LOCAL ORDER IN CONFLICT

THE IMPACT OF ARMED GROUP AND STATE INTERACTIONS DURING INFRASTRUCTURE IMPLEMENTATION IN COLOMBIA



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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the intersections of development and security in the implementation of infrastructure projects in Colombia. The study of infrastructure in armed conflict largely focuses on its potential to deliver security through statebuilding and tends to only examine armed groups when they target infrastructure to undermine state presence in the territory. Yet, armed groups and states also cooperate, coopt, or coexist during and after internal armed conflict. Without incorporating these interactions, we lack a complete picture on how development impacts security.

I build a theoretical framework to show four interactions between the state and armed group during infrastructure implementation on a spectrum between competition and cooperation. Depending on the interaction, the state and armed group use distinct territorial strategies to secure their presence that shape the local order. I develop this theoretical framework through a grounded approach, employing a most-similar subnational research design to examine state-led infrastructure implementation in areas occupied by armed groups in Colombia. Drawing from 82 interviews in the regions of Northern Antioquia and Pacific Nariño, I process trace the local impact of state and armed group interactions during infrastructure through the mechanism of territorial strategies.

By applying an infrastructural lens to armed conflict, I show that the most insecure local orders are at both ends of the spectrum: extreme competition and close cooperation. When the state and armed group are in the mid-range of the cooperative end of the spectrum, their territorial strategy produces security. Yet I show that development – through infrastructure implementation – produces security and agency only when the state and armed group are in competition, not cooperation.

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Esta tesis es, y siempre ha sido, para ustedes.

List of Acronyms

ANLA – Autoridad Nacional de Licencias Ambientales (National Authority of Environmental Licences)

ART – Agencia de Renovacion del Territorio (Agency for Territorial Renewal)

AUC – Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia)

ELN – Ejercito de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army)

EPM – Empresas Publicas de Medellín (Public Enterprise of Medellín)

FARC – Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

FIP – Fundación Ideas para la Paz (Foundation Ideas for Peace)

FOS – Frente Oliver Sinisterra (Oliver Sinisterra Front)

GUP – Guerrillas Unidas del Pacifico (United Guerrillas of the Pacific)

INVIAS – Instituto Nacional de Vías (National Instittue of Roads)

IO – International Organisation

NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation

OANG – Organización Armada Nueva Generación (Armed Organisation New Generation)

PDET –Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial (Programmes for Development with a Territorial Focus)

UK – United Kingdom

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

UNHCR – United Nations High Council for Refugees

UNOPS – United Nations Office for Project Services

UPME – Unidad de Planeación Minero Energético (Unit for Mining and Energy Planning)

US – United States

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CHAPTER 1 THE PROMISES OF DEVELOPMENT



[Ituango, Antioquia November 2018; photo by author]

'Por ti, Ituango, construimos un mejor futuro'

After seven hours on a bus, and almost two on the ferry, the banner that drifted lazily on the half-hearted breeze at the edge of the reservoir of the Hidroituango dam appeared optimistic. It read "For you, Ituango, we are building a better future", a promise made by the Public Enterprises of Medellin (EPM), the public company that had built the massive hydroelectric project that made the ferry necessary in the first place. Yet I took note of the criss-crossing electrical lines spanning the reservoir, the well-paved road, the bustling presence of officious looking people in vests when I

arrived in the tranquil little village of Ituango two hours later in early November 2018. Around the central square, more promises fluttered. "*Construyendo pais*" read another: "Building the country", assured EPM, in building the 220-metre dam, third largest in South America, in the remote mountains of Northern Antioquia.



[Ituango, Antioquia November 2018; photo by author]

I crossed the dam itself a few days later and the thunderous flow of water was staggering. It dwarfed the river and canyons below, a breath-taking torrent of water generating 2400 megawatts per hour. A rainbow seemed to dance permanently above the mist, as if confirming EPM's promise. Ituango, a small municipality nestled in the mountains of northern Antioquia, historically one of the most affected by armed conflict in Colombia, a stronghold of the insurgent Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) for over twenty years and site of multiple massacres by paramilitary forces, finally might have a brighter future ahead.

Yet such an idyllic picture stands in contrast to the continuous reminders of the limits of state presence. New armed groups began making inroads into the territory with the demobilisation of the FARC in 2017. We were warned not to drive or go far after dark as it was against the 'rules'. Despite the dam's construction beginning in 2011, villagers discussed attacks and assassinations from a few months ago, measuring periods of stability in terms of weeks and months, not years. Even the increased presence of the military did not seem to produce the expected security. One interviewee, who lived his whole life in the village and lost multiple family members to the conflict, expressed only muted optimism. "The [military] have only come to protect the dam," He explained: "But perhaps one day they can come to protect us".[0]

Well-paved roads, electricity lighting up houses, labourers, engineers and civil servants at work, all of these are images associated with peaceful and prosperous societies where war can only be conceived as a historic artefact, an exceptional event.[0] States, international organisations, and news media often use infrastructure as the visual medium for such a dichotomy: peaceful growth is found in the building of new electrical towers, paved roads, hydroelectric dams, well-lit streets. Conflict instead is graphically portrayed through the visuals of burnt-out husks of schools, destroyed bridges, and toppled electrical towers. The conventional understanding of development and war contends that where pathways are built to connect smaller local economies to larger licit networks, where basic needs such as energy, water, and communication are met, the drivers of internal armed conflict are more difficult to

[0] Interview with local inhabitant (13), Ituango – November 2018.

[0] Beck, *The Normality of Civil War: Armed Groups and Everyday Life in Angola*; Reemtsma, *Trust and Violence*.

sustain.[0] As EPM promised, development should bring a better future to communities long mired in conflict and violence, and – in doing so – build the country itself.

Therefore, the volatility of conflict should be detrimental to development: it stalls, stops, and rolls development back, appearing to undermine the state, and leaving these spaces unconnected and remote. Yet a closer look at occurrences on the ground demonstrates that such a distinction between development and conflict is not as clear as it first appears. Though conflict is considered antithetical to development – destruction vs construction – infrastructure and large-scale physical projects are still implemented even in the midst of war. Armed groups do not disappear when the state or state builders introduce development. In fact, infrastructure, a proxy for this development, is deeply embedded in acts of warfare between the state and an armed group.[0] In territories marginal to the state's authority, engineers, builders, civil servants, and surveyors must still go about their task despite the presence of armed groups.[0]

If infrastructure represents the roll-out of the state, the end to armed conflict and therefore a threat to the existence of armed groups who challenge the state's monopoly of force, one expects to see violent clashes at any attempts to build infrastructure in these conflict territories. However, violence is not the only way that states and armed groups relate. Internal armed conflicts are complex processes, not

[0] Collier and Hoeffler, 'Greed and Grievance in Civil War'; Krause and Jütersonke, 'Peace, Security and Development in Post-Conflict Environments'; Collier, Kirchberger, and Söderbom, *The Cost of Road Infrastructure in Low and Middle Income Countries*.

[0] Hultman, 'The Power to Hurt in Civil War: The Strategic Aim of RENAMO Violence*'; Stanton, *Violence and Restraint in Civil War: Civilian Targeting in the Shadow of International Law*. In line with work by Schlichte and Schneckener (2015), Kasfir et al (2017), Arjona (2017), and others I choose to refer to these actors as armed groups both for convenience and because it reflects the language used by the local communities in Colombia. It should be noted that when I use the term armed groups, I am always referring to non-state armed groups, even though the state's military could also be considered an armed group.

[0] I discuss the nature of the state in more detail in the next chapter – including what actors are part of the state or act on its behalf when interacting with an armed group.

comprised of single events or static interactions.[0] Armed groups and the state engage not only in confrontations, but at times also work together, take advantage of each other, or simply coexist. Development and infrastructure implementation produce new opportunities for state and armed group interactions, affecting not only each other but all those living in the territory.

Paradoxically then, development efforts and actors cannot be understood as antithetical to conflict but rather part of the complex interactions between states and armed groups. Development efforts of the state become part and parcel of the conflict dynamics that shape the local order. Development and infrastructure efforts provide new insights into the interactions of states and armed groups that challenge simple dichotomies between insecurity and development. Instead of claiming infrastructure will provide brighter and more peaceful futures, we must understand how these projects provide an interface for new interactions that structure local order and blur the boundaries between the exceptional and the everyday.

THE LINKAGES OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND WAR

In my preliminary research[0] it became rapidly apparent that the Colombian state approached development and security in the distinctly binary terms I contest in this thesis: where infrastructure was built, there was less conflict. The absence of infrastructure was seen as an indicator of conflict and opportunity for armed groups. The Colombian state's expectations for the security-producing power of infrastructure were captured in the words of Major General Solarte, chief of military engineers in

[0] Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce, 'Third-Party Intervention and the Civil War Process'.

[0] I conducted research in two stages: the first in September and October of 2018 consisted of preliminary fieldwork in Bogotá to establish contacts and to begin identifying the key dynamics of interest. I discuss my grounded research design approach below.

Colombia in 2015: "the worst enemy of the groups at the margins of the law is a paved road".[0] Civilian agencies also attributed security to the implementation of infrastructure; the former Minister of Transport of Colombia explained to me in January of 2019 that "it is very important for the state [to develop infrastructure]. Where there is a road there is one less conflict with the armed groups".[0]

Development actors use infrastructure as a foundational part of post-conflict and peacebuilding strategies. A 2020 report by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) summarises the importance of infrastructure for fragile and conflict-affected states:

> "Investments in infrastructure development have emerged as a crucial catalyst for peacebuilding efforts. Infrastructure is meant to promote immediate reconstruction and employment opportunities, enable longer-term economic benefits (e.g., access to markets) and improve access to public services (e.g., peace and justice institutions). Indeed, it should come as no surprise that the most fragile states also have the lowest per capita densities of basic infrastructure services".[0]

Public works and infrastructure rehabilitation were a key pillar of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) stabilisation programme's primary areas of engagement in fragile states.[0] The World Bank stressed that infrastructure was crucial for populations to have access to markets necessary to restore economic growth and generate the preconditions for peace and reconstruction.[0]

Therefore, infrastructure investments emerge as a priority for governments and donors who believe in infrastructure's ability to support statebuilding efforts and

[0] PARES, 'Vias Para Los Olvidados'.

[0] Interview with former Minister of Transport (42), Bogota – February 2019.

[0] UNOPS, 'Infrastructure for Peacebuilding: The Role of Infrastructure in Tackling the Underlying Drivers of Fragility', 3.

[0] UNDP, 'Annual Report'.

[0] Ali et al., 'Infrastructure in Conflict-Prone and Fragile Environments: Evidence from the Democratic Republic of Congo'.

peace in conflict-affected settings.[0] Infrastructure is even treated as a tool by which to measure the degree of conflict or instability in a state. According to the US Institute of Peace Special Report, in conflict-sensitive environments,

> "the condition of infrastructure is often a barometer of whether a society will slip further into violence or make a peaceful transition out of the conflict cycle. The rapid restoration of essential services, such as water, sanitation, and electricity, assists in the perception of a return to normalcy and contributes to the peace process".[0]

Yet infrastructure is not reserved only to peacebuilding and post-conflict environments. States and state-supporting actors in internal armed conflicts use the implementation of infrastructure as a way of both rhetorically and militarily edging out their non-state counterparts. The United States heavily invested in infrastructure construction in Afghanistan while the United Kingdom's foreign aid policies have prioritised delivery of infrastructure in service of stabilising under-developed and conflict affected states.[0] Infrastructure is also strategically geared at improving a state's legitimacy with local communities to undercut the appeal of armed groups. Infrastructure construction in Afghanistan and Iraq sought to capture the 'hearts and minds' of local communities and gain their support against enemy groups.[0]

Infrastructure construction was therefore "fundamental to moving popular support away from pre-war or during-conflict loyalties and to moving spoilers in favour of post-war political objectives".[0] Its strategic value is also evident in how states view

[0] OECD, 'States of Fragility 2018: Highlights', 11; UNCTAD, 'Official International Assistance Plays a Key Role in Financing for Sustainable Development'.

[0] Mashatt, Long, and Crum, 'Conflict-Sensitive Approach to Infrastructure Development. Special Report. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace'.

[0] Jones and Howarth, 'Supporting Infrastructure Development in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: Learning from Experience'; Unruh and Shalaby, 'A Volatile Interaction between Peacebuilding Priorities: Road Infrastructure (Re)Construction and Land Rights in Afghanistan'; DFID, 'Building Peaceful States and Societies; A Practice Paper'.

[0] Gordon, 'Winning Hearts and Minds: Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan's Helmand Province'; Berman, Shapiro, and Felter, 'Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq'.

[0] Mashatt, Long, and Crum, 'Conflict-Sensitive Approach to Infrastructure Development. Special Report. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace', 12. This logic manifests itself in Colombia:

potential risks to infrastructure implementation. Fear of violent reprisal against infrastructure leads statebuilding agencies to characterise armed groups as spoilers to infrastructural projects.[0] International peacebuilding coalitions, such as the 2018 International Conference on the Reconstruction of Benghazi, the 2016 Supporting Syria and the Region Conference hosted by UK, Germany, Kuwait, Norway and the UN, and the 2018 International Conference on Reconstruction in Iraq, have put protecting infrastructure against attack at the forefront of their agenda.[0]

Infrastructure is also used as a fundamental part of the statebuilding agenda in conflict-affected areas. Its implementation – i.e., its construction – is meant to play an important role in linking rural territories into regional and international networks to undercut the marginalisation and isolation that allows armed groups to thrive. The state's ability to implement infrastructure represents its ability to govern within a territory. The process of bringing in the peripheries back towards the centre uses infrastructure as a strategic tool for asserting state power. [0] Infrastructure – according to Wasserstrom, head of the Office for Oversight of Publicly Owned Enterprises in the United Nations Mission in Kosovo –adds "arms and legs" to the peace- and state-

according to a former employee of the Public Enterprises of Medellin in Antioquia, constructing the large-scale Hidroituango dam in territories long occupied by the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC) was meant to "generate dynamics so that the project has a greater value [to the community] than the armed group…[who] needed dynamics of exclusion to control" (Interview with former employee of EPM (41), Medellin – February 2019).

[0] de Boer and Bosetti, 'The Crime-Conflict "Nexus": State of the Evidence.'; Jones and Howarth, 'Supporting Infrastructure Development in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: Learning from Experience'.

[0] Laub, 'What to Watch in Post-ISIS Iraq and Syria'; Sattar, 'Conference for Iraq Draws Investors Instead of Donors'; LBBC, 'Libya's Benghazi Hosts International Reconstruction Conference'.

[0] The distinction between centre and periphery is often used in the language of statebuilding and state authority to explain where infrastructure (and the state) is coming *from* and where it is going *to*. In areas of long-term internal conflict, this distinction fails to capture the pre-existing socio-political relations that may exist absent the state. 'Decentering the state' achieved prominence with Foucault, who argued that the state was not the source of the regulation of society, but a product of a governmentalisation of societies building upon an array of institutional forms that allowed the state to appear as the centre of power (Burchell, Gordon, and Miller, 'The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality', 178.).

building strategies of winning "hearts and minds".[0] Yet despite these assumptions it is not clear under what conditions the efforts to build infrastructure result in security at the local level. In the following section I challenge this dichotomy between insecurity on one hand and development on the other by observing the range of interactions between states and armed groups that go beyond competition.

CAPTURING VARIATION: ALTERNATIVE ARMED GROUP AND STATE INTERACTIONS

Despite the continued significance attributed to infrastructure implementation as a tool of statebuilding and peace, the literature behind this assumption is poorly fleshed out. As I discuss further in Chapter 3 in the theoretical framework, much of the existing work on infrastructure and conflict uses infrastructure as an indicator of state capacity and its destruction a measure of the armed group's abilities.[0] Yet this fails to account for the complex interactions between states and armed groups beyond competition. Instead, a puzzle emerges when we consider the variation in how armed groups may react to infrastructure – beyond its destruction – that questions whether development leads to security.

A few studies on conflict and development have begun to interrogate the utility and impact infrastructure has in conflict areas. These studies, which I detail below, question whether armed conflict and armed group presence is antithetical to its development. These include a handful of studies that noted that armed groups at

[0] Mashatt, Long, and Crum, 'Conflict-Sensitive Approach to Infrastructure Development. Special Report. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace', 1.

[0] Goodwin, *No Other Way out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991*; Fearon and Laitin, 'Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War'; Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*; Raleigh and Hegre, 'Population Size, Concentration, and Civil War. A Geographically Disaggregated Analysis'; Voigtländer and Voth, 'Highway to Hitler'.

times use infrastructure for their own benefit, such as Zhukov's assessment of armed group mobility in the Caucuses,[0] Ali et al's analysis of roads and distribution of violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,[0] or Müller-Crepon et al's study on state capacity and conflict onset across Africa.[0]

In more case-study work, Schouten observes that armed groups took advantage of roads in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a way to monitor and control mobility,[0] while Uribe et al's ethnographic study of roads in Putumayo demonstrated how the FARC and the Colombian state coconstructed infrastructure in marginalised territories.[0] Telecommunication networks can also benefit armed groups, as Rubio observes in Colombia,[0] while López-Vallejo and del Pilar Fuerte-Celis argue that criminal armed groups in Mexico take advantage of a booming energy industry to exert their authority.[0]

These studies offer insights into the relationships between security and development and dynamics of statebuilding in conflict, but there are still significant gaps in understanding these varied interactions. How do these different approaches to infrastructure by states and armed groups – violent, cooperative, cooptive – affect the security and agency of communities within the local order? The presence of an armed group in a territory does not necessarily result in violence – it may even encourage

[0] Zhukov, 'Roads and the Diffusion of Insurgent Violence: The Logistics of Conflict in Russia's North Caucasus'.

[0] Ali et al., 'Infrastructure in Conflict-Prone and Fragile Environments: Evidence from the Democratic Republic of Congo'.

[0] Müller-Crepon, Hunziker, and Cederman, 'Roads to Rule, Roads to Rebel: Relational State Capacity and Conflict in Africa'.

[0] Schouten, 'Roadblock Politics in Central Africa'.

[0] Uribe, Otero-Bahamón, and Peñaranda, 'Hacer El Estado: Carreteras, Conflicto y Órdenes Locales En Los Territorios de Las FARC'.

[0] Rubio, 'Illegal Armed Groups and Local Politics in Colombia'.

[0] López-Vallejo and del Pilar Fuerte-Celis, 'Hybrid Governance in Northeastern Mexico: Crime, Violence, and Legal-Illegal Energy Markets'. In Chapter 3 I address in more detail the nature of armed groups and I why I include criminal groups in the definition.

stability[0] – and armed groups and states are not always locked in antagonistic competition but rather can engage in a variety of different interactions ranging from competition to cooperation.[0] Links between development and statebuilding efforts to local security in conflict-affected areas are still underexplored.[0] More precisely, existing studies have not considered the complexity of armed group and state interactions to interrogate this link, nor have they demonstrated how infrastructure implementation generates new interactions between the state and armed group.

Infrastructure – a concrete statebuilding investment – offers a lens through which to understand these evolving relationships among states, armed groups, and local communities. It serves as a new set of resources, actors, and activity in the territory that affects the production of local order. When the state builds infrastructure in areas occupied by an armed group, the two necessarily come into contact. When states and the armed group occupy the same territory, they must find ways to address the other's presence in relation to their own security. The degree of competition or cooperation between them defines their interaction. Therefore, in this thesis, I pose the following question in the context of infrastructure implementation:

> *How does variation in armed group and state interactions affect local orders?*

I argue that infrastructure – and the development it represents – cannot be considered a source of security at the local level without examining the interaction between the state and armed group during its implementation. I argue that security

[0] Olson, 'Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development'; Mampilly, *Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War*; Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly, *Rebel Governance in Civil War*.

[0] Menkhaus, 'Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping'; Staniland, 'States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders'; Rangel, 'Sleeping with the Enemy, or Putting the Enemy to Sleep? A Theory of Insurgency-State Interaction' I will discuss this literature in more detail below and in the next chapter.

[0] Jackson and Beswick, *Conflict, Security and Development: An Introduction*, 3; Nilsson and Taylor, 'Applying the Security-Development Nexus on the Ground: Land Restitution in Colombia'; Stern and Öjendal, 'Mapping the Security—Development Nexus: Conflict, Complexity, Cacophony, Convergence?'

in the local order is affected by infrastructure implementation depending on the interaction between the state and armed group. The degree of competition or cooperation between the state and an armed group drives them to employ different territorial strategies to secure their respective presence. These strategies not only shape security but also the community's ability to participate in political life (what I refer to as agency) in the local order.

Competition between the state and armed group is driven by the perceived threat of the other actor, while in cooperation this perceived threat is reduced, allowing the state and an armed group to work together – even if minimally.[0] Therefore, by drawing on insights from the field and existing literature in a grounded theory approach, I argue that four main interaction types emerge: confrontation, coexistence, cooption, and subcontraction.

I argue that these four interactions shape the local order through four types of territorial strategies (militarising, appealing, institutionalising, specialising). Territorial strategies refer to the approaches taken by the state and armed group to secure their territorial presence and are a product of the degree of competition or cooperation they have with the other actor. States will deploy different actors depending on the strategy, demonstrating the variation of potential state and armed group interaction beyond the military.[0] These strategies serve as a mechanism to link the interaction between states and armed groups to the outcome of the local order.


[0] The capacity to have power over or perceive threat is influenced by a wider host of conditions, including individual leadership, ideological commitment, access to financial resources, or pre-existing interpersonal relationships. I purposefully simplify the independent variable to capture what may be equifinal paths leading to the emergent degree of competition or cooperation to understand its impact on the local order. I do outline in Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework the context under which these interactions are more likely by drawing on existing literature. However, a deeper understanding of when each of these conditions gain salience for an armed group or the state would be a rich subject for future investigation but outside the scope of this research project.

[0] In Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework I detail what I mean by these terms, including the state and how a diverse range of actors, including government officials, contractors, military units, and civil engineers can all be deployed on behalf of the state.

1. When competition is most extreme and threat existential (**confrontation**) armed groups and the state militarise, producing violent clashes and suspicion of community defection, resulting in an *arbitrary* local order.
2. Where competition is less extreme but there is always the potential for threat (**coexistence**) armed groups and the state appeal to the community to avoid violent clashes, resulting in a *responsive* local order.
3. Where there is some cooperation and threat is minimal (**cooption**) armed groups and the state institutionalise their respective presence by committing to a set of explicit or implicit rules, resulting in a *stable* local order.
4. Where cooperation is closest and there is no threat (**subcontraction**) the armed group and the state no longer act to secure against each other but are free to specialise, using their respective advantages to secure their shared territorial presence, resulting in a *repressive* local order.

As threat (real or imagined) of the other actor decreases, the state and armed group's territorial strategies are less consumed with securing their presence against the other and more focused on the advantages the other can provide in the territory. Variation in these strategies then shapes the local order and constrains or enables the security and agency communities enjoy. I situate these interactions between armed groups and the state during infrastructure implementation along a competition-cooperation spectrum, outlined in the figure below.

FIGURE 1. ARMED GROUP AND STATE INTERACTIONS



CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE FIELDS OF DEVELOPMENT AND CONFLICT

My thesis offers three main contributions: theoretical, empirical, and analytical. Firstly, my theoretical contribution addresses two interconnected scholarships that study fragile and violence-affected regions: the *security and development nexus* and *armed politics*, or typologies of state and armed group interactions. Nilsson and Taylor note that "local articulations around the [security-development] nexus" are still under researched.[0] Research into armed politics, including studies in hybrid governance,[0] war-time political orders,[0] and criminal and state dynamics[0] provide insights into different types of interaction between the state and armed group, yet they have not been systematically applied to the nexus of security and development. Nor, as I discuss below, do they often generate precise mechanisms for how these interactions impact the local order.

Drawing from both fields, I offer novel insights into how state development efforts and armed groups shape local orders, affecting the security and agency of local communities. Lee argues that how armed actors interact with state structures beyond

[0] Nilsson and Taylor, 'Applying the Security-Development Nexus on the Ground: Land Restitution in Colombia', 76.

[0] Menkhaus, 'Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping'; Kasfir, Frerks, and Terpstra, 'Introduction: Armed Groups and Multi-Layered Governance'.

[0] Staniland, 'States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders'.

[0] Arias, *Criminal Enterprises and Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean*; Barnes, 'Criminal Politics: An Integrated Approach to the Study of Organized Crime, Politics, and Violence'; Lessing, 'Conceptualizing Criminal Governance'.

violent confrontation remains understudied. [0] By examining development efforts, I bring a new perspective on how armed actors and states not only avoid outright conflict but find different ways of coexisting or cooperating.[0] Waterman observes that more research should consider how development efforts are imbedded in non-violent interactions between states and armed groups and affect local order.[0] To this literature I introduce new types (cooption and more detailed exploration of what coexistence entails beyond Staniland's 'tacit coexistence'[0]) and assess how each of these types impact the local order. I assess the local broadly against two key dimensions: the security of local communities and their agency in voicing needs and having these met (linking both to Arias' concern with civilian mobilisation and security provision in what he refers to as the local political life).[0] Staniland also suggests that "new research should incorporate the ways that cooperation between groups structures the opportunities for civilian participation and influence".[0]

Therefore, my research not only addresses theoretical blindspots in existing typologies of armed group-state interactions, but also presents a new mechanism – territorial strategies – that links these to local outcomes. I show how two radically different interactions, confrontation and subcontraction (respectively, the most competitive and most cooperative interactions) produce insecurity at the local level. This draws attention to the need to clarify how motivations for violence against local community can often be obscured by the logic of confrontation and counterinsurgency. Though Kalyvas pioneered the concept of territorial competition

[0] Lee, 'Political Orders and Peace-Building: Ending the Aceh Conflict', 136.

[0] See Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework for a more detailed discussion on the literature on armed politics.

[0] Waterman, 'Ceasefires and State Order-Making in Naga Northeast India', 520.

[0] Staniland, 'States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders'; Staniland, 'Armed Politics and the Study of Intrastate Conflict'.

[0] Arias, *Criminal Enterprises and Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean*.

[0] Staniland, 'States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders', 254.

in civil war to explain local violence, he recognises that violence in conflict has purposes beyond competition between two armed actors but that it has not yet received a systematic evaluation.[0] Therefore in this thesis I contribute to systematising this distinction by examining the different insecurity outcomes for territorial strategies of militarising and specialising in Chapter 4 and 5, as well as showing how institutionalising can lead to selective instances of violence by armed groups without generating insecurity for the local community in Chapter 6.

I also respond to studies that examine state-led development as a counterinsurgency strategy to diminish the reliance by local communities on armed groups.[0] I challenge the assumption that competition between the armed group and the state always leads to zero-sum objectives in gaining community loyalty. Instead, I show that territorial strategies of community appeal in coexistence – a competitive interaction – is not geared at monopolising community support. As I demonstrate in Chapter 7, the state and armed group each rely on the community's relationship with the other actor to secure their own territorial presence against them.

Research is still required to understand how state and armed group interactions impact the relationships between the state and civilians[0] and between armed actors and civilians.[0] Arjona calls for more fine-grained mechanisms to understand community resistance in armed local orders that are "simultaneously inside and outside the state".[0] In response, I complement this existing work on community

[0] Kalyvas, 'Micro-Level Studies of Violence in Civil War: Refining and Extending the Control-Collaboration Model', 662.

[0] As do Brown, 'Reconstruction of Infrastructure in Iraq: End to a Means or Means to an End?'; Berman, Shapiro, and Felter, 'Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq'.

[0] Barnes, 'Criminal Politics: An Integrated Approach to the Study of Organized Crime, Politics, and Violence', 972.

[0] Kasfir, Frerks, and Terpstra, 'Introduction: Armed Groups and Multi-Layered Governance', 77.

[0] Arjona, 'Civilian Cooperation and Non-Cooperation with Non-State Armed Groups: The Centrality of Obedience and Resistance', 771.

mobilisation and resistance[0] by examining under what conditions in infrastructure implementation community agency is restrained or enabled in the local order. I demonstrate that competitive interactions between the state and armed group lead to strategies of community appeal which – compared to the other types of interactions – provide communities the space to mobilise and make demands of both actors.

Through seven months of fieldwork and over 80 interviews in rural, violence-affected regions of Colombia where infrastructure projects were implemented, my thesis also offers new empirical evidence to infrastructure development in conflict areas, rural state and armed actor impacts on local orders, and state and armed group interactions in Colombia. Research on the impact of infrastructure development in conflict is scarce;[0] this thesis produces empirical insights into how infrastructure implementation in practice shapes and is shaped by conflict dynamics. Existing research on armed politics in Colombia has examined the interstices of criminal and state corruption[0] or parapolitics.[0] I contribute new empirical evidence that responds to Arias' suggestion to move the study of micro-level regimes and their effect on the political life of local communities (in my work: local orders) away from urban centres.[0]

By moving the focus of my analysis to the so-called rural peripheries, I build on Idler's borderlands approach to non-state orders between armed groups and consider

[0] See Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework for more discussion on community resistance.

[0] Bachmann and Schouten, 'Concrete Approaches to Peace: Infrastructure as Peacebuilding', 387.

[0] Gutiérrez Sanín and Jaramillo, 'Crime, (Counter-)Insurgency and the Privatization of Security - the Case of Medellín, Colombia'; Durán-Martínez, *The Politics of Drug Violence: Criminals, Cops and Politicians in Colombia and Mexico*.

[0] Duncan, *Violencia y Conflicto En Colombia Como Una Disputa Por El Control Del Estado En Lo Local*; Grajales, however, contests Duncan's claim that paramilitarism in Colombia emerges out of state weakness but instead is a function of the neoliberal state, mimicking the same public-private partnerships characteristic of neoliberal governance such as subcontracting private contractors for infrastructure implementation (Grajales, 'The Rifle and the Title: Paramilitary Violence, Land Grab and Land Control in Colombia').

[0] Arias, *Criminal Enterprises and Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean*, 249; Barnes, 'Criminal Politics: An Integrated Approach to the Study of Organized Crime, Politics, and Violence'.

instead how these vary between armed groups and the state.[0] This contributes new insights not only to the growing literature on armed actor entanglement with state apparatuses in Colombia but in Latin America[0] and other sites where development interests have had to engage with existing armed actors such as Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, and others. I explore the generalisability of this framework in more detail in the final chapter (Chapter 8 Conclusion).

Through this research I hope to contribute to a deeper understanding of how infrastructure implementation is not simply the target of violent contestation between states and armed groups but the site of complex interactions between these two groups that redraw their relationships with local communities.

AN INFRASTRUCTURAL LENS: A NEW ANALYTICAL APPROACH

In this thesis I use new empirical evidence on infrastructure development as an analytical lens. Rather than focus on the infrastructure itself and the broader ramifications of any single project, I took sites of infrastructure implementation as a space where state actors and armed groups had to make decisions about how they were going to interact with each other that would shape the local order. In this section I explore in more detail how an infrastructural lens is not only an essential part of the theoretical framework I build in this thesis, but also serves as a useful analytical approach that could be applied to future research projects.

Infrastructures – roads, bridges, energy, telecommunications – are penetrative projects: they render geographies and populations legible to the central state and fold

[0] Idler, *Borderland Battles: Violence, Crime, and Governance at the Edges of Colombia's War*.

[0] Arias, *Criminal Enterprises and Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean*; Barnes, 'Criminal Politics: An Integrated Approach to the Study of Organized Crime, Politics, and Violence'; Lessing, 'Conceptualizing Criminal Governance'.

them into the systems of economic markets and labour mobility.[0] The state expands infrastructure into its remote regions in an attempt to assert state authority and consolidate its territorial presence. Yet these efforts must also consider the nature of the society that interacts with the infrastructure project. Star's insightful 'ethnography of infrastructure' approach urged researchers to consider how "infrastructure is both relational and ecological";[0] a social construct imbued with meaning as well as a physical distortion of the environment. Building on her work, Harvey and Knox reflect on how infrastructure embodies "material promises invigorated by mundane engagements" that are integral to the ways in which infrastructure comes to endure as "enchanted sites of contemporary state-craft".[0]

Rich theorising on the relationship between the different actors in the territories where the state implements infrastructure can redefine what the state and its actions 'look like' from the ground up. The state cannot be positioned as a single entity neither in theory nor in practice. Infrastructure requires the mobilisation of significant state resources, state departments of infrastructure, energy, transportation, bureaucratic administration and private subcontraction. It deploys a wide range of manpower and official presence to rural regions far from the loci of state control. Using it as a lens brings into focus the daily machinations of state power that are often relegated to the background of ostentatious violence and armed conflict.

Therefore infrastructure, with so many physical, financial, and administrative demands, requires the state to deploy not simply its military force but a complex array of experts and labourers to its peripheries. The distinction between centre and

[0] Scott, *Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed: 2*.
[0] Star, 'The Ethnography of Infrastructure': 380.
[0] Harvey and Knox, 'The Enchantments of Infrastructure': 522.

periphery is often used in the language of statebuilding and state authority to explain where the state is coming *from* and where it is going *to*.[0] However, in the territories examined in this thesis, the state is *arriving in*, an external actor to the existing authorities and relationships on the ground. The state must therefore select which actors it sends in the implementation – and protection – of its infrastructural interests in order to address the pre-existing complexities of the periphery-turned-centre, especially the presence of armed groups. Infrastructure – a material project implemented by and for the state – is the vector for changing relationships amongst the local constellation of actors.

By bringing to the fore the activities of mid-level and low-level officials and civil engineers, their perspectives can offer new insights into the conflict dynamics. The challenges of armed groups are yet another practical problem for bureaucrats and civil servants to resolve, an attitude that is rarely accounted for when considering leadership or decision-making, which neglects "the many mundane and everyday activities such as administration, solving practical and technical problems, giving and asking for information".[0] Elmore points out that a 'street-level approach' "forces us to contend with the mundane patterns of bureaucratic life and also to think about how new policies affect the daily routines of people who deliver social services".[0] This lens helps distinguish between policy fact and policy fiction. As I demonstrate in the empirical findings, state and armed group leadership are more likely to invoke enmity and competition when discussing interactions with the armed group. Yet lower-level

[0] The act of 'decentering the state' achieved prominence with Michel Foucault, who argued that the state was not the source of the regulation of society, rather that it was a product of a governmentalisation of societies building upon an array of institutional forms that allowed the state to appear as the centre of power (Burchell, Gordon, and Miller, 'The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality': 178).

[0] Alvesson and Sveningsson, 'Managers Doing Leadership: The Extra-Ordinarization of the Mundane': 1436.

[0] Elmore, 'Organizational Models of Social Program Implementation': 254; also see Brodkin, 'Accountability in Street-Level Organizations'.

public officials, engineers, contractors, and project manager – further from the political considerations of policymaking and military operations – were often more transparent about the different types of interactions they had with the armed group in their daily work.

Therefore, infrastructure provides a lens for interrogating the nature of the state, its physical and social relationship with the political life at its peripheries, and the broader variation in how states may actually interact with armed groups. This adds depth and richness to existing studies of armed politics and of development and statebuilding. It also provokes further inquiry into understanding how the different actors within the state may also interact and contradict each other (which I discuss in Chapter 8 in more detail). I also argue that infrastructure provides an analytical approach to data collection and triangulation by drawing out the mundane and oft-overlooked street-level dimensions of infrastructure implementation. An infrastructural lens reveals what Bierschenk and de Sardan refer to as 'states at work',[0] and presents previously unconsidered dimensions of bureaucratic and everyday practices critical to the study of development and conflict.

OUTLINE OF THE THESIS

This thesis is divided into seven chapters to answer the research question: *how does variation in armed group and state interactions affect local orders?* In this chapter I set out the initial puzzle, my argument, contributions to the literature, and structure of the thesis. In Chapter 2 I detail my research design – including case selection, identification of variables, scope conditions, data collection, ethical considerations, and data analysis. In Chapter 3, I outline the definitions of key concepts and present

[0] Bierschenk and de Sardan, *States at Work: Dynamics of African Bureaucracies*.

the theoretical framework of my argument, grounded in and responding to existing literature in statebuilding, conflict studies, and development studies. I explain the nature of the competition-cooperation spectrum for armed group interactions, and then detail the causal mechanisms (territorial strategies) that link a type of interaction between state and armed group to a particular outcome in the local order.

In Chapters 4-7 I present my empirical findings and demonstrate the validity of this theoretical framework based on a grounded approach to theory building. Given the expectations set on development – illustrated at the beginning of this chapter by EPM's promises to the community of Ituango – I order these chapters based on what interactions produce the best outcomes for local communities. Therefore, the empirical chapters are organised from the most insecure local order to the one that not only appears secure but also affords community agency to participate in political life: in order, Chapter 4 (arbitrary local order), Chapter 5 (repressive local order), Chapter 6 (stable local order), and finally Chapter 7 (responsive local order). In the final chapter I conclude with an overview of the key findings of my research, a discussion on alternative explanations and on the generalisability of this theoretical framework to other conflict contexts, and finally the implications, limitations, and future pathways of research.

CHAPTER 2 RESEARCH DESIGN

INTRODUCTION

To understand how state and armed group interactions during infrastructure implementation impact the local order, I employ a most-similar subnational research design comparing across multiple infrastructure projects in Colombia. This approach allows us to identify how the type of interaction (ranging from most competitive to most cooperative) shapes the local order (the experience of agency and security by local communities) through the mechanism of territorial strategy employed by armed groups and the state (how they secure their territorial presence). I detail the concepts behind these variables and their relationship in more detail in the next chapter. In this chapter I outline the grounded research methods I took to identify these variables and assess their causal relationship.

By identifying the commonalities in different processes across cases, I demonstrate patterns in territorial strategies and local orders. I process trace in more detail the individual cases with within-case analysis to show how different types of interaction between state and armed group produced different local orders, identifying the key mechanism of the territorial strategy and rejecting alternative explanations.[0] A subnational comparison serves to deepen the data richness of the analysis by considering conflict variation within countries; as Giraudy et al argue, this assessment is meant to move beyond 'methodological nationalism', replacing countries as a natural unit of analysis by units of varying territorial scales.[0] Subnational variation

[0] Gerring, *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices*, 173.

[0] Giraudy, Moncada, and Snyder, 'Empirical and Theoretical Frontiers of Subnational Research in Comparative Politics', 63.

allows the analysis of multiple observations within cases as well as strengthening the analysis by facilitating matching units of analysis and holding constant key conditions.

While this research challenges assumptions about how infrastructure development affects conflict-affected areas, I do not seek to test a specific hypothesis. Instead, the primary objective of this research is to generate a theory about how variation of armed group and state interactions in infrastructure implementations shapes the local order. By incorporating and addressing state and armed group dynamics as they emerge from the field into the analytical framework, I build a mid-range theory that capitalises on the exploratory advantage of a grounded approach.[0] While I draw on existing theories and empirical descriptions to set out the broad framework of analysis, the largely unobserved nature of the phenomenon of interest required a grounded theory approach. I undertake what Kapiszewski et al consider the benefits of a 'flexible discipline'[0] or what Yom terms 'inductive-iterative' work[0] to build theoretical contribution by engaging the back and forth between existing knowledge, hypothesis, and qualitative observation of causal processes.[0] In this way "data collection and analysis reciprocally inform and shape each other through an emergent iterative process".[0] In the next section I outline how I approached case selection based on the data available before fieldwork.

[0] For a brief overview of the approach and its history see Strauss and Corbin, *Grounded Theory in Practice*; Heath and Cowley, 'Developing a Grounded Theory Approach: A Comparison of Glaser and Strauss'; Charmaz, 'Grounded Theory Methods in Social Justice Research'.

[0] Kapiszewski, MacLean, and Read, *Field Research in Political Science: Practices and Principles*, 29.

[0] Yom, 'From Methodology to Practice: Inductive Iteration in Comparative Research', 636.

[0] In the appendixes to their in-depth fieldwork methods in studying armed group governance, both Idler (2019: 337) and Cheng (2018: 290) detail the dynamic structure of research in qualitative grounded theory that integrates ongoing encounters with the unexpected with existing theoretical claims.

[0] Charmaz, 'Grounded Theory Methods in Social Justice Research', 293.

CASE SELECTION

ARMED GROUPS, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND STATEBUILDING IN COLOMBIA

Colombia has a history of implementing infrastructure in areas occupied by armed groups for the last few decades. The armed conflict between the state and armed groups in Colombia dates back officially to the 1960s, formally initiated in 1964 with the foundation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), although the long-running conflict between the Conservative and Liberal parties in the 1950s (dubbed the Violence for its sheer brutality) set the stages for the struggles that followed. The longevity of the conflict has included multiple other armed groups, including the National Liberation Army (ELN), United Self-Defence Groups of Colombia (AUC), and various splinter groups and organised criminal groups. The AUC paramilitary group was disbanded between 2003 and 2006 and the FARC officially demobilised in 2017. However, both organisations have had successor groups emerge and splinter into smaller groups (FARC dissident groups and former paramilitary groups), while the ELN continues to operate in Colombia. These groups are all collectively termed Organised Armed Groups (Grupos Armados Organizados - GAO) by the Colombian state, but I refer to them merely as armed groups in this thesis.

While not all these armed groups operated and controlled territory in the same ways, there were key similarities to their territorial governance. All these groups engaged in violent activity outside the state's authority and autonomous to state control. While guerrilla and paramilitary groups demonstrated ideological attachment to distinct political agendas, both types of groups have engaged in territorial governance.[0] Both types of groups (and their splinter factions) have engaged in extralegal judicial punitive measures to control crime and punish theft and rape in order to legitimise

[0] Gutiérrez-Sanín, 'Telling the Difference: Guerrillas and Paramilitaries in the Colombian War', 17.

them in the eyes of the community.[0] Their presence challenged the monopoly of force by the Colombian state, while the state's historic absence from the territories has provided opportunities for armed groups to consolidate their presence.

Colombia's particular history of conflict is directly grounded in the tension between centre and periphery; consolidation of land ownership by powerful elites produced a constant expulsion of poor *campesinos* (peasant farmers) towards areas of unclaimed frontier. This exodus to the peripheries – where the presence of the central state's institutions and regulatory power over society was minimal if not wholly absent – saw the rise of armed challengers such as the FARC.[0] In response, by the early 1980s regional elites formed self-defence groups against the encroachment of the insurgents.[0] By the 1990s the FARC and ELN had increased their strength and territorial presence while the self-defence groups banded together, with tacit approval of the state, under the 1997 United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC). As a result, the war's intensity increased.[0] The election of hardliner Álvaro Uribe as president in 2002 shifted the trajectory of the war as the Colombian state also threw more and more resources at defeating the guerrilla.

Implementing infrastructure emerged as a key strategy for the Colombian state to capture the periphery in the last decades. The state's expansion of infrastructure in Colombia has been a process of both state consolidation and a counterinsurgent strategy. Zeiderman notes that in Colombia since the mid-20th century public works "were conceived as antidotes to insurgency" while in most recent years, infrastructure

[0] Gutiérrez-Sanín, 'Telling the Difference: Guerrillas and Paramilitaries in the Colombian War'; Tate, 'From Greed to Grievance: The Shifting Political Profile of the Colombian Paramilitaries'; Nussio, 'Emotional Legacies of War among Former Colombian Paramilitaries.'
[0] Tobón, 'Colonización Armada, Poder Local y Territorialización Privada'.
[0] Romero, 'Paramilitares y Autodefensas'.
[0] Echandía, 'Dos Decadas Del Conflict Interno En Colombia: 1986–2006'.

such as highways "became a popular index of national security".[0] Concerns with armed group attacks led to the 2003 Democratic Security Programme report by the Colombian Ministry of Defence – under President Uribe's (2002-2010) administration – that explicitly outlined the protection of infrastructure as the defence of Colombian sovereignty and the consolidation of the rule of law.[0]

Investment in infrastructure in Colombia boomed at the end of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st century.[0] Since the early 1990s, these investments aimed to "produce the requisite conditions for economic development while conveying the permanence of the state commitment to the region".[0] In a report for USAID, Hartzell et al reported that between 2007 and 2009, "50 percent of the COL$ 422 billion (82£ billion) in PCIM investments was targeted at infrastructure, including road rehabilitation and construction projects that are instrumental in connecting producers to markets and local populations to the rest of Colombia".[0]

The beginning of the peace negotiations between the Colombian government and the Marxist guerrillas of the FARC in 2012 coincided with a new wave of infrastructure investment in motorways and bridges, power plants and dams, ports, and electrical infrastructure. In 2011, the Ministry of Transportation alongside the National Infrastructure Agency had rolled out a list of proposed transportation infrastructure for the following decade that would include US$50 billion (36.5£ billion) worth of investment. This was later incorporated into the 2014-2018 Plan for National Development,[0] where infrastructure would provide marginalised communities new

[0] Zeiderman, 'Concrete Peace: Building Security through Infrastructure in Colombia', 8.
[0] Ministry of National Defence, 'Democratic Security and Defence Policy', 37.
[0] Yepes et al., 'Infraestructura de Transporte En Colombia'.
[0] Fainboim Yaker and Rodríguez Restrepo, 'El Desarrollo de La Infraestructura En Colombia En La Década de Los Noventa', 17; Also see World Bank, 'Colombia: Recent Economic Developments in Infrastructure (REDI)'.
[0] Hartzell et al., 'USAID/OTI's Initial Governance Response Program in Colombia', 20.
[0] DNP, 'Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2014-2018 "Todos Por Un Nuevo País"'.

economic opportunities, particularly incentivising growth in licit industries, improving access to basic services and general quality of life. These were envisaged as key to bringing marginalised areas to comparable standards as the rest of the country.[0]

As the development process got under way, however, the triumphant promotional language starkly contrasted with reports of continued armed group activity in the same territories.[0] Colombia's history of internal armed conflict and infrastructure implementation reflects my initial impulse to examine the apparent disconnect between state-led efforts to develop infrastructure and the ongoing challenges posed by an armed group in the same territory.

THE CASE SELECTION OF COLOMBIA

Unlike many regions engaged in internal armed conflict, a subnational case study of Colombia avoids the potential confounding effects of international interventions in the analysis. As Soifer and Von Haun note, armed groups in Colombia "confront a state that has not built significant infrastructure in the rural regions of the country, but that remains quite effective in the major cities".[0] Colombia has a comparatively low-level international intervention in its statebuilding and peacebuilding processes.[0] This presents an opportunity to re-evaluate critiques of infrastructure provision that focus on the legitimacy (or lack thereof) of external aid and international third parties in conflict intervention.[0] The infrastructure projects in this thesis are funded and carried

[0] DNP, 126.
[0] ICRC, 'Estos Son Los Grupos Que Hacen Parte Del Conflicto Armado En Colombia'.
[0] Soifer and Vom Hau, 'Unpacking the Strength of the State: The Utility of State Infrastructural Power', 222.
[0] Tellez, 'Peace Agreement Design and Public Support for Peace: Evidence from Colombia', 832; Herbolzheimer, *Innovations in the Colombian Peace Process*, 3.
[0] Schmelzle and Stollenwerk, 'Virtuous or Vicious Circle? Governance Effectiveness and Legitimacy in Areas of Limited Statehood'; Mcloughlin, 'When the Virtuous Circle Unravels: Unfair Service Provision and State De-Legitimation in Divided Societies'.

out by the state with domestic private partners. Colombia is uniquely positioned in its relative national ownership over its statebuilding process that controls for the mitigating effects of external intervention; critics of development and its impact on local order largely focus on the imposition of these by powerful outside actors,[0] thus by using Colombia as a case study I can examine the impact of development without external intervention and beyond the framing of a specific peace process or cease-fire.

CASE SELECTION: SUBNATIONAL COMPARISON AND SCOPE OF RESEARCH

For this research I selected two regions of Colombia: Pacific Nariño and Northern Antioquia. I selected these regions in a three-step process. I first identified the criteria of the scope conditions to account for the universe of potential cases within Colombia: simply put, a territory with existing armed group presence that is targeted for infrastructure construction by the state.[0] The universe of cases applies to a significant breadth of Colombian territory; to select specific cases for a grounded approach I maximised the potential observations of interest in each case by focusing on regions that had multiple armed group presence and multiple infrastructure projects between 1995 and 2018 (illustrated in the tables below).[0]

In my second step I selected regions that had more chance of possessing multiple state and armed group interactions. I did this by identifying regions with long-standing presence of multiple different types of armed groups prior to the implementation

[0] Mac Ginty, *International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace*; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 'The Local Turn in Peace Building: A Critical Agenda for Peace'; Pugh, Gabay, and Williams, 'Beyond the Securitisation of Development: The Limits of Intervention, Developmentisation of Security and Repositioning of Purpose in the UK Coalition Government's Policy Agenda'; Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*; Randazzo, 'The Paradoxes of the "Everyday": Scrutinising the Local Turn in Peace Building'.

[0] I include major renovations or updates to dated infrastructure; the important condition is that the state enters a territory where it has significant historic absence.

[0] See the section below for scope conditions.

(more than five years) and multiple different types of infrastructure projects in order to maximise the potential quantity of interactions between the state and an armed group during infrastructure implementation. I carried out this selection by comparing both armed group presence per department and infrastructure investment per department. Since I could not identify all the relevant interactions prior to fieldwork, by selecting departments with multiple infrastructure interventions and armed groups I could maximise the probability of multiple instances and types of armed group and state interactions to understand what aspect of their variation produces different local orders.

Table 1 illustrates the selection process for which departments had significant investment in infrastructure. As almost every department had some infrastructure investment and implementation between 1995 and 2018, I distinguished between departments by counting major projects (conceptualised by type in monetary terms, but also in measurements of energy generation or electrical coverage) in all of them. Therefore, for every dataset of infrastructure investment, I identified the 16 (50% of total) departments that were over the median value of that dataset.[0] I then selected all those departments that fulfilled a minimum five of the six categories to maximise potential observations of infrastructure implementation.

[0] Only one category did not have all the departments represented and therefore I did not attempt to distinguish based on the median value; instead, I merely selected just those departments that possess large-scale hydroelectric plants.

TABLE 1. INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT PER DEPARTMENT (1995-2018)

Department	Investment for major roads 2014[0]	Presence of hydroelectric stations (over 20 MW)[0]	Investment for transport infrastructure (1990- 2002)[0]	Total electrification coverage (2012)[0]	Net energy capacity for 2000-2013[0]	Presence of small hydroelectric stations (producing less than 20 MW)[0]	**Selected Departments**
Amazonas							
Antioquia	X	X		X	X	X	X
Arauca							
Atlántico	X		X	X	X		
Bogota			X	X			
Bolivar	X				X		
Boyacá	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Caldas	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Caquetá						X	
Casanare					X	X	
Cauca		X	X		X	X	
Cesar	X		X				
Choco						X	
Cordoba	X	X			X		
Cundinamarca	X	X		X	X	X	X
Guainía							

[0] Oficina Asesora de Planeacion, 'Transporte En Cifras Estadísticas', 41.
[0] ACOLGEN, 'Mapa de Generacion Electrica En Colombia'.
[0] Pérez-Valbuena, 'La Infraestructura Del Transporte Vial y La Movilización de Carga En Colombia', 14.
[0] Medina, Monroy, and Rodríguez, 'Plan de Expansión de Referencia Generación–Transmisión 2013-2027'.
[0] UPME, 'Boletin Estadistico: Minas y Energia Colombia (2000-2013)', 20.
[0] Vargas, Alarcón, and Fajardo, 'Pequeñas y Microcentrales Hidroeléctricas: Alternativa Real de Generación Eléctrica.', 76.

Guaviare							
Huila		X	X	X	X	X	X
La Guajira	X				X		
Magdalena	X						
Meta	X		X				
Nariño	X		X	X	X	X	X
Norte de Santander	X		X	X	X		
Putumayo						X	
Quindío			X	X		X	
Risaralda			X	X		X	
San Andres y Providencia				X			
Santander	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Sucre			X	X			
Tolima	X		X	X	X	X	X
Valle del Cauca	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Vaupes							
Vichada							

The nine departments that have at least five out of the six categories are Antioquia, Boyacá, Caldas, Cundinamarca, Huila, Nariño, Santander, Tolima, Valle del Cauca. In Table 2, because armed group presence was not as ubiquitous as infrastructure implementation, I identify each department that at some point in the 1995 to 2018 timeframe boasted the consolidated presence of the armed group for at least a year. I then selected the departments that possessed minimum four of the five categories of groups.

While these armed groups may operate at distinct periods, maximising the armed group presence in each department means that at minimum there was an armed group present for four years. Additionally, while both paramilitary successor groups and FARC dissidents are not homogenous actors, based on the shared time frame and similarities of proliferation I have grouped them in the same category.

TABLE 2. ARMED GROUP PRESENCE PER DEPARTMENT (1995-2018)

Department	FARC[0]	ELN[0]	AUC[0]	Paramilitary successors[0] (2005-2018)	FARC Dissidents (2018-2019)[0]	**Selected Departments**
Amazonas						
Antioquia	X	X	X	X	X	X
Arauca	X	X	X	X		X
Atlántico	X	X	X			
Bogota			X			
Bolivar	X	X	X	X		X
Boyacá	X		X			
Caldas	X		X			

[0] Echandía Castilla and Nossa, *Madurez Para La Paz: Evolución de La Territorialidad y Las Estrategias En El Conflicto Armado Colombiano*, 25; Restrepo and Aponte, *Guerra y Violencias En Colombia: Herramientas e Interpretaciones*, 213–14; Rocha and Escobeda, 'FARC En Las Periferias: Tumaco Un Caso Más'.

[0] PARES, 'Que Tanto Ha Cambiado El ELN?'; Datos Electorales, 'Grupos Ilegales'.

[0] Restrepo and Aponte, *Guerra y Violencias En Colombia: Herramientas e Interpretaciones*, 214.

[0] Datos Electorales, 'Grupos Ilegales'; Rocha and Escobeda, 'FARC En Las Periferias: Tumaco Un Caso Más'; Jiménez Herrera, 'Bacrim, En 409 Municipios'.

[0] Alvarez Vanegas, Cajiao, and Pardo Calderon, 'Las Disidencias de Las FARC: Un Problema En Auge'.

Caquetá	X				X	
Casanare	X	X	X			
Cauca	X	X	X	X	X	X
Cesar	X	X	X		X	X
Choco	X	X	X		X	X
Cordoba	X	X	X	X	X	X
Cundinamarca	X		X			
Guainía	X			X	X	
Guaviare	X				X	
Huila	X	X	X		X	X
La Guajira	X	X	X	X		X
Magdalena	X		X	X		
Meta	X		X	X	X	X
Nariño	X	X	X	X	X	X
Norte de Santander	X	X	X	X	X	X
Putumayo	X			X	X	
Quindío	X		X			
Risaralda	X		X			
San Andres y Providencia						
Santander	X	X	X			
Sucre	X		X			
Tolima	X	X	X	X		X
Valle del Cauca	X	X	X	X	X	X
Vaupes	X				X	
Vichada	X		X	X	X	

From Table 2 I selected Antioquia, Arauca, Bolívar, Cauca, Cesar, Choco, Córdoba, Huila, La Guajira, Meta, Nariño, Norte de Santander, Tolima, and Valle del Cauca. In the final step I then compare Table 1 on infrastructure presence and Table 2 on armed group presence, as shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3. SUBSET OF DEPARTMENTS WITH ARMED GROUP PRESENCE AND INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT


Department	Max armed group	Max infrastructure	**Subset of Selected Departments**
Amazonas			
Antioquia	X	X	X
Arauca	X	X	X
Atlántico			
Bogota			
Bolivar	X		
Boyacá		X	
Caldas		X	
Caquetá			
Casanare			
Cauca	X		
Cesar	X		
Choco			
Cordoba	X		
Cundinamarca		X	
Guainía			
Guaviare			
Huila	X	X	X
La Guajira	X		
Magdalena			
Meta	X		
Nariño	X	X	X
Norte de Santander	X		
Putumayo			
Quindío			
Risaralda			
San Andres			
Santander		X	
Sucre			
Tolima	X	X	X
Valle del Cauca	X	X	X
Vaupes			
Vichada			

This process selected the following six departments for my subset of potential cases: Antioquia, Arauca, Huila, Nariño, Tolima, and Valle del Cauca. While departments are large and this selection procedure does not necessitate that armed groups will always be near the areas of infrastructure investment, I took this approach to maximise the potential overlap and – as a result – potential observations of interaction. This does not mean that the universe of potential cases for this question are only those in the subset of cases, but that this selection process helped maximise the potential observations of interactions to be identified in the field.

In my third step of case selection, I selected from my subset of cases (Table 3) within two regions: Pacific Nariño and Northern Antioquia. The unit of analysis in this project is the interaction between armed group and the state in the implementation of different infrastructure projects within these two regions. In Figure 2 below I illustrate the location of these two cases. The maps in this thesis were elaborated based on information on the administrative borders of Colombia including departmental and sub-departmental divisions. The location of infrastructure projects was taken from official project reports and environmental impact assessments, and I identified the presence of armed group from multiple sources including reports by international organisations (IOs), nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), and government accounts.[0] Below I show the map of the location of the subregions of Colombia.

FIGURE 2. RESEARCH LOCATIONS IN COLOMBIA

[0] See Annex 1 for more maps related to the key cases.



