Democracy as Procedure and Principle

Essays on social groups and democratization

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Abstract

How does inequality between social groups impact the politics of democratic change? Several scholars of democratization argue that individuals (a) intuit principles about procedural democracy that consequentially affect the distribution of benefits and; (b) form preferences between democracy and dictatorship based on which maximizes the utility of their social group. This thesis argues for a more comparative understanding of both (a) and (b) through three primary means. First, it compares and contrasts three different and contradictory principles of democracy namely the popular, liberal and associational principles. Second, it looks at a wider variety of social groups through studying gender, class and ethnic identity. Third, it considers a wider variety of inequalities that includes not only economic, but also social, political and demographic inequality.

The chapters of this thesis explore how different varieties of inequality between different social groups can impact the politics of democratic change. The first chapter provides a comparative overview of the role social identity plays in shaping individual preferences and compares and contrasts different principles of democracy. The second chapter introduces a new data set on political elite (WhoGov) which constitutes the largest database of political elite that is publicly available. The third chapter argues that civil and political empowerment of women each have differential impacts on the probability of democratic transition. The fourth argues that influence in democratic executive politics by the authoritarian elite is a function of the predatory economic legacies left by the previous authoritarian regime. The fifth argues that the size of an ethnic group to which an individual belongs does not predict support for democracy. Instead, group size influences the salience with which individuals view differing principles of democracy. The final concludes with policy implications for proponents of democratic change and discusses extensions for WhoGov that can enable scholars to better study how social identity and elite-level politics interact.

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Contents

1 The role of social identity in shaping democratic change 1
1.1 Introduction . . . 1
1.2 The Social Identity of the Selectorate . . . 5
1.2.1 Social identity impacts individual utility . . . 9
1.2.2 Social identity demarcates who selects and who ejects the political elite . . . 10
1.2.3 Social identity determines winners and losers in politics . . . 13
1.2.4 Summary . . . 15
1.3 Principles of democracy and the challenge of electoral authoritarianism 16
1.3.1 The Popular Principle of Democracy . . . 17
1.3.2 The Liberal Principle of Democracy . . . 19
1.3.3 The Associational Principle of Democracy . . . 22
1.3.4 Procedural Democracy and the Challenge Posed by Electoral Authoritarianism . . . 23
1.3.5 Summary . . . 28
1.4 Outline of thesis . . . 30

2 Who governs? A new global data set on members of cabinets 37
2.1 Forward . . . 37
2.2 Introduction . . . 37
2.3 Existing data sets . . . 39
2.4 Creation of the data set . . . 40
2.5 Validation . . . 44
2.6 Applications . . . 47
2.7 Conclusion . . . 54

3 The decline of patriarchal autocracies, varieties of empowerment and the changing role of women in promoting democratic transition 55
3.1 Introduction . . . 55
3.2 Literature Review . . . 59
3.3 A Theory of Women's Empowerment and Democratization . . . 65
3.3.1 Assumptions . . . 66
3.3.2 The demand for democracy under closed autocracy . . . 67
3.3.3 The supply of democracy by the autocratic elite . . . 70
3.3.4 The demand for democracy under electoral autocracy . . . 72
3.4 Political Regimes and Women's Empowerment . . . 74
3.4.1 Operationalizing Cabinet Positions and Democracy . . . 74
3.4.2 Women's Empowerment and Political Regimes . . . 76

3.5 Data Collection . . . 83
3.5.1 Defining Democracy . . . 83
3.5.2 Defining Women's Empowerment . . . 83
3.5.3 Control Variables . . . 85
3.5.4 The Sample . . . 87
3.6 Econometric Analysis . . . 88
3.6.1 Modelling Specification . . . 88
3.6.2 Dynamic Probit Analysis, 1966 to 2016 . . . 88
3.6.3 Thresholds of Women's Executive Participation . . . 93
3.6.4 Fixed Effects Models . . . 97
3.6.5 Alternative Control Specifications . . . 101
3.6.6 Dynamic Probit Models, 1900 to 2000 . . . 104
3.7 Conclusion . . . 106

4 Popular or predatory autocrats? The economic origins of authoritarian influence in emerging democracies 110
4.1 Introduction . . . 110
4.2 Literature Review . . . 113
4.3 Economic Theories of Authoritarian Influence . . . 117
4.3.1 Median Voter and Elite Competition Theories . . . 117
4.3.2 Economic Determinants of Autocratic Influence in Democracy . 120
4.3.3 Class Support Groups and Authoritarian Influence . . . 122
4.4 Data Collection . . . 123
4.4.1 Operationalizing Authoritarian Influence . . . 123
4.4.2 Independent Variables . . . 130
4.4.3 Economic Variables . . . 130
4.4.4 Class Variables . . . 131
4.4.5 Control Variables . . . 136
4.5 Econometric Analysis . . . 138
4.5.1 Modelling Specification . . . 138
4.5.2 Authoritarian Influence in Core Cabinet Appointments . . . 139
4.5.3 Authoritarian Influence in High Prestige Cabinet Appointments 145
4.5.4 Authoritarian Influence in Economic Appointments . . . 148
4.5.5 Class Support Groups and Authoritarian Influence . . . 150
4.5.6 Other Predictors of Authoritarian Influence . . . 157
4.6 Conclusion . . . 158

5 Ethnic conflict or compromise? Interrogating the microfoundations of minority attitudes towards democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa 162
5.1 Introduction . . . 162
5.2 Literature Review . . . 164
5.3 Group Size and Attitudes Towards Democracy . . . 170
5.3.1 Support for democracy . . . 171
5.3.2 Principles of Democracy . . . 172
5.4 Data Collection . . . 174
5.4.1 The Sample . . . 174
5.4.2 Coding Ethnic Identity . . . 177
5.4.3 Coding Support for Democracy . . . 177
5.4.4 Principles Of Democracy . . . 179

5.4.5 Control Variables . . . 182
5.5 Econometric Analysis . . . 184
5.5.1 Modelling Specification . . . 184
5.5.2 Is democracy always preferable to dictatorship? . . . 184
5.5.3 Is your country democratic? . . . 186
5.5.4 Are you satisfied with democracy? . . . 188
5.5.5 Principles of Democracy . . . 190
5.6 Further Tests . . . 196
5.7 Conclusion . . . 196

6 Conclusion **200**
6.1 Theoretical and Empirical Summary . . . 200
6.2 Policy implications for proponents of democratization . . . 202
6.3 Coding the Social Identity of the Political Elite with WhoGov . . . 210

A Chapter 2 Appendix **214**
A.1 Codebook for the within-country data set . . . 214
A.2 Codebook for the between-country data set . . . 217
A.3 Descriptive Statistics . . . 220
A.4 List of Countries . . . 221
A.5 Description of the Data Gathering Process . . . 226
A.6 Title Classifications . . . 229
A.7 Adding party affiliation . . . 232

B Chapter 3 Appendix **235**
B.1 Dictatorial Spells Used in the Analysis . . . 235
B.2 % female cabinet, 1991 to 2021: Comparing electoral democracies and autocracies . . . 240

C Chapter 4 Appendix **241**
C.1 Democratic Spells Used in the Analysis . . . 241
C.2 Authoritarian Successor Parties (ASP) Coded . . . 244
C.3 Alternative Model Specifications . . . 247

D Chapter 5 Appendix **250**
D.1 List of Ethnic Groups Identified in Afrobarometer . . . 250
D.2 Support for Varieties of Authoritarian Rule . . . 254
D.3 Is majority rule important for democracy? . . . 258

Bibliography **259**

List of Figures

2.1 The cabinet in Denmark, July 1968. 41
2.2 Final output for Denmark, July 1968 43
2.3 Cross-validating the data set against other data sets 46
2.4 Replication and extension of Arriola (2009) 48
2.5 Country averages in the period 2000-2016 50
2.6 Four applications of the data 53

3.1 Time series' of the percent of cabinet that are women by political regime 78
3.2 Percent of Rwandan cabinet that is female during the rule of the Rwandan Patriotic Front 81
3.3 Regression models of % female cabinet on political regime 82
3.4 The relationship between female civil and political empowerment 85
3.5 Marginal effects of women's civil empowerment on democratic transition 91
3.6 Marginal effects of women's political empowerment on democratic transition 92
3.7 Change in β Women in Civil Society $_{t-1}$ as cabinet participation increases 92

4.1 The relationship between PAEs and ASPAs 128
4.2 Party affiliation of the PAE 128
4.3 Density plots of dependent variables 129
4.4 Distribution of agrarian and business elite support in the sample 133
4.5 Distribution of urban and rural bourgeois support in the sample 134
4.6 Distribution of urban and rural proletarian support in the sample . . . 135
4.7 Predicted mean % of core cabinet positions assigned to PAE by capital shares 143
4.8 Predicted mean % of core cabinet positions assigned to PAE by growth 143
4.9 Predicted mean % of core cabinet positions assigned to ASPAs by capital shares 144
4.10 Predicted mean % of core cabinet positions assigned to ASPAs by GDP per capita 144
4.11 Predicted mean % of core cabinet positions assigned to PAE by urban bourgeoisie influence 153
4.12 Predicted mean % of core cabinet positions assigned to PAE by urban bourgeoisie influence 153
4.13 Predicted mean % of core cabinet positions assigned to ASPAs by agrarian elite influence 155
4.14 Predicted mean % of core cabinet positions assigned to ASPAs by agrarian elite influence 155

4.15 Predicted mean % of core cabinet positions assigned to ASPAs by urban bourgeoisie influence 156
4.16 Predicted mean % of core cabinet positions assigned to PAE by urban bourgeoisie influence 156

5.1 The number of minority dictatorships from 1966 to 2016 166
5.2 Ethnic Identity and Attitude Formation 171
5.3 Principles of Democracy in Afrobarometer 181
5.4 Predicted probability of liberal versus popular by group size 195
5.5 Predicted probability of associational versus popular by group size . . . 195

B.1 Linear regression models of % female cabinet comparing EAs and EDs . 240

List of Tables

2.1 Available time-series cross-sectional data sets on cabinets 40

3.1 Descriptive statistics in chapter 3 86
3.2 Dynamic Probit Models of Democratic Transition 90
3.3 Dynamic Probit Models of Democratic Transition 95
3.4 Predicted probabilities of transition by women's civil/political empowerment 96
3.5 Dynamic Probit Models of Democratic Transition 99
3.6 Linear Probability Models of Democratic Transition with Country Fixed Effects 100
3.7 Dynamic Probit Models of Democratic Transition 103
3.8 Dynamic Probit Models of Democratic Transition, 1900 to 2000 105

4.1 Coding strategy for identifying the PAE 125
4.2 Descriptive statistics in chapter 4 137
4.3 FRMs of Authoritarian Influence in Core Cabinet Positions 142
4.4 FRMs of Authoritarian Influence in High Prestige Positions 147
4.5 FRMs of Authoritarian Influence in Economic Positions 149
4.6 FRMs of Influence by the PAE 152
4.7 FRMs of Influence by ASPAs 154

5.1 Country and survey wave coverage of Afrobarometer used in the sample. 176
5.2 Descriptive statistics for Chapter 4 analysis 183
5.3 Binary Logit Models of Unconditional Support for Democracy 185
5.4 Ordinal Logit Models of Democratic Identification 187
5.5 Ordinal Logit Models of Satisfaction with Democracy 189
5.6 Multinomial logit models comparing principles of democracy. 191
5.7 Multinomial logit models comparing principles of democracy in democracies. 192
5.8 Multinomial logit models comparing principles of democracy in dictatorships. 193
5.9 Testing IIA for Democratic Principles 194

A.2 List of Portfolios 230
A.3 List of Classifications 231

C.3 Linear Regression Models of Authoritarian Influence in Core Cabinet Positions 248
C.4 Negative Binomial Models of Authoritarian Influence in Core Cabinet Positions 249

D.2 Binary logit models of support for varieties of autocracy 257
D.3 Logit models of the importance of majority rule. 259

Chapter 1

The role of social identity in shaping democratic change

1.1 Introduction

Today, the state of democracy in the world is as much a cause for pessimism as it is for optimism. Democracy has undoubtedly made unprecedented global advances. When democracy initially advanced across the world in its first wave beginning in 1828, only the United States could be classified, at least by minimalist criteria, as a democracy. By 2015, 119 countries – constituting roughly 60 percent of all countries for which we have data – can now be considered democratic using identical criteria.[1] However, the belief that democracy would ultimately prevail over the alternative – namely dictatorship – has been sharply contradicted by current events. Since the mid-2000s, the pace of democratic change has stagnated. The latest annual report published by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project suggests that we are currently experiencing a democratic recession.[2] Several emerging democracies such as Hungary and Turkey have slid backward into dictatorship. Many dictatorships have remained in place either by incorporating flawed elections or by relying upon economic and diplomatic support from authoritarian superpowers such as Russia or China.[3] The spectre of dictatorship looms increasingly large over countries that many scholars once considered consolidated democracies. Citizens of countries as large as India, Brazil and the Philippines have elected populist political leaders that, at best, display scant regard for the democratic

[1] Calculated from Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2013.
[2] Maerz et al. 2020.
[3] Schedler 2002; Ambrosio 2007; Levitsky and Way 2010.

process and, at worst, have made concrete steps toward dismantling democracy altogether. Although Donald Trump, at the time of writing, has recently been defeated by Joe Biden in the US presidential election, the former won the previous election on a campaign that displayed not only populism and authoritarianism but also many hallmarks of social exclusivity such as xenophobia, misogyny and religious intolerance.[4] These electoral victories, some argue, are the latest manifestation of a rising trend in, at best, apathy or, at worst, antipathy toward democracy that may indicate a trend towards deconsolidation.[5]

The uncertain future of democracy is a cause for concern for scholars, regardless of academic discipline. A key pattern of deconsolidation that has emerged is that political leaders with authoritarian aspirations attack autonomous sources of potential opposition such as civil society and the media before they dismantle competitive elections.[6] It is by no means a stretch to lump academics and universities into this category. In the case of Hungary – the first European Union country that has crossed the line into dictatorship[7] – Viktor Orban conducted a protracted legal battle against the Central Eastern University which ultimately led to the renowned university's closure in Budapest in 2019.[8] While scholars and other intellectuals have a very clear stake in promoting democracy, they are not the only ones that suffer as countries become less democratic. Authoritarian elites are seldom the philosopher kings that Plato portrayed in *The Republic*. Instead, autocrats are often driven by the desire to hold on to power and use tactics such as repression, corruption and targeted persecution of vulnerable groups.[9] While democrats are far from saintly, free and fair elections provide a crucial check against abuse of power whereby citizens can punish bad leaders by electing new ones. Without such a check, the temptation for the incumbent elite to abuse their power is thus greater.

The backlash against democracy is, of course, multi-faceted. However, one of the

[4]Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018.
[5]Mounk 2018.
[6]Maerz et al. 2020.
[7]V-Dem has classified Hungary as being an Electoral Authoritarian regime. See Maerz et al. 2020.
[8]Foer 2019.
[9]Gerschewski 2013.

key drivers of backlash concerns a fundamental question: who rules and in whose interests do those who rule 'really' serve? The social identity of those who are perceived to win and lose from the status quo is an unmistakable part of the backlash that we are experiencing. The backlash against liberal democracy that is sweeping many countries is, in part, fuelled by a rejection of tolerance towards minorities on behalf of majorities, who believe that the political elite act in the interests of the former rather than the latter.[10] However, it is also fuelled by myths of an ideal past where politicians served the interests of people like them.[11] This thesis seeks to understand how the interplay between social groups and the political elite impact the politics of democratic change. In doing so, this thesis engages with fundamental issues surrounding the concept of democracy in the context of understanding democratization: what it is, who it affects, how we think about it, and why.

A common and useful axiom underpins the current debate among scholars of democratization: *Democracies and dictatorships have substantial consequences for political actors that, in turn, shape their preferences for one over the other.* This thesis engages with a growing literature which posits that social identity serves as a mechanism through which individuals perceive the relative merits and demerits of democracy in comparison to dictatorship. Social identity is important for three reasons. First, it provides an efficient way through which individuals can make sense of a complex social world and form attachments to other individuals. Second, it divides individuals who are connected to the political elite from those who are not. Third, it can help determine not only who wins and who loses from the political status quo but also what the winners win and what the losers lose.

This thesis contributes to the literature on social identity and democratic change using an essay-based format. Each of the substantive chapters can be treated as a stand-alone contribution, which separately engages with the scholarship on democratization and its relation to three different varieties of social identity – namely gender, class and ethnicity. This thesis addresses three hot topics that have divided scholars of

[10] Mounk 2018.
[11] Gest, Reny, and Mayer 2018.

social identity and democratization using quantitative analysis of cross-country data. The first article addresses how women's empowerment under dictatorship influences the probability that a transition to democracy will occur. In doing so, it provides a framework that attempts to make sense of the evolution of authoritarianism from being gender exclusive to gender inclusive and how this evolution influences the propensity of ordinary women to support democratic change. The second article focuses on how the interaction between social class and political empowerment determines the extent to which elite who are in some way affiliated with the authoritarian past continue to capture positions of executive power, despite transition to democracy having occurred. As a result, it contributes to a growing literature which suggests that distributional conflict is not necessarily fought over whether to accept or reject democracy, but over the extent to which the authoritarian elite continue to shape the politics of a country after transition occurs. The third article focuses on how the proportional size of the ethnic group to which an individual belongs influences their attitudes towards and perceptions of democracy. It challenges beliefs that are prevalent among scholars that ethnic minorities are less likely to support democracy than ethnic majorities and, instead, presents a more nuanced picture that emphasises ethnic compromise more so than conflict. Beyond contributing substantively to the literature, this thesis leverages the power of an original data set entitled WhoGov that collates disaggregated bibliographic information on the social and political identity of individuals who are assigned cabinet positions in 177 countries from 1966 to 2018.[12] As a result, WhoGov is truly the largest resource of its kind and I, along with the other members of the WhoGov team, hope that it can be used to develop a deeper understanding of who our rulers are and how their identity shapes political outcomes beyond understanding democratization.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The second section provides a comparative discussion of the literature on class, ethnic and gender identity and presents a case for why social groups are important to consider in the context of studying democratic change. The third section discusses comparative debates about what democracy actu-

[12]Nyrup and Bramwell 2019.

ally is as a way to understand how it either reshapes or reinforces inequality between social groups. The fourth section provides a summary of the chapters that comprise this thesis.

1.2 The Social Identity of the Selectorate

This thesis engages with a simple yet powerful assumption: groups defined by a shared social identity are crucial for understanding the politics of democratic change. Before detailing why social groups matter, however, I want to set the scene in order to understand why change of this nature is often seen as necessary by way of selectorate theory.[13] In selectorate theory, three groups exist. The first group is the winning coalition which collectively monopolise legislative, executive and judicial power which are, in essence, key constituent parts of political power broadly defined. The second group is the selectorate who decide the composition of the winning coalition. The relationship that exists between the winning coalition and the selectorate is symbiotic. For the winning coalition, the selectorate provides the support necessary for the former to remain in power. For the selectorate, the winning coalition represents their core interests which may suffer if the coalition were to collapse. The implicit third group, sometimes referred to in a tongue-in-cheek way as the ejectorate, is composed of the rest of society.[14] The selectorate receive benefits b_s from the current status quo while the ejectorate receive benefits b_e. Crucially, selectorate theory, in its most basic form, implies that $b_s > b_e$ as the winning coalition represents the interests of the selectorate more so than, or to the detriment of, the ejectorate. As the size of the selectorate increases relative to the ejectorate, a political regime becomes more "inclusive" as a larger proportion of the population have a say in choosing the political elite. As the size of the ejectorate tends toward the total population, a political regime becomes more "exclusive" as a smaller and smaller proportion of individuals decide who gets to rule.[15]

[13] De Mesquita et al. 2005.
[14] Gallagher and Hanson 2015.
[15] Neundorf, Gerschewski, and Olar 2019.

Selectorate theory tells us that politics always produces winners and losers. The difference between b_s and b_e essentially describes inequality between those who are represented and those who are not. As a result, the very demand for political change arguably has deep roots in inequality not only of representation but also in outcomes purported to exist because of such inequalities. Selectorate theory envisions political regimes – defined as the set of rules that determines who gets to govern – continuously, whereby the selectorate becomes more inclusive the further down the continuum these regimes go. While we may instinctively see this process as unidirectional – from exclusivity to inclusivity – the very reverse can also happen. The ejectorate may, for instance, belong to a small minority of individuals who fear that their share of the benefits may be diluted under an inclusive status quo and may conspire towards overthrowing it. While selectorate theory offers an intuitive and helpful framework for understanding the demand for political change, the belief that political change happens along a continuum is questionable. Often political change does not occur incrementally but through critical junctures in the political history of a country.[16] Perhaps the most momentous event of this nature is the emergence of democracy. As we will see, democracy can be defined in many different ways and can mean many things to many people. However, democracy presents a fundamental opportunity to change (in some cases radically) the composition of the selectorate and, by implication, who benefits from politics. Consequently, it is something that is supported and opposed with equal vigour by the ejectorate and the selectorate respectively.

Neither political stability nor political change, however, comes automatically. Social scientists have long realised that outcomes related to either maintaining or changing the status quo in politics require effort on the part not of one but of many individuals acting in concert towards a common goal.[17] However, collective action, in the abstract, is often seen as notoriously difficult to achieve as it requires that atomised individuals reach a consensus around what it is that they want and how they should set about obtaining it. The impossibility theorem as proposed by Kenneth Arrow demonstrates

[16] See Capoccia 2015, pp. 153-155.
[17] Olson 1965.

just how problematic it is to reach a majority consensus in this setting.[18] Suppose three individuals (A, B and C) form a group that seeks to agree upon an agenda but have the following conflicting preference orders over policies a, b and c.

$$a >_A b >_A c$$
$$b >_B c >_B a$$
$$c >_C a >_C b$$

In this scenario, a rational majority decision is impossible because any deal that is reached is the worst outcome for one individual who can then resort to making a side deal with another. For instance if policy a is proposed by person A then B loses out and forms a coalition with C which takes option a off the table and kicks person A out of the group. This process of conflict and exclusion continues until only one person is left standing with the group, itself, destroyed. How, therefore, are group preferences arrived at given that disgruntled individuals within groups have clear incentives to act as agenda spoilers? One way in which humans overcome collective action problems is to sort themselves into groups whereby arriving at a consensus is easier. Individuals are therefore not atomised but related to one another through a common code derived from a common understanding of the world and their place in it. In this setting, the preferences of individuals are likely to be more homogeneous than those used to illustrate the impossibility theorem which increases (decreases) within-group cooperation (conflict). However, this raises the following question. By what attributes do individuals sort themselves into groups? Or - seen from the opposite angle - how do those attributes shape individual preferences?

This thesis engages with these fundamental questions by understanding the role social identity plays in producing democratic change (or lack thereof). First, however, it is important to understand what social identity is. At its most fundamental, social identity relates to an individual's self-concept that is informed by their membership to a group defined by a shared attribute – in this case gender, class and ethnicity.[19] As

[18] See Patty and Penn 2014, pp. 12-15.
[19] Kalin and Sambanis 2018.

scholarly thinking on social identity has progressed, emphasis has shifted towards seeing social identity as constructed rather than a primordial phenomenon.[20] Social identity primarily constructs connections between otherwise unrelated individuals through promoting a shared perception of, or connection with, history rather than being a purely biological phenomenon.[21] Social identity is thus not completely fixed but can be subject to both continuity and change based on the stability of a latent form of consensus within a given society. Some scholars further distinguish between simple possession of an identity (nominal) and an identity that an individual either professes belonging to or is forced upon that individual by others (activated).[22] Changing social identity, in other words, is not just a matter of flicking a switch – it is about challenging a wider consensus that society has reached and is, to varying degrees, unwilling to change. This definition brings to light the importance of social identity as a negotiated phenomenon: while individuals can personally transcend the social identities they inherit, social transcendence requires that society also accepts this decision. Thus, social identity can be 'sticky' in the sense that it cannot simply be switched based on a change in individual beliefs. I thus define social identity as *an ascriptive form of identity that is created through negotiation between an individual and the society to which they belong* and a social group as *a group where membership is determined on the basis of an individual belonging to a specific social identity.*

This chapter argues that social identity is an important producer of collective action needed for regime change and stability for three interrelated reasons. First, social identity impacts individual utility. Second, social identity demarcates who selects and who ejects representatives. Third, social identity can help determine winners and losers in politics. I discuss each reason in turn.

[20] Brubaker 2009.
[21] Vogt et al. 2015.
[22] Chandra and Wilkinson 2008.

1.2.1 Social identity impacts individual utility

Social identity reduces problems of majority consensus related to Arrow's impossibility theorem by relaxing the assumption that groups are nothing more than clusters of atomised individuals. Individuals may seldom see themselves as existing independent of social context for cognitive reasons. The social world is highly complex and individuals, at once, need to cooperate with other individuals to survive and, yet, fear that such cooperation will lead to predation at their expense. How do individuals choose whether to cooperate or not? Cognitive psychologists argue that humans rely upon a series of "fast-and-frugal" heuristics that provide individuals with the ability to make good (meaning, utility maximizing) decisions efficiently without needing to consider every possible factor that determines trustworthiness, which is computationally costly.[23] Shared social identity could be one such heuristic. Henry Hale argues that social, specifically ethnic, identity serves as a powerful basis of cooperation among individuals as it provides visual and/or audible cues which connote that both individuals share the same fate, have reduced or no barriers of communication and cannot credibly reject their social identity to join another group.[24] Sharing the same fate, in this case, means a shared connection to the past and its role in promoting cooperation in the present. Reduced barriers of communication indicate not just a common mother tongue, but a more general common language based on similar experiences that promote trust based on empathy – the ability to put yourself in the shoes of another person, based on your intimate understanding of that person's circumstance. The inability to credibly reject social identity relates to social identity as a negotiated concept. While social identities can be rejected by individuals, barriers are erected based on social conventions that prevent individuals from being accepted into new communities. If one actor embraces their social identity while another rejects it, in other words, both individuals are still bound together either through individual choice or through societal coercion.

It is this bond that is said to form the basis of shared utility between genetically unrelated individuals. How groups of individuals who share the same social identity

[23] Gigerenzer and Todd 1999.
[24] Hale 2008.

define utility, however, is not a matter settled upon by scholars. Proponents of social identity theory (SIT) beginning with Henri Tajfel and colleagues argue that individuals receive psychological benefits from the advancement of their social group that exist independently from whether or not a material reward is attached to this advancement or whether hostility towards another group in which they are in direct competition with is present.[25] Later economists, based on SIT, have proposed that individual utility is composed of the idiosyncratic tastes of the individual and internalized norms which cause them, in turn, to maximize the utility of their social group.[26] Some scholars of ethnicity and conflict, most prominently Donald Horowitz, rely upon SIT to argue that individuals receive psychic rewards when co-ethnic individuals gain access to positions of political power.[27] While, in the abstract, SIT proposes a theory of utility that is exogenous to increases in material reward, it is hard to justify these claims in a political context when group advancement is often intimately connected to both – a point which I will return to in subsection 1.2.3. Regardless of whether or not one takes SIT in its entirety as a credible micro-foundation for within-group cooperation, the proposition that social identity affects individual utility is one that this thesis takes as a starting point for understanding the motivations of political actors.

1.2.2 Social identity demarcates who selects and who ejects the political elite

Just as social identity can be used to form horizontal bonds between otherwise unrelated individuals; social identity can be also be used to form vertical bonds between citizens and leaders. While social identity has, hitherto, been discussed concerning social cooperation, the idea of vertical bonds suggests that social identity can form an equally potent mechanism for understanding political representation. As selectorate theory suggests, governments are never selected by universal consent, even in the most egalitarian democracies. In all cases, there exists a selectorate, a subset of the total

[25] Tajfel et al. 1979; Tajfel 1981.
[26] Akerlof and Kranton 2000.
[27] Horowitz 2000.

population who decide who governs and an ejectorate, the rest of the population that can either tacitly accept the decision of the selectorate or actively oppose it.

This thesis begins with the assumption that the selectorate is not drawn at random from the population but is, instead, determined by belonging to privileged social groups. This assumption, while bold, is not hard to justify when one considers the history of democracy. Ever since the prospect of democracy in the modern era had been broached – whether one includes the English, American or French Revolution as a starting point – these regimes entailed free and fair elections based on an extremely limited suffrage that excluded individuals primarily based on gender, ethnicity and class.[28] Only after the Second World War was the selection of leaders through free and fair elections open to all adults[29] – save for exceptions such as Switzerland and Liechtenstein, where women were given the vote in 1971 and 1984 respectively. While enfranchisement is a necessary part of belonging to the social selectorate in democracy, however, it is by no means sufficient. SIT posits that it is not just whether or not the candidate the individual votes for wins an election, it is also about whether or not the candidate descriptively represents the individual that voted for him/her in terms of social identity. While democracies generally put no legal restrictions upon who gets to govern, in practice, barriers to entry are typically higher for individuals that come from underprivileged class, gender and ethnic backgrounds. More recent theories of intersectionality furthermore suggest that interaction effects exist, meaning that if an individual is underprivileged across a range of social identities, the barriers they face towards entering the pool of potential governors are multiplicatively higher instead of additively.[30] As a result, winning coalitions are often remarkably unrepresentative in purely descriptive terms of the people that voted them into office.[31] As I discuss in the next subsection, the prediction that descriptive representation leads to substantive representation in the form of material reward broadly receives empirical support.

In the case of countries that govern in the absence of free and fair elections, the

[28] Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992; Paxton 2000; Teele 2018.
[29] Alvarez et al. 1996.
[30] Al-Faham, Davis, and Ernst 2019.
[31] Dahl 1971.

social selectorate are often more rigidly demarcated. Under monarchical rulers, most of the population lived in poverty and the selectorate consisted of the aristocracy, whose wealth was based primarily in land ownership and who, in many cases, came from privileged ethnic backgrounds (e.g. the Amhara in Ethiopia) and social castes (e.g. the Caste Hill Hindu Elite in Nepal).[32] At the turn of the 21st century, many monarchies in the Middle East such as Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman and the United Arab Emirates continued to legally bar women from running as members of parliament.[33] Although monarchical rule has been in decline since the French Revolution,[34] however, the social selectorate of many post-monarchical autocracies during the Cold War by no means increased in size or diversity. In Sub-Saharan Africa, a wave of democratic reversals also occurred during the time of decolonization in Sub-Saharan Africa whereby ethnically inclusive democratic ruling coalitions were overthrown in a series of coups and several small ethnic groups tended to gain material benefits that far outstripped their proportional size.[35] While *de jure* Apartheid regimes as existed in South Africa and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) were the logical conclusion of ethnic exclusion, other non-white minority groups descriptively monopolized power in the region such as Liberia, Malawi, Burundi and Ethiopia. A concurrent wave of military coups occurred in Latin America which replaced civilian governments with male-dominated military juntas that used brutally repressive tactics such as mass-execution and/or disappearance of political opponents and, in some cases, genocidal violence. The Cold War also saw a rise in both communist and anti-communist civilian dictatorships – the former of which being supported by the Soviet Union and/or China, while the latter being supported by Western governments led by the United States. Anti-communist regimes typically espoused reactionary views toward social progress that led to the persecution of already marginalized social groups that were perceived to be funded by foreign communist governments.[36] Communism was similar in that enemies of the peo-

[32]Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010; Vogt et al. 2015; Gerring et al. 2020.
[33]Norris and Inglehart 2001.
[34]Gerring et al. 2020.
[35]Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Roessler 2011.
[36]Slater and Smith 2016.

ple were often identified in terms of social identity and were, in some cases, persecuted with equal ferocity when compared to the regimes they ideologically opposed.[37] Furthermore, communism merely redefined the subordinate role women played in society instead of overcoming it, leading to chronic underrepresentation of women in positions of political power.[38] Later in this chapter, I discuss the extent to which the abysmal historical record of social inclusion in autocracy is replicated by many contemporary autocracies.

1.2.3 Social identity determines winners and losers in politics

Descriptive representation relates to the extent to which the political elite share the same identity characteristics as ordinary citizens. However, this raises the question of why an individual would find descriptive representation valuable. A basic assumption many scholars argue from is that descriptive representation tends to lead to substantive representation – the latter relating to the extent to which the political elite pursue policies that advance the interests of those they descriptively represent. Following previous scholars, I adopt the phrase 'descriptive-substantive link' to describe this phenomenon.[39] Scholars interested in how gender, class and ethnic identity influences political outcomes often, whether deliberately or not, posit a descriptive-substantive link between the selectorate and the winning coalition. Separately, these scholars have each demonstrated that social identity is central in understanding the descriptive-substantive link, both in terms of understanding the attributes through which these elite-citizen links operate and how substantive representation manifests itself. Put simply, social identity not only helps social scientists identify who is likely to win (lose) from the political status quo but can help us identify how individuals define winning (losing).

Scholars studying gender in politics have convincingly demonstrated that an increase of women in positions of political power results in policies that advance the

[37] Kim 2018.
[38] Harsch 2014.
[39] Forman-Rabinovici and Sommer 2019.

interests of women. Women are often posited as being distinct from men in the sense that they are descriptively underrepresented in political affairs even though they comprise 50 percent of the total population in most countries. Scholars often measure women's progress either through looking at the proportion of legislative seats or cabinet positions that are assigned to women or through studying thresholds of participation known in the literature as achieving a "critical mass."[40] Regardless of measurement, when women are politically empowered, significant changes in the formation of policy and composition of public spending tend to occur. Such changes include, but are not limited to, increased levels of spending on issues deemed more important to women such as education, healthcare and social assistance, decreased levels of spending on traditionally masculine issues such as defence, and progressive policies that promote female-friendly labour environments and abortion rights.[41]

The most widely disseminated work exploring social identity and democratization tends to focus on the role of class. Cleavages based on class, however, are heterogeneously defined. Some scholars posit that class in society is a bifurcation between a rich minority and a relatively poor majority and that regime type determines which of the two will be substantively represented by the political elite.[42] Other scholars, however, posit that distinctions among the rich should be drawn between those who base their wealth in owning large tracts of land (a.k.a. the aristocracy or agrarian elite) and those who base their wealth in capital (a.k.a. the bourgeoisie).[43] Differences in assets are then said to translate into preferences in government policy and, for some scholars, political regimes. The empirical literature on social class and substantive representation in democracy tends to bypass descriptive representation, focusing either on issues relating to how democratic change increases access to different public goods[44] or how legislative outcomes accord with the preferences of the general public.[45] While the empirical literature that explores the descriptive-substantive link by class is thus less

[40]Grey 2006.
[41]Swiss, Fallon, and Burgos 2012; Atchison 2015; Forman-Rabinovici and Sommer 2019.
[42]Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2005.
[43]Ansell and Samuels 2014.
[44]For instance Lake and Baum 2001; Ross 2006; Ansell 2008.
[45]For instance Gilens and Page 2014; Elkjær and Iversen 2020.

well-developed, recent econometric analysis suggests that economic inequality leads to political inequality between the rich and poor in society while earlier scholars argue that both exist in a continuous feedback loop.[46]

A growing literature studies how descriptive representation of ethnic groups results in substantive representation. Ethnicity is argued to structure elite-citizen relationships through providing a social network that rewards pro-social behaviour and punishes free-riding activity.[47] Earlier accounts argued that ethnic groups receive psychological benefits from descriptive representation that existed exogenously of material reward. However, more recent econometric analyses demonstrates that descriptive representation by elite of a certain ethnicity results in considerable material rewards for co-ethnic citizens. These rewards include increased incomes, educational opportunities, quality of health care and decreased infant mortality.[48] While much of the empirical literature focuses on Sub-Saharan Africa, a recent analysis suggests that ethnic favouritism is pervasive throughout the world, so much so that it should be considered an "axiom" of politics.[49]

1.2.4 Summary

This section began with the premise that politics always produces winners and losers. The winners want to uphold the status quo while the losers want to upend it through changing the political regime. Both actions require collective action that require individuals in both camps to work towards a common goal. While incentives exist for individuals to dissent and thus cause within-group friction, collective action is possible when individuals self-select into groups that are driven by a common interest. Social identity provides a crucial mechanism through which otherwise atomised individuals arrive at a consensus that is widely shared and thus less open to being spoiled by disgruntled members within the group. Social identity achieves this through reducing uncertainty between individuals who share identity characteristics as such characteris-

[46] Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Houle 2018.
[47] Fearon and Laitin 1996; Habyarimana et al. 2007.
[48] Franck and Rainer 2012; Kramon and Posner 2016; De Luca et al. 2018.
[49] De Luca et al. 2018.

tics increase the probability that both share a common connection with history and thus a common interest. Individuals thus increase their utility when they cooperate with members that share the same social identity characteristics. Furthermore, social identity structures vertical relationships between the political elite and ordinary citizens in the sense that the former represents the latter through the descriptive-substantive link. This section presented an argument as to why social identity provides a framework for understanding demand for regime stability and change. Democracy was posited as an opportunity to reshape the selectorate and, as a result, redefine who wins and who loses in politics. However, it went into little detail as to why democracy represents such an opportunity - a point which I will now discuss in depth.

1.3 Principles of democracy and the challenge of electoral authoritarianism

Political scientists have used the mechanics of what democracy is to predict how important political actors view what it does. In comparing democracy to its counterpart, namely dictatorship, many scholars argue that a change from one regime to another has very real ramifications for the interests of those who are privileged and marginalized under the status quo. Should, however, those with privilege under dictatorship view democratic change as intrinsically threatening? The answer is not immediately obvious. Democracy can mean many things to many people, not least to political scientists. Defining democracy is, in itself, a highly contested concept where, as Michael Coppedge notes, "one of the most difficult challenges in studying democratization has been reaching an agreement on what 'democracy' is."[50] The purpose of this section is to discuss in depth how democracy has multiple implications that affect the distribution of privilege in a given country in opposing ways. First, I contrast the popular principle with the liberal and associational principles. Next, I juxtapose these principles with the more procedural approach to studying democracy that many quantitative scholars

[50]Coppedge 2012, p. 11.

of democratization have adopted. Finally, I discuss the challenge of social inclusivity posed by electoral or competitive authoritarianism to proponents of democratization.

1.3.1 The Popular Principle of Democracy

The consequences of different forms of government have been debated by scholars since democracy's birth in Ancient Greece. Philosophers such as Aristotle and Plato were concerned with how politics impacted the ability of the citizen to lead a fulfilling and ethical life. While comparativists today perhaps take for granted that the rights guaranteed under democracy help humans to flourish, both philosophers came to the opposite conclusion. Aristotle viewed democracy as one of the three perverted forms of government in which the rulers arrived at decisions based not on promoting the common good but on advancing their own selfish interests.[51] While tyrants ruled to advance their own interests and oligarchs ruled to the benefit of the rich, Aristotle argued that democrats were found among the poor who advanced their interests by expropriating the wealth of the rich. Such a system, to Aristotle, risked collapse into tyranny unless the disparity of wealth between the rich and the poor was small.[52] Plato attacked democracy from a slightly different angle: in *The Republic*, he argued that politics, like every other profession, should be left to individuals who had undergone rigorous training in the arts of philosophy and statesmanship. If left to the people to decide, however, these so-called philosopher kings would not be selected. Instead, the people would elect individuals that satisfied their immediate material desires over their long-term interests.[53]

Plato and Aristotle anticipated the popular principle of democracy – the principle that democracies should serve the interests of the people. In contemporary political science, this principle is most clearly stated by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson in their influential work *The Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*:

> " . . . non-democracy is generally a regime for the elite and the privileged;

[51] Aristotle and Rackham 1932, Book IV, Part II.
[52] Aristotle and Rackham 1932, Book IV, Part XI.
[53] Plato and Waterfield 2019, Ch. 8, pp. 208-209.

> comparatively, democracy is a regime more beneficial to the majority of the populace, resulting in policies relatively more favourable to the majority."[54]

While we may associate the popular principle in line with Abraham Lincoln's humane and moderate proclamation that democracy is "of the people, by the people, for the people", for Aristotle and Plato, this principle simply meant expropriation of the assets of the rich. The mechanism of expropriation is fairly straightforward. The people play a decisive role in selecting who governs through free and fair elections over the elite simply because the former outnumber the latter in terms of the sheer number of votes the former can collect. Politicians must therefore respond to the people by implementing policies that are the most favourable to their interests which, in game theoretic terms, is tantamount towards following the preferences of the so-called median voter. The influential Meltzer-Richard model of government size under democracy, based on this assumption, suggests that the median voter will opt for a 100 percent tax rate assuming that the costs of transaction are nil.[55] Democracy thus leads to perfect equality between the bottom half who become richer and the top half who become poorer. Needless to say, the Meltzer-Richard model of redistribution under democracy is, for individuals in the bottom (top) half of the income and wealth distribution, a dream (nightmare) come true.

Scholars of political sociology have similarly applied the popular principle of democracy to cases where politically dominant minority groups such as the Afrikaners of South Africa, the Chinese of Taiwan and the Alawites of Syria use authoritarianism to repress ethnic majorities. As Alvin Rabuska and Kenneth Shepsle emphatically state:

> " . . . the overriding fear held by the minority, whether rightly or wrongly, [is] that they stand to be overwhelmed by a vastly larger majority. To protect themselves in this situation, minorities often exclude the majority community from legal participation, deprive them of civil rights and other democratic safeguards, and rely heavily on police rule to maintain order."[56]

Donald Horowitz viewed democratization with similar trepidation for countries escaping ethnic civil war, arguing that "majority rule will become ethnic majority rule."[57]

[54] Acemoglu and Robinson 2005, p. 18.
[55] Meltzer and Richard 1981.
[56] Rabushka and Shepsle 1972, p. 158.
[57] Horowitz 2014, p. 17.

Most recently, Nils-Christian Bormann has demonstrated that ethnically exclusive ruling coalitions are less likely to transition to democracy than ethnically inclusive ruling coalitions for cognate reasons. Bormann's predictions bear repeating, particularly in light of the disaster that unfolded in Syria with the advent of the Arab Spring:

> " ... minority regimes simply have no chance of winning future elections held under majority rule. In order to secure their rule against a numerically superior opposition, ... ethnic minority governments such as [Bashar al-] Assad's Syria ... respond to popular demands for democratization with brutal oppression tactics"[58]

While political economists stress vertical and political sociologists stress horizontal forms of inequality, both argue that democracy, first and foremost, translates the votes of the marginalized into a policy environment that is antithetical to the interests of the privileged.

1.3.2 The Liberal Principle of Democracy

The popular principle of democracy has guided scholars of democratization towards a conception of democracy that is zero sum. For (some) political economists this means redistributing the assets of the rich. For (some) political sociologists this means disempowering or even punishing hitherto dominant minority groups. However, for other scholars, the popular principle paints, at best, a partial and, at worst, a wholly misleading picture of democracy. One of the most notable aspects of the popular principle of democracy is that the analyses conducted by both its proponents and opponents are Platonic or Aristotelian in nature. Both philosophers, however, observed democracy in contexts that are wildly different from that of the modern era in two major regards. First, democracy was direct whereas, today, it is mostly representative. Aristotle makes clear that citizens and elites were one and the same, that is, citizenship entailed direct participation in governmental affairs. Thus, the winning coalition did not represent a selectorate, rather one was a synonym for the other. Second, Athenian democracy was based on systematic exclusion of a decisive majority of the population. Women, immigrants or (sons of immigrants) and slaves (or sons of slaves) were instrumental in

[58] Bormann 2017, p. 129.

the running of Athenian society and yet were barred from gaining executive offices.[59] This exclusion meant that conflicts that occurred among citizens would generally be class-based, that is, among the poor and the rich.

When democracy was reimagined in the modern era, its philosophical progenitors sought to devise a political system that protected, not expropriated, the assets of the rich. John Locke's *Second Treatise of Government* argued that when individuals mixed their labour with land, it was removed from the commons and became their private property. However, without a state, private property was insecure and thus open to predation. While Locke's theory rests upon the dubious assumption that "men have agreed to unequal possession of the earth",[60] Adam Smith more candidly encapsulates the first part of the dilemma the rich face in society in *The Wealth of Nations*:

> "For one very rich man there must be at least five hundred poor, and the affluence of the few supposes the indigence of the many. The affluence of the rich excites the indignation of the poor, who are often both driven by want, and prompted by envy, to invade his possessions. It is only under the shelter of the civil magistrate that the owner of that valuable property ... can sleep a single night in security. He is at all times surrounded by unknown enemies, whom ... he can never appease, and from whose injustice he can be protected only by the powerful arm of the civil magistrate continually held up to chastise it."[61]

To keep the poor from the door of the rich, according to Smith, a government was needed to enforce the unequal distribution of economic assets. However, once stable government was achieved, the rich faced a second dilemma. Many philosophers, beginning with Locke, argued that once individuals were removed from the so-called state of nature, the threat to private property came not from the populace but from the predation of an overly powerful state which would, without legal impediment, expropriate their wealth. Thus, democracy with a suffrage limited to wealthy property owners was proposed so that the rich could protect their rights through hiring and firing their political representatives.[62]

The origins of modern democracy are thus more elitist than populist. The old-

[59] See Osborne 2010.
[60] Locke and Macpherson 1982.
[61] Smith 2001, p. 947.
[62] Blyth 2013.

est democracy in the modern era – the United States – began its independence with a highly restrictive suffrage which only included white property-owning males. As history progressed, however, the franchise grew larger whereby social groups such as women and, in some states, African Americans were given the vote. As democracy began to sweep Western Europe in what was the first of several waves of democratization, proponents of democratic change looked to the example of the United States which had a federally administered government with an expanding suffrage who, instead of directly ruling, voted for representatives that belonged to one of two political parties.[63] Democratic contestation – the ability of the opposition to challenge the incumbent – thus preceded democratic participation – the size of the franchise – during the first wave.[64] In successive waves, most countries that instituted democratic contestation would go on to institute universal adult suffrage.[65] However, contrary to what proponents of the popular principle of democracy might predict, the simultaneous dissemination of democratic contestation and participation has not generally resulted in the poor expropriating the assets of the rich or a vengeful majority persecuting a hated minority.[66]

The liberal principle of democracy – that individual protections against predation by the state should exist – has become increasingly important in shaping the debate among scholars of democratic change, albeit for different reasons. There are, however, two sides to the liberal principle of democracy. Ben Ansell and David Samuels argue that democracy is about protecting the interests of emerging economic elite who are not represented by the current dictatorship and thus face a high risk of predation in comparison to established economic elite.[67] Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo, however, portray a darker side to the liberal principle of democracy. These authors argue that the authoritarian elite often act like corrupt Founding Fathers, manipulating the legal framework democracy provides to lock in the economic gains enjoyed by their support base. In shaping the parameters of democracy, the beneficiaries of autocracy

[63] Meier 1994.
[64] Dahl 1971; Huntington 1993.
[65] Alvarez et al. 1996.
[66] Recent econometric analysis by Dorsch and Maarek (2019) suggests that economic inequality tends to converge towards middling levels after transition from dictatorship to democracy occurs.
[67] Ansell and Samuels 2014.

game the system and can continue to benefit, arguably at the expense of the broader public.[68]

1.3.3 The Associational Principle of Democracy

The popular and liberal principles of democracy contrast sharply with one another. For the former, democracy is about pursuing the will of the people; for the latter, it is about protecting the minority from the majority. There is, however, a third way of viewing democracy that is based on compromise between the elite and the people, and not on conflict. This third way was initially found in the writings of Alexis de Tocqueville, who tried to understand reasons why the American Republic endured. For de Tocqueville, the most important factor that secured democracy in the United States was amicable mores ("habits of the heart") over and above good laws and fortuitous geography. The consequence of the mores peculiar, at the time, to the United States was a thriving associational life whereby individuals learned the values of cooperation towards a common goal which de Tocqueville saw as providing a crucial means through which society preserved political freedom.[69]

The writings of de Tocqueville describe democracy as benefiting from a certain type of citizen, one that is driven both by individual self-interest and a broader sense of civic concern that is largely exogenous to the social identity characteristics assigned to them at birth. This citizen is forged through engaging in civil society which can create cross-cutting cleavages that transcend otherwise harmful ascriptive differences. Concepts such as belonging to a singular nation are argued, by some scholars, to both moderate the demands of the poor for redistribution and the desires of the rich to hoard their wealth.[70] The image of associational life in society is considered by some scholars as a school of democracy, portraying it as a crucial means through which people, from all walks of life, work together and, in doing so, further the interests of everyone involved.[71] However, other scholars have more neutral assessments of civil society arguing it can,

[68] Albertus and Menaldo 2018.
[69] See Tocqueville and Reeve 2009, Section II, Chapter V.
[70] See Kalin and Sambanis 2018.
[71] Putnam 2000.

in some contexts, prove detrimental to democracy as it can disproportionately amplify latent social values that are based on class-conflict, ethnic sectarianism or religious bigotry.[72]

As democracy emerged in places where contentious politics was the norm, many sought to apply the insights of association to state-building – the concept that peace of sorts can be achieved between groups that not only hold conflicting interests but also have a history of conflict through the design of democratic institutions. One of the United States' Founding Fathers, James Madison, was arguably the first political thinker to discuss the problem of competing factions (e.g. groups with passions and interests which violate the rights of other citizens) in a country. In *Federalist Paper 10*, Madison described the deleterious role factions played for the health of a democracy as a product of human nature and thus could not be erased.[73] Instead, Maddison and later scholars proposed that factionalism could be controlled through instituting a federalist system that provided checks and balances on majority and minority abuses of power.[74] Other scholars, most notably Arend Lijphart, proposed that the associational principle could be realized in power-sharing whereby the elite from conflicting groups would work together through a grand coalition where democracy with proportional representation (which empowers the majority) exists alongside mutual vetoes (which protects the minority).[75]

1.3.4 Procedural Democracy and the Challenge Posed by Electoral Authoritarianism

The principles of democracy discussed above are far from exhaustive. Yet they nevertheless provide three distinct visions of what democracy does and, consequently, who wins and who loses as a result. The popular principle paints a picture of democracy that is skewed towards the interests of the majority who, by many accounts, are assumed

[72]For instance Berman 1997; Bermeo 2003.
[73]Madison 1787.
[74]Bermeo 2002; Horowitz 2002.
[75]Lijphart 2002.

to be poor against the interests of the assumed rich minority. The liberal principle, by contrast, argues that democracy protects the rights of the elite who face predation from the people under anarchy and the state under tyranny. The associational principle essentially plots a way between the two extremes, emphasising that institutional design and tolerant societal norms can either mitigate the deleterious effects of factionalism. This thesis, however, asks to what extent these principles are realised in what could be termed procedural democracies, which exist when a country simply follows a set of rules to select political leaders that make it distinct from a country that does not follow these rules. Thus democracy is not distinguishable from dictatorship in terms of any of the principles outlined previously.

