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Joyce's Linguistic Skepticism: The Personal Library as a Cognitive Toolbox

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The twentieth century started with a linguistic crisis. In 1902, Hugo von Hofmannsthal wrote his story "Ein Brief," in which Lord Chandos, after considerable literary achievements, suddenly reaches a crisis and starts doubting language's ability to adequately express human experience.[1] At the same time, Fritz Mauthner was writing and publishing his three-volume *Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache*.[2] Joyce read Mauthner's work on linguistic skepticism, and so did Samuel Beckett, while he was helping Joyce in 1938. From the perspective of Beckett studies, Joyce has been presented as the linguistic problem solver, according to the argument: if language is insufficiently capable of expressing one's thoughts, one can always adjust it and create a new language like "Wakese"—a prototypical form of the modernist "making it new" as it were.[3]

In that sense, we have perhaps too easily adopted Beckett's own habit of using Joyce—the "high modernist" who was "a superb manipulator of material"—as a contrasting backdrop to Beckett's own "late modernist" poetics.[4] For instance, Shane Weller has recently argued

> the Mauthnerian critique of language and of "word superstition" (*Wortaberglaube*) or "word fetishism" (*Wortfetischismus*)—that is, the confusing of word for world—broke harmlessly on the Joycean rock of radical linguistic renewal, for Joyce epitomizes the high modernist reaction to late nineteenth-century language scepticism.[5]

The tenor of this "high modernist reaction" accords with Pound's "make it new" principle: if the old language does not work any more, make it new.

The present essay attempts to revise and refine this canonical view of Joyce as a high-modernist language revolutionary by suggesting instead that he may actually have been setting the agenda for the late-modernist enactment of language skepticism. By examining some of the many books on language that he read, this essay shows how both Joyce's own writing mind and the evocation of the fictional mind in his works depended on the linguistic toolbox that he garnered from

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his reading, and how this toolbox helped him turn *Finnegans Wake* into an enactment of a cognitive process that is solely constituted by language and cannot be attributed to any identifiable fictional character.

Language as "Cognition-Enhancing Tool"

Beckett famously formulated his poetics in his 1937 German letter to Axel Kaun as a program for a "Literatur des Unworts" ("literature of the unword").[6] In this letter, Beckett explicitly referred to Gertrude Stein and James Joyce. Throughout his career, Beckett kept presenting his own "logoclastic" poetics in contrast to Joyce's,[7] to the extent that he arguably *needed* Joyce to give shape to his own aesthetic, as this famous quote from a late interview with James Knowlson indicates:

> I realized that Joyce had gone as far as one could in the direction of knowing more, [being] in control of one's material. He was always adding to it; you only have to look at his proofs to see that. I realised that my own way was in impoverishment, in lack of knowledge and in taking away, subtracting rather than adding.[8]

It may therefore be useful to switch roles for the purpose of this essay: to compare the two to study not Beckett's but Joyce's attitude to language.

Shortly after Beckett had formulated his logoclastic program, he read Olga Plümacher's *Der Pessimismus* and noted down the neologism "Pejorismus" on an interleaf in his copy—denoting the counter-idea to "meliorism," the belief that progress and human interference in nature can lead to an improvement of the world.[9] Pejorism (from the Latin "*pejor*" meaning "worse") thus denotes the belief that progress can lead to the opposite and that this is not the best of all possible worlds—a Voltaire-like reply to the Leibnizian theodicy.[10] Beckett also jotted down the English version of the neologism ("pejorism") in his so-called "Whoroscope" Notebook, on the verso page facing his first notes on Mauthner, which include Mauthner's quite radical cognition-related statement that "all thinking" happens in language (III.616).[11] While Joyce used his Mauthner notes at the very end of his "Work in Progress," Beckett took his notes at the beginning of his career.[12] And whereas Joyce, in his customary way, only snatched a few words here and there, with which he seasoned his multilingual dish as a finishing touch, Beckett made long excerpts, indicating that he was genuinely interested in the content of Mauthner's critique of language. Moreover, Beckett explicitly mentioned in his letters to Thomas MacGreevy that he did not like the term "progress," preferring "mere gress" instead, because of its "purity from destination and

hence from schedule."[13] Thus, Joyce's "Work in Progress" can easily be construed as a useful contrasting background to present Beckett as the late-modernist linguistic skeptic who finally took Mauthner's critique of language seriously and allowed it to ooze into the porous fabric of his language instead of making it break on the blunt, impenetrable "Joycean rock" of linguistic innovation, to build on Weller's metaphor.

