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## **Contextualizing immigrant inter-wave dynamics and the consequences for migration processes**

Ukrainians in the United Kingdom and the  
Netherlands

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**THEMIS**  
Theorizing the  
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- analyse migration as part of broader global change
- contribute to new theoretical approaches
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### Abstract

What drives international migration? Theories of migration networks, migration culture, migration systems and cumulative causation suggest that once a critical threshold level of migrants have settled, migration tends to stimulate the creation of social and economic structures that make the process of migration self-perpetuating (cf. Massey et al. 1987; de Haas 2010). One important aspect of the theory is that the more migrants from a particular locality settle in one place, their presence, assistance and established structures in the destination country act as incentives for others to follow in their footsteps, which emphasizes the instrumental role of pioneers' agency in influencing others to follow suit. A historical perspective on the migration from Ukraine to the United Kingdom and the Netherlands challenges this assumption. While substantial numbers of migrants have settled in those destinations, migration, especially in the last 20 years, has not developed into large, self-sustaining migration systems (in comparison to the dynamic migration linkages between Ukraine and Southern European countries such as Portugal, Italy and Greece). Trying to understand why migration has not taken off, we argue that the role of settled pioneer migrants and their community structures in assisting others to follow in their footsteps should not be taken for granted. We argue that the role of pioneers is much more ambiguous and complex, and the relevant question about 'bridgeheads' and 'gatekeepers' (cf. Böcker 1994) should not be that of 'either/or' but 'how much', 'to what extent' or 'under what conditions'.

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**Keywords:** migration system, cumulative causation, Ukrainian migration, pioneer migrants, migration waves, United Kingdom, Netherlands

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# 1 Introduction

The role of settled migrants influencing others to follow in their footsteps is considered to be an important explanation for continuing and sustaining migration processes (Boyd 1989; Massey et al. 1987). Migration network literature suggests that once a critical threshold level of migrants has settled, their presence and assistance in the destination country tends to stimulate the creation of social and economic structures that make the process of migration self-perpetuating (de Haas 2010; Massey and Espinosa 1997). The role of settled or 'first' migrants can be traced back to social adaptation studies that examined the effects of massive population shifts after the Second World War, arguing that migrants managed in the cities by adapting the support systems that aided them in their rural hometowns (cf. Krissman 2005: 8; Gurak and Caces 1992: 153). However, other studies on migrant networks have shown that sometimes settled migrants and migrant organizations function as 'gatekeepers' instead, discouraging others to follow suit (Böcker 1994; Mahler 1995; Garapich 2006; Eckstein 2009). This evolved into the debate about the 'agency' of pioneer migrants in organizing communities, establishing community structures and helping others to move and adapt to the new environment.

A historical perspective on the migration from Ukraine to the United Kingdom and the Netherlands casts new light on this theoretical debate. While substantial numbers of Ukrainian migrants have settled in these destinations, migration – especially in the past 20 years – has not developed into large, self-sustaining migration systems in comparison to the sudden and dynamic migration linkages between Ukraine and Southern European countries such as Portugal, Italy and Greece. While structural factors attached either to the destination (tightening migration policies, different economic cycles) or to the origin context (Cipko 2006; Malynovska 2007) might partly account for these differences, it is also important to investigate the relationship between the settled and newcomer migrants and to examine the role of pioneers in influencing others to follow suit.

Trying to understand why migration from Ukraine to the United Kingdom and Netherlands has not taken off, we argue that the role of settled pioneer migrants and their community structures as 'bridgeheads' (Böcker 1994) should not be taken for granted. Based on our insights into Ukrainian migration patterns we learned that the role of pioneers is more ambiguous and complex. Inter-wave relations among 'old' and 'recent' migrants are often fragmented with internal tensions, distrust and ample opportunities for migrants to exploit each other. Sometimes pioneers indeed played an important role in encouraging others to come, but at other times they acted as strong gatekeepers of the community. In this paper we attempt to re-conceptualize and nuance the role of pioneer migrants. We develop a contextualized interpretation of the agency employed by pioneer migrants and their organizations for subsequent migratory movements.

Reviewing the scarce and rather fragmented literature on the relationship between different 'waves' of migrants and the consequences for setting in motion migration processes, we set the premises for the analysis (Bakewell et al. 2011). After having introduced our data and methods, we nuance and contextualize the role of pioneer migrants in influencing subsequent movements. We pay attention to the agency of pioneers in establishing network structures, which results in a certain relationship of power between the settled and newcomer migrants. We argue that in order to understand the role of settled migrants for subsequent movements it is important to pay more attention to the

differences between migrant waves, where cultural and class divisions often occur. We conclude that in order to understand the migration dynamics and the role of agency, pioneer migrants should not be viewed solely as 'bridgeheads' or 'gatekeepers' but as a combination of both.

## **2 Conceptualizing agency: beyond pioneers as bridgeheads or gatekeepers**

The definition of a 'pioneer' according to the Oxford Dictionary is 'one of the first people to go to a particular area in order to live and work there' (Oxford Dictionary Online).<sup>1</sup> The traditional approach to pioneer migration sees pioneers as the initial 'movers', who left their country and community of origin (or current dwelling) and went to a different country, where none of the members of their community had been before. Because pioneer migration involves high costs and risks, pioneer migrants are often characterized as innovators and risk-takers (Lindstrom and López Ramírez 2010: 55; de Haas 2010: 1599). They are considered to be crucial nodes in migration networks. By setting an example and facilitating social structures and support, pioneers can affect the migration aspirations and behaviours of potential followers. They are the ones who 'pave the way', and create the opportunities for other members of their community to follow in their footsteps.

