Having sketched out our approach to the study of pan-Islamism, we must now explain what is meant here by the term "discourse." Returning to Freeden, much of his work draws upon the theoretical work of the German school of *Begriffsgeschichte*, or conceptual history, most notably the writings of Reinhart Koselleck. Koselleck's work in turn is notably influenced by the work of hermeneutic thinkers, particularly Hans-Georg Gadamer[43], as is apparent in Koselleck's explanation of the enterprise of *Begriffsgeschichte*:

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[41] On this term's use in international relations, see Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).
[42] Given its relative unambiguity, I will sometimes refer to this concept by its original term in both Persian and Arabic, *taqrīb*.
[43] Martin van Gelderen goes so far as to argue that "[in] many ways, Koselleck's theory of *Begriffsgeschichte* is a deliberate attempt to take Gadamer's Philosophical Hermeneutics from its

> …past social and political conflicts must be interpreted and decoded in terms of their contemporary conceptual boundaries, and the self-understanding on the part of past speakers and writers of their own language-use… *Begriffsgeschichte* is therefore initially a specialized method for source criticism, taking note as it does of the utilization of terminology relevant to social and political elements, and directing itself in particular to the analysis of central expressions having social or political content. It goes without saying that historical clarification of past conceptual usage must refer not only to the history of language but also to sociohistorical data, for every semantic has its link to nonlinguistic content. It is this that creates the precarious marginality of *Begriffsgeschichte* for the linguistic sciences, while being, at the same time, the origin of its great advantages for the historical sciences. The condensation effected by the work of conceptual explanation renders past statements precise, bringing more clearly into view contemporary intentional circumstance or relation in their linguistic make-up.[44]

Here, Koselleck undersells the utility of *Begriffsgeschichte* to linguistics. Indeed, the distinction between linguistics and the historical sciences, at least in the realm of discourse analysis, is in many ways one without a difference. He goes on to highlight the role played by *Begriffsgeschichte* in relation to social history:

> The temporal question posed by a potential *Begriffsgeschichte* with respect to persistence, change, and novelty leads to the identification of semantic components, persisting, overlapping, discarded, and new meanings – all of which can become relevant for social history only if the history of the concept has been first subjected [to a] separate analysis. As an independent discipline, therefore, *Begriffsgeschichte* delivers indices for social history by pursuing its own methods.[45]

Koselleck demonstrates as much elsewhere through an analysis of the changing meaning of marriage in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Germany.[46] His is thus an

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ontological and epistemological heights to make it relevant for the practice of history." Martin van Gelderen, "Between Cambridge and Heidelberg. Concepts, Languages and Images in Intellectual History.," in *History of Concepts: Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Iain Hampsher-Monk, Karin Tilmans, and Frank van Vree (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1998), 229.

[44] Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 80-81.

[45] Ibid., 84.

[46] Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History*, 31-35.

approach deeply rooted in contextualization: social, historical, and political, as well as linguistic.

This approach did not develop in isolation in Germany, however: in England, J.G.A. Pocock and Quentin Skinner had similarly taken a hermeneutically-influenced approach to the study of political thought. But this was a curious state of affairs, as "[p]aradoxically, these shifts in historiography, closely interwoven with linguistic and specific scholarly traditions, have taken place contemporaneously but relatively independently."[47] Indeed, Skinner had been arguing for such an approach since 1969.[48]

It is likewise my contention that such a synchronicity has developed between the fields of history and linguistics (one can also include several ancillary fields, such as international relations or sociology, where this approach is extant, but more peripheral), where developments in discourse analysis, and particularly those associated with the field of corpus linguistics (which will be further discussed in chapter two), have led to a situation where similar ideas have developed on parallel tracks without ever meeting. This study is a small effort at illustrating the benefits each field may bring to the other. Indeed, the possibility of such a fruitful cooperation was recognized some years ago by Koselleck himself:

> Although basic concepts always function within a discourse, they are pivots around which all arguments turn. For this reason I do not believe that the history of concepts and the history of discourse can be viewed as incompatible and opposite. Each depends inescapably on the other. A discourse requires

[47] Iain Hampsher-Monk, Karin Tilmans, and Frank van Vree, "A Comparative Perspective on Conceptual History - An Introduction," in *History of Concepts: Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Iain Hampsher-Monk, Karin Tilmans, and Frank van Vree (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1998), 2.

[48] Quentin Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," *History and Theory* 8, no. 1 (1969). At 53n205, Skinner admits his own indebtedness to John Dunn, illustrating how, as in Germany, English historical thought was deeply influenced by contemporary philosophy. See John Dunn, "The Identity of the History of Ideas," *Philosophy* 43, no. 164 (1968).

> basic concepts in order to express what it is talking about. And analysis of concepts requires command of both linguistic and extra-linguistic contexts, including those provided by discourses. Only by such knowledge of context can the analyst determine what are a concept's multiple meanings, its content, importance, and the extent to which it is contested.[49]

In the study of political thought, Terence Ball has defined this dynamic quite succinctly, while hinting at the reciprocal nature of the individual's relationship with discourse: "The task of the critical conceptual historian is to chart changes in the concepts constituting the discourses of political agents both living and dead…The ways in which speakers shape and are in turn shaped by their language are the subject-matter of critical conceptual history."[50] Discourses can only exist in a specific historical environment, instantiated among a group of specific historical actors, using a specific language. Thus, conceptual historians must concern themselves with both context and discourse.

This brings us to the crux of the matter, namely, how to define discourse. Rather than re-litigate certain foundational theoretical debates, a few key assumptions must be stated here, and taken as a set of theoretical prerequisites for what follows. While certain aspects of some of these theories remain highly contentious, their basic insights, and the systems of thought they establish, remain widely accepted within the

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[49] Reinhart Koselleck, "A Response to Comments on the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*," in *The Meaning of Historical Terms and Concepts: New Studies on Begriffsgeschichte*, ed. Hartmut Lehmann and Melvin Richter (Washington, D.C.: German Historical Institute, 1996), 65. This is likewise the tenor of a book published two years earlier: Dietrich Busse, Fritz Hermanns, and Wolfgang Teubert, eds., *Begriffsgeschichte und Diskursgeschichte: Methodenfragen und Forschungsergebnisse der Historischen Semantik* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag,1994). If we compare Koselleck's "basic concepts" to the Foucauldian "governing statements" described by Larsen, the parallels between the two approaches become even more striking.

[50] Terence Ball, "Conceptual History and the History of Political Thought," in *History of Concepts: Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Iain Hampsher-Monk, Karin Tilmans, and Frank van Vree (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1998), 81. Readers may here note that this reciprocity differs from Foucault's conception of discourse and power operating as a largely uni-directional phenomenon. This will be dealt with more extensively below in the discussion of critical discourse analysis. It should be noted that Ball largely agrees with this assessment: "I want to insist that attention to conceptual conflicts and innovations does not – *pace* some meta-scientific 'realists' and postmodern 'discourse theorists' – require that we eschew political agency or intentionality; quite the contrary." Ball, "Conceptual History," 83.

social sciences and humanities. First, then, let us begin with B.L. Whorf, and his foundational work in linguistics. Prior to his (co-)development of the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis, language was seen largely as a transparent phenomenon, reflecting a correspondence with objects or phenomena "in the real world," and as a direct channel into human thought.[51] His particular insight was precisely the opposite; namely, that language shaped thought as much as thought shaped language.[52] This initiated a period of critical reflection on the nature of language and its role in thought as well as society.

Whorf's work in anthropology was paralleled in philosophy by Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*, where he emphasized that "the meaning of a word is its use in the language,"[53] as opposed to any more abstract or essentialist definition. Wittgenstein's thought shook philosophical objectivism to its core, and its aftershocks were felt across the disciplines. The philosophical and anthropological unmooring of our conceptions of society from any sense of "objective reality" necessitated the rewriting of sociological theory away from Marxist structural determinism, a project already begun by Karl Mannheim. This line of thought would reach its apotheosis in Berger and Luckmann's manifesto on social constructivism[54], which offered a systematic and alternate approach to the study of society, by describing how interlocking psychological, cognitive, and social processes combined to "construct"

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[51] As most notably embodied in Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, trans. Roy Harris (London: Duckworth, 1983). This text was reconstructed from his lecture notes at the University of Geneva; a more recent translation of a set of his manuscripts discovered in 1996 is ——, *Writings in General Linguistics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

[52] The classic collection of his ideas is John B. Carroll, ed. *Language, Thought, and Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,1956).

[53] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1953), §43. This element of Wittgenstein's thinking was highlighted by Skinner in his work, as well: Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding," 37n154.

[54] Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (London: Penguin, 1966). Other scholars have highlighted how, "in many vital instances the words, that is, the rhetoric, are the social reality," situating Berger and Luckmann alongside the symbolic interactionists. Ernest G. Bormann, "Fantasy and Rhetorical Vision: The Rhetorical Criticism of Social Reality," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 58, no. 4 (1972): 401. See also ——, "Fantasy and Rhetorical Vision: Ten Years Later," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 68, no. 3 (1982).

social reality. Berger and Luckmann, via a long chain of influences, have thus provided us with a theoretical orientation, albeit not a definitive answer as to what we are to study, or how. The notion of discourse, most notably embodied in Foucault[55], helps fill that gap, though his own conception of this term is not unproblematic, and requires clarification.

Discourse as defined in this study, then, is precisely those ephemera which are constitutive of the social construct; it is the collective process of meaning-making in and of society, which gives shape to the individual and is in turn shaped by individual (and collective) speech acts and actions. The ephemeral and diffused nature of discourse means that it cannot be directly observed in its totality, but only through its epiphenomena, the most ubiquitous and accessible of which is text.[56] There is no necessity of domination or power in discourse[57]; there is no *telos*. In history, there is no hidden hand.

This somewhat idiosyncratic definition of discourse is at odds with other widely-accepted ones, as will be discussed later.[58] However, it has the advantage of a greater political neutrality than other approaches, carrying much less theoretical

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[55] In particular, Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972).

[56] This is not to suggest that other media cannot be used to study discourse. See, inter alia, Kofi Agawu, *Music as Discourse: Semiotic Adventures in Romantic Music* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), Robert Walser, *Running with the Devil: Power, Gender, and Madness in Heavy Metal Music* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1993), passim, Gunther Kress and Theo van Leeuwen, *Reading Images: The Grammar of Visual Design* (London: Routledge, 1996).

[57] Freeden has justifiably criticized earlier approaches to discourse analysis on precisely this ground: "Discourse analysis attempts, among others, to identify the idiom and social connotation of key turns of phrase, of metaphor and sentence construction, even of emotional implications of tone. In particular, as with Foucault, it emphasizes the power aspect of such discourse, thus reclaiming the concept of ideology for the broadly Marxisant approach. The content-analysis employed here is rather a function of the constrained interlinkages among political concepts and regards political discourse as shaped by such constraints, which cannot be reduced to power relationships." Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 126. The application here of Larsen's theories helps us to avoid this particular pitfall of discourse analysis.

[58] "Discourse analysis" is likewise a term upon which no one can seem to agree. While it was coined as a phrase in 1952, its definitions have been highly varied since then. See Zellig Harris, "Discourse Analysis," *Language* 28, no. 1 (1952). Interestingly, Harris' paper was concerned with a kind of formal morphemic analysis, and as such its content would be largely unrecognizable to the modern discourse analyst.

baggage than they do (particularly from Marx and Foucault), and thus possesses considerably more flexibility, utility, and applicability in a broad variety of contexts.[59] The approach proposed here has, in fact, less in common with "discourse analysis" as has often been understood within history or critical theory (though it is indebted to these fields), and more in common with certain strains of thought within theoretical sociology, particularly the sociology of knowledge. Methodologically speaking, our emphasis on interpretation and contextualization of discourse bears a striking resemblance to the "depth hermeneutics" of John Thompson.[60] I use the term "discourse analysis" here primarily as a way of rooting this theory in a widely-recognized approach, but also to highlight the substantial degree of interdisciplinary overlap between history, linguistics, sociology, and critical theory. By scaling back our theoretical claims just slightly, we find an approach to this phenomenon which unifies disparate schools of thinking which have evolved along separate paths for the past thirty years or so.

Equally so, our greater reliance on linguistic theory helps to provide a stronger evidentiary basis for social constructivism. To give one example, consider the case of lexical priming: "In brief, lexical priming is a self-reproducing *mental* phenomenon whereby the normal language user learns, by repeated acquaintance with a lexical item and by processes of analogy with other similar items, the typical behaviour of that item in interaction…The user then reproduces this behaviour in his/her own

[59] Thus, Norman Fairclough's contention that a "[critical discourse analysis] CDA of the right is quite conceivable" misses the point; in a historical framework, the issue is not of the valence of one's political commitments, it is that they ought not to guide a study in the first place. CDA will be discussed further in chapter two. See Norman Fairclough, "A Reply to Henry Widdowson's 'Discourse Analysis: A Critical View'," *Language and Literature* 5, no. 1 (1996): 52.

[60] John B. Thompson, *Ideology and Modern Culture: Critical Social Theory in the Era of Mass Communication* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 20-27, 277-91. Of particular interest here is his contention that depth hermeneutics "allows us to develop a methodological framework which is orientated towards the interpretation (or re-interpretation) of meaningful phenomena, but in which different types of analysis can play legitimate and mutually supportive roles." (p. 21) This approach helpfully bridges the quantitative/qualitative gap which so often dominates methodological debates in discourse analysis.

linguistic performance."[61] That a similar process occurs in the reproduction of discourse (as defined above) is argued by lexical priming's main theorist, Michael Hoey[62], and thus offers a precise explanatory mechanism for the broader processes of social construction theorized by Berger and Luckmann.

To return, then, to the subject of this project, pan-Islamism, we can define the phenomenon as the configuration of three core political concepts forming an ideology, or as lying at the confluence of three smaller discourses, each flowing together to form a larger one. A brief chronological history of pan-Islamism is given below, which views its development over time as one of the interplay among these three elements, of their ebb and flow across the centuries, with their respective salience and relationship to one another changing constantly, both shaping and reacting to political developments in the larger, non-discursive world.

The Caliphate Debate

Most scholars date the origins of pan-Islamism to some point in the 18th century, usually the debate over the status and authority of the Ottoman Caliphate, which formed the nucleus of pan-Islamist discourse until the institution was abolished by the Turkish National Assembly in 1924. Others find the roots of the debate in India, where Keddie argues that the *ʿālim* Shāh Walī Allāh's (1703-1762)[63] emphasis on the

[61] Alan Partington, "Evaluating Evaluation and Some Concluding Thoughts on CADS," in *Corpus-Assisted Discourse Studies on the Iraq Conflict: Wording the War*, ed. John Morley and Paul Bayley (London: Routledge, 2009), 284.
[62] His argument qualifies the interaction of discourse and lexis somewhat, but for our purposes, it suffices: "We have therefore to assume that the discourse impetus and the lexical priming are interconnected but not coterminous. We also have to assume that primings are stored two-way." Michael Hoey, *Lexical Priming: A New Theory of Words and Language* (London: Routledge, 2005), 163.
[63] *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd edition (Leiden: Brill), s.v. "Al-dihlawī, SHāh Walī Allāh."

Caliphate "may have contributed something to later Pan-Islamic trends,"[64] though he likely did not accept Ottoman Caliphal claims, as he held that this was an "exclusive privilege of the Qureish."[65]

A broader scholarly consensus has formed around the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, which was concluded after the Russian defeat of the Ottomans in the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768 to 1774, as the start of the Ottomans' Caliphal claims in the modern period.[66] In article three of this treaty, the Ottoman Sultan was recognized as "Supreme Mohammedan Caliph," the first documented instance of such a claim in a treaty with a Western power.[67] Bernard Lewis is incorrect in his assertion

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[64] Nikki R. Keddie, *Sayyid Jamāl ad-Dīn "al-Afghānī": A Political Biography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 26n31. See also, in regards to Shāh Walī Allāh's theory of the caliphate, Aziz Ahmad, "An Eighteenth-Century Theory of the Caliphate," *Studia Islamica*, no. 28 (1968).

[65] Azmi Özcan, *Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain (1877-1924)* (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 10n39. Özcan notes here that G.N. Jalbani has highlighted Shāh Walī Allāh's role as the possible ideological originator of pan-Islamism, "conceived in…three steps," which included "formation of a common jurisprudence (*fiqh*)," thereafter the "establishment of national governments on strong and secure grounds," that is, the absence of foreign domination, and "the establishment of an international organization which was the main purpose of the Shari'a of the Prophet." This certainly bears an interesting resemblance to later efforts at pan-Islamism, beginning with the anti-colonialism of Afghānī and carrying through to the formation of modern international organizations such as the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). Equally important is that Shāh Walī Allāh saw *taqrīb* (rapprochement or ecumenicism) in *fiqh* to be the first essential step in the pan-Islamic project, a point often overlooked in the literature. See G.N. Jalbani, "Pan-Islamism," *Islamic Literature* 13, no. 2 (1967). On a related note, Shāh Walī Allāh's followers, including his son Abdul Aziz and Sayyid Ahmad Barelawi, took his teachings on the Caliphate (Qureish descent possibly excepted) so seriously that they established their own state, Caliph included, in the Northwest Frontier Region of India, which lasted from around 1830 to 1870, when it was put down by the British. Niemeijer, *The Khilafat Movement in India, 1919-1924*, 32. On Barelawi (also Barelvi/Brelwi), cf. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, 28-33.

[66] Bernard Lewis, "The Ottoman Empire in the Mid-Nineteenth Century: A Review," *Middle Eastern Studies* 1, no. 3 (1965): 291. Karpat notes that this is the subject of some debate, citing Gilles Veinstein's *La Question du Califat.* Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, 242n7. The classic study of the Caliphal question remains Thomas Walker Arnold, *The Caliphate* (London: Routledge, 1965 [1924]).

[67] Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 29. In n22, however, Özcan points out that, contra conventional scholarly wisdom, it has since been argued that recognition of the Sultan's Caliphal authority over Muslims within the Russian empire *was not* granted in exchange for similar recognition of Russia's suzerainty over the Orthodox denizens of Ottoman lands. In this regard, see: Roderic H. Davison, ""Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecility": The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji Reconsidered," *Slavic Review* 35, no. 3 (1976). This raises only minor objections in the debate over whether Ottoman pan-Islamism was primarily expansionist or defensive, though, as subsequent developments in pan-Islamic policy occurred in the face of continuing European encroachment into Ottoman territories. In any case, specificities of the signatories' motives at the time aside, the provisions pertaining to Russia's right to protect Orthodox Christians were later used as a pretext for it to occupy Wallachia and Moldavia in July 1853, ultimately providing a *casus belli* for what would become the Crimean War. Erik Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History (2nd ed.)* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1997), 55-57.

that this was "the first time the Ottoman Sultan put forward a claim to religious jurisdiction over Muslims *outside* his dominions,"[68] though, as an earlier treaty between Sultan Ahmed III and Ashraf Shah of Persia, signed in 1727, referred to Sultan Ahmed as "Caliph of All Muslims," a title which he "subsequently pressed Nadir Shah…to recognize."[69] Küçük Kaynarca did mark the first such claims made to a non-Muslim interlocutor, and perhaps helped to engender later European fears (which were often lurid and largely unfounded) over pan-Islamic machinations in their colonial holdings.[70]

Though these were the first claims to Caliphal authority made by the Ottomans themselves, there are instances as early as the 16th century of other Muslim rulers pleading for assistance from the Ottoman Sultan in his capacity as Caliph in their conflicts with (primarily) European powers. This was particularly true in Central Asia, mostly in the Turkic Khanates of Bukhara, Hive, and Hokand,[71] though Muslim rulers in Southeast Asia, mostly modern-day Indonesia, also pledged their loyalties to the Sultan, and beseeched him to send them aid. The cases of Indonesia and Malaysia have been the subject of much scholarly attention[72], as has Yakub Bey's state in East Turkistan (Xinjiang in contemporary China), centered on Kashgar[73], less so Sultan Tipu of Mysore[74], while others, such as the Comoro Islands[75], have hardly been noticed.

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[68] Lewis, "The Ottoman Empire in the Mid-Nineteenth Century: A Review," 291.
[69] Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 30.
[70] This is not to suggest that the Ottomans did not themselves take the role of the Caliphate seriously, even before the high point of such claims in the Hamidian period. For example, the concerns of some *'ulamā'* that mutual non-interference pledges in a Spanish-Ottoman peace treaty in 1782 could conflict with Caliphal obligations to defend North Africa's Muslims in the event of future hostilities led to the insertion of exceptions for the defense of the Ottomans' co-religionists. Ibid., 30n24.
[71] Ibid., 24.
[72] Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, 52-56, Anthony Reid, "Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 26, no. 2 (1967).
[73] Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, 57-63.
[74] Ibid., 49-52.
[75] Ibid., 56-57.

From the late eighteenth century until the Hamidian period, however, the Ottoman Caliphate saw little emphasis in Ottoman thought or foreign policy. Attempts at its later revitalization met with resistance, as well as countervailing claims to an Arab caliphate (supported by the British), particularly in the Hamidian era.[76] On the whole, though, Ottoman claims to the Caliphate were widely accepted among Muslims, even before Abdülhamid's embrace of pan-Islamism. There were signs of ferment, and intermittent though mostly ineffectual action during the reign of Abdülaziz, particularly in reaction to European colonialist endeavors[77], but these did not represent a fully fleshed-out policy.[78] This was underscored by the 1839 implementation of the *Tanzimat*, and the resultant policies of modernization and opening to the West, which resulted in numerous trade treaties and economic concessions to the European powers.[79] These reforms, along with the steady pressures of European expansionism, contributed to a milieu of embattlement in the Muslim world, where cultural and economic dislocations marked the first encounters with the historical process now referred to as modernity, and yielded a generalized cultural, religious, and political ferment out of which pan-Islamism as an ideology ultimately arose.

[76] In this regard, see Ş. Tufan Buzpinar, "Opposition to the Ottoman Caliphate in the Early Years of Abdülhamid II: 1877-1882," *Die Welt des Islams* 36, no. 1 (1996).
[77] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 10-13.
[78] There were, however, some initiatives launched during this time, such as the dispatch in 1862 of an *'ālim* from the Ottoman Empire to instruct the Muslims of South Africa. These ties would be further developed under Abdülhamid. Éric Germain, "L'Afrique du Sud dans la Politique 'Panislamique' de l'Empire Ottoman," *Turcica* 31 (1999).
[79] Zürcher, *Turkey*, 66-69.

Pan-Islamism and Islamic Modernism

The distinction between pan-Islamism and political Islam more generally, or Islamism, is often hard to draw, particularly at the end of the 19th century. Karpat goes so far as to see the two as different sides of the same coin, divided into an "international dimension" and an "internal transformational aspect" of the same phenomenon.[80] In some sense, this is correct, as both the localized and international aspects of this broader transformation were reactions to modernity, and an attempt, in effect, not to arrest its progress, but to alter its course, and to make modernization work *for*, rather than *against*, Muslim societies. This is reflected in the emphasis throughout the literature and thinking of that time on the value of education, particularly modern and scientific education[81], and on the international stage by an emphasis on anti-colonialism and a defense of the Muslim world against Western encroachment, as embodied in rallying around the Caliphate.

The numerous revivalist movements preceding Abdülhamid's reign in a sense laid the groundwork for his program, in which he "adopted, reshaped, and augmented many of the basic methods and ideas of the revivalists to create a modern state ideology."[82] That these movements and the ideologies animating them were firstly not ideologies of the state, but of the community, the *umma*, explains some of the tensions inherent in their co-optation for the Hamidian program, and their ultimate failure to meld successfully with it in light of Abdülhamid's increasingly despotic and extra-constitutional rule.[83] While sharing a common point of origin, pan-Islamism

[80] Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, 18.
[81] Cf. Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000), passim.
[82] Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, 23.
[83] Ibid., 22-23. Karpat has elsewhere succinctly described the paradox at the heart of the Hamidian period: "Sultan Abdulhamid used his caliphal credentials and influence to preserve the Tanzimat

and the domestic reformism of the Islamic revivalists thus diverged, partly as a consequence of Abdülhamid's efforts, yielding an ensuing series of localized "Islamic nationalisms," which had previously existed in prototype and in symbiosis with pan-Islamism more generally.[84] Extreme care must be taken, however, to distinguish these localized progeny from the more recent fundamentalist movements, with which they and pan-Islamism are frequently conflated, in large part because contemporary fundamentalist movements appropriate much of the rhetoric of pan-Islamism, including a restoration of the Caliphate, à la Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr.[85] Most such movements are in fact "critical of the modernism of the early Islamic 'reformers,'" while their roots "are found in internal [i.e., localized] political causes, rather than revivalism."[86]

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reforms and to introduce massive new cultural, economic, social, and integrative reforms. These reforms in turn laid the foundations of modern Turkey and Turkish democracy, in spite of the Sultan's own defense of absolutism as a legitimate form of Islamic government…the caliphate became the central Muslim institution not because of Abdulhamid's Pan-Islamic ambitions, but because Muslims sought guidance and legitimacy for change from a basic Islamic institution." Kemal Karpat, "A Reply to Selim Deringil's Review of *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Ottoman State*," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 36, no. 1 (2004): 157. Thus, Abdülhamid, while not himself responsible for the pan-Islamic *zeitgeist*, tried to turn it to political ends, with only middling success.

[84] Cf. Nikki R. Keddie, "Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism," *The Journal of Modern History* 41, no. 1 (1969): especially 26-28. Similarly, Landau argues that "al-Afghānī's greatest merit…was to have shown that, in his days at least, Pan-Islam and nationalism could be mutually complementary." Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 21. I cannot agree with Keddie, however, that pan-Islamism "as a serious political force" died with the Caliphate. (p. 27) While the politicized Hamidian Caliphate required pan-Islamism, pan-Islamism *did not* require the Caliphate, though it found it tremendously useful. (cf. Karpat's argument above, as well as *The Politicization of Islam*, 46, concerning the early revivalist movements' relationships to pan-Islamism, and Abdülhamid's conservative aims in co-opting their leadership and in partially meeting their demands.) Landau and Kramer have both demonstrated in great detail how the transition to pan-Islamism's post-caliphal phase occurred, as will be discussed below.

[85] On which, see: Suha Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamental Quest: Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate* (London: Grey Seal, 1996), passim. Mandaville has coined the term *khilafist* to distinguish these groups from Muslim nationalists who accept the unit of the state, and this term likewise usefully distinguishes between pan-Islamists and groups like Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr. Peter Mandaville, "Sufis and Salafis: The Political Discourse of Transnational Islam," in *Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization*, ed. Robert W. Hefner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 307.

[86] Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, 22. The intellectual antecedents of these movements likewise differ, as contemporary fundamentalists are more deeply influenced by the *salafī* and *wahhābī* currents than the *tajdīdī* or *iṣlāḥī* intellectuals discussed here in relation to pan-Islamism. That said, the *salafīyya* and *wahhābīyya* movements are the subject of a vast scholarly literature, and lie outside the scope of this study.

As a brief note, I must point out that some recent writings have conflated pan-Islamism with these currents of thought, notably Thomas Hegghammer, *Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism Since 1979* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). His definition of pan-Islamism

In this regard, then, Landau is incorrect in his assertion that "[r]ising Islamic fundamentalism comprised an element of pan-Islam,"[87] although it was in many ways a counter-reaction to the very modernization which was embodied in pan-Islamism. Adeeb Khalid sums up best, perhaps, why pan-Islamism could not have been *other* than a modern movement: "Far from being a result of primordial religious affinities, pan-Islamic sympathies were rooted squarely in the modern age, the age of imperial crisis in the Ottoman empire, but also the age of print, which made it possible to imagine 'the Muslim world' as a community for arguably the first time in history."[88] We shall revisit the role of print media later, but the undeniable modernism of pan-Islamist thought is a key lens through which to view the reign of its most famous partisan, Sultan Abdülhamid II.

An Imperial Ideology?

Abdülhamid has long been a controversial figure in Ottoman history, one often viewed as a reactionary by European and Turkish Republican historians alike.[89] More

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as "an ideology based on the view that all Muslims were one people who had a responsibility to help each other in times of crisis," (p. 16) seems to confuse one component of pan-Islamism, affinial unity, with its whole. While pan-Islamism may share this (and institutional unity, in some respects) with other Islamic political ideologies, this is perfectly allowable in Freeden's model, as they exist in differing configurations and alongside different components. That Hegghammer excludes intra-Muslim sectarian violence in the Iraq War from his analysis, while downplaying the theological aspects which distinguish different Islamic political ideologies because "many of the theological descriptors commonly used in the literature on Islamism, such as *salafi*, *wahhabi*, *jihadi salafi* and *takfiri*, do not correspond to discrete and observable patterns of political behaviour among Islamists" (p. 5) seems to wrongly minimize the role of ideology while overemphasizing a specific kind of political action, i.e., violent political action, or terrorism. Equally worrisomely, he seems largely unaware of intellectual developments in pan-Islamism before Rashid Rida, and views pan-Islamist international organizations such as the Muslim World League and Organization of Islamic Conference (see below) as chiefly being creations of the Saudi King Faisal (p. 17), incorrectly Arabo-centricizing the whole enterprise by neglecting the entirety of the Ottoman Empire and South Asia.

[87] Jacob M. Landau, "Pan-Islam," *Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World, Oxford Islamic Studies Online*, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0621.

[88] Adeeb Khalid, "Ottoman Islamism Between the Ümmet and the Nation," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 19 (2001): 198.

[89] Zürcher, *Turkey*, 81.

recently, since the opening of much of the Ottoman archives in 1989, a new wave of historians, primarily Turks, has given the Hamidian period a revisionist reading, finding a more marked effort towards modernization in the Sultan's policies than had previously been thought to be the case, though the assessment of his reign's autocratic nature remains largely unchanged. Chief among these recent histories is Karpat's *The Politicization of Islam*, along with the works of Selim Deringil[90] and a host of mostly younger Turkish scholars.[91] The publication of Abdülhamid's memoirs has likewise aided the historiography of the period.[92] Most recently, Abdülhamid himself has enjoyed something of a popular renaissance among Turkish Islamists.[93]

His embrace of pan-Islamism, originally seen by Europeans as threatening or expansionist and depicted as such in the historiography, is now seen as defensive, an effort to hold together the Ottoman Empire in the face of a host of external pressures.[94] The British Foreign Office, in a surprisingly enlightened post-WWI handbook (sufficiently sensitive to be marked "confidential"), came to a similar conclusion, stating that "[i]t is not probable that Abd al-Hamid ever contemplated leading a confederation of Mohammedan states to war against Christendom; his

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[90] For some of his representative works, see Selim Deringil, "Legitimacy Structures in the Ottoman State: The Reign of Abdülhamid II (1876-1909)," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 23, no. 3 (1991), ———, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998), ———, *Simgeden Millete: II. Abdülhamid'den Mustafa Kemal'e Devlet ve Millet* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007).

[91] These studies have not only revisited the Hamidian period, but the policies of pan-Islamism specifically, as well. A sampling of these studies includes Cezmi Eraslan, *II. Abdülhamid ve İslâm birliği: Osmanlı devleti'nin İslâm siyaseti, 1856-1908* (Istanbul: Ötüken, 1992), A. Merthan Dündar, *Pan-İslâmizm'den Büyük Asyacılığa : Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Japonya ve Orta Asya* (Istanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 2006), İ. Süreyya Sırma, *Bir kaç sahife tarih* (Konya: Selâm Yayınevi, 1986), ———, *II. Abdülhamid'in İslam birliği siyaseti* (Istanbul: Beyan, 1990), Metin Hülagü, *Pan-islamizm Osmanlının son umudu* (Istanbul: Yitik Hazine Yayınları, 2006).

[92] His memoirs have been published in both Turkish and Arabic: Sultan Abdülhamit, *Siyasî Hatıratım (5th ed.)* (Istanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 1987), al-Sultān ʿAbd al-Hamīd al-Thānī, *Mudhakkirātī al-Sīyāsīya, 1891-1908* (Beirūt: Mu'assasat al-Risāla, 1977 (A.H. 1397)).

[93] For a representative light hagiography, see Ūrkhān Muḥammad ʿAlī, *al-Suḷtān 'Abd al-Ḥamīd al-Thānī: Ḥayātuhu wa Aḥdāthu 'Ahdihi* (Istanbul: Dār al-Nīl, 2008).

[94] See, *inter alia*, Yasamee, who argues that pan-Islamism was "an aspect of [Abdülhamid's] domestic rather than of his foreign policy," such was its defensive character. F.A.K. Yasamee, *Ottoman Diplomacy: Abdülhamid II and the Great Powers* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1996), 30.

endeavours to enter into friendly relations with European Powers, especially with Germany, render this unlikely. Still, by representing himself as the natural champion of Moslems who were subject to Christian Governments, he hoped to render himself formidable to those Governments…"[95] The only aggressive aspect of Abdülhamid's pan-Islamism was its implied ability to stir up the Muslim populations living under European colonial rule, and thus act as a deterrent to interference in Ottoman affairs.[96] As such, much more effort was expended on propaganda than any other pan-Islamic policy in the Hamidian period, with the notable exception of the construction of the Hijaz railway, which not only served to bind the Empire together and facilitate the hajj, but also drew support from Muslims as far away as India (on which see below), becoming an instantiation of shared pan-Islamic sentiment.[97] Centralization efforts

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[95] *Handbooks Prepared Under the Direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office, No. 96b, The Pan-Islamic Movement*, 56. This handbook, published in Dec. 1918, is bound together as a single booklet with *No. 96a, The Rise of Islam and the Caliphate*, a general history of Islam, dated Jan. 1919. No author is given. Copies of this document can be consulted at the British Library and at Balliol College, Oxford. It offers a more sensible assessment of pan-Islamism than much contemporaneous European literature; downplaying the rather lurid British fears of pan-Islamism, it later states that "though the Oriental press greatly exaggerated the alarm which the word [pan-Islamism] excited in Europe, there is no doubt that much was attributed to Pan-Islamism that was not really connected with it." (p. 63)

[96] See Jacob M. Landau, "Efforts Towards the Formation of Islamic Unity," in *The Turks, Vol. 4: Ottomans*, ed. Hasan Celâl Güzel, C. Cem Oğuz, and Osman Karatay (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Publications, 2002), 294. Also see Abdülhamid's own words, wherein he states that "[e]veryone knows that a word from the caliph, the head of the Muslims…would suffice to inflict a great harm to the English authority in India." Cited in: Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, 233-34. Likewise, on pan-Islamic policies more generally, see Deringil, *Simgeden Millete*, 19-51. A particularly good analysis of British fears of pan-Islamism is John Ferris, "'The Internationalism of Islam': The British Perception of a Muslim Menace, 1840-1951," *Intelligence and National Security* 24, no. 1 (2009). Likewise, British fear of the pan-Islamic implications of the Hajj is discussed in Michael Christopher Low, "Empire and the Hajj: Pilgrims, Plagues, and Pan-Islam Under British Surveillance, 1865-1908," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 40, no. 2 (2008). A fuller discussion of the topic can be found in Low's M.A. thesis: ———, "Empire of the Hajj: Pilgrims, Plagues, and Pan-Islam Under British Surveillance, 1865-1926" (Georgia State University, 2007).

[97] On the railway, see Jacob M. Landau, *The Hejaz Railway and the Muslim Pilgrimage: A Case of Ottoman Political Propaganda* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1971), William Ochsenwald, *The Hijaz Railroad* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1980), James Nicholson, *The Hejaz Railway* (London: Stacey International, 2005), Murat Özyüksel, *Hicaz Demiryolu* (Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 2000), Metin Hülagü, *Bir umudun inşası Hicaz Demiryolu* (Istanbul: Yitik Hazine Yayınları, 2008). See also Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, 253-55. The Hejaz Railway has recently become something of a renewed symbol of interest in the Turkish Islamist community and abroad; see Metin Hülagü, *The Hejaz Railway: The Construction of a New Hope* (New York: Blue Dome Press, 2010). This is a translation of Hülagü's 2008 book, which appears to have been undertaken by a Fethullaci publishing house (or, at least, that is where the present author purchased a copy).

under Abdülhamid likewise took place in a context of fostering Muslim unity, in addition to their more despotic implications.[98] We can say, then, that the Hamidian period represented the high point of one notion of institutional unity, with support for political unity under Caliphal command embodying many early pan-Islamic hopes, though policy tended to favor implementations of affinial unity.

Concrete efforts at *taqrīb*, while generally under-emphasized in the history of the period, were nonetheless a component of Hamidian policy. Rapprochement with the Qajars in particular was an ongoing concern. In response to a request from Abū al-Ḥasan Mīrzā "Shaikh al-Ra'īs" Qājār, a Qajar prince, pan-Islamist, and Baha'i resident in Istanbul, Abdülhamid undertook in 1886 several policies to improve Ottoman-Iranian relations and bolster the Sultan's standing among the Shi'a, particularly in Iraq. These steps included a ban on publications which insulted the Shi'a; ending discriminatory measures against Shi'i subjects of the Porte; respecting Shi'i pilgrims to the *'atabāt* (Shi'i shrines) of Iraq; and sending gifts to the shrines as a sign of respect.[99] Abdülhamid also made repairs to the *türbe*s (tombs) of several members of the Prophet's family, rather than allowing the Iranian Shah to do so.[100] That said, many of these efforts occurred in the context of Ottoman-Iranian contestation over the loyalties of Iraqi Shi'a[101], and in some cases Ottoman efforts towards Sunnification of the population[102], meaning that Hamidian policies of *taqrīb* were not unproblematized, nor were they divorced from more banal diplomatic and

[98] Stephen Duguid, "The Politics of Unity: Hamidian Policy in Eastern Anatolia," *Middle Eastern Studies* 9, no. 2 (1973).
[99] Mehrdad Kia, "Pan-Islamism in Late Nineteenth-Century Iran," *Middle Eastern Studies* 32, no. 1 (1996): 41. For further discussion of Shaikh al-Ra'īs, see below.
[100] Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, 200.
[101] Selim Deringil, "The Struggle Against Shiism in Hamidian Iraq: A Study in Ottoman Counter-Propaganda," *Die Welt des Islams* 30, no. 1-4 (1990).
[102] Gökhan Çetinsaya, "The Caliph and Mujtahids: Ottoman Policy Towards the Shiite Community of Iraq in the Late Nineteenth Century," *Middle Eastern Studies* 41, no. 4 (2005), ———, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890-1908* (London: Routledge, 2006), 99-126.

political interests. Nonetheless, Abdülhamid's memoirs suggest that his personal commitment to *taqrīb*, beyond the needs of state expediency, was genuine.[103]

Similarly, the Hamidian court was not undivided over such issues as reform, though there was a general consensus over the Caliphate and pan-Islamic policy. Thus, a staunch conservative such as Yūsuf al-Nabhānī could simultaneously be an enthusiastic supporter of the Ottoman Caliphate, a vicious opponent of any policies containing a whiff of modernity, particularly in education, and a bitter enemy of Afghānī, ʿAbdūh, and Riḍā.[104] Likewise, the rivalry between Shaykh Abū al-Hudā al-Ṣayyādī[105], Abdülhamid's chief religious advisor and a prominent courtier, and ʿIzzet al-ʿĀbid[106], a confidant whom Abdülhamid would appoint to manage the construction of the Hijaz railway, did not impact on the Sultan's pan-Islamic efforts.

Besides propagandizing, Abdülhamid's main ongoing effort to bolster his credentials as Caliph and pan-Islamic leader focused on the Muslims of Russia.[107] It was in the Turcophone provinces of Russia that pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism, one of the other competing ideological systems of the era (along with Ottomanism), would find themselves in such a symbiotic existence that Jacob Landau has described

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[103] At one point, he approvingly quotes Afghānī on uniting the Sunna and Shi'a, stating that achieving this would be "a great accomplishment for Islam." See his thoughts on "The Caliph and the Shi'a," al-Thānī, *Mudhakkirātī al-Sīyāsīya, 1891-1908*, 175-76.

[104] Amal Ghazal, "Sufism, Ijtihād and Modernity, Yūsuf al-Nabhānī in the Age of ʿAbd al-Hamīd II," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 19 (2001): 264-71 in particular. It is of some interest that his grandson, Taqī al-Dīn al-Nabhānī, would later go on to become one of the founders of Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr. Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamental Quest*, passim.

[105] On whom, see B. Abu-Manneh, "Sultan Abdulhamid II and Shaikh Abulhuda Al-Sayyadi," *Middle Eastern Studies* 15, no. 2 (1979), Thomas Eich, "The Forgotten Salafī - Abūl-Hudā as-Sayyādī," *Die Welt des Islams* 43, no. 1 (2003), Itzchak Weismann, "Abū l-Hudā l-Sayyādī and the Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism," *Arabica* 54, no. 4 (2007). Al-Ṣayyādī was also involved in the machinations of certain pan-Islamist activists. For a colorful description of one such character active in manipulating French fears of pan-Islamism in North Africa, see Caesar E. Farah, "Khwalddyah Salah: Spy, Patriot and Pan-Islamist," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 18 (2000).

[106] For his biography, see Caesar E. Farah, "Arab Supporters of Sultan Abdülhamid II: ʿIzzet al-ʿĀbid," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 15 (1997).

[107] Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, 276-307, Deringil, *Simgeden Millete*, 249-61.

them as "two distinct but intertwining systems of policy."[108] Another scholar has even written of "Panturkism – the unity of all Muslims," highlighting the unique character of the movement, in that in Russia "the two movements [pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism] were complementary and not opposed to one another as they were in the Ottoman Empire."[109] These ideas would both find fertile intellectual ground in Turcophone Russia and Central Asia.

The Hamidian period marks the most concrete instantiation of pan-Islamism in practice, and serves as a key guide to our understanding of the ideology and its componential analysis. This only serves as a starting point, however, as the dissemination of pan-Islamism would continue long after Abdülhamid had left the Yildiz Palace.

Messengers

Although pan-Islamism came to be identified most strongly with the person of Abdülhamid II, he did not create it *ex nihilo*. Perhaps more than any other individual, the figure of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī[110] (also known as al-Hoseinī[111] or Assadābādī),

[108] Jacob M. Landau, "Pan-Islam and Pan-Turkism During the Final Years of the Ottoman Empire: Some Considerations," in *Union Européenne Des Arabisants et Islamisants - 10th Congress, Edinburgh, 9-16 September, 1980: Proceedings*, ed. Robert Hillenbrand (Edinburgh: 1982), 43. See also ———, *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation* (London: Hurst and Company, 1995).
[109] Alexandre Bennigsen, "Panturkism and Panislamism in History and Today," *Central Asian Survey* 3, no. 3 (1984): 40. This is perhaps somewhat overstated, given the complementarity of nationalism with pan-Islamism throughout the Muslim world, even in the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, Zürcher has shown how the linking of pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic discourse persisted in Anatolia, even in the post-WWI period. Erik Jan Zürcher, "The Vocabulary of Muslim Nationalism," *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, no. 137 (1999).
[110] For a brief treatment of his activities, see Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 13-21. The definitive account of his life remains Keddie, *Sayyid Jamāl ad-Dīn "al-Afghānī"*. For a treatment of his writings, see also Nikki R. Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamāl ad-Dīn "al-Afghānī"* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). His work with ʿAbdūh is the subject of another book, Elie Kedourie, *Afghani and 'Abduh: an Essay on Religious Unbelief and Political Activism in Modern Islam* (London: Frank Cass, 1966). These writings barely scratch the surface of the extant literature on Afghānī, but they provide a good starting point.

pan-Islamist *par excellence*, stands out, not only in terms of his prominence, but for his role in recruiting and inspiring numerous other pan-Islamic activists across the entirety of the Muslim world.[112] Though perhaps best known to students of Islamic modernism for his work with ʿAbdūh on the newspaper *al-ʿUrwa al-Wuthqā*[113], which was tremendously influential despite its short press run of 18 issues from March to October 1884[114], his influence on pan-Islamist thought was even more marked. His first interest in pan-Islamism is evident in an appeal to the Ottoman Sultan, which dates from either 1871, 1877/78, or 1885[115]; in any case, his subsequent travels throughout India, Central Asia, Iran, and Russia would gain him notoriety as a speaker, arguing for resistance to foreign domination and preaching Muslim unity wherever he went, though often with an eye towards local nationalisms.[116] His ideas would evolve, however, taking final form in an 1892 letter to the Sultan, in which he envisions a bloc made up of the Ottoman Empire, Afghanistan, and Persia, which would resist European machinations and act as a "stepping-stone towards attracting to a Pan-Islamic union the Muslims in India and probably in Egypt…to be headed by the Ottoman Empire."[117] His letter would earn him an invitation to the Hamidian court in

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[111] This seems to be a largely Iranian habit: see, for example, Sadr Vāseqī, *Sayyed Jamāl al-Dīn Hoseinī: Pāyeh-gozār-e nahzathā-ye Eslāmī* (Tehran: Sharekat-e Sehāmī-ye Enteshār, 1970 (A.H.I. 1348)).

[112] This aspect of his activities will receive greater treatment below, in the discussion on the role of the press in transmitting pan-Islamist ideas.

[113] Reprints of this critical publication can be surprisingly difficult to find. One recent edition is al-Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn al-Ḥuseynī al-Afghānī and Muḥammad ʿAbdūh (edited by Sayyid Hādī Khusrū Shāhī), *al-ʿUrwa al-Wuthqā* (al-Qāhira: Maktabat al-Shurūq al-Dūwalīya, 2002 (A.H. 1423)).

[114] Keddie, *Sayyid Jamāl ad-Dīn "al-Afghānī"*, 214.

[115] Keddie seems to have shifted her dating of the letter, which she initially placed in 1885: Nikki R. Keddie, "The Pan-Islamic Appeal: Afghani and Abdülhamid II," *Middle Eastern Studies* 3, no. 1 (1966): 54. However, subsequent evidence from Homa Pakdaman's research suggests that it might date from as early as 1871, or possibly 1877/78. Keddie, *Sayyid Jamāl ad-Dīn "al-Afghānī"*, 132-33. This would place it either late in Abdülaziz's reign, or in the early Hamidian period.

[116] Keddie, "Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism," 22-24. On his travels, see ———, *Sayyid Jamāl ad-Dīn "al-Afghānī"*, 143-372. Resistance to foreign domination can be considered an example of institutional unity, relying as it often did on the Caliph as a political and ideational counter to European colonialism.

[117] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 20-21. Note here that this does not envision a unitary state under Caliphal rule, but something akin to a modern alliance system. This bears a resemblance to what Khadduri has elsewhere called "neo-Pan-Islamism," that is, "a desire [among Muslim states] to cooperate as an Islamic bloc within the community of nations," and underscores the phantasmagorical

Istanbul, where he would reside from 1892 until his death in 1897, organizing, among other things, a letter-writing campaign by the Iranian community of the city to various Shiʿi *'ulamā'*, attempting to persuade them to support Abdülhamid's pan-Islamic aims.[118]

Afghānī was not alone at this time in his advocacy of pan-Islamism; elsewhere in the capital, numerous Turkish thinkers were arguing along similar lines. One of the earliest was Namık Kemal, who can claim to be one of the earliest writers to use the term *İttihad-ı İslam* in an eponymous 1872 article in the Istanbul daily newspaper *İbret*.[119] As Landau notes, however, his conception of pan-Islamism was more cultural than political (hence, emphasizing affinial unity more than institutional unity), though it likewise emphasized resisting European domination. As compared to other more martially-minded writers, including those in the newspaper *Basiret*,[120] Kemal argued that "to find a principle of Islamic union in the 'pages of books' was a better way of going about this task than by the use of the sword."[121] A contemporary

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nature of Western writings which dreamed of an Islamic polity directed by Caliphal fiat from Istanbul. Majid Khadduri, "The Islamic Theory of International Relations and Its Contemporary Relevance," in *Islam and International Relations*, ed. J. Harris Proctor (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), 36. It also represents the most encompassing notion of institutional unity put forward by Afghānī.

[118] Keddie, "The Pan-Islamic Appeal," 64, Azmi Özcan, "Jamaladdin Afghani's Honorable Confinement in Istanbul and Iran's Demands for His Extradition," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları/ The Journal of Ottoman Studies* 15 (1995): 288. As Özcan notes, Afghānī's tenure in Istanbul was not entirely voluntary, though Abdülhamid's memoirs (see 288n10), make evident that the Sultan was initially quite hopeful that Afghānī's efforts would do a great deal to foster Islamic unity, contra Keddie's contention that "the Sultan merely had Afghani…write letters."

[119] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 24-25.

[120] The *Basiret* would serve as an important forum for pan-Islamist ideas, particularly in an 1872 debate in which it was "explicitly proposed that a policy of *İttihad-ı İslam* should be adopted against the European expansionist ideologies of Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism." Letters in response argued for distributing pamphlets during the Hajj to create favorable public opinion for such a policy in the Muslim world, while "others broadened the scope of the unity to include the Shiis for they were experienced in missionary activities [and could help propagandize among Muslims the world over]." Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 35-36. That such initiatives at Sunna-Shi'a rapprochement seem to have sprung up spontaneously rather than being directed from above is interesting evidence of the constitutive role of *taqrīb* in pan-Islamist thought, even in in the pre-Hamidian period.

[121] Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, 61n114. On Kemal's life and thought more generally, see Ibid., 283-336. Mardin also points out a critical point raised by Kemal, that "the new advances in communications provided the *means* of cementing such national clusters [i.e., strengthening ties between Egypt, Tunis, and the Ottoman Empire]." As Kemal wrote in *İbret*: "Twenty years ago, the fact that there were Moslems in Kaşgar was not known. Now, public opinion

of Kemal's, Süleyman Hasbi, presented to Abdülhamid a "Treatise about Union for the Happiness of the Islamic Millet," arguing for *ittihad*, obedience to the Caliph, and the use of the Hajj in unifying Muslims. This particular manuscript was written as early as 1873, only slightly post-dating Kemal's *İbret* article.[122]

Turkish thought, of course, was not confined to the imperial capital. The Turkic populations of central Asia, particularly the Volga and Crimean Tatars, were themselves home to several key figures in the history and dissemination of pan-Islamism. Like their Arab and Ottoman contemporaries, these writers and thinkers utilized the mass media, in the form of newspapers, to spread their ideas throughout the Turcophone world. Among the most prominent of these publisher/ideologists was Ismail Gasprinskiy (Gaspralı, sometimes spelled Gasparali by Western writers), a Crimean Tatar and creator of the journal *Tercüman*, which, in addition to acting as a leading pan-Islamist organ among the Tatars, was also written in a newly-created dialectal *lingua franca* of Turkish, to facilitate communication between Turkic groups everywhere.[123] Contemporaneously, and not far away, Ahmed Ağaoğlu (Agayev in Russian) in Azerbaijan, drawing on Afghānī's ideas, was arguing in the press for the

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tries to obtain union with them. This inclination resembles an overpowering flood which will not be stopped by any obstacle placed in its way." Ibid., 60n110. His understanding of the key role to be played by the press, mass media, and new media of the time was prescient, and echoes contemporary studies of transnational Islam, and their focus on the role of communications technology. ———, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*.

[122] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 24. Although Landau dates the text to 1881, he states in footnote 79 that the manuscript is dated 23 Feb. 1873, without explaining the inconsistency of these dates. Concomitantly, a pamphlet from (presumably) 1873 by the civil servant Esad Efendi, entitled *İttihad-ı İslam*, was reportedly translated into Arabic and distributed during the Hajj, marking one of the first uses of the pilgrimage as an occasion to propagandize and agitate for pan-Islamism. Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 37. Whether he was familiar with Hasbi's ideas or simply part of the same *zeitgeist* is unknown.

Relatedly, the first instance of the term *taqrīb* is attributed by Rainer Brunner to sometime after the 1884 founding of an ecumenical society by ʿAbdūh and others in Beirut; *ittiḥād* and *waḥda* were the preferred terms of pan-Islamists before then. Rainer Brunner, *Islamic Ecumenism in the 20th Century: The Azhar and Shiism Between Rapprochement and Restraint* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 38-9.

[123] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 146-50.

establishment of a pan-Islamic union to be headed, interestingly, by Iran, though he would later change his mind and instead favor Ottoman leadership.[124]

Another Tatar and student of Afghānī's in Istanbul, Abdürreşid İbrahim (Ibragimov), would follow an even more interesting path. Though his writing and publishing activities were prodigious[125], most notably including the journal *İslâm Dünyası*[126], he would imitate his teacher, and embark on a series of journeys across the Muslim world, delivering speeches wherever he went and propagandizing pan-Islamism among the Muslims of Russia, in particular.[127] It has thus aptly been said that "[i]n his wanderlust, his political activism, and his anti-colonial stance, he is best seen as a latter-day Afghânî."[128] He would end his life in Japan, where he headed the small Muslim expatriate community, and became deeply involved with that country's pan-Asianist circles in the pre-WWII period.[129]

A bit further from Istanbul were the Bukharans, among whom one Abdurauf Fitrat is of particular note, for his critical appraisals of the Amir of Bukhara, his travelogues, and for his advocacy of political reform and modern education.[130]

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[124] Ibid., 150.
[125] Ibid., 29-30.
[126] Khalid, "Ottoman Islamism," 199.
[127] A very brief outline of his life, though it inexplicably half-Russifies his name, is Mahmud Tahir, "Abdurrashid Ibragim, 1857-1944," *Central Asian Survey* 7, no. 4 (1988).
[128] Khalid, "Ottoman Islamism," 200.
[129] For a recent study of his time in Japan, see Komatsu Hisao, "Muslim Intellectuals and Japan: A Pan-Islamist Mediator, Abdurreshid Ibrahim," in *Intellectuals in the Modern Islamic World: Transmission, Transformation, Communication*, ed. Stéphane A. Dudoignon, Komatsu Hisao, and Kosugi Yasushi (London: Routledge, 2006). See also Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia*, passim. Aydin's is the most comprehensive of the relatively recent field of comparative studies centering on pan-Asianism and pan-Islamism in the twentieth century, particularly after the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, which marked the first defeat of a "European" power by an "Eastern" one. See, e.g., El-Mostafa Rezrazi, "The Moslem World and Japan During the Beginning of the Twentieth Century: Rethinking the Relationship Between Pan-Islamism and Pan-Asianism as an Axis-Center," *Revue d'Histoire Maghrébine/ al-Majalla al-Tārīkhīya al-Maghāribīya* 25, no. 91-92 (1998). Also, a recent M.A. thesis: Sadia Sattar, "Old Friendships: Exploring the Historic Relationship Between Pan-Islamism and Japanese Pan-Asianism" (University of Pittsburgh, 2008). Esenbel also describes Ibrahim's activities in greater detail in a recent article: Selçuk Esenbel, "Japan's Global Claim to Asia and the World of Islam: Transnational Nationalism and World Power, 1900-1945," *American Historical Review* 109, no. 4 (2004).
[130] Khalid, "Pan-Islamism in Practice," 214-16.

Several other Bukharans "appeared in the columns of *Hikmet, Sırat-ı Müstakim* and *Tearüf-ı Müslimin,*" notable pan-Islamist publications of the period.[131]

In addition to the Turcophone writers, Afghānī's most famous student, ʿAbdūh, advocated a more religiously-oriented form of pan-Islamism, in line with his emphasis on education.[132] His student, Rashīd Riḍā, would go on to later publish the tremendously influential *al-Manār*, in which he put forward his own pan-Islamist views, which likewise focused on education.[133]

The Arab press, particularly in its pan-Islamic aspects, did have an extensive existence before *al-Manār*. As early as 1882, Goldziher pointed out the importance of *al-Jawā'ib*, a newspaper edited and published by Aḥmad Fāris al-Shidyāq in Istanbul and subsidized by Abdülhamid as a pan-Islamist organ.[134] In Cairo, ʿAlī Yūsuf published *al-Mu'ayyad*, a similarly influential daily paper which staunchly supported the Ottoman Caliphate and which not only opposed such expansionist moves as Italy's 1911 war in Libya, but also advocated for Sunna-Shi'a rapprochement.[135]

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[131] Ibid., 215.
[132] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 25-26. Cf. also ʿAbdūh's own words to this effect in a letter to *al-Mu'ayyad* in response to Hanotaux: Charles C. Adams, *Islam and Modernism in Egypt* (London: Routledge, 2000 [1933]), 89.
[133] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 125-26. See also the entire first half of: Stéphane A. Dudoignon, Komatsu Hisao, and Kosugi Yasushi, eds., *Intellectuals in the Modern Islamic World: Transmission, Transformation, Communication* (London: Routledge,2006). The first seven chapters are about *al-Manār's* influence across the Muslim world. While one can describe ʿAbdūh's work more as an instantiation of affinial unity, Riḍā's particular interest in *taqrīb* is evident from his writings in *al-Manār*. See Brunner, *Islamic Ecumenism in the 20th Century*, 39-41.
[134] Goldziher, "Muhammadan Public Opinion," 98-99. Also cf. Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 60-62, Lewis, "The Ottoman Empire in the Mid-Nineteenth Century: A Review," 293. Other scholars have taken issue with this characterization, arguing that "there is little concrete evidence [indicating the paper's support for pan-Islamism] when one carefully scrutinizes issues of *al-Jawā'ib,*" and that "*al-Muayyad*, not the *Jawa'ib* of Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq, might be termed the premier Islamic organ influencing Muslim thinking or serving to promote 'Pan-Islamism.'" See, respectively, Farah, "ʿIzzet al-ʿĀbid," 191, Caesar E. Farah, "Reassessing Sultan Abdülhamid II's Islamic Policy," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 14 (1995/96): 204. While *al-Mu'ayyad* may well have been more supportive of pan-Islamism, it was nonetheless different in kind to *al-Jawā'ib,* given the Sultan's backing of the latter paper.
[135] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 124-25.

It would, however, be wrong to assume that the press' role in promoting pan-Islamism did not extend beyond the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire. One writer credits the Afghan paper *Seraj al-Akhbar* with helping to make Kabul "the center of many pan-Islamic activities during and after [WWI]."[136] This paper would enthusiastically support Turkey during the War, as well as the call for *jihād*, and was widely read on the subcontinent, likely in part because its strong support for the Ottomans, and consequently for independence from Britain, dovetailed with the Indian nationalist (and pan-Islamist) currents of the time.[137] That the paper should take a strong pan-Islamist and anti-colonial stance is perhaps unsurprising when one takes into account that its editor since 1912, Mahmud Tarzi, spent in 1896 seven months in close companionship with Afghānī, then in Istanbul, which he would later describe as "equivalent to seventy years of travel."[138]

In addition to *Seraj al-Akhbar*, there appears to have been some sort of popular pan-Islamic press in Afghanistan at that time. A newspaper by the name of *Ettehād-e Eslām*, published in Dari in Kabul, appears to have begun publication around 1300 A.H.I. (1921). A single issue, Year 2 (1302 A.H.I./1923), Number 37, can be found in the British Library[139], and exists in very poor condition (its publisher cannot be ascertained from the existing copy), and, curiously, is bound with a draft curriculum for primary education in Afghanistan, years one through five. Its typesetting is not professional in appearance, and at times appears to border on the handwritten; likewise, its contents are eclectic, though they bear a striking resemblance to other pan-Islamic papers, mostly consisting of stories about Muslims in other parts of the world. Stories in this particular issue include "Turkey and

[136] Senzil K. Nawid, *Religious Response to Social Change in Afghanistan, 1919-29: King Aman-Allah and the Afghan Ulama* (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 1999), 49.
[137] Ibid., 37-38.
[138] Ibid., 45.
[139] Asia, Pacific, and Africa Collection, ORB40/566.

Austria," "A New Railroad in Syria," "Union [presumably, alliance?] of the Germans and the Turks," "A Telephone [Line] from Istanbul to Sofia," "The *jihād* of the Sanusis in Tripoli," "News from Constantinople," and "the Parliament in Angora [Ankara]," among others. A lack of professional editing is evident even from simple linguistic evidence; a single page of the paper, for example, includes the following spellings, all referring to Istanbul: *Istānbūl, Istāmbūl, Islāmbūl, Qanṣtaṇtinīya.* By appearances, the publisher seems to have received news items via several correspondents (each article is bylined), and simply aggregated and reproduced them, sans editing. If this is the case, this hitherto-obscure newspaper is an interesting piece of primary evidence for popular pan-Islamism in interwar Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, on the subcontinent, a thriving press in English, Urdu, and Persian supported the Ottomans and pan-Islamism more generally. This included *al-Hilāl, Zamīndār, Comrade, Hamdard, The Moslem Chronicle,* and *Ḥabl ol-Matīn*, which were primarily published in Calcutta, Lahore, and Delhi.[140] This fluidity of language was accompanied by a fluidity of borders, as Indian pan-Islamists, notably Muhammad Barakatullah, agitated against Britain in Afghanistan.[141] Indian exiles, particularly those living in Britain, would also leave their mark on pan-Islamism. Among these is Mushir Husain Kidwai, a mercurial figure who variously served as secretary of the "Pan-Islam" society in London, one of the founders of the *Khuddām-i Ka'ba*, and author of a book entitled "Pan-Islamism," which drew notice in the West in large part because, unlike other key texts, it was written in English, for a European audience.[142] One section of this book in particular is of note: in an offhand remark on converts to Islam in the West, Kidwai argues that the "spread of Islam in America has

[140] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 192-93.
[141] Ibid., 195-96, Khalid, "Pan-Islamism in Practice," 205. Like İbrahim, Barakatullah would make his way to Japan, which was in the early 20th century host to an interesting congerie of pan-Asianist and anti-Western activists and intellectuals. See Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia*, passim.
[142] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 49-50, 198-201.

been even greater than in England if we consider Babism and Behaism as sects of Islam."[143] This is telling of pan-Islamist attitudes towards the old problem of the *fitna* in light of the greater problem of European domination, and represents an instance of *taqrīb in extrema*.

Perhaps less studied than any other group of pan-Islamists, however, are the Iranians. This is a rather substantial lacuna in the literature, given the emphasis placed by the Ottomans on rapprochement with Iran during the Hamidian period. While the single most notable Iranian pan-Islamist other than Afghānī, Abū al-Ḥasan Mīrzā "Shaikh al-Ra'īs" Qājār, has been mentioned above, he is worth examining in some detail.[144] First, his publication of a book entitled *Ettehād-e Eslām*, written in Persian and published in Bombay in 1894, makes him one of the most prominent pan-Islamists to hail from Iran.[145] He also reportedly edited a newspaper of the same name in Istanbul briefly in 1886, after his successful petition to the Sultan, as discussed earlier.[146] This was not the only Persian paper to be published in Istanbul, as the city was home to a sizable Iranian community, some of whose members would join the circle around Afghānī.[147] There were also pan-Islamists inside of Iran proper, mostly advocates of an inter-state alliance of Iran, Afghanistan, and the Ottoman Empire against Western imperialism, including Mīrzā Yūsef Khān Mostashar al-Dowle and Tālibov-e Tabrīzī, as well as some opposed to the Shah and strongly

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[143] Mushir Hosain Kidwai, *Pan-Islamism* (London: Lusac and Co., 1908), 52.
[144] The only scholar to have studied him extensively in recent years is Juan Cole: Juan R.I. Cole, "The Provincial Politics of Heresy and Reform in Qajar Iran: Shaykh al-Rais in Shiraz, 1895-1902," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 22, no. 1/2 (2002), ———, "Shaikh al-Ra'is and Sultan Abdülhamid II: The Iranian Dimension of Pan-Islam," in *Histories of the Modern Middle East: New Directions*, ed. Israel Gershoni, Hakan Erdem, and Ursula Woköck (London: Lynne Rienner, 2002), ———, "Autobiography and Silence: The Early Career of Shaykh al-Ra'is Qajar," in *Iran im 19. Jahrhundert und die Entstehung der Baha'i-Religion*, ed. Johann Christoph Bürgel and Isabel Schayani (Zürich: Georg Olms Verlag, 1998).
[145] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 31-32.
[146] Cole, "Shaikh al-Ra'is and Sultan Abdülhamid II," 171.
[147] In regards to the Iranian press of Istanbul and the Iranian community more generally, see Anja Pistor-Hatam, "The Persian Newspaper Akhtar as a Transmitter of Ottoman Political Ideas," in *Les Iraniens d'Istanbul*, ed. T. Zarcone and F. Zarinebaf-Shahr (Paris: IFÉA/IFRI, 1993).

supportive of the Ottoman Sultan, such as Mīrzā Malkām Khān and Mīrzā Āghā Khān Kermānī.[148] Kermānī, along with his friend Sheikh Ahmad Rūhī, would become a part of Afghānī's circle in Istanbul, as would Shaikh al-Ra'īs upon his return to the city late in Afghānī's life. What these three men had in common, in addition to pan-Islamism, was their religious heterodoxy; Kermānī and Rūhī were Azali Babis, while Shaikh al-Ra'īs was a Baha'i.[149] Along with the otherwise-minded Afghānī, these men would prove to be part of a curious pattern among pan-Islamists; namely, in attracting modernist intellectuals, pan-Islamism would inevitably accrue a sizable number of adherents to modernizing, albeit heterodox, sects, including Babis and Baha'is. Their embrace by the likes of Kidwai suggests an awareness of this tendency, at least among the ideological leadership of the movement, and an acceptance of it which belies interpretations of pan-Islamism as reactionary, or related to "Islamic fundamentalisms" which at their core reject every tenet of modernity. Afghānī's circle was also in close contact with a group of sympathizers in Tehran, who had organized expressly for that purpose.[150] Among its members were Sheykh Hādī Najmābādī, Mīrzā Hādī Dowlatābādī, and Mohammad Alī Sayyāh Mahallātī.[151] They were not alone in their efforts; the constitutionalist *'ulamā* Ākhūnd Mollā Mohammad Kāzem Khorāsānī and Sheykh ʿAbd Allāh Māzandarānī, residing in Iraq, favored uniting the Ottomans and the Persians and opposed Mohammad Ali Shah, particularly for his tolerance of a Russian troop presence in Iran, going so far as to write to the Sultan and ask for his aid in removing the Shah. This was somewhat

[148] Kia, "Pan-Islamism in Late Nineteenth-Century Iran," 34-35. This would fit in with the general pattern of early pan-Islamists emphasizing institutional unity over pan-Islamism's other aspects, and only later shifting their emphasis towards affinial unity, and *taqrīb*
[149] Nikki R. Keddie, "Religion and Irreligion in Early Iranian Nationalism," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 4, no. 3 (1962).
[150] Abdul-Hadi Hairi, *Shī'īsm and Constitutionalism in Iran: A Study of the Role Played by the Persian Residents of Iraq in Iranian Politics* (Leiden: Brill, 1977), 73.
[151] Yahyā Dowlatābādī, *Hayāt-e Yahyā*, vol. 1 (Tehrān: Enteshārāt-e Attār, 1362 (1983)), 124.

controversial, in that they referred to the Sultan as *amīr al-mu'minīn*, a highly unusual act for Shi'i clergy, to say the least.[152]

A few decades later, the Jangalī movement (1914-21) of Mīrzā Kūchek Khān would develop its own ties to pan-Islamism. One writer describes Kūchek Khān's consultations with pan-Islamists in Tehran, and mentions several political and clerical notables in this number, including "Sayyed Hasan Modarres, Sayyed Mohammad Rezā Mosāvāt, Sayyed Mohammad Komre'ī, Soleymān Mohsen Eskandarī, Sayyed Yahyā Nadāmānī, and Mīrzā Tāher Tankābanī."[153] Kūchek Khān would likewise be a part of the Council of Islamic Unity (*hey'at-e ettehād-e eslām*), composed of twenty-seven clerics and men of politics, which was charged with making decisions for the Jangalī movement.[154] In their official organ, *Rūznāme-ye Jangal*, they explained their purpose: "Yes, in the name of Islamic unity we rose and we are responsible to this community, but it must be known that we are partisans of Islamic unity, in simple terms: 'verily, the believers are a brotherhood[155]'; in other words, at this time we are saying that difference of language [or outlook] and divisions among the Muslims [people of Islam, *eslāmīyān*] have weakened the Muslims at the hands of a common enemy, and the Muslims must not engage in fratricide, nor, in the name of sectarianism kill each other and thereby give advantage to the common enemy."[156] One would be hard-pressed to find a clearer expression of the centrality of *taqrīb* in the face of an external threat. It should be noted that the Jangalī movement has, in

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[152] Hairi, *Shī'īsm and Constitutionalism*, 80-81, 88-89.
[153] Fathallāh Keshāvarz, *Nahzat-e Jangal va Ettehād-e Eslām: Esnād-e Mahramāne va Gozāresh-hā* (Tehrān: Enteshārāt-e Sāzemān-e Esnād-e Melli-ye Irān, 1992), xxiv. While Aghaie rightly notes that we have to be aware of the political implications of the publication of such collections of historical documents and the agendas they may be intended to advance, this collection nonetheless provides valuable evidence for our study. Kamran Scot Aghaie, "Islamist Historiography in Post-Revolutionary Iran," in *Iran in the 20th Century: Historiography and Political Culture*, ed. Touraj Atabaki (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 235.
[154] Keshāvarz, *Nahzat-e Jangal*, xxiv.
[155] The text in the original is the Arabic, *innamā al-mu'minūn ukhuwwa*, Q 49:10.
[156] Keshāvarz, *Nahzat-e Jangal*, xxiv.

recent writings, been portrayed as something of a harbinger of the Islamic Republic, with Mīrzā Kūchek Khān and his followers portrayed as exemplars of Islamic unity and resistance to imperialism.[157]

Pan-Islamism crops up again later, during the Pahlavi era, where Frye notes that the supporters of Ayatollah Kāshānī

> are definitely favorable to pan-Islam and have contacts with the *Ikhwān al-Muslimīn* in Egypt and other groups in the Islamic world. They emphasize the common features of Sunnī and Shīʿa Islam rather than the differences, and they definitely reject the extreme Iranian nationalists who even exalt Zoroastrianism…over Islam. […They] believe that they should promote a pan-Islamic movement in which Iran will find its manifest destiny as a leader. This and not an alliance (cultural as well as social and political) with the West is Kāshānī's aim.[158]

In this, one hears the first footsteps of the Islamic Revolution which would sweep over Iran twenty-six years later. While the press played less of a role inside of Iran than in other parts of the Muslim world in the spread of pan-Islamic ideas, there was without a doubt indigenous support for pan-Islamism, even through the Pahlavi era.

The press in various Muslim countries, then, whether subsidized by the Porte or not, demonstrated a marked trend in support of pan-Islamism, often centering on the Ottoman Caliphate. The widespread popularity of these ideas, and their spread across a variety of locales and in different languages underscores the key role of the new print media in their transmission and diffusion throughout the Muslim world. Equally so, their diversity and dispersion highlight that pan-Islamism, far from being a centrally-controlled plot of the Sultan, was a widespread and deeply popular movement. As Adeeb Khalid has pointed out, even the very names of these

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[157] This situates the Jangalīs in a teleological unfolding of Iranian history, through imperialism, suffering, and redemption in the form of the Islamic Republic. A particularly hagiographical account of the Jangalī movement is Sayyed Mohammad Taqī Mīr-Abūlqāsemī, *Doktūr Heshmat va Andīshe-ye Ettehād-e Eslām dar Jonbash-e Jangal* (Tehrān: Nashr-e Nedā, 1378 [1999]).
[158] Richard N. Frye, "Notes on Religion in Iran Today," *Die Welt des Islams* 2, no. 4 (1953): 263.

publications, such as *İslâm Dünyası* (World of Islam) or *Tearüf-ı Müslimin* (Introducing Muslims), were indicative of an awareness as to the novelty of the concept of a unified "Muslim world," or a "global consciousness" on the part of Muslim elites.[159] The press, in a very real sense, enabled the politicization of the Muslim community:

> The concept of a universal *ummah/ümmet* might have existed as long as Islam, but the *ümmet* had never been imagined as a political or a geographic entity until the late nineteenth century, when such a move became possible, thanks largely to print…It now became possible to imagine a worldwide community of Muslims in new ways. It was a community that existed together on a single planet with other communities, but one which also faced a common threat from an expansionist Europe. *İttihad-ı İslâm* was the strategy to mobilize this newfound community for political purposes, but it presupposed this new vision of the world.[160]

Abdülhamid, though he fostered and used the press for his own aims, did not create this new public sphere, nor could he ultimately control it.[161] That pan-Islamism survived his reign and the end of the Caliphate is further evidence of its independent nature, and its longevity as an intellectual and political movement.

