Περί Βασιλείων

Studies in the Justification of Monarchic Power in the Hellenistic World.

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Demetrius of Phaleron advised King Ptolemy to obtain and read books on kingship and leadership; 'for the advice which their friends dare not give to kings is written in such books'.

Plut. Mor. 109d.

ABSTRACT

The thesis seeks to investigate primarily the philosophical treatises with the title Περὶ Βασιλείας which were written in the Hellenistic period, that is from the age of Alexander to the end of the Roman Republic. It aims to discover their contents, purposes, similarities and differences, and so to illuminate the attitudes of philosophers and other educated men to the Hellenistic monarchies. Each work discussed is put as far as possible in its historical context in order to demonstrate the relationship between philosophical theory and political practice, and in order to show how philosophers influenced and were influenced by the kings they advised.

The Introduction discusses the origins and growth of ideas about kingship in the archaic and classical periods: it treats in outline the main influences on later thought.

Part I deals with the known evidence for works Περὶ Βασιλείας. Chapter 1 concerns treatises addressed to Alexander or written during his lifetime. In particular the evidence for Aristotle's relationship with Alexander is discussed in connection with his alleged Περὶ Βασιλείας; his section on kingship in book iii of the Politics is analysed; and the Arabic treatise recently discovered is shown to be a forgery of Roman imperial date. The works of Xenocrates and Anaxarchus are also discussed. This chapter is particularly concerned with the rivalries between
the various philosophers around the figure of Alexander.

Chapter 2 deals with the other Hellenistic treatises whose authorship is known, by philosophical schools - the Peripatetics, Epicureans, Stoics, and 'Pythagoreans'. Chapter 3 gives the fragmentary evidence from papyri and Suidas.

Part II attempts to fill out this picture, and show the inter-relationship between native and Greek traditions in the world of Hellenistic literature, by taking three extant prose works where a theoretical attitude to kingship can be seen. Again these works are discussed in detail, reconstructed where necessary, and an attempt is made to date them and relate them to their historical background. Chapter 1 deals with the work of Hecataeus of Abdera on Egypt, and especially the section on Pharaonic kingship (preserved in Diodorus book i). Chapter 2 discusses the letter of Aristeas to Philocrates, and especially the relationship between the section on kingship which it contains and the purpose of the work as a whole. Chapter 3 is an analysis of Philodemus, On the Good King according to Homer, which attempts to show the purpose of the work, and the limitations on the use of ideas of kingship in the Roman political world of the late Republic.

There are four appendices, the last of which contains a translation of the new text of the Arabic letter of Aristotle to Alexander On Government, by myself and S.M. Stern; it is given here purely for the convenience of the examiners, since it is unpublished, and should not be considered part of the thesis proper.
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INTRODUCTION.

1. Kingship in early Greece

Until the decipherment of Linear B, the nature of the earliest Greek kingship, that of the Myceneans, had to be reconstructed from the archaeological evidence of the Mycenean palaces, from Homer, and with the help of analogies drawn from other periods and other peoples. Thus perhaps the most convincing of these reconstructions, that of Nilsson, used Homer to build up a picture of the Mycenean king as a monarchic warlord employing vassal princes to hold down lands acquired in an earlier period of migration; the analogy with Viking society and the Germanic tribal migrations of late antiquity was explicit. 1 Others preferred to relate the evidence of Homer primarily to the eighth century, to a period when the monarchy was in decline - a monarchy which was presumed to have existed during the Dark Ages. Only a few accepted the view expounded by Wilamowitz, and more systematically by G. Finsler, that the society portrayed by Homer was the aristocratic society of his own day, and that the monarchic elements were the superficial remnants of an earlier Mycenean society. 2

The evidence of the tablets found at Pylos and Knossos for the organisation of the centralised palace economies of

2. For Wilamowitz, see Staat und Gesellschaft der Griechen (1910) 53ff; (1923), 57ff; and already Aristoteles und Athen ii (1893), 136 n.20. For Finsler, 'Das Homerische Königtum', Neue Jahrbücher f.d. klass. Altertum xvii (1906), 313ff, 393ff; Homer i2 (1913), 202ff.
Mycenean period is only just beginning to produce a coherent picture of the nature of Mycenean kingship. But the effect of these discoveries on our knowledge of the nature of political government in the Dark Ages and the archaic period is perhaps clearer: the basic political structure portrayed in Homer is completely different from the Mycenean palace economy. Only in minor and external details is the Homeric wanax a descendant of the Mycenean wanax living in his great palace at the centre of a complex social and economic organisation; if the wanax owes anything to Mycenae, it is rather to his namesake, the pa-si-re-u, of which dignitary we know little for certain except that there were several - but that in itself is enough to reverse the traditional picture. Thus it seems unlikely that the 'nobility' usurped the title wanax at a late date;


2. For the present position on wanax and wanax, see A.Heubeck Indogermanische Forschungen lxiii (1958), 127ff; A. Morpurgo, Mycenaee Graecitatis Lexicon (1963) s.v. ?qa -si-re-we, wa-na-ke-te; and the works cited in n.1, esp. in Stella. For the view taken in the text, see esp. F. Gschnitzer, Festschrift L.C. Franz (Innsbrucker Beiträge zur Kulturwissenschaft xi) (1965), 99ff; cf. C.G. Thomas, Hist. xv (1966), 337ff.
rather they had always been called βασιλεῖς. The collapse of the Mycenean system consisted merely in the removal of the topmost layers of society - the wanax, the lawagetas, the palace and the palace-oriented economic organisation. Just as the archaeological remains suggest a certain continuity in basic artistic skills, so in many areas the lower structure of society perhaps continued to exist, and intermingled with the new Dorian institutions, which in themselves may not have been so very different from those which the Mycenean Greeks had possessed before they came into contact with Crete and the Orient.

It could indeed now be argued that there was never a period when kingship proper existed as a widespread institution in Greece after the end of the Mycenean age. In Homer there is no separate stratum of nobility below the βασιλεῖς; rather the heads of the noble families are the σχήματων βασιλεῖς-in the ideal state of Phaeacia, for instance, thirteen of them. As the Townleian scholia remark on the passage, 'From this it is clear that it was an aristocracy, of a similar sort to the expedition to Ilium; for each commanded his own, although one had command of the whole.' When even the ideal society is portrayed as an aristocracy, not a monarchy, we may suppose that


In the other scholia, Alcinous is also described as merely 'standing out' (ἐγὼ ἐχάν) among the twelve others.
aristocracy was the contemporary rule. And the scholia are surely right to point out that, considered as a set of institutions, the constitutional picture is the same in the Iliad - an assembly and an aristocratic council of βασιλῆς, of whom one is in an uneasy, ill-defined and constantly challenged position of superiority. In other words, Homer has inflated contemporary society to heroic proportions; deflate the Iliad to its proper eighth century size, and, instead of a set of monarchs leading armies under a king of kings, we see a class of Greek aristocrats called βασιλῆς, under one of their number as a temporary commander, leading their individual groups of retainers against a local native settlement.

Hesiod's society is the same: for him the βασιλῆς are many, not one, and most of them take bribes even if they are under the protection of Zeus. Again the earliest constitutional inscriptions from Chios and Elis refer to βασιλῆς in the plural; and as far as the Greeks knew their most famous 'kingship', the Spartan (whose kings incidentally seem not to have been called βασιλῆς, but rather ἄρχων), had never been a monarchy at all.

This, I would suggest, is the general and aristocratic pattern, modified in particular cases. Loose ties of allegiance,

1 On the difference between Hesiod's attitude to the βασιλῆς in the Works and Days and the Theogony, see the explanation of M.L. West, Hesiod: Theogony (1966), pp. 43ff.
3 Despite L.H. Jeffery, Hist. x (1961), 144f.
felt more or less dimly, existed from the periods of migration; on the basis of these, powerful individuals attempted from time to time to establish themselves as sole rulers in a wider or a narrower sphere; but few succeeded for long. The picture might have to be modified to take account of those areas where Dorian societies retained their cohesion, if it could be shown that Dorian institutions were more monarchic. More probably, dim memories of the Mycenean kings, and the reliving of an heroic past in the imagination, provoked some of the Ionian βασιλεύει to emulation; the Ionian migration may also have tended to throw up an individual in each group whose power as charismatic leader could become institutionalised to some extent; though there is little sign of this, and there would be a contrast here with the later colonies led by the βασιλεύει from the eighth century on, where special honours to their founders after death is the furthest such institutionalisation went - Cyrene is the only known example of the foundation of a permanent monarchy¹. Thus Homer's picture is perhaps more monarchical than that of Hesiod, both because he is describing an Ionian society, and because he sings in the halls of those men who would most like to see themselves as a new Agamemnon - the richer and more powerful βασιλεύει. In reality monarchy remained as much a problem on earth as monotheism in heaven.

1. And there Libyan influence could be suggested if βασιλεύει is really a Libyan title (Herod. iv, 155).
Even in the seventh century the dividing-line between aristocracy and kingship is obscure: the Bacchiads ruled Corinth as a *genos* by means of an 'annual monarchy'; a contemporary oracle refers to them in the plural, by ἀνδράι πατρίδος 1. Nor is it perhaps on purely theoretical grounds that Plato in the *Republic* and *Statesman* regards aristocracy and kingship as identical forms of government 2. So it is a mistake to reconstruct early Greek kingship even on the Macedonian model 3; the Thessalian nobility with its ruling families and occasional Τάγος may offer a better parallel 4. When we talk of the early Βασιλεύς as kings, we fall into the same trap as did those ancient commentators who saw in every Homeric Βασιλεύς a Hellenistic monarch; if one thing is certain, it should be that Βασιλεύς means something much wider than 'king' in archaic Greece. This might explain the fact that the decline of early Greek kingship cannot be dated, traced, or given causes; for early Greek kingship did not decline: it never existed as a general phenomenon 5. The opposite

1. Herod. v, 92,2; cf. G. Busolt, *Gr. Staatskunde* 3 (1920), 347 n.3.  
2. *Republic* 540d; cf. 445d etc; *Statesman* 259d.  
4. Herodotus describes the Aleuadae collectively as Βασιλεύς of Thessaly (vii, 6), which suggests a situation analogous to that of the Bacchiads of Corinth.  

The discovery of an inscription of the mid-fourth century, apparently refounding the Panionion and its league, raises interesting problems which cannot be discussed here. The president of the council is called Παννήσεις και Πελιθαί (21), the city delegates Παννήσεις οικουμένοι (17, 22); they apparently (contd. over)
picture is perhaps more true to such facts as survive: towards
the end of the Dark Ages political organisation in Greece was
becoming more, not less monarchic - the phenomenon of tyranny
is the culmination of a gradual movement towards centralised
power which had been gathering momentum in the eighth and
seventh centuries.

The tyrants too were aristocrats; in their attitudes and
aims they hardly differed at first from earlier βασιλεύς .
If they were more successful in achieving monarchy, it was
because they could make use of a citizen body, not just of
their own retainers; the balance of the state was changing,
but the first effect was an increase and centralisation of
power in the hands of leaders prepared to seize the opportunity.
Similarly even in traditional Sparta the kings seem to have
possessed more power in the seventh and sixth centuries, culmin­
at ing in the reigns of Anaxandridas and Cleomenes, than they
did earlier or later. It is the growth of this body of πολέμοι
which is the reality behind discussions on the origins of
the πολιτική ; here is of course one of the central problems
of archaic Greek history. Population expansion, urbanisation,

have Κάρωνος as helpers. It looks suspiciously as if the whole
organisation is not based on genuine knowledge of the past, but
is rather a conscious literary revival of 'Homeric' society,
and in particular of the 'league' of Achaeans in the Iliad.
The delegates continued to be called Παρισίες at least till
the second century A.D. cf. G. Kleiner, P. Hommel, W.Müller-
Wiener, Panionion und Melie, Jahrb.d.deutschen Arch. Inst.
Suppl. xxiii (1967), 45ff, esp. 59ff. (Hommel).
the impetus that gave to the codification of law and institutions, are all relevant; but most important of all is perhaps the emergence of new military tactics involving a citizen army and a self-conscious class of heavy-armed soldiers, the hoplites. As for oriental influences, certainly they are visible in the art of this period, and to some extent in the literature; the word Τύραννος is new and probably Semitic (not Lydian). But that does not show that the institution was eastern. Perhaps rather, when the Greeks needed a word to describe monocracy, they found their own language ambiguous and turned to one where the institution was more widespread; here, to say that originally Τύραννος began as a synonym for βασιλεύς begs the question: there is no evidence that it was so. Rather, by the fifth century, βασιλεύς had become a mere synonym for Τύραννος, before it later emerged as an antonym. But whatever the origin of the word Τύραννος, the economic, social and military basis of the tyrant's power is a uniquely Greek phenomenon.

1 A. Andrewes, The Greek Tyrants (1956); despite A.M. Snodgrass, J.H.S. lxxxv (1965), 110ff.
2. See C. Winiewicz, Eos xxxi (1928), 520; S. Mazzarino, Fra Oriente e Occidente (1947), 191ff; C. Gallavotti, P.C.P. iv (1949), 39f; T.J. Dunbabin, The Greeks and their Eastern Neighbours (1957), 58f; On the later development of the concept Τύραννος, see Andrewes o.c. c.2, and now H. Berve, Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen (1967), esp. 517ff, 625ff, 654ff, 703, 737ff (excellent notes and bibliography; the text is sound but unadventurous).
3. Itself a useful and well-formed neologism, describing sole and absolute rule without implications of despotism or benevolence, invented between the wars by the French political scientist Marcel Prélot (L'Empire Fasciste (1936), c.8; pp.107, 108, 193; Institutions Politiques et Droit Constitutionnel (1963), c.9), and recently popular in France as a means of distinguishing the aims of General de Gaulle from those of the Comte de Paris. The acceptance of new words to describe new monarchic phenomena seems common; compare the less attractive nineteenth century (contd. over)
Despite the great influence of Homer on later literature and the existence of an oral epic tradition which perhaps contained elements going back to a period of genuine monarchy, the institutions of early Greece were little suited to the development of a literature specifically concerned with kingship, either theoretical or panegyric. The literary patronage exercised by certain tyrants did however produce a form of court poetry which had considerable influence on the later development of Hellenistic poetry: the odes of Bacchylides, and more especially those of Pindar, for the athletic victories of the tyrants of Sicily, and for Arcesilas of Cyrene, are obvious forerunners of Callimachus. Yet these odes very seldom step outside the established framework of praise due to contemporary aristocrats, whose position was in many ways comparable with that of the tyrants; the virtues of government attributed by Pindar to his patrons, or wished on them, are not so different from those attributed to Xenophon's Corinth (Olympian xiii) or to the Aegina of Aristomenes (Pythian viii). There is a certain greater emphasis on the protection of the gods (Olymp.i, 106f) and on the power and wealth of kings (Olymp.i, 104; Pyth.ii, 58ff; v,1ff), and some ideas are borrowed from Homer, as the Homeric neologisms 'absolutism' (D. Levy, Rev. Int. d'hist. pol.et const. NS ii (1952), 133ff), and 'Caesarism' (A. Momigliano, Secondo Contributo (1960), 273ff; Terzo Contributo (1966), 211ff, and the articles of Kaegi and Christ cited on p.214).
sceptre of justice (Olymp.i,12; Bacchylides iii,70). More striking is the insistence on the transience of prosperity (Pyth.iii,85ff) and on the dangers of arrogance (Olymp.i,114; iii,44f), both of course common motifs in Pindar (for instance Pythian vii,20ff on Megacles' ostracism) - but, as Pindar realises, carrying greater weight when applied to monarchs. The reluctance of Pindar to recognise the monarchic victor as requiring different treatment from the aristocrat may help to explain why he seldom gathers together his individual comments of praise and advice to make a continuous section of the ode. The most striking example of such a passage is the conclusion of the first Pythian (81ff), which does indeed anticipate many of the themes of philosophic advice of the Hellenistic period; more personal are the bitter final complaints of Pythian ii,54ff. But in general the most noticeable feature in Pindar is the lack of any explicit form or of a specific vocabulary for describing monarchy, and Pindar's own assumption of an easy equality with his patrons - both attitudes which were to be followed by the court poets of Alexandria.

2. Attitudes to Monarchy in Classical Greece

Paradoxically, although kingship was an institution foreign to the intellectual centres of classical Greece, it was here that the main lines of the Greek and Roman attitudes to kingship were first formulated. There is an excellent recent analysis of the origins of this curious phenomenon in K.F. Stroheker,
The following comments are meant to supplement his account, and to bring out those aspects most important for an understanding of the literature of the Hellenistic period.

1. Homer: Although the details of the Homeric picture largely reflect the institutions of an aristocracy, Homer was rightly taken as attempting to describe what had been a monarchic society, the Mycenean age. In later periods the Homeric ποιηταί were successively interpreted in accordance with the institutions of the reader's own day; for theories of kingship they provided justification in the past of Greece, and a set of exempla of virtues with an aristocratic ethos. Thus it was the ancient commentators who noted that, though Homer did not know the word τυχαστορ (first used by Archilochus, according to Hippias of Elis), he was well aware of the distinction of fourth century theory between king and tyrant.

The continuing influence of Homer on successive centuries of readers can be seen in their comments, often ludicrous, sometimes remarkably perceptive, but always revealing in terms

1. Cf. also esp. J. Kaerst, Studien zur Entwicklung und theoretischen Begründung der Monarchie im Altertum (1898) c.1-2; M. Pohlenz, Staatsgedanke und Staatslehre der Griechen (1923) c.10.

2. Hippias of Elis, F.G.H. 6 F 6 = Diels 79 F 9; cf. Philochorus, F.G.H. 328 F 100 (with the additional material in Schol. Lucian, Katapl. 25); Euphorion of Chalkis, F.H.G. iii, p.72 F 1; Schol. Aeschylus, Prom. 222; Plut. de vit. et poes.Homeri ii, 183; Etymol. Magnum s.v. τυραστορ; Eustathius ad Od. xviii, 85 (p.1839, 8ff R.).

of contemporary response; this can be investigated with the help of the scholia to Homer, especially the bT tradition and the commentary of Eustathius, the twelfth century bishop of Thessalonica. It is a virtually untouched field, for classical scholars have been interested in the evidence of the scholia chiefly for those questions of text, metre and philological interpretation raised mainly in the Alexandrian commentators; the moralising comments, often (though without much reason) attributed to the Hellenistic Pergamene school of criticism, have been largely ignored. Yet the historian of culture and political attitudes will find a mass of material, demonstrating both continuity and change, here and in related texts, through the great Hellenistic commentators, Philodemus, Dio of Prusa and the Roman imperial commentators, the pseudo-Plutarchean de vita et poesi Homeri, Porphyry and the traditions of the Greek rhetorical panegyric which flourished especially in the fourth century A.D. and was continued and enlarged in Byzantium. The subject could have a double interest; for to take such a central and limited topic within the moralising tradition might also produce results more generally valid for the history of the Homeric commentaries - it has been the size of the problem and the difficulty of defining it which has led to its neglect. One manifestation of this use of Homer, that by Philodemus, is discussed below; but for more detailed study it may be necessary

cf. H. Erbse, Beiträge zur Überlieferung der Iliasscholien (1960); Gnomon xxxvi (1964), 549ff; and the introduction to his Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem i (1969), esp. xiiif, xlviliff.
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to wait until the relevant works are available in critical
texts.

2. **Tragedy:** Athenian tragedy is committed literature, often
concerned with contemporary moral or political problems;
though we cannot always see at what level a political inter-
pretation works, or how important it is to the understanding
of the play in question, the fact that tragedy and politics
were interrelated seems clear: the money for these public
spectacles was provided by members of the politically active
class, and the relationship between poet and *choregos* was close.
The dangers of such an approach have often been emphasised;
it is all too easy to simplify the problems by searching for
particular historical references, without regard for the play
as an artistic whole or for literary questions, and often on
the basis of historical theories for which the evidence is
slight - the Allusionist school of interpretation is an easy
target. For the relationship between tragedy and political
theory the problem is as complex. The portrayal of royal
persons in tragedy should be considered in relation both to
myth and to contemporary politics; while the parts of

Themistocles, Cimon, Pericles or Alcibiades have often been

1. As Ehrenberg’s sympathetic interpretation of the least political
of the tragedians in Sophocles and *Pericles* (1954) has I believe
shown. For *Aeschylus*, A.J. Podlecki, *The Political Background
of Aeschylean Tragedy* (1966) offers a useful survey of recent
opinion.

but F. Stoessl’s contribution to that discussion (pp. 162ff) is
important. Compare the lessons to be learned from the mistakes
of scholars exposed with the redating of *Aeschylus’ Supplices:*
overplayed, at least the interaction of myth and reality must have made tragedians sensitive to problems of leadership—possibly more so than other thinkers. Indeed the activity of writing about mythical kings in a society where non-monarchic political questions were freely discussed might give a very misleading impression of the state of thought about kingship. With these dangers in mind, two aspects relevant to later monarchic theory can be singled out with some confidence. The development and articulation of the tyrant as a bad ruler is due very largely to the Attic tragedians, or can at least be best traced in them; here the usual antipathy to monarchy is perhaps important for the general attitude of the fifth century to the question. Secondly, in Euripides especially, it is possible to detect currents of political thought connected with the Sophists and the Socratic circle, which might otherwise be unknown—though again it must be remembered that the demands of the myths themselves are responsible for much of the concentration on the virtues and vices of tyrants. Here, as Stroheker has shown, the attitude of Euripides is theoretical not personal. Even for the Archelaus, probably written in honour of Archelaus of Macedon, it is hard to see anything


2. oc. 399ff.
approaching a formal 'Mirror for Princes' in the surviving fragments.

3. Foreign Monarchies: The Greeks of course knew of the earlier monarchies in the East and Egypt, and showed interest in their institutions well before the Hellenistic period; but their influence on the early development of ideas on kingship seems to have been slight: there seems to have been no early speculation based for instance on Lydian or Egyptian kingship. This is surprising, for the conviction that Thales, Pythagoras, Solon, Democritus and others owed much to Egypt was later strong; the Ionian thinkers must have known Lydia well, and Sardanapallus appears early as an example of the tyrant. But it was not until the fourth century, with the proliferation of political utopias and the tendency to idealise Eastern civilizations that the alleged class system and priest-kings of Egypt began to be taken seriously as a possible ideal state by Plato and others.

The decisive influence was Persian kingship: 'the year the Mede came' marked an epoch for so many Greek states in the establishment of permanent pro-Persian tyrannies (that is, Persian support for one family among the class of bar .

1. As W. Schmid, Geschichte der Griechischen Literatur iii.I (1940), 629 claimed; W. Nauhardt, Das Bild des Herrschers in der Griechischen Dichtung (1940), 80ff. is a good deal more cautious, noting only 'the beginnings of a new judgment on monarchy' in the last plays. It is perhaps significant that, although Stobaeus contains a number of excerpts from the Archelaus, only one (F 250 Nauck) occurs in the section ofz各国 Ραιότός η μονάρχας: none in the section πέρα των βασιλιάς.
Nor could political speculation be unaffected by the questions arising from the swift establishment of the first universal monarchy. Conceivably Heracleitus F 33, 'it is also law to obey the counsel of one man', belongs to a theoretical discussion about Persian monarchy, rather than being a statement about the law at Ephesus. At least Herodotus' main constitutional digression involves a comparison of Spartan kingship with Persia;¹ and it is no accident that the first explicit statement of a theory of kingship and a comparison of constitutions is put by him in a Persian context. The origin of iii,30ff. has been much discussed²; the fact that Herodotus insists on its historical accuracy might suggest that its framework at least comes from a source in Ionia; and there are genuine Persian elements in the story of the choice of Darius. But contemporaries found the speeches themselves Greek and familiar³. If Protagoras may have provided the details, the fundamental division of the three constitutions is already present in Pindar, Pythian ii, 86ff. (468 or possibly earlier). Again the contrast between the good and the bad ruler is found in the earliest surviving work about Persia - the portrayals of Darius and Xerxes in Aeschylus' Persæ⁴. The Great King was for most

1. Herod. vi, 58ff.
2. Cf. F. Jacoby, RE Suppl. ii (1913), 501; Stroheker a.c. 389f. etc.
3. Herod. vi, 43, 3; cf. Thuc. i, 22, 1 and 4.
4. Cf. here W. Kranz, Stasimon (1933) c.3; A.S.F. Gow, J.H.S. xlviii (1928), 133ff; and H.D. Broadhead's commentary. Compare also Pindar Pyth. i, 94ff. (the contrast between Croesus and Phalaris).
Greeks the only king; his attributes were transferred to the kings of tragedy\textsuperscript{1}, and their \textit{hybris} was in turn seen as an inevitable consequence of his absolute power - nor indeed was the historical Xerxes far from the Xerxes of Aeschylus. Thus on the one side was produced the picture of the Persian king as the ultimate tyrant, whose arbitrary whim was law, ruling over subjects who were his slaves.

On the other side there arose a picture equally far removed from reality. While the Socratic circle could at times see the Persian king as the antithesis to the philosopher, certain of them took over and extended the Persian idealisation of Cyrus, to produce a picture of the perfect king. Antisthenes in particular moved from rhetorical to moralising declamations which involved idealising mythical and foreign rulers, and to dialogues on moral and political subjects. Something, if only caution, can be learned from the great Antisthenes controversy begun by F. Duemmler in 1882 with his \textit{Antisthenica}\textsuperscript{2}: the notion that Antisthenes is central to the understanding of Plato, Isocrates and Xenophon, and that he was extensively used by later writers such as Dio of Prusa, is now generally abandoned. But Antisthenes remains important for the history of the

\textsuperscript{1}Alföldi o.c. 15ff.
\textsuperscript{2}Diss. Bonn 1882 = \textit{K.S. i} (1901), 10ff; on the history of the Antisthenes controversy, cf. R. Høistad, \textit{Cynic Hero and Cynic King} (1948), 5ff. There is a good modern survey of Antisthenes by F.D. Caizzi, \textit{Studi Urbinati} xxxviii (1964), 43ff; fragments are quoted according to her excellent edition, \textit{Antisthenis Fragmenta} (1966).
development of thought on kingship, even if the evidence makes it impossible to judge precisely how widespread his influence was. His works were collected in the Hellenistic period into a 10 volume edition, which suggests a certain popularity; it was probably he who gave the impetus to those idealisations of Cyrus and Heracles which are such a prominent part of the literature on kingship from Xenophon to Dio of Prusa and beyond: the emphasis on πολογία, which is the forerunner of the Stoic notion that a king has duties, began with these two figures. But the evidence for the views of Antisthenes and for the contents of his writings is so slight and so confused that little more can be said with any certainty.

Three works especially are important in relation to literature on kingship, the two works called Cyrus and the Archelaus. A Cyrus is described as a counterpart to the Heracles, teaching that πολογία was a good; in it Cyrus seems to have been represented as receiving and giving good advice both of a general ethical sort and related to his office.

1. O. Regenbogen s. 'Pinax', RE xx.2 (1950), 1439.
2. Two further works, which may have been called 'Cyrus', but probably were not, can be ignored.
3. F 19-21 Caizzi. The most illuminating reconstruction of the works on Cyrus is that of H. Dittmar, Aischines von Sphettos (1912), 68ff., who rightly emphasised the importance of F 19 for an understanding of the Cyrus. Dittmar however (although admitting the existence of two works) appears to attribute all the remaining fragments on Cyrus to the Κύρος ἡ πολογία (cf. his useful collection of fragments and possible references, pp.304ff). I prefer with Caizzi to recognise that traces of both works survive; pp.68-76 of Dittmar's discussion seem to me an excellent description of the Cyrus, while pp.77-84 characterise the 'Cyrus or On Kingship' very well. There is an important discussion also in E. Thomas, Quaestiones Dioneae (Diss. Leipzig 1909), 6ff; on Antisthenes' general attitude to Cyrus, cf. Höistad o.c. 73ff.
It was probably a narrative of the life of Cyrus the Great, taking over the Persian idealisation, and describing his upbringing and achievements in freeing the Persians; it seems likely that in form and content it provided the inspiration for Xenophon's Cyropaedia, and it was perhaps largely overshadowed by that work. There is also 'the other Cyrus' which, according to Herodicus in his polemical work Against the Friends of Socrates (an extremely biassed source)\(^1\), contained abuse of Alcibiades, accusing him of various private vices and of sexual relations with his mother, his sister and his daughter 'like the Persians'. Herodicus' bias can perhaps be gauged from another description of Antisthenes' attitude to Alcibiades, derived from Satyrus, which shows him as critical but also appreciative\(^2\). In the fifth volume of Antisthenes' collected works a \( \kappa \omega \sigma \omega \gamma \eta \; \pi \varepsilon \varepsilon \iota \beta \alpha \sigma \iota \lambda \varepsilon \varsigma \) appears together with an Aspasia, which is known to have contained attacks on Aspasia\(^3\); the two works were perhaps paired because of certain similarities, just as in the fourth volume the Cyrus and the Heracles had been. The 'other Cyrus' of Herodicus might then be identical with the 'Cyrus or On Kingship' of the list. Any attempt to

1. F 29a; cf. I. Puëring, Herodicus the Cratetean) (1941), 68ff.
2. F 30c; cf. Herodicus himself (F 33), shortly before F 29a in Athenaeus. Dittmar thought (pp. 64ff.) that these milder judgments on Alcibiades came from the Alcibiades, but that is to put too much trust in Herodicus.
3. F 34 (Herodicus again); cf. F 35. The sexual motif in the Alcibiades portrayal suggests that Arsenius p. 507 Walz on Cyrus' continence (quoted by Caizzi p. 94) might belong in this context.
sort out which fragment might belong to which Cyrus must be conjectural; and, since Antisthenes also wrote an Alcibiades, it cannot even be certain that all mentions of Alcibiades come from the second Cyrus. The additional title of the work does however suggest that Herodicus' statement that it contained abuse of Alcibiades should not be taken to characterise the work as a whole. The most plausible hypothesis is perhaps that it was a dialogue, in which two protagonists (Socrates perhaps, but scarcely Alcibiades himself) discussed problems of morality and leadership, and contrasted or compared Alcibiades with an idealised Cyrus similar to the portrait in the first Cyrus; the derogatory reference to the Persians could be accommodated by supposing a distinction like Xenophon's, between the old Persia and present degeneration. It was perhaps this Κώστας Ἐλκυστατος that Cicero read, thinking from its alternative title that it might help him in composing his letter of advice for Caesar 1; but the second title is almost certainly a Hellenistic addition to distinguish this work from the other Cyrus, and to give some indication of its contents - the parallel with the alternative titles added later to the works of Plato and Isocrates is clear 2.

Thirdly there was an 'Archelaus or On Kingship' which (again according to Herodicus) contained abuse of Antisthenes' old teacher Gorgias. It may be to this work that we should

2. R.G. Hoerber, Phronesis ii (1957), 10ff. holds that the Platonic double titles are fourth century: I agree only that they may not be as late as Thrasyllus; cf. Regenbogen o.c. 1441.
trace the literary references to the story of Socrates refusing to go to the court of Archelaus of Macedon; the work was perhaps a discussion of his refusal and of his reasons, involving both statements that philosophers should not consort with kings and questions concerning the proper education for a king; the latter would explain the attacks on Gorgias as a sophist\(^1\). Such an hypothesis could relate the work to the curiously emphatic condemnation of Archelaus in Plato's Gorgias\(^2\); but the fact that the second title is not 'on tyranny' suggests that the Archelaus, even if it portrayed Socrates as disapproving of the king of Macedon, contained also considerable discussion of what a good king should be like. Attempts to link the Archelaus with a passage in Dio's 13th oration have been shown to be mistaken, for the source of Dio is the pseudo-Platonic Cleitophon\(^3\).

From this it can be seen that Antisthenes wrote dialogues and moral treatises which had some element of polemic in them, and which discussed the ethical side of kingship, possibly also the relation between the king and the tyrant and whether the private citizen or the king were happier\(^4\). The way that his

1. F 42; for its contents see R. Hirzel, Der Dialog i (1895), 123ff; compare the anecdotal traditions about Antisthenes' freedom of speech and attacks on philosophers who consorted with tyrants, esp. F 194 and Caizzi's note to F 155 on the tradition of a polemic with Aristippus.
3. Demonstrated in J. Wegehaupt, De Dione Chrysostomo Xenophonis Sectatore (Diss. Göttingen 1896), 56ff; similarly the notion that parts of Or. iii derive from some work of Antisthenes (Thomas o.c. 18ff.) has no foundation. On possible traces of Antisthenes' views of Homeric kingship, cf. below p. 500.
4. There is a somewhat overfanciful account of his doctrines in Thomas o.c. 11ff.
works were gathered into Τὸπος (presumably papyrus rolls) suggests that many of them were very short; this may be one reason why they were overshadowed by the more substantial works of Plato and Xenophon. Antisthenes certainly influenced the portrayals of the Cynic ideal heroes or kings, Heracles, Cyrus, and perhaps Odysseus, at the start; but it is very unclear how much he was read later: if the existence of the collected edition suggests some interest, references to him after Cicero are suspiciously vague and probably at second hand. The attempt to see the mainstream of kingship thought as a Cynic-Stoic theory of kingship, stemming ultimately from Antisthenes, has little basis in the facts; for, although Hellenistic readers could describe two at least of his works as being 'on kingship', this means little more than that these works were seen to be as relevant to the problems of kingship as other works by Plato, Isocrates and Xenophon: the limited value of these alternative titles for determining the actual contents of works is shown by the fact that Plato's Statesman was described as 'or On Kingship', and yet on another classification was rightly considered to be a 'logical' not a 'political' work. There is thus little reason why Antisthenes should be

2. Apart from F 10 and F 41 most of the later references seem easily explicable as part of an anecdotal tradition, or as derived from the reading of handbooks and earlier authors. On Gomperz's suggestion that a fragment of a Cyrus is preserved in papyrus see below p. 287.
considered more important than extant fourth century authors as a forerunner of the Hellenistic literature on kingship.

4. Politics and Political Literature: Attempts to discern a real influence of political life on positive ideas of monarchy in the fifth century have not been successful. The problem of leadership was to some extent present even in a democracy, and Pericles did possess an unchallenged personal supremacy; Thucydides was hardly alone in talking of Athens then as 'in name a state democratical, but in fact a government of the principal man'. Yet it was obvious that Pericles was not a monarchos, for he could not behave, or be advised to behave, as if he were one; the true situation in Athens is the subject of a famous debate in Euripides Supplices 403-57. And it was recognised that the defining characteristic of kingship opposed it precisely to any Athenian magistracy; unlike them, kingship was an ἀυτοκράτωρ Κύρη: the phrase, found in Herodotus, Plato and Aristotle to describe monarchy, later became the accepted definition of kingship.

In political life itself, monarchy was tyranny, and an accusation against a man; in so far as men who transcended the normal idea of the strategos influenced ideas on monarchy, it

3. Herod. iii, 80,3; Plato, Leg. 761e; Arist. Pols. 1295a20; cf. Plato Def. 415b. For the development of this definition in the Hellenistic world, see below p.216.
was in the articulation by their opponents of political abuse on the grounds of tyranny: this emerges in the attacks on Pericles in old comedy, and more especially in the growing importance of such catchwords noted already by Aristophanes in the *Wasps*, until they became largely responsible for the destruction of Alcibiades' political career. Once again the precondition of such phenomena is the generally negative judgment on monarchy in fifth century Athens.

In the fourth century however the tensions of political life and the growing variety of semi-political literary genres interacted to create a true literature on kingship, whose purity of language and continuing political relevance kept it at the centre of all later ancient education, and so made it the most important influence on subsequent classical thought on monarchy. Various political factors lie behind this development; the element of continuity is especially worth noting. In the fifth century the antithesis democracy-monarchy, as the two extremes in the recognised forms of constitution, was already important (it is the foundation of the *Supplices* debate), and assimilated to other distinctions, Greece-Persia, freedom-slavery; but when men looked for a better alternative to democracy, they saw it in some version of oligarchy. In

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Athens, however, oligarchy was finally discredited by the oligarchic incompetence and terrorism at the end of the Peloponnesian War; for the first time monarchy became a more plausible contender with democracy in conservative thinking - or at least one must find some way of educating for oligarchy, which was difficult as Plato discovered. Thus the intellectual conditions existed for an acceptance of the implications of success (largely for military reasons) in actual monarchies. This at a time when Athens herself was further from any sort of monarchy than ever before: the literature of monarchy is a literature by Athenian intellectuals about foreign, not internal affairs. So Isocrates can praise 'democracy' for Athens, and kingship for others, without considering this a contradiction.

Apart from the search for an alternative to democracy in an age when oligarchy seemed discredited, other attitudes are relevant - idealisation of Sparta and her kingship, and the desire for a leader to unite Greece in a war against Persia; though it is hard to see which is means and which end in this equation of Greek unity with crusade against the barbarian. From these general tendencies each author among that small circle of Athenian intellectuals took his starting point, and, working often in reaction or competition with one of the others, produced an individual synthesis; the interrelationships between the various works are obscure because of the difficulty of establishing chronologies for Plato, Isocrates and Xenophon, but there are clear signs of rivalry and polemic. The result

1. Though E. Delebecque, Essai sur la vie de Xénophon (1957) goes too far in this direction.
of this activity was a remarkable inventiveness in literary genres, which became for later generations a set of stereotypes to be followed more or less closely.

Thus Isocrates in his search for the new Agamemnon for the new Trojan war, and in his competition with the Academy to be and to be seen to be the adviser of governments, produced new variations on what was later called the \( \text{λόγος ουρανοκτικός} \), the letter of advice to a ruler either on specific problems or on how to rule in general (which is the true \( \text{περὶ βασιλείας} \)). The \text{ad Nicoclem} states clearly and correctly, both that it is the first attempt to legislate for monarchies (8), and that many of its individual precepts are commonplace (41); the banality of the ideas should not obscure the importance of the innovation: it is only necessary to compare the efficiency and subsequent influence of the \text{ad Nicoclem} with, say, Plato’s \text{Statesman} as a means of disseminating a practical view of kingship.

Even more important is the \text{Evagoras}, which, despite Aristotle’s claim to the contrary, is for all practical purposes the first prose encomium of a man (8ff.); though its debt to

earlier rhetorical encomia of heroes is obvious, and Isocrates mentions specifically his predecessors in poetry\(^1\). The work became the model for rhetorical theories of *panegyric*; it contains all the elements later considered essential in the different types of *λόγος* in praise of rulers\(^2\). It was also the model for funeral orations and the encomiastic biography in general, from Xenophon's *Agesilaus* to Eusebius' *Life of Constantine* and onwards. The technique in the *Evagoras* is to illustrate the subject's virtues within a chronological account of his life; the first part of the *Agesilaus* is obviously modelled on this, with the added incentive that Xenophon wished to save time and work by using sections from the *Hellenica*. But in the second part Xenophon is more original, organising the events under the headings of various virtues. This too was to have its effect on later literature, especially Latin biography: it is the Suetonian rather than the Plutarchean technique.

The problem of Xenophon is not only the fluent inventiveness of his unoriginality; it is that as a political thinker (and as a historian, if we count the *Anabasis* as history) he was unable to conceive of anyone but himself in control, or to generalise from any but his own experience\(^3\). It was the

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3. On Xenophon in general, see now the massive article by H.R. Breitenbach, RE 2.xviii (1967), 1569-2052; further bibliography in Tigerstedt o.c. 455-72. For a more favourable view of Xenophon's political ideas, cf. N. Wood, Class. et. Med. xxv (1964), 33ff.
conviction of his own uniqueness which persuaded him of the
superiority of monarchy. The Hiero attacks a traditional Greek
problem, whether the tyrant is happier than the private citizen.
The question is already present in Herodotus' account of the
meeting of Solon and Croesus; it is therefore dangerous to
claim that Xenophon is either writing for a particular ruler or
answering Plato's attack on tyranny in the Republic, though
the latter may be so - at least the work should be earlier than
the Statesman, or it would not be so intellectually barren.

It might be thought significant that, despite the powerful
arguments produced in favor of the private citizen being happier,
Xenophon concludes, not only that the tyrant can achieve greater
happiness, but that tyranny is potentially an excellent form
of government, both on grounds of practical administrative efficiency (which is Xenophon's most distinctive contribution to
political thought), and for more traditional reasons bound up
with the aristocratic ethos of paternalism, display and horse-
racing. A moment of supreme importance in the history of ideas,
perhaps - the final replacement of the old negative attitude to
monarchy by a new and more positive evaluation. And yet is
this work significant of anything more than the obvious fact
that Xenophon could see himself as an admirable and happy
enlightened despot?

1. I, 31ff.
2. On the date of the Hiero (? post 358), cf. J. Hatzfeld, R.E.G.
  lxx lx (1946-7), 54ff; G.J.D.Aalders, Mnem. vi (1953), 208ff.
  cf. Isocr. Ep. 6 (to the children of Jason), which takes the
  opposite view to Xenophon, and could be a contemporary allusion
  to the Hiero, if the letter is genuine.
3. The fascinating success of Leo Strauss in reading beneath the
  surface of the Hiero a subtle analysis of tyranny (On Tyranny
  (1963)) shows admirably that no such analysis exists on the
(contd. over)
So the Cyropaedia, though it owes its theme to Antisthenes, is a wholly Xenophontic work, a mixture in which, despite the basic use of a Persian legend of Cyrus, the colouring is less genuine than in any other work on Persia; for the Persians have become Spartans, and idealised ones at that. Again Xenophon leads an expedition up country, an expedition in which there is no-one to dispute the command, and the soldiers do not mutiny, or demand any pay. This could be symptomatic of an age which looked to a crusade against Persia and thought of it in romantic terms, or merely the daydreaming of an old and frustrated man, reliving his triumphs and his unfulfilled ambitions.

If in life Isocrates and Xenophon were neither influential nor particularly representative, in death they were models. Xenophon was the greatest of the Greek philosophers, who alone could satisfy the statesman and king; his Cyropaedia, a portrayal of the ideal government in reply to Plato's Republic,

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2. Dio of Prusa, Or. xviii, 14ff; cf. the characterisation of the Cyropaedia in Dion. Hal. ad Pomp. 4.

3. Diog. Laert. iii, 34; Gell. N.A. xiv, 3; Athen. xi, 112: the very curious notion that it was written in reply to the first two books of the Republic is an embellishment of the original idea, which seems to have as its sole basis Plato's derogatory reference to the Cyropaedia in Laws 694c.
was seldom out of the hands of Scipio Aemilianus, or of his creator Cicero when governing Cilicia. Especially it became the model for the ideal education of many an ideal king and conqueror, from the early Hellenistic portrayals of the young Alexander by Onesicritus and Marsyas of Pella, or of the semi-legendary Egyptian Sesoosis by Hecataeus of Abdera, to the life of Augustus by Nicolaus of Damascus, and the idealised \textit{nautela} in late pagan and Christian hagiography - for instance, Philostratus' \textit{Life of Apollonius of Tyana}. Even Xenophon's portrayal of Cyrus in majesty may have affected the imperial ritual of late antiquity, either in reality or at least in description: traces of it have been discovered in late novelists' portrayal of the king in glory, and in Ammianus' account of the triumphal entry of Constantine to Rome. Xenophon's later influence on education from the Renaissance to the eighteenth century also needs investigation.

1. Cic. \textit{ad Q.F.} i, I,23; \textit{ad Fam.} ix, 25,I; cf. \textit{ad Q.F.} i,2,7 (Quintus); Suet. \textit{D.J.} 87 (Caesar).
2. See below p. 36ff.
3. F.G.H. 90 F 125ff.
4. These more general aspects are not always fully covered in the otherwise excellent work of K. Muenscher, \textit{Xenophon in der griechisch-römischen Literatur}, Philol. \textit{Suppl} xiii, 2 (1920). Cf. also Breitenbach \textit{RE} 1902ff, and such theses on the sources of later writers as Wegehaupt, (n.3, p.21).
5. \textit{Cyrop.} viii, 3,9ff: cf. Iamblichus, \textit{Babylonica} F I Habrich (Muenscher o.c. 146); Chariton vi,4.
Xenophon as the perfect philosopher, Isocrates as the archetypal orator: the later influence of Isocrates is so pervasive that it becomes difficult to define. The commonplace and the universal truth cause more problems in the history of ideas than any work of true originality; and the question is as much one of form as of sentiments. No general survey of Isocrates' influence exists, but it is abundantly clear that he has always been important in the tradition of advice to rulers, and especially from the Hellenistic period to Byzantium, where Agapetus is only one of the authors indebted to him. His works are prominent in the florilegia and (the ad Nicoclem especially) in papyri. Nor did his influence cease with the disappearance of kings who could read Greek; scholars have continued to dedicate editions, translations, and adaptations to their rulers, and to draw heavily on him in their learned compilations of precepts and advice.

1. See esp. the list of references in B. Keil, Analecta Isocratea (1885), c.1; Hermes xxiii (1888), 366ff; also the works cited in Muenscher, RE ix (1916), 2195; S. E. Smethurst, T. A. xiv lxxxiv (1953), 293ff; R. J. H. Jenkins, Dumbarton Oaks Studies viii (1954), 16. If the ad Nicoclem were heavily interpolated, as many scholars have claimed (cf. the Introduction to the Bude edition p. 92ff.), there would be a most interesting consequence: it would mean that some Hellenistic writer, dissatisfied with the primitive original, had tried to transform it into a fully developed πανικαλ. I do not think it likely. On Isocrates in the Renaissance, cf. E. Norden, Antike Kunstrprosa ii (1918), 796ff.

2. A study of the relationship between classical scholarship and monarchy would be an interesting undertaking, illuminating both the relevance of the Classics to western political thought and the effects of the sources of patronage. The material is to be found in abundance in such places as treatises, prefaces, political emblem books and commentaries on triumphal entries. Even in this and the last century, many of the great German scholars (e.g. Curtius, von Arnim, Wilamowitz) delivered scholarly forms of the royal panegyric

(contd. over)
5. **Ethical and Political Theory:** To what extent speculation on the different types of constitution had been formalised and extended by the Sophists remains problematical; but the influence of any specific theory and of Sophistic discussions on the fourth century does not seem to have been great - and probably such elements as may have been used underwent development in the circle of Socrates and his disciples. Here it is attitudes rather than doctrines which are important, notably those pointed out by Julius Kaerst, when he connected the individualistic trends in fifth century thought with monarchic ideas.  

The notion that the will of the stronger is the foundation of the political community, though not in itself favourable to monarchy, at least puts it at no disadvantage in comparisons with other constitutions; and it can easily be combined with the belief that monarchy was the original form of government, realised in a golden age or an ideal state of nature. Further, the emphasis on the virtues of the individual and the search for the perfect man, who was still a man of the *polis*, could produce in the ideal political community a prototype for the *kataleptik* 4d.  

Philosophically more important is of course the Sophistic notion that political skills can be taught, elaborated by the Socratics on appropriate occasions; the tradition seems finally to have died with the First World War. England has a poor record in this respect: since Alfred, only two monarchs have attempted serious patronage of classical studies - James I and the Prince Regent; both were ridiculed for it.

1. o.c. (n.1 p.11); cf. also Geschichte des Hellenismus 2 (1917), 118f; ii 2 (1923), 296ff; Stroheker o.c. (p.11) 402ff.
into the idea that those who do not have the necessary skills ought not to govern: the fact that the skills emphasised by Socrates' disciples are different from those taught by the Sophists does not alter the basic truth that the idea is Sophistic, and originally worked out in a framework of education for democracy. So in Plato the role of the expert, on the analogy of other professions such as medicine and navigation, justifies the idea, not just of political skills, but of one political skill, the \( \text{πολιτική τέχνη or ἐπιστήμη} \): Plato's philosopher-kings were not the new and outrageous paradox he claimed, but an old Sophistic attitude worked out to its unnecessary conclusion.

These however are general tendencies, not specific doctrines. The point is important. The need for an ideal ruler, his virtues and his justification, owe more to the general literature and culture of the fourth century, to certain attitudes towards past and present governments, than to any specific philosophical theory. Even the tabulation of different constitutions is visible before the Sophists, and is still being elaborated in Plato and Aristotle; so too the antithesis of king and tyrant. There is no evidence for fully developed political discussions and theories in the Sophistic movement; indeed the hesitant approaches of

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1. R. Bambrough makes some common-sense points on the limitations of these analogies in Philosophy, Politics and Society ed. P. Laslett (1956), 98ff; but much more could be said from the historical (and I suspect the philosophical) viewpoint. Cf. also J. Kube, \( \text{Technē und Ethic} \) (1959).
2. J. de Romilly, R.E.G. lxxii (1959), 81ff; further literature in Tigerstedt o.c. 520-1.
Antisthenes, Xenophon and Plato, and the extent of Aristotle's reliance on Plato, would be inexplicable if such ideas did exist (this is sufficient explanation why no theory even of democracy was elaborated before the Hellenistic period)\(^1\).

The importance of the non-philosophical, literary aspects of ideas on kingship is not surprising: outside the historical investigations of the early Peripatetics, to the philosophical theorist kingship is a comparatively simple institution to describe and justify. So the tradition, though owing something to philosophy and to a great extent perpetuated by philosophers, is largely a literary phenomenon, a question of the gradual elaboration and articulation of certain basic topoi - the comparison of constitutions, the portraits of king and tyrant, the virtues important or necessary for the king. The various philosophical schools differ only slightly in their attitudes; the interest in studying the tradition is primarily historical not theoretical, in the adaptation of basic political ideas and literary attitudes to particular local traditions, and in the influence of literature on society and politics: men tend to see themselves as representatives of a type - the ideal king, the tyrant, the philosophic adviser, the philosopher opposed to the tyrant\(^2\) - and behave accordingly.

The problems connected with the attitude of Plato to monarchy are too intricate to be dealt with here; for they

\(^1\) Most explicitly in Cic. \textit{de rep.} i,47ff.
\(^2\) I have not yet been able to see A.Alföldi, 'Der Philosoph als Zeuge der Wahrheit und sein Gegenspieler, der Tyrann', \textit{Scientiis Artibusque, Acta Acad. Cathol. Hung.} i (Rome, 1958), 7ff.
involve questions of biography and of the development of his thought on politics. The discussion is complicated by the fact that generally he refuses to recognise any importance in the distinction between kingship and aristocracy; nevertheless there is a shift between Republic and Statesman\(^1\).

On the one hand, only when the next step in his development appears theoretically unnecessary are we really justified in adducing Plato's own experiences in Athens and Sicily; on the other hand, Plato clearly wanted to play a practical role, and was prepared to change his ideas on the form of government more easily than on its ends. Since he was widely read in later generations, we need also an assessment of his influence: I am not aware of any good account of this from the political side.\(^2\) I suspect that the later importance of the Platonic philosopher-king has often been exaggerated, even philosophers usually holding that the king should listen to the advice of philosophers rather than actually practise philosophy (this for obvious reasons of loyalty and reward).

But there is a continuing debate on the point, visible for instance in Musonius Rufus and Themistius; indeed it may be that the fourth century A.D. is the only occasion when the doctrine was a real force in politics. For other questions of the influence of Plato's political dialogues,\(^3\) in particular

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1. Plato: cf. the massive Forschungsbericht (1950-7) of H. Cherniss, Lustrum iv (1959); v (1960), esp. 470ff; Tigerstedt o.c. 532ff; the commentaries of L. Campbell (1867) and J.B. Skemp (1952) on the Statesman are especially useful.

2. Bibliography in the section Platonis commentatores, traductores, sectatores in Annee Philologique each year.

the Republic, Cicero's de republica is the starting-point, both in itself, and even more as a mediator of Platonic ideas especially in Augustine; the process can also be seen in the curious muddle of Plato and Philo in Clement of Alexandria, and even of Plato and Cicero in the Byzantine dialogue on the state discovered by Cardinal Mai.

The semi-theoretical speculation of the fourth century produced a revaluation of monarchy: in place of the old view that one man in supreme power was a tyrant working for his own pleasure and advantage, there emerged the antithesis between βασιλεύς and τύραννος, king and tyrant. Kingship, although still autocracy, was benevolent; its theory was concerned mainly with the virtue of the king and the welfare of his subjects. Those who regret the decline of the free city-state in the face of new international organisations may see this development as an intellectual betrayal of freedom; but if military and social forces made the new order inevitable, then at least the antithesis provided an ideal and a standard of judgment which put the interests of the subject as well as those of the king at its centre. If the Hellenistic kings had been able to see themselves, and been seen by their Greek supporters, only as illegitimate and amoral forces of

nature, the result might well have been perpetual anarchy and the absence of any standard of government. A world without constitutional and international law needed a myth of the state: that provided by the fourth century had the advantage that it was considerably more rational than any alternative found in the West before the demise of the doctrine of Divine Right. And the Greek theory of kingship has less crimes to its name than the modern myth of sovereignty.
PART I

HELENISTIC TREATISES ON KINGSHIP

CHAPTER 1. TREATISES ADDRESSED TO ALEXANDER THE GREAT

Introduction

It was with the generation of Philip II of Macedon that treatises specifically called On Kingship began to emerge, and all of these were either certainly or probably addressed to Philip's son Alexander. In many senses, it is true, there is no break of continuity between the Athenian works of the first half of the fourth century, and the works addressed to Alexander, or written under the later Hellenistic kings: it is one of the purposes of this study to demonstrate the continuity of theory. But in another sense the arrival of permanently established monarchies, ruling or exerting some form of control over virtually all the Greek communities except those of the west, necessarily had considerable effect on philosophers interested in discussing political problems: if it had less effect than might have been expected, that is because in the last resort most Greeks still regarded the city-state as the ideal form of political organisation, and most still found themselves with the political structure of the city-state interposed between themselves and the new
monarchies.

But philosophers were as open to the pressures and opportunities of the new world as any other group of men. The subsidies offered by the kings were, if not essential to the more complex and permanent organisations of the philosophical schools, at least very welcome; the rewards for taking service under a king and for residence at court were great; the inherited prestige of philosophy made these opportunities open to philosophers as much as, if not more than to any other group of intellectuals. Philosophers were honoured at court, and used by kings and cities as ambassadors. Moreover they had a function to perform, in transforming the crude military monarchy that was the heritage of Macedonian influence everywhere, into a constitutional organisation acceptable to educated Greek opinion. But the first step in this process was rather different: it began from the philosophic interest in the education of monarchs, so that they might use their power for the moral improvement of their people. And it began more specifically with the question of the education of the Macedonian prince Alexander himself.

By the middle of the fourth century the belief that philosophers had an important contribution to make to the skills of government was widely held, not least among philosophers. In particular the education of the ruler for
power was a matter of especial concern, and pride. Philosophers were anxious to indulge in political activity, or at least to be thought to have inspired it: in the last resort a letter of advice, whether opened or not, would impress the audience at home with the standing of a particular school. Plato's activities in Sicily had been real enough, if scarcely successful; and there were others. Had he not recommended Euphraeus as philosophical adviser to Perdiccas of Macedon,¹ and two other disciples to Hermias of Atarneus?² Isocrates was tireless in portraying himself as an adviser of kings, and in sending his pupils to posts at courts; he could claim to have educated Nicocles. Some perhaps of the connections alleged by the sources are later embellishments on a well-established theme; but they rest on a firm basis of stories which provided the pattern for the embroidery. There is no doubt that the activity of advising politicians and kings was seen as an important one, which brought honour and glory to the school. Aristotle himself is found writing just such a programmatic piece to a prince who had apparently so far escaped any higher education (and probably continued to evade his pursuers) – the Protreptikos, addressed to the Cyprian prince Themison, 'for he had plenty of money to spend on philosophy,

¹ cf. esp. Plato Epist. 5; Athen. 506e.
² Plato Epist. 6.
and a position of reputation as well'. The work was perhaps not primarily intended to persuade the otherwise unknown recipient, but rather as an answer to the proud claims of Isocrates in his address to Nicocles.\(^1\) And both Xenocrates and Aristotle were invited to spend some time in the city of Assos, practising philosophy with the tyrant Hermias.\(^2\)

Philosophers and educators were well aware of the proper relationship with monarchs. When therefore it became apparent that Philip of Macedon was seeking a Greek tutor for his son Alexander, who by 343 had reached the age of 13, the news must have caused some excitement. The two obvious places to look for a candidate were the great rivals, the Academy and the school of Isocrates. Of these the latter was clearly in the lead. Isocrates already had two pupils, Theopompus and another whose name is not known,\(^3\) at the

\(^1\) Stobaeus iv, 32, 21 p. 786 Hense = Aristotle P 50 Rose\(^3\). For the purpose see I. Düring, Aristotle's Protrepticus (1961), 173ff.; for the problem of date 33ff.; Aristoteles (1966), 404ff. But I confess that I do not believe Düring's late date for the work, after Isocrates' Antidosis. Antid. 74 seems to give the order **ad Nicoclem, Protreptikos, Antidosis** (the fact that Isocrates gets the contents of the Protreptikos wrong does not prove that he was referring to other works: Isocrates' references to Academic teaching and treatises are notoriously misleading). Moreover Düring's excellent characterisation of the ironical purpose of Aristotle in addressing a Cyprian prince loses most of its point unless the work is a reply to the **ad Nicoclem** rather than the Antidosis. I therefore consider the Protreptikos to be among the very early works of Aristotle.


\(^3\) The mysterious 'Pontic' disciple mentioned in c. 11 of Speusippus' letter.
Macedonian court, which under normal circumstances might prove an advantage; though Theopompus was an erratic ally. Moreover only three years before, Isocrates had written perhaps his most important political work, the Philippus, calling on Philip to lead a united Greece against the barbarian Persians, a project Philip was perhaps already believed to be contemplating.

If the Academy was to have a chance, desperate measures were called for. Its head, Speusippus, sent a personal emissary to Philip in the winter of 343/2 with a letter. The authenticity of this letter has been established by Bickermann and Sykutris. In it Isocrates' Philippus was exposed as a hack-piece unworthy even of a rhetorician. Isocrates' ignorance of history was incredible, his failure to answer any of the criticisms brought against Philip's activities in Greece extraordinary; his political reliability could be judged from his earlier activities, and from the fact that the very work which was sent to Philip had first been written for Agesilaus, and then sold to Dionysius.

To counteract the slanders of Theopompus against Athens and Plato, Speusippus sent his own historian, Antipatros, whose studies in the legend of Heracles and in more recent history

would justify Philip's activities at Amphipolis and in the Chalcidice, and his usurpation of extra representation on the Amphictyonic council. Let Philip too remember the previous relations between Plato and Macedon, that it was Euphraeus who had been the adviser of Perdiccas, and so laid the foundation of Philip's own power; for it was Perdiccas who gave him a share in the kingdom, and his opportunity.

The letter was intended for publication,¹ and therefore represents the official attitude of the Academy towards Macedon, as defined by the head of the school. The later Academy was, it is now recognised, anti-Macedonian in its outlook, and in favour of the democratic government of Athens.² It is therefore curious to find Speusippus taking a pro-Macedonian line at a time when Athenian opinion was strongly against Philip; and Speusippus was anyway scarcely the person to indulge in contemporary political debate without good reason. That reason should be sought in the local school rivalry between Isocrates and the Academy, just as the later attitude of Xenocrates is a reflection of the quarrel between the Academy and Aristotle, whose school was under the protection

1. o.c. 18.
of Macedon. 'It would be completely unhistorical to consider the letter as a purely political writing in the Macedonian interest. For Speusippus it was obviously much more a pamphlet against Isocrates than a manifesto for Philip'.

That is true; but it may be asked why Speusippus should be so concerned with Isocrates' standing at the court of Philip, and why he should wait three years before attacking the Philippus. Again the purpose of the letter was not primarily to establish the bearer Antipatros in the king's favour: he is quickly forgotten. The motive lies in the rivalry between Isocrates and Speusippus. 'But what concern did Philip have for these scholastic quarrels?'

The vindication of the letter's authenticity has raised as many problems as it has solved: it is not enough to say that the letter is a reply to the Philippus, and another pamphlet in the quarrel of the two schools.

It was precisely in 343/2 that the question of the relative merits of these schools became relevant at the court of Macedon, for the education of Alexander was being discussed. Such an occasion demanded a reassertion of the

1. Bickermann, Sykutris o.c.45.
2. o.c.70.
3. o.c.71.
4. This suggestion has already been made by the anonymous reviewer of Bickermann and Sykutris in Bull. de l'Assoc. G. Budé Suppl. crit. i (1929), 94f.
Academy's claims on the attention of Philip: an open attack on both Isocrates and Theopompus at that time cannot be seen as anything but an attempt to suggest that Philip should look elsewhere for a tutor. Perhaps Speusippus' hopes were not high: after all, Alexander was too young for philosophy, and not likely to be good material. But at least that aged fraud Isocrates should not get it.

How much effect this travesty of Isocrates had on Philip is more doubtful. His decision to give his son a Greek education was motivated by the highest political considerations; Macedonia had come of age as a Greek state, and its future ruler must have the best training that Greek culture could provide. But the choice of Aristotle was not reached primarily because of his eminence as a philosopher; other factors were decisive. Aristotle had an hereditary connection with the Macedonian royal house through his father Nicomachus' position as friend and physician of Amyntas. Since Plato's death he had been the close friend and confidant of Hermias of Atarneus,

1. A. Momigliano, Filippo il Macedone (1934), 135.
Much nonsense has been written on the education of Alexander, from Plutarch on. Wilamowitz, Aristoteles und Athen (1893), 335ff. remains the most impressive statement, exploiting the irony of the relationship with inimitable assurance; cf. also V. Ehrenberg, Alexander and the Greeks (1938), 62ff. (Tarn's reply, Alexander the Great ii (1948), 366ff. is unconvincing); J.R. Hamilton, Greece and Rome xii (1965), 113f. M. Brocker, Aristoteles als Alexanders Lehrer in der Legende (Diss. Bonn 1966) is useful for refs.
whose strategic position as a bridgehead in Asia for any invasion would lend weight to his personal recommendation. ¹ Such claims would suffice to secure Aristotle his new post. Philip's interest lay in the general culture of Greece; it was no part of his plan to make Alexander a philosopher-king. If philosophy came into the picture at all, it would be under the guise of psychology. Alexander was a difficult child; his old teachers, it would seem, could no longer control him. ² What was needed was a long rest in the country, away from the excitements of court, with a resident psychologist in attendance. For three years Alexander was kept an unwilling prisoner in the Nymphaeum near the small town of Mieza, with Aristotle as his gaoler. Such may be inferred from the secluded retreat chosen by Philip.

Whatever the reason for Philip's decision, in the view of public opinion at Athens the Academy had won - though Speusippus himself might have doubts about the choice of Aristotle, with whom his personal relations were strained. Still the Academy was notorious for its part in educating

¹. cf. Jaeger o.c. 120; Momigliano o.c. 135 n.I; 140 n.I; when and at whose instigation relations began between Hermias and Philip is obscure; nor is it legitimate to attribute to Aristotle either of the different political roles which these authors do.
². Plut. Alex. 7.
rulers, and Aristotle was its most prominent member free to take up such a post. Moreover Aristotle's own views on the need for rulers to study philosophy were known from the Protrepticus. It was not surprising that Isocrates, the very man against whom the Protrepticus had been directed, should feel annoyed. The choice of Aristotle was an unforgivable slight to one who had risked unpopularity and accepted the Macedonian hegemony, had fought the Academy so long, and who was surrounded by brilliant young teachers. In a short letter to Alexander written during the 'idyll of Mieza', he expressed his disapproval in terms as strong as he dared. Alexander was consorting with men whose loyalty was questionable, and following a course of instruction useless for a monarch - eristics. How much better it would be if he turned to rhetoric. Merlan has exposed the bitterness and chagrin behind the polite phrases of the letter; but his conclusion goes too far. Isocrates' belief that Alexander was studying eristics, or dialectic, was, he thinks, based on information from Macedonia itself; 'in fact, Isocrates' letter is the only objective document regarding Alexander's education; everything else is conjectural'. In support of this view, Merlan compares the curriculum of Plato with Dionysius, Euphraeus with Perdiccas, and Aristotle himself with Themison and Hermias.¹

¹. Isocr. Ep.5; P. Merlan, Hist. iii (1954/5), 60ff., esp.73ff. It is not of course possible formally to prove or disprove the authenticity of so short a letter as this; but Merlan has, I believe, given a convincing context for the letter. cf. also his reply to critics denying its genuineness, o.c. 60 n.3.
These parallels are not convincing; they suggest rather that Isocrates had no evidence for his belief. For all these rulers were grown men, of an age to understand philosophy; at the time of Aristotle's arrival Alexander was thirteen, and his full time education ceased at sixteen. All the knowledge we possess of the educational theories of Plato and Aristotle makes it impossible for Aristotle to have conceived teaching Alexander philosophy at such an age.¹ It does not matter whether Aristotle followed Platonic theory, his own later views, Isocrates' curriculum or the normal practice of Greek education; at that age all agree - the only suitable study is literature, and especially poetry. And as Aristotle himself said, 'a young man is not a suitable hearer of political science.'²

The letter of Isocrates is a curious production; its strictures on Aristotle as a man and teacher are necessarily so obscure as to be unnoticed by a child of Alexander's age. Indeed the letter is not written for Alexander at all;

1. Wilamowitz rightly does not think the possibility worth mentioning; a selection of those who do, may be found, R. Andreotti, Hist. v (1956), 257 n.2.
2. Ar. NE i 1095a2. It is true that Isocrates in Panath. 26-8 and Antid. 266-8 demotes eristic to be suitable only for νοητον, and very similar to what μάθημα learn. But this is a caricature and a libel, the practice of no-one, not even himself.
Isocrates claims that it will stop 'those who read it from thinking that I am already a victim of senile decay and an utter idiot, and show them that the part which remains left to me is not unworthy of the talent which I had when I was younger'. Τοῦ ἄλλου ποιήματος - others are peering over Alexander's shoulder. They are the men whom Isocrates conceives as slandering him, that is Aristotle and his circle. The letter, addressed to such a biased audience, can hardly have done much good; its message seems rooted in the bitterness of Isocrates' heart and the injured pride of a man who saw himself rejected.\(^1\) Rational considerations were left aside in the pursuit of a vendetta; obsessed with his own fixed ideas on the subject of Academic education, he forgot the age of the child. The letter is best excused as another unfortunate proof that Isocrates was indeed 'a victim

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1. cf. Panath. 16ff.; indeed the cynic may see a deeper reflection of this bitterness in the changed attitude of Isocrates towards Philip between the Philippus and the Panathenaicus, begun in the same year as Aristotle's appointment (for the change, cf. Momigliano o.c. 189ff.). Certainly the first thirty-four chapters contain Isocrates' most bitter comments on the Academic education (cf. Merlan o.c. 68ff.), and are markedly defensive - the Academy, it appears, has won. In the Panath. Isocrates' educational views are intruded on his political ones in a way that requires explanation. But there may be other motives for his political change of heart; the proem also defends him against the ordinary politician (10-15) - he is denying himself to be pro-Macedonian.
of senile decay and an utter idiot'.

The story of Alexander's philosophic education is an example of the ubiquitous tendency among the champions of philosophy to attribute a philosophic μαθητής and a philosophic adviser to every great man. Its absence from the works of Onesicritus and Marsyas of Pella on the education of Alexander has been noted by Gigon;¹ its full development is probably due to Hermippus, whose interest in the political activities of philosophers is attested by his book, 'On those who turned from philosophy to politics'; but its origins are earlier.² Its formulation in Plutarch is qualified by apologetic phrases εὐφυκε, δοκεῖ δὲ μοι.

The ancients conceived the influence of a philosopher as personal, rather than doctrinal; documentation was unnecessary when such a connection was postulated - the fact that the philosopher had consorted with the king was sufficient. In contrast the evidence for Alexander's love of literature is circumstantial. He found the lack of books on his campaign hard to bear, and at his request Harpalus sent him the three

2. Pace Gigon 183, Alexinus (ap. Aristocles ap. Luseb. Praep.ev. xv 14 = Düring, Aristotle 374) must be referring to a philosophical education. (This passage will not fit Berve's picture of Nicagoras as the Persian supported tyrant of Zeleia, since he is portrayed in Macedonia during Alexander's childhood; cf. Alexanderreich (ii no. 551).
tragedians, two fourth century dithyrambic poets, Telestes and Philoxenus, and the historian Philistus - an odd booklist for anyone to invent.¹ His devotion to Homer is attested as early as Onesicritus, and expressly connected with Aristotle.² At Thebes he showed his respect for Pindar;³ Euripides and Stesichorus are also mentioned.⁴ This version of Alexander's education under Aristotle is so intrinsically probable that its origin scarcely needs investigating, but Gigon's rejection of it warrants a short discussion.

According to Gigon,⁵ this version is also to be attributed to Hermippus, whose practice was to fill out the details of Aristotle's life by inferences drawn from his books. In itself, of course, this is not a disreputable procedure; Jaeger used it with remarkable success. In this instance, Gigon believes that the Homeric education was based by Hermippus on Alexander's known love of Homer, which he connected

¹. Plut. Alex. 8; cf. also T.S. Brown, Hist. xvi (1967), 359ff. (though I do not accept his attempts at emendation).
². Onesicritus, FGH 134 F 38; Plut. Alex. 26; de Alex. Fort. i, 327f.; Strabo xiii, 594; Pliny, NH vii, 29; cf. Dio Or. ii, passim; Gnomol. Vat. 78 with refs.; H. Usener, Kleine Schriften i (1912), 328f. It is difficult to follow Gigon 186 in his assertion that the notion of an Aristotelean edition of Homer was not in Onesicritus; however apocryphal the story.
³. Arrian Anab. i, 9, 10; Plut. Alex. 11; Pliny NH vii, 29; Aelian VH xiii, 7; Dio Or. ii, 33.
⁴. Stesichorus, Dio Lc.; Euripides, Plut. Alex. 6; Nikoboule, FGH 127 F2.
⁵. o.c. 185.
with Aristotle's ἀναγνωρίστα Ὀμηρόν. If Gigon is right, we might be inclined to congratulate Hermippus on his acumen in posing the right question, 'why did Alexander love Homer?', and supplying so intelligent an answer. But the argument for scepticism is not compelling. In the case of the philosophic education the prerequisite for the legend was already there, a pattern of historiography, an idealising tendency among philosophers, to which Aristotle and Alexander must be made to conform. The notion of Homer as especially suitable for kings begins with Alexander; his example moulded the pattern, rather than being forced into it. Moreover Hermippus, it appears, had already filled his vacuum, by postulating the philosophical education; there was no need to add another, unless it was independently attested.

It is clear that Aristotle did not teach Alexander philosophy in any formal sense, though Alexander may have been as adept as most children at making his master digress towards his personal interests. But in those three years some sort of relationship must have emerged; in attempting to determine the authenticity and the date of Aristotle's Περὶ Ὀμηρῶν, the subsequent history of their acquaintance may offer some clues.

There is in fact no sign that their relationship was ever more than formal. Alexander's benefactions and attitude to philosophers went as far as convention dictated, but no
further; an educated ruler must support learning and honour his teacher. On the other side, Aristotle could never have regarded Alexander as his pupil in the way Plato regarded Dionysius and Dion; his stay in Macedonia was an interlude in a life otherwise given to philosophy. Because of the difference in their ages, there was no such friendship as Aristotle had with Hermias and Antipater; nor is there any indication of the mutual respect which seems to have existed between him and Philip. Moreover in an Athens largely hostile to Macedonia it was expedient to mention his connection as little as possible. Open disagreement had also to be avoided, for Aristotle had compromised himself

1. I say 'seems', because the only firm evidence is the offer of a post by Philip, and its acceptance by Aristotle; though it may be noted that Alexander's quarrel with his father over his remarriage does not seem to have affected Aristotle's relations with Philip. On the advice given by Aristotle to Philip see below p. 54. The story that Aristotle wrote his διανοητικά πολέμων for Philip to use in settling inter-city disputes, is found only in Vit. Marc. 4; H. Nissen, Rhein. Mus. xlvii (1892), 167ff., and Momigliano, o.c. 134 n., accept it. The mention of the expedition of Alexander of Molossus (shortly before 330: Aeschines In Ctes. 242) as an historical example would then serve as a terminus post quem only for the final publication of a revised version. It is easier to reject the Vit. Marc. story as an example of the method adopted by the biographical tradition in order to give Aristotle political influence, and follow Jaeger o.c. 328 in dating the work to Aristotle's last years.
in the eyes of the Athenians; his safety in Athens depended on Macedonia, and in particular on the loyal Antipater. There is a saying attributed to Aristotle; when asked what was the most difficult thing in life, he replied, 'to keep silence'.¹ Silence about Alexander was the best course.

Nevertheless there are indications that their relations were not entirely happy. The silence of the Politics on Macedonian power and anything to do with the schemes of Alexander, on the new world which was being born, is due to disapproval rather than blindness on Aristotle's part.² Aristotle was said to have advised Philip not to attack Persia,³ and there was every reason for him to hold

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1. Gnomol. Vat. no. 58.
2. Ehrenberg o.c. 71ff. discusses admirably all possible references in the Politics.
3. Philod. Vol. Rhet. ii, 61, 15; cf. S. Sudhaus, Rhein.Mus. xlviii (1893), 559f. But though this statement is plausible, it cannot be accepted as fact. It appears in the context of an early Epicurean polemic against both Aristotle and Isocrates. The source of the story, if it be not invented, must be Athenian. Opinion at Athens would naturally attribute the failure of Isocrates' appeal in the Philippus to the influence of his erstwhile opponent Aristotle; indeed the joke in the letter of Speusippus 14 (cf. Bickermann, Sygktriq o.c. 3,34) shows Academic interest in opposing Isocrates' appeal, and the background against which stories of Aristotle's influence might circulate a few years later in the ambit of the controversy with Isocrates. Whether Athenian opinion was right or not, is impossible to decide; I doubt whether Philip asked for, or was given, any such advice by Aristotle. But at least it can be said that Aristotle did or said nothing to contradict the impression that he was against Persian expeditions. The inference of Ehrenberg (o.c. 63) from the epigram for Hermias (F 3 Diehl), that Aristotle would have supported a Persian expedition, is invalid.
to that view on the arrival of a ruler without the experience and mental stability necessary to carry out such a project.\textsuperscript{1} The advice to Alexander to treat the barbarians as slaves, although it fits well with Aristotle's general view, reads like a second best after Alexander's success.\textsuperscript{2} Alexander's ideas were a complication of the political scene which Aristotle's theories preferred to ignore; the whole history of the fourth century showed, he might hope, that such conquests were ephemeral. The quarrel did not come into the open until the death of Callisthenes, but its roots are earlier. For Alexander did not regard this as an isolated episode; in a letter to Antipater he intimated that Aristotle was also suspect, and in a short time Antipater himself had joined his friend in disgrace.\textsuperscript{3} When Cassander tried to defend his father with a remark Alexander found too clever, he laughed out loud, and said, 'those are the double-faced sophisms of the disciples of Aristotle'.\textsuperscript{4} It is all too easy to attribute such events to the increasing megalomania.

\textsuperscript{1} The story that Aristotle declared the omens unfavourable to Alexander (Vit. Marc. 23) is apocryphal, but points in the same direction; so too, 'wait until you are grown up before going to war' (Gnomol. Vat. 98). Cf. the letter to Antipater, Plezia F 9.

\textsuperscript{2} Below p. 73.

\textsuperscript{3} Plut. Alex. 53; the letter accuses Aristotle, and also possibly Antipater.

\textsuperscript{4} Alex. 74.
of Alexander; the problem goes deeper. These are not the actions of a man whose relations with Aristotle had until then been happy. Suspicion and mistrust were there before, and contributed to the fall of Callisthenes. As Aristotle said (and both halves of the statement are relevant): with kings 'men who are much their inferior do not expect to be friends; nor worthless men with the best and most wise'.¹ Such were the fruits of the 'idyll of Mieza'.

a. ARISTOTLE ON KINGSHIP

The title of a book by Aristotle On Kingship is given in the list of his works in Diogenes Laertius, a list which is agreed to go back to that of Hermippus in the late third century; it appears from other evidence that this work may have been addressed to Alexander. But, despite much discussion, the date, contents and purpose of the book remain obscure. Moreover the situation has been complicated by the recent discovery of full texts of a work preserved only in Arabic, and purporting to be just such a treatise of advice from Aristotle to Alexander. But the work itself as it stands is certainly a later forgery, probably of Roman imperial date; it therefore seems important to lay out such evidence

¹. Ar. NE viii, 1159a1; cf. Ehrenberg o.c. 84.
as exists from the Greco-Roman world, clearly marking off that which cannot refer to this forgery from that which may, before discussing the problem of the new Arabic text.

The Classical Evidence

The influence of V. Rose's three editions of the fragments of Aristotle is still strong, and not altogether wholesome. His main claim, embodied in the title of the earliest work, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, it is true, has been so long disregarded that the case against the authenticity of individual works is often ignored. But Rose's practice of distributing the fragments, in default of any certain evidence, among the various titles of the lost works, and of not always distinguishing clearly between fragments and testimonia, is still evident today. This claim will, I hope, be substantiated by the following discussion of Aristotle's περὶ ἀνθρώπων, a work on whose nature and contents little agreement has been reached.

This lack of agreement can be simply illustrated by a comparison of the practice of the various editors of

Aristotle's fragments. Rose himself changed his mind in each of his collections. In the first he claimed three separate works, a dialogue \textit{περὶ \ βαςίλειας}, a letter \textit{περὶ \ Ἀλέξανδρῳ σεμπροσέπελενίκης}, and another letter, probably of Byzantine origin, described as \textit{Aristotelis ad Alexandrum regem de moribus rege dignis}, which existed according to him in Arabic and Hebrew codices, and traces of which might be found in various medieval collections of the sayings of Aristotle.\(^1\) In his second edition the evidence for the first two was collected under the heading \textit{περὶ βαςίλειας} and classified as a dialogue;\(^2\) in the third edition the same evidence with the same title was given among the \textit{Epistulæ}, and Rose added that the letter was extant in an Arabic version.\(^3\) It is plain that he had not seen this version, since the fragments he printed as belonging to the \textit{περὶ βαςίλειας} do not appear in it. Ross in 1955 offered the same fragments and testimonia as Rose's last two editions under the heading \textit{περὶ βαςίλειας}, and regarded the work as a dialogue; he ignored the Arabic evidence.\(^4\) Plezia, in his edition of Aristotle's letters,

1. V. Rose, \textit{Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus} (1863), 94ff., 583f.
2. \textit{Aristotelis Opera v} (1870), 1489.
3. \textit{Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta} (1886), 408f.
making good use of the Arabic evidence, classified the περὶ 
παντικής as a συμπολεμικῆς, but went on to 
claim that the Arabic letter was neither the περὶ παντικής 
nor a forgery, but a shortened version of another συμπολεμικῆς, 
the 'Αλέξανδρος ὑπὸ ὄποιον καὶ ἵνα τῆς παλαιᾶς. 1 Finally Heitz, 
whose work has suffered somewhat unjustly in his own and 
subsequent generations from the fact that it was Rose and 
not he who won the competition instituted by the Berlin 
Academy, conceived a genuine συμπολεμικῆς entitled περὶ 
'Αλέξανδρον υπὸ ὄποιον καὶ περὶ παντικής; 2 he modified 
his position in his later edition, so far as to admit 
two works, but still claimed the περὶ παντικής as a 
συμπολεμικῆς. 3 

It is unnecessary to give the great variation among 
these editors in the number and distribution of testimonia 
and fragments, or to follow the vicissitudes of the περὶ 
παντικῆς in the many other authors who have mentioned it. 
In the following pages I have attempted to perform the 
essential preliminary of showing how far it is possible to 
draw any conclusions from the classical evidence. 

2. E. Heitz, Die Verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles (1865), 
207. 
3. Fragmenta Aristotelis (1869), 59f. - to be found in the 
last volume of the Didot Aristotle.
Hermippus' list\textsuperscript{1} of Aristotle's works gives, as nos. 17-8:

\begin{center}
'Αλέξανδρος ἡ ἐπίθετος ἐπιστολήν κ᾽
περὶ βοήθειας κ᾽
\end{center}

Among the letters (144) he gives πρὸς 'Αλέξανδρον ἐπιστολὴν 5'.

The list of the \textit{Vita Hesychii} gives the same two titles,\textsuperscript{3} the περὶ βοήθειας as no. 16, the 'Αλέξανδρος as no. 22; and as no. 137 mentions ἐπιστολή κ᾽ without detailing the correspondents.

This evidence has at times been taken to show that the περὶ βοήθειας was not a letter, either private or public, since it is apparently classified apart from the letters. Such an inference is of course without foundation; a public

\begin{enumerate}
\item On the origin of the list in Diog. Laert., cf. I. Düring, \textit{Class. et Med.} xvii (1956), 11ff. The two lists may most easily be studied in his \textit{Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition} (1957).
\item That the figures refer to individual letters, not books, is plain (cf. P. Moraux, \textit{Listes Anciennes des Ouvrages d'Aristote} (1951), 143ff., and Diog. Laert. iii, 61). Nor is the text of Diogenes as corrupt as Plezia thinks; it runs, 'letters to Philip, letters of the Selymbrians (?), to Alexander four letters, to Antipater four .......' - a completely natural way of writing a list when the first two correspondences are extensive, the remainder small. Plezia treats it as a mechanical tabulation, instead of a piece of Greek prose. Hesychius' number is obtained by counting up the known figures and omitting the unknown, a typically slipshod procedure.
\end{enumerate}
or semi-public letter of advice is always difficult to classify, because it is different in both nature and length from private correspondence. A letter of such an important nature to the Hellenistic world might either circulate separately, or be included in a collection of letters, or both. And, as During has pointed out, the first 19 titles of Hermippus' list should be regarded not as dialogues (there is no evidence that all Aristotle's 'exoteric' works were dialogues), but rather as 'the works most well-known to the general public in Hellenistic times' — the original foundation perhaps of the collection at Alexandria.

The lists attest the existence of the work; its nature must be inferred from other sources. There were two collections of Aristotle's letters, that of Artemon, and a supplement by Andronicus. Demetrius On Style used

1. Plezia o.c. 95.
3. The date and identity of Artemon is uncertain; cf. Plezia, Eos xlv, 1 (1951), 82ff. But it is tempting to put him later than Hermippus (so P. Moraux, Listes Anciennes des Ouvrages d'Aristote (1951), 143 n. 53). The size of both collections is obscure; Artemon's is said to be eight books (Elias, Ptolemy), Andronicus' twenty (Ptolemy). The information is derived from Ptolemy (During, Aristotle, 445), and is unreliable: cf. the six books of the 7tXte6—t (below p. 65). Plezia's solution of twenty-eight letters in all is unlikely, since Hermippus' list already gave over twenty (Plezia resorts to emendation). If Ptolemy's figures must be saved, it might be held that they refer to an organisation by sections instituted by Artemon, and expanded by Andronicus. But this is conjecture.
Artemon's collection, and accepted his theory of epistolography contained presumably in its preface. The following passage probably refers to letters in that work: ¹ ζητεὶ δὲ καὶ πολεμίν ποτε καὶ μαχητῶν γράφοντων, ἐπιστολαί δὲπολλοῖς μικρὸν ἐστὶν ἃν ὧν καὶ τοῦ πρωτοῦ, ὡς γραφότων, ἐστὶ βῆχαν μέντοι καὶ αὐχ ὣτε σύγχρονες εἶναι ἃν ἄντ' ἐπιστολῆς, ἡσπεριν ἄν Ἀριστοτέλους πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ τοῦ τούς Διόνυσος οἰκείου ὂς Πλάτωνος.

Letters existed of Aristotle to Alexander analogous, at least in literary style, to the seventh letter of Plato; so much is certain. It is also possible that there is a relation between these letters and the two titles Alexandros and On Kingship of Hermippus' list. For Demetrius' description of 'the letters of Aristotle to Alexander' suggests works of a formal rhetorical nature, rather than the informal correspondence he refers to elsewhere.² It may be that Demetrius' plural letters are to be identified with these two works, rather than with the four letters to Alexander known to Hermippus. Or Hermippus' list may have included these two in the total of four, as well as mentioning them

1. Demetrius 234. Plezia doubts that Artemon wrote a preface, but this is a corollary of his theory that the collection was apologetic against Demochares' slanders, rather than literary.
2. 225, 230, 233; cf. 29, 154 and 97, 144, 164.
The only reasonably certain evidence of the nature of Aristotle's work is that of Cicero. In contemplating the writing of a συμβουλευτικός to Caesar in May 45, he mentions a similar work of Aristotle to Alexander:

συμβουλευτικον saepe conor, nihil reperio, et quidem mecum habeo et Αριστοτέλους et Θεοσόφου πατος \\
'Αλέξανδρος. sed quid simile? illi et quae ipsis honesta essent scribent et grata Alexandro. ecquid tu eius modi reperis? mihi quidem nihil in mentem venit.

And:

sed in mentem nihil venit. nam quae sunt ad Alexandrum hominum eloquentium et doctorum suasiones, vides quibus in rebus versentur. adolescentem incensum cupiditate verissimae gloriae, cupientem sibi aliquid consilii dari, quod ad laudem sempiternam valeret, cohortantur ad decus.¹

I do not understand how Rose and Ross² can use these passages in connection with a work they believe to be a dialogue. Cicero's statements are clear; Aristotle's work was a συμβουλευτικός, a suasio. I know of no instance of a dialogue being described in this manner, nor was Cicero

1. Cic. ad Att. xii, 40, 2; xiii, 28, 2.
2. Ross's reasons are best stated in the introd. to the Oxford Translation of Aristotle xii, p. xi. They do not convince.
contemplating writing a dialogue for Caesar. He refers eight times elsewhere to his epistula; something similar to the pseudo-Sallustian letters are what was intended. Aristotle's work was as good a model as Theopompus', which is elsewhere described as ὑπομολέβουσιν πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον συμβολαὶ and πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον ἐπιστολὴ. Cicero does not of course say that the suasio of Aristotle which he possessed was called παραλλήλη. It could be that the παραλλήλη was a different work, in which case it could have been a dialogue rather than a letter of advice. The conclusion that can be drawn from the earlier evidence is that there existed in the Hellenistic world a suasio attributed to Aristotle, and addressed to Alexander, which discussed how he should exercise power: whether that work was called παραλλήλη remains obscure.

Finally there is the evidence from the late Roman empire which, provided that it is trustworthy and provided also that it refers to the same work, allows us to characterise the παραλλήλη, and perhaps to connect it with the evidence of Demetrius and Cicero. The Aristotelean Vitae describe a

1. Cic. ad Att. xii, 51, 2; 52, 2; xiii, 1, 3; 7, 1; 26, 2; 27, 1; 28, 2; 31, 3.
2. FGH 115 T 48 (Rhodian booklist, ca. 100 BC); F 252-5. Jacoby's view (commentary 390) that Cicero's reference is to a collection of letters seems to me wrong.
book περὶ παραλήγης written to or for Alexander, ἐν ἐνι ἀνομβίσεις, teaching him how he ought to rule. The Prolegomena of the sixth century AD divide the works of Aristotle into τὰ μετὰλ., written to someone on a particular topic relevant to them, τὰ καθόλου, treatises on general matters, and those between the two. Letters and similar works are classified as τὰ μετὰλ. Of the Prolegomena, Philoponus, who gives examples, is the most revealing:

μετὰλ. περὶ ὑπὲρ ἐστὶ, ὅσα πρὸς τινα ἰδίως γέγραπται, ἐν δὲ ἐπιστολαὶ ἢ ὅσα ἐρωτηθεὶς ἐπὶ Ἀλέξανδρων τοῦ Μακεδόνος περὶ τε μετὰλής καὶ ὅπως ἄν
τῇ ἀποκάλεσθαι ποιοτὸν ἐγγεγράφηκε. The τὰ μετὰλ. and the Ἀλέξανδρος are classified with the letters as τὰ μετὰλ., but apparently differentiated from them; dialogues, however, are a sub-category of τὰ καθόλου. Olympiodorus and Elias, without mentioning the works by name, seem to reflect the same distinction.