The origins of the procedural view of democracy can arguably be found in Joseph Schumpeter's highly influential work *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. Schumpeter defined democracy as an "institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide through a competitive struggle for the people's vote."[76] Although seemingly uncontroversial today, Schumpeter's definition was, at the time, highly revolutionary in its understanding of, and yet utterly mundane in its implication for, democracy. He challenged the notion most influentially articulated by philosophers such as Jean Jacques Rousseau that a general will existed, arguing that it was based on unfounded beliefs of "utilitarian rationalism."[77] Instead, Schumpeter proposed that the popular will did not exist *a priori* to politics but was shaped *a posteriori* according to the interests of what might be termed political specialists. Quite contrary to Meltzer and Richard, Schumpeter theorised that socialism need not go hand in hand with democracy. Democracy thus did not describe an end for Schumpeter. Instead, democracy was considered a procedure through which the people hire and fire governments. Socialism or capitalism could ultimately thrive in democracy. Through Schumpeter we thus gain a valuable insight: political regimes could be orthogonal to economic and social outcomes.

Schumpeter's definition of democracy is also binary. Democracy in country i at

[76]Schumpeter 1947, p. 269.
[77]Schumpeter 1947, p. 265.

time t either exists or it does not. Countries that are not democracies are thus dictatorships – a residual category which describes all other regimes in which rulers are elected through means other than free and fair elections.[78] Giovanni Sartori argued that a scientific understanding of concepts such as democracy lends itself toward producing sharp distinctions between cases. Sartori, however, was not without interlocutors. Kenneth Bollen most prominently argued in various works that democracy was always matter of degree, not classification.[79] The most cogent critique of electoral democracy as a binary concept, however, came from Robert Dahl who argued that scholars such as Schumpeter and Sartori prioritized contestation (the ability of oppositions to fairly compete with incumbents for power) over participation (the degree to which the ordinary people participate in creating governments).[80] Dahl viewed democracy or "polyarchy" as existing in countries where contestation was meaningful, and participation was high. Data collection by research teams has incorporated participation by including thresholds of enfranchisement.[81] Later scholarship by Svend-Erik Skaaning and colleagues, however conceptualises electoral democracy using an ordinal scale which ranges from no elections (low contestation and participation) to minimally competitive multiparty elections with universal suffrage for legislative and executive appointments (high contestation and participation).[82]

In the post-World War II period, the participation-contestation distinction is, in one sense, a moot point. When democratic contestation exists, it tends to be accompanied with universal suffrage.[83] However, in the case of countries where the institutions of democratic contestation do not exist, the issue of participation continues to be of the utmost importance for scholars particularly after the end of the Cold War. Before this momentous event, dictatorships exhibited great institutional heterogeneity. Some were ruled by militaries. Others by monarchs. Still others by civilian elites that relied, to

[78] Svolik 2012.
[79] For a review of the debate between Sartori and Bollen, see Collier and Adcock 1999.
[80] Dahl 1971.
[81] For instance Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2013.
[82] Skaaning, Gerring, and Bartusevičius 2015, p. 1496-7.
[83] Alvarez et al. 1996.

varying degrees, on political parties.[84] However, we have seen in subsection 1.2.2 that these dictatorships relied upon demobilization of, repression toward and discrimination against individuals often based on social identity.

Today's dictatorships, by contrast, often converge toward an electoral or competitive form of rule whereby the political elite rely upon flawed multi-party elections to justify their privileged access to political power.[85] Once dismissed by Samuel Huntington as a halfway house that could not stand, electoral autocracies continue to show remarkable resilience and, at present, constitute the modal political regime according to data provided by the V-Dem project.[86] Electoral autocracies still use repression. Analysis by Svend-Erik Skaaning and colleagues suggests that competitive autocracies can be every bit as repressive as regimes that rely on no or one-party elections.[87] Electoral autocrats further use underhand methods such as reserved positions in the executive, harassment of opposition parties, media bias, informal disenfranchisement, vote buying, electoral fraud and tutelary powers to maximize their hold on power.[88] However, electoral authoritarianism does not survive through repression or co-optation alone. As Johannes Gerschewski writes:

> "Today's autocracies cannot rely ... entirely on their abuse of power in a strictly hierarchical, pyramid-shaped political order as the unconstrained tyrants of the past."[89]

While electoral autocrats thus draw from a 'menu of manipulation', they nevertheless need to demonstrate to domestic and international audiences that their chances of winning elections would nevertheless be high even if such a menu was never to exist.[90] As a result, several scholars argue that autocracies increasingly need to deliver tangible benefits to maintain legitimacy with the public.[91] This involves not just the ability to achieve economic growth but for that growth to be translated into access to public

[84] Geddes 1999; Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010.
[85] Schedler 2002; Levitsky and Way 2010.
[86] Huntington 1993; Carothers 2002; Maerz et al. 2020.
[87] Skaaning, Gerring, and Bartusevičius 2015.
[88] Schedler 2002.
[89] Gerschewski 2013, p. 18.
[90] Schedler 2002; Levitsky and Way 2010.
[91] Treisman 2011; Gerschewski 2013; Miller 2015.

goods. An analysis by Michael Miller finds that electoral autocracies tend to deliver better provision of public goods than the closed autocracies of the past.[92]

The challenge posed by electoral authoritarianism is often framed in terms of valence. However, a further challenge that is perhaps less appreciated can be framed in terms of social inclusivity. While public goods are intended to benefit all, some electoral autocracies have begun to empower social groups that may otherwise have been subject to marginalization or persecution under closed autocracies. In doing so, the new authoritarian elite could dampen the overall level of demand for democratization within society. Anja Neundorf and colleagues comprehensively examine the effect of inclusionary autocracy on attitudes towards democracy by leveraging survey data from 71 countries. They find that when social groups benefit from autocracy, individuals which comprise these groups are more likely to form negative beliefs about democracy.[93] The continued dominance of the Movement for Socialism (MAS) in Bolivian politics, for instance, has seen the fate of indigenous groups – long marginalized in national politics – go from being under to well represented among the ranks of the political elite. As Jonas Wolff points out in a recent article:

> "With the rise of the MAS to political power, social organizations and movements that represent important segments of the socio-economically disadvantaged part of the Bolivian population have gained access to the political arena and have seen their actual influence on policymaking increase significantly."[94]

Wolff powerfully argues that we, as scholars and (likely) proponents of democratization, ignore increasing descriptive representation in our assessment of political regimes at our peril as we overlook how such representation can make a positive difference in the lives of underprivileged social groups. Scholars of democratization Sub-Saharan Africa have further noted that women - who constitute half of the total population - have made some of the largest gains in descriptive representation in countries such as Rwanda and Uganda where democratic contestation emphatically does not exist.[95] Other statistical

[92]Miller 2015.
[93]Neundorf, Gerschewski, and Olar 2019.
[94]Wolff 2018, p. 700.
[95]Bauer 2012; Blankenship and Kubicek 2018.

analysis of women's representation, at best, paints a very ambiguous picture over the extent to which democracy has politically empowered women.[96]

The rise of inclusive autocracy makes for sobering reading for any considered proponent of democracy who understandably sees it as a means through which underprivileged groups can find their voice. In his seminal work *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, Robert Dahl - one of the most powerful advocates of democracy in the field - argued that descriptive representation was one of the reasons why we should value polyarchy:

> "Broadened participation combined with political competition brings about a change in the composition of the political leadership, particularly among those who gain office by means of elections ... As new groups are granted suffrage, candidates closer in their social characteristics to the newly incorporated strata win a greater share of elective offices."[97]

During the time, it is understandable that Dahl would come to such a conclusion. As we have seen, authoritarian rule has historically relied upon a highly exclusive social selectorate. John Gerring and colleagues in 2012 offer a similarly (if more tentatively) positive take on democratization and empowerment:

> "... democracy may serve to inaugurate a culture of equality that empowers oppressed groups. In the process of granting formal citizenship rights to outgroups—lower castes and classes, peasants, racial, ethnic, and religious minorities—democracy may foster a political dynamic in which these groups conceptualize their interests as a matter of rights and take a correspondingly aggressive approach to satisfying those rights in the political, social, and economic spheres."[98]

However, the rise of what Dahl would have termed "inclusive hegemonies" – regimes characterised by high participation yet low contestation – suggests that descriptive power can be distributed widely across social groups without democratic contestation.

1.3.5 Summary

As this review suggests, scholars of democratization have utilized different principles of democracy to arrive at how the winners and losers of the status quo form regime

[96] Arriola and Johnson 2014; Stockemer and Kchouk 2017; Stockemer 2018.
[97] Dahl 1971, pp. 20-1.
[98] Gerring, Thacker, and Alfaro 2012, p. 3.

preferences. The popular principle suggests that democracy turns losers to winners by, in effect, turning winners into losers. The liberal principle suggests that democracy enables the winners to keep winning and the losers to keep losing. The associational principle, however, suggests that, through institutional design and social cooperation, everyone can be a winner in democracy. This review tried to understand these principles in the context of understanding procedural democracy. Furthermore, it argued that the changing nature of autocracy from social exclusion to social inclusion posed a challenge to proponents of democracy. There are, of course, other factors that make democracy more desirable than dictatorship. Electoral authoritarianism is not only inclusive but hegemonic and the political elite in these regimes appear just as willing to use repression to perpetuate their rule as the autocracies of the past.[99] However, in ignoring the power of social identity, understood across different cleavages, as a crucial way in which citizens and leaders relate to one another, proponents of democratization risk underestimating the level of popular support for electoral authoritarianism. Through taking a more comparative perspective on social identity it is the hope of this author that we can better understand the challenge of inclusivity that the current generation of autocracies pose towards democracy. Previous scholars have made similar remarks regarding cognate areas of study. In 2004, for instance, Teri Caraway strongly advocated for a more comparative approach towards understanding suffrage expansion that included gender and ethnic marginalization along with class in the journal *Comparative Politics*:

> "By confining the study of democratization to the incorporation of (white) men, the picture of the politics of democratization is skewed. Gender and race appear to play little or no role because the group obtaining the vote is white men. Such a simplistic view overlooks the extent to which class, gender, and race are mutually constructed and interact in concrete historical circumstances."[100]

I propose that a more comparative understanding of social identity is just as badly needed when understanding the roots of democratic contestation itself. Focusing specifically on democratic change as a primarily class-based struggle ignores how other as-

[99] Skaaning, Gerring, and Bartusevičius 2015.
[100] Caraway 2004, p. 443.

criptive forms of inclusion and exclusion determine whether such change is either accommodated or repressed. While Caraway limited her insightful critique largely to the extension of the franchise, debates about the origins and consequences of democratic regimes are equally pressing. Political regimes consist of rules about who is allowed to govern. The who in this question, however, is not selected at random. Instead, inequality between varieties of social group often impact, and in some cases completely determine, the chances that an individual will either get to govern or will have their preferences be represented by those who govern. I now turn to the outline of this thesis which discusses my empirical contributions towards this comparative understanding.

1.4 Outline of thesis

The previous sections in this chapter explored common themes and debates within the broader literature on social identity and democratic change. They explored not only how inequality between social groups influence the politics of democratic change but also, conversely, what transition to democracy can do to reshape inequality that would not occur if the political status quo were simply maintained. Section 1.2 argued that social identity membership provides an important perspective through which individuals conceptualize their position in politics and, consequently, the extent to which they see themselves as supporters of democratic change. Section 1.3, however, argued that the implications of democracy are ambiguous. Does democracy substantively empower the masses in terms of pursuing policies that the elite do not like? Conversely, does democracy provide a crucial check against the ability of the populace that benefits the elite? Or does neither extreme occur? Can working together, as the associational principle suggests, result in cooperation between otherwise competing social groups as they emerge from the shadow of divisive authoritarian politics?

This introduction has outlined the theory that a descriptive-substantive link exists between co-ethnic citizens and the political elite. However, this raises the question of who are the political elite? While previous data has existed, it does not provide sufficient cross-sectional and temporal coverage to make global generalizations about

the social characteristics and political affiliations of the political elite over a long time period. Chapter 2 thus introduces WhoGov – a data set that provides disaggregated data on individual members of cabinets (including political leaders) in 177 countries from 1966 to 2018. This chapter is based on an article co-written by Jacob Nyrup and me that is now published in the *American Political Science Review*.[101] WhoGov is the largest data set of its kind that can enable scholars to empirically address questions in politics that have hitherto been impossible. It is the hope of myself and the rest of the WhoGov team that this data set will prove to be an invaluable resource for scholars who are interested in further exploring the interaction between social identity and political power.

The chapters that follow comprise the theoretically substantive portion of this thesis. Each takes a component of social identity – gender, class and ethnicity – and addresses key sources of contention among scholars in the field who tend to study each component in isolation.

Chapter 3 seeks to understand the role women's empowerment plays in influencing the probability that a dictatorship will transition to democracy. While the influence of women in promoting democratic change has been traditionally downplayed in the literature, a growing number of scholars have sought to understand women not only as key progenitors (both in terms of expanding the franchise and promoting democratic transition) but also as key beneficiaries of democratic change. This chapter expands upon the literature by developing a theory that attempts to understand women's influence on democratic transition through the perspective of understanding how democratic transition can benefit women as a social group distinct from men. Instead of portraying women as unconditional supporters of democracy, this chapter instead proposes that women will tolerate the political status quo depending on whether or not they can influence public policy.

Consequently, chapter 3 argues that ordinary women are more likely to support the status quo, regardless of regime type, when political power is assigned to female

[101] Nyrup and Bramwell 2019.

elites. Female elites are posited to represent female citizens through the descriptive-substantive link, increasing spending on issues that women typically care about more than men. Furthermore, this chapter considers two different kinds of female empowerment namely civil and political. It argues that women's civil empowerment under dictatorship is positively correlated with transition to democracy for reasons related to demand and supply. I argue that the structure of competition for influence under authoritarian rule throughout the Cold War has resulted in the near monopolization of political power by men. Democracy, conversely, enables ordinary women to make their voices heard in the public sphere and, as a result, have their needs taken seriously by the political elite. Thus, the demand for democracy among women is historically high. I further argue that the visibility of women in the public sphere lowers the perceived costs of repression by the authoritarian elite who may fear economic, political or social retribution if a transition were to occur.

The impact of political empowerment, however, is more complicated and recent scholarship suggests that it is by no means clear that democratization has led to an increase in descriptive representation for women. Using WhoGov, chapter 3 demonstrates that the female representation 'gap' between democracies and dictatorships is mostly driven by the poor performance of closed autocracies and the superior performance of liberal democracies – each of which represents a diminishing proportion of countries in the world today. Closed autocracies of the past were undoubtedly a blight on the interests of women and consisted largely of male-dominated winning coalitions and selectorates. By contrast, examples abound of electoral authoritarian regimes such as Rwanda and Uganda where women are descriptively well represented among the political elite. This chapter consequently argues that political empowerment of women under dictatorships negatively influences the probability of democratic transition. Ordinary women may be less inclined to participate in pro-democratic demonstrations if they are descriptively represented under the current regime. This chapter not only reiterates calls to take women as social and political actors seriously in understanding the politics of regime change, but further argues that proponents of such change need

to convince women that they can be better represented – in descriptive terms – under democracy than under autocracy.

Chapter 4 discusses the role that social class plays in understanding the extent to which elite who are connected to the authoritarian past continue to be assigned positions of political power after transition to democracy – a phenomenon I describe as 'authoritarian influence'. In doing so, it contributes to the debate among scholars of democratization that section 1.3 detailed. Does democracy promote policies favourable to the masses by holding the political elite directly accountable? Or are the economic elite able to lock in their interests using the superior protection of property rights democracies afford? Or does democratization empower an entirely new set of actors that are, at once, wealthy and yet wholly unaffiliated with the previous autocracy? While some scholars have argued that distributional conflict fuelled by these questions is expressed in terms of democratic change or authoritarian stability, chapter 4 instead considers the prospect that such conflict is expressed in terms of the level of authoritarian influence that is present after transition. In doing so, it develops synergies between the democratization literature and an emerging literature on authoritarian successor parties.

This chapter compares and contrasts two different models of understanding authoritarian influence namely median voter and elite competition found within the political economy of democratization literature. The median voter model posits that authoritarian influence will be greater in the current democracy when the previous autocracy delivered widespread benefits to the general public. Consequently, authoritarian influence will be higher post-transition when economic inequality is low, growth is high and average incomes are high. The elite competition model posits that authoritarian influence will be lower in cases where a new economic elite emerge that are wholly unaffiliated with the previous authoritarian regime. Consequently, authoritarian influence will be lower post-transition when economic inequality, growth and average incomes are all higher.

This chapter uses the power of WhoGov to create two new measures of authoritar-

ian influence. The first is the proportion of cabinet portfolios that are assigned to elite who had ruling experience under the previous autocracy. The second is the proportion of cabinet portfolios assigned to affiliates of so-called authoritarian successor parties. Perhaps surprisingly, this chapter finds that both measures are positively yet not highly correlated with one another which suggests that both forms of authoritarian influence originate from distinct data generating processes. Using these measures, this article finds a larger degree of support for the elite competition model of authoritarian influence than the median voter model for different reasons. The previous authoritarian elite are more or less likely to exert influence as a result of economic conditions that existed in the previous authoritarian regime. By contrast, authoritarian successor party affiliates are more or less likely to exert influence as a result of economic conditions that exist in the current democracy. Further analysis suggests that as the urban middle classes gain more political influence, both kinds of authoritarian influence decrease. By contrast, when the agrarian elite gain more political influence, the proportion of authoritarian successor party affiliates in cabinet increases.

Chapter 5 discusses the role that demographic inequality (proxied by group size) among ethnic groups plays in influencing individual attitudes toward democracy. It asks several questions pertinent to the discussion in section 1.3. How does group identity influence individual perceptions of democracy? Do minorities have an aversion to democracy? In doing so, it tests the micro-foundations of each principle of democracy (popular, liberal and associational) by looking at how group size influences individual perceptions of democracy. It considers the role that group size plays in influencing individual perceptions but develops the idea that group size should not only influence relative support towards democracy, but also which principles of democracy individuals find most salient.

Using survey data from Sub-Saharan Africa, this chapter finds evidence that group size does indeed influence individual perceptions towards democracy. However, it does not find evidence in favour of the proposition that group size positively predicts individual support for democracy. Under existing democracies, no significant relationship

exists between group size and individual support for democracy. Under existing dictatorships, however, individuals who belong to larger ethnic groups are more likely to believe that democracy exists and are satisfied with the way democracy currently operates (even though, by standard definitions, it does not) than individuals from smaller ethnic groups. Furthermore, individuals from minorities express significantly more fear of rule by unconstrained despots who could use their power to expropriate their assets or, worse yet, pursue a campaign of violent persecution against them. Individuals belonging to ethnic groups thus do not fear democracy so much as they fear the consequences of dictatorships that, unconstrained by laws, result in their economic and political persecution. This chapter also finds that group size influences the relative salience individuals place on different principles of democracy. Individuals from smaller ethnic groups tend to view liberal or associational principles that emphasize individual liberties or inter-ethnic cooperation more saliently than they view the popular principle. Nevertheless, it does not find that group size predicts the degree of individual acceptance towards popular elections.

This chapter thus portrays a picture of inter-ethnic relations based not on minority aversion but minority compromise towards larger ethnic groups. Furthermore, it suggests that citizens from ethnic minorities are not more averse to democracy than citizens from ethnic majorities. Instead it portrays a more tempered image of how minority citizens perceive democracy that stresses an aversion not to democratic rule but to popular autocratic rule. Throughout, this chapter discusses how this theory is in more accordance with the contemporary history of Sub-Saharan Africa whereby, traditionally, minority groups tended to suffer more harm under unconstrained dictatorships than under democratic rule despite the highly imperfect nature of the latter. It also broaches the issue of whether minority citizens are so supportive of minority autocrats as such leaders (a) use discrimination against the majority thus making the minority more hated and; (b) can use threats of unconstrained majoritarian rule to extract more concessions from their minority support base.

Chapter 6 concludes the thesis in three sections. The first provides a short theoreti-

cal and empirical summary of the thesis. The second draws together policy implications for proponents of democratization based on the findings presented in the substantive chapters. The final section discusses empirical extensions for WhoGov that could advance our understanding of how social identity and political power interact.

Chapter 2

Who governs? A new global data set on members of cabinets

2.1 Forward

This chapter introduces WhoGov – short for Who Governs – which I use in chapters 3 and 4. In subsections 3.3.7 and 4.4.1, I go into detail as to how I use WhoGov to create the metrics used in the analyses. This chapter presents an article co-written by Jacob Nyrup and I that was recently published in the *American Political Science Review*. Jacob and I decided to collaborate because we both needed data of this kind for our respective DPhil projects.

2.2 Introduction

There is an enormous literature on the composition of political elites. Yet, there is currently no time-series data set on governing elites in a large number of countries, and political scientists are therefore unable to answer even basic descriptive questions such as: what is the share of female cabinet members globally, which type of regime has the highest cabinet turnover, and have cabinets increased in size over time? This naturally also hampers our ability to answer questions of theoretical importance.

In this article, we present a new data set, WhoGov, which contains information on

cabinet members in the period 1966-2016 in all countries with a population of more than 400,000 citizens.[1] In total, the data set contains yearly information on 50,197 cabinet members in 177 countries. WhoGov provides vastly greater cross-sectional and temporal coverage compared to existing data sets on cabinets.[2]

We created the data set based on the 'Chief of State And Cabinet Members Of Foreign Governments' directory compiled by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The original documents were digitized through machine-learning and extensive manual cleaning. This provided the position and the name for every cabinet member for a given country in July of every year. To this, we added party affiliation gender, and organized the portfolios into categories. The data set is highly flexible and can be used to calculate countless variables of interest, including the number of female ministers, ministerial experience, cabinet turnover and cabinet size at the country-year level.

We first present how the data was created and validate it against other data sets. Afterwards, we prove that the data set can be used to gain insight. We replicate and extend Leonardo Arriola's study on how African leaders increase the size of the cabinet to distribute patronage and show that the results do not travel outside of Africa, indicating that leaders outside of Africa adjust the size of the cabinet for different reasons than African leaders.[3] Then we demonstrate how the data can be used to gain new insights into four different fields, namely the study of autocracies, gender studies, the study of regime types and government formation. The data has many more applications, and we are excited to see how scholars will use this contribution to political science.

[1] We also include former sovereign states such as the Soviet Union. The data goes up to 2018 for some countries. A full list of countries and years covered by the data set is available in Appendix A.4.

[2] We also refer readers to the project's webpage, `https://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/our-research/research-centres/nuffield-politics-research-centre/whogov`, for further information.

[3] Arriola 2009.

2.3 Existing data sets

The most comprehensive work utilizing minister-level data involves advanced industrial democracies. The bulk of this work focuses on the determinants of minister selection and survival on a country-by-country basis.[4] Several previous studies employ cross-national data and data resources have been made publicly available for researchers interested in comparisons.[5] The Selection and Deselection of Political Elites (SEDEPE) research network offers a data set on 19 European countries from 1945 to 1984, while Alexiadou offers data on 18 OECD countries from 1945 to 2010, and Bértoa presents a new data set on European democracies since 1848.[6]

The equivalent longitudinal data resources covering emerging democracies and autocracies are less developed. Many studies tend to focus on single countries[7] while studies that aim at cross-country comparisons tend to focus on a small number of countries from a specific region such as Latin America,[8] Central-Eastern Europe[9] and Sub-Saharan Africa[10]. Other scholars have reduced the temporal coverage, and increased the number of countries. The recent Global Leadership Project (GLP), for instance, limits temporal coverage of ministers from 2013 onward[11] while an earlier data set compiled by Braun and Raddatz[12] only begins in 1996. Furthermore, some studies only include specific positions, such as leaders[13] or the foreign or finance minister[14].

To sum up, there is, to date, no global data set on governments over a long time span, and the case for such a data set is clear. Table 2.1 compares WhoGov to existing prominent data sets on governments.

[4] E.g. Fischer and Kaiser 2007; Bäck et al. 2009; Berlinski, Dewan, and Dowding 2010; Kam et al. 2010; Kerby 2011; Rodrıguez-Teruel 2011; Smith and Martin 2017.
[5] E.g. Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2008; Bright, Döring, and Little 2015.
[6] Dowding and Dumont 2008; Alexiadou 2016; Bértoa 2020.
[7] Kung and Chen 2011; Schleiter 2013; Buehler and Ayari 2018; Woldense 2018.
[8] Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Camerlo and Perez-Liñan 2015; Camerlo and Martinez-Gallardom 2020.
[9] Bego 2014; Semenova 2018.
[10] Arriola and Johnson 2014; Francois, Rainer, and Trebbi 2014; Kroeger 2020.
[11] Gerring et al. 2019.
[12] Braun and Raddatz 2010.
[13] Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009.
[14] Quiroz Flores 2016; Alexiadou and Gunaydin 2018.

Table 2.1: Available time-series cross-sectional data sets on cabinets

Data Set	Countries (N)	From	To	Region
WhoGov	177	1966	2016	Global
Alexiadou (2016)	18	1945	2010	OECD
Bértoa (2020)	48	1848[15]	Present	Europe
Braun & Raddatz (2010)	150	1996	2005	Global
GLP (2019)	145	2013	Present	Global
Presidential Cabinets (2020)	19	1958	Present	The Americas
SEDEPE (2008)	19	1945	1984	W. Europe

2.4 Creation of the data set


In the following section, we briefly describe the data gathering process and choices of relevance to researchers using the data. We refer to appendix A.5 for a more in depth description.

The original source of data is the "Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments", which is published by the United States' CIA. This directory contains the name, the position and title (if any) of all cabinet ministers and other members of the government in as many countries as practically possible. The earliest available version dates back to 1966 and the directory has been updated at least half-yearly until today. We have obtained the files for every July in the period from 1966 to 2016 and digitized the files. We have used July because data was most widely available for this month.[16]

Figure 2.1 provides an example of the raw data for Denmark in July 1968. The entries are comparable for all countries across all years. To digitize the data, we ran an optical character recognition (OCR) on all the files and developed a script, which turned the original files into digital data files. The script contained a long range of checks, which cleaned the data using matching methods and machine learning.

We then proceeded to an extensive manual cleaning of the data, which especially focused on ensuring that the same person's name is spelled consistently across years, enabling researchers to follow the careers of individuals over time. Furthermore, we

[16]The directory began in September 1966, and we are therefore using September for 1966. Furthermore, it has not been possible to obtain the files from July in 1970. Instead, we use January for 1970.



DENMARK

KING	FREDERIK IX
PRIME MINISTER	BAUNSGAARD, HILMAR
MIN OF AGRICULTURE	LARSEN, PETER
MIN OF CHURCH AFFAIRS	PEDERSEN, ARNE FOG
MIN OF COMMERCE	THOMSEN, KNUD
MIN OF CULTURAL AFFAIRS, DISARMAMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES	PETERSEN, K. HELVEG
MIN OF DEFENSE	HANSEN, ERIK NINN
MIN OF ECONOMIC & NORDIC AFFAIRS	ANDERSEN, POUL NYBOE
MIN OF EDUCATION	LARSEN, HELGE
MIN OF FINANCE	MOLLER, POUL
MIN OF FISHERIES	NORMANN, ARNOLD C.
MIN OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	HARTLING, POUL
MIN OF GREENLAND AFFAIRS	NORMANN, ARNOLD C.
MIN OF HOUSING	HASTRUP, AAGE
MIN OF INTERIOR	SORENSEN, POUL
MIN OF JUSTICE	THESTRUP, KNUD
MIN OF LABOR	DAHLGAARD, LAUGE
MIN OF PUBLIC WORKS & TRANSPORT	GULDBERG, OVE
MIN OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS	LIND, NATHALIE

Figure 2.1: The cabinet in Denmark, July 1968.

looked up every person when in doubt about the entry and used alternative biographical information to triangulate the data. All countries were independently checked by an extra person to ensure accuracy. The end product is a list of members of the cabinet for all years in a given country.

The original names for cabinet portfolios are idiosyncratic both across countries and over time. The Chancellor of the Exchequer in the United Kingdom is, for example, equivalent to the Minister of Finance in other countries. We therefore sorted all ministerial positions into 42 different types of portfolios based on the typology put forward in Krook and O'Brien.[17]. Some ministers have several different portfolios as a part of their ministry. For example, France in 2003 had a Minister of Youth, National Education & Research. To account for this, we have included up to four different portfolios to be associated with each minister. Furthermore, we added a classification to every position, making it easy for researchers to distinguish between different groups of governing elites such as full cabinet ministers, junior ministers, presidents and royals. Lastly, many countries have several ministers covering the same portfolio. For example, Nigeria in 2003 simultaneously had a minister of the navy, a minister of the air-force, a minister for the army, and a general minister of defense. We have therefore singled out the most important portfolios and added a binary variable for whether a person is

[17]Krook and O'Brien 2012.

the minister of finance, the minister of defense, the minister of foreign affairs and the minister of agriculture. The choices for classifying positions are described further in Appendix A.6.

We also added the party affiliation and gender for all ministers and year of birth/death for ministers in all OECD, G20 and EU countries plus a handful of other countries.[18] The party affiliation is time variant and therefore takes into account if members of the elite change parties. We use the abbreviations from the PartyFacts' database, which allows researchers to merge this data set with other data sets on parties.[19] The process for adding party affiliation is described in depth in Appendix A.7.

An example of the final output for the raw data in figure 2.1 is shown in figure 2.2. The final data set contains 226,662 of such rows. Based on the detailed data set, we create a cross-national panel data set with 8,057 country years. This data set contains several variables, including, but not limited to, the size of cabinet, number of women, the retention rate for a given year, and the average experience of the cabinet ministers. We have also added information on the leader start/end date based on Archigos[20] and the government start/end date based on ParlGov[21] and Bértoa,[22] enabling researchers to merge WhoGov with these data sets. The full list of variables and how they are coded can be seen in Appendices A.1 and A.2. The data set is incredibly flexible, and it is possible to create many more variables than those we provide in the cross-national panel data set. Thus, we encourage researchers not to limit themselves to the latter.

[18] See Appendix A.4 for coverage on the party affiliation and birth year.
[19] Döring and Regel 2019.
[20] Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009.
[21] Döring and Manow 2019.
[22] Bértoa 2020.

year	country	country.is	position	name	title	gender	birthyear	deadyear	party	party_nan	party_nan	core	minister	leader	classificat	portfolio_	prestige_
1968	DNK	Denmark	King	Frederik Ix	NA	Male	1899	1972	inde	indepen	independ	0	0	0	Royal	NA	NA
1968	DNK	Denmark	Prime Ministe	Hilmar Baun	NA	Male	1920	1989	rv	Danish So	Det Radik	1	0	1	Prime Mir	NA	NA
1968	DNK	Denmark	Min. Of Agricu	Peter Larsen	NA	Male	1924	1970	v	Liberal Pa	Venstre	1	1	0	Minister	Agricultur	Medium
1968	DNK	Denmark	Min. Of Churcl	Arne Fog Pe	NA	Male	1911	1984	v	Liberal Pa	Venstre	1	1	0	Minister	Religion	Medium
1968	DNK	Denmark	Min. Of Comm	Knud Thoms	NA	Male	1908	1996	kf	Conservat	Konservat	1	1	0	Minister	Industry &	Medium
1968	DNK	Denmark	Min. Of Cultur	K. Helveg Pe	NA	Male	1909	1997	rv	Danish So	Det Radik	1	1	0	Minister	Culture &	Low
1968	DNK	Denmark	Min. Of Defen	Erik Ninn-Ha	NA	Male	1922	2014	kf	Conservat	Konservat	1	1	0	Minister	Defense, I	High
1968	DNK	Denmark	Min. Of Econo	Poul Nyboe	NA	Male	1913	2004	v	Liberal Pa	Venstre	1	1	0	Minister	Foreign Re	High
1968	DNK	Denmark	Min. Of Educat	Helge Larser	NA	Male	1915	2000	rv	Danish So	Det Radik	1	1	0	Minister	Education	Medium
1968	DNK	Denmark	Min. Of Financ	Poul Moller	NA	Male	1919	1997	kf	Conservat	Konservat	1	1	0	Minister	Finance, E	High
1968	DNK	Denmark	Min. Of Fisher	Arnold C. Nc	NA	Male	1904	1978	rv	Danish So	Det Radik	1	1	0	Minister	Agricultur	Medium
1968	DNK	Denmark	Min. Of Foreig	Poul Hartling	NA	Male	1914	2000	v	Liberal Pa	Venstre	1	1	0	Minister	Foreign Re	High
1968	DNK	Denmark	Min. Of Green	Arnold C. Nc	NA	Male	1904	1978	rv	Danish So	Det Radik	1	1	0	Minister	Regional	Low
1968	DNK	Denmark	Min. Of Housir	Aage Hastru	NA	Male	1919	1993	kf	Conservat	Konservat	1	1	0	Minister	Housing	Medium
1968	DNK	Denmark	Min. Of Interic	Poul Sorens	NA	Male	1904	1969	kf	Conservat	Konservat	1	1	0	Minister	Governme	High
1968	DNK	Denmark	Min. Of Justice	Knud Thestri	NA	Male	1900	1980	kf	Conservat	Konservat	1	1	0	Minister	Justice & I	Medium
1968	DNK	Denmark	Min. Of Labor	Lauge Dahlg	NA	Male	1919	1996	rv	Danish So	Det Radik	1	1	0	Minister	Labor, Em	Medium
1968	DNK	Denmark	Min. Of Public	Ove Guldber	NA	Male	1918	2008	v	Liberal Pa	Venstre	1	1	0	Minister	Construct	Medium

Figure 2.2: Final output for Denmark, July 1968

2.5 Validation

Researchers may reasonably express concerns about the quality of our data given that other data sets are gathered manually, while we primarily rely on automatized methods. To address these concerns we cross-validate main variables from this data set against main variables found in other data sets in figure 2.3.

The value of the variable in the validation data set is shown on the x-axis, while our corresponding value is displayed on the y-axis. In the top panels, we match our measure of cabinet size against Arriola and Johnson's data on African ministers (1980-2005) and Indridason and Bowler's data on European cabinets (1945-2003).[23] In the middle panels, we compare the share of female ministers derived from our data with Arriola and Johnson and Krook and O'Brien, which has worldwide coverage for 2009.[24] The bottom panels display our measure of the number of parties against Döring and Manow's data on parliamentary democracies (1966-2016) and Kroeger's measure of retention rates for African countries (1976-2010).[25]

Two points are worth noting. Firstly, all measures correlate very strongly. Secondly, the figures highlight some interesting differences to other data sets. The correlation is lowest for Kroeger and Arriola and Johnson. They base their data on the yearly volumes of Europa Publications Limited, which records the composition of cabinets once a year, often at irregular intervals.[26] Instead, we have data for July every year, which ensures consistency. This can explain the discrepancy, especially for replacement rate which is highly dependent on when it is measured. The downside is that we do not record the cabinet exactly at the time when a new government enters office, which might be preferred by researchers studying government formation.

Another strength is that we record our data for every minister and then aggregate the data. WhoGov contains junior ministers and other members of the elite, which other data sets usually do not include. Most other data sets only present the aggre-

[23] Arriola and Johnson 2014; Indridason and Bowler 2014.
[24] Krook and O'Brien 2012; Arriola 2009.
[25] Kroeger 2020; Döring and Manow 2019.
[26] Europa Publications Limited 1975-2010.

gated data and we are therefore unable to say with certainty that the same people are included. This may explain some of the discrepancies we see in figure 2.3.

Lastly, we tend to include more parties than ParlGov. We do so for two reasons. First, we generally separate electoral alliances into parties. An example is the Solidarity Electoral Action in Poland, which we separate into eight different parties. Second, we do not code the governing coalition, but the party affiliation of ministers. There are cases, where a minister does not belong to a party in the governing coalition. For example, the Minister for Maori Development in New Zealand is often from one of the parties representing Maori rights, even when the latter are not in the governing coalition.




Figure 2.3: Cross-validating the data set against other data sets

2.6 Applications

The data can give political scientists a better understanding of important political phenomena.[27] We demonstrate how our data set can help advance our knowledge of the determinants of cabinet size by replicating and extending Leonardo Arriola's 2009 article on patronage and political stability.[28] Arriola argues that African leaders distribute patronage by increasing cabinet size. This insulates them from extra-constitutional challenges to their rule. He finds that countries that are less democratic with higher per capita incomes and more ethnically fractionalized populations have, *ceteris paribus*, larger cabinets. The results are seen in figure 2.4. In the first row we see the original estimates from Arriola's study, where he has data on 40 African countries from 1971 to 2001. Using an identical specification, we can closely replicate Arriola's findings, providing further proof of the validity of the data. This is seen in the second row, where we use our measure of cabinet size as the dependent variable and the same sample as Arriola. In the third row we include the global sample of countries from WhoGov (1971-2001), and show that the main findings are unique to Africa. Income and ethnic fractionalization are no longer strongly associated with larger cabinets, while higher levels of democracy are not associated with smaller cabinets. In the last specification, we include all years in WhoGov (1966-2016). Overall, the findings indicate that Arriola's findings, contrary to the claim made in the article, are region-specific. Thus, leaders outside of Africa do not use cabinet size as a way to distribute patronage in the same way as African leaders.

Figure 2.5 sheds new light on the world map using four of the main variables from WhoGov, namely the replacement rate, the share of female ministers, cabinet size, and the number of parties. The color indicates the average for a given variable for each country in the period 2000-2016. Some of these findings confirm our intuitions. For

[27] In the analyses we only include data from what we consider core cabinet members. These are cabinet ministers, prime ministers, presidents, vice prime ministers, vice presidents, members of the politburo and members of a military junta. Thus, we exclude deputy and junior ministers, governors of the central bank, ambassadors to the US and Permanent Representatives to the UN from the analyses.

[28] There is a one data-point discrepancy between the models (1) and (2) and those presented in Arriola (2009). Using samples identical to the original article, however, does not alter the results.




Figure 2.4: Replication and extension of Arriola (2009): Regression Analysis of Cabinet Size. Estimation is a between-countries regression model of cabinet size using an ordinary least squares estimator. Coefficient estimates are reported with 95% confidence intervals.

instance, we see that Scandinavian countries have the most gender equal cabinets, while the cabinet in countries such as Saudi Arabia and North Korea is (almost) exclusively a men's club. This is in line with previous research.[29] On the other hand the fact that many autocracies, such as Iran or Côte d'Ivoire, have many parties represented in the cabinet may come as a surprise. Research on authoritarian countries tends to assume that one party controls the government, which is encapsulated by the term "single-party" regimes.[30]

[29]Krook and O'Brien 2012; Stockemer 2017.
[30]Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014; Miller 2020.




Figure 2.5: Country averages in the period 2000-2016

Figure 2.6 highlights four sub-fields, where our data is of particular relevance. First, this data set is the first to contain information on governing elites in a large number of autocracies, and is therefore a unique tool for researchers focusing on authoritarian politics. In the upper left hand corner, we see that the average age of cabinet members in East Germany increased dramatically over the period, while the age for cabinet members in West Germany stayed fairly constant. The explanation for the increase in East Germany is twofold; cabinet members tend to stay longer and new cabinet members tend to be older, especially towards the last years of the regime. This indicates that autocratic systems with limited competition for power and an entrenched ruling elite risk running out of new, young talent, who can take over, which may be an overlooked explanation for the downfall of autocratic regimes.

Second, there has been a surge in the social science literature on the inclusion of women in government.[31] WhoGov is the first, to our knowledge, to offer yearly data on women's access to executive portfolios globally without sacrificing high cross-sectional, temporal and portfolio coverage. In the top-right panel, we see that the share of female cabinet ministers has increased over time. In 1966 only one out of 63 cabinet members was female, while in 2016 it is almost one in 5. While the trend of women's representation in government is generally rising, we see that women are over- and under-represented in low and high prestige portfolios respectively, indicating that solely looking at representation provides an overly optimistic assessment.[32]

Third, there is a canonical literature discussing which type of system provides the most stable form of government.[33] While much of the earlier literature approaches this by looking at the replacement of the chief executive or the government, the new data enables us to approach this question from a new perspective by looking at replacement rates, which is the share of cabinet members, who are replaced from one year to the next. The box plot in the bottom-left panel shows the replacement rate by regime type

[31] Arriola and Johnson 2014; Barnes and O'Brien 2018; Bego 2014; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Jacob, Scherpereel, and Adams 2014; Stockemer 2017.

[32] Low prestige portfolios are, for example, youth and tourism, while high prestige portfolios are portfolios such as finance and interior. For a full list see Appendix A.6.

[33] Horowitz 1990; Lijphart 2012; Linz 1990.

as classified by Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland and updated by Bjørnskov and Rode.[34] We see that presidential systems indeed have the most unstable cabinets, followed by military dictatorships, while parliamentary democracies and royal dictatorships are the most stable. Thus, our data can be used to cast a new light on debates amongst scholars comparing regime types.

Fourth, the data set will be a useful tool for researchers interested in government and coalition formation. The data set contains information on party affiliation for the vast majority of cabinet members. In the bottom-right panel we see that cabinets have become larger globally over the last 50 years, and that more parties, on average, are represented in government. Governments are thus becoming larger and more complex. This data set provides a useful tool for future studies aiming to explain the causes and consequences of these patterns.

[34] Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010; Bjørnskov and Rode 2018.




Figure 2.6: Four applications of the data

2.7 Conclusion

We have introduced WhoGov, which is the largest available data set on members of cabinets. Our data set covers the period 1966-2016 for 177 countries, and contains detailed information on cabinet ministers and other members of the ruling elite - including gender, portfolio, and party affiliation - for every country and year in the panel.

The data set has undergone extensive validation checks to ensure that the information is correct, and we furthermore show that the data closely aligns with the data in existing data sets. As with all data sets, and despite our best efforts, mistakes cannot be ruled out with absolute certainty and readers are encouraged to contact the authors if they find any.

WhoGov is a unique, new tool for political scientists. We show that the data can be used in diverse fields, ranging from the study of autocracies and gender studies to that of regime types and government formation; but the data has countless more applications. We hope that scholars will embrace this new resource to answer important questions in political science.

Chapter 3

The decline of patriarchal autocracies, varieties of empowerment and the changing role of women in promoting democratic transition

3.1 Introduction

What role do women play in promoting transition from dictatorship to democracy? Until recently, much of the foundational studies of democratization have generally overlooked the possibility that women are important social actors who facilitate democratic change. Feminist scholars, on the other hand, have argued for decades that change brought by economic development and political upheaval have had a profound impact on the lives of ordinary women, leading them to become, to varying degrees, more visible in the public arena.[1] A burgeoning literature has thus begun to elucidate the role women play in political change from three different angles. The first

[1] Jaquette 1982; Rai 1994.

discusses the central role that women's organizations played in extending the franchise to all adult women which effectively doubled the number of individuals that could hold governments directly accountable to the public.[2] The second discusses the role that ordinary women play in increasing the number of individuals who can protest the legitimacy of authoritarian rule which may increase the probability that incumbent rulers accede to demands for democratic change.[3] The third discusses the relationship between democracy and the participation of women in positions of political power and finds, perhaps surprisingly, that transition from democracy to dictatorship has not always led to a significant increase in female legislators and governors.[4]

This chapter contributes to the literature by considering the role women play as progenitors of democratic contestation, meaning transition to regimes where the political elite are chosen through a process of free and fair elections.[5] Understanding the origins of democratic contestation is as important as it has ever been. Entire regions such as the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia are dominated by governments that not only rule without the express consent of the people but perpetuate systemic abuses of human rights to maintain their grip on power. In 2002, before the Arab Spring, the United Nations commissioned the first Arab Human Development report in which several leading Arab intellectuals sought to understand the reasons why Arab countries were lagging globally in terms of human development.[6] Of the three deficits they identified, one was the lack of political freedom which, they argued, served to hold back the aspirations of its inhabitants. Crucially, however, they also argued that the very fact that the place of women in society was one of abject marginalization was another reason why the Arab World was being held back. Despite the advent of the Arab Spring nearly a decade later, only Tunisia has been able to maintain its democratic institutions at the time of writing. Other countries that are majority Arab are either ruled by monarchical or military dictatorships while others such as Syria, Libya

[2]Teele 2018.
[3]Wang et al. 2017.
[4]Bauer 2012; Arriola and Johnson 2014; Stockemer and Kchouk 2017; Blankenship and Kubicek 2018; Stockemer 2018.
[5]Dahl 1971.
[6]UNDP and AFESD 2002.

and Yemen are currently experiencing civil war.