This conceptualization already attributes pioneer migrants with a certain degree of agency. To be an agent means to be capable of exerting some degree of control over the social relations in which one is enmeshed, which, in turn, implies the ability to transform those social relations to some degree (Sewell 1992: 20). Emirbayer and Mische (1998) offer a sophisticated theorization of agency, which we adapted to nuance our understanding of pioneers in influencing further migration movements. The agency is conceptualized at three levels: habitual, projective and practical-evaluative. Agency is defined as 'the temporally constructed engagement by actors of different structural environments which, through the interplay of habit, imagination, and judgement, both reproduces and transforms those structures in interactive response to the problems posed by changing historical situations (Emirbayer and Mische 1998: 970).

Massey et al. (1987) described the performance of agency by established pioneers as decisive in encouraging others to migrate. In *Return to Aztlán* they demonstrated how networks based on kinship, friendship, or a sense of common community of origin (*paisaneje*) gave rise to the social organization of migration, which eventually led to the self-perpetuation of migration. A similar understanding of pioneer agency, as directly inspiring subsequent migration, stems from Faist's (2000) research on Turkish migrants in Germany. During the 1960s, pioneer migrants – acting as brokers in their villages of origin during vacations – nominated future migrants, mostly activating their kinship ties if they came from the villages in rural areas, or encouraging 'stepwise migrants' – people who had earlier migrated from villages into big Turkish cities to move on to Germany (Faist 2000: 174). In her study of two Anatolian villages Engelbrektsson (1978) revealed how pioneer migrants to Sweden provided the travel money or sponsored 'tourist' trips abroad; other mechanisms included family reunification and marriage arrangements with Swedish women or obtaining an employer's certification (Engelbrektsson 1978). Fellow villagers both abroad and at home

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<sup>1</sup> <http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/pioneer?rsk=lniikg&result=2>

were willing and felt a moral duty to grant practical assistance to those who opted for emigration.

Previous migration experience and the settlement of migrants at particular places of destination were therefore known to facilitate or even predict the arrival of new migrants (Delechat 2002; Stark and Wang 2002). Social capital embedded within networks of relatives, friends, or even merely co-nationals and more institutionalized social structures in the destination reduced the costs and risks of migration. This increased the likelihood of setting in motion migration dynamics independent of their initial conditions (Bashi 2007; Curran et al. 2005; Curran and Rivero-Feuntes 2003; Garip 2008; Massey and Espinosa 1997; Palloni et al. 2001). The pioneer migrants' agency accounted for the stimulating effect on further migration processes, *par excellence*. They were portrayed as functionally and instrumentally embedded within an established migration system. Their main role was to pave the way and make it easier for newcomers to follow. Their role as catalysts for further migration was taken for granted.

However, settled migrants might also employ their agency in other ways. The prior migrant might not always fulfil the obligations and the expectations of those 'left behind'; they may not agree to provide help when asked, and even when they do they might not extend as much help as they are capable of providing. For instance, 'migration assistance can be withheld when established immigrants have limited resources or when they do not see the arrival of more immigrants as beneficial' (Bakewell et al. 2011). The empirical research on migrant networks does not provide direct measures of the type and quantity of migration assistance provided (Paul 2011). The idea of pioneers reorienting themselves while abroad has been relatively less explored (Faist 2000: 127). Settled migrants acting as gatekeepers is not a new phenomenon, yet it has been used in comparatively few studies, and therefore its employment has been much more fragmented than it is in research on how migrants employ their agency to assist others to follow.

Böcker (1994) introduced the concept of 'gatekeepers' to denote the possible negative consequences of pioneer agency for further migration in the context of marriage migration to the Netherlands. Böcker looked at the family politics of Turkish migrants and their close and distant relatives back in Turkey. In the 1990s when economic conditions worsened, unemployment increased dramatically among settled Turkish migrants in the Netherlands and the Dutch government introduced new restrictions for legal immigration. The settled Turkish migrants responded to these changes by resisting the pressures of family back home and refusing to assist 'yet another brother-in-law' to come to the Netherlands. Some offered vague promises of 'arranging something', while others reduced their contact with relatives back home to a minimum (Böcker 1994: 97).

While Böcker's ethnography is rich, she has not attempted to understand or theorize the reasons *behind* settled migrants acting as gatekeepers beyond the changing socio-economic characteristics of the receiving context. There is a lack of understanding about what this gatekeeping role meant in terms of the agency of settled migrants. It was assumed, along the lines of Massey et al. (1987), that mutual help, support and positive social capital are expected of the relationship between settled and new migrants. Gatekeeping is considered somewhat as an anomaly, 'forced' upon settled migrants by the restrictive admission conditions in the receiving country. We are left with the question: could there be other reasons for the pioneers not encouraging others to follow or cutting their ties with the origin country?