It is difficult to evaluate the reliability of this evidence. The reference in the Aristotelian Vitae can be suspected. These biographies are epitomes of the life of

2. Collected in Plezia o.c. 19ff.; on their nature, cf. Düring o.c. 444ff.
Aristotle by a Ptolemy, of the end of the third century AD;¹ but it was one of the purposes of that author to show Aristotle as influential in public affairs, honoured by Philip and Alexander. Düring goes so far as to write of this particular passage that it 'gives us a glimpse of how Ptolemy worked; the whole study is invented by him on the basis of a book-title in the Index librorum'.² Such certainty is misleading, for Ptolemy clearly did a considerable amount of research in compiling his life; and it is at least known that a work similar to that described by Ptolemy existed in the age of Cicero: Ptolemy's information could go back to Hermippus or other Hellenistic works. Yet it remains possible that Ptolemy invented his account on the evidence of the book-list, or with reference to the forged treatise now extant in Arabic. Similarly the commentators may not offer independent evidence. For they possessed an epitome of Ptolemy similar to the surviving Vitae,³ and may themselves have combined the information in this with the book-lists to produce their category of Ta prōsē: it is therefore possible that they too

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2. Düring o.c. 110.
3. o.c. 445.
posséd either no περὶ βασιλείας or knew only the forgery which has survived.

Such scepticism is perhaps unnecessary. Philoponus pairs the two treatises found together in Hermippus' list, the περὶ βασιλείας and the Alexandros. There is no sign of a forgery of the second of these works, and no sign that it attracted the attention of Ptolemy. Thus one of the two treatises, it seems, survived to be characterised by Philoponus: why not also the other? Philoponus carries with him the other commentators; and if the treatise περὶ βασιλείας was known to these, it could also have been known to Ptolemy. Moreover the evidence of the commentators and Ptolemy is consistent with that of Cicero and Demetrius. The late references therefore, though they must be used with caution, might reasonably be held to supplement the characterisation of Cicero and Demetrius.

There is no literary reason to suppose that Aristotle could not have written a περὶ βασιλείας in the sense of an open letter of advice on government for Alexander. Isocrates might provide a model for the form, Plato for the sentiments. Other contemporaries were writing for Alexander: Theopompus has been mentioned; Xenocrates wrote 'The Elements of Kingship to Alexander' in four books; Anaxarchus, Alexander's companion, composed a περὶ βασιλείας.
Aristotle's own school was later active in this sphere. No less than four works on kingship are attributed to Theophrastus, one a συνβουλευτικός (though this is probably a forgery); Straton of Lampsacus wrote On Kingship in three volumes, and On the Philosopher-King. Aristotle himself had written the Protrepticus for the Cyprian prince Themison; and his interest in the theory of kingship is attested by book iii of the Politics. It is then certain that there was a suasio attributed to Aristotle, and addressed to Alexander; and it may remain a reasonable hypothesis that this suasio is to be identified with the treatise περὶ βασιλείας mentioned in the lists. The following discussion assumes this identification in the sense that it is concerned with the scope and contents of the suasio, which on the evidence of Cicero would seem to have been about kingship even if it were not called On Kingship.

The classification συνβουλευτικός is one of contents or intention, and cuts across the categories of form - a speech or written address to a person, a treatise if sufficiently ad hominem, a formal letter of advice; the various forms shade into one another.¹ The combined evidence

¹. See J. Klek, Symbouleutici qui dicitur historia critica (Diss Freiburg 1919), passim, esp. 38 on the suitability of the letter form for συνβουλευτικὸς.
for Aristotle's Περί Πολιτικής would however suggest that it is nearer the epistolary end of the spectrum - so the Prolegomena, and the comparison with Theopompus, whose αμφοτεροσιμος contained the personal abuse so beloved of philosophic private correspondence in the Hellenistic age.

The work characterised by Ptolemy is described as consisting of one book; but this should mean that it was long enough to exist independently, rather than that it filled a papyrus roll. There is of course no fixed length for advice; Isocrates can address Philip for 40 pages of a modern text. But the nearer the αμφοτεροσιμος approaches to the letter, the shorter it becomes; Isocrates ad Nicoclem is 14 pages, the Commentariolum Petitionis 21, the second Sallustian letter to Caesar 11, the Ciceronian letter to Octavian 6. Aristotle's advice may have been brief. Bernays has already pointed to the tautologous nature of the expression in the Vita Vulgata, ἐν ἐν μονοπλήκτω, and wished to delete ἐν. But it may be that the expression is emphatic, and should be translated, 'in one short book' or 'in only one book'.

The contents of the work are generally described by the Vitae, διάλεκται ὑπὸ Πολιτικῶν, and by Cicero. Rose,

and others following him have attributed two fragments to the work. The first lays no claim to being a fragment; it is a testimonium, and a testimonial to the effect that Aristotle's teaching so influenced Alexander's soul that he used to say:

"Ο κατεύθυνσις, η οποία προηγούταν, έστιν, για το έπωνυμία μου."  

This story is usually told of the Emperor Titus, and is so told five times by the Aristotelean scholar, Themistius!  

The second fragment, from Themistius, is accepted by all editors:  

"Δέκα τοις βιβλίοις τον λόγον πεποίηκει ο Αριστοτέλης, πολλοί δὲ ομολογούν διά τις μεταδομής τον λόγον πεποίηκει ο Αριστοτέλης, χάριν καὶ λόγων, το δὲ φιλοσοφῶν, αυτού τούτους άρχισεν ενυπάρξει καὶ έγκομον. έγκομον γαρ δέχθηκε την βασιλείαν, ενεπλάγη εν ουσί αυτού τούτους."  

Its credentials too seem doubtful. It is about kingship, but it is not known whether Themistius knew Aristotle's work. Polemic, such as this implies, is inappropriate in a ομελετητής. Moreover there is no sign that Aristotle ever changed his view, first expressed in the Protrepticus, that philosophical knowledge was essential in a ruler; the

1. Vit. Marc. 21 = Rose¹ F 69, Rose² F 78, Rose³ F 646, Heitz F 85, Ross F 1 p. 62. Plezia correctly prints as a testimonium (T 16). The story told of Titus: Them. Or. vi, 80a; viii, 107a; xiii, 174c; xv, 193a; xviii, 225a; Suet. Tit. 8; Ep. de Caes. 10,9; Auson. ad Grat. 16, 72. Cf Aristotle, also Elias in Cat. CAG xvii, 1, 112,24.  
content of that knowledge may be different in the Politics, but its importance is the same. Themistius is known to have done odd things to his master's views on kingship. Julian himself had to take him to task for twisting Aristotle in just such a way; he had claimed that on certain occasions Aristotle thought the life of kingly action superior to the theoretical. Julian replied that he had misinterpreted the passage in question. It would only be a small step from that misinterpretation to the claim that Aristotle thought the philosophical life an actual impediment to the practical. The authenticity of the fragment might be doubted. Valens, to whom Themistius was speaking, was no philosopher; an authority might be advisable, to deny what Themistius had said about the need for a philosopher-king on another occasion - under Julian.

A less radical solution would be to place such a statement where it plainly belongs, in a discussion of Plato's views on the philosopher-king - that is, in the lost

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1. cf. e.g. *NE* x, 1180b13ff.
2. Julian, ad Them. 263c; in fact, Julian too seems to have misinterpreted the passage (*Ar. Pol.* vii, 1325b).
dialogue, the Politicus. This helps to remove the other difficulty, that the fragment contradicts Aristotle's views elsewhere. The Politicus, it is clear, as the Protrepticus seems to have done, held the knowledge of the Platonic Ideas to be essential to government; and this knowledge could, of course, only be gained through philosophy. But in defending the Platonic view, Aristotle doubtless, as in the Protrepticus, discussed the arguments against it. The fragment, if it is genuine, will belong to that discussion.

A further passage may have relevance, attributed by Rose and Ross to the Politicus, by Heitz to the

1. This is not the place to discuss this work. Of the fragments assigned to it, only the one cited is certain, or plausible. Rose, followed by Ross, gave it a number of fragments plainly from the Politicus; E. Bignone, L'Aristotele Perduto ii, 97-101 claimed the work to lie behind Philod. Vol. Rhet. ii, pp. 50ff.; but the Politicus is the more probable choice. More could be learned of its contents from a comparison of Plato's Politicus with passages on ideal kingship in the Politics, especially book iii; it seems that Aristotle was there discussing his own version of Plato's views. cf. below p. 95ff.


Advice it is, and advice on how to rule; it may well belong to the Peri Manias, less probably to the Peri Epinicoyn.

Jaeger wished to date the Peri Manias to the accession of Alexander: 'To a king standing at the summit of power and success one does not send philosophical advice as to the way in which he should regard his office'.

1. Plut. de Alex. fort. i, 329b = Rose 1 F 72, Rose 2 F 81, Rose 3 F 658, Heitz F 86, Ross F 1 p. 62, Plezia F 7; cf. Bernays l.c. (p. 69). Eratosthenes attacked the advice, ap. Strabo i, 4, 9, 66. Attempts to date this to a specific occasion are not convincing. H. Berve, Alexanderreich ii (1926), 72 referred it to the death of Callisthenes, which is merely perverse, Wilamowitz, Aristoteles und Athen i (1893), 339 n. to the measures of 324. But there is no need to assume that Aristotle's advice was a reaction to some measure of Alexander's; it fits his known views so well that it could easily have been given unprovoked. E. Badian's attempt (Hist. vii (1958), 440ff.) to date it to the accession of Alexander is unconvincing; he does not explain why the treatment of barbarians should be a topic of discussion then. His only reason, 'we may regard it as certain that Aristotle's views on barbarians changed away from the popular philosophical concept under the influence of his, - and his pupils' - empirical studies', is unsupported by any evidence. We do not know whether Aristotle changed his mind, or, if he did, which way; there is no contradiction, still less a progression in Pol. i, 1252b; iii, 1285a; vii, 1327b - merely a difference in the topics discussed. Nor does the work on barbarian customs reveal more than an interest in anthropology. On other points in this section Badian is misleading.

2. Jaeger o.c. 259n.2; so also Moraux o.c. 38, 341.
ancients had less sense of the appropriate. And one does send a treatise to the conqueror of the world, on how to organise it or regard his new position. Either accession, to the throne of Macedonia, or to the empire of Persia, provides a suitable date. Plezia tried to support Jaeger by pressing the words of Cicero; but these refer equally to Theopompus, whose work is dated between 332 and 325. But Aristotle's treatise will at least have been earlier than the death of Callisthenes.

It is not even clear whether a date fixed for the work would be the actual date of composition, or merely a dramatic date; for it is not impossible that the suasio was an early Hellenistic forgery. The problem of authenticity is one which cannot be dismissed by reference to the absence of ancient doubts, and the evidence of a late third century book list. Whatever view is taken of the letters of Plato and Isocrates, it cannot be doubted that forgers were active in the Hellenistic period, and especially active in the forging of letters. Bentley's caution is fully justified, the more so in a situation involving philosophers and kings. The historians of ancient philosophy have never been noted for their honesty, and the legend of the philosophic

1. Plezia o.c. 102.
adviser to a king was a universal one. Aristotle and Alexander were the supreme examples; what did Aristotle teach Alexander? The subject is one of perennial interest, and imagination supplied the evidence which was lacking.

The argument that Aristotle could well have written a περὶ βασιλείας for Alexander, since all around him were doing so, and since his school was subsequently prominent in the production of such treatises, is a double-edged argument; a work by the man who had educated the greatest king of them all was only to be expected. If Aristotle had not written περὶ βασιλείας to Alexander, someone would have filled the gap, and filled it quickly. The expert could not remain silent when his successors and contemporaries were so active.

If the work were genuine, what would it have said? To reconstruct its message with the help of the Politics is a proceeding more likely to lead to error than truth. The Politics is 'esoteric', too difficult for the ordinary king in the street. Under the guise of accepting the theory of the perfect king, it offers the most devastating critique of actual kingship; the Politics on kingship can hardly be quoted by a supporter of the institution. Not even Aristotle would have claimed Alexander to be the παράβασις; not even Aristotle would have addressed to Alexander such criticisms as he offers of the ordinary king. The boundaries
of flattery and freedom of speech must be respected; a middle way was open. Philosophically the \( \textit{περὶ \ βαρβάρων} \) will have dealt in the harmless and improving ideals that Isocrates offered Nicocles, with perhaps a Platonic tinge, on the need for an education in philosophy and for the employment of philosophers; it was a work of advice and encouragement, not a rigorous philosophical treatise. If it had any originality, it will have been in the area of detailed recommendation, as for instance the advice to treat the barbarians like slaves; but without the actual text of the letter and some evidence for its date, such details must remain unknown. In general various factors may have been at work. The most usual reason for writing to a king can be dismissed; there is no sign that Aristotle would have wanted to identify himself with the aims of Alexander, or advertise his success as a philosophic adviser by claiming him as a pupil. But he might have written to remove suspicion, or to offer advice on a problem about which he felt deeply, or, under the guise of advising, to warn or disclaim responsibility.

A spurious work would show the same characteristics, though to a higher degree. It seems unlikely that any early Peripatetic would have forged a treatise addressed to Alexander; the death of Callisthenes was long remembered.
A forgery would have a primarily literary purpose, and show only a nodding acquaintance with Peripatetic philosophy. But such a concoction, once it had found its way into the library at Alexandria, would not have been rejected by a school notorious for its carelessness with the master's works.

Forgery or genuine, the work will have conformed to the tradition of advice established in the mid fourth century; for Aristotle had neither the interest, nor the confidence that he would be heeded, to make him transcend the usual boundaries.

**Aristotle's Politics**

It is in the *Politics*, not in any lost work written for Alexander, that Aristotle's real and final views on kingship are to be found. Aristotle's argument is complex, involving a series of theoretical points as well as a number of appeals to history. Passages from the section on kingship have too often been taken in isolation, when even in context they are not easy to understand. To offer a synopsis of Aristotle's thought is perhaps to some extent to interpret it at the same time; yet it is an essential preliminary to discussing the reasons why he took this particular attitude to monarchy; for these reasons are usually bound up with the
logic of his argument, and cannot be understood without following his train of thought as a whole.¹

Book iii of the Politics follows the normal Aristotelian method of setting forth the theoretical doctrines, both of Aristotle and of others, and attempting to relate these to political realities. Aristotle does not usually distinguish his own views from those of others; and the argument contains a large number of statements which, though unanswered, are not held by Aristotle, as well as those which he would ultimately seem to accept. The book also makes heavy use of Aristotle's most characteristic mode of argument: it progresses by a study of the various 'difficulties' (διαμάχες) which can be brought against the theoretical views.

The book begins with the problems of defining what a citizen is (1-2): Aristotle accepts that this is in practice done in different ways. The concept of a city is similarly problematical, but basically it is a society of citizens sharing a constitution: the definition of the constitution is seen as central to the problem of defining

¹ In preparing this synopsis I have found especially useful R. Robinson, Aristotle's Politics Books iii and iv (1962). See also E. Braun, SB.oest.Ak.Wiss.Wien Phil.hist.Kl. ccxlvi+ (1965) for the views of modern scholars. I use chapter divisions rather than page references in the synopsis as they reflect well the changes in topic.
both 'citizen' and 'city' (3). Similarly the goodness or excellence (μετάνοια) of a citizen is not entirely identical with the goodness of a man, nor is the goodness of all citizens identical. Again the goodness of the ruler is not entirely identical with that of a citizen, since, while both must be good, the ruler needs also to be wise (φιλόσοφος): in most other respects they do seem to be the same. The question is raised incidentally whether the ruler requires special training, as some have held, and as 'the sons of kings appear to be brought up on the arts of riding and war': the question is not answered except for societies where the ruler rules over free men comparable to himself, where Aristotle holds that the ruler learns to rule by first obeying (4). Finally, though there are various types of citizen, the citizen proper is he who has a share of political honours (5).

A constitution is the ordering of the offices of state, and especially the composition of the sovereign power. There are various types of rule, which can be divided first into the correct, which seek the common advantage, and the perversions, which seek only the advantage of the rulers. There are three correct types, kingship (the rule of one), aristocracy (the rule of the few), and the 'politeia' (the rule of those possessing arms). The three perversions are tyranny, oligarchy and democracy, each aiming at the advantage
of the ruling class. Aristotle says that he has often distinguished the various kinds of rule in his popular works (6-7).\(^1\)

There follows a typical 'difficulty', a hypothetical aporia deliberately constructed in order to clarify the definitions of oligarchy and democracy. They can be distinguished either as the rule of the few and the rule of the many, or as the rule of the rich and the rule of the poor: which is the more basic? Suppose for the sake of argument that the rich is the many, the poor the few: what would be the proper designation of the rule of each of these groups? Clearly it is wealth and poverty which are more basic: oligarchy is therefore essentially the rule of the rich, democracy the rule of the poor (8).

In chapter 9 Aristotle discusses justice. Justice (in its political sense: that is, a fair sharing of the powers of the state) is equals for equals, unequals for unequals, in their proper proportion. The question of what types of inequality are relevant to distributing justice depends on the purpose of the city: if the city is for the

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1. 1278b31: I take this to include the types of political as well as of other sorts of rule: for a similar passage moving from various types of rule to political cf. Xen. *Cyrop.* i,1: if Xenophon used it, it must be a commonplace.
sake of possessions, then an oligarchic justice, that is an oligarchic constitution, is clearly right. But the proper purpose of the city is the virtue of the citizens; those who contribute most to this end, who are superior in 'political virtue' have a greater share in the city than those who are superior in birth or wealth. This point is important, for it lies at the basis of Aristotle's acceptance of the possibility of kingship being the best constitution in certain circumstances.

The question of who should be sovereign in the city is complex: there are objections to all the possibilities suggested. For instance, if the good should hold office, then everyone else will be excluded from honour; if one best man should rule, then the situation is even worse. Perhaps it would be better if the law were sovereign - but what sort of law? (10).

Aristotle discusses first the view that the many should be sovereign, rather than the few best men, and holds that there will be cases where the total virtue of the many exceeds the total virtue of the few (though there will also be cases where it does not): then the many should be sovereign,
and a study of what they are better at will determine what parts of the state they should be sovereign over. Aristotle deals with various objections to such a view, which bring out the need for law to be supreme in any constitution, with the ruling group having authority over areas which are not susceptible to general laws (11).

Chapter 12 returns to political justice and the principles on which it should be distributed: clearly not all inequalities justify political inequality; just as skill at flute-playing is relevant to who should receive the best flutes, while beauty and birth are not, because flute-playing contributes to the end for which flutes are being given, so certain inequalities are relevant to the ends of the state, and others are not: nobility, freedom and wealth are, speed is not. But still more relevant are justice (as a virtue of the individual) and political virtue.

Aristotle has thus set up various possible different scales by which the distribution of political justice (that is, of political rights) can be determined; and he has also allowed the possibility that in any one of these scales the many may be weaker singly, but in total stronger, and therefore entitled to power. He has not yet explored the corollary that on any of these scales the few or the one may be stronger than the many. Nor has he established any correlation between
the different scales. The subsequent chapters discuss these two problems, though only the first is dealt with at all adequately.

In chapter 13 he states that, on the view he has put forward, all the various claims to political power are in some cases just, but not absolutely and in every case, whether the basis of the claim be wealth, nobility, virtue or numbers. Various reasons are given for this. First, supposing all these claims were present in the one city, what then? Moreover if one man excels all others in wealth or birth, by the same right that those of wealth or birth have to rule others, he has the right to rule the whole community. The same is true of he who excels in goodness; and if the many claim to rule on the grounds of their power, then if one man or a group of men are more powerful than the many, they too should rule rather than the many.

Aristotle then poses the question put by others, whether the lawgiver should legislate for the advantage of the better or the many. The answer is that he should legislate for the benefit of the whole city, that is the community of citizens. In the best constitution the citizen is the man who chooses to rule and obey with the aim of living the life of virtue. That is, apparently, the question is an unreal one for the best constitution; but I confess I do
not see the relevance of this question to the general trend of the argument: it is perhaps merely an attempt to introduce the person of the lawgiver, who will be faced with important problems in the subsequent paragraphs.

Aristotle then asks the question, if there is one man (or more than one) whose virtue outweighs that of all others in the city, what should his position be? Clearly he or they should not have equal shares with the others; he or they are in a sense outside the normal structure of a city: 'such a man is as it were like a god among men'. These people are also outside the law, which must concern itself with men who are equal; they themselves are law. It is therefore reasonable (though not just in an absolute sense) for democracies to resort to ostracism to remove such men, and for tyrannies to resort to execution; imperial powers like Persia and Athens have followed the same policy of removing the pre-eminent. This problem is common to all constitutions, perverted and correct. But in the best constitution what is to be done, in particular with the man who excels all others in virtue rather than wealth, power or nobility? Clearly it would be unjust either to expel him or to exercise authority over him. The remaining possibility, which Aristotle accepts, is that everyone should willingly submit to such a man, and that 'such men should
be perpetual kings in the cities'. Here the question is left for the moment.

This discussion of the problems of distributing justice and power in the city is an essential preliminary for deciding whether any one constitution is best. Aristotle now turns to the analysis of kingship. This is one of the correct constitutions; the question is whether it is or is not the best constitution for a city or country, or whether it is sometimes the best.

Aristotle distinguishes five types of kingship, using actual examples to construct his theoretical categories. There is firstly a sort of generalship for life, either hereditary or elective, like the Spartan kingship. Secondly there is the barbarian type, a form of legal and traditional tyranny, absolute and arbitrary, but differing from tyranny chiefly in that it is exercised with the consent of the ruled. Thirdly there is the type of the aisymnetes – a tyranny which is neither legal nor traditional, but elected and therefore by the consent of the people, held either for life or for a limited period. Fourthly there is heroic kingship, which is both legal and traditional and with the consent of the ruled, but differs from the barbarian type in not being absolute, for it is exercised on certain
definite terms. Finally there is absolute kingship, which Aristotle christens with the rare word \( \varepsilon \alpha \pi \rho \beta \alpha \kappa \varepsilon \) :\(^1\) it is characterised as being like the absolute control of a household by its head, which was discussed in book i; it can be exercised over a city, or over one or more nations (14).

Of these five categories only the suitability of the first (Spartan) and last needs to be considered, since these are the limiting cases; but the Spartan can be left on one side, since such a hereditary generalship can exist under any constitution (cf. 1287a1ff.): it is relevant to the study of laws rather than constitutions. Therefore only the absolute kingship needs to be investigated.

The first question to be asked is whether it is better to be ruled by the best man or the best laws. In favour of the former it can be argued that the law is merely general, and does not deal with particulars. The arts cannot be practised by the book: similarly the best constitution does not follow writings and laws. But against this it can be argued that the ruler will have to possess the general principle, and that what is without emotion is

\(^1\) Borrowed presumably from lyric poetry: Alcaeus F 143 Page; Stesichorus F 56A, 3 (in appendix). As far as I am aware, apart from Aristotle, the word and its cognates are used only as cult titles and in poetry, and are even then rare: see Liddell and Scott.
better than what is with it. It might be argued that the king will deliberate better about individual cases; but laws will still be necessary, and must be sovereign where they do not err. Where they do, it is arguable that the people will judge better than one man, on the principle that their combined judgment will be better; also a large number is less easily corrupted by passion. Clearly this is true if the many are good. The argument can be generalised: an aristocracy is better than kingship; and the historical progression away from kingship towards democracy can perhaps be explained by the failure of the one and the few to remain good in comparison with the many.

There are other objections. The hereditary principle leads to bad kings, and it is unlikely that the good father will deprive his sons of the right to rule: that is to expect too much of human nature. The king will also need power to compel others to obey the laws: here the best thing will be if he has enough power for this purpose, but not enough to defeat the people as a whole (15).

It can also be argued that, when all men are alike by nature, it is unnatural for one man to rule, since it deprives his equals of honour. Therefore some system of sharing is required, which needs law; so the rule of law is preferable to the rule of one man. By the same principle
the rulers should be guardians and servants of the laws. Law educates the rulers to be able to judge individual cases and leaves them to decide; if the law is faulty it can be corrected. To allow the law to rule is to allow God and reason to rule: to allow a man to rule is to add passion; the law is reason without passion.

For similar reasons the argument from the arts is not valid: men would prefer treatment from medical books than from doctors if the doctors were thought to be corrupted, as rulers will be thought; and even doctors seek for the appropriate law for the particular case. Furthermore of the two types of law, written and customary, it is clear that one man may be a safer ruler than the written laws, but he will not be safer than the customary. Nor can one man supervise everything; he will need to appoint officers: why should they not exist independently? Again if one good man ought to rule because he is better, then two good men will be better still. Of course no-one disputes that what the law can cover is best decided by the law; but it can still be claimed that a number of men are better than one at deciding those areas not covered by the law. In fact kings use friends in their decisions, and friends can be defined as equal and alike: they ought therefore to share equally and alike (16).
These then are roughly the arguments used by those who dispute against kingship' (1287b35).

From this it is clear that among men who are similar and equal kingship is never the best constitution under any circumstance, whether the king uses laws or is himself the law, whether he and his subjects are good or not, and whether he is better than them or not. There is only one case where kingship is the best constitution.

Different types of peoples could be distinguished, royal, aristocratic and constitutional. A royal people is one which produces naturally a stock which excels in the goodness of political leadership; an aristocratic people produces a natural nobility capable of being ruled by leaders with the appropriate political virtue; a constitutional people is one in which there arises a stock capable of ruling and being ruled in accordance with a law apportioning office in relation to merit to the middle classes.

When therefore a whole family or one person is so outstanding in goodness that his goodness exceeds that of all the others, then it is right for this family or man to be sovereign over all; since (as said before) he clearly should not be killed or ostracised or asked to take turns in ruling. Though it is not natural for the part to exceed the whole, in this case it has occurred.
There is therefore no possibility left but absolute kingship (17). Finally the education of such a man will be practically the same as that of a good man. Having decided these points, Aristotle says that he will now go on to talk about the best constitution (18).

In general Aristotle's argument is clear: it is an argument based on theoretical positions, and conducted to its conclusion in a logical manner. Its premisses are contained in the first thirteen chapters: they are certain views about the nature of political society and its ends, and about the nature of political justice. In contrast to this, Aristotle's use of historical examples is slight, and largely confined to the statement of problems or aporiai: that is, there are certain difficulties raised for the various theoretical positions because they do not seem to correspond to the realities of political life. The one place where Aristotle seems to base positive theoretical categories on historical observation is in his analysis of the five types of kingship; but here it is noticeable that, having offered this analysis, he immediately discards the four types which he has found in the real world, to concentrate on the one type of kingship for which he offers no historical example, and which is clearly a theoretical type.
There are of course in Aristotle's theoretical arguments a number of weak points of general significance; here it is only necessary to draw attention to the two most obvious. Firstly, the entire argument rests on the possibility of establishing some sort of scale by which the claim to political power of an individual or group can be measured against the claim of other individuals or groups. For some claims this might seem easy enough: it might well be possible to measure the wealth or power of an individual against that of other individuals on some absolute scale; but for nobility the problem of assigning any form of quasi-numerical value or weight to different claims would seem great, and in the case of virtue impossible. The situation is even worse when any attempt is made to relate any one of these scales to another, to measure say the claims of wealth against those of birth. Aristotle nowhere adequately faces this problem, which is of course very similar to the problem of constructing a hedonistic calculus in Utilitarianism. And it is on the assumption that such equations could be established that Aristotle's argument rests.

Secondly there is a more technical but still basic confusion in this section between two meanings of 'the best constitution'; the phrase οὐδὲν πολιτεία can mean
either the best constitution in an absolute sense, and it can also mean any constitution in which ἐκρήγη (rather than wealth, power or birth) determines the extent of the individual's political rights. Thus in the second sense there are three 'best constitutions', kingship, aristocracy and the politeia; while it still makes sense for Aristotle to ask whether any one of these 'best constitutions' is the best in an absolute sense, either always or in particular circumstances.

More important for Aristotle's attitude to monarchy itself are certain oddities in his formulation of his views, all of which are related to his discussion of 'absolute kingship'. It is clear that Aristotle has a strong urge to concentrate on pambasileia to the exclusion of all else. He discards his other types of kingship by saying that only the two limiting cases need discussion, and then proceeds immediately to discard also the Spartan kingship as not a true constitution-type. But why does he not then take up one of the other varieties of kingship, which have a better claim to being constitution-types? Moreover many of his arguments against kingship would hold with considerably less force against these types. Further it is not entirely clear why the type which he does discuss, pambasileia, is different from the second (barbarian) type.
of kingship; Aristotle's initial characterisation of the pambasileia is indeed brief and inadequate, nor are many of its details filled out in the course of the subsequent discussion. As Robinson says, 'we thus receive a strong impression of a more Platonic, more conceptual, division, on which has been imposed a more historical, more empirical, subdivision, resulting in considerable incoherence.'

This peculiarity is made even more striking by the fact that at the beginning of book iv Aristotle claims to have discussed both aristocracy and kingship, and even how they differ from one another. Here it seems to be asserted that the previous discussion was not about kingship alone, but about the two first constitutions in which λέγεται is the criterion for a share in the state - aristocracy and kingship. In a sense this could be defended: Aristotle does occasionally suggest somewhat ambiguously that there is really no difference between the rule of one or of more than one virtuous men. But it is difficult to make these references

1. o.c. 52.
2. iv, 1289a32ff.
3. Ehrenberg discusses this point well in Alexander and the Greeks, 73ff.; on p. 75 there seems a contradiction: I would accept that λέγεται does not refer to aristocracy (cf. 1286b5, 1288b10; for other attempts Braun o.c. 159ff.)
add up to a discussion of aristocracy. And it raises the problem why Aristotle chose to discuss the state ordered by κάθεν in terms of its most extreme example, when most of his strictures apply only to that example — obviously much less could be said against a similarly ordered aristocracy. Most of Aristotle's objections to kingship are concerned with the relation of the law to the king; and many of these would clearly have less force, or even simply be false in the case of an aristocracy. Von Arnim indeed felt forced to postulate a lacuna containing the missing discussion of aristocracy; but such a view seems unlikely in face of Aristotle's apparent justification of his procedure in book iv.

This group of oddities is not explicable in terms of contemporary reality: it is clearly not due to later additions in the light, say, of Aristotle's relations with Philip or Alexander, although it is interesting that Aristotle does talk of both cities and countries in discussing absolute kingship. For signs of concrete historical examples are completely lacking in the section on pambasileia; rather, the section is firmly embedded in a

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2. The best rebuttal of attempts to relate anything in the Politics to Alexander is Ehrenberg, Alexander and the Greeks, 62ff.
theoretical progression from the premisses of the earlier part of the book; such historical complications as are introduced are immediately left out of account.

Aristotle has then a strong urge to concentrate on _pambasileia_ to the exclusion of other types of kingship. As most commentators have seen, the reason for this is that Aristotle's views are in some way related to the views of Plato on perfect kingship in his _Statesman_.

It is this which explains Aristotle's appreciation of the importance of law in deciding whether absolute kingship is the best constitution, and his emphasis on the relation of king to law; for Plato's distinctions between the various constitutions had been made on the basis of whether they followed law or not; and he laid great emphasis on the fact that his perfect kingship was one where the king himself was the law. Most important of all, it was the influence of Plato's _Statesman_ which allowed Aristotle to think that in discussing perfect kingship he had also discussed aristocracy; for Plato was far more explicit than Aristotle in claiming that from a theoretical point of view it made no difference

1. On the relation between the _Politics_ and Plato's _Statesman_ see esp. W.L. Newman, _C.R._ vi (1892), 289ff.; and F. Düsemmler's essay in _Kleine Schriften_ ii (1901), 295-330, which is also the best account of the relation between Aristotle's views and historical fact.
whether his 'perfect kingship' was in fact the rule of one or of more than one man.

A number of details in Aristotle's account support this view. The arguments in favour of pambasileia are the arguments of Plato;¹ the analogy of medicine is used by both Plato and Aristotle, and even Aristotle's argument against the relevance of this analogy, that doctors might be corrupted as well as politicians, seems to come from an ironical passage in Plato.² The striking phrase of Aristotle, that the perfect king would be 'like a god among men' finds its source in Plato's description of the perfect royal constitution as being exalted above the others 'like a god among men'.³ Finally Aristotle seems to refer directly to Plato: at the start of book iv, he places his six constitutions in order of preference, and says, 'this has already been said by somebody. He, however, did not regard it in the same way as ourselves: he considered that where they were all good (for example, oligarchy good, and so on) the worst is democracy, and where they are bad it is the best. We on the contrary say that these forms are mistaken

¹. Polit. 294ff.
2. 298.
3. 1284a10; cf. Polit. 303b; though the phrase is found elsewhere: Ehrenberg o.c. 73 n. 1.
in principle, and no oligarchy should be called better than another, but merely less bad.' The passage is a reasonably accurate rendering of the views of Plato in the Statesman.¹

On the other hand there are of course a number of differences from Plato's account in the Statesman: Aristotle has changed the six-fold constitution division to include his own preferred politeia in place of Plato's 'good democracy'. Whereas Plato saw the perfect kingship as a seventh constitution, Aristotle has brought it into the six-fold division - at least in part; for his ambivalent treatment of it, separating it from the other types of kingship and discussing it at length, may well be a legacy of the Platonic position. Most of Aristotle's arguments against kingship are not to be found in Plato; they seem to be the result of discussion about Plato's views rather than Aristotle's own objections, for they are characterised as 'the arguments used by those who dispute against kingship'. Finally it has been noticed that nowhere in the Politics does Aristotle unequivocally cite the Statesman.

The influence of Plato is fundamental to Aristotle's

¹ 1289a26ff. = Polit. 303. Though Plato is not in fact open to the accusation that he claimed oligarchy as good, he did claim democracy could be good, because in his classification there is only one name for the two forms of democracy: Aristotle is quibbling.
views on kingship; but there is another work which perhaps
should be brought into the discussion, and which may well
explain both why Aristotle never refers directly to the
Statesman, and why he has such a sentimental attachment
to the views expressed in it. For Aristotle himself had
written a work On the Statesman in two books, of which
only one fragment survives, a fragment which has a Platonic
ring: 'the most accurate measure of all things is the
good'. It is at least a plausible hypothesis that Aristotle's
work was concerned with Plato's views in the Statesman,
and that it discussed these in some depth; as an early work,
and perhaps a dialogue, it will have been sympathetic to the
Platonic view. In other words, the παραλλακτική is an
early Aristotelean doctrine, developed under the influence
of Plato and before he had any experience of actual kingship.
It would be impossible to tell how much of Aristotle's
argument was derived from his own earlier book, and how
much was due to later reconsideration; though the section
on the four types of kingship apart from absolute kingship
is clearly a product of Aristotle's later empirical interests.
Nevertheless the mediation of another work by Aristotle himself

1. Rose 3 F 79; F 1 is reasonably certain as a testimonium.
The other fragments printed by Rose seem to have no
necessary connection with the work.
between Plato's *Statesman* and Aristotle's *Politics* seems the best explanation both of Aristotle's curious fascination with this particular theoretical problem, and of the way that his analysis is so much deeper than Plato's.

One problem remains: the discussion in Aristotle is theoretical, but how far did he conceive of the existence of *pambasileia* as a practical possibility? Aristotle sees this as depending on his distinction of the three types of peoples, the royal, aristocratic and 'constitutional'. If there did exist a 'royal people', naturally producing one family or person superior to all others in virtue, then his ideal king would be possible. There is no suggestion in Aristotle anywhere that the Macedonian people might fulfill these conditions. Their practicability is illuminated by another passage in the *Politics*, where Aristotle discusses the education in his own 'best constitution':

'If then it were the case that the one class differed from the other as widely as we believe the gods and heroes to differ from mankind, having first a great superiority in regard to the body and then in regard to the soul, so that the pre-eminence of the rulers was indisputable and manifest to the subjects, it is clear that it would be better for the same persons always to be rulers and subjects once for all; but as this is not easy to accept, and as we
do not find anything corresponding to the great difference that Scylax states to exist between kings and subjects in India, it is clear that for many reasons it is necessary for all to share alike in ruling and being ruled in turn.\(^1\)

Aristotle knows of no occasion when the discrepancy between ruler and ruled has existed, except for the description of India by Scylax; and even here he seems hesitant to accept the evidence as reliable. Nevertheless it seems a possibility that such situations might exist somewhere, and this possibility could reinforce Aristotle's own Platonic predilections.

Aristotle did not believe that monarchy was the best constitution, though he was prepared to accept that a certain sort of kingship would be the best under certain strange and hypothetical conditions. These conditions were so stringent that he can scarcely have envisaged them within the known world of his day. In particular it is certain that the Greeks were for Aristotle a 'constitutional' people: there was no chance of an ideal monarchy arising in Greece. Aristotle's discussion is backward looking, concerned with theories and examples from a vanished past. It does however show the position that thought on monarchy

\(^1\) vii, 1332b17ff.
had reached by the mid-fourth century, and it remains the most penetrating discussion of kingship before the fourth century A.D. Because of his study of the Platonic arguments, Aristotle cut through the vague generalities and inspiring sentiments which characterise other fourth century writers on kingship, and exposed the essential arguments and presuppositions of the Greek conception of ideal kingship, with its reliance on justification by virtue. Aristotle's marshalling of the arguments against monarchy was indeed so devastating that his views on kingship were quietly buried, and had no effect on subsequent ages before their translation into Latin by William of Moerbeke in the thirteenth century and their use by Thomas Aquinas. In antiquity they are quoted only once, by the emperor Julian in his letter to Themistius, a letter specifically designed as a protest against an extravagant work of Themistius, and intended to point out that Julian did not fulfill the criteria laid down by Plato and Aristotle for the perfect king.¹

The Arabic Letter of Aristotle to Alexander On Government

On Friday 30th January 1891 occurred the first publication of Aristotle's lost work, The Constitution of Athens, from

¹. *ad Them. 7, 260d ff.*
a papyrus found in Egypt; it was a work which necessitated the complete rewriting of the constitutional history of Athens, made it possible for the first time to investigate the methods of Aristotle in collecting information on politics, and also demonstrated the influence and techniques of the lost local historians of Attica. It seemed at the time the most important papyrological discovery for historians that had yet been made; and that judgment still stands. The excitement of its discovery can be felt in the many books and articles which it immediately inspired, even if it was too late for inclusion in the Oxford school of Literae Humaniores, whose set texts in history had been standardised in 1872.

In the same year there was published in a German thesis a letter preserved only in Arabic, found in a Vatican manuscript, and allegedly written by Aristotle to Alexander on the subject of 'Government'. There is little wonder that in the prevailing climate all things seemed possible.¹ H. Nissen

1. J. Lippert, De epistula pseudaristotelica commentatio (Diss. Halle 1891). In this section the following works are referred to by author's name and page number only: H. Nissen, Rhein. Mus. xlvii (1892), 177ff.; B. Keil, Die solonische Verfassung in Aristoteles Verfassungsgeschichte Athen (1892), 127ff.; E. Pridik, De Alexandri Magni epistularum commercio (Diss. Dorpat 1893); J. Klek, Symbouleutici qui dicitur sermonis historia critica (Diss. Freiburg 1919); M. Plezia, Aristotelis Epistularum Fragmenta (1961); S.M. Stern, Aristotle on the World State (1968; published 1970).
in an excited and fanciful reinterpretation of this new evidence for our understanding of Aristotle ended with the dramatic words: 'while I have been writing, the sun has ended its course and begun another: may he in the new year help our treasure-hunters to uncover new works as full of illumination and pure delight'.

The bubble was soon to burst; the original editor, J. Lippert, had denied the authenticity of his letter; and though others arose to support Nissen, the verdict was generally unfavourable. In 1893 Wilamowitz was confident enough to dismiss it in a footnote: 'I do not consider it necessary to condemn with as many words the treatise on kingship preserved in Arabic: Aristotle did not write words without thoughts. It belongs in the same category as the Secretum Secretorum'. Since then the letter has been quietly forgotten, or condemned in a phrase, until in 1961 M. Plezia attempted to reassert its authenticity in his edition of Aristotle's letters.

Plezia's activity was prophetic. He held, as others had before, that what was preserved in the Vatican ms. was only a shortened and simplified version of the original

1. Nissen 206.
2. There is a good description of the controversy in Stern 11ff.
3. Aristoteles und Athen i (1893), 339 n. 1.
letter. Within a few years three manuscripts containing a longer version of the letter had been found in Istanbul.\(^1\) Apart from a number of passages which were not in Lippert's text, the chief contribution of this new version is in providing the historical examples and references which the Vatican ms. had omitted. It is now clear that Wilamowitz's comparison of the letter with the *Secretum Secretorum* is too extreme; the letter is not a Syriac or Arabic compilation: its historical knowledge shows that it must have been written in the Greco-Roman period. On the other hand the examples and quotations in it are not sufficiently uncommon to show that the work was not an ancient forgery.\(^2\) It seems likely that we now possess the full text of the letter: there is no sign of the sort of incoherence to be expected in an abbreviation; the three new mas. agree in their contents, apart from the usual minor textual variants; and the Arabic testimonia for the letter give no support to the view that a still fuller version might be found. It is however clear from one of these citations that a second, different translation was also available at some time, a fact which removes the last doubts about its being derived from a Greek original.\(^3\)

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1. Stern 1f.
2. cf. Stern 17ff.
3. Stern 75f.
At the time of the death of Samuel Stern, he and I were collaborating on an edition of the letter, and Stern's contribution was happily almost complete: the work will shortly therefore be published in a full critical edition. Many points will have to wait to be discussed in a detailed commentary on the letter, but it is necessary to make certain preliminary observations in order to show that the work is not relevant to the subject of Hellenistic kingship, nor to the thought of Aristotle on kingship. Since some of my arguments depend for their validity on the reading of the letter as a whole, I have included a translation of the new text, prepared by Stern and myself, as Appendix 4.

The work as it stands is called 'a letter of Aristotle to Alexander on Government'; but it is clear that it is what a Greco-Roman author would have called a οὐφαντικός and designated as καὶ ἤθελής. The questions of the dramatic date, authenticity and probable date of composition of this treatise on kingship are intimately bound up together. The dramatic date is given with suspicious promptness in the introductory section: 'after the great battle which you fought at Babylon, the victory which you have won over Darius and his followers, the dangers of those wars which you have fought and the hardships you have undergone.' (2) Some confusion is caused by the fact that the Arabic word for
'battle' also means 'event'; and since there was no battle at Babylon, it has been tempting to translate the first phrase, 'after the great event which befel you at Babylon'. Unfortunately it is not clear exactly what such a 'great event' could be, for nothing particularly dramatic happened during Alexander's stay there in the autumn of 331. Possibly the author means the series of events which began with the victory at Gaugamela and culminated in the surrender of Babylon, where Alexander is now perhaps conceived to be in winter quarters; in which case either the author was writing rather loosely, or (more probably) the point has become blurred in translation.

This solution sees only a loose connection between the 'event' at Babylon and the victory over Darius mentioned in the next phrase, and it appears to make the author refer to Babylon before Gaugamela. It is perhaps more likely that both phrases refer to the same occasion. That is supported by a parallel passage not in the Vatican manuscript. Here the Arabic literally translated is, 'after the great 'event' which occurred for you in Babylon'; in 59 it is, 'in the 'event' which occurred in Chaeronea'. The phrase seems the author's normal way of describing a named battle, and we have therefore felt justified in so translating it. The fact that there was no battle at Babylon is easily explained
by confusion at some point in the tradition; alternatively it is worth noting Noeldeke's very attractive emendation, Arbil for Babel,¹ an easy corruption in the Arabic which would solve all difficulties; for Arbela was the usual name for the battle of Gaugamela in the 'Vulgate' tradition.²

The point is not vital, for it is at least clear that the author is referring to the situation after Gaugamela; the only other possibility, the final return to Babylon in 323, is not in question, for such a letter would not have been conceived after the death of Callisthenes.³ The remaining references to fighting will then be to the campaigns before Gaugamela. Thus Alexander, it appears, having won Gaugamela and with it control of the Persian empire, must now, presumably in the winter of 331/0 or the spring of 330, plan its organisation. The date is of course still somewhat vague, but it would be wrong to expect anything more precise;⁴ for Aristotle ought not to be aware of what exactly was happening in the East. He must be conceived of as writing in Athens, in receipt of little more than the news of Gaugamela and perhaps the surrender of Babylon, news which in fact will not

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1. ap. Nissen 178 n.
2. Arrian vi, 11, 6; Strabo xvi, 737; Plut. Alex. 31.
3. Nissen 177 n. denied this with little reason, dating the letter to the spring of 323. Lippert translated, 'post morbum in quem incidisti Babylone', which led to some confusion: not even a forger would have written to a dead man, or after the Callisthenes affair: cf. Stern 11f.
4. Plezia 142f. tried to see a reference to Alexander's entry into Persis in 34; but the new text shows this is not so.
have reached Greece until Alexander was already in Susiana or Persis. Moreover the work is a public letter of advice, a κατ' οἰκείας χειρισμοῦ, and deals in generalities: detailed personal information, spurious or genuine, which might appear to give some sort of temporal precision, is inappropriate.

The date is well chosen: the situation after Gaugamela provided the best possible occasion for a general letter from Aristotle to Alexander on how Alexander should organise his empire. The victory was recognised as a turning point both at the time and later. It was virtually the end of the Greek crusade against Persia: after it, Alexander issued his edict guaranteeing the autonomy of the Greek cities, undertook to rebuild Plataea, and sent part of the booty to Croton; the destruction of the palace at Persepolis was a last act of vengeance. Finally, in the spring of 330 the League soldiers were dismissed and the contributions of the Greek cities in Asia probably returned. These actions show the closing of the crusade against Persia; in its place Alexander was faced with the problems of the administration of his new empire and his own position at its head. The

1. Compare the news of Megalopolis (apparently shortly before Gaugamela) which, though urgent, did not reach Alexander until after his stay at Susa (Arrian iii, 16, 10) and probably not long before his arrival at Ecbatana (cf. iii, 19, 5ff.). On the date of Megalopolis cf. B. Niese, Geschichte der Griechischen u. Makedonischen Staaten i (1893), 497ff.; J. Kaerst, Geschichte der Hellenismus i (1927), 410, n. 4.
appointment of Mazaeus was an important new departure, the first public demonstration of a policy of co-operation. At Susa there occurred the curious incident when Alexander mounted the Great King's throne, and found that it was too large for him. In the sources this appears as the action of a conqueror taking symbolic possession of the property of the conquered; yet it was probably something more, for Alexander will have known that an important part of the investiture of the Great King was his mounting of the throne. Alexander's action can be seen as symbolising both conquest, and an intention to fill the position of the Great King; appropriately, his stature was as yet too small. The pursuit of Darius follows naturally: the removal of the true King was not so much the culmination of the crusade as a necessary first step towards taking over his position. With the death of Darius, Alexander appears to have felt free gradually to assume the trappings and court ceremonial of the Achaemenids, and to be addressed as King by the Greeks.

To a philosopher, either at the time or later, it would have seemed impossible to address Alexander on the government of his new empire before 331; the victory at Gaugamela offered the first and most appropriate occasion. The empire was won;

1. Diod. xvii, 66; Curt. v, 2, 13ff.
it needed to be governed, and as long as it was not yet known what Alexander had decided, advice would seem appropriate. Further the behaviour of Alexander and the relations between him and Aristotle make any date later than 330 progressively more unlikely. While Alexander was behaving as a king, Aristotle could write to him in the role of his philosophic adviser; but as soon as he became a tyrant, that public relationship must be severed in fact as well as in fiction. Alexander's new policies, of which doubtless Aristotle disapproved as strongly as any, were followed by mounting tension at court; in particular the deaths of Philotas and Parmenion, of Cleitus, and finally of Callisthenes, to mention only those events given most prominence in the literary tradition, showed Alexander as the tyrant. After the death of Callisthenes at the latest, there could be no further public communication of this sort between Aristotle and Alexander. Thus it was not possible to wait until the whole Persian empire was under Alexander's control, or until Alexander had set his own limits to expansion, before advising him.

The last event mentioned specifically is either Arbela or the capture of Babylon, and the supposed date of composition should most naturally be put about the time that this news reached Greece, say in the early spring of 330. But it is not
without reason that some scholars have ignored this clear attempt to date the letter, and preferred to stretch the limits downwards towards the date of Callisthenes' fall.¹ For although the last explicit reference is to an event of October 331, there are a number of passages which appear to contain forward references. Thus Alexander's plans for further expeditions are mentioned in 43, and he is advised to be cautious; that probably refers to the campaigns in the far east. But it could be held that Aristotle had heard of further plans in the air in late 331, or that he was merely guessing from his knowledge of the character of Alexander; and the reference is so vague that it would be dangerous to argue from it alone for the contrary view, that Alexander had not as yet begun his eastern campaigns.²

More difficult are the apparent references to political troubles.

One of the recurring themes in the work is the danger of listening to false accusations. In 22ff. Alexander is warned not to believe accusations against the Greeks, who

¹. Some of the following difficulties were recognised explicitly by Pridik 149 (cf. 151) who saw in 50ff. references to the deaths of Philotas, Parmenion and Cleitus, and therefore wished to date the work in 328/7, before the death of Callisthenes. Similar sentiments may lie behind the late dates of Lippert and Nissen.

². Another possible allusion, even later, is in 18, to honours obtainable from unwilling subjects: is this Alexander's request for deification?
appear from the context to include Macedonians. Rather he is
to welcome the competition in noble actions of such men
nobly born, so long as they do not actually rebel! It is
hard to see this passage as referring to anything but tension
between Alexander and the generals of Philip, Parmenion and
Antipater. Nor should Alexander fear someone who contradicts
him: 'perhaps he does not do so until you provoke him by the
sort of actions through which the ruler becomes unjust and
the king is turned into a tyrant'. The reader thinks immediately
of Cleitus, and of Callisthenes, who is probably referred to
in the previous chapter as one of those who frequent Alexander's
presence and will spread good reports about him. Again, more
generally, in 30ff. Alexander is praised for disliking
flatterers and men who tell lies, and is advised to improve
the behaviour of the Greeks while punishing those who lay
accusations against them; nor should he enquire into every­
thing too closely because that will encourage informers.
Then at 55f. he is exhorted to love and honour his nobles,
to avoid harming their dignity in any way, and in 60 he
is again warned against listening to people who give bad
advice.¹

¹. The type of advice bears a vague resemblance to that
allegedly given by Anaxarchus after the murder of Cleitus
(Arrian iv, 9, 7f.; Plut. Alex. 52; ad princ. inemd.
781B); but the passage is too conventional to be
pressed.
This theme is perhaps the most prominent in the letter. It recurs these several times in slightly different forms, but on each occasion with strong emphasis. The phenomenon is the more striking in that the theme itself is not one which is usually given much prominence in treatises on the duties of a king, though it does of course occur. These passages are sufficiently specific in their reference to trouble among Alexander's Greek and Macedonian supporters to raise the question of dramatic date in an interesting form. The knowledge shown by Aristotle seems to be too great for an author writing in Greece in the spring of 330; if the treatise is genuine, two consequences must be faced. Firstly the dramatic date should be put as late as possible, preferably after the deaths of Philotas, Parmenion, and even Cleitus, perhaps in the period when relations between Alexander and Callisthenes were strained, between the proskynesis episode and the Pages' plot. Secondly it must be supposed that such disloyalty and discontent as undoubtedly existed was not only known in Greece; it was also a matter which could be referred to openly in a philosophical work addressed to Alexander.¹ Neither of these consequences seems acceptable.

¹. A possible partial parallel might be the attacks on Harpalus by Theopompus and Python of Catane; but these are surely to be dated after Harpalus had already fled and the affair was in the open: H. Lloyd-Jones, Gnomon xxxviii (1966), 16f.
No military exploits after 'Babylon' are mentioned, nor would the advice given by Aristotle be relevant to an Alexander engaged in heavy fighting in Areia and Bactria: at that time the administration was in the hands of subordinates. It is doubtful whether anyone received much information from the expedition while it was in the east: the notion that Aristotle was well informed on the development of relations between Callisthenes and Alexander is implausible. Certainly he could have been aware that trouble might arise between the two men, and certainly he could have known from his contacts with Antipater that the king's chief rivals among the Macedonian nobility were not unsuspected by the king. Such considerations might have led him to intercede privately on behalf of one individual or another. But a public and generalised statement that there was danger of unrest among Alexander's commanders and courtiers would only have aggravated the situation; even if Aristotle had known of the dangers to come (which is possible), he could not have proclaimed to the world that he knew. Thus the evidence for the dramatic date of the letter is contradictory: the author appears to intend it to be relevant to the situation in 331/0, yet he betrays knowledge of events which occurred considerably later, at a time when his work would be both unfortunate and irrelevant. The forger betrays himself by
his knowledge of the future.

It is interesting to note the author's techniques and limitations in connection with his use of the historical situation. His generalised advice is sufficiently vague in its implications for it not to be certain what he is referring to; yet this advice is obviously right: it is what Aristotle ought to have written and Alexander ought to have acted on. The historical information he possesses is accurate as far as it goes: indeed here his mistake is the one which a later writer finds the most difficult to avoid, the fault of being too relevant. On the other hand his knowledge seems limited to the main outlines of the story of Alexander; there is no sign that he has done any serious historical research. The four deaths mentioned before, together perhaps with the various stories circulating in the popular and rhetorical traditions about the mutual relations between Aristotle, Antipater and Alexander,¹ are sufficient to explain his advice. It is this very lack of precise historical detail which gives his attempt a certain plausibility; for, except in his knowledge of the future, he has arrived, inadvertently or not, at roughly the right amount of ignorance about Alexander's movements, as seen by a contemporary writing in Athens. In one

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¹. For instance, that Antipater and Aristotle poisoned Alexander.
important respect, however, his Aristotle does display a lamentable short-sightedness: he appears to be in total ignorance of contemporary events in Greece itself. There is no mention of the revolt of Agis, the battle of Megalopolis, or the meeting of the League to decide the fate of Sparta, which left the verdict to Alexander. Yet some part of that news should have reached Alexander in the same post as this letter. The author's omission makes some of his remarks read oddly: protestations about the loyalty of Greeks and Macedonians could have been illustrated by recent example, even if advice on how to deal with Sparta was thought to fall outside the scope of the letter. And it was somewhat inept to feature Lycurgus and Sparta so prominently as examples.¹ The explanation of the author's silence can only be ignorance; if he had known of these events he must have realised that Aristotle should make some reference to them. But the information was irrelevant to the literary genre in which he was working; again it is often symptomatic of forgers that they fail to consider the totality of the historical situation which they wish to portray. The author is working in a framework of the relations between the philosopher and the king, and the transformation of the king into a tyrant; on these aspects he may be well informed, but he knows nothing of events which

¹. 4; 16; 25; 62 (?); 65.
are contemporary, yet outside his literary and philosophical theme.

It is then this theme which offers the chief interest in the letter: a brief discussion of some of the points it contains will bring out more clearly the date at which it is likely to have been written.

The introductory paragraph praises the greatness of Alexander's conquests so far, and proposes a different task, that of organising his new empire according to proper principles. The fame which Alexander will win and the good that he will do his subjects by this activity of lawgiving are emphasised. This is conventional enough, close in its sentiments to the opening of the first Sallustian letter to Caesar; but the author has at least succeeded in inserting the date and situation without strain, and in introducing the first topic of the letter.

The first topic is the need for a ruler and lawgiver in peace as well as in war. The author proceeds by combatting a commonly held view that such a man is only necessary in time of war, because danger is difficult to face, whereas peace and prosperity require no special skill. He holds the opposite view: men in danger are naturally cautious, but in prosperity they tend to excess and need to be restrained
by laws and by a proper education. But law is not law unless it is obeyed; therefore a ruler is needed to lead men to the law, and the only ruler who can do this is a lawful ruler. Two further arguments are brought against the common view. If it were really easy to live in prosperity, fathers would hand over their property to their children; but, just as this would be wrong, so one ought not to entrust the state to the people. Similarly a glance at the history of earlier empires in the East shows that in general the first generation prospers, schooled in adversity, but later generations, living in ease, succumb. No state can last if its people neglect training, yet men naturally love ease; hence the state needs both good laws and a ruler to enforce them. Further a 'common' law needs a 'common' ruler to bring men together in concord and order; this is especially true now that Greece is joined together to make as it were one city. Such a man must be powerful in order to enforce the law (for many obey only through fear), and virtuous, since states decay through the vices of their rulers, when the governing class neglects its duties.

The habit of proceeding by the refutation of a popular view is common in such works,¹ and the view which replaces it

¹. Klek 119.
is hardly less common - the idea that prosperity has its own dangers which must be guarded against. Nor are either of the examples chosen to refute the popular opinion particularly striking. The first, basically an argument against democracy, rests on a comparison between the *demos* and children which attributed to Aristotle is slightly strange, but could have been made at any time in the Hellenistic or Roman periods. The second involves the well-worn topic of the decline of empires. The rest of the argument however does raise a number of interesting points.

It has been recognised that there are two main themes in the letter, the need for lawgiving and the virtues of a good ruler. The second point is dealt with at length and reasonably competently, but the first gets no further than this introductory section. The author points out how important it is that Alexander should make laws, but offers him not even the most general advice on what sort of laws they should be: here the letter is in clear contrast with, for instance, the two Sallustian epistles with their attempts at specific recommendations; it does seem strange that a man who troubled to advance the notion of the conqueror as lawgiver should neglect to explore its possibilities. There is clearly no omission in the present text, for the transition from the king as protector and formulator of law to the virtues he must
have is already apparent in the conclusion of the argument of this paragraph.

The foundation of a new empire is a suitable time for a little lawgiving, and the author may have raised the question so prominently because he felt the activity especially appropriate to a philosopher known to be interested in detailed recommendations for political life. But he seems deliberately to have evaded the implications of his opening remarks. The reason is perhaps that the task of suggesting actual laws for Alexander's new empire was as much beyond him as it would have been beyond Aristotle: to found a city, ideal or real, is one thing; to found an empire quite another. The writer could not have discovered any practical guidance on the problems raised here either in Aristotle or in any other Greek philosopher. Indeed before he could have started prescribing what sort of laws Alexander should make, he would have had to decide what sort of empire he was to rule. There is no sign that he faced this question; rather he shows a basic confusion on two relevant points. He is not at all clear whether his Alexander is to rule an empire organised centrally with provinces and governors, or a series of cities, and hence whether his lawgiving consists in issuing general edicts, or interfering in the constitutions of individual autonomous cities. Thus sometimes Alexander is described as
heir to the earlier empires and faced with their problems; he is in the position not of one but of many kings - that is, like the King of Kings - and can profitably follow Persian precedent.\footnote{1} Elsewhere his activities seem primarily for the welfare of the cities, and comparable (though on a larger scale) to those of Lycurgus.\footnote{2} Connected with this is a second obscurity - how far the author has taken into account anything outside Greece itself, or perhaps rather outside the Greek \textit{polis}. Perhaps the most interesting passage in the letter is extremely difficult to assess because of this: chapter 8 has been discussed in detail by Stern,\footnote{3} but one point in it is distinctly curious - its progression from advice on the suppression and transportation of the Persian nobility in the interests of holding down the barbarians, to a lyrical description of a future golden age of peace and prosperity, when the unity of mankind will be assured and all will live the ideal philosophic life. Who is to be included in the benefits of this society, 'mankind in general', or merely the inhabitants of the cities - that is, Greeks? The disturbing thought arises, had the author himself considered the point?

\footnote{1}{10, 32, 35.} \footnote{2}{39, 65ff.} \footnote{3}{o.c. passim.}
A similar lack of definition can be found in chapter 4, where the need for a 'common' ruler and a 'common' law is emphasised. Here it is at least clear that the author was referring only to 'Greece and its cities, which are joined together to make as it were one city'. But precisely what kind of unity is implied? Is it really the League of Corinth which is described as joining Greece together in this way 'to make as it were one city', with one man as its ruler, who enforces law apparently as an expression of his own will rather than in accordance with League decisions? Clearly the author had little idea of either the actual or the possible political combinations of the period; it might seem further that the type of confusion he exhibits is not that of a contemporary faced with new intractable problems, but of a man who, either because of his stupidity and thoughtlessness or because of the experience of his own day, cannot see that these problems existed.

This particular passage does indeed tend to suggest that the letter is a production, not of the Hellenistic period, but of the Roman empire. Here the statements about a common law and a common ruler offer some guidance. The meanings of ἹΟΡΩΣ ΝΟΜΟΣ in classical and Hellenistic Greek are fairly closely limited.¹ Usually in singular or

plural it refers to such law or laws as can be thought valid for all mankind - that is, to some type of 'universal' or natural law. Thus respect for parents and the proper burial of the dead are κοινοὶ νόμοι ;¹ and (taking a different criterion) Appian can make Seleucus I talk of the κοινὰς νόμος that the king is always right.² All κοινοὶ νόμοι in this sense are, as Aristotle pointed out, δικαίους; though the converse is not true, for some νόμοι of individual states are also unwritten.³ References to the κοινοὶ νόμοι of Greece are scarcely any different, for 'Greece' here means 'civilised men'.⁴ The Stoic identification of κοινοὶ νόμοι with θεοὶ λόγοι is merely a philosophical extension of this basic meaning. A quite different sense of the phrase is also found in the fifth century: within any particular state κοινοὶ νόμοι are laws which are the same for all, the product of ἓσσομαι or democracy in its legal aspects.⁵ But there seems no example before the second century A.D. of κοινοὶ νόμοι in the sense demanded here, of positive law enforced by a sovereign and

1. o.c. 32f.
2. Syr. 61.
3. Rhet. i, 1368b8; 1373b6, 24.
4. Euripides, F 853 Nauck (honour gods and parents); cf. F 346; Orest. 495.
valid within a certain defined community. Similarly the notion of a common ruler on earth might be hard to parallel before the Roman empire.

The linguistic point cannot of course be pressed, for the original Greek could have been κεφαλαία, κεφαλαια, and it would be difficult to establish similar conclusions for words so common. But the problem does reflect one of greater substance. The law of which the author writes is clearly not natural law, or anything similar to the τέκνον of earlier thinkers or the Stoics, but positive law created and enforced by a sovereign ruler in a situation where Greece at least has become as it were one city. There is no evidence for such an idea or such language in the Hellenistic period. Certainly if the author had been a great thinker, or showed signs of having really considered the concrete situation of Alexander, he could have emerged with such new ideas, and clothed them in appropriate language. But the argument is presented carelessly and in passing, not as if it were an original idea. Still it might not be inconceivable that the author obtained it from some unknown source of the Hellenistic period, if it were not for the fact that the whole passage finds disturbing parallels in the tradition of panegyric praising Rome's achievements.

The emergence of Rome brought several new elements into
the traditional panegyric of cities and empires. Roman freedom with the citizenship was the subject of comment and praise from the second century B.C. on; and with the spread of citizenship came the spread of Roman law. From the early empire the establishment of Roman law as a general system throughout the inhabited world was a common theme in praises of Rome: thus the κοινὸς νόμος in Aelius' Aristides' speech To Rome are no longer a philosophical abstraction, but the actual system of positive Roman law. To this recognition in panegyric of Rome's achievement the edict of Caracalla seems irrelevant, for it came too late to influence the tradition. Further Rome, it was recognised, had made of the whole one city, a communis patria for all; here the relation between κοινὸς νόμος and a ἱππολυτίνη was the more acceptable because it echoed earlier Stoic theory, which had derived the existence of a world-state from the existence of κοινὸς νόμος. Finally,

1. See in general W. Gernentz, Laudes Romae (Diss. Rostock 1918).
3. e.g. Hor. Odes iv, 15, 21ff.; Manilius iii, 25; Lucan i, 22 (cf. Verg. Aen. iv, 231); Cr. Sib. viii, 13; S.H.A. Tac. 15; Prob. 20, 5; Orosius iii, 8, 5; Augustin, Civ. Dei. v, 17; Rutilius Namatianus i, 77f., 133. cf. F. Christ, Die römische Weltversaumen in der antiken Dichtung, Tübinger Beiträge z. Altertumswissenschaft xxxi (1938), 113ff.; H. Fuchs, Augustin und der antike Friedensgedanke, Neue Philologische Untersuchungen iii (1926), 194 n. 1.
4. xxvi, 102 Keil; that the reference is to Roman law is supported by the mention of marriage in the same passage.
5. e.g. Pliny, N.H. iii, 39; Aristides xxvi, 36,63,65; xxvii, 32 Claudian, de cons.Stil. iii,150-9; Christ o.c. 81ff.
over the whole stood one ruler who was, like the ideal Hellenistic king, responsible among other things for the moral welfare of his subjects.¹

A supreme ruler, a common law, 'Greece'² joined together to make as it were one city: these are important elements in the argument of the letter. They are found conjoined elsewhere only in praises of Rome. It is a natural inference that the author, steeped in the rhetorical traditions of imperial Roman panegyric, conceived his Alexander as a fore­runner of contemporary emperors, and applied to him notions familiar and relevant to his own day. The letter is a product of that interest in Alexander, and ability for rhetorical reconstruction which can also be seen in Plutarch and Curtius Rufus. More generally perhaps it also attests an attitude towards emperors and their philosophic advisers known to be especially prevalent from the beginnings of the second sophistic to the fourth century A.D.³

Confirmation can be found in another theme from the same tradition. In 10 the author writes of previous empires, the Assyrians, Medes and Persians, and their fall. Here there is a clear trace of the doctrine of the four empires,

1. Aristides, xxvi, 60. cf. e.g. Dio, Or. iii, 6-9.
2. That is, 'ἡ εὐξέλλος', in the sense often used in the second sophistic as virtually synonymous with the civilised world.
3. cf. e.g. O. Murray, Hist. xiv (1965), 49 n. 43.
for the Macedonian empire will make up the number. Two main variants of this doctrine are known. The version found in Jewish and Christian writers stems from Daniel, which, under the influence of Jewish history, took one of the empires to be the Chaldean; in later writers there is a good deal of variation as Carthage or Rome came to be inserted without changing the original framework of four empires. In contrast the pagan version of the list remains the same - Assyrian, Median, Persian and Macedonian. The origins of the commonplace are obscure; both main branches may go back to apocalyptic nationalism under the Seleucids of the second century, for originally the purpose of the list was surely to suggest that the fourth empire too would disappear, to bring in the desired golden age of the fifth. Behind this may lie a Persian tradition, which can be seen already perhaps in Ctesias and traced in later sources. The apocalyptic vision was continued in the use made of the theme by Jewish and Christian writers, for their changes show a primary interest in the fifth empire as a future fulfilment of their respective dreams. In pagan writers the fifth empire is Rome, the present. The date at

2. Only Pompeius Trogus worked with a scheme, Assyria, Persia, Macedonia, Rome: Swain o.c. 16f.
3. o.c.; E. Meyer, Ursprung u. Anfänge des Christentums ii (1921), 189ff.
which the list came to be used by classical authors as a list pointing a moral is reasonably clear. The doctrine was unknown to Polybius, who ignores it despite his very similar remarks on change and decay. It appears in what was probably the preface to a work, *de annis Populi Romani* by Aemilius Sura; his date is unknown, but unless he was a self-conscious and consistent archaiser, he should have written under the Republic. The first datable reference is in the preface of Dionysius of Halicarnassus; it occurs also in Appian, Plutarch, Aelius Aristides, Dexippus, Claudian and Rutilius Namatianus. The majority of the examples of its use are either from prefaces or from panegyrics of Rome; and every known instance connects the succession with Rome. Whatever the origin of the list, its purpose in pagan writers is to lead up to the fifth and greatest empire - Rome.

Given the context in which the passage appears in this letter,

1. cf. Polybius i, 2 (whence Zosimus i, 1-5); it follows that the apparent mention of the doctrine in xxxviii, 22 = Appian, *Pun.* 132 is not Polybian, but part of the rhetorical colouring added by Appian, who did know of the notion.
2. Vell. i, 6, 6 = *H.R.R.* ii (1906), 161. Swain (o.c. 2f.) claims a second century date; but while his arguments from language have some force, those from content do not.
3. For convenience I give the full list (mostly from Fuchs o.c. 50, n. 37): Aemilius Sura ap. Vell. i, 6, 6 (whence Ampelius 10); Dion. Hal. i, 2, 2-4; Appian, *Praef.* 9; *Pun.* 132; Aristides xxvi, 91 Keil; xiii, 183 Dindorf (whence Choricius 32, 69); Claudian *de cons. Stil.* iii, 159ff. (whence Rutil. Namat. i, 81ff.); cf. Plut. *Mor.* 317f. and Dexippus *F.G.H.* 100 F 12.
it can hardly be taken as evidence of an earlier stage in the formation of the list; rather the author modified a common theme of Roman panegyric to fit an earlier situation. Explanation of the successive failures would, in a rhetorical situation, clearly become a natural part of the schema if it were enlarged on;¹ and the reason offered by the letter, the moral decline of nations through prosperity, is an obvious choice. It would not therefore be safe to press the very close parallels between this passage and one in Claudian² as an argument for dating the letter in the fourth century A.D.; Claudian's greatness as a poet in any case lies in the technical competence with which he expressed the whole rhetorical tradition of Greece and Rome.³ It is perhaps safer to say that the most likely date of composition is between the second and fourth centuries A.D.

To have established that the work belongs to the tradition of Roman imperial interest in Alexander as a forerunner of the Roman emperors, does not remove it entirely from a discussion of Aristotle's views. For the author produces a number of hitherto unknown (and even unidentifiable)

1. Usually it is not.
2. de cons. Stil. iii, 159ff.
3. More generally it should be noted that the topos of the comparison of empires (cf. Menander ap. Rhet. Graec. iii, 376, 31ff.; 417, 5ff. Spengler) often includes as here in c. 4 reference to Sparta and Athens: e.g. Polyb. i, 2, 3; Aristides xxvi, 43-9.
episodes in history: he has considerable knowledge. He may therefore have drawn on Aristotle's genuine works in order to construct his letter. Such a view could be supported with the large number of parallel passages adduced by Keil and Plezia between the letter and (especially) Aristotle's Politics, even if Keil and Plezia used these parallels to argue diametrically opposed views of the authorship of the letter.\(^1\) The problem is, of course, that it is possible to find some sort of parallel for almost any statement in political philosophy somewhere in the Politics; moreover many of the parallels adduced are commonplaces used also in a number of works fully within the rhetorical tradition to which the treatise in general belongs. The establishment in detail of the significance of the alleged Aristotelian parallels, in relation to those with other late and less reputable authors, must await my detailed commentary. But it may be said that there is in fact no obvious place where it seems certain that the author knew of Aristotle's Politics; this is exactly what is to be expected, for the Politics was the least quoted and least read of all Aristotle's works until the thirteenth century, failing even to be translated into Arabic.

\(^1\) cf. Stern 12ff.
It is more difficult to answer the question posed by S.M. Stern in his last book, published posthumously in 1970, whether certain passages may not come from exoteric works of Aristotle: that is in itself more likely, and more difficult to refute, since these works do not survive. In general two points can be made against such a position. The procedure of composition postulated is contrary to what is known about the practices of rhetorical writers. Secondly there is no sign of the incoherences which might arise from a cento of Aristotelian passages; the general argument of the letter, commonplace as it is, is undisturbed by any more penetrating analysis. The statement of Wilamowitz, that Aristotle did not write words without thoughts, precludes attributing much of the letter to Aristotle. These arguments are of course in part subjective, and can only be assessed by a reading of the letter as a whole: it is for this reason that I have given the full text in an appendix. Moreover it must be admitted that some of the statements in the letter would indeed be original and surprising if they were the product of the fourth century B.C., whereas they were commonplaces in the imperial period: so the argument is to some extent circular. Such questions can again only be solved by a detailed commentary, or by discussion of the individual passages claimed for Aristotle.
Stern indeed attempted to show that one particular section of the letter was derived from the lost works of Aristotle.¹ This is the new longer version of chapter 8 (34-41). Stern divided the passage into two parts. The first is Aristotle's advice to exile the Persian nobles to Europe in order to make Persia easier to rule, and on the analogy of the Persians' own treatment of captured peoples. The second is the passage where 'Aristotle' hopes to live to see the dawning of a new golden age under a world state, when all may reach true happiness without war and strife, and live a life consonant with philosophy. Of these two passages Stern's opinion was that the first *probably* comes from Alexander's period, and *may* belong to Aristotle', while of the second he said, 'here I do not think one can say more than that the passage on the world-state *may* come from Alexander's period and *may* belong to Aristotle'.²

On the first passage it must be admitted that Stern shows clearly that the advice given is compatible with Aristotle's known attitudes to barbarians, in particular with the statement of Plutarch that Aristotle advised Alexander 'to play the part of a leader to the Greeks and

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1. Stern o.c. chs. 4 and 5.
2. Stern 34.
of a master to the barbarians, care for the former as friends and kinsmen, and treat the latter as beasts or plants'.

However it is clear from the very work of Plutarch in which this advice appears that Aristotle's position on the treatment of barbarians was well known to the rhetorical tradition. Although the specific advice to exile the Persians is not found in any ancient source, it would not take a particularly imaginative forger to combine Aristotle's known attitude with another rhetorical topos certainly popular in the second and third centuries A.D., that of the exiling of the Eretrians by the Persians, and so invent a suitable retribution for the Persian nobility.

The second passage is, as Stern recognises, more dubious. The theme of a future golden age is not found in classical literature before Virgil. Stern himself admits that the passage could well belong to the Roman period: it in fact reads like the stock praise of the pax Romana, with a little philosophical colouring. Moreover everything we know of Aristotle's political thought suggests that he did not see the conquests of Alexander as heralding a new golden age. We do not of course have evidence for all periods of his life; and Stern makes the best case possible for thinking that

1. Mor. 329b (de virt. Alex. 1).
2. See the evidence collected by Stern 27f.
the great victories of Alexander might have turned Aristotle's head for a moment, so that in the short period between Gaugamela and the murder of Callisthenes (331-27) he might have conceived Alexander in a totally different light from earlier or later. But it seems bad historical method to postulate, against all the evidence which we do possess, a temporary aberration on Aristotle's part, when the hypothesis of imperial forgery is so much easier. Moreover the Politics itself is a work whose composition spanned many years, including those in question: the various layers of Aristotle's thought can be dimly seen. Yet nowhere is there any sign that Aristotle may have once had a temporary vision of a totally new order of society.

I conclude that the work is in all essentials a forgery of the Roman imperial period, of great interest to historians of Roman political thought and to those investigating the fascinating question of the varying attitudes to Alexander in antiquity. It does not shed any light either on Aristotle or on the problems of Hellenistic kingship.
b. XENOCRATES AND ANAXARCHUS

Xenocrates

From the activities of Speusippus and Aristotle, it might seem that the Academy was fundamentally inclined towards the Macedonian cause; but the situation was not so simple. It was complicated by two factors. The first was the court politics in the kingdom of Macedon itself, where it is possible to trace two opposed groups from the later years of the reign of Philip even beyond the death of Alexander. On the one side stood Philip and his marshals, who, though entrusted with the highest commands after Philip's death, gradually became more and more suspect to Alexander. On the other side were the supporters and relatives of Olympias and of Alexander himself; the beginnings of this split can be seen in the period of the flight of Olympias and Alexander from Macedon in 337. From the point of view of the history of political attachments in the Academy, the important figures are Philip and Antipater on

1. The controversy was begun by J. Bernays, Phokion u. seine neueren Beurtheiler (1881), whose position was attacked by T. Gomperz, Wiener Studien iv (1882), 102ff.; cf. also the fundamental study of the philosophical schools in this period by Wilamowitz, Antigonos von Karystos (1881), 178ff.
the one hand, and on the other Olympias and perhaps her guardian and uncle Arybbas the Molossian, Alexander himself and his favourite Hephaestion.

The second complicating factor was the growing philosophical estrangement of Aristotle from the mainstream of the Academic school, an estrangement which began with the choice of Speusippus as head of the school in 347, but continued when Aristotle's former friend and companion in his travels to Assos, Xenocrates, succeeded Speusippus in 339. The split was made permanent when Aristotle set up his own rival school in Athens in 335.

Aristotle's primary attachment to Philip and Antipater has already been mentioned, and his gradually increasing estrangement from Alexander is clear. The original collection of his correspondence, whether all of it is genuine or not, included letters to most of the political figures involved, to Philip, Alexander (4), Antipater (9), Olympias (1) and Hephaestion (1).2 Fragments from the letters to Antipater survive, and some of these may well be genuine: they do no more than attest his friendship with Antipater, and his

1. The correct spelling according to epigraphic evidence.
distaste for the conquests of Alexander.¹

The decisive break in the relations between the Academy and Macedon came with Xenocrates.² This break was complete by 322, when the Athenians sent two successive embassies to try to come to terms with Antipater after the disastrous attempt at revolt on the death of Alexander. Xenocrates was chosen as a member of the second of these embassies, although he was a metic, and (as the sources insist) a poor public speaker; according to the anecdotes, he proved himself more intransigent than any of his colleagues.³ When Xenocrates was offered citizenship under the new Macedonian protected oligarchy, he refused on the grounds that he could not be a member of a constitution for the prevention of which he had gone on the embassy.⁴

The story of this embassy shows Xenocrates as a strong supporter of Athens and Athenian democracy; the route by which a disciple of Plato reached such a position must have been devious, and can only partly be guessed at. That mutual personal dislike already existed in 322 between Xenocrates

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1. F 8, 9, 10, 12 Plezia are perhaps genuine.
2. On Xenocrates in general cf. H. Dörrie, RB ix A (1967), 1512ff.; on his political attachments, the fundamental study is now G. Maddoli, Dialoghi di Archeologia i (1967), 304ff. which I follow, but with caution.
and Antipater is shown by Antipater's refusal to greet Xenocrates or listen to him; the same relation is hinted at by the story that Xenocrates accepted only a small sum of money from Alexander, but rejected entirely the offer of Antipater.\(^1\)

If this antipathy was well established by 322, information about Xenocrates' earlier attitude to politics is lacking, unless the story that he took part in an embassy to Philip can be accepted as genuine.\(^2\) The list of Xenocrates' works perhaps offers more certain help; for there are only three works addressed to named individuals, all of whom belong to the group opposed to Antipater. The titles of these books are, *To Arrybas, To Hephaestion*, and *The Elements of Kingship for Alexander* in four books.\(^3\)

Maddoli has recently investigated the background to the first of these works, which (like the second) from its title will have been some sort of letter of advice.\(^4\)

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2. Diog. Laert. iv, 8f.; Maddoli 306f. is inclined to accept it. But I doubt if it is more than a story modelled on the Antipater episode: it is hard to see why Athens should send a metic as ambassador to Philip, or why Xenocrates was considered sufficiently important as a philosopher - unless perhaps he was the only member of the Academy prepared to speak against the Macedonian interest at the time.
3. Diog. Laert. iv, 14; the discovery and the inferences drawn from it were first made by Maddoli.
4. o.c. 309ff.: the evidence for Arybbas' movements is not certain, but the reconstruction accepted by Maddoli seems the most probable.
was driven from his kingdom of Epirus in 343/2, and fled to Athens; a decree of that year confirms the hereditary grants of citizenship and other honours held by his father and grandfather, and instructs the council to see to his return. Arybbas certainly spent some time in exile, though he probably did eventually return to his kingdom (the most likely date for this is after the death of his rival in 331/0): he sent help to Athens during the Lamian War. Arybbas may well have come to know Xenocrates during his exile; the date of Xenocrates' letter to him is uncertain, but the title alone shows the philosopher in contact with a man opposed to the power of Philip and (for that reason) highly regarded by the Athenian democracy.¹

Unfortunately too little is known of the relations between Arybbas and his two wards, his brother's children, Olympias and Alexander (whom Philip had installed as king in his place), to decide whether the work of Xenocrates has any significance for his relation to Macedonian court politics. If it is true that Arybbas was in his kingdom again at the same time as Olympias during the Persian expedition, that suggests that their relations were close, despite the

¹ Maddoli suggests after 331/0, but this is highly conjectural; even his terminus post quem (the election of Xenocrates as head of the Academy in 339) seems dubious: Xenocrates need not have been head.
part she must have played originally in having him expelled in favour of her brother. But it would be dangerous to claim Arybbas as a consistent supporter of Alexander of Macedon, and opponent of Philip and later Antipater.

Xenocrates' relations with Arrybas may be merely evidence of his democratic leanings, together with perhaps a natural Academic desire to advise kings, even if deposed. But the second work, To Hephaestion, does suggest that Xenocrates had relations with the court of Alexander, though date and purpose of the work remain obscure.¹

Given these connections with the circle of Alexander, the fact that the 'democrat' Xenocrates wrote a book On the Elements of Kingship for Alexander becomes less surprising. Emphasis can be laid on the word 'Elements' in the title: one does not write on the elements of kingship except to a king without experience. There are therefore two occasions when such a book would be appropriate. The first is the great philosophical contest of 343/2: Xenocrates perhaps could also have seen himself as one of the candidates for the post of tutor to Alexander, and made his claim in the form

¹. It may have had the same purpose as suggested below for the work addressed to Alexander; Hephaestion had been with Alexander and Aristotle at Mieza and could be considered a pupil of Aristotle, and Xenocrates could be trying to destroy Aristotle's standing as a philosophical adviser in this case too.
of a simplified account of the rudiments of kingship, suitable for a boy of 13. But plausible as such a picture might be, it involves rejecting the evidence of Plutarch, who says that Alexander asked Xenocrates for advice on kingship:¹ that, if true, rules out a date so early. It is perhaps therefore better to place the work slightly later. It could be argued that the accession of Alexander is too late, on the grounds that Alexander will hardly have asked for advice on government from a man known to be a supporter of Athenian democracy at a time when Athenian loyalty was wavering; the work would therefore be dated in the last years of Philip. But these considerations are not conclusive. The years between Chaeronea and the death of Philip (338–6) seem the most likely, with perhaps the accession of Xenocrates to the headship of the Academy and the invasion of Persia as outside limits.

Whatever the precise date, the significance of Alexander's action is clear: he was publicly renouncing his former tutor Aristotle, in turning to a new philosopher for advice on kingship; Aristotle perhaps was too bound up with the court

¹ Mor. 1126d. The reference in Athen. i, 3f. to works by Xenocrates, Speusippus and Aristotle about δικαίωμα is wrongly taken by Heinze to refer to this work: these were books about the rules at symposia, the head of which was called a δικαίωμα.
of Philip. Xenocrates, in accepting the invitation, was reasserting the old claim of the Academy to be the source of wisdom on monarchy, and deliberately putting himself in competition with Aristotle in the eyes of public opinion. The writing of this work was as much a turning-point in the relations between Aristotle and the Academy, as Aristotle's establishment of a rival school (which indeed it may have provoked).

No information on Xenocrates' political philosophy survives. The word τοιχεία suggests that the work was theoretical in content rather than practical; but the imagination hesitates before the task of filling four books with the mere elements of kingship - it is hard enough to see how an advanced course on the subject could be made to extend for that number of volumes. Perhaps Xenocrates accepted the view of Plato, that a full study of all the sciences was necessary for the perfect ruler; and the work was an exposition of a more orthodox version of Academic philosophy in general than he might have been thought to have received from Aristotle. But there is no sign that Xenocrates was particularly interested in making a philosopher-king out of Alexander: he refused to go on the expedition, and said that one would do little to become Alexander's friend.
but a lot to avoid being his enemy.\textsuperscript{1} The work is a product less of an interest in monarchy than of an attempt to oust a renegade member of the Academy from a position of prestige as the publicly recognised tutor of the king of Macedon. And with Xenocrates, Academic political thought and influence on the Hellenistic monarchies disappears, killed by Xenocrates' own personal attachment to the city of Athens and its constitution, and later by the growing tendencies towards scepticism in the Academy. So it was that the most important school of political philosophy in the fourth century, and the source of the most serious thought on kingship, ceased to have any influence at all in the world of the Hellenistic monarchies.

\textbf{Anaxarchus}

One other work \textbf{On Kingship} is known from the age of Alexander, that of Anaxarchus.\textsuperscript{2} The evidence for the life of this philosopher is almost entirely anecdotal: he accompanied Alexander on his expedition, and there are a large number

\textsuperscript{1} Plut. Mor. 1043d; Xenocrates F 105 Heinze.

of stories which concern his activities at court. These are however hard to evaluate, for it is clear that in many of them he is being cast in the opposite role to Callisthenes: he plays the flatterer to Callisthenes, the blunt and honest philosopher. The picture is certainly false of Callisthenes, who (despite his tactlessness and freedom of speech before Alexander) in his history had called him a god; and it is equally false of Anaxarchus. For all the anecdotes portraying Anaxarchus as the flatterer can, with more or less certainty, be traced to Peripatetic sources: Clearchus and Satyrus are expressly cited, and another story is probably from Hermippus; Satyrus called him 'Alexander's flatterer', and in the case of the story from him it is even possible to see how he took his starting-point from a known remark of Anaxarchus and elaborated it in the desired direction. More generally, any anecdote which relates Anaxarchus to Callisthenes is probably false, no more than evidence of the influence of the Peripatetic school on Hellenistic philosophical biography.

The remaining anecdotes, whether true or false, give a consistent and favourable picture of the character and

1. Clearchus: Athen. xii, 548 = Clearchus iii F 60 Wehrli; Satyrus: Athen. vi, 250f. (for the construction of the story see Gomperz o.c. 477); Hermippus: Plut. Alex. 52 (cf. 54).
influence of Anaxarchus. Indeed the distinction between truth and falsehood in such stories is not of fundamental importance. Gomperz stated clearly the significance of even the most dubious stories, when he said, 'one can assert of no other human action, that the essence of an individual's life achieves in it such a completely unspoiled expression. The hero of a true anecdote on the other hand always has his best or worst days'.

In a sense the Peripatetics chose rightly in picking on Anaxarchus as a figure to contrast with Callisthenes, of whom Aristotle said, 'he had a great and powerful ability to speak, but no sense'. For Anaxarchus was a remarkably successful court philosopher: one story shows him attacked by an Indian sage for this, and it is clear that he remained in favour with Alexander throughout the expedition, partly perhaps because he was a fund of information on natural phenomena. His quick wit, irony and independence are also revealed in a number of his alleged exchanges with Alexander; for instance, when Alexander was pelting him with apples at a drinking session, he raised his wine-cup threateningly, and

1. o.c. 473.
2. Plut. Alex. 54.
4. Plut. Mor. 179f.; 331e; Alex. 8; for his usefulness, cf. Val. Max. iii, 3, ext. 4; Diod. xvii, 112, 4f.; Justin xii, 13, 5.
quoted the lines of Euripides, 'one of the gods is about to be hit by a mortal hand'.¹ This anecdote shows, as does another, that Anaxarchus did not take Alexander's claims to divinity seriously.² Thus the story told in Arrian, that Anaxarchus was the protagonist against Callisthenes in the famous episode of the banquet where Alexander arranged for the ceremony of proskynesis, is extremely suspicious. Arrian himself is not using his main sources, Ptolemy and Aristobulus, at this point; and Curtius' account, which makes the Syracusan Cleon the speaker in favour of proskynesis is clearly preferable.³ The story has been reworked in conformity with the Peripatetic antithesis between the two philosophers; and it is again possible to see how, in the speech attributed to the proponent of the new ceremony, what may be a genuine phrase of Anaxarchus has been used as the centre of the argument.