Regions such as the Middle East and North Africa are still dominated by the kind of regimes that pervaded during the Cold War that relied upon tactics such as mass demobilization through repression. Under these regimes, as the Arab Human Development report so powerfully argues, the interests of women were, and continue to be, utterly stifled. The Third Wave of democratization swept away many of these regimes throughout the rest of the world. At roughly the same time, women were becoming more visible in society not only as social organizers but as political leaders.[7] Authoritarianism, however, is by no means history. Instead, the nature of authoritarianism is changing whereby, instead of ruling in the absence of contested elections, incumbent elites adopt elections half-heartedly – they allow contestation by the opposition in a manner that afford themselves unfair advantages. The new breed of authoritarian regimes (often referred to as "electoral" or "competitive" autocracies in the literature) are not an aberration nor are they half-way houses that cannot stand.[8] Instead, they have swept the globe and, as of today, constitute the modal type of political regime.[9] Unlike the dictatorships of the past, however, women have made significant progress. In fact, some of the most well-represented female populations – defined in terms of descriptive access to political power – exist in electoral autocracies such as Rwanda and Uganda.[10]

Given this stark contrast between autocracies of the past and present, this chapter grapples with the idea that women can, in some contexts, be pro-transition and, in others, be either indifferent towards or even anti-transition. I present a theory of how women's empowerment influences the probability of transition to democracy that takes into account demand and supply dynamics that are created by gender inequality in politics. I start from the premise that women prefer political regimes that maximise descriptive representation for women. I then argue that the demand for democracy was historically high for women as the structure of political competition under autocracy

[7] Rai 1994.
[8] Huntington 1993; Schedler 2002; Levitsky and Way 2010.
[9] Maerz et al. 2020.
[10] Bauer 2012; Blankenship and Kubicek 2018.

prevented them from achieving any meaningful political influence. Furthermore, I argue that the visibility of women in civil society lowers the perceived costs of toleration borne by the incumbent elite who may fear retribution at the hands of a society dominated by patriarchal values. As a result, when women are civilly empowered, I expect the probability of transition to democracy from dictatorship to increase. However, I argue that when authoritarian regimes politically empower women, the demand for democracy on the part of women is reduced. Authoritarian elites today typically rely upon elections and need to demonstrate to domestic and international audiences that they can, in theory, win free and fair elections. As a result, they are more likely to assign positions of political power to a wider variety of social groups, women being one such group. I argue that authoritarian regimes insulate themselves from demands for democracy by the general public through co-opting women and, consequently, hypothesize that women's empowerment is negatively associated with transition to democracy.

This chapter leverages original data from WhoGov to uncover facts about women's participation in positions of executive power under both democracies and dictatorships.[11] Starting from the premise that, on average, democracies tend to assign a larger proportion of portfolios to women, this chapter examines whether these differences are dependent upon variation found within these regimes. It finds that much of the representation 'gap' that exists between democracies and dictatorships can be explained by the low performance of "closed autocracies" of the kind that pervaded before 1989 and the high performance of "liberal democracies" that exist in a small subset of democratic countries. This chapter then employs a series of first-order Markov transition models to probe how different varieties of female empowerment influence the probability that a country under dictatorship will transition to democracy. It finds that women's participation in civil society increases the probability that democratic transition occurs and that women's participation in executive cabinets decreases the probability that democratic transition occurs. This chapter employs a range of thresholds to test critical mass theories of women's participation and finds that, in particular, the probability of

[11] Nyrup and Bramwell 2019.

transition significantly decreases when women are assigned 15 percent or more of the core portfolios in the government. Furthermore, it finds some evidence of a counteracting influence: when women's executive participation increases, the effect of women's civil participation on democratic change decreases.

This chapter is divided into seven sections. The second reviews three strands of the literature that separately explore the relationship between women's empowerment and democratic change. The third develops a theory of how women's empowerment impacts the likelihood of democratic contestation emerging within a country and presents the hypotheses that are tested in this chapter. The fourth explores how women's executive empowerment varies both between democracies and dictatorships and within different varieties of these two regime types. The fifth discusses the rest of the data used to test the hypotheses. The sixth presents the results of a series of multivariate regression models. The final section concludes.

3.2 Literature Review

How do women impact the politics of democratic change? Scholars interested in the politics of gender have studied many different modalities of participation by women in democratization. Three such modalities will be discussed, namely women as voters, social organizers and as political elites.

When democratic regimes first began to emerge in the 19th century in Western Europe and North America, women often were not automatically granted the right to vote in elections, even though they comprised 50 percent of the overall population. Given their demographic importance, female enfranchisement represented one of the largest increases in inclusion within the political history of democracy. However, despite the clear demographic importance of women, many political scientists often do not account for female enfranchisement when distinguishing between democracy and dictatorship, for two reasons. First, some data sets focus purely on coding the institutions of contestation that distinguish democracy from dictatorship and either eschew focusing on participation or impose a less demanding cut-off (e.g. allowing a democratic franchise

to include 50 percent or over of the male population).[12] While this approach allows democracy to extend further back in time, excluding women turns this concept into a relativistic one in the sense that we hold democracies of the past to a different normative standard than we do to democracies of the present. Second, some scholars argue that the institutions of contestation that distinguish democracy from dictatorship tend to always involve universal adult franchises, particularly after the end of the Second World War.[13]

While ignoring female suffrage can increase the risk of measurement error in democracy's operationalization, scholars have begun to understand that ignoring women as beneficiaries of democracy has resulted in scholars either or ignoring or dismissing the possibility that women could, in fact, be vital agents of democratization. A well-known case of the latter tendency can be found in Dietrich Rueschemeyer and colleagues' influential work *Capitalist Development and Democracy* whereby the authors assert that gender relations were "far less important in the known histories of democratization" than class relations.[14] Pamela Paxton persuasively critiques this overall orientation:

> "One reason that women are 'far less important' in the known history of democratization may be that, by focusing on male suffrage and class rather than gender divisions, scholars have made them so."[15]

Thus in ignoring gender, scholars were, according to Paxton and others,[16] engaging in a self-fulfilling prophecy whereby women were ignored both as beneficiaries and, consequently, as progenitors of democratic change. Later research by political scientists into female enfranchisement has sought to correct this conceptual skew. Dawn Teele argues that political elites that existed in insecure electoral environments used the relative influence of suffragist movements on society when deciding upon whether or not to institute female suffrage in order to increase the size of their voting base.[17] While women's movements thus existed within a wider political context, they were

[12] Alvarez et al. 1996; Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010; Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2013.
[13] Alvarez et al. 1996.
[14] Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992.
[15] Paxton 2000, p. 96.
[16] See also Caraway 2004.
[17] Teele 2018.

vital political actors when we consider the wider history of expanding the franchise.

Teele's work focuses on the expansion of the franchise in the context of countries where the institutions of democratic contestation are already established such as the United Kingdom, United States and France. However, other scholars have demonstrated that women play an active role in the origins of democratic contestation itself. The historical record is replete with cases where the actions of women have positively contributed to the fall of authoritarianism during the Third Wave. As Shirin Rai notes: "[in] most struggles to introduce democracy ... the presence of women is ... undeniable."[18] In particular, the presence of women in civil society movements has grown not only in size but also diversity. Women have lent their support to movements that not only focus on the primacy of women's gendered experiences or feminist movements which critique the role gendered relationships play in the subordination of women or organizations but that involve wider cross-cutting issues in society.[19] The involvement of women in the public sphere has increased their visibility vis-á-vie several crucial audiences such as the democratic opposition, foreign sponsors and, most importantly, the autocratic ruling elite.

Women's involvement in democratic change often traverses traditional party lines and focuses on issues that critique the injustices perpetuated by dictatorships. *Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo* in Argentina, for instance, were composed of women whose husbands and sons were 'disappeared' by the military junta as part of a wider policy mass-demobilization through repression.[20] Aili Mari Tripp documents the central role that NGOs – many of which were led by women – played in providing autonomous spaces for women in Sub-Saharan Africa to critique the politics of patronage and sectarianism that characterized authoritarian rule.[21] While these are but a few examples, data from the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) project demonstrates that women have participated in the vast majority of large-scale anti-regime campaigns over a 60-year period. Approximately 72 percent of small, 66 percent

[18] Rai 1994, p. 218.
[19] Beckwith 2001.
[20] Jaquette 2001.
[21] Tripp 2001.

of medium and 90 percent of large campaign protest years are classified as "gender diverse" by the NAVCO project. In cases where anti-regime campaigns are estimated by NAVCO to have at least 500,000 participants, all are classified as gender diverse.[22] Yi-Ting Wang and colleagues have recently argued that the ability of women to participate in anti-regime activity is mediated by their level of political empowerment – which they define as their access to civil liberties, social organizations and political power – within a given country.[23] Women's empowerment is then hypothesized by the authors to increase the probability of transition to democracy as it effectively doubles the number of people that can mobilize in opposition to dictatorship. Through involvement in anti-regime activity via widespread social and political participation, the authors argue that women can serve as crucial agents of democratization.

While this literature provides a powerful narrative of what women can do for democratic change, however, it is, as of yet, unclear what precisely democratic change can do for women. A vital benefit open to women is, of course, voting in free and fair elections. However, this benefit is not gender specific. Women tend to exist in conditions of inequality between men and, as a result, may prioritize different policies than men. If dictatorships can, in theory, deliver substantial policy benefits for women then this raises the question of whether women will necessarily view democratization as something worth risking their lives for. One debate that is emerging among scholars is that women may prefer democracy over dictatorship because the former tends to promote more women to positions of political power than the latter. When scholars discuss women's participation in executive or legislative positions, they often tend to either focus on the raw percentage of women or they use so-called critical mass theory to demarcate thresholds of participation whereby women either do or do not exert significant executive or legislative influence.[24] Alternatively, some scholars have focused on the prestige of the portfolios assigned to women to further distinguish between countries that assign women positions of real importance and countries that promote

[22] Chenoweth and Lewis 2013.
[23] Wang et al. 2017.
[24] Grey 2006.

women to "token" positions.[25]

Scholars tend to discuss these two hypotheses – first, that female elites substantively represent female citizens and, second, that democracies select more female elites than dictatorships – separately. Substantive representation of women is, admittedly, a contentious topic as it requires that scholars make *a priori* assumptions about women as political actors that are distinct from men. Approaches to women's interests in the literature range from specifically women-focused (e.g. focusing on issues relating to bodily autonomy such as abortion rights) to wider social issues that women are often assumed to value to a higher degree than men such as education, healthcare, family and other issues relating to social welfare.[26] Several studies strongly support this purported descriptive-substantive link. Using a sample of 19 advanced industrial democracies from 1970 to 2005, Amy Atchison finds that countries with a greater proportion of female cabinet members tend to adopt more female-friendly labour policies that help women reconcile dual (socially imposed) responsibilities of work and child rearing.[27] Liam Swiss and colleagues, using data from the developing world from 1980 to 2005, find that countries with a critical mass of female political representatives tend to have superior health outcomes as measured by higher rates of immunization from infectious diseases and lower rates of infant mortality than countries with no critical mass.[28] A recent article by Aliza Forman-Rabinovici and Udi Sommer further demonstrates that an increase in female representation results in more permissive abortion laws and higher levels of health and education spending.[29] Crucially, however, Forman-Rabinovici and Sommer argue that the descriptive-substantive link works across regime type meaning that dictatorships that descriptively represent women can make equally impressive gains when compared to democracies.

While the hypothesis that descriptive representation increases substantive representation has thus received considerable empirical support, the hypothesis that democratic

[25]See Krook and O'Brien 2012; Barnes and O'Brien 2018.
[26]Forman-Rabinovici and Sommer 2019.
[27]Atchison 2015.
[28]Swiss, Fallon, and Burgos 2012.
[29]Forman-Rabinovici and Sommer 2019.

regimes promote the political empowerment of women has received less support. At the height of the Third Wave of Democratization, Shirin Rai proposed that the global trend towards democracy could provide women with a voice that was, hitherto, being drowned out by political regimes that repressed civil society and made common cause with patriarchal social movements.[30] Ever since Rai's article, there has been a surge of scholarship that attempts to account for women's political participation in cabinets and legislatures. However, studies that assess the effect of democratization on female participation in cabinets and legislatures report mixed findings. Leonardo Arriola and Martha Johnson argue that democratic reforms enhanced the ability of women to successfully gain cabinet portfolios in Sub-Saharan Africa where political appointments were often made to ethnically affiliated "Big Men" with privileged access to patronage resources.[31] However, researchers such as Daniel Stockemer and Bilel Kchouk find no evidence that regime change to democracy (dictatorship) increases (decreases) women's political participation when looking at a global sample of countries.[32] Other scholars have gone further, pointing to the lacklustre performance of many emerging democracies and noting that countries such as Rwanda and Uganda assign some of the largest percentages of cabinet portfolios and legislative seats in the world to women without adopting democratic contestation.[33] Furthermore, scholars have pointed to a fundamental shift in the nature of authoritarianism whereby authoritarian elites tend to rely upon flawed multi-party elections to maintain their rule.[34] While these competitive or electoral autocracies could be dismissed as window-dressing, recent scholarship strongly suggests that this new variety of autocracy boasts a higher level of public goods provision – including policies designed to reduce gender inequality – than the more closed autocracies that pervaded up until 1989.[35]

The literature thus both reveals important developments, on the one hand, and puzzles, on the other. It is clear that women have generally been undervalued by

[30]Rai 1994.
[31]Arriola and Johnson 2014.
[32]Stockemer and Kchouk 2017; Stockemer 2018.
[33]Bauer 2012; Blankenship and Kubicek 2018.
[34]Schedler 2002; Levitsky and Way 2010.
[35]Miller 2015.

political scientists not only as key beneficiaries of expanding the franchise but also as crucial progenitors of democratic contestation in countries where it did not exist. However, it is unclear precisely what women specifically stand to gain from such change particularly if democratic elites choose to ignore their interests. Furthermore, if women can make progress under autocracy then this surely raises the possibility that they may either choose not to engage in anti-regime activity or, in some circumstances, may even rally behind the regime. The next section presents a theory of how women's empowerment influences the prospects of a country transitioning to democracy that attempts to build upon the ideas while addressing the puzzles that scholars in the field have been engaging with.

3.3 A Theory of Women's Empowerment and Democratization

This section outlines a theory of how different forms of women's empowerment influence the probability of transition to democracy from autocracy. Two forms of empowerment are discussed, namely civil and political. Civil empowerment relates to the ability of an individual or group to publicly voice opinions on economic, political and social affairs. Political empowerment, on the other hand, relates to the ability of an individual or group to influence policy decisions made by the political elite. The outlined theory connects women's empowerment to democratization by understanding what women can do for democracy or autocracy and, consequently, what democracy or autocracy can do for women. This section is broken down into four subsections. The first makes explicit two assumptions about women as political actors that are employed in the theoretical argument. The second discusses the demand for democracy by women under closed autocracies. The third discusses supply side of the equation, namely how women's civil empowerment influences the propensity of the authoritarian elite to democratize. The fourth discusses how the demand for democratization has changed as autocracies began to politically empower women.

3.3.1 Assumptions

I make two assumptions about women as political actors in this theory. The first assumption is that women have defined preferences based on their experience of economic, political and social marginalization that is exogenous to membership of other social groups. Women's involvement in politics has historically traversed not just socio-economic divides, but political divides also. Thus, no attempt will be made in this chapter to link the motivations of women to specific issues (e.g. abortion) that characterise, in some cases, deeply partisan political divides. I nevertheless argue that women are distinct from men as social actors – not based on biological difference per se, but on shared historical experience as a result of this difference. As Susan Moller Okin has pointed out "[m]any injustices are experienced by women as women, whatever the differences among them and whatever other injustices they also suffer from."[36] Okin locates the roots of injustice experienced by women in their relegation to the private sphere that involved maintaining the household while their male partners were the bread winners. While childbearing can only be performed by women, childrearing can be performed by both sexes – and yet this task is traditionally seen as the role of women, not men. It is these social pressures that Okin and others argue have driven an enduring inequality between men and women, not only in terms of economic wealth and social status, but also in terms of political power. To quote Mary Caprioli: "although the power and role of women vary across cultures, women are always unequal in both the economic and political spheres."[37]

The second assumption is that women form preferences over autocracy and democracy based on which political regime can maximize political empowerment at a given point in time. While some have characterised political empowerment as 'breaking the glass ceiling,' I argue that women do not value descriptive representation as merely a matter of symbolism. Rather, I argue that when women are represented descriptively, their substantive interests are more likely to be taken into account by the political elite. This occurs as a result of a shared historical experience that can bind together female

[36] Moller Okin 1989, p. 6.
[37] Caprioli 2000, p. 54.

elites and citizens. As the literature review details, policy issues that have a bearing on the social status of women tend to be positively addressed as female participation in legislative and executive appointments increase. Descriptive representation in the executive and the legislature affords women a critical opportunity to translate the issues they care about into concrete political agendas that can be made into laws that are enforced by the state. I thus do not contend that women view democracies (dictatorships) as intrinsically good (bad): instead, I argue that women support regimes that maximise female political empowerment. In the next sub-section, I discuss the demand for democracy for women in autocracies that prevailed during the Cold War.

3.3.2 The demand for democracy under closed autocracy

During the Cold War, most autocracies were closed, meaning they did not rely upon any form of electoral competition (however flawed) when distributing political power. Under these regimes, women existed under conditions of *variable* civic marginalization and *endemic* political marginalization. Women's visibility in civil society was higher in some contexts than it was in others. However, the rules of elite competition under closed autocracies tended to lock women out of positions of real political influence. First and foremost, scholars of authoritarian rule have noted that elite competition often occurs under conditions of anarchy as there exists no all powerful third-party to settle disputes between the leader and rest of the political elite.[38] Political appointments were thus often made by the leader based on the ability of the potential contenders to threaten the interests of the former through violent political tactics.[39] These rules of competition disadvantaged women for two reasons. First, women have access to less resources than men which means they are less able to convert these resources into actions that threaten the political regime. Second, women tend to be socialized into accept non-violent forms of political engagement which means that organizations that promote women are less likely to adopt violent tactics.[40] While I do not argue that women, by nature, are more

[38]Svolik 2012.
[39]Magaloni and Kricheli 2010; Svolik 2012.
[40]See Best, Shair-Rosenfield, and Wood 2019, for a discussion of the literature.

peaceful than men, I do nevertheless propose that women's organizations historically posed less of a threat to closed autocracies than more traditionally male-dominated organizations because the latter have access to more resources and were more willing to use violence to threaten the regime than the former.

The political marginalization of women thus tended to exist across differing varieties of closed autocracy whether for *de jure* or *de facto* reasons. In the case of monarchical rule, many countries simply banned women from running for public office until very recently.[41] Furthermore, monarchies employed explicitly sexist forms of leader transfer such as primogeniture (power passes to the firstborn son) and often assigned political power based on family affiliation.[42] Monarchical ruling coalitions were thus more insulated from outside competition that would enable talented politicians from outside the ruling coalition – both male and female – to compete for power.

Military coups were one of the most common modalities of gaining power during the Cold War. Often, the military elite would solidify their rule by installing a junta that was mostly comprised of high-ranking military officers and a few scattered civilian bureaucrats. These regimes were not just descriptively male; they were also substantively masculine. Military elites tended to gain power in the face of (perceived) threats to national security (e.g. by radical leftist movements) and territorial integrity (e.g. by secessionist movements).[43] Recent scholarship demonstrates that societies living in the shadow of territorial threats tend to become militarized (in terms of increased defence spending) and favour "masculine" traits such as toughness and decisiveness over "feminine" traits such as warmth and compassion in their political leaders.[44] In the face of these perceived threats, the prospects of women gaining substantive positions of political power were bleak.

One-party rule hinged on the ability of leaders to walk a tightrope between accommodating groups that threatened the regime and using repression which, conversely,

[41] Norris and Inglehart 2001.
[42] Kokkonen and Sundell 2014.
[43] Geddes 1999; Slater 2010.
[44] Barnes and O'Brien 2018; Kang and Kim 2020.

risked empowering the military.[45] The ability to distribute patronage to unruly groups was thus seen as a benefit for leaders when appointing cabinet members. However, this disadvantaged women who did not have access to the same level of resources as their male counterparts.[46] While one-party regimes formed official women's branches, these branches were afforded no autonomy to challenge the ruling elite on issues they deemed to be important. Organizations such as the League of Malawi Women, for instance, were little more than glorified cheerleaders for Hastings Banda who required members of the organization to demean themselves by dressing in "party uniforms, singing and dancing in praise of him."[47] While communist regimes were ostensibly more progressive, in reality, they were scarcely any better than the reactionary regimes they sought to subvert. Women were effectively locked out of the higher echelons of political power and party institutions were old boys' clubs. Women's political participation in official state institutions followed a similar pattern of co-option without autonomy. While women were represented in communist legislatures, these institutions acted as rubber stamps for policy dictated by the politburo, where women were wholly underrepresented.[48] Instead of abolishing patriarchy, communism merely redefined it, casting women as great mothers and men as great workers soon after regimes were consolidated.[49]

Under these conditions, it is easy to understand why ordinary women sought political change whether through joining women's organizations or through participating in larger anti-regime activity. Democracy had four attributes that made it more desirable to women than the dictatorships that had hitherto prevailed. First, women could directly choose their representatives through free and fair elections, punishing those who perpetuated marginalization and supporting those who deliver empowerment. Second, individual women could use free speech that is protected under democracy to challenge social attitudes that left them perpetually marginalized. Third, women's

[45]Magaloni and Kricheli 2010; Svolik 2012.
[46]Arriola and Johnson 2014.
[47]Tripp 2001, p. 146.
[48]Fallon, Swiss, and Viterna 2012; Bjarnegård and Melander 2013; Stockemer 2017.
[49]Harsch 2014.

movements were afforded freedom to mobilize and autonomy to focus on issues that concern them. Fourth, women could run as political representatives without having to use or threaten violence against their male competitors. The *demand* for democratization among women was thus high given that the status quo under closed autocracy was one of endemic political marginalization. I next discuss supply-side factors that makes the autocratic elite more amenable to democratic transition.

3.3.3 The supply of democracy by the autocratic elite

Robert Dahl argued that transition from dictatorship to democracy occurred when the costs of repressing the opposition borne by the current autocratic elite are higher than the costs of tolerating them.[50] How therefore do incumbents come to conclusions about this cost-benefit analysis within a given political context? Throughout, I argue that authoritarian elites intuit the power and intentions of the opposition to their rule through observing the societal composition of the individuals who visibly oppose them. This assumption is not made without precedent in comparative political science. Nancy Bermeo in her influential work *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times* argued that democratic breakdown occurred when political elites misperceived the interests of the average citizen through assessing the interests of a biased subsection of social movements who visibly, and often violently, opposed democracy.[51] Dan Slater in *Ordering Power* furthers this fruitful line of reasoning by arguing that authoritarian stability in South East Asia was produced by fear that opposition to the liberal status quo was both endemic and unmanageable on the part of the current elite.[52] This fear, Slater argues, was driven by the comparative radicalism of the opposition and the size of their presence in urban (central) – as opposed to rural (peripheral) – areas. Later scholars who study contentious politics quantitatively have similarly argued that an increase in visible opposition activity does not, by itself, compel incumbents to accept democratic change. Visible opposition is often argued to be driven by seemingly irreconcilable

[50] Dahl 1971.
[51] Bermeo 2003.
[52] Slater 2010.

distributional conflicts between privileged and marginalized social groups which can result in increased repression on behalf of the incumbent.[53]

In adopting this assumption, I part ways with Yi-Ting Wang and colleagues in one significant regard.[54] I propose that the power of the opposition – proxied by its size – may not by itself convince autocrats to accept democratic change. While the power of the opposition can increase the costs of repression, if autocrats deem the opposition to be sufficiently threatening, the costs of toleration may not necessarily decrease in tandem. In some cases, it may in fact increase. In Indonesia, for example, the Parti Komunis Indonesia (PKI) could not only command significant support from among a subsection of the public but posed a threat to the interests of those that benefited from the status quo. Far from allowing democratic regime change, the current elite engaged in a campaign of mass-killing that left anywhere between 500,000 to a million real or suspected affiliates of the PKI dead.[55] Numbers are thus not enough. Support for authoritarianism is often sustained through fear of the consequences of democratization. While a large opposition raises the cost of repression, it does not necessarily lower the cost of toleration. Large oppositions may be viewed as threatening by autocrats and thus met with repression, not accommodation.

I argue that what matters to autocrats is thus not the level of opposition per se, but the extent to which the composition opposition is indicative of, first, the nature of society that will elect the political elite and, second, the policies pursued by the replacement political elite. Here, I argue that the visibility of women in civil society reduces the perceived costs of toleration incurred by the autocratic elite. As Valerie Hudson and colleagues powerfully argue, societies that oppress women typically reward and legitimate violence to achieve economic, political or social goals. Furthermore, these societies are more likely to view conciliatory or cooperative behaviour as weak or effeminate. As a result, the political elite that will be voted into office will be reflective of these violent social norms.[56] Empirical research, which is either based on or informs

[53]For instance, see Ye and Han 2019.
[54]Wang et al. 2017.
[55]Slater 2010.
[56]Hudson et al. 2012.

this work, demonstrates that inter- and intra-state conflict is negatively associated with women's empowerment and that conflict negotiation is positively associated with women's empowerment.[57] In the context of democratization, I argue that women's civil empowerment reduces the costs of toleration as the outgoing authoritarian elite are less likely to fear retributive policies against them and their support base. The first hypothesis of this paper can be stated thus:

> Hypothesis 1: The visibility of women in civil society will increase the costs of repression and lower the costs of toleration perceived by the autocratic elite towards democratic change. As a result, a transition to democracy is more likely to occur as the presence of women in civil society increases.

The next sub-section discusses the advent of electoral authoritarianism and how this has fundamentally changed the supply and demand characteristics of regime change that influenced the transitions of the past.

3.3.4 The demand for democracy under electoral autocracy

Does democracy still hold the same advantages it had over dictatorship regarding women's empowerment? This chapter argues that the evident superiority of democracy over past dictatorships could be eroding. While the dictatorships that existed during the Cold War, at best, side lined and, at worst, wholly marginalised the interests of women, dictatorships of the present are an entirely different proposition. Present day autocrats increasingly converge upon electoral/competitive authoritarian rule which relies upon flawed elections to justify their continued political dominance.[58] While these elections may be perceived as window dressing, electoral autocrats need to demonstrate to domestic and international audiences that they are popular enough to be elected through providing tangible benefits to their electorate and need to put forward candidates that demonstrate a level of responsiveness to the concerns of the people. Consequently, the level of public goods provision tends to be higher in competitive autocracies than it is in closed autocracies.[59] Some scholars of women's empower-

[57] Caprioli 2000; Best, Shair-Rosenfield, and Wood 2019; Nagel 2020.
[58] Schedler 2002; Levitsky and Way 2010.
[59] Miller 2015.

ment furthermore stress that some of the societies that are the most forward thinking in terms of politically empowering women are Rwanda and Uganda – countries that represent this new breed of autocracy.[60] To reiterate, this theory argues that women prefer regimes that maximize their descriptive representation in positions of political power. While autocracies of the past have performed poorly in comparison to democracies, examples abound of electoral autocracies that can be considered world leaders in terms of politically empowering women.

I argue that the demand for democratization by women is reduced when political empowerment under autocracies is commensurate with empowerment under democracy. Today, most countries have not achieved gender parity in terms of apportioning political power. Nevertheless, as we saw in chapter 2, women have made significant progress in terms of political empowerment across both autocracies and democracies. Daniela Donno and Anne-Kathrin Kreft propose that autocrats politically empower women as a strategy for survival in power for two reasons. First, promoting women to positions of power increases not only the incumbent elite's popularity among women but also the perceptions of popularity in regards to domestic and international opposition. Second, promoting women's rights is, according to Donno and Kreft and others, less politically costly than improving the supply of "coordination goods" such as "civil liberties, speech rights or clean elections."[61] While very few autocracies have achieved anything close to gender parity, all that is required is that they keep apace with their democratic counterparts in order to continue to achieve support from women. Seen in the reverse light, if women intuit that the costs of challenging the autocracy are greater than the benefits of transition, then women may opt either to not participate in opposition activity or, in some circumstances, campaign in support of the current authoritarian elite. I thus present the second hypothesis of this chapter:

> Hypothesis 2: The presence of women in positions of political power lowers demand for transition to democracy on the part of ordinary women. Consequently, transition to democracy is less likely to occur when the political empowerment of women is high.

[60] Bauer 2012; Blankenship and Kubicek 2018.
[61] Donno and Kreft 2019, p. 721.

The next section employs descriptive analysis of WhoGov to document the evolution of women's political empowerment across different varieties of autocracy and democracy.

3.4 Political Regimes and Women's Empowerment

The theory in the previous section argued that women are primarily concerned with increasing their level of descriptive representation in the executive. Female political elites are assumed to represent female citizens via the descriptive-substantive link – the concept that an increase in individuals who possess a given identity will act to advance the interests of their broader community when assigned positions of political power. The previous section discussed this fundamental interest to understand the role that organized women who act in civil society and government play in the origins of democratic contestation. As political empowerment forms the basis of the theoretical argument, this section discusses the relationship between women's direct participation in positions of executive power and control and how this varies across different regime types.

3.4.1 Operationalizing Cabinet Positions and Democracy

This chapter leverages original data on women who are appointed to positions of executive influence based on the WhoGov data set as introduced in chapter 2 . WhoGov assigns a binary male/female classification to all members of cabinets across 177 countries from the period 1966 to 2016. In the first instance, we matched the names of all individuals to the Worldwide Gender Name Dictionary which, to date, provides the most comprehensive open source cross-national dictionary of typical male and female names.[62] We were able to classify a majority of cases using this approach. However, there were many cases where the names did not exist in the database or were gender neutral. In these cases, we consulted bibliographic information using a variety of sources to discern whether or not the individual was male or female. In some countries

[62]Raffo 2016.

such as Nepal, China, Cambodia and Ethiopia, the database had either poor or non-existent coverage of names. In these cases, we consulted individuals who were familiar with the language to decide what gender identity to code the individual as belonging to. We also looked up all ministers who are classified as female to make sure that we did not code individuals as male by mistake. Thus, we may slightly underestimate the number of female ministers. WhoGov can claim to be the most comprehensive data set for studying the relative participation of women in cabinets that is publicly available.

I group WhoGov which consists of all cabinet members by a given country in a given year to calculate a proportional measure of women in positions of executive power. I rely only on core cabinet members which are defined as cabinet ministers, prime ministers, presidents, vice presidents, vice prime ministers, members of a politburo and members of a military junta. Thus, the numerator is the number of core ministers that are female while the denominator is the total number of core ministers. Studying women's participation in executive power under autocracies provides us with the most accurate picture of the extent to which women are politically empowered when compared to legislative and judicial power. While legislative power could provide some indication of empowerment as women can, in theory, write laws, authoritarian elites can often disobey or abolish they do not like because there exists no higher third-party that can punish them for doing so.[63] Judicial power under authoritarian rule is thus often considered in the literature to not exist independently of executive power as is the case with democracies. Being assigned a cabinet appointment may be an imperfect measure of political empowerment. However, a cabinet assignment means that an individual possesses the ability to enforce policy within their given area of competency. As a result, executive empowerment is currently the most realistic way we have to understand the extent to which women are descriptively represented in positions of political power.

[63]Svolik 2012.

3.4.2 Women's Empowerment and Political Regimes

Does democracy empower women? Are women comparatively disempowered under dictatorship? Figure 3.1 presents four time series graphs showing the proportion of women in cabinets stratified by different commonly used indicators of political regime. The first is the binary Democracy and Dictatorship (DD) as developed by a group of scholars including Mike Alvarez, Adam Przeworski, Jose Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi, Jennifer Gandhi and James Raymond Vreeland.[64] I use updated DD coding supplied by Christian Bjørnskov and Martin Rode that extends to 2016.[65] DD is focused solely on identifying countries where democratic contestation exists, meaning that the distinction drawn between democracy and dictatorship is one based on identifying who assigns political power based on free and fair elections. DD employ four criteria to distinguish between each regime. First, the chief executive must be chosen by popular election or by a body that was popularly elected. Second, the legislature must be popularly elected. Third, there must be more than one party that competes in elections. Fourth, an alternation of power without a change in electoral rules that brought the original incumbent to power must take place. The second is the binary democracy/dictatorship variable provided by Carles Boix, Michael Miller and Sebastian Rosato (BMR).[66] The BMR measure is similar to DD in that the former essentially adopts the first two same criteria (elected leaders and legislators). However, the BMR measure is different in two critical regards. First, BMR do not adopt criteria four (a.k.a. the alternation rule) when distinguishing between democracy and dictatorship. For instance, in South Africa after the end of apartheid, the African National Congress have consistently won every single election which, according to DD, makes the country a dictatorship. However, BMR code this case as a democracy because, in theory, the opposition could have won because multiple options were consistently provided on the ballot after apartheid and the ANC did not use its government power to eliminate the ability of the opposition to fairly contest the elections. Second, BMR adopt

[64] Alvarez et al. 1996; Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010.
[65] Bjørnskov and Rode 2018.
[66] Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2013.

a participation threshold of 50 percent or over of the adult male population. In doing so, BMR distinguish democracy from dictatorship based on identifying thresholds of contestation and participation as originally proposed by Robert Dahl. The third is a four-fold typology of elections that is based on the DD ratings namely, no elections, one-party elections, unfree and/or unfair multi-party elections and free and fair multi-party elections. As with the binary DD measure, this measure classifies different varieties of contestation. The final measure under consideration is a four-fold regime typology coded by the V-Dem project namely closed autocracy, electoral autocracy, electoral democracy and liberal democracy.[67] Closed autocracies are characterised by chief executives and legislatures that exist without free and fair elections. Electoral autocracies are characterised by *de jure* elections that cannot be considered democratic on account of them not being free nor fair, limiting multi-party competition or not possessing institutional prerequisites of democracy identified by Dahl and coded by the V-Dem project. Electoral democracies meet these minimal criteria but fall short on other criteria such as access to justice, transparent law enforcement, or do not fully enshrine respect for personal liberties, rule of law or do not place sufficient legislative and/or judicial restraints on the executive. Liberal democracies, on the other hand, meet all these criteria and are, in this sense, the most advanced form of democracy.

Turning to figure 3.1, we see that when democracy is dichotomously distinguished from dictatorship, the former has consistently empowered women to a greater degree than the latter. In both the DD and BMR classifications, we see that the difference between democracy and dictatorship becomes ever greater after the Cold War where growth in female empowerment increases more rapidly in the former regime. However, when we consider more nuanced measures of democracy and dictatorship, the picture becomes more complicated. When women's empowerment is stratified across electoral type, we can see that the representation 'gap' between democracies and dictatorships is, in part, explained by the poor performance of regimes that are characterised by either no elections or one-party elections. This fact chimes closely with section 3.3.3.

[67] Coppedge et al. 2019.




Figure 3.1: Time series plots of the percent of cabinets that are female across different political regime types from 1966 to 2016. The top left uses the binary Democracy and Dictatorship (DD) data set as updated by Bjørnskov and Rode. The top right uses the binary Boix, Miller and Rosato data set. The bottom left uses the four-fold election type in the DD data set. The bottom right uses the V-Dem data set. **No E** = No Elections; **1P E** = 1 Party Elections; **> 1P E (Not FF)** = More than 1 Party Elections (Not Free and Fair); **> 1P E (FF)** = More than 1 Party Elections (Free and Fair). **CA** = Closed Autocracy; **EA** = Electoral Autocracy; **ED** = Electoral Democracy; **LD** = Liberal Democracy.

As we have seen, regimes characterised by no contestation erect stringent barriers that prevent women from competing for the highest offices in the land. Instead, political appointments under these regimes were made on the basis of who either (a) was best placed to distribute patronage among members of the selectorate or; (b) could credibly use violence to threaten the security of the incumbent elite. Female cabinet members have thus been conspicuous in their absence and, as a result, women's interests have been truly stultified under these closed forms of autocracy. Autocracies that allow flawed multi-party elections, by contrast, separate themselves from other more closed forms of autocracies after the Cold War and tend to keep more apace with regimes that have true democratic contestation. While these regimes fall short of being democratic, they rely less upon male-dominated selectorates than the more closed forms of authoritarian rule that were the most prevalent during the Cold War. Instead, these electoral autocracies must put forward popular candidates that can address issues that affect a large number of voters. Thus, electoral autocracies have incentives to take the interests of woman who compose half the population more seriously than do closed autocracies. Figure 3.2 demonstrates this effect in the case of Rwanda which is, today, lauded as a world leader in politically empowering women after the Rwandan Patriotic Front took power in 1994. However, as figure 3.2 shows, this was not initially the case. During the late 1990s, only around 10 percent of the cabinet were female. Things began to change, however, when Paul Kagame began to allow flawed multi-party elections that would serve as a means of perpetuating the political dominance of the RPF. After switching to semi-competitive elections, women were consistently assigned a much larger proportion of cabinet positions which gained the Rwandan leadership international renown.

Do democracies have more gender inclusive cabinets than dictatorships? The answer may, in part, depend on the kinds of democracy and dictatorship that are under discussion. The yawning chasm between democracies and dictatorships appears to be driven by both high performance by liberal democracies and low performance by closed autocracies. In the middle, there appears to be less in the way of difference between electoral autocracies and electoral democracies. To investigate this further, figure 3.3 plots the results of four between-country regression models. The DD and BMR classifications in models 1 and 2 show a 6.6 and 7.2 percentage point increase in the percentage of cabinet that are female for countries that change from dictatorship to democracy respectively. However, when election type is considered using the DD criteria, the gap between electoral democracies and electoral autocracies narrows. Furthermore, when we stratify democracies into 'electoral' and 'liberal' using the four-fold typology provided by V-Dem, the gap between the two regimes narrows further to approximately 4 percentage points. While this average difference reaches conventional levels of significance, appendix B.1 demonstrates that superior representation of women in electoral democracies relative to electoral autocracies only occurred consistently between 2000 to 2008. From 2009 onward, the difference between the two regimes reached conventional levels of statistical significance in 3 out of the 13 years for which we have data.

During the Cold War, organized women faced a very clear choice between dictatorship and democracy. Faced with this dichotomy, scholars saw democracy as clearly advantageous for advancing the interests of women as it provided a non-violent space for women to mobilize in their defence against patriarchal political forces.[68] However, the distinction between democracy and dictatorship has become increasingly blurred after the Cold War regarding women's empowerment. According to the V-Dem data from 1989 to 2019, the number of countries with electoral democracies surged from 29 to 50 while electoral autocracies grew from 52 to 67. In 2019, these two regimes consisted of 66 percent of all regimes.[69] This is profoundly important for understanding the potentially changing role that women play in the origins of democratic contesta-

[68] Rai 1994.
[69] Maerz et al. 2020.




Figure 3.2: Percent of Rwandan cabinet that is female during the rule of the Rwandan Patriotic Front. The dashed vertical line represents the year in which Rwanda switched from being a closed autocracy to an electoral autocracy.




Figure 3.3: Coefficient plot of regression models predicting the percent of the core cabinet that are female. Coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals are reported from between-country regressions that employ an ordinary least squares estimator. DD = Democracy and Dictatorship; BMR = Boix, Miller and Rosato; V-Dem = Varieties of Democracy. N = 169 countries for models 1 to 3 and 168 countries for model 4. **No E** = No Elections; **1P E** = 1 Party Elections; **> 1P E (Not FF)** = More than 1 Party Elections (Not Free and Fair); **> 1P E (FF)** = More than 1 Party Elections (Free and Fair). **CA** = Closed Autocracy; **EA** = Electoral Autocracy; **ED** = Electoral Democracy; **LD** = Liberal Democracy.

tion. Before 1989, autocracies performed poorly in comparison to democracies across the board in terms of delivering meaningful access to political power for women. After 1989, however, the rise of electoral forms of dictatorship brought with it an increase in access to political power for women without instituting true democratic contestation. In promoting women to the highest positions of political influence in the land, electoral autocracies may have insulated themselves from demands by women to institute free and fair elections. As a result, women may either choose not to support movements calling for democracy or may even rally to the defence of the regime which, in turn, reduces the costs of repression for the current authoritarian elite.

3.5 Data Collection

3.5.1 Defining Democracy

This chapter is concerned with understanding the role that women's empowerment in civil society and government plays in encouraging democratic change. As a result, it employs a binary conception of democracy taken from the DD data set as explained in section 3.4.2. Countries that are dictatorships are coded as 0 while countries that are coded as democracies are coded as 1. In the sample, a total of 95 transitions took place from democracy to dictatorship.

3.5.2 Defining Women's Empowerment

This chapter looks at two forms of women's empowerment. The first is women's participation in civil society as I am interested in understanding the role that women's visibility plays in influencing the benefits/costs of toleration/repression calculations that the incumbent autocratic elite play. I rely upon data from the V-Dem project which codes a 0 to 1 index for women's participation in civil society. The index codes the extent to which "women have the ability to express themselves and to form and participate in groups" which involves open discussion of political issues, participation

in civil society and representation among the ranks of journalists.[70] This index has a mean of 0.428, a standard deviation of 0.215 and a minimum and maximum value of 0.009 and 0.923 respectively in the sample. The second is women's participation in high-level positions in the political regime. I rely upon WhoGov data to code the percent of the cabinet are female. Collection of this data along with its advantages and disadvantages has been discussed previously. This variable has a mean of 2.94 percent, a standard deviation of 6.84 percent and a minimum and maximum value of 0 and 43.33 percent respectively. This chapter further considers thresholds of participation that are discussed in the next section to test critical mass arguments that some, though not all, scholars use to judge the extent to which women are empowered in politics.[71] Figure 3.4 displays a scatter plot of both variables to assess their level of correlation under dictatorships. While a positive relationship exists between women's civil and political empowerment, the correlation coefficient is quite moderate, standing at 0.429. In particular, there are points in time when women are highly empowered in civil society and yet have no descriptive representation in cabinet positions.

[70] Coppedge et al. 2019.
[71] Grey 2006.




Figure 3.4: Scatter plot of the relationship between women in civil society (the x-axis) and the percent of the cabinet that are female (the y-axis) in dictatorships as defined by DD. Each data point represents a country-year. Darker data points indicate a higher number of observations than lighter data points. The line of best fit is estimated using linear regression.

3.5.3 Control Variables

This chapter utilizes several control variables in the main analysis. I control for widespread protest by using the V-Dem project's "mobilization for democracy" variable. I employ a binary variable to distinguish between country-years where "several large-scale and small-scale events" of democratic mobilization or greater exist from those that do not. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is included as women's empowerment may be higher in countries with higher incomes.[72] Annual economic growth is included as countries that are economically growing may empower women to a greater degree than countries that are receding. Religious diversity is included for similar reasons.[73] Leader turnover during the life of a political regime is calculated from DD to provide a measure of institutional consolidation. Percentages of Catholics, Muslims and Protestants are included to control for different cultural traditions that

[72] Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015.
[73] Alesina et al. 2003.

some argue affect democratization.[74] The number of past democratic breakdowns is calculated from DD to control for regime instability. I include controls for countries that are former British colonies from 1918 onward and a control for whether or not the country gained independence post-1945. Finally, I include the percentage of democracies in the world for each year. Table 3.1 reports descriptive statistics for all variables included in the analysis.

	Count	Mean	Std. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Democratic Transition	4234	0.02	0.15	0.00	1.00
Women in Civil Society $_{t-1}$	4197	44.15	21.49	0.90	92.30
Women in Cabinets $_{t-1}$	4226	5.00	6.84	0.00	43.33
Cabinet $\geq$ 10% Female $_{t-1}$	4226	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00
Cabinet $\geq$ 15% Female $_{t-1}$	4226	0.09	0.28	0.00	1.00
Cabinet $\geq$ 20% Female $_{t-1}$	4226	0.04	0.21	0.00	1.00
Democratic Protest $_{t-1}$	4234	0.17	0.38	0.00	1.00
Log GDP Per Capita $_{t-1}$	3916	8.16	1.09	4.90	12.30
Growth $_{t-1}$	3811	2.23	10.59	-62.94	133.63
Leader Turnover $_{t-1}$	4234	0.23	0.24	0.02	1.00
% Cabinet Retained $_{t-1}$	4226	73.16	28.75	0.00	100.00
Religious Diversity	4197	0.42	0.25	0.00	0.86
Relevant Ethnic Diversity $_{t-1}$	4095	0.37	0.25	0.00	0.86
% Excluded $_{t-1}$	4095	0.42	0.37	0.00	1.00
% Catholic	4197	19.06	29.31	0.00	96.01
% Muslim	4197	39.17	41.38	0.00	100.00
% Protestant	4197	6.36	10.74	0.00	56.91
New Country	4197	0.69	0.46	0.00	1.00
Regime Breakdowns $_{t-1}$	4234	0.66	1.10	0.00	9.00
British Colony	4197	0.27	0.44	0.00	1.00
% Global Democracies$_{t-1}$	4234	0.41	0.13	0.27	0.60

Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables used in the analysis.

[74] Alesina et al. 2003.

3.5.4 The Sample

The overall sample is comprised of 4,234 country-years from 1966 to 2016. For a complete list of dictatorial spells used in the analysis, please consult appendix B.1. Of these years, 3,811 are included in regression models after missing values across different variables are dropped via listwise deletion. Thus, 90 percent of the overall sample is used to predict transitions to democracy. While some scholars have raised valid concerns about how missing data induces selection bias when the data are not missing completely at random, the evidence so far suggests this source of bias tends to become more problematic when the proportion of values that are missing increases.[75] 10 percent is not sufficiently large enough to warrant using Bayesian techniques such as multiple imputation which are more time consuming and computationally costly. Throughout, I lag all time-varying variables by one year.

[75] Lall 2016.

3.6 Econometric Analysis

3.6.1 Modelling Specification

I employ a series of first-order Markov transition models throughout most of this section. I estimate these models, for the most part, using the dynamic probit link. In doing so, I estimate the probability that a country which is not democratic in time t–1 will transition to democracy at time t conditional upon women's civil/political participation and a series of control variables. I estimate dynamic probit models by limiting the sample to countries that are not democracies in t–1. This estimation procedure produces identical results to fully interactive dynamic probit models which interact all independent variables with the one-year lag of the dependent variable and include both non-democracies and democracies in the sample.[76]

3.6.2 Dynamic Probit Analysis, 1966 to 2016

Table 3.2 reports the results of four dynamic probit models. All models employ a specification nearly identical to that employed by Przeworski and colleagues.[77] I add to this specification the dummy protest variable to control for the possibility that the effect of women's civil society participation on democratic transition is being driven by large-scale democratic opposition to the current regime by both genders. Model 1 estimates coefficients for the effect of women's civil society participation on the probability of transition to democracy holding constant all controls. The results show that when the level of women's participation in civil society organizations increases under autocracies, the probability that a transition will occur the next year increases. The probit coefficient for is both positive and statistically significant at the 0.1 percent level, in line with the predictions made in hypothesis 1. Model 2 estimates coefficients for the effect of percent of core cabinet positions that are assigned to women under autocracy, on the probability that transition to democracy occurs in the next year. The results show that when the level of women's participation in core cabinet portfolios

[76] See Przeworski et al. 2000, for a mathematical derivation of this estimation equivalency.
[77] Przeworski et al. 2000.

increases under autocracy, the probability that a transition to democracy will occur decreases, in line with the predictions made in hypothesis 2. However, the coefficient estimate does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. To investigate the possibility that the effects of women's participation in cabinets on democratic change is contingent upon their participation in civil society, model 3 estimates coefficients for both explanatory variables. In this model the coefficient for women's civil society participation is positive and statistically significant, as was the case in model 1. However, the coefficient estimate for the effect of women's participation in cabinets increases 2.5 times in magnitude when compared to model 2 and reaches marginal levels of statistical significance (p-value = 0.065) while retaining the same negative sign. To more intuitively explore the effects of both variables, I plot predicted probabilities of democratic transition from model 3 when women's civil/political participation increases from the 1st to the 99th percentile in figures 3.5 and 3.6. Over this range, women's civil participation increases the likelihood of transition by roughly 16.5 times while women's political participation decreases the likelihood of transition by roughly two-thirds. Model 4 interacts both variables to investigate whether women's executive participation reduces the positive effect that women's civil participation has on democratic change. Figure 3.7 plots the change in the value of the probit coefficient for women's civil participation as women's executive participation increases from 0 percent (the 1st percentile) to 30 percent (the 99th percentile), setting all other controls to zero. Over this range, the coefficient estimate of women's civil society participation on democratic transition decreases by approximately a half. This provides some evidence for the theory that when women's participation in the executive is high, the democratizing effect of women's civil empowerment participation may diminish.