It is useful here to return to Khalid's earlier distinction between "state pan-Islam" and "public pan-Islam," which underscores the ways in which the pan-Islamic *Tendenz* or sentiment was understood and used. Farah argues, in line with numerous other scholars, that "Abdülhamid preferred to use the sword of Islam, like the sword of Damocles, to [frighten] and intimidate his enemies, more specifically to scare off the vultures of imperial Christendom, rather than to combat them when his military

[159] Khalid, "Ottoman Islamism," 202.
[160] Ibid.
[161] Yavuz has said much the same: "…although the sultan welcomed and made use of the developing transnational Islamic consciousness, it was not a development resulting from his own political actions. Rather, the Muslims themselves constructed transnational Islamic consciousness as a reaction to the common social, economic and political experiences under colonial oppression, its construction being facilitated by the same technological advances that facilitated Europe's greatly increased penetration of the Muslim world." M. Hakan Yavuz, "The Patterns of Political Islamic Identity: Dynamics of National and Transnational Loyalties and Identities," *Central Asian Survey* 14, no. 3 (1995): 359.

power was far from adequate for the task."[162] This use is closely tied to how Europeans perceived pan-Islamism (Khalid's first category), and underscores its defensive nature, as a way of harnessing colonial fears to deter European encroachment. In this sense, it was a "state pan-Islam" focusing on preserving the territorial interests of the Ottomans, though again, its nature was primarily defensive, not expansionist or offensive; indeed, it would have been difficult to harness pan-Islamic sentiment to such ends, as the failed *jihād* of WWI would prove. By contrast, "public pan-Islam" existed amongst the mass of ordinary Muslims, and constituted "so-called Pan-Islamism in its more realistic form, a reaction of angered Muslims, sometimes violent, against unpopular colonial policies, as well as resistance to colonial attempts to sublimate their Islamism, culturally and politically."[163] Though the two types overlapped to an extent, the inherent tensions between a popular form of politics and its counterpart on the international level, controlled by the organs of the state, ultimately explain their divergence and the failure of Hamidian policy to have a marked impact, except in a defensive manner. The new Muslim public sphere[164] as instantiated in the press[165], while greatly bolstering pan-Islamism the world over, ultimately could not be controlled or shaped by extant political interests, and marks perhaps the first modern political movement in the Muslim world.

Though the focus of this section has been on the press as a salient mechanism for disseminating pan-Islamic sentiment, numerous other emissaries from around the Islamic world passed through Istanbul, then the center of global pan-Islamic

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[162] Farah, "Reassessing Sultan Abdülhamid II's Islamic Policy," 192.
[163] Ibid.: 203.
[164] In this regard, see Armando Salvatore, "The Genesis and Evolution of 'Islamic Publicness' Under Global Constraints," in *Islam and Globalization: Critical Concepts in Islamic Studies, Volume I - Culture and Identity*, ed. Shahram Akbarzadeh (London: Routledge, 2006).
[165] On the role of the press in spurring the development of pan-Islamic consciousness, see also Francis Robinson, "Technology and Religious Change: Islam and the Impact of Print," *Modern Asian Studies* 27, no. 1 (1993): 243-44.

activity.[166] Landau alone documents such emissaries traveling to or from "Russia, Iran, Afghanistan, Central Asia, India, China, the Malay Archipelago, the Dutch Indies, and particularly Java, Japan, the Philippines…and, naturally, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, and Arabia."[167] These were among the first developments in a new transnational Muslim network, one which has only grown in scope and density since the early twentieth century, and which will be discussed in greater detail below.[168]

Finally, it is also worth acknowledging that this narrative has differed from that traditionally given; that is, a much greater emphasis has been placed on Turcophone and non-Arab thinkers more generally, while discussions of pan-Islamism, and Islamic modernism more broadly, often take an Arabo-centric point of view.[169] This tendency has not gone unnoticed; to wit: "Ottoman Islamists occupy a black hole in the historiography of modern Muslim thought…Looking at the literature on Muslim modernism, one might be forgiven for believing that the Ottoman Empire did not even exist, so complete is the absence of Ottoman debates from the literature."[170] This discussion has been, in part, an attempt to re-center the focus of our study on Ottoman Turkey, the Indian subcontinent, and the Iranian plateau, where so much of the early pan-Islamist movement took root and developed.

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[166] cf. Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 68-72.
[167] Ibid., 65-66. His research since *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, however, would indicate a continued concern with the role of the press, as well as popular organizations, in the dissemination of pan-Islamist ideology. See, for example, Jacob M. Landau, "Al-Ahibba: A Pan-Islamic Journal in Lahore," in *Law, Christianity and Modernism in Islamic Society*, ed. U. Vermeulen and J.M.F. Van Reeth (Leuven: Uitgeverij Peeters, 1998), ———, "Documents on Pan-Islamic Activity in France Near the End of the Ottoman Empire," *Die Welt des Islams* 48, no. 1 (2008).
[168] For one early instance, describing the network of Shakib Arslan and his links to Afghānī and *al-Manār*, see Raja Adal, "Constructing Transnational Islam: The East-West Network of Shakib Arslan," in *Intellectuals in the Modern Islamic World: Transmission, Transformation, Communication*, ed. Stéphane A. Dudoignon, Komatsu Hisao, and Kosugi Yasushi (London: Routledge, 2006).
[169] See, *inter alia*, Haifaa Jawad, "Pan-Islamism in the Middle East: Prospects and Future," *Islamic Quarterly* 37, no. 3 (1993), Abdullah M. Sindi, "King Faisal and Pan-Islamism," in *King Faisal and the Modernisation of Saudi Arabia*, ed. Willard A. Beling (London: Croon Helm, 1980).
[170] Khalid, "Ottoman Islamism," 198.

With the deposition of Abdülhamid in 1909, pan-Islamism played a less prominent role in Turkish thought and foreign policy until 1914, when the Ottoman Empire entered World War I as an ally of Germany, and on November 11th issued a proclamation of *jihād* in an attempt to sacralize Ottoman participation in the conflict and leverage pan-Islamic sentiment into concrete action, as directed by the state.[171] These efforts aimed to stir up revolt among the Muslims in the European powers' colonial holdings, a particular concern to Britain in regards to India, but Ottoman and German propaganda throughout the war was to little effect.[172] There are at least several factors explaining the lack of response, among them distrust of the Committee of Union and Progress and the religious convictions of its leaders; their deposition of Abdülhamid; and the incongruity of a *jihād* directed at certain European powers but in accord with others, such as Italy, which had not long ago been an aggressor against the Muslims of Libya.[173] The threat of colonial uprising was nonetheless one taken quite seriously by the European powers: the French in North Africa saw an uprising as a very real threat[174]; meanwhile, the British in India and the Dutch in the Netherlands Antilles confronted Germano-Ottoman machinations in South and Southeast Asia.[175]

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[171] For a translation of one of the fatwas and its accompanying Caliphal proclamation, see Geoffrey Lewis, "The Ottoman Proclamation of Jihād in 1914," *The Islamic Quarterly* 19, no. 3/4 (1975).
[172] For an explanation of these efforts' inefficacy, see Tilman Lüdke, "Jihad Made in Germany: Ottoman and German Propaganda and Intelligence Operations in the First World War" (University of Oxford, 2001). See also Metin Hülagü, *Pan-İslâmist Faaliyetler: 1914-1918* (Istanbul: Boğaziçi 1994).
[173] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 100-03.
[174] Ibid., 102, Edmund Burke, "Moroccan Resistance, Pan-Islam and German War Strategy, 1914-1918," *Francia* 3 (1975).
[175] Kees van Dijk, "Colonial Fears, 1890-1918: Pan-Islamism and the Germano-Indian Plot," in *Transcending Borders: Arabs, Politics, Trade and Islam in Southeast Asia*, ed. Huub de Jonge and Nico Kaptein (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002).

With the defeat of the Central powers, the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, and the establishment of the Turkish Republic, pan-Islamism would soon become an orphan in the land of its birth. It is after 1918 that the center of pan-Islamism shifted from Istanbul eastward, to India, where the ground had been laid among Muslims through such organizations as the *Anjumān-i Khuddām-i Ka'ba* and by individuals such as Mushir Husain Kidwai for what would become the Khilafat movement.[176] India's Muslims had been deeply involved with the Ottoman Empire for some time, raising funds and sending aid to Turkey via the Red Crescent during the Balkan Wars[177], and similarly collecting money for the Hijaz railway through the *Anjumān-i Islām* of Bombay.[178] Launched in response to the Ottoman defeat in WWI, the Khilafat movement sought to preserve the Ottoman Empire's boundaries and the Sultan's Caliphal authority.[179] It would ultimately become a mass movement, attracting Shi'i, Ahmadi, and even Hindu supporters such as Mahatma Gandhi[180], blending resistance to British policy in regards to the Ottoman Empire with Indian nationalism and pan-Islamism. Some of its adherents went so far as to declare British-ruled India a part of *dār al-ḥarb*, thus necessitating either *jihād* or *hijra*, and spawning the sub-movement of *hejrat*, or emigration, to Afghanistan.[181] Although it commanded tremendous popular support and exerted great pressure on both the

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[176] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 182-215.
[177] Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 146-55.
[178] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 189, 97.
[179] Gail Minault, *The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 1.
[180] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 204-06. Minault's study was one of the first (and best) to argue for the nationalist character of the Khilafat movement. Since then, several other major studies of the movement have appeared, most notably M. Naeem Qureshi, *Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics: A Study of the Khilafat Movement, 1918-1924* (Leiden: Brill, 1999). Another, more recent source of documentary information on the movement is Mushirul Hasan and Margrit Pernau, eds., *Regionalizing Pan-Islamism: Documents on the Khilafat Movement* (New Delhi: Manohar,2005).
[181] See Qureshi, *Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics*, 174-232. A large number of Indians did, in fact, make *hejrat* to Afghanistan, unsurprisingly swamping the government's ability to absorb such a population influx. While many were eventually repatriated to India, a sizable number moved further north, to the USSR, eventually becoming Communists. See M. Naeem Qureshi, "From Pan-Islamism to Communism: The Russian Connection of the Indian Muhajirin, 1920-24," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 32, no. 1 (2008).

British and Turkish governments, the movement would ultimately fail, and the Caliphate would be abolished. Landau attributes this to the Khilafat movement's "failure to weld meaningfully… a universalist cause with a nationalist one,"[182] a breakdown which would presage similar divergences across the Muslim world of local nationalisms from pan-Islamism, as the new realities of statehood created immense ideological fissures where none had previously existed.[183]

The abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 shook the Muslim world to its core, and left it grasping to reconstitute its identity, which had been forged in modern form only a few decades prior. The events of 1924 would thus initiate the first post-Caliphal phase of pan-Islamism's development, that of the convention era.

Seeking Unity of Faith in a World of States

The inter-war period, particularly after the abolition of the Caliphate, certainly was "a low point for Pan-Islam."[184] With no obvious way forward, and no immediate cause to rally for, nor enemy against, Muslims looked backwards, to the restoration of the Caliphate. Sharīf Ḥusayn of Mecca took the initiative, proclaiming himself Caliph on March 5th, 1924, and convening a convention in July of that year, during the Hajj, whose results seemed to bolster Arab unity more so than Muslim unity. These efforts would soon be rendered moot in October, with ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Saʿūd's conquest of Mecca.[185] For much of the ensuing period, the congress or convention would become

[182] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 215.
[183] Cf. above on the co-existence of local nationalisms within a pan-Islamic framework, particularly in reference to the thought of Afghānī. The post-1924 world would likewise reorient the composition of pan-Islamism, as the preferred symbol of institutional unity, the Caliphate, no longer existed, leaving other forms of political unification to fill its place, while simultaneously privileging the other two components of pan-Islamism.
[184] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 216.
[185] Ibid., 236, Martin Kramer, *Islam Assembled: The Advent of the Muslim Congresses* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 80-85. This was predated by an earlier effort by Jamal Pasha of the

the focal point of pan-Islamic activities.[186] This would last until WWII, when the emergent paradigm of the international organization would take hold of the pan-Islamic imagination.

It is perhaps unsurprising that this mode of organization would prove amenable in the wake of crisis; while one writer has described meetings during the Hajj as a kind of "permanent Panislamic congress,"[187] the 1924 congress had other progenitors in the pre-1924 era. Russian Muslims, predominantly Tatars, met in congresses of varying size and purpose intermittently from 1905 to 1917, largely at the initiative of Gaspralı.[188] These were followed by several largely abortive initiatives during WWI and shortly afterwards, largely spurred by Turkish leadership.[189] In the Dutch East Indies, beginning in 1922 several All-Islam Congresses were held, and after 1924, a caliphate committee produced a proposal for a representative, elected caliph. These activities would continue in earnest until 1929, but by the time of the Jerusalem Congress in 1931, had effectively been subsumed by nationalism.[190]

The 1924 congress was shortly followed by back-to-back congresses in 1926, in Cairo in May and in Mecca in June and July. While the Cairo conference resulted in general agreement on the need for a Caliph, no decisions were taken, and in any

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CUP, during a mission of November 1920 to Kabul, to make King Aman-Allah of Afghanistan Caliph. Despite strong public support, as he was the "sole independent [Muslim] ruler left" after WWI, Aman-Allah declined, arguing that the issue "should be decided by the community of Muslims as a whole." Nawid, *Religious Response to Social Change in Afghanistan*, 67-68.

[186] Localized pan-Islamic activities continued during this period, however. One example is the emergence of pan-Islamist groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which found their genesis in the 1930s and 40s. Xavier Bougarel and (tr.) Asma Rashid, "From Young Muslims to Party of Democratic Action: The Emergence of a Pan-Islamist Trend in Bosnia-Herzegovina," *Islamic Studies* 36, no. 2/3 (1997).

[187] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 217n8. Landau is here citing Feduchy's *Panislamismo*. Stoddard, too, has referred to the Hajj as "a perennial Pan-Islamic congress." Lothrop Stoddard, *The New World of Islam* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921), 47.

[188] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 152-60.

[189] Kramer, *Islam Assembled*, 55-79.

[190] Martin van Bruinessen, "Muslims of the Dutch East Indies and the Caliphate Question," *Studia Islamika (Jakarta)* 2, no. 3 (1995).

case both conferences were geared more towards the parochial interests of their host monarchs than the broader cause of Islamic unity.[191]

More successful was the 1931 Jerusalem congress, which took place against a backdrop of conflict over control of Muslim holy places in Palestine and Zionist efforts to establish a Jewish state. This congress marked the beginning of Palestine's role as a pan-Islamic symbol (which continues up to the present day), and attracted far more numerous and notable attendees than the prior congresses of 1924 and 1926, among them representatives from over twenty countries (prior congresses had been predominantly Arab affairs), including such luminaries as Rashīd Riḍā, as well as several Iranian Shi'a, making this a clear effort at *taqrīb*, as well.[192]

A congress of European Muslim exiles was subsequently held in 1935 in Geneva, engineered in large part by Shakīb Arslān[193], which ultimately focused much of its energies on opposition to European colonialism and Zionism, despite Arslān's pledge to the Swiss authorities that it would deal primarily with religious and spiritual matters.[194] This would be the last major congress of note in the pre-WWII period, as war loomed on the horizon and various Muslim countries and notables, most notoriously Amīn al-Ḥusaynī, the Mufti of Jerusalem, began to collaborate with the Axis powers. Though Germany had been supportive of pan-Islamic efforts since Kaiser Wilhelm's reign, Italy likewise stepped in, as did Japan, where Abdürreşid İbrahim would end his life in 1944.[195] As the world drifted towards the second global

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[191] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 237-40, Kramer, *Islam Assembled*, 86-122.
[192] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 240-42, Kramer, *Islam Assembled*, 123-41. The symbolic value of Jerusalem in particular should not be underestimated; indeed, it is enough to merit an entire book on its own: Yitzhak Reiter, *Jerusalem and its Role in Islamic Solidarity* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). A more recent examination of the 1931 conference gives it a more nationalist reading. See Weldon C. Matthews, "Pan-Islam or Arab Nationalism? The Meaning of the 1931 Jerusalem Islamic Congress Reconsidered," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 35, no. 1 (2003).
[193] On whom, see Adal, "Constructing Transnational Islam."
[194] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 242-45, Kramer, *Islam Assembled*, 142-53.
[195] Kramer, *Islam Assembled*, 154-65.

war in thirty years, the idea of the Caliphate slowly faded away, and pan-Islamism instead began to crystallize around a core of issues and grievances commonly afflicting the new Muslim states, largely having to do with colonialism and the maltreatment of Muslims around the world, whether in Palestine (most saliently), or as minorities elsewhere.

In parallel, ideological developments tended less towards political union and more towards the spiritual and religious aspects of pan-Islamism[196], though various proposals sought to establish some manner of union or confederation, in accord with the new milieu of Muslim statehood. While some, such as Sanhoury, argued for what was, in effect, a republican Caliphate selected by a kind of transnational electoral college[197], most thinkers accepted the post-Caliphate and sought to adapt to these changed circumstances. Notably, Ḥasan al-Bannā of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood and Abū Aʿlā al-Mawdūdī argued for a league of Muslim nations[198], effectively accepting the new realities of statehood while adroitly suturing the rifts between pan-Islamism and the new Islamic nationalisms, much like their intellectual predecessors often blended anti-colonial nationalism with pan-Islamism. Others, such as Rashīd Riḍā, began to lay more emphasis on local nationalisms or on pan-Arabism, which would ultimately come to dominate Arab political thought for much of the Cold War, to the detriment of pan-Islamism, which remained, at least in theory, their ultimate aspiration.[199]

With the conclusion of World War II and the onset of decolonization, a host of new, predominantly Muslim states sprang into being, while the partition of India and

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[196] Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 218-19. Or, that is, more towards affinial than institutional unity.
[197] Ibid., 221-22.
[198] Ibid., 223-28. This represented a move towards international organizations in notions of institutional unity and away from a unitary caliphal state.
[199] Ibid., 220.

Pakistan in 1948, along with the creation of Israel in May of that same year, radically altered the geopolitics of the Middle East and South Asia, barely twenty years after the abolition of the Caliphate and the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire had similarly upended Muslims' understanding of global political organization. The ascendancy of nationalism posed a direct challenge to the integrative aspects of Islam as a world-system, and was considered by many thinkers to be inimical to the interests of the *umma* writ large, whilst the supra-nationalist ideology of pan-Arabism sapped much of pan-Islamism's residual strength in the Middle East. While discussions of union and combating division among Muslims continued unabated in the post-war period[200], perceived threats from Zionism and Communism likewise led to a new focus on Islamic solidarity, as opposed to union, and thus a reconception of the very idea of institutional unity. Landau rightly notes that "[i]t was easier, of course, to reconcile fervent nationalism and intra-state rivalries with religious and cultural solidarity (and its derivatives, political and economic coordination) than with overall political and economic solidarity…[and] to adopt common attitudes [rather] than a binding decision on a Pan-Islamic state."[201] Thus, the challenge of reconciling nationalism and pan-Islamism had to be met anew, and the creation of pan-Islamic blocs in the international arena was conceived of as one mechanism to achieve this goal.[202] While various proposals and *ad hoc* arrangements towards such ends were proposed and attempted since 1945, the institutionalization of such means of cooperation within the framework of pan-Islamic international organizations has proved to be the most durable approach to such goals. Several ephemeral organizations have been created and since lapsed, but three relatively stable ones exist

[200] Ibid., 248-60.
[201] Ibid., 261. In effect, Landau is saying that affinial unity was easier to attain than institutional unity at this point in time.
[202] Ibid., 267-76.

into the present day: the Muslim World Congress[203], the Muslim World League[204], and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).[205] Of these, only the OIC is an intergovernmental organization, the other two being nongovernmental organizations.[206]

Thus, as of the late twentieth century, it seemed that pan-Islamism had settled into a comfortable, institutionalized role, and would fade quietly into the world of economic development initiatives, cultural exchanges, diplomatic confabs and ministerial assemblies. In 1979, these assumptions were presented with a revolutionary challenge.

The Islamic Revolution and Its Aftermath

With the overthrow of the Pahlavi regime in Iran and the institution of *velāyat-e faqīh* in its place, Western observers were confronted with a phenomenon of which they had little comprehension, and in which all of their old fears about Islam and its revolutionary potential seemed confirmed. Fearing the new Islamic Republic's talk of "exporting the revolution" (*sodūr-e enqelāb*) and overthrowing the governments of its neighbors, the United States and Europe backed the government of Iraq in its eight-year war against Iran in an attempt to contain the new revolutionary state. One scholar has gone so far as to describe the war as one between pan-Arabism and pan-

[203] Ibid., 280-83. Also: http://www.motamaralalamalislami.org/ (Accessed 25 May 2012)
[204] Ibid., 283-87. See: http://www.themwl.org/ (Accessed 25 May 2012)
[205] Ibid., 287-95. Cf. http://www.oic-oci.org/ (Accessed 25 May 2012)
[206] Not surprisingly, the OIC is the most complex and well-funded of these organizations, encompassing a host of agencies dealing with cultural, economic, educational, religious, and various other issues affecting Muslim communities and member states. Although it is far from a United Nations or even European Union of Islam, it has attained a degree of institutional permanence and legitimacy far beyond that of any prior organization, and has chalked up some accomplishments in the fields of economic cooperation and development. For the most comprehensive description and analysis of the OIC to date, see Noor Ahmad Baba, *Organisation of Islamic Conference: Theory and Practice of Pan-Islamic Cooperation* (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1994).

Islamism.[207] Even Iran's very constitution would seem to commit it to exporting the revolution; its eleventh article states that Iran "is bound to base its general policies on the coalition and unity of the Islamic nations, and it should exert continuous efforts in order to realize the political, economic and cultural unity of the Islamic world."[208] While Iran's ultimate failure in exporting the revolution has led many writers to dismiss revolutionary ideology as a form of chauvinistic Shi'ism[209], recent developments, namely the unvarnished revolutionary rhetoric of President Ahmadinejad, have led some scholars to revisit the role of pan-Islamism in the ideology of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI).[210]

It would be a mistake to assume pan-Islamism had lain dormant in Iran until Ahmadinejad's election in 2005, however. Khomeini regularly disparaged nationalism in favor of the broader unity of the Islamic world against "global aggression" (*estekbār-e jahānī*), and sought rapprochement with the Sunnis through such actions as banning the disparagement of the first three Caliphs.[211] From an early stage, the Islamic Republic similarly made use of Sheikh Shaltūt's famous fatwa declaring the Shi'i Jaʿfaris to be a fifth acceptable *madhhab*, thereby declaring the Shi'a Muslims in good standing.[212] Pan-Islamism and the pursuit of Islamic unity

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[207] Mohssen Massarrat, "The Ideological Context of the Iran-Iraq War: Pan-Islamism versus Pan-Arabism," in *Iran and the Arab World*, ed. Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993).

[208] R.K. Ramazani, "Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran," *Middle East Journal* 34, no. 2 (1980): 190. On the universalist interpretation of this goal, see ———, "Iran's Export of the Revolution: Politics, Ends, and Means," in *The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact*, ed. John L. Esposito (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1990), 48.

[209] On the failures of attempts to export the revolution due its being viewed as solely a Shi'i endeavor, see Farhang Rajaee, "Iranian Ideology and Worldview: The Cultural Export of Revolution," in *The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact*, ed. John L. Esposito (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1990).

[210] See, for example John A. Tures, "Rattling the Hesam: International Distractions from Internal Problems in Iran," *Asian Politics and Policy* 1, no. 1 (2009): 53-54.

[211] The single best source for discussion of Iran's pan-Islamic policy through the Rafsanjani years is Buchta, *Die iranische Schia*. Sadly, this invaluable text, long out of print, has never been translated from the German.

[212] Shaltūt was at that time the rector of al-Azhar, hence his fatwa carried an unusual weight. Al-Sheikh Mahmūd Shaltūt, "Wathīqa Tārīkhīya," in *Al-Jumhūrīya al-Islāmīyah fī Īrān* (Tehran: Matba'at-

have been a consistent element of IRI ideology, though their implementation in policy has sometimes been problematic.[213] Support for pan-Islamism also crosses political boundaries, with contemporary reformists such as Mir Hossein Moussavi (who drew up a plan for a worldwide Islamic front as foreign minister)[214] and Mehdi Karroubi arguing for Islamic unity from early on.[215] The Islamic Republic has even seen the creation of an organization dedicated to Sunna-Shi'a rapprochement, the *majma' al-taqrīb bayn al-madhāhib al-islāmīyya*[216], though its success in these endeavors is somewhat doubtful.[217] Likewise, the very notion of Islamic unity has been contentious within Iran, official governmental efforts at its promotion notwithstanding.[218] And just as the Ottomans and the Qajars vied for the loyalty of the Shi'a in Iraq, much of Iran's efforts have occurred in the context of its rivalry for leadership of the Muslim world with Saudi Arabia[219], meaning that endeavors with an ideological basis cannot be entirely disengaged from the requirements of realpolitik, even in the case of a revolutionary state. This is not an argument against studying

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e Sepehr, 1984). This useful propaganda booklet contains numerous other essays, excerpts, and writings of a pan-Islamic nature. For a comprehensive discussion of the political context of the fatwa, including Ayatollah Montaẓerī's interesting assertion that Ayatollah Borūjerdī was the driving force behind its issuance (p. 290), see Brunner, *Islamic Ecumenism in the 20th Century*, 284-305.

[213] For discussion of Iran's activities on a yearly basis, see the relevant volumes of *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, in which Martin Kramer has regularly written about Iranian pan-Islamism: Vol. 6, 1981-82, pp. 288-92; Vol. 7, 1982-83, pp. 240-43; Vol. 8, 1983-84, pp. 167-74; Vol. 9, 1984-85, pp. 151-60; Vol. 10, 1986, pp. 136-45; Vol. 11, 1987, pp. 162-176; Vol. 12, 1988, pp. 185-94; Vol. 14, 1990, pp. 180-85; Vol. 15, 1991, pp. 185-91; Vol. 16, 1992, pp. 202-12; Vol. 17, 1993, pp. 120-29.

[214] Ramazani argues that he was the first IRI foreign minister to formally adopt export of the revolution as a governmental principle. Ramazani, "Iran's Export of the Revolution," 44-45.

[215] As Khomeini's hajj representative, Karroubi authored a 1987 pamphlet arguing for "unity of the Muslim world" under Khomeini's guidance. David Menashri, "Khomeini's Vision: Nationalism or World Order?," in *The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World*, ed. David Menashri (Oxford: Westview Press, 1990), 51.

[216] Wilfried Buchta, "Tehran's Ecumenical Society (majma' al-taqrīb): A Veritable Ecumenical Revival or a Trojan Horse of Iran?," in *The Twelver Shia in Modern Times: Religious Culture and Political History*, ed. Rainer Brunner and Werner Ende (Leiden: Brill, 2001).

[217] _____, "The Failed Pan-Islamic Program of the Islamic Republic: Views of the Liberal Reformers of the Religious "Semi-Opposition"," in *Iran and the Surrounding World: Interactions in Culture and Cultural Politics*, ed. Nikki R. Keddie and Rudi Matthee (London: University of Washington Press, 2002).

[218] _____, "Die inneriranische Diskussion über die islamische Einheit," *Orient (Opladen)* 35, no. 4 (1994).

[219] For example, see Henner Fürtig, *Iran's Rivalry with Saudi Arabia Between the Gulf Wars* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2002), 215-41.

ideology; rather it is a reminder that one cannot draw a teleological line between ideological content and concrete political actions. The relationship between the two is far more subtle, and sometimes contradictory.

A few studies have indeed focused on the ideology and more particularly, the discourse of the Islamic Republic[220], though those that address pan-Islamism are surprisingly few in number. Haggay Ram has studied the language of the revolution and of "Islamic Newspeak,"[221] as well as the inherent tensions of pan-Islamism and Iranian nationalism[222], while William Beeman has focused on the discourse of Iranian-American relations.[223] Others have attempted to use ideology as an explanatory factor in Iran's international relations.[224] This is an underlying assumption of, among others, Kramer's work on Hizballah.[225] This study will aim to build on these works by focusing on language as a window into ideology, and by tracing the development of pan-Islamist discourse in the IRI over time. The precise theory and methodology to be applied will be discussed below, but we need not delve

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[220] The most recent, and among the best such studies is Mehran Kamrava, *Iran's Intellectual Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

[221] Haggay Ram, "Islamic 'Newspeak': Language and Change in Revolutionary Iran," *Middle Eastern Studies* 29, no. 2 (1993). This article was effectively an excerpt of his later book: ———, *Myth and Mobilization in Revolutionary Iran: The Use of the Friday Congregational Sermon* (Washington, D.C.: American University Press, 1994).

[222] Haggay Ram, "Exporting Iran's Islamic Revolution: Steering a Path Between Pan-Islam and Nationalism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 8, no. 2 (1996).

[223] William O. Beeman, *The "Great Satan" vs. the "Mad Mullahs": How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other* (London: Praeger, 2005).

[224] Kaveh Afrasiabi, *After Khomeini: New Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Westview, 1994), Ramazani, "Iran's Export of the Revolution.", Haleh Vaziri, "The Islamic Republic and Its Neighbors: Ideology and the National Interest in Iran's Foreign Policy During the Khomeini Decade" (Georgetown University, 1995).

[225] He makes brief reference to language and symbols, noting that Hizballah "had to substitute a bland all-Islamic ecumenism for the evocative symbols of Shi'ism," and that they "had adopted all of the principle catchwords of Iran's revolutionary rhetoric." Kramer, "Redeeming Jerusalem," 110,12. In the first instance, I would argue that he has the relationship precisely backwards; revolutionary Iran would later focus on de-sectarianizing its discourse, in effect universalizing what had been particularistically Shi'i symbols. This will be discussed below.

Interestingly, Kramer also notes that, for Hizballah's leading clerical supporter, Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, "the unity of Islam is not so much a process of political amalgamation [contra others in Hizballah, see p. 119 in the same article] as it is a process of sectarian reconciliation, especially between Shi'is and Sunnis." ———, "Redeeming Jerusalem," 125. Thus, even early in Hizballah's existence, *taqrīb* constituted a key component of their discourse.

into them to see why historical parallels might recommend a re-evaluation of IRI ideology in the context of pan-Islamism's long history. A quote from Ali Khamene'i, then President of the Islamic Republic, recalls earlier pan-Islamists' arguments for unity in the face of colonial oppression:

> We have no intention of bringing the Sunni brothers to Shi'ism or the Shi'i brothers to Sunnism…[A]ll the Muslim countries should lay aside their [petty] differences and strive to establish unity among all Muslim societies by creating one popular movement against the oppressors (*mostakbarin*).[226]

Because of its defensive nature, pan-Islamism, far from vanishing into the mists of history, has only been revitalized by the renewed sense of threat faced not only by Iran, but by Muslims around the world in the post-Cold war era.

A Note on Typology

Where has our investigation of pan-Islamism's history brought us? It has shown us, for one, that pan-Islamism refers to many things in many different contexts. But, by and large, these meanings can be grouped into three broad categories, which overlap to an extent and have fuzzy boundaries, but which nonetheless provide us with a useful heuristic device:

1) Affinial Unity – This refers to the affective sense of brotherhood shared by Muslims, a cultural, spiritual, and mystic bond of adherents to a shared faith. While this has existed in some sense throughout Islam's history, its more

[226] Ram, "Exporting Iran's Islamic Revolution: Steering a Path Between Pan-Islam and Nationalism," 15-16. Cf. a discussion, in nearly identical terms, by Shaikh al-Ra'īs in his *Ettehād-e Eslām* in Kia, "Pan-Islamism in Late Nineteenth-Century Iran," 46-47. The irony of Khamene'i echoing, almost a century later, a Baha'i Qajar prince's pan-Islamic appeal is unusually rich, even by the standards of the Islamic Republic.

notable proponents in the modern era include ʿAbdūh. Of these three aspects, it is probably the most salient in the post-WWII era.

2) Institutional Unity – By this, we mean ties in the tangible realm of realpolitik; economic, military, political and institutional linkages. While the notion of a united state under the Caliph was this aspect's apotheosis in the Hamidian era, today it is more closely represented by organizations such as the OIC, and efforts to bolster trade and political cooperation between Muslim countries. Since 1924, it has been in a constant process of redefinition as Muslims have tried to define an *umma* without a Caliph, and has thus been less emphasized than other aspects.
3) Ecumenicism – Finally, we come to the most neglected aspect of pan-Islamism: rapprochement, efforts to ameliorate the Sunna/Shi'a *fitna*. Though this has been an element of pan-Islamism since before the time of Abdülhamid, its importance has only grown in recent years, and is best represented at present by the IRI's *majmaʿ al-taqrīb bayn al-madhāhib al-islāmīyya.* It is perhaps most salient in the post-Cold war era, though it has always existed in some form or other.

These elements sometimes overlap: for example, one cannot entirely disentangle affinial unity from ecumenicism, while institutional and affinial unity have a tendency to co-occur. We shall also further explain how these elements are related as constituent discourses of the broader discursive formation of pan-Islamism, but this will be discussed below.[227] Before we can turn to matters linguistic, we must first examine how recent advances in sociology and communications theory underscore

[227] In this regard, I shall be drawing upon the theoretical framework laid out in Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*.

the historical parallels between the present and pan-Islamism's ascendancy, and what these contextual factors may mean for our analysis.

Reinventing the Umma[228]

Over ten years ago, scholars had begun to notice the changing nature of the global *umma*, and the parallels to the milieu in which pan-Islamism originally arose:

> …it is important to discern the parallels between the original development of trans-national Islamic political consciousness in the late Ottoman Empire, and current trans-national movements of Islamic solidarity which are also presently being fostered by modern communications and the failure of post-colonial Muslim social and political elites to safeguard their population and interests from direct western penetration and exploitation.[229]

While Khan is undoubtedly a partisan, he crystallizes the generalized sense of threat and encroachment felt by many Muslims vis-à-vis the West, while drawing out how the development of a Muslim public sphere has heightened awareness of this state of affairs, as well as this kind of perception:

> The information-age revolution, like previous advances in communications in the late 19th century, has been instrumental in promoting Islamic solidarity and in the formation of a common destiny across time and space. The Bosnian genocide was brought into the homes of Muslim families world-wide through the technology of satellite television. This graphically contributed to the outpouring of global Muslim outrage and solidarity in the face of the unending atrocities and has played a significant role in undermining western claims of possessing a higher and universal standard of moral values…[Western actions

[228] This title is taken from a lecture of the same name delivered by James Piscatori on 26 September 2006 at the Zentrum Moderner Orient in Berlin. James Piscatori, "Reinventing the Ummah? The Trans-Locality of Pan-Islam," (2006).
[229] Mujeeb Khan, "External Threats and the Promotion of a Trans-National Islamic Consciousness: The Case of the Late Ottoman Empire and Contemporary Turkey," *Islamic World Report* 1, no. 3 (1996): 119.

> have] contributed to a legitimation crisis in the Islamic world which has domestic, regional, and international dimensions.[230]

These changes in information technology and communications have contributed to a redefinition of the *umma* as it confronts postmodernity, just as, in the era of Afghānī and Abdülhamid, it confronted modernity. This process has only been accelerated by migration, the creation of diaspora communities, and the creation of networks between these and the Muslim countries, leading to a state of what Mandaville dubs "translocality," and which is closely related to what other theorists of globalization have termed "liminal space," "'gaps' in the global architecture", or a "third space."[231] In the international relations literature, this is related to studies in transnationalism, and such byproducts as "transnational nationalism" or "national membership that is 'de-territorialized', such as what is required by the interpretation of the 'Umma'."[232] In effect, these changes have created a new dimension of the public sphere, one which not only results in a diffusion of traditional authority, but a "new Islam" which "exists in spaces which institutionalized forms of politics cannot reach."[233] By and large, he is entirely correct in arguing that these changes "constitute a dramatic widening of the *Muslim public sphere.*"[234] However, I must take issue with his exclusive focus on the widening of the public sphere in relation to "alternative" voices within Islam[235], which is unfortunately typical of much literature focusing on the interaction between new media, technological change, and change

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[230] Ibid.: 126.
[231] Mandaville, *Transnational Muslim Politics*, 97.
[232] Riva Kastoryano, "The Reach of Transnationalism," http://essays.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/kastoryano_text_only.htm. She discusses this concept in greater detail in ———, "Vers Un Nationalisme Transnational: Redéfinir la Nation, le Nationalisme et le Territoire," *Revue Française de Science Politique* 56, no. 4 (2006). Transnationalism is hardly a new concept, however; cf. James A. Field, "Transnationalism and the New Tribe," *International Organization* 25, no. 3 (1971).
[233] Mandaville, *Transnational Muslim Politics*, 176. I cannot here do full justice to Mandaville's complex and multifaceted argument, but this summary raises the key points pertinent to this discussion.
[234] Ibid., 186. Emphasis in the original.
[235] Ibid., 178-91, passim.

within the Muslim public sphere in its focus on groups and ideologies, such as women, modernists, and secularists, which tend to be most palatable to Western audiences. This is somewhat ironic, given that Mandaville has dealt with such groups as the *jihādīs* in his own work.[236]

This particular lacuna has been addressed by other scholars, notably Lina Khatib, who argues that:

> Islamic fundamentalism is a relativizing force within processes of globalization, not aiming at negating global reality but at shaping it. By that I mean that Islamic fundamentalism is 'a way of asserting a particular (group) identity, which in turn is a prime method of competing for power and influence in the global system.' In doing so, Islamic fundamentalism transcends nations but is not necessarily oppositional to the nation.[237]

The problematic nature of such terms as "fundamentalism" aside, Khatib points at a key weakness of many studies of the new Muslim public sphere; namely, that the extant actors and institutions who no longer hold hegemonic power in these media are assumed to be unreactive in response to changed circumstances; that is, they do not attempt to adapt to this new reality.

This is, to say the least, a problematic assumption. This study will aim, at least in part, to demonstrate how the pan-Islamist elements of official Iranian discourse have changed over time, marking a responsiveness on the part of officialdom to an altered discursive context, while at the same time demonstrating the reflexive nature of discourse and its context; i.e., how the two mutually act to shape each other, rather than one being the product of the unidirectional influence of the other. Thus, this approach assumes a robust, though not totalist, constructivist approach to the relationship between discourse and international politics.

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[236] See ———, "Sufis and Salafis."
[237] Lina Khatib, "Communicating Islamic Fundamentalism as Global Citizenship," *Journal of Communication Inquiry* 27, no. 4 (2003): 391.

2. Method and Discourse

> Social science stands almost in horror of the event. Not without reason: the short-term is the most capricious and the most misleading of time-spans.

Fernand Braudel, Inaugural Address in *Écrits sur l'histoire*, p. 46

> Like its tool the computer, quantification is an instrument in the service of quality, [which]…requires the *esprit de finesse* as much as and even more than the *esprit de géométrie*…. In small doses, the quantitative leads away from quality, but a large dose of the quantitative leads back to it.

Pierre Chaunu, 1972[238]

At the heart of the study of discourse lies the problem of evidence. By its very nature, discourse can only be observed through epiphenomena, though this is not in and of itself inherently problematic; natural scientists, after all, often must rely on instrumentation to interpret phenomena which lie beyond human sensory capabilities. What numerical data representing radio and extra-visible light waves are to astronomers, for example, are what text is to discourse analysts: the observable evidence of phenomena which normally lie beyond the bounds of our perception.

Unsurprisingly, disagreement over the nature of this evidence and how to interpret it is rife within the study of history. There is, however, broad agreement today (particularly in light of the influence of Wittgenstein, Skinner, Gadamer, et al.) on the primacy of language in use as a source for historical interpretation:

[238] Both of these quotes are from Paul Ricoeur, *The Contribution of French Historiography to the Theory of History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 11, 33. In the case of Chaunu, Ricoeur cites a source at p. 119, without making clear which text this is, in typical French fashion. I have been unable to determine the source.

> Conceptual history and history of political language may meet each other at a methodological middle-ground, conveniently described as the semantic field. To grasp the historical meaning of concepts, it is necessary to study their usage in sentences and passages of texts, to study how words, phrases, metaphors and rhetorical topoi denoting the concept are used in argument, to study aligned and contrasting concepts and to study structures of argumentation.[239]

Skinner, in arguing against the possibility of the history of an idea, argued instead that the "only history to be written is thus a history of the various statements made with the given expression. This – rather than the history of the sentence itself – would of course be an almost absurdly ambitious enterprise."[240] This statement, of course, was written before the spread of the personal computer in its modern form[241], and the vast expansion in data storage, manipulation, and analysis capabilities which have recently made entirely new approaches to the study of historical and social phenomena possible.[242]

As a method, corpus linguistics is uniquely well-suited to this "absurdly ambitious enterprise." The ability to examine, analyze, and incorporate into research an enormous body of primary-source text as data greatly bolsters the claims researchers can make, and gives a much-needed evidentiary basis to the practice of discourse analysis. Before we can explain the application of corpus linguistic

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[239] Gelderen, "Between Cambridge and Heidelberg," 234.
[240] Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding," 39.
[241] In 1969, the year Skinner's article was published, many hobbyist PCs still used cassette tapes for data storage. Jonathan Zittrain, *The Future of the Internet: And How to Stop It* (London: Yale University Press, 2008), 13.
[242] This parallels recent developments in the natural and applied sciences, particularly computer science. The ideas of the late Jim Gray of Microsoft have given rise to a "fourth research paradigm" of "data-intensive science," termed eScience, which is defined as "the synthesis of information technology and science that enables challenges on previously unimaginable scales to be tackled." Gordon Bell, Tony Hey, and Alex Szalay, "Beyond the Data Deluge," *Science* 323, no. 5919 (2009): 1298. For a book-length treatment of the topic, see Tony Hey, Stewart Tansley, and Kristin Tolle, eds., *The Fourth Paradigm: Data-Intensive Scientific Discovery* (Redmond, WA: Microsoft Research,2009). Why should history, or the humanities in general, be immune to a similar paradigmatic shift?

methodology in this study, however, a few basic terms and concepts will be explained for the benefit of readers unfamiliar with the field.

Corpus, Concordance, Collocation?

First, a few minor points on what corpus linguistics is not. It does not deal with artificial languages or texts, such as the invented example sentences often favored by generative linguists. [243] It is concerned with the study of real language data, text in use, whether those texts are initially written, or spoken and later transcribed. These texts are compiled in large, electronic databases, known as *corpora*. Typically, texts have to be organized, converted into a machine-readable format (usually some manner of .txt file), and cleaned by removing extraneous data (such as title or date headers, copyright information, and other metadata). Physical texts may have to be scanned or retyped if they are not already available in a digital format. Corpora typically consist solely of text, and do not contain other kinds of data.[244]

However, there is still substantial variation among the types of corpora that exist. While corpora can conceivably be assembled for any human language,

[243] By "generative linguistics," we mean here the school of thought which derives from the theories of Noam Chomsky and his foundational *Syntactic Structures*. A good overview of this school's early development can be found in Randy Allen Harris, *The Linguistics Wars* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 35-73. Unsurprisingly, Chomsky himself is utterly dismissive of corpus linguistics, comparing it to "tak[ing] videotapes of things happening in the world and they'll collect huge videotapes of everything that's happening and from that maybe they'll come up with some generalizations or insights." József Andor, "The Master and His Performance: An Interview with Noam Chomsky," *Intercultural Pragmatics* 1, no. 1 (2004): 97.

[244] There are some exceptions where text corpora are combined (and usually aligned in some manner) with audiovisual data, mostly sound recordings, video, or images. These corpora are *multimodal*, and research in this area is still very much in an experimental stage; multimodal corpora, while not unheard of, are still quite unusual. See Jens Allwood, "Multimodal Corpora," in *Corpus Linguistics: An International Handbook, Vol. 1*, ed. Anke Lüdeling and Merja Kytö (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), Anthony Baldry, "The Role of Multimodal Concordances in Multimodal Corpus Linguistics," in *New Directions in the Analysis of Multimodal Discourse*, ed. Terry Royce and Wendy Bowcher (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2007), Anthony Baldry and Paul J. Thibault, eds., *Multimodal Corpus Linguistics* (London: Routledge,Forthcoming).

including dead ones[245], they are typically assembled for a specific purpose, such as pedagogy or grammatical research. One researcher has identified eight major categories of corpora[246], though the only kind that need concern us here is specialized corpora, those developed to address a specific research topic or question. In this case, this study will use five corpora of text and speeches, one for each of the individual case studies. The details of their assembly and preparation will be discussed in each respective analytical chapter.

Once a corpus has been assembled and cleaned, it is ready to be analyzed. Specialized software packages, usually referred to as *concordancers*, are used for this. In the case of this study, Wordsmith Tools 4.0 was used.[247] The primary techniques which were used in analyzing the data are as follows:[248]

Wordlist – A list containing all of the different word forms in a corpus, along with their frequencies.

Concordance – A way of viewing search words in a corpus, a concordance is a display of the search word and a line of its cotext, with the view centered on the search word. A number of instances (e.g., 50 lines) are displayed simultaneously so as to allow for comparison of typical contexts, or to allow patterns of usage to more easily be seen.

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[245] For example, the Diachronic Corpus of Sumerian Literature at the Oriental Institute, University of Oxford: http://dcsl.orinst.ox.ac.uk/ (Accessed 25 May 2012) See also Jarle Ebeling, "The Electronic Text Corpus of Sumerian Literature," *Corpora* 2, no. 1 (2007).

[246] These are: specialized, general, comparable, parallel, learner, pedagogical, historical/diachronic, and monitor corpora. Susan Hunston, *Corpora in Applied Linguistics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 14-16.

[247] Wordsmith Tools Ver. 4.0, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Wordsmith Tools is probably the best concordancer available, and is one of the few capable of handling non-Roman character sets, particularly right-to-left scripts, such as Farsi. Version 5 unfortunately has problems displaying Arabic/Persian script, hence version 4 was used.

[248] This section draws heavily upon Hunston, *Corpora in Applied Linguistics*, 67-79.

Collocation – The tendency of two or more words to occur in proximity to each other, usually within a span of five words before or after the search word. Words in this kind of relationship are referred to as *collocates*. Collocates can be determined by several types of statistical measures, as well as simple frequency.[249] *Collocation patterns* depict the strongest collocates for each position surrounding the search word (i.e., from five words to the left to five words to the right, in this case).

Keywords – Words which are statistically more likely to be found in one corpus than another, as calculated by one of several different algorithms. The corpus under analysis is compared to a reference corpus, usually a larger corpus of general language data, though not necessarily.

Cluster – A particular grouping of words which tends to recur frequently in a corpus, sometimes also referred to as an *n-gram*. These are phrases which appear in a fixed order (e.g., "in this paper," or "the data show that"), which distinguishes clusters from collocation, which does not depend on words being in a particular position in relation to each other, only that they be proximate.

For the most part, these are all the techniques the reader will need to be familiar with before reading this study.[250] Further technical points will be discussed as necessary during the analysis.

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[249] For an excellent, albeit highly technical explanation of how to calculate various collocation measures, see Stefan Evert, "Corpora and Collocations," in *Corpus Linguistics: An International Handbook, Vol. 2*, ed. Anke Lüdeling and Merja Kytö (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2009).

[250] For readers interested in learning more about the subject of corpus linguistics more generally, there are numerous introductory texts available. The classic work in the field, sadly long out of print, is John Sinclair, *Corpus, Concordance, Collocation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). Sinclair's work

Having outlined some of the basics of corpus linguistics, we must now discern how to apply them in discourse analysis. Fortunately, there is an extensive body of literature dealing with this question, particularly in the context of critical discourse analysis (CDA). However, there are several theoretical considerations and problems, mostly to do with CDA and its basic assumptions, which must be addressed before we can apply this approach in a historical context.

Critical Concordancing

The combination of corpus linguistics and discourse analysis is not a new phenomenon. Probably the earliest study to make a sustained argument for the use of the two approaches in tandem was Hardt-Mautner's 1995 study of the British press, which despite being an unpublished paper is nonetheless cited in almost every treatment of the CDA/corpus linguistics nexus.[251] A key component of her case is that corpus linguistics provides a stronger evidentiary basis to CDA and its findings, and she still argues today that "with corpus linguistic support, the account [of a CDA study] is less speculative and includes insights on patterns most likely to have otherwise gone unnoticed."[252] The converse of this argument, that corpus linguistics prevents the analyst from reading too much into a text, or that it acts as a guard against "overinterpretation," has likewise been made.[253]

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requires some familiarity with linguistics; for non-specialists, a more accessible general book is Wolfgang Teubert and Anna Čermaková, *Corpus Linguistics: A Short Introduction* (London: Continuum, 2007). One final text which is effectively a textbook for discourse analysts is Paul Baker, *Using Corpora in Discourse Analysis* (London: Continuum, 2006).

[251] Gerlinde Hardt-Mautner, "'Only Connect.' Critical Discourse Analysis and Corpus Linguistics," (Vienna, Austria: Institut für Englische Sprache, Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien, 1995).

[252] Gerlinde Mautner, "Corpora and Critical Discourse Analysis," in *Contemporary Corpus Linguistics*, ed. Paul Baker (London: Continuum, 2009), 42.

[253] Kieran O'Halloran and Caroline Coffin, "Checking Overinterpretation and Underinterpretation: Help From Corpora in Critical Linguistics," in *Applying English Grammar: Corpus and Functional*

Thus, this would seem an intuitive pairing of the two approaches, where one's strengths address the other's weaknesses. However, this is not necessarily the case. Critical discourse analysts often take issue with the purported de-contextualization of text by corpus linguistics, worrying that quantification only comes at the expense of quality. This mistrust is deeply ingrained, leading to such curiosities as Mautner's almost apologetic defense of corpus linguistics in a text for CDA practitioners:

> …if you decide to include corpus linguistic methods in your CDA project design, you need not in fact discard, 'unlearn' or in any other way throw overboard whatever more traditional methods you have grown accustomed to using. As an *ancillary method*, corpus linguistics is flexible and unobtrusive, and if handled appropriately, will enrich but not prejudice the rest of the research design or the interpretation of the results.[254]

Note that this was published in the same year, 2009, as her essay above arguing for the interpretive benefits of corpus linguistics. The only difference is audience; that text was written for corpus linguists, while "Check and Balances" is aimed towards CDA practitioners. This tentativeness is understandable, given that even Norman Fairclough, one of the giants of CDA, makes at best half-hearted use of corpus data in a recent and highly influential study.[255]

Despite this temerity, some other critical discourse analysts have even argued that corpus linguistics can help to fortify the theoretical foundations of CDA:

> In general, objections to the theoretical framework of CDA can be subsumed under one basic underlying critical observation: in CDA research interests and political commitment tend to be strictly related and this has often had a number of consequences on the methodological level, in particular regarding

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Approaches, ed. Caroline Coffin, Ann Hewings, and Kieran O'Halloran (London: Hodder Arnold, 2004).

[254] Gerlinde Mautner, "Checks and Balances: How Corpus Linguistics can Contribute to CDA," in *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, 2nd ed.*, ed. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: Sage, 2009), 124-25. Emphasis added.

[255] Norman Fairclough, *New Labour, New Language?* (London: Routledge, 2000).

> the choices made in research work…CDA has often been criticized for 'the inadequate linguistic basis for many cultural and ideological interpretations of texts.'
> …
> It is argued here that in spite of the apparent contradiction between the assumptions underlying the two approaches, resort to Corpus Linguistics [sic] tools in a CDA framework has an important potential in helping overcome some of the questions that have afflicted the discipline and, in particular, the problem of the representativeness of the samples of language analysed and the need to check hypotheses developed in qualitative analysis against empirically verifiable data, chosen on the basis of explicit and objective criteria and collected using rigorous scientific and statistical procedures.[256]

While I contend that corpus linguistics does not help resolve some of the fundamental theoretical problems with CDA (see below), we must note here the interesting parallels between the argument for corpus linguistics in a CDA context and the tenor of the argument for *Begriffsgeschichte* discussed in chapter one. In both cases, there is a need to effect a distance between the analyst or historian and the text under analysis, whether this is in order to obviate problems with political commitment (as with CDA) or in order to clarify past conceptual usage (in *Begriffsgeschichte*), and avoid the error of presentism. And in both cases, the evidentiary benefits of corpus linguistics would seem to address these problems.

Finally, while methodological concerns explain the growing popularity of combining corpus linguistics and numerous varieties of discourse analysis, there are also a couple of simpler explanations. First, CDA studies are often interested in very specific phenomena or types of discourse, and require specific texts rather than general-language corpora. We thus find that in "the past decade, increasing numbers of CDA studies have been appearing which draw on specialized corpora which

[256] Giuliana Garzone and Francesca Santulli, "What Can Corpus Linguistics Do for Critical Discourse Analysis?," in *Corpora and Discourse*, ed. Alan Partington, John Morley, and Louann Haarman (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2004), 352-53.

analysts compiled themselves."[257] This has been greatly assisted by the growing ubiquity of the internet, which in some respects is the world's biggest general corpus[258], and which presents for the critical discourse analyst a panoply of sources and subjects to choose from.[259] These resources have already been used to carry out massive and far-ranging CDA studies, which further bolster the case for this "useful methodological synergy."[260]

Thus, given the fruitful interaction of corpus linguistics with CDA, as well as a host of other fields, such as the various subfields of ELT (English Language Teaching)[261], frame semantics[262], and even the study of stock markets[263], while "[c]orpora and discourse analysis have a troubled relationship,"[264] it is one that is likely here to stay.

The reader may reasonably ask at this point what, precisely, is the matter with CDA, and how will this study do things differently? Some of the key assumptions of CDA will be unpacked below, and will be used to demonstrate that a theoretical reconfiguration of what we mean by "discourse analysis" is necessary if we are to use the theoretical frameworks of Freeden and Larsen, as discussed in chapter one.

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[257] David Y.W. Lee, "Corpora and Discourse Analysis: New Ways of Doing Old Things," in *Advances in Discourse Studies*, ed. Vijay K. Bhatia, John Flowerdew, and Rodney H. Jones (London: Routledge, 2008), 90.

[258] This is basically the *raison d'être* of the WebCorp project: http://www.webcorp.org.uk/ (Accessed 25 May 2012)

[259] Gerlinde Mautner, "Time to Get Wired: Using Web-Based Corpora in Critical Discourse Analysis," *Discourse and Society* 16, no. 6 (2005).

[260] Paul Baker et al., "A Useful Methodological Synergy? Combining Critical Discourse Analysis and Corpus Linguistics to Examine Discourses of Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the UK Press," *Discourse and Society* 19, no. 3 (2008).

[261] For example, David Lee and John Swales, "A Corpus-Based EAP Course for NNS Doctoral Students: Moving from Available Specialized Corpora to Self-Compiled Corpora," *English for Specific Purposes* 25, no. 1 (2006). English language instruction is one of the fields where corpus linguistics first became popular, and as such the literature is vast.

[262] Craig Hamilton, Svenja Adolphs, and Brigitte Nerlich, "The Meanings of 'Risk': A View From Corpus Linguistics," *Discourse and Society* 18, no. 2 (2007).

[263] Khurshid Ahmad et al., "The Mood of the (Financial) Markets: In a Corpus of Words and of Pictures," in *Corpus Linguistics Around the World*, ed. Andrew Wilson, Dawn Archer, and Paul Rayson (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006).

[264] Tuija Virtanen, "Corpora and Discourse Analysis," in *Corpus Linguistics: An International Handbook*, ed. Anke Lüdeling and Merja Kytö (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2009). Virtanen provides a truly exhaustive overview of the literature, of which this section has only scratched the surface.

CDA is discussed here primarily because it is presently the dominant approach in the literature on discourse analysis, and exercises tremendous influence within the academy. It is important to note, however, that it is not a monolithic body of thought, though there are several key components and figures which link the school together, and which differentiate it from the kind of discourse analysis proposed here. While this study does not accept the CDA approach as useful in the study of history, we can nonetheless learn from it.

CDA, according to one of its leading practitioners, Ruth Wodak, is equal parts critique and linguistics, and cannot be disassociated from a social agenda; it "is therefore not interested in investigating a linguistic unit per se but in studying social phenomena which are necessarily complex and thus require a multi-disciplinary and multi-methodical approach."[265] The way the critical discourse analyst goes about addressing "these questions and dimensions [of social inequality] is by focusing on *the role of discourse in the (re)production and challenge of dominance*."[266] CDA assumes a political commitment on the part of the analyst: the goal of an analysis is to effect change in the world through critique. In this, it borrows from the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School, who "indicate[d] that social theory should be oriented towards critiquing and changing society, in contrast to traditional theory oriented solely to understanding or explaining it."[267] In most other respects, CDA has

[265] Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, "Critical Discourse Analysis: History, Agenda, Theory and Methodology," in *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, 2nd ed.*, ed. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: Sage, 2009), 2.
[266] Teun A. van Dijk, "Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis," *Discourse and Society* 4, no. 2 (1993): 249. Emphasis in the original. For his thoughts on applying CDA specifically to the study of political discourse, see ———, "What is Political Discourse Analysis?," in *Political Linguistics*, ed. Jan Blommaert and Chris Bulcaen (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1997).
[267] Wodak and Meyer, "Critical Discourse Analysis," 6.

a great deal in common with other approaches to discourse analysis.[268] However, at its heart is "a shared interest in social processes of power, hierarchy-building, exclusion and subordination[269]," as interpreted through a variety of theoretical foundations and methodical orientations.[270]

This commitment is nothing if not controversial, and has been so since the earliest days of CDA. The applied linguist H.G. Widdowson wrote a withering criticism of CDA, arguing, in effect, that in its focus on social attitudes and the exercise of power, "the question of scope is confused with that of commitment."[271] More fundamentally, he points to the distinction between authorial intent and interpretation, which, he argues, CDA conflates: "The discourse which the writer intends the text to record as output is, in these circumstances, always likely to be different from the discourse which the reader derives from it… This is the necessary consequence of discourse conceived as social action. It is your discourse you read into my text. You can only interpret it by relating it to your reality."[272] The error of critical discourse analysts, then, is that they fail to understand the distinction between

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[268] And they are myriad, and rarely in agreement with each other. Wodak illustrates this point in a review of recent literature on the field: Ruth Wodak, "Dilemmas of Discourse (Analysis)," *Language in Society* 35, no. 4 (2006). Problems of definition, going back to the 23 different definitions of "discourse" in Foucault's lecture at the Collège de France (p. 596), are compounded by methodological and theoretical opacity. As Wodak argues, "any research procedure and device should be transparent and explicit, and thus allow recipients to trace and understand the operationalization and interpretation of results." (p. 609) The same can be said of theory; that is, analysts should make explicit their definitions and theoretical bases, which is what this chapter has attempted to do. Cf. a similar argument to "make explicit the foundations for the knowledge produced [in a research project]." Marianne Jorgensen and Louise J. Phillips, *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method* (London: Sage, 2002), 207.

[269] Wodak and Meyer, "Critical Discourse Analysis," 32.

[270] For a convenient depiction of the relations of various CDA sub-schools in chart form, see Ibid., 20, 22. Wodak, too, has her own preferred approach to CDA, termed the "Discourse-Historical Approach": Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak, "The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA)," in *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, 2nd ed.*, ed. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: Sage, 2009).

[271] H.G. Widdowson, "Discourse Analysis: A Critical View," *Language and Literature* 4, no. 3 (1995): 159.

[272] Ibid.: 164-65. He further illustrates this in regards to pragmatics: "The pragmatic significance we achieve with linguistic forms in contexts of use, the external functions we assign to them, has to be *related to*, but cannot be *equated with* the internal functions of their semantic signification. You cannot read what people mean directly from the texts they produce." (pp. 166-67 Emphasis in the original.)

Skinner's notions of meaning and understanding: they find relations of domination because that is what they set out to find.

Skinner argues that the "understanding of texts…presupposes the grasp both of what they were intended to mean, and how this meaning was intended to be taken…it follows from this that the appropriate methodology for the history of ideas must be concerned, first of all, to delineate the whole range of communications which could have been conventionally performed on the given occasion by the utterance of the given utterance, and, next, to trace the relations between the given utterance and this wider *linguistic* context as a means of decoding the actual intentions of the given writer."[273] The error CDA makes, then, is that it restricts its analysis by refusing to "delineate the whole range of communications," and instead reads its preferred discourse into the text under consideration, rather than attempting to decode authorial intention.

This is a serious weakness of CDA, and one which Fairclough does not answer convincingly. In his reply to Widdowson, he postulates that two kinds of interpretation are involved in CDA: the first, "Interpretation-1," is "an inherent part of ordinary language use..: mak[ing] meaning from/with spoken or written texts;" the second, "Interpretation-2," is "a matter of analysts seeking to show connections between both properties of texts and practices of interpretation-1 in a particular social space, and wider social and cultural properties of that particular social space."[274] The problem, of course, is that while this situates CDA within the realm of social context, it still makes the error of conflating scope with commitment. Furthermore, it does nothing to address the matter of authorial intention, which is of critical importance in

[273] Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding," 48-49. See also his discussion of the difference between the "intention *to do x*" and "an intention *in doing x*," pp. 45-46, which relates his method to Austin's speech act theory.
[274] Fairclough, "A Reply," 49-50.

a historical context, all interpretative matters aside. This leads Fairclough to defend CDA by arguing that its inherent political commitment does not entail a particular valence, that "a CDA of the right is quite conceivable, directed for instance at left-wing or feminist texts."[275]

Widdowson, in his reply to Fairclough, proceeds to raise the very point discussed above: "There is a good deal of talk in *Discourse and Social Change*[276] (and indeed in Fairclough's work generally) about the production and consumption of texts, but in this case, and in the case of other analyses, the actual producers and consumers are not consulted as to what their intentions or interpretations might be. Instead, these are ascribed on the sole evidence of the analysis: in other words, they are read into the text…The analyst preconceives the data as evidence. Fairclough knows what he is looking for. Not surprisingly, he finds it."[277] More presciently, he notes an irony of the debate, namely, that CDA "can be seen as a new ideological orthodoxy and as such, paradoxically, it exerts just the kind of discursive domination which it seeks to expose in other uses of language."[278] This is so, and it is a point others have made since. More poignantly, he raises a fundamental assumption (and weakness) of CDA: "Fairclough's contention, and it is central to his theory of discourse and social change, is that people in power shift voice in subtle ways to exert their influence."[279] Without ascertaining authorial intent, this is difficult to prove, though one can argue that these relations of domination occur unconsciously, as the operand of a pervasive discourse of which the participants are unaware, a discourse in

[275] Ibid.: 52.
[276] Norman Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992).
[277] H.G. Widdowson, "Reply to Fairclough: Discourse and Interpretation: Conjectures and Refutations," *Language and Literature* 5, no. 1 (1996): 62-63.
[278] Ibid.: 57.
[279] Ibid.: 66.

a much more Foucauldian sense.[280] This is even more problematic, as it raises the question of an implicit set of structural power relations which are essentially Marxist in nature.[281] The notion of a self-directing and self-reinforcing system of domination, existing outside of conscious human relations, posits a worrisome teleological framework, one which, in the absence of compelling evidence, we cannot accept as valid.

But to return to the reception of CDA, Widdowson's critique presaged that of others, who were quick to point out that CDA was "often less interested in discovering the truth than in proclaiming it."[282] But more salient was Widdowson's paradox of CDA, how it uses the same means of domination and manipulation which it seeks to unmask. This has most typically been denied by CDA's defenders, although some have accepted this criticism, arguing instead for self-reflection, and a touch of humility, while implicitly accepting Widdowson's argument for better use of evidence in CDA: "It is far preferable to concede that you cannot analyse or write about power, hegemony and dominance without yourself potentially being implicated

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[280] See in this regard Penny Powers, "The Philosophical Foundations of Foucaultian Discourse Analysis," *Critical Approaches to Discourse Analysis Across Disciplines (CADAAD)* 1, no. 2 (2007): 25-31. Also, cf. a definition of discourse given by Jürgen Link: "an institutionalized way of talking that regulates and reinforces action and thereby exerts power," cited in: Siegfried Jäger and Florentine Maier, "Theoretical and Methodological Aspects of Foucauldian Critical Discourse Analysis and Dispositive Analysis," in *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, 2nd ed.*, ed. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: Sage, 2009), 35. In fairness, much of the program laid out by Jäger and Maier is one that is amenable to the approach taken in this study. For example, they note that discourses "can thus be understood as material reality *sui generis*…Discourse is a material reality of its own…Discourse determines reality, though of course always via intervening active subjects in their social contexts as co-producers and co-agents of discourses." (pp. 36-37) In particular, their hierarchical structure of "discourse fragments," "discourse strands," "discourses," and "discourse knots," in ascending order of complexity (pp. 46-47), which draws on Foucault's *Archaeology of Knowledge*, is strikingly similar to the modified framework we have borrowed from Larsen. Questions of power relations aside, theirs is probably the closest approach to the one undertaken here, and illustrates that, despite theoretical quibbles over some matters, there is a broad consensus among many discourse analysts over what, exactly, constitutes our field.

[281] This is far from my original insight; even a writer as sympathetic to Fairclough as Ruth Wodak underscores the extent to which he draws on Marx. See Wodak and Meyer, "Critical Discourse Analysis," 20, 27.

[282] Hugh Tyrwhitt-Drake, "Resisting the Discourse of Critical Discourse Analysis: Reopening a Hong Kong Case Study," *Journal of Pragmatics* 31, no. 8 (1999): 1088. This of course elicited a heated reply: John Flowerdew, "Description and Interpretation in Critical Discourse Analysis," *Journal of Pragmatics* 31, no. 8 (1999).

and compromised by the powerful and hegemonizing turns of your own discourse…Certain strategic and perhaps rhetorical positions are worth adopting, always mindful that they are indeed rhetorical…All such rhetorical claims have to be delivered upon, in no small measure by means of a supporting rhetoric of evidence, documentation and argument."[283] These disagreements are unlikely to be resolved anytime soon, and despite its dominance (hegemony?) within the discourse analysis community, CDA will continue to remain highly controversial.[284]

This criticism is not to suggest that CDA can never be useful; far from it. There may well be instances or subjects where a CDA approach is highly fruitful, and can fulfill its goal of effecting positive social change, though these will most likely be restricted to the analysis of contemporary discourses, rather than historical ones. Nonetheless, we have found ample reason here to reject the CDA approach in this study, which begs the question of which approach we should use. A relatively new school of thinking which blends corpus linguistics with discourse analysis merits our attention: Corpus-Assisted Discourse Studies (CADS).

Towards a Hippogriff Theory

While the study of discourse using corpora is nothing new, there is still a great deal of disagreement over the theoretical orientation one should bring to bear in a study, regardless of one's preferred school of discourse analysis. Early pioneers in the field largely ignored this question; Sinclair only deals with discourse in the glossary of

[283] Michael Toolan, "What is Critical Discourse Analysis and Why Are People Saying Such Terrible Things About It?," *Language and Literature* 6, no. 2 (1997): 87.
[284] See the recent back-and-forth over nominalization in CDA, which makes much the same argument that Widdowson, Tyrwhitt-Drake, and others first made a decade ago, in *Discourse and Society* 19, No. 6 (Nov. 2008), pp. 783-844. Michael Billig's initial criticism drew replies from J.R. Martin, Norman Fairclough, and Teun van Dijk.

Corpus, Concordance, Collocation.[285] One of the clearest attempts at crafting a general theory for the study of corpora was that of Elena Tognini-Bonelli, who devised a binary approach of "corpus-based" and "corpus-driven" studies. She defines the former as "a methodology that avails itself of the corpus mainly to expound, test, or exemplify theories and descriptions that were formulated before large corpora became available to inform language study,"[286] while the latter is an approach in which "theoretical statements are fully consistent with, and reflect directly, the evidence provided by the corpus. Indeed, many of the statements are of a kind that are not usually accessible by any other means than the inspection of corpus evidence."[287] For our purposes, this dichotomy is problematic, as it is largely concerned with the investigation of language structure more generally, and theory-building through the study of corpora, whereas this study is primarily concerned with the study of discourse.

Approaching this problem from the field of discourse analysis does little to remedy our confusion. David Lee utilizes the phrase "corpus-based discourse analysis (CBDA)," which he then subdivides further into four sub-categories: 1) *corpus-informed* studies, which are primarily qualitative in nature, and rely on close manual analysis of text; 2) *corpus-supported* studies, which are both qualitative and quantitative, and in which the analyst "comes to the task using, relying on or imposing prior linguistic intuitions or theoretical frameworks while examining the data;" 3) *corpus-driven* studies, which, like corpus-supported studies, are both qualitative and quantitative, but in which "the analyst approaches the task with fewer preconceptions;" 4) *corpus-induced* studies, which are mainly quantitative and tend to

[285] Sinclair, *Corpus, Concordance, Collocation*, 172.
[286] Elena Tognini-Bonelli, *Corpus Linguistics at Work* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2001), 65.
[287] Ibid., 84. Sinclair himself later embraced this distinction, and identified himself with the "corpus-driven" approach: John Sinclair, *Trust the Text: Language, Corpus and Discourse* (London: Routledge, 2004), 191.

use corpora for largely mechanical ends, such as natural language processing (NLP) applications, machine translation, etc.[288] As this study aims to use corpora as its primary data source, and to utilize a combination of manual and automated analytical methods, it is most likely either corpus-supported or corpus-driven, under Lee's typology. But the line between these two approaches is fuzzy at best, and rather hard to clarify in any non-subjective way.

Furthermore, it does nothing to address the fact that we are concerned here primarily with the study of discourse rather than corpora, even if corpora are central to our methodology. The central importance of combining the qualitative with the quantitative thus recommends CADS, which adopts this as its central motivation: "[it is] possible to combine the *quantitative* types of analysis used in Corpus Linguistics, which generally take into consideration large quantities of texts and subject them to statistical analysis, with the *qualitative* methods more typical of discourse studies which examine in detail much smaller amounts of discourse, frequently single texts."[289] Or, to put it more simply, it is much like the mythical hippogriff: "'[t]he mare (of discourse) shall now lie down with the griffin (of Corpus Linguistics)', and the fruit of their union shall be Corpus-Assisted Discourse Studies (CADS)."[290] Thus, CADS, by combining methodologies, offers a way to resolve the evidentiary problems faced by CDA, as described above, while avoiding the more rigid theory-building of a corpus-driven, purely inductive approach; it "reintroduces a greater focus on social and psychological aspects [of discourse] and so borrows approaches from the social sciences."[291]

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[288] This schema is derived from Lee, "Corpora and Discourse Analysis," 88.
[289] Alan Partington, *The Linguistics of Laughter: A Corpus-Assisted Study of Laughter-Talk* (London: Routledge, 2006), 4.
[290] ———, "Corpora and Discourse, A Most Congruous Beast," in *Corpora and Discourse*, ed. Alan Partington, John Morley, and Louann Haarman (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2004), 19.
[291] Partington, "Evaluating Evaluation," 289.

In practice, this means the CADS researcher investigates a research question, rather than testing a specific hypothesis, making it likewise amenable to historical study. Prior pilot research (as in chapter one) suggests a topic of interest and points of entry for the researcher, who designs a project and delineates the data to be utilized. During the analysis, the data may suggest further questions or hypotheses, which may recursively necessitate other data, or modes of interrogating it.[292] Thus, methodology (or techniques) may change on the fly as new discoveries in the data under analysis require further investigation. It is a dynamic and flexible approach to analysis, one which requires careful execution by the researcher, but which has the benefit of revealing to us things which are new and unexpected, rather than simply proving or disproving our preconceptions. We therefore embark upon this study in the spirit described by Partington: "the CADS researcher is like a picaresque adventurer: s/he knows from where s/he sets off, may know roughly where s/he wants to end up, but all sorts of wonderful discoveries can lie in wait along the way."[293]

There and Back Again

Now that we have (mostly) resolved our problems of theory and methodology, a few final points remain before we can finally embark upon our journey. First, there is comparatively little guidance available in designing a study of this nature. While most studies of discourse focus on a genre, a topic[294], or some other broadly-defined category, this paper consists of five smaller case studies of individuals: the two

[292] This discussion is a summarization of Partington's description of CADS methodology, Ibid., 289-90. Without using CADS terminology, he basically undertakes this type of research in an earlier book, Alan Partington, *The Linguistics of Political Argument: The Spin-Doctor and the Wolf-Pack* (London: Routledge, 2003).
[293] Partington, "Metaphors, Motifs and Similes," 301.
[294] Cf. especially Baker et al., "A Useful Methodological Synergy?."

Supreme Leaders of the IRI, Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamenei; and three Presidents: Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Mohammad Khatami, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. This is highly unusual, in that there is virtually no literature on the analysis of individual or idiolectal corpora.[295]

Accordingly, we are left largely on our own in deciding which data to include in our subcorpora; this will be discussed in more detail in each chapter below, though there are a few general issues which must be addressed. First, there is no clear guideline of how large an individual corpus should be. Previous studies indicate that corpora of even less than 100,000 words may be sufficient, though fortunately all of the corpora in this study will far exceed that threshold.[296] As a general rule, more data yield more reliable results, and this study has been designed with the goal of maximum reliability in mind. This raises a second point: the issue of text type. Mixing political speeches with written letters raises the question of the extent to which internal variation due to genre or text type may affect the data; this is a valid concern, but it is probably less problematic than in the case of general-language corpora, such as the Bank of English or the British National Corpus, given that high-register political discourse, such as prepared speeches, will likely share some features with written discourse, such as letters. Furthermore, while some aspects of these texts, such as verbal inflection, colligation, and syntax likely differ substantially, this is likely to be mediated somewhat by the similarities of lexis which are the result of shared topicality, and which will necessarily be more salient in this study for technical

[295] In fact, I have been able to find precisely two articles: David Coniam, "Concordancing Oneself: Constructing Individual Textual Profiles," *International Journal of Corpus Linguistics* 9, no. 2 (2004), Sandra Mollin, ""I Entirely Understand" is a Blairism," *International Journal of Corpus Linguistics* 14, no. 3 (2009). Mollin's article is more directly relevant to this project, given that it is a study of Tony Blair, a major political figure. However, her focus is quite different from this study, as she notes that her "paper is entirely linguistically, and not at all politically, motivated." (p. 372) This study is more interested in politics, ideas, and discourse than linguistics *per se*.