But the question is whether Joyce was really so insensitive to linguistic skepticism, and whether "radical linguistic renewal" is necessarily antonymous with a critique of language. Beckett actively contributed to the construction of this dichotomy. Perhaps it is time to provide nuances for it. First, "Work in Progress" resulted in a work whose cyclical structure could not make its lack of teleology more explicit. At the very moment the young Beckett was *talking about* "gress," Joyce was *enacting* it with his neologistic project. Moreover, Beckett was not averse to neologisms himself. The very concept that summarizes his literary counter-theodicy—"pejorism"—is a neologism. Arguably his most radical application of this pejorism (and of his logoclastic poetics) is *Worstward Ho*, which is based on the following motto from Shakespeare's *King Lear*: "The worst is not,/So long as one can say, This is the worst."[14] Since everything can still get worse (*pejor*), the text keeps getting "worse," moving "worstward" asymptotically, since the "worst" can never be reached with words: "So leastward on. So long as dim still. Dim undimmed. Or dimmed to dimmer still. To dimmost dim. Leastmost in dimmost dim. Utmost dim. Leastmost in utmost dim. Unworsenable worst" (95). As Olga Beloborodova points out, this passage "contains more neologisms than extant words, not to mention the complete (and deliberate) disregard for syntax."[15] Moreover, it illustrates the deployment of language as an external cognitive artifact, as Andy Clark calls it; one of Clark's tenets challenges the commonplace idea that language is rooted in pre-given thoughts: "It is natural to suppose that words are always rooted in the fertile soil of pre-existing thoughts. But sometimes, at least, the influence seems to run in the other direction."[16] Clark and David J. Chalmers's view that language is "a cognition-enhancing tool" accords with the extended-mind hypothesis, the post-Cartesian idea that the mind is not an entity separated from the outside, according to René Descartes's mind/body split, but rather extends into the world in a continuous and constitutive way.[17]

Whereas the extended mind hypothesis disputes the Cartesian assumption that cognitive activity takes place exclusively inside the skull, it still supports the idea that cognition is information-processing, which implies some form of representation. "Enactivism" takes this post-Cartesian paradigm one step further in that it abandons the representational account, reconceptualizing basic minds as a constant

feedback loop without any pre-given representational structures stored in the brain and rejecting the division between inside and outside. For radical enactivists such as Daniel D. Hutto, Michael D. Kirchhoff, and Erik Myin, minds are not just extended but extensive: "extensive minds are not merely, occasionally and in special circumstances, extended."[18]

In other words, when von Hofmannsthal's Lord Chandos was in despair because language no longer seemed capable of expressing human experience, his crisis was the crisis of Cartesian dualism between mind and body, inside and outside. The very notion of "expression" suggests this inside/outside metaphor. My proposal is that "expression" was a key element in the linguistic crisis at the beginning of the twentieth century. Joyce was neither unaware of this crisis nor insensitive to the German tradition of *Sprachkritik*. Gradually, he developed a strategy that shifted from telling to showing. For instance, instead of "expressing" that "Dublin was a new and complex sensation," as the artist still put it as a young man in *A Portrait*, Joyce later made the words enact this complex sensation in *Ulysses* and especially *Finnegans Wake*.[19]