Eckstein (2009) offers a more exhaustive account by looking at inter-wave dynamics between settled and recent Cuban migrants in California. The settled diaspora of pioneers was comprised of emigrants who left Cuba between 1959 and 1979 and were mainly of upper- and middle-class origins. They left Cuba because of the revolution, which stripped them of property and privileges and left some fearful for their lives. Because of the conditions under which they left, they viewed themselves as political exiles. By contrast, Cubans emigrating in 1980 and thereafter were more likely to be of a working-class background, and they more typically moved to the US for economic reasons to improve their material well-being. The pioneers did not look forward to the arrival of the newcomers, as they came from a different world – with the imprint of the Castro regime. Eckstein paints a picture of rather hostile inter-community dynamics, where the settled diaspora snubbed the new arrivals, whom they considered their social inferiors. As a result Eckstein challenges the methodologically nationalistic position that immigrants from the same home country could best be understood as a homogeneous group of foreign-borns (*ibid.*). While hostility towards the post-1980s wave of immigrants tapered off over the years, to date post-1980s and earlier immigrants socialize little with each other. Cross-cohort family ties are limited, and most active participants in *municipio* (community-of-origin) Cuban-American professional and other groups are first wavers. Moreover these two waves typically live in different neighbourhoods in Miami. In short, Eckstein explains negative inter-wave dynamics by differential circumstances, motives and strategies by which migrants arrived in the destinations.

Sarah Mahler's (1995) *American Dreaming* also demonstrated the dark side of the relationship between established migrants and newcomers: abundant levels of negative social capital and a number of socio-economic abuses that circulate within migration networks. Mahler's most important contribution is an overdue discussion of the bitter surprise of many new migrants when they discover that assistance from the settled migrants – even when provided by close relatives – is often available only if cash or other assets (such as poorly remunerated labour) can be obtained from the recipients (*ibid.*). These experiences of gatekeeping are often internalized by maltreated newcomers to the detriment of subsequent migrants who in turn seek assistance from them; the maltreated newcomers tend to 'pass on' their adaptation experience and notably act as impediments to further migration.

Cultural heterogeneity and political frictions in immigrant waves have also been examined by Garapich (2006) in relation to the Polish community in the United Kingdom. Here there is, on the one hand, the established, highly institutionalized and organized group, which used the symbolic power of the Second World War veteran and political refugee status; and on the other hand the new post-2004 migrants who brought a different set of cultural values and attitudes and thereby challenged the power of the established diaspora. Garapich used this situation to offer insights into contemporary issues of civic participation, inclusion and integration of migrants in the host society (*ibid.*: 152). We have not seen, however, whether (and how) these inter-wave community power relations impact migration processes: setting in motion self-perpetuating dynamics, encouraging other flows or gatekeeping. The agency of pioneer or settled migrants in setting in motion further migration dynamics has not been explicitly articulated, and could only be inferred indirectly from observing intra-community power relations in the processes of adaptation into the host society.

One cannot help but notice that in the above perspectives the agency of pioneer migrants has been treated either as encouraging or preventing others to follow. As a result, while studying migration processes in the context of the relationship between settled and newcomer migrants, we are very often limited by the implicit dichotomy of assistance or network-related explanations: symmetrical – asymmetrical networks, full assistance or no help, mobilization or non-mobilization of social capital. In the search for comprehensive explanations, beyond simplistic dichotomies, we approached our empirical material with questions about which of these strategies prevail, when, and under what conditions? We looked at settled migrants' agency as constituted not by mutually exclusive choices but rather on a scale with different shades of grey, with complex, often contradictory accounts. The development of the Ukrainian communities in the UK and the Netherlands gives rich insight in the response of the post-1945 diaspora toward Ukrainian newcomers after 1991, the reasons for this and the consequences it had for subsequent migration movements.

### 3 Data and methods

This paper is based on fieldwork among Ukrainian migrants in Amsterdam and Rotterdam and in the Greater London area conducted under the auspices of the THEMIS project.<sup>2</sup> We utilize data resulting from eight months of fieldwork and stemming from over 70 in-depth interviews with migrants, representatives of migrant organizations and key stakeholders in Ukrainian migration to Netherlands and the UK, as well as a literature study. Each interview lasted between 1 and 1.5 hours; they were conducted in Russian or Ukrainian, and then transcribed and translated into English. In the empirical part of the paper we particularly draw on the section of the interviews relating to recent migrants' relationship with the settled, 'established' migrants, their knowledge and use of existing institutions, and the role of migrant networks in migration processes.

While the history of the Ukrainian communities in the Netherlands and the UK respectively goes back centuries, in order to explore meaningfully the relationship between settled and newcomer migrants we limit ourselves to the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Our ethnographic approach enabled us to gather information from those who are still alive and remember how the relationship between the settled migrants and newcomers has developed over the years. We have discovered two substantive and largely distinct waves of Ukrainian migrants. For the Netherlands and the UK we called them heuristically – adhering to chronological order – the 'post-1945 wave' and the 'post-1991 wave' (used interchangeably with 'post-WWII' and 'post-Independence' waves).<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> THEMIS – 'Theorizing the Evolution of European Migration Systems' – is a comparative research project that aims to address the gaps in contemporary theory on migration processes. It asks under what conditions initial moves of pioneer migrants result in establishing migration systems and when this does not happen. Although THEMIS looks into diverse migrant populations – trends of migration patterns among Brazilians, Moroccans and Ukrainians in Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK – this paper focuses on Ukrainian migration, taking a comparative perspective on the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

<sup>3</sup> We would want to distance ourselves from the discourses of 'tidal waves' of migrants 'flooding' Europe. On the contrary, we see a 'wave' of migration as a heuristic and analytical device to challenge the methodologically nationalistic position that immigrants from the same origin country could best be understood as a homogeneous group of foreign-borns (Eckstein 2009). By distinguishing 'waves' along different variables such as time of arrival or aim of migration we contribute to nuancing the picture of bilateral migratory movements.