[Map elaborated by author]

I take Pacific Nariño and Northern Antioquia to be representative cases of the subset of potential maximised cases of observations, in that any two other cases (Huila and Valle del Cauca) in the subset may also have fulfilled these requirements and limited the effect of endogeneity. Time and financial limitations to fieldwork precluded my ability to visit all five potential regions. However, in identifying regions that fulfil the selection requirements beyond Antioquia and Nariño, I have also provided a proximate pool of cases that could be used to apply and test the theory generated in this thesis in the future.

Between 1995 and 2018 the Colombian state targeted the Pacific region of Nariño (municipalities of Tumaco, Barbacoas, and Leiva) and Northern Antioquia (Tarazá, Valdivia, Ituango, Amalfi and Anorí) for multiple types of infrastructural intervention, including roads, bridges, electrification, dams, oil pipelines, and communication towers.[0] These regions contain multiple types of armed groups because they are considered strategic areas to control. Pacific Nariño is on the border with Ecuador and possesses one of the main Pacific ports in Colombia in Tumaco. Northern Antioquia straddles the Nudo Paramillo, a natural corridor that connects Colombia to Panama. Due to their highly strategic value in improving cross-border mobility and connecting to wider illicit markets, these areas have had long-standing presence of multiple armed groups, including the FARC (Ituango, Amalfi, Tumaco, Leiva, and Barbacoas), ELN (Amalfi, Anorí and Barbacoas) and paramilitary groups (Tarazá, Valdivia, Amalfi, Anorí, Leiva and Barbacoas) since the mid-1990s, as well as criminal and dissident groups since the demobilisation of the AUC and the FARC (in 2005 and 2017 respectively). The strategic value of the region also increased the likelihood of a sustained interaction between the two actors since abandonment of the territory would come at a high cost for the armed group.

The third step in my case selection also addresses potential hidden variables in the causal process that may emerge from regional differences in background context. I do not ignore that infrastructure projects built in proximity to each other may have some influence in shaping subsequent interactions between the state and armed group. For example, a dam project in Antioquia such as Porce II that had been built first and faced hostile reactions by the ELN and the FARC may directly relate to how EPM then

[0] Due to different resource availability, Northern Antioquia had a high incidence of hydroelectric construction while Nariño had the Transandine oil pipeline because of its port capacity. Capturing both types of infrastructure also required a consideration of the geographic distinctions of the regions (step 3).

approached the construction of Hidroituango dam in the neighbouring municipalities a decade later. However, I take advantage of exploring the variation across Nariño and Antioquia to identify internally-consistent salient processes during the infrastructure implementation in shaping local order.[0] There is no clear consensus where geographic demarcations between cases must be drawn; some studies take different regions or cities as their units of analysis,[0] while others might compare neighbouring towns or city neighbourhoods.[0] I take into account overlapping and iterative factors that may influence these interactions in the empirical chapters, but this analysis focuses on how similar interactions between the state and an armed group produce similar local orders instead of demonstrating what generates those interactions.

This multi-tiered case selection strategy allowed me to identify as many state and armed group interactions as possible with a wide variation in contextual factors to help isolate the interaction itself. I therefore selected based on the initial condition, or independent variable, rather than identified outcomes of interest to extrapolate what caused these. Selecting on the independent variable reduces issues of bias;[0] the analysis of the causal process stems from the variation of independent conditions interest rather than identifies what outcomes of interest have in common. Therefore, by maximising a wide range of interactions, I identify similar patterns that lead to one outcome of interest and show how variation in the independent variable produces a different outcome.

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[0] George and Bennett argue that process tracing can address issues of interdependence through careful consideration of alternative explanations (*Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 33).

[0] Maedl, Haer, and Odenwald, 'Using Micro-Level Data to Map State Failure: The Example of Somalia'; Varshney, 'Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India'.

[0] Malthaner, 'Violence, Legitimacy, and Control: The Microdynamics of Support Relationships between Militant Groups and Their Social Environment'; Bhavnani et al., 'Group Segregation and Urban Violence'; Rokem and Boano, *Urban Geopolitics: Rethinking Planning in Contested Cities*.

[0] For a detailed analysis of this methodological issue, see Geddes, 'How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics'.

IDENTIFICATION OF CASES

Using this case selection strategy, I conducted fieldwork to identify interaction types and their impact on the local order. I identified, as I outlined in Chapter 1, four types of interactions: confrontation, coexistence, cooption, and subcontraction. While I discuss these interactions in more detail in my theoretical framework in Chapter 3 -- and my fieldwork methods in the section below – Table 4 and 5 show the 37 interactions I identified between the state and armed group during infrastructure implementation in Northern Antioquia and Pacific Nariño. The time frame,[0] armed group,[0] type of project, and location[0] are detailed in Tables 4 and 5 below to illustrate the variety as well as the number of different interactions.

[0] These time frames are approximate based on interviews, information from project reports and documents, and contextual evidence. Often, participants did not provide exact dates for when they believed certain events occurred; when I was not able to triangulate against media sources (i.e., if they had never been officially reported) I estimated the temporal scope of each interaction based on contextual evidence (clear policy changes, noting if it was before or after other events that might be more easily timestamped). Therefore, I do not capture the discrete time periods of each state and armed group interaction, but approximations.

[0] The term armed group is often used ubiquitously for all non-state armed factions in the territory (or merely the euphemistically phrased 'the groups'). At other times, local communities may refer to groups by their general labels, i.e., the guerrillas, which means at times there is uncertainty as to whether an action is attributed to the FARC or ELN if both operate in the territory. Both the AUC – a more formalised paramilitary organisation – and the various splinter groups that emerged after its demobilisation are referred to by communities as "paramilitares", "parracos", or "paras". In the empirical chapters I identify the specific group for each interaction. In only a few cases of subcontraction was there uncertainty surrounding the group in question as the armed actors tried to remain anonymous. In other cases, I use the commonly accepted name for a group even if they are referred to by other names – the post-paramilitary group Clan del Golfo is also referred to as the Gaitanistas or Urabeños. I identified the groups by comparing across interviews and triangulating with information from secondary sources.

[0] The case in Leiva in Nariño was further inland than most cases in the main Pacific region of Nariño. However, while the demographic and geographic conditions in Leiva differ to that of the lowlands of Pacific Nariño, this case fulfils the key criteria relevant to the research (presence of armed groups and state-led infrastructure) and is within the administrative umbrella of Nariño and the proximity means shared history of armed groups and state presence.

TABLE 4. IDENTIFIED OBSERVATIONS IN NORTHERN ANTIOQUIA[0]

Interaction	Project	Dyad	Time Period
Confrontation	Hydroelectric: Hidroituango Dam Ituango	FARC – State	2008-2013
	Hydroelectric: Porce III Dam Anorí	ELN – State	2004 - 2007
	Roads: Tertiary Amalfi	ELN – State	1995-2002
	Roads: Tertiary Amalfi	FARC – State	1995-2002
	Hydroelectric: Porce II Dam Amalfi	FARC – State	1996 - 2001
	Hydroelectric: Porce III Dam Anorí	FARC – State	2004 - 2007
Cooption	Hydroelectric: Hidroituango Dam Ituango	FARC – State	2013 -2016
	Hydroelectric: Hidroituango Dam Ituango - repairs	FARC dissidents – State	2018-2019
	Hydroelectric: Hidroituango Dam Ituango - repairs	Clan del Golfo – State	2018-2019
	Hydroelectric: Hidroituango Dam Ituango	Paramilitary – State	2013-2014
	Hydroelectric: Porce III Dam Anorí	FARC – State	2008 -2016
	Roads: Tarazá (and bridge) Secondary	Caparrapos—State	2017-2018
	Electrification: Electrical Towers Ituango	FARC Dissidents —State	2017-2018
	Roads: Ituango-Medellin Secondary	FARC —State	2009-2016
	Roads: Tertiary Anori	ELN – State	2003-2008
Subcontraction	Hydroelectric: Porce III Dam Anorí	AUC – State	1998 - 2006
	Hydroelectric: Hidroituango Dam Ituango	AUC – State	1997-2001
	Hydroelectric: Hidroituango Dam Ituango	Clan del Golfo – State	2008-2013
	Hydroelectric:	Unknown – State	2014-2018

[0] The term Northern Antioquia or North of Antioquia is also used to denote one of the official subdivisions within the Department of Antioquia. I use the term Northern Antioquia more generally to refer to the broader region of Antioquia that includes the subdivisions of North of Antioquia, North-East of Antioquia, and Bajo Cauca.

Hidroituango Dam Ituango		
Hydroelectric: Hidroituango Dam Ituango	FARC Dissidents – State	2018
Hydroelectric: Porce II Dam Amalfi	AUC – State	1995-2001

TABLE 5. IDENTIFIED OBSERVATIONS IN PACIFIC NARIÑO

Interaction	Project	Dyad	Time Period
Confrontation	Roads: Espriella – Rio Mataje Secondary	FARC Dissidents – State	2018-2019
	Electrification: Electrical Towers Tumaco	FARC -State	2012-2018
	Oil: Transandine Pipeline Tumaco	ELN -State	2005-2019
Coexistence	Road: Tumaco Tertiary	FARC—State	2005-2015
	Roads: Leiva Tertiary	OANG—State	2005-2015
	Electrification: Electrical Towers Barbacoas	FARC —State	2012-2018
	Electrification: Electrical Towers Barbacoas	Clan del Golfo—State	2012-2018
Cooption	Oil: Transandine Pipeline Tumaco Barbacoas	FARC – State	2005-2016
	Electrification: Electrical Towers Tumaco and Popayan	FARC Dissidents – State	2016 - 2018
	Roads: Espriella – Rio Mataje Secondary	FARC Dissidents – State	2016 – 2018
	Roads: Espriella – Rio Mataje Secondary	FARC – State	2014 - 2016
	Roads: Junín-Barbacoas Secondary	FARC – State	2008-2010
	Roads: Junín-Barbacoas Secondary	ELN – State	2008-2010
	Roads: Junín-Barbacoas Secondary	Rastrojos – State	2008-2010
	Telecommunications: Cell Towers Barbacoas Tumaco	FARC – State	2010- 2016
Subcontraction	Road: Junín-Barbacoas Secondary	Unknown – State	2008-2010

As Table 4 and 5 show, infrastructure implementation is a long process that may undergo periods of prolonged interactions with the armed group present in the territory. Therefore, one infrastructure project may present multiple types of state and armed group interactions over time. Multiple interactions can also take place simultaneously when a particular site of infrastructure implementation is occupied by more than one armed group.[0]

Despite my efforts to maximise observations of state and armed group interactions, the different interaction types were not completely equally distributed across the regions. In the field it became clear that certain interactions emerged more often. Cooption was the most populous of the cases, with 16 of the identified 37 observations, which reflects how the territorial strategy of institutionalising and the stable order it produces is more attractive than the literature on infrastructure and armed conflict would suggest. Confrontation between the state and armed group in infrastructure implementation may be more frequent, but militarising is volatile and difficult to sustain. If the threat of the other is perceived as existential, then the state has more reason to retreat from the hostile environment if it cannot defeat the group, and vice versa.


Though it is not the focus of this research, this distribution also indicates that there are patterns in what produce different interactions in the first place. Subcontraction is overwhelmingly an interaction between state and paramilitary groups, or splinter paramilitary groups due to historical links and often overlapping ideology. This suggests that cooperative arrangements may be more likely with armed groups who share, historically, the same ideology as state actors (although it should be noted that these groups do not only engage in subcontraction with the state and that other armed

[0] While I consider the intersections of multiple interactions, the key causal process of interest is in how each type of interaction affects the local order.

groups may also engage in subcontraction). I did not identify any clear observations of coexistence in Northern Antioquia, although this does not mean that such interactions do not exist there. This absence begs its own questions, as to what causes states and armed groups to at times interact more cooperatively and at other times more competitively? However, this question is outside the scope of this research; here I am interested in how the different interactions shape local order, and the cases above offer sufficient similarities with which to identify the key causal mechanisms.


The following two maps indicates the locations of the key infrastructure projects examined in both Northern Antioquia and Pacific Nariño. For additional visual aids to the projects and presence of armed groups in specific cases see Annex 1 Maps.

FIGURE 2. LOCATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS IN NORTHERN ANTIOQUIA (1995-2018)



[Map elaborated by author]

FIGURE 3. LOCATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS IN PACIFIC NARIÑO (1995-2018)



[Map elaborated by author]

Finally, while I examine each of these interactions individually, in practice they at times occur simultaneously to other interactions with other armed groups (i.e., one armed group is subcontracted to the state while another engages in competition with the state), or chronologically one interaction type follows a different interaction (a confrontational interaction changes to one of cooption). The steps taken to augment the relative autonomy of cases – such as similar interactions in geographically distant

regions or variation of types of armed groups and infrastructure across interactions – allow me to focus on the state and armed group interaction independent of previous or simultaneous interactions. However, while this thesis generates a framework to understand how different interactions between two actors (state and armed group) impact local orders during development, further investigation into multiple constellations of armed groups and the state or iterative changes in interactions could prove worthwhile avenue of future research. I briefly touch on the nature of simultaneous interactions in the next chapter and discuss these avenues of future research in more detail in the final chapter.

SHADOW CASES

Beyond the selected two sub-regions of Colombia, this thesis also draws on additional third cases to supplement and support the dynamics observed in Northern Antioquia and Pacific Nariño. These 'shadow cases' were selected in part based on the identified subset of potential cases illustrated above (Table 3), as well as on secondary sources and reporting in media reports, government documents, and analysis by third party independent observers such as think tanks or international organisations that emerged over the course of research. Shadow cases do not represent the key cases of the empirical argument, but they add external validity to the processes identified in this thesis. A shadow case serves as an ancillary or peripheral case that is part of a cross-case component of analysis in which "the emphasis of a study shifts from the individual case to a sample of cases".[0] By complementing the analysis in two regions with additional observations from cases in other parts of Colombia that sustain the same scope conditions, I demonstrate the extent and consistency of my empirical

[0] Gerring, *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices*, 20.

observations. This also strengthens the theoretical framework's robustness against issues of endogeneity that either a specific actor, territory, type of project, or period in Colombia might produce.

SCOPE CONDITIONS

The scope of this research comprises the territories in Colombia where the presence of an armed group overlaps with the implementation of the infrastructure project. The timeframe for this research encompasses the boom in infrastructure projects in Colombia since the 1990s while limiting the scope to retain recent participant memory and experience.[0] The infrastructure projects examined in this thesis are "hard" infrastructure projects, including roads, bridges, hydroelectric, oil pipelines, telecommunications, and electrification. These infrastructure projects are penetrative and connective; they are crucial to opening up peripheral and hard-to-reach regions both to broader economic markets and to the institutional structure of the state.[0] The theoretical framework outlined in the next chapter is intended to assess the impact of state and armed group interactions regarding the implementation of the infrastructure project.[0] This restricts the scope of analysis both in terms of physical space and in conceptual range. The space is limited to territories where armed groups challenge the

[0] The 1991 reform of the Colombian Constitution not only decentralised many aspects of governments but became a point of investment into infrastructure (Nieto-Parra, Olivera, and Tibocha, 'The Politics of Transport Infrastructure Policies in Colombia', 14; Guerrero, Furlong, and Arias, 'Complicating Neoliberalization and Decentralization: The Non-Linear Experience of Colombian Water Supply, 1909–2012', 180.). I start my timeframe at 1995 both to avoid going too far back but also to account for the lag time between a new investment phase in infrastructure and the actual planning and implementation of projects.

[0] Soifer, 'State Infrastructural Power: Approaches to Conceptualization and Measurement', 246; Mann, 'Infrastructural Power Revisited', 358.

[0] This means the framework excludes simultaneous state and armed group interactions that have an impact on local orders, such as how clashes over illicit crops may have different impacts than interactions around infrastructure construction.

state's monopoly of the legitimate use of force and where the state seeks to implement infrastructure projects.

The territories selected are broadly configured based on the areas of influence (the geographic scope of the project) that are outlined by the guidelines on the Definition, Identification, and Delimitation of Areas of Influence by the National Authority of Environmental Licenses.[0] Those guidelines require each project to demonstrate the full risk assessment of environmental and socio-economic impact of the project in identifying the area of influence. While this is not without its detractors, it serves as a rudimentary assessment of which territories are most impacted by the implementation of the project for the purpose of this research. However, the effect of such projects can spill over beyond the confines of state-assigned boundaries, as well as any additional territory taken up on account of the project's implementation (e.g., the establishment of a military battalion sent to protect the project, or the work camps built to house labourers). Therefore, the focus of analysis is process tracing the impact of the project (and interaction it produces) on the local order. This space includes the overlapping presence of both the state and the armed group.

Conceptually, the theoretical framework I detail in this thesis is focused on the impact of state and armed group interactions on local order. As the empirical findings that informed this framework are based on groups that are either ideologically or economically motivated, I do not make generalisations for religiously or ethnically motivated groups. However, I expect that such armed groups, if they operate according to similar interests of securing territorial presence against threat, would demonstrate similar behaviour. Equally, this theoretical framework does not interrogate the factors that lead to competitive or cooperative interactions. While

[0] ANLA, 'Order for Environmental Sanctionary Procedure'.

research has started to explore under what conditions armed groups transition between fighting and supporting the state for selected conflicts,[0] I am more interested in identifying how different interactions between the state and an armed group during infrastructure implementation impact local orders.

METHODS

QUALITATIVE DATA

The nature of the question as well as the mechanism-centred approach of process tracing required a qualitative research design. Collecting primary data through semi-structured interviews and field observations within the territories of interest was essential in identifying the interaction between the armed group and the state and its impact on the local order. Census data and conflict statistics from these areas are often underreported or erroneous because local communities may not be willing to trust or report incidents to official databases. While I did draw data from secondary sources to support the process tracing, scarcity of reporting at the submunicipal level made it difficult to assess quantitative changes over time. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Events Dataset (UCDP GED), the most comprehensive armed conflict database with imbedded geocoded data was useful in indicating what reported violence there had been in the different municipalities in the key timeframes of the project. However, these observations were not sufficient nor precise enough to run regressions and evaluate statistically. Ituango, which has faced several waves of violence in the last two decades only had 4 data inputs since the implementation of the

[0] Seymour, 'Why Factions Switch Sides in Civil Wars: Rivalry, Patronage, and Realignment in Sudan'; Otto, 'The Grass Is Always Greener? Armed Group Side Switching in Civil Wars'; Berti, 'From Cooperation to Competition: Localization, Militarization and Rebel Co-Governance Arrangements in Syria'.

project in 2008, while the georeferencing for events across the cases rarely specified the submunicipal location and had a largely urban bias (despite Eck observing that UCDP had the superior geocoded dataset compared to Armed Conflict Location Events Dataset [ACLED]),[0] making it very difficult to ascertain how events could be linked to the project in municipalities as large as Barbacoas or Tumaco.[0] However, as I discuss in the conclusion in Chapter 8, incorporating more detailed quantitative analysis (potentially through surveys) would serve as a robust complement to this theory-building work.

Therefore, the majority of the data I have collected and analysed in this thesis is qualitative based on reporting the experiences of relevant stakeholders involved in these territories and these projects. As noted previously, interactions between the state and an armed group that defied obvious acts of violence are difficult to identify from a distance due to reluctance on both sides to make such information public. I often identified the variables of interest based on information that was rarely reported and at times dismissed or concealed (especially cooption and subcontraction). Reported data also fails to capture how a local order provides security or insecurity beyond overall records of fatalities as proxies for insecurity. As Owen suggests, a person may feel insecure even when objective indicators appear to be favourable.[0] Areas of low fatalities or displacement may not mean that the communities experience security.[0] Insecurity is not necessarily manifested by the direct use of violence but in how its fearful potential structures everyday life.

[0] Eck, 'In Data We Trust? A Comparison of UCDP GED and ACLED Conflict Events Datasets', 138.
[0] Sundberg and Melander, 'Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset'.
[0] Owen, 'The Critique That Doesn't Bite: A Response to David Chandler's Human Security: The Dog That Didn't Bark'', 449.
[0] Rotker, 'Cities Written by Violence: An Introduction'. The circulation of threat pamphlets by armed actors prohibiting certain behaviours may induce anxiety and fear within communities. If one person is killed for some explicit breach of behaviour (or even for no discernible reason) this can also negatively affect the community and the perception by individuals of being the next potential victim.

DATA COLLECTION

My data collection was primarily based on seven months of fieldwork involving the collection of 82 semi-structured interviews as well as field observations. I collected the data between September 2018 and April 2019. I selected individuals based on relevant characteristics to the research question,[0] such as position (officials or private contractors managing infrastructure projects), experience (staff at NGOs or IOs with unique insight on regional and local dynamics), and location (local communities living in the territory of interest). I used a snowballing technique where an initial small set of contacts was used to reach new gatekeepers and connect with more participants with the relevant characteristics. I did not have a set quantity of interviews I wanted to carry out; I continued until I felt that I had achieved sufficient redundancy in responses that a theoretical saturation was reached.

The first phase of my fieldwork occurred in September 2018 in Bogotá. I developed contacts through high level stakeholders in non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international organisations (IOs), and civil society organisations in Bogota which led to contacting gatekeepers and stakeholders in the state capital cities of Medellin (Antioquia) and Pasto (Nariño). For the second stage of fieldwork, I went to Medellin from end of October 2018 to end of January 2019. I visited Bogotá again in January and then went to Nariño beginning of February 2019 until end of March, where I briefly returned to Antioquia before leaving Colombia in April 2019.

At national and subnational levels, I carried out interviews with state officials working in infrastructure development. I also carried out interviews with engineers, experts, and consultants working on the specific infrastructure projects. Multiple contacts in

[0] Kapiszewski, MacLean, and Read, *Field Research in Political Science: Practices and Principles*, 212.

both the national and regional capitals allowed various branching pathways to make contacts with local stakeholders in targeted communities. I arranged interviews in one community through more than one gatekeeper to minimise potential bias and build trust by confirming my non-allegiance to any governmental or non-governmental organisations even when I made initial contact through these organisations. I carried out interviews with a cross-section of local community leaders and members in the municipalities of Tumaco and Barbacoas (in the department of Nariño) and in Ituango, Santa Rosas, Tarazá, Valdivia, and Amalfi (in Antioquia). I also carried out interviews with local officials, and third-party observers in IOs, NGOs, and activists who had worked directly with local communities in these selected areas. The interviews drew from a wide variety of sources and perspectives in order to account for potential bias. I also drew data from secondary sources in news articles, government documents such as Early Alert Reports from the National Human Rights Ombudsman's Office, reports by local NGOs, and international organisations such as Human Rights Watch and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). These secondary sources helped address gaps in information and potential bias. As Bennett argues, "these desiderata are especially important in process tracing on social and political phenomena for which participating actors have strong instrumental or ideational reasons for hiding or misrepresenting evidence on their behaviour or motives".[0]

Finally, areas affected by conflict can affect the uncertain nature of data collection in the field. Goldsmith argues that conflict and criminal research offers many obstacles for primary qualitative data collection; not only do the relevant actors want to avoid informing on their movements or activities, but the threat of retaliation may inspire

[0] Bennett, 'Governments, Civilians, and the Evolution of Insurgency: Modeling the Early Dynamics of Insurgencies', 707.

others to do the same.[0] Unexpected events in the field should not be viewed as a sign to abandon the project or start-over, but as Nordstrom and Robben urge, a chance to understand the nature of accidental anthropology as it pertains "to a wider social and cultural context".[0] Although this research focuses on the broader political study of security and development in International Relations, it shares methodological similarities with the qualitative approaches found in other fields that yield useful insights.

Equally, it is often a feature in academic research to gloss over the perceived failings or shortcomings of field research in order to present a robust account of data collection. I believe this is a missed opportunity, as failures and silences in the field offer new insights into behaviors of different actors both in the peripheries and in the centre. These observations are mediated through my own intuitions and biases. Limitations are addressed by triangulating the observations of silences and instances of disruption or failure with data collected from official sources and interviews and stories shared in the field.

ETHICS

In-person interviews allow a detailed appreciation of the intersubjectivities of power between the various key actors (public officials, private contractors, armed groups, and different individuals in civil communities). This involves a qualitative exploration and interpretation of their social world and focuses on the "experiences, perspectives and histories"[0] of how they interrelate. These interviews explore the various ways

[0] Goldsmith, 'Fear, Fumbling and Frustration: Reflections on Doing Criminological Fieldwork in Colombia'.
[0] Nordstrom and Robben, *Fieldwork under Fire: Contemporary Studies of Violence and Culture*, 16.
[0] Ritchie et al., *Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers*, 3.

relationships are structured between armed groups, the state, and local communities. While I was granted ethical approval by the University of Oxford's CUREC process before beginning fieldwork, the intimacy and willingness required for marginalised communities to share experiences and insights with a relative stranger obliged me to continuously focus on building trust rather than treating fieldwork as an exercise in data extraction. Navigating the obstacles and potential risks of participation should be at the forefront of the researcher's mind during fieldwork. Fieldwork in conflict areas produces additional thorny ethical entanglements. I characterise these as responsibility, positionality, and safety.

I primarily approached this research with the sense of responsibility it entailed. The thesis aims at interrogating the processes, relationships, and power dynamics that characterise insecurity and to give a voice to marginalised communities and their experiences. As a researcher I was able to enter conflict spaces, build rapport and relations with local communities, and leave once the data was collected or if the situation was not amenable. As Nordstrom and Robben write in their thoughtful assessment of *Fieldwork under Fire*, there is an unavoidable contradiction in how "privilege will be applied for its own benefit and reproduce itself even at the expense of others, while at the same time it will be applied to protest against the inequities and injuries caused by the scramble for gain".[0] While I do not know any satisfactory way to resolve this tension, it requires transparency and respect in how I express the stories entrusted to me.

This responsibility is particularly pressing in areas affected by armed conflict or contention. Wood asserts that:

[0] Nordstrom and Robben, *Fieldwork under Fire: Contemporary Studies of Violence and Culture*, 12.

> "the ethical imperative of research ('do no harm') is intensified in conflict zones by political polarisation, the presence of armed actors, the precarious security of most residents, the general unpredictability of events, and the traumatisation through violence of combatants and civilians alike."[0]

With this in mind, the data collection process was done with complete anonymity of all participants.[0] I paid attention to the relative position, perspective, and power of the participant, though any and all reference to name or identifying information was removed from the data at the point of recording to be stored separately. This preoccupation with the safety and comfort of the participants also extended to the interview process. Fieldwork is an iterative process; my experiences in the first few weeks clarified my data collection protocol to ensure participants felt they had authority over their own stories and put them at ease. I provided all participants with my contact details and information of my university and supervisor. In many cases (though not all) I have remained in contact with members of these different communities, to inform them of progress of the work, as well as maintaining personal ties. The nature of many of the interviews and the literacy and comfort of participants meant that I asked for consent orally, after a discussion of their rights, ability to retract or change their statements at any time, and the assurance of their complete anonymity. Although in some cases participants indicated that they did not mind if their names were mentioned, I have erred on the side of caution. In only exceptional cases the position and relative authority of the participant meant they might be easier to identify; I believe these precautions are effective in keeping individuals out of the focus of this research to foreground the shared narratives and stories that reflect daily life.

[0] Wood, 'The Ethical Challenges of Field Research in Conflict Zones', 373.

[0] Almost all interviews were carried out one-on-one and in person, with a few exceptions including two group interviews and one email exchange where the messages were then deleted. An index of all the interviews can be found in Annex 2.

Additionally, after a few attempts with a recording device, it became apparent that in the territories, the nature of the discussion meant several participants found the use of the recording device discomforting. Bernard contends that participant observation requires "getting close to people and making them feel comfortable enough with your presence so that you can observe and record information about their lives"[0] which in the context of conflict adds an extra level of insecurity. Even when participants indicated they did not mind, the occasional semi-public environment of the interviews, or casual nature of the discussion meant that interruptions could occur where identifying details were expressed and recorded on the device. While I made every effort to keep the data in secure locations when travelling or staying on site, there was no guarantee against potential confiscation or common theft. To preserve anonymity, I therefore relied largely on extensive field notes, taken during and immediately after interviews as well as observations of my own experiences. I also reflected on the data collection process in field reports shared and discussed with my supervisor.

There are also distinct ethical and methodological concerns that arise depending on context. Data collection across all the interactions in this research could be difficult and discussions of violence during ongoing conflict are complicated. The repressive nature of the local order produced in subcontracted interactions incentivises silence by all involved. Evidence is more readily collected from cases that have already achieved a high level of media exposure or formal investigation because not only does it permit increased triangulation but also the level of visibility indicates that people are more willing to speak on the subject. Therefore, in my subcontraction chapter I did not seek to prove that cooperative arrangements between armed groups and the state exist in

[0] Bernard, *Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*, 136.

the cases of interest.[0] Local community members are often themselves unable to identify the principals of the armed actors who commit abuses against them[0] or unwilling to verbalise if they do know.[0] Instead, they [or I] must infer from their own conclusions and the intention of the threat, who is the beneficiary of such actions, while drawing on other resources to strengthen these inferences.

There are also broader repercussions of cooperation between state and an armed group that go beyond specific infrastructure projects. In Nariño I interviewed a UN official who had lived a long time in the territories. He had been discussing the incursion of paramilitary groups and their demobilisation in 2005 and the impact this had on levels of violence in the territories. I then asked about the effect of Uribe's democratic security policy in the territory at the same time. This national strategy was known to combine an extreme offensive against the FARC with an unofficial alliance with the AUC, a 'politic of peace'. He was uncomfortable. "You kill [people] with that question," he said finally, and then tried to make light of it. I apologised and made clear we did not have to speak any further on the subject or at all, but he was willing to continue, albeit on other subjects. My role as a researcher and interlocutor in this dynamic is complicated. I am largely unknown to most of the participants and therefore an uncertain source of risk. Even if I am not treated as someone who poses an intent to cause harm, my apparent lack of understanding of the silences required by the unwritten rules of local orders makes me dangerous. Where in other cases I assumed that silence was out of fear of answering, here I also noted that danger could be a matter of simply posing the question.

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[0] Auyero and Sobering distinguish between proving - in legal terms - the empirical facts they observe compared with collecting academically valuable data in their study of police and criminal interactions in Argentina (Auyero and Sobering, *The Ambivalent State: Police-Criminal Collusion at the Urban Margins*, 30).

[0] Krahmann, 'NATO Contracting in Afghanistan: The Problem of Principal–Agent Networks', 1412.

[0] Witness, 'A Hidden Crisis? Increase in Killings as Tensions Rise over Land and Forests', 8.

Therefore, I took as many precautions as possible to ensure that the interviewees were unidentifiable, that they were comfortable and understood their right to retract anything they said or stop at any moment. Ethical considerations must go beyond the treatment of the information provided but also engage with what is withheld. I acknowledge that other researchers in such contexts may not have found such approaches necessary. However, in the balance of risks, I determined this form of data collection to be the best course of action at that stage. From an ethical perspective, the onus was on myself to ensure that the stories entrusted to me were not only faithfully expressed but done so with the wellbeing of the participants in mind. I am less likely to face consequences for asking questions on sensitive topics than are the participants for answering them. Therefore, I should do everything in my power to ensure that my fieldwork and data collection do not put the participants, especially marginalised communities, at risk.

I also must consider my position in the field, which I enter as an outsider, an observer, female, educated, and white. Positionality recognises that identity can be fluid, changing according to context. Despite having been raised and lived in the US, my family ties to Uruguay were instrumental in forging connection with participants. The recognition of my accent in Spanish and confirmation of nationality often led to participants expressing pleasure at speaking with a Uruguayan, citing the positive reputation Uruguay enjoyed in Colombia, including its former President Mujica and even its success in producing footballers of international caliber. Drawing from my Uruguayan background permitted connections that associations with other countries – such as the US – were less likely to inspire.

Positionality also demands that I recognise my own privileges and, in some cases, the vast differences in background and lifestyle with my participants. I made efforts,

whenever possible, to not only conduct interviews with participants but particularly in more isolated regions to spend some time socialising, having meals, going for drinks and even dancing, meeting family and neighbors, enjoying their tours of the village, and their very generous hospitality. While restrictions of safety, as detailed below, meant that these visits rarely resulted in long-term stays, I did my best to go beyond a cursory interest in their lives to have thoughtful conversations outside of the context of interviewing. These interactions not only enriched my understanding of their daily experiences but produced meaningful relationships and interactions I value outside of my research. It also allowed my participants and other locals to learn about me, trying whenever appropriate to correct the imbalance of an interview by expressing my own beliefs, values, and experiences honestly and directly.

Finally, there were some safety concerns I had to address in undertaking this research. I took all necessary precautions before and during the fieldwork, including attending a specialised course on Academic Research in Conflict and Contention (ARCC) on the necessities and obligations of methods and ethics in sites of conflict as well as practical matters of security. In the field, I followed safety protocols agreed upon between myself and my supervisor including a local and regional point of contact. When in more difficult areas I would send daily and sometimes twice daily updates. In areas where the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) recommended against all travel such as Tumaco I travelled with the UN and stayed in the same hotels as the UN officials. These measures were meant to protect against the worst possible scenarios. I also consulted with local and experienced contacts, kept up to date on conflict developments, and exercised my own common sense in difficult situations. No data was worth collecting if it placed myself or others in harm's way.

ANALYTICAL STRATEGY

INDICATORS: IDENTIFYING VARIABLES, OUTCOMES, AND MECHANISMS

The aim in my analysis of the data was to identify and assess the sequential trajectories that causally link the state and armed group's interaction to specific results in the local order through tracing the causal mechanism. Bennett and Checkel define process tracing as an analysis of the evidence on sequences, processes, and conjunctures of events within a case for the purpose of developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms.[0] Gerring notes that such a method is particularly useful in acquiring in-depth insights on the causal pathways that connect two or more variables of interest.[0]

Drawing from existing work on state and armed group interactions[0] my analysis sought to make sense of raw data and identify consistent causal pathways across the observations. In this section I outline the process-tracing method of analysis and its aim in inductively building rather than testing theory. I explain how I coded the data and identified key interactions relevant to the causal pathways of interest and how this evidence factored into my analysis.

To illustrate how I analysed the evidence detailed, I depict the causal process traced in the following table. I take insecurity to be the worst outcome for the threat it poses to human lives and bodily integrity. Lack of agency is not desired but less damaging. Security meets a basic fundamental need, but agency takes the local order a step further by enabling community mobilisation and involvement in the political

[0] Bennett and Checkel, 'Process Tracing', 4.

[0] Gerring, *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices*, 181.

[0] Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*; Kalyvas, 'Micro-Level Studies of Violence in Civil War: Refining and Extending the Control-Collaboration Model'; Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*; Reno, 'Patronage Politics and the Behavior of Armed Groups'; Arias, *Criminal Enterprises and Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean*; Barnes, 'Criminal Politics: An Integrated Approach to the Study of Organized Crime, Politics, and Violence'.

process. This table is organised from the most insecure local order to the one with most agency (as the subsequent empirical chapters are organised).

TABLE 6. TRACING THE EVIDENCE

Interaction	Confrontation	Subcontraction	Cooption	Coexistence
	High threat perception.	No threat perception.	Minimal threat perception.	Potential threat perception.
Territorial Strategy	Militarising	Specialising	Institutionalising	Appealing
	Armed confrontation between actors.	Extralegal and legal targeting of community opposition by both actors.	Payment of extortion between actors.	Use of community to limit actions of the other actor.
Local Order	Arbitrary	Repressive	Stable	Responsive
	Collateral damage.	Selective victimization.	No/minimal violence.	No/minimal violence.
	Displacement.	Displacement.	Community exclusion.	Community inclusion.
	Indiscriminate victimization.	Community self-silencing		

Whether there is competition or cooperation between the state and an armed group is not an immediately observable phenomenon as it is imbedded in perceived threat or lack thereof between the two actors. It may be identified in the language used by state and the armed group: “we must prevent them from entering the territory”, “we can work in the same territory”, “we are here to support the state”, etc. Some observable implications of the interaction include statements made by either actor (“we can never be sure if violence will break out again”, “they can be negotiated with”) that point to their perception of threat of the other actor.

However, the state and armed group are not always forthcoming on perceived threat. Direct proclamations on the nature of the interaction by either actor are rare, especially beyond confrontation since that is – especially as far as the state is concerned – the most legitimate interaction. Even when state actors or armed groups profess to stand in total opposition to each other, their actions often belie the claim. Therefore, the observable implications of the interaction are best identified in the actions the armed group and the state take in response as a territorial strategy. This approach attempts to maximise the use of unobtrusive rather than obtrusive indicators, "since actors whose behaviour is being observed will have less of an opportunity to respond strategically, ethically or emotionally to [my] request for information".[0]

I also began coding unobtrusive indicators to identify not only the type of interaction but also the territorial strategy it produces because I take each interaction to generate distinct reactions by the state and armed group. I also assessed observable instances of 'infrastructure attack', 'extortion', 'displacement', 'rule production', 'threat', and 'military deployment' to understand the state's and armed group's actions on the ground. I identified the context in which the state and armed group found themselves in the territory for infrastructure implementation. This context, broadly defined, includes the relevant aspects of a setting (analytical, temporal, spatial, or institutional) where the initial conditions arise and produce an outcome through a set of causal mechanisms.[0] I identified interactions between armed groups and the state based not only on interviews but also on official media reports, NGO and IO assessments, and then supplemented with official state documentation or armed group proclamation to address gaps in information and potential bias.

[0] Schmitter, 'The Design of Social and Political Research', 282.
[0] Falleti and Lynch, 'Context and Causal Mechanisms in Political Analysis', 1152.

The territorial strategy of an armed group and the state is a pattern of action that travels directly from one variable to another. It is not an intervening variable but a causal mechanism[0] observable across multiple cases that demonstrates "recurrent processes linking specified initial conditions and a specific outcome".[0] Territorial strategy functions as an "entity that — when activated — generates an outcome of interest".[0] Therefore the variation in interaction between states and armed groups activates different territorial strategies to secure each actor's respective presence and directly shapes the local order. It is best to draw on multiple indicators to triangulate among them and resolve disparities.[0] By doing so I can account for and dismiss errors in assignment of indicators that demonstrate equifinal observations of distinct concepts. Some observable indicators of confrontation could also be present for subcontracted or cooptive interactions. Land clearance by an armed group may serve to displace populations loyal to the state or enemy actor, or it may serve to support state infrastructure implementation by removing community claims to land ownership.

Therefore, I need to link the evidence of land clearance to other indicators to understand what territorial strategy it represents. When this single observable implication is combined with other evidence such as increased combatant presence by both sides, escalating defensive and offensive military measures in retaliation, and evidence of both sides demonstrating concern with community defection, then I show it is a territorial strategy of militarising not specialising. Instead, in specialising the

[0] Boudon argues that a mechanism must be grounded in the intelligibility of human behaviour that communicates to the observer the preferences and beliefs of the actors (Boudon, 'Social Mechanisms without Black Boxes', 199; Kitschelt, 'Accounting for Post-Communist Regime Diversity', 59).

[0] Mayntz, 'Mechanisms in the Analysis of Macro-Social Phenomena', 4–5.

[0] Mahoney, 'Beyond Correlational Analysis: Recent Innovations in Theory and Method': 580; also see Falleti and Lynch, 'Context and Causal Mechanisms in Political Analysis'.

[0] Schmitter, 'The Design of Social and Political Research', 282; Adcock and Collier, 'Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research', 537.

state and armed group would be drawing on their respective advantages– extralegal violence by armed groups and judicial and financial resources of the state – to support the others' territorial presence. Indicators for this include the armed group explicitly claiming to protect the project and threaten local communities who oppose the implementation. Evidence could also be linked to indicators of state complicity, such as claims that when community activists make complaints about threats received from armed groups to state officials these disappeared, or where public officials appear to deny such activity, or more explicitly where testimony and evidence in human rights cases reveal collaboration between state actors and armed groups in supporting infrastructure implementation.

The kidnapping of engineers or attacking of infrastructure by an armed group may not be the result of the state and armed group militarising, but rather a punitive consequence for state actors failing to pay extortion. In a cooptive interaction the attack would serve to reinforce institutionalising by both actors – i.e., the credible commitment by both the state and armed group to an agreed set of rules to secure their respective territorial presence. This signifies that although the interaction is not closely cooperative or trustworthy, both actors consider the other sufficiently committed to following the rules as to make them worthwhile in the first place – in short, a minimum amount of cooperation is required. Therefore, to be identified as an indicator for institutionalising, I need to assess the attack alongside evidence of extortion being paid or an absence of any escalation by the state indicating the rules have been reinforced. Any single indicator is not sufficient to account for an interaction and should be considered in combination with others to address the validity of the claim.

Finally, in coexistence, the state and the armed group are still wary of the potential threat posed by the other but seek to maintain the equilibrium of coexistence rather than remove the other from the territory. As a result, indicators include both states and armed groups observing invisible boundaries between armed actors or state actors willing to enter without military support to avoid attacks, but also both actors appear unwilling to approach each other directly and express sense of precarity about their respective territorial security. I thus identify territorial strategies of appeal by the armed group on one hand and non-military state actors such as public officials, civil engineers, and contractors on the other. Appealing to the community serves as a strategy for non-military state actors and armed groups to keep their respective presence secure by avoiding community defection. Evidence of community appeal, i.e., either actor trying to "win over the community", or "keep the community happy" as a form of territorial strategy also points to the competitive nature of coexistence.

To identify the outcomes that emerged from these strategies I then coded the data for evidence of in/security and agency/no agency respectively. To identify insecurity, I first coded the instances of victimisation or violence against communities by both actors. I also drew on expressions of fear or uncertainty communities expressed about attacks, such as "we are afraid when the military comes", "we do not know who to trust", or "if we speak about this we will be killed". Indications of violence combined with community members expressing fear and uncertainty make evident how the territorial strategies of the armed group and the state affect security as part of the local order. If people say that certain rules appear to be in place to prevent harm or mitigate punishing circumstances, then this indicates restraints on violence and therefore security. There is still selective victimisation against those who challenge the shared interests of the state and armed group. I identify this local order as insecure, though

marginally more secure than a local order where violence appears indiscriminate and unpredictable.

Agency in the local order refers to the space communities have to mobilise safely and with some expectation of response by the state and the armed group. A local order enables agency when authorities (in this case the state and armed group) are willing to listen and respond to community needs, thereby involving the community in the decision-making process. Here I coded indicators such "we told them we did not want X and they did not do X", "we asked the community what they wanted", "[the community] do not like X so we did not do X". Conversely, a lack of agency is reflected by the apparent indifference of the state and armed group, with phrases such as "they do not care about us", "they have no more social ties", "they only care about business/money", "we are at their mercy", etc, to reflect the community's exclusion in the local order.

While some of these indicators are drawn from actions described by my interviewees or observed in secondary sources, at other points I also coded the emotive interpretations and qualifiers used by local communities, which revolve around fear, disgust, disdain, satisfaction, normalisation, and uncertainty to better understand the shape of the local order. Silence is a key indicator for lack of agency as individuals feel they cannot even verbalise their concerns or needs, even if silence also indicates their ability to avoid potential violent consequences (thereby generating some security). I therefore identify non-verbal cues, such as dismissive hand gestures, nervous body language, or silences as indicative of repressive local orders.

A BAYESEIAN APPROACH

The initial puzzle emerged from the observation that both literature and policy on armed conflict assumes that confrontation between the state and the armed group is a constant feature in state-led development efforts in conflict areas, rather than a variable. My interrogation of this assumption drew initially from theories of war-time political orders, state capture, crime-conflict nexus, and mediated stateness – which I explore in more detail in the next chapter. From this broader literature I began to identify how interactions between armed groups and the state might vary around infrastructure implementation. Using Bayesian principles, I drew from this background knowledge and then updated my theory through the evidence collected in the field.[0] Assumptions about competition in the literature meant evidence of militarising around infrastructure was more likely; the absence or curtailment of militarising would strengthen the claim that competition varies and influences the outcome of interest. Equally, evidence of cooperation was unlikely in light of most of the literature on infrastructure and conflict which takes for granted competition over territory, but more likely if hypothesised from adjacent literature on hybrid states and political economy of war as well as literature on collusion and corporate interests.

However, as Bennet notes, "there is no Bayesian equivalent for generating a completely new hypothesis from the close process-tracing study of a case".[0] While background knowledge was essential in framing the question and identifying the value of different evidence, the fieldwork component of this research was instrumental in generating new insights[0] and identifying causal mechanisms. By using an inductive process of allowing data and theory to mutually inform each other I sought to produce

[0] Bennett, 'Process Tracing: A Bayesian Perspective', 707.
[0] Bennett, 709.
[0] Such as the competitive nature of coexistence.

theory from the bottom up. I maintained consistency by using the preliminary data collected on a set of observations to then test new insights against other observations during fieldwork. Saturation of data meant a satisfactory consistency in identified causal mechanisms and outcomes across observations.

Refuting alternative explanations for the outcome of interest (whether a local order affords the community security and agency) should take into account issues of equifinality. As Zaks indicates in her Relationships of Rivals framework, mutually exclusive alternative explanations are in fact quite rare in the social sciences.[0] Using her coincident hypothesis, there are alternative explanations for what can affect local orders (such as involvement in illicit coca markets or repressive tactics by the state outside of infrastructure) that are not mutually exclusive to the variation of interest (the degree of competition or cooperation during infrastructure implementation). However, Zaks argues that coincident explanations can arrive at the same outcome while still positing different causal stories.[0] By paying detailed attention to how the four mechanisms of territorial strategy produce distinct local outcomes, I can make clear the particular causal pathway generated from competition or cooperation in the state and armed group interaction to the impact on local order.

In the following chapter I delve into more detail on the literature and conceptual basis that lays the foundations for my theoretical framework. This framework not only provides insights into the complexities of armed group and state interactions in Colombia, but – as I then discuss in my final chapter – could even be applied to examine the links between development and local order around the world.

[0] Zaks, 'Relationships Among Rivals (RAR): A Framework for Analyzing Contending Hypotheses in Process Tracing'.
[0] Zaks, 349.

CHAPTER 3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I lay out a framework to theorise the impact of the interactions between states and armed groups on the local order during infrastructure implementation. This framework allows us to better understand how development affects security and offers new insights into the microdynamics of conflict by building on typologies of armed group and state interactions. The basic thrust of my argument is that the most extreme ends of the competition-cooperation spectrum of state and armed group interactions (confrontation and subcontraction respectively) both produce insecurity and lack of agency in the local order; in confrontation, however the use of violence is arbitrary and indiscriminate, while in subcontraction it is selective. Between those extremes, neither actor is willing to commit to removing the other from the territory or working together. These interactions (cooption and coexistence) lead to alternative territorial strategies that result in security in the local order. Yet only when there is some competition in the mid-range interaction (coexistence) are the armed group and state actors incentivised to be responsive to community needs and make space for community participation in the local political life.

This chapter summarises the literature on security and development and armed politics as it relates to my research question. I review and define key terms, before outlining the variables of interest and causal mechanisms of the theoretical

framework and conclude by detailing the next steps to present the empirical findings that generated this framework.

SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

Security and development are often understood as mutually instantiating phenomena; security is required for development; underdevelopment is linked to insecurity. However, the provenance of this nexus is murky at best. Stern and Öjendal argue that "both 'security' and 'development' emerge from disparate ontologies, refer to many different empirical realities and processes, and evoke much contestation over meaning".[0] Yet Hettne observes that there is little discussion about how such linkages between security and development have been conceived at different points in history; he goes on to argue that in Europe 'the first explicit development-security discourse' can be identified in the nineteenth century in the connection between industrialisation and national security.[0]

But when and how these links were established, they were quickly transformed over the next 100 years. Development in the 20th century underwent a conceptual evolution. During much of the Cold War, the term became popularly associated with national macroeconomic indicators such as economic growth and gross domestic product (GDP).[0] The end of the Cold War and the bipolar world order made the disparities between groups in terms of wealth, development, and stability increasingly obvious,[0] leading critics to argue that macrolevel indicators of growth

[0] Stern and Öjendal, 'Mapping the Security—Development Nexus: Conflict, Complexity, Cacophony, Convergence?', 6.
[0] Hettne, 'Development and Security: Origins and Future', 32–33.
[0] Goldin, *Development: A Very Short Introduction*, 557:4.
[0] Jackson and Beswick, *Conflict, Security and Development: An Introduction*, 1.

were unsuitable to capture the failings of development. Drawing on the basic needs model of Streeten and the capabilities approach to development pioneered by Sen, a more human-focused concept of development began to circulate in the international sphere.[0]

And as development evolved, so did the concept of security. Throughout the Cold War (and earlier), security was primarily understood in state-centric terms[0] – with the state as referent object of security against the threat of external aggressors. As the threat of the Cold War diminished, and multiple simmering tensions erupted in the 1990s into internal armed conflict, policy actors and scholars alike began to shift the focus of security away from the stability of states toward the safety and well-being of individuals within those states. [0] Although the concept of 'human security' was often criticised for painting with too broad a brush,[0] it was still widely adopted by the United Nations, major state interveners like the US, UK, and France, and amongst scholars of peacebuilding and security.[0]

Yet despite more human-centric language, states have largely remained the primary vehicle and target for security-geared development policies. While the 1980s and 1990s saw an expansion of what the security-development nexus could mean in terms of human development and human security, statebuilding was the central paradigm of this nexus in the first years of the twenty-first century. Countries torn apart by violent conflict were characterised by their underdevelopment and institutional

[0] Streeten, *Basic Needs: Premises and Promises*; Streeten, *First Things First: Meeting Basic Human Needs in the Developing Countries*; Sen, 'Development: Which Way Now?'; Sen, 'Development as Capability Expansion'.

[0] Buzan and Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies*.

[0] Jackson and Beswick, *Conflict, Security and Development: An Introduction*, 9; Krause and Jütersonke, 'Peace, Security and Development in Post-Conflict Environments'.

[0] See Paris, 'Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?'

[0] Gledhill, Caplan, and Meiske, 'Developing Peace: The Evolution of Development Goals and Activities in United Nations Peacekeeping', 203.

dysfunctionalities.[0] Fritz and Menocal argue that statebuilding is a combination of security practices to control territory and practices of development and prosperity.[0] If the security-development nexus has never truly extricated itself from its murky ontologies – and the use of the concept has largely been relegated to the policy field[0] – the importance of statebuilding has enjoyed more attention while retaining the crucial links between development and security.

How do development efforts in statebuilding then link to security? Collier and many other scholars have argued that a strong state is crucial to remedy the failures of governance and underdevelopment that led to conflict in the first part.[0] Armed conflict is meant to emerge from the failure of the state to effectively establish its development and security practices.[0] The absence of infrastructure represents the lack of reach by the central state to all territories within its domain and presents opportunities for armed conflict.[0] Eizenstat, Porter, and Weinstein contend that conflict-prone states are weak according to:

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[0] Mallaby, 'The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed States, and the Case for American Empire'; Marquette and Beswick, 'State Building, Security and Development: State Building as a New Development Paradigm?'; Berdal, *Political Economy of Statebuilding: Power after Peace*.

[0] Fritz and Menocal, 'Understanding State-Building from a Political Economy Perspective'.

[0] The rhetoric of security-development nexus has proven to have its own lure. Duffield argues that a developmentisation of security has emerged where projects aimed at 'winning hearts and minds' in conflict areas are thinly veiled efforts to use development as a specific tool to establish security (*Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples*, 130.). Pugh, Gabay, and Williams argue that this is because of funding incentives for different actors, noting that UK policy shifted from securitisation of development to developmentisation of security as security actors began to fear they would lose their mandate and began instead to focus on more development driven tasks ('Beyond the Securitisation of Development: The Limits of Intervention, Developmentisation of Security and Repositioning of Purpose in the UK Coalition Government's Policy Agenda'.).

[0] For more on the literature of development and state fragility see: Collier, 'Development and Conflict'; Blattman and Miguel, 'Civil War'; Zyck and Muggah, 'Preparing Stabilisation for 21st Century Security Challenges'..

[0] The link between security, development, and conflict was greatly facilitated by the growth of so-called 'new wars' in the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st century. These 'new wars' no longer had orderly battles but were rather fought for ideological or political reasons and represented state failure rather than inter-state conflict (Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era*.).

[0] Soifer, 'State Infrastructural Power: Approaches to Conceptualization and Measurement', 243–44; Fearon and Laitin, 'Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War'; Collier, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*.

> "lapses in three critical functions that the government of all strong, stable states perform: security, the provision of basic services, and protection of essential civil freedoms. Failed states do not fulfil any of these functions".[0]

As noted in the previous chapter, the construction of basic physical infrastructure has become a key approach in statebuilding to achieve security through development. These projects are intended to boost legal economic growth and consolidate state power.[0] The destruction of infrastructure by armed groups is intended to undercut the state's presence. Balcells argues that "military-strategic factors normally play a crucial role in the decision to bomb a location…infrastructure locations are most likely to be targeted".[0] In Bertelsen's work on the violence between Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) insurgents and the ruling Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), he argues that the destruction of buildings and infrastructure by RENAMO was effectively a deterritorialisation of the state.[0] Similarly, Beittel argues that attacks on infrastructure in Colombia were a military strategy by armed groups aimed at producing economic losses and disruptions of service.[0] Wood observes that the FMLN in El Salvador shifted its strategy from conventional to unconventional warfare that used attacks on infrastructure to undermine the government's economic strength as the conflict progressed.[0]

Armed groups value attacks on infrastructure because they destabilise the state, reduce state capacity, force concessions, and avoid high levels of civilian casualties that could emerge as a reputational cost.[0] This destruction is meant to indicate the

[0] Eizenstat, Porter, and Weinstein, 'Rebuilding Weak States', 136.
[0] Mardirosian, 'Infrastructure Development in the Shadow of Conflict: Aligning Incentives and Attracting Investment', 4.
[0] Balcells, 'Continuation of Politics by Two Means: Direct and Indirect Violence in Civil War', 403.
[0] Bertelsen, *Violent Becomings: State Formation, Sociality, and Power in Mozambique*, 4:32.
[0] Beittel, *Peace Talks in Colombia*.
[0] Wood, *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador*, 23.
[0] Stanton, 'Terrorism in the Context of Civil War', 1019; Graham, *Cities under Siege: The New Military Urbanism*, 270.

precarity of peace and the weakness of the state in exerting its territorial control which is why it is so often a target in war.[0] Therefore the destruction of infrastructure is deeply imbedded in acts of warfare and state contestation.

Yet statebuilding projects targeting conflict-affected areas and seeking to prevent 'state fragility' are not impositions of order but simply new arrivals into rich informal marketplaces of political and economic currency, power relations, and violent dynamics.[0] The state does not implement infrastructure on a tabula rasa, nor are armed groups reducible to mere spoilers to the state's presence. The very language of centre and periphery obfuscates the complex realities of these local orders and therefore fails to grasp the impact of state infrastructure implementation in these territories. Instead, rich theorising from the ground-up on the interactions between the state and local actors refocuses attention on the socio-political context of the receiving end of such development efforts rather than assessing the efficacy of the implementation from the top.[0]

My theoretical framework offers insights into how this development affects security. It builds on statebuilding and peacebuilding research that examines the microlevel

[0] Robinson, 'The Bombing of Dual-Use Targets'; Graham, *Cities under Siege: The New Military Urbanism*.

[0] De Waal, *The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the Business of Power*; Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly, *Rebel Governance in Civil War*.

[0] This critique reflects a wider literature on critical peacebuilding, largely championed by McGinty ('Hybrid Peace: The Interaction between Top-down and Bottom-up Peace'; *International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace*; *No War, No Peace: The Rejuvenation of Stalled Peace Processes and Peace Accords*.), Richmond (*Peace in International Relations*; 'The Problem of Peace: Understanding the "Liberal Peace"'.), and many others (Pugh, Cooper, and Turner, *Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding*; Chandler, 'The Uncritical Critique of "Liberal Peace"'; Chandler, 'Resilience and the "Everyday": Beyond the Paradox of "Liberal Peace"'; Heathershaw, 'Unpacking the Liberal Peace: The Dividing and Merging of Peacebuilding Discourses'.). They identify what they see as the failures of top-down implementation in peacebuilding and statebuilding, of focusing only on national and international standards, and introduced the local turn to peacebuilding. These criticisms have levied timely assessments of the failures of statist and technocratic practices that negate and ignore the complex realities of such interventions. They have also called for a reframing on the focus of analysis so that it rests not on states but individual experiences, human security, and bottom-up approaches to peaceful transitions.

impact of development on violence and everyday lives[0] by offering a systematic framework of variation that helps study these local outcomes. Much like Berdal[0] and Menkhaus,[0] I argue that local outcomes cannot be understood without accounting for the role of powerful local non-state actors: in the context of conflict these include armed groups. My theoretical framework sheds light on how the local impact of infrastructure projects is mediated by the interaction between the state and an armed group in the territory.

ARMED POLITICS

The study of internal armed conflict is inherently the study of armed group and state interactions. Realists in the study of international relations framed these conflicts in terms of balance of power and competition,[0] but research on conflict and security have since broadened theoretical perspectives to include insights from sociology, criminology, history, and economics.[0] This combination of classical rationalist explanations and new approaches are both incorporated into the literature examining microdynamics of conflict, which has challenged the supposition that states and armed groups are necessarily at odds. Not all interactions between state and an armed group result immediately in violent confrontations; different

[0] Brinkerhoff, Wetterberg, and Dunn, 'Service Delivery and Legitimacy in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: Evidence from Water Services in Iraq'; Unruh and Shalaby, 'A Volatile Interaction between Peacebuilding Priorities: Road Infrastructure (Re)Construction and Land Rights in Afghanistan'; Mains, 'Blackouts and Progress: Privatization, Infrastructure, and a Developmentalist State in Jimma, Ethiopia'; Richmond, *Failed Statebuilding*; Andreucci and Kallis, 'Governmentality, Development and the Violence of Natural Resource Extraction in Peru'; Reboredo, 'A Panacea for Development? Megaprojects and the Construction of State Legitimacy in Post-Apartheid South Africa'; Nilsson and González Marín, 'Violent Peace: Local Perceptions of Threat and Insecurity in Post-Conflict Colombia'.