[296] Coniam, "Concordancing Oneself," 273-77.

reasons. This will likewise be addressed in greater detail in the case studies below. For now, it is probably safe to assume that many of these differences "wash out" due to the fact that we are analyzing corpora of single individuals, which act as a powerful control on other types of variation, unlike in more general language corpora.

When we refer to prepared speech, of course, it raises the issue of who prepares the texts. As has been noted in Mollin's study of Tony Blair's idiolect, most of these texts "may indeed have been drafted by staff rather than by Tony Blair himself."[297] This probably holds true in most advanced political systems, regardless of their nature. However, this is not problematic for our purposes, as we are, again, interested in political discourse rather than idiolectal linguistic features, in which case this fact would cause some problems. Here, we have to deploy what I term the *principle of ideological non-abhorrence*, which is to say that, at a minimum, political figures will not publicly utter words which they find ideologically repugnant. To assume otherwise is to effectively declare the serious study of the language (and ideology) of public figures impossible.[298]

Finally, readers more familiar with the techniques of corpus linguistics may wonder why this study makes use of a comparatively limited range of techniques in the field (for instance, forgoing studies of colligation, using parsed or part-of-speech tagged data). Quite simply put, this is due to the underdevelopment of techniques for the study of non-European languages, and languages which use non-Roman scripts in particular. There are a few tools, including specialized concordancing software (which allows for such features as searching by roots rather than wordforms), for

[297] Mollin, ""I Entirely Understand"," 371.
[298] This can be explained theoretically: figures such as President Ahmadinejad or Ayatollah Khamenei may not be the *authors* of their texts (in the sense of having originally produced them), but they are their *principals*, or those ultimately responsible for them, and in the case of speeches, they are usually their *animators* as well, those who utter the words and perform the speech act. These terms are borrowed from Erving Goffman, *Forms of Talk* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981).

Arabic[299], but there are exceedingly few studies of Persian, even from a strictly discourse analytical perspective, regardless of their use of corpora.[300]

Nonetheless, with these restrictions in mind, we are now finally ready to begin the first of our case studies: that of Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of Iran's Islamic Revolution.

[299] Latifa al-Sulaiti and Eric Atwell, "The Design of a Corpus of Contemporary Arabic," *International Journal of Corpus Linguistics* 11, no. 2 (2006), Eric Atwell, "aConCorde: Towards an Open-Source, Extendable Concordancer for Arabic," *Corpora* 1, no. 1 (2006).

[300] S. Mostafa Assi and M. Haji Abdolhosseini, "Grammatical Tagging of a Persian Corpus," *International Journal of Corpus Linguistics* 5, no. 1 (2000), Tayebeh Mosavi Miangah, "Solving the Polysemy Problem of Persian Words Using Mutual Information Statistics," in *Corpus Linguistics 2007 Conference Proceedings* (Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2007), Homeira Moshirzadeh, "Discursive Foundations of Iran's Nuclear Policy," *Security Dialogue* 38, no. 4 (2007), Mohammad Amouzadeh, "Language as Social Practice: Persian Newspapers in Post-Revolutionary Iran," *Journal of Language and Politics* 7, no. 1 (2008), Farzad Sharifian, "Figurative Language in International Political Discourse: The Case of Iran," *Journal of Language and Politics* 8, no. 3 (2009).

3. Khomeini, the Wellspring

وَاعْتَصِمُوا بِحَبْلِ اللهِ جَمِيعًا وَلاَ تَفَرَّقُوا

"And hold fast, all together, by the rope which Allah (stretches out for you), and be not divided among yourselves…"

The Qur'ān, Āl ʿImrān, *āya* 103. This translation is from Yusufali's rendition.

As a product of the seminaries of Qom, it might at first appear counterintuitive that a Shi'i cleric such as Ruhollah Khomeini would evince an interest in the cause of pan-Islamism. The historically inward-looking and politically quietist *howze*s of Qom, and in particular the Iraqi shrine cities of the *ʿatabāt*, were less concerned with the matters of this world than those of the next, and their focus on doctrinal matters and *fiqh* often served to accentuate their differences with their Sunni brethren. This was particularly the case in Qom, where, unlike in Iraq, a *tāleb* (seminarian) was unlikely to encounter any Sunna, and could spend his entire professional life in a Shi'i milieu.

But Khomeini's era was an interesting time to be in the *howze.* Among the leading clergy, and those with whom Khomeini was closely associated, were Ayatollah Kashani, with whom Khomeini shared views on "Islamic universalism,"[301] and who, as discussed above, supported the notion of *taqrīb*. Likewise, Khomeini was a staunch supporter of Ayatollah Borujerdi, the *marja'-e ʿāmm* of the era[302], and himself a pan-Islamist. Indeed, he considered his support for the activities of the *dār al-taqrīb* to be among "the fruits of his life," and "until the last moments of his life,

[301] Baqer Moin, *Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), 64.
[302] Ibid., 60.

did not neglect to think of it."[303] Likewise, he condemned the publication of materials insulting the Sunna, arguing on a Quran'ic basis that Muslims should not defame the beliefs of other *mazāheb*, lest their own be insulted[304], and that division played into the hands of the enemies of the Muslims.

A spirit of ecumenicism was in the air, and Borujerdi's stance emboldened its advocates, who grounded this attitude in the works of earlier scholars, such as the medieval theologian Sheykh Sodūq, who wrote that: "Forbearance from speaking ill of the beliefs of the Sunna until the appearance of the Hidden Imam is a religious obligation. [*vājeb*] Whosoever does so [i.e., insults the Sunna] before His appearance has left the faith of God and the Imamite sect, and has opposed God, the Messenger of God, and the Infallible [*ma'sūm*] Imams."[305]

But there was also the ever-present threat of foreign intrigue against Iran and the *umma*, and the creation of the state of Israel only stoked the fires of conspiracy. Some years later, the quite literal fire at the al-Aqsa Mosque in 1969, which ultimately led to the formation of the OIC, was blamed on Israel and its colonialist allies, including the Pahlavi regime. This explains Khomeini's skepticism towards the OIC, an organization he might have otherwise been expected to support. Instead, he referred to it as the "so-called Islamic Unity Conference" (*konferāns be estelāh-e vahdat-e eslāmī*)[306], largely due to his suspicions of the regimes which supported it,

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[303] Moslem Tahūrī, *Āyatollāh Borūjerdī va ettehād-e donyā-ye eslām* (Zāhedān: Nahād-e Nemāyandegī-ye Maqām-e Mo'azzam-e Rahbarī, dar-e omūr-e ahl-e sonnat-e Sīstān va Balūchestān, 1382 (2003)), 60. Interestingly, to bolster his claim, the author cites an anecdote from Morteza Motahhari.

[304] Ibid., 88-92. The particular *āya* cited is Q6:108. However, unlike some earlier pan-Islamists, such as Kidwai, Borujerdi most emphatically did not accept the Baha'is as part of the *umma*, and vehemently opposed their very existence. Tahūrī, *Āyatollāh Borūjerdī*, 61-2, 124-27. Khomeini would follow him in this stance.

[305] Tahūrī, *Āyatollāh Borūjerdī*, 91.

[306] This seems to have been an official trope of IRI historiography for some time. See Sayyed Hamīd Rowhānī, *Nahzat-e Emām Khomeinī*, vol. 2 (Tehrān: Vāhed-e Farhang-e Bonyād-e Shahīd, 1364 (1985)), 445-63, passim. While this is the preferred epithet, there are several other creative ones in Rowhānī's work, including *konferāns-e zedd-e eslāmī* ("anti-Islamic conference," p. 456), *konferāns-e*

particularly the Pahlavis. In theoretical terms, then, we can say that Khomeini's notion of pan-Islamism at this time was more focused on affinial than institutional unity. This can be seen in Rowhānī's approving citation in full of a speech by Nasser, in which he refers to "…real Islamic cooperation, cooperation of Muslim peoples…and not cooperation of governments [which are subservient to imperial powers]."[307] Thus, what might casually be seen as an incident most illustrative of the IRI's conspiracy theory-prone view of history is instead an important reminder of the need to distinguish among pan-Islamism's elements, as equating it with only one (here, institutional unity) would lead to a misinterpretation of this incident, and perhaps Khomeini's views more generally.[308]

Despite his suspicion of the OIC, Khomeini nonetheless forged links with numerous Islamic movements in other countries, particularly Iraq and Palestine, during his exile.[309] Some of these relations were perfunctory, others long-standing, but all of these actions are testimony to Khomeini's embrace in this period of affinial unity, sometimes as a means to attain a broader institutional unity in the end.

In analyzing Khomeini as *rahbar*, then, we must bear in mind this background, and the context in which he emerged as leader of the Islamic Revolution. His seminary education and the clerical milieu of the era lent him a strong disposition to *taqrīb*, while the political circumstances during his period of exile led him to eschew ideas of institutional unity in light of the corrupt or imperialist nature of most

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āmrīkā'ī –ertejā'ī be estelāh-e eslāmī ("the American-reactionary conference which is called Islamic," p. 458) and *konferāns-e este'mārī – ertejā'ī be estelāh-e eslāmī* ("the colonialist-reactionary conference which is called Islamic," p. 462).

[307] Ibid., 453.

[308] In fact, the relationship among these various elements is often quite subtle. As others have pointed out, Khomeini viewed the institution of an Islamic government in Iran as something of a vanguard, a first step towards the broader unification of the Muslim world. Thus, institutional unity would act to strengthen affinial unity, which would recursively strengthen institutional unity, in turn. Ḥusayn Nūr al-Dīn al-Ḥamawī, *Nahj al-imām al-Khumaynī wa-taḥrīr al-Quds* (Bayrūt: Dār al-Hādī, 2002), 78.

[309] For a discussion of these links both before and after the Islamic Revolution, see Mahnāz Zahīrīnezhād, *Monāsebāt-e Emām Khomeinī bā harakat-hā va mobārezān-e eslāmī (dar sāl-hā-ye 1343-1357)* (Tehrān: Enteshārāt-e Markaz-e Asnād-e Enqelāb-e Eslāmī, 1382 (2003)), esp. 63-136.

governments in the Muslim world, instead favoring affinial unity and relations with other revolutionary groups, until such time as an Islamic government in Iran could serve as the lodestar for a new kind of institutional unity, a kind of Islamic confederationalism.[310] How these ideas changed, and the new discourses they engendered once Khomeini became the *rahbar* of the new Islamic Republic will be the primary focus of this chapter. But before we can begin our study of these discourses, a brief description of the texts to be used, the reasons for their selection, and the details of their preparation must preface our corpus analysis.

The Corpus

The texts which comprise our Khomeini corpus are drawn from an electronic version of the *Sahīfe-ye Emām*, available at the website of the *Bonyād-e Andīshe-ye Eslāmī* at www.imam-khomeini.com.[311] The *Sahīfe-ye Emām* is the most complete collection of Khomeini's speeches, letters, and various other texts available, from the earliest days of his seminary career up to his final will and testament, the *Vasīyatnāme-ye Elāhī-Sīyāsī*. It does not include, however, his theological treatises from his days in Qom and Najaf, such as the *Tawḍīh al-Masā'il* or *Hokūmat-e Eslāmī*. It differs from the earlier and more widely cited *Sahīfe-ye Nūr* primarily in completeness, as it has been updated to include some texts left out of the earlier compendium, primarily personal and family letters, though some speeches are included, as well.[312] While

[310] Ibid., 116, Mohammad Rezā Dahshīrī, *Darāmadī bar nazarīye-ye sīyāsī-ye Emām Khomeinī* (Tehrān: Enteshārāt-e Markaz-e Asnād-e Enqelāb-e Eslāmī, 1379 (2000)), 313-14.
[311] Specifically, the files in question can be found at: http://www.imam-khomeini.com/ShowList.aspx?cat=11749&lang=Fa (Accessed October 2010)
[312] For a detailed description of the differences between the two compendia, as well as a listing of what is excluded from the *Sahīfe-ye Emām*, see Hamīd Ansārī, "Moqaddame-ye Nāsher," in *Sahīfe-ye*

some editing of the texts may have occurred, an unsystematic comparison of texts in several volumes of both collections revealed no major changes to the texts themselves; what changes did exist mostly encompassed titles and metadata such as more details on the dates and locations of speeches. Thus, for our purposes, it represents the best data source available.

The entire compendium was saved in .txt format, and was prepared for analysis through an extensive cleaning process. First, the decision was made to only include volumes six through twenty-one in the final corpus, with the first text in the corpus being Khomeini's speech at Mehrabad Airport upon his return from exile on 12 Bahman 1357/ 1 February 1979. Given that this event effectively marked Khomeini's assumption of not only the leadership of the Revolution, but of the new post-Pahlavi government as well, it is the most logical starting point for our study of his discourse as *rahbar*. Second, each text file was cleaned of metadata, primarily time, place, and topic headers. Given the time cost involved in attempting to do so, sub-topic headers dividing longer texts were not removed. Third, texts such as interviews were cleaned of text from speakers other than Khomeini, while questions at speeches or sermons were likewise removed. As this section is only concerned with Khomeini's discourse (and thus, his text), it was important to minimize the contamination of the data by other speakers' utterances.

Perhaps more controversially, the decision was made to likewise remove traditional benedictory phrases, primarily the well-known *bism allāh al-raḥman al-raḥīm*, and its closing counterpart *wa al-salām 'alaykum wa raḥmatullāh wa barakātuhu.* (A few different phrases which occasionally took the place of these were left in, due to their low frequency.) The occasional instances of long Qur'anic quotes

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Emām: Majmū'eh-ye Āsār, Bayānāt, Payām-hā, Mosāhebe-hā, Ahkām, Ejāzāt-e shar'ī va nāmeh-hā, V. 1 (Tehrān: Moassese-ye Tanzīm va Nashr-e Āsār -e Hazrat Emām Khomeinī, 1378 (1999)), xxxiii-xxxix.

at the beginning or end of a text, often in fully-voweled Arabic, were deleted as well. While these traditional phrases are indeed a form of linguistic behavior, they hardly carry any ideological value (beyond their deliberate inclusion or exclusion), and their inclusion in a corpus can skew the results quite heavily[313] for two reasons: first, their simple frequency and occurrence in nearly every text creates a strong set of collocates which skew a variety of other measures; and second, particularly in the case of fully-voweled Qur'anic verses, their marked difference from normal Persian language means that such phrases tend to show up as highly statistically significant when using measures of salience. While this might be of some interest in a socio-linguistic study, these results only tend to obscure items of greater interest in a study of discourse and ideology, and as such they have been excluded here. There may be some significance to the choice of a Persian (rather than Arabic) phrase to open a speech or text, but this question is not examined here. In all likelihood, it probably correlates most strongly with text type, rather than indicating any key substantive distinctions.

There is one minor caveat in regards to the final, cleaned text: due to the organization of the original text, it was not efficient in terms of time costs to separate each item into a separate text file. Instead, the original division of the texts into several longer text files per printed volume was preserved. This may lead to some minor interference with the data analysis (a kind of "signal bleed"), with words at the beginning and end of adjacent texts falsely collocating. The effects of such an imperfection in the data are likely to be minor, however, and will not greatly impact

[313] This was found to be the case in earlier pilot studies of Ahmadinejad and Khamenei which did not remove such formulaic text, in which such phrases were both highly frequent and highly salient. While these findings were statistically valid, they provided little information of interest, leading to the removal of such text in this study. See Adam Berry, "Following the Line of the Imam: A Corpus Analysis of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei" (University of Birmingham, 2007), ———, "The Fulcrum of the Umma: Ahmadinejad and the Construction of Pan-Islamist Discourse" (University of Oxford, 2008).

the results of the study.[314] Likewise, the reorganization of texts into yearly chunks to allow comparative analysis over time (as is the case with later chapters of this study, where such annual divisions were naturally occurring in the data) was considered, but ultimately decided against. Unfortunately, a comparative study of five political actors cannot exhaust every potential means of analysis and remain of a readable length; Khomeini alone is easily the subject of a lengthy book. (And many such tomes already exist.)

With all of these caveats, nagging details, and qualifications in mind, we are finally ready to begin our study of Khomeini's discourse, beginning with that simplest of measures: the humble wordlist.

Wordlist

The corpus was comprised of some 2,149,801 words. A frequency-ranked wordlist yields unsurprising results at the very top; as we would expect to find in any naturally-occurring sample of language, function words tend to predominate over content words. The first content word to occur on the list is *eslām* at 18, while the first 17 terms consist of conjunctions, pronouns, prepositions and grammatical particles, along with one verb, *ast* (is). A similar pattern occurs throughout the first 50 words in the wordlist. (See Figure 3-1.) In selecting further terms of interest to examine in greater detail in our next section, the first 200 words on the list will serve as a useful starting point. We will also examine collocations for other terms which may be less frequent, but are related to our research questions; in selecting these, we

[314] Wordsmith usually does not calculate collocation for words separated by a full stop or line break, so this interference should be minimal.

will be informed by the existing literature on this topic. Thus, some of the 200 most frequent terms which may be of interest in the study of pan-Islamism in the Islamic Republic include not just *eslām*, but *allāh* at 34, Iran at 40, *khodā* at 63, *enqelāb* at 91, *moslemīn* at 130, and others to be discussed below. Likewise, we will examine other terms which are likely to be particularly relevant to this study, such as *vahdat*, *ommat*, *okhovvat*, *edalāt*, *mazlūm*, and others which occur frequently in Persian texts on this topic.

It is important to note that the terms discussed here are not the only ones which were analyzed in the course of this study; numerous others were examined, but found to yield little of interest or relevance to the topic at hand. Thus, in order to keep this study of readable length, any discussion of such terms has been excluded. Much like scientific studies only discuss positive findings, there is perhaps an epistemic bias to this approach, but it is the best possible compromise in light of space constraints.

Analysis, Section 1- Most Frequent Terms

Before delving into more specific terminology, we can examine some of the more general and frequent terms in this corpus to give some direction to our investigation of Khomeini's discourse. And in a discussion of pan-Islamism, what better place to start than with some of its core terms? In looking at the collocation pattern of *eslām*, at 18 on the wordlist, we find that most of the high-frequency terms in close proximity to our search term are functional rather than content items, which is unsurprising for a common noun. Less-frequent terms will give us a better understanding of the term's ideological valence(s). Given Persian syntax, we can

follow a simple rule of thumb: words occurring before *eslām* will probably refer to other things' relations to Islam (as we would expect a genitive construction), while words following are likely to specify Islam, and give us greater detail as to its particular valence in Khomeini's discourse.

Important L1 collocates (words occurring before the search word) include *beh* (to or for) at 1, *sadr* (honor, or the early period of Islam) at 6, *doshmanān* (enemies) at 10, *rāh* (way or path) at 11, *zedd* (against) at 13, *khalāf* (against) at 15, *qodrat* (power) at 17, *azmat* (greatness or magnificence) at 23, *hefz* (preservation) at 25, *masāleh* (interests) at 26, *mellat* (nation) at 27, and *khedmat* (service) at 28. (See Figure 3-2.) These collocates can be roughly divided into two categories: those highlighting the glories of Islam and its community (*sadr, qodrat, azmat, mellat, rāh*) and the need to uphold them (*hefz, masāleh, khedmat*), and those indicating the forces arrayed against it (*doshmanān, zedd, khalāf*). A Manichaean vision, and not an unsurprising one. As for the R1 collocates (words occurring after the search word), *rā* (direct object particle) stands out at 2, but perhaps more interesting is the relative infrequency of one we might expect to find more easily, *nāb* (pure), which doesn't occur until R1/50. The key revolutionary phrase *eslām-e nāb-e mohammadī* (pure "Mohammedan" Islam, usually contrasted with the "American" Islam of such countries as Saudi Arabia) seems to occur only 32 times in our entire corpus, and then, only in volume 21, according to the concordance lines. (See Figure 3-3.) This would seem to indicate that Khomeini only used the phrase with any frequency towards the end of his life, which is somewhat unexpected.

The next closely-related term, *eslāmī*, at 24 on the wordlist, is less complicated, with the most common collocates referring to social structures which happen to be Islamic. L1 collocates include *jomhūrī* (republic) at 1, *enqelāb*

(revolution) at 2, *keshvar-hā-ye* and *keshvar* (country/countries in an inflected form) at 3 and 4, *hokūmat* (government) at 5, *nahzat* (movement) at 6, *mamālek* (kingdoms) at 9, *mellat-hā-ye* and *dowlat-hā-ye* (nations and states, both inflected) at 10 and 11, *gheyr* (not, i.e., "not Islamic") at 12, *dowlat* at 13, *nezām* (order) at 20, and *melal* (nations) at 22. (See Figure 3-4.) Other than *gheyr* indicating the existence of other social structures, most of these terms refer to countries in one form or another, evidence of Khomeini's highly political and internationally-focused interpretation of Islam. The main R1 collocate is *Irān* at 4, hardly surprising, given the country's official name, *jomhūrī-ye eslāmī-ye Irān* (the Islamic Republic of Iran).

Our next most basic items might yield some further information. *Allāh*, 34 on the wordlist and the Arabic term for God, is more common than its Persian equivalent, *khodā*, so let us begin there. Most of its proximate collocates seem unpromising; they indicate either ritualistic phrases (e.g., *en shā allāh,* "God willing", comprising the L2 and L1 collocates; or *behamd allāh*, "praise be to God," at L1/2), or epithets for the Prophet or Imams (e.g., *rosūl allāh*, at L1/8; *baqīyyat allāh* at L1/10). (See Figure 3-5.) Given that Khomeini was a cleric, and that his texts were peppered with religious terminology throughout, this is to be expected. However, one collocate, *habl* (cord, or rope), at L1/22, is curious. A closer look at the concordance lines reveals that every one of its 39 occurrences is a reference to Q3:103 (*e'tesām* appears as a left collocate of *allāh* at L3/40). (See Figure 3-6.) These references, spread across several volumes of the *Sahīfe-ye Emām*, are invariably an exhortation by Khomeini for Muslims to "hold fast to the cable of Allah." That Khomeini would consciously reference an *āya* so favored by earlier pan-Islamists cannot be mere coincidence.

Khomeini's use of *khodā*, at 63 on the wordlist, has many similarities to his use of *allāh*, though there are some differences. For example, the L1 collocates *bandegān* (servants) at 9, *doshmanān* at 24, and *nasrat* (victory) at 25, as well as the R1 collocate *qīyām* (from *qīyām kardan*, to rise up or revolt) at 11, indicate the more political valence of this term. (See Figure 3-7.) A glance at the concordance lines for *bandegān* and *qīyām* reveals that the latter typically refers to the Islamic revolution and its participants, while the former likewise refers to the revolutionaries and their actions. Thus, *khodā* more closely fits Khomeini's political Islam, *allāh* his more traditional clerical role.

Now that we have a rough idea of the religious framework of Khomeini's discourse, it might be worthwhile to examine the national elements of it. What role does he see Iran playing in his political cosmology? A look at the collocation pattern for *Irān*, at 40 on the wordlist, yields few surprises; most of the collocates seem topical, such as the L1 collocates *mellat* at 2, *eslāmī* at 3, *sharīf* at 8, *bozorg* at 9, *dowlat* at 10, *keshvar* at 11, *mardom* at 15, *enqelāb* at 16, *mamlekat* at 18, and *azīz* at 19. (See Figure 3-8.) While this tells us little of ideological import, it hints at which terms merit closer examination.

Mellat, number 21 on the wordlist, is one of these. Some of the top collocates, *īn* at L1/1, *mā* at R1/1, and *Irān* at R1/2, indicate that the primary referent of the term is Iran. (See Figure 3-9.) Other collocates indicate what else is commonly referred to as *mellat*. One important criterion is evidenced by the R1/14 collocate *mosalmān* (Muslim, Islamic). Countries which merit this epithet besides Iran include Iraq, Pakistan, Palestine, Bangladesh, Fujairah, Lebanon, and others, as the concordance lines make apparent. Other common collocates are *arāq* (Iraq) at R1/16, *mazlūm* (oppressed) at R1/20, and *barādar* (brother, or brotherly) at R1/21, as well as *eslām* at

R1/23. One common term of address Khomeini seems to use in reference to other countries and their leaders is *mellat-e mosalmān va keshvaretān*, indicating a clear distinction between *mellat* and *keshvar*. *Mellat*, then, seems to have a positive valence, more so than *keshvar*, as it is a term used to identify not only Iran, but also brotherly countries, the nation (as opposed to the government) of Iraq, and oppressed nations, a term which in Shi'i political discourse carries a connotation of righteousness, and draws on the paradigm of Karbala. This would seem to be one way for Khomeini to instantiate affinial unity in his discourse; *mellat* unites various Muslim populations by highlighting a shared, or twinned, set of characteristics: the suffering of oppression and righteousness.

The data for *keshvar*, 56 on the wordlist, seem to bear out this impression. The L1/1 and R1/1 collocates are *īn* and *mā*, respectively, indicating reference to Iran, as does the R1/11 collocate, *Irān*. (See Figure 3-10.) Other than these terms referring to Iran, there is a slight preference for combining *keshvar* with possessive pronouns, such as R1/6, *khodeshān* (their own), R1/9, *khodetān* (your own), and R1/16, *khodemān* (our own). Strangely, the only other country mentioned with any regularity in this fashion is the Maldives, at R1/18. This seems to be a bit of statistical noise; the concordance lines indicate all 45 references are formalities, thanking the President of the Maldives for his congratulatory telegrams on various occasions. Finally, *keshvar* seems to possess a sense of abstraction; the L1 collocates *masāleh* (interests) at 13, *esteqlāl* (independence) at 14, *omūr* (affairs) at 15, or *defā* (defense) at L2/14 all indicate a kind of geopolitical topicality, rather than the affiniality of *mellat*.

A few other frequently-occurring collective terms merit further examination. *Mamlekat* (country, also kingdom), at 100 on the wordlist, seems to refer primarily to

Iran, as is apparent from the top L1 and R1 collocates, *īn* and *mā*, respectively. (See Figure 3-11.) Otherwise, its collocates are something of a mixed blend of geopolitical terms, such as *masāleh* at L1/18, or *esteqlāl* at L1/19, and religious terms, such as *moqadderāt* (destinies) at L1/11, or *eslāmī* at R1/3. By contrast, *dowlat* (government or state), at 102 on the wordlist, while most frequently referring to Iran (R1/5), or an Islamic government, presumably that of Iran (R1/2), is a technical term, used in reference to officials (*ra'īs*, or president at L1/8, *vazīr*, or minister, at L1/13), other countries (*amrīkā* at R1/6, *emārāt*, the UAE, at R1/9, *arāq* at R1/16), or the provisional government (*movaqqat*, at R1/8). (See Figure 3-12.) It should be noted that the common incidence of *mellat* at R2/2, as part of the phrase *dowlat va mellat*, is further indication of the separation of these concepts in Khomeini's discourse.

Finally, the collective terms *enqelāb* (revolution, 91 on the wordlist) and *nahzat* (movement, 161 on the wordlist) exhibit some further interesting tendencies. Despite its central ideological importance, the term *enqelāb* tells us very little. (See Figure 3-13.) While there are ubiquitous references to *pīruzī* (victory) at L1/5, the various institutions of the revolution, such as the Revolutionary Council (*shūrā-ye*, L1/6), Revolutionary Guards (*pāsdārān*, L1/15), Revolutionary Courts (*dādgāh-hā-ye*, L1/16), and the cultural revolution (*farhangī*, R1/9), as well as the Revolution's enemies (*doshmanān*, L1/21, or *zedd,* L1/7), the term seems to have become somewhat frozen, an important symbol or totem, but nothing dynamic.[315] In some respects, *nahzat* has filled this gap, by serving as a loaded identifier for the collective self, as *īn* at L1/1 and *mā* at R1/3 attest. (See Figure 3-14.) Its close collocates are primarily religious, including *khodā* at L1/11, *eslāmī* at R1/2, *moqaddas* (holy) at R1/10, *Irān* at R1/11, and *elāhī* (divine) at R1 /16. In this way, it preserves some of

[315] For discussion of how expressions become frozen or fixed, see: Ronald Carter, *Vocabulary: Applied Linguistic Perspectives* (London: Routledge, 1998), 65-68.

the emotive content lost by the *enqelāb* following its institutionalization. Additionally, a few left collocates may hint at the global nature of Khomeini's movement: *edāme* (from *edāme kardan*, to continue) at L1/21 and *estemrār* (also to continue) at L1/24 highlight that while the revolution may have already happened, the movement is not over.

Having thus surveyed some of the most relevant of the 200 most frequent terms in this corpus, and having sketched out the boundaries of Khomeini's discourse, we can now direct our attention to some of the less common terms most likely to shed light on Khomeini's conceptions of pan-Islamism.

Analysis, Section 2 – Core Terms

Here, we can again begin with some of the more basic terms of interest before delving into further detail. The Muslim community, *ommat*, is in a sense the most basic term in the vocabulary of pan-Islamism. As such, it is an appropriate starting point. Unfortunately, it does not offer us much information, nor is it a particularly frequent term in Khomeini's discourse, occurring only 150 times in our corpus. With such low frequency, is collocates can only tell us so much, and indeed, they mostly appear to be general in nature, referring to Islam (*eslāmī* and *eslām* collocating at R1/1 and 3, respectively) or the Prophet Mohammad (at R1/2). (See Figure 3-15.) This suggests that while the term *ommat* has a religious significance, for Khomeini, it possesses less political resonance than it did for the earlier pan-Islamists. However, given the relative infrequency of the term, it is worth testing these conclusions by delving a bit further into the statistics. Up until now, we've examined collocation patterns, which use frequency ranking and collocate positioning (in relation to the search word) to

study terms. But by looking at statistical collocation, we can obtain a more robust understanding of other terms' relationships to *ommat* by sacrificing the distinction of position.[316] It seems that this conclusion is borne out by the evidence; the strongest statistical collocates of *ommat* are mostly references to the Prophet or God, with a few other terms, such as *esteqāmat* (perseverance) and *mosalmān* making an appearance. (See Figure 3-16.)

The religious character of the term *ommat* can be explicated by looking at some of the Iranian literature on the subject. While *ommat* has had numerous meanings throughout Islamic history, Khomeini saw it less as a term to describe the Muslims of the present-day world (for which *moslemīn* was more commonly used), and more as a descriptor for an ideal community, like that which existed in the early days of Islam (hence, his references to the *ommat* of Mohammad). Khomeini saw the establishment of Islamic government as a way to help bring about this ideal *ommat*.[317] The establishment of this government would lay the groundwork for the formation of such an *ommat*, and the subsequent return (*zohūr*) of the hidden Imam.[318] Interestingly, Bābāyī-Zārech argues that Khomeini rejected the eschatological claims of some clergy who would immanentize the eschaton, and actively seek to hasten the Mahdi's return, while also rejecting the traditional Shi'i quietism and its attendant powerlessness. Instead, he favored establishing a *farhang-e entezār*, or "culture of

[316] Statistical calculation of collocates does not distinguish where in our 5 left/5 right span a word occurs; it either occurs within that span or it does not. While we sacrifice some precision in describing the relationship of two terms by doing so, we nonetheless gain reliability, and draw out some general tendencies that would not otherwise become apparent. Also, because the calculation of collocation statistics relies on a combination of co-occurrence and overall frequency in the corpus, this can highlight some infrequent, but highly relevant, terms which a collocation pattern would exclude. It should be noted here that all collocations are calculated using z-scores to highlight typicality, as opposed to mutual information (MI), which would highlight atypicality.
[317] Alī Mohammad Bābāyī-Zārech, *Ommat va Mellat dar Andīshe-ye Emām Khomeinī* (Tehrān: Enteshārāt-e Markaz-e Asnād-e Enqelāb-e Eslāmī, 1383 (2004)), 188-89.
[318] Ibid., 200.

anticipation," a sort of middle ground between the two approaches.[319] While the establishment of an Islamic government was one component required to bring about this ideal *ommat*, it was not the only one. It would also "follow from the attainment of unity among Muslims," or *vahdat-e moslemīn.*[320] More specifically, this is usually described as *vahdat-e kalame*, or *vahdat-e aqīdeh*, which translates literally to something along the lines of "unity of thought," though it is an ubiquitous revolutionary phrase, and one which we will examine further shortly. But first, we need to get a better sense of what these terms mean.

The term *moslemīn*, while seemingly obvious in its meaning, nonetheless raises some questions. How does it differ from *ommat*, when that term would seem to serve just as well? As usual, the collocates tell an interesting story. If *ommat* is a primarily religious term in Khomeini's discourse, with few political implications, then *moslemīn* is its political counterpart. We see some common collocates with the geopolitical terms discussed above; for instance, *masāleh* at L1/6, *omūr* at L1/10, and *moshkelāt* (problems) at L1/16 are all more frequent collocates than *vahdat* at L1/18. (See Figure 3-17.) Still, *jahān* (world) at R1/5 indicates the global nature of this term in Khomeini's discourse. When he speaks of Muslims writ large, he is not merely speaking of those of one country, but of the *umma* as a whole, albeit not with that exact term. The statistical collocates tell us a similar story; while *okhovvat* is the strongest collocate, others, such as *hedāyat* (guidance), *azemat* (greatness), *masāleh*, *jahān*, *belād* (countries), *mīlīyārd* (billion, usually used by Khomeini in reference to the total Muslim population of the world), *mostaz'afān/mostaz'afīn* (the dispossessed), *maslahat* (interest), *hokumat-hā-ye* (governments, in the genitive case), and even *ferqe* (sect), all indicate a concern with matters of this world, rather than the

[319] Ibid., 203-06. The development of Khomeini's ideas in relation to others' thoughts on eschatology is discussed in detail on pp. 187-206.
[320] Ibid., 209.

next. (See Figure 3-18.) The strong collocation of *okhovvat* suggests that *moslemīn* is key to Khomeini's instantiation of ecumenicism; in this, too, it plays a role similar to that of *ommat* for a prior generation, by serving as a dual emblem of the Muslim community as an actor on the global stage, and as a community which transcends sectarian divisions. (The presence of *tāyefe* and *tavāyef*, sect and sects respectively, in the statistical collocates only underscores this characteristic.)

If *moslemīn* serves much of the same discursive function for Khomeini that *ommat* once did for an earlier generation, then what are we to make of *vahdat*, particularly the expression *vahdat-e kalame*? Given that Khomeini viewed this quality as key to enabling the world's Muslims to overcome the predations of foreign powers[321], it is not an insignificant rhetorical artifact. Nor is it a simple one; Bābāyī-Zārech argues that Khomeini's conception of *vahdat* comprises at least eight main characteristics:

1) *e'tesām be habl allāh*, taking refuge in God, or clinging fast to God;
2) the general interests (*maslahat-e omūmī*) of Muslims;
3) the preservation (*hefz*) of Islam and its interests;
4) *tawhīd-e kalame va aqīdeh*, unity of thought, though this is not clearly defined. He argues that "attainment of *tawhid-e kalame* depends upon the establishment of *vahdat* and *ettehad* [union] founded upon *okhovvat va barādarī* [brotherhood, presumably of the Islamic variety]… therefore, *vahdat* can be a factor/agent (*āmel*) of *tawhid-e kalame*." This seems a bit circular, and we will attempt to unpack some of these terms later, but what this seems to highlight is the interdependency of these various

[321] Ibid., 210-11. Bābāyī-Zārech is quoting here Khomeini's *Chehel Hadīs.*

factors, which comports with our conceptual theory of pan-Islamism described in chapter one;

5) *vahdat* as a manifestation of divine grace and influence;

6) divine and legal (*shar'ī*) duty;

7) brotherhood (*okhovvat va barādarī*);

8) establishment of (Islamic) government.[322]

While some of these characteristics have been discussed above, an examination of *vahdat*'s instances in our corpus should shed light on at least some of the others, if not all of them.

The collocations of *vahdat* confirm our initial suspicions. While *hefz* is the most interesting L1 collocate at 5, R1 collocates include *kalame* at 1, *moslemīn* at 5, and *eslāmī* at 10. (See Figure 3-19.) The statistical collocates of *vahdat* likewise indicate that it is closely tied to several other terms we have seen repeatedly. While *kalame* is the top statistical collocate, it is closely followed by *okhovvat*, *hefz*, *ramz* (symbol), *ettekāl* (reliance), *ensejām* (harmony), *da'vat* (call), *hambastegī* (solidarity), *bāshokūhtar* (the comparative/superlative form of splendid or magnificent), and, of course, *moslemīn*. (See Figure 3-20.) These all indicate the kind of collocational environment we would expect, and confirm some parts of Bābāyī-Zārech's analysis, particularly the close relation between *vahdat* and *okhovvat*. A look at the collocates of *vahdat-e kalame* reinforces this analysis, and highlights a few other interesting connections of the term. In particular, *mellat* collocates at R1/5, with *ettekāl* collocating at R2/6. (See Figure 3-21.) While the latter corresponds to Bābāyī-Zārech's notion of *e'tesām*, the former is even more

[322] More detailed, though at times circular, descriptions of these characteristics are found at Ibid., 213-14.

interesting. In looking at the concordance lines, the term mostly refers to Iran, and underscores the need for *vahdat-e kalame* in both overcoming obstacles and resisting foreign powers, particularly the United States. Perhaps this phrase will help us to understand Khomeini's conception of institutional unity, which up until now has remained largely mysterious to us? *Kalame* yields fiew surprises, though it confirms that *vahdat-e kalame* is a central concept in Khomeini's discourse of pan-Islamism. Many of the strong L1 collocates are familiar at this point, such as *vahdat* at 1, *ettehād* at 6, *tawhīd* at 10, and *ettefāq* (agreement) at 13, while *eslām* is found at R1/7 and R2/1, and *mellat* at R1/13. These are juxtaposed to *ekhtelāf* (dispute or disagreement) at L1/13. (See Figure 3-22.) This density of intercollocation would seem to suggest that we are on the right track, and have identified a tangled but critical discursive web.

A Literary Digression

The concept of *vahdat*, complicated as it is, holds the key to Khomeini's political eschatology, if we may call it that. Ultimately, the attainment and preservation of *vahdat-e kalame*, as a form of affinial unity, was to be used as a catalyst, enabling further steps towards institutional unity. Ecumenicism was a critical reagent in this reaction; division, in the form of *ekhtelāf* or *tafarroqe* (disunity of sects), would only aid the superpowers, and was to be avoided. Thus, ecumenicism was a necessary but not sufficient condition for the establishment of institutional unity[323], the first step of which was to be the establishment of Islamic government. From there, deeper forms of institutional unity could be developed. This is to say that *taqrīb* is best understood

[323] This may explain the somewhat curious absence of the term *taqrīb* from the Khomeini corpus; its presence is already assumed, meaning that its dissolution is to be guarded against while in pursuit of the other forms of unity.

in Khomeini's thought as the natural state of affairs; the presence of *ekhtelāf* is an aberration which must be corrected before any other forms of unity beyond ecumenicism can be established. As such, it is simultaneously foundational yet not salient, hence its comparative infrequency in his discourse. The existence of other forms of unity entails it.

While Khomeini occasionally described the form this institutional unity should eventually take, as in the notion of Islamic confederationalism mentioned above, he was often vague on the details. Among some of the ideas he mentioned were a shared army of the Muslim world, a "Muslim Global Defense Organization," and eventually the formation of a "great Islamic government," presumably some manner of supra-national entity.[324] One other interesting form of institutional unity, and one which curiously would not be exclusive to Muslims, but would instead aim to serve the interests of the oppressed the world over, was the *hezb-e mostaz'afīn*, or party of the oppressed. This was to be based in large part on "calling" (*da'vat*) the oppressed to rise up (*qīyām kardan*) against the arrogant powers (*mostakbarān*), emulating the Islamic Revolution as an exemplification (*olgūgīrī*, or taking on the pattern of something) of the power of faith (*īmān*) and *vahdat*. In so doing, the superpowers would be wiped from the earth, ending the oppression, suffering, and problems of the *mostaz'afīn*.[325] This was, of course, something of an ideal form to be aspired to, rather than an actualized state of affairs, hence, a political eschatology.

With this end-goal in mind, we can also reflect on the precise connotation of the term *mellat*, a word which recurs frequently in relation to several terms discussed above. Particularly in his *vasīyatnāme*, Khomeini dealt with the role of the Islamic Republic as the most important *jelve-ye ommatsāzī* (manifestation of *umma*-building

[324] Bābāyī-Zārech, *Ommat va Mellat*, 237, 42.
[325] Ibid., 247-48.

[activity], for lack of a more felicitous translation).[326] While Iran's exemplar role is clear enough, the question of the relation between the *mellat* and *ommat* is less readily apparent. Khomeini's view was that the relation of national to Islamic interests more generally was that of a part to a whole[327], ergo, the two were not incompatible. Here, he has squared the circle in the same manner as al-Afghānī did nearly a century before him. More parochial national loyalties are not inherently incompatible with service to the goal of attaining a transnational *umma*; in, fact they are an important part of it, assuming that such nationalistic endeavors are directed against imperialism and oppressive superpowers, and not towards racist or narrowly nationalistic activities which divide the Muslim community and weaken it before its enemies.

A widely-used term in the Iranian literature to describe Iran's relationship to the rest of the *umma* is *omm al-qorrā*, an epithet usually reserved for Mecca. The nature of this relationship is described thus: "In Khomeini's view, Iran is the *omm al-qorrā* of the world of Islam, and the primary locus of pure Mohammedan Islam; therefore, defense of it [Iran] is defense of Islam and the Qur'an and not one [i.e., a defense] limited to a mere territory."[328] While Iran was subsumed under the *umma*, it nonetheless had a "purity or nobleness of origin" (*esālat*), thus making it *primus inter pares* of sorts.[329] Interestingly, the phrase *omm al-qorrā* does not seem to be Khomeini's invention; the only instance of the phrase in our corpus is in reference to Mecca itself, in a message to Hajj pilgrims. The term, however, has come to embody a theory which clarifies the oft-misunderstood term *sodūr-e enqelāb* (export of the Revolution). The "*omm al-qorrā* theory" is effectively an argument for the Islamic

[326] Ibid., 281.
[327] Ibid., 285.
[328] Ibid., 288.
[329] Ibid., 318.

Republic's exemplarist role on the international stage, with several corollaries.[330] The *omm al-qorrā* is to serve as an example for the *umma*, and as such must behave as an ideal Islamic state, with an Islamic government. It is, unsurprisingly, embodied in the position of the *rahbar*, who holds responsibility for the entire *umma*, regardless of geographical and political boundaries. Conversely, it is the responsibility of the entire *umma*, not just those Muslims living in *omm al-qorrā*, to come to its aid should its existence (i.e., the existence of an exemplar Islamic government, presumably that of *velāyat-e faqīh*) come under threat. The *omm al-qorrā* holds the reciprocal responsibility to aid those Muslims suffering the oppression of foreign powers. Should exporting the Revolution and preserving *omm al-qorrā* come into conflict, self-preservation should take priority.[331]

Such a theory also casts the notion of *sodūr-e enqelāb* in a new light. Among the means for exporting the Revolution described by Fallāhnezhād are cultural means, including the press and mass media, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, congresses and ceremonies (including commemorations of the events of the Islamic Revolution), the Hajj, and the exchange of students, while economic means include various internal and external factors, among which economic sulf-sufficiency is key, as well as military means and support for liberation movements.[332] It should be noted that he emphasizes that the Revolution cannot be exported by force; military means are to be guided by the doctrine of *jehād*, which itself is primarily defensive, and in this case applies to support for "liberation movements," such as that of the Palestinian

[330] Alī Fallāhnezhād, *Sīyāsat-e sodūr-e enqelāb-e eslāmī* (Tehrān: Enteshārāt-e Markaz-e Asnād-e Enqelāb-e Eslāmī, 1384 (2005)), 69-72. The following discussion summarizes the theory laid out here by Fallāhnezhād.
[331] Ibid., 71-72. The source cited on this last point by Fallāhnezhād is Mohammad Javād Lārījānī's *Topics in National Strategy*. That such highly-placed figures are arguing for such a strategy of self-preservation ought to give pause to those analysts making alarmist interpretations of the doctrine of "exporting the revolution."
[332] Ibid., 77-109.

resistance.[333] Thus, military means are primarily to be used in aiding the expulsion of foreign occupiers from Muslim countries, not in attempting to attain export of the Revolution by coercion.

The theory of *omm al-qorrā* is something of a hybrid, calling for both IRI exemplarism and activism in the interests of the *umma*, and against those of oppressive powers. More importantly, it represents the apotheosis of institutional unity in Khomeinist discourse; the IRI, now firmly established on the world stage, can set course for the political eschaton, to be achieved with the final establishment of the global *umma* under the standard of the Hidden Imam.[334]

Having mapped out Khomeini's broad discourses on the main aspects of pan-Islamism, we shall next follow up on a few of the terms drawn out in this analysis, to see if they can flesh out the description given thus far.

Analysis, Section 3 – Revolutionary Symbols

One of the remaining lacunae of interest is the term *ettehād*. It exhibits patterns similar to *vahdat*, collocating with *kalame* at L1/2, *hambastegī* at R2/2, *yegānegī* (unity) at R2/3, *ettefāq* at R2/4, *ensejām* at R2/7, and *vahdat* at R2/10. Otherwise, it most often refers to the Soviet Union (*ettehād-e jamāhīr-e showravī*). (See Figure 3-23.) Much like the term *taqrīb*, which was mostly favored by an earlier generation of pan-Islamists, *ettehād* seems to have been supplanted by other terms for institutional unity in Khomeini's discourse.

[333] Ibid., 93-101, esp. 96. Others have made this argument, notably Khomeini himself; see Hamīd Pāshāpūr Yovālārī, *Emām Khomeinī va Entefāze-ye Felestīn* (Tehrān: Enteshārāt-e Markaz-e Asnād-e Enqelāb-e Eslāmī, 1381 (2002)), 128-29. On the priority of exporting the culture and values of the Revolution, rather than exporting it through military means, see also Dahshīrī, *Darāmadī*, 340-47.
[334] Bābāyī-Zārech, *Ommat va Mellat*, 300.

Okhovvat, itself a collocate of many of the terms discussed above, possesses some moderately interesting characteristics. Although R1 collocates such as *eslāmī* and *īmānī* (religious or spiritual) are hardly surprising, the L1/2 collocate *aqd* is trickier to explain. (See Figure 3-24.) The word by itself often refers to a marriage contract, and a look at the concordance lines shows us that it is most often used in the phrase *aqd bastan* (to conclude or enter into a contract). Khomeini refers frequently to the concept of *aqd-e okhovvat*, a contract of brotherhood, which unites all Muslim believers. In at least a couple of cases, he cites Q49:10 (*innamā al-mu'minūn ukhuwwatun*…) and Q3:103 (*i'taṣimū bi ḥabl allāh jamī'an wa lā tafarraqū…)*, both of which, as shown above, are perennial ecumenical favorites. *Okhovvat*, at least, seems to serve as a key emblem for Khomeini's concept of ecumenical unity, and his reference to *aqd-e okhovvat* not only instantiates the seriousness and finality of a marriage contract, but highlights the positive decision made by Muslims to join the *umma* as believers, rather fittingly for an activist religio-political ideology, and the "culture of anticipation" advocated by Khomeini.

As for other realms of policy, *sodūr* collocates almost exclusively with *enqelāb*, which tells us little we did not know already. However, the statistical collocates show that the only other noun to collocate with *sodūr*, albeit weakly, is *eslām*. (See Figure 3-25.) Exporting the Revolution, then, can perhaps be seen as akin (or equivalent?) to exporting Islam, at least in Khomeinist discourse. The emphasis in the literature on the importance of exporting the culture and values of the Revolution would seem to entail such an interpretation, as these would likewise entail a particular interpretation of Islam.

Export of the Revolution is tied to Iran's status as Islamic exemplar, and the terms *olgū* (pattern or example) and *nemūne* (model) exemplify this. *Olgū* is

infrequent enough in the corpus that a collocation pattern tells us little, except that Iran collocates at L1/2, and *barā-ye* (for) is the top collocate for R1, R2, and R3. Thus, the logical conclusion is that Iran is a pattern for something or someone. (See Figure 3-26.) The statistical collocates show that he speaks of Iran (often by synecdoche, as Khomeini is usually referring to his audience) being the *behtarīn* (best) example for *melal* (nations) or *mellat*, sometimes preceded by *hame* (all or every). From the discussion above, we know *mellat* to be a strongly affinial term, and the concordance lines often show this to be the case, referring to *melal-e mazlūm* (oppressed) or *melal-e mahrūm* (deprived). A similar pattern exists for *nemūne*, with L1 collocates *yek* (one) at 1, *mellat* at 3, and *keshvar* at 4 telling a similar story. (See Figure 3-27.) As per the concordances, Khomeini is often expressing some variant of the idea that Iran is a model to be followed by other nations. This seems to bolster the theory of *omm al-qorrā*, even if Khomeini never uses that phrase.

Of the key qualities embodied by the Islamic Republic, one of the few not yet discussed here is *tawhīd* (unity). The collocation pattern shows some familiar material, with *kalame* at R1/4, but a few new terms appear, notably *parcham* (banner) at L1/1. A closer look at the statistical collocates brings up a few more terms of interest. While *parcham* is the strongest collocate, *fetrat* (nature), *levā-ye* (banner or standard), *zīr* (under), *nedā-ye* (call), and a few other religious terms are all in evidence, alongside a few diametric terms, such as *sherk* (idol worship), or *sheytān* (Satan). (See Figure 3-28.) Along with the occasional appearance of the synonym *bīrq* (with the same meaning as *parcham*), we find that *parcham-e tawhīd* and *parcham-e sheytān* are strongly emotive signifiers for the Islamic Republic and its enemies, respectively. The concordance lines make for interesting reading; somewhat sordid references to "the red [with our own blood] banners of *tawhīd*" leave no doubt

as to the martial imagery invoked here. Likewise, the references to being under "the banner of *lā ilāha illā allāh*," in addition to evoking the imagery of early Islam, could not be any less subtle in portraying the Islamic Republic as the successor to the first *umma* of Muhammad.

If *tawhīd* is one of the core elements of the IRI's ethos, then the data for *parcham* itself shows how potent of a symbol the standard is. Its L1 collocates are what we would expect, with *zīr* at 1, *taht* (under) at 3, and *sāye* (protection or auspices) at 5. However, the R1 collocates are a little unexpected, with *eslām* at 1, *tawhīd* at 2, *por* (full, here part of the phrase *por-e eftekhār*, or proud) at 3, *lā* (of the phrase *lā ilāha illā allāh*) at 4, and *qorān* (the Qur'an) at 5. (See Figure 3-29.) This only reinforces our interpretation above of *parcham*; what will be interesting will be to see if its collocates change over time, as IRI actors after Khomeini invoke this image in their own discourse.

Turning our attention to another key symbol of the Revolution, the variants of *mostaz'afīn* provide us with some intriguing data. It is best to consider three terms alongside each other: *mostaz'afīn*, *mostaz'afān*, and *mostaz'af*. Though very similar, there are subtle differences between Khomeini's usage of the three terms which merit further examination. Broadly speaking, the differences can be described as follows: *mostaz'afān* typically refers to the people themselves, the masses of the dispossessed; *mostaz'afīn* the more abstract notion of the dispossessed as a global class or actor; while *mostaz'af* is mostly a quality, used in reference to countries or nations. While there is a good degree of overlap among these terms, of course, this seems to be the basic division among them in terms of usage. That is not to suggest that teasing out these distinctions is an easy matter. In particular, *mostaz'afīn* and *mostaz'afān* are rather difficult to disambiguate. But, turning first to *mostaz'afān*, we see that human

plural nouns are among its strongest left collocates: *mosalmānān* at L2/2, *mahrūmān* at L2/3, *moslemīn* at L3/3. (See Figure 3-30.) The L1/4 collocate *hokūmat* also instantiates the notion of a government by the masses. Immediate right collocates tell us little; *jahān* (world) is the strongest R1 collocate for all three terms. Glancing over the other collocates reveals that terms such as *mahrūmān* and *mazlūmān* are scattered throughout the collocation pattern; *mostaz'afān* tends to be a more affinial term, one likely to be found amongst terms of a similar valence. Antonyms such as *mostakberān* or *doshmanān* are uncommon. This pattern is reversed with *mostaz'afīn*: institutional terms such as *hezb* (political party) at L1/8 accompany a much higher incidence of the term *mostakberīn*, such as at R2/4, R3/2, and R4/4, as well as a lesser incidence of affinial mass nouns, such as *mosalmānān* or *mahrūmān*. (See Figure 3-31.) This is indicative of the term's more abstract usage; for example, a parallel could be drawn to Marxists' use of "the proletariat" as opposed to "the workers" as a form of abstract class or group representation. Finally, *mostaz'af* collocates strongly with abstract nouns, but tends to function as an adjective. The L2/1 collocate *mahrūm* is evidence of *mostaz'af*'s adjectival function, but the L1 collocates are even more telling: *mellat-hā-ye* at 2, *melal* at 3, *tabaqe* (social class) at 4, *mardom* at 5, *mellat* at 6, *keshvar-hā-ye* at 8, *qeshr* (social class) at 9. (See Figure 3-32.) What do all these distinctions tell us about the significance of these terms in Khomeini's discourse? First, *mostaz'afān* is a strong term of affinial identification, and likely plays a part in Khomeini's discursive construction of affinial unity. Muslims are united by their suffering at the hands of others; in this sense, Khomeini is universalizing the particularistically Shi'i paradigm of suffering and justice. (We shall examine below what we can glean from the term *edālat*, or justice.) Second, *mostaz'afīn* shows us that the discussion above of a *hezb-e mostaz'afīn* is well-

evidenced in Khomeini's discourse, and can be considered one salient instance of his discourse on institutional unity. Finally, *mostaz'af* shows that the affinial qualities of the term *mellat* in particular are tied to the suffering and justice paradigm, and help to explain Khomeini's political cosmology, particularly its Manichaean character. That all three terms collocate most strongly at R1/1 with the term *jahān* underscores the global nature of Khomeini's discourse, giving the lie to claims that the Islamic Revolution was exclusively Iranian or chauvinistically Shi'i in character.

Having clarified the differences between several key terms sharing a common root, we can now analyze a similar triptych: *mazlūm* (oppressed), *zālem* (oppressor), and *zolm* (oppression). Of these three terms, *zolm* is perhaps the most basic element, so let us begin there. It has an unusually rich collocation pattern, but most of the top collocates are prepositions or function words, which tell us little that we need to know. The statistical collocates offer more useful information in this scenario. (See Figure 3-33.) While we find no shortage of synonyms, such as *setam*, *enzelām* (suffering of oppression), and *ta'adī* (injustice), among numerous others, as well as contextualizing terms such as *zīr*, *taht*, or *moqābel* (against), there is comparatively little information which helps us further characterize *zolm*. The terms *feshār* (pressure) and *dīktātūrī* (dictatorial), are perhaps our strongest indicators that this is a largely political term. Obviously, if someone is being oppressed, there must be an oppressor, or *zālem* involved. Unlike *zolm*, we have fewer items in the collocation pattern, so the statistical collocates help draw out a few trends. (See Figure 3-34.) The terms *tarafdār* (partisan or advocate) and *tarafdārī* (partiality) are among the strongest collocates, followed by *dast* (hand), *moqābel*, *zīr*, and *rezhīm* (regime). These depict a shadowy relationship, one of hidden hands and outside manipulation, backing and supporting an oppressive regime (i.e., the Pahlavis). The oppressed,

mazlūm, are primarily the *mellat* or *mellat-hā*, which collocate with *mazlūm* at L1/1 and L1/2, or the *mardom*. The entities referred to here are variously the oppressed countries of the world (*jahān* collocates at R1/6), or Iran (R1/7), or Iraq (R1/8). (See Figure 3-35.) This again exemplifies Khomeini's Manichaean worldview, with oppressors, backed by foreign powers, exercising unjust power over the oppressed nations, particularly Iran and Iraq.

In the place of oppression, the Islamic Revolution sought to attain justice, though of what sort, precisely? The collocations for *edālat* (justice) are a tad surprising; the top R1 collocate is in fact, *ejtemā'ī*, or social, justice, followed by *eslāmī* at R1/3 and *elāhī* (divine) at R1/5. (See Figure 3-36.) Perhaps this is to be expected; while the Revolution did not occur "so we could have cheaper watermelons" (to paraphrase one of Khomeini's more apropos remarks), this is likely precisely the sort of justice that was demanded by the *mostaz'afīn*. Khomeini was nothing if not a consummate politician.

Finally, a quick note about the term *hambastegī* (solidarity). It is comparatively infrequent, with only 82 occurrences in our corpus, and collocation patterns are of little use. The statistical collocates only tell us a little more, as they mostly include terms we have come to expect, such as *ettehād*, *vahdat*, *jahān*, *mosalmānān*, and *doshmanān*. (See Figure 3-37.) As such, *hambastegī* is something of an empty signifier in Khomeini's discourse; it frequently sits alongside terms such as *ettehād* and *vahdat*, but it is hard to find a clear definition or function of the term. It will be worth seeing if the concept becomes more fleshed out by later political actors.

Having examined some of the more closely related terms which arise from our initial analysis, we can now move on to the last few, miscellaneous terms which may usefully inform our study of Khomeini's discourse.

Analysis, Section 4 - Miscellany

A few final terms were added in to this analysis, either because they were potentially related to the topic of pan-Islamism, or because they held an intrinsic interest. First, an interesting turn of phrase worth keeping in mind: the term *moqābel* (against) is number 136 on the Khomeini wordlist, meaning it is highly frequent in our corpus. As such, we find numerous R1 collocates, such as *eslām*, *āmrīkā*, *qodrat-hā*, etc. What is more interesting are the statistical collocates, of which eight out of the ten strongest collocates are some variant of *īstādegī* or *īstādan* (to stand up to or against). (See Figure 3-38.) This would seem to make the phrase *moqābel* [object/entity] *īstādan* Khomeini's preferred means for expressing resistance in a positive light.

The most widely-touted example of such resistance in the Islamic Republic is that of Palestine, which makes the term *felestīn* worth our while to examine. One commentator has gone so far as to state that not only did the *intifāḍa* have a "pivotal role" for the various Islamic movements, it even took on an "almost religious significance."[335] It may come as some surprise, then, that the term *felestīn* only appears 111 times in our corpus. As such, we have to turn to the statistical collocates to tell us anything meaningful about the term's usage. While the top collocate is *lobnān* (Lebanon), *āzādībakhsh* (liberation), *qods* (Jerusalem), *ghasab* (to usurp), *esrā'īl* (Israel), and *mosalmān* are among the other top collocates. (See Figure 3-39.)

[335] Yovālārī, *Emām Khomeinī va Entefāze-ye Felestīn*, 188-90.

This suggests a pairing of Palestine with Lebanon (and implicitly, Iran) as a fellow-suffering nation at the hands of foreign powers, while underscoring the importance of Jerusalem as a unifying symbol among Muslims.[336] More than that, the data do not allow us to say, although earlier pilot studies have shown that both Khamenei and Ahmadinejad have a great deal more to say about Palestine than Khomeini did in the *Sahīfe-ye Emām*.[337]

Finally, one incidental matter remains: the question of the term *emām*. While later figures in the IRI would most frequently use the term to refer to Khomeini himself, this obviously wouldn't have been the case in his own discourse. Therefore, who did Khomeini use the term in reference to? Primarily, the Hidden Imam, the collocates indicate. (See Figure 3-40.) At R1/1, we find *aleyhe* (upon him), followed by *salām* (peace) at R2/1, which is simply indicative of the ritualistic phrase "peace be upon him," usually used by pious Shi'a whenever they mention the names of one of the Imams or the Prophet. At R1/2 we find *zamān* (age or era), and at R1/6 *asr* (era or age), both of which are epithets for the Hidden Imam. References to Friday prayer leaders, or *emam-e jom'eh*, are at R1 3 and 5, while some of the twelve Imams' names can be found at R1 4, 7, 10, and 18 (Hossein, Hasan, Sādeq, and Sajjād, respectively). Given the importance of *vahdat* in the political eschatology of Khomeini, it should come as little surprise that he makes regular reference to the Hidden Imam; whether this pattern continues with Khomeini's successors will be a further interesting question for our later chapters.

[336] Cf. Reiter, *Jerusalem and its Role in Islamic Solidarity*.
[337] Berry, "Following the Line of the Imam", ———, "The Fulcrum of the Umma".

What has this foray into Khomeini's words taught us? First, it has shown us that corpora can be useful in providing empirical evidence to either substantiate or refute claims that would normally be based on only one or a few citations, at most. For example, consider the following quote: "Religious leaders made freqeuent reference to 'the nation' (*mellat*) and the 'homeland' (*vatan*) alongside Islam and 'Muslim community' (*ummat*), to the extent that these terms often became interchangeable."[338] As the analysis above has shown, at least as far as Khomeini was concerned, this was not the case; the terms *mellat* and *ommat* had rather different functions in his discourse.

But perhaps more importantly, it has shown us the particular configuration of the three core concepts of pan-Islamism within Khomeini's discourse. Their relationship can be roughly described as follows: for Khomeini, ecumenicism was foundational, a necessary but insufficient condition for everything that was to follow. Only with the differences between Shi'a and Sunna resolved (or at least, set aside in as expedient a manner as possible) could they begin to strive towards a broader affinial unity, as embodied in the Revolutionary phrase *tawhīd-e kalame* (or *vahdat-e kalame*). This encompassed the cultural, social, and political aspects of unity, going beyond religious *rapprochement* and bringing this ideology into the everyday realm of lived experience in the material world. This, in turn, would set the stage for the development of greater forms of institutional unity, most of which were to be realized only in the distant future. But Khomeini's political cosmology, establishing Iran as

[338] Maryam Panah, *The Islamic Republic and the World: Global Dimensions of the Iranian Revolution* (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 48-49.

omm al-qorrā to the Muslim world, laid the groundwork for such an approach, albeit one which left its ideal ultimate denouement somewhat vague.

Khomeini did borrow extensively from earlier discourses on pan-Islamism; the centrality of the *mellat* in his discourse was unique only in his emphasis on (and de-sectarianization of) traditionally Shi'i paradigms of righteousness and suffering, and their application to the international stage. His references to the vagaries of colonialism, imperialism, and the "oppressive powers" hark back to al-Afghānī, as transmitted through the likes of Kashani and Borujerdi.

However, his pan-Islamism was not the same as that of the 19th century. In many respects, it was a direct inversion of the old order. For while Abdülhamid had started from a position of inherent authority and served as the logical locus for organizing the Muslim world, Khomeini, in the post-caliphal era, could do no such thing. The cataclysm of 1924, then, marked the end of the old way of thinking. In it, a unified Muslim *umma*, organized under the political authority of the Caliph, would develop ever-closer forms of affinial unity, with *taqrīb* the ultimate goal. Political unity was the starting point; unity among the individual Muslims of the *umma* would follow. By contrast, Khomeini envisioned a world in which Muslims, united in their faith, would first seek to unite their hearts, societies, and cultures before seeking the ultimate goal of a universal *ommat*.

This inversion is evident in Khomeini's discourse: whilst *umma* had been a central term for the earlier pan-Islamists, for Khomeini, *moslemīn* was far more apposite. Likewise, while the caliphate had served as the *ur*-symbol of the pre-1924 era, this was replaced in Khomeini's discourse by the *mostaz'afīn*, and the global *nahzat* of which they were a part. We can most accurately call Khomeini's eschatological vision of pan-Islamism post-modern, then, in the sense in which the

discipline of international relations uses that word. By moving away from the central role of the state on the global stage, and towards a more diffuse political realm of individuals, groups, and the discourses through which they operate, Khomeini's pan-Islamism was to that of the Hamidian period what postmodernity has been to state-centric modernity. That is to say: both an inversion and a continuation. While emphasizing this new, diffused *umma*, he nonetheless called for a revolutionary vanguard, to overthrow unjust states and rulers in the Muslim world, thus grounding his discourse in the modern concept of the territorial state while simultaneously arguing for its eventual dissolution. Discourse, like society, rarely ruptures entirely, nor is it replaced by something utterly new, though it may warp into unrecognizable and alien forms.

As discussed at the end of chapter one, the new global political environment represents a changed set of circumstances to which established actors and institutions have struggled to adapt. Khomeini's movement is arguably one of the more effective of these adaptations, in that it simultaneously preserves the entity of the state while transmogrifying it into something more than a territorial unit, making it a blend of (concrete) institutions and (discursive, diffuse) ideology. In this sense, it is truly transnational, rather than merely national.[339]

This may also go some way towards explaining a few riddles of the era. First, Khomeini's aversion to the OIC[340] can be understood as a function of its very form. The OIC, as an inter-governmental organization, is a thoroughly modern institution, and is in many respects the diametric opposite of the transnational movement

[339] Cf. the discussion above of transnationalism and the development of a new Muslim public sphere, particularly with regards to Mandaville and Khatib. This aspect of the Islamic Republic's ideology (i.e., pan-Islamism) is perhaps one of the least-appreciated elements of this new public sphere, but it constitutes an important formative influence enabling the development of movments which are similar in appearance if not substance, such as the transnational Salafis or al-Qaeda, and their more recent counter-movements (e.g., the "liberal" Muslims emphasized in Mandaville's work).
[340] Rowhānī, *Nahzat-e Emām Khomeinī*.

Khomeini sought to create. What this says about Iran's symbolic reinduction into the Organization with the holding of its 1997 meeting in Tehran will be considered in our chapter on Khatami.

Second, the description by many scholars of pan-Islamism since the end of World War II as a failed movement is only half-correct. As judged by the achievements of the OIC and the other pan-Islamist IOs, there is a great deal of truth in this criticism. However, these assessments may be missing the point completely: by assuming that pan-Islamism as an ideology and consequently as a set of political forces or institutions remains entirely in a modern frame, they have neglected to consider anything not fitting these pre-conceptions. A plank, however warped, remains a plank, whether or not it is recognized as such by wise men. Khomeini's movement thus becomes something far less *sui generis*, but more deeply-rooted, when considered in this light; it is not something formed *ex nihilo*, but the ultimate result of a series of external processes (which, taken together, we call postmodernity) acting with and upon existing discourses, such as pan-Islamism, to yield newer, albeit sometimes unrecognizable, versions of these same discourses. By considering not just the modern, but the postmodern forms of pan-Islamism, we must also reconsider the question of its efficacy in our postmodern world. On balance, it would seem to be greater than has previously been understood. This will be addressed in greater detail in the following chapters.

As controversial as this assertion of pan-Islamism's import globally may be, Khomeini's impact within Iran itself cannot be doubted. The Islamic Revolution not only ushered in a new government and a new politics, it shifted the entire discursive field. Khomeini was the primary and unchallenged authority within this discourse, so it is something of a tautology to state that he influenced all those political leaders who

came after him. With his death, other figures, notably Khamenei and Rafsanjani, quickly rushed in to fill the discursive vacuum, and to try and garb themselves in his mantle.

This unique status also made Khomeini qualitatively different from his political successors. In establishing the official discourse of the Islamic Republic, Khomeini became, in a way, the "firmest bond" which held together otherwise disparate political forces and figures. Each of those who came after him would cling to one or several aspects of Khomeini's legacy, emphasizing or de-emphasizing certain aspects of the Imam's discourse. Hence, the following chapters are delineated not on the basis of chronological periods, but of individual actors, so as to better illustrate the diachronic shifts in official discourse, and to allow synchronic comparisons of discourse between segments of the ruling elite.

Finally, we can sum up our analysis of Khomeini's discourse in broad terms by saying that it is one of Manicheanism and dualities, rife with inherent tensions. One must speculate as to whether or not this is the natural outcome of any major discursive shift; with a change of a long-standing discourse, even in the absence of a complete rupture (and there is a great deal of continuity between the Pahlavis and the Islamic Republic), new contradictions and tensions are introduced into the discourse. That Khomeini was unable to resolve these in his lifetime has created a set of dualities for his successors to contest: active export of the revolution vs. exemplarism; the political vs. the eschatological nature of the *ommat*; the modern vs. postmodern character of the Revolution and the *ommat* itself, among others. Thus, we can say that while Khomeini does not mark the resolution of the Revolution's or the *umma*'s tensions between modernity and postmodernity, he does mark the introduction of the

postmodern question, the problematization of modernity, into the discourse of the *umma*.

Much like clothing, discourse cannot remain unchanged forever, as it is a living, shifting (indeed, reproducing) thing, interacting with and influencing its environment and milieu. The question facing us now is not "did this discourse change after Khomeini's death," but rather, "how did it change?" Which strands stayed together, which were drawn apart?

In trying to answer these questions, the most logical place to turn is Ayatollah Khamenei, who, as Khomeini's successor in the role of *rahbar*, had perhaps the most pressing need to lay claim to that mantle.

4. Khamenei, the Accidental Ayatollah

Sayyed Ali Khamenei was hardly destined for greatness when he was born into a poor Azeri clerical family in 1939.[341] He entered the family trade, enrolling in a Mashhad *howze* from the age of five, advancing through the curriculum at a rapid clip, and eventually finding his way to the seminaries of Najaf, then Qom, where he became a student of Khomeini.[342] While the White Revolution and the protests of 1963 led to Khomeini's forcible exile to Turkey and then Iraq, Khamenei remained in Iran, teaching Khomeini's ideas and furthering his own, as well. A little-known text from 1966 is illustrative. In his translator's foreword to the Persian edition of Sayyid Qutb's *al-Mustaqbal li-hādhā al-Dīn*, we see many of the themes which would become hallmarks of the Revolution's ideology in embryonic form when Khamenei talks about the predations of imperialism and colonial exploitation, and how the true interpretation of Islam is revolutionary in nature, and necessary to defend against the onslaught of Communism and other secular ideologies.[343] He writes, much like Khomeini, against the traditional quietist interpretation of Shi'i Islam's role in the world, stating at one point that "the Shi'i jurists agree that during the period of occultation… [in] every place that the foundations of religion fall into danger of

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[341] Karim Sadjadpour, *Reading Khamenei: The World View of Iran's Most Powerful Leader* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008), 4.

[342] Ibid. One has to take the narrative presented in official biographies of Khamenei with a grain of salt, as it has been demonstrated that the biographies of prospective *marāje'-e taqlīd* tend to follow a well-defined, somewhat formulaic narrative, emphasizing the individual's poverty, piety, and remarkable facility for religious learning, usually as demonstrated by mastery of basic clerical studies at a precociously young age, as was purportedly the case with Khamenei. This is doubly true of most officials in the Islamic Republic, whose biographies tend to emphasize their humble roots and religiosity, political resistance and frequently, imprisonment and/or torture during the era of the Shah, and eventual participation in Khomeini's movement and the Islamic Revolution. For a good discussion of the historiographical problems surrounding clerical biographies in particular, see Benedict Stainer, "Ayatollah Khamene'i and the Position of *marja'-e taqlid:* Religious and Political Authority in the Islamic Republic of Iran" (University of Oxford, 2008), 64-76. Many of the same caveats apply to any high-ranking official in the Islamic Republic.

[343] Alī Khāmene'ī, "Sokhanī az Motarjem," in *Āyande dar Qalamraw-e Eslām* (Mashhad: Enteshārāt-e Sepīdeh, 1345 (1966)), xiii-xiv.

nonexistence, it is obligatory upon all, even old women and the ill, to defend it [religion] to the fullest of their capabilities."[344] Of greater interest to this study, he also speaks of the necessity of solidarity (*hambastegī*) and unity (*ettehād*), classing them alongside other obligations, such as *jahād*, and *amr be ma'rūf va nahī az monkar* (enjoining good and forbidding evil, Q 7:157).[345]

That said, the fact that Khamenei was at that time not only engaging with, but actively translating texts by as prominent a Sunni Islamist writer as Sayyid Qutb bespeaks an air of ecumenicism surrounding the religious opposition of the 1960s similar to that which Khomeini encountered under Borujerdi's tutelage. In the interest of overcoming the more pressing threats of Communism and secular authoritarian modernism in the form of the White Revolution, sectarian disputes had to be subsumed beneath the interests of the *umma* as a whole.[346] Khamenei's revolutionary political activities earned him several prison terms, and eventually, internal exile to Sistan and Baluchestan until 1979.[347]

His career trajectory after the Revolution is well known. He was rewarded for his loyalty to Khomeini with a series of important posts, including as Minister of Defense, supervisor of the IRGC, and Friday prayer leader of Tehran. Following his injury in a Mojaehedin-e Khalq (MKO) bombing, Khamenei stepped in to serve as President of the Islamic Republic after the incumbent, Mohammad Ali Raja'i, was himself killed by the MKO. He would serve in this capacity from 1981 to 1989,

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[344] Ibid., xvi, n1.
[345] Ibid., xii. The very early appearance of these phrases in Khamenei's discourse, long before he held any political power to speak of, problematizes some of the more cynical interpretations of the prominence of pan-Islamism in IRI discourse, e.g. Ram, *Myth and Mobilization*, 195-227.
[346] Interestingly, Khamenei mentions at one point in his foreword "one of the most worthwhile and original" writings by Qutb, his *Khaṣā'iṣ al-Taṣawwur al-Islāmī wa Muqāwamātuhu*, and claims that he is translating it into Persian. Khāmene'ī, "Sokhanī az Motarjem," xix, n1. I have been unable to find evidence that any such translation eventually materialized, and it is not found in one of the most comprehensive listings of Khamenei's written works, though *Āyande dar Qalamraw-e Eslām* is mentioned: Maḥmūd al-Ghurayfī, *Khalīfat al-Imām al-Rāḥil* (Beirūt: Dār al-Hādī, 2003), 213-25. It appears that this is one project which Khamenei never completed.
[347] Sadjadpour, *Reading Khamenei*, 4.

though under the Constitution of 1979, this position was comparatively powerless vis-à-vis the Prime Minister and Speaker of the Majles, particularly in light of Khomeini's dominating presence in the political arena.[348] Following Khomeini's falling-out with his designated successor, Ayatollah Montazeri, in 1989, a replacement had to be found. Khamenei, then only a *hojjat ol-eslām*, was put forward for the role, despite his apparent lack of qualifications to serve as *rahbar*. The strategic calculation on Rafsanjani's part that Khamenei would be easily controlled, and thus serve as a useful proxy for his own rule, is commonly accepted as an explanation for Rafsanjani's support of Khamenei. However, Khamenei's comparatively undistinguished status as a cleric and the precise wording of the Iranian constitution necessitated both a change in the requirements for the office of *rahbar*, and the overnight elevation of Khamenei to the rank of ayatollah.[349] His allies were successful in both regards, and Khamenei ascended to the leadership of the Islamic Republic, aided by a new constitution which simplified the distribution of power, effectively concentrating it in the positions of the President and *rahbar*. With Rafsanjani alongside him as President, Khamenei led the Islamic Republic into the post-Khomeini era.[350]

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[348] Ibid., 5.