Another story may show the same method of construction. The account of Anaxarchus' consolation of Alexander after his murder of Cleitus shows the usual suspicious contrast between him as the court flatterer and Callisthenes as the

¹ For the original version of this story see Philod. τ. κόμας iv ap. Gomperz o.c. 471; also Diog. Laert. ix, 10; Plut. Mor. 737a. Compare e.g. the original version of the story which later involved Nicocreon, Plut. Alex. 28 (Gomperz o.c. 474), showing an adroit combination of independence and flattery.
² For the other story see Plut. Alex. 28; Ael. V.H. ix, 37; and though the story about ichor is attributed to him falsely (Diog. Laert. ix, 60), it shows the same tendency.
³ Arr. iv, 10, 5; Curt. viii, 5, 8; for the construction of the story see Gomperz o.c. 477ff.
true philosopher. Though it appears in Arrian, it is certainly not from his two main sources, for he introduces it with the phrase, 'some people say'; from the context in Plutarch, the story seems likely to have been found in Hermippus. The story must be rejected, but the arguments used by 'Anaxarchus' in his attempt to console Alexander are interesting; for they raise the important point of whether the king is above the law or not. It is said that Dike and Themis sit on either side of Zeus, to symbolise that whatever Zeus does is right: the king himself should be the law, and the standard of what is just. It has been seen that this view of the relation between the ideal king and law is a reputable philosophical one, held by Plato and discussed at length by Aristotle; in this speech, the example chosen to illustrate it is an original one. It may well be that once again the speech has been constructed from the known views of Anaxarchus: in his work On Kingship he perhaps argued for the position that the king was above the law and himself personified law.

Anaxarchus is only known to have written one book, that On Kingship. It is not expressly stated that the work was written for Alexander, but from the two fragments known it

1. Arr. iv, 9, 7; Plut. Alex. 52 (cf. 54): see Gomperz o.c. 475f.
seems possible: at least it is clearly written with the experience of Alexander in mind, and, whatever theoretical views it purveyed, it also contained advice of a practical nature. In one fragment, Anaxarchus is quoted as saying, 'it is hard to collect money, but still harder to keep it safely' - a mordant comment perhaps on Alexander's problems with Harpalus. The other fragment seems to reflect only too well the situation of Callisthenes, and may be deliberately polemical: perhaps the Peripatetic antithesis between the two men is based on more than literary convenience. The passage at least illustrates well Anaxarchus' own attitude to court life: 'much learning can help much, but can also greatly harm him who has it. It helps the clever man, but harms him who readily utters every word in any company. One must know the measure of the right time, for this is the boundary of wisdom. Those who recite a saying outside the right time, even if their saying is wise, are reproached with stupidity, because they do not mix intelligence with wisdom.'

Anaxarchus is the most likeable of the philosophers who are found in the company of Alexander, an ambivalent character who seems to have interpreted the philosophical

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1. Diels 72 F 1-2.
end of life, *eudaimonia*, in an almost Epicurean fashion. He clearly enjoyed the life of a courtier, and retained the confidence of Alexander even when Alexander was becoming increasingly suspicious; yet he was able to ridicule Alexander's more extreme pretensions. His strength of character is not in doubt; the philosopher and poet Timon, a fellow sceptic, well described this contradiction a generation or so later:¹

Here shews it selfe the dogged force of Anaxarchus fell, So stubborne and so permanent, when once he tooke a pitch: And yet as wise as he would seeme, a wretch (I heard folke tell) He judged was, for that to vice and pleasures overmuch By nature prone he was: a thing that Sages most do shun, Which brought him back out of the way, and made him dote anon.

The death of Anaxarchus was the most famous of all philosophical deaths, and set a pattern for subsequent centuries of the proper behaviour of the philosopher before the tyrant. Nicocreon, a dynast in Cyprus whose difficult behaviour towards philosophers was proverbial (and perhaps exaggerated)² for some reason had an especial dislike of

2. cf. e.g. Menedemus, Diog. Laert. ii, 129.
Anaxarchus - perhaps because of a quarrel at the court of Alexander. After Alexander's death, Nicocreon captured Anaxarchus, and had him pounded to death in a pestle and mortar, while Anaxarchus demonstrated his philosophical διάφραγμα by offering the chant, 'pound Anaxarchus' bag, Anaxarchus you do not pound'; and when, in order to silence him, the order was given to cut out his tongue, Anaxarchus bit it off and spat it in the tyrant's face. Not even the Peripatetic philosophers could resist the moral example of such a death.

In the words of Gomperz, Anaxarchus was 'a man who knew how to live like a courtier, and yet die like a hero'.

1. If there is any basis in the elaboration of the story in Plut. Alex. 28 to include Nicocreon: cf. Gomperz o.c. 474.
2. For the death of Anaxarchus, cf. the refs. in H. Berve o.c. 35 n. 1; for his legend, A. Alföldi, Studies in honor of A.M. Freind (1955), 15ff.; and the works cited p. 34 n. 2.
3. o.c. 478.
CHAPTER 2.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS.
The authenticity of the third is doubtful, and is discussed separately below.

Of the πείρα παιδεύειν no fragment survives; it was probably not a treatise written for the education of a particular king, but was rather on the education of the king in general, as opposed to the normal education of the citizen, on which Theophrastus also wrote. It may have been concerned with the philosophic education of a king, that is with Plato's problem, posed in the Republic and Statesman, of how to educate in order to achieve the philosopher-king - compare the book of Theophrastus' successor, Straton of Lampsacus, more explicitly called 'On the Philosopher-king'; if so, the book will have been polemical, for the Peripatetics did not accept the need for philosopher-kings. But it is perhaps more likely that Theophrastus was concerned, not with the views of Plato, but with the different and (especially in the early Hellenistic period) the flourishing genre of writing on the upbringing of particular kings. It would be typical of Theophrastus' antiquarian approach that he should investigate and

2. v, 50: πείρα παιδεύειν etc.
4. If Themistius Or. viii, 107c is right: see above p. 70.
compare the romantic and curious traditions on the upbringing of heroes and kings which for the Greek world began with Herodotus' account of Cyrus' early life, and which were systematised and given philosophical respectability by Antisthenes and Xenophon on the upbringing of Cyrus¹. Recent works in the same genre which may have provoked his attention were those by Onesicritus and Marsyas of Pella on the childhood of Alexander²: Theophrastus, who knew the truth because he had been present in Macedon, will not have had a high opinion of these books. He knew also the work of Hecataeus of Abdera on Egypt, with its account of the upbringing of the Egyptian Pharaoh Sesoosis³. So perhaps a detailed work, sifting these quasi-historical romances, a treatise on the borders of literature and history, showing an interest typical of Theophrastus and his age, in the exotic traditions of the newly opened barbarian world - but an interest still largely satisfied by what could be gathered from Greek sources.

The list of Diogenes Laertius mentions two works On Kingship, the first in one, the second in two books. But, as Usener established, this list is made up of four separate elements.⁴ The first is alphabetical and contains 109 titles: it is probably a list comprising those works known in Alexandria and compiled originally by Hermippus; the second, also alphabetical, of 64 titles, clearly supplements the first:

1. Herod. i, 107ff; see above pp. 18ff, 29.
2. F.G.H. 134, 135.
it should be attributed to Andronicus, using the material available after the rediscovery of the libraries of Aristotle and Theophrastus in the late Republic\(^1\). The third section is a list in no particular order, mainly composed of works which in all probability are identical with those already in the two earlier sections, hiding under different titles or in different combinations. The fourth section, again alphabetical, appears to be another independent attempt to supplement the first and second.

Since the two works On Kingship appear in the first and third sections of Diogenes' list, it is very possible that they are duplicates. Usener indeed thought that the second entry, the work On Kingship in two books, was a combination of two titles in the first part of the list, the works On Kingship and On Tyranny, a view which is supported by the confusion of other titles in the third section. But there is other evidence.

There are four fragments specifically attributed to Theophrastus' works On Kingship, and in their method of citation they show a clear pattern. One refers to the other three say (twice) or .

1. I accept most of the traditional story of the loss and recovery of the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus, against the doubts of A-H. Chroust, Class. et Med. xxiii (1963), 50ff; cf. I. Düring, Aristotles (1966), 35ff. That these two men were responsible for the standard lists of Theophrastus in particular is supported by the scholion at the end of his Metaphysics, which notes that the work is unknown to both; it does not in fact occur in any of Diogenes Laertius' lists: Usener o.c.91f.

2. Wilamowitz suggested that the remark attributed to Theophrastus in Stob. iv,1,72 = Gnom. Vat. 322 might come from a work on kingship (Griechische Verskunst (1921), 420 n.1); but the remark is not about kings and, from its variants cited by Sternbach and Wilamowitz, it clearly belongs in the tradition of sayings of wise men.
It seems likely therefore that there were in fact two separate works *On Kingship* circulating in antiquity, in one and two books respectively. But, though Usener's view becomes less plausible, it cannot be ruled out; for it could be that these were not two wholly distinct works, but rather two different ways of arranging the same work, in combination with the work *On Tyranny* or separately. Between the alternatives of two editions and two distinct works it is hardly possible to decide.

At least, if there were two works, their characters do not seem to have been very different. From the single book *On Kingship*, Theophrastus is quoted apparently as distinguishing the upright tiara or *kitaris* of the Persian king from the *kitaris* of the Cyprians. This will have been part of a learned discussion of the dress of the Persian king, or perhaps more precisely of the insignia of royalty in Persia: for the upright tiara was for the Greeks the distinguishing mark of the King of Kings.

The other three references are to Greek history or myth. Two concern tyranny: one is a story that Themistocles proposed to the Greeks that they should confiscate a richly decorated

1. Photius and Suidas s.v. ΤΙΑΡΗ; Schol. Plato, Republic viii, 553c (not in Wimmer). The meaning of this fragment is established by H.-W. Ritter, *Diadem und Königsherrschaft* (1965), 170ff: he rightly rejects the suggestion that there ever existed an Alternative *ΚΟΗΡΗ*, and shows that *ΚΙΤΑΡΗ* is probably in fact a Cypriot dialect word used by earlier Greek writers to describe in familiar terms the headdress of the Persian king.

tent sent to Olympia by Hieron, and forbid his horses to compete - perhaps an example of Greek hatred for tyrants. The second is a statement that the *aisymnetai* were 'elected tyrants': Aristotle gives the same definition. Supposing these references to come from the 'second book' *On Kingship*, they are compatible with the notion that it was identical with a book *On Tyranny*; and it is this evidence on which Usener based his claim.

The fragment specifically said to be from the second book *On Kingship*, found in a papyrus, is less clear. The papyrus itself consists of excerpts from a book of solutions to literary problems; one of the problems is raised by the following passage in book ii of Theophrastus *On Kingship*:

'And this is the king who really rules by his sceptre, not by his spear like Caeneus; for Caeneus thought it right to rule by his spear, not by his sceptre like many kings; but he was unable to.'

The papyrus explains the passage by referring to the account of the legend of Caeneus in Acusilaus of Argos, according to which Caeneus, king of the Lapiths, provoked the wrath of Zeus by setting up his spear in the market-place to be worshipped.

In the quotation itself Theophrastus seems to be opposing the type of the good King, the *nikeus*, who rules in the

1. Plut. Them. 25, 1 = F 126 Wimmer. The date of this episode, if true, will presumably be 476; for it should be connected with Themistocles' attempts immediately after the Persian Wars to regulate the position of those who had failed to help the Greeks.

2. Dion. Hal. v, 73, 3 = F 127 Wimmer; cf. below p. 160

3. P. Oxy. xiii, 1611 lines 42-51; the text was much improved by L. Deubner and Boll in SB Heidelberger Ak. Wiss. Phil.-hist. Kl. (1919) xvi, 3ff, whose version I follow: it can be consulted in F.G.H. 2 F 22.
Homeric fashion with a sceptre, to the tyrant, Caeneus: it might perhaps still come from a work On Tyranny, if that work contained a contrast between the king and the tyrant. More interesting is the learned nature of what the commentator rightly regarded as an obscure allusion. The legend of Caeneus was told at least in part by Hesiod; but the main source for the story for later writers appears to have been Acusilaus; and though Theophrastus did not quote him (or there would have been no difficulty for the commentator to explain), he very probably was thinking of Acusilaus' version of the story. The statement could be a moral example, but it can hardly have appeared in a work intended for a popular audience.

An interest in the symbols of rule is again apparent; and this particular symbol, the spear, was of very great importance in the early Hellenistic period: after the murder of Alexander's heirs, it was on a claim to 'the land won by the spear' (δοκιμασμένος ξίφος) that the fundamental right of the successor kingships to their possessions ultimately rested. On the other hand, although the sceptre and the spear may perhaps in fact have a common origin, for the Greeks from the time of Homer the sceptre was not a spear; and in the archaic and classical periods an antithesis can often be seen between the sceptre as symbol of justice and kingship, and the spear as symbol of force.

1. F. 87-8 Merkelbach and West.
3. The evidence is collected and discussed, H.U. Instinsky, Alexander der Grosse am Hellespont (1949), 29ff; Ritter o.c. 86 n.2.
injustice and tyranny. Thus, though the 'sceptre of Agamemnon' worshipped at Chaeronea was called a spear,¹ and the spear was the symbol of office at Thebes², yet it was also more generally the symbol of hybris, disrespect for the gods. The myth of Caeneus, as told by Acusilaus (and perhaps Hesiod) is in fact an attempt to accommodate through mythology an old rite of spear-worship to the new attitudes of the archaic world, where the Homeric sceptre of justice dominated³; it contains an implicit contrast of the Homeric ὑπνοῦχος ἐναέριον whose sceptre is symbol of straight judgement and comes from Zeus, the source of kingship and justice, with the man of hybris, son of Poseidon, king of the Lapiths, whose worship of the spear both symbolised his hybris and was the cause of the wrath of Zeus. This Theophrastus saw; for he used the myth to point the same contrast, though now in its fully developed form appropriate to the Hellenistic age, of kingship and tyranny. To give another early Hellenistic example, in Apollonius Rhodius, Idas, the companion of Jason, who is characterised by his arrogance and quickness to anger, boasts that he trusts more in his spear than

¹ o.c. 24; there seems no reason to doubt that this was a spear, not just a piece of wood (contra H.J. Rose, Some Problems of Classical Religion, Eitrem Lectures 1955, Oslo University (1958), 36ff.

² Plut. Mor. 597b; Alföldi o.c. 18. Pompeius Trogus (Justin xliii, 3,3) identified the Greek skeptron with the hasta as ancient symbols of monarchy, in contrast to the more recent diadem; in its original form this was presumably an antiquarian discussion which deliberately assimilated Greek and Roman symbols of rank, and it cannot therefore be taken as good evidence for a general identity of sceptre and spear in Greece.

³ Cf. Alföldi 23f.
in Zeus, a boast which (as the scholia remark) is designed to show his ἀνεμιστὴν. With this background it is possible to see how dubious the claim of the Diadochoi to rule δορυφόρος χώρα must appear, for it could be interpreted as a claim to the position of tyrant ruling over slaves, rather than that of king, ruling over willing subjects. Thus it was that other symbols and justifications were more usually emphasised, symbols for the most part younger and more closely connected with the charismatic figure of Alexander. Theophrastus' discussion may not have been quite so innocent of political significance as might at first appear.

The quotation from Theophrastus on the nature of aisymnetai occurs in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in a curious digression on kingship and tyranny in early Greece; Dionysius was trying to argue that the Roman institution of the dictator was not (as Licinius thought) borrowed from Alba, but from Greece. In fact it can be shown that in general the information on Greece in this digression comes from Theophrastus On Kingship, though Dionysius indulged in some distortion and simplification.

1. i, 467ff (whence Virgil Aen. x, 773 etc.); cf. schol. on 468, 471. Idas is Ἰάννης (151), μεγάλος ἄραξις (iii, 516), and angry (556ff, 1169ff, 1251ff); other examples of this literary motif in Alföldi l.c.
4. The possibility was noted by L. Spengel, Aristotelische Studien i (1865) 57 n.4, and W.L. Newman, The Politics of Aristotle iii (1902), 265, 276, but not followed up. I know of no subsequent discussion, apart from the brief comment by Regenbogen RE 1517.
The evidence for connecting this passage with Theophrastus is of two sorts. Firstly the close relationship of much of Dionysius' information with that in Aristotle's *Politics*, together with a number of significant differences which show that Dionysius was drawing on a Peripatetic writer, rather than directly on the *Politics*. In the actual citation from Theophrastus, Theophrastus had defined *aisymnetai* in exactly the same terms as Aristotle, as 'elected tyrants'¹. A similar set of verbal echoes can be found in the passage immediately following, in Dionysius' use of the example of Pittacus:

Aristotle:  
...οίοι ελέγχοντο ποιείν *μικροκυάνιον* ...οίοι καὶ *μικροκυάνιον* ποιείν ελέγχοντο  

Dionysius:  
περὶ Πιττακοῦ ποιείν τοὺς *φυγάδας* τοὺς  
ποιείν προσθηκεῖσαν ἀντιπερίκλεισιν καὶ  
'Αλκάδων τον ποιητήν.  

In itself this might perhaps suggest direct use of Aristotle, but elsewhere the parallelism is that of a man rethinking the same problems in the same language as Aristotle, and coming to slightly different conclusions. Thus, according to Dionysius, originally every Greek city was ruled by kings, not like the barbarian races despotically, but in accordance with certain laws and ancestral customs², Aristotle similarly recognised the rule of the heroic king in accordance with law and subject to certain limitations; but he was prepared to recognise that barbarian races were ruled by kings also in a

¹. Pols. 1285a33: τὰ ἀσγματὰ τυραννίζειν; Dion. Hal. v,75,3: κρατέρας τῆς θεραπείας; noted by Newman p.258.  
². Pols. iii, 1285b3, b22: Dion.Hal. 74,1 (a view first found in Thuc.i, 13,1).
certain sense in accordance with law, and only quasi-despotically¹. Here the formulation of Dionysius (though not necessarily of his source) is less alive to the nuances of oriental kingship, and adopts the almost universal notion of despotic rule in the orient².

Aristotle lacks Dionysius' interesting examples from 'Homer', the use of the epithets dikaspoloi and themistopoloi of kings to show their concern with justice³. In fact the word dikaspolos occurs only twice in Homer, themistopolos not at all, but only in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter and Hesiod⁴. It is interesting that Eustathius in his commentary on dikaspolos chooses to make a point similar to that of Theophrastus discussed above: he says that in Homer the sceptre is the symbol of justice, just as the spear is the symbol of courage⁵; part of this interpretation at least is Alexandrian, for it lies behind the reminiscence of the Homeric line in Apollonius Rhodius, where he transfers the epithet 'dikaspolos' from the person to the sceptre itself⁶. Thus the connection of epithet and symbol in Homeric scholarship goes back at least to Apollonius; it might possibly be a result

3. 74,2.
4. Refs. in H. Ebeling, Lexicon Homericum (1885) s.vv.
5. Eustath p.92,43R on Iliad i, 238.
6. iv, 1178; on the significance of Apollonius' variatio in relation to Alexandrian scholarship on Homer, see L.E. Rossi. Riv. fil. xcvi (1968), 155ff: the interest of Apollonius in a word is indeed a useful criterion in helping to distinguish early elements in the scholia to Homer in general (though see R. Pfeiffer, History of Classical Scholarship (1963) 147 n.1).
of Theophrastus having discussed both topics in the same work. At least the use of these two rare 'Homeric' epithets in Dionysius' account recalls strongly the type of recondite information which was Theophrastus' distinctive contribution to the framework of ideas on politics which he inherited from Aristotle.

Again Dionysius' description of Spartan kingship as possessing certain stated limitations is similar to that of Aristotle\(^1\). And his account of how the abuse of their power and their failure to observe the laws caused the overthrow of royal governments in favour of laws and magistracies can be paralleled by Aristotle's statement that kingships generally fall from internal causes, such as an attempt to act tyrannically, to increase the royal power or act contrary to law\(^2\). Aristotle however allows the possibility both of kings being deprived of their power and of their giving it up gradually; Dionysius has perhaps ignored subtleties which may have been in Theophrastus, and so assimilated his account to the Roman situation.

Some of the differences between the account of Dionysius and the information in Aristotle's Politics are due to Dionysius' own interest in comparing the development of early Greece and early Rome. But others show clearly the activity of a man working within the Aristotelian tradition with little originality, and less subtlety perhaps than Aristotle, but a deeper antiquarian knowledge. Theophrastus was precisely such a man; and since the

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1. 74,2: 1285a2ff.
2. 74,2: v, 1313a1ff; cf.iii, 1285b15; v, 1314a33; below p.164 n.2.
information concerns early kingship and occurs after a quotation specifically mentioned as coming from Theophrastus On Kingship, the case for claiming the whole passage in Dionysius as a paraphrase from that work is strong.

One serious doubt remains. The historical progression described by Dionysius as typical of Greece is not one which would be accepted by modern historians as true in fact. Kingship turns into tyranny; the overthrow of tyranny is accompanied by the establishment of laws and magistracies. Then because of various faults and emergencies the need for correction is felt, and the kingly and tyrannical powers are re-established, but under euphemistic names, in order to avoid breaking the oaths sworn not to promote tyranny. This development is of course far more appropriate to the early history of Rome than of Greece; and it must be admitted that Dionysius at least distorted the picture by taking what was perhaps only one of a number of possible series of events described by Theophrastus, in order to strengthen the parallelism he wished to establish. But is it right to go further, and see the whole picture as the invention of Dionysius, with nothing more than an admixture of local colour from Theophrastus?

I think not. The modern view of Greek kingship giving way to aristocracy, which in turn threw up the tyrant at the head of a discontented non-aristocratic class, whatever justification it may have in the facts, was not recognised as a universal rule by ancient theorists. Though Aristotle mentions
it\textsuperscript{1}, elsewhere he says that the early tyrants (as opposed to the later ones) achieved power either through the manipulation of high office (presumably in an aristocratic state) \textit{or by transforming their own kingship into a tyranny}\textsuperscript{2}. So in one of the three main ways in which a tyranny is established, the intermediate stage of aristocracy does not appear - Aristotle instances Pheidon of Argos and others. There is therefore no need to suspect that Dionysius' general picture did not come from a Peripatetic writer, although it is probably simplified to point the Roman parallel.

This conclusion is supported by a different type of argument for Theophrastus as author of the information in this digression - not the similarities and differences with Aristotle's \textit{Politics}, but a close parallel with another work by Theophrastus himself. The instances given by Dionysius of the new type of corrector of the state with more attractive titles than the old kings and tyrants, are the Thessalian \textit{archos}\textsuperscript{3} and the Spartan \textit{harmostes}. The same point was made by Theophrastus in book i of his \textit{Nomisma πρὸς τοὺς Καρνωτέρους}:

'\textit{it is much better, at least as far as naming, to send men out like the Spartans, calling them \textit{harmostai}, rather than \textit{episkopoi} or phylakes like the Athenians}.'\textsuperscript{4} This characterisation of the word

\textsuperscript{1} 1286b10ff; 1305a3ff.
\textsuperscript{2} v, 1310b1ff; cf. E.H. viii, 1160b10; H. Ryffel, \textit{METABOLÊ \Pi\O\I\PT\E\LL\N(1949)}, 159ff.
\textsuperscript{3} Almost certainly a corruption for \textit{ταύτης}, an example not used by Aristotle.
\textsuperscript{4} F 129 Wimmer = Harpocrat\textit{ion s.v. ἱππόκερσιος}.
harmostes as politically respectable is a fairly obvious argument from its derivation; but, however obvious, it is in fact found only in these two places. Again it seems probable that Dionysius derived his information from Theophrastus; though Theophrastus presumably made it clear that, if the Spartan harmostai were allegedly rectifiers of the states to which they were sent, in fact they were military governors.

Though it is not possible to be certain whether Theophrastus wrote one or two works on kingship, the nature of these works is reasonably clear. They were learned and antiquarian compilations of information, and even contained allusions that were in themselves obscure. Here the chances of quotation and survival will not have distorted the picture seriously; for, though authors like Athenaeus, Dionysius of Halicarnassus and the sources of the Byzantine lexicographers are likely to have picked out precisely such recondite information, there are the existence of an ancient gloss on the text of Theophrastus and the learned examples in Dionysius' paraphrase to show the nature of Theophrastus' treatise. The work Πολιτικὴ προς τὴν κυριαρχίαν shows very similar characteristics; as do the fragments published by W. Aly of what is probably another work on politics by Theophrastus, perhaps the book on 'How cities can best be governed'; although this treatise was clearly meant to be a

1. On the first, see Regenbogen RE Suppl. vii (1940), 1517f.; on the second, W. Aly, Studi e Testi civ (1943).
practical one suitable for politicians, it is heavily burdened with brief and obscure references to the institutions of different states. In the books *On Kingship* another typical trait is apparent: the closeness of his links with Aristotle are shown by their common information on the *aisymnetes* and by what can be seen of the general framework of ideas in Dionysius' section on Greek kingship. Thus these works show the same character as other political works by Theophrastus; they suggest an author who followed Aristotle in his tendency to amass information on political subjects, but who lacked the Aristotelian ability to generalise. If he differed from Aristotle in any significant way, it was in the acceptance of certain attitudes typical of the early Hellenistic period, in his interest in foreign kingships and his concern for the symbols of royalty. He lived in an age when the question of creating a symbolism for the office of king was especially discussed - when kings experimented with Persian and Egyptian customs, and sought information on the old kings of the Homeric poems, as well as paying attention to Macedonian precedents and following the examples set by Alexander in ritual and representation.

Though his views might be not entirely without practical application, Theophrastus' interest in kingship was largely an antiquarian one; and his theoretical framework remained limited by the categories inherited from Aristotle, which

1. On Theophrastus' political thought and its close relationship to that of Aristotle cf. also H. Bloch, *H.S.C.P. Suppl.* i (1940), 355ff; Regenbogen 1516ff; these discussions need revision in the light of Aly's fragments.
offered little scope for a deeper understanding of the new Hellenistic monarchies. And yet Theophrastus had the opportunity to play an important part in the politics of his day, for he had close connections with at least two dynasties.

He seems to have been in Macedon with Aristotle under Philip; and he could not help inheriting to some extent, along with the headship of Aristotle's school, his Macedonian ties with the family of Antipater. In the five tense years from the death of Alexander to the capitulation of Athens to Antipater's son, Cassander, in 318, this connection must have caused some anxious moments. Theophrastus himself seems to have been relatively free from suspicion of Macedonian sentiments, for he was left in charge of the school when Aristotle's close relationship with Antipater made it advisable for him to retire to Chalcis to avoid prosecution; and when (probably in 318) the radical democrat Hagnonides attempted to prosecute him for impiety - the traditional accusation against a politically undesirable philosopher - the accuser barely escaped the penalty for malicious prosecution. But the connection of other members of the Lyceum with Macedon was close. Aristotle's son-in-law and adopted son, Nicanor, was commander of the Macedonian garrison at Munychia from 319 and Cassander's chief agent.

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1. On the political activities of the Peripatetic school in the early Hellenistic period, see esp. J. Bernays, Phokion u. seine neueren Beurtheiler (1881), 34ff.; Wilamowitz, Antigonus von Karystos (1881), 178ff; W. S. Ferguson, Hellenistic Athens (1911), c.1-3. On the life of Theophrastus, Regenbogen 135ff.


3. Diog. Laert. v.36.

4. See Regenbogen 1360.

Another disciple, Demetrius of Phaleron, was deeply involved in the oligarchic government after 322, and had been in close relationship with Antipater, Cassander and Nicanor; on the final surrender of Athens he was appointed Macedonian governor of the city, which he ruled for 10 years until its liberation by Demetrius Poliorcetes in 307. During this period the Peripatetic school flourished: although as a metic Theophrastus was not allowed to own land in Attica, it was through the assistance of Demetrius that he had his own 'garden' in Athens, which (with adjoining property) he later bequeathed to his friends as a philosophical meeting-place. When Demetrius of Phaleron was expelled, a law was passed prohibiting the existence of any philosophical school without the permission of the people of Athens. Theophrastus and his friends fled: the law was directed primarily against their school, and was passed on political grounds; and it was Philon, a Peripatetic, who enabled Theophrastus to return the next year by prosecuting the author of the law, Sophocles, on a charge of proposing an illegal motion. The personal friendship of Cassander and Theophrastus is mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, who says that Cassander 'received' him: in philosophical contexts the word *(λάμβανε τῷ δίκαιῷ)* often has the connotation of accepting his teaching, or being a disciple.

1. For Demetrius of Phaleron see below pp. 170f; 324f.
3. Pollux ix, 42; Diog. Laert. v, 38; Demochares ap. Baiter-Sauppe, Oratores Attici ii (1850), 341f, with the addition of Wilamowitz o.c. 196; cf. in general on this episode Wilamowitz 194ff, 270ff. In Alexis F94 Koch, Wilamowitz 94 may well be right to contrast Xenocrates and the Academy with the exiles, despite the doubts of Regenbogen 1360.
4. Diog. Laert. v, 37; cf. e.g. Xen. Mem. iv, I, I.
Both prosecutions of Theophrastus seem to show the same curious pattern on the part of the Athenians - mistrust of the political standpoint of the Lyceum, or at least of many of its members, combined with considerable goodwill towards Theophrastus himself. This goodwill, which enabled him and his school to survive the political suspicions, is to be explained by the personal character of Theophrastus himself.

The evidence of his political writings, with their antiquarian and theoretical interests, is confirmed by his life. Although his teaching clearly influenced the work of Demetrius of Phaleron, there is little sign that he personally ever took part in any political activities. He seems to have refused an offer to go to Egypt from Ptolemy I; in one of his letters he describes himself as a 'scholastikos'. Theophrastus was evidently a quiet academic by nature, tireless in productive research, but not inclined to take up a firm position in politics, either theoretical or practical, or to stand forth as a popular educator - rather so absolutely devoted to the ΘΕΩΝ ΛΟΓΟΣ that his horror in the face of the disturbances which might threaten in marriage seems frankly comic.

Wilamowitz's characterisation was that of antiquity: Philodemus

1. Cf. W.S. Ferguson, Klio xi (1911), 265ff; Hellenistic Athens, 40ff; D. Cohen, Mneme. Tiv (1926), 92ff.


3. Loc. cit. He is alleged to have twice saved his home town Eresos from tyranny, but the circumstances are very obscure: Plut. Mor. 1097b, 1126f; literature in Regenbogen 1559. His only other recorded political activity is the intercession with Demetrius Poliorcetes on behalf of Deinarchus: Dion. Hal. Dein.2.

seems to have attacked Theophrastus as unable to write about politics, for he 'lived all his life as a private person and a philosopher, without any knowledge of the affairs of kings (εύμερον τῇ πολιτικῇ τεχνῇ)'. In any event his personal political attitude was that of other members of his school: he favoured a moderate oligarchy: 'these three things are necessary for magistrates, virtue, sufficient wealth, understanding'. Theophrastus did not see it as part of his calling to offer advice to the great new monarchs of the Hellenistic world.

The Peripatetic School

The domination of the Peripatetic school by Aristotle and Theophrastus helps to explain why so much of their political theory continued to revolve around the problems of the city-state. Demetrius of Phaleron was the confidant of first Cassander and then Ptolemy; his activities as a lawgiver are attested in both Athens and Alexandria - but these activities seem limited to the creation of a good constitution for a city, with the regulation of morals and the detailed provisions of a lawcode, on the lines familiar to Greek theorists since Plato's Laws; Demetrius' general attitude is still that of Aristotle.

3. On the alleged work addressed to Cassander, see below pp.178ff.
4. On Demetrius of Phaleron in general, see F.G.H.223; Wehrli, Schule des Aristoteles iv (1949); E. Bayer, Demetrius Phalerus der Athener, Tübinger Beiträge z. Altertumswissenschaft xxxvi (1942); for his activities as lawgiver in Athens, above p.169 p.1; in Alexandria, Aelian V.H. liii.17; Bayer 130ff.; L. Amundsen, Acta Congressus Hadriani 1 (1950), 25ff.
In his political activities his own realistic acceptance of the power of Macedon went no further than that of previous moderate politicians, as the conventionality of his polemics against radical democrats shows\(^1\). There is his famous advice to Ptolemy to buy and read books on kingship and government, 'because the advice which their friends do not dare give kings is written in these books'\(^2\); but, though this attests the importance he attached to such literature, his remark is perhaps more a sign of the moral advice which he personally was too afraid to give than of any positive doctrine on kingship.

Other Peripatetic writers on politics, such as Heracleides Ponticus\(^3\), also kept within the framework of the city-state; even the most original, Dicaearchus, seems to have done little more than proceed from a systematisation of the tables of various types of constitution already in existence to the explicit notion of the best constitution as a mixed constitution\(^4\).

Among later Peripatetics only Straton of Lampsacus wrote directly on kingship\(^5\). He was also for a short time a tutor of the son of Ptolemy I, the future king Philadelphus. His invitation was perhaps due to Demetrius of Phaleron who had arrived in

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1. F 132-3 Wehrli; cf. the treatise \περὶ δυναστείας, Diog. Laert. v, 80.
2. F 63 Wehrli = Plut. Mor. 189d.
4. Schule i (1944) F 70-1; there is a good brief account of the theory of the mixed constitution and Dicaearchus' contribution to it in G. Aalders, Die Theorie der gemischten Verfassung im Altertum (1968), 72ff.
Egypt on the death of Cassander in 297; it may also be connected with Ptolemy's invitation to Theophrastus, the master perhaps sending his pupil in his place. Philadelphus was born in 308, so Straton will have arrived in Alexandria in the late 290s; his instruction will hardly have been suitable before then. He was doubtless instrumental in establishing the scientific interests of the Museum, while his fellow tutors, Philitas and Zenodotus were more interested in the literary aspects of its development. He made scientific observations in the Egyptian countryside, and may have had some contact with the Megarian Diodorus 'Kronos'; for he was interested in solving the Megarian problem of the impossibility of motion. Straton is mentioned as living in Athens in the will of Theophrastus, so he must have returned from Egypt before 287. His friendly relations with the royal house are shown by the statement that Philadelphus gave him 80 talents; and the collection of his letters began with one addressed to Arsinoe.

Straton was known as the ψυχοδιώκτης, and his activities as a philosopher were almost entirely scientific. But among his non-scientific writings there are two which might relate to his life. A work On the Philosopher King must have been a discussion of Plato's views; it may have taken the Peripatetic attitude in opposition to the Academy, that there was no need for a king to be a philosopher, though he might

1. F 91 Wehrli.
2. F 82; cf. Wehrli commentary; below Appendix 1.
3. Diog. Laert v,60; Wilamowitz, Hellenistische Dichtung i (1924) 161.
benefit from the study of philosophy and from intercourse with philosophers. About his other work *On Kingship* in three books nothing is known beyond the title. It seems rather long for a treatise of advice addressed to a king; though, since the work is so out of character for Straton, it may well have had some connection with his mission in Alexandria - possibly it was a handbook on kingship similar to the even longer work of Xenocrates for Alexander. But since it and the doctrines it contained are nowhere mentioned, the question of its originality within the Peripatetic tradition remains unanswerable.

A general impression of the lack of development in Peripatetic political philosophy is given by the compendium of philosophical doctrines preserved in Stobaeus, and written by Areius Didymus, the court philosopher and friend of Augustus. To some extent this impression may be misleading. Areius' sources are disputed; while they seem to have included on occasion writers from most periods of the Lyceum, his account of Peripatetic doctrine seems also to show something of the excitement and exuberant purism of the first generation to possess

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1. Diog. Laert. v, 59; there are textual problems over the title, but (contra Wehrli F 18) this seems the most likely reading. For the Peripatetic attitude to philosophy and kingship see above p. 70; and compare other Peripatetic works concerned with Plato's *Republic*: Diog. Laert. v, 22 (Aristotle); v, 43 (Theophrastus); Wehrli iii (1948) F 3 (Clearchus).

2. Above p. 135 ff; though the absence of any addresses in the title tells against this possibility.

3. Capelle RE 283 notes how many of Straton's titles are identical with those of Aristotle or Theophrastus; but while he was clearly concerned with traditional Peripatetic problems in general, this need not mean that his work on kingship was of the same sort as those of Theophrastus.


5. For older literature see H. Diels, *Doxographi Graeci* (1879), 71 ff; for more recent RE Suppl. vii 1492 ff.
full copies of the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus, as Andronicus had restored them. Areius' attitude is not quite that of his contemporary Nicolaus of Damascus, the philosopher and historian who belonged to the same Augustan circle, and who wrote the first paraphrase of Aristotle's doctrine; but it shows the same spirit. He sought to describe the doctrines found in the new texts of Aristotle and Theophrastus, relying as far as possible on these alone; though his desire to provide as well a practical synthesis for comparison with other schools, and his own eclectic interests meant that a number of later Stoic terms and Stoic-Peripatetic controversies are also reflected. In particular the section on political thought is scarcely more than a paraphrase of Aristotle's Politics. Of the few divergencies the only important one is the alteration of the six constitution schema of Aristotle (kingship, aristocracy, politeia, tyranny, oligarchy, democracy) to kingship, aristocracy and democracy contrasted with tyranny, oligarchy and ochlocracy, together with the additional information that there is another mixed constitution made up of elements from the good constitutions. This schema is precisely that of Polybius, and probably goes back to Dicaearchus' Tripolitikos, rather than Theophrastus. But for this change Areius had no

3. Polyb. vi, 4; cf. Aalders o.c. 70ff; but this cannot be proved: V. Pöschl, Römischer Staat u. griechisches Staatsdenken bei Cicero (1936), 22f; and there may have been a Stoic intermediary: Walbank, Commentary on Polybius i (1957), 641; T. Cole, Hist. xiii (1964), 447 n.19.
need to read Dicaearchus for himself: the theory of the mixed constitution was widely accepted as a model for the explanation of the Roman constitution.

Areius' section on Peripatetic ethics is more complex; it too shows the same archaising tendency, to go back to the views of Aristotle or Theophrastus, but to a far lesser extent; for it contains also a jumble of diverse notions from Hellenistic Peripatetic writers. These are especially interesting in showing how, in default of an adequate explicit political theory, the later Peripatetics could still make some contribution to the casuistic discussion of the duties and virtues of the Hellenistic king. The definition of happiness as activity in accordance with virtue is still an important aspect of the theory; but the list of virtues associated with it contains a

1. Areius' knowledge of this theory would have been close, if (as I believe) he also wrote the polemical work on Cicero's de Republica in six books to which Suetonius replied (Amm. Marc. xxii, 16,16; Suidas s.v. Ὀμηρών). L. Cohn (RE v (1905) 471f; 473) long ago saw that Ammianus' attribution of it to the famous Alexandrian scholar Didymus Chalkenteros must be wrong: such a polemical work scarcely fits with Didymus' philological activity; he was not interested in philosophy, and there is no evidence that he knew Latin. Cohn suggested a confusion with Claudius Didymus of the age of Claudius; but again he was a grammarian, not a polemicist or a philosopher. Areius Didymus is more probable - a philosopher, and one who both lived at a time when Cicero's ideas were still important and dangerous, and also as a protege of Augustus had an interest in combatting the notion that the best constitution was that envisaged by Cicero.

2. Wachsmuth pp. 116ff.

3. 126f.
high proportion of words with political connotations: 

most of which play little part in Aristotle; there are also two 'family' virtues which reappear as Ptolemaic titles, φιλαδελφία and τὸ φίλοτέρον. Moreover the emphasis in the general Hellenistic picture of monarchy on φιλαδελφία as the central virtue of the king fits perfectly into an important aspect of the ethical theory found in Areius' survey; the whole nexus of duties and ethical values is built on Theophrastus' biological notion of the universal kinship (οὐσία τῆς) of all living beings, which results in 'a common love of mankind': φιλαδελφία is for Theophrastus the most fundamental concept in ethics, replacing Aristotle's 'end', happiness, defined by the notion of the function (ἐννοώ) of man.

Similarly the ethical preoccupations of the Peripatetic philosophers, as reflected in the titles of their treatises, show that they were not entirely untouched by the problems of monarchy which affected their contemporaries, though they seem to have approached them in a typically Peripatetic way. There is considerable emphasis on 'court' virtues and (more especially) vices - a tradition perhaps begun by the reactions of Aristotle and Theophrastus to the execution of Callisthenes by Alexander.

Clearchus at least wrote a work on flattery named after one of Alexander's courtiers. Ariston of Ceos wrote 'On how to avoid

1. 121, 22f.; cf. Aristotle, N.E. 1155a19f. for the Aristotelian background to this development, which is discussed by C.O. Brink, Phronesis i (1955/6), 123ff., criticising F. Dirlmeier, Die Ethik-Lehre Theophrasts, Philol. Suppl. xxx (1937).

2. Though there was no general Peripatetic view of Alexander: W. Mensching, Hist. xii (1963), 274ff.

Pride', and his examples show an especial concern with the vice as associated with the bad ruler or tyrant. A similar sensitivity to the problem of tyranny can be seen in the work of Phainias of Eresos 'Tyrannicide as a result of Vengeance', which gathered together accounts of the murders of those tyrants which had been motivated by jealousy: the general Hellenistic description of the tyrant laid great emphasis on his sexual misdeeds. The luxury of Hellenistic courts also provoked extensive discussion among Peripatetics; Clearchus disapproved of luxury, but Heracleides Ponticus in his went so far as to put forward the view that luxury and pleasure were morally improving in general, and particularly for kings, for they contributed to that especially Aristotelian virtue, high-mindedness.

Despite much interest in the individual virtues and vices related to monarchy, the general political theory of the Peripatetic school, as seen in Aristotle and Dicaearchus, and as exemplified in the ideas of the Peripatetic politicians of the

1. vi F 13.
2. ix F 14-69 cf. also Hieronymus of Rhodes, x F 34. An interest in the political aspects of sex is already present in Theophrastus, who devoted book iv of his to it: cf. Regenbogen RE 1517f, and for other Peripaterics on the same subject, A. Meyer Philol. Suppl. xi (1910) 595 and n.264.
3. iii F 41-55, 59-60.
4. vii F 55; though perhaps this was a view he was combatting, rather than his own, for F 56-61 show examples of luxury leading to disaster in a more conventional vein. For the title cf. also Chamaeleon ix F 7-8; Straton v F 137; Regenbogen RE 148-3f. On Hellenistic philosophical interest in luxury in general, see the literature cited in Alföldi, Studies presented to A. M. Friend (1955) 26 n. 95.
late fourth century, notably Demetrius of Phaleron, envisaged the best form of government within the framework of the city-state, as either a moderate form of oligarchy or a mixed constitution - and this last was in origin merely an attempt to give firmer theoretical and historical foundations for the establishing of a moderate oligarchy which would also be permanent. Kingship was an institution primarily of historical interest. This helps to explain why a school which played so great a part in political life and was so closely connected with both Macedon and Egypt, exercised its influence more in the detailed legislation for particular cities than in the wider problems of the new forms of government. It was not until one city-state achieved the status of a world empire, and sought to relate its curious constitution to the models of Greek political theory, that Peripatetic views could make a major contribution. The true flowering of Peripatetic political thought is in the theoretical analysis of the Roman constitution from Polybius to Cicero.

Sosibius and the treatise On Kingship attributed to Theophrastus

One work attributed to Theophrastus presents a problem of authenticity, that addressed to Cassander On Kingship, in one book (Πολιτείας Κασσάνδρῳ πρὸς Θεόφραστον ομώς Λ' ) \(^1\). By analogy with other works addressed to a particular king, this would probably have been an open letter of advice to the king of Macedon on problems of government, general or particular - in technical

\(^1\) Diog. Laert. v, 47.
rhetorical terms a λόγος ομφανεικός; ¹ the length of these letters, which are perhaps better described as political pamphlets, is usually that of a papyrus roll or less.

It cannot be denied that Theophrastus might have written such a letter. A treatise addressed to a particular king was one of the common forms of works on kingship in the Hellenistic period, as later; it has been seen that the connections of the Lyceum in general, and of Theophrastus himself, with Cassander and Macedon were especially close. Such an explicit work of advice certainly seems out of keeping with the usual attitudes of Theophrastus, but such general grounds are not perhaps in themselves sufficient reason to reject the attribution to Theophrastus.

More serious doubts emerge. The work appears in the list of Theophrastus' writings in Diogenes Laertius; and it is also mentioned by Athenaeus, who refers to it for a statement that the Persian kings, because of their love of luxury, used to reward generously those who discovered a new pleasure. Unfortunately Athenaeus introduces his reference with the remark, 'if the work is genuine; for many say it is by the Sosibius for whom the poet Callimachus wrote an elegiac epinicion.'²

Statements that works are forgeries are so rare in antiquity that they should be taken seriously. Moreover Athenaeus seems to have had a special source of information on the authenticity of Theophrastus' work: he believed that the

¹. Not of course a dialogue: contra E. Howald, Hermes lv (1920), 213.
². F 125 Wimmer = Athen.iv, 144e; the epinicion is F 284 Pfeiffer.
work On Pleasure attributed to him was really by Chamaeleon. It may well be, as Usener suggested, that such information comes from the lists of the Alexandrian library, the Pinarés, which noted false attributions and cases of doubtful authenticity; since this title appears in the second section of Diogenes' list, the information would have come not from Hermippus' original list, but from Andronicus' supplement of it.

A further argument against authenticity is the difficulty of conceiving a time when Theophrastus would have written such a work for Cassander. In the circumstances of Macedonian domination over Greece it would seem inappropriate, indeed politically inadvisable, to write a treatise on kingship before Cassander had declared himself openly to be more than a regent. Yet his adoption of the title of king happened probably in 305 - in the year after Athens had passed from the control of Cassander into that of his political enemy Demetrius Poliorcetes. It is most unlikely that Theophrastus, who had just been forced to leave Athens because of the alleged pro-Macedonian sentiments of the Lyceum, should choose that moment publicly to demonstrate his allegiance to Macedon.

The arguments for denying that Theophrastus wrote a letter on kingship for Cassander are strong. Moreover the wording of Athenaeus makes it likely that the question is not one of a mere

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1. vi,273c; viii,347e; this identification is generally accepted: Schule x p.72. cf. perhaps also Athen. xii, 511c; 526d.
2. Kleine Schriften i, 65.
innocent confusion of two authors: 'if it is genuine' implies that the alternative is that it was a forgery - that it claimed to be by Theophrastus, but was not; indeed it is hard to believe in a confusion of authors for a work in letter form, which should have mentioned explicitly both recipient and author. The point is important, for the work and its author have generally been dated in the belief that he must have written while Cassander was still alive, that is before 297\textsuperscript{1}. This would indeed be true if there were a mere confusion of authors; but a forgery, claiming to be by Theophrastus and to be addressed to Cassander, could of course be written at any date, though it is more likely after the deaths of both Cassander and Theophrastus. It would in fact be more plausible to date the work after Theophrastus' death (about 287): the author perhaps took as the historical basis of his work the known relationship between the two men, at a time when neither was alive to deny the authenticity of the letter.

The Sosibius to whom Athenaeus attributes the work is Sosibius, son of Dioscurides, the most prominent Ptolemaic politician of his day, mentioned in honorific inscriptions from Tanagra, Orchomenos, Delos and Cnidos. As Holleaux has shown, he was already a powerful man under Ptolemy III, indeed

\textsuperscript{1} i.e. presumably between 305 and 297: cf. Wilamowitz, \textit{Hellenistische Dichtung} ii, 318; Pfeiffer, \textit{Philol.} lxxvii (1932), 223, and his note to Callimachus F 384 on p.311. Curiously no-one seems to have doubted this date for the treatise: they have preferred to claim a confusion of authorship in Athenaeus: cf. Beloch, \textit{Gr. Gesch.} iv, 2\textsuperscript{1} (1927), 589; H. Herter, \textit{Bursians Jahresbericht} cclv (1937), 155. Only Maas (o.c. 447f) implies a later date.
ever since about 240; he was almost certainly eponymous priest of Alexander in 235/4. From the beginning of the reign of Ptolemy IV in 221 he became chief minister, and with Agathocles was in complete control of the king throughout his reign. A series of murders within the royal house consolidated his power at its start; at its end he was responsible for murdering Ptolemy's wife and forging the king's will, so as to emerge guardian of Ptolemy V: hence his nickname of 'the false guardian' in Polybius; in the midst of these machinations he died.

The claim that it was for this Sosibius that Callimachus wrote his epinicion has been disputed, but the arguments used are weak. Athenaeus' statement, combined with the fragments of the poem, establish that the recipient's name was Sosibius son of Dioscurides, as was that of the statesman; a man who died a natural death probably in 204 may well have been in the prime of life some forty years earlier: the inscription from Delos, which decrees him a crown because of his services to the island and virtue and goodwill towards the king, clearly attests his political importance around 240 or shortly afterwards.

1. Polybius xv, 34, 4; for the career of Sosibius, see esp. M. Holleaux, Etudes d'épigraphie et d'histoire grecques iii (1942), 47ff.
3. For the famous controversy on the date of this poem (Callimachus F 584 Pfeiffer) see the refs. in Herter o.c. 154f; A. Barigazzi, P.d.P. vi (1951), 410ff; and Pfeiffer's edition under F 334, and vol.ii (1953) xl f.
In his poem Callimachus says: ἔκ δὲ διαύλου,
λυκείοις, παῖς σοι πρώτον ἔλεγχος ἔπειτα, Πτολεμαῖς...  
'In the double race, Ptolemy son of Lagus, at your festival we chose first to carry off the prize.'

From the context, a list of Sosibius' victories, and from the relative dates of Callimachus and Ptolemy I, it is clear that the apostrophe of Ptolemy is a literary one, to the presiding deity of the games, not a genuine address to a living person. But there remains an ambiguity: Callimachus could perhaps mean that Sosibius won a victory at the first celebration of the festival of the Ptolemaea (279/8) (taking τοιοῦτον to mean 'at your first festival').

Sosibius can scarcely have been over 30 to win such a race; and he is as likely to have been considerably younger, for the diaulos was often a race for boys or youths. The possibility that a man of such an age in 279/8 might have had a grandson (one explanation of the similarity of name and father's name) who was already a major public figure some forty years later, is remote; indeed on any hypothesis it does seem extremely difficult to postulate two rich and prominent politicians, whether related or not, with identical names and whose fathers also had the same name, within so close a period.

1. F 384, 39ff.
2. Though this interpretation has not been proposed by anyone, the chronological difficulties in fitting two homonyms into such a short period would require putting this victory as early as possible: Pfeiffer indeed supposed that might mean merely 'in your kingdom' (note on 40ff), which would make it possible to take the date even earlier, perhaps into the reign of Ptolemy I; but the interpretation seems somewhat unnatural.
3. Against the views of Wilamowitz and Pfeiffer, see esp. Beloch l.c.
Moreover, the natural meaning of Callimachus' sentence is not that Sosibius won a prize at the first festival, but that he won his first contest at this particular festival. Since his Athenian victory was as a boy or youth (line 37), this would mean that he was under 20 at the time of some undated festival after 279/8¹: he would then be precisely the right age to be identified with the famous politician of the same name whose prominence was already established in 240, and who died of old age in 204. There seems no reason to doubt that it was for a man from his youth onwards a keen athlete, already rich and rising to eminence in court circles, on the occasion of an amazing pair of victories at two major festivals in mainland Greece, that the aging Callimachus wrote his epinicion.

The evidence adduced against this picture is weak. There is first the suggestion that Sosibius must have been a contemporary of Cassander if he wrote a treatise addressed to him; but if, as I have argued, the treatise was a forgery, then it is more likely that Sosibius was not a contemporary of either Cassander or Theophrastus. The only other evidence to set against the combination of the historical evidence with the internal evidence of Callimachus' poem on the name and age of Sosibius, and the explicit statement of Athenaeus, is a weak inference from the scholia which are found in one of the papyri of the sixth century A.D. The value of these scholia is very unclear², ¹. Pfeiffer note on line 37.
². P.Oxy. 2258 F 2 back (p. 63f): Lobel characterises them perhaps too charitably, Ox.Pap.xx (1952), 70.
and even if the interpretation of this passage were certain, its evidence might be rejected without much danger. But all that the note in fact says is that Sosibius was the logographos of Ptolemy; it is a wholly unjustified inference that this was the first Ptolemy: it could equally well be the second, or (more probably) the third, even the fourth - in the context 'Ptolemy' means merely 'the king of Egypt', and there is no sign that the scholiast knew which one. The word logographos has puzzled scholars; but its meanings of 'speechwriter' or 'historian' are confined to specialised contexts: in the Byzantine period it often appears as a conscious archaism with reference to the usage of Herodotus and Thucydides. In normal contexts in late Greek the word describes a financial official, and would be the most likely Byzantine rendering of the Hellenistic dioiketes, the chief financial officer of Egypt.

Sosibius, false guardian, murderer, statesman, architect of Egypt's greatest triumph over Syria at Raphia, and forger of wills, is a man well capable of writing a work on kingship full of very useful advice, under his own or (preferably) someone else's name; he was also in a position to see that such a work was included in the official canon of the library at

1. Contra Pfeiffer's note on p.311; Barigazzi o.c. 411f; Pfeiffer's supplement to the scholia, referring to a son, is both uncertain, and has no bearing on which Ptolemy is intended: it could still refer to any pair of the first five kings.

Alexandria. But Sosibius will hardly have been interested in increasing the sum of Theophrastus' works: his forgery was surely not a literary one. Rather political motives impelled him to disguise the true authorship - and perhaps the reason why the forgery was detected was precisely that the mask was thin, the purpose apparent. A suitable occasion might be Sosibius' political activities at the beginning of the reign of Ptolemy IV, when he might well have wished to portray himself as the philosophical adviser of the young king, struggling to keep him on the right path against the opposition of his family.

To judge from the fragment preserved in Athenaeus, the letter to Cassander was indeed different in character from the genuine works of Theophrastus on kingship. The recondite piece of information (genuine or more likely invented) about the Persian kings does suggest an imitation of the genuine works in one sense, with their painstaking accumulation of facts about the institutions of kingship; but whereas in the genuine Theophrastus these facts seem detached from any general framework, antiquarian erudition for its own sake, in the letter to Cassander there is an obvious moral purpose behind the fact adduced: the author was talking about the dangers of luxury (τροφὴ) for kings, and adducing the Persian kings as the stock rhetorical example of this particular vice: it is a story with a moral purpose. The

1. As Maas observed, o.c. 447f.
2. This cannot of course be used itself as an argument against authenticity; for the treatise was on any hypothesis of a different type from the others on kingship attributed to Theophrastus, and would therefore have been written in a different style.
actual custom itself appears to have no basis in historical fact; it is probably invented, and invented perhaps on an Egyptian model, not a Persian one. Hecataeus of Abdera remarks on the esteem in which inventors were held in early Egypt\textsuperscript{1}.

Disapproval of luxury at the courts of kings is of course a commonplace, and merely a special application of that philosophical disapproval of luxury in general which provoked a number of treatises in the Hellenistic world, from the Peripatetic and other schools\textsuperscript{2}. But in some circles, \textit{τευχή} was respectable, and came to be seen as fastidiousness, delicacy, civilisation: hence the use of the names Tryphon and Tryphaena in the royal house of Egypt and among the ordinary population. This first became an official designation of the king under Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II for a brief period\textsuperscript{3}; and it seems to have been his example which gave the name respectability. This curious development, from vice almost to virtue, must surely be connected to Ptolemy VIII's slavish imitation of the third.

\begin{enumerate}
\item Diod. i, 15, 4-5, 9.
\item Above p. 177.
\item W. Otto, H. Bengtson, \textit{Abh. bay. Ak. Wiss. München} xvii (1933), 47ff: approx. 135/2-130; but his daughter born ca 140 was called Tryphaena. As far as I am aware, all the examples of commoners called Tryphon or Tryphaena are later than this: cf. Preisigke, \textit{ Namenbuch s.v.} It can be seen that I reject the notion of a cult of \textit{τευχή} in the Hellenistic world; while recognising that a number of monarchs consciously pursued the civilised life, I do not believe that they would have called this \textit{τευχή}, even after Ptolemy VIII: the connotations of that word remained dubious and decadent. To the suggestions of J. Tondriau, \textit{R.E.A.} 1 (1948), 49ff I prefer the approach of Otto and Bengtson.
\end{enumerate}
Ptolemy, Euergetes I; he may also have wished to substitute a more respectable nickname for the somewhat invidious Physcon ('pot-belly'). For Euergetes I had been nicknamed 'Tryphon', doubtless in no complimentary sense. To find the chief minister of Ptolemy III writing under a pseudonym to denounce the Πρυτανεύοντα of his king (perhaps recently deceased) would not be inappropriate; there is a close parallel in Seneca's anonymous attack on the previous reign in his Apocolocyntosis, as a means of divorcing the new emperor from the influence of his family. It may perhaps be suspected that the work on kingship which Sosibius fathered on Theophrastus was written by him, not for the long dead Cassander, but for the instruction of Ptolemy IV, and to consolidate his own political position in the eyes of respectable opinion which had disliked certain aspects of the previous reign.¹

¹ Cf. Maas o.c. 448 n.I.
Epicurus and Epicureanism

The importance of Epicureanism in the history of Hellenistic political thought is paradoxical; for *latte biosas*, 'let your life escape notice', was a central tenet of Epicurus, and his denial that the wise man would take part in political life was the most famous and controversial of all his doctrines after that which claimed pleasure as the highest good. Although Epicurus argued for abstinence from politics with considerable force and rigour, it was not for this reason that he had so much influence; for his arguments were compelling only within the context of his own system. Rather the reason why other schools found it necessary to take account of Epicurus' views was psychological: the Epicurean attitude raised questions about the conduct of philosophers at court which made all such men feel uncomfortable; and so they felt impelled to attack the position of Epicurus.

Epicurus' view of politics was derived from his claim that the end of life is pleasure or joy, and that the highest form of pleasure is not 'kinetic' (active) but 'katastematic' (static or continual). The usual types of pleasure which the political life may be thought to produce, the pleasures conse-

1. F. J. C. Osler: although Usener's *Epicurea* (1881) has been superseded by G. Arighetti, *Epicuro: Opere* (1960) for the fragments of Epicurus himself, unless otherwise stated, I shall refer to Usener, since his work is still the only attempt to collect references to Epicurean doctrine, whether or not the quotation can be attributed to Epicurus himself.
quent on the use and abuse of power, are of the lower form, pleasures of activity: wealth and power do not bring happiness, for the needs of man are simple; but they do bring envy and danger, which produce perturbations of the soul inimical to the life of true pleasure. Even when the political life is considered in altruistic terms, it still does not rate highly in the Epicurean scheme; for the sorts of pleasure which might be associated with an altruistic approach to politics, the sense of achievement, the satisfaction of having benefited others, the pleasure of being praised, are nothing compared to the disturbance necessary to achieve these pleasures; and the pleasures themselves are particularly uncertain and liable to be removed. Though 'Epicurus admits that certain pleasures do come from glory', the inferiority of these pleasures is expressed thus: 'Neither the possession of the greatest wealth nor the honour and respect of the people nor anything else that is derived from causes which are undefined can end the disturbance of the soul or create true joy'. That is, only simple pleasures whose causes are clearly definable can provide pleasure without the intrusion of other elements which may mar that pleasure; even within the class of kinetic pleasures, those derived from wealth and honour rank low because they depend on a complex causation. So a man will not take part in public life, because it destroys happiness; 'the crown of an untroubled spirit is a good beyond comparison with great commands'; his

1. f' 548.
2. f' 549.
4. f' 552.
5. f' 556.
disciples 'must free themselves from the prison of business and politics'.

This abstinence from politics is virtually absolute. The wise man will not willingly take part in the political life of the city. He will not of course be a tyrant, for the man who appears terrifying cannot be free from fear. But equally to be a king 'is a fault and a mistake'. On the other hand the state is a necessary organisation; it must exist to provide the security in which the philosopher can achieve that calm necessary to true pleasure. 'The laws exist for the sake of the wise, not so that they shall not do wrong, but so that they may not be wronged'. The philosopher will accept any government which gives him security. As Lucretius said 'it is far better to obey in peace than to wish to rule the world with your power and sway kingdoms'.

Logically, to this position there is one obvious exception. It may be that the government does not provide the necessary conditions for living the philosophic life in peace. If the government is so bad that it prevents the Epicurean from achieving his goal, or if it is so weak or incompetent that it fails to maintain sufficient law and order for this, then the

2. F 554.
3. Diog. Laert. x, 119; F 8 p. 94f.
4. F 537.
7. Lucr. v, 1127f.
Epicurean may enter politics. The doctrine probably goes back to Epicurus himself, though there is no direct evidence for this. The logic of his position seems to demand such an exception, and later Epicureans prided themselves on not deviating from the Master's doctrines. That it was held by later Epicureans is shown by the long discussion of it in Cicero's de Republica; Cicero attacks it in connection with his own claim that the practising politician is a better political theorist than the pure philosopher. Similarly (he claims) the Epicurean notion that the philosopher will keep aloof from politics except when the state is in chaos is in political terms disastrous: a philosopher who has never before taken part in politics will lack the necessary political skills for saving the state.¹

There is no sign that this hypothetical exception to the Epicurean position was ever invoked in the Greek world; and there seems to have been no theoretical discussion of what sorts of circumstances might be relevant to it: should one murder a tyrant, advise a young king, and so on? Rather it is significant that this exception is only given prominence in Roman authors, and particularly towards the end of the Republic. The development of this embryonic idea of Epicurus was a Roman development, resulting from the political pressures on the Roman aristocracy who, whether they were Epicureans or not, remained politicians.²

A second point deserves mention. The Epicurean account of cultural development gave a prominent place to monarchy in the early history of mankind. The reasons for this were not

¹. Cic. de Rep. prefaces to books i and iii; esp. i, 10-11.
theoretical but historical. The Epicurean model of early history aimed to be an account of what had in fact happened, and was based on earlier ideas and current theories. Like these, it saw kingship as an early phenomenon, and related it to the beneficent activities of kings.

Lucretius describes how, after the first initial agreements not to harm each other, men began to invent language and discover the use of fire; the more intelligent, by encouraging the spread of these new developments, gained influence and set themselves up as kings with citadels, dividing fields and flocks among a natural aristocracy distinguished by its handsomeness, strength or intelligence. Then with the advent of wealth the tensions in society caused kings to be overthrown, and, after a period of anarchy, magistrates and laws were established. It is true that the other main Epicurean description of primitive life, given by Porphyry from Hermarchus, does not appear to include such an account of early kingship; for it envisages laws on homicide as being the direct result of better men persuading others that their original agreements not to harm each other were advantageous. But this passage is merely an account of the origin of one particular universal law, not a systematic description of the development of early society; so it is hardly evidence of a different theory of the origins of society. That the Lucretian version is Epicurean is suggested

3. Contra Momigliano o.c.15/.
This appears to envisage a period when kingship was admirable because of the security it brought mankind. The next 'Doctrine' also seems to belong to the same context of a discussion of early society: here he confirms the statement of Lucretius, that men wished to be great and respected for the sake of security: if they did obtain this security, then they possessed a natural good; but if not, they failed in their aim.

It seems then that there had been occasions in the remote past when men had taken part in politics for reasons which the Epicurean might recognise as valid. This picture fits the view of Epicureans that such conditions could recur in the civilised world; but since these primitive kings ran into difficulties and often failed to achieve their aim of security, the Epicurean interpretation of primitive society was hardly an encouragement to indulging in politics lightly. Nevertheless the Epicurean could rate the institution of kingship highly in both past and present: Colotes, addressing Ptolemy Philadelphus, could echo Epicurus' picture of early society in indirect flattery.

1. K.D.6. For this reading of the text see C. Diano, S.I.F.C. xii (1935), 84f; for its interpretation, Cole o.c.127.
2. Philippson (O.C.290,308) rightly remarked on the connection of these two doctrines and saw that they belonged to a discussion of early society. He suggested that they came from the τέκνα ηενελεκτά of Epicurus; but that work seems to have been polemical, not historical: see below p.195f.
of the king: 'The men who created laws and customs and established kingship and government in cities brought human life into a state of great security and delivered it from turmoil'.

Outside the context of history Epicurus also wrote a work specifically *On Kingship*; its character is clear from the references to it. The Epicureans, said Plutarch, 'write on politics in order to deter us from taking part in politics, on rhetoric to stop us from practising rhetoric, and on kingship to persuade us to avoid living with kings'. The first two statements offer a straight antithesis between theory and practice, and need not of course refer to specific works devoted to these topics. But in contrast the third statement presents a curious imbalance; for, instead of saying that the Epicureans wrote on kingship in order to stop us from being kings, Plutarch turns to the special case of men (and perhaps especially philosophers) at court: they wrote 'to persuade us to avoid living with kings'. It is plausible to see this as a specific reference to the actual contents of a particular work - that by Epicurus himself *On Kingship*. For the other evidence suggests that this work was indeed not an attack on kingship in general (which would have involved Epicurus in contradicting his views about the historical development of society and his acceptance of the usefulness of any government to the philosopher), but rather a polemic against philosophers who appeared at court.

The only specific reference to the work describes Epicurus as 'not giving a place even at drinking parties to the literary and learned discussions of scholars, but exhorting even cultured kings to submit to military stories and coarse tomfoolery at symposia, rather than talk about literary and poetic problems'\(^1\). However unrepresentative of the general character of the treatise, this passage again envisages not kings as philosophers, but philosophers at the courts of kings. Epicurus may well have had particular courts and particular philosophers in mind; for he seems to have been attacking something more than a general tendency of contemporary philosophers to congregate at courts. He was perhaps writing especially against the activities of the Ptolemies in Egypt, and the Peripatetic love of literary and learned discussion at symposia; certainly his attack fits their known interests better than those of other philosophical schools\(^2\).

This interpretation may be supported by the known interest of the Epicurean school in the Ptolemaic court: Colotes addressed his systematic attack on other philosophies called 'On the impossibility of living according to other philosophical systems' to Ptolemy Philadelphus\(^3\). The purpose of the work seems to have been similar to that of Epicurus, to prevent philosophers from having influence at court, by persuading Ptolemy that other

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1. Plut. Mor. 1095c = Usener F 5 p.94. The word βωμάξοντας seems to be a favourite with Epicureans: cf. Philod. π.α.β. Col.II, 10.
2. \(\varepsilon\) Bignone, L'Aristotele Perduto e la Formazione Filosofica di Epicuro ii (1936) 541 n.1 suggests polemic against Aristotle himself: the contemporary Lyceum is more likely.
philosophies were both false in theory and dangerous in their practical implications. It was something more than a theoretical refutation of other philosophical views about the nature of the external world, for towards the end appeared the sinister statement: 'The men who created laws and customs and established kingship and government in cities brought human life into a state of great security and delivered it from turmoil; but if anyone takes this away we shall live the life of wild animals and anyone who meets another will all but devour him.' Here Colotes begins by using the Epicurean view of early society to show their high regard for kingship and law, and by implication for Ptolemy himself; but he goes on to suggest that the fallacies he has exposed in the views of other philosophers imply that these philosophies (as opposed to Epicureanism) are a danger to the state. It is scarcely possible to decide whether this attack was connected with any specific attempt on the part of philosophers at Alexandria to discredit Epicureanism in the way that was common later, by pointing to its dangerous political consequences; or whether this was part of a spontaneous move by Epicureans to establish closer links with the Ptolemies. The underlying purpose of Colotes' work is however clearly in some sense political.

It is in the problem of living the philosophic life at court that the real importance of Epicurean 'political' thought lies. The individual arguments of the Epicureans themselves 

were largely ignored, for their validity depended on the acceptance of certain basic Epicurean tenets. It was rather the psychological tensions crystallised in the mere statement that philosophers ought not to consort with kings which worried other schools. The independence of philosophy was a generally accepted tenet: the philosopher must not allow external pressures to modify his basic beliefs. To accept the patronage of kings was to enter consciously into a relationship which endangered that independence. Moreover most schools believed that the true philosophic life was a more or less strict version of the simple life; might the philosopher at court not become corrupted by the temptations around him? The uneasy discussions of flattery (καλακοί) and the insistent denials of any such intention are a feature of works On Kingship under the Roman empire which certainly goes back to Hellenistic originals. The section on flattery became indeed almost an obligatory introductory topos for a philosopher writing to a king, and served to distinguish him clearly at the start of his work from the professional panegyrist. The philosopher, in contrast to the rhetorician, will talk in generalities of the ideal king, not of the specific representative he is addressing; so Dio of Prusa before Trajan denies that he will flatter: the king must decide himself whether his conduct fits the ideal model. Again Synesius, operating on the uneasy borders of rhetoric and philosophy, in a ceremonial situation which required a panegyric, while political events and Synesius' own philosophical background demanded plain
speaking, bursts in on the imperial consistorium flaunting his philosophic cloak and his freedom of speech.

( freedom of speech ) is the antithesis of Koloxeia. The influence of Socrates and the Cynics ensured that this was a necessary attribute of any philosopher, particularly at court. The king and the tyrant were separated only by the fluid barriers of character and action: the philosopher who felt it his duty to advise a king must equally be constrained to abuse a tyrant if the atmosphere at court should change.

But whereas Koloxeia became a literary topos, Parrhesia remained at all times a principle of action. Philosophers regulated their lives by it, and would die in its service: the legend of the philosopher unmoved before the tyrant is to be found in all periods from the fourth century onwards. In so far as it is possible to talk of a 'right of opposition' to monarchs in the Hellenistic world, that right is enshrined in the concept of Parrhesia. Even the Epicureans felt its significance sufficiently strongly to include it in their treatises: Philodemus' Peri Parrhesias is an epitome of a section of Zeno of Sidon's Peri Kakain 3. In it a whole casuistry of Parrhesia is revealed, though it is largely related to the Epicurean view of friendship between private individuals. Plutarch's treatise addressed to

1. Dio, Or. iii, 12ff; cf. i,15; Synesius π.Α.1-2; see my forthcoming article, 'Panegyric and Advice to Princes in late antiquity and the early Middle Ages', in J.W.C.I.
3. Philodemus' purpose in the treatise is described well by Olivieri on p.X of his edition.
C. Julius Antiochus Epiphanes Philopappus, Roman senator and descendant of kings, 'On how to distinguish a flatterer from a friend' combines the two themes of καταφικτικός and πρόσωπο, and relates them to the public and private life of a prominent politician: the limits of freedom of speech are explained in an interesting discussion of τεχνή as a τεχνή. 1

Another treatise of Plutarch's, 'That the philosopher ought especially to consort with those in power', shows the arguments used against the Epicurean position. 2 The dangers of flattery and the limits of freedom of speech are recognised; but the philosopher who teaches an ordinary person can only affect that one man, whereas he who consorts with rulers has a chance of influencing the whole of society. To influence such a man for good is a noble task; nor should the philosopher despise a cultured ruler just because he is a man of power. The arguments are perhaps drawn, like many of the examples, from the Platonic school; and the treatise is addressed to a man who finds himself in the position Plutarch recommends. The polemic against Epicurean doctrines is clear.

Epicurus himself does not seem to have found it entirely easy to live in conformity with his tenets, and let his life escape the notice of contemporary kings. Philodemus wrote a work which appears to have been an account of the relations between Epicurus and his disciples, on the basis of Epicurus' 1 esp. 74c-d; cf. K. Ziegler, RE xxi (1952), 802f on the question of Peripatetic and Epicurean influences. 2 esp. Plut. Mor. 77-8.
correspondence; from the letters preserved here and elsewhere the politics of the day can be seen to have had serious effects on the philosophic calm of the school. Epicurus' first school was founded in Mitylene; political troubles caused him to move to Lampsacus, problems which may have been caused or aggravated by Antigonus. But since Epicurus left Lampsacus for Athens immediately after its liberation by Demetrius Poliorcetes, he cannot at this time have been opposed to the Antigonid cause. Later, about the period of Demetrius' final defeat, he seems to have turned against the Macedonian royal house; there is a letter of 285/4 which appears to contain an attack on them; Epicurus was clearly to some extent in sympathy with the Athenian political stand at the time.

But these movements and political opinions of Epicurus are not evidence of a disregard of his own tenets; they show rather

1. The 'Pragmateiai' (P. Herc. 1418 + 310): the full title is uncertain (A.Vogliano, Riv.Fil. liv (1926), 312 n.2). Despite the fundamental importance of this work, it has never been edited as a whole. Engravings in Vol.Herc.2 i (1861), 107-31; the most important passages in C.Diano, Lettere di Epicuro e dei Suoi (1946), cited as 'Diano', and F.Sbordone, Miscellanea di Studi Alessandrini in memoria di A.Rostagni (1963), 28ff. I have not seen W.Liebich Aufbau Absicht u.Form der Pragmateiai Philodems (1960). The correspondence of Epicurus is in Arighetti 383ff and Sbordone o.c. 26ff; but since quotations are usually short and obscure, it is also essential to study them in relation to their original context in Philodemus.

2. A.Momigliano, Riv.Fil. lxiii (1935), 302ff is fundamental; for Bignone's further speculations on why Epicurus left Mitylene (L'Aristotele Perduto ii, 112ff) see A.Vogliano, Acme i (1948), 98ff.

3. F 103 Arighetti; cf. Momigliano o.c.310f.

4. In particular I cannot accept the wide conclusions drawn by Bignone (esp. ii, 130ff) that there was a serious conflict between Peripatetics and Epicureans which was carried into the political sphere; cf. M.Pohlenz, G.G.A. cxcviii (1936), 524ff.
his search for a city where the philosophic life could be spent in peace, without the political alarms of border towns like Mitylene and Lampsacus, both of them more than usually exposed to the dangers from the swiftly changing frontiers and allegiances of the Diadochoi. Nor is it surprising that when, over twenty years later, he found Athens also exposed to the same dangers, he should curse the Macedonian folly which was disturbing his peace.

Epicurus had worse trouble with his disciples: on at least two occasions he had to pay court to a king on their behalf. The long and virulent quarrel between his disciple Metrodorus and Metrodorus' brother Timocrates, which has left traces of a considerable polemical literature, involved Epicurus in sending disciples to Asia to attack Timocrates and get him expelled from court. Which court this was is uncertain: that of Antigonus or Demetrius has been suggested; but the intensity of the quarrel, and its apparently long duration make it perhaps more likely that Timocrates had gone to a court with which Epicurus was more closely connected, and was stirring up trouble there.

1. Cols. XII and XIV of Philodemus (F 84 Arighetti = Jiancjp.7; Sbordone o.c.31) show a period when Epicurus and Timocrates were friendly. On the quarrel cf. Philipsson RE VI A (1936) 1266ff; apart from the obvious works such as the Letters to Timocrates and the Timocrates of Epicurus and Metrodorus, a number of others are connected with the quarrel, as Epicurus' Letter to the Philosophers of Mitylene (cf. Bignone o.c. ii, 45-62) and perhaps Metrodorus On the Ill-health of Epicurus (o.c. ii, 153-6).

2. Momigliano o.c. 307f.

Lysimachus was a king after Epicurus' own heart, at whose banquets military stories and coarse tomfoolery were indeed more prominent than talk about literary and poetic problems, a man whose patience with philosophers was soon exhausted. There was an occasion which became famous in the anecdotal tradition about philosophical 'freedom of speech', when Ptolemy sent him an embassy which included the Cyrenaic philosopher Theodorus the Atheist. Theodorus' parrhesia did not have a sympathetic reception. Nevertheless philosophers are attested at his court; for he is alleged to have expelled them from his kingdom.

This action may have applied only to the philosophers at court; if so it would have been in accordance with Epicurus' advice to kings. Though there is no certain evidence for Epicurus having direct links with Lysimachus, his friendship with Lysimachus' finance minister Mithres was discussed by Philodemus. This friendship was certainly well established during the reign of Lysimachus, it is attested as early as 290.


2. Most circumstantial, Diog. Laert. ii,102; other refs. in E. Mannnebach, Aristippi et Cyrenaicorum Fragmenta (1961) F 235-9; cf. also K. v. Fritz, Philol. Suppl. xviii.2 (1926), 50f. The presence of Hipparchia, wife of the cynic Crates, apparently at the same time as Theodorus (Diog. Laert. vi, 97), may not be an invention, although both philosophers collected anecdotes around themselves.

3. Athen. xiii, 610e = F. H. G. iv p. 358 (Carystius of Pergamon).

4. cf. Momigliano o.c. 312ff; but his texts should now be consulted in Arighetti and Diano (p. 11ff), who collects the evidence pp. 31ff; cf. also Sbordone o.c. 35ff. The earliest text is F 67 Arighetti; cf. also the new text of F 73 Arighetti, on which below p. 205.
death Mithres was captured in Corinth by Craterus, the half-brother of Antigonus Gonatas, and brought to the Piraeus. Epicurus and Metrodorus were active in arranging for his ransom, and Epicurus appealed to the Macedonian king Antipater on his behalf.

It is probably these two occasions which will explain the curious inconsistency in Epicurean doctrine, which allows that the philosopher 'will pay court to (? or serve: ὑπεράκτησε) a king if necessary'. Again there is no sign that this doctrine was elaborated or developed in Epicurean circles to provide a justification for entering royal service; it seems more probable that it is an admission that it may be necessary to approach a king in order to gain favours, rather than a claim that royal service is compatible with the philosophic life.

These excursions into the world of politics do not seriously contradict Epicurus' own precepts; for it is noteworthy that he himself is not found in personal relationships with the kings involved. Rather his genius for friendship and the natural attraction of his philosophical system brought him disciples who had contacts with kings, or were themselves royal officials. Friendship in the Epicurean view was both philosophically important, and also an emotional relationship of peculiar intensity; combined with the demands of orthodoxy it created situations familiar

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1. Beloch identified the Antipater of F 42 Arighetti with the nephew of Cassander who reigned for a short period in the chaos of the Celtic invasion of Macedon in 279, and was deposed by Antigonus Gonatas by 276: H iv. Fil. liv (1926), 331f.
2. Diog. Laert. x, 121b.
enough around the charismatic founder of a new movement. As in
the quarrels between Freud and his errant disciples, heretics
were pursued with a hysterical vindictiveness; friends were
defended without regard for the strict demands of theory.

It was doubtless part of the accusation against Timocrates
that he had gone to court. But how Epicurus regarded the
activities of Mithres is unknown; Philodemus appears to claim
him as an exception\(^1\). Here the friendly language of Epicurus to
Mithres laid him open to the charge of flattery as well as
inconsistency; there is some sign that Epicurus recognised the
force of these charges\(^2\). But once Mithres had fallen from power,
Epicurus could comfort him with the unimportance of the change\(^3\).

Epicurus' usual advice was clear: he had written to another
disciple, Idomeneus, advising him to flee from the service of a
king\(^4\); fragments of the letter perhaps survive: 'by the gods,
you have seemed to us worthy by your whole character of a free
life not bound by the laws\(^5\). It is in keeping with this attitude

\(^1\) Col. 32 (Diano no. XIII, 10f).
\(^2\) Diog.Laert. x,4; the exact meaning of F 73 Arighetti (col.
XXXVIII Diano) depends on restoration of the main verb and the
interpretation of the enigmatic last clause; the indication
of date (4) may belong to Philodemus not Epicurus. The context
is a discussion of Epicurus' relations with Mithres; he appears
to be defending either his own or Mithres' activities in
relation to Lysimachus against accusations of flattery, rather
than reproving Mithres (as Arighetti in his note thought).
\(^3\) F 72 Arighetti.
\(^4\) Sen. Ep. 21, 3; 22,5; cf. F 45-54 Arighetti, esp. 48-9 and 54.
\(^5\) Philod. col. 32, 2-8 contains two fragments, which are not
fragments of a letter to Mithres (contra Diano; Arighetti
prints them as F 74); as lines 9 ff show, they refer to
another man who, like Mithres, is a special case. Comparison
of 5-7 with F 54 Arighetti suggests that they may come from
the letter to Idomeneus.
that he should refer to the school of Plato as 'the flatterers of Dionysius'\(^1\) his disciples in contrast 'must liberate themselves from the prison of business and politics'.\(^2\)

In the later history of Epicureanism there are two other occasions when Epicureans are found deeply involved in political activity. The first is known only through the fragments of a work on the life of the mathematician and Epicurean philosopher, Philonides of Laodicea, found in the Epicurean library at Herculaneum; three inscriptions from Athens and Delphi help to confirm the evidence of the papyrus\(^3\). Philonides came from a prominent family in Laodicea; his father, also called Philonides, and his brother Dicaearchus had close connections with the Seleucid court in the first half of the second century. All three men were made citizens of Athens: a decree of the Eumolpidae records gifts in connection with the Eleusinian mysteries and mentions the public entertainment of Philonides and his father at Athens; this may well be connected with the building activities of Antiochus IV at the Athenian Olympieion in about 174\(^4\). The

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1. Diog.Laert.x,8; from the Letter to the Philosophers of Mitylene and the context of the Timocrates-quarrel: Signone o.c. ii,76.
2. Gnom.Vat. 50.
4. Polyb. xxvi, I,II; Livy xli, 20,8.
two brothers are listed among the theorodokoi of Delphi in the 170s; and Dicaearchus was honoured for his activities at the court of Antiochus (probably again the fourth rather than the third) on behalf of the city with various honours, including those of hereditary theorodokos and of proxenos\(^1\). In the Life Philonides himself is said to have won over a king who was prejudiced against the Epicureans with 125 works on Epicureanism!\(^2\)

This king is again apparently Antiochus Epiphanes\(^3\). Certainly under Epiphanes' nephew, Demetrius I, he was in high favour. He may have won Demetrius for Epicureanism early, before his departure to Rome as a hostage in 175\(^4\); on Demetrius' return Philonides set up his school in a house outside the palace, and 'King Demetrius honoured Philonides, and made him live and study with him'\(^5\). Philonides also appears in connection with

1. Philippson does not discuss the chronological problem raised by the inscriptions at Delphi. The list of theorodokoi seems to have a terminus ante quem of 1/1 (destruction of Pylae; Livy xlii, 54; cf. line 37); the decree giving Dicaearchus the honours of theorodokos and proxenos has reasonably been held to be earlier than this. Epigraphists have therefore wished to read the archon in O.G.I.S.241 as Xenon (189/3), rather than the palaeographically easier Kleon (168/7). H. Pontow also tried to restore ΑΘηναίος Κλέος as one of the ambassadors who went to Antiochus, thus confirming the earlier date; but it seems very unlikely that the priest of Apollo should have gone on an embassy, and the reading should probably be rejected (Philol. lxxv (1895), 363 n.4). Since it is known that Dicaearchus was the younger son (I.G.12 1236, line 7) this would put the birth of both brothers well into the third century.

The text of O.G.I.S. 241 depends on the fifteenth century copy of Ciriaco d'Ancona, and is very uncertain; the best solution is perhaps to reject the order proposed by the epigraphists and accept the later date (168/7) for O.G.I.S.241. It should be noted that this decree does not appear to be the original conference of theorodokia on Dicaearchus, for it does not mention his elder brother Philonides; and the Delphic connection with Dicaearchus seems to be of some standing. It is perhaps a reaffirmation of this privilege, specifically for Dicaearchus and his descendants, and a grant of various other honours.

2. p.953 F 30 Croenert. 3. contra Philippson o.c.00.
3. p.954 F 32; cf. Philippson o.c.04.
embassies on behalf of the Laodiceans, which may be related to
the occasion in Demetrius' reign when the Roman ambassador,
C. Octavius, was murdered in Laodicea and the Romans demanded
vengeance. This Epicurean ascendancy did not last long. Though
an Epicurean, Diogenes of Babylon, is still found at court under
the next king, Alexander Balas, he is a figure of fun to a monarch
more interested in Stoicism; and he was killed shortly afterwards
by Alexander's son, Antiochus VI. Another episode in Seleucid
history may belong to the same period. Athenaeus records a
letter of a king Antiochus reaffirming the expulsion of philos-
ophers from his kingdom and threatening their disciples with
death.

What perhaps is most significant about Philonides' life
at court is not that he should have been involved in politics;
it may be that with his family connections he could scarcely
avoid it, particularly once Demetrius was an avowed Epicurean.
Rather it is the way the biographer of Philonides chooses to write
about these events. For the biography is at the same time laudatory
and apologetic: the purpose of the author is to show that, despite
all these political activities, Philonides remained a true
Epicurean: 'King Demetrius honoured Philonides, and made him
live and study with him. But even in these circumstances he
behaved well, philosophically and gloriously; for he did not give

1. p.946 F 9; Philippson o.c.60.
2. Athen.v, 211 = Athenaeus of Naucratis, P.G. 1 loo F I.
3. Athen. xii, 54/a; genuine despite the doubts of L.Radermacher,
Miein. Mus. lvi (1901), 202ff.
himself up wholly to councils and embassies\(^1\). He is said to have been unwilling to follow his father and brother to court\(^2\). Again emphasis is laid on the fact that he left the king for Athens twice, and that he was unwilling to go on embassies for the Laodiceans\(^3\). His *diatribai* at the court are defended\(^4\). This of course makes it difficult to judge how much actual political importance Philonides himself and the Epicureans in general had under either Epiphanes or Demetrius. But it confirms the general attitude of Epicureans to any such activity, that it was something to be explained away rather than emphasised. Epicureanism had no place in politics.

The curious tone of this biography would be especially interesting if it were in fact written, as many have believed, by Philodemus of Gadara; for Philodemus' own problems were not dissimilar\(^5\). His position as the favourite philosopher and client of L. Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus in late Republican Rome brought him into contact with Epicurean circles among the Roman aristocracy. And it was here that Epicureanism came closest to having political significance.

Certain linguistic arguments suggest however, either that the *Life of Philonides* is not by Philodemus, or that, if it is, it should be widely separate in time from the other works\(^6\). That

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3. p.946 F 11; 954 F 34; 949 F 56-7.
6. Croenert o.c.957; Philipsson o.c.03.
is perhaps supported by the tone of the work; it would be difficult to conceive of Philodemus accepting so insistently the view that philosophers should not appear in political circles once he had begun his association with Piso. But an early work, defending a fellow countryman and a figure important in the history of Syrian Epicureanism, is likely enough. Philodemus' later attitude was more ambivalent. He clearly accepted to some extent the political views of Piso, and was even prepared to write a sort of political handbook for him. But once again this was a reaction to the Roman environment in which he found himself. Whatever their philosophical views, Roman aristocrats could not cease to be interested in politics, or to consider it their right to act for the republica, however little justification they might find for such activities in Epicurean theory. The Epicurean view that any form of government gives scope for the philosophic life may perhaps help to explain why so many Epicureans found it psychologically easy to accept the leadership of Caesar; but no Epicurean was unmoved by the presence of C. Cassius among the liberators. Yet though Cassius might perhaps have been able to find some sort of theoretical justification in his philosophy for his attempt to remove tyranny from Rome, he acted more as a Roman than as an Epicurean in so doing. Once again the nature of a Greek philosophical system was subtly altered by its contact with the needs of Roman society; but, unlike other philosophies, the tradition of Epicureanism was rigid enough to resist change. The moment passed, without any positive political doctrine emerging.

1. Cf. Homigliano o.c.154; for Philodemus holding orthodox Epicurean views Homigliano cites Vol. Rhet. ii, 12, 8; 28, Sudhaus.
5. KINGSHIP AND THE STOICS

The belief that Stoic ideas on kingship have had a particularly important place in the history of ancient ideas of monarchy has been widely held by modern scholars: 'during the Hellenistic period it was especially the Stoic school which concerned itself with politics, and particularly with kingship'. The Greek theory of monarchy has even on occasion been described as a Stoic theory, or a Stoic and Cynic theory. Again it has been held that, within Stoicism itself, ideas on monarchy held an especially important place, that the early Stoics at least believed monarchy to be the best form of government: 'it is explicitly stated that the Stoics called kingship the highest form of rule, better than any other'. There is some truth in these views; yet, as will be seen, they involve considerable exaggeration: Stoic views on kingship were neither as important nor as original as has often been asserted. Stoicism takes its place among the various philosophical schools who accepted and elaborated already existing ideas on monarchy.

1. L. Delatte, Les Traités de la Royauté d'Ephante, Diotogène et Sthénidas (1942), 140.
2. F.E. Adcock, P.B.A. xxxix (1954), 177; M. Rostovtzeff, S.E.H.R.E. i, 120; in S.E.H.H.W. i, 268, 434 his formulation is more accurate.
3. J. Kaerst, Geschichte des Hellenismus, ii (1926), 306.
In origin Stoic political thought sprang from a concern with the relation between the individual wise man and the society in which he must live: in common with most of the philosophical schools which elaborated Socratic ideas, it saw society from the point of view of the individual; only later did Stoicism come to have opinions about the organisation of society itself.