[0] Berdal, *Political Economy of Statebuilding: Power after Peace*, 77.

[0] Menkhaus, 'Vicious Circles and the Security Development Nexus in Somalia', 154.

[0] Fearon, 'Rationalist Explanations for War'; Lake, 'International Relations Theory and Internal Conflict: Insights from the Interstices'.

[0] Haer, Vüllers, and Weidmann, 'Studying Micro Dynamics in Civil Wars: Introduction', 154.

structures of interest, territorial control, capability, and ideology may all play a role in where and how states and armed groups chose not to confront each other.[0]

There has been a growing literature on the ways that these actors structure their overlapping presence through cooperation and competition.[0] As Kasfir et al insist, the interplay between complementarity and competition in violent contexts requires further excavation.[0] Staniland uses the term "armed politics" – which had until then been used to generally describe the mobilisation of military resources for political purpose[0] – to describe "studying state-armed group interactions across space, time, and levels of violence".[0] This he argues is useful because it challenges what we assume to be political beyond the scope of state actors and allows "systematic comparisons between armed orders…and it integrates diverse armed groups under a unified framework".[0]

The scope of armed politics is broad. Kasfir et al draw on this to argue that we should pay closer attention to the nuanced layers of governance that emerge between different armed actors and states, what they term 'mediated stateness'.[0] Work on hybrid governance in conflict has especially drawn on the complexity of armed group

[0] Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*; Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*; Staniland, 'States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders'; Leader Maynard, 'Ideology and Armed Conflict'.

[0] Reno, *Warfare in Independent Africa*; Mukhopadhyay, *Warlords, Strongman Governors, and the State in Afghanistan*; Staniland, 'States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders'; Barnes, 'Criminal Politics: An Integrated Approach to the Study of Organized Crime, Politics, and Violence'.

[0] Kasfir, Frerks, and Terpstra, 'Introduction: Armed Groups and Multi-Layered Governance', 258.

[0] Giustozzi does expand this to include the involvement of the Taliban in Afghan politics, therefore predating Staniland's inclusion of non-state armed groups. Staniland, however, is credited with transforming the term to exclusively mean the study of state and armed group interactions, with a considerable number of publications since 2012 citing Staniland's interpretation of the term (Giustozzi, *Armed Politics and Political Competition in Afghanistan*; Ikelegbe, 'Crises of the State and Governance and Armed Non-State Groups in Africa'; also see Keith and Hayes, *Perspectives on Armed Politics in Brazil)*.

[0] Staniland, 'States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders', 273.

[0] Staniland, 'Armed Politics and the Study of Intrastate Conflict', 460.

[0] Kasfir, Frerks, and Terpstra, 'Introduction: Armed Groups and Multi-Layered Governance'.

and state interactions beyond violent competition.[0] Barnes argues that the study of armed politics should also include state and criminal interactions as well.[0]

Internal armed conflicts and even criminal enclaves around the world demonstrate the variation of interactions between states and armed groups.[0] From the Democratic Republic of Congo to Iraq, armed groups might transition from supporting insurrection to supporting the state.[0] In northern Peru, Starn found that extralegal peasant patrols maintained various complex relations with the state that involved "manipulation, as well as confrontation, interdependence as well as mistrust, and cooperation as well as conflict".[0] Armed criminal groups in Eastern Europe and Brazil have engaged the state in interactions ranging from cooperation to competition.[0] In other cases, armed groups attempt to not align themselves either with the state or against it, but still substantially impact the occurrence of violence.[0] These interactions go beyond fixed relationships between the state and an armed group: "such relationships are often fluid and shifting…interactions between armed groups and the state can change from hostile confrontations to close collaboration".[0] As a result,

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[0] Menkhaus, 'Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping'; Naseemullah and Staniland, 'Indirect Rule and Varieties of Governance'; Malejacq, 'Warlords, Intervention, and State Consolidation: A Typology of Political Orders in Weak and Failed States'; Berti, 'Rebel Politics and the State: Between Conflict and Post-Conflict, Resistance and Co-Existence'; Berti, 'From Cooperation to Competition: Localization, Militarization and Rebel Co-Governance Arrangements in Syria'.

[0] Barnes, 'Criminal Politics: An Integrated Approach to the Study of Organized Crime, Politics, and Violence', 973.

[0] In the following section I set out my definition of armed groups and discuss how criminal groups are included in this category.

[0] Seymour, 'Why Factions Switch Sides in Civil Wars: Rivalry, Patronage, and Realignment in Sudan', 92; Otto, 'The Grass Is Always Greener? Armed Group Side Switching in Civil Wars'.

[0] Starn, *Nightwatch: The Politics of Protest in the Andes*.

[0] Volkov, *Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism*; Arias, *Criminal Enterprises and Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean*.

[0] Barter, 'State Proxy or Security Dilemma? Understanding Anti-Rebel Militias in Civil War', 80.

[0] Otto, Scharpf, and Gohdes, 'Capturing Group Alignments: Introducing the Government and Armed Actors Relations Dataset (GAARD)', 1; Also see Christia, *Alliance Formation in Civil Wars*; Day and Reno, 'In Harm's Way: African Counter-Insurgency and Patronage Politics'.

> "intricate and often surprising relationships between states and non-state violent actors emerge and change within internal conflicts: mainstream politicians build armed wings, states collaborate with militias against common foes, police ignore private counterinsurgent armies, militaries tacitly share sovereignty with insurgent enemies, and warlords place their loyalists inside state security forces".[0]

The type of interaction that an armed group has with the state determines their actions and these shape the local order.[0] As Barnes observes, "all violent organisations across the criminal/political spectrum are engaged in strategic interactions with the state that determine the "rules of the game" and the nature of political authority in any given context".[0] The variation in interactions and the strategic responses by states and armed groups can explain the different outcomes in the local order, the 'rules of the game' not only for states and armed groups but local communities. Far from being mutually exclusive, violence and order during armed conflict are fundamentally linked.[0] Therefore our efforts to understand how development and statebuilding during conflict affects security must not exclude the microlevel complexities of state and armed group interactions from the assessment.

My research not only builds on the literature on security and development by drawing from theories of state and armed group interactions, but also provides novel insights for studies on armed politics. By using an infrastructural lens, I identify new forms of interactions between states and armed groups, even as I build on existing theories for others. I also contribute to the microdynamics of conflict literature a key new casual mechanism – territorial strategies – to understand how state and armed group interactions shape local order.

[0] Staniland, 'States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders', 243.
[0] Berti, 'Rebel Politics and the State: Between Conflict and Post-Conflict, Resistance and Co-Existence', 128.
[0] Barnes, 'Criminal Politics: An Integrated Approach to the Study of Organized Crime, Politics, and Violence', 973.
[0] See von Benda-Beckmann and Pirie (*Order and Disorder: Anthropological Perspectives*). for a more nuanced anthropological perspective on the micro-dynamics of order and violence.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

My theoretical framework expands on existing typologies of armed group and state interactions and explains how these shape local orders within the territories of infrastructure implementation. The different interactions between the state and armed group each generate unique territorial strategies – the key causal mechanisms – by both actors to secure their presence. These territorial strategies then shape local orders and in it, the security and agency available to communities. The more extreme (at either end of the continuum) the competition or cooperation, the worse the local order becomes for the community. The more interactions remain in the mid-range of the spectrum, the more secure the local order.

Before theorising the causal processes that link these different interactions to different local outcomes, I set out the definitions for the key terms within this framework. I first define the key actors to this theory, including the armed group, the state, and the local community. I then define the variables and mechanisms of interest: dyadic interactions, local order, and territorial strategies.

THE ARMED GROUP

Classifications of an armed group differ widely. Researchers have made distinctions between insurgents, terrorists, militias, warlords, and organised criminals.[0] Some categorise armed groups depending on their roles,[0] their targets,[0] or their political

[0] Krause and Milliken, 'Introduction: The Challenge of Non-State Armed Groups'; Schuberth, 'The Challenge of Community-Based Armed Groups: Towards a Conceptualization of Militias, Gangs, and Vigilantes'.
[0] Podder, 'Non-State Armed Groups and Stability: Reconsidering Legitimacy and Inclusion'.
[0] Schneckener, 'Militias and the Politics of Legitimacy'.

functions.[0] Others focus on the groups' objectives, either as liberators, secessionists, reformers, or warlords,[0] proxy forces,[0] death squads,[0] vigilantes,[0] or counterweights.[0] The many contexts and cases in which armed groups are identified does not help simplify the definition. These many existing typologies and taxonomies of the variety of armed actors tend to limit themselves to a certain region and context or rely on non-exclusive categories.[0]

However, some have put forward more parsimonious definitions of armed groups that capture broad cross-cutting trends and characteristics across these types. I draw on their existing insights to establish my definition: an armed group is one that employs violence, possesses a "minimal degree of cohesiveness",[0] is autonomous from the state,[0] and exerts or attempts to exert some degree of territorial control.[0] These characteristics are broad enough to go further than the traditional armed archetype of civil war: the armed insurgent. The local territorial nature of the

[0] Schuberth, 'The Challenge of Community-Based Armed Groups: Towards a Conceptualization of Militias, Gangs, and Vigilantes'.

[0] Reno, *Warfare in Independent Africa*; Felbab-Brown, Trinkunas, and Hamid, *Militants, Criminals, and Warlords: The Challenge of Local Governance in an Age of Disorder*; Mukhopadhyay, *Warlords, Strongman Governors, and the State in Afghanistan*.

[0] Ahram, *Proxy Warriors*; Barter, 'State Proxy or Security Dilemma? Understanding Anti-Rebel Militias in Civil War'.

[0] Mazzei, *Death Squads or Self-Defense Forces?: How Paramilitary Groups Emerge and Challenge Democracy in Latin America*; Biberman, 'Self-Defense Militias, Death Squads, and State Outsourcing of Violence in India and Turkey'.

[0] Bateson, 'The Politics of Vigilantism'; Schuberth, 'The Challenge of Community-Based Armed Groups: Towards a Conceptualization of Militias, Gangs, and Vigilantes'.

[0] De Bruin, 'Preventing Coups d'état: How Counterbalancing Works'.

[0] Carey and Mitchell, 'Progovernment Militias', 130.

[0] Krause and Milliken, 'Introduction: The Challenge of Non-State Armed Groups', 203; Schlichte, 'With the State against the State? The Formation of Armed Groups'.

[0] Vinci, 'Anarchy, Failed States, and Armed Groups: Reconsidering Conventional Analysis', 296; Schlichte and Schneckener, 'Armed Groups and the Politics of Legitimacy'; Hoffmann, Vlassenroot, and Marchais, 'Taxation, Stateness and Armed Groups: Public Authority and Resource Extraction in Eastern Congo', 2016.

[0] Podder, 'Non-State Armed Groups and Stability: Reconsidering Legitimacy and Inclusion', 35; Arjona, 'Civilian Cooperation and Non-Cooperation with Non-State Armed Groups: The Centrality of Obedience and Resistance'.

definition expands the scope of this framework to include less traditional political actors such as warlords, gangs, cartels, or other criminal organisations.[0]

This research takes a broadly agnostic approach to the ideology, resources, or kinship patterns of armed actors. Instead, I consider the most relevant attribute of the armed group in this context is its willingness to deploy violence to secure its territorial presence.[0] This definition even includes armed groups that might be at times considered militias of the state such as paramilitary groups in Colombia. However, even these groups would operate independently or against the state at different moments.[0] Even in subcontraction where armed groups and the state are at the closest point of cooperation, armed groups are still autonomous of the state and capable of changing their interaction with it – thereby evading easy classification.

THE STATE

In contrast to armed groups, scholars of armed conflict rarely set out a clear definition of what is meant by the state beyond a military force. However, defining an armed group as 'not the state' begs clarification on the latter. I purposefully depart from the Weberian condition that states must possess the legitimate monopoly of force; states in conflict-affected regions rarely boast either legitimacy or a monopoly of force. Such definitions also fail to capture the breadth of the role of the state in these contexts, which can function as a development actor rather than one defined by

[0] See Lessing for a more detailed exploration on the commonalities between dynamics of civil war with what he terms 'criminal war' (Lessing, 'Logics of Violence in Criminal War').

[0] Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*; Hultman, 'Keeping Peace or Spurring Violence? Unintended Effects of Peace Operations on Violence against Civilians'; Balcells, 'Continuation of Politics by Two Means: Direct and Indirect Violence in Civil War'; Raleigh, 'Violence against Civilians: A Disaggregated Analysis'.

[0] Gutiérrez-Sanín and Vargas, 'Agrarian Elite Participation in Colombia's Civil War'; Rivera and Duncan, 'Colombian Paramilitaries: From Death Squads to State Competitors'.

its capacity for violence. I understand a wide range of actors, public officials and private actors are all involved in 'doing the state'.[0]

If the state is not a clear homogenous entity, then what is it? I define the state as the overarching authority that enables various officials, functionaries, civil servants, and even contractors, to act on its behalf to implement infrastructure and carry out the strategy required to secure the state's presence in the territory. This reflects Sckopol's understanding of the state as "an executive authority" that undertakes "more or less well-coordinated" basic set of tasks through "administrative, policing, and military organisations".[0] The heterogeneity of state actors is therefore a consistent characteristic of the state. Davidheiser argues that it is more useful to focus on the state as an actor through various structures;[0] the state is a composite of multiple administrative and bureaucratic institutions, many of which are involved in public goods provision, including physical infrastructure that contribute to basic living needs like energy and connectivity. Agents of the state both operate on behalf of the state and as the state itself, imposing its authority on populations.[0]

This distinguishes the state from its actors: under different conditions the state deploys different actors to act on its behalf. It also distinguishes the state from the government. The state is the permanent sovereign authority that encompasses the wide range of state actors from the military to the civil service to the judiciary. It operates at the national, regional, and local levels. The government is the particular administration at the national, regional, or municipal level – whether elected or not

[0] Migdal and Schlichte, 'Rethinking the State', 14.
[0] Skocpol, 'State and Revolution', 12.
[0] Davidheiser, 'Strong States, Weak States: The Role of the State in Revolution', 463.
[0] Yeo, 'Agents of the State: When Is an Official of the State an Agent of the State?'; Rockman, 'Bureaucracy, Power, Policy, and the State'; This imposition is result of the state's capacity to create boundaries between itself and society (Bourdieu, *On the State: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1989-1992*; Scott, *Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*).

– that takes charge of the legislative and executive office and enacts policy. In this thesis, I focus on the state as a recurrent actor in implementing infrastructure, even if government policy at times dictates different interactions.[0]

These multitudes of actors are not, as I note, purely restricted to what might be traditionally considered a civil servant or public official. The state functions through a composite of institutions that manage infrastructure projects, including contracting private companies to build it, investing in a public company to manage it, or deploying troops to protect it. Some have argued that increased involvement of private actors in public goods provision have effectively 'hollowed out' the state as a development actor.[0] The increased use of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs), especially in Latin American goods provision, would indicate a weakening of the state's authority and transference of its function to non-state, market actors.[0]

However, I argue that the neoliberal state integrates private actors into its governance strategy.[0] The provision of infrastructure is still within the agenda-setting power of the state, and its financing, regulating, and management is often still conducted by public officials.[0] Public-private enterprises become articulations of the political projects intertwined with the authority of the state, not merely driven by apolitical market forces.[0] Understanding the local perspective also challenges this

[0] The role of any particular government is relevant when considering what drives changes in interactions between state actors and armed groups. For the purpose of this research, the importance is that the state demonstrates consistent variation in interaction with armed groups linked to consistent impact on local orders.

[0] Milward, 'The Hollow State: Private Provision of Public Services'; Ferguson, *Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order*; Larkin, *Signal and Noise: Media, Infrastructure, and Urban Culture in Nigeria*.

[0] Whitfield, 'Public Private Partnerships: Confidential "Research" : A Critique of the Audit Commission's Study of Strategic Service-Delivery Partnerships.'

[0] Also see Hodge and Greve ('Introduction: Public–Private Partnership in Turbulent Times') for a more detailed discussion of the strength of the state in neoliberal arrangements.

[0] Pierre and Peters, *Governing Complex Societies: Trajectories and Scenarios*, 59–61.

[0] D'albergo, Lefèvre, and Ye, 'For a Political Economy of Metropolitan Scale: The Role of Public–Private Relations'.

binary of private and public in the delivery of infrastructure. In his assessment of infrastructure provision in Ethiopia, Mains argues that there are no easy distinctions between a 'thinned out' state and a neoliberal state employing private practices of governance.[0] If the state cannot be positioned as a single entity neither in theory nor in practice, then how local populations perceive the state can also demonstrate multiple forms of knowing and identifying 'stateness'. From the perspective of local populations, the private actors involved with the delivery of these goods are as intertwined with state authority as state officials themselves. While private actors are not state officials, for the purpose of infrastructure implementation they are extensions of the state.

THE LOCAL COMMUNITY

I define local communities generally as the non-combatant population within a certain territory occupied by state and an armed group. Migdal contends that civilians as a collective – what he terms society – function as an amalgamation of institutions and mechanisms which act as a buffer between the power of the state and the individual.[0] However, as Painter notes, this definition of society is reducible to those social institutions and collectives which are not-the-state,[0] a definition that makes the definition of armed group as a distinct category untenable. Therefore, my definition focuses on the civilian population organised through various informal organisations or collective identities within a limited territory that are not explicitly affiliated with an armed group. While individuals in the community may have

[0] Mains, 'Blackouts and Progress: Privatization, Infrastructure, and a Developmentalist State in Jimma, Ethiopia'.
[0] Migdal, 'Society-Formation and the Case of Israel', 174.
[0] Painter, 'State: Society', 43.

sympathies with either the state or armed group this does not make them an active member of either organisation.

Territory is also an important boundary for society; individuals have their lives and livelihoods imbedded within the same physical space where other actors, such as the armed group and state, seek to secure their presence.[0] The boundedness of the 'local' in local communities may occur within a village, a municipality, or an area as small as a stretch of riverbank.

In the rural territories explored within this thesis, the non-combatant populations in these territories are in their majority low socioeconomic status, small-scale farmers, miners, or small business owners. These populations are not uniform, nor are their social organisations. Local communities can be ethnically, financially, and culturally heterogenous.[0] When I refer to local leaders, I include religious figures, community representatives, indigenous governors, or heads of labour collectives. Professions can range from business ownership, farming, mining, or fishing with a wider set of interests. While these differences and their relevance will be explored in more detail in the empirical chapters all these individuals within the local community share fundamental interests in security and agency as basic human needs.

THE DYADIC INTERACTION

The engagement between the armed group and the state is the subject of considerable analysis across multiple fields of study, including civil war, terrorism, and organised crime. I start by locating any particular interaction between the state

[0] Häkli, 'In the Territory of Knowledge: State-Centred Discourses and the Construction of Society'.
[0] Voors and Bulte, 'Conflict and the Evolution of Institutions: Unbundling Institutions at the Local Level in Burundi'; Hedlund, 'Mapping the Socioeconomic Landscape of Rural Sweden: Towards a Typology of Rural Areas'.

and an armed group as one of four types on a continuum from competition to cooperation (confrontation, coexistence, cooption, subcontraction).[0] The type of interaction is is characterised by the degree of threat the other actor poses, with existential threat characterising extreme competition, while the absence of threat characterises the extreme end of cooperation. The middle ground of the interaction continuum therefore demonstrates a lesser degree of either condition.

By degree I do not seek to measure competition or cooperation or indicate a quantifiable amount of competition or cooperation. Instead, following Sartori and Klein, Goertz, and Diehl, I present the continuum by placing two endpoints that emphasise the extreme variation of the same scale: competition vs cooperation.[0] I do not quantify the variation in between these – as Gerring and Thomas note, to quantify natural language attributes does not necessarily offer any more precision or value[0] – but rather consider the reality of each interaction in relation to the extreme ends of the continuum. I do not assert that confrontation is produced by *n*th amount of competition, but rather that this is on the highest end of the competition scale. Although coexistence is less competitive than confrontation, coexistence still demonstrates certain elements of competition that cooption does not. I go into more detail on the nature of competitive and cooperative in each interaction below.

The interactions I consider in this framework are always dyadic and focused on the relationship between the state and an armed group.[0] Interactions are always mutual;

[0] As discussed, this research does not attempt to motivate an explanation of what conditions determine why and when specific interactions arise between the state and armed group during infrastructure implementation. Instead, I focus on identifying the interactions based on the literature and on fieldwork and considering how these impact the local order.

[0] Sartori, 'Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics', 64; Klein, Goertz, and Diehl, 'The New Rivalry Dataset: Procedures and Patterns', 335.

[0] Gerring and Thomas, 'Comparability: A Key Issue in Research Design', 5; Potter, *An Analysis of Thinking and Research about Qualitative Methods*, 85.

[0] If the strategies of the state and armed group resulted in the removal or defeat of the other actor, then they would no longer be in a dyadic interaction at that point and therefore I consider them outside the scope condition of the research.

it is not credible that one actor cooperates and that the other competes in the same interaction. If one side acts competitively then the other must do the same or risk a loss. In this sense, because of the existential harm that two actors with recourse to weaponry can wreak, I take competition to be most influential in establishing the interaction and determining the territorial strategies. Where one actor is distrustful and behaves accordingly the other will follow. Cooperation, equally, requires both actors to participate. If one actor perceives the other as a threat, then the cooperative element of the dyadic interaction deteriorates.

In the empirical chapters I engage with some of the factors which appear to influence the perceptions of threat between the state and armed group and therefore structures their interactions. In some cases, macro-level shifts may motivate different interactions, such as the establishment of the peace process between the Colombian government and the FARC in 2012, the changing influence of illicit economies, or reputational crisis and scandals that impact the national government. Each of these may motivate the state and armed group towards a different interaction; a peace process, for example, may reduce the perceived threat between the state and armed group in the building of infrastructure.

Others factors may be more ideological in nature, where actors that demonstrate similar ideological positions are more likely to perceive each other as less of a threat and therefore engage in more cooperative interactions. Different political parties in government administration may approach the presence of armed groups differently depending on their political affiliation or ideology. Similarly, the ideological profile of the armed group may shape their approach to the state. Insurgent armed groups are more likely to be more competitive with the state, while armed actors believed to have no ideological motivation may be more willing to coopt rather than challenge

state infrastructure projects for their own gain. On the furthest end of the spectrum, paramilitary groups that support state military objectives are also more likely to be cooperative with state infrastructure goals.

The spectrum between competition and cooperation has been used by others, such as Staniland and Barnes, to categorise the variety of confrontational and non-confrontational behaviour exhibited by ostensibly hostile actors such as the state and an armed group.[0] I therefore take these interactions as my starting point, not the outcome of interest. The framework lays out what territorial strategies an armed group and a state adopt depending on their interaction, rather than explore what generates that interaction. Further research could and should examine why different state and armed group interactions emerge during infrastructure implementation to expand the causal processes leading to specific security and agency outcomes in the local order, but it is outside the scope of this analytical framework.

I also clarify the internal dynamics of these causal processes. As Barnes notes, interactions between the state and armed actors are fluid, where some "arrangements can be short-lived as relations shift in quick succession while other arrangements can persist for decades".[0] I make no claims as to what may drive the longevity or transience of different interactions and by extent their local impact, though again I explore in empirical chapters the factors that do emerge in each case. Simultaneously, the volatility of interactions can produce blurred boundaries that sometimes complicate overly reductive outcomes.[0]

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[0] Staniland, 'States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders'; Staniland, 'Armed Politics and the Study of Intrastate Conflict'; Barnes, 'Criminal Politics: An Integrated Approach to the Study of Organized Crime, Politics, and Violence'.

[0] Barnes, 'Criminal Politics: An Integrated Approach to the Study of Organized Crime, Politics, and Violence', 973.

[0] Arias, *Criminal Enterprises and Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean*, 25.

Mediating factors may also influence how territorial strategies emerge and shape the local order, such as the role of multiple armed groups in the territory or the necessities of different types of infrastructure implementation. The presence of additional armed actors willing to cooperate with the state can heighten the state's military response and exacerbate the insecurity experienced by local communities in arbitrary local orders. Additional research would prove valuable in theorising the potential additional impact of multiple armed groups in interactions with the state, such as building on the typology produced by Arias.[0]

The type of infrastructure could play a role in shaping the local order for communities. Larger and more resource-intensive projects such as dams may also drive the state to take more extreme protective measures compared to smaller road projects where non-military state actors may have more scope to use strategies of community appeal in smaller projects. Armed groups may also be more interested in extorting more resource intensive projects than less resource intensive ones, where the value of community support is higher.

I address these influences in more detail in the empirical chapters. However, I demonstrate that distinct types of interactions between the state and armed group have similar local impacts identifiable even among the noise of multiple influencing factors. There may be additional types of interactions and territorial strategies that are not included in this framework, but consistent patterns in local dynamics – despite multiple actors, infrastructure type, changes in administration, or ideology – lends credence to a parsimonious framework. This provides a foundation for understanding how state and armed group interactions impact local orders during

[0] Arias, *Criminal Enterprises and Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean*.

infrastructure implementation despite the messiness and complexity of these environments.

THE LOCAL ORDER

The key outcome of interest is the variation in the local order. As the state and armed group compete or cooperate, their interactions not only have repercussions for each other but structure the security and agency in the local order. I define – alongside Mielke, Schetter, and Wilde – the local order as the structuring principle of everyday life and social organisation.[0] Namely, the local order consists of the provision of security (or its absence) and the space for community agency and political participation (or the lack thereof).[0] In this section I detail what I mean by security and agency in the local order and how these are connected to the interactions between the state and armed group.

Local order is not solely produced by a state. We observe alternative forms of rule and order in areas in areas where the state has limited reach.[0] Yet it still echoes the regimes of rule identified in traditional politics, where political order is understood not merely as the production of security but also encompasses the space available for civilians to participate in political decision-making.[0] In the broader literature on

[0] Mielke, Schetter, and Wilde, 'Dimensions of Social Order: Empirical Fact, Analytical Framework and Boundary Concept'.

[0] Anter, *Max Weber's Theory of the Modern State: Origins, Structure and Significance*, 60; Arias, *Criminal Enterprises and Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean*; Arjona, *Rebelocracy*.

[0] Börzel and Risse, 'Conceptual Framework: Fostering Resilience in Areas of Limited Statehood and Contested Orders'; Krasner and Risse, 'External Actors, State-building, and Service Provision in Areas of Limited Statehood: Introduction'; Lilyblad, 'Illicit Authority and Its Competitors: The Constitution of Governance in Territories of Limited Statehood'; Risse, *Governance without a State?: Policies and Politics in Areas of Limited Statehood*; O'Donnell, 'On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View with Glances at Some Postcommunist Countries'.

[0] Hyde and Saunders, 'Recapturing Regime Type in International Relations: Leaders, Institutions, and Agency Space', 365; Grietens, 'Dictators and Their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and State Violence'; Tilly, *Regimes and Repertoires*.

non-state governance, the production of local order can be ascribed to many kinds of groups, such as clan structures, traditional kinship or indigenous rule, or community social regulation.[0] Some of this research has already examined the interplay between the state with informal authorities and its impact on hybrid orders.[0] In this thesis I focus on the role of the armed group: therefore, I draw from the extensive literature on rebel and criminal governance to show that local order can also be produced by coercive non-state actors.[0] I build on this literature to examine explicitly how the interaction between the state and an armed group shapes the local order – i.e. the provision of security and space for agency for local communities – during infrastructure implementation.

Security and agency are not binary dimensions: there are degrees afforded to each depending on the interactions between the state and armed group.[0] Multiple definitions of security confound the practice of identifying its attributes; the more recent literature on human security particularly expands the traditional definitions of insecurity in international relations theory by making the referent object of security the individual human rather than the state.[0] While I retain the individual as the

[0] Diala, 'The Concept of Living Customary Law: A Critique'; Freedman and Lemay-Hébert, 'Critical Hybridity: Exploring Cultural, Legal and Political Pluralism'; Ndulo, 'African Customary Law, Customs, and Women's Rights'; Hertogh, 'What Is Non-State Law? Mapping the Other Hemisphere of the Legal World'.

[0] Boege, Brown, and Clements, 'Hybrid Political Orders, Not Fragile States'; Clements et al., 'State Building Reconsidered: The Role of Hybridity in the Formation of Political Order'; Freedman and Lemay-Hébert, 'Critical Hybridity: Exploring Cultural, Legal and Political Pluralism'; Menkhaus, 'Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping'; Lund, 'Twilight Institutions: Public Authority and Local Politics in Africa'.

[0] Mampilly, *Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War*; Arjona, *Rebelocracy*; Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly, *Rebel Governance in Civil War*; Arias, *Criminal Enterprises and Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean*; Lessing, 'Conceptualizing Criminal Governance'; Varese, *The Russian Mafia: Private Protection in a New Market Economy*.

[0] The reality on the ground is never as neat as binary assessments would demand. The descriptions offered here are simplified for clarity. In the empirical chapters I identify when communities feel particularly trapped, threatened, or empowered by different armed group and state actions in order to demonstrate overarching patterns of local orders.

[0] Alkire, 'A Conceptual Framework for Human Security.'; Kaldor, *Human Security*; Chandler, 'Resilience and the "Everyday": Beyond the Paradox of "Liberal Peace"'; Gasper and Gómez, 'Human Security Thinking in Practice: "Personal Security",'Citizen Security', and Comprehensive Mappings'.

referent object, I limit security in the local order merely to an absence of violence and 'freedom from fear'.[0] Arias refers to security provision as one of the key aspects of political life that is shaped by the level of violence that communities experience.[0] Security is affected both by the collateral harm communities face or their deliberate targeting by the military or armed group.[0] As a result, communities also fear victimisation whenever these actors are present.

Security is also affected by the rules (or lack thereof) that the state or armed group impose. Rules imposed by the armed group or the state in the local order can be commonly understood without being written down or expressly verbalised and give local communities a sense of predictable structure. Arjona observes "there are clear rules of conduct that both civilians and combatants follow, giving place to predictability" in local orders.[0] Arias also refers to the importance of "informal social control" that emerges from microlevel armed regimes and which give rise "norms and systems" that dictate everyday life.[0] Without rules the unpredictability of violence in everyday life is source of anxiety and fear.[0] When there are no rules, then communities cannot determine the prescribed norms for daily interaction and violent consequences become unpredictable and arbitrary. Therefore, rules are crucial to how communities are able to navigate potential harm.

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[0] Condorcet argued that security cannot be understood until the citizen is free not from harm but from fear as the necessary basis through which civil tranquillity is established (Williams, *Condorcet and Modernity*, 84).

[0] Arias, *Criminal Enterprises and Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean*, 26.

[0] The state or armed group may use violence against communities based on other concerns unrelated to the infrastructure project implementation (i.e., if a community member faces violence because they did not pay an extortion or they are against illicit economies that profit armed groups). For the purpose of this thesis, I gauge security as a product of a particular armed group and state interaction around infrastructure implementation.

[0] Arjona, *Rebelocracy*, 100.

[0] Arias, *Criminal Enterprises and Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean*, 26; North, Wallis, and Weingast, *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History*, 16.

[0] Murphy and McDowell, 'Transitional Optics: Exploring Liminal Spaces after Conflict'; Mälksoo, 'The Challenge of Liminality for International Relations Theory'.

Agency is an under-represented characteristic of local order. I define agency not simply as the local community's ability to mobilise to voice their needs without violent repercussions, but for their mobilisation to influence the decisions made by state or armed group so that they are responsive to community needs. When a local order enables agency, the state and armed group demonstrate receptiveness to community demands and willingness to address their interests or include community members in decision-making. Communities can still mobilise in local orders that lack agency, but they face significant obstacles by the state and armed group. Agency therefore is not the willingness of communities to mobilise despite challenges, but the ability to do so and elicit a positive response.

This understanding of agency is grounded in the concept of community participation in decision-making that conditions overall political life in a territory. Arias defines the presence of civic mobilisation and the relative freedom for local civilians (not affiliated with either the state or criminal group) to act and assert their rights as a key aspect of local order.[0] The concept of political agency is not merely restricted to participation in social movements or institutional political processes but instead captures the variety of individual and collective ways of acting that affect politics.[0]

Agency has been elaborated and discussed in great detail in the rich literature of civil resistance in armed conflict. This work reflects upon the political actions taken by local communities under adverse circumstances. Civil society groups, local leaders, individuals in contexts of armed conflict and violence are willing to mobilise and speak out at the risk of exposing themselves to great personal harm.[0] Across these

[0] Arias, *Criminal Enterprises and Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean*, 27.

[0] Häkli and Kallio, 'Subject, Action and Polis: Theorizing Political Agency'; Barnett, 'Political Affects in Public Space: Normative Blind-spots in Non-representational Ontologies'; Flint, 'Political Geography: Context and Agency in a Multiscalar Framework'.

[0] Roberts, *Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-Violent Action from Gandhi to the Present*; Arjona, 'Civilian Cooperation and Non-Cooperation with Non-State Armed Groups: The

studies security is a fundamental need and a core reason that communities mobilise. Therefore, I take agency to be a corollary of security. It is possible for communities to have security without agency, as the state and armed group may refrain from violence for reasons other than community demands. But it is not likely that the local order afford agency but not security, as security would be a fundamental need the community would demand to be fulfilled.

Therefore, in this framework I do not minimise the importance of community mobilisation in the face of adverse consequence, but rather consider under what conditions their mobilisation is enabled. As Suarez argues, local communities not only learned to cope with and navigate the risky and uncertain setting of war, but effectively exploit the conditions to improve their security.[0] I seek to understand what are the conditions that best support the community's ability to mobilise, make demands, and have these met by the state and armed group.

Equally, it is important for the study of community resistance and mobilisation to understand the conditions that lead to more severe repression, or even indifference by states and the armed group to community needs that effectively excludes them from the decision-making process. The local order can circumscribe the community's ability to voice their demands and mobilise. Therefore, understanding what interactions between states and an armed group produce the most violent outcomes for communities and which incentivise both to be most responsive to the

Centrality of Obedience and Resistance'; Kaplan, *Resisting War: How Communities Protect Themselves*; Hallward, Masullo, and Mouly, 'Civil Resistance in Armed Conflict: Leveraging Nonviolent Action to Navigate War, Oppose Violence and Confront Oppression'; Zulver, 'The Endurance of Women's Mobilization during "Patriarchal Backlash": A Case from Colombia's Reconfiguring Armed Conflict'; Chenoweth, *Civil Resistance: What Everyone Needs to Know*; Rudling and Dueñas, 'Liquid Graves and Meaning Activism in the Colombian Armed Conflict: The 'Bottom-up'Recovery and Memorialisation of Victims of Forced Disappearance'.

[0] Suarez, '"Living between Two Lions": Civilian Protection Strategies during Armed Violence in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo'.

local community is a key factor in understanding the conditions that encourage or supress agency.

THE TERRITORIAL STRATEGY

Territorial strategies serve as the key causal mechanism linking the state's and the armed group's interaction with its outcome in the local order. I define territorial strategies as the actions taken by the armed group and the state – in response to their interaction – to secure their respective presence in the territory. Depending on the degree of competition, each actor must determine how they will remain in the territory under a certain amount of (perceived) threat. If an actor decides to retreat from the territory because of threat, then that is not a strategy of securing territorial presence, and it is no longer an interaction with the other actor, so it falls outside the scope of this research.

States and armed groups have an effective toolbox from which they are both able to draw strategies to respond to competitive or cooperative interactions. The state, as discussed above, is a heterogenous actor, and therefore which of its representatives it chooses to deploy is itself reflective of its territorial strategy (i.e., deploying the military indicates a strategy of militarisation). Kasfir et al argue that interactions between an armed group and the state vary *depending on* which sector of the state is employed in the interaction.[0] The armed group may not have the same deep pockets or array of expertise to draw from as a centralised state actor, but they can still deploy violence strategically, or limit it, depending on the interaction.

These strategies are what shape local orders. Where the interaction between an armed group and the state shifts –for example, due to changes in government policy,

[0] Kasfir, Frerks, and Terpstra, 'Introduction: Armed Groups and Multi-Layered Governance', 275.

armed group leadership, fluctuations in illicit markets, or any number of potential influential factors – so do their territorial strategies and – as a result – the local order.

INTERACTIONS AND LOCAL OUTCOMES: TRACING THE PROCESS

To preserve parsimony, this theoretical framework explains how the interactions between the state and armed group impact security and agency in the local order during infrastructure implementation. Table 10 summarises how variation in competition and cooperation impact this outcome of interest.


TABLE 7. CAUSAL MECHANISMS AFFECTING LOCAL ORDERS DURING INFRASTRUCTURE IMPLEMENTATION

Dyadic Interaction	Competition		Cooperation	
	Confrontation	Coexistence	Cooption	Subcontraction
Territorial Strategy	Militarising	Appealing	Institutionalising	Specialising
Local Order	Arbitrary	Responsive	Stable	Repressive

The following section outlines what territorial strategies emerge based on the competition and cooperation between the state and the armed group during infrastructure implementation and how they shape the local order. While I draw on existing theory to strengthen this framework, it is still inductively generated from the interactions and outcomes observed in the field. These four interactions, and the outcomes they have for local order, are not binary pathways. As previously mentioned, these interactions emerge on a spectrum, and therefore their outcomes are also likely to shift to differing degrees. The graph in Figure 5 indicates the

outcome each interaction produces by illustrating the different impact on security and agency in the local order.

FIGURE 5. IMPACT OF STATE AND ARMED GROUP INTERACTIONS



This graph illustrates how the spectrum from competition to cooperation produces distinct outcomes for local communities within a certain range. Understanding variation in interactions – and as a result, in local order – requires one to identify categorical or continuous distinctions. On the regular, everyday level, these dimensions may seem dichotomous or categorical but, upon closer consideration, are

often actually continuous.[0] As I illustrate in the figure above, this theoretical framework does not claim that each type of interaction is discrete from the others but rather assesses interaction along a continuum. Though both extreme competition (confrontation) and close cooperation (subcontraction) result in the most detrimental local orders, there is still variation in the outcome. The distinction between the local order that emerges from confrontation (arbitrary) and subcontraction (repressive) demonstrates how security is not a binary characteristic but – just as the variation of interaction is a continuum – also subject to degree.

In confrontation the militarising between an armed group and the military – and therefore the armed clashes and their concern with community defection – leads to violence that local communities have difficulty predicting or navigating. In repressive local orders, communities are aware that not protesting or challenging these objectives is likely to keep them safe; specialising presents communities with incentive to alter their behaviour to ensure their security where confrontation cannot. Subcontraction's curve reflects this distinction in outcome. Specialising means communities are selectively targeted and avoid violence if they comply. Therefore, I consider this outcome to be somewhat more secure than an arbitrary local order, though both are still insecure for local communities (as I show in my evidence classification table in the previous chapter).

Cooption also demonstrates that a local order lacking or limiting agency does not mean that the community is repressed or that the state and armed group actively go against the community's preference. By this I mean that if the state pays rent to the armed group to implement an uncontroversial infrastructure project safely

[0] For more on distinctions between category and continuum see Master, Markman, and Dweck, 'Thinking in Categories or along a Continuum: Consequences for Children's Social Judgments'; Gonzalez, Zosuls, and Ruble, 'Traits as Dimensions or Categories? Developmental Change in the Understanding of Trait Terms.'; Queller, Schell, and Mason, 'A Novel View of Between-Categories Contrast and within-Category Assimilation.'

communities are unlikely to feel excluded or complain of indifference by the state and the armed group. However, when communities express frustration with an element of the implementation or the rent demanded by the armed group was too high, then the state and armed group's lack of interest in responding to the community's needs highlights their lack of agency. This is particularly a contrast in the outcome of coexistence, where state actors may appeal to the community to limit the rent demanded by the armed group. The state's territorial strategy is not to institutionalise, otherwise it would be willing to pay the armed group. Instead, the state actor is appealing, reflecting a more competitive and distrustful interaction and where the armed group has more to lose by alienating the community. The following sections link these territorial strategies to the different local outcomes of interest. I order these from the most insecure to the best potential outcome for communities: arbitrary, repressive, stable, and responsive.

MILITARISING AND AN ARBITRARY ORDER

Local communities are aware that clashes between an armed group and the state have damaging collateral effects on themselves, their homes, and their livelihoods, they may face victimisation by one or both groups, killing, or displacement. Violence appears arbitrary, and suspicion and distrust permeate the territory as any sort of rules of daily life become increasingly untenable for local communities to follow. How can the implementation of infrastructure, intended to introduce development and – by the logics of statebuilding – stability, result in such an arbitrarily violent outcome?

This local outcome is the result of confrontation between the armed group and the state during the implementation of infrastructure projects.[0] Confrontation is found across multiple studies of armed regimes; if anything, it is the most expected interaction between an armed group and the state during armed conflict. Staniland refers to this interaction as guerrilla disorder, Barnes as confrontation, and Arias as criminal disorder.[0] Confrontation is rooted in the zero-sum objectives of both actors in the territory: the presence of the one actor is an existential threat to the other and therefore must be defended against at all costs. Infrastructure is no exception to this interaction. The close relationship between infrastructure and military rationalities around the world means the implementation of infrastructure is rarely neutral.[0] Although the state's construction of infrastructure is not an explicitly military intervention,[0] the armed group often interprets its presence as an extension of the state's military capacity and thus a threat. This is compounded when the state frames infrastructure, through discursive acts, into objects and spaces vulnerable to attack by armed groups.[0]

In confrontation, the armed group and the state view the other actor as an existential threat. Both actors therefore secure their presence in the territory through militarising. State efforts to protect infrastructure by force invite aggressive

[0] The decisions that lead the state and the armed group to arrive at one interaction or another is not included in this analysis. Instead, this analysis takes as the starting point the observation that there are consistent types of interactions between states and armed groups (as noted in the relevant literature) that have consistent strategic responses by both actors. While more historical or contextual accounts will be considered in the empirical chapters as salient motivators for different interactions, the specific determinants of cooperation or competition is a subject for future research.

[0] Staniland, 'States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders', 252; Barnes, 'Criminal Politics: An Integrated Approach to the Study of Organized Crime, Politics, and Violence', 973; Arias, *Criminal Enterprises and Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean*, 28.

[0] Collier and Lakoff, 'Vital Systems Security: Reflexive Biopolitics and the Government of Emergency'; Dua, 'A Sea of Trade and a Sea of Fish: Piracy and Protection in the Western Indian Ocean'.

[0] In this thesis I use the term military as shorthand for state military forces.

[0] Aradau, 'Security That Matters: Critical Infrastructure and Objects of Protection', 501.

responses by the armed group and make the infrastructure a military target.[0] The armed group may also take effort by the state to build infrastructure as a threat to their presence and pre-emptively attack, pushing the state to bring in its military. Either side can initiate; however, once one side has taken a competitive stance, then the other must either retreat or react, leading to spiralling militarisation by both sides around the infrastructure project to defend against the other actor.

The state and armed group's territorial strategy transforms the local order; militarising by the state and armed group exposes local communities to violence and therefore render the local order insecure and fails to afford agency. Violence is also experienced arbitrarily by local communities, as they are not sure where the next attack may come from or when they might be accused of defection by one side or the other. While this framework focuses on the impact of interactions in the context of infrastructure implementation, I theorise the impact of militarising from broader studies of the territorial dynamics of violence and conflict.[0] In Kalyvas' control-collaboration model, he posits that in civil war armed actors seek to maximise collaboration with the population while minimising defection – i.e., the possibility that local communities will not support them and might support the other side, tipping the scales against them.[0] Where one actor is concerned with the other's intentions in securing territorial presence and considers its own position less than secure then this leads to increased concern that the local communities may withdraw their support from one actor and provide it to the other.

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[0] Lacher and Kumetat, 'The Security of Energy Infrastructure and Supply in North Africa: Hydrocarbons and Renewable Energies in Comparative Perspective'.

[0] See Chapter 4 for more details. Significant works in territorial dynamics of competition include Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*; Kalyvas, 'Micro-Level Studies of Violence in Civil War: Refining and Extending the Control-Collaboration Model'; Humphreys and Weinstein, 'Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil War'; Balcells, 'Continuation of Politics by Two Means: Direct and Indirect Violence in Civil War'; Malthaner, 'Violence, Legitimacy, and Control: The Microdynamics of Support Relationships between Militant Groups and Their Social Environment'.

[0] Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*.

While the armed group may have some baseline support from local communities as it already acts as the incumbent in the territory, the increased presence of an intervening state creates opportunity and potentially offers incentives for local community members to withdraw their support and defect. Concern with defection leads the state and armed group to deter the potential loss of community support to prevent the other actor from gaining an advantage.[0]

The background violence between state and armed group and their concern with community defection in turn affects community agency. As Arias notes, "ongoing conflict prevents the emergence of alternative modes of social control and also may inhibit the formation of civic groups".[0] The local order provides little space for communities to mobilise or influence decision-making, since any demand made by the community to either the armed group or the state may be interpreted as loyalty to the other. The armed group and the state's territorial strategies undermine both security and agency in the local order. This outcome for the local community is linked to competitive nature of the interaction. The community's position and loyalty are an important part of the military struggle between state and armed group; paradoxically this importance is what leads to their victimisation.

SPECIALISING AND A REPRESSIVE ORDER

In the last section I theorised that states and armed groups target civilians because of highly competitive interactions where the military and the armed group struggle to secure their territorial presence around infrastructure implementation. Yet it is not the only type of local order to produce insecurity and limit agency. At other times the

[0]I identify *concern with* civilian support and defection as drivers in armed group and state behaviour, rather than assess whether or not civilians in local communities have or have not defected.

[0] Arias, *Criminal Enterprises and Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean*, 29.

armed group targets communities without the logic of competition,[0] and the local order is characterised by selective violence, where local communities fear attacks from shadowy actors or retaliation for speaking out. The state in turn appears unwilling to turn its legal apparatus against the armed group, or worse, is complicit in the armed group's victimisation of communities. Why do insecure local orders emerge if the state and the armed group are not competing?

States and armed groups are not always at odds. At the other end of the spectrum of competition and cooperation, the state and armed group no longer base their interaction on the threat the other poses. I term this interaction subcontraction, as the armed group becomes involved in the state's infrastructure implementation and uses violence on its behalf.[0] I borrow this term from Idler, who uses subcontraction to understand the role of one actor in realising the interests of another during armed conflict.[0] The state may use an armed group as a source of intelligence, deterring support in civilian populations for political challengers, supplying the state with auxiliary forces in operations, and providing plausible deniability.[0] Barnes' refers to

[0] Some researchers have observed that violence is used to secure territorial dominance by one group; armed actors may use violence to punish perceived wrongdoers, or those who do not follow the rules, selectively killing members of the local community as a process of social cleansing that gains them legitimacy (Malthaner, 'Violence, Legitimacy, and Control: The Microdynamics of Support Relationships between Militant Groups and Their Social Environment'; Prem et al., 'Killing Social Leaders for Territorial Control: The Unintended Consequences of Peace'). In this thesis, I am asking how does victimisation against civilians relate to cooperation between the state and armed group rather than this independent strategy of territorial control.

[0] I use the term subcontraction here much in the way that Idler does in her analysis of non-state orders between violent non-state actors in Colombia (Idler, 'Exploring Agreements of Convenience Made among Violent Non-State Actors', 69).

[0] Idler, *Borderland Battles: Violence, Crime, and Governance at the Edges of Colombia's War*, 203; Idler, 'Exploring Agreements of Convenience Made among Violent Non-State Actors'; Stanton, 'Regulating Militias: Governments, Militias, and Civilian Targeting in Civil War'.

[0] Eck, 'Repression by Proxy: How Military Purges and Insurgency Impact the Delegation of Coercion'; Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger, 'Militias in Civil Wars'; Ahram, 'Pro-Government Militias and the Repertoires of Illicit State Violence'.

this type as an alliance, Staniland as collusion, and Arias as tiered governance.[0] The key characteristic of this interaction is "the coordinated pursuit of a shared goal".[0]

Subcontraction incentivises states and armed groups to specialise their efforts to secure territorial presence. Specialising is the product of cooperation because as the state and armed group are no longer securing their territorial presence against each other, they can draw on their complementing abilities and resources to secure their territorial presence together.[0] The state is able to draw on its law enforcement and legal institutions to address potential threats by third parties. The armed group is equipped to provide extralegal violence, allowing what Cohen refers to as state practices of denial[0] that silence any opposition from either other armed groups or local communities.

The state does not only depend on armed groups to combat other armed groups. The literature on corporate violence in development offers a different perspective on the drivers of violence and targeting by armed groups against local communities that looks beyond competition and confrontation. Private actors use armed groups, including private security, paramilitaries, and criminal groups, not for military purposes but in service of profit-seeking.[0] Reno argues that the collaboration

[0] Barnes, 'Criminal Politics: An Integrated Approach to the Study of Organized Crime, Politics, and Violence', 975; Staniland, 'States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders', 249; Arias, *Criminal Enterprises and Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean*, 30.

[0] Staniland, 'States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders', 249.

[0] Additionally, some evidence of complicity or shared objectives is not only the product of no competition between the two actors but also serves to signal to each actor the lack of threat each poses. The uncertainty about the motives of armed actors always leaves some space for doubt about the potential threat they pose. Therefore, I identify subcontraction at the most extreme end of cooperation because both actors share the same objectives.

[0] Cohen, *States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering*.

[0] Stephens, 'The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights'; Maassarani, 'Four Counts of Corporate Complicity: Alternative Forms of Accomplice Liability under the Alien Tort Claims Act'.

between foreign firms and local strongmen re-emerged in contemporary times as '[t]he cheapest and most efficacious option for indirect management of disorder'.[0]

Yet infrastructure is not driven by private actors (though private companies may become involved with the project) but rather state agencies and public companies. The process of building up infrastructure is also time and resource intensive, much like other large-scale extractive or agricultural projects driven largely by private actors. And despite claims by policymakers and development actors, infrastructure implementation is not always a welcome practice – much like the response to large-scale private extractive or agricultural projects by local communities.[0] Specialising during infrastructure implementation therefore does not undercut state capacity and can even serve statebuilding aims.[0]

In subcontracted interactions during infrastructure implementation, the armed group specialises with strategic violence against civilians, threatening and intimidating local communities. This leads to displacement from desired or valuable land, initiating or supporting a process of territorial dispossession and control that makes acquiring the lands legally considerably easier.[0] Armed groups also work to supress any inimical civil society groups challenging the project through grass-roots mobilisation or activism, while public officials delegitimise community resistance as support for insurgents or appear to ignore or dismiss community concerns about

[0] Reno, 'Order and Commerce in Turbulent Areas: 19th Century Lessons, 21st Century Practice', 623.

[0] Reboredo, 'A Panacea for Development? Megaprojects and the Construction of State Legitimacy in Post-Apartheid South Africa'; Bartilow, 'Corporate Power, US Drug Enforcement and the Repression of Indigenous Peoples in Latin America'; Stephens, 'The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights'.

[0] Mazzei, *Death Squads or Self-Defense Forces?: How Paramilitary Groups Emerge and Challenge Democracy in Latin America*; Raleigh, 'Pragmatic and Promiscuous: Explaining the Rise of Competitive Political Militias across Africa'; Stanton, 'Regulating Militias: Governments, Militias, and Civilian Targeting in Civil War'.

[0] The state has multiple resources at its disposal to acquire and legalise land dispossession: armed, extrajudicial violence is the blunt tip of a broader state apparatus to concentrate land possession (Ballvé, 'Grassroots Masquerades: Development, Paramilitaries, and Land Laundering in Colombia'; Vargas and Uribe, 'State, War, and Land Dispossession: The Multiple Paths to Land Concentration').

their security. Extralegal violence may also be labelled by state actors as a product of endogenous confrontation with armed groups or microlevel antagonisms around control for illicit economies, rather than the dynamics of development.[0]

A repressive local order emerges when the actions taken by the armed group and the state converge to protect infrastructure. Both actors – using their respective strengths of extralegal violence or legal action (or inaction) – target any community members who fail to comply with their shared interests. Communities understand that the local order offers little security or agency; there are rules of what can and cannot be said, and strong critiques of the infrastructure implementation invite violent repercussions.

INSTITUTIONALISING AND A STABLE ORDER

Local order is not always insecure for the communities, even in the midst of an armed conflict. At times, pockets of relative stability are carved out where local communities do not experience violence, and daily life continues as normal even as the state builds infrastructure in territories occupied by armed groups. This local order does not generate any specific risks targeting local communities. However, neither does the local order offer any space for local communities to mobilise or participate in political life, as the state and armed group appear uninterested in community support. Why might the armed group and the state restrain their use of violence but also appear indifferent to the needs of the community?

[0] Grajales, 'State Involvement, Land Grabbing and Counter-insurgency in Colombia'; Devine, 'Counterinsurgency Ecotourism in Guatemala's Maya Biosphere Reserve'; Marijnen, 'Public Authority and Conservation in Areas of Armed Conflict: Virunga National Park as a 'State within a State'in Eastern Congo'.

I theorise that stability is the result of the third point on the competition and cooperation spectrum, veering away from competition but where armed groups and the state are not yet in close cooperation. Cooption (which distantly resembles what Arias refers to as collaborative governance;[0] Staniland and Barnes do not seem to capture this dynamic) is a marginally cooperative interaction which means that threat is minimised but not wholly absent. Cooption leads both actors to institutionalise as a territorial strategy to secure their respective presence. Institutionalising is the commitment by both actors to adhere to this explicit or implicit agreement, establishing clear consequences for its breach.

In cooption, institutionalising is a strategy deployed by the state and an armed group wanting to make use of resources the state finds inconvenient to withdraw.[0] So long as the state meets its end of the agreement, the armed group will limit its attacks. As long as the demand for rent by armed groups is at a price the state is willing to pay, the state has no reason to disrupt the arrangement.[0] Institutionalising means each actor has a credible commitment to maintaining the arrangement and believes the other actor to have the same. Even if both actors have no sense of formal alliance or close cooperation with the other, they both able to better secure their respective territorial presence so long as the other upholds its end.

This territorial strategy draws on the opportunities that infrastructure can present in a territory. Alongside any political agenda or economic objectives, most armed groups possess the "indispensable prerequisite" of survival,[0] and armed operations are expensive ventures. Therefore, an armed group will capitalise on the resources

[0] Arias, *Criminal Enterprises and Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean*, 24.
[0] Also see Kasfir, Frerks, and Terpstra, 'Introduction: Armed Groups and Multi-Layered Governance', 259.
[0] Public officials are rarely in direct contact with the armed groups, and instead depend on private subcontracted companies to preserve deniability in paying the armed groups.
[0] Scott and Clark, *Insurgency*, 93.

and materials made available to it.[0] These resources can come from a variety of sources, including illicit economies or natural resources,[0] taxing local populations,[0] or making demands that large corporations and companies wanting to operate in the territory pay rent.[0] Infrastructure works in many ways like Ross' obstructable resources as their "transportation can be easily blocked by a small number of individuals with few weapons" and require significant material resources dedicated to very specific areas.[0] The state draws expertise from civilian engineers and labourers that must contend with the presence of armed groups in its day-to-day practices as much as a private economic actor might. The armed group accepts the presence of the state in the territory but enjoys the financial benefits the project brings, limiting their use of force against individuals or companies that pay their part of the deal.

The state, unlike local communities, can exit a territory if the conditions are unfavourable to its presence, or if the interaction changes, has the capacity to militarise to address increased threat (or perception of it). However, by institutionalising, state actors prevent an armed group from attacking or sabotaging a project by paying a tax to the group, therefore securing their presence in the territory. This is reflected at the more macrolevel in the literature on elite bargains

[0] Olson, 'Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development'; De Mesquita et al., *The Logic of Political Survival*.

[0] Ross, 'Oil, Drugs, and Diamonds: How Do Natural Resources Vary in Their Impact on Civil War'; Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore, 'A Diamond Curse?: Civil War and a Lootable Resource'; Goodhand, 'Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The Drugs Economy and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Afghanistan'.

[0] Maguire, 'Fraud, Extortion and Racketeering: The Black Economy in Northern Ireland'; Hoffmann, Vlassenroot, and Marchais, 'Taxation, Stateness and Armed Groups: Public Authority and Resource Extraction in Eastern Congo', 2016; Sánchez de la Sierra, 'On the Origins of the State: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo'.

[0] Nordstrom, *Shadows of War: Violence, Power, and International Profiteering in the Twenty-First Century*; Hoffmann, Vlassenroot, and Marchais, 'Taxation, Stateness and Armed Groups: Public Authority and Resource Extraction in Eastern Congo', 2016.