[349] Ibid., 6-7. The maneuvering to legitimate Khamenei as an ayatollah is discussed in great detail in Stainer, "Ayatollah Khamene'i", passim, but especially 76-82. The complexities of this process lie outside the scope of this study; suffice to say that the question of his legitimacy as *rahbar* is today a red line which few dare to cross. Since his accession in 1989, Khamenei (or, rather, his followers) has gradually pushed to bolster his standing, styling himself both a Grand Ayatollah and *marja'-e taqlīd*. His control of the institutions of power in the Islamic Republic has doubtless proven to be a far more effective legitimator of his rank than any clerical affirmation of his erudition.

[350] It should be noted that the constitutional changes of 1989 also partially justify the structure of this study. While Khomeini retained unrestricted authority under the 1979 Constitution (and due in part to his own charismatic authority), thus allowing us to disregard the likes of Raja'i, Bazargan, et al. for the purposes of our analysis, Khamenei had no such inherent advantages. At the same time, the prominence of the President was greatly elevated, thus, Rafsanjani is the first President to be included in this study.

A Historiographical Quandary

The discerning reader will note the comparative brevity of the above biographical sketch vis-à-vis Khomeini. This is not coincidental; rather, it is reflective of the genuine dearth of literature on Khamenei. This raises an interesting historiographical problem in the study of post-Revolutionary Iran: namely, the prevalence of hagiography in the Persian literature on Khamenei, and the consequent difficulty of undertaking a reliable analysis of him. It is, after all, rather difficult to formulate points of entry into the data for an empirical analysis if there is no prior research with which to compare it, and what Persian literature that does exist tends to take the form of either straight hagiography, or books comprised almost exclusively of quotes from Khamenei's speeches, with minimal connective tissue added by the editor.[351]

One must speculate as to why this is so, and the reasons for this state of affairs seem largely political. There is, for example, no shortage of analytical writing on Khomeini, in both Persian and Arabic, which, while hardly critical of the man, is not as obsequious or insubstantive as any given book on Khamenei. Why might this be the case? There are two key features distinguishing Khomeini from Khamenei: first, he is dead; second, his stature as a cleric and political figure always rested on firm foundations, while the same cannot be said for Khamenei. In the first instance, the fact that Khomeini is dead means that those writing about him need not fear that they will be contradicted in their analysis by the subject himself, and thus inadvertently risk falling afoul of the regime. The use of Khomeini's writings and speeches by elements across the Iranian political spectrum is testimony to the infinite interpretability of a dead man's words. Second, there were never any sensitivities

[351] This is similarly the case with books published outside of Iran, such as books in Arabic published in Lebanon, presumably for the local Shi'i readership. See, for example: Alī Khāmene'ī, *al-Islām al-Muḥammadī* (Beirūt: Dār al-Walā', 2005).

surrounding Khomeini's standing as a *marja'-e taqlīd* or as an ayatollah; even his opponents never seriously questioned this. Thus, his reputation was quite secure, and immune to the harmful effects of scholarship and journalism.[352] By contrast, the controversy over Khamenei's elevation to the rank of ayatollah was an uncomfortable one for the regime, and cut to the quick its claims to legitimacy. As such, any self-aware Iranian writer can easily conclude that while there are numerous risks entailed in writing about Khamenei in a manner that could conceivably be construed as critical, none exist in writing about Khomeini. The initial conditions determine the results. Such is how red lines work in the Iranian academy.

The only ways around this are somewhat imperfect. First, we will have to apply some of the insights gained from the previous chapter on Khomeini, and use those to search for continuities and discontinuities of discourse. Khamenei's reliance on claiming the mantle of Khomeini for his own legitimation as *rahbar* suggests that this would be a fruitful approach in any event. Second, that the vast majority of writings on Khamenei are hagiographical in nature does not render them entirely worthless. There is still room for agency in the selection of texts to include in a book comprised solely of his speeches, and this may give us some clues as to salient or significant themes. Furthermore, our intuition can be utilized through a miniature pilot study of sorts, by reading through a subset of pertinent texts in the corpus as a means of familiarizing ourselves with its contents.[353] In this case, the texts chosen

[352] This is not to suggest that writers enjoyed open season on Khomeini once he was dead; while the man himself could be the subject of (comparatively) free study, less firmly-grounded aspects of his legacy, such as the doctrine of *velāyat-e faqīh*, remained no-go areas. Witness the imprisonment of Mohsen Kadivar, largely for his criticisms of Khomeini's theory: Yasuyuki Matsunaga, "Mohsen Kadivar, an Advocate of Postrevivalist Islam in Iran," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 34, no. 3 (2007).

[353] This is comparable to a study of White House press briefings by Alan Partington, though he read his corpus in its entirety. However, it should be noted that: 1) he utilized a single corpus for a book-length study and; 2) he capped the size of his corpus at 250,000 words, while this one contains several million, precluding our reading it in its entirety due to time considerations. Partington, *The Linguistics of Political Argument*, 12.

were his speeches on the occasion of Unity Week (*hafte-ye vahdat*), held every year from the twelfth to the seventeenth of the month *rabī' al-awwal* in the Islamic (*hijrī*, not Iranian) calendar to commemorate the prophet Muhammad's birthday. This week is marked by numerous events to promote *taqrīb*, and usually features an opening speech by a prominent Iranian government official. Khamenei delivered such speeches in his capacity as *rahbar* in 1989, 1990, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 2004, and 2006. This would seem to be a logical starting point for understanding Khamenei's own discourse of pan-Islamism.

Fortunately, the corpus of Khamenei's speeches and writings over the past twenty years is large enough to provide us with a greater level of detail than virtually any other study of an individual to date, and it also enables us to experiment with some new techniques for analyzing such a large volume of data. This will hopefully help us to overcome any limitations imposed by the existing body of scholarship.

The Corpus

The Khamenei corpus is comprised of two subcorpora, one containing his speeches and remarks (*bayānāt*), the other his messages and letters (*payyām-hā va nāme-hā)*. The former were collected from the website of the Office of the Supreme Leader, www.leader.ir[354], while the latter were collected from the website of the Office for Preservation and Publication of Ayatollah Khamenei's Works, www.khamenei.ir.[355] This comprises the most complete collection of his public letters and speeches available; his written theological and *shar'ī* treatises were not included. Thus, this

[354] Specifically, the archive can be found at: http://www.leader.ir/langs/fa/index.php?p=bayanatArchive (Accessed May 2011)
[355] The precise URL for the message archive is: http://farsi.khamenei.ir/message-index (Accessed May 2011)

corpus is comparable in kind to the *Sahīfe-ye Emām* used in the previous chapter. Indeed, the *Sāzemān-e Tablīghāt-e Eslāmī* seems to be consciously imitating the *Sahīfe-ye Emām* in publishing the *Hadīs-e Velayāt*, effectively its equivalent for Khamenei. However, as of this writing, only nine volumes appear to have been printed so far, hardly the entirety of Khamenei's oeuvre, and in any case, the digital versions of his texts are easily available for our purposes.

As for the details of the corpus, his remarks encompass the dates 3 Khordad 1368 to 22 Khordad 1388, or 24 May 1989 to 12 June 2009, the day of the presidential election. His messages date from 16 Khordad 1368 to 9 Khordad 1388, or 6 June 1989 to 30 May 2009. These two subcorpora, remarks and messages, were comprised of 931 files yielding 2,505,759 words, and 626 files yielding 307,114 words, respectively, for a total of 1557 files yielding 2,812,873 words when the two subcorpora were combined into the single corpus which was used to carry out this analysis.

The individual texts were collected and cleaned in much the same manner as the texts for our analysis of Khomeini, with the primary difference being that the Khamenei data were already neatly divided up on an annual basis, allowing us to carry out the kind of rotational analysis described below.

Wordlist

As is the case with most wordlists, the most frequent terms are inevitably function words, verbs, prepositions, and the like. While the first content word is *mā* (we) at 15, the first one of real interest is *mellat* at 19, followed by *mardom* at 22, *eslām* at 32 and *eslāmī* at 36 (and again at 65 due to a Unicode error). It is interesting to note that

if both versions of *eslāmī* are added together in total frequency, this makes *eslāmī* the 19th-most frequent word, immediately above *mellat*, which is moved down to number 20. Thus, appearances can be deceiving: Islam is still more frequent in Khamenei's texts than the *mellat*, even more so if *eslām* and *eslāmī* are considered together, despite what initial examination of the wordlist indicates. The only other religiously-inflected term in the top 50 is *enqelāb*, at 49. (See Figure 4-1.) Among the top (roughly) 200 terms, to compare directly with Khomeini's, we find *emām* at 68, *khodā* at 74, *dīn* at 145, *īmān* (faith) at 156, *mosalmān* (Muslim) at 173, *Qor'ān* at 193, and *Felestīn* at 220.

These exhibit some interesting variance with Khomeini's example; the absence of the Arabic terms *allāh* and *moslemīn* in favor of the Persian *khodā* and *mosalmān* is curious, and might be interpreted as indicative of a shift towards greater "Iranification" of revolutionary ideology, though it may also indicate nothing more than Khamenei's personal idiolect, given that his clerical education took place mostly in Mashhad and Qom, with only a brief sojourn in Najaf as opposed to Khomeini's extended stay in Iraq. One must guard against reading too much into such fragmentary evidence. Of greater significance is the frequent incidence of *Felestīn*, which occurs 1508 times in Khamenei's corpus, as opposed to only 111 times in Khomeini's. Given that Khamenei's corpus is 2.8 million words versus 2.1 million for Khomeini's, this is hardly a statistical artifact, as this frequency is roughly 10.2 times more than what we would expect to find if *Felestīn* occurred in Khamenei's corpus with a frequency directly proportional to Khomeini's. Clearly, Palestine is a matter of some salience in Khamenei's discourse, and will be important to understanding his own conception of Pan-Islamism.

These terms, others selected from the 200 most frequent terms in the Khamenei wordlist, and numerous others assumed to be of interest (as described above in our discussion of Khomeini) will form the basis for the collocation and concordance analyses which follow.

Analysis, Section 1 – Most Frequent Terms

Let us begin again with one of the most basic and foundational terms in the discourse of any political Islam: *eslām*, occurring at 32 on the wordlist. As compared to Khomeini, Khamenei's use of the term revolves less around a political cosmology, and focuses instead on Islam in the (political) world. Important L1 collocates includes *donyā* (world) at 1 and 7, *doshmanān* at 6, *jahān* at 8, *sadr* at 11, *parcham* at 12, *rāh* at 16, *aleyhe* (against) at 19, *hākemīyyat* (sovereignty or rule) at 20, *barekat* (blessing) at 21, *ommat* at 23, and *ālam* (world) at 24. (See Figure 4-2.) Right collocates are less varied, but notably include *nāb* (pure) at R1/8, while *moslemīn* collocates at R2/6, *enqelāb* at R2/7, and *Qor'ān* at R2/9. As compared to Khomeini, we see fewer terms related to Islam as an abstract entity, or pertaining to its glories and the need to preserve and protect Islam as such. Instead, we see a greater emphasis on Islam in the world, evidenced by the prevalence of *donyā*, *jahān*, *ālam*, *ommat*, and the like. For Khamenei, Islam is is a direct force on the world stage, a concrete reality rather than an abstract aspiration. Interestingly, the phrase *eslām-e nāb-e mohammadī* (pure Mohammedan Islam) occurs 103 times in the Khamenei corpus, or about 3 times as often as the Khomeini corpus. While Khomeini may have coined the phrase, it appears that Khamenei was the one who solidified it in the IRI's discourse. This is likely tied to his need to derive legitimacy from Khomeini's legacy.

The pattern of governmentalization or politicization is repeated with *eslāmī*, number 36 on the wordlist. While the top L1 collocates are unsurprising, such as *jomhūrī* at 1/2 (due to spelling variation), *nezām* at 3, *enqelāb* at 4, and *Irān* at 6, other strong L1 collocates underscore the pattern seen with *eslām*. These include *ommat* at 5 and 10, *keshvar-hā-ye* (genitive form of "countries") at 7, 19, and 30, *keshvar* at 17, *mellat-hā-ye* (genitive form of "nations") at 21, *dowlat* (government) at 22, and *nahzat* (movement) at 25, with other terms of interest including *jāme'e* (society) at 20, *bīdārī* (awakening) at 23, and *īmān* at 24. (See Figure 4-3.) It should be emphasized that many of these terms are also to be found in Khomeini's usage of *eslāmī*, which is to be expected, given that Khamenei is his successor. Nonetheless, the shift in emphasis is apparent in their relative frequency and the lesser variation among terms. *Ommat*, in particular, is far more frequent with Khamenei (it doesn't appear among frequent L1 collocates of *eslāmī* in the Khomeini corpus), while such terms as *mamālek* or *melal* don't appear at all in the Khamenei corpus, though Khomeini used them often in conjunction with *eslāmī.* Terms pertaining to Islam have lost the mystical and cosmological associations they possessed with Khomeini, and are now firmly in the realm of states and governments with Khamenei.

A further curious contrast with Khomeini is that *allāh* is relatively infrequent in the Khamenei corpus; all of its variants add up to around 2800 instances, as opposed to at least 4000 for *khodā* (which is 74 on the wordlist), which reverses the pattern of higher frequency for *allāh* seen with Khomeini. This seems to illustrate the ritualization of these terms vis-à-vis *eslām*, as described above. *Allāh* takes on a mostly ceremonial character, as most of its immediate collocates are Arabic, yielding such fixed phrases as L1/1 and R1/1, which form *riḍwān allāh 'alayhi*, a benediction used when speaking of the dead, and most commonly applied to Khomeini. One

exception to this tendency is the combination of L2/20, L1/19 and R1/14, which taken together form the *āya* discussed above, Q3:103. (See Figure 4-4.) *Khodā* exhibits even weaker patterns, with only such collocates as *rāh* at L1/2, *dīn* at L1/7, *bandegān* (servants) at L1/14, *doshmanān* at L1/19, and *moqābel* (against) at L1/20 standing out. (See Figure 4-5.) While these terms retain a patina of political meaning, they are no longer as marked as they were during Khomeini's lifetime. Perhaps this is to be expected under a religious government; after all, such basic terms are ubiquitous, suffusing the entirety of the political discourse, and are common to all elements across the political spectrum of the Islamic Republic.

In light of these discursive shifts since Khomeini, we can now turn our attention to more earthly matters, notably the uses of *mellat*. Despite it being the most frequent content word in Khamenei's corpus, at 19 on the wordlist, it has a relatively narrow range of referents. The most frequent one, unsurprisingly, is Iran at R1/1, followed closely by *Felestīn* at R1/7, Iraq at R1/10 and Afghanistan at R1/28. The qualities these nations possess are explained by *Mosalmān* at R1/12, *mazlūm* at R1/15 and *mo'men* (believing) at R1/22. (See Figure 4-6.) This narrowing of scope is interesting, as it references a far lesser number of Islamic countries than Khomeini did, though the qualities tying them together remain the same. At the same time, we see an upsurge in references to the *ommat*, which may hint at the formation of a more coherent discourse on the *ummah* as a unified entity, as opposed to as a collection of disparate Muslim states. This would comport with a shift from the *ummah* as an eschatological moment in politics to a concrete political reality, that is, as part of a more generalized shift away from political cosmology towards a politics of the here-and-now rather than one of the hereafter.

Keshvar, 40 on the wordlist, does not deviate much from the pattern set out by *mellat*, though it tends to refer primarily to Iran, rather than any other country. The L1/1 collocate *īn* (the demonstrative "this") and R1/2 collocate *mā* (in this case, "our") highlight this, while the R1/12 collocate Iran further emphasizes *keshvar*'s tendency to refer to Iran. (See Figure 4-7.) Only *eslāmī* at R1/13 indicates that this term may also have a broader referent. This is made more apparent by looking at the collocation pattern for *keshvar-hā-ye*, or the genitive plural of *keshvar*. Here, the term refers to *eslāmī* at R1/1 and 3, *mosalmān* at R1/4, *arabī* (Arab) at R1/5, 20 and *arab* at R1/23, and contrasts these with *ūrūpā'ī* (European) at R1/6 and 19 and *gharbī* (Western) at R1/8 and 26. (See Figure 4-8.) Thus, *keshvar*, while broadly similar to *mellat*, does exhibit some differences between its singular and plural forms. There is also a heightened degree of abstraction vis-à-vis Khomeini, and much less of a tendency to name specific countries, with the exception of Iran's neighbors (Iraq, Afghanistan), or certain highly salient countries (Palestine).

Mass nouns tend to fulfill politicized roles in Khamenei's discourse. The highly common terms *mardom* (22nd most frequent term in Khamenei's corpus) and *dowlat* (the 98th) are good, contrastive examples of this tendency. *Mardom* is best compared to *mellat* in its valence, as it is primarily a positive signifier. Right collocates of note include *azīz* (dear) at R1/8, *donyā* at R1/12, *mo'men* at R1/13, and Iran, Iraq, and Palestine at R1/14-16, respectively, as well as *mosalmān* at R1/22 and *mazlūm* at R1/26. (See Figure 4-9.) *Dowlat*, on the other hand, is more mixed, signifying both the positive and the negative. As contrasted with Khomeini's discourse, where it was largely a technical term, *dowlat* for Khamenei takes on a binary set of associations. On the one hand, it collocates with Iran at R1/3, and *eslāmī* at R1/11 and 22, *jomhūrī* (presumably in reference to the Islamic Republic) at

R1/12 and 18, and *khedmatgozārī* (serving, in the sense of serving the public) at R1/13. On the other hand, it collocates with *ghāseb* (usurper, usually used in reference to Israel) at R1/6, America at R1/8,9, and 25, and England at R1/14, as well as *sahyūnīst* (Zionist) at R2/21. (See Figure 4-10.) This duality leaves little room for a neutral portrayal of the term, and politicizes it to an extent not seen in the Khomeini corpus.

Among other mass nouns, *enqelāb* has largely evolved into a fixed phrase, and carries few connotations beyond those one would expect, such as *pīrūzī* or *eslāmī*. *Harakat* (movement, 116 on the wordlist) seems to have filled the discursive space taken up by *nahzat* in Khomeini's discourse. Notable collocates include *azīm* (great) at R1/2, *eslāmī* at R1/13, *omūmī* (popular, general) at R1/15, *mellat* at R1/16, and *enqelābī* at R1/25. (See Figure 4-11.) The concordances show that the *harakat-e azīm* in question often refers to an Islamic movement, the movement of the Imam (i.e., Khomeini), an Islamic or Revolutionary movement, a global movement, or the movement of the Islamic *ommat*. This preserves the globalized sense in which Khomeini used the term *nahzat*.

But perhaps the clearest indicator of the valence of mass nouns in Khamenei's discourse is the term *mosalmān*, number 173 on the wordlist. Virtually every noun it collocates with should be understood in a positive light, and the data largely comport with the discussion above. The strongest L1 collocates are *mellat-hā-ye* and *mellat*, at L1/1-3 and 24, while *mardom* is at L1/4, *barādarān* (brothers) at L1/5, *keshvar-hā-ye* at L1/7, *dowlat-hā-ye* at L1/8, *khāharān* (sisters) at L1/11, *javānān* (youths) at L1/12, *javāme'* (societies) at L1/17, and *ommat* at L1/18. Iran also collocates at R1/8. (See Figure 4-12.) This confirms our earlier interpretation of several of these terms, and also indicates that *mosalmān* is a preferred term for positive references.

A few other terms round out the terms selected here for further study on the basis of their frequency in the Khamenei corpus. *Emām* is a highly frequent term at number 68 on the wordlist, and its collocates explain why. It serves as a referent for one of two types: either the twelve Shi'i Imams, or Khomeini, and the latter is by far the more frequent, indicating the extent to which Khamenei draws on Khomeini's quasi-divine authority in his own discourse. While some collocates could refer to either the Shi'i Imams or Khomeini, such as *hazrat* (an honorific title used to speak reverentially of religious figures) at L1/3, *motahhar* (holy or pure) at L1/8 and 11, or *moqaddas* (holy) at L1/16, other terms are clearly restricted to one referent. *Rāh* (path) at L1/9, *khat* (line) at L1/10, *rahlat* (passing) at L1/13, *bozorgvār* (great) at R1/1, its possessive form *bozorgvāremān* at R1/6, *rāhel* (late, departed) at R1/5, Khomeini at R1/8 and 25, *azīz* (dear) and *azīzemān*, its possessive form, at R1/13 and 14, respectively, and *mā* (our) at R1/20, all clearly refer to Khomeini. Other terms indicate the Shi'i Imams, such as *Hossein* at R1/2, *Sādeq* at R1/15, *Hasan* at R1/17, and *Sajjād* at R1/18. Finally, *zamān* (here, "the Imam of the age") at R1/11 refers to the Hidden Imam. (See Figure 4-13.) While *emām* retains some of its historical religious associations, for Khamenei it serves primarily as a term of reference to Khomeini, and as a way of claiming Khomeini's mantle for his own.

While many of the terms discussed above demonstrate a pattern of politicization of religious terminology, *nezām* (regime, system, or order), at 67 on the Khamenei wordlist, illustrates the sacralization of the political. While some collocates are to be expected, such as *mas'ūlān* (officials) at L1/12, *doshmanān* at L1/18, or *maslahat* (interest) at L1/23, the right collocates illustrate this pattern quite clearly. *Eslāmī* collocates at R1/1,2 and 19, as well as R2/1 and 2, *jomhūrī* at R1/3 and 4, and *moqaddas* at R1/11 and 13. (See Figure 4-14.) These frequent

descriptions of the *nezām* in sacral terms underscore the extent to which the Islamic Republic is portrayed in Khamenei's discourse as a righteous actor on the global stage, and a key figure, or indeed, the leading figure, in the world of Islam.

Finally, the term *Felestīn*, at 220 on the Khamenei wordlist, is far more frequent, relatively speaking, than it was in the Khomeini corpus. It also exhibits some similar collocation patterns of a generally positive nature. Among left collocates, *mellat* at L1/1, *mardom* at L1/4, *mazlūm* at L1/5, *sarzamīn* (country or land) at L1/6, *keshvar* at L1/13 and 18, *ārmān* (aim or desire) at L1/14, *najjāt* (salvation) at L1/15, *mosalmān* at L1/23, *eslāmī* at L1/24, and *ghāseb* (occupier, in reference to Israel, as compared to *eshghālī*, occupied, which collocates at R1/6 and 9) at L1/25 highlight the strong affinial nature of the terms used by Khamenei in reference to Palestine, many of which are typically reserved for describing Iran. (See Figure 4-15.) The extensive use of religious terminology, such as *najjāt*, underscores the sacralized character of the Arab-Israeli conflict in Khamenei's discourse. This relative prominence of the Palestinian issue vis-à-vis the Khomeini corpus is illustrative of its totemic nature for the Islamic Republic under Khamenei; Iran's uncompromising stance on Palestine is a means for it to assert ideological-political leadership of the Muslim world, and not coincidentally, it functions as a powerful symbol of Islamic unity in the face of foreign occupation. As will be discussed below, its utility lies in providing a means to subsume sectarian and political differences in the service of a larger pan-Islamic cause, much like the Caliphate did in the early 20th century.

We can now turn our attention to terms of specific interest to the question of pan-Islamism, having surveyed some of the most frequent terms in the Khamenei corpus.

The term *ommat* is, much like *Felestīn*, far more frequent in Khamenei's corpus than in Khomeini's. It also has a very different collocational environment, one in line with a more politicized and less purely religious usage. Several collocates are telling, notably *emām* at L1/6, which primarily refers to Khomeini as *emām-e ommat*, portraying him as not just founder of the Islamic Republic, but a leader of the global Muslim community, *vahdat* at L1/9, *doshmanān* at L1/19, and *masāleh* (interests) at L1/25. (See Figure 4-16.) Right collocates are not terribly surprising, including *eslāmī* and *eslām* at R1/1-3 and 4, *bozorg* at R1/4, and *mosalmān* at R1/8. This emphasis on political terminology, such as *doshmanān* and *masāleh*, hearkens back to the usage of *ommat* by pan-Islamists before Khomeini, and ironically draws him in by describing him as *emām-e ommat*. The statistical collocates of *ommat* paint a similar picture, with terms such as *doshmanān* and *mardom* collocating more strongly than such terms as *eslāmī*. Curiously, *vahdat* is only a moderately strong collocate, coming in at 27 on a ranked statistical collocate list, directly above *mohammad* at 28. (See Figure 4-17.) This is a marked difference with Khomeini, and probably has something to do with Khamenei's conceptions of the *ommat*. Rather than an eschatological endpoint, as Khomeini envisioned the global *ommat* in a state of becoming rather than of being, Khamenei's conception of it as the existing Muslim community in the here and now necessarily changes its collocational tendencies in his corpus.

If *ommat* has become more salient for Khamenei than it was for Khomeini as a political term, *moslemīn* has become less so. It still retains a similarly political meaning, as such collocates as *vahdat* at L1/6, *bīdārī* at L1/11, *omūr* at L1/14,

ettehād at L1/15 and 25, *feraq* (sects) at L1/17, *ālam* at R1/5 and *jahān* at R1/7 would suggest. (See Figure 4-18.) But its lesser frequency as compared to the Khomeini corpus and the relatively low collocational strength of some of these terms suggests that it is less salient than *ommat* for Khamenei.

Vahdat's collocation pattern has not changed drastically from that of Khomeini. Key L1 collocates include *hefz* at 7, *ījād* (attainment) at 9, and *mohavvar* (pivot) at 12. R1 collocates include *kalame* at 2 and 9, *mellī* at 4, *eslāmī* at 5 and 17, *moslemīn* at 8, and *ommat* at 11. (See Figure 4-19.) These are comparable to the collocates in the Khomeini corpus, with the notable addition of *mellī*. Likewise, *kalame*'s main collocate of note is *vahdat* at L1/1. The phrase *vahdat-e kalame* seems to have become firmly institutionalized under Khamenei, though it exhibits less variance and dynamicity than it did with Khomeini. *Ettehād*, by contrast, seems to exhibit the greater politicization characteristic of Khamenei's discourse. Its R1 colllocates include *kalame* at 2 and 9, *mellī* at 3, *moslemīn* at 7, *eslāmī* at 10, *mellat* at 11, *mosalmānān* at 12, *donyā-ye* at 14 (the concordance lines show that these are all references to *donyā-ye eslām*), *mardom* at 15, and *ommat* at 16. Other collocates of interest include *vahdat* at R2/4, and *ettefāq* (agreement) at R2/5. (See Figure 4-20.) Thus, while *vahdat* seems largely unchanged from Khomeini's discourse, *ettehād* has assumed greater prominence, and is representative of the overall trend in favor of the more robust institutional unity we see permeating Khamenei's discourse.

Two other related terms should be mentioned here. The first, *tawhīd*, is not particularly prevalent, but collocates of note include *parcham* at L1/4, and *kalame* at R1/5. (See Figure 4-21.) *Taqrīb* is very rare, appearing only 27 times in the corpus, and primarily in the context of the activities of the *majma' al-taqrīb*. A closer look at how Khamenei has used the phrases *tawhīd-e kalame* and *ettehād-e kalame* in the past

helps us better understand the significance of these terms, and may offer some explanation as to why *taqrīb* is such a rare term, despite the concept's importance to the Islamic Republic. In a 1984 book, he asserts that *tawhīd-e kalame* means "*ettefāq-e kalame* (agreement) among Muslims, and *ettehād* of them [as well]," and that "*ettehād-e kalame* among the Muslims brought [the Islamic Republic] into being."[356] This is proof that all the Islamic sects (*mazāheb*) are brothers in the *ommat* of Islam, and should set aside and forgive their differences, and focus instead on their shared beliefs[357], and that the forces of Satan, notably the United States, are trying to spread *ekhtelāf* (disunity, difference) to undermine and weaken the *ommat*, because they fear its strength.[358] This element of Khamenei's thinking parallels his approach to the *ommat* vis-à-vis Khomeini, who saw it as something not yet attained. For Khamenei, *taqrīb* is an existing state of affairs, to be preserved and protected. After it brought about the Islamic Revolution and instituted the Islamic Republic (after all, the Revolution would not have succeeded in the absence of *tawhīd-e kalame*, which entails *taqrīb*) these accomplishments had to be preserved to act as a beacon to the rest of the Islamic world. Hence, the relative infrequency of the term *taqrīb* in his discourse; having already been attained, it doesn't merit much further discussion. More important is staving off the danger of disunity, hence we see *ekhtelāf* appear 651 times in his corpus, and the similar term *tafarroqeh* appears 175 times, versus *taqrīb*'s 27.

Terms such as *ettehād* and *tawhīd* relate to other revolutionary symbols, most of which Khamenei makes use of in ways which do not differ significantly from

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[356] Alī Khāmene'ī, "Kalame-ye Tawhīd va Tawhīd-e Kalame," in *Resālat-e Enqelāb-e Eslāmī-ye Īrān dar Tawhīd-e Kalame, Jeld-e Dovvom*, ed. Abdolkarīm Bī-Āzār Shīrāzī (Tehrān: Daftar-e Nashr-e Farhang-e Eslāmī, 1404 A.H. (1984)), 60.
[357] Ibid., 63. These shared beliefs include, notably, "the word (*kalame*) *lā ilāha illā allāh wa muḥammad rusūl allāh*…the line of the Emām…Eslām, the Qur'ān, the Ka'ba, and *velāyat*."
[358] Ibid., 64-65.

Khomeini. That said, there are some which exhibit minor changes worth noting, and which illustrate the broader shift in discourse between Khomeini and Khamenei. *Parcham* is still a strongly religious term, collocating at R1/1 and R2/4 with *eslām*, *tawhīd* at R1/5, and *Qor'ān* at R1/14, among others. But other collocates point towards a growing emphasis on the politics of this world, such as *edālat* at R1/4, *mobāreze* at R1/6, *hoqūq* (rights) at R1/8, and even *āzādī* (freedom) at R1/15, as well as *demokrāsī* at R1/19. (See Figure 4-22.) While Islam remains paramount, a greater emphasis on justice, rights, and resistance is tied to this revolutionary symbol. The injection of realpolitik and resistance into this discourse marks a sharp shift away from Khomeini's religiously-infused, triumphalist use of the term, and suggests that the banner may have been bloodied and humbled by an eight-year war, and the realities of political power.

In this light, it is perhaps unsurprising that *sodūr* is relatively rare, and comparatively speaking less frequent than it is in Khomeini's corpus (54 instances in Khamenei's corpus, versus 52 in Khomeini's, which is roughly 25% smaller). The basic position represented by *sodūr*, that of Iran serving as an exemplar state for the Muslim world, is still present in Khamenei's discourse, though it is much less obvious than with Khomeini. While *nemūne* is not more common in Khamenei's discourse, *olgū* certainly is, occurring around 200 times in the Khamenei corpus versus around 50 times in the Khomeini corpus. However, its collocation pattern tells us little; the statistical collocates are necessary in order to make sense of this data. In the case of *olgū*, several terms of interest exhibit strong collocational tendencies: *dīgar* (other), *mā, mardom*, several forms of *mellat-hā-ye* and *keshvar-hā-ye*, and *onvān* (here, part of the phrase *be onvān*, "as"). (See Figure 4-23.) A glance at the concordance lines confirms that the general use of these terms is to refer to Iran as an example (often in

the phrase *olgū va nemūne*) for other countries or peoples. *Nemūne* exhibits a similar pattern of statistical collocates, albeit less marked than is the case with *olgū*. (See Figure 4-24.)

The importance of domestic solidarity and Iran's role as exemplar is underscored by the slight shift in meaning for *hambastegī*. While such terms as *vahdat* and *ettehād* collocate at L2/2 and L2/3, respectively, more important is *mellī*, which collocates at R1/1 and 3. (See Figure 4-25.) While *hambastegī* thus appears in the context of some key affinial terms, it is itself somewhat de-Islamicized, and has more of a domestic focus in Khamenei's discourse.

A larger pattern can be seen in Khamenei's use of the terms *mostaz'af, mostaz'afān,* and *mostaz'afīn*. All of these terms are far less frequent than in Khomeini's corpus, though their collocates and connotations tend to be the same. Khamenei's discourse, even in how it relates to pan-Islamism, is much more inward-looking than Khomeini's, and his choice of terminology reflects this.

The increased prominence of the term *sarzamīn* is both indicative of this general trend, and illustrates the one major exception. It has two main referents: Iran, as is illustrated by the collocates *īn* (demonstrative "this") at L1/1 and *eslāmī* at R1/5 and 8; and Palestine, which collocates at R1/1 and R2/5. (See Figure 4-26.) *Sarzamīn* is also far more common in Khamenei's corpus, appearing 280 times as opposed to 31 times in Khomeini's. The prominence of Palestine in this context comports with its far more frequent appearance in Khamenei's discourse more generally, and underscores that for him, at least, Palestine is an Islamic issue of similar import to preserving the Islamic Republic as an example for the rest of the Muslim world. Hence its role as a locus for pan-Islamism.

The centrality of Palestine is best illustrated by the example of one of Khomeini's favored terms, *mazlūm* (oppressed). While he favored references to the oppressed nations of the world generally, and sometimes referred to Iran or Iraq specifically, for Khamenei, these are secondary. The prime oppressed nation is Palestine, collocating at R1/2, which is then followed by Iraq at R1/7, Afghanistan at R1/9, Lebanon at R1/13, and Bosnia at R1/15. (See Figure 4-27.) This focus on the oppression and suffering of Palestine is not only a way of tying it discursively to Iran (as is also the case with the use of *sarzamīn*), but a way of configuring it into a Shi'i paradigm, with suffering and oppression conferring justice and righteousness. The only other nation to have merited such a status is Iran, hence Palestine and Iran are set side by side in Khamenei's discourse, as dual exemplars of the same phenomenon. The reference to a small number of oppressed nations, either in Iran's geographic orbit (Iraq, Afghanistan), or those containing many Shi'a (Lebanon) shows the narrowing geographic scope of Khamenei's vision for the *ommat*. Other Muslim countries are not irrelevant (for example, Bosnia), but a focus on Iran and its near abroad takes priority.

Having sketched out some of the discursive shifts between Khamenei and Khomeini, we will next use a close reading of some of these texts to better theorize pan-Islamism in Khamenei's discourse, given the paucity of prior writings on the subject, and to use the data given above to offer a more comprehensive description of Khamenei's worldview.

Literature

Most of the literature about Khamenei, so to speak, consists of collections of his remarks on various selected topics. This is hardly analytical, but is nonetheless indicative of certain salient ideas and recurrent themes in his discourse, and serves as a useful tool to aid in our analysis.

For example, his emphasis on the need to preserve *vahdat*, in particular through the institution of *rahbarī* (leadership) in the *ommat*, comes across in his depiction of Ali. The *ommat*'s insufficient attention to this institution (i.e., *rahbarī*), which Khamenei considers *mohavvar-e vahdat* (the pivot of unity) during Ali's time led, he claims, to the decline of the Muslim community.[359]

Elsewhere, he argues that the Islamic Republic and the Islamic Revolution "laid the groundwork for a global [Islamic] awakening," and attributes Iran's respect in the Middle East, and even as far afield as Latin America, to "the blessing of resistance, the blessing of saying 'no' to arrogance [i.e., America]."[360] He elsewhere states that regarding "the wave of Islamic awakening, it is a fact that it takes Iran as its model [*olgū*]."[361] This bolsters our inferences drawn from the data above about Iran's exemplar role on the global stage in Khamenei's discourse.

Metaphorically speaking, Khamenei uses an interesting set of phrases and images which may help us understand his discourse more fully. Specifically, he frequently refers to Islam through bodily metaphors, calling Palestine "part of the body of the world of Islam" (*pāreh-ye tan-e jahān-e eslām*), and speaks elsewhere of

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[359] _____, *Nahj al-Balāgheh az Dīdgāh-e Maqām-e Mo'azzam-e Rahbarī* (Tehrān: Sharekat-e Chāp va Nashr-e Bayn al-Melalī-ye Sāzemān-e Tablīghāt-e Eslāmī, 1380 (2001)), 75.
[360] _____, *Mozākere bā Āmrīkā?!* (Tehrān: Mo'asseseh-ye Farhangī-ye Qadr-e Velāyat, 1378 (1999)), 275, 81.
[361] _____, *Pāreh-ye Tan-e Eslām dar Āyīne-ye Haqīqat: Felestīn va Rezhīm-e Sahyūnīstī dar Negāh-e Rahbar-e Mo'azzam-e Enqelāb-e Eslāmī* (Tehrān: Mo'asseseh-ye Farhangī-ye Qadr-e Velāyat, 1383 (2004)), 115.

"treating [*elāj*] this danger" to the world of Islam, i.e., a threat to Palestine.[362] Likewise, he speaks of Palestine returning to the "Islamic body" (*peykar-e eslāmī*)[363], and of the situation in Palestine being an "old wound" inflicted upon "the body of the Islamic social order and the Islamic world, which grows deeper day by day."[364] Similar phrases are used throughout Khamenei's writings and speeches, but the basic metaphor has been established. This may be useful in helping us understand his conception of the *ommat*, and also the incidence of certain of the data in our corpus. The body, after all, is whole and indivisible; the severance of any part of it is a grievous injury, and something to be remedied as a matter of urgency. This conceptual metaphor establishes the normative grounds for Khamenei's (and, indeed, arguably Khomeini's, as well) conception of pan-Islamism, especially *taqrīb*. The normative state of the *ommat* is one of unity, anything else is an aberration. Thus, during the time of the Prophet and Ali, the *ommat* enjoyed a state of wholeness, free from outside interference and unmutilated by external powers. The spread of *ekhtelāf* and *tafarroqeh* was the result of external, malicious actors, and was to be combated through efforts at *taqrīb* to re-attain the natural state of *vahdat* in the *ommat*. Once this had been attained, as evidenced by the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the focus would shift to defending this natural state once more. The Islamic Republic in this way represents the first *ommat*, that of the Prophet and Ali. This is why Khamenei has made such claims as "today, the present conditions represent the conditions in the era of the government of *Amīr al-Mu'minīn* [i.e., Ali]. Therefore, these days [*rūzegār*] are the days of the *Nahj al-Balāgheh*."[365] As mentioned above, this helps to explain why ecumenical unity remains a key component of Khamenei's

[362] Ibid., 252-53.
[363] Ibid., 256.
[364] Ibid., 261.
[365] Khāmene'ī, *Nahj al-Balāgheh*, 52.

discourse of pan-Islamism, even if the term most frequently used to refer to ecumenical unity, *taqrīb*, is comparatively rare. In terms of bodily metaphors, this also means that the Islamic Republic is something like the head of the body, or to use an even older bodily metaphor, the heart. Its presence is necessary for the rest of the body to function properly, and its protection is paramount in ensuring the body's survival. While Khomeini's discourse situated Iran as *omm al-qorrā* of the *ommat*, Khamenei's bodily metaphors make Iran's relationship to the rest of the *ommat* even more explicit.

In order to more fully understand the interrelations of these various concepts, we can more closely examine an important source which directly addresses them: Khamenei's speeches on the occasion of the *hafte-ye vahdat*, Unity Week.[366] Unity Week has been an important element of Khamenei's legacy as *rahbar*, and emblematic of his emphasis on ecumenical unity; his supporters have highlighted his efforts towards *taqrīb*, noting his key role in founding numerous organizations, such as the *majma'al- taqrīb*, as well as a constellation of less well-known organizations, including *al-mu'tamar al-'ālimī li-al-waḥda al-islāmīyya*, *al-majma' al-'ālimī li-ahl al-bayt*, *majma' iqāmat al-ṣalāt, majma' fiqh ahl al-bayt,* and scores of other organizations, research institutions, conferences, and the like.[367]

Beginning with his first speech, shortly after Khomeini's death in 1989[368], Khamenei touched on themes similar to Khomeini's, blaming the US for spreading *ekhtelāf* among the Muslims of the world, but also including thinly-veiled criticism of the *salafī*s and their Saudi backers, alluding to those who "say that if something did not exist in the period of Islam's advent, this is a mistake! This kind of talk resembles

[366] All of the texts cited in this section are taken from www.leader.ir, and consist of Khamenei's remarks on the occasion of Unity Week. They are included in the corpus, but are examined here as a group. Citations for each of these texts are abbreviated, and only include the speech's date and URL.
[367] For a comprehensive list, see al-Ghurayfī, *Khalīfat al-Imām al-Rāḥil*, 175-212.
[368] 11 October 1989, http://www.leader.ir/langs/fa/index.php?p=bayanat&id=176.

a conspiracy." Likewise, he attacked those "who spend oil money to write books against the Shi'a," and referred explicitly to "the *omm al-qorrā* of Islam, that is, Islamic Iran." He also argued that to preserve *vahdat* required attention to the "*mohavvar* of the principles of the Revolution, the correct course of the Islamic regime (*nezām*), and *velāyat-e faqīh*." It is rather hard to see daylight between his ideas and Khomeini's here, which is perhaps to be expected so shortly after Khomeini's death. The emphasis on Iran's key role, and the detrimental role played by external powers is clear, however. His not-so-subtle jabs at Saudi Arabia recall Khomeini's particular venom for that country's rulers.

In 1990, he dropped some of Khomeini's terminology, focusing instead on the *majma' al-taqrīb* and the role of unnamed European powers in spreading *ekhtelāf*, while emphasizing the various grounds for *taqrīb*: "*e'teqādī, kalāmī, fekrī, feqhī, osūlī,* and *elmī"* (devotional, philosophical, intellectual, jurisprudential, authoritative, i.e., sources of jurisprudence, and theological).[369] This subtle change in focus marked a shift away from the more confrontational mode of leadership Khomeini sought within the *ommat*, and marked Khamenei's growing emphasis on Iran as a beacon for the rest of the Muslim world. This was even more evident in his next remarks, in 1994, when he argued that because the Islamic Republic "carries the standard of Islam," it is attacked by external powers, whose real goal (here, he quotes Khomeini) is not just opposition to us, but "to Islam and the Qur'an," thus, it is Muslims' duty to defend the Islamic Republic.[370]

By 1995, the opposition of these external powers to Iran and to *vahdat* had grown even stronger and more dangerous, for two reasons. The first was the material advantages, in money, propaganda, and influence that these powers enjoyed over the

[369] 8 October 1990, http://www.leader.ir/langs/fa/index.php?p=bayanat&id=374.
[370] 26 August 1994, http://www.leader.ir/langs/fa/index.php?p=bayanat&id=1036.

Muslim world; the second was the threat they felt from from Islam and the Islamic awakening, now that they had witnessed what it could accomplish in establishing a free, powerful, self-reliant state which resisted their control. (i.e., Iran)[371] Because "these enemies' best tool is is spreading *ekhtelāf* among the Muslims," Khamenei argued that *ettehād* among the Muslims was a "necessity of life," and that "Islamic societies must find *ettehād-e kalame* with each other." While he acknowledged that *ettehād* and attaining *ettehād* were "complex issues," he concluded that *ettehād* between the various Islamic *mellat*s meant that "in issues pertaining to the world of Islam, they should work together (or, take the same line, *hamsū harakat konand*), help each other, and in their own nations, not use their capital (*sarmāye*) against each other." He emphasized the importance of their shared faith, noting that they shared "a single book, a single tradition (*sonnat*), a single prophet, a single *qebla*, a single *ka'ba*, a single *hajj*, a single [set of] devotions (*ebādāt*), a single [set of] sources of belief… and a single enemy." This speech marks an explicit shift in emphasis towards institutional unity, by highlighting the need to work together in the political realm, and the existence of a single shared enemy (presumably, the abstract entity of *estekbār*, rathern than any one state, though the US and Israel are the natural candidates). In the next section of this chapter, on rotational analysis, we will see if the governmentalization of Khamenei's discourse discussed above is in evidence after 1995, as this speech would suggest is likely.

His 1996 speech continued in a similar vein, focusing on the role of *estekbār* in seeking to divide the Muslim world and spread *fetne* (sedition, division between the sects of Islam).[372] This same *estekbār* sought to separate other Islamic nations from Iran, divide Arab and non-Arab countries, and divide the sects of Islam. These same

[371] 15 August 1995, http://www.leader.ir/langs/fa/index.php?p=bayanat&id=1157.
[372] 3 August 1996, http://www.leader.ir/langs/fa/index.php?p=bayanat&id=1300.

powers take action and distribute money within Iran, because they see that in Iran, "Muslim brothers, Shi'i and Sunni, are in a single rank (*saff*), under a single standard (*parcham*), have a single slogan (or battle-cry, *sho'ār*), are in a single front (*jebhe*), are next to each other and with each other." This explains the actions taken against Iran by this *estekbār*, which fears the strength of Iran's example on the world stage.

Khamenei tries to directly counter these efforts in his 1997 speech, arguing that *vahdat-e eslāmī* and *ettehād* do not mean eliminating all *mazāheb* in favor of one single *mazhab*; instead, rather than "negating" (*nafī kardan*) the various *mazāheb* in order to solve the Muslim world's problems, he argues that these problems will be solved by "affirmation" (*esbāt*) of the *mazāheb*.[373] He explicitly states that the enemies of Islam today, "more than ever, fear *vahdat-e eslāmī*." He asks why, in light of this fact, the Muslim world does not make use of its many natural geographic, resource, and population advantages? In describing the advantages of the Muslim world, he refers to "the hoisting of the standard of Islam in the heart of this region [i.e., the Middle East], that is, in Islamic Iran, which today is the heart and primary center of the Islamic world…"[374] This is his counter to the *estekbār*'s fear of *vahdat*; Iran should raise high the standard of Islam and become exemplar to the rest of the Muslim world. This is why the enemies of Islam are afraid.

During the reform era, Khamenei only spoke at one Unity Week event, in 2004. It was also his shortest speech at one of these events, and relatively unremarkable, in that it was primarily a retread of older themes. For example, he referred to Palestine as a "deep wound on the Islamic body," and asserted that "*vahdat* takes precedence over all other necessities and priorities," but otherwise said

[373] 23 July 1997, http://www.leader.ir/langs/fa/index.php?p=bayanat&id=1459.
[374] Note again here the use of bodily metaphors, with Iran having become the "heart" of the Muslim world.

little that was original.[375] The context in which this speech was delivered will be examined later in the chapter on Khatami; what the reform era meant in terms of pan-Islamism is a question best explored through President Khatami's words rather than Khamenei's.

Finally, Khamenei's most recent remarks, in 2006, confirm the trend established before 2004, and hint at how his discourse on Islamic unity may be linked to other relevant political discourses. He reiterates how the Muslim world's enemies fear *vahdat*, and that *ettehād* is the most important issue for the Muslim world.[376] He argues that *ettehād* will enable them to attain technological and political advancement, and that the most important technology of the present era is nuclear technology. The US knows that Iran does not intend to make an atomic bomb, but attempts to stop Iran's efforts to obtain nuclear technology because Iran does not fear America, and does not give in to its demands. Having previously established that Iran is the "heart and… center of the Islamic world," Khamenei ties Iran's aspirations to nuclear technology to the Islamic world more generally, and equates US opposition to its desire to spread *ekhtelāf* and weaken the Muslim world. In this way, Iran's nuclear program ceases to be a national issue and becomes a pan-Islamic issue of the highest import.

This survey of Khamenei's Unity Week remarks over the course of two decades hints at a shift away from Khomeini's more multifaceted discourse of pan-Islamism towards one in which institutional unity is the paramount element, with ecumenical unity acting largely in its service, and affinial unity hardly mentioned at all except in passing. In the next section, we will use rotational analysis and examine

[375] 7 May 2004, http://www.leader.ir/langs/fa/index.php?p=bayanat&id=2574.
[376] 21 August 2006, http://www.leader.ir/langs/fa/index.php?p=bayanat&id=2927.

the changes in keywords for each annum to more precisely describe these shifts in discourse over time.

Rotational Analysis

This section makes use of the technique of *keywords*, which in a nutshell, are the result of a statistical comparison between a small corpus (the target corpus, or the corpus under investigation) and a larger corpus (the reference corpus). Words which are determined to be significantly more frequent in the target corpus are keywords, and are ranked in descending order of keyness, calculated by log likelihood.[377] The innovation applied here is to use a very large corpus comprised of the words of one individual as both target and reference corpus, by breaking out each annum of data in turn and comparing it to the remainder of the corpus, thereby highlighting the most salient features in any given year of data vis-à-vis all other years. To the best of of our knowledge, this method has not been applied in any other studies, which is perhaps to be expected, given the dearth of studies on corpora of individuals.

To illustrate how this method works in concrete terms: first, we select a year to examine, say, 1368. This is separated out from the main corpus, and all other years (1369 to 1388, in this case) serve as the reference corpus. The resulting keyword list tells us what is most unique about the 1368 sub-corpus, and has the added benefit of controlling somewhat for idiosyncrasy and features of Khamenei's idiolect, as these

[377] Hunston, *Corpora in Applied Linguistics*, 68. On a technical note, there is no standard cutoff point for validity of keywords, as keyness values are themselves endogenous to the log likelihood calculation and have no external meaning. Thus, we will try to restrict ourselves here to the top 50 keywords in any given list, while recognizing that this choice is somewhat arbitary. Though some studies have recommended a keyness value of 1000 as a cutoff, this is still an arbitary selection, and in this case the inclusion of most of the universe of texts under analysis (i.e., the entirety of Khamenei's oeuvre), rather than a random sample, obviates the need to fret unduly much over matters of statistical precision which are more relevant to random samples of general language corpora than idiolectal corpora such as ours. See Coniam, "Concordancing Oneself," 278.

should be common across all annual sub-corpora. The compilation of keyword lists for each annum has one additional benefit; Wordsmith Tools has a feature known as a *keywords database*, which in essence compiles a meta-list of keywords which are most frequent across a set of different keyword lists, in this case, our set of annual keyword lists. In contrast to regular keywords, words in the keywords database are the most typical of the data set in question, rather than the most salient or unique.

The results of this analysis create a set of 21 keyword lists for the time period covered in our study of Khamenei, meaning that we will not be able to explore every single one of them in detail in this section. Nonetheless, we can use them to illustrate the trends of discursive change described above, and to describe them with greater precision. To begin at the beginning, 1368 (roughly 1989-90) exhibited several features pertaining to Khomeini's discourse, or tying Khamenei directly to Khomeini. He makes numerous references to enemies, such as *doshmanān* at 7, problems or hardships, *masā'el* at 24, *mosībat* (hardship) at 31, as well as using terms referring directly to Khomeini, notably *īshān* (a highly formal 2nd- or 3rd-person pronoun, used here to refer to Khomeini) at 10, and benedictory phrases, including *r.h.* (an abbreviation for verbal prophylactic phrases used to refer to the deceased) at 21 and *rezvān* (part of the same sort of phrase) at 39. Other terms instantiate his worldview, such as *ommat* at 20, or *keshvar-hā-ye* at 22. (See Figure 4-28.) Taken together, these keywords hint at persistent themes in Khamenei's discourse, but also illustrate the extent to which he does not diverge, and, indeed, directly links himself to Khomeini. This is understandable, given Khamenei's own shaky legitimacy at that point in time, and his need to don Khomeini's mantle, politically speaking.

The years immediately following 1368 show the beginnings of a slow shift away from Khomeini's inherited discourse, and the development of Khamenei's own.

While terms repeat their appearance, such as *doshmanān*, we do not see as many terms referring to Khomeini, such as *īshān*, or *r.h.*, though *rezvān* appears at 29 in 1369. Other terms begin to crop up, such as *jahān* at 16 and *mazlūm* at 31 in 1369. *Hokūmat* appears at 19 in 1370, perhaps hinting at the creeping governmentalization of Khamenei's discourse.

While 1371 does not demonstrate any sharp breaks with the patterns described thus far, it is worth highlighting as an example of the limitations of this kind of analysis, and why it is best used as a complement to several different modes of analysis, rather than the sole method. The top 25 keywords contain an inordinate amount of duplicate terms, as well as several questionable numbers. For example, it is impossible that the reference corpus contains only one instance of the preposition *beh*, as line 2 seems to indicate. (See Figure 4-29.) These are almost certainly statistical artifacts, and can be explained as the byproduct of a very technical detail: Unicode signification. To explain briefly, each character in a human alphabet is represented by a unique numeric identifier as part of a computing industry standard called Unicode, which can be read by a computer and outputs the same alphabetic character to a user's monitor, regardless of differences in software, operating system, etc. However, this sytem is not perfect. For example, medial Arabic *yeh* and medial Farsi *yeh* output identically for a human user's purposes, and render a line with two dots below it, but are in fact two different Unicode characters, U+064A and U+06CC, respectively.[378] This means that idiosyncrasies in data entry, such as choice of character or keyboard setting (for example, entering text in Arabic rather Farsi Unicode), can vastly complicate a data set, since concordancers such as Wordsmith

[378] These codes are taken from Wikipedia's Unicode entry: https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/List_of_Unicode_characters#Arabic_Supplement (accessed 14 February 2011).

Tools rely on the Unicode values of each text, not the human-readable output. Two words that look the same to a human reader may be completely different for a computer. Once all of these possible variations are taken into account (and there are numerous Arabic-script characters which have multiple Unicode variants), the number of possible permutations for even a single word like *īshān* or *eslāmī* becomes enormous. Hence, a certain degree of error is unavoidable in a project of this scale.[379]

In order to derive at least some useful conclusions from the data, we can implement a workaround, though obviously this solution is far from perfect. Given the high prevalence of idiosyncratic Unicode permutations among the keyword noise, a selective culling of the results should help reduce the noise to signal ratio. In this case, we can simply delete all keyword entries which appear in the reference corpus less than 10 times; while there will be some legitimate, low-frequency results lost as a result of this method, most of the deleted keywords probably constituted junk data which would require full lemmatization of the corpus to solve otherwise, which is disallowed by our present time constraints. As such, the keyword lists from 1371 onwards include this rather blunt cleaning, while 1368-1370 do not.

This eliminates much of the noise in the data, but still leaves enough to be problematic. Nonetheless, we can speak with greater certainty about the remaining keywords, even if we have to ignore noise among the top 20 or so most key terms. In the 1371 data, the process of governmentalization continues, with *mas'ūlīn* appearing

[379] There are some techniques for error correction in this regard, primarily through *lemmatization*. In effect, this entails telling the computer to treat two word-forms as variants of the same basic unit, known as a *lemma*, for purposes of calculating statistics. See Hunston, *Corpora in Applied Linguistics*, 17-18. This is usually done through a manually-created list, though some standard lists are available for well-researched languages, such as English. There are no existing Persian lemma lists publicly available, to the best of my knowledge. Creating such a list would involve a significant time investment, and was thus eschewed in this study as offering a low return on investment, in large part because it would have to be done five times over, once for each corpus in this study, which has its own quirks and variances. Ironically, however, it is precisely these sorts of unusual distinctions which keywords analysis is designed to draw out, hence, flaws in the corpus become more visible here than in other kinds of analysis, such as collocation or concordancing.

at 13, while *moslemīn* at 30, *būsnī* (Bosnia) at 36, and *herzegovīn* (Herzegovina) at 40 indicate some of Khamenei's external concerns, namely, his focus on Muslims suffering in other parts of the world. In 1372, *feqh* appears at 8, *shī'e* (Shi'a) appears at 10, and *maktab* appears at 24, while *ommat* appears at 37; similarly, in 1373, *feqh* appears at 10, *shī'e* appears at 14, *mo'tazele* (Mu'tazilite) appears at 22, and *maktab* appears at 40. Interestingly, this may point to a discursive pattern of tying international relations to a familiar Muslim context, with the Balkan conflict necessitating more frequent references to sectarian matters, and analogies to Islamic history. The pattern continues in 1374, with *shī'e* appearing again at 15, *mo'tazele* at 23, *ommat* at 45, and *maktab* at 47.

By 1375, the keywords shift to more conventional matters of interest, focusing either on the internal Iranian political scene, with *matbū'āt* (the press) at 8, or the old standbys of *estekbār* at 9 and *amrīkā* at 28, though *ommat* does appear at 34. This trend is even more evident in 1376, with NATO intervention in the Balkans and the Dayton accords altering the state of the *ommat*. *Estekbār* is found at 15, and *amrīkā* at 20, while the more markedly Islamic terms of 1371-74 are absent from this wordlist. Thus, we can see how Khamenei's discourse is highly responsive to geopolitical events, even in relatively subtle ways.

In 1377, we already see signs of the Reformist wave, with a host of new terms prominently appearing near the top of the keywords list. *Āzādī* (freedom) appears at 11, *rowshanfekrī* (intellectual) appears at 15, *javānān* (youths) at 19, *mūsīqī* (music) at 21, *matbū'āt* at 26, *varzesh* (sport) at 38, and *nowāvarī* (innovation) at 42, though of course *estekbār* can be found at 27, and *amrīkā* at 36. Nonetheless, the shift in discourse over such a short timespan is stunning. In 1378, we find *dāneshjū'ī* (student) at 12, *āzādī* at 16, *javānān* at 20, *estekbār* at 22, *rowshanfekrī* at 26,

matbū'āt at 27, *zan* (woman) at 28, *ommat* at 38, *amrīkā* at 39, *mūsīqī* at 40, *varzesh* at 51, *mozākere* (negotiation) at 55, *amaniyyat* (security) at 58, and *nowāvarī* at 62. That diplomatic terms such as *mozākere* and *amaniyyat* have begun to creep into even Khamenei's discourse is a sign of how deeply the Reform movement altered the terms of Iranian politics.

While many of these same terms are repeated in 1379, we also see *eslāhāt* (reforms) at 14, *khoshūnat* (violence, perhaps in reference to the increasing conflict in Iran's politics, particularly in light of the 1999 student protests), and a few other terms of interest appearing further down, such as *nā'amanī* (insecurity) at 58, *felestīn* at 61, and *tahavvol* (change or transformation) at 64, as well as *mozākere* at 68. These terms may indicate both Khamenei's general stance towards the reform movement, now in its third year, with a greater emphasis on security and stability. It may also indicate Khamenei finding his political footing once again, as indicated by the reappearance of his perennial favorite, Palestine, though this likely also has something to do with the contemporaneity of the Second Intifada.

The keywords for 1380 show how sensitive this measure is to topicality, with Afghanistan being the main keyword of note at 21. While 1381 exhibits no new keywords of interest (though of course America and Afghanistan are prominent), 1382 again demonstrates keyword sensitivity to topicality, with the two most key terms (excluding noise) being *arāq* (Iraq) at 12, and *saddām* (Saddam Hussein) at 13. *Ommat* also reappears higher than it has for quite some time at 50, perhaps in relation to the wars in two Muslim countries bordering Iran.[380]

By 1383, with Saddam deposed and international attention increasingly focused on Iran's nuclear programme, we see more new terms emerge. *Elmī*

[380] That this particular keywords list shows entries for seven spelling permutations of *ommat* suggests that this term is even more key than indicated here.

(scientific) appears at 9, *maktab* at 11, *fanāvarī* (technology) at 16, *elm* (science) at 18, *demokrāsī* (democracy) at 24, *haste* (presumably clipped from *haste'ī*, nuclear) at 39, and *towlīd* (production) at 43. The 1384 keywords include many of the same, as well as *entekhābāt* (elections) at 20, hardly surprising, given the presidential election held in that year. Other notable keywords include *chālesh* (challenge) at 32, *pīshraft* (progress) at 55, as well as *hambastegī* (solidarity) at 64.

While keywords for roughly the prior decade closely track events, in 1385 we slowly start to see more ideologically-patterned ones begin to reappear as a very tumultuous time in Iran's history began to shift towards a new pattern of stability as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad assumed the presidency and Iran dug in its heels on its nuclear program. Lebanon, due to the war with Israel, appears at 10, but we find *donyā-ye* at 18, and *ommat* at 27, along with *tahavvol* (transformation) at 41, and, curiously, *hovīyyat* (identity) at 42. This increasingly global focus may mark the beginning of Iran's new discursive positioning of itself as a regional and global power, and more importantly for this study, Khamenei's taking up of the torch carried initially by Rafsanjani, and another major step towards a more post-modern conception of pan-Islamism. (See the discussion in chapter five.)

The final three years of this data set, 1386, 1387, and 1388, continue in much the same vein and contain few new terms of interest. Unfortunately, the keywords database is heavily contaminated due to the noise factor in the unmodified wordlists used here. We will have to wait until these corpora can be completely lemmatized before this feature can be utilized effectively. What this analysis has shown us is that, even in light of a messy data set, keywords analysis can still tell us some useful information. However, this mostly pertains to topicality, as is clearly illustrated by how rapidly political events show up in Khamenei's discourse when viewed through

the frame of keyword analysis. Discourse is implicated as well, though not as clearly as topicality. Still, the keywords have shown with some precision turning points in Khamenei's discourse, and the beginnings of a broader shift in the mid-2000s, around the same time that Ahmadinejad came to power. More broadly speaking, this analysis also shows the extent to which Khamenei's discourse is suffused with contemporary political events; even his discourse is not hegemonic in the Islamic Republic. Likewise, this shows how discourse more broadly cannot exist in a vacuum; it is implicated in and affected by events in the world, and is hardly the pure, abstract entity some theorists would imagine it to be.

Chapter Conclusions

This analysis shows that the evolution of Khamenei's discourse can be roughly divided into four periods: 1) an early period of justification through recourse to and imitation of Khomeini, lasting for about the first two years of Khamenei's leadership; 2) a developmental period, where Khamenei staked out his own direction while rooting himself in the received discourse of Khomeini, from about 1991 to 1996; 3) a period of reaction, where Khamenei had to cope with the political (and discursive) challenges of the Reform movement and President Khatami, lasting from around 1997 to about 2005; 4) a period of re-consolidation and reassertion, where Khamenei re-emphasized his own themes and bolstered them with new emphases on security and stability. While this period emerges most strongly from 2005 onwards, hints of it emerge as early as 2000, but become far more visible around 2003.

Along with this chronological division, we also see qualitative shifts in Khamenei's overall discourse of pan-Islamism. Beginning with the inherited

discourse from Khomeini, Khamenei begins to emphasize some elements over others early on, with his early governmentalization of IRI discourse elevating institutional over affinial unity, built upon a foundation of assumed ecumenical unity. The imperative need for Islamic unity is no longer one of expansion or export, but of defending Iran as an exemplar for the rest of the *umma*, and of preserving the tenuous state of ecumenicism and harmony which enabled the Islamic Republic to come into being, a state of affairs which had not existed since the early days of Islam, during the leadership of Muhammad and Ali.

While Khamenei was developing this particular discursive thread as *rahbar*, he was not alone in laying claim to and expanding upon Khomeini's legacy. Entering office in 1989 as President, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani assumed greater responsibilities both domestically and abroad, and as a highly-visible public figure, played a greater role than ever before in developing the regime's ideology. While he and Khamenei were never openly at odds with each other, their particular interpretations of Khomeinist discourse were hardly identical, and ultimately led in rather different directions, giving voice to divergent conceptions of Iran's role on the world stage.

5. Rafsanjani, Constructing Discourse in Transition

As Khamenei was settling into his role as Khomeini's successor, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was taking up Khamenei's old job title as President of the Islamic Republic. However, the job itself was quite different, as Iran's revised constitution eliminated the position of Prime Minister, making the President far more than a ceremonial figure. Indeed, in 1989, Rafsanjani became the most powerful elected official in the Islamic Republic, and the most powerful man in the regime other than Khamenei himself. In some ways, this formalized a long-extant state of affairs in Iranian politics, where Rafsanjani had long been considered the second most powerful figure in the Islamic Republic, a "veritable *éminence rouge*," as Azimi puts it.[381] While the aftermath of eight years of war with Iraq and the need for reconstruction and economic reform would occupy much of the agenda during Rafsanjani's two presidential terms, he nonetheless remained active on the international stage, slowly bringing Iran back into the international community after a decade of revolution and war.

In many ways, the period 1989 to 1997 marked the culmination of a long, tumultuous, and unpredictable career that began in the humble village of Bahramān, near Rafsanjān in Kermān province, in 1934, when Rafsanjani was born into a religious family.[382] At the age of fourteen, he left for Qom to study at the *howze*[383], where he met and studied with Khomeini.[384] During his time at Qom, he began

[381] Fakhreddin Azimi, *The Quest for Democracy in Iran: A Century of Struggle Against Authoritarian Rule* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 374. Here, Azimi is paraphrasing Akbar Ganji's description of Rafsanjani.
[382] Mohandes Mohsen Hāshemī, ed. *Hāshemī Rafsanjānī: Dowrān-e Mobāreze: Khāterāt, Tasvīr-hā, Asnād, Gāhshomār* (Tehrān: Daftar-e Nashr-e Ma'āref-e Enqelāb,1376 (1997)), 19-20.
[383] Alī Akbar Hāshemī Rafsanjānī, *Enqelāb yā Be'asat-e Jadīd* (Tehrān: Enteshārāt-e Yāser), 7.
[384] For Rafsanjani's personal recollections of this period, see Hāshemī, ed. *Dūrān-e Mobāreze*, 101-05. While his memoirs are a bit too polished to serve as an objective source on the details of his life, they

writing and publishing, often working with Mohammad Javād Bāhonar, a future Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic. Their first collaboration was a publication entitled *Maktab-e Tashayyo'*, and they would later produce, with several other students, a magazine entitled *Maktab-e Eslām*.[385] His political activities began to be noticed, and he soon fell afoul of SAVAK. During the period 1341-42 (around 1962-63), he was detained for several months, but escaped and went into hiding, during which time he translated the book *al-Qaḍīyya al-Filiṣṭīnīyya*, "The Palestinian Issue," by the Jordanian Ambassador to Tehran, Akram Zuʿaytir, into Persian and published it under the title *Sargozasht-e Felestīn: yā Kārnāme-ye Sīyāh-e Este'mār*.[386]

It is worth examining this work in some detail, as it is an indication of Rafsanjani's ideological formation during his younger years, and the work itself resurfaced again around the time of the Islamic Revolution. In addition to translating the book, Rafsanjani wrote a preface to it, entitled simply *Este'mār* (Colonialism). While much of it is run-of-the-mill *tiersmondisme*, hardly remarkable for its time and place, Khomeini's influence becomes readily apparent in a section titled *Eslām, Khasm-e Este'mār* (Islam, the Enemy of Colonialism). In it, Rafsanjani writes about the role Islam has played in resisting colonialism, and how the imperial powers have tried to repress it for this reason. While illustrating the influence of Rafsanjani's teachers in Qom, it also presages the ideology of the Islamic Republic itself, and the stance it would take on the world stage shortly after Khomeini assumed power.[387] This translation would resurface sometime later, albeit in a slightly different form. In

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are still useful. If anything, given their overall tenor, their contents and layout (for example, the inclusion of hundreds of pages of reproduced SAVAK documents pertaining to Rafsanjani's political activism), these memoirs are best read as Rafsanjani's audition for the job of *rahbar*.

[385] Rafsanjani and his fellow students hoped to use the former publication to spread Khomeini's ideas, according to his memoirs: Ibid., 24, 104.

[386] Rafsanjānī, *Enqelāb yā Be'asat-e Jadīd*, 8, Hāshemī, ed. *Dūrān-e Mobāreze*, 171-77. The original book in Arabic is: Akram Zuʿaytir, *al-Qaḍīyya al-Filiṣṭīnīyya* (al-Qāhira: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1955).

[387] The preface to *Sargozasht-e Felestīn* is republished in Rafsanjani's memoirs: Hāshemī, ed. *Dūrān-e Mobāreze*, 341-55. The section in question is found at pp. 345-346.

passing, Rafsanjani mentions an article he was writing based on *al-Qaḍīyya al-Filiṣtīnīyya* as he was translating the book[388], while a certain Abū Shahāb, the publisher of one of Rafsanjani's later pamphlets, *Esrā'īl va Qods-e Azīz* (undated, but most likely published in the late 1970s), refers to the essay's composition during the year 1342.[389] While it is never labeled as such by the publisher, it is highly likely that this pamphlet is the same essay he wrote around 1963. It is largely a potted history of Palestine, with a clear emphasis on the vagaries of colonialism, Zionism, and the Arab/Israeli conflict. However, its early composition (Rafsanjani would have been around 28 when he wrote it) and later republication suggests that the issue of Palestine is for him not one of simple convenience, but a long-standing personal concern, and one he sought to emphasize in the run-up to the Islamic Revolution.

Shortly after the publication of *Sargozasht-e Felestīn*, Rafsanjani took up residence in Tehran (in 1345, or about 1966), where he lodged with Ali Khamenei, who he had met while studying in Qom, and continued with his political activities.[390] He also wrote another book, *Amīr Kabīr: yā Qahremān-e Mobāreze bā Este'mār* (Amir Kabir: Or, A Champion of Resistance to Colonialism), in keeping with the theme of anti-imperialism which permeated *Sargozasht-e Felestīn*.[391] A pattern of hiding, arrest, and detention would mark the next decade of Rafsanjani's life, interspersed with the occasional writing project, such as the book *Mohammad: Khātam-e Payyāmbarān* (Mohammad: The Seal of the Prophets), which he wrote with Mohammad Javād Bāhonar.[392] Rafsanjani's embrace of armed resistance would earn him numerous stints in prison, until he went abroad for two extended trips in 1354 (around 1975).

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[388] Ibid., 171.
[389] Hāshemī Rafsanjānī, *Esrā'īl va Qods-e Azīz* (Qom: Enteshārāt-e Āzādī-e Qom), 4.
[390] Hāshemī, ed. *Dūrān-e Mobāreze*, 221-24.
[391] Ibid., 224.
[392] Ibid., 234.

First, from Iran, he made his way to Turkey, Belgium[393], England, and Germany, as well as Scandinavia, before returning to Turkey, then Syria and Lebanon before returning to Iran. In his second trip, he began by visiting Bāhonar in Japan, where his old friend was attending a conference on ethics, and from there journeyed on to Turkey, Europe, Syria and Lebanon, the United States, and eventually Iraq and Pakistan. While in Lebanon, he met with Yasir Arafat.[394] Upon his return to Iran, he was jailed in Evin Prison, where he would be imprisoned for almost three years, until shortly before the Islamic Revolution.[395] While his experiences in the Levant doubtless reinforced his existing political views, particularly in regards to the Palestinian issue, Rafsanjani's far-flung travels also made him more cosmopolitan than many of his contemporaries, such as Khamenei or even Khomeini, whose travel experiences outside of the Muslim world were brief and limited. While it is hard to establish direct causation in such matters, this breadth of experience may well help to partly explain Rafsanjani's comparative moderation vis-à-vis others in his political cohort, or perhaps it is indicative of an inherent open-mindedness or openness to experience. We cannot be certain whether his frame of mind is a cause or result of his extensive travels, but there is almost certainly a link between the two.

After the Revolution, Rafsanjani capitalized on his long history of activism and his long-standing connections to Khomeini and his circle, rising rapidly through the ranks to become first a government minister, then Speaker of the Majles, a position he held from 1980 to 1989.[396] Even in the early years of the Islamic Republic, Rafsanjani's ideology showed elements that are of interest to this study. In

[393] During his stay in Belgium, Rafsanjani went about acquiring a second-hand car, so as to make his travels around Europe easier. In order to do so, he had to sell a carpet which he had the foresight to bring with him from Iran. Even as a political quasi-exile, Rafsanjani remained ever the consummate businessman. Ibid., 272.
[394] This is a brief summary of Rafsanjani's own account of his extensive travels. See Ibid., 269-90.
[395] Ibid., 293-320.
[396] Azimi, *The Quest for Democracy in Iran*, 364.