The first attempt to formulate the relationship between the individual and society is not indeed concerned with the real world at all. Zeno's Republic, it is known, was an early work, written when he was still under the influence of Cynicism, 'on the dog's tail'; it is also described as written 'in reply to Plato's Republic'. The fragments show that it described an ideal society of the wise, in which laws and institutions were unnecessary, for all relationships were based on the 'concord' (δυνώνοια) or 'love' which wise men would necessarily have for each other; the sexual customs advocated (which particularly caught the attention of later writers) are those appropriate to the wise man in the Cynic tradition. This state seems to have been seen in a dual light. It was firstly a possible ideal

city-state which could be realised at any time, provided that all the inhabitants were wise men. But it was also a present world-state, in that all the wise men at present on earth were held together by the same ties which would subsist if they were gathered together into one city, and paid the same lack of attention to the accepted norms of civilised society as they would do if the city were ever established. That is, its message was fundamentally anarchic: the wise man was outside society, because his social organisation did not exist; and if it ever did exist, it would do so largely as a negation of the norms of present society.

This negative approach to political life remained always to some extent an important part of the Stoic attitude to politics. In the last resort the concern of the Stoic wise man was with his own soul. But Zeno's later views were more favourable to political participation. The wise man was by definition better than anyone else at every task, and therefore also at politics; it was part of his duty to exercise his skills (for virtues are activities), and for the benefit of others: he would therefore take part in political life, unless something prevented him. Zeno still here seems to mean the ordinary political life of the city-state. No views on kingship can in fact be attributed to Zeno; though the

\[1\] S.V.F. i F 271; cf. Index p. 132.
Stoic theory does seem to emerge from a particular interpretation of one of his statements.

The central Stoic paradox was the claim that there was an absolute distinction between the wise and the foolish, the good and the bad; the full possession of one virtue or skill implied the possession of all virtues: only the wise man could possess virtue or skill, and he possessed all virtues and all skills\(^1\). 'The wise man does everything well; he even makes porridge well'\(^2\).

Thus whether the ability to exercise kingship is conceived of as a skill, or as a moral characteristic of certain exceptional men, it is a necessary corollary that only the wise man is a true king. In origin this doctrine does not seem to have been emphasised at all: 'the wise man is everything, happy, fortunate, blessed, rich, holy, loved by god, honoured, possessed of the qualities of a king, a general, a statesman, an economist, a businessman'\(^3\).

Nevertheless Zeno had said that only the wise man was king; and this statement must have attracted interest. For it was specifically defended by Chrysippus in his work 'On the correctness of Zeno's use of words'. It is this defence which offers the first tangible evidence for a Stoic

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1. See Index s. 216.
2. S.V.F. i F 217.
3. F 216.
theory of kingship:

'Not only are the wise free, they are also kings; for kingship is absolute rule (or rule without accountability), which only the wise can maintain, as Chrysippus says in his work 'On the correctness of Zeno's use of words'. For he says that the ruler must have a knowledge of good and evil, and that no base man possesses this. Similarly only the wise, and not the base\(^1\), are true magistrates, judges and orators; and furthermore they are infallible, not being liable to error; they are also without offence, for they neither do harm to themselves nor to others. Also they have no pity, and make allowance for no-one: they never relax the penalties fixed by law, since indulgence and pity and even compassion (ἐνθέκεια) are weaknesses of the soul which pretends to kindness instead of punishment; nor do they think punishments are too severe\(^2\).

In this passage of Diogenes Laertius it is not clear how much of the second half comes from the work of Chrysippus cited; but it does at least contain doctrines which can be attributed to Zeno himself\(^3\), and can therefore serve as a useful basis for a discussion of views on kingship in the early Stoa.

\(^1\) I use the word 'base' to translate φατνός, as 'wise man'; for ἁριστός; these are of course Stoic technical terms for the two classes into which they divided humanity.

\(^2\) Diog. Laert. vii, 122; cf. S.V.F. iii F 617, where Stobaeus is also cited.

\(^3\) S.V.F. i F 213-4; cf. Index s. ἰδίος.
The definition put forward by Chrysippus of kingship as \( \delta\nu\nu\beta\nu\epsilon\zeta\rho\alpha\sigma\nu\upsilon\zeta\varphi\upsilon\) is not original to him. It describes kingship in a way which was in clear contrast with the practices of Athenian government, and the phrase probably originated in an Athens aware of this difference. It is already recognised as a defining characteristic of monarchy in the earliest theoretical discussion of kingship that has survived, that of Herodotus in book iii; it is used by Plato in his last work, the Laws, and by Aristotle. It is hardly therefore surprising to find the definition included among the pseudo-Platonic Definitions, which are probably also a product of this period. Similarly Hecataeus of Abdera knows of it\(^1\).

The definition may then have come to Chrysippus from the Academy; but it was undoubtedly the influence of Stoicism which caused this particular formulation to become standard. It is referred to in the compendium of Stoic doctrine in Stobaeus as specifically Stoic\(^2\). Andronicus defines 'the kingly art' as 'the skill of ruling the people without accountability (\( \delta\nu\beta\nu\epsilon\zeta\rho\alpha\sigma\nu\upsilon\zeta\varphi\upsilon \)\(^3\)). It is this definition

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1. Herod. iii, 80, 3; Plato, Laws 761e; Ar. Pols. 1295a20; cf. 1287a10; Plato, Def. 415b (for this work cf. R. Adam, Satura Berolinensis (1924), 3ff.); Diod. i, 70, 1.
2. S.V.F. iii F 617.
3. iii F 267.
which is the subject of the 56th oration of Dio of Prusa, where it forms the basis of a discussion whether kings should really be subject to no check or not. Dio is here influenced by Roman attitudes to the constitution; earlier he had accepted the Stoic definition. In Oration iii, after describing the views of 'Socrates' on kingship, he talks about Socrates' successors, who have followed his views closely, and gives a series of definitions which are clearly Stoic. 'Rule (οἰκονομία) is the lawful ordering of men, and the oversight of men in accordance with law; kingship is unchecked rule'.

The passage raised considerable interest in the early Byzantine period, and is somewhat interpolated to make it conform to Byzantine ideas: it seems that the remaining definitions are not Stoic.

This definition clarifies certain elements of the Stoic attitude to kingship. Firstly, if kingship is rule without accountability, what safeguards are there that the king will act rightly? Here seems the basic reason why the king must be a wise man, for a wise man will necessarily act rightly: just as all wise men will have kingly knowledge, so

1. Esp. Or. lvi, 5 and 11; cf. below p.503 .
2. Or. iii, 5.
3. This is generally agreed for the next phrase; but it is also hardly likely that a Stoic would have defined law as 'the decree of the king': that seems more in keeping with the age of Justinian. I would therefore also bracket this definition.
only the king with Stoic wisdom can be a true king. That at least was the theory, which taken strictly involved denying that any kings actually existed on earth, since the Stoic ideal of the wise man seems to have been held to be in fact an unrealised ideal. Still there might be men striving to become kings. Given the imperfections of this world, it will therefore matter little whether the philosopher is on the throne or behind it.

Chrysippus indeed in book i of his On Lives had said that 'the wise man will willingly become a king, and may gain wealth from it; and if he himself cannot rule, he will live with a king and go on expeditions with him.' The later references to this doctrine make much of Chrysippus' attitude towards the acceptance of money; but from the extant fragments it seems that he did not actually say that a wise man would join a king for the sake of making money, rather that there was no objection to his receiving money for his services, just as doctors received it for theirs. Moreover he recognised the dangers of life at court: in one work he described the means by which a philosopher could gain a living as 'ludicrous'; for if he was at the court of a king

1. cf. the anecdote about Ptolemy and Sphaerus discussed below p.243; and compare Sen. de otio 8: there is no state good enough for the philosopher to take part in politics.

2. S.V.F. iii F 690-3.
he would have to humour him\(^1\). The real purpose of such activity was to benefit the king and his subjects by the wise man's knowledge of good and evil, 'to restrain vice and promote virtue'\(^2\).

The views so far discussed raised few problems in relation to other Hellenistic attitudes to monarchy. The Stoic definition of kingship was acceptable precisely because it was already commonly accepted. Like others, the Stoics held that the true king was the man with all the virtues; they believed also in taking part in government at all levels in order to achieve a better political society through the effect of philosophy on the ruler.

It was the Stoic doctrines on the passions which set their views on kingship apart from those of others most clearly. All passions were disturbances of the soul, and therefore bad; the ideal was lack of passion (\(\text{apistēmē}\)). In the legal sphere this raised serious problems: one of the advantages of monarchy according to others was that it allowed equity to take the place of strict justice: pity and respect for the individual merits of a case could play their part. But a Stoic was not allowed to feel pity\(^3\). This denial of the place of emotion in government caused considerable

\(^1\) Diog. Laert. vii, 189.
\(^2\) Diog. Laert. vii, 121.
\(^3\) cf. S.V.F. Index s. \(\text{παθούσα}\); esp. i F 434.
There was ample justification for the attitude in Stoic theory. All true law was natural law, in harmony with the law of the universe; it was supreme over all political affairs, and could not be abrogated by any man rightly: 'universal law is king of divine and mortal affairs. It must be the judge between good and bad and ruler and leader, and it must be the measure of justice and injustice, decreeing to men who are by nature political animals what they should do, and prohibiting them from doing what they should not do'.

In so far as the laws of individual cities deviated from this natural law, they were motivated by self-interest; and according to Chrysippus 'all existing laws and constitutions are at fault'. We are not told how a Stoic wise man would conduct himself in a state where the laws were manifestly unjust, if he were a magistrate; but Stoicism did not recognise degrees of justice and injustice. Presumably he should therefore in any case disregard the laws of the state, and apply the natural law, which was identical with his own right reason. But he would do so not out of compassion for the victim, but rather because he was himself bound by a higher law. The effect might be the same as that achieved by

1. S.V.F. iii F 314.
2. F 324.
a more humane magistrate: the reasons were very different. So when Diogenes Laertius says that Stoics 'do not think punishments are too severe', he perhaps means the proper punishments for breaking the natural law, rather than individual penalties in individual states.

Therefore in a very real sense the king was subordinate to law; there is no sign that the Stoics discussed even whether the king was in any way free from human law, or that they entertained a possible corollary to their position, that the identity of natural law with right reason might allow the true king to be thought of as embodying law, as being in some sense 'living law'. That phrase may be Stoic, in that it could be derived from Stoic doctrines; but the extant Stoic fragments suggest rather that, in so far as the relationship between king and law was discussed, the emphasis was laid on the king's subordination to right reason and natural law.

The notion that kingship should exist without emotion was one which critics of Stoicism found especially hard to accept. The Stoic sage must not show pity: 'indulgence and pity and even compassion are weaknesses of the soul'. This caused Seneca considerable trouble in his attempt to write a treatise de clementia; for though he might try to distinguish between 'misericordia' (which was bad) and 'clementia', the

fact was that orthodox Stoic doctrine disapproved equally of ἐλεος and ἐπιλειτεῖα. Seneca admits that among the ignorant the Stoic school is for this reason unpopular, 'on the grounds that it is too harsh and not at all likely to give good advice to princes and kings; it is objected that the sect does not allow the wise man to be pitiful, or to pardon'.

Seneca's attempts to evade this accusation are scarcely convincing, and suggest that he had little earlier theoretical justifications to follow. But Augustine remarks on the same problem, and his language seems to imply that later Stoics (perhaps only Epictetus) were at least ambivalent on the subject.

A papyrus of the first century B.C. or A.D. shows that the argument could be generalised. Not only would the Stoic wise man not show pity in judgement; he would also be unable to feel that sympathy with his fellow men which is the foundation of φιλανθρωπία. φιλανθρωπία is apparently compared to love, an emotion which a man must suffer before he is able to describe it. Similarly φιλανθρωπία has to have a grounding in the personal experience of emotions.

1. de clem. ii, 3ff.
2. ii, 5, 2.
3. civ. dei ix, 5; the later Stoic position is well described in R.D. Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean (1910), 146ff.
4. Published by D. Comparetti, Festschrift T. Gomperz (1902), 80ff.; for date W. Crönert, Arch. f. Pap. ii (1903), 368.
Certainly compared with such a view the Stoic definition of ἕλπις, which was little more than a friendly attitude towards other men, seems cold and austere.  

ἕλπις was for most Hellenistic writers the central virtue of a king. The Stoic theory of emotions therefore laid them open to attack from other philosophers, and perhaps even more from those who were more concerned with the practice than with the theory of politics. Stoicism, as Seneca's defence shows, could be held to be an unsuitable philosophy for a king. This perhaps is one reason why Seneca's treatise de clementia, which is in one sense an attempt to adapt the genre of kingship writings to the Roman tradition, contains so little doctrine which can be certainly attributed to Stoicism. But the originality of Seneca, and the complexity of the influences which went into this first attempt to write a Roman treatise On Kingship, make it of little use in a discussion of Hellenistic Stoic views.

Some light may perhaps be cast on Stoic attitudes to kingship by the arguments found in later writers in support of monarchy. In particular there are a number of analogies,

1. S.V.F. iii F 292. I find no evidence that the Stoics talked of the ἕλπις of the king (contra S. Lorenz, De progressu notionis ἕλπις, (Diss. Leipzig 1914), 44ff.); though the king must of course have shared in that common affinity which bound together all things in the world, and in that 'love' which subsisted between all wise men.
found in Cicero and in Dio of Prusa, used either to establish that kingship is the best form of government, or to show the king how he ought to rule, which seem to show the influence of Stoicism. It is however important to treat this evidence with caution: Cicero was almost certainly not drawing directly at least on Stoic views in his section on kingship in book i of the de Republica; and Dio's eclecticism is immediately apparent. Moreover many of the arguments from analogy are commonplaces, or arguments such as might have been constructed by any person with a slight knowledge of the way philosophers in general argued in their more popular works.

The most important of these analogies is undoubtedly the argument with which Cicero begins his case in favour of kingship as the best constitution, the parallel between monotheism in heaven and monarchy on earth, which suggests that the rule of one is more in conformity with nature. Cicero offers three explanations of the belief in monotheism, that it was invented by kings for their own benefit, that it is a false and irrational belief of men, and that it is based on the Stoic view of the world as ruled by a single soul or divine reason. It is the third reason which arrests attention, and points surely to the school which originated or at least made good use of this analogy. The same comparison

1. de rep. i, 56.
recurs in Dio's first oration to Trajan, On Kingship\(^1\). Dio begins by discussing nine of the epithets given to Zeus in poetry and cult worship, to illustrate the analogy between Zeus and king; he then talks of the ordering of the universe under one divine wisdom and one law and state, a description which is certainly Stoic.

That the earlier section of Dio's comparison is also Stoic is perhaps suggested by a close parallel to both parts of Dio's description in the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise de Mundo, a work which general consensus would put in the late Hellenistic period\(^2\). Here the purpose of the analogy is reversed: Zeus is described in terms appropriate to the earthly king. But there is a long description of the ordering of the universe under his control, this time in terms of the Peripatetic theory of the gods and of nature. And there is also a list of the cult titles of Zeus which, though longer than Dio's, includes every title mentioned by Dio except two\(^3\).

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2. de Mundo 6-7.
3. de Mundo 7, 401a13ff.: Dio Or. i, 39ff.; the two titles of Dio missing are Φοίνικης and Κλεον (I omit Βασιλεύς and Κράτειρ as too obvious). Similar lists are also found in Achilles' commentary on Aratus (ed. E. Maass p. 84, 16ff.; 332, 8ff.), which is usually held not to be dependent on the de Mundo, and to show Stoic influence. It does not appear that the parallel between Dio and the de Mundo has been noticed - a pity, for it strongly reinforces the argument for Stoic influence in the de Mundo.
The significance of these parallels depends on whether their common source should be identified as Stoic; and if so, whether the source is in the early or middle Stoa: both Chrysippus and Poseidonius have been suggested. In particular Chrysippus seems a plausible originator of the list of cult names at least.

The analogy between god and king is also alluded to in Dio's Oration iii, again On Kingship; but here Dio is concerned to point out various subordinate analogies in nature to show that 'everywhere God has appointed the superior to rule over the inferior'; Cicero similarly mentions such analogies, but to dismiss them as hardly worth serious consideration. Indeed the comparison with bees is, like the helmsman or doctor analogy, a commonplace. But Dio's detailed description of the sun-god who serves a rigorous slavery in keeping to his appointed path and dispensing to mankind all the benefits of nature has perhaps a Stoic

3. Or. iii, 50ff.
4. iii, 61.
5. de rep. 1, 62.
flavour; Cleanthes had portrayed the sun as the ruling power of the world\textsuperscript{1}. Again in all these examples it is essential to use caution. The extent to which Dio, even when he used written sources, changed them is shown by the way he takes from Xenophon Prodicus' well-known account of Hercules choosing between virtue and vice, and turns it into a choice between kingship and tyranny, which he claims to have heard while wandering in exile from an old woman in Arcadia: the setting is elaborately circumstantial, and certainly invented; and the story's point has been radically altered to suit Dio's theme\textsuperscript{2}.

Zeno is credited with having introduced the term καθήκον for the concept of a duty\textsuperscript{3}; and it is tempting to suppose that the emphasis on the duties of a king, found so often in ancient writers, derives from a developed Stoic theory on the duties of kingship. But, though some Stoic influence may be suspected, it would seem implausible to derive all such statements from Stoic works \textit{On Kingship}. The technical Stoic terms for duty are not found at all prominently in such discussions; far more normal are common words like

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} Or. iii, 73 ff.; cf. S.V.F. i F 499; though praise of the Sun's beneficence is not necessarily Stoic; Hague aptly quotes Stob. iv, 1, 138 p. 87, 17ff. Hense (ps-Archytas, πολιτεία).
\item \textsuperscript{2} Or. i, 50-84; cf. Xen. \textit{Mem.} ii, 1, 21ff.; Cic. \textit{de off.} i, 32.
\item \textsuperscript{3} S.V.F. i F 230.
\end{itemize}
Further it is clear that this emphasis on what the king ought or ought not to do goes back to the beginning of Greek thought on the subject, and was already well developed by the end of the fourth century B.C.

The contrast between the willingness of Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus to give political advice, and their own failure to take part in political life was noticed in antiquity; but, as Seneca said, 'though none of them took part in politics, each of them sent others to do so.' The early history of Stoic views on kingship must be related to the practical activities of Stoics, and more especially to the arrival of a king interested in Stoic philosophy.

In his youth Antigonus Gonatas acted as governor in Greece for his father, Demetrius Poliorcetes, from about 296. Here he seems to have been particularly attracted by the literary and philosophical circle which existed in the Eretria of Menedemus. Antigonus indeed claimed to be a disciple of Menedemus, and their relations were certainly

1. i F 27-8.
2. de Tranq. an. i, 10.
friendly¹. There are anecdotes connecting the two men²; and Diogenes Laertius emphasises the way in which Metrodorus was able to obtain benefits for his city from Antigonus' father; he also records a decree passed by Metrodorus on the occasion of Antigonus' great victory over the Celts. When Metrodorus was finally exiled from Eretria, it was to the court of Antigonus that he went³.

Antigonus is also said to have been taught by one of Metrodorus' disciples, Euphantus of Olynthus⁴. Euphantus may not have taught him only philosophy, for he was also a historian and a successful tragic poet. But he did write for Antigonus a work On Kingship, which it is said was very popular. Its contents are completely obscure, for very little is known of the philosophical views of the Megarian school outside logic. Metrodorus had also studied under Plato and the Elean Phaedo; but to infer from this anything about Euphantus' views on kingship in relation to those of Plato would clearly be hazardous. Euphantus did presumably discuss the importance of philosophy for a king: that much Antigonus may have learned first from him. But it is perhaps more important to lay stress on Diogenes Laertius' description of

². ii, 128.
³. ii, 141f.
the work as συνόδος ενδομαζαί. Whether this enigmatic
phrase means that it was highly regarded by Antigonus, by
contemporaries, or even by men of Diogenes' own day, the
work is clearly more likely to have contained popular
doctrines than esoteric or controversial ones.

It was in Eretria that Antigonus met many of the
literary figures who later came to his court in Macedon.
But his philosophical allegiance soon changed to the Stoics.
His close friendship with Zeno is again shown by anecdotes
about their drinking parties, and about the effect that
Zeno had on Antigonus¹. Perhaps already in 279², and
certainly between 276 and 274, Antigonus asked Zeno to come
to Macedon; but Zeno refused on the grounds of old age, sending
instead two of his favourite pupils, Persaeus of Cition and
Philonides³.

Persaeus' activities in Macedon were controversial: it
is his example which lies behind the defence in Chrysippus
of a philosopher taking money from a king, entering his
service and accompanying him on military expeditions.

Originally Persaeus was probably meant to act as Antigonus'

¹. S.V.F. i F 289; Diog. Laert. vii, 13; Epict. ii, 13, 14f.;
Simpl. in Epict. Enchir. 283c. On relations between
Antigonus and Zeno, see A. Grilli, Riv. fil. xci (1963),
287ff. (though I cannot accept his view that the letters
in Diog. Laert. vii, 6-9 are genuine).
². Grilli o.c. 290f.
³. Diog. Laert. vii, 6-9; 36. Philonides is otherwise unknown;
philosophical adviser, and as tutor to his son Halcyoneus. But he quickly made himself at home as a political figure. He is described as having chosen the life of a courtier, not a philosopher; he ran down other philosophers at court, Bion and Menedemus: he persuaded Antigonus not to allow the latter to establish a democracy in Eretria. He wrote dialogues, whose scene was set at drinking parties, which may be some indication of where the source of his influence with the convivial Antigonus lay. He was not popular with his rivals: he is said to have been the one man whom Menedemus hated, and was once described by him thus: 'he may be a sort of philosopher, but as a man he is the worst of all that are or ever will be'.

Persaeus wrote a work On Kingship; though there is no direct evidence for it, it seems likely that it was addressed to Antigonus; the doctrines it contained will have been orthodox Stoic ones, with perhaps considerable emphasis on the justification for advising a king. Finally, in accordance with the view he had himself expressed, that the wise man was necessarily a good general, he took service under Antigonus,

2. Index Stoic. Herc. Col. XIII.
3. Diog. Laert. iv, 47; ii, 143f.
4. vii, 36.
and was put in charge of the garrison on the Acrocorinth in 244\textsuperscript{1}; within a year Aratus had captured it in a surprise attack. Persaeus probably died in the fighting\textsuperscript{2}.

The evidence for the reign of Antigonus Gonatas is too fragmentary for it to be possible to assert that his actions tried to conform to those appropriate in a Stoic philosopher-king: it is for instance hardly likely that his practice of favouring friendly tyrants in Greek cities was an attempt to establish Stoic kings – political expediency is a more probable explanation\textsuperscript{3}.

But though there is nothing in his positive actions to support the notion that Antigonus was striving to become a philosopher-king, there is equally nothing to contradict it. The king of Macedon and overlord of Greece was after all hardly in a position to be able to realise an ideal; nor did Stoicism offer the clear-cut programme of reform that Plato put before Dionysius. At least in comparison with his contemporaries Antigonus emerges as a humane ruler, easy of access and mistrustful of the more extravagant aspects of Hellenistic monarchy: there is no sign of a ruler cult, though this may be due to the different traditions of the Macedonian monarchy. Considering the unenviable position of

\textsuperscript{1} Athen. iv, 162d.
\textsuperscript{2} Plut. Aratus 18, 23; according to one account he survived to escape to Antigonus: see the discussion, RE 927.
\textsuperscript{3} Tarn o.c. 285, rightly rejecting the views of Wilamowitz and Ferguson; cf. also W. Fellmann, Antigonos Gonatas, König der Makedonen u. die Griechischen Staaten (Diss. Würzburg 1930), 59ff.
any king of Macedon in Greece, his reputation there was reasonable enough.

It is the anecdotal tradition which offers more insight into the attitudes and motives of Antigonus, and which suggests that he was influenced by a particular view of his own position\(^1\). One story shows him ridiculing a poet for describing him as 'offspring of the sun'\(^2\). Others of his sayings concern kingship: 'the greatest goods cannot exist without the greatest evils'\(^3\). To an old woman who thought him lucky, he said 'if you knew, mother, how many ills are bound up in this rag', pointing to his diadem, 'you would not pick it up if you found it on a dung-heap'\(^4\). Again when someone said that all things were good and just for kings, he replied 'yes indeed, for kings of the barbarians: but for us only what is good is good and only what is just is just'\(^5\).

It is these remarks which give the background to Antigonus' famous statement when he saw his son misusing some of his subjects: 'Do you not know, my son, that our kingship is a noble servitude?'\(^6\)

Much has been written on the significance of this

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1. On the authenticity of these anecdotes cf. Tarn o.c. 251 n. 107.
2. Plut. Mor. 182c.
3. Stob. iii, 7, 19 no. 7.
4. Stob. iv, 8, 20; the phrase used is the regular one for foundlings.
5. Plut. Mor. 182c no. 8.
statement; and recent interpretations have often been more subtle than convincing. It has been seen as a statement about the relationship of the king to law\(^1\), and as the expression of a new Hellenistic bureaucratic ethic of public service\(^2\). Aelian, who tells the story, understood it in a more simple and traditional way, as an example of how affable and kindly Antigonus was. And the context of the story shows that Aelian was basically right. Antigonus' son was maltreating his subjects as if they were slaves: he was thus conforming to the traditional picture of the tyrant, or the Persian king. The point of Antigonus' remark is to take this conventional situation and stand it on its head — in fact, he claims, the opposite is true: it is the king who ought to be a slave (although it is a noble servitude), his subjects who ought to be free. The remark is as conventional as that just quoted — that all things are good and just for a king of the barbarians, 'but for us only what is good is

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1. H. Volkmann, *Philol. c* (1956), 52ff. As Volkmann himself admits (p. 54), there is no reference to law in the anecdote: it has to be understood. Despite my disagreement with this section, his remarks on the relationship between king and law in the Hellenistic world (pp. 55ff.) seem to me of fundamental importance: cf. my criticisms of F. Dvornik, *Early Christian and Byzantine Political Philosophy* (1966) in *J.T.S.* xix (1968), 676f. But if it can be shown that the relation of king to law was not important in this period, Volkmann's interpretation becomes implausible.

2. Volkmann, *Hist.* xvi (1967), 155ff. with a number of parallels and the later references to the phrase; it is not clear whether Volkmann thinks this explanation supersedes his earlier one. The full earlier literature is given in these articles. On bureaucratic ideals in the Hellenistic period, see also Rostovtzeff, *Introduct. to P. Tebt.* 703 p. 69ff.; *S.E.H.H.W.* 1379 n. 83.
good and only what is just is just': both use the same basic antithesis.

These anecdotes show Antigonus as having a particular attitude towards kingship: it is no mystical religious office of absolute power, but one with limitations, legal and moral, and duties in relation to his subjects - duties which are so burdensome that they might often seem to outweigh all the apparent benefits of power. The conception is not particularly original in its details; it rather suggests that Antigonus took seriously the generally accepted view of ideal kingship in the early Hellenistic world. But it is the intensity and apparent unity of this vision of his role which perhaps differentiates Antigonus from other contemporary monarchs. The Stoic attitude to kingship was equally not original; it is then scarcely possible to prove that Antigonus' attitude was the result of Stoic influence. Yet it seems likely: the emphasis that he laid on service and duty suggests a Stoic outlook; and his contacts were primarily with Stoic philosophers: he wished at least to be thought a Stoic. There seems then little reason to doubt that his attitude to monarchy was a result of his Stoicism, and that he consciously tried to act in accordance with their tenets.

This is not of course either to say that he succeeded,
or that he wished to put into practice every detail of Stoic doctrine. There were practical difficulties: not even Zeno would have thought it possible to turn the Macedonian people into a community of Stoic wise men. Nor was there anyway an established Stoic body of doctrine before Chrysippus. In practical matters Antigonus was primarily a king of Macedon, concerned to preserve his power at home and maintain his increasingly shaky control over Greece¹. The kingship proposed by the Stoics was an ideal, and like all ideals could more easily inspire than serve as a practical model.

Cleanthes too wrote On Kingship²: the complete loss of his work is particularly unfortunate; for on general grounds it ought to have been he who laid emphasis on the parallelism between god (in his case identified with the sun) and the king, and developed the metaphors found in Dio and elsewhere. As a man who never himself took part in politics his viewpoint may have been more theoretical than that of Persaeus. Whether his work was also addressed to Antigonus is unclear³. But it may have been; for Chrysippus was specifically condemned in Diogenes Laertius for his arrogance: 'although he wrote so much, he never addressed any of his works to a king'⁴. This might perhaps suggest that other early Stoics had done so.

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1. On Antigonus' activities within Macedon, see esp. E. Will, Histoire Politique du Monde Hellénistique i (1966), 308f.
2. Diog. Laert. vii, 175.
3. For his relations with Antigonus, see Diog. Laert. vii, 169.
4. vii, 185.
The third Stoic known to have written a work On Kingship is Sphaerus¹: again, as with Persaeus, the book may be suspected of having some relationship to his political activities. For Sphaerus was active at two, or more probably three, separate courts, those of Ptolemy III, Ptolemy IV and Cleomenes III of Sparta.

The evidence for Sphaerus' visits to Egypt is not entirely clear². Diogenes Laertius describes him as having gone there when Ptolemy asked Cleanthes to come, or send a disciple; Chrysippus refused, but Sphaerus accepted³. From the chronology of Cleanthes' headship of the Stoic school the Ptolemy concerned should be Ptolemy III. But elsewhere Diogenes Laertius describes Sphaerus as leaving the school to go to the fourth Ptolemy, Philopator; and an anecdote he there gives, involving the philosopher Mnesistratus, supports this date⁴. Though there is certainly confusion in Diogenes, both accounts can be accepted; for they relate well enough to his connection with Cleomenes of Sparta. Sphaerus could have gone to Egypt under Ptolemy III, who is known to have supported Cleomenes' activities against the Achaean League: it would not therefore be surprising to find Sphaerus

¹. vii, 178; on Sphaerus cf. Hobein, RE 2.iii (1929), 1683ff.
². The problem is expounded well by Hobein l.c.
⁴. vii, 177.
active in Cleomenes' reforms of the Spartan agoge, and then fleeing with Cleomenes to Egypt, and living there for some time under Ptolemy IV.

Plutarch is the only author to describe Sphaerus' relation with Cleomenes, in his biography of Cleomenes which is drawn largely from the historian Phylarchus¹. In c. 11 he states merely that Sphaerus helped Cleomenes to re-establish the Spartan agoge. There are works of Sphaerus which could well be connected with this period, a work on the Spartan constitution, apparently in at least three books, another on Solon and another on Lycurgus². There seems no reason to doubt that this statement of Plutarch about Sphaerus comes from Phylarchus, for it is firmly embedded in the main narrative.

But an earlier passage in Plutarch is clearly not from Phylarchus³: in c. 2 Plutarch alleges that Cleomenes, when he was young, listened to Sphaerus, who came to Sparta and was active in educating the young there. In the Phylarchean account Cleomenes' political ideas are derived from the earlier reformer Agis; and there was a detailed description of how Cleomenes heard them from his wife, Agiatis, who had

3. cf. Africa o.c. 18.
previously been married to Agis' brother, and also from his lover Xenares: Phylarchus' narrative thus gave no place for a philosophical influence on the young Cleomenes, but described his ideas as formed by recent political developments in Sparta itself. Moreover Plutarch's reference to Sphaerus at this point bears all the marks of an insertion by Plutarch. It is prefaced by the words, 'it is also said that ...', which suggest another tradition. It ends with a moralising comment by Plutarch on the dangerous effect which Stoicism can have on great and impetuous minds. It betrays indeed the same interest, typical of Plutarch, in the philosophical education of the hero, which can be seen in his highly conjectural reconstruction of the influence of Aristotle on the young Alexander. Suspicion can be carried further: whatever the source of the story, it is not likely to be true. Sphaerus cannot have been active in Sparta during the period of reaction after the failure of Agis' reforms: the conservative régime of Leonidas would hardly have permitted that. His stay would therefore have to be placed under Agis himself, and he would have to be brought into connection with the reforms of Agis. But the silence of the sources on any connection

1. Plut. Alex. 7; cf. above p. 50.
between Agis and Sphaerus - and in particular of Phylarchus, who did mention the later relationship between Cleomenes and Sphaerus - would make such a hypothesis extremely unlikely.

The question is bound up with another, which has been much discussed - the extent to which Cleomenes was influenced by the ideas of Sphaerus and Stoicism in his reforms. The Phylarchean account, while mentioning Sphaerus' help in the reconstruction of the _agoge_, leaves little room at any point for the influence of philosophical theories on Cleomenes. But it could be that Phylarchus was biased against Sphaerus and deliberately played down his importance, perhaps obscuring his earlier relations with the king as well as his later importance: such a view is implied by many modern accounts of the ideological background to Cleomenes' reforms.

It is an unlikely supposition. There is nothing in the reforms of Cleomenes to suggest specifically Stoic influence, in distinction from the usual idealisation of the Lycurgan constitution; and the Phylarchean account seems probable enough. Moreover it is obvious that Phylarchus portrayed his hero with all the attributes of an ideal king, conceived on the usual contemporary model - as a king who desired to rule over willing subjects, but if he could not, then to compel them to virtue; as a man refusing the trappings

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1. A selection of these is given in Africa o.c. 16ff.
of court ceremonial, living a simple life, brave and steadfast under adversity, and so on. It is true that none of these is necessarily Stoic, but they do combine to produce a portrait of a man with most of the Stoic virtues. It seems unlikely that Phylarchus, who admired both the personal characteristics of Cleomenes and his political programme, and clearly himself had philosophical interests akin to Stoicism, should systematically have ignored the influence of the philosopher Sphaerus on his hero; Hellenistic writers were more prone to exaggerate such connections than to play them down. It is at least more economical to suppose that Phylarchus' account, though laudatory, is basically accurate, and that Sphaerus was not so much the instigator as the helper of Cleomenes in his reforms.

Yet it matters little whether Sphaerus found Cleomenes a natural Stoic, or how far he encouraged him to form his own will in accordance with Stoic precepts. Cleomenes was a man of whom any Stoic could approve, able to bear misfortune

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1. cf. Plutarch's life passim, esp. c. 1 and 13; F.G.H. 81 F 44. The discourse on suicide in Plut. Cleom. 22 shows Stoic influence. Africa o.c. c. 2 tries to make out that Phylarchus' philosophical leanings are towards Cynicism; but his view is based on a mistaken understanding of the nature of Hellenistic thought on kingship: the evidence he collects is as compatible with Stoicism, and Phylarchus' positive political attitudes suggest that, whatever system it was that attracted him, it was not Cynicism. At least one Cynic, Cercidas, was on the opposite side: Africa o.c. 19f.
and fortune equally, above all concerned to bring his people into the path of virtue. Sparta's problem was that she was firmly caught in her own legend: her reformers always aimed not to change, but to recreate a past - a past which had never existed, and which became more akin to a philosophical utopia as the philosophical works on the Spartan constitution proliferated. Spartan society is the best example in Greece of that phenomenon known to anthropologists as a pseudo-archaic culture. Cleomenes stands firmly in this Spartan tradition; but by his day it was also a Spartan tradition interpreted philosophically. Sphaerus must necessarily approve, and could bring to Cleomenes' aid a knowledge of pseudo-antiquarian detail and an articulate general conception.

Sphaerus' activity is important in another respect. It shows how Stoic political theory did not find any one constitution always better than another. Stoicism inherited from fourth century political thought the notion that the final test of a constitution was whether it made the individual citizen morally better. As Plato saw, there were different ways of attempting to reach this goal; for the Stoics, as for him, ideal kingship might well be one. But in the Spartan context, and given Spartan traditions, the re-establishment of the Spartan ancestral way of life was the obvious answer.
Sphaerus also wrote On Kingship. An anecdote in Diogenes Laertius gives some clue as to the contents of this book. When Mnesistratus accused him of saying that Ptolemy was not a king, Sphaerus replied, 'Ptolemy, being such a man, is also king'. The story presupposes that Sphaerus held the orthodox Stoic position that only the wise man is king; he was being accused of thereby implying that Ptolemy was not a king, and his reply is a piece of flattery with just sufficient ambiguity to preserve his philosophical reputation: for it could be interpreted as a hypothetical, 'if Ptolemy is such a wise man, then he is truly a king'.

Whether or not this anecdote is connected directly to Sphaerus' work On Kingship, it is unlikely to have gained currency if that work had been unorthodox, as it would for instance have been had it been written for Cleomenes. And given Sphaerus' greater awareness of the complexity of politics after his stay at Sparta, and the somewhat strained relations between Cleomenes and Ptolemy IV, it is perhaps more likely that Sphaerus' book On Kingship is an early work, connected (it may be) with his first visit to Egypt under Ptolemy III.

No Stoic says that kingship is the best form of government.

1. Diog. Laert. vii, 177.
It is no more than one of a number of possible forms of which Stoics could approve. It has advantages, and the Stoic will not refuse to use these, to become a king, or advise a king, just as he will not refuse public office in an ordinary city. But the Stoic theory of emotions raised serious problems for the Stoic school in relation to generally accepted views on kingship, and the Stoic theory cannot therefore be seen as central to that tradition. Doubtless Stoic attitudes to kingship were especially important in confirming accepted views in those areas where Stoic theory was not original; for many of their views fitted into the general philosophical and literary characterisation of kingship. The Stoics enriched the theory of kingship in a number of ways, but did not alter its substance; for those peculiarly Stoic doctrines which might have had relevance to kingship are not found in later writers.
'Errare, mehercule, malo cum Platone ... quam cum istis vera sentire' Cicero, Tusc.i,39.

Ever since they were dragged from the decent obscurity of Stobaeus' anthology in 1928, the fragments of various 'Pythagorean' works On Kingship have been in the centre of discussions of Hellenistic ideas about the topic. In his original article E.K. Goodenough went so far as to claim that the Pythagorean 'philosophy of royalty will, I think, prove to have been the official political philosophy of the Hellenistic age', and many have accepted his view: the latest work on the history of ideas of kingship in antiquity bases its account of Hellenistic political philosophy largely on these fragments, and takes their interest in the relation between king and law as the central theme of ideas on kingship in the Greek world.

Goodenough dated the treatises to the late Hellenistic period; a number of other scholars have seen them differently. L. Delatte tried to show, in a full length book devoted to the

1. The following works are cited by authors name and page number alone: E.R. Goodenough, Yale Classical Studies i (1928), 55ff; L. Delatte, Les Traités de la Royauté d'Écphante, Diotogène et Sthenidas (1942); n. Thesleff, An Introduction to the Pythagorean Writings of the Hellenistic Period (1961). The texts of the Pythagorean fragments are best consulted either in Stobaeus or in the conservative edition of Thesleff, The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period (1965), rather than in Delatte's book which is too adventurous in emendation.

2. Goodenough 102.

subject, that these works were written in the first or second centuries A.D.; his arguments, though accepted by Goodenough\(^1\), have in turn been declared unconvincing by H. Thesleff, who would put them in the fourth or third centuries B.C. Fortunately Thesleff was not aware of the fundamentally opposite view of F. Taeger who, on grounds of content, had already placed them firmly in the mid third century A.D.\(^2\)

The treatises in question belong to a group of Pythagorean forgeries which by late antiquity, if the fragments which have survived all really belonged to full length works, must have formed a large library: Stobaeus alone had access to a considerable number of such works. They cover almost every topic 'from cosmology to kingship, from arithmology to cheerfulness'\(^3\). The motives of the forgeries seem to differ. Some are designed to show that other philosophers, and Plato in particular, plagiarised the early Pythagoreans wholesale: the *Timaeus Locrus*, for instance, is a précis in Doric of Plato's *Timaeus*, clearly intended to provide Plato with his source. Other works, however, are modelled on the treatises in existence in other philosophical schools: it is as if that motley band of vegetarians and wizards which thought itself from time to time to be the Pythagorean

\(^1\) In his review of Delatte, *C.R.* xlv (1949), 129ff; it should perhaps be pointed out that Goodenough here confuses L. Delatte with his father A. Delatte.

\(^2\) *Saeculum* vii (1950), 186ff; *Charisma* ii (1960), 60ff; 61ff.

\(^3\) J. D. P. Wolton, *C.R.* xvii (1963), 34.
school felt the need to possess a set of handbooks, just like any real philosophical sect. It is in this group that the treatises On Kingship belong; it is to be expected that their dates of composition may vary considerably: the corpus of pseudepigrapha was being added to continuously. But whatever the conclusion about their dates may be, it is clear that these works belong to a known type: they are derivative, for Kingship was hardly a central topic in the thought of Pythagoras himself or of real Pythagoreans. These treatises cannot be more than a bizarre manifestation of the views and attitudes of more sober schools: they cannot be 'the official political philosophy of the Hellenistic age'. Yet they may still hold some interest, for they are at least preserved in larger fragments than their more reputable models.

The problem of their date is complex. Like the other forgeries, except those attributed to Pythagoras himself or his relatives (which are appropriately in Ionic), they are written in koine, the normal Greek of the Hellenistic and Roman periods, with a superficial and inconsistent Doric colouring. There are some quasi-technical Pythagorean terms, and a number of obvious Doric forms and endings; otherwise the Doric seems largely confined to the substitution of long \( \varkappa \) for \( \gamma \) - rather as if they were the composition of a Greek-speaking donkey. It is difficult to analyse seriously such an outlandish linguistic phenomenon.

Nevertheless arguments from vocabulary have some validity. Delatte was able to point to a number of words, special meanings

of words, and usages, which are otherwise first found in Josephus, Saint Paul, Plutarch and Lucian. While it is perhaps dangerous to conclude from Delatte's analysis that the works must have been written in the first or second centuries A.D., his evidence does point very strongly to a date not earlier than the late Hellenistic period. It is scarcely plausible to argue against this on the grounds of 'the scarcity of the Hellenistic prose texts known to us'; the surviving texts in Hellenistic koine constitute a body of prose literature greater in bulk than from any other period of antiquity before the fourth century A.D., and their contents are as varied as could be desired. Linguistic arguments drawn from an analysis of works of such enormous length as Polybius, the Septuagint, Diodorus, Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Strabo, and also the numerous and varied inscriptions, are likely to be correct.

The doctrines contained in these works are on occasion useful in dating some of them: the Timaeus Locrus for instance contains astronomical views which cannot be earlier than the second century B.C. In the case of the works On Kingship the indications are less clear. Taeger is undoubtedly right to claim that many of the attitudes taken by these writers are closer to those of late antiquity than to the surviving evidence for any other period; in particular, there are parallels with the Hermetic

1. Delatte part ii.
2. Thesleff 66.
treatise Kore Kosmou and with Eusebius' works on Constantine. But such evidence does not prove that the Pythagorean works were written during this period; for the revived interest in 'Pythagoreanism' from the third century A.D. onwards may well have meant that allegedly Pythagorean doctrines on kingship circulated more widely and were received with greater respect than before. More helpful is perhaps the observation of A.-P. Berger that one of the authors (Ecphantus) contains doctrines developed in the middle Stoa or later. Similarly it is disturbing that Pseudo-Archytas uses a version of the theory of distributing justice according to mathematical proportions which is found elsewhere only in the sixth century A.D., in Boethius.

Other evidence will emerge in the course of discussing the individual views of these authors, which, if it does not serve to date them, at the least attests their influence from the fourth century onwards.

What is needed is firm testimony for the existence of these works; it is typical of the elusiveness of their authors that, when such testimony emerges, it fails to offer absolute certainty. Clement of Alexandria quotes a passage from Ecphantus: On Kingship, but he quotes it as being from another work by another author, Eurytus (or Eurysus): On Fortune: this book certainly existed.

1. For the first see below p.263; for the second, N.H. Baynes, Byzantine studies (1955), 16ff - though it is to be noted that Eusebius does not use one of the most distinctive of the Pythagorean ideas, and one which was already firmly in the Christian tradition, the notion of nomos eumpsychos.
3. F.D. Harvey, Class.et Med. xxvi (1965), 123ff.
for a fragment is preserved in Stobaeus\textsuperscript{1}. It would be reasonable to suppose that Clement (or his scribe) had made a mistake\textsuperscript{2}, if it were not for two facts. The passage in the two authors is identical, except for certain case endings; but these changes completely alter its meaning: in Clement the passage refers to God making man in his own image, in \textit{Ecphantus} to God making the king. Which writer has tampered with the text? It is certainly possible that Clement has done so in his desire to produce a striking parallel with Christian doctrine. But it is also clear that the Pythagorean forgers plagiarised each other, and even on occasion repeated themselves in different parts of the same work: \textit{Ecphantus} may well have stolen the passage from an earlier colleague\textsuperscript{3}. Thus the quotation in Clement scarcely offers certain evidence for the date of \textit{Ecphantus}.

A date in the late Hellenistic period for the beginnings of Pythagorean literature on kingship can however be supported by a number of allusions in other authors to doctrines which also appear in these Pythagorean works. Again these allusions offer no certainty, for they could be the result of common sources, or of a more distant interrelationship; but they do at least suggest, either that Pythagorean doctrines were known to some more reputable writers by the first century A.D., or that the doctrines which they contain might well have emerged in the intellectual climate of the late Hellenistic world.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} Stob. i,6,19 p.89 Wachsmuth.
\item \textsuperscript{2} So Thesleff 69.
\item \textsuperscript{3} The evidence in Delatte I/ff.
The phrase νομοί ἐπιφανείας will be discussed more fully later; but it may be that its appearances in ancient literature do shed light on the date of one at least of these works, that by Diotogenes On Kingship. For, although the nexus of ideas which the phrase embodies has forerunners in earlier literature, the phrase itself emerges only in works of the late Republic and early Principate. Cicero in the de legibus describes the function of the magistrate as being to rule according to the law, 'for as the laws govern the magistrates, so the magistrates govern the people; and it can truly be said that the magistrate is a speaking law (legem loquentem), and the law a silent magistrate'. Philo in his life of Moses describes him as νομοί ἐπιφανείας καὶ λογιστής in a later passage he seems to echo even more closely the formulation of Diotogenes: 'it is a king's duty to command what is right and forbid what is wrong; but to command what should be done and forbid what should not be done is the peculiar function of law, so that it follows at once that the king is a living law (νομοὶ ἐπιφανείας), and the law a just king'. Elsewhere Philo talks of the holy men of Israel as ἐγνώστηκαί λογιστής νομοί. Plutarch too may echo the phrase, though this is perhaps more doubtful. Most important, the Stoic writer of the Neronian and Flavian period, Musonius Rufus, says, 'in general it is absolutely necessary that the king should be good and without fault in word and deed, if he must be a living law, as the ancients taught,

1. Also perhaps Archytas On Law and Justice, which uses the same doctrine in passing.
2. de leg. iii,2; cf. perhaps de rep. i,52.
3. Philo, Moses, i,162; ii, 4f; Abr.5; Quod det. 141.
4. Mor. '80c: ἐγνώστηκαί λογιστής as the law within the ruler.
creating lawfulness and concord, banishing lawlessness and
discord, and being an imitator of Zeus and father of his subjects
as Zeus is'.

None of the uses of this phrase need necessarily be derived
from Pythagorean treatises. But Philo knew of pseudo-Pythagorean
works and used them elsewhere; he seems also to reflect another
doctrine of Diotogenes on one occasion. The passage quoted is
sufficiently similar to that in Diotogenes to suggest that he
may have been recalling the work On Kingship specifically.
Similarly Musonius' reference to the ancients (οὐ πατάροον)
would fit a Pythagorean treatise well; and Musonius goes on
to use the notion of the imitation of God, which also appears
as a prominent Pythagorean theme. At the least it can be said
that one of the most striking phrases in Diotogenes is a phrase
which became current in the first centuries B.C. and A.D.

Another Pythagorean treatise On Kingship is also mentioned,
but has not survived; this was allegedly by the Pythagorean
Ocellus from Lucania. In one of the spurious letters of Archytas,
to Plato, he says, 'we have been busy over the question of the
notebooks (Ὣτιος ἐπικαίρων); we went upcountry to Lucania, and
met the descendants of Ocellus. The notebooks on law and
 kingship and holiness and the origin of all things we possess
ourselves and have also sent to you; the rest cannot now be found,
but if any is found it will be sent to you'. Plato's reply is

1. Stob. iv, 1 p. 263 :ense.
2. Cf. L. Brehier, Les idées philosophiques et religieuses de
Philon d'Alexandrie (1923), 18ff.
4. Diog. Laert. viii, 304; Plato Epist. 12. Printed in Thesleff,
preserved in Diogenes Laertius, and in his collection of letters. Thesleff considers that Archytas mentions only one work of Ocellus, and that this work is meant by the forger to provide the Pythagorean source for Plato's Laws and Epinomis combined. This seems to me unlikely; the Pythagoreans do not seem to have provided the original for more than one Platonic work at a time, and the alleged composite title is a very odd way to describe the Laws, which is hardly about kingship; nor is there any parallel to a work with such a monstrous title. In any event a fragment of Ocellus' work On Law survives. Further, the author's use of singular and plural in the letter suggests that he conceived of each οὐδεμία as covering only one topic. It is better therefore to accept the traditional view that Archytas refers to four separate works.

The letter of Archytas and its reply from Plato seem to have two purposes, to demonstrate Plato's plagiarism of Pythagorean teaching, and to validate the authenticity of one particular work, the still extant book 'on the nature (not origin) of all things'. Though it is possible that the correspondence was written later than the work to which it refers, it seems more likely that it is in fact a form of preface to it, guaranteeing the genuineness and antiquity of the book on the occasion of its first publication. Thus the letter of Archytas is probably contemporary with the treatise of Ocellus.

1. Ερανός 1x (1962), 1/ff.
2. Stob.1,13, 2 p.139 Wachsmuth.
3. So R. Harder, Ocellus Lucanus (1920), 45. The argument of Thesleff Ερανός 1.c. 161 is not convincing; of course the letter is in a less pompous style than the treatise; it is a letter, and it is allegedly by a different Pythagorean. The author took a good deal of trouble to fake Plato's style, and was therefore alive to the need for different nuances of style.
The date of this treatise is reasonably certain. The first reference to it is in a passage of Censorinus derived from Varro: Varro himself took the doctrinal section in which the reference occurs from a philosophical compendium of the age of Poseidonius, that is the middle of the first century B.C.\(^1\). Ocellus' work was written either in the second century or (perhaps more probably) in the first half of the first century B.C.\(^2\).

If Archytas' letter refers to two works of Ocellus which existed, can it be assumed that there were also forgeries of the other two books mentioned? This may be so; but to rely on the evidence of the letter is perhaps to underestimate the cunning of its author. He certainly varied the title of the main work in which he was interested; he might very well have disguised his purpose of validating one or two particular works by seeming to validate two others as well, so that the letter should appear to be written for reasons not connected with the genuineness or falseness of the texts with which it appeared. There is no compelling reason to believe that there ever existed works by Ocellus on kingship or holiness. Yet Archytas' reference, however misleading, does at least suggest that books by other Pythagorean writers existed on these subjects: otherwise the curious choice of topics would seem unnatural and arouse suspicion. Thus the mention of a (possibly non-existent) work

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2. *Harde 149* prefers the second century; for reasons connected with the linguistic arguments of Delatte and the probable history of the revival of Pythagoreanism, I would prefer as late a date as possible.
by Ocellus *On Kingship* does provide some support for the notion that Pythagorean works *On Kingship* were already being written by the mid-first century B.C. Whether such works included the extant treatises is perhaps not important; for these treatises show common elements which (it may be assumed) would be found also in any predecessors they may have had. The extant fragments can therefore be regarded as representative of at least a deviant tradition of the theory of Hellenistic kingship.

To determine an upper limit for the production of such works is more difficult, particularly if the possibility that the extant treatises are not the earliest of their type is allowed. Such an attempt must rest on hypotheses about the nature of these works in general, and about the much disputed history of the revival of Pythagoreanism after the fourth century B.C.; a closer look at the treatises themselves may also help by providing some sort of understanding of how Pythagorean doctrines on kingship may have developed.

The four works relevant to a discussion of the 'Pythagorean' theory of kingship are Archytas *On Law and Justice* and three authors of books specifically *On Kingship*, Sthenidas, Diotogenes, and Ecphantus. Two of these authors, Archytas and Ecphantus, had previous incarnations as genuine Pythagoreans, though Ecphantus seems to have forgotten Attic and learned Dorian in the meantime. Sthenidas may be identical with the Sthenonidas mentioned by

1. It is perhaps significant that the two works of Diotogenes known to have existed are precisely *On Kingship* and *On Holiness*, the two titles mentioned by Archytas.
Iamblichus in his list of Pythagoreans; Diogenes is a spontaneous creation.

The origin of the 'Pythagorean' approach to kingship can be seen most clearly in Archytas' work On Law and Justice, where mention of kingship is firmly embedded in a longer discussion of other topics. According to Archytas, the unwritten laws of the gods are the origin of the written laws of men, and the relationship of law to the soul and life of man is like the relationship of harmony to sounds and music. Every society is made up of three elements, the ruling, the ruled, and the laws. There are two types of law, the animate king and the inanimate written law. It is with reference to the law that the king is lawful, the rulership fitting and the ruled free, and so the whole community is happy; if it is infringed, the king becomes a tyrant, the ruled slaves, and the whole community unhappy.

Action is a combination of ruling, being ruled, and power. Ruling is appropriate to the better, being ruled to the worse element, power to both: thus reason rules the soul, the irrational is ruled, and both have power over the passions. From the harmony of each of these arises virtue, which leads the soul away from pleasure and pain into calmness and freedom from passion.

The next fragments concern the role of law in constitutions; it must be in conformity with nature, powerful over public affairs.

1. Vit.Pythag. 26/.
2. Stob. iv,1, 132; 135–0; iv, 5,01; there is a detailed commentary on these fragments in A.uelatte, Essai sur la politique Pythagoricienne (1922), 11–124. The discussion of Goodenough 59ff exaggerates the amount of kingship theory in them.
3. Stob.iv,1,132; 135.
and appropriate to the political community; if any of these is lacking, the law is either non-existent or imperfect. Archytas then discusses the conditions for fulfilling these three criteria; in particular laws must vary according to the political community they must serve. There are three types of justice, democratic, oligarchic (or tyrannical) and aristocratic, which distribute power according to geometric, arithmetical and sub-contrary (a technical Pythagorean term for harmonic) proportions. The best constitution is a mixed constitution, like the Spartan. Law must concern itself primarily with important subjects, from which lesser laws take their lead; the best situation is when law is embodied in the way of life of the citizen, rather than in explicit enactment. The best type of punishment is shame rather than the use of fines; the best type of state is that which is self-sufficient; luxury should be excluded. The law engraved in the hearts of citizens will make them self-sufficient, and give what is fitting to each. So the sun distributes what is fitting to the whole world; and that is why Zeus has the titles υἱὸς νόμος and νόμος ἀριστοκρατίας (shepherd and distributor).

The final fragment discusses the attributes of the true ruler (not the king)\(^2\). He must have understanding and power and love of mankind (φιλοτέχνη); for it would be strange for a shepherd to hate his flock. He must also be lawful, for so he will have an understanding of rule. By his understanding he will judge correctly, by his power he will punish, by his goodness he will provide benefits (ἐνέργειαν); by means of the laws he will  

1. 136-8.  
2. Contra Goodenough 60.
do everything according to reason: the best ruler is he who is closest to the law, doing nothing in his own interest, but only in that of his subjects, like the law.\footnote{Stob. iv, 5, ol.}

The doctrines of pseudo-Archytas contain a superficial Pythagorean colouring; the search for triads everywhere, the use of mathematical proportions, and the insistence on harmony are all obvious ideas for a forger to pick on. But behind this lies an analysis of law and of the best constitution which seems closest to Peripatetic views: the mixed constitution is that found in Peripatetic writers, and popularised in the late Roman Republic; so too the late Republic knew of Peripatetic views on the statesman, the man in political power who was not a king. The discussion of law, though it lays greater emphasis on unwritten law, is not unlike that in Aristotle's \textit{Politics}, and could well come from later Peripatetic sources. On the other hand Stoic influence can be seen in the passage about the sun's beneficent activities and the titles of Zeus.

It is of course possible that, so far from being derivative, pseudo-Archytas is the source of all these various Peripatetic, Stoic and perhaps Platonic views\footnote{A. Delatte \textit{o.c.} 121ff was inclined to think the work genuine.}. Yet it would be remarkable if in such a short series of fragments there was to be found the essence of so many doctrines held by such a variety of different schools. Moreover at least one of these doctrines, that of the three proportions, so far from being the source of fourth century writers, is clearly derivative on them, and not found again in this particular form before the sixth century A.D.\footnote{Harvey \textit{l.c.}}.
conclusion emerges from Archytas' brief reference to the sun and to the titles of Zeus, where the close parallel, even in the order of the two images, to Dio of Prusa, suggests dependence on a Stoic source. Further to see this amalgam of ideas common in the late Hellenistic age as the original thoughts of a real Archytas is to misunderstand the nature of the treatise. There is no argument in it, merely the brief and dogmatic exposition of doctrine. It is a handbook, a breviarium, not a serious philosophical work, and belongs in spirit with the other eclectic expositions of philosophical doctrines, such as that of Areius.

Pseudo-Archytas mentions kingship only in passing. He seems to take the same attitude towards it as Plato's Statesman and as the passage on ideal kingship in Aristotle. There is no essential difference apparently between kingship and aristocracy; and the king can be seen as himself one type of law, living law: the notion, though not the word χάσαμεν, is found in both Plato and Aristotle. Thus the origin of one of the most distinctive concepts in the Pythagorean works on kingship can perhaps be seen in an interpretation of Platonic and Peripatetic doctrine; and, given the probable reading habits of Pythagorean forgers, Plato is the more likely source.

The short fragments of the work of Sthenidas On Kingship introduces the other main theme in these Pythagorean doctrines, and again points to a Platonic origin, though perhaps with other later influences as well. According to Sthenidas the king

1. Above, p. 225
2. Stou, iv. 7, 63 p. 270 n. 1. A detailed commentary on Sthenidas is given by L. Delatte 2/4ff.
must be wise; thus he will be a copy and imitator of the highest god. God rules the universe with his divine wisdom (σοφία) the king rules the earth with knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). The way that the king will best imitate God is by showing himself magnanimous, and merciful and undemanding, and by acting like a father to his subjects; for this is the reason that the highest god is thought to be father of gods and men, because of his gentleness and foresight: he is not satisfied with being merely the creator of all things, but is also their nourisher and teacher, and lawgiver. So should the king be. Nothing which is without a king or ruler is good, and no king can exist without wisdom and knowledge: so the wise and lawful king will be the imitator of God.

There is considerable confusion in this fragment over the question whether the king possesses only knowledge, or whether he also has wisdom: Sthenidas does not appear to pay much attention to his initial distinction between the attributes of king and God; this is perhaps a sign that his work is more concerned with the question of providing Pythagoreans with another work On kingship than a product of a true theoretical interest in kingship. The analogy between God and the perfect king is discussed at length in Plato's Statesman¹; and it was a commonplace of the Hellenistic world that kings were descended from or in some sense under the special protection of Zeus². The idea

1. 268ff, esp. 2/5.
that the king should imitate God is an obvious extension of the views expressed by Plato, in the light of such Hellenistic claims. It was doubtless put forward in a number of places: it is, for instance an essential part of the Stoic view that the divine monotheism is mirrored in the human monarchy. But it may still be significant that the author who lays most emphasis on the absolute necessity for the king to imitate God is an Alexandrian Jew of the late Hellenistic period, Aristeas¹.

What in Plato and the Hellenistic poets was an unimportant aspect of kingship, and in the Stoics little more than part of the argument in favour of monarchy, takes a central position in Sthenidas and the other Pythagorean treatises: this is perhaps one sign that their ideas were produced in the syncretistic religious climate of late Hellenistic Alexandria.

The two elements found in Archytas and Sthenidas, of the king as law and the king as imitator of God, are combined in the fragments of Diotogenes². This author is primarily interested in making distinctions; he is considerably more coherent and rigorous than his colleagues. But the impression of rigour is a little misleading, for few of his distinctions are followed up, and they seem made on no particular basis; it is as if he were copying the methodology of other schools such as the stoic, Diotogenes does indeed begin with an interesting argument in a manner reminiscent of Stoic practice: 'the king will be the most

¹. Below part II, chapter 2.
². For a detailed commentary see Delatte 245ff.
just man; the most just man will be the most lawful. Without justice no-one will be king; without law there would be no justice; justice is in the law, for the law is the source of justice: the king is either living law or a lawful ruler. Therefore he is the most just and the most lawful. Here, starting from the common idea that the ideal king should possess perfect justice, Diotogenes argues that, because justice is dependent on law, the king should have a special relationship to law; he should either be 'animate law' or a lawful ruler: that is, presumably, he should either embody the law, ruling without law, or rule in accordance with the laws. The doctrine is an interpretation of Plato's Statesman, where, as Diogenes Laertius says in his account of Platonic doctrine, two types of kingship are recognised, the perfect kingship and the king under the law.

Diotogenes next discusses the three functions of a king, as general, judge, and priest. In the first function he is compared to the pilot, the charioteer and the doctor. In the second he is concerned with law in general and in particular cases, and in doing good (ευτυγχάνει) to his subjects: in this activity he is compared to God. The third function is justified on the grounds that it is right for 'the best to be honoured by the best man, and the governing principle by the governor'; both God and king are best in their spheres; the king is to the city as God is to the universe, and as the city is to the world so the

1. Stob. iv, 7, 01 p. 203 n. sense.
2. Diog. Laert. iii, 02.
king is to God. The city harmonised together from different elements imitates the order and harmony of the universe; and the king as possessing unchecked rule (κύριός τῆς ζωῆς) and himself being living law has been changed into a god among men.

Again among the dry categories of Diotogenes there is the Pythagorean delight in finding triads, and in playing about with ratios. There are also a number of more orthodox analogies, both Platonic and Stoic (the charioteer, doctor, etc; the world as a city); and there is a reference to the Platonic and Aristotelian notion of the 'god among men'. But one particular view of Diotogenes is very odd, his division of the functions of the king into those of general, judge and priest. Diotogenes might have found the idea for his division in Peripatetic thought: Aristotle says of Homeric kings that they were 'in charge of leadership in war, and non-priestly sacrifices, and also judged cases'. But here Aristotle does after all exclude the priestly function. Diotogenes might perhaps have been thinking of the chief functions of the archons at Athens, though no ancient author seems to have commented on this threefold division, or set polemarch, archon basileus and thesmothetai apart. The notion of the king as priest is indeed one which is foreign to Greek political theory. Kings might have had in the distant past some priestly functions; in the Hellenistic world they might be priests of certain cults; but the idea that priesthood should be one of their central duties is not found. The Ptolemies, it is true,
from the point of view of the native Egyptian population, held a central position in the priestly hierarchy; Diotogenes may have been thinking of this. The closest parallel however to Diotogenes' threefold division is in Philo's life of Moses, where he offers a very similar triad, of king, lawgiver and priest; it is a view obviously influenced by Jewish ideas. The parallel is close, but not exact. Again it is perhaps possible to point to the position of the Roman emperor, particularly in late antiquity. In this doctrine of Diotogenes indeed I am inclined to see either Egyptian or (more probably) Jewish influence, or a sign that Diotogenes was writing in the late empire.

The second fragment of Diotogenes is also interesting. He discusses the various vices kings are prone to. The king must not be conquered by pleasure, for he who wishes to rule others must rule himself (a well known Socratic doctrine). The king's desire for wealth is justified as necessary to his beneficence and to the protection of his kingdom. His pre-eminence should rest on his virtue, not his power. These three statements are then related to what is in origin the Platonic threefold division of the soul; desire for wealth is related to reason, love of honour and power to the spirited element, love of pleasure to the passionate element. This very curious passage is, as Delatte shows, dependent on the doctrine found in two other pseudo-

Pythagorean treatises, where the three parts of the soul have

1. Moses i, 334; cf. Jos. Ant. i, 88; Jos. ii, 1-8 for other similar Jewish distinctions.
2. Stob. iv, 1, 62 p. 203 n. sense.
3. See Delatte 256.
their specific virtues and vices: the vices are those of Diotogenes.

The rest of the fragment is more orthodox. The king must bring the city into harmony by means of law. He must behave fittingly and without airs towards those he meets. For this purpose he must firstly be grave, and appear worthy of rule in both looks and speech; secondly he must be gracious in conversation and appearance, and in his good actions; thirdly he must be awesome in punishing wrongdoers. Of these three attributes the first makes him marvilled at and honoured by the people like a god; the second makes him loved, and the third makes him feared by his enemies and revered by his friends. Diotogenes expands on these three attributes without adding much to the argument; in all these aspects the king must remember that kingship is a thing which imitates divinity.

The apparent practicality of Diotogenes in this section is illusory; his main interest is in fitting an already existing triad of Pythagorean vices into a theory of kingship. Diotogenes' main contribution to Pythagorean thought on the subject is indeed

2. In a desperate moment W.W. Tarn tried to extract a date from these recommendations; they were written, he said, under Demetrius Poliorcetes: P.S.A. xix (1933), 152 n.33; Alexander the Great ii (1950), 410 n.1. But the parallels he adduces with Plutarch's life and Diodorus are hardly convincing; and his claim that 'one of the extraordinary things about Demetrius was that (professed historians apart) no one, not even legend, took any further notice of him once the generation which had known him was dead' (Alexander l.c.) is shown to be false by the very next passage in Plutarch (Dem.3), and by Philod. Π α.β. col.478,3; even if the passage did refer to Demetrius, it would not date it to his lifetime.
in his attempt at systematisation, largely through an indiscriminate use of triads. His system is scarcely a genuine attempt to rethink the problems of monarchy; he is derivative, partly on other philosophical views of monarchy, and partly on Pythagorean works on other subjects.

Of these Pythagorean writers, Ἠκέβανθος is the most imaginative; his view of kingship has considerable mystical power, is well integrated into a Pythagorean conception of the universe, and largely devoid of practical doctrine.¹

Ἠκέβανθος begins with an account of the universe.² All living things are attuned to it, and it is itself a living and breathing entity, the most perfect of living beings. In the many and varied parts of the universe, some one living thing rules, being of the same origin as the others, but sharing more in the divine. Ἠκέβανθος deals first with the divine sphere and the region of the fixed planets. In the region of the moon, the demonic spirit has its abode. On earth man is the highest being, but he is weighed down by his origin and far below the divine, scarcely able to leave his mother earth, if it were not for some divine breath in him, leading him to the vision of his creator. The king is more divine than other men,
being the same form as them, as made from the same material, but
made by the supreme craftsman in his own image. The king, as
a single and unique creation, is a model of the higher king,
known always to his maker and seen by his subjects in a kingly
light. Thus is the king tested like the eagle, which flies to
the heights and looks on the sun, while lesser birds become
dizzy and blinded, like pretenders to royal power. Kingship
is a pure and indestructible thing, difficult for a man to
achieve because of its excessive divinity; a man who lives in
it must be pure in spirit and share in its immaculate nature,
knowing himself to be superior to others. If other men sin,
the holiest purification is to make themselves like their rulers,
whether these be law or king. The good order of the universe,
where nothing is without rule, teaches the king how to rule
by the nature of its own government. The king imitates God,
and is loved by God and by mankind. Nothing hates God, but
all follow him willingly; so the earthly king must in no way
fall short of the heavenly king; he is an alien thing come down
from heaven. There must be communion (κοινωνία) between
king and subjects, just as there is between the heavenly king
and those he rules; this is true even of the ordinary political
community (Cephantus specifically excludes the sort of common
communion arising from economic interdependence; this is not
relevant to the self-sufficiency of God and king); the lower
harmony imitates the harmony of the universe. In order to
produce this harmony, a city needs laws and a ruler who has
friendship and communion with his subjects, and who is regarded with goodwill by them.

If Ecphantus has taken more care than his fellow authors to relate his views to Pythagorean doctrines on the universe, and to produce an etiology of the king, behind his analysis lies the same analogy as is found in them, the idea that the king is an image of God, and must imitate him. Other details show that Ecphantus has developed this doctrine further: the idea that the king is a being intermediate between God and man is based on the earlier Pythagorean view that Pythagoras himself, or the wise man, was some form of intermediate spirit; this is an idea which appears even in Aristotle as specifically Pythagorean. But there is no mention of kings in this connection before Porphyry in the late third century A.D.; such an extension of the doctrine seems neo-Pythagorean or neo-Platonic.

The doctrine of Ecphantus on the relation between king and the universe appears in fact in almost identical form in the Hermetic treatise known as the Νόες Κοσμοῦ, which adds to the theory a number of strange details about the means of the king's descent to earth, and about his attendants. These facts do not of course offer certain evidence for dating Ecphantus, for he could be the source of Porphyry, and probably is the source of the Νόες Κοσμοῦ.

Ecphantus' conception may owe something to Egyptian ideas on

2. Porphyry ad Iliad 1,340 ed. Schrader; cf. Schol. BT. ad loc.
3. Corpus Hermeticum ed. Rock and Restugière F 24 (iv, p.32ff); cf. also iii, cxxxviii f; W. Scott, Hermetica iii (1926), 55ff.
the Pharaohs, although it has been firmly placed by him in a Pythagorean cosmology. Less plausibly, it has been suggested that the image of the eagle and of the light which surrounds the king go back to Persian ideas on kingship. For the fable of the testing of the eagle is a famous one in the Greco-Roman world from the time of Aristotle onwards; as M.H. Fisch caustically remarked, 'the sun shines and there are eagles and kings in Greece, too'. In general it must be admitted that the whole spirit of Echphantus' account is mystical and religious, closer to neo-Pythagoreanism and neo-Platonism than to any other school; if it were not for the worrying testimony of Clement, he would have been generally agreed to belong to late antiquity.

Much the same impression is given by the second extract from Echphantus; this deals with the virtue of the king, which is identical with the virtue of the good man. The ideal is the life of self-sufficiency (οἶκος ἑαυτῶν); but if a man must live the active life, then he will remain as close as possible to his ideal, not amassing possessions. The king will have friends, but he will make use of them in accordance with the same standards as he uses in his own life. God has no servants or

1. Nock and Festugière p. cxxxix.
2. Goodenough 78ff.
3. Delatte 204.
4. M.H. Fisch, A.J.P. lvi (1937), 146; Fisch's attack on Goodenough's views was the first, and is still worth reading.
5. Stob. iv, 7,65.
ministers, but inspires in men the desire to imitate him; the imitation of God consists in self-sufficiency, and the king will lead his people towards it by his own example. Compulsion is no good, for imitation requires goodwill; it is the baseness of man's nature which makes compulsion and persuasion necessary. The king alone can give mankind this good; his logos strengthens, heals and drives out the forgetfulness which comes as a result of sin.

The third fragment concerns the relation of this central virtue of self-sufficiency to the other virtues, and in particular to four 'cardinal' virtues. The king as having a holy and divine mentality will be the cause of all goods, just imbued with the spirit of community (κοινωνία), continent, wise. The 'cardinal' virtues for Ecphantus are then γνώση, καλοσύνη, ἔγκρισις, and κόσμος. This is a formulation which can be seen as mere variation on the usual canon. ἔγκρισις has replaced συνεργία, perhaps because the connotations of that word are too closely tied to ideas about Socrates. More surprisingly λάτρεια has disappeared, to be replaced by κόσμος, a word difficult to translate; in Ecphantus it seems to be inserted as a 'Pythagorean' word for the more usual 'love of mankind', φιλανθρωπία. Thus Ecphantus shows signs of altering the doctrine of the four cardinal virtues in two ways; firstly by variation for its own sake, or rather in order to suggest a certain esoteric strangeness about the 'Pythagorean' version of the idea; and secondly by a change which makes the doctrine

1. Stob. iv, 7, 66.
more appropriate to the virtues of a king, while again avoiding
the obvious word in favour of a 'Pythagorean' one.

More interesting is perhaps Ecphantus' emphasis on
self-sufficiency as the central virtue of the good man, and its
justification in terms of imitation of the self-sufficiency of
God. The self-sufficiency of the wise man was a common doctrine
of most Hellenistic philosophical schools\(^1\), but an ethic based
on the notion of autarkia is found most prominently in the
Abderite\(^2\) and Cynic schools. The argument from the self-
sufficiency of God may perhaps be an extension of the comparison
of God and king which is a central theme of these Pythagoreans;
in this case it is perhaps significant that the earliest writer
to state clearly the notion of the self-sufficiency of a
personal God is Philo\(^3\). But it is perhaps more likely that
Ecphantus is reinterpreting in the political sphere what was
in origin an ethical doctrine related to the wise man: such an
emphasis on self-sufficiency recalls again the neo-Platonic
view of the wise man.

Ecphantus works basically from the same position as his
fellow writers. He is fundamentally playing variations on the
theme of the king as imitator of God; but, more than the other
writers on kingship, he managed to create out of a Pythagorean

cosmology and Pythagorean attitudes to the 'divine man' an

\(1\) See in general the article 'autarkie' by I. Milpert,
Reallexicon f.Ant. u.Christ. i (1950), 1039ff, with bibliog-
ophy.

\(2\) Cf. esp. Diels 68 \& 4 (Hecateus of Abdera); there is also
considerable play with the idea in the frag.ments of Democritus,
genuine or false.

\(3\) Cf. e.g. de spec. leg. i,2,7; cf. Delatte 230f; 242f.
account of kingship which fitted into pythagorean philosophy. Thus, his mystical approach, and his insistence on self-sufficiency bring him closer to the neo-pythagoreans of the late empire than either of his competitors. Certainly his work was known and used then, but we are not perhaps entitled therefore to date him to the third or fourth centuries. For the mind and imagination of the mystic are to some extent outside time; they confound the expectations of the mere historian.

The Pythagorean conception of kingship is constructed out of two main elements. The first of these is the principle of the king as an imitator of God, which is found in all three works On Kingship. The analogy is a simple one, but exceedingly fruitful, as generations of Christian writers have found. It enables the theorist to enrich his conception of the king with a great range of divine attributes, and to draw on the arguments for monotheism; in the opposite direction, it allows him to portray the mysteries of the divinity in a series of concrete images of majesty\(^1\). To some extent this analogy was always present in Greek thought from Homer onwards. But it has been seen especially working in both directions in stoeic thought; and there is ample evidence of its use in the Jewish literature of the Hellenistic age, especially in messianic thought\(^2\). To find Pythagorean forgeries using such notions is not perhaps surprising; they may have been more prominent in the

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2. Cf. below p. 312 ff.
Christian era, but they were also well known earlier. The use of this idea does however set Pythagoreanism outside the mainstream of Hellenistic philosophical thought on kingship, which saw the perfect king as the man of perfect virtue, rather than as a semi-divine being. Even the theoretical attitudes to the cult of king-worship are euhemeristic: they see the king as potentially capable of becoming divine because of his benevolences to mankind. Just as the gods and heroes, it was claimed, were men or kings who had received worship as a result of their good actions, so the present monarchs of this world might achieve the same. This is a rational, not a religious approach: it gives the king divinity at the expense of bringing the divine down to earth, of setting it in a context of concrete beneficent activity. In contrast, the Pythagoreans seem intent on raising kingship to heaven.

The second aspect of Pythagorean thought which requires discussion is their emphasis on the superiority of kingship to law, or rather the immanence of the law in the king, as expressed in the phrase θαυμάζω το υπάρχον. This phrase has recently been elevated to the position of the central doctrine of Hellenistic thought on kingship:

"It should be noted once again that the idea of the king as animate law lay at the center of the whole system. Once the king was admitted to be law incarnate and therefore the only source of law in society, he became the essence of the state and in a way the state itself. It was this concept which provided Hellenistic politico-philo-

sophical speculation with a solid framework that stood up to the attacks of the most skeptical critics. It was also the most important contribution made by the Hellenistic age to political thought of all ages; a contribution which found favour with the Romans, was passed on to, and transformed by, the Jews and the Eastern Christians, and finally reappeared in a different shape in the West, where it left its mark on the political thought of the Middle Ages and occupied the political stage from the Renaissance to modern times.¹

In the face of such claims it is important to delimit the problem. The phrase νομοι ἀρχαῖοι has been found in the following authors: among pagans the pseudo-Pythagoreans Archytas and Diogenes, Philo, Musonius Rufus, and Themistius; among Christians, Clement of Alexandria, Lactantius, Isidore of Pelusium, and Justinian. To these may perhaps be added Cicero and Plutarch². That is all; it does not appear in such authors in the mainstream of kingship thought as Aristeas, Dio of Prusa, Eusebius or Synesius. On this evidence it cannot be conceived of as a doctrine central to Hellenistic kingship thought.

Indeed it is not even central to Byzantine political thought; Justinian himself referred to it only in passing, and A. Steinwenter

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1. F. Dvornik, Early Christian and Byzantine Political Philosophy (1966), 276f.
2. The complete list of passages is: Archytas, Stob. iv, 1, 135; Diogenes, iv, 7, 61; Philo, Moses i, 162; ii, 3, 4f; Abr. 5: Quod deis 141; Musonius ap. Stob. iv, 7, 67; Themistius Or. v, 64b; viii, 118d; xvi, 212d; xix, 228a; Clement Strom. i, 26, 167, 3; ii, 4, 15, 4; Lactantius, div. Inst. iv, 17; iv, 25; Isidore Ep. 300 (PG 78, 976); Justinian Novell. cv, 2, 4. cf. possibly Cic. de leg. iii, 2 (cf. de rep. i, 32); Plut. ad. princ. inerud. 780c. Dvornik claims to detect traces of the doctrine in Seneca, Pliny, Dio, Ephraem, Ulpian, Origen, the kerygma Petri, the Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti, Ambrose, Synesius and Agapetus; I find none of these instances convincing.
in his excellent study of the history of the phrase, has pointed out how seldom it occurs in Byzantine writings, although it described so well the actual situation and despite its presence both in Justinian's Novellae and in that central Byzantine school-author, Themistius. The doctrine of 'lex animata' indeed first attained wide circulation in the thirteenth century, under the influence of the Glossators, and the example of Frederick II. The traces that can be found in the ancient world and in Byzantium are traces, not of a lost doctrine, but of one as yet unformulated.

Indeed, to speak of a doctrine at all is misleading; for, as L. Delatte and Steinwenter have pointed out, the phrase νομος ειναι ψυχα is a phrase which can be used to designate not one idea, but several. To take only the two extremes, it can describe a position where the king, being the law himself, is source of law and above the law (a sort of primitive theory of sovereignty). But Cicero can talk of the magistrate as a living law, meaning that he is bound by the laws, and embodies them as a judge who enforces them -- an interpretation which was still possible in the fifth century A.D.; for that is how Isidore of Pelusium understood the phrase. A phrase which can be taken in two such utterly opposed ways can hardly be thought of as a doctrine.

The connotations of νομος ειναι ψυχα for each author who uses it are different. For Philo it recalls the patriarchs and law-

2. E. Kantorowicz, Varia Variorum (Festgabe K.Reinhardt 1952), 163ff.
givers of Israel, men who exemplified the Law of God by their upright life, and especially Moses, who was the original of the Jews. For Clement the phrase is connected with the Philonian Moses, and the ideal Platonic Statesman; and here and in Lactantius it is also identical with the Animate Word, Christ the Divine Logos. Themistius, though not perhaps entirely unaware of the Christian interpretation, is describing a neo-Platonic version of the perfect statesman of Plato, and perhaps of Aristotle's exoteric works. Justinian avails himself of a pagan and ancient phrase to disguise his new claims to a legalistic absolutism, just as he took phrases from earlier jurists and emperors, which in them referred only to the laws of inheritance, to justify the global doctrine, 'princeps legibus solutus'.

Thus the idea itself has no history; there is only the changing use of a phrase. There are three important influences. The Stoic doctrine of the wise man as king, as absolute and yet ruled by the logos within himself is one probable source, for the Stoic definition of is . Then there is the Platonic conception of the perfect king as above the law, and himself being the law. These influences may be suspected in Cicero, Philo, the pseudo-Pythagoreans, Musonius, Plutarch and Clement. Then the Christian identification of Christ with the made the transfer of such ideas into Christian thought easy. But the actual phrase is so uncommon that I suspect that it should in principle be possible to construct
a stemma showing its progression from author to author with an ever-changing content; the problem is where in this progression to place Archytas and Diotogenes.

This is not to deny that the phrase is connected with a nexus of problems concerning the relation between king and law—central problems, which were only desultorily discussed in Hellenistic and Roman thought, and not solved until Justinian cut the Gordian knot. The identification of king and law is obviously one way out, crude and unsatisfactory though it may be. But it is not the only way out, nor is it the one usually taken by Hellenistic political thought; and as a doctrine it is not necessarily connected with the phrase νομίζεις ἐν κυρίων. These problems were so difficult and so dangerous (for they could be seen as questioning the legitimacy of the present government) that they were often passed over.

When Hellenistic writers do touch on the relationship of king and law, they are in general insistent that the king must obey the laws; their insistence may merely disguise the unfortunate fact that he rarely did, but such practical considerations were not allowed to affect the theory. So Hecataeus of Abdera and Aristeas agree on this point. The sources which tell the anecdote allegedly about Anaxarchus' comforting of Alexander after the murder of Cleitus, are shocked at his claim that the king is not bound by the law. Anaxarchus may have put such a view forward theoretically; but the only time known when a king

2. Arrian, iv, 97ff; Plut.Alex. 52, v; Nor. 781a; cf. above p. 146ff.
made public appeal to such a doctrine was when Seleucus called his army together to approve the marriage of his wife and his son, Antiochus. There was little else he could say in defence of a proposal so fundamentally shocking to Greek and Macedonian opinion: 'I shall not cite as a precedent to you the customs of the Persians or of other peoples, so much as this law common to all, that what the king decides is always right.' Otherwise the Hellenistic world is silent on the existence of such a doctrine.

The origin of the phrase νομοδοκία ἐν φύσει for the various writers who use it is not in the practical world of politics, but in particular interpretations of earlier theoretical works, especially Plato. Certain passages in fourth century writers do offer some prefiguration of it. Xenophon describes the good ruler as a 'seeing law' (Ἀλκενοῦντι νόμοι)²; both Plato in the Statesman and Aristotle in book iii of the Politics discuss the situation where the king rules without law, being himself the law³. A passage from Clement shows how, from such material and particularly from Plato, a doctrine involving νομοδοκία ἐν φύσει could be derived⁴.

Discussing the relation between law, right reason and Christ as the Logos, Clement adduces a series of Platonic

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1. Appian Syr. 325.
2. Cyrop. viii, 1,22.
3. Plato Polit. 295e ff; 311b-c; Aristotle Polis. iii,1234al4; 1230c2 are the most relevant passages; cf. Ποιησις, v, 1132a22 where the juryman is described as trying to be a sort of living justice (δικαιοσύνη ἐν φύσει); also Plato Laws, 615c.
statements from the Euthydemus, the Statesman and the Minos. He continues, 'then later [in the Minos] he says clearly, "the right would therefore be lawful and law, being by nature right reason and not written or recorded". And the Eleatic stranger shows the royal and political man to be living law'. Similarly the law of Christ is royal and living, and right reason; a little later he adduces Speusippus: 'Speusippus in book i of his To Cleophon seems to write statements similar to Plato when he says, "if kingship is a good, and only the wise man is king and ruler, then the law being right reason is good", which it is'. Clement goes on to cite the Stoic doctrine that only the wise man is king, priest, prophet, lawgiver and so on.

In this cento of ancient writers designed to illustrate Christ as king and right reason, it is interesting to note the freedom with which Clement exploits them, the way he re-writes the Stoic doctrine of the wise man to include the attributes of the Jewish patriarchs, and his use of imaginative quotation (for his quotation is not in fact found in that form in the Minos). The interpretation of the argument of the Eleatic stranger in the Statesman is however perfectly legitimate: Plato did in essence argue that the perfect king would be living law, even if he did not use that phrase; and Clement is able to find support for his interpretation in Speusippus, in the discussion of the perfect king which Plato's views inspired in the early Academy: Speusippus' work belongs with Aristotle's Statesman.

and with the Academic interest in Platonic ideas seen in *Politics* iii.

So it may be assumed that the Pythagoreans too, in seeking to provide themselves with a distinctive doctrine on kingship turned to their usual source, Plato, and interpreted his most obviously relevant dialogue as Clement had done, adding in perhaps certain later Academic ideas, and (more particularly) Stoic ones.

The Pythagorean treatises are in many respects derivative. They cannot stand at the beginning of a tradition on kingship. They take their doctrines from other Hellenistic works, and from Plato, and construct their theory by exaggerating certain tendencies to be found in their sources. In form too they are of the type of popular handbook common to most Hellenistic schools. Since Pythagoreanism had no real concern for kingship, they are likely to be later than the earliest Pythagorean forgeries; Ecphantus in particular used previous treatises from the same workshop. Their purpose is literary, not political; they offer no new doctrine immediately transferable into practical terms, but are designed to fill a gap in the Pythagorean library, to complete the canon. As maverick productions from a maverick school, they are difficult to date or to place in any particular environment. Internal evidence might suggest that the earliest was pseudo-Archytas, who perhaps provided the source for Diotogenes' more extravagant views on \( \Phi\lambda\alpha\eta\gamma\varepsilon\tau\omicron\sigma\nu \); Ecphantus might seem to be later in the series. There is no difficulty in seeing them as having been written in the late Hellenistic period;
any earlier date goes against the linguistic and (to a lesser extent) the doctrinal content.

External evidence suggests also that the notion that a Pythagorean might write a work *On Kingship* was tenable by the mid-first century B.C.; the idea of "Pythagorean" seems to have been known to Philo and *Musonius Rufus*, and possibly as early as Cicero. The late Republic indeed saw a revival of interest in Pythagoreanism in educated circles at Rome, and there is some sign that the Pythagorean forgers were catering for such a taste. Thus for instance Archytas approves of the traditional analysis of the Roman constitution, the mixed constitution; and the twelfth letter of Plato, connected with the works of Ocellus Lucanus, makes great play with the Trojan origin of the Lucanians - an appeal perhaps to the Roman interest in their own Trojan origin. Thesleff wished to divide the Pythagorean pseudepigrapha as a whole into two groups, those written in the cultural centres of the Greek speaking world, and those written in South Italy; but the evidence he relied on is not strong. Pythagoreanism was after all a western phenomenon: the names of the authors of these treatises will necessarily be western names, and other western allusions can readily be explained as local colour deliberately added, or as intended to appeal to an audience at least in part western. It is hard to believe that a lively industry in forgeries existed in such decaying and malarial provincial towns

1. Thesleff 99ff; I disregard the fact that he would date the works considerably earlier, for reasons given above.
as Tarentum. The eclecticism of the doctrine in these treatises suggests a flourishing intellectual centre; and their apparent contacts with eastern, and especially Jewish thought might point to Alexandria, whence the books could be exported to any area in need of the true doctrine. The traditional view of Zeller and others has more to commend it than any alternative, especially in relation to the works On Kingship, which show a striking insistence on monotheism and on the relation between God and king, and which seem to have been known to Philo. And if any more immediate motive than religious zeal be required for the fabrication of a corpus on kingship, it might be recalled that one king in particular was interested in Pythagoreanism and prepared to pay high prices for Pythagorean works - a king who had close contacts in his youth with Rome (where he was brought up), and through his wife with Alexandria - the antiquarian and eccentric King Juba II of Mauretania, married to the daughter of Antony and Cleopatra, a man to satisfy whom it is said that many Pythagorean works were forged. What more suitable and welcome subject than kingship, especially if it proved him divine and above the law?

Yet there is something refreshing and sympathetic about these productions; we feel with them a sense of the novelist's relief, who 'saw the Houseion, for example, with its sulky,

1. Cf. I Levy, La légende de Pythagore de Grèce en Palestine, Bibl. de l'Ecole des hautes études ccl (1927), 13 ff. See also Härder's claim to have found a reminiscence of Genesis in Ocellus: Ocellus Lucanus 128 ff.
2. Cf. Thesleff 46 ff; I do not regard his objections to the Alexandrian hypothesis as strong.
heavily-subsidized artists working to a mental fashion-plate of its founders: and later among the solitaries and wise men the philosopher, patiently wishing the world into a special private state useless to anyone but himself. It is their independence and lack of seriousness which gives these works charm and originality. They are not weighed down by any grand doctrinal or practical considerations; their authors are free agents able to exploit whatever takes their fancy. So they might become an inspiration for bored or curious men in search of rarer, stronger meat; after four or five centuries they might even find themselves in fashion. When people tire of the orthodox, the rational, they turn to the esoteric, or the East. The Pythagoreans with their premature mysticism were men of the future, a sign of how far Hellenistic thought on kingship had come, and how much further it was destined to go.