Table 3.2: Dynamic Probit Models of Democratic Transition

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Women in Civil Society $_{t-1}$	0.0153***		0.0166***	0.0156***
	(0.0032)		(0.0033)	(0.0035)
Women in Cabinets $_{t-1}$		-0.0067	-0.0169*	-0.0339
		(0.0082)	(0.0092)	(0.0271)
Civil × Cabinet $_{t-1}$				0.0003
				(0.0004)
Democratic Protest $_{t-1}$	0.5271***	0.5825***	0.5407***	0.5408***
	(0.1295)	(0.1237)	(0.1298)	(0.1302)
Log GDP Per Capita $_{t-1}$	-0.1000	-0.0640	-0.1279**	-0.1312**
	(0.0628)	(0.0551)	(0.0634)	(0.0640)
Growth $_{t-1}$	0.0003	-0.0001	0.0005	0.0003
	(0.0041)	(0.0034)	(0.0040)	(0.0040)
Leader Turnover $_{t-1}$	0.1325	0.2030	0.1135	0.1130
	(0.2178)	(0.1995)	(0.2197)	(0.2215)
Religious Diversity	-0.8896***	-0.7559**	-0.8868**	-0.8824**
	(0.3452)	(0.3609)	(0.3557)	(0.3555)
% Catholic	0.0029	0.0013	0.0030	0.0031
	(0.0021)	(0.0023)	(0.0021)	(0.0021)
% Muslim	-0.0009	-0.0037	-0.0009	-0.0009
	(0.0022)	(0.0024)	(0.0023)	(0.0023)
% Protestant	0.0003	-0.0018	0.0018	0.0013
	(0.0066)	(0.0067)	(0.0067)	(0.0068)
New Country	-0.2637**	-0.1672	-0.2808**	-0.2759**
	(0.1271)	(0.1241)	(0.1293)	(0.1294)
Regime Breakdowns $_{t-1}$	0.1288***	0.1310***	0.1282***	0.1290***
	(0.0454)	(0.0425)	(0.0460)	(0.0462)
British Colony	0.1637	0.1725	0.1703	0.1694
	(0.1502)	(0.1430)	(0.1507)	(0.1505)
% Global Democracies $_{t-1}$	-0.8718*	0.4372	-0.4362	-0.3994
	(0.4837)	(0.4645)	(0.5265)	(0.5258)
Log-Likelihood	-364.5189	-377.5996	-362.683	-362.4909
AIC	757.0378	783.1992	755.3661	756.9818
Observations	3,811	3,811	3,811	3,811

Standard Errors Clustered by Country in Parentheses; Constant Not Reported

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$




Figure 3.5: Predicted probability of transition from autocracy (A) to democracy (D) in new countries that experienced large-scale democratic protests with an average income of $2,697 and no previous regime breakdowns as women's civil participation increases from 1st to 99th percentile in the sample. Ribbons represent 90 percent confidence intervals.




Figure 3.6: Predicted probability of transition from autocracy (A) to democracy (D) in new countries that experienced large-scale democratic protests with an average income of $2,697 and no previous regime breakdowns as women's participation in core cabinet positions increases from 1st to 99th percentile in the sample. Ribbons represent 90 percent confidence intervals.




Figure 3.7: Change in β Women in Civil Society $_{t-1}$ as cabinet participation increases with all controls set to zero. Ribbons represent 90 percent confidence intervals.

3.6.3 Thresholds of Women's Executive Participation

The previous set of models sought to understand the level of women's executive participation as a continuous range and found consistent evidence that the probability of transition to democracy decreases as their participation increases. However, the level of significance attributed to the coefficient estimates was dependent on the control specification used. The next set of models, as shown in table 3.3, consider three different thresholds of female participation namely 10, 15 and 20 percent of executive portfolios to test critical mass arguments found in the literature. Models 5 to 10 employ a similar specification to models 2 and 3, only this time the threshold measures of women's executive participation replace the continuous measure. Models 5 and 6 employ a 10 percent threshold. 679 out of 3,811 country-years used in the sample (18 percent) either reach or exceed this threshold. While the coefficient associated with this threshold is negatively signed, it does not reach statistical significance. Models 7 and 8 employ a 15 percent threshold. 315 out of 3,811 country-years used in the sample (8 percent) either reach or exceed this threshold. The coefficient associated with this threshold is negative and statistically significant at the 0.1 percent level. To assess the magnitude of this effect, I calculate predicted probabilities of democratic transition using model 8 for when the 15 percent is and is not reached/exceeded in new countries that experienced large-scale democratic protests with an average income of $2,697 and no previous regime breakdowns. When this threshold is reached/exceeded, the predicted probability of democratic transition is 0.0116 while when it is not reached, the equivalent predicted probability is 0.0371, meaning that countries are 3.2 times more likely to transition to democracy according this model if this threshold is not reached. Models 9 and 10 employ a 20 percent threshold. 165 out of 3,811 country-years used in the sample (4 percent) either reach or exceed this threshold. The coefficient associated with this threshold is negative and statistically significant at the 0.5 percent level. When the 20 percent threshold is reached/exceeded, the predicted probability of transition is 0.0066 while when it is not reached, the equivalent predicted probability is 0.0354, meaning that countries are 5.4 times less likely to transition to democracy.

Table 3.4 reports predicted probabilities of transition to democracy over chosen percentiles of women's civil empowerment, stratified by whether or not a critical mass (15 percent) of women is reached in the executive using the results of model 8. Crucially, we see that the probability transition to democracy is least likely in cases where women's civil empowerment is low yet women's political empowerment is high (0.0018) and most likely in cases where civil empowerment is high and political empowerment is low (0.1228). When women's civil empowerment resides at the 1st percentile, a critical mass of women in the executive will reduce the probability of transition to democracy from dictatorship 4.3 times. When women's civil empowerment resides at the 99th percentile, a critical mass of women in the executive will reduce the probability of transition to democracy from dictatorship by 2.5 times. These results suggest that when autocracies reach a critical mass of women in executive positions, they are significantly less likely to transition to democracy in the following year. As autocracies reach or exceed higher thresholds, the probability of democratic transition decreases according to the models presented. Furthermore, we see that a critical mass of women appears to have a stabilizing effect on dictatorships.

Table 3.3: Dynamic Probit Models of Democratic Transition

	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Women in Civil Society $_{t-1}$		0.0154***		0.0162***		0.0162***
		(0.0032)		(0.0033)		(0.0032)
Cabinet $\geq$ 10% Female $_{t-1}$	0.0659	-0.0299				
	(0.1478)	(0.1494)				
Cabinet $\geq$ 15% Female $_{t-1}$			-0.3979**	-0.5112***		
			(0.1917)	(0.1939)		
Cabinet $\geq$ 20% Female $_{t-1}$					-0.5575*	-0.7097**
					(0.2941)	(0.3090)
Controls Added	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log-Likelihood	-377.7876	-364.4942	-375.7956	-361.0833	-375.8466	-361.164
AIC	783.5752	758.9884	779.5911	752.1666	779.6932	752.328
Observations	3,811	3,811	3,811	3,811	3,811	3,811

Standard Errors Clustered by Country in Parentheses; Constant Not Reported

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

	Political Empowerment:		
Civil Empowerment	A: $\geq 15\%$	B: $< 15\%$	$\frac{B}{A}$
1st Percentile (6.9%)	0.0018	0.0078	4.33
25th Percentile (27%)	0.0047	0.0178	3.79
50th Percentile (43.1%)	0.0095	0.0322	3.39
75th Percentile (60.7%)	0.0192	0.0578	3.01
99th Percentile (87%)	0.0487	0.1228	2.52

Table 3.4: Predicted probabilities of transition to democracy from dictatorship by women's civil and political empowerment in new countries that experience large-scale democratic protests with an average income of $2,697 and no previous regime breakdowns. Women's political empowerment is coded by looking at instances when over 15 percent of core cabinet positions are assigned to women. Results are from model 8.

3.6.4 Fixed Effects Models

The models presented thus far rely upon a conventional specification which assumes that similar countries at a similar point in time are being compared. The next set of models, as reported in tables 3.3 and 3.5, interrogates this assumption by employing several varieties of fixed effects specifications. Models 11 to 14 employ dynamic probit regression and includes a varying mixture of region and decade fixed effects to the specification. In doing so, I estimate the probability of transition to democracy at time t for a country that was a dictatorship at time $t-1$ that exists in the same region during the same decade conditional upon the covariates used in the model. This specification drops 260 observations from the sample as no democratic transitions occur during the 1966 to 1970 in the sample. In all models, I find that women's participation in civil society maintains a positive and statistically significant effect on the probability of democratic transition. While women's participation in cabinets has a consistently negative effect on the probability of democratic transition, this effect is only significant when the threshold of participation reaches/exceeds 15 percent. The next set of models employs country and year fixed effects. Using country and year fixed effects with binary probit models can be problematic as countries that have consolidated autocracies (meaning countries with 0s in all years) will be automatically dropped from the sample which risks selection bias. I thus employ linear probability models to estimate country and year fixed effects as all observations are preserved. Models 15 to 22 estimate country fixed effects. Under this specification, we can predict the (linear) predicted probability that the same country will transition to democracy in the next year, conditional upon the time-varying covariates used in the model. As the coefficients for religious fractionalization, percent of Catholics/Muslims/Protestants, new countries and British colonies are time invariant within countries, they are perfectly collinear with country fixed effects and are thus automatically dropped from the model. As with previous models, women's civil participation has a consistently positive and significant effect on the probability of transition to democracy. Women's executive participation has a consistently negative effect and is statistically significant when

conceived in terms of raw percentages and thresholds that reach/exceed 15 percent of core cabinet positions. Models 16, 18, 20, 22 all employ country and year fixed effects which means we can calculate the (linear) predicted probability that the same country in the same year will transition to democracy in the next year, conditional upon the time-varying covariates used in the model. Women's civil participation has a consistently positive and significant effect on the probability of transition to democracy. Women's executive participation, however, only reaches statistical significance at the 10 percent level ($p = 0.084$) in model 20 where the threshold reaches/exceeds 15 percent.

Table 3.5: Dynamic Probit Models of Democratic Transition

	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Women in Civil Society $_{t-1}$	0.0144***	0.0137***	0.0139***	0.0139***
	(0.0036)	(0.0036)	(0.0036)	(0.0036)
Women in Cabinets $_{t-1}$	-0.0150			
	(0.0095)			
Cabinet $\geq$ 10% Female $_{t-1}$		-0.0124		
		(0.1474)		
Cabinet $\geq$ 15% Female $_{t-1}$			-0.4241**	
			(0.1872)	
Cabinet $\geq$ 20% Female $_{t-1}$				-0.5128*
				(0.2990)
Democratic Protest $_{t-1}$	0.5021***	0.4920***	0.4947***	0.4892***
	(0.1350)	(0.1351)	(0.1351)	(0.1340)
Log GDP Per Capita $_{t-1}$	-0.1520**	-0.1278*	-0.1472*	-0.1390*
	(0.0763)	(0.0739)	(0.0753)	(0.0747)
Growth $_{t-1}$	0.0021	0.0020	0.0023	0.0020
	(0.0039)	(0.0039)	(0.0039)	(0.0039)
Leader Turnover $_{t-1}$	0.2389	0.2455	0.2615	0.2404
	(0.2344)	(0.2375)	(0.2317)	(0.2301)
Religious Diversity	-0.8733**	-0.8736**	-0.8902**	-0.8968**
	(0.3637)	(0.3604)	(0.3622)	(0.3579)
% Catholic	0.0005	0.0005	0.0005	0.0007
	(0.0027)	(0.0027)	(0.0027)	(0.0027)
% Muslim	-0.0010	-0.0008	-0.0009	-0.0009
	(0.0026)	(0.0025)	(0.0025)	(0.0025)
% Protestant	0.0015	0.0008	0.0020	0.0024
	(0.0075)	(0.0075)	(0.0076)	(0.0073)
New Country	-0.0889	-0.0710	-0.0995	-0.0979
	(0.1650)	(0.1612)	(0.1643)	(0.1635)
Regime Breakdowns $_{t-1}$	0.1380***	0.1409***	0.1373***	0.1402***
	(0.0472)	(0.0479)	(0.0472)	(0.0465)
British Colony	0.2195	0.2038	0.2338	0.2306
	(0.1488)	(0.1479)	(0.1487)	(0.1479)
% Global Democracies $_{t-1}$	-6.2588***	-6.3941***	-6.3683***	-6.3717***
	(1.4174)	(1.4224)	(1.4169)	(1.4162)
Region Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log-Likelihood	-334.1471	-335.3097	-333.269	-333.7839
AIC	712.2941	714.6194	710.5381	711.5678
Observations	3,551	3,551	3,551	3,551

Standard Errors Clustered by Country in Parentheses; Constant Not Reported

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 3.6: Linear Probability Models of Democratic Transition with Country Fixed Effects

	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)
Women in Civil Society$_{t-1}$	0.0017***	0.0016***	0.0015***	0.0015***	0.0016***	0.0016***	0.0016***	0.0016***
	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)
Women in Cabinets$_{t-1}$	-0.0010*	-0.0008						
	(0.0006)	(0.0006)						
Cabinet $\geq$ 10% Female$_{t-1}$			-0.0016	0.0049				
			(0.0096)	(0.0100)				
Cabinet $\geq$ 15% Female$_{t-1}$					-0.0236**	-0.0183*		
					(0.0097)	(0.0099)		
Cabinet $\geq$ 20% Female$_{t-1}$							-0.0268**	-0.0185
							(0.0124)	(0.0124)
Democratic Protest$_{t-1}$	0.0648***	0.0577***	0.0651***	0.0581***	0.0645***	0.0575***	0.0646***	0.0577***
	(0.0188)	(0.0177)	(0.0188)	(0.0178)	(0.0188)	(0.0177)	(0.0188)	(0.0178)
Log GDP Per Capita$_{t-1}$	0.0034	0.0072	0.0030	0.0093	0.0028	0.0069	0.0035	0.0079
	(0.0055)	(0.0058)	(0.0053)	(0.0057)	(0.0054)	(0.0058)	(0.0055)	(0.0059)
Growth$_{t-1}$	-0.0000	-0.0001	-0.0000	-0.0001	-0.0000	-0.0001	-0.0000	-0.0001
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Leader Turnover$_{t-1}$	-0.0217	-0.0028	-0.0210	-0.0031	-0.0201	-0.0023	-0.0210	-0.0033
	(0.0193)	(0.0232)	(0.0194)	(0.0235)	(0.0192)	(0.0233)	(0.0191)	(0.0232)
Regime Breakdowns$_{t-1}$	-0.0005	-0.0032	-0.0010	-0.0031	-0.0006	-0.0031	-0.0008	-0.0031
	(0.0060)	(0.0066)	(0.0060)	(0.0066)	(0.0061)	(0.0066)	(0.0061)	(0.0066)
% Global Democracies$_{t-1}$	-0.0142	-0.0412	-0.0298	-0.0918	-0.0229	-0.0511	-0.0277	-0.0640
	(0.0401)	(0.0886)	(0.0402)	(0.0886)	(0.0391)	(0.0844)	(0.0391)	(0.0834)
Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
R-Squared	.0345	.0613	.0334	.0608	.0348	.0615	.0345	.0612
Observations	3811	3811	3811	3811	3811	3811	3811	3811

Standard Errors Clustered by Country in Parentheses; Constant Not Reported

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

3.6.5 Alternative Control Specifications

While the results hitherto demonstrate strong support for hypothesis 1 and some, albeit weaker, support for hypothesis 2, the models employed rely upon controls that some scholars have criticised as being weakly proxied such as elite turnover and fractionalization. Elite turnover is important as some scholars have pointed towards potential synergies between splits within the elite who may seek to collaborate with civil society movements to remove unpopular and extremist cliques within the current ruling coalition.[78] However, leader turnover may not provide a realistic indication of the inner turbulence that autocratic regimes experience as it only considers one, albeit centrally important, person instead of the whole ruling coalition. To more realistically capture wider elite instability, I include yearly retention rates of the core political elite which are calculated using WhoGov and range from 0 to 100, where 0 (100) means none (all) of the core elite in the previous year still hold cabinet appointments in the current year. Religious identity is increasingly being considered by scholars as a constituent part of ethnic identity as religious, linguistic and phenotypic differences constituent parts of larger ascriptive differences. Furthermore, fractionalization does not give any indication of whether or not a specific identity group is incorporated at the level of the state and thus could be an unconvincing way of operationalizing ethnic-based grievances.[79] I thus consider two variables namely the fractionalization of relevant ethnic groups and the proportion of the population that are descriptively excluded (defined in terms of relevant ethnicity) from access to executive power. This is crucial as women's civil/political participation is often seen as being crowded out by concerns related to conflict between politically relevant ethnic groups that are competing for control of the state.[80] The data source used to calculate both variables is the Ethnic Power Relations data set.[81] Table 3.6 reports the results of this updated specification. Under this specification, I find that women's civil participation maintains the same positive and statistically significant effect on the probability of transition to

[78] O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986.
[79] Chandra and Wilkinson 2008.
[80] Roessler 2011; Arriola and Johnson 2014.
[81] Vogt et al. 2015.

democracy. Women's executive participation, however, only reaches statistical significance at the 10 percent level (p = 0.082) in models 25 and 29 where the threshold reaches/exceeds 15 percent. I find that retention rates in the cabinet play a consistently negative effect on the probability of democratic transition which is statistically significant at the 0.1 percent level. By contrast, leader turnover is both inconsistently signed, depending on the model specification, and fails to reach even marginal levels of statistical significance in previous models. This indicates that when the ruling coalition experiences instability, elites may defect from the regime itself and strike bargains with the opposition that enable transition to democracy. Diversity of relevant ethnic groups is not a statistically significant indicator of transition to democracy. However, the level of ethnic exclusion used by the regime was a negative and statistically significant predictor of transition to democracy, as has been documented in other studies.[82]

[82]Bormann 2017.

Table 3.7: Dynamic Probit Models of Democratic Transition

	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)
Women in Civil Society $_{t-1}$	0.0154***	0.0145***	0.0151***	0.0151***	0.0140***	0.0130***	0.0136***	0.0137***
	(0.0034)	(0.0033)	(0.0033)	(0.0033)	(0.0034)	(0.0034)	(0.0034)	(0.0034)
Women in Cabinets $_{t-1}$	-0.0142				-0.0133			
	(0.0099)				(0.0105)			
Cabinet $\geq$ 10% Female $_{t-1}$		0.0096				0.0069		
		(0.1540)				(0.1558)		
Cabinet $\geq$ 15% Female $_{t-1}$			-0.3937**				-0.3488*	
			(0.2002)				(0.2002)	
Cabinet $\geq$ 20% Female $_{t-1}$				-0.5577*				-0.4848
				(0.3171)				(0.3306)
% Cabinet Retained $_{t-1}$	-0.0076***	-0.0078***	-0.0075***	-0.0075***	-0.0081***	-0.0082***	-0.0080***	-0.0080***
	(0.0016)	(0.0016)	(0.0016)	(0.0016)	(0.0016)	(0.0016)	(0.0015)	(0.0016)
Relevant Ethnic Diversity $_{t-1}$	-0.0206	0.0399	-0.0273	-0.0125				
	(0.2590)	(0.2555)	(0.2592)	(0.2627)				
% Excluded from Power $_{t-1}$					-0.5098***	-0.5134***	-0.4970***	-0.4917***
					(0.1620)	(0.1617)	(0.1632)	(0.1642)
Other Controls Included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log-Likelihood	-345.0471	-346.2216	-344.2658	-344.2042	-339.8282	-340.8427	-339.3307	-339.3606
AIC	720.0941	722.4431	718.5316	718.4085	709.6563	711.6854	708.6614	708.7212
Observations	3,686	3,686	3,686	3,686	3,686	3,686	3,686	3,686

Standard Errors Clustered by Country in Parentheses; Constant Not Reported

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

3.6.6 Dynamic Probit Models, 1900 to 2000

The last set of models explore the impact of women's civil/political participation on the origins of democratic contestation over a longer time period from 1900 to 2000. Instead of including women's executive participation, I estimate coefficients for women's legislative participation as the WhoGov data set begins only at 1966. Furthermore, I rely upon Boix, Miller and Rosato (BMR), V-Dem and the Lexical Index of Democracy (LIED) as these data sets extend further back in time than the DD measure.[83] While these models enable me to understand the role of women's civil/political participation over several waves of democratization, using legislative positions is arguably a weaker proxy for women's political participation because legislatures in autocracies can serve as a rubber stamp for policies already decided upon by cabinet members as was discussed in section 3.3.7.[84] I code cases where legislatures do not exist as 0. Across all models, we can observe an identical pattern of women's empowerment on the probability of transition to democracy. Women's civil participation, as was the case in all other models, positively predicts transition to democracy in all samples at high levels of statistical significance. Although weaker, we can nevertheless see that women's legislative participation plays a negative and statistically significant influence on the probability of democratization across most models.

[83] Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2013; Skaaning, Gerring, and Bartusevičius 2015.
[84] Bjarnegård and Melander 2013; Stockemer 2017.

Table 3.8: Dynamic Probit Models of Democratic Transition, 1900 to 2000

	(31)	(32)	(33)	(34)	(35)	(36)	(37)	(38)
Women in Civil Society $_{t-1}$	1.2249***	1.1457***	1.9614***	1.8481***	1.0873***	0.9958***	1.0755***	1.0044***
	(0.3235)	(0.3107)	(0.3576)	(0.3455)	(0.3199)	(0.3082)	(0.3161)	(0.3019)
Women in Legislators $_{t-1}$	-0.0139*		-0.0193**		-0.0148**		-0.0124*	
	(0.0079)		(0.0081)		(0.0070)		(0.0071)	
Legislature $\geq$ 15% Female $_{t-1}$		-0.2547		-0.6407***		-0.2619*		-0.2681*
		(0.1687)		(0.2233)		(0.1432)		(0.1510)
Democratic Protest $_{t-1}$	0.4769***	0.4673***	0.3693***	0.3528**	0.4725***	0.4649***	0.4825***	0.4727***
	(0.1322)	(0.1336)	(0.1356)	(0.1370)	(0.1317)	(0.1332)	(0.1319)	(0.1329)
Political Equality, SES $_{t-1}$	-0.0412	-0.0468	0.0942*	0.1099*	-0.0428	-0.0479	-0.0147	-0.0158
	(0.0451)	(0.0464)	(0.0554)	(0.0578)	(0.0439)	(0.0457)	(0.0451)	(0.0468)
Political Equality, ETH $_{t-1}$	0.1269**	0.1283**	0.3259***	0.3188***	0.1266**	0.1282**	0.1714***	0.1721***
	(0.0532)	(0.0537)	(0.0589)	(0.0576)	(0.0532)	(0.0537)	(0.0513)	(0.0519)
Urbanization Rate $_{t-1}$	0.5085**	0.4931**	0.4099	0.3690	0.3079	0.2877	0.3838	0.3630
	(0.2433)	(0.2409)	(0.2557)	(0.2589)	(0.2252)	(0.2214)	(0.2419)	(0.2395)
Logged Population $_{t-1}$	0.0607*	0.0592*	-0.0030	-0.0057	0.0020	0.0009	0.0120	0.0111
	(0.0352)	(0.0349)	(0.0340)	(0.0333)	(0.0351)	(0.0351)	(0.0355)	(0.0355)
Data Set Used	BMR	BMR	V-Dem	V-Dem	LIED	LIED	LIED	LIED
Log-Likelihood	-468.5993	-469.3102	-508.0236	-503.9961	-540.6407	-541.6351	-518.7373	-518.9691
AIC	953.1986	954.6203	1032.047	1023.992	1097.281	1099.27	1053.475	1053.938
Observations	5,634	5,634	9,945	9,945	5,347	5,347	5,789	5,789

Standard Errors Clustered by Country in Parentheses; Constant Not Reported

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

3.7 Conclusion

Social scientists have approached the subject of women and democracy from several different angles. The first angle considers the history of democracy through the lens of forging the franchise. During the first wave of democratization, women became enfranchised much later than men. Instead of voting rights being given, suffragette movements throughout the West engaged in peaceful forms of protest against this form of inequality in countries where the institutions of democratic contestation had already been established. The second angle taken more recently by scholars is that women play a vital role in understanding the origins of democratic contestation in countries that had hitherto been dictatorships. Empowerment in society acts as a crucial precondition for widespread women's involvement in civil society organizations that, as some have argued, leads to a potential doubling of organized opposition directed against the current authoritarian regime. The third angle, by contrast, seeks to understand the role democracy has played in empowering women. A burgeoning literature exists within the social sciences that seeks to understand whether democracy has brought about an increase in descriptive representation for women in positions of political power such as legislatures, governments and judiciaries and reports, at best, mixed results.

This chapter attempts to understand the role empowered women play in democratic change through the lens of understanding what democracy can do to empower women. The underlying assumption that has guided the predictions in this chapter is that women support regimes that promote other women to prominent positions of political power. Having women in the executive is not, in this sense, an end in itself as typified by the phrase 'breaking the glass ceiling.' Instead, I argue that descriptive representation of women in positions of political power leads to substantive representation in terms of policy choices made by the political elite that positively impact the lives of ordinary women. In the past, the choice between democracy and dictatorship was clear for women. In most dictatorships up until 1989, the interests of women were, at best, ignored and, at worst, contravened by selectorates and winning coalitions that were both descriptively male in composition and substantively masculine in policy prescrip-

tion. Democracies, by comparison, provided a comparatively peaceful public space for women to represent themselves. Using WhoGov, this chapter demonstrates that when the differences in women's executive participation are compared between dictatorship and democracy, democracy has resulted in more women being promoted to positions of political power than dictatorships. However, the choice that women face today is, more realistically, one between electoral democracy and electoral authoritarianism given that both regimes constitute a reality for the vast majority of countries in the world.[85] This chapter demonstrates that, by contrast, a transition from one regime to the other may not result in a substantive increase in access to executive power for women. Indeed, we have seen that some of the world's most empowered women (at least in the sense of having descriptive representation) exist under electoral authoritarianism.

Using first order Markov transition models, this chapter demonstrated support for the proposition that women's civil participation increased the probability of transition to democracy while women's executive participation decreased the probability of transition. The theoretical reasoning provided by the chapter for the former hypothesis is that the authoritarian elite conclude from observing women's participation in civil society that transition is less likely to result in punishment at the hands of a patriarchal society and elite. Furthermore, the structure of authoritarian rule chronically disempowered women politically, which I argue raised demand among women for democratic change. However, the rise of women's executive empowerment under electoral autocracies may present a fundamental shift in how ordinary women weigh the pros and cons of democracy and dictatorship. If enough women are promoted to the most prestigious political offices in the land, ordinary women may be less inclined to campaign against regime change and may, contra the predictions of previous scholars, either stay at home during demonstrations or rally in support of the authoritarian status quo. In particular, this chapter found that once a critical mass of women was reached in the executive, the negative impact of women's executive participation on democratic transition was at its most robust.

[85] Maerz et al. 2020.

This chapter concludes with two broader observations for researchers and policy makers to consider. First, and foremost, this chapter reiterates the call made by previous scholars to take women seriously as agents of democratic change not only in the terms of enlarging the franchise in already existing democracies[86] but also in terms of understanding the very origins of democratic contestation itself.[87] Women's visibility in civil society, in particular, has been argued to encourage autocrats to relinquish their monopoly on power through increasing the costs of repression and lowering the costs of toleration.[88] While previous articles have discussed a version of this cost-benefit analysis[89] which relates to the motivation of autocrats to relinquish their monopoly, this chapter brings to attention the fact that, historically, authoritarianism has undermined women's political interests. Previous authors have argued that democracies provide women with a space of relative openness and peace through which they can represent themselves in the public sphere against patriarchal forces.[90] This chapter extends this useful insight by reasoning that access to political power serves as the best means through which women can shift the priorities of government towards policies that favour their own development. I demonstrate that when we compare democracy with dictatorship, the former has assigned a consistently greater share of cabinet appointments to women than the latter has on average. The crucial take home from this is that to understand why women may prefer democracy to dictatorship, we first need to take the social context in which women operate more seriously instead of considering them as unconditional supporters of democracy.

A second related point is that researchers and policy makers would do well to ask not just what women can do for democracy but what democracy can do for women. This chapter has shown that the representation 'gap' between democracies and autocracies is mainly driven by low performance of the closed autocracies that prevailed in the past and high performance from liberal democracies. When we compare electoral

[86]Paxton 2000; Caraway 2004; Teele 2018.
[87]Rai 1994; Wang et al. 2017.
[88]Dahl 1971.
[89]Wang et al. 2017.
[90]Rai 1994.

democracies with electoral autocracies, by contrast, the 'gap' is far less stark. Several electoral autocracies have been demonstrated to be among the most empowering – in terms of descriptive access to power – of women. In doing so, these authoritarian elite may have changed the perceptions of ordinary women from disapproval to indifference or perhaps even approval of the political status quo. This suggests that if authoritarian elites can close the gender representation gap that once existed between them and their democratic counterparts, the popular demand for transition from autocracy to democracy may become lower. While this chapter in no way suggests that women no longer want democracy, it nevertheless argues that proponents of democratic change need desperately to put the political empowerment of women at the centre of their agenda. If democrats cannot offer women a better deal than the one being proposed than autocrats, one of their most historically valuable allies in the social world may be less likely to support democratization.

Chapter 4

Popular or predatory autocrats? The economic origins of authoritarian influence in emerging democracies

4.1 Introduction

Transitions from dictatorship to democracy are often argued to represent a clear turning point in the political history of a country. Some scholars posit that transitions represent critical junctures whereby the majority place legally binding constraints on the actions of the political elite through regular free and fair elections.[1] In doing so, citizens can reward the actions of elite representatives who act in favour of their interests through re-election and can punish those who act in opposition to them through electing other political elites. Democracy, according to this perspective, represents something akin to a *tabula rasa* – a blank slate in which politicians respond to the interests of the people over the interests of the elite. Later scholars, however have begun to realise that transition to democracy rarely, if ever, constitutes a clean break from the past.

[1] Acemoglu and Robinson 2005.

The "outgoing" authoritarian elite often plays a vital role in shaping the parameters of democracy such as the political, electoral and party system through participating in the drafting and amendment of national constitutions.[2] A now burgeoning literature acknowledges that political elites who are affiliated with the previous authoritarian regime continue to be assigned important positions of political power despite regime change having occurred.[3] Yet, in other instances of transition, the authoritarian elite truly are outgoing and, in some cases, held legally accountable for their actions.

The question of why some authoritarian elites continue to hold political power under democracy while others do not is indeed puzzling. Authoritarian elites rely upon ruling in the absence of meaningful consent from the public and often use repressive tactics that constitute, at times, egregious violations of human rights to perpetuate their hold on political power.[4] Thus we may reasonably intuit that these actions make them completely unpalatable as electoral candidates to the general public. However, regime transition without elite transition is by no means theoretically impossible.[5] Authoritarian elites build reputations among key political actors that may make them highly valuable in positions of political influence.[6] Even without a monopoly on political power, authoritarian affiliates can use entirely legal methods to protect the interests of those who constitute the beneficiaries of the old order. This chapter addresses two research questions that relate to what I term authoritarian influence - defined as the direct participation of elites who are affiliated to the previous authoritarian regime in the executive politics of the current democratic regime. What underlying economic conditions predict authoritarian influence after a transition to democracy? Which social groups (defined in terms of class) form the support base for continued authoritarian influence?

This chapter draws upon previous debates found within the political economy of democratization literature to answer these two questions – with a twist. Instead of un-

[2] Albertus and Menaldo 2018.
[3] Loxton and Mainwaring 2018.
[4] Gerschewski 2013.
[5] Slater and Wong 2013.
[6] Ziblatt 2017.

derstanding the role of economics on the probability of transition,[7] this chapter parses observable implications found within this literature that relates to the perpetuation of authoritarian influence. I consider two theories of authoritarian influence namely the median voter and elite competition theories which tell two conflicting stories. The median voter theory predicts that authoritarian influence will be greater in cases where the previous authoritarian regime delivers widespread benefits that secure their popularity among large sections of the public. The elite competition theory predicts that authoritarian influence will be lower when a new set of economic elite with no ties to autocracy emerge under the previous dictatorship. This new elite fear predation by the authoritarian elite and thus seek to remove the latter's political influence after a transition to democracy occurs. In doing so, this chapter argues, not without precedent, that distributional conflict is not fought over accepting or rejecting democratic transition per se but over determining the extent to which authoritarian influence should continue after transition.[8]

Along with advancing this new direction in the literature, this chapter brings to bear original data based on WhoGov. WhoGov enables academics to gauge the extent to which authoritarian influence is present in a representative sample of transitioning countries. A total of 85 transitions to democracy are identified from 1966 to 2015 using WhoGov in conjunction with other data sets. Using WhoGov, I create two continuous measures that can serve as meaningful proxies for different forms of authoritarian influence. The first measure is the proportion of cabinet positions that are assigned to individuals with previous experience in authoritarian cabinets. The second is the proportion of cabinet positions that are assigned to members of authoritarian successor parties. This chapter uncovers two facts about the nature and extent of authoritarian influence using these measures. First, authoritarian influence is both widespread and substantive. Elites affiliated with the authoritarian past are often assigned a large proportion of cabinet appointments that are non-token. Second, both forms of authoritarian influence are positively yet not highly correlated. Elites that held cabinet

[7] Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Ansell and Samuels 2014.
[8] Albertus and Menaldo 2018.

appointments in the previous autocracy are more likely to join parties that are unaffiliated to the previous authoritarian regime than they are likely to join authoritarian successor parties. Furthermore, a small yet substantial minority of this elite often do not affiliate with any political party and, instead, identify as independent technocrats.

This chapter employs fractional response models to predict levels of authoritarian influence. In doing so, it provides the first test of proportional authoritarian influence to which I am aware. This methodological approach portrays stronger support for the elite competition theory of authoritarian influence than it does the median voter theory, albeit for different reasons. The influence of the previous authoritarian elite is largely a function of economic legacies left by the previous autocracy. Conversely, the influence of authoritarian successor party affiliates is a function of economic development experienced under the current democracy. The analysis, however, strongly suggests that the rise in economic power and political influence of the urban middle class consistently predicts the decline of both forms of authoritarian influence. Furthermore, the results demonstrate that authoritarian regimes where agrarian elites such as large landowners and rich peasants held significant influence predict higher levels of influence by affiliates of authoritarian successor parties.

This chapter is divided into six sections. The second section reviews the literature on direct forms of autocratic influence in post-transition democracies. The third develops median voter and elite competition theories of authoritarian influence and derives competing predictions. The fourth discusses data collection, summary statistics for the dependent and independent variables of interest and control variables. The fifth reports the results of the fractional response models. The final section concludes by discussing the implications of this chapter on the future study of democratization.

4.2 Literature Review

Several seminal accounts of democratic transition portray it as a process through which the authoritarian elite cede power to a democratic elite. Dankwart Rustow argued of the three phases that demarcate democratization (preparatory, decision, habituation)

the decision phase was the most important and, yet, was made by a small group of the political elite who reached a compromise that involved allowing democratic transition, on behalf of the incumbent autocrats, in exchange for limits to the power of majority rule.[9] Guillermo O'Donnell and Phillipe Schmitter similarly argued that a "pact" is made between a select set of actors that defines predictable rules of governance and protects vital interests on both sides. In this story, the old authoritarian elite is assumed to be outgoing while the new democratic elite are assumed to be incoming.[10] Given that power changes hands, several scholars have argued that the relative propensity of the outgoing elite to accept democracy is determined by the extent to which it damages the economic interests of those who benefited from their rule.[11]

Democracy is often portrayed, in this literature, as a blank slate in which politicians propose policies that benefit the people. However, later scholarship reveals that, in many cases, the influence of the previous authoritarian regime often outlives transition to democracy. In their recent book *Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy*, Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo document the extent to which the pacts made between autocrats and democrats are often biased in favour of the former, not the latter.[12] Autocrats, argue the authors, often play a central role in drafting or amending the constitution of the country that shapes the institutional parameters on which democracy is based such as the political, electoral, party and legal system. The overriding imperative of autocrats is to protect the interests of themselves and the economic beneficiaries of the previous autocracy by curtailing challenges from political parties that appeal to the economic interests of the public. As a result, autocrats design institutions that place a stranglehold on popular rule without abolishing procedural democracy.

Albertus and Menaldo focus on indirect forms of authoritarian control - institutional provisions that are designed to lock in the ill-gotten gains of the previous dictatorship in the current democratic context. In some cases, however, the authoritarian elite exert a

[9] Rustow 1970.
[10] O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986.
[11] Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2005.
[12] Albertus and Menaldo 2018.

more direct form of influence in the politics of transitioning democracies. A burgeoning literature has begun to appreciate the role that so-called authoritarian successor parties play in the process of democratic transition. Authoritarian successor parties, as defined by James Loxton, are parties that "emerge from authoritarian regimes, but that operate after a transition to democracy."[13]

Far from being a historical aberration, authoritarian successor parties have been influential actors in the politics of many emerging democracies and have, in plenty of cases, won free and fair elections. The first authoritarian successor parties originated during the first wave of democratization. In Western Europe, parties such as the Tory Party in Britain, the Højre in Denmark and the Allmänna valmansförbundet in Sweden can be considered as some of the earliest examples of authoritarian successor parties. In the advent of democratization, these parties sought to protect the interests of the aristocracy who based their wealth on land ownership against the spectre of popular demands for redistribution. While some of their counterparts relied upon electoral manipulation and corruption to hold on to power, many successor parties built their organizational capacity to survive, and indeed thrive, in an age of mass politics.[14] In East Asia, parties such as the Kuomintang in Taiwan, Democratic Justice Party in South Korea and Golkar in Indonesia served to perpetuate the legacy of the previous military-nationalist dictatorships that ruled for decades in the region.[15] In Eastern Europe, several parties based on the Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party and the Polish United Worker's Party continued to win free and fair elections despite the collapse and widespread refutation of communist rule after 1989.[16] In Sub-Saharan Africa, parties such as the National Democratic Congress in Ghana deftly navigated the transition to democracy by assigning political positions to representatives from a diverse number of ethnic communities (a.k.a. "Big Men"). As a result, the NDC regained power in 2008 and 2012, no less than a decade after the transition to democracy had occurred.[17]

[13]Loxton and Mainwaring 2018, p. 2.
[14]Ziblatt 2017.
[15]Slater and Wong 2013.
[16]Grzymala-Busse 2006.
[17]Riedl 2014.

Scholars are divided over the question of why authoritarian successor parties have been more successful than others at maintaining direct influence over post-transition politics. One perspective, as typified by the work of Anna Grzymala-Busse, sees authoritarian successor parties as undergoing radical reinvention whereby autocratic party elites structurally and ideationally adapt to democracy through centralizing the party apparatus and, to varying degrees, signalling a break with the past – repudiating aspects of the old party that will make them unpopular with, while glorifying aspects that make them viable to, the electorate (e.g. management of the economy).[18] Loxton refers to this duality as authoritarian inheritance and baggage.[19] This perspective has been gleaned by studying democratization in countries that transitioned from communist dictatorships which purportedly served the interests of the working class. Other scholars, drawing from a range of non-communist dictatorships, suggest that authoritarian successor parties are indicative of continuity with the past rather than a radical break with it.[20] A laundry list of variables such as early concession to democracy as opposed to being pressured into it through mass protest, a legacy of delivering upon key metrics (e.g. economic growth) and longevity in power are argued to determine the relative success of authoritarian successor parties at the polls.[21]

The scholarship on the influence of authoritarianism (both indirect and direct) after initial transition has thus advanced our understanding of politics in transitioning countries, forcing us to rethink the extent to which democracy constitutes a clean break with the past. This chapter contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it develops theoretical synergies between the political economy of democratization and the authoritarian successor party literature. Although similar synergies have been developed by Albertus and Menaldo, this chapter develops economic theories of *direct* authoritarian participation in democratic politics. In doing so, it develops an emerging theme in the literature that distributional conflict may not be fought over democratic transition per se but over the extent to which influence from the previous authoritarian

[18] Grzymala-Busse 2006.
[19] Loxton and Mainwaring 2018.
[20] Slater and Wong 2013; Riedl 2014; Ziblatt 2017.
[21] Miller 2019.

regime is tolerated by the public after a transition occurs. Second, it shifts focus away from winning elections towards understanding how political power is apportioned. As previous work has suggested, autocrats can manipulate the parameters of democracy to maximize their level of influence. Winning or losing elections does not automatically entail that these actors will be removed from power. Third, it leverages original data collection to gauge the extent to which authoritarian influence pervades after a transition to democracy.

4.3 Economic Theories of Authoritarian Influence

This section compares and contrasts two theories of authoritarian influence based on foundational works in the political economy of democratization literature. For the sake of conceptual clarity, I use the term authoritarian (or autocratic) influence to describe the direct participation of elites that are affiliated to the previous authoritarian regime in the executive politics of the current democratic regime. The first section compares and contrasts median voter and elite competition theories of authoritarian influence. The second presents hypotheses related to these two different theories by considering how economic inequality, growth and development impact authoritarian influence. The third subsection presents hypotheses related to the role social class plays in determining the level of authoritarian influence in a given country.

4.3.1 Median Voter and Elite Competition Theories

This subsection compares and contrasts two different theories of democratization found within the political economy literature and adapts them to predict levels of authoritarian influence. The first is the median voter theory (MVT) while the second is the elite competition theory (ECT).

The MVT implies that authoritarian influence will be higher in cases where the previous authoritarian elite delivers economic benefits to the general public and not the economic elite.[22] The MVT makes three straightforward assumptions. First, the

[22]It should be acknowledged that there is disagreement among proponents of the MVT. Boix (2003)

public and the economic elite constitute homogeneous entities.[23] Second, the public intuit that economic growth under the previous authoritarian regime can be attributed to the competence of the political elite.[24] Third, members of the public will be more likely to vote for individuals or parties affiliated with the previous regime due to the economic competency displayed under autocracy.[25] The MVT can thus be usefully thought of as the popular autocrat thesis – if the previous authoritarian regime is seen as a competent steward of the economy, individuals affiliated to this regime will be more likely to be voted into office and thus capture key positions of political power.

The ECT, by contrast, implies that authoritarian influence will be higher in cases where the previous authoritarian elite benefits an *established* economic elite at the expense of the public. The ECT directly challenges the assumptions that are made by the MVT in three ways. First, proponents of the ECT argue that the economic elite is not homogenous and not always connected with the political elite. In much of the literature, the aristocracy is portrayed as being the primary beneficiaries of authoritarian rule.[26] The reasoning behind this is that the aristocracy has fixed assets based on land and rely upon restrictions on labour mobility that can only be upheld by authoritarian regimes. By contrast, a new economic elite can emerge under autocracy who are unconnected to the political elite. As these elites have growing assets and yet no connection to the political elite, the former fears future predation by the latter. Ben Ansell and David Samuels argue that the industrial bourgeoisie historically represented this new economic elite and demonstrate that they had income and wealth that far exceeded that of the median citizen.[27]

Second, the ECT implies that economic development under autocracy is not a function of authoritarian competency. Instead, economic development is largely a

argues that mass- and elite-biased autocracies exist whereas Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) argue that dictatorships are always biased towards the economic elite. I rely upon Boix's interpretation as it takes into account authoritarian regimes that use redistribution through expropriation.

[23]Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2005.

[24]For a review of the literature on valence and popularity in elections, see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000.

[25]Grzymala-Busse 2006.

[26]Moore 1993; Ansell and Samuels 2014.

[27]Ansell and Samuels 2014.

product of activities that exist despite the current authoritarian regime not because of it.[28]

The third assumption that proponents of the ECT challenge is that authoritarian affiliates are always held accountable to the people for their actions (whether good or bad) in democracy through the mechanism of free and fair elections. This assumption can be challenged for five reasons. First, democracy can, in theory, exist without any such accountability. Joseph Schumpeter argued in *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* that democracy is simply a procedure for selecting the political elite - it does not necessarily entail that the principles which political theorists ascribe to democracy will be realized.[29] Second, while democracy entails that the political elite is often selected by a majority, the economic outcomes that are associated with democracy are not always beneficial to the majority.[30] Democracies can often result in outcomes that disproportionately benefit the wealthy such as providing protections on property rights that limit the power of the state to redistribute assets.[31] Third, the authoritarian elite can re-brand themselves without necessarily changing policy positions. Individuals associated with authoritarianism can be assigned positions of political influence (especially in presidential systems) by posing politically experienced independents or technocrats. Authoritarian ruling parties can further transform themselves into catch-all parties to, at once, increase the number of people who vote for them while, at the same time, sheltering the established economic elite from demands for redistribution.[32] Fourth, the authoritarian elite often manipulate constitutions to set the parameters of democracy to maximize their electoral advantage.[33] Authoritarian elites with the "strength to concede" may opt for majoritarian electoral systems as they stand to gain a disproportionate amount of seats in the legislature and can assign cabinet appointments at will.[34] Alternatively, less 'strong' autocrats may opt for proportional representation as

[28]Olson 1993.
[29]Schumpeter 1947.
[30]Stepan and Linz 2011.
[31]Ansell and Samuels 2014; Albertus and Menaldo 2018.
[32]Katz and Mair 1995; Ziblatt 2017.
[33]Albertus and Menaldo 2018.
[34]Slater and Wong 2013.

a way of maximizing their share of the votes while minimizing the possibility that a popular-based political party can monopolize executive appointments.[35] A fifth mechanism is that the public may simply not have the economic means to support meaningful alternatives to the authoritarian elite. While the reputation of the authoritarian elite may thus be "bad" poor societies may nevertheless rely upon benefits doled out by these elite and may thus express this reluctant support at the polls. The rise of the bourgeoisie, however, could result in increased demand for, and the ability to fund, new political parties that can act as viable alternatives to the authoritarian old guard.

The ECT can thus be usefully thought of as the predatory autocrat thesis - if the benefits of the previous authoritarian regime are distributed among a narrow economic elite, individuals affiliated to this regime can rely upon inherent biases in the transitional pact to capture positions of political power *despite* free and fair elections, not because of them. To probe the differences between median voter and elite competition theories, I discuss the hypothesized role of economic inequality, growth, development, and class support on predicting authoritarian influence in the next subsections.

4.3.2 Economic Determinants of Autocratic Influence in Democracy

The MVT and EVT suggest two different interpretations of economic inequality under autocracy. For the MVT, economic inequality under autocracy is a consequence of the connivance between the political and economic elite to either prevent downward redistribution of the assets they already possess or to enable upward redistribution of the assets that the rest of the public possess. The autocracies where this predatory behaviour does or does not prevail are the autocracies with the highest and lowest levels of inequality respectively. As a consequence, the MVT predicts that democracies where the economic gains are more evenly distributed under the previous dictatorship will exhibit higher levels of authoritarian influence after a transition. Simply put, this hypothesis states that autocrats who preside over periods of relative economic equality

[35] Boix 1999.

develop reputations of delivering policies that are beneficial to the public and that this reputation translates into electoral success. For the EVT, however, economic inequality under autocracy is a consequence of rising industrial inequality that results in the emergence of a new social class – the bourgeoisie. While the causal mechanisms are distinct, however, I argue that under both theories of democratic change, low levels of economic inequality should yield higher levels of autocratic influence. In the case of the EVT, the bourgeoisie will use their economic power to fund opposition parties/elites that pose a greater threat to authoritarian successor parties/elites during elections. Thus, I propose the first hypothesis of this paper:

> Hypothesis 1: Democracies with low economic inequality at the point of transition will have high authoritarian influence post-transition.