[0] Ross, 'Oil, Drugs, and Diamonds: How Do Natural Resources Vary in Their Impact on Civil War', 10. Like other obstructable resources, a road or dam cannot simply be relocated if the conditions are unfavourable.

and political settlements.[0] As previously mentioned, armed groups often function as local elites in the territories by their capacity to wield violence coercively. State actors are willing to make concessions when needed to provide these local elites with access to their considerable resources in exchange for limiting their coercive power in the territory.

Therefore, while publicly public officials may denounce the presence of armed groups and claim that the infrastructure represents a threat to their territorial control, in private the same actors are willing to accept the armed group's presence and demands to avoid violent retaliation and secure their presence in the territory. The state and the armed group find more positive political economic arrangements that are less costly than all out competition.[0]

The state and armed group's strategy of institutionalising in response to cooption therefore precludes either actor from using violence to secure their presence in the territory. However, while this does not lead either actor to target local communities, this territorial strategy also does not incentivise any responsiveness to community needs. Violence between armed factions and civilian victimisation emerges when the arrangement established by both actors break down, not when it's in place.[0] Institutionalising reduces concern with community defection since the armed group and the state have clear rules structuring their interaction to secure their presence in the territory. It does not incentivise selective community targeting because the two

[0] Giustozzi, 'Double-Edged Swords: Armies, Elite Bargaining and State-Building'; Lindemann, 'Inclusive Elite Bargains and the Dilemma of Unproductive Peace: A Zambian Case Study'; Laws, 'Political Settlements, Elite Pacts, and Governments of National Unity: A Conceptual Study'; Castillejo, 'Promoting Inclusion in Political Settlements: A Priority for International Actors'; Phillips, 'When Less Was More: External Assistance and the Political Settlement in Somaliland'; Cheng, Goodhand, and Meehan, 'Synthesis Paper: Securing and Sustaining Elite Bargains That Reduce Violent Conflict'.

[0] Le Billon, 'The Geopolitical Economy of "Resource Wars"', 12; Richani, 'Multinational Corporations, Rentier Capitalism, and the War System in Colombia', 126.

[0] Nussio and Howe, 'When Protection Collapses: Post-Demobilization Trajectories of Violence'.

actors are not working in tandem, merely willing to cooperate as long as it secures their respective presence.

This stability in the local order also limits agency. Armed groups and the state ignore local communities when they attempt to voice concerns about the infrastructure project since both actors have more to gain from the project than the local community. By dealing directly with the armed group, the state can bypass appeals to the community, so the armed group is not competing with the state for community support. Armed groups in turn have no incentive to appeal to the local community as the cooperative interaction precludes a pressing need for community support.

Appealing and a responsive order

Finally, unexpectedly, sometimes local order during armed conflict has both security and agency. Armed groups and the state restrain their use of violence and do not target local communities. The state and armed group even go further and open up spaces for communities to participate in political decisions, make demands, and then in turn strive to meet their needs. How does this apparently idiosyncratic responsive local order in armed conflict emerge during infrastructure implementation?

This local order emerges – paradoxically – from a competitive interaction between the state and armed group, what I term coexistence. Competition is not always so extreme as to lead the state and the armed group to militarise. Both actors are concerned with threat but it does not appear existential (i.e. neither actor has been able or willing to remove the other from the territory but neither has left, resulting in a standoff); this interaction is similar to Staniland's tacit coexistence, and

comparable to Barnes' evasion-enforcement, and Arias' divided governance.[0] Barnes describes the evasion-enforcement dynamic as one where "criminal organisations do not use violence directly against state agents but also do not collaborate with the state", leading criminal groups to depend on the cooperation of local communities to effectively evade enforcement.[0] Staniland refers to tacit coexistence as minimally cooperative, but equally notes that it is a world where "violence is ever-present but not total"; this implies that the interaction is still competitive though is considered "too costly" for both sides.[0]

Coexistence is also evocative of Zone 3 of Kalyvas' control-collaboration model, as both sides may want to punish defection but are unable to credibly protect informants, producing less violence.[0] While this means that both actors may refrain from militarising (to prevent escalation), the interaction is not cooperative enough for both actors to commit to institutionalising. Instead, both the state and armed group coexist uneasily.

This unease generates territorial strategies of community appeal by both the state and armed group. The state deploys public officials, civil engineers, social liaison officers, even allying with local NGO's to improve its appeal to the community. When the state enters a territory where it is mistrusted or feared, its front-line officials often attempt to build a relationship with local communities for their own safety.[0] In turn the armed group might be wary of the state's presence, but attacking

[0] Staniland, 'States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders', 251; Barnes, 'Criminal Politics: An Integrated Approach to the Study of Organized Crime, Politics, and Violence', 973; Arias, *Criminal Enterprises and Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean*, 29.

[0] Barnes, 'Criminal Politics: An Integrated Approach to the Study of Organized Crime, Politics, and Violence', 974.

[0] Staniland, 'States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders', 251–52.

[0] Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, 204.

[0] Brinkerhoff, Wetterberg, and Dunn, 'Service Delivery and Legitimacy in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: Evidence from Water Services in Iraq', 279.

infrastructure is not only costly in terms of military resources but it can also undermine the group's community support if the community desires the project.[0] As Wood and Kathman note:

> "New competitors operating within the same conflict present civilians with alternative organisations to which they can offer loyalty and support in exchange for security, social order, and other benefits. New entrants to the conflict therefore immediately increase the (perceived) level of competition over civilian loyalty."[0]

Armed groups find it beneficial to appeal to the community as long as state actors remains a potential threat to the armed group's presence. For both the state and armed group, losing the community's support might strengthen the other actor's position in the territory and therefore increase the threat they face. The territorial strategy of community appeal therefore is a result of the low-level competition between the state and armed group that relies on building a relationship with the local community to pre-empt efforts by the other actor to attack since the other actor is also wary of losing the community's support.

Studies on conflict often conceptualise the purpose of this territorial strategy as a way to gain an advantage over the competing actor. Berman et al argue that public goods provision served as a three-way interaction between rebels, the state, and civilians deciding whether to share information about insurgents with government forces.[0] The reduction in violence is understood as the state's success in 'winning' the local community by providing goods the community desired, who in turn provide intelligence that weakens the armed group. These approaches argue that the competitive element of this interaction results in both actors attempting to win

[0] Wickham-Crowley, 'Del Gobierno de Abajo al Gobierno de Arriba …and Back: Transitions to and from Rebel Governance in Latin America, 1956–1990', 65.

[0] Wood and Kathman, 'Competing for the Crown: Inter-Rebel Competition and Civilian Targeting in Civil War', 170.

[0] Berman, Shapiro, and Felter, 'Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq'.

community support to gain valuable resources and military intelligence to secure their presence in the territory.

However, I theorise that rather than function as a contest in which the state or armed group is successful in winning over communities to their side – and therefore gaining valuable intelligence to improve their position relative to the other – the state and armed group appeal to the community as a way to capitalise on the community's existing links to the other. This appeal does not serve to win over the community and ensure its loyalty to one side, but rather considers the community a balancing actor in the equilibrium. The community is capable, when willing to lend its support, to pressure the armed group to change its behaviour in a way that allows the state to secure its presence in the territory. This is only possible as long as the armed group also wants to retain the community's support to in turn the community's relationship with the state to limit its behaviour, therefore securing its presence in the territory.

In order to appeal to the community, the state and armed group must consider their comparative abilities. If an armed group wants to retain the community's support, they either must provide the same infrastructure goods offered by the state (which is often too resource intensive) or permit the state to build it. A closer relationship between local community and the state is a concern for any armed group that seeks to retain its territorial presence in the face of a competitor. The state in turn cannot ensure a monopoly of force and security and officials realise that actions taken to attempt to do so lead to community victimisation and distrust. They must find ways to ensure that local communities do not turn against them and are therefore more responsive to the communities in order to gain their support.[0]

[0] Unlike Kalyvas' control-collaboration model, this competitive dynamic does not depend on winning exclusive community support: both the state and armed group benefit more from the community having some relationship with either side, maintaining the equilibrium of the coexistence. When moving beyond confrontation, competition serves as a way to balance potentially hostile parties and improve responsiveness to community needs.

This strategy does not render the community a passive recipient; just as the community is capable of mobilising and acting even in adverse local orders, the community is a pragmatic actor in the face of such pressures.[0] When the state and armed group have incentive to appeal to the community in order to secure their presence in the territory, then the local order affords not only security but agency, leaving the community better equipped to limit violence and participate in the decision-making process.

TERRITORIAL STRATEGIES AND THE RELEVANCE OF THE COMMUNITY

The territorial strategies deployed by the state and armed group have a clear impact on the local order, such that appealing produces security and agency, while militarising generates the most insecurity and a lack of agency. Both of these extreme outcomes emerge from competitive interactions, while cooperative interactions also produce divergent results. Yet I theorise that although the actual outcome for the local order – and by extension to the experiences of the local community – are radically different, the strategies produced by competitive interactions share a similar interest in the role of the community.

Territorial strategies borne of competition balance the potential threat against either actor on a knife's edge; as a result, both the state and armed group are wary of the role local communities could play in tipping the balance in one direction or the other. Both actors are concerned with community defection. In confrontation, both actors seek to defend against the other at all costs because they perceive an existential threat, leading to both actors to militarise. Militarising is inherently concerned with the community as a threat because the ability of civilians to relay important

[0] Zhukov, 'An Epidemic Model of Violence and Public Support in Civil War'.

information or provide support for the other actor provides the other actor an advantage. Militarising therefore means both the state and armed group are concerned with community defection.

When the threat is not existential, the armed group and the state can coexist. However, this interaction is fragile and liable to breakdown at the hint of threat or aggression since both actors still view the other as a potential threat. In order to maintain the equilibrium, both actors appeal to the community to help secure their presence in the territory. Rather than indicate a concern with community defection to the other side, the appeal to the community uses community linkage to the other actor as a way of relaying information and restraining unwanted behaviour. Community support is therefore desired by both the state and armed group and the community has therefore an important role in both actors' strategy to secure their presence in the territory.

On the other hand, the territorial strategies borne from cooperative interactions exclude the community as playing an important role. In its most extreme, subcontraction excludes communities because there is no perception of threat between the two actors. The only concern with the community is that it poses an external obstacle to the shared interests of the state and armed group. Specialising is a territorial strategy that entirely excludes the community's role and instead focuses on the complementary efforts of the state and armed group to secure their presence. Community support or defection between the two actors is irrelevant to the territorial strategy – the only thing that matters is ensuring compliance.

Equally, cooption leads to both the state and armed group to institutionalise, so that both actors commit to the implicit rules of an arrangement that secures their respective presence in the territory. This strategy, though it limits violence between

the state and armed group and offers no incentive to attack the community, also does not lend the community any significant role or purpose. As a result, the community is excluded from the strategy and the local order offers little agency to have their needs met.

Therefore, while the outcomes of security and agency may appear inconsistent with the broader categories of competition and cooperation, the logics of the territorial strategies that are derived from each show key similarities. Cooperation, though it does not always result in violence, does not position the community as a key player in its territorial strategy. Competition – for better and for worse – puts the community at the centre of both the state and armed group's territorial strategies.

CONCLUSION

The variation and dynamism of interactions reveal how different strategies impact the production of local order. Arbitrary, repressive, stable, and responsive orders emerge from a series of action and reaction between states and armed groups. As these actors pinball against each other in 'under-developed' territories, they drag in their wake the local communities, who must navigate the orders they co-produce. Infrastructure becomes a driving force in what Ballvé calls the 'frontier effect', which materially produces the social spaces at the boundaries of politics, economics, and violence.[0] These frontier state formations reflects the interactions outlined in this thesis, mapping the "rival political ensembles constantly being made and unmade by an array of different actors".[0] Local orders – not dissimilar from Ballvé's regimes of

[0] Ballvé, *The Frontier Effect: State Formation and Violence in Colombia*, 33.
[0] Ballvé, 163.

rule, are not created by any one actor but rather forged in the competition or cooperation between two.

While existing typologies and theories of variation between competition and cooperation often examine the behaviour and relationships between state actors and armed groups, it rarely interrogates the impact such interactions have on the local order and on the everyday lives in the territory. Infrastructure presents a lens with which one can more clearly visualise the complex linkages between development, security, and conflict. In examining state and armed group interactions that emerge from development efforts, I argue that we must consider the impact of these interactions – and the state's and armed group's efforts to secure their territorial presence as a result – with the human-centred security experienced by the local communities. I also go another step to understand under what conditions of competition or cooperation local orders are not only secure (or at least relatively non-violent) but actually receptive and open to community participation in political life. Paradoxically, some degree of competition between the state and armed group incentivises a more responsive local order.

The next four chapters will detail each interaction type, the territorial strategy they produce, and how each shape the local order based on an analysis of a range of infrastructure cases in Northern Antioquia and Pacific Nariño and supported by shadow cases from other departments of Colombia. I organise the following empirical chapters from the perspective of the local, ordering them from the most damaging interaction to the interaction that best enables local security and agency. I begin my empirical analysis with confrontation to explore how an extreme degree of competition spirals into militarising by the military and the armed group that puts communities at the unpredictable crosshairs of both actors. The subsequent chapters

then analyse subcontraction, cooption, and finally conclude with coexistence to explore how different territorial strategies lead to increasingly improved local outcomes.

CHAPTER 4 THE SWORD AND THE WALL

PRODUCING AN ARBITRARY LOCAL ORDER

> "The military is here for the road, not for the protection of the communities. We are more insecure with the military here. Because if there is a confrontation [with the armed groups], the armed groups will harm the community".[0]

In the afro-descendant *consejo comunitario* (community council)[0] of Alto Mira y Frontera in the department of Nariño, the local community was trapped between two armed actors. The Colombian military had come down to station itself along the construction of the Espriella – Rio Mataje road. FARC dissidents – the Oliver Sinisterra Front (FOS) – would appear to clash with the military and placed landmines on the road and the ground about to be paved. Both groups would target the civilians directly; one day the FOS might force the members of the community to attend mandatory meetings, the next the military accused them of providing the FOS with harmful intelligence. The same dynamic was then reversed and communities who had to live side by side with the military were targeted by the FOS for defection. How does the local order expressed by a local leader in Alto Mira and Frontera in Tumaco in the above quote relate to the implementation of infrastructure?

Confrontation between the state and armed group during infrastructure implementation puts communities in the crosshairs of both actors. The title of this chapter refers to the Spanish phrase 'entre la espada y la pared' that means there are no good choices (a close English approximation is 'between a rock and a hard place',

[0] Interview with local leader (81), Tumaco – March 2019.

[0] *Consejos Comunitarios* are designated communities of Afrocolombians with special rights to collective territory, recognised in the 1991 Constitution.

or between 'the Devil and the deep blue sea'). In this case the implementation of infrastructure (in some cases, even a wall of sorts) puts the community between two rival swords.

There are diverging theories that explain the victimisation of local communities – dependent on ideology,[0] material resources,[0] or ethnic compositions of the population[0]. However, I show in this chapter how during the implementation of infrastructure in Colombia, development - considered a tool for peace and stability as discussed in Chapter 1 and 2 – can inflame tensions between the state and armed group over territorial control. Each actors' efforts to address the other's threat fuel the assumption that the presence of one is antithetical to the existence of the other.

As a result, the local order is not stable but upended. Clashes between the military and armed group expose the community to collateral harm. The armed group and the military's concern with community defection leads them to victimise community members indiscriminately. The local community becomes another asset – or potential liability – to this strategy. Finally, the military preoccupations of the state and armed group are prioritised over community needs, obviating agency in the local order. The uncertainty generated by constant proximity and hostility of the military and an armed group means their accusations against the community fly fast and to damaging and arbitrary ends. Arbitrary local order – affording neither security nor agency –emerges because confrontation leads the state and armed group to militarise as a territorial strategy to secure their respective presences.

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[0] Thaler, 'Ideology and Violence in Civil Wars: Theory and Evidence from Mozambique and Angola'; Carson and Suppenbach, 'The Global Jihadist Movement: The Most Lethal Ideology?'; Leader Maynard, 'Ideology and Armed Conflict'.

[0] Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*; Fielding and Shortland, 'The Dynamics of Terror during the Peruvian Civil War'; Wood, 'Opportunities to Kill or Incentives for Restraint? Rebel Capabilities, the Origins of Support, and Civilian Victimization in Civil War'.

[0] Fjelde and Hultman, 'Weakening the Enemy: A Disaggregated Study of Violence against Civilians in Africa'.

In this chapter I demonstrate how confrontation between the state and armed group during the implementation of the Porce II and III dams and the Hidroituango dam in Northern Antioquia, and the implementation of the Espriella – Rio Mataje in Nariño produced arbitrary local orders. I first examine the close relationship between infrastructure and confrontation in Colombia across the country. I then show how confrontation resulted in the Colombian state and armed group militarising the select infrastructure projects. Finally, I show how this territorial strategy shaped the local order, producing considerable insecurity not only in the general use of violence in the territory but in the indiscriminate victimisation of local communities and – in doing so – also curtailed their agency. This chapter therefore demonstrates how development efforts – when implemented under conditions of confrontation – produce not stability but insecurity.

STRATEGIC TO THE NATION: INFRASTRUCTURE AND COMPETITION

The existential threat of confrontation underlies many of the infrastructure efforts by the Colombian state into its peripheries. While much of the discourse around infrastructure in Colombia revolved around peacebuilding since the signing of the peace accord with the FARC in 2016,[0] Colombia has a history of implementing infrastructure in its margins as a valuable asset and a potential target for armed groups.[0] President Alvaro Uribe's Democratic Security campaign against the FARC and ELN explicitly called for increased military presence to protect the road and energy infrastructure of the country.[0] Protecting infrastructure 'strategic to the

[0] Zeiderman, 'Concrete Peace: Building Security through Infrastructure in Colombia', 499.
[0] Parish, 'Burning and Rebuilding Bridges: Forensic Infrastructures in War and Its Aftermath'.
[0] ODHDIH, 'Impacto de la Política de Seguridad Democrática Sobre La Confrontación Armada, El Narcotráfico y Los Derechos Humanos', 52.

nation' and implementing new projects remain key offices of the Colombian military, where military operations are established around oil pipelines, electrical grids, and road connections, as well as to protect the companies – public and private – that build and operate those infrastructures.[0] A former Minister of Transport explained that there was no alternative but to militarise the projects because:

> "The aim of the paramilitaries and the guerrilla is to destabilise the country…they will attack the companies [that build infrastructure] or the community…they need the military to manage this public disorder".[0]

The narrative, therefore, of threat and competition exists at the highest public offices. Public officials present armed groups as spoilers to any development efforts – effectively, an existential threat to infrastructure implementation. Under this competitive interaction, infrastructure implementation in Colombia entangles military and civilian objectives, with the military becoming the key strategic response to protecting the infrastructure and – by extension – the state's presence in these peripheral territories when confronting an armed group.

Armed groups in Colombia also often viewed the state's efforts to implement infrastructure as a source of existential threat. A communication by the FARC high command in 2011 declared:

> "It was no coincidence that in the last eight years, the army of the oligarchy has developed the Energy and Road Plan across the country. In Antioquia they have for example created several of their battalions to add to those that already exist, for the 7th Division, the operational unit with the highest number of units. This is all a machine of terror, accompanied by paramilitaries financed by the State and national and foreign companies."[0]

[0] Donadio et al., 'Misiones Militares y Posconflicto. Una Mirada Regional Sobre Colombia. Red de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina', 14.
[0] Interview with former Transport Minister (45), Bogota – February 2019.
[0] FARC-EP, '¿Energía Para Quién?'

The missive makes explicit the belief that the development of infrastructure was used as a precursor to consolidated state and particularly military presence in the territory to target the FARC's control of the territory.

Protecting infrastructure projects in Colombia is not the sole objective of military in conflict-affected territories. Their mandate is also to combat any non-state armed actors that challenges the state's monopoly on force. [0] However, as I indicate in the cases below, the decision to deploy military force in a territory is incentivised by the state's decision to protect its infrastructure and 'pacify' a region for the infrastructure to be peacefully implemented. Other objectives may coincide with the goal to secure territory for infrastructure, such as broader counternarcotic or counterinsurgent operations. Yet in each of the cases detailed below the state militarised explicitly to protect the infrastructure project. Under conditions of confrontation, infrastructure serves as a catalyst for the state and armed group to militarise; understanding this process and how it exacerbates hostilities is fundamental to understanding the impact of development on local order.

TRACING A STRATEGY OF MILITARISING

In this chapter, I trace three cases of confrontation[0] in order to substantiate my argument and demonstrate the validity of militarising as the causal mechanism. Table 11 details the cases examined.

[0] Donadio et al., 'Misiones Militares y Posconflicto. Una Mirada Regional Sobre Colombia. Red de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina', 14.

[0] I select these three cases as they demonstrate similarities in confrontation across regions (North Antioquia and Pacific Nariño), time periods (from 1995 to 2018), and actors (public companies, national department of roads, FARC, ELN, FARC dissidents). See the Research Design section in the Introduction for a deeper discussion on why specific cases were selected.

TABLE 8. CASES OF CONFRONTATION

Municipality	Department	Timeframe	Infrastructure Type	Dyadic Interaction
Amalfi/Anorí	Antioquia	1996-2004	Roads and Hydroelectric dams (Porce II/Porce III)	Colombian military - FARC - ELN
Ituango and surrounding municipalities	Antioquia	2008-2013	Roads and Hydroelectric dam (Hidroituango)	Colombian military - FARC
Tumaco	Nariño	2018-2019	Secondary Road (Espriella-Rio Mataje)	Colombian military-FOS

In each interaction I identify the specific armed group and the state actor deployed as part of the state's territorial strategy. As the Colombian government and the armed group militarise during confrontational interactions, they produced an arbitrary local order, where the violent clashes between the two armed actors and their concern with community defection rendered the local order insecure and with little agency.

SPIRALING SECURITY DILEMMAS: INFRASTRUCTURE AS A MILITARISED SITE

In this section I demonstrate how a confrontational interaction between the state and armed group during infrastructure implementation led both the state and armed group to militarise against each other. I chart the initial progression of these projects and how the state and armed group's choices reflected a concern with the existential threat of the other, generating a militarised response. This territorial strategy deepened the security dilemma between both actors and escalated not only the clashes between them but also the concern both actors had with community defection.

The Colombian state at times militarised infrastructure at its inception out of concern with armed group presence, deploying the military alongside the construction of the project to protect against a hostile armed group. The Colombian Army accompanied the construction of Porce II and Porce III by the public company Public Enterprises of Medellin (EPM) in the mid-1990s and early 2000s in Northern Antioquia. Porce II initiated construction in 1994 with military bases built in the mountains to protect the project.[0] When EPM began to construct Porce III in 2004, the state deployed additional military units to protect the new project.[0] By the mid-2000s EPM had reached arrangements with the Ministry of Defence, including building various bases for the military to act as headquarters of their operations in protecting Porce III, even delivering vehicles to the national army to enable their patrol of the hydroelectric project and power plants.[0]

Similarly, the Colombian government under President Alvaro Uribe deployed the military to protect the implementation of Hidroituango dam nearly 50 kilometers away. In 2008 EPM began its initial efforts for planning and surveying the site of the dam and construction commenced in 2011. The state increased military presence in the territory in 2009 with the creation of the Conjoined Forces of the Paramillo as part of Operation Medusa so that the "area was militarised for the dam".[0]

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[0] Interview with local leaders (21-24), Amalfi– November 2018. The infrastructure project was not only accompanied by military battalions but also discursively militarised as a counterinsurgent strategy. In 2007, the President of Colombia at the time, Alvaro Uribe, spoke in glowing terms about the Public Enterprises of Medellin (EPM)'s work in Porce Canyon, noting that it was the success of these "pioneering antioqueños that conquered this difficult mountain" that for so long had been "usurped by the terrorist groups, that still linger there" (Presidential Address, 'Desviacion Del Rio Porce (Anorí - Antioquia)'.). The dam was therefore not simply an infrastructure project, or a public good, but integrated into a counterinsurgent strategy – the territory needed to be pacified for and through the project.

[0] Interview with local leaders, Amalfi (23, 24, 25) – November 2018.

[0] EPM, 'EPM Informe Financiero 2008', 142.

[0] Interview with public official (20), Ituango - November 2018; El Mundo, 'Éxito Con La Operación Medusa'; El Colombiano, 'Norte de Antioquia No Se Libra Del Asedio Violento de Las Farc'.

These decisions were part of the state's response to the presence of an armed group in the two territories. In Porce Canyon the FARC's 36th Front and the ELN Heroes and Martyrs of Anorí had both been controlling the territory for over a decade prior to the arrival of the first dam.[0] Neither the FARC or ELN welcomed the state's initial infrastructure implementation of the Porce II and III dams and Hidroituango. Both the FARC's 36th Front and the ELN Heroes and Martyrs of Anorí in Porce Canyon responded to the entry of the Colombian state to build infrastructure as an immediate threat, attacking not only the soldiers and army outposts but the construction itself.[0] In 1995 and 1996 the ELN levied attacks on work camps for Porce II and kidnapped an engineer, leading to the project's suspension in 1996.[0] According to local community leaders from the canyon, Porce II was built amidst constant clashes between the FARC and ELN and the Colombian military.[0]

In Ituango, the Hidroituango dam had been planned since the 1970s to be the largest hydroelectric dam in Colombia. However, lack of political will and FARC presence in the territory meant the state never took the project further. The FARC consolidated their presence in the territory in the late 1980s with the 18th Front, and later supported by the 36th Front.[0] The territory of Northern Antioquia, especially Ituango, was a valuable strategic position with access to the Nudo del Paramillo, a large forested, mountainous area that connected the central Colombian regions to the Panamanian border. The position bolstered the FARC's access to illicit weapon

[0] In 1973 the ELN suffered a significant military loss to the Colombian armed forces in Operation Anori and had to retreat for several years to recuperate. However, by the early 1980s they had doubled their presence in the territory and were well-established with the communities by the 1990s (Echandía Castilla 2013: 5).

[0] Semana, 'Plomo a La Paloma'.

[0] El Tiempo, 'Amenazas En El Trabajo'; Gómez Mira, 'Aportes Para Una Reconstrucción Cronológica de La Violencia En El Nordeste Antioqueño: Caso Yolombó', 80.

[0] Interview with local leaders (21, 23, 24), Amalfi – November 2018.

[0] Sepúlveda, 'La Reconquista de Ituango: Un Reto En Seguridad y Defensa Nacional Del Estado Colombiano'.

smuggling, hiding across borders,[0] and drug trafficking. By the mid-1990s, the Nudo del Paramillo was a key corridor in the drug trafficking network in Colombia.[0]

Constructing dams therefore brought the military into territories the armed group did not want to relinquish. The FARC's 18th and 36th Fronts responded with hostility to the initiation of the construction of the Hidroituango dam by EPM and the accompanying military forces. A communication by the FARC high command in 2015 reflected their view that the dam presented a threat to their presence in the territory, observing that "the general militarisation, with the aim to protect the capital interests of such projects [including Hidroituango, Porce II, and Porce III), ended up exacerbating the continued armed confrontation with the guerrilla".[0] In 2010 the FARC declared the dam a military target.[0] The dam became a site for both the state and the FARC to militarise against their competitor.

The Colombian government under President Juan Manuel Santos also responded to the FARC's aggressive stance towards Hidroituango by increasing military presence in the territory. Between February 2011 and May 2013, the Police of the Department of Antioquia mobilised more police to reinforce surveillance on the roads and headwaters of the municipalities that are part of the Hidroituango area of influence and installed a new police substation in the valley of Toledo (a municipality bordering Ituango and in the area of influence of the dam).[0] At the beginning of 2011, the Colombian Army also installed a Mobile Brigade in Ituango and ordered the

[0] For more on how armed groups strategically use borders to evade the state see Idler (*Borderland Battles: Violence, Crime, and Governance at the Edges of Colombia's War*).

[0] FIP, 'Dinámicas Del Conflicto Armado En El Nudo Del Paramillo y Su Impacto Humanitario'.

[0] FARC-EP, 'En La Vereda El Orejón Se Siembran Esperanzas de Paz'.

[0] El Tiempo, 'Campesinos Denuncian Presiones a Protestas Contra Hidroituango'; Gómez Mira, 'Aportes Para Una Reconstrucción Cronológica de La Violencia En El Nordeste Antioqueño: Caso Yolombó'.

[0] Defensoría del Pueblo, 'Sistema Alerta Temprana Antioquia: Informe de Riesgo No 22-14', 8. See Appendix 1 for a map of the area of influence of the dam.

deployment of units from the 44th Artillery Battalion.[0] In August 2012 it accelerated the stationing of three new battalions in charge of providing security for the implementation of the dam in Ituango against attacks by the FARC.[0]

This was not sufficient to remove the armed actor from the territory, as the FARC did not retreat and even stepped up their opposition. In February of 2013 the group signed an agreement with ELN to target all megaproject and extractive industries across Colombia, and particularly focused on Hidroituango.[0] While the dynamic between the FARC and the project implementers had begun to shift by late 2013 –the FARC at this point demonstrated new interest in exploiting the dam rather than removing it – the initial period of its implementation was characterised by both state and armed group militarising to secure their respective presence in the territory.

This escalating militarisation is explained by the game theoretic modelling of security dilemmas.[0] A security dilemma can either result from the misinterpretation of benign intentions, or from the correct response to aggression.[0] Here I do not evaluate whether competition between the armed group and the state resulted from accurate assessments about threat; instead I argue that any assessment of threat by one actor that concludes the other poses an existential risk – and militarises as a result – will often provoke a similar assessment by the other and escalate the competition.[0] Only when the initial assessment of threat perception has changed (as the degree of competition may lesson) will the state and armed group no longer depend on militarising to secure themselves in the territory.

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[0] Caracol, 'Refuerzan Seguridad En Hidroituango Ante Amenazas de Las Farc'.
[0] El Mundo, 'Ejército Intensifica Labores Contra Explosivos de Las Farc'.
[0] Cardenas, 'Farc y Eln Declaran Objetivo Militar a Los Proyectos Hidroeléctricos de Antioquia'.
[0] Kydd, 'Game Theory and the Spiral Model'.
[0] Jervis, 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma'.
[0] Glaser, 'The Security Dilemma Revisited'; Stein, 'Threat Perception in International Relations.'

A similar confrontational interaction in Nariño also resulted in the state and armed group militarising around the state's construction of the binational Espriella-Rio Mataje road. The motorway between Colombia and Ecuador was nearly two decades in the making. While the road had been a national priority since 2008 for cross-border trade and regional economic development,[0] lack of political will and armed group presence in the territory of Alto Mira and Frontera in the municipality of Tumaco – much like the construction of the Hidroituango dam – had prevented the Colombian state from executing their half of the agreed upon binational motorway. When eventually the national government began building the motorway in 2013 with the National Institute for Roads (INVIAS), it was not with FARC antagonism but rather cooption, as the FARC reportedly opted to tax the contractors entering the territory in exchange for the peaceful implementation of the project.[0]

Yet by early 2018 this interaction turned to confrontation[0] as the consolidation of the new dissident faction the Frente Oliver Sinisterra (FOS) was a concern for President Santos, who considered the FARC dissidents a threat, particularly to the infrastructure in the territory. He launched the Hercules Task Force, a 9000 strong military force into Tumaco and chief among its objectives were to secure the "116 km of oil pipelines, 640 power line pylons, and the Espriella-Río Mataje road project, which connects the ports of Tumaco and Esmeraldas" in the region.[0] In May 2018, the newly elected President Ivan Duque also positioned Tumaco as a security priority

[0] DNP, 'Logistica y Transporte Para La Competividad'.

[0] See Chapter 6 on Cooption.

[0] As discussed in the previous chapter, I do not include in this framework what factors lead to interactions changing from one type to another, though I observe that the demobilisation of the FARC and political efforts to consolidate the peace accord pushed the state to take a more competitive stance against armed group presence in Nariño in particular. This change in interaction from cooption to confrontation resulted in the state (and subsequently the FOS) militarising in the territory.

[0] Dussán, 'Colombia and Ecuador Heighten Security on Shared Border'.

to make it a 'hub of development',[0] and claimed that the military was needed to protect the state's infrastructure investment in the territory.[0]

The state's strategy of militarising to protect the road was matched by the dissident FOS's determination to prevent the state from establishing its presence in the territory. The FOS launched attacks against the battalions stationed around the Espriella- Río Mataje road in the *consejo comunitario* of Alto Mira y Frontera from 2018 onwards.[0] The FOS began planting more and more antipersonnel mines in the remaining land to be developed for the road,[0] leading to soldiers getting killed or injured trying to dismantle them for the construction.[0] The military continued to struggle against dissident factions around the road, even when the FOS allied itself with the United Guerrilla of the Pacific (GUP) – another dissident FARC faction operating further west in Tumaco, and then with the Contadores, another armed group, who tried to enter the territory in May 2019.[0] As with Porce II and III and Hidroituango in Northern Antioquia, the Espriella-Rio Mataje road became the site of confrontation between the state and an armed group and a catalyst for their militarising.

[0] Much like the dams, the road also become part of the militarised imagination of the state. In January of 2021 Duque even personally travelled down to the Espriella-Rio Mataje road to stress the importance of the binational road with Ecuador. He deemed the construction of the road a material contribution to and symbol of the alliance between Ecuador and Colombia in "fighting narcotrafficking and terrorism" and a crucial structure to be protected (Cancillería de Colombia, 'Nueva Infraestructura Vial La Espriella–Río Mataje Fortalecerá Relacionales Comerciales y Cooperación En Seguridad Entre Colombia y Ecuador: Duque').

[0] Soto, 'Semáforo a Las Promesas de Duque Para Tumaco'.

[0] Defensoría del Pueblo, 'Alerta Temprana de Iminencia Tumaco: Informe de Riesgo No 044-18', 1.

[0] Rios Melos, Mosquera Matiz, and Geiringer Ortega, 'Trabajo de Grado', xvi; Interview with indigenous governor (51), Pasto – February 2019; Interview with national engineer (58), Pasto – February 2019.

[0] Interview with engineer (59), Pasto – February 2019.

[0] Duque, 'Las Grietas Del Pacto Entre Disidencias de Tumaco'.

Briefly, I also observe the inclusion of a second armed group in this interaction. My framework focuses on the impact of dyadic interactions between the state and armed group, and how they generate territorial strategies that shape the local order. The state at times deploys not only its own military forces but an armed group with which it closely cooperates to secure its presence against a hostile armed group. This is why I consider the presence of paramilitary groups fighting alongside the state against the FARC and ELN in the case of Porce II and III, and the clashes this provoked[0] as part of the state militarising to secure its territorial presence.

This cooperation is geared at counterinsurgency and therefore requires an additional hostile armed group in the interaction, no longer a dyad but a triad.[0] While this close cooperation resembles subcontraction, in this framework I explore the outcomes of subcontraction in the exclusive interaction between the state and one armed group. In this case, the paramilitaries supporting the state militarised against the rebel armed group. This leads to clashes and community victimisation, producing the arbitrary local order that I show in more detail below. Therefore, I consider this a result of the process of militarising from a competitive interaction.

THIS IS NOT NORMAL: SURVIVING AN ARBITRARY LOCAL ORDER

The state and armed group's strategy of militarising produces the insecurity that one associates with armed conflict, where every day social environments are transformed

[0] Interview with local leaders (21, 24), Amalfi – November 2018; Equipo Nizkor, 'Informe Sobre Las Violaciones a Los Derechos Humanos En La Zona Afectada Por El Proyecto Hidroituango'. For more on the highly cooperative relationship between paramilitary groups and the state see Chapter 6 Subcontraction.

[0] Mazzei, *Death Squads or Self-Defense Forces?: How Paramilitary Groups Emerge and Challenge Democracy in Latin America*; Barter, 'State Proxy or Security Dilemma? Understanding Anti-Rebel Militias in Civil War'; Berti, 'From Cooperation to Competition: Localization, Militarization and Rebel Co-Governance Arrangements in Syria'.

into military targets and local communities are viewed with suspicion by both actors. In this section I examine how militarising during infrastructure implementation produced an arbitrary local order by first assessing how this exposed communities to violence between the Colombian military and armed group and caused collateral harm, generating insecurity. I then examine how militarising causes both the military and the armed group to become concerned with community defection: both actors target community members out of fear of information loss despite a lack of good intelligence on community loyalty, making the victimisation appear indiscriminate to the community rather than selective. Finally, I examine how militarising also suppresses agency in the local order by making communities unwilling to make demands for fear of being labelled a supporter for the competing actor.

CLASHES AND COLLATERAL HARM

The most immediately evident outcome of two armed actors engaging in a military struggle to remain in a territory is in the violence it produces. Both actors militarise to defend themselves against the perceived existential threat of the other actor in the territory. This generates collateral impacts on the lives and security of the local community. Understanding what kind of violence produces insecurity in the local order means examining under what conditions an attack affects the lives and safety of those living in the territory.

Studies of the impact of armed conflict often code attacks against infrastructure as a proxy for insecurity.[0] However, these attacks do not serve as useful indicators for the insecurity of the local order (for more on indicators of insecurity see Chapter 2); as

[0] Hultman, 'The Power to Hurt in Civil War: The Strategic Aim of RENAMO Violence*', 826; Stanton, 'Terrorism in the Context of Civil War', 1015; Stanton, 1015; Balcells, 'Continuation of Politics by Two Means: Direct and Indirect Violence in Civil War', 403.

Polo and Gonzalez observe, attacks on infrastructure have more to do with hard targets of the state rather than soft targets of civilians.[0] As I discuss in Chapter 3, I take security to be human-centric, and assess security and insecurity in the local order primarily in how it affects the physical safety of non-combatants living in the territory and the local community's freedom from fear.

Armed group's attacks on infrastructure itself are disruptive for local communities but not necessarily threatening to their lives. For example, attacks on electrical towers – often used as an indicator for armed group capacity and increased aggression in a territory[0] – did not generate fear or uncertainty for local communities who had become used to the constant disruption to their electricity. These attacks were often performative – geared at symbols of state power for a national audience with little impact on local lives.[0] One interviewee in Tumaco explained that "there are very few attacks on the electrical towers. It's just so the groups can show they still have military power and presence".[0] The attacks occurred far out of town and their impact was reducible to an hour or so without electricity; in one interview in Tumaco when the power cut out, the individuals around me sighed, pulled out a small generator to keep the fan powered, and continued on about their day.[0] Therefore, when I examine how insecurity is generated by the presence of attacks, I do not take the attacks or clashes themselves necessarily as an indicator of insecurity that

[0] Polo and González, 'The Power to Resist: Mobilization and the Logic of Terrorist Attacks in Civil War', 2042.

[0] Giroux, Burgherr, and Melkunaite, 'Research Note on the Energy Infrastructure Attack Database (EIAD)'; Lordan-Perret et al., 'Attacks on Energy Infrastructure Targeting Democratic Institutions'; Lacher and Kumetat, 'The Security of Energy Infrastructure and Supply in North Africa: Hydrocarbons and Renewable Energies in Comparative Perspective'.

[0] For more on the symbolic power of attacks against infrastructure see Ackerman et al., 'Assessing Terrorist Motivations for Attacking Critical Infrastructure'.

[0] Interview with engineer (65), Tumaco – March 2019; interview with project manager (8), Bogota – September 2018.

[0] In other cases, across Colombia, attacks on electrical infrastructure and the resulting black-out were even a sign to local communities nearby that an attack was occurring against the military, which gave them the warning to stay inside (CNMH, 'Tomas y Ataques Guerrilleros (1965 -2013)').

characterises the local order, but rather identify where these took place and how they affected the local community.

Insecurity did arise when the state and armed group's clashes became concentrated in the areas where the community regularly travelled or near houses where they lived, putting them in harm's way. The state's militarising of the territory in 2008 around Hidroituango made the communities living by the banks of the Cauca in Ituango wary, as they understood that the soldiers were not concerned with their protection. In Ituango, one local explained that "when they started the construction [of the dam] they began bringing in the military. The company was also paying the police and then they were clashing with the groups".[0] The FARC and the military (including the police) engaged in multiple skirmishes by the river where the construction was taking place between 2009 and 2010.[0] These clashes meant that locals had to "flee into the tunnels" that were being built.[0] The FARC engaged in several attacks along the Medellin-Ituango road in April and May 2011 where supplies were being brought in for the construction, but in the process also attacked a public bus used by local members of the community.[0]

In order to protect the infrastructure implementation against the armed group, the military was often stationed in the middle of residential areas. This resulted in public spaces in the local villages to becomes contentious sites, and unpredictable sources of insecurity for local communities. In Briceño, a town further down the valley near the Hidroituango dam's construction, a confrontation between the guerrillas and the

[0] Interview with local inhabitant, Ituango (31) – November 2018; interview with local leader (30), Ituango – November 2018; interview with local activist, Ituango (19) – November 2018; interview with local leader (33), Santa Rosas – December 2018.

[0] Interview with local inhabitant, Ituango (31) – November 2018; interview with engineer (40), Medellin – January 2019; interview with local activist (19), Ituango – November 2018.

[0] Interview with local activist (19), Ituango – November 2018.

[0] Markez, 'La Guerra Por El Territorio y Los Recursos Naturales'.

military lead to the FARC placing new anti-personnel mines near the school the military had occupied.[0] In Santa Rita, another *vereda* (submunicipal administrative unit of territory) in Ituango, the Colombian military used the community's roofs as viewing platforms, making the residences and the families within targets for the FARC.[0] In 2012 the FARC also attacked various civilian houses in La Granja in Ituango because the Colombian army had stationed themselves nearby; the FARC did the same in the municipalities of Yarumal and San Andres de Cuerquia, all areas that were subjected to increased state militarisation for the dam.[0] Local communities in Mataje also feared becoming collateral victims to the confrontations between the Colombian army and the FOS: at the beginning of the operation in 2018, families had "to get the children out of there because of these clashes".[0]

In the quotidian spaces of their everyday lives, local communities were continuously exposed to the violence generated by both the state and armed group militarising around the infrastructure project. The sudden intimacy of this violence meant that communities had little choice but to suffer through these sporadic attacks and clashes between the military and the armed group or abandon the territory completely. In many cases, families chose the latter.

Violent clashes between the military and the FARC and FARC dissidents contributed to the high levels of displacement in both Ituango and Alto Mira. In the municipality of Ituango, 88 people comprising 22 families had been displaced by different armed

[0] CCEEU, 'Entre El Sueño de La Paz y La Continuidad de La Guerra'.

[0] Defensoría del Pueblo, 'Sistema Alerta Temprana Antioquia: Informe de Riesgo No 22-14', 18; Equipo Nizkor, 'Informe Sobre Las Violaciones a Los Derechos Humanos En La Zona Afectada Por El Proyecto Hidroituango'.

[0] Defensoría del Pueblo, 'Sistema Alerta Temprana Antioquia: Informe de Riesgo No 22-14', 18.

[0] Interview with local human rights ombudsman, Tumaco [remote] (12) – October 2018; Interview with engineer (59), Pasto – February 2019.

actors in 2006.[0] By 2010, after the state had deployed its forces to protect the construction of the project, this number jumped suddenly to 1547 people comprising 438 families.[0] In Tumaco, after the state deployed military in part to protect infrastructure including the Espriella-Rio Mataje road, the rate of forced displacement reportedly jumped 52% from 2016 to 2019 because of clashes between groups and the state.[0] The deployment of Operation Hercules coincided with the first observed clashes between the Colombian military and an armed group in Tumaco since 2011 and a corresponding 14 instances of civilian victimisation by the FOS where UCDP had no previous attacks recorded against civilians.[0]

While precise data on displacement for every year is difficult to obtain, and the exact reasons for attacks or why each family chose to leave the territory is not clear, the higher levels of attacks and displacement correlate with the increased confrontations and clashes between the military and the FARC and FARC dissident groups around the dam and the road respectively. It also reflected the same concerns voiced by community members above: for them to stay in the territory with these background clashes, they risked their own lives and that of their children.

CONCERN WITH DEFECTION AND VICTIMISATION

Given their competitive interaction and their geographic proximity with local communities, the state's and armed group's clashes not only produce collateral

[0] Defensoría del Pueblo, 'Sistema Alerta Temprana de Inminencia Antioquia Ituango: Informe de Riesgo No 027 -06', 3.
[0] Defensoría del Pueblo, 'Sistema Alerta Temprana de Inminencia Ituango: Informe de Riesgo No 007-11', 5.
[0] Salazar and Wolff, 'El Posacuerdo Llegó Con Violencia a Tumaco'.
[0] Sundberg and Melander, 'Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset'. As discussed in Chapter 2, the microlevel focus of this thesis makes it difficult to use aggregate data due to the small sample size. The rigorous standards of reported evidence for UCDP is also likely to exclude attacks that are not reported in any official capacity or through media sources, therefore the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.

harm, but also concern with potential community defection. Communities are exposed to both the armed group and the military stationed in the territory to protect the infrastructure project. As a result, communities face accusations by both the military and the armed group for aiding the other. These charges appear to communities to be largely arbitrary, generating further insecurity in the local order beyond the threat itself as the community could not avoid the action that provoked the armed actor's threat in the first place.

As militarising leads the armed group and the military to clash and attack each other, it also incentivises both actors to neutralise potential losses of information and defection by non-combatants in the territory. Hicks et al argue that:

> "a civilian population in war is comparable to a parasitised host in that it possesses a finite resource - the disputed territory - that opposing actors are competing to dominate and use. Warring actors can attempt to shift the dynamics of this competition in their favour by focusing their energies onto controlling or eliminating the civilian population".[0]

The local community becomes an important asset for the military and the armed group – and a dangerous liability. Living amongst both armed actors means the community is capable of sharing damaging information about one actor to the other, such as troop movements, locations, size, or resources.[0]

In Colombia, the state was often at an initial disadvantage since it – and particularly its military – had a more distant and distrustful relationship with local populations; the initial entry of the military was often immediately suspicious of local

[0] Hicks et al., 'Global Comparison of Warring Groups in 2002–2007: Fatalities from Targeting Civilians vs. Fighting Battles', 1.

[0] Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*; Kalyvas, 'Micro-Level Studies of Violence in Civil War: Refining and Extending the Control-Collaboration Model'; Wood, 'Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence against Civilians'; Wood and Kathman, 'Competing for the Crown: Inter-Rebel Competition and Civilian Targeting in Civil War'; Rubin, 'Rebel Territorial Control and Civilian Collective Action in Civil War: Evidence from the Communist Insurgency in the Philippines'.

communities who were generally perceived as insurgent supporters.[0] In Ituango, the FARC's 18th and 36th Front had been established for so many years prior to the Hidroituango project's construction that local 'ituanguinos' were often labelled as *familias farianas*, or FARC families.[0] This provoked suspicion by the military concerned that local members of the community might inform the FARC on their movements.[0] The entry of the Operation Hercules in Tumaco led military forces to levy similar threats and confinement of the local communities, who the military accused of being with the guerrillas.[0] State actors, especially military actors, rarely have pre-existing relationship with the local community in the territories before the project implementations; this information deficit leads military forces to often resort to indiscriminate violence against local communities based on their locality and historical proximity to an armed group.[0]

As the military occupies the territory to protect the infrastructure, the armed group begins to develop similar concerns about community defection. Armed groups that face active rivalry for their control over territory are more likely to turn to violent actions against civilian populations to retain their dominance, even if they previously had closer relations with the population.[o] The military stationed to protect the

[0] The strategy of 'draining the sea to kill the fish' is a tragic staple in many counterinsurgent dynamics (Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay, '"Draining the Sea": Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare'; Downes, 'Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves: Investigating the Effectiveness of Indiscriminate Violence as a Counterinsurgency Strategy'.). Its efficacy is not necessarily clear and in some cases may back-fire (Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, 388; Downes, 'Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves: Investigating the Effectiveness of Indiscriminate Violence as a Counterinsurgency Strategy'.), though it can have devastating effect if it sufficiently eliminates a potential support base for insurgents (Fjelde and Hultman, 'Weakening the Enemy: A Disaggregated Study of Violence against Civilians in Africa'; Hazelton, *Bullets Not Ballots*.)

[0] Sepúlveda, 'La Reconquista de Ituango: Un Reto En Seguridad y Defensa Nacional Del Estado Colombiano', 145.

[0] CINEP, 'Noche y Niebla: Violencia Politica En Colombia Enero-Junio 2009', 218; Interview with local activist (16), Ituango - November 2018.

[0] Interview with IO staffer, Pasto (61) – February 2019. Interview with indigenous leader (51), Pasto – February 2019; La Liga, 'Militarizar La Frontera, Medida Poco Eficaz'.

[0] Kalyvas and Kocher, 'How "Free" Is Free Riding in Civil Wars?: Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem', 186.

[0] Metelits, *Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior*.

construction of Espriella-Rio Mataje provoked concerns by the FOS about community loyalty. A staffer at an international organisation (IO) in Nariño explained that this created problems because "the military come in and they speak with [the local community] and then they leave, and then the armed group comes, and they know that [the military] spoke with [the local community] and then they threaten you".[0] Therefore both the military and the armed group were concerned with local communities sharing potentially damaging information to the other actor.

This concern is not unique to infrastructure; as discussed in Chapter 3, the broader literature on armed conflict has observed how incomplete territorial control leads armed actors to react with suspicion and indiscriminate force against civilians out of fear of information loss and disloyalty.[0] Yet here the state militarises in order to secure the infrastructure project – the supposed catalyst for development and peace. In the cases of Espriella-Rio Mataje, Porce II and III, and Hidroituango the state and armed group militarised to protect their respective territorial presence against the other because of the infrastructure implementation, and in doing so not only clashed between them but created new concerns with community loyalty and defection.

The armed group and the military's concern with defection as a result of their overlapping territorial competition generates significant insecurity in the local order. In the quote at the beginning of the chapter, the armed group (in this case the FOS) harmed the community after the confrontation with military because of the community's close geographic proximity to the military stationed by the Espriella-Rio Mataje road. The local leader went on to explain how "the problem was that the military come by and talk to you, then they leave, and the armed group comes by,

[0] Interview with IO staff (61), Pasto – February 2019.

[0] Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*; Balcells, 'Continuation of Politics by Two Means: Direct and Indirect Violence in Civil War'; Bhavnani, Miodownik, and Choi, 'Three Two Tango: Territorial Control and Selective Violence in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza'; Lyall, 'Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya'.

and they know that [the military] came by and talked to you, so they threaten you".[0] Another local activist in Ituango bluntly summed up the result of the state and armed group's militarisation around the dam:

> "The increase in the presence of military and police forces has created an extremely tense situation with mutual distrust between the security forces and the community. The civilian population feels threatened and like objects of suspicion, as much by the guerrillas as the state actors. The people live with great anxiety and fear of being associated with either and then being punished for it."[0]

Communities in Ituango and Alto Mira and Frontera were caught between the mutual distrust of the military and the guerrilla, who both treated the local community as an object of suspicion since the arrival of the military to protect the infrastructure. Neutrality was a difficult position to retain. Local women, for example, found themselves accused by both sides in Ituango. A local activist explained that women "who will say that they don't want to dance with [the soldiers] and they accuse them of being with the [guerrillas] and they threaten them. If they are girlfriends with the soldiers, then [the guerrillas] kill them".[0]

An Awá leader explained that the increase of military presence in the *vereda* of Espriella around 2018 had severely affected local indigenous communities there: "We are angry because the Army came in, they capture innocent people who had nothing to do with anything, and take them to the prison, they are illegal captures,

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[0] Interview with local leader, Tumaco (81) – March 2019.

[0] Wåhlin, 'Derechos Ahogados, Responsabilidades Diluidas', 18; interview with local activist (16), Ituango - November 2018; interview with local inhabitant (17), Ituango - November 2018.

[0] Interview with local activist (16), Ituango – November 2018. This gendered dynamic repeats itself in confrontational interactions around the world: women were specifically targeted in Indonesia by the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) for "dating soldiers" (Schulze, 'Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency: Strategy and the Aceh Conflict, October 1976-May 2004', 228.). In Kashmir, women faced punishment by government forces for "supporting the armed struggle" while also being targeted by militant groups for being state informers when they interacted with soldiers (Qutab, 'Women Victims of Armed Conflict: Half-Widows in Jammu and Kashmir', 256.). While this insecurity is a product of competition, it is also inherently gendered; as Cockburn notes, in conflict "men and women die different deaths…both because of physical differences between the sexes and because of the different meanings culturally ascribed to the male and female body" (*The Continuum of Violence: A Gender Perspective on War and Peace*, 35–36.).

and we are demanding that the state respect us".[0] In Mataje, where the bridge to be built was going to connect the two roads, a military battalion detained three people in April 2018. They were interrogated for five hours and then let go; one detainee described his experience:

> "they arrested me, they tied me up, and they had me in the hills. They said to me that I should tell them who was shooting at them, but I did not know. Since I could not tell them, they took a knife and pretended like they would cut my legs to see if I spoke, but I did not know anything."[0]

Inhabitants of Mataje faced stigma and accusations of disloyalty from both sides: "the soldiers accuse the people of being 'criminals' and 'guerrilla' and the illegal armed group says, 'that one must be a *gobiernista* [state supporter]".[0]

Even actors involved in infrastructure projects could recognise that militarising produced significant insecurity that characterised the local order. One of the public officials heading the Espriella - Rio Mataje road project admitted that the "entry of the military to de-mine the area around the road and to deal with the insurgency is difficult. It could be a massacre to introduce the military".[0] He demurred to explain how that might lead to a massacre, but it was evident that public officials implementing infrastructure were aware of the violent repercussions that militarising could have on local orders.

Even the damage caused by clashes between the state and armed group was exacerbated by the armed group's concern with potential community defection and information loss. The FARC and then later FARC dissidents had built dirt roads and pathways in Alto Mira that communities used to keep clear of mines.[0] The increased

[0] La Liga, 'Comunidades de Llorente, Silenciadas Bajo Presión'.
[0] La Liga, 'Militarizar La Frontera, Medida Poco Eficaz'.
[0] Ibid.
[0] Interview with public official (60), Pasto – February 2019.
[0] Interview with public official (12), Oxford – October 2018; interview with local leader, Tumaco (81) – March 2019.

presence of the military to protect the road and clear the area of insurgents led the FOS to start planting mines indiscriminately in the path of its construction and without informing the community to prevent information leaks.[0] The uncertainty and fear of potential information loss led the armed group to retain crucial information from the community that could help them navigate potential dangers in the territory.

Militarising also led the state and armed group to establish checkpoints to monitor any potential unknown actors in the territory, leading communities increased interactions with the armed group and the military and lose mobility. A local leader from Porce Canyon explained how the military and armed group had become concerned with community loyalty since militarising the Porce II dam:

> "The military didn't come here much [before the dam]. Then the same campesino will go their normal way, but then the army decided no one could go by. Then the guerrillas [ELN] did as well, they did not let me pass and it took me another half day to get to where I needed to go."[0]

While previously the ELN had been less concerned with where and how the members of the community went, once the state had deployed military forces to the territory to protect the dam, the armed group became increasingly suspicious of the community's movements.

Therefore, the state subjects the community to unwilling interactions with the military as a result of the state's desire to protect the implementation of the infrastructure project from the armed group. Quickly moving or uncertain frontlines between the state and armed group make information collection more difficult and cause both actors to over-react.[0] As the state and armed group continue to militarise to secure their presence in the same territory, frontlines become difficult to

[0] Interview with indigenous governor, Pasto (51) – February 2019; Defensoría del Pueblo, 'Alerta Temprana de Iminencia Tumaco: Informe de Riesgo No 044-18'.
[0] Interview with local leader (21), Amalfi – November 2018.
[0] Schlichte, *In the Shadow of Violence: The Politics of Armed Groups*, 1:79.

determine and local communities have no clear side on which they can fall.[0] Both actors approaching a level of territorial parity undermines their ability to gather information to effectively deploy violence against members of the community to deter defection.[0] Partial and overlapping territorial control makes it difficult to assess when non-combatants are providing information to the other actor.

Armed actors also target communities for their perceived loyalties after suffering losses during clashes with the other actor. A leader from the Alta Mira and Frontera *consejo comunitario* explained how the distrust between military and community and the exacerbation of conflict between military and FARC dissidents during Operation Hercules had spiralled into a tragic story in early January 2019.

> "The war is very personal. The military find someone and there is no compassion, they are dead…they are enraged because [members of FARC dissidents] killed three of their men in Candelillas [a small *vereda* just south of Espriella]. They went and found these men and then killed them with machetes. It was a horrible thing. Then this week [the military] killed two people. The official report by the military has nothing to do with what they are doing. [The military] said this man was a combatant [and killed in battle]. The community said he was not, that he was just sleeping, and they went and killed him. This is not normal."[0]

The leader from Alto Mira and Frontera went on to explain that "if there is a confrontation [between the military and armed group] then the armed group will harm the community".[0] The community lived in fear of confrontation between both actors not necessarily because of crossfire or the collateral damage they may incur but because they are aware that both actors may seek to vent their anger at losses

[0] Zhukov argues that during armed conflict communities are more likely to select the side they believe most likely to win, referring to this as bandwagoning, regardless of political affiliation and sometimes even overlooking previous negative treatment ('An Epidemic Model of Violence and Public Support in Civil War'). However, where outcomes appear less certain and both government forces and armed groups struggle for territory, communities have no clear view on which actor to choose.

[0] Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, 204.

[0] Interview with local leader (81), Tumaco – March 2019.