## 4 Post-1945 pioneer migrants and community formation in the UK and the Netherlands

The Netherlands and the United Kingdom have never been traditional centres for Ukrainian settlement. Studies indicate that earlier migration from Ukraine to the UK and the Netherlands took place in the seventeenth century when young Ukrainians came to study at institutions of higher education (Kohut 1994; Kravets 2011). Two centuries later, during the eventful final decades of the nineteenth century and first decades of the twentieth century, economic refugees as well as political refugees ended up in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Although exact numbers remain unclear, it probably concerns several hundred in both destination countries. In contrast, many more Ukrainian migrants treated the UK and the Netherlands as stepping stones on their way to Canada and the US. Those who stayed, settled in the Manchester area of the UK and the Low Countries (the Netherlands and Belgium), never boarding the clipper to the other side of the Atlantic Ocean.

The foundations for the current population of Ukrainians in the Netherlands and the UK were laid in the 1940s. It is important to distinguish what forms of adaptations and community formation could be observed among Ukrainians, as the ways in which these pioneer migrants responded to the conditions of life in the respective 'host countries' bear important consequences for further migration movements.

During the Second World War, Dutch men were employed in Germany. Young women from the conquered areas of the Soviet Republic were employed in Germany as 'Ostarbeiterinnen'. A large share of those women came from the Ukrainian S.S.R. as this region was the first to be conquered by the advancing German armies. Although contact between people of the Slavic and Germanic 'races' was prohibited, approximately 4000 Dutch men brought back Russian/Ukrainian partners to the Netherlands after the war. Ukrainian women who met their Dutch partners in Germany during the Second World War, originated from different regions in Ukraine. In the Netherlands, most of them ended up in the Randstad region: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Den Haag and Breda.

A number of men also migrated to the Netherlands. They were displaced persons who after the war found themselves in various camps throughout continental Europe and did not want to return to the Stalinist regime in Ukraine. In the Netherlands, most of them were employed in the textile industry in the province of Overijssel: in the municipalities of Enschede and Hengelo (Key informant, 2010). One of them explains:

After the war, I stayed in a camp for displaced persons. I wanted to stay in the West. I preferred to go to Canada but that did not happen. In 1947 I was in the Netherlands and I found a job in mechanics in Hengelo so I stayed.' [R, Male, 87, NL].

The numbers for the UK are more significant, as we can talk of a population of 33,000–36,000 people (Kravets 2011) arriving in the aftermath of the Second World War, consisting of three major groups. The first group formed part of the Second Polish Corps in which they were serving. The second group of some 8,500 people were former soldiers of the Galicia Division, who at the end of the war had surrendered to the British army and were then interned in Italy, and finally transferred to the UK. The largest group of approximately 21,000 Ukrainians were recruited from displaced persons (DP) camps in continental Europe, mainly in Germany and Austria, and came to the UK as part of the European Volunteer

Workers (EVW) scheme (Kay and Miles 1988; Kravets 2011). Most of the immigrants originated from Western Ukraine which was under Polish, Romanian and Czechoslovak rule before the war. A few others came from pre-war Soviet Ukraine. Subsequently the EVWs were allowed to invite close relatives to join them from the DP camps, and by the end of 1950 the Ukrainian EVWs were joined by around a thousand adult and minor dependants (mainly spouses, parents and children born in DP camps).

In the Netherlands the post-war Ukrainian pioneers did not form a tightly knit community (Kohu, 1994). As most of the Ukrainian pioneers were women who married Dutch men, they did not stay in close neighbourhoods where they could mingle – they joined Dutch families dispersed all over different cities. In line with cultural expectations at that time they adopted Dutch last names. They lost most of their possessions and legal papers in the war. Voluntarily or not, they had to assimilate quickly into Dutch society. The social expectation of a woman at that time was to look after the house, so Ukrainian women were supposed to spend most of their time at home and take care of their families. They do not all share fond memories of their relationships with Dutch families:

The family was very distant. They weren't very friendly to me. They were cold, warmthless Dutch people. There must have been many girls who ended up a lot worse than me. Some of them were expelled and had to live on the streets. But to me they were friendly. They all spoke a little German. But I never felt any warm feelings from their part. Never. I tried to imitate everything. I noticed that Dutch women would clean the windows and the outside of the house every Friday. In Ukraine, people would do this only twice a year. Although I didn't consider it necessary, I just did the same. I did everything I could to adjust. I was already worried about not speaking Dutch and wanted to fit in with everything else. I learned a lot from my mother in law.' [O, Female, 87, NL]

These women had to learn to speak Dutch quickly because it was not acceptable to use German which they had learned during the war:

I learned the Dutch language by imitation. Being laughed at or distrusted because I was speaking German motivated me to learn to speak Dutch. [O, Female, 87,NL]

Another reason for the quick assimilation of the Ukrainian pioneers and their lack of social organization was the elaborate repatriation activities of the Soviet Regime until the beginning of the 1950s along with Khrushchev's thaw. Although this repatriation was supposed to be voluntary, many Ukrainians felt pressured to return. Those Ukrainian pioneers who stayed back in the Netherlands organized themselves informally. In this way they could support each other and live out their cultural habits. They did not engage or organize politically. Through their actions they reconstructed Ukraine how they remembered it, and to the extent allowed by the structural conditions encountered in the Netherlands. As their Ukrainian roots were often a disadvantage in finding a job or relating to Dutch people, the women found it necessary to assimilate and limit their identity to folkloristic, often nostalgic expressions of *Ukraineness*:

I knew one and they knew others and that way we came together often with several families. We made Russian borshch and wodka and we drank and danced and sang. We were always busy. That is how Kalinka [Folklore group in Rotterdam, RD] came into being. [O2, Female, 86, NL]

These folklore dance, drama and singing groups existed in Rotterdam (Rodina/Kalinka), The Hague (Droesjba), Amsterdam (Loena/Otchizna), Groningen (Lev Tolstoj/Sjewtsjenko) and Hengelo (Roesalka). Alongside these associations registered by the Russian embassy, informal gatherings took place. Ukrainian pioneers were welcomed in the Russian Orthodox Church that has existed in the Netherlands since 1763 (Kalinka 2004). Ukrainian social organizations were based on cultural enactments of folkloric dancing and singing. They were initially oriented towards Ukraine as the pioneers knew and remembered it. The organizations preserved the imagined Ukrainian homeland and culture, while in their daily lives the pioneers had to reinvent themselves as Dutch wives and citizens. As pioneer migrants' ties with the origin country were cut off by the new world order, they adapted and contextualized their actions to the degree allowed by the challenges and uncertainties of social life abroad.

In the UK on the other hand, while the structural conditions of the host country's environment might not have been too favourable,<sup>4</sup> the numbers of Ukrainians were greater, their gender balance was different than in the Netherlands, and upon arrival they were clustered together in temporary displaced persons camps. This configuration of factors created opportunities for different forms of adaptations and broader articulations of Ukrainian migrants' identity, beyond the folkloristic expressions. And indeed, the processes of social organization of the Ukrainian community in the UK proceeded at a rapid pace. Ukrainians who left continental Europe and settled in England maintained strong Ukrainian national consciousness and remained largely inward-looking and origin-oriented, becoming preservers of Ukrainian identity. In the camps, they established educational programmes, choirs, folk dance groups, drama groups and even orchestras. In 1946 the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain was established; the key principle of the Association was mutual support and assistance as the vast majority of Ukrainian settlers had no family – the community became an extended family for them (Kravets 2011). *Ukrayinska Dumka* was first published in 1945 and is still the only Ukrainian-language newspaper in the UK.

Migration and displacement enabled the Ukrainian émigrés in the UK to reconstruct and build upon their traditions in accordance with evolving desires and purposes – 'to organize ourselves in this land' (Emirbayer and Mische 1998: 984). As Ukrainians left the camps and settled in industrial towns and cities all over the country, they began to establish churches (e.g. the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in Duke Street, London), Ukrainian Saturday schools and community centres (e.g. Ukrainian Social Club, Association of Ukrainian Women) so that they could maintain their cultural and religious habits, and pass these on to their children (Kravets 2011). The main role of the established organizations allowed the sustaining of identities, commonly developed meanings and interactions that were familiar to their members and widely practised when still 'at home':

We protected all our cultural achievements, and tried to show it all to the Englishman, we tried to find our own place in the English world, a place for us as Ukrainians. [I, female, 91, UK]

Basically their aim was to keep people together, so they don't disappear from the face of the Earth. Or probably in less dramatic terms... But the main idea was 'your own goes to your own for their own'. [O, male, 41, UK]

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<sup>4</sup> Cf. works on institutional racism of the immigration system in the UK (Gibney and Hansen 2005).

Both diasporas – Ukrainians in the Netherlands and in the United Kingdom – adapted to the conditions encountered in the destination countries. In the Dutch case the sometimes voluntary, sometimes forced assimilation experienced by the Ukrainian women who followed their partners from the labour camps under Cold-War conditions, resulted in ‘cutting off’ the ties with the origin community and negative consequences for further migration dynamics. These accounts of extremely limited contacts with Ukraine and subsequent movements between the 1950s and 1980s were consistent with the narratives of our Ukrainian respondents in the UK. The specific configuration of adaptation and inward community-oriented agency among the Ukrainians in the UK was conducive to sustaining identities, meanings and institutions over time. Nevertheless, due to the limited transnational connections this form of adaptation resulted more in an emergence of ‘imagined Ukrainian’ community (Anderson 1991).

After Ukraine’s declaration of independence in 1991 and the dissolution of the USSR, it became much easier to leave Ukraine, yet in the Netherlands it was no longer possible for Ukrainians to apply for asylum. In the UK Ukrainians could claim asylum until 2002, when the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 put Ukraine on the ‘safe country list’. For the Ukrainian diaspora settled in the West, 1991 also marked the first family reunifications, when they could finally travel to Ukraine and meet with their family members who had stayed behind. The movement of Ukrainian families to the West in search of maternal and paternal uncles and aunts in the UK also took place during that initial period.

Over the last three decades, family migration, migration of students, and economic migration have been the main types of Ukrainian migration to the Netherlands and the UK. Due to the largely irregular nature of the latter it is difficult to estimate the scale of migration. In the Netherlands, by 2005 there were 5,600 Ukrainian migrants registered as coming from the former Soviet Union (Chkalova et al. 2008: 23). Including the irregular migration we might conclude that the total number of Ukrainians residing in the Netherlands might be closer to 10,000. For the UK, estimates vary from 15,000 (APS 2008) to 30,000. While the irregular population is difficult to identify, the movement of ‘legal’ Ukrainians remains low: between 1998 and 2007 a total of 6,350 Ukrainian citizens were granted indefinite leave to remain in the UK (Kravets 2011).