CHAPTER 3.

PAPYRUS AND OTHER FRAGMENTS.
It is clear that the works discussed above were not the only ones written on kingship in the Hellenistic period; a booklist of the first century B.C. from Rhodes, giving the works of Theopompus, ends 'by a different Theopompus, On Kingship'. The remains of writings in the papyri of Egypt are scanty; for it may be assumed that, once the Ptolemaic dynasty had disappeared, there was little incentive to copy or preserve works whose content was now irrelevant to the political situation, and the number of papyri which have survived from the Ptolemaic period is small. Moreover the bulk of the papyri come from the sites of small provincial towns, where there are likely to have been far fewer people interested in reading or writing works on kingship than in the capital of Alexandria. Unfortunately the fragments which have survived are too fragmentary to offer much illumination of the genre. But they do at least show that such works circulated in Egypt as elsewhere, and their very conventionality is of some significance. None of them can be dated or attributed to any known author; none shows any sign of doctrines which could be claimed to be the property of a specific philosophical school. Thus they exhibit the same eclecticism and popular philosophical character as is found elsewhere.


2. Despite this, I have included in my discussion all fragments of such works which cannot be proved to have been composed in the Roman period.
1. F. Schubart (Puck 2594). 1st century B.C.


'For immediately if some failure occurred with regard to this man, and these marvellous benefits of his flowed away from him, it is likely that he would fall at the hands of his subjects or his sons. Alexander held the whole extent of the inhabited world under his right hand; and is not even he proof, who was shown to be mortal by a single cup?' Darius is then mentioned, 'who lived under the shade of golden plane-trees', obviously as a similar example.

It is perhaps better to take the first sentence as a reference to kings in general, rather than to a particular example. But the mention of a man falling at the hands of his subjects or his sons is curious; I know of no literary parallel. It suggests that the author had in his mind some particular event, which (if it could be identified) might help to date the work. The single cup of Alexander is a reference to the legend that he was poisoned. ¹ The presence of the first person in line 5 does not imply that the work was a speech, or that a king is speaking, as Schubart thought.

Wächter sees the fragment as a discussion of the divinity of kings: kings are mortal, and not therefore gods. ² But this is to ignore the

¹. cf. J. Durin, Aristotle in the Biographical Tradition (1957), 236f.
². C. Wächter, Gottmenschentum und Griechische Städte (1951), 193 n. 34.
first sentence. The work plainly had some literary pretensions, and
the phrasing of the example of Alexander should not be taken too strictly.
The subject is rather the worthlessness of the power and riches of kings.
As such it need not necessarily come from a work specifically περὶ

dynasteias.

2. P. Lit. Iorn. 163 (Pack 2573) 3rd century A.D.

Six pages of a codex; no complete line remains. It is only
possible to pick out words, but these are sufficient to show that the
work was about the duties and virtues of a king, with special emphasis
in this section on ἐγκρατεία. Thus verso col. 17: ήδονή
(10), στρατηγοῦ πόνου (12), ταλαντῶν (13). A recto col.
1: ἐπιθυμία (10,14), ἀκριβεία ὀνομάσεως (12), τὴν ἑαυτὴν ἐγκρατείαν
Verso col. 1 seems to enter on other topics: τὰ]πάσα (19),
τολῆμος (24), οὕτως (26). B recto: βασιλικῆς ποιο̣

Comperz suggested Antisthenes' Cyrus, Faebelin the second century
A.D. Apollonius Cyrus, neither with any good reason.

1. Faebelin, Imag. Mus. lxiii (1907), 15ff: he compared νικηφόρος
κελάνθεναι (A recto col.1, 80-1) with ΚΑ Ἑραμ. 2,9.
3. P.U.C. inv. no. 2873

3rd century A.D.

C. Pascual, Ianx Satum Niccolae Terzaghi Oblata (1963), 283ff.

A very mutilated fragment. There is mention of πανδέα (Col. II, 9, 10, cf. 8), ϕιλοσοφία (7), those who have the wealth of a kingdom (10), the assistance of gods (12), and perhaps of men. The fragment would seem to be about the opportunities and advantages of generosity for kings, and the way such conduct is approved by the gods and those subjects loyal.

4. P. Rylands i.20 (Pack 2 2262) 1st century B.C.

These fragments come from a letter of advice addressed to a man in authority, obviously a king, or (less probably) from a dialogue in which a king was addressed as one of the characters. This particular section of the work was a discussion of how to finance an army. The best preserved fragment runs: 'For if you try like the Persian king to provide for the soldiers out of revenues, there will be very little surplus left to you indeed, as can be clearly learned from the sums left by the Persians: for in this way, though they ruled Asia for a long time, and captured the wealth which had been collected by the Medes and Syrians ....'

The author takes a very peculiar view of Persian administration: the Persians do not seem to have spent large sums on their army, and the treasure captured by Alexander was enormous, in the region of 180,000 talents. It might seem therefore that the work is not a

serious one, but a rhetorical exercise. Perhaps the author has in mind the provision of estates, which was the Ptolemaic practice, rather than unpaid levies. The historical situation envisaged would then presumably be the early Ptolemaic period, for the king addressed seems not to have any policy as yet on how to maintain his army: he will be Soter, or possibly Philadelphus.

5. B.C.n.ii,217 (Paci 2 2204) 2nd century A.D.

This is a small fragment of what also was clearly a letter of advice to a king: 'since) your kingship controls its affairs far better than any that has ever existed, its system and what is distinctive of these times ought to be law, and especially for those who do not hold elected office in a city.'

The contrast between the present and past monarchies, the apparent need for rules for a new group of royal officials, and the distinction between monarchies and cities, all suggest that this is a letter addressed to Alexander the Great, or less probably Philip. Whether it is a genuine letter or a rhetorical exercise, and who its author might be, are impossible to say. But the absence of rhetorical touches may mean that it is genuine, and there is nothing to prevent it being by Aristotle or Theopompus. 1

1. cf. C. c.ad Att. xii,40; Halmowitz objected to Theopompus on the grounds of status (Archiv f. d. p.t. 1 (1901), 526), but this is not conclusive.
This work, written on the first part of the papyrus which contains the dialogue on Demades, is more puzzling. It begins with a comparison between kingship and democracy. Some have praised kingship for a reason which is obscured by lacunae; the author then presents the heroes of democracy, Solon, Cleisthenes and Zaleucus. 'I do not know how I am to seek out from among all these heroes a hero who will do what the god once signified his assent to ...... the third alternative (aristocracy) I greet from a distance'. Though the tone is rhetorical, the author seems to have some philosophical interests. It is a pity that the discussion is so obscured by gaps, for it might have shed light on the Hellenistic sources lying behind the similar discussion in Cicero de republica i.

The second column contains praise of Egypt and Alexandria: 'you see with your very eyes the prosperity of the city established at the mouth of the Nile. All other cities are only cities of their surrounding areas, but villages of Alexandria; for Alexandria is the chief city of the whole world. But I am such as I am, having a notion of what a city means (i.e. I know what I am talking about)'.

The third column contains the concluding sentences of the work, and concerns the good king: 'he reverences all ....; he maintains a civil approachability, rejoices in good men, adds noble things to noble

1. There is a good, if occasionally fanciful, translation of it in K. Barker, From Alexander to Constantine (1956), 95.
people (or adds noble acts to noble acts), fights against his enemies till he wins, keeps his preference alive for friends even when they have charged, and makes immortal the honours he renders to the immortals'.

Since this comes from the end of a work, it is difficult to draw any conclusions about the general character of the whole. In tone it is highly rhetorical; it may have been a theoretical discussion of different constitutions ending with praise of the reigning king, or praise of the king, in the course of which it was shown that kingship is the best constitution; for the second possibility compare Dio of Prusa, fr. III, 42ff. The general tone and the praise of Alexandria suggest a speech or a work intended originally to be delivered before an audience; it was not addressed to the king, since he is spoken of in the third person.

Unlike the other fragments, it is visibly concerned with the Egyptian scene, though still operating within the limits of Hellenistic thought. One feature seems peculiar to Ptolemaic Egypt. For the praise of the king, Hörte compares Theocritus xi, 61ff.; it is tempting to connect the papyrus even more closely with Hyll xii. In both, the praise of Egypt and the Nile leads on to praise of the cities of Egypt and then to the king. There are of course differences: Theocritus is also concerned with Philadelphus' overseas possessions in the First Syrian war; the papyrus concentrates on Alexandria.

Theocritus praises most of all the king's munificent patronage; the

papyrus lists more ordinary virtues. Any similarity of expression should be explained by the similarity of theme; thus it is hardly significant that both mention the king's ἀρετή But the structure of both, the way they progress from praise of the country and its cities to praise of the king, suggests some connection. A common model may lie behind them both. Egypt was especially famous for its fertility and richness (cf. Herodas i, 26ff), which may have led Ptolemaic panegyric to connect the two genres, of praise of the country and praise of the king.

1. THE SUDA

The Suda preserves some interesting fragments about his ship, from different sources. The means by which two of these fragments reached the lexicon is known. Under Λάοκης Νέας (144) the Suda quotes the scholia to Aristophanes Acharrianks 31 on the different designations of kings, the Great King as king of the Persians, the others as kings of the Spartans and Macedonians. The passage continues: 'there is a difference between king and tyrant; for the king receives his rule from his ancestors by right of succession with fixed prerogatives, but the tyrant seizes his rule for himself by force. But some use the words interchangeably with each other: Hieron calls Hieron the tyrant of Syracuse 'King', and Sopilus in the Demoi brings in 'King Peisistratus'. They also often call kings 'tyrants'. The source of this passage is some work on literature which made use of the typical antithesis of king and tyrant, but noted that earlier poets did not recognise the distinction; this interest in the non-existence of the developed antithesis has been
seen to be as early as Hippicus of Helias. The Suda's second quotation on kingship (147) is taken from Diogenes Laertius vii,122, where he mentions the Stoic definition of kingship as ἀρχήν ἄριστος and the Stoic view that only the wise man is king.

It is the third and fourth quotations which are more interesting. The third runs thus:

'Neither birth (φύσις) nor justice apportions kingships to men, but they are given to those who are able to lead an expedition and manage practical affairs with sense; such were Philip and the successors of Alexander. For his relationship in no way helped his natural son, because of the weakness of his spirit. But totally unsuitable kings have ruled throughout almost all of the world.'

The fragment is concerned with non-hereditary qualifications for kingship: thus Alexander is omitted since he was a hereditary monarch, whereas his father and the Diadochoi were not. The author takes a detached view of Hellenistic monarchy: 'neither birth nor justice apportions kingships to men'; by this he perhaps does not mean that the kings he describes were in fact unjust, merely that in the practical world justice carries little weight. He is also careful to point out that on any criterion almost all the kings of the world are unsuitable.

Kerst has pointed to the close parallel between the first part of the

1. Above p. 11.

2. These have been discussed especially by J. Kerst, Studien zur Entwicklung und theoretischen Begründung der Monarchie im Altertum (1966), 56ff; G. Kühler, SB d. I. w. 61 (1894), 213ff.

All three took them as the same work, and therefore found it difficult to characterise. Kerst supposed a history, Köhler and Pöhlmann a politico-philosophical pamphlet.
fragment and the arguments of Ptolemy in the debate about the succession on the death of Alexander, as recorded in Justin: 'it would be better to choose from those who because of their virtue were closest to their king, who rule provinces, and take charge of wars, rather than submit themselves to the rule of unworthy men commanding in the guise of king'.

The sources of Trogus are early Hellenistic: this passage might indeed in origin go back to Ptolemy's own account of his activities. The Suda fragment also seems concerned with the Hellenistic period, for there is no sign of the influence of Roman ideas; and the situation envisaged is one in which kings exist in the plural. It is not clear whether the fragment comes from a historical or a theoretical work. In favour of the former is the absence of any specifically philosophical ideas, and the fact that the word Ἰς Δίκαιος is used instead of Ἰττάρη, which might seem more natural in a philosophical work. Moreover the ideas expressed in the passage seem sufficiently heterodox to be better buried in a historical work than openly expressed in a political pamphlet or philosophical treatise. But if the source is historical, the fragment is clearly from a generalising theoretical passage. It could perhaps be argued that the original was a treatise of advice addressed to a usurper; in which case the apparently hostile tone would rather be indirect flattery of the one king who was competent, and measured up to

1. Justin xiii,2,12; cf. Leerst, Philol. x (1897), 638 n.27.

2. In the sources of Trogus cf. N.J. Fontern, Atti Acc.Sc.Lett. e atti di Belonor xviii.2 (1953), 282ff, who argues for Hieronymus and Diadochoi; the prominence of Ptolemy in this episode suggests his own history, for his claim is a justification of the position of himself and the other Diadochoi.
the standards of Philip and the 'Iadochoi; and the reference to To dikaios would have to be to a law of inheritance, rather than to the lack of virtue in the king addressed. But such a hypothesis seems so far-fetched that it rather serves to demonstrate the difficulties in supposing a source in a treatise On Kingship. The fragment most probably comes from a theoretical digression in a historical work concerned with the Hellenistic period, though not perhaps necessarily written during it; the last sentence does not necessarily refer to the present.

The final fragment (148) concerns taxation and the revenues of state:

'That kingship is a possession of the community, but public property is not the possession of kingship. Therefore one should hate exactions made by compulsion and with violence as tyrannical greed, but respect requests for taxes made with reason and out of a love of mankind, as a mark of the king's care'.

In contrast to the previous passage, it seems unlikely that this could come from a historical work, unless the theoretical digression were so developed that it constituted in itself a section of political advice, as for instance the speech of Maecenas to Augustus in Dio's Roman History. The source seems more probably a philosophical work of practical political advice, such as a σοφία; though the immediate reference is to how the subjects should view taxation, it may still come from a treatise addressed to a king. The ideas in the

1. ἐστιαμαντία is a more unfavourable word than ἔσοφος.
passage are interesting: the notion that kingship belongs to the people suggests a more 'democratic' interpretation of kingship than was usual, though it is not such a very different view from that which lies behind the remark of Antigonus Gonatas that kingship was a noble slavery. The proper attitude of the king towards raising revenue is a common and natural preoccupation in the more practical treatises. It should perhaps be noted that the king appears to be envisaged at least on the analogy of the king of a city: there is no suggestion of the complications found in the actual Hellenistic world, where kings levied taxes over widely different areas and communities in widely different ways. Again this suggests a theoretical rather than a historical approach.

As in the fragments of works attributable to the better known philosophers, these chance survivals show an interesting combination of the commonplace and of individual variety. Within the basic limitations of Greek thought on kingship there was scope for practical and theoretical creativity. From the papyrus evidence we can guess that, just as poets introduced themselves to and wrote for their royal protectors, so there were many aspiring philosophers and politicians who sought to draw themselves to the attention of the Hellenistic kings either as tutors or advisers by addressing to them works On Kingship, or who felt that the patronage they had already received made it incumbent on them to appear in the role of philosophical adviser. Despite the fragmentary nature of the evidence, the variety of forms in which such philosophical attitudes to kingship came to the attention of the educated public can also be seen. These works seem to include purely theoretical treatises of philosophy and the more practical open letter of advice, the οὐρολογίον;
they left their mark in history books and in rhetorical speeches. The evidence is lacking only for dialogues incorporating ideas on kingship.
CONCLUSION: A TYPICAL TREATISE ON KINGSHIP

So far the discussion has centered on the actual evidence for the contents of works On Kingship, and what light the relations between kings and philosophers can shed on the production of these works. The distribution and nature of this evidence has dictated the shape of the argument; often it is the differences rather than the similarities between the various schools which have attracted attention. That is all to the good, for it must not be assumed that every work On Kingship was alike. Clearly the antiquarian researches of the Peripatetics and the negative attitudes of Epicurus set them apart from the common run of philosophical moralists; and within the other schools different interests led to different points of emphasis. There is also a fundamental difference between the treatise of advice addressed to a particular king, and more general works of political philosophy. But since no single treatise On Kingship survives from the Hellenistic period, the general picture of what might be called the mainstream of ideas has necessarily remained obscure, or been illuminated only in passing remarks. The central concerns of Hellenistic ideas on Kingship will be further investigated in Part II, where three works which reflect these concerns are discussed in detail: in particular it is the letter of Herodes which offers the best and most complete example of the doctrines which a typical treatise On Kingship might contain.
In order, however, to give a background against which the
idiosyncrasies of the various writers can be assessed, it seems necessary
at this point to desert the strict canons of historical truth, and
attempt imaginatively to reconstruct an 'ideal' or 'typical' treatise
on kingship. Some of the evidence on which such a reconstruction might
be based falls within the period covered by this work, but most of it
does not: for the closest approaches to what might be thought to be
typical treatises on kingship are such works as Isocrates ad Nicoclem,
the first and third orations of Dio of Prusa, Plutarch's On the different
constitutions, To an uneducated ruler, and Thucydides' fragment on
especially to consort with men in power, or Musonius Rufus' fragment on
the topic that the king ought to be a philosopher. The following
reconstruction of the sorts of topics that would have appeared in
Hellenistic treatises on kingship is based partly on these works, partly
on Aristotle, and partly on the fragmentary evidence of the treatises
themselves. In such an imaginative exercise documentation would be out
of place, unless it took the form of an attempt at a full collection of
the commonplaces relevant to the topic of kingship, an undertaking which
would involve systematic combing of the literature of the whole period
from the fourth century B.C. to the fourth century A.D. at least. I
have preferred to offer merely a sketch, with the purpose of giving
greater reality to the concept of a treatise on kingship, and of
collecting the scattered allusions to such a 'typical model' in the rest
of the work.
Such a treatise might perhaps have begun with the arguments in favour of monarchy. By the Hellenistic period there was established a more or less universal classification of constitutions into three good and three bad forms, kingship, aristocracy and democracy on the one hand, tyranny, oligarchy and ochlocracy on the other; to these might be added the mixed constitution, and among followers of Platonic ideas an ideal form of kingship, sometimes separated from and sometimes confused with the good kingships of this earth. Aristocracy, the rule of the best, was not always clearly distinguished from kingship, for the Platonic notion that there was no essential difference between the rule of one good man and of a group of good men continued to have some influence. This scheme meant that monarchy was judged in relation to the other constitutions of the city-state, rather than as a form of government suitable to the control of large empires: the Hellenistic monarchies were reduced to the theoretical status of cities, and treated as if their political structure offered the same problems as those of a city-state.

The accepted definition of kingship was εὐσεβῶνος ἀρχή, and the central problem in any defence of monarchy was how to ensure that such a rule was good. The answer lay in the rigid distinction between good and bad types of constitution: the rule of the three good types would be good because it would be rule by good men. In particular aristocracy was justified in terms of its being rule by the best, and kingship was the rule of the one best man. It is not clear whether
Aristotle held that his virtue had to outweigh that of all others combined—probably not: it was probably enough for most theorists that he should merely be the best man or even merely a good man. Thus the justification of monarchy was in terms of the virtue of the king and the checks on monarchy were checks of morality inherent in the character of the king himself. There was according to this view no need to worry overmuch about his relation to law; thus a problem which has afflicted all absolute monarchies was answered by defining it out of existence; for if a king ceased to be good he became a tyrant, and the constitution has no longer one of the good constitutions. If the answer seems theoretical, it is at least a more rational answer than the western Christian appeal to the vengeance of God in an afterlife as a means of frightening the king into good government.

The arguments in favour of kingship as the best constitution against the others were not in general logical arguments. Aristotle's claim that, given a scale of virtue, one man might outweigh the entire rest of the state, is not found explicitly elsewhere. And the argument of Plato and Aristotle, that equity is better than strict justice because it takes account of special circumstances, and that this equity involves having a man as supreme legal arbiter rather than written law, is very rare.

The most common argument in favour of monarchy is the 'naturalness' of kingship. There is first the claim that it is obviously right for the better or best to rule over the worse. This is supported by a large
num be of analogies from the structure of the universe. Firstly there is the comparison with the monarchy of Zeus; then everywhere animals such as cattle and bees are seen to obey one leader. Monarchy is in fact a constitution which (in contrast to the others) is 'natural': this was an especially important consideration for those schools who believed, as for instance the Stoics did, that man should live in conformity with nature. Again in human society, the same situation could be seen to hold: the family possesses one head, the father; the shepherd controls his flocks, the captain a ship, the general an army: without such unitary control those aspects of society would fail to achieve success. Within man himself, reason rules as a monarch over the passions. History also showed the temporal priority of kingship over other forms of government, and hence its closeness to the natural, primitive order of things: here the examples of the good kings and heroes of legend could be invoked (Theseus, Hercules and so on), and also the kings of history, such as Cyrus who was a father to his people. Appeal could be made to authority: the poets, and particularly Homer, advocated kingship: 'the rule of many is not good; let there be one ruler, one king' (Iliad ii,204f) was the most popular quotation of all. Finally only in monarchy did the good man or the wise man have total freedom to benefit his subjects.

Against the claim that kingship was the best constitution, it could be said that rule without check was a dangerous form of government which could easily degenerate into tyranny. Here there was argument as to
whether the king should be above or below the law. Again could the
ran of perfect virtue be found, and if so how? Kingship was in fact
dangerous because it could turn into its opposite more easily than any
of the other good constitutions. But these arguments could be countered:
after all, if the king were not virtuous, the kingship was not a kingship;
it was the ideal which was important, not the difficulties of reaching
it. If the king were the perfect man, there would be no problem of his
relationship to law or of the choice of a successor. Philosophy would
produce the best man, by education. Most philosophical thinkers seem
to have felt the force of the arguments in favour of monarchy; even the
republican Cicero in book 1 of the de republca sees kingship as the
best of the unmixed constitutions. Such were the theoretical arguments
which at least allowed philosophers and intellectuals in general to
approve of the monarchies of the Hellenistic world, provided they went
some way to meeting the claim that the king should be the best man.

From the practical point of view of the actual workings of Hellenistic
monarchies, the questions of the definition of the most virtuous man
and of his duties were more important.

The king as the perfect man must have all the virtues which the
particular philosophical sect considered important; these varied slightly,
some being thought more essential than others by different philosophers.
But it was more often a question of emphasis rather than one of substance.
The king must of course have all the normal virtues, such as courage,
self-control, wisdom (φρόνησις: σοφία, philosophical wisdom, is
only sometimes thought necessary, by people in the Platonic or Stoic tradition), justice, honesty, friendliness, truthfulness, kindness and so on; most treatises on kingship will have been in the form of lists of virtues which the king ought to possess, and reasons why they are especially important for a king: in general, the king stands on a pedestal visible to all and has the duty of leading his subjects to virtue; he therefore has especial need of virtue himself. One virtue was central for the king: φιλοσθένεια, love of his subjects. From this all the others would flow. He would seek to be just, to bring his people to virtue, and above all to benefit them: εὐεργεσία was a direct consequence of φιλοσθένεια.

Apart from benefiting his subjects, the king had other duties. He must protect his subjects, and so have all the qualities of a military leader, though he should not love war for its own sake. He must exercise continual foresight (πρόνοια), and a sleepless watch over his people: kingship was from this point of view a burden. The king should also foster the worship of the gods: he should love the gods and be honoured by them. He should impose taxes only for the benefit of his subjects, to safeguard their security, and not in order to amass wealth for himself.

The consequences of being such a king would be that his people would love him. There would be no plots; he would have plenty of true friends to help him in his task. These friends should practise honesty and freedom of speech before him; thus the advice on which he acted would be good. The king must however be careful to choose the right
sort of friends and officials, for these are the king's eyes. He must not mistrust them or listen to informers. Under such a king the subjects would be free and the state united and happy.

On the other hand stood tyranny and the dangers of tyranny. The tyrant was a man who cared only for his own advantage; he had all the vices of the wicked man. His sexual vices, luxury of life, corruption in justice, and cruelty, were especially emphasised. There were plenty of historical examples to draw on, such as Phalaris; many tyrannies, it could be claimed, had fallen as a result of the personal vices of the ruler. The tyrant would be hated and feared by his subjects, and especially by those good men who might otherwise help in government; for even a tyrant needed helpers, and his government would collapse without them. The tyrant would be hated by the gods; he would live in fear until his wretched life was ended by the inevitable assassin.

The chief weakness of Hellenistic ideas of kingship lay here, in the absence of any viable sanction against misgovernment. Legal sanctions were ruled out by the ambivalence of the relationship of king to law; religious sanctions were scarcely regarded as of much power by the ancient world, for punishment in the afterlife was reserved for a very small class of spectacular sinners; and the available punishments had already been monopolised by legendary characters; the thunderbolts of Zeus were notoriously inaccurate. One sanction remained, the right and the duty of any man to kill a tyrant. Plots and assassination were the necessary consequence of bad rule; the tyrannicide, successful or
unsuccessful, was a hero. But this 'right of assassination' was seldom appealed to in practice in the Hellenistic world: most murders were familial affairs. It was not until the example of Harmodius and Aristogeiton was reinforced by that of Brutus and Cassius, in the Roman Republic, that the philosophical doctrine of the duty to kill a tyrant became a serious threat to the ruler.

Philosophical works on kingship will have had much to say on the proper relationship between philosophy and kingship. The question whether the king should be a philosopher or not was seriously answered. Strict Platonists and Stoics must hold that he should be; but there is little sign that great emphasis was laid on the importance of the king being wise in the full philosophical sense (σοφός): he usually needed merely to be φρόνιμος. Those who wished to frequent the courts of kings had a better answer: it was not necessary for the king to be himself a philosopher; provided that he listened to philosophers, respected their advice, and recognised that philosophy was essential to government. If he had a son, he should of course be educated by a philosopher. The advantages of philosophy for kingship were that it enabled the king to recognise good and evil, and so to lead his subjects to virtue; it also taught him how to be virtuous himself, and provided him with all the necessary skills of rule.

In the light of the criticisms of Epicurus and other jealous and evil-minded critics, the proper behaviour of the philosopher at court was much discussed. The philosopher should be prepared to advise kings,
for philosophy was a practical activity intended to benefit mankind. The philosopher who teaches an ordinary pupil only benefits one man; the philosopher who teaches a king transforms a whole kingdom. The tradition of philosophy in the past could be invoked to justify the philosopher's presence at court. Every craftsman likes to do his bit for the common good; the philosopher, who knows the secrets of society and the ways of good and ill, should be especially willing. Moreover only the philosopher does not fear the consequences of speaking the truth, for he faces all threats with equanimity; because of his freedom of speech he makes the best of advisers.

If the philosopher were faced with a tyrant, he must do his duty by speaking out at all costs; that was the teaching of Socrates; any other course was flattery. Torture, execution, suicide, exile, all were indifferent to him. He must show the steadfastness of Socrates, or Anaxarchus; posterity would vindicate him: the philosophic death before the tyrant was a favourite theme. On the other hand the attitude of the philosopher to tyrannicide seems to have been more ambivalent: philosophers do not seem to have encouraged tyrannicide openly in particular political circumstances, though they might approve of it in theory. No Hellenistic philosophical martyr of action is known, and even in the Roman Empire passive opposition is more obvious than active plotting among philosophical circles. Philosophic writings indeed seem to have concentrated on the passive attitude of the philosopher, his duty to speak and suffer the consequences without fear, rather than to organise revolt or plots against the tyrant.
Such are some of the elements which would be found in Hellenistic treatises on kingship, interspersed no doubt with more practical advice as the occasion demanded. The basis of the theory is the notion of the king as the most virtuous man (μεγίστος ἀληθινός), loving his subjects and benefiting them. The chief disadvantage of the theory was its lack of positive sanction against misgovernment; its chief advantage is that it was an attempt to create a wholly rational canon of conduct for the king, without appeal to tradition or divine sanctions.

The Hellenistic theory of kingship stands as the most complete and most successful attempt to provide a rational justification for kingship, and to ensure by rational and moral considerations that absolute monarchy should act for the benefit of its subjects. In a society where ignorance of natural phenomena meant that reason was always in danger, the Hellenistic philosopher provided a bulwark against the invasion of the irrational into government; the corollary of this is that, where unreason, tradition and sentiment are excluded, it is all the easier to descend to the Machiavellian principle that the personal benefit of the ruler and the success of his rule are all that matter. The Hellenistic rulers might on occasion be wicked tyrants and act on amoral principles; but at least they knew that what they did was wrong, and disapproved of by the men who controlled educated opinion and the verdict of posterity. The discomfort of such a situation is well illustrated by the action of Ptolemy VII in 145/4, when he expelled most of the scholars of the
from Egypt; Lysias' expulsion of philosophers from his kingdom may have had similar motives. If they became tyrants, at least the monarchs tutored by philosophers seldom succumbed to the temptations of religious or political fanaticism, or the charms of charismatic leadership. For six hundred years philosophy helped to keep government out of the hands of priests and doctrinaire politicians, and in the keeping of bureaucrats, reasonable men whose greatest virtue was benevolence and greatest vice corruption: that was no mean achievement.

If the claims of philosophers for their skills may sometimes seem a little exaggerated, it must be remembered that every society has its experts in government and in the proper relationship of government to the universe. In the Hellenistic world the philosopher performed the same function as the witch doctor, the priest, or the prophet in other societies, and (it may be argued) did it as well. He was the conscience of the kingdom, a check on arbitrary abuse of power, and a protagonist of proper standards. He also possessed the secrets of good government; he held the same position as the sociologist or the economic expert today. Like them, he was welcomed at court, paid huge sums, and listened to attentively; his advice formed the basis of policy and of action; his judgment dominated the civil service. And who is to say that the philosopher, with his emphasis on the need for virtue and morally correct government in the interests of the people, did any more

1. Andron, F.G.H. 245 F 1; cf. Athen. xiii, 50e.
harm or was any less effective than the political expert or the economist?
At least the advice of philosophers, whatever its lack of positive
content and ignorance of practical considerations, could not be held
positively to have increased the misery and unhappiness of the governed.
PART II.

NATIVE AND GREEK TRADITIONS

Introduction.

The influence of these philosophical works on kingship can be traced in most areas of political activity in the Hellenistic world; it is indeed a combination of this theoretical attitude to monarchy with the various practices and symbols drawn from the example of Alexander the Great which provides the element of unity among the various forms of kingship in the Hellenistic world\(^1\). Ruler cult, court poetry, diplomacy and administration, the royal titulature and the emergence of a chancellery style in papyri and inscriptions, all show an ethical conception of monarchy which is derived from the philosophical tradition. But although all these different areas reflect the preoccupations of the treatises discussed above, the necessary gap between word and deed, between literary production and the needs of daily administration, or between the different traditions of literature in poetry and prose, make it difficult to use this scattered evidence to illuminate the philosophical tradition: the process must be rather the reverse.

In order therefore to obtain a deeper understanding than is possible from the fragmentary evidence discussed above, both of philosophical ideas on kingship and (to some extent) of their practical influence on the Hellenistic world, I have concentrated

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on those areas closest to the philosophical treatises themselves, that is on prose literature. But here again the possibilities are numerous: selection is necessary, and my exclusions can be justified only on grounds of expediency. Thus to discuss for instance Hellenistic biography and historiography in relation to ideas of monarchy would have been impossible within a limited space and time. Two further areas which have been regretfully omitted, or rather touched on only incidentally, demand to be mentioned.

The problems of kingship thought in relation to Hellenistic Judaism are complex; they can best be clarified by a series of oversimplified and overlapping antitheses. There is firstly the relationship between religious and political Messianism, both using a vocabulary related to ideas on kingship; this has of course been discussed by theologians, with results which will often be of great interest to the historian of political thought - as for instance in S. Mowinckel's *He That Cometh* (1951; E.T.1956). For in one of its aspects even the most religious eschatology is still merely another way of conceiving the ideal government, and, if monotheistic, should in principle be comparable to any portrayal of the ideal king. Then there is the tension between the use of ideas on kingship in relation to earthly rule, and its use to describe a concept especially important to Jewish thought - the theocracy of Jahwe; the Hellenistic world with its ubiquitous confusion of kings and gods, at least in cult and titulature, made this tension especially fruitful, and theologi-
cally dangerous. On the more practical level the attitude of the Jews to the governments of this world, to foreign domination (Persian, Ptolemaic, or Seleucid) and to native dynasties, is also important; in both respects the literature connected with the Maccabean revolt and the Hasmonean dynasty is the main source. Especially significant here, after the anti-authoritarian attitudes in the actual revolt, is the struggle for a more positive evaluation of the new national dynasty in I Maccabees; similarly the book of Jubilees sees the period as an age of peace and joy (xxiii, 29-31), and accepts the claim of the Hasmonean dynasty to combine the offices of High Priest and king (xxxii,15), a claim which was the centre of controversy at least from the reign of John Hyrcanus: compare for instance the varying opinions in the Testament of Levi 8,10, 14-16.

Then there is an area of conflict of particular interest to my theme, the interaction of Jewish and Hellenistic ideas on kingship. The question is at least raised in chapter 2, only for the Jewish community in Egypt; the fusion of ideas found in the 'letter' of Aristeas is also present to some extent in other Jewish works, especially in the Wisdom literature; and yet the limits of this fusion are clear in both. What is not

2. Some interesting remarks on the pro-Hasmonean tradition as far as Josephus by M.A. Beek in The Sacral Kingship (Humen Suppl. iv(1959)), 349ff.
3. Cf. the parallels in R. Tramontano's detailed commentary on Aristeas ad Philocratem (1931).
discussed there is the tenacity of older Israelite ideas; nor have I considered how far it is possible on the evidence available to raise the question of possible differences between Judaeans and Egyptian Judaism in their attitude to authority. To such questions the many problems of the relationship between the various books of the Hebrew original and its remarkably free translation, the Septuagint, are relevant.

Similar difficulties arise in attempting to relate Roman ideas on monarchy to Hellenistic ideas; for once again the original native attitudes to the institution - in this case an almost total hostility - were so strong as to transform Hellenistic theory, even in those authors who were to a considerable extent influenced by Greek ideas. Thus any full discussion of the theoretical attitude of writers in the Republic towards monarchy would have to begin with the whole tradition of Roman historiography on the early kings of Rome, and the continual interplay between this tradition and Hellenistic ideas. It is this which makes two of the most informative writers on kingship, Polybius and Cicero, so difficult to interpret. Both authors have been the subject of extensive recent investigation; since I have little to add to the discussions of the most important passages (book vi of Polybius' history, and Cicero's

1. On Roman attitudes to kingship, see the sketch of C.J. Classen, Hist. xiv (1965), 385ff; apart from the extensive literature on the sources and political significance of Polybius and Cicero de Republica, two recent theses deal with their general attitudes to kingship: K.-W. Welwei, Könige u. Königstum in Urteil des Polybius (Diss. Köln 1963); R. Klein, Königstum u. Königszeit bei Cicero (Diss. Erlangen 1962).
de Republica), I have preferred to take as an example the work of a more neglected writer, Philodemus.

The three works which are the subjects of the following chapters have then been chosen for various reasons. All three illuminate in different ways the central theme of Hellenistic philosophical attitudes to kingship, and help in important ways to supplement the somewhat fragmentary evidence so far adduced. Each offers the chance of demonstrating a different method of obtaining evidence from literature, and on each I have something new to say. Again all three illuminate the close relationship between political thought and politics itself: because I believe that political thought is in general both ephemeral and strongly conditioned by the interests of the society which produces it, and can only profitably be studied in relation to that society, I have therefore devoted considerable space to the exact political background of these works - these chapters may be seen as an attempt to substantiate the thesis that the study of political thought is a historical, not a theoretical discipline. But perhaps most important of all, these three works by their very diversity do, I believe, illustrate what is perhaps the central aspect of Hellenistic history - the fusion and interaction of different national cultures with the tradition of Hellenism. Since unfortunately it is not possible to investigate from literary sources attitudes to monarchy in the Seleucid empire, in Asia Minor, Bactria or
Macedonia, I have concentrated on Egypt and Rome, on works which show firstly the influence of Pharaonic ideas on the foundation of the Ptolemaic kingdom, secondly the interaction of that kingship with Jewish traditions, and thirdly the problems of adapting Hellenistic ideas to the **principes viri** of the later Roman Republic.
CHAPTER 1.

HECATEUS OF ABDERA AND THE EGYPTIAN TRADITION.

"Flattery is the prolific parent of falsehood, and falsehood, I will now add, is not incompatible with the sacerdotal Character." Edward Gibbon, Memoirs, p.56, ed. G.A. Bonnard.

In the distribution of provinces which took place after Alexander's death, Egypt, with Arabia and Libya, was assigned to Ptolemy son of Lagus, who took control of his satrapy towards the end of 323. For the next seventeen years he governed the country in fact as an independent ruler, though ostensibly (at least until 311) under the three successive regents appointed for Alexander's heirs. In 305, following the example of Antigonus, he proclaimed himself king, and ruled until his death in 282.

The problems facing Ptolemy during this period were great, and involved fundamental questions of policy; but, although the main outline of events is clear enough, evidence for Ptolemy's attitude to these events and for his general aims is small, and little more than mere inference derived from what actually happened. Yet it is certain that the Ptolemaic state as it emerged under Ptolemy II was the result of a series of conscious decisions on internal and external policy, rather than of simple reaction to the pre-existing situation. The

early development of Ptolemaic Egypt and the parts played in that development by the first two Ptolemies have therefore long been points of discussion for modern historians.1

Within the period of government of Ptolemy son of Lagus various questions are central: firstly that of Ptolemy's attitude to foreign affairs, his approach to the fundamental problem of the legacy of Alexander. Was he concerned only to assert the independence of Egypt against the claims of the central government, and to strengthen her defences? Or did he have wider ambitions? It is clear that from the start his main aim was to establish and strengthen his power in Egypt and to protect himself by all possible means against the various attempts to reunite Alexander's empire; he also strove to extend his power at least to include southern Syria, Cyprus and Cyrene. His control of the sea led to an interest in the islands and coastal cities of the Aegean, and he made an expedition to mainland Greece in 309-8. A defeat at Salamis in Cyprus in 306 left the Aegean in the hands of Demetrius Poliorcetes for the next ten years; but from 295 Ptolemy was active again at sea; and in 285 he won complete control of the Aegean when Demetrius' fleet came over to him. These may be in part the actions of a man concerned with the defence of his kingdom and the provision of those essential commodities lacking in Egypt,

1. A good account with bibliography in H. Volkmann, RE xxiii.2 (1959), 1607ff.
notably timber, silver and soldiers. It may also be that beyond
this Ptolemy was most concerned to break up possibly dangerous
combinations among his rivals. Yet the notion that he was
uninterested in external conquest or in laying claim to the
heritage of Alexander is merely an inference of modern historians,
who have interpreted both the caution and solidity of Ptolemy's
planning, and its ultimate failure, as unadventurous isolationism1.

Still more interesting is the question of Ptolemy's attitude
to the native population and its culture. E. Kornemann postulated
two periods within his reign: in the first he consciously
followed the policy of assimilation and political and cultural
fusion between Greek, Macedonian and native inaugurated by
Alexander; but from about 312 onwards he was concerned to con­
struct a Greco-Macedonian state apparatus for the exploitation
of a subject population2. Though most of Kornemann's arguments
are dubious (he laid especial emphasis on the fusion characteristic
of the cult of Sarapis, whose main codification at least appears
to be late in the reign; and religion was always a special case
in Egypt), his general point has seemed sufficiently probable a
priori for much attention to have been given to finding evidence
which could relate to it.

At the least it seems that there was a period when Ptolemy
followed a deliberately conciliatory line towards the Egyptians.

1. The best recent discussion is that of E. Will, Histoire
Politique du Monde Hellenistique i (1966), 133ff, who argues
for a basically defensive policy; in this he perhaps does not
sufficiently distinguish the policies of Soter and Philadelphus
from each other.

2. Raccolta Lumbroso (1925), 235ff; Mitt. Schles. Gesellschaft für
Volkskunde xxvii (1926), Iff; other literature on this question
in RE xxiii, 1630ff.
When he first arrived his most pressing need was to build up a solid basis of support in Egypt which could be used against the other satraps and regents. It had been intended that he would share control of the country with Cleomenes, who had been there since 332/1; Cleomenes' exactions had made him extremely unpopular with the Egyptians, and Ptolemy must have made use of this unpopularity in the essential task of removing him as soon as possible. At the start, until enough Macedonians and Greeks could be attracted, Egyptian troops were necessary, and were used for instance at the battle of Gaza (312). Moreover Egypt in the fifth and fourth centuries had undergone a number of national risings against Persian rule, which had ceased only in 343/2 with Ochus' reconquest of the country; at the least the avoidance of any open clash with national sentiment must have been an important factor in Ptolemy's approach, before he was sufficiently well established to be able to ignore native opinion. An essential part of his policy will have been to win over the priestly class by safeguarding their privileges, and so to use their influence with the rest of the population: this was always one of the fundamental lines of Ptolemaic policy in the chora. The priesthood at this time saw the conquest of Alexander the Great as the liberation of Egypt, and there can be no doubt that this was an attitude promoted by the government; the satrap Ptolemy was described as restoring property and sacred books
taken by the Persians to the temples, and favouring their priests\(^1\).

The fact that this evidence comes from official and priestly sources does not invalidate it, for it is precisely the official attitudes which mattered. It was Memphis which was first chosen as capital of Egypt: the origins of the Sarapis cult are at Memphis, and Alexander's body was buried there in 321; but Alexandria had become the capital by 312, for it is mentioned as capital before the description of the second Syrian campaign of 312 on the 'Satrap stele'\(^2\). Nectanebos, descendant of the last national king of Egypt, was appointed strategos and nomarchos in the Delta; and the Egyptian royal nomenclature of Ptolemy was carefully formulated to relate him to the previous dynasty.

It has even been suggested that he married a princess of the Egyptian royal house\(^3\). Thus an initially conciliatory attitude to the Egyptians seems certain, as also that this policy was gradually given up in favour of one which laid more emphasis on

1. See the 'Satrap stele' (Eng. Trans., E.R. Bevan, History of Egypt under the Ptolemaic Dynasty (1927), 28ff; and the attitude expressed on the tomb of Petosiris (literature, RE xxiii, 1632f.).

2. The date of this stele is controversial. I accept the argument of C. Bradford Welles (Hist. xi (1962), 274 n.8) that it is 311 not 317/5; I also accept his argument that the Syrian campaign mentioned is that of 312, not 319/8 (contra P.M. Fraser, Opuscula Atheniensia iii (1960), 2 n.1). On the other hand I believe Fraser is right in asserting that the historical events are in chronological order. This produces a date for the removal to Alexandria between 321 and 312; Hecataeus' use of sources from Memphis and his apparent failure to mention Alexandria (note esp. Diod. i, 31, 2; 50, 6-7, appears to show modernisation by Diodorus - the original perhaps mentioned Memphis as capital) might be a slight indication that the move was after the publication of his work.

the Greek culture of his kingdom. The steps in this pro-
gression are obscure, but they should be related to Ptolemy's
increasing security, his developing reliance on Greek soldiers
and administrators, and his various interventions in Greek
affairs. Especially significant were perhaps the removal
from Thebes to Alexandria, and the arrival of Demetrius of
Phaleron.

It is in relation to the foreign and internal policies
of Ptolemy that his attitude to culture, which would in any
case be interesting as laying the foundations for the greatest
intellectual centre of the Hellenistic world, becomes important
also for political reasons. Despite the fact that the number
of Greeks in his territory was originally small, Ptolemy was
as dependent on the goodwill of Greeks as any other of the
Successors. Militarily he lacked any recruiting area, and had
to rely on mercenaries attracted either from his rivals or
from Greece and Macedonia; his internal administration also
needed Greek organisers and officials. In external affairs
it was in his interest as a sea power to stand forth as the
protector of Greek cities, in order to cause disaffection
in the territory of his opponents and to strengthen his own
position in the Aegean: thus when Antigonus in 314 declared
the Greek cities to be free, Ptolemy in competition was
forced to follow his example. Hence refugees were welcomed,
factions fomented and supported. And more consistently than
any other ruler, Ptolemy encouraged and patronised culture
in his new capital city of Alexandria. Though concessions
might at first be made to local Egyptian feeling, the Ptolemaic court soon emerged as the court of a Greek king, and the city of Alexandria as an intellectual centre for Greeks.

Ptolemy's interest in becoming a patron of Greek culture is at least as early as his expedition to Greece in 309/8. His stay on Cos may have introduced him to some of those who later came to Egypt; and an anecdote shows him, after the capture of Megara in 308, listening to a dialectical debate between the two Megarian philosophers, Stilpon and Diodorus. More interesting for future developments is the statement that he invited Stilpon to Egypt; but Stilpon, who was a prominent politician in the town, and, to judge from his later relations with Demetrius Poliorcetes, an opponent of Ptolemy, preferred to retire to Aegina. Despite Stilpon's connection with Demetrius, who is said to have been a follower of his and whom he advised on the kingly topic of how to benefit mankind (περὶ λαθρείαν εὐεργεσίας), relations with Ptolemy seem to have been reasonably cordial; for among Stilpon's dialogues, which are described as 'frigid', is one called Ptolemaios. In accordance with the usual convention, this will have been intended to honour Ptolemy, by calling a work after him and including him as one of the main speakers; the work is therefore presumably to be dated to this period.

The invitation to Stilpon shows that Ptolemy himself was genuinely interested in creating a cultured circle in Alexandria: as well as his own activities as an author\(^1\), anecdotes portray him taking part in learned symposia with enjoyment\(^2\). But there is no other evidence which can certainly be dated earlier than the arrival of Demetrius of Phaleron, the Peripatetic philosopher who had ruled Athens as Cassander's governor for ten years until the city was liberated by Demetrius Poliorcetes in 307. On the death of Cassander in 297 Demetrius of Phaleron came to Egypt, and remained at court until Ptolemy's death, when he was imprisoned by the new king and shortly died\(^3\). He must have been in greatest favour with Ptolemy during the 290s, for the cause of his eventual downfall was that he supported the right to the succession of Ptolemy's children by his first wife, Eurydice; with the departure of Eurydice and Ptolemy Keraunos about the year 290\(^4\) and the elevation of Ptolemy Philadelphus to the coregency in 285, Demetrius' position must have become more doubtful. Demetrius, like Stilpon, wrote a Ptolemaios; and his influence has been detected in two separate spheres. He is alleged to have been active in drafting a Ptolemaic lawcode, a statement which is to some extent

1. F.G.H. 138; Lucian, pro Lapsu 10 (letters collected by Dionysodorus).
3. Diog. Laert. v, 78; for Demetrius see F.G.H. 228; F. Wehrli, Die Schule des Aristoteles iv (1940).
4. J. Beloch, Griechische Geschichte iv\(^2\) I (1925), 221 n.1.
supported by similarities between Attic and Ptolemaic law. And he laid the foundations for the Museum, where scholars of many disciplines were housed, paid a salary, and provided with the means of research; in conception this institution was clearly modelled on the Lyceum at Athens, though its greater funds and connection with the king meant that many of the details of its organisation were different.

Many of those who came to Alexandria under Ptolemy will have done so as a result of the activities of Demetrius of Phaleron; thus the presence of the geometer Euclid and the doctor Herophilus of Chalcedon should be connected with the foundation of the Museum. When the son of Berenice, born on Cos in 308, reached an age appropriate to advanced education in the late 290s, the Peripatetic school had a natural


2. On the origins of the Museum, see esp. the works cited in note 1. The most recent discussion is that of R. Pfeiffer, History of Classical Scholarship (1968), 87ff; he confines himself to the activities of the institution in poetry and textual analysis. On the relation between these two and the position of Librarian, he makes important and challenging points; but as a picture of the Museum in general his account seems to me one-sided. On its organisation and the influence of Demetrius, I agree with his concluding remarks (p. 104), rather than with the preceding argumentation. The often repeated assertion that philosophy was not represented in the Museum (e.g. Pridik o.c. (122); Pfeiffer p. 97) seems to me as false for the origins of the Museum as it certainly is for its later development.

3. F. Susemihl, Geschichte der Griechischen Literatur in der Alexandrinerzeit i (1891), 705 n. 17; 785f.
claim. It was perhaps on this occasion that overtures were made to Theophrastus, who had written both on kingship and on the education of the king; though he refused, his pupil Straton of Lampsacus came: Straton was himself the author of a work on kingship in three books, and of another on the philosopher king. Straton was already back in Athens by about the year 287 when he became head of the Lyceum; and, given the age of the young Ptolemy, he must have come to Alexandria shortly after Demetrius. Other tutors of Ptolemy at about the same time were the poet and philologist Philitas of Cos and his pupil Zenodotus, who remained to become the first head of the Library.

The Lyceum had no monopoly of philosophy in Alexandria. Though Stilpon of Megara refused Ptolemy's invitation in 308, his rival Diodorus 'Kronos' seems to have lectured in Alexandria later; for an anecdote connects him with the doctor Herophilus and his death is the subject of one of Callimachus' epigrams. Theodorus 'the atheist', exiled from Cyrene in the troubles after Alexander's death, had lived in Athens under Demetrius of Phaleron and been protected by him from prosecution. Banished from Athens, he came to Egypt; and Ptolemy employed him on a notorious but undatable embassy to

1. Diog.Laert.v,37; see above pp.152 ff.
2. Diog.Laert.v, 58-9; cf. Wehrli, Schule v (1950), 45f; see above pp.172 f.
3. von Blumenthal, RE xix.2 (1938), 2165 f; Pfeiffer, o.c. 87-120.
4. See Appendix I.
Lysimachus, in which Theodorus displayed a freedom of speech unsuited to his position. He later returned to Cyrene, where he was friendly with Magas, Ptolemy's governor there and son of Berenice by her first marriage. Another Cyrenaic, Hegesias, author of a book On Suicide by Starvation is alleged to have caused such a rash of suicides by his teaching in Alexandria that Ptolemy forbade him to lecture. Ptolemy's activities in trying to attract talent to Alexandria are also reflected in the stories which grew up around his invitations to the comic poets, Menander and Philemon.

Demetrius of Phaleron is said to have recommended Ptolemy to buy and read books on kingship and government; 'for what friends are not brave enough to recommend to kings are written in those books!'. But there is no evidence whether any of the philosophers who gathered in Egypt under Demetrius wrote a work on kingship specifically for Ptolemy. The closest approach to a serious discussion of the problems of kingship and government in early Ptolemaic Egypt is to be found in a work of

2. Mannebach p.57; there is no ancient evidence for the notion that he was expelled from Alexandria. As a result of Hegesias, the became a favourite topic in New Comedy: Antiphanes, Apollodorus of Carystos (?) and Philemon wrote comedies with this title, Apollodorus of Gela one with the title (possibly significant in view of Hegesias' Alexandrian connections) of . For other examples of the word in New Comedy, cf. Kock's note to Timocles F 18,4.
4. Plut. Mor. 189d; repeated in Stobaeus iv, 7, 27.
central importance for the understanding of all aspects of the period, by an author who cannot be brought into relation with the Museum - Hecataeus of Abdera.1

Hecataeus was a pupil of the Sceptic Pyrrho, and lived under the Diadochi. No full list of his works survives, but they included books On the Poetry of Homer and Hesiod, On the Hyperboreans, and on Egypt2; there were probably also other philosophical works. He is described in various ways, as a philosopher, sophist, historian, or critical grammarian. He came to Egypt, for his work on Egypt was written there under Ptolemy; on the evidence of this book he does indeed seem to have been the first of the men of learning whom Ptolemy protected. For it has recently been shown that Theophrastus' work On Stones was written almost certainly in the archon year 315/4 (it gives a date with reference to the archon of that year), or at least within ten years of that date.3 In that work Theophrastus referred twice to information 'from the records concerning the Egyptian kings'. It is unlikely that Theophrastus or one of his pupils consulted these records themselves; the references probably come from a literary work which used them.

1. The following basic discussions are referred to by authors' name, or name and short title: E. Schwartz, 'Hekataeos von Teos', Rh. Mus. x1 (1885), 223-62; F. Jacoby, 'Hekataios 4', RE vii (1912), 2750-69 (= Griechische Historiker (1956), 227-37); Jacoby, F.G.H. IIIa (1943), 29-87: Commentary on Hecataeus F.G.H. 264. References to the fragments are to F.G.H, except in the case of Diodorus i (= F25).

2. The exact titles is unknown, probably Περί Αιγύπτίων .

3. D.E. Eichholz, Theophrastus De Lapidibus (1965), 8-12: an author does not say 'about ninety years before the archonship of Praxibulus', unless he cannot say 'about a hundred years before the archonship of Euxenippus', because that event is still in the future.
That work would be Hecataeus' book on Egypt, which claimed to be based on Egyptian records, used the same name for them as Theophrastus, and contained just the sort of information which appears in him\(^1\). The last event which Hecataeus is known to have recorded is the death of the Apis bull 'just after Ptolemy had taken over Egypt'\(^2\). The precise date of this event is not known, but again it must be early in the period of Ptolemy's government. The last fixed point in the chronology of the Apis bulls is the murder of the bull by the Persian king Ochus on his reconquest of Egypt in 343/2\(^3\); the next is the beginning of a new Apis era in 300. Between 343 and 300 there will probably have been two Apis bulls; this would fit well with the fact that one died shortly after Ptolemy came to Egypt, sometime around 320\(^4\). Far more important, the passage in

1. De Lapidibus 24, ἀναγραφημένος ὑπὸ τῶν πατέρων τῆς Ἁγιουργίας; cf. 55. For ἀναγραφημένος in Hecataeus, see Diod. i, 31, 7; 43, 6; 44, 4; 46, 7-8; 63, 1; 69, 7; 81, 4; 96, 2; cf. 73, 4. For information similar to Theophrastus in Hecataeus, cf. e.g. 46-7 (monoliths); 55, 10 (tribute); 13, 3; 14; 15, 4; 43, 5 (names of kings as inventors). The connection between Theophrastus and Hecataeus was noticed by W. Jaeger, Diokles von Karystos (1930), 123ff; but he wrongly thought it implied a late date for Theophrastus, rather than an early one for Hecataeus: cf. Jacoby, Commentary p. 32f. On other traces of a knowledge of Hecataeus, see below p. 383.

2. Diod. i, 34, 8.

3. Deinon F.G.H. 690 F21 (=Plut. Mor. 363c); Mor. 355c; Aelian de nat. anim. x, 20; Var. Hist. iv, 8.

4. H. Brugsch, Zeitschr.f.Ägyptische Sprache u. Alterthumskunde xxiv (1886), 39f. The evidence, which is almost complete for the Ptolemaic period, comes from the excavations of the Apis-cemetery; the bulls, with monotonous regularity, achieved a life-span of between 20 and 23 years: cf. M.L. Strack, Die Dynastie der Ptolemäer (1897), 154ff.
Diodorus about the death of the bull ought to suggest that no later Apis bull had yet died when Hecataeus made these statements - that is, that the bull which died just before 300 was still alive. The next bull survived into the reign of Philadelphus. The argument is not conclusive, for it cannot be shown that the original wording of Hecataeus excluded the possibility of two Apis bulls having died since Ptolemy arrived, although the passage clearly refers to the first such occurrence. Nevertheless, independent Egyptian evidence confirms the inference from Theophrastus, by pointing strongly to a date before 300 for the latest historical event mentioned. It is worth noting also that Ptolemy is not described as a king in the work as we have it, but merely as 'Ptolemy son of Lagus', although he behaves like a king, and is described as governing a kingdom. The evidence suggests therefore that Hecataeus' work on Egypt was written between about 320 and 315, or before 305 at the latest.

A work on Egypt composed under Ptolemy, and within the first crucial ten years about which so little is known, would

1. Diod. i, 31, 7; 46, 7-8; kingdom, 30, 1. Other arguments for an early date have some force: the Jewish Aristaeus considers Hecataeus to be earlier than Demetrius of Phaleron (F 23; Jacoby, Commentary p. 65); Theophrastus probably used Hecataeus on Jewish and Egyptian religion in his Ἐλεορία (Jaeger o.c. 134-53; Journal of Religions xviii (1938), 127ff; A. D. Nock, H. T. R. xxxvii (1944), 174; T. Cole, Democritus and the Sources of Greek Anthropology (1967), 160 n. 35); dated 319-4: W. Pötscher, Theophrastos (1964), 122-5; cf. F 13 and O. Regenbogen, RE Suppl. vii (1940), 1515f.). Note too the absence of Alexandria in Diod. i, 31, 1: above p. 321 n. 2.
clearly shed a great deal of light on contemporary attitudes to the country; it is fortunate that, for two somewhat different reasons, a certain amount can be discovered about the author and his book. In the course of it, Hecataeus had mentioned the Jews - the first Greek historian to do so; though his description was not entirely favourable, it was sufficiently so to provoke a later Jewish writer to father a whole book On the Jews on him. Fragments of this forgery are preserved in Josephus' Contra Apionem, together with Josephus' characterisation of the author. From these it emerges that this pseudo-Hecataeus mentioned the battle of Gaza and Ptolemy's Syrian expedition of 312: he perhaps portrayed himself as taking part in it; he claimed also to have visited the Red Sea on official business, and is described by Josephus in general terms as 'a philosopher experienced in practical affairs'. This picture seems to be based on facts known about the genuine Hecataeus, and it can be accepted in outline, even if the actual details of pseudo-Hecataeus' travels were invented to suit the needs of a book on the Jews; for it is

1. F 6; on his attitude to the Jews, cf. below p. 361.
3. T 7a; F 21; cf. Jacoby, Commentary, 3.62f. But the venue of F 21, 189 is Egypt, not Judaea (Jacoby, Commentary p.63; see his text and apparatus). The forgery perhaps was presented as a correction of the genuine Hecataeus' earlier account, as a result of information allegedly obtained from the Syrian expedition of 312: just as, presumably, the information of the genuine Hecataeus concerning Judaism is to be connected with the Syrian campaign of ca 320-18.
supported by a Greek anecdote showing Hecataeus at the court of Archidamus IV of Sparta\(^1\); like Theodorus and other philosophers he may well have been employed on an embassy, and Archidamus is known to have fought against Ptolemy's enemy Demetrius Poliorcetes in 294. Hecataeus' work on Egypt can therefore claim especial authority as the opinions of a man who was prominent at court on the problems facing Ptolemy in his early days. One further fact can be inferred from the Jewish interest in Hecataeus: he must have died under Ptolemy I, or he would otherwise have found himself, as allegedly an expert on Jewish law and a friend of the Jews, playing a part in the legend of the translation of the Pentateuch under Ptolemy II\(^2\).

So much for the author; his work is not entirely lost. Apart from the fragments, most (perhaps all) of Hecataeus' book survives in epitome; for Diodorus, with his usual preference for philosophical historiography, took Hecataeus as the basis for the first book of his *Historical Library*, on Egypt\(^3\).

1. T 5.
3. The implications of this fact, established by Schwartz, are worked out in detail in Jacoby's commentary to § 25, and applied in the bracketing in his text of the fragment. My own views in this section were first discussed in a class on Diodorus given by Professor A. Andrewes in summer 1966; with a few minor exceptions (below n. 2 p. 347) I find myself in agreement with Jacoby's conclusions: the results are laid out in Table I. On the problem of where Diodorus' use of Hecataeus begins, see Appendix 2.
It is true that Diodorus mentions Hecataeus by name only once, and then in such a way as to suggest that he was a subsidiary source; but various considerations make it certain that he was in fact the basis of Diodorus' account. Thus all the known fragments from Hecataeus' book can be fitted easily into Diodorus' narrative; that narrative was originally dated to the age of Ptolemy I, and has been modernised only very superficially; the structure of the whole account and its general nature show a clear pattern appropriate to that genre of ethnography which Hecataeus is known to have practised - they can be compared with his treatment of the Hyperboreans and

1. i,46,8 where he becomes only one of a whole class of Greeks writing Egyptian histories under Ptolemy I! (cf. Jacoby, commentary p.75 on the form of citation). Note however that Diodorus gives himself away: the description of the tomb of Osymandyas is specifically attributed to Hecataeus at the start (\( \phi \gamma \sigma \tau \nu \), 47,1), but by the end to those Egyptians (\( \phi \gamma \sigma \tau \nu \), 49,6) to whom the whole of the Theologoumena and History is attributed. Thus Hecataeus is clearly identical with the alleged authors of the oratio obliqua throughout. Similarly at 43, 1 \( \phi \gamma \sigma \tau \nu \) refers back over the whole Agatharchides insertion (32-41), to the subject of 10-29, Egyptian priests.

2. For the position of F 1-6 and 19 in Diodorus, see Jacoby, commentary, and Table I.

3. 31, 6-8; 46,7; 84,8: note Diodorus' half-hearted modernisations, actually involving a failure to change the original chronology at 44,1: in fact the 'little less than 5,000 years' there is related to the 4,700+ years of native rule and 195 years of Persian rule (= 4,945+ years) of 59,6. The terminus must therefore have been the same in both passages, Alexander's crossing - not, as in 44,1, Diodorus' own visit in the 18th Olympiad: here Diodorus has included the Ptolemaic period, without bothering to adjust the figures.
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the Jews\textsuperscript{1}. Finally the unity of Diodorus' basic account is shown by its internal consistency in chronology, tone and a large number of small details which recur or find echoes in different places\textsuperscript{2}.

Diodorus was however concerned to create a finished literary product, and he was not therefore a completely mechanical excerptor. In this section he was particularly proud of having been to Egypt himself, and not averse from giving the impression that the whole was the result of his own researches hence insertions showing himself as an eyewitness\textsuperscript{3}, and some curious attempts to bring the information up to date without actually having to find out any new facts\textsuperscript{4}. There is also the problem of abbreviation, which may have been heavier in some places than in others\textsuperscript{5}, and may even on occasion have caused omission on a scale such as to obscure the structure of the original. For instance, the section on the spread of culture from Egypt to the rest of the world by means of colonisation has suffered severely; it must once have been a major part of the work, describing in detail how every other civilisation

\textsuperscript{1} In structure, not Tendenz; in the latter there are differences. I agree with Jacoby, commentary p.48f, against Jaeger, that the Jews are not portrayed as wholly ideal (cf. below p.361f), and Hyperborean society is largely imaginary.

\textsuperscript{2} See the marginal annotations provided to the texts of Fl-15, 19, 25 by Jacoby: he notes only the more striking parallels.

\textsuperscript{3} 61,4; 83,8-9; cf. 10,6-7, 333 n.3

\textsuperscript{4} See the passages cited \textsuperscript{3}; also 52,3; 63,5; 50,6-7 (a reference forward to Diod. xvii,52) and Jacoby, commentary p.78.

\textsuperscript{5} See Jacoby on Fl,4. Notices of abbreviation are common: 29,6; 42,2; 44,5; 58,5; 69,2; 72,6; 85,5; 89,4; 90,4; 98, 10; cf. 37,1.
was derivative on Egypt, an effective claim for the attention of the civilised world on behalf of the nascent Ptolemaic state, and one which provoked answers from other Hellenistic historians under different patronage. Something of its original scale is shown by Hecataeus' description of the Jews, which Diodorus omitted at this point, to insert an abbreviation of it forty books later as a digression in the narrative of Pompey's Jewish War. If other civilisations were given as much more space than the Jews as their comparative importance in Hecataeus' eyes would seem to require, it is not surprising that Diodorus, in despair, virtually limited himself to recording the most interesting case, the colonisation of Athens from Egypt, and that even he (usually so credulous) ended by protesting:

"In general the Egyptians say that their ancestors sent out numerous colonies to many parts of the inhabited world, by reason of the eminence of their kings and their great population; but since they offer no precise proof whatsoever of these statements, and since no historian worthy of trust supports them, I have not thought their accounts worth recording."

A further problem concerns the section on the geography of Egypt. In Diodorus, this begins with a description of the

1. Diod. i, 28-9; for replies, see below p.381,379.
2. F6; Jacoby, commentary p.46ff.
3. Diod. i, 29,5-6.
4. 30-1.
natural barriers which defend and isolate the country, a
description which owes as much to symmetry and logical
coherence as to geographical fact; there follows mention of
its great population both earlier and under Ptolemy. All this
is clearly from Hecataeus. Then there is a sentence which
suggests transition to the history of the country: 'it is for
this reason, they say, that the ancient kings built great and
marvellous works with the aid of so many hands, and left them
as immortal memorials to their glory'. But Diodorus immediately
postpones the history to insert a long digression on the Nile,
its animal life and the causes of its risings, a digression
which can be shown to come from the second century author,
Agatharchides of Cnidos. Diodorus was right in thinking
Agatharchides' description superior to anything Hecataeus
could have offered; but the problem arises, did Hecataeus in
fact offer anything similar?

An account of the geography of Egypt which omitted the
Nile would have been curious, especially when written by an
author who plagiarised Herodotus as extensively as Hecataeus
did; moreover the founder of the Abderite school of philosophy,
to which Hecataeus belonged, Democritus, had also speculated
on the rising of the Nile. Perhaps Diodorus has abbreviated
so heavily that only the beginning and the end of the section

1. 31,9, looking forward and back: below n.3, p.338.
2. F.G.H. 86 F10.
on geography survive. On the other hand it can be argued that the alleged priestly sources of the work and the purpose behind Hecataeus' geographical section left little place for a description of the Nile - that it was precisely because Hecataeus had not given one that Diodorus felt impelled to turn elsewhere. Hecataeus is insistent that his information, in contrast to that of earlier historians, comes from the sacred archives or the priests: that is true even of the section on Egyptian customs! A geographical description of the country does not really fit this pattern, for here autopsy is clearly preferable to priestly sources - except of course for population figures, which Hecataeus duly produces. Again, the progression suggested by chapters 30-1 is coherent in itself, without introducing the Nile: from the natural defences of Egypt on west, south, east and north to the density of its population and its prosperity, which explain the great monuments of the kings of Egypt; this last topic both leads into the historical section and refers back to the mention of colonisation through overpopulation in chapter 29, suggesting that any geographical section may not have been long. Certainly both in this work and in that on the Hyperboreans Hecataeus shows interest in the relation between land and people, and certainly every historical ethnography should

2. 31,7.
3. 31,9 connects closely with 29,5, and with 45ff.
contain a geographical section; but Hecataeus, it is clear, rearranged the ethnographic form to suit his own needs, and may have given little space to geography; his data in fact merely emphasise the strength of Egypt's defences, its isolation and suitability as a philosophically ideal state, lacking contact with the corruption of its neighbours and wholly self-sufficient - the ethical autarkeia of the Abderite school reinforced the importance laid on political autarkeia in fourth century political philosophy. Moreover, at the time Hecataeus wrote, Egypt was in theory part of a larger empire; this emphasis on the defences of the country and its geographical autonomy reflects the viewpoint of Ptolemy: the dismemberment of Alexander's empire is referred to in the statement that Egypt 'seems to excel by a long way in natural strength and fertility the other regions separated off into kingdoms'. The short description in Diodorus may then be, less the remains of a full-scale section on geography, than a geographical introduction to the history of Pharaonic Egypt, which adduced briefly certain relevant facts. It would not be surprising if the author of a sober guide to the fairyland of the Hyperboreans lacked any interest in real geography.

2. 30,1.
3. Hecataeus certainly described the route to the Hyperboreans, asserted that they still existed, and was free with geographical information (cf. esp. F8,10-14); Jacoby assumes that the book was organised as a fictitious travel story. While there is no direct evidence for this in the fragments, it might explain why the witness of Hecataeus was accepted later; and Euhemerus, who certainly had read the book on (contd. over)
Diodorus' techniques of compilation disturb the structure of the work in another way. Having chosen to use a certain author because that author's particular interests coincide with his own, he has a tendency to interpolate variant accounts of those aspects which again particularly interested him. Thus the original author is expanded precisely at those points on which he gave most information, and correspondingly perhaps abbreviated most heavily where he was originally weakest; the faults and virtues of the original are intensified. The spirit of the interpolation is often close enough to the spirit of the original to make identification difficult; it is after all the same man with the same interests selecting, abbreviating and combining in each case. Thus Diodorus was, 

Egypt (below n. 1 p. 347), may have taken the form of his work on Panchaea from this book (cf. Jacoby, commentary p. 54ff.) Yet it is possible that Hecataeus derived his authority, not from the claim of autopsy, but from his systematic exposition of earlier traditions, the completeness and philosophical organisation of his description, and his apparently factual approach. It would be disturbing to find Ptolemy unable or unwilling to expose a man who laid much emphasis on his pseudo-travels.

The problem of whether there was a geographical section to Hecataeus' book on Egypt is not, I think, solved by R. Merkelbach's attempt to identify a papyrus fragment of the section (Archiv für Papyrusforschung xvi (1958), 112ff.). The geographical fragment he discusses certainly shows the influence of Hecataeus' general conceptions of Egypt, but I doubt whether it can be by Hecataeus. The practice of theomorphising elements ('Demeter' for 'earth', 'Poseidon' for 'sea') in this fragment displays a rhetorical preciosity of style unlikely in Hecataeus, whose similar identifications occur embedded in a theological context: for him, they are part of a system of explanation, not a stylistic trick. The description of the origins of human food (lines 22ff.), though comparable to Diod.1,10,1, seems in detail difficult to reconcile with it; moreover Hecataeus would surely not have said διακόπτειν ζέ παρ' - he would have appealed to the authority of the Egyptian priests.
like Hecataeus, interested in Egyptian animal worship, added alternative explanations to the reasons which Hecataeus gave for this practice, which are sufficiently like Hecataeus' reasons that they can be detected as an insertion only because they appear in the wrong place and interrupt the main account. Again Hecataeus gave a list of Greeks who visited Egypt, and underlined their debt to Egyptian learning; but, though the list of Egyptian lawgivers which precedes it would have fitted very well this emphasis of Hecataeus, its historical statements conflict with what Hecataeus says in his historical section; and its praise of Darius and hostility towards the Ptolemies show that it reflects a later native nationalism.

1. Thus 80, 5-90, 2, being various general reasons for animal worship would be in place at 86, but is shown to be an addition by its coming after the detailed causes of 87-89, 3; these should originally have concluded with mention of the special addiction of Egyptians to gratitude at 90, 2-3. For Hecataeus' interest in animal worship, cf. 85-9; 21, 9, 9-11; for Diodorus himself, 83, 8-9; 84, 8; 90, 4.

Cole (o.c. (p. 334), 184f.) has argued that c. 90 produces doctrines sufficiently similar to c. 8, 1 for it to be attributed to Hecataeus. But its curious position, interrupting the argument, tells against this; moreover c. 90 is in fact a variant of Hecataeus' second general explanation, which has already appeared at the proper point in the discussion (86, 4-5). c. 90 is probably therefore an insertion, showing once again the overwhelming influence of Hecataeus and his types of explanation on all later writing on Egypt (cf. below p. 378).

2. 94-5; on this point Jacoby originally had doubts (RE 2, 60), but was rightly more confident in commentary p. 78. Of the lawgivers mentioned, Mneves is presumably an alternative to Hecataeus' Menas (45, 1), who is characterised very differently; Sasychis does not appear in Hecataeus; there is no sign of Amasis' lawgiving activities in c. 68. The section is favourable to Darius, whereas Hecataeus seems not to have included an account of the Persian period. Only Sesoosis and Bocchoris show some correspondence. Moses is spelt differently in 94, 2 and F6. But the anti-Macedonian (contd. over)
The most extensive interpolations are however in the early section on the gods of Egypt. Here Hecataeus gave a rationalising account of the gods on two levels, as personifications of the elements of matter, and as early kings of Egypt deified for their wisdom and benefactions to mankind; the events under the latter were sufficiently historical in his eyes for him to be able to produce a chronology of the period\(^1\). Diodorus, interested both in chronology and in Egyptian religion, added to Hecataeus large passages from a different account, which equated Osiris with Dionysus, combated various Greek legends of Dionysus, portrayed Osiris as the great conqueror, and offered a different, shorter chronology\(^2\). Many tendencies in these two narratives are

attitude in 95,6 is also present in F6,\(^5\)b: in both cases the sentiment attributing decline specifically to Macedonian rule is, I would suggest, an addition of Diodorus himself, to explain why the ideal state has disappeared, on the lines of Xenophon in the Cyropaedia and Constitution of Sparta (cf. A. Momigliano, Terzo Contributo (1966), 341ff.). On Diodorus' moralising additions to his sources, cf. R. Drews, A.J.A. 1xxxiii (1962), 383ff.

1. Hecataeus' chronology: 26,1: 23,000 years, divided into 18,000 for gods and heroes, starting from Helios, and just under 5,000 until the crossing of Alexander (44,1; cf. 69,6; above n. 3 p. 333).

2. The shorter chronology has a different starting-point and a vaguer finishing-point, from Osiris to the reign of Alexander, 10,000 years: 23,1; 24,2. Starting from the basic insertion, 17-20,5, the following are clearly part of the same account: 11,3; 15,6-8; 23,1-24, end; perhaps also 22,1-6; 26,6-27,2. Diodorus' declared interest in chronology (i,3,8) is evident in the prevalence of interpolations in the chronological sections of Book i: thus it is difficult to see to whom the 'three seasons' explanation in 26,1-5 should be attributed (in favour of Hecataeus, cf. 11,5; 12,8; 16,1).
similar, as for instance their belief that Greek religion was derived from Egyptian; the non-Hecataean account indeed seems to have based its description of the conquests of Osiris-Dionysus on a later passage in Hecataeus, his version of the conquests of Sesoosis. Hence there may be places where the original authorship is uncertain, and where Diodorus himself intervened in an effort to reconcile the two chronologies, or bridge a gap between the two narratives. Again confusion is caused because it is the very similarity between the two accounts, the fact that one is partly derived from the other, which tempted Diodorus to combine them.

Despite these minor difficulties, it remains true that it is possible to discover more about Hecataeus' work on Egypt than about most other lost works by Greek historians. In its form, it is perhaps the best example of a complete ethnographic and historical description of a particular people, and served as a model for many later writers.

It began at the beginning, perhaps with a cosmogony, certainly with a demonstration that the origins of animal life are to be found in Egypt's fertile mud. The first men looked up to heaven, and worshipped the sun and moon, Osiris and Isis,

1. Compare 17-20,6 with 53-8; and see n. 4 p. 364.

2. Thus I would disagree with Jacoby in that I would attribute 25,2-6 to Hecataeus. Diodorus' own interventions: 19,6-7; 15,2; 21,4; 23,1; 25,1-2 (?); 27,5; 29,5,6. There is at least one other source, apart from Ctesias and Agatharchides: the Nysa story, (27,3-end; 13,4), including the famous Praises of Isis (cf. A.D. Nock, Gnomon xxi (1949), 221ff. D. M"uller, "E"gypten u. die Griechischen Isis-Aretalogie, Abh. S"ehs. Ak. Wiss. Leipzig liii,1 (1961)). Most illuminating for Diodorus' scissors-and-paste method are the passages discussed in Appendix 2.
together with the five elements. These are the gods in heaven who have existed from eternity. Then there are the earthly gods, some of them with the same names as the heavenly, who were once mortal kings, but have been deified for their benefactions; about these Hecataeus can write a quasi-historical account, based on genuine Egyptian myths; he can also offer a chronology - eighteen millenia of divine rule. This was the Egyptian age of colonisation, and Hecataeus' account of the spread of Egyptian civilisation throughout the world (much abbreviated in Diodorus) appears as a sort of appendix to this first section, which is described in general as περὶ τῶν θεολογουμένων παρ' Αἰγύπτιοι, on the theology of Egypt.

The section on the land of Egypt has already been discussed. It leads into a full-scale history of the country, covering the five millenia of mortal rule. The most interesting section is the next, on the customs of Egypt, which were eagerly admired by such Greeks as Orpheus, Homer, Pythagoras and Solon, and whose excellence is shown by the political stability and prosperity of the country for more than 4700 years. Hecataeus discards the sensationalism of Herodotus and other Greek writers: 'after careful investigation, we shall set out only what is written in the records of the priests of Egypt'.

These records appear to have included everything necessary for

1. 29,6.
2. 69,7.
the construction of an ideal state which, if a little exotic, would have satisfied most Greek political philosophers. The daily life and duties of the kings are described, the financial organisation of Egypt and its class structure, the administration of justice and various particularly striking laws. Then marriage customs (designed to ensure a large population), the education of the priestly class and the non-education of others, and the practice of medicine in Egypt. There follows a section which perhaps appears more prominent than it originally was, because Diodorus has abbreviated it only slightly, that on animal worship - first the practices involved, then possible reasons for this curious custom in general and for particular animals. Finally Egyptian burial practices. The work seems then to have concluded with a description of the debt of Greece to Egypt in historical times - the various poets, philosophers, politicians, astrologers and sculptors who visited Egypt, and owed their ideas to what they saw there.

Virtually the entire work, it appears, claimed to be based on Egyptian priestly sources - even in Diodorus it often remains in indirect speech, as what the priests say;¹ Hecataeus was trying to emphasise his independence from earlier

1. The major sections not in indirect speech are the 'Geography', the 'History' from 50,2 (but the whole is alleged to come from priestly records (44,4), and there is constant reference to Egyptian sources), and the 'Customs' (which are also said to come from the sacred records, as is even the list of Greek tourists - cf. below n. 3 p.347!). See in general Jacoby, commentary p.12ff. For the various modes of reference to his sources: 'sacred records', see p.329; 'the Egyptians', c.10-29, 43ff.(?); 52,6; 62,1; 60,2; 'the priests', 21,1; 26,1; 43,6; 51,2; and the references in p.346 n.2.
Greek sources both here and in his occasional discussion of variant Greek accounts. The truth is not so simple, or so creditable.

In general it is clear that Hecataeus did use previous Greek accounts, and did not often distinguish explicitly their information from that of the priests. But though he could not read the Egyptian records for himself, he certainly did consult the priests - indeed he probably sought out and recorded different priestly traditions: Jacoby has pointed out that at least three sources seem to be involved, the priests of Heliopolis, Memphis, and (especially) Thebes.

But what is new in Hecataeus is not only some of his information; it is also its systematic co-ordination, and the resulting fusion of Greek and Egyptian elements into a unified picture. Each section of the narrative, however, presents such different problems that the question of its sources would have to be treated separately; similarly, the conclusions which could be drawn from such an investigation would be relevant to different problems in each case. Before considering one particular area, I shall note briefly the importance of other aspects.

The theological section combines Ionian physical speculation and religious rationalism with less critical Greek

1. Greek writers, 15,2; 46,8; 53,1 (cf. 9, and 63,5: άξιοωσία as opposed to άξιοωσία); 64,13 and such passages as 61,1. Note especially the attacks on Herodotus, explicit (60,7) and implied (59,2 - Herod. ii,111; 62,2 - Herod. ii,112; 66,10 - Herod. ii, 151); cf. Jacoby, commentary

2. Signs of variant priestly stories, 13,3; 15,2; 44,1; 53,1,9; 64,3,13; 85,4-5; and many variant stories in the section on contd. over.
attitudes to Egyptian religion, and genuine Egyptian myths. It offers important help in understanding the attitudes behind various early Hellenistic phenomena. Thus it was Hecataeus, not Euhemerus (whose debt to Hecataeus in this and other particulars is clear), who first systematically worked out the theory that the gods are divinised kings, and so, by bringing together heaven and earth, facilitated that most characteristic feature of Hellenistic kingship - the development of the founder cult into a systematic worship of kings. Again the establishment of the official Greco-Egyptian cult of Sarapis presents problems of chronology and motive; the attitude of Hecataeus in this section is the best evidence for the religious background to the cult at its inception.

1. animal worship; cf. also 40,1; 51, 3; 61,3; 64,1. Theban sources, 10,2; 15,1ff; 45,4ff; 50,1-2; 87,8; cf. 46,8 and in general Jacoby, commentary p.84f.
1. This is not disputed even by Tarn, who dates Euhemerus' book earlier than most, shortly after 303: P.B.A. xix (1933), 163ff. (his argument that Euhemerus met Demetrius of Phaleron in Alexandria in 303 (p.165) is clearly wrong); cf. Jacoby, Re vi (1909), 953, 957ff, 958ff; and the very clear argument of Cole o.c. (p.138) 153ff. (though some of his items in col.3 are from the secondary source, not Hecataeus); also the introduction to G.Vallauri's new edition of the fragments of Euhemerus, Euemero di Messene, Pubbl. Fac. Lett.e Fil. Univ. Torino viii.3 (1956), 4f. On the derivativeness of Leon of Pella from Hecataeus, see Cole 157ff; F. Pfister, Mullus, (Festschrift T. Klauser (1964), 291ff.
2. Cf. esp. P.M. Fraser, o.c. (p.138); Operacula Atheniensia vii (1967), 23ff.
3. It should be taken together with Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride, which relies heavily on Hecataeus and on Manetho, who was, with Timotheus the Eumolpid, the alleged author of the theology of the Sarapis cult: their activity is later than Hecataeus. On the importance of the Greek tourist section for the new Hellenistic attitude to the relation between Greek and oriental wisdom, see esp. T. Hopfner, 'Orient u. griechische Philosophie', Alte Orient, Beiheft iv (1925), esp. 10ff, 4ff: Hopfner attributes the information even in this section to genuine priests.
The section on colonisation is clearly to a very large extent Hecataeus' own, and is especially interesting in showing the contemporary awareness of the role of colonisation in spreading civilisation, at a time when, as a result of Alexander's conquests, the Greek world was in its own second age of colonisation: to see the foundation of colonies in terms of the deliberate spreading of Greek culture is not an anachronistic attitude, but a response valid for the early Hellenistic world.

The historical section is of less general importance, for it is clear that Hecataeus was not particularly interested in history. Here his relationship with Herodotus, and possibly with other lost historians on Egypt, is very close; which may perhaps make it easier to see how much really comes from his own consultation of the priests, and how much is mere wilful variation of Herodotus.

Most problematical is the section on Egyptian customs. Earlier Greek descriptions, priestly information, and his own rationalisation are interwoven; the way that Diodorus varies the tense from present to past suggests that the description was seen partly as that of a past utopia, and partly as that of a present reality - or rather perhaps of a possible future reality, if Ptolemy could be persuaded to respect native Egyptian traditions. This idealisation in both past and future seems partly due to Hecataeus' priestly informants and partly to his own leanings towards the construction of a perfect state. Thus, for instance, the position of skilled craftsmen, hereditarily
tied to their particular craft, is justified on the Platonic grounds that the habit of meddling in two or three trades and in politics is a weakness which has ruined democracies! The phenomenon may be partly Egyptian; the reason for it is that of a Greek philosopher. To evaluate these strands systematically would require a detailed commentary by someone expert in late Pharaonic and early Ptolemaic social history, and also in Greek political thought. The problems can however be posed by considering one particular topic within the section of Egyptian customs, those chapters 'concerning the ancient kings'.

Diodorus has reproduced only the most important of the customs concerning the ancient kings, but the main lines of Hecataeus' description seem clear. It began with a general account of the nature of Egyptian kingship: unlike other kings, who ruled without check, the conduct of the kings of Egypt was governed by written regulations both in daily life and in public affairs. Even their servants had to be drawn from the sons of the priesthood. Hecataeus described their daily life in detail: public business at dawn, then a religious ceremony which included a formal panegyric by a priest on the king's virtues, and absolution for his transgressions. After sacrifice the priest read from the sacred books to

1. 74, cfr. Dicaearchus F5 a Wehrli, below n. 5 p. 383.On the 'Customs' in general and their interweaving of genuine Egyptian practices with Platonic institutions, see esp. C. Bradford Welles, *Journal of Juristic Papyrology* iii (1949), 40ff.

2. c.70-72; see the statement of abbreviation at the end of c.72.
provide the king with models for his conduct. Every detail of
the king's diet and private life was prescribed by the sacred
books.

Similarly the king had no freedom in legal or other public
business, but could act only in accordance with established
precedent. The result of this system was the goodwill of the
ruled, bringing political stability and prosperity. Hecataeus
took a similar attitude in describing the funeral ceremonies for
the king, which were designed to give expression to the goodwill
of his subjects. There is communal mourning for seventy-two
days; then a tribunal is set up to judge the king's deeds
during his lifetime: decision is by popular acclamation, and
the ultimate sanction is that the king should be deprived of
the customary public burial.

The general theme of the section is the subordination of
the Egyptian kings to the laws and customs of their office,
and the function of the priests in ensuring this: 'For in
general the priests are the first to deliberate on the most
important matters, and are always at the king's side, sometimes
as his helpers, sometimes as proposers of measures and teachers;
and they also forecast future events by astrology and divination,
and make known to him those acts recorded in the sacred books
which can be of assistance.' Compared with the reality of
Pharaonic kingship, this seems a rather curious characterisation.

1. Not explicitly in Diodorus, but in F5.
2. 73,4.
Moreover it is clear that such an interpretation was not suggested to Hecataeus by official Ptolemaic court opinion: not even the most ardent advocate of Egyptianisation would have wanted to see Ptolemy so completely in the hands of the priests; nor will Hecataeus have intended his description to be directly applicable to Ptolemy. This can be seen from the way Diodorus describes it as \(\pi\epsilon\rho \tau \nu\> \lambda\epsilon\xi\alpha\iota\sigma\upsilon \beta\alpha\rho\iota\kappa\varepsilon\upsilon\>^1\), and (in contrast to much of the rest of his abbreviation) uses the past tense; indeed the whole account is presented as paradoxical.\(^2\)

There is in fact considerable reason to believe that both general approach and many of the facts, if they did not come actually from the 'sacred archives' Hecataeus alleged, at least came from the priests who will have been the mediators between Hecataeus and the archives.

A similar subordination of king to law and the priests recurs in Diodorus in book III, in his description of Ethiopian kingship, drawn directly or indirectly from Agatharchides of Cnidos.\(^3\) Here we are told that the king is chosen by the god from among a pre-selected group of priests; his daily life and all his actions are regulated by laws or ancestral customs, and his favours and punishments are ruled by precedent. The priests are even able to send a message to the king, saying

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1. 72,6. The problem of this characterisation is recognised by Schwarz (l.c. below, \(p.379\)) and Bradford Welles (o.c.44).
2. esp. 71,1.
3. Diod. iii, 5-7 = Strabo xvii, 222-3; Herodotus already knows of the political power of the Ethiopian oracle of Zeus at Meroe: ii, 29,7.
that it is the god's order that he should die. Formerly the kings used to obey the priests, but Ergamenes (Arqamani, ca 250-15)¹, 'who had had a Greek education and had studied philosophy' was the first to disobey them: having executed the priests, he proceeded to rule in accordance with his own will.

Agatharchides was a curious and not wholly reliable author, well able to pick up, embellish, and even perhaps invent picturesque customs; he had read Hecataeus, and it might perhaps be claimed that his account was to some extent modelled on that of Hecataeus. But there are no verbal similarities between the two descriptions², and many of the details in each account are very different. Certainly there was a tradition, going back to Herodotus, which tended to locate curious customs concerning kingship among the Ethiopians³ (a tradition which is still alive among anthropologists today:

2. Contrast the wording of iii,5,2 with i,70,11; 71,1 on the same subject.
3. On the tendency of ancient writers to organise and localise similar ethnographic phenomena into distinctive culture patterns, see the fundamental study of S. Pembroke, J.W.C.I. xxx (1967), 1ff; he mentions Ethiopian kingship in passing (22f.), but fails to realise that it is an excellent example of the phenomenon he is discussing. Whether Nicolaus of Damascus F.G.H. 90 F103m is therefore really evidence for a matrilineal royal succession is very doubtful: it may merely be a reflection of the Meroitic freedom of choice within a limited group. Nicolaus goes on to say that, if no sister's son is available, they choose the most handsome and most warlike: here he is clearly combining elements from the theme of curious customs concerning Ethiopian kingship: cf. below nn. 4-6 p. 353.
the tribes of the Sudan play an important part in theories of 'Divine Kingship' in Africa. Nevertheless Agatharchides' information concerning the Meroitic kingdom of Cush seems to be good, based probably (as he claimed) on travellers' information, and the Ptolemaic archives in Alexandria. The circumstantial description of how Ergamenes freed himself from priestly control sounds plausible: a sixth century decree of the Ethiopian king Aspalta records a similar quarrel between king and priests.