[0] Interview with local leader (81), Tumaco – March 2019; a similar story was reported by an IO staffer who described the retaliation by the military against the community after a mine in the area targeted for the road killed several soldiers (interview with IO staffer, Pasto (61) – February 2019.

against members of the community, regardless of whether or not the individuals had defected.

Armed actors – both the armed group and the military – are often impeded from making rational calculus on community defection by problems of personal revenge.[0] In situations of 'confrontational fear' individuals are more likely to turn to violence; soldiers and combatants facing existential threats are more likely to resort to violence as a solution.[0] As conflict between two actors intensifies and endures, subsequent attacks and violence against civilians can be driven out of revenge for previous rounds of confrontation or as a psychological response to a major military loss.[0] Combatants hurt and angry at their attack and loss – like the Colombian forces described above – seek an outlet against those they perceive as enemies, and communities whose loyalty remains unclear become valid targets – even if official reports avoid providing details that might undermine the validity of the attack.

Armed actors deploy selective violence when they have access to information on the culpability of the target, whereas indiscriminate violence is a response to threat without good information.[0] Therefore the outcome of the former is considered more effective than the latter since it can accurately punish defectors, where indiscriminate violence may appear to lack rational motivation.[0] I do not argue that indiscriminate

[0] Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, 58–61; Balcells, *Rivalry and Revenge: The Politics of Violence during Civil War*.

[0] Collins, *Violence: A Micro-Sociological Theory*.

[0] Balcells, *Rivalry and Revenge: The Politics of Violence during Civil War*; Midlarsky, *The Killing Trap: Genocide in the Twentieth Century*.

[0] Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*; Zhukov, 'An Epidemic Model of Violence and Public Support in Civil War'; Bhavnani, Miodownik, and Choi, 'Three Two Tango: Territorial Control and Selective Violence in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza'.

[0] However, the application of these terms is not entirely straightforward. As De la Calle observes, a purely indiscriminate attack rarely takes place, since the actor often has some reasoning behind who they are targeting and why ('Compliance vs. Constraints: A Theory of Rebel Targeting in Civil War', 430). Collective violence against an entire community – often used as examples of indiscriminate violence – may be driven by the desire to punish communities believed of supporting rebels (De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca, 'Killing and Voting in the Basque Country: An Exploration of the Electoral Link between ETA and Its Political Branch').

violence is irrational; I do however observe that indiscriminate violence produces issues of credible behavioural change in local communities since a) there is no incentive for an individual to refuse to support a group if punishment appears arbitrary and 2) when both the state and armed group are competing in shared territory, the community's constant exposure to both makes it almost impossible to avoid accusations in the first place.

Therefore, when both the state and armed group militarise around the implementation of infrastructure projects and become uncertain as to which members of the community might have loyalties to the enemy, their resulting victimisation appears arbitrary. The local order not only generates risks of physical harm for civilians but also fails to produce any rules that local communities can follow to appease either actor to avoid victimisation.

Militarising and limitations to agency

An insecure local order already lacks agency; as discussed in the previous chapter, agency in the local order represents the ability of local communities to mobilise and have their needs heard and addressed by the armed group and the state. If security – a fundamental need – is already so dramatically compromised in the local order both by collateral harm and concern with defection, then the local order scarcely affords agency. However, in this section I still briefly consider how the territorial strategy of militarising also minimises any incentive for either the state armed forces or armed group to listen and address community needs.

Militarising reflects the armed group and state's priority in securing their respective presence against the existential threat posed by the other. Therefore, community support comes second to their immediate potential for damaging defection. While those in the community often prefer the state to not send the military, in practice they could not prevent it when the state approached the armed group as essentially hostile to its infrastructure implementation.[0] Teachers and civil leaders attempted to protest the stationing of new troops in the schools of Ituango to protect the dam in 2012 to no avail,[0] while communities in Briceño complaints against the FARC placing new anti-personnel mines near the school the military had occupied fell on deaf ears.[0] In Santa Rita, the communities mobilised to protest the military using their roofs as viewing platforms and making the families targets for the FARC, but their concerns were ignored.[0]

In Tumaco, communities were also aware of their lack of agency to influence either the state or armed group. As the previous sections demonstrate, the deployment of military forces in Tumaco in 2018 led to clashes and victimisation of communities by both soldiers and members of the FOS and GUP. However, the afrodescendant community in Alto Mira y Frontera expressed fear of what both actors might do if they spoke out, and therefore often did not file complaints.[0] This was reflected in the explanation by an indigenous leader from Tumaco:

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[0] This sentiment was expressed to me in various interviews (17, 22, 31, 51, 74, 79). One interview with teachers (18) in Ituango did reflect that the community's relationship with the military had improved since the signing of the peace accord with the FARC in 2016, although he noted that this was also a time with less armed group presence in the village.

[0] Interview with local teachers (18), Ituango - November 2018; Wåhlin, 'Derechos Ahogados, Responsabilidades Diluidas'.

[0] CCEEU, 'Entre El Sueño de La Paz y La Continuidad de La Guerra'.

[0] Defensoría del Pueblo, 'Sistema Alerta Temprana Antioquia: Informe de Riesgo No 22-14', 18; Equipo Nizkor, 'Informe Sobre Las Violaciones a Los Derechos Humanos En La Zona Afectada Por El Proyecto Hidroituango'.

[0] Defensoría del Pueblo, 'Alerta Temprana de Iminencia Tumaco: Informe de Riesgo No 044-18', 6.

> "The presence of the military produces more insecurity. Because if they see the armed group having a meeting with the community, then the authorities will say they are also illegal. But that has nothing to do with us. These are violations of our rights. But when we try to sit down for a dialogue, [the state] says this is also illegal."[0]

Confrontation between the state and armed group – and their militarised response – not only produces collateral harm to local communities and what seemed to the communities to be indiscriminate victimisation. Its impact on agency in the local order is to both reduce the armed group or the state's incentive for addressing community concerns compared to their military priority. At times, community protest against militarisation can even provoke more aggressive responses by both actors. As such, militarisation meant the local order not only produces insecurity – in a highly arbitrary and difficult to predict form – but also affords no agency for communities to safely mobilise and have their needs met.

CONCLUSION

Confrontation renders the implementation of infrastructure a site and catalyst for the state and armed group to militarise: the state deploys its armed forces as part of the protection for the project just as the armed group targets it as an incursion of the state into the territory. As established in the last chapter (Chapter 3), infrastructure development can be used to heighten military positions for the implementing states, and often becomes the first target of hostile armed actors seeking to undermine opponents. Therefore, infrastructure – even when mostly civilian in nature – can be implemented with military rationalities that heighten the threatening presence of such projects.[0] A confrontational interaction between state and armed group leads to

[0] Interview with indigenous governor, Pasto (51) - February 2019.

[0] Zeiderman, 'Concrete Peace: Building Security through Infrastructure in Colombia', 500; Collier and Lakoff, 'Vital Systems Security: Reflexive Biopolitics and the Government of Emergency'; Dua, 'A Sea

an escalating security dilemma: where the state militarises infrastructure to protect it from armed group attack, then it reinforces its importance as an object of war.

In the cases examined in this chapter, concern with defection and community loyalty drove threats and attacks against the community by both the state and armed group to punish would-be defectors or any perceived as disloyal. In the competition between the state and armed group, the local community represented a potential tiebreaker and therefore a significant potential counterweight; as Valentino observes, "civilians are not merely bystanders to armed conflict…sometimes they become the objects of war itself".[0] These acts of violence were often unpredictable for the local community, and community mobilisation often met by armed actors more preoccupied with the existential threat posed by the other.

That development efforts can produce insecurity is not a novel claim. Brenner observes that the economist reading of conflict that claims that growth and development will override political grievances is challenged by the "escalating conflict in areas of large-scale infrastructure investment and development along the China-Myanmar border".[0] In Colombia, human rights groups have already been critiquing state efforts to secure infrastructure construction through military might, observing that this strategy escalates conflict with the armed group and affects local communities.[0] The armed group is no bystander, and as the chapter demonstrated, will also attack as a response to perceived threat. By examining how a territorial strategy of militarising produces an arbitrary local order, I not only problematise the argument that infrastructure implementation brings security but demonstrate how

of Trade and a Sea of Fish: Piracy and Protection in the Western Indian Ocean'.

[0] Valentino, 'Why We Kill: The Political Science of Political Violence against Civilians', 94.

[0] Brenner, 'The Development-Insecurity Nexus: Geo-Economic Transformations and Violence in Myanmar', 3.

[0] CITPAX, 'Actores Armados Ilegales y Sector Extractivo En Colombia.'

development efforts by the state might be actively counterproductive to that goal under confrontation, especially for the local order.

The local order I show here is therefore in contrast with the repressive local order I examine in the next chapter on subcontraction. At the opposite end of the competition-cooperation spectrum, state and armed group interaction during construction can also produce insecurity and lack of agency for communities. Yet the nature of this insecurity is qualitatively distinct, as its strategic purpose is not to protect each actor against the other but rather in tandem selectively ensure community compliance. Territorial strategies of militarising emerge to protect each actor against the other at terrible costs to the local community. The blurred boundaries of the state and the armed group's presence means that communities are mired in their clashes and indiscriminately targeted by both, trapped between the sword and the wall.

CHAPTER 5 BETWEEN THE GAVEL AND THE GUN

PRODUCING A REPRESSIVE LOCAL ORDER

> "People understand that if they talk about the dam, they die."[0]

In the shadows of the mountains of Ituango dam, the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) forcibly displaced local communities from land slated for the construction of the Hidroituango. The Clan del Golfo, and even FARC dissidents, appeared to intimidate, attack, or kill activists and community organisers who opposed the infrastructure implementation, or anyone who voiced concern about rights or transparency in the process itself. Even outsiders working in the territory, such as the Medellin-based activist and engineer who provided the quote above about the dam in Ituango, were aware that mobilising against infrastructure implementation was a hazardous affair. Despite the juridical opacity on the provenance of these actions, the intention behind the attacks was clear to the communities: there was a link between opposing an infrastructure project by the state and violent repercussions by armed groups.

How does this repressive local order emerge? In this chapter I show that subcontraction – close cooperation between an armed group and the state – during infrastructure implementation produces a repressive local order through a territorial strategy of specialising. The state and the armed group draw from their respective strengths to secure their shared presence in the territory. Environmental activists, local leaders, labour unions can all challenge the infrastructure implementation.

[0] Interview with engineer and activist (28), Medellin – November 2018.

Communities can be obstacles by living on land slated for construction. The armed group deploys extralegal violence to selectively punish or remove community members who challenge the project implementation or refuse to comply to requests by state actors. In turn the state operates through public companies that can formally seize the land and claim the absence of its occupants, or the state controls judicial institutions and forums for complaints and transparency where state actors such as law enforcement, judges, and state officials can turn a blind eye or be actively hostile (if not violent) against community opposition or community claims of being threatened or attacked for opposing the infrastructure.

In this chapter, I first show how the Colombian state, armed groups, and development interests have a history of cooperation in the country's conflict to demonstrate how this challenges development and security logics and produces insights into the impact of cooperative interactions. In Porce in the 1990s and early 2000s, in Ituango in the 2010s up to 2019, or Barbacoas in the late 2000s, communities were aware that any opposition to the state's infrastructure projects would invite violent consequences from the armed group in the territory, and an impassive or actively hostile state.[0] I identify in the cases selected how the armed group and the state engaged in a cooperative rather than competitive interaction. I then show how the armed group and the state both specialised to secure the infrastructure implementation against opposition from the local community. Finally, I demonstrate how this strategy generated insecurity and limited agency in the local order.

As I demonstrated in Chapter 4, when the state and the armed group militarise around infrastructure implementation the local order was insecure and offered little agency. Subcontraction, at the other end of the competition-cooperation spectrum,

[0] As I discuss in the chapter, exactly which armed groups are responsible for threats and intimidation is not always clear, but for the most part paramilitary groups, former paramilitary groups, and dissident FARC factions appeared the most likely to deploy these territorial strategies alongside the state.

also produces a local order with little security and no agency. However, these local outcomes are different, due to the different territorial strategies each interaction generates. The state and armed group specialise not to defend against the other actor in the dyad – and therefore produce arbitrary instances of collateral violence or community victimisation – but rather to prevent third-party opposition to their shared territorial presence.[0] Unlike the arbitrary violence produced by confrontation, a quietly repressive local order is meant to pave the way for development. The armed group and state's combined military and legal resources is geared at suppressing civilian opposition; the community as a result is caught between the gavel and the gun.

A HISTORY OF COUNTERINSURGENCY AND CORPORATE COMPLICITY

Colombia is no stranger to alliances between the state and armed groups and violent complicity for corporate aims. Paramilitary organisations in Colombia were first formed as private security forces to protect the interests of rich landowners from the threats of the FARC, and their collusion with corporate interests have persisted since the 1980s.[0] The formation of paramilitary groups in Colombia is rooted at the beginning of its internal armed conflict in the 1960s, where the Colombian government introduced Decree 3398 in 1965 and authorised private citizens to organise and carry firearms, which laid the foundations for the Colombian state's counterinsurgency strategy. By 1989, a new decree suspended the creation of paramilitary groups, but by then the state was neither willing nor capable of fighting

[0] When there is another armed group hostile to both state and armed group in the dyad, the interaction – and its outcome – devolves to confrontation. I discuss this briefly in the previous chapter and in Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework, but I largely exclude multi-party interactions from this analysis.
[0] Rivera, 'History of the Paramilitarismo in Colombia'.

those that were already created.[0] Despite being officially banned, a significant number of military personnel maintained their relationship with these groups into the 21st century.[0]

By the beginning of the 1990s, paramilitary groups supported the state not only against the Marxist-Leninist insurgencies of the FARC and ELN but also targeted any opposition figure to the state, including union leaders, journalists, students, and human rights advocates where the death toll reached 14 476 people between 1988 and 2003.[0] While paramilitary groups have demonstrated a far greater history of sympathy with the state, they are not mere extensions of the state. After the demobilisation and splintering of the AUC into multiple armed groups between 2003 and 2006, their motivation and alliances were less consistent. Paramilitary groups – and their successors – in Colombia operated independently and – at times – even in confrontation with the state.[0] Massé argues that although some links remain between the armed forces and the former paramilitary groups, the fragmentation of these into multiple smaller groups with increased pressure from the state in capturing and combatting drug trafficking has led to more hostile and fluctuating interactions between the two across the country.[0] Collapsing their cooperation with the state into a

[0] Richani, 'Caudillos and the Crisis of the Colombian State: Fragmented Sovereignty, the War System and the Privatisation of Counterinsurgency in Colombia', 407.

[0] By the mid-2000s, though the state was increasing its military pressure on the AUC itself, the paramilitaries had established a new political strategy articulated by Mancuso. This strategy consisted of two basic tenets:

1. The AUC functions will not cease to exist with the demobilisation.
2. The AUC will not cede the territories under their control to the insurgency, but rather will continue protecting these regions within an integrated defence strategy, that will safeguard the established socio economic order which includes the new political and economic power acquired by members of the AUC.' (Richani, 'Caudillos and the Crisis of the Colombian State: Fragmented Sovereignty, the War System and the Privatisation of Counterinsurgency in Colombia').

[0] CINEP, 'Deuda Con La Humanidad: Paramilitarismo de Estado En Colombia 1988-2003'.

[0] Jenss, 'From Coexistence and Complementarity to Confrontation? Colombian Paramilitaries, Their Successors and Their Relation to the State'.

[0] Massé, '¿Bandas Criminales o Neoparamilitares?', 48.

definitional characteristic of the group ignores the variation in their behaviour towards state actors during infrastructure implementation, variation captured in Chapter 6 and 7 .

Paramilitary groups had also become more involved in landownership by the 1990s and began cooperative arrangements with businesses and rural elites in the role of palm oil expansion. This cooperation was not only geared at the protection against the FARC and ELN but also the expulsion of peasants from land that the palm oil companies then cheaply acquired, where often industrialists and paramilitary groups set up joint business enterprises to transfer the profits and hide illicit activity.[0] As the interest of multinational companies in developing Colombian territory grew in the 1990s and 2000s, paramilitary groups also offered their services to these companies. Coca-Cola, Drummond, and Chiquita faced lawsuits in the United States for cooperating with the AUC to use extralegal violence acts of intimidation, displacement, torture, and even assassination to avoid challenges from local populations, human rights activists, and trade unions.[0]

The parallel trends of state power and private expansion in the context of conflict in Colombia is not coincidental. Grajales argues that violence deployed by agrarian elites and associated with large-scale development in Colombia is not merely an extension of private economic interests independent of state authority, but that Colombian state formation is "constitutive of logics of competition, accumulation and economic development".[0] Even extractive industries, which might be considered a private third

[0] Gutiérrez-Sanín and Vargas Reina, *El Despojo Paramilitar y Su Variación: Quiénes, Cómo, Por Qué*, 18; García Reyes, 'Tierra, Palma Africana y Conflicto Armado En El Bajo Atrato Chocoano, Colombia. Una Lectura Desde El Cambio En Los Órdenes de Extracción'.

[0] Martin-Ortega, 'Business and Human Rights in Conflict', 275; Sánchez Gómez et al., *Una Nación Desplazada: Informe Nacional Del Desplazamiento Forzado En Colombia*, 255.

[0] Grajales, 'The Rifle and the Title: Paramilitary Violence, Land Grab and Land Control in Colombia', 774.

actor in this dynamic, elucidate the link between statebuilding and cooperative interactions. The large influx of public money into palm oil made the industry attractive to paramilitary groups. These public investments into economic development provided, as Goebertus puts it, 'perverse incentives' for armed actors to appropriate land through violent means.[0] Ballvé notes that in Colombia:

> "The paramilitary structures more broadly helped to socialise and materialise the state's territorialisation through repression, infrastructure construction, bureaucratic procedures, agribusiness plantations, NGO activities, political participation, and public services—backed in all instances by ultraviolent force."[0]

The Colombian state was constructed at its margins through cooperative arrangements between public officials, private actors, and armed groups. Molano argues that violence by armed groups intentionally facilitated expropriating land, largely involved from its onset with agricultural development. He observes constructing large-scale infrastructure projects was another avenue in which "one cannot analyse displacement as a consequence or collateral effect of the actions of armed actors; it is not an 'effect' of conflict but rather a weapon of war itself and a strategy of economic accumulation".[0]

This history demonstrates the importance of understanding how different interactions emerge not only in conflict but in the complex relationship between conflict and development. As discussed in Chapter 1 and 3, conflict – and insecurity – have often been positioned in opposition to development. However, the Colombian state and its cooperative interactions with armed groups have not solely been geared

[0] Goebertus, 'Palma de Aceite y Desplazamiento Forzado En Zona Bananera: Trayectorias Entre Recursos Naturales y Conflictos'.

[0] Ballvé, 'Everyday State Formation: Territory, Decentralization, and the Narco Landgrab in Colombia', 605.

[0] Molano, 'Desterrados", Papeles de Cuestiones Internacionales, Primavera de 2000, N° 70, Pp. 41-46.', 42.

at counterinsurgency (as I briefly touched upon in the previous chapter), but to secure the developmental presence of the state in territories at its periphery. As I demonstrate below, this interaction, and the territorial strategy of specialisation it generates, also produces a local order without security or agency, like that of confrontation. Unlike militarising, however, specialising produces a local order where insecurity is at least navigable for local communities even if the objective of the state and armed group is ultimately to repress community mobilisation.

TRACING A STRATEGY OF SPECIALISING

In this section I examine the territorial strategies of specialising through three cases of infrastructure implementation. I select these cases as they demonstrate similarities in subcontraction across region (North Antioquia and Pacific Nariño), time periods (from 1995 to 2018), and actors (public companies, national department of roads, AUC, Clan del Golfo, FARC dissidents).[0] As in the previous chapter on confrontation I select cases that demonstrate the dyadic interaction between an armed group and the state and the resulting territorial strategies. I also draw from shadow cases across Colombia to demonstrate the proliferation of this interaction. Confrontation is the expected interaction between an armed group and the state; therefore, to improve the robustness of my process tracing I select more cases to demonstrate how specialising by the state and armed group is a distinct strategy from that of militarising. Subcontraction leads to a distinct repressive local order where insecurity is a product of selective, rather than indiscriminate violence, and agency is deliberately curtailed by the armed group and the state.[0]

[0] See the Research Design section in the Introduction for a deeper discussion on why specific cases were selected.

[0] The more expected the interaction (as the literature and policy approaches to armed conflict and infrastructure would suggest of confrontation) the less significant are additional pieces of evidence to

TABLE 9. CASES OF SUBCONTRACTION

Municipality	Department	Timeframe	Infrastructure Type	Dyadic Interaction
Amalfi/Anorí	Antioquia	1996-2004	Hydroelectric dams (Porce II/Porce III)	Public Company - Bloque Metro
Ituango and surrounding municipalities	Antioquia	2008-2019	Roads and Hydroelectric dam (Hidroituango)	Public Company – Clan del Golfo Public Company - FARC Dissidents (36th Front)
Barbacoas	Nariño	2008-2011	Secondary Road (Junín-Barbacoas)	National/Municipal Government-Unknown

I first demonstrate how cooperation leads the armed group and the state to specialise. Across these cases – and drawing from other examples around Colombia – the armed group used its capacity for extralegal violence to clear land for infrastructure or intimidate community activists, while the state relied on public utilities companies, law enforcement, and judicial institutions to dismiss or supress community opposition to infrastructure implementation. Specialising allowed both actors to use their respective capabilities to their mutual advantage in a way that protected the armed group from formal prosecution and provided the state with plausible deniability in the implementation of the infrastructure project.

SPECIALISING AND CLEARING LAND FOR INFRASTRUCTURE

Infrastructure projects need land, which means the pre-existing occupants might be loath to part with it or require recompense from the project implementers for doing so. Where the armed group and the state are in a closely cooperative interaction –

support it. In this case, as subcontraction is less expected, all additional pieces of evidence to demonstrate its occurrence improve its probability in Bayesian reasoning (see Chapter 1 for a more detailed explanation on Bayesian approach).

subcontraction – they specialise their efforts to secure their mutual presence in the territory. The state and armed group make concerted but distinct efforts to clear land for infrastructure projects, using their respective capabilities to coerce communities off land and then formalise the result. Specialising not only violently forces communities from land but negates any formal – or informal – appeals against the process as both actors supressed any opposition.

The construction of Porce II and Porce III dams in northeastern Antioquia required significant tracts of land for the construction and subsequent flooding. Amidst the incursions of the Bloque Metro detailed in Chapter 3, the actions of the armed group led to mass displacement of the local communities in the canyon. The Bloque were thought to have caused over 1045 forced displacements in the territories slated for the two dam constructions between 1990 and 2006.[0] When the combatants from Bloque Metro arrived in the early 1990s, they made clear to the community that they were there to support the construction of the dams.[0] One local leader explained that "suddenly, they were assassinating people and you did not know who, that was when people turned up who said they were working for EPM, and that scared people because they were afraid that data would be used to kill them…as a result many people left"; for him, this was part of the strategy of building the project: "first passes the paramilitaries, to get rid of the leaders of the area, then the army, and then finally the company".[0]

Unlike confrontation, this displacement was not geared at removing the hostile armed group and protecting the infrastructure from attack, but rather removing local

[0] CEV, 'San Roque: De La Doctrina Contrainsurgente al Extractivismo', 88.

[0] Interview with local leader (21), Amalfi – November 2018. Other leaders also explained that the paramilitaries appeared to secure the construction of the dam (Interview with local leaders [23, 24], Amalfi – November 2018).

[0] Cárdenas Delgado, 'Porce IV: Las Comunidades o Los Macroproyectos'.

communities whose presence posed an obstacle to the transfer of land to the dam project. Whether or not these threats and violence by the paramilitary groups were explicitly a state strategy to clear the land, official media and state actors seemed unwilling to investigate the displacement. Another local leader from Porce observed that:

> "There were so many complaints [about the displacement]. But then I heard the news and they said officially there were no complaints or displaced people…[EPM] took advantage of the dispossession. This happens all the time all over the country".[0]

Those who had been displaced did not have any legal recourse to reclaim the land. EPM, the public company building Porce III, encountered few existing inhabitants in the territory by the time construction began in 2004. The armed group forcibly displaced the communities living on the land, and the state – through official platforms that monitored displacement and its public companies like EPM – overlooked the actions that had taken place and legalised the seizure of land, very similar to how Grajales details the process of the state's formal territorialisation through extralegal paramilitary violence.[0]


An armed group utilised extralegal violence to force displacement for Ituango as well, where the Bloque Minero of the AUC made incursions into FARC-controlled territory. In 1996 and 1997, the Bloque Minero carried out some of the most notorious massacres in recent Colombian history in the *veredas* of el Aro and the Granja, leading to mass exodus of local communities out of the territory and to the city. Though I discussed the confrontation generated between the state and the FARC last chapter, in this one I illustrate how other armed groups also occupied territory around

[0] Interview with local leader (24), Amalfi – November 2018; Interview with engineer (28), Medellin – November 2018.

[0] Grajales, 'The Rifle and the Title: Paramilitary Violence, Land Grab and Land Control in Colombia'; Grajales, 'State Involvement, Land Grabbing and Counter-insurgency in Colombia'.

the dam. The following map indicates the general geographic presence of armed groups around the implementation of Hidroituango (including the AUC successor groups, the Clan del Golfo and later the Caparrapos).

FIGURE 6. ARMED GROUP PRESENCE AROUND HIDROITUANGO (2009-2016)



[Map created by author]

These incursions had a dramatic effect beyond the confrontations between the FARC and Bloque Minero that laid the groundwork for future development. While FARC forcibly displaced the paramilitary group from the territory eventually in 2001,[0] the damage was done. Many in the communities had migrated to the Medellin to escape

[0] Defensoría del Pueblo, 'Sistema Alerta Temprana Antioquia: Informe de Riesgo No 22-14', 6.

further victimisation.[0] By 1998, the then-governor of Medellin, Alvaro Uribe, had created the commission for the Pescadero Hidroelectric dam to be built in Ituango.

Investigations into the relationship between Uribe and the massacres dogged his political career, continuing even in 2020.[0] Official investigations in 2010 by the Prosecutor of the Peace and Justice Unit, Patricia Hernandez, observed that "parallel to the [hydroelectric] project's evolution was the paramilitary advancement". She detailed that between 1996 and 1998 were at least 15 massacres in the municipalities in the area of influence of the hydroelectric project that led to mass displacements of local communities; Hernandez claimed that in her judgement, the incursions were to pacify the territory for the hydroelectric project and the paramilitaries "did the dirty work", though no legal action came of the investigation and eventually it appeared abandoned.[0]

Yet the actions of the paramilitary group and the departmental government still appear consistent with a territorial strategy of specialising. In an interview with the Guardian, a local inhabitant of el Aro who suffered the incursions of the Bloque Minero in 1997 recounted that the paramilitary group had told him their objective in the territory: "they said that we were on land that would be used [for the dam]. When we refused to leave, that's when they started shooting".[0] Another former inhabitant of

[0] Arboleda Garcia, 'Las Cicatrices de El Aro'; Sánchez Gómez et al., *Una Nación Desplazada: Informe Nacional Del Desplazamiento Forzado En Colombia*.

[0] El Tiempo, 'Corte Remite a La Fiscalía Proceso Contra Uribe Por Masacre de El Aro'. For more on the evolving investigation on the links between the Uribe administration and the Bloque Minero in the attempted conquest of Ituango see reports by the Colombian Comission of Jursits ('Las Responsabilidades En La Masacre de El Aro: Una Verdad Por Desentrañar'.), Verdad Abierta ('Los Consejeros de Los "Paras" Según "Don Berna"'.), and recent reporting in the media (El Tiempo, 'Corte Remite a La Fiscalía Proceso Contra Uribe Por Masacre de El Aro'; Semana, 'La Audiencia Del Caso Uribe Continúa El 4 de Octubre: Las Claves Del Convulsionado Proceso').

[0] Noticias Caracol, 'Investigan Relación Hidroituango y Paramilitares'; Torres Ramírez, *Colombia Nunca Más: Extractivismo - Graves Violaciones a Los Derechos Humanos. Caso Hidroituango, Una Lucha Por La Memoria y Contra La Impunidad*, 436.

[0] Parkin Daniels and Ebus, 'Colombians Who Once Fled War Now Forced to Run from Catastrophic Flooding'. Also reported in interview with local teachers (18), Ituango – November and a local leader from Yarumal (35), a neighbouring municipality also in the area of the dam (Santa Rosas – December 2019).

Ituango displaced by the paramilitaries in the 1990s explained that the land clearance was "why [EPM] came into the territory and said there was no one there".[0] With fewer inhabitants in the territory and no official land records to account for, the construction of roads and the dam could bypass significant legal hurdles.

Once the Hidroituango project entered into its planning and construction phases, the paramilitary successor group and the public company EPM appeared to continue to specialise their territorial strategy in and around Ituango. Violence against communities and forced displacement continued for the next decade. Between 1998 and 2008 a total of 62 separate massacres were recorded in the twelve municipalities in the area of Hidroituango's influence.[0] The Bloque Minero paramilitary bloc and the Clan del Golfo that succeeded it were accused of authoring over 315 human rights abuses in the 12 municipalities in the area of the dam's influence between 1990 and 2016, while approximately 18000 inhabitants fled the area between 2000 and 2002 alone.[0]

In 2008, as EPM began to carry out surveys and censuses, engineers observed that in their visits to the territory the Clan del Golfo had control of the river and the valley, including the access roads. They recounted that later others from the territory had told them that these "irregular armies were giving the project and its constructors protection".[0] The cooperation of an armed group was not limited to protection from

[0] Interview with a local leader (30), Ituango – December 2018; interview with local leader (18), Ituango – November.

[0] Agencia Prensa Rural, '62 Masacres En Los 12 Municipios Donde Se Desarrolla Proyecto Hidroituango'.

[0] Torres Ramírez, *Colombia Nunca Más: Extractivismo - Graves Violaciones a Los Derechos Humanos. Caso Hidroituango, Una Lucha Por La Memoria y Contra La Impunidad*, 3–7.

[0] Interview with engineers (40), Medellin – January 2019. There are various other pieces of evidence that point to a potentially subcontracted interaction between the state and armed group in implementing Hidroituango: in 2010 the official tender by the departmental government of Antioquia was administered by the governor of Antioquia, Luis Alfredo Ramos, went to the firms of Camargo Correa and Conconcreto. In 2011 the Colombian Supreme Court opened an investigation into alleged links Ramos had with paramilitary groups; by February 2021 there was still no conclusive verdict (El Espectador, 'Luis Alfredo Ramos: Un Caso a Punto de Definirse Tras Años de Demoras'). In 2015, the

other armed actors. An activist from Puerto Valdivia, the municipality just downstream of the dam, explained how the Clan del Golfo and EPM specialised to secure their shared presence in the territory and the infrastructure project:

> "During the [first stages] of construction, Uribe was in charge of the project. He was the owner of the paramilitaries. The guerrilla was in the mountains and the paramilitaries would displace many people in 2006 to 2008 by the borders of the river. Then EPM came in to build the project… the paramilitaries displaced the people in 2009 to buy the land titles for the road EPM wanted to build. They were the Gaitanistas, Uribe's group. Now they call themselves the Clan del Golfo, but it is all the same. In 2008 they started the construction, and they did not warn us. In 2008 they were buying land titles. Those [titles] they did not want to buy, [EPM] would just take because they said it was public land. They would set the price and then buy it. They would use the law and set the public attorney on people who did not agree [to the sale or the price]. Then they sent the paramilitaries in 2009 in advance to kick people out [who did not comply]. They were the Gaitanistas. There was also the military but then the paramilitaries would come. They would knock on doors and threaten people to leave."[0]

The Clan del Golfo threatened and intimidated local inhabitants where required, and the law, the public attorney, and the public company of EPM were all state actors capable of formalising these same land clearances. As my interlocutor expressed, the state was as able to "use the law and set the public attorney on people" alongside the Clan del Golfo's threat of extralegal violence.

The armed group continued to carry out land clearance even during the implementation of the project. On the 20th of January 2013, approximately 80 pan-miners living on the Sardinas beach on the river Cauca (just upstream the construction of the dam) were approached by a group of armed masked men who told them to leave, threatened to kill them, and said that they were Urabeños (another name for Clan del Golfo). This event was detailed in a report commissioned by

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Conconcreto company was also implicated in financing the AUC by former paramilitary commander Rodrigo Zapata (UNHCHR, 'El Misterioso Frente Suroeste de Las Auc'). The Clan del Golfo had many of the same members as the AUC. While no conclusions can be drawn from this, the links between state officials, private companies, and armed groups during the implementation of the dam are consistent with the reported experiences of local inhabitants in encountering paramilitary support for the project.

[0] Interview with local activist (82), Puerto Valdivia – April 2019.

Sumapaz, an independent human rights organisation. In the report employees of companies contracted in the dam's construction recount having overheard other employees speak of their experiences as paramilitary and/or as demobilised combatants, and of their involvement in other hydroelectric such as the Porce canyon projects. Several employees noted there were suddenly fewer employees in the camp that evening when the pan-miners were threatened by masked armed men on the 20th of January.[0] The understanding alluded to by the interviewed employees was that the contracting companies had hired members of an armed group to continue serving as extralegal enforcement when problems arose during implementation.

Other armed groups have carried out similar land clearances for other infrastructure projects around Colombia. In northern Nariño, on the border with Cauca, the development of the Patia dam by the public company ISAGEM coincided with the arrival of a new armed group in the area following the 29th Front of the FARC's demobilisation in 2017, and local leaders reported having received explicit threats from the armed group to make space for the dam's implementation.[0] The state and armed group also appear to resort to territorial strategies of specialising in the department of Valle del Cauca and the construction of the Buenaventura port. As one local leader reported, the efforts to develop the largest port in western Colombia also brought in former paramilitary armed group who used violence as:

> "A tactic of terror to get the people to move from the paramilitary-controlled waterfront areas and flee to the rural zones so that the large projects can have free rein. The mafiosos, allied with businessmen, want to force people out through fear".[0]

[0] Sumapaz, 'Estado de Los Derechos Humanos En Antioquia 2014: Entre El Sueño de La Paz y La Continuidad de La Guerra', 64–65.

[0] Pedraza, 'La Cordillera Occidental En El Departamento Nariño: Entre Despojo, Resistencias y Luchas', 837.

[0] Molano Jimeno, 'Buenaventura, Entre La Pobreza y La Violencia'. An IO staffer also observed that the development of the Buenaventura port had been intimately linked with patterns of violent displacement by armed groups (Interview with IO staff [6], Bogota – September 2018).

Large-scale projects to expand the port and increase trade and connectivity between Colombia and the world have been accompanied by violence leading to an 'exodus of residents fleeing the threat of death or dismemberment' that 'feeds back to encourage capital investment in the development of port infrastructure'.[0] In both Northern Antioquia and Valle del Cauca, armed groups sought to clear land slated for infrastructure construction, paving the way for the infrastructure implementation to have 'free reign'.

Specialising by the state and armed group in clearing land for infrastructure therefore reflects what Ballvé and Grajales refers to as a territorialisation for the purpose of statebuilding.[0] The extralegal violence by the armed group obviates the state from going through official (and constricting) channels to formally secure the land for large infrastructure projects, yet the state can in turn render that land legally available to build upon after it is cleared. This 'laundering' of land provides the state with plausible deniability to build infrastructure without addressing – or even obfuscating – the human price paid.

SPECIALISING AND TARGETING COMMUNITY MOBILISATION

In this section I demonstrate how the armed group, in subcontraction, serves as instrument of intimidation for the state against community opposition, leading to victimisation of local leaders who speak out. The state in turn can target and harass local leaders through its law enforcement and judicial institutions, rather than protect them from the armed group's violence. As the previous section demonstrated, the armed group cooperating with the state may use coercive force and intimidation to

[0] Zeiderman, 'Submergence: Precarious Politics in Colombia's Future Port-city', 17.

[0] Ballvé, 'Everyday State Formation: Territory, Decentralization, and the Narco Landgrab in Colombia'; Grajales, 'State Involvement, Land Grabbing and Counter-insurgency in Colombia'.

remove local communities in the way of the advancement of the project. Community opposition can especially snarl the process in legal procedure or gain unwanted media attention for unpopular decisions or less than licit practices by state actors and their contractors in the infrastructure implementation. Finding extralegal solutions to opposition secures the presence of state actors in the territory.

Efforts by an armed group to intimidate and target outspoken communities became increasingly apparent in the early stages of Hidroituango's construction. By 2012, community opposition to the Hidroituango dam had begun to coalesce and mobilise. Various communities displaced by the dam formed the Rios Vivos (Living River) movement in 2011.[0] The movement started mobilising and organising protests and marches against EPM and the dam in 2012 after the main bridge connecting Ituango to the south was submerged. The reasoning for communities to oppose the dam were varied, from loss of land and livelihood, loss of the bridge and easy connection to the outside world, religious beliefs, as well as concern that the dam would erase still undiscovered mass graves from the last few decades of the conflict.[0] Protests and opposition against the dam spread among the local community in Ituango, as well as the neighbouring municipalities of Valdivia, Toledo, Sabanalarga, and Briceño.

The armed group and the state both opposed the community's efforts to mobilise. As of March 2013, when Rios Vivos began organising marches in Ituango to protest the

[0] While Rios Vivos was the most active organisation in opposition to the dam, they were not universally liked in the community even though many others shared similar issues. Rios Vivos still had support from many communities that had been displaced by the project but were considered by others unwilling to compromise for adequate compensation by EPM. Other miners associations also led their own efforts against the dam and also faced threats independent of Rios Vivos (Torres Ramírez 2018: 435). As one of the leaders of ASOCBARENA explained, "we did not fully oppose the construction of the project [like Rios Vivos], we only wanted them to give us what was owed" (Interview 32). Equally, some members of the community (especially in the more urban areas of Ituango) expressed support for the dam and the perceived benefits of increased economic development in the territory and were not happy with Rios Vivos' perceived agitations (Interviews 13, 14).

[0] Family members of disappeared civilians have been advocated for a proper investigation into these potential mass graves of the late 1990s. EPM and the government's failure to adequately investigate before flooding the valley is another point of contention with local communities.

dam, threats began emerging from armed fighters that called themselves the AUC, [0] leading to the displacement of various organisers and eventually assassination. Nelson Giraldo, a leader in the Rios Vivos movement returned to Ituango in September 2013 after being displaced to Medellin by unidentified armed men because he could not find a source of livelihood in the city. A few days after he returned, he was found dead in the Cauca river in Ituango, shot multiple times and his throat slit.[0] The brutal manner of his death send a clear and intimidating message to other members of Rios Vivos, who now feared returning to Ituango.[0]

Communities understand that the actions by the armed group is not committed in a vacuum. One of the main spokespeople for Rios Vivos observed that the extralegal violence was intertwined with state efforts to suppress civilian opposition to the dam:

> "First [the state and armed group] mess with the personal to discredit your voice and then they try to do it with all the collective action of the process, and they continue to discredit you, and, when it is not enough, they move on to threats, and from threats to judicial harassment, and from there, to the attempted kidnapping and forced disappearance. As they cannot end the resistance, the escalation can end in murder or in jail".[0]

The armed group – unspecified in this instance – was better positioned to deploy extralegal violence to threaten community activists against the infrastructure implementation. The state in turn used various legal processes to secure the project and to enable the extralegal intimidation and violence by an armed group. The state could begin to supress community opposition to the dam through discrediting the legitimacy of the movement in official statements and then carrying out "judicial harassment", including accusing leaders of assaulting members of the private security

[0] CCEEU, 'Estado de Los Derechos Humanos En Antioquia 2014: Entre El Sueño de La Paz y La Continuidad de La Guerra', 66.

[0] El Mundo, 'Asesinan a Un Activista Colombiano Que Se Había Enfrentado a Una Hidroeléctrica'.

[0] Semana, 'Drama de Los Mineros En El Campus de Universidad de Antioquia'.

[0] Chato, 'Hidroituango o La Criminalización de La Resistencia'; Hacemos Memoria, 'Hidroituango, ¿inundar La Memoria?'

team of EPM (charges that were eventually proven to be false).[0] Where the state's criminalisation of the protest was insufficient, the armed group could step in and carry out more definitive and violent measures to ensure that communities stopped mobilising, limiting their agency.

The second crisis moment that motivated a potential strategy of specialising by the state and armed group around Hidroituango was in 2018. An unexpected failing in the dam's internal mechanisms caused the river to rise rapidly in April of 2018, leading to a crisis downstream in Puerto Valdivia and Tarazá. One leader of the ASOCBARENA explained that they had begun organising to assist with those displaced by the newly rising waters of the dam and had established a refugee camp in the Libano *finca* (farm) in Ituango. In that period several people associated with ASOCBARENA were killed between June and August 2018. According to the leader, "three of the assassinations that happened this year [2018] were to finish with that camp. It was receiving too much attention and the company did not want that much attention".[0] Eventually those in the camp abandoned it out fear of continued reprisal.[0] A local activist from Valdivia explicitly linked victimisation by an armed group to community mobilisation against the dam in 2013 and 2018, and laid the blame of the action with EPM and the state:

> "They would attack us because EPM would pay them to threaten us. They would call us; they would leave messages or pass by there so that we would know they were watching us. They would say to us at Rios Vivos, we will give you only so much time, like 15 days to stop bothering about the project. We had companions who died. Now it is getting better because some of those who were threatening us are in jail or dead themselves. But the worst era was when we were carrying out demonstrations and marches against EPM. That was when we had the most threats, when they killed our companions. Then there was the blockage of the tunnel and we went to

[0] Chato, 'Hidroituango o La Criminalización de La Resistencia'.

[0] Interview with local leader (33), Santa Rosas – December 2018.

[0] Interview with local leader (33), Santa Rosas – December 2018; this was reiterated in an interview with a displaced local leader from Ituango (32), Medellin – December 2018.

> carry out more protests and they killed two more of our companions. We planned another march, and they killed another companion. EPM never wanted to give anything to us living downstream of the dam."[0]

Therefore 2013 and 2018 were two periods in the implementation of Hidroituango that had significant opposition by local activists – generating national and international attention – and the same two periods where activists faced violent threats from an unknown armed group. The media attention generated by the activism made it a threat to the infrastructure implementation and the state's presence in the territory in implementing the project through the public company. The communities themselves draw a direct link between that threat to the territorial presence of EPM and the threats and intimidation they faced by an armed group.

The state and the armed group also specialise to prevent communities from exposing shared corrupted interests in infrastructure implementation and jeopardise the state and armed group's presence in the territory. The case of the Junín-Barbacoas road in the department of Nariño shows how the state and armed group may specialise to secure their presence in the territory when exploiting infrastructure implementation. In Barbacoas, the community's outrage at the state was not geared at the project itself, but rather, like the crisis in Ituango, at the faulty implementation of the Junín-Barbacoas road that left communities vulnerable. Between 2008 and 2011 local communities awaited the construction of the Junín-Barbacoas secondary road, but efforts started, stalled, and proved unsatisfactory. Local communities regarded the excuses provided by officials from the government of Nariño and contractors with suspicion. One regional leader based in Tumaco observed a connection between the project's continued funding and the lack of effective progress made.

[0] Interview with local activist (82), Puerto Valdivia – April 2019. The report by the Centre for Historic Memory in Colombia also reports that the assassination of Rios Vivos leaders by unknown armed actors occurred predominantly in 2013 when opposition to the dam first peaked and then again in 2018 when the blockage occurred (Valencia, 'Memoria En Río Revuelto').

> "[The state] said they could not properly build the road because of the armed groups. On paper the state has given a lot of money. The contractors take the money and then say they cannot. The money comes because of particular interests, there was a senator involved, and then they do not build the road."[0]

This was reflected in the personal account of a local leader in Barbacoas, who explained how his attempts to denounce failings and corruption of the project in the late 2000s and early 2010s [he was vague as to the exact year] resulted in an unknown armed group making threats. He explained that this was not solely the work of an armed group but rather the product of a strategy of specialising by the state and armed group:

> "It's not just the armed groups because it sometimes it is the state as well…I will denounce when I see that [the companies] are stealing these resources from us. But if you make any official complaint to the mayor or the government those complaints disappear."[0]

Worse still, as the regional leader observed, in that time "if there was a complaint to the state about a lack of progress [on the road] they would eliminate you".[0] The apparent involvement of a senator and the disappearance of formal complaints lodged with local and departmental government illustrated to local communities the faulty implementation was not simply a betrayal by private actors of public trust but approved and supported by state actors.

Corruption in infrastructure implementation may appear to undermine the state's authority and power rather than reinforce it. However, criminal practices of private accumulation have a historical role in the representations of emergent state power and should not be simplified as its abuse.[0] Viewing corruption as an illegitimate

[0] Interview with regional leader (67), Tumaco – March 2019. This was repeated in various interviews with local inhabitants of Barbacoas (53, 73, 74, 75, 76). For more on the change in the infrastructure implementation and resulting interaction with armed groups see Chapter 7 on Co-existence.

[0] Interview with local leader (75), Barbacoas – March 2019.

[0] Interview with regional leader (67), Tumaco – March 2019.

[0] Tilly, 'War Making and State Making as Organized Crime'.

spoiler of the idealised Westphalian state ignores its integral relationship in constructing the state's power and presence.[0] Even if the state's authority is wielded out of self-interest by those involved, subcontraction still requires the apparatus of the state to secure those interests in the territory against threats.

Armed groups carried out similar actions in other parts of Colombia to supress challenges or dissent against state-led infrastructure projects. The AUC threatened the Embera indigenous group in the department of Choco in 1999 to allow the construction of a small-scale hydroelectric plant – threats the Embera attributed directly to the departmental politicians paying the group but which were dismissed by court officials.[0] The Águilas Negras, another armed group successor to the AUC, threatened local leaders opposing the construction of a motorway in the department of Santander in 2018[0] and a motorway in the department of Cauca in 2019.[0] In October 2020 the Águilas Negras also threatened local leaders who challenged the state-owned Ecopetrol company for not abiding by the environmental licencing agreement in drilling and transporting oil in the department of Magdalena Medio. The leaders raised concerns about threats they received, claiming that the Águilas Negras had declared them military objectives for "supposedly obstructing development and progress" in the territory,[0] a facsimile of the rhetoric of growth the Colombian state used when describing its infrastructural vision for the country.[0]

The case of the Urrá dam in the department of Córdoba also shows how the state and armed group specialise in the construction of infrastructure. In 2001, the Urrá public

[0] Pugh, 'Statebuilding and Corruption', 81.

[0] Supreme Council of the Judiciary, 'Compilación y Selección de Los Fallos y Decisiones de La Jurisdicción Especial Indígena 1980-2006', 67.

[0] El Espectador, 'Ambientalistas En Santander Habrían Recibido Amenazas'.

[0] El Espectador, 'Dos Líderes Afro Del Cauca Son Amenazados Por Las Águilas Negras'.

[0] Semana, 'Defensores Ambientales Del Magdalena Medio Denuncian Amenazas'.

[0] Zeiderman, 'Concrete Peace: Building Security through Infrastructure in Colombia'.

utilities company was challenged by the indigenous Embera Katío tribe for building a dam in their territory. In 2020 Salvatore Mancuso – the ex-paramilitary leader responsible for invading the territory – testified that he was responsible for assassinating the indigenous leader Kimy Pernía Domicó in 2001 and that the Colombian state had ordered the attack to quash the opposition to the dam. His testimony made explicit the link between the killing and threats against the indigenous group and the construction of the dam:

> "What happened to the indigenous leader Kimy Pernía Domicó was a crime of the state. The excuses they were giving, because you remember that the State was censuring you and prohibiting you from entering the area freely, because they said you were supporting subversive armed groups in the area, and that when they were going to build the hydroelectric dam [Urrá], they started the systematic actions by the Colombian state intended to weaken you and end whatever effort to claim or realise your rights. That is why such a conflict started…why we had blockades by the river, examined all the canoes that came up."[0]

Mancuso's revelations reinforced the claims local leaders had been making across these cases; development was a dangerous business when armed actors and the state were aligned. Whether with dams, ports, or roads, subcontracted interactions generated specialisation by the armed group and the states to intimidate and manage any the local population's dissent to secure the infrastructure implementation. The armed group is capable of using extralegal violence while the state can ignore or dismiss complaints or claims of such abuses while still retaining plausible deniability. Specialising, as I will discuss in more detail in the next section, not only produces insecurity that characterise the local order but also supresses any agency in it.

Although subcontracted interactions in Colombia appear predominantly between paramilitary organisations and the state (as discussed in Chapter 2), FARC dissidents also appeared to be involved in one case targeting local leaders that spoke out against

[0] Florez Arias, 'Confesión de Mancuso Sobre Kimy Pernía Remueve La Verdad Pendiente de Los Paras'.

the Hidroituango dam. One of the ASOCBARENA leaders received a call before going to Bogotá in August of 2018 to denounce the threats and actions by EPM. The caller identified himself as a member of the 36th Front of the FARC (now a dissident armed group)[0] and had called the leader and threatened him that if he went to Bogota he would be considered a military target and that he should not keep working for ASOCBARENA or return to Ituango.[0] In his view, though the paramilitary and successor groups demonstrated a historical sympathy with the state, that did not preclude other groups from cooperating with the public company, "as long as they were paid".[0] Specialising allows the armed group to contract out their capacity for violence without accountability in exchange for some level of judicial protection or economic compensation.[0]

SPECIALISING AND PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY

Specialising by the state and an armed group allows the state to deny any connection between its interests and the armed group's actions. Without this plausible deniability, the state cannot credibly formalise land cleared by an armed group or ignore or discredit claims of victimisation by activists. By avoiding using its own armed forces, the state can frame community members selectively victimised by an armed group for speaking out against the implementation of a project as agents of the guerrillas, or victims of local conflicts and criminal squabbles.

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[0] The dissident 36th Front of the FARC, under alias 'Cabuyo' were by 2018 known to be actively recruiting former paramilitary combatants and entered in alliance with the paramilitary splinter group the Caparrapos by early 2018, indicating that the FARC dissident group was softening if not outright abandoning of any ideological position (Monsalve Gaviria, '¿Se Alían Exmiembros de Las Farc y Clan Del Golfo En Ituango?').

[0] Interview with local leader (33), Santa Rosas – December 2018.

[0] Ibid.

[0] Eaton, 'The Downside of Decentralization: Armed Clientelism in Colombia', 534.

In Ituango, military leaders and spokespeople for EPM insisted that the FARC had coerced the local community to protest[0] – a claim many in the community denied.[0] The former Minister of Transportation claimed that across the country "often there were armed groups behind theses aggressive communities who opposed infrastructure projects".[0] In 2020, the newly elected President Ivan Duque attributed a nation-wide increase in attacks against local leaders to territorial disputes between armed groups or from drug trafficking conflicts.[0] State actors not only discredit any potentially legitimate motives for local protest, but also suggest that rather than opposition to infrastructure, local leaders face threats and intimidation because of a loyalty to an armed group provoking retaliation by competing armed groups.

These narratives of competition obscure the difference in the territorial strategies of specialising compared to militarising. As I discuss in the next section, these broad explanations of violence produced by competition fail to capture the selectively repressive nature of the local order. Mancuso's testimony offers a revealing look at the difference. At the time in 2001 Colombian officials claimed that Pernía Domicó's disappearance was by paramilitary actors for personal reasons relating to drug trafficking and because of the support his indigenous group had given to the FARC.[0] This was strengthened by later testimony from Mancuso himself in 2007 where he claimed that the attack was because Kimy was believed to be supporting the FARC.[0] Mancuso's unexpected extradition in 2008 to the US prevented him from further testimony; the case was largely left to rest until his testimony in 2020 revealed that

[0] El Mundo, 'Golpe a Red de Apoyo de Las Farc En Ituango'.; Interview with former security manager at EPM (41), Medellín – January 2019.
[0] Interview with local inhabitants (18, 19, 31, 32), Ituango – November 2018.
[0] Interview with former Minister of Transport (42), Bogota – January 2019.
[0] Banchon, 'Líderes En Colombia: "Asesinar Sigue Saliendo Gratis"'.
[0] Jaramillo, 'Kimy, Palabra y Espíritu de Un Río', 147.
[0] Florez Arias, 'Confesión de Mancuso Sobre Kimy Pernía Remueve La Verdad Pendiente de Los Paras'.

the state's infrastructural interests were more important than initially admitted. His recent admission was more in line with the same claims the Embera had been making since 2001 about the dangers of opposing the dam.[0] Both public officials and the armed group at the time linked the indigenous community and its leaders to the FARC to explain the armed group's actions and avoided implicating the state and the community's opposition to the infrastructure implementation.

Navigating the competing claims to the provenance of the extralegal violence committed against communities – whether out of competition or cooperation – requires us to understand the importance of the different capabilities of an armed group and the state when specialising. A local leader from Ituango associated with ASOCBARENA recounted a conversation overheard between two military officials in 2017 at one of the camps for miners displaced by the Hidroituango dam:

> "A major told another major that they should 'fill us full of lead' and then say it was the guerrillas. But the other major said no, we cannot shoot them because everyone knows the guerrillas don't get involved with the miners."[0]

From this exchange it appears that military officials were aware of their limitations in supressing protest and community challengers. They could not directly attack the peaceful protestors without provocation and there was no good explanation for why the FARC would do so. This is not unique to this case: the Colombian military has a history of using links with paramilitary groups to avoid legal risks during violent land grabs and displacement of civilians.[0] The armed group enjoys a greater degree of opacity in using extralegal violence than the military. They can intimidate, threaten,

[0] Jaramillo, 'Kimy, Palabra y Espíritu de Un Río'; Rodríguez Garavito and Orduz Salinas, 'Adiós Río. La Disputa Por La Tierra, El Agua y Los Derechos Indígenas En Torno a La Represa de Urrá'; Leguizamón Castillo, 'Conflictos Ambientales y Movimientos Sociales: El Caso Del Movimiento Embera Katío En Respuesta a La Construcción de La Represa Urrá (1994-2008)'.

[0] Interview with local leader (33), Santa Rosas – December 2018.

[0] Grajales, 'The Rifle and the Title: Paramilitary Violence, Land Grab and Land Control in Colombia', 774.

and assassinate local community members from the shadows, making it difficult to prove who was responsible for the attacks and why. States benefit from the extralegal violence as a strategy of deniability to increase their counterinsurgency success.[0] States use the armed group as a source of intelligence, deterring civilian support for other challengers through threat, supplying the state with auxiliary forces in operations, and providing plausible deniability.[0] The armed group in turn can be confident that the state will not use its law enforcement or judicial institutions to target or investigate its extralegal actions and may even financially benefit from the arrangement.[0]

I argue this same benefit exists for states that cooperate with an armed group during infrastructure implementation when geared at local communities, rather than at hostile armed actors. When specialising means the armed group and the state gear their comparative abilities to supressing the local community's opposition to the implementation of infrastructure, counterinsurgency can become a useful justification for the state to undermine community opposition and dismiss instances of violence. The state, however, can cooperate with an armed group to suppress community opposition to its projects without a hostile armed group in the territory. Land defenders killed across Latin America are often stigmatised, criminalised, and violently repressed by combinations of criminal armed groups, extractive industries, and state authorities.[0] However, ambiguity about the cause of violence and the

[0] Rudbeck, Mukherjee, and Nelson, 'When Autocratic Regimes Are Cheap and Play Dirty: The Transaction Costs of Repression in South Africa, Kenya, and Egypt'.

[0] Eck, 'Repression by Proxy: How Military Purges and Insurgency Impact the Delegation of Coercion'; Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger, 'Militias in Civil Wars'; Ahram, 'Pro-Government Militias and the Repertoires of Illicit State Violence'.

[0] Auyero and Sobering, *The Ambivalent State: Police-Criminal Collusion at the Urban Margins*; Eck, 'Repression by Proxy: How Military Purges and Insurgency Impact the Delegation of Coercion'.

[0] Rasch, 'Citizens, Criminalization and Violence in Natural Resource Conflicts in Latin America'; Navas, Mingorria, and Aguilar-González, 'Violence in Environmental Conflicts: The Need for a Multidimensional Approach'; Andreucci and Kallis, 'Governmentality, Development and the Violence of Natural Resource Extraction in Peru'.

extrajudicial and independent nature of the armed group allows the state to minimise potential backlash by broader national and international audiences and protect the armed group from prosecution.[0] In Colombia the backdrop of internal armed conflict and insurgency offers the state a way of dismissing the violent suppression of community challengers by an armed group as the product of territorial competition.

A Nexus That Will Get Us Killed: Navigating a repressive local order

The armed group's extralegal violence and state actor's obfuscation results in an insecure local order, whether communities are forcibly displaced from land required for the project or targeted for voicing opposition. The clear intentions behind the armed group's violent actions and the state's effort to discredit and conceal produce a culture of fear that serves to silence communities beyond individual intimidation. Unlike militarising – which provokes arbitrary victimisation – specialising produces a repressive local order without agency, but where at least the rules of behaviour were clear: stay out of our way, and you won't get hurt.