By making this shift, Joyce seems to have intuited a different attitude towards language, even though neither the extended-mind hypothesis nor enactivism had yet been introduced. "Really, it is *not I* who am writing this crazy book," Joyce is reported to have said about *Finnegans Wake*: "It is you, and you, and you, and that man over there, and that girl at the next table."[20] From a cognitive perspective, this is a more radical statement than it may seem, for it breaks with a Cartesian, dualistic notion of the mind as separate from the body and the outside world. Instead of seeing literature as the most individual expression of his inner thoughts, Joyce explicitly states that language is a cognitive artifact. In this sense, Joyce's view on language presages Clark's thesis that language is an external tool. Instead of seeing language merely as a tool for communication, Clark regards it as a form of "*scaffolding*" to expand the brain's capacity (*Being* 45)). Thus, the mind is not just something inside the skull, but an interaction between an intelligent agent and his or her cultural and material environment. Clark refers to Peter Carruthers's idea of *public thinking*, suggesting that "one does not *first* entertain a private thought and then write it down: rather, the thinking *is* the writing" (*Being* 197).[21] This statement sounds very similar to the way Beckett famously described what Joyce was doing in "Work in Progress": "His writing is not *about* something; *it is that something itself*."[22] This profound appreciation of literary enactment is what binds Joyce and Beckett. And what both authors' late works—respectively *Finnegans Wake* and *Worstward Ho*—enact above all are the workings of the extensive mind by means of the cognition-enhancing tool that is language.

Enacting the Enactive Mind

Enactivism and enactment are two rather different concepts. Enactivism is the philosophical paradigm according to which cognition arises through a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment, whereas enactment denotes the literary quality of showing rather than telling. In F. R. Leavis's sense, literary enactment entails that, for instance, characters' actions are not presented as exterior signs of inner propositional beliefs; their actions *constitute* their beliefs; in effect, their beliefs are enacted.[23] So, at first sight, the two concepts have nothing to do with each other. But since literary enactment can enact anything, it can also enact an enactive or extensive mind at work.

Evidently, Joyce's aim was not to present an enactive mind at work; the notion of "enactivism" had not even been coined at the time. But he—like many other modernists—did have a special interest in the workings of the mind and in the cognitive (not just communicative) role of language. As for the communicative function of language, Joyce's view was probably as skeptical as Mauthner's, as is evident from his view of history in terms of the parlor game "Chinese whispers."[24] We continuously "express" ourselves and "communicate" historical events, and, in the process, the facts get distorted. From this perspective, *Finnegans Wake* is one big rumor and a parody of the optimistic belief in an "international language." From a cognitive angle, however, Joyce was doing more than just providing skeptical parody. Precisely because he focused on the cognitive rather than communicative function of language, he was onto something that, only decades later, was to become a new, post-Cartesian paradigm in cognitive philosophy.

Joyce's Toolbox of Trite Tropes

Presaging Clark's view of language as a cognition-enhancing tool, Joyce never stopped filling his linguistic toolbox, not unlike the toolbox Stephen King speaks about in *On Writing* when he notes that "to write to your best abilities, it behooves you to construct your own toolbox and then build up enough muscle so you can carry it with you."[25] This toolbox is the equivalent of the tips and tricks for writers, which Joyce found in a book in his personal library, called *Practical Rhetoric* by John Duncan Quackenbos.[26] In Part II ("Literary Invention") of *Practical Rhetoric*, the first "Lesson" concerns "The Art of Gathering Literary Material," and one of the suggested methods is "Invention by Reading": "If the subject selected be unfamiliar to the student; if, on faithfully searching the chambers of memory, he finds them empty of suitable material,—there are still means of collecting

it. Books suggest themselves at once" (64).

Joyce's "art of gathering literary material" is remarkably often related to books on the topic of language and linguistics. Their number is too high to discuss them all in this essay.[27] I will therefore concentrate on a selection, consisting of—on the one hand—books with a positive outlook on language (on eloquence and on effective international communication) and—on the other hand—linguistic skepticism. My aim is to show how Joyce plays these differing perspectives out against each other, gravitating to linguistic skepticism by parodying the naive belief in the possibility of creating an artificial language to promote better international communication. In the process of parodying this optimistic linguistic attitude, he intuited that the human mind is extensive and enacted the workings of the cognitive functions of language as an essential quality of this extensive mind.