As with economic inequality, the roots of economic growth and development under autocracy are portrayed very differently in median voter and elite competition theories of democratization. For the MVT, high economic growth and development indicate that the authoritarian elite delivers widespread prosperity among the public. Consequently, autocrats who reside over periods of high economic growth and development will be more palatable to the public as candidates for political office and will thus receive a larger share of the vote. For the EVT, however, economic growth under autocracy is a product of omission not commission. Instead, economic growth and development originate from sectors of the economy that occur despite the presence of authoritarian rule and not because of it. Instead of prosperity being shared among the public as a whole, growth and development are driven by the increased prosperity of the bourgeoisie who will seek to prevent their wealth from being expropriated by the state by introducing democracy. Authoritarian regimes that exhibit higher levels of growth and development may therefore paradoxically be the regimes with the lowest levels of authoritarian influence. I thus propose two further competing hypotheses:

> Hypothesis 2a: Democracies that emerge from periods of high growth under the previous dictatorship will exhibit high levels of authoritarian influence post-transition.

Hypothesis 2b: Democracies that emerge from periods of high growth under the previous dictatorship will exhibit low levels of authoritarian influence post-transition.

Hypothesis 3a: Democracies that are highly developed at the point of transition will exhibit high levels of authoritarian influence.

Hypothesis 3b: Democracies that are highly developed at the point of transition will exhibit low levels of authoritarian influence.

4.3.3 Class Support Groups and Authoritarian Influence

What role does social class play in determining the level of authoritarian influence in an emerging democracy? The MVT predicts that class arguably should play little role in predicting authoritarian influence. Society is simply bifurcated between the "rich" elite and the "poor" masses. Instead, what matters for challenging the hegemony of the current authoritarian elite is broad-based organization by the public. The EVT, however, offers more varied predictions that distinguish between the economic interests of different social classes. I consider three, namely the aristocracy, the working classes (or proletariat) and the bourgeoisie in the context of democratic transition from elite- and mass-biased autocracies. Under elite-biased autocracies, I assume that the aristocracy plays a disproportionate role in influencing government policy whereas, under mass-biased autocracies, the working class will play a disproportionate role in influencing government policy. In the case of transition from an elite-biased democracy, the aristocracy will support authoritarian influence because the previous authoritarian elite is seen as indispensable protectors of their interests. The same logic applies in the context of transitioning from mass-biased autocracies regarding the proletariat. If the previous authoritarian elite has a reputation for delivering policies that benefit the proletariat, then they may view this elite as similarly indispensable protectors of their economic interests after a transition occurs. For the bourgeoisie, however, both forms of dictatorship are equally unappealing. In the case of mass-biased dictatorship, they fear downward redistribution of their wealth towards the proletariat. In the case of

elite-biased dictatorship, they fear upward redistribution of their wealth towards the aristocracy. Thus, as the power of the bourgeoisie increases both during and after a transition, the level of authoritarian influence should be lower as the bourgeoisie will seek to minimise authoritarian influence. I thus propose the final three hypotheses of this paper:

> Hypothesis 4a: After a transition, authoritarian influence will be higher in countries where the aristocracy forms the social basis of support for the previous authoritarian regime and are empowered.
>
> Hypothesis 4b: After a transition, authoritarian influence will be higher in countries where the proletariat forms the social basis of support for the previous authoritarian regime and are empowered.
>
> Hypothesis 4c: After a transition, authoritarian influence will be lower in countries where the bourgeoisie forms the social basis of support for the previous authoritarian regime and are empowered.

4.4 Data Collection

4.4.1 Operationalizing Authoritarian Influence

The previous section defined authoritarian influence as the direct participation of elites that are affiliated to the previous authoritarian regime in the executive politics of the current democratic regime. The dependent variable (authoritarian influence) is operationalized using two different measures. The first is the proportion of core cabinet members in a democracy who have held any portfolios under the previous authoritarian regime. The second is the proportion of core cabinet portfolios in a democracy that are assigned to individuals who affiliate with an authoritarian successor party.

I consider countries that experience dictatorship for a period of one year or over and transitioned to democracy between 1966 and 2015. Countries that democratized before or remain dictatorships throughout this period are thus not considered. I rely upon a dichotomous indicator of democracy and dictatorship as coded by Carles Boix, Michael Miller and Sebastian Rosato (BMR) who operationalize democracy based on the following three criteria. First, the executive must be directly or indirectly elected

in popular elections and is responsible either directly to voters or to a legislature. Second, the legislature (or executive if elected directly) must be chosen in free and fair elections. Third, a majority of adult men has the right to vote. Using BMR has three advantages. First, it presents a "thin" criteria for coding democracy which minimises the risk of measurement error that is abundant in many "thick" definitions that rely on continuous scales.[36] The objective of this paper is to understand the extent to which members of the previous authoritarian elite participate in positions of power under conditions of free and fair elections in which a large proportion of the population can participate. Second, it does not require that an alternation of power takes place regarding either the ruling elite of the previous dictatorship or the democratic elite that took power during the initial transition. Other dichotomous measures of democracy such as the Democracy and Dictatorship (DD) measure adopt this strategy which can remove countries in cases where one party has consistently won national elections even if they are free and fair.[37] Third, the cross-sectional and temporal coverage of the BMR variable enables me to include smaller states such as Fiji and the Maldives while other data sets such as Geddes, Wright and Franz only code countries with a population of 1 million or above.[38]

I rely upon WhoGov to identify cabinet-level appointments from 1966 to 2015. WhoGov is the first data set to provide bibliographic data on cabinet members (including party affiliation) and standardized classifications of government portfolios in a representative number of countries over a significant time period, regardless of regime type, making it the best available data source to conduct this analysis with. I focus on core cabinet appointments in democracies which I define as cabinet ministers, prime ministers, presidents, vice presidents and vice prime ministers. Other appointments such as junior ministers, central bank directors or government agency officials are not included in this definition.

I identify members of the previous authoritarian elite by identifying individual

[36]Munck and Verkuilen 2002.
[37]Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010.
[38]Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014.

members that had portfolios in the previous authoritarian regime and the current democracy. Table 4.2 provides a simple illustration of the process. Suppose a country exists where autocracy A is ruled by three individuals named a, b and c which transitions to democracy D where three individuals rule namely d, b and f. Individual b would be the only individual coded as a previous member of the authoritarian elite as b holds a position of power in A and D. After having identified members of the previous authoritarian elite, I then count the number of individuals who can be identified as such and divide them by the number of core portfolios within a given country in a given year, yielding a proportional measure of influence by the previous authoritarian elite. In this scenario, authoritarian influence in D is 1/3.

Individual	Regime	Prev. Authoritarian Elite?
a	A	-
b	A	-
c	A	-
d	D	No
b	D	Yes
f	D	No

Table 4.1: Coding strategy for identifying the previous authoritarian elite.

I identify authoritarian successor party affiliates by matching party affiliation coded to individual members of cabinet in WhoGov to the Autocratic Ruling Parties data set compiled by Michael Miller.[39] Miller defines an authoritarian ruling party as "a political party that is either the supreme ruling power or is used as a significant vehicle of power by the regime and is clearly preeminent among all parties."[40] I code the last authoritarian ruling party before transition to democracy as being the authoritarian successor party after a transition. I then derive a proportional measure of cabinet influence by authoritarian successor party affiliates by dividing the number of affiliates by the total number of core portfolios in a given country in a given year. For a list of authoritarian successor parties used in the sample, please consult appendix C.2.

Are both indicators of authoritarian influence highly correlated? Figure 4.1 presents a scatter plot which reports the relationship between the two measures where each

[39]Miller 2020.
[40]Miller 2020, p. 7.

data point represents a country-year. I find that both measures are positively yet weakly correlated (R = 0.156). A high number of observations include cases where the proportion of authoritarian successor party affiliates is high, and the influence of the former autocratic elite is low and vice versa. To investigate this low correlation further, figure 4.2 reports party affiliation of the previous authoritarian elite using a trichotomous classification. Category 1) captures all previous authoritarian elites that are affiliated with authoritarian successor parties. Category 2) is intended to capture all parties that are not associated with the previous authoritarian ruling party. Category 3) captures all elites where no party affiliation was found in WhoGov. I find that only 38.3 percent of the previous authoritarian elite belong to authoritarian successor parties. However, a plurality of these elite (49.4 percent) either join or, in some cases, create other parties that are unaffiliated with the authoritarian past. A small, yet substantial, minority (12.3 percent) of the previous authoritarian elite are classified as independents. This low correlation is surprising and could suggest that these two measures of authoritarian influence originate from two distinct data generating processes.

I further identify proportions of authoritarian influence for portfolios that fall under a certain level of prestige and competency. Using a typology based on Mona Krook and Diana O'Brien[41] I calculate the proportion of portfolios assigned to authoritarian affiliates with the following high-prestige competencies: (a) Defence, Military, National Security Affairs; (b) Foreign Relations; (c) Government, Interior and Home Affairs and; (d) Finance, Budget and Treasury. Furthermore, I calculate the proportion of core economic portfolios assigned to authoritarian affiliates by only considering the following clusters of competencies: (a) Finance, Budget and Treasury; (b) Agriculture, Food, Fisheries and Livestock; (c) Construction and Public Works; (d) Enterprises, Companies and Business; (e) Foreign Economic Relations; (f) General Economic Affairs; (g) Industry and Commerce; (h) Labour, Employment and Social Security; (i) Natural Resources; (j) Planning and Development; (k) Tax, Revenue Fiscal Policy.

[41] Krook and O'Brien 2012.

This coding strategy yields an unbalanced panel data set of 85 transitions from dictatorship to democracy. 56 of these transitions involved participation by an authoritarian successor party in executive politics. A total of 1,408 democratic country years are included in the sample. Figure 4.3 presents density plots for all dependent variables described. It is clear that the distributions are all right-skewed due to a high proportion of zeros (meaning democratic cabinets exhibit no authoritarian influence). However, authoritarian influence is far from negligible in the sample. In 51 and 56 percent of the sample, at least one core portfolio was assigned to a member of an authoritarian successor party and a member of the previous autocratic elite respectively. In approximately 31 percent of the sample, authoritarian affiliates are assigned more than 10 percent of the core portfolios available. Furthermore, the distribution changes little when only high prestige and economic portfolios are considered. While authoritarian influence is far from hegemonic globally, we can nevertheless conclude that it is far from non-existent in post-transition democracies. Authoritarian influence in the executive is quite large and highly substantive. Instead of being assigned token positions of political power, the WhoGov data demonstrates that the authoritarian elite can gain control over a surprisingly large proportion of the cabinet appointments available despite transition to democracy having occurred.




Figure 4.1: Scatter plot showing the correlation between the percent of core portfolios that are assigned to (on the x-axis) individuals who held cabinet appointments during the previous authoritarian regime and (on the y-axis) affiliates of authoritarian successor parties. Darker data points indicate a higher number of observations than lighter data points. The line of best fit is estimated using linear regression. ASP = authoritarian successor party.




Figure 4.2: Party affiliations of government members who held appointments during the previous authoritarian regime.




Figure 4.3: Density plots of dependent variables. The density plots in blue are of the proportion of the previous authoritarian elite in core/high prestige/economic portfolios. The density plots in red are of the proportion of authoritarian successor party affiliates. The y-axis reports densities for all variables.

4.4.2 Independent Variables

As section 4.3 specifies, I am interested in the economic legacy of authoritarian rule and the extent to which this legacy is altered after a transition to democracy. Several fixed variables identified by the subscript A are therefore created in order to estimate the effects of different legacies of authoritarian rule. In some cases, I am interested in using the value of a variable during the final year (FY) of an autocracy which I denote as A_{FY}. This is employed for variables such as GDP per capita where I am interested in understanding how economic outcomes at the time of regime change impact authoritarian influence. In other cases, I calculate average values to understand continuous variables such as growth in the context of understanding the economic legacy of authoritarian rule (denoted $\bar{A}$). In yet other cases, I calculate modal values to understand more slow-moving variables such as class support (denoted as $\hat{A}$ to represent the peak of the distribution). To measure change that occurs over time in democracy (D) I subtract the value of A_s from D_t which gives me Δ_t. Assuming that $A_s \in \{A_{FY}, \bar{A}, \hat{A}\}$ I state formally that:

$$\Delta_t = D_t - A_s$$

Thus, A_s is designed to uncover the fixed effects of the authoritarian past while Δ_t measures the extent to which a democracy deviates from that past at time t and is time-varying.

4.4.3 Economic Variables

I use capital share of the value added to operationalize economic inequality. Capital shares give the percentage of the value added that accrues to owners of firms and not labourers. As several scholars have argued, capital shares provide the most realistic measure of private inequality available that is the most cross-nationally reliable.[42] In the sample, this variable has a mean of 69 percent, a standard deviation of 11 percent and

[42]Houle 2009, 2016.

a minimum and maximum of 46 and 89 percent respectively. I impute missing values in cases of democratization that occur after 2007 with values from 2007. Previous scholars have adopted this practice over longer periods of time, arguing that economic inequality tends to exhibit high degrees of cross-national stability and thus does not change drastically from year to year.[43] Given that the latest instance of democratization happens less than a decade later, I thus assume that the likelihood of imputing non-realistic values of economic inequality using this approach is small. To measure income I rely on the Penn World Tables and use GDP Per Capita measured in 2011 US dollars.[44] In the sample, this variable has a mean of $9,261, a standard deviation of $8306 and a minimum and maximum of $443 and $41,805 respectively. Using the GDP Per Capita data, I estimate the average percentage of economic growth that exists under the previous regime from 1966 up until the date it transitions to democracy. In the sample, this variable has a mean of 2.6 percent, a standard deviation of 3 percent and a minimum and maximum of -2.6 and 12.3 percent respectively.

4.4.4 Class Variables

To understand the role class plays in predicting authoritarian influence, I rely upon V-Dem which provides yearly data on support groups for political regimes. The variable in question asks "[w]hich groups does the current political regime rely on in order to maintain political power" and directs coders to consider groups who, if they retracted their support, would "substantially increase the chance that the regime would lose power."[45] The level of support is considered over a 0 to 1 range where 0 indicates no influence from a class whereas 1 indicates full support from a class. I consider six class support groups namely the agrarian elite (including large landowners and rich peasants), business elite, urban middle class, rural middle class (including family farmers), urban working class (including labour unions) and the rural working class (including peasants). Figures 4.4 to 4.6 display density plots for each class support

[43] For instance Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011.
[44] Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015; Bolt et al. 2018.
[45] Coppedge et al. 2019.

group both at its modal value under the previous authoritarian regime ($\hat{A}$) and the change from this value at time t (Δ). In general, the distribution of $\hat{A}$ is right-skewed indicating that there are many cases where each social class exerted little influence over the previous dictatorship. However, some classes have exerted greater influence than others. In 50 and 25 percent of observations, the business and agrarian elite have been a crucial source of support for the previous autocracy, making them the most prominent support groups out of all those considered. By contrast, the urban and rural middle class have been a source of support for 18 and 16 percent of the previous autocracies in the sample. Existing at the middle is the urban and rural working class who have been a source of support for 18 and 21 percent of the previous autocracies considered in the sample. After a transition, we can see that the peak of the distribution is zero which indicates that class support systems for political regimes tend to remain stable within countries despite regime change. Be that as it may, some social classes make considerable gains in influence after a transition to democracy occurs. The group that gains the most influence after democratic is the urban middle classes. In 41 percent of the sample, the urban middle classes gain political influence while they lose influence in only 5 percent of the sample. The group that loses the most influence, by contrast, is the agrarian elite who lose influence in 11 percent of the sample.




Figure 4.4: : Distribution of agrarian and business elite support in the sample. The graphs in red show the modal level of support towards the previous authoritarian regime. The graphs in blue show the yearly change in support from the previous authoritarian regime in the current democracy at time t.




Figure 4.5: Distribution of urban and rural bourgeois support in the sample. The graphs in red show the modal level of support towards the previous authoritarian regime. The graphs in blue show the yearly change in support from the previous authoritarian regime in the current democracy at time *t*.




Figure 4.6: Distribution of urban and rural proletarian support in the sample. The graphs in red show the modal level of support towards the previous authoritarian regime. The graphs in blue show the yearly change in support from the previous authoritarian regime in the current democracy at time t.

4.4.5 Control Variables

I include the mean level of democratic protest that occurred throughout the tenure of the previous autocracy to provide a measure of the level of popular opposition using data from the V-Dem project. I include the modal value of political equality between social classes as coded by the V-Dem project.[46] This variable captures the extent to which the rich monopolise power which, as V-Dem proposes, includes actively participating in politics through voting, involvement in civil society organizations, securing representation in government, agenda-setting power, influence over political decisions and influence over implementing these decisions. I include the mean level of political equality that existed under the previous dictatorship and the difference in political inequality in the same country after it transitions to democracy in a given year. I also include a series of institutional controls. I employ the Democracy and Dictatorship (DD) data set to identify parliamentary, presidential and mixed regimes.[47] In cases where DD does not code democracy while BMR does, I consulted web-based sources to identify the constitutional variety of the democracy. I include a three-fold variety of electoral system which includes majoritarian, proportional representation and mixed.[48] In cases where this data set does not code the electoral system, I rely upon the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance's online database of elections to code this variable. Finally, I include the number of years that the previous authoritarian regime as identified by BMR was in power. Table 4.2 reports descriptive statistics for all variables included in the analysis.

[46] Coppedge et al. 2019.
[47] Bjørnskov and Rode 2018.
[48] Bormann and Golder 2013.

	Count	Mean	Std. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Prop. PAE (Core)	1408	0.10	0.15	0.00	1.00
Prop. ASPA (Core)	1408	0.20	0.33	0.00	1.00
Prop. PAE (High Prestige)	1408	0.10	0.20	0.00	1.00
Prop. ASPA (High Prestige)	1408	0.20	0.36	0.00	1.00
Prop. PAE (Economic)	1408	0.10	0.17	0.00	1.00
Prop. ASPA (Economic)	1408	0.19	0.34	0.00	1.00
Capital Share (A_{FY})	1382	69.32	10.85	46.37	88.88
GDP Per Capita (A_{FY})	1327	5724.63	4402.08	503.00	24309.00
Δ GDP Per Capita $_t$	1327	3285.47	4914.22	-7781.00	25716.00
Growth ($\bar{A}$)	1353	2.67	2.74	-2.56	12.30
Protest Level ($\bar{A}$)	1408	0.90	1.03	0.00	3.86
Political Equality ($\hat{A}$)	1376	1.77	0.92	0.09	3.50
Δ Political Equality $_t$	1376	0.51	0.80	-1.31	2.73
DD Category $_t$	1408	2.03	0.68	1.00	3.00
Electoral system $_t$	1408	1.96	0.64	1.00	3.00
Federal System $_t$	1373	0.23	0.42	0.00	1.00
Duration (A)	1408	42.82	48.93	1.00	193.00
Agrarian Elite ($\hat{A}$)	1255	0.22	0.36	0.00	1.00
Business Elite ($\hat{A}$)	1255	0.34	0.40	0.00	1.00
Urban Bourgeoisie ($\hat{A}$)	1255	0.08	0.21	0.00	1.00
Urban Proletariat ($\hat{A}$)	1255	0.14	0.30	0.00	1.00
Rural Bourgeoisie ($\hat{A}$)	1255	0.08	0.21	0.00	1.00
Rural Proletariat ($\hat{A}$)	1255	0.15	0.30	0.00	1.00
Δ Agrarian Elite $_t$	1254	-0.08	0.35	-1.00	1.00
Δ Business Elite $_t$	1254	0.16	0.41	-1.00	1.00
Δ Urban Bourgeoisie $_t$	1254	0.32	0.37	-1.00	1.00
Δ Urban Proletariat $_t$	1254	0.10	0.32	-1.00	1.00
Δ Rural Bourgeoisie $_t$	1254	0.09	0.19	-0.63	1.00
Δ Rural Proletariat $_t$	1254	0.02	0.33	-1.00	1.00

Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables used in the analysis. Prop. = Proportion; PAE = Previous Authoritarian Elite; ASPA = Authoritarian Successor Party Affiliates.

4.5 Econometric Analysis

4.5.1 Modelling Specification

I employ a series of fractional response models using a probit specification to predict proportional autocratic influence in democratic governments throughout this section. Fractional response models enable researchers to predict the conditional mean in cases where the dependent variable is continuous, bounded between 0 and 1 and is not normally distributed. As section 4.4.1 demonstrates, all conditions are satisfied which makes this modelling approach preferable over employing ordinary least squares regression. While the magnitude of the coefficients derived from these models is hard to interpret, I discuss the predicted proportion of autocratic influence to more intuitively discuss substantive effects. As a robustness check, I estimate OLS models and further include negative binomial models that predict the number of portfolios assigned to authoritarian elites in Appendix C.3 to demonstrate similar results. I cluster the standard errors at the government level as there exists little variation in autocratic influence within governments. Governments are identified whenever there is (a) a new election; (b) a leader change or; (c) a change in the composition party affiliation among cabinet members. I adopt two approaches to modelling temporal dependence. First, I employ a cubic polynomial of time-under-democracy as recommended by David Carter and Curtis Signorino.[49] Second, I employ time-under-democracy (denoted in years) fixed effects. As I am interested in understanding the legacies of authoritarian rule, I estimate coefficients for variables with no temporal variation between governments and democratic spells more generally. As a result, including democratic spell fixed effects is inappropriate due to the incidental parameters problem. However, I do include regional fixed-effects to control for time-invariant regional-level variation which enables me to compare governments that exist in the same region.

[49] Carter and Signorino 2010.

4.5.2 Authoritarian Influence in Core Cabinet Appointments

Models 1 to 4 predict the proportion of individuals that held positions in the previous authoritarian regime. Model 1 employs a cubic polynomial of time. Model 2 adds to the specification of model 1 by including regional fixed effects which means that we can compare governments that exist within the same region. Model 3 models time dependence using time-under-democracy fixed effects which means that we can compare governments that exist at the same point in time after transition from dictatorship. Model 4 is the most stringent as it combines both regional and time-under-democracy fixed effects which means that we can compare governments that exist in the same region at the same point in time after transition from dictatorship. The coefficient for capital shares is negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level across all models. As economic inequality increases, in other words, the proportion of former autocrats in democratic governments decreases. Using the coefficients from model 4, I plot the predicted conditional mean when capital shares increase from 46 percent (the 1st percentile) to 88 percent (the 99th percentile) when the autocracy experienced mean levels of economic growth, democratic protest and duration. At the 1st percentile, the predicted conditional mean is 15 percent while at the 99th percentile decreases to 7 percent, indicating that when Capital Shares increase over this range, their influence is reduced to just under a half. This provides general support for hypothesis 1. Economic inequality under autocracy could indicate that the political elite are engaged in upwardly redistributing the wealth of the country to a narrow economic elite. In this case, ordinary people will be ill-disposed towards electing the very same individuals under which this occurred. Alternatively, rising inequality could indicate the rise of a new class of entrepreneurs who seek to establish democracy precisely because it will remove the influence of a political elite who posed a threat to their wealth. Contrary to my theoretical expectations, GDP Per Capita both in terms of its level in the final year of autocracy and its difference at time t does not significantly predict a smaller proportion of former autocrats in cabinet appointments. The coefficient for economic growth is, on the other hand, negatively signed and statistically significant at the 5 per-

cent level across all models. Higher growth rates achieved under autocracy mean that the political elite that presided under that change are likely to be assigned a smaller proportion of appointments. Using the coefficients from model 4, I plot the predicted conditional mean when growth increases from -2.5 percent (the 1st percentile) to 12 percent (the 99th percentile) when the previous autocracy experienced average levels of democratic protest and duration and had an average level of economic inequality at the time of transition. At the first percentile, the predicted conditional mean is 13 percent while at the 99th percentile it decreases to 5 percent, indicating that when Economic Growth increases over this range, their proportional influence decreases over two-and-a-half times. This provides evidence in favour of the EVT of authoritarian influence. Economic growth does not necessarily indicate that former autocrats are competent stewards of the national economy. Instead, high growth could indicate that an emerging class of economic entrepreneurs are succeeding despite the policies pursued by the previous authoritarian elite. Once transition occurs, these rising economic elite may use their newfound influence to remove former autocrats from positions of political power.

Models 5 to 8 use identical control specifications to models 1 to 4 respectively only, this time, the dependent variable is the proportion of cabinet positions that are assigned to members of authoritarian successor parties. Using a different dependent variable yields subtly differing results. Economic inequality is negatively correlated with authoritarian influence only, this time, the coefficient only reaches marginal levels of statistical significance when regional-fixed effects are not included. Average GDP per capita during the final year of the previous regime plays an inconsistent and statistically insignificant influence in predicting authoritarian influence. However, growth in GDP per capita after a transition has a consistently negative impact on authoritarian influence that is statistically significant at the 5 percent level or better. Using the coefficients from model 8, I calculate the predicted conditional mean when growth in GDP Per Capita increases from $1,301 (the 1st percentile) to $20,812 (the 99th percentile) when the previous autocracy experienced average levels of democratic protest

and duration and had an average level of economic inequality at the time of transition. At the first percentile, the predicted conditional mean is 23 percent while at the 99th percentile it decreases to 2 percent, indicating that when growth in GDP Per Capita increases over this range, their proportional influence decreases by 11.5 times in magnitude. Growth during the previous autocracy is positive and yet does not maintain statistical significance when regional fixed effects are included in the specification. As suggested previously in the chapter, these findings suggest that authoritarian successor party influence and previous authoritarian elite influence operate through different data generating processes. Continued influence by the previous authoritarian elite is largely a function of the economic legacies pursued by the previous authoritarian regime. Conversely, continued influence by authoritarian successor parties is largely a function of economic outcomes pursued in the current democratic regime. Nevertheless, as with models 1 to 4, models 5 to 8 provide greater support for the EVT of authoritarian influence. As average incomes increase, new economic elites will seek to reduce authoritarian influence. Table 4.4 reports the results of models 1 to 8.

Table 4.3: Fractional Response Models of Authoritarian Influence in Core Cabinet Positions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Capital Share (A_{FY})	-0.0083**	-0.0107**	-0.0087**	-0.0111**	-0.0162*	-0.0095	-0.0161*	-0.0094
	(0.0040)	(0.0046)	(0.0041)	(0.0046)	(0.0084)	(0.0083)	(0.0084)	(0.0083)
GDP Per Capita (A_{FY})	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	0.0000	-0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Δ GDP Per Capita $_t$	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000*	0.0000	-0.0001**	-0.0001***	-0.0001**	-0.0001***
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Growth ($\bar{A}$)	-0.0358**	-0.0389**	-0.0360**	-0.0387**	0.0335	0.0704**	0.0334	0.0702**
	(0.0160)	(0.0191)	(0.0160)	(0.0190)	(0.0252)	(0.0314)	(0.0253)	(0.0315)
Protest Level ($\bar{A}$)	-0.0837**	-0.0924**	-0.0874**	-0.0958**	0.1769**	0.1318*	0.1796***	0.1344*
	(0.0416)	(0.0420)	(0.0415)	(0.0419)	(0.0696)	(0.0783)	(0.0693)	(0.0780)
Political Equality ($\hat{A}$)	-0.0772	-0.0460	-0.0762	-0.0442	-0.0649	-0.1483	-0.0670	-0.1495
	(0.0624)	(0.0707)	(0.0637)	(0.0716)	(0.1019)	(0.1204)	(0.1024)	(0.1208)
Δ Political Equality $_t$	-0.0102	-0.0249	-0.0163	-0.0322	-0.3292**	-0.4868***	-0.3289**	-0.4856***
	(0.0695)	(0.0741)	(0.0699)	(0.0739)	(0.1497)	(0.1798)	(0.1492)	(0.1786)
Parliamentary	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Presidential	-0.1961	-0.1938	-0.1955	-0.1907	0.3560	0.2165	0.3576	0.2181
	(0.1288)	(0.1392)	(0.1260)	(0.1374)	(0.2268)	(0.2582)	(0.2275)	(0.2590)
Mixed	-0.1928	-0.2503*	-0.1971	-0.2539*	0.3539*	0.2858	0.3584*	0.2889
	(0.1420)	(0.1395)	(0.1384)	(0.1365)	(0.2143)	(0.2219)	(0.2144)	(0.2223)
Majoritarian	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Proportional	-0.2556**	-0.0825	-0.2660**	-0.0918	-0.3698	-0.1711	-0.3671	-0.1690
	(0.1145)	(0.1218)	(0.1134)	(0.1219)	(0.2257)	(0.2237)	(0.2252)	(0.2241)
Mixed	-0.0245	0.0470	-0.0310	0.0373	-0.3348	-0.2783	-0.3236	-0.2667
	(0.1148)	(0.1200)	(0.1154)	(0.1205)	(0.2522)	(0.2496)	(0.2507)	(0.2485)
Federal System	-0.0598	-0.0791	-0.0621	-0.0806	-0.4796***	-0.5547***	-0.4730**	-0.5469***
	(0.1092)	(0.1075)	(0.1107)	(0.1088)	(0.1825)	(0.1849)	(0.1839)	(0.1863)
Duration (A)	0.0009	0.0017**	0.0010	0.0017**	0.0000	0.0015	-0.0000	0.0015
	(0.0007)	(0.0008)	(0.0007)	(0.0008)	(0.0013)	(0.0013)	(0.0013)	(0.0013)
Region Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Time Cubic Polynomial	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Time Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Log-Likelihood	-414.0079	-411.0483	-410.918	-408.0058	-572.27	-557.8903	-569.6851	-555.4938
AIC	862.0157	862.0967	929.8359	930.0116	1178.54	1155.781	1247.37	1224.988
Observations	1,327	1,327	1,327	1,327	1,327	1,327	1,327	1,327

Standard Errors Clustered by Government in Parentheses.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$




Figure 4.7: Predicted conditional mean of % cabinet positions assigned to the previous authoritarian elite (PAE) as capital shares increase from the 1st to 99th percentile. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.




Figure 4.8: Predicted conditional mean of % cabinet positions assigned to the previous authoritarian elite (PAE) as economic growth increases from the 1st to 99th percentile. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.




Figure 4.9: Predicted conditional mean of % cabinet positions assigned to authoritarian successor party affiliates (ASPAs) as capital shares increase from the 1st to 99th percentile. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.




Figure 4.10: Predicted conditional mean of % cabinet positions assigned to authoritarian successor party affiliates as Δ GDP per capita increases from the 1st to 99th percentile. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.

4.5.3 Authoritarian Influence in High Prestige Cabinet Appointments

Models 9 to 12 explore the proportional influence of the previous authoritarian elite in high prestige positions using identical control variables to models 1 to 4 respectively. The coefficient for capital shares is consistently negative, as before, only this time it consistently reaches statistical significance at the 1 percent level, meaning we can reject the null hypothesis with a higher degree of confidence. Using the coefficients from model 12, I calculate the predicted conditional mean over the same percentile range of capital shares used previously when the previous authoritarian regime experienced average levels of democratic protest and duration and had an average level of economic inequality at the time of transition. At the first percentile, the predicted conditional mean is 19 percent while at the 99th percentile it decreases to 5 percent, indicating that when capital shares increase over this range their proportional influence decreases 3.8 times in magnitude. Rising inequality, in other words, has a substantively stronger negative impact on the proportional level of influence the previous authoritarian elite exert on high prestige positions when compared to the level of influence they exert across all core positions. As with previous models, GDP Per Capita both in terms of its level in the final year of autocracy and its difference at time t does not significantly predict a smaller proportion of former autocrats in the cabinet. Economic growth negatively predicts proportional authoritarian influence in high prestige appointments. The coefficients associated with economic growth are of a similar magnitude and yet only reach marginal levels of statistical significance. However, when we compare the magnitude of the results of model 12 using the similar percentile range and scenario as before, economic growth still decreases proportional authoritarian influence in high prestige appointments by a similar magnitude as compared to when all core cabinet appointments are considered.

Models 13 to 16 adopt the same specifications as models 9 to 12 respectively only, this time, the dependent variable is the proportion of high prestige cabinet positions that are assigned to members of authoritarian successor parties. Capital shares neg-

atively predict the proportional influence of authoritarian successor party affiliates in high prestige positions. However, this variable does not reach statistical significance when regional fixed effects are included. As GDP per capita grows under democracy, the proportional influence authoritarian successor party affiliates wield in the executive significantly decreases. In line with the MVT of authoritarian influence, average growth levels under the previous autocracy predicts a higher proportional influence of authoritarian successor party affiliates. However, as with previous models, this positive result does not maintain statistical significance when regional fixed effects are included. Table 4.5 reports the results of models 9 to 16.

Table 4.4: Fractional Response Models of Authoritarian Influence in High Prestige Positions

	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Capital Share (A_{FY})	-0.0123**	-0.0181***	-0.0130***	-0.0187***	-0.0213**	-0.0128	-0.0213**	-0.0127
	(0.0048)	(0.0054)	(0.0048)	(0.0055)	(0.0090)	(0.0090)	(0.0090)	(0.0090)
GDP Per Capita (A_{FY})	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Δ GDP Per Capita $_t$	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000*	0.0000	-0.0001**	-0.0001**	-0.0001**	-0.0001**
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Growth ($\bar{A}$)	-0.0349*	-0.0467*	-0.0351*	-0.0463*	0.0419	0.0783**	0.0426	0.0789**
	(0.0195)	(0.0239)	(0.0195)	(0.0240)	(0.0276)	(0.0338)	(0.0278)	(0.0342)
Protest Level ($\bar{A}$)	-0.0856*	-0.0872*	-0.0892*	-0.0903*	0.2133***	0.1591*	0.2206***	0.1653*
	(0.0483)	(0.0496)	(0.0485)	(0.0497)	(0.0776)	(0.0843)	(0.0781)	(0.0848)
Political Equality ($\hat{A}$)	-0.0945	-0.0217	-0.0942	-0.0199	-0.0534	-0.1669	-0.0593	-0.1729
	(0.0752)	(0.0867)	(0.0772)	(0.0888)	(0.1155)	(0.1366)	(0.1153)	(0.1362)
Δ Political Equality $_t$	-0.0486	-0.0458	-0.0588	-0.0586	-0.3878**	-0.5437***	-0.3883**	-0.5443***
	(0.0809)	(0.0861)	(0.0827)	(0.0874)	(0.1684)	(0.2029)	(0.1678)	(0.2021)
Parliamentary	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Presidential	-0.1294	-0.1304	-0.1299	-0.1283	0.3803	0.2473	0.3863	0.2555
	(0.1456)	(0.1601)	(0.1432)	(0.1592)	(0.2427)	(0.2732)	(0.2452)	(0.2759)
Mixed	-0.2175	-0.2967*	-0.2256	-0.3041*	0.2912	0.2344	0.3062	0.2479
	(0.1628)	(0.1656)	(0.1604)	(0.1641)	(0.2340)	(0.2430)	(0.2356)	(0.2447)
Majoritarian	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Proportional	-0.2654**	-0.0429	-0.2760**	-0.0495	-0.3908*	-0.2278	-0.3872*	-0.2222
	(0.1353)	(0.1447)	(0.1344)	(0.1458)	(0.2304)	(0.2330)	(0.2298)	(0.2339)
Mixed	-0.1034	-0.0140	-0.1126	-0.0286	-0.3782	-0.3186	-0.3727	-0.3108
	(0.1430)	(0.1483)	(0.1438)	(0.1491)	(0.2669)	(0.2722)	(0.2674)	(0.2728)
Federal System	0.0578	0.0289	0.0524	0.0232	-0.4774**	-0.5591***	-0.4676**	-0.5460***
	(0.1329)	(0.1327)	(0.1349)	(0.1342)	(0.1901)	(0.1911)	(0.1927)	(0.1936)
Duration (A)	0.0020**	0.0031***	0.0020**	0.0031***	-0.0007	0.0005	-0.0007	0.0005
	(0.0008)	(0.0009)	(0.0008)	(0.0009)	(0.0014)	(0.0014)	(0.0014)	(0.0014)
Region Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Time Cubic Polynomial	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Time Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Log-Likelihood	-426.6712	-420.5942	-420.4672	-414.4117	-556.8027	-543.9558	-552.3068	-539.565
AIC	887.3424	881.1885	948.9344	942.8235	1147.605	1127.912	1212.614	1193.13
Observations	1,327	1,327	1,327	1,327	1,327	1,327	1,327	1,327

Standard Errors Clustered by Government in Parentheses.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

4.5.4 Authoritarian Influence in Economic Appointments

Models 17 to 24, reported in table 4.6, adopt the same approach as models 9 to 16 respectively only, this time, the dependent variable is the proportion of economic portfolios that are assigned to the previous authoritarian elite (models 17 to 20) and authoritarian successor party affiliates (models 21 to 24). In essence, we see similar relationships. As economic inequality increases, the proportional influence of the previous authoritarian elite in economic portfolios decrease significantly. As the income of the average citizen grows larger under democracy, the proportional influence of authoritarian successor party affiliates decreases significantly. Interestingly, average growth levels under the previous democracy does not predict a lower proportional influence of the previous authoritarian elite in economic portfolios as is suggested by previous models. In general, however, we can say that the EVT of authoritarian influence receives a larger amount of support from this analysis so far albeit through subtly different mechanisms. The proportional influence of the previous authoritarian elite tends to be strongly linked to the economic legacy of the previous authoritarian regime. The proportional influence of authoritarian successor party affiliates, by contrast, appears to be more heavily influenced by increasing incomes that emerge under democracy and less influenced by outcomes related to the previous authoritarian regime.

Table 4.5: Fractional Response Models of Authoritarian Influence in Economic Positions

	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)
Capital Share (A_{FY})	-0.0084*	-0.0102*	-0.0087*	-0.0104**	-0.0152*	-0.0087	-0.0150*	-0.0085
	(0.0047)	(0.0052)	(0.0047)	(0.0052)	(0.0091)	(0.0091)	(0.0091)	(0.0091)
GDP Per Capita (A_{FY})	-0.0000*	-0.0000	-0.0000**	-0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Δ GDP Per Capita $_t$	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	-0.0001**	-0.0001**	-0.0001**	-0.0001**
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Growth ($\bar{A}$)	-0.0269	-0.0296	-0.0273	-0.0295	0.0230	0.0569*	0.0227	0.0564*
	(0.0173)	(0.0198)	(0.0173)	(0.0197)	(0.0262)	(0.0319)	(0.0262)	(0.0321)
Protest Level ($\bar{A}$)	-0.0956**	-0.1074**	-0.1003**	-0.1119**	0.2177***	0.1637**	0.2217***	0.1669**
	(0.0452)	(0.0467)	(0.0449)	(0.0463)	(0.0742)	(0.0823)	(0.0738)	(0.0819)
Political Equality ($\hat{A}$)	-0.0387	-0.0218	-0.0359	-0.0183	0.0536	-0.0402	0.0515	-0.0420
	(0.0746)	(0.0826)	(0.0759)	(0.0833)	(0.1107)	(0.1345)	(0.1110)	(0.1349)
Δ Political Equality $_t$	0.0049	-0.0146	0.0006	-0.0206	-0.2368	-0.3917*	-0.2383	-0.3918**
	(0.0807)	(0.0861)	(0.0816)	(0.0865)	(0.1657)	(0.2003)	(0.1652)	(0.1992)
Parliamentary	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Presidential	-0.2441*	-0.2210	-0.2440*	-0.2207	0.3348	0.2865	0.3338	0.2865
	(0.1416)	(0.1532)	(0.1380)	(0.1503)	(0.2345)	(0.2643)	(0.2351)	(0.2652)
Mixed	-0.2158	-0.2621*	-0.2188	-0.2645*	0.3575	0.2956	0.3632	0.2996
	(0.1584)	(0.1543)	(0.1531)	(0.1500)	(0.2234)	(0.2309)	(0.2237)	(0.2315)
Majoritarian	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Proportional	-0.2154	-0.0420	-0.2294*	-0.0549	-0.5005**	-0.2388	-0.4974**	-0.2350
	(0.1329)	(0.1409)	(0.1317)	(0.1406)	(0.2322)	(0.2295)	(0.2318)	(0.2299)
Mixed	-0.0450	0.0349	-0.0539	0.0221	-0.4111	-0.2991	-0.4012	-0.2865
	(0.1292)	(0.1360)	(0.1297)	(0.1361)	(0.2612)	(0.2572)	(0.2603)	(0.2567)
Federal System	-0.0862	-0.1024	-0.0877	-0.1031	-0.5099**	-0.5654***	-0.5052**	-0.5587***
	(0.1357)	(0.1340)	(0.1371)	(0.1352)	(0.2009)	(0.2025)	(0.2011)	(0.2026)
Duration (A)	0.0008	0.0015*	0.0008	0.0016*	-0.0010	0.0007	-0.0010	0.0007
	(0.0008)	(0.0009)	(0.0008)	(0.0009)	(0.0015)	(0.0015)	(0.0015)	(0.0015)
Region Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Time Cubic Polynomial	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Time Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Log-Likelihood	-407.0021	-404.2997	-402.6194	-399.9503	-533.0161	-519.0446	-529.6712	-515.8431
AIC	848.0043	848.5995	913.2387	913.9006	1100.032	1078.089	1167.342	1145.686
Observations	1,327	1,327	1,327	1,327	1,327	1,327	1,327	1,327

Standard Errors Clustered by Government in Parentheses.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

4.5.5 Class Support Groups and Authoritarian Influence

The next set of models test the role that class support for the previous authoritarian regime plays in predicting authoritarian influence. All models test coalition support from different social class groups both at the modal value under the previous autocracy and its change at time t under the current democratic government. Tables 4.7 and 4.8 report the results of twelve models that use the proportional authoritarian influence in core cabinets as the dependent variable.

The urban middle classes have a consistently negative and statistically significant effect on proportional authoritarian influence generally. Using estimates from model 27, I find that when the urban middle classes have greater influence over an authoritarian regime with a 21-year tenure, the proportional influence of the same political elite after the transition decreases from 10.1 to 3.8 percent, in other words, by 2.7 times. As the urban middle classes continue to gain influence under the current democracy, the proportional influence of the previous authoritarian elite decreases from 13.7 to 6.1 percent, in other words, by 2.2 times. Using estimates from model 33, I find that when the urban middle class have more influence over an authoritarian regime with a 21-year tenure, the proportional influence of authoritarian successor party affiliates decreases by 2.3 times. As the urban middle classes continue to gain influence under the current democracy, the proportional influence of authoritarian successor party affiliates decreases by 9.6 times. Furthermore, I find that as the rural middle classes gain influence under the current democracy when compared to the previous democracy, the influence of authoritarian successor parties significantly decreases.

By contrast, I find that the influence of the agrarian elite significantly increases the proportional influence of authoritarian successor parties but not the previous authoritarian elite. Using estimates from model 31, I find that when the agrarian elite have greater influence over an authoritarian regime with a 21-year tenure, the proportional influence of authoritarian successor part affiliates increases from 16 to 38 percent, by 2.4 times after the transition to democracy. As the agrarian elite continue to gain influence under the current democracy, the proportional influence of authoritarian successor

party affiliates increases from 6 to 32 percent, by 5.3 times.

I find that as the influence of the urban proletariat increases both in the previous autocracy and the current democracy, the proportional influence of authoritarian successor parties increases. However these results only achieve marginal levels of statistical significance meaning that we can only reject the null hypothesis with 90 percent confidence. I further find that when the influence of the rural proletariat increases under the current democracy, the proportional influence of authoritarian successor parties significantly increases.

Table 4.6: Fractional Response Models of Executive Influence by the Previous Authoritarian Elite

	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)
Agrarian Elite ($\hat{A}$)	-0.0918					
	(0.1704)					
Δ Agrarian Elite $_t$	-0.0931					
	(0.1799)					
Business Elite ($\hat{A}$)		-0.0271				
		(0.1360)				
Δ Business Elite $_t$		-0.1282				
		(0.1411)				
Urban Bourgeoisie ($\hat{A}$)			-0.5197**			
			(0.2136)			
Δ Urban Bourgeoisie $_t$			-0.3314***			
			(0.1218)			
Urban Proletariat ($\hat{A}$)				-0.1953		
				(0.2185)		
Δ Urban Proletariat $_t$				0.1017		
				(0.1513)		
Rural Bourgeoisie ($\hat{A}$)					-0.3294	
					(0.2147)	
Δ Rural Bourgeoisie $_t$					-0.1423	
					(0.2266)	
Rural Proletariat ($\hat{A}$)						0.0491
						(0.1627)
Δ Rural Proletariat $_t$						0.2599*
						(0.1349)
Institutional Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time Cubic Polynomial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log-Likelihood	-392.1009	-391.8271	-389.6987	-391.1181	-391.4137	-391.2781
AIC	808.2018	807.6541	803.3974	806.2361	806.8274	806.5562
Observations	1,251	1,251	1,251	1,251	1,251	1,251

Standard Errors Clustered by Government in Parentheses; Constant Not Reported.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$




Figure 4.11: Predicted conditional mean of % cabinet positions assigned to the previous authoritarian elite (PAE) as Urban Bourgeoisie $\hat{A}$ increases. Whiskers represent 95% confidence intervals.




Figure 4.12: Predicted conditional mean of % cabinet positions assigned to the previous authoritarian elite (PAE) as Δ Urban Bourgeoisie increases. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.

Table 4.7: Fractional Response Models of Executive Influence by Authoritarian Successor Party Affiliates

	(31)	(32)	(33)	(34)	(35)	(36)
Agrarian Elite ($\hat{A}$)	0.8091**					
	(0.3245)					
Δ Agrarian Elite $_t$	0.7821**					
	(0.3157)					
Business Elite ($\hat{A}$)		-0.3463				
		(0.2941)				
Δ Business Elite $_t$		-0.1366				
		(0.2764)				
Urban Bourgeoisie ($\hat{A}$)			-0.5998*			
			(0.3438)			
Δ Urban Bourgeoisie $_t$			-1.1769***			
			(0.2259)			
Urban Proletariat ($\hat{A}$)				0.4517*		
				(0.2431)		
Δ Urban Proletariat $_t$				0.5060*		
				(0.2672)		
Rural Bourgeoisie ($\hat{A}$)					0.3968	
					(0.4216)	
Δ Rural Bourgeoisie $_t$					-0.9370**	
					(0.4353)	
Rural Proletariat ($\hat{A}$)						0.6816*
						(0.3879)
Δ Rural Proletariat $_t$						0.5439**
						(0.2559)
Institutional Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time Cubic Polynomial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log-Likelihood	-549.3053	-556.0514	-530.4551	-553.4581	-550.0281	-552.934
AIC	1122.611	1136.103	1084.91	1130.916	1124.056	1129.868
Observations	1,251	1,251	1,251	1,251	1,251	1,251

Standard Errors Clustered by Government in Parentheses.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$




Figure 4.13: Predicted conditional mean of % cabinet positions assigned to authoritarian successor party affiliates (ASPAs) as Agrarian Elite $\hat{A}$ increases. Whiskers represent 95% confidence intervals.




Figure 4.14: Predicted conditional mean of % cabinet positions assigned to authoritarian successor party affiliates (ASPAs) as Δ Agrarian Elite increases. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.




Figure 4.15: Predicted conditional mean of % cabinet positions assigned to authoritarian successor party affiliates (ASPAs) as Urban Bourgeoisie $\hat{A}$ increases. Whiskers represent 95% confidence intervals.




Figure 4.16: Predicted conditional mean of % cabinet positions assigned to authoritarian successor party affiliates (ASPAs) as Δ Urban Bourgeoisie increases. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.