1360 (around 1981), he spoke during interviews of Iran serving as an *olgū* (model) for other Muslim countries while explaining the concept of *sodūr-e enqelāb*. His explanation is distinctly less activist than Khomeini's, and is in some respects akin to Khamenei's, with an emphasis on avoiding interference (*modākhele kardan*) in other countries' internal affairs. At one point, he seemed to explicitly disavow any such ideas, noting that "Their [i.e., other countries'] revolution has been exported to them, and is/will be exported." (*Enqelāb-e khod be khod sāder shode va mi shavad*.)[397] Elsewhere, he assails critics (Saudis in particular) of the *hafte-ye vadhat* for weakening Islamic unity, making the Muslim world more vulnerable to the predations of Israel and the United States.[398] Unity as a defense against external threats is a well-worn theme in the many discourses on Islamic unity, and it is not surprising that Rafsanjani would choose to draw on it at a precarious time in the Islamic Republic's history.

Indeed, the Iran-Iraq War would only lead Rafsanjani to invoke such concepts more frequently. In 1983, he would praise "our brothers from Sistan and Baluchestan… and the Sunnis [*ahl-e sonnat*]" for their efforts in the war, while emphasizing that "the most important foundation for stable union [*ettehād-e pāydār*] is piety," which, presumably, is a trait shared by both Shi'a and Sunna alike.[399] In this same essay, he also premiered a kind of economic pan-Islamism (which would later resurface in his thinking), which is perhaps best understood as a kind of institutional unity, whereby the Muslim world should make use of its natural resources and strategic locations to exercise greater influence on the world stage,

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[397] Mohandes Mohsen Hāshemī, ed. *Hāshemī Rafsanjānī: Mosāhebe-hā-ye Sāl-e 1360* (Tehrān: Daftar-e Nashr-e Ma'āref-e Enqelāb,1378 (1999)), 150.
[398] Ibid., 201.
[399] Alī Akbar Hāshemī Rafsanjānī, "Vahdat-e Pāydār," in *Resālat-e Enqelāb-e Eslāmī-ye Īrān dar Tawhīd-e Kalame, Jeld-e Avval*, ed. Abdolkarīm Bī-Āzār Shīrāzī (Tehrān: Daftar-e Nashr-e Farhang-e Eslāmī, 1403 A.H. (1983)), 72.

while at the same time turning its attention to the more pressing threat of Israel, rather than fighting amongst themselves.[400] Finally, he undermined accusations of Persian chauvinism in the Islamic Republic, highlighting the role of Arabic in the new educational system (all students had to study it for twelve years), while also stating: "We believe that, on that day when a unified Islamic [world-wide] government is formed, certainly its [official] language could not be anything other than Arabic."[401] While the war no doubt played a role, such statements were clearly not out of character for Rafsanjani, given his personal, political, and intellectual history.

This pattern continued during his presidency. In letters exchanged with Saddam Hussein after UN Security Council Resolution 598, which ended the Iran-Iraq War, during preliminary negotiations towards reaching a comprehensive formal settlement of the conflict, he emphasized the damage it had caused to the region, including its impact upon "Islamic solidarity" (interestingly, he uses the somewhat archaic term, *tazāmon-e eslāmī*, in his letter).[402] In his 22nd of Bahman speech in 1990, he again highlighted the role of the Islamic Republic as *olgū* for the rest of the world[403]. At the same event in 1996, he hosted Louis Farrakhan, the head of the Nation of Islam, as a special guest, and used the black population of America as an example of how the Islamic Republic was loved around the world for its support of the oppressed and exploited. He also reiterated his denial that *sodūr-e enqelāb* meant interfering in others' affairs, insisting that it meant crying out the *faryād-e qor'ān va da'vat be edālat* (the call of the Qur'an and the call to justice) and *e'lān-e rāh-e*

[400] Ibid., 75-77.
[401] Ibid., 78.
[402] *Matn-e Nāme-hā-ye Mobādele Shode Beyn-e Ro'asā-ye Jomhūrī-ye Eslāmī-ye Īrān va Johmūrī-ye 'Arāq*, (Tehrān: Daftar-e Motāle'āt-e Sīyāsī va Beyn al-Melalī, 1380 (2001)), 59. The letter in question is dated 17 Mordad 1369/ 8 August 1990.
[403] *Keyhān*, 23 Bahman 1368/12 February 1990, p. 5.

najjāt-e mardom (the proclamation of the path for man's salvation).[404] In this, he would seem to be drawing closer to Khamenei's emphasis on Iran as exemplar nation, while de-emphasizing foreign policy activism, which was not out of line with his efforts to rehabilitate Iran on the international stage. Iran's pan-Islamism would turn inwards, and focus on building a model society for other Islamic countries to emulate, rather than directly exporting the Revolution, as Khomeini had advocated. This direction, first laid out by Khamenei, dovetailed with Rafsanjani's project of national reconstruction. It also explains the apparent contradiction between exporting the Revolution and Iran's refusal to back the Islamists in the Tajik civil war, or its favoring Armenia over Azerbaijan in their conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.[405] As *omm al-qorrā'*, the preservation of Iran's national interests could override other objectives of the Islamic world, much as Khomeini had decreed that the Islamic Republic could temporarily nullify even the basic pillars of Islam, such as fasting and prayer, if it were deemed necessary.[406] Rafsanjani's pragmatism, even in foreign policy, did not require an abandonment of ideology, but it did require a certain degree of flexibility in its interpretation.[407]

In his post-presidency, Rafsanjani has remained politically active, chairing the *Maslahat* (Expediency) Council, which is charged with the function of legislative arbitration between the upper and lower houses of parliament (the Guardian Council and the Consultative Assembly), as well as the Assembly of Experts, which elects the

[404] *Keyhān,* 23 Bahman 1374/12 February 1996, p. 6.
[405] Hanna Yousif Freij, "State Interests vs. the Umma: Iranian Policy in Central Asia," *Middle East Journal* 50, no. 1 (1996), Shireen Hunter, "Iran's Pragmatic Regional Policy," *Journal of International Affairs* 56, no. 2 (2003), Adam Tarock, "Iran's Policy in Central Asia," *Central Asian Survey* 16, no. 2 (1997).
[406] Shaul Bakhash, "The Politics of Land, Law, and Social Justice in Iran," *Middle East Journal* 43, no. 2 (1989): 198n41.
[407] Rafsanjani himself has said as much on numerous occasions. See Trita Parsi, *Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S.* (London: Yale University Press, 2007), 263.

Supreme Leader. He chaired the latter body until early 2011.[408] In 2005, he ran for President again and initially led the field, only to lose to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in a second round marred with allegations of vote fraud and manipulation.[409] Since leaving the Presidency, Rafsanjani is rumored to have become one of Iran's wealthiest men, which only reinforced his political influence, even if he was less visible than he had once been. Far from being marginalized, Rafsanjani remained a grey eminence, and a force to be reckoned with in the Islamic Republic's politics. He also did not remain static in political terms after 1997; while he had toed a moderate, pragmatic conservative line as President, he increasingly moved towards the reformists, becoming the de facto reformist candidate in the second round of the 2005 election, and a prominent critic of the Ahmadinejad administration afterwards.

In terms of pan-Islamism, he changed relatively little after finishing his second term in 1997; he still emphasized the threat a united Muslim world posed to the imperial powers of the West, and described the Islamic Revolution, for Iran, as a kind of return to the *umma*.[410] He also hearkened back to his insistence, in the early 1980s, that the Muslim world make more strategic use of its "God-given resources," particularly oil and energy, and blamed the collective failure to do so for American domination of the Islamic world.[411]

Thus, Rafsanjani has maintained a high degree of ideological consistency over several decades since the 1960s, and certainly since 1979. In this chapter, however, we will concern ourselves primarily with the period of his presidency, 1989-1997, as during this period he assumed the role of Iran's primary representative to the rest of

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[408] Said Amir Arjomand, *After Khomeini: Iran Under His Successors* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 45-47.
[409] Azimi, *The Quest for Democracy in Iran*, 400-01.
[410] Abbās Bashīrī, *Goftogū bā Hāshemī Rafsanjānī: Bār-e Dīgar Felestīn va Entefāze Hamrāh bā Chand Sokhanrānī va Gāhshomār-e Vaqāyī-e Tārīkhī-e Felestīn* (Tehrān: Sadaf-e Sīmā, 1381 (2002)), 81-82.
[411] Ibid., 235.

the world before passing the torch to his reformist successor, Mohammad Khatami. It is important to emphasize that this is just one of the many Rafsanjanis, as the brief biography outlined above makes evident. Nonetheless, while Rafsanjani has been a tremendously influential individual since 1979, the period 1989-1997 marked the height of both his institutional, official, and unofficial authority, and as such it is the logical focus of our study.

The Corpus

The largest set of digital texts available covering the period 1989-1997 can be found on the website of the Office of Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, www.rafsanjani.ir. Unfortunately, as of the time this corpus was being prepared (March/April 2011), the site was still in development, and only a small number of texts were available from Rafsanjani's presidency, almost all *khotbe*s.[412] Fortunately, these texts tended to be very long, mitigating somewhat their low number. All of these texts were collected and cleaned, which primarily involved the removal of metadata and the long Qur'anic quotations found at the beginning and end of each *khotbe*. These limitations on the number of texts and their restriction to a single text type inhibit the conclusions we can draw about Rafsanjani, but our data set is large enough to nonetheless yield some useful results. If at some future date, more texts of a greater variety become available from this period, we may be able to revisit this section and give the Rafsanjani era a more comprehensive treatment, but for now, we remain limited by the data that are available at present.

[412] While the fact that all the source texts are one text type skews the characteristics of this corpus somewhat, and this must be borne in mind in carrying out the following analysis, it is not a fatal weakness of the data. Given that *khotbe*s are not purely religious, but incorporate a great deal of political, and, especially under Rafsanjani, economic discourse as well, they are far more representative of political discourse more generally than one would initially be inclined to believe.

This yielded a corpus of 83 files, totaling 548,034 words. The texts included dated from 22 Farvardin 1368 to 20 Tir 1376, or 11 April 1989 to 11 July 1997. While still a substantial corpus, particularly for an individual, it is nonetheless much smaller than those used in the previous two chapters, and crucially, it is limited to a single text type, that of the *khotbe*. While this has not been problematic in prior studies[413], it still limits what conclusions can be drawn from our analysis in this chapter. That said, the *khotbe* in post-Revolutionary Iran lies at the precise intersection between religion and politics, and remains a primary vector for disseminating the dominant discourses of the regime. This is especially the case with the *khotbe* delivered at Tehran University, which has historically been broadcast throughout Iran on the official radio and television networks, and which Rafsanjani delivered personally for much of his presidency.[414] As such, this text type is ideal for a study such as this one, as the subject matter is highly likely to be relevant, and the intended audience for Rafsanjani's *khotbe*s is not only the entire population of Iran, but Muslims outside the country, meaning that pan-Islamist themes are more likely to be present, even in a highly-restricted corpus such as this one.

In terms of analysis, we will have to restrict this section to relatively basic techniques, such as the wordlist and collocation analysis, due to the data limits. There are not enough texts available to allow for a diachronic comparison, unlike with the Khamenei corpus. Still, comparison with Khamenei may prove fruitful, given the overlap between his tenure as *rahbar* and Rafsanjani's as president. We can also use keywords analysis to compare the Rafsanjani and Khamenei corpora from 1989 to 1997, in order to draw out some of the features unique to Rafsanjani's discourse.

[413] See, for example, an entire study based on *khotbe*s: Ram, *Myth and Mobilization*.
[414] Ibid., 26-27.

Finally, in terms of finding entry points into the data, the contemporaneity of Rafsanajani's and Khamenei's tenure allows us to make use of many of the same search terms. While this may be slightly less than ideal, it is a necessary workaround, given our retstricted data set.

Analysis, Section 1 – Most Frequent Terms

We can begin our analysis by first examining terms which appear among the 200 most frequent items in the Rafsanjani wordlist. Looking first at the core Revolutionary symbols, it is apparent that Rafsanjani's *khotbe*s possessed a significant global element. The collocates of *eslām*, at 57 on the wordlist, are hard to interpret in any other way. At L1/1, we find *donyā-ye*, followed by *jahān* at L1/4 and *ommat* at L1/15. Others relate to historical aspects, notably *tārīkh* at L1/5, *sadr* at L1/9, and *hākemīyyat* at L1/11, while *doshmanān* is hardly unexpected at L1/10. Curiously, *nāb* collocates quite infrequently at R1/15, with only 9 occurrences. Of these, only a single one is as part of the phrase *eslām-e nāb-e mohammadī*, suggesting that by the time of Rafsanjani's presidency, this phrase of Khomeini's was on the way out. (See Figure 5-1.) *Eslāmī*, 50 on the wordlist, exhibits some of these same patterns, but even more markedly so. Some L1 collocates, such as *jomhūrī* at 1 and *enqelāb* at 2, are predictable, but the presence of *ommat* at 5 and 21, *keshvar* in various forms at 3 and 9, *donyā-ye* at 15, *tamaddon* at 16, and even *mellat-hā-ye* at 22, underscores the global aspects of Rafsanjani's discourse. On a related note, it is interesting to see that *harakat* at L1/13 is a stronger collocate than *nahzat* at L1/19. After Khomeini's death, it appears that both Khamenei and Rafsanjani referred to his

movement as *harakat* rather than *nahzat*, the term Khomeini himself favored. (See Figure 5-2.)

Among the most frequent terms in the Rafsanjani corpus, we quickly encounter some differences from Khamenei. To start, *allāh* is nowhere to be found in the top 200, while *khodā* only occurs as number 161 on the wordlist. Likewise, *mellat* is nowhere to be found among the top 200, while *dowlat* is number 125. Rafsanjani uses the term *keshvar* more frequently, as it appears at 37 on the list, and *mardom* is even more common, at number 16. Both of these terms appear to be used primarily in reference to Iran, though *mardom* does make reference to other countries, collocating at R1 with *arāq* (Iraq) at 12, *donyā* at 14, *mosalmān* at 16, *felestīn* at 19, and *mazlūm* at 20, all more strongly than with Iran at 24, though *mā* at R1/1 makes the primary referent clear. Indeed, *mardom* even collocates more strongly with *Kūfe* (the city of Kufa in Iraq), at R1/22, than it does with Iran. (See Figure 5-3.) This is a curious phenomenon, though perhaps reference to *mardom-e Īrān* is mostly redundant, given the text type and audience for Rafsanjani's *khotbe*s, meaning that it only needed to be specified when referring to other countries and peoples. In any case, all of these various referents for *mardom* share the common Revolutionary traits of being Muslims and being oppressed, meaning that *mardom* may play the affinial role once reserved for *mellat*.

The absence of such terms as *mellat* may be indicative of a trend in Rafsanjani's discourse which is the opposite of Khamenei's; that is, there is less of a governmentalization of discourse, and, judging by Rafsanjani's other choices of terminology, we see in its place a greater degree of abstraction, favoring such terms as *keshvar* or *mardom*, collective mass nouns. Given the more concrete tendencies in Rafsanjani's *khotbe*s (for instance, it is not uncommon to see him cite economic data,

often in eye-glazing levels of detail), this is somewhat surprising, but it likely reflects a difference in prioritization, an emphasis on reconstruction and the incremental normalization of foreign affairs. Rather than a fervent emphasis on exporting the Revolution, it becomes one concern among many, as Iranian self-preservation and protection became the over-arching issue (though of course, this was hardly incompatible with IRI pan-Islamism, as discussed in the prior two chapters).

One exception to this pattern becomes apparent when we examine the collocates of the term *mas'ale* (problem), which is number 54 on the Rafsanjani wordlist. At R1/3, we find the collocate *Felestīn*, making the Palestine issue the single most salient issue referred to specifically by Rafsanjani. This is in part to be expected, given Rafsanjani's demonstrated long-standing interest in the Palestinian issue, which predates the Revolution by over a decade. A little further down the list, at R1/20, we also find *Būsnī*, a reference to Bosnia. (See Figure 5-4.) Here, it would seem that now that the war with Iraq was over, Rafsanjani reverted to the time-honored pan-Islamist tactic of emphasizing conflicts in distant lands which impacted other Muslims as a way of focusing political attention, and uniting the body politic around the common goals of relief and resistance.

Numerous abstract terms yield little of interest and few surprises; such high-ranking terms in the wordlist as *enqelāb* at 58, *donyā* at 63, Iran at 70, and *manteqe* at 113 have either entirely predictable collocates or collocate mostly with grammatical particles. Other terms unique to the Rafsanjani wordlist, such as *barnāme* (program) at 74, are mostly to do with economic matters and plans, which is to be expected, given Rafsanjani's emphasis on reconstruction.

There are several terms which cast into sharp relief the differences between Rafsanjani's and Khamenei's discourses. *Emām* is one of these, and it is highly

frequent at 38 on the wordlist. In Rafsanjani's discourse, it is used in almost the opposite manner in which Khamenei uses it. While references to Khomeini are of course present, notably at L1/9, *rāh*, and L1/12, *khat*, as well as *r.h.* at R1/2 and *rāhelemān* at R1/13, these are outnumbered by references to either the Hidden Imam or other Shi'i Imams. These include *zamān* at L1/7 and R1/5, Hossein at R1/1, Rezā at R1/3, Sādeq at R1/4, Javād at R1/8, Hasan at R1/9, Bāqer at R1/11, and *ommat* at R1/12, as well as various other references peppered throughout the collocation pattern. (See Figure 5-5.) A similar pattern can be found with *rāh*, which historically (and certainly for Khamenei) had typically been part of the phrase *rāh-e emām*. For Rafsanjani, it takes on a rather different tone, collocating at R1/1 with *khodā*, and at R1/6 with *hal*, *emām* at R1/7, *sa'ādat* (happiness) at R1/9, *dorost* (right, correct) at R1/10, and such related terms as *eslām* at R1/12 and *najjāt* at R1/18. (See Figure 5-6.) Here again, we see that while Khomeini is not slighted by Rafsanjani, he is not emphasized to the same extent as he is by Khamenei. This likely has to do with the politics of succession more than anything else. While Khamenei's position as *rahbar* was somewhat tenuous, and heavily reliant upon his designation as Khomeini's successor, Rafsanjani, elected to the presidency in his own right, had no need to cling as tightly to Khomeini's mantle, and this is evident in his discourse. Perhaps this lesser need to legitimate his political position allowed Rafsanjani greater leeway to add his own interpretation to Khomeini's received discourse?

The absence of *mellat* in the Rafsanjani wordlist may be an indication that this is the case. (Recall that Khamenei largely replicated Khomeini's sharp distinction between *mellat* and *dowlat*.) Looking at several other relatively frequent terms may help us to understand how these terms and concepts have been reconfigured in Rafsanjani's discourse. These include *dowlat* at 125, *harakat* at 130, and *hokūmat* at

197. *Dowlat* is a largely technocratic term, referring almost exclusively to matters of governance and policy, while the other two terms are more interesting. While *hokūmat* has numerous technocratic uses, in ideological terms it tends to exhibit diametrically opposed collocates. While its collocation pattern tells us little of interest, other than confirming that *eslāmī* is its top right collocate (which is hardly surprising), the statistical collocates tell us more. Some of them are technocratic, such as *mowrūsī* (inherited) at 2, *zarūrat* (necessity) at 6, or *vazāyef* (duties) at 8, while others establish a clear binary pattern. *Yazīd* at 7 (often referring to the historical Yazid of early Islam, rather than the metaphorical Yazids of the 20th century), *edālat* at 12, *esrā'īl* (Israel) at 22, and even *eslām* at 23 exhibit the dual valences of *hokūmat*. (See Figure 5-7.) By contrast, *harakat* is a uniformly positive term, and one which is both linked to Khomeini and seems to have replaced *nahzat* as the term of choice for referring to his movement. Among collocates tying it to Khomeini are *mosīr* (course) at L1/4, and of course, *emām* at R1/8, while other collocates make clear that it refers to the Islamic Revolution, namely *īn* at L1/1, *eslāmī* at R1/5, *mā* at R1/10, and *enqelāb*, buried at R1/16. (See Figure 5-8.) This changes Rafsanjani's political cosmology somewhat from that of Khomeini. *Dowlat* has become largely neutral, *hokūmat* serves double duty with dual valences, and *harakat* is uniformly positive. *Mellat* is largely absent, though *mardom* serves as a comparable positive referent, while there is no equivalent for *dowlat* in the previous binary distinction between *mellat* and *dowlat*. Perhaps this is an artifact of the text type constituting this particular corpus (i.e., *khotbe*s), but if not, it is an interesting difference between Rafsanjani's discourse and those of both Khomeini and Khamenei, given how salient the *mellat*/*dowlat* distinction is in both. If this discursive shift is related to a more moderated international stance on Rafsanjani's

part, than perhaps Revolutionary demonography has shifted to focus instead on named enemies? The presence of three named countries (other than Iran, which occurs at 70) in Rafsanjani's wordlist hints at this: Iraq occurs at 165, Israel at 201, and Palestine at 204.

Iraq's collocates reinforce our interpretation of *mardom*. The top L1 collocate is *mardom*, followed at L1/2 by *ba's* (i.e., the Iraqi Ba'ath party). In an ad hoc fashion, this mirrors the Manichaean *mellat/dowlat* division, with the Ba'ath playing the villain in this particular context. Further down the collocate list, this is reinforced by the less frequent collocates *rezhīm* (regime) at L1/12 and *mellat* at L1/17. (See Figure 5-9.) Israel and Palestine, two diametrically-oppposed symbols in the iconography of the Revolution, also help to illustrate this dynamic. In looking at the statistical collocates of Israel (as the collocation pattern provides little useful data), several strongly negative terms crop up: *mahkūmīyyat* (condemnation) at 2, and *tahrīm* (boycott) at 7. (See Figure 5-10.) By contrast, for Palestine, its collocates are largely positive: *mardom* collocates at L1/3, *mellat* at L1/6, and *mazlūm* at L1/8, while *eshghālī* (occupied) collocates at R1/7. (See Figure 5-11.) These treatments of different countries in Rafsanjani's discourse suggest several things. First, he has not abandoned Khomeini's discourse so much as adapted it; he has moved away from concrete entities opposed to the Revolution (such as the various *dowlat*s arrayed against their respective *mellat*s), while taking the basic Manichaean dynamic and establishing an even more abstract positive referent, *mardom*, but specifying the negative referent (in these cases, Israel, or the Iraqi Ba'ath). It is a subtle shift, but one that fits with his broader moderation in foreign policy. While trying to appeal to an even larger global audience (or constituency), Rafsanjani has limited the targets of Revolutionary ire to a specified few. This also demonstrates the importance of the

Palestinian issue to IRI discourse; the salience of this topic is no coincidence. That Israel and Palestine represent the *ne plus ultra* of evil and good in the Revolution's political cosmology explains their high frequency in Rafsanjani's wordlist. Only Iran and Iraq are more frequently mentioned, which is hardly surprising, given that the two countries had recently concluded an eight-year war shortly before Rafsanjani became president. The focus on Israel and Palestine, however, demonstrates the limits of discourse mutation over time; clearly, this concept is too central to Revolutionary discourse as a whole for Rafsanjani to modify it in any significant way. Even one degree removed from Khomeini, this particular issue has changed little in discursive terms since his lifetime.

As for Rafsajani's appeals to a broader audience, and his mediation of earlier, more bellicose Revolutionary rhetoric, his treatment of less frequent, but highly relevant discourse terms can tell us how he finessed such a subtle but significant discursive shift.

Analysis, Section 2 – Core Terms

The relatively small size of this corpus limits what can be said about several of the core terms of interest in this study. *Ettehād*, for example, only appears 19 times, far too infrequently for us to draw any meaningful conclusions, while *taqrīb* does not appear at all. In the case of *vahdat*, it only appears 75 times, meaning we have to look at the statistical collocates to see any patterns. Among its strongest collocates are *hafte* at 2 (as in *hafte-ye vahdat*), *eslāmī* at 5, and *eslām* at 8.[415] (See Figure 5-12.)

[415] Astute readers will observe that *mellī* is in fact a strong collocate at 3. However, *eslāmī* and *eslām* are more frequent collocates; the reason for *mellī*'s higher ranking here has more to do with its overall relative infrequency (much like *mellat*) in the Rafsanjani corpus, hence its collocation with *vahdat* is more marked, as is refelected in the z-score ranking used here.

Thus, Islamic unity (as well as national unity) is still an element of interest in Rafsanjani's discourse, mostly instantiated through the institution of the *hafte-ye vahdat*. Given how this event embodies all three elements of pan-Islamism (institutional, affinial, and ecumenical), this is rather crucial for our study. The *hafte-ye vahdat* marks the single largest institutional effort to coherently combine these three elements into something resembling a stable ideology and discourse of pan-Islamism, even if the IRI does not use that particular term.

The case of *ommat* also illustrates the beginnings of an interesting discursive trend, specifically, the gradual de-Shi'ification of Khomeini as a symbol, which is a marked contrast to Khamenei's reliance on him as a symbol of legitimation. For Rafsanjani, the *umma* is a key symbol, appearing much more frequently than *vahdat* (216 times to 75 for *vahdat*). While some of its strongest collocates are, as we would expect, *eslāmī* at R1/1 and *eslām* at R1/5, a set of second-tier collocates tells another important part of this story. (See Figure 5-13.) Among them are *emām* at L1/2, *azīzemān* at R1/4, *bozorgvār* at R1/7, *azīz* at R1/9, and *bozorgvāremān* at R1/11. As should be readily apparent, these are references to Khomeini. In referring repeatedly to Khomeini as *emām-e ommat*, Rafsanjani is both reinforcing the broadest claims of the Islamic Revolution to be leading a global movement, and the existence of the *ommat* as a transnational entity in the contemporary world, rather than an end-state in the political eschatology of the IRI, as was the case for Khomeini.[416] Thus, we may be able to claim that the era of reconstruction under Rafsanjani also marks the decisive turning of the IRI's slow, but steady progress towards a postmodern form of pan-Islamism, and away from the modernist export of the Revolution. Ironically, despite Khomeini's emphatic rejection of the international system as it existed in

[416] See chapter 3 for a more extensive discussion of the concept of *ommat* in Khomeini's thought.

1979, this discursive shift marks a more final rejection of state-centric notions of geopolitics, and the embrace of the transnational ideational unit of the *umma* as primary.

This interpretation is reinforced by his use of the terms *mosalmān* and *mosalmānān*. *Mosalmān* collocates strongly with *mardom*, which we have already established as a strongly positive term akin to earlier uses of *mellat*, at L1/1, but also such terms as variants of *keshvar* at L1/6 and 10, *mellat* at L1/7, and even *jam'īyyat* (population or society) at L1/9. (See Figure 5-14.) This underscores the importance, for Rafsanjani, of the Muslim identity of various social and political units on the world stage. With *mosalmānān*, the characteristics of these various populations emerge quite clearly. As the statistical collocates show, they are either specific oppressed populations, such as those of Bosnia (collocating at 2) or Palestine (collocating at 6), if not the Muslims of the world more generally (*jahān* collocating at 4, or *donyā* at 5), but they are all aware (*āgāh*, collocating at 3), which is to say that they are aware of the necessity of a politicized Islam, as purveyed by the Islamic Republic. (See Figure 5-15.) Or, rather, it is to say that being Muslim is an inherently political identity, and as Rafsajani's use of *ommat* shows, this, not the nation-state, is the most essential and basic unit of politics on the world stage.

Finally, among the core Revolutionary terms *zolm, zālem,* and *mazlūm*, only the last yields any collocates of interest. While its strongest L1 collocate is *mardom*, the statistical collocates are more revealing. We find *mellat* at 2, *felestīn* at 3, *kovayt* (Kuwait) at 5, and *lobnān* (Lebanon) at 6. (See Figure 5-16.) While the use of *mellat* as an affinial term here is interesting, showing that it hasn't completely dropped out of Rafsanjani's lexicon despite its infrequency, and while Palestine is to be expected, Lebanon is less expected, and Kuwait is very interesting. What unites these three

countries is their victimization by foreign powers, whether Israel in the case of Lebanon and Palestine, or Ba'athist Iraq in the case of Kuwait. This suggests that suffering is a meritorious quality in Rafsanjani's discourse, and one by which otherwise diverse qualities are joined together in the *umma*. As discussed in previous chapters, this is another instance of the de-sectarianization of peculiaristically Shi'i conceptions of the linkage between righteousness and suffering, but more importantly, it is also reflective of the pattern of broadening and abstraction that permeates Rafsanjani's rhetoric, and marks the beginning of the postmodern turn in IRI pan-Islamism.

Keywords Analysis

Finally, we will see what other useful information can be gleaned from our limited corpus. We can better distinguish between the unique features of Rafsanjani's discourse and those which are due mainly to the political environment and time period by running a keywords analysis using a subsection of the Khamenei corpus as our reference corpus. By only using Khamenei's texts from the period of Rafsanjani's presidency (12 Mordad 1368 to 11 Mordad 1376), we can control for most external factors in the data, leaving us with as close to a direct comparison between Rafsanjani and Khamenei as can be obtained. In order to cope with the noise problems discussed in the last chapter, here we have applied an admittedly imperfect solution to the resulting keywords list; we have simply deleted all words with a frequency of less than 10 in the reference corpus (i.e., the Khamenei corpus). While this may erroneously remove some naturally-occurring low-frequency terms, it mostly

clears away terms which are the result of Unicode errors, and makes the data far more readable.

Many of the keywords are topical, and pertain either to text type or subject matter, for instance, *khotbe* at 11, *barnāme* (in reference to Rafsanjani's economic programs) at 17, *kārkhāne* (factory) at 23, *tomān* (a unit of currency) at 24, and *dolār* (dollars) at 36 refer either to the context of this corpus (*khotbe*s) or the economic matters which were Rafsanjani's primary concern during his tenure as president. (See Figure 5-17.) Other keywords reinforce the analysis above; *keshvar* at 10, *harakat* at 33, and *mosalmānhā* at 50 all highlight salient features of Rafsanjani's discourse. While these data do not necessarily show us anything new, the keyness of these terms indicates that these are marked differences from Khamenei's discourse, and reinforce the conclusions drawn from the collocational analysis above.

Chapter Conclusions

Despite the limitations on our data, we can safely say that Rafsanjani took the discourse he had received from Khomeini and began to interpret it in a very different way than his contemporary, Khamenei. His discursive shifts mirrored his moderation in foreign policy, placing less emphasis on concrete villains, while simultaneously reinforcing the abstract notion of the *umma* as a reality comprised of Muslims the world over, rather than an eschatological end-state of international politics. In this sense, Rafsanjani's presidency marked the post-modern turn in the IRI's discourse of pan-Islamism, one focused outwards towards the rest of the *umma*, as opposed to Khamenei's turn inwards, towards making Iran a beacon for the rest of the Muslim world. While it is hard to say so with any great precision, this outward focus, and

concomitant de-emphasis on institutional unity (and the absence of the governmentalization of discourse we saw with Khamenei), probably marked a resurgence of affinial unity as the primary component of Rafsanjani's discourse on pan-Islamism, with institutional unity largely relegated to the economic realm.

More broadly, then, we see with Rafsanjani a predominant discourse of abstraction, on the one hand, and a fusion of economic policymaking and reconstruction into a different and moderated discourse. It is a discourse of marked distinction, from Khamenei but also Khomeini, as well as one of moderation, eschewing as it does the delineation of enemies or an outward-focused, vanguard foreign policy. There appears to be some truth to the notion of a "thermidor" under Rafsanjani[417], overused as that phrase might be.

Rafsanjani's emphasis on reconstruction and Khamenei's on Iran serving as an exemplar state overlapped in practice for the most part in the period 1989-1997, leading to these subtle differences being masked by broad concurrence in policy. This would not be the case with Rafsanjani's successor as President, Mohammad Khatami, who attained a surprise victory in 1997, riding a wave of discontented youth voters seeking greater political and social freedoms after a decade of war followed by eight years of economic dislocation. While Khatami was himself tied strongly to the institutions of the Revolution, how would he adapt the discourse of pan-Islamism to fit with his own discourses of reform and dialogue?

[417] This term has been used so often in the literature that it would be foolhardy to try and quote every instance here. For one recent example, see: Arjomand, *After Khomeini*, 56.

6. Khatami, Discursive Fusion

The man swept into the presidency by a landslide margin in 1997 was an unlikely embodiment of young Iranians' hopes for the reform and liberalization of the Islamic Republic. A former minister of culture and head of the national library, Mohammad Khatami was hardly a firebrand, and with his clerical garb, spectacles, and penchant for philosophical musings, he resembled an affable middle-aged *howze* instructor more than a youth tribune.

Khatami was born in 1944 in Ardakan, the second city of Yazd province, into a clerical family. Following in the footsteps of his father, an ayatollah, the younger Khatami was sent to Qom to study in the *howze*, but interrupted his studies there to study philosophy and education at the universities of Esfahan and Tehran before completing his clerical training. In 1978, he would take up the position of head of the Islamic Center in Hamburg, a post which would be short-lived, as he returned to Iran shortly after the Islamic Revolution.[418] He quickly won election to the majles, and from there rose rapidly through the ranks, serving in various wartime posts in the early 1980s, and becoming the Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance from 1982 to 1986 (and again from 1989 to 1992). His penchant for cultural openness and flexibility in this position earned him the ire of conservatives, and he resigned from the Ministry in 1992, becoming head of the National Library of Iran, hardly a typical stop for aspiring presidential candidates.[419] During this period, in addition to teaching philosophy at the University of Tehran, he also published two books: *Bīm-e Mowj* (Fear of the Wave, 1992) and *Az Donyā-ye Shahr tā Shahr-e Donyā* (From the World

[418] Ghoncheh Tazmini, *Khatami's Iran: The Islamic Republic and the Turbulent Path to Reform* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 9-14.
[419] Ibid., 14-16.

of the City to the City of the World, 1994).[420] Unlike the literary activities of Rafsanjani and Khamenei, however, Khatami's writings were hardly political in the conventional sense, and dealt mostly with his interests in comparative studies of Western and Islamic societies and political philosophy.

His early works and philosophical inquiries would inform much of Khatami's approach and discourse as president, in particular his "Dialogue of Civilizations" for which he is most widely known in the West.[421] Arguably, his early thinking also informed his domestic agenda, which won enthusiastic youth backing, at least initially, for its promised aims of cultural openness and liberalization, though the reality of dashed hopes dimmed enthusiasm for his administration within a few short years. While the reformist agenda has received copious scholarly attention, and Khatami's philosophical ideas have received a fair amount of scholarly treatment, both within Iran and the West[422], his political ideology and discourse, as separate from his philosophical leanings, his "Dialogue of Civilizations," and his policy inclinations more generally, appear not to have been subject to serious scholarly scrutiny. What follows is a brief examination of some of the existing literature before we turn to the corpus which will help us provide some of that scrutiny.

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[420] Ibid., 16.

[421] Translations of his speeches and writings are myriad. See, e.g., Mohammad Khatami, *Hope and Challenge: The Iranian President Speaks* (Binghamton: Institute of Global Cultural Studies, Binghamton University, 1997), ———, *Islam, Liberty, and Development* (Binghamton: Institute of Global Cultural Studies, Binghamton University, 1998), ———, *Islam, Dialogue, and Civil Society* (Canberra: Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, Australian National University, 2000), ———, *Dialogue Among Civilizations: A Paradigm for Peace* (Pretoria: Unit for Policy Studies, Centre for International Political Studies, University of Pretoria, 2001), ———, *Islam, Dialogue, and Civil Society* (New Delhi: Centre for Persian and Central Asian Studies, School of Language, Literature, and Culture Studies, The Jawaharlal Nehru University, 2003).

[422] See, e.g., Daniel Brumberg, *Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr, *Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), Arjomand, *After Khomeini*.

Literature

Most Iranian writers, when not analyzing Khatami as a politician or president, have approached him as a scholar, philosopher, and intellectual. As such, discussions of his political ideas tend to be relatively bifurcated; on the one hand are his studies of early Islamic political philosophers such as al-Farābī and their connections to Western thought[423], on the other are his works in modern philosophy and his own contributions to Iran's "new religious thought."[424] There is a curious lacuna somewhere in the middle encompassing roughly the period of the late 1970s to the early 1990s, or Khatami's time as a Revolutionary before he was ever a Reformist. Fortunately, Khatami himself has left a few clues to guide us in our search.

A relatively obscure essay of his from the Iran-Iraq War period shows us Khatami in the process of developing from a Revolutionary figure like so many others into the politician and thinker he would eventually become. In an otherwise anodyne essay on the "Foundations of the Union of Muslims," we see hints of his philosophical leanings, as when he states that a "unified Islamic society and *ommat*" were built on a foundation of "a people of [free] choice and consciousness" (*mardomī-ye entekhābgar va āgāh*).[425] Elsewhere, he remarks that the Revolution has relied on "the desire of all men to share in their fate," and that since the Revolution, they have carried out "the freest and most superb elections in the history of global democracy."[426] Of course, he also references more traditional emblems of pan-Islamism, such as his assertion that "this shared pain [the bitter taste of colonialism,

[423] Alī Asghar Haqdār, *Goftemān-e Farhangī-Sīyāsī-ye Khātamī* (Tehrān: Shafī'ī, 1378 (1999)), 67-74. By "Western" here, we are of course referring to Classical, mostly Greek, political philosophy. See, e.g., Dimitri Gutas, *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture* (London: Routledge, 1998).
[424] As such, he is often mentioned in the same breath as Daryush Shayegan and Abdolkarim Soroush. See Hossein Kājī, *Kīstī-ye Mā az Negāh-e Rowshanfekrān-e Irānī: Barresī-ye Ārā va Afkār* (Tehrān: Rūzne, 1378 (1999)), 127-44.
[425] Mohammad Khātamī, "Asās-e Ettehād-e Mosalmānān," in *Resālat-e Enqelāb-e Eslāmī-ye Īrān dar Tawhīd-e Kalame, Jeld-e Avval*, ed. Abdolkarīm Bī-Āzār Shīrāzī (Tehrān: Daftar-e Nashr-e Farhang-e Eslāmī, 1403 A.H. (1983)), 120.
[426] Ibid., 122.

arrogance, and dependence on foreigners] is the most important motive for the union and harmony between all the Muslims of the world."[427] The "most bloodthirsty enemies of humanity and Islam," such as Zionism, are the "greatest cause of *tafarroqe* in the world of Islam," but through *vahdat-e moslemīn*, and the "union of the greatest material and spiritual power in the world," the foundation of which is "the pain and suffering of one billion people," this division can be overcome.[428] While Khatami here is embracing the received Revolutionary discourse, there is an interesting blending of it with his own nascent concerns for democracy and self-determination, which he emphasizes more than other figures in this particular volume of propagandistic essays.

This is not to suggest that Khatami marked a stark departure from earlier Revolutionary discourse; some parts of his writings are clearly conventional, such as his references to Khomeini as a "herald of *tawhīd*," or "the soul of the Emam, which is the sun of the life of the Islamic *ommat*."[429] Indeed, his fealty to extant discourses was probably part of the reason for his success; discourse is far easier to build upon than to tear down, after all. He highlighted in particular Khomeini's transformative role, noting in a commemoration of Khomeini's death that Iran was "a representative of all the revolutionary nations of the world," and "that man [Khomeini] became [like] an '*ommat*,' and did the work of an *ommat*," while praising "this revolutionary society and this transformative *ommat* [*ommat-e tahavvol-sāz*]."[430] Interestingly, he also compared the Revolution to earlier movements, noting that its famous slogan "neither East nor West" was not in fact a total neologism, but borrowed from the National Front's "negative balancing" and Modarres' "neutral [*adamī*] balancing.

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[427] Ibid., 124.
[428] Ibid., 127.
[429] ———, *Ehyāgar-e Haqīqat-e Dīn* (Tehrān: Mo'asese-ye Nashr va Tahqīqāt-e Zekr, 1380 (2001)), 19, 26.
[430] Ibid., 86-87.

Modarres himself was a figure whose character Khatami thought most closely resembled that of Khomeini.[431] Elsewhere, Khatami himself offers a critique of contemporary Western civilization along these lines, arguing that East and West are two aspects of the same essence, equating secularism with the concept of *estekbār*, and arguing that renewing the *ommat* is a necessary response; indeed, that "the path of salvation from *estekbār* is a return to the self," and that "the [political concepts of] East and West are two children of [Western thought.]"[432] This return to self necessitates a "globally-oriented Islam [*dīd-e jahānī*]," in part because *estekbār* is global. In this state of affairs, Iran will be "a refuge for the free Muslims of the world," and "in the not-too distant future, we will see the flag of *eslām-e nāb-e mohammadī* throughout the world."[433] This is something of an interesting distinction of his later civilizational arguments as president, and suggests that during its developmental period, his ideology was focused more on the use of the Revolution as a foundation for a new civilization, of which *tawhīd* constituted a foundational pillar. Pan-Islamism, then, was of civilizational import in this new millennium. He explicitly described this civilizational transformation, stating that "a new power is being born in the world on the basis of Islamic ideology, as against the failed ideologies of liberalism and socialism."[434] Indeed, it is hard to overstate Iran's central role in this transformation, as Khatami equates the interests of the Islamic *ommat* and Islam with the interests of the nation, and states that "the focal point [*mohavvar*] of government is the interests of the Islamic *ommat*."[435] He even ties *sodūr-e enqelāb*

[431] Ibid., 97-98.
[432] Ibid., 100-07.
[433] Ibid., 111-13.
[434] Ibid., 116-17.
[435] Ibid., 157. As an interesting aside, a paragraph later, Khatami states that "I am still certain that our Emam is oppressed [*mazlūm*]." Given that Khomeini was dead at this point, this is a somewhat curious statement. However, viewed through the Shi'i paradigm of oppression as righteousness, it makes sense. Until the eschaton, the righteous will remain the oppressed, and theologically speaking, there is

into his idea of the return to the self, arguing that it appeals not just to Muslims, but even the other religious peoples of the world, and that it comprises trust in the self and the claim of one's rights, while emphasizing that it is a message spread through speech, not strength.[436]

Khatami developed these embryonic ideas further in a later, widely-read book, *Bīm-e Mowj* (Fear of the Wave). While much of his rhetoric in this work would seem unexceptional, e.g., "The Islamic Revolution was the most important movement for revival of religion in the present era," and was "the most humane revolution of the era,"[437] we begin to see a more definitive shift and an incorporation of other strands of Khatami's politico-philosophical discourse into the weave handed down by Rafsanjani. He argues that Iran must elucidate a form of Islam capable of competing with Western ideologies by offering solutions to problems in the world, and that the Muslims of the world are waiting for the Islamic Republic to put forward solutions and ideas for progress and advancement.[438] Here, Khatami blends institutional and affinial conceptions of pan-Islamism, with Iran leading in a practical sense, showing the way forward in concrete and real-world, rather than just spiritual terms. Elsewhere, he quotes approvingly from Khomeini, who states variously that *feqh* and religious government have to develop over time in response to changing circumstances[439], while later stating that Khomeini bore "the standard of the message of revival of faith" [*parcham-e resālat-e ehyāgarī-ye dīn*], tying together through Khomeini's authority the strands of reform and unity in Islam.[440] This does not imply

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no reason to think that this (admirable) state will be altered until the return of the Mahdi, even through the veil of death.

[436] Ibid., 181-82.

[437] ———, *Bīm-e Mowj* (Tehrān: Mo'assese-ye Sīmā-ye Javān, 1378 (1999 - 1372 /1993, 1st ed.)), 26, 28.

[438] Ibid., 34.

[439] In a quote from the *Sahīfe-ye Nūr*: Ibid., 38.

[440] Ibid., 44.

that he ignored the ecumenical components of unity; in fact, he found a place for it within his own discursive framework. In a speech given around 2000, commemorating the Prophet's death, he discussed "The Shi'a, the Sunna, and Democracy." He emphasized key points of agreement in the political theory of the two *mazāheb*, noting two points in particular: that both agree that Islamic government is not a divinely-decreed order, but is entrusted to the people, and that they both agree on the centrality [*mohavvariyyat*] of the people in Islamic government.[441]

He would reiterate these themes from the beginning of his presidency, when he delivered the keynote address to the OIC gathering in Tehran in 1997, itself a symbolic re-entry of Iran into the international community after many years of pariah status. Many ideas run through his speech, but among them are a recognition of the diversity within the *ommat*, as when he states that Islamic civilization [*tamaddon-e eslāmī*] is more properly described as a civilization of Muslims [*tamaddon-e mosalmānān*], but in effect calls for these to be subsumed (in a positive sense) underneath a "new Islamic civilization," or an "Islamic civil society."[442] A corollary to his dialogue of civilizations theory and his focus on the development of civil society is a new kind of pan-Islamist project, albeit one oriented not in opposition to the West, as earlier incarnations would have had it, but as a unified front in peaceful dialogue. Peace and dialogue within the *ommat* and without. In this, Khatami's approach, blending his focus on political theory and democracy with the received discourses of pan-Islamism, becomes something *sui generis*. Throughout his talk, he invokes common symbols of affinial unity, emphasizing the *madīnat al-nabī* (the City of the Prophet, perhaps in contraposition to Khamenei's *omm al-qorrā*?) as a unifying symbol, while arguing that government in such a society needs to be the servant of the

[441] ———, *Mardomsālārī* (Tehrān: Tarh-e No, 1380 (2001)), 160.
[442] ———, *Ensān, Moltaqā-ye Mashreq-jān va Maghreb-aqal* (Tehrān: Markaz-e Asnād va Tārīkh-e Dīplomāsī-ye Vezārat-e Omūr-e Khāreje-ye Jomhūrī-ye Eslāmī-ye Irān, 1379 (2000)), 12-13.

people, not its master. He even reaches to the roots of pan-Islamist discourse, emphasizing that the Qur'an is a unifying force above race, nationality, language, and *mazhab*, that it is *āmel-e vahdat va orvat al-vosqā-ye peyvand va eshterāk-e mā*, the unifier and the firmest bond linking us [Muslims] together.[443] His charm offensive of the Muslim world continued in 1999, during a speech given to OIC delegates in Saudi Arabia (itself another major symbolic gesture by Khatami), in which he decried *tafarroqe* (sectarianism), and called for a greater union [*ettehād*] of the Muslim world, founded on *tawhīd*, among other things, with an eye towards greater development in the Islamic world, all under the auspices of the OIC.[444] Finally, at a 2000 OIC meeting in Qatar, he expounded further on his vision for the dialogue of civilizations, and how it would replace power and wealth with wisdom and logic, politicians and power-mongers with wise and sympathetic men. Much of his speech is peppered throughout with terms discussed extensively in the prior chapters, including *vahdat*, *hambastegī*, *hamdelī*, *hamāhangī*, etc.[445] The strong collocation (at least at first glance) of so many terms that we have previously established as key to the discourse of pan-Islamism with Khatami's dialogue of civilizations points towards the formation of a discursive nexus blending the two, almost seamlessly, within Khatami's discourse at this time. The coincidence of these terms with his discussions of problems facing the entire *ommat*, particularly Palestine, Lebanon, and Afghanistan, demonstrates the linkage of this non-oppositional form of pan-Islamism with older, more traditional embodiments of the discourse. Whether this new nexus exists in Khatami's discourse, and whether we can prove it, will be an interesting empirical challenge for our corpus.

[443] Ibid., 14-16.
[444] Ibid., 108-09.
[445] Ibid., 253-60.

The Corpus

Preparing the Khatami corpus presented some unique challenges. First, while Khatami himself was the first Iranian president to be able to make use of the web[446], and probably the first to have a website, much of his record fell down the memory hole after Ahmadinejad became president. For a while, an archive of his speeches and remarks was available at www.president.ir, and most of the texts used in this study were collected from there. Some were collected via archived versions of the presidential website available through the Internet Archive, www.archive.org. Khatami's current website, www.khatami.ir, does not appear to contain any texts from his presidency, and the current version of the president's website seems to have removed all records from the Khatami period sometime in the summer of 2010. This data does not appear to have been reproduced anywhere else, which means that this corpus may be the most complete digital record in existence of Khatami's speeches, writings, and remarks as president. The somewhat serendipitous nature of the data-gathering means that there are some weaknesses and inconsistencies in the corpus. The texts are divided into three main categories: messages, interviews, and speeches. During the early period of Khatami's presidency, the availability of sources was somewhat sporadic, and likewise towards the end. Similarly, for periods of several months (mostly around 1381-1383, or 2002 to 2004), full texts of speeches were not posted, only excerpts. Given the lack of alternate data sources, however, these sources have nonetheless been included. The vast majority of texts during the middle portion of Khatami's eight years in office are intact, and these can still provide us

[446] While the internet was first brought to Iran in 1993, it was largely relegated to scientific research institutions. By 1997, and particularly by 2001, it had become a much more widespread phenomenon. See Babak Rahimi, "Cyberdissent: The Internet in Revolutionary Iran," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 7, no. 3 (2003): 101-2.

with a sound basis for analysis. All of the texts were cleaned in a fashion similar to the other corpora analyzed in previous chapters; the only major difference in the Khatami corpus was the far greater number of interviews, which required more careful cleaning to ensure that interviewers' data was removed.

Despite these deficiencies, we still possess a great deal of data. The corpus consists of a total of 1875 texts, dating from 3 Khordad 1376 to 26 Tir 1384 (24 May 1997 to 17 July 2005), and totaling 3,360,778 words. This makes the Khatami corpus larger in absolute terms than either the Khomeini or Khamenei corpora, so it should be more than adequate for our purposes, given that it covers a shorter period than either of those two.

Analysis, Section 1 – Most Frequent Terms

The wordlist makes readily apparent how different Khatami's discourse is from that of any other political actor. Such staples of IRI discourse as *doshman*, *Amrīkā*, *mobāreze*, and even mentions of other countries, such as Israel or Palestine, and curiously absent in the 200 most-frequent terms. Instead, we find *jāme'e* (society) at 26, *emrūz* (today) at 53, *ensān* (human/person) at 58, *vojūd* (existence) at 64, *kār* (work) at 69, *ejtemā'ī* (social) at 125, *qānūn* (law) at 130, *towse'e* (development) at 131, *sarmāye* (investment) at 134, *farhang* (culture) at 143, *āzādī* (freedom) at 150, *tamaddon* (civilization) at 153, *āyande* (future) at 175, and *elm* (knowledge) at 195. To be sure, there are still plenty of terms we would expect to see, such as *mardom* (people) at 19, *eslāmī/eslām* (Islamic/Islam) at 35/70, respectively, *Irān* at 42, *mellat* (nation) at 45, *enqelāb* (revolution) at 49, *dowlat* (government) at 52, *talāsh* (struggle) at 90, *rāh* (path) at 111, *emām* (Imam) at 160, and numerous others in keeping with

established IRI discourse. (See Figure 6-1) Khatami's choices of terms seem to be far more inward-looking, and seem to have an economic emphasis comparable to that of Rafsanjani. In order to tease out the international dimensions of this discourse, we will need to look more closely at the collocation patterns. However, it should be noted that an overall shift in the tenor of the discourse is readily apparent from this wordlist; the sudden appearance of numerous "reform" terms, such as *jāme'e*, *emrūz*, *kār*, *ejtemā'ī*, and the like, taken together with their high frequency, shows the extent to which the overall topicality of Khatami's discourse differed from that of his predecessors. While most of these terms will not be discussed in detail here (due to the fact that they tell us little about pan-Islamism per se), they are important to keep in mind, as they form the discursive background against which we must read the terms which have run throughout our analysis since 1979, as well as newer discursive strands, such as Khatami's *goftogū-ye tamaddon-hā*.

There are a few general patterns worth noting. While *mā* has consistently been one of the most frequent terms for all of our corpora, even here we can see the extent to which reform terms have permeated Khatami's discourse, with *jāme'e* collocating at L1/2. (See Figure 6-2) A similar pattern emerges with *mardom*, where, if we combine all the variants of *sālārī* (taken together, we get the word *mardomsālārī*, or democracy) at R1/4, 10, and 17, we get a total of 1020 instances, making it the second most-frequent R1 collocate after *va*. (See Figure 6-3) If we take into account what appears to be another spelling error, *sā* at R1/11, we get a total of 1319 instances of *sālārī* at R1, making it the single most frequent right collocate of *mardom*. It is hard to overstate how central the concept of democracy is to Khatami's political discourse, and here the data seem to bear this analysis out. Interestingly, *mardom* also reveals another pattern, namely, its greater relative frequency vis-à-vis

mellat in the Khatami and Rafsanjani corpora, whereas in the Khomeini and Khamenei corpora, the pattern is reversed, with *mellat* being more frequent than *mardom*. It is unclear if this is a function of time or the office of the speaker, but it is an interesting pattern to note, and may mark a secular trend in Iranian political discourse more generally if it is sustained through the Ahmadinejad era. The old *mellat*/*dowlat* dichotomy is being replaced with a *mardom*/*dowlat* division. Similarly, Khatami's use of *jāme'e*, at 26 on the wordlist, illustrates the new dimension that reformist discourse introduced into the prevailing political discourse. Most interesting is the higher frequency of *madanī* (civil) at R1/7, vis-à-vis *eslāmī* (Islamic) at R1/9. (See Figure 6-4) The ascent of Khatami's favored concept of civil society over the traditional emphasis on Islamic society is plain enough in the data, but it is difficult to grasp how jarring this change must have appeared when Khatami burst onto the political stage in 1997. Here, for the first time in 18 years, there was a weaving of a new, *sui generis* thread into the political discourse, where even the changes in the Rafsanjani and early Khamenei era had mostly proven variants on existing themes inherited from Khomeini. This kind of discursive change is probably reflected elsewhere in the data. For example, it is hard to parse the decline of *mellat* and the rise of *mardom*/*jāme'e*/*tamaddon*. This may be where our postmodern interpretation of pan-Islamism comes to a fuller fruition. With the abandonment of old, discrete categories, such as the *mellat*, we see a diffusion of politics in two directions: first, towards the individual, at the level of *mardom*, second, towards the abstract, collective, or transnational, at the level of *jāme'e*, or *jāme'e -ye madanī*. This is hard to prove definitively through the data, but it seems the most plausible reading of this general shift in the pattern.

Before turning to more religiously-oriented terms, it is worth noting that even *shomā*, the most common form of address at 31 on the wordlist, illustrates the fundamental differences of Khatami's discourse. Among key R1 collocates of note here are *mardom* at R1/6, *zanān* (women) at 9, *khānom* (woman, presumably paired with the plural suffix *hā* at R2) at 19, *javānān* (youths) at 24, and *khāharān* (sisters) at 25. (See Figure 6-5) This focus on key elements of Khatami's two strongest constitutencies, women and youth, is perhaps unsurprising, but it is nonetheless significant. Here, Khatami sought democratic legitimation, rather than relying on divine splendor inherited from Khomeini.

Moving to core religious terms, *eslāmī* exhibits a rich set of collocates illustrating three main patterns: those indicating traditional revolutionary uses, such as *jomhūrī* at L1/1, 5, and 22, *enqelāb* at L1/2, *shūrā-ye* (council) at L1/3 and 24, *nezām* at L1/7, and *hokūmat* at 12, which tend to refer to institutions of the Iranian government; traditional internationalist terms, such as *keshvar/keshvar-hā-ye* at L1/8 and 23; and terms more associated with pan-Islamism, whether in institutional or more post-modern forms, such as *tamaddon* at L1/4, *jāme'e*/*javāme* at L1/6 and 26, *konferāns* (in reference to the OIC) at L1/10 and 25, or *ommat* at L1/16. (See Figure 6-6) Here, we can see that while Khatami has expanded the discourse of pan-Islamism by introducing new societal and civilizational concepts, he has nonetheless maintained some traditional modes of analysis, including terms such as *keshvar* or *meyhan* (at L1/13). His emphasis on the OIC is topical, but also indicative of a shift in conceptualizing the world of Islam, as one not primarily comprised of nations, but of peoples represented through an international organization (see the discussion of *mellat* and *mardom* above). *Eslām* reinforces this interpretation, with L1 collocates such as *donyā-ye* at 2 and 10, or *jahān* at 4 underscoring this globalized conception of

Islam. (See Figure 6-7) The statistical collocates of *eslām* tell a similar story, with *jahān* at 4, *donyā-ye* at 18, and *ommat* at 24. (See Figure 6-8) Curiously, the collocates of *Irān* do not appear to exhibit any strong patterns of interest, and Khatami's use of the word seems relatively anodyne. For him, it does not appear to have any strong ideological connotations. *Mellat*, despite its lower relative frequency, retains a sympathetic valence, with Iran as the top R1 collocate, while strong affinial terms such as *mazlūm* appear at R1/14. That other Muslim countries, notably Iraq at R1/15 and Palestine at R1/17, appear in a similar context should hardly be surprising, and this would suggest that Khatami retains the use of *mellat* as a core affinial term. However, the appearance of *āmrīkā* at R1/20 and 23 is interesting. It is most likely a result of his emphasis on dialogue and outreach, and is the result of such contrastive terms as *dowlat* (or rather, *va dowlat*) at R1/24. (See Figure 6-9) Khatami's embrace here of the traditional *mellat/dowlat* distinction is probably best read within the context of dialogue, as a way of emphasizing *mellat-mellat* communication, even when the Clinton *dowlat* was less than receptive to Khatami's overtures. By contrast with *mellat*, *enqelāb*, at 49 on the wordlist, appears to have been relegated to a relatively fixed, almost ceremonial role, and its collocates exhibit none of the variation or novelty we have seen in other elements of Khatami's discourse. While his discourse is certainly innovative, it does not mean that he has entirely abandoned existing political discourse. Change in a discursive field is slow, even when change might seem relatively drastic in lived experience. New discourse necessarily builds upon the old (some degree of commonality is necessary for successful communication, after all), meaning that some degree of constancy is to be expected.[447] Even Khomeini, following a revolution, could not entirely jettison the

[447] It is good to emphasize here that the terms discussed in this chapter are by no means all the terms

existing political discourse. Khatami, with his landslide election, introduced several major strands of his own into the political discourse, and this is still a marked accomplishment.

The more globally-oriented elements of Khatami's discourse exhibit a greater degree of shift then some elements of the domestic political discourse (e.g., terms such as *keshvar*, *nezām*, and even *dīn* remain mostly unchanged and uninteresting for our purposes.) While *donyā* at 109 on the wordlist is not exceptionally interesting (except in the context of *eslām* as noted above), *jahān* tells us much more. Its top R1 collocate is *eslām*, while *mosalmānān* appears at L1/20, and *emrūz* at R1/4. (See Figure 6-10) There is an interesting duality at play here; on the one hand, Khatami emphasizes the world of Islam, hardly surprising in light of his strong interest in the OIC. But the other key valence of *jahān*, that of the world of today, is perhaps an outgrowth of his reformist discourse more generally. Change and adaptation were key components of his political agenda, and we have seen these themes elsewhere in the prevalence of reform terms throughout his discourse. It is worth examining a few examples of terms altered by the reform discourse, as they frame the entirety of this analysis. *Amaniyyat* (security) is a good example at 198 on the wordlist, as while there are some traditional terms we would expect, such as *mellī* at R1/2, *keshvar* at R1/5, and *manteqe* (region) at R1/12, we also find *jāme'e* at R1/6. (See Figure 6-11) Here, there is an overlap of the domestic and international elements of Khatami's political discourse, suffused with reformist terminology. The prevalence of the notion

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analyzed in the Khatami corpus; they are about half or so. Many are not discussed here in large part because they exhibit virtually no change from the Rafsanjani or Khamenei corpora. They represent a kind of discursive firmament upon which new edifices are built by each succeeding political generation. While there is perhaps a bias in this kind of study in focusing on the new or the changed, this is an unfortunate correlate of the need to work within constraints of space and interest. Few people would want to read a study that described in large part how things remained entirely the same, after all. That said, care must be taken to guard against epistemic bias, and to remember just how broad the discursive constraints operating upon Khatami were, despite how revolutionary the changes he ushered in may have appeared to be.

of social security is also an example of the diffusion of politics away from the *mellat* as the unit of analysis. On occasion, reformist discourse effectively inverts existing discursive frames, such as with *rāh* (path or way), at 111 on the wordlist, where the R1/1 collocate is *hal* (solution or solving), trailed by more traditional terms, like *khodā* at R1/7, or even *emām* at R1/13. (See Figure 6-12) It is striking that Khatami would discuss solving social problems with such greater frequency than following the line of the Imam, but that appears to be what the data indicate. The main gist of term 125 on the wordlist, *ejtemā'ī* (social), is much the same, with *edālat* (justice) collocating at L1/2. Khatami's emphasis on *towse'e* (development) is evident from its frequency at 131 on the wordlist; investment, *sarmāye*, at 134, is another priority. The notion of the rights of the people is apparent in *haqq*'s collocates (132 on the wordlist), with *mardom* at R1/2, and *hākemiyyat* (rule) at R1/6, while this notion complements Khatami's emphasis on law, *qānūn*, at 130 on the wordlist. With collocates such as *chārchūb* at L1/2 and 9, and *eslāh* (reform) at L1/19, his broader vision of rule of law and social justice is readily apparent from the most frequent terms in his wordlist. (See Figure 6-13)

While this gives us a clear notion of his domestic political discourse, of far greater import to our analysis of pan-Islamism (though still related to his reformist discourse) is term 153 on the wordlist, *tamaddon* (civilization). Various fragments (due to spelling variations) of the word *goftogū* (dialogue) are to be found at L2/1, L1/2, 3, 9, 19, and 23, while it is clear that there are two primary civilizations Khatami is concerned with: *eslāmī* at R1/2 and *gharb* (the West) at R1/4. (See Figure 6-14) On this evidence, it is probably safe to say that Khatami's analysis of Islam in the world differs from earlier state-centric approaches with its focus on Islam as a civilization, something transcending political boundaries. Given the high frequency

of *mardom* in his corpus, we can likewise conclude that the peoples of the Islamic world serve as the constituent units of Islamic civilization, as opposed to their states or governments, Khatami's fondness for the OIC aside. This means that for Khatami, the most salient aspect of pan-Islamism is its affinial element, with its institutional manifestations a more distant second. As will be discussed below, ecumenicism is not much of a concern in his discourse, though it may be that this is due to the subsumation of sectarian differences underneath the broader civilizational umbrella, or the functioning of civil society. The centrality of dialogue as a peaceful means of relations between civilizations probably can also be applied internally to the *ommat* itself. This is the logical outgrowth of Khatami's reformist discourse in the domestic realm; taking for granted the bi-directional diffusion of politics in the postmodern era discussed above, Khatami's emphasis on democracy, participation, and rule of law at the individual level leads naturally to the correlate of dialogue at the broader, civilizational level. His relative quiescence on questions at the state level is also probably related to this phenomenon.

Before moving on to our analysis of terms most closely related to pan-Islamism, let us wrap up a few loose ends among Khatami's high-frequency terms. At 160 on the wordlist, *emām*, while highly frequent, nonetheless exhibits some differences from its usage by other actors. While references to Khomeini are quite common, such as *r.h.* at R1/4, Khomeini at R1/6, and *ommat* at R1/22, the most common R1 collocate is *jom'e* (Friday, in reference to *emām jom'e*, or Friday prayer leaders). (See Figure 6-15) References to the various Shi'i Imams fill out much of the rest of the collocate list, with a reference to *zamān* at R1/18, as well. What is most salient here is that, while Khomeini is certainly present, he is not the predominant referent for *emām*, as was the case with Khamenei. This is probably due

to Khatami's lesser need to seek legitimation through the leader of the Revolution, as he had already attained it through the ballot box. Finally, other terms of note in Khatami's reformist discourse include *āyande* (future) at 175 on the wordlist, as well as *elm* (knowledge or science) at 195.

Having sketched out Khatami's political discourse at both the domestic and international levels in broad strokes, it is worth asking what this tells us about pan-Islamism so far before moving to the terms most immediately related to our subject. At a basic level, his discourse, particularly that revolving around the concept of *tamaddon*, is the result of bringing reformist sensibilities to bear on the international stage, and adapting the received discourse, even in this realm, to fit new social and political realities. In this sense, his notion of *tamaddon* is perhaps best understood not wholly as a *sui generis* concept, but a transformative one, the more refined product of a process begun with the intial shift towards postmodernism on the internationanl stage which we glimpsed in the Rafsanjani era. Khatami's transformative, and strikingly different, political discourse can be seen as the fruition of more subtle shifts initiated a decade before, which only accelerated following Khomeini's death as other concepts and discourses rushed in to fill the void left by the disappearance of such a dominant presence in the discursive field.

As a result of this broad-based transformation in Khatami's discourse, it is worth bearing in mind in the following section of the analysis just how many terms traditionally associated with pan-Islamism are almost or entirely absent, and which ones are rendered even more interesting by virtue of their continued presence. Some terms were the victims of the ascendancy of the dialogue of civilizations, while others successfully weathered the transformation, and retained their potency, though perhaps in a radically changed form.

The most striking thing about many of the terms associated up to now with pan-Islamist discourse in Iran is how infrequently some of them appear in the Khatami corpus. For example, *parcham* is found only 15 times, far too few to tell us much of anything, while *parchamdār* only appears twice. *Taqrīb* only appears seven times (mostly in reference to *taqrīb beyn-e mazāheb-e eslāmī*), while some traditional Revolutionary terms are equally scarce: *eslām-e nāb* appears twice, *eslām-e nāb-e mohammadī* only once, and *sodūr-e enqelāb* does not appear at all. Such terms as *mostaz'af/mostaz'afān/mostaz'afīn* appear rarely, and even then mostly in reference to the *bonyād-e mostaz'afān*. Some terms which do occur relatively frequently, such as *tawhīd*, *nemūne*, or *olgū* appear to have lost any political valence. This is even the case with *moslemīn*, a term which had been notably politicized since the Khomeini era.

That said, our inquiry is not a fruitless one. Many of the core terms remain frequent in Khatami's discourse, and can tell us something about how the dialogue of civilizations discourse interacted with the received discourse of pan-Islamism. For example, in looking at the statistical collocates of *ommat*, we find several interesting patterns. First, there are the expected collocates, such as *emām* (in reference to Khomeini as *emām-e ommat*) at 8, or *vahdat* at 10, illustrating the usual nexus of interconnected core pan-Islamic terms. (See Figure 6-16) More interesting for our purposes is *masāleh* (interests) at 12, which indicates an emphasis on the *ommat* as a contemporary political reality, rather than an abstract, eschatological concept, as was the case with Khomeini. Concern for the *ommat* as a community in this world rather than the next will necessarily alter one's perceptions of contemporary international

politics, and may explain, in part, Khatami's emphasis on the dialogue of civilizations as an alternative to conflict. *Ettehād* illustrates the bifurcation of politics discussed more extensively above. Setting aside the strong collocates *jamāhīr* and *showravī* at 4-6 (in reference to the Soviet Union), we come across the terms *hambastegī* at 7, *vahdat* at 8, and *mosalmānān* at 9. (See Figure 6-17) *Hambastegī*, as we have seen in previous chapters, is a strongly affinial term, while *mosalmānān* again underscores the the primacy of *mardom* as the main relational unit on the international stage, rather than the *mellat* (which can be found a bit further below at 12). *Vahdat*, by contrast, displays some unexpected behavior, as one of its strongest statistical collocates is *mellī* at 13. (See Figure 6-18) This may be an effect of reformist discourse, as *mīsāq* (contract or promise) at 14, when viewed in its concordance lines, appears to apply mainly in the context of national unity and social justice. More generally, *vahdat* appears to occur at the nexus of numerous other terms we've encountered repeatedly, such as *hambastegī* at 15, *vafāq* (agreement) at 16, *ettehād* at 17, *mosalmānān* at 19, *moslemīn* at 20*, ensejām* (harmony) at 21, *and peyvastegī* (connection) at 22.

Some of these secondary terms are worth exploring in greater detail. Given its seeming ubiquity, *hambastegī* is a good example of the transformations in Khatami's discourse. In its statistical collocates, we see many expected terms, e.g., *ettehād* at 9, *vahdat* at 10, *hamdelī* at 11 and 12, *nazdīkī* (closeness) at 14 and *peyvastegī* at 15. However, we also find *mellī* at 13, which is somewhat surprising in light of the general trend favoring *mardom* over *mellat*. (See Figure 6-19) A glance at the concordances suggests that this is much like *mellī*'s behavior with *vahdat*; that is, it is related to domestic reformist discourse more than anything else. Much the same pattern is at play with *ensejām*. While *vahdat* occurs at 4 and *taqvīyyat*

(strengthening) at 5 among the statistical collocates, directly below at 6 and 7 are *jāme'e* and *ejtemā'ī*, respectively. (See Figure 6-20) Thus, there seems to be a general trend of terms that had largely been associated with internationalist and pan-Islamist discourse in earlier periods of the Islamic Republic's political history being reappropriated for use in the domestic context by the reformists.

There are a couple of curious exceptions to this rule, however. While *edālat* collocates most strongly with *ejtemā'ī* at R1/1 and 7, for example, as we might expect, a look at the statistical collocates shows that the strongest content word is *jahān* at 7. (See Figure 6-21) Interestingly, a bit further down we find *solh* (peace) at 14 and *ejtemā'ī* only appears at 17. The concordance lines reveal that in many cases, *edālat* often occurs in the context of world peace, which usually follows it in rapid succession. This suggests a link between Khatami's goals at home for the reform program (i.e., social justice), and his broader vision for the world through the dialogue of civilizations (i.e., world peace).

How are we to make sense of Khatami's appropriation of previously pan-Islamist terms into his reformist discourse? If we stop viewing his visions for domestic and international politics as bifurcated or binary, and instead approach them as a unitary system, we find a way to explain this process. Simply put, the discourse of the dialogue of civilizations results from the fusion between Khatami's nascent reformist discourse and latent pan-Islamist discourse prevalent in the Islamic Republic. It is the result of transforming the confrontational paradigms inherent in earlier manifestations. The same basic impetus is applied in both contexts; thus, when we see the greater domestic focus of such traditionally pan-Islamist terms as *hambastegī*, this is not the result of ignoring international politics, but rather of removing the old oppositional paradigm which was at the heart of pan-Islamism in a

state-centric conception of international politics. In the postmodern context, where we are concerned with the *mardom* at one level and the *ommat* at the other, there is little room for conflict. Hence, Khatami's focus on social justice at the first level and *masāleh-e ommat* at the second.

Despite this broad-based transformation in Khatami's political discourse, this is not to suggest that the older substrate underlying state-centric pan-Islamism had been completely washed away by the reformist tide (or wave, to borrow Khatami's preferred term). Take, for example, the strongly affinial term *sarzamīn*. It retains strong links to its traditional usage, with Palestine collocating at R1/4, higher even than Iran at R1/7 or *mā* at R1/10, though *īn* at L1/1 suggests that Iran may nevertheless be the primary referent. (See Figure 6-22) Still, the statistical collocates support this link to Palestine, with *khodeshān* (their own) at 6, *jahān* (this is an issue for the *ommat*, after all, and not merely a local one) at 9, *edālat* at 11, and various terms referring to Palestine or occupation at 15 through 20. (See Figure 6-23) *Felestīn* itself exhibits some of the broader trends discussed above, notably the collocation of *mardom* at L1/1, over *mellat* at L1/3, with *mazlūm* at L1/2. (See Figure 6-24) *Mazlūm* retains its usual role as an affinial term, with Palestine collocating at R1/2, Iraq at R1/3, and Afghanistan at R1/5. (See Figure 6-25) Interestingly, even here *mardom* collocates at L1/1, and *mellat* at L1/2. Other affinial terms of interest, such as *mosalmān* and *mosalmānān*, retain some features, primarily a global focus, with such terms as *jahān* among statistical collocates for the singular form at 9, and the plural at 4. (See Figures 6-26 and 6-27) *Mosalmān* also collocates with *ommat* at 14, and *mellat-hā-ye* at 15, while *mosalmānān* collocates with *vahdat* at 14. Thus, like *mazlūm*, while these terms are less frequent then in the earlier political eras, they retain much of their political valence. Most interestingly, *zolm* and *zālem* are rather

infrequent in the Khatami corpus, and *zolm*, the more frequent of the two, appears largely devoid of the strongly political connotations it once held. *Zālem* is perhaps more striking by its sheer infrequency; in a corpus of over three million words, it occurs only 19 times. We may only be able to explain this through the sheer strength of the dialogue of civilizations discourse; with the oppositional component of pan-Islamism removed, the earlier prevalence of the oppressor and oppression in the Islamic Republic's political discourse is no longer tenable, and this is reflected by the absence of these two terms in the data. The absence of an overt oppressor, however, does not mean the absence of oppression, and the continued frequency of *mazlūm* and the constellation of terms and countries frequently found in its company shows that this element has survived. In reality, the paradigm of justice and suffering is probably too fundamental a component of the Islamic Republic's foundational political discourse for even the reform movement to shakes its foundations; that said, its configuration has been realigned somewhat, as it now appears to be more closely linked to the social justice paradigm which dominates Khatami's domestic political discourse. In this respect, the suffering *mardom*s of various Muslim countries provide the mid-level linkage between localized polities and the *ommat*, and help fill the gap left by the decline of *mellat*. But their orientation is likewise different; instead of an outward-facing oppositional unit, poised against the machinations of the *mellat*s of the West, here, the oppressed *mardom*s serve as a means of inward focus, leaving the dialogue of civilizations as the outward-facing element of Khatami's political discourse.