Agatharchides' description of the succession procedure contrasts favourably with that in other writers; for he is the only ancient authority to distinguish between the practices of the Meroitic kingdom, and the customs of those beyond Meroe: the various Greek stories of how the 'Ethiopians' chose their kings for their size or their beauty are placed by him further south - that is, beyond the region of his exact knowledge.

Moreover there are a number of descriptions of the succession procedure in the hieroglyphic inscriptions from the kingdom of Cush, both in the Annals of different kings, and in a detailed

2. Diod. iii, 35, 1; cf. the useful information in the somewhat laboured article of W. Peremans, Hist. xvi (1967), 432ff.
4. Herod. iii, 29; Arist. Pol. iv, 1290b5; Scylax, Periplus 112.
5. Bion, F.G.H. 668 F2; cf. Arist. Pol. loc. cit.; Nic. Dam. F.G.H. 90 F103m; Pomponius Mela iii, 86; and for India, Onesicritus, F.G.H. 134 F21.
6. Diod. iii, 9, 4 = Strabo xvii, 822.
7. Note esp. Budge o.c. 117ff. (accession of Harsiotef, 404: all dates approximate, and after Arvell); 140ff. (election of Nastasen, 336); M.F. Laming Macadam, The Temples of Kawa (contd. over)
account of the election of king Aspalta; the evidence ranges from the seventh to the third century. The constant elements in these inscriptions seem to be precisely the selection by the God of the king from among a group of 'Royal Brethren', often with a ceremony at Thebes or Napata; occasionally the army is mentioned as involved, but in a passive role. In this particular at least Agatharchides' account is vindicated, though it is obvious that his information is more oriented towards the priesthood than the statements in the royal inscriptions. The fact that Agatharchides' account comes ultimately from priestly sources in Ethiopia sheds much light on the similar account in Hecataeus.

From the end of the twentieth dynasty the power of the High Priest of Amon at Thebes had considerably increased. In fact he was often an independent ruler in control of Upper Egypt, and in theory even occasionally took the titles of the King; but for the most part he seems to have sheltered behind Amon-Re himself, whose rule was exercised by means of oracles; the government was thus a direct form of theocracy. During the

2. Cf. Laming Macadam o.c., 1:11n.; he confirms this from the complexities of the actual relationships in the succession (124ff.), but does not consider the evidence of Agatharchides or Nicolaus.
3. The fundamental study of this period, and of the relation between Hecataeus, Agatharchides and reality, is E. Meyer, *SB Preuss. Ak. Wiss.Berlin* xxviii (1928), 495ff; cf. also *G.d.A. II.2* 1ff; H. Kees has modified the picture somewhat in *Der Götterglaube im alten Aegypten* (1941) 306ff;

(contd. over)
twenty-second to twenty-fourth dynasties various means were employed to bring Thebes under the firmer control of the kings, such as the appointment of a son as High Priest, or a daughter as wife of the God; but the result was merely to bring Amon-Re and the king into closer connection than they had been before, and to increase the influence of Thebes and its priests. It has been suggested that this tendency was accentuated when the Ethiopian rulers of Cush conquered Egypt in the second half of the eighth century; for these kings seem to have been under the control of the priests of Amon at Napata, and to have conceived themselves as having a religious duty to restore what they believed to be the ancient customs and beliefs to a degenerate Egypt. The earlier relationship between Napata and Thebes is obscure: it has been suggested that the kingdom of Cush was Egyptianised by priests fleeing from Thebes in the tenth century, when the Libyan dynasty succeeded in reuniting Egypt; certainly it must be about that time that Napata began to develop independently of Thebes. Thus the Theban priestly theocracy reached its full culmination in Cush, and was from there introduced briefly into Egypt with the twenty-fifth dynasty. Then, in the seventh century, the Ethiopians were expelled by the Assyrians; in 581 the troops of Psammetichus II sacked Napata, and the kingdom of Cush moved its centre to

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Das Priestertum im ägyptischen Staat vom Neuen Reich bis zur Spätzeit (1953), c.6-8; Die Hohenpriester des Amon von Kamak von Herihor bis zum Ende der Äthiopenzeit (1964); General surveys, A.H. Gardiner, Egypt under the Pharaohs (1961), 302ff; E. Drioton, J. Vandier, L'Égypte (1962), 812, with additional bibliography, p.36ff; J. Cerny, C.A.H. ii c.35.
Meroe, though Napata remained of religious importance.¹

Hecataeus cannot of course have possessed detailed information about the Meroitic kingdom: the Greeks did not penetrate that far until the reign of Ptolemy II². But in Egypt itself the native Saite rule, the disturbed days under the Persian Empire and the national struggle of the fourth century will have produced no idyllic picture of a perfect kingship: indeed the only traditions of such a phenomenon which could have survived these troubles would be priestly ones. Thus the ideal picture of the Ἁρχων Μεροτίκης in Hecataeus, if it were in reality derived from Egyptian sources, should have come, as he says it did come, from Egyptian priests, and would surely refer to that period when the priests had most power over the kings. It could only be they who were interested in distorting the character of Egyptian kingship and society in a way so favourable to the interests of themselves and their temples.

The preoccupation of Hecataeus and Agatharchides with the relations between king, the laws, and the priesthood is also present in contemporary Egyptian sources. In the biographical inscriptions of priests from the late Pharaonic period, there appears, in the characterisation of the king, beside the older picture of an ideal monarch, merciful, just and powerful, a new tendency to emphasise the position and influence of the

priest himself, as adviser and mediator between god and king. Similarly, Egyptian national attitudes to kingship in the period of the Persian Empire and the early Ptolemies are evident in a demotic commentary on an oracle, written in priestly circles in the third century - the so-called 'Demotic Chronicle'. The commentary is concerned with the kings of the twenty-eighth to the thirtieth dynasties, that is the national kings of the fourth century. The success or failure of each king is explained entirely by whether or not he 'deserted the law', and there is a strong emphasis on benefactions, especially to temples. So too the Pharaoh of the Petubastis legend is a lover of peace, whose actions are governed by the oracle of Amon. And the legend of the last

3. Esp. col. iii.16-21; iv.1-12.
4. Col. v.22; vi.3.

Particularly interesting is the way such productions, with their strong Egyptian and often nationalistic attitudes, could be translated into Greek and accepted by Greeks as apocalyptic religious literature.
national king of Egypt, Nectanebos, attributed his downfall to an inadvertent failure to complete the temple of Onouris at Sebennytus. The priesthood which could elevate εὐεργετικόν and conformity to the law to principles of historical explanation, and transform an Assyrian puppet dynast into the loyal servant of Amon-Re is the priesthood from which derives Hecataeus' account of the ancient kings of Egypt¹. The Saite dynasty arose in a national reaction against Assyrian and Ethiopian domination, however much it may have relied militarily on Greek hoplite mercenaries; the period of Saite and Persian rule was, it seems, a time of conscious archaism in art, architecture and law: older forms, going back sometimes nearly two millenia, were revived and consolidated². Much of the tendency in this and other sections of Hecataeus should be seen against the background of priestly archaising in culture and their role as guardians of the national tradition. Hecataeus does indeed offer valuable evidence for this aspect of Egyptian nationalism.

In particular Theban sources can be detected elsewhere in Hecataeus' account of Egypt, and Hecataeus is explicitly said by Diodorus to have visited Thebes³; there can be little doubt that this section was inspired by Theban priests, and represents a highly idealised version of a past whose closest approach to reality lay in the rule of the High Priest over Upper Egypt from the twenty-first dynasty, and the practices

¹. As A.D. Nock remarked: Gnomon xxi (1949), 226.
². See the general characterisation in J.Pirenne, Histoire de la Civilisation de l'Egypte Ancienne iii (1953), 209ff.
³. 46, 8; above n. 2 p. 346.
introduced from Ethiopia by the twenty-fifth dynasty. The
first sign of this tradition is perhaps already in Plato, who
says: 'In Egypt no king can rule without the priestly art, and
if he happens to have forced his way to power from some other
class, he must of necessity be enrolled in the priestly class
later.'

The similarities and differences between Agatharchides
and Hecataeus are significant and understandable. Agatharchides'
account was doubtless garbled; and the later Meroitic kingship
was only distantly and in part connected with Thebes - by the
third century, the Egyptian tradition in Ethiopia had degener-
ated so far that the hieroglyphic inscriptions are barely
intelligible. Similarly the version of Hecataeus has undergone
systematisation and idealisation both within the priestly
tradition and by himself.

The evidence for the institutions of late Pharaonic king-
ship does not allow a detailed comparison of Hecataeus' views
with historical reality; and in any case, given the nature of
the tradition, such an attempt would not offer much profit.
It is more important to note those elements in his picture which
probably derive from the priestly tradition. Apart from the

1. Statesman 290d-e; cf. Plut. Mor. 354b (F.G.H. 566 P93);
J. Gwyn Griffiths, C.R. lxxix (1965), 155f. Compare the
remarks of E. Otto on the relation between the king and his
priestly duties and titles as depicted in Ptolemaic hiero-
glyphic records: Gott und Mensch nach den ägyptischen Tempe-
linschriften der griechisch-römischen Zeit, Abh. Heidel-
2. Laming Macadam, Temples of Egypt, 78ff.
n.3 p.354) 42ff; Vienitz (o.c. p. 367), 40ff; contra Jacoby,
commentary, p.35f.
general attitude towards king and law, there are the statements which find parallels in Agatharchides, on the regulation of the royal diet\(^1\), and on the limitations of the king's function as judge\(^2\); a common institution may lie behind the description of the priestly and aristocratic servants of Hecataeus, and the group of king's friends and priests in Agatharchides\(^3\). The description of the daily religious service which the king must attend is probably from the same source\(^4\); in the daily services of Egyptian temples the priest was merely a substitute for the king. The closest parallel to Hecataeus' account seems to be the order of ceremony practised in the temple of Horus at Edfu under Ptolemy VI Philometor, where the king (that is, the priest) protested his justice and piety in a series of negative statements, before making offering to the god:

'I have not been partial in judgment: I have not entered into alliance with the strongest, and I have not detracted from the right of the weakest: I have not brought the offering into the temple with dishonesty, and I have not taken away any part of the sacrifice.'\(^5\)

Similarly a priestly tendency is apparent in the description of the funeral ceremonies of the king, which are very similar to those described for ordinary people\(^6\). Thus both general

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1. 70, 1.11-12; F5: cf. iii,5,2,5.
2. 71,1: cf.iii,5,2.
3. 70,2: cf.iii,7; 5,1.
4. 70, 4-10.
5. N.Alliot, Le Culte d'Horus à Edfou au temps des Ptolemées (1949), 142f; though this is part of the solemn, not the daily ritual. Cf. the comments of Otto o.c. (p.359), 67ff. on the ritual, which is closely related to the Declarations of Innocence in the Book of the Dead (C. Maystre, Les Declaratons d'Innocence (1937)).
6. 72; cf.92. The prominence of this section on royal burial may of course be related to discussions arising from the recent arrival of Alexander's body.
tendency and almost every individual item bears the mark of Hecataeus' priestly informants; it is worth remembering that Hecataeus' information on Judaism is similarly derived from the Jewish priesthood, and is remarkable for its general accuracy.

The description of Judaea brings out another important element in Hecataeus' account of Egyptian kingship. Though his information about the Jews is genuine, in selection and emphasis it is permeated with Hecataeus' own idealising tendencies. The framework is that of a Greek ethnographer. Moses founds his city, and then gives it laws, in the Greek fashion: Judaea is almost (but not quite) the ideal city-state of a Greek philosophical speculator - not quite, because it is derivative on the more perfect culture of Egypt. Moses, excelling in wisdom and courage (3) appointed religious observances of the utmost purity, and a priesthood of the highest accomplishments (4), to guard the laws and customs; he took special care for military affairs, saw to it that the youth was trained in all sorts of hardship (6), and tried to ensure a large population by making the allotments of land inalienable. The description is that of an Egyptian Sparta. The one thing wrong in this state is a natural consequence of the expulsion from Egypt, which caused Moses to introduce a way of life to a certain extent unsocial and hostile to strangers, deliberately distorted in

relation to other nations (4,8a); without this variation on the Spartan model, perhaps Hecataeus would have found it difficult to fuse the genuinely Jewish elements with the Spartan model he has constructed. Hecataeus cannot refrain from philosophical idealisation, whether he is describing the curious customs of the Jews, or romancing in the Northern Ocean; not all the colour in his account of Egyptian kingship has come direct from the Theban priesthood.

The position and structure of the section belong to Hecataeus. It comes, as it should in a Greek account, at the beginning of his detailed description of the ideal state, which extends through administration, social organisation, justice, marriage, education, health, religious customs and burial practices. Within itself, it is articulated in a similarly logical way: the character of Egyptian kingship, the daily life of the king, his administration of justice, the royal funeral. This systematic organisation of his material seems characteristic of Hecataeus' approach in general. More interesting are the reasons given for the various customs - though the customs may be derived from the priests, their explanation seems almost always Greek. Thus the king is surrounded by high-born sons of priests to serve him, 'for no ruler advances far along the road of evil unless he has those about him who will minister to his passions' 1. Again

1. On the idealising tendency, Jaeger o.c. 135ff, esp. 140ff; Diokles von Kerystos (1928), 151ff; I have taken note of the objections of Jacoby, commentary 48f, which do not invalidate Jaeger's general picture.
2. 70,2.
the High Priest offers a daily panegyric of the king's virtues before the king, but mentions his vices only in general terms, and blames them on others, 'to accustom him to live in a proper manner, not by sharp rebukes, but by praises which were agreeable and most conducive to virtue'. The notion that the function of panegyric is to advise and set an example for the person praised to follow, is an early idea in Greek rhetorical theory. The view that reading about suitable historical models has an effect on practical administration is perhaps from the same source. Again the reason why the kings follow the law in giving judgment is the danger, well recognised in Greek political thought, that a judge not bound by the law may give way to his passions. And the effect of good rule is prosperity, the goodwill of subjects to master, and an exceptional stability of constitution and laws - all of them well known to Greek philosophy as natural results of a good constitution. Some of these explanatory relationships are of course common to Greek and Egyptian thought; but it is noticeable in Hecataeus' account that, whereas the customs in themselves might appear peculiar or paradoxical to a Greek, the reasons for them are always immediately acceptable in Greek terms - no explanation ends in a specifically Egyptian mode of thought. It is this phenomenon, more than any other, which has misled commentators

1. 70,8.
2. e.g. Arist. Rhet. i,9,135b37ff.
3. 70,9.
4. 71,3.
5. 71,4-5.
into thinking that the whole account of Hecataeus is merely a Greek philosophical utopia.

The same tendency is there even in the description of the relationship between king and law, which has been seen to be in part of Egyptian origin. For Plato, the Egyptian priest-king approaches the true philosopher-king;\(^1\) Hecataeus does not idealise his monarch in that direction, towards the enlightened despot. Nor is his king ruled directly by the priesthood, as for instance Agatharchides describes the situation. Rather his relation is primarily to laws, only secondarily to those who interpret them and see that they are obeyed, the priests. What Hecataeus describes is not fundamentally a priestly theocracy but a constitutional monarchy\(^2\); though he may be deriving his information from the priesthood, his thought is also concerned with a fundamentally Greek problem - the relationship of king to law. The paradoxical fact that Egyptian kingship does not conform to the usual Greek definition of βασιλεία\(^3\), is made to produce an example for the Greek debate, whether the king is or should be above or below the laws. Here is one point where Hecataeus may have intended his description to be directly relevant to contemporary Ptolemaic Egypt.

The virtues of the king show an interesting tendency to make Egyptian and Greek ideas converge\(^4\). His chief virtue is

\(^{1}\) p. 359
\(^{2}\) Jacoby, RE 2/63.
\(^{3}\) 70,1; cf. 71,1; above p. 216.
\(^{4}\) Cf. esp. 70,6.
one common to Egyptian and Greek thought, εὐεργεσία, which is indeed elevated until it becomes the ultimate justification of monarchy itself, and a final explanation of the peculiarities of Egyptian kingship. Thus in Hecataeus the notion of the βασιλεὺς εὐεργεσία usurps the position often given in other Greek writers to the ἀριστος άνδρα, the rule of the best man, or to the φιλανθρωπία of the ruler.

According to the priests, it was the kings who discovered the necessities of life: 'and this was why the kingship was bestowed in early times, not on the sons of former rulers, but on those who had conferred the greatest and most numerous benefits on the people; whether it is that men sought thus to incite their kings to the common service of all, or that they have in reality received this account in the sacred records'. This doctrine that it is εὐεργεσία which bestows the right to kingship is reflected in other passages: some of the priests said that Hephaestus, not Helius, became the first king, because of the usefulness of his discovery of fire; again it

1. For Egyptian emphasis on benefactions, cf. above p.357; H. Bolkestein, Wohltätigkeit und Armenpflege im vorchristlichen Altertum (1939), 391ff. Schwartz 254ff. and Jacoby RE 2761 emphasise the Greek aspects (on which, E. Skard, Zwei religiöse-politische Begriffe, Eumenes-Concordia, Avh. Norske Videnskaps-Akademi i Oslo Hist-fil Kl.1931.2 (1922), c.1; on Hecataeus, 39ff.); but it is precisely because the βασιλεὺς εὐεργεσία is acceptable in both traditions that Hecataeus here emphasises it so strongly: cf. C. Préaux, L'Economie Royale des Lagides (1959), 559.

2. I have noted φιλανθρωπία only of Aegyptus at 51,4.
3. i.e. the 'divine kings'.
4. 43,6.
5. 13,3; Manetho gives the order Hephaestus, Helius: F3a p.12. Cf. 13,4: the arete of Zeus and Hera gave them world rule.
was in gratitude for a benefit, a gift of corn, that the Athenians made the Egyptian Erechtheus king of Athens. Thus what may originally have been an idea of non-hereditary kingship similar to that described by Agatharchides, has received an explanation and an emphasis which combines Greek and Egyptian attitudes.

So too the deification of kings and other strange animals. Animal worship is explained as gratitude for various benefactions; and gratitude is said to be a marked characteristic of the Egyptians. This is why the Egyptians practise proskynesis before their kings, and honour them as being in truth gods, believing that they have not attained supreme power without the help of some divine providence, and also that such as have the will and ability to confer the greatest benefits share in the divine nature. The same theory lies behind the 'Euhemerism' of Hecataeaus - his description of a stage intermediate between the gods as physical properties, and men as kings, when Egypt was ruled by 'divine kings': 'Beside these there are other earthly beings, who were once mortal, but because of their wisdom and common benefaction of mankind achieved immortality, some of whom were also kings in Egypt.' Agatharchides in turn has copied Hecataeaus in his description of those Ethiopians who divide their gods into

1. 29,1.
2. Even the kings were expected to show the virtue: 70,6.
3. 90,2-3.
4. 13,1.
these two types, the second of which, though sharing in mortal nature, has come to receive immortal honours because of 'virtue and common benefactions towards mankind'. The idea of the _basileús_ on a theoretical level explains non-hereditary kingship and the deification of kings; it also connects a number of more practical topics. According to Hecataeus, the kings were generous in sharing their riches; the miserly king who does not spend on offerings to the gods and benefactions is merely a good steward, not a good king. The king's building activities are considered from the point of view of their contribution to the welfare of the subject. The result of his beneficent attentions is the goodwill and loyalty of his subjects; contrarily a bad king must expect disloyalty and dishonour after his death.

From consideration of the _basileús_ , it is already clear that the description of the ancient kings of Egypt does not stand on its own; it is closely related to the historical section of the work. Indeed the ethical models of virtue and vice provided by the successive biographies

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1. iii, 9,1-2. According to Diodorus, this is the theology of those above Meroe; but it is so close to Hecataeus that one may suspect that Agatharchides was really describing the Meroitic kingdom (for which Diodorus gives no theology), and copying Hecataeus, whether there was any justification in the facts as related by the priests of Amon, or not.
2. 70,6; cf. 54,2; 64,9; 73,6.
3. 62, 5-6.
4. 51,5-7; 55, 12-57.
5. ἄφιλος , 1,4; 72,1; 54,1-2; 51,4; 64,9.
6. 72,6; cf. 45,2; 60,3; 64,4ff.
in that section might have come straight out of the sacred writings which (according to Hecataeus) the priests used daily to read for the encouragement of virtue in their kings. Yet it is also clear that the information in the historical section did not come primarily from the priests, but from earlier Greek writers on Egypt, notably Herodotus. The ethical tendencies common both to these biographies, and to the description of Egyptian kingship, must therefore be to a considerable extent Hecataeus' own contribution, added by him to his different Greek and Egyptian sources.

The influence of various theoretical attitudes to kingship on the historical section can be seen most clearly in two of the biographies, those of Osiris and Sesoosis. Osiris, when he succeeded to the kingship did much to benefit the social life of man (πρὸς ἐνεργεσίαν τοῦ κανόνισμοῦ, 13,5). He was the first to introduce the cultivation of crops, and so cause men to give up cannibalism; his wife, Isis, discovered wheat and barley, and established laws. The building activities of Osiris are shown in the foundation of Thebes, his ἐστάσεις in the temples.

1. 70,9.

2. For the exemplification of theoretical virtues in the historical section, see above π367aceous; also ἐστάσεις 70,6: 49,3; 65,2,4; justice 70,5-6; 71,4: 49,3 (contrast 60,1); ἐπιτείμησις, ἀναγήσεις 70,6: 54,2; 55,10; 64,9; 60,3; 65,3 (though the last two might reflect genuine Ethiopian customs: cf. iii,5,2) (contrast 60,1; 64,5).

3. Hecataeus' story of Osiris is heavily interpolated by Diodorus; it runs probably thus: 14,1-15,5; 15,9-16,2; 20,6-21,11.
built for the gods. At the court of Osiris and Isis especial esteem was given to inventors of the arts and those who practised useful activities, in particular to Hermes who invented language, writing, religion, astronomy, music, wrestling, dancing, the lyre, rhetoric and the cultivation of the olive. In short the court of Osiris, having this man as priestly scribe communicated with him on every matter and used his advice especially. Here the discoveries of Hermes are more appropriate to Greek than to Egyptian cultural life; but the portrait belongs in part to the priestly tradition, which, according to Hecataeus, strictly divided the credit for the various discoveries between kings (the necessities of life), and Hermes (the arts). Hermes is of course the first High Priest; the whole picture is that of a primeval division of functions between the priest (or in Greek terms the philosophical adviser) and the Ἀριστοτέλης—in the last resort between Hecataeus himself and Ptolemy. The fusion of Greek and Egyptian attitudes is almost complete.

The strands are more easily disentangled in Hecataeus' biography of Sesoosis, the great conquering king whom Herodotus and Manetho called Sesostris. All the basic facts

1. 15,
2. A clear instance of interpolation: 15,9-16,2 continues 15,4-5.
3. 43,5.
4. Herod.ii, 102-10; Manetho, F.G.H. 60ς P2-3a p.30. The relation of Manetho to Herodotus and Hecataeus is obscure: the extant passage adds to Herodotus information on the king's size, the length of his reign and of his expedition, to Hecataeus only information on the king's size. He seems to accept Hecataeus' length of 9 years for the campaign of (cont. over)
in Hecataeus come from Herodotus: thus Sesoosis conquers
Ethiopia, Asia as far as India and Scythia, Europe to Thrace,
and sails a fleet on the Red Sea. The anecdotal material is
also from Herodotus: Hecataeus has the Egyptian origin of the
Colchians (proved by the practice of circumcision), the
sexual stelai and statues set up by Sesoosis, the building
activity with captives on his return, and the plot of Sesoosis' 
brother, even the account of how Darius was rebuked for comparing
himself with Sesoosis. In all these stories the variations are
so slight as to make it clear, on the one hand that they are
not inserted by Diodorus directly from Herodotus, on the other
that Hecataeus had Herodotus in front of him when he composed
his account.

At the start Hecataeus alleges his method: 'since with
regard to this king, not only are the Greek writers at variance
with each other, but among the Egyptians the priests and the

Sesoosis, but contradicts him on the king's name and the
length of his reign. The variant Sesonchosis seems to
belong to the novelistic tradition: esp. Π.Οxy. xv,
no.1826 (cf. F. Zimmermann, Rhein.Mus. lxxxv (1936), 165ff.
for very hypothetical supplements and interpretation).
On the Sesostris legend see esp. H. Kees, Real II ii.2
(1923), 1861ff. (esp.1865ff, an excellent commentary on
Diodorus-Hecataeus); K. Lange, Sesostris: ein ägyptischer
König im Mythos, Geschichte und Kunst (1954), 22ff. The
useful survey of ancient and modern literature by M. Malaise,
Chr. d'Egypde xli (1966), 244ff, adds little; he does not
unfortunately recognise the true position of Diodorus' 
narrative in the tradition; nor does he investigate the
wider background to this and other legends of the 'Drang
nach Osten'. I hope to return to this interrelationship of
the legends of Cyrus, Dionysus, Osiris, Sesostris and
Alexander later: on the relation between the legends of
Alexander and Sesostris cf. R. Pfister, 'Studien zum
Alexanderroman', Würzburger Jahrbücher für die Altertums-
wissenschaft i(1946), 5ff.
poets who sing his praises give conflicting stories, we shall try to give the most probable account, and that which most nearly agrees with the monuments still standing in the land' (53,1). In fact the additions of Hecataeaus to the basic narrative of Herodotus fall into three groups. Firstly addition of details, such as an explanation of why Sesoosis stopped in Thrace, the number of ships he took on the Red Sea, the fact that the campaign lasted nine years. These are all clearly the rationalisations and corroborative detail of a Hellenistic writer, used to historical accounts which left no question unanswered; they come from Hecataeus himself, or conceivably in part from earlier fourth century writers, not from the Egyptian priests. Secondly modernisations: just as the Herodotean account of Sesostris presupposes the Persian conquests, in that Sesostris is portrayed as a greater warrior than Cyrus and Darius, so Sesoosis is a figure from contemporary history, explicitly conceived as a greater one than Alexander: 'not only did he visit the territory that was afterwards won by Alexander of Macedon, but also certain nations into whose land Alexander did not penetrate' - that is, India as far as Ocean, and Scythia to the Tanais (55,3). To complete the parallelism, according to Diodorus Sesoosis committed suicide after a reign of thirty-three years, a figure plainly chosen to recall the death of Alexander in his thirty-third year. Indeed

1. Has Diodorus here misunderstood his source? Did Hecataeaus make Sesoosis die in the thirty-third year of his life, not after a reign of thirty-three years? Manetho gives Sesostris 43 years; and K. Sethe, Sesostris, Untersuchungen zur Geschichte und Altertumsfunde Aegyptens II, 1 (1902), 23,
it may be asked, does the modernisation stop here? Does the king who begins by safeguarding his rear, earning the goodwill of his subjects in Egypt and bringing peace and prosperity to the country, and then goes on to conquer the world, not find a model nearer home? There are signs that this may have been the real policy of Ptolemy in his early years: the man who stole Alexander's body, and wrote a history of Alexander's conquests, was not unaware of the heritage of Alexander\(^1\). Thus the tendency to model Sesoonis on Alexander might be thought to be Ptolemaic, entirely due to Hecataeus; and yet it was genuine Egyptian priests who told Herodotus a similarly modernised story, of a Sesopian modelled on (and contrasted with) Cyrus and Darius\(^2\). It is also clear that the legend of Sesoovisor was particularly alive in Egypt in the fourth century: the last native king, Nectanebos, chose as his first royal name that of Sesostris' historical original, Senwosret I; and this name was taken over by Ptolemy in his Egyptian titulature\(^3\). Moreover later Egyptian sources connected Sesostris

1. Above p.\(^{317}\).  
2. Esp. Herod. ii. 110, rationalised in Hecataeus (Diod. i. 58, 4): Herodotus' priests had mentioned Scythia in the original story, a clear anachronism since Darius' Scythian expedition had not yet taken place: M. Braun, History and Romance in Graeco-Oriental Literature (1935), 15.  
3. Sethe o.c. 24; Lange o.c. 27; above p.\(^{321}\). Cf. in general for the Egyptian attitude to Sesostris, Kees o.c. 1865.
specifically with Alexander: in the Alexander Romance he is welcomed as a 'new Sesonchosis'\(^1\). Hecataeus' modernisation of Sesoosis in the light of Alexander's career was then the work of men (historian or priests) desiring to please a king well aware of his own position as heir to the traditions of both Alexander and Sesostris\(^2\). Perhaps it is significant that, among the conquests of Sesoosis specifically mentioned in Hecataeus, but not in Herodotus, are the Cyclades (55,5)\(^3\). Similarly the earlier description of Egyptian colonisation constitutes in some sense a justification of Ptolemaic expansion in such areas as Judaea.

The third type of addition certainly belongs to Hecataeus himself - the idealisations. Sesoosis is of course the perfect king according to the canons laid down in the section on kingship, and the emphasis of the Herodotean account has been changed to conform with this. But Hecataeus has gone further. For the biography of Sesoosis begins with a section on the education of the ideal prince - an Egyptian 'Education of Cyrus'. Inspired perhaps by a dream, the father of Sesoosis

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1. ps.-Call. Hist. Alex. Magni i,34,2; cf.33,6; ii,17,17; 24,2; [34,4]; cf. in general Pfister l.c. (p.370).
3. Nor does Herodotus mention Hecataeus' Libyan expedition (53,6), perhaps a reworking of the Cyrene expedition of Ophellas and Ptolemy during 322-0. But it may have a genuine foundation: cf. Kees 1866f.
collected together children born on the same day and constituted a band of companions who were trained throughout youth in the proper physical pursuits. This training ended with a hunting expedition into Arabia, a sort of practice conquest of Arabia and Libya. The band of comrades was a useful nucleus of commanders for the later campaigns. This ideal education is again Greek, not Egyptian. Though the band of companions might owe something to the idea of a group of men surrounding the king, which appears in different forms in Hecataeus and Agatharchides, it finds a stronger echo in the Macedonian institution of the King's Pages, and in the common education which Xenophon alleges is the custom in Persia, and which existed in reality at Sparta. Other elements recall Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* - the emphasis on abstinence in food, on hunting and the progression from hunting expeditions to war. But Hecataeus' debt to Xenophon is more in atmosphere than detail. Indeed it could be that he owes something to one of the lost works similar in scope to Xenophon's. to Antisthenes' *Cyrus*, or Onesicritus or Marsyas of Pella on the education of Alexander. At the least these examples made it evident that any real Egyptian hero must also be provided with a proper 'Education'.

More generally, it is difficult to determine how much Hecataeus owed to his Greek predecessors other than Herodotus, because of the lack of evidence. He certainly often quoted 'other writers', and contrasted them with the priestly tradition; but there is nothing in the extant fragments of Hecataeus of Miletus, Hellanicus or Aristagoras (the known writers on Egypt) which can be brought into close relationship with Hecataeus.

Certainly his philosophising and systematisation is merely a more extensive application of tendencies already apparent in fourth century descriptions of Egypt, at least in non-historical writers. Thus Plato in the Statesman and the Timaeus is prepared to consider ancient Egypt as a possible ideal model, though in the Laws he seems to recognise its present degeneration. Aristotle compares the Egyptian caste system of Sesostris with that of contemporary 'political philosophers', referring probably to the Timaeus passage; and the Egyptians were often asserted to be the inventors of arts or science.

The most systematic expression of this philosophical tendency before Hecataeus is Isocrates' Busiris, which gives a panegyrical description of Egypt, and, like Hecataeus, talked of its prosperity, defences (13ff.), class system (15ff.), animal

3. Statesman 290d-e; Timaeus 24aff; Laws v, 747a; cf. above n. 1 p. 359.
4. Pol. vii, 1320c40ff; for Dicaearchus on the caste system cf. below n. 5 p. 383.
worship (26) and other customs. Isocrates also says that philosophers (probably Plato again) prefer the Egyptian form of government above all others, and that the Spartans have taken some of their institutions from Egypt (17f.).

Hecataeus' ideas on kingship differ only in their emphasis from those of other writers. The idea of the king as benefactor, the relationship of kingship to law, the virtues of the king, show little conceptual originality when compared with the views of earlier writers; and such originality as there is, appears to be largely a result of his reliance on Egyptian material. In writing on kingship Hecataeus could have drawn on the tradition of the Abderite school of philosophy. There is no direct evidence for Democritus having dealt with kingship; but the Epicurean picture of early society suggests that such discussions might have arisen in relation to the early history of man. Epicurus seems to have seen kingship as the earliest form of political organisation, and to have attributed its appearance to the beneficial activities of the more intelligent on behalf of their fellow men. Admittedly the evidence is slight; but if it is accepted there is an obvious parallel between such a view and Hecataeus' account of the origin of kingship in ἐφορκομενα: both might owe something to Abderite discussions.

Hecataeus was a pupil of Pyrrho, who had studied under Anaxarchus and accompanied him on Alexander's expedition 1.

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1. On Pyrrho and Hecataeus cf. Jacoby RE 2758, commentary p. 33. The 'Democritean' view of kingship which Cole tries to reconstruct (o.c. (p. 20) 120ff.) lacks any evidence; but he may be right in seeing a connection between Epicurus and Hecataeus. On Epicurean attitudes see above p. 183.
But it was an ambiguous heritage: Anaxarchus, the philosopher closest to Alexander, who had written a work on Kingship for him and been rebuked by an Indian sage for being a court philosopher, nevertheless ended his life as the supreme embodiment of philosophical ἀναγνώριση in the face of a tyrant, pounded to death by pestle and mortar to his own chant of 'pound Anaxarchus' bag, Anaxarchus you do not pound' - then, when his tongue was ordered to be cut out, biting it off and spitting it in the face of his tormentor. That at least was the legend of the most famous philosophical death after that of Socrates. At all events a man closely involved in court life and politics; for he was killed by Nicocreon, a dynast in Cyprus, not without cause - he had recommended Nicocreon's own execution to Alexander. Then Pyrrho, whose experiences on Alexander's expedition had caused him to forego the illusions of this world, and who was never again found in connection with politics, or kings. 2

Anaxarchus' book was at least in part polemical and political; if its doctrine was in any way unorthodox, it was probably in the direction of an emphasis on the absolute power and autonomy of the king: Anaxarchus is alleged to have comforted Alexander on the death of Cōtûs with the doctrine

1. Cf. the discussion of Anaxarchus above p. 143f.
2. For Pyrrho in general K. von Fritz, RE xxiv.1 (1963), 8ff. The story that he was honoured by Athens for the murder of Cotys is chronologically impossible, and a confusion with another Pyrrho (ib. 22).
that whatever the king does is just¹. This attitude is specifically rejected by Hecataeus - for him the king is below the law.

From Pyrrho, Hecataeus perhaps inherited a respect for foreign political philosophy, Hyperborean, Indian, Jewish or Egyptian. Scepticism in politics, when not coupled with total abstention, might lead to a relativism which saw that no one ideal state was inferior to another. Hence, though reality was not over-important, the search for a political ideal could take account of local traditions. But this is pure speculation; a certain distaste for luxury (τευφή) in kings, and an emphasis on ethical and political self-sufficiency (αὐταρκεία) and on the moderation of desires, are the closest links between Hecataeus and his philosophical teachers². Hecataeus' final position is indeed as much the result of general tendencies of the age as of specific philosophical arguments. In the early Hellenistic period, the Greek mind, though dominated by its own ordered vision of the world, was still open to the impact of the immense intellectual vistas created by Alexander's conquests; indeed perhaps this tension between the real barbarian world and its Greek stereotype is never absent from the best Hellenistic prose writers.

Hecataeus' relationship with his royal master must have been close; the research that went into his work on Egypt, both in previous literature and in conversations with the Egyptian priests, is more than the desultory enquiry of a dilettante traveller; and the systematic tendency of the book suggests royal patronage. In general Ptolemy obtained what he wanted, a work of propaganda portraying Egypt in a light which would appeal to Greek (and perhaps Egyptian) educated opinion; it began a war of books between the Hellenistic monarchies, which earned various learned men royal subvention:

1. See fn. 2, previous page.
2. Remarked by Jacoby RE 2754; cf. esp. c.45; Schwartz 244ff; R. von Pöhlmann, Geschichte der Sozialen Frage und des Sozialismus in der Antiken Welt ii (1925), 20ff.
Berossus and Megasthenes replied for Babylonia and India, for the Seleucids were just as alive to the political importance of encouraging Greek veneration of older cultures\(^1\). The significance of these works for the new kingdoms should not be underestimated; the popularity of Hecataeus among intellectuals was great, and it is probable that such books circulated in the early Hellenistic period among a far wider group than normally; for many potential mercenaries, officials and traders will have wished to discover more about their future prospects, and many settlers will have been interested in the antiquities of their new world. Despite the learned nature of Hecataeus' book and its lack of popular appeal, it may still have helped in the essential task of creating a favourable impression of Egypt, as did (for instance) Theocritus' more blatant appeals to material rewards in the *Idylls*\(^2\). Again in the world of royal competition, there is a necessary element of self-deception; each of the Hellenistic kings wished to be persuaded of the cultural superiority and great antiquity of his own kingdom, and so of the especial importance of himself and his task.

Yet one aspect of Hecataeus' work cannot have been wholly acceptable to Ptolemy - the emphasis implicit in his views of kingship. He was not of course writing in opposition to Ptolemy;\(^3\) but no more was he bound to an official 'Ptolemaic view of kingship. There is little doubt that Hecataeus' own

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1. *Jacoby, commentary* p.37; we now see how early this rivalry began - before the actual foundation of the Successor kingdoms.
2. Esp. *viv*, 57ff; xvii passim; also Callimachus' Hymns to Zeus and Delos.
3. As Schwartz 260ff. thought.
views coincided with those of the priests, to the extent that the king should be subordinate to law if not to religion; and the strong nationalism of his informants is not toned down by Hecataeus. If there is a certain tension here between Hecataeus as a court writer and the actual tenor of his work, it is lessened by the date of composition. He wrote in the very early years of Ptolemy's rule, when the forms of government were not yet established, and when Ptolemy's own chief concern, like that of Sesoosis, was in conciliating the natives, whether before further conquests or to strengthen his own position against others; it was possible then to describe things in a way which might not have been so acceptable once the fundamentally Greek lines of Ptolemaic rule were well established, and the native population was firmly in its place.

It Ptolemy obtained what he wanted, Hecataeus himself perhaps failed; the deeper fusion of Greece and Egypt which his work seems to envisage did not take place: 'the Greek remained Greek even in the land of the Pharaohs, for all the priests and their hieroglyphs.' 1 The Ionian viewpoint of Hecataeus gave way to that of Demetrius of Phaleron, Attic, Hellenocentric, despising the native barbarian as Aristotle had done, imprisoned in the political framework of the city-state. It may be too adventurous to see Hecataeus and Demetrius as the protagonists at court of two explicit and opposed political doctrines, yet they certainly represent two incompatible

attitudes. With the arrival of Demetrius Greek and Egyptian culture fell apart; and a whole intellectual approach was forgotten, submerged in the excitement of the establishment of Alexandria - an attempt to turn all Egypt into the territory of one city-state.

But in another sense Hecataeus was only too successful, in bringing Greek order and unity into the world of native cultures. His book, so complete and so well documented, immediately became and remained the standard work on Egypt, and a model for the new Hellenistic historiography of native cultures; its fusion of the traditions of philosophy and historical ethnography with local tradition was more complete than that in any previous work, and set a standard for the next two centuries. The extent of Hecataeus' influence has not yet been fully realised; he is, I believe, the bridge between Ionian and Hellenistic historiography. But these are questions of emphasis, attitude, and approach to history, which can only be dealt with in the context of Hellenistic historiography as a whole1. The details here offered are no more than the external and certain signs of his popularity.

Among historians, Berossus and Megasthenes opposed Hecataeus on political grounds2; Euhemerus borrowed his theological

apparatus\(^1\); Agatharchides certainly knew him\(^2\). The popularity of his name among Jews is not only due to the accident that he was the first to mention them; it also attests his general literary importance\(^3\). Apart from the forgeries attached to his name, Artapanus used Hecataeus in his portrayal of Moses, reversing the picture of Hecataeus, and claiming that, so far from the Jews having taken their institutions from Egypt, it was Moses who created Egyptian civilisation: he was indeed identical with the Hermes portrayed by Hecataeus, even to being given the same name by the Egyptians\(^4\). Even the Egyptian priest Manetho, who of all writers should have been able to free himself from Hecataeus' influence, was unable or unwilling to do so. Manetho's polemic against Herodotus was explicit and continuous\(^5\); this very attitude rules out similar attacks on Hecataeus, for it puts him alongside Hecataeus\(^5\). Indeed Manetho accepted a framework for his own chronology, a division between gods, \(\text{κυκλοῦς} \) or \(\text{ηλίθεοι} \), and men\(^7\), reminiscent of Hecataeus' threefold

1. Above n. 1 p. 347.
2. Above n. 1 p. 367; there are other signs: cf. p. 352 On the disputed question of Hippys of Rhegion and Hecataeus, cf. F.G.H 554 F6-7 and commentary.
3. Above p. 331f; below p. 395f: Jacoby RE 2765f.
4. Artapanus, F.G.H. 726 F3, 1-12; note esp. the claims that Moses invented many skills useful to mankind (4: cf. esp. Diod. i,13,3 \(\text{ἰδρυτὴς τῶν} \), was responsible for the nome division (cf.54,3), and for assigning a god to each district (cf.15, 3f; 16,1; 45,1), was called Hermes by the Egyptians because of \(\text{ἐξωτερικὸν} \) - his discovery of writing (5: cf. the same etymology 15,2), and finally invented animal worship (12), for the same reasons as alleged in Hecataeus. Cf. in general Braun o.c. (p.372), 29f.
5. F15; also F1, F2 p.22f; F3 p.16f; F23b; cf. F2 p.42.
6. For Hecataeus' attitude to Herodotus cf. n.1, p.344. Plut. Mor. 354 c-d does not suggest that Manetho contradicted Hecataeus by name, for Plutarch used Hecataeus directly in the \(\text{εἰς Ἰσίδος} \) et Ostriche.
7. Manetho Th; F2-3 p.11-19.
division; his list of gods who ruled was nearly the same as Hecataeus' list of 'earthly gods'\(^1\). He may even have accepted Hecataeus' explanation of the gods as physical entities in its entirety\(^2\). The list could doubtless be enlarged; Diodorus was the least of those who fell under Hecataeus' spell.

Among philosophers the work was an immediate success; both as a source-book and as a basis for discussion of the Egyptian ideal state: traces of it appear in Theophrastus On Stones and On Piety\(^3\), Alexinus On Self-Sufficiency\(^4\), Crantor On Plato's Timaeus\(^5\). For the Greeks in Egypt it was the standard work. It can be detected in Apollonius' Argonautica\(^5\); when Theocritus in his encomium of Philadelphus wished to praise the land of

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2. That depends on how much of Manetho F18 (from Eusebius) really belongs to Manetho rather than Diodorus: see Jacoby apparatus ad loc.
3. On the importance of Hecataeus for philosophical attitudes to Egypt, cf. the remarks of H.E. Stier, Bericht über den VI Internationalen Kongress für Archäologie 1939 (1940), 286ff.
4. Athenaeus, x 418e; Plut. De Is. et Os. 354a.
5. Jüger, Diokles von Karystos 132f. Whether Dictearchus' \(\beta\upsilon\sigma\gamma\nu\sigma\theta\upsilon\) (F57-5 Wehrli) should be added is not clear: the name he gave to 'Sesoosis' was probably not 'Sesonchosis' (see Appendix 3). He probably still followed Aristotle (compare the content of F57a with Pol. vii,132b), and used the name 'Sesostris', as Schol. Parisinus on Apollonius suggests; the \(\beta\upsilon\sigma\gamma\nu\sigma\theta\upsilon\) may well be earlier than Hecataeus: there is no sign of Theophrastus' influence in it (cf. Wehrli commentary p.56). On the other hand the reason given for the caste system in F57a is similar to Diod. i, 74, 6f; (but this is a commonplace since Plato's Republic); possibly also Hecataean is the appearance of Sesostris as a \(\mu\alpha\omicron\rho\iota\omicron\omicron\ \\nu\epsilon\sigma\nu\rho\varepsilon\nu\) .

6. It must surely be the inspiration for the Egyptian digression in Argos' geographical discourse, Argonautica iv, 250-81; the king there alluded to but not named is therefore Sesoosis for Apollonius, not the Sesostris or Sesonchosis of the scholia (whose sources include Herodotus, but not Hecataeus).
Egypt for its populousness, he too from Hecataeus the number of villages in Ptolemy's census and versified the figure: 'three hundreds of cities are built therein, and three thousand and thrice ten thousand as well, and twice three and three times nine besides; and of all Lord Ptolemy is king'.¹ There may be other echoes in the poem. With characteristic playfulness, Callimachus praises the speed and efficiency of Philadelphus' administration; his wealth gives him power, power to give wealth to a poet: 'by evening he achieves whatever he thinks of in the morning, by evening the greatest things, but the lesser as soon as he thinks of them'.² A glancing allusion perhaps to Hecataeus' picture of the early morning administration of the Pharaoh. Certain of the attributes which the Jewish author Aristeas considered desirable in a Ptolemaic king may reflect a reading of Hecataeus: many of the parallels are commonplace, but Aristeas does for instance emphasise punishing offenders less harshly than they deserve, and paying workmen for their building labours; and the administrative correspondence read to the Pharaohs in Hecataeus has become the administrative reports prepared for the Ptolemaic king.³

1. Theocritus xvii, 82 = Dioc. i, 31,7; Hecataeus F10; cf. Jacoby commentary ad loc. How much of the rest of the poem is inspired by Hecataeus can only be guessed, but compare lines 95-101 with Hecataeus' emphasis in the geographical section on the defensibility of Egypt.
2. Callimachus, Hymn i, 87f; cf. perhaps Dioc. i, 70,4.
3. On the relation of Aristeas to Hecataeus cf. Schwartz 238ff; M. Hadas, Aristeas to Philocrates (1951), 43ff; below pp.345ff. Apart from general influences, the closest parallels are 70,6: 188; 64,4-5, cf. 56,2: 256; 70,4 (cf. 0): 256. Cf. also 70,6: 205 (truthfulness), 220 (μεταδοτικός); 71,4; 73,7: 233. (cont'd over)
Here lies the ultimate irony: later writers, when they wished to portray the Ptolemies as something more than merely kings, as kings of Egypt, went for their information to Hecataeus, and no further. As a standard work, the effect that he produced was not what he intended. A.D. Nock pointed to the parallel between Hecataeus and Polybius: 'In a very different style Egypt produced on Hecataeus an effect remotely comparable with that of Republican Rome on Polybius'¹. The point is valid, not only for the relation of writer to his subject, but also for that of the later reader to the finished work. Both writers had deep insight into the greatness and idiosyncracy of the peoples they portrayed; both tried to interpret their political systems in terms that Greeks would accept, and succeeded so well that they prevented later generations from progressing beyond their analysis to a deeper understanding². In the end Hecataeus' work served only to strengthen the prejudices of the Greeks in Egypt. Xenophon's Cyropaedia shows how little influence genuinely oriental ideas of kingship had on Greek political theory, and how such traditions could only be assimilated when they were so transformed into Greek modes as to be almost unrecognisable; the

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¹ Gnomon xxi (1949), 226 n.4.
² I refer of course primarily to Polybius' characterisation of the Roman state in terms of the theory of the mixed constitution.
achievement of Hecataeus is far greater than that of Xenophon, but it points the same moral: the Greek could not understand oriental kingship, unless it was portrayed in Greek terms.
CHAPTER 2.

ARISTEAS AND THE JEWISH TRADITION.

Justify not thyself in the presence of the Lord; and display not thy wisdom before the king. Sirach vii,5.

The section of Hecataeuss' work on the habits of the Pharaonic kings was not inaccurately described as 'an original variation on the usual address to a king'. But its originality is so marked and its date is so early that it cannot help much to answer the question of what an ordinary conventional work on kingship offering advice to an ordinary conventional king must have contained in the Hellenistic period. Although it is idiosyncratic in many ways, probably the most important single passage for the understanding of normal attitudes to kingship in Ptolemaic Egypt is contained in a work usually considered in quite other contexts.

The 'letter' of Aristeas to Philocrates is an account of how the Greek translation of the Pentateuch came to be made. It purports to have been written by a Greek official of the court of Ptolemy Philadelphus who was himself intimately

1. F. Jacoby, RE vii (1912), 2764.
2. The literature on Aristeas, ad Philocratem is large; bibliographical references are selective, indicating the best discussion rather than the first or last. The introduction to M. Hadas, Aristeas to Philocrates (1951) offers the clearest and most recent general survey; the following editions are cited by author's name and page number alone: P. Wendland (1900), R. Tramontano (1931), M. Hadas (1951), A. Pelletier (1962), Strictly the work is not a letter, but a διαγραφή (cf. Hadas, 56ff.)
concerned in the proceedings; he claims to base his account both on his own observation and on written sources to which he had access. He tells of how Philadelphus, desiring for the Museum a correct copy of the Laws of the Jews, on the advice of Demetrius of Phaleron his librarian, obtained a text and seventy-two Jewish elders from the High Priest at Jerusalem, and how these provided him with the version he required. The story is detailed and circumstantial, with many digressions and an abundant use of documents. It includes such episodes as a conversation with the High Priest on the allegorical interpretation of certain Jewish customs, a description of Jerusalem and its cult, of Palestine and the mines of Arabia, and a long account, comprising a third of the work, of the welcome given to the seventy-two elders by the king, with seven successive banquets at which each elder in turn was asked a philosophical question, and replied to the general approbation of the court. Compared with all this, the actual business of translation is described both briefly and ambiguously.

This letter appears to lie behind every account of the origins of the Septuagint that survives; the various embellishments which the legend underwent offer no evidence for alternative versions being available. The story of Aristeas was

accepted as true by Jews and Christians alike. Modern scholars are however agreed that, whatever may lie behind the various parts of the story, the framework provided by Aristeas is spurious. The documents are inventions; the author was not a Greek but a Jew; and his work contains a number of anachronisms which show that he must have written considerably later than the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus.

The age in which the letter was written has been exhaustively discussed, but the various arguments which survive inspection converge to support a date around 100 B.C. The language of the letter suggests the late Ptolemaic period; the fabricated

1. Cf. e.g. Wendland, xxvi; Hadas, 5ff. He admits it himself at 28 and 102.
2. Cf. H.G. Meecham, The Oldest Version of the Bible (1932), 94ff; Hadas, 9ff. A date under the Roman empire is now generally rejected (despite L. Herrmann, Latomus xxv (1963), 56ff); the chief argument for an earlier date (c. 200) is the dependence of Aristobulus on Aristeas in several places (esp. Euseb. P.E. xiii, 12, 2; floruit ostensibly 130-145). But 'Aristobulus' is probably another Aristeas, projecting himself into the past in the role of adviser to Philometor; cf. Hadas, 26f. The useful discussion of N. Walter, Der Thoraausleger Aristobulus (Texts u. Untersuchungen Ixxvi (1964) is not wholly convincing; paradoxically, he accepts Aristobulus as genuine, but thinks he is earlier than Aristeas.
documents contain formulae of the period 145-100. The names invented by Aristeas are equally important, for they seem to show the influence of contemporary events or of the immediate past. A number of the names in the list of seventy-two elders are associated with the Maccabean period; two in particular, which appear in the list separated by only one name, are significant - Ananias and Chelkias. For these are the names of the two Jewish generals of Cleopatra III in her wars with Ptolemy Lathyrus (107-2). Some sort of lower limit is provided by these names, and by the fact that the High Priest is not called Αριστοκλῆς by Aristeas. The first to take this title was Aristobulus in 104. It is unlikely that an author who lived more than a few years after this event would have resisted the temptation to add a finishing touch to a representation of the High Priest which already depicts him as an independent ruler in his own right. The author seems to have been a man whose knowledge of public

1. E. Bickermann, Zeitschr.f.d.nt.Wiss. xxix (1930), 28ff; with the amendment o. W. F. Albright, The Greeks in Bactria and India (1951), 425 n.1. E. van 't Riet, Antidorus V. Torenans, Studia Hellenistica xvi (1968), 265ff. argues on grounds of the court organisation for a date c.120-116; but, though his evidence offers welcome confirmation of a date after 150 and not later than the early decades of the first century, it is insufficiently precise to overturn the arguments for a date around 100.

2. Wendland, xxvi f; Jewish Encyclopedia ii (1902), 93ff; ad Phil. 48: Chelkias has to be supplied from Epiphanius.

3. Jos. B.J. 1,70; or perhaps rather Alexander Jannaeus a year later (Strabo xvi, 752), who is the first to use the title on coins. Cf. B. Motzo, Atti Acc. Sc.Torino,(1914-5), 223ff., who interprets this terminus ante loo strictly. Gaza, destroyed in 96, is mentioned as a port at ad Phil. 115.
affairs was moulded in the last years of the second century.

The combination of invention, idealization and attempted historical verisimilitude makes it difficult to estimate the validity of arguments drawn from the conscious statements of Aristeas; yet the general background which emerges from the fog of archaism tends to support a date inferred by other means. The Ptolemaic dynasty is long established; its institutions are accepted and unquestioned: there is no sign of the presence of Rome. The Jewish community in Alexandria is large and flourishing; the moderation of Aristeas betrays a man who feels reasonably secure. The author is steeped in Hellenism - he finds no difficulty in identifying Jehovah with Zeus. From the firm foundation of a common culture he can see the possibility and the need for proselytism. He shows the beginnings of that interest in allegorical interpretation of the Law which reached its zenith in Philo. He can be related to the apocrypha of the period: he had read 1 Maccabees, and is a representative of the liberal attitudes opposed by the fervent religious nationalism of 3 Maccabees.

Finally the author's name seems to provide a clue. Eusebius quotes from Alexander Polyhistor a work by a certain Aristeas Πέτρος τοῦ Φωκίου. The date of this Aristeas can be

1. ad Phil. 16.
2. A. Momigliano, Aeg. xii (1932), 161ff., comparing 1 Macc. x, 37 with ad Phil. 37.
determined: the fragment quoted betrays a knowledge of Job in the Greek translation. He is therefore later than that translation and earlier than Polyhistor, and will have lived in the late second or early first century B.C. The περὶ Ἰσραήλ of Aristeas is apparently referred to by the author of the 'letter' to Philocrates; he says in his preface:

> 'On a previous occasion I sent you an account of matters that I thought worth relation concerning the Jewish race (περὶ Ἰσραήλ ἤργου περὶ Ισραήλ), which I received from the most learned high priests of the most learned land of Egypt.'

If the 'letter' to Philocrates was written at about the same time as Aristeas περὶ Ἰσραήλ, it is almost inconceivable that an author who calls himself Aristeas should not have intended this passage to refer to the περὶ Ἰσραήλ; his readers at least would certainly have so taken it. The easiest explanation of the passage would then be that the author of the 'letter' was attempting to father his production on the historian. But there is a difficulty: how should a pseudo-Aristeas, impersonating a character at the court of Philadelphus, wish to identify himself with a historian not more than a generation old? And if he did not wish to identify himself with the historian, how could he be so

2. ad Phil. 5.
3. H. St. J. Thackeray, *The Letter of Aristeas* (1917), 22, n. 4. Wendland (xxvii; *Jewish Encyclopaedia*, ii, 92f.) thinks that 'the author of the letter very probably borrows his name from the historian'; this has been generally accepted. But it is hard to see how he could borrow his name without also being suspected of borrowing his work by readers of *ad Phil.* 5.
incompetent as to take the same name, and then attribute to himself a work apparently identical with that of the true Aristeas? The situation is plainly ridiculous, one such as any writer of pseudepigrapha would avoid at all costs.

Two possibilities remain. It may be that the author of the 'letter' was so ignorant that he thought the history of Aristeas to have been written under Philadelphus, and inserted the reference merely to give plausibility to his story. It would be a little surprising that his error went unnoticed by his readers. And the author of the 'letter', though he committed anachronisms, was certainly not ignorant of the literature and practices of his own day. If an explanation is to be sought in this direction, it must involve separating the pseudo-Aristeas from the historian in time or in place. The author's use of the name Aristeas and his reference to the history in fact constitute the strongest argument yet advanced for a late date - one late enough for the historian to have become no more than a name. This conclusion conflicts with the evidence so far adduced for the date of the 'letter'; it must therefore be discarded.

The second alternative is, I believe, preferable. It is that the history of Aristeas too actually purported to have been written by a Greek at the court of Philadelphus, and that contemporaries accepted the claim. The sole fragment which has survived, it is true, offers no basis for such an
assertion; it is a sober account of the lineage of Job, plainly written by a Hellenized Jew with a knowledge of the additions to the Septuagint version of Job. Yet one short fragment is small evidence for the general nature of a book, and there is at least nothing in that fragment which can be held to disprove the hypothesis. If a brief factual quotation were all that survived from the 'letter' to Philocrates, the credit of its author would stand as high as that of the historian. A mistake of the greatest authority on the Greek historians neatly proves the point. Jacoby, in his apparatus to the fragment Πολυδακου suggested that the historian was identical with the Aristeas quoted elsewhere by Eusebius as the author of a text. This second quotation is in fact from the 'letter' to Philocrates; yet Jacoby's mistake was understandable, for that 'fragment' shows the same characteristics of sobriety and Jewish learning as the fragment from the history. Finally, in favour of the view that the Πολυδακου was not a sober and reliable historical work, the description in the 'letter' to Philocrates

1. P.E. ix,38 = ad Phil. 88 cf. F.G.H. 725 F 1 apparatus: it would be both charitable and a support to the above argument to suppose that Jacoby intended to suggest the identity of the two Aristeases; earlier (in 1940) he had shown knowledge of the provenance of the P.E. passage: F.G.H. 273 F 19, p.102, line 2. The title Eusebius gives means of course 'On the Translation (not the Interpretation) of the Jewish Law', and this may well be the original title of the work. On the meaning of ἐπανάθεσιν in Aristeas and Hellenistic Judaism see G.Zuntz, Journal of Semitic Studies iv (1959), 111f; Sir. prol.; Dan. LXX, v,1. cf. also the heading of the Aristeas passage in P.E. viii,2, and the very clear example of P.Oxy. 1331, col.II,55.
can be adduced, whether that description be of the book itself or of an imitation book by an imitation author. A work that can be described, however loosely and even at second hand, as 'received from the most learned high priests or the most learned land of Egypt', does not inspire confidence.

If this characterisation of the Περὶ 'Χαρακτῆρις of Aristeas be accepted, the conclusion is clear. We cannot have two men in the same period, each calling himself Aristeas, each writing historical fictions, each impersonating an otherwise unknown Greek of the time of Philadelphus, and one of them claiming to have written the other's book. The two Aristeases are identical: the evidence which fixes the date of the author of the Περὶ 'Χαρακτῆρις serves also to date his alter ego.

If the Περὶ 'Χαρακτῆρις of Aristeas did purport to be the work of a Greek courtier of Philadelphus, a close parallel might be found in another book of the same name, attributed to Hecataeus of Abdera. In his work on Egypt, Hecataeus had been the first Greek historian to mention the Jews; his description was reasonably favourable, and the inevitable result was that a whole book Περὶ 'Χαρακτῆρις was fathered on him by a Jewish writer.

1. See below, n. 2 p. 397
2. There are of course cases of two or more men impersonating a real figure (cf. n. 4), but not of two contemporaries inventing the same fictitious character. My general conclusion is that of Motzo, o.c. (p.390), 202ff; while he was chiefly concerned to counter the objections of Freudenthal, I have attempted to find positive arguments for the identification.
3. F.G.H. 264 F 5.
4. F 21-3; with Jacoby, commentary, 62, n. I cannot accept this work as genuine, contra H. Lewy, ZintWiss.xxxi (1922), 117ff. With H. Willrich, Juden und Griechen vor der Makkabäischen Erhebung (1895), cf. and Jacoby; I think it likely that (contd. over)
Fragments of this book are preserved in Josephus contra Apionem, and it seems reasonably clear that it was known to the author of the 'letter' to Philocrates. For that author refers to 'Hecataeus'; and though the actual citation may be invented, the sentiment is more appropriate to the false than the genuine Hecataeus. Some of the information in the 'letter' seems also to come from pseudo-Hecataeus, as does more generally the inspiration for certain passages: the role of the High Priest Eleazar may be modelled on that of Ezekias, and the description of Jerusalem in both works shows certain similarities. But more significant than these similarities is the freedom with which the author of the 'letter' exploited the information he obtained from pseudo-Hecataeus, a freedom which is also evident in his handling of the Scriptures and of at least one genuine Ptolemaic document. It appears that the pseudo-Hecataeus modelled his Ezekias on Onias founder of Leontopolis (cf. below pp.431ff): a terracotta relief of (pseudo-) Hecataeus found during the excavations at the Oniad centre of Leontopolis seems to have been overlooked: W.M. Flinders Petrie, Hyleos and Israelite Cities (1905), pl.XIX D. Later a second pseudo-Hecataeus produced a much inferior work, on Abraham and the Egyptians: p.24 (compare p.436 on pseudo-Euopotamus for the tendency apparent in this). On these forgeries see in general p.436; Jacoby, commentary 61ff; Walter, o. c. (p.55), 172ff.

1. Denied by Jacoby in RE vii (1912), 276; but later rightly accepted in commentary, 62.

2. ad Phil. 1.31; see Jacoby, commentary, 65f., 74f., who doubts whether this passage came even from pseudo-Hecataeus.

3. ad Phil. 12ff; cf. F 21,188,194.

4. Jacoby, commentary, 66. ad Phil. 33-120: cf. F21,105-9. The differences are so striking that it is easy to underestimate the similarities; cf. V. Tcherikover, H.T.R. i (1958), 77f. for biblical parallels.

author of the 'letter' was not a mere compiler.

If the 'letter' is modelled in part on pseudo-Hecataeus, that should also have been true of Aristeas' πατερικὴ οὐσία. Such a connection would explain why Aristeas chose in both cases to present himself as a Greek of some standing at the court of Ptolemy; but the comparison between the two works πατερικὴ οὐσία cannot in the state of the evidence be carried far. Indeed the only point which can be noticed is one on which Aristeas seems to have diverged from his model. Pseudo-Hecataeus claimed to derive his information from Jewish friends, especially from Ezekias the High Priest. Aristeas preferred sources which in Greek eyes were more respectable - the most learned priests of the most learned land of Egypt.

Jewish historiography should not be judged by standards appropriate to Greek historians. Jewish authors wrote in the tradition of the Old Testament. Moses wrote the Pentateuch, including the account of his own death. History was teleological; its writing was the propagation of true belief - and belief was truth. It is no criticism of a Jewish author to uncover the man behind the persona, for to convince others of the truth and importance of a story which is true may require a mask. Aristeas is no more a pseudonym for the author of the 'letter' than Moses for the author of the

1. F21, 100, 104, 200.
2. Egyptian priests are a common motif in Greek historians on Egypt.
3. Cf. e.g. Philo, Moses ii, 291.
Pentateuch. The elaborate machinery which Aristeas employed is evidence only of the seriousness with which he regarded his task.

One section of Aristeas' work in particular, the story of the seven successive banquets, is of importance; for it has often been held to be an independent work older than the rest of the book, and has in general been characterized as a ἄριστος βουλευτής. Thus Tarn could write: 'That all this belongs to a ἄριστος βουλευτής and must have been written in the third century, not the first, should need no demonstration; the document belongs to the period when the ἄριστος βουλευτής was a most active literary form.' Others have pointed to the difficulties caused by the insertion of a treatise on kingship, and to the need for an analysis of the section in connection with Hellenistic writings ἄριστος βουλευτής. The section is composed of seventy-two questions and seventy-two answers. Many of the answers consist of two parts: the first gives a reply which might be expected from

1. Strictly, Aristeas should be designated as 'Aristeas', but not pseudo-Aristeas, since he was inventing himself, not impersonating another - unless, that is, the ingenious suggestion of J.E. Stambaugh, Aeg.xlvii (1967), 69ff. is right, that the author was impersonating a certain Aristeas of Argos of the third century. But virtually nothing is known of this figure; and there is certainly no evidence in the 'letter' to suggest that our author wished to connect himself with Argos. The name is very common.
2. o.c. (p370), 426.
any Greek philosopher; the second connects this reply with Jewish monotheism or Jewish ethics. In a number of answers, however, this division breaks down: the entire reply, and sometimes the question as well, is in Jewish rather than Greek terms. Moreover, of those answers which can be classified as partly Greek, not all are concerned with kingship; their source is rather in popular Hellenistic philosophy. Further, the form of this section is without parallel in any known work on kingship. These factors make it impossible to claim that the work as it stands is a Greek treatise on kingship, or that the simple removal of a superficial Jewish colouring (which might have been applied by Aristeas) will produce such a treatise.

Yet a separate existence for this section of Aristeas has often been postulated; why? No anachronism can be discovered which might suggest a date earlier than Aristeas; nor does there seem to be any difference in vocabulary or attitude between this and other parts of the work - the virtues considered important for a king here are the same as those mentioned elsewhere. Rather has been the general feeling that the questions are irrelevant to Aristeas' purpose, and that they can be removed from the narrative without making any

1. Tarn (o.c. 425ff.) suggested a proto-Aristeas, also a Jew, and writing a work remarkably similar to Aristeas' own - an exercise in source criticism reduced to absurdity.
2. Tarn in 1938 (o.c.426) thought he could see one in the mention of petitions at 252, but in his second edition (1951) retracted (o.c.539).
3. See the examples adduced in text and notes, below pp. 415ff.
difference to it. The problem of irrelevance involves the problem of purpose. If the only purpose of the letter was to establish the Septuagint as the official Greek version of the Hebrew, then the questions are irrelevant; for the work would be addressed to the Jewish community in Alexandria. But such a view makes large sections of the rest of the letter irrelevant, for Aristeas' purpose would be served if he merely showed that the work was done with care, and under official Jewish direction. It has long been recognized that the letter is not in fact directed only at the Jews; it is also (perhaps primarily) intended to recommend the Septuagint, and Judaism in general, to Greeks. This is at least in part the reason for the author posing as a Greek, for the justifications of Jewish customs, the accounts of Jewish religious practices, and the description of Jerusalem and Judaea. It also helps to explain why Aristeas has constructed his elaborate machinery involving such honoured names and institutions as Philadelphus, Demetrius of Phaleron, and the Museum. Such an aim requires a demonstration of Philadelphus' interest in the translators and the content of their faith. It is this which emerges from the questions and answers; the scene, far from being irrelevant, is of the greatest importance, given Aristeas' purpose.

1. I cannot follow V. Tcherikover, H.T.R. li (1953), 59ff. in thinking the propaganda element directed entirely towards other Jews; while he is right to emphasise the limited effect of literary proselytism and the dangers of assuming all Jewish literature to be apologetic (cf. the very important article, Eos xlviIII.3 (1956), 169ff), in the case of Aristeas this purpose does seem clear enough: N.Walter, Neue Beiträge z. Geschichte der Alten Welt, i (1964), 375f. See further below, p.446f.
The view that the questions and answers existed in a previous form because they are not closely tied to the narrative of Aristeas, ignores the nature of that narrative. Aristeas was not a skilful author; in particular he seems to have found it difficult to co-ordinate the various sections of his work. He had a complicated story to tell, involving sustained falsification which must yet appear to rest on the strongest possible evidence. He had to insert as many documents as he could; and where documents were inappropriate, he was careful to claim either written sources or personal participation, even (as in this particular section)¹ both. If the possibility that there was already a story of how the Septuagint came to be translated be admitted², he had to combine this story with his own embellishments. The result is a narrative which does not co-ordinate its various parts. Thus the freeing of Jewish slaves is inserted between the beginning of the narrative of the translation and its continuation. The journey to Jerusalem, told in the form of a des-

¹ ad Phil. 297ff.
² One must have existed, but what it was is completely obscure. If the mention in Aristobulus is accepted as deriving from Aristeas (above n.2 p.389), the only other pieces of evidence possibly independent of Aristeas are: 1), the festival on Pharos (Philo. Moses ii,7; but as Tramontano, 53f, points out, the silence of Aristeas on the inauguration of the festival shows that it did not exist when he wrote: in ad Phil. 180 a festival is mentioned, but with a different explanation of its significance); 2), the mention of five translators in Massakhet Soferim i, 8 (Zeitlin suggests in Hadas, 81 n.109, that this is a scribal error). It is not even clear who invented the number 72, which must derive ultimately from Exodus xxiv, 1,9; Numbers ii, 16ff. (cf. Tramontano, commentary p.73; Hadas, 71f).
cription of Jerusalem and Judaea, has only the slightest connection with the surrounding story; so too Eleazar's exposition of Jewish customs. There is scarcely any part of the work which could not be detached from its surroundings without harming the rest of the narrative. Yet each section is in some way related to the theme of the work; it is hardly likely that Aristeas was able to find so many different sources which fitted so well his central theme. It is only on the stylistic level that the work fails to cohere; on the conceptual level it is a unity. And the very structure of the questions and answers, implying the existence of seventy-two elders gathered together (for what other purpose than to make the Septuagint translation?), shows that this section is more closely tied to the central situation than any of the other 'digressions'; as it stands, it must be the last, not the first, to be attributed to another author.

The questions and answers are an invention of Aristeas. The investigation of their antecedents is not a search for another author who might have written this section, but for the models and sources of Aristeas. The problem can be clarified by considering two questions separately. It is necessary to investigate first the form, to discover what type of writing lies behind Aristeas' account, and why he chose to cast the section in its present shape; secondly, the contents.
The form in fact presents little difficulty; in portraying Philadelphus as setting problems to his Jewish guests at dinner, Aristeas was using a setting which was a familiar feature of Ptolemaic court life; and for Judaea the quarrel between John Myrcanus and the Pharisees began on just such an occasion. Literary and learned conversations, the setting of riddles and κλέον, were popular entertainment at the symposia of kings. Epicurus, in his πειράματα, was even moved to protest against the practice, which Aristeas in his turn specifically commends. Any new guest might expect to have to enter the game, and with seventy-two guests nothing could be more natural than to ask seventy-two questions. The literature on symposia and on court life reflects this practice, and offers many partial parallels to Aristeas; in Plutarch's Symposium of the Seven Wise Men, for instance, each sage in turn offers a piece of advice on kingship for Amasis, and a little later pronounces on the best sort of democracy. Similar settings can be found in Jewish literature: the book of Kings mentions a contest of wisdom between Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, and Josephus tells of how Hirom of Tyre and

2. Epicurus F5, Usener, p.94; ad Phil. 286 - such self-praise was natural; cf. Philodemus Πέρακτα with my comments, below p.489. For the Ptolemaic court custom of inviting new arrivals at Alexandria to dinner, cf. e.g. Machon F5 Gow. For the following remarks, see further Zuntz o.c. (ψιλιτικον), 32ff., esp. 35 n.3.
3. It is sufficient to cite e.g. Athenaeus or Plutarch; but most symposiastic literature contains some such element.
4. Mor. 152, 154c ff.
Solomon used to exchange problems. Thus when Aristeas fears that no-one will believe his story, it is not because the setting is unlikely in itself; as he says, what his readers may find hard to accept is the versatility and skill of the elders, their ability to answer such difficult questions so well and on the spur of the moment.

The tone of Aristeas' narrative is, it is true, more serious than is usual in descriptions of such gatherings, but this is due to his purpose: he was not writing to amuse, but to convince Jews and Greeks of the philosophical merits of Philadelphus and the elders. There is also a note of competition present: the king approves each answer, and his courtiers applaud, as if a test had been passed. So it had, for Aristeas specifically mentions his purpose in two passages: it is to show that the elders could beat Greek philosophers on their own ground, because unlike the philosophers they have a theoretical basis for their views in Jewish theology. The sparseness of the form and its comparative monotony might seem to be due as much to Aristeas' lack of inventiveness.

1. 1 Kings x, 1-3; Jos. c.Ap. i, 114f, 120; further examples ap. Zuntz l.c. Compare for the infiltration of such 'oriental' motifs into Greek literature Alexander and the Gymnosophists, Aesop and Nectanebos (with W.R. Halliday, Indo-European Folk Tales and Greek Legend (1933), 143ff.); more generally A.-J. Festugière, Rev. de l'hist. des Religions cxxv (1942-3), 32ff, cxxx (1945) 29ff; J. Huizinga, Homo Ludens (E.T.), 105ff. The riddle element is rationalised philosophically in Clearchus F63 Wehrli, Plut. Mor. 153ef. But the various strands in such stories are hard to disentangle.

2. ad Phil. 296.

3. 200, 235.
and his desire to get through the banquets as quickly as possible, as to any specific literary model.

Thus Aristeas' choice of form was a natural one. Only in one small particular is there any sign of strain. The seventy-two questions are divided among seven days, at the rate of ten a day, and eleven on the last two days - a curiously untidy arrangement. The natural division of seventy-two is by six and twelve, and such a division would fit the facts Aristeas gives elsewhere. For his elders are already divided by six and twelve - six from each of the twelve tribes of Israel. If Aristeas had allowed twelve questions each day for six days, he would have been able to make use of this, by allowing two tribes to each day, or two elders from each tribe each day. The choice of seven days instead of six meant that Aristeas had to abandon the tribal division he had earlier insisted on. It also meant that he was unable to have the same number of questions each day. There is a further oddity: it is strange that, though this section of the narrative contains seven successive days, there is no mention of the Sabbath here or elsewhere. On the seventh day the feast is grander, and the guests more numerous, but apparently only because it is the last feast. After the seven days the elders do indeed rest before beginning the translation, but

1. 46-50. Josephus, Ant. xii, 99 saw the oddity, and sensibly changed the number of feasts to twelve: cf. A. Pelletier, Flavius Josèphe Adapteur de la Lettre d'Aristée (1962), 179.
for three days, not one. The Sabbath is not of course infringed by contemporary standards; feasting, praising God, religious instruction and philosophy are activities mentioned as especially appropriate to it. But the chance of mentioning and justifying yet another curious Jewish custom has been missed by not choosing six days for the banquets.

These oddities may be pure inadvertence; but they could be explained if for some reason Aristeas felt obliged to keep to a scheme of ten questions a day - if at the back of his mind there was a model involving the number ten. The story of Alexander and the Naked Philosophers is in content and intention very different from that of Philadelphus and the elders; it is a set of riddles played for the stake of life, with a typically intellectual Greek joke to round it off. Many of the similarities with Aristeas' story may be illusory, for they could arise from the brevity and lack of embellishment in both narratives; nor is the fact that both end with the presentation of gifts significant. But there are ten naked philosophers, and ten questions: it may well be that Aristeas did know of the story of the Gymnosophists, and that he derived from it at least the number ten. The oldest text of the story is a papyrus contem-

1. Jubilees ii, 21; Philo, de decalogo 98,100; de spec. leg. ii, 61ff.

2. Composite text in R. Merkelbach, Die Quellen des griechischen Alexanderromans (1954), 116ff; cf. G. Zuntz, Hermes lxxvii (1959), 436ff., who suggests plausibly that the presenting of tunics to the Naked philosophers at the end of the contest is a Greek, not an oriental touch.

3. This suggestion was made by Tarn, o.c. (p394), 429ff., though in an extreme form and for different reasons: the Questions of Milinda are best omitted from the discussion, for the motif is so common that only this inconcinnity in Aristeas has weight. E.L. Bowie has suggested to me that the important (contd. over)
The form Aristeas chose presented him with a framework of seventy-two questions and answers, which must be filled with contents appropriate to the occasion. The problem of the sources of the contents must now be faced. In general it is easy to detect three strands, though it may not always be possible to make a clear distinction in a particular case. One source can be quickly dismissed: eighteen or so questions reflect the influence of popular Hellenistic philosophy. Such are, for instance, the explanation of nightmares and how to avoid them, the questions on envy, grief, the nature of philosophy, and foreign travel. There is no sign that this material is taken from any particular florilegium or handbook to philosophy; it shows no consistent doctrine, and no special knowledge which number for Aristeas might be seven rather than ten, as a number especially appropriate to symposia. In Plato's Symposium only seven of the speeches are reported, and Plutarch's Symposium of the Seven Wise Men is, as he says, not the first (Mor. 146c; cf. J. Defradas' edn. (1954), 16ff; K. Ziegler, Plutarchos von Chaironeia (1964), p.248). But this ought to imply seven guests a day, and therefore ten days for the feasts, not the reverse.


2. 213, 224, 232, 256, 257.

3. Contra Zuntz o.c. (p317), 30f.
would be inappropriate for a Greek-speaking Jew in first
century Alexandria. Doubtless if Aristeas could have thought
of seventy-two questions on kingship alone, he would not have
inserted these other questions; their justification is the need
to arrive at a certain total.

By far the largest number of questions and answers are
derived from one particular branch of Hellenistic philosophy;
from doctrines of kingship. But the analysis of these doctrines
and of Aristeas' debt to works on kingship is not easy. Sometimes
the question echoes a real problem for kingship, which is
answered from the same source. Sometimes it is the answer
which contains the chief point, and Aristeas has had to invent
a question to lead up to it: this explains many of the apparent
incoherencies - it is the question, not the answer, which is
irrelevant. Sometimes the opposite is true: the question is
derived from kingship theory, but the appropriate Greek answer
was felt to be unsuitable and another was substituted.

The third element in the section complicates the analysis
further. The author was a Jew portraying Jews; all the answers
are connected more or less loosely to Jewish thought - 'they
take God as the starting point of their reply'. Where the
answer falls into two parts, Greek and Jewish, there is little
difficulty. But the connection is often closer and more
complex.

1. Cf. p. 404 n. 3.
Further problems emerge. It must be remembered that Aristeas is himself the main source for Hellenistic doctrines of kingship; the use of earlier or later writers for purposes of comparison is not entirely satisfactory. The language presents difficulties: Aristeas had behind him an extensive Jewish literature written in Greek, and Greek words had acquired connotations which owed as much to the Jewish tradition as to the Greek. The process was accelerated by the fact that the Law itself was studied by Aristeas and his contemporaries in the Greek translation; to take only one example, should δικαιοσύνη and δικαιοσύνη in Aristeas be translated 'justice', or 'righteousness'? Moreover when an author has taken so much trouble to combine the Greek and Jewish strands, it must be assumed that he has exercised powers of selection and emphasis; he must have adapted the topics of kingship to suit the circumstances and his own predilections. Certain aspects, such as king worship, will be necessarily excluded; others will be played down or emphasised as he thinks desirable. In such a situation it is not surprising that people have preferred to ask for an analysis in terms of kingship theory rather than provide it. For any such analysis will seem often subjective and sometimes circular.

Recently Professor Zuntz has offered a solution to the problem which is both simple and seductive; Aristeas used one

1. In his article often cited already, Journal of Semitic Studies iv (1959), 21-31. The following disagreements with Zuntz should not be allowed to disguise my debt to this masterly article, both for his clarification of this particular problem and in his discussion of other questions.
particular treatise on kingship, and used it so mechanically that its main outlines can be extracted from the text of the questions. The significance of this claim for Aristeas studies needs no emphasis: if Aristeas can be detected in plagiarism for so large a part of his work, this must reveal much about his techniques elsewhere. Equally important is the possibility of reconstructing to whatever extent for the first time a Hellenistic treatise ΠΕΝΙΚΗΒΑΘΜΗΩΚ. But while many of Zuntz's remarks are true, and important for the understanding of Aristeas' technique of composition, the general conclusions he draws from them seem to me unfounded.

The case rests on two sets of observations. The first is that, once certain irrelevancies and repetitions are excluded, a systematic outline which is that of a treatise on kingship becomes obvious; thus the 'source' is reconstructed with the help of twenty-nine questions. But of the total of seventy-two it could be argued that not twenty-nine, but something more like forty-seven questions are about kingship:1 Zuntz has rejected over a third of the possible questions. The full significance of this becomes apparent when it is realised that mathematically the number of possible combinations involved even in selecting twenty-nine ordered objects from forty-seven

1. i.e. rejecting 195, 197, 199, 213, 224, 228, 236, 237, 238, 243, 244, 248, 256-7, 260, 268, 276, 277. The following are perhaps doubtfully appropriate: 229, 234 (but see p.123); 230, 232 (but the answers are appropriate enought to a discussion on kingship); 241, 250 (but see p.424); 266 (but cf. perhaps pseudo-Aristotle,Π. βασιλευτικά 13,4ff.).
ordered objects, while retaining the order, runs into twelve figures: potentially we have not one, but billions of treatises on kingship. It might be claimed that Zuntz's ordering is more plausible than the other possible combinations. But here the difficulty is that the headings of Zunt's sections, which illustrate the alleged connections between questions, are so vague that almost anything could be included under most of them; it is for instance difficult to see the difference between a section called 'requirements for just administration1, and one called 'the exercise of power'; indeed how might these or many of the other groupings have been described in Greek? It is also clear that the alleged archetype contained no information on such essential topics as the military duties of the king, or his relation to the gods; Aristeas' remarks on these are excluded by Zuntz, for they do not fit his picture. In fact it seems to me that we do not find buried among over twice as many questions the clear and unmistakable outline of a πρός
αυτοκράτορα; rather the illogical, vague, and repetitious whole is the work of one mind, itself illogical, vague, and repetitious. It is true that on a few occasions questions are grouped with some semblance of order; but even so scatter-brained an author as Aristeas must have let his mind run on occasionally.

1. See the schema, o.c. 28f.
2. E.g. the questions from which Zuntz begins: the remarks on subordinates, 280-1 (two questions), the king's daily life, 283-6 (three questions), and the first three (188-90) on ἑπιστολεύματα, ἀνακρίβεια and εὐθυγραμμίζει (though I would dispute his detailed interpretation of the first two: cf. pp.
Zuntz's second set of observations concerns infelicities in the construction of the questions. It may be question or answer which gives the main point; sometimes the two do not appear to fit. In particular there is a numerous group of questions of the form, 'how should the king ...?' (ἠδώ ἢ ...), where the answer is given not to the question 'how?', but to the question 'why should he ...?' - that is, in the form of reasons for behaving in a certain way. This is alleged to 'show the incompetent transformation of plain reasoned statements ... into questions and answers: the statements themselves were stolidly turned into questions, while the arguments supporting them were made to serve as the sages' answers'.

The problem here is that the 'how?' questions occur elsewhere, both outside the questions on kingship (which led Zuntz to suppose another source, a general handbook on Hellenistic philosophy), and among the questions on kingship which Zuntz himself rejected. The phenomenon is real, but Zuntz's explanation is perhaps wrong; to Aristeas, regardless of what sources he was using, the question and answer form must have seemed an unnatural way of thinking about moral problems; the difficulty of transforming the normal mode, of statements of duties with attendant reasons, into questions

1. E.g. 224, 245. Zuntz would presumably attribute all such questions to his putative handbook on general philosophy; but these two at least seem to require the presence of a king.
and answers, will have been the same whether Aristeas was copy­
ing out a single source, or drawing on his own memory and
imagination. Nor are the \( \text{他表示} \) ... questions as odd as has
been suggested; I take one example (206): 'How should he adhere
to the truth? - By realising that lying brings great shame on
all men, but especially on kings: having the power to do what
they like, what reason have they for lying? And you must
keep hold of this, King, because God is a lover of truth'.
Strictly perhaps the only logical answer to the question 'how
should I adhere to the truth?', is, as Zuntz claims, the
tautology 'by avoiding lies'. But it is hardly a helpful
answer. Strictly perhaps reasons for adhering to the truth are
only relevant to the question, 'why should I do so?', not 'how?'.
But Aristeas has carefully adapted these reasons to fit a 'how?'
question, by prefacing them with the word \( \text{他表示} \), 'by
realising that ...'. In other words, the question 'how can I
remain in a certain state?' can legitimately be answered with
'by realising that you ought to, for the following reasons';
the resolve to be something is fortified by the remembrance
of reasons why one ought to be it. Certainly Aristeas might
have found it easier to use a 'why?' form of question, but there
is perhaps a simple explanation for his preferring the 'how?'
form. His interlocutor was a king; it may be possible for the
ordinary citizen to ask, 'Why should I tell the truth? Why
should I love my fellow men (208)? Why should I not act
against the laws (240), or do unworthy deeds (217)?'. But
the dignity of kings must be respected; a monarch who could
even ask such immoral questions is straightway shown to be a
tyrant, not a king. Aristeas could not have used any other
form for his 'how?' questions without shedding doubt on the
moral character of Philadelphus.

Aristeas was an educated man, who had doubtless read
widely in kingship literature; there was no need for him to
sit down and depilate tediously a particular treatise - he
had only to use his imagination. If that failed, he might
consult a few works to refresh his memory, but such a random
procedure would leave no recognisable trace. Zuntz's hypothe-
sis requires an author with the mentality of an epitomator;
yet he believes, rightly in my opinion, that the framework of
the whole story was Aristeas' invention; and wherever Aristeas'
sources can be identified, it appears that he used them as a
basis for free invention rather than following them closely1.

So far the question of Aristeas' sources has been allowed
to eclipse other problems - properly, because if a view such
as Zuntz's were right, that question would be the only
important one raised by the section. Yet it may be that this
question is in the end as unimportant as it is insoluble. If

1. Above, p. 396
Aristeas believed what he wrote, it does not matter much where he found it\(^1\).

The final question sums up what is in Aristeas' view the tenor of the whole discussion: 'What is the greatest achievement of kingship? - That the subjects should enjoy continual peace and obtain prompt justice in judgments. This comes about through the ruler, when he is a man who hates evil and loves good and devotes his energies to saving the lives of men' (291). The three aspects which are here emphasised as being particularly important may perhaps be singled out to serve as a rough guide for distinguishing the main topics; they are peace (understood to include prosperity)\(^2\), the exercise of justice, and the character of the ruler which guarantees the presence of the other two.

The activities of the king for the prosperity of his subjects are expressed in the words \(\pi\ ι\ ο\ ν\ ω\ ν\ ε\ \) and \(\epsilon\ ι\ η\ ρ\ ι\ ο\ ν\ \). The king must show \(\pi\ ι\ ν\ ω\ ν\ ι\ ο\ \) for his people and imitate the \(\epsilon\ ι\ η\ ρ\ ι\ ο\ ν\ \) of God (190); the imitation of God's beneficence is emphasized in several answers\(^3\). The foundation of this beneficence is the king's own \(\phi\ ι\ \lambda\ ο\ θ\ ρ\ ω\ \) (cf. 208), and its effects on his subjects are brought out in an answer which does not seem to

1. For another analysis of the ideas in this section, cf. Tramontano 143ff., who perhaps imports a little too much of the modern into his account.
2. Zuntz o.c. 29 sees that \(\epsilon\ ι\ η\ ρ\ ι\ ο\ ν\ \) is taken in its Septuagint sense, equivalent to Hebr. \(\text{salom}\).
3. Cf. n.3 p.427; the idea is Greek as well as Jewish: see Wendland, ad loc., LXX Concordance.
have been properly understood. The king asks, 'What is the most necessary possession for a king?'; the reply is 'οὐν τὸν ἐξοχοτητήν τοῦ καί θυμὸν', for by this an indissoluble bond of goodwill (εὐγνώμονα) is created' (265). ἐξοχοτητήν and θυμὸν have usually been taken as synonymous;¹ but it seems better to understand ἐξοχοτητήν as the love of the king for his subjects, θυμὸν as the reciprocal love of his subjects for him. For ἐξοχοτητήν usually refers to a love of mankind in general, and is especially applied to the attitude of a superior towards his inferior²; moreover the result of possessing both ἐξοχοτητήν and θυμὸν is a bond of goodwill, a reciprocal relationship.

