Mad qualia

Abstract:: This paper revisits some classic thought experiments in which experiences are detached from their characteristic causal roles, and explores what these thought experiments tell us about qualia epiphenomenalism, i.e., the view that qualia are epiphenomenal properties. It argues that qualia epiphenomenalism is true just in case it is (nomologically) possible for experiences of the same type to have entirely different causal powers. This is done with the help of new conceptual tools regarding the concept of an epiphenomenal property. One conclusion is that it is not obvious if qualia epiphenomenalism is false; and it is also not obvious what should make us believe that it is false—or for that matter, true. Connections between qualia epiphenomenalism, physicalism, and non-physicalist property dualism are further explored.

Files:: Mad Qualia (Final for ORA).pdf

(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 385.9KB, Terms of use)

Language:: English
Keywords:: realisation

properties

physicalism

absent qualia

inverted qualia

qualia epiphenomenalism
Pubs id:: pubs:946938
UUID:: uuid:d2d38cc8-78fe-4566-9888-cff26e3a7f3c
Local pid:: pubs:946938
Source identifiers:: 946938
Deposit date:: 2018-11-28

Copyright holder:: Umut Baysan
Notes:: This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from Oxford University Press at https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqy065

Licence:: Terms and Conditions of Use for Oxford University Research Archive

If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

Journal article