Thus, we have established that many of the changes and absences in the discourse of pan-Islamism in the Khatami period result from the fusion of reformist discourse with the discourses it inherited. In the process, both were transformed, and

led to concrete political impacts, such as Khatami's focus on the OIC and his ubiquitous dialogue of civilizations.

Before moving on, we will make one final comparison between Khatami and Khamenei, using keywords to draw out how their two contemporaneous discourses differed in the period 1997-2005, and how the tensions and rifts between them helped to shape the following period of the first Ahmadinejad administration.

Keywords Analysis

For this portion of the analysis, a sub-corpus of the larger Khamenei corpus was used as a reference for the Khatami corpus, comprising the period 2 August 1997 to 3 August 2005. While the results are interesting, they should nonetheless be viewed with some caution, as the Khamenei subcorpus only consists of some 950,000 words, much less than the Khatami corpus. As a reference corpus should be larger than the target corpus, this disparity probably distorts the results somewhat.

Nonetheless, they keywords illustrate how distinct Khatami's discourse was, even compared to the contemporaneous discourse of Khamenei. Despite the high number of key terms that appear to be the result of typographic errors, notably those at 1, 3, 9, 10, and 14, among others, there are still numerous substantive keywords. (See Figure 6-28) For example, we find *jāme'e* at 13, *mas'ale* at 15, *towse'e* at 45, *ta'mīn* (security, in the financial sense) at 49, and *ejtemā'ī* at 61, all reflective of the salience of reformist terminology in Khatami's discourse. Other terms, such as *mā* at 12, are indicators of affect in Khatami's discourse vis-à-vis Khamenei, probably unsurprising given that Khatami was a retail politician at this time, while Khamenei, by virtue of his position, was to remain "above the fray," and did not portray himself

as one of the people to the same extent as Khatami. Additionally, we discover *tamaddon* at 30 on the wordlist, an indication of how salient this term was, a fact even more notable given that Khatami appears to have single-handedly introduced it into the discourse himself. According to the corpus data, *tamaddon* only appeared in the Khamenei corpus 45 times in the 1997-2005 period, versus 2760 times for Khatami. In fact, looking at the entire Khamenei corpus, 1989 to 2009, we find only 245 occurrences of *tamaddon* over a 20-year period. This marked difference in frequency would seem to bolster our theory that Khatami himself is primarily responsible for this term's frequency and salience; this makes it a unique example of the tremendous power that even a highly-constrained individual has to shape the political discourse, as long as he has a soapbox and a megaphone large enough to get his message across.

Conclusion

Our review of the Khatami period, then, has shown us several things about political discourse in the period 1997-2005. First, the radical shift in discourse is apparent at even the most basic level, with foundational terms uprooted from the political discourse, and new ones planted in their place. Second, the reformist wave that washed over the electorate inundated the political discourse with its own terminology and concepts. Third, while much of the surface political discourse was upended and drastically changed, a key substrate remained, and was largely untouched. We see this in the use of such terms as *sarzamīn* and *felestīn*, which remained largely the same as they had since the 1980s. Such terms touched on some of the most foundational elements of the Islamic Republic's political discourse, and probably could not have been permanently altered even if Khatami had consciously wished to

do so; they formed, in effect, the bounds of what was possible within the Islamic Republic's political discourse.[448]

These transformations in the political discourse nonetheless have to be read in the context of the broader geopolitical shifts in which they occurred, which themselves most probably have their roots in the Rafsanjani era. As exemplified in the gradual ascendancy of the *mardom* over the *mellat*, Khatami's discourse embodies the post-modern move away from a state-centric conception of the international arena, with a de-emphasization of the state as the primary unit of analysis, towards a bifurcated distribution of power between the various *mardom*s at one level, and supra-national entities and organizations, whether the purely abstract, such as the *umma*, or the more concrete, such as the OIC. For Khatami, too, the *umma* was less an eschatological concern than one of the present-day real world. Its advancement and peaceful development was a theme he emphasized through his role in the OIC, and one that can best be seen as an outgrowth of the reformist discourse which he had planted at home. While reformism served primarily as a program for a domestic agenda, its basic ideas and lessons could nonetheless be transplanted onto the international stage, where they would grow and merge with other existing discourses to yield something quite unique in the *umma*'s long history.

The result was the dialogue of civilizations, a concept which assumed a central place in Khatami's discourse. With reformism following the reconstructionist discourse of the Rafsanjani period, Khatami emphasized a new kind of thinking about domestic society, with social justice, youth, culture, women's rights, and other related

[448] This would seem to suggest that perhaps Foucault was on to something after all when he wrote about the limiting, constraining nature of discourse, and how it shapes the range of possible utterances. While he perhaps underestimated the degree of fluidity present in any given discourse at any given time, the consistency of such basic elements as these across a range of (radically different) time periods in Iranian history indicates that some discursive elements are more persistent, and quite probably more fundamental, than others.

concepts moving to the forefront with the demographic wave of the late 1990s. Such concerns obviated the older discourse of threat and conflict which had so predominated the late 1970s and 1980s, from the early days of the Revolution through the Iran-Iraq War. The winding-down of such concepts began during the Rafsanjani period, and was reflected on the world stage through Iran's gradual re-entry into international politics. With the de-emphasis on conflict at home, the stage was set for such a concept to expand outward, and this idea blossomed into full bloom shortly after Khatami's election, with the dual initiatives of the dialogue of civilizations and Khatami's newfound leadership role in the OIC. By bringing the same basic elements of reformist discourse onto the international stage, Khatami reconfigured the received discourse of pan-Islamism, with the new emphasis on the *mardom* tying affinial pan-Islamism with reformist discourse, while the OIC and its institutions provided a hook for institutional pan-Islamism. Thus, the state-state model of institutional pan-Islamist relations which had predominated for some time (arguably, since the 1870s), and which Khomeini had so distrusted in the OIC (see chapter 3), was eclipsed in favor of the post-modern *umma*, a concept in which states were included, but in which they were not primary. Such pride of place belonged to the various *mardom*s making up those states. This fundamentally democratic rendering of existing concepts may be the only way to explain the virtual absence of ecumenical pan-Islamism in Khatami's discourse; it may have been naturally subsumed under both the reformist discourse and that of the dialogue of civilizations. Its greater salience under Khomeini and Khamenei may well have been tied to the state-centric pan-Islamist model, in which sectarian differences tracked the national boundaries carved out of the *umma* since the demise of the Ottoman Empire.

Finally, and perhaps most interestingly from a theoretical standpoint, the development of the dialogue of civilizations discourse shows how discourses can fuse when they encounter one another, and lead to *sui generis* hybrids whose emergence would have been entirely unpredictable beforehand. This shows us that discourse is far from a set path or a set of rigid constraints; discourses are constantly evolving, indeed, living, and they interact in ways which may be unpredictable even to their progenitors. While individuals may have some choice in setting in motion and promulgating a given discourse (as was certainly the case with Khatami, whose intellectual roots in the reform movement trace back to the early 1990s), the precise effects of that discourse once loosed in the wild prove uncontrollable, and its interactions with existing discourses is something which is often clear only in retrospect, when we have both the temporal distance and data with which to judge their impact.

With that caveat, we can now turn to perhaps the most unexpected of all developments in Iranian politics in a very long while; the now two-term presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, elected in contentious and questioned circumstances in 2005, and re-elected in 2009 through what many believed to be massive electoral fraud and political manipulation. In part because we lack the requisite temporal distance to his second term (and certainly access to information), the next chapter of this study will only focus on the first Ahmadinejad administration, 2005 to 2009. Additionally, after the political turmoil, violence, and still-unsettled transformation of the Iranian political environment following the 2009 presidential election, it became readily apparent that the Islamic Republic had entered a new phase in its 30-year existence. What precisely that phase entails, and what characteristics will most clearly distinguish it from the period(s) that came before, are still unclear as of this

writing. For these reasons, then, we turn finally to the unlikely ascendancy of a man who embodied the opposite of almost everything Khatami stood for as president. How would this man, who had been nearly unknown before becoming mayor of Tehran, receive and transform the radically-transformed political discourse he inherited from Mohammad Khatami and the reform movement? Outside observers did not have to wait long for their first impressions.

7. Ahmadinejad, the Discursive Vanguard

Ahmadinejad's questionable victory in the 2005 presidential elections surprised (and unnerved) more than a few observers. Perhaps his most salient characteristic, at least initially, was his relative obscurity; little was known of his biography prior to becoming mayor of Tehran, nor had he given any strong indications of what his foreign policy would look like as president. Puzzlement on the part of the international community quickly turned to alarm, when, in a highly-publicized statement at the "World Without Zionism" conference, Ahmadinejad called for Israel to be "erased from the pages of history,"[449] and later called the Holocaust a myth.[450] Combined with Ahmadinejad's avowedly populist tone during the 2005 campaign and his reported fascination with the return of Imam Mahdi and the Jamkarān mosque[451], all set against the background of a covert Iranian nuclear program, which had only come to light in late 2002, the media frenzy which ensued is perhaps understandable. That said, it would be an analytical mistake to try to read Ahmadinejad's discourse solely against the context of this international outcry, which came about, after all, when he was already president, and had more to do with discourse reception rather than formation. A more orderly journey through his biography is in order.

[449] This is only one translation of the phrase used in his speech; several others are in common usage. In any case, the quote wasn't even original, as Ahmadinejad himself prefaced the statement with the acknowledgement that it came from Khomeini.
[450] These incidents have been reported *ad nauseam* in the press, see, inter alia, Ali Ansari, *Iran Under Ahmadinejad: The Politics of Confrontation* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 51.
[451] For a scholarly, rather than alarmist treatment of the topic, and some discussion of how this relates to Ahmadinejad's relationship with Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, see Ali Rahnema, *Superstition as Ideology in Iranian Politics: From Majlesi to Ahmadinejad* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 35-113.

The Making of the President

The future Iranian president was born Mahmoud Sabaghian (his father later changed the family name to Ahmadinejad) in Aradan, a small town some two hours south of Tehran, in 1956.[452] His father moved the family in 1958 to Narmak, a then-poor east Tehran neighborhood, where he set up shop as a blacksmith. His son excelled in school, making top marks in the national university entrance exams, all the while maintaining his family's devout religiosity. By all accounts, his football-mad youth was largely apolitical, despite the relative ferment of post-1963 Iran. In 1975, he enrolled at what is today the Iran University of Science and Technology, where he became involved in the various Islamic students' societies, coming under the intellectual influence of Shariati and Khomeini, and eventually attracting the unfriendly attention of SAVAK.[453]

Ahmadinejad's involvement in the course of the Revolution itself is somewhat disputed and murky. While he was affiliated with the hard-line Students Following the Line of the Imam, the group which was responsible for the hostage-taking at the U.S. Embassy, it remains unclear as to whether or not, and if so, to what extent, he was a participant in the hostage crisis. Media reports in the US surfaced shortly after the 2005 presidential election in which former hostages claimed to recognize the new president as one of their tormentors in captivity. Despite claims that he was one of the hostage-takers by a hard-line group in 2003, which Ahmadinejad did not then dispute, he openly denied involvement in 2005. Several reformist political figures who had been involved in the hostage crisis, including Mohsen Mirdamadi, Sa'id

[452] Kasra Naji, *Ahmadinejad: The Secret History of Iran's Radical Leader* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008), 3-7. This section necessarily leans heavily on Naji's book, as, despite the attention Ahmadinejad has attracted since 2005, most books about him remain either largely polemical or hagiographical. Naji's account is by far the most objective English biography of Ahmadinejad.
[453] Ibid., 7-18.

Hajjarian, and Abbas Abdi, stated that Ahmadinejad had not been a part of the hostage-taking. However, Abdi in particular lent support to the theory that Ahmadinejad had attempted to become involved only after Khomeini came out in support of the hostage-takers. This theory may be the most plausible, but in all likelihood, given how politicized the question has become, it is unlikely that it will ever be definitively answered.[454]

Whatever his involvement in the hostage crisis, Ahmadinejad's role in the revolutionary *komiteh*s and his demonstrated loyalty as a true believer in Khomeini's cause redounded to his benefit, as he was brought to West Azerbaijan province to serve as District Governor in Maku, where he worked to calm ethnic unrest in the largely Kurdish and Azeri province. After two years in Maku, he relocated to Khoy, and again after two years there, he was reassigned to Sanandaj. In these posts he was involved in the new government's efforts to repress the incipient Kurdish rebellion, a thoroughly bloody endeavor, and to maintain quiet on the home front during the course of the Iran-Iraq war.[455] Around 1986, Ahmadinejad undertook his military service with the IRGC, based out of the Ramazan Headquarters in Kermanshah. As was the case with the hostage crisis, the extent of Ahmadinejad's combat duties, if any, remains murky. The IRGC unit at Ramazan carried out an attack on an oil refinery in Kirkuk in late 1987, disrupting the fuel supply to Iraqi forces, though there is no documentation of Ahmadinejad's role in the raid, and some, including the reformist sociologist Hamid-Reza Jala'ipour, believe he did not play any role in the combat operations. Regardless of the extent of his involvement in this operation,

[454] Ibid., 18-25.
[455] Ibid., 29-33.

Ahmadinejad's time at Kermanshah helped him develop contacts within the IRGC, which would bear fruit much later in his political career.[456]

His next post would see him deployed to Ardabil province, in Iran's Azeri northwest, as the new governor general in 1993. He had secured the job through the Interior Minister, Ali Mohammad Besharati, a hard-liner closely affiliated with *majles* Speaker Ali Akbar Nategh-Nouri, and no friend of then-president Rafsanjani. Ahmadinejad's role was equally political as well as administrative, as much of his role was to bolster support for the hardliners around Nategh-Nouri, and to help deliver the province for the Speaker in 1997. Ahmadinejad succeeded in neither of these tasks, but he did become embroiled in a scandal involving the resale of subsidized fuel to Azerbaijan, the proceeds of which were then diverted to Nategh-Nouri's campaign fund. Ahmadinejad's tenure in Ardabil was cut short with Khatami's electoral victory in 1997, which resulted in the replacement of all provincial governors.[457]

Returning to Tehran, Ahmadinejad rode out much of the reformist era by taking up a teaching position at his alma mater, where he served as an assistant professor of traffic engineering from 1997 to 2005. He remained involved in politics, running as a candidate for the Tehran city council in 1999, and for the *majles* in 2000, losing badly in both contests. Despite these setbacks, Ahmadinejad remained deeply involved with the political right, becoming a peripatetic activist. His efforts were rewarded by the Abadgaran victories in the 2003 city council elections, when they swept the ballot in a low-turnout election. While Ahmadinejad was not a candidate for the council, he was elected mayor of Tehran by the new city council on 3 May

[456] Ibid., 33-36.
[457] Ibid., 36-40.

2003.[458] His tenure was marked by controversy over his conservative social policies and initiatives, such as the re-burial of Iran-Iraq War dead in public parks and squares, as well as allegations of financial improprieties in his relations with the IRGC, whose business-industrial complex is alleged to have benefited handsomely from his decisions as mayor.[459]

When Ahmadinejad declared his candidacy for president of the Islamic Republic in 2005, he was widely considered to be a hopeless also-ran. He was facing off against the old political lion, Hashemi Rafsanjani, the national police chief and conservative favorite, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, as well as two prominent reformists, the former *majles* Speaker Mehdi Karroubi, and Mostafa Mo'in, a cabinet minister in the Khatami government, along with several other less prominent candidates. His campaign style was unorthodox, to say the least, leaning heavily on war nostalgia and emphasizing his humble lifestyle. His self-portrayal as a modest man of the people was carefully calculated to highlight his contrasts with the presumptive frontrunner, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who by then was exceedingly wealthy, and was widely assumed to have attained his wealth through less-than-honorable means. Ahmadinejad's campaign persona was also aimed towards the poor religious voters of Tehran and the provinces, who had been largely ignored by the campaigns of Rafsanjani and Qalibaf, which had focused almost exclusively on stirring up youth enthusiasm in urban areas. The assumption that Ahmadinejad was a religious fringe candidate meant that the political establishment was stunned when it was announced that he had come in second to Rafsanjani, and would face him in a runoff second round vote. After the political shock subsided, reformists, youth, and moderates rallied around Rafsanjani, whom they had until that

[458] Ibid., 40-49.
[459] Ibid., 49-56.

point derided as corrupt and having grown fat off his nepotistic tendencies, believing him to be the only route to stop Ahmadinejad, seen as a radical threat to the reformist gains of the previous eight years. Despite the reformist-Rafsanjani marriage of convenience, Ahmadinjead would go on to win the second round handily amidst allegations of voter manipulation and outright fraud, largely attributed to his allies in the IRGC and the Basij, whom he had cultivated carefully during his mayoral tenure.[460]

With the election over, a conservative majority in the *majles*, and a new and somewhat obscure president about to take office, the timorous Iranian public, as well as the international community, began to ask themselves what the new presidency would hold in store for Iran, and the world.

The "Miracle of the Third Millennium"

Regardless of how he has come to be perceived in the West, Ahmadinejad and his allies have carefully cultivated his image abroad, and his image in the Muslim world, in particular. His supporters have focused on his high-profile speeches at the UN as not only "destiny-making" (*sarnevesht-sāz*), but as an opportunity for Ahmadinejad to hoist the "banner of glory, honor, Islam, and Shi'ism." (*parcham-e ezzat va eftekhār, eslām va tashayyo'*)[461] His public image is also tied with other elements of Revolutionary ideology, as when his embodiment of *eslām-e nāb-e mohammadī*, a

[460] Ibid., 57-90.
[461] The explicit reference to Shi'ism is somewhat unusual, but doesn't seem to detract from Ahmadinejad's *tiersmondiste* self-presentation, and claims to leadership of the Muslim world. Fāteme Rajabī, *Ahmadīnezhād: Mo'jaze-ye Hezāre-ye Sevvom* (Tehrān: Dānesh Āmūz, 1385 (2006)), 301. This may be more a function of Rajabi's personal adulation for Ahmadinejad as a Shi'i figure than any larger agenda; her references to Ahmadinejad's sharing the "savior's message of *mahdaviyyat*" with all of humanity at his UN speech underscore the extent to which her book is written for Ahmadinejad's core supporters, rather than a more general audience. Rajabī, *Ahmadīnezhād*, 303.

term which was saliently absent during the Khatami administration, is explicitly linked to his "common man" lifestyle, as well as the lack of corruption in his mayoral administration and presidential politics.[462] This portrayal is reflected in such areas as the Arabic hagiographical literature, where Ahmadinejad is portrayed as not only a common man, but as leading a global anti-imperialist, anti-Israeli, and anti-Zionist front[463]; in the context of a coming world revolution amidst no less than seventeen signs of the end times[464]; and whose speeches are to be read (by some at least) in an explicitly messianic context.[465]

Salient as these examples may be, there is a risk in focusing too closely on Ahmadinejad's self-representation in the Shi'i world. More typical is his willful embrace of *tiersmondisme* on the international stage, and his willingness to take up the mantle of the oppressed, like Khomeini. Much has been made in the Iranian literature of his 2007 trip to New York, which has received both a breathless writeup[466] and the publication of a volume of letters written to Ahmadinejad by Americans after his trip.[467] On a more scholarly level, Iranian analysts have emphasized the *mardomī* nature of Ahmadinejad's foreign policy, drawing favorable comparisons to Latin American populism (and using Ahmadinejad's own speeches in doing so), while highlighting his reception as "one of the most beloved presidents in

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[462] Rajabī, *Ahmadīnezhād*, 304-10.
[463] ʿĀdil al-Jūjarī, *Aḥmadīnijād: Rajul fī Qalb al-ʿĀṣifa* (Dimashq: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 2006).
[464] Shādī Faqīh, *Aḥmadīnijād wa al-Thawra al-ʿĀlimīyya al-Muqbila* (Beirūt: Dār al-ʿilm, 2006). This deeply entertaining book appears to have been written with a Lebanese Shi'i audience in mind. Given its publication in 2006, when Ahmadinejad was at the height of his popularity alongside Hassan Nasrallah in the wake of the Israel-Lebanon war, it serves as an excellent example of how Ahmadinejad's association with messianic Shi'ism has not in every instance been a political liability.
[465] *al-Mahdī wa al-Madhawīyya fī Khiṭāb al-Raʾīs Aḥmadīnijād*, (Beirūt: Dār al-Taʿāruf lil-Maṭbūʿāt, 2009?). Though this book is simply a set of translations of Ahmadinejad's speeches into Arabic, its foreword by the Iranian cultural attaché in Beirut can be read as tacit official approval of portraying Ahmadinejad's speeches in this light, at least within the context of the Lebanese Shi'i community.
[466] Sāsān Valīzāde, *Resāneʾī be Nām-e Ahmadīnezhād: Gozāresh-e Safar-e Nīyū Yūrk* (Tehrān: Khāne-ye Ketāb, 1387 (2008)).
[467] *Goftār dar Ravesh-e Irānīān*, (Tehrān: Jomhūr, 1386 (2007)).

the world" because of his attention to the oppressed nations of the world.[468] This is attributed, in part, to the centrality of the discourse of justice in Ahmadinejad's government, in both its foreign and domestic policies.[469] Even in a more scholarly context, Ahmadinejad's messianism is addressed, albeit in a more abstract fashion, one which highlights the commonalities linking eschatology and eternal justice in all world religions, and stating that the concept of *mahdaviyyat* is likewise common among religions.[470] More specifically, Ahmadinejad views *mahdaviyyat* as historically continuous with the Islamic Revolution, arguing that "Imam Khomeini's revolution is not separate from the great revolution of *mahdaviyyat*."[471] This seems to be how Ahmadinejad squares the sectarian circle of his *mahdaviyyat* discourse. Elsewhere, these sectarian-universalist tensions are further reconciled, by arguing, in regards to the justice-seeking aims of Iranian foreign policy, that "justice is one of the foundations of the Shi'i *mazhab*," and that justice-seeking is not a national aim, but a global one.[472]

This discussion of *mahdaviyyat* is important to bear in mind when examining his views on Islamic unity. While acknowledging that shared material interests are important, Ahmadinejad emphasizes that shared thought and beliefs are more important, which would seem to privilege affinial over institutional unity, at least in

[468] Hamīd Mowlānā and Manūchehr Mohammadī, *Sīyāsat-e Khārejī-ye Jomhūrī-ye Eslāmī-ye Irān dar Dowlat-e Ahmadīnezhād* (Tehrān: Dādgostar, 1387 (2008)), 141-42.
[469] Ibid., 143-45.
[470] Ibid., 178-79. This is an interesting, if somewhat under-appreciated argument. Assuming that the broader trend in the discourse of the Islamic Republic of "Shi'ifying" the entire *umma* by encompassing it within the discourse of suffering and righteousness is an ongoing project, this would seem to suggest that, at least aspirationally, Ahmadinejad's discourse on *mahdavīyyat* should not be read as exclusively Shi'i, but rather as a shared aspiration for all the oppressed people of the world. Thus, Ahmadinejad is not a messianic deviant from the IRI's discourse, but has only refined it further, to a point where it can encompass all of the world's oppressed within what has otherwise been a particularistically Shi'i eschatology.
[471] Ibid., 181.
[472] Ibid., 182.

the view of analysts sympathetic to Ahmadinejad.[473] That said, a great deal of emphasis is placed on geopolitics in this vision, with the OIC receiving much attention as a means for the world's Muslims to exert their political strength, while moving towards greater degrees of unity in such areas as common markets, media, collective security, and a "united Islamic society." Such broader goals are to be accompanied by more concrete steps, including the establishment of a permanent Muslim representative on the UN Security Council, as well as that of an Islamic Human Rights Organization.[474] These aims might seem at odds with Ahmadinejad's conception of *mahdaviyyat*, but this is only the case if one views it as a sectarian doctrine; it should be clear that Ahmadinejad's conception is a universalist one. While the coming of Imam Mahdi certainly marks a historical terminus, it is best understood as a kind of *telos*, in relation to which the Islamic revolution and Ahmadinejad's vision of Islamic unity are necessary, indeed, inevitable steps.

Given the importance of discourse to our understanding of Ahmadinejad's politics, it should perhaps not come as a surprise that some Iranian analysts, including those most sympathetic to Ahmadinejad, have chosen to analyze his administration through that framework. One in particular, Mojtabā Zāre'ī, has utilized a discourse analysis-like approach in his writings, though preferring to apply the label of theosophy or hermeneutics.[475] Others have taken a more explicitly discourse analytic approach, though theirs is not as robustly developed in theoretical terms. Nonetheless, it does give us some insight into Ahmadinejad's discourse, and something against which to compare our own analysis of the data. Hamīd-Rezā

[473] Ibid., 189-90.
[474] Ibid., 190-94. This laundry list of proposals comes from a speech delivered by Ahmadinejad at a meeting of the leaders of Muslim countries in Saudi Arabia. It is worth noting that, not only in choice of venue, but even in topic, Ahmadinejad is building upon rather than rejecting the geopolitical/regional advances of the Rafsanjani and Khatami administrations.
[475] For representative works, see Mojtabā Zāre'ī, *Hekmat va Dīyālektīk* (Qom: Majnūn, 1387 (2008)), ———, *Āmrīkā Tamām mī-Shavad* (Tehrān: Khāne-ye Ketāb, 1388 (2009)).

Esmā'īlī, in a revisionist (that is to say, very pro-Ahmadinejad) study of the 2009 presidential elections, uses such an approach, focusing in large part on the discourse of *edālat, ma'naviyyat* (justice and spirituality) which he claims was embodied in Ahmadinejad's campaign.[476] This is in opposition to such concepts as *zolm* (oppression), *fesād* (corruption), *faqr* (poverty), and *tab'īz* (discrimination). Thus, his discourse was founded on three critiques of the reformist period: 1) distanciation from the original discourse of the Revolution; 2) aristocracism (*ashrāfīgarī*); 3) insufficient attention to social justice (which is a rather interesting appropriation/inversion of reformist discourse).[477] In brief, distanciation from the original discourse of the Revolution is the result of the influence of Western thought, which leads invariably to secularism, and distancing from society and the people as well as a crisis of identity.[478] Aristocracism is not something that is only in conflict with Islam, but with human values, such as freedom and justice-seeking. It is the result of forgetting religious teachings, and embracing disbelief of them, and aristocratic culture does not belive in true democracy (despite reformists' talk of *mardomsālārī*). The aristocratic officials (*modīr-e ashrāfī*) are incapable of serving the people's interests, unlike their counterpart *modīr-e khedmatgozār* (roughly, servants of the people), and are incapable of striving for justice or fighting economic corruption and discrimination. Indeed, this critique of Ahmadinejad finds its roots in Khomeini's discourse (this is Esmā'īlī's contention, not my own, though I certainly agree on this last point).[479] Justice is the ruling spirit of Ahmadinejad's discourse, and what drives his policies, unlike the reformists.[480] This discourse of justice and spirituality is not restricted to

[476] Hamīd-Rezā Esmā'īlī, *Shorūsh-e Ashrāfīyyat bar Jomhūrīyyat: Rīshe-yābī-ye Havādes-e Sāl-e '88* (Tehrān: Bahār, 1389 (2010)), 131.
[477] Ibid., 131-32.
[478] Ibid., 132-33.
[479] Ibid., 134-35.
[480] Ibid., 136.

the realm of domestic policy, but also informs Ahmadinejad's understanding of international relations. According to him, without the revival of justice and spirituality, world peace is impossible, and this approach will require greater participation of the *dowlat*s and *mellat*s of the world (note here the Khomeinist dichotomy) in a remade international order. This will entail a greater role for religious identity on the global stage, as well as greater regional cooperation (presumably within the Muslim world?) to combat the superpower regime. The upshot of this is that it will allow Iran to assume its role as a rising power, in an international system in which states, notably the U.S., are in decline, and in which the roles of individuals and *mellat*s (i.e., the collective body politic) will be distinct from those of the states.[481] For the same reasons his discourse was popular in Iran, his opposition to Zionism and imperialism explains his "beloved" status in Islamic and Arabic societies, as well as his warm reception at international institutions, such as the Durban Two meeting.[482] While this last point only underscores how important Ahmadinejad's perception abroad is to his supporters, the rest of this discussion is rather reminiscent of the postmodernist thread that has been woven throughout these last few chapters, beginning most noticeably in the Rafsanjani period. What is interesting is that Ahmadinejad attempts to embrace these changes, rather than contesting them, but instead roots his discourse (explicitly) in Khomeini's. Whatever his views, Khomeini was not a postmodernist, and still largely viewed the international arena in state-centric terms, hence his origination of the *dowlat*/*mellat* distinction. That Ahmadinejad has embraced that distinction while trying to make it

[481] Ibid., 142-44.
[482] The term used here is interesting; *nahād-hā-ye mardomī* is used in place of the expected *beyn-ol-melalī*, thus underscoring the emphasis on populism and legitimacy derived from the population. Ibid., 146.

work within a postmodern setting is an intriguing notion, and one which we will have to examine to see if it is borne out in the data.

Before moving on, it is worth noting the role that Ahmadinejad's discourse is credited with playing in the 2009 presidential election. His discourse of justice and spirituality was opposed by a discourse of *edālat* and *eslāhāt* (reforms).[483] In electoral terms, the dominant discourse will also prevail among the electorate, while the number of primary discourses also limits the number of viable candidates. As such, even though other candidates ran in the 2009 elections (e.g., Karroubi, Reza'i), because Ahmadinejad and Moussavi were the representatives of their respective discourses, they were the only two viable candidates.[484] Interestingly, Esmā'īlī in effect accuses Moussavi of attempting to co-opt Ahmadinejad's discourse through his emphasis on Khomeini, the Iran-Iraq War, the *mostaz'afān*, and various other Revolutionary discursive institutions.[485] While one can obviously dispute the substance of Esmā'īlī's analysis, the simple fact that he has seen fit to carry out a discourse analysis of Ahmadinejad is itself revealing. This marks a recognition on the part of the Iranian political class, especially those on the right, of the increasingly postmodern nature of political contestation, at both the domestic and international level. This explains such things as the concern for Ahmadinejad's image abroad, and the conscious effort to burnish it through the publication of Arabic hagiographies and the like. Discursive power, the thinking goes, translates into political power at the national level, and so, too, at the international level. Hence, Ahmadinejad's audience for his discourse is not only the domestic electorate, but the entire Muslim world (and arguably the *mostaz'afān* the world over). We will have to bear this framework in

[483] Ibid., 147.
[484] Esmā'īlī accepted the official Ministry of the Interior vote tallies for 2009 as correct, though of course most analysts consider them to be fabricated. Ibid., 148-50.
[485] Ibid., 160.

mind when analyzing the actual corpus data, to see to what extent Esmā'īlī's analysis is reflected in Ahmadinejad's discourse, as well as to what extent Ahmadinejad marks an inversion or appropriation of Khatami's discourse, much like Khatami himself marked a fusion of domestic reformism with the received discourse of pan-Islamism. Would Ahmadinejad's open invocation of his Khomeinist roots mark a resurgence of the older, state-centric form of pan-Islamism? If not, what would an attempt to adapt that discourse to an acknowledged postmodern context result in?

The Corpus

The corpus was compiled from texts available at www.president.ir (Accessed March 2012), and was organized and cleaned in a manner similar to all of the other corpora in this study. Texts included in the corpus dated from 12 Mordad 1384 to 13 Khordad 1388, or 3 August 2005 to 3 June 2009, up to the date of the 2009 presidential election, and encompassed all of Ahmadinejad's first term.[486] As mentioned elsewhere, this formed a natural cut-off point for the study, given the drastic changes in domestic Iranian politics since the events of 2009, and the fact that as of this writing, Ahmadinejad was still in the middle of his second term as president. A comprehensive study incorporating both of his presidential terms will have to wait until he is no longer in office, and we have a closed record of texts. This resulted in a corpus of 932 texts, comprising 2,380,179 words. While not as large as the Khatami corpus, this is more than adequate for purposes of this study. With these limitations in mind, we can now turn to the Ahmadinejad wordlist.

[486] There is something of a lacuna from 17 September 2005 to 27 December 2005, as texts between these dates appear not to be available on the president's website. While unlikely to badly distort the results of this study, this particular gap will have to be filled in the future.

From the top of the Ahmadinejad wordlist, we begin to see some distinctive features of his discourse. First, the most salient change vis-à-vis Khatami (and arguably, since Rafsanjani) is the prevalence of *mellat* at 19 on the list over *mardom* at 24. This is an interesting reversal, and one that seems to reflect both a broader discursive shift under Ahmadinejad, as well as a return of some features of the earlier Khomeinist discourse (though certainly not all). There is also a higher frequency of such terms as *dowlat*, at 34, or *khodā* at 36, then has been the case for some time. (In the latter case, this may be due to Ahmadinejad's preference for using ritualistic phrases or invocations in many of his speeches, which is nonetheless an interesting affectation for Iran's first non-clerical president since 1981. This also places *khodā* much higher on his wordlist than is the case with the other figures analyzed in this study. The closest we come is with Khomeini, for whom *Allāh* was 34 on his wordlist.) (See Figure 7-1) Salient in their absence or much lower frequency are quite a few terms: *jāme'e*, which had been highly frequent in the Khatami corpus, is only 158 on this list, while *enqelāb*, an old Revolutionary standby, is only at 123. Even *eslām* and *eslāmī*, which we would expect to find high up the list, given that they are core terms of Revolutionary discourse, only appear at 126 and 128, respectively. There are some continuities, such as *farhang*, which appears at 131 (it had been 143 on the Khatami wordlist), or *javānān* at 144 (it only appeared at 331 on the Khatami wordlist, interestingly), which both indicate that there is some discursive continuity between the two Presidents. However, other terms, such as *tamaddon*, which is most closely associated with Khatami, only appears 346 times in his corpus (number 921 on his wordlist), versus 2760 times for Khatami, at 153 on his wordlist, or *ejtemā'ī*, at 125 on the Khatami

wordlist versus 499 on Ahmadinejad's. There are other terms which seem more salient in Ahmadinejad's discourse, many of which are to be expected, but some of which do not mesh with his self-presentation.

In examining individual terms, we find that there is an emphasis on increasingly abstract entities; for example, *mā*, the 10th term on the wordlist, collocates strongly with *mellat* and *keshvar* at L1/2 and 7, respectively. (See Figure 7-2) This seems to mark a distinction in Ahmadinejad's discourse which is best illustrated by the differences between *mellat* and *mardom*. As mentioned above, *mellat* is the more frequent term, and it seems to serve a strongly affinial function. Among its strongest R1 collocates is Iran at 1 and 3, *mā* at 2, *azīz* (dear) at 5, *rā* (direct object marker) at 6, *bozorg* (great) at 8, *Felestīn* at 9, Iraq at 13, *mo'men* (believing) at 18, *mazlūm* at 20, and *Amrīka* at 22. Among L1 collocates, we find *barā-ye* (for) at 9 *ezzat* (honor) at 12, *hoqūq* (rights) at 13, *pīshraft* (progress) at 16, *doshmanān* (enemies) at 19, and *badkhāhān* (ill-wishers) at 20. (See Figure 7-3) By contrast, *mardom* collocates at R1 with *rā* at 1, *azīz* at 3, *Felestīn* at 7, *Ghazeh* (Gaza) at 9, *mo'men* at 11, *mā* at 12, *Amrīka* at 13, and Iraq at 15. Its L1 collocates include *shomā* (second person plural, formal) at 6, *barā-ye* at 8, *khedmat* (service) at 9, *hoqūq* at 13, and *hozūr* (presence or attendance) at 20. (See Figure 7-4) Despite the substantial overlap between these two terms, we can draw out some distinctions here. First, *mellat* appears to be more strongly associated with coherent, unified, named entities such as Iran, Palestine, or Iraq. It is somewhat less likely to be a grammatical object (*rā* is only sixth in frequency of R1 collocates, versus first for *mardom*), and it is an active term for international politics, as *pīshraft*, *doshmanān*, and *badkhāhān* demonstrate. *Mardom*, in contrast, is more likely to be a grammatical object, and is more closely associated with *shomā* than *mā*, implicitly leaving Ahmadinejad out of

the figurative masses of the *mardom*, despite his populist tendencies. This is not a sign of hypocrisy, however, but rather an example of role delineation in his discourse. These features combine to make *mardom* something which is acted upon, and often suffering (hence, the references to Palestine, Gaza, Iraq), but which can nonetheless render service (*khedmat*), meaning it is not totally excluded from the international stage, though any such actions will have to be channeled through the *mellat*. A *mellat*, of course, implies a political leader of some sort, such as Ahmadinejad. The distinction here is a subtle one, but it underscores the salience and significance of the individual leader in Ahmadinejad's discourse, which perhaps ought not to be surprising. Khatami had civil society and the dialogue of civilizations, Ahmadinejad has a strong leader speaking and acting on behalf of the people. The *mardom* to *mardom* international order envisioned by Khatami is replaced by a more traditional *mellat* to *mellat* one in Ahmadinejad's discourse.

Naturally, the most significant *mellat* is Iran, at 20 on the Ahmadinejad wordlist. Its strongest L1 collocate is *mellat*, not *eslāmī*, which is a feature that distinguishes Ahmadinejad from both Khatami and Rafsanjani, but not from Khomeini or Khamenei, in both of whose discourse Iran collocates most strongly with *mellat*. Indeed, *eslāmī* is quite far down the list, collocating at L1/6, after *azīz* at 4 and just above *sākhtan* (to build) at 7 and *bozorg* at 9. (See Figure 7-5) Whether this means the concept of *mellat* is more important than *jomhūrīyyat* in Ahmadinejad's discourse is an open question, but it certainly places him closer to Iran's two supreme leaders, discursively speaking, then his two post-war predecessors as president. It also hints at his conception of Iran on the world stage: not merely as a representative of Islam (thought it is certainly that, too – see below on *nemūne* and *olgū*), but as a powerful entity in its own right, acting independently and going toe-to-toe with other

world powers. Within the *mellat*, the center of power lies in the *dowlat* (government), at 34 on the wordlist, a position higher even than Khatami (where it was number 52), when it was itself much higher than in the wordlists for Rafsanjani, Khamenei, or Khomeini. Its collocates indicate mostly a dichotomy between Iran, such as *īn* (demonstrative this) at L1/1 or *eslāmī* at R1/9, and the US, *Amrīkā* at R1/4. (See Figure 7-6) A somewhat greater emphasis on government is perhaps to be expected, given Ahmadinejad's prior experience in provincial and municipal government, and his efforts to sell himself as a manager and servant of the people. (On the relevance of which, see the discussion of *khedmat* below.) This is, of course, in direct contrast, and a rebuke to, the reformist emphasis on civil society, and Khatami as an intellectual rather than a leader. There is thus a parallel between Ahmadinejad's vision for the *mellat* on the world stage and his vision of his role domestically. A strong, centralized leadership is key to both visions.

Continuing in our wordlist by descending frequency, we encounter *rāh* (path or way), which, contra to expectations, does not have the exact religious connotations it has had in the past, when *rāh-e emām* (the path of the Imam) was used as a self-descriptor by those who most enthusiastically followed Khomeini, notably the US Embassy hostage-takers. Instead, Ahmadinejad appears more focused on solutions, both temporal and eternal, with R1 collocates including *hall* (solution) at 3, *najjāt* (salvation) at 4, *khodā* at 6, *dorost* at 12, *mellat* at 18, and *emām* only appearing at 20. (See Figure 7-7) The statistical collocates reveal the appearance of *mojāhedat* (struggle or endeavor) at 9, as well as *shahādat* (witness or martyrdom) at 13, both largely collocating at L2. (See Figure 7-8) As regards *mojāhedat*, it is worth noting here that, as it shares the same root as *jahād*, it likewise embodies the linkage between temporal and spiritual struggle, which is so common in Revolutionary

discourse. That it collocates strongly with *rāh*, itself a highly frequent term in Ahmadinjead's discourse, illustrates how suffused his discourse is with terms and concepts from the early period of the Revolution. Again, this should hardly be surprising, given that the Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War were the formative period of his political and social identities, in many respects. It is somewhat fitting, then, that the term *emām* follows *rāh* so closely in the wordlist, appearing at 72. While there is some truth to the media's obsession with Ahmadinejad's obsession with the Hidden Imam, it is only partly accurate. Strong R1 collocates for *emām* include *asr* (age) at 4 and *zamān* at 10, both in reference to the Hidden Imam, but others notable collocates include *rāhel* (deceased) and *farmūdand* (commanded, preterite third person singular, highly formal), both in reference to Khomeini, at 13 and 14, respectively. Other R1 collocates are mostly in reference to other Shi'i Imams, such as Rezā at 5, Hasan at 6, the generic *azīz* at 7, and *ma'sūm* (innocent) at 15. (See Figure 7-9) Of particular interest here is the use of *farmūdand*, which is used here to introduce a quote by or reference to Khomeini, and with great frequency. In addition to rooting his discourse in the Khomeinist era, Ahmadinejad may here be taking the same tack as Khamenei in attempting to claim Khomeini's mantle as a means of legitimation. This suggests that there is something to Esmā'īlī 's contention that Ahmadinejad emphasized a return to the original discourse of the Revolution in the 2009 campaign; it certainly appears to have been a part of his discourse, even before that point.

One of the next terms on the wordlist, *edālat* at 78, also implicates the presidential campaigns of both 2005 and 2009. It is indeed a central component of Ahmadinejad's discourse, though it behaves a little differently than might be expected. To begin with, Ahmadinejad's use of the term is markedly different from

Khatami's; the complete absence of *ejtemā'ī* in the collocation patterns is a good indication of how Ahmadinejad's conception of justice differs from that of the reformists. This does not mean that social justice per se is entirely absent, however. His administration's focus on justice is evident in the L1 collocates, namely *ejrā-ye* (performing or carrying out, here, "doing justice" is probably the most felicitous translation) at 2, *sahhām* (shares, in reference to the "justice shares" redistributive payment scheme that had been part of his campaign platform) at 5, *bar pā-ye* (built upon or resting upon) at 6 and 25, *bar asās-e* (on a foundation of) at 9, *asās* (foundation) at 11, and *pā-ye* (leg, or base of) at 13 highlight the foundational importance of justice in his discourse. (See Figure 7-10) There are several other features of *edālat*'s discursive role worth noting, as well. First, the presence of *khodāparastī* (love of God) at L1/15, as well as *tawhīd* at L1/17 further bolster Esmā'īlī 's contention of the centrality of the discourse of *edālat* and *ma'naviyyat*. Equally important is what this discourse tells us about Ahmadinejad's conception of his role and that of his administration. *Parchamdār* (standard-bearer) at L1/21 is a good indication, and one confirmed by *khāhī* (seeking, as in justice-seeking) at R1/8, *khāh* (seeking) at R1/11, *mohavvar* (axis or pivot) at R1/13, and *talabī/talab* (seeking or demanding) at R1/18 and 21, respectively. Justice, then, is less a concrete policy objective, and more of an aspirational, definititional, orientational component of Ahmadinejad's discourse. It is a polestar rather than an accomplishment. This is fitting for a renewed Revolutionary discourse, with an emphasis on ongoing struggle, in contrast to the reformist conception of social justice, which is something that can actually be attained. In this sense, it is comparable to Khomeini's conception of the *ommat* as an eschatological state, rather than a polity.

We can learn a little bit about the outward orientation of Ahmadinejad's discourse from *jahān* (world) at 105 on the wordlist, and *mellat-hā* (nations) at 109. *Jahān* retains at least one collocate we would expect, *eslām* at R1/10, but we also see among its left collocates *hame* (all) at 5 and 10, *mardom* at 7, *ezzat* at 8, *sarāsar* (throughout) at 12, *masā'el* (problems) at 14, and *mellat-hā-ye* (nations, genitive plural) at 15. (See Figure 7-11) By contrast, *mellat-hā* collocates with *hame* at L1/1 and 2, *sāyer* (the rest) at L1/4 and 15, *hoqūq* at L1/6, *servat* (wealth) at 11, and *pīshraft* at L1/14. (See Figure 7-12) Much like the discussion of *mellat* and *mardom* above, the distinction here is a subtle one. *Jahān*, with its slightly stronger association with *mardom*, is likewise an abstraction. Though there is a *jahān-e eslām*, this is associated with abstract concepts, such as honor, or spoken of in generalities, such as possessing problems. *Mellat-hā*, on the other hand, is not seen as a broad collective entity, but rather as a grouping of distinct and separate entities, hence the prevalence of *hame* as a left collocate, and the talk of rights and progress of nations. This represents an important qualification that must be made to the discussion above; while Ahmadinejad certainly has a discursive role for the *mardom* and *jahān-e eslām*, this is in the background, while the *mellat*s of the world are the primary actors. Again, this is a subtle shift away from the primacy that *mardom* had been accorded under Khatami, and it is probably the byproduct of Ahmadinejad's conception of the necessity of a strong leader within the polity. This is still, in many respects, a Khomeinist conception. We will examine the interesting relationship of Ahmadinejad's discourse to the postmodern international system below.

One of the more interesting features of Ahmadinejad's discourse is the presence of an entirely new term on his wordlist: *khedmat* (service) at 117. This is in keeping with Ahmadinejad's self-conception as *modīr-e khedmatgozār*, and helps us

understand the polity he represents. *Khedmat*'s most interesting collocates are *shomā* at R1/1, *mardom* at R1/3, *shomāst* (in this case, a contraction with *khedmat*, meaning "your service is…") at R1/6, *solh* (peace) at R1/8, *mellat* at R1/10, and *refāh* (welfare) at R1/13. (See Figure 7-13) This tells us several things. First, *khedmat* in many cases is rendered by *shomā*, that is, Ahmadinejad's audience and supporters. In addition to the *mardom*, (and even here, the *mellat*), they contribute to this endeavor, which is directed towards several ends, namely *solh* and *refāh*. Taking Esmā'īlī's description above as a fairly accurate one of Ahmadinejad's role conception, he and his supporters are thus a kind of vanguard, serving at home against corrupt political forces bent on self-enrichment and Westernized decadence, while also serving the global aims of peace and welfare. While at a basic level, vanguard is an appellation for Ahmadinejad and his supporters, it encompasses a concept much broader than parochial Iranian domestic politics. We might even be able to say that the next term on the wordlist, *harakat* (movement) at 121, is a rather apropos description. Its collocates imply this reading of *khedmat*; in particular the R1/4 collcate *mellat*, when we examine the concordance lines, most frequently refers to *mellat-e mā* or *mellat-e Irān*. (See Figure 7-14) The term plays a role in Ahmadinejad's discourse similar to what it does in Khamenei's or Rafsanjani's, and much like *nahzat* in Khomeini's. While not being confined solely to Iran's borders, the Revolution is an ongoing process and movement rather than a discrete historical event, and Ahmadinejad and his supporters are presently the vanguard of that global movement. Despite its comparative infrequency vis-à-vis the other figures in this study, *enqelāb*'s usage in Ahmadinejad's discourse seems to confirm this reading. Such collocates as *mellat* at R1/14, and particularly *dowrān* (era or period) at L1/4 and *ārmān-hā-ye* (goals or aims) at L1/6 highlight the continuing process of the Revolution. (See Figure 7-15)

One of the more potent symbols of the Revolution is implicated by *eslām* and *eslāmī*, at 126 and 128 on the wordlist. Among *eslām*'s collocates, collective phrases such as *donyā-ye* (world, genitive) at L1/4, *farhang* (culture) at L1/6, *jahān* at L1/7, *ommat* at L1/12, and even *parcham* (banner or flag) at L1/23 stand out. (See Figure 7-16) For our immediate purposes, though, more interesting are the right collocates, notably *nāb* (pure) at R1/3, *hazrat* (an appellation for an Islamic holy figure) at R1/4, *Mohammad* at R2/2 (with related collocate *Mostafā*, itself an appellation for the Prophet at R3/3), and *Mohammadī* at R2/3. Despite the near-total absence of the old Revolutionary standby *eslām-e nāb-e Mohammadī* in Khatami's discourse, it is quite common in Ahmadinejad's, with *nāb* collocating 220 times with *eslām*, *Mohammadī* 87. It is hard to think of a better way for Ahmadinejad to restore the original discourse of the Revolution. With his emphasis on a "culture of pure Islam" or "the Islam of Hazrat-e Mohammad," Ahmadinejad makes it crystal-clear what he sees as the foundation (and aim) of the ongoing Revolutionary process in which he plays such a central role. The various concepts discussed up to this point, including the role of the *mellat*s, the centrality of Iran, the emphasis on justice, and the role of *khedmat* in forming a global movement, converge on this basic concept. The concept of *eslām-e nāb-e Mohammadī* can be seen as a historical counterpoint to the notion of *gharbzadegī*, and its solution. It represents a return to self, the *rāh-e najjāt* (path of salvation), if you will, for the problems facing the contemporary Muslim world. In restoring the original discourse of the Revolution at home, and by solving the ills brought about by the reformist period, Ahmadinejad can both serve the Revolution at home, and make Iran an example for other countries in the *donyā-ye eslām* (world of Islam). (See below for discussion of *olgū* and *nemūne*.) *Eslāmī* helps us understand how he envisions this coming about at the micro level. Its L1 collocates include the

utterly predictable, such as *jomhūrī* at 1 and *enqelāb* at 2, but we then find *dowlat* (government) at 3, *keshvar-hā-ye* (countries, plural genitive) at 4, *jāme'e* at 5 and 6, *nezām* (order or system) at 9, *farhang* at 10, *ommat* at 11, *konferāns* (conference, in reference to the OIC) at 12, *meyhan* (motherland) at 14, *keshvar* at 15, *eqtesād* (economy) at 16, *andīshe* (thought) at 18 and 19, *tamaddon* (civilization) at 21, and *mellat-hā-ye* at 23. (See Figure 7-17) There are many things going on among all of these collocates. First, *dowlat* shows the domestic side of Ahmadinejad's discourse, and the role he sees his administration playing. For a term that had largely been drained of any ideological valence over the years (at least since Khomeini's hard *mellat*/*dowlat* dichotomy), here, *dowlat* carries more of a positive valence than it ever has before, as a mechanism for rectifying error and restoring the proper state of Iran, and the Revolution. For a "servant of the people," such as Ahmadinejad, it is an important mechanism for bringing about desired change. The other collocates refer to a combination of the abstract and the concrete, but they both emphasize the international level. At the most abstract level are *jāme'e, nezām*, *tamaddon,* and *farhang*, global, all-enveloping concepts that still have a strong resonance. *Ommat*, of course, is a term with deep roots. (See below for detailed discussion of this term.) *Eqtesād* plays a related role, though like *andīshe* it is somewhat instrumental, something of a channel or means for reaching a desired state of affairs. This is also true of *konferāns*/the OIC, which is a means to greater unity, and one that Ahmadinejad has, like Khatami, embraced openly, as discussed above. *Meyhan* brings us down to the singular level, as a strongly affinial term with an atomized institutional aspect; every individual Muslim has a *meyhan-e eslāmī*, after all. They are the basic building block of Islamic international society. Most interesting is *keshvar-hā-ye*, which might seem at first to be a relatively anodyne term. But in

examing some of its concordance lines, we can see that in many cases Ahmadinejad is referring to the need for these countries to unite in some way, or expressing the wish that they help each other (or Iran). (See Figure 7-18) A similar dynamic is at work with *keshvar* and *mellat-hā-ye*, as well. As instrumentalities of his broader discursive vision, the various *keshvar*s and *mellat*s serve as the institutional building blocks of Ahmadinejad's pan-Islamism, as channeled through economic relations or the OIC. Islamic thought is like the mortar holding these blocks together.[487] While *tamaddon* served as the central unifier of the Islamic polities in Khatami's discourse, for Ahmadinejad the *keshvar* is much more important, as is the *mellat*. This also explains the relative senescence of *mardom* vis-à-vis *mellat*. In a discourse where *tamaddon* is central, the *mardom* are naturally more salient; but this is not the case in a discourse where resurrecting the Revolution is central.

Ahmadinejad's focus on states in the international arena is highlighted by the 133rd term on the wordlist, *haste*, or rather, *haste'ī* (nuclear), a rather timely term, given Iran's political situation. Many of its collocates are entirely topical, e.g. *enerzhī* (energy) or *selāh-hā-ye* (weapons), but these are entirely unsurprising. More interesting is *hoqūq* (right) at L1/14, and the right collocates (note that all R1 collocates are *ī*, due to the software incorrectly parsing *haste'ī* as two words, rather than one) *haqq* at R2/2, *mossalam* (certain or indisputable) at R3/1 and *māst* (is ours) at R4/1. (See Figure 7-19) Taken together with the L1/1 collocate *enerzhī*, this gives us the phrase *enerzhī-ye haste'ī haqq-e mosallam-e māst*, "nuclear energy is our indisputable right," a common phrase at political rallies, on banners, and the general rallying cry in defense of the Iranian nuclear program. This is framed in an interstate context; the concordance lines where *hoqūq* is an L1 collocate mostly refer to the

[487] The importance of *keshvar* also goes a long way towards explaining its otherwise puzzling frequency in Ahmadinejad's discourse; at 46 on his wordlist, it is unusually salient, and seems to lack any other distinguishing characteristics.

nuclear rights of Iran or *mellat-e Irān*, which fits comfortably within Ahmadinejad's *mellat*-centric approach to international relations. Justice in this context, the defense of this right, means standing up for Iran's right to nuclear energy, as against the wishes of outside, oppressive powers. This means that nuclear energy is not the unique and separable issue Iran's negotiating partners have often tried to frame it as; it is one more item (albeit a highly salient one) on a list of agenda items and priorities. Viewing it disconnected from Ahmadinejad's broader discursive context is going about it precisely the wrong way, and all but ensures failure. This study does not purport to propose a comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis, but any realistic solution will have to take into account the Iranian and international discursive context if it hopes to craft a proposal Ahmadinejad (and the rest of the Iranian government) can accept. A lack of discursive sensitivity will simply lead to solutions viewed as alien, unresponsive, or unrealistic within Iran.

Before moving on to terms most closely associated with pan-Islamism, let us examine a few final terms on the wordlist. *Talāsh* (struggle), at 139, is a term that has been common since the early Revolutionary days. Of most interest here are the L1/6 collocate *mā*, the L1/12 collocate *dowlat*, and the R2/2 collocate *mojāhedat* (endeavor or struggle), as well as the R1/3 collocate *konīm* (present tense subjunctive, giving us "we struggle" or "let us struggle"). (See Figure 7-20) Struggle being a desirable Revolutionary undertaking, it is unsurprising that Ahmadinejad is exhorting us to do so, or is asserting that this is what his government does. It is somewhat less frequent in relative terms in his corpus than in others (in the Khatami corpus, it was 90 on the wordlist), though this may be the result of his more frequent use of *mojāhedat*. Moving along, *javānān* (youths) at 144 on the wordlist is not exceptionally interesting, but the L1 collocates *eshteghāl* (employment) at 6 and *ezdevāj* (marriage)

at 14 give a hint of the problems facing Ahmadinejad on the campaign trail and as president, as well as some of the initiatives aimed at helping this demographic (encouraging youths to marry by offering newlyweds loans was a pet initiative of his as mayor[488]). In regards to *jāme'e* (society) at 158, the most interesting collocates are *nemūne* at 10 and *olgū* at 12, both of which, typically, looking at the concordance lines, are in reference to Iran building or serving as an exemplary Islamic society. *Pīshraft* (progress), at 165 collocates strongly with *mellat* at R1/2 and *keshvar* at R1/3, along with *forsat* (opportunity) at L1/9. This fits with his pattern of emphasizing *mellat*s and *keshvar*s as the primary international actors, and relates their progress to his emphasis on justice. Having sketched the outlines of Ahmadinejad's discourse through terms of interest in the 200 most-frequent entries in our wordlist, we can now examine those terms most directly related to pan-Islamism, and see how they interact with the Ahmadinejad's general discursive background.

Analysis, Section 2 – Core Terms

We have already seen several marked differences between Khatami's and Ahmadinejad's discourses, such as the much higher frequency of *eslām-e nāb-e mohammadī*, a term which had been largely absent in the Khatami corpus. It is, however, worth noting some similarities between the two, which probably mark a broader, secular trend in the IRI's discourse. First, the continued rarity of such terms as *ettehād* or *taqrīb*, which only appear 60 and 5 times in the corpus, respectively, means that they are no longer a major component of IRI discourse. This does not necessarily mean that the discursive functions they served or the concepts they

[488] Naji, *Ahmadinejad*, 54.

represented are no longer important; rather, those functions have transformed, and been taken up by other existing terms, or new ones. Likewise, *sodūr-e enqelāb* is not attested at all in the Ahmadinejad corpus, suggesting that discursive change is indeed quite "sticky," something not easily reversed once it has occurred. A similar trend is at work with *mostaz'af*, *mostaz'afān*, *mostaz'afīn*, and *moslemīn*, which only occur 14, 15, 26, and 29 times, respectively. Like *sodūr-e enqelāb*, a term closely associated with Khomeini and his era, they have mostly faded from use, and seem to lack a strong ideological valence. This would be less strange were it not for the conscious intention of the Ahmadinejad administration to revive the original discourse of the Revolution, and the otherwise pronounced influence of Khomeinist discourse described above. It certainly raises the question of the extent to which a given actor can consciously control or shape discourse, and the extent to which it acts upon them. This seems to suggest that individual control may exist at the margins, but any given political actor is more or less carried along by the wave (we see this too, with the changes in Khamenei's discourse over 20 years), and is bound in large part by received discourse. Hence, changes that firmly took root in the Khatami period may have been irreversible (though not immodifiable) by the time Ahmadinejad came to power.

With this in mind, we can now turn to some of the terms which have consistently formed a part of pan-Islamist discourse within the IRI. *Vahdat* marks a hybrid pattern of collocates; on the one hand, the L1 collocate *mohavvar*, at 3, in its concordance lines displays behavior we've come to expect, such as references to the Prophet as *mohavvar-e ommat*, or the *emām* (both Khomeini and the Hidden Imam, interestingly) as *mohavvar* for the *mosalmānān*. *Edālat* likewise sometimes fulfills the role of *mohavvar* in Ahmadinejad's discourse. More prominent, though, are right

collocates, such as *mellī* at R1/3, *hamdelī* at R1/4 and R2/2, *mellat* at R1/5, *ensejām* (harmony) at R2/3, and *īstādegī* (resistance) at R2/4. (See Figure 7-21) Though such terms as *hamdelī* maintain the affinial unity aspects of *vahdat*'s discursive role, we see a much stronger emphasis on institutional unity, probably due to the role that *mellat* plays in Ahmadinejad's discourse as a whole (though of course *vahdat-e mellī* and *vahdat-e mellat* were present in earlier actors' discourse, as well). This is also partly due to the kind of political cosmology Ahmadinejad seems to adhere to as described above, in which *mellat*s are the primary international actors and units of the *ommat*, aiming towards greater unity through the OIC and other mechanisms which are primarily institutional in nature, as opposed to Khatami's more civilizational and affinial tendencies. In regards to the *ommat* itself, with only 117 occurrences in the Ahmadinjead corpus, its collocations tell us relatively little besides the fact that it collocates almost exclusively at R1 with *eslāmī*, that *vahdat* is a strong collocate at L1/2, and that the phrase *mellat-e Irān va ommat-e eslāmī* is comparatively common. Looking at the concordance lines reveals an interesting array of associations; *emām-e ommat*, *barādarān-e ommat*, *hamdelī-ye ommat*, and the separation of *mellat-e Irān* from *ommat* indicate that its usage here is indeed more reminiscent of Khomeini's usage, in an affinial and abstract sense, rather than in the sense of a concrete polity. In that sense, it exists at the very top of the hierarchy, giving us something like the following order: *mosalmān* (i.e., an individual) < *mardom* < *mellat* (with, of course, a leader at its head) < *konferāns* (the OIC) < *ommat*, listed in ascending levels of abstraction. The aspects of pan-Islamism are thus clustered around these concepts in a bifurcated pattern, with institutional aspects associating most strongly with *mellat* in the center, and affinial aspects at the individual and supranational levels. Looking at the role played by some other terms helps to illuminate this hierarchy.

Mosalmān and *mosalmānān*, one might think, were simply the singular and plural forms of the same word. However, as is often discovered to be the case in corpus studies, different word forms tend to have very different sets of collocates, even if we might think of them as related.[489] While the collocational differences between the two terms at issue here are not as drastic as is the case with some other terms, they do point us towards some helpful distinctions. As both terms are not overly frequent the statistical collocates yield somewhat more useful information than collocate patterns. In the case of *mosalmān*, such terms listing other religions as *masīhī* (Christian), *yahūdī* (Jewish), or *hendū* (Hindu) populate much of the list, more interesting for our purposes is *mellat-hā-ye* at 13. (See Figure 7-22) *Mosalmānān* has a similar collocate list, with the plural forms *masīhīyān* and *yahūdīyān* replacing their singular forms. Right below these, at 7, is *rahbarān* (leaders). (See Figure 7-23) In both cases, our terms of interest are L1 collocates; but how do these help us distinguish the two forms of *mosalmān*? Part of the distinction is grammatical; *mellat-hā-ye mosalmān* is an adjectival relationship, describing the abstract unit of the nation, while *rahbarān-e mosalmānān* is a genitive relationship between two nouns, describing "leaders of Muslims." But by plugging these concepts into the hierarchy described above, we can make some sense of the relationship between Ahmadinejad's discourse and the shifts on the international stage brought about by postmodernity.

Recall the bifurcated structure implicit in the discussion of Khatami's discourse in the last chapter; the result was a void in between the level of *mardom* and the level of *tamaddon*. The role of the *mellat* was much diminished in reformist discourse vis-à-vis the role of the *mardom* or the supra/trans-national *tamaddon* or *ommat*. By contrast, in the case of Ahmadinejad, this bifurcated structure looks a bit

[489] For a famous example illustrating the difference between *eye* and *eyes*, see Sinclair, *Trust the Text*, 30-35.

more like an hourglass, with the *mellat*, in its new heightened role, at the center. These individual units, defined in religious terms (*mellat-e mosalmān*), constitute the basic units of the *ommat*, as discussed above. Below each of these are their respective *mardom*s, or in the sense of aggregated individuals rather than abstract collectives, *mosalmānān*. At the head of each of these is a *rahbar*, much like Ahmadinejad. His relationship to the constitutive units of the *mellat*, then, is at the top of the pyramid within the *mardom*, or the tip of the spear (depending on your preferred metaphor), pointing upwards towards unity not just within the *mellat*, but between *mellat*s in the greater *ommat*. Thus, there is a fundamental difference in Ahmadinejad's political/civilizational cosmology as compared to Khatami's, and one that is borne out in various aspects of his discourse.

We can go still further, and say that even on the medial level of nominally equal *mellat*s, Ahmadinejad's discourse reveals a special role for Iran. Consider the role of *parchamdār* (standard-bearer), discussed briefly above in connection with *edālat*. The identity of the standard-bearer is key, and in that regard, we can see that it is usually Iran. Left collocates include *mellat* at L3/1 and L2/1, Iran at L2/3 and L1/2, and *mā* at L1/3. The self-reference here is clear, but there is no reason to think that *mellat* refers here exclusively to Iran (though it remains a strongly ideational term pertaining to unity, affinial or institutional). The values which *parchamdār* expresses are illuminated by R1 collocates, including *edālat* at 1, *solh* (peace) at 3, *elm* (knowledge) at 4, *tawhīd* (unity) at 5, *ezzat* (honor) at 7, *mobāreze* (resistance or combat) at 8, *khodāparastī* at 13, *da'vat* (call or invitation, in the religious sense) at 11, *harakat* at 14, *farhang* at16, and *tamaddon* at 17. (See Figure 7-24) This association is confirmed by the R1 collocates of *parcham*, such as *tawhīd* at 1, *ezzat* at 2, *edālat* at 3, *eslām* at 5, *hedāyat* (guidance, in the religious sense) at 7, *emām* at 8,

velāyat at 9, and *yālsarāt* (a term affiliated with Ansār-e Hezbollah) at 10. (See Figure 7-25) The trend of these collocates is clear; Iran as *parchamdār*, with Ahmadinejad at its head, is the vanguard of the *ommat*, hoisting the standard for all of the Islamic values listed here. While all other *mellat-hā-ye mosalmān* are of course part of the *ommat*, Iran is a sort of *primus inter pares*, or at the very least is leading the (figurative) charge.

This discursive formation of Ahmadinejad's seems to have reinvigorated a few terms which had become moribund during the Khatami administration. *Tawhīd*, for example, which had lost much of its political valence in Khatami's discourse, collocates with such terms as *parcham* at L1/4, *kalame* at L1/7 and R1/12, *parchamdār* at L1/12, *faryād* (cry) at L1/13, and *edālat* at R1/6 and R2/1. (See Figure 7-26) Now, it lies at the same discursive nexus as many of these terms and is something of a symbol of affinial unity once again. *Nemūne* (model) and *olgū* (pattern), both of which had likewise lacked political valence in the Khatami era, have also been reinvigorated. *Nemūne*, in particular, collocates strongly with terms such as *jāme'e* at L1/3,4, and 13, *mā* at L1/9, and *eslāmī* at R1/5 and 13. (See Figure 7-27) The concordances show that the phrase *jāme'e-ye nemune* (model society) or *jāme'e-ye nemūne-ye eslāmī* (model Islamic society) are often used in connection with Iran. A similar dynamic is at play with *olgū*, which also collocates strongly with *jāme'e*, as well as *barā-ye* (for) at R1, and often refers to Iran as a model society (*barā-ye* is mostly used to refer to the Prophet as a model for all humanity). *Olgū-ye* has a similar set of collocates, though it is not as marked. All of these terms have apparently been reinvigorated by Ahmadinejad's *mellat* discursive formation, with which they largely comport.

Some elements of his discourse continue existing patterns. *Sarzamīn* (homeland) remains strongly associated with both Iran and Palestine. *Felestin* still lies at the nexus of several strong affinial terms, such as *mazlūm* and *moqāvemat.* Interestingly, its L1/1 collocate is *mellat*, followed by *mardom* at L1/2, though the difference in frequency is tiny. There seems to be a slight tension here between the key discursive role Palestine plays as suffering from outside control, rather than determining its own actions (*mardom*) and the aspiration to make it an equal player on the world stage (*mellat*). *Mazlūm* reflects the broader patterns of Ahmadinejad's discourse, with *mellat-hā-ye* collocating at L1/1 and 7, *mardom* at L1/2, and *mellat* at L1/3. Among right collocates, *Felestīn* is the strongest at R1/3, with *Ghaze* (Gaza) and Iraq at R1/4 and 5, respectively. Little has changed here. *Mohavvar* (pivot or axis) behaves in two different and interesting ways. Its L1 collocates, notably *edālat* at 2, Iran at 4, and *tawhīd* at 7 all describe things which have central importance, or which act as an axis. These comport with the discourse features described above. Among right collocates, most notable is *vahdat* at R1/1. (See Figure 7-28) *Vahdat* still remains a key concept, even in this age of postmodern politics. Finally, the greater incidence of *zālemān* (oppressors, occurring 90 times) as opposed to *zālem* (oppressor, occurring 48 times), is interesting, and suggests that a greater degree of abstraction may be at play here. That the statistical collocates of *zālemān* include *īstādegī* (resistance), *moqābel-e* (against), *barābar* (against), and *mobāreze* at 6,7,8, and 9, respectively, shows that the term plays is less of a concrete descriptor of specific actors, and more a general ideational term, used to refer to that which Iran is standing against. In sum, while some of these terms show little change, such as *Felestīn*, and are likely too deeply rooted in the IRI's foundational discourses to be changed by any actor within that system, many other aspects of Ahmadinejad's

discourse, notably those terms related to pan-Islamism, demonstrate a great deal of change from the Khatami period, and in some cases a total inversion.

Conclusion

Ahmadinejad's discourse defies easy classification, but at a minimum we can say that it effected a transformation which had been underway since at least the Rafsanjani era, and took the discourse in some unexpected directions. Set against the background of the changing international system, Ahmadinejad received a pan-Islamist discourse which had been fused in the Khatami period with reformist discourse, yielding the hybrid *tamaddon* discourse. While Ahmadinejad consciously tried to restore the original discourse of the Revolution, he probably could not have been entirely successful under the best of circumstances. In trying to pry apart this fused discourse, he met a great deal of resistance, as discourse, being a much broader social system, is not easily shaped by a single individual, and often exerts strong pressure on individuals, no matter how powerful, to conform to its prevailing tides. This is clear from the disappearance of some early Revolutionary terms, such as *sodūr-e enqelāb*, which were first absent in Khatami's discourse, and remain a lacuna in Ahmadinejad's. They are also unlikely to come back, as it seems to be quite difficult (though not impossible) to restore terms that have fallen out of the discourse entirely. Instead, what Ahmadinejad has accomplished is a repurposing of existing terms and discourse features, shaping them to accord with his own received discourse.

Like Khatami, Ahmadinejad did not come to the stage a *tabula rasa*; and like Khatami, his own domestically-oriented discourse interacted and ultimately merged with the received outward-oriented discourse to yield a hybrid pan-Islamism which

bears little resemblance to the historical categories. Ahmadinejad's defenders among Iranian analysts deserve some credit for understanding the importance of discourse in shaping political campaigns and outcomes, and for getting some of the core elements of Ahmadinejad's discourse right. His discourse of *edālat*, *ma'naviyyat* appears to indeed be at the heart of his entire discursive complex; it also seems to entirely subsume the ecumenical aspect of pan-Islamism, by completing the transformation or de-Shi'ification of the discourse of suffering and righteousness. This is effected, in large part, through his universalization of *mahdaviyyat*, encompassing all Muslims within what had traditionally been a uniquely Shi'i concept. Indeed, he seems at points to expand the ecumenical umbrella beyond just Muslims, including all those who are suffering. In this, ironically, he is reminiscent of some of the earlier pan-Islamists, such as Kidwai[490], who had advocated not just pan-Islamism unifying all Muslims, but a conception so broad as to encompass even groups like the Babis and Baha'is that had been deemed heretics by the majority of Muslim society.

Discursive ironies aside, Ahmadinejad's reliance on *edālat* and *khedmat*, combined with leaning heavily on Khomeini, seems to have injected several new elements into the dominant IRI discourse, and moved it in a new direction. The centrality of the *mellat* in his discourse is key to making sense of most of these changes. While not entirely identical to Khomeini's use of the term, it does allow him to position himself differently vis-à-vis the changed international scene, which shaped so much of Khatami's discourse. While Khatami developed more of a bifurcated structure, leaving the *mellat* out to a much greater extent, Ahmadinejad's interpretation is more of an hourglass, or a sharp arrow pointing upward towards the *ommat*, with Ahmadinejad as leader of the *mardom* within Iran, and Iran as vanguard

[490] See Chapter 1. This would be in keeping with the ironic tradition of the Islamic Republic unintentionally echoing earlier pan-Islamists, such as Khamenei largely restating views initially expounded by Shaykh al-Ra'īs Qajar; see the discussion at the end of Chapter 1.

and *parchamdār* among the various *mellat*s of the Muslim world. It is not a rejection of the postmodern structure of international society, but nor is it a total accommodation. It is rather the hybrid that results from an attempt to pry loose reformist elements from the Iranian discourse and graft in their place resurrected components from the Khomeinist era. It is an imperfect fit, and one that has faced much resistance domestically, but it appears to have reached an uneasy and somewhat tenuous stability. While simultaneously relying heavily on such elements of Khomeinist discourse as *eslām-e nāb-e mohammadī*, it also favors rather different aspects of pan-Islamism than those propounded by Khomeini. For starters, Ahmadinejad's warm reception of the OIC would have been anathema to Khomeini, and this represents an odd holdover of Khatami's legacy in the post-reform period. More importantly, the basically institutional view of pan-Islamism embraced by Ahmadinejad's *mellat*-centric discourse places far less emphasis on its affinial or ecumenical aspects than did Khomeini's. For Ahmadinejad, much of pan-Islamism's affinial aspects are subsumed under his conceptions of *khedmat* at the domestic level, itself largely in service of the broader ends of *mahdaviyyat*, which can be said to operate at the international level. This is related to *edālat*, the other key component of Ahmadinejad's discourse, which together with *mahdaviyyat*, completes the subsumation of ecumenicism within Ahmadinejad's discourse. In a discourse where Ahmadinejad and Iran serve as a singular point of focus, upwards towards the eschatological *ommat* (a concept Khomeini largely embraced) and towards the inevitability of *mahdaviyyat* (a concept towards which Khomeini would have been cooler), there is far less need to concern oneself with the social and cultural variations that form the substance of affinial unity, or the doctrinal and theological fissures which ecumenicism seeks to mend. The institutional focus of Ahmadinejad's

discourse of *mellat*s, each headed by a leader like himself, obviates the need for such hair-splitting.