As to the optimistic works on language, he kept familiarizing himself with linguistic and rhetorical intricacies in order eventually to create a language that—in formalist terms—"defamiliarizes" common English. Quackenbos's *Practical Rhetoric* is a good example in and of itself. As Ronan Crowley argues, it was Joyce's source for the "Rhetoric" page in his "Subject Notebook."[28] The tropes listed follow the order of Quackenbos's book, but some of the examples are taken from Joyce's own works, such as "Budding buddhists"—Joyce's example of "Alliteration"—which is taken from *A Portrait* (*P* 226).[29] What is particularly interesting is that Joyce seems to be attracted by Quackenbos's examples of how these tropes should *not* be applied, such as his note on "The Excessive Use of Antithesis" as an "offensive mannerism" or his footnote on the "pernicious" effects of hyperbole in everyday conversation, especially among "American young people" who call everything "*magnificent, awful, splendid, agonizing*" (292, 296). Joyce makes a special note about Quackenbos's warning that "Trite and Vulgar Figures offend against dignity" (311). Quackenbos's example "alabaster neck" (311) may be the source for the "allbeplastered neck" in *Ulysses* (*U* 14.1480). But Joyce's most typical and telling *modus operandi* is that he turns Quackenbos's pedantic warning against vulgar figures of speech into—precisely—a vulgar figure of speech, using an alliteration for this item: "Trite tropes" ("Rhetoric page"). Preferring to "offend against dignity," Joyce ignores Quackenbos's example of tmesis and supplies his own "vulgar" alternative, "Satis bloody faction" ("Rhetoric page"). What Quackenbos calls mixed metaphors becomes the item "Bull" in Joyce's list, which ends with "Catachresis"—or "beautiful mixed metaphor" in Quackenbos's definition—and the example—"Architecture is frozen music" (313-14, "Rhetoric page"). Almost two decades later, in the last stages of "Work in Progress," Joyce was still interested in mixed metaphors and catachresis. In his notes on Mauthner's *Beiträge*

zu einer Kritik der Sprache, he noted "hand of mouth,"a reference to Saint Augustine's use of the expression "manus oris mei" about which Mauthner comments that it sounds like "extended longing" or "ausgestreckte Sehnsucht" (II.504).[30] Yet Mauthner mentions it, not as a positive example of how to improve one's rhetorical skills, but rather to illustrate that Shakespeare basically stole this trope from the ancient masters in Latin and Greek.

That brings us to the pessimistic attitude toward language. Since language is based on the memory of past sensory experiences, it is often more of an obstacle than a bridge between the human being and reality, according to Mauthner. Language is therefore unsuitable to acquire knowledge and even unsuited for communication, since words are based on memories and everyone has different memories (III.641).

Linguistic Optimism Versus Skepticism

Joyce's attitude is deliberately ambiguous. While he read Mauthner, he also made notes on Otto Jespersen's *An International Language*, which announces itself in the first sentence of the introduction as "a plea for an artificial international auxiliary language."[31] Before Jespersen presents his own language, NOVIAL or Nov (new) International Auxiliary Language, he summarizes the history of the Interlanguage movement, discussing such artificial languages as Volapük, Esperanto, Ido, and Latino sine flexione (52). From the section on Volapük, Joyce took a set of notes that he inserted in *Finnegans Wake* as a deliberately convoluted passage "to mark (or disturb?) the transition between one section in which the accusations against Earwicker's alleged 'partial exposure' (*FW* 34.26-27) in the park are attenuated and the next in which his guilt is apparently affirmed as he meets the 'cad with a pipe' (*FW* 35.11)."[32] Even for someone who speaks Volapük, the passage (*FW* 34.30-32) makes no sense, or, in Wakean terms: "this is nat language at any sinse of the world" (*FW* 83.12). Joyce added the nonsensical passage at a relatively late stage just before the sentence that starts with "Guiltless," the first word of the red-backed "Guiltless" copybook, which testifies to one of the most creative bouts in the genesis of *Finnegans Wake*.[33] The word itself is rhetorically highly interesting as it immediately suggests the notion of guilt in the very act of denying it: "Guiltless of much laid to him he was *clearly* for once at least he *clearly* expressed himself as being" (*FW* 34.34-35, my italics). This is a pivotal sentence, not just because the denial is the engine behind the narrative of the entire book, but also because it deals with "expression." HCE "expressed himself" as being without guilt; in other words, he is said to have expressed a pre-given propositional thought in language. And because he expressed