## **5 Inter-wave community dynamics: post-1945 and post-1991 Ukrainians**

How did the settled community organize itself and respond to the newcomers from Ukraine after 1991? The simple answer would be ambiguously. The initial years after Ukrainian independence and the dissolution of the Soviet Union were marked by euphoria which consequently intensified movements between Ukraine and the UK. It was the time of family reunions, either back in Ukraine or in the West. Brothers saw each other after many decades, cousins met for the first time:

First people from the Ukraine started to come here. So it was a very exciting time I must say. Extremely exciting! The early 90s was a time of great expectations as you know. Brothers came here and it was very emotional. And then the children of immigrants who had never been to the country of their parents started to travel. So it was going both ways. And people started to marry their friends who came to the Ukraine, or somehow arranged by the

immigration community. But they wanted to marry Ukrainians. [O3, female, 54, UK]

Many Ukrainians, particularly from Western Ukraine, came to the UK either because they were invited by their family members or upon encountering letters or carefully preserved snippets of family memories:

My relatives lived in the UK, those first immigrants. And, one day, we found a letter. It was written on a very old, yellow, fragile-looking paper. It was written in an old type of handwriting, Polish letters. We had to 'translate' it. My grandma translated it because we couldn't understand everything. It was my grandfather's own brother. He said he didn't want anything apart from coming [to Ukraine] and visiting parents' graves, and to see his brother. There was only one brother still alive there because all six of them migrated. [L, female, 37, UK]

The 1990s for Ukraine was also a decade of severe economic hardships (Aslund 2002); in the aftermath of the USSR collapse people were losing their jobs, or their salaries were withheld for months [L2, female, 56]. Not surprisingly therefore, for Ukrainians the ideas of coming to the West and meeting distant relatives (where they existed) were usually combined with livelihood strategies and predominantly focused on earning money and improving ones' situation while abroad.

The migrants who had settled in the UK first very often acted as bridgeheads for these temporary money-earning projects; they prepared official invitations and took it upon themselves to be hosts to their family members:

My nieces were all eager to come here. They want me to send them an invitation. I needed to fill in some documents, sign them and mail those. My nieces have to go to the embassy and within a few days they will get a visa. Then they can stay here for as long as they can pay. [O2, Female, 86, NL]

We helped a lot to those who arrived from Ukraine in the UK, I personally helped many family members between 1991 and 1995/6. We used to organize their lodging. [A, female, 78, UK]

Aside from help with immigration matters, offering accommodation and subsistence, the settled migrants also used their contacts to arrange for jobs or temporary assignments – house decorating, painting, small construction projects, domestic cleaning. Therefore, the settled migrants significantly contributed to making the first money-earning projects worthwhile and reinforcing them as a temporary survival strategy for many Western Ukrainians in particular:

My friend used to live on the same street as I did, and she needed some renovation work, some painting. She would not ask her sons to do it, as they completed college, so she was taking those people, who came from Ukraine that was cheaper. They spoke the same language as the people from the diaspora who needed the job to be done. So this was how we helped. [A, female, 67, UK]

These moves, with the help or encouragement of settled migrants, were particularly intense from around the early to mid 1990s. But then the general attitude towards the newcomers from Ukraine changed rather significantly. After the years of initial euphoria surrounding family reunification, the settled migrants felt that their duty towards fellow Ukrainians was

– at least partially – completed, and that the constant trips, invitations, paying guests and lodgers as part of everyday life were not sustainable in the future:

There was a huge wave of migration, the same as from Poland, *even English people* [emphasis – authors] got overwhelmed. [A, female, 78, UK]

At the same time, however, the news of ‘quick’ money earned in the West reached Ukraine and there were more and more people who wanted to follow suit. It was no longer a matter of coming via family ties, visiting uncles or cousins, and earning some money ‘on the side’. The subsequent movements became independent of the initial conditions that enabled it – family reunifications. From the perspective of the diaspora, things started getting ‘out of control’, the situation became overwhelming, and more often than not it was perceived and interpreted as ‘morally wrong’ [M, male, 97]:

I also had experiences: ‘just make us an invitation, we won't bother you’. I said I can't do this because I am a law abiding person. [O3, female, 54, UK]

The position of the settled migrants, the diaspora, regarding the newcomers from Ukraine turned from bridgeheading towards gatekeeping:

I would prefer if they were there [in Ukraine]. [O, female, 76, UK]

I am not looking for other Ukrainian people because we have nothing in common. They grew up in a very different time. They don't know about the thirties, about what I experienced in Ukraine. They are all gold diggers. Most of them. [O, Female, 87, NL]

It was quite common for the migrants who arrived after 1991 to share the feeling that they were not welcomed in England or in the Netherlands by the settled diaspora members. Many of them shared experiences of their decision to come to the ‘West’ being regarded as ‘unpatriotic’ [M, male, 42, NL]:

I am generalizing a little but older generation were looking at us with suspicion and quite a few of them made it clear that we should pack up and go home to ‘build Ukraine’. [T, male, 40, UK]

The more contact there was between the settled migrants and the newcomers the more differences become visible, and seemingly, irreconcilable. There is no reason to believe that political generational experiences are left behind when people emigrate. At the same time, the generationally variable experiences forming part of the immigrant ‘baggage’ are cultural and economic as well as political, and these experiences likewise influence the relationship between historically distant ‘waves’ of migration.