In the end, then, what are we to make of Ahmadinejad? If Rafsanjani marked the Islamic Republic's first serious encounter with postmodern internationalism (Khomeini glimpsed only its beginning), and Khatami its eager embrace, Ahmadinejad represents a serious attempt to square the roots of IRI discourse with the postmodern challenge, with all the incongruencies and mis-fits that necessarily entails. In terms of pan-Islamism, it represents an even stranger development; a concept which seems to have come full circle in the span of a century and a half. While the tri-partite conception of pan-Islamism was certainly around in the days of the late Ottoman Empire, it is safe to say that the institutional aspect had primacy, by simple virtue of the importance of the institution of the Caliphate, and the person, initially Abdülhamid, in which it was embodied. Ahmadinejad, of course, would never claim the mantle of the Caliph. But, much like Khomeini coyly refusing to answer, or even acknowledge, his followers' questions as to whether or not he was the promised Mahdi, Ahmadinejad, with his humble roots, and wearing his humble jacket to the United Nations, would never explicitly claim any special importance to the Muslim world for his leadership, or that of Iran on the global stage. While he and his allies are doubtless keenly aware of the transnational *umma* which Mandaville and others have identified, Ahmadinejad's basic aim was to translate the kind of ideational leadership perfected by Khomeini to that transnational level. And in a rather lateral (and perhaps appropriately postmodern) fashion, rather than wrestling with the thorny problems posed by affinial and ecumenical unity, which had hounded pan-Islamism since the days of the Ottoman Empire, Ahmadinejad simply swept them up under his institutional umbrella, recognizing the ability of discourse, amplified

through modern technology and media, to allow a leader to reach across the *mellat*, and speak directly to the *mardom*, and attempt to drag the entire unit, *mardom* and *mellat* both, forward through sheer force of will.

Or at least, circa 2006 or so, this appeared to be his clear discursive strategy and his attempted self-presentation throughout the Muslim world, and to a lesser extent throughout the entire developing world. Read in this light, his efforts at outreach to Latin America and Africa represent more than harebrained pet initiatives; they are attempts to harness the nature of transnational politics in service of a much broader, global movement, one in which *mahdaviyyat* means much more than is implied in Shi'i eschatology alone. Of course, these desired effects in the material world never came to pass; international politics and economics proved far too treacherous, Ahmadinejad's hold on power too tenuous, and the very nature of his discourse too fragile and lacerated to withstand the buffeting it would receive during the furor over Iran's nuclear program, itself inseparably grafted to Ahmadinejad's discourse of *edālat*. The events of 2009, with all their blood and turmoil, ensured that Ahmadinejad's dream would never come to pass. One has to wonder in which direction the causality flowed; did Ahmadinejad's weakening grip on political power undermine the strength of his discourse, or did the very chirurgical nature of his attempt at prying away reformism's taint and replacing it with "pure" Revolutionary discourse fatally wound his prospects from the start?

8. Conclusion

At the end of this study, we can finally return to the three central questions laid out in the introduction. First, we have demonstrated the role that pan-Islamist discourse played in the genesis of the Islamic Republic of Iran, shaping how this new polity conceived of itself and its role on the international stage, as well as how it would define its interactions with other states and peoples. By demonstrating how it has drawn on historical elements of pan-Islamist discourse, this analysis de-exoticizes the phenomenon of the Islamic Revolution, and shows how it is linked to broader currents within Islamic politics around the globe. It is not something entirely apart, but is a component of the transnational *umma* described by Peter Mandaville. Viewing Iranian history through this lens helps us recast it as a part of the broader historical processes at work in the global transition between modernity and postmodernity, and shows us how Iran has been an active player in this process, rather than the passive recipient of changes imposed from outside. It also asks us to rethink our understanding of Iranian history itself, and the global communities of which it is, and has been a part.

Second, using the tools of various disciplines, including history, linguistics, politics, and sociology, we have problematized the very concept of pan-Islamism, and shown how these disciplines can engage in a productive dialogue with each other. Analyzing pan-Islamism in terms of its constituent concepts and observing their interactions and shifts over time has helped us avoid the intellectual trap of freezing its development in the late 19th century and seeking to explain why that failed or vanished, rather than seeing how it has adapted to its changed circumstances and been taken up and transformed by local political actors in the many states that have

emerged in the Islamic world since the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and the end of European colonialism. More fundamentally, this approach raises important questions for the study of political Islam more generally. Differing configurations of the basic concepts of pan-Islamism, and their arrangements with other basic concepts of political Islam have been show to explain the distinctions between differing movements, from the Tablighi Jama'at to al-Qa'eda. This study only utilizes a small number of the universe of concepts which are at work out there, and leaves many questions unanswered. A more comprehensive description of these concepts, akin to Freeden's work on the development of various Western political movements, will give us as scholars the tools we need to chart the development of different movements in political Islam over the centuries, and to describe them in their own terms rather than in terms of categories borrowed from a Western political context.[491] Only when we have these tools in front of us will we truly be able to begin the even more complex task of understanding the interactions of Western and Islamic concepts and the hybrid ideologies to which they have given rise. The events of the last few years have shown that we are entering a period of rapid and unpredictable change, in which these interactions are only likely to accelerate. Unless we develop the vocabulary and an understanding of the concepts at play, we risk badly misconceiving the nature of the processes at work in the various countries of the Middle East, and policymakers risk causing terrible harm by refusing to approach these new discourses with a different perspective. We have already seen the difficulties these shortcomings cause

[491] Returning to Freeden's terminology momentarily, we can say that institutional, affinial, and ecumenical unity comprise the core concepts of pan-Islamism, while at least in the Iranian context, the Karbala paradigm of suffering and righteousness constitutes an adjacent concept, one firmly linked to the three core concepts. Peripheral concepts would include those small-scale variations present in each actor's individual discourse.

Recasting this argument in Larsen's terms, the three core concepts become governing statements, while the adjacent concept perhaps operates proximately at the DS1 level, with individual variations operating at the DS2 level. Thus, while the governing statements of the discourse of pan-Islamism are more or less unchanged (though they do shift their internal configuration around from time to time), their subsidiary discursive elements have demonstrated substantial variance over time.

in the context of the Iranian nuclear program; multiplying these failures across the entire region could lead to dire consequences for all involved.

Third, this study has demonstrated how the field of corpus linguistics can interact with historical scholarship, yielding new synergistic approaches to the study of ideas. While the experimental methods demonstrated here can no doubt be improved upon, they can, at a minimum, show the accessibility of these tools to even non-specialist analysts, and can serve as inspiration for future studies which can build upon and improve the analyses undertaken here. The ability to create corpora of individual speakers and to analyze texts in quantities and ways hitherto inconceivable also forces us to rethink our approach to the study of history, and enables historians to introduce an element of greater replicability into their work. One of the key shortcomings of discourse analysis, conceptual history, and other approaches to the study of ideas is the highly idiosyncratic element of interpretation that forms a necessary part of these approaches.[492] While we will never be able to do away entirely with the element of human interpretation these approaches entail (nor should we try to do so), we can use the tools of corpus linguistics to offer more transparent analyses, and to allow others to inspect the same evidence and see what conclusions they would draw. Such data-driven and computational approaches have already revolutionized the social sciences over the last few decades; why should the

[492] Our use of Partington's CADS framework shows some potential ways to minimize this problem, which has hopefully been demonstrated by the multi-stage analysis carried out in each chapter of this study, whereby each actor was described, his discourse and relationship to pan-Islamism examined through traditional historiographical methods, and then interrogated and expanded upon through data-driven corpus analysis.

Reinhart Koselleck's description of the conceptual history method, which so closely parallels both Partington's ideas and our own approach here, bears reiteration:

"*Begriffsgeschichte* is therefore initially a specialized method for source criticism, taking note as it does of the utilization of terminology relevant to social and political elements, and directing itself in particular to the analysis of central expressions having social or political content… The condensation effected by the work of conceptual explanation renders past statements precise, bringing more clearly into view contemporary intentional circumstance or relation in their linguistic make-up."

Koselleck, *Futures Past*, 80-81, see also 84.

humanities be any different? There is little to fear, and much to gain, from the incorporation of such new methods alongside the traditional tools of the historian. Such an approach, drawing on the methods of a variety of disciplines, whether humanistic or social scientific, to illuminate the many different facets of a given historical or social phenomenon, demonstrates the promise of the digital humanities as a nascent school of thinking about the same problems and puzzles which have occupied humanists for centuries. Rather than giving in to the forces of reaction and dismissing these ideas as another intellectual fad, we should recognize that the data-driven approaches which have come to suffuse so much of contemporary life are here to stay, and embrace them for what they may offer us. Hopefully, this study will serve as one brick in the new edifice, and demonstrate the new kinds of knowledge such research can create.

Let us revisit, briefly, the conclusions drawn from each of our five case studies, and what they have revealed about our immediate subject. Khomeini looked around and saw a world full of division among Muslims, in which sectarianism was the key obstacle to defeating oppression. For him, the notion of *ommat* was not the same as it was in classical pan-Islamism, in part because there was no Caliphate, and each *mellat* had fallen under the sway of a local ruler concerned primarily with his own wellbeing, and not that of the Muslim world more generally. The OIC was a symbol of this self-absorption, and not a serious means for advancing unity. What united Muslims was the shared status of *mazlūmiyyat*, oppression at the hands of alien powers. *Taqrīb* would begin, then, paradoxically through the introduction of the Shi'i discursive formation of righteousness and suffering, which rests on the Karbala paradigm. Rather than trying to elide the differences between Shi'a and Sunna, Khomeini broadened Shi'i doctrine to encompass all Muslims suffering oppression

around the world (and perhaps, with his concept of *hezb-e mostaz'afīn*, non-Muslims, as well).

Ecumenical unity would thus form the foundation of his discourse, and was a necessary precursor upon which affinial elements could be built, allowing calls for justice and resistance to take root independently of political or institutional mechanisms through which to channel them. Institutional unity was something of an eschatological afterthought, belonging to the *ommat* towards which all these efforts were aimed, in the end. The failures of existing rulers and institutions such as the OIC meant that the other aspects of Khomeini's pan-Islamism had to find a firmer footing before any institutional unity could be seriously spoken of. Khomeini's conception of pan-Islamism was thus an inversion of the classical model, in which institutional unity came first, via the Caliphate, and affinial and ecumenical unity were to be brought about over time. This may represent Khomeini's adaptation of his ideology to the first intimations of post-modernism on the international stage, as he did not yet reject the notion of the state as the basic unit of operations, but sought to overthrow many of them through the exercise of diffuse, discursive power. When set next to the Manichaeism evident in so many other aspects of his discourse, an inherent tension between his universalism and his Manichaeism becomes clear; this is best understood as emblematic of the tension between modernity and postmodernity which began to suffuse the international system towards the end of the 20th century, and Khomeini's life. Through sheer force of will, Khomeini could overcome any such tensions as *rahbar*, and hold his discourse together as a coherent whole in the face of external adversity. But later political actors in the IRI lacked the deep discursive roots and bases of legitimacy which Khomeini possessed, and could at best

hope to only take hold of a shred of his mantle, leaving other parts to their rivals for power.

This was most evident with Ali Khamenei, who inherited power from Khomeini in tenuous circumstances. His discourse was thus marked from the start by a heavy reliance on Khomeini, out of a need to consolidate power and attempt to institutionalize Khomeini's charismatic leadership. This was accompanied by a broader governmentalization of discourse, as Khamenei was forced to move away from a state of revolution and war towards one of permanence and stability. This held tremendous implications for pan-Islamism, particularly the conception of *ommat*, as it ceased to be primarily an eschatological device and instead represented the concrete polity of the present-day Muslim world, something which existed in the here and now rather than the indeterminate future. As such, this necessarily began to privilege the institutional aspects of pan-Islamism over its other components. Affinial unity shifted from a generalized role to one emphasizing several focal points for the discourse of righteousness and suffering, chief among them Palestine. This was a necessary result of consolidation, as Iran was no longer suffering *mazlūmiyyat* under an Islamic government. The ascendance of institutional unity, combined with the development of several focal points for affinial unity, meant that ecumenical unity was no longer foundational, but was instead subsumed underneath the other aspects. They encompassed more pressing political concerns, and doctrinal differences were to be set aside, emphasizing instead Khomeini's ideas and his unique role as an ecumenical *emām-e ommat*. This was accompanied by the greater salience of such terms as *ettehād*.

In this context where *taqrīb* is understood as something that has effectively been attained, the need to set aside differences becomes even more crucial in the face

of threats from external powers, primarily Israel and the United States. This also explains the decline of *sodūr-e enqelāb*, as the Revolution is now something to be built at home, rather than exported. Khamenei's usage of bodily metaphors becomes quite interesting in this context, as the emphasis is now on healing and preserving the *ommat*, of which Iran is the heart. To use a different metaphor Khamenei himself might favor, if the Khomeini era was the Battle of Karbala, than this is the reign of Ali, the establishment of the perfect Islamic government. (Though of course, Ali's reign predated Karbala.) Protecting the Islamic Republic is protecting Islam for Khamenei, no more, no less.

This represents quite a shift from Khomeini, and something of a reversal away from the recognition of the changed international arena. In this sense, Khamenei's discourse of pan-Islamism represents the classical conception, albeit with some qualifications. Rather than seeing affinial and ecumenical unity as something to be attained, it sees them as subordinate, subsumed under the more pressing need for institutional unity centered on the Islamic Republic. There is less consciousness of the tensions inherent in the discourse of pan-Islamism here, and a lesser engagement with the questions of post-modernity. Some of this may be the result of Khamenei's reactions to Khatami and the reformist discourse, which led in a quite different direction from his own.

While we are somewhat limited as to the conclusions that can be drawn about the Rafsanjani period in this study by virtue of the limited size of the corpus, we can nonetheless describe a few general characteristics of Rafsanjani's discourse. First, there is a pronounced focus, much like with Khamenei, on the external threats faced by Iran, notably from Israel, and an emphasis on the plight of the Palestinians. Unlike Khamenei, there is more of an emphasis on bolstering international connections, and

less political isolationism, meaning that for Rafsanjani, affinial unity takes primacy over institutional unity. That said, it would be a mistake to think that Rafsanjani's discourse diverges from Khamenei's; they overlap significantly, and can be described as dovetailing. Iran is still an exemplar nation, but Rafsanjani is more focused on reconstruction than Islamic exemplarism, and expressly disavows foreign policy activism, emphasizing noninterference. For him, exporting the Revolution is no longer even on the radar. Rafsanjani's is thus an outward-facing discourse, as opposed to Khamenei's inward-looking discourse[493], though there is broad agreement between the two in the period 1989-1997 as to what role Iran should play in the world. Rafsanjani favors reaching out, rather than simply protecting the heart of the *ommat*.

Part of this difference with Khamenei can be explained by Rafsanjani's lesser reliance on Khomeini for legitimation; unlike Khamenei, Rafsanjani did not need to artificially bolster his hierocratic standing, and had just won election to the Presidency. This gave him a freer hand to interpret Khomeini's discourse, and develop his own. This meant, at least in part, an introduction of *mardom* into the discourse in earnest, and a move away from Khomeini's *mellat*/*dowlat* binary distinction. This also coincided with a much greater emphasis on the role of the *ommat* as an existing political entity rather than as an eschatological endpoint, and a move away from the state-centric conception of the world in which both Khomeini and Khamenei operated. In some respects, then, Rafsanjani marks the turning point where the Islamic Republic's discourse began to grapple with the challenges of postmodernity, free from the travails of eight years of war with Iraq, and with its gradual reintroduction to the international community after a decade of isolation.

[493] This difference in orientations would only be exacerbated during the Ahmadinejad era. It is interesting to note here the parallel to the historic debate in the Hamidian period over whether pan-Islamism was a defensive or expansionist doctrine.

This resulted in a move towards affinial unity on Rafsanjani's part, as he focused on the *mardom* at home and the *mardom* abroad, while Khamenei looked inward, emphasizing institutional unity to protect Iran as the heart of the *ommat*. There is insufficient evidence to draw any conclusions about the status of ecumenical unity in the Rafsanjani period; such questions will have to await further study once there is more information available to us.

Mohammad Khatami, Rafsanjani's successor, gave no early indication that he would prove to be such a unique figure in Iranian politics. His early writings during the Iran-Iraq war emphasized shared suffering as a reason to unify Muslims to defend against the outside world, the classical instantiation of the Karbala paradigm. That said, his emphasis on choice and democracy, even in the context of wartime, was a harbinger of what would later become his reformist agenda. Still, these ideas were ancillary to his much stronger emphasis on the importance of strengthening the *ommat* and *tawhīd* as a way of facing *estekbār*, which, in retrospect, may have been the first inklings of his civilizational discourse. Proto-reform and Islamic unity are thus tied together in his early discourses, presaging what was to come in the Dialogue of Civilizations.

As an intellectual and as president, Khatami would continue in the direction Rafsanjani had set off, with a much stronger emphasis on affinial unity at home and abroad, particularly through his ideas of civil society, as well as *tawhīd* and dialogue. Civil society, in particular, marks a concrete instantiation of ecumenicism, as a way for Muslims to sort out their differences peacefully, which operated as a micro-scale version of the dialogue of civilizations. With this ascendance of affinial unity and a reinvigoration of ecumenicism, it is easy to think that institutional unity faded away, but this is not correct. Rather, its focus shifted significantly, away from making Iran

an exemplar state (as in Khamenei's conception) and towards the multi-*mellat* organ of the OIC. Likewise, its aims shifted away from protecting Iran as the heart of the *ommat* towards building Islamic civilization as a whole, which necessarily led to a greater focus on the *mardom* as opposed to the *mellat*. Notably absent in Khatami's discourse of pan-Islamism as President was the use of suffering as a unifying tool; while such Revolutionary standbys as Palestine are of course mentioned, they do not have the same salience as with other actors. Dialogue had taken the place of suffering as the key paradigm of righteousness in Khatami's views, and this also had the side effect of putting different countries on an egalitarian footing, making Khatami's discourse incompatible with Khamenei's "heart of the *ommat*" approach.

What is most remarkable about Khatami's discourse is what it represents in theoretical terms: the weaving of an entirely new strand into the discourse, namely, reformism. This new discourse, in its interactions, fused with the received discourse of pan-Islamism, yielding the new Dialogue of Civilizations, a *sui generis* discourse whose existence would have been entirely unpredictable beforehand. This discourse transformed the confrontationalist/oppositionalist paradigm of classical pan-Islamism into one of dialogue, cooperation, and peace, marking a whole-hearted embrace of the postmodern system and abandonment of state-centricity. In essence, Khatami finished what Rafsanjani had begun, and took the process further than Khomeini could have ever envisioned, though he certainly saw its first glimmerings on the horizon. Khatami's conception of global politics, then, involved a bifurcation of the international arena into a sub-national level, focused on the *mardom*, and a supra-national level, focused on the *ommat*. This left little room for the states or *mellat*s, and created a curious void.

Despite these tremendous changes effected by Khatami, it is important to note that a substrate of discourse remained which even the Reformist wave could not wash away, mostly clustered around concepts such as the importance of Palestine and the discourse of righteousness and suffering. These elements of the IRI's discourse may be too foundational and important for any political figure to alter, at least within a relatively short time-span. That these elements persisted, despite the broad sea-change in Iranian politics in the period 1997-2005, suggests that Foucault's musings on the role of discourse as a control and constraint have some merit.

Finally, Ahmadinejad and some of his supporters demonstrated an awareness of the key role of discourse in politics, both domestic and international. Their emphasis on his use of a discourse of *edālat*, *ma'naviyyat* has some merit to it, and is bolstered in part by the data in the corpus. More important, however, is his explicit desire to restore the original discourse of the Revolution, and to bring back its Khomeinist roots. This places Ahmadinejad in the somewhat tricky position of trying to embrace Khomeini's *mellat*/*dowlat* dichotomy while making it work in a postmodern context. This attempt yielded an imperfect result, at best. Given that Ahmadinejad largely rejected Khatami's approach, as demonstrated through his reassertion of the centrality of the *mellat* over the *mardom*, it makes his conscious attempts to speak directly to the *mardom*s of other Muslim countries and capitalize on the transnational nature of the *ommat* somewhat incongruous with other elements of his worldview. His approach to *mellat* and *mardom* creates a distinction between their characteristics; *mellat*s are the primary actors on the international stage, with the implication of a strong leader at their head, while *mardom*s are more passive, acted upon, and led, though they can render service to the *mellat*, which is the key contribution of Ahmadinejad and his own supporters.

At the domestic level, the centrality of *edālat* and *khedmat* is key to understanding Ahmadinejad's discourse; these are his aims in restoring the original discourse of the Revolution. Translated to the international stage, such key terms as *parcham* and *parchamdār* come into play. As Ahmadinejad is the leader of the *mardom* of Iran, so Iran is the leader of the other *mellat*s constituting the *ommat*. It is the *parchamdār-e edālat*, and its role as standard-bearer means that it is more than just one coequal state among others, unlike in Khatami's Dialogue of Civilizations. This role as standard-bearer is to be effectuated through the reinvigoration of *eslām-e nāb-e mohammadī*, which will serve to make Iran an exemplar state for other *mellat*s to follow. What *edālat* means here is somewhat different from what it has meant for other actors, however; it is not a concrete goal or something that can be attained through a political program, as was the case in the Reformist period. Rather, it is a teleological end-state, an eschatological value much like the *ommat* in Khomeini's conception. The central, overriding importance of *edālat* in Ahmadinejad's discourse explains the salience and intractability of the nuclear issue. *Haste'ī* is closely associated with the nexus of *edālat* and *mellat* at the heart of Ahmadinejad's discourse, meaning that it is not easily separable as a discrete issue that can be dealt with independently of broader concerns. This goes some way towards explaining the failure of negotiations thus far.

Despite the marked differences between Ahmadinejad's and Khatami's discourses, we nonetheless see a continuation from the Khatami period of a decline in many of the terms traditionally associated with pan-Islamism in the Khomeini era, such as *mostaz'af* and its ilk, as well as the total absence of *sodūr-e enqelāb*. This represents the stickiness of discursive change when it does occur; while it is not easy to effect, when it does happen, it cannot be easily reversed on a whim, so many of the

changes initiated in the Khatami period appear to have continued on into the Ahmadinejad period, though he has introduced numerous changes of his own. Most notable is the general filling of the discursive void left by Khatami's conception of the international system; the role of the *mellat*s was largely undefined in his bifurcated system, and Ahmadinejad has filled that void. At the head of each given *mellat* is a leader, like Ahmadinejad, and among these *mellat*s, Iran has a leadership role, pointing upwards towards the *ommat*.

What this means in terms of pan-Islamism is that Ahmadinejad's discourse is almost entirely one of institutional unity. His *mellat*-centric approach is one which harks back to the Khomeini era, with states as the primary actors, though this is cast against the background of the postmodern international system, which is far more fully developed than it was in 1979. With this heavy emphasis of leadership within the individual *mellat* as a means for attaining unity and justice, and the leadership of Iran among *mellat*s within the *ommat*, there is little room left for pan-Islamism's other aspects. When taken together with Ahmadinejad's universalization of *mahdaviyyat*, which subsumes pan-Islamism's affinial and ecumenical aspects under its broad umbrella, Ahmadinejad's discourse of *mellat* and *edālat* can be seen as one comprised almost entirely of institutional unity, leaving affinial unity and ecumenicism behind in its wake.

The incongruities and tensions in Ahmadinejad's discourse can likewise be seen as the result of attempting to make a Khomeinist conception of the international system fit into a drastically different context. This is further complicated by the fusion of discourses which occurred in the Khatami era, meaning that, in effect, Ahmadinejad tried to pry apart the discourses of reform and pan-Islamism, and to

graft onto it his own. This attempt was highly imperfect at best, and resulted in a highly fragile discursive structure.

Each of these five case studies depicts a very different perception of Iran's role in the world. For Khomeini, Iran as best described as an ideal martyr state, a *mellat-e kāmel*, if you will, in which Iran's suffering is proof of its righteousness, and serves to redeem it. Other peoples are to follow its example, and the same process of Revolution and redemption. Khamenei sees Iran as a beacon for the rest of the Muslim world, a source of emulation, and a model to be protected and preserved above all else. For Rafsanjani, Iran is a state reborn and rebuilt, a phoenix out of the ashes. It is a new kind of state, reaching out to its neighbors and the world in a strange, new, nascent international order. Khatami, following the direction set by Rafsanjani, views Iran as an emissary state, the representative of Islamic civilization in a productive dialogue with other civilizations. By contrast, Ahmadinejad views Iran as the vanguard of a global movement, a unique state which can lead by example and persuade the other Islamic and dispossessed states to support it in the remaking of a fundamentally unjust international order.

Each of these self-representations and self-conceptions demonstrates the unique interaction of these leaders with the discourse of pan-Islamism, and the extent to which they have managed to adapt it and harmonize it with their own unique political discourses, and the changing circumstances of the world around them. While Ahmadinejad's global vision has perhaps garnered the most attention, due to its stark contrast with the Reformist period that immediately preceded it, and the heightened international awareness and concern over Iran's nuclear program, it is hardly the only such discourse that an Iranian leader has promulgated. Indeed, if history is to be any guide, while we cannot say with any certainty what will follow Ahmadinejad, we can

safely say that it will likely be different, perhaps drastically different. Ahmadinejad's imperfect attempt at grafting his revivalist Khomeinist discourse onto the civilizational discourse he received from Khatami will probably not outlive the end of his administration in 2013. That wound will take some time to heal, and his successor may well chart an entirely new direction. The diminishment of Ahmadinejad's prestige in the Muslim world since its high point in 2006, the domestic turmoil that has rattled Iran since 2009, the series of popular uprisings which have remade the face of the Middle East since early 2011, the concomitant rise of Turkey as a leading regional power and the decline of competing powers such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia will all impact the direction Iran's political discourse will take in the next few years. Quite possibly it will lead further down one of the paths outlined above, such as the civilizationalist path of Khatami, or perhaps the vanguard trail blazed by Ahmadinejad. Or perhaps something entirely unpredictable will transpire, like the discursive fusion which gave rise to the Dialogue of Civilizations. Regardless of which of these paths Iran eventually takes, pan-Islamism will be a part of it, in some form. And as it has done since the late Ottoman Empire, this discourse will interact with, change and be changed by the discursive currents flowing around it, a living, breathing, and vital presence at the confluence of Islam and politics on the ever-shifting international stage.

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



Figure 3-1 *First 50 words of the Khomeini Wordlist (Part 1)*



N	Word	Freq.	%	Texts	%
26	اگر	8,892	0.41	143	99.31
27	چه	8,681	0.40	144	100.00
28	نمی	8,664	0.40	144	100.00
29	باشد	8,466	0.39	144	100.00
30	بود	8,251	0.38	144	100.00
31	کند	8,216	0.38	144	100.00
32	هر	8,071	0.37	144	100.00
33	اینکه	7,791	0.36	142	98.61
34	الله	7,691	0.36	144	100.00
35	بر	7,134	0.33	144	100.00
36	مردم	6,855	0.32	144	100.00
37	هستند	6,653	0.31	144	100.00
38	تا	6,618	0.31	144	100.00
39	گردند	6,251	0.29	143	99.31
40	ایران	6,190	0.29	144	100.00
41	شود	5,946	0.28	143	99.31
42	کنید	5,913	0.27	143	99.31
43	اند	5,862	0.27	144	100.00
44	خود	5,737	0.27	144	100.00
45	بشود	5,731	0.27	141	97.92
46	او	5,463	0.25	144	100.00
47	دست	5,421	0.25	144	100.00
48	طور	5,174	0.24	144	100.00
49	یا	5,118	0.24	143	99.31
50	شده	4,971	0.23	143	99.31

Figure 3-1 *First 50 Words of the Khomeini Wordlist (Part 2)*

Figure 3-2 *Collocation Pattern for* eslām




Figure 3-3 *Concordance Lines for* eslām-e nāb-e mohammadī




Figure 3-4 *Collocation Pattern for* eslāmī





Figure 3-5 *Collocation Pattern for* Allāh







Figure 3-6 *Sample Concordance Lines for* habl Allāh

Figure 3-7 *Collocation Pattern for* khodā



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	که	برای	خدا	و	و	و	و	و
2	که	که	که	به	به		را	می	که	که	که
3	خدا	است	می	و	که		می	است	است	به	را
4	این	این	است	در	از		به	که	به	خدا	خدا
5	می	خدا	این	است	رسول		باشد	به	را	این	این
6	است	می	را	را	راه		بود	این	این	برای	است
7	را	را	به	از	و		در	شما	می	می	به
8	برای	به	خدا	توجه	پیش		این	ما	خدا	را	می
9	به	در	ما	ما	بندگان		با	در	برای	در	از
10	در	از	در	این	اولیای		کار	را	از	است	برای
11	از	برای	با	برای	خانه		قیام	کند	ما	از	در
12	همه	ما	از	با	را		که	برای	در	ما	ما
13	ما	همه	همه	شما	با		هم	داد	شما	شما	شما
14	یک	یک	برای	اتکال	محضر		همه	کرده	همه	همه	همه
15	شما	هم	شما	ایمان	عنایت		از	کنید	کند	با	هم
16	با	آن	آن	می	رضای		برای	از	یک	اسلام	کند
17	آن	شما	هم	هم	امر		هستند	کار	او	کنید	الله
18	هم	کنید	اینکه	همه	احکام		هستیم	الله	آن	کنند	با
19	اسلام	کند	باشد	اگر	حکم		خواست	همه	علیه	یک	آنه
20	اگر	باشد	خدمت	کنید	دین		صلی	رسول	اسلام	باید	آن
21	کنید	با	کسی	بود	دست		بوده	شماست	الله	هم	اسلام
22	باید	اسلام	کنید	اینکه	رحمت		باید	آن	آن	اگر	باید
23	باشد	خداست	اگر	خدا	خلق		هست	اسلام	با	من	یک
24	کنند	باید	بود	اینها	دشمنان		دارد	خدا	داده	کرده	اگر
25	الله	کنند	یک	قیام	نصرت		هستید	کرد	شود	کند	او

Figure 3-8 *Collocation Pattern for* Irān




Figure 3-9 *Collocation Pattern for* mellat





Figure 3-10 *Collocation Pattern for* keshvar



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	در	این	کشور	ما	و	و	و	و
2	که	که	که	و	و		و	را	به	که	که
3	این	به	در	که	یک		را	به	می	آن	به
4	به	می	به	به	از		اسلامی	می	که	می	در
5	در	در	است	اسلام	به		به	در	از	به	این
6	از	است	را	رئیس	در		خودشان	از	تبریک	این	است
7	می	این	اسلام	برای	برای		است	است	است	است	از
8	است	را	از	از	سرتاسر		شما	که	این	از	می
9	را	اسلام	می	را	که		خودتان	پیام	در	در	را
10	همه	از	این	است	جمهور		در	این	را	را	جناب
11	کشور	برای	برای	همه	سراسر		ایران	ملت	کنند	شما	کشور
12	برای	کشور	کشور	می	همه		خود	یک	کشور	کشور	با
13	دست	همه	ما	بر	مصالح		عزیز	تلگراف	ملت	ملت	ما
14	یک	ملت	القیوم	دفاع	استقلال		هستند	با	همه	اسلام	آن
15	اسلام	یک	ملت	ملت	امور		از	ما	کشور	ملت	همه
16	ما	عبد	رئیس	خارج	سطح		خودمان	همه	آن	همه	اسلام
17	با	با	همه	کنند	آن		خودش	خود	با	برای	یک
18	آقای	شما	با	با	تمام		مالدیو	باشد	شود	با	حضرت
19	مأمون	ما	بر	دیوان	خارج		می	اسلام	اسلام	کنند	شما
20	آن	هم	اسلامی	ما	عالی		با	ایران	برای	کند	ملت
21	شما	آن	کنند	اسلامی	بر		یک	دست	ما	اسلامی	باشد
22	هم	خدمت	یک	کشور	جمهوری		خدمت	برای	شما	باید	برای
23	ملت	اسلامی	خدمت	تا	کل		باید	اسلامی	دست	یک	کنند
24	اسلامی	دست	شما	الله	داخل		هست	خدمت	کند	دست	آنها
25	تمام	کنند	هم	خدمت	وزیر		که	هم	اسلامی	کنید	هم

Figure 3-11 *Collocation Pattern for* mamlekat




Figure 3-12 *Collocation Pattern for* dowlat




Figure 3-13 *Collocation Pattern for* enqelāb




Figure 3-14 *Collocation Pattern for* nahzat




Figure 3-15 *Collocation Pattern for* ommat






Figure 3-16 *Statistical Collocates for* ommat

Figure 3-17 *Collocation Pattern for* moslemīn







Figure 3-18 *Statistical Collocates for* moslemīn

Figure 3-19 *Collocation Pattern for* vahdat






Figure 3-20 *Statistical Collocates for* vahdat

Figure 3-21 *Collocation Pattern for* vahdat-e kalame





Figure 3-22 *Collocation Pattern for* kalame



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	را	جهت	و	و	وحدت	کلمه	ای	اسلام	و	این	جانب
2	و	و	صرف	با	یك		و	که	به	و	و
3	که	که	که	این	اعلای		ضربه	را	نزد	که	که
4	جانب	می	را	در	این		را	و	این	می	این
5	این	به	به	که	چند		راجع	با	از	اوصیه	به
6	به	این	با	به	اتحاد		این	به	را	به	ائمه
7	می	است	می	جهت	تا		اسلام	می	در	کلمه	می
8	از	کلمه	این	اگر	و		هم	حفظ	که	اسلام	از
9	با	از	در	من	دو		می	در	می	از	ما
10	هم	را	است	است	توحید		است	است	یك	ما	در
11	است	در	ما	ما	با		با	اتکال	کنم	ز	را
12	ما	ما	اگر	حفظ	سه		به	از	کنید	همه	با
13	در	حفظ	اسلام	یك	اختلاف		ملت	این	آن	خدای	یك
14	آن	رمز	نمی	همین	هر		عرض	راجع	همه	هم	است
15	یك	سیمین	کنید	آن	اتفاق		شما	وحدت	بین	شما	همه
16	شما	اگر	پیروزی	هم	همین		بر	ما	حفظ	است	ملت
17	من	همه	از	نه	هیچ		از	همه	ما	یك	اینکه
18	اسلام	وحدت	شما	از			در	شما	است	آن	آن
19	رمز	شما	بود	شما			صحبت	نمی	با	در	شما
20	وحدت	هم	خدا	برای			همه	بگوید	برای	آنها	اسلام
21	همه	قدرت	یك	گردند			اثر	عرض	اسلام	کنید	تبارك
22	اسلامی	تعالی	هم	کنید			پیدا	گفته	کلمه	ملت	خدای
23	ملت	شود	کلمه	باید			بود	بشود	دست	کنم	بود
24	اگر	اسلامی	تا	دو			بگوید	ملت	وحدت	با	من
25	کلمه	بود	ایمان	تعالی			که	من	ملت	خدا	کنم

Figure 3-23 *Collocation Pattern for* ettehād



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	در	و	اتحاد	و	و	و	و	و
2	را	که	این	و	به		کلمه	همبستگی	دعوت	را	در
3	که	ما	را	را	با		جماهیر	یگانگی	در	نموده	از
4	به	در	با	با	سایه		پیدا	اتفاق	که	از	اسلام
5	نتوانید	را	که	دعوت	هم		را	شوروی	را	در	دشمنان
6	دارند	برزنف	صدر	اسلامی	این		بین	در	از	با	به
7	هم	به	است	که	که		در	انسجام	است	به	که
8	در	همه	می	به	از		به	به	به	این	شما
9	خدای	است	به	هیأت	رئیسه		ملت	با	آنان	که	آن
10		تعالی	در	بر	دست			وحدت	پیام	دشمنان	با
11		اسلام		است					با		را
12									کامل		

Figure 3-24 *Collocation Pattern for* okhovvat





Figure 3-25 *Statistical Collocates for* sodūr




Figure 3-26 *Statistical Collocates for* olgū

Figure 3-27 *Collocation Pattern for* nemūne






Figure 3-28 *Statistical Collocates for* tawhīd

Figure 3-29 *Collocation Pattern for* parcham




Figure 3-30 *Collocation Pattern for* mostaz'afān



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	و	و	مستضعفان	جهان	را	و	و	و
2	به	همه	که	مسلمانان	همه		و	و	به	به	ایران
3	همه	بر	مسلمین	محرومان	به		را	محرومان	از	مستکبران	که
4	را	از	همه	به	حکومت		است	است	در	در	از
5	از	اسلامی	مسلمانان	جهان	از		از	بر	می	این	خود
6	بر	می	به	که	بنیاد		که	که	جهان	است	است
7	که	که	ملتهای	مسلمین	جهان			در	با	از	می
8		است	دشمنان	برای				مظلومان	است	را	اسلامی
9		به	را	است				به	ملت	که	این
10		ملت	نجات	بلکه					بر		
11		برای		مظلومان					مستکبران		
12				در							
13				اسلامی							
14				اسلام							

Figure 3-31 *Collocation Pattern for* mostaz'afīn



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	و	و	مستضعفین	جهان	و	و	و	و
2	به	است	که	که	همه		و	از	مستکبرین	که	که
3	همه	همه	است	به	این		را	را	از	می	از
4	که	از	را	از	به		است	مستکبرین	کنند	مستکبرین	است
5	را	در	به	است	برای		در	در	در	در	مستکبرین
6	است	را	اسلامی	برای	که		بر	که	به	از	به
7	می	که	همه	در	بنیاد		که	می	که	این	این
8	از	به	از	بر	حزب		به	به	می	را	همه
9	در	اسلامی	برای	مسلمین	تمام		هستند	است	را	به	مستضعفین
10	اسلام	مسلمین	ما	محرومین	حال		دنیا	این	است	است	کنم
11	مستضعفین	این	مسلمین	همه	از		می	محرومین	این	با	می
12	برای	می	در	خدمت	با		این	تبریک	آن	آنها	اینها
13	این	آن	می	می	حکومت			چه	همه	کنند	باید
14	بر	اسلام	جهان	را	نفع			من	بر		کنند
15		مستکبرین	اسلام	اسلام	پیروزی			با	عرض		را
16		کند	این	با	بر			بر	هم		
17		کشورهای	بشود	کنند	خصوصا			کند	دنیا		
18		برای	تعالی	تعالی	جهان				جهان		
19		ما		باید	نجات				کند		
20					طرفدار				با		
21									شما		

Figure 3-32 *Collocation Pattern for* mostaz'af



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	ملل	محروم	و	مستضعف	جهان	را	و	و	و
2	برای	همه	و	همه	ملتهای		و	و	از	مستکبران	از
3	است	ملت	به	و	ملل		را	به	بر	که	که
4	که	به	پیروزی	این	طبقه		در	که	به	در	استعمارگران
5	نجات	را	که	توده	مردم		باشد	باشد	در	را	را
6	به	تعالی	از	سایر	ملت			می	می	با	مستکبران
7	همه	سایر	برای	از	های			در	جهان	سلطه	
8	از	که	مردم	پیروزی	کشورهای			بر	که	می	
9	را			همین	قشر						
10	می			به							
11				که							




Figure 3-33 *Statistical Collocates for* zolm





Figure 3-34 *Statistical Collocates for* zālem

Figure 3-35 *Collocation Pattern for* mazlūm



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	و	ملت	مظلوم	و	و	و	و	و
2	که	که	به	این	ملتهای		را	در	این	می	که
3	در	به	در	از	و		ما	را	می	است	است
4	است	مظلوم	ما	یک	مردم		در	به	ظالم	آن	می
5	از	این	این	به	که		است	که	که	مظلوم	از
6	می	است	که	که	کشور		جهان	می	از	این	را
7	به	می	اسلام	همه	هم		ایران	از	در	را	این
8	ملت	ما	می	در	کشورهای		عراق	با	به	در	مظلوم
9	مظلوم	را	از	بر	های		بود	است	زیر	از	در
10	را	از	با	ملت	مسلمانان		تحت	همه	با	کشت	به
11	هم	در	ایران	با	نه		از	طول	ایران	که	
12	چه	ظالم	ملت	سایر			که	بستم	هم	هم	
13	اسلامی	جمهوری	دفاع	برای			بوده		ملت		
14	ما		اسلامی				واقع		تاریخ		
15	نه		برای				هستیم		تا		
16			است				بودند		مظلوم		
17			مظلوم				با				
18							آن				
19							چه				
20							اسلامی				
21							می				
22							هم				

Figure 3-36 *Collocation Pattern for* edālat



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	که	و	که	که	و	عدالت	اجتماعی	و	و	و	که
2	به	که	و	است	به		را	در	آن	عدالت	و
3	در	است	می	را	که		اسلامی	است	که	به	در
4	این	عدالت	عدالت	برای	از		و	را	در	است	است
5	و	این	در	و	با		الهی	می	عدالت	این	عدالت
6	را	به	را	به	اجرای		باشد	به	می	در	به
7	عدالت	می	ما	عدالت	برای		در	عدالت	است	را	این
8	می	یک	این	می	روی		است	کند	تمام	ما	می
9	است	هم	است	با	بسط		ایجاد	بشود	همه	که	را
10	حکومت	ایجاد	اسلام	این	اینکه		با	پیدا	ما	اگر	از
11	ما	را	مردم	در	طور		به	آن	این	با	آن
12	اگه	آن	نیست	اسلامی	آن		می	برای	حضرت	ایجاد	برای
13	شود	عدل	به	از	ایجاد			که	اجتماعی	اجرا	همه
14	آن	با	از	همه	این			باشد	از	می	هم
15			با	شد	خلاف				شد	ضروری	خواهیم
16			حکومت	حق					با	عالم	کنند
17			اسلامی	هم						امیر	ما
18			کرد								



Figure 3-37 *Statistical Collocates for* hambastegī




Figure 3-38 *Statistical Collocates for* moqābel





Figure 3-39 *Statistical Collocates for* felestīn

Figure 3-40 *Collocation Pattern for* emām



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	از	سهم	مبارك	امام	علیه	السلام	الله	علیه	مخارج
2	مجازند	تمك	صرف	به	و		زمان	سلام	را	در	در
3	صرف	در	و	و	كه		جمعه	است	و	مجازند	و
4	اخذ	به	را	از	به		حسین	هم	در	نصف	مصارف
5	مبارکین	مجازند	مورد	در	حضرت		جماعت	و	نیز	و	آن
6	كه	جنابعالی	كه	كه	سهم		عصر	ارواحنا	ص	به	ترویج
7	شما	از	شما	است	سمت		حسن	را	فداه	از	از
8	نیز	نصف	به	این	صحیفه		ج	در	این	صرف	را
9	ما	است	اخذ	شما	تشکر		را	كه	كه	است	است
10	به	شما	اسلام	برای	ظهور		صادق	محترم	به	كه	خودشان
11	را	ما	این	می	از		به	عجل	آن	مخارج	این
12	اسلام	می	است	الله	این		و	به	السلام	این	كه
13	امام	كه	تمك	با	نه		علی	می	می	را	می
14	در	حضرت	می	آن	كشور		امت	امام	امام	می	به
15	با	را	ما	آقای	است		خمینی	علیه	از	آن	امام
16	است	هم	بود	را	خدمت		امت	این	من	تعالی	هستند
17	می	تجمیلی	همه	امام	سربازان		می	20	است	با	محل
18	وسیله	این	پیغمبر		نماینده		سجاد	ما	اگر	مصارف	موارد
19	این	یك	امام		یك		جمارانی		خودش	همه	با
20	صلح	حکومت	در		آقای					السلام	سهم
21	كند	خدا	نصف		دفتر					نیز	فرجه
22	آن	زاد	نه		را						یك
23	تعالی	اسلام	هم		اینکه						همه
24	شرعیه				با						باشید
25											هم




Figure 4-1 *First 50 Words of the Khamenei Wordlist (Part 1)*




Figure 4-1 *First 50 Words of the Khamenei Wordlist (Part 2)*

Figure 4-2 *Collocation Pattern for* eslām





Figure 4-3 *Collocation Pattern for* eslāmī



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	و	جمهوری	اسلامی	و	و	و	و	و
2	در	در	در	نظام	جمهوري	اسلامي	را	به	این	به	این
3	به	که	که	در	نظام		است	در	است	در	در
4	این	است	به	به	انقلاب		در	این	در	این	به
5	است	به	از	از	امت		به	است	به	است	است
6	که	این	است	که	ایران		ایران	از	را	را	از
7	را	از	اسلام	با	کشورهای		از	که	که	که	که
8	از	را	اسلامی	ی	ی		که	می	از	از	را
9	ی	اسلامی	را	مجلس	و		این	را	اسلامی	اسلامی	ی
10	اسلام	ی	این	جامعه	امّت		با	با	ی	ی	با
11	اسلامی	اسلام	ی	ارتش	شورای		هم	می	می	با	اسلامی
12	آن	ما	سپاه	پاسداران	حکومت		باید	آن	آن	آن	آن
13	با	با	همه	علیه	ي		می	ملت	اسلامي	ما	اسلام
14	ما	انقلاب	که	است	بزرگ		ما	ایران	با	اسلامي	هم
15	می	می	اسلامي	این	معارف		بود	نظام	ما	اسلام	می
16	مي	مي	با	که	شوراي		بر	همه	ملت	می	مي
17	ملت	اسلامي	نظام	یك	کشور		که	شد	ایران	که	که
18	هم	ایران	ما	دولت	ارزشهای		برای	ی	همه	همه	ما
19	که	که	امروز	برای	کشورهاي		آن	وجود	مي	ایران	مردم
20	امروز	آن	بر	تشکیل	جامعه		یك	کنند	کند	مي	ملت
21	ایران	امروز	انقلاب	امروز	ملتهای		باشد	ما	اسلام	هم	خود
22	برای	ملت	آن	بر	دولت		چه	مردم	خود	باید	یك
23	انقلاب	نظام	می	پیروزی	بیداری		-	هم	که	یك	باید
24	مردم	هم	ایران	ي	ایمان		قرار	که	کنند	ملت	اسلامي
25	اسلامي	مردم	هم	اگر	نهضت		خود	یك	شود	خود	همه

Figure 4-4 *Collocation Pattern for* Allāh




Figure 4-5 *Collocation Pattern for* khodā




Figure 4-6 *Collocation Pattern for* mellat




Figure 4-7 *Collocation Pattern for* keshvar






Figure 4-8 *Collocation Pattern for* keshvar-hā-ye



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	ق	در	و	در	کشورهای	اسلامی	و	و	و	و
2	که	در	و	در	از	کشورهاي	دیگر	به	در	در	که
3	در	که	که	که	و		اسلامي	در	به	از	از
4	است	به	از	بعضی	به		مسلمان	که	که	که	در
5	از	از	این	همه	ی		عربی	را	می	می	به
6	را	می	را	را	با		اروپایی	است	از	را	این
7	ی	امروز	است	بسیاری	بعضی		مختلف	از	این	این	ی
8	می	این	کشور	از	بر		غربی	ی	است	به	کشورهای
9	به	را	ی	است	برای		دنیا	هم	را	با	را
10	این	اسلامی	به	اسلامی	دیگر		منطقه	این	ی	است	است
11	کشورهای	است	هر	به	این		جهان	منطقه	هم	هم	می
12	هم	امریکا	ما	ما	که		گوناگون	می	کشورهای	ی	با
13	ایران	کشور	کشورهای	امروز	سران		پیشرفته	اسلامی	با	کشورهای	آن
14	امروز	ما	امروز	خیلی	همین		اروپایی	با	-	کنند	اسلامی
15	بر	ی	آن	مسلمان	میان		همسایه	دنیا	عرض	کند	آنها
16	آن	کشورهای	هم	کشوری	مردم		این	-	ما	آن	ما
17	کشور	برای	اسلامی	ملتها	مسؤولان		سرمایه	سوم	کنند	اسلامی	مسلمان
18	با	کنند	بر	ی	سفرای		ضعیف	تبریك	کردند	همه	کنم
19	شود	اسلام	امریکا	برخی	امروز		اروپائی	چه	آن	دست	کند
20	ما	هم	برای	بسیاري	ي		عربي	ما	دنیا	یك	چه
21	برای	کند	با	هم	جوانان		عقب	چه	داری	منطقه	مردم
22	همه	فلسطین	خود	امریکا	برخی		خودشان	برای	کنید	ما	برای
23	مثل	شما	مردم	نیست	رؤسای		عرب	آفریقا	آورده	امریکا	هم
24	یعنی	همه	مثل	بعضي	مثل		مرتجع	امروز	شود	اند	عالم
25	اسلام	عراق	همه	یکی	اختیار		غیر	باید	یك	اما	-

Figure 4-9 *Collocation Pattern for* mardom



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	و	به	مردم	را	و	و	و	و
2	در	این	در	در	و		و	به	این	به	در
3	این	به	را	به	این		در	در	به	این	این
4	به	مردم	این	است	از		به	این	را	مردم	را
5	را	در	مردم	از	که		است	را	مردم	در	به
6	مردم	را	به	را	آحاد		ما	از	در	را	مردم
7	که	است	که	که	با		از	است	که	که	از
8	است	که	است	همه	شما		عزیز	می	از	است	که
9	از	از	از	این	ی		هم	می	است	که	است
10	با	می	می	با	برای		این	با	می	می	می
11	هم	با	می	مردم	میان		با	که	می	با	با
12	آن	می	که	می	برای		دنیا	مردم	با	می	می
13	می	هم	هم	که	است		مؤمن	آن	کنند	ی	که
14	ی	که	با	می	که		ایران	هم	آن	هم	ی
15	می	ی	آن	هم	حضور		عراق	مسؤولان	ی	آن	هم
16	که	آن	ی	ی	چشم		فلسطین	ما	هم	آنها	آن
17	ما	خود	ما	بر	ی		آن	کنند	کند	ما	آنها
18	باید	ما	همه	بود	زندگی		باید	ی	که	کنند	ما
19	همه	بر	بود	ما	بر		سالاری	همه	آنها	که	کنند
20	آنها	بود	برای	توده	بین		سالاری	شود	ما	همه	شما
21	بر	همه	خود	کنند	در		می	صحنه	همه	باید	همه
22	کنند	کشور	کنند	خدمت	ایمان		مسلمان	کشور	باید	کند	کنند
23	بود	امروز	کشور	شد	آراء		می	که	شد	شما	اند
24	کشور	مسؤولان	باید	باید	ما		بود	دارد	کشور	یک	باید
25	ملت	انقلاب	کنند	برای	دل		قرار	نسبت	اند	خود	خود

Figure 4-10 *Collocation Pattern for* dowlat






Figure 4-11 *Collocation Pattern for* harakat



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	و	این	حرکت	و	و	و	و	و
2	که	در	در	این	و		عظیم	در	به	در	این
3	به	که	به	در	یک		می	کند	در	که	در
4	این	این	این	که	به		به	است	این	به	به
5	در	به	که	است	آن		کند	به	که	این	که
6	است	است	است	با	که		را	این	است	را	است
7	را	را	از	از	در		کنیم	را	را	است	را
8	ی	ما	با	به	با		می	سمت	می	حرکت	می
9	می	از	می	راه	از		کنند	کنند	از	از	از
10	ما	می	ی	آن	جهت		در	که	ایران	ی	ی
11	از	حرکت	را	را	راه		کرد	ملت	با	می	آن
12	آن	با	ما	سمت	باید		کرده	کنیم	ما	با	با
13	با	آن	آن	می	ی		اسلامی	از	حرکت	ما	حرکت
14	یک	هم	حرکت	ی	هر		کنید	اسلامی	آن	هم	یک
15	اسلامی	ملت	باید	ما	برای		عمومی	تلاش	یک	باید	هم
16	حرکت	باید	سمت	اسلامی	است		ملت	با	ی	یک	ما
17	باید	ی	راه	باید	اسلام		کردن	کرد	باید	اسلامی	همه
18	کند	سمت	یک	همین	هم		عظیمی	یک	راه	اسلام	اسلام
19	شما	اسلامی	جهت	خود	آنها		علمی	ما	پیش	راه	ملت
20	هم	یک	خود	دنبال	دارد		خود	آن	اسلامی	سمت	سمت
21	ملت	اسلام	ملت	یک	انقلاب		ما	مردم	بود	ملت	اسلامی
22	همه	بر	اسلام	بود	خدا		است	ایران	کشور	مردم	برای
23	امروز	کار	برای	حرکت	مقابل		کردند	کشور	ملت	کند	راه
24	مردم	ایران	هم	انقلاب	خود		مردم	بود	سمت	کار	کار
25	هر	آنها	انقلاب	امروز	او		انقلابی	ی	مردم	انقلاب	خواهد

Figure 4-12 *Collocation Pattern for* mosalmān



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	و	ملتهای	مسلمان	و	و	و	و	و
2	در	در	همه	به	ملتهاي		در	در	به	در	در
3	به	است	در	ی	ملت		را	به	این	به	به
4	است	که	است	که	مردم		است	این	در	از	را
5	که	از	به	از	برادران		از	همه	که	این	از
6	این	به	که	یك	و		به	از	از	را	این
7	را	این	اسلامی	ملت	کشورهای		با	است	ی	ی	که
8	ی	را	از	در	دولتهای		ایران	که	است	که	است
9	از	مسلمان	را	میان	زن		باید	با	می	اسلام	اسلامی
10	می	ملت	این	با	های		ما	را	اسلامی	مسلمان	با
11	اسلامی	اسلامی	برادران	این	خواهران		که	می	همه	است	ی
12	ملت	اسلام	ملتها	است	جوانان		هم	سراسر	را	اسلامی	آن
13	آن	ی	امروز	همه	که		این	هم	با	آن	می
14	هم	می	مسلمان	ي	ملل		بودن	کشورهای	مسلمان	با	ملت
15	اسلام	اسلامي	می	برای	غیر		می	مسلمان	هم	می	اسلام
16	با	ما	اسلام	دل	های		ها	آن	خود	عالم	مسلمان
17	همه	یك	ی	امروز	جوامع		دیگر	غیرمسلمان	جهان	ما	بر
18	مسلمان	ایران	ملت	که	امت		باشد	مؤمن	ما	خود	هم
19	ما	امروز	بر	توده	جوان		بخصوص	ی	فلسطین	جهان	مي
20	ملتهای	شما	اسلامي	آن	یك		آن	اسلام	دنیا	دنیا	همه
21	ایران	کنند	یك	اگر	ی		امروز	هر	جای	مي	که
22	خواهد	مردم	دولتها	یک	آحاد		برای	کنند	آن	بزرگ	اسلامي
23	برای	مي	مردم	مسلمان	میلیارد		خود	شده	اسلام	هم	کنند
24	که	انقلاب	که	ما	ملتهای		نشین	یك	عالم	کنند	جهان
25	مي	با	ایران	مؤمن	زنان		نیز	مي	کنند	اسلامي	باید

Figure 4-13 *Collocation Pattern for* emām




Figure 4-14 *Collocation Pattern for* nezām




Figure 4-15 *Collocation Pattern for* Felestīn





Figure 4-16 *Collocation Pattern for* ommat






Figure 4-17 *Statistical Collocates for* ommat

Figure 4-18 *Collocation Pattern for* moslemīn




Figure 4-19 *Collocation Pattern for* vahdat




Figure 4-20 *Collocation Pattern for* ettehād



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	و	و	اتحاد	و	و	و	و	و
2	به	به	این	وحدت	این	اتحاد	کلمه	است	است	اسلامی	است
3	است	این	را	که	با		ملی	را	به	این	به
4	از	ی	است	است	ی		جماهیر	وحدت	در	به	این
5	در	را	با	به	به		را	اتفاق	را	در	در
6	این	هم	وحدت	این	است		بین	شوروی	با	را	هم
7	که	است	در	در	از		مسلمین	به	خود	ی	با
8	را	از	ما	با	آن		است	ملت	این	است	همه
9	باید	با	از	مسئله	که		کلمه	مردم	حفظ	از	را
10	ی	اسلام	که	مسأله	برای		اسلامی	اسلامی	که	با	از
11	ما	که	به	را	هم		ملت	ی	انسجام	که	که
12	ملت	آن	یک	که			مسلمانان	این	که	اسلام	ی
13		باید	کنند	می			باشد	یگانگی	اسلامی	ملت	می
14		می	برای	هم			دنیای	همدلی	سابق	همدلی	
15							مردم	همبستگی			
16							است	با			
17								انسجام			
18								شوروی			
19								اسلام			
20								در			

Figure 4-21 *Collocation Pattern for* tawhīd





Figure 4-22 *Collocation Pattern for* parcham






Figure 4-23 *Statistical Collocates for* olgū




Figure 4-24 *Statistical Collocates for* nemūne

Figure 4-25 *Collocation Pattern for* hambastegī




Figure 4-26 *Collocation Pattern for* sarzamīn






Figure 4-27 *Collocation Pattern for* mazlūm



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	و	ملت	مظلوم	و	و	و	و	و
2	از	است	به	آن	و		فلسطين	در	به	در	به
3	را	در	در	اين	مردم		است	را	در	اين	که
4	که	که	که	از	مسلمانان		را	به	با	آن	از
5	به	به	ملت	به	ملتهای		واقع	با	از	است	اين
6	اين	از	از	بر	از		در	از	فلسطين	را	است
7	است	می	را	يك	ملتهاي		عراق	می	که	ملت	در
8	ملت	مردم	اين	ی	شهيد		آن	است	است	با	با
9	در	ملت	همه	محروم	انسانهای		افغانستان	حمايت	اين	که	را
10	می	فلسطين	ی	دفاع	حق		که	اين	می	ما	فلسطين
11	که	آن	بر	در	شهدای		ما	که	ملت	به	ی
12	آن	را	است	بخصوص	شهيدان		دفاع	مستضعف	ی	کنند	هم
13	فلسطين	می	برای	با	های		ليدن	کنند	می	ی	می
14	مردم	ی	نسبت	است	ی		از	شد	اسلام	می	
15		بر	با	ديگر	را		شده	بوستی	اند	از	
16		با	دفاع	مسلمان	ايران		می	بود		امروز	
17		اين	كمك	ملت	قشرهاي		می	روز		ديگر	
18				يار	فلسطينيان		نمايي	ضعيف			



1368 Keywords.kws


File Edit View Compute Settings Windows Help

N	Key word	Freq	%	RC. Freq	RC. %	Keyness
1	تي	3,142	1.42	5,678	0.22	5,472.53
2	تما	1,075	0.49	1		5,464.63
3	و	19,208	8.71	164,248	6.33	1,735.03
4	مي	3,868	1.75	21,294	0.82	1,599.05
5	مورد	215	0.10	1		1,082.73
6	عمل	212	0.10	1		1,067.47
7	بثمنان	197	0.09	1		991.19
8	بي	534	0.24	893	0.03	979.58
9	كه	6,386	2.90	51,379	1.98	761.18
10	ايشان	145	0.07	1		726.86
11	تكته	135	0.06	1		676.05
12	اسلامي	852	0.39	3,854	0.15	517.99
13	كساني	216	0.10	271	0.01	475.68
14	يكي	200	0.09	225		467.85
15	براي	909	0.41	4,582	0.18	450.54
16	قبل	90	0.04	1		447.61
17	كسي	216	0.10	320	0.01	429.82
18	حقيقت	80	0.04	1		396.90
19	علماي	66	0.03	1		325.96
20	امت	65	0.03	2		313.44
21	ره	101	0.05	65		302.84
22	كشورهاي	122	0.06	125		299.48
23	كاري	125	0.06	146		286.51
24	مسايل	142	0.06	207		285.48
25	اعلام	57	0.03	1		280.41
26	سياه	228	0.10	619	0.02	275.78
27	عظمت	55	0.02	1		270.29
28	كارهاي	90	0.04	62		263.04
29	اعتماد	50	0.02	1		245.01
30	انقلاب	859	0.39	5,560	0.21	230.21

KWs | plot | links | clusters | filenames | notes | source text

422 Type-in

Figure 4-28 *1368 Keywords, 1-30*



N	Key word	Freq	%	RC. Freq	RC. %	Keyness
1	این	5,766	4.63	3		29,740.72
2	به	5,342	4.29	1		27,572.34
3	این	3,177	2.55	3		19,843.90
4	به	3,164	2.54	1		19,791.68
5	کند	843	0.68	1		4,322.88
6	کند	681	0.55	1		4,235.64
7	مردم	744	0.60	2		3,801.06
8	اگر	665	0.53	1		3,406.85
9	مردم	472	0.38	2		2,919.64
10	اگر	403	0.32	1		2,500.64
11	می	2,657	2.13	24,666	0.92	1,388.86
12	می	3,954	3.17	24,666	0.92	1,284.32
13	ی	3,763	3.02	25,764	0.96	931.21
14	که	6,742	5.41	54,103	2.01	925.16
15	دشمنان	155	0.12	1		785.27
16	بی	616	0.49	1,672	0.06	769.22
17	بکند	144	0.12	1		728.84
18	ایشان	137	0.11	1		692.93
19	دشمنان	101	0.08	1		618.81
20	بگیرد	120	0.10	1		605.75
21	جهت	116	0.09	6		549.71
22	آقایان	107	0.09	1		539.11
23	جناب	107	0.09	2		530.67
24	قبل	94	0.08	1		472.51
25	که	3,662	2.94	54,103	2.01	454.99
26	عظمت	88	0.07	1		441.78
27	نبود	85	0.07	1		426.42
28	جهت	73	0.06	6		413.38
29	اسلامی	763	0.61	7,081	0.26	395.42
30	نمی	660	0.53	3,346	0.12	341.74

Figure 4-29 *1371 Keywords (Uncleaned), 1-30*

Figure 5-1 *Collocation Pattern for* eslām





Figure 5-2 *Collocation Pattern for* eslāmī



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	و	جمهوری	اسلامی	و	و	و	و	و
2	که	که	در	که	انقلاب		در	که	که	می	که
3	این	در	که	در	کشورهای		ایران	این	می	که	در
4	در	به	از	از	جامعه		است	در	در	در	می
5	را	این	به	یک	امّت		را	می	این	این	به
6	می	را	است	مجلس	حکومت		به	به	به	به	از
7	است	است	را	به	و		که	است	را	را	این
8	به	می	این	با	شورای		این	از	است	است	را
9	از	از	یک	این	کشور		از	را	ما	از	است
10	برای	ما	با	حزب	ایران		با	با	از	هم	ما
11	ما	با	می	برای	جوامع		می	ما	اسلامی	ما	با
12	همه	اسلام	ما	بین	معارف		ما	انقلابی	یک	آن	یک
13	اسلامی	ای	اسلامی	امروز	حرکت		بود	انسانی	با	با	آن
14	هم	برای	بود	سایر	نظام		هم	شود	شود	همه	برای
15	یک	یک	عنوان	حضور	دنیای		شده	بوده	مردم	شود	هم
16	آن	یا	برای	علیه	تمدّن		برای	باشد	آن	کنند	اسلام
17	دنیا	کنند	هم	جامعه	اخلاق		داشته	شد	هم	مردم	کند
18	آنها	مردم	اسلام	پیروزی	آزاد		باشد	ایران	اسلام	یک	اسلامی
19	با	جامعه	بسیاری	است	نهضت		بودند	برای	دنیا	آنها	بود
20	اگر	امام	بر	همه	کنفرانس		دارد	آن	همه	برای	مسأله
21	باید	ایران	کند	واقعا	امت		خودمان	انقلاب	بود	روز	کرده
22	بود	بعد	آن	انقلابی	ملّتهای		یک	یک	کنند	امام	وقتی
23	مردم	وجود	ایران	عربی	وظیفه		تشکیل	هم	کرده	اینها	تا
24	اینها	نمی	آنها	دانشگاه	وظایف		نیست	همین	دارد	کنیم	حالا
25	کنم	مسأله	کردند	نیروهای	ضد			بود	شد	اسلام	آنها

Figure 5-3 *Collocation Pattern for* mardom




Figure 5-4 *Collocation Pattern for* mas'ale




Figure 5-5 *Collocation Pattern for* emām





Figure 5-6 *Collocation Pattern for* rāh



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	و	و	راه	خدا	و	و	و	و
2	این	می	که	در	این		را	را	را	را	که
3	که	در	را	که	در		و	به	که	می	در
4	را	به	می	را	به		آهن	است	می	به	را
5	می	که	است	از	که		می	که	به	این	است
6	است	را	در	به	از		حل	این	است	که	این
7	در	این	راه	این	ما		امام	می	در	در	می
8	به	ما	این	ما	یک		به	در	از	است	از
9	از	است	کنند	می	بین		سعادت	برای	راه	از	ما
10	ما	از	به	راه	ادامه		درست	شده	برای	کنند	به
11	با	آن	از	است	است		اقتاده	دارد	این	راه	مردم
12	یک	راه	کند	کنند	هم		اسلام	ادامه	با	اگر	راه
13	هم	کنیم	ما	با	عنوان		خودش	راه	ادامه	باید	هر
14	راه	یک	کنیم	برق	را		هم	هم	هم	ما	هم
15	کار	برای	برای	کنیم	سر		خداست	باز	یک	شود	برای
16	اینها	با	هم	بود	تنها		انداخته	از	ما	کند	با
17	همین	مردم	یک	اینها	اگر		خودشان	ما	آن	انتخاب	کنیم
18	مردم	خودشان	انقلاب	جهاد	نه		نجات	بود	نمی	دهیم	ادامه
19	آن	آب	هستند	آب	همان		انداختند	حسین	بود	با	کنند
20	دیگر	هم	امام	اگر	آنها		دیگری	کشور	شود	اند	بود
21	نمی		خدا	برای	کنند		انقلاب	انتخاب	اسلام	دارد	من
22			خودش	شده			صحیح	درست	ع	خدا	
23				شود			رسیدن		کنند		
24				هم			حق		کرد		
25							این		کرده		





Figure 5-7 *Statistical Collocates for* hokūmat

Figure 5-8 *Collocation Pattern for* harakat



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	در	که	این	حرکت	می	و	و	و	و
2	که	می	و	و	یک		را	است	که	که	در
3	می	در	که	این	و		و	را	در	در	را
4	در	که	به	در	مسیر		به	در	است	این	که
5	به	به	می	با	در		اسلامی	که	به	است	این
6	این	این	است	از	آن		کنیم	کنند	می	را	می
7	از	است	ما	به	که		کند	می	این	به	است
8	هم	ما	این	می	محور		امام	این	شده	می	از
9	یک	را	از	است	با		کردند	کند	را	یک	به
10	را	بود	با	مسیر	از		ما	ما	از	از	شود
11	امام	یک	ع	کند	به		کرده	به	ع	ما	
12	با	حسین	را	محور	برای		وسیع	کنیم	ما	همه	
13	ما	شود	بود	شد	است		تاریخ	حسین	شما	آنها	
14	است	نمی		آن			در	کرد	اسلام		
15	کنند			طرف			یک	دارد	شود		
16	برای			ما			انقلاب	با			
17	کند			عنوان			بسیار	پیدا			
18							جدیدی	شما			
19							اقتصادی				
20							سریع				
21							ادامه				
22							مردم				

Figure 5-9 *Collocation Pattern* for Iraq



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	که	و	در	مردم	عراق	و	کویت	و	و	و
2	که	و	که	که	بعث		را	به	که	به	که
3	در	در	در	حزب	و		به	که	این	ما	این
4	ما	می	می	و	در		در	و	به	که	را
5	از	از	از	از	که		از	از	کویت	از	به
6	را	به	ما	ایران	به		می	می	می	می	می
7	این	این	به	ما	با		که	در	عراق	این	از
8	به	را	جنگ	با	تجاوز		هم	با	در	را	هم
9	است	عراق	عراق	برای	خاک		است	ما	است	عراق	آن
10	می	بود	را	مردم	از		با	است	با	در	کرد
11	شما	ما	اسلامی	به	خروج		باید		را	آنها	جنگ
12			این	اگر	رژیم		بود		یک	است	
13			مردم	را	شمال		هستند		آن		
14				مسأله	کردستان				برای		
15					جنوب						
16					مرز						
17					ملت						





Figure 5-10 *Statistical Collocates for* Israel

Figure 5-11 *Collocation Pattern for* Felestīn



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	در	و	در	مسأله	فلسطین	و	می	و	و	این
2	در	که	در	که	در		را	و	است	در	در
3	را	و	می	و	مردم		است	که	که	می	که
4	می	یک	که	به	به		در	در	این	که	و
5	از	می	ما	از	و		می	است	می	است	را
6	کنند	این	این	اسراییل	ملّت		به	از	به	این	است
7	است	از	از	مردم	از		اشغالی	این	شود	از	می
8	به	را	را		مظلوم		هم			به	از
9		به	است		مورد		که			آن	جهانی
10		فلسطین	به		تاریخ		از			فلسطین	
11		مردم	مسأله		مسایل		این				




Figure 5-12 *Statistical Collocates for* vahdat

Figure 5-13 *Collocation Pattern for* ommat





Figure 5-14 *Collocation Pattern for* mosalmān






Figure 5-15 *Statistical Collocates for* mosalmān





Figure 5-16 *Statistical Collocates for* mazlūm




N	Key word	Freq	%	RC. Freq	RC. %	Keyness
1	که	21,187	3.85	7,837	0.64	21,936.72
2	کنند	2,528	0.46	1,320	0.11	1,951.78
3	کردند	1,671	0.30	562	0.05	1,810.23
4	ع	925	0.17	81		1,661.94
5	البته	652	0.12	13		1,407.58
6	کرده	1,364	0.25	502	0.04	1,392.96
7	کند	2,166	0.39	1,396	0.11	1,338.14
8	کار	1,523	0.28	838	0.07	1,116.43
9	#	1,843	0.34	1,249	0.10	1,070.86
10	کشور	1,517	0.28	908	0.07	1,018.56
11	خطبه	564	0.10	60		969.46
12	کنم	881	0.16	344	0.03	862.97
13	امّا	624	0.11	132	0.01	858.23
14	کرد	1,191	0.22	677	0.06	844.42
15	فکر	580	0.11	132	0.01	772.68
16	بحث	612	0.11	231	0.02	613.85
17	برنامه	872	0.16	543	0.04	559.89
18	الان	636	0.12	299	0.02	538.64
19	مشکل	309	0.06	31		538.53
20	کم	414	0.08	105		524.10
21	درصد	285	0.05	26		507.41
22	مقدار	323	0.06	66		450.60
23	کارخانه	236	0.04	21		422.40
24	تومان	217	0.04	15		407.74
25	کردن	377	0.07	129	0.01	403.55

Figure 5-17 *Rafsanjani Keywords, Part 1*




N	Key word	Freq	%	RC. Freq	RC. %	Keyness
26	موقع	234	0.04	30		382.90
27	بود	3,110	0.57	4,333	0.35	382.60
28	امکانات	250	0.05	47		360.48
29	هفته	342	0.06	121		358.26
30	بودند	1,241	0.23	1,286	0.11	357.63
31	مشکلات	258	0.05	59		342.88
32	هزار	391	0.07	178	0.01	340.14
33	حرکت	517	0.09	326	0.03	327.10
34	قرآن	842	0.15	751	0.06	325.39
35	اتفاق	260	0.05	77		303.37
36	دلار	191	0.03	28		300.28
37	مسأله	1,130	0.21	1,214	0.10	300.19
38	حالا	762	0.14	673	0.06	299.54
39	شود	2,608	0.47	3,697	0.30	299.53
40	ممکن	346	0.06	168	0.01	284.87
41	برق	181	0.03	27		283.00
42	شده	1,774	0.32	2,325	0.19	271.35
43	واقعاً	464	0.08	314	0.03	269.70
44	میّ	237	0.04	74		268.26
45	مصرف	274	0.05	108		266.44
46	بودجه	197	0.04	46		259.33
47	کوفه	142	0.03	12		256.88
48	اوّل	480	0.09	357	0.03	246.34
49	کردم	249	0.05	97		244.18
50	مسلمانها	173	0.03	39		231.38

Figure 5-17 *Rafsanjani Keywords, Part 2*



N	Word	Freq.	%	Texts	%
1	و	188,755	5.59	1,822	97.17
2	به	80,039	2.37	1,863	99.36
3	که	77,516	2.30	960	51.20
4	در	75,594	2.24	1,706	90.99
5	این	69,378	2.06	1,795	95.73
6	است	61,950	1.84	1,777	94.77
7	می	57,556	1.71	1,763	94.03
8	از	48,839	1.45	1,697	90.51
9	ما	42,944	1.27	1,664	88.75
10	را	42,597	1.26	1,678	89.49
11	که	40,622	1.20	844	45.01
12	با	37,577	1.11	1,789	95.41
13	هم	35,631	1.06	1,592	84.91
14	ها	28,587	0.85	1,632	87.04
15	آن	24,573	0.73	1,670	89.07
16	هاي	17,647	0.52	1,171	62.45
17	براي	16,229	0.48	1,435	76.53
18	ن	15,455	0.46	429	22.88
19	مردم	15,114	0.45	1,406	74.99
20	همه	14,702	0.44	1,665	88.80
21	بايد	13,649	0.40	1,249	66.61
22	يک	13,324	0.39	843	44.96
23	#	13,274	0.39	1,096	58.45
24	ي	11,836	0.35	446	23.79
25	من	11,250	0.33	1,469	78.35