himself "clearly," he is also assumed to be equally "clearly" guiltless. The repetition of the adverb "clearly" suggests the irony between the lines. By choosing precisely this moment in the text to insert the incomprehensible Volapük passage, Joyce parodies the ambition of the Interlanguage movement to solve all communication problems by making people express themselves "clearly" in a language, as Jespersen writes, "made consciously by one man or a group of men" (11). In this context, it is interesting that Joyce was inspired by Jespersen to give HCE a stutter. In an earlier work, *Language: Its Nature, Development, and Origin*, Jespersen writes that "there are far more stammerers and bad speakers among boys and men than among girls and women," which gave Joyce the idea that "Pop stammers."[34] Shortly after the Volapük passage, in his reply to the cad with the pipe, HCE stammers: "Shsh shake, co-comeraid! . . . for the honours of our mewmew mutual daughters, credit me, I am woowoo willing to take my stand, sir, upon the monument, that sign of our ruru redemption" (*FW* 36.20-25).

The Cognitive Functions of Language

Joyce's parody of clear communicative expression is a form of linguistic skepticism, but it also serves as an investigation of the cognitive functions of language. Talking about Marcel Proust in conversation with Arthur Power, Joyce suggested that "[a] living style should be like a river which takes the colour and texture of the different regions through which it flows."[35] If the "riverrun" can be regarded as an enactment of the workings of the mind in terms of a "stream of consciousness"—to use the then current metaphor—this mind is the main topic of chapter 8 of *Finnegans Wake*, and it takes the linguistic color and texture of the "gossipaceous" washerwomen on its banks (*FW* 195.04). Again, Jespersen—this time in his book *Growth and Structure of the English Language*—served as a source of linguistic material ("gossipaceous" is one of his examples of the formation of adjectives).[36] Jespersen explains how the Dutch in South Africa,

> finding there a great many natural objects which were new to them, designated them either by means of existing Dutch words whose meanings were, accordingly, more or less modified, or else by coining new words, generally compounds. Thus *sloot* "ditch" was applied to the peculiar dry rivers of that country. (*Growth* 156)

Joyce noted the word "sloot,"[37] which made it into the ALP chapter: "sound asleep in a sloot" (*FW* 204.16). In Jespersen's conclusion to the book, he discusses euphemisms. Joyce's attention is, as usual, attracted by the examples, which he mainly used for the washer-

women. Thus, Jespersen enumerates a series of euphemisms for the word "trousers": "*inexpressibles, inexplicables, indescribables, ineffables, unmentionables, unwhisperables*" (*Growth* 249). Joyce noted them down (VI.B.06:72-73), and in *Finnegans Wake* one of them is not just whispered, but exclaimed—"How unwhisperably so!" (*FW* 182.28-29)—suggesting Joyce's view of history as the game of "Chinese whispers." When we talk about an event in the distant past, nobody has actually experienced it; we just pass on what has been whispered into our ears by our predecessors and usually distort it in the process. When Joyce was asked what his next project after *Ulysses* would be, he replied that his plan was to write a history of the world. Against this background, the accusations of HCE, all the rumors circling around a blank space—an event in the park about which the reader never actually receives the facts—serve as Joyce's view of the mechanism behind the history of the world. Similarly, he presents the mechanism behind the workings of the mind as the whispers and tittle-tattle of the "gossipaceous" washerwomen in the ALP chapter, as the dirt through which the stream of consciousness flows, and whose color and texture it inevitably takes. There is more to this bleak picture than merely linguistic skepticism. Instead of expressing a pre-given propositional thought in language, language here gives shape to thought. The language of the washerwomen on the banks of the regions through which ALP flows gives color to a mind about which we do not know anything else. Thus, fifty years before Clark, Joyce uprooted the commonplace idea that language is "rooted" in pre-given thoughts.