4.5.6 Other Predictors of Authoritarian Influence

Although not the focus of this chapter, it is worth considering which of the control variables in the models significantly predict authoritarian influence and discussing theoretical reasons as to why this may be the case. I found that protest levels under the previous autocracy negatively predicted the proportion of cabinets appointments assigned to the previous authoritarian elite and yet positively predicted the proportion of cabinet appointments assigned to authoritarian successor party members. While the former relationship is intuitive, the latter is less yet not inexplicably so. If protest levels are high, the demand to remove the previous authoritarian elite is likely also high. High levels of protest, however, may raise concerns among the agrarian elite that the public may be able to more successfully lobby for economically egalitarian policies. As a result, the agrarian elite may be more likely to fund authoritarian successor parties. Governments that operated under federal systems also negatively predicted the proportion of cabinet appointments assigned to authoritarian successor party members. Under federalism, the central government may have less powers to redistribute the wealth of the agrarian elite. The agrarian elite may thus play a greater role in influencing state-level politics and may be less concerned with politics at the central level. This indicates that the demand for authoritarian successor parties that campaign for cabinet appointments in the central government may be reduced vis-á-vie the agrarian elite. As political equality increases after the transition (Δ Political Equality$_t$) the proportion of core and high prestige portfolios assigned to authoritarian successor party members significantly decreases. Given the theory presented, these results are relatively intuitive. As new economic actors such as the urban middle classes gain influence in politics, new political parties may emerge that can viably compete in elections against authoritarian successor parties. Finally, I found that the duration of the previous authoritarian regime positively predicted the proportion of core and high prestige cabinet positions assigned to the previous authoritarian elite. This echoes previous studies which argue that authoritarian regimes that have longer tenures will

cast a greater shadow over democratic politics after the transition occurs.[50]

4.6 Conclusion

Scholars of democratization have traditionally considered transition from autocracy to democracy as being tantamount to replacement of an outgoing autocratic elite with an incoming democratic elite. However, later scholars have argued that the vestiges of authoritarianism often outlive regime change. Authoritarian elites can exert a significant influence over the political life of a transitioning democracy. This elite often manipulate the parameters of democracy by playing an, at times, decisive role in designing national constitutions to protect the interests of their (usually rich) clients. In doing so, autocrats attempt to lock in the economic structure that assigned privilege to their sponsors and marginalization to the rest of society without the need to maintain a monopoly on political power. Furthermore, many of the autocratic elite play a decidedly more direct influence in political life post-transition. Authoritarian successor parties have won, and continue to win, free and fair elections despite the supposed "authoritarian baggage" that, we may argue, ought to make them undesirable stewards of the popular will.

This chapter focused on direct forms of authoritarian influence. It starts from the premise that distributional conflict is not fought over accepting or rejecting democratic transition per se but over determining the extent to which authoritarian influence should continue after the transition. In doing so, it asks the central question of who economically benefits from continued authoritarian influence in the same way that scholars of democratization have done when discussing democratic transition. The chapter compares two competing theories of authoritarian influence: 1) median voter and; 2) elite competition. The MVT posits that authoritarian influence will be greater when the policies of the previous authoritarian elite provide economic benefits that are widely shared among the population. The EVT, by contrast, posits that authoritarian influence will be lower when new economic elites that are unaffiliated with the previ-

[50]For example Miller 2019.

ous authoritarian regime seek to protect their assets from predation by the state by supporting alternatives to the authoritarian old guard in democracy.

This chapter leverages WhoGov to operationalize two forms of authoritarian influence used to compare both theories. The first looks at the influence of the elite who held cabinet appointments during the previous authoritarian regime. The second looks at affiliates of authoritarian successor parties. Contrary to initial intuitions, both forms of authoritarian influence are, in fact, weakly correlated. Members of the previous authoritarian elite are more likely to join political parties unaffiliated with the authoritarian past than they are to become affiliates of authoritarian successor parties. In a smaller percentage of cases, the previous authoritarian elite also identify as independents. The econometric analysis in this chapter shows greater support for the EVT of authoritarian influence. However, both forms of authoritarian operate through subtly different mechanisms. The previous authoritarian elite will continue to exert direct influence as a result of economic conditions that were present during the previous authoritarian regime. When economic inequality and growth are at their lowest in the sample, the influence of the previous authoritarian elite was at its highest. By contrast, authoritarian successor party affiliates will continue to exert direct influence as a result of economic conditions in the current democracy. As the average individual becomes richer under democracy, in other words, the influence of authoritarian successor parties tends to wane.

This chapter concludes by discussing two broader issues for policy makers to consider. First, and foremost, it reiterates the calls of previous scholars to reconceptualise democratic transition as involving a change in the regime but not necessarily a change in the elite or even a change in policy.[51] While some scholars have characterised democracy by the popular principle via the MVT, others have noted that transition often occurs during periods of high inequality when the pressure to redistribute wealth may be at its highest.[52] While previous scholars have emphasized institutional design that locks in the privilege of the authoritarian selectorate, this chapter explores how

[51]Slater and Wong 2013; Albertus and Menaldo 2018.
[52]Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Ansell and Samuels 2014.

continued participation in positions of executive power could serve as a more direct mechanism for how such privilege is maintained. Median-voter and elite-competition theories, alike, argue that the agrarian elite (a.k.a. the aristocracy) are the social class that is less amenable to democracy. However, scholars such as Michael Albertus, David Samuels and Henry Thomson have recently proposed that factors such as a change in expropriation risk from dictators, asset diversification and technological change that occurred during the third wave have resulted in the agrarian elite reconsidering the prospect of democratic change.[53] Much like how authoritarian successor parties operated during the first wave of democratization, this chapter presents evidence that when agrarian elites perpetuate their influence after the transition to democracy occurs, authoritarian successor parties tend to be assigned more positions of political power.[54] This chapter thus posits the authoritarian successor party as a crucial means through which the agrarian elite can continue to exert influence under democracy during the third wave.

While this chapter discusses authoritarian influence as a source of continuity after the transition, however, it also outlines how it can diminish over time. Authoritarian influence is, in some countries, utterly pervasive while, in others, it is wholly non-existent. Anna Grzymala-Busse recently found that the authoritarian successor parties that transformed themselves and ran on platforms of managerial expertise tended to fare better in elections in the short term yet worse in the long term than the parties that underwent no transformation:

> "...the reinvented parties shone more brightly for a time but then burned out. In contrast, the orthodox parties never enjoyed the spectacular success of the reinvented parties, but they were able to survive in the long term."[55]

This is puzzling for proponents of the MVT as authoritarian elites who govern over periods of considerable economic progress may be viewed favourably by the general public.[56] However, for proponents of the EVT, this result is not puzzling at all. This

[53] Albertus 2017; Samuels and Thomson 2020.
[54] Ziblatt 2017.
[55] Grzymala-Busse 2019, p. 573.
[56] For example Treisman 2011.

chapter posits that variation in authoritarian influence can be explained by endogenous economic processes that occur both under the previous dictatorship and the current democracy. The previous authoritarian elite tends to exert influence as a result of economic conditions under the previous autocracy. Authoritarian successor party affiliates, by contrast, tend to exert influence due to the economic conditions under the current democracy. The basic story of decline in both forms of authoritarian influence lies in the economic conditions that result in the rise of a burgeoning urban middle class. However, the EVT suggests that such growth may occur *despite* authoritarian rule not because of it and that the progenitors of this growth risk having their assets expropriated by an unconstrained state. While some scholars posit that in this conflict lies the origins of democracy,[57] I instead argue that the urban middle classes are key to reducing direct authoritarian influence after a transition to democracy occurs. In conclusion, this chapter argues that the continued influence of the authoritarian elite is a function of the predatory, not the popular, legacy of authoritarian rule.

[57] Ansell and Samuels 2014.

Chapter 5

Ethnic conflict or compromise? Interrogating the microfoundations of minority attitudes towards democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa

5.1 Introduction

Powerful ethnic minorities are often portrayed as being averse to democratic change. In their influential work *Politics in Plural Societies*, Alvin Rabuska and Kenneth Shepsle argue that powerful minorities "stand to be overwhelmed" by powerless majorities after transition and, as a result, "rely heavily on police rule to maintain order."[1] Nils-Christian Bormann argues that governments that are monopolized by an ethnic minority use "brutal oppression tactics" to sustain their rule as they have "no chance of winning future elections held under majority rule."[2] Underpinning this negative association between powerful minorities and democratic change is the belief that democracy is a political regime that primarily advances the interests of the majority. The case of the Alawites of Syria is one that scholars who rely upon this popular principle of

[1] Rabushka and Shepsle 1972, p. 158.
[2] Bormann 2017, p. 129.

democracy use to demonstrate how minority autocrats employ repression in the face of substantial domestic unrest aimed at regime change.[3]

While this purported relationship is not hard to comprehend, however, I nevertheless argue that the popular principle of democracy that underpins it is, at best, incomplete and, at worst, misleading. Democracy is not unfettered majority rule. Democracies are regimes that can stress not just majority empowerment through elections but also constitutional protections for minorities against the excesses of majority rule. Some scholars in the field of post-conflict institution building have further emphasized democracy's superior ability to build consensus, trust and respect among previously warring ethnic groups when compared to dictatorship.[4] There may thus be good reasons to believe that powerful ethnic minorities could prefer democratic transition over maintaining authoritarian rule or risking replacement by another dictatorship.

This chapter discusses multiple yet contradictory principles of democracy: some that work in the favour of majorities (the popular principle); some that work in favour of minorities (the liberal principle); and some that work in the favour of both (the associational principle). It adjudicates between these different principles using a simple method. It asks individual members of different ethnic groups that vary in size how they think about democracy and dictatorship. I study two clusters of attitude. The first cluster studies individual support for democracy. The second cluster studies how individuals perceive democracy based on the salience they ascribe to different principles of democracy as specified earlier.

This chapter leverages survey data from Sub-Saharan Africa in order to test the supposed minority aversion to democratic change. It finds no evidence of such an aversion. There is some evidence that individuals from larger ethnic groups are, in fact, more likely to express support for "democracy" even when the regime they live under does not meet a minimalist criteria of democracy. The chapter finds some evidence that minorities are more averse to unconstrained dictatorships which have been the most relentless in terms of punishing previously powerful minorities. Furthermore, this

[3]Examples include Horowitz 2000; Roessler 2016; Bormann 2017.
[4]Bermeo 2002.

chapter finds some evidence that the size of an ethnic group influences the relative salience each of its members place on different principles of democracy. Larger ethnic groups are more likely to hold the popular principle of democracy as salient while smaller ethnic groups are more likely to hold liberal and associational principles as salient.

This article is divided into seven sections. The second section explores and critiques how previous scholars assume ruling minorities view democratization. The third outlines theoretical assumptions and presents several empirical predictions made in this article. The fourth outlines the data used and summarizes key dependent and independent variables. The fifth presents the empirical analysis. The sixth discusses further tests. The seventh concludes.

5.2 Literature Review

This chapter focuses on democracy and how the proportional size of someone's ethnic group determines their attitudes towards it. While this chapter taps into deeper debates over who prefers democracy and how people relate to democracy in their own lives, there exists a wider historical context that make this relationship one of the most contentious issues surrounding democratization in many countries. Minority dictatorships where ethnic minorities capture the commanding heights of political power and exclude elites from ethnic majorities are a distinct form of dictatorship which an increasing number of scholars have taken seriously.[5] The most notorious example of a minority dictatorship is South Africa where Apartheid was created and enforced by political elite that belonged to the Afrikaner minority. However, examples abound including Liberia up until the 1990s, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Ethiopia both under Haile Selassie and the communist regime, Rwanda under Paul Kagame and, most notably, Syria under the Assad family.

The most comprehensive source available to identify minority rule is the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data set which will be discussed more in depth in subsection

[5] Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Horowitz 2000; Bormann 2017.

5.4.1. Figure 5.2 uses data from EPR and the Democracy and Dictatorship (DD) classification of democracy to arrive at a definition of minority dictatorship.[6] The metric used is regimes in which at least half the population are not descriptively represented in positions of executive power under regimes where democratic contestation does not exist. The frequency of minority dictatorships is plotted over a fifty-year period from 1966 to 2016. Figure 5.2 demonstrates that a non-negligible number of minority dictatorships have existed throughout the period under observation. At their peak from 1976 to 1977, a total of 41 minority dictatorships existed.

[6] Alvarez et al. 1996; Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010; Vogt et al. 2015.




Figure 5.1: The number of minority dictatorships globally from 1966 to 2016. Minority rule is identified when over half of the population has no descriptive representation in the executive. Dictatorship is determined by the DD ratings.

The purported relationship between minority dictators and those they rule is one of fear on behalf of the former and hatred on behalf of the latter. Scholars of ethnic politics tend to conclude that when minorities gain a monopoly on power, they are more reluctant to concede to disempowered majorities and, as a result, more willing to use repression against challenges to their rule.[7] Ethnic majorities often push back against increased repression which results in violent conflict between the two sides. While previous literature on civil war has downplayed 'grievance' based interpretations of the phenomenon,[8] a growing body of literature using the EPR has convincingly shown that denying descriptive access to power to an increasing proportion of the population significantly predicts the onset and duration of civil war.[9]

While less quantitative literature exists on the impact minority rule has on democratization, much of the scholarship that focuses on this relationship tends to be

[7]Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Bormann 2017.
[8]Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004.
[9]Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Wucherpfennig et al. 2012; Wucherpfennig, Hunziker, and Cederman 2016.

pessimistic. At the heart of this pessimism is the belief that democracy is detrimental towards minority interests. This belief assumes that democracy empowers the people which, in this context, means empowering the ethnic majority. This can be referred to as the popular principle of democracy. According to this principle, democracy is a political regime that assigns *de jure* political power through free and fair elections and *de facto* political power through the ability to both legislate and enforce a political agenda to the winning coalition. Winners are decided under this regime by who can deliver the most votes, leading some scholars to reduce democracy to a game of numbers.[10] For some scholars the numbers game of democracy is enough of a theoretical motivation for powerful minorities to dismiss democracy altogether.[11] If democracy empowers majorities then, by definition, minorities will lose their descriptive access to executive power. If minorities are power seekers – meaning power access an end in itself – then this, alone, is enough of a motivation for minority dictatorships to exist. However, some scholars argue that majorities use democracy to punish minorities through one of two mechanisms. First, majorities can politically persecute minorities by, for instance, marginalizing their cultural institutions most notably the status of their language.[12] Second, majorities can use economic policy to redistribute the wealth of the minority to the majority.[13] Thus whether viewed from a power- or a policy-seeking perspective, minority autocrats have less incentives to accommodate demands for democracy.

While the popular principle of democracy is, from the perspective of powerful minorities, bleak, it may be unnecessarily so. Ever since its apex in 1976 to 1977, minority dictatorship has been in secular decline throughout the world as figure 5.1 demonstrates. Some scholars of democratization may argue that elites, instead of conceding, were simply pushed from power by mass-protest.[14] However, Sub-Saharan Africa – which has had significant experience of minority dictatorships – demonstrates that many of the transitions to democracy have either been anticipated by incumbent au-

[10]Beissinger 2008.
[11]Bormann 2017.
[12]Bormann, Cederman, and Vogt 2017; Liu 2017.
[13]Acemoglu and Robinson 2005.
[14]For instance Bunce 2003.

tocrats or accepted by these elite and larger sections of the public.[15] South Africa is perhaps the most obvious case where the white minority voted overwhelmingly in favour of abolishing apartheid and transitioning to multi-ethnic democracy despite the loss of political privilege that this entailed. Furthermore, South Africa is hardly an anomaly. In countries as diverse as Liberia, Malawi, Nepal and Taiwan, minority dictatorships successfully transitioned to democracy. These counter examples present a problem for scholars who rely upon the popular principle to conceptualise what inter-ethnic relations look like under democracy.

Scholars drawing from liberal perspectives on democracy, by contrast, argue that democracy is a regime that may, in fact, benefit minorities. Drawing from the history of early democratization in the West, scholars have argued that democracy was originally designed to protect property rights either from the people under conditions of anarchy (as proposed by Adam Smith) or the elite under conditions of tyranny (as proposed by John Locke).[16] While early democracies often consisted of an extremely narrow franchise, expanding the pool of enfranchised individuals has generally not resulted in unfettered majority rule. Democracies, today, tend to offer superior protection for human rights such as the right to life, free speech, religious liberty and to organize against objectionable government policies in comparison to autocracies.[17] Thus, minority citizens may stand to benefit from democratization if they can ensure that their personal security can be protected under democracy. This can be done either indirectly through institutional design[18] or, as chapter 4, explored, directly through re-electing elites who were in some way affiliated to the authoritarian past. Furthermore, the risk of political violence inherent in maintaining minority dictatorships may, in fact, pose a greater threat to their economic and cultural interests in comparison to accepting democracy given that the risk of civil conflict tends to be higher. The liberal principle of democracy thus suggests that, in some conditions, democracy may be seen as advantageous for powerful minorities when compared to the status quo.

[15] Cheeseman 2015.
[16] Olson 1993; Ansell and Samuels 2014.
[17] Davenport 2007; Fox 2008; Liu 2017.
[18] Albertus and Menaldo 2018.

The popular and liberal principles of democracy are arguably zero-sum. For the former, majorities use elections to select leaders that campaign on a platform of punishing minorities. For the latter, minorities use property protections to shield their (potentially) ill-gotten gains under dictatorship. A third way scholars have conceptualised inter-ethnic relations under democracy is through the associational principle. This principle treats both ethnic majorities and minorities as participants in a mutually beneficial discussion whereby both parties recognise each other's inherent worth and agree upon democracy in order to establish better relations. Scholars such as Donald Horowitz argue that these relations are better served when ethnic groups are given political autonomy via federal institutions as ethnic groups can focus on addressing divisions within their own communities through regional political competitions instead of exploiting divisions between ethnic groups over politics at the central level.[19] By contrast, Arend Lijphart argues that democracies where a grand coalition between warring groups that is characterised by proportional representation and mutual veto is the primary means through which both parties can foster the associational principle.[20] Both approaches, needless to say, may not completely ameliorate conflict. However, the associational principle, in general, paints a picture of democracy that is positive sum. Minorities and majorities alike can work together through democracy in order to achieve mutual benefits.

The assumption that minorities are inherently averse to democracy is therefore more questionable than the current literature has hitherto portrayed. In general, it seems that democracy can be viewed from multiple angles depending on what principle (popular, liberal or associational) is under discussion. Minorities may view democracies as threatening if they perceive democracy to entail a loss of economic wealth or cultural prestige. Alternatively, minorities may see democracy opportunistically as a way of protecting their interests through the enhanced legal protection it offers. Further still, minorities may wish to cooperate with majorities in order to arrive at mutually beneficial arrangements. A major problem that exists in the current literature, however,

[19]Horowitz 2002.
[20]Lijphart 2002.

is that these attitudes are more or less assumed and have been subject to little in the way of empirical tests. Attitudinal assumptions nevertheless form a crucial theoretical micro-foundation for theories on minorities and democratization. This chapter contends that a crucial way which we can assess the relative credibility of these theories is, simply, by asking a representative sample of individuals how ethnicity influences their attitudes towards democracy. The next section in this chapter provides a theoretical outline of how ethnic identity influences individual attitudes towards democracy.

5.3 Group Size and Attitudes Towards Democracy

This section briefly outlines how individual attitudes towards democracy are shaped by the size of the ethnic group to which they belong. This chapter defines ethnicity broadly as a politically salient form of identity based on a shared experience of history. Ethnicity, by this definition, cannot always be reduced to phenotype and could be expressed religiously, linguistically or regionally depending on national context. While ethnicity is thus assumed to be a multidimensional concept, much of the recent literature persuasively argues that each dimension taps into a latent concept of ascriptive difference that can be compared across countries.[21] Ethnic groups, however defined, are therefore assumed to be unitary actors, as previous scholars in the field have argued.[22]

Having a shared experience of history can bind otherwise unrelated individuals together. The social world is highly complex in nature and individuals must make judgements about other individuals in a way that allows them to function efficiently and yet protects them from predation. Ethnic groups can serve as ready-made social networks where those who cooperate are rewarded and those who free ride are punished, simplifying the process considerably.[23] Politicized ethnicity may thus act as a heuristic that helps individuals simplify the social world as it connotes that two or more individuals share the same fate, have no barriers to communication, and cannot

[21] Chandra and Wilkinson 2008; Wilkinson 2008.
[22] Horowitz 2000.
[23] Fearon and Laitin 1996; Habyarimana et al. 2007.

change their identity in order to join another ethnic community.[24] As individuals who share an ethnic community also share a common experience of history, I assume that co-ethnic individuals can develop similar perceptions of threat and opportunity based on this experience. These ethnic communities form the basis on which individuals formulate attitudes about politics. Figure 5.2 summarizes the assumed path of influence outlined in this article.




Figure 5.2: Ethnic Identity and Attitude Formation

While each principle described in the previous section suggests a different attitude towards democracy, all propose that the proportional size of an individual's ethnic group should, in some manner, influence individual attitudes towards democracy. This is because individuals are assumed to develop clear beliefs about how the operation of a political regime should affect the interests of their group. More specifically, I argue that individuals adopt attitudes and accentuate principles based on how democracy in comparison to dictatorship can benefit their ethnic group. I develop theoretical intuitions and observable implications for two different dimensions of attitude towards democracy. The first dimension is support for democracy whereby group size determines the extent to which an individual believes democratic rule is legitimate. The second dimension is the meaning of what democracy is whereby group size influences individual perceptions of what principle of democracy they find most salient.

5.3.1 Support for democracy

How does ethnic group size influence the extent to which an individual supports democracy? I consider each principle (popular, liberal and associational) in turn. The popular principle argues that democracy is about how majorities use elections to advance their

[24] Hale 2008.

policy interests whether defined in terms of economic or culture. A corollary to this is that the interests of the majority are in opposition to those of the minority. The former wish to redistribute the benefits of power whereas the latter do not want this outcome. Consequently, group size should positively predict support for democracy if the popular principle of democracy is perceived to be in operation. The liberal principle argues that democracy is about protecting individual liberties and property rights. While both majorities and minorities can benefit, these kinds of rights may disproportionately benefit individuals who exist higher up on the economic distribution or cultural ladder. Thus, group size should negatively predict support for democracy if the liberal principle of democracy is perceived to be in operation. The associational principle argues that democracy is about working together towards developing mutually beneficial outcomes based on a shared sense of respect towards one another. As a result, it suggests that group size does not predict individual support towards democracy. Three competing hypotheses can thus be stated:

> Hypothesis 1a: Democracies enable majorities to pursue policies that contradict the interests of minorities through directly electing the political elite. Group size should thus positively predict individual support for democracy.
>
> Hypothesis 1b: Democracies enable minorities to protect their interests against predation by majorities through constitutional protections. Group size should thus negatively predict individual support for democracy.
>
> Hypothesis 1c: Democracies enable both minorities and majorities to work together towards achieving mutually desirable policy outcomes. Group size should thus not predict individual support for democracy.

5.3.2 Principles of Democracy

The theory presented in this article suggests that shared threat perceptions formulated within ethnic communities shape individual beliefs about what institutional features of democracy are considered most salient. If large and small groups alike attach salience to the popular principle of democracy, we should thus see little variation in this regard. Alternatively, as different ethnic groups vary in size, they should find different principles of democracy more salient than others depending on how these features impact

group-level interests. Individuals belonging to larger ethnic groups should find the popular principle salient because it is a crucial means through which they maximize their comparative advantage in democracy. Members of smaller ethnic groups, on the other hand, should emphasize features that maximize their comparative advantage such as limitations on executive power, individual liberty and the rule of law. As minority ethnic groups gain disproportionately from power sharing agreements, associational concepts such as mutual respect, trust and dialogue may also be viewed with greater salience among members of smaller ethnic groups for similar reasons. Three further hypotheses can thus be stated:

> H2a: Members of ethnic groups should view democracy through through the popular principle regardless of the size of the ethnic group.
>
> H2b: Members of smaller ethnic groups are more likely to view the liberal principle of democracy as more salient than the popular principle of democracy.
>
> H2c: Members of smaller ethnic groups are more likely to view the associational principle of democracy as more salient than the popular principle of democracy.

5.4 Data Collection

5.4.1 The Sample

This chapter employs survey data from Sub-Saharan Africa. This region is advantageous for the purpose of studying group size and attitudes towards democracy for three reasons. First, the salience of ethnic ties between the political elite and the rest of society is high throughout this region. Scholars have proposed the concept of neopatrimonialism which describes a system of patronage dominated by so-called 'Big Men'. As Michael Bratton and Nicholas Van de Walle argue:

> "The interaction between the 'big man' and his extended retinue defines African politics, from the highest reaches of the presidential palace to the humblest village assembly. As such, analysts of African politics have embraced the neopatrimonial model."[25]

Second, and relatedly, Sub-Saharan Africa has exhibited rich variation in terms of ethnic coalition and regime type. Several instances of minority rule have existed in countries such as Angola, Ethiopia, Liberia, Malawi, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), South Africa and the Sudan. While in some cases, minorities were composed of European settlers (most prominently in Rhodesia), non-white minorities such as the Americo-Liberians in Liberia or the Tutsi in Burundi have also monopolised political power in their countries. Conversely, after Apartheid rule was overthrown in Rhodesia and Zimbabwean independence was declared, the Shona – the ethnic group to which Robert Mugabe belonged – which composed the ethnic majority captured the vast majority of cabinet positions. Another example of ethnic majoritarianism is Mali where, despite significant ethno-regional variation, the African population enjoy significant cross-cutting cleavages that have compelled scholars to view this population as relatively unified.[26] Countries such as Kenya, Benin or Ghana, on the other hand, have seen coalitions between big men from different ethnic groups emerge and sustain themselves despite transition to democracy occurring.[27] Thus, instead of one minority or

[25] Bratton and Van de Walle 1994, p. 458.
[26] Dunning and Harrison 2010.
[27] Riedl 2014.

majority group prevailing, elite politics has consisted of cooperation among a series of smaller ethnic groups. Some countries have exhibited temporal variation in ethnic ruling coalition. Ethiopia, for instance, has experienced monarchical, communist and, now, regionalist dictatorships. During monarchical and communist rule, the Amhara ethno-regional group dominated the executive. After communism was overthrown, a relatively more inclusive ethnic coalition consisting of the Tigry, Oroma, Amhara and, later on, other Southern groups was formed without transition to democracy.[28] Third, Sub-Saharan Africa has uniquely rich and complete data on ethnic groups given the relative importance of ethnicity in politics. In equivalent regional surveys such as the European Social Survey, Latin Barometer and Asian Barometer, for instance, smaller ethnic groups tend to receive poor coverage or important differences within ethnic groups are overlooked. In the case of Latin America, many otherwise distinct indigenous groups are often lumped together when the political status of these groups are different. In Bolivia, for instance, the ethnic group of Evo Morales (the Aymara) have privileged access to political positions since 2005, the Quechua have lesser access while smaller indigenous peoples such as the Guarani have no access. By comparison, the data on ethnic groups in Afrobarometer is comparatively disaggregated which makes it particularly well-suited to working with EPR data.

While Sub-Saharan Africa is thus a region rich for theorizing about group size and attitudes towards democracy, there are three factors that limit the extent to which the relationships found in the analysis will translate to other regions. First, the time period studied is in the 1990s where many ethnically exclusive regimes were supplanted with relatively inclusive ones regardless of regime type.[29] In practically all cases, I found that nearly all ethnic groups identified had some level of descriptive access to political power. Second, ethnic identities in the region are often nested inside one another which, some scholars argue, make the implicit threat of majoritarianism inherent in democratization arguably weaker when compared to regions where within-group divisions are

[28] I rely upon the EPR coding (Vogt et al. 2015) for the examples discussed in this paragraph.
[29] Raleigh and Wigmore-Shepherd 2020.

potentially.[30] Third, ascriptive difference tends to express itself in terms of phenotypic (especially in settler colonies) and linguistic difference while in other regions such as the Middle East, tends to express itself in terms of conflict between and within different religious groups. Nevertheless, I propose that Sub-Saharan Africa can provide a useful indication of how group size could influence individual attitudes towards in divided societies such as Syria which scholars of African politics have previously referred to.[31] Table 5.2 reports the countries and waves included in the sample.

Country	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Wave 5	Wave 6
Benin			✓	✓	✓	✓
Botswana		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Burundi					✓	
Cameroon					✓	✓
Cote d'Ivoire					✓	✓
Gabon						✓
Ghana	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Guinea					✓	✓
Kenya		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Liberia				✓	✓	✓
Malawi	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mali	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mauritius					✓	✓
Mozambique		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Namibia	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Niger					✓	✓
Nigeria	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Senegal		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sierra Leone					✓	✓
South Africa	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Togo					✓	✓
Uganda	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Zambia	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Zimbabwe	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Table 5.1: Country and survey wave coverage of Afrobarometer used in the sample.

[30] Baker, Scarritt, and Mozaffar 2016.
[31] Horowitz 2000; Roessler 2016.

5.4.2 Coding Ethnic Identity

I follow previous scholars by using group level data from the EPR data set and merging it with individual level survey data from Afrobarometer.[32] I take advantage of two survey items in Afrobarometer where respondents are asked to state their ethnic or linguistic identity. For ethnicity, respondents were asked: *What is your tribe? You know, your ethnic or cultural group?* For language, respondents were asked one of three questions: *What language do you speak most at home?* OR *What is your home language?* OR *What language do you speak most often?* The EPR is currently the most useful data set of its kind as it provides disaggregated data on what it defines as politically relevant ethnic groups and provides demographic information such as the proportional size of this group that is the main independent variable under analysis. Political relevance is achieved when (a) one or more political actor represents an ethnic group at the national level or; (b) an ethnic group faces political discrimination at the national level. An alternative data source that could have been used is the Minorities at Risk.[33] However, as the name suggests, this data suffers from selection bias as it narrows the discussion to smaller ethnic groups who (a) suffer or benefit from systemic discrimination and/or; (b) are the focus of political mobilization in defence of a commonly defined interest.[34] As proportional size is the key independent variable, using this data set risks losing coverage of larger groups. For instance, the Black and Shona majorities in Mali and Zimbabwe respectively are not included in this definition. A total of 120 politically relevant ethnic groups were identified using the EPR in conjunction with Afrobarometer. A complete list of these groups can be found in appendix D.1.

5.4.3 Coding Support for Democracy

I operationalize support for democracy by looking at three survey items in Afrobarometer. The first item asks:

[32] For instance Houle 2015; Wimmer 2017; Neundorf, Gerschewski, and Olar 2019.
[33] Gurr 1993.
[34] See Hug 2013.

> With which one of these statements are you in most agreement? A, B or C?
>
> **A** Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government
>
> **B** In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable to democratic government
>
> **C** For someone like me, a democratic or non-democratic regime makes no difference.

I recode this variable as binary where answer A is assigned 1 and answers B and C are assigned 0. I therefore interpret this variable as unconditional support for democracy given that respondents had the option to consider dictatorship as a conditional alternative or indifference. 76 percent of the sample express unconditional support for democracy indicating a high degree of consensus in the region over the time period studied about this regimes value.

The next variable looks at an individual's belief that his or her country is a democracy. This item asks:

> One the whole, is the way *your country* is governed democratic? OR
> In your opinion is *your country* today a democracy or not a democracy? OR
> In your opinion, how much of a democracy is *your country* today?
>
> **= 1** Not a democracy
>
> **= 2** Major problems, but still a democracy
>
> **= 3** Minor problems, but still a democracy
>
> **= 4** Full democracy

I interpret this measure as an individual's recognition of democracy in his or her country where higher values denote higher support for democracy. I code "don't know" and "not applicable" as missing values. 9 percent of respondents answered that their country was 'not a democracy', 33 percent answered 'major problems, but still a democracy', 36 percent answered 'minor problems, but still a democracy' and 23 percent answered 'full democracy'.

The next variable looks at an individual's satisfaction with democracy in his or her own country. This item asks:

> Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in *your country*? OR

> Overall, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in *your country*? OR
> Generally, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in *your country*? OR
> Generally, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in *your country*?
>
> = **1** Very dissatisfied
>
> = **2** Somewhat dissatisfied
>
> = **3** Somewhat satisfied
>
> = **4** Very satisfied

15 percent of respondents said they were 'very dissatisfied', 27 percent answered 'somewhat dissatisfied', 38 percent answered 'somewhat satisfied' and 19 percent answered 'very satisfied'.

5.4.4 Principles Of Democracy

To operationalize the salience of different principles of democracy, I rely upon a survey item which asks participants to describe the first thing that comes to mind when they think of democracy:

> What, if anything, do you understand by the word "democracy"? What comes to mind when you hear the word? OR
> What, if anything, does democracy mean to you? When you hear the word "democracy," what is the first thing that comes to your mind? OR
> When you hear the word "democracy", what is the first thing that comes to your mind? What, if anything, does "democracy" mean to you?

Figure 5.3 presents a frequency chart of answers the respondents gave after having grouped similarly worded responses together and coded non-responses as missing. I have grouped these responses into four categories, popular, liberal, associational and other. Generally, respondents view a variety of democratic principles as salient. However, we can see that the three principles combined equate to 77 percent of non-missing answers. Furthermore, all of the other answers are comparatively fragmented, meaning that it is hard to aggregate them in any meaningful way into a different principle of democracy. I therefore code 'other' responses as missing. Of the non-missing responses, 31 percent of respondents viewed the popular principle of democracy as the most salient

while 55 and 14 percent viewed the liberal and associational principle as most salient. Contrary to the perceptions of some scholars, the majority of respondents thus tend to view the liberal principle as most salient. This question is only included in waves 1, 3 and 6 of Afrobarometer.




Figure 5.3: Categorising different principles of democracy using participant responses from the Afrobarometer data. The x-axis uses a logarithmic scale.

5.4.5 Control Variables

Data on group size is provided by EPR which provides demographic estimates for politically relevant ethnic groups. I log-transform this variable to reduce the possibility that outliers disproportionately influence the results. I further add several level 1 (individual) and level 2 (ethnic group) control variables. Level 1 variables include the respondent's age, sex, living status (urban or rural) and whether or not they obtained any post-secondary education. All level 1 are calculated through various survey items in Afrobarometer. Level 2 variables include logged group size, group incomes and history of conflict. Group income is operationalized as an unbalanced ratio of average group income and average total income.[35] History of conflict is operationalized, first, by coding groups that have, at some point, experienced civil conflict (defined by ≥ 25 battle deaths) and, second, by coding the number of years a group has been at peace.[36] Table 5.2 presents descriptive statistics on all independent variables.

[35] Cederman, Weidmann, and Bormann 2015.
[36] Vogt et al. 2015.

	Count	Mean	Std. Dev	Min	Max
Female	112,020	.529	1.770	0	1
Urban	111,718	.423	.494	0	1
Logged Age	110,824	3.524	.3779	2.773	4.868
Post-Secondary	111,827	.097	.296	0	1
Logged Group Size	110,786	3.182	.834	.095	4.511
High Income	111,806	1.067	.222	1	3.493
Low Income	111,806	1.153	.332	1	4.289
War History	112,020	.082	.274	0	1
Logged Peace Years	112,020	3.718	.599	0	4.263

Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics for key explanatory variables.

5.5 Econometric Analysis

5.5.1 Modelling Specification

This section provides a detailed discussion of how group size influences individual attitudes towards democracy. I employ a series of generalized linear models with standard errors clustered by ethnic group. Country and year fixed effects are included in all models to mitigate the possibility that attitudes predicted by group-level characteristics are endogenous to country- or time- factors such as institutional selection or regime type. These characteristics plus all others that are country and time invariant are held constant using this approach. Fixed effects are further appropriate as they also hold constant question wording in surveys that may produce subtle yet different responses. Thus we can compare how group size influences individual attitudes toward democracy in the same country at the same point in time conditional upon the individual and group level controls specified in the model. I employ a binary measure of democracy throughout as coded by Carles Boix, Michael Miller and Sebastian Rosato to identify whether the relationships suggested in the overall sample are driven by regime type.[37]

5.5.2 Is democracy always preferable to dictatorship?

Table 5.3 reports the results of six binary logit models which predict the probability that an individual will express unconditional support for democracy. Models 1 and 2 use all countries in the sample regardless of regime type while models 3 and 4 only include dictatorships and models 5 and 6 only include democracies. In all models, group size plays a positive yet statistically insignificant effect in predicting unconditional support for democracy. These results are in contradiction to hypotheses 1a (1b) which suggests that group size positively (negatively) predicts support for democracy. Instead, hypothesis 1c which functions as a null hypothesis is not rejected. This is theorized to be the case as individuals that belong to ethnic majorities and minorities may both be able to benefit from democracy.

[37] Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2013.

Table 5.3: Binary Logit Models of Unconditional Support for Democracy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	-0.2412***	-0.2413***	-0.1878***	-0.1877***	-0.2773***	-0.2771***
	(0.0397)	(0.0397)	(0.0541)	(0.0539)	(0.0522)	(0.0522)
Urban	0.0228	0.0217	0.0483	0.0462	-0.0106	-0.0092
	(0.0277)	(0.0280)	(0.0409)	(0.0423)	(0.0342)	(0.0343)
Logged Age	0.1981***	0.1979***	0.2388***	0.2399***	0.1677**	0.1681**
	(0.0474)	(0.0473)	(0.0398)	(0.0390)	(0.0673)	(0.0672)
Post-Secondary Educated	0.2235***	0.2244***	0.2078***	0.2099***	0.2370***	0.2380***
	(0.0379)	(0.0379)	(0.0612)	(0.0608)	(0.0478)	(0.0485)
Logged Group Size	0.0238	0.0191	0.0526	0.0503	0.0111	0.0204
	(0.0255)	(0.0267)	(0.0392)	(0.0392)	(0.0420)	(0.0402)
High Income	0.0322	0.0570	0.1407***	0.2018***	-0.3554	-0.3748
	(0.0879)	(0.0982)	(0.0323)	(0.0405)	(0.2733)	(0.2590)
Low Income	-0.0451	-0.0408	-0.1459	-0.1333	-0.1123	-0.1147
	(0.0789)	(0.0812)	(0.1272)	(0.1284)	(0.0875)	(0.0830)
War History	0.0305		0.0221		0.0755	
	(0.1248)		(0.1340)		(0.2402)	
Logged Peace Years		0.0399		0.0871*		-0.1420
		(0.0654)		(0.0447)		(0.1285)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log-Likelihood	-54089.93	-54088.02	-20509.66	-20500.88	-33357.88	-33354.08
AIC	108249.9	108246	41069.32	41051.76	66767.76	66760.16
Observations	101,457	101,457	37,893	37,893	63,564	63,564

Standard Errors Clustered by Ethnic Group in Parentheses; Constant Not Reported.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

5.5.3 Is your country democratic?

The next set of results report the extent to which group size predicts an individual's belief that the country that he or she belongs to is democratic. Table 5.4 reports the results of six ordinal logit models. Models 7 and 8 use all countries in the sample regardless of regime type while models 9 and 10 only include dictatorships and models 11 and 12 only include democracies. Group size positively and significantly predicts the dependent variable in models 7 and 8. However, when only dictatorships are included in the sample, the coefficient for group size doubles in magnitude and achieves statistical significance at the 0.1 percent level. This suggests that when group size increases individuals are more likely to identify dictatorships as democratic even though, by the definition used here, they are not. To provide an impression of the magnitude of these results I use model 9 to predict the probability that an urban-dwelling male with post-secondary education who belongs to an ethnic group with an average income will identify his country as democracy when, by the definition used here, it is a dictatorship when group size increases from 3 (the 1st percentile) to 90 (the 99th percentile) percent. As group size increases over this range, the predicted probability that he will unambiguously"misidentify" his country as a dictatorship decreases by 11 percentage points. The predicted probability that he will unambiguously "misidentify" his country incorrectly as a democracy, by contrast, will increase by 4 percentage points.

Table 5.4: Ordinal Logit Models of Democratic Identification

	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Female	0.0401**	0.0401**	0.0876***	0.0870***	0.0105	0.0105
	(0.0166)	(0.0166)	(0.0279)	(0.0279)	(0.0190)	(0.0190)
Urban	-0.1800***	-0.1806***	-0.1165***	-0.1200***	-0.2132***	-0.2135***
	(0.0279)	(0.0279)	(0.0444)	(0.0452)	(0.0336)	(0.0337)
Logged Age	0.0041	0.0047	-0.0144	-0.0114	-0.0012	-0.0010
	(0.0370)	(0.0369)	(0.0387)	(0.0381)	(0.0527)	(0.0526)
Post-Secondary Educated	-0.2815***	-0.2829***	-0.2553***	-0.2589***	-0.2881***	-0.2865***
	(0.0434)	(0.0431)	(0.0584)	(0.0571)	(0.0548)	(0.0553)
Logged Group Size	0.0813**	0.0824**	0.1722***	0.1723***	0.0348	0.0370
	(0.0380)	(0.0375)	(0.0547)	(0.0555)	(0.0450)	(0.0457)
High Income	-0.1112	-0.0883	-0.0508	-0.0208	-0.0076	-0.0156
	(0.0683)	(0.0833)	(0.0608)	(0.0883)	(0.4060)	(0.4002)
Low Income	0.0516	0.0593	0.3651***	0.3991***	-0.0010	-0.0030
	(0.0825)	(0.0831)	(0.1136)	(0.1273)	(0.1042)	(0.1032)
War History	-0.1037		-0.2158		0.1390	
	(0.1438)		(0.1907)		(0.1276)	
Logged Peace Years		0.0588		0.0831		-0.1090*
		(0.0851)		(0.0892)		(0.0570)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log-Likelihood	-120991.2	-120990	-45707.62	-45715.61	-74854.6	-74853.94
AIC	242056.4	242054.1	91469.25	91485.23	149765.2	149763.9
Observations	98,194	98,194	37,008	37,008	61,186	61,186

Standard Errors Clustered by Ethnic Group in Parentheses; Constant Not Reported.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

5.5.4 Are you satisfied with democracy?

The next set of results report the extent to which group size predicts an individual's belief that the country that they belong to is democratic. Table 5.5 reports the results of six ordinal logit models. Models 13 and 14 use all countries in the sample regardless of regime type while models 15 and 16 only include dictatorships and models 17 and 18 only include democracies. Group size positively predicts satisfaction with democracy at marginal levels of statistical significance in models 13 and 14. However, when only dictatorships are included in the sample, the coefficient for group size triples in magnitude and achieves statistical significance at the 0.1 percent level. This suggests that when group size increases individuals are more likely to identify dictatorships as democratic even though, by the definition used here, they are not. To provide an impression of the magnitude of these results I use model 15 to predict the probability that an urban-dwelling male with post-secondary education who belongs to an ethnic group with an average income will be satisfied with democracy even though his country is dictatorial when group size increases from 3 (the 1st percentile) to 90 (the 99th percentile) percent. As group size increases over this range, the predicted probability that he will be very dissatisfied with democracy under dictatorship decreases by 12 percentage points. Over this range, the predicted probability that he will be very satisfied with democracy under dictatorship will increase by 5 percentage points.

Table 5.5: Ordinal Logit Models of Satisfaction with Democracy

	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Female	-0.0396*	-0.0396*	0.0262	0.0249	-0.0784***	-0.0785***
	(0.0204)	(0.0204)	(0.0313)	(0.0317)	(0.0217)	(0.0217)
Urban	-0.1601***	-0.1603***	-0.0916**	-0.0956**	-0.2095***	-0.2095***
	(0.0320)	(0.0318)	(0.0393)	(0.0375)	(0.0371)	(0.0371)
Logged Age	0.1044***	0.1054***	0.0756	0.0807*	0.1003*	0.1005*
	(0.0383)	(0.0382)	(0.0479)	(0.0463)	(0.0517)	(0.0516)
Post-Secondary Educated	-0.2126***	-0.2148***	-0.1892***	-0.1957***	-0.2089***	-0.2068***
	(0.0421)	(0.0419)	(0.0543)	(0.0530)	(0.0501)	(0.0503)
Logged Group Size	0.0627*	0.0669*	0.1840***	0.1856***	0.0060	0.0095
	(0.0352)	(0.0351)	(0.0441)	(0.0464)	(0.0434)	(0.0440)
High Income	-0.2372***	-0.2217**	-0.1257*	-0.1021	-0.2348	-0.2510
	(0.0757)	(0.0880)	(0.0716)	(0.0965)	(0.3403)	(0.3327)
Low Income	0.0020	0.0091	0.3826***	0.4280***	-0.0862	-0.0900
	(0.0785)	(0.0798)	(0.1417)	(0.1656)	(0.0924)	(0.0908)
War History	-0.1460		-0.3259**		0.2089**	
	(0.1435)		(0.1618)		(0.0998)	
Logged Peace Years		0.0526		0.0925		-0.1705**
		(0.0690)		(0.0631)		(0.0663)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log-Likelihood	-123928.6	-123937.9	-44703.65	-44737.93	-78434.35	-78432.07
AIC	247931.2	247949.7	89461.31	89529.87	156924.7	156920.1
Observations	96,309	96,309	35,654	35,654	60,655	60,655

Standard Errors Clustered by Ethnic Group in Parentheses; Constant Not Reported.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

5.5.5 Principles of Democracy

Does group size help determine the salience through which individual members view different principles of democracy? Table 5.6 reports the results of two multinomial logit models with standard errors clustered by ethnic group. Tables 5.7 and 5.8 repeat the analysis by limiting the sample to democracies and dictatorships respectively. Models 19 and 20 present evidence in favour of hypotheses 2b and 2c. As group size increases, individual members are significantly less likely to see liberal or associational principles of democracy as salient in comparison to the popular principle. Furthermore, these negative and significant findings only hold when the sample is limited to democracies. I test the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption by estimating two separate binary logit models and find similar coefficient estimates for logged group size in comparison to model 19 both in terms of magnitude and precision. Figures 5.4 and 5.5 plot predicted probabilities using models 25 and 26 to more intuitively assess the likelihood that an individual will view the liberal or associational principle as a more salient feature of democracy in comparison to the popular principle as his or her group size increases from the 1st to the 99th percentile in the sample. Over this range, I find that the probability of viewing the liberal principle as more salient than the popular principle decreases by 9 percentage points. Furthermore, I find that the probability of viewing the associational principle as more salient than the popular principle decreases by 12 percentage points over the same range.

Table 5.6: Multinomial logit models comparing principles of democracy.

	(19)		(20)	
	Liberal	Associational	Liberal	Associational
Female	0.00358	0.00644	0.00376	0.00676
	(0.00467)	(0.00644)	(0.00463)	(0.00641)
Urban	0.124**	-0.140**	0.120*	-0.145**
	(0.0618)	(0.0551)	(0.0623)	(0.0563)
Logged Age	0.134**	0.301***	0.134**	0.301***
	(0.0657)	(0.0790)	(0.0659)	(0.0790)
Post-Secondary	-0.341***	-0.553***	-0.343***	-0.556***
	(0.0676)	(0.107)	(0.0669)	(0.108)
Logged Group Size	-0.0999**	-0.153***	-0.108**	-0.154***
	(0.0465)	(0.0580)	(0.0473)	(0.0577)
High Income	-0.0481	-0.217	0.0758	-0.106
	(0.0973)	(0.176)	(0.128)	(0.187)
Low Income	-0.0343	-0.234	-0.00985	-0.210
	(0.103)	(0.157)	(0.106)	(0.158)
War History	-0.0410	-0.215		
	(0.212)	(0.190)		
Logged Peace Years			0.158	0.186***
			(0.109)	(0.0681)
Country Fixed-Effects	Yes		Yes	
Year Fixed-Effects	Yes		Yes	
Log-Likelihood	-32844.1		-32830.0	
# Groups	106		106	
# Observations	37,023		37,023	

Standard Errors Clustered by Ethnic Group in Parentheses; Constant Not Reported.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5.7: Multinomial logit models comparing principles of democracy in democracies.