The insecurity of selective violence

In the cases examined in this chapter, communities themselves often understood the violence they faced as a direct consequence to their challenging the implementation of

[0] Reputational costs from excessive use of state force in support of development projects can have damaging effect on state actors. Levien argues that the ruling party in India lost significant national credibility and political support because of the extreme force used by the police in land grabs and dispossessions for private corporations strengthened opposition political groups ('The Politics of Dispossession: Theorizing India's "Land Wars"').

infrastructure by the state. Land clearances that paved the way for the construction of dams caused mass displacement, and communities spent years rebuilding from the damage it caused. One local inhabitant explained how the incursion of the Bloque Minero in Porce Canyon impacted o the local community and its relationship to the planned infrastructure projects:

> "There were difficulties in the areas of influence of what would be Porce II. There were many displacements. It caused conflict because one was not always sure who was directly responsible for the displacement. Different armed groups would come, and they would confront each other. Always in the areas of influence of the dam between 1998 and 2006. We then know for sure that Porce II enters operation in 2001, but all these conflicts and displacements also occurred where they wanted to build Porce IV and also increased fighting and displacement where they then build Porce III. Why did the paramilitaries and sometimes the military victimise the communities without any reason to remove us from that territory? We left in 1999 and did not return until after 2004. When we returned, we saw that along the entire river there was not a single house with lights on. People returned very slowly because the entire community had been displaced."[0]

Though violence may have multiple motivators, confounding reductive causal explanations,[0] community members that managed to escape still appeared fearful and uncertain about the potential links between the displacement by the paramilitary and the implementation of the dam. The impact of this potential cooperation is tragic: a local inhabitant, displaced from her home on the Cauca river by the implementation of the Hidroituango dam explained that:

> "megaprojects are always hand in hand with the paramilitaries because they enter, and they kick us off this land, like they did around the territories of Hidroituango. They cleared this territory with the paramilitaries… through dispossessions, disappearances…they assassinated two of my brothers".[0]

[0] Interview with local leader (24), Amalfi – November 2018. Also reflected in the interview with local leaders (21, 23) and local fisherman in Tarazá (37) who had lived in Porce.

[0] Kalyvas, 'Micro-Level Studies of Violence in Civil War: Refining and Extending the Control-Collaboration Model', 662; Bara, 'Incentives and Opportunities: A Complexity-Oriented Explanation of Violent Ethnic Conflict'.

[0] Interview with local activist (19), Ituango – November 2018.

The armed group also threatens, attacks, and displaces local leaders and activists who oppose infrastructure projects or attempted to expose an issue in their implementation. These efforts at supressing dissent by local communities at times result in fatalities, as the assassination of the leaders of Rios Vivos and Kimy Pernía Domicó show. Families lose homes, livelihoods, and loved ones because of the subcontracted interaction during infrastructure implementation. A local leader from the Porce Canyon explained the insecurity they experienced in succinct terms:

> "We leaders are falling. Those of us who get involved know that there is an immediate risk. The same thing that happens to any social leader can happen to us. Anyone who opposes a megaproject will end up buried."[0]

Local leaders understand that opposition to the infrastructure project could result in violent consequences by the armed group. Rather than face a state and armed group paranoid about potential disloyalty, the local communities face an armed group that explicitly punishes speaking out against the infrastructure implementation.

On the other hand – unlike an arbitrary local order – this means that local communities understand that staying silent is a way of avoiding violent consequences by the armed group. Wood et al observe that targeted violence produces "a clear selective incentive for civilians – if they avoid transgressions, they can avoid sanctions".[0] One inhabitant from Ituango explained that the paramilitary groups shifted from accusing the community of loyalty to the FARC to threatening those who opposed the dam; while he did not say exactly why he thought this was the case, he observed that compared to before, this selectivity reflected "a calmer era".[0]

[0] Interview with local leader (21), Amalfi – November 2018.

[0] Wood, Kathman, and Gent, 'Armed Intervention and Civilian Victimization in Intrastate Conflicts', 648; Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, 156; Mason, 'Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and the Rational Peasant'.

[0] Interview with a local inhabitant (17), Ituango – November 2018

Selectivity helps communities to navigate insecurity in the local order, but it also reinforces their lack of agency. While local organisations continued to oppose infrastructure implementation despite the threats, the communities were aware of the insecurity this provoked. The Embera in Choco understood that challenging the state-led infrastructure projects would make them targets to paramilitary groups in the 1990s.[0] In Ituango, one local activist bluntly described the insecurity and lack of agency in the local order: "No-one wants to be opposed to [the dam] because EPM has a lot of power and they will kill them".[0] Communities identified, though it rarely resulted in legal prosecution, a clear link between opposing the implementation of infrastructure and the state's dismissal and the armed group's violence.

As I set out in Chapter 2, I define security as the absence of violence and 'freedom from fear' for local communities. Yet while specialising did lead to some violence against individuals, the armed group and state's actions also provided clear guidelines for how the community might avoid provoking harmful repercussions, making clear the selective nature of the violence so that communities could follow to minimise their insecurity, a distinct outcome from the violence that emerged from confrontation.

This constrains the physical harm of violence but does not free communities from fear. In fact, specialising produces a culture of fear in the local order, designed to generate apathy and the community's non-engagement with the infrastructure project. The phrase 'culture of fear' was coined by O'Donnell and Galli[0] to

[0] Supreme Council of the Judiciary, 'Compilación y Selección de Los Fallos y Decisiones de La Jurisdicción Especial Indígena 1980-2006', 66.
[0] Interview with local activist (82), Puerto Valdivia – April 2019.
[0] Referenced for the first time in Corradi et al., *Fear at the Edge: State Terror and Resistance in Latin America*, 3.

demonstrate how the systematic repression of Argentina's dirty war produced a practice of non-engagement against the state and its policies rooted in fear, not apathy. In Brazil, the use of paramilitary groups by the state "made individual citizens feel uninformed, separate, fragmented, and powerless".[0] Arias shows that cooperative criminal-state arrangements in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro paved the way for infrastructure and development but also cultivated a sense of fear for the community reluctant to turn to either the state or criminal group for help.[0]

Unlike confrontation, where militarising may induce the state to ignore or dismiss the violent actions of its own forces in order to secure itself in the territory, in subcontraction, the strategy of specialising leads the state to refrain from investigating the actions of the armed group. Formal investigations into links between paramilitary activity around the Hidroituango dam's construction were dropped. Claims made to local government by community leaders regarding threats against them for opposing the contractor's faulty implementation of the Junín-Barbacoas road disappeared. Attacks against leaders who oppose infrastructure implementation like Kimy Pernía Domicó were dismissed as criminal violence and little investigation followed. This reinforces the repressive nature of the local order: where militarising led to communities unable to criticise one actor for fear of that actor's retribution (for being accused of loyalty to the other), specialising led communities to understand that any criticism of one actor would be ignored, or worse, punished, by the other.

A culture of fear is not only the product of close cooperation between the state and armed group but also fosters its continuity. Where a culture of fear emerges, those in power benefit from the lack of opposition and entrench their position. The director

[0] Corradi et al., 190.
[0] Arias, *Criminal Enterprises and Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean*, 231–33.

of a development NGO, who had worked with the communities in Barbacoas for several years, observed how the threat against local leaders who challenged the faulty implementation of the Junín-Barbacoas project had shaped the community's attitudes towards speaking out.

> "The social control of the project meant that they will assassinate them. Those who denounce issues of corruption with a project are afraid of a threat or something like that. [The local communities] are careful because they say that there could be a nexus there that will order them killed. They say either the armed groups or the corrupted government itself will contract someone to have us killed."[0]

The armed group's extralegal violence to prevent community opposition is selectively punitive. Threats and intimidation are predictable to the local community – if brutally oppressive – and ensure compliance from many with the implementation of the project. The local leader in Barbacoas explained how violence was not only a response to his challenge to the road's implementation, but of any future challenges: "When I defend my community they say, there, that is the head. We cut if off and we leave them in the dark and they will think twice".[0] Like the brutality of Nelson Giraldo's death in Ituango, violence is not only punitive but performative. Its effects are diffuse and serves to internalise self-policing across the broader community in regions where the objectives of the armed group and the state are aligned.

Subcontraction has an indelible effect on the local order in generating a culture of fear around infrastructure implementation. Where the armed group can provide deniability, the state is able to exercise its own resources in securing their mutual presence. This requires the apparatus of bureaucratic and judicial exception to run in parallel to coercive extralegal violence in ensuring compliance from citizenry. Producing this fear is beneficial to authoritarian regimes, facilitating "state control

[0] Interview with NGO director (62), Pasto – February 2019.
[0] Interview with local leader (75), Barbacoas – March 2019.

and capital accumulation".[0] Yet McGovern argues that even democracies collude with armed groups to arrange for "the suspension of legal norms that marks the state of exception of the modern state".[0]

Therefore, by specialising, the state and armed group's efforts to intimidate local communities combines the clear potential for violent repercussions with the uncertainty of who to turn to for protection. Gambetta observes in his study of the Sicilian Mafia that:

> "Threats which are not explicit but only hinted at create an atmosphere which increases the effect of intimidation and the need for protection. If you do not know when and where the hit will come, anxiety and mistrust are intensified; fear becomes hazy and generalised. The acute, almost paranoid, sensitivity to signals which develops transforms the raising of an eyebrow into the most compelling of threats".[0]

Fear is paralytic; it stupefies dissent and paves the way for state actors and the armed group to profit from their cooperative arrangement. A local leader from Porce Canyon noted that this violence had a psychological impact on communities: "people do not act because they are afraid of everyone, so we cannot articulate our problems. These lands have been scarred with the injustices of the state".[0]

The armed group's violence combined with the state's denial produces what Beban, in her analysis of violent landgrabs and statemaking in Cambodia, refers to as the cyclical production of uncertainty.[0] Threats are rarely explicit, assassins and armed actors often remain in the shadows, and law enforcement and public officials use both rhetorical misdirection – by referring to these incidents as distant products of armed conflict between armed groups – and bureaucratic obfuscation to reinforce

[0] Schoenberger and Beban, '"They Turn Us into Criminals": Embodiments of Fear in Cambodian Land Grabbing', 1339.
[0] McGovern, 'The Dilemma of Democracy: Collusion and the State of Exception', 226.
[0] Gambetta, *The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection*, 131.
[0] Interview with local leader (21), Amalfi – November 2018.
[0] Beban, *Unwritten Rule*, 215.

the culture of fear and inaction in the local order. With the possibility of violent consequences lurking in every shadow, local communities under such watchful eyes quickly learn that the best way to survive is to stay silent.

INSECURITY AND SILENCE

In any study of local orders characterised by silence, it is incumbent upon the researcher to not only draw data from those that chose to speak, but those who do not.[0] In the previous section I recounted an interview with a local inhabitant who described his displacement from the Porce Canyon by the paramilitary incursion in the 1990s and how that led to all the houses on the river going dark. However, this insight was not immediately offered in our interview. As we spoke, I had my recording device on the table. When he started speaking of the history of violence and displacement in the territory in the late 1990s and early 2000s, I asked if these events had occurred in what then became the area of influence of the Porce III dam. My interviewee paused and sat back, silent, suddenly nervous. Then he pointed at my recording device. Understanding his unspoken request, I turned it off, and there he continued, giving me permission to continue writing down what he described as long as I did not turn the recorder back. He concluded by recognising that the actions by the Bloque Mineros and their successor groups in Porce Canyon on behalf of the dams' implementations had a lasting effect on the local order:

> "This is what happens normally, even at the national level. We meet with leaders from other departments, and they say the same. We do not know whose methods these are exactly, but it changes the dynamics in the territory completely."[0]

[0] Gonzalez-Ocantos and LaPorte, 'Process Tracing and the Problem of Missing Data'.

[0] Interview with a local leader (24), Amalfi – November 2018.

The displacement and its impact on the community had occurred nearly twenty years before; unlike Hidroituango, none of my interviewees spoke of more recent instances of intimidation or displacement in Porce Canyon. Yet as he observed, the impact of such actions and the potential cooperation between the state and armed group has a lasting effect on the dynamics of the territory – as such, the local order.

He was not the only participant whose silence spoke volumes. Tarazá was one of the municipalities affected by the Hidroituango dam and largely controlled by the Caparrapos, a smaller paramilitary faction that had split from its alliance with the Clan del Golfo in 2017. In my visit there in December of 2018, I spent an afternoon with a group of approximately twenty local pan miners. They had all been affected by Hidroituango crisis that had changed the level of the river and wanted to share their experiences.[0] Crowded in a small room, they explained how difficult it was to pan for gold now that the water had risen because of the crisis with the dam. They were worried about the blocked tunnel and the possibility of the dam – which loomed large over them physically and psychologically – breaking was never far from their minds. They explained that there had been some media presence, but that their reports had been unsatisfactory and that officials from EPM had told various people they needed to stop communicating with the media.

Having spoken already to some activists who had presented formal complaints (including those I had spoken to with Rios Vivos and ASOCBARENA) to the state on their treatment by EPM, I asked if they had done anything similar given their shared concerns. They all fell silent. Compared to the clamour of twenty overlapping voices in the last hour, the quiet in the prickly heat was jarring and their discomfort contagious. Finally, one miner answered carefully: “we have order here as long as no

[0] Interview with a local miner (38), Tarazá – December 2018.

one gets involved with no one. Then we can live peacefully. That is how it is with the dam. Here it is all calm". He paused. Another miner added, "We don't throw water on oil, we do not protest, and we have been very peaceful".[0] I noted that several participants were glancing at the open door to the street outside where armed members of the Caparrapos were known to patrol on motorcycle. I thanked them for their insights and the meeting ended there.

Even local leaders who were outspoken about the victimisation they faced by an armed group were reluctant to speak on the dangers associated with opposing infrastructure implementation. I was invited to sit in on a workshop with local leaders from across Northern Antioquia – as well officials from an international organisation and representatives of the Colombian Ombudsman's office – to discuss the threats and violence leaders faced from armed groups. The convener from the international organisation asked the leaders what issues or activities put them at risk. They immediately recounted their support for coca substitution, opposition to armed group presence and human rights abuses, and opposition to the high levels of extortion by different armed groups of community members. Other leaders quickly seconded and reinforced each of these points. By the time the answers were dwindling, however, one leader felt they had omitted a key issue:

> "I will say this because no-one wants to say it themselves. We leaders are not only being threatened because of the illicit cultivation, but because of the companies and the mines and the hydroelectric projects. Everything that is a large project also puts leaders in danger."[0]

This time the room was silent. Some leaders nodded; others did nothing. No one disagreed or sought to elaborate, and the discussion quickly moved on to other topics. The leaders felt comfortable in that space to criticise armed groups for

[0] Interview with local miners (38), Tarazá – December 2018.
[0] Field observations, Santa Rosas – November 2018.

involvement in illicit activities, drug trafficking, and territorial clashes with other armed groups. They were even willing to raise the issue that the military at times could be detrimental to their own security, though they refrained from any explicit examples. But when it came to criticise the armed group when its motives appeared entangled with the developmental interests of the state in front of representatives of the state, they fell silent.

Fear of repercussions in what was meant to be a safe space dozens of kilometres away from where they lived demonstrates the extent to which a culture of fear can affect behaviour. The armed group's strategy of specialising alternates performative visibility and violence with anonymity to support the infrastructure projects. As a result, silence becomes a way for communities to avoid violence by an armed group.[0] Silence – and the curtailment of community agency – is characteristic of a repressive local order, a product of cooperation, not competition. Despite rhetoric of conflict and insurgency, communities were aware that over any mobilisation regarding infrastructure implementation hovered the spectre of violence.

CONCLUSION

The repressive local orders I detail in this chapter are the result of the state and armed group specialising during infrastructure implementation. The state has the means to dissuade civilian challengers on its own, but where cooperation is possible, state actors find a useful ally in an armed group. An armed group can deploy extralegal violence to displace communities from land marked for infrastructure implementation or harass, intimidate, or target any community member who oppose

[0] While some in the community continue to mobilise despite the threat of violence, mistaking courage for others' permissiveness overlooks the violent and sometimes fatal consequences of their choices.

the implementation. State officials reduce the credibility of the protestors by claiming they were actually insurgents. Enforcement bodies and judiciary bodies fail to carry out or protract investigations on armed group violence.[0] Politicians and public officials grant companies tender for construction projects with links to armed groups and then overlook irregularities.

While it may not be clear whether the state and the armed group are always in direct communication, as subcontraction is inherently characterised by a need (primarily by the state) for deniability,[0] the actions of the state appear to support and capitalise on the armed group's extralegal violence against local communities. It is in this contradictory requirement – to remain deniable and yet communicate the specific rules of the local order – that specialising becomes a valuable territorial strategy for the armed group and the state. The communities themselves understand that opposition to infrastructure implementation can lead to violent consequences. This culture of fear that silences communities and suppresses mobilisation benefits the state's infrastructure implementation and secures the presence of an armed group, since communities are less likely to denounce to the state an armed group they believe to be working with the state.

While the literature on conflict and civil war focuses on the competition underscoring targeting and displacement by an armed group,[0] an armed group does

[0] The state is not a homogenous actor; other branches, such as the Public Defence Office, recorded threats and dangers posed by alignment between the state and an armed group, or actively investigated these instances, such as the Supreme Court. However, these cases indicate that the state is capable of reinforcing and obfuscating the extralegal actions of armed groups that share similar objectives in securing the infrastructure implementation.

[0] See the following chapter for how a lesser degree of cooperation (Cooption) is still characterised by state denial.

[0] Steele, *Democracy and Displacement in Colombia's Civil War*; Wood and Kathman, 'Competing for the Crown: Inter-Rebel Competition and Civilian Targeting in Civil War'; De la Calle, 'Compliance vs. Constraints: A Theory of Rebel Targeting in Civil War'; Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*; Kalyvas, 'Micro-Level Studies of Violence in Civil War: Refining and Extending the Control-Collaboration Model'.

not solely direct their violence according to a counterinsurgent logic but also a developmental one. Violence is borne out of cooperation and not competition, even if the armed group's actions are cloaked in the language of counterinsurgency and conflict. Using an infrastructural lens is essential to understanding this repressive local order since it is the subject around which silence is spun; without it our assessment of repressive local orders in conflict areas would be incomplete. Communities cannot turn to one actor or the other for help, and instead fear drives self-censorship so that local communities are able to survive development. Cooperation does not always produce insecurity – as I show in the following chapter – but it places little value in the loyalty of the community in the interaction between the state and armed group.

CHAPTER 6 THE COST OF DOING BUSINESS

PRODUCING A STABLE LOCAL ORDER

> "The ELN doesn't protest against the project…the war in Colombia is a business and what we have to do now is survive…No armed group has been against the dam. Maybe they negotiated internally with the EPM to do it and there was money under the table. There was no intent [to stop it] … they've lost their social ties."[0]

Pockets of stability can emerge in the midst of conflict, where there are few – if any – clashes or attacks between the military and an armed group, or by the armed group against the infrastructure project. In Porce Canyon, EPM built Porce III, with contractors, engineers, and public officials presiding over the construction apparently unhindered by the ELN. The local communities were largely left alone with neither the state nor armed group involving community members in their interaction. Yet this was a double-edged sword: on the one hand the community enjoyed the relative peace of a stable local order, but on the other hand they were faced with two actors uninterested in responding or addressing their needs. What produced this stable – though unresponsive - local order?

I argue that cooption – a cooperative interaction between the state and an armed group – produces a stable local order though the territorial strategy of institutionalising. Institutionalising is where both the state and armed group agree to explicit or implicit rules of behaviour to secure their presence. In the conversation above, the local leader from Porce Canyon expressed frustration with how the ELN had responded to the construction of Porce III. He believed that the ELN lost its

[0] Interview with local leader (22), Amalfi – November 2018.

social ties with the community when they cooperated with EPM in the construction of the dam. His rebuke reflected a broader pattern of behaviour by armed groups in Colombia, where groups would take money from contractors and builders, preferring to capitalise on the projects rather than tear them down. As Rangel observes, cooption serves as a credible strategy for the armed group to secure its presence in the territory when they are willing to accept the "looming presence of the state, which could potentially destroy them" so that they can access its resources.[0] The state, in turn, is willing to accept these conditions if it keeps the project from being attacked, with public officials unofficially including the 'cost of doing business' in contracting budgets and turning a blind eye to any payments made by contractors to the armed group.

I demonstrate in this chapter that while institutionalising reduces the incentive for either the state or the armed group to turn to the local community for support, there is no immediate incentive for violence either. The immediate outcome is a secure local order since violence only occurs between the state and armed group to reaffirm the rules and the consequences of breaking these. Yet unlike coexistence, where competition between the state and the armed group incentivises both actors to appeal to the community to secure their presence in the territory through third parties, cooption allows the state and armed group to deal with each other directly, cutting out the need for the community to act as a point of leverage. The indifference of these actors in cooption was most notable for the Marxist-Leninist insurgency of the FARC and ELN, whose willingness to minimally cooperate with the state by allowing unpopular infrastructure projects was perceived –as the plaintive explanation the

[0] Rangel, 'Sleeping with the Enemy, or Putting the Enemy to Sleep? A Theory of Insurgency-State Interaction', 15.

local leader provided above suggests – as a betrayal of their values and proof that war had become a matter of business even between the state and armed group.

In this chapter I first demonstrate the proliferation of cooptive interactions in Colombia, observing how armed groups' rent-seeking of infrastructure projects helped secure their presence in the territory and generated understood rules of behaviour by private contractors, public companies, and state officials. Public officials deny the payment of extortion while simultaneously integrating these costs into their calls for tender for private companies. I then examine institutionalising in more detail across selected cases of cooption in Northern Antioquia and Pacific Nariño. Finally, I demonstrate how institutionalising by an armed group and the state shaped the local order, affording local communities security even as it excluded them from the decisions made by the armed group and the state.

VALUE OF THE *VACUNA*: COOPTION AND INFRASTRUCTURE IMPLEMENTATION

Institutionalising is grounded in the commitment by both actors to adhere to explicit or implicit agreement, establishing clear consequences for its breach. I demonstrate how armed groups in Colombia use the *vacuna* – explained below – to set out rules in the territory, sometimes even codifying the practice, that helps secure its presence. The state in turn integrates the *vacuna* into its own infrastructure implementation process as a way to protect its investment without militarising excessively.

The *vacuna* (literally translated - vaccine), is the colloquial term for the rent armed groups demand in Colombia. Different groups refer to the payment under different names: insurgent groups such as the FARC or ELN were more likely to refer to these

demands as 'contributing to the cause' or 'revolutionary tax'. However, the *vacuna* is framed, it serves as a lucrative income source. The focus on the illicit drug trade has overshadowed the extent to which armed groups can also rely on permeating licit and legal businesses with their interests.[0] Armed groups have applied it to large and small businesses, domestic and foreign companies, and targeted individuals or entire professions. Some analysts estimated that by the time of the signing of the peace accord with the FARC in 2016, extortion was the second largest income source for all armed groups in Colombia after illicit trafficking in coca and gold.[0] State-led infrastructure was not immune to the *vacuna*. In 2016, Juan Martin Caicedo, the President of the Colombian Chamber for Infrastructure (CCI) – a merger of the main infrastructure trade unions in the country – explained how guerrilla groups had profited from the development of infrastructure in Casanares:

> "The guerrillas will identify themselves by telephone and demand 10 percent of the total value of the contracts that the companies are currently carrying out in the area. If they do not do so, the delinquents will burn the machinery".[0]

Yet although it is extortive, when it comes to infrastructure implementation, the practice of the *vacuna* reflected a more cooperative state and armed group interaction. An engineer in Medellin made it clear during an interview that the practice was widespread and rarely reported. He elaborated on how construction companies would be made to pay the *vacuna* when they entered a territory:

> "The *vacuna* is obligatory, there is not a single project that does not pay the armed groups. There are many ways to pay. Sometimes they contract

[0] For an indepth analysis of armed group involvement in alternative resource collection see Rettberg and Ortiz-Riomalo, 'Golden Opportunity, or a New Twist on the Resource–Conflict Relationship: Links Between the Drug Trade and Illegal Gold Mining in Colombia' on the involvement of armed groups in Colombia's gold mining industry.

[0] Neumann and Elsenbroich, 'Introduction: The Societal Dimensions of Organized Crime'; Rettberg, Leiteritz, and Nasi, 'Entrepreneurial Activity and Civil War in Colombia: Exploring the Mutual Determinants between Armed Conflict and the Private Sector'; McDermott, 'Las Riquezas de Las FARC: Hasta US$580 Millones de Ingresos Anuales'.

[0] Monsalve Gaviria, 'Extorsiones Del Eln y Farc Azotan a Ingenieros En Casanare'.

> them [the armed group] for 'security' and in the accounts, they put them down as a security cost. They say, fine, bring me three guys and then they hire them. Or they create a shell company, and they subcontract for rubbish collection, for example. And there is no trace. In all of that extortion everybody uses their own form of *vacunas* or 'voluntary collaboration'".[0]

Under cooption, the armed group could bypass the potential threat posed by the state by establishing clear – and expected – rules that conditioned the state's entry into the territory to build infrastructure. The process detailed above was not only fairly sophisticated at times, but 'obligatory', indicating the state's expected commitment to the rule.

Some armed groups even codified the practice of the *vacuna*. The Law 002 of the FARC passed in 2000 demanded that certain types of licit economic activity pay a percentage to the guerrillas. The law stressed the importance in combating the imposition of transnational extractivism and government aggression in a 'new democracy' for Colombia. It noted that the current "'voluntary contributions' that many compatriots send us and those originating from our own investments are insufficient to cover the needs demanded by the struggle of the FARC-People's Army" and would therefore impose a 'tax for peace' to the people or entities valued at over a million dollars or they would risk kidnapping and reprisals.[0] While the sum of one million dollars seems in practice not a hard and fast rule, the rent seeking practice was especially geared towards large industries such as automotive, financial, transportation, banana, gold, and mining.[0]

The FARC would also diversify their revenue streams depending on the skills, capabilities, and opportunities available in different regions; while the FARC in

[0] Interview with engineer (27), Medellin – November 2018.

[0] FARC-EP, 'Law 002: On Taxation'.

[0] Verdad Abierta, 'Radiografía de Las Extorsiones de Las Farc'; As part of the peace agreement with the Colombian state, FARC leader Rodrigo Londoño (alias 'Timochenko') ordered in July 2016 the suspension of all "taxes on all legal economic activity in the regions".

completely isolated areas tended to profit from coca production and trafficking, FARC fronts that came more into contact with development and industrialisation turned to extortion as a key source of funding.[0] The revenue stream from these rents fortified the FARC and other armed groups in holding territories; it increased their military capacity and expanded their finances.[0] By the time of the FARC's demobilisation in 2017, the FARC would normally charge 10 to 15 percent of the value of the infrastructure contract to allow the work to move forward.[0] The various contracts for Hidroituango in 2011 alone accounted for approximately USD $170 million,[0] while the total cost of the project was approximately USD $3.8 billion. Even if the FARC were to levy a tax on only some of those contracts for some of the years (the ones with the most physical presence in the territory such as the workers camp, the construction of the dam wall, and the construction of various roads and tunnel) the financial benefit would still be significant.

While not every project could produce such huge sums, the financial benefits of the *vacuna* were difficult to ignore. An analyst from a national NGO that had worked in Ituango explained that for armed groups, it was much "more profitable to extort contractors that are doing work in the territory", and that even compared to other revenue streams such as coca production and trafficking and illicit gold mining, extortion of these companies was a process that needed very little "initial investment".[0] The lucrative appeal of the *vacuna* did not mean that the armed group gave up other forms of income, but it did become an important revenue stream that they were loath to relinquish.

[0] Alsema, 'Colombia's 10 Top Corporations, or Mafia Organizations?'
[0] Estrada, 'Progresividad e Impuesto de Guerra: Análisis de La Ley 002 de Las Farc Después de 10 Años'.
[0] McDermott, 'Las Riquezas de Las FARC: Hasta US$580 Millones de Ingresos Anuales'.
[0] EPM, 'Valorizacion de Contratos Recibidos Para Hidroituango'.
[0] Interview with NGO analyst (7), Bogota – September 2018.

The *vacuna* was also not the remit of any particular group or any specific ideology. Paramilitary and other armed groups also collected *vacuna* and some semi-formalised the practice.[0] After the engineer in Medellin explained the process of charging *vacuna*, he explained that such practices were not just ubiquitous but also existential: 'it's all the same whether they are 'parracos' [paramilitary] or guerrilla," he concluded, with the *vacuna* "they survive".[0] And as the state becomes more invested in the infrastructural development of its peripheries, "the more possibilities for illegal armed actors to capture resources through extortions from the contracting companies".[0] In Nariño, one of the heads of the Espriella-Rio Mataje road project was unphased by the *vacunas*; that, he explained, was "how the armed groups finance themselves; blackmailing, vaccinating, charging bribes, extorting".[0] Regardless of the group's ideology or motivation, *vacuna* was a lucrative source of income for their activity in the territory, and so ubiquitous it was normalised by other actors, including state actors working on infrastructure projects.

Yet the *vacuna* not only secures the armed group's presence in the territory by ensuring a valuable source of revenue. It also incentivises state actors to pay the *vacuna* as a way of preventing attacks against infrastructure. During internal armed conflict, the state's presence across its sovereign territories is uneven at best and must deploy its resources strategically.[0] This means that as long as state actors takes such payments to deter attack (requiring the armed group committing to its part in the

[0] McDougall, 'State Power and Its Implications for Civil War Colombia', 338; Gutiérrez-Sanín, 'Telling the Difference: Guerrillas and Paramilitaries in the Colombian War'.

[0] Interview with engineer (32, Medellin – November 2018.

[0] Massé and Camargo, 'Actores Armados Ilegales y Sector Extractivo En Colombia', 6. Interview with independent analyst (5), Bogota – September 2018.

[0] Interview with engineer (56), Pasto – February 2019.

[0] Staniland, 'States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders'; Mampilly, *Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War*; Fearon and Laitin, 'Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War'; Wickham-Crowley, 'The Rise (And Sometimes Fall) of Guerrilla Governments in Latin America'.

arrangement to avoid attacking if paid) there is no incentive to deploy both financial and military resources to a territory. If the state is to try to militarise to secure its territorial presence, it would negate any gains made by institutionalising since the armed group would become concerned with the existential threat against it and no longer restrict its attacks (engaging in a military territorial strategy as I describe in Chapter 4). Any financial investment the state makes in paying off the armed group is lost. Therefore, as long as the armed group has the state paying to build infrastructure in peace, it has little reason to believe the state will militarise against it, thereby reducing any risk to the armed group's territorial presence.

Under cooption, the state institutionalises by using its private and public actors to navigate the complicated legalities of paying the *vacuna* and avoiding attacks or clashes with the armed group. A conversation with a senior official at a central development bank illustrated its double-sided nature. He made clear that the 'public' side of the project (placing the call for tender, providing the budget, and managerial oversight) was not informed of any type of extortion or blackmail being paid by the private side of the partnership (carrying out the construction on the ground). The official explained that if anyone were made aware that armed group were attempting to extort money from the private company, then the project would be halted. Any indication of paying a *vacuna* meant the officials were legally obligated to report it to the police because if "we find out then we cannot allow it because it is a crime to collaborate with the armed group".[0] Yet later when I asked about the cost of the vacuna the same official made clear how the cost of implementing infrastructure in conflict areas might have to take into account additional expenses:

> "We cannot cost the risk of the *vacuna* because that is illegal, but there is a higher administrative cost, such as cost of security, energy, marginal

[0] Interview with senior public official (44), Bogota – February 2019.

> costs to be able to carry out the project. Sometimes for unqualified labour without construction experience." [0]

These allusions to unqualified labour without construction experience reflected the same tactic the engineer detailed above for how the armed group would charge the *vacuna*. While the contractors on the ground might not report any incidents, the payment of the *vacuna* to access and work peacefully is built into the budgeting of the infrastructure project overseen by public officials. Another official in the same development bank explained that the contractors who carry out infrastructure projects in conflict areas must "assume the risk of these construction and factor into the cost the presence of the armed group before starting the project".[0]

The understanding that the *vacuna* is part of the cost while also acknowledging the illegality of payment is why the private and public nature of the partnership matters. An engineer with a consulting firm in Medellin explained how the private nature of the contractors mattered to the state's strategy of institutionalisation:

> "Many of the projects are with public contractors. They have to negotiate; they always had an assessor who went to negotiate [with the armed group]. This is included in the cost of the project, very informally. The more private the contractor the more difficult it is to see these practices".[0]

The private nature of the contractor reduces the visibility of the negotiations conducted for access with an armed group. In turn, state officials could claim to not know for certain if such practices were taking place even while admitting that any additional costs of doing business in these territories was integrated into the budget. Internalising the *vacuna* into its own institutional practice allowed the state to commit to a strategy of institutionalisation to secure its presence. Through implicit

[0] Ibid.

[0] Interview with project manager (3) Bogota – September 2018; interview with senior public official (44), Bogota – February 2019.

[0] Interview with engineer (40), Medellin – January 2019.

arrangements between public officials and private contractors to pay the *vacuna*, the state could continue implementing infrastructure without interference from the armed group.

If the state considered the armed group too great a threat or that payment would not suffice for securing its territorial presence, then it would either resort to other strategies or remove itself from the territory entirely[0] – taking its lootable resources with it. Therefore, the armed group has an incentive to not attack at will or demand too much of the state. In turn the armed group benefits from the arrival of the infrastructure project with some justified expectation that state actors would not also attempt to militarise against them to secure the project if they were already paying.

TRACING A STRATEGY OF INSTITUTIONALISING

In the following sections I demonstrate in more detail how institutionalising disincentivises violence by both actors. This interaction produces a set of rules for both the state and the armed group to follow in order for the arrangement to hold and for each to retain their territorial presence. I then demonstrate that neither actor has incentive to victimise the community when institutionalising to secure their territorial presence, but also no incentive to respond to community needs over the benefits provided by institutionalising. As a result, the local order affords communities some security but little agency. Community members who actively oppose a project or seek a change the implementation find the state and the armed group indifferent to their interests.

[0] Giraudy and Luna, 'Unpacking the State's Uneven Territorial Reach: Evidence from Latin America', 102; Herbst, *States and Power in Africa*.

TABLE 10. CASES OF COOPTION

Municipality	Department	Timeframe	Infrastructure Type	Dyadic Interaction
Amalfi/Anorí	Antioquia	2006-2016	Hydroelectric dam (Porce III)	Public Company - FARC Public Company- ELN
Ituango and surrounding municipalities[0]	Antioquia	2013-2019	Hydroelectric dam (Hidroituango)	Public Company – FARC Public Company - FARC Dissidents (18th Front)
Tumaco	Nariño	2018	Electrification (Tumaco)	Departmental Government- FARC Dissidents (GUP)
Tumaco	Nariño	2014-2018	Secondary Road (Espriella- Río Mataje)	National Government- FARC National Government - FARC Dissidents (FOS)

The additional case selected in this chapter, compared to the previous two, helps highlight the ubiquity of this type of interaction. Cooption and its local impact is underexplored in the literature of armed conflict,[0] as discussed in the Case Selection section in Chapter 2 Research Design.

SHOULD I STAY, OR SHOULD I GO? COOPTION AND INSTITUTIONALISING

An armed group and the state institutionalise across multiple projects and appear committed to certain rules of engagement, at times even despite a history of competition between them. Even though the inception of the Porce III project in Northern Antioquia in 2003 produced a confrontational interaction between the

[0] See previous chapter for more details on the area of influence of the dam, and inclusion of the municipality of Tarazá.

[0] Kalyvas, 'Micro-Level Studies of Violence in Civil War: Refining and Extending the Control-Collaboration Model', 662; Zürcher, 'What Do We (Not) Know about Development Aid and Violence? A Systematic Review', 518.

FARC and ELN against the state (with its allies in the Bloque Metro), it did not remain competitive. By 2005, the demobilisation of the Bloque Metro was underway and pressure on the FARC and ELN in this territory lessened. The FARC in particular were able to take back a significant amount of territory and both groups regained territorial control.[0] For the remainder of the construction of Porce III, the ELN and the FARC were not facing the same active threat as they had at the project's inception.

Although the military was still stationed near the project, and the soldiers would often patrol the roads and accompany contractors, a local leader explained that the military's lack of knowledge of the territory compared to that of the guerrillas had become more apparent, so the military did not try to venture too far from the project itself and it remained more active in small pockets of territory though the construction of the dam extended much further and covered more territory.[0] Another local leader from the Canyon explained that this meant: "the company [EPM] still had to pay the armed groups even if they have soldiers guarding this [Porce III dam]".[0] Therefore, even the presence of the military – one indicator of confrontation – does not necessarily mean that the state and the armed group interacted competitively.

In Ituango, the competitive interaction between the FARC's 18th Front and the state (implementing the project through EPM with military accompaniment) had also shifted by 2013. The state's militarising of the territory (examined in Chapter 4 Confrontation) had not removed the FARC which remained ensconced in the mountains around the dam while the Colombian military patrolled the urban areas of

[0] Interview with local leader (21) Amalfi – November 2018; Aramburo Siegert et al., 'Norte - Desarrollo Regional: Una Tarea Comúnuna Universidad-Región', 119.

[0] Interview with local leader (21) Amalfi – November 2018; interview with local leader (25), Amalfi – November 2018.The construction of these projects, as discussed previously, are not limited to the very physical site of construction, but also on the road networks, campsites for laborers, and exploratory assessments and surveying parties that are all part of the implementation process.

[0] Interview with local leader (25), Amalfi – November 2018.

Ituango as did FARC militias that operated in the villages.[0] Under the control of alias "Molina", FARC combatants monitored who entered the urban areas while the soldiers patrolled the centre square and surrounding streets of Ituango during the day, but did not venture further for fear of attack and retreated into the barracks after dark, when the FARC had a curfew that threatened to kill anyone outside after 8pm.[0] This interaction, while not completely absent of competition, minimised the immediate threat that the armed group and the state posed towards each other and allowed the second structure of the 36th Front under the command of alias "el Flaco" to take charge of trafficking, kidnappings, and extortion of businesses in or moving through the territory in the municipalities of Ituango, San Andres de Cuerquia, and Toledo – all central points of transportation and movement for contractors and material for the Hidroituango dam.[0] In these territories the FARC reportedly began to extort the dam's construction by 2013,[0] signaling a shift emerging from the previously confrontational interaction to one of cooption.

The state and armed group also deployed a territorial strategy of institutionalising in the initial construction of the road from Espriella to Rio Mataje in the department of Nariño. The road was meant to begin construction in 2002, but its implementation did not start until 2014, when peace talks between the Colombian government and the FARC minimised the confrontational interaction.[0] However, the FARC were not entirely welcoming of the state and appeared to monitor who had access to the

[0] FIP, 'Dinámicas Del Conflicto Armado En El Nudo Del Paramillo y Su Impacto Humanitario', 22–24; interview with local teachers (18), Ituango - November 2018; interview with local leader (16), Ituango - November 2018.

[0] FIP, 22–24.

[0] Ibid, 23.

[0] Gualdrón, 'Farc Ven a Hidroituango Como Una Seria Amenaza'; Defensoría del Pueblo, 'Alerta Temprana Para San Andres de La Cuenca'; Interview with local activist (82), Puerto Valdivia – April 2019; Interview with local teachers (18), Ituango - November 2018; Interview with local activist (16), Ituango - November 2018.

[0] Interview with civil servant (57), Pasto – February 2019; Interview with local leader (81), Tumaco – March 2019.

territory. An engineer for INVIAS, the national Institute of Roads that had taken over the project in 2014 explained that "the [FARC] gives the orders, even with the military presence there the work can still be stopped. The military is not constant and cannot be everywhere",[0] much like the leader in Porce had reflected. Militarising had failed to secure the state's territorial presence, but the interaction also did not appear to be characterised by existential threat. Instead, the engineer admitted that contractors were most likely paying the FARC for the project to continue safely, as well as the FARC dissident group (FOS) that emerged right after the group's demobilisation in 2017.[0]

Similarly, the electrification of Tumaco on the Pacific Coast of Nariño in 2018 also demonstrated the lack of confrontation when state actors and an armed group – this time the FARC dissident group the United Guerrilla of the Pacific (GUP) – engaged in institutionalising. Although the military was initially brought in at the beginning of the project, they did not stay long, and the contractors continued operating in the territory by paying the GUP.[0] The strategy was geared at securing each other's presence and therefore deterred violence or clashes between the state and armed group.

In cooption, state and armed group institutionalise rather than militarise to secure their respective presence and interests in the territory. The state is willing to pay – most often through private contractors – and incentivised not to launch a military contest against an armed group because it risks bringing the project to a halt. In turn, the armed group can continue to enjoy some de facto control of strategic territory and

[0] Interview with engineer (59), Pasto – February 2019.
[0] Interview with engineer (59), Pasto – February 2019; Interview with contractor (69), Pasto – March 2019.
[0] Interview with regional leader (67), Tumaco – March 2019.

minimise the uncertainty of its survival through an arrangement – if still coercive – with the state.

The armed group's credibility in limiting violence matters more when the state and its contractors are the actors being extorted. Unlike local inhabitants, the state is more capable of withdrawing its presence from the territory if the pressure of extortion becomes too high or sending in military reinforcement to protect the project against extortion if required.[0] Therefore, the armed group has a more delicate balance to strike when coopting the state's infrastructure projects; this pressure generates a territorial strategy of institutionalising that suits, though imperfectly, the interests of both parties.

Breakdowns and renegotiation: Institutionalising consequences

When violence does emerge under cooption, it is a result of a failure by either actor – though often the state – to adhere to the implicit arrangement rather than the objective of the state and armed group's territorial strategy. In this section I demonstrate how an attack by an armed group against state actors and the infrastructure project is an indicator of cooption, rather than confrontation. When combined with additional indicators such as evidence of payment demanded by an armed group, refusal to pay by the state, or indicators that the state actors later paid (see Chapter 2 Research Design on how indicators should be combined to increase the robustness of the identification), this interaction is identified as cooption. A single attack by an armed group – when combined with evidence of the armed group

[0] When the state sent engineers to restart the Junín-Barbacoas project (see next chapter for more details) part of the reasoning for sending military engineers was to protect against extortion (interview with public official (50), Pasto – February 2019; interview with social officer (72), Barbacoas – March 2019), though ultimately the engineers and public officials on the project employed a territorial strategy of community appeal to prevent extortion.

demanding payment – reinforces the rules established by institutionalising by serving both as a consequence and a reminder to state actors to recommit to institutionalise to secure themselves in the territory.

The FARC, ELN, and FARC dissidents were not the only armed groups to demand *vacuna* in Northern Antioquia. The Clan del Golfo asserted their own territorial authority and demanded resources from the companies that they had previously been protecting in the valleys (near Puerto Valdivia and Tarazá). This resulted in occasionally misleading reports of FARC aggression against the dam. A former security advisor to EPM insisted that the FARC had been especially violent against the dam and its contractors between 2010 and 2013, and that in 2013 90% of workers had to evacuate the territory because the FARC sent threats against the workers in the valley.[0] However, a local activist from Puerto Valdivia in the valley asserted that it was not the FARC who had caused some of the most prolific attacks against the dam's machinery, but paramilitary successor groups:

> "It was the paramilitaries who were extorting and demanding a *vacuna* from EPM. They were the ones who stopped the work. They did it in 2017 as well. There was another freeze in the construction in 2013 as well because they retaliated." [0]

Either way, the workers were pulled out of the territory but returned shortly after, indicating that EPM had deemed the situation no longer a threat. This was attributed to the payment of the vacuna, reflected in the observations of a community member who lived and fished on the river Ituango by the dam's construction site. She explained that even though there had been clashes between the military and the FARC when EPM began constructing the Hidroituango dam in 2011, eventually the

[0] Former security manager EPM (41), Medellin – January 2019; in an interview with a project manager in EPM, I was assured that she had never in her work on Hidroituango faced any opposition by armed groups or attempts at extortion ([43], Medellin – January 2019).

[0] Interview with local activist (82), Puerto Valdivia – April 2019; also reiterated in interviews with local fishermen (37) in Tarazá – December 2018.

dam's construction needed armed group "approval because for the project to be carried out, it has to be in hand with the armed groups. If [EPM] don't pay a *vacuna* [the FARC] burn the machinery. But if they pay, the machinery is kept safe".[0] In July of 2018 FARC dissidents also threatened the construction for the contractor's failure to pay; while EPM denied making any payment, local inhabitants observed that the company seemed to take its workers out of the territory for a time and returned a few weeks later without any apparent issue.[0] Therefore while institutionalising allows the armed group to collect rent while the state implements infrastructure safely in the territory, if the state reneges, it risks disruption and attack.[0]

A local activist detailed how the EPM and FARC institutionalised when the FARC signalled it would not accept EPM attempting to implement Hidroituango by militarising and trying to avoid the rent that the FARC had begun to demand since 2012. In 2014 EPM had agreed to build a football pitch in the village of Ituango and used the village as a central logistical point for the dam. At that time, paramilitary forces that my interviewee believed were allied with EPM entered the village of Ituango and confronted the FARC. The FARC pushed them back out and there had been "many attacks on the road after that…EPM understood that it could not use force in that area and that they would need to negotiate directly" in order to enter.[0] The FARC made clear that the group would respond with violence if EPM avoided paying by militarising (through a subcontracted armed group) the territory. Once

[0] Interview with local inhabitant (31), Ituango – November 2018. Paying 'for protection' can have two significances, which in this thesis I distinguish between cooption and subcontracting. While the FARC may have been charging the EPM and its contractors 'for protection' they were not subcontracting their services to the company (and by extension the state). The armed group refrained from attacking the infrastructure themselves in exchange for payment. The company paid the *vacuna* to prevent punitive consequences.

[0] Interview with local activist (16), Ituango – November 2018; interview with local leader (33), Santa Rosas – December 2018; interview with local inhabitant (31), Ituango – November 2018.

[0] Le Billon details a similar occurrence in the extractive industries penetration of central African conflicts ('The Geopolitical Economy of "Resource Wars"', 12).

[0] Interview with local activist [16], Ituango – November 2018.

"EPM understood", the FARC no longer needed to attack as long as their arrangement was respected.

The repercussions for failing to pay complicate the identification of institutionalising versus militarising in a territory. In June of 2018, an unidentified armed group burned an EPM helicopter.[0] While local government officials in Ituango claimed this was a terrorist attack by the FARC dissidents against the dam,[0] local fishermen in Tarazá attributed it the company's failure to pay the *vacuna*.[0] It is difficult to verify what was the true motive of the attack; however, it is common for an armed group to engage in punitive action for the failure of the company to pay. In an assessment of the impact of petrol infrastructure in the Meta department, Massé and Camargo observe a similar dynamic where:

> "various sources consulted in the territory have coincided in that the air of apparent calm only meant that 'all of the businesses pay'…The burning of the helicopter and various camping areas of PlusPetrol in Mapiriripan (department of Meta) by the FARC's 39th Front seems to confirm that it was the failure to pay by the companies to the armed group that caused this type of actions".[0]

Though breakdowns in cooption may occur, it is not sufficient to take these violent events as proof of confrontation between an armed group and the state. Cooption by an armed group does not necessarily ensure that violence disappears entirely. Armed groups often deploy limited and selective violence to signal their credibility and re-establish the payee's commitment to the arrangement.[0]

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[0] El Tiempo, 'Queman Helicóptero En Zona de Influencia de Hidroituango'.

[0] Interview with public official (20), Ituango – November 2018.

[0] Interview with local fisherman (37), Tarazá – December 2018; this interpretation was also reflected in an interview with local teachers (18), Ituango – November 2018, and a local activist (82), Puerto Valdivia – March 2019.

[0] Massé and Camargo, 'Actores Armados Ilegales y Sector Extractivo En Colombia', 17.

[0] Le Billon, 'Resources and Armed Conflicts', 35; Williams, *Criminals, Militias, and Insurgents: Organized Crime in Iraq*, 157.

Therefore, the attacks that emerge from institutionalising between the armed group and the state are selective. Overwhelming destruction or loss of life is not conducive for the armed group to continue to engage in cooption and might threaten their territorial presence by inviting militarising by the state.[0] In turn the state had an incentive to commit to paying the *vacuna* because its actors understood attacks were selective and preventable. A strategy of institutionalising by the armed group and the state can solve what McCarthy and Farrelly term 'the problem of violence' if both actors are satisfied with the arrangement and payment of rents.[0]

FALLING ON DEAF EARS: FACING A STABLE LOCAL ORDER

On first look, cooption has an almost negligible impact on the local order. If anything, cooption between the state and armed group fits within a broader pattern of armed group extortion that communities have come to accept as part of the local order. So ubiquitous is this form of rent-seeking by armed groups that the FARC established it as a law. That state actors implementing infrastructure in the territory also paid was no great surprise to local communities. As I demonstrate in this section, although the institutionalising provides neither the state nor armed group incentive for violence (so long as the rules are followed), it also disincentivises both actors from including communities into the decision-making process. The state and the armed group have less use for community loyalty when both actors are able to secure their territorial

[0] One of the justifications for sending the army to build the Junín-Barbacoas road that I discuss further in Chapter 7 was to protect the project from extortion by armed groups (interview with public official (50), Pasto – February 2019). As I show in the next chapter however, this confrontation was eventually replaced by coexistence and the local community became essential to deter excessive extortion by the armed groups.

[0] McCarthy and Farrelly, 'Peri-Conflict Peace: Brokerage, Development and Illiberal Ceasefires in Myanmar's Borderlands', 144; Also see North, Wallis, and Weingast, *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History* for how allocation of rents reduces violent incidents between armed groups and the state.

presence by setting out rules for engagement that they credibly believe the other will commit to.

INSTITUTIONALISING AS BUSINESS AS USUAL

The proliferation of the *vacuna* imposed on multiple actors and businesses makes communities see cooption as the inevitable outcome of new infrastructure implementation. In Ituango in November 2018, as the EPM were working to fix a breakdown that had occurred at the Hidroituango dam, a religious leader patiently explained the inescapability of the *vacuna*. "Everyone must pay the *vacuna*" he told me when asked if such a practice occurred there. "Everyone…EPM, the workers who are trying to fix the dam…even all the buses and the taxis".[0] Similarly in Nariño, an engineer noted that when he worked in the countryside people would tell him "everyone had to pay *vacunas*, if you had a business you had to pay".[0] The obligatory nature of the *vacuna* transforms it into part of the political landscape and local order of the territories. An indigenous governor from Pacific Nariño explained in fatalistic terms: "if they exist [the armed groups] they will always charge taxes from those who are there. The armed groups will never leave".[0]

As previously discussed, armed groups levy the vacuna not solely on contractors on infrastructure projects but also for a wide variety of individuals and companies living and working in the territory. In Amalfi where the Porce III dam was built, this point was reiterated by a local leader from the river basin: "*Vacunas* must always be paid; if it happens even in the city where there are laws, how will it not happen in the

[0] Interview with religious leader (14), Ituango – November 2018.
[0] Interview with engineer (56), Pasto – February 2019; Interview with IO staff (63), Pasto – March 2019.
[0] Interview with indigenous leader (51), Pasto – February 2019.

countryside?".[0] Migdal argues that recurrent practices of rule-setting are what lead people to "consider the state to be as natural as the landscape around them, they cannot imagine their lives without it".[0] If the city is associated with the boundaries of formal laws, the very geography of the countryside is implicitly inscribed to the authority of an armed group. Institutionalising not only produces an arrangement between the state and the armed group but normalises the practice in the local order and sets out clear rules, which at minimum provides a sense of expectation for behaviour and explanation for when violence does erupt.

LEAVING COMMUNITIES ALONE AND LOCAL SECURITY

Institutionalising affords the local order some security. The inevitability of the *vacuna* permits local communities some certainty on how the armed group will interact with the state. This is because the set of rules both actors adhere to preclude the necessity for armed clashes between them, and therefore limits the collateral harm communities might suffer. Secondly, though other scholars argue that armed groups that draw from lootable resources will lead to community victimisation, I show that this is not necessarily the case. The minimal cooperation between the state and armed group mean that neither have any incentive to target the community and the community are left alone.

As the previous section indicates, institutionalising precluded violence producing "an air of apparent calm", as Massé and Camargo describe above. A local leader in Ituango noted that by 2014 and 2015 the FARC would not get involved with EPM and

[0] Interview with local leader (21), Amalfi – November 2018.
[0] Migdal, *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*, 137.

the workers could continue peacefully without being attacked.[0] In the construction of the Espriella-Rio Mataje bridge, an observer from an international NGO noted that "there was never many clashes as long as the contractor would fulfil their part of the deal".[0] In building the electrification in Tumaco, the only time any clashes or attacks occurred it was because "the company failed to pay [the GUP]".[0] Once it was resolved the project continued as usual, a priority for the state in the region.[0] As I discuss in Chapter 4, the presence of armed group attacks against infrastructure does not render the local order insecure for communities. The attack could instead reinforce the institutionalised arrangement and recommit state actors to paying their part, therefore avoiding armed clashes and exposing communities to violence compared to the outcome of militarising.[0]

A few scholars, however, argue that coopting lootable resources does have a negative impact on how armed combatants interact with the communities.[0] Weinstein's theory of economic endowments posits that the armed group's cooption of external endowments (i.e. not community-based resources) leads to increased victimisation against local communities. Weinstein argues that easily lootable resources increases incentive for recruitment based on greed and therefore reduces the armed group's control over civilian victimisation by less-disciplined combatants.[0] In line with

[0] Interview with religious leader (14), Ituango – November 2018.

[0] Interview with IO staff (66), Pasto – March 2019.

[0] Interview with regional leader (79) Tumaco –March 2019.

[0] Interview indigenous leader (51), Pasto – February 2019.

[0] In his discussion of protection in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Raeymaekers observes that rebels proceeded in a reign of terror on the same villages they were being paid to protect. Payment is not a guarantee that the armed group will never engage in violence; however, in many documented cases it does increase the likelihood that you will be spared from negative ('Protection for Sale? War and the Transformation of Regulation on the Congo–Ugandan Border', 10).

[0] Ross, 'Oil, Drugs, and Diamonds: How Do Natural Resources Vary in Their Impact on Civil War', 48.

[0] Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*; Also see Fearon, 'Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?'; Ross, 'How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases'.

Weinstein's theory of economic endowments, Sarkar and Sarkar argue that the FARC's use of easily accessible economic endowments in the form of tax (particularly of coca and large-scale extractive projects) lead to higher levels of violence.[0]

Lootable resources themselves do not doom armed groups to indiscipline and violent victimisation: groups with organisational and disciplinary strength are able to still engage in selective recruitment, training, and prevent combatants from attacking communities,[0] meaning that the strategic concerns of cooption do not necessarily lead to armed group victimisation of local communities. Additionally, Sarkar and Sarkar's assessment of the FARC assumed violent acts like kidnapping and extortion were indiscriminately applied and were therefore evidence of the FARC victimising its social base.[0] Yet conversations with less affluent local community members indicated that victimisation was not as indiscriminate as Sarkar and Sarkar contended. Communities in Ituango and Tarazá indicated that though armed groups – including the FARC, Caparrapos, and Clan del Golfo – would demand a *vacuna* from the construction companies, they would rarely make the same demands of the local miners and fishermen.[0] The armed group finds a more lucrative target in big infrastructure projects and leaves the communities largely alone.

Even more relevant to Weinstein and Sarkar and Sarkar's point, institutionalising provides little incentive for either the state or armed group to target the local communities. This minimal degree of cooperation allows for the state and armed group to deal with each other directly, but the cooperation is not sufficient for the

[0] Sarkar and Sarkar, 'The Rebels' Resource Curse: A Theory of Insurgent–Civilian Dynamics'.

[0] Wood, 'Armed Groups and Sexual Violence: When Is Wartime Rape Rare?'; Stanton, *Strategies of Violence and Restraint in Civil War*; Sanín and Giustozzi, 'Networks and Armies: Structuring Rebellion in Colombia and Afghanistan'; Hoover Green, 'The Commander's Dilemma: Creating and Controlling Armed Group Violence'.

[0] Sarkar and Sarkar, 'The Rebels' Resource Curse: A Theory of Insurgent–Civilian Dynamics', 887.

[0] Interview with local fisherman (37), Tarazá – December 2018; Interview with local leader (32), Medellin – December 2018.

armed group to target the community on the state's behalf as in subcontraction. This meant the communities viewed this interaction as a respite. A local pan-miner and civil leader from Puerto Valdivia explained that with regards to the electrical towers, the FARC:

> "charged these companies [building electrical towers] and there were confrontations because they [the company] did not think about it. But then when it was hard, they would hand over the money and it would all calm down… they did not ask us for *vacuna*. We were left alone, and it was a bit like peace".[0]

Contrary to Weinstein's assessment of economic endowments, the FARC's interest in rents from the contractors did not lead to attacks against the community. Where an armed group and the state institutionalise to secure their respective presence in the territory, there is little incentive to attack each other, or the community, resulting in a local order that was 'a bit like peace'.

INDIFFERENCE AND LACK OF AGENCY

Institutionalising meant that the state and armed group do not need to victimise the community, but nor does it provide either actor with a reason to prioritise community needs over following these rules. This exclusion is most apparent when the community's interests are clearly at odds with that of the armed group and the state and results in their apparent indifference when communities try to express their needs.