Conclusion

With these books on language and linguistics, Joyce filled his toolbox by focusing on the illustrations and in some cases on the mistakes or bad examples. The effect is that language becomes more than just a means of "expression." For Joyce—in effect, on the level of the *writing mind*—it was a tool, an extension of the neural agent, a crucial aspect of the workings of the mind. On the level of the *fictional mind*, language's role is arguably even more important. If the "riverrun" of *Finnegans Wake* can be seen as a stream of consciousness (*FW* 3.01), we, as readers, partake in the workings of this fictional mind as soon as we read the first word. We do not know "whose" mind this is. In other words, we do not know who is the "neural agent"; we do not even know if there is a neural agent at all. *Finnegans Wake* can thus be read as the literary enactment of a cognitive process that is solely constituted by language and cannot be attributed to any identifiable fictional character. From a post-Cartesian point of view, the experiment is so radical that it imagines a mind that does not just consist

of a neural-agent-plus-linguistic-extension, but purely of linguistic extension. The same applies to Beckett's *Worstward Ho*, which can also be seen as an enactment of an enactivist view of the (extensive) mind, assuming a linguistic extension in interaction with an implied, totally inexplicit, neural agent. In both cases, the Cartesian way of seeing literature as an outward expression of an "inner" propositional content of thought is replaced by another, post-Cartesian paradigm. Neither Joyce nor Beckett considered themselves philosophers, because they did not *write about* this phenomenon; instead, their literature *enacted* it: their late works are not about an extensive mind; they *are* that extensive mind at work. In that sense, Beckett may have had more in common with Joyce than he was ready to admit.

NOTES

[1] The verb "express" (*ausdrücken*) occurs a few times in the story: see Hugo von Hofmannsthal, "Ein brief," *Gesammelte Werke in Einzelausgaben, Prosa II*, ed. Herbert Steiner (Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 1976), pp. 7-20.

[2] Fritz Mauthner, *Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache*, 3 vols., 3rd revised ed. (1901-1902; Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1923). Further references will be cited parenthetically in the text with Roman numerals indicating the volume numbers.

[3] Ezra Pound, *Make It New: Essays* (London: Faber and Faber, 1934).

[4] Israel Shenker, "An Interview with Beckett," *Samuel Beckett: The Critical Heritage*, ed. Lawrence Graver and Raymond Federman (London: Routledge Publishers, 2005), p. 162.

[5] Shane Weller, "From Language Revolution to Literature of the Unword: Beckett as Late Modernist," *Beckett and Modernism*, ed. Olga Beloborodova, Dirk Van Hulle, and Pim Verhulst (London: Palgrave Press, 2018), p. 42.

[6] Beckett, *Disjecta*, ed. Ruby Cohn (New York: Grove Press, 1984), p. 54.

[7] See Beckett's discussion of "logoclasm" or "ruptured writing" in *Letters of Samuel Beckett*, ed. George Craig et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009), 1:521.

[8] James Knowlson, *Damned to Fame: The Life of Samuel Beckett* (London: Bloomsbury Press, 1996), p. 352. At the same time, Beckett highly respected Joyce, as his German diaries indicate—on this, see Knowlson (p. 258)—and he kept respecting him until the end, even paying homage to him by referring to the last lines of *Finnegans Wake* in his own last work "What Is The Word," in "*Company*," "*Ill Seen Ill Said*," "*Worstward Ho*," "*Stirrings Still*," ed. Van Hulle (London: Faber and Faber, 2009), p. 134. Further references will be cited parenthetically in the text. Joyce's ending lines—"A way a lone a last a loved a long the"—became, for Beckett, "afaint afar away over there" (134). See Joyce, *Finnegans Wake* (New York: Viking Press; London: Faber and Faber, 1939), 628.15-16. Further references will be cited parenthetically in the text by *FW* and the page and line numbers.

[9] Olga Plümacher, *Der Pessimismus in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart: Geschichtliches und Kritisches*, 2nd ed. (Heidelberg: Georg Weiss Verlag, 1888).

[10] See G. W. Leibniz, *Essais de Théodicée sur la Bonté de Dieu* (Amsterdam: L. Troyel, 1710).