This bond, which results from the εὐγνώμονα of the king, is an important source of strength for his rule; it ensures that his friends (190)³, and his subjects in general, are loyal; by his liberality and readiness to share the benefits of rule he retains his good reputation (226). It seems that Aristeas here goes no further than Greek thinkers: εὐγνώμονα is, as usual, largely conceived of in terms of liberality,

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1. E.g. by Wendland (ap. E. Kautzsch, Apokryphen u. Pseud-epigraphen, (ii (1900), 27), Thackeray, Meecham: both words meaning the love of the subjects for their king; Hadas 204 n.: both words meaning the love of the king for his subjects.
2. As Tramontano, commentary, recognised, comparing 290, 257; but it does occasionally have the opposite sense.
3. Accepting Zuntz's emendation, Philol. cii (1958), 243f. But the mss. δὲ ἐξοχοτητήν is not impossible: Aristeas may be meaning that, just as you imitate and make yourself like to God, so your friends, seeing you do this, will imitate and make themselves like to you.
gifts to individuals. Thus if the king does not spend his money on unworthy pursuits, but rather by generosity brings his subjects to goodwill towards himself, he will remain rich (204); he should be generous, not only to his friends, as everyone recognizes, but also to his enemies, in order to win them over (227). The effects of this will be more than mere reputation: he cannot fail in any enterprise, for the $\pi\nu\sigma\tau\omega\delta\iota\varsigma\zeta$ of all men is the best assurance of security (230); again, if he himself shows $\pi\nu\sigma\tau\omega\delta\iota\varsigma\zeta$ to all men and creates friendships, he need fear no enemies (225). Even in war his soul can rest in peace 'in the realisation that, having done no ill to any of his subjects, they will all fight for their benefits, knowing that even if they lose their lives you will take care of their patrimony' (273). It is a curious piece of reasoning, but not so curious as Aristeas' other advice on warfare. The king asks two questions: the first is how to be invincible in war; the reply is that he should put his trust, not so much in numbers and power, as in the Lord God (193). Again the king asks how he can be feared by his enemies; the elder answers that, while making appropriately large military preparations, he should recognize that these are futile for achieving any lasting result, and that God by delay and a mere demonstration of his power puts fear into the hearts of men (194). The two questions are pertinent to a Greek discussion on kingship, but the answers are not such as any
Greek would either give or receive with satisfaction: they are entirely Jewish. Aristeas is deliberately denying any importance to military exploits, and emphasizing a policy of non-aggression and negotiation from strength: just as ordinary men are led by their impulses to food, drink and other pleasures, so kings are led to conquest in search of a great reputation; they should control their impulse (223). It is in keeping with this that he suggests that the king should choose as military commanders those who excel in courage and justice, and who think that saving men's lives is more important than gaining victory by rashness. This attitude goes beyond the usual Greek view that a king should be πολεμικός but not φιλοσοφός. Indeed, though many of the ideas mentioned in this paragraph are connected with Greek views on the φιλοσοφία of the monarch, much of the detail and emphasis seems to owe a great deal to the preoccupations of Hellenistic Judaism.

The king's aim should be justice in every action (189) and thought (212); but this common idea is surprisingly little emphasized. This is perhaps due to the fact that in Egypt the notion of absolute justice required qualification to meet a situation where more than one system of law applied:


'How can one accommodate oneself to all the different races in the kingdom? - By taking an attitude which is fitting to each, with justice as a guide' (267). Justice could only be a guide, and Aristeas lays far greater emphasis on the notion of ἀρετή. The first question the king asks is how to retain his kingship unshaken to the end: 'By imitating the unceasing clemency of God; for by exhibiting magnanimity and punishing the guilty more leniently than they deserve, you will turn them from evil and lead them to repentance' (187). The king's decisions in audiences and judgments will be approved even by the unsuccessful 'if you show yourself fair in discussion to all alike, and abstain from arrogance or arbitrary abuse of power against the guilty'; thus God shows his clemency by granting the requests of the worthy and warning others of their error, rather than striking them in the fulness of his power or according to their strict deserts (191). Again, 'As you wish to avoid evil and partake of all good things, so you should act thus to your subjects, even the guilty, and admonish men of substance (τοὺς καλοὺς καὶ ἄγαμοὺς) with kindness; for God acts with kindness towards all men (207). 

1. Accepting Zuntz's emendations, o.c. (241f.), 241f.
2. So Pelletier; cf. 43 (Andreas and Aristeas), 46 (the Jewish elders), 3 (the High Priest); in LXX Tobit (S) 7,6; 9,6 (Tobit and Tobias); 2 Macc. xv, 12; 4 Macc. iv, 1 (Onias). Others take the meaning to be wholly moral; Meecham o.c. (292ff.), 292ff. discusses possible Jewish parallels.
of as guilty; unlike God, it seems the king may leave the
common people out of account - that is 'the teaching of
wisdom'. The view is not peculiar to Aristeas; it is found in
other works on kingship. Aristeas is usually more liberal:
it is the mark of a φλαξθησαν to consider that man is born
and grows up slowly and amid great sufferings, so that he
should not lightly punish or inflict tortures (208). Aristeas'
notion of εκτείνεται is a wide one; it might be said to include
in passing the Aristotelian concept of equity as a correction
of strict justice, but in fact it shows no sign of having a
specifically legal significance. It is rather synonymous
with παράρρειπα, a word often coupled with it in other authors,
though not used by Aristeas. The origin of εκτείνεται is in
the φλαξθησαν of the ruler on the one hand, and on the other
in a comparison with the infinite mercy of God. Despite
this insistence on humanity and the mitigation of legal
penalties, Aristeas does not make use of the argument that
the king may do this because he is above the law. On the
contrary, though in fact he may do what he likes (cf. 206,
253), the law is supreme. The king must obey the laws,
that acting in justice, he may restore the lives of men (279);
he should do nothing against the law in the knowledge that
God gave the lawgivers their ideas for the preservation of
human life (240).

1. Cf. Philodemus π.φ col.VIII; ps-Aristotle, Π. βασιλευματι
II,3.
2. It is generally true that the Aristotelian distinction is
unnoticed by later writers; cf. below p. 503f.
The canon of rule (διδομένων) is to govern oneself well and not to be led by wealth or fame into arrogant and unseemly desires; 'for you possess all you need, and God is self-sufficient and kindly: you should think the thoughts of a man, and not strive after many things, but only after what is sufficient for exercising rule' (211). Again the highest form of government is 'to be master of yourself and not to be carried away by impulses', especially by such as a king is prone to, the desire for conquest (222). Thus the king must be a man who can rule himself. The king's virtues are all-important: it is which preserves his popularity and honour (272). His glory and pre-eminence are such that all he rules think and talk of his actions: like an actor he must attune his behaviour to his station in life (217); for the man worthy of admiration is he who, having honour and wealth and power, also possesses a soul equal to them all (282). Two of the king's virtues have already been discussed, his and his . The opposite of for Aristeas is (211).¹ This above all must be avoided: when arrogance and implacable anger are in control, the result is dishonour and loss of reputation (269). The king asks how to avoid it: by keeping to equality (σοφία), and remembering on all occasions that he is a man ruling men (262). Anger too must be avoided; for the vice most often attributed in the LXX to kings: cf. Sir.x, 6-18.
The king must remember that, having absolute power, if he gives way to anger he will be the cause of death: 'How useless and lamentable it is if a man deprives many of their lives because he is their master. Since all are his subjects and none opposes him, what reason will there be for anger?' (253).

Other virtues are mentioned. The king should be ἁλαλον for lying is shameful for all men, but especially for kings; having the power to do what they wish, what need have they for lying? Besides God loves truth (206). ἀγάπη had to be mentioned, but it offered a difficult problem which Aristeas solved by a skilful manipulation of Jewish ideas. The virtue is emphasized in three questions: it is the height of beauty, and its motive-force is love (ἀγάπη) (229); its true mark is the realisation that God works in all things and that nothing escapes him - he benefits the whole world, and the king should imitate him (210); the height of glory is to honour God, not with gifts and sacrifices, but with purity of soul and holy thoughts, since all things are fashioned and governed in accordance with his will (234).

The king should avoid ἀθυμία and pleasures, always remembering that he rules a great kingdom and many peoples, and that he should not apply his mind to anything but forethought and care for his subjects (245). The daily life of the king is discussed in three successive questions. He should spend

2. The virtue is often attributed to Philadelphus: 24, 37, 42, 215, 233, 255, 261.
most of his time in the reading and study of the records of
tours of inspection such as are written for the rulers of
kingdoms for the improvement and preservation of men (283)¹.
For relaxation and leisure he may watch theatrical displays if
they be restrained, and view scenes taken from life and enacted
with dignity and decency: for there is some edification even
in these amusements (284). His symposia should be conducted
on the model of the present one, in receiving learned men
capable of advice useful for kingship and for the life of his
subjects (286). Two other questions concern his relations
with his wife (250) and the usefulness of relatives (241).
The answers may not perhaps be relevant to kingship, and it
is tempting to dismiss these as mere space-fillers. But that
such advice did find its way into works on kingship is suggested
by a curious and partly corrupt passage in Dio of Prusa's third
oration (119-22).

The king should be ἐπιγνωστός, for all knowledge is useful,
because it enables him with God's help in any situation to
select something he has heard and apply it to the present
crisis (239). ἐπιτροπὴ is important; it consists in doing
everything well with reflection, taking into account in a dis­
cussion the disadvantages according to the opposite opinion
(255)². The king has need of helpers: the most essential

¹. This should not be compared with Plut. Mor. 189d; that is
about reading books of philosophy, not official records - a
very different and much less practical matter.
². This appears to be the meaning, rather than taking into
account the disadvantages of the opposite course of action.
But the Greek is difficult
qualification for ruling is that he himself should honour justice and show incorruptibility and sobriety (most of his life), and that he should make friends of those who do the same (209). His counsellors should be men with practical experience and unshakeable goodwill towards himself, and such as share his principles of conduct: God will help him choose (264). He should trust those who frequent him through goodwill, not in fear or covetousness, referring everything to their own profit. The first is a sign of love, the second of disaffection and opportunism; and the man who seeks his own profit is a born traitor (270). Such men can be recognized by their servile behaviour around the court at receptions and in council; they go beyond what is right in compliments and other matters of deportment (246). He should appoint governors who hate evil and who practise justice, following his principles in order to obtain for themselves a good reputation for ever (280); the criteria on which military commanders are to be chosen have already been mentioned. But in the last resort responsibility rests on the king; he can only be free from error by always acting with gravity and deliberation and not believing slanders, but himself being a judge of accusations and giving satisfaction with discernment to petitions submitted to him (252). And he should exercise a careful supervision

1. Above, p. 417. According to 125 the king's advisers should be δικαιος , ἀσεβεὶς and endowed with παραφυσικῇ.
2. Earlier (166ff.) informers have been compared to weasels, and the king encouraged to destroy them.
over his subordinates, lest they injure his subjects (271).

Two answers concern a particular problem which has often worried the supporters of kingship, the question of hereditary succession. The king asks how he should best keep his possessions intact and hand them on to his descendants. The answer is, by praying to God for good projects and by exhorting his children not to be overcome by glory and riches, for these are the favours of God - it is not to their own efforts that they owe their pre-eminence over all other men (196). More directly, the king asks which is best for the common people, that they should be ruled by a king risen from a private station, or by a king born of kings. The elder avoids this false dichotomy

'He who is best by nature; for kings born of kings can be cruel and harsh to their subjects, but much worse are some of those of private station who have experienced misfortune and known poverty, and when they ruled nations have turned out to be harsher than an impious tyrant. But, as I said, a character which is good and has enjoyed the benefit of education is able to exercise rule, even as you are a great king, not so much by reason of the glory and wealth of your empire as because you have excelled all men in clemency and love of mankind, God having granted you these gifts (288).'

Ultimately for Aristeas kingship exists; it is not an institution which can be questioned. He is not interested in theoretical discussion about forms of government. If we ask the question, what is the justification for the existence of kingship, Aristeas' answer is given indirectly. First, it is God who apportions honour to all and great wealth to kings: no-one can be king by his own wish; though all desire to share
in this glory, they cannot, for it is a gift from God (224; cf. 19, 37, 196, 201, 219, 244, 269). Though parallels can be found in Greek writings for such a view, the emphasis laid on it seems Jewish\(^1\). In contrast, the usual Greek justification, in terms of the king's pre-eminence in virtue, is not directly mentioned; it emerges only in the importance still given by Aristeas to the king's virtues\(^2\), and in the various statements that Philadelphus is worthy of his trust (cf. 290, 219). A third justification may be detected in the assent of the ruled. The bond of goodwill which unites the king and his subjects makes his position secure and acceptable; as long as his subjects are willing subjects there can be no question whether a king ought to be king.

Two aspects are of particular interest. Firstly, the king's relation to the divine. King worship is emphatically excluded; the king is a man, and must remember it (262; cf. 137). His title to rule is not based on any descent from a divine ancestor or justified by hereditary succession; it is a gift of God to him personally, and if God chooses to renew the gift in each generation that is His will. So the kings of Israel were each individually chosen of God, the Lord's anointed; if Aristeas does not apply the full conception to Philadelphus, it is because the expression of God's will

1. Cf. e.g. 1 Chron. xxix, 12; Prov. viii, 15; Sap. vi, 3; Sir. x, 4; Dan. iv, 17; Esther (LXX) viii, 12q.
in the anointing by the High Priest is absent—besides such language would be inappropriate applied to a heathen ruler. The king may pray to God for his desires; and expect the help of God if his plans are approved. Above all he must imitate God, especially in His infinite mercy and His benefactions to the human race. In all this there is little sign of the special relationship postulated in varying forms by many Greek writers; the king's position is no more privileged than that of his subjects. They too must pray and strive to imitate God; they too will find their prayers answered if God approves their design; they too have their station in life fixed by God's will. If certain ideas and certain phrases find an echo in Greek works on kingship, the conception as a whole is Jewish.

Secondly it is clear that for Aristeas the problem is not theoretical but practical. Justification through works is the theme—how to be a good king. And the answer is given from the point of view of the subject who is a member of a minority group. For all the trappings of Greek kingship, the practical nature of Aristeas' preoccupations is clear: few works on kingship will have concentrated so much and offered such detailed advice on how government should affect

3. \(\text{ἐν καὶ ἀριστοκρατία} : 188, 192, 207, 208, 211, 254; \text{ἐν ἀριστοκρατία} : 190, 205, 210, 259, 281. \text{cf. ἐν ἀριστοκρατία} : 194; \text{ἐν ἀριστοκρατία} : 209. \text{See further the index of R. Marcus, 'Divine Names and Attributes in Hellenistic Jewish Literature; \text{Proc. Am. Ac. Jew. Res. iii (1932), 43-120.}
the governed. Aristeas is not, of course, interested in reform: an ordinary subject might find it difficult to conceive how the system should be changed, and such an attitude would be both impractical and impolitic. Yet, given the system, it might be properly and humanely conducted.

When attention is paid to all the relevant statements of Aristeas, a doctrine of kingship does emerge. But it is not expressed in any particular order either of logic or literary taste. Further the doctrine is not entirely Greek in inspiration; it is strongly influenced by Jewish ideas, and by the historical situation of Alexandrian Judaism, both in the selection and emphasis of topics, and in their detailed treatment. This influence goes far deeper than has been suspected; some of its importance has emerged from the preceding discussion, but the existence of genuine traditions of Jewish kingship of different dates, and the possible ambiguities inherent in the use of a Greek conceptual framework by an author brought up on the literature of Alexandrian Judaism, raise questions which have only been touched on. Aristeas' language is not that of a Greek, but of a Greek-speaking Jew; and however hard he may have tried to come to terms with the Greek tradition, his own background will have coloured his use

1. For instance, one question not yet cited: buildings will last if they are beautiful, and if the workmen are treated properly and not forced to work without pay (258). Or is this a reminiscence, either of Physcon's building activities, or of Exodus c.i and v?

2. With the above arrangement, cf. Tramontano's totally different classification 'in logical order', p.164.
of the abstract terms of Hellenistic kingship. Further it is clear that many of the sentiments expressed by Aristeas can be paralleled both in Greek and in contemporary Jewish sources\textsuperscript{1}. The proper solution of these questions involves an investigation into the whole political vocabulary of contemporary Judaism, and especially of that used in the Septuagint. The problem is similar to that of charting the effect of Roman political institutions on the language of the Vulgate, and the subsequent effect of that language on later institutions themselves\textsuperscript{2}; for translations made in a certain political environment, and accepted as authoritative then and later, necessarily add further complications to the problems which arise in investigating the political tradition of any society possessing both a sacred book and a political tradition.

Yet it would be wrong to underestimate Aristeas' debt to Hellenistic works on kingship; that is immense, and pervasive. There are numerous parallels with other works which draw on the same tradition, and some of these parallels are so close that they might suggest the possibility of a common origin\textsuperscript{3}. This makes Aristeas' work of the greatest importance as a

1. See the many parallels with the LXX and especially with apocryphal literature cited by Tramontano in his commentary on this section. Tramontano neglects the Greek side, and some of his parallels are remote; but they do show how little of Aristeas' thought is foreign to Hellenistic Judaism.


3. See esp. the parallels with Hecataeus, above p. 384.
source for the theory of Hellenistic kingship, for it is the most complete statement of it that we possess; Schubart was fully justified in using Aristeas as a basis for his discussion of the ideals and formulae found in inscriptions and papyri. The general picture is one of fusion, not mechanical juxtaposition; and the question of Aristeas' sources is of less interest than the problems raised by a document illustrating the fusion of two political traditions.

The section must be viewed in its relation to the work as a whole. Aristeas' chief purpose was no doubt to demonstrate the wisdom of the elders and the respect shown to them by Philadelphus and his philosophical experts. Thus the status of the translators would enhance the status of their translation and their faith; in the interests of proselytism Aristeas sought to persuade Greeks as well as Jews. Yet the section is curiously out of proportion with the actual account of the translation if this is its only purpose. Other, political, factors may be suspected.

In 116 Ptolemy 'VIII' (Physcon) died, leaving Egypt to his wife and niece Cleopatra III, in association with whichever of their two sons she might choose. Against her will Cleopatra

1. W. Schubart, Archiv f. Pap. xii (1937) 1ff; Die Antike xii, (1937), 272ff.
was forced by the Alexandrians to prefer the elder, who became Ptolemy IX, nicknamed Lathyrus; her younger son Alexander was sent to govern Cyprus. There followed some years of slowly worsening relations, until in autumn 107, Cleopatra engineered Lathyrus's removal by a false accusation of attempted matricide.

The Alexandrians rioted, and Lathyrus fled; his brother, opportune at Pelusium, took his place. In turn Lathyrus seized Cyprus, and Cleopatra's attempts to dislodge him were only temporarily successful. She executed one of the commanders of the expeditionary force, and large numbers of the troops deserted; only the Jewish supporters of the Oniads could be relied on, for Ananias and Chelkias, the sons of Onias, were Cleopatra's chief generals.

In Judaea, Alexander Jannaeus succeeded his brother Aristobulus as High Priest in 103, and proclaimed himself king; his first act was to attack the coastal city of Ptolemais. Ptolemais appealed to Lathyrus, whose chief aim at this time seems to have been to gather sufficient money and troops for a land attack on Egypt. Lathyrus crossed to the mainland, and a confused campaign followed. Ptolemais, fearing the power of Cleopatra, refused him entry; and he was bribed by Jannaeus to attack his own ally, Zoilus tyrant of Dura - the

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friendship of Jannaeus was obviously of more importance than the doubtful allegiance of the cities of the coast, who were too exposed to the Egyptian fleet. But then Lathyrus discovered that Jannaeus had begun negotiations with Egypt; he defeated Jannaeus in a great battle at Asophon near the Jordan, and Ptolemais was taken after a siege.

Meanwhile Cleopatra had been making preparations which showed that she realised the dangers of the situation in Judaea, and her own lack of popular support in Alexandria. Most of the treasure of Egypt, together with her grandsons and her will, were deposited on Cos, and she moved north with the entire armed forces of Egypt. The land army was commanded by Ananias and Chelkias; the fleet, under herself and Ptolemy Alexander, besieged Ptolemais. Lathyrus, evading the army, made for the now defenceless Egypt; Chelkias died in the pursuit, but Cleopatra managed to send back sufficient troops to chase Lathyrus out of Egypt. Ptolemais was captured, and Lathyrus, after wintering in Gaza, returned to Cyprus.

Alexander Jannaeus came with presents to pay homage to Cleopatra. According to Josephus, some of her advisers suggested that she should accept the presents, but go on to conquer Judaea; she was prevented by Ananias, who warned her that if she attacked her ally, 'you will turn all us Jews into your enemies'. An alliance between Jannaeus and

1. Ant. xiii, 354.
Cleopatra was therefore concluded at Scythopolis, and Cleopatra returned to Egypt, leaving Jannaeus to pursue his aggressive policy.

The struggle between Cleopatra and Lathyrus was unpopular with the Greeks in Egypt. It was the people of Alexandria who had forced Cleopatra to respect the rule of primogeniture. They were tricked into demanding the removal of Lathyrus, and the well-laid plans of the queen suggest that the demonstration was hardly spontaneous. Cyprus welcomed Lathyrus, and gave him full support; the army sent to oust him deserted. Cleopatra's careful plans for safeguarding her family and treasure before the Syrian campaign show little faith in her own popularity. Shortly after the war she died, murdered, it was said, by her second son. The reign of Ptolemy Alexander became progressively more intolerable, until a popular rising, supported by the army, drove him out. He returned at the head of a body of Syrian (probably Jewish) mercenaries, but was again expelled and died trying to cross to Cyprus. Immediately the Alexandrians recalled Lathyrus, and gave him the title Ναὸςεὐστάθιος.

According to Josephus, the period was one when the Jews prospered in both Judaea and Egypt; it is indeed clear that

2. Ant. xiii, 284; for the importance of Jews in Egypt in this period, see V. Tcherikover, Corpus Papyrorum Judaicarum (1957), pp.19ff. Under Physcon they had supported Cleopatra II, and suffered for it: ib. 21ff; RE xxiii, 1726.
Cleopatra's support came largely from the Jewish population in Egypt. The connection is early, for the immediate cause of Lathyrus' expulsion was the fact that he had sent six thousand troops to help Antiochus IX fight John Hyrcanus, against his mother's wishes; Lathyrus perhaps was aiming to free himself from his mother by appealing to the Greeks. From Cyprus onwards Ananias and Chelkias were in command of the army, and their Jewish followers showed their loyalty on that expedition; the warning of Ananias at Scythopolis was not to be taken lightly. This reliance on Jewish support caused trouble under Ptolemy Alexander. There were riots against the Jews; and after his death the Alexandrians wanted to condemn his memory and renumber the years of his reign as those of Lathyrus: according to Porphyry their hatred was roused largely by his use of Jewish troops.

The Jews of Egypt may not have been united. In the mid-second century refugees from trouble in Judaea fled to Egypt, and with the encouragement of the government founded a settlement at Leontopolis, which included a second temple modelled as closely as possible on that at Jerusalem. The artificial

1. Ant.xiii, 278; cf. Otto-Bengtson, o.c.166.
2. Jordanes, Rom. 81: the first recorded riots.
hill, shaped to resemble the citadel at Jerusalem still exists, and was explored by Flinders Petrie\(^1\); the funeral inscriptions from the nearby necropolis have recently been re-edited\(^2\). From this evidence it is clear that the settlement began as a deliberate attempt to replace Jerusalem as the centre of Jewish cult, perhaps as the result of Antiochus Epiphanes' desecration of the Temple; but it is also clear that its culture became as Hellenised as that of the Jews of Alexandria: except for the names and the very occasional Jewish motif, the epitaphs are Greek\(^3\). In this connection it should be remembered that both sides in the struggle with Antiochus were at the start deeply Hellenised; in so far as the quarrel was cultural, it was concerned with whether such Hellenism should enter into the actual religious sphere.

Although Josephus tries to disguise the fact, the temple at Leontopolis flourished and continued to receive official support. The settlement there was at least in part a military colony, and as such was still of importance in the days of Caesar. What is less clear however is how important the temple

\(^1\) The site: W.M. Flinders Petrie, *Hyksos and Israelite Cities* (1906), 19ff; *RE* xii.2 (1925), 2054; xviii.1 (1939), 477.
was for Egyptian Judaism in general. On the one hand there
is the absence of any explicit reference to Leontopolis in
the literature of Alexandrian Judaism; on the other are a
number of historical reasons why the temple should have been of
importance at least for a time. The problem involves the
question, who founded the temple? Josephus in the Jewish War
claims that it was founded by Onias III, the High Priest, who
fled from Antiochus: if that were so, Leontopolis possessed

1. As opposed to indirect allusions (this argument need not
be taken too seriously; cf. §2). Even the LXX variant
at Isaiah xix, 18 (Νοίαι-ναιο, 'city of righteousness', for
'city of destruction') presents difficulties; for if a
direct reference to Leontopolis were intended, why does
the LXX not make use of the much more meaningful Hebrew
variant, 'city of the sun' (i.e. Helieopolis, in which nome
Leontopolis lay)? I suspect the change was made with refer­
ence to Egyptian Jews in general, before the foundation of
Leontopolis; the translation of Isaiah may well be earlier:
cf. I.L. Seeligmann, The Septuagint Version of Isaiah
(1948), 76ff. But it is clear that there was considerable
interest in earlier Jewish settlements, especially that
alleged to have been at Helieopolis: cf. the LXX translation
ii, 188 Jacob was settled at Heliopolis; according to
Artapanus (F.G.H.726 F 2,3) Joseph built two temples, one at
Heliopolis, and the people of Heliopolis knew of a ten year
war involving Moses (F 3, 8; cf. 35: the crossing of the
Red Sea); according to pseudo-Eupolemus (724 F 1,8) Abraham
lived there and taught the Egyptian priests astrology. The
reference in Or. Sib. v, 501ff. may be merely a literary
reminiscence of Isaiah (cf. J. Geffcken, Komposition und
Entstehungszeit der Oracula Sibyllina (1902), 26). More
generally, Sap. Sal. takes most of its historical examples
from the history of the Jews in Egypt (cf. c.x-xii, xvi-xix; for
the relation of pseudo-Hecataeus to Leontopolis, in
general see §2.5.6. cf. the remarks of N. Walter, o.c. (1959),

2. B.J. i, 31ff; vii, 422ff; supported by the Talmudic legend
of its foundation by Onias son of Simon (i.e. the third):
Bab. Talmud, Manahoth 109b; Jer. Talmud, Yoma vi,3. Also by
Theodorus of Mopsuestia, Comm. in Ps. liv (Ad.R.Devreesse,
(contd. over)
at the start a higher claim to orthodoxy, at least as long as Antiochus and Zeus Olympus held Jerusalem; and even later Onias could still claim to be the true High Priest. But in the Antiquities Josephus gives a different story, in which the trouble at Jerusalem begins after the death of Onias III, and Leontopolis is founded by a son of Onias, of the same name, who had been passed over in the succession; thus it was founded for reasons not entirely reputable, and after the re-establishment of the cult at Jerusalem¹. This detailed version is hard to evaluate, for it is a conflation of at least two accounts. One of these is related to 2 Maccabees in some way, but it was clearly contradicted by another on a number of important points; Josephus' usual practice of rewriting to produce a single story means that the non-'Maccabean' version cannot be disentangled with any certainty ².

1. Ant. xii, 387f; xiii, 62ff; xx, 236ff. (cf. xiii, 74ff.?); death of Onias III: xii, 237.
2. The existence of two traditions is shown by the muddle over names in xii, 237ff. (cf. Meyer, o.c. 165, n.2; H.H. Rowley, Studia Orientalia I. Pedersen ... Dicata (1953), 303ff.). On the sources of the Ant. story see Willrich, o.c. (p.434 n4) 83ff; Urkundenfalschung in der hellenistisch-jüdischen Literatur (1924), 27ff. (Jason of Cyrene); B. Niese, Kritik der beiden Makkaberbücher (1900) 105ff. (Jason indirectly); G. Hölscher, Die Quellen des Josephus (Diss. Marburg 1904), 43ff. (in the first instance from Alexander Polyhistor); B. Motzo, Saggi di Storia e Letteratura Guedel-ellenistica. (1924), 180ff.
2 Maccabees itself mentions the death of Onias III, murdered at Daphnae near Antioch about 171-0; like the Antiquities, it tends by this claim to diminish the importance and orthodoxy of Leontopolis. All three accounts are equally suspect, for the first could be called a 'pro-Leontopolis' version, the others 'pro-Jerusalem' or 'anti-Leontopolis'. The complex question has been clarified to some extent in favour of the 'Leontopolis' account by the discovery of a letter from Herodes the dioiketes to an Onias who is clearly a close friend of the Ptolemaic court and a well-established high official. This Onias can only be the founder of Leontopolis. Now the letter is dated to the 21 September 164; but this date conflicts with the detailed story in the Antiquities, according to which Onias the son could not have reached Egypt until 162 at the earliest. An Onias in high favour in 164 either supports the 'Leontopolis' version of its foundation, or at the least makes it likely that the temple was founded before the re-establishment of the full cult at Jerusalem, with the appointment of Alcimus as High Priest in 162.

At the time of its foundation Leontopolis must therefore have been of importance for Alexandrian Judaism; it must have

1. 2 Macc. iv, 34. The question has wider implications: it involves the whole problem of the historicity of 2 Macc. i-x, the identity of the High Priest 'cut off' in Dan. ix, 26 (Jason or Onias?), and perhaps of the Teacher of Righteousness in the Dead Sea Scrolls (but cf. the arguments of G.R.Driver, The Judaean Scrolls (1965), 132ff.).
2. C.P.J. i no.132; cf. Tcherikover's discussion: he suggests retaining the Ant. narrative while rejecting its chronology (so already Meyer, o.c. 156 n.4), which seems unsatisfactory.
done more than just 'awake the curiosity of the Jews of Egypt'.

The Ptolemies supported the temple because they saw the chance of turning a large section of the population away from allegiance, however tenuous, to a Seleucid dominated shrine; they clearly wanted a Jewish centre in Egypt. Moreover both Onias and his sons Ananias and Cheklias held high positions as generals, posts which must surely have made them to some extent the natural leaders and spokesmen for Egyptian Jewry.

It could be argued that during the Hasmonean period, and especially with the resurgence of an aggressive nationalism under Alexander Jannaeus, the possibility of tension inherent in the existence of two temples may have been aggravated. Such speculations could be supported by reference to, for instance, the existence of contrary foundation stories for Leontopolis, or the whole tendency of 2 Maccabees, and in particular the letters prefaced to it, which call with some insistence on Egyptian Jews to celebrate the festival of the purification of the temple at Jerusalem. It is possible that against the

1. Tcherikover o.c. (p.431), 281; the effect of Onias' arrival is little exaggerated in Graetz o.c. (p.434), xx 29f. There seems no evidence that Alexandrian Jews regularly made the pilgrimage to Jerusalem in this period; despite valiant attempts to claim that Aristeas shows first hand knowledge, his idealized account of Judaea and Jerusalem tends to suggest that he had never been there, and had no reason to think his readers would have been there either.

2. 2 Macc. 1-ii, 18; on the pro-Jerusalem bias in both 2 Macc. and its source Jason of Cyrene, cf. A. Momigliano, Prime Linee di Storia della Tradizione Maccabaica (1930), 67ff.; Bickermann, Der Gott der Makkabäer (1937), 32ff; Abel o.c. (p.437), xxxv.
Oniads may have stood a faction which once again looked to Jerusalem for its inspiration, and which rejected the Hellenised Judaism of Egypt in favour of a purer orthodoxy.

There is in fact little sign that such a split was of importance. Even the fervent nationalism of 3 Maccabees sees Judaea and Egypt standing together: an expedition against the one is matched by a persecution in the other. Indeed the actual situation was such that any opposition between Leontopolis and Jerusalem was by no means as clear as some strict Jews might have liked to pretend. In Judaea itself there had been a serious division, since the days of John Hyrcanus, between the Pharisees and the Hasmoneans, which led later in the reign of Alexander Jannaeus to civil war and massacres. By the time of Jannaeus the Hasmonean court had become as Hellenised as any other, and even to some extent relied on Greek mercenaries; the actual High Priesthood at Jerusalem is not likely therefore to have had a strong appeal for the orthodox. When the Pharisees alleged that the line of John Hyrcanus was illegitimate, the gaze of the orthodox might well have turned to the proper claims of the Oniads. In fact doctrinal disputes seem to have been subordinate to political considerations. At no time did Jerusalem offer more than the mildest rebukes to Leontopolis, and the legitimacy of that temple is recognised in Jewish

1. Ant. xiii, 372-83; Zeitlin, o.c. (p.434), 153ff, 317ff; Tcherikover o.c. (p.435), 251ff.
2. Cf. n. 1 p. 403.
sources\textsuperscript{1}. In Egypt, Onias' support of Cleopatra II against Ptolemy Physcon had implied general Jewish support, and had resulted in a general persecution of all Jews, not just 'Oniads'.\textsuperscript{2} Lathyrus supported Antiochus against John Hyrcanus: it seems to have been Cleopatra and her 'Oniad' supporters who disliked it. When Ananias had operated on behalf of Alexander Jannaeus, and could claim to have brought about the alliance between Judaea and Egypt, there could be no hope of distinguishing the supporters of Leontopolis from the supporters of Jerusalem. It was perhaps this to which Ananias referred, when he pointed out the danger of attacking Jannaeus: Cleopatra's power rested on the Egyptian Jews, and the unity of these Jews rested on the presence of good relations with Jerusalem. In other words, whatever the attitude of 'Onias', and whatever the views of extremists, the 'sons of Onias' followed a deliberately conciliatory policy towards Jerusalem, either because they saw themselves as Jews not schismatics, or because this was the best way of uniting Egyptian Judaism under their leadership.

Aristeas was not, of course, so incompetent as to leave in his text clear proof that he wrote with these events as

\textsuperscript{1} Mishnah, Menahoth 12, 10; B.Talmud, Men. 109a; 'Abodah Zarah, 52b; Megillah, 10a. Kahrstedt o.c. (p.434) tried, but could find little reflection of serious dispute in contemporary sources.

\textsuperscript{2} Cf. n.2 p.433
a background. But if a date of around 100 is found acceptable for other reasons, many of the peculiarities of the work can be explained by reference to the contemporary scene.\(^1\)

The situation envisaged by Aristeas is that of his own day. Judaea is a free and prosperous state, ruled by a High Priest; embassies pass to and from Egypt bearing letters in which the two rulers address each other as equals. Jews are welcomed at court and in the army: as Philadelphus writes to the High Priest, 'Those of your people who were in the prime of life I have drafted into my army, and those who were fit to be attached to my person and worthy of the confidence of the court, I have established in official positions' (37). In contrast with 3 Maccabees, Aristeas can be seen as a moderate who accepted Greek culture.\(^2\) On the question of relations between Leontopolis and Jerusalem he is suitably cautious. Some trace of the Leontopolis attitude might be detected in the Μηδησα χάρισμα: he perhaps chose to rewrite Jewish history in contrast to pseudo-Hecataeus, using 'Egyptian' sources rather than Jewish in order to emphasise the long history of Judaism in Egypt; for the primary use of these 'sources' must have been to accentuate the continuity between the Pharaonic and the Ptolemaic community.\(^3\) In the 'letter' the whole frame-

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1. See esp. Motzo, o.c. (p. 390) 71ff.; Tramontano 65ff, though somewhat hypercritical, is right to see that none of these considerations is conclusive for the date.
2. Aristeas' own attitude is reflected esp. in 121-7.
3. Cf. ὃ. 436 ν.'
work of the story is a justification of the Septuagint translation, which was the bible of Leontopolis and Egyptian Jewry\(^1\). More extreme Jews found the very notion of translation suspect\(^2\).

On the other hand Aristeas is at pains to make the translation an official production of Jerusalem, and to exalt Judaea in every way. At first sight this seems a contradiction; but in the light of the policy of rapprochement followed by Jannaeus and the sons of Onias, it is easily explicable. Indeed this very policy may explain how the story of the translation came to be written now rather than earlier; especially in such a period would it be possible to combine the two elements, of translation and of loyalty to Jerusalem - an earlier generation might have found it more difficult. In a sense then Aristeas was defending Leontopolis, by portraying Egyptian Jewry as loyal to Jerusalem: the schism did not exist.\(^3\)

The questions and answers take up a third of the work; yet that too finds a justification in contemporary history. The banquets mirrored on the ideal plane the present political situation. Jews were now the advisers of the Ptolemies; their

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1. I do not find the notion that Leontopolis used a different translation convincing. Nor can Aristeas be making propaganda for a recent revision: on the theory of P.E. Kahle, *The Cairo Geniza*\(^2\) (1959), 209ff, see Zuntz o.c. (p. 39\(^\ddagger\) ), 11\(^\ddagger\) f., 123; S. Jellicoe, *J.T.S.* xii (1961), 261ff; D.W. Gooding, *Vetus Testamentum*, xiii (1963), 357ff.


3. This might go some way towards explaining the general silence of other writers on Leontopolis; cf. also the remarks of Feldman o.c. (p. 43\(^\ddagger\) ), 231, who points out that most of the literature which could have mentioned Leontopolis has not survived.
beneficial influence and deep learning in the problems of government must be displayed in literature as well as life. Ananias and Cheikias were as good as any Greek philosophical adviser. The age was one when it was appropriate to demonstrate that Judaism was compatible with Ptolemaic kingship, and to declare the loyalty of Jews to the regime. The reconciliation of Hellenism and Judaism was not to be confined to the realms of history and philosophy; common action on the political scene required a theoretical basis in common ideals. And in so far as the prominence of Jews was controversial, that must provoke Aristeas to deal with the problem at greater length.

Posidonius describes Ptolemy Alexander; no Jew, however biased in his favour, could feel entirely comfortable with that disgusting and ridiculous obesity in the role of the ideal king. A motive similar to that which lies behind every serious attempt to write a τεχνητον συνολον can be detected - the desire to show kingship in its ideal form, and so provide a model for the present government to follow. Again this seems to suggest a period when Jews were in high favour: it is difficult to see a Jew bothering to write such a long and detailed account of the proper way to rule, unless there were some chance that his ideas might have an effect on the present

2. F.G.H. 87 F 26; he would have needed Aristeas' advice on the proper behaviour at symposia.
Certain details in the section perhaps become a little less odd. The question about how to get on with one's wife and its answer (250) might recall the struggles of Physcon and Cleopatra II; the general condemnation of women would be appropriate after the death of Cleopatra III. The previous question is on patriotism, and evokes a condemnation of exile curious in a work by an Egyptian Jew: that perhaps glances at Ptolemy Lathyrrus, the exile on Cyprus, Physcon, by his own example and by his will, had set aside the principle of primogeniture; Cleopatra too had disregarded it. Yet the kingship had not left the royal house: it had merely gone to the best member, υπερασπιστής τοῦ βασιλέως (288). This is not to suggest that such passages were deliberately intended to have a contemporary reference; Aristeas was too cautious, and too anxious to avoid anachronisms, to make such a slip. But no writer, especially on a political subject, can wholly escape his environment - it will have an almost unconscious effect on his choice of topics and his general treatment. To contemporaries the work will seem to possess on certain points a resonance which will render it strangely modern. A forgery reflects the interests of the present so much better than a genuine antique, and is

1. Motzo, o.c. (p.390), 218.
2. Cf. the warning of Momigliano, o.c. (p.39), 170.
correspondingly, and deservedly, more popular.

The immediate political relevance of Aristeas' work should not be allowed to obscure its general affiliation to other Jewish literature of the same period. The importance of Jews and their progressive assimilation into the political and economic life of Ptolemaic Egypt combined with the deep Hellenisation of Alexandrian Judaism to produce a new type of literature. There arose a genuine desire to contribute to contemporary Greek thought, to demonstrate that Jewish culture had come of age. When the 'elder' Philo wrote a historical epic on Jerusalem, or Ezekiel tragedies on biblical themes, their works were not apologetic. It is clear that the readers of these books were in the first instance Alexandrian Jews, who felt the need for a literature acceptable to their educated tastes.

Aristeas' work, though it shows clear traces of the desire to proselytise, owes much to this general literary background. In his description of the process of translation he has tried (and failed) to appropriate the techniques of Alexandrian textual criticism; more successful is the sample he gives of allegorical interpretation. The ideal description of Jerusalem and Judaea looks both to the Torah and to the Greek tradition of philosophical ethnography. These were the

1. V. Tcherikover, Eos xlvi. 3 (1956), 169ff.
2. Zuntz, o.c. (p. 14), 120ff.
trappings necessary if Aristeas was to find a hearing even among his own people. Similarly the banquet scene shows to some extent this desire to master Hellenistic culture, to offer a serious contribution to current political thought, both Jewish and Greek.

Tradition and originality, the combination of political cliché with political insight, come together: Aristeas set out to give, within a somewhat incongruous framework, a view of kingship based on that adopted by the Ptolemies, which would yet be acceptable to Egyptian Judaism. The result illustrates peculiarly well how widespread the influence of doctrines of kingship was, and also their vitality and adaptability - the way they might be transposed into different literary forms and different traditions of thought, and still offer a valid framework in which to discuss the living problems of government.
c.3. PHILODEMUS 'ON THE GOOD KING ACCORDING TO HOMER' AND THE ROMAN TRADITION

In 1844 Italy was in travail; even the subjects of Ferdinand II Bourbon, King of the Two Sicilies, knew it. The previous year had seen the failure of the 'Moto di Savigno', an attempt at a combined rising in Romagna and Calabria. In March occurred the massacres of Cosenza; on 12th June the Bandiera brothers set sail for the kingdom, only to be arrested on arrival and executed. The martyrdom inflamed liberals throughout Europe.

It was appropriate that the scholars of the Reale Officina de' Papiri Ercolanesi, engaged in the task of publishing the papyri found in 1752 in the Villa dei Pisoni at Herculaneum, should have reached a work of Philodemus.

The following works are here cited by author's name and page number only: F. Bücheler, 'Philodem über das homerische Fürstenideal,' Rh. Mus. xlili (1887), 198 ff.; S. Cirillo, Volumina Herculaneensia viii (1844); A. Olivieri, Philodemi πόλις τοῦ Ἡμεροκοιμίσθων Ἰλίου (Teubner, 1909); M. Paolucci, 'Studi sul epicureismo romano I: Note al πόλις τοῦ Ἡμεροκοιμίσθων Ἰλίου καὶ Ἐκλείσιον di Philodemo,' Rend. Ist. Lomb. lxxviii (1955), 483 ff.; R. Philippson, review of Olivieri, B. Ph. W. xxx (1910), 740 ff.

1. For a succinct statement of the problems connected with the ownership of the villa, and the relations between Piso and Philodemus, see R.G. Nisbet's edition of Cicero's in Pisonem (1961), App. 3 and 4. For the theory of B. Hemmerdinger, REG lxxii (1959), 106, see my note ib. lxxvii (1964), 568; his reply (lxxviii (1965), 327 ff.) has not convinced me: the alleged ex libris Ἀλέκτρου Οὐρακλού is clearly the name of the bookseller or owner of the scriptorium, by analogy with P.Herc. 1426 (quoted in Hemmerdinger's first article) and P. Primi i9 (cf. E.J. Bickermann, J.Bibl.Lit. lxiii (1944), 340 n. 8).
'Hinc fit, Rex Augustissime, ut tomos hic quasi suo iure se Tibi tradat, cui divinitus fuit mandata Tuorum populorum cura, atque incoluitas (quae adeo acriter sancteque tueris) hoc praecipue tempore, quo vana quaedam, falsa, et perniciosissima philosophandi ratio caecas hominum mentes, animosque invasit.'

'Philosophandi ratio' might seem an understatement. And a Freudian error was involved: the title was quite obviously περὶ τοῦ καθ' Ὀμηροῦ λόγου λαοῦ. But to the loyal scholars of the Officina it was the people, not the King, who needed advice.

The original edition of Cirillo is still of value. It contains engravings of most of the work, which are copies of the transcriptions made by the unroller; these engravings, though at the second remove from the original, are the closest it is possible to get to the papyrus without visiting Naples. Cirillo's notes and synopsis are of the greater importance,

2. D. Comparetti, La Villa Ercolanese dei Pisoni (1883), 73 castigates Cirillo for accepting an impossible reading; in his favour it can be said that the scribe achieved symmetry elsewhere on the colophon; Diels' restoration sacrifices this.
because his mistake over the title gave him no incentive
to attempt by emendation and interpretation to force every
element of the work into the normal pattern of Hellenistic
kingship writing.1 After Diels restored the correct title
in 1878,2 this temptation was not resisted. In 1887 Bücheler,
working from Cirillo's edition, published an important article;
and in 1909 Olivieri produced what is now the standard text.
To this text the efforts of subsequent scholars have added
little.3

Bücheler's article and Olivieri's introduction contain
significant remarks on the nature and general contents of the
work; since then two further articles have been of importance.
Philippson, in an outstanding review of Olivieri, was the
first to bring the book into relationship with Epicureanism and
with Philodemus' other writings; recently Paolucci has offered
a detailed and subtle interpretation from the same viewpoint,
in an attempt to illustrate the intellectual climate of
Epicureanism in the late Republic.

My reason for offering a detailed discussion of the work
is that Olivieri's account has never received proper criticism.

1. Olivieri, despite 'his 'commentaria silentio praeterire
licet', took much from Cirillo's synopsis.
2. Herm. xiii (1878), 3.
3. Supplements, Philippson 765 ff. and D.A. van Krevelen,
Mnem. x (1942), 226 f., are too uncertain to be of use.
More recently A.M. Marchetti, Studi classici e orientali
xv (1966), 221 ff. has looked at the papyrus, and substantially
confirmed my judgment on Olivieri's text by being able to
produce only very minor corrections (Col. XII, 13-14; Col.XIV,
30; Col. XVII, 32; she also sheds doubt on his reading at
F9, 10; Col. VIII, 16). None of these changes affect the
sense of the passages concerned.
A study of the papyrus and the documents connected with it, in the summer of 1963, suggested that his text is in general sound, so far as one who is not a papyrologist can judge - the script itself is clear enough. Such passages as aroused doubt did indeed reveal minor errors; but a new edition of the text must await an expert, and perhaps the discovery of new techniques of reading the papyri. Olivieri's carelessness with the other documents, and his apparent inability to read nineteenth century copperplate, are no reflection on his skill as a papyrologist; but they do require his preface to be largely rewritten. More important are his conception of the nature of the work and his commentary on it; certain mistakes in method have led him to conclusions which are often wrong.

In a text so fragmentary it is only too easy to impose on the author one's own views of the nature of his work, to end with an interpretation based on the lacuna rather than the fragment. I do not imagine that I have wholly escaped this fault; but I have tried at least to make it easy for others to correct me, to see exactly what my conclusions are based on and whether they can accept even the basis. This study therefore falls into three sections: the first embodies a number of corrections and elucidations of Olivieri's account of the papyrus; the second is a synopsis or 'reconstruction' of the surviving portions of the text; the third is an attempt to place the work in its literary and historical setting.
I. THE PAPYRUS

The problems connected with the Herculaneum papyri are peculiar to them. They are extremely brittle; in general ink and surface are a uniform black. Only the shine of the ink (which easily vanishes) as the papyrus is tilted back and forth in different lights, or (where the surface has gone) the marks in the underlying fibres, are visible. Where the evidence has disappeared, reliance must be placed on the copy made about the time of unrolling, usually by a man with little Greek whose chief skill was draughtsmanship.

The method of payment instituted by John Hayter, chaplain to the Prince of Wales, in 1802 is described by him thus: 'Each of these men received from me a sum of monthly salary, quite inadequate to their respective support. The compensation for this deficiency depended upon their own exertions.' This method, apparently continued after Hayter's departure with the Bourbons in 1806, required close supervision; it led later to some carelessness and even deliberate falsification.

The identity of the draughtsman and the date of his work are

3. W. Croenert, Rh. Mus. liii (1898), 585 ff.; F. Casanova was the worst culprit, C. Malesci only careless.
therefore important.

Papyrus Herculanensis 1507 was unrolled in 1808 by L. Corazza, and drawings of it were made by the same man before 1811.¹ He is responsible for all twenty-five columns and the colophon, and fifteen of the fragments in Olivieri's edition; F 6 and F 21 are due to C. Malesci in 1845 and 1852.² A note on the drawing of the colophon, 'finito ad incidere 8bre 1812,'³ shows that the engravings were made from the drawings almost immediately - and thirty-two years before publication. The engravings are the work of F. Casanova; his later practices suggest that more than the usual care should be taken before accepting them as completely accurate representations of the drawings. But Corazza is above suspicion, and would seem from this papyrus to have been extremely conscientious; moreover it is probable that Hayter's exemplary supervision continued for sometime under the new head of the Officina,

¹. D. Bassi, Riv. Fil. xli (1913), 460. The folder of the disegni reads, 'Svolto nel 1808 da Luigi Corazza, disegnato nel, da Luigi Corazza (prima del 1811) Carlo Malesci (1845.1852) ...', unsigned, dated 'Maggio 1911'. This is obviously a product of the same researches by Bassi, described l.c. 432 ff., 197. The general catalogue of 1853 records none of this.

². Olivieri p. v is a series of misunderstandings. F 6 is signed 'C. Malesci', and certified with the date, 'Visto per Giugno 1845 L. Pasca'; F 21 is signed 'Carlo Malesci dis: Pap° N° 1507', with the date in the same hand, 'Per Aprile 1852'; elsewhere, in a different hand, it has 'VB Genovesi' - not his initials, but the usual 'visto' or 'VB (visto bene)' with a signature, certifying that it has been checked. Bassi, l.c. 460, queries these dates, presumably because of Olivieri's mistakes.

³. Not 1819 (Olivieri).
Rossini.\(^1\)

The colophon offers a stichometric indication which should make it possible to determine the original length of the work. The papyrus reads today \(\text{AP\[\text{\(\Box\)}}\), with room for two letters before a small tear.\(^2\) It has deteriorated, for originally the number \(\text{XX}\) was also visible; it also seems to have suffered shrinkage, for Corazza's \textit{disegno} shows \(\text{AP[\ldots]}\).\(^3\) \(\text{XX}\), with a free space equivalent to one letter before the same tear.\(^3\) Nothing is therefore lost after \(\text{XX}\), and Bassi's \(\text{AP[\text{\(\Box\)}}\text{XX}\text{XX]}\) can be ruled out.\(^4\) To Olivieri's solution, \(\text{AP[\text{\(\Box\)}}\text{XX}\text{XX]}\), Bassi made two objections: that only the first one or two numeral letters in these stichometric indications have the line over them, and that a space should anyway be expected after \(\text{AP[\text{\(\Box\)}}\), to conform with the scribe's practice elsewhere on the page.\(^5\) These objections seem valid; I would add that the present traces, even allowing for shrinkage, fit

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1. An unjust picture of Rossini, who was also in charge before Hayter's arrival, is drawn in Hayter's letter; Rossini justifiably opposed plans to remove the papyri to England. The materials for a history of the Officina are available in Naples and Oxford; it would be a fascinating study.

2. The circle of the \(\text{\(\Box\)}}\) is clearly visible in the fibres underlying the surface, which has now disappeared; there appears to be a transverse stroke immediately after it, which might belong to the first \(\text{X}\).

3. The engraving is misleading here.

4. \textit{Riv. Fil.} xlvii (1909), 349 f.; the tear is in any case still clean, and too small for a figure to have got lost in it without being visible, or causing a messier deterioration. Bassi believed that the \(\sigma\tau(\text{\(\chi\)\)}}\) in the Herculanean papyri was the actual line, not an arbitrary measure based on the hexameter.

5. He runs together only \(\text{\(\kappa\alpha\theta\omicron\mu\nu\}}\text{[\(\eta\;\rho\]\)}}\).
a short figure best. The indication should therefore read \( \text{AP} \) \( \text{XX} \);\(^1\) this is confirmed by the stichometric indication in Col. \text{XX}, roughly a hundred stichoi before the end, which must be \( \text{T} (= 19) \); applied to the actual line and column length, this gives the original length of the roll as 103-104 columns.\(^2\) The answer in itself provides the motive for the higher estimates of Olivieri and Bassi, for it is the shortest of all the finds whose original length is known.\(^3\) But it will become apparent that the work is of a very different nature from the others in the library, which are serious philosophical treatises; it cannot therefore be compared with them.

Olivieri's view that, of the original, twenty-five columns and twenty-one fragments remain, is curious. Cirillo says clearly: 'In primis autem monendum totum hoc opus absolutum fuisset \text{columnis} \text{XLV.} quarum omnino interciderunt I, 6, 8, 13, 15, 16, 17, 20 et 45.\(^4\) ceterarum vero a secunda ad decimam nonam

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1. I give the numeral without brackets as Corazza saw it plain, and so apparently did Olivieri; though Bassi, at the same date, saw only the line above the figures.

2. See K. Ohly, Archiv f. Pap. vii (1924), 212 ff.; I overlooked this article when I made my original calculation in J.R.S. lv (1965), 163. My figures there were lower than those of Ohly because I took slightly different factors into account; but the stichometric indication in Col. \text{XX} makes it clear that Ohly is right. For the method of calculating, see in general his Stichometrische Untersuchungen (1928), c. I.


4. Cirillo has inadvertently omitted 10: see p. 457\(\text{n} \).1.
That is, the papyrus was unrolled as a continuous strip, in which could be detected the traces of forty-five columns, each attached to the previous one. This is clear from the original numbering of Corazza's drawings, from Col. 1 to Col. 45; where the traces were so slight as not to be worth copying, he was careful to leave a gap in his numbering. In the sense of the word 'fragment' in use in the Officina from the start, and universal today, there is only one fragment. This is F 21 in Olivieri, not noticed in Corazza's numeration, and owing its disegno to Malesci. This fragment is a thick wodge of papyrus completely detached from its surroundings. It presumably represents the contents of a lacuna in three or four of the surrounding columns; to which column its visible letters refer cannot be known. But Corazza's numbering shows

1. Cirillo p. iv; my italics.
2. Thus there is no disegno for Cols. 13, 16, 17, 20 in his numeration; that for Col. 6 was done later by Malesci.
3. D. Comparetti, Riv. Fil. iiii (1875), 453 n.: '.... nel linguaggio dell'officina, diconsi colonne quelle che, quand'anche frammentose, hanno un posto sicuramente definito rimpetto a ciò che le precede e le segue. Frammenti invece diconsi quei brani, i quali, quand'anche abbraccino tutta una pagina, non hanno alcun sicuro rapporto di continuità fra loro, e il cui posto nell' originale è ignoto.'.
4. See commentary ad loc.
that it does not represent a column lost between Olivieri's F 20 and Col. I.

The reason for the original division between columns and fragments is obvious. The first twenty columns were very badly damaged; five were not worth a disegno, a further four not worth engraving.¹ Of the remaining eleven, eight were so small that they could be fitted two to a plate for engraving, provided their order was ignored. All order for the first twenty columns was therefore abandoned, and they were designated fragments; the remaining columns were renumbered. It was a procedure both economical and in conformity with the standards of the age, one which could do little harm if a warning was given, as Cirillo did. But to retain the arbitrary distinction between fragments and columns after the reasons for it had ceased, and yet rearrange the 'fragments' in their correct order, and then to talk about them as if they were true fragments, all without warning, could hardly fail to mislead. This incomprehensible muddle was indeed my main reason for visiting Naples.²

¹ See p.⁴⁶⁸ the disegni of Corazzati: Cols. I, 8, 10, 15, 45 have the statement, 'Inutile deciso da Monsignor Rossini'; and Col. 45 has also 'Inutili framenti 5 cioè il framto segnato Col. I, Col. 8, Col. 10, Col. 15 e Col. 45.'
² Bücheler 207 was misled even by Cirillo, and tried to connect F 9 with Col. XXI. It is with this protest that I retain Olivieri's numbering; it would look as if he followed the same practice in his edition of the.
The statement that we possess the last forty-five columns and one fragment of the work is substantially correct; but two qualifications are necessary. In the course of unrolling, two or more layers of the papyrus might stick together; in an extreme case this could lead to the complete disappearance of a column, and its replacement by another later in the papyrus. The difficulty of sorting out these sovrapposti is notorious, since the surface is everywhere cracked and peeling.\(^1\) Olivieri noted both sovrapposti and sottoposti where they could be discerned; it can only be said that there is no certain case of the loss of a whole column. A close examination of the papyrus, taking into account the circumference of the roll at each point and the extent of the lacunae in the surrounding columns, would establish more.

There is a more serious doubt. The attempt to unroll the papyri in one piece was soon abandoned as in general impracticable;\(^2\) it was therefore usual to cut the text at convenient points. In the course of this cutting and reattachment to the machine for unrolling, a certain amount of trimming was practised. It is always possible for a column to have disappeared at one of these

\(^1\) cf. the remarks of Hayter, o.c. 63 ff.; Traversa, l.c.

\(^2\) The greatest success was by Piaggio himself - pap. 1672, which is 3.34 metres long.
breaks; and at one point in this papyrus it has clearly occurred. To the left of F 7d, opposite lines 23-6, appear the traces of the end of the previous column, which is not F 6.¹

These two factors can alter the picture only slightly, and not at all in the better preserved later columns. It is therefore true to say that we possess extensive traces of slightly under half, the second half of the original. All the columns except perhaps eight² show the bottom margin, and even these have their relative position fixed by the adjacent columns. There seems no reason to doubt that the original height of the columns was about forty lines, despite the fact that a top margin is nowhere visible;³ with this assumption, the extent of most lacunae can be approximately ascertained. Since I am not concerned to fill the lacunae, but rather to comment on what is extant, I leave this task to a future editor; it is sufficient to note that in the later part few lacunae are more than ten lines long.⁴

1. Viz. Ἀρτο, ἇτο, ἄκη, ἄκι. Breaks occur after F 6, 10, 12, 16, 20, Cols. IV, VIII, XII, XVII, XXI.
2. F 6, 8, 10, 13, 15, 16, 20, 21.
3. Bassi (I.c., p.454) thought he could detect the top margins in two or three cases; I could not. If he is right, there were thirty-eight to forty lines to a column.
4. Cols. XXII ff. are broken in the middle; at least one line is missing.
II. THE GOOD KING ACCORDING TO HOMER

Despite the fact that the papyrus is one of the better preserved of the finds, the task of supplementing its text with any certainty would have been difficult, if it had not been for the nature of the work. This offered a number of fruitful approaches, through the identification of Homeric quotations, and analogies with other authors making a similar use of Homer as a source for moral examples or writing on kingship in general. Bucheler and Olivieri were able to achieve good results, but the method could be carried too far.

At the foot of his text Olivieri published a subsidium interpretationis, in which he listed parallels from other authors, and in many places made suggestions as to what Philodemus was discussing. In citing parallels from works on kingship, he used G. Barner's dissertation, Comparantur inter se Graeci de regentium hominum virtutibus auctores (Marburg, 1889), which, though excellently conceived and clearly laid out, is confined to a few authors, not always accurate in detail, and certainly insufficient to distinguish the important but subtle differences between what Philodemus and other authors said. Most of Olivieri's subsidium consists of citations intended to throw light on the meaning and literary antecedents of Philodemus. When Olivieri wrote, the rage for discerning parallels and literary borrowings, for Quellenforschung, was still at its height; and the criteria for deciding what was
a parallel were remarkably lax. In a work full of quotations from Homer, in which Greek literature abounds, the results of this approach were disastrous. A careful study of the subsidium reduces the parallels to a bare score.

The subsidium had two bad effects. It led Olivieri to make a number of identifications of the subject matter, which were based rather on the hypothesis of Philodemus' unoriginality than on the evidence of the text. These identifications, apparently supported by a mass of evidence, went unquestioned. Secondly the sheer accumulated weight of evidence led others to accept Olivieri's view of Philodemus' literary affiliations.

Further, Olivieri made no attempt to relate the different sections of the work to each other; he may have thought it was no more than an unco-ordinated collection of quotations and comments. Such a view is untenable. A definite plan can be seen in the work, a plan which involves modifying a number of Olivieri's detailed interpretations, and explains many passages which puzzled him. The lacuna at the top of each column does not often obscure the train of thought. Paolucci indeed offered a coherent account of this thought, but he accepted too often Olivieri's interpretations. And it will be obvious from what follows that I regard as fundamentally mistaken his attempt to take the work as truly representative of Epicureanism in the late Republic, and to explain the differences
between it and Epicurean doctrine by reference to eclecticism and the need to come to terms with the Roman situation. I would agree with both the objections which Paolucci envisages to his view. Such an occasional work is indeed 'priva di grande impegno spirituale'; it tells as little of Philodemus' genuine philosophy as do his epigrams. And the work does point to the flagrant contradiction between theory and practice into which Roman Epicureans fell in the late Republic.¹

To offer a translation of the work would be difficult and misleading. The following synopsis is designed both to show what is in the text or can reasonably be inferred from it, and to bring out its structure. Its interpretations are supported by a detailed commentary which, while it makes no pretensions to completeness, may perhaps serve as a foundation for future discussion. Parallel passages have been selected on these principles: firstly, to give parallels which could have some bearing on possible sources of Philodemus; secondly, to give sufficient parallels to kingship literature to indicate Philodemus' debt to it, especially in the less obvious cases; thirdly, to use the scholia to Homer

¹. Paolucci 485; cf. A. Momigliano, J.R.S. xxxi (1941), 151 ff. But though most of my references to Paolucci will therefore be critical, I owe much to him, and would agree with much that he says, on a different occasion.
and Eustathius to lend support to particular interpretations of Homeric passages. This is not to imply any view of the origins of the Homeric commentaries, but is merely the easiest way of demonstrating that a Greek could, or would, have taken a certain passage in a certain way. This method will perhaps help to correct the impression left by Olivieri of a monolithic tradition; for the same reason, I have pointed out in the commentary why some of Olivieri's more plausible parallels must be abandoned. The passages quoted by Philodemus are given in square brackets in the text of the synopsis; 'cf.' indicates a reference to a passage, but no direct quotation.

Synopsis and Commentary

Fragments 1-5

F 1 mentions Bellerophon and Anteia [cf. II. vi, 156 ff.], F 2 the prayer of Achaeans and Trojans before the combat of Paris and Menelaus - a prayer that the guilty man should die [cf. II. iii, 318 ff.]. F 3 quotes Homer on the generally hybristic behaviour of the suitors and their raping of the maids [Od. xxii, 37; xxiv, 282]. The conclusion is, 'Homer attacked those who not only take away the property of others but also think it the best advice for a tyrant to kill and commit murder.' In contrast, F 4 describes the material prosperity of a people under a good king [Od. xix, 109-14; ? cf. xiii, 238 ff.]. F 5b mentions 'he who thinks (that he
can rule?) by fear alone', the Trojans' love for Hector, and perhaps the help they gave him when wounded by Ajax (Il. xxii, 410-1; ? cf. xiv, 411 ff.).

These topics are plainly connected with the usual distinction between ἱπποκράτεια and ὕππολειτε. The result of the abuse of power and the typical crimes of the ὕππολειτος, rape, immorality, murder, is the hatred of his subjects, who can only be kept in subjection by fear. The ἱπποκράτες, by reason of his virtue a favourite of the gods, rules over a prosperous people, and has as his protection the devotion of his subjects for him. This train of thought is common to almost all extant works ἐν περί ἱπποκράτεια. It may be conjectured that these are the remains of the central portion of the work, a contrast between the positions of king and tyrant. But the exact way in which Philodemus is arguing is not clear. He is probably exhorting with the help of Homeric parallels; but he could, like Homeric commentators since Hippias of Elis (above p. 11), be saying that Homer, though he does not know the word ὕππολειτος, did recognize the traditional distinction, and took the same attitude to it as other thinkers.

F 1 The story of Bellerophon could be used both to encourage sexual uprightness, and to point out its dangers (cf. e.g. Hor., Odes iii, 7, 13 ff.); here of course the former. Cf. in general R. Peppermüller,
Die Bellerophontessage (Diss. Tübingen, 1961), 93 ff., esp. 103. Plutarch's use of Ili. vi, 160 ff. in de aud. poet. 32b-c is to make the philosophical point that ἡμαία is subordinate to αἰτία; he takes no interest in the story of Bellerophon itself. F 2.

Olivieri's claim, following Cirillo p. v, that the subject is 'bonus rex deum ante omnia colere debet', is based on the very uncertain supplement of Ili. xxiv, 503 f. in 5-7 (only seven letters present), and on an interpretation of the reference to Ili. iii, 318 ff. in 13 ff. He takes this as an instance of prayer: the point would seem to be rather in the contents of the prayer, uttered by 'both Greeks and Trojans', that Paris the adulterer should die. So Eustath., ad loc., p. 418, 6 R.: the Trojans hated Paris and prayed for his death as the cause of the war. It is an example of the hatred of the people for an immoral prince. Paolucci's discussion (503 ff.) of the Epicurean attitude to gods is therefore misconceived. F 3. The context in 10 ff. and Athen. i, 9b is different. F 4, 23 ff. Olivieri's interpretation, based on a supposed parallel with Dio, Or. iii, 9, is unlikely. Dio, in claiming that the subjects of a good king are necessarily morally better, cites only ἔρωτας καὶ λοξόλαβος οὕτως: Philodemus' quotation of the whole passage refers it to material prosperity, not ἐρωτήματα - so also Col. XII, 24 ff. F 5b 5.
The contrast with 22 was noted by Bücheler 208.

**Fragments 6-16**

F 6-8 are obscure. F 9 seems to be about the proper use of self-praise; Nestor's speech to Patroclus is cited [cf. *Il.* xi, 668 ff.]. F 11 mentions the epiphany of Athena to Achilles in the quarrel, and perhaps her omen to Odysseus and Diomedes on the night patrol [cf. *Il.* i, 199; ? cf. x, 274 ff.] - possibly examples of the heroes' attitudes to the gods. F 12 quotes Homer on moderation in mourning [*Il.* xix, 228-31, 225]. F 13-16 offer no clues. The train of thought in these columns is lost.

F 7, 25. There is a paragraph mark (>|—|) at this point. Of the various types of mark, the forked paragraphos usually appears more decisive than the ordinary stroke, which may equal no more than a comma or semi-colon. The arrowhead (>) seems a mere variant of the forked paragraphos; all can be used, and perhaps intensified, with a gap of a few letters in the line. In general they give valuable help in indicating a change of topic, though some individual cases seem difficult to justify. They may, as perhaps here, mark off a general remark from its instances; then it is not always clear whether the general remark begins or concludes the paragraph. Olivieri's supplement in 30 is weak; Philodemus is plainly uttering a paradox or controversial
claim: καὶ εἰς δυνατόν; Olivieri restores a cliché. Something which is in fact λεξαίματος, but in theory
βασιλικάτος is needed: perhaps τὸ πάντα ἐπιστήμων
(cf. e.g. Ar., Pol. iii, 1287b8; Dio, Or. iii, 87).
Cirillo 50 is clearly right on the sentiment: 'vere
regium boni principis munus esse, ut ipse omnia inspiciat,
omnibusque prospiciat, si id fieri possit.' F 9, 10 ff.
The suggestion of Cirillo p. v, that the topic is περὶ τοῦ
ἐμπάντος ἔνδομαν, is strengthened by the use of the
same incident in Plut., de seips. laud., 544d: cf. in
general Dio. Or. lvii, passim. The conclusion, it would
seem, of a paragraph. F 11. The interpretation offered
is Olivieri's; but Cirillo p. v and 54 may be right in
limiting the topic to the effect of theophanies on the
Both quote Il. xix, 228 ff.; but Philodemus quotes also
225, the other adds xxiv, 48 f. They would therefore seem
to be independent. The moderation of grief was good
Epicurean doctrine, but common to other schools; it is
hardly evidence of Epicurean bias in the work, as Philippson
743 thought. Eustath., ad Il. xix, 225 (p. 1182, 9 R.)
says that this line quoted without 'Ἀχαίος' is γνωριμῶν.

Fragments 17-21: Columns I-V

F 17 is the first of nine columns on the leisure activities
of the ἀμήδευτος. It starts with a section περὶ τῶν συμποσίων (F 17, 14); in F 18, 15 ff. there may be a reference to the famous problem of Nestor's cup [cf. II. xi, 636 ff.] — was Nestor a φίλομοσφάγης? At the end of the column, Philodemus seems to be claiming that Homer never shows his characters drunk; he shows the suitors deranged, 'but not even among these is there an appearance of drunkenness.' F 19 talks of how the Phaeacians listened to Odysseus and Demodocus, and even the suitors to Phemius, for the most part in silence. (F 21 belongs perhaps to an earlier context; Odysseus inveighed against the suitors, not because of the number of their servants, but because of their noise and unruliness [II. xviii, 558]).

Col. I carries on the topic of F 19; the κλέα ἀνδρεία [II. ix, 189, etc.] were sung to drinkers as well as to the sober, to the easy living Phaeacians and to more austere audiences. The reason for this is lost, but it has presumably to do with the effect of the Iliad on character. For he continues in Col. II by contrasting the practice with that of τῶν μὲν ἰπποτίκων; dancing is an incitement to λυτοτασία. From such tomfoolery, and worse, one should abstain, lest one be laughed at and despised. At Col. II, 19 there is a paragraph mark; the rest of the column seems to be a digression, attacking the illegitimate use of certain Homeric passages to justify sexual licence [Od. xxiii, 296; xi, 246 + ν, 227]. Col. III, 18 ff. points out that Homer does not like a king to be φιλομοσφάγης: his
unfavourable portrait of the buffoon Thersites shows this [II. ii, 215-6, 220].

Col. IV enters on a more general discussion of suitable pastimes; dice and telling dirty stories are condemned. Some of the suitors play draughts, 'but for the most part all either practise something worthwhile and useful, or take counsel, or train themselves in athletics or armed contest, not only the virtuous, but also the less reputable.' Even the suitors are blameless in this respect [Od. iv, 626-7]; their fault lies in 'being a nuisance to the land of another and deserting their own, like the father of the last Nicomedes'. In contrast to this, Philodemus gives Telemachus as a πολιτικός, who, though a young man, showed prudence and care for his patrimony. The example is pursued; necessity taught him to be διευθυντάς and skilled in free debate [Od. xv, 90, 11; cf. i, 384 ff.]. The digression on Telemachus follows naturally from the precise formulation of the suitors' fault.

F 17. The behaviour of a king at symposia is discussed, Epicurus, Περὶ βασιλείας F 5 Usener, p. 94; Aristeas, ad Philocr. 286 f.; see further p. 521. F 18, 15 ff. Bücheler 207 seems right in seeing a reference to Nestor's cup here, for in 17 ? φ (λοπόνη) appears (as in Eustath., ad loc., p. 870, 57 λ.). The passage was famous. Apart from elaborate descriptions of Nestor's cup (ἡ Νεστορίη, cf. Athen. xi, 487 ff.), two problems were discussed: did
this show Nestor as a φιλοσόφος, and did Homer really mean that only Nestor could lift it? A number of variants and forced interpretations were attempted; Sosibius lost his salary from Ptolemy Philadelphus for 'solving' the problem (Athen. xi, 493c ff.; deservedly, since his solution was stolen from Aristotle). Stesimbrotus, Antisthenes, Glauccon and others are also mentioned as discussing the passage; the debate can be reconstructed from Athen. x, 433b ff.; xi, 493a ff.; Porphyry, ad loc., p. 168 f. Schrader; Schol. Ven. A, Town., ad loc.; Eustath. p. 870, 31 ff. R. 26 ff. contrasts with Athen. i, 17f, which states that the suitors were drunk (Olivieri's method of citing reverses the sense); Philodemus seems to imply that they were not - see further on F 21. The remaining passages cited by Olivieri are irrelevant. F 19, 25 ff. cf. Musonius Rufus F 49, p. 131 Hense = Gellius, Noct. Att. v, 1. In his invitation to Piso, Anth. Pal. xi, 44 = xxii Kaibel, Philodemus repeats the image:

φαίνετε γάρ πολύ μελέτητε

F 21. On the nature of this fragment see p.456; from its content, it might belong to the beginning of F 19. I have given its sense in Olivieri's restoration; but his lines seem too short, and the mention of drunkenness contradicts F 18, 26 ff. Philippson's restoration of 9 ff.
in RE xix, 2 (1938), 2475 is very conjectural.

Col. I, 23 ff. For the interpretation given, cf. Dio, Or. ii, 31; the scholia A, B, T, G give at II. ix, 189: οἱ ἀνθρώποι δὲ τοὺς πολιτές εἶναι εἰς γὰρ ὁμολογεῖν διὰ τὴν παλαιὰν ἀστορικὴν τοὺς ἀκοδοσίης ἐσωφρονίζον.

It is clear that, like Dio, Or. ii, 6, 27, Philodemus recommended the Homeric practice as suitable for his own day; dramatic recitations by Homeristae were common — cf. Petr., Sat. 59; W. Heraeus, Rh. Mus. lxxix (1930), 399 ff.

Col. II. cf. Plut., Quaest. Conviv. 712e; Dio, Or. ii, 55 f. Büheler 200 f. took τοῖς [ν] μεγάλων (8) as a reference to Hellenistic kings (cf. 36, where he restored βασίλειαν); but it seems unlikely that any specific reference is intended. And if one is, it would surely be to the advice of men of the same class as Homer, that is later poets: e.g. Anacreon, F 96 Diehl; Ion of Chios, F 2, 7 ff.; for the genre cf. C. M. Bowra, Problems in Greek Poetry (1953), 1 ff. The simile in 16 ff. is difficult; the lack of grammar suggests the text is wrong. Those who process are contrasted with real kings, so presumably are pretence ones. Cirillo 4 saw a reference to processions at the lesser Dionysia, perhaps rightly; cf. M. P. Nilsson, Opuscula Selecta i (1951), 188 ff. But it may be a king mime: cf. the mocking of Jesus; Philo, in Flaccum 36 ff.,
with the literature quoted in H. Box's edition (1939), 91 f.; Acta Pauli et Alexandri ap. H. Musurillo, Acts of the Pagan Martyrs (1954), 49, cf. 247 f. Or it may be a reference to a Roman custom, to the king of the Saturnalia (cf. the military New Year festival: St. Asterius, Patrol. Graec. xl, 221; Nilsson, o.c. 247), or perhaps to the captive monarchs in a triumphal procession. For the interpenetration of these and similar practices, cf. S. Weinstock, Mullus (Klauser-Festschrift), Jahrb. f. Ant. u. Christentum Suppl. 1 (1964), 391 ff. The paragraph marks at 19 and 35 suggest that this section stands on its own as a sort of appendix.

Col. III. The first 18 lines are wholly obscure; Olivieri and Philippson 766 offer different restorations of 8 ff. In 17 τὸν τῆς Σύρου διαστάτην is curious. Cirillo 6 referred it to a ruler of Scyros; Bücheler 201 compared Dio, Or. iv, 113 (sc. Sardanapallus). Both these require emendation. The best explanation is that of Philippson 766, who adduced Od. xv, 403 ff. - Ctesius, king of Syrie. In confirmation of this, it may be added that Strabo x, 5, 8 thought Syrie was Syros; the same identification might explain both spelling and gender in Philodemus. In 31 ff. Philodemus gives a different interpretation of Thersites from that in Plut., de aud. poet. 30a, de invid. et odio
537d. According to Plutarch, Homer blames him for his cowardice and moral defects, according to Philodemus for his desire to make the Achaeans laugh. cf. below on Col. XVII, 27.

Col. IV. The question of how a king should spend his leisure is discussed e.g. by Aristeas, ad Philocr. 284 ff.; Dio, Or. iii, 133 ff.; athletics and military are common suggestions - together with hunting. For the use of Homer, cf. Athen. i, 9f, 24c (from the epitome it remains obscure whether the subject of either quotation was the suitors); de vit. et poes. Hom. 207, who is closer to Philodemus, in that he at least saw the same difficulty, that the suitors were bad men doing the right thing in the wrong place. The 'father of the last Nicomedes' is Nicomedes III Euergetes; see F. Geyer, RE xvii, i (1936), 496; D. Magie, Roman Rule in Asia Minor (1950), ii, 1199. The reference is to his activities in collaboration with Mithradates.

Columns VI-VII, 19

The section on leisure ends at the paragraph mark at Col. VI, 6; 'leaving such things, let us again praise virtue for a king.' The seems to refer back, perhaps to the discussion in F 1-5b; once again we are in the mainstream of kingship writing. The virtues of ἐπισκέψεως, ὑπερπόντι, προσφορᾶς
are extolled. Harshness breeds hatred; ἐπισκέψις and τὸ
μέτρον establish a sound government. Cambyses is
an example of the wrong attitude; the king should be like a
gentle father [Od. ii, 47 = 234] -ἔμετρον, συμπάθεια,
αὐθαυτική appear. The judicial side of this is emphasized:
'... but appear mild either in acquittal or in judgement,
both because of his gentleness be loved, and because of his
harshness, when it is necessary, be not despised. Such a
man is not seen taking vengeance for plots, because he has held
to a course of action aiming at goodwill.'

Col. VI, 8. Read πᾶν τ[ν] οὖσαι[ν μα]γνήτικόν; πιθοῖ δὲ
was confirmed by myself and Prof. Sbordone on the papyrus.
For πᾶν in Philodemus, cf. e.g. F 4, 31; W. Croenert,
Memoria Graeca Herculanensis (1903), 140. The notion of
ἐπισκέψις is not, pace Paolucci 498, an Epicurean one.
It is true that Sen., de clem. i, 3, 2 claims that both
Stoics and Epicureans agree on the importance of 'clementia';
but, as he shows elsewhere, it is certain that not even all
Stoics agreed. The passage offers, not a statement of actual
doctrine, but a claim that an acceptance of 'clementia' is
logically entailed by the Stoic and Epicurean views of
society. There is no evidence that the Epicureans accepted
the entailment. The quotation of παντὶ δ' ἔσσει τὴν
(cf. 23) to illustrate what a king should be like, is very
common: cf. e.g. de vit. et poes. Hom. 182; Themistius,
Or. i, 17a; Stobaeus iv, 7, 8, p. 250 Hense (ὑπὸ Θήρην
περὶ Παρθένου...). But it is interesting that at Od. ii, 47 the scholia and Eustathius, p. 1433, 63 R. mention Herodotus on the Persian kings - Darius the κάστορος, Cambyses the δεσπότες, and Cyrus the πατήρ (iii, 89, 3). The papyrus is now mostly illegible, and the disegni give little help; but the reference to Cambyses and the citation of the line are clear.

Columns VII. 19-XIII. 21

There follows (Col. VII, 20) a section on τὰ περὶ οἰκετεύματος, military affairs, introduced by an apology for a philosopher presuming to treat such a subject (sc. before a Roman princeps). Νομόμαχος is praised, and the contrast between the descriptions of the Achaean and Trojan battle-lines cited [Il. iv, 431; iii, 2]. Odysseus' actions after Agamemnon's suggestion that the Achaeans return home, shows how one should deal with the threats and unruliness of the common soldier [cf. Il. ii, 198 ff.]. The leaders of the Achaeans (Col. VIII, 10 ff.) are punished rather by mild threats and holding them up as an example; various instances are mentioned to show that officers deserve such different treatment [Menestheus, cf. Il. iv, 338 ff.]. Conversely the right sort of reward for a gentleman consists not in gain but in honour, a high position at the table, special food, extra drink,
as the other gods show to Zeus, the best part of the sacrificial meat, and, greatest of all, praise [Il. viii, 162; cf. i, 533 f.].

'The good ruler must therefore be warlike, but not a lover of war or of battle' (Col. IX, 14 ff.). Homer attacks such men when he makes Zeus and Agamemnon call Ares and Achilles the most hateful of gods and of men [cf. Il. v, 890; i, 176]. Similarly the lover of civil strife: 'he must be thought to be really stupid, who thinks that he will strengthen his rule in the same way as some private individuals think that there should be "strife among the servants" [Menander, F 784 Koerte]'; both are wrong, for this leads to the destruction of households and the overthrow of dynasties. Homer shows this when he attacks those who stir up civil strife and portrays the various conciliatory moves of Nestor [Il. ix, 63-4; cf. ii, 336 ff.; ix, 179 ff.; xi, 655 ff. or xvi, 20 ff.]. So Homer hates both the lover of war and the lover of strife; his picture of Eris and the prayer of Achilles for its destruction are quoted [Il. iv, 442-3; xviii, 107]. All τὸ Ἀριστομαχοῦ too should be banished; again Nestor's activities are an example: 'rightly if Odysseus and Nestor were the wisest of the Greeks, did they abstain from such passions' and stand together in war and in counsel [Od. iii, 127-9].

The result of such unity is material prosperity, such as that of Phaeacia and Ithaca; Homer really believes that good
harvests go with a benevolent and just ruler [Od. xix, 112; cf. vii, 81 ff.; xiii, 238 ff.]. There is a paragraph mark at the end of Col. XII; an objection seems to be envisaged, whose validity is accepted. Prosperity produces military decadence; others compel an unguarded people to fight, with disastrous consequences. Even in time of relaxation, it is essential to be constantly exercising for war.

Col. VII, 21. Olivieri's text is odd; ἐνομομία is a word applicable to an army, but not to a writing. I would suggest that it is to be taken with στρατηγοὶς after περὶ, reading: εἰ δὲ τῷ φ[ι][λοσοφόν] τιετε [ι τὰ] περὶ στρατηγοῖς εὐπρεπείας καὶ ἐ[ξ]υμομία γραφεῖς. I have not checked the papyrus, but the engraving shows room for only two letters, not four, after καὶ. The comparison of the Achaean and Trojan battle-lines (28 ff.) is common: cf. Dio, Or. ii, 52; Plut., de aud. poet. 29d; de vit. et poes. Hom. 149; Schol. BT, ad Il. iii, 8; iv, 429, 433.

is a gratuitous insertion by Olivieri; if the nature of the encomium was specified, it was surely 'poetic' - the greatest reward of all is to have one's exploits sung to later generations.

Col. IX, 13. I should prefer πολλοί for πολλοὶ : so Eustath., ad Il. i, 176, p. 75, 42 R. and ad v. 889, p. 618, 30 R.: χρη γὰρ καθ' τοὺς σοφοὺς πολεμικὸς εἶναι τινὰ, οὐ μὴν φιλοσόφους (οἱ σοφοὶ are philosophers or ancient writers); cf. Dic. Or. i, 27; Schol. BT, ad Il. ix, 63. Olivieri's supplement οὐκαίνη (35) is unlikely; war rather than οὐκαίνη is the subject of Philodemus at this point, and of the passages to which he refers.


Col. XI. In Col. IX the φιλοσόφους is rebuked, in Col. X the man who thinks οὐκαίνη a good thing, and in Col. XI, 5 ff. the civil and military aspects are brought together; on the significance of this connection, see below p. 502.
tips for Achilles (12) suggests perhaps that Philodemus
is quoting from memory. A paragraph is marked at 14,
but the connection is close; τὸ ἀρετῶν is the
beginning of τὸν. At 27, Cirillo 22 points out that
Philodemus has confused Od. iii, 127 with Il. ii, 202,
perhaps another indication that he is quoting from memory.
Schol. ad Od. iii, 128 offer the same interpretation:
the poet is secretly teaching that ἡ ὁμόνων τὴν ἀρετήν
is essential to success.

Col. XII. Olivieri's parallel with Dio, Or. ii, 37 is
misleading; as in F 4, Philodemus talks of material
prosperity under a good king, whereas Dio claims that
Homer depicts the country to conform with the character
of the soft Phaeacians. Paolucci 502 seems to go a little
beyond the evidence in calling this 'un lungo passo, dove ...
è esaltato, con accento personale e con sottile insistenza,
il paese dei Feaci, ideale di pace, di serenità, di
bellezza'. Eustath., ad Od. xix, 111 (p. 1857, 57 R.)
in his paraphrase takes the passage in the same way:
ἐν δὴ ἡ πόλις ἡ ἀρετή καὶ ἡ ὁμοιότης τοῦ
παληθεοῦτον: cf. p. 1857, 27 R. for the moral. At 24,
Bücheler's τὰ [ἃ] is easier than καὶ [ἢ].

Col. XIII, 1-21. This seems to have no connection with
22 ff.; despite the paragraph mark at the end of Col. XII,
it seems reasonable to treat it as an appendix or objection to the previous discussion. The dangers of prosperity and the need for constant ἀναγκή for war, even in peacetime, are philosophical commonplaces (cf. e.g. ps-Aristotle, Περὶ ἀναγκῆς 2; 3, 8ff.). Olivieri's parallel at 10 with de vit. et poes. Hom. 166 is erroneous.

Columns XIII, 22-XV

σωφρόνες are discussed, those of Alcinous and Telemachus mentioned [cf. Od. vi, 53 ff.; ii, 6 ff.]. In both war and peace 'one wise counsel defeats great force' [Euripides, F 200 Nauck²], even leads to success with no, or small show of force. The poet has not forgotten this, as is shown by his description of Nestor, the prayer of Agamemnon for ten such counsellors, and Diomedes' choice of Odysseus for his wisdom, not Ajax, to accompany him on the night patrol [Il. viii, 80; cf. ii, 371 ff. x, 246-7; Od. xiii, 89, cf. 331 ff.]. Homer sees the need for σοφία; he praises those kings who are first in both counsel and battle [Il. 1, 258; ii, 273]. The next paragraph (Col. XV, 16 ff.) is difficult; it still talks of the λογική, apparently of its recruitment from those with φρονία: 'as when the commanders led off (sc. to the council outside the ditch) Meriones and Antilochus, who had not yet been appointed to the council, on the grounds that, having seen their prudence in other things
and in the matter (sc. the guard) ...' [cf. II. x, 192 ff.].

Col. XIII, 22. πάλιν is a favourite word of Philodemus for beginning a new topic: cf. Col. VI, 8; XVI, 20. But the lack of a paragraph mark is odd – perhaps lost with the start of the previous line. The discussion is of συνέδρια; Philodemus cites Alcinous, and Telemachus in Ithaca, but as examples of what? Homer says nothing of what happened at Alcinous' council; the only things common to both are that they are both βουλαὶ, and both held soon after dawn. It seems that they are merely used as evidence that Homeric society possessed councils. Again the first question asked at the Ithacan assembly is what? Aegyptius asks a series of questions; perhaps Od. ii, 32. Cirillo's comments on this section (Col. XIII-XV) are excellent.

Col. XIV, 10. έν ευαίσθενι ηῶν περιοδέσσαν : sc. in war and peace (so Bühler 199). The same fragment of Euripides is cited by Schol. BTG and Eustath., p. 240, 42 R., ad II. ii, 372. But it is very common indeed elsewhere – even as a school motto on the wall of a master's house at Herculaneum (Hayter, Report 26). It is especially found in kingship writings, for its continuation: σων ὁχλων ἱεροθείω πλησίου κακῶν (for refs. see Nauck, TGF² (1889), 420). It therefore seems to me mere coincidence that Philodemus should shortly after take II. ii, 372 as one of his examples; I cannot accept either that Eustathius read
Philodemus (Cirillo 28), or that this is evidence for a common source (cf. Bücheler 199; Paolucci 489 f.). Bustathius' point, that, according to οἱ Ηῆλιοι, Homer thinks τὰ ψυχὰ better than τὰ σώματα, is certainly different from Philodemus'. 17 ff. Nestor and Odysseus are of course the supreme examples of ἄνθρωπος in Homer; Olivieri's parallels contain variations on this theme, none of which is closely comparable to Philodemus. Dio, Or. ii, 20 includes Diomedes in his list; in Philodemus he is merely the author of a remark about Odysseus. Moreover Dio is concerned with rhetorical skill.

Col. XV. The example of Odysseus seems to carry on from the previous column, but by 11 the argument has become general. The significance of the examples of Meriones and Antilochus escaped Olivieri, as he failed to identify the passage referred to. After 37 read τῆς ψυχῆς.