Public officials who might have factored the cost of the armed group's rent into the project have little reason to take into account community needs or include communities in the decision-making process regarding the infrastructure implementation. The Espriella-Rio Mataje road project was not rejected by the local

[0] Interview with local leader (33), Santa Rosas – December 2018

community, who broadly wanted improved roads in the territory.[0] However, the implementation continuously ran afoul of local needs, and public officials and contractors were accused of being slow and even hostile about meeting the agreements made in the *consulta previa* (prior consultation) with the community.[0] Like Espriella-Rio Mataje, the communities on the Pacific coast of Tumaco also desired electrical grids. However, the project negotiations for installing the electrical connection were contentious and hostile between the community and the contractors.[0]

If the state appears indifferent to the community's needs in implementing infrastructure, the armed group also appears indifferent by allowing these projects to continue unimpeded. As the local leader's charge at the beginning of the chapter,[0] the ELN's willingness to take EPM's money and allowing Porce III to go forward demonstrated their lack of interest in representing community needs. Local community members in Ituango expressed a similar sentiment against the FARC for having reached an under-the-table agreement with EPM. A local teacher in Ituango, who criticised the Hidroituango dam "as a strategy of domination of the population" also critiqued the FARC, saying that "while they spoke out against the dam, as long as the *vacuna* was paid, the project continued".[0] Even third-party observers noticed the

[0] Interview with local leader (81), Tumaco – March 2019; interview with IO staff (61) Pasto – February 2019.

[0] Interview with IO staff (61) Pasto – February 2019; interview with IO staff (68), Pasto – March 2019. the state's apparent indifference to the needs of the local community also manifested itself in the attitudes of the project managers. In interviews, one of the state officials heading the project made clear his hostility to the local community's demands, complaining that "they [the local communities] all have their own interests and want their piece of [the project] …the problem is the consulta previa, the law protects the blacks and the indigenous too much" (Interview with public official (60), Pasto – February 2019). The right to consulta previa (prior consultation) was enshrined in the 1991 Constitution and required that large-scale projects, including state-led, had to negotiate the construction of the project with protected communities such as the afro descendant and indigenous communities. Most communities in Pacific Nariño were indigenous and afro-descendant.

[0] Interview with regional leader (79), Tumaco – March 2019.

[0] Interview with local leader (22), Amalfi – November 2018.

[0] Interview with a local teacher (18), Ituango – November 2018. A local leader in Tarazá was also dismissive of the armed groups, noting that dissidence or paramilitary was all the same with the dam,

communities' reactions to the perceived betrayal of the FARC. The head of a regional branch of a human rights international organisation explained that the communities in Ituango and areas affected by the dam's construction "accused the FARC of selling their territory to the multinationals".[0]

In the electrification of Tumaco, the regional leader expressed frustration that the FARC dissidents in the territory had not acted on the community's behalf. He noted that even though the community had felt cheated, the FARC dissidents simply "took out the contractors and asked for collaboration and that was all…they have no mission, these armed groups…. they act like they are the kings in the territory".[0] The FARC dissidents – with no incentive to prioritise community interests over the stable negotiated arrangement with the state – took a decidedly non-democratic approach to the infrastructure project and excluded the community from their decision-making. Though cooption could control significant clashes and violence between the armed group and the state (as observed in the previous section on Breakdowns and Renegotiation), the arrangement between the state and armed group did not require either to appeal to the community.

While cooption may lead to some level of stability and provide the armed group with external revenue that did not have to be drawn from the community, when profitability became more valuable to the armed group than community support, this exclusion was a double-edged sword. As the opening quote in this chapter indicates, institutionalising omits local communities from the arrangement between the armed group and the state. The cooption between the ELN and EPM in the construction of

"all they cared about was getting paid" (interview with local leader [36], Tarazá – December 2018).

[0] Interview with IO director (29), Medellin – November 2018. The term multinational here is misleading, as the dam was a public-private project managed and constructed by Colombian companies.

[0] Interview with regional leader (79) Tumaco –March 2019.

Porce III shows how both actors appeared to ignore the concerns and problems the communities faced with the dam. Local communities in both Porce Canyon and around Hidroituango also expressed frustration that their issues fell on deaf ears with EPM.[0]

There is considerable evidence that armed groups rarely prioritise community support when other low-investment and high-return opportunities arise.[0] As Arias notes in a collaborative regime, while armed groups would still try to retain some community support, their leverage over the state allows them to exclude active participation of civil society.[0] For an armed group that had previously enjoyed close community support, this is a perceived betrayal by the community of their professed ideological commitment and a turn to the purely criminal. For an armed group that did not enjoy close support, their cooption of infrastructure represents further proof of their base criminal motivation in the eyes of local communities.

That this stable but indifferent local order emerges from a territorial strategy of insitutionalising between the state and armed group reflects at the microlevel the work done in political settlements during peace negotiations.[0] As Phillips observes:

> "vertically exclusive distributions of power and resources—that exclude most non-elites—may be more likely to augur political stability, at least in the short to medium term, than those that are vertically inclusive".[0]

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[0] Interviews with local activist, teacher, displaced miners, and local hospital worker (13, 16, 18, 39), Ituango – November 2018, Interviews with local leaders (22-28), Amalfi – November 2018, also see Ramírez (2019).

[0] Doornbos, 'Researching African Statehood Dynamics: Negotiability and Its Limits', 761; Arnaut et al., 'Gouvernance et Ethnographie En Temps de Crise', 14.

[0] Arias, *Criminal Enterprises and Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean*, 34.

[0] Lindemann, 'Inclusive Elite Bargains and the Dilemma of Unproductive Peace: A Zambian Case Study'; Laws, 'Political Settlements, Elite Pacts, and Governments of National Unity: A Conceptual Study'; Hickey, 'Thinking about the Politics of Inclusive Development: Towards a Relational Approach'; Cheng, Goodhand, and Meehan, 'Synthesis Paper: Securing and Sustaining Elite Bargains That Reduce Violent Conflict'.

[0] Phillips, 'When Less Was More: External Assistance and the Political Settlement in Somaliland', 636.

While institutionalising permits the state – through its public companies and contractors – to engage the armed group in a cooperative arrangement that precludes violence, this inclusion is horizontal in nature. By institutionalising, neither the state nor the armed group has incentive to include the need of their constituents (the local community) over the benefits of including the other actor into their arrangement. The local community becomes effectively locked out of the interaction and excluded from participating in the decision making around infrastructure implementation.

Indifference and reputational costs

The armed group – despite their willingness to prioritise cooption to the exclusion of community needs – is often careful to keep such arrangements as hidden as possible from public view when they understand the cooption is unpopular. In subcontraction the shared interest between the state and an armed group is made clear to the community so that they understand that opposition to infrastructure results in violent extralegal repercussions. In cooption neither actor has an incentive to damage their relationship with the community, therefore efforts are sometimes made to keep the arrangement (especially of unpopular projects) under wraps. Competition, not cooperation, has the most political appeal for the armed group and the state, but cooption lays bare the calculus made by the state and armed group in choosing between social and economic endowments.

Institutionalising does not mean that the state and armed group have reason to destroy their relationship with the community if it could be prevented. Public officials and members of the armed group demonstrate some concern with the reputational costs of the territorial strategy by denying its existence. To prevent charges of acquiescing to armed group extortion, former President Santos had warned national

companies that they would face criminal charges and international companies would be expelled from the country if they were found to be paying armed groups in any way.[0] As I discussed above, this led public officials to deny payment of the *vacuna* even if they admitted that such costs would often emerge in practice.

The armed group appears even more aware of the local reputational costs of entering into profitable arrangement with contractors working for the state. The FARC, for example, were especially cautious about admitting to cooption as a peace agreement neared. The possibility of becoming a political party and having to win votes – a different form of competition – meant that the FARC's admission to profiting from construction projects would be politically costly when those projects were deeply unpopular with the communities that formed their grass-roots support.[0] As evident by their missives against the Hidroituango dam and continuous rhetorical opposition, the FARC tried to retain the appearance of being on the community's side, even if the lucrative appeal of the *vacuna* was prioritised.

The reputational costs of admitting to the *vacuna* is also noticeable in interviews with top level figures in both the FARC and the state apparatus. The only two interviewed groups of participants who categorically denied wide-spread practice of the *vacuna* in Ituango were officials involved in the EPM constructions and the ex-FARC. In these interviews, both groups agreed that the guerrillas had reacted antagonistically to the infrastructure projects in northern Antioquia; they also insisted that it was their side that had always stood with the community.[0] Advertising cooperation between state and armed group (as it is with subcontraction in the previous chapter) is not in the

[0] El Espectador, 'Petrolera Que Pague Una Extorsión Se Va'.

[0] Yagoub, 'FARC, Mafia y Políticos Presuntas Conexiones de Odebrecht En Colombia'.

[0] Interview with former security manager EPM (41), Medellin – January 2019; Interview with former FARC commander (42), Medellin – February 2019; Interview with EPM project manager (43), Medellin – February 2019; interview with former Minister of Transport (45), Bogota – February 2019.

interests of either – especially for projects unpopular with the local community; an apparent recognition of the trade-off that Chenoweth et al describe below:

> "Thus, state support may be a double-edged sword, rife with trade-offs for insurgent groups. While it may provide violent insurgencies with more war material with which to wage the struggle, it may also undermine the relationship between the insurgency and the civilian population, a population whose support may be critical to the outcome of the campaign."[0]

Although Chenoweth et al are referring to voluntary state support for insurgents, cooption over infrastructure also provides the armed group an opportunity to take advantage of state-led development efforts and for states to acquiesce to keep their presence in the territory.

Therefore, reputationally the armed group and the state are aware that cooperation between the two would lose both credibility. Just as they did in subcontraction, some degree of plausible deniability is therefore useful for both groups. However, in the space between their rhetoric and their actions, the state and armed group make no real effort to include communities in the decision-making in the local order, compounding the frustration felt by communities who cannot turn to either actor for help.

CONCLUSION

State-led infrastructure introduced new revenue streams for armed groups in Northern Antioquia and Pacific Nariño and a chance for state actors to secure their presence without recourse to violence. This interaction requires that both the state and armed group are credibly committed to institutionalising, that the state pays, and

[0] Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, 55.

that the armed group constrains its violence or excessive demands. Otherwise, public officials, contractors, and workers face punitive consequences, and the armed group might lose their lootable resources if the state withdraws. This territorial strategy allows both actors to deal directly with each other and limit the threat the other posed and therefore securing their territorial presence. This institutionalising produces a stable local order characterised by security but offering little agency as neither actor makes an effort to meet the community's needs. Compared to militarising, this territorial strategy does not result in clashes and attacks between state actors and an armed group – except when the one side fails to adhere to the implicit or explicit rules set out. Compared to specialising, institutionalising does not incentivise the armed group to attack the community on behalf of the state, as cooperation is limited only to securing their respective territorial presence, not their shared interests.

Infrastructure represents a contradiction between what Gledhill refers to as the opportunity structures for insurgents – where infrastructure improves the state's presence and reach at the detriment to the insurgent's opportunities – and their organisational resources – as insurgents can extract resources from the implementation of these projects.[0] While the state is able to securely extend its infrastructural power by improving access and meeting energy demands, institutionalising also provides new resources, materials, and actors in the territory vulnerable to armed group cooption. Both the state and armed group gain something from this trade-off. This draws the state and armed group into what Woods refers to as 'cease-fire capitalism'[0] where the central state integrates the armed group into a capitalist system of profiteering through development projects in marginalised

[0] Gledhill, 'Disaggregating Opportunities: Opportunity Structures and Organisational Resources in the Study of Armed Conflict'.

[0] Woods, 'Ceasefire Capitalism: Military–Private Partnerships, Resource Concessions and Military–State Building in the Burma–China Borderlands'.

spaces. The more the armed group and the state engage in cooption, the more entrenched this behaviour becomes and neither actor has an incentive to prioritise the needs of the local communities. This strategy may repeat itself in other industries; in Northern Antioquia and Bajo Cauca where Hidroituango was built, exploration in goldmining by multinational companies boomed in 2008,[0] offering armed groups since a similar incentive to continue to institutionalise their presence with private companies. Yet, despite claims that such extortion flourishes under state absence,[0] these industries are developed alongside the massive state-led infrastructure of Hidroituango.

Therefore, the ramifications of this interaction go beyond 'something like peace' in a stable local order. Institutionalising distances the armed group from the community and reinforces the indifference of an already distant state. Stability may generate security for local communities, but it also calcifies agency so that the demands made by the community are ignored by both actors, much like vertical inclusion suffers under elite bargains and political settlements. Community dissatisfaction with the armed group offers an interesting counterpoint to Wickham-Crowley's assertion that rebel attacks on infrastructure weaken their relationship with local peasant communities.[0] The willingness of the armed group to capitalise from infrastructure unpopular with the community diminishes its standing in the eyes of the community. It is only when the armed group and the community have some competition between them that they are incentivised to respond to community needs, as I demonstrate in the next chapter.

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[0] Giraldo Ramírez and Carlos, *Informalidad e Ilegalidad En La Explotación Del Oro y La Madera En Antioquia*, 6; also mentioned in interview with local activist (16), Ituango - November 2018.

[0] Rettberg and Ortiz-Riomalo, 'Golden Opportunity, or a New Twist on the Resource–Conflict Relationship: Links Between the Drug Trade and Illegal Gold Mining in Colombia'; Giraldo Ramírez and Carlos, *Informalidad e Ilegalidad En La Explotación Del Oro y La Madera En Antioquia*.

[0] Wickham-Crowley, 'Del Gobierno de Abajo al Gobierno de Arriba …and Back: Transitions to and from Rebel Governance in Latin America, 1956–1990', 65.

CHAPTER 7: BALANCING THE SCALES

PRODUCING A RESPONSIVE LOCAL ORDER

> "When [contractors] go in [for the project] they are paying. [The armed group] tell them they need to contribute to the cause. But there is strong pressure from the communities who say we want this [electrical interconnection] here. That makes them be aware and have a conscience and then they ask for less money because if not the project is just abandoned there. There is no opposition from the guerrillas, not even from paramilitaries, because the communities come out."[0]

As contractors and engineers carried out the new national project of electrification in Barbacoas, the FARC dissidents, ELN, and even the Clan del Golfo appeared willing to limit their extortion of the project on the community's request. Despite the state's presence in the territory through its public officials and civil engineers, and even tendered contractors, there was no armed clashes or conflict either between these actors. What drives the security and agency in such a responsive local order?

I demonstrate in this chapter how coexistence between the state and armed group produces a responsive local order – with both security and agency – through a territorial strategy of community appeal. When the state and armed group coexist uneasily in the same territory, wary of the potential threat the actor poses, they must employ a territorial strategy to secure their presence that avoids militarising. As Fearon observes, in guerrilla warfare the diminishing returns of conflict mean that contestation can be drawn out for years and often arrives at an equilibrium where the conflict remains stalemated.[0] Militarising disrupts this equilibrium and therefore boundaries usually emerge that delineate the presence of the armed group and the military. Public officials, engineers, and contractors building infrastructure still cross

[0] Interview with local leader (75), Barbacoas – March 2019.
[0] Fearon, 'Civil War since 1945: Some Facts and a Theory', 3.

this boundary, however, and must therefore find alternative strategies to secure themselves against the potential threat of the armed group. In turn, the armed group seeks reassurance that the continued presence of actors working for the state would not undermine or threaten their position.

Therefore, both actors turn to the community as a way to secure their presence in the territory and maintain the fragile equilibrium between both actors. This result challenges the expected outcome of violence and insecurity in competitive interactions between the state and armed group. The strategy of community appeal, unlike the expectations set by the literature on 'hearts and minds' in development,[0] or theories of defection in civil war,[0] does not have a military objective in winning community loyalty or exclusive community support. Instead, I argue that the state and the armed group appeal to the community to use the community's own relationship with the other actor to limit its most harmful behaviour. The community is therefore a valuable asset to both actors to secure their respective territorial strategy, and as such both the state and armed group make an effort to retain or gain the community's support, establishing not only security in the local order, but agency.

In this chapter I first demonstrate that in coexistence the state avoids sending the military– which might instead linger at the boundaries of the territory – and instead sends engineers, contractors, project managers, social liaison officers, and public officials to not only build the project but to also appeal to the community who distrust the military. The armed group is also concerned with the potential threat of state

[0] Berman, Shapiro, and Felter, 'Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq'; Gordon, 'Winning Hearts and Minds: Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan's Helmand Province'; Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov, *Winning Hearts and Minds through Development? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan*; Fishstein and Wilder, 'Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan'; Crost, Felter, and Johnston, 'Aid under Fire: Development Projects and Civil Conflict'; Sexton, 'Aid as a Tool against Insurgency: Evidence from Contested and Controlled Territory in Afghanistan'.

[0] Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, 279; Arjona, 'Civilian Resistance to Rebel Governance', 3.

actors entering the territory –even if military actors stay at the invisible boundaries of the territory – and make an effort to retain community support. I then detail how the strategy of community appeal is deployed by both actors to secure their respective presence in the territory against each other and show how it shapes the security and agency available in a responsive local order.

This local order stands in sharp contrast to the insecurity communities face in arbitrary local orders as I show in Chapter 4 despite the fact that both interactions are still competitive. Yet in comparing this local outcome to the dynamics of specialising and institutionalising in Chapters 5 and 6, I demonstrate that competition supports the relevance of local communities in the interaction between the state and armed group just as cooperation undermines it.

TRACING A STRATEGY OF APPEALING

To show how appealing produces a responsive local order, I examine four cases of infrastructure implementation in Nariño. In Table 14 below, I outline the details of each case of coexistence before assessing how it led both the state and the armed group to adopt a strategy of community appeal to secure their respective presence.

TABLE 11. CASES OF COEXISTENCE

Municipality	Department	Timeframe	Infrastructure Type	Dyadic Interaction
Leiva	Nariño	1995-2015	Tertiary roads, electrification, and schools	Departmental Government -FARC Departmental Government -OANG
Barbacoas A	Nariño	2017-2018	Electrification	National Government -FARC National Government-Clan del Golfo National Government-ELN
Barbacoas B	Nariño	2012-2019	Secondary Road	Departmental Government-FARC Departmental Government - Clan del Golfo Departmental Government -ELN
Tumaco	Nariño	2018-2019	Tertiary Roads	Municipal Government-FOS

I select four cases, with an additional shadow case, in this chapter to process trace the generation of responsive local orders because this mechanism remains the most underdeveloped in existing literature, as I discuss in Chapter 3. Therefore, to ensure the robustness of the theorised mechanism of community appeal, I assess the construction of several tertiary roads, a school, and electrical grid in the municipality of Leiva between 1995 and 2015, the installation of an electrical grid in Barbacoas between 2017 and 2019, the construction of a tertiary road in Tumaco in 2018 and 2019, and the construction of the Junín-Barbacoas road in the municipality of Barbacoas between 2013 and 2019.

While I did not identify an interaction of co-existence in Antioquia, I include the implementation of the River Amoyá hydroelectric dam in the municipality of

Chaparral in the department of Tolima between 2005 and 2013 as a shadow case.[0] This helps show the robustness of the process tracing, as Tolima fulfils not only the scope conditions for the universe of cases but also the maximised subset of cases identified in Chapter 2. This presented me an equally likely case with existing secondary sources detailing the interactions between an armed group and infrastructure implementing state actors.

As discussed in Chapter 2, including such a wide variety of types of infrastructure allows me to isolate the similar patterns of behaviour despite the difference in project. Public officials and engineers involved in small road projects by municipal governments like the tertiary roads in Tumaco have the same incentives to secure their territorial presence as regional offices to build secondary roads in Barbacoas or national public companies such as ISAGEN in building a massive dam in Tolima. By showing how public officials, project managers, engineers, and contractors all conducted similar strategies of community appeal I show that a responsive local order is linked to the interactions between the state and armed group rather than the type of infrastructure implemented.

LINES IN THE SAND: THE PRECARITY OF COEXISTENCE AND ESTABLISHING BOUNDARIES

In this section I first show why I take coexistence, unlike Staniland's tacit coexistence,[0] to be a competitive rather than cooperative interaction between the state and armed group. Although coexistence is not so competitive that the state and armed group to resort to militarising, the potential for conflict to erupt is never far. Rather than tacit, coexistence is tense, especially when the military hovers at the informal boundaries of the armed group's territory.

[0] See Appendix 1 for a map illustrating the position of the River Amoyá dam.
[0] Staniland, 'States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders', 251.

This tense coexistence can emerge after periods of conflict when the military is incapable of removing the armed group from the territory. The departmental government of Nariño in the mid 1990s sought to build tertiary roads, schools, and electrification in the inland municipality of Leiva, on the Andean ridgeline. These efforts fell apart when the Colombian national government began pushing its military further into the territory to try and win back the ground lost to the FARC. Paramilitary forces entered Leiva in 1999 under the Southern Liberation Block (Bloque Libertadores del Sur). Between 1999 and 2008, violence by paramilitary groups in particular, but also FARC and the military resulted in the death of hundreds of local inhabitants in Leiva and the surrounding small municipalities of Rosario and Policarpa while the various infrastructure projects in Leiva were left to languish for almost seven years.[0]

The paramilitary group officially demobilised in 2005, but many combatants regrouped under the banner New Generation Peasant Organisation, which later became New Generation Self-Defence Organisation (OANG). Between 2006 and 2008 different groups wrestled over control of the drug trade, leading to multiple clashes,[0] violence against civilians accused of acting as informants,[0] and a dizzying arrays of alliances and enmities amongst the FARC, smaller factions of the ELN, and OANG.[0] By end of 2007, after a particularly brutal massacre perpetuated by the OANG, the Colombian military started cutting off contacts with the paramilitary successor groups and began to treat them as enemies.[0] The period from 2007 onwards in Leiva saw increased efforts by the state to distance itself from

[0] Verdad Abierta, 'La "Cacería" Del Frente Libertadores Del Sur'.

[0] MAPP/OAS, 'Octavo Informe Trimestral Del Secretario General al Consejo Permanente', 9.

[0] HRW, 'Paramilitaries' Heirs: The New Face of Violence in Colombia'.

[0] Muñoz, 'Municipio de Leiva (Nariño): Zona Roja, Historias de Destierro y Escenario de Reconfiguración Narcoparamilitar', 220.

[0] HRW, 'Paramilitaries' Heirs: The New Face of Violence in Colombia'.

paramilitary groups and to build trust through non-militarised presence in the territory, with the governor of Nariño reinstating the infrastructure projects.[0]

At this point the military and FARC established invisible boundaries, though non-military state actors such as project managers and public officials were still able to cross. An official from the Department of Infrastructure in the capital of Nariño observed that Colombian military presence in Leiva was stationed at the limits of armed group-controlled territories. In a visit in 2012 to oversee the completion of various schools that had finally been constructed in the FARC-controlled territories of Leiva, she noted the clear boundaries drawn up by the guerrillas and what they permitted to enter:

> "We went to confirm the schools. There was a [state] military checkpoint on the road. They said, if you go past here, we are no longer responsible for your security. I then had to explain [to the guerrilla] that I was there for the educational project so that they let us in."[0]

The military and the FARC established a careful delineation of boundaries to prevent escalation into attacks and allow the project to move forward. As long as the military did not interfere, the contractors and engineers could continue to enter and work in the territory occupied by the FARC.

Both actors established similar boundaries in the Barbacoas municipality for the construction of the Junín-Barbacoas road beginning in 2012 after confrontation broke out initially. The unpaved trail, which extended from the Junín juncture of the primary road from Nariño's capital city of Pasto to its port city of Tumaco to the more remote urban centre of Barbacoas, changed the dynamic between local communities, regional and national state actors, and the various armed groups that occupied the 55 kilometres. Paramilitary successor groups concentrated at the initial entry point in


[0] Jiménez Villabona, 'Leiva, Nariño y Su Relación Con La Coca Desde 1990 al 2014', 63.
[0] Interview with public official (54), Pasto – February 2019.

Junín, with the Rastrojos established since 2006 and then slowly pushed out by the Clan del Golfo in 2014.[0] The ELN, with the Martyrs of Barbacoas concentrated from the mid-point stop at Buenavista while the FARC's Daniel Aldana Front – which controlled the territory north of Barbacoas – also maintained a presence on the northern part of the road.[0]

FIGURE 7. ARMED GROUP PRESENCE ON THE JUNÍN-BARBACOAS ROAD (2008-2018)

[0] Semana, 'Bacrim Se Expanden En El Sur Del País'.

[0] Interview with local councilor (74), Barbacoas – March 2019.



[Image created by author]

Promises by the Nariño departmental government to pave and improve the road to viable conditions failed to materialise. The Junín-Barbacoas road was initially slated for 2001 and construction on the initial sector finally managed to start from 2005 to 2008. At that time the state and armed group appeared to enter a cooptive interaction and institutionalised; one manager on the project noted that the paramilitaries did not feel threatened by the road's construction and instead would

use extortion to allow the contractors to continue, as did the ELN and FARC.[0] As long as the contractors paid, then the contractors and engineers entered the territory without issue.[0] Eventually, however, a combination of continuous extortion and lack of commitment by the departmental government to the project led to significant delays by 2009.[0] It was not until a group of local women mobilised to protest the lack of road in 2010 that the national government took action.[0]

By 2012 construction officially recommenced after a long delay; however, in an attempt to secure the road, the national government also sent in a battalion of military engineers in early 2013.[0] The newfound determination of the Colombian state to address the embarrassing failures of the project led to a retrenchment of military presence on the implementation of the road, even against the wishes of the community.[0] This militarising generated clashes and confrontation with the various armed groups already in the territory, and insecurity for the community who lived there.[0]

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[0] Interview with social worker (72), Barbacoas – March 2019; interview with public official (50), Pasto – February 2019; interview with local leader (75), Barbacoas – March 2019; interview with regional leader (67), Tumaco – March 2019.

[0] Interview with local leader (75), Barbacoas – March 2019; interview with regional leader (67), Tumaco – March 2019.

[0] Interview with social officer (72), Barbacoas – March 2019; Another reported issue with the first few phases of the project was also corruption within the project's management and contractors. I discuss this in Chapter 5 Subcontraction.

[0] Under the name *Piernas Cruzadas* (literally, Crossed Legs) the group, in a modern echo of Lysistrata, went on a sex strike to protest the failure of the state to build the road. By June 2011 the strike gained national and even international attention, successfully incentivising national leadership to put pressure on the departmental government to renew its efforts in building the Junín-Barbacoas road. This protest and the national and international pressure it generated galvanised the state to reconsider its commitment to the territory and to the implementation of the infrastructure project (Interview with local activist (76), Barbacoas – March 2019). While this story demonstrates what factors may pressure political actors to implement infrastructure, it does provide the mechanism that leads to a responsive local order, since the state's initial decision to implement the project was done so under a confrontational interaction, generating militarisation and making the local order initially insecure.

[0] HSB Noticias, 'Creen Que La Vía Junín - Barbacoas Está Maldita'.

[0] Interview with local leader (75), local councillor (74), local inhabitant (73), and social officer (72), Barbacoas – March 2019.

[0] Interview with indigenous community member (53), Pasto – February 2019, interview with inhabitants of Barbacoas (73, 74, 75, 76), Barbacoas – March 2019; interview with indigenous leader (78), Pasto – March 2019. To illustrate this point, one inhabitant wanted to show me the bullet holes that peppered the small huts by the road as a result of the clashes between the military and the ELN

Coexistence emerged as the military began to draw new borders between them and the armed group. Despite their initial clashes it became evident that neither actor could be fully removed from the territory. On a visit to Barbacoas in 2013, an IO staffer noted that the military and the FARC had established an uneasy truce. He explained:

> "When I went to Barbacoas it was the armed forces and then the FARC. When we were about to cross a certain point, the military had a lot of questions for us and then they said, the FARC will ask you a lot of questions. The FARC and the soldiers could see each other from their stations [on the road]."[0]

This coincided with an absence of clashes between the Colombian military and armed groups by the Barbacoas road after 2013 by the UCDP database.[0] The military and the FARC avoided fighting, but the project continued and in particular engineers, public officials, and contractors were still able to enter the territory.[0]

The Colombian military and the FARC also established another boundary in the building of the hydroelectric dam on the River Amoyá in the Canyon de las Hermosas in the municipality of Chaparral located in the south-central department of Tolima. The military accompanied ISAGEN in building the dam, leading to a period of bloody clashes between the FARC and the state between 2006 and 2008, where clashes rose from approximately 85 events per year in 2005 to nearly 180 in 2007.[0] In the same period attacks against the local community by the FARC and the military rose.[0] The FARC responded aggressively to the presence of Colombian forces near the project, considering it a 'trap for the Army to consolidate territorial control'. This also

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and FARC (Interview with local inhabitant ([73], Barbacoas – March 2019). This reflects another case of confrontation as detailed in Chapter 4.

[0] Interview with IO staff (61), Pasto – February 2019.

[0] Sundberg and Melander, 'Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset'.

[0] Interview with public official (50), Pasto – February 2019; interview with social officer (72), Barbacoas – March 2019.

[0] FIP, 'Dinámicas Del Conflicto Armado En Tolima y Su Impacto Humanitario', 22.

[0] ILSA, 'Tolima | Las Hermosas: Hidroeléctrica Del Río Amoyá y Luchas Por El Territorio', 78.

incentivised the FARC to victimise members of the local community who were now seen as potential informants (*sapos*) for having supported the project.[0] The interaction therefore devolved into confrontation between the state and armed group and resulted in arbitrary local order.

These clashes eventually settled into one of tense coexistence as neither the state nor the FARC were removed from the territory. Between 2008 and 2010 the military and FARC had established informal boundaries; the FARC settled into their mountain stronghold while the military established a base in the valley. A FARC combatant explained that at that point, "they can go ahead and build the hydroelectric, but if they 'go up the canyon' we will be there waiting for them".[0] Engineers and workers were able to access the top of the canyon for construction and repairs of the connecting energy transformers, but the military remained at the bottom of the canyon near the site of the wall.[0]

In a strategy of appeal the state deploys non-military state actors to implement the infrastructure projects, such as engineers, project managers, or public officials, and eschews military accompaniment, both to avoid escalation and – as I discuss below – to build a relationship with the community. A senior public official at a Colombian national development bank explained why militarising could prove so damaging when implementing infrastructure:

> "it is not recommended [to enter with the military]. Colombia is very big and if you go in with the military then it is a temporary thing. Because when they leave, things will be worse. And the [armed] groups will then understand the project as a military objective".[0]

[0] Patiño and Miller, 'ISAGEN y La Construcción de La Central Hidroeléctrica Río Amoyá-La Esperanza', 21.

[0] Interview in Patiño and Miller, 'ISAGEN y La Construcción de La Central Hidroeléctrica Río Amoyá-La Esperanza', 26.

[0] Patiño and Miller, 26.

[0] Interview with senior public official (44), Bogota – February 2019. The same sentiment was conveyed by the engineer working on tertiary roads in Tumaco (interview with engineer [65], Tumaco – March

When public officials and project managers avoid militarising to secure their infrastructure implementation against an armed group, they indicate that they do not consider the armed group an existential threat and instead they seek other ways of securing their territorial presence. More importantly, this admission demonstrates that state actors are aware that militarising escalates attacks with an armed group (as examined in Chapter 4) *unnecessarily* when threat is not existential – it is instead bringing in the military that may make the threat of the armed group existential.

Yet just because engineers, contractors, and state officials are non-military and do not seek to forcibly remove the armed group from the territory, they still view themselves in opposition to the armed group. Unlike non-state development agencies and international organisations that might present themselves as neutral in the conflict, state actors were quick to assert their opposition to the armed group. When the River Amoyá dam in Chaparral finally entered into operations in 2013, then President Santos declared that the project had been built through fire and blood, and "against the will of the FARC".[0] A lead engineer for the infrastructure projects in Leiva expressly distanced himself from the FARC, explaining that they did not work with the armed group, merely tolerated their presence.[0] One project manager in a national development bank even explicitly stated that "infrastructure development is like an armed branch of the state – in a positive form".[0] The state's ability to enter and implement infrastructure in territories of long-state absence and armed group control had a strategic significance even to non-military state actors. Though the state and armed group could coexist as neither posed an immediate existential threat, this was not a cooperative arrangement.

2019) and one of the head engineers on the road and electrification projects in Leiva (interview with engineer (56), Pasto – February 2019).

[0] El Nuevo Dia, 'Central Hidroeléctrica Del Río Amoyá: Una Obra Que a Sangre y Fuego Salió Avante'.

[0] Interview with engineer (56), Pasto – February 2019.

[0] Interview with project manager, Bogota (2) – September 2018.

Coexistence is therefore an interaction characterised by precarity. The potential threat of the state and the armed group to the other hovers like a spectre in the territory. In Leiva, the initial infrastructure project was implemented in the 1990s when the military– and paramilitary allies – had not made direct incursions in the territory. Yet though the FARC had successfully established territorial presence by 1992, they were not without potential challengers, as by the mid 1990s the region the Bloque Libertadores were starting to make headway into the broader Andean region.[0] As a result, engineers and contractors working on the projects in the 1990s often had to leave the territory quickly if there was ever any "misunderstandings with the FARC" who feared they might be spying on them.[0] Further south and over twenty years later, the national government's construction of electrical grids in rural *veredas* in Barbacoas in 2017 followed intense confrontations between FOS, ELN, the Clan del Golfo, and the Colombian military.[0] In Tumaco, the FOS were facing the increased military incursions by the Colombian government at the boundaries of their territory under Operation Hercules when they allowed the municipal government of Tumaco to build tertiary roads in the territory.[0]

Therefore, while the armed group is willing to accept the presence of state non-military actors such as public officials, engineers, and contractors to implement infrastructure, there is a constant potential for the state to become a threat, especially when the military is at the armed group's doorstep. Similarly, public officials, engineers, and contractors have little protection against any unexpected attacks by

[0] Muñoz, 'Municipio de Leiva (Nariño): Zona Roja, Historias de Destierro y Escenario de Reconfiguración Narcoparamilitar', 207.
[0] Interview with engineer (56), Pasto – February 2019.
[0] RCN, 'Ejército Atribuye a Disidencias de Las Farc Ataque a Helicóptero En Nariño'; 90 Minutos, 'Desvertebrada Banda al Servicio Del Clan Del Golfo En Barbacoas, Nariño'; INDEPAZ, 'Acciones ELN 2017'.
[0] RCN, 'En Nariño inició la Mega Operación Hércules con 2 mil militares'.

the armed group. To secure themselves against this precarity, both state actors and the armed group therefore turn to a strategy of community appeal.

A STRATEGY OF COMMUNITY APPEAL

The state and armed group appeal to local communities to act as third-party balancers to secure their respective territorial presence in coexistence. In this section I detail how this strategy relies on *both* actors seeking community support to use the community's relationship with the other actor to pressure the other to modify their behaviour and limit threat. The government interacting with the armed group strategically avoids militarising in the territory not only to avoid escalation with the armed group, but also because the community often mistrusts the military and militarising damages that relationship. Instead, it deploys non-military state actors in its strategy of appeal, such as engineers, project managers, public officials, contractors, but also even at times bringing in specialised social liaison officers to explicitly build relationships with the community.

The strategy of community appeal leads state actors to build a relationship with local leaders as a way to avoid potential attacks by the armed group when entering a territory to build infrastructure. The same development worker who had described the state and armed group stationed across from each other in Barbacoas observed that in crossing this tense boundary "having a relationship with a social leader would help".[0] In the southwest tip of Tumaco in 2018 one of the chief engineers on the project explained that the FARC dissident factions Frente Oliver Sinisterra (FOS)

[0] Interview with IO staff (61), Pasto – February 2019. Project managers from a national development bank in Bogota echoed this sentiment, as did a public official in Ituango when discussing small community development projects. All three actors noted the importance of cultivating a relationship with local leaders and social ties with the community to help intercept and prevent interference by armed groups (Interviews 8, 15, 44). Though not offering sufficient data to consider the full case, these insights support the mechanism of community appeal I identify in the cases in Nariño and Tolima.

refrained from interfering with the municipal government's implementation of tertiary roads.[0] Despite incursions of the Colombian military in Tumaco – and particularly around the Espriella-Rio Mataje road as I discuss in Chapter 4 – engineers and contractors made inroads on implementing the project without military accompaniment. A former public official in Tumaco observed that "the groups would allow [workers] in if it was a matter of a productive project for the community, even if it was on the part of the state…but we had to avoid the military".[0] The engineer who worked on the tertiary roads in Tumaco was explicit that community appeal was a strategy of securing his presence – and that of the project – in the territory, in direct contrast to the strategy employed in confrontation that sought to remove the FOS through military force:

> "The army does not give us security. The community, we involve the community in every step of the project: with labour, evaluation…they will provide the security. The military generate clashes when they put a battalion [near the project]."[0]

Project managers for the River Amoyá dam took a similar approach to their territorial security. Before the project was transferred to ISAGEN in 2006, the rights to the hydroelectric dam in Tolima had been awarded to the utilities company Generadora Union in 1999.[0] When Generadora Union began constructing the dam in 2005, the public utilities company decided to avoid military accompaniment out of fear that it might exacerbate the situation with the 21st Front of the FARC that had a long-established presence in the territory.[0] Where ISAGEN was initially unwilling to accept

[0] Interview with engineer (65), Tumaco – March 2019

[0] Interview with public official (64), Tumaco – March 2019.

[0] Interview with engineer (65), Tumaco – March 2019.

[0] ILSA, 'Tolima | Las Hermosas: Hidroeléctrica Del Río Amoyá y Luchas Por El Territorio', 12.

[0] Patiño and Miller, 'ISAGEN y La Construcción de La Central Hidroeléctrica Río Amoyá-La Esperanza', 17. This region was famously the site of the Republic of Marquetalia, were Manuel Marulanda Velez declared independence from Colombia after the Violencia in the 1950s that tore the country apart. It was this armed communist peasant group of 48 fighters that defended the Republic against the Colombian government's attack in 1964 and became the FARC. .

the FARC's presence, Generadora Union attempted to avoid military accompaniment, instead finding other ways of entering the territory and navigating the FARC's presence.

These two public utilities companies came to different assessments of risk, indicating not only the subjectivity of threat perception, but also the heterogenous nature of the state and the actors who carry out its development. As Generadora Union did not consider the presence of the FARC an existential threat, its project managers instead reached out to the community to employ a territorial strategy of appeal. Though the FARC changed their stance when ISAGEN later brought in military forces, they initially granted their approval after the community petitioned on behalf of the project.[0] Across these cases, state actors considered the community a source of security in the face of tense coexistence.

The armed group also adopts a strategy of community appeal in the face of coexistence with the officials and engineers building infrastructure. Before the advancement of the military and paramilitary troops militarised the region in 1999, the FARC in Leiva were confronted with the need to appeal to community needs or risk losing community support to the state. The FARC had established their territorial control earlier in the 1990s under the Front 29, later setting up further presence with Mobile Column Mariscal Antonio José de Sucre. The FARC made clear that they were there as a substitute for the state, announcing their arrival in 1992 with promises about how they would compete with the state and what goods they would provide compared to the state. One local community member recalls:

> "They would say, 'for the good of the community. The state is not fulfilling its mandate, look what is happening, here there is no investment…and they would let us know about the presence of paramilitaries, and that we had to

[0] Patiño and Miller, 17.

> be very careful…they would say, 'other people are not going to be like us, they will arrive just to kill people'"[0]

The municipality at the time had little to no state presence, and infrastructure was almost non-existent. The FARC sought to win community support by taking on the role of the state in a territory that was almost entirely under their control; this coheres with Kasfir's argument that when either the armed group or the state has higher levels of territorial control, they can effectively afford to exercise restraint and even responsiveness to gain legitimacy and continued support from the local communities.[0] Groups that are able to exert control over substantial territory and provide selective benefits to the local population in the form of political institutions, security, basic health, and educational services have more pacific relations with civilians,[0] while an armed group with weaker territorial control that does not provide goods and services tends towards higher levels of victimisation.[0] This supports the argument that that weaker armed groups unable to provide goods would lack community support compared to other actors (such as the state) and turn to community violence to coerce support.[0]

Yet the FARC's warnings were not completely accurate. The state did send people; not to kill, but to build. In 1995 the departmental government of Nariño, alongside a regional NGO, began an infrastructure development project in the municipality of

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[0] Muñoz, 'Municipio de Leiva (Nariño): Zona Roja, Historias de Destierro y Escenario de Reconfiguración Narcoparamilitar', 206.

[0] Kasfir, 'Guerrillas and Civilian Participation: The National Resistance Army in Uganda, 1981-86'.

[0] Wood, *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador*; Young, *Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia: The Tigray People's Liberation Front, 1975-1991*; Arjona, *Rebelocracy*.

[0] Arjona, 'Civilian Resistance to Rebel Governance'; Wood, 'Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence against Civilians'; Wood, 'Opportunities to Kill or Incentives for Restraint? Rebel Capabilities, the Origins of Support, and Civilian Victimization in Civil War'.

[0] Wood, 'Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence against Civilians'; Humphreys and Weinstein, 'Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War'; Robust military capabilities are potentially required as a precursor for other public and private benefits; Weinstein observes that insurgents need to achieve a certain amount of strength before they can provide collective goods (*Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*, 85).

Leiva despite the active presence of the FARC in the territory. However, the FARC were now confronted with the fact that the state was offering infrastructure that they did not have the resources to provide and they allowed the engineers and contractors to enter the territory to build the project.[0] Yet as noted in the previous section, that did not protect against potential 'misunderstandings'.

To address this precarity, the engineers and contractors – both in 1995 and later after their resumption in 2007 – explicitly reached out to the community for help who in turn advocated for the project to the FARC and OANG.[0] After 2007 the paramilitary successor group OANG was no longer cooperating with the state and even clashed with the military (see last section). As the infrastructure projects restarted in parts of territories that the OANG also controlled, the group had to decide whether to let the projects move forward. In this period, the engineer noted that,

> "the OANG had then a similar relationship with community councils as these councils had with the guerrillas…some went with the guerrillas and some with the paramilitaries… [We went in] always with the support of the local leaders, like the presidents of the Communal Joint Action (JAC)[0] committees. We would also work with the mayor's office. Sometimes we could not travel or move around certain times. We would communicate with local leaders and they would advise us. With other commanders it was more difficult. But there was no trouble working for these communities. The armed groups would not oppose these projects because they would also benefit, and it was a good relationship with the community."[0]

[0] Interview with engineer (56), Pasto – February 2019.

[0] Interview with engineer (56), Pasto – February 2019; a staffer at the same regional NGO who came in later to the project indicated that they were able to enter the territory as long as they were 'prudential' and depended on the relationship between the guerrilla and the community (interview with NGO staff [52], Pasto – February 2019), while a public official in the government of Nariño went to Leiva in 2012 to check in the construction of schools and roads and observed that relations with the community were essential to navigating the FARC's presence (interview with public official [54], Pasto – February 2019. Also reflected in interview with IO staff (63) working in the same community, Pasto – March 2019).

[0] The Communal Joint Action (JAC) were some of the primary avenues in which the FARC and other armed groups maintained relationships with local communities across Colombia, and in turn were essential in securing the armed group's territorial presence Larratt-Smith, 'Navigating Formal and Informal Processes: Civic Organizations, Armed Nonstate Actors, and Nested Governance in Colombia'..

[0] Interview with engineer (56), Pasto – February 2019.

As the engineers and contractors returned to build the projects, the groups in the territory (FARC and OANG) appeared willing to allow infrastructure projects that communities desired. The OANG's sudden interest in building a good relationship with the community correlated with the more competitive relationship it had with the state.

The armed group is also wary of the state getting too close to the community in coexistence and try to ensure that they retain close ties with the community. Though the River Amoyá dam project suffered a disruption in coexistence between 2006 and 2010, the eventual boundaries established between the Colombian military and the FARC meant that the engineers and builders still needed assurances as to their safety and did not seek to negotiate directly with the FARC, indicating a lack of cooperation. The company instead returned with a new mandate to secure their presence through community appeal in 2010. The ISAGEN social team began to use the Transparency Table – established in 2007 but virtually abandoned since – to improve communication between the company, the military, and the local community.

As ISAGEN invested more energy into appealing to the community through the Transparency Table, "the guerrilla did not want to antagonise the community, so they cautiously accepted the realisation of the project".[0] The FARC had just previously victimised any community members suspected of defecting to the state when clashing with the state armed forces. Yet, the closer the community became with the state actors – including the military – at the Transparency Table, the more incentive for the FARC to appeal to the community to secure their presence in the territory.

A strategy of community appeal permits state actors to gain safe passage in the territory, constrain the armed group's use of attacks and limit the level of extortion or

[0] Patiño and Miller, 'ISAGEN y La Construcción de La Central Hidroeléctrica Río Amoyá-La Esperanza', 26.

demands made by the armed group. In 2014 in Junín-Barbacoas the departmental government of Nariño set up a Special Unit to deal especially with the road. The Special Unit took several steps to improve the state's relationship with the community: the office brought in a social officer to liaise with the community, provided smaller community focused projects for the Awa, and censured one of the contracting companies for mismanaging their construction and presenting falsified documentation on its completion.[0] As a result, one of the head officials explained, they did not face "any more significant inconveniences" with the road project.[0]

The Unit's appeal to the community not only minimised attacks from the FARC and ELN,[0] but also limited financial risks to the project.[0] Project managers in the electrification of Barbacoas and the tertiary roads in Tumaco also drew on community support to have the local leaders intervene when the FARC dissidents and Clan del Golfo levied prohibitively extortionate rents on the workers and engineers.[0] When engineers in Tumaco informed the community that they could not proceed with the tertiary roads because of the extortion, the community renewed its efforts to petition the FOS to relent, which the FOS did as they did not want to lose community support to the state.[0]

The armed group also practices restraint against state actors as a way to appeal to communities who receive desired public goods while also ensuring that the state's presence in the territory is limited to non-military actors such as engineers, project

[0] Diario del Sur, 'Vía Junín-Barbacoas Lista Este Año'; interview with public official (50), Pasto – February 2019.
[0] Interview with public official (50), Pasto – February 2019.
[0] Indigenous leader (77), Pasto – March 2019
[0] Interview with local leader (75), Barbacoas – March 2019.
[0] Interview with local leader (75), Barbacoas – March 2019; interview with engineer (65), Tumaco – March 2019.
[0] Interview with engineer (65), Tumaco – March 2019; this was also reflected in the experience of a public official in the departmental government who also worked on tertiary road projects in Tumaco in 2013 and 2014 (interview with public official [54], Pasto – February 2019).

managers, and builders. The efforts by the engineers and contractors to get close to the community in Leiva meant the FARC used the community to relay when and how the state actors were allowed to enter the territory to work and when they had to leave, controlling the potential intelligence gathering of the engineers and contractors.[0] This helped the FARC retain continued oversight of the territory to secure their presence. Similarly, when first attempting to enter the territory to implement the project in 2005, Generadora Union approached the JAC to offer them the chance to participate as part of the security protocol so as to avoid the army. The community considered the FARC's approval for the dam unavoidable, since "by obligation, [the community] had to go consult the guerrillas".[0]

While the armed group usually has fewer non-military resources and expertise compared to the centralised state;[0] it can manipulate its coercive use of force in the territory to retain a relationship with the community. In the example above, the FARC's appeal to the community was in limiting its coercive power and providing access to the state when this was what the community desired. In Barbacoas, a local inhabitant explained that the FARC were willing to allow the road to be built but required that the workers refrained from using a camera; this appeared to my interviewee to be a "a very simple rule" that he would help uphold by informing the workers.[0] This strategy by the FARC ensured that the community could have a road,

[0] Interview with engineer (56), Pasto – February 2019.

[0] Patiño and Miller, 'ISAGEN y La Construcción de La Central Hidroeléctrica Río Amoyá-La Esperanza', 17.

[0] While armed groups have been capable of providing various types of public goods, including opening schools (Mampilly, *Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War*; Lippert, 'Sahrawi Women in the Liberation Struggle of the Sahrawi People'), healthcare facilities (van Baalen, 'Reconceptualising Rebel Rule: The Responsiveness of Rebel Governance in Man, Côte d'Ivoire'), keeping factories open (Martínez and Eng, 'Stifling Stateness: The Assad Regime's Campaign against Rebel Governance'), establishing judicial systems (Ledwidge, *Rebel Law: Insurgents, Courts and Justice in Modern Conflict*), or acting as law enforcement (Arjona, *Rebelocracy)*, construction of large-scale infrastructure is much rarer, as it involves a significant amount of expertise and finances to accomplish.

[0] Interview with a local inhabitant (73), Barbacoas – March 2019

the state could secure its presence, and the FARC reduced the chances of intelligence being put in the hands of Colombian military.

Therefore, the precarity of coexistence drives both the state and armed group to appeal to the community to secure their respective territorial presence. In Arias' divided governance, the armed group and state minimise violence between them but retain a competitive relationship; the armed group in this case continues to try "to marginalise police presence" and "increase legitimacy and insulation from state repression" by appealing to the local community.[0] Equally, Idler refers to this dynamic between armed groups (she terms these Violent Non-State Actors), as a "pacific coexistence", where each armed group "strives for the social recognition of the local population in order not to be out-ruled by the other".[0] This coexistence therefore incentivises both actors (in this analysis, the armed group and the state) to limit violence and increase their responsiveness to the local community to ensure they do not lose community support.

While competition in coexistence drove the state and the armed group to appeal to the community in an effort to secure their presence, it is not in pursuit of a zero-sum victory. Instead, the aim of the territorial strategy was to use the other actor's relationship with the community. Generadora Union considered the relationship between the FARC's 21st Front and the local community in Chaparral an asset to implementing the infrastructure. The Colombian National Authority of Environmental Licences required an environmental impact report from the project which was drawn up in 2003 environmental impact report by a third-party consultant firm of engineers in conjunction with Generadora Union and ISAGEN – a secondary partner at the time. The report recognised that the presence of the FARC in the

[0] Arias, *Criminal Enterprises and Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean*, 29.
[0] Idler, *Borderland Battles: Violence, Crime, and Governance at the Edges of Colombia's War*, 312.

territory presented potential risks to the project, but that the close relations between the FARC and the local community presented an opportunity to secure the construction in the territory:

> "the presence of the armed group generated a certain level of 'security and protection' in the region, as there were no longer any fights, thefts, or family abuse. Although this situation could be considered a threat to the Project, we could also think that the coordination and comanagement that are consistent with the principles of [local] participation and agreement between all the different actors involved in the processes in the region, could generate the adequate conditions to ensure that the project is carried out in the best possible terms. It is important to note and highlight the need to carry out a work of concertation and sensitisation of the Project that involves the various social actors of the region, *the ignorance of any of the parties may be misunderstood and generate an inappropriate environment for the development of the Project* [emphasis own]."[0]

Rather than see the community's support to the FARC as providing the FARC an advantage, the consultants noted that the pre-existing relationship between the FARC and the community could be capitalised as a way to minimise the potential hostilities and 'misunderstandings' that might come about from coexisting with the FARC during the dam's implementation. Generadora Union secured the infrastructure implementation against the potential threat of the FARC by leveraging community links to pressure the armed group to restrain their violence.

In the cases examined, the state had not militarily outmanoeuvred or defeated the armed group and the military were often not even directly present in the territory. The value of community support was not in providing actionable intelligence that could defeat the insurgents through denunciations, but rather using an improved relationship with the community as a way of limiting the armed group's potentially harmful actions, depending on the fact that the community in turn had a relationship with the armed group. Whereas confrontation and the strategy of militarising pushes

[0] Garcia Lozano, Generadora Union, and Isagen, 'Proyecto Hidroelectrico Rio Amoya : Estudio de Impacto Ambiental', 3–4.

both the state and the armed group to remove the actor from the territory and prevent the community from defecting to the other side, coexistence and the strategy of appeal incentivises both armed group and the state to win community support but not at the expense of the community's relationship with the other actor.

This challenges us to think past zero-sum outcome of public goods provision based on the idea of a 'legitimacy marketplace' where local communities will allocate their loyalty to the highest bidder.[0] Firstly, these marketplaces exist only in the abstract, local communities are rarely able to enter into governance arrangements simply based on perceived best distributional outcomes posited by contractualist interpretations.[0] If the community provides the state with military intelligence that is then used against the armed group, this jeopardises the not only the position of the community by inviting retaliation but also by potentially making the infrastructure project a military object. Across these cases, the potential threat always present in coexistence led the armed group and the state to use community appeal as a strategy of securing their presence in the territory, not by 'winning' the community, but in a more complex strategy of balancing community support against the other actor's interests.

[0] Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, 87; Wickham-Crowley, 'The Rise (And Sometimes Fall) of Guerrilla Governments in Latin America'; Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*.

[0] For another challenge to this view, see Brenner ('Ashes of Co-Optation: From Armed Group Fragmentation to the Rebuilding of Popular Insurgency in Myanmar') and his work on rebel governance and legitimacy in Myanmar.

TAKING ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITION: LEVERAGING A RESPONSIVE LOCAL ORDER

While the state and the armed group appealed to the community as a territorial strategy, it unsurprisingly also produced a local order that afforded communities not only security, but agency. In this final section I examine how the armed group and the state's appeal to the community produces a responsive local order that goes beyond mere security for communities, or even the delivery of public goods, but can even make space for the active participation of the community in decision-making in the territory. This local order empowers communities compared to all the previous orders I have examined, and communities can take advantage of the competition between the state and armed group to mobilise and have their needs met.

LIMITING MILITARISATION AND GENERATING SECURITY

Coexistence means that the state avoids militarising in the territory or recognises, informally, certain boundaries to its military presence. There is less reason for the state and armed group to clash or attack each other, exposing local communities to violence and collateral harm. This was evident in the case of the Junín-Barbacoas road once the military and FARC had established informal boundaries in 2014. A later report by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in 2015 also indicated that the military presence on the Junín-Barbacoas road did not devolve into clashes with armed groups. Instead, the situation at the time was characterised by a "tense calm", where the army controlled the segment of the road further south nearest Junín, the FARC and ELN continued to patrol further north.[0]

[0] UNHCHR, 'Barbacoas: Un Olvido, Muchos Conflictos'.

As the Special Unit continued working on the road using a strategy of community appeal, the local order remained secure even in 2019 when I arrived to carry out fieldwork. This time the boundaries for the military and the armed group had shifted from the spatial to the diurnal: physical space was not delineated, but rather time of day determined which actor would patrol the road. When I was planning my journey to Barbacoas I asked a woman from the area how safe it was to travel in that territory. She told me it was fine, that sometimes it would be the military on the road and sometimes it would be the armed groups. Both actors might stop a traveller and ask for their documentation.[0] Local community members of Barbacoas reiterated this point, explaining that if one went during the day it would be the military who might stop one, whereas after 10pm it would be the armed groups.[0] Despite the changeover in armed actors at sunset, the buses in Barbacoas ran all night.[0]

State actors also explicitly avoid militarising to build a better relationship with the community, providing the community freedom from fear that confrontation and the sudden presence of the military did not. In Junín-Barbacoas, when the state finally committed to building a road that the community had fought so hard for, it did so with military engineers. One of the head engineers explained that the inclusion of the military complicated their ability to gain community support and why that then led to alternative methods:

> "[The military battalion of engineers] has affected our project because there is always tension when the army arrives. It ends in shootings. It's very difficult to get along with the community and manage our social contribution. The priest helps…the people believe a lot and are very religious."[0]

[0] Interview with a local inhabitant (46), Pasto – February 2019.

[0] Informal conversation with local inhabitants, Barbacoas – March 2019.

[0] This did not mean that violence never broke out in the territory, but to indicate that a form of uneasy coexistence managed to establish itself as long as the military presence was restricted and the threat to armed group existence was not therefore existential.

[0] Interview with public official (50), Pasto – February 2019.

As a result of the state and armed group avoiding unnecessary militarising to appeal to the community, the local order is rendered relatively secure. The local communities do not face either the collateral harm of clashes between the military and the armed group, indiscriminate victimisation by both actors because of their potential disloyalty, or even selective victimisation as both actors are more interested in building relationships with the community than with each other. Even the mere absence of the military in the territory is intended to reduce the fear and distrust communities might feel, reflecting the 'freedom from fear' aspect of how I define security in Chapter 3.

Demands made and needs met

Territorial strategies of community appeal also very directly shape the agency of the local order. Coexistence incentivises the armed group to try to win community support despite not being able to implement infrastructure themselves. In Leiva, in the 1990s, the FARC even attended meetings and at times helped organise local labour for the Leiva road and school projects.[0] However, this direct material support was rare; in most of the cases of coexistence in this chapter, the state provided the resources, expertise, and material for the infrastructure implementation and the armed group merely refrained from antagonising.

However, communities are able to intercede with the armed group's military attacks and extortive practices. When the Clan del Golfo began extorting the Junín-Barbacoas contractors in 2014, a local leader explained how "in that moment it was up to me to sit down with the paramilitaries. You cannot tell us what to do, I told them; this project is ours and from our taxes. They said okay well that is alright".[0] The

[0] Interview with engineer (56), Pasto – February 2019.
[0] Interview with local leader (75), Barbacoas – March 2019.

willingness of the armed group to limit their extraction of readily available resources from the state demonstrates the impact of the territorial strategy of appeal in shifting state and armed group behaviour to the community. In 2008 the community had the same desire for the road to be built yet the state and armed group appeared uninterested in ensuring the project move forward; the FARC would charge rents of the contractors, who in turn were also accused of cutting corners and pocketing resources from the project.[0] Though many of the local communities were initially frustrated with the FARC for undermining the construction, local leaders in the territory also blamed the state for failing to properly implement the long-desired infrastructure, yet neither actor appeared willing to respond to the community and take their needs into account.[0]

When the project began again, however, and the FARC and the departmental government had established a coexistence, the strategy of community appeal provided inclusion where institutionalising had not. The local leaders were even able to themselves curb the practice of demanding the vacuna. In the above example, the local leader's point reminds the armed group that the road is the product of a reciprocal relationship between community and the state, one which provides communities benefits the Clan del Golfo could – or would – not. The armed group is more amenable to community mobilisation when employing strategies of community appeal. In Barbacoas, an Awá indigenous leader explained how they had demanded that the FARC's refrain from mining the road project in 2014:

> "The FARC would come in and out of the territory, patrolling on motorcycle and car…they controlled the territory. Every engineer that came in would have to speak to the commander to enter. Nothing

[0] Interview with local activist (76), Barbacoas – March 2019. See Chapter 4 Subcontraction for more of the state's interests and cooperation with other armed groups around the project implementation, and Chapter 6 Coexistence on the shift between the FARC and the state by 2011.