Figure 6-1 *First 50 Words of the Khatami Wordlist (Part 1)*



N	Word	Freq.	%	Texts	%
26	جامعه	10,853	0.32	1,018	54.29
27	شود	10,612	0.31	1,432	76.37
28	اي	10,199	0.30	1,321	70.45
29	دارد	9,792	0.29	1,452	77.44
30	باشد	9,617	0.29	1,284	68.48
31	شما	9,532	0.28	1,311	69.92
32	شده	9,260	0.27	1,429	76.21
33	بود	9,169	0.27	1,348	71.89
34	خود	9,124	0.27	1,336	71.25
35	اسلامی	9,100	0.27	1,374	73.28
36	ست	8,451	0.25	791	42.19
37	شد	7,955	0.24	1,380	73.60
38	داشته	7,597	0.23	1,358	72.43
39	يا	7,578	0.22	1,200	64.00
40	يعنی	7,338	0.22	1,154	61.55
41	اگر	7,282	0.22	1,047	55.84
42	ايران	7,243	0.21	1,435	76.53
43	تا	7,085	0.21	1,428	76.16
44	بر	6,801	0.20	1,180	62.93
45	ملت	6,557	0.19	1,202	64.11
46	نيست	6,373	0.19	1,215	64.80
47	نمی	6,354	0.19	1,124	59.95
48	نه	6,118	0.18	1,264	67.41
49	انقلاب	6,101	0.18	1,017	54.24
50	البته	6,081	0.18	1,222	65.17


Figure 6-1 *First 50 Words of the Khatami Wordlist (Part 2)*

Figure 6-2 *Collocation Pattern for* mā




N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	و	که	ما	در	این	و	و	و
2	این	که	که	است	جامعه	ما	به	به	که	که	که
3	به	این	این	در	و		باید	است	است	به	به
4	در	است	است	که	که		با	و	این	ما	این
5	که	به	در	می	است		هم	در	به	در	در
6	ما	ما	می	که	اگر		را	می	را	این	ما
7	است	در	به	به	همه		و	از	می	را	می
8	می	می	ما	این	براي		از	با	ما	است	است
9	از	هم	که	از	به		می	توانیم	در	می	را
10	هم	که	از	هم	ملت		این	که	از	که	که
11	که	از	هم	ها	معه		که	را	که	از	از
12	را	را	را	ما	هاي		ن	ما	با	با	با
13	با	ها	ها	جا	ي		براي	آن	ها	هم	هم
14	ها	آن	آن	هاي	مردم		بتوانیم	که	آن	ها	ها
15	آن	با	با	را	ن		ست	ها	هم	آن	آن
16	ن	هاي	براي	براي	کشور		هستند	یک	هاي	داریم	داریم
17	هاي	جامعه	ن	نیست	انقلاب		نمی	همه	داریم	هاي	ن
18	باید	ن	هاي	ست	جوان		که	باید	هستیم	باید	باید
19	جامعه	مردم	امروز	دارد	هم		یک	هم	ن	هستیم	هستیم
20	براي	ست	اي	با	البته		داریم	دارد	یک	ن	هاي
21	همه	اي	ي	شود	عزیز		اگر	داریم	زمینه	مردم	بکنیم
22	یک	براي	داشته	باشد	امروز		شده	همه	یک	یک	براي
23	شود	باشد	مردم	بود	اسلامی		وجود	خواهیم	ي	داشته	داشته
24	مردم	باید	شده	جامعه	از		هست	ن	بکنیم	ي	یک
25	ي	ي	باشد	بشود	یعنی		خیلی	زمینه	براي	براي	همه

Figure 6-3 *Collocation Pattern for* mardom



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	و	این	مردم	و	و	و	و	و
2	مردم	مردم	که	به	و		است	می	مردم	مردم	مردم
3	که	این	مردم	که	به		را	به	این	این	به
4	این	که	به	در	که		سالاري	در	است	که	این
5	به	به	این	است	از		خوب	است	به	به	که
6	است	است	است	از	با		ما	این	که	در	در
7	در	در	در	با	شما		شريف	در	در	است	می
8	از	می	با	را	خود		در	را	با	می	است
9	می	را	می	که	براي		به	که	می	از	از
10	را	با	را	مردم	که		سالاری	با	از	با	را
11	با	از	که	این	راي		سا	مردم	را	را	با
12	که	ما	از	هم	همه		با	از	ما	ما	هم
13	ما	که	هم	می	بر		بزرگوار	دینی	که	که	که
14	هم	هم	ما	براي	حضور		هم	هم	هم	هم	ما
15	آن	ها	براي	ما	حقوق		می	ما	شود	ها	آن
16	ها	آن	آن	حق	حاکمیت		این	سرنوشت	آن	آن	ها
17	انقلاب	براي	قدرت	خدمت	خواست		سالار	آن	ن	براي	براي
18	باید	اسلامی	ها	مورد	حق		بر	باشد	بزرگوار	همه	همه
19	براي	هاي	باید	بر	هاي		از	صحنه	هاي	باید	انقلاب
20	بر	یعنی	انقلاب	ها	میان		ایران	که	خود	خود	باید
21	هاي	باید	خواست	یعنی	است		باید	عرصه	حق	انقلاب	هستند
22	همه	انقلاب	حکومت	حکومت	اراده		باشد	ن	اند	هاي	هاي
23	بود	باشد	اي	دولت	مشارکت		که	براي	باید	اند	اند
24	قدرت	قدرت	خدمت	ن	هم		براي	بشود	گند	ن	ن
25	اسلامی	بر	حضور	بود	زندگی		اند	شد	من	حق	خود

Figure 6-4 *Collocation Pattern for* jāme'e



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	و	در	جامعه	ما	و	و	و	و
2	که	که	که	در	و		و	به	است	است	که
3	به	به	به	که	یک		ای	می	به	به	این
4	این	در	است	را	این		است	که	که	که	به
5	در	این	جامعه	به	که		را	است	در	در	در
6	جامعه	جامعه	در	جامعه	از		مان	در	می	این	است
7	می	است	می	است	به		مدنی	را	جامعه	می	جامعه
8	از	می	این	ما	برای		به	جامعه	این	جامعه	از
9	است	ما	ما	های	کل		اسلامی	ما	از	ما	می
10	را	از	از	از	ما		در	از	شود	از	ما
11	ما	را	را	هم	بر		ماست	این	ما	آن	هم
12	هم	های	بخش	که	های		از	با	باشد	را	آن
13	با	هم	های	این	پیشرفت		می	دارد	را	هم	را
14	باید	آن	هم	می	است		بشری	هم	دارد	با	که
15	ها	یک	که	بخش	یک		ای	باشد	با	باید	باید
16	های	با	آن	برای	مدیریت		باید	یک	داشته	باشد	با
17	یک	برای	یک	باید	که		که	که	آن	یک	یک
18	که	که	باشد	اگر	هم		هم	ست	باید	دارد	باشد
19	برای	باید	برای	نظام	آن		باشد	باید	هم	کند	دارد
20	آن	ها	باید	موجود	بخش		ایجاد	بشود	که	ای	ها
21	باشد	بخش	با	بخشی	مختلف		هست	یک	ای	شود	همه
22	شود	شود	یعنی	امنیت	متن		جوان	ایجاد	باشیم	که	های
23	همه	باشد	شود	شود	فرهنگی		جهانی	وجود	اگر	های	ای
24	اجتماعی	اجتماعی	مردم	آن	امنیت		بشری	شود	کند	ست	اگر
25	یعنی	یعنی	ها	همه	شدن		با	یعنی	همه	اگر	برای

Figure 6-5 *Collocation Pattern for* shomā




Figure 6-6 *Collocation Pattern for* eslāmī





Figure 6-7 *Collocation Pattern for* eslām








Figure 6-8 *Statistical Collocates for* eslām

Figure 6-9 *Collocation Pattern for* mellat



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	و	این	ملت	ایران	و	و	و	و
2	این	به	به	به	و		ما	ایران	است	است	این
3	که	این	این	دولت	همه		و	است	به	به	است
4	به	که	که	که	به		ها	به	این	این	به
5	است	است	در	است	یک		شریف	در	در	در	در
6	در	در	است	که	که		بزرگ	این	می	می	که
7	ملت	ملت	از	از	دو		است	را	از	ملت	ملت
8	را	که	می	در	که		بزرگوار	می	که	که	که
9	می	از	که	ملت	برای		های	که	را	با	ما
10	با	می	ملت	این	از		را	دولت	ما	از	با
11	که	را	را	ما	است		به	با	با	را	از
12	ما	با	با	را	تاریخی		با	ملت	ملت	ما	می
13	از	ما	ما	ها	با		در	از	که	که	را
14	ها	ها	ها	با	میان		مظلوم	ما	دولت	ایران	ها
15	آن	هم	هم	انقلاب	یک		عراق	که	انقلاب	ها	همه
16	هم	آن	میان	خواست	ما		بزرگی	هم	ها	هم	آن
17	همه	انقلاب	دولت	برای	شما		فلسطین	ن	ایران	همه	ایران
18	برای	همه	انقلاب	تاریخی	ن		است	برای	مردم	آن	ن
19	ایران	ن	خواست	کشور	خواست		می	انقلاب	آن	ن	هم
20	شما	برای	اسلامی	می	حقوق		امریکا	ست	همه	انقلاب	اسلامی
21	های	ایران	ن	اسلامی	خود		از	مردم	بزرگوار	مردم	های
22	ست	های	ایران	ن	منافع		این	بود	های	اسلامی	مردم
23	انقلاب	دولت	کشور	میان	سربلندی		امریکا	ی	ن	های	ست
24	خود	اسلامی	های	هم	دولت		ودولت	کشور	هم	برای	انقلاب
25	ن	شما	برای	ایران	بر		برای	شده	شود	تاریخ	خود

Figure 6-10 *Collocation Pattern for* jahān



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	و	در	جهان	اسلام	و	و	و	و
2	در	در	در	در	و		و	به	در	است	به
3	به	به	به	به	این		را	است	به	در	است
4	است	این	که	که	به		امروز	می	است	به	در
5	که	را	از	است	از		به	در	می	از	این
6	از	که	جهان	منطقه	که		است	از	از	این	که
7	این	است	می	همه	با		در	را	جهان	که	می
8	را	از	است	را	کشورهای		ما	هم	این	جهان	از
9	ما	جهان	این	ما	که		سوم	با	با	می	را
10	می	می	را	از	همه		از	که	را	با	با
11	جهان	که	که	که	بر		می	ما	که	های	جهان
12	با	با	ما	می	سراسر		برای	دارد	ما	ما	که
13	برای	ما	با	ایران	برای		انسان	قطبی	کند	آن	ما
14	که	برای	خود	انسان	است		با	انسان	که	هم	های
15	های	های	ایران	های	امروز		کنونی	جهان	های	را	هم
16	آن	یک	آن	با	های		هم	این	امروز	که	آن
17	ایران	ایران	همه	هم	سطح		بیتی	برای	هم	انسان	ها
18	ها	هم	های	این	آن		نیز	آن	صلح	ها	یک
19	یک	ها	انسان	جهان	مردم		باید	باشد	انسان	دارد	نیز
20	ای	انسان	ای	جان	مسلمانان		باشد	نیز	دارد	بود	باید
21	هم	آن	منطقه	اسلام	یک		بود	که	شده	شده	برای
22	دارد	صلح	یک	جامعه	نقاط		دارد	ست	آن	امروز	امروز
23	همه	همه	هم	قدرت	سیاسی		هستیم	بر	یک	باشد	خود
24	انسان	منطقه	ست	امروز	عرصه		جدید	بود	داشته	ایران	بر
25	بر	دارد	امروز	برای	دیگر		هست	همه	باشد	قرار	اسلامی

Figure 6-11 *Collocation Pattern for* amaniyyat




Figure 6-12 *Collocation Pattern for* rāh






Figure 6-13 *Collocation Pattern for* haqq




N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	و	و	حق	و	و	و	و	و
2	این	است	که	که	این		مردم	که	را	را	به
3	به	که	به	است	به		دارند	را	که	حق	که
4	است	حق	است	به	صاحب		دارد	مردم	است	در	این
5	در	به	می	از	از		را	است	در	به	حق
6	که	این	حق	مردم	که		حاکمیت	به	حق	که	است
7	می	در	مردم	ما	هم		است	در	به	از	در
8	حق	می	این	این	مردم		دارد	از	از	می	را
9	مردم	مردم	را	می	که		می	که	مردم	این	می
10	را	را	که	که	ما		مسلم	بر	می	است	از
11	آن	که	در	هیچ	است		هم	حرمت	این	سرنوشت	ما
12	که	ما	هم	حق	حب		داریم	می	که	که	مردم
13	هم	هم	ما	را	شما		ما	حق	بر	با	هم
14	ها	از	همه	هم	باید		این	این	ما	ما	خود
15	از	آن	آن	در	حضرت		خود	عدل	با	مردم	که
16	ما	با	براي	انسان	ها		اند	ما	ها	خود	با
17	با	قانون	از	براي	با		خودشان	هم	خود	هم	آن
18	همه	انسان	دارد	آن	شناختن		خودش	با	سرنوشت	بر	دارد
19	ن	ها	انسان	با	آن		زندگی	دفاع	آن	اگر	همه
20	جامعه	بود	ن	صا	را		آزادي	سرنوشت	حکومت	باید	اگر
21	انسان	ن	هیچ	همه	همه		طبیعی	براي	براي	آن	ها
22	باشد	همه	شود	ها	داراي		تعیین	انسان	ن	ن	شود
23	باید	جامعه	بشود	بر	کس		به	عدالت	هم	ها	داشته
24	یک	هاي	نمی	ن	نه		او	آن	باشد	من	رسمیت
25	نظام	دارد	هر	نه	یک		راي	دارد	انسان	براي	باید

Figure 6-14 *Collocation Pattern for* tamaddon



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	گفت	و	تمدن	ها	و	و	و	و
2	که	در	گفت	و	وگوي		اسلامی	را	است	است	است
3	است	که	فرهنگ	فرهنگ	گوي		و	است	فرهنگ	ها	تمدن
4	تمدن	است	که	ها	این		غرب	به	به	این	به
5	در	به	از	در	که		هاي	در	می	به	که
6	به	از	در	که	میان		جدید	فرهنگ	در	که	این
7	می	تمدن	است	است	در		ساز	که	تمدن	در	در
8	این	ها	به	به	از		بشري	از	این	تمدن	از
9	را	می	تمدن	از	وگوی		ایرانی	هم	از	از	می
10	از	این	این	می	صاحب		آفرین	می	که	می	را
11	که	گفت	که	که	بسط		هاست	با	اسلامی	را	ها
12	گفت	را	ملت	میا	که		را	داشته	ها	ما	که
13	ما	که	ها	با	ن		وفرهنگ	بوده	آن	با	با
14	هم	میان	ما	هم	یک		است	اسلامی	با	آن	آن
15	با	با	با	ما	با		در	تقش	اند	هاي	هم
16	اسلام	ما	اصل	تمدن	جنگ		بوده	وفرهنگ	یک	براي	ما
17	آن	هم	می	اسلام	تاریخ		بزرگ	ست	بوده	اند	گفت
18	ها	وگوي	تاریخ	اسلامی	آن		بزرگی	یک	مطرح	هم	اند
19	ملت	آن	را	هاي	گوی		به	دیگر	شود	بوده	اسلام
20	هاي	ملت	وگوي	وگوي	است		های	بود	را	که	ن
21	ایران	اند	تاسیس	ملت	به		بشری	این	شد	اسلامی	بوده
22	ن	اسلامی	ایده	گوي	هاي		ما	باشد	ایران	داشته	ست
23	اسلامی	ایران	هم	غرب	گفتگوي		امروز	مطرح	ما	ملت	ملت
24	بوده	اسلام	مسأله	آن	همه		غربی	ي	گفت	ست	صلح
25	یک	من	میان	ایران	هم		سازي	تمدن	بشري	اي	داشته

Figure 6-15 *Collocation Pattern for* emām



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	و	حضرت	امام	جمعه	و	و	و	و
2	به	که	به	به	که		حسین	ع	به	این	که
3	که	به	که	که	و		و	محترم	که	که	است
4	از	در	در	است	از		ره	بن	این	در	این
5	این	از	انقلاب	در	به		علی	می	را	به	به
6	است	امام	از	از	که		خمینی	ره	در	امام	در
7	می	می	این	اسلامی	است		در	به	است	از	را
8	در	این	است	را	راه		بزرگوار	را	ابی	است	می
9	را	است	امام	می	این		به	که	از	می	امام
10	امام	را	می	انقلاب	شخصیت		را	در	امام	را	از
11	ما	با	را	این	رهبري		حسن	این	بود	طالب	بود
12	با	آن	هم	فقیه	سال		می	ما	می	ع	انقلاب
13	انقلاب	محترم	با	بود	خود		امیرالمومنین	است	ما	آن	با
14	هم	ما	ولی	امام	با		هم	آن	آن	بود	مردم
15	آن	انقلاب	آن	ما	آن		است	از	ابیطالب	همه	آن
16	نماینده	هم	ما	رهبري	بندر		که	با	با	هم	ما
17	مردم	اسلامی	جناب	تعبیر	بلند		این	صدر	انقلاب	ما	هم
18	اسلامی	حضرت	مردم	روح	خط		زمان	معزز	علی	اسلامی	که
19	که	بود	همان	اسلام	اسلام		موسی	بود	هم	مردم	ع
20	اسلام	مردم	بود	خود	یاد		با	امام	همه	که	ایشان
21	هاي	که	که	هم	تعبیر		از	انقلاب	سره	با	اسلامی
22	بزرگ	بزرگ	راه	که	مثل		امت	هم	ع	محترم	همه
23	حضرت	باشد	خود	مورد	اما		بود	سره	شهرستان	یک	شهرستان
24	اي	خود	سال	با	او		ما	علی	حضرت	انقلاب	اسلام
25	من	ع	همه	مردم	خدمت		صادق	مردم	مردم	من	جناب





Figure 6-16 *Statistical Collocates for* ommat



N	Word	With	Relation	Total
1	را	اتحاد	715.120	12
2	اتحاد	اتحاد	580.702	95
3	است	اتحاد	476.741	8
4	جماهير	اتحاد	179.630	10
5	شوروي	اتحاد	82.653	9
6	شوروی	اتحاد	79.574	5
7	همبستگي	اتحاد	47.017	14
8	وحدت	اتحاد	22.274	8
9	مسلمانان	اتحاد	12.857	5
10	و	اتحاد	7.179	104
11	بعد	اتحاد	5.429	5
12	ملت	اتحاد	3.797	7
13	ايران	اتحاد	3.477	7
14	براي	اتحاد	1.609	8
15	با	اتحاد	1.366	15
16	يک	اتحاد	1.163	6
17	به	اتحاد	0.952	27
18	در	اتحاد	0.814	25
19	اين	اتحاد	-0.579	17
20	ما	اتحاد	-0.605	10
21	که	اتحاد	-0.829	18
22	هم	اتحاد	-0.963	7
23	ها	اتحاد	-1.079	5
24	می	اتحاد	-1.555	10
25	از	اتحاد	-1.834	7

Figure 6-17 *Statistical Collocates for* ettehād





Figure 6-18 *Statistical Collocates for* vahdat



N	Word	With	Relation	Total
1	است	همبستگی	1,317.424	40
2	را	همبستگی	1,020.997	31
3	که	همبستگی	790.443	24
4	همبستگی	همبستگی	599.008	321
5	همبستگي	همبستگی	580.850	9
6	بر	همبستگی	362.270	11
7	باشد	همبستگی	230.524	7
8	شد	همبستگی	209.563	9
9	اتحاد	همبستگی	47.014	14
10	وحدت	همبستگی	41.566	27
11	وهمدلی	همبستگی	39.983	8
12	همدلی	همبستگی	35.068	19
13	ملی	همبستگی	27.964	40
14	نزدیکی	همبستگی	18.141	5
15	پیوستگی	همبستگی	16.335	5
16	و	همبستگی	12.484	334
17	درعین	همبستگی	11.812	7
18	همکاری	همبستگی	11.318	7
19	مسلمانان	همبستگی	11.019	8
20	دوستی	همبستگی	10.160	5
21	میان	همبستگی	10.138	19
22	اعلام	همبستگی	9.864	9
23	همراهی	همبستگی	9.390	5
24	بیشتر	همبستگی	8.490	16
25	متقابل	همبستگی	7.892	5

Figure 6-19 *Statistical Collocates for* hambastegī




Figure 6-20 *Statistical Collocates for* ensejām





Figure 6-21 *Statistical Collocates for* edālat

Figure 6-22 *Collocation Pattern for* sarzamīn



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	در	این	سرزمین	و	و	و	و	و
2	است	است	که	به	به		ها	به	است	است	است
3	که	در	از	و	در		های	است	به	به	به
4	در	که	است	از	از		فلسطین	می	می	این	این
5	ن	از	که	که	آمایش		است	ی	که	می	در
6	از	می	این	که	دراین		را	در	از	سرزمین	که
7	ها	سرزمین	به	است	و		ایران	را	این	از	که
8	را	ن	در	ن	اشغال		خودشان	ن	در	که	از
9	به	این	را	طرح	است		شان	از	با	ن	سرزمین
10	فلسطین	که	برای	را	آن		ما	که	سرزمین	در	با
11	این	به	سرزمین	نقضه	یک		خود	با	ن	ما	می
12	ما	ما	ما	این	ن		زندگی	شده	شده	های	را
13	همه	ایران	با	ما	یك		های	اند	ها	همه	هم
14	برای	ی	حق	اصلی	که		می	این	همه	آن	همه
15	سرزمین	برای	ن	سرزمین	ازاین		به	ایران	شود	ی	ما
16	می	را	مردم	هم	اصلی		خدایی	سرزمین	مردم	ها	مردم
17	منطقه	اسلام	دیگر	دفاع	که		بزرگ	اشغالی	اند	بوده	ملت
18	مردم	چه	دفاع	ایران	ما		مقدس	پرور	اشغا	هم	شده
19	چه	آن	بر	صاحبان	درون		هستند	بیرون	را	چه	آن
20	با	ای	ملت	می			شما	برای	برای	مردم	ن
21	آن	مردم	می	فلسطین			برخاسته	هستند			ها
22	بوده	با					از	ملت			هایی
23	که	ها					اصلی				
24	شود						عشق				
25							بوده				





Figure 6-23 *Statistical Collocates for* sarzamīn

Figure 6-24 *Collocation Pattern for* Felestīn



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	ملت	مردم	فلسطين	و	و	و	و	و
2	اين	كه	كه	در	مظلوم		به	مى	به	به	كه
3	است	در	از	مردم	ملت		مى	به	است	اين	اين
4	مى	به	حقوق	كه	در		اشغالى	از	چه	كه	به
5	براي	است	در	و	سرزمين		را	است	با	ن	در
6	آن	آن	به	كه	و		است	گذرد	مى	كه	از
7	از	از	حق	حقوق	مساله		چه	در	از	در	سرزمين
8	همه	ها	ن	به	از		در	اين	كه	از	است
9	ملت	مظلوم	آن	حق	به		از	با	ن	با	با
10	كه	همه	با	جمله	درسرزمين		هستند	سرزمين	شود	ترين	كه
11	به	بى	مى	با	انتقاضه		كه		حقوق	آن	ها
12	ي	ما	شد	از	است		هم		ما	بود	فلسطين
13	چه	مى	فلسطين	عراق	مسايل		اند		فلسطين	ساكنان	
14	در		كه	مسلم			با		نى		
15	حقوق			است			اعم		ها		
16	كه			خود			مظلوم				
17	فلسطين			مسا			عراق				
18				دولت							

Figure 6-25 *Collocation Pattern for* mazlūm



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	در	و	و	این	مردم	مظلوم	و	و	و	و	و
2	و	که	که	و	ملت		فلسطین	است	که	به	که
3	که	است	در	از	و		عراق	در	به	ما	در
4	این	در	به	ما	از		است	به	این	در	به
5	به	از	از	در	شهید		افغانستان	محروم	می	این	است
6	می	این	که	که	ما		را	می	است	می	این
7	ما	می	می	یک	انسان		در	از	که	فلسطین	که
8	با	که	ملت	آن	ي		ترین	که	ما	از	ان
9	که	به	است	به	کشورهای		به	را	بهشتی	هم	ها
10	است	ملت	این	ها	فلسطین		آیت	الله	در	که	
11		را	دفاع	حمایت	هم		بوده	این	هم		
12		ها		حقوق	ن		بود	اند			
13		هم		است	هاي		تر	تحت			
14				که			می	آن			
15				با				که			
16				حق							
17				دفاع							
18				محروم							





Figure 6-26 *Statistical Collocates for* mosalmān




Figure 6-27 *Statistical Collocates for* mosalmānān




N	Key word	Freq.	%	RC. Freq.	RC. %	Keyness
1	ن	15,455	0.46	0		7,696.17
2	ها	28,587	0.85	1,888	0.20	5,796.12
3	ست	8,451	0.25	9		4,090.49
4	هاي	17,647	0.52	1,171	0.12	3,556.53
5	#	13,274	0.39	724	0.08	3,097.84
6	مي	57,556	1.71	9,522	1.00	2,672.28
7	كه	77,516	2.30	13,998	1.47	2,660.67
8	بكنيم	4,920	0.15	60		1,978.65
9	م	3,862	0.11	0		1,920.24
10	ل	3,805	0.11	0		1,891.89
11	بشود	5,699	0.17	165	0.02	1,829.91
12	ما	42,944	1.27	7,305	0.77	1,814.23
13	جامعه	10,853	0.32	894	0.09	1,781.10
14	ت	3,364	0.10	0		1,672.52
15	مساله	3,008	0.09	0		1,495.45
16	كا	2,911	0.09	0		1,447.21
17	ءالله	2,926	0.09	1		1,439.73
18	يكي	2,892	0.09	0		1,437.76
19	سا	2,815	0.08	0		1,399.47
20	ولي	4,911	0.15	192	0.02	1,386.91
21	خصوص	3,139	0.09	44		1,229.63
22	معه	2,491	0.07	5		1,181.35
23	عرصه	4,558	0.14	211	0.02	1,176.70
24	هايي	4,156	0.12	165	0.02	1,164.68
25	تي	2,300	0.07	0		1,143.36

Figure 6-28 *Khatami Keywords 1-50 (Part 1)*




N	Key word	Freq.	%	RC. Freq.	RC. %	Keyness
26	يعني	7,338	0.22	635	0.07	1,139.88
27	دراين	2,492	0.07	11		1,130.78
28	براي	16,229	0.48	2,347	0.25	1,081.53
29	نا	2,276	0.07	6		1,066.31
30	تمدن	2,760	0.08	45		1,047.12
31	اينكه	2,065	0.06	0		1,026.51
32	واقعا	2,044	0.06	0		1,016.06
33	ه	2,124	0.06	4		1,009.74
34	اي	10,199	0.30	1,223	0.13	999.10
35	حتي	2,865	0.08	68		983.81
36	شا	1,971	0.06	0		979.77
37	بكند	2,874	0.09	93		883.19
38	مسايل	1,846	0.05	3		882.16
39	ري	1,908	0.06	7		877.10
40	اينجا	1,850	0.05	4		874.61
41	نيز	5,174	0.15	443	0.05	813.05
42	مان	2,140	0.06	38		795.80
43	داشته	7,597	0.23	878	0.09	792.44
44	بوده	5,661	0.17	535	0.06	791.01
45	توسعه	3,035	0.09	141	0.01	781.70
46	گرچه	1,686	0.05	8		760.63
47	كساني	1,529	0.05	0		760.01
48	دي	1,594	0.05	5		739.80
49	تامين	1,457	0.04	1		710.67
50	حا	1,396	0.04	0		693.89

Figure 6-28 *Khatami Keywords 1-50 (Part 2)*



N	Word	Freq.	%	Texts	%
1	و	134,503	5.63	932	100.00
2	مي	58,909	2.46	794	85.19
3	را	55,349	2.32	928	99.57
4	به	54,127	2.26	932	100.00
5	در	54,066	2.26	930	99.79
6	است	50,662	2.12	924	99.14
7	كه	48,245	2.02	841	90.24
8	از	40,210	1.68	928	99.57
9	اين	37,451	1.57	867	93.03
10	ما	28,779	1.20	878	94.21
11	هم	22,775	0.95	882	94.64
12	يك	18,639	0.78	788	84.55
13	با	17,930	0.75	922	98.93
14	شما	16,692	0.70	846	90.77
15	آن	14,375	0.60	890	95.49
16	من	13,271	0.56	847	90.88
17	همه	12,412	0.52	874	93.78
18	براي	12,371	0.52	781	83.80
19	ملت	11,912	0.50	819	87.88
20	ايران	11,374	0.48	788	84.55
21	بايد	11,332	0.47	792	84.98
22	#	9,770	0.41	714	76.61
23	شود	8,947	0.37	845	90.67
24	مردم	8,912	0.37	794	85.19
25	اند	8,866	0.37	839	90.02


Figure 7-1 *First 50 Words of the Ahmadinejad Wordlist (Part 1)*



N	Word	Freq.	%	Texts	%
26	کنند	8,794	0.37	761	81.65
27	اي	8,263	0.35	737	79.08
28	کنيم	8,053	0.34	713	76.50
29	نمي	7,747	0.32	673	72.21
30	آنها	7,545	0.32	779	83.58
31	چه	7,531	0.32	737	79.08
32	اما	7,510	0.31	816	87.55
33	تا	7,507	0.31	849	91.09
34	دولت	7,311	0.31	714	76.61
35	کند	7,292	0.31	743	79.72
36	خدا	7,204	0.30	786	84.33
37	کار	7,176	0.30	719	77.15
38	سال	7,139	0.30	769	82.51
39	اگر	7,136	0.30	791	84.87
40	امروز	6,787	0.28	851	91.31
41	بر	6,780	0.28	848	90.99
42	همة	6,363	0.27	642	68.88
43	شد	6,104	0.26	812	87.12
44	بود	5,963	0.25	808	86.70
45	که	5,946	0.25	125	13.41
46	کشور	5,871	0.25	699	75.00
47	مي	5,797	0.24	70	7.51
48	هر	5,762	0.24	830	89.06
49	شده	5,676	0.24	814	87.34
50	همين	5,656	0.24	742	79.61

Figure 7-1 *First 50 Words of the Ahmadinejad Wordlist (Part 2)*

Figure 7-2 *Collocation Pattern for* mā



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	مي	كه	ما	را	مي	و	و	و
2	مي	را	مي	و	ملت		در	را	را	مي	را
3	به	مي	را	است	است		مي	به	كه	را	مي
4	را	به	است	در	به		به	و	مي	كه	به
5	است	است	كه	كه	و		بايد	در	به	در	در
6	اين	در	در	را	عزيز		هم	است	كنيم	به	كه
7	در	ما	اين	از	كشور		از	اين	اين	ما	ما
8	كه	اين	به	به	براي		با	از	است	اين	اين
9	ما	كه	ما	پيامبر	امروز		اين	خواهيم	از	از	كنيم
10	از	از	از	هم	از		و	شما	در	است	از
11	هم	هم	هم	اين	اگر		يك	يك	ما	هستيم	است
12	شما	شما	شما	نمي	گفتند		كه	گوييم	هستيم	شما	هم
13	يك	آن	آن	امروز	با		نمي	توانيم	با	با	با
14	با	يك	آنها	شود	شود		براي	كه	شما	كنيم	شما
15	آن	با	چه	براي	كنيم		فكر	داريم	يك	هم	يك
16	آنها	اي	نمي	بود	كنند		داريم	آنها	كن	يك	ملت
17	من	همه	اي	كنند	پيامبر		امروز	با	داريم	اي	بايد
18	همه	آنها	اند	شما	جوانان		خدا	آن	هم	داريم	داريم
19	اي	چه	يك	اند	كه		چه	نمي	آن	بايد	هستيم
20	كنيم	ملت	كنيم	گفتند	آقا		مي	همه	كنند	همه	ايم
21	ملت	ايران	كنند	مي	كند		هستند	هم	آنها	آنها	آن
22	ايران	كنيم	ايران	امام	اند		هر	ما	همه	آن	همه
23	بايد	بايد	امروز	ما	كنيد		مي	همة	ملت	نمي	من
24	شود	من	مي	خواهد	البته		الان	ايران	ايران	ايران	ايران
25	چه	همين	همين	شده	بالاخره		گفتيم	براي	اي	من	براي

Figure 7-3 *Collocation Pattern for* mellat






Figure 7-4 *Collocation Pattern for* mardom




N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	و	به	مردم	را	و	و	و	و
2	به	مي	را	در	و		و	به	مي	به	مي
3	مي	را	مي	به	اين		عزيز	مي	را	مي	در
4	در	كه	در	از	از		اين	در	به	را	به
5	را	مردم	كه	را	كه		است	را	در	در	اين
6	است	به	مردم	مي	شما		در	اين	مردم	مردم	را
7	مردم	در	به	است	با		فلسطين	از	از	از	مردم
8	كه	اين	است	كه	براي		به	هم	است	كه	كه
9	از	است	از	بر	خدمت		غزه	ديار	اين	است	از
10	اين	از	ملت	ايران	است		مي	است	كه	اين	است
11	ما	ما	اين	خدمت	بر		مؤمن	با	ما	اند	ما
12	با	روز	ما	با	متن		ما	استان	كنند	ما	هم
13	من	رحمتت	بر	عزت	حقوق		امريكا	كه	با	هم	بر
14	باران	هم	براي	ما	بين		هم	اي	هم	كنند	كنند
15	يك	اي	هم	اين	خود		عراق	ما	اند	با	با
16	بايد	ملت	بايد	هم	همه		خوب	مؤمن	يك	بايد	ملت
17	هم	من	با	بايد	زندگي		از	بشود	خداي	هستند	يك
18	شما	ايران	ايران	براي	اختيار		بيفزا	هستند	هستند	يك	هستند
19	كنند	براي	شما	اند	هاي		استان	مردم	بايد	بزرگ	اند
20	آن	شما	عزيز	كنند	حضور		قرار	بايد	من	شما	آن
21	دولت	دولت	امروز	مردم	هم		ايران	بر	شود	من	بايد
22	ملت	بايد	كنند	شما	زبان		با	كنند	براي	آن	خودشان
23	اند	با	خواهم	دولت	دست		اند	بگيرد	ايران	همه	ايران
24	بر	آن	من	خدا	همة		جهان	يك	مؤمن	چه	شما
25	همه	كنند	سلام	كنيم	تا		مظلوم	آن	شما	ملت	من

Figure 7-5 *Collocation Pattern for* Iran




N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	و	ملت	ایران	را	و	و	و	و
2	به	می	که	که	در		و	است	است	است	است
3	می	را	در	ملت	به		است	به	به	به	به
4	ایران	است	است	به	عزیز		در	می	می	در	ایران
5	را	به	به	است	و		به	در	در	می	در
6	که	که	می	امروز	اسلامی		عزیز	را	این	را	می
7	در	در	از	همه	ساختن		از	این	از	این	که
8	است	ایران	را	از	از		با	از	ایران	از	را
9	این	از	ایران	در	بزرگ		می	بسازیم	را	ایران	این
10	از	این	این	جمهوری	که		یك	ملت	که	که	ملت
11	ملت	شما	امروز	برای	با		زمین	مردم	ملت	ملت	از
12	ما	ما	ما	با	جای		هم	که	ما	ما	ما
13	شما	ملت	شما	می	باید		هستند	یك	کنند	با	با
14	با	هم	هم	ما	مردم		امروز	همه	همه	شما	هم
15	آنها	آنها	بر	عزت	ای		این	اند	با	من	شما
16	هم	امروز	برای	را	امروز		اند	ما	یك	همه	همه
17	امروز	عزت	اما	هسته	سرزمین		باید	شما	من	یك	یك
18	یك	ای	باید	همهٔ	تام		برای	همهٔ	امروز	هم	ای
19	ای	همه	با	بر	است		که	من	شما	ای	برای
20	خدا	اند	هسته	پیشرفت	فرهنگ		ملتی	با	اند	امروز	بر
21	همه	با	اند	اما	برای		هیچ	کرده	آنها	باید	امروز
22	برای	یك	ای	حق	پیشرفت		نیست	کنند	باید	همهٔ	من
23	اما	برای	دنیا	حرکت	عزت		قرار	ای	اما	برای	آنها
24	همهٔ	باید	ملت	بدخواهان	جوانان		یعنی	شده	هسته	مردم	سال
25	باید	من	سیاسگزاریم	علیه	همه		ملت	شد	کنیم	بزرگ	آن

Figure 7-6 *Collocation Pattern for* dowlat



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	در	در	این	دولت	است	و	و	و	و
2	است	که	و	از	که		و	است	را	را	را
3	می	در	که	به	در		در	می	است	که	که
4	در	است	از	و	و		امریکا	در	که	در	به
5	را	می	است	دستور	کار		هم	را	به	به	در
6	به	را	را	است	است		به	این	در	از	می
7	از	از	می	که	به		را	از	از	می	از
8	این	به	این	می	جلسه		باید	به	می	است	این
9	که	این	به	را	تصویب		اسلامی	که	این	دولت	است
10	هم	دولت	هم	این	از		برای	خواهد	ما	این	برای
11	دولت	هم	ما	ان	جلسهٔ		این	ملت	دولت	برای	دولت
12	ان	آن	دولت	با	یك		می	ان	کرد	هم	هم
13	دیگری	شما	ان	هم	شاءالله		رسید	باید	برای	ما	ما
14	ما	ما	قبل	برنامه	هاي		با	مجلس	با	با	یك
15	برای	ان	باید	مجلس	امروز		تصویب	رسید	ان	مردم	با
16	یك	برای	برای	کار	را		خواهد	شنید	شما	یك	شما
17	آن	شود	الله	شما	هم		ان	دارد	کند	کند	کرد
18	با	من	کار	شاء	دیگر		از	با	خواهد	خواهد	من
19	شما	باید	با	ما	بشود		خواهید	گرفت	شد	شد	خواهد
20	بشود	یك	شاءالله	همین	الله		بودجه	هم	یك	شما	آن
21	باید	با	آن	ملت	خبر		تصمیم	ما	هم	ان	کند
22	کنم	شاءالله	مجلس	دولت	این		که	بود	شاءالله	باید	مردم
23	من	یکی	مردم	شود	که		یك	کرد	کار	کرد	استان
24	خواهد	شاء	همه	هاي	با		قرار	شد	من	من	همه
25	بود	مردم	کنیم	بشود	اما		مصمم	یك	استان	الله	ان

Figure 7-7 *Collocation Pattern for* rāh



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	در	در	راه	را	و	و	و	و
2	به	را	است	به	و		و	را	است	است	است
3	است	است	مي	و	تنها		حل	است	به	به	را
4	مي	مي	را	است	اين		نجات	به	مي	را	به
5	در	كه	كه	كه	كه		مي	باز	را	در	مي
6	را	به	راه	مي	به		خدا	براي	در	مي	در
7	كه	در	در	را	پايان		آهن	اند	راه	اين	كه
8	راه	اين	از	از	را		است	در	اين	كه	راه
9	از	راه	به	اين	از		اندازي	اين	كه	راه	اين
10	اين	ما	اين	اند	يك		رسيده	مي	ما	از	از
11	ما	از	هم	ملت	است		براي	از	از	ما	ما
12	يك	شما	از	ما	ما		درست	رسيده	هم	هم	هم
13	آن	هم	ملت	راه	هم		خودش	راه	براي	كند	يك
14	با	ملت	امروز	يك	ايران		افتاده	ما	انتخاب	باز	خدا
15	شما	براي	براي	براي	جنگ		ديگري	ايران	من	يك	من
16	هم	خدا	يك	ايران	آن		هدايت	كه	اند	آن	همه
17	ملت	با	شما	مجاهدت	تا		خود	اندازند	با	خدا	باز
18	ايران	يك	ايران	كنيم	ابتداي		ملت	گم	همه	كنند	با
19	خدا	آنها	آنها	كنند	وزارت		بيفتد	هم	كند	اند	امروز
20	اند	امام	بايد	كند	خدا		امام	بشريت	امروز	كرده	ملت
21	براي	كنند	با	هم	دنبال		عزت	افتد	تا	با	آن
22	بر	دنيا	خدا	آن	كردن		انداختند	با	كنيم	براي	كنند
23	آنها	امروز	همه	شما	دو		هستيم	تشان	خدا	امروز	اند
24	امام	همه	خواهد	حركت	بايد		افتاد	بشود	كنند	ايران	براي
25	كنيم	اند	امام	باز	راه		اتيا	بر	آن	بايد	بايد






Figure 7-8 *Statistical Collocates for* rāh

Figure 7-9 *Collocation Pattern for* emām




N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	و	به	امام	است	ع	و	و	و
2	است	است	است	به	از		و	و	است	است	امام
3	امام	امام	مي	است	كه		را	ما	را	امام	را
4	مي	به	امام	در	و		عصر	است	به	را	به
5	به	كه	به	از	با		رضا	مي	امام	به	مي
6	را	مي	كه	مي	است		حسين	را	در	مي	است
7	كه	در	را	را	وجود		عزيز	عج	مي	در	از
8	در	از	در	كه	مهر		در	به	از	كه	در
9	از	را	از	دعوت	حضرت		به	در	اين	اين	كه
10	اين	ما	ما	صندوق	دست		زمان	از	كه	ما	ما
11	ما	اين	اين	امام	بود		حق	امام	فرمودند	از	اين
12	همة	همه	عالم	ما	اگر		مي	كه	ما	اگر	همة
13	شما	براي	انسان	عشق	تام		راحل	محترم	با	يك	همه
14	اصلا	خدا	آن	واسطة	عشق		فرمودند	همة	چه	هم	هم
15	هم	يك	تأسيس	اين	راه		معصوم	بشود	اصلا	عالم	شما
16	يك	شما	جز	با	حاكميت		آمد	اگر	الهي	همه	خدا
17	با	آن	براي	بود	بدون		جمعه	چه	همة	با	چه
18	همه	با	اصلا	خدا	هست		هم	فيض	هم	همة	آن
19	عالم	دولت	با	اگر	حركت		اين	يك	همه	گرد	هر
20	براي	جز	خدا	اتصال	جز		كه	اصلا	خدا	خدا	يك
21	من	هم	كسي	شود	ياد		ما	براي	براي	بود	بود
22	خدا	شود	هم	همه	نوراني		نباشد	حضرت	يك	آن	دارد
23	بود	بايد	شود	وجود	اما		واسطة	همه	شود	شما	شود
24	اگر	كند	مي	يادتان	كه		يعني	يك	آن	من	راه
25	مي	همة	شما	بدون	بلند		باشد	هم	اگر	هر	ملت

Figure 7-10 *Collocation Pattern for* edālat




N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	و	و	عدالت	و	و	و	و	و
2	است	است	به	بر	اجراي		است	همه	است	است	است
3	در	به	در	در	به		را	در	به	به	به
4	كه	در	است	است	است		در	مي	در	در	در
5	به	عدالت	كه	به	سهام		يعني	است	عدالت	عدالت	مي
6	عدالت	كه	عدالت	توحيد	برپايي		باشد	عدالت	را	را	عدالت
7	مي	را	را	خداپرستي	از		يعني	به	كشور	همه	كه
8	از	مي	مي	عدالت	بدون		خواهي	از	از	مي	را
9	را	از	از	مي	براساس		به	صلح	مي	كه	از
10	ما	با	ما	براي	بشود		امكان	عشق	همه	از	با
11	همه	بر	هم	كه	اساس		خواه	برپا	كنيم	اين	اين
12	بر	ما	بايد	از	بر		برپا	اين	كند	ما	هم
13	كشور	بايد	كشور	صلح	پايه		محور	خداپرستي	اين	با	همه
14	ملت	ايران	همه	حق	كه		هم	احترام	كه	بايد	ما
15	بايد	اين	بر	قانون	خداپرستي		مي	همة	با	كشور	بايد
16	هم	ملت	اين	توزيع	با		صلح	را	جهان	شود	براي
17	اين	براي	صلح	را	توحيد		پاكي	پاكي	شود	هم	ملت
18	با	همه	پرچمدار	با	جهت		طلبي	كه	براي	ملتها	ملتها
19	امروز	آن	ملت	برادري	بايد		براي	ترين	عشق	اند	پيشرفت
20	صلح	هم	با	بايد	اگر		برادري	با	باشد	براي	انسان
21	شما	خدا	خدا	ما	پرچمدار		طلب	معنويت	بايد	انسانها	مردم
22	مردم	اما	تلاش	جهت	صلح		از	ما	صلح	صلح	كشور
23	يك	كشور	اگر	پاكي	پايه		گسترش	بشود	من	اگر	همة
24	پيشرفت	صلح	ايران	خدا	دنبال		بسازيم	امكانات	اند	انساني	توزيع
25	همة	دعوت	براي	پيشرفت	برپايي		سخت	اجرا	برادري	همة	اگر

Figure 7-11 *Collocation Pattern for* jahān




N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	در	در	جهان	را	و	و	و	و
2	در	را	در	و	بر		است	به	است	است	به
3	به	در	به	را	امروز		و	است	در	به	است
4	است	که	بر	حاکم	و		به	مي	از	مي	را
5	از	است	که	از	همهٔ		در	در	به	در	در
6	مي	به	را	بام	از		بتشان	از	مي	ما	مي
7	که	مي	از	به	مردم		مي	بشود	ما	اين	از
8	را	از	مي	که	عزت		حاکم	اين	که	را	ما
9	ايران	ما	است	بر	به		امروز	با	اين	که	اين
10	ما	ايران	امروز	امروز	همه		اسلام	را	شود	ملت	که
11	اين	اين	ايران	براي	اين		با	اي	يك	از	ايران
12	مردم	نگاهي	ما	منطقه	سراسر		از	شده	را	بزرگ	شما
13	امروز	صلح	عدالت	همه	سطح		هستند	که	امروز	ايران	هم
14	با	امروز	با	شرايط	مسائل		قرار	خواهد	هم	با	يك
15	ملت	ملت	اين	کشور	ملتهاي		بايد	شما	شد	همه	جهان
16	صلح	يك	براي	وضعيت	شرايط		بايد	اما	خداي	آن	با
17	بر	شما	همه	است	که		هم	سرعت	کند	من	ملت
18	جهان	عدالت	شما	مسائل	اول		اين	براي	ايران	يك	براي
19	شما	با	ملت	عدالت	وضعيت		هستيم	اصلاح	اند	شما	همه
20	براي	بر	بسياري	ايران	مديريت		خواهد	ما	همه	امروز	آن
21	عدالت	بايد	نظامات	نقاط	اصلاح		که	شود	با	براي	ملتها
22	يك	خود	بايد	همهٔ	مشکلات		وجود	آن	من	بايد	سازندگي
23	اند	براي	خود	هاي	اقتصادي		بريا	هم	ملت	جهان	امروز
24	بايد	هم	خواهد	وضع	تمام		براي	مطلب	آن	هم	اند
25	امام	انسان	انسان	بايد	بام		نيازمند	يك	اي	اگر	من

Figure 7-12 *Collocation Pattern for* mellat-hā



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	و	همهٔ	ملتها	و	می	و	و	و
2	به	می	در	در	همه		را	و	می	به	به
3	می	به	می	به	و		به	به	است	می	است
4	است	ملت	است	از	سایر		در	شده	به	در	می
5	را	که	را	برای	به		از	از	اند	از	در
6	که	را	به	که	حقوق		می	در	گنند	است	را
7	در	در	از	را	بین		با	است	از	این	از
8	ملتها	است	که	است	بر		هستند	ملت	را	ملت	این
9	از	ملتها	برای	می	که		تحمیل	گنند	در	ملتها	ملتها
10	امروز	از	ما	با	با		هم	این	ملت	را	ملت
11	ملت	این	ایران	انسانها	ثروت		تبدیل	اند	آنها	گنند	که
12	با	با	امروز	بر	از		قرار	را	با	ما	ایران
13	برای	گنند	گنند	امروز	برای		استفاده	خواهد	ایران	که	شما
14	صلح	عدالت	ملت	برای	پیشرفت		بیدار	بشود	ما	امروز	امروز
15	عدالت	برای	این	دولتها	سایر		بوده	دولتها	که	ایران	گنند
16	شما	آنها	ملتها	بسیاری	امروز		باشد	با	این	آنها	اند
17	این	ایران	شما	جیاول	است		احترام	ایران	هم	شما	ما
18	ما	هم	خودشان	پیشرفت	قدرت		باید	انسانها	شما	اما	من
19	آنها	ما	اند	دست	بین		این	شما	صلح	اگر	با
20	ایران	امروز	حقوق	گنند	دل		همه	ما	شوند	اند	هم
21	گنند	شما	آنها	سلطه	تحقیر		برای	آنها	ملتها	خودشان	آن
22	دست	دنیا	بر	کشورها	همهٔ		ملت	دولتهای	شود	همه	هستند
23	جهان	خواهند	دنیا	خواهند	علیه		باز	کرده	اگر	هم	ای
24	دنیا	آن	باید	جیب	دلهای		دارند	غارت	گند	یك	عدالت
25	بر	راه	پیشرفت	ما	ترین		امروز	هم	آن	با	آنها

Figure 7-13 *Collocation Pattern for* khedmat




N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	و	در	خدمت	شما	و	و	و	و
2	را	به	من	را	و		به	عرض	کنم	مي	که
3	در	است	که	که	را		مردم	مردم	در	در	مي
4	که	در	به	مي	خواهم		بيشتر	عزيزان	مي	از	از
5	مي	را	در	هم	براي		و	هستيم	به	است	به
6	به	مي	ما	ما	به		شماست	قرار	اين	اين	در
7	است	که	است	بايد	من		آقا	به	است	به	اين
8	اين	اين	دولت	به	که		صلح	بگويم	قرار	کنم	را
9	از	از	را	در	هم		مي	عزيز	مردم	که	است
10	هم	من	اين	است	يك		ملت	تشويق	گرديد	را	هم
11	ما	با	مي	عرض	ما		رساني	است	ملت	ما	همه
12	من	تا	همه	لحظاتي	توفيق		همة	جامعه	عزيز	مردم	مردم
13	عنايت	همه	از	من	است		رفاه	مي	بکنم	ملت	ما
14	دولت	براي	خودتان	اين	سال		تعالي	در	که	ايران	من
15	همه	هم	تا	دولت	براى		عزيزان	ملت	باشم	هم	عرض
16	با	سال	يك	امروز	امروز		است	اين	را	عرض	ايران
17	آن	خواهم	عنوان	ايران	مشغول		پيشرفت	انسانها	خدا	امروز	شما
18	مى	همة	هم	که	ارادت		انسان	بندگان	بود	قرار	يك
19	مردم	خدمت	مردم	مردم	اينجا		کنند	کشور	از	خدمت	قرار
20	يك	ما	ملت	کار	اين		ايشان	باشد	ايران	عزيز	کنم
21	سال	فرزندان	سال	خواهم	مردم		دوستان	هستم	عرض	کشور	باشد
22	براي	بايد	لحظاتي	يك	بايد		اين	شما	هم	همه	با
23	داد	عنوان	خود	بزرگ	ترين		کند	از	بگيرد	شما	بايد
24	خدمت	خادمان	توفيق	داد	داد		همکاران	باشند	پيشرفت	براي	کشور
25	ايران	که	شما	عالم	فرصت		کمال	عزيزم	مى	با	دولت




Figure 7-14 *Sample Concordance Lines for* harakat

Figure 7-15 *Collocation Pattern for* enqelāb




N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	در	از	انقلاب	اسلامي	و	و	و	و
2	که	در	که	و	و		و	است	است	است	را
3	در	به	در	از	پيروزي		را	در	به	در	در
4	به	که	از	بعد	دوران		ما	به	از	به	است
5	است	است	است	قبل	در		در	را	در	را	به
6	مي	مي	را	به	آرمانهاي		است	اين	را	ما	اين
7	از	ما	به	است	اين		به	که	مي	مي	که
8	را	از	ما	که	است		هم	شد	ما	که	از
9	ما	را	مي	رهبري	اول		فرهنگي	شده	انقلاب	از	انقلاب
10	اين	اين	اين	ايران	عزيز		اسلامي	مي	ملت	انقلاب	مي
11	انقلاب	انقلاب	انقلاب	اين	که		شد	ملت	اين	اين	ما
12	با	شما	ملت	مي	به		مي	ايران	که	يك	با
13	شما	ملت	قبل	ملت	براي		اسلامي	يك	ايران	ايران	ملت
14	اند	سال	بعد	دهة	يك		ملت	اند	يك	شما	يك
15	هم	همه	شما	را	شوراي		که	از	شما	با	هم
16	همه	اسلامي	سال	كشور	با		يك	با	امروز	ملت	ايران
17	ايران	براي	براي	ما	پيام		آمد	نظام	با	هم	همه
18	براي	بود	هم	سال	هاي		عظيم	دفاع	مقدس	اسلامي	همة
19	يك	با	ايران	انقلاب	فرهنگ		اند	براي	همة	همة	امام
20	من	يك	همه	با	فجر		از	تا	شده	حركت	چه
21	ملت	امام	اسلامي	طول	دورة		هستند	هم	من	بود	اسلامي
22	ترين	آن	خصوص	اند	اوايل		با	ما	امام	آن	شده
23	طول	مردم	بود	همة	اصل		تا	انقلاب	بود	اي	شد
24	همة	اند	همة	اسلام	ايران		امام	اسلامي	شد	همه	مقدس
25	شده	كند	امروز	همه	نيروهاي		بود	آرمانهاي	كردند	اما	هاي

Figure 7-16 *Collocation Pattern for* eslām



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	از	و	پیامبر	عزیز	اسلام	و	و	و	و	و
2	به	و	از	و	پیامبر		است	محمد	است	ص	است
3	در	به	مکتب	در	گرامی		ناب	محمدی	مصطفی	است	در
4	که	در	به	از	دنیای		حضرت	است	به	در	را
5	است	که	که	به	و		را	در	ص	به	به
6	ما	وجود	در	مکتب	فرهنگ		در	به	که	را	می
7	از	است	است	که	جهان		به	پیامبر	در	اسلام	سال
8	را	ما	سال	پیامبر	به		با	را	از	می	ما
9	می	اسلام	وجود	است	از		که	همه	را	همه	از
10	درسی	امسال	نازنین	ایران	حاکمیت		هم	مطلب	همه	این	که
11	شما	می	نام	را	صدر		می	می	دوم	از	همه
12	اسلام	را	را	عظیم	امت		برای	ایران	مصطفی	پیامبر	این
13	آموزی	این	اسلام	سال	است		قرار	که	ما	که	اسلام
14	درس	نام	ما	می	اندیشهٔ		عزیز	همهٔ	پیامبر	ما	پیامبر
15	این	امروز	می	انقلاب	عزیز		بود	ما	می	سال	امروز
16	من	همه	فرزند	این	گرامی		ص	شده	اسلام	دربارهٔ	سازندگی
17	همه	شما	ایران	رسول	که		یك	این	این	یك	برای
18	امسال	باید	پیامبر	با	گرامی		نامگذاری	سال	همهٔ	الهی	هم
19	ایران	درسی	درس	ما	جهانی		همه	از	ایران	یعنی	من
20	اول	عزیزان	همه	برای	نیست		دین	نگاهی	عزیز	امروز	همهٔ
21	با	ایران	جهان	دفاع	علمای		اند	با	من	بشریت	آن
22	ملت	پیامبران	فرهنگ	زندگی	بزرگ		این	اما	بشریت	خدا	یك
23	برای	پیروی	امروز	حاکمیت	پرچم		از	برای	یك	ع	باید
24	پیامبر	درس	پرچمداران	بر	توراتی		شهر	مرور	اسلامی	اسلامی	با
25	آن	واسطه	شما	همه	پیامبر		بر	ملت	اند	با	اند

Figure 7-17 *Collocation Pattern for* eslāmī




N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	و	جمهوري	اسلامي	و	و	و	و	و
2	در	مي	در	در	انقلاب		است	در	است	در	در
3	به	به	به	مجلس	دولت		ايران	است	در	است	است
4	است	در	از	است	كشورهاي		را	به	اين	اين	را
5	كه	كه	است	از	و		در	مي	مي	به	به
6	مي	است	كه	نظام	شوراي		به	از	را	كه	مي
7	از	ملت	ايران	به	جامعه		كه	اين	از	مي	اين
8	اين	از	مي	كه	جامعة		بايد	كه	كه	اسلامي	از
9	را	اسلامي	اين	برپايي	نظام		با	با	به	از	كه
10	ايران	اين	را	سازمان	فرهنگ		مي	شده	ما	را	ما
11	يك	را	ما	وظايف	امت		هم	عدالت	ايران	ما	يك
12	اسلامي	ما	اسلامي	دولت	كنفرانس		يك	ملت	اسلامي	براي	اسلامي
13	ما	ايران	براي	با	ايران		اين	يك	كرد	همه	با
14	همه	انقلاب	عدالت	حيات	ميهن		هستند	شما	همه	ملت	هم
15	براي	ترين	بر	هاي	كشور		بريا	براي	عدالت	بايد	من
16	ملت	امروز	دهة	براي	اقتصاد		از	همه	انقلاب	با	همه
17	هم	اسلام	امروز	يك	عقود		ما	ما	براي	يك	عدالت
18	انقلاب	مردم	اسلام	پيروزي	انديشه		نمي	همة	شما	بر	مردم
19	كردند	براي	همة	امروز	انديشة		بود	را	دوم	انقلاب	ايران
20	عدالت	اي	همه	فجر	عزيز		بر	ايران	ملت	هم	ملت
21	فرهنگ	كشور	اما	اصلا	تمدن		براي	ايراني	هم	امروز	همة
22	جمهوري	عدالت	با	روح	حكومت		نيست	امروز	با	ايران	براي
23	سال	يك	فرهنگ	اين	ملتهاي		همه	بشود	مردم	من	بايد
24	دولت	اند	هم	ايراني	حاكميت		هستيم	مطلب	همة	شما	شده
25	بر	نمي	كنم	ميهن	هاي		با	بايد	كنيم	آن	بر




Figure 7-18 *Sample Concordance Lines for* keshvar-hā-ye eslāmī

Figure 7-19 *Collocation Pattern for* haste'ī




N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	در	در	انرژي	هسته	اي	را	مسلم	ماست	و
2	مي	مي	كه	از	موضوع		اى	حق	مي	و	ما
3	كه	از	و	حضار	انرژى		اى	است	به	است	مي
4	به	در	از	به	سوخت		ي	و	و	ما	است
5	است	ملت	ايران	توليد	سلاح			ايران	ايران	در	به
6	را	به	است	كه	قضيه			ما	در	به	كه
7	ايران	ما	ما	و	فناوري			در	را	از	را
8	ما	شما	استفاده	صلح	مسئله			شده	اند	مي	اين
9	در	كه	به	ما	آميز			به	است	ملت	ملت
10	از	است	مي	اين	سلاحهاي			هم	از	را	در
11	با	را	را	با	قضية			شدن	شما	اين	ايران
12	ملت	مى	امروز	يك	مسئلة			ملت	ما	كنند	از
13	هسته	ايران	شما	همين	فناورى			مي	كه	كه	آنها
14	اين	اين	هم	است	حقوق			كه	همه	ايران	هسته
15	اي	اي	كرد	ايران	فعاليتهاي			با	پيدا	اما	همه
16	شما	هسته	نظر	امروز	تأسيسات			متعلق	اين	همه	با
17	استفاده	هم	اي	اگر	ايران			هستند	شده	شما	اند
18	آنها	كنند	همه	مي	در			يك	يك	هسته	اي
19	فرياد	صلح	آنها	همه	ماجراي			بشود	ملت	اند	گنيد
20	هم	اند	فناورى	موضوع	كه			بشوند	اما	كند	اما
21	امروز	نخواهد	كنند	شما	كشور			براي	با	آنها	شما
22	مردم	يك	اين	دربارة	بحث			استفاده	آنها	من	آن
23	اگر	امروز	چرخه	چرخه	ما			داشته	مى	يك	يك
24	حق	خواهد	اگر	اوج	و			خود	هم	كرده	براي
25	كامل	با	راجع	درباره	به			شما	تعطيل	اختيار	اينها

Figure 7-20 *Collocation Pattern for* talāsh



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	كار	و	تلاش	و	و	و	و	و
2	به	در	است	و	بايد		مي	مجاهدت	كه	را	را
3	در	است	در	است	كار		كنيم	كنند	است	به	به
4	كه	با	با	كه	با		براي	كه	به	در	در
5	مي	را	مي	همه	سال		كردند	اين	اين	كه	اين
6	است	كه	براي	اين	ما		كرده	كنيم	در	اين	از
7	را	به	از	ما	كه		بكنيم	به	براي	مي	است
8	اين	از	كه	مجاهدت	در		كنند	كند	را	است	كه
9	با	مي	به	مي	هم		كنيد	تا	از	يك	سال
10	از	سال	سال	در	بر		در	اند	با	ما	ملت
11	هم	براي	اين	با	دارند		كند	در	بيشتر	از	مي
12	ما	بايد	هم	سال	دولت		است	براي	عدالت	هم	براي
13	سال	هم	همه	بايد	است		براى	كرد	مي	با	با
14	براي	اين	بايد	به	خيلي		يكنند	است	تا	سال	آن
15	يك	همه	را	دولت	همه		همه	با	يك	ايجاد	هم
16	بايد	ما	اهل	براي	يك		كرد	از	من	ملت	بشود
17	ايران	پيامبر	ما	اند	داريم		دارند	جانبه	كشور	براي	يك
18	همه	ايران	يك	از	از		مى	را	ايران	ايران	ايران
19	ملت	باشد	كار	كار	عدالت		ما	اما	آن	پيشرفت	كشور
20	خدا	مردم	پيامبر	اهل	اين		يكند	كه	همه	همه	اشتغال
21	كار	يعني	مهم	حركت	حاصل		خواهيم	ايجاد	هم	آن	ما
22	بر	دست	دولت	آن	كشور		شد	برابي	ملت	تشكر	دست
23	مردم	اند	يعني	هم	دارد		مى	كوشش	كار	من	دولت
24	يكي	پيشرفت	وحدت	بود	شما		مجاهدت	فعاليت	خدا	اگر	كار
25	آن	مجاهدت	همة	يعني	همة		براى	وقفه	ما	عامل	خدا

Figure 7-21 *Collocation Pattern for* vahdat




N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	و	و	وحدت	و	و	و	و	و
2	به	به	است	عامل	با		است	همدلي	است	است	است
3	که	است	با	است	محور		ملي	انسجام	در	به	در
4	را	هم	ايران	مي	به		همدلي	ايستادگي	ملي	در	ما
5	مي	اين	مي	اين	عامل		ملت	است	تلاش	مي	به
6	است	مي	که	در	اول		در	توکل	ملت	اگر	يك
7	در	ملت	ما	با	است		کار	را	وحدت	را	مي
8	من	عامل	در	خدا	از		شما	ما	ما	وحدت	را
9	دست	بايد	وحدت	همدلي	سال		برادري	کار	شما	همه	که
10	اين	ما	پيامبر	ايران	تقويت		امت	بايد	مي	خدا	وحدت
11	وحدت	وحدت	به	را	براي		همه	وحدت	از	تلاش	بايد
12	از	را	رمز	تنها	ايجاد		بين	که	بر	ما	ملت
13	بايد	که	براي	ايمان	نقطة		همة	همبستگي	به	از	اين
14	امروز	خدا	هم	به	شود		همدلي	تلاش	هم	که	تلاش
15	چند	تلاش	اين	ايستادگي	رمز		داشته	من	اين	کار	همة
16	هم	با	لطف	امام	همدلي		بود	همدلي	همه	بايد	از
17	با	دست	ساختن	بايد	نيازمند		ما	باشيم	با	ايران	امروز
18	لطف		بايد	از	که		آفرين	اين	توکل	با	شود
19	ما		ملت	وحدت	ما		انسجام	ايستادگي	که	باشد	بر
20			بدهند	ما	ايمان		را	محبت	بايد	هم	با
21				تلاش	تحکيم			در	ايران		سال
22				دعوت	حفظ			برادري			



N	Word	With	Relation	Total
1	مي	مسلمان	900.178	29
2	مسلمان	مسلمان	531.731	270
3	همه	مسلمان	527.677	17
4	بشود	مسلمان	155.176	5
5	اصلا	مسلمان	134.908	25
6	مسيحي	مسلمان	105.914	33
7	يهودي	مسلمان	99.085	26
8	مسيحى	مسلمان	69.268	10
9	اعم	مسلمان	58.024	13
10	هندو	مسلمان	30.849	6
11	ابراهيم	مسلمان	15.442	5
12	غير	مسلمان	15.124	14
13	ملتهاي	مسلمان	14.802	14
14	ايراني	مسلمان	12.306	9
15	وظيفه	مسلمان	8.417	6
16	زن	مسلمان	8.372	5
17	مسئوليت	مسلمان	7.674	6
18	حضرت	مسلمان	7.318	9
19	برادر	مسلمان	7.085	5
20	چه	مسلمان	6.515	26
21	يعني	مسلمان	6.113	16
22	جهاني	مسلمان	6.062	9
23	نه	مسلمان	5.919	14
24	هستند	مسلمان	4.659	15
25	اسلام	مسلمان	4.427	9

Figure 7-22 *Statistical Collocates for* mosalmān



N	Word	With	Relation	Total
1	همه	مسلمانان	667.493	17
2	می	مسلمانان	549.696	14
3	مسلمانان	مسلمانان	532.710	169
4	دائما	مسلمانان	87.744	5
5	مسیحیان	مسلمانان	71.955	8
6	یهودیان	مسلمانان	52.510	9
7	رهبران	مسلمانان	30.503	7
8	بلکه	مسلمانان	17.805	12
9	اسلام	مسلمانان	11.331	15
10	عزت	مسلمانان	10.927	12
11	تنها	مسلمانان	10.000	8
12	بین	مسلمانان	9.484	12
13	قرآن	مسلمانان	9.011	5
14	امید	مسلمانان	8.651	5
15	پیامبر	مسلمانان	7.711	12
16	وحدت	مسلمانان	7.703	5
17	فقط	مسلمانان	6.416	7
18	جنگ	مسلمانان	5.988	6
19	بشریت	مسلمانان	5.466	7
20	امریکا	مسلمانان	5.317	6
21	فلسطین	مسلمانان	5.274	5
22	همة	مسلمانان	4.866	14
23	نه	مسلمانان	4.854	9
24	منطقه	مسلمانان	4.311	5
25	و	مسلمانان	3.611	120


Figure 7-23 *Statistical Collocates for* mosalmānān

Figure 7-24 *Collocation Pattern for* parchamdār




N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	ملت	ملت	و	پرچمدار	عدالت	و	و	و	و
2	است	در	است	و	ایران		این	در	عدالت	است	است
3	در	که	و	ایران	ما		صلح	با	در	در	در
4	که	است	که	امروز	امروز		علم	از	است	عدالت	همه
5	ایران	امروز	در	است	همواره		توحید	است	پرچمدار	برای	به
6	امروز	ملت	امروز	ما	که		و	فرهنگ	از	به	عدالت
7	ملت	ایران	ایران	که	باید		عزت	به	فرهنگ	بوده	همه
8	این	ما	طول	عزیز	همچنان		مبارزه	عدالت	اند		جهان
9	را	می	پیامبر	به	همیشه		خداپرستی	بود	ایران		اند
10	از	از	پرچمدار	تاریخ	است		همه	بوده			ملت
11	پرچمدار	این	ما	در	که		دعوت	خوبیها			پرچمدار
12	سیاسگزاریم	توحید	می		را		آن	اندیشه			بوده
13	می				عنوان		خداپرستی				این
14					ایران		حرکت				را
15					هم		محبت				
16							فرهنگ				
17							تمدن				

Figure 7-25 *Collocation Pattern for* parcham



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	و	و	پرچم	توحید	را	و	و	و
2	است	است	که	که	این		عزت	و	را	را	در
3	این	در	است	است	که		عدالت	در	در	بر	به
4	را	با	در	ملت	امروز		را	ملت	عدالت	ملت	را
5	که	که	می	تا	زیر		اسلام	بلند	بلند	در	است
6	می	به	امام	این	با		برافراشته	عدالت	برافراشته	این	بلند
7	شما	همة	ایران	ایران	تا		هدایت	به	ایران	همه	ایران
8	از	از	تا	به	ایران		امام	می	است	است	برافراشته
9	به	امروز	شما	کرد	برافراشتن		ولایت	ایران	بر	عدالت	
10	در	این		برافراشته	باید		بالتزات		به	بلند	
11		را			شدن		دار		برافراشت		
12							و				

Figure 7-26 *Collocation Pattern for* tawhīd




N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	و	توحید	است	توحید	و	عدالت	و	و	و
2	است	است	است	و	به		است	و	است	است	است
3	همه	همه	همه	دعوت	و		یعنی	همه	به	عالم	همه
4	از	به	از	در	پرچم		یعني	توحید	همه	همه	به
5	توحید	در	به	به	از		را	خدا	عالم	به	از
6	که	از	که	از	درس		عدالت	خداپرستي	در	در	که
7	به	را	عالم	همه	کلمه		در	در	عدالت	از	توحید
8	در	پیامبران	در	است	بر		به	خداپرستی	را	خدا	در
9	عالم	درس	پیامبران	عدالت	با		از	است	توحید	را	عالم
10	خدا	خدا	را	بر	مسیر		سر	همهٔ	می	که	را
11	این	توحید	الهي	عالم	الهي		هیچ	می	این	توحید	خدا
12	را	ما	توحید	پیامبران	پرچمدار		کلمه	عالم	از	همهٔ	این
13	پیامبر	پیامبر	همهٔ	خدا	فریاد		خداپرستي	به	می	پیامبران	عدالت
14	اولین	دعوت	خدا	که	بدون		می	از	یعني	ما	همهٔ
15	اول	این	دعوت	خداپرستي	انبیا		محور	دعوت	کلمه	کرامت	اند
16	پیامبران	همهٔ	پیامبر	الهی	نور		یك	می	که	عدالت	می
17	عزیز	عالم	درس	ایمان	کلمهٔ		فقط	هیچ	خدا	یك	یك
18	الهي	بشریت	ملت	ایران	پایه		نور	یك	کرامت	هیچ	با
19	عزیزان	که	می	بشریت	خداست		بود	ما	دهند	عشق	هیچ
20	براي	ایران	امروز	اسلام	مکتب		ایمان	حقیقت	یك	امروز	دعوت
21	او	اسلام	یك	با	نیست		بر	که	پیامبران	انبیاست	الا
22	ملت	الهي	الهی	فرهنگ	پیامبران		فریاد	عشق	بر	پرچمدار	امروز
23	محور	می	الله	می	که		ستون	شده	پرستي	باید	انسان
24	ما	می	عزیز	انبیاي	الهی		ندای	درس	هستی	می	پیامبر
25	صلح	من	انبیا	من	اند		رمز	عبودیت	مسیر	اله	بر

Figure 7-27 *Collocation Pattern for* nemūne



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	و	و	به	الگو	و	نمونه	و	را	و	و	و
2	به	را	و	به	منطقه		گردشگري	و	از	است	است
3	در	است	مي	يك	جامعه		اش	در	را	در	را
4	ايران	در	كه	است	جامعة		است	از	در	از	اين
5	است	كه	است	مي	يك		اسلامي	الگو	تصويب	كه	مي
6	از	به	در	مقتدر	عنوان		اي	همين	شهرستان	را	از
7	مي	ما	پيشرفته	برپايي	منطقة		هستند	براي	همه	ملت	در
8	دولت	مي	تصويب	دو	است		اند	به	يعني	من	كه
9	اين	جامعه	از	عنوان	ما		در	كنيم	اين	دولت	خواهد
10	ان	پيشرفته	ما	چهار	استاد		را	پيشرفته	كه	به	بود
11	شاء	الله	را	ايران	دو		آن	است	هستند	بايد	ايران
12		براي	جامعه	در	تا		هاي	شاهد	است	ايران	
13			شما	و	جامعة		اسلامي	مخصوص		الگو	
14			اين	اين			گيري			شما	
15			يك	تحقق			پيشرفته			خواهد	
16			مقتدر	جامعه			انتخاب				
17							الگو				
18							براي				
19							هايي				
20							ها				

Figure 7-28 *Collocation Pattern for* mohavvar



N	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	است	و	و	است	و	محور	وحدت	و	و	و	است
2	و	را	مي	و	عدالت		و	است	است	است	و
3	از	است	است	كه	كه		همه	اسلامي	اين	اين	به
4	را	كه	محور	مي	ايران		شرارت	همه	محور	ما	در
5	مي	به	با		است		اصلي	در	به	همه	توحيد
6	در	مي	دنبال		در		است	از	در	عدالت	بود
7	با				توحيد		عالم	پايه		كه	از
8	آن				تنها		همة	همة			محور
9	محور				اين		كار	به			عدالت
10	كار				را		جامعة				
11	كه				يك		اول				
12					حول		را				
13					كنيم		جامعه				
14							اين				