	(21)		(22)	
	Liberal	Associational	Liberal	Associational
Female	-0.0394	0.0122	-0.0389	0.0127
	(0.0395)	(0.0164)	(0.0395)	(0.0165)
Urban	0.0844	-0.0792	0.0860	-0.0785
	(0.0735)	(0.0733)	(0.0736)	(0.0739)
Logged Age	0.0210	0.192**	0.0211	0.192**
	(0.0697)	(0.0786)	(0.0696)	(0.0787)
Post-Secondary	-0.316***	-0.407***	-0.320***	-0.416***
	(0.0741)	(0.141)	(0.0739)	(0.142)
Logged Group Size	-0.111**	-0.262***	-0.0923*	-0.253***
	(0.0484)	(0.0748)	(0.0509)	(0.0766)
High Income	-0.112	-0.100	-0.159	-0.113
	(0.140)	(0.246)	(0.167)	(0.262)
Low Income	-0.0335	-0.286**	-0.0361	-0.281*
	(0.114)	(0.144)	(0.116)	(0.146)
War History	-0.0298	-0.339		
	(0.191)	(0.222)		
Logged Peace Years			-0.152	0.133
			(0.125)	(0.157)
Country Fixed-Effects	Yes		Yes	
Year Fixed-Effects	Yes		Yes	
Log-Likelihood	-18609.1		-18608.6	
# Groups	68		68	
# Observations	20,932		20,932	

Standard Errors Clustered by Ethnic Group in Parentheses; Constant Not Reported.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5.8: Multinomial logit models comparing principles of democracy in dictatorships.

	(23)		(24)	
	Liberal	Associational	Liberal	Associational
Female	0.00614	0.00604	0.00645*	0.00634
	(0.00381)	(0.00774)	(0.00376)	(0.00773)
Urban	0.144	-0.227***	0.134	-0.238***
	(0.0911)	(0.0794)	(0.0942)	(0.0818)
Logged Age	0.277**	0.423***	0.280**	0.425***
	(0.109)	(0.152)	(0.110)	(0.152)
Post-Secondary	-0.317***	-0.636***	-0.319***	-0.638***
	(0.0953)	(0.128)	(0.0940)	(0.127)
Logged Group Size	-0.0185	0.0282	-0.0259	0.0164
	(0.0745)	(0.0695)	(0.0742)	(0.0690)
High Income	0.00375	-0.236	0.192	-0.0902
	(0.144)	(0.184)	(0.166)	(0.199)
Low Income	-0.187	-0.0874	-0.127	-0.0266
	(0.311)	(0.310)	(0.307)	(0.301)
War History	-0.0635	-0.247		
	(0.323)	(0.232)		
Logged Peace Years			0.198**	0.190***
			(0.0981)	(0.0627)
Country Fixed-Effects	Yes		Yes	
Year Fixed-Effects	Yes		Yes	
Log-Likelihood	-14110.8		-14091.0	
# Groups	57		57	
# Observations	16,091		16,091	

Standard Errors Clustered by Ethnic Group in Parentheses; Constant Not Reported.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5.9: Binary logit models comparing principles of democracy.

	(25)	(26)
	Liberal vs. Popular	Associational vs. Popular
Female	-0.0234	0.0914***
	(0.0383)	(0.0340)
Urban	0.125**	-0.120**
	(0.0632)	(0.0549)
Logged Age	0.133**	0.299***
	(0.0662)	(0.0829)
Post-Secondary	-0.349***	-0.554***
	(0.0691)	(0.116)
Logged Group Size	-0.107**	-0.183***
	(0.0457)	(0.0525)
High Income	-0.0718	-0.0941
	(0.0939)	(0.147)
Low Income	-0.0432	-0.208
	(0.0987)	(0.155)
War History	-0.0328	-0.299*
	(0.213)	(0.181)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Log-Likelihood	-18614.5	-9095.0
# Observations	31,563	16,877




Figure 5.4: Predicted probability of an individual viewing the liberal principle of democracy as the most salient meaning of democracy versus the popular principle as the size of their ethnic group increases. Predictions are calculated from model (25) and are for a 33 year old individual with post-secondary education who lives in an urban area. Shaded areas represent 90% confidence intervals.




Figure 5.5: Predicted probability of an individual viewing the associational principle of democracy as the most salient meaning of democracy versus the popular principle as the size of their ethnic group increases. Predictions are calculated from model (26) and are for a 33 year old individual with post-secondary education who lives in an urban area. Shaded areas represent 90% confidence intervals.

5.6 Further Tests

The analysis presented in this article demonstrates that group size does not positively and significantly predict individual support for democracy. In fact, there is some evidence that individuals from larger groups are more likely to view dictatorships as democratic than individuals from smaller groups. To analyse this further, appendix D.2 presents the results of logit models which use expressions of support for a variety of dictatorships which include single-party, military and one-man. While group size did not significantly predict support for single-party or military rule, group size was a positive and significant predictor of support for one-man rule. One-man rulers such as Robert Mugabe, for instance, may gain support from the ethnic majority by redistributing minority assets. Furthermore, I find that, rather than influence support for democracy, the relative size of one's ethnic group profoundly influences the salience of differing principles of democracy. Individuals from smaller groups are more likely to see liberal and associational principles of democracy as more salient than popular principles. This, however, does not necessarily mean that minorities do not accept the importance of majority rule in democracy. Appendix D.3 utilizes a survey question in the first wave of the Afrobarometer survey which asks participants to ascribe the importance of majority rule in democratic societies. I find that group size, while consistently positive, is, at best, a marginally significant predictor of this dependent variable.

5.7 Conclusion

Scholars focusing on ethnic groups and democratization have generally argued that powerful ethnic minorities tend to view democratic change as threatening. Underpinning this hypothesized relationship is the popular principle of democracy that was originally articulated by philosophers such as Aristotle and Plato and later adopted by several influential scholars in the fields of political economy and sociology. This article has argued that other principles of democracy exist that benefit powerful minorities

that are often overlooked by scholars in the field. The liberal principle suggests that democracies can provide legal protections that prevent majorities from engaging in expropriation and/or persecution of minorities. The associational principle suggests that minorities and majorities alike can work together to achieve compromise that mutually benefits both parties.

The empirical analysis conducted in this article sought to test whether or not group size predicts attitudes towards democracy. Attitudes were divided into two different categories namely support for democracy and understanding the meaning of democracy. The motivation behind this analysis was to assess the degree to which a minority (majority) aversion (inclination) to democracy existed using data from Sub-Saharan Africa – a region that has experienced several well-known instances of minority dictatorship after decolonisation. Many scholars who posit such an aversion argue that minorities fear that they will lose descriptive access to political power and, in some cases, will be subject to policies that redistribute the wealth and/or threaten the cultural integrity of the groups to which they belong. In doing so, scholars echo beliefs extending back to Aristotle and Plato who saw democracy as by the majority, of the majority and for the majority.

To what extent is this theory supported? The analysis suggests that this theory has limited explanatory power in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa. Group size does not predict unconditional support for democracy at the individual level. However, individuals who belong to larger ethnic groups are more likely to identify the regime they live under as democratic when it is, according to the classification used in the analysis, dictatorial. This could be indicative both of the time and the historical context. In Sub-Saharan Africa, dictatorships have become more inclusive in terms of allowing, albeit flawed, democratic contestation and tend to be more responsive to the needs of a broad section of the public than the democracies that prevailed during the Cold War.[38] However, individuals who belong to larger ethnic groups are also more likely to express satisfaction with democracy when they, in fact, live under

[38]Schedler 2002; Levitsky and Way 2010; Miller 2015.

dictatorship. When the sample is limited to democracies, however, group size does not predict whether individuals will either correctly classify their country as democratic or will express higher levels of satisfaction with democracy.

These results suggest that individuals who belong minority ethnic groups are less likely to support autocracy than individuals from majority ethnic groups. Assuming a descriptive-substantive link exists, minority dictatorships entail a smaller selectorate which means a smaller proportion of individuals will get a larger share of the economic pie. While this suggests incentives for powerful minorities to support autocracy, however, they need to weigh the benefits of maintaining monopoly against the prospects that they need to spend a higher proportion of those benefits on state repression.[39] When a larger proportion of the population are not descriptively represented by the political elite, as the literature suggests, the likelihood of civil war occurring and enduring increases along with the likelihood that the minority dictatorship will be overthrown.[40] Thus, the benefits that accrue to minorities in minority dictatorships are arguably more insecure when compared to dictatorships that descriptively represent a larger proportion of the population in the executive.

Instead of being uniquely averse to democracy, this chapter demonstrates that group size influences the level of salience an individual attaches to each principle of democracy. For majorities, democracy is more likely to entail political power through directly electing representatives. For minorities, democracy is more likely to entail either protection from the state or working together with other ethnic groups to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes. This suggests that minorities are far from averse about democracy. Rather than focusing on elections, minorities tend to attach higher salience to principles of democracy that enable them to pursue their interests.

The results of this chapter, however, suggest a degree of majority support for dictatorships, not without justification. In chapter 4, I discussed how the legacy of authoritarianism is perpetuated in democracy indirectly through constitutional measures

[39]Rabushka and Shepsle 1972.

[40]Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Wucherpfennig et al. 2012; Wucherpfennig, Hunziker, and Cederman 2016.

or through direct participation of elites that are affiliated with the previous authoritarian regime in political affairs. Inhabitants of Sub-Saharan Africa are by no means strangers to these deleterious legacies. In South Africa – hailed as one of the major success stories of democratization – income and wealth inequality has risen according to the World Bank despite the legal abolition of Apartheid in 1994, making the country one of the most economically unequal in the world.[41] The South African case is a stark reminder that the institutions of democracy, far from promoting populism, can lock in advantages enjoyed by the elite. With the concomitant rise of competitive authoritarianism and political populism, proponents of democratic change thus need to find a balance between promoting greater equality in the cultural, economic and political spheres while protecting individuals from minority groups that fear not democracy per se, but unconstrained majority rule.

[41] World Bank.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

6.1 Theoretical and Empirical Summary

This thesis has engaged with different principles of democracy and how they affect outcomes important to social groups in what I term procedural democracies - regimes in which the political elite are selected through free and fair elections.[1] Previous scholars have argued that individuals (a) form preferences over political regimes depending on how each regime impacts the utility of the social group to which they belong and; (b) exist to varying degrees in an environment of social inequality. Whereas political economists define utility in terms of income and/or wealth while political sociologists often define utility in terms of accessing political power, the chapters in this thesis have tried to understand how differing varieties of inequality impact outcomes of interest (transition to democracy, authoritarian influence in democracy, and support for/beliefs about democracy). While the approach of this thesis has been to address 'hot topics' in each of these distinct areas, each have a common overarching theme. Regime change is seen by social groups that win (lose) from the political status quo as a critical juncture that can fundamentally alter the way foundational benefits are distributed to their detriment (benefit). While many factors can be argued to have an influence on how rational individuals order their preference of regime, membership to a social identity group is uniquely compelling for three reasons. First, membership to a social group

[1] Schumpeter 1947.

serves as a useful heuristic for individuals to make sense of, and operate efficiently in, an otherwise complex social world. This heuristic helps bind otherwise unrelated individuals together by providing a shared connection with history and, in turn, reducing conflict that makes collective action difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. Second, social group status serves as a crucial means in which citizens relate to their political representatives. This type of representation is often termed as 'descriptive' meaning that a citizen is more (less) adequately 'represented' if a larger (smaller) proportion of the political elite belong to the same social group as them. Third, and perhaps most importantly, descriptive representation is often argued to lead to substantive representation in the sense that policies decided upon by the political elite will have a definite impact upon the relative fortunes of a given social group. I have discussed this using the term 'descriptive-substantive link' that has been widely assumed, while not always explicitly stated, in the previous literature.[2]

The chapters in this thesis each have sought to answer different yet theoretically related questions by employing quantitative analysis on time-series cross-sectional data. How does social and political inequality between men and women impact the probability of transition to democracy from dictatorship? How does economic inequality and development determine the level of authoritarian influence in the politics of countries after transition to democracy occurs? How does demographic inequality between ethnic groups translate into individual attitudes toward democracy? In chapter 3, I demonstrate that as women become more civilly empowerment relative to men, the probability of transition from autocracy to democracy increases whereas when women become more politically empowered, the probability decreases. In chapter 4, I demonstrate that as the relative power of the middle class increases, relative authoritarian influence in the executive politics of post-transition democracies decreases. In chapter 5, I demonstrate that when the size of the ethnic group to which an individual belongs decreases they attach greater salience to the liberal and associational principles of democracy when compared to the popular principle of democracy. Conversely, I

[2]Forman-Rabinovici and Sommer 2019.

demonstrate that group size does not predict whether or not an individual will express support for democracy.

The empirical approach taken is advantageous in the sense that I have either relied upon a globally representative sample of countries for my analysis and, in the case of chapter 5, have drawn from nationally representative samples of individuals in Sub-Saharan Africa. As a result, the external validity of my findings is arguably high. Furthermore, this thesis has relied upon WhoGov, an original data set that contains bibliographic information on the largest number of political elite across the world and over time.[3] In doing so, I have been able to create metrics that intuitively capture the political phenomena under investigation in this thesis. However, a disadvantage of using observational data is endogeneity via omitted variable bias. As a result, I stress that my results should not be interpreted causally but are, rather, contingent upon the model and control specifications employed. Where possible, I have employed a variety of fixed effects specifications to control for unit invariant factors that may also predict the outcome under analysis. However, this does not completely eliminate the possibility that an unaccounted for confounding variable predicts both the outcome in question and the variables used to predict the outcome.

6.2 Policy implications for proponents of democratization

Political scientists tend to operate from a common assumption that democracy is preferable to dictatorship. In a widely circulated critique of Donald Trump's election campaign organized by the American Political Science Association, for example, the signatories - who are among the most influential scholars in the field of democratization - argued from the shared "conviction" that democracy is normatively preferable to dictatorship.[4] Writing a thesis that explores how social groups make sense of political regimes has served to reinforce this general consensus in my own mind. In general,

[3] Nyrup and Bramwell 2019.
[4] https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B7l0lh4nmE3OSkpCWjJJNGVoNXc/view

the history of dictatorship is one where power and the benefits accrued from power are shared among a small subset of the population on the basis of social group membership. Only in dictatorships such as Saudi Arabia were women, until recently, banned from running for office.[5] Indeed, according to WhoGov, not a single female has been assigned a position of executive power in the country. While, in this regard, Saudi Arabia is the worst offender of women's rights, other monarchical dictatorships such as Brunei and Qatar have similarly abysmal track records. Other forms of dictatorship such as military or one-party rule have either, in the case of the former, wholly locked out women from positions of executive power or, in the case of the latter, have provided access that does not afford them any meaningful autonomy to advocate for policies that benefit women. In continents such as Europe and Latin America, dictatorships typically served to perpetuate the interests of the aristocracy and the agrarian elite that they maintained through repression of the middle and working classes. While literature on democratization has typically focused on vertical struggles between different social classes, a growing literature discusses the role that horizontal struggles between ethnic groups play in shaping outcomes in the field. In cases such as South Africa and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), for instance, ethnicity expressed in terms of race was one of the key attributes that shaped opposition to the political status quo.

The history of democracy is not without its share of exclusivity and injustice. Athenian democracy excluded individuals on the basis of gender, class and ethnicity.[6] From its modern rebirth in Western Europe and North America, a similarly small share of white, property-owning males constituted the entirety of the suffrage (selectorate) and the political elite (winning coalition). The United States - by many measures the first democracy to emerge in the modern era - political freedom for citizens existed in tandem with slavery of African Americans and genocide of Native Americans. What makes democracy distinct, and thus normatively preferable, to dictatorship, however, is its ability to incorporate hitherto disenfranchised social groups. Before the advent of universal suffrage, these milestones included expansion of the suffrage to include

[5] Female candidates were allowed to run in the Saudi Arabia's local elections in 2015.
[6] Osborne 2010.

women and non-white minorities. While earlier democratic theorists such as John Locke, Adam Smith and David Hume advocated regimes with, to adopt a Dahlian parlance, high contestation and low participation, later theorists such as James Mill (father of John Stuart Mill) began to argue for polyarchies - regimes that married high contestation with high participation.[7] Furthermore, regimes that upheld civil liberties such as freedom of speech and association while limiting suffrage provided autonomy for individuals from disenfranchised social groups to advocate for their rights and form coalitions with like-minded individuals from enfranchised social groups. The historical danger of authoritarianism, conversely, lies in its tendency to deteriorate from relative inclusivity to exclusivity. As authoritarian leaders accrue more time in office the balance of power between themselves and the rest of the political elite tend to skew in the direction of the former.[8] Over time, leaders are able to exclude individuals with ever greater impunity until the composition of the political elite consists purely of loyalists. While this process is often described absent of any social context, several scholars have argued that the social identity of the political elite tends to descriptively represent a narrower and narrower subset of the overall population as dictatorships consolidate.[9] Without the check on power that free and fair elections entail, this process of ever greater exclusion may continue to go unchallenged.

This thesis generally echoes the consensus in the field that democracies are normatively preferable to dictatorships. However, it does not do so uncritically particularly in light of developments that have occurred in the post Cold War era. Today, the distinction between countries that are democracies and dictatorships are not as well-defined as they were in past. During the Cold War, polarization existed between exclusivist or 'closed' autocracies and (relatively) inclusivist or 'liberal' democracies. Today, however, the lines between democracy and dictatorship have become more blurred for two reasons. First, autocracies rely increasingly upon elections to survive. As a result, they need to rely more upon popular support than the autocracies of the past. This has led

[7] Dahl 1971; Ansell and Samuels 2014.
[8] De Mesquita et al. 2005; Svolik 2012.
[9] Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Roessler 2011.

many autocracies toward descriptively representing a more diverse range social groups in politics. In Chapter 3, I demonstrate that both democracies and autocracies have made consistently greater efforts over time to include women in cabinet appointments. Today, however, some of the most politically empowered women (in descriptive terms) in the world exist under competitive authoritarian regimes.[10] Furthermore, in countries such as Bolivia, one-party dominance has led to greater descriptive representation for indigenous ethnic groups that, before the 2006 victory of the Movement for Socialism, were poorly represented by the democratic elite.[11] In Chapter 5, I further demonstrate that so-called minority dictatorships have increasingly dwindled over time in frequency. Instead both democratic and autocratic elites descriptively represent a larger proportion of the total population. Second, many of the world's emerging democracies have either not jettisoned their authoritarian past or have slid backward into dictatorship. In Chapter 4, I argue that authoritarian influence in emerging democracies is the product of predatory, not popular legacies. Authoritarian elites that govern over periods of low economic growth and prosperity tend to capture a larger share of executive positions after a country transitions. Previous work further suggests that the beneficiaries of authoritarian rule use the constitutional protections of democracy to reduce the prospects of new social actors being represented by the political elite.[12] While some scholars theorise the risk of democratic collapse as coming from a disgruntled economic elite,[13] others argue that the primary actors who seek dictatorship today are populist politicians who often argue on behalf of an aggrieved social group.[14]

While many scholars have framed the threat of electoral authoritarianism as one of valence - the ability to deliver economic benefits - an equally important threat exists in terms of social inclusivity. If the new autocratic elite descriptively and substantively represent a large proportion of the population, the popular demand for democratic change may be reduced. In Chapter 3, I demonstrate that transition to democracy is

[10]Bauer 2012; Blankenship and Kubicek 2018.
[11]Wolff 2018.
[12]Albertus and Menaldo 2018.
[13]Houle 2009.
[14]Haggard and Kaufman 2012.

most likely when women are civilly empowered yet politically underprivileged. When a "critical mass" of women is reached in the executive, authoritarian regimes are less likely to transition to democracy. Strikingly, this threshold is low - when 15 percent or more of cabinet positions are assigned to women then autocracies are significantly less likely to transition. Autocrats thus do not even have to achieve gender equality when assigning political power, instead they can hold onto power for longer by providing apparently moderate concessions for women. On the other hand, this low threshold also reflects a broader reality that countries, regardless of regime type, under-promote women to positions of political influence relative to their proportion of the population. Using the WhoGov data set, I demonstrate in chapter 2 that only 19 percent of core cabinet positions were assigned to women on average in 2016. Furthermore, women tend to be assigned positions of lower prestige when compared to their male counterparts. The problem this chapter engages with is convincing ordinary women living under dictatorship that democratization is in their interests when they are already descriptively represented and when challenging the regime is associated with risks to their livelihood. Furthermore, women are entitled to ask whether democracy can perform better in terms of delivering superior representation given that both political regimes tend to under-promote women.

While this thesis engages with countries that have experienced dictatorship after the Second World War, it is worth considering the current politics of inclusivity/exclusivity in so-called advanced industrial democracies and how this plays into the perceptions of ordinary people in dictatorships. At the time of writing, the presidential nominee for the Democratic Party Joe Biden has won the presidential election in the United States. His predecessor Donald Trump, however, successfully ran for office despite exhibiting many of the hallmarks of social exclusivity such as xenophobia, misogyny and religious intolerance. While the election of Joe Biden and Kamala Harris - the latter being the first vice president of mixed race heritage in the history of the country - serves as a repudiation of sorts for the social exclusion espoused by Trump, there is no guarantee that the divisiveness of Trump's presidency will be expunged from America's political

history. The experience of the United States is indicative of a global trend in populism, an ideology which bifurcates society into a virtuous 'people' and a malignant 'elite'.[15] Current statistical analysis further suggests that while the electoral success of radical right wing parties is limited in Western Europe, the threat of these parties tends to drive traditional conservative and labour parties towards more cultural protectionist and anti-immigrant policies.[16] The increased salience of cultural protectionism and intolerance exhibited in Western societies may further play into fears both among the authoritarian elite and the social groups they represent that a transition to democracy may bring with it further bitter division and conflict which, at present, is nullified by keeping a 'benevolent dictator' in power. Furthermore, if the autocratic elite can claim to descriptively represent a diverse cross-section of the population, they will be able to leverage this justification with greater authority vis-à-vie their democratic opponents.

The social inclusivity challenge can be posed from a different angle: to what extent does transition to democracy change the social composition of the political elite? Furthermore, does democracy result in the empowerment of new political elites who can better represent the interests of hitherto marginalized social groups? Chapter 4 brings to bear new data on the proportion of cabinet appointments assigned to affiliates of authoritarian rule. It finds that authoritarian influence in democracy is a function of the predatory legacies of the previous regime. In particular, it finds that the current crop of authoritarian successor parties tend to rely upon a similar support base - namely the aristocracy or agrarian elite - to that of their historical equivalents during the first wave of democratization in Western Europe.[17] Previous scholars in the transitions literature demonstrate that the authoritarian elite often play a substantial and deleterious role in designing the institutions of democracy that serves to limit competition for office at the expense of new challengers that may better represent a broader and more diverse proportion of the population.[18] While some scholars portray democracy as a regime that promotes the interests of the so-called median voter, others argue just the opposite

[15]Mudde and Kaltwasser 2014.
[16]Abou-Chadi and Krause 2018.
[17]Ziblatt 2017.
[18]Albertus and Menaldo 2018.

- that democracy can be used by the previous authoritarian elite to lock in (by means of constitutional design) the advantages of those who have privilege to the detriment of those who have none.[19]

How therefore do proponents of democracy best proceed? The chapters in this thesis engage with democracy as a procedure for selecting political elites. However, as chapters 1 and 5 demonstrate, individuals often use social identity to attach grander theoretical principles of what democracy, as a procedure, should accomplish. The popular principle suggests that democracy should empower the majority not only through making them a decisive voice in elections, but through pursuing policies that are in their socio-economic interests. Historically, the popular principle has been a bitter pill for autocrats to swallow as it entails handing power to "the people" who, the former assume, will use their newfound power to punish their stakeholders.[20] In cases such as Syria, the spectre of persecution of the minority Alawite community by the majority Sunni Arab community may serve as one of the primary motivations for autocrats such as Bashar al-Assad to hold onto power regardless of the costs associated with repression.[21] An over-reliance on the popular principle thus seems misguided. Indeed, the public intellectual Fareed Zakaria lamented that American foreign policy tended to support "unconstrained democracy" that was different from its own system of checks and balances that constrained the ability of elected officials to persecute minorities on behalf of majorities.[22]

However, contra Zakaria, this thesis engages with the idea that the liberal principle of democracy is, in fact, a double-edged sword. On the one hand, democracies can and often do provide superior legal protections against predation by the state when compared to dictatorship.[23] Chapter 4 demonstrates that many of the transitions that occurred during the third wave have often resulted in the political empowerment of the urban middle classes. On the other hand, when the urban middle classes are not

[19]Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Albertus and Menaldo 2018.
[20]Meier 1994.
[21]Bormann 2017.
[22]Zakaria 2007.
[23]Ansell and Samuels 2014.

empowered by transition, constitutional protections and direct involvement in political affairs by the authoritarian old guard are often used by the beneficiaries of authoritarian rule to lock in their economic privilege and prevent any form of downward distribution from occurring.[24]

A third way of viewing democracy is the associational principle - that democracies should find non-violent compromises between privileged and marginalized social groups. While a large literature debates the merits and demerits of power-sharing and federalism,[25] the associational principle further suggests a fundamental change in political culture at the societal level. On the one hand, privileged social groups need to accept a form of downgrading whether that comes in the form of losing their monopoly on political power or accepting that a non-zero level of redistribution will need to occur. On the other hand, marginalized social groups need to accept that there will be limits to what they can achieve within a democratic framework, meaning they cannot use their newfound power to soak the rich or punish a hated ethnic minority. While this literature often revolves around the size and density of civil society organizations,[26] this thesis suggests that we should pay greater heed to social inclusivity in civil society. Chapter 3, in particular, echoes the work of previous scholars that the civil empowerment of women is of paramount importance for promoting democratic change.[27] In particular, societies with patriarchal social norms may tend to pose a greater threat to the authoritarian elite who may, in such settings, be more reluctant to accept democratic change.

This thesis does not hold any definitive answers to which principle of democracy should be promoted. Indeed, in chapter 5, I demonstrate that each principle of democracy is salient in the minds of ordinary people depending on individual and group level characteristics. Instead, it tries to develop the idea that procedural democracy can have multiple and seemingly contradictory implications in regards to how benefits are

[24] Albertus and Menaldo 2018.

[25] Examples include Lijphart 2002; Horowitz 2002; Cheeseman and Tendi 2010; Horowitz 2014; Graham, Miller, and Strøm 2017.

[26] Examples include Berman 1997; Putnam 2000.

[27] Hudson et al. 2012.

distributed in society. The popular principle implies that the marginalized become privileged and vice versa. The liberal principle implies either fundamental change or stultifying stability. The association principle implies that both the privileged and marginalized can reap the benefits of compromise. This thesis suggests that proponents of democratization need to understand how inequality understood not only in terms of class but across a wider range of social identities shapes how political actors think about democracy when formulating policy.

6.3 Coding the Social Identity of the Political Elite with WhoGov

This thesis has presented and utilized WhoGov which is currently the largest publicly available data set that contains disaggregated data on cabinet members. As it stands, WhoGov represents a critical opportunity for scholars interested in studying the social identity of the political elite.

The subject of women's empowerment in politics is one that has drawn increased attention from empirical social scientists. Using WhoGov, we are not only able to understand the raw proportion of cabinet appointments assigned to women but can construct more nuanced measures that capture the extent of their participation in different ways. WhoGov contains standardized coding of portfolios, assigning them a level of prestige. While prestige may strike some scholars as ultimately arbitrary, the inherent flexibility of WhoGov can enable scholars to arrive at alternative systems of measuring prestige that more adequately fit their theoretical priors. Mona Krook and Diana O'Brien have persuasively argued that we need to focus not just on whether or not women participate in the executive but whether such participation is substantive and not "token."[28] In chapter 2, we demonstrate that while the proportion of cabinet appointments assigned to women has been increasing, women, when empowered, tend to be assigned positions that have low prestige according to the classification used.

[28]Krook and O'Brien 2012.

Scholars such as Tiffany Barnes and Diana O'Brien have taken a different approach by focusing on specific portfolios - in this case, defense - which have traditionally been assigned to men.[29] With WhoGov, equivalent variables based on other high prestige positions such as foreign, financial or interior ministries fairly straightforward to code meaning that papers equivalent to Barnes and O'Brien can be written with greater ease.

Political economists have focused on class as a critical social cleavage that divides those on either side on the merits or demerits of democracy. Generally, the conflict produced by this social cleavage has been operationalized in one of two ways. First, and most predominantly, scholars have looked at economic inequality both in terms of income and wealth as a latent social condition which implies an underlying level of distributional conflict. Economic inequality has several interpretations. It can, to some, mean the monopolization of wealth that comes as a result of extractive institutions while, for others, it can mean the emergence of new economic actors that may make democratization possible.[30] Second, recent projects such as V-Dem have begun to understand what they term political inequality meaning the extent to which socially privileged identity groups have a monopoly on political decision making. This measure is designed to capture both descriptive and substantive dimensions of political inequality and, as a result, constitutes a significant step forward.[31] WhoGov can further contribute to our understanding of descriptive representation by incorporating information that is pertinent to social class such as professional background before politics (if any), educational qualifications and family background. Furthermore, WhoGov can help scholars arrive at more nuanced understandings of prestige that take into account the economic value of each portfolio on a country-by-country basis. In doing so, we can understand the extent to which privileged social classes maintain a descriptive dominance in positions of economic power.

Political sociologists, by contrast, have focused on the role ethnic cleavages play in

[29] Barnes and O'Brien 2018.
[30] Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Ansell and Samuels 2014.
[31] Coppedge et al. 2019.

shaping the politics of democratic change. Traditionally, these scholars have focused on ethnic diversity much in the same way as political economists have focused on economic inequality - as a latent social condition that is indicative of a certain level of social conflict.[32] However, a new wave of scholarship has sought to understand how communal conflict is based not on diversity per se, but over how diversity is translated into inequality of representation.[33] While some scholars have focused on minorities at risk whereas others have constructed alternative (and more meaningful) fractionalization indices, the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data set achieves the best of both worlds and, as such, provides the most comprehensive measure of descriptive access to executive power at the level of the ethnic group.[34] However, coding ethnic identity at the level of individual elites can provide scholars with a more fine grained picture of descriptive access to executive power. Clionadh Raleigh and Daniel Wigmore-Shepherd have recently created the African Cabinet and Political Elite Data Project (ACPED) which compiles monthly data on the ethnic identity of cabinet members in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1997 until the present. The authors argue that the exclusivist nature of African cabinets has been overstated.[35] However, as chapter 5 demonstrates, minority dictatorships have become more of a rarity especially during the time the ACPED begins. I propose that WhoGov can add value both in terms of providing superior historical and country coverage to understand how the relative exclusivity/inclusivity of cabinets throughout the world have changed over time.

WhoGov further offers information on political party membership. Scholars focusing on the 'historical turn' in comparative politics have argued that parties provide a crucial means through which the interests of different social identity groups are aggregated.[36] By including party information on members of the political elite, the potential of WhoGov to code information on different varieties of political party is extremely high. In chapter 4, I used coding on authoritarian successor parties created by Michael

[32]Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004.
[33]Chandra and Wilkinson 2008.
[34]Gurr 1993; Vogt et al. 2015.
[35]Raleigh and Wigmore-Shepherd 2020.
[36]Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010.

Miller in conjunction with WhoGov to calculate a measure of authoritarian influence in executive power.[37] Similar approaches can be used for scholars interested in studying the extent to which left-right, religious or ethnic-based political parties, to name a few, have access to power. It is the hope of myself and the rest of the WhoGov team that significant opportunities exist for researchers to extend the temporal and cross-sectional richness of the data and, in doing so, come to a deeper understanding of who rules and, consequently, who is descriptively and substantively represented in politics.

[37] Miller 2020.

Appendix A

Chapter 2 Appendix

A.1 Codebook for the within-country data set

year Year. We are using July for all years apart from 1966, where data was only available for September and 1970, where we are using January instead of July.

country_isocode The country's alpha-3 ISO code.

country_name Country name.

id A row id.

position The person's position in the cabinet.

name The person's name. The names have been standardized across years.

title The person's title, such as Dr., Gen. or Lt. Gen. The titles are standardized, so the most frequent title used in the original dataset for the given person is used across all year for the same person. It should be noted that we have not done any extra checks on this variable, and solely have relied on the information provided in the "Chief of State And Cabinet Members Of Foreign Governments"-directory. The coding is based on national customs. For example, some countries consistently address people with a PhD as 'Dr.', while this is not the case in other countries.

gender The person's gender. We have primarily coded the gender based on the person's name. However, in some cases we have looked up the person to confirm their gender or relied on country experts.

birthyear The person's year of birth. We have added year of birth when the data was available. However, in some cases we would only have the age of a person at a given point in time. Here, we have subtracted the age from the year.

deadyear The person's year of death. If the person is still alive at the time when the data was gathered, the entry is A (2020).

party The abbreviation for the person's party affiliation. For further information on this variable, see Appendix A.7.

party_english The name of the party in English.

party_otherlanguage The name of the party in the local language or other commonly used language in the country. We have prioritized languages using the Latin alphabet.

core The variable takes the value 1 if the person is perceived as being a core member of the cabinet. We consider cabinet ministers, prime ministers, presidents, vice presidents, vice prime ministers, members of the politburo and members of a military junta as core positions. The variable is coded manually on a country by country basis.

minister The variable takes the value 1 if the person is a cabinet minister. Deputy and junior ministers are not coded as being cabinet ministers. The variable is coded manually on a country by country basis.

leader The variable takes the value 1 if the person is coded as being the de facto leader for the given country in the given year. We have relied on Archigos to code the leader (2009).[1]

classification A classification of the position. See appendix A.6 for further information.

portfolio_1 A standard category of the portfolio. See appendix A.6 for further information.

prestige_1 The prestige of portfolio_1. See appendix A.6 for further information.

portfolio_2 A standard category of the portfolio if the position includes several portfolios. See appendix A.6 for further information.

prestige_2 The prestige of portfolio_2. See appendix A.6 for further information.

portfolio_3 A standard category of the portfolio if the position includes several portfolios. See appendix A.6 for further information.

[1]We have decided to deviate from Archigos in a few instances. These are: Romania after 1990. Finland after 2000, Croatia after 2000, Portugal after 1976, Bhutan in the period 1998-2007, Syria from 1966-1970, Timor Leste (2002-2018), Papua New Guinea (2011, mistake in Archigos), Somalia (1966-1969, parliamentary system), Albania (1992-1997, parliamentary system).

prestige_3 The prestige of portfolio_3. See appendix A.6 for further information.

portfolio_4 A standard category of the portfolio if the position includes several portfolios. See appendix A.6 for further information.

prestige_4 The prestige of portfolio_4. See appendix A.6 for further information.

m_finance The variable takes the value 1 if the person is minister of finance.

m_defense The variable takes the value 1 if the person is the minister of defense.

m_agriculture The variable takes the value 1 if the person is minister of agriculture.

m_foreignaffairs The variable takes the value 1 if the person is minister of foreign affairs.

A.2 Codebook for the between-country data set

year Year. We are using July for all years apart from 1966, where data was only available for September and 1970, where we are using January instead of July.

country_isocode The country's alpha-3 ISO code.

country_name Country name.

n_total Number of entries for the country in the dataset. This number includes unoccupied positions and multiple positions held by the same persons.

n_individuals Number of unique persons in the cabinet. This number exclude unoccupied positions and positions, which are held by the same person.

n_core Number of core members in cabinet. This number exclude unoccupied positions, positions, which are held by the same person, and posts, which are not considered core positions.

n_minister Number of cabinet ministers. This number only include cabinet ministers.

leader Name of the person coded as being the de facto leader of the country.

leader_start_date Day the leader enters office. We have relied on Archigos to code the date (2009).

leader_end_date Day the leader exits office. We have relied on Archigos to code the date (2009).

leader_party Party of the leader.

leaderexperience$_{c}$*ontinuous* The number of years the person has been leader of the country in a row. Thus, it starts over if the leader is removed. The count starts at 1, when the leader first appear as leader in the dataset. Therefore, the measure is imprecise for leaders, who came to power before 1966.

leaderexperience$_{c}$*ontinuous* The number of years the person has been leader of the country in total. The count starts at 1, when the leader first appear as leader in the dataset. Therefore, the measure is imprecise for leaders, who came to power before 1966.

n_female_total The number of women in n_total.

n_female_core The number of women in n_core.

n_female_minister The number of women in n_ministers.

n_militarytitle_total The number of people in n.total with a military title. It should be noted that we have not done any extra checks on this variable, and solely have relied on the information provided in the "Chief of State And Cabinet Members Of Foreign Governments" directory. The information is based on national customs. Thus, in some countries military titles are consistently used, while this not the case in other countries, and we therefore encourage researchers to be cautious when using this variable.

n_militarytitle_core The number of people in n_core with a military title. It should be noted that we have not done any extra checks on this variable, and solely have relied on the information provided in the "Chief of State And Cabinet Members Of Foreign Governments" directory. The information is based on national customs. Thus, in some countries military titles are consistently used, while this not the case in other countries, and we therefore encourage researchers to be cautious when using this variable.

n_militarytitle_minister The number of people in n.ministers with a military title. It should be noted that we have not done any extra checks on this variable, and solely have relied on the information provided in the "Chief of State And Cabinet Members Of Foreign Governments" directory. The information is based on national customs. Thus, in some countries military titles are consistently used, while this not the case in other countries, and we therefore encourage researchers to be cautious when using this variable.

average_total The average tenure for people in n_total.

average_core The average tenure for people in n_core.

average_minister The average tenure for people in n_ministers.

retention_rate_total The share of people in n_total, who were in n.total the previous year.

retention_rate_core The share of people in n_core, who were in n_core in the previous year.

retention_rate_minister The share of people in n_ministers, who where in n_ministers the previous year.

retention_rateadj_total The share of people in n_total, who were in n_total the previous year. This measure is adjusted for an expansion of the size of n_total, so n_total stays constant and the retention rate is therefore not influenced by an expansion of the cabinet.

retention_rateadj_core The share of people in n_ministers, who where in n.ministers the previous year. This measure is adjusted for an expansion of the size of n_core, so n.total stays constant and the retention rate is therefore not influenced by an expansion of the cabinet.

retention_rateadj_minister The share of people in n_ministers, who where in n_ministers the previous year. This measure is adjusted for an expansion of the size of n_minister, so n_total stays constant and the retention rate is therefore not influenced by an expansion of the cabinet.

age_total Average age for people in n_total.

age_core Average age for people in n_core.

age_minister Average age for people in n_minister.

age_share Share of n_total, where the age is coded.

n_party Number of parties represented in the government.

party_share Share of members in n.total (excluding UN representative, Ambassadors and Central Bank governors), where party is coded.

m_finance The name of the minister of finance.

m_agriculture The name of the minister of agriculture.

m_defense The name of the minister of defense.

m_foreignaffairs The name of the minister of foreign affairs.

govern_name The name of the government based on Döring (2019) or Bértoa (2020).

govern_start_date Day the government enters office based on Döring (2019) or Bértoa (2020).

govern_end_date Day the government exits office based Döring (2019) or Bértoa (2020).

system_category The regimetype as classified by Cheibub et al. (2010) and updated by Bjørnskov and Rode (2018).

A.3 Descriptive Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
n_total	8,057	28.13	13.09	1	146
n_individuals	8,057	25.50	11.64	1	133
n_core	8,057	22.08	9.26	0	109
n_minister	8,057	18.11	7.47	0	65
leaderexperience_continuous	8,057	6.83	6.96	1	46
leaderexperience_total	8,057	7.16	7.04	0	46
n_female_total	8,057	2.17	2.60	0	21
n_female_core	8,057	1.85	2.24	0	15
n_female_minister	8,057	1.66	2.12	0	15
n_militarytitle_total	8,057	1.56	3.68	0	65
n_militarytitle_core	8,057	1.44	3.18	0	38
n_militarytitle_minister	8,057	1.06	2.56	0	35
average_total	8,053	4.18	2.38	1.00	18.50
average_core	8,049	4.47	2.66	1.00	18.50
average_minister	8,020	3.96	2.37	1.00	18.12
retention_rate_total	8,057	0.70	0.30	0	1
retention_rate_core	8,049	0.70	0.31	0.00	1.00
retention_rate_minister	8,020	0.67	0.33	0.00	1.00
retention_rateadj_total	7,880	0.73	0.28	0.00	1.00
retention_rateadj_core	7,872	0.72	0.30	0.00	1.00
retention_rateadj_minister	7,843	0.69	0.31	0.00	1.00
age_total	4,471	54.05	6.47	28.00	82.00
age_core	4,459	54.00	6.62	28.00	82.00
age_minister	4,179	52.59	6.20	25.67	78.00
age_share	8,057	0.38	0.43	0	1
n_party	7,996	2.16	2.05	0.00	18.00
party_share	8,057	0.94	0.16	0.00	1.00

A.4 List of Countries

ISO	Country name	Number of years	First year	Last year	%-party	%-age
AFG	Afghanistan	47	1966	2018	0.91	0.00
AGO	Angola	42	1975	2016	1.00	0.00
ALB	Albania	51	1966	2016	0.99	0.00
ARE	United Arab Emirates	45	1972	2016	1.00	0.20
ARG	Argentina	53	1966	2018	1.00	0.93
ARM	Armenia	25	1992	2016	0.76	0.00
AUS	Australia	53	1966	2018	1.00	1.00
AUT	Austria	53	1966	2018	1.00	0.99
AZE	Azerbaijan	25	1992	2016	0.96	0.81
BDI	Burundi	51	1966	2016	0.94	0.00
BEL	Belgium	53	1966	2018	0.98	0.98
BEN	Benin	51	1966	2016	0.72	0.00
BFA	Burkina Faso	51	1966	2016	0.99	0.00
BGD	Bangladesh	45	1972	2016	0.93	0.00
BGR	Bulgaria	50	1966	2016	0.98	0.38
BHR	Bahrain	46	1971	2016	1.00	0.38
BIH	Bosnia & Herzegovina	25	1992	2016	0.79	0.00
BLR	Belarus	25	1992	2016	1.00	0.07
BOL	Bolivia	51	1966	2016	0.90	0.05
BRA	Brazil	51	1966	2016	0.97	0.98
BRN	Brunei	33	1984	2016	1.00	0.00
BTN	Bhutan	46	1971	2016	1.00	0.62
BWA	Botswana	50	1967	2016	1.00	0.78
CAF	Central African Republic	51	1966	2016	0.94	0.00
CAN	Canada	53	1966	2018	1.00	1.00
CHE	Switzerland	53	1966	2018	1.00	1.00
CHL	Chile	53	1966	2018	0.98	0.82
CHN	China	51	1966	2016	1.00	0.98
CIV	Côte dIvoire	51	1966	2016	1.00	0.00
CMR	Cameroon	51	1966	2016	0.98	0.00
COD	Congo - Kinshasa	53	1966	2018	0.94	0.00
COG	Congo - Brazzaville	51	1966	2016	0.96	0.00
COL	Colombia	53	1966	2018	0.99	0.78
COM	Comoros	51	1966	2016	0.54	0.00
CPV	Cape Verde	43	1976	2018	0.88	0.00

CRI	Costa Rica	53	1966	2018	0.91	0.76
CUB	Cuba	53	1966	2018	1.00	0.05
CYP	Cyprus	53	1966	2018	0.98	0.81
CZE	Czech Republic (incl. Czechoslovakia)	51	1966	2016	1.00	0.88
DDR	East Germany	24	1966	1989	1.00	0.93
DEU	Germany	53	1966	2018	1.00	1.00
DJI	Djibouti	40	1977	2016	0.95	0.00
DNK	Denmark	54	1966	2019	1.00	1.00
DOM	Dominican Republic	53	1966	2018	0.51	0.00
DVN	North Vietnam	10	1966	1975	1.00	0.87
DZA	Algeria	51	1966	2016	0.88	0.00
ECU	Ecuador	51	1966	2016	0.84	0.00
EGY	Egypt	51	1966	2016	1.00	0.06
ERI	Eritrea	24	1993	2016	1.00	0.49
ESP	Spain	51	1966	2016	1.00	1.00
EST	Estonia	27	1992	2018	0.99	0.87
ETH	Ethiopia	51	1966	2016	1.00	0.00
FIN	Finland	53	1966	2018	1.00	0.99
FJI	Fiji	46	1971	2016	0.97	0.00
FRA	France	53	1966	2018	1.00	1.00
GAB	Gabon	51	1966	2016	0.99	0.18
GBR	United Kingdom	53	1966	2018	1.00	1.00
GEO	Georgia	25	1992	2016	0.98	0.00
GHA	Ghana	51	1966	2016	0.95	0.00
GIN	Guinea	51	1966	2016	0.94	0.00
GMB	Gambia	51	1966	2016	1.00	0.00
GNB	Guinea-Bissau	42	1975	2016	0.90	0.00
GNQ	Equatorial Guinea	49	1968	2016	0.98	0.27
GRC	Greece	51	1966	2016	0.89	0.68
GRD	Grenada	45	1974	2018	0.99	0.11
GTM	Guatemala	51	1966	2016	0.36	0.00
GUY	Guyana	51	1966	2016	1.00	0.00
HND	Honduras	51	1966	2016	0.64	0.03
HRV	Croatia	25	1992	2016	0.99	0.81
HTI	Haiti	51	1966	2016	0.87	0.00
HUN	Hungary	51	1966	2016	1.00	0.79
IDN	Indonesia	51	1966	2016	0.92	0.95
IND	India	53	1966	2018	0.99	0.97

IRL	Ireland	53	1966	2018	1.00	0.99
IRN	Iran	51	1966	2016	0.99	0.00
IRQ	Iraq	51	1966	2016	0.99	0.16
ISL	Iceland	53	1966	2018	1.00	0.96
ISR	Israel	53	1966	2018	1.00	1.00
ITA	Italy	53	1966	2018	1.00	1.00
JAM	Jamaica	53	1966	2018	1.00	0.33
JOR	Jordan	51	1966	2016	1.00	0.00
JPN	Japan	53	1966	2018	0.99	1.00
KAZ	Kazakhstan	25	1992	2016	0.80	0.69
KEN	Kenya	51	1966	2016	0.99	0.57
KGZ	Kyrgyzstan	25	1992	2016	0.83	0.10
KHM	Cambodia	51	1966	2016	1.00	0.00
KOR	South Korea	51	1966	2016	0.79	0.93
KWT	Kuwait	51	1966	2016	1.00	0.00
LAO	Laos	51	1966	2016	1.00	0.38
LBN	Lebanon	51	1966	2016	0.86	0.00
LBR	Liberia	51	1966	2016	1.00	0.02
LBY	Libya	51	1966	2016	1.00	0.18
LKA	Sri Lanka	51	1966	2016	0.93	0.00
LSO	Lesotho	50	1967	2016	1.00	0.00
LTU	Lithuania	27	1992	2018	0.99	0.98
LUX	Luxembourg	53	1966	2018	0.99	0.99
LVA	Latvia	27	1992	2018	0.99	0.94
MAR	Morocco	51	1966	2016	0.71	0.01
MDA	Moldova	25	1992	2016	0.85	0.79
MDG	Madagascar	51	1966	2016	1.00	0.00
MDV	Maldives	53	1966	2018	0.99	0.00
MEX	Mexico	53	1966	2018	0.99	0.96
MKD	Macedonia	22	1995	2016	1.00	0.74
MLI	Mali	51	1966	2016	0.96	0.00
MLT	Malta	53	1966	2018	1.00	0.79
MMR	Myanmar (Burma)	51	1966	2016	1.00	0.18
MNE	Montenegro	20	1997	2016	0.99	0.73
MNG	Mongolia	51	1966	2016	0.99	0.21
MOZ	Mozambique	42	1975	2016	1.00	0.04
MRT	Mauritania	51	1966	2016	0.97	0.08
MUS	Mauritius	53	1966	2018	0.95	0.00
MWI	Malawi	51	1966	2016	0.93	0.00

MYS	Malaysia	51	1966	2016	1.00	0.91
NAM	Namibia	27	1990	2016	1.00	0.96
NER	Niger	51	1966	2016	0.93	0.00
NGA	Nigeria	51	1966	2016	0.93	0.00
NIC	Nicaragua	51	1966	2016	0.77	0.17
NLD	Netherlands	53	1966	2018	1.00	0.98
NOR	Norway	53	1966	2018	0.99	0.99
NPL	Nepal	51	1966	2016	0.99	0.00
NZL	New Zealand	53	1966	2018	1.00	0.99
OMN	Oman	51	1966	2016	1.00	0.00
PAK	Pakistan	51	1966	2016	0.97	0.00
PAN	Panama	51	1966	2016	0.70	0.00
PER	Peru	51	1966	2016	0.99	0.74
PHL	Philippines	53	1966	2018	1.00	0.00
PNG	Papua New Guinea	43	1976	2018	0.80	0.00
POL	Poland	51	1966	2016	0.88	0.90
PRK	North Korea	53	1966	2018	1.00	0.32
PRT	Portugal	51	1966	2016	0.99	0.96
PRY	Paraguay	51	1966	2016	0.87	0.20
QAT	Qatar	46	1971	2016	1.00	0.29
ROU	Romania	51	1966	2016	1.00	0.87
RUS	Russia	25	1992	2016	0.97	0.99
RVN	South Vietnam	9	1966	1974	1.00	0.33
RWA	Rwanda	51	1966	2016	0.80	0.00
SAU	Saudi Arabia	53	1966	2018	1.00	0.58
SDN	Sudan	51	1966	2016	0.95	0.00
SEN	Senegal	51	1966	2016	0.96	0.00
SGP	Singapore	53	1966	2018	1.00	0.99
SLE	Sierra Leone	51	1966	2016	0.96	0.00
SLV	El Salvador	51	1966	2016	0.69	0.00
SOM	Somalia	51	1966	2016	0.56	0.00
SRB	Serbia	20	1997	2016	1.00	0.86
SSD	South Sudan	5	2012	2016	0.96	0.00
STP	São Tomé & Príncipe	44	1975	2018	0.91	0.00
SUN	Soviet Union	26	1966	1991	1.00	0.02
SUR	Suriname	40	1979	2018	0.89	0.00
SVK	Slovakia	24	1993	2016	1.00	0.92
SVN	Slovenia	25	1992	2016	0.99	0.98
SWE	Sweden	53	1966	2018	1.00	1.00

SWZ	Swaziland	48	1969	2016	1.00	0.00
SYR	Syria	51	1966	2016	1.00	0.02
TCD	Chad	51	1966	2016	0.82	0.00
TGO	Togo	51	1966	2016	0.98	0.00
THA	Thailand	51	1966	2016	0.86	0.00
TJK	Tajikistan	25	1992	2016	1.00	0.13
TKM	Turkmenistan	25	1992	2016	1.00	0.12
TLS	Timor-Leste	17	2002	2018	0.98	0.00
TTO	Trinidad & Tobago	53	1966	2018	0.98	0.18
TUN	Tunisia	51	1966	2016	1.00	0.05
TUR	Turkey	51	1966	2016	1.00	0.97
TWN	Taiwan	51	1966	2016	0.99	0.00
TZA	Tanzania	51	1966	2016	0.95	0.25
UGA	Uganda	51	1966	2016	0.88	0.00
UKR	Ukraine	25	1992	2016	0.98	0.69
URY	Uruguay	51	1966	2016	0.97	0.90
USA	United States	56	1963	2018	1.00	0.99
UZB	Uzbekistan	25	1992	2016	0.60	0.43
VEN	Venezuela	51	1966	2016	0.66	0.48
VNM	Vietnam	41	1976	2016	1.00	0.08
YEM	Yemen (incl. North Yemen)	51	1966	2016	0.79	0.00
YPR	South Yemen	22	1968	1989	1.00	0.21
YUG	Yugoslavia	37	1966	2002	1.00	0.00
ZAF	South Africa	51	1966	2016	0.97	0.80
ZMB	Zambia	51	1966	2016	1.00	0.00
ZWE	Zimbabwe	36	1981	2016	0.99	0.88

A.5 Description of the Data Gathering Process

Step 1: Gathering the main files

The dataset is based on the entries in the "Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments", which is published by The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The directory is identifying chiefs of state and cabinet members of foreign governments and the data has been prepared and collected by The Central Intelligence Agency. The directory is originally prepared for the use of US Government officials. The earliest available version dates back to 1966 and the directory has been updated at least half-yearly until today. The versions dating back to 2001 are freely available on the CIA's website through `https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-leaders-1/`. The versions before 2001 have been downloaded either from HathiTrust Digital Library or have been obtained through Freedom of Information Requests (FOI) to the CIA. We assembled all the files in a folder and ran an optical character recognition (OCR) on all the files using the text scanning program ABBYY.