## **6 The immigrant divide**

With the arrival of Ukrainians from the independent Ukraine throughout the 1990s ‘the community of Ukrainians in the UK’ (heuristically speaking) became much more diversified, extending far beyond the small circle of Ukrainian nationalists from the West. In the Netherlands it grew beyond the circle of largely assimilated Ukrainian women with Dutch partners. It now incorporated people from Central and Eastern Ukraine, those who had experienced Soviet rule, perhaps even those who supported it back then, or those for whom Russian was their first language. The divisions became more substantial and cut across several areas: cultural, generational and class. There were differences in identity politics,

language, education, and opinions about the future of Ukraine, that came with varying motives and circumstances of migration. This was often confirmed and expressed through the images that different waves of Ukrainian migrants constructed of each other:

All the Ukrainian organizations became one big thing, called the diaspora, older generation – with all their divisions inside. And then there was a new structure which was new migrants. They call it in Ukrainian ‘Ukraincy’ [Ukrainians] – which meant the diaspora, and ‘Ukraincy z Ukrainy’ [Ukrainians from Ukraine] – which meant the new arrivals. [O, female, 27, UK]

The language division is the first aspect that underlines the cultural differences. In the UK it took the form of symbolic imbalances of power over the use of ‘high’ and standardized Ukrainian. The Ukrainian diaspora members repeatedly stressed that their language was legitimate, its authenticity was additionally strengthened by the deep conviction that ‘Ukraine was Russified and taken away from us’ [J, female, 87, UK]; while the newly arrived migrants spoke a version of Ukrainian that was arguably severely changed and Russified:

The diaspora would say that our Ukrainian is of slightly lower standard because we introduce a lot of Russian words, and it is difficult to communicate, and thus there is a language division, which is huge. [A, female, 27, UK]

In the Netherlands, on the contrary, many of the pioneers spoke Russian while migrants from the newly arrived wave often expressed themselves in Ukrainian. This clearly marks a division between the waves:

We spoke Russian, not Ukrainian because we grew up in the city, not in a village. In the city, all people spoke Russian. The Russian language suits me better than Ukrainian. Ukrainian is a bit coarse. It is a coarse language. I don’t know how to explain. Russian is more distinguished, a light language. [O2, female, 86, NL]

The settled diaspora and the newcomers saw themselves as different from each other also in terms of education; the newcomers were often acknowledged by the settled migrants to have better education opportunities in the origin country and in the destination country – both the UK and the Netherlands. Aside from Ukrainian, they usually speak English, Dutch, Russian or Polish and find it easier to adapt themselves to the new society. The recognition of the newcomers’ educational status often went hand in hand with regret that such opportunities were unavailable to the ‘political migrants’ after the war:

Those who arrived now, they consider us very primitive. That we do not understand many things... They all have now good education, normal education, get their degrees acknowledged here, and they get the job – they work in hospitals as doctors, for instance. But they also do not understand that people, who arrived in this country after the war, it took them quite some time to stand on their two feet. They were starting from zero. [I, female, 91, UK]

I meet a lot with my friends from Ukraine who have studied here, we communicate regularly. But organizations – no, I think it is more for old people. I also have a lot of Dutch friends now, and spend quite some time with them. [S, Male, 28, NL]

The next line that divides the community is the socially constructed aim of or motive for migration. It is apparent now in the context of the above reflections that the diaspora

members conceive of themselves as political migrants (although a large proportion of its members came to the UK as migrant workers under the European Volunteer Workers scheme (Kay and Miles 1988; Kravets 2011)). This, above all, reveals the different generational experiences of the two waves that are historically and contextually grounded (cf. Eckstein 2009) with relation to Ukraine. The diaspora and – to a much lesser extent – their children, morally driven by anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalism, sought to speak for all Ukrainians in the UK or the Netherlands. This, in turn, inevitably resulted in a view of the current economic motives as petty and less worthy; a view shared equally by the diaspora and the newly arrived migrants themselves. In conversations with the settled migrants, the newcomers saw that their rationale for migration was difficult to comprehend and often despised:

The diaspora would normally say: 'We are only here, because there was no Ukraine to go back to. You are the ones who are leaving this wonderful and independent country and that's not good, you are looking for money, whilst we were looking for safety'. [A, female, 27, UK]

I rather hope not many people from Ukraine will migrate to the Netherlands. They all want to live from social welfare. They are clever. We never received any social welfare. Until now, now I receive a state pension. [O2, Female, 86, NL]

For many settled migrants this new wave of Ukrainians came 'from a different country' [B, male, 71]. The settled migrants, beyond family ties, became disinterested and disengaged with keeping the movement going. On the contrary, they saw themselves as obliged not to encourage this 'mass migration' from Ukraine, be it along the nationalistic lines – for the future sake of Ukraine – or to preserve the integrity of their own community:

I went once to the pub of Ukrainians. And there was one dziadek [elderly gentleman – authors], and he came to me and started saying: 'What are you doing here? Ukraine is such a picturesque country, why don't you go back home and help it rise on its legs. And help to rebuild it? What are you doing here? Go back to Ukraine!' [H, female, 28, UK]