Columns XVI–XVIII

Col. XVI, 20 seems to be the start of a new paragraph, the topic of which is not clear [Od. iii, 130; Il. ix, 128]. Again at Col. XVII, 17 a new paragraph starts, a section apparently on ἔρημος. Thersites' boastful claim that Agamemnon gets first pick when 'we capture a citadel', or the ransom when 'I or some other Achaeans' takes a man prisoner, is a Ποιησὶς φημωμένης [Il. ii, 228, 231]. Odysseus refused to compare himself with past generations or heroes [Od. viii, 223];
Hector's $\nu\beta\nu\gamma$ was punished by his not being allowed to flee into the city before Achilles (or perhaps exemplified in his refusal to do so). His lack of respect for the gods is cited [cf. Il. ix, 237 ff.], perhaps also Odysseus' boasting after the blinding of the Cyclops [cf. Od. ix, 500 ff.], which enabled the latter to call down the wrath of Poseidon on him; finally Odysseus' refusal to allow Eurycleia to boast over the dead suitors, although they had been justly killed [Od. xxii, 412]. This last instance contrasts with the previous, and so betrays the view of Homer, not Odysseus. These examples are difficult to connect, except as instances of the nexus of attitudes comprised in the word $\nu\beta\nu\gamma$.

**Col. XVI.** Despite the number of clues, the meaning of the whole of this column is obscure; with Bücheler 205, I find 30 ff. very odd, and especially $\nu\nu\nu\nu$ in 31. Cirillo's view (p. vii), that it has to do with Agamemnon's promise to give presents to Achilles, fits only one of the quotations. It is tempting to connect 30 ff. with Col. XVII, 27 ff., both about spoils of war; but to do so makes it difficult to understand Col. XVII, 32-XVIII, 11 (that there is no break between XVII and XVIII is suggested by the appearance of Hector's name in XVII, 35).

**Col. XVII, 17.** The start of a new paragraph is suggested by the paragraph mark, and by $\tau\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon[\alpha]\rho\omega\upsilon\upsilon$; cf. Col. IX,
13. 27. A very similar interpretation of Thersites' words is given by Eustath., ad II. ii, 228 (p. 209, 14 R.):

\[\text{(sc. Agamemnon) \'O\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\n
Odysseus or the whole previous sentence: 'he (or it) reveals Homer, because disapproving of such thoughts ...'. That is, the remark just quoted reveals Homer's ideas, as opposed to those of Odysseus, who elsewhere is perfectly prepared to boast over his victims. The contrast between Odysseus' words here and elsewhere was noted by the scholia to this line, but citing Il. xi, 450 as the opposite, not the Cyclops episode; cf. Porphyry, ad Od. xxii, 412 (p. 128 Schrader).

Columns XIX-XXI

Col. XIX slides naturally into an extension of the topic. Demetrius Poliorcetes' vanity over his personal beauty was neatly attacked by the man who quoted the Homeric lines on Paris - 'his lyre and the gifts of Aphrodite, his hair and his beauty will not help him, when he lies mingled with the dust' [Il. iii, 54-5]; the prophecy came true. Ares, the lover of Aphrodite, was caught prisoner by a lame god; Nireus' beauty is mentioned [cf. Od. viii, 266 ff.; Il. ii, 673 ff.; xxiii, 532 ff.]. These seem to be examples of Homer's denigration of personal beauty. 'And yet he makes his kings θεοκράτες and θεομάχοι, for good reason in my opinion; for even this has a certain overawing effect with regard to the commons and is a likening to the higher beings whom one must imitate.' Philodemus gives a number of examples of Homer's
use of beauty to make his heroes impressive, ending with his
description of the Achaean battle-line [Agamemnon, II. ii, 483;
Achilles, xxii, 26; v, 5; xxii, 31]. Col. XX, 25-XXI
offers instances of the self-praise of Odysseus and others
[Od. viii, 494; ix, 19-20; II. xix, 218-9; ix, 104-5].
In Col. XXI, 27 there is an allusion to a reason previously
given by Philodemus why neither Homer nor his characters are
blameworthy for this. The reason seems to be partly preserved
in Col. XX, 25 ff., and is apparently one of literary economy;
the practice is a literary device enabling other characters
to recognize the hero and his achievements.

Col. XIX. The extension of the topic to the question of
Homer's attitude to personal beauty emerges through the
example of Demetrius Poliorcetes, a man who boasted too,
but of his beauty not his deeds, and had Homer quoted against
him. Bücheler 202 suggested that the author of the lampoon
was Epicurus, but this is mere conjecture. Demetrius was
famed for his κακά (cf. Athen. vi, 253d; Plut., Dem. 2;
Diod. xx, 92, 3), and his magnificence in dress shocked
even the Hellenistic world (Duris, FGH 76 F 14; Plut.,
Dem. 41). The attack might have originated from any of
his numerous contemporary enemies, and κακά would
fit an anonymous graffito as well as a written lampoon.
Philipsson's suggestion (744) that the source for the story
was Epicurus' Περί Προθυσίας is still less likely; there is no reason to suppose that work to have contained anecdotes. Julian made a similar use of the line in his violent attack on Constantine, Caes. 335b. 18. For Nireus' popularity as an example after Homer, see RE xvii, 1 (1936), 708. The reference to Eumelus is to II. xxiii, 532; but, with Bücheler 205, I find its point obscure. 23. So far we have had examples of Homer's dislike of beauty; after a paragraph mark (cf. καίτοι ) opposite examples are adduced. It appears that the argument is that Homer disapproves of beauty alone, but rightly sees that it enhances his heroes; Philodemus thus accepts (διεδρίστη γι' ἑπολ γε ) that handsomeness is an advantage in politics (compare the early career of Octavian). In a treatise addressed to Piso, this is in sharp contrast with Cic., in Piso, i, 1. At 24 with some hesitation I accept Cirillo's Θε[δεσθήσαι] μ[ν] Θεο[καθή] , which is supported (perhaps too strongly) by 31. Bücheler's Θε[λού] γε[ ] would not change the sense. The conflicting evidence is given in Olivieri's apparatus. τούς κρατίστους (29) I take to be gods and heroes. On 30 ff. Olivieri compares de vit. et poes. Hom. 133; but the explanation there is somewhat different from Philodemus'. There is a close parallel in Diotogenes, Περί Βασιλείας (ap. Stob. iv, 7, 62, p. 267, 11 Hense); ο μὲν γ' ορμότατος Θεόμορφος ὑπεραναλαβώς πρώτη 
Σύμπαθε Θεόμορφον καὶ γιμάχεσθεν κύτων παράκλησιν τοῦ 
πλείστερον.
cf. the discussion of L. Delatte, Traité de la Royauté (1942), 264 ff.

Col. XX, 20. The sense is improved by reading [οὐ] for [ἐλ]. 25 ff., a difficult passage seems to me to have been rightly interpreted by Bächeler 206, despite the fact that the reading from which he started (25: ἀλλ' ἐν for γὰρ ἐν) was wrong: Homer's heroes do boast, but not for the sake of boasting; it would have been a severe limitation for instance in the representation of Odysseus if Homer 'had deprived him of noticing the successes he has, through which, apart from other things, he will make himself known to the ignorant, remind the forgetful, dig out the eyes of the ungrateful (a word play on the Cyclops episode), ... those neglecting ...'. Col. XXI, 32. Perhaps ἀλλ' ἐν

Columns XXII-XXIII

The subject of Col. XXII appears to be slanderous attacks and public disagreements in politics: '... because those in charge of affairs, disagreeing with one another and plotting against one another, pull the listener like a puppet to what is being shaped against one side or the other.' Zeus deprecated Aphrodite's intervention [perhaps cf. Il. v, 428]. In Col. XXIII a transition to a different topic is visible; lines 7 ff. seem to be saying that this is a result of too much striving after glory. The example to be followed is the trust
of Agamemnon for Odysseus and Nestor, his respect for them and the honours he heaped on them. These two were of course the wisest of the Greeks (Col. XI, 22 f.); the direction of Philodemus' thought becomes clearer: 'the soothsayer too seems to have been well looked after in Ithaca; wherefore Telemachus also, not only because he chose to befriend strangers, looked after Theoclymenus whom the Greeks trusted, knowing the race of soothsayers...'

[cf. Od. xv, 223 ff.]. The begging note is not wholly disguised; the Homeric μάρτυς, it may be conjectured, is the modern philosopher - a worthy friend, wisest of the Greeks.

**Col. XXII.** Bücheler's statement, 'Über Dienerschaft und deren Gefahren für Monarchen,' seems to have been based on reading at 20 ἐπί τε [θερέ]μαν (cf. ἐ σοφοίν). Cirillo's suggestion (p. vii) seems better: 'transit ad ostendendam temeritatem eorum, qui mutuis eorundem calumniis inconsulto adhibent aures.'

**Col. XXIII, 7.** There is an alternative way of taking this passage, connecting it with what follows, rather than (as above) with what goes before. Something is fitting for those who especially strive after glory; possibly restore in 6-7 πρ[ί]χ[ε]ν. But the grammar is obscure.

32 ff. For a similar identification, of bard and philosopher, cf. Athen. i, 14b: σῶσον δὲ τι ἄν τὸ ἄνθρωπον γένει καὶ φιλοσόφων διάλεκτων ἔπεχον. The begging note is one which
Philodemus used elsewhere to Piso, in his invitation to dinner:

\[ \eta v \delta \; \pi o t e \; o \tau e \gamma e \nu \; \kappa \iota \; \varepsilon \; \kappa \iota \iota \nu \; \epsilon \nu \; \alpha \delta \nu \; \lambda \eta \nu \; \epsilon \iota \iota \nu \; \gamma \iota \eta \nu \; \pi o \tau e \gamma e \nu . \]

(Anth. Pal. xi, 44 = xxii Kaibel; see his note). The discussion of Paolucci 507 (cf. Philippson 744), on the Epicurean attitude to soothsaying is therefore misconceived.

199. The subject of \( \zeta o u v e v \) is hardly Odysseus, as Bücheler thought; for Philodemus immediately proceeds with a story which has no connection with Odysseus. It is rather 'the king' (generic), or impersonal; I have translated by a passive.

Columns XXIV–XXV

The work concludes, as is appropriate, with a section on the posthumous fame which is the reward of the good life [Od. v, 311; Il. xviii, 121; Od. ix, 264; xix, 108, 127–8; i, 298–9; xxiv, 200–1]. The significance of Col. XXIV, 30 ff. is obscured by the lacuna before it; a reference to Nestor's work of reconciliation [cf. Il. i, 254 ff.] fits strangely in the peroration—unless it be emphasized with regard to Piso's own opportunities as mediator.

An appendix mentions various omissions, Orestes, Phoenix and Achilles, Meleager ... [cf. Od. i, 28 ff.; iii, 306 ff.; Il. ix, 432 ff., 543 ff.]; 'if we have left out any of the starting-points, Piso, which it is possible to take from Homer for the
correction of dynasties, and of the examples...'

Col. XXV, 6. Philodemus doubtless has in mind the same moral as Plut., de aud. poet. 27a, in mentioning his omission of the story of Meleager. I do not find Philippson's supplement (743) of 20 ff. plausible.

III. THE GOOD PRINCEPS ACCORDING TO PHILODEMUS

Despite the numerous lacunae in the text, it is possible to perceive much of the thought and structure of the work. Its literary character is plain; it belongs to that class of popular Hellenistic philosophy which modern writers have called 'diatribes'.¹ The appropriateness of the name may be questioned, but not the existence of the genre. Its elements are short ethical discussions on a theme, rhetorically developed and provided with numerous examples; these could easily be combined to form longer treatises on a general topic. Some of the best examples of this are to be found in philosophical works for the virtues and attributes of the good king lent themselves especially well to treatment in small almost independent sections, rather than to sustained argument.

The extent of Philodemus' debt in detail to kingship writings

¹. cf. Philippson 741 f.; RE xix, 2 (1938), 2474. Paolucci 486 lays greater stress on Col. XXV, 15 ff. to explain the form.
is discussed below, but it is obvious that he used the same technique of composition in this work. It is this to which he refers, when he talks of taking ὑμνάζει and παρασημανότω from Homer ξύλος ἀναφέρον ἔρωτικών οὐδὲν [ὑπώρεῳ]. And it is this which accounts for many of the abrupt transitions and apparent incoherences in the work; for it naturally falls into a number of small sections, on symposia, military affairs, self-praise, friends and so on. These are held together only loosely by the subject of the ὑμνάζει παρασημανότω; but some attempt to give unity to the whole can be seen, for instance, in the way Philodemus ends with a section on the rewards after death of such a life.

If the form is common enough, the subject is for an Epicurean an extraordinary one to choose. In general the Epicureans despised both poetry and politics; in particular,

1. cf. p. 500f.
2. Col. XXV, 15 ff. I give this important passage as it stands in Olivieri's text:

   Let be παραμελακεν
   παραμελν πεύχαν δεν κτέλ
   οὐτων, ἐξ οὗ προφορούμενον
   μεν εἰς τὴν ἐπανορθώσαν
   νοκετε[ν] ἐξ [ὑπώρεῳ], καὶ τὸν πα[ντὴ]
   δε[λεε][ταν] [...]

Epicurus had said in his πᾶσι τοις μοίρασθαι that the philosopher should not consort with kings. And in the same work he was described as 'not giving a place even at drinking parties to the literary and learned discussions of scholars, but exhorting even cultured kings to submit to military stories and coarse tomfoolery at symposia, rather than talk about literary and poetic problems'. Philodemus' work is directly condemned by his master. In writing it, he cut himself off from the Epicurean tradition; and, not surprisingly, the amount of Epicurean doctrine in it is small. Both Philippson and Paolucci have tried to connect various aspects with Epicurean thought, but their attempts are not convincing. Such echoes as can be adduced point to contradiction, perhaps even deliberate. Thus Epicurus deprecated literary conversation at symposia; Philodemus practises it, and even recommends Homeric readings. Ἀλκείδα, which Epicurus thought at least better than literature, is condemned. Philodemus both consorted with 'kings', and recommended himself for so doing.

1. F 5-6 Usener p. 94; cf. above p. 195 ff.
2. Philippson's parallels (743 f.) depend on his supplements, or are common to other schools; see commentary on F 12, Col. XIX. For Paolucci, who takes the work as representative of Epicurean thought, see in general above, p. 462 n.1.
3. Contrast F 5 Usener with Col. II, 7 ff.; F 6 with Col. XXIII, 32 ff.
that, in the concluding section on the rewards of the good life, ἐκλεκτὸς alone seems to be mentioned - the one reward after death which does not involve a belief in immortality.

These considerations make it impossible that Philodemus intended the treatise solely for his circle of ardent Epicurean friends, one of whom was L. Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus (cos. 58 B.C.); the work is essentially popular and exoteric. Even in style it lacks the polemical obscurity and technical vocabulary of Philodemus' Epicurean works; it is almost well written.¹ When it is addressed to Piso,² this 'dedication' proclaims that Philodemus wished publicly to connect the views set forward in it with the name of Piso; the work is therefore something more than a pure treatise of literature or philosophy.

Any discussion of the seriousness of these views must attempt first to determine how far the content is influenced by previous writers on the subject. For, while the fact that Philodemus followed another authority would not involve a denial of his sincerity, if what is new can be isolated, this at least may be said to be his own, and will provide a surer basis than mere intuition for assessing the significance of the more traditional parts.

1. See n.1, p.491.
2. Perhaps even composed at his request: so Sudhaus, l.c. (n. 2, p.492), comparing Cic., in Pis. 70; Philippson 742.
The large number of parallel passages adduced by Olivieri led him and others to see a close literary connection between Philodemus, the work used by Athenaeus in book i of the Deipnosophistae, the de vita et poesi Homeri, and Plutarch's quomodo adolescens poetas audire debeat. In particular, the work apparently epitomized by Athenaeus has been held to be either directly or ultimately a source for Philodemus. But though they are similar in their approach to Homer, the general theme of each of these works is different. Plutarch's claim is that poetry can be an introduction to philosophy, that many useful precepts can be drawn from it, but that it must always be remembered that the poet is concerned with characterization, not moral truth; the portrayal of life as it involves the portrayal of both good and bad men. The de vita et poesi Homeri wishes to show that Homer is the source of all practical and theoretical knowledge, in particular every philosophic view ever put forward. In so far as it is possible to argue from the epitome of an epitome, Athenaeus' source would seem to have hung a minute examination of the private life and diet of the Homeric heroes on the claim that Homer's

1. Olivieri p. ix; Philippson 742 f.; RE, l.c. (p.471); Paolucci 489 ff.
2. On the problems connected with Athenaeus' source, a work of uncertain date, authorship and title, see E. Schwartz, RE v (1905), 1128 ff.
3. The de vita et poesi Homeri is the name by which a pair of independent works are known. It is the so-called book ii which is relevant to this discussion; the text in Bernadakis' edition of Plutarch's Moralia vii, 337 ff. Plutarch's de aud. poet. does not go back to Chrysippus: H. Pohlenz, Die Stoa ii² (1955), n. to p. 140.
intention was to inculcate ὑπόσχομαι in his readers. None of these general attitudes is comparable to Philodemus' approach; if a literary stemma is to be postulated, it must rest on the detailed use made of quotations and examples within the various works.

Every educated Greek knew Homer well enough to be able to quote him on apposite occasions; from his schooldays, every educated Greek was familiar with the moral interpretation of Homer. Certain criteria stricter than usual are therefore necessary if we are not to be misled by spurious parallels. By itself the use of the same quotation or example proves nothing; they must receive the same interpretation. Nor are Homeric examples which carry on the surface an obvious interpretation any help; such for instance are Nestor and Odysseus as ὑπέρμοι, the Phaeacians as ἱπτερόμοι, the ὅβας of the suitors. Certain quotations were commonplaces, such as the king as shepherd of the people. Apart from close verbal echoes, a connection can be established between two authors by the identical interpretation of a number of passages, or by agreement in interpreting a passage in such an odd way that it would seem difficult for two men to reach the same view

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1. Athen. i, 8e. Paolucci 493 ff. claims ὑπόσχομαι as the central message of Philodemus, indeed of all Hellenistic philosophy; I cannot follow him in giving the notion so much importance or so wide a meaning.
independently. On the opposite side, the use of the same example to prove different points, or conflicting interpretations of an incident, must be held to count against the possibility of interdependence.

To turn to the parallels with Philodemus which have been adduced, although both he and the others on occasion offer extremely strange interpretations of Homer, there is no case in which they agree in this strangeness. A small number of identical interpretations can be dismissed as commonplaces, or too obvious to be of use. And each of the few legitimate parallels can be matched with a case where an episode is interpreted in different, even mutually exclusive ways. There is therefore no evidence at all to show any close literary affiliation between the various works, and sufficient negative evidence to suggest that such affiliation, if it existed, was very remote. We are in the presence of an attitude to Homer which was almost universal, denied only by the followers of Plato and those who indulged in allegorical interpretation.

1. On these criteria, the only close parallel with Athen. is Col. VIII, 33: i, 13e (a similarity of thought in IV, 8: i, 9f, 24c; and, if Bücheler is right, F 18, 15: x, 433b); contrast F 18, 27: i, 17f (cf. 10e). For Plut. de aud. poet. contrast III, 32: 30a. For de vit et poes. Hom., compare VIII, 35: 197 (cf. 179); X, 26: 186; F 12: 189 (but note difference in selection of quotations). Similarities of thought in IV, 8: 207. Contrast VII, 27: 149; XI, 26: 145; XIX, 30: 133; XXIV, 12: 185. For further details see commentary.
It would be foolish even to assign an important influence on this attitude to certain schools; the Aristotelian Ἀριστοτέλους, the Stoic interpretations, are merely deeper and more systematic versions of this popular attitude.¹

There are signs that Philodemus was aware of the results of Homeric exegesis. Paolucci indeed attempted to show the compilatory nature of the work, and its dependence, 'either on a work of a similar nature or an anthological collection, from the many compiled in the third century, and therefore anterior to the Alexandrian ekdosis of Homer.'² In support of this last point, he adduced four places where Philodemus gives a variant to the 'Vulgate' in quoting Homer; but these variants are also found in writers as diverse as Plato, Cicero, Pliny the Younger, Plutarch and Themistius. They cannot be used to illustrate the date or nature of Philodemus' 'source'. More generally, an extensive investigation of quotations from Homer in kingship writings has shown no trace of the existence of a gnomological collection of suitable excerpts.³ Nor do

1. Philippson denies Stoic influence, but argues for Peripatetic in two places. One depends on his conjecture; for the other see commentary on Col. XVIII. Paolucci 491 ff. argues for Stoic influence, basing himself on 'parallels' with Plutarch.  
2. Paolucci 489 f.  
3. This might seem to shed doubt on a wider topic, the possibility of a gnomological tradition for Homer, such as is envisaged by e.g. A. Peretti, Teognide nella Tradizione Gnomologica (1953), 31 ff., 334. The problems of how much variation to accept as compatible with a 'Vulgate' text, and how far that was the result of Alexandrian scholarship, are complex; and the certainty that many quotations were from memory or earlier writers makes any generalization from variants hazardous.
the other passages adduced prove Paolucci's case. The fragment of Euripides cited in connection with Il. ii, 372 by the BT scholia and Eustathius is too common for its appearance in Col. XIV, 11 f. to be significant.¹ And if Menander F 784 is known to us elsewhere only from the BT scholia on Il. xxi, 389, it is not impossible that Philodemus had read Menander for himself.² But although individual instances fail to support an extreme view, a general impression of some connection with Homeric commentaries emerges. Philodemus seems to have discussed two famous problems, Nestor's cup and Odysseus's taunting of the Cyclops; and there are a few passages where the scholia and Eustathius can be used to elucidate Philodemus.³ It is impossible to conceive of him as a source for the Homeric commentaries; yet these parallels suggest, though they by no means prove, some connection. Philodemus perhaps remembered, or could consult, moralizing works or commentaries on Homer, which influenced the later scholia. Such early commentaries are attested in papyrus finds.⁴ This 'dependence'

1. See commentary ad loc.
2. But Il. xxi, 389 is another Homeric crux; cf. Porph. p. 254 Schrader; Eustath. p. 1242, 45 ff. Porph. contrasts the line with v, 890, which Philodemus has just referred to in Col. IX, 31 ff. The quotation might come from some commentary.
3. cf. esp. commentary on F 2; Col. I, VI, VII, IX, XI, XII, XVII; some of these are topoi.
4. cf. esp. P. Oxy. 221.
of Philodemus is no more than should in any event be expected; it is a long way from proving it either possible or likely that Philodemus in general did not consult a full text of Homer, or in general followed others' interpretations. The wide ranging nature of the book makes such claims in themselves implausible.

If detailed arguments on literary affiliation offer little help, it is still possible that Philodemus was not the first to write on kingship from this particular angle. It was recognized that Homer was especially rich in examples for a king.1 Dio of Prusa in Or. liii, after a short history of philosophic contributions to Homeric scholarship, gives in a paragraph Homer's doctrine of kingship. It might be a reasonable inference that Dio is following one of the men he mentions; of these, Antisthenes or Persaeus of Citium would appear the most likely, for both had written on kingship as well as on Homer. Persaeus in particular, notorious as the flatterer and drinking companion of Antigonus Gonatas, might have laid heavy emphasis on the behaviour of kings at symposia.2 But this trail

1. 'Antisthenes', Xen., Symp. iv, 6 (cf. Mem. iii, 2; Plato, Ion 540b; F. Duemmmer, Kleine Schriften i (1901), 36 f.); Dio, Or. i, 11 ff.; ii, 6; de vit. et poes. Hom. 199. The only known work similar in scope to Philodemus' is Porphyry κατὰ τὸν Ἐπικούριον ἐκθέσιν τὸν Προνύμος βιβλίον τούτον ἔχει (!), mentioned in Suidas, of which nothing survives (an unlikely 'fragment' ap. Porph., ad II. 1, 340, p. 12 Schrader; cf. his note). J.A. Fabricius, Bibliotheca Graeca i4 (1790), 541 f. has an interesting essay on the subject.

does not lead far. There is nothing to connect Dio's use of Homer as an authority on kingship with Philodemus, in this or any other oration.

The influence of kingship writings on Philodemus' work may come from an unknown book of the Hellenistic period similar in scope to his; but it may equally well be an application of the treatise-form πολιτείας to Homer by Philodemus himself. Either view would account for the general selection of topics offered. The contrast between the βασιλείας and the τραγωδία, with its emphasis on sexual morality; the proper behaviour at symposia, the discussion of leisure activities; the notion that the love of one's people is a better foundation for rule than fear; the emphasis on ἡμισυνέκτης, πράσυνη, justice; the presence of a section on military affairs, and especially the statement that a ruler should be πολιτείας, not Φιλοσοφίας; the problem of the right attitude to personal beauty; the need for a philosophic adviser - none of these topics would have been out of place in a work addressed to a Hellenistic monarch.

Strong though these literary parallels are, there are striking peculiarities in the details of the book, which can best be explained by reference to the contemporary Roman world. In the somewhat rambling section on military affairs, the love of war and of σέληνη are closely connected. This is hard to
parallel in Greek literature; there is rather civil disturbance, the love of war something which makes life uncomfortable for other countries. Philodemus seems conscious of his departure from tradition: ὁμοιοῦσθαι τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ τοῖς εὐθυγένεις φλο[ῦς].¹ The use of the compound ὁμοιοῦσθαι and the repetition of the definite article seem to lay special emphasis on this combination. If such a statement is foreign to Greek thought, it is of course strongly supported by Roman political experience; from the time of Marius at least, ὁμοιοῦσθαι was not so much a matter of civil disturbance as of rival generals at the head of troops, whose status as citizens was incidental to the primarily military nature of the conflict.²

A second peculiarity is the presence of a section on the συνέδριον or σούλή. The importance of listening to φρόνησις or φάσις is often referred to in kingship writings, but they are not conceived of as a regular advisory body. A very similar train of thought is present in Dio of Prusa's Oration lvi, in which Dio is consciously overturning the traditional definition of the συνέδριον, by pointing to the fact that in

1. Col. XI, 5 ff. As E.L. Bowie reminds me, the two are often contrasted; e.g. Herod. viii, 3, 1; Plato, Rep. v, 470b; Xen. Hell. ii, 3, 29; Herodes Π. 11; Ael. Arist. xxiii, 55 K; xxiv, 19 K.
2. cf. Appian, BC i, 2, 4 for the recognition of the breakdown of the distinction in Roman history.
the *Iliad* Agamemnon is not supreme; he is both obedient to Nestor and will not attempt anything without a council of elders. Both Dio and Philodemus wrote with their attention on the Roman world and the position of the senate. Dio, under the empire, offered his doctrine as a conscious paradox, for he himself had elsewhere applied the definition of the supreme king to the Roman emperor.¹ Philodemus takes the presence of the *poilh* as natural, and there is no suggestion that it should merely be one man's advisory body; it seems to be thought of as a council whose function is to come to decisions of its own by discussion. If Philodemus has perhaps overemphasized the importance of the Homeric senate, the reason is clear.

Again the section on *Επικαιρότητα* and *Προφητία* disregards two of the traditional arguments, which sought to connect these virtues with the absolute monarch. The exercise of mercy was something especially appropriate in such a situation; a man in a position to exact what penalty he liked, was exhorted to be lenient even to the point of disregarding the laws, in order to win the love of his subjects.² Or the advantage of

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¹. The definition of the *poilh* accepted in Or. iii, 43 is repeated in lvi, 5, only to be rejected. Nestor perhaps represents Trajan's philosophic adviser, Dio himself.  
². cf. e.g., Sen., *de clem.*; esp. i, 3, 3; 5, 2-4; ii, 7, 3.
kingship over other forms of government was that the king, as supreme judge and embodiment of the legislature, could disregard the written law. Δικαίωμα was the strict application of universal rules to the particular case, without regard for its peculiarities; ἔνδοξον, which could only be exercised by the man untrammelled by law, was superior, in taking into account the particular, and basing its judgement on that. Philodemus has used the notion that only by winning the love of the ruled will the government be stable, but there seems no suggestion that the judge is at liberty to do more than mitigate the action of the laws. Such vague generalities seem a reformulation of Greek ideas to fit the position of a republican magistrate; a similar preoccupation is apparent in the views of Panaetius. Philodemus keeps within the notions acceptable, if not endemic, to Rome.

There are other indications of a concern with the actual Roman scene. Telemachus learned through necessity to be Πολιτικὸς Προφήτης, a skill appropriate to the Roman politician, not the Hellenistic king. The connection

1. cf. Plato, Polit. 294 a-b; Aristotle, Pol. iii, 1286a7 ff.; cf. NE v, 1137b11 ff.
between ὁ ἄρσιππος and ὁ ἀρσιππός may betray an outsider's comment on the struggles of the nobility;¹ and in Col. XV, 31 ff. there seems to be a reference to the recruitment of the δουλεία from those who have proved their ἀρετή by military service. In Col. XXII, 28 ff. the disputes and plots of leading men are denounced for their bad effect on others. The prominence given to the example of Nestor as mediator, after the peroration on the rewards of the good life, suggests that Piso himself is being put forward for the same role.²

The work, designed for a wide audience and adapting kingship ideas to the Roman scene, is connected with the name of Piso. It was these factors which led A. Momigliano to suggest, 'The book fits into the years of Caesar's dictatorship and is an appeal to moderation. The king has the duty of composing civil struggles and must use moderation rather than violence. Not fear but love is the foundation of his throne.' So Philodemus, as the friend of a moderate Caesarian, wrote a veiled address to Caesar on how he should conduct himself in the position of βασιλεύς. Similarly P. Grimal has seen the work as a political pamphlet written in 45, and combining an attack on Marcus Antonius' government of Rome during Caesar's absence with advice on how Caesar himself should

¹. Col. XI, 15 ff.
². Col. XXIV, 30 ff.
behave on his return. 1 It is an attractive notion, for 45 was the year when Cicero too was attempting to write a formal epistula for Caesar, and finding the task of transforming the Greek advice to kings for a Roman audience particularly difficult; after considerable hesitations, he finally decided not to make his advice public: 2 Philodemus perhaps compromised in such a very delicate situation by this most indirect of approaches. Yet such views, though inherently attractive, fail to do justice to the character of the work. A political pamphlet carries its meaning openly and is intended to be directly relevant to the contemporary scene. This work contains nine columns on leisure, and important sections on personal beauty, mourning, self-praise. These are hardly topics of political importance; indeed, in contrast to what is known of the contents of Cicero's letter, there is little in the extant part which could have direct application to the actual situation at any time, still less to the difficult predicament in which Caesar had placed himself. Nor is moderation the theme of the work: it appears, and is emphasized, as it needed emphasizing from the time of Sulla onwards.

1. Momigliano, J.R.S. xxxi (1941), 152 f.; Grimal, R.E.I. xlv (1967), 254 ff. Grimal's notion that the whole work is an oeuvre à clef, and that behind the good and bad king, Nestor, Thersites and Odysseus contemporary politicians are to be discovered, seems to me to have no justification either in contemporary literary practices or in the text of Philodemus.

2. See esp. ad Att. xii, 40, 2; xiii, 28, 2-3; 31, 3; cf. also xii, 51, 2; 52, 2; xiii, 1, 3; 7, 1; 26, 2; 27, 1; and perhaps xii, 38a, 2.
But the theme is a generalized one, the whole position and behaviour of the βασιλέως, in private no less than in public life.

The title of the book is 'The Good King according to Homer', and many of the themes come from Hellenistic kingship literature; it is an easy step to the assumption that Philodemus was writing about one man in supreme power. This assumption has little to support it. Philodemus uses βασιλέως descriptively, of the Homeric kings; μόναρχος, except in Col. VI, 12 ff., is used only in the plural, again of the Homeric kings. Only in this one passage is there any suggestion that Philodemus might be referring to the rule of one man; he writes of ἐπιτύμβως and τὸ βασιλεῖα τῷ στόχῳ, πλατών ἐγὼ ψυχὸν [υν] τε π[ρ]ο[ς] γαμήλιον μοναρχίαν καὶ μὴ δεσποτικῶν φόβων δικάσεως τε [πε].

Δυσανάλωσις does not of course imply monarchy, and may be substituted for the more explicitly unitary rule of the τύραννος. But μοναρχία seems to be mentioned. The text is uncertain; and, even if it be accepted, the context robs the

1. Under the nouns I have included the cognate adjectives, verbs and abstract nouns. βασιλέως of Homeric kings:
   Col. III, 20; VIII, 28, 32; IX, 32-4; XII, 25; XV, 18; XIX, 25; XXII, 21 (?); cf. II, 15. In VI, 8 the usage might be better described as generic; cf. F 7, 27; Col. VI, 13. It is interesting that τύραννος is found only at F 3, 17.

2. Col. III, 10; VIII, 13; IX, 35; XVIII, 15 (?).

3. See Olivieri's apparatus. The engraving (=dis. b) shows a hole after π.οκευτῆς, and in 17. ἀρξ. . . . . . ; which is hardly compatible with the disegni as reported by Olivieri. I have not checked the papyrus; the engraving would allow ὀλυνχήν.
remark of any wider significance, for Philodemus is here in
the mainstream of kingship writings. The typical virtue
of ἐπιτιμίας and ἐπικράτειας, Cambyses a stock
tyrant, the king as father, all suggest that Philodemus in
repeating traditional views has slipped into the conventional
mode of expression of his forerunners.

In general the political situation envisaged is the
ὑποκράτεια; he writes ἐν ἐπικράτειᾳ δ[υνά]κατε[ίν].¹
In Philodemus ὑποκράτεια and ὑποκράτεια are vague words;²
like the English 'ruler', the nature of the rule must be
gathered from the context. They may be used of monarchy,³
or coupled with ὑποκράτεια, as a synonym.⁴ The concept is
neutral, and can be qualified either way.⁵ These usages are
normal in Hellenistic prose, as a comparison with Polybius
shows; and they correspond to the freedom with which Roman
writers use 'princeps'.⁶

It may then be asked, why did Philodemus write on the good
king according to Homer? It is here that the contrast with
Dio of Prusa's use of Homer in Or. ii is striking, and relevant.
For Dio, Homer is the author most suitable for a king, and

1. Col. XXV, 18; cf. X, 18; IX, 15; VI, 18.
2. I have used C.J. Vooghs, Lexicon Philodemeum (1934-41); it
   is neither complete nor wholly accurate.
   ἐν ὑποκράτειᾳ, Col. XXXIV, 3.
5. Col. VI, 18; IX, 15.
6. Of oligarchy, Polyb. vi, 9, 4; cf. ix, 23, 5; of king,
e.g. x, 40, 7. cf. esp. Livy, discussed in L. Wickert, RE
the king is a man in the position of Alexander, πάντως μὲν δ',
κρίτους ἐδέλευ, πάντως δ' ἐνδόθεν. This attitude permeates
the work.¹ But Philodemus has omitted those parts of kingship
theory which could be of use only to the monarch, and there
is no sign in the extant columns of those famous Homeric
quotations which specifically advocate absolute rule.² The
μορίατος of his title refers primarily to Homer; since Homer
talks of μορίατος, Philodemus could not have written περὶ τοῦ
καθορίσμος λόγου δυνάστου. μορίατος is then generic;
Philodemus has in mind, not one man, but a class of men whom
he sees as analogous to Homer's μορίατος. His choice and treatment
of the subject are deliberate; for the μορίατος mirror closely
the 'principes viri' of Rome. In following out this parallel,
he has reduced Agamemnon to a level with the others; all are
equal in law, if not in authority and honour. Once the analogy
is stated, it can hardly be denied that it is close and
fruitful; Homeric society did mirror the political situation
of the Roman principes well enough for Homer to be especially
rich in λογοτεχνία and μαθηματική. The diversity of Philodemus'
examples, compared with the poverty of those used by others

¹. Or. ii, 5 f.; cf. esp. 65 f., contrasted with the
treatment of the same passage in Col. XX, 3 ff.
². e.g. the often cited II. ii, 196-7, 204 ff., which
appear in Stobeaus in the section οτί καθορίστοι κή
rωμάχω (iv, 6, 1-2, p. 239 Hense).
to illustrate the position of the supreme king, is striking. And his use of ἐπιτίθενται and ἐπιτίθεται finds its natural explanation. There is no one word in Greek to designate the Republican principes; Greek writers were forced to resort to periphrases. Philodemus needed one word: ἐπιτίθενται was the best that offered.

Philodemus himself should be credited with the invention and application of the analogy, for few Hellenistic writers had the chance to forestall him. The estimate of his importance and originality as a political thinker may be somewhat revised. In infusing new life and a new application into older literary forms, he changed the details considerably. The search for his antecedents is not devoid of interest, but it cannot give any important insight into the nature of the work, for it is certain that he did not copy slavishly a previous writer. The naturalization of kingship theory in Rome through the mediation of Homer shows a touch of genius; a dangerous topic has been rendered harmless. It may be suspected that, at the start of the book, he made a fuller statement of his purpose than appears in the concluding remarks, and that these

1. A. Gwosdz, Der Begriff des romischen princeps, Diss. Breslau (1933), 54 ff. Plutarch's usage (66 ff.) is the closest to Philodemus; e.g. Cic. 15, 1; Lucull. 37, 3; ἐπίτιθενται καὶ ἐπιτίθεται; Caes. 13, 3; τῶν μέγιστων ἐν τῇ πόλει διακόσιον.
The work is a description of the duties and moral behaviour of a princeps in private and public life, not a political pamphlet. This of course makes it difficult to date, for it is relevant to any period of the late Republic. Certain remarks of Momigliano offer a terminus ante quem: 'I incline to think that a book on Kingship dedicated to Piso must be anterior to the Ides of March. Piso was active for the Republic in 44, and from that date the word rex was probably heinous enough to compromise even its innocent Greek equivalent.' But does this go far enough? It could be argued that only when there is clearly not one man in charge of the state can the word βασιλεύω be innocent. Cicero would hardly have seen kingship as the best unmixed constitution in his de Republica, if he could have looked into the future. A work using kingship theory should be prior to the bellum civile.

The dedication to Piso offers a clue. Various non-political motives might be relevant. The writing of συμβουλευτικά, treatises of practical advice, was common in the Hellenistic world, particularly by philosophers to kings. The role of the philosophic adviser at Rome goes back at least to the second century; many a Scipio might have his Panaetius. The convention demanded a specific occasion or position to which the advice was relevant; but the topic was often also of wider interest.
Such works could have serious political content. Cicero, called on for one to Caesar, dared not write what he wished, and would not write within the convention; but the fact that he could be asked for such a work suggests that others had lower standards.\(^1\) Again the dedication of handbooks *de officio*, on the duties of a certain position, to a man attaining it, is well attested.\(^2\) Finally the commemorative element; poets and littérature often celebrated a step in the career of a patron with a suitable work addressed to him. Thus, since it is difficult to claim that the motive behind the work is primarily political, the dedication to Piso suggests that it should rather be connected with a particular stage in his career, presented to him on an occasion when its message was in some way relevant. Since from its un-Epicurean nature it seems not to have been intended for Piso alone, but for a wider audience, it might be claimed that the occasion should be one which excited a certain amount of interest and controversy. The work, under the guise of advising Piso, might also serve to defend him against criticism, or offer a programme which apparently had the endorsement of Piso.

Paolucci tentatively suggested that the work was written


for Piso's proconsulate of Macedonia, which began in 57.¹ His positive arguments he admitted to be weak; the date seems to be based on two assumptions, that the Macedonians would appreciate a governor who could quote Homer, and that the μεγάλης of the title is one man in supreme power. The first may be true; reasons for doubting the second have already been given. The work is tied more closely to the Roman scene than Paolucci realized. And a συμβουλευτικός must be relevant. Cicero could write to his brother, his brother to Cicero, about topics of which the recipient knew more than the writer, but at least they kept to the point. There is little in Philodemus which could help a Roman governor.

Piso as censor in 50 might welcome a work on the moral qualities to look for in a good senator; nor would an emphasis on moderation be out of place for the colleague of Appius Claudius Pulcher. But there is no sign in the work that Piso was in a position to enforce the lenient standards which it suggested; a certain concern with the vices to be extirpated, as well as the virtues to be retained, would be expected. Again the work is too irrelevant to the occasion.

In 55 Piso returned to the ranks of the principes from Macedonia, and was attacked by Cicero; Philodemus on that

¹. *Aevum* xxix (1955), 201 ff.
occasion might have offered a guarded defence of his patron: in which case, the emphasis on symposia could be a discreet reply to *In Pisonem* 22 and 67, the mention of disputes between leading men would acquire a specific significance, and Piso might welcome a portrait of himself as a mediator, a corrector of *sensus*. But to justify what a man has done by telling him what he ought to do, is odd. Philodemus might have been wishing to heal the breach. But then he should have answered the question posed by Cicero's invective - did Piso live up to those ideals which Cicero and Philodemus shared? He might have been wishing only to dissociate himself from the quarrel, leaving Piso to answer (as he did) for himself. Yet Cicero had specifically exempted Philodemus from blame, and it is difficult to believe that any philosopher would choose to cast an apologia for himself or another in the form of a Homeric florilegium. In short, any theory which connects the work with so serious a situation must rest on stressing individual passages, while ignoring the general approach. That is literary, and requires an occasion when literature is appropriate.

The obvious date has been neglected. The method of Piso's arrival among the *principes* was noticed. In 59 his

daughter married Caesar; in 58 he was consul. It was intolerable, Cato said, that the leadership should be prostituted by marriages.¹ The consulate was considered as admitting to the ranks of the principes;² for Piso it did more - it enrolled him in the hated ruling δυνατεία, 'gravisse principum amicitias'.³ The dedication of works to a consul is common.⁴ A close friend who was also an Epicurean might wish to show his approval of a prominent and controversial political figure, in despite of the tenets of his philosophy; what better way than to dedicate a work on the duties and life of a princeps to that man?

δυνατεία is not always an innocent word. In classical Greek it meant precisely a close oligarchy, with the pejorative implication of the usurpation of power by a few from a larger body. Thucydides contrasts it with ἀθέτητες ἰσόνομοι and ἰσόνομοι;⁵ in Aristotle it is a technical term, a by-form of oligarchy, as tyranny was of kingship.⁶ Here it had in fact exactly the same connotation as the Latin 'dominatio' or 'dominatus'.⁷ A Roman audience would be as conversant with

1. Plut., Caes. 14, 8; cf. Cic., in Pis. 3.
2. Cic., Phil. xiv, 17; cf. Wickert, l.c. (n. 6, p. 508), 2029 ff.
3. Hor., Odes ii, 1, 3 f.
5. iii, 62, 3; iv, 78, 3.
6. cf. esp. Pol. iv, 1292b5 ff.; 1293a30 ff.; v, 1306a24.
7. For the almost invariably pejorative meaning of these words in politics, see TLL, s.v.; Hellegouarc'h, o.c. (n. 3, p. 504), 562 ff.
the classical as with the later usage; it would seem as
uncomfortable to them for a Greek to write of the ὁδός ὑπὲρ ὁδός
and the λύσθς ὑπέρ λύσθς as for a Roman to write
of 'corrigere dominationem' and the 'bonus dominus'.

Cassius Dio distinguished the two triumvirates from the
periods of the Παντέλη and the δημοκρατία, as καὶ δυναστεία. ¹
Appian, in a slightly wider sense wrote of the Παντέλη ... καὶ ὀσμάς
πουργίμενε from the time of the Gracchi on. ²

This terminology is that of Cicero at the start of the 'first
triumvirate'; in letters of 59 he referred in terms of strong
disapproval to the 'dynastae', the 'dominatio' and Pompeius
the 'dominus'. ³ A man is entitled to use his own language,
but he should take some account of the susceptibilities of
his audience. Philodemus' use of Παντέλη was strangely
opposed to the political situation of the day and the political
vocabulary of the optimates.

This might seem to provide an argument for the date of
the work. Philodemus' usage would be possible only at a time
when the exact nature and the stability of the 'triumvirate'
was in doubt; only before the Παντέλη appeared permanent

¹. liii, 1; LS-J, s. Παντέλη 11, mistakenly take this of
the Roman senate; similarly Παντέλη in Phld., Rh.
2, 1455., mistakenly 'oligarchical'.

². BC 1, 2, 7.

³. Dynastae, ad Att. ii, 9, 1; dominatio, 21, 1; dominus,
19, 3; cf. regnum, 12, 1; 13, 2; reges, 8, 1; ad Q. fr.
i, 2, 16; ὁμανεῖται ad Att. ii, 14, 1; Πολκήλη 17,
1; Piso the tyrannus, ad sen. 12.
could a man hope thus to abuse language and reality. On the most cautious estimate the work should be prior to the conference at Luca; and the earlier the date postulated for it, the less extraordinary Philodemus' usage becomes. In 59 the 'dominatio' was apparent; its permanence and political significance were less clear - not even the three men themselves knew where their new alliance would lead them. It is in the context of such a situation that Philodemus' usage begins to be explicable.

There is only one allusion to recent history in the extant part. Even the suitors practised the right leisure activities; their crime lay in 'being a nuisance to the land of another and deserting their own, like the father of the last Nicomedes'.¹ Not an incident that springs to mind, to be mentioned in passing and understood without further explanation. Strange that it should be the only mention of contemporary history; strange too the method of referring to a man as 'the father of X'. But it was precisely in 59 that the scandal of Caesar's relations with 'the last Nicomedes' was dragged from obscurity, to be hurled at Caesar in the senate, and in the edicts of the consul Bibulus. 'The last Nicomedes' was a name that in 59 was

¹ Col. IV, 30 ff.
fresh and on everyone's lips. The same period might explain another passage, which could otherwise be held to support a Caesarian date. Col. VII, 10 ff. mentions that balance between 'clementia' and severity in giving judgments which leads to an absence of plots; such a sentiment would be especially appropriate addressed to a consul who was also an intimate of Caesar, shortly after Cicero's controversial treatment of the Catilinarian conspirators. And though rumours of plots against state or individual were not in short supply in the last years of the Republic, the Vettius affair, shortly before the elections in 59, had raised again the problems of conspiracies and political assassination.

It is plain that, despite the claim that the work was κατὰ ἑαυτὸν φάβορας, ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς, Philodemus was not writing specifically of the triumvirs. His book is too general to serve the purpose of commending or advising the δυνασταὶ he saw before him; it contains too much that is related to the individual rather as a member of a class, than in a concrete political situation. Yet certain apologies were appropriate. Cicero the 'novus homo' had refused to join the 'dynastae';

1. Suet. DJ 22, 2; 49; cf. 2; Dio xliii, 20, 2; de vir. ill. 78, 1. The scandal was still alive at the time of Caesar's Gallic triumph; the point cannot therefore be pressed. And Philodemus will have been in the East during the lifetime of Nicomedes III.
2. de prov. cons. 41; ad Att. ii, 1, 6 f.; 3, 3.
Piso, the scion of a noble family, accepted their invitation publicly and irrevocably in 59. His accession was the first step in ensuring continuity of control over the state; for the duration of his consulship, he would be at least as important as the other three, and he was as much a member of the 'dominatio' as they. A friend of Piso would find it appropriate to ignore the existence of a Δυνατία, and to attempt to divest the word of its pejorative connotations. Philodemus perhaps was engaged in a deliberate attempt to confuse the issue; by using Δυνατία as a synonym for 'princeps', he was claiming that Rome had always under the Republic been ruled by a Δυνατία. The so-called present 'dominatio' was no more than a traditional alliance in 'amicitia' of three or four of the leading principes, and required no justification. In general the book was one of universal interest, of political philosophy for 'le grand public cultivé'. The princeps' private and public life was discussed and illuminated by comparison with the Homeric heroes; a way of conduct attainable by all was set forward, moderation and the absence of commended. Few would disagree.

It is in this last fact that, if anywhere, the political tendency of the work should be discerned. By its dedication, the views expressed in it were connected with Piso. The book is politically innocuous, sufficient to reassure its readers of the harmlessness of its author and the conventionality of
his patron. It refers to δυκάσιαι; but these δυκάσιαι are not the 'triumvirs', who by this very mode of reference were reduced to the level of the other principes. The political situation was extraordinary; it was in the interests of Piso and the 'triumvirs' to make it appear ordinary. Philodemus offered wholesome food:

\[ \text{δύκασιοι δὲ οὖν}
\phiλόμους λύγε, ἕνα πάγη λαβόμενο παρίδος αἰθή. \]

Such might be the verdict of the contemporary reader.

In the last analysis the work eludes precise classification; various elements went into its composition. To concentrate attention on one is to ignore the fundamental truth that the more motives and models a man has, the more certain it is that he will write; it is to confuse the critical with the creative function. But certain factors may be more important than others; the political motive behind the work should not be over-estimated. Fundamentally it is not a pamphlet, recommending or approving certain courses of action in the present circumstances; it rather paints a picture of a certain ideal to which prominent men should conform, in public and (even more) in private life. It may be that politics emerge from it only in the sense that a literary work concerned with social attitudes must mirror

1. \textit{Od.} x, 235 f.
to some extent the preoccupations of the day. The date of composition is important, because only by discovering it can the background to the work and the reason why it was written for Piso, be fully understood. But the fixing of the date is more relevant to the personal relations between Philodemus and Piso, than to the political problems of the 'first triumvirate'. If I have argued correctly, the commemorative element is in itself sufficient to explain the genesis of the book; its main purpose was to commemorate the arrival of a new princeps, to present him with a suitable treatise which might prove useful in his new estate. An explicit justification of Piso's career and a statement of his ideals are foreign to such an occasional piece. The place of its first performance too might influence its content - a symposium, perhaps, shortly after the consular elections of 18th October, 59. Philodemus has much to say of the proper behaviour on such occasions; one should listen to Homer, and take note of the examples he provides. The book, it may be, recommends itself as a suitable entertainment. It is possible that, behind this, there may lie a deeper concern with the present situation; but that cannot be allowed to distort the essential relation, between the philosopher and his patron. The pièce d'occasion is not necessarily

without practical and political implications, but its message is muted by the conventions of literature and society.

To the historian, the work is more significant for its general approach than for its immediate relevance. The writings of second rate minds are of infinitely more importance for the political attitudes of an age than those of a genius, for they represent what the average educated man, the politician, can understand and accept. The book demonstrates clearly how far ideas of kingship could be used and adapted to illustrate the position of the 'principes viri'. Such men, when they turned to Hellenistic philosophy, could see their situation mirrored in that of the πολιτικός δήμος. The difference between the πολιτικός and the βασιλικός δήμος was one of opportunity; their virtues and duties were largely interchangeable. Given this confusion, the temptation to talk of the principes in terms reminiscent of kingship theory was strong; but the ground was dangerous. So Philodemus worked through the Homeric heroes; Cicero, drawing on the notion of the πολιτικός for his description of the true statesman in the de Republica, was led to consider its brother, the βασιλικός, as the best of the unmixed constitutions. Such ambivalent attitudes are

1. So from the time of Plato on; cf. Polit. 259d; 293a; SVF iii, F 618.
grounded in theory, and show no sympathy for the actual rule of one man; they are the product of the common way of talking about the principes of the late Republic. But when, with first Caesar and then Augustus, the βασιλεῖς become a reality, men recoiled in horror; the Republic must be restored. Horace preached on the same text as Philodemus:

Quidquid delirant reges plectuntur Achivi.
seditione, dolis, scelere atque libidine et ira
Iliacos intra muros peccatur et extra.¹

The Iliad shows only the folly of kings; both sides suffer for the sins of their rulers.

¹ Epist. 1, 2, 14 ff. The whole passage from line 6 is important in showing how impossible it had become to take political precepts even from Homer's Ili. Sudhaus, l.c. (n. 2, p. 402), attempted to connect line 11 with Col. X, 27; but the parallel is possible only with Cirillo's reading, which Olivieri rejects.
CONCLUSION

The study of these three works illustrates the strengths and limitations of Hellenistic political philosophy. Hellenistic society was complex: an advanced and alien culture dominated a whole series of different traditions, some of them far older and at least as articulate and systematised as the Greek. No theory of government which was not flexible could hope to encompass the variety of the Hellenistic. Yet on the basis of a theory which originated in hypothetical discussions about the best constitution for a Greek city-state, Hellenistic philosophy constructed a theory of kingship sufficiently practical to fulfil the needs of the Greco-Macedonian governing class, and sufficiently flexible to attract thinkers from other traditions, and to enable Greek historians and anthropologists to interpret widely different societies within its terms.

The importance of the theory of kingship for Greek attitudes to government has already been discussed; but equally significant is its impact on the description and analysis of foreign cultures, and the way that it could in turn be used by Hellenised representatives of those cultures. The historian or anthropologist faced with an alien culture often has recourse to a model or stereotype, in order to select and arrange his material in a manner comprehensible to his readers, who belong to the same cultural tradition as himself. Usually the anthropologist writer, brought up partly within an alien tradition, who is anxious to
convince Greek readers of the superiority of a foreign way of life, will face the same problem of communication, and answer it in the same way. The descriptive models of the Hellenistic world were drawn from philosophy; for philosophy both provided conceptions of the ideal state, and also showed a tendency to embody those ideals in a more or less imaginary description of some primitive culture. It is easy to ridicule the ubiquitous appearance of the Greek philosophical ideal in serious attempts to analyse alien cultures, and to claim that it was the dominance of such ideals which inhibited the Greeks from understanding different civilisations. But the problem is not so simple: modern anthropology too has found the same difficulties in attempting to describe primitive communities. The idealisation of the noble savage, and the attempt to discover in his society the preoccupations of the writer's own age on the origins or foundations of social institutions, seem endemic and perhaps incurable diseases of anthropology: to take only one example, there is a clear relationship between the dominance of the legal theory of sovereignty in the late nineteenth century, and the notion that divine kingship was the original and universal rule in primitive societies: the assumption is that the historical origins of society must reflect and be reflected in the logical structure of all societies, and that both these can be discovered by investigating 'primitive' cultures or 'primitive survivals'. But ancient writers paid less attention to the question of finding one single explanation of the development of society; their problem was rather that which still faces the anthropologist.
Some sort of model is needed for purposes of description, organisation, and comparison: the question is how far that alien model falsifies the individual character of the civilisation to be described. The philosophical models used by the Hellenistic world were not satisfactory; but it may be doubted whether anthropology has yet developed a methodology sufficiently flexible for it to be able to desist earlier attempts. The proper relationship between theory and description in anthropology is still under discussion.

Like all theories of monarchy, the Hellenistic theory is not of much philosophical interest. That is indeed true of most successful political theories; for in the political sphere the importance of a theory is not a matter of its logical coherence or philosophical ingenuity, but of its usefulness to the particular society which produces it. It is the causes and consequences of a theory in its historical context, as an expression of the needs and aspirations of a particular period, which are significant. The Hellenistic theory served a purpose, and served it well. Moreover, without an understanding of it, the political history of the Hellenistic world becomes a meaningless series of facts and events. It is the prejudices and ideas of the common politician, the king and his advisers, which explain the interrelationships between events: it is not until we understand the ideals of a political society that we can begin to understand its political history or the minds of the men who made it.
In his classic work, fundamental to the rehabilitation of the role of ideas in history, The Divine Right of Kings, (1896; 2nd edition 1914), J.H. Figgis defended his approach to a theory which others had dismissed as merely comical:

'That the doctrine is absurd, when judged from the standpoint of modern political thought, is a statement that requires neither proof nor exposition. But the modern standpoint is not the only one, and the absurdity of the doctrine in our eyes is the least interesting or important fact about it, except as driving us to seek further for its real meaning and value..... Instead of stating a fact, which is common to all obsolete doctrines, it were surely better to enquire into the notions of those, to whom the doctrine seemed natural, and to set it in relation to the conditions which produced it. Large numbers of men may embrace a belief without good reason, but assuredly they will not do so without adequate cause.' (pp.1-2)

And again he says:

'That facts are the parents of theories far more than theories of facts, that political thought is inevitably relative to political development, men are all too prone to forget...... On the other hand it is unquestionably true, that a doctrine produced by the pressure of circumstances may have a great practical work to perform. It gives expression to real needs, and strengthens men in their determination to make a stand, for what they instinctively feel to be of vital importance.' (p.15)

Such is the viewpoint from which this study has been written.
Diodorus 'Kronos' was mocked by Ptolemy I for being unable to answer the dialectical arguments of Stilpon of Megara; he left the banquet, and, having written a work on the problem, ended his life in despair (Diog. Laert. ii. 115f.; cf. Pliny, N.H. vii 180). The incident seems datable: Stilpon and Ptolemy can have met only during Ptolemy's residence in Megara after its capture in 388, when Stilpon, who was also a prominent politician in the town, refused Ptolemy's invitation to come to Egypt and retired to Aegina; he was clearly a supporter of Demetrius Poliorcetes (Diog. Leart. ii. 115f.). Hence a date for Callimachus' epigram on Diodorus (F 393 Pfeiffer): his earliest datable poem (Wilamowitz, Hellenistische Dichtung i (1924), 177f; cf. 59 n.1), belonging perhaps to his student days in Athens (Die Textgeschichte der griechischen Bukoliker (1906), 172 n.1).

The argument will not hold. Only the banquet scene is dated; the actual death of Diodorus ought to be considerably later, for he was teaching Zeno apparently in the 290s, towards the end of his twenty year apprenticeship (313-293) (Diog. Laert. vii.25; cf.2,4). The combination of the two events may perhaps be traced to Hermippus, with his interest
in picturesque death stories. More important for Callimachus, another anecdote suggests that Diodorus, unlike Stilpon, did visit Alexandria; when he went to the doctor Herophilus with a dislocated shoulder, Herophilus diagnosed thus: 'your shoulder has been dislocated either in the place where it was or in the place where it was not; but it has not been dislocated where it was, nor where it was not; therefore it has not been dislocated'. Diodorus would not accept this application of his own reductio ad absurdum showing the impossibility of motion (Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. ii.245). Herophilus, as far as is known, worked in Alexandria.

Diodorus should perhaps be added to the list of those who visited Alexandria under Ptolemy I (cf. Müller-Graupa, RE xvi.1 (1933), 803); it was allegedly Ptolemy who gave him his nickname 'Kronos'. If so, Callimachus' interest in Diodorus is explained; the emphasis on his Ionic accent suggests that Callimachus may even have heard him lecture. But the fragment itself is not an attack on a living man, nor a direct reference to his attempt to solve Stilpon's problem (Wilamowitz, ll.cc.); it is rather a comment on the news of Diodorus' death. The time for the praise even of Momus is past; he used to write 'Kronos is clever' on walls; now it is the

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crows, mocking Diodorus' accent, who recall his tenets, the rules governing the truth of conditional statements, and (more unkindly) his views on death, which are another application of the argument used to deny the possibility of motion: 'since the living thing does not die either in the time when it lives or in the time when it does not live, therefore it never dies. So, being eternal according to him, 'we shall continue to exist hereafter' (Sext. Emp. adv. Math. i.312; cf. x.346ff. The phrase \[\frac{\beta\theta\epsilon}{\gamma\omega\nu\sigma\nu\epsilon\theta\epsilon}\] is odd, presumably direct quotation; but this is what is must mean. \[\frac{\beta\theta\epsilon}{\gamma\omega\nu\sigma\nu\epsilon\theta\epsilon}\] cannot be taken as introducing the conclusion of an argument, for the normal connec-
tive there is \[\frac{\varphi\alpha}{\lambda\rho\alpha}\] : cf. e.g. x.87; 347). As in the Herophilus story, Diodorus, being dead, is witness against himself; whether the epigram is almost complete or not, 3-4 should be its final lines.

Both Herophilus and Callimachus misrepresent the views of Diodorus, for he denied the possibility merely of moving, not of having moved, and therefore of dislocating a shoulder, not of having dislocated it, of dying not of having died (adv. Math. x.48; 85; 92; 97ff). It is this concession to the evidence of the senses which probably lies behind the story that Stilpon was able to defeat him, for Stilpon held the simple orthodox Megarian position that motion is impossible (Eusebius P.E. xiv. 17.1). The actual controversy between the two men may perhaps be detected in the first of the five objections to Diodorus'
position given in Sextus Empiricus (adv. Math. x.91-6); for in contrast with the others, this is a contemporary objection answered by Diodorus himself (97), and both its formulation and the reply show a similar concern with problems of modality, suggesting controversy within the Megarian school. Indeed Diodorus' own interest in modality is clearly connected with his claim in this debate that past statements can be true without their present counterpart ever having been true (cf. W. and M. Kneale, The Development of Logic (1962), 117ff).
APPENDIX 2

Diodorus, i, 7-8

There has been some dispute as to where Diodorus' use of Hecataeus begins. K. Reinhardt, Hermes xlvi (1912), 492ff, saw the similarities between the prehistory of c.7-8 and the Egyptian prehistory of c.10 as suggesting that Diodorus had taken certain ideas out of Hecataeus to use them in his introduction: the contents of the original had run 7,8,10-29. Jacoby however rejected this idea (Commentary p.39), and saw Diodorus' use of Hecataeus as beginning with the first mention of Egyptian priests in c.10. I cannot accept the still more radical view of W. Spoerri, SpHethellenistische Berichte Uber Welt, Kultur und Götter (1959), 164-211 that not even c.11-13 is from Hecataeus, nor his scepticism as to the rest of book i (see the remarks of O. Giglon, Gnomon xxxiii (1961), 776). G.Pfligersdorffer, Studien zu Poseidonios, SB Oest, Ak.Wiss. Wien, Phil. hist. Kl. ccxxii.5 (1959), 100-46, suggests Poseidonius as the source of c. 7-8: contra, Spoerri, Mus. Helv. xviii (1961), 63ff.

Recently, however, T. Cole, Democritus and the Sources of Greek Anthropology (1967), 174ff, has cogently restated Reinhardt's case; while not convinced by all the details of his complicated account of the genesis of c.7-8 from Hecataeus, I consider he has demonstrated the similarities between 7-8 and the Hecataean parts of Diodorus, both in the cosmogony
and in the description of man's early life, to be so striking that they can only be explained by supposing 7-8 to be derived from Hecataeus.

I add two confirmatory points. The use of a main source in a subsidiary role at later and earlier points in the narrative is a common feature of Diodorus' method (cf. Ctesias, i, 56,5; Hecataeus himself, x1,3). And secondly Cole notes (p.182f.) that at the start of c.8 one group of mss. (DBA + the contaminated EN) contains an extra passage, which reproduces in different words the argument of c.10,2-3, an Egyptian example of spontaneous generation from mud. On the assumption that the additional passage goes back to a variant draft by Diodorus himself, the appearance of this Egyptian element in the disputed passage might be due to Diodorus' hesitation as to whether to use an example from Hecataeus to illustrate a passage drawn from another author or in its original context; but it seems more likely, given the similarities in the whole account of the genesis of life in chapters 7 and 10, that it is a sign that Diodorus made two different précis of Hecataeus on different occasions, and for different purposes (c.4,6 shows that the preface, as far as c.5 at least, was compiled after the work was finished). The deletion of the passage in

1. The first and last sentences of the additional passage are confused and probably corrupt. As Cole suggests the quotation from Euripides in i,7,7 may well be an addition of Diodorus to replace the deleted passage, for it appears to conflict with ἕνα λόγον ἀκρόασιν in that passage.
c.8 might then be due to Diodorus having noticed that the Egyptian example had already been used in c.10.

The notion that one particular group of mss. contains traces of author's earlier variants would seem far-fetched, if it were not supported by the only two other passages in book i, where there is substantial divergence in the mss. Together with the concluding words of the book (98,10), which refer back to the preface (9,5f.), DBA contain also a very similar alternative concluding sentence, which does not refer to the preface, and which was presumably the original conclusion altered when the preface was added: here they clearly contain both the earlier and the later draft. Further, after c.27,2, where Diodorus is changing from one secondary source to another inserted into Hecataeus, and may well have got confused, DB add a long passage which is again a different précis of the information already given in c.22,2-6: Diodorus presumably, in revising his work, noticed the inadvertent doublet and deleted it; but again one of the original copyists seems to have ignored the deletions. It is interesting that AEN repeat only two sentences of the passage, before breaking off with a note that this has already been said before - presumably the remark of an observant scribe late in the tradition,

I therefore accept that Hecataeus' narrative originally contained a cosmogony of an Abderite nature, though not necessarily wholly Democritean; whether it stood at the beginning of
the work (i.e. c.10), or at the beginning of the History (c.43), or was divided between the two, is obscure: perhaps c.7 appeared in Hecataeus in relation to c.10 and c.3 in relation to c.43. There is the additional problem that, though in composing his preface, Diodorus used earlier works as in the rest of his history, his method here seems to have been less mechanical - as A.D. Nock put it (J.R.S.xlix (1959), 4f): 'the proem style of a small man with pretensions'.
Appendix 3

Dicaearchus F 57-8 Wehrli

The passages from the scholia to Apollonius Rhodius iv, 272-4 (cf. also 276,277-8) printed as F 57-8 in Wehrli's edition of the fragments of Dicaearchus, call the great Egyptian conqueror alluded to by Apollonius by the name 'Sesonchosis'. They refer to three authorities, Dicaearchus, Herodotus and Theopompus. Theopompus is specifically said to have called the king 'Sesostris'; it is implied that Herodotus called him 'Sesonchosis', and the evidence for Dicaearchus is contradictory: most of the scholia citing Dicaearchus use the name 'Sesonchosis', but one (the Parisinus) uses 'Sesostris'. Wehrli (commentary p.59) rejected the evidence of the Parisinus, and read the text of F 57a in such a way as to insert a clear statement that Dicaearchus had called the king 'Sesonchosis':

Δικαίωμα μὲ ἐν Σεσονχώσι τῶν Θεῶν λόγων, καὶ νόμων ὀς ἰδίων Θεῶν λόγων.

The arguments against this view are strong:

1. The name 'Sesonchosis' is otherwise first attested in Manetho (F.G.H. 609 F 2-3 p.44f.), who in any case used it of a different king. Apart from these scholia it is found as a name of the conqueror only in the novellistic tradition - the Alexander Romance and the Sesonchosis Romance (refs in M. Malaise, Chr.d'Égypte xli (1966), 246f.).

2. The reference in Dicaearchus F 57a to the king's lawmaking
activity seems to be connected with Aristotle, Pol. vii, 1329b, where the king is called 'Sesostris'. If the source of Dicaearchus' information is the Lyceum, it seems unlikely that he would have rejected the name used by Aristotle, and apparently by all Greek writers before Hecataeus of Abdera.

3. The scholia are in any event muddled about the nomenclature, for it was not only Theopompus who called the king 'Sesostris': so too did Herodotus.

4. Wehrli's reading of the text is awkward. This is not perhaps a serious objection, since the scholia are garbled and abbreviated. But the text offered by C. Wendel seems much more coherent, and requires only the deletion of the redundant [ὡς ῥοῖον]

5. On Wehrli's view it is difficult to explain why the Parisinus (which probably goes back to a different archetype: C. Wendel, Scholia in Apollonium Rhodium Vetera (1935), p.xv) should have the variant 'Sesostris'.

In view of these difficulties, I would accept Wendel's text, and believe the Parisinus to be right in portraying Dicaearchus as using the usual 'Sesostris'. The muddle could have arisen because the original of the scholia identified Apollonius' unnamed king with 'Sesonchosis', under the influence of the novellistic tradition. The information derived from Herodotus and Dicaearchus was attributed to this king; and at some stage it was noted that Theopompus had called him 'Sesostris'. 
But it was not noted (except implicitly by the Parisinus scholia) that the same was also true of Herodotus, and (I believe) Dicaearchus. At least the scholia are so clearly composed of different layers of annotation that we can only be certain that they themselves identified the king as 'Sesonchosis', not that any of the authorities cited or Apollonius himself did.
APPENDIX 4

A Letter from Aristotle to Alexander on Government

Translated by S.M. Stern and O. Murray.
I.

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate.

1.1  Admiration for your good qualities is almost destroyed by their great number, for they have become like something old to which we are accustomed rather than something new to marvel at. Still we are not free from pleasure at your achievements, especially when we recall the extent of your good fortune, and since you are such a person of whom people rightly say, 'he who praises you does not lie'.

2  Now news has come to us that, after the great battle which you fought at Babylon, the victory which you have won over Darius and his followers, the dangers of those wars which you have fought and the hardships you have undergone, you are beginning to busy yourself with other tasks. It is however necessary that you should first find time to consider the welfare of cities and the correction of their laws. For this is something which you ought to think about, and which will bring you fame and a good reputation. For you know well how Lycurgus obtained these by correcting the laws of his own city: in virtue of the size of your kingdom and the number of your cities, your excellence will be greater than his who ordered one city well; and you will achieve eternal reputation and renown, since the establishment of laws promotes the welfare of the people and lasting good order and quiet among the subjects.
Many men, it is true, have thought that there is no need of a ruler to care for the laws except in times of war; when on the other hand wars have ceased and security and tranquility are assured, he can be dispensed with. They are led to this opinion because they think that the use of prosperity is something easily achieved by anyone, whereas it is difficult to stand up under hardship and not everyone is capable of it. I do not myself approve of this opinion; the opposite seems to me much truer, because, if men are troubled by hardships, they will move and wake up to that which will bring about their welfare; likewise if dangers approach them they strive to obtain protection against them; but if they achieve safety, they tend towards pride and corruption and cast off the curb of caution.

Thus you will perhaps find nothing more difficult than the preservation of prudence in a state of ease: very often ease carries off and diminishes prudence; and so men who live in tranquility and quiet have especial need of laws. For if wars are being waged, many misfortunes occur in them, and when they occur men are cautious and take care; but although many misfortunes occur in a state of tranquility, then men are taken unawares and neglect their affairs. Therefore in this condition the people has need of education and law; but law is not law unless it is acted on, and men live in accordance with law only if they have a ruler to enforce the law. But the only person who can do this is he whose rule is legitimate and generally accepted, and not acquired by civil discord or tyranny.

Indeed it is not everyone who knows how to enjoy peace and
tranquility, as these men have thought; for if this were so, fathers ought to hand over their possessions to their sons right from their early childhood. But just as one ought not to entrust affairs to children, so one ought not to entrust them to the people; for the character of the people is like that of children, since both need guardians and rulers. The reversals of fortune and changes of empire which we observe also provide an example of this: rule does not remain for long with one race or one city; for we have seen changes of this sort both in Asia and in Europe and in other lands. For some time the kingdom of Asia belonged to the Assyrians: to them succeeded the Medes, and to them the Persians; likewise the same thing happens among other nations. The cause of all this is the same: as we have said above, it is more difficult to dwell in prosperity than to stand firm against adversity. Similarly we find that those whose rule was obtained with labour and effort and increased only gradually, and who were trained by affairs and taught by experience, in most cases rule for a long time and bring their reign to a happy and prosperous conclusion; on the other hand the opposite happens to those who have grown up in tranquility, who have obtained rule without labour, suffered no hardship nor been approached by fear. So you see that cities grew great and flourish in effort and labour, but declines and are destroyed by luxury and tranquility, because luxury calls men to idleness, and most men are attracted by it and find it pleasant. This is so because they dislike education and the good life, avoiding effort, and prefer
idleness and inactivity, seeking quiet. Thus they waste their
lives in things resembling play, until the vicissitudes of
fortune turn their play into disgrace and disaster. No kingdom
can last if men indulge in idleness and neglect education; then
there is no defence for men's homes and no welfare for the people.
Therefore, as I have explained before, there is need for correct
law, and for a ruler to care for it and lead the people to the
good life - those of a common and base nature through fear,
but those of a generous and noble nature through shame.

How can a common law be established without a common ruler?
Who moreover can bring men together in concord and order, who
can defend and establish the law, except a man who has great
prestige and outstanding power in a mighty city, so that he may
be a champion of the law and a lord of concord? Through such a
man the good life can be made to remain in the cities and evil
deeds be kept out: nor can cities flourish unless their nobles
and rulers be worthy. This man ought to be excellent and supreme,
not only in courage, justice and the other virtues, but also
in power and the might of war, that he may coerce the people
and bring them to obey the law. For many people do not obey
justice or submit to it: if they have no fear, they turn aside to
idle pursuits and neglect of the law. So a unifying ruler is
necessary to bring all public affairs to unity, especially
in the case of Greece and its cities, which are now joined
together to make as it were one city. Nor is the welfare of
cities possible without the welfare of their leaders and rulers,
as we have seen in the cities of Lacedaemon and Athens; for
some had good governors, some lawgivers, and some just people:
so these cities acquired eminence and wide fame. On the other
hand that disorder and confusion and corruption which has
invaded states has arisen from the misrule of nobles and rulers,
who preferred their own profit to looking after the affairs of
the people and establishing the laws of their cities, and who
only pursued temporary pleasures, neglecting that rule from
which arises a fame lasting on earth for ever.

Now the ruler ought to consider his subjects, not as his
personal property, but as his family and friends; nor should
he seek those honours which he can obtain from the people by
force, but those of which he shows himself worthy by his good
deeds and right rule. The ruler ought to seek two things which
are of the utmost importance and greatest consequence, namely
that he should be loved by the people, and that he should be
admired by them. All rulers indeed ought to possess these
things, but they very seldom obtain them; rather they sometimes
meet with the opposite from the people, that is great hatred and
contempt, because they wish to enjoy alone the profits and
benefits of their position, and desire that no-one should share
such benefits. This is regarded by the people as an evil and
hateful deed done to them and gives rise to resentment and a bad
reputation; and the contemptible greed which appears in them leads
the people to despise and spurn them. Therefore he who is
endowed with authority should possess both these things; for
through them he possesses in reality both his authority and the
dignity which accompanies it, so that the people will allow itself
to be ruled by him and will obey him; but if he does not have
them, men will spurn and despise him, and also hate him and
revolt against him. I trust that you will meet with good fortune
and obtain both these things from the Greeks. I do not say this
as a man who wishes to attribute to you something you do not
deserve; on the contrary I think that anyone who would attempt
this would be more worthy of blame than of praise. But I find
that you have obtained two titles to fame: one is your past
achievements, and the other I hope will come about through the
reports of you spread by your companions who frequent your
presence and whom you consult about your affairs. For all of
them, if they are asked about you, will mention things which
suggest success and perfection.

5.22 I warn you not to believe accusations against the Greeks
from men who would like to harm their relations with you, because
by doing this they are only trying to harm you. For they
[the Greeks] are your support and help. Do not be angry with them
if you hear that any of them is competing with your exploits
or striving to equal you in worth and ambition, as long as he
does not show open rebellion against you. For to compete with
the people is unworthy of an upright spirit; those who compete
with you must belong to the -a- ing class, who are urged on to it
by their importance and noble ambition, or by the merit which
they have obtained in the past. Therefore it is best for them,
and for yourself in relation to them, that your pre-eminence over
them and over all men should be manifested in your victory over
then in their contest with you about virtue and worth, so that they may submit to you, recognising your pre-eminence. Your position is such that you ought to outdo all men in all virtues, and dread appearing to fall short in anything which befits your situation, or that you should prove the past oracle and the terms in which it described you to be false. In short you ought not to be afraid of a man whom you think contradicts you; perhaps he does not do so until you provoke him by the sort of actions through which the ruler becomes unjust and the king is turned into a tyrant. This is not worthy of a virtuous and noble man, nor should he who cultivates justice fear anyone; for men say that those who are just do not have any fear of God when they seek his goodwill and carry out his commands.

Your justice should be such that you may serve as an example for others, since justice is praised and preferred in the sight of all wise men and also of most of the ignorant. You have heard that, when the Lacedaemonians asked the advice of the Aeginetans, saying 'how ought we to act in respect of injustices done by us?' they answered, 'you must obey the order of the magistrates whether it was just or unjust'. And the words of Pindar seem also to be similar to this, when he says, 'the law leads all things to justice; it validates the truth and has a strong force'. Some have said that justice is subordinate to government, but this shows their lack of intelligence and education. I say that the opposite is true, that government is subordinate to justice, because he who acts justly in this
follows after the truth. There are many people who possess
government but are violent tyrants, possessing no justice:
not everywhere where there is government is there justice,
whereas justice is the truth which accepts no error; it is
above everything, and government is something which is subor-
dinate to it. In regard to errors about government men are in
two positions. Some of them think that the condition of all men
should be equal: there should not be among them some who govern
and some who submit. They do not realise that this implies the
abolition of government and justice together, since there is no
justice among the people except through the governor. Others
think that it does not matter if the governor is a tyrant and
does not follow the law. This is manifest falsehood; the right
thing is that your government should be a just government, not
a tyrannical one, and that you should not lean towards the
opinion of those who try to persuade you with specious arguments
to adopt this course.

Since you are in the position not of one but of many kings,
a man like you must take on different forms. I know that it is in
your character to do this, and combine justice and philanthropy,
gentleness and fierceness; and it is this which causes men to
admire you, especially when they consider the success of your
rule and the results of your actions. For they will have a
firm hope that your reign will last and the countries will enjoy
welfare through you. Moreover I know that you are not easily
swayed by informers, disliking flattery and people who try to
ingratiate themselves by falsehoods: this is most beneficial
both to the people and to the best and wisest. You are worthy to obtain what you deserve by your possession of all these characteristics. Indeed I believe that you love honour especially when you receive it from people of dignity and worth, and that you desire to obtain it from them through their respect, not their fear. This will certainly happen if men see that you prefer those who honour you for your justice and lenience, not those who honour you with flattery and try to ingratiate themselves with you. This will be established in the hearts of the people if you hate and remove those who approach you with flattery. It is fitting that you should improve the behaviour of the Greeks; part of this is that you should punish those who try to ingratiate themselves by falsehoods and obtain your favour by calumniating men. The Persians used to have a good custom concerning this, and it is fitting that good examples should be followed. But the investigation of every matter which is brought before you and the examination of it in order to discover the truth and the falsehood would take your mind from other affairs and would not keep informers away; this is done by punishing him whom you find addicted to such practices, and inflicting on him harsh and heavy penalties, as a warning to others, that they may be deterred from committing the same offence.

It will, I think, contribute to your success and will be the cause of your future glory, if you remove the inhabitants of Persia from their places. If this cannot be done with all of them, do it at least with a great number, including the ruling
class, and settle them in Greece and Europe. This will be acting
justly towards them, since it is just according to the law of
Radamanthys to do to a man as he has done. The Persians have
exiled many Greeks from their homes, populating with them some
of their own cities; such as the Milesians and the Eretrians
and [the inhabitants of] other cities the names of which have
been handed down to us. You must make it your business more
especially to bring back the inhabitants of these cities; but in
general it will be beneficial to your affairs to exile them
from their country. All who think about it will easily see the
reason for this. To make the common people behave well and put
respect firmly into the hearts of their leaders, so as to make
them all obedient to you, is a difficult matter which can only
be achieved over a long time and subsequent generations. If
they find an opportunity, they will rise and find many people
to assist them in this. You know what the Persians did to
their different conquerors, the Lydians, the Medians, and
the Babylonians, how they rose against them and defeated them.
Thus if you wish to behave resolutely, assure lasting good
order, and be safe from trouble and strife, you must transfer
all of them, or at least those possessing prestige and power.
Besides, this will give you glory and fame, since in the most
distant future people will ask, 'From where are these people,
and who has settled them in this country, and how and when did
this happen?' It will then be said, 'These were once the noble-
men of Asia, but when Alexander became king, he gained for the
Greeks victory over them, and transferred them to this country'.

This will ensure your lasting glory in Asia, and you will be remembered just as Attalus is remembered through having transferred the inhabitants of Phrygia from their country. Even if you leave behind a glorious memory, I should wish that among the titles of your glory there should be mentioned what you have done to the Persians in particular, and the barbarians in general.

All your many deeds and famous actions you ought to crown by your good works for the welfare of the cities. This is achieved when two things are found together, prosperity and just behaviour. By the presence of both these things together, the welfare of the cities and their good order is achieved. But if the two things are separated, the one causes a life of pleasure and luxury in the midst of corruption and lawlessness, whereas the other causes a chaste life and virtuous behaviour in the midst of toil and hardship. Therefore one who obtains the majesty of kingship ought to aim at obtaining these two things together, aiming at justice.

I know that if mankind in general is destined to reach true happiness during the extent of this world, there will come about that concord and order which I shall describe. Happy is he who sees the resplendence of that day when men will agree to constitute one rule and one kingdom. They will cease from wars and strife, and devote themselves to that which promotes their welfare and the welfare of their cities and countries. They
will all enjoy safety and quiet, so that they will divide their
days into a part devoted to the welfare of the body, a part
given to play, and another to learning and to attending to that
noble pursuit, philosophy - studying what they have achieved,
and seeking what they have not yet attained. I would love to
remain alive and see that age - if not the whole of it, at least
part of it. If however my old age and the length of my past life
make this impossible, I wish that my friends and brethren may
see it; if they too will not obtain this privilege, then those
who are similar to them and follow their ways.

9.42 In every proper affair there seem to me to be two activities
or actions, the first the obtaining of it, the second its use
and employment. You have already achieved the first; for, apart
from what came to you from your father, you have acquired a
numerous army, you have occupied vast territories and have
obtained a wider fame and reputation than anyone else in the
memory of man. There remains for you the second, the correct
use of what you have gained and the ruling of it. I hope most
strongly that you may achieve this by your love of honour, and
your urge for renown and fame, characteristics which have long
been firmly established in you. I know that your soul yearns
after other expeditions and battles, about which you are thinking
and for which you are preparing - by my life, God has granted
you good fortune and has given you a strong position. Yet
remember the harm which may befall mankind from a change of
fortune and from disasters brought by fate, and recall this in
the struggles you undertake for yourself and your country.
You have become a king of your people and have obtained the glory of ruling over them; but to make your rule yet more noble and increase its worth, you must strive to render the people virtuous, and so become the head of good and praiseworthy not evil and blameworthy e. For a tyrannical rule, though it is condemned for various reasons, is especially worthy of censure because it diminishes the worth of rule and makes it contemptible. This is because the tyrant exercises his power over men as if they were slaves not free men; but to rule over free men is more noble than to rule over slaves: the latter is as if someone preferred grazing animals to kingship over men, thinking that this was the right choice and profitable. This is the attitude of the tyrant in what he does; he seeks the glory and nobility of kingship, but obtains the opposite. There is nothing further from kingship than tyranny, for while the tyrant is in the position of a master, the king is in the position of a father, and there is a great difference between the two. Homer mentions this subject where he says that Zeus is the father of the higher and lower beings: he does not say that he is their lord or master. But the king of Persia used to call all his subjects slaves, beginning with his own son; yet this practice diminishes the worth of rule, because rule over free men and good men is better than government over slaves, even if they are many. This is a worthy course for all men, but especially for those who have noble ambitions and aspirations. Aim at good deeds in your laws and your rule, since this is a thing of which
no ruler has ever taken care, except for a few pious and god-fearing men in the past: other rulers either began to undertake good actions, but died before carrying them out, or had it in mind to perform great deeds but lacked the ability to do so. Most of the kings in their small-mindedness confined themselves to short-lived profits and to governing in any fashion; and so they were held in honour, if at all, through fear not love. But this sort of honour is short-lived and frail: it disappears when the rule comes to an end. That honour, on the other hand, which comes from a good life and good deeds, remains for ever and never fades or disappears. You should not miss this honour, because there is no short-coming in your earlier life nor negligence in your rule; on the contrary, your rule is noble and your achievements great. Therefore since your condition is such, you ought to act in a manner which befits it.

You should direct yourself towards two things which are the centre of the matter, that you should be both just and gentle, and also harsh and feared. For government can be established only in the following two ways: many people, the foolish, do not obey the government unless they are driven by fear, so that it is necessary to use severity towards them. On the other hand, good men are led to obedience by shame and love, so that the government must gain their hearts and show them lenience. In this way the government will gain the obedience of all, from some willingly and from others by constraint. Nor should the government treat the two kinds in exactly the same way, but each in an appropriate
manner. All men want to become rulers, because this is in the nature of all mankind; but they do not seek it through justice and in accordance with nature. But if government is not in accordance with justice, it is not government, but tyranny and rule by constraint. You should remove the resentment of the people from your government by giving them a taste of your lenient rule, and removing from them that harshness and cruelty which is disliked. Slaves, when they are offered to purchasers, do not ask about their wealth or position or about things like this, but only about their character and behaviour and whether they are cruel. Free men are even more likely to be repelled by this if it is found in a ruler, and will finish by deposing him and revolting against him. When you have conquered a people, you should remove the burdens of anger with the burdens of war, because formerly they were your enemies, but now they are subjects: you should therefore offer them mercy and pity in the place of anger. It is not right that a king should show resentment against his nobles: he should rather lead both them and the whole people with his bounty, so that he should put to shame those who accuse him of the opposite by the evidence of his generosity and the extent of his kindness. You should know too that free men resent an injury when it concerns their rank more than when it concerns their wealth or their persons; for they give freely of their possessions and their persons, provided that their dignity or worth is not injured. It does not become a king to afflict anyone in this way, for that is a sign of baseness and small-mindedness.
A king should know the measure of his anger, lest it is too strong and harsh, or too weak and short; for the one belongs to the nature of wild animals, the other to that of children. Homer also blames excessively sharp anger and rage, when he says 'blazing anger (?) alone is that which nothing satisfies'; and I say that not to have pity on people shows a lack of magnanimity. It is by pity and kindness that a king becomes noble and his fame spreads widely. A proof of this is the letter which came to you from the people of Rhodes, with the embassy which came to you by sea, to announce to you that they offer allegiance to you because they have heard of your kindness and pity for all men. This is something which will prove useful in many of your affairs. Another example of this is what happened to your father. Many people disliked him and felt an aversion from him; but after he defeated them at the battle of Chaeronea, he was found to be like a loving father in ease of approach, gentleness and care for the people. So people gave up their bad opinion and the dislike which they had for him, and became instead greatly pleased with him, and gave him the highest praise.

I know that this is the way you behave, but I am afraid you may be treated to the bad advice which many people usually give. For often when men give advice they give advice which is in their own interests, not that of the man who asks them - not what will bring benefit in any occurrence, but what will profit themselves alone. But I recommend you to follow the advice of Hesiod, where he says, 'To do good is always better than to do evil'. Sometimes it is possible to overcome evil men with good,
rather than with evil; and this is the nobler victory of the two, because victory through evil shows strength, but victory through good shows virtue. Remember the story of Sander, to whom Atnys gave the advice, 'If I were you I would kill this man'; to which Sander replied, 'But since I am not you I will not kill him'. So you should not listen to men who give you advice which is not worthy of you, or take account of the words of men whose views and aims are worthless, who confuse the issues before you and incite you against the people; for they do not think of anyone except themselves and the profits they may gain.

Moreover they cheat you in the bargain, since they obtain profit from your favour, but you obtain none from their opinions, because it does not befit you to follow them in their baseness and small-mindedness. Your position is very different from theirs: what is good for them is not good for you, and not all that brings glory or fame to them brings it to you. For everything which they have obtained as a result of your openhandedness and generosity is gain for them, just as a man who once had nothing counts everything which he obtains as profit.

Your good deeds enable you to leave among men a reputation which may spread to all regions of the earth and remain for all time; therefore seize the occasion now. Men admire generosity and high-mindedness, and they love modesty and gentleness; combine both things, and you will gain both men's love and their admiration. Moreover you must know that three things produce a
good reputation and wide fame. The first is good laws: thus Solon and Lycurgus acquired fame. The second is success in wars and battles, which earned Themistocles and Brasidas their reputations. The third is the establishment of cities, since many who have done this have gained fame and wide reputation. Some men in the past have gained fame through doing one of these in one particular region; you have been successful in wars in many countries, and you ought to gain the other two by paying attention to laws and the establishment and welfare of cities; thus you will combine all three titles to glory. This is possible for you today, and God will help you and inspire you to obtain it. Do not refuse to persuade your subjects with words, for men listen to words more readily than to force. Nor should you think that such a course diminishes your prestige: rather your worth is increased if you use arguments when you have the power to compel if you wish. Know that the love shown by weak men is counted flattery, but the love shown by the powerful is counted modesty and magnanimity; do not therefore refuse to show love to your subjects, that you may receive in return love and honour from them. Know that time affects all things; it effaces actions, wipes out deeds, and destroys reputation except that which love confirms in the hearts of men: this is handed down to posterity as an inheritance. Strive therefore to acquire a reputation which will not die, by instilling in the hearts of men that love which will preserve the reputation of your deeds and the fame of your efforts.

Peace upon you.