[11] See Mauthner's original comment: "weil alles Denken in den Worten der Sprache stattfindet" (III.616), and see also Beckett's Mauthner notes at the University of Reading (UofR manuscript 3000, 47v).

[12] For a summary of critical works on Joyce and Beckett's use of Mauthner's *Kritik*, see Van Hulle, "'Eff it': Beckett and Linguistic Skepticism," *Beckett/Philosophy*, ed. Matthew Feldman and Karim Mamdani (Stuttgart: Ibidem, 2015), pp. 279-80.

[13] Beckett, *The Letters of Samuel Beckett, 1929-1940*, ed. Martha Dow Fehsenfeld and Lois More Overbeck (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009), p. 186.

[14] William Shakespeare, *King Lear*, *The New Oxford Shakespeare: The Complete Works* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2017), p. 2403. See Beckett's "Sottisier" Notebook, preserved at the University of Reading (UofR MS 2901, 14v).

[15] Olga Beloborodova, *Postcognitivist Beckett* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, forthcoming 2020).

[16] Andy Clark, *Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), p. 208. Further references will be cited parenthetically in the text by *Being*.

[17] Clark, "Magic Words: How Language Augments Human Computation," <http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/concepts/magicwords.html>. See also Clark and David J. Chalmers, "The Extended Mind," ed. Richard Menary (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010), pp. 27-42.

[18] Daniel D. Hutto, Michael D. Kirchhoff, and Erik Myin, "Extensive Enactivism: Why Keep It All In?" *Frontiers in Human Neuroscience*, 8 (2014), <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4174762>.

[19] Joyce, "*A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man": Text, Criticism, and Notes*, ed. Chester G. Anderson (New York: Viking Press, 1968), p. 66, and "*Ulysses": The Corrected Text*, ed. Hans Walter Gabler et al. (New York: Vintage Books, 1986). Further references to *A Portrait* will be cited parenthetically in the text by *P* and the page numbers and to *Ulysses* by *U* and the episode and line numbers.

[20] Eugene Jolas, "My Friend James Joyce," *Partisan Review*, 8 (March-April 1941), 90, my italics.

[21] See, for instance, Peter Carruthers, *Language, Thought, and Consciousness* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996).

[22] Beckett, "Dante... Bruno. Vico.. Joyce," *Disjecta* (p. 27, my italics).

[23] F. R. Leavis, *D. H. Lawrence: Novelist* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1955), p. 143. Leavis also referred to "enactment" as "active presentment"—see Leavis, *"Anna Karenina" and Other Essays* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1967), p. 28.

[24] See Sylvia Beach, *Shakespeare and Company* (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1959), p. 185: "history was like that parlor game where someone whispers something to the person next to him, who repeats it not very distinctly to the next person, and so on."

[25] Stephen King, *On Writing* (New York: Scribner Publishers, 2000), p. 114.

[26] John Duncan Quackenbos, *Practical Rhetoric* (New York: American Book Company, 1896). Further references will be cited parenthetically in the text. See Michael Patrick Gillespie, *James Joyce's Trieste Library* (Austin, Tex.: Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center, 1986), p. 191.