As a result of these tensions, the newcomers of the 1990s did not dare to ask diaspora members for help with migration. They confined themselves to their own networks of friends, or institutionally embedded migration businesses. The recent migrants did not feel the need to affiliate with *diaspora* organizations such as the folklore groups. They had different expectations and different needs that for a long time could not be met by the plethora of existing community structures, as they developed without a 'real' link to Ukraine and its current problems:

I don't really feel a need [to participate in Ukrainian organizations – authors]. I don't have any particular patriotic feelings. I don't feel in my blood that I am Ukrainian. But I am also not that Russian, because I grew up in Ukraine. I can be seen as a patriot in a sense that I am Russian, Slavic, in my mentality. But to say that I want to link back, no. For me the church is enough. In the choir there are a lot people from Kalinka and that's really my link. But to join more, to be honest I don't even have that much time. Maybe I am just not interested enough, or in the future, when I am an old grandmother. I don't know, maybe. [A, Female, 26, NL]

It's the expectations of people who just came and [that of the members of] associations and the job they were doing. They were not necessarily matching each other. And that obviously creates tensions and a lot of people misunderstood the organizations and what they do. [W, male, 43, UK]

Institutions created or attended by the post-1991 migrants seem to be of a more instrumental or practical nature and less for socializing or 'living out' Ukrainian folklore and culture:

To be honest, I am not involved in any kind of organizations concerning Ukraine or Russian speaking people – I do have a group on Facebook with Russian speaking society with Ukrainian and Russian people – in the Netherlands. You can get addresses of Russian shops, you have news about events coming up, about their experiences which is very important to know. People pretty much move with the same background. But you cannot say that it is an official society. It is just a group on Facebook but it is useful. [V, Male, 21, NL]

All in all, recent Ukrainian migrants observe that there is not much communality among those who arrived in the post-1991 wave:

Ukrainians are not keeping together; there are no strong bonds and connections. They spread around and assimilate fast. [O, Female, 31, NL]

As a result, from the mid 1990s we can actually observe two different Ukrainian communities in the UK and the Netherlands: the old diaspora with its own institutions and organizations, and the new migrants whose networks were of a rather informal character. Contacts between these two waves are sporadic or take place on other territory – such as the church. As a result, these two waves started growing apart from each other. If settled migrants did offer help and acceptance, one could hypothesize that this would reinforce the migration dynamics or perhaps even give rise to more intensified migration. The reality proved on the contrary to be that of lack of support or acceptance which hindered the newcomers' adaptation and was not conducive to further migration.

The nature of social relationships between the post-1945 and post-1991 migrants could be used to infer observations about the role of settled migrants in decelerating the migration processes from Ukraine. We offer a proposition that a configuration of different structural factors in interplay with elements of settled migrants' agency resulted in the rather stagnant nature of migration dynamics. The 'old' diaspora institutions being 'overwhelmed' by the new arrivals distanced themselves from the fact that the Ukrainian community in the UK and in the Netherlands became more and more diverse. Instead, they remained inward-looking and limited social events to their 'own' circle of people. Their community structures and institutions remained closed to the matters and experiences of contemporary Ukrainians for many years. The settled migrants' attitude towards the newcomers was one of distrust, as they arguably came from different world – one with the experience of socialist regime. Additionally, for at least two decades we saw a lack of new institutions and organizations, called to life by more recent Ukrainian migrants, which could directly respond to their needs of post-arrival adaptation, thereby failing to fill in the void resulting from lack of support from the established diaspora.

## **7 Conclusions**

This paper argues that when studying settled migrants' agency regarding newcomers, the relevant question about 'bridgeheads' and 'gatekeepers' should not be one of 'either/or' but of 'how much?', 'to what extent?' or 'under what conditions?' The case of Ukrainian migration to the UK and the Netherlands shows that settled migrants employ their agency not exclusively in a way that encourages or discourages subsequent migration. We should see settled migrants' agency not as a dichotomy but rather on a scale with different shades of grey, with complex, often contradictory accounts, which tend to change over time.

By contextualizing the situations in which different types of agency were employed, we found that bridgeheading is more likely to occur in a situation where new opportunities for migration of close friends and family members come along. Gatekeeping, on the other hand, happens when the division lines between the settled and newly arrived waves of migrants become prominent. In this case, cultural, generational and socio-economic and class differences in interplay with settled migrants' capacity and willingness to act stopped diaspora members from assisting and welcoming the newly arrived migrants. These differences could also explain why the newly arrived migrants did not join the pre-existing social and community structures established by the diaspora, but rather confined themselves to informal arrangements that cut across ethnic divisions. This led to two Ukrainian communities living next to each other, side by side, for over 20 years and resulted in specific consequences for further migratory movements.

In explaining the continuation of migration from the network perspective, one should take into account the complex and differentiated inter-wave dynamics in which the agency of pioneer migrants encouraging subsequent movement should not be taken for granted (Massey et al. 1987; Faist 2000). The focus on the agency of settled migrants as captured through their behaviour and attitudes towards newcomers helps to answer some crucial questions: whether community institutions are open or closed to newcomers, how migrants from different waves perceive each other, and what was the evolving nature of their social relationships.

If we are to understand immigrants' role regarding others following in their footsteps, we have to bear in mind the complex cultural, generational, and socio-economic differences between migrant cohorts. We need to examine how the perception of their co-nationals is produced and consumed and then draw out its social implications, such as what meaning people attach to others following them, what expectations they have, and how they perceive each other in everyday life.

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