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A Multinomial Probit Model of Stochastic Evolution.

Abstract:

A strategy revision process in symmetric normal form games is proposed. Following Kandori et al. (Econometrica 61 (1993) 29), members of a population periodically revise their strategy choice, and choose a myopic best response to currently observed play. Their payoffs are perturbed by normally distributed Harsanyian trembles, so that strategies are chosen according to multinomial probit probabilities. As the variance of payoffs is allowed to vanish, the graph theoretic methods of the earlier ...

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Authors


David P Myatt More by this author
Chris Wallace More by this author
Journal:
Journal of Economic Theory
Volume:
113
Publication date:
2003
URN:
uuid:d1459631-318f-4890-afda-7e40b6b4a1f2
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:10962
Language:
English

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