Step 2: Creating the country datasets

After digitalizing the files we were able to read the files into R using the tm-package. We then ran a script, which we developed, on the files. First, the script singled out a country in a given year and provided a list of cabinet members for the given country. The script then looped over all the files in the folder, so we had a list of cabinet members for all years in a given country. Afterwards, the script ran a long number of checks, regular expressions and matching algorithms on the data to ensure that names and titles were written in a consistent way for the given country. For example, a fuzzy-matching algorithm compared all names and singled those out, which only differed by one letter, while another algorithm checked whether there were cases, where the first and last names were swapped. These could then be corrected if the difference was due to an error. All information in the files were entered using the Latin alphabet, and we therefore did not have to account for different types of writing systems.The data for the given country was then exported to a xlsx-file.

Step 3: Manual cleaning of the data

Although the automatized approach made the process of creating the data significantly easier, we still needed to conduct a thorough manual cleaning of the data to ensure that the entries were correct. While double checking the entries against other sources, we found that the CIA correctly identified the cabinet members at a given point in time in almost all instances. We found two exceptions, namely that the CIA has started updating the registry less frequently after 2013 for smaller countries. Here, we have

manually edited the data to make sure that it reflects the cabinet in July every year. Furthermore, we found a few instances, where the CIA did not remove the minister, when the ministry was closed or merged with another ministry. Here, we could use the party affiliation of ministers to single out ministers not belonging to the governing coalition and validate these entries. Despite the fact that the data from the CIA was very reliable, there were issues with around 15 percent of the entries for other reasons. Some of the scans were of poor quality and therefore not readable for the OCR. These entries were therefore added or corrected manually. Furthermore, we needed to ensure that the same person's name was spelled consistently over time. This might not be the case for at least four reasons. First, a person may change their name during the period of investigation.[2] Second, the original files were not consistent in whether they included middle names or not. Third, the same name may be spelled in different ways[3], and fourth, the OCR may have incorrectly loaded some characters.[4] As mentioned before, we used an algorithm to correct the names, where the inconsistency in the spelling was due to an obvious mistake. However, in many cases it is not possible to immediately know whether it is the same person or another person with a slightly different name. Thus, we looked up every person when in doubt about the entry and used alternative biographical information to triangulate the data. All entries were checked by two people to ensure that the entries were as accurate as possible. In addition, we had country experts and native speakers looking over many of the countries, and these found very few mistakes in the data. In the end, we therefore ended up with a list of members of the cabinet for all years in a given country.

Step 4: Classifying positions

The names of cabinet portfolios are notoriously idiosyncratic, and in the dataset we have 21,958 distinct names for positions in the dataset. We therefore classified the names of position in four different ways, enabling researchers easily to filter out specific members of the governing elite. We refer the reader to Appendix A.6 for a description of the approach used here.

Step 5: Adding background variables

The original files only contained the name of the position, the name and, in some cases, the title. The title can, for example, be Dr., Gen. or Lt. Gen. See the codebook in **??** for a further discussion of this variable. We used this dataset as a basis for adding

[2]For example, a number of African countries, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Equatorial Guinea, have seen an Africanization of names.

[3]This is especially the case for countries, which do not use a Latin alphabet. For example, Muhammed can be translated from Arabic in many different ways.

[4]For example, the OCR often reads "u" as "ii".

further variables, namely gender, party affiliation and year of birth/death. To code the background variables, we produced a script, which printed the list of people listed for every country. Using these lists, we added the background variables, and then merged the list with the original datasets to add these new variables.

We have primarily coded the gender based on the person's first name, where we developed a script, which matched the first names in our dataset against the information in the "World Gender Name Dictionary".[5] Using this method, we were able to classify the majority of the names. However, some names did not exist in the directory or were gender neutral. In these cases, we looked up the person and used biographical information to classify the name. Some countries, such as Nepal, China, Cambodia and Ethiopia, use names, which are not covered by the directory. In these cases, we got help from a person, who were familiar with the language and the country to code the names.[6] In addition, we looked up all ministers, who are classified as female to make sure no ministers mistakenly are coded as female. As a result, we might slightly underestimate the number of female ministers.

The year of birth/death is added by looking up the person on Google. In many cases, the information is readily available on Wikipedia. We find Wikipedia to be a trustful source for this type of information. In some cases, we had to rely on obituaries or newspaper articles. Obituaries and newspaper articles often only list the age of the person and not the year of birth. Here, we subtracted the age from the year the article is published, which may cause us to overestimate the age with up to a year in a few instances.

We also added party affiliation. The process for adding the party affiliation is described in Appendix A.7.

Step 6: Creating the cross national dataset

We transform the yearly data on members of cabinets into a cross-country panel dataset. We do so by running a script on top of the within country datasets. This code creates variables for each country for each year and then assembles the data into one large dataset. This dataset contains variables on, for example, the size of the cabinet in a given year, the share of female ministers, the retention rate for the given year, average experience of the cabinet ministers and the name of ministers, who possess important portfolios. The list of variables covered in the cross-country panel dataset can be seen in appendix A.2.

[5] Raffo 2016.

[6] These countries were Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Greece, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Nepal, Mauritius, Myanmar, Mongolia, South Korea, Thailand and Vietnam

A.6 Title Classifications

We have assigned 23 different classifications of the titles found in the raw data. The classifications were chosen in order to, at once, adequately simplify and represent the sheer organizational diversity found within different varieties of democracy and autocracy. While many classifications will be self-explanatory, we would like draw the reader's attention to specific coding decisions made in regard to leaders and their deputies, minister, members of juntas, monarchies and regional elites.

While many countries assign standard classifications for leaders and their deputies (e.g. President or Deputy Prime Minister), some countries and regimes tend to assign idiosyncratic classifications for their leaders such as Chancellor, Premier, Secretary General or Chairman. For these cases, we use the 'Chief of State' for the leaders and 'Deputy Chief of State' for leaders and their deputies. For all deputy leader classifications (a.k.a. Deputy Prime Minister, Vice President and Deputy Chief of State) we include second, third, fourth etc. deputies.

Ministers can either be of full rank or junior. We obviously identify which is which in a majority of cases by looking at whether the words 'deputy' or 'junior' are used. For Ministers/Secretaries of State, we ascertain whether or not they have full rank by looking at (a) the order in which they are listed in the raw data; (b) the stability of their portfolios throughout the period of observation and; (c) colonial history (e.g. many former French colonies will accord Ministers of State ministers of full-ministerial rank).

For military- or civilian-led juntas, we include 'Member (Ruling Group)' which is used to classify individuals who are named members of a Military Council or Politburo respectively. We have also included 'Governor (Military)' to classify military elites who have *named* governing competencies based on their titles alone.

For monarchies, we include a classification for Princes, Kings, Queens and Princesses called 'Member (Royal Family)'. It should be noted, however, that we only include these classifications based on titles alone and not on a comprehensive analysis of familial affiliations for all cabinet members. This is beyond the scope of our data just now but we hope to add this information in future iterations.

Finally, for decentralised political systems, we have included a classification for regional governors called 'Governor (Regional)' as and when they are included in the raw data. While we are confident that our dataset represents a relatively complete picture of executive politics at the *central* level we cannot make similar assumptions regarding equivalent politics at the *regional* level. Users are therefore encouraged to draw upon country-based expertise to determine whether or not these individuals should be included. Table A.3 presents a complete list of title classifications.

Table A.2: List of Portfolios

Portfolio	**Prestige**
Defense, Military & National Security	High
Foreign Relations	High
Government, Interior & Home Affairs	High
Finance, Budget & Treasury	High
Agriculture, Food, Fisheries & Livestock	Medium
Audit, Oversight & Internal Affairs	Medium
Civil Service	Medium
Communications & Information	Medium
Construction & Public Works	Medium
Correctional Services & Police	Medium
Culture & Heritage	Medium
Education, Training & Skills	Medium
Energy	Medium
Enterprises, Companies & Business	Medium
Environment	Medium
Executive & Legislative Relations	Medium
Foreign Economic Relations	Medium
General Economic Affairs	Medium
Health & Social Welfare	Medium
Housing	Medium
Industry & Commerce	Medium
Justice & Legal Affairs	Medium
Labor, Employment & Social Security	Medium
Local Government	Medium
Natural Resources	
Planning & Development	Medium
Political Reform	Medium
Properties & Buildings	Medium
Religion	Medium
Regional	Medium
Tax, Revenue & Fiscal Policy	Medium
Transport	Medium
Ageing & Elderly	Low
Children & Family	Low
Immigration & Emigration	Low
Minorities	Low
Science, Technology & Research	Low
Sports	Low
Tourism	Low
Veterans	Low
Without Portfolio	Low
Women	Low
Youth	Low
Other	

Table A.3: List of Classifications

Classification
Advisor
Ambassador to the United States
Assistant Advisor
Attorney General, Chief Justice or Legal Official
Chief of Staff
Chief of State
Deputy Chief of State
Deputy Director of Government Agency
Deputy Prime Minister
Director of Government Agency
Government Spokesperson
Governor (Central Bank)
Governor (General)
Governor (Military)
Governor (Regional)
Member, Royal Family
Member, Ruling Group
Minister (Full Rank)
Minister (Junior)
President
Prime Minister
Representative to the United Nations
Vice President

A.7 Adding party affiliation

First, we categorized all country years into six categories based on historical knowledge gained from various sources, including the Political Handbook of the World[7] (PHW), and existing datasets, namely Miller,[8] DPI[9] and Cheibub et al.[10] updated by Bjørnskov and Rode.[11] The six categories are as follows:

- Parliamentary
- Presidential
- Mixed democratic
- Autocracy with no parties in government
- Autocracy with one party in government
- Autocracy with multiple parties in government

Second, we added information about which parties, if any, should be represented in government for every country in every year. Here, we relied on ParlGov[12] for some countries[13], and year-by-year descriptions from the Political Handbook of the World for the remaining countries. We then combined this information with the individual-level datasets on cabinets and printed a file for every single country, where each cabinet member is represented once for every government they are represented in. Thus, the coding allows cabinet members to change party between governments.[14]

Third, we added individual-level party labels for all cabinet members over time for every government in the world since 1966.[15] To help us we hired a team of research assistants, which had language capabilities in Arabic, Danish, Farsi, French, German, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Mandarin, Norwegian, Romanian, Russian, Spanish, Swahili and Swedish. We were therefore able to access primary sources in most of the world's countries. For some country-years, we could confidently assume that all members of

[7] PHW is a reference handbook, which provides information on the major aspects of each country's government and political party system. PHW has been published yearly since 1927.

[8] Miller 2020.

[9] Beck et al. 2001.

[10] Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010.

[11] Bjørnskov and Rode 2018.

[12] Döring and Manow 2019.

[13] These countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium Bulgaria, Canada, Switzerland, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkey

[14] We found a few instances, where the cabinet member changes party within a government, mainly in Italy, and have adjusted for this as well.

[15] We did not add party information for Governors of the Central Bank, UN Representatives and Ambassadors to the US.

the government are independent.[16] In other cases, we could assume that all members of government belonged to the same party. [17] All decisions are noted below. However, for the vast majority of cabinet members, we could make no such assumptions and had to look every person up individually and add the party-label. We have relied on many thousands of sources to code the party affiliation, and providing a full list of sources is therefore not feasible. Instead, we have taken notes in the files for the respective countries. Yet, a few sources have been used extensively. These are the PHW, Europa Regional Surveys of the World,[18] Bertoa,[19] The Presidential Cabinets Project,[20] Wikileaks, LinkedIn, Historical Dictionaries for the various countries and Wikipedia.[21]

While coding, we had to make a number of decisions, which may be of relevance to readers. First, we had to decide when a person is affiliated with a party. Often politicians will have a relationship with, openly sympathize with a party or be nominated by a party, while not being member of the party. We try to only code "card carrying" members of the party, who, for example, have run for office on behalf of the party. Nonetheless, it is often impossible to know, which criteria other sources base their coding on and the exact date, which a person joined or left a party. We have done our utmost by reading through biographical information and by validating different sources against each other. Nonetheless, it can be discussed whether a person is a member of a party or not in some cases.

Second, we had to decide, which type of information to add. We have relied on the abbrevations and party names used in Party Facts.[22] Party Facts have harmonized party abbreviations across datasets. Thus, this new dataset can easily be merged with other major datasets such as ParlGov,[23] CLEA,[24] PolCon,[25] and the Manifesto Project.[26] Party Facts does not include information on all the parties we found, while coding party affiliation. The parties not found in Party Facts are usually minor parties in developing countries. Here, we used the most intuitive abbreviation and kept a separate list with abbreviations. Using Party Facts also solves another dilemma, namely whether to

[16]Some autocracies such as Saudi Arabia and Swaziland have a ban on political parties.

[17]Some countries such as Zaire (1967-1992) mandated that all adult citizens were members of the ruling party, while we code all members of the Chinese ruling elite are coded as belonging to the all-dominant Chinese Communist Party

[18]Specific surveys used are Africa South of the Sahara, Central South-Eastern Europe, Far East Australasia, Middle East North Africa, South Central America Caribbean

[19]Bértoa 2020.

[20]Camerlo and Martinez-Gallardom 2020.

[21]Bertoa (2020) and The Presidential Cabinets Project came to our awareness/were published late in the process, where we had already coded most of the countries covered in these with the use of other sources. We therefore mostly used these datasets to validate and double check our coding.

[22]Döring and Regel 2019.

[23]Döring and Manow 2019.

[24]Kollman et al. 2018.

[25]Henisz 2000.

[26]Volkens et al. 2018.

perceive the party as a new party when the party changes name or merges with another party. Here, we have relied on the information provided in Party Facts and therefore only coded a party as a new party if Party Facts does so.

Third, parties often form electoral coalitions, meaning that we can code a politician as belonging either to the coalition or the party. We have as a general rule tried to code politicians as belonging to the smallest unit, and researchers can then aggregate the ministers into coalitions if needed. For example, members of the *Barisan Nasional* in Malaysia are coded as belonging to either *the United Malays National Organisation*, *Malaysian Chinese Association* or *Malaysian Indian Congress*. We have been unable to do so in a few cases. An example is North Korea, where everyone is coded as belonging to *the Democratic Front for the Reunification of Korea* (DFRF). Officially, there are multiple parties in North Korea, who collectively form the DFRF, but we are unable to classify the ministers into the subunits of DFRF. We have noted the choices down below.

Fourth, in some countries, parties exist but play a minor role. Here, we find that party affiliation often isn't recorded in biographical information. This is especially an issue in presidential systems, where parties tend to be weaker.[27] Similarly, in a handful of cases, data is very sparse historically; and we know from historical documents that multiple parties are represented in government or that some members of government are independent, we therefore cannot make any assumptions and are unable to code many ministers.

[27] Samuels and Shugart 2010.

Appendix B

Chapter 3 Appendix

B.1 Dictatorial Spells Used in the Analysis

Country	Start Year	End Year
Afghanistan	1967	2016
Albania	1967	1990
Algeria	1967	2016
Angola	1977	2016
Argentina	1967	1973
Argentina	1977	1983
Azerbaijan	1993	2016
Bahrain	1972	2016
Bangladesh	1973	1985
Bangladesh	2008	2016
Belarus	1993	2016
Benin	1967	1990
Bhutan	1972	2007
Bolivia	1967	1982
Bosnia & Herzegovina	1993	2016
Brazil	1967	1984
Brunei	1985	2016
Bulgaria	1967	1989
Burkina Faso	1967	2016
Burundi	1967	1992
Burundi	1998	2005
Burundi	2016	2016
Cambodia	1967	2016
Cameroon	1967	2016

Cape Verde	1977	1990
Central African Republic	1967	1993
Central African Republic	2004	2016
Chad	1967	2016
Chile	1975	1989
China	1967	2016
Comoros	1977	1989
Comoros	1997	2003
Congo - Brazzaville	1967	1992
Congo - Brazzaville	1999	2016
Congo - Kinshasa	1967	2016
Cote d'Ivoire	1967	2016
Cuba	1967	2016
Cyprus	1967	1977
Czechia	1967	1989
Djibouti	1978	2016
Ecuador	1967	1979
Ecuador	2001	2002
Egypt	1967	2016
El Salvador	1967	1983
Equatorial Guinea	1971	2016
Eritrea	1994	2016
Ethiopia	1967	2016
Fiji	1972	1991
Fiji	2002	2016
Gabon	1967	2016
Gambia	1967	2016
Georgia	1993	2003
Ghana	1967	1969
Ghana	1973	1979
Ghana	1983	1992
Greece	1968	1974
Grenada	1980	1983
Guatemala	1983	1985
Guinea	1967	2010
Guinea-Bissau	1976	1999
Guinea-Bissau	2005	2005
Guinea-Bissau	2010	2014
Guyana	1967	1992

Guyana	1999	2011
Haiti	1967	2016
Honduras	1967	1970
Honduras	1974	1981
Hungary	1967	1989
Indonesia	1967	1999
Iran	1967	2016
Iraq	1967	2016
Jordan	1967	2016
Kazakhstan	1993	2016
Kenya	1967	1997
Kuwait	1967	2016
Kyrgyzstan	1993	2004
Laos	1967	2016
Lebanon	1976	2016
Lesotho	1968	2011
Liberia	1967	2005
Liberia	2013	2016
Libya	1967	2016
Madagascar	1967	1992
Madagascar	2010	2016
Malawi	1967	1993
Malaysia	1967	2008
Maldives	1967	2008
Maldives	2015	2016
Mali	1967	1991
Mauritania	1967	2006
Mauritania	2010	2016
Mexico	1967	2000
Mongolia	1967	1989
Montenegro	2007	2016
Morocco	1967	2016
Mozambique	1976	2016
Myanmar (Burma)	1967	2016
Namibia	1991	2016
Nepal	1967	1990
Nepal	2003	2005
Nicaragua	1967	1989
Niger	1967	1992

Niger	1997	1999
Nigeria	1967	1979
Nigeria	1985	1998
North Korea	1967	2016
Oman	1967	2016
Pakistan	1967	1971
Pakistan	1978	1988
Pakistan	2001	2008
Panama	1970	1989
Paraguay	1967	1988
Peru	1970	1980
Peru	1992	2000
Philippines	1967	1985
Poland	1967	1989
Portugal	1967	1975
Qatar	1972	2016
Romania	1967	1989
Russia	1993	2016
Rwanda	1967	2016
Sao Tome & Principe	1976	1990
Saudi Arabia	1967	2016
Senegal	1967	1999
Serbia	1998	2000
Sierra Leone	1968	1995
Singapore	1967	2016
Somalia	1971	2016
South Africa	1967	2016
South Korea	1967	1987
South Sudan	2013	2016
Spain	1967	1976
Sri Lanka	1979	1988
Sudan	1970	1985
Sudan	1990	2016
Suriname	1981	1987
Swaziland	1970	2016
Syria	1967	2016
Taiwan	1967	1999
Tajikistan	1993	2016
Tanzania	1967	2016

Thailand	1967	1974
Thailand	1978	1979
Thailand	1992	1992
Thailand	2008	2008
Thailand	2015	2016
Togo	1967	2016
Tunisia	1967	2011
Turkey	1982	1983
Turkey	2016	2016
Turkmenistan	1993	2016
Uganda	1967	1980
Uganda	1987	2016
United Arab Emirates	1973	2016
Uruguay	1976	1984
Uzbekistan	1993	2016
Vietnam	1977	2016
Yemen	1967	2016
Zambia	1967	1991
Zambia	1998	2011
Zimbabwe	1982	2016

B.2 % female cabinet, 1991 to 2021: Comparing electoral democracies and autocracies




Figure B.1: Linear regression models by year of % female cabinet where electoral democracies (EDs) are compared to electoral autocracies (EAs). EDs and EAs are identified using V-Dem and data on % female cabinet is from WhoGov. Thick (thin) bars represent 90 (95) percent confidence intervals.

Appendix C

Chapter 4 Appendix

C.1 Democratic Spells Used in the Analysis

Country	Start Year	End Year
Albania	1992	1995
Albania	1997	2015
Argentina	1974	1975
Argentina	1984	2015
Burundi	2006	2015
Benin	1991	2015
Bangladesh	2009	2013
Bangladesh	1991	2006
Bulgaria	1991	2015
Bolivia	1983	2015
Brazil	1985	2015
Central African Republic	1994	2002
Chile	1990	2015
Comoros	2006	2015
Cape Verde	1991	2015
Cyprus	1978	2015
Czechia	1990	2015
Ecuador	2003	2015
Ecuador	1980	1999
Spain	1976	2015
Fiji	2014	2015
Georgia	2004	2015
Ghana	1970	1971
Ghana	1980	1981

Ghana	1997	2015
Gambia	1972	1994
Guinea-Bissau	1994	1998
Greece	1975	2015
Grenada	1984	2015
Guatemala	1986	2015
Guyana	1993	2015
Honduras	2010	2015
Honduras	1971	1972
Honduras	1982	2008
Croatia	2000	2015
Hungary	1991	2015
Indonesia	2000	2015
Kenya	2003	2015
South Korea	1988	2015
Lebanon	1971	1976
Liberia	2006	2015
Sri Lanka	1991	2009
Lesotho	2002	2015
Madagascar	1993	2008
Maldives	2009	2011
Mexico	2001	2015
Mali	1992	2012
Mongolia	1990	2015
Mozambique	1995	2004
Malawi	1994	2015
Niger	2000	2009
Niger	2011	2015
Niger	1993	1995
Nigeria	2015	2015
Nigeria	1980	1983
Nicaragua	1984	2015
Nepal	2008	2015
Nepal	1991	2000
Pakistan	2009	2015
Pakistan	1972	1976
Pakistan	1989	1999
Panama	1990	2015
Peru	2001	2015

Peru	1981	1990
Philippines	1986	2015
Poland	1989	2015
Portugal	1976	2015
Paraguay	2004	2015
Romania	1990	2015
Senegal	2000	2015
Sierra Leone	2002	2015
El Salvador	1984	2015
Suriname	1988	1990
Suriname	1992	2015
Thailand	2012	2013
Thailand	1975	1975
Thailand	1983	1990
Thailand	1992	2006
Tunisia	2015	2015
Turkey	1984	2015
Taiwan	1996	2015
Uganda	1981	1985
Uruguay	1985	2015
South Africa	1994	2015
Zambia	2009	2015

C.2 Authoritarian Successor Parties (ASP) Coded

Time Period	ASP (N = No ASP in period)
ALB 92-95	Communist Party of Albania / Party of Labour of Albania / Socialist Party of Albania
ALB 97-NA	Democratic Party of Albania
ARG 74-75	N
ARG 84-NA	N
BGD 91-06	Jatiya Party (Ershad)
BGD 09-13	N
BEN 91-NA	People's Revolutionary Party of Benin
BOL 83-NA	N
BRA 85-NA	National Renewal Alliance / Democratic Social Party
BGR 91-NA	Bulgarian Communist Party
BDI 06-NA	Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU)
CPV 91-NA	African Party of Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV)
CAF 94-02	Central African Democratic Rally
CHL 90-NA	N
COM 06-NA	N
HRV 00-NA	Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)
CYP 78-NA	N
CZE 90-NA	Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
ECU 80-99	N
ECU 03-NA	Popular Democracy / Christian Democratic Union
SLV 84-NA	Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA)
FJI 14-NA	N
GEO 04-NA	Union of Citizens of Georgia (SMK)
GHA 70-71	N
GHA 80-81	N
GHA 97-NA	National Democratic Congress (NDC)
GRC 75-NA	N
GRD 84-NA	New Jewel Movement
GTM 86-NA	N
GNB 94-98	African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC)
GUY 93-NA	People's National Congress
HND 71-72	National Party of Honduras
HND 82-08	N
HND 10-NA	N

HUN 91-NA	Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party
IDN 00-NA	Golkar (Party of the Functional Groups)
KEN 03-NA	Kenya African National Union
LBN 71-76	N
LSO 02-NA	Lesotho Congress for Democracy
LBR 06-NA	National Patriotic Party (NPP)
MDG 93-08	Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution (Arema) / Association for the Rebirth of Madagascar (AREMA)
MWI 94-NA	Malawi Congress Party
MDV 09-11	Maldivian People's Party (Dhivehi Rayyithunge Party, DRP)
MLI 92-12	Democratic Union of the Malian People
MEX 01-NA	National Revolutionary Party / Mexican Revolutionary Party / Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
MNG 90-NA	Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party
MOZ 95-04	Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO)
NPL 91-00	N
NPL 08-NA	N
NIC 84-NA	Sandinista National Liberation Front
NER 93-95	National Movement for the Development of Society (MNSD)
NER 00-09	National Union of Independents for Democratic Renewal (UNIRD) / Rally for Democracy and Progress (RDP)
NER 11-NA	N
NGA 80-83	N
NGA 15-NA	People's Democratic Party [Nigeria]
PAK 72-76	N
PAK 89-99	N
PAK 09-NA	Pakistan Muslim League (Q)
PAN 90-NA	Democratic Revolutionary Party
PRY 04-NA	Republican National Association - Colorado Party (ANR-PC)
PER 81-90	N
PER 01-NA	Cambio 90 / Peru 2000
PHL 86-NA	New Society Movement (KBL)
POL 89-NA	Polish United Worker's Party (PZPR)
PRT 76-NA	National Union / National Popular Action
ROU 90-NA	Romanian Workers' Party (PMR) / Romanian Communist Party (PCR)
SEN 00-NA	Senegalese Progressive Union / Socialist Party of Senegal (PS)
SLE 02-NA	Sierra Leone People's Party
ZAF 94-NA	National Party [South Africa]

KOR 88-NA	Democratic Justice Party (DJP)
ESP 76-NA	Falange (FET-JONS)
LKA 91-09	United National Party (UNP)
SUR 88-90	N
SUR 92-NA	National Democratic Party (NDP)
TWN 96-NA	Kuomintang
THA 75-75	N
THA 83-90	N
THA 92-06	N
THA 12-13	People's Power Party
GMB 72-94	People's Progressive Party
TUN 15-NA	Ennahdha Party (Renaissance Party)
TUR 84-NA	N
UGA 81-85	Uganda People's Congress
URY 85-NA	N
ZMB 09-NA	Movement for Multi-party Democracy

C.3 Alternative Model Specifications

This section reruns the control specification of models 1 to 8 in the analysis using two different modelling specifications. The first uses linear regression models to predict proportional authoritarian influence. The second uses negative binomial models to predict the number of portfolios assigned to members of the previous authoritarian elite (models 1 to 4) and members of authoritarian successor parties (models 5 to 8).

Table C.3: Linear Regression Models of Authoritarian Influence in Core Cabinet Positions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Capital Share (FY)	-0.0014*	-0.0017**	-0.0014*	-0.0017**	-0.0042*	-0.0021	-0.0042*	-0.0021
	(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.0024)	(0.0022)	(0.0025)	(0.0023)
GDP Per Capita (FY)	-0.0000*	-0.0000	-0.0000*	-0.0000	-0.0000	0.0000	-0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Δ GDP Per Capita t	0.0000*	0.0000	0.0000*	0.0000	-0.0000***	-0.0000**	-0.0000***	-0.0000**
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Growth ($\bar{A}$)	-0.0064**	-0.0063*	-0.0065**	-0.0064*	0.0080	0.0167**	0.0079	0.0166**
	(0.0028)	(0.0032)	(0.0029)	(0.0033)	(0.0074)	(0.0083)	(0.0076)	(0.0084)
Protest Level ($\bar{A}$)	-0.0157**	-0.0163**	-0.0163**	-0.0169**	0.0464**	0.0348	0.0466**	0.0352
	(0.0071)	(0.0075)	(0.0072)	(0.0077)	(0.0208)	(0.0229)	(0.0209)	(0.0231)
Political Equality ($\hat{A}$)	-0.0102	-0.0052	-0.0096	-0.0047	-0.0053	-0.0287	-0.0053	-0.0287
	(0.0115)	(0.0128)	(0.0119)	(0.0132)	(0.0288)	(0.0328)	(0.0294)	(0.0335)
Δ Political Equality t	0.0021	0.0010	0.0019	0.0009	-0.0760*	-0.1101***	-0.0756*	-0.1097**
	(0.0137)	(0.0143)	(0.0139)	(0.0145)	(0.0389)	(0.0425)	(0.0393)	(0.0430)
Parliamentary	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Presidential	-0.0332	-0.0345	-0.0337	-0.0345	0.0954	0.0443	0.0959	0.0448
	(0.0252)	(0.0282)	(0.0253)	(0.0284)	(0.0633)	(0.0783)	(0.0643)	(0.0794)
Mixed	-0.0319	-0.0398	-0.0332	-0.0410	0.0704	0.0516	0.0716	0.0528
	(0.0267)	(0.0263)	(0.0270)	(0.0266)	(0.0531)	(0.0526)	(0.0539)	(0.0534)
Majoritarian	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Proportional	-0.0545**	-0.0271	-0.0557**	-0.0284	-0.1102	-0.0643	-0.1100	-0.0642
	(0.0234)	(0.0257)	(0.0236)	(0.0260)	(0.0763)	(0.0779)	(0.0772)	(0.0791)
Mixed	-0.0138	-0.0029	-0.0148	-0.0038	-0.1134	-0.0990	-0.1116	-0.0975
	(0.0235)	(0.0244)	(0.0240)	(0.0248)	(0.0829)	(0.0806)	(0.0836)	(0.0814)
Federal System	-0.0062	-0.0070	-0.0071	-0.0078	-0.0800**	-0.0930**	-0.0793*	-0.0924**
	(0.0184)	(0.0180)	(0.0191)	(0.0187)	(0.0395)	(0.0397)	(0.0405)	(0.0406)
Duration (A)	0.0002	0.0003*	0.0002	0.0003*	-0.0003	0.0000	-0.0003	0.0000
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)
Region Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Time Cubic Polynomial	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Time Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	.1048	.1178	.1171	.1297	.1592	.1882	.1640	.1928
Observations	1,327	1,327	1,327	1,327	1,327	1,327	1,327	1,327

Standard Errors Clustered by Government in Parentheses; Constant Not Reported; FY = Final Year; PA = Previous Autocracy.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C.4: Negative Binomial Models of Authoritarian Influence in Core Cabinet Positions

	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Capital Share (FY)	-0.0134	-0.0148	-0.0146*	-0.0153	-0.0085	0.0082	-0.0079	0.0098
	(0.0086)	(0.0102)	(0.0084)	(0.0101)	(0.0119)	(0.0117)	(0.0119)	(0.0118)
GDP Per Capita (FY)	-0.0000*	-0.0000	-0.0000**	-0.0000	-0.0000	0.0001**	-0.0000	0.0001*
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Δ GDP Per Capita t	0.0001*	0.0000	0.0001*	0.0000	-0.0001**	-0.0001**	-0.0001**	-0.0001***
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Growth ($\bar{A}$)	-0.0583*	-0.0614*	-0.0558*	-0.0573*	0.0527	0.1489***	0.0529	0.1523***
	(0.0313)	(0.0333)	(0.0307)	(0.0324)	(0.0464)	(0.0559)	(0.0464)	(0.0562)
Protest Level ($\bar{A}$)	-0.1398*	-0.1600*	-0.1505*	-0.1739**	0.1903**	0.0186	0.1994**	0.0260
	(0.0834)	(0.0871)	(0.0830)	(0.0868)	(0.0956)	(0.1187)	(0.0961)	(0.1183)
Political Equality ($\hat{A}$)	-0.3386***	-0.3172**	-0.3501***	-0.3290***	-0.3247**	-0.4381***	-0.3498**	-0.4671***
	(0.1172)	(0.1258)	(0.1192)	(0.1245)	(0.1581)	(0.1540)	(0.1577)	(0.1544)
Δ Political Equality t	-0.0624	-0.1978	-0.1035	-0.2466*	-0.5220***	-0.7453***	-0.5217***	-0.7441***
	(0.1359)	(0.1342)	(0.1347)	(0.1306)	(0.1861)	(0.1901)	(0.1836)	(0.1862)
Parliamentary	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Presidential	-0.5170**	-0.5932**	-0.4971**	-0.5558**	0.0259	-0.1229	0.0387	-0.1146
	(0.2252)	(0.2547)	(0.2172)	(0.2483)	(0.3509)	(0.4069)	(0.3475)	(0.4007)
Mixed	-0.2804	-0.4548*	-0.2806	-0.4326*	0.5767	0.3303	0.6004	0.3657
	(0.2488)	(0.2522)	(0.2340)	(0.2343)	(0.3908)	(0.3809)	(0.3907)	(0.3819)
Majoritarian	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Proportional	-0.6047***	-0.1511	-0.6332***	-0.1762	-0.6815***	-0.3666	-0.6419**	-0.3382
	(0.2079)	(0.2281)	(0.2026)	(0.2264)	(0.2587)	(0.3036)	(0.2554)	(0.3042)
Mixed	0.1232	0.2243	0.1145	0.2107	-0.1244	-0.1092	-0.0590	-0.0514
	(0.2111)	(0.2199)	(0.2127)	(0.2205)	(0.3357)	(0.3524)	(0.3332)	(0.3526)
Federal System	-0.2891	-0.3378*	-0.2578	-0.3043*	-1.0718***	-1.1166***	-1.0410***	-1.0878***
	(0.1879)	(0.1787)	(0.1889)	(0.1781)	(0.2753)	(0.2820)	(0.2714)	(0.2795)
Duration (A)	0.0008	0.0031**	0.0007	0.0031**	0.0015	0.0059**	0.0015	0.0059**
	(0.0012)	(0.0015)	(0.0012)	(0.0015)	(0.0023)	(0.0025)	(0.0023)	(0.0025)
Region Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Time Cubic Polynomial	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Time Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Log-Likelihood	-2525.09	-2498.519	-2504.34	-2476.609	-2856.565	-2814.967	-2850.925	-2808.933
AIC	5086.18	5039.037	5118.68	5069.219	5749.13	5671.935	5811.849	5733.866
Observations	1,327	1,327	1,327	1,327	1,327	1,327	1,327	1,327

Standard Errors Clustered by Government in Parentheses; Constant Not Reported; FY = Final Year; PA = Previous Autocracy.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix D

Chapter 5 Appendix

D.1 List of Ethnic Groups Identified in Afrobarometer

Country	EPR Group Name
Benin	Southeastern (Yoruba/Nagot and Goun)
Benin	Northern (Bariba, Peul, Ottamari, Yoa-Lokpa, Dendi, GourmanchÃ©ma)
Benin	Southwestern (Adja)
Benin	South/Central (Fon)
Botswana	Yeyi
Botswana	Tswapong
Botswana	Tswana
Botswana	Birwa
Botswana	Kalanga
Botswana	Mbukushu
Botswana	Kgalagadi
Botswana	Herero/Mbanderu
Botswana	White
Cameroon	Beti (and related peoples)
Cameroon	Bamileke
Cameroon	Bassa/Duala
Cameroon	Fulani (and other northern Muslim peoples)
Cote d'Ivoire	Southern Mande
Cote d'Ivoire	Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur)
Cote d'Ivoire	Kru
Cote d'Ivoire	Other Akans
Gabon	Eshira/Bapounou
Gabon	Myene

Gabon	Fang
Gabon	Mbede (Nzebi, Bateke, Obamba)
Ghana	Northern Groups (Mole-Dagbani, Gurma, Grusi)
Ghana	Ga-Adangbe
Ghana	Asante (Akan)
Ghana	Ewe
Ghana	Other Akans
Guinea	Susu
Guinea	Peul
Guinea	Malinke
Kenya	Luhya
Kenya	Luo
Kenya	Kikuyu-Meru-Emb
Kenya	Kalenjin-Masai-Turkana-Samburu
Kenya	Kamba
Kenya	Mijikenda
Kenya	Somali
Kenya	Kisii
Liberia	Gio
Liberia	Mano
Liberia	Americo-Liberians
Malawi	Northerners (Tumbuka, Tonga, Ngonde)
Malawi	Central (Chewa)
Malawi	Southerners (Lomwe, Mang'anja, Nyanja, Yao)
Mali	Arabs/Moors
Mali	Tuareg
Mali	Blacks (Mande, Peul, Voltaic etc.)
Mozambique	Makonde-Yao
Mozambique	Shona-Ndau
Mozambique	Tsonga-Chopi
Namibia	San
Namibia	Coloreds
Namibia	Basubia
Namibia	Kavango
Namibia	Mafwe
Namibia	Nama
Namibia	Herero, Mbanderu
Namibia	Baster
Namibia	Damara

Namibia	Ovambo
Namibia	Whites
Niger	Hausa
Niger	Kanouri
Niger	Djerma-Songhai
Niger	Toubou
Niger	Tuareg
Nigeria	Ogoni
Nigeria	Yoruba
Nigeria	Igbo
Nigeria	Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt
Nigeria	Tiv
Nigeria	Ijaw
Senegal	Diola
Senegal	Mandingue (and other eastern groups)
Senegal	Wolof
Senegal	Serer
Senegal	Pulaar (Peul, Toucouleur)
Sierra Leone	Mende
Sierra Leone	Creole
Sierra Leone	Kono
Sierra Leone	Temne
South Africa	Xhosa
South Africa	South Sotho
South Africa	Venda
South Africa	Asians
South Africa	Ndebele
South Africa	Zulu
South Africa	English Speakers
South Africa	Tswana
South Africa	Swazi
South Africa	Afrikaners
South Africa	Tsonga
Togo	Ewe (and related groups)
Togo	KabrÃÂ© (and related groups)
Uganda	Langi/Acholi
Uganda	Kakwa-Nubian
Uganda	Basoga
Uganda	Baganda

Uganda	Karamojong
Zambia	Nyanja speakers (Easterners)
Zambia	Luvale (NW Province)
Zambia	Bemba speakers
Zambia	Lunda (NW Province)
Zambia	Kaonde (NW Province)
Zambia	Lozi (Barotse)
Zambia	Tonga-Ila-Lenje (Southerners)
Zimbabwe	White Zimbabweans
Zimbabwe	Shona
Zimbabwe	Ndebele-Kalanga-(Tonga)

D.2 Support for Varieties of Authoritarian Rule

Variable	Question Wording	Answers
Reject One-Party Rule	"Our current system of governing with regular elections and more than one political party is not the only one [COUNTRY] has ever had. Some people say that we would be better off if we had a different system of government. How much would you disapprove, neither disapprove nor approve, or approve of the following alternatives to our current system of government with at least two political parties and regular elections: If only one political party, or candidates from only one party, were allowed to stand for elections and hold office. OR Some people say that we would be better off if the country was governed differently. What do you think about the following options: We should have only one political party? OR There are many ways to govern a country. What do you think about the following options: We should have only one political party?	Strongly disapprove Disapprove Neither approve nor disapprove Approve Strongly approve Don't know (DNR) OR Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree Don't know (DNR)

Variable	Question Wording	Answers
Reject Military Rule	Our current system of governing with regular elections and more than one political party is not the only one [COUNTRY] has ever had. Some people say that we would be better off if we had a different system of government. How much would you disapprove/neither disapprove nor approve, or approve of the following alternatives to our current system of government with at least two political parties and regular elections: If the army came in to govern the country? OR Some people say that we would be better off if the country was governed differently. What do you think about the following options: The army should come in to govern the country? OR There are many ways to govern a country. What do you think about the following options: The army should come in to govern the country?	Strongly disapprove Disapprove Neither approve nor disapprove Approve Strongly approve Don't know (DNR) OR Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree Don't know (DNR)

Variable	Question Wording	Answers
Reject One-Man Rule	Our current system of governing with regular elections and more than one political party is not the only one [COUNTRY] has ever had. Some people say that we would be better off if we had a different system of government. How much would you disapprove, neither disapprove nor approve, or approve of the following alternatives to our current system of government with at least two political parties and regular elections: If parliament and political parties were abolished, so that the president could decide everything? OR Some people say that we would be better off if the country was governed differently. What do you think about the following options: We should get rid of elections so that a strong leader can decide everything? OR There are many ways to govern a country. What do you think about the following options: We should get rid of elections so that a strong leader can decide everything?	Strongly disapprove Disapprove Neither approve nor disapprove Approve Strongly approve Don't know (DNR) OR Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree Don't know (DNR)

	Single-Party	Military	One-Man
Female	0.0226**	0.0191***	0.0197***
	(0.0103)	(0.00476)	(0.00517)
Urban	-0.288***	-0.199***	-0.196***
	(0.0302)	(0.0263)	(0.0388)
Logged Age	-0.170***	-0.164***	-0.194***
	(0.0398)	(0.0317)	(0.0348)
Post-Secondary	-0.602***	-0.381***	-0.426***
	(0.0680)	(0.0682)	(0.0576)
Logged Group Size	0.0170	0.00982	0.115***
	(0.0277)	(0.0376)	(0.0404)
High Income	-0.0523	-0.0780	0.0384
	(0.0900)	(0.0815)	(0.0771)
Low Income	-0.0696	0.0831	0.0394
	(0.0669)	(0.0820)	(0.0790)
Logged Peace Years	0.0657	0.104***	0.0677
	(0.0526)	(0.0391)	(0.0660)
Country Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log-Likelihood	-47482.8	-45787.0	-33129.9
# Groups	109	109	109
# Observations	106,397	106,070	104,917

Table D.2: Binary logit models of support for varieties of autocracy. Coefficients reported with standard errors clustered by ethnic group. Stars indicate statistical significance at the 10 (*), 5 (**) and 1 (***) percent level. Constant not reported.

D.3 Is majority rule important for democracy?

Variable	Question Wording	Answers
Democratic Society and Majority Rule	People associate democracy with many diverse meanings such as the ones I will mention now. In order for a society to be called democratic, is each of these: Majority rule? OR	Absolutely essential Important Not very important Not important at all Don't know (DNR) OR
	People associate democracy with many different meanings such as the ones I will mention now. In order for a society to be called democratic, how important is each of these: The majority rules?	Very important Important Not very important Not at all important Don't know (DNR)

	1 to 4 scale	Very Important = 1	≥ Important = 1
Female	-0.00427	-0.00598	-0.00124
	(0.00337)	(0.00496)	(0.00490)
Urban	-0.0446	-0.0556	-0.00798
	(0.0768)	(0.0735)	(0.140)
Logged Age	-0.0155	-0.000197	-0.0402
	(0.0714)	(0.0659)	(0.112)
Post-Secondary	0.282**	0.352***	0.00184
	(0.127)	(0.134)	(0.129)
Logged Group Size	0.158	0.128	0.253*
	(0.101)	(0.0962)	(0.145)
High Income	-0.149	-0.266	0.119
	(0.305)	(0.343)	(0.476)
Low Income	-0.164	-0.228	-0.0300
	(0.234)	(0.227)	(0.302)
Logged Peace Years	0.0457	0.204	-0.289
	(0.304)	(0.378)	(0.309)
Logit Model	Ordinal	Binary	Binary
Country Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log-Likelihood	-10491.6	-6832.7	-3803.0
# Groups	37	37	37
# Observations	10,211	10,211	10,211

Table D.3: Logit models of the importance of majority rule. Coefficients reported with standard errors clustered by ethnic group. Stars indicate statistical significance at the 10 (*), 5 (**) and 1 (***) percent level. Constant not reported.

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