[0] Interview with NGO staff (52), Pasto – February 2019; Interview with local activist (76) Barbacoas – March 2019, interview with local leader (75), Barbacoas – March 2019.

> happened to those who worked there. At one point the FARC began to mine the road. We all protested that that was not alright. We are very interested that the road project advance for our benefit. The patients were not reaching the hospitals in leaving for Junín. It was a very high priority. The FARC stopped mining."[0]

A responsive local order also means that communities receive the infrastructure they desired. The engineer leading the tertiary road construction in Tumaco in 2018 explained that this was precisely what they communities had requested through the Programme for Development with a Territorial Focus (PDET).[0] This programme emerged from the 2016 peace accord with the FARC to commit to territorial development, where communities were consulted about what were their local priorities. In 2018 the national Agency for Territorial Renewal (ART) supported the municipal government of Tumaco in the opening and paving with treadplate[0] of localities in the southern areas of Tumaco that had been raised by the community in their PDET.[0] This was beneficial to the national government as well since it had its own priorities in connecting these rural peripheries "to the centre of the department",[0] making them more legible to the state. The electrification in Barbacoas was also what the community specifically wanted[0] and therefore to ensure community support (and use it to secure its presence) the state merely had to provide the desired connectivity. In turn the communities mobilised to ensure that the armed groups, including the guerrilla and paramilitary successors, did not demand too much rent from the project. As observed in the quote at the beginning of this chapter, the armed

[0] Indigenous leader (77), Pasto – March 2019

[0] Interview with engineer (65), Tumaco – March 2019.

[0] Treadplate is a faster and cheaper alternative to paving with concrete, although less durable.

[0] ART, 'Pacto Municipal Para La Transformacion Regional Del Municipio San Andres de Tumaco'.

[0] Interview with engineer (65), Tumaco – March 2019.

[0] Interview with indigenous leader (77), Pasto – March 2019; Interview with local councilor (74), Barbacoas – March 2019.

groups complied,[0] highlighting the agency afforded to communities in this responsive local order.

In other cases, the state's appeal of the community leads to investment beyond the project itself. In Tolima, when the Generadora Union SA first approached the community with the River Amoyá hydroelectric project, they had to find other ways of winning community support since the infrastructure itself was not desired. They promised additional benefits and promised the project would ensure employment and improved economic conditions for the communities and even included contracts for additional infrastructure project, such as roads and bridges.[0] Where community support is desired to gain secure access to the territory, communities enjoy broader investment and attention by state actors.

OPENING SPACES FOR PARTICIPATION

To retain the community's support, the state's strategy of community appeal can even extend beyond the immediate provision of desired goods. Especially where projects are long and the history between the state and community is tense, state actors have to make more effort to include communities directly into the decision-making process. This results in the creation of spaces in the local order for communities to feel more involved in the political life in the territory. In Barbacoas, for example, the social official in charge of community relations for the road project explained how he needed to appeal to the community to secure their work:

> "Here there has to be a social bridge. The engineers came and [the armed groups] thought they were here to do an investigation. They would threaten them. They know me and I have more access. You have to ask

[0] Interview with local leader (75), Barbacoas – March 2019.

[0] Patiño and Miller, 'ISAGEN y La Construcción de La Central Hidroeléctrica Río Amoyá-La Esperanza'; ILSA, 'Tolima | Las Hermosas: Hidroeléctrica Del Río Amoyá y Luchas Por El Territorio'.

> permission of the people. They would then ask for permission from the armed group that I could be there."[0]

Local communities, who across these chapters have been threatened, victimised, or ignored, were here asked for permission. By acting as a social bridge between the state and armed group, the support of the community is a valuable asset. This territorial strategy therefore directly affords communities more agency than any other. It provides an opportunity for the community to leverage the strategic needs of the state and armed group to have their demands met.

This agency can go beyond the day-to-day tasks in implementing the project. In Leiva, the engineers did not simply build roads and schools and electrification that the community wanted. They also avoided private contractors and used the community themselves as workers, therefore providing employment, as well as making sure they were "transparent with how we used money".[0] One of the head engineers lamented that since the completion of those infrastructure projects, new oversight of infrastructure projects meant managers were not acquainted with the community and might bring:

> "External contractors where there are issues with corruption. There is more tension between the presidents of the JAC and the mayors, but it is saveable. We just have to have a reunion every month."[0]

The state actors' efforts to appeal to the community produces a more consistent conduit and platform with which the community is able to communicate their needs to representatives of the state. In Chaparral, the Transparency Table became a place where the community could voice their grievances and loss suffered at the hands of the army and the Colombian military leaders would join to make promises and

[0] Interview with social officer (72), Barbacoas – March 2019.

[0] Interview with engineer (56), Pasto – February 2019; a project manager in a national development bank explained that he would also involve the community as labour to build better relations (interview with project manager [3], Bogota – September 2018).

[0] Interview with engineer (56), Pasto – February 2019.

assurances to the community that they would investigate the cases and respect local communities in the territory.[0] Project managers on the dam established the Table as a way to improve the security of the project and their presence in the territory. The Transparency Table itself outlasted the implementation of the dam; in 2015 it continued to host, with ISAGEN's support, discussions on security, human rights violations, and trust with the military and served as a space for discussions on territorial development and improved health, education, and agricultural investments in the region.[0]

The Transparency Table demonstrates how a responsive local order depends on the territorial strategy of the state and armed group in securing their respective presence. The more time passed since the implementation of the dam had concluded in 2013, the less incentive the company and the state had to retain the community's support. Although several agreements were made between 2014 and 2017 on the improvement of roadworks, the building of schools, better energy provision, and assurances of measures taken to mitigate the environmental damage caused by the dam, by 2018 none of them had yet to be implemented and interest by ISAGEN and the state seemed to have faded.[0] No longer facing the potential threat of the FARC against its constructors and engineers in the territory, ISAGEN had less incentive to appeal to the community. The Transparency Table lost much of its strategic value and communities were once again left struggling to be heard by state actors.

These cases illustrate how competition and the desire to limit the potential threat of the other actor incentivises the armed group and the state's responsiveness to and

[0] Patiño and Miller, 'ISAGEN y La Construcción de La Central Hidroeléctrica Río Amoyá-La Esperanza', 26.
[0] Patiño and Miller, 27.
[0] Briceño Alvarado et al., 'La Transformación de Las Comunidades Desde Los Procesos Educativos: Sistematización de Experiencias de Proyección Social de UNIMINUTO En Los Territorios.', 59.

inclusion of the community into decision-making. In Junín-Barbacoas, though community mobilisation had managed to pressure the state to commit to the road through international embarrassment,[0] the state first chose to send military engineers, something the communities were vehemently opposed to. Only when a confrontational interaction with the armed groups in the territory changed to coexistence did the departmental government shift to a strategy of appeal, creating the Special Unit and even employing a social liaison to reach out and build relationships with the community. Similarly, in Chaparral, the state's responsiveness to the community only followed several years of attempting to remove the armed group without success. The FARC shifted from victimising the community for being potential informants to acquiescing to community needs only once state actors started building better relations with the community through the Transparency Table.

Fundamentally, the agency of the communities is still structured by the limitations that the armed group and state place on the local order. Migdal contends that states that have fragmented political control, with competing sets of rules by multiple authorities are more susceptible to political mobilisation by the public since no actor or group can be assured of their monopoly on authority.[0] Communities alone face difficulties in mobilising to make themselves heard: however, when they are able to leverage the competition between the state and an armed group they can capitalise on a responsive local order.

[0] A classic example of Keck and Sikkink's (2014) "boomerang effect" where local activists can incentivise national governments to act by reaching out to transnational activists and international actors.

[0] Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, 263.

CONCLUSION

A responsive local order, one where communities not only feel secure but have the space to voice their needs and have these met, seems an unlikely outcome to emerge from competition between the state and armed group. However, due to its fitful and competitive nature, coexistence results in both actors appealing to the community as a territorial strategy to secure their respective presence. State actors take efforts to connect with local communities and build trust so that community members advocate on their behalf to the armed group and prevent attacks. In turn, the armed group allows the state to implement locally desired infrastructure projects to retain links to the community in the face of potential threat from the state. Both actors rely on the community's relationship with the other actor while ensuring that the community does not solely have a relationship with the other. This mechanism of appeal naturally results in a responsive local order with security and agency for local communities.

Understanding how this responsive local order emerges during conflict requires an analysis of the mundane, the steps bureaucrats and engineers and contractors take to secure their day-to-day tasks. In their own words, the rejection of military support by state actors such as engineers, public officials, and project managers reflects how coexistence, and responsive local orders, are not impossible outcomes in conflict but instead often the best possible approach – for the state and the local communities – to implementing infrastructure. Infrastructure therefore provides a lens through which we can also understand the diverse resources available to the armed group and – more significantly – the state when it comes to their competitive interactions. I showed how the state can operate in a territory by drawing on a range of actors who

can make appeals to the community that the military – both because of their history and the violence they provoke – are not capable of doing.

As this chapter demonstrates, communities try their best to capitalise on the agency a local order affords them to simply try to secure their own welfare and security under impossible conditions. Under conditions of coexistence, the state, the armed group, and the community face 'unworkable Weberian ideals' and do their best to approximate some pragmatic – if not permanent – systems of order.[0] In the following chapter I conclude by showing how these different outcomes in the local order are products of the type of interaction between the state and the armed group, rather than alternative explanations. I then discuss implications and further research for the study of local order and state and armed group interactions during infrastructure implementation. Understanding what produces a secure and responsive local order compared to one rife with danger, repression, or indifference is not simply an academic exercise but necessary to any study and application of development in conflict areas.

[0] Meagher, 'The Strength of Weak States? Non-state Security Forces and Hybrid Governance in Africa', 1097.

CHAPTER 8 INFRASTRUCTURE, CONFLICT, AND ORDER



[Barbacoas March 2019, photo taken by author]

"Development for who?" A local community leader asked me once. It was a rhetorical question. She was under no illusion that the Colombian state's past efforts to build infrastructure were intended to help her. "The problem," she went on to explain, "is that Colombia lacks memory. People do not speak about what has happened and what will happen again, with this effort to build up the country".[0] Her comments are evocative and reflect a key objective of this project: to examine more closely the impact of development during conflict to understand how these concepts intersect and who do they affect.

[0] Interview with local leader, Oxford (11) – October 2018.

This thesis provokes an obvious question: why, in a study of violence, statebuilding, conflict, and local order focus so specifically on infrastructure? Federico Restrepo, a former project manager at EPM, offered a positive assessment of Colombia's infrastructural efforts. He explained, in an interview with Teo Ballvé, that infrastructure was "a detonator, a structuring axis, a detonator of development…it will necessarily induce more industry and more commerce in the region".[0]

Infrastructure *is* a detonator, although perhaps not always as Restrepo envisions it. It produces a physical distortion of land, space, and territoriality, while simultaneously carrying with it the social and symbolic implications of the state. Basic connective and energy infrastructure are usually key components of the statebuilding and development intended to draw conflict to a close and establish more enduring peace. The logic behind constructing infrastructure – to serve as the optimistically termed 'bridge to peace' – understands this type of physical development as "a causal driver of an array of benefits which are thought to directly contribute to economic development, peace, and security for the general population".[0] This outcome – closest to the responsive local order I detail in this thesis – often proves elusive, yet the state's efforts to build roads, bridges, dams, electrification, and telecommunication still move forward in the midst of conflict.

The intersections of development and conflict are often blurred; development efforts and their outcomes cannot be divorced from the complicated landscape in which they occur. Infrastructure projects mobilise a diverse group of state actors (and their contracted private partners) that challenge assumptions that state and armed group interactions are limited to armed factions. Instead, as I demonstrate with the cases in

[0] Ballvé, *The Frontier Effect: State Formation and Violence in Colombia*, 154.

[0] Unruh and Shalaby, 'A Volatile Interaction between Peacebuilding Priorities: Road Infrastructure (Re)Construction and Land Rights in Afghanistan': 56.

Colombia, infrastructure implementation provokes a range of different interactions between the state and an armed group that shape local outcomes.

Through this infrastructural lens, I build a theoretical framework that examines a continuum of interactions between states and an armed group. Infrastructure implementation requires finances and expertise, civil engineers and project managers, and private contractors. For the researcher, infrastructure magnifies state power by placing a lens on the mobilisation of significant state resources, state departments of infrastructure, energy, transportation, bureaucratic administration and private subcontraction. Infrastructure implementation requires significant manpower and official presence to rural regions far the loci of state control. By bringing to the fore the activities of mid-level and low-level officials and civil engineers that are more open about their interactions with non-state armed groups than high level state officials, an infrastructural lens permits observing state and armed group interactions that may otherwise be hidden.

Therefore, I use this infrastructural lens to examine the microdynamics of state and armed group interactions often overlooked in studies of war and armed conflict. As I discuss in Chapter 2, while development may impact local order according to multiple factors, such as infrastructure type, project duration, existing economies, and legal policies of compensation,[0] research has not yet systematically examined how the state's interactions with an armed group shapes these outcomes. I have sought in this thesis to address this puzzle: how can development be associated with security if we do not take seriously the potential variation in armed group and state interactions?

[0] Mcloughlin, 'When Does Service Delivery Improve the Legitimacy of a Fragile or Conflict-Affected State?'; Pearse-Smith, 'The Impact of Continued Mekong Basin Hydropower Development on Local Livelihoods'; Mcloughlin, 'When the Virtuous Circle Unravels: Unfair Service Provision and State De-Legitimation in Divided Societies'; Unruh and Shalaby, 'A Volatile Interaction between Peacebuilding Priorities: Road Infrastructure (Re)Construction and Land Rights in Afghanistan'.

In this last chapter I therefore review the key arguments and findings of my research and how they relate to the theoretical framework I present. I then consider alternative explanations and discuss how my framework produces generalisable insights that can travel to other countries and conflicts. Finally, I conclude with a discussion on the policy relevance of these findings, the implications of this thesis, and useful future pathways of research.

Competition, Cooperation, and Consequences

Territorial strategies and local order: arriving at the outcome of interest

I take as a starting point for this thesis the assumption – articulated in more detail in the broader literature on armed politics – that the state and armed group do not always engage in confrontation during infrastructure implementation. Where any particular interaction falls on the continuum from competition to cooperation determines what type of territorial strategy the armed group and the state deploy to secure their presence. I argue that it is this strategy that shapes the security and agency afforded to communities in the local order.

In Chapter 4 I show how arbitrary local orders emerge from the state and armed group militarising in response to confrontation. The state and armed group militarise to protect or attack the infrastructure project; the state deploys its armed forces as its territorial strategy, while the armed group responds by attacking the soldiers, workers, or infrastructure itself. Clashes between the military and the armed group leads to communities suffering collateral harm as well as becoming the subject of suspicion and threat by both actors out of their fear of disloyalty. However, due to the armed group and the military's incomplete territorial control, both armed actors

appear to merely punish the communities for interacting with the other rather than actually defecting – something the community could not avoid when both actors share the territory. As a result of militarising, the local order is therefore arbitrarily insecure and lacks agency for local communities.

I compare the production of this local outcome with that of a repressive local order in Chapter 5. Both confrontation – the most competitive interaction – and subcontraction – the most cooperative – produce local orders without security or agency. Yet they are not the same order, as a key qualitative distinction emerged in how communities were targeted in the cases in Colombia. In an arbitrary local order, the military and the armed group target the community indiscriminately out of fear of potential defection. In a repressive local order, the armed group specifically targets community members that speak out or challenge the state's implementation of infrastructure. Though this latter outcome lacks agency, silence and self-censorship is a way for communities to survive the local order.

Specialising, not militarising, produces this distinct local outcome. In a closely cooperative interaction, the state and armed group have no reason to perceive the other as a threat and can instead focus on using their comparative advantage to secure their shared territorial presence. While the state can deploy law enforcement and judicial institutions, and public officials and heads of public utility companies take advantage of access to official media platforms, the armed group can deploy extralegal violence. This violence provides the state with plausible deniability even as state actors refuse or fail to investigate its use, thereby protecting the armed group. This violence is therefore geared at local communities who attempt to block or mobilise against the implementation of state-led infrastructure projects.

In Chapter 6 Cooption I demonstrate how cooperation results in a stable local order: without agency but with security for local communities. I show how the armed group and the state institutionalise around infrastructure implementation to secure their respective presence by committing to explicit or implicit rules of engagement. The armed group demands a fee for contractors to build infrastructure without interference. Public officials rely on private contractors to pay this fee quietly, while informally including the payment into the cost of the project. This strategy of institutionalising limits the necessity for violence between the two actors and offers no incentive to target the local communities. However, like specialising, institutionalising means the state and armed group have no reason to prioritise community support. As such, although this stable local order is secure, it affords little agency to local communities.

Finally, in Chapter 7, I examine what interaction during infrastructure implementation leads to a local order with both security and agency, and through what mechanism. I demonstrate that coexistence – as the state and armed group represents a potential threat to the other, leads to a responsive local order through the territorial strategy of community appeal. To deter this potential threat, the armed group limits its military actions in the territory and allows the implementation of community-desired infrastructure, while the state deploys non-military actors such as public officials, engineers, project managers and even special social liaison officers to build relationships with the community. This strategy is not an attempt by either actor to 'win' the community at the expense of the other, but rather use the community's relationship with the other to limit the other's potential harmful actions. As a result, not only do the state and armed group limit their use of violence, producing a secure local order, but the community is able to take advantage of the

agency of the local order to mobilise, make their demands, and have these met by both actors.

IDENTIFYING THE MECHANISM AND ADDRESSING ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

I identify territorial strategies generated by armed group and state interactions as the key causal mechanism in producing local order. These strategies are generated by the degree of competition or cooperation between the armed group and the state for both to secure their presence in the territory. By process tracing each interaction and its impact on the local order, I not only compare between territorial strategies in producing different local orders, but also address other explanations for these distinct outcomes. In testing an explanation against its most powerful rival, I increase the confidence in its credibility.[0]

The alternative explanations I wish to focus on in this section are those that address the outcomes of repressive, stable, and responsive local orders. Arbitrary local order is the most expected outcome of state and armed group interactions. The mechanism of militarising is taken from the study of territorial dynamics of violence in explaining victimisation of communities by the armed group and the military.[0] This dyadic explanation for understanding the subnational variation in violence during conflict has been broadly accepted by the literature on armed conflict and in Chapter 4 I show how it can be explicitly applied to militarising development as well.

However, as I demonstrate in Chapter 5 on subcontraction, this explanation of territorial competition and concern with community loyalties does not capture all the

[0] Bennett and Checkel, 'Process Tracing', 24; Beach and Pedersen, *Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines*.

[0] Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*; Balcells, *Rivalry and Revenge: The Politics of Violence during Civil War*; Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay, '"Draining the Sea": Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare'; Downes, 'Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: The Causes of Civilian Victimization in War'.

incentives armed actors have to target local communities during conflict. Research on subcontraction and cooperative relations between states and armed groups takes the main explanation for community victimisation to be counterinsurgency efforts.[0] Yet the cases in Chapter 5 show that displacement and attacks against community leaders in the midst of armed conflict are not always best explained by competition, but by cooperation. Specialising, rather than militarising, leads to communities experiencing selective violence by an armed group that appears to be supported by state actors.

Even more interesting in the study of armed conflict is not the explanations for why violence occurs but why it does not. In the same theory of territorial control discussed before, restraint is a product of territorial monopoly; armed groups that are secure in their territorial control against the state can afford to exercise restraint towards civilians.[0] Yet in Chapter 6 I show that the local order can be secure not because there is no overlapping presence of the state and armed group but because institutionalising by the two actors precludes any need for violence and produces stability. In Chapter 6 I argue that this brings the dynamics of elite pacts and political settlements to the micro-level in explaining how interactions between the state and armed group can simultaneously stabilise an environment while excluding civil society. Brief instances of violence by the armed group and the state are best explained not by militarising, but rather as a punitive response by the armed group against contractors for failing to pay (and these attacks also do not necessarily represent insecurity for local communities as I discuss in Chapter 4 and 6).

[0] Berti, 'From Cooperation to Competition: Localization, Militarization and Rebel Co-Governance Arrangements in Syria'; Day and Reno, 'In Harm's Way: African Counter-Insurgency and Patronage Politics'; Stanton, 'Regulating Militias: Governments, Militias, and Civilian Targeting in Civil War'; Clayton and Thomson, 'Civilianizing Civil Conflict: Civilian Defense Militias and the Logic of Violence in Intrastate Conflict'; Steele, *Democracy and Displacement in Colombia's Civil War*.

[0] Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*; Stanton, *Strategies of Violence and Restraint in Civil War*; Wood, 'Opportunities to Kill or Incentives for Restraint? Rebel Capabilities, the Origins of Support, and Civilian Victimization in Civil War'.

Beyond stability, explaining the emergence of responsive local orders also challenges existing theories for why an armed group and the state are receptive to community needs. The theory of territorial control also posits that actors with territorial monopoly are more able to redirect resources towards governance, improving not only pacific relations with civilians but demonstrating a willingness to respond to needs for public goods and selective benefits. Armed groups that never managed to establish good governance systems tend towards higher levels of victimisation.[0] This means that weaker armed groups unable to provide goods cannot win community support and turn to community violence to coerce it.[0] Robust military capabilities likewise serve as a precursor for other public and private benefits. As Weinstein observes, insurgents need to achieve a certain amount of strength before they can provide collective goods.[0] In this explanation therefore, armed group restraint and responsiveness emerges from strong territorial control and the lack of effective competition and pressure from other actors. Yet in Chapter 7 I show that this is not an adequate explanation for why armed groups and public officials, engineers, and contractors sent by the state make an effort to respond to community needs, when both sets of actors are aware of the potential threat posed by the other in the same territory.

Other theories do consider competition an explanation for why the state would act responsive to local communities. Research on state (or state-supporting actors) public goods provision during conflict posits that this is driven by a competitive

[0] Mampilly, *Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War*; Wood, 'Opportunities to Kill or Incentives for Restraint? Rebel Capabilities, the Origins of Support, and Civilian Victimization in Civil War'.

[0] Wood, 'Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence against Civilians'; Humphreys and Weinstein, 'Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil War'.

[0] Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*, 85.

'hearts and minds' strategy designed to win over communities.[0] Yet while I show that state actors do try to appeal to communities for strategic purposes, the mechanism of appeal is not geared at achieving a military advantage over the other actor,[0] but rather using the community's relationship with the other actor to deter attack. Therefore, I also reject the explanation that a responsive local order is the product of a zero-sum approach by the state and armed group to winning community support.

Finally, I reject the explanation that a responsive local order is solely driven by community mobilisation; instead, the outcomes examined in Chapter 7 are a product of the competitive interaction between state and armed group opening a space for political participation. Research on community mobilisation has shown how communities can impact and restrain the use of violence by armed actors and improve responsiveness to their needs.[0] While this research is fascinating, the decisions made by the state and the armed group to respond to community needs across the cases I trace in Chapter 7 are better explained by their strategic interests in securing their territorial presence against a competing armed group. While the community's ability to organise renders it a desirable basis of support for the armed group and the state,[0] it does not explain why some community actions (such as the Rios Vivos activism in Ituango) are met with repression or indifference (as illustrated in Chapter 5 and 6 respectively) but in other cases leads to responsiveness by the

[0] Crost, Felter, and Johnston, 'Aid under Fire: Development Projects and Civil Conflict'; Khanna and Zimmermann, 'Guns and Butter? Fighting Violence with the Promise of Development'; Weintraub, 'Do All Good Things Go Together? Development Assistance and Insurgent Violence in Civil War'; Sexton, 'Aid as a Tool against Insurgency: Evidence from Contested and Controlled Territory in Afghanistan'.

[0] See also Berman, Shapiro, and Felter, 'Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq'; Vanden Eynde, 'Targets of Violence: Evidence from India's Naxalite Conflict'; Zhukov, 'An Epidemic Model of Violence and Public Support in Civil War'.

[0] Arjona, *Rebelocracy*; Kaplan, *Resisting War: How Communities Protect Themselves*; Krause, *Resilient Communities: Non-Violence and Civilian Agency in Communal War*; Masullo, 'Refusing to Cooperate with Armed Groups Civilian Agency and Civilian Noncooperation in Armed Conflicts'; Schubiger, 'State Violence and Wartime Civilian Agency: Evidence from Peru'.

[0] Rubin, 'Rebel Territorial Control and Civilian Collective Action in Civil War: Evidence from the Communist Insurgency in the Philippines'.

armed group and the state (such as mobilisation by the Awa in Barbacoas). Therefore, while community behavior may matter (and I discuss below how it should be further examined in studies of infrastructure implementation and armed conflict), it is not a sufficient explanation for the emergence of a responsive local order.

Assessing the validity of alternative explanations is not simply good methodological practice; it also demonstrates how my findings respond and challenge existing studies on insecurity and agency in the local order. By identifying the key causal mechanism of territorial strategy, I provide a novel framework to explain instances of violence, restraint, and responsiveness by the state and armed group during armed conflict. While the inductive nature of this thesis focused on the case of Colombia, as I demonstrate in the next section, this framework and the mechanisms I put forward apply to other contexts.

Beyond Colombia: Generalisability and Scope

In this thesis I traced the impact of state and armed group interactions through data from Colombia, specifically Northern Antioquia and Pacific Nariño. I also drew on shadow cases from the same time but across different regions in Colombia to demonstrate that the processes identified are not endogenous to the specific regions. However, these interactions and their impact on local order are also not limited to Colombia. As with other studies of territorial conflict and violence, I must also ask how well the results from Colombia can travel to other contexts.[0] Development efforts in building infrastructure span the globe and multiple different armed conflicts. In this section I present examples of interactions in different parts of the world that resonate with the framework I establish in this thesis and therefore bear

[0] Blattman and Miguel, 'Civil War', 37.

similar repercussions for the local order. These examples demonstrate the breadth of scope in the potential universe of cases for this research and offer an opportunity to further test the theoretical framework I have built.

To review, I have set out explicit scope conditions that frame the breadth of my analysis. Cases of interest were identified by cross-referencing regions in Colombia where the state invested in infrastructure implementation simultaneous with the presence of an armed group. I focused on hard infrastructure projects, as connectivity and energy are key foundational components to economic development and statebuilding, yet I observe in these examples that there is potential for expansion of the scope conditions to development efforts in schools and healthcare infrastructure.

For the purpose of this thesis, I selected regions based on the presence of multiple armed groups to maximise the potential observation of interests in a grounded theory approach. However, the scope conditions for the universe of cases that this framework applies to only require at least one armed group be present in the same territory at the same time as the state implements infrastructure. In my definition of armed group, I have also cast the net wide, to include political as well as criminal actors in the scope conditions. The key characteristic of the armed group is that such actors are autonomous from the state, even if they at times appear to cooperate with state actors.

With these conditions in mind, I use this section to examine the generalisability of the insights drawn from this research. The examples I draw upon below indicate the broader relevance of this research. They also present opportunities to test the theory I have built inductively in this thesis to see if the same mechanisms of territorial

strategy impact the local order in infrastructure implementation outside of Colombia.

I start by considering the most obvious interaction – confrontation – as conflict studies have long focused on the competing interests of states and armed groups in claiming territory. States often fear armed group attacks against infrastructure just as armed groups try to undermine and gain ground on the state by destroying it.[0] This is evident in examples such as Afghanistan, where Adams observes that large-scale infrastructure over 50,000 dollars led to increased instances of violence by the Taliban, and Sexton argues that the CERP programmes to build roads and bridges in Afghanistan increased violence when built in contested territories.[0]

However, the ubiquitous nature of competitive interactions resulting in violence is less clear when examining how the violence comes about. The CERP programmes represent military-led infrastructure installations, which Sexton noted might provoke more violence by the armed group out of perceived threat in areas where territorial control is contested.[0] As I have argued in this thesis, the territorial strategy of militarising infrastructure – rather than its mere implementation – is itself a source of provocation and contention. In Algeria armed groups more often attacked security forces or private guards tasked with protecting oil pipelines rather than the infrastructure itself.[0] In Myanmar, the military accompanied oil companies to secure the construction of pipelines and refineries from the armed groups; Larsen reports, however, that most of the attacks supposedly against the infrastructure were instead

[0] Lordan-Perret et al., 'Attacks on Energy Infrastructure Targeting Democratic Institutions'; Ackerman et al., 'Assessing Terrorist Motivations for Attacking Critical Infrastructure'.

[0] Adams, 'Honing the Proper Edge: CERP and the Two-Sided Potential of Military-Led Development in Afghanistan'; Sexton, 'Aid as a Tool against Insurgency: Evidence from Contested and Controlled Territory in Afghanistan'.

[0] Sexton, 'Aid as a Tool against Insurgency: Evidence from Contested and Controlled Territory in Afghanistan': 745.

[0] Lacher and Kumetat, 'The Security of Energy Infrastructure and Supply in North Africa: Hydrocarbons and Renewable Energies in Comparative Perspective'.

a response to escalating confrontation between the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and the military now in the territory.[0] Violence is not a necessary outcome of infrastructure implementation itself but rather a result of the state and an armed group militarising to secure their territorial presence. While there are fewer studies on how this affected the local order during infrastructure implementation, existing understandings of territorial competition provide insights into how militarising by states and armed groups victimises communities around the world.

Subcontraction also emerges in other contexts around the world, it is at times less evident in the study of conflict. The links between counterinsurgency efforts and development schemes have permeated many internal armed conflicts around the world. [0] Le Billon and Lujala present a quantitative breakdown of assassinations of land defenders around the world that also demonstrates subcontracted interactions in development efforts. They identify 346 killings between 2015 and 2018 which had a reported perpetrator. While nearly a third were directly perpetrated by government authorities (either police, military, or other state actor), the rest fell to non-state armed actors, including paramilitary and armed militias, mobs, private security, guerrilla, individual hitmen, and organised criminal groups.[0] Cruz observes that the actors involved in large-scale projects are often more likely to resort to non-state allies where the state lacks resources or prefers to outsource efforts of territorial control.[0] Specialising – the territorial strategy presented in Chapter 5 – leads to selective victimisation of community members.

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[0] Larsen, 'Crude Investment: The Case of the Yadana Pipeline in Burma': 6.

[0] Grajales, 'State Involvement, Land Grabbing and Counter-insurgency in Colombia'; Devine, 'Counterinsurgency Ecotourism in Guatemala's Maya Biosphere Reserve'; Marijnen, 'Public Authority and Conservation in Areas of Armed Conflict: Virunga National Park as a 'State within a State'in Eastern Congo'.

[0] Le Billon and Lujala, 'Environmental and Land Defenders: Global Patterns and Determinants of Repression': 7.

[0] Cruz, 'Criminal Violence and Democratization in Central America: The Survival of the Violent State'.

Therefore, the potential scope of study in subcontraction appears to generalise far beyond Colombia, and further research can compare interactions of close cooperation between the state and an armed group in infrastructure in other contexts. In the Niger Delta, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta opposed large-scale oil development in the region. However, despite emancipatory rhetoric or secessionist interests, observers noted that the group's aggressive stances towards foreign oil companies was more likely a product of rival national companies recruiting 'some of the Delta militants to harass Chinese oil interests in Nigeria',[0] which also offers an interesting insight to how specialising may also arise where national and international interests compete.

Large-scale projects across the world have seen armed groups and state actors specialise their efforts to secure their shared territorial presence. Large-scale state-backed palm oil plantations in Aceh in Indonesia had military, para-state militia, and even insurgency leadership complicit in carrying out land grabs and the brutal suppression of civilian opposition and mobilisation.[0] In the Philippines, anti-dam activists were framed as terrorist supporters and found themselves in the cross-hairs of extrajudicial assassination by state and parastate agents.[0] The murder of Berta Caceres, an environmental defender in Honduras battling against the construction of a dam in her indigenous territory, was revealed in 2019 as contracted by the company itself and carried out by former ex-military and hired gunmen.[0] Landowner syndicates in Brazil worked to oppose landless peasant movements through both pushing through legal reforms and hiring hitmen.[0] Conflict provides ample

[0] Page, *The Intersection of China's Commercial Interests and Nigeria's Conflict Landscape: 11*.

[0] Lund, 'Predatory Peace. Dispossession at Aceh's Oil Palm Frontier'.

[0] Delina, 'Indigenous Environmental Defenders and the Legacy of Macli-Ing Dulag: Anti-Dam Dissent, Assassinations, and Protests in the Making of Philippine Energyscape': 6.

[0] Lakhani, *Who Killed Berta Caceres? Dams, Death Squads, and an Indigenous Defender's Battle for the Planet*.

[0] Mendes and Gross, 'Fight for the Forest'.

availability of armed actors; where these are open to cooperating with the state building infrastructure, local communities are more likely to suffer repressive outcomes.

Cooption is also not exclusive to Colombia. Development often comes about because state actors and their private partners institutionalise specific rules of engagement with armed groups, such as the Japanese Yakuza protection rackets,[0] injuries against 'unwilling players' in Iraq,[0] or punitive systems established by *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path) in Peru.[0] In Iraq, the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), a state-sponsored militia, began extending independent control over state-owned engineering and construction companies and 'interfering' in the function of ports by demanding payments from the functionaries.[0] These examples all indicate a territorial strategy of institutionalising, where both actors are aware that to secure their respective territorial presence, they must be 'willing players' in the same arrangement.

Libya presents multiple cases for how different armed groups and state actors institutionalise. In eastern Libya, the Libyan National Army (LNA) had uncertain official status after the fall of Gaddafi and integrated multiple unofficial local armed groups in the region. In 2016 the LNA had established predatory systems of cooption of public infrastructure and exports of oil. The international community as a response pressured the internationally recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) – which did not endorse the LNA – to treat the LNA as a legitimate actor to

[0] Gragert, 'Yakuza: The Warlords of Japanese Organized Crime'.
[0] Williams, *Criminals, Militias, and Insurgents: Organized Crime in Iraq*.
[0] Mason and Campany, 'Guerrillas, Drugs and Peasants: The Rational Peasant and the War on Drugs in Peru'.
[0] Al-Nidawi, 'The Growing Economic and Political Role of Iraq's PMF'.

keep the flow of oil unimpeded.[0] Much like the FARC's Law 005 this cooption applied the veneer of respectability and normality to the interaction and maintained the LNA's security in the region by keeping them financially supported. In the west, community attempts to pressure the powerful militia of al Nasr Brigade to stop coopting the Zawiya oil refinery – which resulted in a power cut along 900 kilometres of the Libyan coastline – were unsuccessful. The militia saw more benefit in maintaining its revenue stream and buyers – content to continue to receive oil – did not try to remove them.[0]

Other studies have explored the ramifications of cooptive interactions on the local order. In their study of armed group exploitation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Garrett, Sergiou, and Vlassenroot observe that in a situation where there is neither full peaceful cooperation nor conflict then a "negotiated, mutual accommodation of economic and political interests linked with security provision" can be found.[0] If the state put pressure to formalise its presence and undermine that of the armed groups, the 85th Brigade in Walikale would create enough disruption to derail the process. Garrett et al argue that the negotiation between the armed group (effectively an autonomous actor) and the state produced stability in the local order, much as I how I demonstrate that the outcome of institutionalising around infrastructure in Colombia was something 'like peace' in Chapter 6. However, the resulting security of institutionalising does not lead to a local order with agency. In Myanmar, leaders of the KIO ethnic armed group began to get involved in mining infrastructural projects, enabling the expansion of services and the construction of infrastructure by enriching themselves. Brenner demonstrates that this new group of

[0] Noria Research Group, 'Predatory Economies in Eastern Libya: The Dominant Role of the Libyan National Army': 10.
[0] Eaton, *Libya's War Economy: Predation, Profiteering and State Weakness: 30*.
[0] Garrett, Sergiou, and Vlassenroot, 'Negotiated Peace for Extortion: The Case of Walikale Territory in Eastern DR Congo': 3.

rebels turned profiteers were perceived as having become indifferent to the "continued impoverishment of local communities at a time when KIO leaders grew rich", leading to a rejection of the leadership by members of the communities.[0] As the interaction between the state and armed group becomes more cooperative, the community have little importance to the territorial strategy and are therefore excluded from the decision-making process of the state and armed group.

Finally, coexistence is a difficult interaction to identify around the world: unlike confrontation and subcontraction it does not carry in its wake indicators of violence and victimisation. Unlike cooption, it does not produce any measure of lost finances or reported demands. As I discuss in the case selection section in Chapter 2, identifying relevant interactions is a time-consuming process that involves detailed research to discover the dynamics that may underlie relevant outcomes; peaceful and politically open outcomes at the very local level make the least amount of noise.

However, I do observe several examples that demonstrate how secure and responsive local orders can emerge from competition beyond Colombia. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka permitted and even encouraged state healthcare and education programmed in areas under their control. The arrangement permitted state institutions to deliver services, whilst the LTTE oversaw and regulated the process, maintaining military control over the territory. From interviews with state officials, Mampilly observes how the Sri Lankan state saw such service provision as offering an "essential – if tenuous – link to the Tamil population…therefore the official strategy was to wean the population from the insurgents by providing public goods".[0] Such a system worked both to the Sri Lankan state's and the LTTE's benefit

[0] Brenner, 'Ashes of Co-Optation: From Armed Group Fragmentation to the Rebuilding of Popular Insurgency in Myanmar', 350.
[0] Mampilly, *Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War: 114.*

and kept a fragile equilibrium in their interaction as both made efforts to appeal to the civilian population. This did not mean that the LTTE was content with the state presence: it remained wary of the potential threat even these government officials posed. As Philipson and Thangarajah note, "the LTTE also has been very watchful of any attempt by the government to use rehabilitation and development programs as a means of further undermining the LTTE".[0] One LTTE leader even commented that this competition with the state made Sri Lankan state institutions more accountable and efficient in the northeast than in the rest of the island.[0]

Therefore, other contexts demonstrate the competitive nature of coexistence and the resulting territorial strategy of community appeal. In many cases, it is not state actors, but rather international or humanitarian organisations that carry out development projects and employ this territorial strategy. While most of these actors position themselves as neutral, the realities of donor government pressure and the statebuilding objectives of many humanitarian interventions (especially in infrastructure development) undermine that neutrality.[0] In Afghanistan in particular, Friis argues that the "increase in the targeting and killing of humanitarian workers in Afghanistan in recent years also shows that humanitarianism is seen as a political ideology".[0] Humanitarian organisations are therefore not exempt from competitive interactions with state actors which consider the presence of the other a potential existential threat. This is compounded when humanitarian interventions are also

[0] Philipson and Thangarajah, 'The Politics of the North-East: Part of the Sri Lanka Strategic Conflict Assessment 2005 (2000-2005)': 32; Flanigan, 'Nonprofit Service Provision by Insurgent Organizations: The Cases of Hizballah and the Tamil Tigers'.

[0] Stokke, 'Building the Tamil Eelam State: Emerging State Institutions and Forms of Governance in LTTE-Controlled Areas in Sri Lanka': 1031.

[0] Terry, *Condemned to Repeat?*, 23; Mills, 'Neo-Humanitarianism: The Role of International Humanitarian Norms and Organizations in Contemporary Conflict', 35.

[0] Friis, 'Which Afghanistan? Military, Humanitarian, and State-Building Identities in the Afghan Theater', 287; O'Brien, 'Politicized Humanitarianism: A Response to Nicolas de Torrente', 32.

militarised; at times despite the wishes of the development workers themselves.[0] This parallels the frustration of project managers in Colombia at the state's choice to deploy military forces in building infrastructure rather than using less provocative territorial strategies.

Therefore, it is possible to expand the universe of cases to consider humanitarian actors as representatives – even if unwilling – of the state and statebuilding projects.[0] In Afghanistan, humanitarian organisations that were trying to coexist with the Taliban had to take steps to secure their workers against a hostile armed group. Humanitarian organisations appealed to the community to successfully negotiate the release of a kidnapped worker from the Taliban or reduce the tax imposed by the group.[0] Taliban rebels reportedly implemented a tiered system in some provinces in which "authentic" humanitarian aid was exempted (i.e. the one most beneficial to communities) but other NGO activities were taxed at a rate of 10 percent, and private company projects at 20 percent.[0] An armed group may see a benefit in taxing such projects, but just as the community leader in Barbacoas pressured the Clan del Golfo group to curb its extortion of the project (Chapter 7), in Afghanistan the more the organisation could appeal to the community the more pressure they could leverage for that project to go forward (i.e. not tax for being 'authentic'). These cases fall within the scope conditions of this theoretical framework because they demonstrate how competition, despite the lack of formal state representatives in the interaction, generates a strategy of community appeal in other parts of the world.

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[0] Olson, 'Fighting for Humanitarian Space: NGOs in Afghanistan'.

[0] For example, Gordon examines how UK (and US) stabilisation efforts in Afghanistan incorporated humanitarian and aid organisations into their statebuilding agenda ('The United Kingdom's Stabilisation Model and Afghanistan: The Impact on Humanitarian Actors').

[0] Carter and Haver, 'Humanitarian Access Negotiations with Non-State Armed Groups: Internal Guidance Gaps and Emerging Good Practice': 22; Gordon, 'Winning Hearts and Minds': 45-46.

[0] Jackson and Giustozzi, 'Talking to the Other Side: Humanitarian Engagement with the Taliban in Afghanistan': 15.

These examples demonstrate the plausibility for this theoretical framework to travel to other contexts where an armed group and state actors each employ territorial strategies based on their interactions. These examples are broadly anecdotal and require more systematic research to understand the processes underlying them and draw out key comparisons. However, they do offer insight into both the generalisability of this framework and present potential avenues of future research to further explore how competition and cooperation between the state and armed group shape the local order.

POLICY RELEVANCE: ASSESSING INFRASTRUCTURE FROM THE GROUND UP

The insights produced in this thesis also generate policy relevant suggestions for the implementation of infrastructure in conflict-affected areas. As I noted previously, despite assumptions that development and security go hand in hand, efforts to produce local level security through development often fail to satisfy expectations.[0] Calls for 'conflict-sensitive development' are growing and reflect a concern with local ownership and participatory approaches as simply a device to impose top-down development that provides little benefit.[0] I present three key policy suggestions from my research to policymakers, institutions, and organisations involved in infrastructure implementation in conflict:

[0] Chandler, 'The Security–Development Nexus and the Rise of "Anti-Foreign Policy"'; Stern and Öjendal, 'Mapping the Security—Development Nexus: Conflict, Complexity, Cacophony, Convergence?'; Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*.

[0] Freedman and Lemay-Hébert, 'Critical Hybridity: Exploring Cultural, Legal and Political Pluralism'; Randazzo, 'The Paradoxes of the "Everyday": Scrutinising the Local Turn in Peace Building'; de Coning, 'Adaptive Peacebuilding'.

1. *Evaluate militarisation*: Deploying the military to protect infrastructure may have adverse effects to both the workers' security by making the project a military objective to armed groups and detrimental to the security of local communities.

2. *Reinforce legal avenues of objection*: Local communities may oppose particular elements of infrastructure implementation. Development should therefore not be considered a purely physical construction but also strengthen parallel institutions of reclamation and human rights protection. Protecting legal avenues of formal objection such as the previous consultation to a project is important but so is ensuring that judicial and human rights institutions are equally present during the implementation of the project. Dismissing victimisation of communities as an endemic problem to conflict-affected territories risks obscuring the role of infrastructure and the state in the targeting of activists and local leaders.

3. *Centre the strategic value of communities*: Policymakers need not only protect community rights and respond to the community because it is the moral choice to make – although it is undoubtedly that – but because there is strategic value in building relationships with the community when implementing infrastructure. Community leaders often possess existing ties or relationships with armed groups and can communicate intentions between the two actors to avoid misunderstandings. Communities can also warn engineers and contractors when the territory is 'hot' – i.e., the armed group are not amenable to the presence of new actors and avoid attacks against

> workers or damage to material. Public officials and project managers should incorporate the community and its existing organisation and leadership more explicitly in its implementation of infrastructure.

Policymakers continue to push for statebuilding and stability through infrastructure and claim that these goods benefit the local communities and diminish conflict. My thesis straddles this assumption and its critique; I argue that development is not inherently beneficial to the local order, but that there are conflict-driven incentives for states to appeal to local communities during development and including them in the decision-making process. The head of a local development NGO in Pasto summarised one of the key issues in the state's implementation of infrastructure:

> "It is impossible to imagine economic development without peace, these things seem to go together, but development is also conflictive. The problem is that there is a sectoral approach to its implementation, and it prevents us from seeing the territory as a whole."[0]

As I discussed in Chapter 2, and which I demonstrated with the empirical findings, the state is not a homogenous actor. Rather it deploys different actors, with different views and biases, to the territory depending on the interaction. At times these actors are even at odds. If we want these infrastructure projects to benefit the communities then we need to better understand the nature of the state, and the nature of the territory as a whole, in implementing infrastructure. In my findings I present how conditions of competition – paradoxically – can not only secure communities but empower them because engineers and project managers and contractors and public officials find more benefit in reaching out to the community then excluding them from the process. Therefore, policymakers invested in development, especially if these objectives are also geared at securing the local order and producing better

[0] Head of development NGO, Pasto (52) – February 2019.

outcomes for local communities, should seriously address the actions that undermine these.

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND PATHWAYS OF FUTURE RESEARCH

Any quest for knowledge tends to breed more questions than it answers. Internal armed conflicts continue to rage in contexts as diverse as Mali, Ethiopia, Ukraine, the Philippines, Nigeria, and Afghanistan. Countries like Mexico and Brazil do not have revolutionary or explicitly political insurgents but also have high causalities of criminal violence and contest with the state. In these contexts, development efforts do not cease entirely. States continue to build infrastructure and make promises of economic growth and prosperity. As long as the fields of development and conflict continue to collide, there is still more to understand about how these inform each other, local orders, and broader trends in violence, and peace. While I have sought to build a theory that addresses an aspect of this puzzle and contributes to the relevant literature in both fields, these efforts only scratch the surface of what I believe is a fledgling research agenda.

I first probe at the limitations of my own research to consider what is an apt continuation of this project. Starting from a continuum from competition to cooperation opens up several new questions about what conditions determine different starting points along that continuum. What leads states and armed groups to more readily engage in confrontation? What decisions are made and under what conditions do state actors believe the armed group would credibly commit to institutionalising? Under what conditions does an armed group prefer to extort than

attack? While my findings may have pointed to some potential drivers (national reputation, leadership personalities, or financial reward), a more systematic approach is required to understand why different interactions emerge.

Investigating the causal dimensions of the interactions challenges us to consider the broader contextual factors of each interaction. While intensely local disaggregation provides rich new insights into behaviours, motivations, and outcomes of different micro-level dynamics, it risks losing sight of the wider political, economic, and social processes.[0] How do shifts in Colombian policy or electoral cycles at the national level impact the likelihood of different interactions emerging? How do trends in global illicit markets or fluctuations in supply and demand for illicit goods shape the type of interactions observed between the state and armed group at the micro territorial level?

This framework could also benefit from incorporating different variables into its analysis. Does the availability of other resources shape how the armed group approaches the potentially lucrative appeal of infrastructure projects? When do different personalities in armed group and state leadership affect perceptions of threat? Do international shifts in illicit economies or licit economic opportunities affect the level of competition or cooperation between state and armed group? How does the pressure of national and international audiences beyond the local affect both state (as briefly observed in Barbacoas) and armed group behaviour?

Beyond the cases analyzed here, there is also room to expand the scope of analysis to new actors. How do transnational companies differ from states when implementing infrastructure? Are there significant differences in impact on the local order if foreign

[0] Haer, Vüllers, and Weidmann, 'Studying Micro Dynamics in Civil Wars: Introduction'; Balcells and Justino, 'Bridging Micro and Macro Approaches on Civil Wars and Political Violence: Issues, Challenges, and the Way Forward'.

states or international organisations implement infrastructure projects instead of the state? There is even relevance to moving beyond a dyadic interaction; what happens to the local order when there are multiple armed groups in a territory versus just one? I have briefly discussed how an armed group can become subcontracted by the state into a confrontational interaction – thereby generating a territorial strategy of militarising not specialising. However, future work could more systematically examine how multiple armed groups interacting with the state simultaneously impacts the local order, building not only on this thesis but work by Arias and Idler on armed group interactions.[0]

These varied levels of analysis (international, national, local, individual) and different factors (economic drivers, geopolitics, personal, and ideological positions) all provide rich potential insight into these interactions and can in turn deepen our understanding of the impact on the local order. Another avenue of research would be to examine the longer-term repercussions of state and armed group interactions. If infrastructure is meant to be a successful avenue to stability and growth, then understanding how it succeeds in the long-term – and by what parameters of success – would benefit from building on the analysis of this thesis with further and deeper exploration. This can continue to build on the local turn of development and peacebuilding to consider how success can encapsulate more than the absence or presence of violence, but also space for agency in the local order. How does a specific interaction shape long-term legitimacy of the state in the eyes of local communities? Do these interactions have different impacts on voting behaviours, another form of political participation?

[0] Idler, *Borderland Battles: Violence, Crime, and Governance at the Edges of Colombia's War*; Arias, *Criminal Enterprises and Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean*.

Similarly, this thesis has not delved into the extensive literature of rebel governance,[0] instead focusing more specifically on the territorial strategies an armed group employs when facing the state. However, this research has implications for the literature on rebel authority, for example in expanding the motivators for responsiveness. Where much of the rebel governance literature looks at service provision and desire for legitimacy as actions rebels take when they have uncontested territorial control, in the chapter on coexistence I demonstrated how competition and shared territorial presence with the state could incentivise responsive behaviours to local communities. This pushes us to ask: how might these behaviours affect longer term patterns of armed group legitimacy and community support?

Finally, this research introduced the infrastructural lens to the study of security and conflict and local order. This approach can not only adapt itself to new contexts but invites new ways of analyzing conflict and development. This also means considering where the infrastructural lens could be applied; while this thesis focused on the rural contexts of conflict, infrastructure implementation is also a ubiquitous feature of urbanisation. The city is a crucial and growing part of a transnational network of trade that already challenges external and internal concepts of statehood and sovereignty. These spaces – even in the cities where states may boast the most control – are often occupied by an armed group that can compete or cooperate with state actors. As Arias demonstrates in his work on micro-level regimes between states and criminal actors in cities across Latin America, territorial competition is not only fought out in the countryside, yet there is still very little research on the urbanised dynamics of territorial competition and cooperation between states and

[0] For more see Mampilly, *Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War*; Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly, *Rebel Governance in Civil War*; Arjona, *Rebelocracy*; Arias, *Criminal Enterprises and Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean*.

armed groups.[0] An infrastructural lens to his approach – as I used to help build this theory – could refine further connections between micro-level regimes (what I term dyadic interactions) and the local order.

While the dynamics of confrontation and its repercussions on the local order might be the most easily recognisable in the study of civil war and internal armed conflict, its relationship to infrastructure challenges assumptions about development and security. Instead of stabilising a region, infrastructure implementation may produce insecurity and disorder when the state and armed group militarise to remove the other actor from the territory. Yet as I note in the previous section on generalisability, studies on the impact of development on violence are still trying to consider what role militarising has in shaping its effect. Large N studies and cross-national studies that can incorporate these distinctions would be a fascinating way to approach the broader trends in military strategies to protect infrastructure and its impact on local order. Additionally, developing mixed methods approaches such as subnational experimentation and surveys can generate new observations and data on these dynamics.

Another implication that became clear in the chapter of subcontraction is that these interactions are all occurring in the context of conflict where the language of competition dominates most of the rhetoric used to justify state and armed group behaviour. This presents a complex issue in assessing how development intersects with conflict and insecurity, as both the state and armed group have incentives to cloak shared objectives in more reputationally palatable language of counterinsurgency and security. Examining development projects during armed

[0] Arias, *Criminal Enterprises and Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean*; Kalyvas, 'The Urban Bias in Research on Civil Wars'; For more on the urban built environments that affect armed groups and state sovereignty see Davis ('Non-State Armed Actors, New Imagined Communities, and Shifting Patterns of Sovereignty and Insecurity in the Modern World').

conflict requires more nuanced investigation into how repressive state practices can find more leeway in violent contexts to target and exclude communities from these development efforts. How do efforts of subcontraction differ when the state and an armed group are imbedded in ongoing civil or internal armed conflict versus cases where armed groups might be better considered criminal or militia actors supporting repressive state measures? Does the 'othering' or labelling of anti-development efforts as 'insurgent'[0] or dismissing victimisation and attacks as the product of territorial dispute and conflict create sufficient uncertainty for states and armed groups to retain plausible deniability? Or do different mechanisms of institutionalisation and state corruption become more prominent when not relying on ongoing conflict? Does it matter for its impact on the local order?

Cooption also requires us to think more critically and broadly about shifts in conflict dynamics from violence to peace. Development brings in new sources of income and rent for existing armed groups. Extortion of state resources may allow state actors to build infrastructure in areas with an armed group, and the financial objective of the armed group may lessen strategic challenges to secession or revolution or changes to the political status quo. However, does development criminalise conflict actors? Development under these conditions may become a double-edged sword; on one hand successfully implementing infrastructure projects without violent ramifications may herald a more peaceful era but on the other, cooption may hollow the legitimacy of the state and armed group. Such practices, which mimic elite power-sharing arrangements that trade off short-term stability for the longer-term damages of systemic corruption,[0] effectively exclude broader populations from participating in

[0] Schoenberger and Beban, '"They Turn Us into Criminals": Embodiments of Fear in Cambodian Land Grabbing': 1344; Andreucci and Kallis, 'Governmentality, Development and the Violence of Natural Resource Extraction in Peru': 102.

[0] Haass and Ottmann, 'Profits from Peace: The Political Economy of Power-Sharing and Corruption'; Binningsbø, 'Power Sharing, Peace and Democracy: Any Obvious Relationships?'

political life. How does this legacy affect the quality of peace, development, statebuilding or the potential recidivism to conflict?

Coexistence emerged in this research as one of the most undertheorised dynamics in the field. While coexistence has been identified before in different analyses of armed group and state interactions, these are usually assessed as either relatively cooperative[0] or competitive in the sense that states and the armed group war over winning hearts and minds in order to gain intelligence to use against the other.[0] Berman et al, for example, hypothesize that the violence reducing effect of small infrastructure projects in Afghanistan are due to the closer relations this built with community, who then shared information on armed group movements to the US troops.[0] However, the examination of coexistence in similar projects in Colombia indicates that the mechanism is not necessarily geared at extracting militarily viable information, but rather pressuring the armed group through its relationship with the community.

This brings me – last, but certainly not least – to the matter of the community. Though I assess agency in the local order as the space made available for communities to mobilise and have their needs met, communities often take their own initiative to mobilise regardless of constraints.[0] Rios Vivos continues to operate in Ituango despite clear threats and tactics of intimidation. Communities mobilise to demand better attention from the government, as the Piernas Cruzadas group did in

[0] Staniland, 'States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders': 251.

[0] Berman, Shapiro, and Felter, 'Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq'; Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov, *Winning Hearts and Minds through Development? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan*.

[0] Berman, Shapiro, and Felter, 'Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq', 810.

[0] For example, see Moncada, *Resisting Extortion: Victims, Criminals, and States in Latin America* for how civilians can devise strategies to resist extortive practices by armed actors. It would be beneficial to examine in more detail how civilians may develop strategies to resist extortion on behalf of state-led infrastructure.

Barbacoas. One of their leaders explained that she was under no illusion about the intentions of the state: "We do everything ourselves; they do not give us anything… it's only because of us and this group that they are still building this road because if we were not doing this they would already be gone".[0] It was the collective mobilisation of women that put pressure on the government through shaming the administration at the national level to send more resources and prioritise the construction of 55 kilometres of road. The community reveals the failures of state governance when it mobilises and forces the state to respond.

Across this research I have sought to keep the local order and the communities it affects at the core of analysis. How an armed group and states interact has potentially damaging repercussions for lives and livelihoods of local communities, for the ability of individuals and collectives to safely voice their concerns and participate in political life. Infrastructure is an inescapable aspect of daily life, tied to state power, to economic opportunity, to private interests, to basic essential needs. Acknowledging how the apparently banal endeavour of building a road or establishing an electrical grid can shape patterns of violence and order in the midst of conflict is no small matter. Although the focus of this theoretical framework has remained at the local level, its significance stretches across academic, political, and geographic boundaries to reimagine the intersections of security and development, violence, and order. For the sake of not repeating the harms of the past, Colombia – and scholars and policymakers alike – must remember what comes with efforts to physically build the state. If infrastructure is a detonator, then we must discover what is left in the debris.

[0] Interview local activist (76), Barbacoas – March 2019.

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