[27] The following list is not exhaustive but may give an impression of what

can either be reconstructed on the basis of Joyce's notes or is still extant in his personal library: *Bell's Standard Elocutionist* (1892); Jacques Boulenger and André Thérive, *Les Soirées du Grammaire-Club* (1924) in VI.B.5, VI.B.14; Pedro Carolino, *English as She is Spoke* (1883); Edward Clodd, *The Story of the Alphabet* (1900); J. Crépieux-Jamin, *Les éléments de l'écriture des canailles* (1923), in VI.B.06; Ernest Fenollosa, "The Chinese Written Character as a Medium for Poetry" (1919) in VI.B.30; Henri Goujon, *L'expression du rythme mental dans la mélodie et dans la parole* (1907); Otto Jespersen, *Language: Its Nature, Development, and Origin* (1922) in VI.B.02; *Growth and Structure of the English Language* (1923) in VI.B.06; *An International Language* (1928) in VI.B.46; Marcel Jousse, *Le style oral rythmique et mnémotechnique chez les verbo-moteurs* (1924) in VI.B.21; Mauthner, *Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache* ([1901-1902] 1923) in VI.B.41 and VI.B.46; Antoine Meillet, *Les langues du monde* (1924) in VI.B.45; Sir Richard Paget, *Babel, or The Past, Present, and Future of Human Speech* (1930) in notebook VI.B.32, 140-46; *Human Speech: Some Observations, Experiments, and Conclusions as to the Nature, Origin, Purpose, and Possible Improvement of Human Speech* (1930) in VI.B.32, 147-52; L. Sainéan, *La langue de Rabelais* (1922) in VI.B.45; Léopold-François Sauvé, *Proverbes et dictions de la Basse-Bretagne* (1878) in VI.B.14; Adrien Timmermans, *Pourquoi parlons-nous comme nous parlons?: Justification du langage dans sa genèse et dans son évolution phonétique et sémantique* (1925) in VI.B.12; Richard Chenevix Trench, *On the Study of Words*: *English Past and Present* (1855); *A Select Glossary of English Words Used Formerly in Senses Different from Their Present* (1859) in the notesheets for "Oxen of the Sun"; and Giambattista Vico, *La Scienza Nuova* in VI.B.02, VI.D.02.

Included at the Harry Ransom Center collection (the Trieste Library): *Selections from the Best English Authors* (1907); Quackenbos, *Practical Rhetoric* (1896); Quintilian, *Unterricht in der Beredsamkeit*, Book X, trans. into German by W. Nicolai (n.d.); and Charles John Smith, *Synonyms Discriminated: A Dictionary of Synonymous Words in the English Language* (1913); at the University at Buffalo (the Paris Library): Henry Louis Mencken, *The American Language: An Inquiry into the Development of English in the United States* (1922); Charles Kay Ogden, *Debabelization: with a Survey of Contemporary Opinion on the Problem of a Universal Language* (1931); *Brighter Basic: Examples of Basic English for Young Persons of Taste and Feeling* (1931); and *Basic English: A General Introduction with Rules and Grammar* (1930); and at Stanford University: John Camden Hotten, *The Slang Dictionary* (1870). For a more extensive discussion, see the forthcoming monograph *James Joyce's Library* by Geert Lernout, Ronan Crowley, and Dirk Van Hulle.

[28] Crowley, "The Macrogenesis of *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*," *The New Joyce Studies: Twenty-First Century Critical Revisions*, ed. Catherine Flynn (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, forthcoming). The "Rhetoric" page of the Subject Notebook is catalogued as National Library of Ireland MS 36,639/3, p. [14r]. Further references will be cited parenthetically in the text as "Rhetoric page."

[29] For other examples derived from Joyce's own works, see Wim Van Mierlo, "The Subject Notebook: A Nexus in the Composition History of *Ulysses*—A Preliminary Analysis," *Genetic Joyce Studies*, 7 (Spring 2007), <geneticjoycestudies.org>.

[30] See the *Finnegans Wake* notebook VI.B.41 (p. 272), and see Saint Augustine, *St. Augustine's Confessions: or, Praises of God* (London: T. Meighan,

1739), XI:11.

[31] Otto Jespersen, *An International Language* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1928), p. 11. Further references will be cited parenthetically in the text.

[32] Erika Rosiers and Van Mierlo, "Neutral Auxiliaries & Universal Idioms: Otto Jespersen in *Work in Progress*," *James Joyce: The Study of Languages*, ed. Van Hulle (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2002), p. 66.

[33] See BL Add 47471b.

[34] Jespersen, *Language: Its Nature, Development, and Origin* (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1922), p. 146. See the *Finnegans Wake* notebook VI.B.02: 62.

[35] Arthur Power, *Conversations with James Joyce* (Dublin: Lilliput Press, 1999), p. 91.

[36] Jespersen, *Growth and Structure of the English Language* (New York: Appleton Publishers, 1923), p. 126. Further references will be cited parenthetically in the text by *Growth*.

[37] *Finnegans Wake* notebook VI.B.06:73.